1. Aratuc v.

COMELEC, SCRA 251

Nature:

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the respondent Comelec resolving their
appeal from the respondent Regional Board of Canvassers for Region XII regarding
the canvass of the results of the election in said region for representatives to the I.B.P.
held on April 7, 1978.

Facts:

 Tomatic Aratuc et al. sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken
by respondent Board in Cotabato city. A supervening panel headed by
Commissioner of Elections, Hon- Venancio S. Duque, had conducted of the
complaints of the petitioners therein of alleged irregularities in the election
records in the voting centers. Before hearing, the canvass was suspended.

 After hearing the parties, the Court allowed resumption of the canvass but issued
guidelines to be followed but thereafter modified.

 On July 11, 1978, respondent Board terminated its canvass and declared the result
of the voting. The petitioners brought the resolution of respondent Board to the
Comelec.

 Hearing was held on April 25, 1978, after which, the case was declared submitted
for decision. In order to enable the Commission to decide the appeal properly: a.
It will have to go deeper into the examination of the voting records and
registration records and in the case of voting centers whose voting and
registration records which have not yet been submitted for the Commission to
decide to open the ballot boxes;

 and b. To interview and get statements under oath of impartial and disinterested
persons from the area to determine whether actual voting took place on April 7,
1978, as well as those of the military authorities in the areas affected. On January
13, 1979, the Comelec rendered its resolution being assailed in these cases,
declaring the final result of the canvass

Issue:

WON there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part
of COMELEC.

Held:

 Under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, "the Commission (on
Elections) shall have direct control and supervision over the board of canvassers"
 and that relatedly, Section 175 of the same Code provides that it "shall be the sole
judge of all controversies."

 Pre-proclamation The fact of the matter is that the authority of the Commission in
reviewing actuations of board of canvassers does not spring from any appellate
jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such
provision anywhere in the Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of
direct control and supervision endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of
Section 168.

 And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting
citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision and control over
another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.

 We cannot fault respondent Comelec for its having extended its inquiry beyond
that undertaken by the Board of Canvass. On the contrary, it must be stated that
Comelec correctly and commendably asserted its statutory authority born of its
envisaged constitutional duties vis-a-vis the preservation of the purity of elections
and electoral processes and in doing what petitioner it should not have done.

2. Maceda v. Energy Regulatory Board, G.R. Nos. 95203-06, December 18,

1990

FACTS:

 Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 1990, private
respondents oil companies filed with the ERB their respective applications on oil
price increases. ERB then issued an order granting a provisional increase of
P1.42 per liter. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to
nullify said increase.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the decisions of the Energy Regulatory Board should be subject to
presidential review.

HELD:

 Pursuant to Section 8 of E.O. No. 172, while hearing is indispensable, it does not
preclude the Board from ordering a provisional increase subject to final
disposition of whether or not to make it permanent or to reduce or increase it
further or to deny the application. The provisional increase is akin to a
temporary restraining order, which are given ex-parte.
 The Court further noted the Solicitor General’s comments that “the ERB is not
averse to the idea of a presidential review of its decision,” except that there is no
law at present authorizing the same.

 The Court suggested that it will be under the scope of the legislative to allow the
presidential review of the decisions of the ERB since, despite its being a quasi-
judicial body, it is still “ an administrative body under the Office of the President
whose decisions should be appealed to the President under the established
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies,” especially on a matter as
transcendental as oil price increases which affect the lives of almost all Filipinos.

3. U.S. v. Dorr, 2 Phil. 332

FACTS:

 Fred L. Dorr and a number of other persons (Dorr, et al.) were convicted of
violating Section 8 of Act No. 292 which punishes the utterance of "seditious
words or speeches;

 and the writing, publication, or circulation of "scurrilous libels against the

Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands" or other libels against the same entities which (1) "tend to disturb or
obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office", (2) "tend to instigate others to
cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes", (3) "suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots", or (4) "tend to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety, and order of the
Government".

 The same provision also punishes the deliberate concealment of

the aforementioned acts.

 The charge against Dorr et al. stemmed from an article published in the
newspaper Manila Freedom criticizing the appointment by the Civil Commission
of certain persons— including Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera— to key government
positions.

 The said article referred to the aforementioned appointees as "rascals" and

"corrupt" and called certain government offices organized by the Civil
Commission as "rotten" and "corrupt".

Issue:

Whether or not the publication of the subject article falls within the purview
of Section 8 of Act No. 292.
Held:

 No. The article in question produces none of the effects enumerated in Section 8
of Act No. 292. In addition, the same provision refers to libel of the government
in general, and not of specific individuals.

Ratio Decidendi

 N.B.: The Court did not provide any basis for finding that the subject article did
not have the tendency to produce the effects enumerated under Section 8 of Act
No. 292, other than all the justices agreed on the same conclusion.

As used in Act No. 292, the term "government" is used in the abstract sense of
the existing political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the
Government, such as the Houses of Congress and the Executive, which are also
specially mentioned. Had the framers of the said law intended to mean specific
government personnel, they would have expressly stated so.

In this case, the article in question, attacked the Civil Commission and some of
its individual members, not the governmental system. Hence, it falls outside the
purview of Act No. 292.

Malaga v. Penachos, Jr., 213 SCRA 516

FACTS:

 The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualifications, Bids
and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26
and 28, 1988 issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the
construction of a Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF.

 However, petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of
PBAC for their refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-
inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the
December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also
asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants be directed
not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.

 On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC
from conducting the bidding and award the project. The defendants filed a motion
to lift the restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing
 such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in
government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also
contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it
was served after the bidding had been awarded and closed.

 On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the
petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be
constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the government falling
within the coverage of the subject law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality subject to the provisions of
PD 1818?

HELD:
Yes. ISCOF is covered by the contemplation of a government instrumentality
provided by law. However, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by
the prohibition in the said decree.

RATIO:
 The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
“Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter.

 This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-

owned or controlled corporations.” (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).

 The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: “Chartered institution —

refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by
law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This
term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of
the state.” (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).

 Indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality are the

following:
 First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of
the State, a priority program of the government to effect the socio-economic life
of the nation.
 Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines also be the ex-officio
Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses to be audