The

. Marunouchi
Edited by
Kees Christaanse
Anna Gasco
Naomi C. Hanakata

nghai . Lujiazui
Grand
West Kowloon
rina Bay Area
Projet
urg . HafenCity
s . La Défense
arcelona . 22@
Understanding the
Making and Impact of
Contributions from
Pablo Acebillo

. King’s Cross
Urban Megaprojects Kees Christiaanse
Anna Gasco
Naomi C. Hanakata
Ying Zhou
nai010 publishers and others
 MNU–T

LJZ–S

WK–H

MBA–S
The Grand Projet
CURRENT/PRE-INTERVENTION BASE PLAN
Site Boundary: Area of the case study.
Building Footprint (In Site): The area
within a project site used by the build­
ing structure.
Building Footprint, Projected (In Site):
The area within a project site intended
to be used by the building structure
when the plan is built and completed.
Building Footprint (Surrounding): The
area surrounding a project site used by
the building structure.
Water Bodies: Any significant accumu­
lation of water, including lakes, ponds,
seas and rivers.
Softscape: Any open piece of land that
is undeveloped (no buildings or other
TRANSPORTATION PLAN

Highway/Freeway: Major road linking
large towns. Includes toll roads and
roads for truck mobility. Usually dedi­
cated to higher speed traffic.
Highway/Freeway, Projected: Area in­
tended to be used as highway/freeway
when the plan is built and completed.
Primary Road: Major roads expected
to support large volumes of traffic.
Secondary Road: A road with a lower
speed limit than that assigned to high­
ways and primary roads. Includes local
streets and collector lanes.
Railway: Any on-ground railway track.
built structures) and often accessible
to the public. Includes parks, gardens,
plazas and playgrounds. Related to the
live horticultural elements and perme­
able surface of open spaces, which in­
clude parks, ponds and gardens.
Softscape, Projected (In Site): The area
within the project site intended to be
used as softscape when the plan is built
and completed.
Hardscape: Represents inanimate com­
ponents of an open space, including
plaza paver stones, public seating areas
and paved playgrounds.
Hardscape, Projected (In Site): The area
within the project site intended to be
used as hardscape when the project is
completed.

Underground Railway: Any railway track
below ground.

Bikeway: Bike path. Includes paths with
protected, separated and/or shared (with
other motorised and pedestrian traffic)
lanes.
Pedestrian Way: Includes footpaths and
lanes dedicated to pedestrian use.

Waterway: Any route for travel by water,
especially by ferry.
Bike Station
Bus Station
Ferry Station
Train Station
PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE OPEN SPACE PLAN
Softscape: Publicly accessible soft­
scape within the case study.
Hardscape: Publicly accessible hard­
scape within the case study.
HERITAGE STRUCTURE
Heritage (In Site): Any structure within
a site whose premises, in any capacity,
convey that place’s history and culture,
via its preservation, architecture, aesthet­
ics, environment and/or craftsmanship.
PROGRAMME PLAN
Residential: An area predominantly com­
posed of housing.
Business: The area intended for use by
for-profit entities, mostly those dealing
with goods and services. Includes of­
fice space and convention centre(s).
Commercial: The area intended for use
by for-profit owners, with a focus on trade-­
related activities. Includes retail, food
and beverage and hotel programmes.
Civic: The area frequently visited by the
public; it may provide public services.
Includes school, university, library and
medical facilities as well as government
institutions.
Industrial: Areas intended to support
industrial activity, such as factories and
warehouses.
Pedestrian Friendly Zone: Space where
pedestrian activity is high and encour­
aged and vehicle volumes are either low
or temporarily discouraged.
Heritage (Surrounding): Heritage struc­
ture(s) within the surrounding area that
highly impact(s) the case study.
Technical Utilities: All utility facilities in
the area, including transport stations
(with no mix of commercial or other pro­
grammes), heating and cooling ameni­
ties, power stations, parking garages,
etc.
Mixed-Use: A type of area that physi­
cally and functionally integrates com­
mercial, business and residential land
use.
Ground Floor with Commercial & Busi­
ness: Any area with a ground floor ded­
icated to commercial and business ac­
tivities. Includes apartments, airports
and train stations with retail programmes
on the ground floor.
Deck (for La Défense): Elevated plaza/
slab consisting of seven storeys of utility
services.
The
Edited by
Kees Christaanse
Anna Gasco
Naomi C. Hanakata

Grand Projet Understanding the

Making and Impact of
Urban Megaprojects
Contributions from
Pablo Acebillo
Kees Christiaanse
Anna Gasco
Naomi C. Hanakata
Ying Zhou
and others nai010 publishers
 8 PREFACE 24 A Theoretical Framework for Analysis 325 LA DÉFENSE PARIS LD–P
Kees Christiaanse Naomi C. Hanakata, Anna Gasco, 345 New Urban Paradigm
Pablo Acebillo and Kees Christiaanse Anna Gasco
11 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS REFERENCE CASE STUDIES
Anna Gasco and Naomi C. Hanakata 33 COVERSATION SERIES 386 Île Seguin
35 In Conversation with Peter Bishop 387 Rive Gauche
13 INTRODUCTION 38 ——— Alessandra Cianchetta
15 Understanding the Making and Impact 41 ——— Dieter Läpple 389 22@ BARCELONA 22@–B
of Grands Projets 44 ——— Peter Rowe 409 Incremental Growth of a New Downtown
Naomi C. Hanakata and Anna Gasco 47 ——— Paul Tange and Michael Thanner Pablo Acebillo
REFERENCE CASE STUDIES
449 Forum Area
450 Sagrera Station
451 Europe Square

51 CASE STUDY PORTRAITS 453 KING’S CROSS LONDON KX–L

467 New Piece of Old London
53 MARUNOUCHI TOKYO MNU–T Anna Gasco
67 Continuous Update of a Modern Urban Vision REFERENCE CASE STUDIES
Naomi C. Hanakata 506 Canary Wharf
REFERENCE CASE STUDIES 507 Paddington
102 Shibuya Station 508 Battersea Nine-Elms
103 Roppongi Hills 509 Broadgate

105 LUJIAZUI SHANGHAI   LJZ–S

119 Urban Paragon for a Post-Socialist China
Ying Zhou
REFERENCE CASE STUDY 511 FURTHER INSIGHTS 525 Continuing Marunouchi: 130 Years
146 Hongqiao 513 The Making of Marina Bay of Urban Design Innovation
 Fun Siew Leng and Koki Miyachi and Noboru Kawagishi
149 WEST KOWLOON HONG KONG WK–H Andrew David Fassam 531 Designing the City as an Infrastructure:
163 A Transport-Oriented Development with Culture 519 The 22@ Project and its Revision La Défense
Ying Zhou and Desmond Choi Ramón García-Bragado Virginie Picon-Lefebvre
REFERENCE CASE STUDY
196 Kowloon East
537 C OMPARATIVE ASPECTS
199 MARINA BAY AREA SINGAPORE MBA–S 539  he ‘Bordering’ Practices of Grands Projets 573 
T Grand Projets and Modelling Practices
219 Building an Image for Singapore Anna Gasco Naomi C. Hanakata
Kees Christiaanse and Lei-Ya Wong 551 Urban Catalysts in Grands Projets 586 Spatial Regulatory Plans
REFERENCE CASE STUDIES Pablo Acebillo Anna Gasco
258 One-North 562 The Grand Projet as a Centrality
259 Jurong Lake District Naomi C. Hanakata

261 HAFENCITY HAMBURG HC–H

281 New City for the City 601 CONCLUSION 615 APPENDIX
Naomi C. Hanakata 603 The Potential of Grands Projets for 617 Biographies
REFERENCE CASE STUDY Inclusive and Adaptable Future Cities 621 Credits
322 IBA Anna Gasco and Naomi C. Hanakata 637 Colophon

6 7
 PREFACE
Kees Christiaanse
In 1983, I worked at OMA on the competition for the Parc de La Villette in
Paris. Even though we did not have the opportunity to realise the project ​
— ​despite placing first in the starting round ​— ​it compelled me to enter the
world of Grands Projets by Francois Mitterrand. As a follow-up to the com-
petition, I worked on various projects, such as the Exposition Universelle
(1989), and prior to leaving OMA, we secured the tender for Euralille, Lille’s
high-speed railway quarter uniting Paris, Brussels and London.
Coming from the Netherlands, with its tradition of centralised
planning to accommodate many people on a limited surface, we were not
intimidated by such a project’s scale. Rather than approaching the massive
programme for the Parc de La Villette literally, we developed a catalogue
of programme types with associated space types, which were organised in
a flexible urban design framework. It was the first project of its kind that I
had encountered, one that required a sustainable, robust public space frame
that could address changing circumstances and an open-ended future with-
out sacrificing design quality. At the same time, I was involved in the Dutch
urban renewal and social housing culture of the post-1970s participation
society, which included the squatter movement and protests against large-
scale projects like the Amsterdam metro-system.
In 1991, I became one of the designers for Amsterdam Waterfront,
a comprehensive public-private partnership between the city of Amsterdam
and a bank consortium, established to redevelop the centre’s seven-­kilometre
southern waterfront. Politically, the project was highly controversial, con-
stituting a struggle between Amsterdam’s first top-down attempt towards
a global city and its traditional social-democratic planning culture. Here,
I understood the importance of a designer’s various skills, particularly the
ability to moderate various interest groups, ranging from investors and
regional politicians to grassroots politicians and local residents. More impor-
tantly, I became aware that large-scale urban interventions, or urban meg-
aprojects, are often inevitable. They have also historically created (re-)
generative effects, which become key drivers of urban development, as in
Pope Sixtus’ interventions in fifteenth-century Rome, Haussmann’s trans-
formation of nineteenth-century Paris and the more recent evolution of
Singapore’s Marina Bay area.
In this creative, digital society, I see a developing reconciliation
between the traditional dialectics of conceptual and economic drivers and
urban megaprojects; this reconciliation is creating new synergies and com-
plementary values. Such complementarity is not self-evident. Since the
1850s Plan Hausmann in Paris, which evicted countless individuals and
8 9
demolished historic structures, there are still those projects ​— ​specifically
in places under authoritarian governments ​— ​in which delicate socio-eco-
nomic systems and valuable substances are destroyed.
My office’s 2000 appointment as Masterplanner for HafenCity in
Hamburg spoke to KCAP’s reputation for designing grand urban visions
and moderate long-term implementation processes. HafenCity became a
benchmark, leading us to develop a praxis of complex Grands Projets mas-
terplans, such as those for the Olympic Legacy in London and the Jurong
Lake District in Singapore. My work as chair at the Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology (ETH) in Zurich and the ETH-Future Cities Laboratory in
Singapore has since focused on investigating the nature of the Grand Projet
and teaching students how to design adaptive and inclusive projects in
complex situations, both in terms of process and physical components.
The research in this text investigates how Grands Projets are con-
ceived, designed, implemented and operated. It also examines their impact
within local and global contexts. In selecting our research case studies, it
became apparent to us that, despite similarities, Grands Projets are highly
specific to their local contexts. Thus, this research concerns not only gen-
eral characteristics but also differences. Projects may differ according to
the time of realisation, local politics, planning cultures or hard parameters,
like climate. Grands Projets tend to develop over a long period of time,
whereby some appear to be more adaptive than others. Whereas younger
European Grands Projets, like HafenCity or King’s Cross, have a built-in
flexibility and are more mixed in uses, older projects like La Défense have
required far-reaching redevelopment efforts to meet the demands of con-
temporary urban society. A project like 22@ concerns less design than it
does strategy, where the urban district transforms in an open-ended fashion
according to development principles and stakeholder forces. These all illus-
trate a certain diversification of Grands Projets over time, as knowledge of
changing urban conditions enables more adaptive design. In some projects,
like Marina Bay Area in Singapore, this changing perspective of urban design
principles is clearly visible in the successive districts implemented within
the area’s larger framework. This demonstrates the importance of a robust
public space framework as a foundational base for Grands Projets.
Grands Projets across the world form a network in which projects
mutually inform each other and establish new benchmarks. As such, they
are vital actors in the making of our cities and the global network in which
they are embedded.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Anna Gasco and Naomi C. Hanakata

The research of Grands Projets presented in this book was made possible
due to the extraordinary research facilities of the Future Cities Laboratory
(FCL) of the Singapore ETH Centre (SEC) and the support of the National
Research Foundation of Singapore. Both allowed us to develop a compre-
hensive framework for examining urban megaprojects from various angles
and in a comparative manner, which required continuous dialogue between
research team members.
The four-year timeframe of this research and multiple field trips
to each case study location enabled us to build relationships with local
contacts and colleagues studying and/or making urban megaprojects. We
are greatly indebted to all of these individuals for their insights and advice.
In particular, we would like to thank Peter Bishop, Jürgen Bruns-Berentelg,
Alessandra Cianchetta, Andrew David Fassam, Siew Leng Fun, Ramón
García-Bragado, Dieter Läpple, Peter G. Rowe, Paul Norita Tange, Michael
Thanner, Noboru Kawagishi, Koki Miyachi and Virginie Picon Lefebvre.
This complex research endeavour would not have been possible
without a dedicated core team and we would like to thank in particular
Kees Christiaanse, for his leadership and trust, Pablo Acebillo and Ying
Zhou, for their continuous commitment, as well as Dissa Pidanti Raras,
Desmond Choi, Felicia Lim and Lei Ya Wong. Many others supported
our efforts, including Dietmar Leyk, Joris Jehle and several interns. Last
but not least, this publication would not have taken shape without our
thorough reviewer Christian Salewski, our committed copy editor Kate
­McGunagle and talented cartographer and typographer Joost Grootens.

10 11
 Introduction

12 13 The Grand Projet

 UNDERSTANDING THE MAKING AND
IMPACT OF GRANDS PROJETS
Naomi C. Hanakata and Anna Gasco

This book examines the making and impact of urban megaprojects. Rising
above our cities, often with iconic architecture like the Shanghai Tower in
Lujiazui or La Grande Arche in Paris La Défense, urban megaprojects pro-
vide more than additional programmes to their existing built environments.
They frequently create a new image for their cities and a link to global
networks tied to the ground within their sites. As powerful drivers of urban
transformation, these megaprojects are an important component of our
cities today and trendsetters of urban development practice (Christiaanse,
Gasco, Hanakata 2018). The research this book presents refers to these
urban megaprojects as Grands Projets, emphasising their inherent notions
of power: both the power governing bodies hold over a project and the
power of these projects to profoundly impact and transform urban land-
scapes and the global perceptions of their cities.
Grands Projets are carefully laid-out urban developments; in many
cases, they are the direct translation of a city’s political and/or economic
objectives into an urban layout and morphology. They are comprehensively
planned, hosting a variety of uses, and are realised and/or operated under
the authority of a single or concerted governing body, often composed of
complex combinations of stakeholders. As newly built centralities, Grands
Projets function as urban landmarks, broadcasting ambitious project agen-
das to their surroundings. In most instances, they absorb primary local and
global investment capital and are driven by political interests, enabling
new or exceptional practices. Grands Projets host programmes and tenants
of acclaimed global relevance and, in doing so, impact local economies.
However, Grands Projets are not necessarily social centralities with a high
density of residences or intensity of visible activities; rather, they are the
result of highly controlled development processes and urban environments,
which require a meticulous determination of spaces, activities and tem-
poralities. Our research has found that Grands Projets’ number and size
have been increasing over the past decades and, with their growing pres-
ence and urban impact, pose many questions and challenges this research
strives to address. ​→ GP–IN.01
As comprehensively planned, large-scale urban development pro-
jects with a range of uses, Grands Projets are facilitated by a coordinated
application of capital and power. They have both advanced the develop-
ment of urban visions and initiated contestations over rights, access, power
and space. As such, they provide an interesting means of studying contem-
porary and future urban developments, the individuals who create these
and those who activate them. Indeed, examining a society through the lens
of its megaprojects might tell us something about its local and global ambi-
tions, challenges, dreams and disputes.

14 15 Introduction
In understanding the making and impact of urban megaprojects within their Colombo Port City
Madinat al-Hareer

local urban settings and global networks, an investigation of different geog-

Castellana Norte
Forest City
New Sao Paulo
raphies is requisite. This research examines eight cities across Asia and Masdar City
New City Istanbul
Europe: Tokyo, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Singapore, Hamburg, Paris, Barce- EuropaCity
Waterfall City

lona, and London. We have analysed one in-depth case study in each of Europa City
Khazar Island

these cities; the study of other reference projects within these same cities
Gracefield Island
Lippo Cikarang
New Cairo Capital
has furthered our understanding of our cases’ exceptionality within local Duqm, Sino-Oman Industrial City
Newhall Ranch

planning practices. Our primary case studies are anchored in different dec- Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco City
World Trade Center Area

ades spanning the past 130 years, thus presenting a range of development
Todtown
Eko Atlantic
King Abdullah Economic City
stages: Marunouchi in Tokyo and La Défense in Paris, for example, have Forest City
New Clark City

both undergone multiple cycles of redevelopment, whilst West Kowloon Hudson Yards District
Sunqiao

in Hong Kong and King’s Cross in London are currently 50% developed.
Dholera
Belmont
Gujarat International Finance Tec City
All projects are situated in distinct urban regimes and planning cultures, Tbilisi Sea New City
Rotterdam Central
making a transversal, comparative reading both challenging and enlight- Água Branca
Boston Marketplace

ening, as such a reading has enabled us to discover much common ground

Mexico City Airport
Donau City

amidst notable differences.

Bairro Novo
Atlantic Yards
West Side Rail Yards
The criteria for selecting our case studies include the international Shibuya Station
Battersea-Nine Elms

significance of these projects as paradigmatic urban developments and as Calcutta Riverside

Tianfu

centralities for various programmes and/or transport. The selection also

Dockland Intern Financial Service Center
Les Halles
Lippo Kaarawaci
incorporates a broad historical range of Grands Projets with diverse pro- Binhai New Area
Birmingham CBD

grammatic foci and private and public ownership constellations. This has Thames Gateway
Battery Park City

allowed us to unsettle assumptions about certain development conditions,

Songdo Smart City
Baltimore Inner Harbour
Maha Mumbai
such as the assumption that ownership affiliation to private or public bod- Palm Deira
Jurong Lake District
ies is determined by urban development models or intentions. The selected Amsterdam South East
Clichy-Batignolles

case studies ​→ GP–IN.02 ​of Marunouchi (Tokyo), Lujiazui (Shanghai), West

Al Sowwah Island Megaproject
Rogoredo Santa Giulia Megaproject
King’s Cross
Kowloon (Hong Kong), Marina Bay Area (Singapore), HafenCity (Ham- Dankuni Township
IBA Hamburg
burg), La Défense (Paris), 22@ (Barcelona) and King’s Cross (London), Sagrera Station
Wujin New District

provide a heterogeneous sampling of Grands Projets that has enabled us to Saadiyat Island
Kai-Tak

draw inferences relevant to our overarching research questions. Our pri-

Ile-Seguin
Afghan Ring Road
Palm Jebel Ali
oritisation of Asian and European geographies has also been driven by the MüPa
Moskva-City

location of our research team in Asia (FCL Singapore) and Europe (ETH Zhengdong New District
Orestaden

Zurich) and this team’s indispensable local expertise regarding urban devel-
Palm Jumeirah
One-North
22@
opment practice in these cities. HafenCity
Kop Van Zuid
The multidimensional complexity of Grands Projets requires a mix Bundang New Town
Roppongi Hills

of quantitative and qualitative research methods. Qualitative methods used

Europe Square
Lincoln Center
Kowloon East
in this research range from urban analysis, including detailed fieldwork, Expo 1998
Abandoibarra
to semi-structured interviews with a generous range of stakeholders. These Hanoi North
Forum Area

qualitative methods complement data gathered from government reports, Bonifacio Global City
Makati CBD

documents released by developing and/or operating agencies, local news-

Euralille
Adlershof
Muang Thong Thani
letters, statistical annals and scholarly literature. Quantitative measures Kuala Lumpur City Center
Lujiazui

include a survey of figures relevant to the planning of Grands Projets, such West Kowloon
Paris Rive Gauche

as built-up and floor area ratios, accessibility measures, programme quan-

Stuttgart 21
Ilsan New Town
Tsim Sha Tsui
tities, budgeting and development timeframes. Paddington
Canary Wharf

Through the analyses of our case studies, this research aims to Broadgate
Hongqiao

provide insights into the making and spatial implications of large-scale

Ayala Alabang
Centro Direzionale
Times Square
urban projects as agents of (re-)development in contemporary Asian and Marina Bay Area
EU District/European Quarter
European cities. Given the increase in speed and scale of urbanisation pro- La Défense
The South Bank

cesses around the globe, we argue that Grands Projets may hold answers
Olympic Village
Marunouchi

to some of the emerging challenges related to the future of our cities. 1890 1990 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040

GP–IN.01 Urban Megaprojects over the past 130 years illustrating the gradual > 1200 ha 201–400 ha
increase in number and size.
601–800 ha 0–200 ha

16 The Grand Projet 17 Introduction

401–600 ha N/A
Canary Wharf Paddington Battersea-Nine Elms Broadgate KX–L HC–H IBA LJZ–S Hongqiao MNU–T Roppongi Hills Shibuya Station
King’s Cross HafenCity Lujiazui Marunouchi
London, UK Hamburg, Germany Shanghai, China Tokyo, Japan

HafenCity

King’s Cross
La Défense

22@
Marunouchi

Lujiazui

West Kowloon

Marina Bay Area

LD–P 22@–B MBA–S WK–H

La Défense 22@ Marina Bay Area West Kowloon
Île Seguin Rive Gauche Paris, France Barcelona, Spain Forum Area Sagrera Station Europe Square Singapore One-North Jurong Lake District Hong Kong Kowloon East

GP–IN.02 Global map showing urban megaprojects including the case studies of this research.    In-depth case study
Location of reference case
study
Urban megaproject
mentioned in referred
literature

18 The Grand Projet 19 Introduction


GP–IN.03 The RCA building
stands out during the Rockefeller
Center complex construction
process in 1933.
GP–IN.04 Painting of the
Forbidden City in Beijing: a built
manifestation of cosmological
rules.
20 The Grand Projet
GRANDS PROJETS AS MIRRORS OF SOCIETAL DEVELOPMENT
The latest proliferation of urban megaprojects began in the early 1980s,
at a time when older Grands Projets like Marunouchi and La Défense were
entering new stages of redevelopment. This increase of Grands Projets’
developments can be attributed to various factors, including the revalori-
sation of urban centres that began in the late 1970s, which led to population
shifts within city regions and subsequent reprogramming of housing, ser-
vice infrastructures and amenities. Another factor is underpinned by the
emergence of neoliberal economics, a new regulatory regime that gave
greater power to private corporations in advancing urban development,
whether in the developmental states of China and Japan, social market
economy of Germany, mixed economies of France and Spain or the market
economies of Singapore and the United Kingdom.
The role of project agencies, composed of selected elites, is crucial
across our case studies. These agencies are equipped with great power and
multiple responsibilities in the development process and are granted an
exceptional status in local planning practices, which often allows them to
expedite implementation procedures. It is this configuration of power capac-
ities that creates new regimes of governance, of which Grands Projets are
a spatial manifestation. At the same time, these regimes have spurred crit-
icism of urban megaprojects within planning constituencies, affected neigh-
bourhoods and scholarly debates.
A selective process of referencing ‘successful’ projects has gener-
ated narratives of success frequently at odds with lived realities on the
ground. Furthermore, the hegemony of project agencies and exceptional
practices has neglected municipal authorities and citizens’ interests by
limiting modes of open participation and infringing democratic account-
ability. The power that Grands Projets’ agencies have acquired over project
planning, implementation and managerial processes has contributed to
the creation of distinct and often non-inclusive places within projects’ urban
contexts. Defying such criticism, large-scale urban developments have
nonetheless become efficient vehicles for responding to changing needs, GP–IN.05 The Ideal City by Fra Carnevale illustrating Renaissance ideals of urban planning.
leveraging the efficacy of new forms of urban making and generating inno- GP–IN.06 Paris after Haussmann: Avenue de l’Opera.
vative scales and related impacts of urban development within adjacent
neighbourhoods and global spheres. urban settlements, demonstration of potency and strategic means of city
Many Grands Projets function as pioneers in urban development ‘rebranding.’ Given our definition of Grands Projets, we can even consider
and trend-setters in regulatory, programmatic and spatial practices. Subse- the ideal imperial Chinese cities as such, reliant as they are on comprehen-
quently, it is not uncommon for these megaprojects to appear out of place sive planning frameworks for large territories of mixed-use activities. The
or isolated at their time of construction. An example is Rockefeller Centre ideal imperial Chinese city is based on the unifying entity of the square, feng,
in New York: at its completion in 1939, it stood in stark contrast to its heter- the structuring unit of the manifestation of cosmological rules. ​→ GP–IN.04 ​
ogeneous, low- to mid-rise surroundings. ​→ GP–IN.03 ​Whilst Lewis Mumford The ideal cities of the European Renaissance can also join the lineage of
famously described Rockefeller Centre as a “Cloudcuckooland” (Mumford Grands Projets, given that they address various moral, spiritual and juridical
and Wojtowicz 1998) whose architects deserved to “remain in chains” (Cohen functions of citizenship and provide coherent spatial frameworks, includ-
2003), the Centre became the yardstick for new projects in New York and ing buildings and street layouts, to accommodate mixed-use functions on
eventually faded into the rising skyline of Midtown Manhattan. a large scale. ​→ GP–IN.05 ​Grands Projets implemented one-to-­one during the
nineteenth century include the large-scale urban transformations of Paris ​
THE RISE OF GRANDS PROJETS and Barcelona, which, based on a clear vision, introduced coher-
­→ ­GP–IN.06 ​
Urban megaprojects have always been part of our cities. They have com- ent spatial frameworks and increased the density of built-up volume in
pelled radical urban transformations. They have been starting points of new their cities.
21 Introduction
 Large-scale projects have become necessary ​— ​and possible ​— ​due to a With respect to project inclusiveness, we address the variety of stakehold-
restructuring of production processes, new divisions and outsourcing of ers included in a project’s initial conception and the diversity of people’s
labour and a calculated need for open floor spaces. Such projects are often needs considered in the design of spatial qualities, programmes and modes
linked to the need for infrastructural upgrades, which, in many cases, have of daily operation. The concept of including a wide range of individuals
been the main drivers of large-scale interventions in the city’s fabric. This with potentially conflicting interests has emerged as one of the most chal-
confirms Flyvbjerg’s assessment of Grands Projets as “central to the new lenging points in our projects. Swyngedeow et al. acknowledge that “the
politics of distance” given that “infrastructure is increasingly being built rhetorical attention to social issues” is present in many recent large-scale
as megaprojects” (2003, 3). urban projects (2002, 268); however, the potential these projects have in
The parallel development of new transport technologies ​— ​espe- responding to real urban problems is seldom actualised.
cially former railway and port terminals ​— ​has liberated space for Grands In order to make our inquiry of adaptability and inclusiveness use-
Projets in the hearts of our cities, underpinning their presence and accel- ful to future projects, our analysis is not limited to a mere observation of
erating their impact on their surroundings. New urban regimes, dedicated adaptive and inclusive schemes. It also attempts to identify the capacities
project agencies and the pursuit of economic gain have contributed to the needed to secure an adaptive and inclusive urban condition, either con-
role many of today’s Grands Projets assume at the core of urban develop- sciously developed or deliberately silenced.
ment agendas and academic discourses.
In examining Grands Projets in the context of these societal trans- THE AIM OF THIS BOOK
formations and new forms of spatial production, the guiding questions for This book intends to contribute to a better understanding of urban meg-
this research were as follows: aprojects in relation to their urban environments, including the contem-
porary challenges and opportunities that lie within such developments
� How are Grands Projets made? given their central and increasing roles in shaping our cities. The text draws
� How do Grands Projets impact and determine urban environments? from a thorough and comparative analysis of our urban megaproject case
What are ways in which Grands Projets can increase their capacity to
�  studies and the perspective of a broad range of stakeholders involved in
create more inclusive and adaptive urban megaprojects in the future? the making of Grands Projets. With our findings of the spatial practices of
Grands Projets, we aim to not only broaden the scholarship of urban meg-
In attempting to answer these questions, we analyse our selected case stud- aprojects but also to provide applicable insights for planners, managers,
ies across their development stages, prioritising spatialising practices and policymakers and other urban actors. Additionally, this book seeks to pro-
considering various stakeholder perspectives. We further explore selected vide in-depth knowledge for readers interested in a particular city or case
aspects across cases to enable a comparative perspective. The following study and new comparative urban studies. With these various intentions,
chapter presents the methodology of this approach. we hope to speak to multiple audiences about the possibilities Grands Pro-
jets offer for creating more inclusive and adaptable urban conditions.
ADAPTABILITY AND INCLUSIVENESS
In the investigation of our case studies across decades and continents, the
notion of adaptability and inclusiveness has emerged as central to the assess-
ment of Grands Projets’ capacities in the future of sustainable cities. In pro-
posals and evaluations of urban interventions, the concept of sustainability
is often deployed in an inflationary manner. Whilst sustainability of course
remains a valid criterion for any action that concerns environmental and
human well-being, adaptability and inclusiveness provide a more sizeable
concept for evaluating social and spatial qualities of urban megaprojects.
With the notion of adaptability, we thus set forth to study the capac-
ity of an initial spatial, programmatic and managerial framework to trans-
form over time in response to external situations ​— ​economic, environmental
or social ​— ​without becoming an entirely different project. Such adaptability
is a crucial quality of Grands Projets: due to their large size and multiple
stages of development over long periods of time, changes in demand,
requirements and trends are unavoidable. Hence, projects built with a cer-
tain degree of flexibility and openness in their spatial design and imple-
mentation have proved to be more resilient and successful in the long run,
not only in realisation and operation but also in social acceptance.

22 The Grand Projet 23 Introduction

 A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
FOR ANALYSIS
Naomi C. Hanakata, Anna Gasco, Pablo Acebillo and
Kees Christiaanse
OVERVIEW OF SCHOLARLY DEBATES
Given the extensive history of Grands Projets, the landscape of scholarly
debates on the subject is accordingly rich. What we have discussed else-
where (Hanakata and Gasco 2018) can be summarised as follows: most
recent discussions are particularly interested in Grands Projets as indicators
of neoliberal ideologies and politics and societal transformation. Here,
Grands Projets emerge as examples for new forms of urban governance and
exceptional measures for urban development (Swyngedouw, Moulaert,
and Rodriguez 2002; Fainstein 2008; Pinson and Journel 2016; Savini and
Salet 2017). The narrative of urban megaprojects is a complex one; in The
Globalized City: Economic Restructuring and Social Polarization in European
Cities, Moulaert et al. point out that a common corollary of such develop-
ments is a “social restructuring that actually often accentuates social polar-
ization and re-enforces social dynamics of exclusion and/or marginalization”
(Moulaert, Rodriguez, and Swyngedouw 2003, 246). Thus, a multi-per-
spective analysis of Grands Projets is indispensable for a nuanced under-
standing of the making and impact of urban megaprojects.
Other works have highlighted the diversity of contemporary urban
megaprojects across socio-cultural contexts with the common trait of iconic-
ity and complexity (Koolhaas 2004; del Cerro 2013). Whilst globalisation
is determining patterns of transnational financialization and exchange
within urban megaprojects, we can still observe “many different incarna-
tions” when these projects are confronted with “diverse societal and cul-
tural preconditions” (del Cerro 2013, Research in Urban Sociology:xxiii).
Some scholars have focused on the financialization of such urban
megaprojects, emphasising the increasing investment in these projects and
extent to which Grands Projets exceed budgets (Altshuler and Luberoff 2003;
Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter 2003; Flyvbjerg 2005, 2014). They
have investigated projects’ shared ambition to advance a city within glob-
ally competitive networks of production and representation, which results,
in their opinion, in an increasingly homogenous urban landscape (Marshall
2003). This has, as Robert Marshall claims in Emerging Urbanity: Global
Urban Projects in the Asia Pacific Rim, led to a “deliberate construction of
city form through the articulation of buildings, roadways, streets, parks,
and sidewalks without any attempt to foster a social sphere” (2003, 193).
A separate strand of scholarly debate has been dedicated to new forms
of urban transformation in Asia. Gavin Shatkin, Trevor Hogan, Tim Bunnell,
Ananya Roy, Aihwa Ong, Lisa Hoffmann and others have investigated devel-
opment projects that have become references for urban visions elsewhere
and the origin of “worlding” as a spatial practice (Roy and Ong 2011), which
24 The Grand Projet
“[attempts] to establish or break established horizons of urban standards
in and beyond a particular city” (Ong 2011, 4). In Worlding Cities: Asian
Experiments and the Art of Being Global, Roy and Ong analyse various mod-
els of urbanism for their potential to facilitate an understanding of city-mak-
ing in an Asian context and simultaneously underline the “instability of
claims to geographic origin” (Roy 2011, 311).
Whilst these debates have greatly informed our general approach
to the topic of Grands Projets, they also reveal clear gaps in the study of
urban megaprojects. Most notably, these debates neglect material con-
cerning on-the-ground spatial dimensions and planning practices and actual
comparative studies of urban megaprojects. In response to these gaps, and
based on our interest as planners in projects’ spatial dimensions, this research
focuses firstly on the spatial transformation of large-scale urban develop-
ment projects. By focusing on the urban design and built reality of Grands
Projets, including their potentials and challenges, we hope to elucidate the
significance of these dimensions in the decision-making process and pro-
posal of concrete planning schemes. We have secondly devised a frame-
work for a comparative reading of Grands Projets across our case studies in
Asia and Europe. This framework aims to capture the spatial, structural
and temporal complexity of Grands Projets. It also enables us to discuss the
specificities of each project and its respective urban condition.
A COMMON NARRATIVE AND SPATIAL FOCUS
A focus on urban design and built reality within the complex making of Grands
Projets has been pivotal in our case study analysis, which this book presents
in eight individual Grands Projets portraits. To enable a comprehensive anal-
ysis of each case study, we have conceptualised five analytical frames: con-
ception, design, implementation, operation and implication. ​→ GP–IN.07
Conception: Our framework begins by examining the initial phase
of a project ​— ​predating any design ​— ​and the ambitions outlined to actuate
a project and its broader socio-political context. This allows us to under-
stand the project’s development logic impacting subsequent phases. We
study how Grands Projets introduce a new scale, urban development logic
and system with varying aspirations, complexity, timeframes and stake-
holder involvement. The reading of Grands Projets as reified gestures of
power reveals much about the project itself and those who conceived it.
For example, Bent Flyvbjerg discusses the ‘political sublime’ or rapture
politicians exhibit when projects they have advanced garner attention; such
acclaim often positions these politicians for re-election. The ‘economic
sublime’ involves the prospect of high economic return for those who par-
take in megaproject making (2014, 7). Beyond these, conceptions are driven
by the aim(s) to
� improve existing urban conditions,
� increase financial and/or programmatic opportunities,
� expand a city on a local scale,
� position a host city on the world map and/or
� facilitate advancement in some global hierarchy.
25 Introduction
Case Studies Frames Aspects
b BORDERING
MNU–T 1 CONCEPTION
​
LJZ–S
2 DESIGN
​ c CENTRALITIES
WK–H
MBA–S
3 IMPLEMENTATION
​ m MODELLING
HC–H
LD–P
4 OPERATION
​ r REGULATORY PLANS
22@–B
KX–L 5 IMPLICATION
​ u URBAN CATALYSTS​
GP–IN.07 A theoretical framework for analysis: a common narrative and spatial focus.
This investigation of a Grand Projet’s early stage allows us to derive key
insights into the socio-political, economic and/or ideological mission a
project is set forth to accomplish.
Design: The spatial design, either projected or realised, is the rei-
fication of a project’s vision, driving motivations and stakeholder interests.
Understanding a design’s production process is as crucial as understanding
its focus and leitmotiv, which determine built result and urban qualities.
The way a design is made and the diversity of stakeholders involved in this
making provide many clues regarding the project’s capacity to be inclusive.
Identifying what a spatial design does or does not determine is the starting
point for understanding a project’s future spatial flexibility and quality.
Examining further specifications and the evolution of an initial design
scheme provides insights into locally specific planning practices and the
power main actors hold in this process. Furthermore, design has become
a means of product differentiation, through, for example, engaging (st-)
architects who are expected to provide the desired legitimacy for an ambi-
tious city agenda and candidacy in global markets.
The production of any Grand Projet spatial design scheme also marks
a decisive moment of interest negotiation. Potentially conflicting priorities
of involved stakeholders must be concerted and translated into a spatial
scenario: some stakeholders may have shorter-term expectations, such as
immediate revenue, whilst others may pursue longer-term results. Design-
ers often find themselves at the intersection of conflicting agendas and are
challenged with “balancing the commercial requirements of their clients
with meeting the design expectations of the local authority” (Carmona,
Magalhães, and Edwards 2002, 18).
26 The Grand Projet
Implementation: In material realisation processes, the grand visions of a
project confront the realpolitik of local governments and established prac-
tices. Within each Grand Projet, there are tendering processes, commission
procedures and ways of programme distribution, all of which display an
exceptionality from established practices to varying degrees.
Within the specificities of local planning practices, many of our
case studies are exempt of otherwise common implementation procedures.
This is due to the fact that their governing agencies are equipped with
amplified capacities to expedite, mobilise, direct and decide. The way in
which projects are awarded, negotiated or phased demonstrates the extent
of these agencies’ control and determines a project’s public acceptance.
The exceptional capacities mobilised within Grands Projets, however, are
paralleled by a ‘democratic deficit’ (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodri-
guez 2002): this development practice, induced by fast-track action plans,
consults the public via events or questionnaires when convenient but is
ultimately only accountable to a board of directors.
Operation: Our case studies present various forms of governance
and combinations of private and public bodies. Understanding the config-
uration and power relations of a Grand Projet’s key authorities provides the
key to decoding built realities. We have defined Grands Projets as projects
realised and/or operated under the authority of a single or concerted gov-
erning body. It is this body that is, in most cases, also in charge of an active
project’s daily management. These bodies are often specially established,
private, public or private-public in nature; the rationale for their existence
is the need for dedicated entities with necessary expertise to operate at an
internationally competitive level. Analysing these bodies’ scope of respon-
sibilities can provide further insight into the high degree of control that
appears as a common trait of Grands Projets and the impact this control has
on a megaproject’s built environment and external linkages. Studying the
accountability of these agencies reveals the interest in which operations
are carried out.
Implication: The implications of Grands Projets are multiple and
become apparent at different scales. They concern the development tra-
jectories of Grands Projets themselves and the urban condition of the areas
in which they are situated. For our analysis, we have focused on four dif-
ferent realms of impact: the subsequent development of a Grand Projet
(‘local implications’), in which we study how a project has developed beyond
a scheduled phase of implementation; the impact on immediate surround-
ings (‘surrounding implications’), in which we examine how areas adjacent
to a Grand Projet site have changed as a result of development, such as
programme adaptations and increases in auxiliary services and property
prices; the impact on the larger city and region (‘regional implications’),
in which we investigate how a Grand Projet has changed the dynamics within
the region in terms of concentration of activities, revenue or connectivity;
and impact on a global scale (‘global implications’), in which we examine
a Grand Projet’s capacity to change a city’s image, elevate a city within
global rankings or establish regions of select foreign investment.
27 Introduction
 With this analytical framework, we can better understand particular urban
forms and cultures of management and place-making; we can also under-
stand Grands Projets as sites for projections and sources of struggle and
advancement. The frames are loose enough to give each case study an
opportunity to develop its own narrative yet sufficiently coherent to enable
comparative analysis. References to specific case study frames are made
within the comparative section of this research via indications included
within the text (eg. ​1 MNU–T CONCEPTION). References to other case study
chapters are also made within case study portraits, highlighting linkages
between projects.
A COMPARATIVE LENS
We have discovered commonalities and reoccurring aspects within our
case studies, despite their vastly different geographic situations. Reading
Grands Projets as a growing phenomenon on a global scale, we believe that
they offer us a better understanding of specific urban settings and a global
network of urban production. The latter is, in fact, an integral part of Grands
Projets; our case studies are created via an inter-referencing practice of
shared visions and development models, which feeds international rank-
ings of urban success, global competition and re-occurring engagement
GP–IN.08 Speaking with and to
different urban actors.
of the same urban actors.
As discussed here (Gasco, Hanakata and Christiaanse 2019), the
‘comparables’ we have analysed for this purpose are not the case studies
as a whole but rather selected aspects central to the development of Grands
Projets. Whilst not exhaustive, these aspects enable deep understanding
of the making of Grands Projets, their spatial manifestations and their capac-
ity to become more inclusive and adaptive. ​→ GP–IN.08
b BORDERING ​In ‘The Bordering Practice of Grands Projets’ we exam-
ine the types and qualities of borders these projects produce or eliminate
within established urban settings. We consider physical borders, such as
rail tracks, canals, misaligned plots of development and obstructing built
forms, and abstract borders, such as those resulting from different admin-
istrative zones, economical segregations, managerial practices or program-
matic focuses. In doing so, we investigate the various potentials of Grands
Projets to integrate or separate from their urban environments and to gen-
erate or overcome borders within our cities.
c CENTRALITIES ​Grands Projects absorb primary capital investment
within their regions, concentrating certain functions and connecting indi-
viduals with specific ambitions. They host programmes and tenants of
acclaimed global relevance and, in doing so, impact local economies and
livelihoods. In ‘Grands Projets as Centralities,’ we examine the making of
Grands Projets as places of centralised control and explore how governing
bodies claim certain authoritative positions and deploy specific tools in trans-
lating control into space. We analyse the impact of Grands Projets as central-
ities of power within and upon their immediate, extended surroundings.
m MODELLING ​In ‘Grands Projets and Modelling Practices’ we inspect
the practice of modelling that Grands Projets have both facilitated and relied
upon in their development schemes. We also examine the ways in which
28 The Grand Projet
this practice is, in fact, an integral part of the making of Grands Projets. To
understand the making of Grands Projets, one must identify their models
of reference and the extent to which the ambition of becoming models
themselves determines project realisation and impact. For that purpose,
we investigate both the creation of Grands Projets as models and the practice
of emulating models within new Grands Projets’ development processes.
This clarifies the knowledge transfer within urban development and the
migration of desires that guide so many of these projects in their vision
development and implementation.
r REGULATORY PLANS ​In examining the ‘Spatial Regulatory Plans’ that
govern a Grand Projet’s design and development, we scrutinise the mech-
anisms of control deployed to define, regulate and safeguard a project’s essen-
tial aspects and qualities over time; these include masterplans, framework
plans and design guidelines and their manifestations within planning cultures.
Our focus here is the different degrees of flexibility inherent in these mech-
anisms and how this flexibility is ​— ​or is not ​— ​translated into space. This
particular quality is illustrated by a project’s development or deviation from
its original condition or ‘plan.’ In the case of not yet completed projects, it
informs us about a project’s ability to adapt to changing conditions and needs.
u URBAN CATALYSTS ​In ‘Urban Catalysts in Grands Projets’ we rely on
our case study analysis to consider urban catalysts as crucial drivers and
moments within a Grand Projet’s development; these may serve to activate
and direct holistic project development or catalyse particular areas within
the project over its long development timeframe. Considering the long-
term nature of a Grand Projet’s realisation, the use of urban catalysts is
particularly relevant for securing or initiating desired qualities at a later
stage, which often lies beyond the control of initial urban planners or man-
aging agencies. We consider built as well as unbuilt catalysts, ranging from
single buildings and urban clusters, which function as attractors and acti-
vators of neighbourhoods within Grands Projets, to policies, legislation or
events, which are introduced as strategic measures of directing develop-
ment in a specific way.
These investigations into selected aspects of Grands Projets allow
us to discuss the making and impact of urban megaprojects on common
ground and bring our cases’ distinct geographies and planning cultures
into nuanced conversation. In some cases, these queries also provide insights
into features that facilitate ​— ​or inhibit ​— ​the development of adaptive and
inclusive capacities, which the conclusion of this book consolidates. Cross
references between the portraits and the comparative aspects (marked
within the body of the text) underline the complex yet coherent concept
and structure of this research endeavour.
SPEAKING WITH AND TO DIFFERENT URBAN ACTORS
Another key component of this research has been the investigation of Grands
Projets via various stakeholder perspectives. Given the temporal width we
considered in this research, from conception phases to the operation and
implication of realised projects, we also intend to examine urban megapro-
jects from the viewpoint of individuals involved at different stages of a
29 Introduction
 development. We do so through interviews conducted with several stake-
holders of Grands Projets during our fieldwork and a series of essays, written
by experts from various domains of Grands Projets developments.
A selection of interviews addressing broader challenges and oppor-
tunities regarding Grands Projets has been included in this book. Interview-
ees are Peter Bishop, Professor in Urban Design at the Bartlett UCL and
former Director of Physical Planning at the Borough for Camden during
the key conceptual phase of King’s Cross; Alessandra Cianchetta, architect
and founding partner of AWP (London and Paris), involved in the requal-
ification plan for the open spaces of La Défense; Dieter Läpple, Professor
Emeritus of International Urban Studies and long-term advisor to Hafen­
City; Peter Rowe, Professor of Architecture and Urban Design at Harvard;
architect and planner Paul Tange; and Michael Thanner, Vice President
of Tange Associates Asia.
The series of external essays is written more explicitly from the
perspective of the stakeholders who authored them: city planners, devel-
opers, and/or scholars, amongst others. These essays provide additional
insights into various aspects and stages of Grands Projets, as well as infor-
mation on four of our case studies. The authors include Siew Leng Fun,
Chief Urban Designer, and Andrew David Fassam, Senior Director, at the
Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) of Singapore; Ramón García-
Bragado, Deputy Major of Barcelona, in charge of the implementation of
the 22@ Plan; Koki Miyachi, Senior Architect, and Noboru Kawagishi,
Architect, at Mitsubishi Jisho Sekkei in Tokyo; and Virginie Picon Lefebvre,
architect, urbanist and Professor at Paris-Belleville, who has published
extensive material on La Défense.
Within our research framework, we set out to capture and analyse
urban megaprojects in their complexities and capacities to adapt and be
inclusive over time. In studying projects of varying maturities, it became
evident that an ultimate assessment is impossible. However, if led by indi-
viduals with visionary ideas, equipped with the necessary authoritative
and financial capacities, even rigid and monotonous urban megaprojects
can develop a flexible and more inclusive urban condition. It is thus first
and foremost the individuals driving these projects who determine their
success or failure. ‘Good urban design’ ideas and their capacity to trans-
form provide the basis for projects to evolve over generations and produc-
tively engage in a dialogue between people and space.
Despite their continuous and often justified criticism, we believe
Grands Projets should be seen as valuable opportunities and testing grounds
for strategic and open-ended planning approaches, operational practices
and instantiations for new forms of urban governance. Grands Projets have
become origins of theorisation and entry points to an understanding of
urban development in a globally interconnected and inter-referenced state.
They are built upon global knowledge transfers and constitute strategic
tools to revitalise and/or direct a city’s development trajectory. They are
made by people, their decisions and actions, and they impact our lives and
our urban environments. Grands Projets rise within and above our cities.
They reveal something about our societies, today and tomorrow.
30 The Grand Projet
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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31 Introduction
 Conversation
Series

32 33 The Grand Projet

IN CONVERSATION WITH PETER BISHOP
Peter Bishop, Professor of Urban Design at
The Bartlett School of Architecture and
a partner of Bishop & Williams consultants.

PB Peter Bishop
AG Anna Gasco
NH Naomi C. Hanakata

NH What are the biggest challenges of Grands NH Part of the reason that Grands Projets are
Projets, historic and contemporary? being compared across the world is that
PB First, I’m not convinced we’ve developed many of the stakeholders or developers
sufficient understanding of what Grands Projets themselves are the same, which means
are, how they fit into the context of cities and what we have generated a certain similarity in
they are meant to do for urban areas. Grand Projet terms of form and programme. What is
is a very general, unquestioned term laden with your opinion on this?
pre-conceived ideas of form and nature. PB Certainly, the finance [aspect of Grands
Perhaps that is why it is important to study a series Projets] is global. A number of key clients are global.
of completely different cultural and geographical And if they’re not developing globally, they’re cer-
contexts [of Grands Projets] to analyse the extent tainly a part of a global network.
of their similarities. I think some city governments lack the experience
to define what their city needs. These governments
AG We’ve discussed whether or not there is often accept the notion that the Grand Projet and
a significant increase in larger scale pro- its norms are good without interrogating the con-
jects in inner-city areas within the last two text of the city itself.
decades. What potential does this bring
to the city? AG Many projects are built in one go ​— ​or within
PB The potential is difficult to pinpoint. We very short timeframes ​— ​and create gigan-
have a number of Grands Projets across the world, tic alien bodies. Based on your experience
partly because cities have become globalised and at King’s Cross, how can we increase the
partly because we are witnessing levels of unprec- possibilities for the Grand Projet to be both
edented scale in urban areas. open and adaptive to the city around it?
You could argue that Hausmann’s redesign of cen-
tral Paris or the huge sprawl of Edwardian London
were massive urban interventions. Yet the ways
in which these were procured, designed and built
Cities are now competing
are completely different. and comparing themselves
Cities are now competing and comparing them-
selves to one another. The danger of the Grand to one another. The danger
Projet is that it becomes only a vanity project (i.e.,
‘our development is bigger, better and glossier
of the Grand Projet is that it
than others’). becomes only a vanity project.

35 Conversation Series
PB It’s interesting to compare two Grands
Projets in London: King’s Cross and Canary Wharf.
Canary Wharf was an interventionby a Canadian­­
American developer collaborating with North
American architects. Thus, what you see in Canary
Wharf is North America, not London: large podium
blocks, inflexible for single-­phase development,
a total reliance on the private motor car rather than
public transport.
King’s Cross was the result of a British developer:
London-based, British finance, British architects.
Therefore, it was a lot easier to produce some-
thing that sat more comfortably in context.
The political context of Canary Wharf was also
the desperate drive, driven from the top, to develop
old dock areas. The Thatcher government was
directly involved. Their approach was simply to
say, Yes, we want this development.
King’s Cross was in the hands of a confident left-
wing council quite prepared to assert its local vision
and impose its particular conditions.
NH In terms of strategy, some developers seem
to want to define the city’s future; others
want to create a new landmark to define
what is already there.
What is your opinion of these two strat-
egies and to which extent they may also
be locally specific?
PB The desire to create landmarks is a bizarre
idea. When I worked in planning, I told any archi-
tect to leave if they talked about an icon or landmark
building, because it’s just sloppy shorthand.
With King’s Cross, the masterplanners Allies and
Morrison were very British, while Dmitri P ­ orphyrios
came from a deep European tradition of architec-
ture. Both teams were inspired by certain aspects
of the European modernist movement and used
this inspiration in an understated way.
The question is whether King’s Cross is deeply con-
servative or deeply radical; I don’t know which one
of the two it is. It certainly looks back into the tra-
ditions of what has worked previously in London.
We and the developers also talked about the Lon-
don Great Estates. Most of the West End of Lon-
don is owned by the Great Estates and has been
considered some of the most valuable, attractive
real estate in the world for over 300 years.
36 The Grand Projet
There’s a tendency to see the
Grand Projet within a capsule.
But a successful Grand Projet
makes good stuff happen in
the surrounding area.
The continuity of land ownership and traditional
elements, such as streets, frontages, blocks and
human scale, were embedded in the scheme from
the start. Many would say these are quite con-
servative elements in this design. However, in
the London context, these elements work.
If you look at the sustainability and renewability
of built-form projects, a finer grain approach is
more resilient. I find it interesting that many make
an immediate leap into Grands Projets as precinct
rather than Grands Projets as a piece of city.
Maybe some Grand Projets should be precincts. I
think that is the first point for investigation in any
debate. But rather than starting with the precinct,
there should be clear justification as to why that
is the appropriate urban form.
The other element to consider, of course, is car
dependency. Many Grand Projets, although they
have the scale, concentration and density for public
transport, are car-based, especially where they fail
to connect at their edges with the grain of the city.
AG That brings us to density. King’s Cross
has a low building height that only allows
a certain density. But Asian cities have a
very different type of density.
To what extent is density in terms of, i.e.,
built-form, programme, people and res-
idential population?
PB I don’t think density really matters, but,
ultimately, your plan determines density. You can
get high density within low-rise compact cities,
but you don’t see that very often in many devel-
oping Grand Projets at present.
One density is occupation of public areas. Quite
often, you see very low-density occupation of pub-
lic areas with mid-density high-rise schemes. There
are two crude types of urban form associated with
these: developers either pull the building to the
trouble with this as researchers is that our children
will have to finish this research in thirty years. We
edge of the block or sit it in the centre of the block. forget time, the fourth dimension of the city.
Buildings placed in the centre sit in excess space.
Increasingly, it’s difficult to pinpoint that space’s AG What you are doing now triggers events
function. Space is not necessarily a good thing in
a city. Space needs function. And good space, I’d PB
elsewhere.
It’s also interesting to see the Grand Projet
argue, needs to have enclosure. research including older Grands Projets. The Tokyo
example is a mature one with its own evident his-
NH One of our project’s integral questions torical context. The historical context of other
regards assessment. How do we actually Grands Projets, however, is not yet visible.
assess whether or not a Grand Projet is
successful? AG But it’s very challenging to find a compar-
PB I think it’s typically the architecture, urban ison to that. King’s Cross and Marunouchi
design and planning. One of a city planner’s key are in the centre of established cities,
duties is to consider what happens outside any whereas Kowloon is reclaimed land.
particular site. The client does not want to pay PB Even reclaimed land isn’t a tabula rasa.
the architect to think outside their line; the key You can still have the cultural context of the city;
planning debate involves urging architects and you still have to connect it.
developers to take responsibility for wider areas
and context. NH Thank you very much for your time.
The second thing is to ask, what happens next? What PB My pleasure.
happens next is rarely of interests to city planners
but it should be one of the essential questions that
they ask. What happens next in a city is the miss-
ing conversation in a lot of city planning.
I did a project in Central St. Giles with Renzo Piano.
I was there in the same role as I had at King’s Cross:
Director of Planning in Camden. The debate we
had concerned the areas of the city beyond the
site boundary.
We concluded that just because those buildings
existed wasn’t to say they’d be there in twenty-five
years. In fact, if a development is successful, it
will trigger a ripple in land values and redevelop-
ment and regeneration of surrounding areas that
are not necessarily protected.
You can instigate a set of moves that will force
the hands of future architects. It’s a bit like a chess
game, where you are interested in forcing your
opponent’s third or fourth moves as you make a
move yourself.
We spent a day together, drawing the scale of the
future city, analysing how this little site would
actually trigger a future web of spaces and routes.
There’s a tendency to see the Grand Projet within
a capsule. But a successful Grand Projet makes
good stuff happen in the surrounding area. The
37 Conversation Series
IN CONVERSATION
WITH ALESSANDRA CIANCHETTA
Alessandra Cianchetta, Architect and founding
partner of AWP.
AC Alessandra Cianchetta
AG Anna Gasco
NH Naomi C. Hanakata
NH What are the biggest challenges of urban NH It’s difficult to predict the timeline of urban
megaprojects?
AC One is having an overall view of what is
there. In urban megaprojects, politics and gov-
ernance are often more essential than architectural
design. Stakeholder alliances can be quite intri-
cate. La Défense, a project that is now fairly de-­
centralised, is very complex politically: there are
multiple conflicts of interests and overlaps.
Another challenge is timeframe. In Europe, it can
take a lot of time to develop a preliminary design;
large-scale urban projects cannot be implemented
over a short period. The timeframe [for Grands Pro-
jets] can thus be exceedingly long. Given admin-
istrative permissions, political changes, cuts in
funding and unexpected geo-political events, a
project can become obsolete, and it can be difficult
to predict timelines.
The conception of public space, however, is chang-
ing. We’re asking more profound, candid questions
about it. Technology and people move at a certain
speed; design, architecture and urbanism have
another speed.
In urban megaprojects, poli-
tics and governance are often
more essential than architec-
tural design.
38 The Grand Projet
projects.
AC Indeed. How do you avoid creating projects
today that will be obsolete in three years’ time?
AG There’s another challenge: integration,
including a project’s physical integration
with its surroundings and integration
between stakeholders. Are there mech-
anisms that allow for better integration
of these projects in the long term?
AC Two key issues are strategy and phasing.
Implementation of large-scale projects spans a
period of time. How urban projects become alive
or functional depends on their connection to the
existing environment in terms of pedestrians flows
and transportation.
With a tabula rasa project, you have to create a
mass critical enough to support a level of attrac-
tion so that the site becomes a hub and the rest
[of the area] can be efficiently developed.
With La Défense, we’re acting on something that
already exists. There’s a strong retrofitting aspect;
it’s not possible to re-develop it suddenly and to-
tally, because that would be too expensive and
disruptive.
Phasing is much like acupuncture. You must deter-
mine what is primary, what will create an energy
and vision that can be communicated through-
out. If you’re retrofitting, it’s less straightforward.
How you decide to act often depends on money
and resources.
NH Given these challenges, do you think
Grands Projets still represent a viable
urban development scheme for future
projects?
AC Framework planning rather than oppor-
tunistic scheming is important. Thinking strate-
gically about public space, networks, transportation
and the city as a whole is key for creating liveable,
sustainable cities, but it cannot be too directive.
It has to be supple.
That’s why strategy is vital. Architects, designers
and urban planners must play a role, but there are
other factors: economics, political willingness to
maintain a project, synergy between stakehold-
ers. It’s not purely architectural or technical.
Designers can also re-envisage their role as or-
chestra directors. It’s a dance between two ques-
tions: how much can we direct this, and how much
can be left to opportunity? Too much opportunity
may compromise urban sustainability or legacy.
Yet too much planning is also not ideal.
AG 
Grands Projets are often globally connected
to each other through planning techniques,
architectural design and building tenants.
How do these global mechanisms shape
the planning of Grands Projets?
AC Cities have been globally connected for
a while now, but they are becoming more so. When
we were commissioned to work on La Défense,
our clients had images of international central
business districts in their boardrooms.
Now there’s an evident competition between cit-
ies. At the European scale with the prospect of
Brexit, Paris is already trying to compete with
Frankfurt, Dublin and beyond.
AG Global events can influence development
trajectories.
AC Indeed. But this competition is not design-
based. It’s related to similar economic models and
different typologies of capitalism. The corpus of
laws, the way developers can operate, local policies
and administrations in London, New York, Paris,
etc. aren’t identical, yet there are similarities.
There’s global competition despite different cul-
tural and historical backgrounds. World class cities
compete globally; it’s easier to compare London
39 Conversation Series
Designers can also re-envisage
their role as orchestra directors.
It’s a dance between two
questions: how much can we
direct this, and how much can
be left to opportunity?
to Singapore than to Glasgow. Paris is more com-
parable to Frankfurt than it is to Nantes. These
cities’ positions act as city-states.
NH Many projects realise the importance of
creating something locally specific to dif-
ferentiate themselves. How important do
you think these geographically-specific
qualities are and what are successful ways
to achieve this differentiation?
AC An important component is climate, which
is often disregarded. Building in a tropical climate
is different from building in a continental climate.
This kind of architecture, of steel, glass and high-
rise clusters, wasn’t typical of La Défense. The
model is rather North American.
The same kind of high-rises appear in Japan or
Dubai, yet these places’ climates differ. I find Sin-
gapore to be similar to La Défense’s skyline, but
they are also dissimilar. It’s an architecture driven
by an economic force that more or less works with
the same symbolic references.
The specificity of these places could emerge from
what happens where these buildings and clusters
meet the ground. But the more connected these
cities are, the more they learn from each other and
the more there’s a French or English or Japanese
specificity. Land ownership and mechanisms of
governance can also determine this specificity.
NH Does La Défense have a specific quality?
It has a vanity. It wasn’t built this way
AC
for an entirely rational reason. That’s the Grand
Projet ​— ​this idea of grandeur. La Défense also
needed to be very centralised, which is a distinctly
French notion.
But it’s not a question of architectural style or lan-
guage; it’s a question of politics, governance and
Many developers like the idea of creating an image
of a place, as in Dubai and Barcelona’s 22@.
IN CONVERSATION WITH DIETER LÄPPLE
values, such as the values of grandeur and axial- But if you want sustainability, you have to look at Dieter Läpple, Professor Emeritus of Inter­
ity. La Défense is almost military in its way of what you have called the invisible or ‘dark matter’ national Urban Studies at HafenCity University
establishing territory. The architectural object is of a project. Dark matter includes the urban reg- Hamburg.
not the differentiating factor. ulations, irrational desires and tangible networks
behind projects. DL Dieter Läpple
AG How do you as architect and planner con- Networks from TVT to transportation to sewage NH Naomi C. Hanakata
tribute to resilience and a mix of uses? systems build the territory at a larger scale. They
AC That’s the biggest challenge. As a planner are the essential components of building a struc-
and designer, you must have a variety of skills: ture, including strategies that enable transforma-
political skills for orchestrating a dialogue between tion, public space and access to nature and health.
stakeholders and design skills to ensure a design These aren’t necessarily visible, iconic things.
that is strong and supple enough to survive.
You must also determine the site’s current and NH We still need to think of them.
future needs, which is extremely difficult. That’s AC Of course, that’s where conflict occurs.​ NH What is your approach to understanding coherent with an overarching plan under a single
why looking elsewhere is critical. Cities don’t I think most developers know that transportation, urban megaprojects? management agency, the HafenCity Hamburg
develop at the same rate, so you can bring in best for instance, is a key issue, because if you don’t DL Megaprojects can be decisive levers for GmbH, which is trying to create adaptability
practices and typologies from other places. It’s get to places then they have little economic (e.g. the revitalisation of cities or parts of cities, a task through step-by-step implementation.
often instructive to look at case studies that are property) value. that cannot be achieved via “normal” market pro- This is one of several means for coping with the
not exactly the same. But if you want to look at sustainability in the long- cesses or the routines of city administrations. Such ambivalences of urban megaprojects, which, due
term, then of course there’s a conflict between projects need a convincing vision or “Leitbild” to their size and scale, develop their own logic.
NH You’ve mentioned strategising as an im- the image of a project and how it works. linked to real city problems and supported by cit-
portant component. izens; this vision should have the ability to inspire NH What are the biggest challenges of urban
AC Yes, for these big-scale projects. Working NH We talked about phasing as a key element and mobilise. megaprojects, past and present?
in teams that function well together and have dif- of project success. But even longer-term Secondly, we must understand ownership rela- DL The difficulty with large-scale projects,
ferent yet complementary skills is important. phasing schemes, such as HafenCity’s tions. Who owns and controls the land and the which, as a rule, are market-driven, is the contra-
Developing a large-scale masterplan is not just twenty-five-year timeline, are negligible real estate? Who is responsible for infrastructure diction that results from the short-term economic
a question of land ownership, governance and if we look at how long cities take to grow and planning rights? Who are the potential inves- imperatives of real estate capital and the city’s
design. There’s also a megalomania that emerges incrementally. tors, buyers and tenants? long-term interests. That’s because it’s all about
from working at such a big scale. Yet this big scale At the same time, today’s impatience to Thirdly, we must understand different planning making profitable projects more profitable.
can become more diffused. have things completed quickly poses a big and management cultures. Development agen- To realise a project with urban qualities that main-
challenge for Grands Projets. The question cies based on private law but under public hand tain social inclusiveness, ecological sustainability
NH You quickly reach a point of lack of control. concerns the mechanisms available to deal appear as a strong trend in the implementation and economic vibrancy ​— ​that is difficult. The
AC But too much control is an issue as well. with this timing challenge. of current major projects. question becomes: Is it possible to reconcile the
AC It depends on the location. Many Asian Today we can observe that urban megaprojects logic of real estate development with a sustaina-
AG So, it’s a matter of striking a fine line of cities ​— ​Bangalore, Chennai ​— ​have grown from are widespread attempts to develop cities as com- ble city vision?
balance that provides a solid framework few millions to dozens of millions of people in plex, interdependent systems. Whether this can
and leaves room for growth. less than ten years. be done successfully is another question. HafenC- NH Because we always need a vision that
AC There also needs to be a right political Nearly all European cities, by comparison, are ity illustrates an attempt to produce something can sustain a project for decades and in-
moment, the right economics, the right synergy. shrinking due to declining economies, so the notion corporate dynamic development logic,
of time is different. It’s therefore essential to cre- do you think that urban megaprojects
AG You’ve mentioned control, laissez-faire ate critical mass and think in terms of connectivity Is it possible to reconcile the present a contemporary means of urban
and phasing. What are other parameters so that places can function and have value in a development?
for producing sustainable urban mega-­ shorter term. logic of real estate develop- DL Hamburg is at least the attempt to realise
projects?
Flexibility, thinking long-term and will- AG Thank you so much.
ment with a sustainable city such a vision.
AC The city of Hamburg was cut off from the water
ingness to produce iconicity and market a city. vision? for histological reasons; HafenCity district was a

40 The Grand Projet 41 Conversation Series

It is critical to see major
projects not only as a part
of urban extension but also
as transformative urban
interventions.
mono-functional port area in the middle of the
city. Additionally, due to a lack of housing in the
city centre, the inner city was relatively dead after
business hours.
Hence, the HafenCity project was a great oppor-
tunity not just to build a major project ​— ​which
could meet objections in a mixed city with an
urban character ​— ​but also to become the key lever
of change for the whole downtown area.
It is critical to see major projects not only as a part
of urban extension but also as transformative urban
interventions. In some cases, like Hamburg or
London, the question concerns how to bring res-
idents back to the city; in the case of Barcelona,
the question was how to bring new economic activ-
ities and forms of production back to the city. If
done successfully, this truly changes a city’s inte-
gration and innovation capacity.
NH Many urban megaprojects struggle to
include local specificities. What do you
think is a successful response to local
specificities?
DL Firstly, a Grand Projet must be integrated
into historical infrastructure. Secondly, it has to
respond to existing and surrounding urban typol-
ogies. La Défense quite deliberately broke with
the tradition of the typology of the Parisian city.
On the other hand, with HafenCity, city planners
sought typologies that already existed in Ham-
burg and reinterpreted them in order to integrate
the project into the city’s DNA. Furthermore,
HafenCity is connected to the old city through
carefully planned visual axes.
Lastly, the economic relationship to the existing
city is important. It’s essential not to create a sit-
uation of economic cannibalism, such as in the field
42 The Grand Projet
of retail. Planners and developers must respond
to the city’s economic and social geography.
NH Another question concerns project adapt-
ability. What qualities promote this?
DL If we look at “grown” cities, we see that
they adapt over time. They are built, yes, but they
are also appropriated and maintained by the users
and, through them, transformed. With large-scale
projects, there is always the danger of a short cir-
cuit in the sense that they are built and, accordingly,
forms of space appropriation are predetermined.
Alas, rigidities and estrangement are often present
in large-scale projects! There are certain “tricks”
to deal with these, such as building step by step:
an overarching masterplan can secure coherence.
This also allows projects to better respond to, for
example, changes in the economy, real estate mar-
ket and social and cultural needs of the city.
The other solution is functionally open spaces,
called “spaces of opportunity.” In HafenCity, it
was determined through building regulations that
the entire ground floor level has to be available
for commercial, public or community use. This
required consistent access and a ceiling height of
approximately 4.20 metres. There was thus great
strategic value in these ground floor zones as city-­
defining, city-forming elements.
We also need to think about special governance
structures in order to integrate certain programmes.
This may involve supporting strategic building
measures, such as special regulations for ground
floor zones. A good approach would be to say, “We
are creating a porous city. The big project has to
overcome its hermetical sealing.”
We can make a city porous by either leaving cer-
tain things free, which we can then cultivate, or
by integrating short-term interim uses. We can
complete these uses afterwards. This is probably
one of the simplest measures for reducing project
rigidities, but it is also the most difficult, as the
economic pressure for profitability is high.
In order to deal with this pressure, two things are
essential: first, one must make a concept tender
in order to guarantee the coherence of the project
at a larger scale. Second, there must be the oppor-
tunity to call back the land if the developer does
not comply with the rules of the game.
NH A possibility that exists in Hamburg a very important project was Battery Park in New
through the Anhandgabe clause? York in the 1980s. For this project’s urban quality,
DL Yes. Hence, these rules of the game are it was crucial to allocate about 40% of the area
extremely important. as public space.
We could also turn the question around. Which
NH What is the role of urban megaprojects projects have very specific mistakes and negative
as centralities or their relationship to the effects that we can learn from? Many ‘model’ qual-
notion of centrality? ities of HafenCity are due to the fact that the pro-
DL Many of these projects create new cen- ject was somewhat delayed; therefore, it could
tralities. But these centralities have to be seen in learn from the ‘mistakes’ of other waterfront de-
the context of the city’s system of centralities, in velopments already well under way.
order not to create isolated centralities outside
the urban network. NH As great as the danger might be to create
homogeneous redevelopments within urban meg-
NH It would be interesting to do a typological aprojects, there’s an even greater opportunity to
study of the different existing centralities, learn from such preconditions.
ranging from projects as extensions of Thank you for your time and this conversation.
existing centralities to types like Hong
Kong or Shanghai, where a new quality is
emerging with the intention of leaving the
old ​— ​and all existing problems ​— ​behind.
We’ve discussed how these projects are
integrated into a city. At the same time,
it is important for these projects ​— ​because
of their scale ​— ​to be, to a certain extent,
self-sufficient. What is needed for this to
take place?
DL The scale is, of course, decisive. And time
is a major resource for urban development.
NH This seems to be one of the big problems
[of Grands Projets] today. We do not want
to give cities time to develop.
DL Yes, because of investor timelines and the
need to fix a city’s short-term household budget
at the expense of long-term objectives.
To retain the long-term development of the city
as a central task requires much political force. It
is something that goes beyond single legislative
periods. It requires a strong, self-confident city
administration that keeps the city’s requirements
and interests in mind.
NH What other urban megaprojects offer les-
sons to learn from regarding a successful
development?
DL There are always a few projects with par-
adigmatic characters that act as role models. I think
43 Conversation Series
IN CONVERSATION WITH PETER ROWE
Peter Rowe, Professor of Architecture and
Urban Design at Harvard University’s Graduate
School of Design and Chairman of SURBA in
Brooklyn, New York.
PR Peter Rowe
KC Kees Christiaanse
NH Naomi C. Hanakata
NH What are the main challenges of Grands PR
Projets?
PR I would start a discussion of Grands Pro-
jets not with their challenges but with the sugges-
tion that they differ individually despite their
physical similarities. Those currently emerging
are also largely developing for national or large-
scale regional reasons.
Marunouchi in Tokyo departed from ‘one-size-
fits-all’ regulations and inefficient ownership
structures. This shift began in the 1980s and
addressed the same problem: how to produce effi-
cient, mixed-­used urban spaces that could make
cities competitive.
Grands Projets exemplify how this process is in-
ternally-driven. Lujiazui’s aim was to cross the
Huangpu River from Puxi [West] to Pudong [East],
when Shanghai’s functional character was depart-
ing from the Danwei system and embracing a
service market. They had a ‘ready-made’ site in
the middle of the city.
Grands Projets seem fairly similar because they
emerged over the last twenty-five years, constructed
within a fixed ambit of development financing,
technology and infrastructural servicing. Grands
Projets also represent certain regimes, the conver-
gence of which gives them a similar appearance.
KC You mentioned that, when developing
Canary Wharf, coordinators were already
thinking about mixed-use. When exactly
did they start doing so?
44 The Grand Projet
Many of these projects occurred in na-
tional settings, where mixed-use structures were
historically commonplace. This is true for Chinese
and Japanese cities. In Anglo-continental circum-
stances, we built structures mono-functionally
in the modernist tradition.
That changed in the 1970s with the rise of post-­
modernism, which reconsidered the distribution
of urban space and examined it in a longer durée;
as such, projects almost always became mixed-
use. This is true in Paris and in London.
It’s also possible to consider these projects in the
context of period regime: namely, how regimes
created a setting that facilitated a form of devel-
opment and how that form married itself to na-
tional and local concerns. The other perspective
concerns land tenure and changes in ownership,
which varied over time.
Grands Projets seem fairly
similar because they emerged
over the last twenty-­five
years, constructed within a
fixed ambit of development
financing, technology and
infrastructural servicing.
NH They also vary by region.
PR Yes. China’s controlled, detailed plans and
large mega-plots are, in many perspectives, a trans-
migration of the Russian Danwei system into con-
temporary life, which generates problems.
The most successful Grands Projets are the ones
with project flexibility, high functional and socio-­
economic diversity and heterogeneous grains of
development. Of course, there are many clunkers:
Lujiazui and Roppongi Hills.
NH Roppongi Hills has very high program- Consider Mitsui and Mori as company examples:
matic diversity.
PR But it is built in one chunk. Most Grands
Projets have been built in a singular period of time.
We should ask: how should we behave when pre-
sented with a situation within a singular point in
time? Big and clunky? I hope not! More diversified
and flexible is best.
The question is, naturally, how to get there. Na-
tional proclivities tend towards homogenised use
and placement. It is a matter of vision, financial
and institutional mechanisms behind this vision
and the orchestration, definition and management
of entire systems. Instrumentalities and an insti-
tutional mindset have to follow vision.
NH That should happen parallel to the plan-
ning process.
PR Yes; we must also examine cases with deep
institutional backgrounds.
We need to understand why, initially, there were
big plots in Lujiazui. That is relatively straight-
forward to answer: it is easy to implement and
administer big plots, especially when low levels
of human capital supervise them, which was the
case in China in the 1990s. The case of Roppongi
Hills, however, is counter-factual: the developer
Mori had to convince 600 landowners.
NH
PR
That case is exceptional within Tokyo.
It was at the time.
KC In Tokyo, there is a drastic increase in large-
scale plots near railway stations. Is there
a trend in which these projects are con-
verted into smaller, highly mixed plots?
PR There does not seem to be a decline.
45 Conversation Series
How should we behave when
presented with a situation
within a singular point in
time? Big and clunky? I hope
not! More diversified and
flexible is best.
Mori built Roppongi Hills and Toranomon, which
are on top of a new subway line. The same is true
for Mitsui, who built Midtown and Nihonbashi.
NH In Tokyo, the primary focus of the con-
struction industry lies in the reconstruc-
tion of large-scale projects.
PR This gives even greater urgency to our need
to define a Grand Projet. As soon as we do, we can
address how to steer Grands Projets to operate more
sympathetically within their environments.
NH And how to move away from homogene-
ous landscapes.
KC 
Grands Projets will always exist, but they
change in the way they are approached,
conceived and implemented. They are
also highly sophisticated in how they an-
ticipate further, catalysing urban devel-
opments. That is of interest to us.
PR Yes, it is key to assess each project’s cat-
alytic effect. Some Japanese and Chinese projects,
including Lujiazui, are islands. Their catalytic
effect is practically non-existent.
NH Do you see any challenge in the fact that
planners are often ‘external?’ As a result,
does knowledge of the place’s specificity
and context find its way into the project
only partially?
PR Not really. I don’t think you have to be local
to plan these projects. Lujiazui is directed very much
by locals and strong political motives. Mitsubishi
Estate has been a property owner in the Marunouchi
area for a century. It is as local as it gets. We are
beyond the foreign legion phenomenon.
NH If we look at locations where most Grands NH An understanding of past turning points
Projets are emerging, we find only so much
place consciousness. PR
PR I am not arguing that. I’m simply saying I believe in discontinuities. That is how we work.
this consciousness did not exist before. St. Peter’s
Basilica may have been grandiose for its time, NH
but it fits because of the transcendental quality
it brings to Rome. Society doesn’t want to live
with finely grained, low-quality structures. We
love monumentality.
NH  es. These projects initially appeared
Y NH Naomi C. Hanakata
completely out of scale, and that is how
we perceive many new projects today.
But, over time, the surrounding adopted
it and adapted to it.
PR One of the saving graces of Lujiazui is Cen-
tury Avenue, which is now quite monumental.
NH Is the higher number of large-scale pro-
jects over the past decades the result of a
larger trend? For example, the population
in central Tokyo declined between the
1960s and 1980s, until recentralisation
in the 1990s.
PR It is always a push-pull. There was cer-
tainly a turning point in the 1990s when cities
experienced the de-territorialisation of territo-
rialising forces: former differences no longer
applied.
I would be surprised if we could disprove the no-
tion of Grands Projets as indicators of paradigm
change. This includes demographics. Neoliberal
economics created a new regime in the 1990s,
which created a different product. One aspect of
that is the Grand Projet.
NH It is a new regime of regulation.
One occurring as we speak. Talking to Ng
PR
Lang, the Chief Executive Officer of the URA, about
Singapore is interesting because a few years ago,
they never believed urban agriculture could work.
Now, they are all for it. This has largely resulted
from local communities doing it successfully.
It invites questions about how shifting regimes
alter regulatory systems and perceptual struc-
tures. That is an interesting story to tell. I think
Grands Projets concern the turning point.
46 The Grand Projet
always helps us anticipate future ones.
Of course. I don’t believe in linear histories.
Thank you for your time.
IN CONVERSATION WITH PAUL TANGE AND
MICHAEL THANNER
Paul Tange, Architect and Chairman of
Tange Associates.
Michael Thanner, Vice President of
Tange Associates Asia (Singapore).
PT Paul Tange
MT Michael Thanner
NH What do you consider to be the main chal- NH Many developers involved in these Grands
lenges regarding Grands Projets? Projets are international corporations.
PT A Grand Projet is a very important element There are global layers of implementation
of city development. Yet challenges differ from one and regionally specific contexts. Would
city to another. For example, in Japan, land acqui- you say that this leads to a certain resem-
sition ​— ​rather than a different political system ​— ​is blance between Grands Projets?
a serious issue. However, in China and Taiwan, PT Cities need Grands Projets in order to grow.
the legality of land-gathering is different. In a globalised world, our needs are very similar ​
MT The challenge we see now concerns the — ​everybody’s travelling, seeing things and shar-
people. They’re asked for their opinions [about ing information. Because of this, global players
development] and they have the power to oppose are involved in many Grands Projets.
[development decisions]. Yet globalisation also helps us realise how impor-
This is the case not only in democracies like Ger- tant locality is. Local flavours, like Singapore’s urban
many; in Mainland China, the government must development and Hong Kong’s bustling streets, are
also listen to the people’s voice. Once politicians very important to culture and identity.
face opposition from their supporters, they change People flock to Grands Projets to take part in cer-
their minds about development decisions. tain activities; figuring out how to localise those
As a result, projects improve. King’s Cross is a won- Grands Projets to fit into the specific tradition, cul-
derful project because people took the time to ture and history of each country, city, place and
experience and evolve the space. Citizen involve- neighbourhood is key. The Grand Projet has to be
ment makes our work as architects and developers a global and a local player.
more challenging, but also more rewarding.
I see a big difference between the Japa-
Figuring out how to localise
PT
nese and Singaporean systems.
For example, in Japan, the public and private sec-
tors are less integrated. It’s like playing tennis;
those Grands Projets to fit into
first one side makes a move, then the other. the specific tradition, culture
With Singapore, it’s much more integrated. I think
it’s a better system, particularly for Grands Projets. and history of each country,
MT The Singaporean government is also very
quick to react to the need for essential projects,
city, place and neighbour-
such as hospitals and infrastructure. hood is key.
47 Conversation Series
NH King’s Cross has been more process-ori- With the Green Railway Corridor, there might be
ented in its realisation, whereas Pudong
was designed with one goal in mind. What
is your experience with these two models
and their success?
PT We need a masterplan and vision to carry
out Grands Projets, but these must be carefully
modified due to time. Today’s vision will not nec-
essarily be the right vision five years from now.
Consider the case of Pudong: developers started
quickly building and then realised in the middle
that their design was not suitable. Shanghai adapt-
ed by adjusting its planning requirements in order
to meet changing demands.
With a masterplan, developers can identify devel-
opment possibilities and strategies before starting.
Singapore is a good example: when it launches a
new policy, if it doesn’t work, it does something
else immediately.
In Japan, however, we make the policy and then
it’s very difficult to change. Grands Projets must
have a vision and a masterplan to adapt to the city’s
actual needs.
There are certain things we take for granted. Once
you take things for granted, there’s no challenge.
In my company, we have more than ten different
nationalities, and I’m very proud of that. In our
design process, we try to see everything with sev-
eral sets of eyes and go with the flow. We exhaust
all possibilities, even if they are ridiculous, and
play through many different scenarios until we
are happy with the outcome. That’s the way we
design buildings.
NH How relevant do you think a concentra-
tion of users, programmes, functions and
diversity is for successful Grands Projets?
PT First, I question the notion of density. The
Green Railway Corridor in Singapore, for exam-
ple ​— ​that, for me, is a Grand Projet. There might
not be any building involved, but it’s in line with
other projects that completely change the way
people look at cities.
Another example is the Inner Harbour in Balti-
more: people look at waterfronts differently as a
result [of this project]. Both the Green Railway
Corridor and Inner Harbour draw people into an
urban environment they never experienced before.
Thus, density is better defined as temporary density.
48 The Grand Projet
300,000 people there on a national holiday; the
next day, it’s empty.
A Grand Projet, of course, is still architecture ​— ​it
concerns big buildings and critical mass ​— ​but it’s
different for every country, every city and every
purpose. We need to ask, what’s the impact in the
end? What’s the legacy? Canary Wharf was consid-
ered poorly done, but, in the end, it helped Lon-
don survive.
NH I totally agree. It’s more a matter of what
a Grand Projet can release or trigger. What
would you refer to as good examples of
Grands Projets, having practiced in vari-
ous countries and contexts?
MT Rockefeller Center is often portrayed as
the grandmother of all Grands Projets, and I feel
that it is indeed one of the great urban megapro-
jects. The way it worked, what it did for New York
through the decades, how it has aged well… We’re
doing a project next to it and the Rockefeller Center
has profoundly influenced our design.
Its architecture and connectivity are perfect; it
works on different levels and generates a centre
in New York. But it’s not overpowering. It works
on the human and the global scale. This is a Grand
Projet I feel people can learn from.
NH We’ve said that many Grands Projets, in-
cluding Rockefeller Center, were com-
pletely out of scale at an early stage. By
the time Rockefeller Center was built, it
was nearly inhuman in scale.
Because of Grands Projets’ size, they really
do need time, not only to adapt, but also
for their cities to adapt. That’s why it’s dif-
ficult to assess the success of Grands Pro-
jets early on.
PT Usually, successful Grand Projets are un-
welcome at the beginning. Initially, people be-
lieved the Eiffel Tower would destroy the entire
fabric of Paris. But today, Paris is not Paris without
the Eiffel Tower.
I think there are many interesting projects all
over Asia, which later evolved city and country
fabric: KLCC, for example. It began as a large-
scale mixed-­use development. Now, it is the icon
of Malaysia.
We have to be aware that we NH We as planners might not know of all of
these flavours. But we know of their impor-
cannot come up with a pre- tance to a project and therefore should
give space to them.
conceived solution, but must MT We are conflicted because we are archi-
go through a multi-layered tects and planners at the same time. We have two
hearts beating in our breast, as the Germans say.
process and be open to frus- As architects, we love Grands Projets because it’s
great and exciting to create big buildings. As urban-
trations in order to experience ists, we know how difficult it is to create a Grand
success. Projet and how easily a Grand Projet can destroy
a whole city.
We have to be sensitive. Projects require research
and we have to talk to all people involved or con-
cerned with the project. We have to be aware that
There were no shopping malls in Taiwan twenty we cannot come up with a preconceived solution,
years ago; now, there are many of them. There but must go through a multi-layered process and
was only one Hyatt Hotel and one convention cen- be open to frustrations in order to experience suc-
tre in the Xinyi District of Taipei two decades ago; cess. Grands Projets cannot only be big architec-
now, it is a centre full of activity. ture. They must relate to the city and become part
of the city to be successful.
NH It reminds us to be patient with Grands
Projets. In the past, Grands Projets like St. NH Thank you for your time.
Peter’s in Rome took decades to con-
struct. Now, we’re impatient if something
like the Elbphilharmonie in Hamburg is
three years past its completion date.
PT I think you’re saying the Grand Projet with
a well-thought-out scale is very successful. We
always talk about urban scale, architecture scale
and human scale.
What’s important is urban edge: how a project
meets city fabric. You have to be very sensitive to
this from the beginning. Today, it might look right,
but twenty years from now, it might be different.
No masterplan is perfect and no built environment
is perfect. Sensitivity to scale, culture and tradition
remains very important. As I said before, everybody
talks about globalisation. But globalisation only
proves how important it is to have local flavour.
About twenty years ago, I was invited to Ho Chi
Minh City. We created a masterplan for Saigon
South with SOM. But the client’s initial reaction
was, “When can we be Singapore?” I said, “No, you
have to have your own identity.”
They felt that they were far behind with modern-
isation; they wanted to catch up. Yet preserving
local flavours is essential, even more essential
than modernisation.
49 Conversation Series
 Case Study
Portraits

50 51 The Grand Projet

Marunouchi
Tokyo

MNU–T
53 The Grand Projet
 Marunouchi

Roppongi Hills
Shibuya Station
Marunouchi
Haneda Airport
Site area 1,200,000 sqm

GFA 8,000,000
sqm

Density 6.67 FAR

Population Density 0.17 inh / ha

Streets/roads25.00%
Built-up38.00%
Non Built-up 36.00%

Residential<1.00%
Business 83.00% Office / Hotel

Commercial 15.00% Retail

Civic 2.00%
Education, Arts, Culture Centre

1889 First planning act for the site

1894 Purchase of the site
1914 Opening of Tokyo Station
1923 Great Kanto Earthquake
1945 End of WWII
1959 Marunouchi remodelling plan with FAR increase
1988 Founding of OMY District Council
1990 Economic crisis
1998 Start of Marunouchi Redevelopment Project
2000 First OMY Guidelines: Marunouchi to become an Amenities Business Centre
2001 Start of Urban Renaissance policies
2010 Marunouchi to become a MICE destination

54 Marunouchi Tokyo Conception Design Implementation Operation Implication

1868 The Marunouchi area is located between the 1894 The Iwasaki Family (founder of Mitsubishi) 1921 Beginning of Showa Period 1964 Olympic Games
Imperial Palace and Shitamachi, the downtown area purchases 267,300 sqm of land in the Marunouchi
for business and trade; it is a Samurai residence area district, 9,900 sqm in Yurakucho and 72,600 sqm 1923 The Great Kanto Earthquake destroys large
in Kanda Misakicho from the Japanese government parts of the Marunouchi area and its brick buildings
on 6 March 1890 for 1.28 million yen (Mitsubishi
Asset Book, 2015) 1926 End of Meiji period and Establishment of Mit-
subishi Trust & Banking

1928 Mitsubishi Aircraft is established

1885 Plot subdivision in Marunouchi.
1869 Meiji Restoration: Tokyo becomes the capital of Ichigocan Buidling, the first brick building in Marunouchi, opens in 1894.
Japan and the Emperor is reinstated as sovereign
1894 7 The Mitsubishi Ichigokan Building and
1885 Opening of Shibuya & Shinjuku Station first Western-style buildings are completed; more
three-storey brick office buildings are later construct-
1889 6 The Marunouchi area is divided into blocks ed, resulting in the “London Block”
according to the Shhiku-kaisei City Planning Act,
the first established by the new Meiji government 1914 7 Opening of Tokyo Station, which has
550,000 passengers in the first year. The district is
later developed as a business centre, with American-­
style reinforced concrete buildings lining the streets;
this area is eventually renamed the “New York Block.”
Trees are planted along Babasaki-­dori
1931 Mitsubishi Oil is established
1934 Mitsubishi Heavy Industry is established
1945 Japan surrenders at the end of WWII
50% of the built environment of Tokyo is (1959), the district is rebuilt with sixteen large-­scale
destroyed
1952 Tokyo Station and surrounding area
The rooftops of the two Olympic gymnasia by Kenzo Tange in Yoyogi Park.
1960s 7 As Japan enters an era of high economic
growth, there is an increase in demand for office
space
1960s Through the Marunouchi Remodelling Plan
office buildings, increasing total available floor space
by more than five times
1972 Mitsubishi Estate office in New York opens
1974 7 Completion of the Marunouchi Remodel-
ling Plan, which started in 1959:

The area around Tokyo Station in 1952.

An abundance of large-capacity office build-

ings appears near Tokyo Station, reflecting a period
of rapid economic growth

SECOND PHASE

FIRST PHASE 1959 6 Beginning of the Marunouchi Remodel-

1890s Development of the first full-scale business
centre under the Meiji government
1893 Renaming of the Iwasaki Company to Mitsub-
ishi Company (Mitsubishi Goshi Kaisha)
Tokyo Station opens in 1914. ling Plan, the first redevelopment of buildings in the
area allowing structures higher than 31 m and a wid-
1915 Mitsubishi Goshi establishes a sales branch ening of the central road (Naka-­dori Avenue) from The area around Tokyo Station in 1974.
in London 13 m to 21 m
1980s High-rise buildings over 100 metres tall ap-
1919 Mitsubishi Bank is established First high-speed bullet train starts operation pear in the district

Conception
Design
Implementation

56 Marunouchi Tokyo 57 Transversal Data

Operation
Implication
1980s Despite this changing skyline, the Maru­ 1991 Collapse of the Japanese economy of Ôtemachi, Marunouchi and Yûrakuchô 2007 8 Ecozzeria is established as a hub for envi-
nouchi district remains a business centre with sce- ronmental plans and activities
nic views of the Imperial Palace’s moats and vege- Move of Tokyo City Hall from Marunouchi to 8 Release of Special Urban Renaissance Law;
tation (Mitsubishi Asset Book, 2015, p. 2) West Shinjuku creation of incentives and legal relaxations Shin Marunouchi Building Tower (197m) in
front of Tokyo Station is completed
1986 Mitsubishi Estate branch is established in the 1994 78 Approval of the Otemachi-Marunouchi-­­­ 8 Allocation of special Urban Renaissance
U.K. Yurakucho District Basic City-­Planning Agreement Districts

The Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) THIRD PHASE 7 Marunouchi Building is completed (180 m)
launches the 4th National Capital Region Develop- and is the first one to open its ground floor in the po-
ment Plan (NCRDP), which focuses on decentrali- 1996 8 Establishment of the Advisory Committee dium for retail:
sation and a polycentric core of the city to the OMY Area Development Project Council

0 Launch of the Urban Renaissance Policy 1997 6 TMG proposes the ‘Grand Design for Cen-
under PR Nakasone tral Tokyo’

Land acquisition begins in the area of Rop- Establishment of the Study Committee on
pongi Hills Development and Promotion Policies for Urban
Infrastructures around Tokyo Station
0 The Otemachi-Marunouchi-Yurakucho area
becomes a Priority Urban Development Area (PUDA) 7 Tokyo international forum opens on the
site of old city hall
1987 Privatisation of Japanese National Rail-
way company (JNR) 1998 07 Mitsubishi Estate begins redevelopment
in the area around Tokyo Station as the first stage of
1988 0 6 Mitsubishi Estate proposes the Redevel- its Marunouchi Redevelopment Project
opment Plan, aka Manhattan Plan, for Marunouchi
in response to the Urban Renaissance Law of 1986; Based on the concept of “pursuing diverse
the Manhattan Plan comprises 60 towers, each 200 and multifunctional urban development,” the pro-
m high with a FAR of 2000 ject aims to create a landscape that will grant a new
image to the site, which has until now been strictly
Subsequently, Mitsubishi faces criticism from a business area
the public and the press
2000 0 6 First OMY District Guidelines intro-
duced by the OMY Advisory Committee, revised in
2005, 2008, 2012 and 2014 and titled ABLE (Amen-
ity Business Life Environment) CITY: A City of New
Opportunities
2001 7 Introduction of the Urban Renaissance
Policy
The Redevelopment Plan aka Manhattan Plan, 1988.
2002 8 Ligare is established as the OMY Area Man-
6 OMY District Redevelopment Council is agement Association is established
founded to develop a vision and specific develop-
ment strategy and guidelines for the area; its foun- 8 The Ôtemachi, Marunouchi, Yûrakuchô
dation can be seen as a reaction to the failed Man- District Redevelopment Project Council is renamed
hattan Plan proposal the Council for Area Development and Management
2008 69 The focus shifts to make the Maru­nouchi
Redevelopment Project more comprehensive in its
second stage
Redevelopment begins with the construction
of the Marunouchi Park Building and Mitsubishi
Ichigokan
6 With input from the Study Committee on
Development and Promotion Policies for Urban By spreading Marunouchi’s vibrant, bustling
Infrastructures around Tokyo Station, a plan for the atmosphere to Otemachi and Yurakucho and estab-
redevelopment of the Marunouchi station-front lishing a financial business centre with a larger amen-
plaza and the east-west connection in the southern ity infrastructure, the project strengthens the area’s
part of the station is formulated international competitiveness
2003 8 Committee for the Promotion of Otemachi Through the addition of a museum and other
Urban Development is established art and cultural facilities and eco-friendly develop-
ment, Mitsubishi Estate aims to give the area a fresh
Opening of Roppongi Hills appeal based on new values
2004 OMY Council and Uchisaiwaicho Town 8 9 Mitsubishi Estate Asia Pte. Ltd. estab-
Council establish a Regional Disaster Prevention lished in Singapore
Organisation
2009 First draft of the MICE Promotion Action Plan
7 Merging of the Urban Development Cor- released by the Japan tourism Agency (JTA) & In-
poration and the Housing and Development Cor- augural year of MICE
poration to create the Urban Renaissance Agency
2011 Great Tohoku earthquake
7 Establishment of Tokyo Station Neighbour-
hood Association for Disaster Prevention 2012 Start of Shibuya Station Redevelopment
2005 7 8 OMY District Council revises ABLE City 2014 The OMY Council releases the latest guide­
concept and proposes City Planning Guidelines lines for the Otemachi-Marunouchi Area

Conception
Design
Implementation

58 Marunouchi Tokyo 59 Transversal Data

Operation
Implication
 100 500m 100 500m

Current base plan. MNU–T Building footprint Softscape Pre-intervention base plan, 1896. MNU–T Project site
MNU–T Building footprint, Projected softscape
projected Hardscape
MNU–T Project site Projected hardscape

60 Marunouchi Tokyo 61 Transversal Data

 Ôtemachi Station

Tokyo Station

Hibiya Station

100 500m 100 500m

Publicly accessible open space plan. Softscape (within site) Transportation plan. Toei lines: Metro lines: Tozai Metro station
Hardscape (within site) Asakusa Ginza Yurakucho Toei station
Mita Marunouchi Hanzomon Train station
Oedo Hibiya Bus station
Chiyoda Pedestrian way Bike station

62 Marunouchi Tokyo 63 Transversal Data

 Nihonbashi
Japan Bankers Bridge
Association
The Industry
Club of Japan

Imperial Palace

Tokyo Station

Meiji Life Insurance

Building Japan Central
Post-Office

Mitsubishi
Ichigokan

DN Tower 21

100 500m 100 500m

Heritage structures. MNU–T Heritage structure Programme plan. Residential Civic institutions
Imperial Palace, Nihonbashi Commercial Technical utilities
Bridge, Historic Imperial Business Mixed-use
Palace buildings, Nihonbashi Industrial Ground floor with
Bridge commercial & business

64 Marunouchi Tokyo 65 Transversal Data

 MARUNOUCHI TOKYO
Continuous Update of a Modern Urban Vision
Naomi C. Hanakata

1 INTRODUCTION

Marunouchi is Tokyo’s financial and business centrality. It is located in the

geographical heart of Tokyo, framed by Tokyo Station and the Imperial
Palace in Chuo Ward. Its proximity to Tokyo Bay, the Nihonbashi River
and the Palace has made it an ideal strategic site for a new business hub.
Marunouchi is, in many ways, representative of Tokyo’s urban
development over the past 120 years: it illustrates both a gradual densifi-
cation of the city and Japan’s particular way of adopting international trends
and adapting them to locally specific circumstances. ​→ MNU–T.01 S ​ imulta-
neously, Marunouchi is a unique project, diverging from Tokyo’s idiosyn-
cratic, fragmented development pattern. It is largely owned by a private
company, Mitsubishi Estate, and governed by various stakeholders, making
it the largest comprehensively-planned and privately-driven urban devel-
opment project in Tokyo. Today, the project emblemises an increasingly
diverse programme, with commercial and cultural amenities and a variety
of open spaces that speak to its persistent ambition to improve itself.

1.1 FROM A FEUDAL TO A CAPITALIST CENTRE

The beginning of the Marunouchi development coincides with
several important moments in the city’s urbanisation process. The devel-
opment began at the start of a new imperial era, the Meiji Era. This was
also when Japan began to engage in international trade and exchange, ini-
tiating nation-wide industrialisation and modernisation.
Tokyo became the new capital of Japan in 1868. Prior to this, Kyoto,
450 kilometres southwest of Edo (the historic name of Tokyo), was the
official seat of the Emperor. However, the actual political and military power
of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries​ — ​a peaceful epi-
sode in Japanese history​ — ​had been in the hands of a military regime, which
had established its headquarters in Edo. Because this regime, the Shogu-
nate, was able to maintain peace and stability between all the regional lords
(daimyô) of the country, cultural development during these times flour-
ished, spawning an artisanal renaissance.
When the Shogunate was overthrown in 1868 and the emperor
reinstated as sovereign in the Meiji Restoration, Edo was renamed the
Eastern Capital: Tokyo. It is this Meiji Restoration that initiated a new era,
in which the young Meiji Emperor was eager to ‘modernise’ his country
and develop Tokyo into the country’s new capitalist centre.

MNU–T.01 View from Mitsubishi Building onto Tokyo Station. 67 Introduction

 1.2 FROM AN OPEN FIELD TO A CENTRE OF BUSINESS
After the Meiji Restoration, large estates previously owned by
wealthy and influential daimyô, part of the old aristocracy, were appropri-
ated by the central government and awaited a fresh purpose in the new
capital. Whilst the country had started to open its international borders,
many people had left the capital due to the various changes triggered by
the Meiji Restoration and a lurking uncertainty about the city’s future. A
large area east of the Imperial Palace, where Marunouchi is today, similarly
transformed: originally home to regional lords under the Shogun, the site
had become vacant at the beginning of the Meiji Era and was partially used
as a military exercise field. In 1890, the government sold 27.87 hectares
(84309.909 tsubo) of the area to the Iwasaki Family. Under the new emperor,
members of the family had founded a successful shipping company, which
Ôtemachi quickly expanded into a mining and banking business. By the time of the
site’s purchase, the Iwasaki family was one of the new industrial oligarchs
who played a key role in Japan’s modernisation.
The site discussed in this case study consists of three areas: a cen-
tral area named Marunouchi, a southern part, Yûrakuchô, and a northern
region, Ôtemachi. → ​ MNU–T.02 T
​ he diverse expertise of the Mitsubishi Estate
Company, still the major property owner, enabled the site’s comprehensive
development, encompassing real estate, planning, project management,
construction, marketing strategies and implementation of energy systems.
Thus, Marunouchi offers a rich case study for comprehensively planned urban
megaprojects and a long history to examine its transformation over time.
Marunouchi

2 CONCEPTION

Marunouchi’s development has been very gradual but consistent. In its more
than 120 years of continuous transformation and densification, Marunouchi
has maintained its initial conception as a showcase of Tokyo modernity and
as a business and trade centre. Over time, however, both the understanding
of the term ‘modern’ and visions for the site have changed.
When the Iwasaki Family purchased the land east of the Imperial
Yûrakuchô Palace, the rail connection between the city’s port in Yokohama and the site
was already in full operation. As early as 1872, Shimbashi Station was the
terminus for the Tôkaidô Main Line, connecting the city to the south and
placing the site at the end of the essential trading route of the country, the
Tôkaidô or Eastern Sea Route. With the decision to turn the area into the
city’s business centre, the new owner leveraged the site’s historic status as
a residential area close to the Palace. Such proximity has created highly val-
ued property from the beginning and also implicitly influenced Marunouchi’s
development.

100 500m

MNU–T.02 Three sites of Marunouchi.

68 Marunouchi Tokyo 69 Introduction / Conception


MNU–T.03 Late Meiji era view of Babasakidori with Ichigokan Building on the right.
2.1 WHAT IS MODERN?
In order to understand the underlying logic of the Marunouchi
development, we need to understand the particular notion of modernity
in Tokyo at the turn of the century and its role in the societal and built
transformation of the city.
The beginning of the project coincided with a time of political
turmoil and uncertainty: with newly opened borders, Japan was gazing out
into the world, seeking ideas that could help the country modernise. Moder-
nity, in this context, refers to a state of urban development in the West and
the process of modernisation as an opening towards Western influences.
One of the Emperor’s first orders in the 1870s involved educational
missions to Europe and the United States. These encounters between Jap-
anese ambassadors and scholars and civilisations abroad in conjunction
with trading partners coming to Tokyo’s shores brought new ideas, inno-
vation and technologies to the capital. Ships arrived in the port of Yoko-
hama and delegates and tradesmen​ — ​with their goods and ideas​ — ​travelled
by train to Shimbashi, at the southern end of the Marunouchi site. Key to
the city’s urban development was the introduction of British technologies
for infrastructure and German expertise, which established a legal system
and restructured the Japanese military. Paris, recently remodelled under
Georges-Eugène Haussmann, London and Berlin served as primary ref-
erences for urban planning.
70 Marunouchi Tokyo
Large urban planning projects, however, were never implemented, despite
the commission of foreign planners to redesign the central area, rife with
fragmented private ownership structures and a lack of implementation
mechanisms. It was in smaller architectural moments and selected street
corners that new ideas of urban space based on Western ideals became
realised. The first building modelled after London references was the
Ichigôkan Building in the centre of Marunouchi, a red brick building de-
signed by British Architect Josiah Conder and referred to as the London
Block. →
​ MNU–T.03 T ​ he Ichigôkan Building was demolished in 1968 to make
way for a FAR increase; however, it was reconstructed in 2009 to host the
Mitsubishi Ichigôkan Museum and now represents an important piece of
heritage within the area.
It was in reference to these punctual insertions of modern life that
Kafu Nagai, a well-known novelist and contemporary wrote: “… When a
city aped the West to the degree that Tokyo did, the spectacle provoked in
the observer is an astonishment, along with a certain sense of pathos”
(1922/1994). With individual buildings like the Ichigôkan Building, the
notion of modernity gradually infused the built environment.
2.2 A NEW CENTRALITY
With its transition from Edo to Tokyo, the city was no longer the
capital of a feudal system. In the new era, Tokyo had to re-establish its
hegemony, this time as a central open market for ideas and cross-border
exchange. In doing so, Tokyo became a centrality of urban development
logic and form of spatial production. The Marunouchi site played a pivotal
role in this process.
The opening of Tokyo Station on the eastern side of Marunouchi
in 1914 strengthened its position as a logistic hub, and the development of
the area accelerated thereafter. During this early phase, the economic struc-
ture of the city shifted from agricultural to manufacture-based. Daily life
was similarly transformed: in addition to new architectural typologies,
electrified train lines began to cross the city centre and western couture
became increasingly visible on the streets. The area of Ginza, on the east-
ern side of Marunouchi, where red brick buildings soon framed entire
streets, became the commercial centre for the exchange of Western com-
modities, ideas and products offered for purchase in shops and department
stores. Whilst Ginza was largely destroyed during the Great Kanto Earth-
quake and fire in 1923, the brick buildings in Marunouchi remained and
the site continued to fill with office buildings from the 1920s onwards­​
→ MNU–T.04 , evolving into Tokyo’s business hub. At this time, Tokyo had
already reached a population of six million.
As the primary location for local and foreign business headquarters​ — ​
whether to connect Japan to the world or the world to Japan​ — ​Marunouchi
can be seen as the spatial result of the global network of markets our cities
tie to the ground. These networks have shaped Marunouchi, as the spatial
71 Conception
Before 1895 1895 1896–1905 requirements of the service sector shape its buildings and the Western city
influences its streetscape, now dotted with internationally recognisable logos
and signs. This offers an interesting case to study how global abstract sys-
tems are superimposed onto concrete urban centralities. ​​c CENTRALITIES ​​

2.3 NOT A TOD

The sequence of urban development and implementation of mass
transport systems in Marunouchi deserves special attention. Transport-ori-
ented development (TOD) is a well-established mechanism for urbanisa-
tion in Tokyo and other cities in Japan. Urban development, in concert with
the installation of mass transit lines, started in the 1910s in Tokyo and
proliferated through diversified company structures mentioned earlier.
1906–1915 1916–1925 1926–1935 These combined line installation with real estate and amenity develop-
ment. The reference case study of Shibuya ​→ P. 102 ​provides one of the most
prominent examples here: the line operator Tôyoko (today part of Tôkyû
Corporation) opened the first department store-cum-rail station in 1934
and, with that, consolidated its monopoly over the rail infrastructure in
the southwest of the city (Jacobson 2010).
Marunouchi, however, differs from the transport-oriented devel-
opment model, as it was neither developed by the company operating
Tokyo Station nor any of the railway lines crossing the site; indeed, it was
not a direct response to the opening of any of the mass transit hubs in the
area. Whilst it is located at the end of the Tôkaidô, the Eastern Sea Route,
Marunouchi was designated as a business centrality prior to the introduc-
1936–1945 1946–1955 1956–1965
tion of any train lines within the site. Furthermore, the existing project is,
in its spatial, programmatic and organisational logic, fairly independent
of the transportation infrastructures. It can therefore not be considered as
a mere implication of Tokyo Station, one of the largest stations in the city,
but rather as an urban development creating its own logic, consolidated
by growing local and regional connectivity over time.

3 DESIGN

With its historical preconditions and the city’s modern agenda, Marunouchi
1966–1975 1976–1985 2015
has been developed in a consistent manner, without a masterplan like those
of other Grands Projets discussed in this text. The underlying spatial scheme
was initially determined by the site’s prior functions​ — ​large estates and
exercise fields​ — ​and adopted less of a regulatory disposition. The First
Urban Area Improvement Plan for Tokyo, released in 1888, reflected the
rectangular street grid of the noble residential area of the Edo period. The
plan further suggested an incremental development approach, proposing
an insertion of only singular urban improvement projects (Hein 2010, 72).
To date, Marunouchi is defined by a compilation of building regulations

MNU–T.04 Build-up evolution of Marunouchi.

72 Marunouchi Tokyo 73 Conception / Design

MNU–T.05 Map of the City of Edo around 1845.

and design guidelines. There has not been a comprehensive masterplan

design but various attempts have been made to synthesise and define
strategic principles for the site. A coherent development has nevertheless
occurred over time and is particularly evident in the pre-existing grid and
block dimensions. These specific spatial parameters serve as a means of
investigating defining spatial characteristics of the project in the absence
of a masterplan. ​​r REGULATORY PLANS ​​

3.1 THE GRID

The plan for Marunouchi incorporates the grid structure laid out
during the Edo period. This grid regularity extends to the area commonly
referred to as Shitamachi, located further east; together, Marunouchi and
Shitamachi stand out from their more organic surrounding street pattern.
The notion of a grid with specific dimensions is based on an eighth-century
Chinese system, which identified the grid’s ideal dimensions as 109 by
109 metres (equivalent to the unity of 60 ken), forming a block of 1.2 hec-
tares. This block was typically subdivided into plots (tan) of 10 by 30 metres,
creating evenly sized paddy fields of 300 sqm (Sorensen 2002, 28). In the
case of Marunouchi, the plots were larger than these dimensions, as they
were intended for residential purposes. They remained, however, within
the initially devised grid, with blocks measuring an average of 6,500 sqm
each. The plots gradually decreased in size, winding around the castle in
a clock-wise, spiral fashion and hosting lower-ranking vassals. → MNU–T.05 100 500m

MNU–T.06 Map of original block subdivision.

74 Marunouchi Tokyo 75 Design

The grid, which still structures Marunouchi today, reflects this particular
urban dichotomy that was more than a structural distinction between the
elite residencies of daimyô and the merchant quarters. This was also a
sociocultural ordering that divided Tokyo into what was known as the ‘high
city’ in the west (including the area adjacent to the Palace) and the ‘low Imperial Palace Outer Garden
Yaesu
city’ in the east. Thus, without the large-scale changes imposed on cities MNU–T.09 Tokyo Central Post
Office, ca. 1935.
like Paris or London, Marunouchi’s layout naturally accommodated West-
ern planning ideas, such as wide boulevards and perimeter block buildings
framing grand urban gestures.
In 1987, the grid was expanded conceptually in an attempt to rede-
velop the site at the peak of Japan’s economic boom. In 1988, the Redevel- Kanda/ Hibiya/
Jimbocho Shimbashi
opment Plan, informally also known as the Manhattan Plan, a proposal by
Mitsubishi Estate, suggested 200 towers with a FAR of 20, vertically extrud- MNU–T.07 Height restriction guidelines dependent on area and distance to the Imperial Palace.
ing the grid structure. The Manhattan Plan responded to a law released  asin-shaped skyline from
B
the Imperial Palace
the previous year, which tried to counter a slowdown of the local construc- Approx. 200m
tion economy by providing various incentives for inner-city developments. Approx. 150m
Approx. 100m
This Urban Renaissance Law was the first of many urban revitalisation 31m
measures designed to invigorate local and national economies. The Man-
hattan Plan, however, failed, largely due to public criticism and the auto-
cratic way in which Mitsubishi had been directing the development in the
area. In response to the provocative high-rise proposal and the new interest
in the area, the Ôtemach-Marunouchi-Yurakuchô District Redevelopment
Council was founded in 1988 to provide a more inclusive platform for var- MNU–T.10 New JP Tower, 2012.
ious stakeholders to be involved in the site’s planning. The structure and
purpose of this council will be further discussed in the chapter concerning
implementation.

3.2 THE BLOCK 1900 1920s 1970s 2000s

The design of Marunouchi’s individual blocks and architectural
typologies is very much the formal and functional result of the grid’s her-
metic layout. The first series of buildings, as well as the first generation of
buildings constructed after the war, largely consisted of a perimeter block
typology. ​→ MNU–T.06 ​In this process, individual buildings were gradually
consolidated into this block structure, maximising the permitted FAR. A
height restriction of 31 metres (100 shaku), valid until 1959, enforced a
uniform streetscape. This height restriction was eventually removed, but
a 31-metre eaves height restriction remained in the central and southern
area of the site, along with a maximum height for podia, which enabled a
consistent vanishing line. ​​r REGULATORY PLANS ​
Today’s height restrictions vary by area and distance to the Impe-
rial Palace. ​→ MNU–T.07 ​The podium height limitation and gradual height
increase allowed for an integration of first- and second-generation buildings
into the gradually densifying area →​ MNU–T.08 : façades of older, low-rise build-
ings were maintained and created a podium base, whilst towers were erected
above. Examples of this tower development include the Tokyo Central Post
Office (now the KITTE mall within the podium of the old post office, which
first opened in 1931) ​→ MNU–T.09 , the new JP Tower, which opened in 2013
→ MNU–T.10 ​and the Marunouchi Building. The first Marunouchi Building
MNU–T.11 Marunouchi
Building, built in 1923.
MNU–T.12 Marunouchi
Building, 2002.
​ ding cake’ building shapes unified the first generation of high-rise buildings
MNU–T.08 Gradual podium tower densification.
opened in 1923 ​→ MNU–T.11 , and the most recent redevelopment of the site
opened in 2002. → ​ MNU–T.12 T​ he podium tower simultaneously mimics early
modern architecture and showcases an entirely new development. In the
northern area of Ôtemachi as well as east of the train tracks, the block is
less restricted, exhibiting, for example, tower developments that extend
for over two blocks (including the World Financial Centre) without any
significant restriction to height. ​→ MNU–T.13
The latest generation of podia includes generous internal public
spaces or city rooms, which provide cross-connections and venues for exhi-
bitions or seasonal activities. Today, this urban streetscape of podium tower
buildings is also a reference to the early Manhattan streetscape, whose ‘wed-
in New York. In the case of Marunouchi, however, this particular aspect of

76 Marunouchi Tokyo 77 Design

 Imperial Palace Uchibori-dori
Hibiya Park
Outer Garden
Wadakura
Fountain
Park Otemachi Area
Uchibori
Yurakucho Area Marunouchi Area
Hibiya-dori
Hibiya-dori

Gyoko-dori
Marunouchi Naka-dori Otemachi Hub

i
dor
mi-
Daimyo-koji Daimyo-koji

Babasaki-dori
u
Marunouchi Station

Har
Yurakucho Hub

Eitai-dori
Front-side Plaza vicinity
JR Yurakucho Sta.
Marunouchi Hub

k
Yaesu Area

r
Pa
Tokiwabashi

hi
JR Tokyo Sta.

as
Hub

ab
w
ki
To
Sotob
ori-do
ri
Yaesu Hub

MNU–T.14 Schematic map showing the individual improvement zones, hubs and axes in the project area.

form is less the result of a historic or Western reference, as Eric Firley argues
01 02 (2013, 196), but more the result of a gradual densification process within
block limits and the conservation of various generations of building façades.
The towers’ architectural variations are within the confines of a
maximum FAR and other regulations established by the Council for Area
Development and Management of Otemachi, Marunouchi and Yurakucho
01
(hereafter referred to as the OMY Council). For the most recent tower
additions, external architects have contributed to concept design, intro-
ducing slight variations from the traditional glass structures. The Interna-
tional Forum by Rafael Viñoly (1997) near Shimbashi Station, a convention
centre complex built on the site of the old City Hall​ — ​relocated to Shinjuku
in 1991 to make space for a more business-conducive programme​ — ​typifies
diversion from tower-podium typology. The International Forum is a
medium rise development, spanning over four blocks with a symmetric
lens on the side facing the train tracks and a fragment of block perimeter
02
development on the other, creating a covered open space between.
The latest block development in the southern Yûrakuchô area in-
volves a proposal for a wooden high-rise tower designed by Sumitomo For-
estry and Nikken Sekkei, on a site currently occupied by a building from the
early 1960s. The project was selected to commemorate the 350th anniversary
of the SUMITOMO Group in 2041 with the world’s tallest wooden structure,
and will also be completed as a gesture to consolidation and FAR increase.
The block perimeter building typology forms the basic unit of the
100 500m area’s urban design. It has evolved from street-lining brick buildings to
podia of high-rise towers, maintaining a homogeneous yet dense urban
MNU–T.13 Strict podium height regulations in the central area vs. more flexible regulations in the Strict podium regulations atmosphere. The hermetic urban grid layout and block are not the result
periphery and the north. More flexible regulations
of modernistic, rational planning principles; rather, they have provided an

78 Marunouchi Tokyo 79 Design

adaptive framework that enabled the area to incrementally densify and
redevelop without any fundamental changes. ​​r REGULATORY PLANS ​This is
in stark contrast to the surrounding areas of Ginza, Ôtemachi and Yûra-
kucho, where small structures crammed next to buildings of differing heights
form the variegated and small-scale urban landscape for which Tokyo is
otherwise known.
3.3 THE CENTRAL AXIS
Central in the site’s urban design are three representative axes that
connect the area’s main destinations in an east-west direction. ​→ MNU–T.14 ​
Most prominent are Naka-dôri Avenue (see chapter 4.1) and Gyôko-dôri
Avenue. The latter is 200 metres long and eight lanes wide with a pedestrian
boulevard connecting the central entrance of Tokyo Station with the Wada-
kura Gate and the Sakashita Gate of the Imperial Palace. Gyôko-dôri Avenue
was laid out in its existing dimensions after the 1923 earthquake and rede-
veloped in 2010 to increase its quality as a public space. Now, even though
much shorter, it resembles the Champs-Elysées in Paris in width and rep-
resentation, and constitutes a symbolic central axis in the city. ​→ MNU–T.15
Secondary in importance and dimension to Gyôko-dôri Avenue
are Eitai-dôri Avenue to the north and Babasaki-dôri Avenue to the south.
Both axes continue beyond the site to the east and delineate the three sub-
districts of Yûrakucho, Marunouchi and Ôtemachi.
Under this strategy of maintaining basic urban design elements,
Marunouchi has continued to play home to the realisation of innovative
ideas that generate Tokyo’s modern international signboard. Whilst this
logic may not be representative of other urban developments within Tokyo,
Marunouchi has certainly proved successful in creating the image of a global
capital network hub and modern business centre by design. Its highly reg-
ulated space underlines the role of the area as one of the main centralities
in the city and exemplifies the implementation of coherent spatial guide-
lines otherwise absent in Tokyo. ​​c CENTRALITIES ​
3.4 THE BOUNDARY
Marunouchi is surrounded by areas that are distinctly different in
terms of building typologies, programmes and urban qualities. ​​b BORDERING ​
To the west, it faces the Imperial Palace, hidden in a lush green park and
separated from the city by a sequence of moats. ​→ MNU–T.16 ​The border to
the north is formed by the historic Nihonbashi River, which comes from
the northwest and leads to the famous Nihonbashi Bridge just outside
Marunouchi. This barrier was aggravated by the Inner Circular Route (part
of the Shuto Expressway) in the 1960s, which is built on top of the river
bed. ​→ MNU–T.17 ​This bridge used to be the commercial heart of the old
capital and is depicted in the famous woodcut prints by Hiroshige, reveal-
ing glimpses in their illustrated scenes of what was to become Marunouchi.​
→ MNU–T.18
Attempts to extend the central commercial axis of Marunouchi,
Naka-dôri Avenue, across Nihonbashi River is in discussion but currently still
blocked by a private property on the northern bank of the river (Fujii 2017).
80 Marunouchi Tokyo
MNU–T.15 View of the
representative Gyôko-dôri leading
to Tokyo Station.
MNU–T.16 The Marunouchi
development facing the Imperial
Palace which is hidden behind a
moat and lush green.
MNU–T.17 The Nihonbashi
River towards the north of the site
is covered by the Inner Circular
Highway.
MNU–T.19 The train tracks
running through Tokyo Station
form a border of the site towards
the east.
MNU–T.20 Ginza on the left
exposes much more diverse
building fronts, separated from
Marunouchi from the train tracks
(right).
MNU–T.18 Nihonbashi Bridge with the Marunouchi site in the back, in Clear Weather after Snow at
Nihonbashi Bridge (Nihonbashi yukibare no zu), from the series Famous Places in Edo, Newly Selected
(Shinsen Edo meisho), Art Object by Utagawa Hiroshige I (1797–1858).
Towards the east, a large physical barrier is formed by the bundle of train
tracks (170 metres wide) running through Tokyo station. → ​ MNU–T.19 W
​ hilst
these tracks can be crossed belowground, they create an insurmountable
void in the urban fabric. New developments on the east side of the station
extend the site’s perceived reach, however, further pronouncing its phys-
ical contrast to the Ginza area. ​→ MNU–T.20 I​ n the south, these train tracks
come close to the open space of Hibiya Park, forming a border with another
contrasting spatial element. All these spaces define the perimeter of the
Marunouchi project today and have been there from the outset, some of
them pre-dating the development. Their fixed framing of the project has
left little room for its physical extension or integration with its surround-
ings. Whilst much exchange and pedestrian movement occurs within the
Marunouchi area, far less traffic flows across its borders.
The site’s insularity is also due to the unique property ownership
and governance structure, first led by Mitsubishi Estate and then the OMY
Council. Aerial views of the case study further suggest an insular develop-
ment not only because of the project’s preeminent physical barriers but
also due to the contrast in building typologies to that of nearby areas. Stra-
tegic redevelopment cycles and a gradual FAR increase created this dis-
tinction and enabled the site to meet national and international headquarter
demands with little need to bridge its boundaries.
81 Design
01 Nikkei Building, JA Building,
Keidanren Kaikan
This is a major project of coordi-
nated redevelopment that aims to
ensure that Otemachi continues
to carry out its function as a busi-
ness centre and to establish it as
a strategic base for vibrant
enterprises.
04 Marunouchi Eiraku Building
An environmentally friendly
multipurpose building at the
intersection of Marunouchi and
Otemachi.
07 Marunouchi Park Building
Tower in the back of the Ichigo-
kan Building with the head office
of the Mitsubishi Corporation.
MNU–T.21 Strategic sites and buildings are property of Mitsubishi Estate, which owns about 35% of land
within Marunouchi.
82 Marunouchi Tokyo
02 Otemachi Park Building
Introduces service apartment
facilities to strengthen the area’s
function as an international
business centre.
05 Ichigokan Building
This art museum serves as a
centre of cultural exchange and an
office space that sits in the midst
of the premium office zone in the
Marunouchi district. Neighbouring
the modern Park Building, it is the
first historic building reflecting
Western influence in the city’s
architecture.
08 Otemachi Financial City
Fully equipped with a variety of
business support facilities to
strengthen Marunouchi’s interna-
tional competitiveness.
03 Shin Marunouchi Building 10 Marunouchi Building 11 Marunouchi Kitaguchi
Along with the Marunouchi The original building set the Building
Building, this symbolic and stately stage for the transformation of Multipurpose building developed
building helps to create a gateway Marunouchi into a modern on the site of the former head
in front of Tokyo Station.
01 busi­ness centre. The new office of Japanese National
08 development together with the
Shin Marunouchi Building form a
Railways thats becomes a new
landmark.
gate-like connection be­tween
Tokyo Station and the Imperial
Palace.
02
04
11
03 09
10
12
06 The Peninsula 12 JP Tower
Mitsubishi Estate attracted the 07 High-rise tower on top of the
Peninsula Hotel Group to the preserved and renovated portion
Marunouchi district.
13 of the former Tokyo Central Post
Office.
05
09 Industrial Club Japan 06
Part of the historical building was
retained and integrated into the
new office building.
13 Tokyo Building
First building to utilise the unique
floor-area ratio transfer system in
Japan.
With 35% ownership, the Mitsubishi Estate Group is the largest single property owner and developer of the Property owned by
area. The primary land owner of the area since 1890, Mitsubishi owns buildings at key strategic locations and Mitsubishi Estate
of historic importance. The Ôtemachi area in the north, which is primarily occupied by Mitsubishi owned
buildings, forms the crucial link for a future expansion towards the north and northeast of the core region.
83 Implementation
4 IMPLEMENTATION
Mitsubishi Estate is the driving motor behind the implementation pro-
cess of the Marunouchi development and its multiple stages of redevel-
opment. The company officially owns about one third of the land in strategic
locations. ​→ MNU–T.21 ​Together with other Mitsubishi branches such as
Mitsubishi Motors, Mitsubishi Electrics and the Bank of Mitsubishi UFJ,
however, its collective property ownership is even greater. This collective
does not have any legal ties since the zaibatsu, the company conglomerate,
was dissipated under the allied occupation after the war, but unwritten ties
still exist. Today, approximately 600 companies still espouse the Mitsub-
ishi name, variations of the family crest ​→ MNU–T.22 a
​ nd three principles of
the Iwasaki family: corporate social responsibility, integrity and fairness
and international understanding through trade (Mitsubishi.com 2018),
reflected in the three diamonds of the company’s emblem. The strong pri-
vate guidance in Marunouchi’s development and the condition of one dom-
inant property owner are decisive for the site’s implementation process.
4.1 CYCLES OF REDEVELOPMENT
The first redevelopment phase of interest began with the Iwasaki
family’s purchase of the site from the Meiji government in 1890. The fam-
ily’s company started to develop the site by acquiring further areas through
purchase or expropriation and by ‘loaning’ individual lots in exchange for
a lot elsewhere in the city or other transfer conditions (Nomura 2012). As
mentioned earlier in this case study, neither the developed buildings them-
selves nor the sequence of development occurred in accordance with a
masterplan but rather in alignment with the spatial structure in place.
Despite the existing road infrastructure, the development proceeded slowly;
many referred to the site as mitsubishigahara, the Mitsubishi Wasteland,
for years. The first brick buildings were nearly obscured by the fields as
early photographs indicate. → ​ MNU–T.23 I​ t was only with the opening of Tokyo
Station in 1914 that Marunouchi came closer to what it aspired to be: a
new centrality and modern entrance to the city.
A second phase of redevelopment started after the end of World
War II, which had devastated ninety percent of Tokyo. Based on a remodel-
ling plan released in 1959, the Naka-dôri Avenue, running north-south, was
widened from thirteen to twenty-one metres and old structures were removed
to make way for new and larger developments. This central axis, albeit owned
by the Prefecture of Tokyo, enables us to most easily trace the various imple-
mentation cycles through the transformation of its streetscape. ​→ MNU–T.24
The third phase was compelled by changing needs for office space
in the 1970s and 1980s; large open floor plans became the necessity for
operation and sales. Accordingly, Marunouchi underwent another exten-
sive update of its building stock during a time when its economy was thriv-
ing. Shinagawa in the south and Nishi-Shinjuku in the west simultaneously
84 Marunouchi Tokyo
First generation of brick buildings along Second generation of office buildings with Temporary closure along Naka-dôri for
Naka-dôri Avenue increased FAR along Naka-dôri Avenue in 1968 pedestrian activities in 2016
MNU–T.22 Old Iwasaki Family
Crest and today’s Mitsubishi
company logo.
1910 1968 2016
MNU–T.24 Redevelopment of Naka-dôri Avenue over the past 100 years showing an increase of FAR and
MNU–T.23 The ‘Mitsubishi
Wasteland’ around 1900.
an improvement of open space for pedestrian usage.
began to transition into a business district and administrative district,
respectively. These addressed requirements for larger floor plans from the
very beginning; hence, the pressure of competition required Marunouchi
to provide similarly updated spaces. The third overhaul of architectural
typologies in the area was also in a direct, competitive relationship with
international urban megaprojects that had already become synonymous
with global financial centralities, such as Manhattan in New York, Canary
Warf in London and La Défense in Paris.
This phase and its construction boom, however, came to a harsh
end with the collapse of the Japanese economy and crash of the Japanese
stock market in the early 1990s. The construction sector, which had become
core to the national economy since the war, was particularly impacted, as
urban development had already begun to stagnate in the early 1980s. This
stagnation lasted for nearly two decades (Shinkenchiku 2008).
4.2 INCENTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS
In response to the local economy’s collapse and the stagnation of
the construction sector, the national government issued new policies and
created numerous incentives to revitalise the building trade, which initi-
ated the fourth and latest phase of redevelopment in the area. These pro-
motional measures are commonly referred to as ‘Urban Renaissance,’
mentioned in chapter 3.1. The area of Marunouchi was designated as an
Urban Renaissance Emergency Area amongst eighteen others within the
central twenty-three wards in 1986. ​→ MNU–T.25 ​This measure provided
developers with exceptions in applying for building permissions and spe-
cial trade-offs for increased FARs and building heights.
In Marunouchi, the implementation of these measurements and
an increase in structures and building heights can be clearly traced over
time. ​→ MNU–T.26 F
​ ARs, for example, were increased in return for privately
owned public space (POPs), a typology that started to populate the area
in the 1990s. Other implemented incentives included FAR trade-offs,
85 Implementation
 FAR increase through non-office programme additions within a block

Non-office use additional FAR

150%

Allowed
trade off
14 within
Office use a block Maximum
FAR total FAR
1000% 1150%

06
09
10

18
19 Possible FAR increase Possible programming of a FAR increase

03 05
17 11 12 FAR increase by transfering unbuild FAR within blocks
07
16 Possible Additional FAR
01 08
13 300%
Distribution
within a block

15 02
04
Maximum
Building possible
FAR FAR through
1000% trade-off
1300%

Allowed maximum FAR Possible FAR increase

MNU–T.27 FAR Trade-Off scheme whereby FARs could be increased if adjacent buildings were not using
their maximum FAR allowance.

whereby FAR titles could be purchased from adjacent plots, a mechanism

1 3
# AREA
01 Shibuya Station District
02 Hamamatsu-Cho District
03 Toranomon 2 District
04 Shibuya Station Sakuragaoka Exit District
(Reference case study)
05 New Hibiya Project
MNU–T.25 Map of urban renaissance areas in the 23 Ward zone of Tokyo.
particularly interesting for developments next to heritage buildings such
5 km as Tokyo Station. ​→ MNU–T.27 ​Such deals led to the fourth redevelopment
cycle in the 2000s and further diversification of the built environment
with a new generation of high-rise towers. Today’s statutory FAR is thir-
06 Tokyo Nihombashi Tower
07 Toranomon Hills
13 Shibuya Hikarie
14 Shinjuku Eastside Square
teen, which can be negotiated within the individual planning district of
08 ARK Hills Sengokuyama Mori Tower 15 Roppongi Hills (Reference case study) the area. Any FAR above ten has to be programmed to at least fifty percent
09 West Shinjuku
10 Nihombashi Muromachi East District
16 Shiodome
17 Tokyo Midtown
with activities of public interest, including commercial or recreational facil-
11 ARK Hills South Tower 18 Ginza 6-Chome ities (Firley and Groen 2013). Subsequently, the area’s programme started
12 Tokyo Square Garden 19 Marunouchi Area (case study)
to diversify with the arrival of high-rise towers with FARs close to twenty,
Urban renaissance such as the Shin Marunouchi Building, which has a GFA of 195,000 sqm.
development area
Urban renaissance area

86 Marunouchi Tokyo 87 Implementation

 Tokyo Governor Aoshima introduces ABC (Amenity Business Core) concept
POLICIES AND LAWS
PM Hashimoto wants to make Tokyo a ‘World City’ again
Introduction of District plan
New Special Law to promote housing supply and development in metropolitan areas
TMG releases new ‘Central Ward Area Development Guidelines’
New law to promote Citizens’ innitiatives (NPOs)
1983 1986 4th National Capital Region Development Plan 2004 Landscape Law
Minkatsu policies
1986 Urban Renaissance Policy 2001 New Urban Renaissance Policy
2002 Urban Renaissance Special Measure Law
1994 Basement and shared spaces excluded from FAR calculation; increase of FAR: 6 → 7 in Tokyo
POLICY AMENDMENTS / ADDITIONS
2003 More FAR relaxations

1973 oil crisis 1986 Baker-Miyazawa agreement 1996 Big Bang Policy
INTERNATIONAL EVENTS
1987 Black Monday 1997 Asian financial crisis
1987 Louvre accord
POLITICAL DIRECTION
Prime Minister Nakasone (LDP) JNP JRP JSP Prime Minister Koizumi (LDP) LDP LDP
(NATIONAL)

REGULATORY Urban Neo-liberalisation

CHANGES
40 Planning relaxation
RELAXATION < Land Prices US$/sqm
Ginza 7-Chome

m
/sq
35

US
0$
m

m
700
/sq

/sq
30

US

US
0$

0$
600

600
25

20

m
15

m
< Land Prices US$/sqm

/sq

/sq
Publicly Owned

US
Marunouchi area

US
Private Space

0$

0$
10

450

450
1988 Manhattan Plan 50,000sqm 2005 ABLE City
1989 Burst of the economic bubble 20,000sqm
5
10,000sqm
1990 9.1Mio sqm office space newly created

qm
qm

5,000sqm
m

S/s
0 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
S/s

DEVELOPMENT
/sq

$U
$U
US

PROJECTS OF

210
150
90$

MITSUBISHI ESTATE -5

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020

# YEAR BUILDING GFA (sqm) RFA (sqm) FLOORS 20 1981 Hibiya Kokusai Building 128,403 69,800 31
01 1958 Otemachi Building 111,272 72,100 9 21 1993 Tokyo Gingko Kyokai Building 32,575 13,700 20
02 1958 Shin-Otemachi Building 88,785 60,700 10 22 2002 Marunouchi Building 159,839 74,200 37
03 1962 Fuji Building 81,877 35,900 10 23 2003 Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Building 109,616 39,300 30
04 1962 Nippon Building 173,016 74,300 14 24 2004 Marunouchi Kitaguchi Building 65,565 52,500 29
05 1963 Marunouchi-Nakadori Building 46,102 29,200 10 25 2005 Tokyo Building 149,314 81,700 33
06 1963 Shin-Tokyo Building 106,005 72,600 9 26 2007 Shin-Marunouchi Building 195,401 99,800 38
07 1964 Marunouchi 2-Chome Building 45,985 32,100 10 27 2007 The Peninsula Tokyo 58,600 – 24
08 1965 Tokyo Kotsu Kaikan Building 65,144 18,300 15 28 2007 Yurakucho Ekimae Building 76,466 15,600 21
09 1965 Shin-KokusaiBuilding 77,484 40,300 9 29 2009 Kaidanren Kaikan 54,709 33,000 37
10 1966 Yurakucho Building 42,159 22,900 11 30 2009 JA Building 79,734 15,400 23
11 1966 Kokusai Building 76,918 42,159 9 31 2009 Marunouchi Park Building 195,401 115,700 34
12 1966 Shin-Yurakucho Building 83,688 49,200 14 32 2012 Palace Building 66,850 43,100 23
13 1970 JX Building 63,066 37,400 20 33 2012 JP Tower 212,000 93,000 38
14 1971 Asai Life Insurance Otemachi Building 49,296 33,800 29 34 2012 Otemachi Financial City Tower 242,500 86,100 21
15 1972 JFE Shoji Building 14,277 10,500 13 35 2012 Marunouchi Eiraku Building 139,684 53,400 27
16 1973 Marunouchi 1-Chome Mizuho Building 75,994 – 15 36 2016 Otemachi Financial City Grand Cube ~193,500 ~108,000 31
17 1973 Mitsubishi Building 60,435 37,800 15 37 2016 Otemachi Tower JX Building ~108,800 ~42,300 27
18 1980 Kishimoto Building 33,972 9,500 11 38 2017 Otemachi Park Building ~149,000 ~62,500 29
19 1981 Shin-Nisseki Building 26,566 6,200 11 39 2017 Marunouchi 2–3 Plan ~ ~ ~
MNU–T.26 Timeline of issued regulations and building stock development. Publicly owned Land Prices US$/sqm
private space Marunouchi area
Floors above Land Prices US$/sqm
Floors below Ginza 7-Chome

88 Marunouchi Tokyo 89 Implementation

The original height restriction of 31 metres was a key principle for the imple-
mentation of projects in the area until 1958. This regulation, however, was
dictated by aesthetic reasoning and the area’s proximity to the Imperial
Palace rather than earthquake safety requirements or flight corridors. Fur-
ther OMY Council regulations include building setbacks and the distribu-
tion of energy supply networks and centres.
In 1998, Mitsubishi Estate pursued the redevelopment around Tokyo
Station under the label of the Marunouchi Redevelopment Project. Based
on the concept of “pursuing a diverse and multifunctional urban develop-
ment” (The Council for Area Development and Management of Otemachi,
Marunouchi and Yurakucho 2008), the aim was to create an urban land-
scape that would provide a new image to the area, which had, until then,
concerned only business. This image was to be one of a “world-class beau-
tiful cityscape” that welcomed people from around the globe (The Council
for Area Development and Management of Otemachi, Marunouchi and
Yurakucho 2017). Beginning with the Marunouchi Building in 2002, Mit- Private access
subishi Estate developed six buildings in line with this concept.
The programmatic exclusion of housing has only very recently been
under discussion (Takao 2016). Two explanations for the absence of hous- Public access
ing have surfaced: residential units, so close to the Imperial Palace, might
be incongruous and high rental prices might prohibit the feasibility of res-
idential property. The latter, however, would not necessarily prevent private Privately accessible
owners from occupying parts of their property and renting out the rest as underground

offices. This is the case in many other centralities in Tokyo, as zoning reg-
ulations do not explicitly exclude housing. Aside from a growing number
of commercial and cultural facilities, the absence of residents has created
a lack of amenities and a programmatic imbalance that limits the area’s Publicly accessible
underground
relevance as a concrete urban centrality within the city. ​​c CENTRALITIES

4.3 FROM CBD TO ABC

Within this latest phase of redevelopment, the most significant
changes in relation to the built environment have involved programme
diversification and attention to open spaces. During the economic crisis
of the 1980s and 1990s, the vulnerability of Marunouchi, a district dedi-
cated to a particular programme and single economic sector, became appar-
ent. Its operational management was forced to devise strategies to revitalise
the area and increase its resilience for the future. As a result, a variety of
open spaces have been added over the past fifteen years, providing new
spaces for leisure, recreation and events in an effort to improve the area’s
quality as a destination for work, visitors and international venues (see
transversal map of open spaces).
In 2000, the Advisory Committee to the OMY Council issued
guidelines that built upon recent developments and projected a transition
from a central business district (CBD) to an Amenities and Business Core
(ABC), a model created by the Tokyo Metropolitan Government in 1997
to increase a mix of uses in the city. The proposal was labelled ABLE CITY: 100 500m

A City for New Opportunities (Amenities, Business, Life and Environment).

The ABLE City also attempted to create an original identity for Marunouchi, MNU–T.28 Map of underground network in Marunouchi. Privately accessible
underground connections
Publicly accessible
underground connections

90 Marunouchi Tokyo 91 Implementation

rather than merely referring to other places, such as nineteenth-century
London or 1980s Manhattan. The ABLE City was, however, never truly
successful in its efforts of place-making (Kinjo 2017) and gradually disap-
peared in internal as well as public discussions.
The attempt to diversify has been continuous, nonetheless, and
Marunouchi became the first official Meeting Incentive Convention Event/
Exhibition (MICE) destination in 2010 together with Roppongi ​→ P. 102​
and the Odaiba Waterfront. This initiative was launched by the Japan Tour-
ism Association and showcased diversely programmed inner-urban areas
in order to convey a global, competitive image of the city.
4.4 A CITY BELOW GROUND
Marunouchi’s underground city of streets, subway stations and
retail spaces is interesting to investigate in the context of the project’s imple-
mentation, as it exemplifies certain characteristics: first, gradual redevel-
opment under several planning strategies as opposed to a single plan, and
second, progressive programme diversification.
The configuration of subway stations, including Tokyo Station itself,
has led to an extensive underground street network. ​→ MNU–T.28 ​Interest-
ingly, this network was not planned as a means of increasing connectivity
to surrounding areas cut off by rail, road or water infrastructures nor as an
additional layer of navigation during the hot summers or cold winters of
Tokyo; rather, this network developed incrementally over the past century.
It provides direct access to many of the buildings and allows commuters
to walk between stations belowground. Whilst this network initially con-
sisted of purely functional connections, with space sufficient only for single
pedestrian lanes, these gradually expanded in width and length, creating
a world of bistros, shops, exhibitions spaces and plazas → ​ MNU–T.29–30 ​oper-
ated and managed by the subway stations and proximate buildings.
4.5 LATEST PLANNING GUIDELINES
The current operation of the Marunouchi project follows the Guide-
lines for the Redevelopment of the Area, issued by the OMY Council; the
latest version of these was released in 2014. These guidelines were first issued
in 2000 to form a coherent planning basis for future development and a
starting point for diversification. The guidelines, however, do not have any
statutory authority and cannot be considered an addition to the Ward’s zon-
ing and building requirements. They are merely based on a collective accept-
ance by Marunouchi property owners. The guidelines are a compilation and
update of the Urban Design Manual (2009), the Environment Design Man-
ual (2013) and the Sign Design Manual (2008). The document includes
planning guidelines, an outline of planning tools, development promotion
in­centives and a vision for Marunouchi during the 2020 Tokyo Olympics.
These planning guidelines and incentives are based on a four-zone
division of the area. Each zone demonstrates distinct historical and spatial
affiliations, requiring different strategies and mechanisms for development.
92 Marunouchi Tokyo
These zones are the central Marunouchi area, Yûrakuchô in the south,
Ôtemachi in the north → ​ MNU–T.02 a
​ nd Tokyo Station. A superimposed spa-
tial structure marks important axes and points, including junctions and
open squares. This structure, the hierarchy of zones and the network of
key roads and squares form the basis of a scheme with differentiated but
consistent regulations, tools and incentives. On a smaller scale, the urban
MNU–T.29 Old underground design guidelines go so far as specifying, for example, street widths in rela-
connection in Marunouchi.
tion to façade openings, depending on axis; the planning tools provide
rules for the distribution logic and accessibility of pocket parks within a
block perimeter, depending on built FAR. The development promotion
incentives include FAR trade-offs (see chapter 4.2).
The guidelines are comprehensive and, in many instances, intri-
cate, referencing several other documents. Hence, compliance demands
close coordination with the OMY Council and the Area Management Asso-
MNU–T.30 New underground ciation, Ligare, especially for developers not part of the Mitsubishi Estate’s
connection in Marunouchi.
in-house project envelopment pattern.
The latest District Modification Plan, a basic zoning plan for the
entire site issued by the Chiyoda Ward in 2017, includes measures for a com-
fortable, convenient and vibrant urban environment with a network of green
open spaces intended to balance the densely built-up area (Chiyoda Ward
2017). These spaces, in conjunction with the widening of some roads, also
serve as disaster preventatives, creating zones for emergency access and
evacuation. The plan also forms the basis on which the OMY Council devel-
oped the latest Otemachi, Marunouchi, Yurakucho District Community
Development Guidelines, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
Mitsubishi Estate was the driving force of this gradual implemen-
tation process. The company-owned buildings pioneered a redevelopment
cycle, testing innovative structural typologies and exemplifying new require-
ments, guidelines and technologies. The continuous development and
redevelopment of the site and its individual plots have generated a wide
spectrum of spatial qualities within Marunouchi as a whole.
5 OPERATION
The latest changes in the programming of the area and its built environ-
ment reflect modifications to Marunouchi’s operational structure. These
changes imply not just a new vision of the area as a diverse urban centrality
but also a more open discussion of the area’s future. This chapter discusses
the various stakeholders involved in the most recent stage of Marunouchi’s
development, their relations and the power geometries between them.
5.1 GOVERNING STRUCTURE EVOLUTION
For much of Marunouchi’s development, Mitsubishi Estate led
operations. As mentioned in chapter three, this changed in 1988, when the
non-profit Ôtemachi, Marunouchi, Yûrakuchô District Redevelopment Pro-
ject Council (OMY Council or daimaruchiku saikaihatsu sekkei suishin kyôgikai
setsuritsu) was founded. The council consisted of various property owners
93 Implementation / Operation
in the area, including Mitsubishi Estate, JR East and Chiyoda Ward. The
council was designed to formulate coherent planning proposals competitive
with other business centres’ in an increasingly interconnected and global
market. Since 1996, the OMY Council has been advised by an external com-
mittee, the Advisory Committee on Otemachi-Marunouchi-Yurakucho Area
Development (ōtemachi-marunouchi-yûrakuchô chiku machizukuri kon-
dankai), which also includes members from the Chiyoda Ward, the Tokyo
Metropolitan Government and the Japan East Railway Company.
In 2002, the OMY Council was renamed the Council for Area
Development and Management of Ôtemachi, Marunouchi and Yûrakuchô
(ippanshadanhôjin ôtemachi, marunouchi yûrakuchô chiku machizukuri
kyôgikai or daimaru machizukuri kyôgikai). The same year, an interesting
division of tasks occurred with the creation of the Area Management Asso-
ciation, termed Ligare, which is solely in charge of ‘soft management’ within
Marunouchi. It is also a non-profit organisation deliberately open to prop-
erty owners, shop owners and employees in the area. Ligare has worked
in close collaboration with the OMY Council and together they have initi-
ated the formation of further subsidiaries involved in area operations. As
such, the OMY Council has become an umbrella organisation that super-
vises development but focuses on the built environment.
Ligare is also in charge of the programming of open space: it curates
public events and attractions throughout the year and oversees their imple-
mentation. It also supervises the implementation of open space guidelines
(issued by the OMY Council) and launches area marketing campaigns.
These efforts include the renting out of spaces to third parties, who must
be non-profit in nature or offer educational or entertaining benefits. Every
summer, Gyôko-dôri is used to host a festival (matsuri) where owners, retail
and office tenants, employees and visitors perform traditional dances, mim-
icking local village traditions that celebrate deities, community and cus-
toms. →​​ MNU–T.31 P
​ ast events include a weekend during which IKEA occupied
Naka-dôri Avenue, turning the central boulevard into a balcony landscape
→ MNU–T.32 , and an eco-mobility day hosted by Mercedes Benz. These exam-
ples are manifestations of a co-optation of public space with a for-profit
agenda, which leverage Marunouchi’s central location. ​​b BORDERING
Ligare further supervises the scheme for development incentives
and promotion policies, which include area programming and activation
efforts discussed at the start of this chapter. According to Ligare, these
guidelines are continuously being updated based on feedback collected
through questionnaires (Fujii 2017; Takashi 2016).
The creation of several other subsidiaries to the OMY Council
expanded the organisational diagram with increasingly nested and co-de-
pendent institutions. The Ecozzeria, for example, was founded in 2007 and
is dedicated to sustainability efforts within the area. It also operates the 3×3
Lab Future, located in the Ôtemon Tower, which functions as an incubator
and R&D space for new ideas to be implemented in Marunouchi. Other
projects include the Morning University of Marunouchi, jointly organised
by the OMY Council, Ligare and Ecozzeria, which offers various courses to
participants. Another effort reflecting a high degree of control by Mitsubishi
94 Marunouchi Tokyo
Estate and the attempt to streamline activities in the area is the Marunouchi
Card, a promotional strategy that offers special services to customers of
shops and facilities located in one of the Mitsubishi Estate-owned devel-
opments (Kasahara and Tomita 2017). In 2017, the Destination Manage-
ment Organisation (DMO) DMO Tokyo Marunouchi was initiated to provide
a one-stop solution for business events, including after-work activities, which
MNU–T.31 Annual Matsuri is meant to further support the area as a MICE location.
Festival on Gyôko-dôri in
Marunouchi.
Whilst the prioritisation of Mitsubishi Estate property in the last
example is obvious, other projects, committees and innovation boards are
nominally neutral and dedicated to the interests of the larger area. Behind
this network of diverse bodies and actions, however, Mitsubishi Estate
maintains its directive power by not only functioning as the primary source
of ideas and proposals but also by having the leading managerial team of
each body on its payroll. This creates a picture of Marunouchi’s current
operational structure, which appears diverse and much more decentralised
MNU–T.32 IKEA chairs in
Naka-dôri in Marunouchi.
than it was twenty-five years ago; the actual decision-making power, how-
ever, remains in the hands of Mitsubishi Estate.
This diversified operational structure is not just a matter of social
capacity-building, something usually considered to be a positive attribute
of governmental structures. It is also a matter of creating increasingly com-
plex structures that divert responsibilities and conceal actual power rela-
tions. These fragmented institutional structures are lauded as inclusive,
diverse and democratic in their internal processes. What we have to ana-
lyse, however, are the power geometries built into these structures, which
can present a project in a light quite different from the one reiterated in
official presentations, brochures or websites, one that shows Marunouchi
under centralised and firm control of a single, private and corporate actor.
5.2 STAKEHOLDER AND POWER RELATIONS
The Stakeholder Diagram → ​ MNU–T.33 i​ llustrates the configuration
​ of Marunouchi stakeholders and the power relations between them. This
has evolved over the past three decades. Characteristic of the project’s
management is the fact that Mitsubishi Estate is the central property owner,
developer and actor through its shares in the OMY Council. Some individ-
ual property owners have also commissioned Mitsubishi Estate with devel-
opment. Given that the local ward is the authority that issues and approves
zoning and building regulations represented in the Council, a conflict of
interest is implicit: stakeholders act in different capacities in a project as
“enablers, partners and clients” (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez
2002, 566).
The engagement of single actors in multiple roles is also the case
in other large-scale development projects in Tokyo. It is, in fact, a practice
common to Japan that dates back to the existence of zaibatsu at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century. In these scenarios, real estate developers,
95 Operation
 financiers, contractors, marketing agents and tenants have emerged out
of one single industrial oligarchy that, today, appears under multiple names;
Advisory
Chiyoda
Committee on
Ward/Tokyo JR East
OMY Area
Individual private Development
Metr. Gov.
O these individuals still build their business on these initial ties, even though
Various
and corporate owners M AO
Developers
and tenants most of them are now informal in nature.
B O Whilst in other case studies of the Grand Projet this conflicting
Tokyo engagement of actors is paralleled by increasing institutional fragmenta-
tion, the number of Marunouchi actors is fairly limited: indeed, the fact
MICE Hubs

B
that there are relatively few key players is the very foundation of the site’s
The Council for
Area Development
and Management of
Otemachi, Marunouchi
consistent development, as this enables more or less continuous property
and Yurakucho DMO ownership relations and the deliberate honing of planning and building
(OMY Council)
M B requirements over time. It has also permitted an integration of different
generations of building stock and the development of longer-term goals
and strategies.
Various Visitors,
Architects Consumers,
D Convention
guests

Ligare
V
M 6 IMPLICATIONS

Mitsubishi Estate Ltd. Over the course of Marunouchi’s development, its surrounding inner-city
grew from roughly one million residents in 1890 to more than nine million
Mitsubishi
Jisho Sekkei MBO
D in 2016. The development has had significant impact on Tokyo’s global
Morning
perception, Marunouchi’s status as a regional reference for development
and the local dynamic within the city centre. These first two realms of
Ecozzeria
University
M A impact at the global and regional scales, as well as Marunouchi’s role as a
financial centrality, are worth scrutiny, as they have been part of the rea-
soning for selecting the site as a case study for this research project.

6.1 TOKYO, A GLOBAL CITY?

Post-war economic development in Japan pushed the country into
the Olympus of world economies with a growth rate of 500 percent between
1950 and 1973. As the national financial centre, Marunouchi became known
as a centralised marketplace at the top of the 1980s global economic order.
In a scholarly examination and discussion of the global city theory at the
time (Friedmann 1986; Sassen 1991), Tokyo was placed next to New York
and London and Marunouchi was the field study site in illustrating a growing
social polarisation within these cities. Whilst Sassen’s analytical construct
stresses Tokyo’s developmentalist state backing, Tokyo had undisputedly
become part of both a global financial network and an international discourse
ROLE SECTOR IMPACT
amongst urban scholars. Sassen’s classification of Marunouchi as a site pro-
A Authority Public sector High impact ducing twenty percent of the national GDP in the early 2000s (Morishita,
DV
M
Developer
Management
Private sector
Public & private sector
Okada, and Arita 2006) reinforced the area’s global attention and led to a
O Owner remarkable documentation of its urban development.
D
C
Designer
Community groups
COOPERATION
However, Tokyo is not synonymous with Marunouchi. The global
R Residents / Residents association Founded economy is not spatially embedded in Tokyo, as some scholars describe it,
B
OA
Retailers / F&B / Business association
Other association
Strongly connected
Weakly connected
but rather within Marunouchi specifically (Sassen 1991; Douglass 1993; Hill
V Visitor Targeted Low impact and Kim 2000). Whilst Marunouchi as a financial centrality determined the

MNU–T.33 Marunouchi stakeholder diagram.

96 Marunouchi Tokyo 97 Operation / Implications


MNU–T.34 Mitsubishi Estate operation around the globe.
city’s international importance, it is by far not representative of urban qual-
ity and development patterns​ — ​if there are any​ — ​of Tokyo city at large. Urban
development driven by private corporate conglomerates is not exceptional
in Japan. In the capital city it is in fact part of the development logic that has
created a subdivision of territories, within which a particular industrial con-
glomerate is dominant. The association of names like Mitsubishi, Mitsui,
Mori, Sumitomo or Tôkyû with particular areas in the city is a long-standing
tradition; these associations originate, in many cases, in the particular loca-
tion of a company’s original business, such as ports, train stations or indus-
trial sites. The reader, however, shall not be misguided by these names and
their associated large-scale urban projects: the greatest part of Tokyo’s urban
fabric is fragmented, small-scale and incrementally grown. Without any
obvious logic, the urban tissue of the city consists of a continuous low-rise
built-up only occasionally disrupted by urban megaprojects like Marunouchi.
Therefore, an understanding of Tokyo as a city with a globally embedded
business and financial market is accurate; however, it only discloses a frac-
tion of the city’s contemporary urban condition.
6.2 MITSUBISHI IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA REGION
Marunouchi has become a key reference for comprehensive urban
district developments, particularly for Mitsubishi Estate and its architec-
ture and planning branch, Mitsubishi Jisho Sekkei. Mitsubishi Estate has
more than thirty ongoing operations in Asia, Oceania, the U.K. and the
98 Marunouchi Tokyo
U.S. →
​ MNU–T.34 (​ Mitsubishi Estate Co., Ltd., n.d.). The company established
Mitsubishi Estate Asia Pte. Ltd. in Singapore in 2008 and over the last
decade has developed various large-scale mixed-use projects in Asia, with
several current or recently completed projects larger than five hectares. In MNU–T.35 City room concept
Myanmar for example, Mitsubishi Estate is developing a landmark project integrated in the Marunouchi
in Yangon, for which it is drawing on its “experience of developing Tokyo’s Building for gatherings and
events.
Marunouchi into a world-class business district” (The Business Times 2016).
According to a company report, it plans to expand its portfolio with Hong
Kong’s investment bank CLSA, intending to manage another $1.79 billion
worth of property assets in the next four years (Nikkei Asian Review 2017).
For these various projects, Marunouchi serves as a powerful ref-
erence point, exemplifying the company’s capacity to successfully imple-
ment and operate a large-scale project. Beyond this, however, it represents
Tokyo’s rapid post-war economic success and the city’s membership in a
global power alliance, both of which many of the company’s clients aspire
to obtain. A project like the one in Yangon then becomes not only an oppor-
tunity for Mitsubishi to “export its urban development system” (The Busi-
ness Times 2016) but also a means for the company to become a pioneer
in global collaborations and a trailblazer for international businesses to
enter the local market of Myanmar.
This again illustrates that the impact of large-scale urban projects
varies and is not limited to immediate surroundings or changes in the built
environment. Large-scale projects impact the physical realm of urban envi-
ronments as much as they do the city’s abstract dimension of networks,
hierarchies, ambitions and aspirations.
7 CONCLUSION
Over the past 130 years, Marunouchi has accumulated floor space of eight
million sqm and now includes 101 buildings that provide space for approx-
imately 280,000 employees. This was made possible through a gradual
densification and expansion of FAR and a concentrated effort to meet the
fluctuating needs of large-scale offices, trading floors and office floor plans.
All of these needs have been easily accommodated within the site’s grid
layout and incorporated into a block typology, which have further led to a
consolidation of buildings within single blocks, a gradual optimisation of
built-up space and a consistent and uniform streetscape.
Due to the site’s shape, physical barriers, underground network
and height limitations, the built adaptation process focused on interven-
tions within the confines of the block →
​ MNU–T.35 a ​ nd a qualitative improve-
ment of open spaces. ​→ MNU–T.36 ​The continuous redevelopment of the
area illustrates Mitsubishi Estate’s capacity and power as one of the major
real estate developers in Tokyo and the primary property owner in the
Marunouchi area. It is because of the company’s high property share that
an investment in the area’s long-term development and qualitative up-
grades is worthwhile.
99 Implications / Conclusion
 energy systems, public art and sustainability efforts, representing interests
beyond those of the financial sector which, nonetheless, remain at the very
core of the project.
Considering the numerous challenges that have confronted the
project since its inception in 1890, including the Great Kantō Earthquake
of 1923, World War II, the economic collapse of the 1990s and the 2007
global financial crisis, we can see these very challenges as the driving force
behind the area’s continuous innovation, which is not limited to the built
environment but rather includes new visions, governance structures and
the area’s soft scape and programming. Whilst its driving actor, Mitsubishi
Estate, has made the idyllic and ambitious claim that Marunouchi is a “city
that fuses greenery, art, history, and culture with charming elegancy” (Mit-
subishi Estate Co., Ltd. n.d.), the company has certainly proven to be pro-
gressive and flexible in responding to these various challenges over time.
Marunouchi is still the modern face of Japan. The project emanates
an image of Tokyo that comes closest to other financial centres in the West,
such as Canary Warf in London or downtown Manhattan in New York. As
such, the project has managed to adhere to its initial vision and succeeded
in creating a business centrality that is a site of global encounter, guided
by Western planning principles and a testing ground for new implemen-
tation strategies.
Marunouchi is driven by very specific interests and a unique con-
stellation of stakeholders. It is not representative of Tokyo and its vernac-
ular landscape, both of which have inspired countless projects, including
megacities. However, it continues to span frontiers in programme and
building technology, and its adaptive and incremental development scheme,
alongside its 130 years of development history, provide manifold instruc-
tion points for future projects.

MNU–T.36 New open spaces created with the reconstruction of the Ichigokan Building.

The Marunouchi development has undergone a significant transformation

in appearance, value as an urban centre and governing structure. It has
changed from an urban district with empty streets and closed-off buildings
to a site in the city centre with diverse destinations. Employees, tourists
and passers-by savour its distinct atmosphere in stark contrast to Tokyo’s,
given its unique streetscape, treelines, high-rise buildings, open squares
and absence of residential life. Even though the number and variety of
voices shaping the project have remained relatively stable over these years,
Marunouchi has managed to incorporate various agendas, including new

100 Marunouchi Tokyo 101 Conclusion

SHIBUYA STATION AREA ROPPONGI HILLS
REDEVELOPMENT
MAIN CURRENT OWNER Site srea (sqm) 90,000
MAIN CURRENT OWNER Site area (sqm) 140,000 Mori Building Co., Ltd. (Japan) GFA (sqm) 89,300
Tokyu Corporation (Japan) GFA (sqm) 848,170 Urban density (GFA) 1.0
Urban density (GFA) 6.06 MAIN MASTERPLANNER
MAIN MASTERPLANNER Various and Mori Biru Architects PROGRAMMES
Various Residential programme 4.77% and Engineers Residential programme 24.00%
Commercial programme 26.69% Commercial programme 8.00%
Start of construction 2012 Business programme 61.35% Start of construction 2000 Business programme 62.00%
Expected end of construction 2027 Civic institutions programme 2.55% End of construction 2003 Civic institutions programme 6.00%

Aoyama Tokyo Metropolitan

Cemetery Aoyama Park South Roppongi Station
M M
SR 04 SR District

03 02 HIKARIE

p2.11
01 p2.11
M Marunouchi (case study) Shibuya Station M Marunouchi (case study)
S Shibuya Station DOGENZAKA S Shibuya Station
03
R Roppongi Hills
Haneda Airport
R Roppongi Hills
Haneda Airport
01 Mori
Garden

01
02
Tokyu Department Store
Shibuya Hikarie
DISTRICT 21
01
02
Mori Tower
Roppongi Hills Arena
02
03 Hachikō Memorial Statue 03 Grand Hyatt
04 Shibuya Crossing 04 Roppongi Residences 04
SAKURAGAOKA
100 m 500 m 100 500 m

The Shibuya Station Area illustrates a more com-
mon practice for large-scale urban development
projects in the city of Tokyo. Designated by the
Metropolitan Government, Shibuya Station Area
resembles Marunouchi in that it is an Urban Re-
naissance Emergency Development Area and a
Special Economic Zone (SEZ). The 14-hectare site
includes retail, office, housing and cultural amen-
ities within four subprojects, which are all con-
nected to the station and developed by Tokyu
Corporation, the owner and operator of Shibuya
Station. The project started in 2012 and is sched-
uled for completion in 2027. Historically, Shibuya
Station has been the main commuter hub con-
necting the city with its southwestern end. Tokyu
Corporation has been the main developer of a
transit-­oriented development (TOD), a practice
which also can be found around other key com-
muter hubs in the city (e.g. Shinjuku Station and
Ikebukuro Station). The plan for the Shibuya
Station Area entails the replacement of existing
buildings built in the 1960s and 1970s and intro-
duction of a mixed-use, high-density programme.
The land and early buildings were owned by Tokyu
Corporation; however, the Sakuragaoka Devel-
opment and the stretch along the Shibuya River,
comprised of multiple small-scale, privately owned
properties, had to be acquired and consolidated.
The so-called ‘Urban Core’ of the Shibuya Station
Development, the project’s centrepiece, is a mul-
ti-level, semi-public space inside the new Shibuya
Tower. It connects station platforms with the ad-
jacent buildings (e.g. Hikarie) and outdoor public
space (Hachiko Square and Shibuya Crossing).
Building footprint
Building footprint projected
Project site
Softscape
Projected softscape
Hardscape
Roppongi Hills presents an early example of pri-
vately developed, comprehensively planned urban
megaprojects in Tokyo conceived in the 1980s.
Land acquisition processes from private, small-
scale property owners were controversial; thus,
fourteen years passed before project construction
could begin in 2000. The 8.93-hectare site con-
tains offices, residences, retail and cultural amen-
ities, a hotel, a cinema complex, a TV Studio, an
outdoor amphitheatre and several parks. After its
completion in 2003, it served as a programmatic
model for several similar large-scale projects
around the city (e.g. Tokyo Midtown). With the
construction of Roppongi Hills, the area of Rop-
pongi became known and advertised as the new
cultural centrality in Tokyo replete with galleries
and museums. The vision of owner and developer
Mori Building was to create a ‘vertical city,’ which
would unite all facilities and activities of a city in
one location; it would also reduce travel time by
situating housing close to workplaces. The inter-
national corporate tenants and high-end condo-
miniums created, however, a cluster of urban elites,
a pattern otherwise absent in the urban condition
of Tokyo. The programmatic and social integra-
tion of Roppongi Hills into its surroundings has
been minimal, aggravated by a large number of
expatriate residents in Roppongi Hills. Their short-­
term stays and limited capacities to engage with
local residents and the neighbourhood make long-
term integration an ongoing challenge.
Building footprint
Building footprint projected
Project site
Softscape
Projected softscape
Hardscape
Projected hardscape

102 Marunouchi Tokyo Projected hardscape

Train station 103 Reference Case Studies
Metro station
Toei station

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104 Marunouchi Tokyo 105 The Grand Projet

 Hongqiao
Lujiazui Lujiazui
Shanghai
Hongqiao
Airport
Site area 1,800,000 sqm

GFA 7,225,000
sqm
L Lujiazui (main case study)
H Hongqiao (ref. case study)
p2.11 Shanghai Hongqiao Airport (left) Density 4.01 FAR

Population Density NA

p2.11 Shanghai Pudong International
Airport (right)
inh / ha

Streets/roads48.00%
Built-up24.00%
Non Built-up 29.00%

Residential5.00%
Business 64.00% Office / Hotel

Commercial 13.00% Retail

Civic 17.00%
Education, Arts, Culture Centre

1978 PRC, a closed planned economy, starts opening up

1988 Lujiazui (1.7 sqm) as CBD
1989 Tian’anmen Incident
1990 Pudong development approved
1992 Shanghai becomes “Dragon’s Head”; International Consultation begins
1993 Design development integrates Consultation proposals
1994 Pearl TV Tower opens
1997 Asian Financial Crisis; Jinmao Tower opens
2007 Shanghai World Financial Center opens
2008 Global Financial Crisis; Pedestrian walkways start
2010 World Expo; Pedestrian walkways open
2016 Shanghai Center Tower opens

106 Lujiazui Shanghai Conception Design Implementation Operation Implication

1949 People’s Liberation Army enters Shanghai
Shanghai Stock Exchange closes
Founding of the People’s Republic of China
1976 Mao Zedong, People’s Republic of China’s
Founding Father, passes away
1978 China starts opening up
1980 State Council issues first regulation on Chi-
nese joint venture with a foreign partner for use of
land for building purposes
1984 Tax reform and fiscal decentralisation grant 1989 Tian’anmen incident
Shanghai more financial autonomy
Shanghai Municipal Government approves Development Strategy with its 5 special economic
Hongqiao Development Area plan zones and invites foreign investors to invest
Construction of Yan’an Road Tunnel begins
1986 State Council approves national-level Hong-
qiao Economic and Technology Development Zone
State Council approves Shanghai Compre-
hensive Plan with proposed airport in Pudong
Masterplan
Land Administration Act makes it legal for
private organisations to use state-owned land
Shanghai Masterplan 1986.
1987 6 Shanghai Municipal Government estab-
lishes Pudong Development Research Consultation
Group Pudong Development
108 Lujiazui Shanghai
1988 0 Lujiazui Central District Plan defines
1.7 sqkm as CBD
0 Shanghai Municipal Government holds
international conference for Pudong Development
Research Consultation Group proposals
People’s Republic of China Constitution is
amended to permit the transfer of land-use rights
from the state to a third party for a predetermined
period
8 Yan’an Road Tunnel opens, connecting
Puxi with Lujiazui
0 Mayor Zhu Rongji introduces the Pudong
1990 7 Shanghai Municipal Government submits
Application to Develop Pudong to State Council
Central government leaders visit Pudong
Pudong Masterplan 1990.
7 Shanghai Municipal Government issues
ten preferential policies for foreign investors
Deng meets Chia Tai Chairman Dhanin
Chearavanont
Premiere Li Peng announces approval of the
7 Pudong New Area is granted the status of 8 Nanpu Bridge opens
sub-municipality
People’s Bank Shanghai signs first land lease in
Shanghai Municipal Government establishes Lujiazui to develop People’s Bank of China Tower
the Pudong Development (Administrative) Office
1992 State Council approves Shanghai Municipality
Shanghai Municipal Government establishes to establish Pudong New District
Shanghai Lujiazui Development Company
Deng visits Shanghai and declares Pudong a
China People’s Bank issues policy for joint “Dragon’s Head”
ventures
World Bank and ADB fund tangible infra-
7 Shanghai Municipal Government issues structural projects
nine favourable policies for foreign investors
Ten more preferential policies adopted
Relocation of existing occupants begins in
Lujiazui 0 SUPDI finalises Pudong Masterplan after
extensive consultation
Lujiazui Development Company establishes
ZCI and issues domestic A-share stocks 7 SLDC with Chia Tai and its subsidiary HK
Fortune establish joint venture Fortune World De-
Central Bank of China approves Shanghai velopment
Stock Exchange
7 Construction begins on People’s Bank of
Shanghai Stock Exchange opens China Tower
ADB sponsors research into development of 6 International Consultation for Lujiazui
water and electricity infrastructure for Pudong Central District begins with Rogers, Perrault, Fuk-
sas and Ito invited to propose plans
1991 7 SUPDI submits Lujiazui Central District
Plan Adjustment
Linkages and connectivity in Lujiazui.
6 Shanghai Mayor Zhu visits France and
announces International Consultation for Lujiazui Masterplan proposed by international designers for Lujiazui Shanghai.
­Central District
7 88-year contract begins for 40 hectares of
7 Pearl TV Tower starts construction land in LJZ for Fortune World Development
Conception
Design
Implementation
109 Transversal Data
Operation
Implication
 State Council approves Pudong New Area
6 International Consultation presentations
1993 Shanghai Municipal Government sets up Pu-
dong New Area Comprehensive Planning and Land
Resource Administration
Pudong New Area Administration Committee
replaces Pudong Development (Administrative)
Office
6 Design development of Lujiazui Central
District Masterplan integrates consultation pro-
posals
7 CSFTC begins developing Z2-2 as Jinmao
Tower
6 Lujiazui Central District Masterplan is
completed
8 Yangpu Bridge opens
7 Taiwanese Aurora Group leases X1-6 from
Fortune World
6 Invitations for traffic consultants issued
6 Shanghai Municipal Government approves
Lujiazui Central District Masterplan
Lujiazui masterplan.
1994 7 10 construction begins on Jinmao Tower
7 Mori Group leases D1-1 and Z4-1
110 Lujiazui Shanghai
Towers under planning or construction in Lujiazui.
8 Pearl TV Tower opens
1995 6 SLDC signs contract with Toronto firm
FSC led by Macklin Hancock for Lujiazui Urban
Masterplan
6 FSC completes Lujiazui Urban Masterplan
8 People’s Bank of China Tower opens
18 more Extraordinary Policies adopted, in-
cluding permission for foreign banks in Pudong to
conduct business in local currency
1996 7 Super Brand Mall breaks ground
1997 7 Chinese developer Bading leases X1–2 from
Fortune World
Lujiazui takes shape.
8 Completion of Lujiazui infrastructural pro-
jects in time for Handover of Hong Kong
ASIA FINANCIAL CRISIS
7 Construction of the foundation of the 8 Central Government regulates foreign di-
Shanghai World Financial Centre begins rect investments to cool down the “over-heated”
real estate market
8 Jinmao Tower structure tops off
2007 SHK sells IFC office block to HSBC, renaming
Construction of Pudong International Airport it IFC-HSBC Tower
begins
8 Shanghai World Financial Centre tops out
8 Lujiazui Development Company officially
registers its name change to LJZ Group 2008 GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) moves into Shanghai Center breaks ground
new SSE Tower
2009 Policies are implemented to promote more
1999 Construction of Super Brand Mall begins again amenities in Lujiazui
Pudong International Airport opens 2010 Lujiazui Function Zone Management Com-
mittee is abolished and Lujiazui Financial Zone
Century Avenue opens Management Committee is established
HSBC leases parts of Mori-developed Sen- 8 Pedestrian walkways Pearl Ring and Ori-
mao Tower, renaming it HSBC Tower ental Floating Pavilion are completed, connecting
TV Tower to IFC and to Lujiazui Central Green
2000 Pudong New Area urban district government
is established 8 WORLD EXPO opens in Shanghai
8 Metro Line 2 with Lujiazui station opens SHK opens IFC-HSBC Tower
2001 Public tender is required for land lease for Hang Seng purchases Senmao Tower and re-
commercial development names former HSBC Tower Hang Seng Tower
2002 Super Brand Mall opens 2011 Century Sky Bridge opens, connecting IFC to
Jinmao
CitiGroup buys parts of Bading Tower and
renames it CitiGroup Tower 2013 Shanghai Pilot FTZ is established
2000s LJZ emerges as business hub as more MNC Century Corridor opens, connecting Jinmao
banks appear in the area to World Financial Centre
2003 LJZ Group and SHK sign land lease for X2 to 2015 Shanghai Pilot FTZ is expanded to include
build IFC LJZ
2004 Lujiazui Function Zone Management Com- 2016 8 Shanghai Center Tower opens its obser-
mittee established vation deck
2005 CitiGroup Tower opens Lujiazui Financial Zone Management Com-
mittee is abolished and Lujiazui Financial City De-
2006 Pedestrian Bridge system design consultation velopment Bureau is established
with Mori Group, SOM and Ove Arup
0 Conception
6 Design
7 Implementation
111 Transversal Data
8
9
Operation
Implication
 100 300m 100 300m

Current base plan. LJZ–S Building footprint Softscape Pre-intervention base plan, 1989. LJZ–S Project site
LJZ–S Building footprint, Projected softscape
projected Hardscape
LJZ–S Project site Projected hardscape

112 Lujiazui Shanghai 113 Transversal Data

 Mingzhu Park

Lujiazui Central Greenland

Binjiang Park

100 300m 100 300m

Publicly accessible open space plan. Softscape (within site) Transportation plan. Metro lines: Bikeway
Hardscape (within site) Metro Line 2 Pedestrian way
Metro Line 9 Metro station
p2.12 Ferry station
Underground Bus station
Waterway Bike station

114 Lujiazui Shanghai 115 Transversal Data

 Chen Guichun
Residence

100 300m 100 300m

Heritage structure. LJZ–S Heritage structure Programme plan. Residential Civic institutions
Commercial Technical utilities
Business Mixed-use
Industrial Ground floor with
commercial & business

116 Lujiazui Shanghai 117 Transversal Data

 LUJIAZUI SHANGHAI
Urban Paragon for a Post-Socialist China
Ying Zhou

1 INTRODUCTION

China’s rapid ascendance as an economic and political power since its open-
ing and economic liberalisation began in the 1980s is represented by its
growing urban skylines, and none more symbolically than the rise of Shang-
hai’s Lujiazui Financial District. Yet, despite the importance of Lujiazui as
a development precedent for China’s transition from a planned to market
economy, few analyses since urban geographer Kris Old’s incisive piece
on the ‘global design corps’ (Olds 1997) have further unpacked the pro-
cesses and pathways of Lujiazui’s development.
To outsiders, Lujiazui today appears the very image of market cap-
italism. ​→ LJZ–S.01 ​In the film Her, Lujiazui’s glowing skylines are even used
to represent the Los Angeles of the future (Jonze 2014). Whilst Lujiazui
appears the image of China’s economic liberalisation, the processes of its
spatial production and its spatial products, on closer examination, reveal the
state’s persistence and privilege in the country’s economic marketisation.
The coexistence of planned and market economies in China’s tran-
sition economy, which scholars refer to as the ‘dual market,’ is at the foun-
dation of Lujiazui and visible in its spatial production. Lujiazui’s rise affirms
China’s transition to a state-led market economy and its state developmen-
talism. Lujiazui’s existence, moreover, explains what political scientists
have regarded as the ‘Black Swan’ of China’s economic transition: namely,
the conundrum of an authoritarian state’s economic marketisation that
occurs without it foregoing its one-party state.
Lujiazui is, thus, the most ‘extreme’ example of the Grand Projet
cases, showing through its spatial production how the developmentalist
state dominates the economy and participates as a privileged market player.
As developmentalist authoritarianism is the Chinese model many ‘One-
Belt One-Road’ emerging economies are adopting, it is even more impor-
tant to include the case of Lujiazui, the physical showcase and conceptual
symbol of the Chinese model’s success. Lujiazui has, more importantly,
set the precedent for China’s state developmentalism.

1.1 SHANGHAI AS AN ECONOMIC HUB IN CHINA

Shanghai emerged as the nation’s most important economic hub
after it became a semi-colonial treaty port following China’s defeat in the
mid-1800s. After 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) founded

LJZ–S.01 View of Lujiazui. 119 Introduction


LJZ–S.03 Lujiazui in 1984, overlaid with realised road network.
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Shanghai’s commercial importance
continued under the country’s transition to central planning, despite cen-
tral government restrictions and China’s isolation from the world. When
economic liberalisation began in the late 1970s, Shanghai regained eco-
nomic autonomy incrementally. With its leaders’ rise to central government
leadership after 1989, Shanghai spearheaded the acceleration of economic
liberalisation whilst the CCP maintained the political status-quo. At the
centre of this, Lujiazui’s financial district rose. ​→ LJZ–S.02
1.2 LUJIAZUI IN PUDONG
Located in the less-developed part of Shanghai, Pudong ​— ​literally
“east of the Huangpu River,” in contrast to the historic urban area west of
the Huangpu River, the Puxi ​— ​became the urban manifestation of the coun-
try’s economic development under the CCP. Even though the “Pudong
miracle” (Qisheng Zhao and Shao 2008) has been publicised as rising from
a field of farmland, the area was not a tabula rasa. ​→ LJZ–S.03 ​Its advanta-
geous location at the river’s turn across from the Suzhou Creek industrial
belt of Puxi of the late 1980s meant that Lujiazui had a high concentration
120 Lujiazui Shanghai
of large-scale industrial buildings. Some were quite historic, whilst others
were established much more recently. Together with a scattering of hous-
ing, the area housed 49,234 residents, 39 factories and 14 warehouses in
the early 1990s. The tabula rasa myth of Lujiazui serves to magnify the rapid-
ity of China’s transformation and its astounding progress.
2 CONCEPTION
As a large-scale urban project, Lujiazui was put forth under two primary LJZ–S.02 Lujiazui, 1850s to
premises: as a Central Business District (CBD), which grew out of Shang- 2010.
hai’s revival of its economic basis starting in the late 1970s, and as a national-­
level Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which served China’s economic opening
after 1989.
2.1 HISTORIC LEGACY OF SHANGHAI AND
LJZ AS ­SHANGHAI’S NEW CBD
In the mid-1800s, the Imperial Qing government ceded Shanghai,
along with a handful of coastal port cities, to Western powers after they
defeated China in the Opium Wars. Between the 1850s and 1949, Shang-
hai became an important hub in global trade routes, a “gateway of moder-
nity” for China, and contributed 50% of China’s GDP (X. Chen 2009).
After 1949, the PRC steadily closed China to global flows of capital, infor-
mation and people. China became a centrally-directed command economy. ​ LJZ–S.05 Documentation of
existing conditions in 1982 and
→ LJZ–S.04 In the late 1970s, China again re-opened itself to the world and Planning for Shanghai from 1986.
Realised road network
began to take on a market economy. Because of Shanghai’s importance to
China’s economy, the central government hesitated to open Shanghai from
under its central planning.
Despite the central government’s restrictions, Shanghai had been
conceiving ways to develop after its long hiatus beginning in the 1950s. ​
→ LJZ–S.05 ​Plans from 1982 show initial studies for developing the area of
Pudong and its potentials. In 1984, the Shanghai Comprehensive Plan included
the proposal of a new airport for Shanghai in Pudong’s east. Midyear of 1984,
the Shanghai municipality proposed to the central government the Shang-
hai Strategic Development Plan, requesting the designation of Pudong as a
new economic development zone with tax and policy concessions to attract
investment. Tokyo’s Marunouchi and Paris’s La Défense, perceived as suc-
cessful role models, served as references for Shanghai’s CBD development
(Huang 1997). ​� LD–P IMPLICATIONS ​m MODELLING
121 Introduction / Conception
1840 Concessions created as result of
Opium War and the ensuing open ports.
1949 Flight of wealth and elites from
concessions to safer havens as result of
Communist liberation of China.
1965 Coastal cities subsidise development
of inland cities as industrial hubs.
1978 Following the death of Mao, Deng
Xiaoping takes over as national leader and
creates the first SEZs in proximity to capitalist
Hong Kong. The first wave of emigration also
starts.
1992 Following inflation induced protests of
1989 and their successful quelching,
Shanghai allows market economy and FDI.
2005 A maturing of the controlled market
system and urban develompent prepares for
the showcasing at the World Expo, both to
inland cities and to international visitors/
investors.

Shanghai Shanghai Shanghai

Taipei
Hong Kong Shenzhen

Population: 500,000 Population: 5,000,000 Population: 10,000,000 Population: 10,000,000 Population: 12,900,000 Population: 18,000,000 (4300000 floating)
GDPP: — GDPP: 43 RMB GDPP: — GDPP: 2000 RMB GDPP: 9380 RMB GDPP: 67492 RMB
Shanghai rises as city after becoming a Shanghai comes under Communist rule as the Even though half of national GDP is generated Shanghai builds only 22.8 mio square metres Shanghai becomes ‘Head of Dragon’
Concession city financial and economic generator of China. by Shanghai, little of it returns to the city to of housing from 1950–80, accounting for less
invest in its infrastructure or housing. than 0.5% GDP.

LJZ–S.04 Historic development of Shanghai and China.

In 1987, the Shanghai municipality established the Pudong Development
Research Consultation Group to oversee Pudong’s development. The fiscal
decentralisation of the mid-1980s, decreed by the central government, gave
the Shanghai municipality unprecedented financial autonomy for much-
needed infrastructural development. The first access tunnel to Pudong was
completed and opened in 1988. In February 1988, the Lujiazui Central Dis-
trict Plan confirmed the 1.7 square kilometre area as an across-the-river exten-
sion of the Bund, which had been the business district before 1949 and part
of the new CBD for finance and trade (Huang 1997). ​→ LJZ–S.06 ​The political
shifts of 1989 would expedite the realisation of Lujiazui’s prospects.
2.2 LJZ AS CHINA’S SEZ IN THE AFTERMATH OF 1989
Even though Shanghai was “re-awarded with the permission to
attract foreign investment on a lavish scale” after Chinese leader Deng
Xiaoping’s 1992 tour of the Yangtze River Delta (YRD) (Mitter 2008, 70),
it was the events of 1989 that catalysed the establishment of Pudong as an
SEZ, in which Lujiazui was the centrepiece. After the crushing of student
pro-democracy movements, culminating in the Tian’anmen Square inci-
dent of June 4th, 1989, the international community cut off capital inflow
for China’s economic liberalisation. This stoppage compelled CCP to strat-
egise how to attract capital for continuing economic liberalisation whilst
maintaining its authoritarian political status quo. Shanghai’s economically
savvy and politically pragmatic leaders, who bloodlessly quelled the mass
protests in Shanghai in 1989 (Warner 1990) and were rapidly promoted to
top central government posts (Saich 1992), facilitated Pudong’s promotion
LJZ–S.06 Lujiazui and the to SEZ as part of this national strategy. As a publicity official in charge of
bund as CBD.
Pudong New Area confirmed, “our Party chose Shanghai … as the window
for further intensifying reforms and expanding the opening up, fully demon-
strating our Party’s determination and confidence in unswervingly under-
taking the socialist road with Chinese characteristics and resolutely adhering
to the Party’s basic line…”
The Pudong New Area Comprehensive Masterplan, completed in
October 1989, designated four function zones: Lujiazui-Huamu for finance,
trade and administration, Waigaoqiao as a tax-free zone, Jinqiao for export

122 Lujiazui Shanghai 123 Conception

processing and Zhangjiang for high-tech. ​→ LJZ–S.07–08 ​In April 1990, Pre-
mier Li Peng announced the approval of the Pudong Development at the
fifth anniversary celebration of Shanghai Auto, signifying its opening to
foreign investment. In September 1990, the Shanghai municipality issued
nine regulations regarding land leases, foreign investments and incentives
for Pudong’s development. Ten more preferential policies were implemented
in 1992, allowing non-national enterprises to be able to locate in Pudong,
designated as a ‘New Area’ in the same year.
Even though Pudong New Area was not named as such, it became
a de facto SEZ because of the preferential policies adopted by the central
government and unavailable to the rest of the nation under the early phases
of economic transition. ​b BORDERING ​SEZs are “designated areas whose eco-
nomic systems and policies are different from the rest of China” (Sang 1993,
132), which, in the early 1990s, was dominated by state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) in the planned economy. SEZs were exceptional territories in which
non-state-owned enterprises, including joint ventures and foreign-owned
enterprises, could operate in a market mode, including having autonomy
in operation and management of businesses and land leases. Preferential
tax structures were also implemented in SEZs to incentivise investment.
The supreme hierarchy of the one-party state, centred in the CCP,
enabled rapid solidification of Shanghai’s Lujiazui as a financial hub for the
nation and expedited its realisation in the aftermath of the Tian’anmen Square
Incident of 1989. The national need to project a positive image to a scep-
tical outside world became the ultimate impetus for Lujiazui’s conception.
3 DESIGN
Whilst conceptions for Lujiazui changed under political and economic
shifts, evolving designs for the area responded to strategies for a new CBD
in Shanghai and a new SEZ for China. Rapid, urgent implementation, often
preceding or concurrent with design, would ultimately render design pro-
cesses ineffectual.
3.1 FIRST MASTERPLANS FOR THE CENTRAL AREA AND
NEW CENTRALITIES
As China began to open in the late 1970s, urban planning returned
as a projective specialty that could resume looking to the cities’ futures.
The Shanghai Comprehensive Plan and the Pudong Comprehensive Plan, sub-
mitted in June 1984, showed a Lujiazui zoned for institutional functions,
with its northern riverfront designated as green space. Midyear of 1984,
the Shanghai Strategic Development Plan designated Pudong as a new eco-
nomic development zone with tax and policy concessions. With the con-
firmation of a future airport in Pudong in the same plan, the city’s mod-
ernisation and infrastructural development began to shape the role that
Pudong could play, in contrast to the densely populated Puxi urban area
west of the Huangpu River. 1985 saw the plan for a TV tower located in
Lujiazui’s northern waterfront green zone approved. In 1988, the Shanghai
124 Lujiazui Shanghai
municipality submitted the first Central District Plan for Lujiazui to the
central government for approval, confirming the 1.7 square kilometre cen-
tral area of Lujiazui as part of a new CBD in Shanghai. ​→ LJZ–S.09
3.2 ‘GLOBAL DESIGN CORPS’ INPUT
LJZ–S.07 Pudong’s four SEZs. Foreign expertise has been a valuable source of knowhow since
China’s first encounter with Western modernity. Foreign experts were again
invited when development resumed in the 1980s. In September 1985, the
Shanghai municipality signed a cooperative agreement with Institut
d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme de la Région Île de France (IAURÎF) for
technical support. This collaboration with IAURÎF led to the Central District
Plan for Lujiazui in February 1988, which defined Lujiazui as an extension LJZ–S.09 Lujiazui’s layout
LJZ–S.08 Lujiazui-Huamu zone.
of the Bund (Shanghai Lujiazui Group 2001a, 1:22). before the consultation.
In April 1991, whilst in France, the mayor of Shanghai Zhu Rongji
announced an international consultation for Lujiazui’s design. In May
1992, on behalf of the Shanghai municipality, a French committee from
the Ministry of Economy and International Affairs, IAURÎF and the L’Étab-
lissement public pour l’aménagement de la région de la Défense (EPAD) ​
� LD–P IMPLICATIONS ​issued invitations to Richard Rogers, Dominique Per-
rault, Toyo Ito, Massimiliano Fuksas ​— ​well-known architects but not for
their urban design ​— ​and a Chinese team. From May to November 1992,
the five teams participated in the design consultation.
Even though literature attributes the ensuing development largely
to Rogers’ plan, components of all the plans were taken into the next round
of design development. Rogers’ plan appeared as what Shanghai officials
expected only a creative foreign architect could deliver. Its formal simplic-
ity caught the eye of decision makers, who could understand its iconicity.
Documentation of the Rogers plan deemed it as “using new eyes to look at
urban planning” (Shanghai Lujiazui Group 2001a, 1:44). Rings of roads in
perfect circles radiate from a central circular park, surrounded by granular
buildings. The buildings descend in height from the centre of the circle.
Equally-angled roads bisect the circle like dials of a clock face, with the
eleven and five o’clock spokes following the existing tunnel that brings traf-
fic in from Puxi. All roads intersect at the centre underneath the park. The
radiating roads visibly misalign with the surrounding roads; yet the juxta-
position of the perfect circle with its context and the imperfection of the
river seems unimportant.
The Perrault plan is also formally clear in its imposition of a new
rectangular city onto the site area bounded by the river and existing roads.
The designers superimposed city blocks mimicking the existing urban mor-
phology of Shanghai, with smaller grain edging the existing urban fabric
to the southeast and becoming larger towards the river. High buildings
facing the river shield the lower-rise structures behind, creating a visible
waterfront skyline of which the TV tower is part. Inside the new urban area,
125 Conception / Design
June 1992 International consultation
December 1992 Integration into a hybridised plan
LJZ–S.10 International consultation proposals and their localisations in 1992.
a semi-ovular park is at the centre of the built developments (Shanghai
Lujiazui Group 2001a, 1:59–73). The Fuksas plan, a superposition of an
egg-shaped ring road onto an otherwise uniform grid of blocks, also pro-
posed the highest buildings face the western waterfront. Despite the clarity
of the Ito proposal with its functionally-zoned bands, it lacked the out-
ward formal boldness that a non-professional audience such as that in
Shanghai could appreciate. Nevertheless, the realised form of Lujiazui
most resembles the podium-less towers dispersed on an open ground from
the Ito proposal.
Little integration with the surrounding context is visible in all of the
proposals. ​b BORDERING ​The central park was the only idea common to all
plans and unanimously taken into later realisation. The Rogers team’s con-
cept of descending building height from centre to waterfront overtook the
Perrault and Fuksas teams’ propositions of a waterfront tower zone; however,
in the final realisation, the clarity of the Rogers plan is no longer evident.
Even though the event was understood as a design competition,
Chinese officials knew that it was more for the purpose of elevating Luji-
azui’s profile than realising its ideas. As the international consultation was
taking place, plot leasing was already underway: Lujiazui’s first land lease
of 40 hectares was transferred in April, and the first plot leased by the Peo-
ple’s Bank of China (PBoC) began construction.
3.3 THE LOCALISATION OF IDEAS
In early 1993, the Shanghai Urban Planning Bureau and the newly
established Pudong New Area Management Committee organised a design
development based on the five teams’ submissions (Huang 1998). The final
iteration of the design development remained close in form to the Chinese
126 Lujiazui Shanghai
team’s submission, maintaining an axis from the 1990 Lujiazui Central
District Plan Adjustment bisecting Lujiazui and the large block atop the
parcellation proposed before the consultation.
The first design development round incorporated Rogers’ circular
plan and descending building heights, whilst the massing grew from Rog-
ers’ fine grain to resemble the plot sizes in the pre-consultation Central
District Plan Adjustment. ​→ LJZ–S.10 ​Similarly, Rogers’ large central park LJZ–S.11 Lujiazui Plan 1993.
shrank to half its size, with gradual mediation of the perfect circle to the
curve of the waterfront. In the second iteration of the hybridised plan, the
inner and outer rings started to morph into a geometry following the roads
bounding the site’s southern and eastern boundaries. In the third iteration,
the green space located at the end and centre of the axis in the Rogers plan
shifted a block to the northeast (Shanghai Lujiazui Group 2001b). This
shift meant that the axis bisecting Lujiazui would terminate on the ground LJZ–S.12 Urban Design Plan.
in a roundabout at the northwest “nose.” The road descended into a tunnel
to Puxi. The ambiguous form of the ring roads, neither true rings nor log-
ically gridded, as in the Fuksas and Ito plans, would lead to decades of con-
fusion for drivers. It is clear, in this iterative integration of the international
consultation plans into the pre-consultation plan, that the strongest ideas
garnered were eroded, whilst the earlier shortcomings remained.
The municipality approved the final version of the Lujiazui Central
District Plan at the end of 1993. ​→ LJZ–S.11 ​Immediately after, invitations
were issued to ten international traffic consultants. By April, the Lujiazui
Development Company (LDC), which the Pudong New Area government
formed in 1990 for Lujiazui’s development and management, selected and
signed a contract with the British engineering consultant Oscar Faber.
LDC signed a contract in January 1995 with Toronto-based urban
design firm FSC to further define Lujiazui’s urbanism (Shanghai Lujiazui
Group 2001b). The Lujiazui Central District Urban Design report, com-
pleted in May 1995, showed FSC’s main concern for pedestrian connec-
tivity. ​→ LJZ–S.12 Three years later, the architectural office of Arte Char-
pentier, who along with the EPAD were commissioned with the urban design
of the main axis of Lujiazui, Century Avenue, also showed similar concerns
in their proposals of a pedestrian-oriented streetscape and proposed col-
onnaded podium to ameliorate the pedestrian experience. Despite detailed
propositions attempting to make the pedestrian experience less confronta-
tional against motor traffic, these were largely unrealised. Eight projects
were already under construction, and twelve projects were land-leased (Yang
Chen 2008). It was simply too late to co-ordinate pedestrian connections
between these projects. One month after the completion of the urban design
report, the first land-leased building, PBoC Tower, opened.
The rapid rate of implementation rendered Lujiazui’s design efforts
largely ceremonial. The prioritisation of motorised traffic, indicative of the
development stage of Lujiazui at the time of its conception and design,
would also leave a lasting impact difficult to modify and upgrade later. ​
r REGULATORY PLANS ​
127 Design
 4 IMPLEMENTATION

Central China’s urban transition relied on swift implementation not always con-
Government
A tingent upon design and planning, much in line with the CCP’s famous
adage, “crossing the river while feeling the rocks” (Nolan 1994, 25). Luji-
azui, which the central government urgently needed after 1989 for attract-
ing capital, necessitated concurrent implementation, planning and design.
State Design Shanghai
Institutes Municpality

D A
Pudong
New Area 4.1 THE LOCAL STATE AND STATE DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATIONS
Government

A
In 1990, the Shanghai municipality established LDC for the devel-
International
Designers opment and management of Lujiazui, giving it 100 million RMB (21 mil-
D lion USD) start-up capital. To secure further funding, LDC created joint
ventures with domestic and overseas investors for Pudong’s development.
In October 1991, LDC established two of its numerous subsidiaries to raise
Lujiazui funds for the area’s development. LDC owns majority stakes in its subsid-
SOE Development JLL iary companies, such as the Lujiazui Joint Development Company, by con-
Investor Company M
O Lujiazui Group tributing land, whilst domestic, often government-affiliated investors, such
ABM as SIIC, contribute capital. LDC also established subsidiaries for issuing
stocks for domestic and overseas investments. By the mid-1990s, LDC had
five direct subsidiaries responsible for real estate development, 14 joint
Visitors Residents
ventures for investment capital and stakes in 20 enterprises in the finan-
V R
Foreign
Investors
cial, commercial and service industries (“Chapter 2 Pudong National-Level
O Development Zone Section 2 Lujiazui Finance and Trade District” 2001).
Under the planned economy, land transfer had occurred largely by state
allocation (Yeh and Wu 1996). In Pudong, the precedent established for
the transfer of land to development corporations, allowing them to work
Enterprises
Chinese in a market economy, was significant.
Tenants
Non-State
Investors In China, the development corporation is charged with acting both
O O as a developer seeking to compete in the market and maximise profits and
as a manager of provision of public goods. The inherent conflict of interest
embedded in this dual role was reflected in the alterations to Pudong’s
detailed plans. The active role that the local state plays in the market is
fundamental for its rapid global integration and economic development
of the city (Chan 2006). In Pudong, LDC exemplified what sociologist
Manuel Castells has termed China’s ‘bureaucratic entrepreneurs’ (Castells
ROLE SECTOR IMPACT
1998, 311–28), who spearheaded China’s economic liberalisation, in turn
growing the power of the local developmentalist state. ​→ LJZ–S.13
A Authority Public sector High impact
DV Developer Private sector
M Management Public & private sector
O Owner
D Designer COOPERATION
C Community groups
R Residents / Residents association Founded
B Retailers / F&B / Business association Strongly connected
OA Other association Weakly connected
V Visitor Targeted Low impact

LJZ–S.13 Lujiazui stakeholder diagram.

128 Lujiazui Shanghai 129 Implementation

 4.2 JOINT VENTURE PUBLIC-PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT
Early in China’s economic transition, when the local state was much
in need of funds, joint ventures with wealthy overseas firms who provided
capital whilst the local state provided land expedited development. In the
aftermath of 1989, the nation’s leader Deng Xiaoping courted sympathetic
overseas Chinese capital. On 7 April 1990, Deng met the Chinese-Thai Chia Tai Group

chairman of the Thai conglomerate Chia Tai. Two years after the first meet- and LCD
1.7 sqkm
ing, LDC, Chia Tai and its subsidiary HK Fortune established the joint 0.4 sqkm
venture of Fortune World Development Ltd, with a registered capital of
30 million USD and with a 50%–15%–35% LDC–Chia Tai–HK Fortune
share. LDC contributed 40 hectares of waterfront land ​— ​nearly one-quar- LJZ–S.14 Fortune World’s 4Ha.
13 ter of Lujiazui’s 1.7 square kilometres ​→ LJZ–S.14 ​— ​whilst Chia Tai and HK
03
07 05 Fortune contributed capital. In July 1992, the 40-ha site began its 88-year
lease. Because of its scale and the local state’s cash shortage, Fortune World
also invested in infrastructural development.
53 In November 1993, the Taiwanese Aurora Group was the first inves-
tor to lease Plot X1-6 from Fortune World. Between 1994 and 1995, Fortune
09 World leased four pieces of land for 200 million USD. The highest price for
52 LJZ–S.16 Fortune World’s 4Ha.
land-lease was to the Hong Kong developer Kerry Group for the Shangri-la
Hotel on the X1-3 parcel and the X1-4 parcel in 2000. ​→ LJZ–S.15

4.3 ENTICING STATE-OWNED FINANCIAL

INSTITUTIONS TO LJZ
LDC also invited numerous heads of Chinese banks to settle in
the new area. In June 1991, the PBoC Shanghai branch became the first to
sign on. LDC in effect subsidised more than three million RMB for the relo- LJZ–S.17 Lujiazui’s plot
cation compensation of plot D2-4, and allocated almost a dozen staff given divisions.
that the bank had no expertise in construction. Earlier in the year, an
international design consultation was announced and launched in May
1992, but the urgency of development would render the designs to come
ineffectual in face of implementation. ​→ LJZ–S.16
Early in 1993, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) Building, rep-
resentative of Lujiazui’s significance in China’s liberalisation and global
reintegration, laid its foundation. The China Construction Bank (CCB), LJZ–S.18 Zones B and D.
China Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), China Development Bank (CDB),
China Merchants Group, China Insurance Group, China Marine and China
Huaneng (CHNG) would also sign on, largely in zone D’s two blocks to the
east of the central green space. ​→ LJZ–S.17–18 ​Whilst most of the occupants

# BUILDING OVERSEAS OWNER / DEVELOPER

03 Super Brand Mall Chia Tai Group
05 Pudong Shangri La Kerry Properties Limited
07 Aurora Plaza Aurora Group
09 Tomson Riviera Tomson Group Limited
13 Shanghai IFC  Sung Hung Kai Properties
52 DFC  CK Hutchison Holdings Limited
53 Bank of East Asia (BEA) Finance Tower  CK Hutchison Holdings Limited

LJZ–S.15 Overseas owner / developers. Chia Tai 40ha

130 Lujiazui Shanghai 131 Implementation

 of zone D were Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and “province and
ministry towers,” an early enthusiast for Lujiazui was the Japanese Mori
Group, which signed on to develop D1-1 into the Senmao Tower, renamed
the HSBC Tower in 2000 and the Hang Seng Tower in 2010.
Midyear of 1992, the central government requested that all central
government level and provincial level enterprises lease land in Lujiazui
under the “province and ministry tower” policy. Provinces and national
ministries were incentivised to build in Pudong by leasing land at the sole
39 26 cost of compensating relocation. Even though there was no issued docu-
40 48 ment ​— ​thus no paper trail ​— ​the policy stipulated that only LDC could exe-
49 41 33 31 cute the preferential policy to the provinces or ministries (Shanghai Lujiazui
13 33 34
37 Group and Shanghai Municipal Administration for Planning and Land
07 05 03 40 30 Resources 2015, 3:103–4).
06 The most conspicuous of the province and ministry towers is the
29 iconic Jinmao Tower. Jinmao’s builder, the China Foreign Trade Centre
08 53 12 01 25 (Group) (CSFTC) is a high-level state organisation that has been responsible
14 for foreign trade since the 1950s. CSFTC spearheaded many of the first trade
09 26
23 fairs as China began to open in the 1980s and oversees central government
20 level enterprises such as COFCO, SinoChem, Sinopec and others. A soaring,
15 22 41 43 visible tower, the CSFTC building was to be a prominent marketing symbol
19 for attracting key national industries to Lujiazui. It was thus of utmost impor-
18 tance that in 1993 CSFTC leased plot Z2-2, which was the first of the three
50 16 21 plots utilised for Lujiazui’s three highest towers.
10 17 Like other buildings constructed in the 1990s, the 420.5-metre
Jinmao Tower, the highest tower in China upon completion, far exceeded
the height designated in the 1993 Lujiazui Central District Plan (D. Li 2011).
At a cost of 560 million USD, the iconicity of the tower was a requisite. The
American design conglomerate Skid, Owings and Merrill (SOM)’s concept
for an octagonal tower with a footprint that becomes smaller as it rises,
# BUILDING GLOBAL DESIGN CORPS # BUILDING GLOBAL DESIGN CORPS like the Chinese pagoda, won the global competition when LDC invited
01 Oriental Pearl TV Tower  Shanghai Modern Architectural
Design Co. Ltd.
22 China Development
Bank Tower
ECADI
six other international firms to participate.
03 Super Brand Mall  The Jerde Partnership 23 Shanghai Merchants Tower  Simon Kwan & Associates More than 70 companies, both local and overseas, were part of
05 Pudong Shangri La
International, Inc.
Kohn Pedersen Fox Associates 25 New Shanghai
Limited
B+H Architects
Jinmao’s construction and brought international standards to the building
06 Mirae Asset Tower Kohn Pedersen Fox Associates International Tower industry in China. For a country that was just economically opening, the
07 Aurora Plaza
08 Citigroup Tower
Nikken Sekkei
Nikken Sekkei
26 Jin Sui Mansion
29 Huaneng Union Tower
 Frank Feng Architects
ECADI
tremendous knowledge transfer to local designers, consultants and con-
09 Tomson Riviera Global Design Group 30 Senmao Mori Building struction companies was an important part of Lujiazui’s development. m
MODELLING ​As in the case of Jinmao, overseas expertise helped realise the
10 Skyling Mansion ECADI 31 Zhongrong Jasper Tower Gresham, Smith and Partners
11 Shanghai Center Gensler 33 Bank of Shanghai Tower Kenzo Tange
12 Taiping Financial Mansion Nikken Sekkei 34 Bocom Financial Tower A.BB Architekten construction of many of the towers of the 1990s. In 2000, 31 buildings
13 Shanghai IFC
14 Jin Mao Tower
Cesar Pelli & Associates
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP
37 Azia Center
39 Shanghai Kempinski Hotel
Kohn Pedersen Fox Associates
 Architectural Design and
were contracted, 23 buildings involved investment from overseas ​— ​pre-
15 Shanghai World Kohn Pedersen Fox Associates Research Institute of dominantly Hong Kong and Taiwan ​— ​and 10 buildings were entirely for-
Financial Center
16 21st Century Tower Gensler 40 DBS Building
Tongji University (TJADRI)
Haipo Architects
eign-invested. 26 buildings were designed or jointly designed by foreign
17 Pufa Tower WZMH Architects 41 Shanghai Ocean Aquarium Crossley Architects or Hong Kong architects (Fu 2001). It is in the implementation of Lujiazui
18 Shanghai Information Center
19 Standard Chartered
Nikken Sekkei
Shanghai Institute of
43 Century Financial Mansion
48 Times Finance Center
ECADI
Nikken Sekkei
that Olds’ ‘global design corps’ is truly emblemised. ​→ LJZ–S.19
Bank Tower Architectural Design & 49 Wanxiang Plaza GMP Architekten
Research Co.Ltd (SIADR) 50 Fraser Suites AEDAS
20 China Insurance Building WZMH Architects 53  Bank of East Asia (BEA) TFP Farrells
21 Shanghai Stock Exchange WZMH Architects Finance Tower

LJZ–S.19 The ‘global design corps’ in implementation.

132 Lujiazui Shanghai 133 Implementation

1992–1997 1997–2008 2008–present 4.4 THREE PHASES OF LUJIAZUI’S REALISATION
Represented by the three tallest towers, the years of their comple-
tions ​— ​SOM-designed Jinmao (1998), Kohn Pederson Fox (KPF)-designed
World Financial Centre (WFC) (2008) and Gensler-designed Shanghai
Centre (2015) ​→ LJZ–S.20 ​— ​demarcate the three phases of Lujiazui’s reali-
sation. ​→ LJZ–S.21 ​The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the 2008 World
Financial Crisis affected the implementation of the buildings, as well as LJZ–S.20 Lujiazui’s three
their ensuing operation. tallest towers.
When the Asian Financial Crisis hit in 1997, China was still largely
shielded from the adverse effects of global capital flow. The impact of the
Crisis could be felt, however, in the plots targeted to overseas investments.
A change in land-use was implemented in the southern portion of Lujiazui
in response to slow cash flow after 1997. Plots X4-2 and X5-2, which For-
tune World leased to the Taiwanese Tomson Group and the development
LJZ–S.21 Buildings realised in Lujiazui over time. Newly completed arm of the Chinese National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation
Under Construction
Existing
(COFCO), were rezoned as residential plots and became luxury housing
Unknown developments. Both these residential compounds opened after the mid-
2000s (Yang Chen 2008, 43).
It is clear that the overseas investors who arrived after 1997 were
much more cautious and established compared to the high risk, high return
actors of the first phase. Procedures for land transfers and approvals also
became more developed, with market precedents in place that had not existed
in the 1990s. In August 2003, Fortune World leased out its final Plot X-2 to
the Hong Kong developer Sung Hei Kei Group (SHK). In comparison to the
speed of first lease signings in the 1990s, it took nearly three years for the
finalisation of the transfer of land lease to SHK: the initial negotiations
between the developer and LDC took one year, then municipal approval.
By the early 2000s, a local ecology of developers and investors
was in place in China. In 2002, Fortune World leased Plot X1-7, east of
Aurora Plaza, for two billion RMB (243 million USD) to Bading Group, a
local developer with state connections (C. Chen 2002). Attracting the inter-
national Citibank Group as its anchor tenant, Bading’s tower became
branded as the CitiGroup Tower. Similarly, Guangzhou-based Hopson
leased plot X1-5 in 2004; in 2006, Hopson sold it to the Hong Kong-based
1997 Asian Financial Crisis 2008 Global Financial Crisis investment arm of the Korean Mirae Asset Group with a 6% gain in plot
value. The transaction was lauded for its timing, because the sale was con-
current with a 2006 policy tightening foreign investment in Chinese real
Shanghai Centre
estate: part of the central government’s attempt to cool down the bubbling
Jinmao Tower World real estate market (Xiuhao Liu and Wang 2006; Fan 2006). The Hopson
Financial International Tower has since become the KPF-designed Mirae Asset Tower.
Centre
The construction of the WFC, second of the Lujiazui’s tallest tower triad,
and its protracted lease-to-opening time showed the impacts of 1997 and
2008 ​→ LJZ–S.22 and the disadvantages of not being a SOE in a Chinese
CITI

SEZ. In November 1993, Minoru Mori made his first visit to Pudong and

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

LJZ–S.22 Lujiazui’s rise in time. United States

Other rich countries
China
Other BRICs
Other emerging countries

134 Lujiazui Shanghai 135 Implementation

signed the lease of two plots. Plot D1-1, which would become the Senmao
Tower, was priced at 500 USD per square metre and began development
in 1995. The other parcel was Z4-1, priced at 540 USD per square metre
and designated to be the highest tower in Lujiazui and in Asia. In Septem-
ber 1994, the Mori Group leased two sites in Lujiazui for 50-year terms,
one in zone D and the other in zone Z. Land clearance began immediately
for the 834 households and 41 work units of Z4-1, the second of three plots
for Lujiazui’s tallest towers. Even though a similar clearance would have
required ten years in Japan, it took only three years in mid-1990s China
(Fu 2001, 116). The ground-laying in August 1997, however, immediately
after the start of the Asian Financial Crisis, forebode the tower’s difficult
realisation. The sudden stall in cash flow meant that it was only in 2003
that construction of the tower was resumed.
As was the case for the Jinmao Tower, a U.S. design conglomer-
ate, KPF, was commissioned to design the WFC. KPF proposed a tapering
494.3-metre tower with a circular cut-out at its top, through which wind
flow would reduce pressure on the building. Growing anti-Japanese senti-
ment in the 2000s, however, compared the prominent circular form to the
rising sun of the Japanese flag, forcing the designers to change to a rectan-
gular cut-out instead; this made the tapering tower appear much like a bottle-­
opener to more mocking popular opinion.
Along with the tower’s image problem, receding incentives, which
had been in place in the 1990s, also added to the cost of the tower’s reali-
sation in the 2000s. When the central government rolled back preferential
tax policies in 1995, the Shanghai municipality lobbied for and received
concessions for the Mori development (Fu 2001, 118). The maturing of
institutional procedures meant that such concessions were more challeng-
ing to come by in the 2000s.
The WFC opened at the end of 2007, ahead of the 2008 World
Financial Crisis. Cash flow difficulties meant that LDC was able to buy
back parts of the WFC at a discounted rate. Compared to the 1,938 USD
per square metre construction cost and five-year construction period for
Jinmao, the WFC took more than eleven years to finish and cost 3,145 USD
per square metre (McQuilkin 2012). This shows the shifting frameworks
for implementation in Lujiazui as well as the persistence of advantages for
SOEs in China’s dual market.
At the end of 2008, construction of the Shanghai Centre, third of
the tower triad, began. Like Jinmao, the Shanghai Centre is a state-owned
tower and is also designed by a U.S. design conglomerate, Gensler. ​→ ­LJZ–S.23 ​
Following its completion in 2015, it faces new challenges amidst predic-
tions of China’s mid-2010s economic slowdown.
136 Lujiazui Shanghai
It is now almost three decades since the initial conception of Lujiazui as a
CBD and SEZ for China. The first phase of Lujiazui was urgently ad-hoc but
also rife with opportunities for both overseas and local participants that ulti-
mately brought much-needed knowhow to China. As processes and insti-
tutional frameworks matured, the pace of development steadied. The priv-
ileged access of the local state continues to expand, even as overseas agents
LJZ–S.23 Competitors for the have also found their niche in the development.
Shanghai Centre.
5 OPERATION
Since the realisation of Lujiazui as both Shanghai’s and the nation’s CBD LJZ–S.24 View from the TV
for financial industries, LDC has actively implemented and overseen the Tower 1998.
management of the district, including tenant and user engagement. In
contrast to political economies where active civil society and tenant groups’
feedback prompt upgrades, in a political economy such as PRC’s this role
can only be played by its bureaucratic entrepreneurs. Despite its commercial
prioritisation, LDC has still performed this internalised role to ameliorate
systemic shortcomings.
5.1 BECOMING A FINANCIAL DISTRICT
Until the late 1990s, Lujiazui was largely a tourist destination for
regional and local tourists, with the Pearl TV Tower and its Bund-facing water­
front amenities the only parts realised with new leisure amenities. ​→ LJZ–S.24 ​
Whilst the skyline of Lujiazui was still under construction, the waterfront
Häagen-Dazs café was a popular destination for locals to bring their out-of-
town visitors for the imported luxury of ice cream and a view of the Bund’s
historic skyline. The TV Tower itself, as the highest building in China, im-
parted a distinct sense of local pride. Despite architecturally dating itself
with its pink glass skin ​— ​aspiring in this to be technological and modern but
actually revealing an outdated design palette ​— ​the tower nevertheless has
become representative of the economic growth of the city and the country.
As the first phase of towers came to rapid completion, differences
between local and overseas developers were stark. These were especially
evident in vacancy rates following the Asian Financial Crisis. In the after-
math of the 1997 Crisis, there was on average a vacancy rate of 50%, with
some as high as 90%, for Lujiazui’s seven million square metres of new
floor space (V. Wu 1998). Private overseas investors, who built grade-A
office towers targeting multinational corporations (MNCs), offered better
amenities and designs, resulting in lower vacancy rates. The lessons learned
from the 1997 Crisis compelled local developers to raise their buildings to
international standards.
Even though in late 1995 Japan’s Fuji Bank was the first overseas
financial institution to open, it was not until the 2000s that more opened
in Lujiazui, confirming overseas financial institutions’ confidence in China.
Many of the multinational corporations (MNCs) chose Lujiazui. HSBC was
the first to acquire 4,800 square metres of office space in Mori-developed
Senmao Tower for 33 million USD in 1999, subsequently renaming it the
137 Implementation / Operation
 HSBC Tower (S. Li 2007a). In 2001, CitiGroup followed suit and acquired
22,000 square metres in a tower developed by the Bading Group and fin-
ished in 2005, becoming its anchor and giving it the name of CitiGroup Tower
(C. Chen 2002). In 2006, Standard Charter acquired 7,600 square metres
in the UC Tower for 25 million USD, and then in 2008 paid 40 million USD
for the naming of a new tower, in which it has majority floor space. UBS
acquired floors in the CitiGroup Tower, Rabobank in the former HSBC Tower
and DBS and ABN AMRO in the Azia Centre (China Daily 2006; S. Li 2007a).
Beginning in late 2002, a number of Chinese financial institutions,
including Huaxia, Minsheng, CBC, ICBC and Pingan Insurance, acquired
37 38
13 35 36 34 real estate and gave their names to towers in Lujiazui (Xu 2010). LDC played
an active role in the selection of tenants, working with building owners to
03 33 LJZ–S.25 The Ping’an Tower.

07 31 incentivise expanding MNCs, often already in Shanghai’s Puxi, to sign leases

05 29 in Lujiazui.
Around 2007, international property managers projected that
53 24 28 Lujiazui would overtake West Nanjing Road and Huaihai Road, early sites
14
11 26 of grade-A offices popular with MNCs in Puxi. When in April 2007, HSBC
09 23
20 45 announced its 648 million USD purchase of office spaces in the SHK-devel-
52 15 22 oped International Financial Centre (IFC), shifting its name to the SHK-­ LJZ–S.27 Lujiazui “Financial
42 43 developed new tower, property managers such as JLL promoted the move Town”.

as confirming the rising importance of Lujiazui (S. Li 2007b). Domestic

18 institutions, some of which were also becoming MNCs, such as Taiping
50 16 Insurance, Agricultural Bank of China, Minsheng Bank and Shanghai Rural
10 17 Commercial Bank, continued to purchase real estate and name towers in
Lujiazui in the late 2000s (21st Century Business Herald 2009). ​→ LJZ–S.25–26
Compared to Shanghai’s historical centre, Lujiazui’s district rep-
resents a new large-scale urban form that lacks the urban intensity attrac-
tive to many elites who can afford small-grain urban diversity. Lujiazui’s
mono-functional business district, concentrating white-collar works in
MNCs and SOES of financial industries, eventually salvaged its monotony
in the 2000s through high-end luxury malls such as the IFC, which have
since cultivated a new lifestyle for the new elites. ​→ LJZ–S.27

5.2 THE CASE OF AN MNC

The case of a German pharma giant’s offices in Lujiazui shows
both the broader flows of international capital to China and, more specif-
ically, the maturing of the real estate market in Lujiazui as a centrality in
# INTERNATIONAL OWNERS # SOEs 38 China Merchants Bank Shanghai.
03
05
Chia Tai Group
 Kerry Properties Limited
14
17
China Foreign Trade Centre (Group)
SPD Bank
42
43
China State Shipbuilding Corporation
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
When China opened as a market after the mid-1850s, Bayer, founded
07 Aurora Group 18 China Telecom 45 The People’s Bank of China in the mid-1850s in Leverkusen, marketed its dyes through China’s Con-
09
13
Tomson Group Limited
 Sung Hung Kai Properties
20
22
China Life Insurance Company
China Development Bank
50 COFCO Corporation
cession-city trading houses until it established its own companies in Shang-
15 Mori 23 China Merchants Group hai in the 1900s, where it produced aspirin for China. After the founding
28
30
NA
Mori
24
26
China Construction Bank
Argicultural Bank of China
#
10
DOMESTIC ENTERPRISES
Shanghai Homeby Group., Ltd
of the PRC in 1949 and the closing of the Chinese market to the world,
32 Mery Land 29 Huaneng Power International 16 China Everbright Group Bayer established Bayer China Ltd in Hong Kong in 1958. In the 1980s,
37
52
GIC
 CK Hutchison Holdings Limited
33
34
Bank of Shanghai
Bank of Communications
31
36
ZhongRong Holding Group
Ping An Insurance
Bayer, like many MNCs, anticipating China’s economic opening and the
53  CK Hutchison Holdings Limited 35 Bank of China 44 China Minsheng Bank vast market the continent-sized country would offer, opened a represent-
ative office in Beijing and a liaison office in Shanghai. In 1994, Bayer China
LJZ–S.26 Domestic and overseas financial institutions in Lujiazui. International Ltd was established in Beijing as a holding company.
Non-State
SOE

138 Lujiazui Shanghai 139 Implementation

In cities like Shanghai, there was an overall lack of office space after four
decades of planned economy, where the only enterprises that existed were
state-owned ones with state-allocated real estate. As is evident with the
positioning of Lujiazui in the 1990s, this lack of office space coincided with
international companies’ growing interest in China. These companies not
only needed office space, but also required what would be designated
grade-A office space in a real estate market that was not yet mature enough
to provide quality space. In 1989, Bayer’s representative office found space
in a tower on West Nanjing Road, one of the early developments in the city
centre catering to MNCs. When the holding company moved from Beijing
to Shanghai in 2003, the office also moved. As Bayer’s Shanghai office rap-
idly grew in the mid-2000s, the team sought even larger space. In 2006,
Bayer considered, amongst others, a newly constructed office tower off of
Huaihai Road and one in Xujiahui, another centrality for commercial office
development. Xujiahui was eventually considered too commercial for an
office location.
When representatives of LDC approached Bayer with two towers
completed in 2005, what they offered with their larger square footage and
possibly-incentivised rent was attractive. The KPF-designed Azia Centre
in the northern part of Lujiazui was one possibility. The other was the Cit-
iGroup Tower designed by Nikken Sekki. Developed by the Jiangxi-origi-
nated Bading Group, the 40-storey CitiGroup Tower is mostly owned by
its developer, whilst the other part of the tower is strata-title owned by
CitiGroup, which owns floors 28 to 36. Facilitated by LDC and JLL, which
manages the building, Bading was willing to offer a competitive price to
attract key renters. Bayer, as a reputable and expanding MNC, was, to say
the least, an ideal tenant.
As an international MNC, Bayer had high standards for the kind
of office space it sought for its employees. Access, amenities and the repu-
tations of the developer and management company were selection criteria.
Bayer’s office manager found that, compared to that of Beijing, Shanghai’s
office real estate was of higher quality as a result of the standards interna-
tional developers brought, higher than Chinese developers would provide
in the early phase of economic transition. Bayer also found that because
CitiGroup partially financed the building of the Bading tower, CitiGroup
was able to impose higher standards in the realisation of the office spaces.
Though attracted by the competitive rental price for such large
square footage, the Bayer staff was not immediately swayed. As was the
case for many other MNCs, Puxi remained more attractive given its cos-
mopolitan setting, density and accessibility. After its relocation to Pudong,
Bayer had to provide a shuttle bus service to accommodate employees and
install its own cafeteria to alleviate the lack of food options available in
mid-2000s Lujiazui. The selection of restaurants and stores in Chia Tai’s
Super Brand Mall, the only commercial entity in the area, was insufficient
for the white-collar workers accustomed to the diversity of food and shop-
ping options found in Puxi’s West Nanjing Road or Huaihai Road areas.
Offering below-market rents for a five-year rental contract for Bayer as
anchor tenant, however, LDC and JLL convinced the pharma giant to move
140 Lujiazui Shanghai
to Lujiazui. Other MNCs, such as UBS and the Intercontinental Group,
also settled in the CitiGroup Tower following Bayer’s move.
Beginning with four floors in 2006, Bayer eventually expanded to
another five floors. In 2015, its growing material science division relocated
to new premises. Employees slowly became accustomed to the commute
from Puxi to Lujiazui. Along with the ferry that crosses the Huangpu River
every 30 minutes and with a stop a mere five minutes’ walk from CitiGroup LJZ–S.28 Automobile-
Tower, subway line 2 remained the main public transport option for employ- dominated and pedestrian
unfriendly ground in Lujiazui.
ees, until the opening of subway line 14 expected in late 2019.
With the impending conclusion of Bayer’s third five-year rental
lease and LDC’s promotion of its new development in Qiantan, a new area
south of Lujiazui along the Bund, the future location again will indicate
the ensuing chapter for Lujiazui.
5.3 UPGRADING LUJIAZUI LJZ–S.29 View from the
Whilst public consultation, in the Western sense, is not part of the Oriental Floating Pavilion.
institutional structure of a Chinese city, the bureaucratic entrepreneurs,
in the case of Lujiazui, actively absorbed this role. By the mid-2000s, the
lack of ground pedestrian connectivity was a repeated complaint in Luji-
azui, as anticipated earlier. ​→ LJZ–S.28 ​Lack of amenities was also another
shortcoming. To ameliorate these grievances, the local government and
LDC implemented upgrades.
The Shanghai Planning Bureau, together with Pudong New Area
Government, organised studies for underground connectivity in 2005
(Shanghai Lujiazui Group 2001b, 2:236). In March 2006, LDC organised
an international consultation, inviting the Mori Group, SOM and the inter-
national design consultancy Ove Arup Partners to make proposals for an
above-ground pedestrian linkage system (Shanghai Lujiazui Group 2001b,
2:240). Preparations for the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai further expedited
Lujiazui’s upgrades. High volumes of tourists, mainly from different parts
of China, were anticipated for the Expo. Construction of the above-ground
pedestrian linkage began in April 2008 (Xiaoxin Liu and Chen 2012, 106).
At the end of 2009, district authorities implemented a new policy
to promote better amenities in Lujiazui (Labor News 2009). In April 2010,
the above-ground pedestrian connectors Pearl Ring, which circled the
roundabout that ended Century Avenue before it dipped into the river-­
crossing tunnel, and the Oriental Floating Pavilion ​→ LJZ–S.29, which con-
nected the Ring to the newly-finished IFC and the Lujiazui Central Green,
were completed in time for the opening of the Expo in Shanghai. ​→ LJZ–S.30 ​
In 2014, LDC acquired the underground space of the WFC plot for under-
ground connection between the three highest towers, a proposal that had
been part of the urban design more than a decade earlier but shelved due
to the rapidity of implementation. ​b BORDERING ​
In 2016, after the mayor’s return from a visit abroad, where water-
front spaces became a topic of concern for urban quality, upgrades in Luji-
azui connected what were once disconnected waterfront passages.
141 Operation
 With the completion of large parts of Lujiazui, LDC increasingly took on
a management rather than development role inside the district, even whilst
its projects expanded beyond its namesake jurisdiction. The bureaucratic
entrepreneurs continued to compensate for the shortcomings resulting from
the area’s urgent realisation.

05 LJZ–S.31 Car-oriented
6 IMPLICATIONS urbanism as model.

From the very beginning, Lujiazui was an image project as much as a func-
01 tional one. Today, Lujiazui has achieved the global impact of delivering
the image of China’s economic rise, showcasing a globally-connected and
market-oriented China. Even though in the regional competition of finan-
04 cial industries Hong Kong still dominates and remains the country’s most
important conduit for global capital, the very existence of Lujiazui speaks LJZ–S.32 The Chen Residence.
03 to the aspirations of China’s economic transition: to eventually inflect global
flows to its rules by sheer size.
09 Regionally, the actual effect that Lujiazui has played in China’s
urban transition, as role model for land marketisation and the demolition-­
02 and-reconstruction model of rapid urban development, is far greater in
10 impact than the iconic image projected internationally, exemplifying the
08 transition urban China underwent in the decade after Pudong. The bureau-
cratic entrepreneurs were instrumental in facilitating land leases, eviction,
relocation, development, and management, reproduced and proliferated
07 in ensuing Chinese developments. The establishment of state-owned devel-
11 opment corporations is commonplace today as a means for the local state
to not only steer but also control development.
Formally, the Lujiazui model’s prioritisation of the automobile,
06
realised in its wide boulevards and large setbacks, serves as a successful
template for Chinese urban developments. ​→ LJZ–S.31 ​Despite its obstacles
to pedestrian connectivity, Chinese cities emulating Lujiazui’s success con-
tinue to reproduce an automobile-privileging urbanism. Though the ‘global
design corps’ proved to be less effective at the design stage, implementa-
tion has helped proliferate its towers.
One unintended by-product of Lujiazui’s rapid, unobstructed dem-
olition process was the initiation of heritage conservation in Shanghai,
beginning with a small building in Lujiazui originally called the Chen Res-
idence. A group of architectural scholars, through their successful saving
# LOCATION
01 Shanghai Tower of the brick modern-era building, now in the southern edge of Lujiazui’s
02 Shanghai World Financial Centre central green space, set a precedent for conservation efforts of built cul-
03 Jin Mao Tower
04 Shanghai IFC tural heritage in the early 1990s (Zhou 2017, 157–59). ​→ LJZ–S.32
05 Oriental Pearl Tower More locally, Lujiazui serves as a precedent for ensuing devel-
06 Century Corridor
07 Century Sky Bridge opments in Shanghai. Qiantan, developed and managed by LDC, and
08 Interchange Hall other developments, including West Bund and North Bund, garnered the
09 Pearl Ring
10 Oriental Floating Pavilion
11 Lujizui Central Green Space

LJZ–S.30 Pedestrian connections implemented before the 2010 World Expo. Connected overhead
walkways

142 Lujiazui Shanghai 143 Operation / Implications


LJZ–S.33 Buildings of Lujiazui in an ad for the BoC.
important attractor of grade-A office spaces whilst avoiding the monofunc-
tionalism of Lujiazui by including residences and amenities. In its plans
for four million square metres of development in Qiantan, LDC anticipates
reserving 40% for residential purposes (Ren 2018).
As bureaucrats recognise that early, expedited implementation
coupled with little experience resulted in inconvenience, new develop-
ments have tried to mitigate these earlier mistakes. For example, the 2007
Gregotti plan for the area just east of Lujiazui’s central region reinstated
podia, which had long been reiterated in urban design plans by FSC, Char-
pentier and EPAD for Lujiazui and Century Avenue.
Despite claims by local authorities that they have learned from
Lujiazui’s everyday fallibilities, it remains to be seen how much of the plan-
ning and implementation remains systemic to the institutional frameworks
that lease large plots and require rapid development. Procedurally, large
plots remain a protocol for state development corporations leasing land.
7 CONCLUSION
If popular advertisement is a measure of iconicity, then Lujiazui has far
exceeded its initial ambition of demonstrating to the world China’s eco-
nomic prowess. ​→ LJZ–S.33 ​Its recognisable buildings splashed across inter-
national airport billboards ​— ​the Pearl TV Tower next to the Eiffel Tower and
144 Lujiazui Shanghai
Big Ben ​ ​— ​and its pulsating neon setting the tone for James Bond’s opening
sequence, Lujiazui’s skyline has convinced the once-doubting world and
China’s own vast populace that China’s time has arrived again. ​→ LJZ–S.34
Despite the ‘adaptive governance’ (Heilmann and Perry 2011) and
‘urban loopholes’ (Zhou 2017) that have facilitated Lujiazui’s first decade
of rapid realisation, the rigidity of the initial masterplan and prioritisation
of automobile traffic at the expense of pedestrian connectivity continue to LJZ–S.34 The Chinese leader
Deng Xiaoping who began the
impede the site’s physical adaptability. Upgrade efforts still strive to over- country’s ‘reform and opening’ in
come Lujiazui’s ground-level pedestrian disconnect and lack of amenities. front of Lujiazui.
More fundamentally, mega-plots, the modus operandi for development in
China’s transition economy, will continue to pose intractable challenges
to not only Lujiazui’s adaptability, but also to the adaptability and resilience
of new developments in Chinese cities.
In terms of Lujiazui’s inclusiveness, its monofunctionality and
development mode have fundamentally contrasted Shanghai’s right bank,
Pudong, with the physical richness and socially diversity of its left bank in
historic Puxi. Whereas Puxi’s fine-grained urban morphology and histor-
ically-layered architecture typology have made its inclusiveness innate,
Pudong, only with time, has grown increasingly diverse and mixed, in spite
of its coarse urban morphology and functional planning.
The analysis of Lujiazui is a case in point of the spatial manifesta- LJZ–S.35 View towards Puxi
tion of political economy under transition, namely that of an authoritarian from Lujiazui.
state with central planning undergoing economic liberalisation without
foregoing political control and social stability. In the case of Lujiazui, the
local state as privileged market player underlines how specific institutional
framework impacts its spatial production. Lujiazui also shows that similar
symbolic representations do not necessarily undergo similar pathways of
spatial productions. The context-reliant specificities of contemporary urban-
ism, contingent on institutional frameworks, governance structures, and
socio-cultural norms, are crucial to understanding the impact of these spa-
tial products. ​→ LJZ–S.35 ​The development phase of the political economy,
the particularities of the transition economy in this case and the institutional
frameworks that shape spatial production are crucial to a more compre-
hensive understanding of Lujiazui as a case study for the Grand Projet.
145 Implications / Conclusion
HONGQIAO
MAIN CURRENT OWNER & DEVELOPER
Multiple (China & International)
DESIGNER
Shanghai Urban Planning Design Institute—
SUPDI (China)
Start of construction 1983
End of construction 1990s
L node74728/node74741/node74846/node74852/userobject1ai89845.html.
p2.11
H 际金融报 International Finance Daily, December 18, 2002. http://www.
L Lujiazui (case study)
H Hongqiao
Shanghai Hongqiao Airport
01 Shanghai International
Trade Centre
02 Shanghai World Trade
Exhibition Hall
03 Jiadun Plaza Gubei Road
100 m
Hongqiao Economic and Technological Devel-
opment Zone is a special economic zone (SEZ)
the central government designated in Shanghai
in the early-1980s for the inflow of international
capital. It was one of fourteen such zones in the
nation selected to resume and accelerate eco-
nomic development following three decades of
planned economy insulated from global economic
flows. Under China’s economic transition from a
planned to a market economy, the centrally-des-
ignated zones were the sole location of foreign
investments in industrial and commercial func-
tions and residential accommodations. The loca-
tion of Hongqiao was selected close to the existing
Hongqiao Airport to facilitate flow of capital and
resources. Hongqiao’s distance from the historic
city also served to insulate incoming investors from
the decrepit, complex conditions of the inner city.
This mode of a new business district built on tab-
ula rasa land would continue in the development
146 Lujiazui Shanghai
Shanghai, China
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WK–H
148 Lujiazui Shanghai 149 The Grand Projet
 Hong Kong
International
Airport Kowloon East

West Kowloon
West Kowloon
Site area 830,000 sqm

GFA 2,776,000
sqm

Density 3.35 FAR

Population Density NA inh / ha

Streets/roads36.00%
Built-up40.00%
Non Built-up 24.00%

Residential28.75%*
Business 38.65%* Office / Hotel

Commercial 9.94%* Retail

Civic 22.66%*
Education, Arts, Culture Centre

1989 Creation of West Kowloon as part of Airport Core Programme

1998 Kowloon Station opens
1999 West Kowloon Cultural District Announced
2008 XRL Terminus to be located in WK
2008 WKCD Authority founded with $216b gov funding
2011 Foster+Partners wins WKCD masterplan competition
2012 WK receives Uli Sigg’s Chinese Contemporary art collection
2018 Ownership of partial XRL Terminus transferred to China
2018 XRL and Xiqu Centers open

150 West Kowloon Hong Kong Conception Design Implementation Operation Implication * estimated calculation
1872 Following the Opium War, Imperial China 1992 6 MTRC is commissioned to design and op-
cedes Hong Kong to Britain erate the Airport Express system using the Rail &
Property model with Kowloon Station in West Kow-
1949 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is es- loon. TFP wins the competition for the development
tablished above Kowloon Station

1984 British–Chinese agreement for Hong Kong in

1997
1989 0 On 4 June at Tian’amen Square, interna-
tional confidence in China’s reform is lost
The British Hong Kong government announc-
es that it will invest in the city’s future. Land recla-
mation on the west coast of Kowloon for a new MTR
link results in West Kowloon
1998 0 In his Policy Address, SAR Chief Executive
Planned developments along the Kowloon’s land reclamation.
Tung Chee Hwa announces plans for a performance
1990 0 The Metroplan initiates West Kowloon venue, to be located in West Kowloon
Reclamation, designed to offer public space, hous-
ing and commercial programmes in order to ‘thin
out’ Kowloon’s dense built area
Kowloon Station Plans.
1996 0 Hong Kong Tourist Association (HKTA)
conducts a public survey, the results of which em-
phasise the city’s lack of a performance venue
1997 Asian Financial Crisis
British Hong Kong is handed over to China
and becomes The Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region (SAR)
Aerials of West Kowloon from 1998 and 2016. IFP entry by Foster+Partners.
1999 0 40 hectares of West Kowloon are desig- 2005 7 Public consultation for IFPs begins
nated as a cultural district
SAR Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa resigns
2000 6 SAR Chief Execultive Tung announces the amidst protests and is replaced by Donald Tsang
West Kowloon Cultural District (WKCD) Concept
Plan Competition 2006 6 The Elements Mall partially opens on the
podium level of Kowloon Station
2002 6 Foster + Partners, sponsored by SHK Prop-
erties, wins the WKCD Concept Plan competition 6 7 Public protest of WKCD’s single devel-
with its single roof canopy scheme oper approach
SAR government discontinues IFP
2007 0 The Ten Major Infrastructural Projects,
including WKCD, XRL and other cross-border fa-
cilities, are announced. The XRL Terminus is to be
located in West Kowloon
6 Chief Executive Tsang confirms XRL plans
with dedicated line in West Kowloon and terminus
extending into WKCD’s underground
Winning entry for WKCD by Foster+Partners, 2002. 2008 7 World Financial Crisis
The SARS Epidemic causes economic down- The statutory body West Kowloon Cultural
turn District Authority (WKCDA) is established. WKCDA
is responsible for developing and managing WKCD
6 7 To limit public spending, the SAR gov-
ernment invites private developers to submit propos- The SAR government conducts a one-time
als for the development and operation of WKCD. transfer of 21.6 billion HKD to WKCDA
Invitation for Proposals (IFP) requires private devel-
opers to base designs on Foster’s canopy scheme

Feasibility Study for a New Performance Venue, 1998. 2004 6 7 Major local developers, such as SHK
properties, Cheung Kong Holdings and Henderson
8 Airport Express Kowloon Station and the Land, form consortiums to participate in the IFP for
West Kowloon Development Statement, 1994. Chek Lap Kok Airport of Hong Kong open WKCD WKCDA.

Conception
Design
Implementation

152 West Kowloon Hong Kong 153 Transversal Data

Operation
Implication
 6 MTRC is commissioned to design XRL 8 Kowloon Station finishes development WKCDA appoints Michael Lynch as its new 2015 7 CEO of WKCD Michael Lynch resigns and
Hong Kong Station following the completion of the International Com- CEO is replaced by Duncan Pescod, former HK bureau-
merce Centre (ICC), the tallest building in Hong crat
2009 6 The transport consultancy MVA is com- Kong 2012 Xiqu Centre in WKCDA selects Bing Thom
missioned by the Transport Department to redesign Architects (now Revery Architects) and Ronald Lu 8 Austin Station Development completed
the car mobility network around West Kowloon, & Partners as architects.
integrating the site’s separate projects with retrofit-
ted road infrastructure 7 Dr. Uli Sigg, Swiss art collector of contem-
porary Chinese art, donates 1,400 works of his col-
lection to M+. This museum in WKCDA aims to
Kowloon Station. become Asia’s regional museum for visual culture
that is ‘rooted in Hong Kong’
2010 6 The WKCDA shortlists three firms, Fos-
ter + Partners (UK), OMA (NL) and Rocco Design 7 Swiss architect Herzog de Meuron wins
Architects (HK), to participate in concept master- competition for designing M+ The Austin Station development.
plan consultations
2016 7 Plans for a Palace Museum are announced
in Beijing, which override plans by Foster + Partners.
The local firm Rocco Design Architects is directly
commissioned as the museum’s architect
Transport network design, 2009.

8 The Austin Station portion of Austin Sta-

tion Development is completed. The residential
portion is tendered out to private developers New
World Development and Wheelock

7 The Legislative Council (LegCo) grants The three shortlisted masterplan proposals.
funding to construct the XRL railway amidst public The M+ Museum winning design.
protest against its high cost and alleged political WKCDA CEO Graham Sheffield resigns after
symbolism five months in office 2013 7 Foster + Partners scheme for WKCD is in-
tegrated into a development plan and approved by
2011 6 The City Park concept by Foster+Partners the Hong Kong Town Planning Board. The develop- 2017 6 Beijing announces the Greater Bay Area
is chosen as the preferred scheme ment plan defines loose zoning and non-building Development Plan, integrating Hong Kong with
areas rather than massing and exact plot areas other Chinese cities in the region and citing XRL
and other cross-border facilities

PRC approves XRL Co-location arrangement,

announcing that part of the underground area in the
XRL Terminus will be part of Mainland China. This
fuels public discontent in Hong Kong

2018 Completion and opening of the XRL and XRL

Terminus
The 2013 development plan.
8 The Xiqu Centre opens as the first major
Protests against the XRL, 2009. The Foster+Partners plan chosen for WKCD. 2014 Occupy Central performance venue of WKCD

0 Conception
6 Design
7 Implementation

154 West Kowloon Hong Kong 155 Transversal Data

8
9
Operation
Implication
 100 300m 100 300m

Current base plan. WK–H Building footprint Softscape Pre-intervention base plan, 1990. WK–H Project site
WK–H Building footprint, Projected softscape
projected Hardscape
WK–H Project site Projected hardscape

156 West Kowloon Hong Kong 157 Transversal Data

 Kowloon Station
West Kowloon Terminus

Austin Station

China Ferry Terminal

Kowloon Ferry Terminal

100 300m 100 300m

Publicly accessible open space plan. Softscape (within site) Transportation plan. MRT lines: XRL lines XRL station
Hardscape (within site) Airport Express Underground highway MRT station
Tung Chung Line Highway under construction p2.12 Ferry station
West Rail Line Bikeway Bus station
Pedestrian way Bike station

158 West Kowloon Hong Kong 159 Transversal Data

 100 300m 100 300m

Heritage structure. WK–H Heritage structure Programme plan. Residential Civic institutions
Commercial Technical utilities
Business Mixed-use
Industrial Ground floor with
commercial & business

160 West Kowloon Hong Kong 161 Transversal Data

 WEST KOWLOON HONG KONG
A Transport-oriented Development
with Culture
Ying Zhou and Desmond Choi

1 INTRODUCTION

West Kowloon exemplifies a Grand Projet built in a transitioning political

economy with strong neoliberal interests and a weak state. By analysing
the spatial production of this large-scale contemporary urban project, this
portrait will not only unpack how Hong Kong’s laissez-faire economy and
developmentalist state prioritises infrastructure at the cost of urban qual-
ity; this portrait will also show how Hong Kong’s technocratic piecemeal
planning has been eroding its citizens’ trust in the local state, in the context
of the city’s political transition as the Special Administration Region (SAR)
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since 1997.
Located across Victoria Harbour from the city’s iconic Central sky-
line ​→ WK–H.01, West Kowloon is the well-located by-product of land recla-
mation initiated as part of a mega-infrastructural strategy to bolster Hong
Kong’s economy after the city’s jurisdictional transfer from British control
back to the PRC. An exceptional Grand Projet case, its components ​— ​the
Kowloon Station, West Kowloon Cultural District, Express Railway Link
station, residences and Austin stations ​— ​are distinct, disconnected urban
forms representing the SAR’s changing priorities. Their coexistence, how-
ever, confirms the carryover of infrastructural priorities and pro-growth
governance structures of British Hong Kong to the SAR.

1.1 HONG KONG: THE CLASSIC LAISSEZ-FAIRE POLITICAL

ECONOMY, VESTED PRIVATE INTERESTS, EXECUTIVE-­
LED GOVERNANCE
Imperial China ceded Hong Kong to British control in 1842 follow-
ing the Opium War. After 1949, when the PRC was established and closed
the nation to international circulation of capital and resources, Hong Kong
became the crucial and nearly singular conduit between the outside world
and insular China with its planned economy. The influx of talent and capital,
expedited by the PRC’s founding and then its political upheavals ​— ​notably
after the Cultural Revolution that began in the mid-1960s ​— ​propelled British
Hong Kong’s rapid economic growth. British Hong Kong became one of the
Asian Tigers for its economic prowess, and, under the British governance’s
encouragement of private sector enterprise, has been dubbed the represent-
ative laissez-faire political economy (Castells 1998; Hampton 2016).
With the PRC’s opening in the 1980s, Hong Kong’s role as conduit
for Chinese capital amplified with the establishment of Shenzhen as PRC’s
first Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in proximity to Hong Kong, and manifested

WK–H.01 View of West Kowloon. 163 Introduction

in the rise of financial towers in Central, Hong Kong’s CBD. When China
began to open to the world in the 1980s, optimism for Hong Kong’s capac-
ity to spearhead China’s economic liberalisation ​— ​presumed to also lead Hong Kong North Lantau Lantau Link Expresswar Route 3
to a potential political liberalisation ​— ​encouraged negotiations for the return International Airport Expressway

of Hong Kong to the PRC. In 1984, British and PRC negotiations resulted
in a scheduled Handover date of 1 July 1997 and the PRC government’s
promise that Hong Kong would maintain large parts of its own legal and
financial systems within a ‘One Country Two Systems’ agreement for fifty Pre 1997 West Kowloon Reclamation

years following the 1997 Handover (Gargan 1997; Singh 2016). West Kowloon Highway

Despite Hong Kong’s transition from British colony to Special

Administration Region (SAR) of the PRC ​→ WK–H.02, the executive-led SAR Western Harbour Crossing
Airport Express
government continued to privilege vested private interests in its public deci-
sion-making, which planning scholars Alexander Cuthbert and Keith McK-
innell have identified as an ambiguity in the role of private corporations in 1997–2047
Central Reclamation
Phase 1
public institutions of Hong Kong (Cuthbert and McKinnell 1997). Hong Tung Chung
New Town
Kong citizens’ growing discontent with the PRC government’s interference
in political decisions culminated in the 2014 Occupy Central protests, known
as the Umbrella Movement, which called for universal suffrage.

1.2 WEST KOWLOON: PRIME REAL ESTATE IN Post 2047 ?

WK–H.05 The Airport Core Programme (ACP)’s projects. Transport infrastructure
A TRANSITIONING SAR Urban developments
West Kowloon
West Kowloon is a new urban area reclaimed from the sea. It is Railway
located west of the historic Jordan neighbourhood and occupies the south- Road

ern waterfront-facing tip of reclaimed land on the western side of the Kow-
loon Peninsula. ​→ WK–H.03 ​Even though it is tabula rasa with little physical
context, its development history and urban location, facing Victoria Har-
bour, reveal its pivotal role in Hong Kong’s post-Handover transition as a
SAR of the PRC.
Within the executive-led developmentalist institutional framework
and set against shifting public sentiment against the SAR government’s
acquiescence to PRC impositions, West Kowloon’s conception, design,
implementation and operation demonstrate Hong Kong’s British colonial
legacy of technocratic problem-solving and neoliberalism in governance.
Moreover, the Express Railway Link (XRL) station, flashpoint of territorial
contestations developed on the last mega-plot in West Kowloon, reveals
the potency of this exceptional Grand Projet as a centrality in the city. West
Kowloon, currently under construction, remains pliant to the political econ-
omy’s shifts. Thus, this portrait emphasises West Kowloon’s conception
and design, whilst its implementation ​— ​still under way ​— ​operation and
implications are crucial to understanding its future pliancy.
2 CONCEPTION
West Kowloon is a by-product of land reclaimed in service of infrastruc-
tural development in the aftermath of the 1989 Tian’anmen Square Inci-
dent. Although West Kowloon has emerged as a prime waterfront site, its
disparate parts were conceived at different times in reaction to an evolving
WK–H.02 From British Hong
Kong to the SAR.
01
02
01
02
Kowloon Station development
West Kowloon cultural district
03
04
XRL West Kowloon Terminus
Austin Station development
WK–H.03 West Kowloon in
Hong Kong and its parts.
political economy. ​→ WK–H.04 ​This lack of broader vision and adherence to
technocratic, piecemeal problem-solving exemplify the SAR’s urban devel-
opment mode, which prioritises infrastructure development over urban
spatial quality.
2.1 INFRASTRUCTURE’S IDEOLOGICAL BEGINNINGS
The international community’s optimism for China’s economic
liberalisation and political reform were shattered following the Tian’anmen
Square Incident on 4 June 1989. With it British confidence in Hong Kong’s
future also dissipated. At the end of 1989, the British Hong Kong govern-
ment announced the Port and Airport Development Strategy (PADS) project ​
— ​also referred to as the “Rose Garden Project” ​— ​in order to, according to
the British Hong Kong governor Lord David Wilson, “sustain Hong Kong
during the present period of uncertainty” (Wilson 1989). The British Hong
Kong government initiated large-scale infrastructural investments a few
months after 4 June in response to misgivings that the events of 1989 wrought
on the city’s future, evidenced by a rising exodus of Hong Kong citizens. By
03 04 creating a global air hub, the Rose Garden Project attempted to bolster Hong
Kong’s economic prowess in the long-term and restore confidence.
An important part of the Rose Garden Project was the Airport Core
Programme (ACP), which consisted of ten infrastructural projects centred
around the construction of a new airport at Chek Lap Kok, located on the
north side of Lantau Island. ​→ WK–H.05 ​In addition to the construction of
the airport on Lantau Island, and of bridges and highways leading to it,

164 West Kowloon Hong Kong 165 Introduction / Conception

VISION 1995 Secondary office and hotel centre around (…) 1998 Intention to boost Hong Kong’s status as 2002 West Kowloon Cultural District (…) creates an 2007 People’s West Kowloon / Cultural gateway to
railway terminals Asia’s entertainment and events capital. unmistakable landmark for Hong Kong. It would be the Pearl River Delta.
a major tourist attraction.

MAJOR DESIGN
ITERATIONS

1992–1997 Kowloon Point Development, TFP

1999 Performance Venue 2002 Conceptual Masterplan, 2010 City Park (Winner),
Feasability Study, Tao Ho Foster + Partners Foster + Partners

Developer’s Proposals
→ 2004 Dynamic Star ltd,
Foster + Partners
→ 2004 World City Culture Park ltd,
Tange Associates
→ 2004 Sunny Development ltd,
2010 Cultural Connect, 2010 Project for a New
Foster + Partners
Rocco Design Architects Dimension, OMA

REALISED SCHEMES

2008–2018
2017–(2022)
Express Railway Link
Palace Museum FS
Aedas
Rocco Design
1995
Kowloon Station Development
TFP

Austin Station

KEY EVENTS
→ West Kowloon

Airport Core Programme (ACP) Announcement of West Kowloon Ten Major Infrastructures WKCD China passes
Announced West Kowloon Reclamation Harbour Protection Act Cultural District (1st iteration) (2nd iteration), Express Railway Link, ‘co-location’ plan
Kowloon Station Development HK Zhuhai Macau Bridge in Hong Kong

→ Hong Kong SARS Epidemic Umbrella Movement

Economic Downturn
Hong Kong Handover
20th Anniversary
CEPA
The Mainland and Hong
Kong are closer to an
Economic Partnership
ACP Agreement Hong Kong Handover
between UK and China
→ World June 4th Incident Beijing Olympics

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
WK–H.04 Designing in parts for West Kowloon.

166 West Kowloon Hong Kong 167 Conception


WK–H.06 West Kowloon reclamation.
reclamations on the western coast of Kowloon Peninsula ​→ WK–H.06 ​and
Central’s harbour front on Hong Kong Island were an important part of the
ACP for the construction of an underground Airport Express and Mass Tran-
sit Railway (MTR) linking Chek Lap Kok to the CBD at Central (Blake 1994).
Even though infrastructural development could hardly be regarded as ide-
ological, its implementation in the neoliberal political economy of Hong
Kong was the technocratic colonial government’s strategy for sustaining
its soon-to-be-former colony through future political uncertainty.
2.2 PRAGMATIC BY-PRODUCT OF INFRASTRUCTURE
West Kowloon is a by-product of this airport development and the
colonial government’s ideological stance towards Hong Kong’s impending
Handover. ​u URBAN CATALYSTS ​However, the vast amount of land reclaimed,
totalling 340 hectares along the western edge of Kowloon Peninsula, 40
of which compose West Kowloon (“CEDD ​— ​West Kowloon Cultural Dis-
trict” n.d.) lacked vision and definition.
168 West Kowloon Hong Kong
The Planning Department’s 1990 Metroplan Selected Strategy, the first ter-
ritorial-scaled restructuring plan for Hong Kong, indicated only that the
reclaimed areas would serve as mitigation and spill-over regions for Kow-
loon’s high density (Hong Kong Planning, Environment and Lands Branch.
Strategic Planning Unit 1989). In the West Kowloon Development State-
ment of 1994, which was to “translate the Metroplan concept into more
specific district planning objectives and targets” (P. C. M. Li 1994, 2), exist-
ing usage patterns were extended along the reclaimed areas. Given that
Tsim Sha Tsui (TST) was a commercial tourist area on Kowloon’s southern
tip, its functions were extended to the southern part of West Kowloon Rec-
lamation, what is today the West Kowloon Cultural District (WKCD), and
to the Kowloon Point Reclamation, which does not exist today. The Devel-
opment Statement designated the waterfront area a continuous green that
bulged towards the southwestern area. This initial and vague green would
later concretise into the zoning plans for a southwestern waterfront.
Whilst the Planning Department and its West Kowloon Develop-
ment Statement remained relatively vague regarding urban vision for the
land reclamation, the Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) had
already begun to construct the Airport Express and Tung Chung lines con-
necting Central to the new airport in 1992, rapidly implementing Kowloon
Station. In the 1995 publication The Shape of Things to Come issued by the
Planning, Environment and Lands branch, equivalent of the SAR’s Devel-
opment Bureau, the overall image for West Kowloon remained abstract
but the architectural models of the Kowloon Station development showed
Reclaimed area
its form (Hong Kong Planning, Environment and Lands Branch 1995). It WK–H.07 West Kowloon’s Early
Visions; Metroplan 1990 (01),
is thus not surprising that while an overall vision for West Kowloon was Railway Development Strategy
still lacking ​→ WK–H.07, Kowloon Station opened in 1998. Its efficient infra- 1994 (02), West Kowloon
Development Statement 1994
structural execution created a closed, multi-levelled single volume, which (03–04).
incorporated living, working and commerce, its scale emblematic of Hong
Kong’s transport-oriented developments (TODs).
2.3 ‘CULTURE’ AS ECONOMIC RESPONSE TO REGIONAL
URBAN COMPETITION
Whilst the infrastructural node of Kowloon Station was undergo-
ing rapid implementation, the function of West Kowloon’s southern water-
front land was also shifting in concept.
The year before the 1997 Handover, Hong Kong Tourist Association
conducted a survey and received feedback that Hong Kong lacked a large-
scale venue for performances (Chu 2010; Kong, Ching, and Chou 2015).
This coincided with reports that the popular Broadway musical Cats was
unable to find a venue in Hong Kong (Tsui 2008). The idea that a large-scale
performance venue was needed for Hong Kong and the possibility that it
could be located in newly-reclaimed West Kowloon began to take shape.
169 Conception
In his October 1998 policy addresses, the SAR’s first Chief Executive Tung
Chee-Hwa referred to a West Kowloon performance venue as part of “our
broader vision… to cultivate Hong Kong’s image as the Asian centre for arts
and culture… as catalyst for upgrading our image as Asia’s entertainment
capital” (Tung 1998). The British Hong Kong government had regarded
culture as a mediator of popular dissent. This legacy of linking culture with
leisure would continue under the SAR government. In the minds of Hong
Kong’s elites, led by Tung, deploying cultural functions to cater to a growing
tourist market not only elevated the British Hong Kong legacy of interchang-
ing culture with leisure and entertainment; it also tapped into the elites’
functionalist business instincts for marketing entertainment and furthering
Hong Kong as a global node amidst regional economic competitors. West
Kowloon was the tabula rasa site for this economic strategy.
The Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, designed by star architect
Frank Gehry, also opened in 1997, the highlight of Bilbao’s revitalisation
project. Whether the Bilbao Effect directly reverberated in Hong Kong’s
elite circles is not documented, but the aspiration for deploying culture as
attractor was becoming an international trend. ​m MODELLING ​In October
1999, Tung again announced that a performance venue in West Kowloon
“will be designed to world-class standards and will help put Hong Kong
on the map as the events capital of Asia” (Tung 1999).
In 1998, the Tourist Association had commissioned prominent
local architect Tao Ho to study West Kowloon’s feasibility. His firm’s 1999
Study on the Feasibility of a New Performance Venue presented a large park
and a performing arts venue ​→ WK–H.08, set amongst other cultural facilities
(TaoHo Design Architects Ltd. and Hong Kong Tourist Association 1999).
In March 1998, the Planning Department also commissioned a Study on
the Requirements of Cultural Facilities and the Formulation of New Planning
Standards and Guidelines for Cultural Facilities (Roger Tym & Partners and
HKU Social Sciences Research Centre 1999). In addition to reviews on
cultural policies and facilities provisions, the report’s appendix included
an appraisal of developing cultural venues in a “high-value” location such
as West Kowloon and the percentages of its commercial mix. The report
was completed in December 1999.
At the end of 1999, the Planning, Environment and Lands Bureau
announced a shift from developing the western 5.5-hectare part of West Kow-
loon with one large-scale performance venue to developing all of West Kow-
loon’s 40 hectares as a “world-class integrated arts, cultural and entertainment
district” (Planning, Environment and Lands Bureau 1999). West Kowloon’s
designation has thus become a Cultural District for all cultural and enter-
tainment venues. Not soon after, in 2000, the SAR government launched
170 West Kowloon Hong Kong
WK–H.08 Guggenheim Bilbao,
realised in 1997, and the 1999
design of a performing arts venue
in West Kowloon.
the branding of Hong Kong as “Asia’s World City,” which had been underway
since the Handover. Culture remained for Hong Kong’s economically-driven
elites the resource for sustaining the city’s regional competitiveness.
It was only in 2004, when public discontent rose against the prof-
it-driven way the SAR government began developing West Kowloon, that
the government changed the Cultural District’s branding from one of global
aspirations to what Chief Secretary Henry Tang called “the People’s West
Kowloon” (H. Y. Tang 2009). However, although the SAR government
increasingly responded to Hong Kong’s vocal civic groups and changed its
development processes, its economic priorities remained fundamentally
the same. The clustering of culture in a single, sprawling district also
revealed a continued imprecision regarding culture’s role in Hong Kong.
WK–H.09 Growing rail network
2.4 CATERING TO CHINA’S GROWING MIDDLE CLASS in China and the PRD.
In 1994, the British Hong Kong government was considering plans
for a regional rail to connect Hong Kong to Mainland China (Transport
Branch 1994). Because of the uncertainties of the Handover’s effect on
Hong Kong and the financial stagnation of the Asian Financial Crisis in
1997, these plans were ongoing. Following the Handover, the SAR govern-
ment, through the Kowloon Canton Railway (KCR), commissioned TFP
Farrells to study the area and make a proposal in 2002. In early 2004, the
PRC government also announced the Long and Mid-term Railway Network
Plan and initiated the rapid development of the country’s high-speed rail-
way network. This placed the Hong Kong-Shenzhen-Guangzhou railway
connection once again on the discussion table. ​→ WK–H.09
In the aftermath of the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) epidemic that crippled Hong Kong, the PRC’s central government
increased the quota for mainland Chinese entering Hong Kong to revive
the SAR’s economy. The potential influx of mainland tourists from China
following the Mainland-Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrange-
ment announced in October 2003 changed the conception of the railway
connection. The mainland tourists became a new market for both the Cul-
tural District and the adjacent Kowloon Station development. The growing
wealth originating in mainland China in the 2000s evolved West Kowloon ​
— ​its Cultural District, the high-end mall and residences in Kowloon Sta-
tion and the soon-to-be-conceived XRL station ​— ​into an area able to accom-
modate the enormous flows of capital from the PRC.
The political importance of the SAR’s ties to the PRC remained pri-
ority. In 2007, after Chief Executive Donald Tsang’s visit to Guangzhou, the
SAR government announced the Ten Major Infrastructure Projects, part of
which included the construction of a new XRL to better connect Hong Kong
171 Conception
 SHENZHEN
Lok Ma Chau Loop
co two
ne
nn rk i
ec n C
tio
n t hina
oX
RL
Rail connection between the Hong
Kong and Shenzhen airports
(cancelled)
Tuen Mun–Chek Lap Kok Link and
Tuen Mun Western Bypass
Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macao Bridge
← Zhuhau / Macao
WK–H.10 Ten major infrastructure projects.
to Guangdong province (Tsang 2007). In his Policy Address, Tsang positioned
the Ten Major Infrastructure Projects ​→ WK–H.10 ​as an economic stimulant
that would recreate the success of ACP and asked the SAR’s law-making body
Legislative Council (LegCo) for the approval of funds (Tsang 2007). With
the exception of new local train networks, the Ten Major Infrastructure Pro-
jects anticipated the growing integration of Hong Kong and mainland China,
notably within the Pearl River Delta (PRD) region.
At the end of 2009, LegCo approved funds for the XRL. Public
antagonism towards the PRC government’s impositions on the autonomy
of SAR and what many Hong Kong civic groups see as an erosion of the
city’s cultural identity through the influx of Mainlanders has been growing
since the late-2000s. The XRL is a point of great sensitivity for Hong Kong
politicians and target of popular contention because its terminal station,
located in West Kowloon, anticipates a daily flow of 200,000 individuals
coming from China, physically manifesting closer Hong Kong-China inte-
gration. Guangzhou’s ​— ​rather than the PRC central government’s ​— ​initi-
ative of the XRL also demonstrates its political interest in Hong Kong: at
the end of the SAR’s special status within the PRC, Hong Kong may hier-
archically be under the jurisdiction of Guangdong province. Nevertheless,
the conception of this part of West Kowloon emphasises the SAR govern-
ment’s prioritisation of infrastructural developments.
172 West Kowloon Hong Kong
North East New Territories and
Hung Shui Kiu New Development Areas
Hong Kong section of the
Guangzhou–Shenzhen–Hong Kong
Express Rail Link (XRL)
Sha Tin to Central Link
Kai Tak Development
West Kowloon Cultural District
South Island Line
Transport infrastructure
Urban developments
West Kowloon
Railway
Road
Under the British Hong Kong government, infrastructural development
took precedence as economic strategy. Especially after 1989, responding
to the crisis of confidence in the PRC’s opening, infrastructure develop-
ment was deployed to shield and sustain Hong Kong, which would become
an SAR on its return to PRC sovereignty. This modus operandi of prioritis-
ing infrastructural development continues under the SAR government;
technocratic problem-solving deprives the urban developments of poten-
tial for greater vision, as is evident in the fragmented ideas for West Kow-
loon’s components. Even in its negotiation with the PRC power structures
into which Hong Kong will one day be absorbed, the SAR government con-
tinues to utilise infrastructure as an instrument at the arguably high cost
of its citizens’ confidence.
3 DESIGN
Just as the conception for West Kowloon is disparate and ad hoc, the design
of its varying parts reflects poor integration and a prioritisation of infra-
structure. Indeed, what links the development’s three parts is their mon-
olithic scale and shared disconnect from the adjacent urban fabric. The
architects of Kowloon Station took the lack of a greater concept for the trans-
port interchange as an opportunity to impart an urban idea to a Transport
Oriented Development (TOD) and tried to extend this form to the entire
area. Similarly, with the Cultural District, architects, at times in conjunction
with developers, offered possible urban concepts by giving different forms
to the southern waterfront of West Kowloon in front of the TOD. The design
of the intraregional connection of the XRL confirms the primacy of infra-
structure efficiency and a unique, politicised border condition over urban
qualities such as pedestrian connectivity and diversity. ​b BORDERING
3.1 KOWLOON STATION: DESIGNING THE MULTIPLE
GROUNDS OF A TOD
In 1992, the Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC) acquired
the land parcel on top of Kowloon Station for the Airport Express and new
Tung Chung MTR line stations. The MTRC commissioned the British firm
Terry Farrells and Partners (TFP) to draw up a masterplan for the station.
TFP’s late-1980s commission for the British Consul building in Hong Kong
and its winning of the Peak Tower commission, a tourist and infrastruc-
tural hub for the Peak tram, led to the enterprise’s incorporation in Hong
Kong in 1991. With a 12.4 plot ratio for 1.7 million square metres on 13.5
acres, TFP designers saw Kowloon Station as their opportunity to design
a “Transport Super City” (Terry Farrell & Partners 1998), where the impend-
ing MTR and Airport Express stations were pivots of a larger masterplan
for a high-density urban area.
173 Conception / Design
Since the 1970s, the MTRC has been expanding its system of TOD projects,
with some large-scale shopping centres built as podiums atop MTR stations
and some stations topped with residential towers. These TODs have been
important to the development of surrounding residential neighbourhoods.
The Kowloon Station development was the first TOD on ACP reclaimed
land and occupies a mega-block whose podium is a mall atop the under-
ground MTR and Airport Express stations.
Residential and commercial towers rise atop Kowloon Station’s
commercial-infrastructural podium. In the TFP design, the podium and
tower TOD of Kowloon Station was part of a larger system of similarly-scaled
mega-block podiums in the broader context of Kowloon Reclamation. These
mega-block podiums were planned for the north-south strip of reclaimed
area west of TST called Kowloon Point, for which TFP was also engaged.
Each mega-block was designed to be a self-contained urban unit with amen-
ities that could fulfil the needs of the residents above.
The Kowloon Station design was an interiorised mega-block podium
with multiple pedestrian grounds within, part of a larger system of podiums
connected by bridges. Even though modernist projects such as Le Corbusier’s
Plan Voisin that retained the ground as the main pedestrian connector were
referenced (Terry Farrell & Partners 1998, 16), the depth of a singular vol-
ume in the mega-block of Kowloon Reclamation compelled interiorisation
of public spaces in the mall podiums. With the MTRC requiring 1.7 hectares
of gardens and recreational facilities on the Kowloon Station site (Terry
Farrell & Partners 1998, 26), the designers also designated the podium’s
roof as an additional ground. Occupants of the residential and commercial
towers can thus enjoy the privatised public space of podium rooftops, replete
with gardens, facilities and pathways. Additionally, the TFP design included
spaces for linking to future bridges that would connect the podium mall of
Kowloon Station to the future WKCD to its south and the future XRL sta-
tion to its east.
For the functional allocation and formal configuration of the towers
atop the Kowloon Station podium, the TFP designers iterated different con-
figurations, emphasising the flexibility of their masterplan in accommodat-
ing market demands and corresponding density requirements. This flexibility
was especially important in Hong Kong’s real-estate-dominated economy.
An early sketch shows an outline with north-south zones of hotels to the west
and office towers to the east sandwiching residential uses. In 1994, TFP sub-
mitted a master layout plan to the Town Planning Board (TPB) for approval.
When the MTR Kowloon Station and other ACP infrastructures
opened in 1998, Hong Kong’s civic organisations succeeded in putting forth
the Harbour Protection Ordinance against the expansion of land reclama-
tion. The Ordinance halted further reclamation, including that for Kowloon
Point. As a result, only the Kowloon Station development of TFP’s original
vision for a massive urban area with a new urban type was realised.
174 West Kowloon Hong Kong
3.2 CULTURAL DISTRICT: WHAT FORM DOES A CULTURAL
PRECINCT TAKE?
Whilst design and implementation were set in motion in the mid-
1990s for the infrastructural node of Kowloon Station, the waterfront of
the reclaimed areas south of Kowloon Station remained ambiguous. It was
only after Chief Executive Tung’s 1999 policy address that the clustering
of cultural venues in this area began. In April 2001, the SAR government
announced the launching of a Concept Plan Competition for the Development
of an Integrated Arts, Cultural and Entertainment District at the West Kow-
loon Reclamation (Planning and Lands Bureau 2002), proceeding with the
idea of a Cultural District declared two years prior.
The 2001 design competition attracted 161 entries from interna-
tional firms. In February 2002, the firm of Foster and Partners, led by Lon-
don-based 1999 Pritzker Prize winner Norman Foster, won the competition. ​
→ WK–H.13 ​ Designer of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (HSBC) building
and Chek Lap Kok airport, the firm is well-known amongst elites of the
former British colony. Foster and Partners’ proposal included a continuous
glass roof that spanned the entirety of the site, which Lord Jacob Rothschild,
chairman of the ten-member jury and chair of the Pritzker Prize at the time,
proclaimed the “signature feature of the design” (Foster + Partners 2002).
The roof rose from five storeys above ground on the east side near Jordan
to over fifteen storeys on the west side. Underneath this roof, bulges of an
undulating coast line framed a continuous east-west green park, which
constituted 70% of the 40-hectare site. At the western end, using the design
language of the early 2000s when the first sophisticated digital drawing
tools became prevalent, Foster’s designers carved out a bay from the land-
fill for boat docking under the sectionally-undulating glass roof. Supported
by Sun Hung Kai Group (SHK), one of the major Hong Kong developers
and developer of the adjacent Kowloon Station, the proposal also seam-
lessly integrated its expansive green ground with the rooftop of Kowloon
Station, connecting to the waterfront with one kilometre of stairs that medi-
ate the three-storey descent. The singular expansive roof is a reminder of
Foster’s earlier collaborations with American Buckminster Fuller, known
for covering Manhattan with a three-kilometre dome to regulate weather
and control pollution, as well as the ecological concerns of a generation of
architects. In West Kowloon, the “great canopy would create an unmistak-
able landmark for Hong Kong,” the jury of the competition pronounced
(Planning and Lands Bureau 2002).
Following the competition in September 2003, Chief Secretary for
Administration Donald Tsang announced an Invitation for Proposals (IFP)
for the development of the WKCD, emphasising that the invitation for the
private sector to finance and construct the project was “in keeping with our
philosophy of ‘small government’”(Tsang 2003). The IFP required a pre-
liminary masterplan incorporating a list of required performing and visual
175 Design
2002 DESIGN COMPETITION
→ Designers
Enhance Hong Kong’s position
as a centre of arts, culture and
entertainment and create a new
look for Victoria Harbour.
WINNER
→ Foster + Partners
2ND PRIZE
→ Philip Liao Architects   The Conceptual Plan Consultants were the Rotterdam-based firm
HONOURABLE MENTION
→ Rocco Design Architects
WK–H.11 Designs for the cultural district.
176 West Kowloon Hong Kong
2004 INVITATION FOR
PROPOSALS (IFP)
→ Developers & Designers
It is all part of our positioning as
Asia’s world city. We want Hong
Kong to be the most vibrant hub
for culture, arts and entertain-
ment in the region. When
completed, state-of-the-art
facilities will provide residents
and visitors with a wide range of
cultural and leisure pursuits. Our
local artists will also have a
creative hive in which to further
develop their talents.
SHORTLISTED ENTRIES
→ Dynamic Star co. ltd
Developer: Sun Hung Kai
Properties and Cheong Kong
Designers: Foster + Partners
→ Sunny Development co. ltd
Developer: Sino Land, Wharf,
Chinese Estate
Designers: Unknown
→ W
 orld City Culture Park
Limited
Developer: Henderson Land
Designers: Tange Associates
2010 DESIGN COMPETITION
→ Designers
As far as our broad vision is
concerned, my short answer is:
West Kowloon Cultural District is
the people’s gathering place; it is
meant to bring arts to the people,
and people to the arts. The arts
can lift the spirit, stir the soul,
inspire us and help us look at the
world from different perspectives.
They are expressions of creativity,
and crucibles of talent. So, the
cultural district should stand for
individuality and multiplicity. It
should be both inclusive and
exclusive.
PREFERRED SCHEME
→ Foster + Partners
OTHER SHORTLISTED
PROPOSALS
→ OMA
→ Rocco Design Architects
2012 DEVELOPMENT PLAN arts venues, a canopy covering at least 55% of the development area and
technical, financial and operation proposals (HKSAR Government 2003).
Dynamic Star, a collaboration between developers SHK and Cheong
Kong (CK), commissioned Foster and Partners as design partner. Foster
and Partners modified its single roof design by embedding five levels of
programme below a park that covered 75% of the total area and adding a
row of high-rise residential towers on the north edge, rising in height toward
the eastern edge (Dynamic Star International Limited 2004). Sunny Devel-
opment, a collaboration between developers Wharf, Sino Land and China
Estates, commissioned the design firms of Aedas, Richard Rogers, Jean
Nouvel and Herzog & de Meuron and proposed amoeba-planned cultural
venues topped by green roofs and covered by a glass canopy, composed of
100 pieces of saddle-back-shaped ETFE panels and held up by bundled
arches (Sunny Development Limited 2004). Henderson Land created the
firm World City Cultural Park and commissioned the offices of Cesar Pelli,
Tange Associates, HOK Sport and Jerde Partnership as design partners for
their submission (World City Park Limited 2004). Swire’s submission, which
commissioned Frank Gehry for the museums, was disqualified because it
did not submit a large roof design. Because of the realities of real estate
economics, all submitted proposals exceeded the requisite 1.81 plot ratio.
Following technical assessments, three schemes went forward to
public consultation in 2005. ​→ WK–H.11 ​Of the 33,100 comment cards and
DEVELOPMENT PLAN
251,000 visits received, public feedback was overwhelmingly negative
(Carmona 2006). Following protests against the single-developer bid, as
elaborated in this chapter’s “Implementation” frame, the SAR government
reviewed its single developer approach (Chu 2010). In July 2008, it created
the statutory body of the West Kowloon Cultural District Authority (WKCDA)
(Cap. 601 West Kowloon Cultural District Authority Ordinance 2008). In April
→ Foster + Partners
2009, the Chief Secretary addressed the public for the first time, reframing
the vision for West Kowloon as one for the locals (H. Tang 2009). Imme-
diately following its establishment, the WKCDA engaged in extensive pub-
lic consultations for the design of the Cultural District. In 2009, the WKCDA
launched another international design consultation, the first of its three-
part public engagement, selecting three Conceptual Plan Consultants
(WKCDA 2009).
OMA led by Pritzker-Prize-winner Rem Koolhaas, the firm of Rocco Design
Architects led by prominent local architect Rocco Yim and Foster and Part-
ners. ​→ WK–H.12 ​Danny Yung, a cultural activist and critic of Foster’s 2001
proposal, criticised the proposals again as mere “architectural design” rather
than a real “masterplan” (Yang 2008).
177 Design

WK–H.12 Two layers of buildings along the pedestrian east–west axis atop automobiles underground.
OMA’s proposal, entitled “Project for a New Dimension,” put forth clusters
of ‘villages,’ with a fine grain and open network. Required to attend the
public consultations with numerous civic and arts groups between October
2009 and January 2010, the OMA scheme proposed a streetscape scale
mimicking that of older fine-grained Hong Kong neighbourhoods, where
many Hong Kong residents were increasingly locating their city’s identity
in its street life. The OMA proposal located one village on the western water-
front, pivoted by a north-south bar of performing arts backing the water-
front village fabric. A visual art centre was located to the east, and another
village was located south of Kowloon Station, buttressed by a theatre for
Cantonese opera to the west and movie theatre to the east.
In 2001, Rocco had submitted a proposal of plate-like structures.
In Rocco’s 2010 proposal, three layers were proposed: a northern spline
of housing towers south of Kowloon Station called the “city link;” a cultural
core with venues south of the city link; and the “green terrain,” a contin-
uous serrated green roof descending from north to south covering the water-
front southern edge.
After extensive consultation for almost a year, Foster and Partners’
proposal won once again in 2011. The Selection Panel cited the overall
strengths of the Foster proposal as “strong co-ordination amongst arts and
cultural facilities, public spaces and land uses,” a “good range of transpor-
tation” and “environmental friendly features” (LegCo Joint Subcommittee
to Monitor the Implementation of the WKCD Project 2011). Chief Secretary
Tang regarded the proposal’s large park and flexibility as preferable. Nota-
bly, following rounds of consultations and public voting, the vote itself was
never disclosed.
Foster and Partners’ submission of “City Park” maintained a large
park on the west side of WKCD connected by the southern waterfront all
the way to Kowloon Park on the east. Renderings emphasised this park as a
pedestrian connector. A second east-west pedestrian axis was the hardscape
178 West Kowloon Hong Kong
public space of the development, lined on the north and south by two rows
of buildings, each sitting atop plots 100–130 metres wide. The northern
row, facing Kowloon Station and the West Kowloon Terminus of the XRL,
were narrower in the north-south direction and designated for commercial
and residential functions. The southern row, facing the waterfront, con-
sisted of larger lower volumes for cultural functions. Two plazas, one diag-
onally connected to the XRL and the other facing a bridge connecting
northward to Kowloon Station, cut through the pedestrian axis.
The competition renderings showed the pedestrian axis framed
by the two layers of buildings as arcaded, shielding pedestrians from the
sun, with automobiles speeding below. ​→ WK–H.12 ​An important part of the
proposal was the vertical separation of car traffic and pedestrian access,
sinking highway and parking below the pedestrian connector and park. WK–H.13 From masterplan to
This hiding of infrastructure below the green and the city also appeared development plan.
in the Foster schemes of 2002 and 2004. Instead of a single roof, a large
podium is continuous throughout the new WKCD.
Foster and Partners, along with consultants, repacked the proposal
as a development plan for submission to the TPB. ​→ WK–H.13 ​Based on feed-
back from the WKCDA board, which saw the simplicity of a straight pedes-
trian axis as insufficiently designed, the axis shifted northwards at the plaza, WK–H.14 Continuous
Central Square, in front of the XRL station. This shift also moved the larger underground infrastructure.
massing for cultural programmes to the northern row east of the Central
Square and the larger massing to the southern row west of the Square. The
location of the M+ museum, which had been clustered together with the
Xiqu Centre across from Kowloon Park, shifted to the western end of the
WKCD, west of a smaller plaza called the Artist Square, located south of the
connection coming from the southwestern corner of Kowloon Station.
In terms of development process, Foster and Partners urged the
Home Affairs Bureau, which oversees the WKCDA, that the WKCDA be
involved in the land sales in the development of the cultural district. The
development plan, moreover, allows for changes to plot boundaries and
massing, so long as the public corridors are maintained. This makes Gross
Floor Area (GFA) shifts possible in the implementation stage. Even though
zoning is fixed, landuse categories such as ‘arts’, ‘culture’, ‘entertainment’and
‘commercial’ provided flexibility. The Chief Executive approved the devel-
opment plan in 2013 (Legislative Council 2013). Foster and Partners’ engage-
ment for WKCD would largely conclude with the approval, resulting in visible
changes to its Design Guidelines in the implementation stage.
The design’s continuous large basement flipped the singular roof
concept Foster and Partners initially tabled for WKCD in 2002. ​→ WK–H.14
Even though the continuity of the infrastructure is invisible, buried unde-
ground, the irony of this reversal, together with the decade-long delay in
the WKCD’s implementation, have been the target of sustained criticism.
179 Design
3.3 XRL STATION: DESIGNING A CONTROVERSIAL
CROSS-BORDER PROJECT
The design of the XRL began in 2007 as part of the Ten Major Infra-
structure Projects development. The MTRC, commissioned to both design
and build the infrastructure, awarded the design contract to the international
architecture conglomerate Aedas in 2008 after a private competition that
involved TFP and Foster and Partners. The design led by Aedas’ Andrew WK–H.15 Rendering of XRL.
Bromberg consists of a terminus station topped by a north-south wave-
shaped roof occupying the entire mega-block. The roof is striated, partly
occupiable and partly green, opening onto a future plaza connecting to
WKCD’s Central Square and facing Victoria Harbour to the south. ​→ WK–H.15 ​
Aecom was charged with designing the landscaping of the public space and
the important connection across the east-west Austin Road underpass into
WKCD. Pedestrian bridges connect to the western side of Kowloon Station
and cross the north-south underpass between the two plots. Aecom pro-
vided expertise in civil, structural, fire and, most importantly, geological
engineering, whilst Aedas provided expertise in heritage and green space.
Because the station’s profile is low in proportion, especially next
to Kowloon Station’s tall towers, 294,000 square metres of office towers
were planned atop the station on the western edge (Furuto 2012). 25 metres
aboveground at its highest points, the 400,000-square-metre structure is
especially complex given its five-storey underground infrastructure and
jurisdictional border between the SAR and PRC within its premises. First
designs for segregated immigration, which met territorial requirements,
meant spatial inefficiency. As in an airport, the vertical separation of arriv-
als and departures was a design solution. The station’s massive under- WK–H.16 Infrastructural priorities of West Kowloon. Above ground Underground
ground infrastructural requirements and connection to the sea also mean Train terminus (China) Train terminus (China)
that it extends well under the WKCD, its infrastructural delays in imple- Train station (local) Bus station (China)
Train station (local)
mentation attributed to WKCD’s delays. Bus terminus (local)
The lack of an overall vision for West Kowloon is visible in its design
disintegration. The architects engaged in the master-planning of the site, 4 IMPLEMENTATION
notably of the WKCD, are more known for their buildings than for urban-
ism. Scaling up does not work, especially here. The confirmation of the As with the phasing of the West Kowloon development, the implementa-
XRL and its shortening of a cross-border commute from mainland China tion of the different urban forms of Kowloon Station, the WKCD and the
has incited a growing nativism in a disgruntled local populace. The shared XRL have been unintentionally staggered ​→ WK–H.17, whilst the SAR’s involve-
disconnect of West Kowloon’s developments from the adjacent neighbour- ment has been prevalent. ​→ WK–H.18 ​West Kowloon’s implementation reveals
hoods could even be read as a deliberate but understated quarantining of the SAR’s infrastructural and economic priorities and the shifting impact
an unwelcome influx to safeguard the identity of these adjacent neighbour- that a growing vocal but nevertheless ineffective civic society has on the
hoods. A belated commission by the Transport Department to integrate SAR’s urbanism. ​→ WK–H.19​
its parts in 2009 through traffic connectivity shows the difficulty of retro-
fitting a rigid framework (Transport Department 2009). Inadvertent infra- 4.1 KOWLOON STATION AS TOD
structural priority may ensure efficiency but not urban quality. ​→ WK–H.16 ​ Kowloon Station’s 1.06 million square metres of real estate, con-
taining sixteen residential towers with 8,809 units, two hotels, the 118-sto-
rey tower of the International Commerce Centre (ICC) with 231,778 square
metres of office space and the 82,750-square-metre Elements Mall, are an
example of what architecture historian of Chinese urbanism Li Shiqiao
hails as “architecture of finance” (S. Li 2013). Its implementation is testa-
ment to Hong Kong’s economic and infrastructural priorities.

180 West Kowloon Hong Kong 181 Design / Implementation

WK–H.17 Completion of buildings in West Kowloon. Plans to be confirmed 2005–2009 Public sector Public / private
2015– 2000–2004 Government WKCD + Private sector tbc
2010–2014 1995–1999 WKCD MTR
MTR + Sun Hung Kai
Private MTR + Private developers
In the early 1990s, SAR’s government gave a land grant to the MTRC for Private sector Government-owned
companies
the development of the TOD Kowloon Station. The MTRC is the sole owner
of the transport hub and all voids connecting to it. In 1998, the station opened.
For the development of the podium mall, the MTRC formed a joint venture Funding
Ownership
(Beginning)
Ownership
(Built) Implementation
Operation
Management
with the Hong Kong developer Sung Hung Kei (SHK) and acquired a 99-year
lease. Owned by MTRC and SHK (10%–90%), the Elements mall opened West Kowloon → WKCDA → WKCDA → WKCDA → WKCDA → WKCDA
Cultural District → Private Developers → Private Developers
in 2007.
Following TFP’s phasing outline, the first phase of development of
the eastern cluster towers atop the podium was conducted by a consortium Express Railway → HKG Government → HKG Government → HKG Government → MTR Corporation → MTR Corporation
→ CHN Government
of Wing Tai, Temasek and the MTRC (MTR Corporation 2005, 34). In the Link West Kowloon
Terminus
second phase, Wharf and MTRC developed the northern cluster (MTR Cor-
poration 2005, 34). The southeast corner, planned for the third phase, had Kowloon Station → MTR Corporation → MTR Corporation → MTR Corporation → MTR Corporation → MTR Corporation
Development → HKG Government → Private Developers → Private Owners → Private Developers
been originally zoned for service apartments. Because of the financial down- → Private Developers
turn, their function changed to commercial apartments. MTRC and SHK
have 38% ownership of the building ARCH (MTR Corporation 2005, 37). Austin Station → MTR Corporation → MTR Corporation → MTR Corporation → MTR Corporation → MTR Corporation
Development → HK Government → Private Developers → Private Owners → Private Developers
In the final phase of development, SHK took advantage of the finan- → Private Developers
cial lull of the late 1990s to push for a single tender for the cluster in the
southwestern corner of Kowloon Station’s podium. This resulted in a sin-
gular development package of the cluster from the ICC to the high-end WK–H.18 Developers of the buildings in West Kowloon.

182 West Kowloon Hong Kong 183 Implementation

 residential tower Cullinan. This was also a site where the MTRC sold its
50–50 share with SHK to SHK, such that this is the only site with 100%
PRC Government SHK ownership. SHK, in this case, incrementally sold its units to take advan-
AMO Private
Consultants
tage of a steady increase in real estate prices. The later the unit is sold, the
D higher the selling price; thus, the Cullinan was still selling units in 2018
(Zhu and Chen 陳寶恩 2018).
WKCDA
ABMO
Visitors
In 2000, tendering was completed for the towers. The names of WK–H.21 The Western

V these housing towers ​— ​Sorrento, the Arch, the Cullinan ​— ​evoke market-­ Harbour Crossing Ventilation
Building was for a decade one of
desired exclusivity and luxury. As is prevalent in Hong Kong, where the the only buildings in the WKCD.
laissez-­faire state has little control of actual development after tendering
completes, SHK also adjusted the GFA to maximise profits.
HKSAR Government Conceived by TFP as a self-sufficient urban unit, Kowloon Station
ABMO consists of 37% residences, 29% offices, 12% hotel, 6% retail and 16%
Private Developers transport. The mega-block development also visibly shows Hong Kong’s
BMO
Retailers

B ownership in vertical layers. ​→ WK–H.20 ​The MTRC owns the transport por-

tion at the bottom, including the MTR and Airport Express stations and
tunnel. The MTRC and SHK joint venture owns the commercial podium
of the Elements mall. Wharf, SHK, WingTai, et. al. were the private devel-
opers of the residential towers above, with units sold to buyers. Because
Residents
of the infrastructure underground, this vertical layering of ownership will
also hold in the WKCD.
Legislative
Council R
A MTR Corporation
ABMO
4.2 THE CULTURAL DISTRICT’S PROTRACTED
DEVELOPMENT
Even though the idea of a Cultural District was initiated in the late
1990s, the path to its implementation has been protracted and contested.
The earliest buildings in the WKCD were the yellow Kowloon Ventilation
Building by TFP, completed in 1998, and the blue Western Harbour Cross-
ing Ventilation Building, the only above-ground pieces of the vast ACP infra-
structural project. ​→ WK–H.21 ​Another two decades would pass before the
site housed buildings for its cultural function.
After the SAR government announced Foster and Partners’ single
canopy proposal, which had been backed by SHK in 2002 as the winner of
the 2001 competition, it then proceeded, in September 2003, with its typ-
ical tender process, calling for a single entity to bid for the development.
The government justified the single-developer approach as necessary for
the coherence of what it regarded as a future icon of Hong Kong (HKSAR
ROLE SECTOR IMPACT
Government 2003). With proposal submissions for the Invitation for Pro-
A Authority Public sector High impact posals (IFP) in March 2004, construction was set to begin in April 2006
DV
M
Developer
Management
Private sector
Public & private sector
and all venues in operation by 2012.
O Owner The SARs epidemic of 2003 and the ensuing financial malaise made
D
C
Designer
Community groups
COOPERATION
the government’s turn to the private sector urgent. Given the 50-year de-
R Residents / Residents association Founded velopment lease, requirement that a single canopy cover at least 55% of the
B
OA
Retailers / F&B / Business association
Other association
Strongly connected
Weakly connected
development area and the stipulated programme breakdown of 39% cul-
V Visitor Targeted Low impact tural facility, 21% retail, 17% office and 16% residential, it was inevitable
that the five proposals received in June 2004 were from the largest devel-
opers of Hong Kong, including Cheung Kong and SHK, Henderson Land,
WK–H.19 West Kowloon stakeholder diagram. Sino Land, Wharf, K. Wah and Swire. Public consultations began at the end

184 West Kowloon Hong Kong 185 Implementation

 of 2004. As discontent with the SAR government’s neoliberal collusion with
the economic elites mounted, a charged public attacked the single-­developer
approach for the 40-ha waterfront site. Many arts groups also accused the
development of neglecting local art in favour of international art.
In October 2005, the SAR government announced additional
requirements of infrastructural investments to the three final bidders: the
winning developer had to provide HKD 30 billion (USD 38.6 million) up
06 02 front to finance operation of cultural facilities. This high cost discouraged
the bidding teams and failed to placate protesters (Lui 2008).
In February 2006, the SAR government shifted stance and the
Chief Secretary Rafael Hui announced that in order to appease “local aspi-
07 rations,” the SAR government would discontinue the IFP process (Hui
2006). Knowing insiders disclosed that PRC’s central government also
S
03 frowned on the single-developer scheme. Following the recommendation
05
report by the Consultative Committee in June 2007 (Consultative Com-
mittee on the Core Arts and Cultural Facilities 2007), the SAR government
01 created the WKCDA, a semi-autonomous statutory body governed by a
board of directors; the Chief Secretary of Administration chairs gave a land
grant to this body for the WKCD in 2008 (HKSAR Government 2008).
04 The same year, the SAR government asked LegCo for 21.6 billion HKD
(2.8 billion USD) for a one-time transfer to the WKCDA (LegCo Finance
Committee Public Works Subcommittee 2008), a notably low sum that
did not cover infrastructure developments and was based on an unrealistic
timeline given the magnitude of buildings on the site. In 2011, another
02 request of funding for the construction of bridges took place.
06 Under the timeline for the single-developer scheme, the comple-
tion date for WKCD would have been 2012 (Tsang 2003). Had this pro-
ceeded, some claim, the site would have already been developed for public
use, even if the area would have been predominantly for mass tourism
01 rather than high culture. The 2006 do-over delayed public access to the
07 05
publicly-funded reclaimed land; the high-mindedness of the intention of
04
this delay remains to be seen. However, the economic reality, evident in
03
the WKCDA’s shortage of funds, would most likely have dictated the remain-
ing developments as commercial. In 2014, the WKCDA asked the TPB to
increase the GFA from the original distribution to 36% cultural, 15% com-
mercial, 20% residential and 16% food & beverage. Ironically, had the single-­
developer approach been pushed through in the early 2000s, the contro-
versial XRL station may not have found its place in West Kowloon, which
# SITE YEAR USE ENTITIES some locals see as handing the prime real estate to the PRC.
01 The Waterfront 2011 Residential MTR Corporation (SL); Wing Tai Asia (PL); Lai Sun Development (PL);
World-wide Investment (PL); USI Holdings (PL); Temasek Holdings (PF);
Singapore Land (PF); Keppel Land (PF)
02 Sorrento 2011 Residential MTR Corporation (SL); The Wharf Estate Development Ltd (PL)
03 The Arch 2005 Residential MTR Corporation (SL); Sun Hung Kai Properties (PL)
04 The Harbourside 2003 Residential MTR Corporation (SL); Hang Lung Properties (PL)
05 Elements Mall 2006 Retail MTR Corporation (SL); Sun Hung Kai Properties (PL)
06 The Cullinan 2009 Residential / Hotel / MTR Corporation (SL);
Service Apartments Sun Hung Kai Properties (PL)
07 International Commerce Centre 2011 Office MTR Corporation (SL); Sun Hung Kai Properties (PL)
S Kowloon Station 1998 Transport Hub MTR Corporation (SL)

WK–H.20 Kowloon Station development. (SL) Semi-public entity (local) Kowloon Station
(SF) Semi-public entity (foreign) Public bus terminus
(PL) Private entity (local) Public programmes
(PF) Private entity (foreign) Public passage
Public open space
Construction sequence

186 West Kowloon Hong Kong 187 Implementation

For the development of the WKCD, the WKCDA is charged with the build-
ing of cultural venues, including the Xiqu Centre, the M+ and the Lyric The-
atre. The differing processes of realisations of these, along with that for the
Palace Museum, show the changes in the implementation of the WKCD. For
non-cultural venues, WKCDA would operate commercial leasing. The High-
ways Department owns, constructs and manages transport infrastructures,
furthering the SAR’s prioritisation of infrastructure in urban planning.
The Xiqu Centre for Chinese Opera was the first cultural venue to
be realised. ​→ WK–H.22 ​In March 2012, a call for design proposals was launched
(WKCDA, n.d.). Of the fifty proposals submitted, five were shortlisted, includ-
ing Foster and Partners with Hong-Kong-based O Studio Architects, the
Dutch Mecanoo with Hong Kong firm Leigh and Orange, Safdie Architects
and Hong Kong firm Wong and Ouyang. In December 2012, the jury, which
was not publicly announced, chose Hong Kong firms Bing Thom Architects
and Ronald Lu Architects for their concept relating to Chinese qi. In 2013,
the budget for the Xiqu Centre was slashed (Chung 2013). In 2018, when
the 30,000-square-metre Xiqu Centre opened, this first building realised
in WKCD visibly ignored the Urban Design Guidelines’ arcaded street by
Foster and Partners.
In 2008, an international symposium organised by the founder of
Asia Art Archive (AAA), a prominent contemporary arts organisation in Hong
Kong, SAR’s Home Affairs Bureau and the Fine Arts Department of Chinese
University of Hong Kong positioned M+ as “part of a much bigger trend in
the way that globalisation is changing the role of museums in the 21st cen-
tury … [It] represents a new trend where art museums are seen as a neces-
sary status symbol of a truly ‘world class’ city”(Hsu and Ho 2008). In addition
to the performing arts, city elites have embraced the developing of visual
arts. In 2011, the international art fair Art Basel acquired the Hong Kong
Art Fair and established its Asian branch in Hong Kong. In June 2012, the
WKCDA announced a donation by the Swiss collector of Chinese contem-
porary art, Uli Sigg, of more than 1,400 works of art, estimated to be worth
1.3 billion HKD (165 million USD) (WKCDA 2012). The donation propelled
plans to initiate the M+ Museum for Visual Culture.
At the end of 2012, the WKCDA called for a public shortlisted
competition with six international participants, including SANAA, Shigeru
Ban, Toyo Ito, Renzo Piano and Snøhetta. In 2013, the Swiss architecture
firm of Pritzker Prize winners Herzog & de Meuron (HdM) was selected
as designer for the museum with a 61,950-square-metre on-site GFA. HdM
has been working since 2007 in Hong Kong on the adaptive reuse project
of the former Central Police Station, which opened in 2018 as Tai Kwun
Centre for Heritage and Arts (Zhou 2018a). Whilest design and implemen-
tation of the M+ building are underway ​→ WK–H.23, the institution of M+ is
rapidly growing in personnel and collection acquisition for its impending
188 West Kowloon Hong Kong
opening. Of the 21.6 billion HKD allocated to WKCDA, 6.7 billion HKD
(85 million USD) is allocated for the development and realisation of M+
as a museum for contemporary visual culture, including 5 billion HKD for
its building and 1.7 billion HKD for its collection (WKCDA 2017b). A tem-
porary M+ pavilion opened in 2016 and a WKCD Temporary Pavilion in
2019, following public design competitions, to showcase M+’s growing
collection and also demonstrate to the public that WKCDA is working.
Despite the WKCDA’s creation as a semi-autonomous statutory
body that can bypass the cumbersome SAR bureaucracy, the rapid turno-
ver of its CEOs reveals the challenges of leading this body and navigating
the SAR government’s shifting priorities. The first CEO appointed in 2010,
Graham Sheffield, quit after five months to work at British Council. Michael
WK–H.22 Xiqu Centre under
Lynch, who became CEO in 2011, oversaw the competitions for the Xiqu
construction. Centre and M+ but resigned in 2015. His departure and replacement by
Duncan Pescod, then COO of WKCDA, is notable in the tightening of spend-
ing and reduction of public consultations. In February 2017, the WKCDA
implemented a change to the financing of the WKCD development (WKCDA
2017c). These shifts in priorities and management styles would be visible
in the differences, for example, between the implementation of M+ and
that of the adjacent Lyric Theatre.
WK–H.23 M+ under
The expression of interest document for the Lyric Theatre was
construction. issued in late 2013. Unlike M+, for which a conceptual design competition
was held, the theatre involved a tender for “design consultancy services”
(WKCDA 2015); the jury members were never publicly announced. Budget
efficiencies for the Lyric Theatre had direct effect on design implementa-
tion, with reduced involvement by the Dutch architects UN Studio. Addi-
tionally, due to delays of the XRL, the original plan for only one theatre on
the plot shifted to incorporate a complex of three theatres (WKCDA 2015),
made possible by the WKCD development plan’s built-in flexibility for GFA
shift. Its design has accordingly undergone significant modifications and,
despite the increased GFA, its construction completion has been moved
from 2022 to 2020.
At the end of 2016, the SAR Chief Secretary Carrie Lam announced
at a press conference at the Palace Museum in Beijing, home to the Chi-
nese imperial collection, that the Palace Museum would open a branch in
the WKCD (Siu and Chiu 2016). Feedback was immediate and vigorous,
criticising what the SAR’s public saw as yet another act of Beijing’s encroach-
ment on Hong Kong’s identity and sovereignty. The manner of this deci-
sion’s execution, without public knowledge or consultation, deepened
mistrust in the SAR government, both for its acquiescence to Beijing and
for its pro-growth collusion with the city’s economic elites.
189 Implementation
The WKCDA directly commissioned Rocco Yim in 2017 for the Palace
Museum branch. The prerequisites for the WKCD Palace Museum’s de-
signer, released after the WKCDA announced its selection, required a local
designer with experience building large museums (WKCDA 2017a). Rocco
Yim was the only Hong Kong architect thus qualified. Rocco’s office had
been one of three design consultants chosen for the 2009 WKCD master-
plan competition, and also won the competition for the Central Govern-
ment Complex, the seat of the SAR government completed in 2011. The
Jockey Club is tasked with sponsoring the construction of the Palace Mu-
seum. The WKCDA will operate the museum, with the collection from
Beijing’s Palace Museum (WKCDA 2017d).
The WKCDA commissioned Dutch landscape architecture firm Bridge network
West 8 and Hong Kong-based DLN to design the waterfront public space WK–H.24 XRL under
Accessible space (outdoor)
of WKCD, again overriding Foster’s Urban Design Guidelines. construction.
Accessible space (indoor)
Accessible space (indoor,
no information)
4.3 THE XRL STATION: A POLITICALLY CHARGED
REALISATION
Even though Aedas began its design of the XRL building in 2008,
it was not until LegCo’s endorsement in January 2010 that the XRL’s phys-
ical relationship with the WKCD would be discussed (Joint Subcommittee
to Monitor, the Implementation of the, and West Kowloon Cultural District WK–H.25 XRL’s construction
Project 2010). The Aedas design itself was not released until 2011 (Furuto coverage.
2012). The XRL’s deep levels extend under and into the WKCD (Joint Sub-
committee to Monitor, the Implementation of the, and West Kowloon Cul-
tural District Project 2010). Additionally, for the transport of materials,
the XRL has direct access to the water. Much of the XRL’s implementation Ground accessibility
Private enclosed spaces
was shrouded in secrecy due to its politically provocative nature as a bor- Private spaces
der project. ​→ WK–H.24 The SAR government retains ownership of the land (to be announced)
Inaccessible spaces (2018.04)
on which the XRL station sits and the MTRC is tasked with its manage- Mainland China
Transport infrastructure
ment. The contract for the realisation of the XRL included railway, train (underground)
Transport support
Accesible space (w / border)
Underground train tracks
tracks and station; non-railway provisions include road networks around to Mainland China
Open space
the XRL and circulation needed to access construction sites. ​→ WK–H.25 Pedestrian crossing

Due to delays in its construction, the XRL was announced as over WK–H.26 XRL’s jurisdictions.

budget in 2014 (Legislative Council Panel on Transport 2014). At the end

of 2017, the PRC National People’s Congress Standing Committee endorsed
a proposal for “co-location,” or the full jurisdictional implementation of
mainland Chinese officers, in the XRL station (Legislative Council 2017) ​
→ WK–H.26 Despite heated pushback against this proposal, which many indi-
viduals in Hong Kong see as further infringement on the SAR’s territorial
rights, LegCo passed the co-location bill mid-2018 (Legislative Council
2018). A few months later, the XRL opened.
In West Kowloon, the TOD of Kowloon Station was the first to be
realised, confirming the infrastructural priorities that initiated the landfill.
The completion of the XRL, despite its later conception than that of the
WKCD, further verifies the SAR government’s deployment of infrastructure
to oblige what it sees as the growing demands of the PRC hierarchy against Car / Pedestrian underground
circulation overlay
an increasingly hostile local opinion. Not only is the institutional framework Basement footprints
for West Kowloon inflexible, but the rigidity of the development’s form, set Car carriageway
Underground tunnel
by its infrastructure, will likely thwart its future adaptability. ​→ WK–H.27 WK–H.27 West Kowloon’s layers.

190 West Kowloon Hong Kong 191 Implementation


WK–H.28 Vertical ownership. Public sector
Government
Jurisdiction
WKCD
Private
Public / private
Private sector
Sun Hung Kai properties
5 OPERATION
Of the three components of West Kowloon, only the Kowloon Station devel-
opment and XRL are under operation. The WKCD is awaiting its protracted
completion to complement these. Hong Kong’s high density, additionally,
has made the ownership and management of West Kowloon sectional rather
than in plan. ​→ WK–H.28
5.1 KOWLOON STATION: AN EXCLUSIVE ENCLAVE
­AWAITING INCLUSION
Due to a staggered construction timeline and disconnected urban
forms, Kowloon Station has remained, until recently, an exclusive enclave. ​
→ WK–H.29–30 ​Kowloon Station’s residents have been anticipating the com-
pletion of XRL and WKCD as a means of bringing vibrancy to their fortress-­
like neighbourhood atop a high-end mall. Whilst the Elements mall’s brands
can accommodate only some of residents’ everyday needs, the MTRC pro-
vides basic daily amenities. Current residents enjoy the privilege of low-­
density living, a rarity in Hong Kong. An additional privilege includes the
station’s proximity to West Kowloon’s new waterfront and Nursery Park,
while still enjoying the convenience of old Jordan. The completion of the
XRL, as expected, has brought mainland tourists and regional commuters
to the mall, filling its once empty spaces.
192 West Kowloon Hong Kong
Mainland Chinese territory
MTR (railway)
MTR (property) + private
developers
Government-owned
companies
5.2 A CULTURAL DISTRICT UNDER CONSTRUCTION
In the construction site of the WKCD, the interim use of the west-
ern Nursery Park is clearly the most successful. ​→ WK–H.31 ​Despite many
of its trees not surviving, the park has become an active public space. With
M+’s main building under construction, the temporary M+ Pavilion, com-
pleted in 2016, has been displaying exhibitions of M+’s growing collections,
albeit quite far from public transport. The recent addition of the WKCD
Temporary Pavilion is also newly in operation. ​→ WK–H.32 ​
At the end of 2018, the long-awaited Xiqu Centre for Chinese Opera,
the first of the permanent cultural venues in the WKCD, opened (K. Ng
2019). As a building and as a new institution for Chinese opera, two local
performing arts groups in Hong Kong had vied for its operation; WKCDA WK–H.29 The edge
selected and Henry Tang mediated the parties. After the centre’s opening, condition of Kowloon Station
renders it an enclave.
some local groups still protested the expense of the Xiqu Centre (“‘High
Rent at Xiqu Centre Deters Opera Performers’” 2019). Despite the unpop-
ularity of the Xiqu Centre’s architectural form, local performing arts groups
see its new institution for Chinese opera as engaged with and promoting
local culture.
In contrast, despite the WKCDA’s serious commitment to the archi-
tectural design of M+ and the acquisition of its permanent collection, local
visual arts groups view M+ as part of the economic elite’s global aspirations,
which remain disconnected from local identity. Local cultural groups have
criticized that 80% of the WKCDA’s personnel are not from Hong Kong,
and that M+ curators consist of mostly outsiders.
5.3 THE NEWLY-OPENED XRL
In September 2018, the XRL station opened. The Leisure and Cul- WK–H.30 Rooftop public space
tural Services Department (LCSD) operates the XRL’s public spaces. As of Kowloon Station.
was the case throughout its conception and implementation, the XRL phys-
ically manifests the territorial rights disputes between the Hong Kong pub-
lic, the SAR government and the PRC.
The SAR government’s anticipated demographic demand for the
station, which had justified the expensive XRL building ​— ​and the ten infra-
structure projects of the Macau Bridge ​— ​has shown to be less than projected
(Apple Daily 2018). It is important to note, nonetheless, that the XRL was WK–H.31 WKCD waterfront.
not built to accommodate real demand only; rather, it was more of an image
project of regional integration that could curry favour with the provincial
leaders of Guangdong.
Whilst the WKCDA manages north-south bridges between WKCD
and Kowloon Station and the MTR manages all east-west bridges between
Kowloon Station, the XRL and Jordan, such experience and operational
efficiency cannot compensate for the XRL’s physical disconnect from its WK–H.32 WKCD Temporary
most proximate neighbour: Kowloon Station. Pavilion by New Office Works
opened in 2019.
193 Operation
6 IMPLICATIONS
As West Kowloon is still under construction, its impact will only be evident
with time. Kowloon Station, as the first part of West Kowloon to be real-
ised, has had the most important local impact since its completion. It has
served as a model TOD for ensuing Hong Kong infrastructural develop-
ments. ​→ WK–H.33 ​It is also an exemplar of infrastructural efficiency and
commercial success with regional impact. At the same time, the high-end
developments of Kowloon Station and the inflow of consumers through
the XRL have caused a rise in real estate prices in the surrounding areas
in an already unaffordable market for local residents. ​→ WK–H.34 ​Develop-
ers anticipating the impending influx of mainland wealth have invested in
high-end residential developments close to the XRL.
The regional effect of West Kowloon is most represented by the
XRL station, highlighting Hong Kong’s integration into the PRD and the
PRC. The SAR’s status in the PRC political hierarchy in 2047 looms on the
horizon, embodied by the XRL’s border conditions. Even though the impact
of the WKCD is still not yet visible, its role as a tourist destination for regional
visitors will further reveal Hong Kong’s shifting role as China’s gateway to
the world.
The WKCD’s concentration of cultural venues also seems to be
fulfiling Hong Kong’s global aspirations. Nevertheless, the concentration
of cultural consumption venues magnifies the global-local disconnect, es-
pecially in competition for limited resources. The concentration of culture
and consumption seems to compete with the dispersion of local cultural
venues in other parts of Hong Kong. The district’s impending commercial
developments will likely exacerbate already fraught relations between the
SAR government and increasingly agitated civic groups.
7 CONCLUSION
The architect and theorist Li Shiqao refers to the growth of capital-driven
‘terminal developments’ in his incisive analysis of the Kowloon Station
development (S. Li 2013). According to Shiqao, ‘terminal’ refers to two
things: the way a development is physically and socially disconnected from
the city ​— ​a depot or terminus connected but not necessarily integrated into
the surrounding urban fabric ​— ​and the way such a development is ‘termi-
nal’ or fatal to the agency of architecture. Even though Li’s analysis focuses
only on Kowloon Station, his notion of ‘terminal’ is also applicable to the
XRL and West Kowloon.
With two TODs targeting the consuming class and a district con-
centrating high-end performing and visual arts venues, the conceptualis-
ation, design and implementation of West Kowloon have always precluded
inclusiveness. West Kowloon’s formal disconnect from the adjacent older,
small-grained, socially-­diverse local neighbourhoods seems to confirm its
deliberate separation.
194 West Kowloon Hong Kong
WK–H.33 West Kowloon’s
Kowloon Station as role model for
TODs.
WK–H.34 Advertisement for
Residences highlighting West
Kowloon.
Whilst the physical and social disconnect of ‘terminal’ is pejorative, oppos-
ing an ideal of open and inclusive urbanism, ‘terminal’ could also be used,
either inadvertently or deliberately, to safeguard a rapidly eroding local
identity that many locals see as under threat in neighbourhoods such as
Jordan. ​→ WK–H.35 ​The West Kowloon developments have reduced the afforda-
bility of adjacent neighbourhoods and gentrified their diverse functions.
In the context of a laissez-faire political economy, where the weak state WK–H.35 The built fabric of the
does not support and uphold open and inclusive urbanism, the only means West Kowloon Reclamation
viewed from Kowloon Station.
of mitigating the inevitability of the socio-economic pressures rendered
by the West Kowloon developments could be a physical quarantining of
its effects via its ‘terminal’ disconnect.
Whilst West Kowloon and its disparate components are deliber-
ately exclusive, its infrastructural priorities have also rendered it inadvert-
ently non-adaptive. With mega-scale blocks and constrained by pre-existing
infrastructure, both Kowloon Station and the XRL are physically unequipped
to be adaptable, their rigidity innate to TODs. Even though the WKCD WK–H.36
Kowloon.
View of West
appears more malleable, its underground plinth makes it intractable. Only
programmatic adjustments would be possible within the limits of the plot
structure. Unlike projects beyond the border in nearby China, the SAR’s
institutional frameworks also preclude the kind of adaptive governance
that has made China’s economic transition not only possible but expedited.
The development of the projects in West Kowloon have increasingly antag-
onised local opinion against the SAR government, which is caught between
its obsequiousness toward the PRC central government and appeasing the
desires of its populace.
Since the original conceptions of Kowloon Station, WKCD and the
XRL, Hong Kong’s elites have proved technically efficient and globally-as-
piring, capitalising on the unique role that the SAR still plays in an increas-
ingly insular PRC. The district’s physical and social disconnect from local
neighbourhoods and residents is clearly confirmed by the physical enclave
created for globals and Mainlanders. ​→ WK–H.36 ​Although not set out to be
rigid and non-adaptive, the infrastructural priorities of the SAR government
have delivered three inflexible, deeply-rooted structures on reclaimed land.
195 Implications / Conclusion
KOWLOON EAST Hong Kong
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W West Kowloon (case study)

01 KOWLOON BAY 100-million/.
Consultative Committee on the Core Arts and Cultural Facilities. 2007.
LegCo Joint Subcommittee to Monitor the Implementation of the WKCD
Project. 2011. “*CB(2)1380/10-11(02) West Kowloon Cultural District ​
MA TAU KOK
H Kowloon East “Recommendation Report of the Consultative Committee (CC) on the — ​Celebrate West Kowloon: Create a Vision Together.” March 29.
Hong Kong International NGAU TAU KOK Core Arts and Cultural Facilities of the West Kowloon Cultural District LegCo Secretariat. 2003. “*CB(1) 161/03-04— West Kowloon Cultural Dis-
Airport (WKCD).” Hong Kong. trict Background Brief.”
Cuthbert, Alexander R, and Keith G McKinnell. 1997. “Ambiguous Space, Legislative Council. 2013. “CB(2)658/12-13(01) ​— ​The Approved Develop-
01 Kai Tak Cruise Terminal Park Ambiguous Rights  ​— ​Corporate Power and Social Control in Hong Kong.” ment Plan of the West Kowloon Cultural District.” Legislative Council.
02 Kowloon Bay International
Trade & Exhibition Centre
03 Cities, The Return of Hong Kong to China, 14 (5): 295–311. https://doi.
org/10.1016/S0264-2751(97)00020-6.
———. 2017. “CB(4)441/17-18(04) Co-Operation Arrangement between the
Mainland and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on the
TO KWA WAN KWUN TONG
03 Kai Tak Fantasy Dynamic Star International Limited. 2004. The West Kowloon Cultural Dis- Establishment of the Port at the West Kowloon Station of the Guang-

500 m
Kowloon East is a developing centrality in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR). Kow-
loon East, West Kowloon and Wong Chuk Hang
are anticipated to become CBDs providing high-
end office spaces in the next decade. The visions
for East Kowloon’s redevelopment, though distinct
from West Kowloon’s infrastructure with cultural
facilities approach, demonstrate the importance
of developmentalism for its conception and im-
plementation. In the aftermath of the 4 June
Tian’anmen Square Incident, the British Hong
Kong government implemented the Port and Air-
port Development Strategy (PADS) project in 1989,
using infrastructure to bolster Hong Kong’s econ-
omy, which would return to PRC sovereignty in
1997. As West Kowloon resulted from the Airport
Core Programme (ACP) reclamations, centred
around the new airport at Chek Lap Kok on Lantau
Island, so the redevelopment of Kowloon East re-
sulted from the Hong Kong International Airport’s
Victoria Harbor 02
1.5 km
move from Kai Tak to Chek Lap Kok under PADS
and the conversion of neighboring industrial areas
to commercial use. Totalling 522 hectares, Kow-
loon East comprises the land of the former Kai Tak
Airport, retired in 1998, adjacent Kwun Tong Busi-
ness Area and Kowloon Bay Business Area. In 2012,
the Development Bureau established the Energiz-
ing Kowloon East Office (EKEO) to oversee its de-
velopment. In a 2013 Policy Address, the Chief
Executive announced the Kai Tak Fantasy (KTF) as
a landmark hub with an international cruise termi-
nal at its centre. Advocates have criticised the SAR
government for its reuse of former airport land for
tourism and leisure and conversion of the industrial
area into a high-end business district, which is
pushing out vibrant local arts communities.
Building footprint
Building footprint projected
Project site
Softscape
Projected softscape
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museum/period/past.
Hui, Rafael. 2006. “Statement by Chief Secretary at LegCo’s Subcommittee
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zhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link for Implementing Co-Lo-
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tp/papers/tpcb4-441-4-e.pdf.
———. 2018. Guangzhou-Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link (Co-Location)
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Position of the Construction of the Hong Kong Section of the Guangzhou-­
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Lewis, Michael J. 1999. “The Guggenheim in Bilbao.” New Criterion 17 (10):
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Lui, Tai-lok. 2008. “City-Branding without Content: Hong Kong’s Aborted
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Ng, Mee Kam. 2008. “From Government to Governance? Politics of Plan-
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14649350802041480.
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Planning, Environment and Lands Bureau. 1999. “FCRI(1999–2000)18 ​— ​
West Kowloon Reclamation — Review of Land Uses and Deletion of Pro-
posed Road and Infrastructural Works.”

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Projected hardscape 197 Bibliography

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———. 2007. “Policy Address 2007-2008.”
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MBA–S
———. 2015. “CB(2)1066/14-15(04) Update on the Development of Lyric
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———. 2017b. “CB(1)560/16-17(01) Update on the Financial Situation of the
West Kowloon Cultural District Project.”

198 West Kowloon Hong Kong 199 The Grand Projet

Jurong Lake District

One-North
Changi
Airport
Marina Bay Area
Marina Bay Area Site area 4,300,000 sqm

GFA 4,917,000
sqm

Density 1.14 FAR

Population Density 8.69 inh / ha

Streets/roads35.00%
Built-up27.00%
Non Built-up 38.00%

Residential5.70%
Business 82.00% Office / Hotel

Commercial 12.30% Retail

1962 UNDP engaged as urban planning consultant

1965 Singapore gains independence
1966 Land Acquisition Act
1971 First Concept Plan
1976 First Central Area Masterplan
1983 Pei & Tange invited for proposals
1991 Concept Plan
1997 Asian Financial Crisis
2003 Masterplan
2005 Request-for-Concept Proposal for MBS
2011 Concept Plan
2014 Masterplan
2019 Masterplan

200 Marina Bay Area Singapore Conception Design Implementation Operation Implication
1822s The Raffles Town Plan (also known as the 1965 SINGAPORE GAINS INDEPENDENCE 1983 I.M. Pei & Kenzo Tange are engaged by URA
Jackson Plan) organises the downtown region within to devise separate urban design proposals for the
a grid layout of road networks and areas according 1966 The Land Acquisition Act is passed, endowing central area. I.M. Pei’s proposal is adopted for fur-
to different ethnic groups the government with the ability to acquire land from ther study
private owners
1942–45 JAPANESE OCCUPATION
The East Coast Land Reclamation begins
1958 6 8 The Masterplan for the central area is
issued by the Planning Department 1970–80s LAND RECLAMATION

1971 The first Concept Plan is released to guide the

physical development of Singapore. It is heavily based
on the Ring Concept plan by UNDP

Masterplan 1958: Central Area Map. © Urban Redevelopment Authority.
All rights reserved.
1960s 6 7 8 URBAN RENEWAL 1971 Concept Plan.© Urban Redevelopment Authority. All rights reserved.
In the early 1960s, there is a period of set- 1974 The Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) is
backs on executing urban renewal in Singapore due formed for overseeing the urban planning of Singa-
to housing shortages and society fragmentation pore, including comprehensive urban renewal, as-
sembling and clearing of land and the sale of sites
1962 The feasibility study of Singapore’s Urban
Renewal is supported by UNDP 1976 6 The first Central Area Masterplan is re-
leased by the URA
1963 URA engages UNDP for advice on the rede-
velopment and planning of Singapore 1977 The Singapore River restoration and cleanup
begins and the government announces an additional
360 hectares of land reclamation at ­Marina Bay
1978 The First Sale Site is released in Marina Cen-
tre. Marina Square is tendered out
1980 The Central Area Masterplan is updated and
released
1982 The Singapore government proceeds with
1963 Koenigsberger Ring City Plan. © Urban Redevelopment Authority.
the Mass Rapid Transport (MRT) system imple-
All rights reserved. mentation
I.M. Pei’s urban grid plan for central area with twin towers facing waterfront
(left top, left bottom) and Kenzo Tange’s radial urban plan for central area (right
top, right bottom). © Urban Redevelopment Authority. All rights reserved.
Suntec City.
1985 The Central Area Masterplan is updated and
released The Conservation Masterplan is adopted,
which regulates historic districts to be protected by
the URA Act
1991 The new Concept Plan is released (Towards
a Tropical City of Excellence), integrating island-­
wide as well as central area planning, in order to
accommodate 4.4 million inhabitants. The plan
aims to decentralise developments and grow sev-
eral technology corridors in the northeast and the
southwest of Singapore, with developments such as
Jurong, One-North, Science Park and NUS
Marina South Reclamation 1985. © Urban Redevelopment Authority. All
rights reserved.
1986 The East Coast Land Reclamation and the
Singapore River clean-up are completed
1987 PM Lee Kuan Yew envisions Marina Bay as
“Lake City” with advanced water infrastructure
1989 Tender of Suntec City, representing the na-
tion’s aspirations towards a “global city” 1991 Concept Plan. © Urban Redevelopment Authority. All rights reserved.

Conception
Design
Implementation

202 Marina Bay Area Singapore 203 Transversal Data

Operation
Implication
1992 “Marina Bay Land Use Plan” is published
Marina Bay land use plan 1992. This plan served as development guide plan
for the downtown core. © Urban Redevelopment Authority. All rights
reserved. 2003 Inclusion of Marina Bay area in the Down-
town Core planning area. First glimpse of Marina
55 Development Guide Plan is released, re- Bay area appears
sulting in Downtown Core, an expansion of the
Central Area
Singapore is divided into 55 regional area.
1997 ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS
2001 “Land-use plus plan” is published to retain
and enhance characteristic places with land use
planning as part of the masterplan revision
2001 Concept Plan. © Urban Redevelopment Authority. All rights reserved.
2002 The Esplanade Theatres on the Bay, designed Casino ban is lifted and the Marina Barrage
by DP Architects Michael Wilford & Partners, opens is put for tender
204 Marina Bay Area Singapore
Esplanade Theatres on the Bay.
2003 Marina Bay Masterplan. © Urban Redevelopment Authority. All rights
reserved.
2003 Engagement of SOM + Mapletree, with out-
comes such as: 1. Refinement of grid road network
to allow flexible parcellation parcels; 2. Develop-
ment of a ‘Cultural Necklace’ of public attractions
around the bay; 3. Shifting of the tallest twin towers
proposed by I.M.Pei away from the waterfront, in
order to achieve a more human-scale environment
along the public promenade; 4. Creation of distinc-
tive districts and of two major open spaces: The
Lawn & The Square
2004 GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
Marina Barrage is open 7 Marina One is completed
Public space on the roof of Marina Barrage.
The new Masterplan is released
2010 Designed by Moshe Safdie, Marina Bay Sands The public plaza of Marina One.
Integrated Resort opens, fronting Marina Bay. Owned
by the Las Vegas Sands corporation, it was billed in 2019 The new Masterplan is released by URA
2010 as the world‘s most expensive standalone casi-
no property at S$8 billion, including the land cost
Masterplan exhibition at URA Design Center.
As part of the new Draft Masterplan, the Ma-
rina Bay Area is envisioned to evolve into a “a wider
Marina Bay Sands. diversity of uses and creative lifestyle possibilities,
so that it will not only be an attractive place for work,
2011 The new concept Plan is released but also a vibrant place to live and play in. Better
connectivity and an enhanced public realm will also
Ingenhoven Architects announced as winners help to anchor its position as a dynamic 24/7 down-
of competition for Marina One town and global financial hub.”
(https://www.ura.gov.sg, 2019)
2014 The new masterplan is released
Masterplan 2014: Singapore River & Marina Bay. © Urban Redevelopment Draft masterplan 2019: Central Area Downtown Map. © Urban Redevel-
Authority. All rights reserved. opment Authority. All rights reserved.
Conception
Design
Implementation
205 Transversal Data
Operation
Implication
 Territory of Marina Bay Area

100 300 m

Current base plan. MBA–S Building footprint Softscape

MBA–S Building footprint, Projected softscape
projected Hardscape
MBA–S Project site Projected hardscape

206 Marina Bay Area Singapore 207 Transversal Data

 100 300 m

Pre-intervention base plan, 1970s. MBA–S Project site

208 Marina Bay Area Singapore 209 Transversal Data

 Marina Bay Waterfront
Promenade

Gardens by The Bay

The Promontory

Marina Bay Waterfront

Promenade

Marina Station Park

100 300 m

Publicly accessible open space plan. Softscape (within site)

Hardscape (within site)

210 Marina Bay Area Singapore 211 Transversal Data

 Promenade
City Hall Esplanade

Fort Canning

Clarke Quay

Bayfront
Chinatown

Raffles Place

Telok Ayer Place

Maxwell
( to be completed 2021) Downtown

Shenton Way Gardens by The Bay

(to be completed 2021)

Tanjong Pagar Marina Bay

100 300 m Marina South

Transportation plan. Metro Lines: Downtown Line Metro station

East West Line Thomson-East Coast Line Bus station
North South Line Bike station
North East Line Bikeway
Circle Line Pedestrian way

212 Marina Bay Area Singapore 213 Transversal Data

 Change Alley Clifford Pier
Aerial Plaza

Former Customs
Harbour Branch

Singapore Conference Hall

100 300 m

Heritage structures. MBA–S Heritage structure

214 Marina Bay Area Singapore 215 Transversal Data

 *White Zone
These are areas used or intended to be used mainly for commercial,
hotel, residential, sports & recreational and other compatible uses,
or a combination of two or more of such uses as a mixed use devel-
opment. To realise the overall planning intention for an area, specific
controls on quantum and types of uses may be imposed.

**Reserved Site
These are areas the specific use of which has yet to be determined.
Interim uses that are compatible with the uses in the locality may
be allowed and are subject to evaluation by the competent
authority.

100 300 m

Programme Plan. Residential Technical utilities

Commercial Mixed-use *
Business Ground floor with
Civic institutions commercial & business
Industrial Reserved site **

216 Marina Bay Area Singapore 217 Transversal Data

 MARINA BAY AREA SINGAPORE
Building an Image for Singapore
Kees Christiaanse and Lei-Ya Wong

1 INTRODUCTION

Located on over 380 ha of reclaimed land in front of Singapore’s

city centre, the greater Marina Bay Area has developed over several dec-
ades in a sequence of projects around the Marina Bay Reservoir, between
the original shoreline and landfill body at the Singapore River’s mouth.
Initiated in the 1970s, the development is still ongoing. Nonetheless, its
current volume and programme, hosting a substantial portion of Singa-
pore’s Central Business District and commercial and retail facilities, have
begun to shift the gravitation point of Singapore’s historic centre. Marina
Bay’s distinct character, iconic building complexes like the Marina Bay
Sands Integrated Resort and public space activation have contributed to
the area’s symbolic representation of Singapore’s city centre and the nation
as a whole. ​→ MBA–S.01
The greater Marina Bay Area’s successive sub-projects can be seen
as an aggregation of Grands Projets within a singular holistic Grand Projet. ​
→ MBA–S.02 Planning boundaries within the site have accordingly changed
in the last fifty years of development. However, this research focuses on
the area that incorporates the two reclaimed peninsulas: Marina Centre
(which includes Marina Square, Suntec City, the Millenia Walk Complex,
the Esplanade, the Float@Marina Bay, The Flyer and Marina Bay Street
Circuit) and Marina Bay (which includes the new CBD, Marina Bay Sands,
Gardens by the Bay, Marina South, Straits View and Marina Cruise Cen-
tre), referred to as the Marina Bay Area in this text.
Changing markets and cumulative urban design experience have
necessitated several revisions to Marina Bay Area’s development direction.
The shifting urbanistic and architectural focus of Marina Bay Area’s indi-
vidual projects offers insight into an evolving approach to urban develop-
ment by government agencies, real estate actors, architects and other
stakeholders. The effort to integrate the project’s components internally
and externally via urban design guideline tools and an extensive public
space network makes Marina Bay Area an interesting subject of investiga-
tion into the relationship between vision, control and laissez-faire in large-
scale, long-term projects.

1.1 COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING OF AN ISLAND STATE

Singapore is an island state of 725 sqkm between Malaysia and
Indonesia on the Singapore Strait. It became independent from Malaysia
in 1965; within fifty years, the island state’s population grew from 2 million
to 5.6 million residents. As a global hub for trade, logistics, finance, industry

MBA–S.01 Singapore Marina Bay Area. 219 Introduction


01 Suntec City, 1997
02 Marina Square, 1980s
and science, Singapore currently belongs to the world’s most prosperous
countries. As such, it has required a high degree of spatial organisation
from a planning consideration. ​→ MBA–S.03
Under Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the founder of Singapore, a
unitary dominant-party, the People’s Action Party (PAP), was formed in
1954. This government has since implemented a liberal market economy MBA–S.05 1971 Concept Plan.
03 Esplanade, 2002 04 Millennia Walk Complex, 1995
based on a strong welfare state strategy. Singapore features a non-corrupt © Urban Redevelopment
legal system supported by successful education, medical and housing pro- Authority. All rights reserved.

grammes: 73% of all housing is supplied by the Housing Development

05 Float@Marina Bay, 2007
06 The Flyer & Marina Bay Street
Circuit, 2008
01 04 Board (HDB). Originally, HDB was Singapore’s foremost spatial agency;
02 the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA), the nation’s current planning
06 authority, is an HDB tributary.
Like Holland, Singapore is entirely man-made. The 1963 Ring Plan
03 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) proposed a frame-
05 work for the redevelopment of the island and its central area. A vast land-­
reclamation programme was also envisaged. ​→ MBA–S.04 ​The 1971 Concept
Plan was the first of a series ​— ​updated each decade ​— ​guiding Singapore’s
MARINA land-use and transport development. It comprised a green heart, the intro-
RESERVOIR
duction of the Mass Rapid Rail (MRT) public transport system, the relo-
07 cation of the airport to the island’s east and a network of expressways.
The Concept Plan formed the framework needed to accommodate
11 Singapore’s post-colonial, post-Malaysian future as an independent state,
whose limited land and natural resources required meticulous planning of
logistics, infrastructure and spatial development.

1.2 A NEWLY RECLAIMED CENTRAL DISTRICT

12 Initially created for the ECP (East Coast Parkway) and later trans-
formed into the city’s new gravitation point, the Marina Bay Area is con-
08 structed entirely on reclaimed land. The successive development of sub-­
projects within Marina Bay Area constitute an urban evolution that has
formed a complementary half to the former shoreline centre, enclosing
12 Marina South, N/A
Marina Bay Reservoir as the ‘Padang’ or national public space.
As noted in the chapter “The Making of Marina Bay” by URA
planners Fun Siew Leng and Andrew Fassam, the government did not spe-
10 cifically envisage a new urban district in front of the city. Only in the course
of the construction of the landfill for the ECP was the idea to reclaim addi-
tional land for urban development born. Thus, the Grand Projet of Marina
Bay Area did not develop as a grand vision from the beginning but rather
07 Marina Bay Sands, 2010 11 Garden by The Bay, 2012 was triggered by the ECP project in the wake of the 1971 Concept Plan. ​
→ MBA–S.05
09

08 New CBD, N/A 09 Marina Cruise Center, 2012 10 Straits View, N/A

MBA–S.02 Marina Bay Area’s subsequent series of Grands Projets. Marina Centre, starts 1978
Marina South, starts 2010s
Marina East, starts 2015s

220 Marina Bay Area Singapore 221 Introduction

GREEN ENVIRONMENT ‘Garden City’ initiated ‘Garden City’ unveiled

55,000 new trees planted

158,600 new trees planted Gardens by The Bay 1,400,000 new trees planted

CULTURE
Nation Building Cultural Renaissance for
a global city for the arts
GDP per capita $55,000

ACCA RCP I RCP II RCP III

TOURISM ‘Visit the Orient’ Singapore River 1st Tourism Masterplan: US$ 1 billion ‘New Asia Singapore’ ‘Uniquely Singapore’ ‘Your Singapore’ Redevelopment: S$3 million $50,000
→ Historic Landmarks → Civic District
Emblem Singapore — A World within a World Merlion Park
→ Bugis Street → Bras Basah Bugis
Instant Asia Singapore promoted as convention city → Boat Quay
→ Clarke Quay
‘Surprising Singapore’
‘Orient Year Grand Prix’ ‘Orient Year Grand Prix’ banned One Raffles Quay 2008 Singapore Grand Prix
Bras Basah Bugis /
Ophir Rochor / Civic District
Marina Centre Marina South Suntec City Marina Centre 1995–97 Marina Sands Marina One
$40,000
LAND SALES Land Aquisition Act Govt owns One Raffles One Raffles MBA Capitol DUO Residences and
76.2% of SG land for sale for sale for sale for sale Marina One for sale

INFRASTRUCTURE Changi Airport opens Common Services

Tunnel (CST)
East Coast Parkway complete
Metro Metro Metro Metro Metro
→ North–South 1 → North–East → Circle Line 3 → Downtown Line 4 → Thomson–East Coast Line 5 $30,000
→ East–West 2 → Connection to
Changi Airport

WATERWAYS Singapore River Singapore River

Clean Up Mission Cleaned
Damming Marina Basin Call for Tender Marina Barrage

FOREIGN INFLUENCE UNDP engaged to Marina South Masterplan SOM & Mapletree
ON PLANNING identify areas for → I.M. PEI engaged to review
urban renewal → KENZO TANGE masterplan $20,000

PLANNING & Singapore as ‘global city’ Conservation Masterplan Development Guide Marina Bay Development ‘Future of Us’
LEGISLATIONS amongst policy makers → Chinatown Plan for Marina Bay Agency
→ Kampong Glam
Integrated Resort at Railway corridor
→ Little India
Marina Bay & Sentosa competition
→ Singapore River
→ Emerald Hill Sustainable Singapore
→ Heritage Link 6 Blueprint

Singapore as $10,000
‘Tropical City
of Excellence’

CP 1971 CP 1991 CP 2001 CP 2011

MAJOR NATIONAL Independence of Singapore 1965 Casino ban lifted Tanjong Pagar railway station closed
EVENTS
SG50 (50 Year Anniversary of Singapore)

1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
1997 2008
Asian Financial Crisis Financial Crisis

MBA–S.03 Timeline of interdependent developments shaping the planning of Singapore. 1 Raffles Place/City Hall/Marina 5 Shenton Way
Bay/Marina South Pier 6 Civic and cultural belt linking
2 Raffles Place/City Hall/Bugis/ Empress Place, Fort Canning
Tanjong Pagar Park and Bras Basah Road
3 Marina Bay/Bayfront/
Promenade/Esplanade/
Nicholl Highway

222 Marina Bay Area Singapore 223 Introduction

4 Bugis/Promenade/Bayfront/
Downtown/Telok Ayer
 Land Reclamation in Marina Bay
There “can only be (social) equalness in a clean and green
Singapore when rich or poor can enjoy the same public spaces” 1958
(Lee Kuan Yew, 2011)

THE GROWING SINGAPORE SUNGEI KADUT & KRANJI

1960s 581.5 sqkm Phase 01 1965/87ha
2016 723.2 sqkm Phase 02 1972/ NA
2033 apx 820.0 sqkm

NORTHEASTERN COAST
* Solely undertaken by the Housing Development Board (HDB) as
Phase 01 1985 / 685ha
part of the East Coast Reclamation, the Marina Bay area is the only
waterfront project with a variety of uses ranging from commercial,
residential to include parks, schools and hotels amongst others. 1976
The other waterfront projects in Singapore’s quest of land
reclamation are mostly for industrial and port/airport purposes.

CHANGI AIRPORT
RECLAMATION
Phase 01 1976 / 663ha
Phase 02 1982 / 612ha 1980

WEST COAST RECLAMATION

Phase 01 1975 / 89ha
04
MARINA BAY AREA *

03 02 01
PASIR PANJANG TERMINAL 05 EAST COAST RECLAMATION
Phase 01–07 1,525ha
01 Phase 01
02 Phase 02
1966 / 405ha
1966 / 53ha
Phase 01 1972/37ha 06 S$613 million 03 Phase 03 1971 / 67ha
1985
TUAS RECLAMATION Phase 02 1977/24ha 18km coastline 04 Phase 04
Phase 01 NA / NA Phase 03 1995/NA 07 05 Phase 05
1971 / 486ha
1974 / 154ha
Phase 02 1884 / 650ha 06 Phase 06 NA / 234ha
07 Phase 07 NA / 360ha
EAST LAGOON CONTAINER COMPLEX
JURONG ISLAND Phase 01 1972 / NA
Phase 01 1993 / 2,000ha Phase 02 1971 / 23ha

SENTOSA RECLAMATION
Phase 01 1979 / 63ha
TUAS TERMINAL
Phase 01 2015 / 294ha 2003

MBA–S.04 Singapore Land Reclamation. Singapore reclamation process:
Original island
Current reclaimed land
Future land reclamation
Marina Bay reclamation process:
Marina Bay Area reclaimed
land
Marina Bay Area boundary
Central area

224 Marina Bay Area Singapore 225 Introduction

URA MASTERPLANS WITHIN THE 1958 1976 1980 1985 1995 2003 2008 2014
MARINA BAY AREA BOUNDARY

DEVELOPMENT GUIDE DGP

PLAN (DGP)
1978 Marina Centre – 1988 Marina Centre – 2014 Marina South
Marina Square Suntec City
1998 New Downtown 2014 Greater Southern Waterfront
1980 Marina Centre – 2003 Marina Bay Impression
CONCEPTION Rahardja Centre
LOGICS
Urban Renewal

Modernisation

City Expansion

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1985 1990 1995 1997 2000 2005 2008 2010 2015 2020 2025

MBA–S.06 Evolution of conception logic of the URA’s masterplans for the Marina Bay Area.

2 CONCEPTION Bay was believed to become the mirror image of the old CBD across the
Marina Bay Reservoir. These urban design concepts present snapshots of
The East Coast Parkway (ECP) was of great impact for Singapore’s water- a gradual change, beginning in 1978, in how the Singaporean government
front development, crossing in front of the city and connecting the new aimed to accelerate the country’s progress by producing a global hub with
Changi Airport with the centre. The ECP was significant both for the emerg- international ambitions.
ing land reclamation programme and for the vision of A City in a Garden,
the prime minister’s 1960s policy to turn Singapore into a green city. In 2.1 MARINA CENTRE CONCEPT PLAN: 1978
order to soften the expressway’s effect on the waterfront and to provide a Marina Centre is situated east of Nicolls Highway, the first highway
welcoming gesture from and to the airport, the ECP was embedded in a constructed in front of the city in 1956 that also creates a barrier between
generous East Coast Park and lined with canopy trees. The Parkway net- Bras Basah-Bugis neighbourhood and the sea. As a result, Marina Centre
work is an important element of the City in a Garden policy, complement- was initially disconnected from the city. In the 1960s, many waterfront
ing Singapore’s now rich network of parks, natural reserves, connectors areas such as Manhattan, Boston, Tokyo and Rotterdam were affected by
and recreational routes. car-friendly expressways. The ECP reflects a similar Zeitgeist phenome-
The vision of a new central district emerging from the ECP’s land non, which is now outdated. ​→ MBA–S.07
reclamation first materialised in Marina Centre, the area’s northern pen- URA’s 1978 Concept Plan for Marina Centre, with the ECP’s cen-
insula. ​→ MBA–S.06 ​URA developed a masterplan for Marina Centre in the tral arrival point from the east, furthered the City in a Garden notion with
wake of the government’s 1978 decision to engage in a public-private part- a parkway fly-over and dense district of building complexes floating in lush
nership with investors to boost business and tourism. Marina Centre, at green and accessed by tree-lined streets. The northern tip was conceived
the time deemed ‘the city of the future,’ was intended to form a T-crossing to house a domestic urban programme with housing, schools and sports
between the Orchard Road shopping axes and the waterfront. For Marina facilities. The centre was reserved for hotel complexes, shopping and enter-
Bay, the southern peninsula, masterplan studies were created in 1983; these tainment and the southern bay-front was green and replete with a yacht
formed the base for URA’s 1991 Concept Plan for the Central Area. Marina club, food and beverage and other amenities. A Cultural Centre was projected

226 Marina Bay Area Singapore 227 Conception

POPULATION
IN SINGAPORE
7M 6.5–6.9M [2030]

6M 5.5M [2040–2050]
3.66M [2020]
5M 3.45M [2010]
4M [?] 4M [1992] 3.23M [2000]
4M
3M
2M [1972]
2M
1M
0M 2M 4M 3.6M 6.5–6.9M 5.5M

DEVELOPED 1971 1991 200,000 m2 500,000 m2 1,500,000 m2 100,000 m2

2001 2011 2030
MASTERPLAN
→ FOCUS → Focus → White Paper
by URA
0 2.5 6.0 13.0 Varies by location
[Central Area] Fringe Centre Sub-Regional Centre Regional Centre of New Town

→ 
ROCHOR: LITTLE

→ Recreation Providing affordable 6.9 million

Arts & INDIA
KALLANG BASIN: Enterntainment
Basin for Fun &
$
Recreation KAMPONG

→ Parks homes with a full range

GLAM

population
$
$ ORCHARD:
Premier Shopping Belt
MARINA MARINA CENTRE:
CULTURAL &

→ New Towns
SG RIVER:

of amenities
$ SG RIVER: CENTRE CIVIC DISTRICT Hotel & Convention
$
MARINA River of History
River for & Entertainment
EAST
$
$
$
History and MARINA BAY:
Entertainment Bay for events

→ Transport Infrastructure → 
Integrating greenery into
$ $ & National CHINATOWN
Celebrations $$
DOWNTOWN:
Central Business District
MARINA

the living environment

SOUTH

→ RING PLAN ADOPTION → 

Providing greater mobility
→ Decentralisation → Urban Waterfront → Central Area Identity with enhanced transport
→ ‘White’ Sites connectivity
→ 
Sustaining a vibrant
economy with good jobs

→ District → Marina Bay

DEVELOPED UNDP Marina Bay SOM + Mapletree

MASTERPLAN Redevelopment
→ Action-Programme
by external parties
→ ‘Ring City Plan’
→ Central Arena
21 Presincts
Public – Alliance – Private

→ Focus on public realm

→ by IM PEI → by Kenzo Tange → R
 efinement of grid
road network
→ S
 hift tall towers away
from waterfront
→ D
 istinctive district &
address location

GOVERNING
* Urban Renewal Urban Redevelopment
BODIES
Department Authority
* Urban Renewal Unit, Under HDB

MAIN
DEVELOPMENT Urban Renewal Urban Redevelopment Redefine Identity Advance Modernisation
SCHEMES

OTHER Golden Shoe Redevelopment

DEVELOPMENT
* Central Area Planning Team
SCHEMES
Infrastructure Redevelopment
* State & City Planning Project

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1995 1997 2000 2005 2008 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
MBA–S.07 Singapore’s strategic development evolution.

228 Marina Bay Area Singapore 229 Conception

in the southeast facing Kallang River, which would later find its reincarna-
tion on the westside as the Esplanade, the national centre for performing
arts, now facing the Marina Bay Reservoir.
The Raffles International Centre, an integrated complex of hotels,
offices, retail, entertainment, conference and recreational facilities, was
the predecessor of Marina Centre and the Marina Bay Sands complex.
Designed by I. M. Pei, who christened it A City within the City, and con-
ceived in 1968, this project was later redesigned as Raffles City. It is con-
sidered the first stepping stone of the tourist corridor formed by the axis
from Orchard Road to the seafront.
2.2 MARINA BAY AREA URBAN DESIGN CONCEPTS: 1983
In 1983, URA engaged renowned architects K. Tange and I. M. Pei
to develop an urban design concept for Marina Bay, specifically the bay-
front and Marina Bay Reservoir. At that time, the ECP was planned to con-
nect to the AYE on grade level, creating a barrier between the bay-front
and the Strait. The old waterfront road was to continue via a tunnel under
Singapore River to maintain the Padang and City Hall’s direct access to
the water. The conception of the Esplanade Bridge eventually replaced
this tunnel notion. In their individual proposals, both Tange and Pei con-
centrated a high-rise zone along the bay-front, inverting the original water-
front into an inward-looking skyline around Marina Reservoir, a mirror-­image
to the CBD. The vast surface beyond the ECP was not designed.
In Tange’s proposal, Marina Reservoir formed a quarter circle
around a centre point near Fullerton Hotel. From here, a system of radial
buildings and parks departed from the bay-front, travelling across the ECP
to the Strait. The Reservoir reflected the CBD skyline at Boat Quay in the
Singapore River. Between the old CBD and the new development, a canal
marked the former waterfront, turning the peninsula into an island. Twin
towers were projected at the entrance and the end of the canal, forming a
triangular beacon.
While Tange’s plan was a Beaux-Arts composition, requiring inte-
gral implementation, Pei created an American street grid parallel to Cecil
Street and Shenton Way, providing a seamless transition from the old to the
new CBD. The bay-front was integrated in this grid with a boulevard and
bridge to Marina Centre. Pei’s plan also featured twin towers, located in the
axis of Marina Reservoir on a promontory. This axis had its pendant in a
perpendicular WS-axis running from the old CBD to the Strait. Less depend-
ent on form than Tange’s proposal, Pei’s configuration was ultimately adopted
by the URA and became the framework for the development.
The notion of turning Marina Reservoir (‘Water Padang’) into Sin-
gapore’s living room circumscribed by two CBDs ​— ​one existing and one
new ​— ​would trigger a revision of Marina Centre’s waterfront from a green
park into a strip of public amenities. Nonetheless, in their focus on the inward
bay-front skyline, the studies by Tange and Pei did not address the entire
landfill or the strait-front, part of Singapore’s outer façade; this ambiguous
dealing with the island’s edge remains unresolved today, excepting recent
projects for the cruise terminal and Marina South.
230 Marina Bay Area Singapore
3 DESIGN
The 1971 Concept Plan, the 1978 vision for Marina Centre ​→ MBA–S.08 ​and
Pei’s 1983 study for Marina Bay formed the foundation for a series of mas-
terplans that ultimately determined the design of Marina Bay Area.
3.1 CHANGING URBAN DESIGN CONCEPTS
In the decades after 1978, subsequent visions and masterplans for
the greater Marina Bay Area adapted to various changing conditions, result-
ing in distinct development phasing. As such, the early concept for Marina
Centre differs significantly from the later concept for Marina Bay; the con-
cept for Marina South, one of the remaining sub-zones in Marina Bay, only MBA–S.08 Marina Centre Plan.
emerged in 2010. © Urban Redevelopment
Authority. All rights reserved.
I.M. Pei’s design for Marina Bay enabled the creation of sub-zones
of distinct character within an urban public space network. After URA adopted
Pei’s concept, it initiated review sessions to refine it, such as in 2003, when
SOM architects and investor Mapletree elaborated adaptions. These included
two major open spaces (The Lawn and The Square) and more distinctive
districts with clear address locations. A more human scale was introduced
along the promenade and a public space network was elaborated to con-
nect distinct characters and their functional focus: Bayfront, Central, Gar-
dens by the Bay, Marina South and Straits View. A necklace of attractions
encircling the bay was proposed, with special amenities to foster a sense
of community. In the 2003 Masterplan ​→ GP–FI.08, P. 517 ​Bayfront and Helix
Bridges (opened in 2010) appear, improving accessibility between the pen-
insulas and closing the active public space loop around the bay.
In the Central Area Structure Plan for the year 2000 and Beyond
(Urban System Studies | Planning for Tourism : Creating a Vibrant Singapore
2015, 55), part of the 1991 Concept Plan, the eventual layout of the Marina
Bay Area began to take shape. In the 1991 Central Area Structure Plan and
the 1992 Downtown Core & Portview Development Guide Plans ​→ GP–FI.05,
P. 517 , the Esplanade, the performing arts centre along Raffles Avenue,
appeared. Its construction began in 1992 and the centre opened in 2002.
The bay-front zones of Marina Centre, Marina East and Marina Bay were
envisaged as curving green waterfronts facing each other. The first con-
struction phase of Marina Bay was conceived around Marina Bay MRT
along the ECP, which was still on grade level and supposed to continue
between Marina and Central Boulevards, westward to the old CBD and
eastward towards the coast.
3.2 DESIGNING A MULTI-LEVELLED INFRASTRUCTURE
OF MOBILITY
Originally a district of self-sufficient fortresses (Ho 1984), Marina
Centre developed via continuous upgrades. ​→ MBA–S.09 ​Successive links to
the district have produced a connective pedestrian labyrinth. Initially,
Marina Centre was to be connected to Bugis MRT via a private mono-rail;
however, it was eventually linked to three new MRT stations. City Hall
MRT, adjacent to Raffles City, opened in 1987 and was later connected to
231 Conception / Design
 01
03
04

02
05

MARINA CENTRE 1960s–1970s MARINA CENTRE 1970s–1980s MARINA CENTRE 1980s–1990s MARINA CENTRE 2000s–2010s
01 Raffles City 03 Suntec City 05 Esplanade
02 Marina Square 04 Millenia Singapore

1968 I.M. Pei starts work on a masterplan
for Raffles International Centre (RIC) along
the Bras-Basah / Stamford Road Corridor.
RIC goes through several revisions before
emerging as one superblock re-labeled
Raffles City in 1978.
1978 Reclamation of 106ha of land for 1986 Opening of Raffles 1995 Suntec City’s Convention Centre 2004 City Link underground mall opens,
‘Marina Centre’ is completed. Later City. Marina Square opens opens, including Towers 1 and 2 and part connecting Marina Square and Suntec
this year the first parcels are success- 2 months later. of the mall. Millenia Singapore by Kevin City to City Hall MRT. City & Raffles Link
fully bid by Singapore Land and John Roche opens. Roche’s Ritz Carlton Mille- are developed as ‘white sites’.
Portman Properties. 1987 City Hall MRT nia Hotel, John Burgee’s Conrad Centen-
opens as a ‘new nial Hotel and Philip Johnson’s Millenia
entrance to the city.’ Walk Mall open the following year.
2010 Circle Line’s
1998 Grand Open- Esplanade and
ing of Marina 1997 The third phase of Promenade MRTs
Square complex. Suntec City is completed with open
Towers 3 and 4.
1981–1989 Superland Development and DMJM
successfully tender for 2 Marina Centre parcels 2000 One Raffles Link, designed
with a plan for ‘Rahardja Centre’, featuring 80-and by KPF, opens and features the
50-storey hotels and an exhibition centre. The largest column-free floor plate in
project stalls in 1984. The land development rights Singapore.
are sold in 1989.

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

MBA–S.09 Marina Centre development 1960s–2010s.

Marina Centre by One Raffles Link (2000) and City Link Mall (2004), Airport, with Marina South and Gardens by the Bay MRTs, is currently under
vital parts of the Underground Pedestrian Network. Marina Centre has construction. As a result, in 2021, the Marina Bay Area will become the most
nevertheless maintained its introverted, car-oriented character, directly rail accessible location on the island, served by nine stations before the
accessible from the ECP. The new links are, in fact, retroactive repair-work full area’s completion.
of an inadequate urban model. ​b BORDERING A similar pre-investment was made for road infrastructure. At the
The opening of Marina Bay MRT station is indicative of the state’s end of the 1990s, the ECP was designed to travel underground, as it con-
confidence in Marina Bay Area’s success, given the significant pre-invest- stituted a barrier between Central and Bayfront subzones and Marina South,
ment decades before life came to the area. The first MRT North-South line the Gardens by the Bay and Straits View. Once it was shifted underground,
opened in 1987 and extended to Marina Bay in 1989. Within thirty years, the ECP was renamed the Marina Coastal Expressway (MCE), which now
four more lines opened and another four began construction. As the first spans five kilometres. This enabled integration of the former ECP into the
complex, One Raffles Quay, was only completed in 2004, Marina Bay MRT street grid and interconnection of the Marina Bay districts. The MCE was
was an advance investment, under-used for nearly fifteen years. Bayfront a pragmatic alternative for the Singapore Underground Road System (SURS),
and Marina Bay MRTs were linked in 2012. Marina South Pier MRT, near a ring-expressway circumscribing the centre, conceived in the 1980s and
Singapore Cruise Centre, opened in 2014, and Downtown MRT opened cancelled in 2017.
in 2013 on the Downtown Line. The Thomson East-Coastline to Changi

232 Marina Bay Area Singapore 233 Design

3.3 MARINA CENTRE
Successive projects within Marina Centre ​— ​specifically Marina
Square, Suntec City and the Millenia Walk Complex ​— ​favoured a large indoor
labyrinth of malls and lobbies ​→ MBA–S.10, gradually interconnected by sky-
walks and underground tunnels traversing outdoor green spaces. ​→ MBA–S.11 ​
These have effectively dedicated the streetscape to motorised traffic. Today,
the Formula-1 Marina Bay Street Circuit has its base in Marina Centre.
In 1989, the Advisory Council on Culture and the Arts recom-
mended the development of a new performing arts centre. This led to the
construction of the Esplanade in 1992 on the northern shore of Marina
Bay. Nicknamed the Durians due to its roof shape and designed by DP Archi-
tects and Michael Wilford, the complex opened in 2002 and has since
become a vital element in the necklace of cultural amenities around Marina
Bay, to which the Float@Marina Bay (2008) and the Singapore Flyer were
added. The Float@Marina Bay is a large floating stage with a tribune on the
quay, where national celebrations and ceremonies, sports events, concerts
and performances are held. The Flyer, the world’s largest Ferris wheel upon
completion, is a popular tourist infrastructure marking the bay’s entrance.
3.4 MARINA BAY MASTERPLAN
The 1996 model New Downtown: Ideas for The City of Tomorrow ​ ​
→ GP–FI.06, P. 517 ​ contained the first public exhibit of a comprehensive con-
cept for Marina Bay, adapting Pei’s 1983 proposal. According to this model,
the ECP was to be relocated from its curved track and would become the
MCE (constructed between 2008 and 2013); the curve was straightened
into the street grid as an urban avenue and Marina Bay differentiated into
distinct quarters with varying building heights, typologies and uses.
Contrary to today’s urban design practice for the area, which has
a control and laissez-faire approach, the 1996 plan still conveyed a clear
Beaux Arts axiality, with the Marina and Central Boulevards Corridor form-
ing a supra high-rise axis ending in a circular harbour at the Strait, Pei’s
original twin tower symmetry axis and a main park and low-rise institu-
tional axis through the middle. This axis framework divided the area into
distinct character zones: the new high-rise CBD adjacent to Tanjong Pagar,
the Bayfront along Marina Bay with a configuration of medium podium-
cum-tower blocks, Marina South as a compact high-density residential dis-
trict and a vague Straits Boulevard zone.
The monumental emphasis on the Marina and Central Boulevards
Corridor gave the plan an east-west orientation, whilst Marina Bay currently
has a north-south orientation as a result of Marina Bay Sands. In 1996, the
extension of the old CBD was clearly prioritised, as reflected in the plan’s
ambiguous borders and coastal sides.
The 1997 Planning Report “Downtown Core (Central & Bayfront
Subzones), Straits View and Marina South Planning Areas” ​→ GP–FI.07, P. 517 ​
attempted to resolve the dilemma of Marina Bay’s development phasing,
height and density given Singapore’s land scarcity and uncertain future. The
new phasing proposal consisted of a preliminary compact Central subzone,
234 Marina Bay Area Singapore
MBA–S.10 Underpass as an
‘in-between’ urban space in
Marina Centre.
MBA–S.11 Sky Garden, an
upper-­level extension, functions
as a connection between Suntec
City and Fountain of Wealth.
a square extending the downtown CBD. In addition, according to the pro-
posal, the Bayfront subzone was to be developed to complete the skyline
of the Reservoir.
URA also introduced the White Site zoning category in 1995, offer-
ing flexibility for developers in determining mix of uses within permitted
Gross Floor Areas (GFA). The White Site concept appeared quite early in
comparison to similar zoning legislation introduced in other countries. For MBA–S.12 Marina Bay Sands as
example, the Urban Area zoning category in Germany, designed to pro- landmark of Singapore.
mote higher density in central zones and mixed use, was only introduced
in 2017. As is the case in Singapore, this category requires strategic gov-
ernance given investors’ preference for mono-functionality.
The 2008 Masterplan ​→ GP–FI.08, P. 517 ​reflects the integration of
several reviews. This plan incorporates the Float@Marina Bay, Singapore
Flyer and Marina Street Circuit in the amenities necklace and defines the
layout of the MCE tunnel. The future Gardens by the Bay display their char-
acteristic trumpet shape, opening towards the water, and the Marina Barrage
appears, turning Marina Bay into the largest freshwater reservoir on the
island. The Masterplan also features the footprint of the Marina Bay Sands
Integrated Resort (constructed between 2006 and 2012), replacing the for-
mer delicate parcellation of medium-size blocks with one mega-building.
3.5 MARINA BAY SANDS INTEGRATED RESORT AND
GARDENS BY THE BAY
Designed by Starchitect Moshe Safdie, Marina Bay Sands Integrated
Resort (IR) has become an iconic landmark in Singapore. ​→ ­MBA–S.12 The
Sky-deck spanning the resort’s three towers provides a unique architectural
typology that greatly impacts the surrounding skyline and context. Due to
its programme, it has become a social condenser for tourism, commerce,
culture and business.
Marina Bay Sands houses Singapore’s first casino and was built
following twenty-two months of public consultation starting in March 2004,
which weighed the negative consequences of legalising gambling against
economic effects. The Integrated Resort was seen as an effective way to
quickly develop a large tourist attraction and catalyse Marina Bay’s devel-
opment. The complex contains a hotel, casino, apartments, retail, food
and beverage and convention centres and began opening in phases in 2010.
URA enables adaptability in plot configuration through an amal-
gamation and subdivision option. Marina Bay Sands is a radical example
of this. The 2003 Masterplan conceived Marina Bay Sands as six individual
plots fronting the Reservoir and four individual plots facing Gardens by
the Bay. It finally became one large plot fronting the bay and three indi-
vidual plots facing the gardens. Two other examples of this approach are
Asia Square and Marina One. With Asia Square, the developer opted to
235 Design

MBA–S.13 The iconic ‘Supertrees’ of Garden by The Bay.
purchase and integrate the adjacent plot. With Marina One, the developer
integrated the road between four plots via a lease from the Land Transport
Authority. Although this option provides flexibility, it raises the question
about the size of individual projects with respect to porosity, active street-
fronts and functional, typological and architectural diversity, which might
be endangered by large self-contained fortresses. ​r REGULATORY PLANS
Primary criticism of Marina Bay Sands concerned not so much its
enormous scale or its isolated, private character but rather whether Singa-
pore should legalise gambling and effectively sell out to a casino tycoon
236 Marina Bay Area Singapore
from Las Vegas. In 2005, the Prime Minister stated: “Without [the resort],
it might take fifteen years or more to tender out the land in individual par-
cels, and to develop the area on the same scale. But if we build it, within four
years the Bayfront will be developed”(Lee 2005, 7). ​u URBAN CATALYSTS URBAN CATALYST
Moshe Safdie has configured Marina Bay Sands’ enormous pro-
gramme in a series of loosely composed, elegant components whilst simul-
taneously addressing the two parallel highways crossing the site. The lobby MBA–S.14 Plan for Marina
below the towers lies between the roads and seamlessly connects to the South area as seen in model at
the Singapore City Gallery of the
Bayfront buildings, under-passing Bayfront Avenue. This double set of ave- URA Centre.
nues may still be needed due to traffic capacity, but it does not comply with
a future car-lite mobility concept. Despite its design ingenuity, MBS will
likely only be integrated after completion of its surroundings.
In 2005, the competition for Gardens by the Bay, a national iconic
public park, was won by a team led by British landscape architects Grant
Associates. ​→ MBA–S.13 Opened in 2011, Gardens by the Bay was designed
“to blend nature, technology, environmental management and imagina-
tion to create a 21st century focus for tropical horticulture and a unique
destination experience”(Grant Associates 2012). The park features eight
Supertrees, steel-framed vertical gardens that include technical installa-
tions, an aerial walkway and a treetop bar; two large greenhouses; heritage
gardens of Singapore’s culture; biodiversity gardens; water bodies; art; and
environmental infrastructures. Like Marina Bay Sands, the park attracts
large numbers of regional and international visitors. Its enlargement, as
presented in the original masterplan, replacing possible saleable land, con-
stituted a deliberate decision to stimulate tourism.
3.6 MARINA SOUTH AND BEYOND
On the other side of Gardens by the Bay, Marina South, a new res-
idential district, will be a car-lite zone linked with the Thomson-East Coast
MRT. ​→ MBA–S.14 URA’s visualisations of the neighbourhood convey the
image of a European waterfront neighbourhood; apart from climate-­related
design features and high-rises, this image resembles Hamburg’s Hafen­
City. The neighbourhood, called a ‘village,’ is characterised by city streets
with corner shops, food and beverage and other services. Walking and
cycling ​— ​active mobility ​— ​are promoted via covered walkways and dedi-
cated cycling lanes. Communities of street neighbourhoods will enhance
social contact. URA hopes that the village, which will comprise 9,000 apart-
ments, will entice people who work in the city centre and desire to live a
short distance from their workplaces. The block-typology studies feature
half-open perimeter block podia with green courtyards and playgrounds
and set-backed towers. An underground mall will connect the two MRT
stations to the neighbourhood.
Marina South is the preliminary conclusion of Marina Bay; an offi-
cial concluding urban design concept has not yet been defined. For Tanjong
Pagar Terminal and Brani Island, preliminary studies are underway. As noted
previously, the character of Marina Bay’s boundaries and the degree of den-
sity, height and flexibility of adjacent areas pose a challenge and require
careful study.
237 Design
 Nonetheless, in examining the site’s urban design approach, ranging from
the self-contained architectural fortresses of Marina Centre to the inclu-
Sport SG PUB LTA NParks
Place sive neighbourhood principles and conscious public-private and outdoor-in-
Management
A A A A Department door relation in Marina South, Singapore’s urban design culture has arguably
A taken some evolutionary steps.

4 IMPLEMENTATION
Marina Bay
Singapore Development Three observations can be made with respect to Marina Bay Area’s imple-
Tourism Board Agency
A mentation. First, URA plays a central role in the site’s implementation and
A
operation. Second, technical and mobility infrastructures have substan-
tially influenced implementation given their advanced pre-investment and
realisation. Third, although Marina Bay Area features an impressive sky-
line, less than half of the envisaged built volume is currently completed;
the rest of the development’s design lacks a definitive vision.
Local and
international

URA is the primary body that implements masterplans and urban

Visitors

Economic URA Various Business

Associations V
Development
Board
AMO B planning strategies within Singapore. ​→ MBA–S.15 Regularly advised by inter-
A national consultants, URA has realised design schemes in a relatively cohe-
sive manner, as most of the land belongs to the government. Since the
beginning of the project in the 1960s, a stable central administration and
adaptive agenda have allowed urban planning practice to evolve in a way
that permits location and project-specific response by prioritising economic
Various
International
Owners/Projet revenue models and/or a project’s iconic value. Various tender systems
Ministry of panel of experts O have enabled a distinct implementation model intended to create added
National A
Development value. ​→ MBA–S.16
A
Various
Developers
4.1 URA, PLANNING AND TENDER AUTHORITY
B Paramount to the visions and plans guiding the greater Marina Bay
Area was the consolidation of various URA agencies, which streamlined
decision-making and implementation (Urban System Studies | Planning for
Tourism : Creating a Vibrant Singapore 2015, 7). Apart from being respon-
Various
Owners/Projet sible for Singapore’s urban development, URA also acts as Conservation
Various
O Authority and agency for the Government Land Sales (GLS) programme.
State-owned
Developers
The GLS, introduced in 1967, was instrumental for the city’s growth, stead-
ily releasing plots into the market. The programme underwent several
Local and
B international

reforms between the 1980s and the 2000s in response to a desire for “trans-
Architects

D
parency, credibility and reliability” within the GLS system (Urban System
ROLE SECTOR IMPACT
Studies | Planning for Tourism : Creating a Vibrant Singapore 2015, 83) and
an increasing focus on design quality. c ​ CENTRALITIES
A
DV
Authority
Developer
Public sector
Private sector
High impact
Land can be released through the Confirmed List (CL) or the
M Management Public & private sector Reserve List (RL). The Confirmed List contains sites intended for sale at
O
D
Owner
Designer COOPERATION
pre-­determined dates. Most plots are released for tender through the Con-
C Community groups firmed List every six months. The Reserve List, introduced in 2001, con-
R
B
Residents / Residents association
Retailers / F&B / Business association
Founded
Strongly connected
tains sites that can be triggered for tender when a developer submits a price
OA Other association Weakly connected deemed acceptable by the government or when more than one party submits
V Visitor Targeted Low impact
a price within a certain period. The Reserve List is a flexible tool enabling
MBA–S.15 Marina Bay Area stakeholder diagram.

238 Marina Bay Area Singapore 239 Design / Implementation

KEY REDEVELOPMENT MASTERPLAN
AREAS OVERSEEN BY URA
Other areas by : Other areas by :
HDB, JTC, etc HDB, JTC, etc

PRE 1979 1979–1989 POST 1989

Development plans were prepared to Central Area Planning Team As a continuation of URA’s efforts in comprehensive planning
steer the execution of ‘action plans’ by [CAPT] was set up by MND to of the Central Area, the entire island was demarcated into 55
agencies such as URA (Central Area), steer planning efforts as well planning areas. Development Guide Plans for each of these
HDB (public housing towns), and JTC as coordinate developments areas, communicated future planning intentions to the private
(industrial developments) within the Central Area. sector in a more systematic and transparent manner.

INTRODUCTION 1966 LAND ACQUISITION ACT 1995 ‘WHITE SITE’

OF CONCEPTS TO GLS Allowed the government to acquire land Allows developers to change the mix or use
at sustainable prices for redevelopment for of land without additional land charge, or any
‘public purposes’ uncertainty on whether it will be allowed
2001 ‘RESERVE LIST’
Introduction of sites which could be triggered
for tender by developers through submission of
an acceptable minimum price.
2005 LAND PURCHASE OPTION
Developers can develop the project in phases.
Option scheme allows the developers to purchase
the land at a specified price in the future.

TENDER FOCUS DESIGN CONCEPT + PRICE
If the winning tender proposed a very good design,
but did not offer the highest price bid, there was
the option for the successful tenderer to top up his
bid to the average of the top three highest bids.
Despite the positive contribution such a scheme
might have in the architectural design culture, it
could be perceived as not transparent enough.
PRICE
Developers only needed to submit
the tender price without any design
proposal. This reflected the strive for
transparency in the process. Sites at
important or prominent locations, an
Architectural Design Panel would
supervise the development’s design.
DESIGN CONCEPT + PRICE + TRANSPARENCY
New mechanisms introduced in the
tender system allows for good design to
be assessed against a transparent and
robust procedure.

TENDERS EXAMPLES OF TYP SPECIFIC INFORMATION ON CONDITIONS OF TENDER 2005 Marina Bay Sands
Fixed Price Request for Proposal NOT ACCESSED AT POINT OF RESEARCH. 2006 Resort World Sentosa
Concept And Price Revenue 2005 Illuma
2006 Fullerton Heritage
2007 South Beach
2010 Capitol
Price 2002 The Sail@ Marina Bay
2005 Marina Bay Suites
2010 Ogilvy Sofitel
2011 SBF Center
REQUIREMENTS 2005 Marina Bay Financial Centre
Design Advisory Panel 2007 Asia Square
2010 Tanjong Pagar Center
2013 Frasers Tower
2016 IOI Properties
2017 GuocoLand
Competition 2006 Gardens by the Bay
2007 National Gallery
2011 DUO
2011 Marina One
TOTAL 10
Total No. of Sites Tenders in
Downtown Core
1

1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025
MBA–S.16 Evolution of the tender system in Singapore.

240 Marina Bay Area Singapore 241 Implementation

 TENDER SYSTEM
Price Concept And Price Revenue
Evaluation Method 1st Concept
A B C $$
$$$
$$ $$
$ $
returned
unopened
A B C A B C
2nd Price
Criteria Assessed PRICE USE
→ Tender goes to the highest bidder. → Composition of uses to be
→ All tenderers must fulfil the
requirements set out in the
compatible with urban waterfront
→ Placement of uses along key
Technical Conditions of Tender pedestrian routes
APPROPRIATENESS TO CONTEXT
→ Overall design concept
→ Sensitive interface between old
and new buildings
→ Attractiveness of public spaces
→ Good connectivity
QUALITY OF ARCHITECTURE
→ Quality of design
→ Response to tropical climate
→ Adaptive reuse of conservation
buildings
→ Night lighting
BUSINESS
→ Marketable as attraction to both
local residents and tourists
→ Creation of sustainable appeal
TRACK RECORD
→ Experience in development and
operation of mixed-use projects
DESIGN
→ Pedestrian–Oriented
→ Integration with site
→ Reaction to conservation sites
→ Servicing
Examples
Tanjong Pagar Center (top left) Fullerton Heritage (top left)
Asia Square (bottom left) Capitol (bottom left)
Sofitel So (right) South Beach (right)
Design Advisory Panel YN Y Y
MBA–S.17 Evolution of the tender system in Singapore.
242 Marina Bay Area Singapore
URA to adjust supply to match demand in uncertain economic situations
(Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) Singapore 2002, 30). While the
Fixed Price Request For Proposal
Confirmed List ensures a continuous release of sites for tender, the Reserve
fixed price List enables developers to shorten URA’s phasing if they identify a specific
$$ $$ development opportunity. An example of a Reserve List site is Marina Bay
Financial Centre, for which tender was awarded in 2004.
Modes of tendering have shifted since the pre-1980s, when ten-
A B C dering focused largely on design, and the 1990s, when it focused on econ-
omy, transparency and fairness. Today, URA deploys three different tendering
A B C systems. ​→ MBA–S.17 The Price Only system, most commonly used, awards
the tender to the highest bidder. The Concept and Price Revenue system
design & concept
requires tenderers to submit a design proposal in addition to a price pro-
Information not available at time of
posal; architecture quality, programme allocation, business cases and sub-
research mitters’ track records are evaluated and competitive tenderers are short-­
listed. URA awards the site to the highest bid and returns price proposals
to short-listed candidates unopened. The Fixed Price Request-for-Proposal
system was applied to Marina Bay Sands. In this system, price is fixed and
evaluation focuses primarily on design and qualitative criteria. Both the
Concept and Price Revenue and Fixed Price Request-for-Proposal tender-
ing systems are assessed by a Design Advisory Panel that varies per site
and includes international experts.
4.2 BINDING CONDITIONS AND INCENTIVES
Each tender contains specific conditions, such as a developer’s
responsibility for technical substations (i.e., Marina Bay Financial Centre).
The implementation of public spaces and collective infrastructure is
described in the deliveries (i.e., Marina Bay Promenade and the event space
outside Marina Bay Sands). These conditions enable URA to formulate
specific requirements, such as ownership and management of public space
and infrastructure.
Incentives in the form of GFA exemptions and cost-sharing stimu-
late projects like the Underground Pedestrian Network (UPN). Whilst tender
conditions bind developers to a specific investment, incentives provide an
open exchange of terms through which developers may defray costs. Such
collaborations have contributed to a Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) culture
in Singapore, which has become a significant pillar of urban development.
Apart from requirements for construction, management and main-
tenance of public space, URA also includes other clauses in tenders perti-
nent to a development’s operation. For example, the tender for Marina Bay
Financial Centre (MBFC) required that the submitting tendering parties
retained a share of more than half in the development, which must be
guaranteed until issue of a Temporary Occupation Permit (TOP). Failure
to obtain the TOP may result in repossession of the plot, including built
Marina Bay Sands
243 Implementation
structures, with a forfeit of the amount paid for the sale price. Such condi-
tions ensure that developments are completed within a designated project
completion period.
Problems do emerge, as in the case of The Cube, a city room or
shared space of encounter at Asia Square occupying the central space of
two different plots as required in the tender. The two plots were sold sep-
arately then developed as a single development with two towers. After com-
pletion, the towers were sold separately (Leow 2017), creating an uncertain
future for the The Cube. A common option in tenders such as those for
Asia Square and Marina Bay Financial Centre is that the successful ten-
derer may with the prior consent of the Authority appoint another company
to carry out the development. Nonetheless, the developer is required to
retain a controlling interest of 50% until the release of the TOP. MBFC is
a successful case of this, in which a third company was in charge of con-
struction. Raffles Quay Asset Management (RQAM), founded in 2001 to
market and manage One Raffles Quay, later included MBFC. Tendered in
2005, with its first phase completed in 2010, the RQAM consortium com-
prises a representative of each investor and operates as one management
entity (Tong 2017). The constellation has extended beyond the TOP to include
daily management, concierge services and engineering works.
For Marina Bay Sands, the tender documents contain precise details
for the management of public spaces and their daily operation; however,
the state remains sole owner.
4.3 SPECIFIC PLANS AND GUIDELINES
URA and the STB (Singapore Tourism Board) began focusing on
place management to “program activities and bring life” to Greater Marina
Bay (Urban System Studies | Planning for Tourism : Creating a Vibrant Singa-
pore 2015, 95) with the 2008 Leisure Plan, part of the 2008 Masterplan.
The “Civic and Cultural District by the Bay,” introduced in 2014, priori-
tised heritage and cultural experience around the Reservoir.
URA’s 2008 Central Area Masterplan includes the Parks and Water-
bodies, Activity-Generating Uses and Underground Network plans for the
city centre. These plans stitch together the public waterfront promenades
surrounding the Reservoir and Singapore River with adjacent public spaces.
It assigns corresponding malls and promenades through block links, dotted
with proposed or existing open and covered spaces. The LUSH (Landscaping
for Urban Spaces and High-rises) programme was introduced in 2009 to
address urban heat islands, air quality and green spaces. It requires that a
new development provide landscaped water-absorbable surfaces in the form
of roof terraces and sky gardens equivalent in size to its built footprint.
In addition, URA releases Urban Design Guidelines (UDG) for
each planning area. To ensure a district’s distinctive character and coher-
ence (Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) Singapore 2013), these
guidelines provide a framework for building envelopes, height, design
parameters, through-block links and view corridors. They also prescribe
specific surface materials for public spaces, street furniture, lighting and
tree species. ​r ­REGULATORY PLANS
244 Marina Bay Area Singapore
4.4 UNDERGROUND AND ABOVE-GROUND
INFRASTRUCTURES
The government finances the majority of infrastructures, includ-
ing the MRT and road networks. For the Underground Pedestrian Network
(UPN) and the Common Service Tunnel (CST), whose layout is coordinated
by URA but partially crosses private plots, the public-private partnership
shares investment. MBA–S.19 Circulatory network
The Underground Pedestrian Network in the Central Area is meant of Raffles City and Marina Centre.
to foster seamless connectivity between Marina Bay, the CBD, Marina
Centre and beyond to Orchard Road, linking main nodes in the centre. ​
→ ­MBA–S.18 With the network of links and malls in Marina Centre completed,
the network in Marina Bay is still in development. It covers the new CBD
rectangle and Bayfront and connects these with the old CBD. In the future,
it will extend along Marina and Central Boulevards to Straits View and con-
nect to Marina South and Gardens by the Bay and other MRT stations. Sup-
plementing the UPN are various incentives and requirements included in
the tenders for adjacent developments. URA offers partial reimbursement
of construction costs and GFA exemption for Activity-Generating Uses along
the UPN (Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) Singapore 2016).
Complementary underground, street and elevated pedestrian net- MBA–S.20 Privately-owned
works only exist in a few cities, including Singapore, Hong Kong, Seoul covered open space area of
South Bank Tower Complex.
and Tokyo. ​→ MBA–S.19 In these cities, climate conditions require additional
air-conditioned public spaces. Further, as the density in Asian city centres
is higher than that elsewhere, multi-level environments do not necessarily
compete. As climatized space is often private space ​→ MBA–S.20, the relation
between covered and non-covered ‘private’ public space and ‘public’ pub-
lic space is considered less problematic than it is in western cities.
Public private partnership extends beyond the management of
underground and elevated networks. A Common Services Tunnel (CST)
was envisioned for Marina Bay in the 1990s and opened in 2006. The 5-kilo-
metre infrastructure connects two district cooling plants (at One Raffles Quay
and Marina Bay Sands with a satellite at One Marina Boulevard) to supply
cooling, energy and utilities. The CST required significant pre-investment,
planning and management before and after completion. The Energy Market
Authority was established to facilitate its execution. A pilot zone of 1.25 mil-
lion sqm GFA was defined in which new developments were required to use
water from the district cooling system. The system’s costs, initially undertaken
by the government, are defrayed by new developments through tenders.
In order to avoid visible installations in public space, the first dis-
trict cooling plant was integrated inside One Raffles Quay, whilst owner-
ship and management remain with URA. The benefits of the system include
a reduction of up to 42% in energy use and an allowance of additional gross
GFA (Urban Redevelopment Authority 2016). Marina Bay’s CST, one of
the first in Asia, has since informed other projects, such as the Jurong Lake
District, a future high-speed railway terminus.
As buildings and infrastructure are responsible for more than half
of Singapore’s energy consumption, district infrastructure, which balances
energy demand between multiple sites, is a priority. A current challenge
245 Implementation
 Little India
NEWTON ROCHOR
Rochor

Nicoll Highway
Dhoby Gaut

Bugis
01 Garden By The Bay Elevated Walk Bencoolen

Somerset

RIVER VALLEY Bras Basah

Promenade
Esplanade

02 Elevated Walk at Shenton Highway

City Hall

Clarke Quay
MARINA BAY

03 Raffles Place Underground Access Raffles Place Bayfront

Chinatown

Gardens by The Bay

(to be completed 2021)
OUTRAM
Telok Ayer
Maxwell
(to be completed 2021) Downtown
Outram Park

MARINA SOUTH
Marina South
(to be completed 2021)
Tanjong Pagar

Marina Bay

Marina South Pier

STRAITS VIEW

MBA–S.18 Undergound and elevated connection in Central Area. Elevated connection
Underground connection
MRT line
MRT line (under construction)
Elevated entrance access

Underground entrance
access
Underground MRT station

246 Marina Bay Area Singapore 247 Implementation

is the district cooling culture in residential buildings, which today are gen-
erally served by private air-conditioning units.
An infrastructure of great impact is Marina Barrage, constructed
between 2004 and 2008, which dams the 350-metre wide Marina Chan-
nel from the sea. The Singapore River clean-up occurred between 1977
and 1987; as a result, Singapore River, Marina Bay and the Kallang, Rochor
and Geylang Rivers were effectively blocked from the ocean, creating Sin-
gapore’s fifteenth freshwater reservoir. With this intervention, almost all
rivers on the island have been dammed and turned into freshwater reser-
voirs. These contribute to Singapore’s quest for a self-sufficient water sup-
ply, as its supply is currently dependent on the Malaysian State of Johor.
4.5 INCREMENTAL IMPLEMENTATION AND PHASING
Marina Centre has been completed, and URA’s aims to create suf-
ficient critical building mass, an impressive skyline and a dense programme
of activity around the Reservoir have been accomplished. However, apart
from Gardens by the Bay and half of the Bayfront and Central subzones,
the majority of Marina Bay still has to be developed.
While Marina Centre’s labyrinthic improvisations of its links and
extensions illustrate its lack of adaptability, Marina Bay has, through suc-
cessive masterplans, become more adaptive over time, enabling a contin-
uously growing district to unfold. The site’s open-ended contours, pre-­
realised transport infrastructure and street grid demonstrate Marina Bay’s
built-­in flexibility: in addition to providing a smooth connection to the old
city, the street grid alternates programmes between and inside blocks.
Although the White Site zoning category enables developers to adapt pro-
gramme mix according to demand, the limited projects realised thus far
and investors’ inclination towards mono-functionality have not yet demon-
strated the category’s full advantage. ​r REGULATORY PLANS
Marina South, the car-lite residential village between the Straits
and Gardens by the Bay, will experience its first construction soon, whilst
its MRT stations and road structure are underway. A lingering question
concerns whether or not there will be HDB housing in Marina South. On
the one hand, land prices may be too high for HDB housing given Marina
South’s prime location; on the other hand, competitive socially inclusive
urban districts contain some form of affordable housing.
Given that URA regularly updates local masterplans in response
to changing circumstances, however, adaptive, phased development of
Marina Bay will likely continue.
5 OPERATION
Whilst URA holds a central role in developing masterplans and planning
instruments, releasing tenders and land sales, it is also the key stakeholder
in managing placemaking and event programming with other agencies and
private parties. In the Marina Bay Area, this URA-led coordination of various
authoritative institutions reflects Singapore’s multi-tiered organisation.
248 Marina Bay Area Singapore
The combination of these tasks essentially makes URA a Development
Corporation similar to HafenCity GmbH, which enables effective handling
of all aspects of development. ​3 4 HC–H IMPLEMENTATION & OPERATION
5.1 PLACEMAKING
An important aspect of governance of Grands Projets is public space
management. For URA, this includes maintenance, the need to ensure that MBA–S.21 Marina Reservoir as
events do not disrupt social or racial harmony or pose risks to public health, ‘Water Padang’, activated with
various spaces and programmes.
order or safety (Urban Land Institute SIngapore 2019) and a comprehen-
sive vision of the network of open spaces, which concerns public use pro-
grammes, thematically-linked amenities and activities and the mediation
between public-public and private-public space. In the course of Marina
Bay’s implementation, an integrated public space management system
has emerged, promoting policies on activation, vegetation, water manage-
ment and climate mitigation. As a result, Marina Bay has become a bench-
mark for placemaking.
The art of placemaking is rapidly emerging as a new science. Sin-
gapore has carefully studied placemaking in other cities, incorporated its
observations in its urban design policies and thus contributed to the notion
of placemaking as discipline (Centre for Liveable Cities 2014). While place-
making often begins at street-level rather than within planning agencies,
in Singapore placemaking is a government-initiated activity that aims to
create controlled, well-designed and attractive public spaces. In the greater
Marina Bay Area, placemaking includes hardware, or physical design, and
software, activities and event programming.
Consequently, spaces and programmes in the Marina Bay Area are
meticulously planned. The two most essential spaces are the necklace of
attractions around the Reservoir and Gardens by the Bay. Marina Reservoir
has been christened Water Padang or People’s Bay, and is designated for
national celebrations like the New Year’s Countdown. ​→ MBA–S.21 ​It is the
“centre-stage for Singapore, the new symbolic heart of the city” (Urban
System Studies | Planning for Tourism : Creating a Vibrant Singapore 2015, 72).
For developments along Bayfront, including Marina Bay Sands
(MBS), developers must have Activity-Generating Uses on the ground floor.
The tender documents for Marina Bay Sands prescribe developers’ man-
agement tasks of publicly owned spaces. The Skydeck, the shelf topping the
three towers of MBS, is the outcome of the required viewing platform in
URA’s tender and formally part of the necklace. Elements in front of Marina
Bay Sands include the ArtScience Museum, reminiscent of a lotus flower,
and two Crystal Pavilions for Louis Vuitton and the Avalon/Pangaea night-
clubs. Despite various pergolas, boardwalks and ponds, the pavement along
the necklace showcases little green; designers have experimented with street
furniture, such as shading canopies with solar energy-driven ventilators.
249 Implementation / Operation
Whilst Marina Bay Sands exploits much of the Bayfront ​— ​except the Red
Dot Museum ​— ​Fullerton Quay, including Clifford Pier and Customs House,
is mainly operated by the Fullerton Hotel, Singapore’s former post office.
The two quays are thus largely managed by private players. The northern
Bayshore with the Esplanade, the Float@Marina Bay and Singapore Flyer
are publicly managed. Two pedestrian bridges, the Jubilee bridge and the MBA–S.22 iLight festival, one
of several initiatives to activate
Helix, close the loop around the bay, whilst Singapore River’s quays are urban spaces in Singapore.
connected via underpasses, forming the necklace, which lies in the middle
of a theme park. Such concentration of activity has raised questions about
a city centre’s favouring of abundant attractions over quieter open spaces.

5.2 EVENT PROGRAMMING

URA engaged the Marina Bay Development Agency (MBDA) in
the early 2000s to promote Marina Bay locally and internationally and to
activate the People’s Bay with placemaking in collaboration with entities
like Marina Bay Business Association (MBBA). MBBA was established in
2003 under the auspices of URA and the Singapore Tourism Board (STB)
and consists of major stakeholders around the Reservoir, which include
Marina Bay Sands, Marina Bay Link Mall, Marina Square, CityLink Mall, MBA–S.23 Prudential Marina
Raffles City Shopping Centre, Suntec City Mall, Millenia Walk, the Espla- Bay Carnival, located at the
nade, Singapore Flyer and The Fullerton Heritage. These stakeholders col- Bayfront Event Space, next to
Marina Bay Sands.
laborate with URA when planning activities and events, which include the
Christmas light-up at Marina Bay, co-organised with STB in 2011. Follow-
ing the completion of major developments in 2013, MBBA has become less
active; today, its members focus largely on individual marketing. Since
2005, URA has partnered with Esplanade, Singapore’s National Arts Cen- MBA–S.24 Various landmarks in Marina Bay Area as icons of Singapore.
tre, and the MBBA for the annual Countdown.
Public private partnership is also evident in downtown night-light-
ing: cash grants and GFA bonuses encourage a coherent nightscape (Urban
Redevelopment Authority 2009). First released in 2006, the Night Lighting
Masterplan outlines the “lighting of developments within the Central Busi-
ness District (CBD), Marina Centre and Marina Bay” in order “to create a An insurance company organises the Marina Bay Carnival in collaboration
unique, three-dimensional nightscape for Singapore’s city centre” (Urban with stakeholders, such as Suntec City, on The Promontory @ Marina Bay
Redevelopment Authority 2011). These guidelines encourage lighting of and Bayfront Event Plaza. ​→ MBA–S.23 ​The availability of such large spaces
specific areas, such as crowns, facades and building perimeters. The yearly for rent expands the pool of stakeholders wishing to represent their brands
iLight Singapore festival involves a series of light installations by interna- in Marina Bay.
tional artists, designed with energy-efficient lighting and environmentally-­ Large-scale events such as the annual Formula 1 Grand Prix, on
friendly materials. ​→ MBA–S.22 Given the daily Gardens by the Bay Supertree the Marina Bay Street Circuit, or the Car-Free Civic District, part of the
lightshow and the Marina Bay Sands Spectra Water and Laser Show, the 2016 Year-End Countdown (Heng 2016), require the concerted efforts of
area often gives the impression of a massive choreographed theatre per- all involved stakeholders. The Formula 1 Grand Prix has its pit area in Marina
formance at night rather than an urban district. Centre behind the Singapore Flyer.
The bay’s inter-connected public space has inspired the organisation
of sponsored sporting events like the Sundown Marathon and Singapore Mar-
athon. For large-scale events, the area may be temporarily reorganised and 6 IMPLICATIONS
roads may close. Public spaces are available for rent from different agencies.
The greater Marina Bay Area has considerably influenced local and global
urban design and architecture culture. ​→ MBA–S.24 ​It has become a symbol
and point of identity for Singapore itself, informing the country’s urban

250 Marina Bay Area Singapore 251 Operation / Implications

design procedures and parameters, infrastructure systems and building
typologies. It has become the paradigm of CBD development in Asia and
a global benchmark for waterfront development and placemaking.

6.1 A LOCAL REFERENCE

The Bayfront area, with its necklace and Reservoir, has become a
social symbol for the nation. This is apparent in the reservoir’s name (Water MBA–S.26 White Site land use
Padang) and role in national celebrations. The necklace is one of the most within Marina Bay Area as shown
at the Singapore City Gallery of
popular boulevards in the country, inspiring public spaces in other parts URA Centre.
of Singapore. ​→ MBA–S.25
In URA’s new vision of the island, greater Marina Bay Area is the
primus inter pares to three additional centres and gateways: Jurong Lake
District, the future high-speed railway terminus near the port; Woodlands,
a hub to Johor and Malaysia; and Tampines-Changi, the airport gateway.
The application of White Sites, district infrastructure, sustainability stand-
ards and urban design guidelines in these new centres is the direct result
of the experience of Marina Bay’s development. ​→ MBA–S.26 Marina Bay
Sands’ Skydeck, in combination with the LUSH-policy, has established a
new trend in building typology, represented by projects like The Pinnacle
at Duxton.

6.2 MODELLING
Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader spearheading China’s resur-
gence after Mao Zedong’s death, initiated the Shenzhen Special Economic
Zone in 1978. The economic model of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) imi-
tated those of Hong Kong and Singapore with its free-trade harbours; con-
versely, Singaporean planners and architects have influenced Shenzhen’s
urban design and architecture, evident in the land reclamation approach
and City in a Garden concept. This influence is also apparent in the devel-
opment of Shekou, Shenzhen’s exemplary waterfront on the southwestern
tip between Shenzhen Bay and Pearl River. Shekou is a state-of-the-art
international district that includes a Cruise Terminal, Victoria & Albert
Museum, industrial heritage buildings housing the Shenzhen Biennale and
creative industries, a necklace of public spaces with amenities and activi-
ties, international schools and Singapore-style condominiums for a grow-
ing expatriate population. The Singaporean condominium, consisting of
slender apartment towers with lush terraces in a soft-gated compound with
a pool, playground, tennis court, gym and parking has become an export
product throughout South East Asia for the upcoming middle class. Its tropic-­
architectural features with naturally ventilated spaces remind of 1960s
Brazilian modernism and form a sharp contrast with the speculative apart-
ment towers of Hong Kong.
At the same time, Hong Kong Central has been a reference for
Singapore with its waterfront skyline, multi-level 3D-city pedestrian net-
work and mall typology, brought to Singapore with the aid of Hong Kong
investors when Raffles City and Marina Centre emerged. Although Singa-
pore’s traditional CBD, constructed on the fine street pattern of the past,
MBA–S.25 Marina Bay Reservoir as the most prominent public space in Singapore.
deliberately features a Wall Street skyline, Marina Bay does not showcase
a dynamic skyline. It derives its quality from the specificity of building
ensembles like Marina Bay Sands, diversity of district characters and qual-
ity of public space.
The notion of reclaiming land in a waterfront city to extend a har-
bour or city centre is not new. Many cities, such as Amsterdam, New York
and Hong Kong, have implemented such reclamation efforts in the past.
Unlike Singapore, however, these cities do not exhibit waterfronts that func-
tion as the city centre’s gravitation point and the country’s symbol.
The civic symbolism of the Marina Bay Area has inspired other
cities. For instance, the ​— ​recently cancelled ​— ​Garuda plan for the sea in
front of Jakarta, primarily conceived as a ring-dike for a freshwater reser-
voir and flood control, featured a CBD-like island in the form of a Garuda
bird in the middle of the dike. The Palm reclamations in front of Dubai in
the Gulf are designed to be observed from space, thus mediating a global
symbol. However, the Gulf cities’ reclamations are rather suburban, with
extremely tall and/or revolving skyscrapers that contrast with Singapore’s

252 Marina Bay Area Singapore 253 Implications

more integrated planning culture; such forms of misinterpretation have
spurred various ‘copy-paste’ projects, like Forest City in Johor, Malaysia
or Coastarina on the Indonesian island of Batam, both in direct sight of
Singapore. In these cases, attempts to address a tentative overspill of the
Singaporean real estate market and to connect to the global waterfront
culture have led to unfortunate outcomes of environmental damage and
real estate mismanagement.
Marina Bay’s conception was accompanied by benchmarking stud-
ies of other waterfront developments, including the Opera House on Syd-
ney’s Circular Quay. Large cultural institutions like the Esplanade at Marina
Bay, the Elbphilharmonie in Hamburg’s HafenCity and the Conference Cen-
tre in Dalian all demonstrate Sydney’s influence. ​m MODELLING T ​ he combi-
nation of a public cultural building as iconic attractor amidst a chain of smaller
waterfront attractions, set in a high-quality public space design and activated
with a thematic event programme, has become a global archetype of water-
front urban design with its own marine-inspired architectural language.
Marina Bay Sands elucidates the iconic, symbolic power of water-
front design. The Skydeck and Infinity Pool have triggered a new architec-
tural typology. The Integrated Resort (IR), partly informed by Sentosa, may
also be seen, in its compact form that combines resort and metropolitan
grand hotel programmes, as an innovative urban typology. The high-­density
programme mix in an urban context on a small footprint offers an alterna-
tive to large-footprint, unsustainable country resorts. The IR has become
an export product, as evident in Raffles City Chongqing, the largest invest-
ment by a Singapore firm in China (Tan 2016). The complex, also designed
by Moshe Safdie, features an exact replica of Marina Bay Sands’ Skydeck.
Marina Bay’s public space necklace around the Reservoir is inspired
by Baltimore, the first city to develop an incremental waterfront connected
by red brick promenades and funded via attraction revenue. The 1989 Urban
Waterfront Plan, 1988 Civic & Cultural District Plans and other policy instru-
ments launched an ongoing campaign of placemaking and programming
of public space along Singapore’s waterfront, culminating in the area’s cur-
rent diversity of amenities and events. This software aspect has drawn global
attention and informed public space management of waterfronts elsewhere,
evident in international events like Sail in Amsterdam or Port Days in Rot-
terdam and Hamburg.
The World Cities Summit, held yearly at the Marina Bay Sands Con-
vention Centre, is a strategic instrument for Singapore’s planning culture
and the branding of the country as a global city. Co-organised by URA and
CLC (Centre for Liveable Cities), the summit attracts decision-makers from
cities around the world. Event highlights include the mayors conference
and the Lee Kuan Yew World City Award, allocated to a city exhibiting best
practices in inclusive, sustainable urban design. As Cheong Koon Hean,
Nominating Committee member and CEO of HDB, states: “through this
prize, we hope to draw inspiration, share experiences, and progress together
as a global community” (Cheong n.d.). The Summit’s location in Marina
Bay establishes Singapore as an international authority and fuels export
of the Singapore brand.
254 Marina Bay Area Singapore
7 CONCLUSION
The greater Marina Bay Area is quite large in volume; after forty years of
development, it is far from completion and progressing in distinct phases.
This case study thus presents an open-ended condition of the development,
whose unique phasing has actually led to several Grands Projets within a
comprehensive Grand Projet. These Grands Projets are distinct, not only in MBA–S.27 Marina Centre
context and mix of uses, but also in urban design concept due to the large portrays the rigidity of urban
spaces in the past.
span of time that exists between them. Nonetheless, they are successfully
tied together, partly retroactively via a public space system.
Marina Bay Area’s relative success as a coherent urban design pro-
ject is the result of the fact that URA acts as the central agency in concep-
tion, design, implementation, operation and implication. As landowner
and planning agency, it elaborates Marina Bay’s conception and design;
as land sales agency, it tenders out development projects. In URA’s place-
making and urban design guidelines, it controls area management and by
organising benchmarking activities inside and outside of Singapore, it
exchanges experiences with other sites and cities. This condition of a cen-
tral body controlling an urban area’s significant flows is exceptional and
not present to such a degree in most other cities and Grands Projets.
As in HafenCity in Hamburg, also constructed on government-­
owned land without neighbouring residential districts, there were no res-
idents initially in the greater Marina Bay Area; activities gradually grew as
the result of developer and activity-related interest groups. The culture of
participation in Singapore has only recently emerged, rather late in com-
parison to cities like Hamburg, London or Barcelona. Hence, the country’s
capacity to be inclusive of various interests and stakeholders is still at a
very early stage of development.
Integration of programming and event-planning, coordinated by
URA, has turned the area into a magnet for local and international visitors
and actors in sports, music and national events. This software aspect is also
present in different degrees of intensity in other Grands Projets and seems
to be an important strategic tool for activating projects in their initial stages.
Marina Bay has produced a comprehensive set of innovative urban
design and governance tools, such as district infrastructure, the White Site
zoning category, the LUSH green replacement requirement, the Activity-­
Generating Uses plan and sustainability policy instruments.
While Marina Centre is an urban utopia of the past, Marina Bay is
quite adaptive. ​→ MBA–S.27–28 ​Although the site’s contours are still specu-
lative, successive masterplans have enabled development over a longer
period of time. Today it is not yet clear how the Tanjong Pagar Area, the
large site of the central port terminal in the process of dismantling, will
connect to Marina Bay; this is one reason why Marina Bay is well compart-
mented. With the principle of clear character zones within a larger frame-
work, successive districts can be customised into specific neighbourhoods
according to demand, whilst the street grid allows for a block structure that
can be modified by typology and programme. The White Site zoning cat-
egory differentiates programmes; whilst this category’s purpose is to achieve
255 Implications / Conclusion

MBA–S.28 Mix of heritage and contemporary building typology in Marina Bay.
higher mixes of use, this has not always been the case due to developers’
inclination towards mono-functionality. Nonetheless, it has been exported
to other developments, such as One North and Jurong Lake District, as
have other placemaking efforts like the LUSH programme, which prescribes
a building’s footprint as the minimum surface for sky gardens, and the
Activity-Generating Uses programme.
256 Marina Bay Area Singapore
Marina Bay’s infrastructure is steadily running ahead of construction and
has accelerated the area’s integration into the city’s tissue. All MRT lines
and road systems have been constructed prior to completion of the neigh-
bourhoods. Marina Bay hosts one of the first large common services tun-
nels (CST) in Asia, while the Marina Barrage effectively transformed the
Reservoir into the island’s largest freshwater basin. This enormous gov-
ernment-financed pre-investment in vital urban infrastructure surpasses
what other cities can generally afford.
Marina South illustrates the evolution of urban design culture in
Marina Bay Area: whilst Marina Centre consists of one plot, one architect
fortresses, Marina Bay Sands is the new CBD in the Central sub-zone. Marina
South has a delicate typology with active ground floors along car-lite com- MBA–S.29 The public open
munity streets and semi-public courtyards, reminiscent of the waterfronts space on the rooftop of Marina
Barrage overlooking the reservoir.
of Vancouver, Hamburg and Helsinki. Current discussions concern the exist-
ence of affordable housing (HDB) and the degree of non-residential pro-
grammes, both of which will contribute to the quarter’s inclusivity.
Placemaking consists of hardware ​— ​the Marina Reservoir, surrounding
quays and Gardens by the Bay ​— ​and software ​— ​event programming along
the necklace of attractions. ​→ MBA–S.29 Whilst this placemaking has cata-
pulted Marina Bay as the central place in Singapore, attracting visitors from
all over the world, one wonders how principles of liveability, car-liteness
and resource-friendly behaviour, to which Singapore has dedicated itself,
can be balanced with such extravagance.
Marina Bay Sands presents a similar paradox in this tableau vivant.
The building is a sophisticated architectural cruise-ship, whose belly opens
to the public space and provides it with a certain porosity. Its architecture
has such iconic power that it produces an urban horizon by itself, effectively
becoming a symbol for Singapore. As the area’s adjacent buildings are neu-
tral architectural volumes, appearing as office towers although they contain
apartments, it is difficult to imagine Marina Bay without Marina Bay Sands.
This raises the question about the risk inherent in an urban design’s depend-
ence on one building complex.
The Underground Pedestrian Network (UPN) combines major
infrastructure, a public space system and a placemaking vision. Raffles
Link and City Hall Link connect Orchard Road with Marina Centre. This
18-kilometre network is growing to connect the rest of the Central District.
The network complements the grade-level public space network, featured
by vertical links in buildings and MRT stations; public-private partnership
character as it travels through public and private territory; and lining of
activity-generating uses. Whilst such networks generically emerged in cit-
ies like Hong Kong, Tokyo, Seoul and Montreal, the Singapore network is
a vital element of the city centre’s urban design vision.
In conclusion, the Marina Bay Area, as a whole, is a rather success-
ful project as it exhibits the implementation of various lessons learned. Due
to its long development period, it is fairly embedded into its surroundings
and has gradually adjusted to changes and updates. Marina Centre will likely
transform or undergo redevelopment over time. Ultimately, as Marina Bay
continues to expand, it will further diversify and mature.
257 Conclusion
ONE-NORTH Singapore JURONG LAKE DISTRICT Singapore

MAIN CURRENT OWNER & DEVELOPER Site area (sqm) 2,000,000 MAIN CURRENT OWNER Site area (sqm) 3,600,000
SLA, JTC, MINDEF GFA (sqm) 1,500,000 URA GFA (sqm) NA
Urban density (GFA) 2.3 Urban density (GFA) NA
DESIGNER MAIN MASTERPLANNER
Zaha Hadid Architect, PROGRAMMES URA, KCAP, S333, SAA PROGRAMMES
developed by JTC Residential programme 25.00% Arup, Lekker Residential programme 20,000 units
Commercial programme 24.00% Commercial programme NA
Start of constrcution 2000 Business programme 47.00% Start of constrcution NA Business programme NA
Expected end of constrcution 2040 Civic Institutions programme 4.00% Expected end of constrcution NA Civic Institutions programme NA

Lakeside
Chinese Garden
Buena Vista Jurong Lake

J p2.11 01 J p2.11
O M 02 O M Chinese
Garden
03 Commonwealth
04
M Marina Bay Area (case study) M Marina Bay Area (case study) Japanese
O One-North 05 O One-North Garden
J Jurong Lake District One-North J Jurong Lake District Jurong East 03
Changi Airport
NATIONAL
Changi Airport 01
01 The Star Vista
UNIVERSITY OF
01 Science Centre Singapore
02
SINGAPORE
02 The Metropolis Kent Ridge 02 Big Box Singapore
03 Biopolis 03 Ulu Pandan Water Treatment
04 One-North Residences 06 JURONG EAST
05 Fusionopolis INTERNATIONAL

r
g Rive
06 National University Hospital BUSINESS PARK
500 m 1 km Kent Ridge Park 500 m 1 km

One-North is a 200-hectare research and devel-
opment (R&D) and high technology business park
located in Queenstown Singapore in close prox-
imity to Holland Village and connected to the
Mass Rapid Transport (MRT) network. The park
was developed by JTC Corporation, a Singaporean
state-owned real estate company and the Island
State’s principal developer and manager of indus-
trial estates. Officially launched by former Deputy
Prime Minister Tony Tan Keng Yam in 2001, One-
North aims to create a “global talent hub and
knowledge-based economy” comprised of bio-
medical sciences, infocomm technology (ICT)
and media industries. It is located near various
educational and research institutes such as the
National University of Singapore (NUS), INSEAD,
Singapore Institute of Technology (SIT), the Sin-
gapore Science Parks and ESSEC Business School.
The business park also hosts numerous private
sector firms, including Procter and Gamble (P&G)
and Apple, and F&B and retail amenities, support-
ing a live-work-play and learning environment.
Masterplanned by Zaha Hadid Architects, One-
North’s urban design applied the concept of “ar-
tificial landscape formation” to an entire urban
quarter, resulting in a rather formal urban struc-
ture that lacks adaptability in the long term.
Building footprint
Building footprint projected
Project site
Softscape
Projected softscape
Hardscape
The Jurong Lake District (JLD) regional centre in
West Singapore was an international planning
competition held by the Singaporean government
in 2016. Based on a masterplan by a multi-disci-
plinary team led by KCAP, JLD will be developed
into Singapore’s second Central Business District,
complementing the Downtown Core and Marina
Bay areas. The JLD project surrounding the HSR
terminus will provide over four million square
metres of GFA and is designed with the flexible
long-­term evolution of the future economy in
mind. The detailed masterplan for the area aims
to develop it into a new CBD that will provide
live-­work-­play amenities around the future Kuala
Lumpur–Singapore High-Speed Rail terminus. It
introduces a high-density mixed-use programme
linking new waterways and a series of stacked
landscape datum that weave throughout the entire
district, emphasising Singapore‘s vision as a ‘City
in the Garden.’ The proposed urban typologies
Juron
maximise vertical urban greenery within a vertical
city concept and propose a streetscape network
for mobility, walkability, interactive public spaces
and a car-light district. Existing heritage buildings,
landscapes and ecosystems will seamlessly inte-
grate into the district infrastructure—including
district cooling and pneumatic waste systems—to
reduce resource and manpower consumption.
With its strategic location, open environment and
optimised programming, the project aims to be-
come a gateway to West Singapore and will serve
as the hub for the nascent regional science and
innovation corridor, aspiring to integrate work,
knowledge, leisure and living environments.
Building footprint
Building footprint projected
Project site
Softscape
Projected softscape
Hardscape

258 Marina Bay Area Singapore Projected hardscape

Metro station 259 Reference Case Studies
Projected hardscape
Metro station
 HafenCity
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260 Marina Bay Area Singapore 261 The Grand Projet

 Hamburg Airport

HafenCity
HafenCity
IBA Hamburg
Site area 1,270,000 sqm

GFA 2,460,000
sqm

Density 1.94 FAR

Population Density 110 inh / ha

Streets/roads22.00%
Built-up24.00%
Non Built-up 54.00%

Residential35.77%
Business 47.15% Office / Hotel

Commercial 8.94% Retail

Civic 8.13%
Education, Arts, Culture Centre

1984 Development study for Grasbrook amd Baakenhafen

1989 IV Bauforum: International Architecture workshop HAFENCITY
1997 City announces plan to build HafenCity
1999 Masterplan competition
2000 City approves winning masterplan for HafenCity by Hamburg Plan
2003 Offical ground breaking
2004 HafenCity Hamburg GmbH becomes successor of GHS
2007 Start of IBA Hamburg
2010 Revision of masterplan
2014 Founding of IBA Hamburg GmbH
2015 Founding of Billebogen Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH & Co KG
2017 Begin of The Innovation District Grasbrook
2030 Projected completion

262 HafenCity Hamburg Conception Design Implementation Operation Implication

1881 The Hanseatic City of Hamburg joins Imperial 1920 The site of HafenCity has become a central
Germany and the customs law of the German Reich logistic area for port infrastructure
under Otto von Bismarck. This law establishes priv-
ileges for the port area but requires construction of
physical boundaries between the port and the city.
For this purpose, the construction of the Speicher-
spadt is decided
1883 Construction of Speicherstadt begins
1885 The Hamburger Freihafen-Lagerhaus Ge- Grasbrook.
sellschaft (Hamburg’s Port and Warehouse, public
Ltd Co.) is founded 1927 Completion of Speicherstadt
1887 Demolition of the residential quarters of Kehr­ 1943 Large parts of the city are destroyed in a stra-
wieder and Wandrahm on the site of Hafen­City tegic attack by Allied forces on the port
1890 Speicherstadt expands along the waterfront 1966 The first container ship is built in one of Ham-
burg’s shipyards and represents the beginning of a
major overhaul in port logistics
1966 The population of the city reaches 1.8 mil.
1980 0 City releases New Urban Development
Concept
1981 0 New Port Development Law (Hafenent-
wicklungsgesetz)
The city introduces a programme plan to pro-
Speicherstadt.
mote the city as an economic and employment cen-
tre in the region
1900s Development of Magdeburger Hafen
1984 0 The city’s Agency for Economic Develop-
ment commissions GMP/Volkwin Marg with a de-
velopment study for Grasbrook and Baakenhafen
1987 7 The city releases new guidelines for the
development of the Elbe riverfront (Leitlinien zur
Entwicklung des nördlichen Elbufers)
1988 The city decides to sell Speicherstadt but re-
scinds the deal after citizens protest
View along the Magdeburger Hafen with what is today’s Maritime
New development study for Grasbrook and
Museum in the back. Baakenhafen by GMP
1920 The city of Hamburg has more than one mil- 1989 Speicherstadt becomes an UNESCO world
lion inhabitants heritage site
264 HafenCity Hamburg
0 IV. Bauforum: Internationale Architektur- 2002 7 First building of HafenCity, Großer Gras­
werkstatt HAFENCITY brook 17 by Spengler Wischolek Architekten, com-
pleted
1990 Reunification of East and West Germany
2003 7 Construction of Grasbrook and Dahlmann­
1995 0 Mayor of Hamburg (Henning ­Voscherau) kai districts begins
and head of the HHLA (Peter Dietrich) agree to built
a new container terminal in Altenwerder 7 HafenCity site is removed from the Hafen­
entwicklungsgesetz policy, which inhibited develop-
0 City releases New Urban Development ments not directly serving the port ’s purpose
Concept
7 Beginning of construction of Elbphilhar-
0 Founding of the Association for Port and monie by architects Herzog&deMeuron and devel-
Location Development (Gesellschaft für Hafen- oper Hochtief
und Standortentwicklung; later HafenCity Ltd) as
a subsidiary company to the HHLA 7 District Plan competition for Am Sandtor­
kai/Dalmannkai, Am Sandtorpark/Grasbrook
1996 0 Volkwin Marg publishes study for the inner­­­
city development of the port area between Grasbrook 8 Jürgen Bruns-Berentelg becomes manag-
and Baakenhafen (Studie zur Entwicklung des inner- ing director of The Gesellschaft fuer Hafen- und
städtischen Hafenrandes zwischen Grasbrook und Standortentwicklung (GHS)
Baakenhafen)
2004 8 GHS is renamed HafenCity Hamburg
1997 6 City publishes ‘Port Development Plan GmbH (HCH)
1997’ (Hafenentwicklungsplan 1997)
7 Completion of Am Sandtorkai 68
6 The city and Association for Port and Lo-
cation Development announce the concept of a 2005 Hamburg’s Freeport and Warehouse, public
masterplan for HafenCity Ltd Co., is renamed Hamburger Hafen and Logistic,
public Ltd. Co (HHLA)
Mayor announces the plan to build HafenCity
7 Introduction of Business Improvement
1998 8 Bernd Tiedermann becomes CEO of the Districts (BID) to strengthen centres of commercial
Association for Port and Location Development activities (Gesetz zur ‘Stärkung der Einzelhandels
(later HafenCity Ltd) in charge of the Hafen­City und Dienstleistungszentren’)
development
6 District Plan competition for Strandkai
Competition of the office building (Hanse­atic
Trade Centre) at Kehrwiederspitze 7 Strandkai construction begins
1999 Jörn Walter becomes new head of the City’s 7 Completion of Am Sandtorkai 54 / 56,
Planning Department Ocean’s End / Am Sandtorkai 66, H2O / Am Sand-
torkai 64, Dock 4 / Am Sandtorkai 62, China Ship-
City announces competition between eight ping / Am Sandtorkai 60
invited teams for the HafenCity masterplan
2007 7 Begining of construction at Brooktorkai
2000 6 City approves winning masterplan for
HafenCity by Hamburg Plan, a planner consortium 7 8 International Building Exhibition (IBA)
including KCAP, ASTOC and Arthur Andersen Hamburg in Wilhelmsburg
Conception
Design
Implementation
265 Transversal Data
Operation
Implication
 Architekten and the Spiegel Headquarter d
­ esigned 2014 9 Establishment of IBA Hamburg GmbH 7 Completion of Grasbrook neighbourhood
by Henning Larsen Architects district and Northern Überseequartier district
7 Completion of Am Strandkai 57 and Elb­
Completion of Hamburg’s northern Elbe river­ harkaden and Greenpeace headquarters 7 Opening of Lohsepark
front (Perlenkette)
7 Beginning of construction of Oberhafen
6 Masterplan revision for the eastern part by district
KCAP and ASTOC
7 Official opening of HafenCity Hamburg
Ministry of Urban Development and Environment Hamburg/Wilhelmsburg. 8 Start of Netwerk HafenCity, a neighbour- University
hood platform for local residents and retail tenants
7 Beginning of construction at Übersee- 2015 7 Completion of Cinnamon Tower and Pa- Lohsepark with Erikkusspitze in the back.
quartier 7 Restart of the southern Überseequartier vilion by Bolles + Wilson in the heart of the Über­-
by Univail-Rodamco after the initial consortium for seequartier, Am Sandtorkai 46, Singapurstraße 2 and 7 Platinum HafenCity Umweltzeichen be-
7 HafenCity Hamburg University by code the entire project withdraws Completion of Shanghaiallee 17, a development with comes mandatory for all future projects in HafenCity
unique Architekten is completed in the southern a mix of residential programmes
part of Elbquartier 2011 0 Official decoupling of HafenCity and
Altenwerder
7 Beginning of construction of Elbquartier
7 Completion of construction of district 8 G20 Summit occurs in HafenCity/Elbphil-
7 Completion of Hamburg Cube, Am Sand­- Brooktorkai, Am Sandtorpark 8–14, Großer Gras- harmonie
torkai 58, Kaiserkai 4–8, Centurion Commercial brook 11–13, Ericus Contor, Ericusspitze 2–4 and
Centre, Großer Grasbrook 9 Koreastraße 4 Jörn Walter’s term as Chief Planning Direc­tor
of the City’s Planning Department ends
7 First school by Spengler Wischolek Archi­ 2012 7 Completion of Internationales Maritimes
tekten opens Am Dalmannkai 12–18. It becomes the Museum Hamburg and San Francisco-Straße 4–6, Heart of the Überseequartier: Überseeboulevard pedestrian zone. 9 HafenCity Hamburg GmbH is now also in
successor of the nearby Katharinen Schule Virginia, Überseeallee 5, Nidus-Loft, Shanghai­allee charge of ‘The Innovation District Grasbrook’
6–10, Ökumenisches Forum Hafencity and König- 7 Founding of the Billebogen Entwicklungs-
7 District Plan competition for Brooktorkai/ Haus, Shanghaiallee 7–9 gesellschaft mbH & Co. KG by the city and as a sub- 2018 7 Hamburg receives a special mention in the
Ericus, Überseequartier, Elbtorquartier sidiary of the HafenCity Hamburg GmbH Lee Kuan Yew World City Prize
6 District Plan competition for Am Lohse-
8 Introduction of the HafenCity Umwelt- park and Baakenhafen 6 9 KCAP prepares a proposal for Ham- 6 Opening of the Elbbrücken Station
zeichen burg’s hosting of the Olympic Games in 2024. The
6 HafenCity Hamburg GmbH releases a new application is finally withdrawn after the people of 6 David Chipperfield wins the international
2008 World Financial Crisis brings the construction ‘Development Plan’ (German Entwicklungsplan) Hamburg vote against it in a referendum competition for the Elbtower with developer SIGNA
of Überseequartier to a halt Prime Selection AG
7 Beginning of construction of Baaken­hafen 2016 7 District Plan competition for Elbbrücken
7 Completion of Am Kaiserkai 3–7, 22–23, and Am Lohsepark districts
35–45, 42–57, and 59–69 and Großser Grasbrook 10 7 Completion of Geb. Heinemann, Korea­
2013 7 Completion of Virginia, Dalmanncarée/ straße/Shanghaiallee 4, Marquard & Bahls AG,
2009 7 Completion of Am Kaiserkai 10–12, 30, Am Kaiserkai 9–19, Am Sandtorkai 48, Coffee Plaza­/ Koreasstraße 7
50, Unilever HQ, Am Strandkai 1, Heinemann­ Am Sandtorpark 2, 4 and 6, Arabica, Osaka­allee 2,
speicher, Koreastraßse 3 and Dalmannkai Java, Am Sandtorkai 44 / Singapurstraße 1 and Cey- 7 The Elbphilharmonie is finally completed
lon, Osakaallee 6–8 after exceeding planned construction time by seven
2010 7 Completion of Am Kaiserkai 26–28, includ- years and increasing the initial budget by tenfold.
ing the first cooperative housing project by the Schiff­ 9 End of IBA Hamburg Total budget is 789 million EUR Elbtower design by David Chipperfield.
zimmerer housing corporation and Brooktorkai 18–
22, Singapurstraße 3–19 and Überseeboulevard 9 HafenCity receives the ULI Global Award 2017 7 The Elbphilarmonie has its Grand Open- ~2030 7 Planned completion of remaining build-
4–10, Marco-­Polo Tower am Brooktorkai by Behnisch for Excellence ing on January 11th ing projects

Conception
Design
Implementation

266 HafenCity Hamburg 267 Transversal Data

Operation
Implication
 100 300 m

Current base plan. HC–H Building footprint Softscape

HC–H Building footprint, Projected softscape
projected Hardscape
HC–H Project site Projected hardscape

268 HafenCity Hamburg 269 Transversal Data

 100 300 m

Pre-intervention base plan, 2002. HC–H Project site

270 HafenCity Hamburg 271 Transversal Data

 Dar-es-Salaam-Platz

Lohseplatz

Sandtorpark
Magdeburger Hafen
Magellan-Terrassen

Sandtorhafen
Lohsepark

Grasbrookhafen

Marco-Polo-Terrassen Grasbrookpark

Baakenpark
Park Baakenhöft

100 300 m

Publicly accessible open space plan. Softscape (within site)

Hardscape (within site)

272 HafenCity Hamburg 273 Transversal Data

 Baumwall

Sandtorhöft

Elbphilharmonie Überseequartier HafenCity Universität

Elbbrücken

100 300 m

Transportation plan. U-Bahn Lines: S-Bahn Line U-Bahn station

U1 Waterway S-Bahn station
U3 Bikeway p2.12 Ferry station
U4 Pedestrian way Bus station
Bike station

274 HafenCity Hamburg 275 Transversal Data

 Speicherstadt
This UNESCO site is the largest warehouse district in
the world. This complex spans an area of 260,000 sqm.
Located in the port of Hamburg, it was built between
1883 to 1927.

Oberhafen Kantine
Speicherstadt Fleetschlösschen
Restaurant
Heinemannspeicher

HafenCity Info Centre Info Pavillion Internationales Maritimes

Überseeboulevard Museum Hamburg

Hotel Altes Hafenamt

Elbphilarmonie

100 300 m

Heritage structures. HC–H Heritage structure

The Speicherstadt,
UNESCO Heritage Site
Outside HC

276 HafenCity Hamburg 277 Transversal Data

 100 300 m

Programme plan. Residential Civic institutions

Commercial Technical utilities
Business Mixed-use
Industrial Ground floor with
commercial & business

278 HafenCity Hamburg 279 Transversal Data

 HAFENCITY HAMBURG
New City for the City
Naomi C. Hanakata

1 INTRODUCTION

The HafenCity brownfield renewal is an ongoing, large-scale urban devel-

opment project at the Elbe River waterfront of Hamburg. ​→ HC–H.01 ​The
project’s goal is to convert a former port area into a new urban district,
expanding the city centre by forty percent. Guided by a flexible framework
plan and designed by KCAP/ASTOC Architects and Planners in 2000, the
project is transforming a site adjacent to the historic city centre into a mixed-
use area with places for work, living and cultural activities and open spaces
linked to the old port’s distinct water basins.
The project is continuously evolving, offering models of on-site
project management with its elaborate, proactive development strategy
and regional and global urban development practices. Therefore, unsur-
prisingly, many stories have been told about HafenCity, and not least by
the project management company itself, the HafenCity Hamburg GmbH,
which has proved extremely forward-looking in its realisation of what is
currently Europe’s largest inner-city renewal development. This chapter
examines the project from its inception to its development today and por-
trays HafenCity as a highly controlled, sophisticated urban development
and testing ground of new strategies for Grands Projets.

1.1 A FLOURISHING TRADING PORT AND ITS CITY

The port of Hamburg is older than the city itself. Over 1,000 years
ago, the first port structures were built at the end of the River Bille, where
it joined with other streams flowing toward the North Sea. The port settle-
ment flourished and gradually became a hub of trade between the North
Sea, the Baltic Sea and Northern and Central Europe. In the mid-twelfth
century, first formal alliances were established between merchant towns
that had accrued similar wealth via the region’s shipping trade. In 1356,
this alliance officially became the league of ‘Hansa’ (an old German term
for convoy), granting its members a special trade status that allowed them
to leverage their economic prosperity and power in contrast to those who
were subjects of kingdoms and empires. After the dissolution of the Holy
Roman Empire in 1806, Hamburg became a sovereign state and the Free
Hanseatic City of Hamburg, with permission to continue as a trading port
under special regulations. ​→ HC–H.02
When the Hanseatic City joined Imperial Germany in 1881, it was
necessary to redraw the borders of the special economic zone within the
city in order to maintain the port’s free trade zone. ​→ HC–H.03 ​The port was
thus able to operate under free trade privilege even after joining the cus-
toms policies of the German nation state in 1888. The new, restricted area

HC–H.01 Project overview. 281 Introduction

 for port infrastructure required spatial reorganisation and the construction
of the Speicherstadt, a warehouse district within the free port zone. This
was built between 1883 and 1927 and became a UNESCO World Heritage
Site in 2015, as it exemplifies one of the largest coherent historic ensem-
bles of port warehouses in the world. Indeed, the Speicherstadt forms a
megaproject on its own, testament to the rapid growth and spatial restruc-
turing spawned by industrialisation and international trade at the end of HC–H.04 Speicherstadt in
the nineteenth century. ​→ HC–H.04 between the old city (right) and
the site of HafenCity (left).

1.2 THE SITE, A CONNECTING HUB TO THE WORLD

Until the nineteenth century, the site of today’s HafenCity was a
wet marshland (brook). In the second half of the nineteenth century, the
area was systematically consolidated; within thirty years, further land had
been claimed and quays and water basins implemented to allow for opti-
mal freight handling. This generated the site’s contemporary characteristic
layout: slender quays alongside train tracks stretching from east to west, HC–H.05 Shipping container in
the port of Hamburg.
the tightly beaded heritage warehouses of the Speicherstadt in the north
and the port’s imposing cranes and container ships in the south.
In 1966, the first container ship was built in one of Hamburg’s ship-
yards. This marked the beginning of a major structural overhaul for the port,
its territory and the city. With the introduction of the container, warehouses
adjacent to ports became redundant: the container was its own portable
warehouse, which could be stacked in up to twelve tiers depending on wind
and location. Loading and unloading of freight became more efficient, which HC–H.06 Aerial view of port
area in the 1990s.
enabled shorter ship layover times. Thus, fewer quay walls were needed for
parking purposes. Instead, flat open spaces to store containers and deeper
port basins for loaded ships to pass through became critical. ​→ HC–H.05
This new form of global freight trade eventually required Ham-
burg to build an extended deep-water port. It also created a 128-hectare
landscape south of the city that became available for redevelopment in the
1990s. ​→ HC–H.06 ​This landscape was the starting plane of a long concep-
tion phase and the framing condition for a progressive urban development
practice that has since received international attention.

2 CONCEPTION

HafenCity’s conception aligned with a phase of great societal and political

overhaul in Germany and in Europe. With the reunification of Germany
in 1990 and plans for a further European extension to the north and east,
Hamburg’s politicians saw this shift towards the scene’s geographic centre
as a means of acquiring greater economic significance. The city’s popula-
tion increase between 1990 and 1995, from 1.6 million to 1.7 million, coin-
cided with the growing service sector’s demands for structural and spatial
adaptation. Here, the port’s relocation from the inner city’s waterfront to

HC–H.02 Hamburg 1880 with the entire area of today’s HafenCity within the city’s boundaries. Free-Port zone
HC–H.03 Hamburg 1886 with a new border to the port.

282 HafenCity Hamburg 283 Introduction / Conception

a site further downstream in Altenwerder enabled a response to these trans-
formations, essentially linking port expansion and relocation with an inner
city extension.
The city senate released a whitepaper in 1987 providing “guide-
lines for the development of the norther port front” (Leitlinien zur Entwick-
lung des nördlichen Hafenrandes). It built on a framework paper by Egbert
Kossak, the city’s Chief Planning Director between 1991 and 1999, and on
the report of an expert commission entitled “Historic Traces and Restric-
tions.” The whitepaper emphasised the old port sites’ potential for housing,
office spaces and the future of the city (Kähler 2016). Preparations around
the site of HafenCity continued secretively; the city senate announced ten
years later the urgency of inner city extension given the growing metro-
politan region and need for new (office) spaces (Hamburger Senat 1997).
In the same announcement, the city senate determined that rev-
enue from plot sales in the old port site should support the port extension
in Altenwerder (Ibid.). This was the condition of HafenCity’s development
at the outset, which garnered project support from the city-owned Hafen
und Lagerhausgesellschaft mbH (Corporation of port and warehouses in
Hamburg; now HHLA Hafen und Logistic AG). It also meant that the site’s
urban development was financially tied and subjected to the interests and
expansion of the port. For Dieter Läpple, a long-time adviser to the city
and HafenCity, this was fateful linking: “the coupling of the extension of
the port and the development of a new urban district for Hamburg would
have been a disaster for the city,” (Läpple 2017c) as financial levies would HC–H.07 Sketch by Gerkan, Marg & Partner (GMP).
have trumped any investment in the site’s urban qualities. For Hamburg,
however, the ambition was clear: “with this project, the city is able to return
to the waterfront of the Elbe River after four generations,” the Senate of the city’s future development. Volkwin Marg, Professor of Architecture at
Hamburg proclaimed (Hamburger Senat 1997, 2). The new port and water- RWTH Aachen, was a prominent actor in this respect. Marg developed
front district would strengthen the city’s core identity as a port city, create various scenarios for the area that addressed both economic interests and
new opportunities for business and urban expansion and strengthen Ham- the steps necessary for developing a viable urban district. ​→ HC–H.07 ​His
burg’s position as a destination for culture and tourism. Development study Grasbrook-Baakenhafen would prove to be particularly
significant in the future master planning competition. For Marg and his
2.1 PREPARING NEW GROUND team, the maintenance of the Speicherstadt, the gradual dismantling of
Public attention of the HafenCity project emerged partly as a result port infrastructure and the development of attractive market housing were
of the IV. Bauforum (Building working group). Initiated in 1985 as a gen- central project themes (Marg 1999). The site’s later realised plan responded
erator for urban development ideas, the Bauforum began as an open dis- to some of these proposals, especially with its staged development of eight
cussion platform, focusing each year on a selected site within the city. In districts, but also departed from initial studies with, for example, a much
1989, local and internationally renowned architects and students came more diverse programming of the site. With a new subsidiary of the HHLA,
together for the fourth annual Internationale Architekturwerkstatt HAFEN­ the Gesellschaft für Hafen- und Standortentwicklung mbH (GHS; later
CITY (International Architecture Workshop HAFENCITY). For a week, converted into the HafenCity Hamburg GmbH, HCH), a dedicated devel-
participants including Zaha Hadid, Oswald Mathias Ungers, Kees Chris- opment and management agency came forward in 1995 to advance this
tiaanse, Massimiliano Fuksas and Cederic Price brainstormed and pro- notion of a ‘Hafen City.’
duced a broad spectrum of schemes, from a baroque city scenario to a Another important decision that determined the project’s subse-
renaturation of a sea. quent development was related to flood protection of and within the site,
Other attempts to capture the site’s potential were made through which is situated outside the main dyke line protecting the city of Ham-
multiple development studies, commissioned by the HHLA in the 1980s burg. The reason for this dates back to the mid-nineteenth century. Refer-
and frequently carried out under strict secrecy. These studies attempted ring to plans by Johannes Dalmann, chief director of water-related con-
to better understand the site’s condition, expansion challenges and role in structions in the city at that time, the city decided to protect Hamburg with

284 HafenCity Hamburg 285 Conception

a dyke line but keep the port open, allowing for faster processing of ships
and freight. Other large ports of the time decided to construct docks with
floodgates to remain independent of tidal fluctuation. This was the case
for Bremen, Amsterdam and London. As an open port, however, Hamburg
experiences water levels that vary by up to 3.6 metres between tides. Dur-
ing a strong storm surge, levels can vary by 5.6 metres above sea level (twice
a day). Without dykes or barriers, each building within HafenCity had to
be built to withstand these surges and floods.
This nineteenth-century planning decision was adhered to in
Hafen­City’s preparation and profoundly influenced individual project budg-
ets: in order to avoid high pre-investment, which would have required a
revenue-driven sales strategy, the city agreed to pass a portion of these
infrastructural costs on to individual developments. The raising of the street
level and bridges was carried out by GHS and financed through land sales.
This meant that comprehensive flood protection did not have to be coor-
dinated and completed up front but rather could be established over time.
2.2 FROM BY-PRODUCT TO PRODUCT
The initial decision to use the HafenCity development to finance
the new container terminal in Altenwerder significantly contributed to the
conception of HafenCity as a new urban district. The goal of generating
revenue prescribed, in many ways, how HafenCity was to be realised: the
highest project bidder would have neglected architectural quality and the
programme composition would have been determined by whatever brought
the highest return. The senate of Hamburg, however, also stated that “the
politics of real estate and urban planning had to be guided by interest in a
diverse and healthy mix of uses” (Hamburger Senat 1997, 4). It was Jörn
Walter, Hamburg’s Chief Planning Director from 1999 to 2017 and a key
driving force behind the project, who made clear from the beginning that
it was essential to focus on the creation of an “urbanity” for the HafenCity
development (Jörn Walter cited in: Dörting 2008; J. Walter and Kraft 2011).
The city also had a very narrow timeline for advancing the project; the socio-­
political and economic opportunities that had emerged on a trans-regional
level would have to be seized swiftly in order to take advantage of the loca-
tion and its urban situation (Ibid.).
Dieter Läpple warned early on that “the development of a mixed-
use urban district of high urban and architectural quality is not going to
generate revenue in the immediate or near future but [rather] is going to
cost money” (Läpple 1998, 5). The connection, or rather, the entanglement,
between the new port terminal, which opened in 2001, and HafenCity first
became an area of conflict between the city and the HHLA. The city knew
that HafenCity would need special attention in order to develop according
to its promised outcome: an attractive urban waterfront and new façade
of the city. The HHLA together with other port companies, however, had
only agreed to vacate the area and sell the plots if that would allow realisa-
tion of the new port. In 2003, after a petition from the senate and parliament’s
286 HafenCity Hamburg
approval, the site of HafenCity was finally released from the jurisdiction
of the Hafenentwicklungsgesetz (Port Development Law), which had inhib-
ited any infrastructure development not serving the purpose of the port.
Subsequently, the GHS was converted into HafenCity Hamburg GmbH
(HCH) in 2004. Since 2003, the new CEO, Jürgen Bruns-Berentelg, gave
the project the attention and management skills it needed to progress. It
was, however, only after a change in the city government in 2011 that the HC–H.08 View from the
two projects, the new port and the ‘new city,’ were financially disjointed Magdeburger Hafen towards the
Dar-es-Salaam-­Platz with a
and HafenCity could fully explore its potential as a new urban district. glimpse of the Speicherstadt in
The financing of the port of Altenwerder had to occur through subsidiary the back and Project 34/1 Arabica
on the left.
city budgets.
Bruns-Berentelg describes the project as “an inner city product in
a strong direct spatial relationship with the water” (Bauer 2008, 40). His
direct classification of HafenCity as a product is indicative of the particular
ways in which the project was conceived: once detached from its status as a
financing tool for the new container terminal in Altenwerder, all effort went
into making it a prime piece of urban development and coherent, well-pack-
aged product. The next steps of planning thus involved preparing a brief, HC–H.09 View through Lohse-
park towards the Ericusspitze.
design and narrative of revived identity and potential for HafenCity.
The following chapter discusses how this narrative was translated
into a design proposal and eventually captured, as well as the moments
that established this project as a reference point for others around the globe.
3 DESIGN
HafenCity’s urban design is based on a proposal developed by KCAP/ASTOC
Architects and Planners. Whilst it formally has the status of a Supplemen-
tary Urban Development Plan according to Section 1 (5) No. 10 of local build-
ing codes, the design is commonly referred to as a masterplan. It is, however,
not legally binding and thus more of a framework plan. ​r REGULATORY PLANS ​​
c CENTRALITIES ​​It leverages the site’s existing water basins and proximity to
historic building stock ​→ HC–H.08, complementing these with a variegated open
space network and coherent volumetric landscape of mixed-use buildings. ​
→ HC–H.09 The design, nonetheless, continues to evolve throughout the pro-
ject’s implementation. This chapter discusses the distinguishing elements
and challenges emphasised in the brief and captures underlying design
principles that continue to shape the project.
3.1 THE BRIEF
The brief (Masterplankonzeption), published in 1999 by the GHS,
refers to various studies of project challenges. Central to the brief is the
project’s connection to the inner city: it discusses future integration towards
the east and the intention to create a “compact mixed-use quarter using
the model of the European city” (Gesellschaft für Hafen- und Stand­ort­
entwicklung mbH 1999a, 37). The brief also acknowledges pollution,
287 Conception / Design
water-related issues and the natural habitat of terrestrial and aquatic life.
On-site soil tests did not reveal any hazards to human health except the
site of the former gasworks which had been operating until 1976 and needed
to be cleared. The disposal and/or safeguarding of soil extract, however,
could become an expensive endeavour and noise and odour pollution posed
a continuous challenge due to ongoing port activity. Accordingly, special
measures had to be considered to allow for the development of new resi-
dential and office spaces. One of these was the HafenCity window ​→ HC–H.10,
a double window frame designed by local engineering offices in which only
opposing windows can be tilted, forcing incoming air and sound to travel
through the inner frame, which is insulated with sound-absorbing mate-
rial. The resulting noise reduction can be as significant as 35dB.
Given the site’s location at 4.4 to 7.2 metres above sea level, the
brief also discusses flood control, requiring protection of individual build-
ings and secure access to all places during floods. The brief recommends
two general approaches in addressing the level of the site: a polder (an
elevated protection line) around the site’s edge or a mound (an elevation
throughout the site). The latter was preferred, as the polder would affect
accessibility to the water, require a pre-investment and only prove effective
upon completion. The mound could be completed in parts, although it would
create a discrepancy in the level of on-site historic buildings.
The brief does not specify the volume to be built, but 60% of the
land was allocated for buildings of a higher density, with the intention of
creating an inner-city neighbourhood capable of housing 12,000 residents
and creating space for 20,000 employees. The brief ’s requirements for the
remaining 40% of land are rather terse, referred to merely as the ‘urban
design planning specifications for public landscape’ in the city.
The brief presented the challenge of designing a new urban dis-
trict both autonomous of and complementary to the existing urban fabric
and historic city centre. It also elucidated the need to manage the project’s
site-specific challenges whilst gradually transitioning from an industrial
site to an inhabited urban space.
3.2 WINNING PROJECT AND FLEXIBLE PLAN
The winning masterplan was a design chosen in an international
competition in 1999 by Hamburg Plan, a planner consortium that included
KCAP/ASTOC Architects and Planners and Arthur Andersen of Hamburg.
KCAP/ASTOC had begun in 1990 and acquired experience with other
waterfront projects in the Netherlands and the Holzhafen Hamburg (1999-
2003), two kilometres down the Elbe River. The jury praised this proposal
for HafenCity, as it “allow[ed] for a great degree of flexibility, … integrate[d]
the various water bodies without much intervention … develop[ed] a par-
ticular identity … and successfully manage[ed] to establish connection to
the inner city” (Gesellschaft für Hafen- und Standortentwicklung mbH
1999b, 10). Markus Neppl, one of the chief planners, describes the proposal
288 HafenCity Hamburg
Reduced Indoor Noise
Sound
Insulation
Diagonal
Flow Outdoor
Noise
HC–H.10 Schematic drawing
of the noise-absorbing HafenCity
window.
HC–H.11 First masterplan for HafenCity by Hamburg Plan in 2000.
as more of a narrative: “We developed a script, a screenplay, which was
not a law and neither describing an ideal city, but which was based on very
pragmatic considerations” (Neppl 2016). ​​r REGULATORY PLANS ​​
The masterplan was developed based on several detailed scenar-
ios, which were then abstracted again. It shows eight neighbourhoods of
varying programmatic focus composed of diverse architectural typologies. ​
→ HC–H.11 ​ These establish links between the waterfront and the old city
centre by emphasising central roads and bridges, view corridors of the
water and open space connections, all of which are communicated in a
series of simple diagrams. ​→ HC–H.12 ​A consistent building height ​— ​with
slight variations ​— ​unifies these key design elements. Gradations of blue,
increasing from light to dark towards the centre of HafenCity, illustrate
different degrees of intensity in building mass and mix of uses. The plan
also proposes a development from west to east with a centre around the
Magdeburger Habour and the Überseequartier as the central urban quar-
ter. The Oberhafen in the east was removed from the masterplan’s site and
deliberately left ‘open.’ It was later labelled a ‘creative district’ in a strategic
attempt to increase the plurality of voices and actors within HafenCity,
and has since been recognised as one of the site’s great spatial potentials
in future planned connections to Hamburg Hammerbrook in the east.
The winning masterplan responded to water-related challenges
and assets by proposing an ‘urbanistic flood protection system’ with pub-
licly accessible promenades around the quays between six and fifteen metres
wide. These promenades are on the original quay level and can be flooded;
HC–H.12 Diagram showing the
different urban qualities and
they are framed with flood protection walls that include carparks of respec-
spatial relations of the proposal. tive plots and form the wharfs’ structural walls. ​→ HC–H.13 ​In a number of
289 Design
Dry Scenario Upper Floor Elevated Upper Floor
Street Level

+ 8.3m
+ 4.5m A

Flood-Protected Flood-Protected
Ground Floor Ground Floor

Flood Scenario Upper Floor Elevated Upper Floor

Street Level

+ 8.3m
+ 4.5m A

Flood-Protected Flood-Protected
Ground Floor Ground Floor

HC–H.14 Altes Hafenamt with the original entrance and street level in the front and the new, elevated Street
street level in the back. Addition elevated to new
street level
Original level

cases (Dalmannkai promenade, Versmannkai, Magdeburger Hafen and

Magellan-Terraces), cafes are located on this lower level. These can, how-
A Fixed flood protection wall, B Flexible flood protection wall,
ever, in the case of a flood, lock their water-facing façades and operate via
installed in parking area installed in lobby areas and retail on ground floor the level above. Around historic buildings, a second secured access is pro-
vided on the upper level whilst partial setbacks expose the entire façade
of these buildings. ​→ HC–H.14 ​In some areas (at the Sandtorhafen, for exam-
ple), the elevated building basis also functions as a flood wall by protecting
the lower-lying inner street (Am Sandtorkai) and the front row of the Speich-
HC–H.13 Schematic section through Baakenhafen showing the flood protection mound principle. Fixed flood protection wall, erstadt, which is on a lower quay level behind.  ​→ HC–H.15
installed in parking area
Flexible flood protection
wall, installed in lobby areas
and retail on ground floor

290 HafenCity Hamburg 291 Design

 01 Magellan-Terrassen 02 Dar-es-Salaam-Platz 03 Marco-Polo-Terrassen

Dar-es-Salaam-Platz 02

Magellan-Terrassen 01

Vasco-da-Gama Terrassen

Dalmankai Treppen

Marco-Polo-Terrassen 03

100 300 m

HC–H.15 Current flood protection. Flood protected area

(elevated by 8.3 m)
Original site level,
now a floodable area
Future floodable area
Hamburg dyke line

292 HafenCity Hamburg 293 Design

43% Non-Built-up 27% Streets & Roads 30% Built-up

INCLUDING WATER

01 Ericusspitze 02 Intelligent Quarters 03 HafenCity Univsität

54% Non-Built-up 22% Streets & Roads 24% Built-up

HC–H.17 Built-up ratio of the site without waterbodies.

04
MASTERPLAN 2000 MASTERPLAN UPDATE 2010
GFA 1.5 Mio sqm 2.4 Mio sqm
Residential Unit 5,500 7,000
Job Provided 20,000 45,000 The Elb Tower
University Student — 5,000
School 1 3 04 The Elbtower 05 Uberseequartier
Cultural Space No Specific Cultural Space Cultural Quarter
Public Transportation Tramway Subway to Elbe and Bridges, including S-Bahn Link

HC–H.20 Changes in the masterplan for HafenCity between 2000 and 2010 with an increased density
and programme diversification.

07
The site’s east-west elongation determined its main connecting routes: 03
Am Strandtorkai-Brooktorkai, Am Kaiserkai, Am Dalmannkai-Übersee- 01
allee-Versmannstrasse and Baakenallee-Kirchenpauerstrasse. These nat- 02
urally follow the waterfront, making only subtle turns in an effort to support 05
each district’s individual character.
Lohsepark is the central green space, conceived as a ‘green har-
bour basin’ for the eastern part of HafenCity. With its opening in early 2017, HC–H.16 Temporary uses in
it inserted itself into the site’s west-to-east development sequence. Two Lohsepark.

years into its operation, Lohsepark is still on the periphery of the develop-
ment but has become a well-frequented neighbourhood park, embedding
HafenCity in the larger open space network of the city and providing a
location for temporary uses. ​→ HC–H.16 ​Distributed, localised open spaces
in each block and district serve as anchor points for developing distinct
character. These spaces always complement the water, a fact that drasti-
cally increases the build-up to open space ratio. ​→ HC–H.17–18 HC–H.18 View towards the
06
Essential to the entire project’s cohesion and international sign-­ Magellan Terrassen and the
Coffee Plaza showing the
posting is the placement of six landmarks or ‘spectacular moments’ (Neppl generous open space created via
2016) at the tip of harbour piers. ​​u URBAN CATALYSTS ​​Here, the planners the water bodies on site.

stressed that programmes could be defined over time, as long as they catered
to a wider public and maintained a certain iconic quality. The planned and
realised projects for these sites illustrate the scope of freedom the master-
plan has provided. ​→ HC–H.19 06 Elbphilharmonie 07 Baakenhafen

With a density ranging from 3.7 to 6.1, the masterplan increased

the original FAR as formulated in the brief, establishing varying density HC–H.19 Realised and planned special landmarks of HafenCity and an initial diagram by Kees Catalyst
levels for different districts through a set of proposed building typologies. Christiaanse indicating their strategic location. HC–H building footprint

294 HafenCity Hamburg 295 Design

 100 500 m

HC–H.21 Revised masterplan for HafenCity, status: 2018. Private space 1–3 floors
Publicly accessible private 4–8 floors
space 9–50 floors

Kees Christiaanse, the chief master planner at KCAP, recalls: “We wanted
to create a DNA for building typologies. Not to precisely define volume
and types was a deliberate strategy to provide flexibility within the plan”
(Christiaanse 2017a). Anchoring the project’s identity in the masterplan
with simple rules was also important, considering the limited control a city
and its planners can expect in a project once the masterplan is completed
and developments tendered. HC–H.23 View form the
After the completion of the masterplan, KCAP/ASTOC’s involve- Elbphilharmonie towards
Sandtorkai and Magellan
ment was reduced to the role of project consultant. An exception to this Terrassen.
was the revision of the masterplan focusing on the eastern part of Hafen­
City in 2010. ​​r REGULATORY PLANS ​​This revision reflects the areas realised
at that time and projected modifications. ​→ HC–H.20–22 ​Kees Christiaanse
remained a member of the advisory board to HafenCity Hamburg GmbH
(HCH) and a jury member in design competitions. Project implementation
and masterplan compliance are now in the hands of HCH. With its built-in
flexibility, the masterplan poses certain risks, requiring strong guidance
throughout the implementation process (Christiaanse 2017a).
At its current stage, the masterplan presents a robust division of
the site into neighbourhoods, which all have distinct spatial features and
‘spectacular’ architectural moments; these create a clear spatial hierarchy
between activated boulevards and quiet zones and a network of open spaces
with (water) plazas, parks and secluded areas. At the same time, the site’s
spatial result and built landscape are highly dependent upon design com-
petitions carried out in each neighbourhood. These have led to clusters of 100 300 m
homogenous building typologies with vibrant façades ​→ HC–H.23, a result
alternately critiqued as overly conventional by some and as too colourful HC–H.22 Comparison of first (2000, top) and second (2010, middle) masterplans and their translations Footprint of buildings
by others (Walter, Drieschner and Twickel 2017). into a land use plan in 2017 (bottom). Public spaces (places, parks,
promenades, playgrounds)
Private open spaces
(publicly accessible)
Private spaces (not publicly
accessible)

296 HafenCity Hamburg 297 Design

4 IMPLEMENTATION Masterplan Individual District and Open
1999 Space Plans 2003–2010

According to Markus Neppl, “HafenCity was actually an impossible site By KCAP/ASTOC Architects By various local and iterna-
and Planners and Arthur tional architects
to build on” (2016). Because the site was historically alluvial, its buildings Andersen from Hamburg Plan
had to be anchored with deep-reaching pillars. An enormous amount of Am Sandtorkai/Dalmannkai
and Am Strandtorpark/
earth was necessary to raise the level of the main arterial streets above the Grasbrook (2003); Strandkai
highest flood-level of 6.45 metres to 8.3 metres. Subsequently, in some (2005); Brooktorkai,
Überseequartier, and
cases, half of a building’s value is below ground (Ibid.). This forms the back- Elbtorquartier (2007)
drop of an implementation process anticipated to last until 2030. Land Use Plan
(German: Bebauungsplan)
Tendering and
realisation of
Since 2006, HafenCity has held the status of a special develop- individual open
ment district (Vorranggebiete). Thus, all submitted plans are discussed in spaces and
building projects
a special commission and prepared by the Department of Urban Develop- 2003–2025
Revised Masterplan Individual District and Open
ment and Housing of the City. ​​c CENTRALITIES ​​GHS managed implemen- 2010 Space Plans
tation until Hafen­City Hamburg GmbH’s (HCH) succession in 2004. Initial 2010–2016
By KCAP/ASTOC Architects
planners only played a supporting role in this process. In fact, Kees Chris- and Planners By various local and inter­
tiaanse has described the external planners’ lack of control over the imple- national architects

mentation process as “overwhelming” at times (Christiaanse 2017a). Hence, Am Losepark and Baaken-
the masterplan that was refined between 2000 and 2002 had to be both hafen (2012); Elbbrücken
(2016)
flexible and “precise and solid” in order to safeguard key spatial qualities,
such as connectivity to the water or open space network (Ibid.). Planners
remained actively involved, however, in stakeholder management: “fifty HC–H.24 Types of plans and planning stages. Guiding document
percent of an urban designer’s work” (Ibid.). Legally binding document
Urban design competitions based on the masterplan were carried Update

out between 2003 and 2016 for key open spaces and individual districts,
further detailing building typologies and programmatic distributions. Results
were integrated into a Land Use Plan (Bebauungsplan), which assembles
land-use details relating to density, height regulations and materiality and
forms the legal basis for building permits (by 2018, ten plans have gained
final approval). Project tenderings and the acquisition of developers, how-
ever, are based on the functional draft of the urban design competitions. ​
→ HC–H.24 ​This process also facilitated the development of distinct urban
atmospheres and programmatic articulations within each district, which
strengthened the initial concept of diverse neighbourhoods, rather than
one overriding, corporate identity, forming the core of HafenCity (see
HC–H.25: Different neighbourhood foci and characteristics). Throughout,
the masterplan served as a vision and guiding document, providing ‘frame-
work conditions’ yet also allowing situated and timely responses to emerge. ​​
r REGULATORY PLANS ​​
4.1 CREATING A MARKET — PREPARING THE GROUND
For the realisation of individual building projects, HCH has devel-
oped an elaborate procedure that includes different tendering schemes for
varying project types and sizes. This procedure begins with HCH’s analysis
of the current real estate market, site potential and condition and future
demands (a process internally referred to as ‘market mobilisation’ (Bruns-­
Berentelg 2017a)). HCH mobilises potential developers with specific
conceptual ideas (commercial and residential). In this process, called ‘market
matching,’ HCH decides whether a project is awarded through a competition
or directly commissioned based on a unique idea (Ideen­träger­konzept).
Projects are then either tendered out for investor competitions or,
in a selected few cases, directly commissioned for development. The latter
is the case for unsolicited applications for individual, outstanding projects
(e.g., Elbphilharmonie).
This capacity significantly influences the resulting implementa-
tion process and urban district. The flexibility provided by the masterplan
and district development plans in terms of programme allocation creates
a situation in which early, proactive project proposals are freer to choose
convenient mixed-use combinations; programme choice becomes increas-
ingly limited the further along a district is in its realisation.
Each project must comply with HafenCity’s ground floor regula-
tions and architectural specifications. Furthermore, entries have to comply
with the latest standards of the HafenCity Umweltzeichen (HafenCity Envi-
ronment Certificate). This certificate was introduced in 2007, one year

298 HafenCity Hamburg 299 Implementation

 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Size (in ha) Total GFA (in sqm) Number of Jobs Number of Residential Units

HAMBURG BORGEFELD

03

07
08
06
02 05
01
09 10

04

KLEINER GRASBROOK

# LOCATION PROGRAMME START FINISH SIZE (ha) GFA (sqm) JOBS RESIDENTIAL UNITS # LOCATION PROGRAMME START FINISH SIZE (ha) GFA (sqm) JOBS RESIDENTIAL UNITS
01 AM Sandtorkai/Dalmannkai Business, Commercial 2003 2009 10.9 261,000 2,700 746 06 Elbtorquartier Business, Education 2007 2018 9 200,000 3,700 370
02 AM Sandtorpark/Grasbrook Business, Education 2003 2017 5.7 119,000 6,700 278 07 AM Lohsepark Commercial, Service 2012 2020 4 106,000 3,350 30
03 Brooktorkai/Ericus Business, Education 2007 2011 4 106,000 3,350 30 08 Oberhafen Creative Business, Culture 2011 2030 8.9 25,000 500 500
04 Strandkai Commercial, Education 2005 2025 6.9 190,000 4,770 733 09 Baakenhafen Residential, Leisure 2012 2021 24 39,5000 4,500 2,000
05 Überseequatier Cruise Terminal, Culture 2007 2022 14 410,000 6,140 1,100 10 Elbbrücken Commercial, Leisure 2016 2025 21.4 560,000 13,000 1,000

HC–H.25 Different neighbourhood foci and characteristics.

300 HafenCity Hamburg 301 Implementation

before the German Association for Sustainable Construction’s nation-wide
introduction of a sustainability certificate, for which HafenCity was also
a reference. Thus, HafenCity is also considered to be a pioneer in sustain-
able building construction in Germany. ​​m MODELLING ​​These stipulations
require significant financial and logistical resources and commitment at
an early, riskier stage of development, which is only possible for develop-
ers with select financial standing and security.
Proposals or entries can only be submitted for individual projects
to ensure a diversity of investors, architecture and uses. In the eastern side
of HafenCity, residential programme submissions must comply with the
city’s requirements: namely, that one third of programmes must be avail-
able as market housing, one third as rental housing and one third as sub-
sidised rental housing in the median of individual development projects.
For the western side, which began development first, this was not followed
until 2010 because no subsidies were available for affordable housing until
then (Bruns-Berentelg 2017e). HCH also introduced discounted housing,
(preisgedämpfter Wohnraum) with a capped rental price at 12.50 ­€/sqm. In
addition to market housing and city subsidised housing (at 6.40 €/sqm
and 8.50 €/sqm), this further differentiates the housing market.
The selection of competition winners is based on a comparison of
individual projects by the HCH. This process considers all of the following
when awarding projects: programme(s) and innovative character (50%);
feasibility of timeline and budget (15%); and sustainability efforts (5%)
beyond the required high HafenCity Platinum standard. Only the remain-
ing 30% of the evaluation concerns a sales price. Jörn Walter stresses this
point, stating that “not a single project was decided based on price, but
rather based on programme proposals and their variety, mix of occupants,
special features, mix of developers, targeted price segments and architec-
tural and ecological concepts” (J. Walter 2012, 19). This clearly highlights
HCH’s priority of convincing concepts within a labour-intensive, subjective
evaluation process, which consolidates HCH’s influence in the realisation
of projects. ​c CENTRALITIES ​​
A successful tender is followed by an ‘exclusive option’ (Anhand-
gabe), a phase of 12 to 24 months ​— ​depending on project size ​— ​during which
the developer organises an architecture competition in accordance with
HCH and the city. At the end of this phase, the developer must successfully
apply for a building permission and demonstrate that she/he is able to
carry out the proposal in accordance with the approved submission. Once
this evidence is delivered, the sales transaction can occur. Through this
option, HCH has managed to exert its control over the implementation
process and HafenCity as a project before marketisation. Yet the exclusive
option also bears potential for conflict and delay: whilst some aspects might
302 HafenCity Hamburg
be mentioned in the proposal, their interpretation might vary depending
on involved parties or progress over the granted period of time. Whilst a
project group, for example, agreed in the tender to partake in a shared
mobility concept, HCH management further specified this to be actualised
by participating in a private, shared mobility company, which is exceeding
the project group’s capacities by far (Müller 2017).
4.2 FINANCING MECHANISMS AND THE PROVISION
OF HOUSING
Parallel to the preparatory studies of the 1980s and 1990s, the
city purchased buildings from lease holders (plot ownership was predom-
inantly with the city) in the HafenCity area from various private owners
without much public notice (Kähler 2016). This was driven by the desire
to prevent any speculative investment that could intervene with any plans
for the area’s future, a legitimate concern for other Grands Projets (Dzi-
omba and Matuschewski 2007, 171). Inseparable from HafenCity’s imple-
mentation process is its financing strategy: whilst the city was the property
owner, it had entrusted the GHS with the land for development. The plan
to subsidise Altenwerder with project revenue, however, was drastically
changed with the company’s restructuring into HafenCity Hamburg GmbH.
The employment of Jürgen Bruns-Berentelg, who had helped develop Sony
Centre at Potsdamer Platz in Berlin and Holzhafen in Hamburg, marked
a crucial moment in the implementation process, as he brought necessary
expertise and ambition to develop, in his own words, a “new urban sphere”
and a “reinvention of the concept of ‘City’ in architectural terms” (Bruns-­
Berentelg 2010).
HCH’s goal is to break even with plot sales and the provision of
common spaces and facilities. Land sales have, until now, generated 688
million EUR; the city has provided 550 million EUR of additional funds in
private public partnerships for cultural and communal facilities. Through
a process the management refers to as urban capital generation or market
matching, which involves workshops and market stimulation designed to
advertise projects and attract developers, the third level of economic invest-
ment from the private sector is generated.
Project size is key in determining developers. The site’s average
plot size of 4,600 sqm is tailored to meet the needs of mixed-use projects.
These plots are too large for smaller, detached residential projects and too
small for large-scale projects, such as malls. Plot size has thus created a
fairly consistent, natural selection of developers, 84% of whom are from
the region. ​→ HC–H.26 ​Similarly, the majority of the site’s current retail anchor
tenants, originally based elsewhere in Hamburg, sought out Hafen­City for
relocation and expansion.
Private individuals and cooperatives, on the other hand, face the
challenge of HafenCity’s high development prices, due to sustainability stand-
ards and exceptional construction costs. Whilst prime waterfront locations
are offered in return for these prices, subsidised housing projects struggle.
303 Implementation
 Hines Interests Limited
Partnership, Houston, USA

ADAMANTA,
Düsseldorf, Germany

HOCHTIEF,
Hamburg, Germany Unibail-Rodamco,
Paris, France

100 300 m

HC–H.26 Distribution and origin of developers. Germany – Hamburg 84.8%

Germany – Outside Hamburg 8.7%
Europe 5.4%
Outside Europe 1.1%
N/A

*this percentage calculation only

304 HafenCity Hamburg 305 Implementation

includes developers who could
be identified.
 Framework PLANNING District PLANNING Framework REVISION Tentative Completion
IMPLEMENTATION

INFRASTRUCTURE / Continuous waterfront promenade Continuation of waterfront promenade within HafenCity New main highway connection: from Brooktor to North
ACCESSIBILITY
U4 (Train)
S-Bahn Stop Elbbrücken
Kippelsteg connection/Pedestrian and cycling routes First landing decks for public Folding bridge to connect Baakenhafen Bridge to connect expansion to the East

Public facilities Adapting residential/educational

PROGRAMME FOCUS
facilities to new demand

KEY BUILDINGS / HafenCity University 06 Ericusspitze 04 Bid for the Olympic Games 2024 Elbtower 10
CATALYST DEVELOPMENT Spiegel HQ was withdrawn after Referendum
Marco Polo Tower/Unilever HQ 03 Lohsepark 08
Elbphilharmonie 01

HAFENCITY PHASING
02 04 06 07
03 05 08
01 10
09
01 Sandtorkai/Dalmannkai 10.9 ha 03 Strandkai 6.9 ha 05 Überseequartier 14 ha 07 Oberhafen 8.9 ha 09 Baakenhafen 24 ha
Focus on the connection to city and Actual waterfront: longest realisation period. Übersee Quartier is the urban hear to Hafen­ Open: strategic attempt to increase the Focus on housing along the waterfront and
Speicherstadt. Key buildings/space: Marco Polo Tower City adjacent to Magdeburger Hafen. plurality of actors. building a ‘sustainable village.’
Key buildings/space: Elbphilharmonie/ Key buildings/space: Mall + Tower/Cruise
Magellan Terrassen 04 Brooktorkai/Ericus 4 ha Terminal 08 Am Lohsepark 12.5 ha 10 Elbbrücken 21.4 ha
Connection to existing city centre. Focus on housing around central green space. Focus on a mix of uses around a commercial
02 Am Sandtorpark/Grasbrook 5.7 ha Key buildings/space: Ericus Spitze 06 Elbquartier 9 ha Key buildings/space: Lohsepark and office centre.
Key buildings/space: Katherinen Schule Key buildings/space: HafenCity Hamburg Key buildings / space: Elbtower
University

7251 of residential units 116.49 ha

45960 of total jobs

10 Elbbrücken

09 Baakenhafen

08 Am Lohsepark +1100

07 Oberhafen
+6140
+650
06 Elbquartier

+279
+4700
05 Überseequartier
04 Brooktorkai/Ericus
+2600
03 Strandkai +30
+790
02 Am Sandtorpark/Grasbrook
+2250
+2700
01 Sandtorkai/Dalmannkal 0 ha

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

HC–H.27 Phasing diagram of HafenCity development with key buildings and infrastructures.

306 HafenCity Hamburg 307 Implementation

In 2008, the Schiffzimmerer Cooperative, founded in 1875 by local ship- Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase X

Level of Sustainability
builders, opened a project with 17 cooperative housing units in Am Kaiserkai. Experimentation
Holger Müller, the association’s representative, recalls that the subsidised in limited areas of
innovation
project (14.70 €/sqm rent) could only be realised through the cross-­financing Establishing
of other projects elsewhere in the city (Müller 2017). Whilst this is not entirely mandatory

New Standard
fair in the eyes of housing cooperative shareholders, it is at least possible for requirements

larger organisations like the Schiffzimmerer Cooperative. Single project Experimentation Roll Out,
in limited areas of Rapid Diffusion
groups for shared residential projects (Baugruppen), on the other hand, must innovation
confront challenges upon which HCH insists, such as the stipulation that all Establishing mandatory requirements
projects must also integrate ground floor uses of public interest. Whilst this

New Standard
creates an activated streetscape, Müller notes, “it is tough to find tenants to
Experimentation in limited Roll Out, Rapid Diffusion
stay, since the area [Kaiserkai] is still a sleeping town and dead at night” areas of innovation
(Müller 2017); indeed, the cooperative’s new project at Baakenhafen and
future developments in the east face similar requirements, despite the fact Establishing a starting level of Innovation and Sustainability:
a) Flood Protection System
that it will take even longer for individuals to ‘arrive’ in these areas. Whilst b) Compatibility of Harbour and City
subsidised housing projects like those of cooperative housing initiatives c) Starting with Fine Grained Mixed Use

are commonly referred to as exemplary, their struggle remains largely untold;

their role as a ‘fig leaf ’ in the HafenCity narrative is critical but ultimately
lacks the support it demands (Müller 2017; Semprich 2017).
Construction costs also grew with the provision of capped rental
housing. HafenCity’s location has largely contributed to this. In a study
investigating construction-related costs, the senator for Housing and Urban
Development concluded that “Hamburg’s property prices are about 13%
more expensive than [those] in other German cities. For housing projects,
this comes to 663.78 €/sqm for residential projects in Hamburg and 588.84 €/
sqm in other cities” (Stapelfeldt 2017). In order to minimise costs, involved
stakeholders must work together and also realistically consider overall eco-
nomic developments. This is one of the “birth defects” that Thomas Krüger,
Professor of urban planning at HafenCity University, attributes to the pro-
ject: “High property prices lead to a situation where possibilities to develop
a socio-economically diverse programme and mix of residents in the area
are limited.” what is more, “HafenCity … is an area dominated by members
of the middle and upper class,” a condition not representative of the rest of
the city (Krüger 2006, 197). ​​b BORDERING ​​HafenCity is a popular location
for affluent multilocals or ‘empty-nesters,’ individuals whose children have
left home. This diagnosis does not undermine the project’s potential to change
over time; however, it highlights a condition at odds with an inclusive, sus-
tainable urban development project.
4.3 PHASING STRATEGY: LEARNING BY DOING
Time is a crucial element in the making of any Grand Projet. In the
case of HafenCity, availability of land, the early intention to connect the
site to the city and the position of existing infrastructures determined devel-
opment phases. ​​b BORDERING ​​Subsequently, first developments began
opposite the Speicherstadt along Sandtorkai, followed by Dalmannkai and
Brooktorkai / Ericus. ​→ HC–H.27 ​Here again, subdivision into individual
HC–H.28 Implementation and adaptation of sustainability criteria. Time
neighbourhoods facilitated a step-by-step implementation of single, coherent
entities and improved the holistic scheme over time. Jörn Walter has described
this as “priceless value,” which has kept options of architectural and urban-
istic specification open without jeopardising the scheme (J. ­Walter 2012).
The Überseequartier, next to the Magedeburger Hafen, was planned
to be realised as a single Grand Projet in order to secure the development
at the project’s heart from the start. In 2005, out of four project proposals,
a Dutch-­German investor consortium with OMA as architects was chosen;
however, the project stagnated due to the world financial crisis of 2008 and
only the northern part was completed by 2010. Development of its south-
ern portion began in 2004 under the French real estate company Univail-­
Rodamco, with plans to crown the district’s waterfront with a mall tower
by Christian de Portzamparc. After this experience, HCH decided that
investors would only be able to partake in one project within a district, in
order to not jeopardise the entire district in the instance of a failed project
(Bruns-Berentelg 2017b).
In a similar way, the HafenCity Umweltzeichen illustrates the les-
sons learned from phase to phase. Over the years, new standards have been
introduced, including Silver and Gold labels in 2007 and a Platinum label
that became mandatory for all projects in 2017. This latest label requires
on-site energy generation, integration of electric and shared mobility sys-
tems and alignment with the DNGB (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Nachhaltiges
Bauen; German Association for Sustainable Building). In this process, each
implementation phase served as a testing ground for sustainability criteria
and a gradual establishment of standards to be applied to all projects. ​→ HC–H.28

308 HafenCity Hamburg 309 Implementation

HCH’s site-specific preparatory procedures are not just a matter of market
mobilisation, controlled through capped market values or what Bruns-­
Berentelg calls ‘de-commodification.’ The management of implementation
in this case study is, in fact, an example of control of every step in the
production of a city: a power over processes using power over resources. ​​
c CENTRALITIES ​​
5 OPERATION
The first new building completed within HafenCity was the SAP office build-
ing, today’s Kühne logistics university. Planned by Spengler and Wiescholek
Architekten, the building was, in many ways, a testing bed for ground floor
and flood protection requirements and the operationality of the master-
plan itself (Spengler 2017). Since the building’s completion, development
has continued amidst district operations and growing daily life in Hafen­
City. The following subchapters focus on the development and challenges
of public space and include a structural portrait of involved stakeholders
in operation processes.
5.1 PUBLIC LIFE — PUBLIC SPACE
The question of public space and life is a significant one in Euro-
pean cities. In HafenCity, the city owns main roads, public squares and
parks. All other open spaces will eventually be privately owned. Accessible
open spaces create a continuous network throughout the site, independent
of ownership conditions (see transversal map of publicly accessible open
spaces). A variety of uses for public space are permitted, including demon-
strations, begging and art performances; however, some of these are only
allowed within certain spaces and/or timeframes. Whilst controlled and
curated by HCH, these spaces are managed by a shared district manage-
ment in accordance with HCH in the case of the northern Überseequartier.
Such consistent control and quality assurance by HCH as a publicly owned
private company allow for a coherent strategy and operation of open space,
yet are rightfully also criticised as an example of the increasing “privati-
sation” of public space (Krüger 2006, 194), another prevalent theme in
the development of Grands Projets. ​​b BORDERING ​​c CENTRALITIES ​​
The identity intended for HafenCity in the beginning was ambi-
tious and public: the project would serve as an extension of the existing
city centre and, therefore, as an addition to the local public sphere. This
has created both opportunities and challenges. HafenCity’s public events
agenda is dense and carefully curated. The waterfront location and various
events make the area attractive but also influence public perception of
privacy. Marcus Menzl, a sociologist hired by HCH to facilitate residents’
concerns, describes the situation as follows: “When you go outside on the
balcony, you feel watched or disappear in the steam vapor of traditional
ships firing their boilers; as soon as you leave your residence, you have to
share the spaces close to your residence with strangers” (Menzl 2010, 155).
80,000 daily visitors are expected upon project completion; the 15,000
310 HafenCity Hamburg
anticipated residents must navigate varying scales of privacy constraints
that come with the area’s location, from public paths crossing in front of
residential units (as in Am Kaiserkai) to fully closed off areas (as was the
case for the G20 Summit in 2017). This growing abundance of public activ-
ities within HafenCity has already compelled some first-generation resi-
dents to move out of the area (Semprich 2017).
The HCH’s engagement of a sociologist reflects its acknowledg- HC–H.29 View along Kaiserkai
ment that building a city goes beyond provision of physical space, and that displaying the coherent ground
floor height and opening ratios.
social structures are at the core of any new or old urban district and inev-
itable for an urban condition. Jürgen Bruns-Berentelg refers to this ‘invest-
ment’ as ‘social capital creation,’ whilst a journalist has compared the in-­
house sociologist to an ‘animator à la Club Med’ (Dörting 2008). HCH’s
employment of Marcus Menzl for nearly ten years (until 2017) also reflects
the company’s desire to control processes beyond the tendering of plots
and its resourcefulness in doing so. Menzl himself endorses “that the mul-
tifarious social life in HafenCity is the result of a primarily constructive
and generally intensive matching process” (Breckner and Menzl 2012, 139).
Another tool for achieving ‘social life’ is a set of requirements for
ground floors in HafenCity. All of these are required to have a 5.00- to
6.50-metre ceiling height and open facades to the street. ​→ HC–H.29 The
programme has to be attractive to locals, individuals from the region and
tourists, and prime tenants must be approved by HCH; the replacement
of prime commercial tenants with a residential programme is not possible.
Private law further determines floor sizes, rent caps and concessions for
starting phases. Through these meticulous regulations, HCH attempts to
ensure a consistent quality and ‘sustainable concept of urbanity’ (Hafen­
City Hamburg GmbH 2017a), which considers the design of commercial
banners and placement of technical facilities in the urban context.
5.2 INVOLVED STAKEHOLDERS
The circle of involved stakeholders in HafenCity is rather “small
and focused” (Neppl 2016). Conceptual development was mainly negoti-
ated between HCH, the city and the project’s master planners; the role of
these master planners diminished early on, however, whilst developers,
residents and tenants enjoyed more opportunities to share their voices ​— ​
though these individuals were not necessarily consulted in daily operations ​
— ​through neighbourhood networks or management committees. Despite
the diminishing amount of HCH-owned property, the company’s power
in all decision-making processes remains pervasive and persistent. Whilst
various public and private actors are involved at different stages in the form
of advisory boards, award committees and evaluation panels, HCH remains
the main authority in the implementation process. ​→ HC–H.30 ​Despite an
increase in socio-economically diverse ‘citizens,’ the project is still very
heavily dependent on a higher income clientele. This is likely to inhibit the
emergence of a truly diverse urban condition on the site and a sustainable,
inclusive development in the long-term. ​​b BORDERING
311 Implementation / Operation
 HCH maintains a long-standing knowledge of the area and local practices
External Expert
Commitees
Visitors,
Consumers
Oberhafen /
Kreativ Gesellschaft
of urban development in the area. The company is equipped with a range
D V D of expertise, allowing it to compete on an international level and become
City of Hamburg
AO an increasingly mentioned point of reference for good practice in manage-
ment of Grands Projets elsewhere. ​​m MODELLING In development logic,
appearance and success, the project is inseparable from its local and inter-
national figurehead, Jürgen Bruns-Berentelg; the project has profited in many
Neighbouring
communities ways from Bruns-Berentelg’s professional commitment and continuous
C leadership of the past sixteen years. In managing the project, he has suc-
cessfully advocated for economic feasibility and demonstrated sensitivity
for the project’s urban and spatial qualities. This strong attachment to a
single individual, however, raises questions about the project’s future past
Bruns-Berentelg’s term (Bruns-Berentelg 2017b).
Various
HafenCity
Other stakeholders include neighbourhood managements, which
Netzwerk
Architects and
Planners Hamburg GmbH HafenCity e.V.

D MO R are an established form of interest group in Hamburg and commonly ded-

icated to the interests of local retailers. Within HafenCity, membership is
mandatory for all property owners, with an annual fee depending on pro-
gramme and occupied floor area, yet these organisations are also open to
tenants and others with a ‘committed interest’ in the area (HafenCity Ham-
burg GmbH 2013). HCH is yet again a key initiator of such efforts, aligning
with its aim to support any endeavours to make the project a success.

Growing group
Various Developers of individual owners
and tenants
6 IMPLICATIONS
B Various Housing
Cooperatives O
O HafenCity has acquired a strong presence in the city of Hamburg and has
become a well-cited reference project for other large-scale urban devel-
opments. As such, it has already had direct implications on its surround-
ings. This book’s comparative chapter, Grands Projets and Modelling Practices,
investigates the model character of Grands Projets and HafenCity’s abstract
implications in this context; the following chapter examines the project’s
immediate effects in the city and region. ​→ HC–H.31

6.1 STARTING OFF …

Today, as one of the most popular tourist attractions in Europe
(Hawthorne 2017), HafenCity continues to absorb primary investment
capital in the region. With this, HafenCity has created a new dynamic and
power balance within Hamburg: as a large-scale and high-priority project,
ROLE SECTOR IMPACT
it has gradually increased its capacities to define the image and agenda of
A Authority Public sector High impact the city itself.
DV
M
Developer
Management
Private sector
Public & private sector
Over the past years, retail opportunities have been decentralised.
O Owner With the development of HafenCity, the city and local retail associations
D
C
Designer
Community groups
COOPERATION
have advocated for an increase of retail in the city centre. HafenCity has
R Residents / Residents association Founded thus become a competing location for inner-city retail tenants and residents.
B Retailers / F&B / Business association Strongly connected
OA Other association Weakly connected
V Visitor Targeted Low impact

HC–H.30 HafenCity stakeholder diagram.

312 HafenCity Hamburg 313 Operation / Implications

 HAMBURG-HAMM
ST PAULI

Hamburg City Centre

Hamburg City Centre
HAMM-MITTE Hamburg is home to Europe’s
second largest port and a broad
corporate base. The city is also a
major science, research and
education hub and major tourist
destination.
Norderlebe Fluss

HAFENCITY Billebogen

STEINWERDER ROTHENBURGSORT
Billebogen, Start 2015
The development period is at
least 20 years. As an initial
Kleiner Grasbrook project, the new piggyback
station is being developed. The
main programme concerns
No
rde commercial, industrial and
rle
be cultural production.
Flu
ss

VEDDEL

Kleiner Grasbrook, Start 2019

The district was initially planned
as part of the Olympic Games bid.
HAMBURG-MITTE Today it is planned to host 6,000
residents, 16,000 workplaces,
commercial facilities and schools.

IBA Hamburg

ALTENWERDER

IBA Hamburg, Start 2007

The project is a curated form of a
strategic urban redevelopment
featuring various hard and soft
Süde interventions based on citizen
relbe
Fluss innitiatives and participation.
WILHEMSBURG
500 m 1 km

HC–H.31 Regional connectivity and impact of HafenCity. Railway access

Vehicle access
Pedestrian access

314 HafenCity Hamburg 315 Implications

Developments in HafenCity have also created opportunities for outdated
office and residential spaces to be updated with an increase of rental prices.
The implications of this upgrading process would need to be investigated
separately, but it appears evident, given similar processes elsewhere, that
implications for the area’s property market will be real. Hence, whilst clas-
sic gentrification might not be occurring within HafenCity itself, related
displacement in the area cannot be so easily dismissed as it is on HCH’s
website (HafenCity Hamburg GmbH 2018a); it should rather be carefully
observed and responded to.
The changing perception of HafenCity in Hamburg and of the city
through the project is largely the result of a strong curation of events within
HafenCity. Events such as the annual HafenCity Festival, Queen Mary II’s
frequent visits, the HSH Nordbank Run and G20 festivities in the Elbphil-
harmonie have brought people to the area and facilitated an image of Ham-
burg as a “liveable waterfront metropolis,” a headline under which Hamburg
presented itself at the annual MIPIM, the world’s ‘leading property market’
in Cannes in 2018. With awards such as the ULI Global Award for Excel-
lence (2013), HafenCity has been acclaimed as a “global mini-city,” Ham-
burg’s “answer to Dubai, to New Songdo, to West Kowloon” (Berg 2013)
and an “extraordinary port city” with “excellent urban initiatives” (Lee
Kuan Yew City Prize 2018).

6.2 CHANGING (BUSINESS) MODELS OF URBAN HC–H.32 Billebogen with Huckepackbahnhof.

DEVELOPMENT
Hamburg’s growing population is affecting its central area and
pushing the city’s development boundary further east and south, where
former port-related areas lie vacant due to urban spatial and restructuring
processes.
HCH has started to expand its realm of influence to the eastern
side of HafenCity, what Jürgen Bruns-Berentelg refers to as “HafenCity
2.0” (Bruns-Berentelg 2017c). This has begun with a development proposal
for the Billebogen in the district of Rothenburgsort. For this purpose, the
city established the Billebogen Entwicklungsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG
in 2015 as a subsidiary of HCH and with the same CEO, Jürgen Bruns-Ber-
entelg. The body intends to develop the area into a high-density destina-
tion with a mix of uses, emphasising production, R&D and housing. The
site’s catalyst and initial project is the Huckepackbahnhof, which aims to
bring together “industrial and cultural production and urban qualities”
(Hamburger Senat 2015). ​→HC–H.32 ​HCH’s growing scope of responsibility
makes it unlikely that the company will dissolve once HafenCity is com-
pleted (as initially planned); rather, it will likely become the city’s key devel-
opment agency.
An antidote to the HafenCity development model that also takes
inspiration from the project is the IBA Hamburg GmbH. What had begun
as an instantiation of the Internationale Bauausstellung (IBA) in 2007 in
Wilhelmsburg, on the other site of the Elbe River, was a heterogeneous
mix of projects and strategies to support an area with more than 50,000
residents. ​→ P. 322 ​In the 1990s, the Elbe island of Wilhelmsburg was
struggling with a high rate of unemployment and number of immigrants
despite strong support from the NPD, Germany’s far-right party. Bolstered
by special city and private sector funds, the IBA gathered existing initia-
tives, provided them with necessary support and complemented these with

316 HafenCity Hamburg 317 Implications

 new projects that would integrate them into a larger urban-redevelopment
strategy. ​→ HC–H.33 ​Around four central themes (Cosmopolis, Metrozones,
Cities and Climate Change), a broad range of projects and initiatives, includ-
ing education and capacity-building efforts, were central to the IBA Ham-
burg, as well as its intention to ‘leap across the Elbe:’ connect the island of
Wilhelmsburg with the inner-city. This included overcoming physical bar-
riers of water and rail and biases towards formerly port-related blue-collar
districts in Wilhelmsburg. ​→ HC–H.34 ​With a ‘temporal state of emergency,’ HC–H.34 IBA Logo.

the IBA was able to carry out projects with strong local support under excep-
tional regulations, including new housing, a temporary neighbourhood
school, various surveys, climate and educational campaigns and other
events addressing the needs of local residents and general public. It was
not the IBA’s intention to complete any projects by the end of the exhibi-
tion term but rather to create a development corridor and new opportuni-
ties for the area.
After the exhibition’s official closing in 2013, the city demonstrated
strong interest in institutionalising the IBA Hamburg more permanently,
similar to HCH. After various deferred decisions, the IBA Hamburg GmbH
was established as an urban development agency in 2014. As such, it is in
charge of upcoming greenfield developments but only under the city’s
directive. With this, Dieter Läpple suggests, the ‘new IBA’ has lost a great
deal of its autonomy and visionary approach, and no longer has any lever-
age in dialogue with the district or city to realise coherent strategies; rather,
it is reduced in its role to moderator and curator of development processes
(Läpple 2017b).
Another development project in line with the narrative of creating
a greater connection within the area was the Olympic City 2024, proposed
as a new sustainable city quarter on the Kleiner Grasbrook with KCAP
being part of the design team and HCH acting as the development man-
ager. However, Hamburg had to withdraw its application after a failed ref-
erendum in 2015. The project would have been a crucial puzzle piece in
the ongoing effort to connect Hamburg towards the south. In 2017, the city
announced that it would task HCH with the regeneration of a part of this
area, titled “The Innovation District Grasbrook.” Initial ideas forecast a
district that builds on HCH’s accumulated knowledge and acts as an urban
HC–H.33 Map of IBA projects.
testbed for innovative infrastructure and work environments for research
and development and urban production. Following a technical assessment
and public participation process, the tender of an urban design and land-
scape design competition is scheduled to commence in 2019.
HCH and IBA are simultaneously working towards a prosperous
and innovative urban condition of Hamburg; their realms of influence,
however, are separated and clearly distinct in their focus territories. Both
have become important players in the city and references for privatised,
state-owned development bodies that act at least partially outside tradi-
tional regulatory frameworks. ​​c CENTRALITIES ​​

318 HafenCity Hamburg 319 Implications

7 CONCLUSION
Due to a well-documented development process by its governing body,
HafenCity Hamburg GmbH (HCH), the project of HafenCity offers an
abundance of material to study the various aspects of a Grand Projet in the
making. Furthermore, the project is driven by a managerial body that proved
open and supportive in the research of this case study. At the same time,
it is exactly through this abundance of written, visual, digital and printed
materials that a project’s key driver, in this case the HCH, can control a
development’s narrative and outpace any critical voices that arise.
In 2018, fifteen years after the project’s inception, 71 projects have
been completed and 68 are under construction. HafenCity has developed
into a neighbourhood with its own strong identity, creating a new urban
dynamic in the centre of Hamburg. 3,600 people currently live in Hafen­
City (statistik-nord.de 2017). This number of residents is expected to rise ​
— ​and to rise more quickly than its current trend ​— ​with the developments
in Baakenhafen. Over 730 companies have settled down and created more
than 14,000 jobs in the area. The primary challenge of connecting the site
to the historic city centre remains, due to existing physical barriers. None-
theless, the building of new bridges over the Zollkanal and Oberhafen will
likely bolster the site’s integration into Hamburg’s urban fabric.
By continuously testing and improving its development scheme,
standards and guidelines, HafenCity provides a model for new develop-
ment strategies, mechanisms of implementation and realisation require-
ments, which bespeak negotiation-intensive processes highly dependent
upon the extraordinary commitment of single actors. This practice has also
enabled engagement with various actors during the development process,
ranging from residents of HafenCity to external experts. As discussed in
the following comparative chapter on centralities, however, an actual empow-
erment of a broad societal spectrum of actors is ultimately decisive for cre-
ating an inclusive development process and outcome.
In a situation in which there is no existing ‘market,’ the commu-
nicative creation of potential markets and civic spaces can be seen as an
important element of capital formation for a Grand Projet realisation. As
is the nature of complex investment-intensive projects, intentions and
ambitions are presented according to the audience to be convinced. The
capacity and flexibility to deploy varying arguments and negotiation strat-
egies is clearly something HCH has mastered. Should it ever appear oth-
erwise or suggest an open and/or ‘uncontrolled’ condition, it is only ever
the result of a deliberate and controlled strategic move. ​→ HC–H.35 ​As with
any critical reading, however, we need to parse between the lines of such
narratives and question what is discovered. Doing so in the case of Hafen­
City, we nonetheless still find a highly sophisticated and innovative devel-
opment project.
All cities that have undergone similar port transformations like
Hamburg, from Amsterdam to Singapore, have encountered the challenge
of integrating new urban structures and creating distinct urban characters.
HafenCity serves as an example of project with a high capacity to learn
320 HafenCity Hamburg
and improve over time; with its open masterplan and long-term strategy
for realisation, it has created the time and space for a reflective, adaptive
project attempting to connect the past of the port to the present and future
of the city. HafenCity has introduced and continuously updated its energy
supply system, mobility infrastructure requirements and sustainable con-
struction regulations. This has been feasible through initial testing phases,
the laboratory-like conditions of HafenCity, the site’s manageable scale HC–H.35 Entrance to one of
and the continuous effort of specific individuals. the many culturally active
institutions located within
With similar development goals, other cities have leveraged quality Oberhafen.
of life at the waterfront, which, for a great portion of urban history, was occu-
pied by industry and veiled from the city by smoke and noise. In the case of
HafenCity, the masterplan determined important connections to the city,
remaining heritage and the waterfront. The responsive capacities of Hafen­
City’s masterplan do not, however, lie in the occasional moments of public
engagement but rather in the plan’s ability to absorb socio-economic and
political changers that naturally occur over an implementation timeframe HC–H.36 View towards the
of 25 years. Any existing critiques of HafenCity should not be perceived as Sourthern Überseequartier,
mere expressions of envy, as Jürgen Bruns-Berentelg once claimed (Bauer which has just started
construction.
2008, 44), but rather as opportunities to continue to improve remaining
development stages and grant the new urban district the capacity to craft its
own narrative with and beyond that of individual figureheads. ​→ HC–H.36
With its flexible masterplan, the HafenCity development has man-
aged to respond to a global economic crisis in 2008, shifting political con-
ditions in 2011 and a resulting change in the city’s urban development agenda.
For the second half of the development, it remains to be seen how the new
housing and mixed-use areas will be actualised and integrated, if the project
will increase its competitive relation to the existing city and how HafenCity
will find ways to complement and expand the urban portrait of Hamburg.
321 Conclusion
IBA HAMBURG Germany
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02 Spreehafenviertel
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06 Haulander Welg
1 3 km
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GmbH focuses on the planning and development
of individual projects rather than on the holistic
improvement of an existing urban condition.
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into a System of Central Places: The Challenges of Hamburg’s HafenCity’.
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Semprich, Sabine. 2017. HafenCity ​— ​Interview with Sabine Semprich
(Ge­nossen­schaft Bergedorf-Bille) Interview by Hanakata, Naomi C. Audio
Recording.

Paris
Spengler, Ingrid. 2017. HafenCity ​— ​Interview with Ingrid Spengler (Spengler
Wischolek Architects) Interview by Hanakata, Naomi C. Audio Recording.
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stellt’. Hamburg City. https://www.hamburg.de/pressearchiv-fhh/
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http://www.statistik-nord.de/fileadmin/maps/Stadtteil_Profile_2018/
atlas.html.
Theis, Gerti. 2017. IBA Hamburg ​— ​Interview with Gerti Theis Interview by
Hanakata, Naomi C. Audio Recording.
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Hamburg. Das erste Jahrzehnt: Stadtentwicklung, Städtebau und Architektur,
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Walter, Roland, B Rauhut, M Kerner, Burkhard Rauhut, R Kopp, and
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LD–P
324 HafenCity Hamburg 325 The Grand Projet
 D La Défense

S Île Seguin
R Paris Rive Gauche La Défense
p2.11 Paris ORLY Airport
Site area 1,600,000 sqm

GFA 7,451,000
sqm

Density 4.66 FAR

Population Density 156 inh / ha

Streets/roads9.00%
Built-up48.00%
Non Built-up 43.00%

Residential16.00%
Business 79.00% Office / Hotel

Commercial 5.00% Retail

1958 Creation of EPAD (State Body)

1964 First Masterplan by Camelot, Mailly and Zehrfuss
1970 Inauguration of the RER and of the Boulevard Circulaire
1981 Inauguration of the Quatre-Temps shopping centre
1984 Von Spreckelsen wins the competition for la Grande Arche
1989 Inauguration of la Grande Arche
2002 Winning competition scheme of Les Terrasses (urban extension)
2006 Start of the Urban Renewal Plan to modernise the Business District
2009 DEFACTO is appointed as manager (Body formed by Local Authorities)
2010 EPADESA (Body formed by State and Local Authorities)
2015 EPADESA presents its strategic plan for the next 10 years
2018 “Paris La Défense” (Body formed by Local Authorities mainly)

326 La Défense Paris Conception Design Implementation Operation Implication

1950s The area is structured by a roundabout at the
end of the “Voie Royale” designed by Lenôtre, in
line with Paris’s Historical Axis. The surroundings
consist of warehouses, farms and shantytowns, with
approximately 7,000 residents
1957 7 Expropriations begin. Residential pro-
grammes will be provided within La Défense to
rehouse expropriated residents
1958 0 Inauguration of the CNIT by Camelot, de
Mailly and Zehrfuss, which attracts public attention
and helps catalyse the larger area’s development
1965 6 First generation of towers: identical in size, 1972 6 Second generation of towers: EPAD dou-
with 42 by 24 metre bases, a maximum height of bles commercial programmes to 1,600,000 sqm
100 metres and 28,000 sqm of office space and eliminates the height limitation of 100 metres.
Amendment to the 1964 masterplan allows for
larger plots and higher towers of approximately
100,000 sqm of office space

The site of La Défense in 1950s.

Tour Initiale, former Tour Nobel by de Mailly & Depussé and engineered
by Jean Prouvé in 1966.
1951–8 0 The government selects the site for build- The CNIT in 1960.
ing a comprehensive business district. Referencing
north-American CBDs, the project provides large- 78 The first French state-led planning body, 1969 7 Construction of the Boulevard Circulaire
floor plates and high-rise typologies required by the EPAD, is established to plan, implement and man- around the deck
service industry, which the older city centre cannot age La Défense. The administrative perimeter is
accommodate fixed with two zones totalling 750 hectares: Zone A
(130 hectares) across Puteaux and Courbevoie for
the business district and Zone B (620 hectares) in Tower Fiat by Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM), 1974.
Nanterre
1973 Oil crisis halts developments.

1976 The red spider “Le Calder de La Défense” is

The site of La Défense in 1973.
1956 6 Camelot, de Mailly and Zehrfuss devise a
preliminary plan with an open-air central highway 1964 6 The Masterplan by Camelot, Mailly and
extending the Historical Axis
inaugurated. The ‘Open-Air Museum’ of La Défense’s
open spaces features works of art from internation-
Model of Zone A, showing site contours, Boulevard Circulaire, road net-
works and pedestrian deck, 1960.
ally renowned artists and asserts the quarter’s glob-
al recognition
1970 Inauguration of the RER station, connecting
EPAD boudary in 1958.
La Défense to Place de l’Étoile in under five minutes
and spearheading developments
Zehrfuss is approved by EPAD with the adoption of
the pedestrian deck

Projet La Défense model published in L’Architecture d’Aujourd’hui, n.97,

September 1961. EPAD’s first masterplan, 1964. Entrance to La Défense multimodal station. The red spider “Le Calder de La Défense”.

Conception
Design
Implementation

328 La Défense Paris 329 Transversal Data

Operation
Implication
1978 6 Third generation of towers: smaller, slim- 1992 La Défense is connected to Paris Métro with
mer, more diverse and with a focus on natural light the extension of line 1
and improved energy management
2000 6 8 The planning and management of Zone
B is dissociated from EPAD and placed under the
local planning authority of Nanterre through the
specially created Public Establishment for the De-
velopment of Seine-Arche (EPASA)
6 Fourth generation of towers: mixed-use
developments realised with new technologies, novel
materials, a diversity of forms and more environ-
mentally friendly techniques
Tour Total, former tour Elf.
1981 Inauguration of the Quatre-Temps shopping
centre, which has since become a major retail hub
within the Paris region
Coeur Défense designed by Jean-Paul Viguier and built in 2001.
2001 Coeur Transport is inaugurated under the
Parvis of La Grande Arche, connecting the two main
commercial centres of the Quatre Temps and the
refurbished CNIT and linking both to the multi-­
modal transport node of Paris La Défense
Les Quatres Temps shoping centre. 2002 7 The lower-rise, mixed-use development
of Les Terrasse begins in Nanterre (Zone B), in con-
1989 Inauguration of La Grande Arche, which framed tinuation of the Historical Axis
and projected the Historical Axis beyond the busi-
ness district, catalysing the extension of La Défense
into the territory of Nanterre
La Grande Arche. La Terrasses, view towards La Grande Arche.
330 La Défense Paris
2006 6 Approval of the Urban Renewal Plan by
EPAD, which includes upgrades of towers and down-
grade of the Blvd. Circulaire into a slower road to
enable better connections to the surroundings
Renewal taking place in Paris La Défense.
2007 6 Fifth and Sixth generations of towers: resto-
ration of existing ones and approval of 300,000 sqm
of additional mixed-use developments
8 Management of open spaces is transferred
from EPAD to the local authorities through the
Public Establishment for the Management of La
Défense Bunisess District (EPGD), renamed Defac-
to in 2010
2010 7 EPAD merges with EPASA to become
EPADESA, including both the state and the sur-
rounding local authorities in the planning of the
larger territory
2016 6 La Défense-Seine Arche Stratégie 2025 is
published by EPADESA to direct the development of
the overall territory
La Défense Seine Arche territory.
331 Transversal Data
2017 Inauguration of the ramp, designed by AWP,
connecting the neighbourhood of Les Terrasses to
the business district, through the new neighbour-
hood of les Jardins de l’Arche
The ramp within les Jardins de l’Arche.
7 Inauguration of U-Arena, a multi-purpose
events and sports hall within the Jardin de l’Arche, a
mixed-use and leisure-focused centrality
The U-Arena within les Jardins de l’Arche.
2019 7 8 Merging of EPADESA and Defacto into
the (mainly) local authorities-led body of “Paris-La
Défense” with a merge of implementation and op-
eration competencies
2019–30 0 6 7 Planned completion of Le Groue,
a mixed-use residential neighbourhood with a focus
on start-ups and co-working spaces
2019–35 0 6 7 Planned completion of the auto-
mated transport network Grand Paris Express, with
new stations in La Défense-Seine Arche
Conception
Design
Implementation
Operation
Implication
 100 300 m

Current base plan. LD–P Building footprint Softscape

LD–P Building footprint, Projected softscape
projected Hardscape
LD–P Project site Projected hardscape
Deck

332 La Défense Paris 333 Transversal Data

 100 300 m

Pre-intervention base plan, 1959. LD–P Project Site

334 La Défense Paris 335 Transversal Data

 100 300 m

Publicly accessible open space plan. Softscape (within site)

Hardscape (within site)
Pedestrian-friendly zone

336 La Défense Paris 337 Transversal Data

 Nanterre Prefecture Station

La Défense Station

Esplanade de La Défense

100 300 m

Transportation plan. Train lines: Tram lines: Bus station

Transilien L T2 Bike station
U Train station
RER A Bikeway Metro station
Pedestrian way Tram station
Metro lines:
1

338 La Défense Paris 339 Transversal Data

 Center for New Industries and
Technologies (CNIT)

100 300 m

Heritage structure. LD–P Heritage structure

340 La Défense Paris 341 Transversal Data

 100 300 m

Programme Plan. Residential Mixed-use

Commercial Ground floor with
Business commercial & business
Industrial Deck
Civic institutions Commercial under the deck
Technical utilities

342 La Défense Paris 343 Transversal Data

 LA DÉFENSE PARIS
New Urban Paradigm
Anna Gasco

1 INTRODUCTION

‘La Défense? It is like a mirror of the societal and political

evolution of France.’
(Subileau 2017) Director of the SAEM Tête-Défense and in charge of developing
the Grande Arche (1986-1991). Founder of Une Fabrique de la Ville, Paris.

La Défense is Europe’s first and largest purpose-built business district.

Launched in 1958, the project has developed on a 750-hectare site just
west of Paris’s centre and along the city’s Historical Axis. Served by one of
Paris’s most powerful transport networks, this key urban node now features
over 500 companies, including the headquarters of major national and
international corporations. Thousands of individuals use the district, includ-
ing 180,000 employees, 42,000 residents, 45,000 students and 8.5 mil-
lion annual tourists, ranking this business centrality above and beyond
London’s Canary Wharf and the Financial District of New York. → LD–P.01
The project materialised after World War II, driven by the desire of France’s
elites to spearhead the nation’s global financial position and to answer to
the spatial needs of the evolving service industry. The tabula-rasa opera-
tion developed distinctive high-rise typologies organised on top of a pedes-
trian deck (la dalle), which includes thirty-one hectares of car-free open
space and hides required infrastructure in seven above-ground levels that
largely disconnect the project from its surroundings. From its inception as
a rather literal translation of top-down large-scale urban planning pro-
cesses, the pear-shaped business district has, over sixty years of develop-
ment, undergone several redevelopment phases and multiple changes in
governance models. It has also been questioned for its Haussmann-Beaux
Arts-cum-modern planning principles. Through more inclusive approaches,
the project is evolving into a more mixed-use and diverse urban environ-
ment; however, it faces the tremendous, costly challenge of adapting its
inflexible pedestrian deck.
These evolutions in approach and governance make this strategic
project an ideal case for understanding urban megaprojects’ conception
and implication. Today, La Défense is at a crucial stage in its development,
one that spans three different means of conceiving its future: first, the
renewal of its business district; second, the Seine Arche extension into the
territory of Nanterre; and third, the development of several mixed-use and
eco-friendly neighbourhoods on the original district’s periphery.

LD–P.01 Paris La Défense. 345 Introduction

1.1 THE SITE: A KEY LOCATION
After World War II, the hill the business district currently occupies
was structured by a roundabout, with a commemorative statue titled La
Défense at its centre. The wider area mainly consisted of warehouses, farms
and shantytowns. The La Défense roundabout marked the end of the Paris p2.11
Historical Axis, which travelled in a straight line from Le Louvre; the Voie Charles de Gaulle

Royale (later remained Champs-Élysées), designed by Lenôtre in 1640, cre- LD–P.02 The Arc de Triomphe
ated a visual connection to the west, formalising an existing route linking seen from La Défense.

the king’s palace to its hunting grounds in the forest of Saint-Germain-en-

Laye twenty kilometres west of Paris’s centre. The notion of extending the Forest of
axis emerged at the end of the nineteenth century (Picon-Lefèbvre 2003). Saint-Germain-en-Laye

The Paris Historical Axis, which culminates at La Défense today,

materialises the influence of governing powers over space throughout
France’s history: from monarchy (Louis XIV’s Tuileries gardens, Palace
and Voie Royale), to emperor (Napoleon’s Arc de Triomphe) and finally to
republic (Charles de Gaulle’s La Défense). → LD–P.02 The ten-kilometre axis
forms the urban backbone of the capital and its western extension. La
La Défense
Défense, in turn, is an essential node along this axis, strategically linked
via major transport connections to its wider region. → LD–P.03
Arc de Triomphe
1.2 PARIS’S COMPLEX PLANNING SYSTEM
The planning context in Paris is complex, due to the numerous Jardin des Tuileries
actors and institutions involved at the local, inter-local, regional and national Musée du Louvre
levels. La Défense is part of the Paris Metropolitan Area within the Île-de-
France region. Located in the department of Hauts-de-Seine, the site spreads
across the four local authorities​ — ​or communes​ — ​of Courbevoie, Puteaux,
Nanterre and La Garenne-Colombes. → LD–P.04 Today, these administrative
layers and many others influence the development of La Défense in differ-
ent ways. The Île-de-France Region, for example, establishes long-term
guidance through its Directing Framework (Schema Directeur). The Métro-
pole du Grand Paris (Grand Paris), a public administrative structure for coop-
eration between the city of Paris and its suburbs, oversees the development
of the Grand Paris Express, a regional automated public transport network
that will greatly improve connectivity to the area (see design frame). In
addition, various inter-communal structures (collectivités territoriales) have
developed over the years with governing powers through their Intercom-
munal Syndicate of Studies and Programming (SIEP). Two SIEPs are located
within the territory of La Défense. There are also various planning instru- p2.11
ments at the local and inter-communal levels. Paris Orly
The project of La Défense spans over sixty years of planning his-
tory. In a country where public authorities lead and guide any key decision-­
making related to the city, the planning and governance of this strategic

5 10 km

LD–P.03 Site location: Île-de-France.

346 La Défense Paris 347 Introduction


Parc Andre Malraux
500 m 1 km
LD–P.04 Site location: Local authorities. La Garenne–Colombes 178 ha
Courbevoie
Puteaux
Nanterre 1219 ha
project evolved alongside France’s own political progress. Nonetheless,
among the many shaping steps, the Decentralisation Act of 1982 marked a
cornerstone in the project’s evolution, since it enabled state and local author-
ities to better share the responsibility of planning, implementing and man-
aging this large-scale urban addition to the city of Paris. The Decentralisation
Act strengthened stakeholder roles in spatial development (Subra and New-
man 2008), resulting in a stronger collaboration amongst the central gov-
ernment, regions, local authorities and other autonomous bodies, such as
the state-led body governing Paris La Défense (see Implementation frame).
The original, almost exclusive dialogue between La Défense’s auton-
omous body and the central government has, since 1982, evolved into a
complex conversation; the many authorities and institutions in the valley
of the Seine now all have a say in the future of La Défense, with diverse
impact on project design, realisation and management, discussed in the
following sections.
348 La Défense Paris
COLOMBES
2 CONCEPTION
The project of La Défense has undergone various phases of conception
linked to changing needs over time, including post-war modernisation,
urban renewal and extension. As Viginie Picon Lefebvre notes: “La Défense
is an operation entering its fourth phase. All [phases] are very different and
almost antagonistic: the philosophies are different, the doctrines are dif-
ferent, the actors are different” (Picon Lefebvre 2017). This section focuses
on three key moments in the evolution of the project’s logic, highlighting
related decisions, actors and implications for overall development.
2.1 POST-WAR MODERNISATION: FROM THE REVOLU-
TIONARY CENTRE FOR NEW INDUSTRIES AND TECH-
NOLOGIES (CNIT) TO THE “MANHATTAN-SUR-SEINE”
In order to understand the original logic of La Défense, we need
to understand the notion of modernity in Europe at the end of World War
II and its role in the societal and built transformation of Paris. As the ex-­
director of strategy at EPADESA (La Défense’s previous autonomous gov-
erning body) explains,
t he act of developing a business quarter based on planning prin-
ciples from North America was rather symbolic at that time. After
the war, there was a crucial need to give a modern image to our
war-damaged and still mainly agriculture-based country [France].
The image needed was one of modernity, one of a new start, one
ine
of a clean slate (Paris La Défense Interviewee One 2017).
Se
417 ha
33%
14%
 Local authorities administrative
boundaries
Recognising the need to better connect Paris to its western periphery, Min-
319 ha 38%  Operation of National Interest ister of Urbanisation Eugène Claudius-Petit authorised the state’s acqui-
29% boundary of La Défense (OIN)
sition of land within the current perimeter of La Défense in July 1951. He
selected architects Robert Camelot, Jean de Mailly and Bernard Zehrfuss
to reconceptualise the area. In October 1956, a first perimeter was defined,
comprising a linear 140-metre wide non-buildable zone for axis extension.
The programme for this territory, however, remained unclear in this early
stage. The expropriation of existing populations began in 1957, leading to
substantial demolitions, including one quarter of Puteaux’s territory (Horn
2014). Self-termed ‘ExproDef ’ as individuals expropriated by the project
of La Défense, these original residents would later be rehoused within the
business district itself, as illustrated by residential developments from 1958
onwards (Paris La Défense Interviewee two and three 2017).
Even though the state led area redevelopment, private developer
Emmanuel Pourveau established the first building, which attracted public
attention and catalysed development. Designed by Camelot, de Mailly and
Zehrfuss, the Centre for New Industries and Technologies (CNIT) opened
in 1958. Demonstrating architectural and engineering prowess at the time,
349 Introduction / Conception

LD–P.05 The site of La Défense in 1973.
the CNIT was a symbol of industry modernisation and post-war recon-
struction of the capital. It ultimately triggered the development of the area
into a business district, which illustrated regained prosperity and economic
growth. ​ u URBAN CATALYST ​As Pierre Gibel, Chief of Planning for the Paris-
ian region at the time, states, “the project of La Défense reflected the desire
to modernise the suburbs by controlling their urbanisation and focusing
on rebuilding the industry” (Gibel in Picon-Lefèbvre 2003, 163). → LD–P.05
In 1958, the administrative perimeter of La Défense was fixed with
two zones: Zone A (130 hectares) across Puteaux and Courbevoie, which would
become the business district, and Zone B (620 hectares), which included part
of the municipality of Nanterre. Whilst the development of both zones began
at the same time, Zone A progressed more quickly. It strove to answer the
service industry’s growing need for larger floor plates and higher typologies,
which Paris’s older city centre could not accommodate. At the time of Zone
A’s conception, the influence of Haussmann and Beaux Arts architecture was
in decline but still very much influential (Chabard and Picon-Lefebvre 2013,
22). As such, the project followed a classic architectural plan, with a major
axial avenue organising buildings in a formal composition, yet also assim-
ilated the modern vision of the functional city, conceptualised in the Athens
Charter of 1941: a spatial division of programmes with high-rise offices and
residential blocks, seated atop a large pedestrian deck. ​r REGULATORY PLANS ​
350 La Défense Paris
As a formal break from the urban fabric of Paris, La Défense was often
referred to as a Manhattan-sur-Seine, with typologies influenced by the
“groups of office blocks” and skyscrapers under construction in North Amer-
ica at the time (Chabard and Picon-Lefebvre 2013, 22). Several French archi-
tects who travelled, studied or worked in the United States accordingly
became influential in the project’s early years. From the 1970s onwards,
prestigious American firms such as Skidmore, Owings & Merril (SOM) and LD–P.06 Urban renewal taking
Harrison & Abramovitz were hired to develop radically different architec- place in 2017 within La Défense
Quartier Saisons.
tural typologies (ibid. 2013, 29). ​m MODELLING ​As such, La Défense’s original
conception marks a particular post-war moment and beginning of a new era.
2.2 A CRUCIAL RENEWAL
In the early 2000s, forty years after Zone A’s inception, aged build-
ing stock, obsolete public spaces and outdated infrastructures threatened
the business quarter’s long-term success. An Ernst & Young study revealed
that the net sqm GFA of most of the towers did not meet industry require- LD–P.07 The Grande Arche
viewed from Les Terrasses in
ments; floor plates were too small; one out of six buildings had been built Nanterre.
prior to 1985 and had not been restored; and seventeen towers, totalling
almost twenty percent of the building stock, did not meet market stand-
ards (Ernst & Young 2006).
By 2005, seven of ten worldwide corporations located in La Défense
since 1995 had left. The business quarter faced harsh competition from
London’s Canary Wharf and other European business districts. In order
to secure the business quarter’s longevity, Nicolas Sarkozy, president of
EPAD (La Défense’s original autonomous governing body), launched a
comprehensive urban renewal operation in July 2006, a year before becom-
ing the nation’s president. This urban renewal phase included tower dem-
olition, reconstruction and restoration to better cater to the companies’
evolving needs → LD–P.06 and to develop buildings with sustainable tech-
nologies in light of environmental concerns. In addition, the urban renewal
plan set forth an extensive redevelopment of the Boulevard Circulaire (the
district’s main access road) into a slower road for better connections to the
surroundings. ​b BORDERING ​
2.3 TOWARDS LA DÉFENSE SEINE ARCHE: FROM TOP
DOWN OPERATION TO A DECENTRALISED VISION
After this “mono-maniac phase focused only on the business dis-
trict [Zone A]” (Paris La Défense Interviewee One 2017), the inauguration
of La Grande Arche in 1989, built at the then end of the historical axis per-
spective, refocussed attention on the territory of Nanterre (Zone B). The
need for developable land, programme diversification and improved con-
nections to surroundings led to a new phase of La Défense’s extension into
the Seine-Arche territory. This first materialised in the project of Les Ter-
rasses beginning in 2002 (see Design frame). → LD–P.07
351 Conception
LD–P.08 La Défense Seine Arche territory.

352 La Défense Paris 353 Conception

 Garenne Colombes
Place de Belgique
Papereries ILE FERROVIAIRE
UNIVERSITÉ
32,000 étudiants
Place de Groues

PARC DU
CHEMIN DE L’ILE
COEUR DE QUARTIER
commerces PLACE DE LA FOLIE
commerces
1959 1969
ARENA
35,000 places
PREFECTURE

Courbevoie Centre

THEATRE DES
AMANDIERS
AUTOUR DE L’ARENA
commerces
HERMITAGE
Nanterre Centre 4 TEMPS + CNIT Commerces & congrès
56 millions de
visiteurs par an

La Boule

1974 1987
Puteaux Centre
500 m 1 km

LD–P.09 La Défense Seine Arche Strategy 2025, a polycentric territory. Regional centrality Market
Inter-communal centrality Train station
Local centrality Leisure / Culture
Regional commercial node Softscape
Inter-communal Green links
commercial node Main roads
Local commercial node

Towards the end of the 2000s, EPAD found itself at a crucial moment. It
needed to surmount three challenges at several scales: its urban renewal
strategy (local); the extension of its territory (regional); and improved inte-
gration (metropolitan). As clearly stated by Patrick Jarry, mayor of Nan- 1990 2001

terre, “the future of the business district depends on its capacity to open
up to its environment, to renew itself and to diversify” (Jarry in EPADESA
2016, 5). In order to face this challenge, the EPADESA and local authorities
developed a comprehensive strategy for future development detailed in
the key document of “La Défense Seine Arche: Stratégie 2025”(EPADESA
2016). → LD–P.08
The new vision of Stratégie 2025 is the antithesis of what had been
conceived post World War II; its focus concerns programme complemen-
tarity and physical connectivity of the business district and its catchment
area. It also emphasises soft mobility and at grade public spaces and incor-
porates plans for several mixed use, eco-friendly neighbourhoods in Nan-
terre. Stratégie 2025 further promotes programme diversity via subsidised 2011 2025
space for start-ups and markets. → LD–P.09 LD–P.10 Built development timeline: Zone A & Zone B. Present LD–P project territory
LD–P Deck

354 La Défense Paris 355 Conception


LD–P.11 EPAD’s first master­plan, 1964.
3 DESIGN
The spatial designs for Zones A and B evolved unevenly. → LD–P.10 After a
long period of design process based on formal master planning and mono-
functional programmes, the spatial approach of the 1990s sought to trans-
form the larger territory​ — ​including both zones​ — ​into more integrated,
diverse and mixed-use environments. This section examines the spatial
qualities, elements and strategies that have defined La Défense’s urban
environment over time: the initial masterplan and subsequent generations
of towers, the rigid deck and its influence on area accessibility, iconic build-
ings such as La Grande Arche and their catalysing impact and current efforts
to integrate La Défense’s two original zones.
3.1 FROM BEAUX ARTS TO MODERN: THE AXIS, THE
TOWERS, THE PALAIS ROYAUX AND THE DECK
Camelot, de Mailly and Zehrfuss’ preliminary plan for Zone A in
1957 relegated automobile traffic to a central, open-air road that continued
the perspective of the historical axis. Pedestrian sky-bridges connected
commercial and residential developments on both sides of this road, which
356 La Défense Paris
divided the district into two parts. These buildings were organised in a
series of courtyard-shaped orthogonal residential apartments​ — ​Royal Pal-
aces (Palais Royaux)​ — ​alternating with commercial towers.
In the early 1960s, the notion of a deck emerged to solve the chal-
lenges of the central vehicular axis. Making use of the 21-metre difference
between the river Seine and the natural hill of La Défense, the master-
planners proposed a seven-storey pedestrian deck, similar in length to that LD–P.12 The old residential
of the Champs-Élysées. The deck organised vehicular and pedestrian mobil- blocks of the Quartier Boieldieu
(the first one to be developed), the
ity separately with independent access and consolidated parking zones. quartier Corolles and the quartier
The pedestrian deck formed a key element of the first masterplan Saisons (here photographed) still
form an integral part of today’s
approved in 1964, → LD–P.11 incorporating a central rectilinear open space urban landscape.
(the grand axis) with residential low-rise and commercial high-rise devel-
opments on both sides. The commercial towers of the first generation were
42 by 24 metres in plot size and less than 100 metres (25 floors) tall; this
limited each commercial building to a maximum GFA of 28,000 sqm. Hous-
ing blocks ranged from five to twelve floors and took the form of courtyards
surrounding internal gardens. → LD–P.12 Ground floors included retail spaces,
public squares → LD–P.13 and amenities for children. → LD–P.14 However, the LD–P.13 Retail along the
rigidity of this Beaux Arts type of masterplan and the sqm limitation would ground floor of the Quartier
quickly compel a new design phase for the business district. Boieldieu.
3.2 LA DALLE TODAY
Before proceeding further, it is important to thoroughly examine
the deck’s design to understand how it influences the business district’s
accessibility, atmosphere and overall identity.
The business quarter (Zone A) is subdivided into fourteen neigh-
bourhoods organised around the deck’s 31 hectares of open space. The LD–P.14 Semi-private space
Boulevard Circulaire, the main access road, slopes upward from the Seine in the Quartier Saisons.
and borders the deck. The district’s urban landscape gives an impression
of horizontal and vertical immensity, with its seven-storey deck, high-rise
towers on both sides of the central axis and distinctly pedestrian environ-
ment. This identity contrasts greatly with the surrounding urban grain and
remains rather insular in accessibility and atmosphere. Visitors must trav-
erse multiple pedestrian bridges, → LD–P.15 stairs, escalators, poorly lit tun-
nels and/or lifts to pass under or above the Boulevard and finally access LD–P.15 Bridge to access La
the deck’s upper level. → LD–P.16–18 ​b BORDERING Défense Quarter Saisons.
On the deck, the open spaces flow from the river to La Grande
Arche in a succession of diverse, large areas (Parvis of La Grande Arche)
and intimate, hidden spaces (Place des Saisons, Place Jean Millier and Cours
Valmy). → LD–P.19   In the 1970s, EPAD initiated an operation for contem-
porary art installation on the deck to bolster the district’s growing interna-
tional acclaim. This state-financed open-air museum now includes 68
artefacts, dating from 1974 onwards. → LD–P.20 At deck level, all towers have
357 Design
 Cours du Triangle

Rampe Pietone Jardins de l’Arche Square Henri Regnault

Place Carpeaux

Place Henri Regnault

Place des Vosges
Terrasse Valmy Place de La Défense
Parvis de La Défense
Parc Diderot

Cours Valmy
Esplanade du
General de Gaulle
Place des Saisons

Place des l’Irus

Place de
Place des Degres la Pyramide Esplanade de
Place Basse La Défense
Terrasse Boieldieu

Jardins Boieldieu
Cours Michelet

100 300 m 100 300 m

LD–P.16 Zone A: Deck pedestrian access (top). LD–P.19 Zone A: Key open spaces & artefacts locations.
LD–P.17 Border created by the Blv Circulaire near the Quartier Boieldieu (bottom right). LD–P.20 Artefacts in La Défense open spaces.
LD–P.18 Border of the pedestrian deck next to the Grande Arche (bottom left).

Pedestrian flow, Pedestrian access Open Space: Courtyard

on and under the deck to deck (outside of Parvis Park
Access to deck parking and Jetty Art piece
Access to / from transport access) Esplanade On the slab

358 La Défense Paris surrounding street level

Elevator
Stairs
Bridge 359 Design
Plaza
Terrace
Under the slab
Inside building
 above-ground access for workers and visitors. However, despite the instal-
lation of signalisation boards in 2010 to facilitate orientation, navigation
remains a challenge. → LD–P.21
Saisons The situation below-deck is even more complicated. The planning
of deck infrastructure required complex engineering to integrate two pub-
Corolles
Iris 2 lic transport stations, technical galleries, building basements, various com-
Coupole Regnault mercial and cultural programmes, 22,000 parking spaces and extensive
kilometres of mobility flows (the tramway T2, bus lines, the expressway
A14, regional access roads and VIP and taxi accesses). → LD–P.22 While EPAD
engineers aimed for something rational, the resulting underground layers
of this ‘urban iceberg’​ — ​mille-feuille​ — ​are extremely ambiguous and intri-
cate. ​→ LD–P.23 ​Armengaud of Agence de Reconfiguration Territoriale (AWP), LD–P.23 Differentiation of flows.

Centre Commercial
which won the plan to redefine a new open spaces framework for the deck
Des 4 Temps in 2011, stated that “following our survey and analysis of the underground
deck, we found out that around 100,000 sqm were unused by Defacto [La
Défense’s ex-managing company]” (Armengaud 2018). Ongoing tower
refurbishment and development further impacts design, administration
and construction processes.
Whilst the deck of La Défense is indeed its modern heritage, this
Centre Commercial P3 Boieldieu
infrastructure poses distinct economic, management and accessibility chal-
Michelet
lenges likely to remain well into the future. ​b BORDERING
Villon
3.3 GENERATIONS OF TOWERS: A TIME CAPSULE
OF ARCHITECTURAL STYLES
The masterplan (Plan Masse) approved in 1964 envisioned 21 com-
100 300 m
mercial towers. After the construction of the first five, the companies started
to complain about the height and space restrictions. In 1969, under EPAD’s
new CEO Jean Millier, the height limitation of 100 metres was removed
and the commercial programme doubled to 1,600,000 sqm. The master-
plan devised and approved by EPAD in 1972 liberated private developers of
dimensional constraints, allowing for higher, larger, denser and freer towers
of the second generation, enabling developers to express their singularity
against competitors. → LD–P.24–25 These second generation towers received
heavy criticism as they were visible from Paris’s historical centre.
From 1973 to 1978, the economic recession triggered by the petrol
crisis halted developments. Construction stopped and many towers​ — ​
around 600,000 sqm of office space​ — ​remained empty. The economic
crisis further impacted the towers developed after 1978. These third gen-
eration towers were smaller, reflecting a focus on natural light and improved

LD–P.21 The Deck’s various differences of levels (bottom left and right).
LD–P.22 Zone A: Underground land use & network (top). Car parking Vertical circulation
Delivery area Commercial
Taxi drop-off Public transport
Bus stop Civic
Firefighter reserve Parking space
Technical area Main underground
Bike/Motorcycle network

360 La Défense Paris parking

Gas station
Secondary
underground tunnels 361 Design
360m × Hermitage Plaza

325m
× Hermitage Plaza,
320m, 2019

300m
× Phare, × Sisters,
300m, 300m,
2018 2022

275m Coeur Defense

CNIT

250m

× Link, 244m, 2021

× First Tower, 231m, 1974
225m
× Hekla, 220m, 2020
× Phare
200m Quatre Temps × Air2, 202m, 2021
× Jardins,
× Majunga, 194m, 2014 200m, 2022
× Engie/T1/GDF Suez, 185m, 2008
× CB21, 179m, 1974 × Coeur Defense, 180m, × Granite, 183m, 2008
175m × Areva, 178m, 1974 2001 × D2, 175m, 2015 × Link
× Societe Generale, × EDF, 165m, 2001 × St-Gobain, 165m, 2019
167m, 1995 × Carpe Diem, 162m, 2013
150m × Ariane, 152m, 1975
× Egee, 155m, 1999
Societe Generale
Areva × Alto, 150m, 2020
Ava, 142m, 2017 ×
 Sisters
× CBX, 142m, 2005 ×
× Eqho, × Vinci
× Trinity, 140m, 2019
140m, 2013
125m × Franklin, 129m, 1972
First Tower Grande Arche

× Winterthur, 119m, 1974 × Sequoia, 119m, 1990

Eqho
× Hekla
Manhattan Les Villages × Air2
CB21 × Manhattan, 110m, 1975 × × Europe, 110m,×2013 × Pascal
× Initiale, 109m, 1967 Grande Arche, 110m, 1989 Ava × Jardins
Pascal
100m Franklin
× Opus12, 100m, 1973 × Pascal, 101m, 1983
Collines de La Defense
EDF
Engie/T1/GDF Suez Majunga × Pascal,
×  Alto 101m, 2020
× Prisma,
Egee
97m, 1998 Granite
St. Gobain
Kupka
× Atlantique,Ariane
90m, 1970 × Pacific Tower, Trinity
Pacific Tower
90m, 1992 × D2
Allianz One, 85m, 2015
75m Voltaire, 80m, 1988 × 10–12 Cours Michelet
Carpe Diem × Window
× Campuséa,
Building75.2m, 2018
Les MiroirsLes Miroirs, 69m, 1981
× Voltaire
Sequoia RIE Triangle CBX × Hotel Melia, 70m, 2015
Winterthur de L’Arche Basalte
Defense Plaza
Initiale Opus12
50m
× × Defense Plaza,
CB3 54m, 2004 × Basalte, 54m, 2013One
CNIT, 50m, 1958
Atlantique
× Kupka, 50m, 1992 × Guynemer, 46m, 2002 Europe
Allianz
× Belvedere
× Window Building, 47m, 2017
Galilee
× Les Villages, 40m, 1992 Prisma × RIE Triangle Ampere e+, 35m, 2016 × Hotel Melia
de L’Arche, ×  CB3, 37m, 2006 ×
Immeuble One, 32.5m, 2017 & × Campusa 36m, 2018
Belvedere,
25m
L’Immeuble Île-de-France, 32m, 1982 × × Galilee, 41m, 2001 Citizen M Hotel, 32.5m, 2017 × × Vinci, 31m, 2020
L’Immeuble Île-de-France 30m, 1986 × Collines de La Defense, 25m, 1991 Guynemer Ampere e+ × 10–12 Cours
× Quatre Temps, 24m, 1981 × Immeuble One27m,
Michelet,
2018
× Citizen M Hotel
0
1st-Generation Building 2nd- 3rd-Generation Building 4th-    Generation Building 5th-Generation Building 6th-Generation Building
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

LD–P.24 Buildings generations timeline: Heights. × Built project

× Planned project
Footprints

362 La Défense Paris 363 Design

250k sqm × Hermitage Plaza

× Hermitage Plaza,
225k sqm 320m, 2019

× Phare, × Sisters,
300m, 300m,
2018 2022

200k sqm Coeur Defense

CNIT

175k sqm
× Link, 244m, 2021
× First Tower, 231m, 1974

× Hekla, 220m, 2020

150k sqm
× Phare
Quatre Temps × Air2, 202m, 2021
× Jardins,
× Majunga, 194m, 2014 200m, 2022
× Engie/T1/GDF Suez, 185m, 2008
× CB21, 179m, 1974 × Coeur Defense, 180m, × Granite, 183m, 2008
125k sqm × Areva, 178m, 1974 2001 × D2, 175m, 2015 × Link
× Societe Generale, × EDF, 165m, 2001 × St-Gobain, 165m, 2019
167m, 1995 × Carpe Diem, 162m, 2013
× Ariane, 152m, 1975
× Egee, 155m, 1999
Societe Generale
Areva × Alto, 150m, 2020
× × Sisters
100k sqm × CBX, 142m, 2005 × Eqho,
Ava, 142m, 2017
× × Vinci
 Trinity, 140m, 2019
140m, 2013
× Franklin, 129m, 1972
First Tower Grande Arche

× Winterthur, 119m, 1974 × Sequoia, 119m, 1990

Eqho × Hekla
Manhattan Les Villages × Air2
CB21 × Manhattan, 110m, 1975 × × Europe, 110m,×2013 × Pascal
75k sqm × Initiale, 109m, 1967 Grande Arche, 110m, 1989 Ava × Jardins
Pascal
Franklin
× Opus12, 100m, 1973 × Pascal, 101m,
Collines de La Defense
EDF
Engie/T1/GDF Suez Majunga × Pascal,
×  Alto 101m, 2020
1983
× Prisma,
Egee
97m, 1998 Granite
St. Gobain
Kupka
× Atlantique,Ariane
90m, 1970 × Pacific Tower, Trinity
Pacific Tower
90m, 1992 × D2
Allianz One, 85m, 2015
Voltaire, 80m, 1988 × 10–12 Cours Michelet
50k sqm Carpe Diem × Window
× Campuséa,
Building75.2m, 2018
Les MiroirsLes Miroirs, 69m, 1981
× Voltaire
Sequoia RIE Triangle CBX × Hotel Melia, 70m, 2015
Winterthur de L’Arche Basalte
Defense Plaza
Initiale Opus12

× × Defense Plaza,
CB3 54m, 2004 × Basalte, 54m, 2013One
CNIT, 50m, 1958
Atlantique
× Kupka, 50m, 1992 × Guynemer, 46m, 2002 Europe
Allianz
× Belvedere
× Window Building, 47m, 2017
Galilee
25k sqm × Les Villages, 40m, 1992 Prisma × RIE Triangle Ampere e+, 35m, 2016 × Hotel Melia
de L’Arche, ×  CB3, 37m, 2006 Immeuble One, 32.5m, 2017 & × × Campusa 36m, 2018
Belvedere,
L’Immeuble Île-de-France, 32m, 1982 × × Galilee, 41m, 2001 Citizen M Hotel, 32.5m, 2017 × × Vinci, 31m, 2020
L’Immeuble Île-de-France 30m, 1986 × Collines de La Defense, 25m, 1991 Guynemer Ampere e+ × 10–12 Cours
× Quatre Temps, 24m, 1981 × Immeuble One27m,
Michelet,
2018
× Citizen M Hotel
0 sqm
1st-Generation Building 2nd- 3rd-Generation Building 4th-    Generation Building 5th-Generation Building 6th-Generation Building
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

LD–P.25 Buildings generations timeline: Footprints.  Built project

× Planned project
× Height

364 La Défense Paris 365 Design

energy management. Developers aimed to combine economic resiliency
with human comfort. These towers thus enabled a new urban landscape:
with diversified heights, they became more fragmented, complex and
slim.​ → LD–P.24–25 Les Quatre Temps, Europe’s largest shopping centre at
the time, also opened in 1981. It featured over 100,000 sqm of diverse
commercial spaces, including a cinema, doubling the existing retail space
of La Défense and diversifying its programmatic focus.
The advent of the internet at the turn of the century initiated yet
another architectural revolution in the towers of the fourth generation. Lumi-
nous, vast office spaces with direct views to the outside replaced rooms
dedicated to computer servers. The new technologies of the time, including
environmentally friendly techniques and materials, materialised differently
in each tower, further diversifying the urban landscape and its programmes.
Coeur Défense, designed by Jean-Paul Viguier, became the largest mixed-
use commercial development in Europe for 2001. → LD–P.24–25
At the dawn of urban renewal in 2006, triggered by an ageing
building stock, the business district boasted a rich collection of diverse
buildings, encapsulating fifty years of architectural styles. → LD–P.26 Between
2006 and 2015, several towers were built or extensively restored. These
towers of the fifth and sixth generations responded to even newer envi-
ronmental and comfort standards. In 2006, EPAD wanted to become a
worldwide model of sustainability. Developer briefs from 2007 onwards
strongly reflect this desire; these briefs regulated the environmental impact
of buildings and their construction sites and pushed for environmental
requirements, certificates and ratings, pioneering this trend of sustaina-
bility in France. Furthermore, 300,000 sqm of additional mixed-use pro-
grammes were approved. New towers currently under construction will
reach higher yet and exhibit even more diverse styles. → LD–P.24–25
3.4 HEAD-DÉFENSE AND MITTERRAND’S GRANDE ARCHE
‘The notion of power is a key factor of La Défense.’
(Subileau 2017)
A central consideration of La Défense’s initial masterplan was the contin-
uation or closure of the historical axis at the western end of the business
district at the site called “Head-Défense” (Tête-Défense). Famous architects
composed numerous studies attempting to address this, until unknown
Danish architect Johann Otto von Spreckelsen’s Grande Arche was chosen
366 La Défense Paris
in an international competition of 1982 by newly elected president François
Mitterrand out of 424 anonymous projects and against jury advice (Klein
2007). Had the competition not been anonymous, as European regulations
now mandate for strategic tenders, von Spreckelsen would probably not
have been chosen due to his lack of experience (Cossé, Dauge, and Sub-
ileau 2017).
LD–P.26 From 1960s to today: La Grande Arche is an insightful illustration of the rationales,
a time capsule of architectural
styles.
stakeholder struggles, cost overruns, financial cuts and political battles
that occur behind-the-scenes of Grands Projets yet profoundly shape these
projects’ futures. La Grande Arche catalysed Zone B’s development in
Nanterre and transformed the image of the La Défense business district. ​
u URBAN CATALYSTS
The programme Mitterand envisioned for Head-Défense, the inter-
national communication hub (CICOM) including the Ministry of Environ-
ment, was a rather undefined one. Described by the architect as a “Modern
Arc of Triumph to the glory of humanity”(Cossé 2016, 77), the monumental
carved-out cube​ — ​as wide as the Champ-Elysées​ — ​framed and extended
the historical axis. La Grande Arche offered a view of the city centre on
one side and a new, northwest perspective of the future on the other, antic-
ipating Seine-Arche future developments. The conceptual simplicity of the
cube, however, hides the extreme complexity of its realisation, including
design problems related to interior spatial dimensions, the durability of
materials chosen and political battles. As Robert Lion, in charge of imple-
menting the project, noted, “this building is not meant to be inhabited
[utilised]. We inserted offices inside a monument” (Lion in Cossé 2016,
329). When the right won the legislative elections and France entered the
era of cohabitation in March 1986​ — ​with a rightist prime minister (Jacques
Chirac) and a leftist president (François Mitterrand)​ — ​state financial sup-
port for the project was cancelled.
367 Design
Financial tensions between the main contractor and implementation body
due to cost overruns (twice the anticipated price of construction) led to
construction of the Collines, the 100,000 sqm office buildings flanking
La Grande Arche, intended in von Spreckelsen’s plan to stand on an empty
landscape. More ‘sellable’ than the Grande Arche, the Collines “saved the
project” by increasing capital needed for construction (Cossé, Dauge, and
Subileau 2017). However, with this primarily commercial programme, La
Grande Arche emerged as one of the least programmatically civic build-
ings of Mitterrand’s Grands Projets, especially in comparison to Mitterrand’s
national library (Bibliothèque Nationale de France), which in the 1990s
triggered the redevelopment of a former railway land area into the now
vibrant Paris Rive Gauche neighbourhood. → P. 386 La Grande Arche, or
“l’Arc de the Triomphe de l’homme,” became “a big business” (von Spre-
ckelsen in Cossé 2016, 225). These several factors, amongst others, led to
von Spreckelsen’s resignation during construction. The architect died eight
transform the old carriageway infrastructure into a new development,
including a public, 600-metre ‘high-line’ and student-housing tower, ‘Cam-
puséa,’ by Jean Nouvel.
Along the edge of La Grande Arche, a continuous 600-metre ramp
was inaugurated in 2017, directly connecting the neighbourhood of Les
Terrasses to the business district. Designed by AWP as part of the master-
plan for the Jardins de l’Arche, the ramp is part of a larger requalification
plan for the open spaces of the deck, won by AWP in 2011, to redefine the
framework of the 160 hectares above-deck, the deck’s underground and
the interaction between the deck and other buildings. → LD–P.30
In addition to this physical transformation, the urban renewal plan
LD–P.27 La Grande Arche. also incorporated a profound revision of EPAD’s governance and manage- LD–P.30 Gentle continuous
ment structure in order to support more cohesive planning and develop- ramp (designed by AWP Agence
de Reconfiguration Territoriale)
ment mechanisms between the business district and its surroundings (see linking the Deck to Les Jardins de
Implementation and Operation frame). b ​ BORDERING l’Arche in Nanterre.

months later, before the completion of his monument.

Despite this complex process and outcome, Subileau notes that
“from an urbanistic point of view, this monument remains an exceptional
milestone in the history of Paris…[one] of irreplaceable value” (Subileau
2017). La Grande Arche transformed the quarter into a tourist attraction,
giving La Défense a ‘new head’ and spatial hierarchy. → LD–P.27 Thousands
of Parisians who had never set foot in the business quarter before 1989
flocked to see the new monument, which Mitterand officially inaugurated,
together with the Louvre Pyramide by Pei, on the bicentenary of the French
Revolution, 14 July 1989. On this day, Paris also hosted the fifteenth sum-
mit of the seven most industrialised countries in the world (G7); the fol-
lowing day, the chiefs of states met on the roof of La Grande Arche for a
commemorative reception. After attracting worldwide attention to La
Défense, the building was officially opened to the public on 26 August 1989.
3.5 THE STITCHING PLAN
The urban renewal plan that took place from 2006 to 2015 encom-
passed several scales. Along with the tower’s redevelopments, the plan
intended to transform the Boulevard Circulaire into a slower, more urban
road. This was made possible by the development of the underground high-
way A14, which alleviated the boulevard of a substantial portion of its transit
traffic: traffic was reduced by thirty-five percent between 1996 and 2003
(Courtiau 2011). The Boulevard transformation was accompanied by a requal-
ification of the spaces alongside the deck in order to increase constructible
surfaces and develop more suitable links to the surroundings. → LD–P.28
To the northeast, near the Courbevoie commune, the carriageway
has been reduced, pedestrian pavements and cyclist lanes integrated and
landscaping and open spaces incorporated alongside roads. → LD–P.29 To
the south, near the Puteaux commune, the Rose de Cherbourg project will
LD–P.28 Renewal of La
Défense’s pedestrian deck.
LD–P.29 Downgrade of the
Boulevard Circulaire towards the
commune of Courbevoie to
include pedestrian pavements,
cyclist lanes, landscaping and
open spaces.
3.6 TO COEUR TRANSPORT AND BEYOND
Today, La Défense features one of the best public transport sys-
tems in the region, with 500,000 daily commuters. Around eighty-five
percent of the people who work and reside in La Défense use public trans-
port (Paris La Défense Interviewee two and three 2017). Two stations located
under the deck serve the district: to the south, Esplanade de la Défense with LD–P.31 The refurbished
Metro 1 and to the north, la Défense Grande Arche, which has become one CNIT with access to Coeur
Transport in the centre of the
of the busiest multimodal hubs in France with access to Coeur Transport, Esplanade de la Grande Arche.
link to the RER A, Metro 1, tramway T2, two suburban rail stations and 22
bus lines. In addition, the transformation of Coeur Transport in 1996 ena-
bled a complete overhaul of the deck near La Grande Arche, with a new
underground retail hub (20,000 sqm) connecting the two main commer-
cial centres of La Défense: the refurbished CNIT → LD–P.31 and the Quatre
Temps, both renovated by their new owner Unibail-Rodamco. Their ren-
ovation, combined with the public transport node, bolstered an increase
of visitors to La Défense district from 2000 onwards.
Nonetheless, RER A and metro 1 are amongst the most congested
lines in Europe. The future Grand Paris Express, an automated transport
network for the Paris region currently under implementation, aims at improv-
ing public transport connectivity and congestion issues. La Défense, along
the new line 15, will become the main transport hub just outside Paris, with
a direct rail link to Paris airports, boosting global accessibility to the district
→ LD–P.32 and accommodating “50,000 additional commuters” (Paris La
Défense Interviewee two and three 2017). This improved public transport
capacity will support future development projects for La Défense.

368 La Défense Paris 369 Design

 series of twenty terraces (each 30 by 100 metres), which enable transversal
linkages to surrounding neighbourhoods. → LD–P.33 The bordering pro-
p2.11
Aéroport grammes are at ground level, unlike the former Zone A conceived on a
Charles de Gaulle deck. The developments along the terraces are defined by specific urban
design guidelines, such as plot dimensions of 98 by 24 metres, ground-
floor street alignment and upper level set-backs.
Les Terrasses are part of the larger territorial strategy of “La Défense LD–P.33 Les Terrasses in

Saint-Denis- Seine Arche Stratégie 2025” planned and implemented by Paris La Défense Nanterre.

Université (EPADESA 2016), which intends to implement 96 projects in Zones A and

La Défense
Gare St-Lazare
Charles de
Gaulle-Étoile
Châtelet
Gare Montparnasse
p2.11
Aéroport d’Orly
5 10 km
LD–P.32 The planned network of the Grand Paris Express.
3.7 TOWARDS A POLYCENTRIC URBAN TERRITORY
The project of Les Terrasses, in direct continuation of the histor-
ical axis, was one of the first outcomes of the new urban dynamic of the
2000s; it approached Zones A and B in a more integrated, coherent fash-
ion. Designed by Treuttel-Garcias-Treuttel and selected for an international
competition, Les Terrasses form the spine of La Défense in Nanterre, start-
ing from La Grande Arche and extending up the arm of the Seine River in
Nanterre for 1.6 kilometres. Les Terrasses introduced fundamentally dif-
ferent design principles from the ones that had informed Zone A: they
structure low-rise commercial and residential programmes along a recti-
linear public space (above the underground A14 highway) organised in a
B (Paris La Défense 2018c). These are grouped within sixteen areas, each
Porte de assigned masterplanning teams and architects and governed by urban design
la Chapelle guidelines concerning public space, programme mix, linkage and sustain-
Gare du Nord ability; these are similar to the framework plan of the Trapèze area within
Gare de L’Est the Île Seguin (one of our reference Grands Projets cases in Paris), whose
environment is typologically and programmatically diverse and structured
by a well-connected public realm framework. → P. 387 Future projects in Zone
B include the Jardins de l’Arche, Les Groues, Coeur de quartier, Eco-quartier
Gare de Lyon Hoche, Bords de Seine, Rouget de Lisle and Champs-Philippe. → LD–P.34
Gare D’Austerlitz
Jardins de l’Arche is a 15-hectare project next to La Grande Arche.
Designed by AWP with TGT-François Leclercq and TVK, the site acts as
a primary connection between the business district deck and Nanterre. It
contains housing, retail, education, hotel and event programmes, includ-
ing U-Arena, a 94,000-sqm multi-purpose hall inaugurated in 2017 and
designed by Atelier Christian de Portzamparc. As a new centrality within
the larger territory of Paris La Défense and the Paris Metropolitan region,
Les Jardins de l’Arche will offer a mixed-use leisure-focused neighbour-
hood only ten minutes from the city centre by public transport. → LD–P.35
The next centrality in the making is the neighbourhood of Les
Groues, which will be implemented between 2019 and 2030. Conceived
around the future public transport nodes of Nanterre La Folie (RER E in 2022
and Grand Paris Express line 15 In 2030) and masterplanned by Güller &
Güller, the 65-hectare site will be a mixed-use development of commercial,
residential and office spaces, with a focus on smaller enterprises, start-ups,
Line 11 Line 16 fab labs and co-working spaces. Les Groues is illustrative of the contempo-
Line 14
Line 15
Line 17
Line 18
rary urban planning processes taking place in Paris La Défense, especially
with respect to collaboration and spatial design. The framework offers a flex- LD–P.35 Les Jardins de
l’Arche in Nanterre.
ible planning strategy, which establishes parameters to guarantee quality top: Jardins de l’arche, Résidence
over time​ — ​such as roads and linkages, parks and open spaces​ — ​yet allows One (left); middle: Jardins de
l’arche, Citizen M Hotel; bottom:
for flexibility in programme and typological evolution. ​r REGULATORY PLANS Jardins de l’arche, U Arena.
Over time, the many physical, programmatic, social and adminis-
trative borders between the two original zones of La Défense may fade. How-
ever, despite today’s urban stitching efforts, both zones still remain physically
different. La Défense’s spatial design includes several styles reflecting, in
many ways, societal evolution throughout the project’s sixty years of contin-
ued development. After a period of top-down, formal and monofunctional
design approaches, La Défense larger territory is now developing through
more inclusive and integrated processes. A change of governance has pri-
marily enabled this paradigm shift and will be analysed in the next two frames.

370 La Défense Paris 371 Design

 03 COLOMBES
01

Nanterre-Ville Station
02 Gare de La Garenne-Colombes Station

Nanterre-Université Station
04
08

05
Nanterre Prefecture Station
07 LA GARENNE-COLOMBES

06

09
NANTERRE

CORBEVOIE

10
La Défense Station

11
13
12

15
Esplanade de
La Défense Station
14

16

NEUILLY SUR-SEINE
# PROJECT AREAS FOCUS PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION # PROJECT AREAS FOCUS PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
01 Eco-quartier Hoche Social-mix residential 100% (40% are Social housing) 09 Jardins de l’Arche Sport complex 27% Residential; 3% Commercial; 18% Business; 52% Civic institutions
02 Rouget de Lisle Social-mix residential 97% Residential; 1% Commercial; 2% Business 10 Regnault-Carpeaux Business NA
03 Bords de Seine Urban renewed industrial N/A 11 Rose-Boieldieu Public space 45% Residential; 65% Public space
04 Coeur de Quartier Startup, Co-Working 41% Residential; 15% Commercial; 43% Business 12 Bd Circulaire Sud Business NA
05 Terrasses 9 à 11 Residential, Public space N/A 13 Corolles-Reflets-Iris Business NA
06 Terrasses 12 à 17 Residential, Public space N/A 14 Michelet-Gallieni Mixed-use NA
07 Groues Startup, Co-Working 65% Residential; 45% Business 15 Bd Circulaire Nord Student housing NA
08 Champs Philippe Residential, Business 46% Residential; 4% Commercial; 47% Business; 2%Public space 16 Saisons Residential, Public space NA

LD–P.34 Paris La Défense-Seine Arche: Projects areas and focus.

372 La Défense Paris 373 Design

 EPAD
4 IMPLEMENTATION

‘At the beginning, La Défense was the operation of the imperator

state under Charles de Gaulle. Today the power of the state in the
development [of the territory] has disappeared… It is the power
of the cities [communes] that matters.’
EPASA
(Subileau 2017)

La Défense’s implementation process shifted throughout development due

to changes in governance style and planning regulations. This section dis-
cusses the mechanisms governing project development, including institutional
and stakeholder powers, financial models and legal planning regulations.
EPAD
4.1 A COMPLEX INSTITUTIONAL SET-UP
Planning and developing a territory that spans several municipal- 1958 (750 ha) 2000
ities poses distinct financial and management challenges. In September
1958, the first state-led planning body was created in order to acquire land EPADESA
Paris
La Défense
and build the infrastructure of Zones A and B. The Public Establishment
for the Development of the Défense’s Region (Établissement Public pour
l’Aménagement de la region de la Défense, EPAD) was founded for an ini-
tial period of thirty years. EPAD was directed to acquire and free up land,
plan and develop infrastructure, sell air-rights and developable land, man-
age built and open space and promote La Défense over time, all whilst
balancing expenses with revenue.
The creation of EPAD contributed to the area’s autonomy in terms
of decision-making, development and operation. Whilst one representative
from each local authority was included in EPAD, the central government
had the absolute majority with eight representatives (Picon-Lefèbvre 2003,
171). At the beginning, EPAD thus demonstrated a clear, centralised struc-
ture, with the government as the main decision maker, despite the fact that
the project territory crossed several local boundaries. However, local author-
ities benefited from taxation of those companies who acquired air-rights
and relocated to La Défense (Paris La Défense Interviewee One 2017). Over 2010 2018 (564 ha)
time, Courbevoie and Puteaux communes, where Zone A is primarily located, Exact administrative boudary yet to be confirmed by
benefited from this fiscal taxation and gradually gentrified (Subileau 2017). LD–P.36 Governance perimetre timeline. authorities in charge.

Nanterre commune, on the other hand, did not profit in this way initially,
given that its territory was largely used as “left-over” land for infrastructure,
logistic stations, railway lines and social housing. ​c CENTRALITIES
EPAD governance then evolved to accommodate an increase in
influence from surrounding municipalities, both in terms of implementa-
tion and operation of the territory. → LD–P.36 Triggered by the 1980s decen-
tralisation of power in France, EPAD slowly evolved into a more decentralised
structure of governance. In 2000, the planning and management of the
Seine Arche territory was dissociated from EPAD and placed under Nan-
terre’s authority through the Public Establishment for the Development of
Seine-Arche (Établissement Public d’Aménagement Seine-Arche, EPASA),
whilst the state remained in charge of the business district through EPAD.
In the mid-2000s, the territory’s growing scale and complexity​ — ​largely
due to the Seine Arche extension and urban renewal​ — ​mandated a new
governance model, which separated business district planning and devel-
opment from management activities. Operation-related tasks were disso-
ciated from the implementation body between 2007 and 2017 and placed
in the hands of local authorities. EPAD maintained governance of planning
and development of the business district.
In July 2010, EPAD merged with EPASA and became EPADESA,
including both the state and surrounding local authorities in the planning
and development of the larger territory. The local authorities remained in
charge of management.

374 La Défense Paris 375 Implementation

 Finally, the government decided to reconstitute a unified governance of
La Défense by merging planning and management roles, in order to strengthen
La Garenne- the district’s long-term cohesion. The result, a single, local public institu-
Courbevoie
A
Colombes Central State tion, was created on 1 January 2018 and named Paris La Défense. The exec-
A A utive board is composed of two officers representing the central government,
nine officers from the department of Hauts-de-Seine, one officer from the
Île-de-France region, one officer from the Grand Paris Metropole and one
Grand Paris officer for each of the communes of Courbevoie, Nanterre, Puteaux and
A Paris. Local authorities have accordingly become the main players in the
Puteaux
A planning and management of the larger territory of La Défense, including
its business district. → LD–P.37
The long and convoluted evolution of the governance of La Défense
Île-de-France
Region is testimony to the complexity related to the implementation of such a large-
A scale development, which needed to accommodate local, regional and national
aspirations. The resulting governance incorporating multiple public actors
Paris La Défense (state, regional and communal), combined with ad-hoc actors like Paris La
Nanterre AMOB
AM Défense and the Société du Grand Paris, will remain, however, very complex
SIEPs
in terms of interest negotiations, repartition of finances and management.
A
4.2 FINANCIAL MODEL: THE GROUND AND THE SKY
With the conception and approval of the deck in the 1968 Master-
Residents plan came the challenge of its ownership and development. The deck re-
R quired an ownership system that combined, juxtaposed and mixed spaces
Masterplaners Visitors above and below. EPAD formalised the distinction between infrastructures
Various owners
D V and superstructures in 1970: the first were to be realised by EPAD and the
Various Developers
(air rights) (air rights) second by private developers through acquisition of air-rights (Picon-Lefèb-
B O State
(air rights) vre 2003, 173).
O Given deck-related development and maintenance costs, this own-
ership system presented a substantial financial burden for the central gov-
ernment. This distinction had, however, two main advantages, given the
fact that the ‘ground’ stayed in the hands of the state: it blocked any land
Architects Retail & F&B speculation and guaranteed a long-term controlled land development strat-
D B egy. Tower redevelopment also promised additional revenue: each tower
must be modified every thirty years to respond to changing environmental
regulations, needs and trends. 3 to 3.5% of building stock is annually rede-
veloped in La Défense (Paris La Défense Interviewee two and three 2017).
Transformations focus on building envelopes, basements and lobbies,
ROLE SECTOR IMPACT
sometimes requiring acquisition of additional square metres. Unsurpris-
A Authority Public sector High impact ingly, due to the complex distinction between infrastructure and super-
DV
M
Developer
Management
Private sector
Public & private sector
structure, it is difficult to obtain a land-ownership boundary status-quo for
O Owner players and related buildings (ibid. 2017).
D Designer COOPERATION
C Community groups
R Residents / Residents association Founded
B Retailers / F&B / Business association Strongly connected
OA Other association Weakly connected
V Visitor Targeted Low impact

LD–P.37 La Défense stakeholders diagram.

376 La Défense Paris 377 Implementation

Sixty years later, criticism emerged within the implementation body, point-
ing at a “short-term and inadequate model from an economic point of
view,” which guarantees an instant gain upon selling of air-rights but “has
little return or substantial further recurrence in time,” making it difficult
to develop or adapt infrastructure from a financial perspective (Paris La
Défense Interviewee One 2017). A lease-hold model, such as those in Lon-
don or Singapore, may have guaranteed more revenue over time.
4.3 PLANNING GUIDELINES
Because Zone A developed earlier, the business district develop-
ment was based on a more centralised, regulatory planning system. Zone
A was governed by the formal EPAD masterplan of 1964, which delineated
the deck perimeter, including its underground infrastructure and above
ground open spaces, the area programme and building locations, height
and typologies. Albeit an evolution of tower typologies over the years, the
actual masterplan was more or less fixed by the Plan Masse of 1964, decided
unilaterally by the EPAD and therefore by the state. ​r REGULATORY PLANS
Following the inclusion of local authorities in La Défense planning
and management, the development phases of the mid-2000s responded
to a different set of guidelines. Whilst Paris La Défense remains in charge
of the planning of the larger territory, it only defines framework and related
infrastructure with help from private masterplanning offices and in collab-
oration with local authorities. The new frameworks follow statutory plan-
ning regulations, governed by regional planning instruments such as the
local plans of urbanism (Plans Locaux d’Urbanisme-PLU) (Paris La Défense
Interviewee two and three 2017). ​r REGULATORY PLANS
La Défense Seine Arche is the only location in Paris where towers
are allowed. Accordingly, Paris La Défense has insisted on the creation of
higher-rise typologies. Outside of the historical Zone A, however, very few
high-rises are approved by local authorities. As the former EPADESA CEO
of urban planning maintains, this is also an “identity demarcation process
used by the municipality of Nanterre” (Paris La Défense Interviewee two
and three 2017). A complex shift in boundaries and planning processes over
time have led to a more inclusive governance, but this still does not com-
pletely solve the ongoing identity challenges of this larger territory, which
spans several municipalities of different demographics and political bases.
The territory of Nanterre still reflects a lower middle class popu-
lation of workers and immigrants, whom the municipality welcomed dur-
ing the industrialisation of the twentieth century. Nanterre is also home
to the famous Nanterre University, where the volatile period of civil unrest
in the late 1960s originated in France. A communist enclave for the past
seventy years, Nanterre therefore remains a site of contrast next to one of
the richest and most powerful business districts of Europe, a “back-office
[Nanterre]” urbanistically “anchored in the prolongation of the historical
Grand Axe of Paris” (Chabard 2011, 9). On the other hand, the communes
of Puteaux and Courbevoie have, as mentioned previously, largely bene-
fited from La Défense fiscal revenue and gradually gentrified. Whilst current
378 La Défense Paris
and future development strategies focus on the Seine-Arche territory as a
whole, competitions and identity struggles between the various munici-
palities remain. → LD–P.38
5 OPERATION
LD–P.38 Diverse community:
La Défense is a project of national importance and high visibility, spanning Esplanade Charles de Gaulle in
Nanterre, connected to Les
several local administrations. Its management is therefore a complex under- Terrasses.
taking. This section details daily management, maintenance, security and
promotion tasks, key district tenants and sectors and efforts to involve
existing residents and tenants as decisionmakers in the life of the estate.
5.1 EVOLVING MANAGING STRUCTURES
When La Défense management was relegated to local authorities
in 2007, it was through the Public Establishment for the Management of La
Défense Business District (établissement public de gestion du quartier d’af-
faires de la Défense, EPGD), created for this specific purpose. The EPDG was
tasked with managing, activating and promoting the business district (Zone
A). The public realm within Nanterre’s territory, albeit located within the
project of La Défense, remained independently managed by Nanterre com-
mune. EPDG was renamed Defacto in January 2010 as part of a re-branding
strategy, but its duties and governance structure remained unchanged.
In 2018, both planning (EPADESA) and management (Defacto)
roles were merged into the local public institution of Paris La Défense,
which can now draw from tax revenue (which benefits local authorities),
infrastructure rentals (such as parking) and air-rights profit (which benefits
the planning body). This should strengthen and guarantee the business
district’s long-term attractiveness (Paris La Défense Interviewee One 2017).
Nanterre, however, remains in charge of the management of its territory.
As mentioned in the previous sections, the longwinded evolution of gov-
ernance, which now includes multiple stakeholders and administrative
territories, remains a complex negotiation of local, regional and national
aspirations. → LD–P.36
5.2 OPEN SPACE ACTIVATION AND BRANDING
Paris La Défense organises several activities, such as the yearly
Christmas market, free concerts and music festivals like the La Défense
Jazz Festival, which attracts 200,000 people every year. In addition, Paris
La Défense takes care of day to day operations, such as cleaning, mainte-
nance and security of the open spaces. As in many of our other Grands
Projets case studies, this space activation is closely supported by a branding
and place-making strategy through on-site advertisement and signage,
which make it clear that the site is independently operated. Such material
379 Implementation / Operation
attempts to “propose an improved life experience through qualitative acti- Dominant Sectors:
vation” (Paris La Défense 2018b). Signal boards for example, installed in 20% Energy
2010, facilitate accessibility and orientation, and are complemented by 27% Insurance
53% Finance
the ‘Paris La Défense City Map’ (Paris La Défense 2018b). → LD–P.39

5.3 WORKING AND LIVING IN LA DÉFENSE

180,000 people work in La Défense Seine Arche. Of the 500 firms LD–P.39 Signalisation boards
in the district, fifteen are part of Fortune 500 (Paris La Défense 2018b). The within Paris La Défense.

three main sectors include finance, insurance and energy industries, fol-
lowed by communication & technologies and consulting firms. → LD–P.40
The finance industry is the largest sector, with 53 banks and credit
companies located within La Défense Seine Arche, totalling fifty-three per-
cent of the total square metres. The primary player is Société Générale,
followed by Credit Agricole and HSBC. Insurance is the second most
represented industry, with 31 companies located in La Défense Seine Arche
and occupying twenty-seven percent of the total. Axa and Allianz are the
key players in this sector. Energy and petrochemical companies, including
Total, EDF, Technip, GDF Suez and Areva, occupy twenty percent of the
area. Consultant and service providers include Ernst & Young, Mazars,
KPMG, Fiducial and others. The Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Devel-
opment, located in La Grande Arche, represents the public sector. 35,000
sqm of coworking spaces are now available and the neighbourhood of Les
Groues will provide start-up spaces for entrepreneurs at competitive rates.
Although business activities were always the focus of La Défense
development, housing programmes have been present from the start. Today,
42,000 residents live in La Défense (Paris La Défense 2018a). An EPAD
study revealed that 28% of La Défense’s employees lived within Zones A
and B’s housing developments in 2006 (Courtiau 2011). Upcoming housing
developments within the Seine-Arche territory will aim to provide diverse
public and high-end residential housing types.

5.4 TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE OPERATION?

Paris La Défense, local authorities and other stakeholders are cur-
rently negotiating future plans for the area. Decentralised decision-­making
approaches have evolved to partially include local residents in the design
process through statutory public enquiries, consultations and public work-
shops. However, residents are not involved in open-space event programming.
According to a Paris La Défense officer, it is more of a “feedback-​loop-­­after-
the-event type of process,” which enables the managing body to rate the suc-
cess of planned activities (Paris La Défense Interviewee four and three 2018).
100 300 m

LD–P.40 La Défense-Seine Arche: Key owners by sector and origin. Origin: Energy & Petrochemical:
France Total
Europe EDF
Outside Europe Technip
Public Government RTE
GDF Suez/ENGIE
Finance: Areva
Société Générale
Credit Agricole Real Estate:
HSBC Unibail Rodamco
Beacon Investment Tishman & Speyer
KanAm GrundInvest Saint Martin Property
Fonciere des Regions
Insurance: ICADE

380 La Défense Paris 381 Operation

Allianz
AXA
SIIC de Paris
Until recently, Paris La Défense displayed a centralised mode of manage-
ment with regard to the owners of privately developed towers. Many of
these private actors were also landowners, yet these had minimal influence
over the management of the business district, its redevelopment or its open-
space activation. The dissociation of planning and operation-related tasks
necessitated negotiations of air-rights and various planning applications;
however, after these, the towers’ private owners had little relations with
Defacto concerning day-to-day operations. Over the last five years, trig-
gered by the change of governance that materialised in January 2018, reg-
ular board meetings between EPADESA and private owners have reinstated
a more direct relation between private stakeholders and the state (Paris La
Défense Interviewee One 2017). This merging of competencies within the
new Paris La Défense governance could further facilitate a more inclusive
management style.
6 IMPLICATIONS
Over the course of La Défense’s development, the project has profoundly
impacted its surrounding areas, Paris’s regional urban dynamics and the
city’s global perception, serving as a model for other business districts
around the world.
6.1 AN URBAN CENTRALITY IN PARIS AND IN EUROPE
La Défense has become one of the major business centralities in
the Parisian metropolitan region and in Europe as a whole. As of 2014, the
quarter represents 36% of all international investment in Île de France and
22% of Hauts-de-Seine’s employment (EPADESA 2016, 18). The high con-
centration of French and international corporate headquarters (such as
Axa, Total, BNP Paribas, etc.) makes this district unique within the Paris
region. Based on a 2017 study by the Urban Land Institute, which exam-
ined several “attractiveness criteria,” the business district of Paris La
Défense takes second place in Europe after the City of London but well
before London’s Canary Wharf (fifth); it ranks fourth worldwide, after
Marunouchi in Tokyo (third) but before the Financial District of New York
(sixth) (Urban Land Institute 2017, 7). ​p MNU–T PORTRAIT ​La Défense par-
ticipated in the creation of a “new image” for French business “around the
world” (Ringelstein in Architecture d’Aujourd’hui 2013), contributing to
the worldwide appeal of the Île-de-France region.
382 La Défense Paris
With its distinctive urban form and high-rise typologies, La Défense has also
become one of Paris’s major landmarks, home to the region’s most intensively
used public transport hubs. The quarter became a tourist attraction following
the opening of La Grande Arche, Les Quatre Temps and the reconverted
CNIT. In 2001, 8.4 million visitors came to the business district (Courtiau
2011): one third of these visitors, from the immediate region, came to enjoy
the district’s commercial centres, whilst two million foreigners came to view
the architectural typologies and Open-Air-Museum (ibid. 2011). → LD–P.41
6.2 TOWARDS A POLYCENTRIC TERRITORY
The wider territory located in the municipalities of Puteaux, Cour-
bevoie and Nanterre (Zone B) has undergone major redevelopments, largely LD–P.41 Users within
triggered by the business district (Zone A). The Grand Projet’s early sur- La Défense.
rounding effects concerned the gradual gentrification of the Courbevoie
and Puteaux municipalities. In the department of Hauts-de-Seine, for
example, housing prices have increased by thirty percent over the past
decade (Notaires, INSEE 2018). Of course, Courbevoie and Puteaux’s close
proximity to Paris’s centre also influenced this economic upgrade.
Today the business district relies on improved physical and pro-
grammatic connections to its wider catchment area. Several neighbour-
hoods are developing with different yet complementary focuses: start-ups
(Les Groues), social housing (Rouget de Lisle) and leisure (Jardins de l’Arche),
integrated within a coherent territorial framework and public transport
strategy. The 515 hectares of Seine-Arche Territory are therefore gradually
taking a polycentric posture. As such, the originally isolated nature of the
business district is changing, albeit slowly, into a more networked place
with its peripheral neighbours. → LD–P.34
6.3 THE MODEL
La Défense has become a model for other large-scale international
business districts around the world in terms of urban planning and imple-
mentation. One such case is the Lujiazui financial district of Shanghai-­
Pudong in the mid-1980s. ​p LJZ–S PORTRAIT ​Limited in its knowledge of
planning and implementing such a large-scale project at that time, the
Shanghai Municipal Government sought advice from EPAD officers and
the Institut d’Amenagement et d’Urbanisme de la Region Ile de France
(IAURIF) after Shanghai Mayor Zhu Rongji visited La Défense. These
experts provided technical assistance in the development of a metropoli-
tan planning strategy for Shanghai (Xue, Zhai, and Mitchenere 2011). Their
involvement led to the formation of Groupe Français d’Appui au Development
de Shanghai-Pudong under the leadership of Joseph Belmont, president of
EPAD from 1982 to 1992 (Rowe 2011).
EPAD and IAURIF’s assistance profoundly influenced the posi-
tioning of the Lujiazui financial district, advocating for the now famous
downtown skyline​ — ​supported by the approval of four-million square metres
of floor space in high-rise typologies​ — ​and the east-west Grand Axis, run-
ning through Lujiazui from the historical Puxi to Pudong (ibid. 2011). IAU-
RIF officers also advised the organisation of an international competition
383 Operation / Implications

LD–P.42 View towards Paris’ historical centre from La Grande Arche’s roof.
for urban design of the Lujiazui Financial District, which led to the involve-
ment of firms such as Richard Rogers, Dominique Perrault, Toyo Ito and
Massimiliano Fuksas architects. ​m MODELLING
7 CONCLUSION
Over the past sixty years, La Défense has been built to accommodate over
four million sqm of GFA, including offices and residential, retail, civic and
educational programmes and one of the most connected public transport
nodes in the capital. From an urban planning perspective, the pedestrian deck,
accommodating typologies referencing North-American skyscrapers, organ-
ised in a formal Beaux Arts composition, created a distinct urban space on a
key site prolonging the historical axis of the city of Paris. → LD–P.42 The crea-
tion of EPAD, France’s first state-led planning body, enabled effective and
autonomous implementation of the project. This distinctive method of
384 La Défense Paris
governance supported the modernisation of Paris and the reputation of the
French savoir-faire on a global scale ​— ​a central aim in the project’s post-­war
conception ​— ​yet also served to isolate the district from its surroundings.
In terms of adaptability, the deck initially enabled flow differen-
tiation but eventually created an unprecedented, inflexible burden. The
business district struggles to accommodate a steady densification: exten-
sive demolition and renovation, with great financial implication, will con-
tinue to be necessary to maintain an up-to-date physical environment. The
deck’s complex distinction between infrastructure and superstructure also
has serious administrative repercussions, especially in terms of identifying
clear land-ownership boundaries. The original masterplan also makes it
challenging to accommodate incremental changes; important spatial param-
eters such as plot dimensions, height and density have been modified sev-
eral times and the overall coherence of the original composition is barely
noticeable today. ​r REGULATORY PLANS
Despite stitching operations at work, the seven-storey wall of the
deck, bordered by the Boulevard Circulaire, still shuns spatial attempts at
including neighbours within the business district. However, the evolution
of governance has enabled a more inclusive process with the surrounding
authorities, who, since January 2018, have now become central players in
the planning and management of La Défense’s larger territory, including
its business district. The territory of La Défense Seine Arche is being devel-
oped in collaboration with many local, regional and national stakeholders.
Nonetheless, such a distribution of governance remains complex, particu-
larly when negotiating conflicting interests and identities.
The influence of central governing powers over space has been
key in the development of La Défense. Most French presidents used the
project as a means of spearheading their agendas: Charles de Gaulle ini-
tiated the project after World War II to secure France’s global position;
Valery Giscard d’Estaing helped to save it during the economic crisis of
1973; François Mitterrand gave it a ‘new head’ with La Grande Arche, which
triggered the urban extension of the 1980s; and Nicolas Sarkozy initiated
the renewal of its decaying building stock and the latest change in govern-
ance. Whilst a central form of governance has supported the project’s global
renown, the recent balance of powers may enable more inclusion within
its local context.
The larger territory is indeed evolving toward a mixed-use, inter-
dependent, polycentric urban area, testament to the pull-factor effect Grands
Projets can have on their surrounding regions. Whilst Paris La Défense’s
current urban strategy has great potential to correct the errors of the past
and develop an integrated urban region with global reach, it is yet too early
to assess whether it will successfully solve the many administrative, phys-
ical, social and programmatic challenges created by the project’s radical
conception model.
385 Conclusion
PARIS RIVE GAUCHE ÎLE SEGUIN
MAIN CURRENT OWNER Site area (sqm) 1,300,000 MAIN CURRENT OWNER Site area (sqm) 740,000
SEMAPA (France, Public-led Body) GFA (sqm) 2,200,000 SAEM Val de Seine Aménagement GFA (sqm) 850,000
Urban density (GFA) 1.69 (France) Urban density (GFA) 1.5
MAIN MASTERPLANNER
Multiple PROGRAMMES MAIN MASTERPLANNER PROGRAMMES
Residential programme 19.6% Multiple Residential programme 45.0%
Commercial programme 18.4% Commercial programme 4.3%
Start of construction 1991 Business programme 31.9% Start of construction 2004 Business programme 33.1%
Expected end of construction 2020 Civic institutions programme 30.1% Expected end of construction 2024 Civic institutions programme 17.6%

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03 02 l’Île Seguin
03 Strate, Ecole de Design
Parc de d i b
Jar ns A
03 Foire du Trône
04 Université Paris Diderot
Choisy
o uli 04 04 Trapèze sector Brimborion
M

Ri
ve
500 m 1 km 500 m 1 km

Paris Rive Gauche is a 130-hectare urban regen-
eration project of former railway land, warehouses
and industrial yards in the central area of Paris.
The new neighbourhood is located in the 13th ar-
rondissement along the west bank of the river
Seine. It is bordered by the railway tracks of the
Gare d‘Austerlitz to the west and the Boulevard
Périphérique to the south. Similar to La Défense,
its development was overseen by a public-led
body (SEMAPA). The operation has been one of
the most significant urban renewals in Paris. The
main catalyst was the construction of the Biblio-
thèque Nationale de France (one of Mitterrand’s
Grands Projets) in the 1990s, which triggered the
redevelopment of the larger area. Its construction
was initiated in 1991 and was characterised by a
large-scale stitching operation (urban couture),
which covered the railway tracks with a 26-hec-
tare deck in order to reinstate surrounding con-
nections. The development was organised into
rS
ei
ne
eight areas, each framed by a distinct plan and
set of urban design guidelines devised by different
co-ordinating architects, some of whom included
Christian de Portzamparc, Christian Devilliers
and Jean Nouvel. Many designers have been in-
volved with this project since its conception; the
area has since transformed into a dense, mixed-
use, multi-facetted and multi-income neighbour-
hood, with a pedestrian- and cyclist-friendly envi-
ronment built around several key public transport
nodes. The development accommodates approx-
imately 15,000 residents, the 30,000 students and
staff of the University Paris VII Denis Diderot,
which relocated there in 2012, and 50,000 em-
ployees. In addition to several other civic institu-
tions, the cultural centre of the Cité de la Mode
et du Design was inaugurated in the area in 2012
within former warehouses along the Seine.
Building footprint
Building footprint projected
Project site
Softscape
Projected softscape
Hardscape
Projected hardscape
Île Seguin-Rives de Seine is a 74-hectare devel-
opment project on the former industrial Renault
plots in Boulogne-Billancourt along the river
Seine, including the Ile Seguin Island. The anon-
ymous company of mixed economy (SAEM) Val
de Seine Aménagement, created in 2003, was
tasked with undertaking the operation, which is
divided into three sectors with distinct foci: the
mixed-use Trapèze, the innovative and cultural-
ly-driven Seguin Island and the Pont de Sèvres.
The 37.5-hectare mixed-use Trapèze, comprised
of private and social housing, public amenities,
offices, shops and open spaces, was the first area
to undergo development and is nearing comple-
tion. The framework plan of the Trapèze details
twelve urban mega-blocks or ‘macro-plots.’ Much
like Paris Rive Gauche, each urban mega-block
was assigned a co-ordinating architect, who de-
vised the mega-block’s urban guidelines and over-
saw the architects tasked with individual building
design. The resulting environment is typologically
and programmatically diverse, structured by a
well-­connected public realm framework. The
11.5-hectare redevelopment of the Île Seguin Is-
land, on the other hand, faced several delays due
to project and client changes, including the can-
cellation of the proposed Foundation François
Pinault in 2005 due to a protracted bureaucratic
process. In 2009, Jean Nouvel was appointed as
the lead master planner to transform the island
into an international innovation hub dedicated
to the creative economy and comprised of con-
temporary art galleries, salesrooms and exhibi-
tion spaces. In 2010, the regional département
des Hauts-de-Seine purchased a third of the is-
land for the Seine Musicale project, a permanent
concert and performance space by Shigeru Ban,
which was inaugurated in April 2017.
Building footprint
Building footprint projected
Project site
Softscape
Projected softscape
Hardscape
Projected hardscape

386 La Défense Paris Metro station

Tram station 387 Reference Case Studies
Metro station
Tram station

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———. 2009. ‘La « ville durable ». Paradoxes et limites d’une doctrine d’ur-
banisme émergente’. Esprit Décembre (12): 136–53.
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Paris La Défense Interviewee four, and three. 2018. Interview with the Direc-
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22@–B
Rowe, Peter G. 2011. Emergent Architectural Territories in East Asian Cities.
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Gasco. Audio recording and Meeting notes.

388 La Défense Paris 389 The Grand Projet

 Sagrera Station

22@
S
@F

E Europe Square
Forum Area
22@
p2.11 BCN Airport
Site area 1,980,000 sqm

GFA 4,038,000
sqm

Density 2.2 FAR

Population Density 90 inh / ha

Streets/roads37.0%
Built-up57.0%
Non Built-up 6.0%

Residential17.0%
Business 79.0% Office / Hotel

Civic 4.0%
Education, Arts, Culture Centre

1994 Release of Bangemann Report

1999 Extension of Diagonal Avenue
2000 Approval of 22@ Plan
Creation of 22@ company
2003 Completion of 1st building in 22@
2006 Approval of Poblenou Heritage Plan
2009 Completion of Media Cluster in Audio-visual Campus
2011 Dissolution of 22@ company
2017 Creation of 22@ Coordination Commission
2018 Manifesto submitted by 22@ experts to adapt 22@ guidelines

390 22@ Barcelona Conception Design Implementation Operation Implication

1720s Given its freshwater creeks and peripheral
location to the city and coastline, the existing 22@
area becomes the ideal location for the bleaching of
manufactured cloth, which requires a significant
amount of space and water
filling the agricultural landscape between the for- The primary roads perpendicular to the coast follow
mer city centre and adjacent municipalities. One of this rule and will thus later define the street hierar-
these, Sant Marti, in which 22@ is currently located, chy of the 22@ area
is also affected by the Cerdà Plan

General Plan for the International Exhibition, 1888.

Barcelona Map, 1718.
1848 The first train line in Spain is built to connect
Barcelona and the town of Mataró. The tracks run
along the coastline next to the existing 22@ area.
This enhances the industrial potential of the site,
making it an ideal place for a variety of industries
to settle
Cerdà Plan, 1859.
1860s The area becomes the epicentre of Catalan
and Iberian industry, earning its sobriquet of the
‘Catalan Manchester.’ Several industries are repre-
sented: textile mills such as Ca l’Aranyó (today the
home of Pompeu Fabra University) and Can Felipa
(today a civic centre), rail stock plants such as Can
Girona (of which the chimney has been preserved),
flour mills, tanneries, chocolate factories and liqueur
distilleries
1897 Sant Marti becomes part of Barcelona
1907 The Jaussely Plan is presented, aiming at ad-
dressing the connections between the Cerdà grid and
formerly independent municipalities surrounding
the city of Barcelona. The public competition is held
in 1903 and the winner, Léon Jaussely, is announced
in 1907. Although the plan is only implemented in
small parts, both Cerdà and Jaussely grant special
relevance to Glories Square, a fact that will determine
subsequent developments in the Sant Marti area
Macià Plan, 1935. Fondation Le Corbusier.
1936–39 Spanish Civil War between the ‘Popular
Front’ and ‘Nationalists.’ Barcelona is bombarded
by the latter on several occasions, as the Catalan
city becomes a stronghold for progressive and re-
publican groups. A 36-year dictatorship by General
Franco follows
1953 0 7 The Regional Plan of Barcelona is ap-
proved, aiming at managing increased immigration
inflow from other regions. This Plan qualifies the
current 22@ area as industrial land, leaving the
3,000 pre-existing housing units in legal limbo

Cerdà Topographical Study, 1855.

Jaussely Plan, 1907.
The location of the first factories is deter-
mined by the eighteenth-century citadel fortress, The ‘Catalan Manchester’, 1935. 1935 0 The Macià Plan, conceptualised both by
built by King Philipp V in the current Ciutadella Josep Lluis Sert and Le Corbusier on the basis of the
Park. A royal decree imposes a 1,250 metre wide 1888 The celebration of the International Exhibi- rationalist movement, foresees a zoning subdivision Regional Plan of Barcelona, 1953.
no-construction zone. Consequently, the first struc- tion reuses the area where the old citadel fortress of the city in which residential areas are clustered
tures appear along the current Maria Aguilo Street (demolished in the 1860s) was located as a leisure in 400 × 400 metre urban units, representing nine 1960s 0 The industrial pre-eminence of Sant Mar-
park. This event marks the start of restructuring Cerdà blocks. The Plan is not implemented, but the ti starts to abruptly decay. Industrial companies,
1859 0 Ildefons Cerdà proposes a grid for the ur- efforts in the surroundings of the existing 22@ area, street network based on the 400 × 400m module fuelled by logistic and transport changes, start re-
ban expansion of the city. The plan foresees tiering and is regarded as the first attempt to give interna- remains in subsequent urban development, visible locating to outskirt locations in search of more space
down of city walls and a 133 × 133 metre urban grid tional visibility to the city in the crossings on Gran Via Avenue in Sant Marti and affordable land

Conception
Design
Implementation

392 22@ Barcelona 393 Transversal Data

Operation
Implication
1972 Construction of a new water treatment plant 1986–92 0 For the Olympic Games, high invest- municipal 22@ Company is founded to steer devel- 0 8 The Forum of Cultures is also celebrat-
at the end of Diagonal Avenue on the coast begins.ments infuse Poblenou, which improves the area’s opment. In October, the Infrastructure Plan is ap- ed. Both the Forum and 22@ urban transformations
The integration of this infrastructure with the urban
derelict state. Key interventions include the removal proved, guiding and regulating the implementation are conceptualised together. A DHC network gen-
fabric will be resolved in the framework of the Fo-
of rail tracks from the coast line, the construction of advanced infrastructures in the district erating heat and cold with the residual steam of the
rum Area project of ring roads, the Olympic Village and Glories Square incinerator plant in the Forum Area supplies cold
and the deliberate placement of several cultural and warm water to the 22@ developments
1975 Dictator General Franco dies, initiating the facilities
Democratic Era 2006 0 6 7 The Poblenou Heritage Plan is ap-
proved, specifying 68 new elements to be pre­served
1976 067 The General Metropolitan Plan (PGM)
marks the beginning of Barcelona’s new urban am- 2008 Start of the financial and economic crisis
bitions, steered by the start of the Democratic Era.
Although de-industrialisation is already impacting 2009 6 7 8 Completion of the University Pom-
the area, the PGM still qualifies the current 22@ peu Fabra hub in the Audio-visual Campus. This
area as industrial land 22@ site perimeter. urban block has become one of the most emblem-
atic components of 22@
2003 6 7 Completion of the first building on pri-
vate initiative. The tenant is the German IT compa-
Olympic Village, 1992. ny T-Systems

1997 0 The final extension of Diagonal Avenue
beyond Glories Square to the sea launches subse-
quent development of the 22@ district. This is part
of an overall strategy to convert obsolete urban tis-
sues into tertiary uses
2004 6 7 The former Agbar Tower and current
Glories Tower, designed by Jean Nouvel, is complet-
ed and soon becomes a landmark for the district

General Metropolitan Plan (PGM), 1976. Audio-visual Campus, University Pomepu Fabra.

1980–86 0 The Urban Acupuncture Programme
represents the start of a deliberate improvement of
civic living in Barcelona. More than 150 squares and
park areas are developed with intentional design and
awareness of social and neighbourhood dynamics.
In the vicinity of 22@, a railway workshop becomes
Clot Park
Former rail workshop converted into Clot Park, 2001.
Before (1996, left) and after (1999, right) Diagonal Avenue extension.
1999 0 At this time, the area of Sant Marti has
experienced profound urban transformation due to
Olympic operations and other structural projects,
such as Diagonal Avenue, Front Maritim and Glories
Square. The last parcels of industrial land in the
district are the areas to be developed within the
framework of the 22@ Plan
2000 0 6 7 The 22@ Plan is approved on 27 July
2000 by the Regional Government of Catalonia. It
aims at re-using the last 190 hectares of industrial
land in Sant Marti for new productive activities. The
2011 8 The 22@ Company is dissolved by the new
Nationalist Government, CiU. Both this disruption
in governance and the economic crisis slow down
investments in the district
2017 89 Creation of the 22@ Coordination Com-
mission by the new far-left Government, ECM, which
aims at aligning actions of different stakeholder
groups for better coordination
2018 9 A debate about the future of 22@ arises in
Barcelona, prompting the City Council, civil society
and former experts to submit their recommenda-
tions on how to adapt the initial guidelines of the
Plan to better face the future. A Manifesto is submit-
ted by 22@ experts in June. The City Council pre-
sents its suggestions in the Ca l‘Alier Agreement in
November, disregarding the proposals of the 22@
experts. The Ca l‘Alier Agreement is not implement-
Glories Tower. ed due to lack of parliamentary support

Conception
Design
Implementation

394 22@ Barcelona 395 Transversal Data

Operation
Implication
 Territory of 22@

100 200m

Current base plan. 22@–B Building footprint Softscape

22@–B Building footprint, Projected softscape
projected Hardscape
22@–B Project site Projected hardscape

396 22@ Barcelona 397 Transversal Data

 100 200m

Pre-intervention base plan, 1999. 22@–B Project site

398 22@ Barcelona 399 Transversal Data

 Central Park
Diagonal Mar Park

Gandhi
Miquel Marti i Pol Gardens
Glories Park Gardens

Poblenou Park

Poblenou Cemetery

100 200m

Publicly accessible open space plan. Softscape (within site)

Hardscape (within site)
Pedestrian-friendly zone
(Superblock)

400 22@ Barcelona 401 Transversal Data

 100 200m

Transportation plan. Subway lines: Tramway line Subway station

L1 Regional train line Tramway station
L2 Pedestrian way Regional train station
L4 Pedestrian-friendly zone Bus station
(Superblock) Bike station

402 22@ Barcelona 403 Transversal Data

 Ca L’Alier

Can Ricart

Can Jaumandreu

Can Framis

Can Tiana

Can Gili Nou

100 200m

Heritage structures. 22@–B Heritage structure

404 22@ Barcelona 405 Transversal Data

 * The 22@ Plan changes regulations in the event that private land-
owners are willing to transform the land. It does not, however, force
anybody to develop the plots. In fact, existing industrial activities,
complying with certain guidelines, are allowed to coexist with new
urban uses. The remaining industrial uses in 22@ are thus constitute
potential future transformations.

100 200m

Programme plan. Residential Civic institutions

Commercial Technical utilities
Business Mixed-use
Industrial * Ground floor with
commercial & business

406 22@ Barcelona 407 Transversal Data

 22@ BARCELONA
The Incremental Growth of a New Downtown
Pablo Acebillo

1 INTRODUCTION

The 22@ project is an urban renewal project located in the district of Sant
Martí in northeast Barcelona. The project aims to transform 200 hectares
of obsolete industrial land into a functionally mixed district combining
tertiary activities, public spaces and housing. ​→ 22@–B.01
This project was motivated by industrial relocation, an urban phe-
nomenon affecting many large metropolises in the west. By the 1980s,
Barcelona had experienced a significant loss in economic and social activ-
ity due to this relocation of industrial activity. The structural change from
an industrial to tertiary economy required urgent urban transformations,
addressed via specific City Council strategies; one of these was to grant
the obsolete industrial spaces located in the northeast of the city new ter-
tiary uses, exemplified by this case study. In the immediate surroundings
of the site perimeter, three urban locations, vulnerable at that time but
poised to become new centralities, were also addressed: Glories Square,
the area around the new Sagrera High-Speed Station ​→ P. 450 ​and the Forum
Area territory ​→ P. 449 ​(J. Acebillo 2004). In this sense, 22@ was one aspect
of a much larger urban ambition: to prepare the city for a non-industrial
future. ​→ 22@–B.02 ​The 22@ transformation also reveals relevant consid-
erations concerning the use of urban regulations instead of expropriation
mechanisms as a viable means of generating urban quality. Furthermore,
22@ illustrates how changes in political leadership may challenge the coher-
ence and guidance of an urban project intended to transform and extend
a tourism-based city into a tertiary economic hub.

1.1 SANT MARTÍ: FROM SWAMPS TO INDUSTRIAL HUB

What is today an integral part of the city of Barcelona was for cen-
turies an area of unsanitary marshes, swamps and lagoons. First settlements
appeared in the twelfth century next to the Roman road (today Pere IV
street) that led to the Vallés region, and the area’s industrialisation began
in the middle of the eighteenth century with the ‘calico meadows’ of textile
mills based in Barcelona (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2011). These mills’
production process involved the bleaching of manufactured cloth, which
required large quantities of space and water. In their quest for these ele-
ments, Barcelona’s industrialists moved to Sant Martí, an ideal place for
their purposes as it was on the outskirts of the city. With road improvements
and the draining of the lagoons and marshes, the area devoted to industrial
uses grew, and suitable conditions arose for the establishment of large
industries. In 1842, the first Spanish railway line was built, running along

22@–B.01 Past, present and future. 409 Introduction

 COLLSEROLLA MOUNTAIN RANGE

Llo
b
reg
at

Diagonal Av.
R
ive

r
ive
r

sR
sò
Be
Europe Square
Sagrera Station
(planned)
Sants Station
Glories Square

Zona Franca
Logistic Park 22@ Forum Area
El Prat Airport
Historic centre Olympic Village Front Maritim

Freight Port

1 2 km

22@–B.02 Context. Main case study

Reference case studies

410 22@ Barcelona 411 Introduction

 the coast of Sant Martí and giving the area significant transport capacity
Sarria
and accessibility. The abundance of groundwater, the proximity of the port
and the railway and all that this entailed for the supply of raw materials
Sant Gervasio
Sant Andreu and exports attracted industries from the textile, chemical, food process-
de Palomar
de Cassolas ing and metalworking sectors (Clos 2019). The 1848 demolition of the
Gracia
nearby Citadel of Barcelona, built by King Philipp V in today’s Ciutadella
Park, further encouraged industries’ settlement in Sant Martí; the military
Las Corts de Sarria
infrastructure had imposed, for security reasons, a 1,250-metre wide buffer
area around the fortress, to be kept free of construction. ​→ 22@–B.03

1.2 SANT MARTÍ: FROM AN INDEPENDENT MUNICIPALITY

2nd Railway line, TO A DISTRICT OF BARCELONA
Sants Barcelona–Granollers The rail tracks laid down in the mid-nineteenth century around
Sant Marti Sant Martí certainly enabled the municipality to support a high concen-
de Provensals tration of industrial power. On the other hand, the rail infrastructures iso-
lated Sant Martí from the rest of Barcelona. ​b BORDERING ​The first railway
line hindered the relationship between Sant Martí and the waterfront, whilst
the second railway line obstructed mobility between Sant Martí and the
Citadel of rest of Barcelona. ​→ BOTH INDICATED IN 22@–B.03 ​The approval and implemen-
Barcelona tation of the Cerdà Plan, designed by urban planner Ildefons Cerdà for a
Castle of competition in 1859, emphasised this isolation. ​→ 22@–B.04 ​He proposed a
Montjuïc St. Jaume
1st Railway line,
Barcelona–Mataró
homogenous 133 × 133 metre grid to alleviate demographic pressure and
Square
poor health conditions present within the city walls at the time. The homo-
Barceloneta
geneity of the plan reflected Cerdà’s egalitarian ideology (Cerdà 1867a): it
intended to homogenise certain areas by using 20-metre wide streets as
structural roads, which would facilitate wind circulation and hygienic con-
1855 PLANO DE LOS ALREDEDORES DE LA CIUDAD DE BARCELONA LEVANTADO POR ORDEN DEL GOBIERNO PARA LA FORMACIÓN
Sarria Sant Gervasio Autor: Ildefons Cerdà Escala: 1/5.000
SantDEL
Font:
Andreu
de C.I.
PROYECTO DEL ENSANCHE
Palomar Mida Original: 270 x 168 cm
ditions. Four axes appear in the layout. Two are perpendicular to each
de Cassolas other, rotated 45 degrees from the general layout: the north-south Merid-
Gracia iana Avenue and the east-west Paralelo Avenue. The Gran Via Avenue runs
parallel to the coast and the Diagonal Avenue crosses the city from west
Las Corts de Sarria to east. At the intersection of the Meridiana, Gran Via and Diagonal, Cerdà
also envisioned a new centre for Barcelona: Glories Square (Cerdà, 1867a).
Meridiana The Cerdà Plan was meant to incorporate neighbouring settle-
Sants
Diagonal Avenue Avenue ments and towns. One of these was Sant Martí, which at that time was an
Glories
independent municipality. As such, it was not obliged to follow the city’s
Gran Via Avenue
Square urban planning guidelines and regulations. In fact, in the 1860s, the City
Sant Marti
de Provensals Council of Sant Martí granted construction licenses for buildings that did
not align with the Cerdà Plan. This is why the geometric discipline of the
Paralelo
Cerdà Plan is disrupted upon reaching Sant Martí and is still visible in today’s
Avenue 22@ area. Nevertheless, the administration included a clause under which
owners were required to cover the costs of demolition if street alignment
to the Cerdà Plan was needed (Generalitat de Catalunya 2006). This admin-
istrative challenge was overcome in 1897, when Sant Martí became part of
Barcelona as a new district.
St. Jaume
Square

Barceloneta
22@–B.03 First settlements. 22@ site perimeter
22@–B.04 Cerdà plan. Barcelona city
Military fortress
Non-built-up zone
Former surrounding
Municipalities
Glories Square
Historic centre

412 22@ Barcelona New city expansion

Railway 413 Introduction
 Ring Road

Sagrera Station

Glories Square
Besòs River
Clot Park

Diagonal Avenue

22@
Forum Area
Olympic Village

1 2 km

22@–B.05 Three periods of urban renewal. Acupuncture programme

(1980–1986)
Olympic venues
(1986–1992)
Strategic projects
(1993–2004)
Triangle of Levant

414 22@ Barcelona 415 Conception

The dictatorship of General Franco from 1939 to 1975 brought a period of
general stagnation in development efforts. However, the Regional Plan of
Barcelona, a decree approved in 1953, aimed at managing increased immi-
gration inflow from other regions. This plan neglected the mixed fabric of
Sant Martí, in which factories and housing units coexisted. In fact, the Plan
qualified the current 22@ area as industrial land, suspending the 4,000
pre-existing housing units in a legal limbo.
The 1976 General Metropolitan Plan (PGM) marked the start of
new urban ambitions in Barcelona, compelled by the death of Franco in
1975 and the start of a new democratic era. This plan still qualified the
current 22@ area as industrial land, although the de-industrialisation pro-
cess had already begun with the relocation of industries to new industrial
parks in the city’s outskirts. During this phase, logistic and transport com-
panies predominated in the 22@ area.
This portrait analyses how an historical disregard towards the area
of Sant Martí was used as an opportunity to catalyse the urban renewal
potential of the northeast side of Barcelona. The 22@ Plan is, in this regard,
a paradigmatic example of how to transform a formerly isolated, obsolete
part of a city into a vital component of its fabric.
2 CONCEPTION
The 22@ project began to take shape in the mid 1990s and was formalised
in 2000 by the City Council of Barcelona and the Regional Government of
Catalonia with the approval of the Modification of the General Metropoli-
tan Plan for the Re-use of Industrial Areas in Poblenou (MPGM) (General-
itat de Catalunya 2000). Three key factors, detailed later in this section,
shaped the project’s conception and identity: urban infrastructural devel-
opment in the area’s surroundings, a change in land-use and the advent of
digital technologies and knowledge transfer between Barcelona officials
and European stakeholders. The projected mixed-use development was
designed to prevent many companies from leaving the city and relocating
in Barcelona’s periphery, a dynamic that posed a real threat to the city’s
economic competitiveness (Sagarra 2016). As former Deputy Mayor of Bar-
celona Ramón García-Bragado notes, the 22@ project also represented a
change in the way local authorities approached the built environment:
 Before the Olympic Games, the main urban interventions in Bar-
“ placement of several cultural facilities in its surroundings. ​→ 22@–B.07 Despite
celona were concentrated in the public domain. We didn’t regulate
but [rather] used expropriation as the main tool to carry out projects.
416 22@ Barcelona
After the Olympic Games, Barcelona entered a new phase in which
urban management [was] at the core. We shifted from the public
domain of infrastructures to the requalification of private urban
tissues, mainly through regulation” (Bragado 2016a).
2.1 THREE PERIODS OF URBAN RENEWAL: FROM URBAN
ACUPUNCTURE TO KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 22@–B.06 Rondas along the
The intense urban infrastructural developments carried forth by waterfront.
the City Council in Sant Martí’s surroundings inaugurated the transforma-
tion of the district’s industrial character. This development was part of a
long-term strategy to revitalise Barcelona after decades of decay experi-
enced under dictatorship. ​→ 22@–B.05
In the 1980s, the new Urban Planning Services, led by Oriol Bohi-
gas, initiated this process. The first phase, the Urban Acupuncture Pro-
gramme, spanning 1981 to 1986, represents the start of a careful improve-
ment of civic life in Barcelona. The logic of this phase was to act through
small interventions, without altering the City Council’s large infrastructure
projects (Clara Films 1988). This phase emphasised squares, streets, parks
and the provision of public facilities throughout the city and particularly
its peripheral areas. Clot Park, in Sant Martí’s surroundings, showcases
development efforts’ attempts to respect heritage in this initial phase: the
park, now replete with sport facilities, nonetheless pays distinct homage
to the railway workshop in place prior to the intervention.
The 1992 Olympic Games embodied the second phase of devel-
opment. This event granted Barcelona the opportunity to address large
infrastructure projects. This was only possible through an international event
of such magnitude, which in turn managed for the first time in democracy
to create political consensus and bring together the different administrative
levels needed to tackle urban infrastructures in the city. As part of Olympic
infrastructural works, high investments in the Sant Martí district began to
improve the derelict state of the 22@ area and to open it up to the rest of
the city. As Josep Acebillo, Technical Director of the Olympic Holding at
the time, affirms, “the actions were directed to restructure the edges of Sant
Martí district,” whilst the centre ​— ​the 22@ territory ​— ​would be left for future
consideration (Clara Films 1988). Key interventions of this phase included
the removal of the rail tracks from the coast line, the construction of ring
roads or Rondas ​→ 22@–B.06 ​increasing accessibility between the city and its
metropolitan catchment area, the development of Glories Square and the
the success of such interventions, the Olympic Village, located next to the
22@ area along the waterfront, provided distinct takeaways for the drafting
of the 22@ Plan. Both the low density of this development (1.2 sqm/sqml,
or FAR) and its mono-functional character (residential) have proven unsuc-
cessful in terms of generating sufficient urban dynamism in the area. This
aspect was reconsidered when preparing the 22@ Plan (Bragado 2016b).
Following the Olympic Games, the third phase of urban develop-
ment represented the Urban Planning Department’s shift in focus to stra-
tegic and infrastructure projects at a metropolitan scale through the newly
created Barcelona Regional, a metropolitan agency responsible for planning
417 Conception
01 OLYMPIC VENUES → 02 EXTENSION DIAGONAL AVENUE → 03 NORTHERN WATERFRONT → 04 22@–B → 05 FORUM AREA → 06 GLORIES SQUARE →

Sant Adrià
de Besòs
Barcelona

Sant Marti

Sea

PE urban ordering of Barcelona’s waterfront line PE in Diagonal Poblenou sector MPGM along Waterfront in Pobe­nou Barcelona MPGM for the re-use of industrial areas in MPGM along Waterfront line and right side of MPGM in Glories square and Sourh Meridiana
in Passeig Carles I and Icaria Avenue sector Poblenou Besòs river. Forum ambit

Expropiation of industrial land to develop a
residential neighbourhood for the Olympic
Games. First major waterfront development with
the generation of a new coast line and beaches.
Construction of Ring Road and improvement of
Glories square with public facilities.
Extension of Diagonal Avenue to the seafront by
expropiating land to industrial landowners. Most
of the land reused for residential activities.
Environmental regeneration project for the Besòs
river, converting a once polluted area with high
risk of flooding into a linear park.
Continuation of waterfront development after
Olympic Games towards northeast. Front
Maritim operation with residential programme.
Diagonal Mar operation by Hines with the
construction of a shopping mall and a high-end
office and condo development.
Transformation of the remaining industrial land in
Sant Marti district under the 22@ Plan into
a technological and tertiary hub. Development
mechanism relies mostly on private initiative
through a set of incentives. No expropiation used.
Finishing of northern waterfront line in the
context of the Forum 2004 International event.
Integration of main urban infrastructures along
the sealine and upgrade of adjacent neighbour-
hoods by increasing accessibility and providing
new housing and public facilities.
Tiering down of Glories square flyover and
burying down of Gran Via Avenue. Proposal of ​
a new park. Provision of cultural facilties and
housing in the vicinities.

01 Approved 06.1986 03 Approved 07.1993 06 Approved 07.2011

02 Approved 04.1993 05 Approved 12.2000

04 Approved 07.2000

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

22@–B.07 Surrounding urban development.

418 22@ Barcelona 419 Conception


22@–B.08 Diagonal Avenue extension beyond Glories Square.
infrastructure and strategic projects in the metropolitan area of Barcelona.
In this phase, the conversion of obsolete industrial fabric, particularly in
the northeast of the city, became a central consideration. This included
the long-desired extension of Diagonal Avenue from Glories Square to the
sea ​→ 22@–B.08 , materialised in 1999 and completing what would be known
as the Triangle of Levant (Ajuntament de Barcelona 1993). The Triangle
served as an attempt to geographically visualise the most ambitious inter-
ventions of the time. These urban ambitions, located at the three vertices
of the Triangle and marked with a blue line in 22@–B.05, include the Forum
Area waterfront intervention ​→ 22@–B.09 → P. 449, Glories Square and the
Sagrera High-Speed station development. → P. 450 The 22@ territory is
located in the centre of these three vertices.
2.2 THE LAND USE CHANGE: USING EUROPEAN SYNERGIES
AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE TERTIARY USES
The decision to change the land use code bolstered urban trans-
formation of the 22@ area. The regeneration of industrial areas in Poble-
nou was made possible by the City Council’s initiative and formally stated
in the Modification of the General Metropolitan Plan for the Re-use of Indus-
trial Zones in Poblenou (MPGM).
420 22@ Barcelona
This land use change was not without polemic. In the mid-1990s, an inten-
sive debate rose about 22@’s future primary use. Individuals such as Ramón
García-Bragado, a member of the LocalRet, and Miquel Barceló of the
Catalan Institute of Technology supported the area’s productive character
and thus prioritised productive and tertiary activities. Others, including
developers, private owners and individuals represented by the City Coun-
cil, supported residential development. The former perspective gained 22@–B.09 Forum Area.
momentum due to the technological tendencies of Europe at that time, the
liberalisation of the telecommunications market, initiated by the Bange-
mann Report in 1994, and the European Commission’s creation of the ‘High-
Level Group on the Information Society.’ Amongst this group’s stakeholders
were the Mayor of Barcelona and Pasqual Maragall. Maragall, in turn, assem-
bled a group of technicians in the Barcelona City Council to support him.
Two of the experts he recruited were Ramón García-Bragado, future Munic- 22@–B.10 Warehouse for
ipal Manager of Planning, and Ramon Sagarra, future Head of Infrastruc- construction materials in 22@.
ture in the 22@ company. Joan Majó, personal Advisor to EU Commissioner
Bangemann since 1989 and actively involved in the elaboration of the Bange-
mann Report, would become the CEO of the 22@ company. Thus, the advent
of information and communication technologies (ICT) and the parallel rise
of the ‘knowledge economy’ and ‘information society’ (Roca and Quesada
2002) (Sassen 2001) (Castells 1992) were used as programmatic opportu-
nities to elevate 22@ as an economic hub in Barcelona.
Europe’s support helped further challenge the residential program-
matic idea for 22@ (Barceló 2016). In fact, in 1998, the group promoting
the area’s tertiary development filed an official appeal with nine other indi-
viduals against the City Council’s brief that specified a predominance of
housing (Pi i Sunyer et al. 1998). More specifically, the appeal proposed to 22@–B.11 Social housing.
change the land use code from ‘22a,’ to ‘22@.’ This meant that the indus- The 22@ Plan foresees 4,000
trial land use would be maintained (22) but the conventional character of new social housing units.
The land on which they are built
industries (a) would be replaced by a new set of activities: @, referring to is ceded mandatorily by private
services with an intensive use of knowledge and technology. Technically owners when transforming their
land.
speaking, the proposed 22@ land use designated a sub-zone within the
industrial category; it did not entail removing the industry but rather expand-
ing the programme. The proposed change permitted the co-existence of
certain industrial uses ​→ 22@–B.10 , new economic activity, open spaces, social
housing ​→ 22@–B.11 ​and public facilities. Mayor Joan Clos accepted the appeal
in 1999. This formed the conceptual base of the future approval of the MPGM,
which would grant legal coverage to new use of land in Poblenou.
421 Conception
FIRST LEVEL OF PLANNING
3 DESIGN
PLANEAMIENTO GENERAL APPROVED BY PROMOTED BY ADMISSIBLE
DENSITY
The design dimension of 22@ is based on two principles. The first is that
the legal document, or 22@ Plan, only includes guidelines and regulations
General Metropolitan Plan 1975 (PGM)
Plan General Metropolitano 1975 (PGM)
Regional
government of
Public
authorities
2.0 FAR before
the 22@ plan
concerning the densities, activities, benefits and duties as applicable to
Catalonia developers. ​r REGULATORY PLANS ​This legal document is formed by differ-
ent plans: at the First Planning Level, the 22@ Plan, or MPGM ​— ​approved 22@–B.13 Industrial building

22@ Plan — Modification of the General Metropolitan Plan Regional Public 2.2 FAR new
in July 2000 and the document that permits the change in land use ​— ​and reused as loft.
In order to incentivise developers
1975 (MPGM) government of authorities base density at the Second Planning Level, the Infrastructure Plan (PEI) and collection to restructure and mantain
Modificacion del PGM para la renovacion de las areas indus-
triales del Poblneou — Districte d’activitats 22@
Catalonia
of Special Plans (PE), the two most relevant legal tools for carrying out trans- heritage buildings, the 22@ Plan
allows marketing of these units as
BCN — (MPGM) formations. ​→ ­22@–B.12 ​These plans, however, exclude design considera-

specifies infras­truc­ture fees

private lofts. A maximum 2.2 FAR
tions that precondition final architectural and morphological outcomes. is allowed.
perimeter of Publicly

The second principle is that, due to the 22@ Plan’s lack of design
defines available
Special Plans

Driven Plans
defines site

guidelines, an additional quality control mechanism was needed. This was

accomplished through the Quality Commission, a municipal entity led by
SECOND LEVEL OF PLANNING
the Chief Architect and responsible for assessing design quality of the var-
PLANEAMIENTO DERIVADO ious plans to be approved.
These two principles were motivated by two factors: (1) the high
private ownership of land, which made the expropriation tool extremely
Infrastructure Plan (PEI)
* Special Plans (PE) Plan Especial de
City council of
Barcelona
Public
authorities
N/A
costly for the administration, compelling it to regulate instead, and (2) the
Planes Especiales Infraestructuras del City Council’s willingness to adapt design considerations to future trends
Poblenou (PEI)
* list of Special Plans is not ex­haustive
rather than defining spatial qualities at the outset.

a Publicly Driven Plans City council Public 3.2 3.1 THE LEGAL PLAN: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN 22@–B.14 Existing housing.
Planes Especiales de Reforma Interior de
los ambitos de transformacion delimitados
of Barcelona authorities FAR
INDUSTRIAL AND POST-INDUSTRIAL CITY Since the 1953 Regional Plan,
4,614 housing units were not
en la MPGM (PERIS) The approval of the MPGM in July 2000 initiated the industrial recognised as residential land.
urban intervention. This legal document was the regulatory framework The 22@ Plan gave these units
legal character and integrated
b Block Plans City Council Private 3.0
that guided district transformations. them in the new development.
Planes de manzana o Planes de Mejora Urbana (PMU) of Barcelona Owners FAR The MPGM had three main goals: first, it defined the new land use
category 22@. This included industrial uses that complied with certain
compli­ance of PEs with PEI

requirements, such as pollution and noise thresholds and those that did not
c Re-use of industrial buildings for tertiary activity
Planes Especiales de Reforma Interior para
City council
of Barcelona
Private
owners
< 2.7
FAR
require a heavy use of lorries and trucks (Generalitat de Catalunya 2000).
ejecutar actuaciones de transformacion de edificios Secondly, the MPGM defined the different ways in which transformations
industriales consolidados
were to be carried out in 22@ through the use of the above-mentioned Spe-
cial Plans (PE), shown in 22@–B.12: (a) the Publicly Driven Plans promoted
City council Private 2.2 by the City Council, (b) the Block Plans promoted by private initiatives, (c)
d Re-use of industrial buildings into ‘lofts’
Planes Especiales de edificios industriales destina- of Barcelona owners FAR
Reuse of industrial buildings for tertiary activity, (d) Reuse of industrial
dos a viviendas no convencionales
buildings into ‘lofts’ ​→ 22@–B.13 , (e) Extension of existing housing units ​
→ 22@–B.14 ​and (f) Plans for public facilities and public space. For each of

e Extension of existing housing City council Private Depending on

these transformations, the MPGM defined densities, mandatory private-­to-
Planes Especiales de los frentes consolidados of Barcelona owners street width public land transfers and other general guidelines. The specific spatial com-
position of each transformation was not predefined by the MPGM but rather
relied on the Special Plan (PE), elaborated once the transformation of a plot
f Plans for public facilities and public space City council Public Public facilities
Planes Especiales para equipamientos y zona verde of Barcelona authorities do not compute
GFA

22@–B.12 Planning tools.

422 22@ Barcelona 423 Design

 Peru–Pere IV

22@–B.16 Audio-visual Campus 22@–B.17 Llacuna Axis 22@–B.19 Llull–Pujades East

A fundamental element of this The proposed planning strength- A system of buildings that are
area is the maintenance of the ens the sea-mountain relation of superimposed on one another
industrial building of Ca l’Aranyo. the sector and the urban central- form diverse planes recessed
ity condition of the axis. from the line of the main facade.

Central Park

Llull–Pujades
East

22@–B.18 Llull–Pujades West 22@–B.20 Central Park

The basic idea has been to pre- The fundamental element in this
serve the existing fabric, acting in Llacuna Axis area is the presence of Can
an isolated way on interstitial Ricart, an industrial compound
plots in order to mantain a sub- from the mid-19th century.
stantial part of the buildings and
plot structure.
Audio-visual
Campus

Llull–Pujades West

22@–B.21 Perú–Pere IV
This area contributes to the
creation of a centrality and public
space in a place that is marked
by substantial deficiencies in
urban quality.
100 300m

22@–B.15 Publicly driven plans. 22@–B site perimeter

Publicly driven plans

424 22@ Barcelona 425 Design

was initiated. Hence, the Special Plan (PE) defined the spatial configuration
based on the overall guidelines outlined by the MPGM. Secondly, the MPGM
recognised the area’s pre-existing dwellings built prior to 1950. Lastly, the
MPGM described the subordination of all Special Plans (PE) to the Infra-
structure Plan (PEI) and the consequent co-finance scheme, by which pri-
vate owners had to contribute to 22@ infrastructure development.

3.2 THE INFRASTRUCTURE PLAN (PEI):

A TRANSVERSAL TOOL
The PEI was the only legal tool at the Second Planning Level that
applied to all transformations carried out in 22@. It set the basis for invest-
ments related to the financing of public spaces and new infrastructure util- 22@–B.22 Audio-visual Campus
ities such as sewers, fibre optics, district heating & cooling and pneumatic along Roc Boronat street.

waste collectors. The drafting and approval of the PEI coincided with the
on-going European liberalisation process in the telecommunications mar-
ket, in which monopolies were removed and competition amongst different
service operators was incentivised.
The PEI had three main objectives: first, to analyse infrastructures
present before the implementation of 22@; second, to determine which
new infrastructures were needed for the development of 22@ and; third, to
propose technical mechanisms to upgrade obsolete infrastructures (Sagarra
2016). Six different infrastructure systems were addressed for this aim: mobil-
ity, public space, waste collection, water cycles, energy systems and tele-
communications (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2000). The City Council, private
owners and network operators co-financed these systems; as it had to deliver
these networks before the completion of new buildings, the City Council
carried out implementation. In this way, the administration guaranteed
proper supply and operation of infrastructures before tenants moved in.
The PEI has proven to be innovative and successful. It marked the
first time that new networks, such as district heating and cooling systems
and fibre optics, were introduced comprehensively in Spain (Sagarra 2016).
The PEI was the underlying, transversal system of all transformations in
22@ and, as such, the instrument that enabled 22@ to be perceived as a
single, comprehensive project. More importantly, it was the technical engine
that enabled the area’s transition from an industrial to tertiary district.

3.3 DIVERSITY OF PLACES, DIVERSITY OF PLANS

The diversity of urban situations required a collection of Special 22@–B.23 Rates Alley Block Plan.
Plans (PE). Though various, these planning tools consistently referenced
the site’s industrial past, not only in terms of heritage preservation (through
the Poblenou Heritage Plan approved in 2006) but also with regard to the
Cerdà street network (through the General Metropolitan Plan approved in
1976) and multiple block alleys, considered on a case-by-case basis.
One example of these Special Plans were those applied to six dif-
ferent areas: the Publicly Driven Plans. ​→ 22@–B.15–21 These plans, of public
initiative, used the Cooperation management tool by which the City Council
drafted and issued the plan, defining densities, uses and spatial configura- 22@–B.24 22@–B.25 22@–B.26 22@–B.27
tion of the blocks. The Audio-visual Campus ​→ 22@–B.16 & 22 ​has become Initial plot structure. New plot structure / land use. Proposed planning envelope. Proposed building envelope.

Tertiary activity Social housing

Hotel Existing housing

426 22@ Barcelona 427 Design

Industrial building
re-used as office
Civic institutions
Open space
 the most prominent example of these. ​u URBAN CATALYSTS ​Private owners
No objections Vote for Block Plan A accomplish the actual transformation of the blocks.
submitted approval in Municipal
Parliament
The vast majority of plans, here called Block Plans, were carried
out by private initiatives, e.g. land owners or developers, such as the Block
Landowners mobilise to
Objections
Plan of Rates Alley. ​→ 22@–B.23–27 ​These use the Compensation manage-
transform Block A
submitted ment form, by which the transformation can begin once individuals owning
Support
No
Support
at least 60% of the land within the site perimeter agree to transform (80% 22@–B.30 Industrial building to
in the case of a Cerdà block divided by an alley). ​→ 22@–B.28 ​shows the trans- be reused as office space in
Sancho de Ávila street.
Informal negotiation
formation process of a hypothetical Block Plan. The process includes stake-
process amongst
1 month consultation
process to collect
holders from the private domain (dotted outline) such as landowners, archi-
landowners to reach
60% of site perimeter
objections by anyone
Block Plan A
is legally valid
tects and developers; the public sector (solid outline) represented by the
in Block A
about Block Plan A
City Council, Urban Planning services or the Property Register Centre;
Full operation from 2000–2011 the 22@ municipal company (blue dashed), also part of
the public domain but here highlighted due to its relevance in the efficient
Government
Formation of a Compen- approval of urban plans; and the community sector (dashed outline). The 22@–B.31 UOC University
≥ 60% ≥ 60%
Commission approval
sation Board amongst
landowners of Block A Lease to tenants
process follows the Urban Planning law and is designed to evaluate plans placed in a former textile factory.
through several control mechanisms. These include the Quality Commis-
sion assessing the project’s architectural and urban design quality, the Urban
Hiring of Architect
Planning Department evaluating whether the plan follows guidelines and
by landowners Rejected Approved Architect elaborates Construction contributes to the spatial coherence of its context, the one-month public
re-allotment project for
Block Plan A. Awarding
consultation in which anybody can submit objections and the Municipal
of plots to landowners Parliament, which eventually has to approve the plan.
The maximum density in this type of transformation was set at
2000–2011

Architect proposes
spatial configuration
Block Plan A to City
Council-Urban Planning
Landowners develop
plots either by them-
3 sqm/sqml. The 60% land ownership stipulation translates unevenly across
of Block Plan A with Department: selves or sell them to 22@ due to the blocks’ degree of fragmentation. In fact, plot sizes in 22@
→ Adaptation of Block
distribution of activities
and uses following the Plan A
City Council-Urban
Planning Department
developers
vary from 6 sqm to 13,500 sqm with a minimum of 3 plots and a maximum
22@ Plan regulations → Assignment of fees controls the re-allot- of 44 plots per block. ​→ 22@–B.29 ​The more fragmented the plot structure,
to landowners for
infrastructure works
ment process and plot
assignment to
the more complex it is to carry out a transformation, as more owners must
landowners
Dissolution of
agree in order to reach minimum stipulations.
Compensation Board The Block Plan excludes certain building types (Marzo and Garcia
Evaluation of Block
2017b), such as 117 consolidated industrial buildings with a density of at
2011–on going

Plan A by the Municipal

Quality Commission Block Plan A to 22@ least 2.7 sqm/sqml. ​→ 22@–B.30 These buildings, built prior to the 1976 Gen-
in terms of architectural
and urban design quality
company-Urban Plan-
ning section:
Rejected Approved
eral Metropolitan Plan and still in good structural condition, were main-
→ Adaptation of Block Demolition of struc- tained and reused with new activities according to the 22@ regulation.
tures, redevelopment of
Plan A
→ Assignment of fees streets and infrastruc- The reasoning behind this decision stemmed from the high cost of dem-
to landowners for
Plots registered in the
tures in Block A based olition. The Plan also excluded 3,344 pre-1950s housing units that fulfilled
on the 22@ Infrastruc-
Rejected Approved
infrastructure works
Property Register Centre ture Plan certain density requirements. These two building types, if transformed,
were elaborated in a separate Special Plan, as described in 22@–B.12. These
2000–2011

transformations were, however, also subjected to mandatory land transfer

22@–B.28 Transformation process for a Block Plan. and financial contributions to the Infrastructure Plan.
From a design perspective, the Block Plans were very diverse in
form and spatial impact. Commonalities included a preference for open
block configurations, loose street alignment, diversity in building heights,
the use of public space as a means of increasing block accessibility and
general respect of heritage buildings. ​→ 22@–B.31 Manuel de Solà-Morales
also highlights this flexibility in design, stating that “in 22@ the form of the
buildings becomes independent of the support, the infrastructure of the streets
defines the limits of the quantities, the density of use, but construction can
Control mechanisms
Private sector
Public sector
22@ company (2000–2011)
Community sector
Move forward

428 22@ Barcelona Revision / Re-submission

Fast approval 429 Design

02
03
PROGRAMMATIC DIVERSITY COEXISTENCE BETWEEN OLD AND NEW
The initial premise of the 22@ Plan is to create 01 The functional diversity is achieved by an
a district in which the mix of uses is the key
element for generating dynamism in a former
influx of new activities and the inclusion of
pre-existing programmes. The acceptance of
derelict area. This is done by mixing privately-­ the existing housing is both a legal and moral
driven tertiary activity with publicly-­driven
community services.
obligation as well as an opportunity to mantain
a high housing share in the area.
02 The strong presence of industrial heritage
buildings in the area is a further opportunity
to create an identity and reuse these
structures with varied programmes such as
office, housing and civic institutions.
03 Furthermore, industrial activities com­plying
with 22@ regulations and not willing to trans-
22@–B.29 Conditions. form can mantain their activity indefinitely.
430 22@ Barcelona
01
OWNERSHIP FRAGMENTATION
The high ownership fragmentation within
blocks is partly responsible for the lack of
transformation in specific areas. New urban
plans will be drafted only if 60% of the land
owners within a block agree to do so. Hence,
the more fragmented the plot structure, the
more complex the transformation process.
Individual plot sizes in 22@ range from 6–
to 13,500 sqm, with an average plot size of
1,370 sqm.
Tertiary activity
Hotel
Industrial building
re-used as office
Social housing
Existing housing
Industrial building
re-used as loft
Civic institutions
Industrial buildings open
for redevelopment
Open space
be extremely autonomous, perhaps excessively so” (Ajuntament de Bar-
celona 2011). This reflects authorities’ desire to reinterpret the original
Cerdà block. Whereas in the city centre the Cerdà block appeared very
much constrained by tight regulations ​→ 22@–B.32 related to street align-
ment, height and even material use, in 22@ the flexibility granted by the
22@ Plan allowed for open block configurations ​→ 22@–B.33 : open spaces
could cut across blocks to create new spaces, street alignments were looser 22@–B.32 Traditional block
and height limits were determined by a block’s overall density and specific configuration in the city centre.
design proposal. In fact, Barcelona’s city centre represents a mature and
consolidated architectural fabric, which does not always suit the needs of
new companies and start-ups and, by extension, the new economy. 22@’s
flexible regulations attempted to answer these companies’ needs, provid-
ing strict guidelines in terms of densities and uses but minimal regulations
in terms of distribution and architecture.
The wide variety of PEs was a consequence of the acceptance of 22@–B.33 Open block
pre-existing conditions in the area, which integrated new architecture with configuration in 22@.
heritage structures and pre-existing housing. ​→ 22@–B.29 ​As Oriol Clos, the
former Head of Urban Planning at 22@ company, reminds, “the flexible
regulation allowed developers to adapt the answer to each specific circum-
stance in the blocks. The morphological definition was left for the Second
Planning level, in which precise parameters are defined in each block inter-
vention” (Clos 2019). Once the morphological composition was defined
at the Second Planning Level, the architectural design was contemplated
outside of the legal process. Through the Quality Commission, formed by
local as well as international experts, each plan in 22@ was scrutinised
and evaluated based on design considerations. This allowed the City Coun-
cil to maintain control of the final design outcome despite its development
by private initiative and to decouple design assessment from the legal plan. ​
→ 22@–B.28 ​This decoupling had strategic reasoning, which Juan Carlos Mon-
tiel, former Head of Urban Planning at 22@ company, elucidates:
 We voluntarily took out the design dimension from the regulation
“
and placed it along the administrative process through a Commis-
sion. This allowed us to adapt the design needs and requirements
to on-going tendencies and demands instead of petrifying it in a
conventional masterplan” (Montiel 2017).
The design approach taken by the 22@ project shows how land ownership
conditions this dimension. In 22@, “the private ownership of land, coupled
with the will of letting private owners transform, translated to a very high
capacity of regulation from the administration’s point of view but a com-
paratively low capacity to act in the area” (Bragado 2017).
The Forum Area → P. 449 , developing at the same time, demonstrated
the opposite approach. This intervention was a public project in its realisa-
tion, as the land was mostly occupied by public infrastructures and thus pub-
licly owned. The City Council elaborated master planning services, supported
by local architects; as such, city planners determined spatial configuration
alone, without the aid of private developers. The administration’s capacity
431 Design
 to act in this territory was therefore very high, provided that it defined the
Employees Employees Residents
spatial outcome. On the contrary, it was not critical for the administration
A A R to regulate the same territory, since private landowners were not present.

Commercial Neighbourhood
4 IMPLEMENTATION
22@ Network
Tenants Association
A A R The effectiveness of project implementation has varied throughout the
years, as different political realities have spawned a volatile governance
Commercial
Tenants
structure in 22@’s management. Furthermore, technical mechanisms regard-
A
Sant Marti
District ing density allocation, land transfer and financing have generated different
A outcomes. At the same time, the phasing strategy proved rather weak in
directing the implementation process, since plot developments were depend-
ent on private initiatives. ​→ 22@–B.34
22@
Various Landowners City Council Urban Planning Coordination
4.1 GOVERNING THE PROJECT: DIFFERENT POLITICIANS,
AO MO A Commission

A DIFFERENT PRIORITIES
22@ was initially managed by the 22@ company created in 2000
by the Socialist Party (PSC). ​c CENTRALITIES ​This company was in charge
Toursim &
of planning, implementing and operating 22@’s redevelopment. The com-
Economy pany’s governance structure has changed slightly over time. Between 2000
A and 2007, the entity was divided into three sections: (1) the urban planning
section, which supervised urban plans proposed in the district, (2) the urban
Various Developers management section, which dealt with re-allotment procedures and legal
Architects
B Various actions and (3) the infrastructure section, supervising the implementation
of the Infrastructure Plan. From 2007 to 2011, coinciding with the arrival
Developers
D AB
of Socialist Mayor Jordi Hereu, the initial foundation of infrastructures
and urban projects (hardware) made it possible to focus on the software,
the promotion of the economic sector to drive private companies’ demand
for office space on a national and international scale. The governance struc-
ture was therefore delineated into two main areas of responsibility, giving
priority to the economic domain: (1) an urban section including urban plan-
ning, urban management and infrastructures and (2) an economic, inno-
vation and talent section, including clusters, business development and
network development (Piqué 2012).
Within these two organisational periods of the 22@ company, the
sectorial areas worked closely together, and, in doing so, were able to co-or-
ROLE SECTOR IMPACT
dinate and match the demand for office space with the supply of urban space.
A Authority Public sector High impact In this capacity, the 22@ company was similar to companies like Pro Eixam-
DV
M
Developer
Management
Private sector
Public & private sector
ple, SA or Pro Nou Barris, SA. In all of these, and according to the Catalan
O Owner
D Designer COOPERATION
C Community groups
R Residents / Residents association Founded
B Retailers / F&B / Business association Strongly connected
OA Other association Weakly connected
V Visitor Targeted Low impact

22@–B.34 22@ stakeholder diagram.

432 22@ Barcelona 433 Implementation

BEFORE TRANSFORMATION
22a
According to the Urban Planning
Law, the industrial zone is defined
by the land classification ‘22’. The
type of industry is defined by ‘a’,
in this case conventional and
polluting industries.
The maximum density within the
industrial zone ‘22a’ equals 2.0
FAR.
01
01 Allowed density 2.0 FAR
Only industrial uses are allowed.
100% of the land under private
ownership.
2005
Industrial 100 % land
AFTER TRANSFORMATION
22@
The new Plan keeps the industrial
zone ‘22’ but modifies the type of
industry. ‘@’ describes the new
uses allowed, such as clean
industries, IT activities mixed with
community services.
Increase of new base density to
2.2. Develop­ers are allowed to
add 0.5 exclusively for ‘tertiary
activities’. Additionally, 0.3 is
assigned under public ownership
for public uses. In the ‘Predeter­
mined Plans’ the density
assigned under public ownership
can be increased to 0.5.
01 02 03 04
01 New base density 2.2 FAR
02 Tertiary activities 2.7 FAR
03 Public uses 3.0 FAR
04 Publicly Driven Plans 3.2 FAR
New land use pattern mixed
combining economic activities
under private ownership (70%)
with social housing, civic institu-
tions and public space under
public ownership (30%).
2011
Tertiary activities 70% land
 Industrial building
re-used as loft 10% land
Civic institutions 10% land
Public space 10% land
BENEFITS
→ Increase in land value.
→
  Increase in base density by
0.2, in order to compensate
the infrastructure financing.
→ Higher admissible densities.
→ Higher potential revenues.
→ Higher diversity of uses, mak-
ing the district more attractive
for working and living.
DUTIES
→ Compliance with the new
legal framework provided by
the 22@ Plan.
→ Developers have to finance
the new infrastructures and
street development (DHC,
fibre optics, sewers, pneu-
matic waste collectors, etc.) in
order to compensate the
higher densities.
→ Developers have to finance
the public space.
→ Developers have to finance
any demolition or reallocation
cost for buildings and people.
→ Transfer of private land under
public ownership. 0.3 FAR will
be transfered to the Public
Administration for social hous-
ing development. This in turn
will generate the necessary
land for public facilities and
public space. According to the
Urban Planning Law, for every
100 sqm of housing gross floor
area (GFA), 18 sqm of public
space and 13 sqm of public
facilities must be provided to
suport the citizens’ needs.
→ Preservation of heritage.
Urban Planning Law, the urban plan prepared by the municipal company
and revised by the central Urban Planning Department was subjected to a
one-month long public consultation, in which any individual could pose
objections. Once the amendments were revised, the plan was updated by
the Municipal Parliament and ratified through parliamentary majority (Ajun-
tament de Barcelona 1998). The 22@ company was nevertheless the only
municipal company able to craft urban plans ‘in-house’ without the Central
Urban Planning Department’s further supervision for the Government’s
Commissions approval. ​→ 22@–B.28 ​The 22@ company professionals’ tech-
nical knowledge and the high level of trust generated between this entity
and the City Council permitted such exceptional procedures. This led to an
efficient approval process for 22@’s development and consolidation of the
Publicly Driven Plans, such as the Audio-visual Campus, and Block Plans,
such as Cristobal de Moura Street, approved in 2001.
This worked relatively well until the arrival of the Nationalist Party
(CiU) in 2011. The priorities of this new government shifted to re-central-
ising municipal services, inspired by political ​— ​rather than technical ​— ​rea-
soning. This led to the dissolution of the 22@ company and four others.
Subsequently, the project’s urban and economic management sections
were separated, which challenged further concerted efforts in the devel-
opment. Urban planning services were relegated to the newly created Hab-
itat Urbà central department and 22@’s economic promotion was clustered
within Barcelona Activa, a municipal agency created in 1986 and respon-
sible for settling companies and foreign investments in the city (Civit i Fons
2017). This splintering of urban development and economic promotion
proved to be devastating for 22@’s transformation. These actions were
prompted by Nationalists’ political will to dilute the project’s Socialist leg-
acy. Since the project’s inception, the integrated approach of urban and
economic development has been one of its clearer successes, embodied
in the 22@ company. The on-going economic crisis in Spain further ampli-
fied these effects. Both conditions slowed area investments and construc-
tion completely halted between 2010 and 2011 (Lopez 2017).
The current far-left government (ECM) led by Ada Colau, in power
since 2015, has approached the 22@ project from a different angle. Sup-
ported by exogenous factors, such as an overall economic improvement
that once again spurred investments in the district, the City Council has
attempted to reconstitute the former governance structure of 22@ by appoint-
ing a Coordination Commission for the project. The task of this new entity
is to bring together the city’s central Urban Planning Services, the Eco-
nomic and Tourism Board and the local district of Sant Martí. Contrary to
the past 22@ company, this Commission has no administrative competence
but rather a consultative capacity in bringing the political stakeholders of
the 22@ development around one table. Whilst this is a step towards a
more integrated operational structure, the extent to which the Commission
is able to reconstitute the success of the 22@ company, however, remains
to be seen (see Implications frame).

22@–B.35 Transformation mechanisms.

434 22@ Barcelona 435 Implementation

4.2 INTERDEPENDENCIES BETWEEN DENSITIES,
FUNDING AND LAND
The transformation mechanisms available for 22@ were struc-
tured between developer benefits and duties. The benefits were granted
by the City Council and the duties were compensations carried out by pri-
vate developers to the City Council. The duality of these two concepts is
further specified based on the interdependencies of three types of guide- 22@–B.36 Reconversion of a
lines: density, transfer of land and financing. ​→ 22@–B.35 former sugar factory into lofts.

One primary benefit public authorities granted to developers in

the 22@ territory was an increase in buildable density, designed to incen-
tivise private developers to transform land according to new regulations
and, in return, acquire compensations. These compensations ranged from
acquiring private land for public use to requiring developers to fund new 01 Initial situation 01 Final situation

infrastructures and public space. In doing so, the 22@ Plan defined a care-
ful balance of benefits and duties, in which the extent of one should not 22@–B.38 Blocks involved in
jeopardise the reach of the other. the clustering.

The maximum floor area ratio (FAR) was defined by the 22@ Plan
and varied between individual plans. New densities ranged from 2.2 FAR
(in the case of re-purposing heritage buildings into ‘lofts’ ​→ 22@–B.36 to
3.0 FAR (in the case of private Block Plans). The Publicly Driven Plans
assigned a 3.2 FAR to allow for larger provisions of public infrastructures.
As 22@–B.35 demonstrates, the increase in densities resulted from a desire
to incentivise certain activities in the area. Indeed, the increase from 2.2 22@–B.39 Opening up of
FAR to 3.0 FAR was only possible if the proposed Plan included 0.5 FAR Marroc street on land previosuly
occupied by a seeds factory.
of @ activities: programmes that involved an intensive use of knowledge
and technology.
It is worth mentioning that the allocation of publicly-owned plots
can occur in the same area of transformation or in a different one. Thus, 02 Initial situation 02 Final situation

the City Council could achieve larger volumes of activities by shuffling

them around. The transfers are only possible, however, between plots already
owned by the City Council. 22@–B.37 shows an example of this mechanism
by which three blocks in 22@ ​→ 22@–B.38 ​exchanged social housing and pub-
lic facilities. This resulted in a larger provision of social housing in Block
B, located in the north side of 22@. In exchange, the public facility in Block
C expanded. Block A exchanged social housing for public facility activities
located in Block C.
A further interdependency was the link between density increase
and the mandatory transfer of land from private to public ownership. The
administration’s aim was to acquire public land in an area dominated by
privately-owned land. Private developers were required to dedicate 10%
of site perimeters to social housing developments. The social housing, in
turn, required additional land for public space and facilities: developers
had to grant 18 sqm for open spaces and 13 sqm for public facilities for 03 Initial situation 03 Final situation

every 100 sqm of social housing Gross Floor Area (GFA). Lastly, all trans- 22@–B.37 Clustering of activities. Tertiary activity
formations were obliged to transfer private land on street areas defined in Hotel
Industrial building
the 1976 General Metropolitan Plan to the Public Authorities. This was the re-used as office
case for Marroc Street, previously occupied by an industrial facility and Existing housing
Social housing
opened for public use in January 2018. ​→ 22@–B.39 Civic institutions
Open space

436 22@ Barcelona 437 Implementation

The increase in density was associated with further duties for developers.
One of them was the compulsory financing of public spaces and new infra-
structure utilities. The additional density increase, in fact, intended to com-
pensate the costs of infrastructure, public space funding and demolition
of existing buildings. Because infrastructure utilities had to be provided
before tenants arrived, the City Council advanced investments in order to
complete utilities before the end of construction. Once the transformation 22@–B.40 Public space in ‘Llull ​– ​
was carried out, private owners paid a fee according to the amount of GFA Pujades East’ Publicly Driven
Plan.
they were developing, currently 90 EUR/sqm of GFA (Generalitat de Cata-
lunya 2000). There were, nevertheless, additional funding sources for
infrastructure investment in 22@. Operating companies, such as electrical
or gas companies, contributed to the renewal of infrastructure networks.
Additionally, the City Council paid approximately 40% of the overall cost
of utilities, as it is part of city infrastructure (Marzo and Garcia 2017a).
Public programmes such as social housing and public facilities were financed
by the public bodies responsible for them. In the case of social housing, 22@–B.41 Vacant plot with
heritage building to be reused as
the Municipal Patronage of Housing carried out planning, construction and lofts in ‘Perú ​– ​Pere IV’ Publicly
management of units. The source of funding for public facilities depended Driven Plan.

on the facility’s final use. If the facility was appointed to accommodate a

public school, for example, the Education Consortium provided financing
(Montiel 2017).

4.3 PHASING THE DEVELOPMENT: OWNERS SET THE TONE

In 2000, the 22@ project proposed 3.2 million sqm of office space.
In 1999, the demand for office space in Catalan city amounted to 90,000 sqm/
yr (Bragado 2018). Such figures already implied the development of 22@
over a long period of time, in which its implementation would need to adapt
to market needs and economic cycles.
This phasing strategy was, however, quite limited in scope. As the
transformations largely depended on private initiative, the City Council
had few mechanisms in place to steer and catalyse development in specific
areas and time frames. One of these mechanisms included the six Publicly
Driven Plans. The plans for these zones were amongst the first to be approved,
as the administration promoted them. It was implied that by having the
plan already approved, private owners would feel more confident to initi-
ate a project, as planning and approval procedures would be much faster.
The Audio-visual Campus and Llull-Pujades East were approved in June
and July 2001, respectively. ​→ 22@–B.40 Today, these areas are amongst the
most developed in 22@. Another Publicly Driven Plan, for Perú–Pere IV,
was approved in January 2003 but transformation only began in 2018. ​
→ 22@–B.41 In this case, the area’s distance from main public transport hubs
explains the lack of transformation momentum.
In the Sagrera High-Speed station development ​→ P. 450, the situa-
tion was quite the opposite. The main development is steered by the Public
Administration’s use of the Cooperation management tool, contrary to 22@,
in which Compensation is the main management tool. In Sagrera, due to 100 300m

the complex interrelation between the urban form and the railway, the City
Council retains control of the development process and the final outcome 22@–B.42 Open space ownership. Public owned
(public accessible)
Private owned
(public accessible)
Private owned
(private accessible)

438 22@ Barcelona 439 Implementation

(Balta i Torrember and Domenech 2016). This, in turn, allowed planners
to fix specific phases and aspects of the development. In this case, the main
problem concerned the subordination of urban planning works to rail infra-
structure. The former was under the competence of the City Council, the
latter under the Spanish State. As the economic crisis slowed national invest-
ments, urban planning works were tied to the slow pace of the rail works.
In June 2017, the Ministry of Public Works announced the restart of these
projects after two years of inactivity, specifically regarding the waste water
collector along Prim Street (Blanchar 2017), an operation currently bringing
momentum to the entire site as the first residential development by real
estate group Castellvi shows (Castellví 2017). In this regard, 22@’s auton-
omous governance structure has enabled the project’s agility, given the fact
that external administrations are not conditioning its development.
5 OPERATION
The operation of 22@ follows standard city practices and does not rely on
exceptional operational procedures. The project’s open space management,
which highlights different types of ownership and accessibility and soft man-
agement practicespractices ​— ​which, in turn, manage users’ concerns, such as
the creation of economic associations or neighbouring groups ​— ​illustrate this.
5.1 OPEN SPACE AND ITS MANAGEMENT
In Barcelona, the operation of open spaces is dependent on land
tenure. 22@ is not an exception to this rule. Nevertheless, 22@’s open space
management schemes elucidate the synergies between ownership, man-
agement and use. Three different types of open space tenure in the area
existed: a) publicly owned accessible spaces, b) privately owned and publicly
accessible spaces and c) privately owned spaces inaccessible to the public. ​
→ 22@–B.42
The first type of open space was owned by the City Council and
managed by the Municipal Institute of Parks and Gardens. The regulations
defining the usage of this space did not differ from those regulating other
spaces in Barcelona. ​→ 22@–B.43 ​The second kind of open space was owned
and managed by private owners. However, the City Council granted these
spaces the ‘right of way,’ whereby it allowed public use through private
property upon compensation (Gobierno de España 1889). This action is
enforced by law and motivated by the possibility that the administration
will impose access for the connection of public services, such as network
utilities or infrastructures. These spaces were generated by the specific
configurations of buildings within each plan. Whilst both the ownership
and the management of these spaces remained in the hands of private
property owners, the public administration had specific requirements as
to how to maintain and develop a continuous open space network. Subse-
quently, these two types of open spaces did not differ much in appearance.
The third type of open space was privately owned but had no ‘right of way;’
hence, its use was limited to the property holder (Lopez 2017).
440 22@ Barcelona
The area’s distinct conditions shaped the availability of different schemes
of open space. In particular, the second type of open space was of great
benefit to the public realm, as it increased the amount of open space in the
area at no cost to the administration.
5.2 SOFT MANAGEMENT: THE USERS
22@–B.43 Public courtyard with Other mechanisms, equally relevant and effective, focused on
heritage structures and public
facilities.
area users. One example was the 22@Network, an association founded in
2004 with the aim of representing companies operating in the area and
acting as the main intermediary between users and decision makers. Mem-
bership was voluntary and implied a fee depending on each company’s
number of employees. Of the approximately 8,000 companies in 22@,
150 are currently listed in the entity. The services provided by the 22@
Network incorporated networking events and the creation of links between
companies and educational centres. Another management mechanism,
implemented in 2017, is via the 22@ Coordination Commission, which
aligns actions between the Urban Planning Department, Sant Martí district
and the city’s Economic Board. This entity also includes neighbours, research
and educational centres, companies and experts involved in the 22@ pro-
ject in the past. It therefore tries to create an inclusive environment in
which various social groups can participate in the debate about the future
of 22@ (Martínez 2017b).
The Neighbourhood Association of Poblenou represents the dis-
trict’s neighbours. This entity holds regular meetings with citizens to dis-
cuss local issues concerning retail, facilities and pending urban plans. Initially,
neighbours strongly contested the 22@ project. The project was defined
as speculative and as only targeting business and financial interests. Fur-
thermore, these individuals opposed the public administration’s use of
heritage. In fact, the Poblenou Heritage Plan was only approved in 2006,
six years after the approval of 22@, a fact that neighbours heavily criticised.
The authors of this Plan, including Ramón García-Bragado, argue that “we
took more time to approve the Heritage Plan … because we didn’t even know
of the existence of such heritage up until we arrived in 22@; it was all pri-
vate” (Bragado 2016b). With time, these protests ceased. As a former man-
ager of the Neighbourhood Association Salvador Clarós stated in 2016,
“the people living in the area have seen and appreciate the contribution
and improvement the 22@ project has brought to the district, easing social
protests against its implementation” (Clarós 2016).
6 IMPLICATIONS
The implications of 22@ have been manifold, both for the city and its peo-
ple. At the local level, the project has enabled the regeneration of 200 hec-
tares, transforming an obsolete industrial neighbourhood into Barcelona’s
new tertiary downtown. The area’s innovative start-ups and high living
standards have also attracted representative architectural pieces in its sur-
roundings. At a regional level, 22@ has become a metropolitan centrality
441 Operation / Implications
 06
07
01
03
22

04 08
02
05
09

17 10
11
12 14
13

15

16

21
18
20

19

# YEAR BUILDING / PROJECT ACTION BY INVESTMENT # YEAR BUILDING / PROJECT ACTION BY INVESTMENT
01 2007–on going Glories Square Redevelopment City Council – 12 2017 Amazon office Opening Colonial & Stoneweg 60 mil. EUR
02 2014 Design Museum Opening City Council – 13 2017 WeWork office Opening Colonial & Stoneweg –
03 2018 Facebook Fake News Hub Opening Merlin Properties – 14 2018 WIP building Bought Catalan Occidente 20 mil. EUR
04 2017 Silken Hotel Bought Benson Elliot Fund 80 mil. EUR 15 2002 T-Systems HQ Opening T-Systems 30 mil. EUR
05 2017 Housing for elderly Opening City Council – 16 2019 Offices Investment Brilten 35 mil. EUR
06 2012–2017 Glories Mall Refurbishment Unibal Rodamco 148 mil. EUR 17 2013 Encants market Opening City Council –
07 2015 University of Barcelona Campus Opening City Council – 18 2015 62 Housing units Development Solvia –
08 2009 Pompeu Fabra University & Cluster Opening City Council & Rilson XXI Inmuebles – 19 2009 MelonDistrict Student Housing Bought The Student Hotel 40 mil. EUR
09 2019 Parc Glories Tower Investment Colonial 77 mil. EUR 20 2010 Office complex Investment Metrovacesa 35 mil. EUR
10 2009 Can Framis Museum Opening Villa Casas Foundation – 21 2018 Office complex Investment Barcelonesa de Immuebles –
11 2010 Media TIC (Start-up incubator) Opening City Council – 22 2018 MediaPro complex Bought Hines European Value Fund 56 mil. EUR

22@–B.44 Regeneration as a spill over effect (selected projects / events).

Media Cluster 22@
Publicly driven plans
— Audio-visual Campus 22@
Approved plans in 22@

442 22@ Barcelona 443 Implications

Approved plans outside 22@
Open space
for high-tech companies. At a global level, Barcelona is no longer positioned
as merely a tourist destination; now, it is also an economic hub of entre-
preneurship and innovation.
6.1 LOCAL UNINTENDED EFFECTS: A REVISION
OF 22@ GUIDELINES
Apart from planned improvements in the district, such as new jobs
and housing units, which will be further discussed in this chapter’s con-
clusion, 22@ has generated other effects not foreseen at its inception, such
as a rise in property prices. The year to year average increase from 2000
to 2014 for rental housing prices was 4.1%, above city average in the Sant
Martí district. Sant Martí’s average prices increased by 6.5% in the sec-
ond-hand housing market, versus the city’s 4.5%.
Housing figured prominently in the 2017 public debate about 22@’s
future. This discussion concerned which guidelines from the Plan should
be adapted to give the area momentum for the future. Both the ‘civil soci-
ety,’ represented by area neighbours, the City Council and universities and
led by the 22@ Coordination Commission, and ‘individual parties,’ consist-
ing of former experts and ‘authors’ of the 22@ Plan, such as Ramón García-
Bragado, Miquel Barceló and Oriol Clos, contributed. The latter experts
submitted a formal Manifesto to authorities in June 2018, which suggested
Plan revisions related specifically to transformations in the economic sector.
The document also highlighted environmental challenges and social changes
in citizens’ perception of the city, which, in the experts’ consideration, should
be included in the revised 22@ Plan (Bragado, Barcelo, and Clos 2018).
Meanwhile, the ‘civil society’ signed the Ca l’Alier Agreement, in
which the heterogeneous group proposed nineteen measures to make 22@
“more inclusive and sustainable” (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2018a, Pag.
4). One of these measures proposes to increase the social housing propor-
tion from 10% to 30% in the north side of 22@ (Ajuntament de Barcelona
2018a). Although an increase in housing would arguably be beneficial for
the area, a surge in residence would pose difficulties to the allocation of
necessary public uses ascribed to housing programmes. Moreover, the trans-
fer of an extra 20% of land could potentially hinder future area transfor-
mations, as this would be perceived as an additional burden (Ajuntament
de Barcelona 2018b). The Ca l’Alier Agreement has no binding character.
Thus, only the municipal elections in May 2019 will determine if the agree-
ment is able to gather sufficient support to enable this modification.
6.2 REGENERATION AS A SPILL-OVER EFFECT
In addition to localised effects, 22@ has become a catalyst for its
surrounding areas, attracting investments and new urban interventions both
within and without its site perimeter. Since the inauguration of the University
Pompeu Fabra and the Media Cluster in 2009, the Audio-visual Campus has
become the major engine of this urban development spill-over. ​→ 22@–B.44 ​
u URBAN CATALYSTS
444 22@ Barcelona
One noteworthy example is the re-development of Glories Square, which
will soon become the district’s centrality. Following the guidelines of the
1976 General Metropolitan Plan (AMB 1976), the square had to serve as
both a public space and a transport node. The improvement of road acces-
sibility to support the 1992 Olympic Games addressed the latter requirement;
however, the former requirement was somewhat overlooked, resulting in
an undefined park with a dubious urban quality. The new Glories Plan fore- 22@–B.45 University Campus
sees Glories Square as a 4.5-ha urban park framed by housing units and for the Engineering Faculty in the
Forum Area.
public facilities and covering Gran Via Avenue. Construction of this new
programme began in late 2013. When completed, Glories Square will become
an active node of transport and public activities and a distinct centrality
within the metropolitan area of Barcelona.
An additional spill-over effect of re-development includes archi-
tectural interventions around the 22@ district, triggered by the upgrading
of the district’s image into an innovative neighbourhood. Iconic projects
from renowned architects have emerged in the project’s vicinities and have
subsequently contributed to the regeneration of surrounding areas. Some
examples include the 37,000 sqm Glories Tower, designed by The Ateliers
Jean Nouvel, the 25,000 sqm Melia Sky Hotel designed by Dominique
Perrault Architecture and Central Park designed by The Ateliers Jean Nou-
vel. Synergies emerging between 22@ and proximate centralities, such as
the Forum Area ​→ P. 449 ​have also catalysed further projects, such as the
new Besòs University Campus opened in 2016 (Cols and Ibanez 2016), ​
→ 22@–B.45 ​ and the 25,000 sqm Telefonica Headquarters by Massip-Bosch
Architects. Both projects lie in the Forum Area, next to the Herzog & de
Meuron Forum Building. These projects have not only added emblematic
structures to 22@’s broader area but have also become international land-
marks, bolstering Barcelona’s global recognition.
6.3 REGIONALLY AND BEYOND
At a metropolitan or regional level, 22@’s primary conceptual aim
was to halt companies’ relocation from the city to its outskirts by providing
a new economic hub. Two decades after its inception, the area has succeeded
in this aim; it is now the highest-demanded area in Barcelona and Catalonia
for corporate and technological companies (Salvador 2016). The other most
demanded areas are the traditional Diagonal Avenue-Paseo de Gracia axis
and Europe Square, a recent mixed-use development in an adjacent munic-
ipality. ​→ P. 451 ​At the end of 2018, 42% of all companies in Barcelona are
located in 22@ accounting for 53% of the GDP and employing 51% of
employees in the city (Ejeprime 2019), boasting some of the highest rental
prices for office space in the city at up to 20 EUR/sqm. ​→ 22@–B.46 ​The area’s
445 Implications

22@–B.46 A new economic downtown for the city.
vacancy rate has been declining for the past five years, declining to 7% in
2017 (Urban Input 2017). 22@’s attraction extends beyond the business
sphere given the numerous universities that have located within the dis-
trict, creating a new location for students, researchers and entrepreneurs
to jointly innovate (Katz and Wagner 2014). ​→ 22@–B.47–48
A further effect of 22@ ​— ​unforeseen but equally important for Bar-
celona’s global positioning ​— ​is the district’s growing number of international
congresses and fairs related to the innovative sector. The following exam-
ples are not located in 22@, but their acclaim is undoubtedly a consequence
of the innovative ecosystem created in Barcelona since the inception of the
22@ district. An example is the Mobile World Congress, the world’s largest
gathering for the mobile industry, organised by the GSMA and held in Bar-
celona since 2012. Since 2011, the Smart City Expo World Congress in Bar-
celona has annually assembled world-renowned technology companies and
municipalities to discuss challenges of urban application of technologies.
The Barcelona International Convention Centre (CCIB), located in the Forum
Area → P. 449 and adjacent to 22@, is another engine for international events.
446 22@ Barcelona
In 2017, it organised 119 events, bringing 543,451 visitors to the city with an
estimated economic output of 442 million EUR (Sánchez 2019). Since its
conception, the CCIB was meant to complement the 22@ territory, the for-
mer as an event venue and the latter as a generator of international demand
and provider of accommodations. This is evidence of how synergies between
centralities in Barcelona have become essentially functional.
22@–B.47 UOC University
strengthening the educational
hub in the district.
7 CONCLUSION
Next year marks the 20th anniversary of the 22@ Plan’s approval. This
urban project, initiated and promoted by the City Council of Barcelona,
has successfully converted a derelict, obsolete industrial neighbourhood
into a dense, programmatically hybrid part of the city. As of 2019, more
than 90,000 new jobs have been created. 70% of potential planning efforts
have been approved in more than 160 different plans, mostly compelled 22@–B.48 Inner courtyard of
the Pompeu Fabra University
by private initiative. Furthermore, 46% of potential social housing stock facilitating synergies between
has been built (1,841 units) and more than 17 km of streets fully developed industry and academia.
with high-quality infrastructures underneath (47% of potential) (Ajunta-
ment de Barcelona 2017) (Marzo 2019). Although progress has been made,
the process is by no means finalised. Whilst 70% of potential planning
efforts has been approved, only 30% of potential GFA for tertiary activity
is actually built (Martínez 2017a). This means that more than 2 million
GFA are still available to be developed, making 22@ the ‘reservoir’ for
future office space in Barcelona.
In 1999, when Barcelona city planners decided to use a set of guide-
lines, allowing for an organic, progressive urban transformation, their key
aim was flexibility. ​r REGULATORY PLANS ​The concept of creating an adapt-
able space was mediated through a sophisticated, complex legal plan, which
only defined permitted activities, densities, benefits and duties. The fact
that the Plan did not define a phasing scheme or morphological prescrip-
tion, rather relying on the private initiative of landowners to transform
their land, enabled a slow but progressive urban development. The use of
design assessment also reflects the project’s adaptable quality. As described
in the Design frame, the decoupling of the 22@ legal plan and the Quality
Commission, responsible for ensuring high-quality architectural design,
was motivated by the desire to adapt the design evaluation of block plans
to on-going needs and trends. It is fair to be critical of the apparent lack of
design control and high flexibility given to developers in 22@, or, accord-
ing to Manuel de Solà–Morales, the “extreme autonomy in construction”
(Ajuntament de Barcelona 2011). However, it is worth mentioning that this
apparent lack of design was compensated by the Quality Commission to
ensure adaptable design criteria over time.
The 22@ Plan’s flexibility was combined with a respect for exist-
ing urban tissue. Sant Martí, a heterogeneous district with over three cen-
turies of history, presented the significant challenge of completing an urban
renewal project whilst enabling historic preservation. Accordingly, the
inclusive nature of the 22@ project relies on recognition and acceptance
447 Implications / Conclusion
of pre-existing structures that ought to be preserved for the sake of cultural
and historical identity. The recognition of more than 3,000 existing hous-
ing units, which land use plans failed to recognise for over fifty years, served
FORUM AREA Barcelona and Sant Adrià del Besòs, Spain

as a judicious tribute to those neighbours and their participation in the dis-

trict’s future development. Similarly, the 2006 Poblenou Heritage Plan MAIN CURRENT OWNER Site area (sqm) 1,810,000
listed over 60 buildings and structures with varying conservation degrees City Council of Barcelona and City Council GFA (sqm) 1,390,000
of Sant Adrià del Besòs (Spain) Urban density (GFA) 0.77
to be reused for different purposes. The involvement of diverse stakeholder
groups in the decision-making process of 22@ has gained momentum in MAIN MASTERPLANNER PROGRAMMES
Barcelona Regional Residential programme 38.0%
the last three years with municipal backing. As discussed in the Implication Commercial programme NA
frame, the participatory debate about 22@’s future, uniting neighbours’ Start of construction 2000 Business programme 35.0%
Expected end of construction NA Civic institutions programme 27.0%
associations, City Council officials and 22@ experts, exemplifies a new
means of accomplishing urban planning, one that prioritises interdiscipli-
nary, citizen-based participation as opposed to conventional top-down solu- S La Pau
Be
sò
sR
Sant Adria del Besos

tions. The success and usefulness of this approach remains yet to be seen. @F ive
r
Given these factors, interesting times lie ahead of 22@, the Sant E
Sagrera (planned) Besos
Sant Marti
Martí district and Barcelona as a whole. Current initiatives to rethink the 03
future of 22@ will have to prove not only whether there is the political will p2.11 02
to implement necessary changes but also, most importantly, whether the @ 22@ Bac de Roda
Besos Mar
22@ project is adaptable over time. The permanence of the 22@ model F
S
Forum Square
Sagrera Station
will thus rely on its flexibility and ability to continuously respond to chang- E Europe Square El Maresme / Forum
ing societal needs without jeopardising the project’s foundations and basic BCN Airport

thesis. In doing so, the 22@ project and Barcelona will be better prepared 01 Water treatment plant
El Clot-Arago Selva de Mar 01
to face the urban challenges of the years ahead. 02 Waste incinerator plant
03 Electrical plant
Poblenou
Mediterranean Sea

600m 1.2 km

The Forum Area is a 180-hectare territory stretch-
ing between the city of Barcelona and Sant Adrià
del Besos. It stands as one of three anchors around
which the 22@ district pivots; Sagrera Station and
Glories Square complete the triad. The transfor-
mation of the Forum Area was an intensive engi-
neering operation aimed at recovering the last
three kilometres of waterfront in the northeast of
Barcelona. In addition to creating a new marina,
the intervention integrated existing urban infra-
structures, including the water treatment, incin-
erator and electric plants. All facilities were up­
graded to comply with current environmental
standards; the water treatment plant, for exam-
ple, added a biological treatment to its water pu-
rification process. By covering this infrastructure
with a 16-hectare public plaza, city planners ef-
fectively integrated it into the surroundings. On
top of the plaza, a new photovoltaic plant has
emerged as the new icon of this urban geography.
Since its conception, Forum Area has served as
the resource centre for the 22@ district: the resid-
ual heat of the upgraded incinerator plant gener-
ates a district heating and cooling system linked
to 22@. Furthermore, the structural synergies be-
tween these two projects rely on three new pro-
grammes: the planned marine zoo, the University
Campus for Engineering and the Convention Cen-
tre. Finally, the Forum project has generated a new
metropolitan centrality, addressing the system-
atic isolation of the nearby neighbourhood of La
Mina. New road connections and a central boule-
vard have increased accessibility, whilst 1,100
new dwelling units have replaced old industrial
warehouses in La Mina.
Building footprint
Building footprint projected
Project site
Softscape
Projected softscape
Hardscape
Projected hardscape
Subway station

448 22@ Barcelona 449 Reference Case Studies

Regional train station
AVE Train Madrid
SAGRERA STATION Barcelona, Spain EUROPE SQUARE L’Hospitalet de Llobregat, Spain

MAIN CURRENT OWNER Site area (sqm) 1,600,000 MAIN CURRENT OWNER Site area (sqm) 330,000
City Council of Barcelona (Spain) GFA (sqm) 1,780,606 Private owners GFA (sqm) 364,144
Urban density (GFA) 1.03 Urban density (GFA) 1.12
MAIN MASTERPLANNER MAIN MASTERPLANNER
Barcelona Sagrera Alta Velocitat (BSAV) PROGRAMMES Viaplana Arquitectes PROGRAMMES
Residential programme 57.3% Residential programme 46.3%
Commercial programme NA Commercial programme 0.0%
Start of construction 1996 Business programme 35.1% Start of construction 2006 Business programme 52.6%
Expected end of construction NA Civic institutions programme 7.6% Expected end of construction 2020 Civic institutions programme 1.1%

Torras i Bages
S Virrei Amat S Can Tries / Gornal
@F @F
Santa Coloma
St. Andreu Arenal
E E
Maragall
p2.11 St. Andreu Comtal p2.11
@ 22@ Congres @ 22@ Europa / Fira
F Forum Square Santa Rosa F Forum Square
Onze de Setembre
S Sagrera Station S Sagrera Station
La Sagrera Bon Pastor

r
E Europe Square E Europe Square

ive
Camp de

sR
BCN Airport BCN Airport
l’Arpa Llefia

sò
Be
01 Future high-speed train 01 Barcelona Fair
Navas Bellvitge / Gornal
station
01
Verneda

Sant Marti La Pau 01

500 m 1 km 200 400 m

Sagrera Station is the second of three anchors
around which 22@ district pivots. The project in-
tends to create a new urban centrality around the
future high-speed train station in Barcelona. The
development is led by a public company, Barce-
lona Sagrera Alta Velocitat, whose mission is to
coordinate the restructuring of railway and trans-
port systems, develop and manage the urban trans-
formation resulting from this work and draw up
project plans and implement construction. The
shareholders are distributed amongst the State
Infrastructure Manager (ADIF), the State Infra-
structure Operator (RENFE), the Regional Gov-
ernment of Catalonia and the City Council of Bar-
celona. The project is an operation designed to be
integrated physically and conceptually. Two main
layers of this complex project, the surface and the
subsoil, will therefore be intimately correlated.
The surface — the area of life, work and leisure ​
— is shaped on one side by public spaces and by
buildings on the other. A forty-hectare linear park
covering the existing rail tracks will be the princi-
pal provider of public space in the development
and a key element in connecting the two sides of
the tracks. Along the park, the future urban de-
velopment will host over 25,000 inhabitants,
30,000 jobs and 140,000 square metres of pub-
lic facilities. Transport and service infrastructure
networks, systems that support surface activities,
form the subsoil. The high-speed network, the
metro, the regional train and the road network
will all convene in the intermodal station build-
ing. This will be the point where both the subsoil
and surface system meet to generate a seamless
connectivity.
Building footprint
Building footprint projected
Project site
Softscape
Projected softscape
Hardscape
Projected hardscape
Europe Square development is located in L’Hos-
pitalet de Llobregat and has become one of the
most successful business and tertiary hubs of the
metropolitan area of Barcelona. Its inception dates
back to 1996, when the first plans for modifying
urban infrastructures in the river Delta area were
prescribed. The extension of the port and airport,
as well as the planning of new rail lines to promote
the site’s connectivity to its hinterland, created the
opportunity for economic centrality. However, the
site’s sunken motorway served as a barrier be-
tween the two neighbourhoods. The Europe
Square transformation thus offers an urbanistic
solution to the issue of integrating road infra-
structure and increasing permeability between
the dislocated areas. The partial coverage of the
sunken motorway increases connectivity be-
tween both sides and creates a public square ca-
pable of accommodating new programmes, which
will host 1,200 dwelling units and 9,000 jobs
upon completion. An additional catalyst for the
project’s development is the co-location of the
Barcelona Fair facilities adjacent to the Europe
Square site. These facilities celebrate numerous
events throughout the year, bringing both people
and economic activity to the area. Europe Square’s
key position between the airport and the city of
Barcelona supports its capacity to attract metro-
politan economic development. In recent years,
both 22@ and Europe Square have become the
most desirable districts for office space and cor-
porate activities.
Building footprint
Building footprint projected
Project site
Softscape
Projected softscape
Hardscape
Projected hardscape
Subway station

450 22@ Barcelona Subway station

Regional train station 451 Reference Case Studies
Regional train station
Suburban train station

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KX–L
453 The Grand Projet
 King’s Cross

Paddington Broadgate

Battersea
LDN City Airport

Canary Wharf
King’s Cross
Site area 2,580,000 sqm

GFA 6,540,000
sqm

Density 2.54 FAR

Population Density 271 inh / ha

Streets/roads15.00%
Built-up53.00%
Non Built-up 32.00%

Residential24.00%
Business 57.00% Office / Hotel

Commercial 11.00% Retail

Civic 8.00%
Education, Arts, Culture Centre, Recreation

1996 Channel Tunnel Railway Act (Eurostar)

2000 Argent appointed as developer
2002 King’s Cross Development Forum formed for community consultation
2004 King’s Cross confirmed as Opportunity Area in London Plan
2006 Planning permission granted
2007 Eurostar station completed at St Pancras
2007 Start of construction
2011 Inauguration of Central St Martins University of the Arts
2012 Granary Square re-opens
2017 Google gets planning permission
2025 Set for completion

454 King’s Cross London Conception Design Implementation Operation Implication

1820 The construction and opening of Regent’s 1868 St Pancras Station is built. As the approaching 1970–90 By the 1980s, the area has the lowest rent
Canal compels rapid industrialisation of the area, line to the station crosses Regent’s Canal, the line at in central London: artists, musicians and designers
linking King’s Cross to major industrial cities in the St Pancras railway station is 5m above ground level (such as Antony Gormley and Thomas Heather-
north of England and bringing coal, goods and build- wick) move in. The site of the Goods Yard becomes
ing materials to London one of London’s warehouse rave scenes. The area
also becomes notorious for prostitution and drug
abuse

The Granary Building, Watercolour signed by Lewis Cubitt.

1854 The Greater Northern Hotel is built

King’s Cross site around 1850.

Transformation of the Coal Drops Yard in 2017, where former Bagley’s

1824 The Imperial Gas Light and Coke Company nightclub used to be located.
develops a gasworks holder station on a site south
of the canal, which draws a number of other indus- 1989 0 The London Regeneration Consortium
tries to the area (LRC) develops the speculative “Office City” (6.9
The Greater Northern Hotel. million sqf of office spaces) with two master plan-
ning teams: SOM and Foster

The area in 1894.

1873 Inauguration of the Midland Grand Hotel

fronting St Pancras Station

The gasholders were originally constructed in 1860–67 and enlarged in

1879–80.

1846 Comprehensive development of the area for

railway uses. St Pancras Road becomes a major road,
and industries locate to the east of York Road. The
gasworks holder station expands to the west, cross-
ing over Wharf Road

1852 King’s Cross Station and the Northern Goods

Yard are built (with the Granary building). The railway 1970–90 After World War II, the area transitions
tracks from the north fan out to serve the Goods Yard from a busy industrial and distribution district to a
buildings after crossing under York Way viaduct The area in 1862. partially abandoned post-industrial district LCR’s proposals from SOM masterplan in 1989.

Conception
Design
Implementation

456 King’s Cross London 457 Transversal Data

Operation
Implication

LCR’s proposals from Foster masterplan in 1989.
1990 0 The King’s Cross Railway Lands Commu-
nity Development Group produces “Towards a Peo-
ple’s Plan,” based on retaining local housing and
comprising mixed uses, including community and
leisure facilities
Recession hits the U.K. economy and halts
redevelopment schemes
1996 Decision to move Britain’s first high-speed
railway, the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL), from
London Waterloo to St Pancras. Planning begins
for the King’s Cross scheme. Strategic Planning
Guidance for London declares that a mixture of
land uses should be accommodated, with the high-
est density and most commercial uses closest to the
rail termini, and residential facilities to support the
local community
1997 The British Library by Colin St John Wilson
opens on the site of the former Midland Railway
Goods Depot to the west of St Pancras, supported
by the governmental King’s Cross Partnership fund
for regeneration projects
458 King’s Cross London
2000 The works of CTRL start and provide a major
impetus for wider redevelopment. Prior to these,
many fragments of the gasworks and old urban
blocks were still intact
The area in 1999.
7 Development partnership is formed with
previous landowners (London and Continental Rail-
ways (LCR) and Exel) and British property develop-
er Argent as developer partner. A community con-
sultation process is established in conjunction with
Camden and Islington Councils. Argent assembles a
design team of three: Allies and Morrison, Porphyrios
Associates and Townshend Landscape Architects
2004 0 The planning application is submitted by
Argent and its design team
2006 7 The outline planning permission is granted
after revisions
2007 St Pancras International Station is completed 2012 7 The 27-storey Urbanest student housing
and the London terminus of the Eurostar moves to is completed with accommodation for over 650
St Pancras in November 2007, acting as a catalyst students
of development for the wider area. The extension
and construction of the terminus leads to the dem-
olition of several heritage buildings and structures
(see plan pre-intervention)
Urbanest students housing.
2012 7 The affordable housing Rubicon Court
building, the first residential building, is completed
and tenants move in in July
St Pancras International Station, east side entrance from Pancras Road.
7 Construction of King’s Cross Central starts:
the first phases focus on infrastructure, streets, public
spaces and the restoration of Victorian buildings
2008 78 Argent, LCR and DHL form a joint land-
owner partnership: King’s Cross Central Limited
Partnership (KCCLP)
Rubicon Court building.
KCCLP logo
2015 7 8 The British government sells its stakes
2011 7 The University of the Arts moves to the Gra- in the development to Australian Super, an Austral-
nary Complex. The many students passing through ian superannuation and pension fund. KCCLP be-
the area will support district revitalisation comes Australian Super (67%) and Argent King’s
Cross (33%)
2017 7 Google receives a planning application for
its headquarters located in King’s Cross Central,
designed by Heatherwick Studio and Bjarke Ingels
Group (BIG)
Granary Square. 2025 7 8 Development set for completion
Conception
Design
Implementation
459 Transversal Data
Operation
Implication
 100 200m 100 200m

Current base plan. KX–L Building footprint Softscape Pre-intervention base plan, 2007. KX–L Project site
KX–L Building footprint, Projected softscape
projected Hardscape
KX–L Project site Projected hardscape

460 King’s Cross London 461 Transversal Data

 Lewis Cubitt Park

Lewis Cubitt Square

Gasholder Park
Handyside Gardens

Granary Wharf Road Gardens

Camley St. Natural Park Square
Canalside Steps

St. Pancras
Train Station
Pancras Square

King’s Cross
Battle Bridge Place Train Station

St. Pancras
International
Train Station
King’s Cross Square King’s Cross
St. Pancras

100 200m 100 200m

Publicly accessible open space. Softscape (within site) Transportation plan. Underground lines: Underground railway
Green and open space sums up to 32% of King’s Cross area. Hardscape (within site) Roadways and parking sums up to 15% of King’s Cross. London Overground Bikeway
Pedestrian-friendly zone Circle Pedestrian way
Hammersmith & City
Metropolitan Underground station
Northern Train station
Picadilly Bus station

462 King’s Cross London 463 Transversal Data

Victoria Bike station
 Granary Building
Gasholders
West Handyside Canopy

Midlands Goods Shed

Coal Drops
Regeneration Houses

Fish & Coal Buildings

German Gymnasium

King’s Cross Station

St. Pancras Station

Great Northern Hotel

100 200m 100 200m

Heritage structures. KX–L Heritage structure Programme plan. Residential Civic institutions
St. Pancras Station, Commercial Technical utilities
King’s Cross Station, Business Mixed-use
Great Northern Hotel Industrial Ground floor with
commercial & business

464 King’s Cross London 465 Transversal Data

 KING’S CROSS LONDON
New Piece of Old London
Anna Gasco

1 INTRODUCTION

King’s Cross Central is a mixed-use development located on 25.8 hectares

of former railway land in London’s boroughs of Camden and Islington.
Since 2007, the project has been built by the private King’s Cross Central
Limited Partnership (KCCLP) with U.K. property developer Argent as sole
developer. The site’s central location, 1.5 kilometres east of Regent’s Park,
4 kilometres north of Charing Cross and 4.5 kilometres northwest of Liver­
pool Street, makes it one of the largest pieces of brownfield site regenera-
tion in the capital’s centre. With the St Pancras International and King’s
Cross St Pancras train and underground stations, the area is also charac-
terised by unrivalled public transport connection on a local, regional, national
and international level. → KX–L.01
The area was a busy centre of transport and trade between 1800
and 1960, prior to deindustrialisation. Its central location, transport con-
nections and Victorian building stock set it apart as a strategic site. This
potential, initially limited by railway infrastructure, was unlocked in the
mid-1990s by two catalysts: the construction of Eurostar, the international
transport link to Europe at St Pancras and the London Plan’s designation
of the site as an Opportunity Area. → KX–L.02
Despite this potential, the site and its larger surroundings main-
tained an unsavoury reputation following deindustrialisation. The chal-
lenges of integrating the development into its local context and communities
were, according to the Director of Environment at Camden Council from
2000 to 2006, “economic and political rather than architectural” (Bishop
and Williams 2016, 39). A ‘strategy above design’ approach has thus char-
acterised the site’s current urban renewal process, which establishes it as
a paradagmatic case for studying mechanisms related to the making of
urban megaprojects. The mixed-use area, set for completion in 2025, is
currently fifty percent developed. The development already boasts a vibrant
public realm with heritage and contemporary buildings that host mixed-­
tenure housing, offices, restaurants, community-centred amenities and
the University of the Arts London.

1.1 A BUSY CENTRE OF TRADE

Prior to the site’s current urban renewal, historic structures from
its former existence as an industrial trading hub densely occupied the area.
These included mid-to late-nineteenth century gasholders, gasworks, rail-
way structures, storage warehouses and workers’ housing blocks (Campkin
2013; Edwards 2010; Battista et al. 2005). This proliferation of Victorian

KX–L.01 Granary Square in King’s Cross Central. 467 Introduction

 King’s Cross 1.2 A CHALLENGING POST-INDUSTRIAL AREA
After World War II, deindustrialisation led to a decline in trading
activities with the closure of distribution buildings and warehouses. By the
Euston 1970s, the site’s low rent, vacant industrial buildings and central location
had attracted nightclubs, musicians, designers and artists. In the 1980s,
Bishopsgate
the site acquired a reputation as an area rife with drug traffic, prostitution
Farringdon
Holborn Smithfield and physical decay, establishing hermetic boundaries towards its surround-
Paddington Broadgate ings, accentuated by the impermeable infrastructures of York Way, the large
Tottenham
Court Road
City Fringe/ typologies of the southern railway stations and the St Pancras railway via-
Tech City
duct. ​→ KX–L.03 ​
b BORDERING ​
King’s Cross’s broader surroundings also experienced decay as a
result of disinvestment in the railway land. Densely populated with low-
er-income groups, council tenants and local small enterprises, this com-
munity was amongst the “most deprived wards” of England, with rampant
London Bridge, unemployment and health issues (Holgersen and Haarstad 2009). Neigh-
Borough & Bankside
bouring residential properties ​— ​85% of which were social housing ​— ​were
poor-quality; these council estates were amongst the 20% most over-
crowded households in London. ​→ KX–L.04
Victoria
Whilst this “dark picture” has been deemed a strategic “attack on
Elephant & Castle
the area’s image,” designed to bolster support for a “vibrant, creative and
Waterloo
safe” area (Campkin 2013; Edwards 2010), the challenges of integrating
any future development within the site’s surrounding areas were very real.
These required a development partner “who could demonstrate a clear
process and strategy for dealing with the complex planning and devel-
opment process, and one with a participatory rather than an adversarial
approach” (Bishop and Williams 2016, 39). b ​ BORDERING
KX–L.02 King’s Cross Central within the London central activities. Central activities zone
CAZ frontages
Legal character
Health character
Several other constraints posed planning challenges. The site was
Opportunity areas Arts, cultural or entertainment under two protected-view corridors to St Paul’s Cathedral: one from Par-
Areas for intensification
West end special retail
Academic character
Royal parks, palaces and
liament Hill and one from Kenwood House ​→ KX–L.03 , which meant that
policy area environs most new buildings on the site could not be taller than fifty metres. In addi-
State character International retail centre
tion, underground infrastructural tunnels posed aboveground construction
limitations (Allies and Morrison Architects, Porphyrios Associates, and
buildings was the result of the development of Regent’s Canal in 1830, link- Townshend Landscape Architects 2004b).
ing the Grand Junction Canal’s Paddington Arm to King’s Cross in order to The following sections describe the complex process of negotia-
transport goods produced in London’s hinterlands, and later the construction tions amongst stakeholders involved and the spatial framework devised
of King’s Cross (1852) and St Pancras (1868) railway stations, when rail took to guide the development over time.
traffic off the canals from the 1840s onwards. As the approaching line to St
Pancras station crossed the Regent’s Canal, it was built five metres above
ground level, resulting in a physical border at the northwest part of the site. 2 CONCEPTION
This former railway land sloped eight metres upward from Euston
Road in the south to Regent’s Canal to the north, which cut the area roughly
Central Activities Zone State Character
With King’s Cross and St Pancras national rail stations, most of the U.K.’s
in half. The site was relatively flat in its northern part. Although the canal major cities were directly connected to the site, enabling access to London’s
CAZ Frontages Legal Character
functioned as a divider, it also provided pedestrian access to the wider city five international airports via public transport in less than an hour. In addi-
International Retail Centre Health Character
from east to west via its towpaths. Camley Street Natural Park, alongside tion, the site was the only transport hub in London with six underground
Opportunity Areas Arts, Cultural or Entertainment
the canal’s western bank, offered a distinct green space at the site’s centre, lines, fourteen bus routes and the London overground. As such, it had unpar-
Areas for Intensification Academic Character
a natural buffer in the midst of industrialisation. alleled public transport accessibility within London. ​→ KX–L.05–06
West End Special Retail Royal Parks, Palaces and Environs
Policy Area

468 King’s Cross London 469 Introduction / Conception

 HOLLOWAY

CAMDEN

ST. PANCRAS

THORNHILL

BARNSBURY

SOMMERSTOWN

CLERKENWELL

KING’S CROSS
King’s Cross Central

100 200m

KX–L.03 Pre-existing border condition and view corridors in 2007. Railway & typological KX–L.04 Communities in London and index of multiple deprivation, 2015. Statistics for lower layer super
barriers output areas (LSOAs) in England:
Physical barrier 5% most deprived (52)
Road barrier 5–10% most deprived (222)
Urban compound 10–20% most deprived (815)
View corridors 20–50% most deprived (1,964)
50% least deprived (1,782)

470 King’s Cross London 471 Conception

 2.1 FAILED PLANS
The notion of aligning this public transport connectivity with a
redevelopment scheme had been recognised by the former landowners ​
— ​British Rail and the National Freight Corporation (now DHL) ​— ​in the
mid-1980s, before the site’s ownership change to KCCLP in 2008. Their
main incentive concerned the government’s decision to construct the tun-
nel for a high-speed rail link from continental Europe to London, which KX–L.07 King’s Cross Station
2 hr 19 min by train
required a new station beneath King’s Cross Station (Bishop and Williams New Ticket Hall by John McAslan +
Partners.
2016). In the decades leading up to the current scheme, private and public
actors explored three large-scale projects: the widely contested ‘Office City’
Amsterdam in 1989 by the London Regeneration Consortium (LRC) with Skidmore
King’s Cross Owings and Merrill (SOM) and Norman Foster as separate masterplanners
Brussels
and ​— ​in opposition to the latter ​— ​the community-driven ‘People’s Plan’ in
1990, led by the King’s Cross Railway Lands Group (KXRLG) supported
Lille
Frankfurt
by UCL Bartlett scholars and Camden grants. The ‘People’s Plan’ created
Paris challenges and delays for the LRC’s commercial-led regeneration (Edwards KX–L.08 King’s Cross Station
renovated square.
2010; Campkin 2013; Bishop and Williams 2016). In 1992, when Camden
was “minded to grant” planning application to LRC’s ‘Office City’ (Bishop
and Williams 2016, 30), the scheme collapsed due to the U.K. economic
Lyon Aime la Plagne recession of the 1990s.
Moutiers
Bourg St Maurice
2.2 TRANSPORT AND LEGISLATIVE CATALYSTS
Avignon It was not until the late 1990s that two major acts catalysed the
urban renewal scheme materialising in King’s Cross today. One was the
decision, authorised by the Channel Tunnel Railway Act of 1996, to move
KX–L.05 National & international transport node.
Britain’s first high-speed railway from London Waterloo rail station to St Pan-
50 mins to
cras (instead of under Grade-I listed King’s Cross station, which proved to
Stansted Airport be a costly, risky solution (Bishop and Williams 2016, 41)), connecting con-
32 mins to tinental Europe to King’s Cross via the Eurostar. ​→ KX–L.05 ​The upgrade and
Luton Airport restoration of the underground stations on site, following a fire at King’s
Cross station in 1987, also supported the former landowners in their deci-
sion to redevelop the site. The renewal of the underground concourse cre-
ated additional passenger capacity that would benefit any future development
(Bishop and Williams 2016; Urban Land Institute 2014). ​→ KX–L.07–08
The other foundational decision was the establishment of the
King’s Cross Central
Greater London Authority (GLA) under the Blair government, which con-
firmed King’s Cross as one of 38 Opportunity Areas in its 2004 London
48 mins to 46 mins to
Heathrow Airport City Airport Plan. The site was initially classified as ‘Central Area Margin Key Oppor-
tunities’ by the national strategic planning guidance (RPGs) for London
published in 1996. ​→ KX–L.09 ​Opportunity Areas are defined as brownfield

46 mins to
KX–L.06 Regional transport node. Gatwick Airport Tube / DLR
Train

472 King’s Cross London 473 Conception

Total opportunity area: 18,484ha
Total indicative employment capacity: 554,100
Total minimum new homes: 324,300

King’s Cross Central

0.29% total area
4.51% total (IEC)
0.59% total (MNH)

31 18 10 25 03 34 19 02 38 35 16 12 29 11 37 24 27 21 09 04 14 08 33 36 13 06 07 17 15 26 30 20 05 28 01 23 22 32

Area

# LOCATION / OPPORTUNITY AREA AREA (ha) IEC MNH # LOCATION / OPPORTUNITY AREA AREA (ha) IEC MNH
01 Bexley Riverside 1,347 7,000 4,000 20 Lewisham, Catford & New Cross 815 6,000 8,000
02 Bromley 69 2,000 2,500 21 London Bridge, Borough & Bankside 155 25,000 1,900
03 Canada Water 46 2,000 3,300 22 London Riverside 3,000 1,600 26,500
04 Charlton Riverside 176 1,000 3,500 23 Lower Lee Valley (including Stratford) 1,400 50,000 32,000
05 City Fringe / Tech City 901 70,000 8,700 24 Old Kent Road 114 1,000 2,500
06 Colindale / Burnt Oak 62 2,000 12,500 25 Paddington 38 5,000 1,000
07 Cricklewood / Brent Cross 324 20,000 10,000 26 Park Royal 713 10,000 1,500
08 Croydon 194 7,500 7,300 27 Old Oak Common 155 55,000 24,000
09 Deptford Creek / Greenwich Riverside 165 4,000 5,000 28 Royal Docks and Becton Waterfront 1100 6,000 11,000
10 Earls Court & West Kensington 38 9,500 7,500 29 Southall 87 3,000 6,000
11 Elephant & Castle 88 5,000 5,000 30 Thamesmead & Abbey Wood 811 4,000 3,000
12 Euston 85 7,700–14,100 2,800–3,800 31 Tottenham Court Road 19 5,000 500
13 Greenwich Peninsula 259 7,000 13,500 32 Upper Lee Valley 3,900 15,000 20,100
14 Harrow & Wealdstone 177 3,000 2,800 33 Vauxhall, Nine Elms & Battersea 227 25,000 20,000
15 Heathrow 700 12,000 9,000 34 Victoria 47 4,000 1,000
16 Ilford 85 800 5,000 35 Waterloo 78 15,000 25,000
17 Isle of Dogs 410 110,000 10,000 36 Wembley 239 11,000 11,500
18 Kensal Canalside 20 2,000 3,500 37 White City 110 10,000 6,000
19 King’s Cross Central 53 25,000 1,900 38 Woolwich 77 5,000 5,000

KX–L.09 Opportunity and intensification areas in London: Scale, employment and homes provision. Indicative employment
capacity (ICE)
Minimum new homes
(MNH)

474 King’s Cross London 475 Conception

land with existing public transport access and significant capacity to accom-
modate large-scale developments. They are set to host “at least 5,000 jobs,
2,500 new homes or a combination of the two, along with other supporting
facilities and infrastructure” (London.gov.uk 2015). Opportunity Areas aim
to support the development process by granting higher densities and resolv-
ing cross-borough issues that may prove contentious during the early stages
of the planning process. They are often criticised for not meeting the real
needs of local communities and for pushing speculative, expensive devel-
opments, with little participation from people already in the area.
The site’s designation as an Opportunity Area and its exceptional
transport connectivity granted it the momentum required for high-­density
development. ​ u URBAN CATALYST ​However, the site’s surroundings required
a specific approach in order to produce “a new piece of old London” (Bishop
2016).
2.3 THE SELECTION OF A PARTNER
In 2000, the site’s former landowners appointed Argent as their
development partner. The selection was the result of an open competition,
in which the terms highlighted that the landowners were not looking for
“a masterplan or design” (Bishop and Williams 2016, 39). The selection
criteria included a participatory approach and ability to work with different
stakeholders. The landowners also wanted “commitment to a long-term
partnership whereby growth in value would be realised through develop-
ment of a ‘place’”(ibid. 2016).
The competition led to an initial selection of 24 firms, subsequently
reduced to three in the second stage: Lend Lease, AMEC and Argent. While
the first two submitted detailed proposals by renowned architects, Argent’s
proposal consisted of a “single sheet of paper that set out a process” (Bishop
and Williams 2016, 41), stressing that it would be “inappropriate to pro-
pose even initial ideas before a comprehensive analysis of the site.” It high-
lighted the need for “flexibility,” “dialogue with local politicians and com-
munities” and the importance of phasing for a development that might
have a long timeframe (ibid. 2016).
As Roger Madelin (Argent’s chief executive from 1987 to 2016)
explained in an interview, “The site was too complex to spend money on
design…There were too many things to understand first. There was also a
big history of failed plans for that area of London” (Madelin 2016). Argent’s
proposal bid resonated with the needs of the site, its larger area and with
the vision developed in planning policy documents.
3 DESIGN
The area’s spatial framework has been shaped through a complex collab-
orative process between several stakeholders. The design focuses on open
spaces strengthened by ground floor activities. The new framework inte-
grates heritage and contemporary buildings to facilitate a sense of local
context: as Bob Allies, one of the masterplanners, noted, “we resist any
476 King’s Cross London
‘formal’ approach to the masterplan” (Allies and Bishop 2016). The pro-
posed network of streets, open spaces and complementary programmes
aim to support the development’s permeability and integration. ​→ KX–L.10 ​
b BORDERING ​
3.1 SHAPING THE BRIEF: FROM VISION TO GUIDING
DOCUMENTS
Before the Channel Tunnel Railway’s completion in 2007, its con-
struction occupied most of the site. Argent therefore spent the six years
following its 2000 appointment devising a scheme in partnership with
landowners, local authorities and community groups. During that time,
various vision documents emerged, which shaped a final Planning Brief
(Camden and Islington 2004) for the site, renamed King’s Cross Central.
The vision was to create a scheme that would be part of London in terms
of character, activities, urban grain and social mix.
“Principles for a Human City,” published in 2001, outlined the
ten principles that would underpin the vision for the area (Argent St George
2001a). As Roger Madelin notes, “these ten principles deliberately avoided
any debate or ideas about architectural style; instead they sought to set out
a framework within which the urban pattern could evolve and be built on
the strong historic essence of King’s Cross” (Madelin 2016). These ten
principles advocated for a city with a ‘human scale,’ supported by an urban
design of a tighter pattern-built form with lower rise and high-density build-
ing blocks fronting the streets and public spaces. “Principles for a Human
City” concluded that the scheme should be designed around people. The
document was the result of workshops involving Argent’s appointed mas-
terplanner practices ​— ​Allies and Morrison Architects, Porphyrios Associate
and Townshend Landscape Architects ​— ​and other stakeholders. ​→ KX–L.11 ​
Later that year, Argent published “Parameters for Regeneration” to explore
how these ten principles might physically materialise in space (Argent St
George 2001b). This document also established the economic and social
parameters within which the development would emerge (Partridge 2015).
In order to reconcile the need for high density within height con-
straints, several case studies of urban regeneration in the U.K., Europe and
the U.S.A. were analysed. ​m MODELLING ​The result was a “ground-scraper”
approach, which advocated intensification of a city development without
high-rise typologies (Argent St George 2001b, 27). The only high-rise devel-
opment in King’s Cross is the 27-storey Urbanest Student Housing tower,
north of the site and outside view corridors. Another key principle illustrated
in “Parameters for Regeneration” concerned mixed-use development. The
document advocated against “the block ‘zoning’ of particular uses to spe-
cific areas” and put forward a programmatic strategy to establish “lively”
areas with their own “character and sense of place” (ibid. 2001b, 27).
477 Conception / Design
NEW AND HERITAGE BUILDINGS The spatial vision for the site was developed in an intense negotiation pro-
cess between local councils, landowners and Argent. This vision stated
design priorities for the site before the brief for the masterplan was released.
In 2001, the Camden King’s Cross Team was established within the Coun-
cil to lead negotiations with Argent during this pre-development phase. As
Robin points out, this is quite rare, as local authorities’ planning teams
usually work on multiple schemes simultaneously (Robin 2019). The team
at Camden was composed of architects, urban designers, planners and
lawyers who supported the local authority during negotiations. This ena-
bled, for example, more social housing and public spaces than were orig-
inally offered by the developer (Bishop and Williams 2016).
The King’s Cross Opportunity Area Planning and Development Brief,
published in 2004 by the local authorities in charge, is the legal device that
underlined strategic objectives for area redevelopment (Camden and Isling-
ton 2004). The document was extremely detailed. The main objective was
OPEN SPACES
“to create firm links between the development and the local area so that
Gasholder Park
it is a relevant and positive addition to, and well-integrated with, this part
Lewis Cubitt Park of London“ (ibid. 2004, 8). The document not only outlined the targets
Lewis Cubitt Square
that had to be included in the final plans, but also detailed social housing,
Camley St. Natural Park jobs creation, provision of healthcare and community facilities, the public
Granary Square
Canalside Steps
Handyside Gardens realm and other aspects. ​→ KX–L.11
Wharf Road Gardens Whilst the Joint Planning Brief was shaped by various stakeholders
Pancras Square
and followed a cohesive vision, the strong relation between Argent and the
King’s Cross Team at Camden reflects how private objectives were directly
Battle Bridge Place negotiated by the developer with the public at the level of the local plan-
ning guidelines production, as confirmed by Bishop and Allies in an inter-
King’s Cross Square view (Allies and Bishop 2016).

3.2 LISTED HERITAGE BUILDINGS AND RELATED

CONTROVERSY
Argent’s masterplanners proposed a scheme that built upon the
vision and the brief. The spatial framework is detailed in documents sub-
STREETS
mitted in support of the planning application: the King’s Cross Central Urban
Design Statement and the King’s Cross Central Urban Design Guidelines. ​
→ KX–L.11 ​Recognising that the site’s heritage was a unique asset for foster-
ing identity, key historic buildings and structures were retained and inte-
grated. As the masterplanning team notes, “the existing buildings ​— ​their
form, disposition, scale and character ​— ​have been central to shaping” the
plots and public realm of the new framework plan. In doing so, the heritage
buildings are “woven into” the new fabric to ensure their integration and
reuse. The result is that “new has grown out of, rather than being imposed
on, the old” (Allies and Morrison Architects, Porphyrios Associates, and
Townshend Landscape Architects 2004b, 38). ​→ KX–L.12

KX–L.10 Spatial framework overview.

478 King’s Cross London 479 Design

GREATER LONDON AUTHORITY (GLA)

RPG3: Strategic GLA, London GLA, London Plan:

Guidance for London Plan: Draft A Spatial Strategy
Planning Authorities for Greater London

LOCAL BOROUGHS
→ Camden
→ Islington

King’s Cross
Camden’s Vision

Camden, Unitary Islington, Unitary Camden, Camden, Camden Draft Planning Camden Camden Replacement
Development Plan Development Plan Objectives Paper King’s Cross Replacement and Development King’s Cross Planning Replacement UDP Proposed
King’s Cross Towards Conservation deposit draft UDP Brief, Camden & & Development Brief revised draft UDP Modifications
an Integrated City Area Statement Islington
Revised
Judicial review;
Islington refuses
‘Triangle’ appli-
cation; St Pan-
cras opens for
Euro­star Trains

Camden Regent’s Canal Camden, Chapter 13 King’s Cross Opportu- Draft Sub-regional
Conservation Area Statement of Camden’s Unitary nity Area Planning & planning Framework
Development Plan Development Brief,
Camden & Islington

DEVELOPER
→ Argent Argent and
St George split
MASTERPLANNING TEAM
Revised planning
→ Allies and Morrison,
application submitted
→ Porphyrios Associates
→ Townshend Landscape Architects Principles for a A Framework for Planning approved by
Human City Regeneration Camden and Islington
Parameters for Framework
Argent Section 106
Regeneration Findings Urban design statement
as developer approved
and guidelines as part of
first planning application Work starts

COMMUNITY CONSULTATION King’s Cross Development
Forum is set up by Argent and
Camden to channel the com-
Argent kickstarts munity consultation
community consultation
Argent updates Argent updates design / plans Camden council holds consul-
design / plans following consultation responses tations facilitated by PAL.
following consul-
tation responses Argent and Camden update In response to community
and holds further design / plans following several work- feedback, Argent incorporates
consultation shops with the King’s Cross Develop- a number of revisions in its
roadshow in ment Forum and other groups revised planning application.
Camden and
Islington Planning Aid for London (PAL) is commissioned to Planning report submitted
facilitate outreach and community engagement with summary and analysis of
work, and to provide specialist independent planning consultation responses
advice. Camden and Islington councils run health
impact assessment for King’s Cross developments.

1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
KX–L.11 Timeline towards the planning brief, the planning application & the community consultation.

480 King’s Cross London 481 Design

 Streets / surface parking
4.05 ha (15% of total area)

Green parks & squares

8.64 ha (32% of total area)

03
02

01
07 09
04 08 10

05
11
06
13 12
Conserved heritage
structures
Demolished heritage
structures

Green & open space Bike station

Water bodies Bus station
# SITE BEFORE 2007 AFTER 2007 Pedestrian route Potential bus stop
01 Coal Drops Rail infrastructure Public events place; Retail & Dining Bike route
02 Gas Holder Triplets Infrastructure Residential Bus route
03 Gas Holder no. 8 Infrastructure Park KX–L.15 Public realm and mobility framework. Potential bus route
04 Fish & Coal Buildings Infrastructure Park, offices; Retail & Dining
05 Stanley Building Offices Residential
06 St Pancras Station Good storage; Transport Retail & Dining; Transport
07 Granary Building Good storage Culture / Arts school; Retail & Dining
08 Regeneration House Offices Offices; Art gallery
09 West Handyside Canopy Fish market; Storage & unloading Public events place; Retail & Dining critical to area revival. All parties, including English Heritage, agreed to
10 Midlands Goods Shed Offices; Goods shed; Rail infrastructure Retail & Dining their demolition (Bishop 2018). The heritage reuse strategy also required
11 German Gymnasium Art exhibitions; Offices; Storage; Sports hall Retail & Dining
12 King’s Cross Station Retail & Dining; Transport Retail & Dining; Transport displacing some of the structures, such as the Gasholders, initially located
13 Great Northern Hotel Hotel Hotel on the southern half of the site. ​→ KX–L.12 ​Whilst Gasholder no. 8 has been
left open to accommodate a new public space ​— ​the ‘Gasholder Park’ ​— ​the
KX–L.12 Conserved heritage buildings and future functions.
‘Triplet’ now hosts a new market-housing development by Wilkinson Eyre
Architects. ​→ KX–L.14 KX–L.13 The Fish & Coal
building restored into the office
HQ of British designer Tom Dixon.
Several buildings ​— ​twenty in total ​— ​have been renovated to house new uses, 3.3 THE FRAMEWORK PLAN: KEY PUBLIC REALM
such as the Granary building, restored by Stanton Williams Architects, which NETWORKS
now hosts Central St Martin’s University of the Arts. ​→ KX–L.13 ​However, King’s Cross’s public spaces are diverse, ranging from hard to soft,
the decision to remove some of the not statutorily protected old buildings, semi-private to public, historic to contemporary. They are knitted together
remains unpopular, as these had come to form part of the area’s distinct by a network of streets stitched into existing routes wherever possible.
identity. In particular to the south of the canal, except for the German Gym- Occupying 47% of the total land area, the 10.5 hectares of open spaces ​— ​
nasium and one of the three blocks of the Stanley Buildings workers’ hous- ten new public squares and 20 new streets ​— ​steer the development towards
ing of 1864, these structures have almost all been removed to “maximise a coherent and connected whole. ​→ KX–L.15 KX–L.14 The Gasholders
the quantity of office space and retailing” (Edwards 2010). This new accessibility emerged around two inherited areas: Bat- restored into a public park as well
According to Argent and the masterplanning team, the removal of tle Bridge Place (formerly Station Square) between St Pancras and King’s as luxury residential apartments
by Argent with Wilkinson Eyre
some buildings was necessary “to help revive others and plug them back into Cross stations and Granary Square at the centre (the Goods Yard). ​→ KX–L.16 ​ Architects.
the city” (Urban Land Institute 2014, 8). For example, the older buildings to
the south of the canal were seen as blocking north-south mobility flows,

482 King’s Cross London 483 Design

 Two new prominent routes create bold connections between the two: King’s
Cross Boulevard (a generous, pedestrian-focused street) ​→ KX–L.17 ​and
Pancras Square (a more intimate pedestrian space). ​→ KX–L.18 ​Two bridges
reconnect the northern portion of the site with its southern region, ensur-
ing that the canal is no longer a barrier: the bridge to Granary Square and
the pedestrian Somers Town Bridge, connecting the Coal Drop Yards north
to Camley Street Natural Park south and further westwards to Camden KX–L.17 King’s Boulevard.
Town. The canal is now perceived “as one of the main arteries of the site”
(Urban Land Institute 2014). Broad south-facing steps from the upper level
01 of Regent’s Canal open it up to Granary Square, offering a distinctive new
public space. ​→ KX–L.19 ​To the west, the canal is further linked to the public
space near the Gasholders; a ramp connects the canal’s towpath to an open
green space in the eastern region of the site. ​→ KX–L.20 ​The northern Lewis
02 Cubitt Square and Park is situated between urban blocks, which follow the KX–L.18 St Pancras Square.
direction of the original railway grain and structure several north-south
routes. ​→ KX–L.21
This network of streets and open spaces secures the development’s
permeability. Surrounding streets actually flow into the new development,
as in the case of Goods Street, which extends Copenhagen Street from its
origin in Islington. York Way, with its ground floors uses, adds a secondary
layer of permeability, and King’s Cross Square in the southern region of the KX–L.20 Wharf Road Gardens.
site facilitates connections to Bloomsbury and Midtown. The Western con-
KX–L.16 King’s Cross Central Urban Design Statement: Urban Design Principles of Connections: 2007
course ​— ​designed by John McAslan + Partners and completed in 2012 ​— ​on
situation (left), proposed situation (right); (01) Granary Square (the Goods Yard); (02) Battle Bridge Place the west side of the station facing Battle Bridge Place opens to King’s Boule-
(formerly Station Square)
vard, promoting traffic between the station and the new development. ​
→ KX–L.22 ​ b BORDERING ​
The entire site is located within walking distance of King’s Cross
and St Pancras stations. In order to further extend the underground net- KX–L.21 Lewis Cubitt Park.
work, developers incorporated a new subway link at Pancras Square. People
are prioritised over cars; shared routes, which mix cycle and pedestrian
traffic, emphasise soft mobility, with material-paving that reinforces the
continuity of the pedestrian network. The London cycle hire scheme has
docking stations across the development with storage facilities for bicycles. ​
→ KX–L.15 ​The framework plan’s focus on a distinctly pedestrian network
further supports the permeability of the new development.
KX–L.22 Battle Bridge Place in
front of King’s Cross Station
3.4 THE FLEXIBLE URBAN MEGA-BLOCKS linking to King’s Boulevard.
The space between heritage buildings, primary routes and open
spaces is occupied by urban ‘mega-blocks’ or ‘Development Zones.’ These
are broken down into city blocks by a series of secondary streets and then
into individual buildings by tertiary routes. These mega-blocks are high-­
density areas, which host semi-private open spaces with “strongly defined
urban edges” (Allies and Morrison Architects, Porphyrios Associates, and
Townshend Landscape Architects 2004a, 38). ​→ KX–L.23

KX–L.19 Regent’s Canal with the Canal Side Steps.

484 King’s Cross London 485 Design


01 Development Specification
02 Development Specification
03 Guidelines
04 Guidelines
05 Guidelines
06 Illustrative Build-out Scheme
These mega-blocks were defined by the framework plan, which also estab-
lished height, scale and density constraints for these Development Zones.
With the conserved heritage buildings, key routes and open spaces, these
formed the outlining planning permission, detailed later. Central to the plan-
ning application were also the Development Specifications and Design Guide-
lines, which established rules relating to mega-block subdivision, frontage,
and ground floor uses to ensure a “suitable scale and permeability” (ibid.
2004a, 38). These rules also addressed building techniques, materials and
the use of setbacks in the upper parts of buildings to ensure sufficient amounts
of natural light at ground level. ​→ KX–L.24 ​However, while “bulk and massing
have been defined, architecturally … the proposals do not (and should not)
attempt to define or put a straitjacket around future detailed designs“(ibid.
2004a, 56). Once designed, any plots and buildings require additional plan- KX–L.25 Diversity of
ning applications on an individual basis. ​r REGULATORY PLANS ​ Architectural Styles in King’s
This architectural flexibility has led to some eclectic styles and Cross Central.

buildings at King’s Cross, ​→ KX–L.25 which Peter Cook and Zaha Hadid have
KX–L.24 Building envelope
definition by development
criticised as “dull” and “boring” (Fairs 2015). Bob Allies nevertheless argues
specification & urban design that the architectural practices involved in King’s Cross ​— ​mainly British ​
guidelines.
— ​were selected to “reproduce a piece of London,” not to create an “iconic
piece of architecture,” which would be superfluous in the presence of prom-
inent structures like the heritage stations, granary and gasholders (Allies
and Bishop 2016). What underpins the scheme’s design are the public realm,
streets and flexible small-grain blocks. The choice of architect, however,
is closely monitored by Argent. Over time, the developer has selected key
architects with whom it feels confident working (Alderson 2017a). Even
when plots are sold on freehold, Argent remains part of the design revision
board. As such, the developer maintains a certain level of control over
architectural output. ​c CENTRALITIES ​
The overall plot ratio of King’s Cross is 2.9, a little greater than
the density of well-established central areas in London, such as Covent
Garden and Mayfair. The distinctive characters of the site have been used
to allocate zones with different densities: higher near the train stations
(plot ratio 3.4), lower in the Goods Yard, which reuses many existing build-
ings and spaces (plot ratio 1.1), and highest in the northern area, which
has the greatest mix of uses and incorporates most of the residential units
(plot ratio 3.6).

3.5 AN ACTIVE MIXED-USE PLACE

Different areas have also emerged via meticulous distribution of
a range of programmes. King’s Cross is a mixed-use scheme: the south area,
around King’s Boulevard and Pancras Square, offers predominantly large-
scale commercial uses, including offices and chain-retail. The area around
Granary Square and Regent’s Canal hosts a mix of residential, office and
community space. Lewis Cubitt Square and Park provides a more relaxed
atmosphere near its residential buildings, which encompass markets and
100 200m

KX–L.23 Development zones. KX–L Development zones

486 King’s Cross London 487 Design

 social housing; commercial uses include largely independent, food-and-­
beverage outlets such as Caravan and The Lighterman pubs. ​→ KX–L.26
The ground floors predominantly host restaurants and retail areas. ​
→ KX–L.27 ​These active ground floors are spread across the development to
encourage pedestrians to move through the entire area and engage in activity
along the streets and public spaces. In addition, strategically placed “anchors”
(Partridge 2015) ensure that the site is animated, even in areas furthest from
public transport. These anchors include Central St Martin’s University of the
Arts in the Granary Building ​→ KX–L.28 ; the Cultural and Arts Centre and Uni-
19 versity facility by the Aga Khan Foundation on Lewis Cubitt Square; a primary
15 09 18
10 school (King’s Cross Academy) and school for deaf children (Frank Barnes
16 25 School) next to Gasholder Park; Coal Drops Yard, east of Granary Square; KX–L.27 Active ground floors
21 and the Urbanest student housing to the north of the site.
23 22
along Stable Street.
17 30 12
20

Public
KING’S CROSS
03 11
04 4 IMPLEMENTATION
28
02 29
26 The implementation of King’s Cross Central required a collaborative gov-
27 05 24 ernance and flexible development approach to support the site’s reinte-
08 gration within its surrounding public life. In order to detail this methodology,
13 this section focuses on the power relations between the stakeholders in-
06 volved, the phasing strategy that prioritised the open realm and the regu-
latory spatial tool that enabled flexible development without sacrificing
01 07 key spatial qualities.
14
EXEL
4.1 A PARTNERSHIP OF PRIVATE LANDOWNERS
The King’s Cross Central Limited Partnership (KCCLP) is the col- 2007
lective name for the single landowner that comprises two private groups:

Public/Private
Australian Super, an Australian superannuation and pension fund (owning 50% 36.5% 13.5%

67%) and Argent King’s Cross (33%). Prior to becoming a fully privately-­
# RETAIL, F&B # RESIDENTIAL USE
owned development in 2016, the nationally-owned London and Conti- 2016

01 St Pancras Station Retail, F&B; Transport 15 Tapestry (market & affordable) nental Railways Limited (LCR) held a 36.5% share in the site, Argent 50%

Private
02 Fish & Coal Buildings Retail, F&B; Office; Park
03 Coal Drops Retail, F&B; Event Space
16 Plimsoll Building (market & key workers)
17 Gasholder Triplet (market)
and DHL Supply Chain (former Exel) 13.5%. The British government’s 33% 67%

04 Granary Building Retail, F&B; Office 18 Victoria Hall King’s Cross Accomodation decision to sell its 36.5% share was part of the deficit reduction programme
05 Midlands Goods Shed Retail, F&B 19 Urbanest King’s Cross (student housing) of 2015 (Power 2015). Argent, through its subsidiary Argent King’s Cross KX–L.29 King’s Cross central
06 German Gymnasium F&B 20 Rubicon Court (affordable)
07 King’s Cross Station Retail, F&B; Transport 21 Saxon Court / Roseberry Mansion (affordable) Limited Partnership, is the sole developer and asset manager at King’s ownership timeline evolution.
22 Fenman House (market) Cross and thus remains the central decision-making body. Prior to the
23 Luma (market)
# BUSINESS USE 24 Arthouse (market & affordable) acquisition of the largest stake of the development by Australian Super,
08 Pancras Square 25 Triangle site (affordable) the landowners had remained unchanged from 2001 (when Argent entered
09 Canal Reach Area
10 Handyside Street Offices a joint venture with LCR and Exel) to 2014. During these crucial thirteen
11 Beaconsfield Street Offices # EDUCATION AND CIVIC USE years, all landowners worked together within the overarching vision detailed
12 Aga Khan Offices 16 Plimsoll Building (market & key workers)
13 Google Headquarter 26 Camden Council in the prior sections. → KX–L.29
27 Regeneration House Office; Culture; Art Gallery
28 West Handyside Canopy Event Space
# HOTEL USE 29 Central Saint Martins College of Art and Design
14 Great Northern Hotel 30 Aga Khan Education Centre & Student Hal

KX–L.26 Programme distribution.

Residential use
Business use
Retail, F&B

488 King’s Cross London Education and civic use

Hotel use 489 Design / Implementation

KX–L.28 Granary Square.
4.2 FINANCIAL BACKERS AND TENDERING SCHEMES
IN A PERIOD OF ECONOMIC TURMOIL
After its appointment as development partner in 2000, Argent
entered a collective ownership acquisition and development agreement
with the former landowners. The agreement stipulated that the land would
be valued following the planning permission’s approval and completion of
the CTRL’s construction. Upon this land valuation, Argent would have the
option of acquiring it from the landowner or entering a 50/50 partnership.
The agreement also stipulated that the price paid by Argent would be dis-
counted according to the value the developer added throughout the plan-
ning process, with an increasing discount in proportion to rising land value.
The deal not only incentivised Argent to optimise the value of its scheme
through good planning but also prevented LCR and Exel from selling the
land at a lower price, years before Eurostar’s completion (Bishop and Wil-
liams 2016; Urban Land Institute 2014). As Edwards also recognises, the
structure of the “ownership vehicle” may have “[positively] influenced the
development process towards longer-term concerns” (Edwards 2010). In
2007, Argent entered a 50/50 partnership with LCR and DHL.
Support from the British Telecom Pension Fund (BT) has also
ensured the site’s long-term financial stability. Construction has also been
funded through equity, senior debt and recycled receipts from plot sales
490 King’s Cross London
and leasing (Urban Land Institute 2014). Argent, as sole development man-
ager, has delivered all buildings on site except two: the student accommo-
dation built by Urbanest and the AXA building on Pancras Square. Argent
is also developing some of the remaining plots “as spec [speculation]”
(Alderson 2017a): in these cases, building design is finalised and, in some
instances, the planning application approved before clients are secured. ​
→ KX–L.30 ​The scheme is a mix of shorter and longer leases (from 125 to 999 KX–L.30 Model within
years). Some plots are on complete freehold. Whilst Argent actively pro- Argent’s Marketing Suite, with
white buildings waiting to be
motes the development by working with commercial agents such as Savills acquired.
or Cushman & Waefills, larger deals occur via private connections: plots
over 500,000 square feet were signed “by characters who knew each other”
(Alderson 2017a). This was the case for the one million square foot plot
allocated to Google, one of the “few players in town able to occupy and
afford that much space”(ibid. 2017a).
This mixed-land tenure strategy is illustrative of the 2008 world
economic crisis, which the scheme had to confront upon construction.
Despite the BT Fund’s guarantee, the uncertain global economic situation
had direct consequences on the partnership’s financial strategy and selec-
tion of tenants. Whilst the initial business plan was to hold the land as an
asset, develop the plots and lease the buildings to tenants, KCCLP decided
to sell some plots ​— ​around ten percent of the total area ​— ​on freehold in
order to “keep the project going” and, as Alderson, Argent’s marketing
director since 2002, affirmed, to “secure the already huge investment made
on infrastructures during the first phase” (Alderson 2017a). As explained
by a Camden planner, whilst the council was initially not considered a ten-
ant by the partnership, “because [it was] not part of the right ‘image’ for
Argent,” Camden’s available funds enabled the council to secure a share
in the development (Reidy 2016).
Another visible outcome of such negotiations is Urbanest’s 27-sto-
rey tower, the only high-rise building in King’s Cross Central. The private
student housing developer, which agreed to lease the plot and develop the
building early, did so on the condition to be able to “build more.” As Reidy
explains, “In an ideal world, we would not have done it [the tower]. But in
turn we were able to develop the public realm” (Reidy 2016). Similarly, the
affordable housing building Rubicon Court, delivered in 2012, was one of
the first buildings to be completed, due to the availability of “government
grants at that time” (Wheat and Cullen 2017).
4.3 GOVERNANCE AND CONSULTATION: THE COUNCIL,
THE DEVELOPER AND THE COMMUNITY
Camden borough played an active role in negotiations to secure
social and regenerative benefits such as affordable homes, civic and com-
munity facilities, public spaces and employment centres. In London, the
Greater London Authority (GLA) is officially responsible for the planning
491 Implementaion
 of any flagship developments of over 1000 housing units. In the case of
GLA KX Forum King’s Cross, Camden Council therefore operated in a policy context, where
A C it was “subordinated” to the GLA and the British state (Holgersen and Haar-
stad 2009, 356). However, thanks to the Camden King’s Cross Team, Cam-
Argent den Council proved capable of “getting on with King’s Cross” (Bishop and
OB Williams 2016, 63). The GLA therefore “tacitly agreed” for the local author-
Australian Super
ity to remain in charge of the area’s regeneration, whilst the GLA focused
O
its energies on other, more pressing flagship developments in London at
Camden Borough that time, such as the Olympic Games Park (Allies and Bishop 2016). ​→ KX–L.31
A Following the developer-led, laissez-faire approach to urban regen-
eration under Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s ​— ​often fuelled by public
Masterplaners

D
subsidies, as in the case of Canary Wharf → P. 506  ​— ​the 1990s initiated a
Inslington
Borough
restructuring of UK policy framework towards more locally sensitive strat-
A Owners egies. These encouraged developers to include community groups in urban
O planning and design. This is reflected in several documents and govern-
King’s Cross
Central Architects
ment policy, such as the Urban White Paper (DETR 2000). As Imrie points
Partnership D out, community engagement is nevertheless a process fraught with ten-
Retail & F&B (KCCLP) sions relating to defining the specific community or moderating activist
B ABMO Owners
voices. At the start of the planning process, the community of King’s Cross
O
was described as a “crowded field of hundreds of organisations” (Imrie
2009). The King’s Cross Railway Group, in particular, had been active in
TFL Asset
the area since the early 1990s. ​→ KX–L.32
A managers
Visitors
M Led by Argent and Camden Council, community consultations
V
began in 2001. These included both informal and formal approaches. The
King’s Cross Development Forum, founded in 2002, attempted to facili-
English
Heritage

A tate the opinions of different community groups concerning the develop-

ment process. Despite these efforts, groups, activists and scholars reflected
Leaseholders dissatisfaction over their lack of influence in truly shaping the outcome of
One O the regeneration process and the largely “officer-led” consultation (Imrie
KXRLG housing Residents
C group
R 2009; Holgersen and Haarstad 2009; Edwards 2010, 2015). When Argent
M
submitted its first planning application to Camden and Islington in May 2004,
the application was supported by nineteen reports produced by interdisci-
plinary consultants, experts in community engagement, planning, archi-
tecture, environmental issues, infrastructure and heritage. This may have
reinforced the masterplan’s legitimacy and undermined the capacity of com-
munity groups and local authorities to contest the development (Robin 2019).
Following this first planning application, the plans were neverthe-
ROLE SECTOR IMPACT
less revised in consultation with Camden and Islington Councils and other
A Authority Public sector High impact stakeholders, such as the GLA, English Heritage and local communities.
DV
M
Developer
Management
Private sector
Public & private sector
An updated application was submitted in September 2005, reflecting a
O Owner greater number of three- and four-family homes, revised proposals for
D
C
Designer
Community groups
COOPERATION
heritage building development and explicit provision for health and edu-
R Residents / Residents association Founded cation facilities, green energy and green spaces. The borough’s central role
B Retailers / F&B / Business association Strongly connected
OA Other association Weakly connected
V Visitor Targeted Low impact

KX–L.31 King’s Cross stakeholder diagram.

492 King’s Cross London 493 Implementation

 $50,000
KING’S CROSS Conception (2000–) Construction (2007–)
GDP per capita [USD]

REFERENCE GRANDS PROJETS IN LONDON

BATTERSEA Construction (1929–83) Central Electricity Generating Board award Wandsworth Council granted Phase 01
redevelopment to consortium (1984) permission to demolish and
rebuild chimney (2005)
Heritage (1980) Closed (1983) Sold (1993) Sold (2006) Sold (2012)

PADDINGTON Construction Phase 01 (1989–2001) Phase 02 (2001–)

$40,000
Paddington Special Policy Area (1988) Heathrow Express (1998)

CANARY WHARF Urban Enterprise Zone (1982) Construction (1988–)

Docklands closed (1981) London Underground London Underground
Heron Quays DLR (1987) Canary Wharf (1999)

BROADGATE Construction (1985–)

London Underground
Liverpool Street (1991) Heritage Demolish

$30,000
URBAN Ripple effects of negative publicity
CORPORATIONS of London docklands

PLANNING London Planning Advisory Committee (1986)

AUTHORITIES
Decline in effective strategic planning for wider London (1986–2000)

Greater London Council (GLC) is abolished (1996) Creation of the Greater LOCOG
London Authority (GLA) $20,000

LEGISLATIONS Increase of power to LDA & Mayor for Flagship Projects

Re-focus on metropolitan level planning and London wide agencies:

Centralised power, power taken away from with more power to Boroughs and Cross Boroughs
local authorities (1980–90)

Privatisation of London Sustainable Communities

corporation (1980–97) Plan, ODPM (2003)
BURA (2002)
Planning and Land Act (1980)
Public Request to Order Disposal (1980) Urban White Paper, $10,000
DETR (2000)
Creation of London Mayors

LONDON MAYORS Ken Livingstone Boris Johnson Sadiq Khan

Labour Party Conservative Party Labour Party
(1999–2008) (2008–16) (2016–)

ELECTIONS Margaret Thatcher John Major Tony Blair Gordon Brown David Cameron David Cameron
Conservative Party Conservative Party Labour Party Labour Party Conservative Party resigns
(1979–90) (1990–97) (1997–2007) (2007–10) (2010–16)
BREXIT

1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017

Economic Boom Recession Global Financial Crisis

KX–L.32 Political timeline in relation to reference Grands Projets in London.

494 King’s Cross London 495 Implementation

and the developer’s willingness to negotiate are also reflected in the King’s
Cross Section 106, detailed later, one of the longest and most detailed S106
agreements in U.K. planning history (Bishop and Williams 2016, 11).
4.4 SECTION 106, A MEANS OF OFFSETTING NEGATIVE
IMPLICATIONS
In the UK, many planning consents include a set of separately
negotiated planning obligations titled ‘Section 106 of the Town and Coun-
try Planning Act 1990’ (S106). The S106 covers the provision of anything
needed to offset any wider negative implications of development. The King’s
Cross section 106 agreement was over 250 pages long. It detailed afforda-
ble housing, schools, health centres, open spaces, streetscapes, public trans-
port and funds for services such as the Construction and Training Centre
and the Skills and Recruitment Centre. However, throughout the scheme’s
implementation, the emphasis has been placed on delivering the purpose
rather than the details of S-106 (Wheat and Cullen 2017). In this sense,
both Argent and Camden have been keen to renegotiate the specifications
of S-106 in order to accommodate changing conditions. One example
includes allocating more space for a sport and community centre and reduc-
ing space allocated for a medical surgery.
4.5 A FLEXIBLE OUTLINING PLANNING PERMISSION:
SPATIAL AND PROGRAMMATIC EFFECTS
After six years of negotiation, the outlining planning permission
was granted in December 2006. The ‘outlining’ type of planning application
is essential, because this granted flexibility in the scheme’s ongoing devel-
opment. The site’s twenty historic buildings were key elements in the out-
lining permission, along with streets, open spaces and Development Zones. ​
r REGULATORY PLANS ​
In addition, the outlining permission allowed for programmatic
flexibility. When KCCLP received planning approval in 2006, the floor
space was outlined in terms of “total permissible use” (713,000 sqm) with
a twenty percent variation of uses allowed within this total. The permission
permitted adjustments to the land use plan depending on market condi-
tions; the floor space of one programme could be exchanged with another
(up to twenty percent), according to demand (Urban Land Institute 2014).
The partnership is not, however, bounded to make programme changes
for reasons other than maximising economic return. For example, no legal
agreement enforces developers to contribute more affordable housing when
market changes inflate profit. Scholars have accordingly criticised the mas-
terplan’s ‘financially-focused’ programmatic flexibility, whereby the main
aim is to ensure Argent’s ‘commercial’ viability and profitability (Edwards
2015; Holgersen and Haarstad 2009).
496 King’s Cross London
4.6 ENGAGING TEMPORARY USES AND PHASING
The public spaces and infrastructures were planned and completed
in the first phase. The KCCLP initial funds went towards new roads (includ-
ing King’s Boulevard), public spaces (including Granary Square), the bridges
across Regent’s Canal, canal-side improvements and the Energy Centre (with
its district heating and distribution networks). Whilst the costs related to
phasing, infrastructures and public accesses have been higher than predicted, KX–L.33 The King’s Cross
the Partnership’s investment (£250 million) has been key in supporting the Pond temporary use in June 2016,
closed since October 2016 to
development’s reintegration into its wider area (Urban Land Institute 2014). make way for a public park,
In addition, temporary uses were introduced for selected open despite calls by the community
to keep it.
spaces and plots yet to be developed, such as the Skip Garden, a commu-
nity garden moved around the site according to plots’ development, or the
popular King’s Cross Pond, which allowed visitors to bathe in the middle
of the construction site until it was removed to make way for Lewis Cubitt
Park. ​→ KX–L.33–34 ​The area remained accessible throughout; developers
did not “put a big red line around the site, even during the early construc-
tion phases” (Alderson 2017a). Creating engaging public spaces from the
start attracted prospective tenants and encouraged people to visit the scheme KX–L.34 The public viewing
point towers spread across King’s
in its early days. These measures created opportunities for interactions Cross Central enable monitoring
between local users and neighbouring residents. ​b BORDERING ​ of the neighbourhood’s evolution.
4.7 DISSATISFACTION OVER AFFORDABLE HOUSING
Each programme in the mixed-use development of King’s Cross
has its own specificities of implementation, which are, at times, contested,
especially in the case of the site’s affordable housing provision. The Lon-
don Plan identified King’s Cross Opportunity Area as a strategic housing
site; provision for housing, particularly affordable housing, was therefore
a key element in gaining planning permission. The new development aims
to provide nearly 2,000 homes (around 24% of the overall programme),
of which 33% will be affordable. Initially set at 42%, this lowered provision
of affordable housing has generated significant discontent. ​→ KX–L.26
The original Section 106 defined the initial 42% affordable housing
provision. The S106 ensured that of the 1,946 homes on site, 750 would be
affordable, including a mix of ‘social rented,’ ‘affordable’ and ‘intermediate
rent’ units. However, cuts in government subsidies for social housing in
early 2015 allowed the developer to trigger a ‘cascade clause’ included in
the S106, whereby Argent was legally allowed to lower the provision of
affordable homes. According to this cascade clause, Argent was lawfully
bound to provide 74 social rented units, instead of the 148 initially agreed.
Through negotiations between Camden Council and Argent, the devel-
oper eventually decided to maintain a sizeable majority of these genuinely
497 Implementation
affordable units ​— ​127 social rented ​— ​and sacrifice the intermediate rent
units that would have been, according to Phil Jones, Camden’s planning
chief at the time, out of financial reach for most Camden residents.
Both the council and the developer nevertheless faced public crit-
icism, which pointed to a lack of transparency, public consultation and
independent financial assessment (Edwards 2015). The lowered provision
has been considered “a regret” (Bishop 2016) and a “betrayal of the King’s
Cross community” (Brooker 2015). It should be stressed, however, that
minimal affordable housing is a general problem in London ​— ​largely due
to cuts in government subsidies ​— ​that should be addressed by policies at
the national level. The proportion of residential uses and affordable hous-
ing in King’s Cross remains significant in comparison to other recent Grands
Projets in London. → P. 506–509
5 OPERATION
The management of an estate such as King’s Cross is a complex task, not
only because of the development’s scale and variety of users but also because
of the land’s private ownership.
5.1 A PRIVATELY-RUN ESTATE AND OPEN REALM
The entirety of the King’s Cross estate is privately owned by KCCLP.
This has effects on funding, management and activation of open spaces.
All commercial and residential occupants, for example, must pay an estate
service charge, which contributes to the Partnership’s upkeep of streets and
squares and the organisation of ongoing public events, often free of charge.
King’s Cross is one of many large-scale London developments
under private ownership, whose open spaces are subject to landowner reg-
ulations rather than local bylaws. In the case of King’s Cross, however, this
has led to unrestricted use of the public realm. Granary Square, for exam-
ple, has become one of the busiest open spaces in London; diverse crowds
occupy it for leisure, exercise and social gatherings. ​→ KX–L.35 ​Informal uses
occur alongside activities organised by KCCLP’s events team, which drive
the area’s popularity.  ​→ KX–L.36 ​b BORDERING ​
The S106 also defines the terms under which Camden borough
can adopt (take back control of) the main streets (Stable Street and King’s
Boulevard) and some of the public spaces once the development is com-
pleted. This ensures that private landowners’ management styles align with
public authorities’ wishes. Under tight public funding, however, local author-
ities are reluctant to adopt the public realm in private estates, especially
when the landowners maintain agreed standards, such as in King’s Cross.
It should be stressed, nonetheless, that whilst the open spaces in King’s
Cross are subject to guarantees ​— ​such as 24-hour access and inclusive man-
agement ​— ​Camden’s current non-adoption means that Argent could change
private regulations concerning the use of open spaces.
498 King’s Cross London
KX–L.35 Children playing in
the fountains of Granary Square.
KX–L.36 Board for one of the
many activities organised by the
KCCLP events team.
Privately-owned open spaces have historic roots in London and are char-
acteristic of the city fabric. Older, large London estates and their squares,
such as Marylebone, Portman and Hyde Park Estate, have private owner-
ship and management despite providing broad public access. Research con-
ducted by the London’s Centre for the Built Environment highlights how
these traditional estates have proved to be adaptable over time. Their man-
agerial frameworks include social, cultural and economic aspects that look
beyond the physical, such as by directing funds for charitable, educational
and artistic initiatives at a local level (New London Architecture (NLA) 2013).
5.2 DIVERSITY OF TENANTS AND POLICIES
The Partnership has clear guidelines on the type of commercial ten-
ants who can occupy the site and controls their selection in each area.  ​→ KX–L.37 ​
Whilst international companies such as Google or Louis Vuitton illustrate
London’s global economic sectors, Camden Council and Central St Martin
speak to a more local network. In addition, tenants such as the international
non-profit Aga Khan Foundation or the Frank Barnes School for Deaf Chil-
dren promote innovative, community-driven solutions. The site provides a
broad range of attractions, from independent pubs and food-trucks in the
north ​— ​handpicked by the developer (Allies and Bishop 2016) ​— ​to food and
beverage retail chains near the rail termini. Design shops within the Coal
Drops Yards (opened in 2018) focus on craftsmanship and complement the
internationally renowned brands on offer along King’s Boulevard.
The diversity of tenants is made possible by the site’s variety of rental
spaces, which range from large spaces in new offices to studios in historic
buildings. This deliberate mix of tenants is also facilitated by small business
incentives, such as reduced rent for promising tenants (like the Caravan Pub).
Small restaurants within the Granary Building received subsidies for their fit-
ting costs in return of a percentage of their profit over the next five years. After
these restaurants became hugely successful, Argent agreed to negotiate a cap
to the profits value, which the small tenants had neglected to do (Bishop 2016).
In order to achieve a tenant mix that embodies the “King’s Cross
Retail Values,”(KCCLP 2017, 4) some uses are not accepted, such as retail-
ers “with a mass market or traditional high street presence” or “ground
floor uses that restrict more than half of their interior floor-space from pub-
lic access.” On the other hand, brands and concepts that “bring a distinctive
and innovative concept to the Estate” are likely to receive favourable con-
sideration (ibid. 2017, 5). Prohibited uses include gambling, amusement
shops and adult entertainment establishments. Moreover, specific neigh-
bourhood policies ensure that the seven-character areas retain their dis-
tinctive atmospheres: no fashion-type retail spaces are permitted in Pancras
Square, for example, given that they are offered along King’s Boulevard and
in the Coal Drops Yards, and select uses are prohibited in Gasholder Park
to promote a tranquil residential atmosphere. These strategies have crafted
a deliberate, high-quality environment complemented by a vibrant mix of
‘quirky’ users who reportedly drew Google to King’s Cross.
499 Implementation / Operation

Cubitt Park West
5.3 LIVING IN KING’S CROSS
The new development aims to provide nearly 2,000 homes, 33%
of which will be affordable and 67% market. Argent designs, develops and
delivers all housing; Home England provides some financial support (£42
million) for affordable housing.
Market housing incorporates four buildings: the canal-side refur-
Cubitt Park East Gasholder Park bished Gasholders ​→ KX–L.38 ​, the Fenman House and the Luma in Lewis KX–L.38 Luxury Gasholders
Cubitt Park and the Plimsoll Building, which houses King’s Cross Academy Apartment Marketing Suite.

and Frank Barnes School for Deaf Children on the ground floor. ​→ KX–L.26​
According to Argent, the majority of buyers are U.K.-based. Asian-based
clients are approached at an early stage for investment potential; however,
statistics on buyers’ origins were not made available by the Partnership.
Foreign ownership of private housing in London is a highly debated mat-
ter, as evidenced in our London Grands Projets reference cases. → P. 509
One Housing Group is the affordable housing partner of KCCLP,
Cubitt Park West which manages and leases the 250 units in Rubicon Court, Saxon Court
Cubitt Park East and Roseberry Mansions, Arthouse and Tapestry. Argent has chosen re-
Gasholder
nowned architects for the design. ​→ KX–L.26 ​The Dolphin Square Founda-
Park
Coal Drops
Yard
tion, an independent charity, rents 77 apartments to ‘key workers’ within
the Plimsoll Building to accommodate individuals who “make the city work”
Coal Drops Yard
but usually have a more modest income, such as chefs, nurses, drivers,
Canalside social workers, actors, police, restaurateurs, craftspeople and designers
(Dolphin Living 2019).
Rubicon Court was the first building to be completed in King’s Cross.
Alongside the 650 units of student housing provided in the Urbanest Tower,
King’s
also constructed at an early stage, Rubicon Court has been central in sup-
Boulevard porting the creation of a fairly demographically diverse community. This is
Pancras further supported by each building’s provision of a variety of units, ranging
Square from one- to five-bedroom units, duplexes and penthouses. ​b BORDERING ​

Canalside
6 IMPLICATIONS

It is rather early for evaluating the implications of King’s Cross Central, given
that the development is halfway through completion (expected by 2025).

6.1 LOCAL AND SURROUNDING EFFECTS

King’s Boulevard
The evolution of the former border condition ​— ​through spatial
transformation and specific implementation process ​b BORDERING ​— ​has
supported a progressive change of the site’s image. “Nobody would come
to King’s Cross ten years ago; now we are on the map,” Alderson notes.
“We are on the ‘tick list,’ as much as the South Bank, the West-end or the
City” (Alderson 2017a). In 2016, King’s Cross attracted 50% more food

100 200m Pancras Square

KX–L.37 ​ Map of seven neighbourhoods.

500 King’s Cross London 501 Operation / Implications


KX–L.40 Live Wimbledon match screening on on the banks of Regents Canal along Granary Square
in King’s Cross Central.
and beverage customers than it had in 2015 and 325,000 people attended
the 125 programmed events. 30,000 people are expected to be working in
King’s Cross upon its completion and 7,000 to be residing there (KCCLP,
Cushman&Wakefiled, and Nash Bond 2017). ​→ KX–L.39 ​
Knight Frank estimated the average price per square foot at the
Plimsoll residential building on Regent’s Canal at £1,400 in 2015 and fore-
saw that prices could reach £2,000 by 2018 (Brooker 2015). Housing rates
have nearly doubled since the outset, from £700 per square foot to almost
£1,300 (Urban Land Institute 2014).
Every day, thousands of users come to enjoy King’s Cross Central,
such that, on weekend evenings, it is difficult to find space in local restau-
rants. At the size of Trafalgar Square, Granary Square has space for over
2,000 people, yet the increasing numbers of daily users may lead to the
closure of car access along the Square to preserve a pedestrian friendly
environment. ​→ KX–L.40 ​Cars may soon not be allowed to cross from Stable
Street to King’s Boulevard along Granary Square (Alderson 2017b).
The project has also influenced the market and retail quality of the
surrounding residential properties: average residential prices in central Lon-
don rose by 70% between 2009 and 2015, whereas average prices within
a 1.5-kilometre radius of the site have climbed by 80% (Knight Frank 2016).
The growing number of retail spaces and similar amenities has corresponded
with an increase in retail quality rating in the same radius (ibid. 2016).
502 King’s Cross London
It is difficult to pinpoint the sole cause of the wider area’s gentrification.
As Joanna Rowelle, leader of economic development and regeneration pro-
jects at ARUP and in charge of evaluating King’s Cross effects on behalf of
Argent, notes
 ausality is always challenging for projects such as King’s Cross.
C
How much of the surrounding regeneration is due to the CTRL? KX–L.39 King’s Cross
Or to the central location in London? Or to the project itself? The Welcome Sign on York Road,
along the edges of the new
surroundings, mainly on the East, had started to change prior to development.
area redevelopment (Rowelle 2017).
This is illustrated by developments that emerged on surrounding sites fol-
lowing the CTRL Act of 1996, including Regent Quarter, King’s Place and
Gagosian Gallery. Newer developments have also stemmed from the
attraction of nearby programmes, such as University College London (UCL).
Located along the western edge of the site, the Francis Crick Institute opened
in 2016; it is the largest independent biomedical research centre in Europe,
funded by UCL and other partners. The development of King’s Cross Cen-
tral is one of several key elements supporting the market process of upscale
activity replacing downscale activity.
6.2 “SHARED VALUE WHEEL”
As part of Section 106, a regeneration programme aims to improve
socioeconomic opportunities for individuals in the surrounding area: the
Shared Value Wheel programme includes a construction training centre
and an employment centre. The training centre was inspired by the Pad-
dington development, which had implemented a similar centre at the start
of scheme regeneration. → P. 508 The £2 million construction training cen-
tre north of York Way has delivered nearly four hundred apprenticeships
on-site and around London. Meanwhile, the King’s Cross Recruit employ-
ment centre, operated by the Partnership, has created almost two hundred
jobs on- site since its inception in 2013. In addition, Camden and Argent
are discussing the possibility of encouraging King’s Cross Central compa-
nies to sponsor young people in the area with internships at high-level busi-
nesses, such as Google (Rowelle 2017). Camden Borough noted that the
training centre has become popular amongst individuals of the local com-
munity, inspiring some of them to enjoy such services for the first time.
In 2014, Argent commissioned ARUP to review the development
and evaluate how its implementation had responded to the details of S-106
and Principles for a Human City (Argent St George 2001a). Although the
503 Implications
results were not fully disclosed, the main findings indicate that crime rates
have decreased drastically and the feeling of safety has improved in the
area; the development is not perceived as a “gated centre” but rather a “col-
lective and engaged development;” there is evidence of local job creation
due to the training and recruit centres; and younger individuals in the wider
area are demonstrating a change in attitude, aspiring to higher-­level jobs
(Rowelle 2017). It should be mentioned, however, that a consultant hired
by the developer advanced these results.
6.3 GROWING GLOBAL RECOGNITION
Attracted by this urban transformation, firms and institutions such
as Google or Central St Martins have relocated their London headquarters
and activities to King’s Cross Central. This densification of activities is lead-
ing to an improved centrality in the urban region. However, despite grow-
ing worldwide recognition ​— ​as illustrated by foreign planning authorities
like the Singapore Urban Redevelopment Authority sending their officers
to benchmark the development’s success ​— ​King’s Cross has yet to prove
itself on a larger global scale. ​m MODELLING
7 CONCLUSION
King’s Cross Central was conceived to become “an integral part of Lon-
don” (Bishop 2016). This vision was underpinned by ten initial planning
principles, which promised a development that would promote accessibility
through a robust open-realm framework, ensure a vibrant mix of uses,
include existing heritage structures and engage the community and stake-
holders in this process whilst committing to a long-term delivery. This vision
greatly contrasted with that of Canary Wharf, which in the 1980s was devel-
oped to “save the city of London” (Keith 2017) by attracting international
banks and financial institutions.
The King’s Cross scheme is approximately 50% developed. As
detailed in this portrait, the open-ended conception began with a strategy
rather than a design, which included multiple stakeholders. The scheme’s
implementation followed local planning procedures. The daily management
of the area, now privatised, allows for a diversity of residents and users,
and the framework of streets, squares and smaller plots integrates built
heritage with contemporary, low-rise, dense typologies. The phasing strat-
egy has emphasised communities and linkages to the surrounding physical
environment, incorporating temporary uses. These mechanisms are tes-
tament of the site’s aspirations of belonging to a wider local context; upon
evaluation, these have supported the project’s initial aim, principles and
attempts at inclusivity.
Whilst matters of community consultation, social housing provisions
and broader challenges of gentrification have been ​— ​and still are ​— ​contested
by several actors within the local community, the most outspoken critic to
504 King’s Cross London
the scheme regards it as, by far, the “best one in London, by matters of com-
parison with what else happened in town” (Edwards 2016). King’s Cross’s
opponents make more of a case against capitalism processes than against
the development itself (Allies and Bishop 2016). These matters likely require
a wider change in policies and planning regulations at the government level.
The outlining planning permission enables the scheme to adapt
to new conditions whilst fixing crucial spatial qualities, such as key routes,
public spaces, conserved heritage buildings, maximum and minimum heights
and development zones. Further specifications regulate urban mega-block
subdivision, frontage, set-backs, ground floor uses and building materials.
However, the governing spatial tool ​r REGULATORY PLANS ​does not fix exact
outcomes within each plot or building. Adjustments to the land use plan ​
— ​with exchange of up to 20% of floor spaces between programmes ​— ​are
allowed. Whilst this strategy helps the scheme respond to fluctuating mar-
ket conditions, it does primarily focus on financial flexibility and commer-
cial viability for the developer. A better definition within this programmatic
adaptability of what would happen in the instance of profit inflation may
help address a fairer retribution to the planning authority and local context.
The overall development, however, is characterised by an organic process,
ensuring that room for flexibility, negotiation and change is established
from the outset.
An essential part of the scheme’s success has been the balance of
powers at stake. A balance of power between the developer and the local
authorities, allowing the “individual and the institutional” to “come together”
(Allies and Bishop 2016) at King’s Cross Central exemplifies a commercial
development taking the lead whilst working closely with local authorities
and communities. This requires that private property companies function
like de facto municipalities whilst making a profit for their backers (Moore
2014). The landowners’ decision to seek a development partner rather than
a developer was a key move, ensuring long-term profit and interest to build
the estate to high standards. The balance of powers between a strong inclu-
sive vision and a resilient spatial framework of smaller grain also secured
long-term adaptability. “King’s Cross was a political process, not a Master­
plan,” Bishop maintains. “We threw away the masterplan for the idea of
an integrated piece of a city” (Bishop 2016). King’s Cross Central can be
considered as a very traditional and, at the same time, rather radical way
of shaping the city. It questions the means by which Grands Projets emerge
and gestures to the tradition of greater London estates for both the wider
and individual good.
505 Implications / Conclusion
CANARY WHARF BROADGATE
MAIN CURRENT OWNER Site area (sqm) 3,400,000 MAIN CURRENT OWNER Site area (sqm) 130,000
Canary Wharf Group (UK), supported by GFA (sqm) 1,470,000 British Land (UK) & GIC (Singapore) GFA (sqm) 359,200
Brookfield (Canada) & QIA (Qatar) Urban density (GFA) 4.27 Urban density (GFA) 2.76
MAIN MASTERPLANNER
MAIN MASTERPLANNER PROGRAMMES ARUP (UK) PROGRAMMES
SOM (USA) Residential programme 3.0% Residential programme 0.0%
Commercial programme 3.0% Commercial programme 3.0%
Start of construction 1988 Business programme 94.0% Start of construction 1985 Business programme 97.0%
Expected end of construction On Going Civic institutions programme 0.0% End of construction 2018 Civic institutions programme 0.0%

Shoreditch High Street

Blackwall
K K
P b West India Quay P b
C C
B B
Canary Wharf
Ferry Station Canary Wharf
K King’s Cross K King’s Cross
P Paddington Blackwall P Paddington B AR
B Battersea Canary Wharf Basin B Battersea B I CA
Middle D N ES
Riv

ock TAT Liverpool

b Broadgate b Broadgate E
er T

C Canary Wharf Jubilee Pa C Canary Wharf Moorgate Street Station

rk
ham

LDN City Airport LDN City Airport Finsbury

Circus
es

01 Crossrail Place 01 Broadgate Circle Garden

South D
02 Museum of London Docklands ock 02 Bishopsgate
03 Poplar Neighbourhood 03 Brick Lane Market
South Quay
100 500 m 100 500 m

Canary Wharf in the London Docklands typifies
the laissez-faire approach to urban regeneration
under Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom
in the 1980s. Overseen by the London Docklands
Development Corporation, the scheme circum-
vented local authorities and established planning
frameworks that fostered private developers’ in-
vestments. The Local Government, Planning and
Land Act of 1980 created a shift from local au-
thorities to centralised governance: the related
Public Request to Order Disposal enabled the gov-
ernment to force local authorities to sell public
derelict land. The Act also introduced the Urban
Enterprise Zone ​— ​granted to Canary Wharf in
1982 ​— ​with tax concessions, infrastructure incen-
tives and relaxed regulations. These mechanisms
led to the redistribution of power from local coun-
cils to a range of mainly private stakeholders. Ca-
nary Wharf was privately owned by a Canadian
developer initially and master-planned by Amer-
ican architects (Skidmore Owings and Merrill) who
aimed to replicate a miniature Manhattan in East
London with a layout disconnected from adjacent
communities. The urban design and management
style of the scheme reinforced polarisation be-
tween rich and poor communities. Negative pub-
licity emerged in the 1980s, also highlighting a
decline of strategic planning for wider London.
The 1990s brought a restructuring of the UK policy
framework towards more locally inclusive strate-
gies for the design of urban plans (see King’s Cross
case). London-wide agencies such as the GLA were
also reinstated with a clear focus on the metropol-
itan level, complemented by powers devolved to
boroughs & cross-boroughs. Canary Wharf nev-
ertheless eventually shifted the financial centre
of the city and provided a boost to the private sec-
tor housing development, spurring the relocation
of professional dwellers to the east. It has now
become a commercial and transport centrality
within the urban region.
Building footprint
Building footprint projected
Project site
Softscape
Projected softscape
Hardscape
Projected hardscape
Underground station
Broadgate is an office complex in the city of Lon-
don that reflects the economic boom of the 1980s,
when London became one of the main financial
centres of the world under Margaret Thatcher’s
fearless deregulation policies. Similar to Paris La
Défense’s conception, Arup’s Broadgate master-
plan managed to address banks’ needs for new
kinds of office spaces, namely larger plots accom-
modating typologies with immense floor plates.
However, unlike La Défense, Broadgate is located
in the centre of the city. Arup’s plan created a new
environment in the back-land spaces behind the
narrow streets of Liverpool Street Station. The
layout offers a series of primary and secondary
open spaces fronted by new buildings and acces-
sible via numerous pedestrian routes. Now owned
by a mixed British and Singaporean consortium
(British Land and Singaporean government sov-
ereign wealth fund GIC), the private estate is
known as one of ‘the largest pedestrian neighbour-
hoods in London;’ albeit a privately managed pub-
lic realm, Broadgate welcomes people to gather
within its diverse squares and piazzas. Nonethe-
less, Broadgate’s largely corporate environment
and retail focus limit the diversity of people using
the monofunctional estate, which lacks residen-
tial space and more varied programmes. In addi-
tion, the open spaces are not effectively linked to
their surroundings (also due to Liverpool Street
station). The elevated, opaque ground-floor of the
main eastern facade of Bishopsgate Street creates
an impermeable border. Broadgate nevertheless
shows a 99% occupancy rate. Over the years, the
scheme has been an engine of regeneration for
the northern fringe of the city.
Building footprint
Building footprint projected
Project site
Softscape
Projected softscape
Hardscape
Projected hardscape

King’s Cross London


Train station Underground station
506 DLR station 507 Reference Case Studies Train station
PADDINGTON BATTERSEA NINE-ELMS
MAIN CURRENT OWNER Site area (sqm) 180,000 MAIN CURRENT OWNER Site area (sqm) 1,950,000
Multiple GFA (sqm) 675,590 Multiple GFA (sqm) NA
Urban density (GFA) 3.71 Urban density (GFA) NA
MAIN MASTERPLANNER MAIN MASTERPLANNER
Multiple PROGRAMMES Multiple PROGRAMMES
Residential programme 11.0% Residential programme NA
Commercial programme 13.0% Commercial programme NA
Start of construction 1985 Business programme 74.0% Start of construction 2012 Business programme NA
End of construction 2018 Civic institutions programme 2.0% Expected end of construction 2026 Civic Institutions programme NA

L IT
TL
05
EV
EN
K ICE K
P b P b
C C
B B
Edgware Road
04 Vauxhall

rk
Battersea
06

Pa
Power Station Pier

ton
K King’s Cross K King’s Cross
sin s 02 07

g
P Paddington n Ba P Paddington me
er Tha

nin
B Battersea Padd
ingto B Battersea Riv
01

n
Ke
b
C
Broadgate
Canary Wharf
b
C
Broadgate
Canary Wharf Battersea Park
03
LDN City Airport 01 LDN City Airport
Battersea
01 St. Mary’s Hospital Park
01 Battersea Power Station
02 Circus West
Paddington Station
03 New Covent Garden Market
er
st 04 Vauxhall Bridge
u ce re 05 Lambeth Bridge
100 500 m o a
Gl Squ 06 The Oval 500 m 1.5 km
07 US Embassy

Paddington, in Westminster Borough in London,
is the urban regeneration of the area around Pad-
dington Basin to the north of the station and the
south of Westway Highway. Designated as the
Paddington Special Policy Area in 1988 in order
to ‘fast-track’ planning processes and encourage
private investments, the derelict area previously
dedicated to canal and rail trade has since devel-
oped into a thriving commercial environment.
Westminster Council took the decision not to cre-
ate an overall masterplan for Paddington, in con-
trast to their approach to Camden Borough and
the regeneration of King’s Cross. Due to the frag-
mentation of multiple land ownership and the low
probability that the different sites would cohere
at the same time, Westminster’s strategy aimed
at coordinating prevailing development pressures
rather than devising an area-based vision. West-
minster provided an overall framework plan ​— ​
including uses, accessibility and management of
transport impact ​— ​complemented by thirteen
site-­specific development briefs. Profit-seeking
developers have since pushed for high-value uses,
including expensive office and residential devel-
opments, resulting in a rather ‘soulless,’ corporate-­
oriented character that lacks integration with the
surrounding communities. The employment cen-
tre implemented by developers at the beginning
of Paddington urban regeneration nevertheless
aimed at improving socioeconomic opportunities
for area residents. Camden and Argent referenced
Paddington’s employment centre twenty years later
in their regeneration of King’s Cross Central.
Building footprint
Building footprint projected
Project site
Softscape
Projected softscape
Hardscape
Projected hardscape
Battersea Nine Elms is a 195-hectare area cur-
rently undergoing redevelopment on the western
south bank of the River Thames. As King’s Cross,
it is one of London Plan’s opportunity areas, spe-
cifically the Nine Elms Battersea Opportunity
Area. The key anchor is the Battersea power sta-
tion, which lay derelict for four decades whilst sev-
eral developers tried and failed to restore the 1930s
heritage landmark. In 2011, a Malaysian consor-
tium (Setia, Sime Darby) bought it for £400 mil-
lion, after the previous developing company had
fallen into administration in the wake of Rafael
Viñoly’s plan. It is now being transformed into an
£8 billion development replete with shops, offices
and luxury apartments and surrounded by new
housing designed by star architects. The flagship
tenant will be Apple, whose new headquarters will
occupy the top six floors ​— ​about forty per cent of
the office space within the heritage power station.
The rest of the area will eventually host high-end
commercial and housing developments near the
US embassy, which relocated to the site in 2008.
The famous Covent Garden flower market and
the landmark Victorian gasholders have been de-
molished to make way for housing towers. In 2014,
the underground Northern Line extension was
confirmed, providing a final boost to the area’s
development; this extension connects passengers
to central London within a mere fifteen minutes.
The lack of a vision and comprehensive master-
plan for the area has been criticised by many local
stakeholders; others disparage the incompatibility
of new developments and their poor integration.
The high-density typologies obstructing the power
station and the waterfront have, many maintain,
turned the area into a “Dubai-on-Thames” or
crafted a “Hong Kongification” of London’s sky-
line. The majority of the first phase flats were sold
to overseas buyers, many from Asia, illustrative of
London’s increasing private foreign acquisitions.
Building footprint
Building footprint projected
Project site
Softscape
Projected softscape
Hardscape
Projected hardscape

508 King’s Cross London Underground station

Train station 509 Reference Case Studies
Underground station
Train station

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Robin, Enora. 2019. ‘The Politics of Urban Expertise’. PhD Thesis, London:
University College London.
Rowelle, Joanna. 2017. Interview with Joanna Rowelle (ARUP, Director Inte-
grated City Planning, leading the economic development and regener-
ation projects) Interview by Anna Gasco. Meeting notes.
Urban Land Institute. 2014. ‘ULI Case Studies: King’s Cross, London’.
London. http://uli.org/case-study/uli-case-study-kings-cross-london-
united-kingdom/.
Wheat, Frances, and Bethany Cullen. 2017. Interview with Frances Wheat
and Bethany Cullen (Camden Council, London) Interview by Anna Gasco.
Meeting notes.
Wiles, Colin. 2014. ‘Affordable Housing Does Not Mean What You Think
It Means’. The Guardian (Online), 3 February 2014, sec. Housing Network.
http://www.theguardian.com/housing-network/2014/feb/03/affordable-
housing-meaning-rent-social-housing.
511 The Grand Projet
THE MAKING OF MARINA BAY
Fun Siew Leng and Andrew David Fassam
The plan for the new extension of Singapore’s City
Centre and the creation of the area known as
‘Marina Bay’ have a long history. Development
of the area also had a long gestation period. The
notion of reclaiming additional land was first con-
ceived in the 1970s in conjunction with the deci-
sion to construct a new highway bypassing the
city. The planning and development of the area
is guided by the Urban Redevelopment Authority
(URA), Singapore’s national land-use planning
and conservation agency. This article focuses on
some of the key decision points in the evolution
of the masterplan for Marina Bay and the impetus
behind them, which have helped shape the phys-
ical form of the development seen on-site today.
LAND RECLAMATION
The story of Marina Bay began with the decision
to reclaim land by the shoreline east of the exist-
ing city. The first phase of land reclamation for
Marina South and Marina Centre took place in
the 1970s and was planned to support construc-
tion of the East Coast Parkway (ECP). This stra-
tegic east-west expressway connection, intended
to bypass the city, was identified in the First Con-
cept Plan for Singapore. It recognised the need
to build a road transportation network to relieve
congestion and support urban renewal and the
forecasted economic and population growth.
Without land reclamation, an extended stretch
of the ECP would have to have been constructed
over the sea. At this time, the notion of reclaim-
ing more land to form Marina Bay had not been
conceived.
513 Further Insights
The early phases of reclamation therefore only
involved creating land at Marina Centre, Marina
East and Marina South to a profile adequate to
support the ECP’s construction. However, as urban
renewal intensified, the planners saw an oppor-
tunity to extend reclamation efforts to accom-
modate city expansion; as such, the government
officially decided to expand the reclamation of
Marina Bay in 1976. ​→ GP–FI.01 This reclamation
was carried out in phases in the mid-1980s and
1990s to its current profile.  ​→ ­GP–FI.02 The fact
that reclamation costs at that time were low rel-
ative to the future value of the land also drove the
push for additional reclamation. It was an ambi-
tious plan, as it created over 700 hectares of re-
claimed land, of which approximately 226 hectares
form the area known as Marina Bay. In the 1980s,
planners intended to retain most of this as a ‘land
bank,’ given that development was only anticipated
to begin some forty to fifty years later. Ultimately,
the existing city grew faster than anticipated, and
the development of Marina Bay commenced in
the early 2000s.
THE CHANGING PROFILE OF THE BAY
The eponymous new waterbody created as a result
of land reclamation efforts has since become the
genius loci for Marina Bay and key reference point
for the area. Ringed by a 3.5-kilometre continu-
ous waterfront promenade, which is connected
by two foot bridges, the Bay itself has become a
location for national celebrations. These include
the National Day Parade, the Marina Bay Singa-
pore Countdown on New Year’s Eve and i-light
Marina Bay, a sustainable lights art festival. These
events are held at The Float@ Marina Bay and
within the public spaces located around the Bay.
The profile of the Bay itself underwent
several iterations. In the first phase of land rec-
lamation, it had a curved, eastern edge, aligned
with the ECP’s sweeping curve. Later on, following
adoption of the Master Plan proposed by I.M. Pei
(see next section), further land reclamation led to a
straightening of this part of the waterfront and a
slight reduction in the width of the Bay. Planners
took great care in configuring the Bay in order to
ensure that it was of sufficient size but not so large
as to form a gulf between the developments on
the opposite sides at Collyer Quay and Bayfront.
The size and scale of the Bay was benchmarked
against other major urban waterbodies as part of
the planning process: in particular, the Inner Har-
bour at Baltimore and Sydney Harbour.
THE STRUCTURE OF MARINA BAY
Although it was assumed that the development
of Marina Bay would occur four or five decades
later, URA requested two world-renowned archi-
tects, Kenzo Tange and I. M. Pei, to formulate a
masterplan for the area in 1983. ​→ GP–FI.03 ​The
two conceptual masterplans differed significantly.
Pei advocated a gridiron plan, whilst Tange pro-
posed a radial pattern with wedge-shaped green
spaces between rectilinear development plots.
The latter was based on strong visual corridors
emanating from a proposed focal point at the
mouth of Singapore River and an axis linking the
City Hall area to Marina Bay. Tange consciously
introduced the radical concept of highlighting
the contrast between the future extension of the
city and the existing CBD. This masterplan re-
tained the former Telok Ayer Basin, creating a
seam between the ‘old’ and the ‘new.’ A pair of
landmark towers marked both the mouth of the
Singapore River and the opening to Telok Ayer
Basin, forming part of a curvilinear row of high-
rise developments defining the edge of the Bay.
Conversely, Pei’s plan incorporated a rectilinear
grid extending from the existing CBD. He also
advocated further reclamation to reshape the Bay
into a more rectilinear configuration, mirroring
the waterfront of the existing city, and introduced
514 The Grand Projet
1967 1970
GP–FI.03a Model of Master
Plan Proposal by Kenzo Tange
(Aerial View).
1974 1980
GP–FI.03b View into Marina Bay
from the East.
1990 2008
GP–FI.03c Model of Master
Plan Proposal by I.M. Pei
(Aerial View).
2010 Future
GP–FI.03d View into Marina Bay
from the East.
GP–FI.03 The contrasting
GP–FI.01 Phasing of reclamation works showing the initial
reclamation in 1967–1974 to support construction of the East Coast
Master Plans for Marina Bay in
the early 1980s by Kenzo Tange
Parkway and later phases for the extension of the existing Central and I.M. Pei.
Business District.
GP–FI.02 Reclamation works GP–FI.04 The ArtScience
underway at Marina East Museum at Marina Bay Sands on
(foreground) and Marina South in
the 1980s.
the ‘promontory’ site along the
eastern edge of Marina Bay
intended for a landmark building.
515 Further Insights
two ‘promontories’ along the waterfront edges,
each of which were identified as landmark sites
with high-rise developments to anchor the over-
all structure.
The decision of which plan to adopt took
into consideration the fact that the area would be
developed over a long period of time. While Tan-
ge’s radial plan presented a bold, sweeping sky-
line, the urban structure would likely only be re-
alised and appreciated when the area was fully
developed and all the high-rise towers were in
place. In contrast, Pei’s gridiron concept would
be easier to implement incrementally and offered
greater planning flexibility to accommodate chang-
ing market needs. This inherent versatility allowed
for subdivision or amalgamation of the land par-
cels if required. The key concepts and guiding prin-
ciples of Pei’s plan were thus adopted in the draw-
ing of the masterplan for Marina Bay.
Even though the masterplan has under-
gone several revisions since, the essential plan-
ning principles of the gridiron road network and
parcellation have been retained. The configura-
tion of the Bay with two promontory sites ​— ​one
of which has been developed into the ArtScience
Museum at Marina Bay Sands ​→ GP–FI.04 ​— ​has also
been realised, albeit with some refinements.
A CITY CHARACTERISED BY PARKS AND
GREENERY
Another central element of Pei’s plan was its focus
on public spaces. In addition to keeping the water-
front area open and accessible to the public via an
extensive promenade, the plan featured a central
linear park with a large reflecting pool, anchored
by a ‘twin tower’ landmark development at the
waterfront and a high-rise tower to the southwest.
This axial green space has been retained through
subsequent iterations of the Master Plan and has
been realised as The Lawn, adjacent to the Marina
Bay Financial Centre.
Subsequent revisions to the masterplan,
exhibited in 1992, incorporated an ambitious plan
that went beyond the area originally conceptual-
ised in Pei’s plan. This revision effectively demon-
strated, for the first time, how the entire 350 hect-
ares of reclaimed land at Marina South could be
developed. ​→ GP–FI.05 ​
These ideas continued to be refined and were again
exhibited in 1997 as part of a further revised plan
entitled “New Downtown: Ideas for the City of
Tomorrow”. ​→ GP–FI.06 ​However, by the late 1990s,
URA acknowledged that, based on the existing
pace of development, the larger area was unlikely
to be developed as early as previously thought,
and large parts were zoned as Reserve Sites for
future study. ​→ GP–FI.07 ​
Building upon Pei’s vision of a green axis,
the revised 1992 plan included the safeguarding
of substantial park spaces throughout the area and
fronting the coast. These green open spaces form
important focal points in the larger structure of the
area to create ‘address locations,’ around which
individual sub-districts can form. This revision of
the plan also preserved the idea of a national-scale
park at Marina South, with the former Marina City
Park ​— ​developed as part of an interim use plan ​
— ​becoming a permanent feature.
The inclusion of a major park in the form
of Marina City Park set the stage for a substantial
evolution a decade later as part of the 2008 Master
Plan ​→ GP–FI.08 ​with the conceptualisation of the
Gardens by the Bay, a series of three waterfront gar-
dens spanning 100 hectares. In developing this am-
bitious proposal, the National Parks Board and URA
carried out a series of studies on the size and con-
figuration of the main garden at Marina South to
ensure that it would receive sufficient sunlight, given
the fact that the adjacent land parcels would even-
tually be developed with high-rise buildings. After
several iterations, the park was shaped to embrace
the entire waterfront along Marina Channel.
In subsequent versions of the Master Plan,
the location and configuration of other green spaces
underwent further revisions. However, the initial
intent of imbuing the plan with major open spaces
remained intact. URA’s planning policies, includ-
ing the 100% greenery replacement scheme under
the Landscape for Urban Spaces and High-Rises
(LUSH) programme, have further enhanced the
vision of Marina Bay as a ‘City in a Garden.’ Under
the LUSH scheme, all developments have to include
greenery in the form of sky terraces or roof-top
gardens equivalent in size to the built-up area at
ground level. URA also introduced guidelines that
require twenty-five percent of the built-up foot-
print of developments to be set aside as covered
516 The Grand Projet
public space, or ‘city rooms.’ These spaces, such
as The Cube at Asia Square and the Green Heart
at Marina One, have increased permeability at
street level, improving pedestrian connectivity
and creating privately owned public spaces for
activities, respite and social interaction.
UNFORESEEN OPPORTUNITIES:
A RESERVOIR IN THE HEART OF THE CITY
The Bay is often referred to as the ‘water piazza’
of the new extension of the CBD and its genius
loci. It is used for recreational activities, such as
sailing, and for water taxis. It is also the venue
for many sporting events, including the annual
DBS Dragonboat Regatta, and the focal point for
Singapore’s National Day and year-end Count-
down celebrations. As a freshwater reservoir, it
also supports Singapore’s largest catchment area,
spanning 10,000 hectares.
The reservoir was made possible through
the 1972 Water Master Plan, which began shap-
ing Singapore’s water management systems and
initiatives as early as 1977. In the two decades fol-
lowing the 1960s, the construction of flood con-
trol drains and canals and the cleaning of polluted
rivers advanced steadily. In 1977, former Prime
Minister Lee Kuan Yew called for the clean-up of
the highly polluted Singapore and Kallang Rivers,
which flow into Marina Bay. Over a ten-year period,
industries, such as pig farms and shipyards, were
phased out; squatters rehoused; and street hawk-
ers relocated to centralised markets. In addition
to addressing the source of the pollution, more
than 260 tonnes of rubbish were collected from
the waterways and subsequently disposed. This
Herculean effort restored the two rivers to a state
in which fish could thrive once again.
This led to an even more ambitious vision:
to build a barrage to provide flood control meas-
ures for the city and convert the waterbody into
a freshwater reservoir. This idea was realised two
decades later following advances in engineering
and membrane technology and the construction
of Marina Barrage across the mouth of Marina
Channel in 2007. URA saw the opportunity to cap-
italise on this project and persuaded the Public
Utilities Board, Singapore’s national water agency,
to design the barrage and adjacent pump house
as a people-friendly destination and continuation
of the waterfront park. Today, the Marina Barrage
is a popular public space with a grassy rooftop that
is an attractive location for community gatherings
and activities, whilst the barrage doubles as a
pedestrian bridge to connect the waterfront prom-
enades at Marina South and Marina East.
GP–FI.05 Extract from the 1992
publication “Downtown Core &
PLANNING FOR FLEXIBILITY: Portview Development Guide
MANY SHADES OF WHITE Plans (Draft)” showing Marina
City Park as a permanent feature
The term “White Site” was first introduced by URA of the Master Plan and substantial
in 1995 to several land parcels at China Square park spaces along the waterfront.
that were tendered out under the Government
Land Sales Programme (GLS). This new ‘White’
zoning was intended to allow developers greater
flexibility in deciding on the mix of uses within
each development and moved away from the more
conventional approach of prescribing specific types
and proportions of uses. It recognised a certain GP–FI.06 Extract from “New
rigidity in the existing zoning system and the need Downtown: Ideas for The City of
Tomorrow” (1996) showing the
to allow for uses to be more easily changed in re- potential long-term development
sponse to market demands and trends, without for the entire reclaimed land.
requiring rezoning.
In 1997, following the release of URA’s
Development Guide Plan (DGP) for the New
Down­town at Marina Bay, URA’s White Site zon-
ing was formally introduced for the majority of
the Marina Bay land parcels. This gave developers
greater flexibility in planning a variety of uses in GP–FI.07 Extract from the 1997
their developments. This was significant, given Planning Report publication
“Downtown Core (Central &
that the land parcels were sizeable and the devel- Bayfront Subzones), Straits View
opment intensity very high. and Marina South Planning
Areas” reflecting the zoning of
This new zoning was applied to the first the Straits View and Marina
site to be launched for development under the South areas as Reserve Sites, to
be developed over a longer term.
GLS Programme in 2001 and, as a result, the suc-
cessful tenderer decided to use the site predom-
inantly for offices, with some space allocated for
retail and food and beverage purposes to activate
key pedestrian routes. The second GLS site was
launched in 2002. However, in contrast, the suc-
cessful tenderer decided to develop the site largely
for residential purposes with some retail and food
and beverage uses. Both these outcomes were
based on assessments of market demand at that
point in time.
Given that Marina Bay was planned as an
extension of the existing CBD, the development GP–FI.08 The Master Plan
outcome did not fulfil URA’s overarching inten- 2003 (above) and Master Plan
tion for a mixed-use precinct. A review led to the 2008 (below), showing the
extended Park zoning for the
introduction of requirements for certain desired Gardens by The Bay.
517 Further Insights

GP–FI.09 Marina Bay, the
live-work-play extension of
Singapore’s business and financial
district.
518 The Grand Projet
uses ​— ​i.e., minimum proportions of office, resi-
dential or hotel use ​— ​for subsequent GLS sites.
These requirements created ‘shades of white,’
but still attempted to align with URA’s original
intention of providing developers with as much
flexibility as possible when determining remain-
ing uses.
When the third site, intended for the
Marina Bay Financial Centre, was tendered out,
these stipulations required a significant propor-
tion of the gross floor area to be developed for
Grade A office use, in anticipation of the need to
provide space for international financial and busi-
ness firms. Today within the Marina Bay Finan-
cial Centre and the Asia Square and Marina One
developments, there is a diverse mix of office,
residential, hotel, retail and food and beverage
uses. As such, since the start of the development
of the Marina Bay area in 2000, it now consists of
approximately 51% office use, in contrast to 77%
within the existing CBD. This reflects the inten-
tion of creating a ‘live-work-play’ precinct as an
extension of the business and financial district. ​
→ GP–FI.09 ​
CONCLUSION
Marina Bay is currently in its fifth decade of plan-
ning and second decade of active development. It
is anticipated that development will continue for
the next forty to fifty years. The area exemplifies
Singapore’s long-term approach to planning and
development. It emphasises the importance of a
strong vision and robust development plan, both
of which must also be flexible enough to accom-
modate revisions to respond to changing market
demands and development models. Marina Bay
illustrates URA’s role in regularly reviewing and
modifying development plans to ensure a desirable
outcome consistent with original intentions.
FUN SIEW LENG
Chief Urban Designer at the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) of Sin-
gapore. Her primary responsibility is to oversee all architectural and urban
design aspects of URA’s work.
ANDREW DAVID FASSAM
Senior Director of Strategic Projects at the Urban Redevelopment Authority
(URA) of Singapore.
All illustrations and plans © Urban Redevelopment Authority.
All rights reserved.
THE 22@ PROJECT AND ITS REVISION
Ramón García-Bragado
BACKGROUND
In 1999, the socialist government of the Barce-
lona City Council faced the problem of managing
the urban transformation of an important indus-
trial zone located in the Poblenou neighbourhood,
a central sector in the northeast region of Barce-
lona. The area comprised 200 hectares, which
had concentrated much of Barcelona’s industrial
potential for 150 years but had entered a phase
of irrevocable decline fifteen years prior.
The urban structure of the area was con-
ditioned by the “Cerdá plot,” with 113 × 113 metre
blocks and 20-metre wide streets. From a regu-
latory perspective, the land within the project area
was defined as industrial (land qualification: 22a).
It was approved in the General Metropolitan Plan
of 1975 with a maximum FAR of 2 for exclusively
industrial uses incompatible with tertiary, hotel
or housing activities.
To manage this area’s transformation,
those of us with the responsibility of directing the
city’s urban planning services had three factors
in our favour. The first (i) was the professional
experience we accumulated with urban transfor-
mations carried out in anticipation of the Olympic
Games in 1992. The second (ii) was the parallel
rise of the New Economy, or the emergence of
digitisation and ICT (Information and Commu-
nication Technologies) in the production land-
scape of cities. This was fuelled by the liberalisation
of broad economic sectors hitherto monopolistic,
a process promoted by the European Union. The
third factor (iii) was the social mobilisation of an
important professional and citizen group in regard
519 Further Insights
to the future uses of 22@. This group, to which I
belonged, demanded developers maintain the
character of Poblenou by linking it to economic
and productive activities, thereby avoiding the
transformation of the district into a low-density
residential area, as had already occurred with the
Olympic Village and the Front Maritim.
The extraordinary dimensions of the area
to be transformed (200 hectares) meant that, for
the first time in Barcelona, urban planning was
considered from a supply rather than demand
perspective. 22@ was not intended to satisfy de-
mand for office space; instead, it served as the
international business card of a city that wanted
to move from an industrial-based production sys-
tem to a tertiary economy. In fact, the annual
demand for office space in 1999 accounted for
90,000 sqm, whilst 22@ placed 3,000,000 sqm
on the market. In this way, we positioned Barce-
lona on the radar of international investors fo-
cused on real estate associated with economic
and technological activities.
Undoubtedly, one of the success factors
of 22@ was that the urban transformation did not
arise radically or suddenly but rather voluntarily
and gradually. A modification of the General Metro­
politan Plan of 1975, which established the ben-
efits and duties of landowners who wanted to trans-
form, and special or derivative planning (called
Second Planning Level in this text’s 22@ portrait)
for each area of transformation, in which land-
owner benefits and duties were specified, have
allowed an adaptation of the transformation pro-
cess according to different economic cycles.
The 22@ project also represents a practical and
effective expression of how public-private collab-
oration, or PPP, is able to solve important urban
problems. In our case, the public sector assumed
the function of planning and managing this trans-
formation, whilst the private sector assumed the
execution of planning, investments and risks inher-
ent to real estate development.
During these nineteen years, the 22@ Plan
has served as an excellent landing strip for com-
panies interested in settling in Barcelona. It has
also helped characterise the city as an economic
centre beyond its tourist attractions. The principle
of constructing buildings fully adaptable to com-
panies’ needs has been a key component of the
22@ Plan’s success. Similarly, urban intervention
has relied on the value of heritage as a means of
maintaining identity. In Barcelona, we have learned
since the Acupuncture Plan of the 1980s that the
best way to maintain our heritage is to use it. Fol-
lowing this premise, the extraordinary industrial
heritage of Poblenou is being reused for the estab-
lishment of innovative companies, public facilities
and housing.
We can therefore say that the transfor-
mation of an old, obsolete industrial zone into a
modern technological district (from 22a to 22@)
was, above all, the result of transforming a prob-
lem into a great opportunity.
APPROVAL AND MANAGEMENT
The 22@ Plan was approved in July 2000 with
the unanimous support of all political parties in
the City Council Parliament.
Accordingly, 22@ Barcelona SA (called
22@ municipal company in this text’s 22@ portrait)
was established. An entirely public capital com-
pany directing planning and management, 22@
Barcelona SA bypassed the bureaucracy of the City
Council and established new protocol for expe-
diting decision-making in its search for investors.
To avoid contradictions with City Council machin-
ery, some officials who had great knowledge of
municipal urban planning became part of the new
company. For example, I became the CEO of the
new 22@ company when I was also the Head of
Urban Planning in the City Council. In this way,
520 The Grand Projet
we ensured that both the general city planning
direction and the actions taken by the new com-
pany were aligned.
The competencies of 22@ Barcelona SA
were specified in three areas, each led by a direc-
tor: (i) the processing and approval of derivative
planning, public and private, prior to block trans-
formation; (ii) upon plan approval, management
of land transfers from private owners to the public
administration, which would accordingly be used
for social housing and public space; (iii) and the
implementation of the Infrastructure Plan, fi-
nanced by private developers and enabling com-
plete renewal of urban utility networks, such as
electricity, telecommunications, district heating/
cooling, etc.
Of these functions, the most essential
was the first. As already mentioned, the critical
elements of the 22@ Plan focused on i) mainte-
nance of productive activities, ii) increase in den-
sity, iii) diversification of uses, iv) architectural
flexibility, v) redevelopment of urban infrastruc-
tures, vi) protection of industrial heritage, vii)
mandatory transfer of land for public use and viii)
the recognition and preservation of existing hous-
ing. The implementation of these principles was
the responsibility of the Planning Director of 22@
Barcelona SA. The City Council was not involved
in such processing, allowing the 22@ company
autonomy and leadership in its work.
The success of this management practice
was extraordinary until the nationalist municipal
government of CiU decided to dissolve the 22@
company and integrate its services into the City
Council structure. This was, in my opinion, an
unfortunate, politically motivated decision that
has proved to negatively impact the promotion and
development of the district.
THE FUTURE OF THE 22@ PLAN:
A DEBATE WITH TWO OPPOSING
POSITIONS
In 2015, the nationalist party lost municipal elec-
tions, giving way to a populist government with
an anti-capitalist mindset. The new municipal
government, led by Ada Colau and clearly sup-
porting the public initiative, was sceptical about
the intervention of the private sector in urban
transformation processes. This spawned a gen-
eral distrust of Colau’s government regarding the
22@ project.
This distrust stems from the distinction
between 22@ and the neighbourhoods in which
it is located: it contrasts the conception of 22@
as a reference district for economic and techno-
logical activities in Barcelona with the neighbour-
hood of Poblenou, consisting of local retail, co-
operatives and social bonds promoted by Colau’s
government. It is worrisome that a new hierarchy
is trying to emerge in which the function of 22@,
whose impact in the productive economic system
extends beyond Barcelona, is contingent on its
development in the most local, reductionist vision
of neighbourhood life. If the general system is
subjected to the demands of the local system, it
ceases to be general and, therefore, fails to fulfil
its function.
Based on this perspective and in order to
thoroughly review the project, a profound debate
emerged regarding the 22@ Plan and the best way
to promote the project nineteen years later. It is
a debate initiated by the City Council itself; neigh-
bourhood and professional entities have accord-
ingly participated. This discussion has elucidated
two antagonistic perspectives regarding how 22@
should be transformed.
The first approach, driven by those of us
who actively participated in the design, approval
and management of the project during its first ten
years, is shared by technical and professional groups
in favour of maintaining the essential identity signs
of 22@. These include economic activity as the
area’s predominant use, a sufficient FAR to gen-
erate a dense city, architectural flexibility respect-
ing the urban structure of the “Cerdá model” and
high endowment of utility infrastructures. The main
considerations that have emerged from these pro-
fessional entities are the following:
� The 22@ Plan is a “success model,” rec-
ognised around the world by economic
and urban actors. The evolution of its
founding principles must be rethought
via dialogue and recognition of its values,
521 Further Insights
exceptionality and strategic dimension
in the city’s development.
� The 22@ Plan was conceived, formulated
and approved nineteen years ago and it
is necessary to adapt it to current needs.
This adaptation must address transforma-
tions affecting economic and productive
systems, environmental and sustainability
concerns and citizens’ perceptions of urban
problems, such as gentrification processes
and the lack of affordable housing.
� The 22@ Plan is central to Barcelona’s sta-
tus as a City of Knowledge, and its refer-
ence should be of a metropolitan scale.
� The 22@ Plan needs a new governance
model with clear public leadership sup-
porting PPP, the participation of different
agents of the quadruple helix (Adminis-
tration, Economy, University and Citizens)
and a professional, stable management
over time.
Contrary to this viewpoint, a second perspective
has emerged, promoted largely by the municipal
government and Poblenou neighbourhood asso-
ciations. The proposal of this sector is much more
radical in terms of its suggestions for revision,
advocating profound changes in activities, a sig-
nificant increase in housing, decrease of produc-
tive activities and prohibition of new hotels. The
main principles of this perspective are specified
as follows:
� Increase of housing from 10% to 30% of
total density and recognition of traditional
urban structures of Poblenou, character-
ised by the presence of low-density, old
housing.
� Boost to the local, social, traditional and
collaborative economy. Support pro-
grammes for the settlement of local retail
and activities aimed at the local con-
sumer, easing rental prices.
� Greater protection of architectural her-
itage with subsidies aimed at dedicating
it to cultural activities with a strong social
base.
� Establishment of new planning guidelines Labs shall function as publicly accessible, in resource use and reducing consumption Therefore, we propose to:
that limit flexibility in block and building living laboratories where companies and of raw materials and energy emissions.
configuration. citizens can see and experience the trends � 22@ as laboratory for mobility solutions, � Establish a social support programme,
transforming the world economy. incorporating experimental innovations integrating the area’s development and
In November 2018, the municipal government and � Enhance the interaction between individ- in the district and emphasising collective social needs with the district’s educational
Poblenou associations signed an agreement es- uals and organisations within an inno- transport. Examples include electric mo- system and connecting this with the busi-
tablishing the general guidelines for the 22@ re- vative ecosystem and activate clustering bility systems, urban logistics solutions, ness world. This requires the active par-
vision (informally named the Ca l’Alier Agreement) processes, reinforced by public facilities, shared-mode roads, intermodal public ticipation of schools, institutes and the
according to what the neighbours demanded and with a special attention to cultural and transport networks, personal mobility 22@ Network association, which convenes
against the initial project approved in 2000. How- creative industries. devices and other innovations of sustain- companies of the 22@ area.
ever, the municipal government, lacking sufficient � Promote innovation, quality of life and able and testable mobility. For this aim, � Structure a dynamic of social innovations
majority in Parliament, has not been able to carry the cultural dimension of 22@, Poblenou Barcelona has recently been chosen to that allows development of an urban
out such modifications. The results of the last mu- and Barcelona. research and apply new urban mobility model of inclusive growth, in which solu-
nicipal elections in May 2019 will force the different � Promote the relationships of companies solutions, promoted by the European In- tions for social challenges occupy a cen-
political parties to further negotiate, as non of them with universities and centres of research stitute of Innovation & Technology. tral role in the 22@ strategy and become
acquired sufficient majority. In doing so, the general & development, enhancing interaction � To respond to these new challenges, the an international reference.
guidelines of the 22@ Plan will be maintained. within an innovative space capable of at- Infrastructure Plan must be revised, up- � Evaluate the role of housing in the devel-
tracting global talent. dating its energy, environmental and mo- opment of the 22@ district. The possibil-
bility guidelines and the penetration of ity of constructing 22@ employee hous-
THE PRINCIPLES OF THE FUTURE 22@ ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY technology in the public space with 5G ing must be analysed. 10% of area density
Apart from these negotiations, the principles upon In 2000, environmental considerations were fibres. The pneumatic waste collector as must be directed to social housing devel-
which 22@ should be updated are as follows. crystallised in a comprehensive and innovative well as the structuring of streets and pub- opment on a rent basis.
Infrastructure Plan. Today we understand that lic spaces shall also be reconsidered. It � Confront the area’s gentrification phe-
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY environmental challenges are critical and that is also necessary to promote the mobility nomenon.
In 2000, a direct, radical commitment was made technology allows the implementation of efficient of the district, in accordance with the sig- � Actively incentivise the development of
to “re-programme” the industrial areas of Poble- energy management systems. However, there are nificant increase in residents and jobs, the industrial Northern Zone of 22@,
nou, orienting them towards what at the time was serious regulatory hindrances that limit short- and better connect 22@ with the rest of given its unquestionable potential linked
called “the knowledge economy,” the essential term actions. It is necessary to determine how to the city, especially given the Sagrera Sta- to the high-speed intermodal station of
characteristic of which was “to be intensive in the incorporate environmental considerations in the tion development and Besós area. Sagrera located less than a kilometre
use of information systems.” Today we have to future of the 22@ Plan despite these hindrances, away.
consider essential elements that promote the eco- considering: URBAN SPACE AND SOCIAL CHANGES � Minor modifications to the 22@ Plan,
nomic activity of 22@. The following points should During the past nineteen years, the citizens of Bar- given that some of these reflections must
guide this strategy: � 22@ as reference for a sustainable met- celona have significantly modified their percep- be integrated into 22@ regulations. These
ropolitan energy model. This transition tion of the problems and priorities the city must modifications must maintain the Plan’s
� Promote an urban model of inclusive and should be based on distributed genera- face, as evidenced by the fact that the City Council essential guidelines and structuring crite-
socially sustainable growth, based on a tion, the promotion of self-consumption has been governed by three different political ria. Most of the proposed actions, however,
strategy that reinforces equity and im- and energy efficiency that should begin forces since 2000. Any city project, such as the concern the need for updating the project
proves the distribution of income at the in cities. 22@ can be the space of exper- 22@ Plan, must consider the evolution of these beyond its urban instrumentation.
metropolitan level. imentation and dissemination of inno- sensitivities, fostering a concept of participatory
� Promote Barcelona as a reference location vative solutions to the entire metropolitan citizenship.
for large corporations, medium-sized com- area of Barcelona and should be accom- 22@ is also an urban project, and, as such, CONCLUSION
panies and international entrepreneurs panied by a regulatory, legal framework defines the densities, uses and conditions in which For almost twenty years, the 22@ project has been
seeking centres of excellence in areas of able to support such changes. urban development can unfold in this part of the an international benchmark of the urban trans-
technology and innovation such as 22@. � 22@ as benchmark for a circular econ- city. The evolution of these conditions, as well as formation of a consolidated structure with an
� Encourage a sharing economy by promot- omy, in which the value of products and their forms of governance, give new impetus to industrial base into a sustainable system with a
ing co-working spaces throughout the 22@ materials is maintained as long as possi- 22@. It is imperative to examine how to integrate decisive presence of technological companies.
district connected to the network of co-­ ble. Production processes shall generate the requirements of the economic and environ- This system has also required public-private col-
working spaces in Barcelona. These Fab minimum waste, maximising efficiency mental dimension with social priorities. laboration in its realisation.

522 The Grand Projet 523 Further Insights

Amongst other reasons, Barcelona has overcome
the worst moments of the 2008 economic crisis
because the 22@ model has acted as an adjustment
mechanism for financial and real estate tensions.
We can say that the main crises arising
in 22@ have been political. They have their ori-
gin in the inability of some political groups in the
City Council to understand the 22@ project and
accept the weight the private initiative has in its
development.
At this moment in time, the city and its
citizens are questioning how to adapt the 22@
project to the social, economic and environmen-
tal circumstances our society is facing. Unfortu-
nately, the current municipal government, unlike
the one that promoted the project in 2000, seems
more willing to yield to local and reductionist
pressures than to embrace the conception of 22@
as a metropolitan strategy for promoting eco-
nomic activity in the city.
However, we must once again rely on the
vitality of the city of Barcelona and its inhabitants,
as well as on its ability to find at all times the best
means of encountering the future.
RAMÓN GARCÍA-BRAGADO
Head Urban Planning, City Council of Barcelona (1999–2004)
CEO, 22@ municipal company, City Council of Barcelona (2000–2004)
Deputy Major for Urban Planning, City Council of Barcelona (2007–2011)
524 The Grand Projet
CONTINUING MARUNOUCHI:
130 years of Urban Design Innovation
Koki Miyachi and Noboru Kawagishi
Mitsubishi Jisho Sekkei has been involved in the between these nodes and the structure of the
urban redevelopment of the Marunouchi area urban fabric.
since its predecessor, the Estate Department of One of the major buildings of the area
Mitsubishi Limited Partnership Company, was today is Marunouchi Building. It was replaced with
established in 1893. The Marunouchi develop- a high-rise version in 2002 after the Great Han-
ment is the firm’s primary project because of Mit- shin-Awaji Earthquake, which initiated another
subishi Jisho Sekkei’s continuous leadership role round of redevelopment in the district. This elu-
in the design of the ­120-hectare contiguous area. cidates the fact that the Marunouchi district has
continued to upgrade its utilities and infrastruc-
INTRODUCTION tures over time in response to natural events and
The development of the Marunouchi district began changing market demands whilst acknowledg-
in 1890, when Baron Yanosuke Iwasaki purchased ing the unique properties of the townscape it has
the piece of palace-front property from the Meiji inherited throughout its development.
government. The first building, Mitsubishi Ichigo-
kan, was completed in 1894, and a streetscape DESIGN VISION AND ITS TRANSLATION
along Babasaki-Dori Boulevard, called Iccho-Lon- INTO GUIDELINES
don (London Block), was developed with red brick In order to establish a coordinated effort for
buildings by 1912. Later, 31-metre tall buildings improving the 120-ha district of the OMY Area
such as the Marunouchi Building, designed after (Otemachi, Marunouchi and Yurakucho), The
the American office building typology, were built Council for Area Development and Management
along Gyoko-dori Boulevard to form a neighbour- of Otemachi, Marunouchi and Yurakucho (OMY
hood called Iccho-New York (New York Block). ​ Council) was established in 1988, enabling land-
→ GP–FI.10 ​Between the 1960s and 1970s, proper- owners to come together to discuss the specifics
ties were reorganised into 100-metre square of neighbourhood development. By 1996, the
blocks, and most of the buildings were replaced Council grew to become The Advisory Commit-
with 31-metre tall office buildings. tee on Otemachi-­Marunouchi-Yurakucho Area
The townscape of Marunouchi was trans- Development, which included the Tokyo Metro-
formed in tandem with Japan itself after the Meiji politan Government, Chiyoda-ku City Hall, JR
Restoration. Its unique location required a har- East and other related parties, and the first com-
monious urban design given its proximity to the prehensive Development Guidelines were for-
Imperial Palace, the spiritual centrepiece of the mulated in 2000.
Japanese psyche. With its adjacency to transit Mitsubishi Estate Co., Ltd, as the largest
nodes such as JR Tokyo Station, JR Yurakucho landlord of Otemachi, Marunouchi and Yurakucho,
Station and Tokyo Metro Otemachi Station, the dis- has fulfilled the role of secretariat of the OMY
trict also developed with respect to the relationships Council and provided leadership in the creation
525 Further Insights
of guidelines. Mitsubishi Jisho Sekkei, as the archi-
tectural design firm of the Mitsubishi Estate Group,
offers suggestions to the OMY Council concerning
urban design, landscape, architecture, lighting and
signage alongside the viewpoints of urban plan-
ners and architects.
The Development Guidelines define the
direction of comprehensive urban planning as pro-
moted by authorities and private sectors. This in-
corporates utility and cityscape improvements ne-
cessitated by market demand, which further strive
to maintain the refined ambiance of the OMY Area.
The Guidelines are regularly reviewed and revised
Otemachi Marunouchi
Kanda, Jimbocho
to meet the requirements of the time.
In the Development Guidelines, three
urban attributes frame the Marunouchi area: zones,
axes and subcentres. Zones are categorised as fol-
lows according to their history, utility and spatial
characteristics. ​→ GP–FI.11 ​
OTEMACHI ZONE
Z ones with a generally high concentration of
global financial institutions. These also consti-
tute hubs of innovative, entrepreneurial and inter-
national businesses. Public plazas and courtyards
encourage a myriad of activities with an abun-
dance of greenery.
MARUNOUCHI ZONE
These zones are characterised by improved cross-­
border interactions and formation of active busi-
ness environments. They generally emphasise
human scale, streetscape and building facades.
YURAKUCHO ZONE
 hese zones promote MICE and the develop-
T stipulating rules related to notation, fonts, instal- context of town development. The most notable
ment of a neighbourhood thriving with commer-
cial activities. They are conducive to ambulatory
exploration.
YAESU ZONE
 ones characterised by improved transit terminal
Z GP–FI.15 Maru-Cube: Interior
functions, quality office space and stronger com-
mercial and neighbourhood exchange features.
‘Axes’ describe unique streets designed to become
a basis of neighbourhood attractiveness. Naka-
dori and Gyoko-dori are especially positioned to
526 The Grand Projet
Yurakucho Zone
Marunouchi Zone
Yaesu Zone
Hibiya-dori Avenue
Harumi-dori Avenue
Babasaki-dori Avenue
Marunouchi Naka-dori Avenue
Eitai-dori Avenue
Along the Nihonbashi River
JR Yurakucho Station
Tokyo Station Plaza base
Yaesu base
Tokyo Station
Otemachi base
Yurakucho
Hibiya
Narunouchi base
GP–FI.11 Urban attributes
defined in the Development
Guidelines—Zones (top), Axes
(middle), and Subcenters
(bottom).
GP–FI.13 Lighting Strategies.
be two important axes central to the area. There given the district’s proximity to the Palace Outer
are six such axes in the Marunouchi district: Garden. ​→ GP–FI.13
The concept of the “Living Room in the
Gyoko-dori: symbolic axis City”—a place where people would want to stop
Otemachi Zone
�
� Babasaki-dori: historic and cultural axis for a moment and discover what the city has to
� Eitai-dori: finance and information axis offer—helped redesign Marunouchi Naka-dori,
Gyoko-dori Avenue
Marunouchi 1st Street
GP–FI.10 Urban blocks � Marunouchi Naka-dori: amenity axis which was renovated in the first phase of devel-
“Iccho-New York” in Marunouchi
� Hibiya-dori: urban streetscape axis opment between 2002 and 2008 and the second
(1920’s).
Daimyokoji � Daimyo Koji: work-place axis phase of development between 2009 and 2012
at the time of the Marunouchi Building’s rede-
‘Subcentres’ include major transit nodes and areas velopment. Marunouchi Naka-dori has accord-
that generate attraction and exchange oppor­ ingly become the main street of urban vibrancy,
tunities. There are four such subcentres in the traversing like a spine through the OMY Area. It
Approx. 200m in height
Approx. 150m in height
Approx. 100m in height
31m (100 shaku)
Marunouchi district: boasts a unique pavement design with Argentina
porphyry, planters that give rhythm and spice to
� Marunouchi Subcentre the streetscape and public art pieces. It also has
� Yurakucho Subcentre become a venue for numerous events in conjunc-
� Otemachi Subcentre tion with indoor spaces, such as Maru-Cube, a
� Tokiwabashi Subcentre public atrium space in the Marunouchi Building
that offers diverse urban amenities. ​→ GP–FI.14–15
GP–FI.12 A directory map in
Marunouchi.
The Development Guidelines address networks Each project within the area closely con-
above and below ground level. Individual projects siders building envelope design and environmen-
must propose schemes that comply with the con- tal properties, intending to present office planning
cepts discussed herein. As for the district’s sky- schemes that satisfy the most demanding of the
line, the guidelines stipulate a gradated formation class-A tenants. Projects also strive to incorporate
to protect the view of the Imperial Palace and an efficient building core design, business con-
building heights of up to 200 metres in the four tinuation planning (BCP) measures and district
subcentre neighbourhoods to maintain a land- heating and cooling (DHC) demand-managed
GP–FI.14 Maru-Cube: Podium
of Marunouchi Building.
mark presence. For the rest of the area, schemes energy distribution systems.
must respect traditional 31-metre or 100-metre
datum eave lines. The guidelines also include a MARUNOUCHI’S ARCHITECTURE AND
Signage Design Manual and Lighting Guide Book. MATERIALITY
The Signage Design Manual promotes The Marunouchi area hosts several historic build-
unified design quality for signage throughout the ings, which are regularly restored and recommis-
OMY Area, defining languages to be used and sioned as important urban legacy elements in the
lation, parking signs, exterior and underground structures include The Industry Club of Japan
public signs and legally required plaque signs. ​ Building, Meiji Life Insurance Headquarters, Mit-
→ GP–FI.12 subishi Ichigokan and the Tokyo Central Post
The Lighting Guide Book was compiled Office. Economic rationale is often a prerequisite
to encourage streetscapes becoming the main for owners when it comes to preserving and uti-
View of Maru-Cube.
entrance to Japan by creating unified evening lising historic buildings; thus, it is imperative to
city views in the OMY Area. It aims to achieve a achieve a floor area ratio commensurate with the
distinguished colour and quality of light; skilful location’s potential. Owners are required to apply
articulation of subcentre buildings, 31-metre eave to a multitude of urban planning variance pro-
lines and street-level façades; differentiation of grammes in order to obtain a bonus FAR to build
discrete neighbourhoods; expression of historical more floor area and simultaneously preserve the
and cultural uniqueness; and artful illumination historic building.
527 Further Insights
The Industry Club of Japan Building was built in
1920 as a five-storey reinforced concrete and steel
building. It was admitted as a Registered Tangible
Cultural Property in 1999. However, due to deteri-
oration, its southern portion was restored and the
rest rebuilt in 2003 as the Headquarters of Mitsub-
ishi Trust and Banking Corporation under the Spe-
cial Exemption District programme. ​→ ­GP–FI.16–17 ​
A portion of the high-rise structure was cantilevered
out in order to make the restoration scheme a real-
ity despite difficult site constraints. Furthermore,
the seismic isolation system was applied to the orig-
inal portion of the building to satisfy seismic struc-
tural requirements for renovated older structures.
Meiji Life Insurance Headquarters was
designed by architect Shin-ichiro Okada and com-
pleted in 1934. ​→ ­GP–FI.18 It was commandeered
after World War II by GHQ (General Headquar-
ters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers) and returned by American troops in 1956.
Designated in 1997 as an Important Cultural Asset,
the building was later redeveloped under the Spe-
cial Exemption District programme for Import-
ant Cultural Assets. Operated together with the
adjacent 30-storey Meiji Life Insurance Building,
this historic piece of architecture was successfully
preserved and infused with new life.
Josiah Conder, an English architect invited
in 1894 by the Japanese Government, designed
Mitsubishi Ichigokan. The building was demol-
ished in 1968 due to perceived obsolescence. Mit-
subishi Corporation Building, Furukawa Building
and Marunouchi Yaesu Building were built on its
former site and then integrated to construct the
Marunouchi Park Building. Mitsubishi Ichigokan
was rebuilt at the original location based on Cond-
er’s original design. Marunouchi Park Building
was developed using the Urban Regeneration Spe-
cial District programme. ​→ GP–FI.19 It comprises a
34-storey office tower, the restored Mitsu­bishi
Ichigokan and a courtyard called Ichigokan Plaza,
which provides an oasis-like environment conven-
ing high-end cafes, retail outlets and lush green-
ery. Mitsubishi Ichigokan was rebuilt in brick, true
to original design. The issue of its low seismic
resistance was resolved with the seismic isolation
structure. Mitsubishi Ichigokan is now a museum
and rare institution of history and culture in the
Marunouchi area.
528 The Grand Projet
Designed by architect Tetsuro Yoshida, Tokyo Cen-
tral Post Office was completed in 1933. Its white
tile tectonic design, composed of columns and
beams without ornamentation, was applauded by
Bruno Taut as a masterpiece of modernist archi-
tecture. In 2008, the postal service was privatised;
accordingly, Tokyo Central Post Office underwent
redevelopment using the Urban Regeneration
Special Exemption District programme. In order
to respect the historic cityscape of the plaza in front
of Tokyo Station and preserve the historic signif-
icance of the old post office building, the structure
along the plaza was preserved up to two bays deep,
exterior tile cladding redone in dry-mount and the
seismic isolation foundation adopted. A 38-storey
office tower, now the JP Tower ​→ GP–FI.20, was
erected behind the redeveloped post office. These
efforts resulted in a new urban design typology
that juxtaposes preserved older building façades
with modern towers. Along with the restored Tokyo
Station building, such a contrast illuminates a new
cityscape at Tokyo Station Plaza.
In its restoration projects, Mitsubishi
Jisho Sekkei has seamlessly integrated history
into existing neighbourhoods by respecting her-
itage and preserving the cityscape of the past for
future generations. To implement such projects,
however, it is necessary to demonstrate to clients
how such an urbanistic contribution is feasible
from a business perspective. Mitsubishi Jisho Sek-
kei accomplishes this by stressing the importance
of protecting history, proposing architectural
solutions that incorporate historic edifices and
detailing the availability of economic incentives
through creative application of urban planning
variance provisions.
LEARNING FROM MARUNOUCHI
Mitsubishi Jisho Sekkei’s collective experience in
neighbourhood building in Marunouchi has pro-
vided the firm with significant expertise, particu-
larly with regard to urban redevelopment schemes
maximising the benefits of available regulatory
variances; design knowledge of grade-A office
buildings and mixed-use buildings; and success-
ful public spaces exemplified by the Naka-dori
renewal and Maru-Cube. The following para-
graphs illustrate several projects that have bene-
fited from such experience.
GP–FI.16 The Industry Club of
Japan Building: Perspective.
GP–FI.17 The Industry Club of
Japan Building: Section Diagram.
GP–FI.18 Meiji Life Insurance
Headquarters.
GP–FI.19 Mitsubishi Ichigokan
and Marunouchi Park Building.
529 Further Insights
GP–FI.20 Tokyo Central Post
Office and JP Tower.
GP–FI.21 Minato Mirai district
and Grand Mall Park.
GP–FI.22 Dai Nagoya Building.
GP–FI.23 Grand Front Osaka.
In the Minato Mirai district of Yokohama, Mit-
subishi Jisho Sekkei designed large redevelopment
projects, namely Landmark Tower of 1996 and
Queens Square of 1997. The knowledge acquired
through the Marunouchi Naka-dori project, such
as the green network, street furniture and lighting
and criteria for public spaces, were applied to the
renewal project of Grand Mall Park, the pedestrian
axis penetrating the middle of this neighbourhood
(completed in 2017). ​→ GP–FI.21 Grand Mall Park
now functions as a centrally positioned public re-
gion with attractive, urbanistic outdoor spaces.
Dai Nagoya Building in front of JR Na-
goya Station is a redevelopment project at the
front gate of Central Japan developed under the
Urban Regeneration Special Exemption District
programme. ​→ GP–FI.22 It comprises commercial
facilities in the podium and office spaces in the
high-rise tower. There is a roof-top garden, Sky
Garden, on the roof level of the podium, accessi-
ble by the general public. An abundance of green-
ery exists throughout the site. Roadside retail out-
lets line the perimeter of the building as well as
its internal passage, promoting steady commercial
activity. The first basement of Dai Nagoya Build-
ing is connected to the underground concourse
of Nagoya Station, forming a subterranean net-
work towards the northern portion of the site. The
expertise gained through the street design of the
Marunouchi Naka-dori project improved the defi-
nition of urban framework with greenery and
commercial concentration. Similarly, the devel-
opment of the network of subterranean passages
in Marunouchi contributed to the creation of the
underground network.
Grand Front Osaka is a large-scale rede-
velopment project adjacent to JR Osaka Station on
the northside using the Urban Regeneration Spe-
cial Exemption District programme. ​→ GP–FI.23 It
contains a shopping mall, office spaces, hotel, con-
vention centre, theatre and high-rise residential
tower. “Knowledge Capital” is positioned as a pub-
lic amenity facility; its concept of generating new
values through cross-border, collaborative inter-
actions between individuals is a culmination of the
operational know-how of similar installations in
Marunouchi. The knowledge gathered from devel-
oping Marunouchi Naka-dori was applied to the
well-planned network of pedestrian paths between
JR Osaka Station and each building, realising an
urbanistically scaled streetscape.
At Dai Nagoya Building and Grand Front
Osaka, the Signage Design Manual of Marunouchi
was adopted, resulting in an urban environment
with a high level of design and integrity, similar
to what one might glimpse in Marunouchi. To fur-
ther note, we apply similar expertise to large-scale
redevelopment projects we are involved in in nu-
merous ASEAN countries, intending to deliver
the highest quality urban environments.
CONCLUSION
The Marunouchi area has grown over time by in-
heriting unique and appealing characteristics de-
veloped throughout its history and by providing
new utilities and programme elements in response
to society’s shifting demands. To maintain the
grace and quality of this cityscape, which extends
for 120 hectares, a system that establishes and
continually improves a reliable set of guidelines
in response to the requisites of the time is indis-
pensable. At the same time, blindly following such
guidelines might render the city colourless and
void of public attraction. If each project harbours
a distinct personality and contributes collectively
to neighbourhood diversity, a well-­designed city-
scape composed of authentic structures that main-
tain a sense of unity is conceivable. Marunouchi’s
mixture of integrity and diversity is arguably its
most alluring characteristic.
In addition to these qualities, Marunouchi
must remain enticing to visitors. It is thus imper-
ative to turn a discerning eye to the mandate of the
future. Moving forward, Mitsubishi Jisho Sekkei
will strive to raise the standard of sophistication
the cityscape of Marunouchi provides by address-
ing issues such as coordination with other neigh-
bourhoods, improved systems of intra-district
pedestrian flow, environment- and energy-sensitive
design and improved BCPs (business continuation
plans). Such strategies will make Marunouchi, and,
by extension, the rest of Tokyo, a city that celebrates
diversity and provides accessibility to all individ-
uals as Japan transitions into its next era.
KOKI MIYACHI
Principal Architect at Mitsubishi Jisho Sekkei, with Noboru Kawagishi,
Architect at Mitsubishi Jisho Sekkei.
530 The Grand Projet
DESIGNING THE CITY AS AN
INFRASTRUCTURE: La Défense
Virginie Picon-Lefebvre
One can argue that urbanism is grounded on the
idea that a city must facilitate the movement of
people and vehicles. At the end of the nineteenth
century, the rise of urbanism was related to very
large projects of transformation in Paris, Barce-
lona and Chicago designed to improve the circu-
lation of air, water and energies as well as trains,
automobiles and pedestrians.
The aim of this essay is to show that this
desire for improvement transformed the city of
Paris itself, as evidenced in large infrastructure
like La Défense, which emerged in the 1950s. At
the end of the 1980s, architects and urban design-
ers who wanted to return to a more traditional
approach of urban design viewed La Défense as a
mistake, arguing that the city was not only a com-
plex set of technical operations designed to facil-
itate movement but also a sociohistorical context
that had to be preserved. Today, La Défense is con-
sidered a succesful hybrid form and has inherited
several layouts of design. The eventual challenge
will be how to integrate these different stories into
the new paradigm of the smart city. La Défense
was the most ambitious project in Europe, and it
entirely transformed urban life; circulation was
the main driving force of those transformations.
The question of circulation was seen not only but
also as a constraint, but as a new urban condi-
tion that implied the territory’s large-scale phys-
ical metamorphosis. By following the history of
La Défense, one follows the evolution of nine-
teenth-century Paris into a metropolis with an
historic core and vast suburbia, connected by a
system of express highways and subways.
531 Further Insights
TRAFFIC JAM
Directly following the second World War, Paris
was not very different from the city it was at the
end of the nineteenth century. During WWII, it
survived destruction. Yet although Paris resem-
bled a frozen urban structure, it had sustained
significant structural and sociological damage. It
was also the Paris of les Ilots Insalubres, the slums
that emerged in 1910 but were not improved before
the 1950s. City administrators, architects and
urbanists were convinced that they had to build
a new foundation for the society that they wished
to promote; nonetheless, their assessment of the
existing urban environment and its suitability for
a new social reality was severe, given their per-
ception of several malfunctions.
Foremost amongst these was traffic con-
gestion. A new criteria of urban efficiency was in
fact emerging in relation to automobiles: the city
was seen as an organ, in which every fluid must
constantly circulate. The stop and go of cars at
crossings presented a risk of death, both literally
and symbolically. To justify the creation of a plan-
ning administration, Jean Vaujour, a collaborator
with Paul Delouvrier, declared that “the congestion
of the living core of the city [was] increasing, so
that one [had] to realise that the city [was] gradu-
ally coming close to asphyxia” (Vaujour, 1970, p.2).
HOUSING CRISIS
Another issue involved the shortage of affordable
housing. Existing housing was cramped and un-
comfortable: according to 1950 city statistics, fifty
per cent of housing did not have private toilets.
Architects and urbanists further perceived that
the problem of these old neighbourhoods was not
only structural but also political, as it was the re-
sponsibility of the state to provide comfortable and
affordable housing for the poor, according to the
Charter of Athens. On the one hand, architects
and urbanists wanted to simplify and rationalise;
on the other hand, they saw those places as un-
suitable and as a factor of disorder. Sociologist
Henri Coing discussed the renovation process and
its implications for the everyday life of the working
class (Coing, 1966, p. 296). He uncovered that the
residents, after moving elsewhere, completely
changed their lifestyles, given their access to
kitchen spaces, running water and other vital amen-
ities. New architecture and urban design provided
more private spaces; consequently, life outside the
apartment became less important. Prior solidari-
ties and street life began to disappear.
A CITY OF SERVICES
Besides the housing crisis and traffic demands,
other factors influenced the alteration of Paris in
the 1950s: namely, the emergence of the tertiary
sector and the city’s general lack of commercial
and office buildings.
France’s professional structure changed
drastically with the implementation of commer-
cial services. The State-led policies of industrial
dispersal concentrated most of these services in
Paris. Consequently, white collar workers replaced
blue collar workers who were traditionally sent to
suburbs or provincial cities. The installation of a
Renault factory in Flins typifies this gradual exile
of blue collar workers. In le Joli mai (1962), Chris
Marker documents the renovation process and
what it implied for working class families mov-
ing from a cramped Parisian room to a suburban
social housing estate.
Indeed, the development of the tertiary
sector profoundly influenced the alteration of
social organisation and the evolution of urban ide-
als and practice. However, the employees of the
service industry were not a homogeneous group.
The modernisation of Paris was intended for dis-
tinct segments of a heterogeneous population.
Maine-Montparnasse was, for instance, designed
for l’homme d’affaires, the businessman. The latter,
532 The Grand Projet
seen as the continuously moving actor of an inter-
nationalised economic stage, was central in plan-
ners’ concerns, influencing the composition and
placement of railway stations, expressways, air-
ports, office buildings, restaurants, boutiques and
apartment buildings.
THE PROCESS OF MODERNISATION
The modernisation of Paris during the 1960s was
directly aligned with the city’s standardisation of
construction. Standardisation required large-scale
projects in order to be feasible; its objective was
not to discard the notions of intensity and density ​
— ​as emblemised, for example, in the radiant city
by Le Corbusier ​— ​but rather to invent a new form
of urbanisation. The urban planners were not inter-
ested in the division between these notions and
the existing city, for they assumed that the ancient
structures would disappear. They saw themselves
as the pioneers of a necessary modernisation, fre-
quently alluding to Manhattan, with its corridor
streets lined with skyscrapers and crowded with
automobiles and pedestrians.
In their perspective, Manhattan was not
necessarily superior to the old European cities,
as both urban forms did not provide the critical
life conditions for a modern society. As a Paris
Match journalist stated in 1967, “the plans had
in common their large scale as well as a unique
objective, the transformation of the old, archaic
and cramped Paris into a Capital for the twenty-­
first century” (Paris Match, 1967).
COMPLEXTITY AND SCALE
While subterranean urbanism remained marginal
in France, the planners in charge of La Défense,
Maine-Montparnasse and the Front de Seine de-
cided to implement underground private and pub-
lic transport systems, constructed beneath artifical
decks. This had never been attempted on such a
large scale, and it was immediately met with many
technical and financial problems; the projects were
frequently cut, and the majority were carried out
in the 1960s and 1970s. Whilst abandoned in the
late 1970s, deck urbanism returned with the Seine
Rive-gauche operation in the early 1990s and in
recent constructions behind the Grande Arche
and near the RER s­ tation Nanterre Université.
Large scale is a common feature of all deck urban-
ism operations; however, the threshold cannot be
determined precisely. The designers of La Défense
did not speak of one deck but of various decks,
distinguishing the central one, la dalle centrale,
from the square, le parvis or le mail. This rather
loose vocabulary reflects the difficulty planners
experienced in pinpointing a single word to char-
acterise the spaces created. “A deck has generally
to do with what it covers, but here it is less the
underground that matters than what is, because
of it, freed on the ground,” stated a 1972 report
on La Défense (Auzelle, in rapport EPAD, 1972).
Which models and images inspired the
deck’s designers? Norman Bell Geddes’ works
likely influenced the constitution of a modernist
imaginary. Other possible sources include Ludwig
Hilberseimer or Eugène Hénard’s projects. Gen-
eral Motors commissioned a large model, the
Futurama, by Bell Geddes for the 1939 New York
exhibition; the Futurama successfully organised
urban circulation on different levels, suggesting
European influence. The main objective of Futur-
ama was to discover means of drastically reducing
the number of traffic accidents. In 1962, Robert
Auzelle, one of the most important urban design-
ers of the time in France and a consultant architect
for La Défense, declared: “We would like to em-
brace a one-way system of circulation that allows
an homogeneous flow of vehicles.”
AN HYBRID SPACE
In comparison to the streets, avenues and boule-
vards of Paris, the deck represented a distinctly
new type of urban space. In the 1960s, deck op-
erations seemed to answer all of the pressing struc-
tural issues addressed above. Radical and ambi-
tious, La Défense provided a new structure for
the urban environment and an authentic base for
social and technical organisation, both of which
could optimise commercial and residential con-
struction. These could also interconnect various
networks, enabling each to expand according to
its own logic.
In a similar perspective, the characteri-
sation of the underground station of La Défense
as a pedestrian interchange is revealing of the
way pedestrian circulation was conceived. Under
533 Further Insights
the deck, rationality and technological constraint
were guiding principles; above deck, it was quite
the opposite. However, at La Défense, the deck
was gradually realised, its technical constraints
appearing to be, initially, the determining design
factor. The consulting architect Michel Camelot
observed that the the technical implications of
roads, subways and parking lots closely informed
the study of the central open space of La Défense
and its gardens. Constraints imposed by the under-
ground civil engineering work thus defined the
shape of the space and enabled the production
of a new public realm.
THE RADICAL TRANSFORMATION
OF SUBURBIA
Old factories and small residences occupied the
site of La Défense in the early 1950s, so planners
enjoyed relative freedom in their efforts. Nonethe-
less, the project was somewhat traditional at first.
Its promoters envisaged a broad roadway leading
from Paris to the forest of Saint-­Germain­-en-Laye,
much like the open avenues that had characterised
nineteenth-century Parisian urbanism. Unlike
Haussmannian public works, however, the build-
ings were to be isolated, as in Ferriss’s proposal.
Gradually, the deck emerged as a means
of linking the buildings above the central road-
way. Its structure became clearer in a general plan
by the architects Jean Camelot, Henri de Mailly
and Bernard Zehrfuss, which established the var-
ious buildings’ locations. This structure consisted
of three distinct levels, the first reserved for the
subway, the second for vehicles in transit and the
third for taxis and delivery trucks. Some of these
levels connected to a one-way peripheral boulevard
(called Boulevard Circulaire, around La Défense’s
deck) and several parking lots. The lowest level
also provided access to underground halls leading
directly to office towers. The deck followed the
natural slope of the ground that rose from the Seine
to the western suburb, which required a more com-
plex internal organisation. Staircases and under-
ground corridors enabled a pedestrian route mir-
roring vehicle circulation.
Above ground, the deck spans 36 hec-
tares; 8.5 of these are occupied by the central deck.
The planning of the central area was entrusted to
an American landscape design firm, Dan Kiley of a crisis of pictorial representation: namely, the approach would be faithful to the very nature of
and Partners, which proposed planting a range inability to produce meaning aside new modes human gardens, which have always emulated na-
of plane trees, installing works of art and crafting of visual creation. The deck was the outcome of ture through the use of technology.
distinct spaces for activity and event purposes, a similar judgment concerning the historical city’s A more simple approach involves rethink-
all of which create landscapes that, according to loss of significance when confronted with changes ing the vertical and horizontal circulation, as well
the planner, answer to both local and general con- induced by modern phenomena such as the auto­ as the links between the natural and the artificial
cerns. Nothing must, for instance, block a visitor’s mobile. It also implied a certain distance from re- ground, in order to improve them aesthetically
view of the Etoile Triumphal Arch. ality. The site, for instance, had to be transformed and functionally. Both efforts could enable more
into a set of abstract data points, such as the number enjoyable urban spaces.
FOSTERING THE FLUIDITY OF of apartments and offices required or the amount One recalls, for instance, the astonish-
MOVEMENT of parking space needed. ing iron lift created in Lisbon at the end of the
Fluidity was a major theme in the planning of La This process of abstraction occurred on nineteenth century. Beyond aesthetics, there is
Défense. The importance given to this notion was various levels and can be traced in graphic docu- still a problem of accessibility with this lift; fur-
a common feature of most great operations of ments produced to describe the project. In these thermore, the different levels of the decks are dif-
the time. Efficiency was another key notion: plan- documents, the deck is represented as a schematic ficult to distinguish. A new typology has yet to
ners imagined a giant conveyor belt traversing cross-section, distinguishing the layers of circula- be invented for what remains of the 1960s and
the main axis of La Défense and escalators to ena- tion and corresponding means of transportation. 1970s urban utopia.
ble fluid circulation. These graphics give an impression of simplicity,
The designer of the Great Arch, Johann intended to guarantee the efficiency of the pro-
Otto Von Spreckelsen, had also planned to install posed solutions. The road system of La Défense
escalators beside the marble staircase of his mon- was, for example, drawn without displaying any
ument. The French team responsible for the com- of the buildings, including the old ones that had
pletion of the Great Arch abandoned this idea, been preserved. Representations of the design
capitulating to a dilemma similar to what planners of the deck’s surface were also schematic. In this
encountered in their implementation of the deck. respect, these were very similar to those produced
In the early stages of the operation, planners had for the grands ensembles; in both cases, drawings
to balance their fascination with the deck’s empty were abstractions, especially when concerning
space and majestic appearance with their desire exterior spaces.
to equip it with all manner of devices for decora-
tion and entertainment purposes. ARTEFACT
La Défense was indeed the expression of aIn conclusion, there are several directions urban
technocratic vision of urban development. The cre- designers should explore as they continue work
ation of a multi-layer artificial surface a few metres
on La Défense, which is not yet completed. The
above the natural ground implied the reconstruc- most intriguing one involves the notion of artifici-
tion of all technical networks and the recreation ality. The attempts to naturalise an artificial ground
of entire road systems. The necessary means were are indeed doomed to failure. Despite the trees
considerable. In the French case, only the State planted on the deck of La Défense ​— ​which are cur-
was powerful enough to manage these means. The rently growing in two metre high tubs filled with
abandonment of the deck in the Maine-Montpar- earth ​— ​visitors are unlikely to feel as if they are
nasse case is revealing of the inherent difficulty walking along a traditional boulevard lined with
in financing such an operation with private funds. plane trees, as in Marseilles or Aix-en-Provence. VIRGINIE PICON-LEFEBVRE
Hence, the deck can be interpreted as the urban The unease experienced when traversing these Architect, Professor at ENSA Paris-Belleville
space of triumphant technocracy. spaces might very well proceed from their ambig-
uous and even counterfeit character. If the ground BIBLIOGRAPHY
Robert Auzelle, Historique sommaire de l’évolution du pland masse de La Défense,
ABSTRACTIONS is artificial, one should expect an artificial nature. rapport EPAD, 1972.
The guiding approach in the conception of these Perhaps designers should work with snow tubes, Henri Coing, Rénovation urbaine et changement social, l’îlot n° 4 ( Paris 13°) ,
Paris, Les éditions ouvrières, 1966, p. 296
operations involved an abstraction of urban ter- conveyor belts, musical trees, mechanical birds, Paris Match , 1 er Juilllet 1967.
ritory. As in painting, abstraction was the result video displays and/or massive screens. Such an Jean Vaujour, Le plus grand Paris, Paris , PUF, 1970, p.2.

534 The Grand Projet 535 Further Insights

 Comparative
Aspects

536 537 The Grand Projet

 THE ‘BORDERING’ PRACTICES OF
GRANDS PROJETS: A Comparative Study
of Border Types and Qualities
Anna Gasco
GP-BO.01 The Speicherstadt in
HafenCity in Hamburg.

1 INTRODUCTION

 […] border is not simply a borderline. It is a mix of regimes with var-

A
iable contents and geographic and institutional locations
(Sassen 2013, 30).

The effects of Grands Projets extend far beyond their project boundaries.
Within their perimeters, Grands Projets have various practices of spatial
differentiation. These include comprehensive planning and design, higher
densities, specific programmes, exceptional policies and control mecha-
nisms, which lead to the creation of Grands Projets as distinct places and
recognisable identities, often underlined by a clear demarcation of the
projects from their urban surroundings. Urban megaprojects must be “vis-
ibly new as well as visibly different from existing structures” in order to
justify their exceptional status and the high priority given to them by public
authorities (2013, 187). Grands Projets thus become key forces in the pro-
duction of intra-urban borders within their neighbourhoods and metro-
politan regions.
Borders often exist before a Grand Projet itself. Along the bound-
aries of King’s Cross in London, for example, railway stations, railway lines
and roads formed initial physical barriers. The site’s deindustrialisation
preceded its gradual decline and unsavoury reputation, ultimately contrib-
uting to a less physical but nonetheless perceivable abstract border. Whilst
various stakeholders have suggested this “dark picture” is merely a stra-
tegic means of promoting a more “desirable” image of the contemporary
area (Edwards 2015), the challenges of integrating the development within
its larger surroundings were very real. p
​ KX–L INTRODUCTION S ​ imilarly, Hafen­
City in Hamburg is outlined by an existing physical border formed by the
River Elbe and the historic Speicherstadt, a complex of warehouses located
at the interface of the former port site and Hamburg’s old city centre. ​
→ GP-BO.01 ​These borders continue to exist and are even promoted as a dis-
tinct feature: the ‘waterfront development.’ Other less physical borders,
such as the former political, economic zone of a free trade port and the
programmatic border between industry and city centre, have been elimi-
nated by the new development. Once completed, the HafenCity area will
increase the size of Hamburg’s inner city by 40% and has been accordingly
dubbed “the project of the century for the city” (Grubbauer 2013). The
area’s initial isolation from its surroundings, nevertheless, posed serious
design challenges at its conception. 2 ​ HC–H DESIGN ​

539 Comparative Aspects

Whilst pre-existing conditions influence Grands Projets’ borders, Grands
Projets themselves have various urban-bordering practices. These enable
a project to overcome a border and/or to generate and regulate a specific,
more or less inclusive border in place. The study of borders has undergone
a “renaissance” (Newman 2006) in the past two decades and a rescaling
of focus from national to local scales of spatial activities. Newman and Passi
argue that local boundaries can have a greater impact on daily lives and
behavioural patterns of individuals than do state or international bound-
aries (Newman and Paasi 1998). Contemporary studies consider borders
to be socially constructed and managed and as such impacting our daily
lives (Newman 2006). Newman and Paasi define these social and mana-
gerial processes as “boundary-producing practices” (ibid. 1998). Likewise,
to capture the fluidity of urban borders, geographers have urged attention
to shift from fixed borders to “bordering:” defined as a project’s “strategic
effort to make difference in space” and, as such, shape distinct places through
an on-going process of regulating mobility of various flows (Van Houtum
and Van Naerssen 2002, 126).
Grands Projets’ urban-bordering practices may involve spatial design
of reconnection to or blockage from surrounding networks and typologies;
inclusive or exclusive management of the public realm within the new area;
retail diversity and programmatic complementarity; provision of high-end
monofunctional programmes; the inclusion of diverse stakeholders in deci-
sion-making processes; or the centralisation of governance power. Whilst
there are many gradations between these urban-bordering practices, the
physical and/or abstract border types they produce are key elements in the
way Grands Projets shape urban environments. Indeed, elucidating these
differences is critical to producing inclusive urban megaprojects.
This chapter focuses on Grands Projets’ urban-bordering practices
in order to better understand how these projects produce intra-urban bor-
ders and what the spatial types and qualities of these borders are. To do so,
we discuss six urban-bordering practices within our eight Grands Projets
cases in the context of existing scholarly debates. In its conclusion, the
chapter reflects on the capacity of Grands Projets’ urban borders to create
more or less inclusive spaces within their respective cities.
2 GRANDS PROJETS’ PHYSICAL AND ABSTRACT BORDER
TYPES AND URBAN-BORDERING PRACTICES
The spatial border types of Grands Projets can be as much physical
as they are abstract. ​→ GP-BO.02 ​As Newman explains, borders may be per-
ceived in places where no physical borders exist, whilst nevertheless greatly
impacting lives: “The ‘here-there’ and ‘us-them’ cut-off points are not
always played out through the construction of physical and visible walls
and fences. They may be as invisible as they are tangible and, equally, as
perceived as they are real” (Newman 2006, 177).
The physical border of a Grand Projet can include built infrastruc-
tures, such as building typologies, water channels, railway lines, roads,
viaducts and misaligned development plots interrupting the urban grain
540 Bordering
of the surrounding region. An abstract border can be the result of various
factors. A difference in real estate prices, for example, can prevent a cer-
tain population from acquiring or renting housing within the development,
especially when the new project’s provision of social housing is low. Abstract
borders can also result from programmatic segregation. Factors related
to security, as evident in King’s Cross prior to its regeneration, and man-
agerial policies concerning private and/or public access to the new area,
may also generate abstract borders. Whether abstract or physical, the qual-
ity of the border is embedded in the different practices producing it.
2.A EXCEPTIONAL REGULATIONS
Grands Projets are often the result of exceptional regulations that
enable the projects’ effective realisation. Global financial centres such as
Lujiazui in Shanghai or Canary Wharf in London were assigned Special
GP-BO.03 Lujiazui in Shanghai.
Economic Zones (SEZ) status with relaxed legislation and tax incentives
to attract private investors and global corporations. These special jurisdic-
tions produced autonomous areas distinct from the local regulatory system.
Whilst these financial centres inhabit a local territory, they often “operate
across the conventional or statutory border of local policies” (Sassen 2013).
SEZ, in particular, have been widely discussed in scholarly literature for
their capacity to, on the one hand, attract foreign investment, promote
export-oriented growth and generate employment and, on the other, neg-
atively impact local, social and environmental conditions (Farole 2011).
In the context of our research, we noticed how such special regulations
have decisive urban-bordering practices, which single Grands Projets out
from statutory planning contexts with specific spatial results.
The large-scale urban project of Lujiazui was one of China’s first
Special Economic Zones (SEZ), which supported the nation’s economic
opening, especially after the international community cut off capital inflow
in the aftermath of the 1989 Tian’anmen Square Incident. Lujiazui, within
Pudong’s SEZ, became a strategy for attracting capital and the centrepiece
for showcasing China’s re-globalisation. In 1990, the Shanghai munici-
pality issued several supporting regulations, which the central government
adopted. These were not, however, available to other SEZ during China’s
early phases of economic transition. Pudong SEZ’s special regulations
include preferential policies allowing non-national enterprises to locate
there and incentives supporting foreign investments. In this context, Luji-
azui underwent an expedited development, which, coupled with China’s
transition economy, created a singular area in Shanghai with a spatial
intent that focused strongly on an iconic, imposing skyline. Lujiazui’s spa-
tial framework prioritised motorised traffic and large plots with monolithic
high-rise buildings set back from the streets, thus limiting overall acces-
sibility. ​→ GP-BO.03 ​1 LJZ–S CONCEPTION ​This case provides an example of
Grands Projets’ reliance on exceptional regulations and developmental
policies that prioritise wider economic objectives, supported by specific
spatial design solutions, which lead to projects’ physical and administra-
tive insularity.
541 Comparative Aspects
 BORDER TYPES: BORDERING PRACTICES BORDER TYPES: BORDER QUALITIES
PRE-GRANDS PROJETS CURRENT STATE
Exceptional Regulations Governance Practices Operation Mechanisms Design Schemes Programme Compositions Phasing Schemes
More Fewer Exclusive Inclusive Exclusive Inclusive Isolated Integrated Monofunctional Mixed Use Rigid Incremental Closed Premeable Open

Physical Physical
22@–B From 2000 to 2011, short- Mix of stakeholders: first Publicly-operated by the Integrated within the grid Mixed-use and similar to Organic & dependent on
none none
22@, cut to Government Com- overseen by city-owned City of Barcelona, follow- of the Cerdà Plan, with surrounding programmes, private owners
Barcelona, Spain mission approval in the 22@ Company and cur- ing the same regulations similar small-grain plots, with added focus on infor-
Abstract application process, rently by the 22@ Coordi- as in other districts of high-density / low-rise mation and communica- Abstract
by-passing the City Coun- nation Commission Barcelona typologies, and integra- tion technologies (ICT)
cil Urban Planning tion of existing heritage programmes
Department structures
Physical Physical
HC–H Special development HafenCity Hamburg Operated exclusively by a New street network con- Mixed-use programmes Gradual phasing scheme,
HafenCity, district within the city of GmbH (HCH) as the sole dedicated body (HCH) necting the project to the similar to surrounding based on the subdivision
Hamburg, Germany Hamburg and additional governing body promot- with regulations differing surroundings, with simi- programmes, but with an into 10 districts / neigh-
regulations issued by the ing, however, an inclusive from those that apply to larly sized plots and in­crease in residential pro- bourhoods Abstract
Abstract dedicated governing body project by various forms of surrounding areas high-density/low rise grammes over recent
HafenCity Hamburg outreach depending on typologies in these sur- years
GmbH (HCH) project or occasion roundings
Physical Physical
KX–L One of 38 Opportunity Mix of stakeholders, with KCCLP-led regulations: Network of new streets Mixed-use programmes Phasing scheme with
none
King’s Cross, Areas within the London strong power held by the Inclusive programming and open spaces integrate similar to surroundings focus on open realm first,
London, UK Plan of the Greater Lon- partnership of private of open spaces and surroundings and herit- ones with additional com- with temporary uses to
Abstract don Authority (GLA) landowners KCCLP management, selection of age structures, with simi- plementary uses (commu- activate the area Abstract
diverse tenants lar small-grain plots and nity facilities, schools, etc.)
high-density/low-rise
typologies
Physical Physical
LD–P From 1958 to early 2000, State-led and centralised Paris-La Défense-led 7-storey deck disconnect- Business and commercial- Fast-paced, with no ex-
none
La Défense, independent regulations at first by EPAD. Now regulations: ing the surrounding net- ly-geared with little hous- plicit phasing scheme;
Paris, France devised by the first state- authority-led under the Commercially-­­driven works, complemented by ing, contrasting with sur- however, the area has
Abstract led planning body of publicly-owned ‘Paris- programming of open large plots and high-rise rounding programmes undergone various distinct Abstract
none France (EPAD) La Défense’ body spaces & tenant selection typologies contrasting with redevelopment cycles
the neighbouring grain

Physical Physical
LZ–S Special Economic Zone Centralised by the city- Lujiazui Development Co Spatial framework of large Business and commercial- Fast-paced, with no phas-
none
Lujiazui, (SEZ) owned Lujiazui Develop- Ltd-led regulations: Zero / infrastructure and plots ly-geared programmes, ing scheme
Shanghai, China ment Co Ltd little activation of open with high-rise typologies contrasting with sur-
Abstract spaces, commercially-­ contrasting with the sur- rounding ones Abstract
none driven selection of tenants roundings

Physical Physical
MBA–S Statutory within the Centralised and State-led URA-led regulations: Land reclamation: bound Business and commercial- Commercially driven
Reclaimed
Marina Bay Area, Project National Planning Agency by the National Planning Inclusive programming by highways, integrated by ly-geared programmes, phasing scheme fast-
Singapore (URA) regulations Agency (URA) and management of open underground networks, with a strong focus on paced
Abstract spaces, commercially-­ disconnected from adja- leisure and with little Abstract
none driven selection of tenants cent grain by large plots / housing
high-rise typologies

Physical Physical
MNU–T One of the 18 Urban Re- Multi-layered governance Operated by the OMY Street grid connects to Business and larger-scale No explicit phasing
Marunouchi, naissance Areas of the structure under Otemachi Council and its various surroundings but physical commercial programmes scheme but has under-
Tokyo, Japan City of Tokyo and a Spe- Marunouchi Yurakucho sub-bodies; Commercially-­ borders and varying block with very limited housing gone three distinct rede-
Abstract cial Economic Zone (SEZ) (OMY) Council; primary driven programming of sizes and typologies cre- stand in contrast to sur- velopment cycles since Abstract
authority, however, is held open spaces & selection ate a contrasting urban rounding programmes the beginning: 1890s,
by Mitsubishi Estate Co. Ltd. of tenants condition and scales 1960s, 1990s

Physical Physical
WK–H Special Economic Zone Centralised by the West West Kowloon Cultural Land reclamation, sur- Commercial and cultural Fast-paced, with no phas-
Reclaimed
West Kowloon, Project (SEZ) Kowloon Cultural District Distric-led regulations: rounded by transport infra- focus with high-end hous- ing scheme
Hong Kong, China Association Zero / little activation of structures and further ing programmes, contrast-
Abstract open spaces, disconnected from neigh- ing with surrounding Abstract
none commercially-­­driven bouring grain by large plots programmes
selection of tenants and high-rise typologies

GP-BO.02 Grands Projets’ urban-bordering practices: Border types and qualities. Physical Borders: Abstract Borders:
Road Infrastructure Programme
Railway Infrastructure Administration
Building Form Management
Water Economy
Topography Insecurity

542 Bordering 543 Comparative Aspects

2.B GOVERNANCE PRACTICES
Specific authorities, composed of private and/or public actors,
implement and operate Grands Projets. These producers are often endorsed
with various legal powers to steer the project towards a specific aim through
comprehensive planning, realisation and management. As Grubbauer notes,
urban megaprojects “further the restructuring of urban policy-making
through the redistribution of competencies and responsibilities to private
and semi-public institutions and development agencies” (Grubbauer 2013,
186). These producers can be found in projects as old as that of La Défense,
with its autonomous, specially created state-led body ​— ​the first in France ​
— ​of the Public Establishment for the Development of La Défense’s Region
(EPAD), founded in 1958.
Central to the way Grands Projets differentiate themselves is the
mechanism through which “an urbanism of exception” (Boano and Martén
2012, 3) “emerges as engineered by particular urban actors at specific times
to deal with particular situations” (Boano and Leclair-Paquet 2014, 21),
such as ‘military’ (Graham 2011) or ‘splintering’ (Graham and Marvin 2001)
types of urbanism, often symptomatised by gated communities, enclaves
and fenced condos. The governance and managerial mechanism put in
place by Grands Projets’ special bodies greatly influence the project’s dif-
ferentiation and border condition.
EPAD, for example, planned and implemented La Défense, by-­
passing local authorities and communities; for thirty years, surrounding
municipalities had no say in the realisation and management of La Défense
until the decentralisation of powers in France in the 1980s. Since then, the
role of the surrounding municipalities has increased, as reflected in a gen-
eral shift of administrative borders and changes in project planning, man-
agerial boundaries and responsibility. This has led to a gradual, albeit very
challenging, adaptation of the pedestrian deck’s physical border to better
integrate the Grand Projet into its surroundings. 2 ​ 3 4 LD–P DESIGN, IMPLE-
MENTATION, OPERATION ​
Our more recent Grand Projet case studies exhibit various degrees
of inclusion of diverse stakeholders from the start, unlike exclusive ‘splin-
tering’ types of urbanism, “uncontrollable and unshapable by the users”
(Boano and Leclair-Paquet 2014, 21). For example, the King’s Cross com-
munity consultation, established by the partnership of private land owners
(King’s Cross Central Limited Partnership (KCCLP)) and the local borough
of Camden, has enabled the wider community to partake in the decision-­
making process to some degree and, in doing so, influenced the project’s
gradual acceptance and integration into public life. ​3 KX–L IMPLEMENTATION ​
2.C MANAGERIAL MECHANISMS
Physically entering the area of a Grand Projet ​— ​crossing its border ​ ​
— ​ ​does not mean that a visitor will automatically have access to the pro-
ject’s amenities and spaces or feel comfortable using them. As Newman
writes, “borders are institutions;” they have their own set of internal rules
that govern their behaviour (Newman 2003, 14). Intra-urban borders are
interfaces of various flows of people, goods, capital and information, which
544 Bordering
GP-BO.05 Canary Wharf in its
larger regional context (London
building centre’s Physical model).
GP-BO.04 Children playing and
community gathering at King’s
Cross Granary Square, alongside
the KCCLP partnership security
guard.
545
the interface can empower, enable or block. These processes are oftentimes
rooted well before the physical manifestation of the border itself. As New-
man writes, “the practices through which borders are demarcated […] reflect
the ways in which borders are managed” (ibid. 2003, 14). The management
of the border regime determines the relative ease or difficulty with which
borders are crossed, to the benefit of some or to the exclusion of others (New-
man 2006). Similarly, as Saskia Sassens explains in the context of territorial
borders, “each flow constitutes bordering through a particular sequence of
interventions, which can occur at different locations along the chain. The
geographic borderline is but one point in the chain” (Sassen 2013, 30).
The formalities by which authorities select tenants and control open
spaces within Grands Projets enable more or fewer interactions to occur
within a wider and diverse community. King’s Cross, for example, is pri-
vately owned and managed by the KCCLP. Its open spaces are, therefore,
not subject to local authority regulations but rather by those established
by private landowners. So far, the KCCLP has managed these open spaces
in an unrestrictive way, allowing for protests, unplanned public gatherings
and community activities to take place alongside well-curated open spaces
and planned annual events. → GP-BO.04 ​4 KX–L OPERATION ​In Marunouchi, gov-
erned by the OMY Council of which Mitsubishi Estate holds the largest share,
the management association Ligare is in charge of the area’s ‘soft manage-
ment,’ including activation of open spaces. The curation of public attrac-
tions generally reflects a for-profit agenda under the guise of education or
entertainment, with events such as Mercedes Benz’s eco-mobility day and
IKEA’s transformation of Naka-dôri Avenue into a balcony landscape. ​
4 MNU–T OPERATION With respect to regulations behind tenant selection, we
see that, in King’s Cross, the Partnership’s retail and entertainment policy
reflects a range of options that cater to a variety of users, including inde-
pendent pubs, food trucks, international food and beverage chains, small-
scale design shops and globally renowned brands. ​4 KX–L OPERATION ​KCCLP’s
regulations focusing on retail diversity contrast with Canary Wharf policies,
which endeavour to meet the demands of large global corporate tenants.
2.D DESIGN SCHEMES
A project’s design scheme and spatial guidelines also play a key
role in its physical integration within or disconnect from its surrounding
area(s). The urban megaproject’s needed “visibility,” which justifies its ex-
ceptional status and conveys a sense of regeneration, modernisation or
urban extension, is “inevitably bound up with the question of … design”
(Grubbauer 2013, 187).
Canary Wharf in London → CW REFERENCE CASE, for example, was
intentionally built on a layout of large plots and high-rise typologies to
respond to the needs of the world’s mega-banks, further distinguishing the
area from its neighbourhoods in Tower Hamlet by Aspen Way and the Dock-
land Light Railway viaduct. This effectively segregated upper middle-class
individuals working and living in Canary Wharf from an area of lower
income housing and lower wage earners. ​→ GP-BO.05 ​In addition, due to
security concerns related to the Irish Republic Army (IRA) bombing attacks
Comparative Aspects
of the 1980s, active ground-floor uses were initially prohibited in Canary
Wharf ’s early masterplan (Ringelstein 2017). This further exacerbated the
condition of an inward-looking scheme. → GP-BO.06 Likewise, in La Défense,
hard boundaries were developed within the project’s design itself: the iconic
seven-storey deck creates a physical border disconnecting surrounding com-
munities and enhancing the area’s autonomy. The introduction of radically
different architectural typologies further reinforced the differentiation of GP-BO.06 Canary Wharf,
the new project from its surroundings. Access to the deck’s upper level non-active ground floors.

remains challenging, as neighbouring residents and users must traverse

multiple bridges, tunnels, stairs, escalators and lifts. → GP-BO.07 ​2 LD–P DESIGN ​
It should be stressed, however, that physical borders do not have
the same meaning everywhere. In Singapore, for example, the wide roads
of Nicoll Highway, Esplanade Drive, Collyer Quay and Shenton Way, which
border the area of Marina Bay’s incremental Grand Projet, have become
physical barriers visitors must cross from the downtown core area and older GP-BO.08 Marina Bay Area
central business district. ​→ GP-BO.08 ​Areas segregated by road and highway central business district viewed
from Esplanade drive.
infrastructures are, however, the norm in functionalist urban planned Sin-
gapore. The different projects within the Marina Bay area have been ret-
roactively supplemented by public transport and pedestrian underground
networks to improve the area’s accessibility. ​2 MBA–S DESIGN ​
In the case of King’s Cross, the design of spatial framework ini-
tially focused on the public realm, ensuring the development’s permea-
bility by extending existing streets of surrounding neighbourhoods. New
squares and parks are positioned along these main axes to ensure inte- GP-BO.09 New bridge between
HafenCity and the old city centre
gration, whilst smaller plots integrate heritage buildings with contempo- of Hamburg.
GP-BO.07 Accessing the deck of La Défense in Paris.

rary ones. ​2 KX–L DESIGN ​Similarly, the spatial framework of HafenCity

establishes links between the waterfront and the old city centre through
connecting roads and bridges, new view corridors and open space connec-
tions. Thus, the HafenCity spatial scheme enables a gradual disappearance
of the pre-­existing physical border. → GP-BO.09 ​2 HC–H DESIGN ​
2.E PROGRAMME COMPOSITIONS
Grand Projet visibility is often supported by particular programme
provision, enabled through wider policies that reinforce the area’s economic
strength and the creation of a specific centrality: an information and com-
munication technologies (ICT) area for 22@, enabled by a change of land
use code and formally stated in the modification of the General Metropol-
itan Plan of Barcelona; ​1 22@–B CONCEPTION t​ he transformation of a former
port area into a mixed-use waterfront in HafenCity, decided by the City
Senate of Hamburg ​1 HC–H CONCEPTION; and a business district in Marunouchi,
also supported by the more recent Meeting Incentive Convention Event/
Exhibition (MICE) initiative launched by the Japan Tourism Association
to convey a global, competitive urban image. ​3 MNU–T IMPLEMENTATION T ​ he
degree of diversity and inclusiveness of a Grand Projet’s programmes is
another key bordering practice.
GP-BO.10 West Kowloon
In the project of West Kowloon cultural centre, for example, pro-
Cultural Centre in Hong Kong. grammes such as the M+ museum of visual culture by Herzog and DeMeu-
ron, the Express Railway Link to China, the Cultural District masterplanned
by Foster and the high-end housing developments above MTR Kowloon
Station all speak to a non-local population, reflecting the different motiva-
tions driving the project: the handover of Hong Kong, on the one hand, and
the desire to strengthen the city’s position as “Asia’s World City” on the
other. Whilst still under development, there is a lack of incentives for sur-
rounding residents to access the site. The new programmes thus participate
in the formation of an abstract border. In addition, road arteries, viaducts
and tunnels structure the new project’s spatial framework, physically iso-
lating but also internally dividing the project. In fact, the inward-­looking
building typologies are better integrated with the regional railway network
than with the surrounding neighbourhoods. ​→ GP-BO.10 ​1 WK–H CONCEPTION
As in Lujiazui or the initial phases of La Défense, where activities
mainly cater to global centralities, programmatic segregation forms a key
parameter for abstract borders. In King’s Cross, although distinct spatial,

546 Bordering 547 Comparative Aspects

temporal and programmatic strategies strive to reconnect the project to its
surroundings, market housing rates have nearly doubled since the project’s
outset. According to a study by real estate agent Knight Frank, average prices
on site have climbed by more than 80% since 2009 and by only 70% in other
prime locations in central London (Knight Frank 2016). Whilst market hous-
ing (67%) is accompanied by a provision of social housing (33%) in the pro-
ject, the residential population within the new area consists of far wealthier
individuals than those of surrounding communities. ​5 KX–L IMPLICATIONS ​
2.F PHASING SCHEMES
Temporal aspects of a Grand Projet’s realisation, such as the focus
of each phase or the inclusion of temporary uses, impact the development’s
accessibility and form another urban-bordering practice.
The King’s Cross site remained accessible throughout different
phases of construction. Streets and infrastructures were planned and fin-
ished in the first phase, with temporary uses assigned to undeveloped plots.
A community garden, swimming pond and pop-up vendors encouraged
people to visit the scheme in its early days. As Alderson, marketing director
at Argent, affirms, “We didn’t put a big red line around the site, even dur-
ing early construction phases” (Alderson 2017). ​→ GP-BO.11 ​These measures
also created opportunities for interactions between local users and neigh-
bouring residents. ​3 KX–L IMPLEMENTATION
Likewise, in HafenCity, the central green space of Lohsepark has
become a highly frequented albeit peripheral neighbourhood park, pro-
viding a location for temporary uses and embedding HafenCity in the larger,
open space network of the city of Hamburg. ​2 HC–H DESIGN ​
3 CONCLUSION: BORDER QUALITIES
As evident in our case studies, types of physical and abstract bor-
ders can range greatly and are often blurred or influence each other in dif-
ferent ways. Physical and abstract types thus lead to different spatial qualities
of border conditions. ​→ GP-BO.02 ​These may include rather closed borders,
which isolate the area from its local context and turn it inwards through
socially homogenous environments and enforced rules of inclusion and
exclusion (in the case of Lujiazui, West Kowloon and La Défense); more
permeable borders, which facilitate various degrees of interaction between
new and existing populations, yet maintain a distinct identity (in the case
of Marina Bay and Marunouchi); or more open borders, which illustrate a
higher integration of the new development (in the case of Hafen­City, King’s
Cross and 22@). Grand Projet borders, however, are never completely opened
or closed, and nor are they fixed in time. This is best shown in the example
of La Défense, where the deliberately created deck is now evolving into a
more diluted border condition, triggered by the evolution of the project’s
governance. The territorial demarcations of Grands Projets may also adapt
and, over time, fail to coincide with initially planned socio-economic cat-
egories: older projects may become more or less assimilated within their
surroundings or, through multiclausal effects, neighbouring areas may adapt
to the Grands Projets themselves.
548 Bordering
GP-BO.11 King’s Cross in
London, border towards York Way
and the new project.
549
Grands Projets’ borders are complex, influenced by various historical, social,
economic and political processes. Flows of residents, users and visitors cross,
more or less easily, intra-urban borders for different reasons and needs.
Permeable borders often allow for greater accessibility; in the case of King’s
Cross, such accessibility surpasses that of the past, when the area was con-
sidered to be unsafe. Nonetheless, the project has maintained a new abstract
border as a result of its increased rents and real estate prices.
In a comparative analysis of Grands Projets’ borders ​— ​and their
related urban-bordering practices ​— ​we must bear in mind that borders are
contextual. At the local level, and in daily life, borders have different mean-
ings, as the case of Marina Bay illustrates. A description appropriate to one
case may therefore not suit another. Whilst our project attempts a com-
parative analysis of the border theme, we recognise borders’ specific con-
ditions of materialisation in space. However, Grands Projets have a strong
role in the creation of intra-urban borders, producing, diminishing or elim-
inating them. Comparing the urban-bordering practices of our case studies
and their resulting border qualities therefore helps us to address one of the
central questions of our research project: the inclusiveness of Grands Pro-
jets. To take Saskia Sassen’s words, “… territoriality, the legal construct, is
not on a one to one with territory ​— ​the latter can deborder the legal con-
struct and in this process show us something about the territorial itself ”
(Sassen 2013, 23). The process of “debordering” ​— ​or lack thereof ​— ​of a
Grand Projet is illustrative of its internal mechanisms; its border quality is
illustrative of its bordering practices.
The above analysis uncovered certain practices facilitating the pro-
duction of more inclusive border qualities than others, such as program-
matic diversity and spatial design guidelines, governing mechanisms and
community consultation processes, placemaking and tenant selections and
inclusive managerial procedures of a project’s open realm. The careful, com-
prehensive consideration of these different practices at specific moments
along a project’s development timeframe will influence the spatial materi-
alisation of a specific border in place and, in turn, produce a more or less
inclusive urban megaproject.
Comparative Aspects
BIBLIOGRAPHY
URBAN CATALYSTS IN GRANDS PROJETS
Alderson, Steve. 2017. Interview with Steve Alderson (Marketing Director
at Argent since 2002) Interview by Anna Gasco. Meeting notes. Examining the Importance of Catalysts
Boano, Camillo, and Benjamin Leclair-Paquet. 2014. “Potential, Freedom
and Space: Reflections on Agamben’s Potentialities in the West Bank.”
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Boano, Camillo, and Ricardo Martén. 2012. “Agamben’s Urbanism of Excep-
tion: Jerusalem’s Border Mechanics and Biopolitical Strongholds.” Cities
34: 6–17.
Edwards, Michael. 2015. “King’s Cross: The Dark Side.” Michael Edwards Pablo Acebillo
(blog). April 19, 2015. https://michaeledwards.org.uk/2015/04/19/kings-
cross-the-dark-side/.
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Urban catalysts are crucial drivers and moments within a Grand
Grubbauer, Monika. 2013. “‘Global’ Architecture as a Contradictory Sig- Projet: they help activate specific developments through concrete actions.
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In Urban Megaprojects: A Worldwide View, edited by Gerardo del Cerro
As planning schemes in large-scale developments move toward more flex-
Santamaría. ible frameworks ​r REGULATORY PLANS, securing key elements within a devel-
Karaman, Ozan, and Tolga Islam. 2012. “On the Dual Nature of Intra-Urban
Borders: The Case of a Romani Neighborhood in Istanbul.” Cities 29 (4):
opment is crucial to steering the project in a desired direction. Whilst our
234–43. research considers Grands Projets as urban catalysts for both the economic
Knight Frank. 2016. “Knight Frank - Focus on: King’s Cross 2016.” Knight
Frank Research Report. Residential Research. London: Knight Frank
and social prosperity of their cities, this chapter focuses on urban catalysts
LLP. http://www.knightfrank.com/research. within Grands Projets in an attempt to better identify the inherent dynamics
Newman, David. 2003. “On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework.”
Journal of Borderlands Studies 18 (1): 13–25.
guiding large-scale developments.
———. 2006. “Borders and Bordering: Towards an Interdisciplinary Dia- For this research, we understand urban catalysts as those that
logue.” European Journal of Social Theory 9 (2): 171–86.
Newman, David, and Anssi Paasi. 1998. “Fences and Neighbours in the Post­
stimulate further development within an urban district. We differentiate
modern World: Boundary Narratives in Political Geography.” Progress in between built and unbuilt catalysts. A built catalyst can be a building, urban
Human Geography 22 (2): 186–207.
Ringelstein, Dan. 2017. Interview with Dan Ringelstein (Urban Design Direc-
cluster or infrastructure. Examples of built catalysts include the Glories
tor at SOM London) Interview by Anna Gasco. Meeting notes. Tower in Barcelona, Marina Bay Sands in Singapore and the Eurostar Train
Sassen, Saskia. 2013. “When Territory Deborders Territoriality.” Territory,
Politics, Governance 1 (1): 21–45.
Station in King’s Cross, London. Unbuilt catalysts are policies, legislation
Van Houtum, Henk, and Ton Van Naerssen. 2002. “Bordering, Oredring or events strategically introduced to direct development. The Opportunity
and Othering.” Tijdschrift Voor Economische En Sociale Geografie 93 (2):
125–36.
Areas in London and the Urban Renaissance areas in Tokyo exemplify such
policies aimed at fostering development in their respective cities.
The long-term nature of urban megaprojects makes the use of urban
catalysts particularly relevant. The 22@ project began planning in 1998, was
approved in 2000 and is far from being fully completed. Other more mature
projects, such as La Défense, experience several governance changes that
lead to continuous redevelopment spanning decades. ​2 LD–P DESIGN ​Due
to such lengthy implementation timespans, initial planners have a limited
capacity to predict and control the entire development. Understanding the
types of urban catalysts, their role and/or their programme can facilitate
the realisation of ideas planners initially envisioned. Hence, urban catalysts
are crucial in directing the making of Grands Projets at an early stage and,
if planned and implemented accordingly, can have the desired impact for
these Grands Projets and their cities.
Building upon existing scholarly debates on urban catalysts and
drawing from examples within our case studies research, this chapter dis-
cusses catalysts’ role in the making of urban megaprojects and in how Grands
Projets impact and shape our cities today. After analysing the built and un-
built catalysts and related stakeholders within our case studies, the chapter

550 Bordering 551 Comparative Aspects

discusses the type of impact some urban catalysts have on Grands Projets and
their cities, spanning from global attention to programmatic and economic
specialisation. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the relevance of
urban catalysts within Grands Projets and their specific contributions.
2 THE URBAN CATALYSTS IN GRANDS PROJETS
The concept of the urban catalyst emerged in the 1970s as a reac-
tion to decaying urban centres in North American cities. The post-WWII
economic boom triggered tremendous growth and sprawl developments,
spurred by a subsidised road infrastructure programme and an increas-
ing vehicle ownership rate. As a consequence, downtown areas started to
decay: the dwindling demand for space in central locations attracted low-­
income individuals to these areas, whilst peripheral locations drew more
affluent social groups.
One of the first theoretical discussions addressing the necessary
restructuring of urban centres appeared in Wayne Attoe and Logan Donn
Logan’s American Urban Architecture: Urban Catalysts in the Design of Cities
(Attoe and Logan 1989). In this text, Attoe and Logan argue that urban
design, defined for so long as the implementation process of a city’s ideal
image, more appropriately referred to a process of ‘arranging catalytic reac-
tions.’ According to their theory, urban catalysts have several characteris-
tics, which cause a reaction that modifies existing elements in an enhanced
manner, without damaging context. The urban catalyst is, in their opinion,
to be arranged in a sequence of limited, incremental and achievable visions,
each with the power to kindle and condition other aims. The ingredients
of these catalytic reactions are not predetermined and their design is stra-
tegic (Attoe and Logan 1989). Milwaukee’s downtown illustrates how a
strategic public-private partnership can lead to successful enhancement
of an undermined city centre. Here, the Grand Avenue retail complex is
considered an urban catalyst, activating the centre by offering “an interior
place, a semi-public realm better than that found in any suburban shopping
centre” (Attoe and Logan 1989, 49). Similarly, the Central Saint Martin’s
College of Arts in King’s Cross managed to catalyse urban development
and pedestrian activity through a semi-public interior porous to its sur-
roundings. ​5 KX–L IMPLICATIONS ​
Ernest Sternberg has focused his research on commercial and sport
facilities as the main catalysts for revitalising urban areas. He argues that
urban catalysts are, above all, ‘activity generators’ in which pedestrian flows
are the most determinant strategy for ‘creating catalytic reactions’ (Ster-
nberg 2002). The city of Buffalo, as Sternberg explains, placed high hopes
in the ability of football stadiums and other sport facilities to revitalise
decaying areas. The examples given by Wayne, Logan and Sternberg under-
stand urban catalysts as built phenomena. However, as Aldo Rossi suggested
in 1970, urban catalysts, or “primary elements,” are not always “physical,
constructed, measurable artefacts” (Rossi 1977, 88). Unbuilt catalysts can
also activate urban development: specific policies or legislation, for exam-
ple, can incentivise future development, and particular events can trigger
a site’s spatial transformation. This category of unbuilt catalysts includes
552 Urban Catalysts
the Opportunity Areas in London, a planning status granted to 38 specific
sites including King’s Cross that provided certain advantages, such as higher
densities, as a means of incentivising investors. 1
​ KX–L CONCEPTION ​The Spe-
cial Economic Zones in China, of which Lujiazui in Shanghai is a part, is
also considered an unbuilt catalyst, as this policy was directed at attracting
foreign investments in China. Likewise, specific management organisations
have acted as facilitators of urban development; this is the case for HafenC-
ity Hamburg GmbH and the 22@ company (the latter dissolved in 2011),
both public companies created solely for the planning and management
of HafenCity and the 22@ project, respectively. ​3 22@–B IMPLEMENTATION ​
4 HC–H OPERATION
Although this chapter focuses on the relevance of urban catalysts
in fostering development within a Grand Projet, it is worth mentioning
some authors’ critique of using Grands Projets as urban catalysts in the
context of regional development. Questioning the suitability of Grands
Projets as agents of development, Kongsombat claims that “instead of imi-
tating another format of the city by injecting a large masterplan, other
available tools are more suitable, such as arranging catalytic reactions that
can be flexibly changed” (Kongsombat, n.d., 1). Others are sceptical about
large-­scale projects’ suitability in effectively developing cities. Cermetrius
Lynell Bohannon makes this argument by referencing the American urban
renewal programme or Housing Act, which launched in 1949 and, in his
opinion, “had a devastating effect on the supply of low-rent housing and
on the low-income residents who occupied it” since “more housing was
destroyed than was rebuilt; the programme demolished 404,000 low and
middle-income urban units, replacing them with only 41,580 units for the
same population” (Bohannon 2004, 1). Hence, the American urban renewal
programme, a Grand Projet in its own, acquired a doubtful legacy, fell far
short of its goal of building 810,000 units of new public housing by 1955
and provided little aid to cities suffering from housing shortages (A. Caro
1974). Bohannon further states that large urban projects are more suscep-
tible to unpredictable changes than smaller interventions are, since the
former involves larger financial investments in early stages of planning.
Alternatively, he advocates for smaller catalytic interventions as a more
suitable approach to urban development.
3 THE MAKING OF URBAN CATALYSTS
This section illustrates the making of urban catalysts substanti-
ated by various examples from our research. → GP–UC.01 It also considers
the different natures of built and unbuilt catalysts and key stakeholders.
One may suggest that unbuilt catalysts are broader in reach since the cat-
alytic tools are embedded in laws and legislation that may have a range of
spatial outcomes. Their effects can, nevertheless, be as powerful as those
generated by built catalysts, including, for example, rental price surges,
increases in capital inflow or effective management structures.
One example of an unbuilt catalyst is the Publicly Driven Plans of
22@ (Planes Predeterminados), a legally binding planning tool introduced
by the City Council of Barcelona for the 22@ project and applied to trigger
553 Comparative Aspects
 six sites within the project perimeter considered strategic for development. ​
22@–B
22@, Barcelona
Public Driven Plan
2 22@–B DESIGN This tool was devised due to the largely private ownership
22@ Company
of land: as urban transformations depended on private owner initiatives,
22@ Barcelona
public authorities endowed these six areas with advantages to encourage
Glories Tower private developers to transform their land. These sites were granted 3.2
FAR as opposed to the rest of the district’s FAR of 3; furthermore, given
Audio-visual Campus
GP–UC.02 University Pompeu that the spatial configuration and re-allotment project was already elabo-
Fabra and Media Cluster in 22@.
rated by the Public Authorities, the time required for planning approval
HC–H HafenCity Company HafenCity was much shorter. In contrast to the rest of 22@, the masterplan for the
HafenCity, Hamburg
six areas was decided by City Planners rather than private landowners and
Elbphilarmonie
supported by local architects. This was to ensure a cohesive spatial config-
HafenCity University
uration in which both architectural representativeness and large programmes
of public facilities could coexist. Sizeable urban programmes such as the
Elbtower (planned) University Pompeu Fabra and the Media Cluster would not have been pos-
GP–UC.03 Granary Building sible without combining several urban blocks; the Publicly Driven Plans
Ericusspitze Campus containing the Central Saint
Martin’s College of Arts.
facilitated this as well.
Indeed, the Media Cluster around the University Pompeu Fabra ​
KX–L Eurostar Train Station → GP–UC.02 ​is perhaps the most decisive ​5 22@–B IMPLICATIONS, built result of
King’s Cross, London
this policy; today, it is a vibrant, representative area of the 22@ district.
Opportunity Areas
The university’s decision to open its Audio-visual Faculty in 2009 initiated
Central Saint Martin’s
development not only around the area but also within the 22@ district as
a whole. The Media Cluster, part of the Audio-visual Campus and occu-
pying one and a half blocks, was carefully designed around the Ca l’Aranyo
LD–P
La Défense, Paris
CNIT
heritage compound, a former cotton factory built in 1874 now used for edu-
La Grande Arche
cation purposes. Moreover, the planning of the block enabled programmatic
synergies between three main components: the public university, the admin-
istration and the private sector. These are represented by the University
LZ–S
Lujiazui, Shanghai
Special Economic Zones
Pompeu Fabra and its Audio-visual Faculty, occupying the heritage build-
ings; the MediaPro building facility fosters collaborations with students
and the RBA publisher, which, in turn, provides internship and work pro-
MBA–S
Marina Bay Area, Singapore
Marina Bay Sands
grammes for students and graduates. Such synergies have also stimulated
Lands Acquisition Act 1966
joint innovation projects and educational programmes offered to inhabi-
tants of the surrounding neighbourhoods (van Dinteren and Jansen 2018).
As some stakeholders reported, both the configuration of the block and
MNU–T
Marunouchi, Tokyo
Tokyo Station
the establishment of the university facility meant a turning point in the
consolidation of the 22@ district. Josep Pique, CEO of the 22@ company
from 2007 to 2011, claims that “everything changed when the university
WK–H
West Kowloon, Hong Kong
Urban Renaissace Areas
moved there … from then on, big investments started to arrive. What the
Airport Core Programme
city has learned is that the university is the ultimate transformative agent,
and 22@ was no exception to this” (Piqué 2016).
Express Railway Link The use of educational facilities as an urban and social transfor-
mative force also appears in London, especially in the case of Central Saint
M+ Museum (planned)
Martin’s College of Art in King’s Cross. → GP–UC.03 The decision to include
an educational institution as part of the King’s Cross regeneration area was
1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
not part of the initial plan; this emerged during the early phases of area
redevelopment. In 2011, three years after the start of construction within the
King’s Cross area, Central Saint Martin’s signed an agreement with devel-
GP–UC.01 Urban catalysts along the Grands Projets timelines. Start date of related oper Argent to acquire one of the twenty heritage buildings ​— ​the Granary
Grand Projet
Built Project
(Building, Structure)

554 Urban Catalysts 555 Comparative Aspects


NORTH
King’s Cross
St. Pancras
EAST
WEST
CENTRAL
GP–UC.04 Opportunity areas in London.    
   
Complex ​— ​and transform it into its new campus. This complex, restored
by Stanton Williams architects for £200 million, provided the cultural and
creative heart of the redeveloped area. The art school has since acted as a
key stimulant for the area, and the 5,000 students and staff have been vital
for injecting life into the new scheme. The presence of Central Saint Mar-
tin’s has been cited as one of the essential factors that “tied the scheme in
with the surrounding area” (Brooker 2015). Its catalytic effects are visible
in its surroundings, where Granary Square has become the busiest open
space in London. ​2 3 KX–L DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION ​
Whereas the Publicly Driven Plans were created specifically for the
22@ project, other unbuilt catalysts were applied to a broader territorial
coverage. Hence, these not only targeted one particular project but also
attempted to create an overall development strategy for the city. This is the
case with the Opportunity Areas in London, → GP–UC.04 a planning status
granted by the Greater London Authority to 38 specific sites that included
advantages such as higher densities to incentivise investors. King’s Cross
was one of the designated areas with such status. ​1 KX–L CONCEPTION ​Another
556 Urban Catalysts
strategy using unbuilt catalysts was carried out in China with Special Eco-
nomic Zones. This policy was one of many instruments with which Deng
Xiaoping’s Government reformed and opened the Chinese economy to
ensure its competitiveness in the global market. These special areas ​ ​— ​ ​of
which our case study of Lujiazui is part ​— ​included tax advantages for busi-
nesses and flexible government policies tailored to foreign investments.
GP–UC.05 Marina Bay Area in The attraction of such companies and the subsequent inflow of wealth have
Singapore.
caused tremendous economic growth for the whole country, particularly
within more urbanised coastal regions. These positive economic prospects
have triggered a massive migration of millions of rural Chinese willing to
move to urban centres for better living standards. It is estimated that more
than 500 million people were lifted out of extreme poverty as China’s pov-
erty rate fell from 88% to 6.5% between 1981 and 2012 (The World Bank
2018). Thus, this policy can be seen as an unbuilt catalyst contributing to
a nation’s overall economic development.
A well-known example of a built catalyst is the Marina Bay Sands
(MBS) development in Singapore, an Integrated Resort completed in 2011
and owned by the Las Vegas Sands Corporation. → GP–UC.05 Its construc-
tion was framed on the effort to consolidate Marina Bay as a fresh-water
basin to be used for leisure purposes. With a clean Singapore River and
technological advancements, the realisation of the Marina Barrage began
in 2004 and was completed in 2007. Following a state-led public consul-
tation from March 2004 to December 2005, which weighed the possible
negative social consequences of legalising gambling against the economic
effects a casino would bring to the country, Prime Minister Lee announced
the development of the Integrated Resort.
Intensification areas
MBS was a key component in the consolidation of Marina Bay’s
Opportunity areas urban transformation. In fact, the tender of such a large parcel for the devel-
Central activities
Inner London
opment of Marina Bay Sands was seen as an effective way of quickly and
Outer London efficiently completing the bay’s skyline. As the Prime Minister stated,
“Without the Integrated Resort, it might take us fifteen years or more to
tender out the land in individual parcels, and to develop the area on the
same scale. But if we build an Integrated Resort, within four years the Bay-
front will be developed”(“Ministerial Statement – PM 18apr05.Doc – Min-
isterial Statement – PM 18apr05.Pdf ” 2005, 05).
This focus on consolidating the bay and activating the waterfront
translated into regulations enforced by the Urban Redevelopment Author-
ity (URA), the Singaporean planning agency. It is, for example, mandatory
for private developments facing the bay, including Marina Bay Sands, to
include Activities Generating Uses, such as retail, food and beverage, along
ground floor levels. Due to this and programme placement in the bay area,
the Integrated Resort has become a key activator for the waterfront pub-
lic space, providing seating terraces, museums, performances and events.
Marina Bay Sands manages the event plaza, promenade and boardwalk
on behalf of the URA and finances the daily upkeep of these spaces. It is
obliged, through its commitment in the tender documents, to develop and
manage the outdoor spaces, renting them out in accordance with URA’s
guidelines and subjected to URA approval.
557 Comparative Aspects
Beyond becoming an iconic Singaporean image, MBS has become synon-
ymous with the Singapore brand, the city-state’s global standing, a polit-
ically stable, regulated nation and a safe haven for investment and con-
sumption (Juan Zhang and Brenda SA Yeoh 2016, 201). Marina Bay Sands
thus signifies both a strategic move to position Singapore as an interna-
tional tourist destination and a key component in completing urban trans-
formations around the bay.
Another example of a built catalyst using iconic architecture as a
means of triggering development in its surroundings is the Elbphilharmonie
in HafenCity, Hamburg. → GP–UC.06 An initial masterplan anticipated con-
structing a landmark at the concert hall’s current location, but the hall was
only implemented after the first building proposal was discarded. In fact,
its implementation was directed and commissioned by the City Council of
Hamburg, a process in which the HafenCity Hamburg GmbH, the actual
managing company of the project, was little involved. The final building
has, nevertheless, captured global media attention because of its power-
ful physical presence and sophisticated architecture. The historical brick-
walled podium topped with an ensemble of new and iconic architecture
acts as a key tourist attractor in the city.
4 THE IMPACT OF URBAN CATALYSTS
This section examines the impact urban catalysts have within their
respective Grands Projets. Here the discussion concerns urban megaproj-
ects’ iconicity, aim of acquiring global attention and ambition for economic
specialisation through regulations and incentives.
Attracting global attention is by no means a Grand Projet’s end goal;
rather, this aim is directed at pursuing further objectives, such as foreign
investments or the recognition of a city as a hub where particular economic
activities can flourish. In Paris, the built urban catalyst of La Grande Arche ​
→ GP–UC.07 in the financial district of La Défense is a paradigmatic example
of how architecture can catalyse an entire area’s development. La Grande
Arche’s alignment with Paris’s historical axis and its move to extend this
axis westward catalysed future developments in the La Défense-Seine Arche
area of Nanterre. La Grande Arche and its architecture stand as symbols
of economic pre-eminence and triggers for further development in their
vicinities. ​2 LD–P DESIGN
Marina Bay Sands, the built catalyst in Singapore discussed in the
prior section, demonstrates how iconic architectural typologies acquire a
global reach: the development’s multifunctional programme, incorporating
a five-star hotel, shopping complex, convention centre, casino and theatre,
positioned Singapore as a node for tourism and high-end consumption in the
2010s. Furthermore, its unconventional and perhaps extravagant building
typology garnered attention beyond its national borders.
Another urban catalyst impact traced across our case studies is
the attempt of economic specialisation. In Barcelona, the 22@ Plan and
Publicly Driven Plans supported the emergence of a new tertiary hub. The
former plan foresaw a land-use change from industrial to mixed-use within
the 22@ project site; accordingly, developers could only generate “@
558 Urban Catalysts
activities,” a type of use created specifically for the project and delineating
activities intensive in the use of knowledge and technology. By including
these activities in the different urban plans, developers would receive ben-
efits from the administration  ​— ​such as higher densities to build ​— ​and a
return on investment. Due to today’s ubiquitous use of internet, technol-
ogy and talent, nearly any kind of company or tertiary activity falls under
GP–UC.06 Elbphilharmonie, the @ category. It is worth remembering, however, that the 22@ plan was
HafenCity.
drafted in 1999, a period in which the new economy was only just emerg-
ing and internet and ICT activities were not yet present. Whilst the site’s
requirement for @ activities is now less restrictive, 22@ remains the prime
district in which start-ups and technological companies settle.
In Tokyo, Marunouchi was the generative force for creating a global
hub of financial activities. The urban catalysts for this strategy were various:
early on, the Iwasaki family designated the site as a new centre for busi-
GP–UC.07 La Grande Arche, ness, as it was strategically located between the port, the Imperial Palace,
La Défense.
important trading routes and the city’s merchant district. Decades later,
the national government identified Urban Renaissance Areas ​→ ​MNU–T.25 IN
MNU–T PORTRAIT to revitalise the building trade after the Japanese economy’s
collapse in the early 1990s. ​1 MNU–T CONCEPTION ​The area of Marunouchi
was designated an Urban Renaissance area amongst nineteen other areas
in Tokyo, within which developers enjoyed exceptions in their applications
for building permissions and trade-offs for increased FARs and building
heights. Founders’ willingness to create a business centre and Marunouchi’s
consolidation as a business hub through its Urban Renaissance planning
status have anchored Tokyo as an international centre for finance and trade.
22@ in Barcelona and Marunouchi in Tokyo illustrate how regula-
tions, or unbuilt urban catalysts, can promote desired economic specialisa-
tion within a territory. These aspirations for global attention or economic
specialisation should not be seen as mutually exclusive. In fact, La Grande
Arche is also representative of La Défense, a well-known business and
finance hub in Paris, which, in turn, positions the French capital as a node
for a certain kind of economic activity. Conversely, the desire for economic
GP–UC.08 Glories Tower, specialisation does not exclude the use of iconic architecture for the sake
marking the new downtown in
Barcelona.
of global outreach. The Glories Tower in Barcelona, → GP–CA.08 although
strictly speaking not part of the 22@ site perimeter, has become a landmark,
delineating the city’s new downtown and fostering foreign investments in
Barcelona’s technological district.
5 CONCLUSION
The development of urban catalysts within the framework of large-
scale developments is crucial for a project’s success. Different types of cat-
alysts can have a positive impact on the subsequent development of urban
projects. Built catalysts, such as Glories Tower in Barcelona or Elbtower in
Hamburg, are mostly developed through private initiative, whereas unbuilt
catalysts, in which regulations and policies play a central role, such as the
Publicly Driven Plans in 22@ or the HafenCity Hamburg GmbH, are mostly
directed by public authorities. A mutual collaboration between the pub-
lic and private sphere is essential for the successful implementation of
559 Comparative Aspects
different catalysts in a project. An efficient, creative government structure
is also vital for devising specific policies. The leadership in the government
might be crucial in planning anchor institutions, such as universities or
major corporations, which will adopt a leading role and effectively act as
innovation catalysts for the area (Pique, Miralles, and Berbegal-Mirabent
2019). Additionally, sufficient incentives must be in place for the private
sector to invest in buildings or clusters that can act as transformative forces
on surroundings.
Once the making is implemented, the impact of catalysts on urban
development comes into play. Both architectural iconicity in the pursuit of
global attention and the use of regulations to generate specific economic
activities have been discussed. The first form of impact uses architectural
landmarks to identify the project and position it on the global scene, as the
example of Marina Bay Sands in Singapore demonstrates. The second type
of impact positions the project as a viable economic opportunity through
the use of incentives and regulations, as in Marunouchi in Tokyo. These
impacts are closely related to the public-private stakeholder collaboration
structure during the making of the project. In Singapore, this public-private
collaboration relies on the project brief developed by the public agency
URA and private investment for the construction of the complex, devel-
oped by Las Vegas Sands Corporation. In Tokyo, the Mitsubishi company
developed most of the business area with the support of public authorities,
who issued policies promoting the consolidation of a financial hub. The
examples discussed in this chapter challenge a common misconception
that architectural icons ​— ​​the built landmark ​— ​are the sole means of cre-
ating an identity for the success of a large-scale project. Projects such as
22@ demonstrate that underlying policies and activities being generated
are the most relevant aspects of a development’s success, to the extent that
no architectural icon is actually needed for the district’s transformation.
These case studies illustrate the relevance of catalysts to a project’s
success. It is difficult to imagine the development of King’s Cross without
the successful implementation of the Eurostar Train Station. Likewise, it
is doubtful that Marina Bay and Gardens by the Bay in Singapore would
enjoy their current levels of economic activity and urban vitality without
the powerful presence of Marina Bay Sands and its programmatic anchors
along the bay. In other instances, urban catalysts were not planned as such
but have nonetheless generated impacts unanticipated during the planning
stage. This is the case with La Grande Arche in Paris, which was not con-
ceived as a transformative force for the Nanterre area but has ultimately
acted as such. Thus, although relevant, catalysts are sometimes out of the
control of Grands Projects. In any case, the success of a Grand Projet is often
contingent on the presence of a catalyst. In this sense, the urban catalyst
can be seen as a proof of concept for the viability of the entire Grand Pro-
jet and acts as a key element in the large-scale development’s completion.
560 Urban Catalysts
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axzz42aHEOfrT.
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Knowledge-Based Development, 10 (1).
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561 Comparative Aspects
THE GRAND PROJET AS A CENTRALITY
A Comparative Discussion of Large-Scale
Urban Developments and the Concept of
Centrality
Naomi C. Hanakata
1 INTRODUCTION
Grands Projets present specific urban dynamics that have the capac-
ity to disrupt and reconfigure existing power structures. As such, these
projects represent a centrality based on a carefully laid out urban develop-
ment with, in many cases, a direct translation of the city’s objective into a
layout and morphology. As newly built centralities, they function as new
urban landmarks, broadcasting an ambitious project agenda to the city and
its surroundings.
In the cases we studied, Grands Projects have, in most instances,
absorbed primary investment capital in the region and been driven by or
in collaboration with political interests, which pave the way for new or excep-
tional practices. Physically and figuratively, this culminates in the creation
of new centralities, which concentrate certain functions and connect peo-
ple with specific ambitions. Centrality is a quality that describes the con-
dition of one location in relation to another, namely the periphery. This
relational quality is key when we see Grands Projets as centralities in a priv-
ileged position in relation to other areas of the city and region.
Grands Projets host programmes and tenants of acclaimed global
relevance and, in doing so, impact local economies as much as livelihoods.
At the same time, Grands Projets are not necessarily ‘social’ centralities
with a high density of residences or an intensity of visible activities; rather,
they are the result of highly controlled development processes and urban
environments, which include a meticulous determination of spaces, activ-
ities and temporalities.
Grands Projets are set out with new development practices and tra-
jectories; they do not follow established ones. In fact, they are initiated to
disrupt and reconfigure existing power structures. To cite Swyngedouw et al.:
 rban megaprojects “turn the city into a global competitive actor
U Lefebvre denotes that centralities are not by default epicentres of social
in the domain in which the elites feel it has some competitive ad-
vantage. Needless to say, the imagin(eer)ing of the city’s future is
directly articulated with the visions of those who are pivotal to the
formulation, planning and implementation of the project” (Swynge-
douw, Moulaert and Rodriguez 2002, 568).
562 Centralities
As such, Grands Projets can be seen as ambitious trendsetters for urban
development, representing the ‘exemplary urban condition’ of a capable
few and realised under the ideal laboratory condition of a confined site
and extensive control.
With a comparative analysis in this chapter, we examine the mak-
ing and impact of Grands Projets as centralities of power and control. We
explore how Marunouchi in Tokyo, a project underway since the late nine-
teenth century, and HafenCity in Hamburg, a project which began official
construction in 2001, became ​— ​or are becoming ​— ​important centralities
in their cities and how these projects furnish fascinating insights into their
own spatial-temporal impact. ​p HC–H & MNU–T PORTRAITS ​
This chapter is structured in three sections. First, we introduce the
concept of centralities in urban literature and its value as a global compara-
tive lens for Grands Projets. Second, we examine the making of Grands Projets
as places of centralised control, exploring how governing bodies claim cer-
tain authoritative positions and tools these bodies deploy in translating con-
trol into space. Third, we explore the impact of Grands Projets as centralities
of power within and upon their immediate, extended surroundings. In these
explorations, the theoretical discussion is supported by empirical findings
from our eight research cases studies, focusing especially on Marunouchi
and HafenCity, which offer very distinct manifestations of centrality.
2 GRANDS PROJETS AS CENTRALITIES
The concept of centrality has been repeatedly discussed in urban
literature. Studies of this notion emerged especially in the decades follow-
ing WWII, in which many regions in the West experienced rapid economic
growth and population increase, triggering discussions about the mecha-
nisms driving urban agglomeration and expansion.
Walter Christaller, for example, tried to quantitatively capture the
‘behaviour of centralities’ in his Central Place Theory, first published in
1933. His analysis focuses on their spatial configuration, size and distance
relative to other centralities. David T. Herbert examined the measurement
of ‘internal centrality’ as gross rateable value (RV) divided by units of ground
floor area (GFA): “the higher the value the more ‘central’ the establishment
with the core,” he concluded (Herbert 1961, in Bird 1977). Jean Gottmann
describes the shifting function of centralities from administrative, ritual
or commercial places to places of concentrated manufacturing and, we
could add, services and information exchange. These discussions, how-
ever, are largely concerned with the quantitative description and relational
position of centrality rather than its qualitative conditioning.
To discuss centrality as a relational and qualitatively distinct space,
Henri Lefebvre’s The Production of Space, first published in 1974, is helpful.
space but rather places where power becomes actualised. It is, in fact,
through the realisation of power that centralities as we understand them
563 Comparative Aspects
here become apparent: they seek to dominate or reduce elements of resist-
ance, including spaces outside clear regulatory frameworks and protests
against established rules. This notion is key in the discussion of Grands
Projets as centralities from a comparative perspective. Places like Hafen­
City or Marunouchi are not necessarily the heart of communal activities,
social exchange or productive labour within their surroundings (yet), but
they are places representing ambitious city agendas and progressive urban
development in the context of a city’s future.
In her work on competitive international cities as geographic anchors
in an interdependent global economy, Saskia Sassen describes centralities
as locations that constitute “the capability of global control and the infra-
structure of jobs involved in production”(Sassen 1995, 64). As such, cen-
tralities are allocated a dual role: one within local networks and one within
global hierarchies. With this bifold condition, and as locations that epito-
mise a growing socio-economic imbalance, the case study cities of Sassen’s
research become transterritorial ‘centres’ marking a “transterritorial ter-
rain of centrality with regard to a specific complex of industries and activ-
ities” (1995, 71). In the case of Marunouchi, which Sassen identifies as part
of the ‘global cities’ triad alongside London and New York, this becomes
distinctly evident: whilst the financial and business centrality in Tokyo
and an important transport node between the city core and its periphery,
Marunouchi’s relevance as a link to global trading platforms and flagship
for Tokyo’s international allegiances prevails.
With regard to the making and impact of large-scale urban devel-
opment projects, we wish to focus on the notion of power; as such, we
examine centrality as a moment of concentration and control. This under-
standing presumes centrality as a relational space in which concentration
and control manifest relative to surroundings. Hence, we are exploring a
space where power is exercised within the project and by the project. The
project emerges not only as a symbol or placeholder for such power, but
also as an active agent in its negotiation of space.
3 THE MAKING OF CENTRALISED CONTROL
The establishment of centralised control within Grands Projets is
ubiquitous to our case studies. Here, power manifests as a dispositional
quality and resource concentrated in the hands of a distinct group of actors,
i.e., governing bodies created for this purpose. Their power allows them
to control development processes in a concerted way, which is crucial in
realising large-scale, coherent urban development schemes.
We observed in all of our cases that the power as a capacity to mobi-
lise, direct and decide rests firmly in the hands of selected elites and bureau-
cratic organisations. These capacities emerge in the conception phase of
a project, which defines a more or less articulate vision that guides subse-
quent phases. They continue with a development according to design guide-
lines and may even include display regulations, controlled access of open
spaces or selected admission of tenants once the project is in operation. ​
→ GP–CE.01–02
564 Centralities
GP–CE.01 KCCLP partnership
security guard patrolling Granary
Square, King’s Cross.
GP–CE.02 Monitoring of public
space users along Nakadôri in
Marunouchi.
565
When we look at our case studies for decisive, common denominators regard-
ing these capacities, we find them primarily in the nature of their governing
bodies. The categorisation of ‘private’ or ‘public’ ownership is less decisive,
although it allows us to challenge normative assumptions regarding these
terms. The exceptional character of many of these cases’ governing bodies
suggests a more centralised mode of control: examining state-run Marina
Bay in Singapore ​p MBA–S PORTRAIT ​or (largely) privately-run Marunouchi
in Tokyo ​p MNU–T PORTRAIT, we cannot simply observe the former as directed
in the interest of the public ​— ​with a greater level of social interaction as a
result ​— ​and the latter as emerging under a clear, hierarchical governing
structure compelled by profit margins.
HafenCity and Marunouchi, however, illustrate examples of pro-
jects where the control over vision, implementation mechanisms and future
development is more or less exercised by a single actor: in these cases,
Hafen­City Hamburg GmbH, a private company owned by the city, and the
Otemachi-Marunouchi-Yurakucho District Redevelopment Council oper-
ated by private and public entities. ​p HC–H & MNU–T PORTRAITS ​Similarly, the
22@ Company, owned by the municipality (and dissolved in 2011), in the
case of 22@; or the King’s Cross Central Limited Partnership in the case of
King’s Cross and the Shanghai Lujiazui Development Co., Ltd., owned by
the Shanghai Pudong New District Asset Management Co., Ltd. ​— ​in turn
owned by the state ​— ​in the case of Lujiazui ​p 22@–B, KX–L & LJZ–T PORTRAITS ​
→ GP–CE.03 ​present specially created development and governing bodies
which are in charge, independent of their private or public nature, and which
are privileged with exceptional requirements and procedures that facilitate
centralised control.
These exceptional bodies have greater capacity to mobilise resources
and, in many cases, make decisions almost single-handedly, as they are not
dependent on public approval or the consent of opposing parties. At the
same time, these bodies allow for greater stability over time, which extends
beyond the four or five years of electoral cycles. This is, however, paralleled
by what Swyngedouw et al. call a ‘democratic deficit’ (2002): a development
practice induced by fast-track action plans, which consults the public via
events or questionnaires when convenient but is only accountable to the
bodies’ board of directors, rather than the public or electorate.
These special governance structures also allow stakeholders to
partake in multiple capacities, as owners, shareholders, developers and/
or managers; this is in stark contrast to individuals within a government
administration, who face restricted capacities in order to avoid conflicts
of interest. Such simultaneous capacities allow stakeholders to consolidate
and even conceal power distributions within a project.
Comparative Aspects
SPECIALLY CREATED AND DEDICATED 22@ Company – HafenCity, King’s Cross, Paris La Défense Shanghai Lujiazui Otemachi-Marunouchi- West Kowloon Cultural
GOVERNING BODY Hamburg GmbH Central Limted Development Co.Ltd. Yurakucho District District Authority
Partnership Redevelopment Council

LEGAL STATUS S.A. Public GmbH LP Public Co. Ltd. General Incorporated Public
Association (Japanese:
ippan shadan hōjin)

OWNER OF GOVERNING BODY City of Barcelona Government authority City of Hamburg Private companies Local municipalities City of Shanghai Private companies, SAR of Hong Kong
City Ward

FOUNDING YEAR OF THE 2000 1974 2004 2008 1958 1990 1988 2008
CURRENT / LATEST GOVERNING BODY

DISSOLUTION YEAR 2011 – – – – – – –

PROJECT 22@–B MBA–S HC–H KX–L LD–P LJZ–S MNU–T WK–H

Barcelona Singapore Hamburg London Paris Shanghai Tokyo West Kowloon

SITE

WAYS IN WHICH THE EXCEPTIONAL Special treatment in application process
STATUS OF THESE BODIES AND / OR
PROJECTS MANIFESTS → Fast planning approval through in-house
evaluation and by-passing of conventional
city council bureaucracy
(22@: under the 22@ Company)
→ Under the direct supervision of top deci-
sion making authorities
(HC: Special Development District;
German: Vorranggebiet)
→ Planning regulations decided by specially
created planning body (at first) overriding
municipal planning procedures (LD–P)
Special spatial requirements / allowances
→ Comprehensive design guidelines pre-
scribing facade material, ground floor
height, street level facade design and dis-
play design (HC–H)
→ Special ground floor design and require-
ments (HC–H)
→ Special eaves height restriction (MNU–T)
→ Special open space design guidelines
(HC, MNU–T)
→ Special plot and height regulations of
towers (LD–P)
→ Special FAR trade offs between develop-
ments are possible
Special programme incentives or requirements Special economic incentives
→ Change of land use code requriements → Special Economic Zone with tax incentives
from industrial to ICT (@) activities (22@–B) (LJZ–S, MNU–T)
→ Special mix-use requirements for each → FAR trade off within a block which allows
development (minimum 2 different uses) increased total FAR (MNU–T)
(HC–H) → FAR increase to provision of publicly
→ Active ground floor with programme for accessable open spaces (POPs) (MNU–T)
creating an vibrant and active ground level
experience (HC–H, KX–L)
→ Special open space programming require-
ments (HC–H, MNU–T)
→ Compliance with minimum provision of
housing and jobs (KX–L)

GP–CE.03 Matrix of case studies, governing bodies and special practices, incentives and regulations.
regulations

566 Centralities 567 Comparative Aspects

In Marunouchi, for example ​4 MNU–T OPERATION, the owner of 35% of the
land is Mitsubishi Estate. Several other governing bodies, founded by Mit-
subishi Estate over the past thirty years, are nominally neutral and in charge
of different tasks in the area. For example, Ligare, a non-profit organisa-
tion, is the area management association, formed by owners (also of non-­
Mitsubishi Estate property), tenants, employees and scholars. The organ-
isation is in charge of soft area management and promotional activities,
including the advertisement of Marunouchi as a MICE (Meeting, Incentive,
Conference and Exhibition) venue in Tokyo. Another body is Ecozzeria,
an association open to anyone interested in developing and supporting
projects that lead to sustainable, environmentally-friendly district improve-
ment. ​→ GP–CE.04 ​Under the surface of this multi-agency structure, Mit-
subishi Estate maintains its directive power, financially sponsoring these
groups and offering ideas for implementation. This gradual dispersion of
power over the past thirty years has increased the number of what John
Allen refers to as “authoritative locations” in the centre of development
action, firmly maintaining “responsibility for ordering people’s lives” (2011,
79:35). Hence, what is set up a network of differentiated capacities to gov-
ern the project is in fact a centralised power structure directed by one main
actor, Mitsubishi Estate.
In the case of HafenCity ​4 HC–H OPERATION, the central governing
body, the Hafen­City Hamburg GmbH, is a private company owned by the
city state of Hamburg. It describes its role as “development manager for
the city, a property owner and provider of infrastructure” (HafenCity Ham-
burg GmbH 2018), directly denoting the multi-capacity engagement of such
bodies. As a privately registered company, it is led by a chief executive officer
and chief managing director. Its governing board consists of senators (city
state ministers) from the city council. Since all governing board members
are part of the local government, the company clearly falls under govern-
ment control; however, as a private company, HafenCity Hamburg GmbH
remains outside the directive realm and public accountability.  ​→ GP–CE.05 ​
This comparative reading demonstrates that the making of Grands
Projets as places of centralised control is less determined by the private or
public nature of their main governing bodies than it is by these bodies’ struc-
tural set-up, scope of responsibilities and exceptionality in local planning
practices. Thus, Grands Projets are facilitated by bodies in charge of managing
a coherent urban scheme, presenting a capacity otherwise absent in the city
as in the case of Marunouchi; through direct supervision by city authorities,
making district-level approval a mere formality, as in Hafen­City; or by skip-
ping certain stages in the planning approval process, as was the case in 22@.
The scope and configuration of dispositional qualities and resources facil-
itate the making of Grands Projets and permit control to the extent needed
for generating such large-scale, comprehensively planned projects.
568 Centralities
GP–CE.04 Ecozzeria space in
Marunouchi.
GP–CE.05 The seat of
HafenCity Hamburg GmbH with
the Überseequartier in the back.
569
4 THE IMPACT OF CENTRALITIES OF POWER
For an understanding of Grands Projets as centralities of power and
their impact on urban environments, we examined centrality as a ‘power
over,’ which is closely tied to the governing bodies in charge. These bodies
and Grands Projets impact the condition of our cities at a larger scale through
incentives, constraints and control of plans, processes, programmes and
actions, thereby realising their power over spaces and actors. ​→ GP–CE.03 ​
p 22@–B, KX–L & LJZ–S PORTRAITS ​
Masterplans, framework plans or regulatory toolsets predefine
urban developments at an early stage to varying degrees of detail in order
to generate a coherent urban condition on the scale of the Grand Projet.​
r REGULATORY PLANS In the case of HafenCity p ​ HC–H PORTRAIT, the master-
plan, or Supplementary Urban Development Plan, was not yet legally bind-
ing for the development. It formed, however, the basis for the District
Development Plans (Bebauungsplan), developed in separate, successive
stages and binding for the project’s tenderings. Furthermore, this initial
masterplan, developed by KCAP/ASTOC Architects and Planners and
approved by the Senate of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg in Feb-
ruary 2000, determined programmatic ratios and distributions, the mate-
riality of open spaces, plantings and lighting to generate the distinct urban
characters within the project (Geslleschaft für Hafen-und Standortentwick-
lung mbH 2000). HafenCity Hamburg GmbH further detailed a regulatory
framework for ground floors, which prescribed a ceiling height between 5.5
and 6.6 metres, forbade office usage in building corners, determined ground
floor façade design requirements ​— ​such as structural elements or opening
ratios ​— ​and delineated the format, mounting, colour and design of shop
signs and outdoor advertisements (HafenCity Hamburg GmbH 2017). All
this contributes to a cohesive urban design and generates a unified appear-
ance of the built environment, which allows us to read HafenCity as a single
project and the visible result of coordinated, centralised control.
Grands Projets also tend to be spaces of power over programmatic
realms. Incentive schemes target particular sectors by, for example, cre-
ating special economic zones (in the cases of Lujiazui and Marunouchi) or
building regulations that address specific sectoral needs: large building foot-
prints and open floor plans speak to the need of trading floors and related
businesses in La Défense, Marunouchi and Lujiazui. In the case of 22@, a
new programme introduced through the change of a land use code fostered
the co-existence of industrial uses with information and communication
technologies (ICT), creating a hub for the knowledge economy in the region
(and within Europe). In the case of Marunouchi, preferential treatment of
related businesses by the main property owner and project manager, Mit-
subishi Estate, has further consolidated a concentration of (Mitsubishi-re-
lated) office headquarters.
Comparative Aspects
Subsequently, individual projects are branded as “district[s] of innovation,”
(22@ Barcelona municipal company n.d.) ​p 22@–B PORTRAIT ​“the perfect
place for business events” in the city (Destination Management Organi-
sation (DMO) TOKYO Marunouchi n.d.) ​p MNU–T PORTRAIT ​or “the world’s
largest cultural quarter” (West Kowloon Cultural District Authority n.d.). ​
p WK–H PORTRAIT ​This programmatic focus establishes a specific centrality
and authoritative claim within the programmatic realm. This claim influ-
ences the city, the region and beyond. It does so by, for example, attracting
related uses to the site, such as the Hong Kong Palace Museum in West
Kowloon, ICT businesses in Barcelona and business clusters attached to
Marunouchi in the north and the east.
This shows us that Grands Projets are not only centralities of power
over the development within; they also have an impact as territories of author-
itative knowledge. Grands Projets determine a new default for an area or
development practice by becoming a reference point for developments yet
to come. Authoritative knowledge operates as a ‘regulating fiction’ of the
global city and appears as an “authorised image of city success (so people
can buy into it)” (Robinson 2002, 546), precisely the urban success Grands
Projets are initiated to acquire.
Access to and partaking in the making of these new centralities requires
seizing opportunities to further shape these projects. Yet this process must
also connect and realise potentials. Unilateral decision-making processes
or limited programme diversity essentially deprive residents, property own-
ers and affected neighbours of this access. Therefore, a Grand Projet cen-
trality has an impact not only through its powerful and often progressive
interference in an established urban setting, but also through the limitations
and restrictions that result from specific programme scenarios and fast-
tracked realisation processes. To move towards more inclusive centrality
conditions requires continuous involvement of a broad spectrum of stake-
holders but also time-consuming, multilateral negotiation and production
processes, which have to become part of a Grand Projet vision from the start.

5 CONCLUSION
The exploration of Grands Projets as centralities allowed us to fur-
ther investigate the ways in which Grands Projets are made and how they
impact our urban environments. Across our variegated case studies, we
find commonalities in the way dedicated governing bodies control the devel-
opment process and in how implementation processes are regulated and
projects become prescriptive developments for their surroundings. Power
is an imperative element of both.
The extent to which governing bodies determine, regulate and con-
trol the development and outcome of a project appears particularly strong
in all of our case studies. This can be primarily attributed to the challenge
of realising a coherently planned, large-scale urban development meant
to reconfigure existing city dynamics; it is also the result of these projects
performing as built signboards of ambitious development agendas. Here,
power is centralised in the hands of governing bodies specifically created
to direct this process. The degree of power these bodies hold over project
implementation varies amongst our cases. The same can be said for the
degree of power the projects themselves hold over the direction of urban
development at a larger scale. There is, however, a consistent trend in the
way Grands Projets change programme focus and provision of auxiliary ser-
vices beyond their site and adjacent areas. In this sense, Grands Projets
attempt to take advantage of the new attention their neighbours have gar-
nered, be it the IBA development in the south of HafenCity or the areas of
Nihonbashi-Muromachi and Yaesu, which have recently started to rede-
velop and cater to a more international clientele as a result of their prox-
imity to urban megaprojects.

570 Centralities 571 Comparative Aspects

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Sassen, Saskia. 1991. ‘The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo’. London, realm of modelling practices and the different aspects in which Grands
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——— 1995. ‘On Concentration and Centrality in the Global City’. In World
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Planning A 40 (2): 383–401. most interested in the particular ways in which this practice is, in fact, an
———. 2011. ‘Planning Privatopolis: Representation and Contestation in
the Development of Urban Integrated Mega-Projects’. Worlding Cities:
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Asian Experiments and the Art of Being Global 41: 77. ies in our research have contributed to and/or drawn from globally recog-
Shmuely, Andrew. 2008. ‘Totality, Hegemony, Difference, Henri Lefebvre
and Raymond Williams’. In Space, Difference, Everyday Life, edited by
nised typologies of large-scale urban development, which shape and represent
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Stanek, Lukasz. 2008. ‘Totality, Hegemony, Difference, Henri Lefebvre and the making of Grands Projets if we know their models of reference and the
Raymond Williams’. In Space, Difference, Everyday Life, edited by Stefan
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Engagement as a Tool of Hegemony: The Case of Designing the New tions. Typically, a selection process driven by local circumstances and key
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572 Centralities 573 Comparative Aspects

This selection process can be observed in all of our case studies. More (vis-
ually) obvious categories of selection include a) landmark architecture, b)
overall spatial schemes or specific spatial elements (such as central squares
or axes), c) high-end office spaces (for international company headquar-
ters), d) specific configurations of commercial tenants (well-known, mid-
range and high-end brands) and e) programme specifications. Less obvious
criteria include f) policies or planning regulations, g) management practices,
h) financing schemes, j) engaging the same urban actors (architects, plan-
ners or project advisors) and k) schemes for housing provision. ​→ GP–MO.01
& 02 ​Investigating the creation and emulation of models within these cate-
gories in the context of large-scale urban development projects helps us to
better understand Grands Projets’ increasing number around the globe, their
ambitions and interconnectedness and the locally specific conditions that
allow each Grand Projet to meet a site’s requirements.
Grands Projets are designed to actuate urban renewal and, in many
cases, to serve as flagship projects that represent a city’s ambitions and
candidacy in global markets. Modelling urban development according to
forms or practices elsewhere is a “mode of governing the urban … tied to
the fostering of civilised and quality citizens who have a sense of national
obligation and social responsibility, as well as the skills desirable for the
global knowledge economy” as Lisa Hoffmann acknowledges in her dis-
cussion of urban modelling in China (2011, 312). Therefore, modelling prac-
tices within the production of Grands Projets are not only technological
strategies for urban development; they are also “a political tool for changing
the built form and social spirit of another urban environment,” as Ahiwa
Ong states in Worlding Cities, which discusses forms, implications and poten-
tials of modelling in an Asian context (Ong 2011, 15). Thus, a discussion of
Grands Projets as models and emulations allows us to observe their global
competitive contexts, their intended and unintended implications and the
way local practices tie these projects to the ground. Accordingly, we can
learn about knowledge transfer in urban development and the migration
of desires that guide so many of these projects in the mirroring process.
Grands Projets are spatial manifestations of modelling practices
by virtue of their planning tools, architectural forms, managerial practices
and financing schemes. These are often commissioned to the same (st-)
architects, who are expected to provide the desired legitimacy. For the dis-
cussion of Grands Projets in this context, we focus on different moments
of the modelling process. This chapter first investigates the creation of Grands
Projets as models and, second, the practice of emulating within new Grands
Projets’ development processes. The categories of selection mentioned above
reoccur within these two perspectives; findings from our case studies sub-
stantiate the discussion.
2 CREATING A MODEL
In their aim to achieve a globally competitive form of urban devel-
opment, successful projects can become an export good of knowledge and
expertise. The creation of a model can thus be a powerful tool for making
claim over successful development practices and communicating ambition
to observers and the world. The process of model-making creates a symbolic
574 Modelling
value expected to translate into direct economic assets over time. With the
creation of a model project, urban actors insert themselves into a global
competition of such city values “in the language of explicit comparison
and ranking” (Ong 2011b, 18). This allows them to participate in the imag-
in(eer)ing of globally acknowledged, desirable urban attributes, commonly
driven by and available for a select urban elite.
Sometimes, entire cities are proclaimed as models, such as Hong
Kong or Singapore. In these cases, what is commonly referred to as a model
is actually a complex interplay of features that includes governmental pol-
icies, social programmes, economic incentive zones, cultural practices and
a degree of control required to actualise these features. Together, these
features create “centres to be invoked, envied and emulated as exemplary
sites of a new urban normativity” (Ong 2011b, 14). Singapore, a paradig-
matic example for model cases ​— ​least due to Chua Beng Huat’s much-­
discussed essay Singapore as Model (2011) ​— ​has, within three decades, trans-
located low-wage production sites, raised a new middle class and augmented
its purchasing power and global ambition. This has inspired cities from
China to India to look at Singapore as a reference for their own ambitious,
fast-paced urban development plans.
In other instances, singular projects serve as models. With regard
to Mitsubishi Estate’s involvement in Yangon in Myanmar, for example,
reference to and expertise with a comprehensive urban development
(Marunouchi) have proved to be decisive factors. As such, the company
has been able to contribute to the creation of new urban planning guide-
lines for a city in a country often referred to as Asia’s last frontier.
Creating models is a way of establishing new norms. This can take
place in an explicit and implicit way. New planning regulations (f) can be
established to facilitate a project, or these can be formulated retroactively
in anticipation of future projects. In the case of 22@ in Barcelona, for exam-
ple, the Infrastructure Plan (PEI) of the project was subsequently incorpo-
rated into the Planning Law of the city ​3 22@–B IMPLEMENTATION, whilst Hafen­
City Hamburg’s successful managerial practice is now the template for
further developments in the south and east of the city (g). ​3 HC–H IMPLEMEN-
TATION ​In her observation of urban modelling practices in Dalian, China,
Lisa Hoffmann notes: “Establishing places as models, whether through
localised exchanges, by decree or via international competitions and assess-
ments, is an important tool of place-marketing and place-making for urban
governments” (2011, 62).
This practice of acknowledging project success becomes more than
a template for a new Grand Projet; it emerges as a veritable recipe for suc-
cess. As such, this ‘model’ becomes what Jennifer Robinson refers to as a
‘regulating fiction’ (2002), an authoritative form of knowledge that prescribes
and, in some ways, also limits the pathways to a project’s ‘success.’ It makes
claims of how projects should be carried out without necessarily including
that project’s full scope of implications for the city and its quality of life.
Learning lessons from elsewhere for the production of new urban
space is not revolutionary. The practice can be observed, for example, with
respect to the Chinese city, whose rectangular form, grid layout and spe-
cific orientation have, since the 16th century B.C., characterised many east
575 Comparative Aspects
(a) 
LANDMARK (b) 
OVERALL SPATIAL (c) 
HIGH-END OFFICE (d) 
SPECIFIC (e) 
PROGRAMME (f) 
POLICY & PLANNING (g) 
MANAGEMENT (h) 
FINANCING SCHEMES (i) 
URBAN ACTORS (j) 
HOUSING SCHEMES
ARCHITECTURE SCHEME SPACES CONFIGURATIONS SPECIFICATIONS REGULATION PRACTICES
OF COMMERCIAL
TENANTS
MARINA BAY AREA LA DÉFENSE CANARY WHARF SHOPPES AT MARINA BAY SPECIAL ECONOMIC 22@ HAFENCITY CITY PARTNERSHIP EPAD AFFORDABLE HOUSING
ZONE SCHEME KITAKYUSHU IN SINGAPORE, BY THE
‘The Public Establishment
HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
for Installation of La
BOARD (HDB)
Défense’ is the main
stakeholder in La Défense,
and advised Lujiazui,
including the Century
Avenue project.

2010 The West Japan Industrial

Marina Bay Sands opens. Club forms a partnership
Designed by architect with Dalian Environmental
Moshe Safdie (USA), Protection bureau. Some SAFDIE ARCHITECTS
developed by Marina Sands Japanese companies and
The programme is
pte.ltd (SG) and owned by environment-related designed the Singapore‘s
dominated by high-end
its parent company, Las enterprises from Kitakyushu icon, Marina Bay Sands, and
office spaces
Vegas Sands Corporation open in Dalian. then was commissioned to
Developed and managed by
(USA). The Urban Planning Law design and create master-
↓ Special economic zone in Public Authority
incorporates new advanced ↓ plan for Raffles City
Tokyo, including Scheme: Home Ownership
↓ networks as a pre-requisite Chongqing.
HAFENCITY Marunouchi (top), and
to qualify land as ‘urban’ The managerial practice of DALIAN
financial district in Ile de ↓
CHONQING based on the experience of HafenCity Hamburg served
Avenue in La Defense, Tenants at The Shoppes France, including La
the 22@ Infrastructure Plan as a template for further
France (top), Axis of La Mall at Marina Bay are Défense (bottom) — which THE CINGAPURA LOW
in 22@. development in East and
Défense, (bottom) global brands that aim to influence the establishment COST HOUSING IN SAO
South Hamburg. UNIBAIL-RODAMCO-
show ‘worldclassness’ in its Shanghai Free Trade Zone PAULO
↓ WESTFIELD
↓ shopping experience. (SFTZ), covering area of
↓
Lujiazui (below).
BARCELONA developed and owned some
LUJIAZUI ↓
EAST AND SOUTH OF towers in La Défense,
↓
Fibre optic networks (top), HAMBURG including CNIT, Les 4
SHOPPING MALLS AT
and district heating-cooling Temps, and as well as in
WEST KOWLOON INNOVATION DISTRICT
infrastructures (bottom) in Kleiner Grasbrook in the HafenCity, including
SCHEME
22@, Barcelona. south of Hamburg (top), and Westfield Shopping Center.
Huckepackbahnhof in east
High-end office spaces are
of Hamburg (bottom) are
part of a mixed-use
2013 both managed by
programme scheme.
Start of construction of subsidiaries of the
Raffles City Chongqing, HafenCity Hamburg GmbH. HERZOG & DE MEURON
President Xi Jinping visits
developed by CapitaLand ARCHITECT
Kitakyushu in 2009 (top), Developed and managed by
(SG), designed by Moshe Residential
Dalian (below) Municipality of Sao Paulo
Safdie (USA). Commercial 22@ designed iconic architecture
Scheme: ‘Self-help’ project.
Business in HafenCity, Elbphilhar­
Building materials are free,
2019/2020 Civic institutions monie and the M+ Museum
construction process is
The main building for Industrial in West Kowloon Cultural
done by residents.
Raffles City, branded as Technical utilities District.
‘The Crystal’, designed by Mixed-use
Moshe Safdie (USA), is Ground floor with
expected to be open. commercial &
business Sillicon Alley in the Flatiron
Surrounding building district, New York, a new DAVID CHIPPERFIELD
footprint tech hub,inspires planners ARCHITECTS
The ‘Triple Helix’ model of
Water bodies in Barcelona to establish a
governance combining
hi-tech district in the centre designed iconic architecture
University, Industry and
of the city, the 22@ in HafenCity, Elbtower and
Government in 22@ (above)
Century Avenue in Lujiazui, (bottom). the One Pancras Square in
inspired the clusterisation
China (top), Axis of Lujiazui, King’s Cross.
model in Ruta N, Medellin
(bottom) ↓
and Porto Digital, Recife
↓
(below).

Case building ↓
KCAP
footprint Many of the commercial
Site boundary tenants in Festival Walks, RUTA N & PORTO DIGITAL
designed the masterplan of
Surrounding building (top) and Elements mall
HafenCity and Jurong Lake
footprint (bottom) are also present at
District in Singapore.
Axis The Shoppes.

GP–MO.01 Urban development projects and their model references according to selective categories.

576 Modelling 577 Comparative Aspects

 Euralille,
Euralille, Postdamer
Postdamer
Platz,
Platz,
Germany
Germany
France
France HafenCity,
HafenCity,
Canary
Canary
Wharf,
Wharf,
UK UK Germany
Germany

King’s Cross,
King’s Cross, Dalian,
Dalian,
UK UK La Défense,
La Défense, China
China
France
France
Sillicon
Sillicon
Alley,
Alley, Battery
Battery
ParkPark
City,City,
USAUSA USAUSA 22@,22@,
Spain
Spain Lujiazui,
Lujiazui, Marunouchi,
Marunouchi,
China
China Japan
Japan

Chongqing,
Chongqing,
China
China

Bengaluru,
Bengaluru,
IndiaIndia

RutaRuta
N, N,
Colombia
Colombia

Singapore,
Singapore,
Singapore
Singapore

Porto
Porto
Digital,
Digital,
Brazil
Brazil

São São
Paulo,
Paulo,
Brazil
Brazil

GP–MO.02 Urban development projects as models and emulations according to selective categories on Model project
a world map. Note: This map shows the inter-referencing made within projects. It neither shows all project City/project which references
references nor all model projects that have had an impact on other urban megaprojects. a model project
Inter-referencing happening
within local/national context
(a) Landmark architecture
(b) Overall spatial scheme
(c) High-end officespaces
(d) Specific configurations
of Commercial tenants
(e) Programmme
specifications
( f) Policy & planning
regulation
(g) Management practices
(h) Finacing schemes
(i) Urban areas
(j) Housing schemes

578 Modelling 579 Comparative Aspects

Asian cities; it can also be observed in the fortified city structures built dur-
ing the Renaissance and in the nineteenth-century redevelopment of cen-
tral European inner-cities. Such mimicking of select aspects of Grands Projets
has further intertwined the global market of urban development with coex-
isting reference value systems. The consequence is that “urban actors are
constantly juggling heterogeneous multiple cultural norms of what con-
stitutes urban success and achievements in a world of circulating city sym-
bols” (Ong 2011b, 18). Selecting from the international buffet of urban
development, actors develop a sense of successful geographies, which are
accordingly rearranged in the global ranking of urban destinations. The
case study of Paris La Défense is a productive example of such practices:
in the 1980s, the Shanghai Municipal Government hired La Défense’s main
public stakeholders in charge of project implementation (j) as key consult-
ants in the development of a metropolitan planning strategy for Shanghai. ​
5 LD–P IMPLICATIONS ​
One way a project can establish itself with model attributes is through
the formation of an experienced and fit governing body, prepared to nav-
igate, consult and disseminate expertise on an international floor (g). Rather
than leaving prestigious ventures up to internal bureaucrats, new special
agencies are established to accommodate internationally acquired devel-
opment professionals and enable greater freedom in mobilising, acting
and operating in the interest of a successful project. In the case of HafenC-
ity in Hamburg, the HafenCity Hamburg GmbH, a city-owned body that
succeeded the Gesellschaft für Hafen-und Standortentwicklung mbH (GHS)
in 2004 and is entrusted with all plots of the site and their development,
created its own development guidelines, energy standards and adminis-
trative board; in many direct and indirect ways, these have served as a tem-
plate for subsequent development projects in the city.
Justifying large-scale investments, expropriation and relocation
with the aim of ‘worldclassness,’ such special bodies often bypass estab-
lished planning procedures through fast-tracked approval processes or even
limited approval requirements. In the same spirit, international alliances
are made, mutual modelling agreements signed, foreign investments
planned, media-effective competitions held and widely-broadcasted open-
ing ceremonies hosted. All of these are woven together into narratives of
success, which create the image of a Grand Projet that can inspire, trigger
or actuate projects elsewhere.
As a result, there is an increasing number of reoccurring urban
actors in the making of Grands Projets through the involvement of foreign
design and consultancy teams, internationally practicing developers and
contractors (j), transnational capital, cosmopolitan residents, tenants or
visitors (c, d) (Hanakata and Gasco 2018b, 9).This only consolidates the
role of Grands Projets as internationally attuned practices of urban devel-
opment, which transforms these projects themselves into built hubs of global
knowledge transfer infrastructures.
580 Modelling
3 MODELLING AFTER
The inter-referencing and emulation of Grands Projets in the devel-
opment of new Grands Projets has been a crucial part of their increasing
production over the past three decades. Projects have been studied in terms
of best or worst practice in the development of new schemes and bench-
marking of new project ambitions. In some cases, existing projects have
been directly referred to as models in the announcement of new urban
development plans. For example, Silicon Alley in Manhattan, a high-tech
cluster around the Flatiron District that formed during the 1990s dot-com
boom, was an important reference for the planners of 22@ in Barcelona
(e). In order to prepare the city centre’s existing urban fabric for new eco-
nomic activities, planners from Barcelona visited New York and emulated
the programmatic and morphological mix they observed. Similarly, the
Shanghai municipality referred to the CBDs of Tokyo (Marunouchi) and
Paris (La Défense) by designating Lujiazui as a new economic development
zone in the Shanghai Strategic Development Plan (e). In the late 1980s, in
an attempt to leverage an economic boom ​1 LJZ–S CONCEPTION , Mitsubishi
Estate announced a redevelopment of Marunouchi according to a ‘Man-
hattan Plan’ (formally known as the Redevelopment Plan for Marunouchi),
which proposed Manhattan-like towers all over the site and a massive
FAR increase. ​2 MNU–T DESIGN ​
Canary Wharf provided an important lesson for HafenCity’s gov-
erning body, the HafenCity Hamburg GmbH, with regard to the project’s
high-end tenants (c, d), waterfront condition and its failure to connect to
its surroundings during its first thirty years of existence. As a redevelop-
ment of London’s Docklands into the city’s new financial and business cen-
tre, Canary Warf initially gave rise to significant criticism. This underlines
the importance of a complementary rather than competitive relation to an
old city centre and a high programmatic mix in place of monofunctional
clusters. These two aspects were subsequently made a priority in Hafen­
City’s planning process.
In our comparative study of projects in Asia and Europe, we need
to note, however, that the imitation of models has a distinctly different con-
notation in the East than in the West. In many Eastern cultures, emulating
is a pedagogical method, means of upholding order (Bakken 2000, 169)
and key aspect of knowledge transfer. The emulation of paradigmatic mod-
els is an essential component of educational practice in Japan, where stu-
dents acquire traditional artistic skills by diligently mimicking their teachers’
performance. In China, the creation of a “modelling culture” and the emu-
lation of models is integral to Chinese philosophy (Bakken 2000, 173). Con-
fucius explicitly advocated this, calling for citizens to aspire towards positive
581 Comparative Aspects
models within their society. Deng Xiaoping’s call to follow Singapore’s model ​
— ​and do it even better (Kristof 1992) ​— ​very much falls in line with this prac-
tice and its tradition. In the West, on the other hand, models commonly
serve as references in order to facilitate individual growth and development.
Particularly in contemporary urban development, accusations of plagiarism
quickly surface if a unique selling point or realised project appears suspi-
ciously similar to a submitted scheme, which served as a model rather than
a blueprint.
Beyond these varying cultural geographies, project referencing
bridges skills gaps, enhances trust in a vision and undermines potential
criticism with the promise of success. Emulation can further justify a par-
ticular course of action and establish an objective that might have very little
to do with the model’s own original intentions, as Rapoport acknowledges
(2014, 58). Similarly to the process of model creation, urban actors insert
themselves into an international discourse of urban development practice
by emulating models. They accordingly participate in the ranking of exem-
plary practices, as advertised at global development fairs like the Marché
International des Professionnels de l’Immobilier (MIPIM), praised at global
city prices like the Lee Kuan Yew World City Price and studied and circu-
lated by associations like the Urban Land Institute (ULI) or the International
Urban Development Association (INTA) and by members of the Global Intel-
ligence Corps (GIP) (Rimmer 1991).
In some cases, however, urban development models remain unat-
tainable within their own context. They may exemplify certain achieve-
ments but these are impossible to emulate even within identical cultural
or planning contexts. This is especially the case when projects are based
on exceptional regulations and build on the interest of powerful stakehold-
ers, who allow for practices outside established norms. For example, the
features commonly referred to in Singapore’s success story are inextricably
linked under the government’s authoritative auspice. What are copied, how-
ever, are distinct moments, such as the approach to mass housing in São
Paolo, Brazil (k); the city in a garden in Dailan, China (b); a clone of Marina
Bay Sands in Chongqing, China (a); or the vertical building frenzy in Ban-
galore (Bangaluru), India, (b) after the city-state left a deep impression on
state visitors from Bangalore in the 1970s (Nair 2005). The isolation of
model ‘ingredients’ and a disregard of complex local circumstances in the
translation process only ever lead to partial success; indeed, it may result
in veritable disappointment. In anticipation of an upcoming change in gam-
bling laws in Japan, developers, investors and planners have already iden-
tified Marina Bay Sands with its basement casinos as a reference point for
the impending bidding war of casino licences and developments (a, d, e).
The extent to which a project in Tokyo, embedded as the city is in the coun-
try’s decades-long economic and political challenges, can recreate the suc-
cess of Singapore’s icon remains highly questionable.
582 Modelling
These highlight that there is, once again, always a symbolic value created
on the ‘demand’ side around single project imitations that address locally
embedded ambitions and desires. “The practice of citing a ‘more success-
ful city’ ​— ​itself an unstable category ​— ​seems to stir urban aspirations and
sentiments of inter-city rivalry as well as standing as a legitimation for par-
ticular enterprises at home,” writes Ahiwa Ong (2011b, 17). Modelling a
Grand Projet after projects elsewhere contributes to a growing network of
transnational spaces. This is a process driven by eagerness for self-reali-
sation, success and international recognition, which are, nonetheless, always
tied to a project’s local fittings, a condition that also enables the creation
of something new.
4 REFLECTIONS
The practice of creating models and emulating, imitating or sim-
ulating them is an integral part of building Grands Projets that aim to trans-
form a city’s urban development trajectory (Hanakata and Gasco 2018a).
It is a central component of established global networks of building and
development practices.
The definition of a model and the selection of features to simulate
are rarely concurring instances. Rather, they are subsequent steps in a chain
of actions, whereby a ‘part’ is often expected to create the effect of the ‘whole.’
Isolating singular practices in the referencing of others also bares the risk
of obfuscating the less savoury by-products of a successful model, such as
marginalisation and exclusion. Singapore, a model celebrated and imitated
elsewhere, is increasingly “at odds with the reality back home [in Singa-
pore] where income disparity is at its highest,” as Pow notes (2014, 303).
At the same time, in the translation and translocation process, new spaces
for innovation and adaptation emerge.
The practice of sharing successful strategies, however, is not just
a matter of abstract knowledge transfer. It is, in fact, increasingly expedited
through involvement of the very same actors and stakeholders who trans-
form the modelling process into tangible transactions: planners re-draw
and adapt schemes, financiers re-invest in similar models and retailers extend
their store chains. Thus, modelling ​— ​or re-modelling ​— ​becomes a practical
exercise for key globally operating actors involved. In examining our Grands
Projets case studies, we find the Parisian architecture firm Arte Charpentier
planning the century axis of Lujiazui (albeit deliberately designing it one
metre wider than Les Champs-Élysée) (b,j); Unibail Rodamco developing
aspects of La Défense and HafenCity (j); Safdie Architects building Marina
Bay Sands and, in collaboration with Singapore’s largest real estate company
CapitaLand, an ‘improved’ version in Chongqing, China (a, j); and tenants
imitating storefront line-ups with Apple, Muji and VanCleef&Arpels in West
Kowloon’s cultural district and Shoppes at the Bay in Singapore (d).
But do we ultimately end up re-visiting the same urban experi-
ences? What might create confusingly similar landscapes is always also a
reflection of locally embedded practices, mechanisms and desires. This
only underpins the importance of context-specific and locally-determined
frameworks and practices in defining project outcome and ensuring that
583 Comparative Aspects
a project includes and reflects the people who visit and inhabit these spaces
and their surroundings. The growing number of Grands Projets, with their
skylines and their landmarks, have to be seen for what they are: powerful
drivers in transforming economies, city agendas, urban spectacles and
global ambitions.
The result recalls the “hyperbuildings” Koolhaas discusses in the
context of Beijing (2004), projects less defined through their form or height
and more through their presence and impact on the ground. Ahiwa Ong,
who elaborates this concept in her text on hyperbuildings and hyperspace,
views these projects as indicative of urban development in Asia today, striv-
ing to shift city profiles in a new direction and plot new landmarks, which
are effectively translations of aspirations for greatness into space (Ong
2011a). Often built on exceptions and aiming to create spectacles and spec-
ulation, hyperbuildings ​— ​or hyperprojects, as we may call them here ​— ​are
strategic tools for creating associations with global norms, enabling aspi-
rations and branding and increasing investment (ibid.).
For the making of Grands Projets, this appears as an essential ingre-
dient, which serves their agenda of creating new centralities and dynamics
in urban development and the city’s economic condition and political land-
scape. In order to optimise the impact of Grands Projets, learning from pro-
jects with relatable ambitions or agendas provides both a starting point
and a political, technical tool that facilitates a globally connected urban
development practice. As citizens, planners and scholars of the subject, we
have to become capable of utilising and transforming these practices to
ensure that projects remain grounded and locally specific, in order to avoid
homogenised urban places and create variegated and situated urban futures.
584 Modelling
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585 Comparative Aspects
SPATIAL REGULATORY PLANS:
A Comparative Perspective on Spatial
Regulatory Tools of Grands Projets
Anna Gasco
1 INTRODUCTION
The growing number and size of Grands Projets have led to new forms
of urban governance, spatial design, production and regulation. This chap-
ter focuses on the spatial regulatory plans that predefine spatial design and
regulate the development of Grands Projets over time. Based on our case
studies, we have noticed that, whether referred to as masterplans, frame-
work plans, development briefs or design guidelines, and bearing different
specificities depending on planning contexts, these planning schemes are
diversifying, incorporating more open and strategic approaches to design.
They provide various legally-binding degrees of flexibility that enable
scheme adaptability over time, in contrast to previous more drawn-­up,
detailed approaches that anticipated and defined spatial outcomes in their
full scope.
Due to their long development timeframes, Grands Projets face evolv-
ing societal needs that impact their spatial and programmatic implemen-
tations. Grands Projets’ recent flexible plans potentially grant stakeholders in
charge the opportunity and power to adapt projects. As seen in our case stud-
ies, Grands Projets are regulated instances of urban space with sophisticated
hierarchies of control exercised by dedicated authorities. ​c CENTRALITIES ​
These authorities often establish legal mandates to execute power through
various mechanisms, such as design guidelines to direct spatial develop-
ment, management of open spaces to control accessibility or the selection
of tenants to guarantee place-making. The implementation and managerial
processes authorities set forth greatly impact the project’s physical and social
inclusivity via bordering practices. b
​ BORDERING ​Amongst these mechanisms
of control, spatial regulatory plans present themselves as means of translat-
ing the authority’s power into space. As Lee describes, the related spatial
specifications, devised by bureaucratic experts “working from a distance,”
become “authoritative and prescriptive texts” with specific effects on the
way the built environment is produced and influencing the development “at
the level of architectural details and atmospheric qualities” (Lee 2014, 139).
Any new Grand Projet challenges the status quo of an existing con-
text. While spatial regulatory plans with open-ended approaches endow
projects with greater adaptability for the future, they also require clear param-
eters and mechanisms for defining and safeguarding projects’ essential spa-
tial elements over time. In addition, flexible plans depend on progressive,
inclusive governing bodies ready to embrace the uncertainty of the future
586 Regulatory Plans
whilst navigating many possible spatial scenarios without bias towards any
one stakeholder’s needs. The development of a spatial plan for any Grand
Projet marks a decisive moment in negotiations over design priorities and
is a central tool for exercising control. Potentially conflicting priorities of
stakeholders must be concerted and translated into a spatial scenario. Some
stakeholders ​— ​such as governing bodies and project developers ​— ​may have
commercially-driven expectations, whereas others ​— ​such as city authorities
and users ​— ​may aim for longer-term results and wider impact (Carmona,
Magalhães, and Edwards 2002, 146). Designers often lie at the intersection,
“balancing the commercial requirements of their clients with meeting the
design expectations of the local authority” (ibid. 2002, 157).
The process of producing Grands Projets’ plans can be more or less
inclusive. With King’s Cross, the spatial framework that regulates the pro-
ject’s ongoing physical implementation was based on a vision developed
in an intense negotiation process between local councils, the surrounding
community (to some extent), former landowners and the developer Argent.
Outlined in various documents, this vision stated design priorities and
helped shape a detailed planning brief for the master-planning team (Cam-
den and Islington 2004). The appointed planners proposed a spatial scheme
that built upon this brief and includes flexible implementation mechanisms
reviewed later in this chapter. 2​ KX–L DESIGN Singapore, on the other hand,
manages long-term planning through a largely state-led “highly central-
ised and exclusive [planning] bureaucracy” with little input or resistance
from civil society (Lee 2014, 140–41). Even though spatial development
for key areas, such as the Marina Bay Area, also relies on a close relationship
between the state, foreign expertise and private capital, resulting schemes
often represent the interests of a very specific category of stakeholders.​
1 2 MBA–S CONCEPTION & DESIGN
The processes of producing Grands Projets’ spatial regulatory plans
can be more or less inclusive and can greatly impact spatial outcomes. How-
ever, this chapter focuses on these plans themselves: their different types
and related tools. The chapter reviews existing scholarly literature on reg-
ulatory plans and, contrasting these discussions with the eight cases of our
research, uncovers the types of spatial regulatory plans guiding our Grands
Projets. The conclusion discusses key characteristics of these plans and their
related specifications, which define and safeguard essential spatial qualities
for Grands Projets over time, allow for flexible implementation and promote
continuity of a pre-defined vision. In doing so, the chapter addresses a key
question of our research: that of urban megaproject adaptability.
2 TYPES OF GRAND PROJET PLANS AND
RELATED TOOLS
The regulatory plans that guide the implementation of our case stud-
ies vary widely in legal requirements and status, urban design approach, phas-
ing strategies and spatial parameters that they fix. In addition, terms such as
masterplan, framework plan or design guidelines bear different specificities
587 Comparative Aspects
according to planning contexts: the masterplan of HafenCity, for example, TOOLS Spatial Outlines Urban Design Building Regulations Phasing Strategies
has very different spatial regulatory characteristics than the masterplan of (SP) Guidelines (UDG) (BR) (PS)
Lujiazui. To better understand the different natures of spatial regulatory plans Spatially lay out a vision Stipulate rules that regu- Govern building tech­ Govern the development
regimenting Grands Projets, it is important to examine current literature on on the site’s overall area, late mega-block subdivi- niques and materials, timeline according to
these existing terms. However, our categorisation of the types of spatial reg- including streets, axes,
mega-blocks, etc.
sions, street frontages,
ground floor uses, mini-
amongst others various focuses and are
incremental, organic,
ulatory plans identified in our cases is not based on existing terminology; mum and maximum demand-driven, etc.
rather, it focuses on understanding what Grands Projets’ plans fix (or do not heights, densities, build-
ing set-backs, block
fix), their tools for doing so and related spatial characteristics. porosity, etc., without,
Several tools are fundamental in defining the spatial characteris- however, formally
designing a specific spa-
tics of regulatory plans. These tools are not mutually exclusive and are often tial outcome.
used in combination:  ​→ GP–RP.01

1 spatial outlines, which spatially lay out a vision on the site’s overall
area, including streets, axes, mega-blocks, etc.;
2 urban design guidelines, which stipulate rules that regulate mega-
block subdivisions, street frontages, ground floor uses, minimum and SPATIAL REGULATORY Formal Spatial Plan Structural Spatial Plan Flexible Framework Instrument-driven Plan
maximum heights, densities, building set-backs, block porosity, etc., PLANS
Outlines a vision of the Based on a (sometimes Spatially outlines a vision Does not create spatial
without, however, formally designing a specific spatial outcome; overall area in a compre- pre-existing) fixed overall of the overall area of the outlines but relies on
3 building regulations, which govern building techniques and mate- hensive, fully drawn,
fixed manner.
spatial outline but used
in combination with
site but leaves certain
parameters to be defined
urban design guidelines,
building regulations
rials, amongst others; and evolving urban design at a later stage and relies and/­or phasing schemes.
4 phasing strategies, which govern the development timeline accord- guidelines and building
regulations. These plans
on guidelines, regulations
and phasing schemes.
ing to various foci and are incremental, organic and/or demand- enable the Grand Projet
driven, etc. to adapt over time within
the confines of a prede-
termined structure.
Based on these tools and their combinations, we have identified four types
of Grand Projet spatial regulatory plans ​→ GP–RP.01

1 the Formal Spatial Plan, which outlines a vision of the overall area
GRANDS PROJETS
in a comprehensive, fully drawn, fixed manner (La Défense, Luji- CASES
azui and West Kowloon);
2 the Structural Spatial Plan, based on a (sometimes pre-existing)
fixed overall spatial outline but used in combination with evolving
urban design guidelines and building regulations. These plans ena-
ble the Grand Projet to adapt over time within the confines of a pre-
determined structure (Marina Bay Area and Marunouchi);
3 the Flexible Framework, which spatially outlines a vision of the over- LD–P MNU–T HC–H 22@–B
all area of the site but leaves certain parameters to be defined at a
later stage and relies on guidelines, regulations and phasing schemes
(HafenCity and King’s Cross);
4 the Instrument-driven Plan, which does not create spatial outlines
but relies on urban design guidelines, building regulations and/or LJZ–S

phasing schemes (22@).

2.1 FORMAL SPATIAL PLANS

In the context of planning in the United Kingdom, Bell notes that WK–H MBA–S KX–L
the masterplan has become a significant feature of town planning since the
1940s, particularly for the development of new towns and the reconstruction
of city centres. He notes, however, that there is no clear consensus amongst GP–RP.01 Types of Grands Projets spatial regulatory plans and related tools. Spatial outline tool (SP):
partially outlined plan
Spatial outline tool (SP):
fully outlined plan

588 Regulatory Plans 589 Comparative Aspects

writers, policymakers or practitioners about the exact meaning of the term
masterplan (Bell 2005, 84). In his paper The Emergence of Contemporary Master­
plans, Bell broadly defines the term as “a document, or series of documents,
explaining the development proposals for an area by including a strategy
for the area, designs and implementation details” (ibid. 2005, 85). He des-
ignates two types of masterplans, whose differences are based on scale: a
strategic area masterplan governing a “wide area, perhaps a whole city cen-
tre” and a “site development masterplan” (ibid. 2005, 85). Bell’s masterplan
definition thus designates a document incorporating a vision, related design
component, spatial representation of a proposed development ​— ​for a broad
or specific area ​— ​and an implementation document.
In the case of La Défense, the masterplan of Camelot, de Mailly
and Zehrfuss approved in 1964 by EPAD supported the post-war modern-
isation vision of developing a modern business district with high-rise typol-
ogies organised on top of a pedestrian deck that hid required infrastructure.
The Masterplan of 1964 (plan masse) fixed the deck’s shape, boundary, levels,
central rectilinear open space, typologies of residential (low-rise court-
yards) and commercial (high-rise) developments on both sides of the cen-
tral axis and office building footprint (42 by 24 metres) and height (less
than 100 metres). ​2 LD–P DESIGN T ​ he approval of the masterplan also led
to a clarification of the implementation process (in 1970), with the distinc-
tion between infrastructures (below deck) to be realised by EPAD and super-
structures (above deck) to be addressed by private developers through
acquisition of air-rights. ​3 LD–P IMPLEMENTATION ​The rigidity of this fully-­
drawn masterplan and its sqm limitations, however, quickly led to “aban-
donment of the masterplan” (Picon Lefebvre 2017). Several design phases
followed over time, including six generations of towers with varying foot-
prints and height requirements, resulting in a rather “uncoordinated spatial
quality” of the overall area (ibid. 2017). In addition, the fully-drawn deck
and its fast-paced implementation have led to a rapidly outdated urban envi-
ronment, whose physical rigidity has required extensive capital influx, dem-
olitions and reconstruction to meet evolving needs. ​→ GP–RP.02 2​ LD–P DESIGN​
Lujiazui’s similarly fully-drawn type of masterplan with fast-paced
implementation has also struggled to accommodate change. The Lujiazui
Central District Plan was approved by the municipality of Shanghai at the
end of 1993. The masterplan heavily prioritised motorised traffic and for-
mally outlined the project area with large plots for high-rise developments
segregated by wide infrastructure roads. The Lujiazui Development Com-
pany (LDC) subsequently hired engineer and urban design consultants to
offer guidance on the spatial scheme. The consultants’ recommendations
included detailed propositions for improved pedestrian connectivity between
590 Regulatory Plans
the large development plots. Unfortunately, these recommendations could
not be followed due to the fact that, by 1995, a major part of the area had
already been realised: eight projects were under construction and twelve
plots leased out. 2
​ LJZ–S DESIGN I​​ n 2010, the LDC constructed the Pearl Ring,
a circular pedestrian bridge connecting various buildings over the highway
roundabout that culminates Century Avenue. The Pearl Ring retroactively
ensures improved yet locally very limited accessibility to specific plots.​
4 LJZ–S OPERATION T​​ his spatial scheme, which allotted one building per mega-
block, each segregated by large infrastructure, and its lack of phasing strat-
egy have contributed to an outdated physical environment that struggles to
accommodate changes without resorting to extensive and costly endeavours. ​
→ GP–RP.02
Though at an early stage of implementation, the West Kowloon
land reclamation project exemplifies a similar fast-paced development based
on fully-drawn spatial schemes. This case study is composed of three dis-
tinct projects, each with its own masterplan devised by different agencies;
the larger area lacks an overarching plan. Each project’s spatial scheme
advances monolithic scales of development plots, infrastructure supremacy
and a fundamental disconnect from the adjacent existing urban fabric.​
2 WK–H DESIGN ​​
In our case studies, there is a sharp contrast between Formal Spa-
tial Plans, such as those of La Défense and Lujiazui, where a total vision is
imagined once and for all and translated into a fixed design scheme that
struggles to accommodate changes, and spatial schemes that identify key
structural elements, supported by design guidelines and incremental phas-
ing strategies. With these latter schemes, “the end result is the […] accu-
mulation of many reiterations” (Lee 2014, 142), as illustrated by the case
studies reviewed in the following sections.
2.2 STRUCTURAL SPATIAL PLANS
In 1876, German engineer Reinhard Baumeister published one of
the earliest planning manuals, which describes essential instruments and
practices for urban planning and the precision and implementation tem-
porality required for long-term resiliency. Two of these instruments are
the masterplan and building regulations. According to Baumeister, a master­
plan is designed to organise future urban space in order to maintain urban
order and permit investors to anticipate further developments. As in Bell’s
definition, an economic dimension is considered alongside a spatial one.
However, Baumeister also warns “against making the masterplan too rigid
and inflexible; urban development cannot be planned with too much pre-
cision, and therefore it is counterproductive to wish to freeze it within a
totally predetermined frame” (Söderström 1996, 262–63). The plan ought
to restrict itself to providing the directives necessary for general cohesion;
more precise directives should be subject to local plans with a more limited
591 Comparative Aspects
FORMAL SPATIAL PLAN STRUCTURAL SPATIAL PLAN FLEXIBLE FRAMEWORK INSTRUMENT-DRIVEN PLAN

LD–P LJZ–S WK–H MNU–T MBA–S HC–H KX–L 22@–B

Tools: SP BR SP SP SP UDG­ BR PS SP UDG­ BR PS SP UDG­ BR PS SP UDG­ BR PS UDG­ BR PS

02

01
01
With Podium

02
Without Podium

LD–P EPAD Masterplan 1964 LJZ–S Central district plan outline WK–H Mega-blocks MNU–T Spatial grid MBA–S URA Masterplan HC–H Framework plan KX–L Outlining planning permission 22@–B Planning tools
SPATIALLY FIXED SPATIALLY FIXED SPATIALLY FIXED SPATIALLY FIXED SPATIALLY FIXED SPATIALLY FIXED SPATIALLY FIXED SPATIALLY FIXED

→ Deck’s shape → Open space

→ Deck’s levels
→ Central axis open space
→ Open space
→ Road networks
→ Rail infratructures
→ Plots
→ Typologies of residential
(low-rise courtyards)
→ Typologies of commercial
(high-rise) developments
→ Min & max heights
→ Land use plan
→ Programme
→ Land reclamation → Spatial Grid → Land reclamation → Distinct urban characters → Main road networks → Existing Cerdà Plan Structure
→ Road networks
→ Deck’s shape → Axis → Road networks → Building typologies → Main open spaces → Main open spaces
→ Rail infratructures
→ Deck’s levels → Open space → Rail infratructures → Heritage structures → Mega-blocks → Cerdà-blocks (Mega-blocks)
→ Mega-blocks
→ Open space → Road networks → Mega-blocks → Landmark location → Heritage structures → Heritage structures
→ Plots
→ Road networks → Rail infratructures → Open spaces → Programme ratios → Streets frontages → Densities
→ Building footprints
→ Rail infratructures → Mega-blocks → Landmark location → Active ground–floors → Active ground-floors → Programme ratios
→ Typologies
→ Plots → Heritage buildings → Density → Densities → Densities
→ Min & max heights
→ Typologies → Density → Max & min heights → Lighting concepts → Max & min heights
→ Land use plan
→ Landmark locations → Max & min heights → Land-use plan
→ Programme
→ Min & max heights → Land use plan
→ Land use plan
→ Programme

FLEXIBLY REGULATED FLEXIBLY REGULATED FLEXIBLY REGULATED FLEXIBLY REGULATED FLEXIBLY REGULATED FLEXIBLY REGULATED FLEXIBLY REGULATED FLEXIBLY REGULATED

The Deck requires expensive and
extensive retroactive adaptation
work to keep its infrastructure
up-to-date and increase the
surroundings’ integration
The Pearl Ring structure was
retroactively added to improve
pedestrian accessibility
Extensive infrastructure are being
comprehensive developed on the
overall site (as of 2017).
→ Plots → Programme: i.e. white site (below) → Mega-blocks → Plots → Plots
→ Secondary, tertiary networks → Plots → Plots → Secondary, tertiary networks → Secondary, tertiary roads
→ Building footprints → Building footprints → Secondary, tertiary networks → Building footprints → Building footprints
→ Building volume → Architectural outcome → Building footprints → Building volume → Building volume
→ Architectural outcome → Building volume → Architectural outcome → Architectural outcome
→ FAR distribution within → Road networks → Programme ratios → Land use allocation
mega-blocks → Land-use plan → Land-use plan → Phasing schemes

High variety in new and old

building typologies as a result of
GP–RP.02 Fixed and flexible spatial components of Grands Projets spatial regulatory plans. heritage preservation

SP Spatial outlines
UDG Urban design guidelines

592 Regulatory Plans 593 Comparative Aspects

BR
PS
Building regulations
Phasing strategies
temporal horizon. Baumeister’s masterplan is thus complemented by the
second instrument of building regulations, which can be adapted in light
of shifting needs.
Our oldest case study, Marunouchi in Tokyo, has not been governed
by an overarching masterplan as such. The business district has indeed been
developed in a consistent manner since 1888 under several planning strat-
egies, but development has proceeded without an underlying prescriptive
plan. Marunouchi’s spatial grid of axis and connectors was developed in
alignment with the spatial structures previously in place: the grid struc-
ture laid out during the Edo period (hosting large, noble, residential estates)
and based on an eighth-century Chinese system that specified the grid’s
ideal dimensions (109 by 109 metres). The gradual (re-)developments of
Marunouchi’s plots were then based on a compilation of evolving design
guidelines. The spatial framework of a rectangular grid outlining the overall
area was therefore not an outcome of a formal regulatory plan but rather of
the incorporation of existing context. ​2 MNU–T DESIGN ​​This fixed grid has
nonetheless served as the fundamental and overall spatial structure organ-
ising the entire area.
Within Marunouchi, building typologies largely consist of perimeter
blocks, regulated by a maximum statutory FAR of thirteen complemented
by the possibility of FAR trade-offs; regulations to increase developments
of public interest related activities (for any FAR above ten); height restric-
tions that vary by area and distance from the Imperial Palace (such as a
31-metre height cap in the central and southern areas); tower set-backs;
street alignment of tower podia; and a maximum height restriction of these
podia, which enables a consistent street height and integration of lower-rise
older-generation buildings into the gradually densifying area. The grid lay-
out and block perimeter building typology form the basic units and struc-
tures of the area’s urban design. This solid spatial structure, complemented
by specific yet evolving design guidelines, has provided an adaptive frame-
work that has enabled the area to incrementally densify and redevelop,
accommodating older typologies yet maintaining a coherent urban atmos-
phere. ​→ GP–RP.02 2​ 3 MNU–T DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION ​​
The larger area of Marina Bay Area in Singapore, realised on land
re­claimed from the sea, is composed of successive sub-Grands Projets, imple-
mented at different times and with varying spatial regulatory plans. The over-
all area relies on a long-term masterplan (updated every decade) devised
by the national Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA). Changing market
demands and insights acquired from the successive projects’ implementa-
tions have, however, caused multiple revisions to the Bay’s development
direction and related regulatory plans. While the earlier sub-Grand Projet
594 Regulatory Plans
of Marina Centre is based on a fully-drawn formal plan, the mega-blocks of
the more recent Marina South area (of which the new CBD, Marina Bay
Sands and Gardens by the Bay have already been implemented) rely on
sophisticated guidelines and tendering schemes that govern the design
development of each block and building. However, despite this more recent
flexibility, the land reclamation, wide streets and mega-blocks have been
fully drawn and rapidly developed. In addition to design guidelines, the
URA uses other planning tools, mainly in the form of FAR incentives, to
ensure that private developments contribute to the public good: in return
for additional GFA, private developers must, for example, implement an
underground pedestrian network between plots, publicly accessible ‘city
rooms’ with amenities, pedestrian rights-of-way or public art within their
plots. ​→ GP–RP.02 2
​ 3 MBA–S DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION
2.3 FLEXIBLE FRAMEWORKS
Further examining masterplans’ aspects of change and flexibility,
Bell discusses the term framework, which, he says, can be used to describe
a masterplan when it allows for “managing change over a wider area rather
than just the spatial rendering of a property development on a site” (Bell
2005, 85). However, Bell does not articulate how a framework manages
change or what type of change it permits. Two of our younger case studies
(HafenCity and King’s Cross) advance the notion of masterplan flexibility
to a greater level: their regulatory plans fix crucial spatial elements and are
complemented by sophisticated spatial guidelines and temporal schemes,
yet they do not define exact plot outlines (for HafenCity) or, if they do (for
King’s Cross), the plot outlines are large mega-blocks in which internal
subdivisions can be defined and regimented at a later stage by relevant
authorities and design guidelines.
HafenCity Hamburg’s masterplan, by KCAP and ASTOC Archi-
tects and Planners, did not specify an end result but rather focused on a
phasing strategy and spatial elements to be safeguarded. The specifications
of the ‘framework plan’ (Rahmenplan) consisted of distinct urban charac-
ters and related building typologies, including an accessibility axis and
open spaces, view corridors toward the old city centre and waterfront,
programmatic ratios and distributions and plant and lighting concepts.​
2 HC–H DESIGN ​The HafenCity framework plan thus “opted for an open”
rather than “deterministic” concept, which, according to Kees Christiaanse,
defined “the underlying structures while leaving a certain amount of lee-
way for various types of building initiatives within the framework of a set
of rules” (cited in Grubbauer 2013, 196). Specifications for upcoming devel-
opment areas, such as land plot sizes and building volumes, are derived in
a timely manner “on the basis of workshops involving planners, city author-
ities and project managers” (ibid. 2013). Once these specifications are devel-
oped, they are included in the Land Use Plan (Bebauungsplan) ​→ HC–H.24 IN
HC–H PORTRAIT and HafenCity Hamburg GmbH issues competitive tenders
for building areas, including mandatory architectural competitions. ​→ ­GP–RP.02 ​
3 HC–H IMPLEMENTATION
595 Comparative Aspects
In King’s Cross, the underlying plan is officially titled an ‘outlining plan-
ning permission.’ Granted by the planning authorities of Camden and Isling-
ton, this permission fixes crucial aspects of the spatial scheme for the area:
conserved heritage buildings, main routes and open spaces, ‘Development
Zones’ (or mega-blocks) ​→ KX–L.23 IN KX–L PORTRAIT, density and maximum
and minimum building heights. Within these large mega-blocks, subdivi-
sions and the position of secondary and tertiary routes are not fixed but
rather regulated by ‘Development Specifications,’ which include rules on
frontage, set-backs and active ground floor uses. The architecture for each
building is not predefined but rather determined by design guidelines to
be followed by individual architects. ​2 KX–L DESIGN ​Within the outlining
planning permission, spatial flexibility is complemented by a programmatic
one: floor space is defined in terms of ‘total permissible use’ with a twenty
per-cent flexibility of mix of uses. This regulatory framework allows adjust-
ments to the land use plan depending on market conditions: the floor space
of one programme can be traded against another and certain programmes
may be introduced according to demand. ​3 KX–L IMPLEMENTATION
An internal debrief and feedback process, following each plot’s
completion, has enabled the developer to adjust development of subsequent
phases. Whilst fixing key spatial parameters (streets, open spaces, frontage
and scale), the outlining planning permission allows flexibility for the devel-
opment to evolve and adapt to changing circumstances. ​→ GP–RP.02
Masterplans complemented with design guidelines (Structural Plans
or Flexible Frameworks) allow for more flexible implementation and spatial
adaptability over time than do fully-drawn masterplans (Formal Spatial Plans).
However, guidelines can “often camouflage … power relations behind a
veneer of technocratic and neutral language” (Lee 2014, 141). While the
plans of HafenCity and King’s Cross allow for flexible implementation and
spatial quality, their reliance on design guidelines and high spatial flexibility
also ensures a certain level of control over the whole precinct’s appearance
by respective authorities. In a further development of the KCAP and ASTOC
framework plan, for example, the HafenCity Hamburg GmbH detailed design
guidelines prescribing ground floor heights, facade opening ratios and mate-
rial requirements and the design of signs and outdoor advertisements. These
guidelines contribute to a cohesive urban design but also to a unified appear-
ance dictated by HafenCity Hamburg GmbH. ​c CENTRALITIES ​
2.4 INSTRUMENT-DRIVEN PLANS
Design guidelines and codes can be employed “in order to disci-
pline built form to conform to an envisaged grand aesthetic” (Lee 2014,
142), as in cases like HafenCity. However, design guidelines and building
regulations, when implemented via multiple stakeholder involvements (as
in 22@), can offer several degrees of built environment variety. As discussed
earlier, spatial regulatory plans that provide more flexibility also require
596 Regulatory Plans
governing bodies prepared to navigate many spatial scenarios without over-
looking the needs of a particular group of stakeholders to the benefit of
others; similarly, the more diverse the stakeholders involved in deploying
guidelines, the more varied the resulting environment.
The 22@ project, the urban renewal of industrial areas west of Bar-
celona’s historical centre (Poblenou), is governed by the 22@ Plan, approved
in June 2000 by the municipal parliament. The 22@ Plan gives the City
Council planning and management competence without resorting to inten-
sive land expropriations, despite the fact that most of the industrial land
is privately owned. The 22@ Plan endows private owners with the power
to execute redevelopment investment and defines the different ways in
which private owners can carry out urban transformations. More than six
Special Plans are available depending on site conditions and pre-existing
structures. For each Special Plan, the 22@ Plan defines densities, manda-
tory land transfers to the City Council (from private to public domain), co-­
financing schemes and other design guidelines. These guidelines govern
the spatial configuration of the Special Plans, without, however, predefining
architectural and morphological outcome. Furthermore, the original Cerdà
street network is the baseline framework that defines the limits of mega-
blocks. Since the 22@ Plan does not prescribe design criteria, an additional
quality control mechanism, a local and international jury of experts (the
Quality Commission), ensures final architectural design quality once a Spe-
cial Plan is submitted for approval. The 22@ Plan did not predefine phasing
schemes, since transformations are linked to private landowner initiatives.
This resulted in the area’s organic transformation ​— ​according to private
landowners’ economic capacities ​— ​that relied on responsive building reg-
ulations enabling adaptability over time depending on tendencies and needs. ​
2 3 22@–B DESIGN & IMPLEMENTATION
→ ­GP–RP.02 ​
3 CONCLUSION: TOWARDS AN OPEN PLAN
The combinations of implementation tools vary greatly within our
case studies, leading to four types of spatial regulatory plans. ​→ ­GP–RP.01 ​
The spatial schemes of our Grands Projets case studies can be roughly cat-
egorised into projects that either work with a spatially unique feature of
high iconic value ​p LD–P, LJZ–S, WK–H & MBA–S PORTRAITS or those with a more
strategic spatial frame that allows for greater flexibility in the site’s future
development. ​p 22@–B, HC–H, KX–L & MNU–T PORTRAITS ​
The more varied and open-ended regulatory tools are, the more
flexible the resulting projects will be, as 22@ illustrates. In Formal Spatial
Plans, on the other hand, the primary tool is a fixed spatial design drawing,
outlining an area vision in its full scope. La Défense and Lujiazui have
proven how difficult such plans are to adapt over time. Flexible plans safe-
guard essential spatial elements, such as view corridors, axes, streets, open
spaces, mega-blocks, active ground-floors, character areas and programmes,
597 Comparative Aspects
landmarks and heritage elements. These plans allow more detailed plot
and architecture design to be defined at a later stage yet govern these with
clear urban design guidelines (for height, street alignment, set-backs, etc.),
building regulations and incremental phasing strategies. ​→ ­GP–RP.02 Such
adaptability, often in the hands of the authority overseeing implementa-
tion, also comes with the responsibility of using these guidelines to produce
an inclusive environment for varied categories of stakeholders.
The dilemma of spatial flexibility however, is that it sometimes comes
at the price of lacking distinctive spatial features. The architectural flexibil-
ity of King’s Cross, for example, has been criticised as “dull” and “boring”
(Fairs 2015). ​2 KX–L DESIGN ​A Grand Projet plan’s primary challenge lies in
striking an initial balance between control and laissez-faire. Fixing spatial char-
acteristics is important for Grands Projets because of their implicit ​— ​and
often explicit ​— ​need to “stand out” in order to spatially translate their cit-
ies’ political and/or economic agendas. More flexible regulatory plans might
struggle to deliver a spatial project supporting a “new image” for a city, espe-
cially if these plans are decidedly non-iconic. In order to do so, Grands Pro-
jets’ spatial regulatory plans must both define and fix essential spatial elements
that guarantee spatial quality and identify flexible parameters within a set
of clear rules to allow for adaptive yet coherent development.
The ideal plan, the Open Plan, to which any future Grand Projet
should aspire, will incorporate recognisable spatial features, such as archi-
tectural landmarks or distinctive open spaces. It will, however, rely on flex-
ible development zones rather than fixed plot sizes; view corridors and key
connectors instead of laid-out street networks; a ratio of built and open
spaces within each plot in place of building footprints; allocation of char-
acter areas and densities rather than fixed programmes and building typol-
ogies; and incremental phasing or organic temporal approaches in place of
‘fully build and growth will come’ strategies. These are the parameters to
consider for influencing a Grand Projet’s spatial adaptability over time. Ulti-
mately, this built-in flexibility will affect the environmental quality of a Grand
Projet by allowing the project to change without delays in its development
timeframe or drastic changes to its spatial framework and programmes.
598 Regulatory Plans
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alderson, Steve. 2017. Interview with Steve Alderson (Marketing Director
at Argent since 2002) Interview by Anna Gasco. Meeting notes.
Argent St George. 2001a. “Principles for a Human City.”
——— ​. 2001b. “Parameters for Regeneration.”
Bell, Darren. 2005. “The Emergence of Contemporary Masterplans: Prop-
erty Markets and the Value of Urban Design.” Journal of Urban Design
10 (1): 81–110.
Camden, and Islington. 2004. “King’s Cross Opportunity Area Planning
& Development Brief.” Planning Brief. London.
Carmona, Matthew, Claudio De Magalhães, and Michael Edwards. 2002.
“Stakeholder Views on Value and Urban Design.” Journal of Urban Design
7 (2): 145–69.
Fairs, Markus. 2015. “Peter Cook Pans ‘Awful’ Redevelopment of King’s
Cross.” Dezeen. April 11, 2015. https://www.dezeen.com/2015/11/04/
peter-cook-architect-pans-awful-redevelopment-kings-cross-london/.
Grubbauer, Monika. 2013. “‘Global’ Architecture as a Contradictory Signifier:
Lessons from Hamburg’s and Vienna’s Urban Megaprojects.” In Urban
Megaprojects: A Worldwide View, edited by Gerardo del Cerro Santamaría.
Lee, Kah-wee. 2014. “Feeling like a State: Design Guidelines and the Leg-
ibility of ‘Urban Experience ’ in Singapore.” International Journal of Urban
and Regional Research.
Madanipour, Ali. 2006. “Roles and Challenges of Urban Design.” Journal
of Urban Design 11 (2): 173–93.
Picon Lefebvre, Virginie. 2017. Interview with Virginie Picon Lefebvre (Pro-
fesseur HDR, ENSA Paris-Belleville) Interview by Anna Gasco. Meeting
notes.
Söderström, Ola. 1996. “Paper Cities: Visual Thinking in Urban Planning.”
Ecumene 3 (3): 249–81.
599 Comparative Aspects
 Conclusion

600 601 The Grand Projet

THE POTENTIAL OF GRANDS PROJETS
FOR INCLUSIVE AND ADAPTABLE
FUTURE CITIES
Anna Gasco and Naomi C. Hanakata

This volume set forth to provide insights into the making and impact of
urban megaprojects within cities in Asia and Europe. We have conceptu-
alised Grands Projets as large-scale urban developments, comprehensively
realised under the mandate of a specially created authority and laid out
under a vision that translates a city’s political and/or economic agenda
into space. In addition, our research focused on the spatial dimension of
Grands Projets’ various and multifaceted empirical manifestations. Para-
digmatic masterplans, complemented by iconic architecture and driven
by elite stakeholders, play a fundamental role in the worldwide competitive
positioning of cities and in the impact Grands Projets have on our cities.
In analysing our case studies, which together illustrate 120 years
of urban development within Asia and Europe, we found that Grands Projets’
growing number and size have led to new forms of urban governance, spa-
tial design, implementation and management practices. Grands Projets are
at the centre of restructuring efforts designed to regenerate or increase urban
development, especially in places where populations are rapidly increasing.
Our research has therefore taken Grands Projets as lenses for investigating
urban trends in globally connected forms of concentrated urbanisation.
However, our methodology, built upon specific analytical frames
and comparative aspects, has allowed us to surpass current readings of
Grands Projets as top-down artefacts disrupting local situations for the sake
of projecting a city’s ambition to the world. In examining our eight case
studies in their context-specific, temporal and structural complexities, we
have focused on conception, design, implementation and operation prac-
tices that have direct implications on Grands Projets’ spatial outcomes on
the ground; these analytical frames facilitated both a context-specific read-
ing and a productive dialogue between Grand Projet development processes
across varying geographies. ​→ GP–CR.01 ​These frames also served as entry
points to our comparative analysis, which prioritises five aspects we con-
sider of central importance to Grands Projets: bordering, centralities, mod-
elling, spatial regulatory plans and urban catalysts. These aspects enabled
us to reveal and assess commonalities and differences across distinct devel-
opmental contexts.

Our research began with the following questions:

� How are Grands Projets made?
� How do they impact our urban environments?
� In what ways can Grands Projets create more inclusive and adap-
tive urban megaprojects in the future?

603 Conclusion
 CONCEPTION DESIGN IMPLEMENTATION OPERATION IMPLICATION Many Grands Projets struggle with the fact that they are outdated the moment
they are completed, as we observed in our more mature case studies: La
MNU–T Development of an Urban grid with Implementation Managed by OMY Limited impact on
Défense in Paris and Marunouchi in Tokyo. p ​ MNU–T & LD–P PORTRAITS ​Cer-
Marunouchi urban model for central axis and en over several (re-) Council, which is surroundings but tain mechanisms, however, enable Grands Projets to respond better to the
Tokyo, Japan a modern city; bloc developments; development cycles
with gradual density
strongly influenced
by Mitsubishi Estate;
defining for Tokyo’s
global image.
changing dynamics of their times and to reflect the diverse voices of the
increase; individuals who bring these megaprojects to life. Adaptability and inclu-
siveness therefore provided another line of comparative inquiry for our
LJZ–S Development of a Car-centric develop­ Planned and devel­ Managed by the Placed Shanghai on
cases in order to gain insights into parameters critical for the development
Lujiazui financial district ment with wide oped by state-owned Shanghai Lujiazui the global financial of sustainable Grands Projets. Accordingly, we examined our cases’ spatial
Shanghai, China within a special eco­
nomic zone after
roads, large plots and
monolithic high-rise
Shanghai Lujiazui
Development
Development
Company Ltd.;
map and created an
international image
implications on the one hand and their social impact on the other.
China’s re-opening to buildings; Company Ltd.; for the city. Our findings have been multiple and interconnected, revealing
international trade;
crucial specificities, differences and similarities amongst our cases. How-
ever, while we advance a set of concluding reflections in this final chapter,
WK–H Development of a Tapestry of four Gradual implement­ Managed by a Major parts yet to we have recognised that Grands Projets are expanding and very much evolv-
West Kowloon
Hong Kong
cultural and transport
hub to turn Hong
different design
schemes around
ation in (re-) develop­
ment cycles with
cooperation of
different government
be completed and
implications there­
ing all over the world; it is therefore essential not to limit Grands Projets’
Kong into ‘Asia’s TOD infrastructures; gradual density related entities; fore currently unfor­ great diversity of spatial outcomes within a list of finite conclusions. The
World City’; increase; seeable.
outcomes of our research address various stages, scales and perspectives
of the making and impact of Grands Projets; they underpin the value of urban
MBA–S Modernisation, re­ Tapestry of different Government land Public spaces man­ Singapore becoming megaprojects as pioneers for new regimes of governance, planning tools,
Marina Bay Area
Singapore
newal and extension
of the city centre to
masterplans, stitched
together by urban
sales implemented
by URA with various
aged by public &
private developers
a reference for other
Asian and Arab cities.
public policy and urban development practices that advance economic and
create a ‘global city’; guidelines; tender systems; complying with social programmes. They also highlight the complex and multiple impacts
city-wide regulations;
Grands Projets have on surrounding areas, urban regions and cities’ global
positioning in their requirement of extensive capital and their support of
HC–H Redevelopment of Framework plan for Coordinated by Managed by Gradual but direct political visions. As such, we argue that Grands Projets hold a crucial role
HafenCity
Hamburg, Germany
the old port area,
extension and con­
ten individual neigh­
bourhoods con­
HafenCity Hamburg
GmbH following
HafenCity Hamburg
GmbH;
impact on surround­
ings and HafenCity’s
in shaping the existing and future urban condition of our cities, on local
nection of the city nected in a linear, three different global image. and global scales.
with the waterfront; east-west sequence; options for imple­
mentation;

KEY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS

LD–P Development of a Beaux-Arts style Coordinated by Managed by Secured Paris’s
La Défense new urban paradigm masterplan with Paris–La Défense, Paris–La Défense position in the global
Paris, France for a post-war city separation of activi­ planning body mainly finance market and 1 GRANDS PROJETS ARE IMPORTANT DRIVERS AND
and expansion of the
service sector;
ties and transport
flows through
composed of local
authorithies, after 60
preservation of the
historical centre.
TEST-BEDS OF URBAN TRANSFORMATION AND
7-storey deck, host­ years of State-led DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES
ing high-rise towers; implementation;
Grands Projets are mirrors of societal change. In analysing the ambi-
tions behind our case studies and within their broader socio-political con-
22@–B Renewal of an obso­ Emphasis on infra­ Coordinated by Transformed through Barcelona becoming texts, we found that Grands Projets seldomly follow pre-existing urban
22@
Barcelona, Spain
lete indutrial area by
creating space for
structure and regula­
tion over design;
private development
initiative leaving
private initiative
leaving 22@'s final
a tertiary hub in
addition to a tourist
conditions or established planning and development processes; rather,
the ‘new economy’; 22@’s final outcome outcome unclear; destination. they create their own. They become vehicles of modernisation, urban
unclear;
renewal and extension. They are testing grounds for planning guidelines,
programmes, energy standards, mobility concepts and/or open space acti-
KX–L Renewal of a cent­ Flexible spatial & By the private King’s Managed by the Factor in the vation and management, which, in many cases, establish new benchmarks
King’s Cross
London, UK
ral­ly located, old
industrial site into a
programmatic frame­
work plan organ­-
Cross Central
Partnership (KCCLP)
King’s Cross Central
Partnership (KCCLP);
gentrification of the
surrounding and
in local and regional planning practices.
mixed use neigh­ ising streets, open in consultation with regional attraction of With respect to more mature projects, such as Marunouchi in Tokyo
bourhood; spaces and small
plots, with new &
local actors; Head Quarters.
or La Défense in Paris, modernisation is a key initiating ambition of Grands
heritage buildings; Projets. These projects introduce a new urban development logic that helps
manifest their cities’ political and economic agendas at a given time, with
varying aspirations, complexities, timeframes and stakeholder involvement.
GP–CR.01 Grand Projet case studies through five analytical frames. The conceptions of La Défense and Marunouchi marked a particular moment

604 The Grand Projet 605 Conclusion

 in time ​— ​a post-isolation and post-war moment ​— ​and the beginning of a KX–L I TBRCCT
new era. This is ultimately reflected in a new understanding of the city
itself, with Grands Projets becoming the spatial manifestation of these ideas 22@–B IR TBC
in practice. ​1 LD–P & MNU–T CONCEPTION HC–H BRCC
In the case of urban renewal ambitions, Grands Projets become
vehicles for revitalising outdated brownfield land in central areas and mate- WK–H B CC
rialising emergent trends and technologies. 1 ​ 22@–B CONCEPTION T ​ he devel-
opment of 22@ in Barcelona addressed the city centre’s pressing lack of LJZ–S R BC CT
office space by reusing the existing obsolete industrial fabric within the MBA–S B C CR
Poblenou area. The emerging narratives of a knowledge economy and infor-
mation society at the turn of the century resulted in the area’s focus on LD–P BR CC T
information technology and media. ​1 KX–L CONCEPTION T ​ he current rede-
velopment of King’s Cross in London was catalysed by the construction of MNU–T B T C C
the international rail-link to Europe, which triggered the revitalisation of 1890 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020 2040
centrally located railway land brownfield into a mixed-use quarter with a
focus on creative industries and activities. ​u URBAN CATALYSTS ​ GP–CR.02 Grand Projet case studies’ programmatic evolutions. C Commercial I Industrial
Grands Projets also serve as means of urban extension to relieve devel- B
R
Business
Residential
T Transport
IT 
Information
opment pressure and increase urban territory. Urban extensions frequently CC Cultural & Civic Technology
involve land reclamation and result in a significant increase in built-up urban
land. 1 ​ WK–H CONCEPTION T ​ he West Kowloon project in Hong Kong, for exam-
ple, was built on reclaimed land leftover from infrastructural developments strength and significance as components of internationally connected,
of the 1990s connecting Hong Kong Island to Chek Lap Kok Airport. competing centralities, supporting the evolution of cities’ global images.
The ambitions driving Grands Projets are multiple and dynamic, Increasingly diverse uses equip Grands Projets with the capacity to respond
and they often evolve over time. O ​ MBA–S INTRODUCTION T ​ he case of Marina to specific trends or urban aspirations, such as the pursuit of creative and
Bay Area best illustrates this: the development initially coincided with Sin- culturally-driven centres in West Kowloon (Hong Kong) and Marina Bay
gapore’s ambitions for modernisation ​— ​namely, to transition from a post-co- Area (Singapore).
lonial city into a modern metropolis ​— ​and urban renewal of its city centre Grands Projets have become drivers of urban transformation within
before the area expanded through land reclamation, exhibiting Singapore’s cities’ development trajectories, economic conditions and functional foci.
growth into a global metropolis. Underpinning this range of megaproject Grands Projets can serve as catalysts for the regeneration of adjacent areas,
ambitions are the transformative capacity of Grands Projets, inherent in their redefinition of regional urban dynamics and repositioning of cities on a
scale  ​— ​“mega” ​— ​and the significance they garner within a city’s urban devel- global scale. Growing programme diversification has also increased the
opment. These ultimately enable actualisation of project aspirations. capacity of these projects to interact with the spaces and activities of their
adjacent neighbourhoods. Nonetheless, Grands Projets’ ability to attract
2 GRANDS PROJETS ARE DEVELOPING MORE DIVERSE programmes of relevance to public life ​— ​shopping, community and cultural
PROGRAMMES uses and administrative functions ​— ​risks the creation of increasingly self-­
Over the last three decades, Grands Projets have become increas- sufficient projects. These projects, less dependent on their surroundings,
ingly diversified in the mix of uses they host. We found that whilst earlier enable users and residents to satisfy their needs without exiting the site’s
projects ​— ​Marunouchi in Tokyo or La Défense in Paris ​— ​prioritised mono-­ perimeter. The degree of programme complementarity to surrounding regions
functional, business-oriented uses, many contemporary Grands Projets and other centralities, as well as a programme’s capacity to cater to a vari-
include a range of activities at their inception, such as retail, cultural, edu- ety of users, are key elements that determine a Grand Projet’s inclusiveness.​
cational and entertainment facilities. Recently conceived projects like 22@, b BORDERING ​
West Kowloon and King’s Cross have promoted themselves as mixed-use
districts with a focus on knowledge economy, culture and/or education 3 GRANDS PROJETS ARE DIVERSIFYING WITH MORE OPEN-­
from the start. ​→ GP–CR.02 ​In addition, initially mono-functional business ENDED AND STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO DESIGN
centres, such as Marunouchi, La Défense and Canary Wharf in London, Design schemes spatially translate early visions of Grands Projets
have diversified their programmes in order to improve the urban quality of and form a decisive part of the realisation of a project’s ambition. We found
their areas by providing more commercial, leisure and/or residential uses. that the spatial outcomes of our case studies indicate that Grands Projets
Grands Projets’ diversification of programmes reinforces their economic are diversifying with more open-ended and strategic approaches to design,

606 The Grand Projet 607 Conclusion

 which affect both the spatial quality of a place and a scheme’s flexible imple-
mentation over time. Given their long development time frames, Grands
Projets face evolving societal needs that impact their spatial and programmatic
implementations. One of the central challenges of a spatial design scheme
therefore lies in its ability to strike a balance between control and laissez-faire
from the outset. The spatial implementations of Grands Projets are governed
by what we call spatial regulatory plans. ​→ GP–RP.01 IN r REGULATORY PLANS ​We
found that the regulatory plans guiding more recent Grands Projets provide
various legally-binding degrees of flexibility that enable schemes to adapt
over time, in contrast to previously more drawn-up, detailed approaches
that attempt to anticipate and define spatial outcomes in their full scope.​
r REGULATORY PLANS
More adaptive spatial regulatory plans rely on flexible mega-blocks
rather than fixed plots; view corridors, axes and key connectors in place of
laid-out street networks; a ratio of built and open spaces within each plot
instead of building footprints; the allocation of character areas and densi-
ties rather than fixed programmes and building typologies; and incremental
phasing or organic temporal approaches in place of ‘fully build and growth
will come’ strategies. However, even in more flexible spatial regulatory
plans, the development of recognisable spatial elements remains impor-
tant in order to guarantee a Grand Projet’s needed iconicity and spatial
identity; these support a project’s exceptional status and maintain essential
spatial qualities over time. In addition, whilst flexible spatial approaches
endow projects with greater adaptability, they require stable, forward-look-
ing and inclusive governing bodies, willing to navigate the numerous pos-
sibilities in development trajectories without overlooking the needs of a
diverse group of stakeholders. ​b BORDERING
The process of producing Grands Projets’ spatial designs can be
more or less inclusive and, as such, reflects various aspirations: whilst some
of our cases call for continuation of an existing context, others deliberately
create a new piece and image of a city, distinct from surrounding areas.
Today, Grands Projets exhibit various degrees of inclusion of diverse stake-
holders from inception, whether in the development process of a site’s brief
or in the project’s actual spatial design. King’s Cross’s masterplanners,
directly appointed by the development partner (Argent), proposed a flex-
ible spatial scheme based on a detailed brief, cohesively developed by the
landowners, the local planning authority, the developer and even the sur-
rounding communities. 2 ​ KX–L DESIGN A​ more open-ended design approach
is crucial for influencing a place’s long-term spatial quality, inclusivity and
integration into public life. ​b BORDERING
4 THE REALISATIONS OF GRANDS PROJETS DEPEND
ON EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
The Grands Projets of our case studies are all governed by excep-
tional bodies and regulations. These become decisive at various stages of
project development: in some cases, such as 22@ or King’s Cross, urban
redevelopment has only been made possible via special policies and the
creation of particular development incentives. In addition, Grands Projets
exhibit a dependency on exceptional regulations outside statutory planning
608 The Grand Projet
procedures, including relaxed planning policies and/or applications. In
Shanghai, for example, the central government issued preferential policies
for Pudong in 1989 in the form of special economic zones (SEZ), extended
in 1992 to allow foreign individuals to invest in Lujiazui. 3​ LJZ–S IMPLEMEN-
TATION T​ he Publicly Driven Plans for 22@ were introduced by the City Coun-
cil of Barcelona in 2000 for the industrial area in the district of St. Martin
to allow for the its redevelopment with new programmes and an increased
FAR. 3 ​ 22@–B IMPLEMENTATION I ​ n King’s Cross, the 2004 London Plan des-
ignated 38 Opportunity Areas, which permitted higher densities and special
attention at the planning authority level. 1 ​ KX–L CONCEPTION T
​ hese specially
designated development areas can be compared in status to the Urban Renais-
sance Areas in Tokyo or even the Vorranggebiete (Special Development
Districts) in Hamburg. ​3 HC–H & MNU–T IMPLEMENTATION ​
The rapid realisation of Grands Projets is frequently coupled with
the creation of special governing bodies outside established public ones.
The stakeholders behind the new authorities in charge of our cases exhibit
various constellations and overlaps of public and/or private actors. Some-
times, local authorities even become developers themselves or form strong
alliances with private sectors in order to continue to influence a market-led
development, as La Défense and Marina Bay Area both illustrate. Regarding
project inclusivity, we found that it is less the public or private nature of
these governing bodies that is decisive but more so the extent and control
of their power, including, for example, their capacity to select developers
or architects, control over design guidelines and right to monitor area access.​
b BORDERING c
​ CENTRALITIES ​
Whilst these bodies enable greater stability over time, which extends
beyond the four or five years of electoral cycles, accountability for a project
becomes increasingly blurred. It can even exist outside the public realm’s
influence, with fast-track action plans and development practices that rely
on public consultation only when convenient, often via marketing events
or questionnaires. For example, HafenCity Hamburg GmbH is a private
company owned by the city state of Hamburg; as such, HafenCity Hamburg
GmbH has its own governing structure and enjoys great freedom in deter-
mining management practices of the HafenCity project. ​4 HC–H ­OPERATION​
In the case of La Défense, a state-led planning body, the Public Establishment
for the Development of the Défense’s Region (EPAD) was created at the begin-
ning of development, which enabled the central government’s exclusive
power over local authorities within the project’s site. 3
​ LD–P IMPLEMENTATION​
While EPAD evolved over time and in response to a wider decentralisation
of power in France, the project’s initial exclusion of local authorities and
communities has held a lasting legacy on La Défense’s insularity and image.​
b BORDERING
5 GRANDS PROJETS CHANGE THE POWER BALANCE
WITHIN OUR CITIES
With the development of Grands Projets and through the introduc-
tion of their special governing bodies in charge, cities’ established physical
and governing gravitational centres are very likely to change. Marketed as
flagship projects with the capacity to transform a city’s image and reality
609 Conclusion
 on the ground, new Grands Projets tend to absorb primary investment cap-
ital in the region and garner attention from local authorities, private devel-
opers and citizens. The realisation of Grands Projets is carried out in an
increasingly comprehensive way: the formulation of a project vision aligns
with urban design, which is implemented in a coordinated fashion and
supplemented by marketing strategies, activities and events. This is made
possible through the aforementioned governing bodies, which can facili-
tate a coherent development that would otherwise be divided amongst
many different jurisdictions of the public apparatus.
The growing range of responsibilities that fall into the hands of
single actors might include hosting design competitions, selecting devel-
opers, issuing guidelines for building practices or energy standards and space
programming and use. They also involve the maintenance and control of
open spaces and infrastructures, selection of tenants and place-making ini-
tiatives. Our case studies indicate varying scopes of multi-capacity engage-
ment, in which central bodies in charge also function as owners, shareholders,
developers, managers, tenants and/or event organisers; this further aug-
ments the power of Grands Projets’ specially created authorities.
HafenCity Hamburg GmbH acts as initial property owner and sole
agency in charge of HafenCity development and management. Its extremely
broad range of responsibilities, entrepreneurial freedom to act and continuity
in personnel have enabled a highly coherent project in terms of implemen-
tation and management. ​3 HC–H ­IMPLEMENTATION In the case of Marina Bay
Area, the Urban Redevelopment Authority of Singapore (URA) is the main
governmental agency in charge of urban planning, tendering of plots for
development and management of the public realm. In collaboration with
other stakeholders, such as the Sands Corporation, the property owner of
Marina Bay Sands, URA assumes the role of place manager to ensure a
vibrant, diverse and daily activation of the public spaces around Marina
Bay throughout the year. ​4 MBA–S ­OPERATION
6  RANDS PROJETS LIE AT THE INTERSECTION OF
G CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: TOWARDS INCLUSIVE AND
GLOBAL HIERARCHIES AND LOCAL NETWORKS
Comparative analysis of our cases studies has brought different
cultures of planning and development practice into conversation and revealed
surprising commonalities, many of which are independent of urban layout
and built form. We discovered similar management practices and ambi-
tions, architecture firms and developers (Herzog De Meuron in both Hafen­
City and West Kowloon, Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield in both La Défense
and HafenCity and Singapore’s developer CapitaLand, which realises large-
scale projects in cities all over Asia). We found similar programme config-
urations (cultural, leisure or business centres), the same commercial tenants
(high-end fashion brands in Marina Bay Area and West Kowloon) and iden-
tical tenant types (service industries, national company branch offices,
international headquarters and IT branches in Marunouchi, King’s Cross
and 22@). This is not a coincidence but rather the result of Grands Projets
imagineering similar visions and responding to related spatial requirements.
610 The Grand Projet
It is also the result of a high degree of exchange between urban megapro-
jects: namely, learning from the failure and success of others and emulat-
ing projects elsewhere. m ​ MODELLING T ​ hese practices establish a complex,
close-knit network between Grands Projets around the globe.
At the same time, Grands Projets reflect regional ambitions, spe-
cificities and desires. Even though they might be inspired by or modelled
after international references, they emerge from local needs ​— ​justified or
not justified ​— ​and speak to distinct and specific aspirations. With that, their
primary scale of impact also concerns their immediate surroundings: in
some cases, adjacent neighbourhoods respond to new programme inser-
tions or landmarks by profiting from a Grand Projet through spill-over effects.​
b BORDERING King’s Cross’s surrounding areas have steadily gentrified since
the project’s inception. It is, however, difficult to identify the new project
as the sole cause for this, given the area’s central location in London and
the concurrent completion of the international rail connection to Europe.​
5 KX–L ­IMPLICATIONS ​In other cases, adjacent neighbourhoods or old city
centres find themselves competing with new projects, as observed in the
relationship between Hamburg and HafenCity, the old business centre of
Shitamachi in Tokyo and Marunouchi and the historic centre of Puxi and
Lujiazui. ​5 HC–H, MNU–T & LJZ–S ­IMPLICATIONS
This dual role of Grands Projets ​— ​forming hubs in a global network
of knowledge transfer, exchanging actors and inter-referencing project
practices on the one hand and establishing locally anchored spatial man-
ifestations on the other ​— ​is a key characteristic of urban megaprojects.
Grands Projets reconcile global and local agendas, influence international
urban rankings of city success and liveability and contribute to a growing
network of transnational spaces. They also tie these abstract networks to
the ground, where they meet with the realpolitik of local governments,
established practices and the people who create and activate them.
ADAPTABLE GRANDS PROJETS
Over the past three decades, Grands Projets have increasingly shaped our
urban environments and connected them through transnational networks
of practice and capital, simultaneously reflecting localised processes of
development. Often realised by dedicated elites outside statutory planning
procedures and via massive public and private investments, Grands Projets
have unsettled established procedures of city making through development
of new planning tools, forms of urban governance and exceptional policies.
In doing so, Grands Projets have had multiple impacts on their surrounding
areas, urban regions and cities’ global perceptions. It is thus crucial that
we leverage the inherent capacities of Grands Projets not only to transform
but also to improve the urban condition of our cities by increasing their
potential to better respond to uncertain futures and reflect a more diverse
set of voices shaping and using these projects.
611 Conclusion
 In order to become more adaptable, Grands Projets must develop strategies
rather than fully detailed solutions. What is more, they must refrain from
building these strategies upon rigid assumptions about the future. Rather,
Grands Projets should incorporate “spaces of opportunities” and have the
capacity to adapt programmatically, spatially and typologically. Projects
need to be conceived as dynamic spaces via flexible urban design frame-
works, where robust and accessible public spaces and urban design qual-
ities are prioritised over a final design image.
In order to become more inclusive, projects’ authorities must recon-
sider the balance of powers at stake. Realised projects only grow in quality
and acceptance if these authorities act in dialogue with and in the interest
of a broad range of stakeholders. Each project is built within a specific city
with a specific history and socio-political context, all of which impact local
decision-making processes. Whilst Grands Projets influence each other,
authorities must surpass global development ambitions and trends in order
to ensure that projects remain grounded and to create diverse urban futures
inclusive of the many different social perspectives and conditions that shape
our cities.

612 The Grand Projet 613

 Appendix

614 615 The Grand Projet

BIOGRAPHIES

PABLO ACEBILLO has always combined his work with teaching and
(author and researcher, Grand Projet team research and has held professorships at TU Berlin
2016–2019) and ETH Zurich. His work focuses on complex
Pablo Acebillo is Senior Urban Planner at enCity urban assignments and guiding challenging urban
Urban Solutions in Singapore. Prior to his position processes.
at enCity, Acebillo worked at the Future Cities
Laboratory in Singapore, where he contributed ALESSANDRA CIANCHETTA
to the Grand Projet research. He holds a MSc in (interviewee)
Spatial Development & Infrastructure Systems Architect and founding partner of AWP (London
from ETH Zurich. and Paris). Her work has been presented at MAXXI,
MoMA and Cité de l’Architecture and has been
PETER BISHOP featured in the New York Times and The Guard-
(interviewee) ian. Cianchetta has taught at Cornell, Columbia
Peter Bishop is Professor of Urban Design at The GSAPP, UVA and The Berlage. She currently directs
Bartlett School of Architecture and a partner of the GLC platform at IKA in Vienna and teaches
Bishop & Williams consultants. For 25 years, he was at The Cooper Union in New York (www.awp-­
planning director at four different Central London architecture.com).
Boroughs and has worked on various major pro-
jects, including King’s Cross. In 2006, Bishop was ANDREW DAVID FASSAM
appointed first Director of Design for London. (external essay contributor)
Andrew Fassam is Senior Director of Strategic
DESMOND CHOI Projects at the Urban Redevelopment Authority
(research assistant, Grand Projet team (URA) in Singapore. In his 25 years at URA, he
2017–2018) has overseen planning and urban design of Sin-
Desmond Choi is an architect and urban researcher. gapore’s City Centre, including the extension of
He holds a BA in Architectural Studies from the the Central Business District at Marina Bay, which
University of Hong Kong and is currently pursu- has comprised major development projects such
ing a Master’s degree at the Royal Danish Acad- as the Marina Bay Financial Centre, Marina Bay
emy of Fine Arts. Choi previously worked at the Sands and the Gardens by the Bay.
Future Cities Laboratory in Singapore, where he
contributed to the Grand Projet research for the SIEW LENG FUN
Hong Kong case study. (external essay contributor)
Siew Leng Fun is Chief Urban Designer at the
KEES CHRISTIAANSE Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) in Singa-
(author and project leader, Grand Projet team pore. Her primary responsibility is to oversee all
2015–2019) architectural and urban design aspects of URA’s
Kees Christiaanse is an internationally renowned work for the Central Area of Singapore and key
architect and urban planner. He is founder and growth areas, such as Jurong Lake District, Wood-
partner of KCAP with offices in Rotterdam, Zurich lands Regional Centre, Punggol North Coast and
and Shanghai. Throughout his career, Christiaanse the Greater Southern Waterfront.

617 Appendix
RAMÓN GARCÍA-BRAGADO DIETER LÄPPLE Projet at Future Cities Laboratory. She holds an YING ZHOU
(external essay contributor) (interviewee) MS in Architecture and Urban Design from GSAPP, (author and researcher)
Ramon Garcia-Bragado, a lawyer who specialises Dieter Läpple is Professor Emeritus of International Columbia University, USA, and a B.Eng from UGM, Ying Zhou is an architect teaching at the Univer-
in urban and infrastructure management, is part- Urban Studies at HafenCity University Hamburg. Indonesia. She has practiced in New York City, sity of Hong Kong. Born in Shanghai, Zhou col-
ner of Miliners Lawyers, a law firm based in Bar- He was I.A. visiting professor at Institut d’Études Jakarta and Yogyakarta. laborated with Kees Christiaanse at the Future
celona. With over 30 years of experience, Ramon Politiques in Paris, advisory member of the Urban Cities Laboratory and Herzog & de Meuron at the
has served as Deputy Major of Barcelona, where Age Programme at the London School of Econom- PETER G ROWE ETH Studio Basel. She holds a BSE from Prince-
he led the department of Urban Planning, Infra- ics and Senior Fellow of the Brookings Institution (interviewee) ton University, a M.Arch. from Harvard University
structures and Housing. He also led and imple- in Washington. He is member of the Scientific Advi- Peter G Rowe is the Raymond Garbe Professor and a Ph.D. from ETH Zurich.
mented the 22@ Plan in Barcelona. sory Board of the Future Cities Laboratory. of Architecture and Urban Design at Harvard Uni-
versity’s Graduate School of Design and also a
ANNA GASCO FELICIA LIM Harvard University Distinguished Service Pro-
(author, research leader and book editor, (research assistant, Grand Projet team fessor. Between 1992 and 2004, he served as Dean
Grand Projet team 2015–2019) 2017–2018) of the faculty of Design. Currently he is Chairman
Anna Gasco is the founder of Studio UPLA and Felicia Lim Yu Qing is an Architect at the Urban of SURBA in Brooklyn, New York.
KCAP’s senior architect and urban designer in Redevelopment Authority (URA) in Singapore. She
Singapore. She has previously practiced in Europe, oversees northern planning areas and has been PAUL NORITA TANGE
Russia and the Middle East. Committed to culti- involved in the development of the Singapore Mas- (interviewee)
vating synergies between professional and aca- terplan 2019. Before joining URA, she worked on Educated in Japan, Switzerland and USA, Paul
demic worlds, she is senior researcher at FCL, the Grand Projet research after receiving her Mas- Noritaka Tange received his AB (1981) and MArch
teaches at the National University of Singapore ters in Architecture from the Singapore University (1985) from Harvard University. A registered archi-
and has lectured at The Bartlett and ETH Zurich. of Technology and Design (SUTD). tect in both Japan and Singapore, he worked with
She holds a M.Arch., M.Sc. from The Bartlett and his father, architect Kenzo Tange, for twenty years,
a Ph.D. from ETH. KOKI MIYACHI before heading his own firms in Tokyo and Sin-
(external essay contributor) gapore with liaison offices in Taipei, Shanghai and
NAOMI C. HANAKATA Koki Miyachi is Principal Architect with Mitsubi- Jakarta.
(author, research leader and book editor, shi Jisho Sekkei, based in Tokyo. In 1990, he grad-
Grand Projet team 2015–2019) uated from the University of Tokyo with a Master’s MICHAEL THANNER
Naomi C. Hanakata is an architect and urban plan- in Architecture. Since 1996, he has been involved Michael Thanner was educated in Germany and
ner. In her research, teaching and practice she in Marunouchi’s Mixed-use Development Projects. the U.S. and received Master’s degrees in Archi-
investigates emerging demands in high-density Miyachi has received various awards, including a tecture/Urban Design and Urban Planning from
urban areas. She has practiced in Zurich, Tokyo, BCS award (2015) and BELCA award (2014). Columbia University in 1994. He is a licensed archi-
New York and Singapore as planner and consult- tect in New York and a LEED accredited profes-
ant. She has taught at Rice University, ETH Zurich VIRGINIE PICON-LEFEBVRE sional. He started working for Tange Associates
and NUS and was educated at ETH, Tokyo Uni- (external essay contributor) as Principal Architect in 2010 and became Vice
versity and LSE, and holds a Ph.D. from ETH. Virginie Picon-Lefebvre is an architect and urbanist President of Tange Associates Asia (Singapore)
and holds a Ph.D. in History of Art. She is professor in 2017.
NOBORU KAWAGISHI at Paris-Belleville. Picon-Lefebvre has taught at
(external essay contributor) the Ecole d’Architecture de Versailles and Malaquais LEI-YA WONG
Noboru Kawagishi is an architect with Mitsubishi and at the GSD, Harvard University. Her recent (research assistant, Grand Projet team
Jisho Sekkei, based in Tokyo. He studied Archi- book La fabrique du bonheur concerns the archi- 2015–2018)
tecture and Urban Design at Niigata University tecture of leisure and tourism. Lei-Ya Wong graduated from the National Uni-
and at ETH in Zurich. Kawagishi has been involved versity of Singapore with a Master in Architecture.
in several mixed-use development projects and DISSA PIDANTI RARAS Her expertise includes residential projects, air-
large-scale masterplans in Japan and Asia. (research assistant, Grand Projet team craft carousels, mixed-use facilities, and urban
2018–2019) design and planning in Singapore and abroad.
Dissa Pidanti Raras is an urban designer and archi- Curiosity propels her to seek elegant resolutions
tect working as a research assistant for the Grand in design, research and dance.

618 The Grand Projet 619 Appendix

 CREDITS
INTRODUCTION
UNDERSTANDING THE MAKING AND IMPACT
OF GRANDS PROJETS, P. 15– 23
→ GP–IN.— (by image number)
01 Timeline showing projects which started over the past 130 years, illustrat-
ing the gradual increase in number and size of urban megaprojects. The
selection includes the case studies of the Grands Projet research and
further projects discussed within key reference literatures of this project
and reports by Forbes and the World Economic Forum. Source: Compiled
and visualised by Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019; https://www.weforum.org/
agenda/2018/08/smart-cities-forest-city-belmont/; https://www.forbes.
com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/12/12/why-hundreds-of-completely-
new-cities-are-being-built-around-the-world/#32b4310a14bf
02 Global map showing the location of the Grands Projet case studies and
urban megaprojects discussed in key reference literatures of this project
and reports cited by Forbes and the World Economic Forum. Source:
The selection is based on cases discussed within key reference litera-
tures of this project and reports by Forbes and the World Economic
Forum. Compiled and visualised by Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019, with ref-
erence to:
→ King’s Cross: https://www.archdaily.com/486267/bennetts-associates-
unveil-plans-for-latest-development-in-london-s-king-s-cross/
5321fd0cc07a8042fc000086-bennetts-associates-unveil-plans-for-
latest-development-in-london-s-king-s-cross-photo
→ Broadgate: https://www.alamy.com/stock-photo-aerial-view-south-of-
broadgate-tower-construction-site-liverpool-street-20224750.html
→ Battersea-Nine Elms: https://nineelmslondon.com/events/nine-elms-
pimlico-bridge-public-consultation
→ Paddington: https://www.cleaningexperts.co.uk/end-of-tenancy-cleaning-
london/end-of-tenancy-cleaning-paddington-w2/paddington-london-
aerial-view/
→ Canary Wharf: http://hollandproperties.co.uk/2018/02/16/canary-wharf-
comes-of-age-at-30-with-highs-and-lows-in-business-and-security/
→ HafenCity: https://archiscapes.wordpress.com/2015/04/18/waterfronts-
urban-renovation/aerial-photograph-of-the-hafencity-hamburg-2012/
→ IBA: https://www.leekuanyewworldcityprize.com.sg/media/feature-
articles/hamburg-in-pictures
→ Lujiazui: https://www.offset.com/photos/shanghai-china-april-17-2015-
shanghai-lujiazui-aerial-view-655220
→ Hongqiao: http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node27118/node27968/
node26490/userobject22ai36177.html
→ Marunouchi: https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/15-years-in-Mitsubishi-
Estate-finds-cash-cow-with-central-Tokyo-revamp
→ Roppongi Hills: https://www.reddit.com/r/CityPorn/comments/51qip9/
roppongi_hills_the_largest_building_in_tokyo/
→ Shibuya Station: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/04/16/
national/shibuya-station-to-be-rebuilt/
→ La Défense: The Defacto “Atlas de La Défense, Phase Diagnostique” of
2012, made available by AWP Agence de Reconfiguration Territoriale:
Project leader: AWP Agence de Reconfiguration Territoriale, consultant:
HHF, bet : OTEIS, LEA, Jonction
620 The Grand Projet 621 Appendix
→ Rive-Gauche: http://www.parisrivegauche.com/Les-quartiers-et-leurs-
projets/Tolbiac-nord
→ Île Seguin: http://www.lecourrierduparlement.fr/lile-seguin-resiste-
encore-et-toujours-a-la-betonneuse/
→ 22@: Guillermo Farinós, 2016.
→ Forum Area: Guillermo Farinós, 2016.
→ Sagrera Station: https://www.barcelonas.com/la-sagrera.html
→ Europe Square: https://www.archdaily.com/66387/porta-fira-towers-
toyo-ito-aa-fermin-vazquez-b720-arquitectos
→ Marina Bay Area: https://www.visitsingapore.com/see-do-singapore/
places-to-see/marina-bay-area/
→ One-North: https://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2016/08/25/singapore-
to-have-the-worlds-first-self-driving-taxi-service-starting-from-one-
north/one-north-oveview_lta/
→ Jurong Lake District: https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/new-
homes-jobs-lifestyle-in-jurong-lake-district
→ West Kowloon: https://www.dezeen.com/2010/08/20/west-kowloon-
cultural-district-by-foster-partners/
→ Koowloon East: https://www.ktd.gov.hk/udgm/en
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/08/smart-cities-forest-city-
belmont/; https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2017/12/12/
why-hundreds-of-completely-new-cities-are-being-built-around-the-
world/#32b4310a14bf
03 The RCA building stands out during the Rockefeller Center complex
construction process in 1933. Source: Photographed by Samuel Herman
Gottscho, 1933; restored by Michel Vuijlsteke, Open source;
04 Painting of the Forbidden City in Beijing: a built manifestation of cos-
mological rules. Source: Wikimedia Commons, public domain.
05 The Ideal City by Fra Carnevale illustrating Renaissance ideals of urban
planning. Source: Wikimedia Commons, public domain.
06 Paris after Haussmann: Avenue de l’Opera. Source: Wikimedia Commons,
public domain.
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKFOR ANALYSIS, P. 24–31
→ GP–IN.— (by image number)
07 A Common Narrative and Spatial Focus. Source: The Grand Projet
Team, 2019.
08 Speaking with and to Different Urban Actors. From top to bottom: In
conversation with Paul Tange, In conversation with Peter Bishop, In
conversation with Peter G. Rowe, Fieldwork in HafenCity with Prof.
Jürgen Bruns-Berentelg. Source: Photograph taken by Sharan Sudhindra,
Pablo Acebillo, 2017.
 CREDITS
CASE STUDY PORTRAITS
MARUNOUCHI TOKYO
TIMELINE, P. 56–57 (by column)
I 1885 Plot subdivision in Marunouchi. Source: Shinbunsha. 2009. ‘Trans­
portation Map of Edo with town lables (Oedodensha meguri chomei
sakuin iri)’. Tokyo: Shinbunsha.
I Source: Dissa Raras, Naomi C. Hanakata 2019, redrawn and adapted
based on: Mitsubishi Realestate Corporation. 2013. Marunouchi. Beijing,
China: Chinese Jisho Publisher.
II Ichigocan Buidling, the first brick building in Marunouchi opens in 1894.
Source: public domain.
II Tokyo Station opens in 1914. Source: public domain.
III The area around Tokyo Station in 1952. Source: The Asahi Shimbu Digital.
2014. ‘Tokyo Stsation Opening 100 Anniversary’. asahi.com. 2014.
IV The rooftops of the two Olympic gymnasia by Kenzo Tange in Yoyogi
Park. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata 2016.
IV Source: Dissa Raras, Naomi C. Hanakata 2019, redrawn and adapted
based on: Mitsubishi Realestate Corporation. 2013. Marunouchi. Beijing,
China: Chinese Jisho Publisher.
IV The area around Tokyo Station in 1974. Source: The Asahi Shimbun
Digital. 2014. ‘Tokyo Station Opening 100 Anniversary.’ asahi.com. 2014.
P. 58–59 (by column)
I The Redevelopment Plan aka Manhattan Plan, 1988. Source: Mitsubishi
Estate Co., Ltd.
III Source: Wikimedia Commons, public domain.
IV Shin Marunouchi Building Tower (197m) in front of Tokyo Station.
Source: Wikimedia Commons, public domain.
TRANSVERSAL MAPS, P. 60–65
The six transversal maps of the Marunouchi Portrait were drawn by Dissa
Pidanti Raras and Naomi C. Hanakata and the axonometry of Marunouchi
was drawn by Felicia Lim, Dissa Pidanti Raras and Naomi C. Hanakata, in
2019 based on the following key source:
→ Fieldwork between 2015 and 2019.
→ The Council for Area Development and Management of Otemachi,
Marunouchi and Yurakucho. 2018. ‘The Council for Area Development
and Management of Otemachi, Marunouchi and Yurakucho. 2018.’
→ Open Street Map.
→ Google Maps 2019.
SPECIFIC, P. 66–101 (by image number)
→ MNU–T.— (by image number)
01 View from Mitsubishi Building onto Tokyo Station. Source: Naomi C.
Hanakata, 2016.
02 Three sites of Marunouchi. Source: Dissa Raras Pidanti and Naomi C.
Hanakata, redrawn and adapted based on OMY Report 2016.
622 The Grand Projet 623 Appendix
03 Late Meiji era view of Babasakidori with Ichigokan Building on the right.
Source: Wikimedia Commons; public domain.
04 Build-up evolution of Marunouchi. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, redrawn
and adapted based on Mitsubishi Jisho Sekkei. 2013. ‘Marunouchi. Global
City “Tokyo Marunouchi” 120 Years of Ever-Evolving City Planning.’
China City Press as well as Google Maps.
05 Map of the City of Edo around 1845. Source: Wikimedia Commons; pub-
lic domain, scanned by the University of Texas.
06 Map of original block subdivision. Source: Dissa Raras Pidanti and Naomi
C. Hanakata, redrawn and adapted based on OMY Council Guidelines 2015.
07 Height restriction guidelines dependent on area and distance to the
Imperial. Source: The Council for Area Development and Management
of Otemachi, Marunouchi and Yurakucho. 2014. ‘Otemachi, Marunouchi
and Yurakucho Area Machizukuri Guidelines 2014 (Ôtemachi, Marunouchi,
Yûrakuchô Chiku Machizukuri Gaidorain 2014)’.
08 Gradual podium tower densification. Source: Dissa Raras Pidanti and
Naomi C. Hanakata, 2018.
09 Tokyo Central Post Office, ca. 1935. Source: Public domain; credit: Harry
S. Truman Library & Museum.
10 New JP Tower, 2012. Source: Wikimedia Commons; public domain.
11 Marunouchi Building, built in 1923. Source: Mitsubishi Estate Co., Ltd.;
https://office.mec.co.jp/en/area/history.html
12 Marunouchi Building, 2002. Source: Mitsubishi Estate Co., Ltd.
13 Strict podium height regulations in the central area vs. more flexible
regulations in the periphery and the North. Source: Dissa Raras Pidanti
and Naomi C. Hanakata, redrawn and adapted based on OMY Council
Report 2016.
14 Schematic map showing the individual improvement zones, hubs and axes
in the project area. Source: Mitsubishi Estate Co., Ltd. 2013. ‘Marunouchi
in Tokyo. The Best Place for Global Interaction.’
15 View of the representative Gyōko-dōri leading to Tokyo Station. Source:
Barbaros Oezyilmaz, 2019.
16 The Marunouchi development facing the Imperial Palace which is hid-
den behind a moat and lush green. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
17 The Nihonbashi River towards the north of the site is covered by the
Inner Circular Highway. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
18 Nihonbashi Bridge with the Marunouchi site in the back, in Clear Weather
after Snow at Nihonbashi Bridge (Nihonbashi yukibare no zu), from the
series Famous Places in Edo, Newly Selected (Shinsen Edo meisho), Art
Object by Utagawa Hiroshige I (1797–1858). Source: Photograph © about
1839–42, Museum of Fine Arts, Boston.
19 The train tracks running through Tokyo Station form a border of the site
towards the East. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
20 Ginza on the left is exposing much more diverse building front and
separated from Marunouchi by a train tracks (right). Source: Naomi C.
Hanakata, 2017.
21 Strategic sites and buildings are property of Mitsubishi Estate, which
owns about 35% of land within Marunouchi. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata
and Dissa Raras Pidanti; including images from:
→ Tokyo Metropolitan Government (http://www.toshiseibi.metro.tokyo.
jp/pamphlet/pdf/udt2015english_3.pdf).
→ OMY Council (http://www.otemachi-marunouchi-yurakucho.jp/wp/
wp-content/themes/daimaruyu/pdf/info_daimaruyu_2018.pdf).
→ Wikimedia Commons, public domain.
→ Wikimedia Commons, Lover of Romance.
→ Mitsubishi Estate Ltd. (https://office.mec.co.jp/en/search/detail/905/).
→ blog.xuite.net (https://tinyurl.com/y6f33d8h).
→ toda.co.jp (https://www.toda.co.jp/company/history/index.html).
→ Tokyo Invest (https://www.seisakukikaku.metro.tokyo.jp/invest_tokyo/
english/why-tokyo/project.html).
→ Mitsubishi Estate Co., Ltd. 2015. ‘Asset Book 2015’. Mitsubishi Estate
Co., Ltd.
22 Old Iwasaki Family Crest and today’s Mitsubishi company logo. Source:
Wikimedia Commons, public domain.
23 The ‘Mitsubishi Wasteland’ around 1900. Source: public domain.
24 Redevelopment of Naka-dôri Avenue over the past 100 years showing
an increase of FAR and an improvement of open space for pedestrian
usage. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata. Including images from:
→ Wikimedia Commons, public domain.
→ Mitsubishi Estate Co., Ltd (http://www.mec.co.jp/j/news/archives/mec-
180510marunouchihapp.pdf).
→ Naomi C. Hanakata, 2016.
25 Map of Urban Renaissance Areas in the 23 Ward zone of Tokyo. Source:
Naomi C. Hanakata and Dissa Raras Pidanti; redrawn and adapted based
on Tokyo Metropolitan Government. 2017. ‘Urban Development in
Tokyo’. Tokyo Metropolitan Government.
26 Timeline of Issued Regulations and Buildings Stock Development. Source:
Naomi C. Hanakata, 2016.
27 FAR Trade-Off scheme whereby FARs could be increased if adjacent
buildings were not using their maximum FAR allowance. Source: Dissa
Raras Pidanti and Naomi C. Hanakata; redrawn and adapted based on
OMY Report 2018, p. 10.
28 Map of underground network in Marunouchi. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata
and Dissa Raras Pidanti; redrawn and adapted based on observations,
Shinkenchiku 2008, p. 98, and Google Maps 2018.
29 Old underground connections in Marunouchi. Source: Barbaros Oezyilmaz,
2019.
30 New underground connection in Marunouchi. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata,
2016.
31 Matsuri Festival in Marunouchi. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
32 IKEA Chairs in Naka-dori, 2016. Source: junkan-life.com.
33 Marunouchi stakeholder diagram. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2019.
34 Mitsubishi Estate operations around the globe. Source: Naomi C.
Hanakata; drawn based on Mitsubishi Estate. n.d. ‘Mitsubishi Estate,
International Business’.
35 City Room concept integrated in the Marunouchi Building for gathering
and events. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
36 New open spaces created with the reconstruction of the Ichigokan Building.
Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2016.
REFERENCE CASE STUDIES, P. 102–103
A Shibuya Station Area Redevelopment. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
B Roppongi Hills. Source: Barbaros Oezyilmaz, 2019.
LUJIAZUI SHANGHAI
TIMELINE, P. 108–109 (by column)
I Shanghai Masterplan 1986. Source: Shanghai Urban Planning Institute.
II Pudong Masterplan 1990. Source: Shanghai Urban Planning Institute.
III Linkages and connectivity in Lujiazui. Source: Shanghai Urban Planning
Institute.
IV Masterplan proposed by international designers for Lujiazui Shanghai.
Source: Lujiazui Development Company (LDC).
P. 110–111 (by column)
I Lujiazui masterplan. Source: Lujiazui Development Company (LDC).
624 The Grand Projet
II Towers under planning or construction in Lujiazui. Source: Lujiazui
Development Company (LDC).
II Lujiazui takes shape. Source: Image courtesy of Lujiazui Development
Company (LDC).
TRANSVERSAL MAPS, P. 112–117
The transversal maps of the Lujiazui Portrrait are drawn by Leiya Wong and
Dissa Pidanti Raras, and the axonometry was drawn by Leiya Wong and
Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2016–2019 based on key sources:
→ Shanghai Commercial Atlas, 1989.
→ Map of Shanghai from the Urban Planning Institute, 2016.
→ Fieldwork conducted by Ying Zhou between 2015 and 2019.
SPECIFIC, P. 118–145
→ LJZ–S.— (by image number)
01 View of Lujiazui. Source: Photo by Ying Zhou, 2019.
02 Lujiazui, 1850s to 2010. Source: Shanghai Urban Planning Institute.
03 Lujiazui in 1984 overlaid with realized road network. Source: Drawn by
Leiya Wong and Ying Zhou, 2016, based on the 1989 Commercial Atlas
of Shanghai.
04 Historic Development of Shanghai and China. Source: Drawn by Ying
Zhou, 2019.
05 Documentation of existing conditions in 1982 and Planning for Shanghai
from 1986. Source: Shanghai Urban Planning Institute.
06 Lujiazui and the Bund as CBD. Source: Shanghai Urban Planning Institute.
07 Pudong’s Four SEZs. Source: Drawn by Leiya Wong and Ying Zhou,
2016, based on the 1992 Comprehensive Plan of Pudong.
08 Lujiazui-Huamu Zone. Source: Drawn by Leiya Wong and Ying Zhou,
2016, based on the 1994 Lujiazui-Huamu Plan.
09 Lujiazui’s Layout Before the Consultation. Source: Shanghai Urban Plan­
ning Institute.
10 International Consultation Proposals and their localizations in 1992.
Source: Drawn by Ying Zhou, 2018, based on drawings from the LDC.
11 Lujiazui Plan 1993. Source: LDC.
12 Urban Design Plan. Source: LDC.
13 Lujiazui stakeholder diagram. Dissa Pidanti Raras and Ying Zhou, 2019.
14 Fortune World’s 4Ha. Source Photo: LDC; Drawing: Leiya Wong and
Ying Zhou, 2016.
15 Overseas Owner/Developers. Source: Drawn by Leiya Wong and Ying
Zhou, 2016.
16 Fortune World’s 4Ha. Source drawing: Leiya Wong and Ying Zhou, 2016.
17 Lujiazui’s Plot Divisions. Source: Drawn by Leiya Wong and Ying Zhou, 2016.
18 Zones B and D. Source: Photo by Ying Zhou, 2016.
19 The ‘global design corps’ in implementation. Source: Drawn by Leiya
Wong and Ying Zhou, 2016.
20 Lujiazui’s three tallest towers. Source: Ying Zhou, 2016.
21 Buildings Realized in Lujiazui over Time. Source: Drawn by Leiya Wong
and Ying Zhou, 2016.
22 Lujiazui’s rise in time. Source: Drawn by Leiya Wong and Ying Zhou,
2016–2018.
23 Competitors for the Shanghai Center. Source: Photo by Ying Zhou, 2016.
24 View from the TV Tower 1998. Source: Photo by Ying Zhou, 1998.
25 The Ping’an Tower. Source: Photo by Ying Zhou, 2016.
26 Domestic and overseas financial institutions in Lujiazui. Source: Drawn
by Leiya Wong and Ying Zhou, 2016.
27 Lujiazui “Financial Town”. Source: Photo by Ying Zhou, 2015.
28 Automobile-dominated and pedestrian unfriendly ground in Lujiazui.
Source: Photo by Ying Zhou, 2016.
29 View from the Oriental Floating Pavilion. Source: Photo by Ying Zhou, 2016.
30 Pedestrian connections implemented before the 2010 World Expo.
Source: Drawn by Leiya Wong and Ying Zhou, 2016.
31 Car-oriented urbanism as model. Source: Photo by Ying Zhou, 2016.
32 The Chen Residence. Source: Photo by Ying Zhou, 2015.
33 Buildings of Lujiazui in an ad for the BoC. Source: Photo by Ying Zhou,
2015.
34 The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping who began the country’s ‘reform
and opening’ in front of Lujiazui. Source: Ying Zhou, 2015.
35 View towards Puxi from Lujiazui. Source: Photo by Ying Zhou, 2015.
REFERENCE CASE STUDY, P. 146
A Hongqiao. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
WEST KOWLOON
HONG KONG
TIMELINE, P. 152–153 (by column)
I Planned developments along the Kowloon’s land reclamation. Source:
HKSAR Government Secretariat.
I West Kowloon Development Statement, 1994. Source: HK Planning,
Environment and Lands Branch.
II Kowloon Station Plans. Source: TFP Farrells.
II Feasibility study for a new performance venue, 1998. Source: HKSAR Legco.
II Aerials of West Kowloon from 1998 and 201. Source: MTRC.
III Winning entry for WKCD by Foster+Partners, 2002.
Source: www.info.gov.hk
III IFP entry by Foster+Partners. Source: www.info.gov.hk
IV WKCDA. Source: WKCDA.
P. 154–155 (by column)
I Transport network design, 2009. Source: HKSAR Transport Department.
I Protests against the XRL, 2009. Source: Ming Pao.
II Kowloon Station. Source: WKCDA edited by Desmond Choi.
II The three shortlisted masterplan proposals. Source: OMA/Foster+
Partners/Rocco Design Architects.
II The Foster+Partners plan chosen for the WKCD. Source: WKCDA/
Foster+Partners.
III The M+ Museum winning design. Source: Herzog & de Meuron.
III The 2013 development plan. Source: HKSAR Town Planning Board.
IV The Austin Station development. Source: Wikipedia user -Wpcpey ed-
ited by Desmond Choi.
IV Plans for a Palace Museum are announced in Beijing, which override plans
by Foster + Partners. Source: HKSAR Information Services Department.
TRANSVERSAL MAPS, P. 156–161
The transversal maps of the Lujiazui Portrait are drawn by Desmond Choi
and Dissa Pidanti Raras, and the axonometry was drawn by Desmond
Choi and Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2016–2019 based on key sources:
→ Maps from the HKSAR.
→ LegCo documents.
→ MTRC annual reports.
→ Buildings Departments architectural plans.
→ GoogleEarth 2017.
→ Fieldwork conducted by Desmond Choi in 2016–2018.
SPECIFIC, P. 162–195
→  WK–H.— (by image number)
01 View of West Kowloon. Source: Photograph by Ying Zhou, 2018.
02 From British Hong Kong to the SAR. Source: Drawn by Desmond Choi, 2017.
03 West Kowloon in Hong Kong and its parts. Source: Drawn by Desmond
Choi, 2017, Basemap: Google Earth, 2017.
04 Designing in Parts for West Kowloon. Source: Drawn by Desmond Choi,
2017, Basemap: Google Earth, 2017.
05 The Airport Core Programme (ACP)’s Projects. Source: Drawn by Desmond
Choi, 2019, Basemap: Google Earth, 2017.
06 West Kowloon Reclamation. Source: Drawn by Desmond Choi, 2019,
Basemap: Google Earth, 2017.
07 West Kowloon’s Early Visions (B). Source: HKSAR.
08 Guggenheim Bilbao realized in 1997 and the 1999 design of a perform-
ing arts venue in West Kowloon. Source: AP (above), Tao Ho Design
Architects, 1998 (below).
09 Growing Rail Network in China and the PRD. Source: Economist 2017
(above) and Shenzhen Weibo (below).
10 Ten Major Infrastructure Projects. Source: Drawn by Desmond Choi,
2017, Basemap: Google Earth, 2017.
11 Designs for the Cultural District. Source: Drawn by Desmond Choi, 2019,
based on the LegCo documents, publicized competition submissions,
GoogleEarth 2017, and fieldwork between 2016 and 2018.
12 Two layers of buildings along the pedestrian east-west axis atop auto-
mobiles underground. Source: WKCDA/Foster+Partners, 2010.
13 From masterplan to development plan. Source: WKCDA/Foster+Partners,
625 Appendix
2010 (above), Town Planning Board HK (below).
14 Continuous underground infrastructure. Source: WKCDA/Foster+
Partners, 2010.
15 Rendering of XRL. Source: ArchDaily, 2012.
16 Infrastructural Priorities of West Kowloon. Source: Drawn by Desmond
Choi, 2017, based on the LegCo documents, MTRC annual reports,
Buildings Departments plans, GoogleEarth 2017, and fieldwork between
2016 and 2018.
17 Completion of Buildings in West Kowloon. Source: Drawn by Desmond
Choi, 2017, based on the LegCo documents, MTRC annual reports,
Buildings Departments plans, GoogleEarth 2017, and fieldwork be-
tween 2016 and 2018.
18 Developers of the Buildings in West Kowloon. Source: Drawn by
Desmond Choi, 2017, based on the LegCo documents, MTRC annual
reports, Buildings Departments plans, GoogleEarth 2017, and fieldwork
between 2016 and 2018.
19 West Kowloon stakeholder diagram. Dissa Pidanti Raras, Ying Zhou
and Desmond Choi, 2019.
20 Kowloon Station Development. Source: Drawn by Desmond Choi,
2017, based on the LegCo documents, MTRC annual reports, Buildings
Departments plans, GoogleEarth 2017, and fieldwork between 2016
and 2018.
21 The Western Harbour Crossing Ventilation Building was for a decade
one of the only buildings in the WKCD. Source: Photograph by Ying
Zhou, 2016.
22 Xiqu Centre under construction. Source: Photograph by Desmond
Choi, 2016.
23 M+ under construction. Source: Photograph by Chi Yan Chan, 2019.
24 XRL under construction. Source: Photograph by Desmond Choi, 2016.
25 XRL’s construction coverage. Source: Drawn by Desmond, 2017, based
on the LegCo documents, MTRC annual reports, Buildings Departments
plans, GoogleEarth 2017, and fieldwork between 2016 and 2018.
26 XRL’s Jurisdictions. Source: Drawn by Desmond Choi, 2017, based on
the LegCo documents, MTRC annual reports, Buildings Departments
plans, GoogleEarth 2017, and fieldwork between 2016 and 2018.
27 West Kowloon’s Layers. Source: Drawn by Desmond Choi, 2017, based
on the LegCo documents, MTRC annual reports, Buildings Departments
plans, GoogleEarth 2017, and fieldwork between 2016 and 2018.
28 Vertical ownership. Source: Drawn by Desmond Choi, 2017.
29 The edge condition of Kowloon Station renders it an enclave. Source:
Photography by Ying Zhou, 2016.
30 Rooftop public space of Kowloon Station. Source: Photograph by Ying
Zhou, 2016.
31 WKCD waterfront. Source: Photograph by Chi Yan Chan, 2019.
32 WKCD Temporary Pavilion by New Office Works opened in 2019. Source:
Photograph by Chi Yan Chan, 2019.
33 West Kowloon’s Kowloon Station as role model for TODs. Source: Drawn
by Desmond Choi, 2019, Basemap: Google Earth, 2017.
34 Advertisement for Residences highlighting West Kowloon. Source:
Coronation, 2017.
35 The built fabric of the West Kowloon Reclamation viewed from Kowloon
Station. Source: Photography by Ying Zhou, 2016.
36 View of West Kowloon. Source: WKCDA.
REFERENCE CASE STUDY, P. 196
A Kowloon East. Source: Kai Tak Development Office.
MARINA BAY AREA
SINGAPORE
TIMELINE, P. 202–203 (by column)
I Master Plan 1958: Central Area Map. Source: URA.
I 1963 Koenigsberger Ring City Plan. Source: URA.
II 1971 Concept Plan. Source: URA.
III IM Pei & Kenzo Tange model. Source: URA.
III Marina South Reclamation 1985. Source: URA.
IV Suntec City. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019.
IV 1991 Concept Plan. Source: URA.
P. 204–205 (by column)
I Marina Bay land use plan 1992. This plan served as development guide
plan for the downtown core. Source: Image courtesy of URA. P.93 in
Urban System Studies, by Centre for Liveable Cities, 2016.
I Singapore is divided into 55 regional area. Source: Image courtesy of
Wiki Commons.
I 2001 Concept Plan. Source: URA.
II Esplanade Theatres on the Bay. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2018.
II 2003 Marina Bay Masterplan. Source: URA.
III Public space on the roof of Marina Barrage. Source: Anna Gasco, 2016.
III Marina Bay Sands. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2018.
III Master Plan 2014: Singapore River & Marina Bay. Source: URA.
IV Draft Master Plan 2019: Central Area Downtown Map. Source: URA.
IV Masterplan exhibition at URA Design Center. Source: Dissa Pidanti
Raras, 2019.
IV Draft Master Plan 2019: Central Area Downtown Map. Source: URA.
TRANSVERSAL MAPS, P. 206–217
The transversal maps of Marina Bay Area Portrait are drawn by Dissa Pidanti
Raras and Lei-Ya Wong and the axonometry was drawn by Dissa Pidanti
Raras and Lei-Ya Wong, in 2019 based on the following key sources:
→ URA Space web-based map portal: https://www.ura.gov.sg/maps/
→ 3D model made available by URA.
→ URA website for current and future plan: https://www.ura.gov.sg/
→ Other supporting map data copyrighted from OpenStreetMap contrib-
utors and available from https://www.openstreetmap.org
→ Fieldwork conducted by Kees Christiaanse and Lei-Ya Wong between
2015 and 2019.
SPECIFIC, P. 218–257
→  MBA–S.— (by image number)
01 Singapore Marina Bay Area. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019.
02 Marina Bay’s subsequent series of Grands Projets. Source: Dissa Pidanti
Raras, 2019. Sources photographs:
→ Suntec City, Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019.
→ Marina Square, https://stateofbuildings.sg/places/marina-square
→ Esplanade, Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2018.
→ Marina Bay Sands, Anna Gasco, 2018.
→ New CBD, Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019.
→ Marina Cruise Center, Wikimedia Commons, 2012, 7 [CC BY-SA 3.0
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Costa_Victoria_approaching_MBCCS.JPG
→ Millennia Walk Complex, http://dragages.com.sg/projects-post/millenia-
tower-and-millenia-walk-retail-mall/
→ The Flyer & Marina Bay Circuit, Zairon, 2015, Wikimedia Commons,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Singapore_Singapore_Flyer_
viewed_from_Marina_Bay_Sands_4.jpg
→ Float@Marina Bay, photo by CEphoto, Uwe Aranas, 2015, https://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Singapore_The-Float-at-Marina-
Bay-04.jpg
→ Marina South, Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019.
→ Garden by The Bay, by Shiny Things, 2012 https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/File:Supertree_Grove,_Gardens_by_the_Bay,_Singapore_
-_20120712-02.jpg
→ Straits View, Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019.
03 Timeline of interdependent developments shaping the planning of
Singapore. Source: Lei Ya Wong, 2017.
04 Singapore Land Reclamation. Source: Lei Ya Wong, 2017. Redrawn
based on:
→ http://blogs.ntu.edu.sg/hp331-2014-10/files/2014/11/map.jpg
→ https://books.google.com.sg/books?id=qSIJ2uKKs88C&pg=PA42&lpg=
PA42&dq=marina+east+reclamation&source=bl&ots=i9rJVWllm3&sig=
8IoUfWTZJz9b6uh2ksYCE-jlfRE&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage
&q=marina%20east%20reclamation&f=false
→ https://sgfilmhunter.wordpress.com/tag/intertidal/ | http://eresources.
nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_1096_2010-05-14.html
626 The Grand Projet
→ http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/singapore/mpa-signs-
s-2-4b-deal-for/1802502.html
→ https://books.google.com.sg/books?id=qSIJ2uKKs88C&pg=PA42&lpg=
PA42&dq=east+coast+reclamation+singapore&source=bl&ots=
i9rJX1ljh-&sig=RiVXZBkW08PrOAx22wt7vIouWqQ&hl=en&sa=
X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=east%20coast%20reclamation%20
singapore&f=false
05 1971 Concept Plan. Source: URA. https://www.jld.sg/Corporate/Planning
/Concept-Plan
06 Evolution of conception logics of the URA’s masterplans for the Marina
Bay area. Source: Lei Ya Wong and Dissa Raras, 2019. Redrawn based
on URA masterplans.
07 Singapore’s Strategic Development Evolution. Source: Lei Ya Wong and
Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019.
08 Marina Center Plan. Source: (URA).
09 Marina Center Development 1960s-2010s. Source: Marina Center Plans,
courtesy of Matthew van der Ploeg, FCL Magazine, 2015.
10 Underpass as an ‘in-between’ urban spaces in Marina Center. Source:
Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019.
11 Sky Garden, upper level extension functions as a connection between
Suntec City and Fountain of Wealth. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019.
12 Marina Bay Sands as landmark of Singapore. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras,
2018.
13 The iconic ‘Supertrees’ of Garden by The Bay. Source: Dissa Pidanti
Raras, 2018.
14 Plan for Marina South area as seen in model at the Singapore City Gallery
of the URA Centre. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019.
15 Marina Bay Area stakeholder diagram. Source: Kees Christiaanse, Naomi
C. Hanakata, Dissa Pidanti Raras, Lei Ya Wong, 2017.
16 Evolution of the tender system in Singapore. Source: Lei Ya Wong, 2017.
17 Evolution of the tender system in Singapore. Source: Lei Ya Wong, 2017.
18 Underground and Elevated Connection in Central Area. Source: Lei Ya
Wong and Dissa Raras, 2019.
19 Circulatory network of Raffles City and Marina Centre. Source: Courtesy
of Matthew van der Ploeg, FCL Magazine, 2015.
20 Privately-owned covered open space area of South Bank Tower Complex.
Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019.
21 Marina Reservoir as ‚Water Padang‘, activated with various spaces and
programmes. Source: Anna Gasco, 2018.
22 iLight festival, one of the initiatives to activate urban spaces in Singapore.
Source: Bernard Oh, 2012. https://www.flickr.com/photos/bernardoh
/6980179203/in/photolist-midMWh-bCPe4i-bCPhSv-bCPd3e-
bFNdu6-bCP2Ug-miaWvP-bCP3mF-bsTryu-bFNejX- 7Qg9zN-midixo-
bpTXS5-bppo3j-bsTp5Y-bFLPe6-micvoD-bppjuG-bppc8G-bppvcq-
mibMvF-amYPfb-bsTfnb-bppCSL-bCPf6i-bCP3ZV-nzYX3c-bpU6oA-
8JVFfa-­mieZxG-bCjhug-bCjoXT-niuowC-YkNMy4-2CLDzb-d3j5b9-
bpUgK1-5Dy8Nu-bCj9Ba-bCP4xD-8KKDX3-bpUfHY- 59Dosx-bCjn6p-
bppzcN-bpTY51-3aPGGo-59HA85-GyLeoN-57Nbxc/
23 Prudential Marina Bay Carnival, located at the Bayfront Event Space,
next to the Marina Bay Sands. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019.
24 Various landmarks in Marina Bay Area as icons of Singapore. Source:
Dissa Pidanti Raras, Anna Gasco, 2019.
25 Marina Bay Reservoir as the most prominent public space strip in Singapore.
Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019.
26 White Site land use within Marina Bay Area as shown at the Singapore
City Gallery of URA Center. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019.
27 Marina Center portrays the rigidity of urban spaces in the past. Source:
Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019.
28 Mix of heritage and contemporary building typology in Marina Bay.
Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019.
29 The public open space on the rooftop of Marina Barrage overlooking
the reservoir. Source: Anna Gasco, 2016.
REFERENCE CASE STUDY, P. 258–259
A One-North. Source: Image: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2019; The map is re-
drawn based on a plan provided by JTC, 2019.
B Jurong Lake District. Source: Image Courtesy of Jurong Lake District
Design Team: KCAP (lead consultant), S333, SAA, Arup, Lekker; The
map is redrawn based on Masterplan by Jurong Lake District Design
Team: KCAP (lead consultant), S333, SAA, Arup, Lekker.
HAFENCITY HAMBURG
TIMELINE, P. 264–265 (by column)
I Speicherstadt. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata.
I View along the Magdeburger Hafen with what is today’s Maritime Museum
in the back. Source: HafenCity.com © HHLA/Hamburger Fotoarchiv.
II Grasbrook. Source: Wiki Commons.
P. 266–267 (by column)
I Ministry of Urban Development and Environment Hamburg in Wilhelms­
burg. Source: The Grand Projet 2017.
III Heart of the Überseequartier: Überseeboulevard pedestrian zone. Source:
Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
IV Lohsepark with Erikkusspitze in the back. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
IV HafenCity Umweltzeichen. Source: HafenCity Hamburg GmbH
IV Elbtower design by David Chipperfield. Source: HafenCity Hamburg GmbH.
TRANSVERSAL MAPS, P. 268–279
The six transversal maps of the HafenCity Portrait were drawn by Dissa
Pidanti Raras and Naomi C. Hanakata and the axonometry of HafenCity
was drawn by Dissa Pidanti Raras, Felicia Lim and Naomi C. Hanakata, in
2018 all based on the following key source:
→ Fieldwork between 2015 and 2018.
→ Data received from HafenCity Hamburg GmbH.
→ Open Street Map.
→ Google Maps 2019.
SPECIFIC, P. 280–321
→  HC–H.— (by image number)
01 Project Overview. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
02 Hamburg 1880 with the entire area of today’s HafenCity within the city’s
boundaries. Source: Open source.
03 Hamburg 1886 with new border to the port. Source: Open source.
04 Speicherstadt inbetween the old city (right) and the site of HafenCity
(left. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017).
05 Shipping Container in the port of Hamburg. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata
2017.
06 Aerial view of port area in 1990s. Source: HafenCity Hamburg GmbH.
07 Sketch by Gerkan, Marg & Partner (GMP). Source: Hamburg, sein Hafen
und die HafenCity. 5. Arbeitsheft zur HafenCity, Gerd Kähler, and Sandra
Schürmann, eds. 2010. ‘Spuren Der Geschichte’. HafenCity Hamburg
GmbH, p. 86.
08 View from the Magdeburger Hafen towards the Dar-es-Salaam-Platz
with a view on the Speicherstadt in the back and Project 34/1 Arabica
on the left. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
09 View through Lohsepark towards the Ericusspitze. Source: Naomi C.
Hanakata, 2017.
10 Schematic drawing of the noise absorbing HafenCity window. Source:
Dissa Pidanti Raras, adapted from hafencity-fenster.de
11 First masterplan for HafenCity by Hamburg Plan, 2000. Source: Hafen­
City Hamburg GmbH.
12 Diagram showing the different urban qualities and spatial relations of
the proposal. Source: Gesellschaft für Hafen- und Standortentwicklung
mbH. 1999. ‘Städtebaulicher Wettbewerb —Das Ergebnis’. Gesellschaft
für Hafen- und Standortentwicklung mbH, page 8.
13 Schematic section through Baakenhafen showing the flood protection
mound principle. Source: Drawing: Dissa Raras Pidanti, adapted from
Themen Quartier Projekte, HafenCity, March 2017, p. 63; Photographs:
Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
14 Altes Hafenamt with the original entrance and street level in the front and
the new, elevated street level in the back. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
15 Site plan showing the dyke line, the protected city and the flood exposed
other areas. Source Plan: Dissa Raras Pidanti, Naomi C. Hanakata.
SourceS Included images:
→ Dar-es-salaam: https://archiv.­quartier-magazin.com/quartier14/ortstermin
→ Marcopolo: https://cityseeker.com/hamburg/668104-marco-polo-terrasse
→ Magellan: https://www.hafencity.com/de/konzepte/die-freiraeume-
der-westlichen-­hafencity.html.
627 Appendix
16 Temporary uses in Lohsepark. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
17 Build up ratio of the site without waterbodies (top) and build up ratio of
the site including waterbodies (bottom). Source: Naomi C. Hanakata,
Dissa Raras Pidanti, 2019.
18 View towards the Magellan Terrassen and the Coffee Plaza showing the
generous open space created through the water bodies on site. Source:
Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
19 Realized and planned special landmarks of HafenCity and an initial
diagram by Kees Christiaanse indicating their strategic location. Source:
3D based on data received from Hafen­City Hamburg GmbH. Sources
photographs:
→ Ericus­spitze: http://www.abg-gruppe.de/en/references/office/hamburg/
hamburg-ericusspitze.html
→ Intelligent Quarters: http://hochhauswelten.blogspot.com/2015/01/
hamburg-­intelligent-quarters-70m.html (Photo Courtesy of Störmer
Murphy and Partners).
→ HafenCity University — https://www.baunetz.de/meldungen/Meldungen-
Hafencity-Universitaet_von_Code_Unique_4003375.html (Photo
Courtesy of Robert Gommlich).
→ Baakenhafen: https://hafencity.com/de/konzepte/quartier-baakenhafen.
html
→ The Elb Tower: https://www.metalocus.es/en/news/david-chipperfield-
wins-elbtower-competition-hamburg (Rendering of David Chipperfield
Architects in Berlin).
→ Uberseequartier: https://www.unibail-rodamco-westfield.de/en/portfolio
/ueberseequartier/
→ Elbphilharmonie: https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/
augmented-reality/what-perfect-sound-looks-like/?utm_term=.
63c0f97930a6
20 Changes in the masterplan for HafenCity between 2000 and 2010. Source:
Naomi C. Hanakata based on material from Hafen­City Hamburg GmbH
including Adaptability and Inclusiveness of Urban Transformation, Prof.
Jürgen Bruns-Berentelg, Hamburg, September 2017.
21 Revised masterplan for HafenCity, status: 2018. Source: HafenCity
Hamburg GmbH.
22 Comparison between first (2000) and second (2010) masterplan and
its translation into a land use plan in 2017. Studio Joost Grootens redrawn
based on: Adaptability and Inclusiveness of Urban Transformation, Prof.
Jürgen Bruns-Berentelg, Hamburg, September 2017, page 6.
23 View form the Elbphilharmonie towards Sandtorkai and Magellan
Terrassen. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
24 Types of plans and planning stages. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2019.
25 Different neighbourhood foci and characteristics. Source: 3D based on
data received from Hafen­City Hamburg GmbH; Dissa Raras Pidanti
and Naomi C. Hanakata based on data from HafenCity Hamburg GmbH.
2017. ‘Themes Quarters Projects (27)’, 2018.
26 Distribution and origin of developers. Source: Dissa Raras Pidanti based
on data from HafenCity.com, 2018.
27 Phasing diagram of HafenCity development with key buildings and
infrastructures. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata based on fieldwork and
data from HafenCity Hamburg GmbH. 2017. ‘Themes Quarters Projects
(27)’.
28 Implementation and adaptation of sustainability criteria. Source:
Dissa Raras Pidanti 2018, Adapted from HafenCity: Adaptability and
Inclusiveness of Urban Transformation, Prof. Jürgen Bruns-Berentelg,
Singapore, September 2017, page 16.
29 View along Kaiserkai displaying the coherent ground floor height and
opening ratios. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
30 HafenCity stakeholder diagram. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2019, based
on interviews and fieldwork.
31 Regional connectivity and impact of HafenCity. Source Plan: Dissa Raras
Pidanti and Naomi C. Hanakata, 2018. Sources photographs:
→ Hamburg City Center: flickr.com by ‘o’ wie obacht.
→ Billebogen: http://www.henn.com/en/projects/urban-design/new-
huckepackbahnhof, Photo Courtesy of HENN
→ Kleiner Grasbrook: https://www.germanpulse.com/2015/03/16/ham-
burg-beats-out-berlin-as-2024-olympic-candidate-city/, Image Courtesy
of Architekten von Gerkan, Marg und Partner (gmp)
→ IBA Hamburg: http://zillerplus.de/project/smart/?lang=en, Image
Courtesy of zillerplus Architekten und Stadtplaner.
32 Aerial view of Billebogen with Huckepackbahnhof. Source: Hamburg.
de Behörde für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt; Spengler Wiescholek
Architekten und Stadtplaner, WES GmbH Landschaftsarchitekten, Urban
Catalyst Studio; Visualization: Mokka-studio, Luftbild Matthias Friedel.
33 Map of IBA Hamburg projects. Source: iba-hamburg.de
34 Logo of IBA Hamburg. Source: iba-hamburg.de
35 Entrance to one of the many culturally active institutions located within
Oberhafen. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
36 View towards the Southern Überseequartier, which has just started con-
struction. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
REFERENCE CASE STUDY, P. 322
A IBA. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
LA DÉFENSE PARIS
TIMELINE, P. 328–329 (by column)
I The site of La Défense in 1950’s. Source: EPAD Archives.
I The site of La Défense in 1973. Source: EPAD Archives.
I Projet La Défense model published in L’Architecture d’Aujourd’hui, n.97,
September 1961. Source: EPAD Archives.
II The CNIT in 1960. Source: EPAD Archives.
II EPAD boudary in 1958. Source: EPAD Archives.
II EPAD’s first masterplan, 1964. Source: EPAD Archives.
III Tour Initiale, former Tour Nobel by de Mailly & Depussé and engineered
by Jean Prouvé in 1966. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
III Model of Zone A, showing site contours, Boulevard Circulaire, road
networks and pedestrian deck, 1960. Source: EPAD Archives.
III Entrance to La Défense multimodal station. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
IV Tower Fiat by Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (SOM), 1974. Source: EPAD
Archives.
IV The red spider “Le Calder de La Défense”. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
P. 330–331 (by column)
I Tour Total, former tour Elf. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
I Les Quatres Temps shoping centre. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
I La Grande Arche. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
II Coeur Défense designed by Jean-Paul Viguier and built in 2001. Source:
Anna Gasco, 2017.
II La Terrasses, view towards La Grande. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
III Renewal taking place in Paris La Défense. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
III La Défense Seine Arche territory. Source: EPADESA 2016.
IV The ramp within les Jardins de l’Arche. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
IV The U-Arena within les Jardins de l’Arche. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
TRANSVERSAL MAPS, P. 332–343
The transversal maps of La Défense Portrait are drawn by Dissa Pidanti
Raras, Anna Gasco and Felicia Lim and the axonometry was drawn by Dissa
Pidanti Raras, Felicia Lim and Anna Gasco, in 2019 based on the following
key sources:
→ The Paris La Défense website listing current and future projects: https://
amenagement.parisladefense.com
→ The Defacto “Atlas de La Défense, Phase Diagnostique” of 2012, made
available by AWP Agence de Reconfiguration Territoriale: Project leader:
AWP Agence de Reconfiguration Territoriale, consultant: HHF, bet:
OTEIS, LEA, Jonction.
→ Les Groues Plan Guide by EPADESA. 2016, accessed via de Paris La Défense
website :https://fr.calameo.com/read/00398144105d3a711cb51.
→ The Géoportail website for the pre-Intervention Site Plan of 1959: https://
www.geoportail.gouv.fr
→ Fieldwork conducted by Anna Gasco between 2015 and 2019.
SPECIFIC, P. 344–385
→ LD–P.— (by image number)
01 Paris La Défense. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
02 The Arc de Triomphe seen from La Défense. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
628 The Grand Projet
03 Site Location: Ile-de-France. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, Lei Ya Wong
and Anna Gasco, 2019. Adapted from The Defacto “Atlas de La Défense,
Phase Diagnostique” of 2012, made available by AWP Agence de Recon­
figuration Territoriale: Project leader: AWP Agence de Reconfiguration
Territoriale, consultant: HHF, bet: OTEIS, LEA, Jonction, planche 12.
04 Site Location : Local Authorities. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, Lei Ya Wong
and Anna Gasco, 2019. Adapted from The Defacto “Atlas de La Défense,
Phase Diagnostique” of 2012, made available by AWP Agence de Recon­
figuration Territoriale: Project leader: AWP Agence de Reconfiguration
Territoriale, consultant: HHF, bet: OTEIS, LEA, Jonction, planche 15.
05 The site of La Défense in 1973. Source: EPAD Archives.
06 Urban renewal taking place in 2017 within La Défense Quartier Saisons.
Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
07 The Grande Arche viewed from Les Terrasses in Nanterre. Source: Anna
Gasco, 2017.
08 La Défense Seine Arche Territory. Source: EPADESA 2016.
09 La Défense Seine Arche Strategy 2025, a polycentric territory. Source:
EPADESA 2016.
10 Built Development Timeline: Zone A & Zone B. Source: Dissa Pidanti
Raras, Anna Gasco and Lei Ya Wong, 2019. Adapted from The Defacto
“Atlas de La Défense, Phase Diagnostique” of 2012, made available
by AWP Agence de Reconfiguration Territoriale: Project leader: AWP
Agence de Reconfiguration Territoriale, consultant: HHF, bet: OTEIS,
LEA, Jonction, planches 24–30.
11 EPAD’s first masterplan, 1964. Source: EPAD Archives.
12 The old residential blocks of the Quartier Boieldieu (the first one to be
developed), the quartier Corolles and the quartier Saisons (here photo-
graphed) still form an integral part of today’s urban landscape. Source:
Anna Gasco, 2017.
13 Retail along the ground floor of the Quartier Boieldieu. Source: Anna
Gasco, 2017.
14 Semi private space in the Quartier Saisons. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
15 Bridge to acces La Défense Quarter Saisons. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
16 Zone A: Deck Pedestrian Access. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras and Anna
Gasco, 2019. Redrawn based on The Defacto “Atlas de La Défense, Phase
Diagnostique” of 2012, made available by AWP Agence de Recon­figuration
Territoriale: Project leader: AWP Agence de Reconfiguration Territoriale,
consultant: HHF, bet: OTEIS, LEA, Jonction, planches 24–30.
17 Border created by the Blv Circulaire near the Quartier Boieldieu. Source:
Anna Gasco, 2017.
18 Border of the pedestrian Deck next to the Grande Arche. Source: Anna
Gasco, 2017.
19 Zone A: Key Open Spaces & Artefacts. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras and
Anna Gasco, 2019. Redrawn based on The Defacto “Atlas de La Défense,
Phase Diagnostique” of 2012, made available by AWP Agence de Recon­
figuration Territoriale: Project leader: AWP Agence de Reconfiguration
Territoriale, consultant: HHF, bet: OTEIS, LEA, Jonction, planche 59.
20 Artefacts in La Défense Open Spaces. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
21 The Deck’s various differences of levels. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
22 Zone A: Underground Land Use & Network. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras
and Anna Gasco, 2019. Redrawn based on The Defacto “Atlas de La
Défense, Phase Diagnostique” of 2012, made available by AWP Agence
de Recon­figuration Territoriale: Project leader: AWP Agence de Recon­
figuration Territoriale, consultant: HHF, bet: OTEIS, LEA, Jonction’,
planches 203, 207.
23 Differentiation of flows. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
24 Buildings Generations Timeline: Heights. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras
and Anna Gasco, 2019.
25 Buildings Generations Timeline: Footprints. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras
and Anna Gasco, 2019.
26 From 1960’s to today: a time capsule of architectural styles. Source:
Anna Gasco, 2017.
27 La Grande Arche. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
28 Renewal of La Défense’s pedestrian deck. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
29 Downgrade of the Boulevard Circulaire towards the commune of Courbe­
voie to include pedestrian side-walks, cyclist, landscape and open spaces.
Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
30 Gentle continuous ramp (designed by AWP Agence de Reconfiguration
Territoriale) and linking the Deck to Les Jardins de l’Arche in Nanterre.
Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
31 The refurbished CNIT with access to Coeur Transport in the centre of
the Esplanade de la Grande Arche. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
32 Existing & Future Regional Rail Transport. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras,
Lei Ya Wong and Anna Gasco, 2019. Adapted from:
→ https://www.ateliers.org/media/workshop/documents/1_presentation
_eng_defense2050_2.pdf
→ https://www.societedugrandparis.fr/info/grand-paris-express-largest-
transport-project-europe-1061
→ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grand_Paris_Express
33 Les Terrasses in Nanterre. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
34 Paris La Défense-Seine Arche: Projects Areas and Focus. Source: Dissa
Pidanti Raras and Anna Gasco, 2019. Data drawn from The Paris-La
Défense website listing current and future projects: https://amenagement.
parisladefense.com/la-carte-des-projets/projets.html
35 Les Jardins de l’Arche in Nanterre. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
36 Governance Perimetre Timeline. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, Anna
Gasco and Lei Ya Wong, 2019.
37 La Défense stakeholder diagram. Source: Anna Gasco, 2019.
38 Diverse community: Esplanade Charles de Gaulle in Nanterre, connected
to Les Terrasses. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
39 Signalisation boards within Paris La Défense. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
40 La Defense-Seine Arche: Key Owners by Sector & Origin. Source: Dissa
Pidanti Raras and Anna Gasco, 2019. Partly adapted from The Defacto
“Atlas de La Défense, Phase Diagnostique” of 2012, made available
by AWP Agence de Reconfiguration Territoriale: Project leader: AWP
Agence de Reconfiguration Territoriale, consultant: HHF, bet: OTEIS,
LEA, Jonction’, planche 42.
41 Users within La Défense. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
42 View towards Paris’ historical centre from La Grande Arche’s roof.
Source: Guilhem Vellut, 2017, taken from Flickr.com
REFERENCE CASE STUDIES, P. 386–387
A Paris Rive Gauche. Source: Nicolas Rougé, 2006.
B Île Seguin. Source: Nicolas Rougé, 2011.
22@ BARCELONA
TIMELINE, P. 392–394 (by column)
I Barcelona Map, 1718. Source: Poblenou Heritage Plan 2006, City Council
of Barcelona.
I Cerdà Topographical Study, 1855. Source: Poblenou Heritage Plan 2006,
City Council of Barcelona.
II Cerdà Plan, 1859. Source: Poblenou Heritage Plan 2006, City Council
of Barcelona.
II The ‘Catalan Manchester’, 1935. BCNROC, City Council of Barcelona.
III General Plan for the International Exhibition, 1888. Source: BCNROC,
City Council Barcelona.
III Jaussely Plan, 1907. Source: BCNROC, City Council of Barcelona.
IV Macià Plan, 1935. Source: Macia Plan, F.L.C, Adagp, Paris, 1935
IV Regional Plan of Barcelona, 1953. Source: Poblenou Heritage Plan 2006,
City Council of Barcelona.
P. 395–396 (by column)
I General Metropolitan Plan (PGM), 1976. Source: Poblenou Heritage Plan
2006, City Council of Barcelona.
I Former rail workshop converted into Clot Park, 2001. Source: Pablo
Acebillo, 2017.
II Olympic Village, 1992. BCNROC, City Council of Barcelona.
II Before (1996,Left) and after (1999, Right) Diagonal Avenue extension.
BCNROC, City Council of Barcelona.
III 22@ site perimeter in dashed line. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2017.
III Glories Tower. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2017.
IV Audiovisual Campus, University Pompeu Fabra. Source: Pablo Acebillo,
2017.
TRANSVERSAL MAPS, P. 396–407
The six transversal maps of the 22@ Portrait were drawn by Pablo Acebillo
629 Appendix
and the axonometry of 22@ was drawn by Pablo Acebillo and Dissa Pidanti
Raras, in 2019 based on the following key source:
→ Fieldwork between 2015 and 2019.
→ Cadmapper open source, 2018.
→ CartoBCN open source, City Council of Barcelona, 2018.
→ BCNROC open source, City Council of Barcelona, 2018.
→ Poblenou Heritage Plan 2006, City Council of Barcelona, 2018.
→ MPGM per a la renovació de les àrees industrials del Poblenou, Generalitat
de Catalunya, 2000.
→ Metropolitan Transport of Barcelona (TMB), 2018.
→ Bicing, City Council of Barcelona, 2018.
→ Data sent by Carmen Marzo, Urban Planning Department, City Council
of Barcelona, 2017.
→ Data sent by Juan Carlos Montiel, Barcelona Regional, City Council of
Barcelona, 2018.
SPECIFIC, P. 408–448
→ 22@–B.— (by image number)
01 Past, present and future. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2017.
02 Context. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018 based on ‘AMB Geoportal de Car­
tografia’ open source, Area Metropolitana de Barcelona.
03 First Settlements. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018 based on ‘Topographi­cal
study by Ildefons Cerdà in Barcelona surroundings’, ‘MPGM per a la reno­
vació de les àrees industrials del Poblenou, Generalitat de Catalunya,
2000’.
04 Cerdà Plan. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018 based on ‘BCNROC’ open
source, City Council of Barcelona.
05 Three Periods of Urban Renewal. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018 based
on ‘AMB Geoportal de Cartografia’ open source, Area Metropolitana de
Barcelona and data from Lluís Domènech, Barcelona Regional, 2004.
06 Rondas along the waterfront. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
07 Surrounding Urban Development. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018 based
on ‘AMB Geoportal de Cartografia’ open source, Area Metropolitana de
Barcelona.
08 Diagonal Avenue extension beyond Glories Square. Source: Pablo
Acebillo, 2018.
09 Forum Area. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
10 Warehouse for construction materials in 22@. Source: Pablo Acebillo,
2018.
11 Social housing. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
12 Planning Tools. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
13 Industrial building reused as loft. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
14 Existing housing. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
15 Publicly Driven Plans. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2017 based on ‘CartoBCN’
open source, City Council of Barcelona and data from Carmen Marzo,
City Council of Barcelona, April 2017 and ‘MPGM per a la renovació de
les àrees industrials del Poblenou, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2000’.
16 Audio-visual Campus. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
17 Llacuna Axis. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
18 Llull – Pujades West. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
19 Llull – Pujades East. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
20 Central Park. Source: ‘Mobilitat i Transport’, City Council of Barcelona, 2017.
21 Perú – Pere IV. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
22 Audio-visual Campus along Roc Boronat street. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
23 Rates Alley Block Plan. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2017 based on ‘CartoBCN’
open source, City Council of Barcelona and data from Carmen Marzo,
City Council of Barcelona, April 2017 and ‘PMU de l’illa delimitada pels
carrers d’Álaba, de Tanger, de Sancho d’Ávila i de Pamplona (Passatge
Ratés), Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2006’.
24 Initial plot structure. Source: ‘PMU de l’illa delimitada pels carrers d’Álaba,
de Tanger, de Sancho d’Ávila i de Pamplona (Passatge Ratés), Ajuntament
de Barcelona, 2006’.
25 New plot structure/land use. Source: ‘PMU de l’illa delimitada pels car-
rers d’Álaba, de Tanger, de Sancho d’Ávila i de Pamplona (Passatge Ratés),
Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2006’.
26 Proposed planning envelope. Source: ‘PMU de l’illa delimitada pels car-
rers d’Alaba, de Tanger, de Sancho d’Ávila i de Pamplona (Passatge Ratés),
Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2006’.
27 Proposed building envelope. Source: ‘PMU de l’illa delimitada pels car-
rers d’Alaba, de Tanger, de Sancho d’Ávila i de Pamplona (Passatge Ratés),
Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2006’.
28 Transformation process for a Block Plan. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2019.
29 Conditions. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018 based on ‘CartoBCN’ open
source, City Council of Barcelona and data from Carmen Marzo, City
Council of Barcelona, April 2017.
30 Industrial building to be reused as office space in Sancho de Ávila street.
Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
31 UOC University placed in a former textile factory. Source: Pablo Acebillo,
2017.
32 Traditional block configuration in the city centre. Source: Pablo Acebillo,
2017.
33 Open block configuration in 22@. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
34 22@ stakeholder diagram. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2019.
35 Transformation Mechanisms. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2019 including
image from ‘PMU a l’illa delimitada pels carrers del Doctor Trueta, Roc
Boronat, Ciutat de Granada i Passatge Mas de Roda (Farinera La Fama),
Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2004’ and image from Pablo Acebillo, 2017.
36 Reconversion of a sugar factory into lofts. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
37 Clustering of Activities. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2017 based on ‘CartoBCN’
open source and data from Carmen Marzo, City Council of Barcelona,
April 2017 and ‘P.E. de Redistribucio de sols de cessin (22@hs i 7@)
dels PERIS: Sancho de Avila, Ciutat de Granada, Almogàvers i Badajoz ​
— Cristobal de Moura, Veneçuela, Agricultura i Josep Pla — Pere IV, Roc
Boronat, Pallars i Ciutat de Granada, Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2002’.
38 Blocks involved in the clustering. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018 based on
‘CartoBCN’ open source, City Council of Barcelona and data from Carmen
Marzo, City Council of Barcelona, April 2017.
39 Opening up of Marroc street on land previosuly occupied by a seeds fac-
tory Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
40 Public space in ‘Llull – Pujades East’ Publicly Driven Plan. Source: Pablo
Acebillo, 2018.
41 Vacant plot with heritage building to be reused as lofts in ‘Perú– Pere IV’
Publicly Driven Plan. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
42 Open space ownership. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018 based on ‘CartoBCN’
open source, City Council of Barcelona and data from Carmen Marzo,
City Council of Barcelona on April 2017.
43 Public courtyard with heritage structures and public facilities. Source:
Pablo Acebillo, 2017.
44 Regeneration as a spill — over effect. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2019 based
on ‘CartoBCN’ open source, City Council of Barcelona and data from
Carmen Marzo, City Council of Barcelona, April 2017.
45 University Campus for the Engineering Faculty in the Forum Area. Source:
Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
46 A new economic downtown for the city. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2017.
47 UOC University strengthening the educational hub in the district. Source:
Pablo Acebillo, 2017.
48 Inner courtyard of the Pompeu Fabra University facilitating synergies
between industry and academia. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2017.
REFERENCE CASE STUDIES, P. 449–451
A Forum Area. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
B Sagrera Station. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2017.
C Europe Square. Source: Pablo Acebillo, 2018.
KING’S CROSS LONDON
TIMELINE, P. 456–457 (by column)
I King’s Cross site around 1850. Source: https://www.kingscross.co.uk/
I The gasholders were originally constructed in 1860–67 and enlarged in
1879–80. Source: Hisano Luttman.
II The Granary Building, Watercolour signed by Lewis Cubitt. Source:
National Railway Museum/Pictorial Collection/Science & Society
Picture Library.
II The Greater Northern Hotel. Source: https://www.kingscross.co.uk/
II The area in 1862. Allies and Morrison Architects, Porphyrios Associates,
and Townshend Landscape Architects. Source: ‘King’s Cross Central
Urban Design Statement.’ London, 2004, p29.
630 The Grand Projet
III The area in 1894. Allies and Morrison Architects, Porphyrios Associates,
and Townshend Landscape Architects. Source: ‘King’s Cross Central
Urban Design Statement.’ London, 2004, p29.
III Inauguration of the Midland Grand Hotel fronting St Pancras Station.
Source: Anna Gasco, 2016.
IV Transformation of the Coal Drops Yard in 2017, where former Bagley’s
nightclub used to be located. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
IV LCR’s proposals from SOM masterplan in 1989. Source: SOM.
P. 458–459 (by column)
I LCR’s proposals from Foster masterplan in 1989. Source: Foster & Partners.
II The area in 1999. Allies and Morrison Architects, Porphyrios Associates,
and Townshend Landscape Architects. Source: ‘King’s Cross Central
Urban Design Statement.’ London, 2004, p29.
III St Pancras International Station, east side entrance from Pancras Road.
Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
III KCCLP logo. Source: https://www.kingscross.co.uk/
III Granary Square. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
IV Urbanest students housing. Source: Anna Gasco, 2016.
IV Rubicon Court building. Source: John Sturrock.
IV Source: www.google.com
TRANSVERSAL MAPS, P. 460–465
The transversal maps of King’s cross were drawn by Dissa Pidanti Raras
and Anna Gasco and the axonometry was drawn by Dissa Pidanti Raras,
Lei Ya Wong and Anna Gasco, in 2019 based on the following key sources:
→ Allies and Morrison Architects, Porphyrios Associates, and Townshend
Landscape Architects. ‘King’s Cross Central Urban Design Statement.’
London, 2004.
→ Google Maps 2019.
→ Open Street Maps 2019.
→ Fieldwork conducted by Anna Gasco between 2015 and 2019.
SPECIFIC, P. 466–505
→ KX–L.— (by image number)
01 Granary Square in King’s Cross Central. Source: Anna Gasco, 2016.
02 King’s Cross Central within the London Central Activities. Source: Lei
Ya Wong and Anna Gasco, 2019 - Data drawn and map adapted from:
London Plan March 2015, Page 74, Map 2.3 CAZ Diagram.
03 Pre-Existing Border Condition and View Corridors In 2007. Source:
Anna Gasco, Dissa Pidanti Raras and Lei Ya Wong, 2019 - Data drawn
and map adapted from: Allies and Morrison Architects, Porphyrios
Associates, and Townshend Landscape Architects. ‘King’s Cross Central
Urban Design Statement’. London, 2004, figure 18, p23.
04 Communities in London and Index of Multiple. Source: Lei Ya Wong
and Anna Gasco, 2019—Data drawn from and map adapted from: Depart-
ment for Communities and Local Government, Indices of Deprivation
2015.
05 National & International Transport Node. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras,
Lei Ya Wong and Anna Gasco, 2019.
06 Regional Transport Node. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, Lei Ya Wong
and Anna Gasco, 2019.
07 King’s Cross Station New Ticket Hall by John McAslan + Partners. Source:
Anna Gasco, 2017.
08 King’s Cross Station Renovated Square. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
09 Opportunity and Intensification Areas in London: Scale, Employment
and Homes Provision. Source: Lei Ya Wong and Anna Gasco, 2019—
Data drawn from: The London Plan, 2015.
10 Spatial Framework Overview. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, Anna Gasco
and Lei Ya Wong, 2019.
11 Timeline towards the planning brief, the planning application & the com-
munity consultation. Source: Anna Gasco, 2019, the book covers included
in the timeline collage were extracted from the following reports:
→ Camden, and Islington. ‘King’s Cross Opportunity Area Planning &
Development Brief ’. Planning Brief. London, January 2004.
→ Allies and Morrison Architects, Porphyrios Associates, and Townshend
Landscape Architects. ‘King’s Cross Central Urban Design Statement’.
London, 2004.
→ Allies and Morrison Architects, Porphyrios Associates, and Townshend
Landscape Architects. ‘King’s Cross Central Urban Design Guidelines’.
London, 2004.
12 Conserved heritage buildings and future functions. Source: Dissa Pidanti
Raras, Lei Ya Wong and Anna Gasco, 2019.
13 The Fish & Coal building restored into the office HQ of British designer
Tom Dixon. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
14 The Gasholders restored into a public park as well as luxury residential
apartments by Argent with Wilkinson Eyre Architects. Source: Anna
Gasco, 2017.
15 Public Realm & Mobility Framework. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, Lei
Ya Wong and Anna Gasco, 2019.
16 King’s Cross Central Urban Design Statement: Urban Design Principles
of Connections: 2007 situation (left), proposed situation (right). Source:
Allies and Morrison Architects, Porphyrios Associates, and Townshend
Landscape Architects. ‘King’s Cross Central Urban Design Statement’.
London, 2004, figure 30, 33.
17 King’s Boulevard. Source: Anna Gasco, 2016.
18 St Pancras Square. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
19 Regent’s Canal with the Canal Side Steps. Source: Anna Gasco, 2016.
20 Wharf Road Gardens. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
21 Lewis Cubitt Park. Source: Anna Gasco, 2016.
22 Battle Bridge Place in front of King’s Cross Station linking to King’s
Boulevard. Source: Anna Gasco, 2016.
23 Development Zones. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras and Anna Gasco, 2019.
24 Building envelope definition by development specification & urban
design guidelines. Source: Allies and Morrison Architects, Porphyrios
Associates, and Townshend Landscape Architects. ‘King’s Cross Central
Urban Design Statement’. London, 2004, figure 69.
25 Diversity of Architectural Styles in King’s Cross Central. Source: Anna
Gasco, 2017.
26 Program Distribution. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, Lei Ya Wong and
Anna Gasco, 2019.
27 Active Ground Floors along Stable Street. Source: Anna Gasco, 2016.
28 Granary Square. Source: Anna Gasco, 2016.
29 King’s Cross Central Ownership Timeline Evolution. Source: Anna
Gasco, 2019.
30 Model within Argent’s Marketing Suite, with white buildings waiting to
be acquired. Source: Anna Gasco, 2018.
31 King’s Cross stakeholder diagram. Source: Anna Gasco, 2019.
32 Political Timeline in relation to Reference Grands Projets in London
Source: Anna Gasco and Lei Ya Wong, 2019.
33 The King’s Cross Pond temporary use in June 2016, closed since October
2016 to make way for a public park, despite calls by the community to
keep it. Source: Anna Gasco, 2016.
34 The public viewing point towers spread across King’s Cross Central en-
able to monitor the neighbourhood evolution. Source: Anna Gasco, 2016.
35 Children playing on the fountains of Granary Square. Source: Anna
Gasco, 2017.
36 Board for one of the many activities organised by the KCCLP events
team. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
37 Map of 7 Neighbourhoods. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras and Anna Gasco,
2019.
38 Luxury Gasholders Apartment Marketing Suite. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
39 King’s Cross Welcome Sign on York Road, along the edges of the new
development. Source: Anna Gasco, 2016.
40 Live Wimbledon match screening on on the banks of Regents Canal
along Granary Square in King’s Cross Central. Source: Anna Gasco, 2016.
REFERENCE CASE STUDIES, P. 506–509
A Canary Wharf. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
B Broadgate. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
C Paddington. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
D Battersea Nine-Elms. Source: Spectacle Archive, 2018.
631 Appendix
 CREDITS
FURTHER INSIGHTS
COMPARATIVE ASPECTS
CONCLUSION
FURTHER INSIGHTS
THE MAKING OF MARINA BAY, P. 513–518
→ GP–FI.— (by image number)
Source (01–09): All illustrations and plans © Urban Redevelopment Au­
thority. All rights reserved.
01 Phasing of reclamation works showing the initial reclamation in 1967–
1974 to support construction of the East Coast Parkway and later phases
for the extension of the existing Central Business District.
02 Reclamation works underway at Marina East (foreground) and Marina
South in the 1980s.
03 The contrasting Master Plans for Marina Bay in the early 1980s by Kenzo
Tange and I.M. Pei.
04 The ArtScience Museum at Marina Bay Sands on the ‘promontory’ site
along the eastern edge of Marina Bay intended for a landmark building.
05 Extract from the 1992 publication “Downtown Core & Portview De­vel­opment
Guide Plans (Draft)” showing Marina City Park as a permanent feature of
the Master Plan and substantial park spaces along the waterfront.
06 Extract from “New Downtown: Ideas for The City of Tomorrow” (1996)
showing the potential long-term development for the entire reclaimed land.
07 Extract from the 1997 Planning Report publication “Downtown Core
(Central & Bayfront Subzones), Straits View and Marina South Planning
Areas” reflecting the zoning of the Straits View and Marina South areas
as Reserve Sites, to be developed over a longer term.
08 The Master Plan 2003 (above) and Master Plan 2008 (below), showing
the extended Park zoning for the Gardens by The Bay.
09 Marina Bay, the live-work-play extension of Singapore’s business and
financial district.
CONTINUING MARUNOUCHI, P. 525–530
→ GP–FI.— (by image number)
10 Urban blocks “Iccho-New York” in Marunouchi (1920’s). Source: Mit­
subishi Estate.
11 Urban attributes defined in the Development Guidelines — Zones, Axes,
and Subcenters. Source: Mitsubishi Jisho Sekkei.
12 A Directory map in Marunouchi. Source: Mitsubishi Jisho Sekkei.
13 Lighting strategies in Marunouchi. Source: “Lighting Guide Book”, Mit­
subishi Estate.
14 Maru-Cube: Podium of Marunouchi Building. Source: Kokyu Miwa.
15 Maru-Cube: Interior view of Maru-Cube. Source: Martin Holtkamp.
16 The Industry Club of Japan Building: Perspective. Source: Kokyu Miwa.
17 The Industry Club of Japan Building: Section diagram. Source: Kokyu Miwa.
18 Meiji Life Insurance Headquarters. Source: Kawasumi-Kobayashi Kenji
Photograph Office.
19 Mitsubishi Ichigokan and Marunouchi Park Building. Source: Taisuke Ogawa.
20 Tokyo Central Post Office and JP Tower. Source: Taisuke Ogawa.
632 The Grand Projet 633 Appendix
21 Minato Mirai district and Grand Mall Park. Source: Forward Stroke Inc.
22 Dai Nagoya Building. Source: Kawasumi-Kobayashi Kenji Photograph
Office.
23 Grand Front Osaka. Source: SS Osaka Co.,Ltd.
COMPARATIVE ASPECTS
THE ‘BORDERING’ PRACTICES OF GRANDS PROJETS, P. 539–550
→ GP–BO.— (by image number)
01 The Speicherstadt in HafenCity in Hamburg. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata,
2017.
02 Grands Projets urban-bordering practices: border types and qualities.
Source: Anna Gasco & Dissa Raras Pidanti, 2019
03 Liujiazu in Shanghai. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017
04 Children playing and community gathering at King’s Cross Granary
Square, alongside the KCCLP partnership security guard. Source: Anna
Gasco 2017
05 Canary Wharf in its larger regional context (London building centre’s
Physical model). Source: Anna Gasco, 2017
06 Canary Wharf, non-active ground floors. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017
07 Accessing the deck of La Défense in Paris. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017
08 Marina Bay central business district viewed from Esplanade drive. Source:
Dissa Raras Pidanti, 2019
09 New bridge between HafenCity and the old city centre of Hamburg.
Source: Anna Gasco 2017.
10 West Kowloon Cultural Centre in Hong Kong. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017
11 King’s Cross in London, border towards York Way and the new project.
Source: Anna Gasco, 2017
URBAN CATALYSTS IN GRANDS PROJETS, P. 551–561
→ GP–UC.— (by image number)
01 Urban catalysts along the Grands Projets timelines. Source: Dissa Pidanti,
2019.
02 University Pompeu Fabra and Media Cluster in 22@. Source: Pablo
­Acebillo, 2017.
03 Granary Building containing the Central Saint Martin’s College of Arts.
Source: Anna Gasco, 2016
04 Opportunity Areas in London. Source: Lei Ya Wong and Anna Gasco, 2019
05 Marina Bay in Singapore. Source: Dissa Pidanti, 2018.
06 Elbphilharmonie, HafenCity. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
07 Le Grande Arche, La Défense. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017
08 Glories Tower, marking the new downtown in Barcelona. Source: Pablo
Acebillo, 2017.
THE GRAND PROJET AS A CENTRALITY, P. 562–572
→ GP–CE.— (by image number)
01 KCCLP partnership security guard patrolling Granary Square, King’s
Cross. Source: Anna Gasco, 2017.
02 Monitoring of public space users along Nakadôri in Marunouchi. Source:
Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
03 Matrix of case studies, governing bodies and special practices, incen-
tives and regulations. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2019.
04 Ecozzeria space in Marunouchi. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
05 The seat of HafenCity Hamburg GmbH with the Überseequartier in the
back. Source: Naomi C. Hanakata, 2017.
GRAND PROJETS AND MODELLING PRACTICES, P. 573–585
→ GP–MO.— (by image number)
01 Figure 1: Urban development projects and their model references ac-
cording to selective categories. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, Naomi C.
Hanakata, 2019. Including the following images:
→ Marina Bay: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aerial_of_Marina_
Bay_Singapore_(35925244794).jpg
→ Chongqing: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raffles_City_Chongqing
Avenue in La Défense: Yvon Maurice, 2012, https://www.flickr.com/
photos/19787482@N04/8105088794
→ Axis of La Défense: Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019; Avenue in
Century Avenue.
→ Lujiazui: http://www.arte-charpentier.com/en/projet/century-­avenue/
→ Axis in Lujiazui: Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2019.
→ Canary Wharf Program Plan: Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2018.
→ HafenCity Program Plan: Dissa Pidanti Raras, 2018.
→ Shoppes Mall, Marina Bay: https://www.businessinsider.sg/the-shoppes-
at-marina-bay-sands-reports-record-us179-million-mall-revenue-in-2018/
→ Louis Vuitton retail store, Marina Bay: https://www.marinabaysands.
com/shopping/louis-vuitton.html
→ Festival Walks mall atrium, West Kowloon: https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Festival_Walk#/media/File:Festival_Walkelevator_20070729.jpg
→ Louis Vuitton retail store, Elements mall, West Kowloon: https://hk.
louisvuitton.com/eng-hk/point-of-sale/hong-kong/louis-vuitton-hong-
kong-elements
→ Chanel retail store, Elements mall, West Kowloon: http://butterboom.
com/new-stores/chanel-opens-new-boutique-at-elements/
→ Special Economiz Zone in Tokyo Map: https://www.seisakukikaku.metro.
tokyo.jp/invest_tokyo/assets/pdf/jp/invest-tokyo/conference/leaflet_
en.pdf
→ Financial District in La Défense Map: https://www.lelivrescolaire.fr/ma-
nuel/1189304/histoire-geographie-3e-2016/chapitre/1189645/amenager-
le-territoire/page/1189650/acteurs-et-enjeux-de-lamenagement-en-ile-
de-france/lecon/document/1253378
→ Shanghai Free Trade Zone Map: https://www.economist.com/china/
2013/10/03/the-next-shenzhen
→ digital.NYC interactive platform to support Sillicon Alley in New York:
https://www.digital.nyc/map
→ Map of Technological, Information and Communication center in 22@:
http://europe.uli.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/127/ULI-Documents/
FINAL-Innovation-Report1.pdf
→ Fibre Optics System, 22@: Ramon Sagarra, Barcelona City Council, 2006.
→ Heating-cooling system, 22@: Ramon Sagarra, Barcelona City Council,
2006.
→ Kleiner Grasbrook: https://www.hafencity.com/en/news/grasbrook-
hamburg-to-get-a-new-city-district.html
→ Huckepackbahnhof: http://hh-mittendrin.de/2014/11/stromaufwaerts-
an-elbe-und-bille-rothenburgsort/2/
→ 22@: http://conarquitectura.co/obra/ca34-campus-de-la-comunicacion-
del-poblenou-distrito-22-universidad-pompeu-fabra/
→ Ruta N, Medellin: http://www.dronestagr.am/2016/07/?orderby=views
→ Kitakyushu Smart Community Campaign: http://icities4greengrowth.
in/casestudy/kitakyushu-smart-community-kitakyushu-japan
→ President Xi Jinping visits Kitakyushu: https://sustainabledevelopment.
un.org/content/documents/6918Sustainable_Urbanization_Kitakyushu_
E.pdf
→ City of Dalian: https://internchina.com/dalian-first-impressions/; EPAD:
https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89tablissement_public_pour_l%
27am%C3%A9nagement_de_la_r%C3%A9gion_de_la_D%C3%A9fense
634 The Grand Projet
→ Safdie Architects: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCJx3X7XL37Rx
QHPfDm_j0sQ
→ Unibail-Rodamco-Westfield: https://www.urw.com/
→ Herzog & de Meuron; https://primeresi.com/company/herzog-de-
meuron/
→ David Chipperfield: https://www.architravel.com/architravel/architects/
david-chipperfield-architects/
→ KCAP: http://www.hollandpropertyplaza.eu/member/page/22/
→ Affordable Housing in Singapore, by HDB: https://www.straitstimes.
com/singapore/housing/hdb-resale-flat-transactions-fall-109-year-on-
year-in-february-even-as-prices
→ Cingapura Low Cost Housing In Sao Paulo, Brasil: http://www.construbase.
com.br/areas-de-atuacao/construcoes/cingapura.php
02 Urban development projects as models and emulations according to
selective categories on a world map. Source: Dissa Pidanti Raras, Naomi
C. Hanakata, 2019.
SPATIAL REGULATORY PLANS, P. 586–599
→ GP–RP.— (by image number)
01 Types of Grands Projets Spatial Regulatory Plans and related Tools. Source:
Anna Gasco & Dissa Raras Pidanti, 2019
02 Fixed and flexible spatial components of Grands Projets Spatial Regulatory
Plans. Source: Anna Gasco & Dissa Raras Pidanti, 2019 based on the
following sources:
→ LD: Graphic: EPAD Masterplan, 1964; Photographs: Ticketeaser.com,
2019 and Gasco, 2017
→ LJZ: Graphic: Raras, Wong & Zhou, 2019; Photographs: skyline of Lujiazui,
Zhou, 2017 and Pearl Bridge, http://www.knstrct.com/, 2019
→ Graphic: Raras & Choi, 2019; Photographs: http://westkowloon.hk,
2019 and https://www.agefotostock.com/, 2019
→ MNU: Graphics: Raras, 2019 and Mitsubishi Asset Book, 2015; Photo­
graphs: Acebillo, 2019 and Hanakata, 2016
→ MBA: Graphic: URA Masterplan, 2008; Photographs: URA, 1980 and
Raras, 2019
→ HC: Graphics: HafenCity Hamburg GmBH and KCAP, 2000; Photo­
graphs: Hanakata, 2017
→ KX: Graphic: Raras, 2019 and Allies and Morrison Architects, Porphyrios
Associates, and Townshend Landscape Architects; Photographs: Gasco, 2017
→ 22@: Graphic: Acebillo, 2019; Photographs: Acebillo, 2019
CONCLUSION
THE POTENTIAL OF GRANDS PROJETS FOR INCLUSIVE
AND ADAPTABLE FUTURE CITIES , P. 603–610
→ GP–CR.— (by image number)
01 Grands Projets Analytical Frame. Source: The Grand Projet team, 2019.
02 Grands Projets Programmatic Evolution. Source: The Grand Projet team, 2019.
635 Appendix
 EDITORS This publication was made possible by financial
Kees Christiaanse support from The Future Cities Laboratory (FCL),
Anna Gasco ETH-Zurich and Singapore’s National Research
Naomi C. Hanakata Foundation (NRF)

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636 The Grand Projet 637 Appendix

CURRENT/PRE-INTERVENTION BASE PLAN
Site Boundary: Area of the case study.
Building Footprint (In Site): The area
within a project site used by the build­
ing structure.
Building Footprint, Projected (In Site):
The area within a project site intended
to be used by the building structure
when the plan is built and completed.
Building Footprint (Surrounding): The
area surrounding a project site used by
the building structure.
Water Bodies: Any significant accumu­
lation of water, including lakes, ponds,
seas and rivers.
Softscape: Any open piece of land that
is undeveloped (no buildings or other
TRANSPORTATION PLAN

Highway/Freeway: Major road linking
large towns. Includes toll roads and
roads for truck mobility. Usually dedi­
cated to higher speed traffic.
Highway/Freeway, Projected: Area in­
tended to be used as highway/freeway
when the plan is built and completed.
Primary Road: Major roads expected
to support large volumes of traffic.
Secondary Road: A road with a lower
speed limit than that assigned to high­
ways and primary roads. Includes local
streets and collector lanes.
Railway: Any on-ground railway track.
built structures) and often accessible
to the public. Includes parks, gardens,
plazas and playgrounds. Related to the
live horticultural elements and perme­
able surface of open spaces, which in­
clude parks, ponds and gardens.
Softscape, Projected (In Site): The area
within the project site intended to be
used as softscape when the plan is built
and completed.
Hardscape: Represents inanimate com­
ponents of an open space, including
plaza paver stones, public seating areas
and paved playgrounds.
Hardscape, Projected (In Site): The area
within the project site intended to be
used as hardscape when the project is
completed.

Underground Railway: Any railway track
below ground.

Bikeway: Bike path. Includes paths with
protected, separated and/or shared (with
other motorised and pedestrian traffic)
lanes.
Pedestrian Way: Includes footpaths and
lanes dedicated to pedestrian use.

Waterway: Any route for travel by water,
especially by ferry.
Bike Station
Bus Station
Ferry Station
Train Station
PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE OPEN SPACE PLAN
Softscape: Publicly accessible soft­
scape within the case study.
Hardscape: Publicly accessible hard­
scape within the case study.
HERITAGE STRUCTURE
Heritage (In Site): Any structure within
a site whose premises, in any capacity,
convey that place’s history and culture,
via its preservation, architecture, aesthet­
ics, environment and/or craftsmanship.
PROGRAMME PLAN
Residential: An area predominantly com­
posed of housing.
Business: The area intended for use by
for-profit entities, mostly those dealing
with goods and services. Includes of­
fice space and convention centre(s).
Commercial: The area intended for use
by for-profit owners, with a focus on trade-­
related activities. Includes retail, food
and beverage and hotel programmes.
Civic: The area frequently visited by the
public; it may provide public services.
Includes school, university, library and
medical facilities as well as government
institutions.
Industrial: Areas intended to support
industrial activity, such as factories and
warehouses.
Pedestrian Friendly Zone: Space where
pedestrian activity is high and encour­
aged and vehicle volumes are either low
or temporarily discouraged.
Heritage (Surrounding): Heritage struc­
ture(s) within the surrounding area that
highly impact(s) the case study.
Technical Utilities: All utility facilities in
the area, including transport stations
(with no mix of commercial or other pro­
grammes), heating and cooling ameni­
ties, power stations, parking garages,
etc.
Mixed-Use: A type of area that physi­
cally and functionally integrates com­
mercial, business and residential land
use.
Ground Floor with Commercial & Busi­
ness: Any area with a ground floor ded­
icated to commercial and business ac­
tivities. Includes apartments, airports
and train stations with retail programmes
on the ground floor.
Deck (for La Défense): Elevated plaza/
slab consisting of seven storeys of utility
services.
 KX–L HC–H
LD–P

22@–B
 To
Urban Megaprojects — here referred to as Grands Projets ​
— are increasing in number all over the world. They have
become major drivers for urban intensification and mani-
festations of the larger economic and political agenda of

S
their city. As such, Grands Projets offer a productive moment
to investigate current urban trends in a globally connected
form of concentrated urbanisation.
This book looks into the adaptive and inclusive capac-
ities that urban megaprojects can offer to shape the future

Hong Kon
of our cities. Featuring eight unique case studies: M
­ arunouchi
Tokyo, Lujiazui Shanghai, West Kowloon Hong Kong, M ­ arina
Bay Area Singapore, HafenCity Hamburg, La Défense Paris,
22@ Barcelona and King’s Cross London, the book provides
a comprehensive reading of selected urban mega­projects

Singapore .
in Asia and Europe, and a comparative view of key aspects
regarding their role in contemporary urban developments.
The text draws from the perspective of a broad range
of stakeholders involved in the making of Grands Projets.
With a focus on the spatial practices, our findings aim to not

Ham
only broaden the scholarship of urban megaprojects but
also to provide applicable insights for planners, managers,
policymakers and other urban actors.

P
nai010 publishers
www.nai010.com

Lond
Printed and bound in
the Netherlands
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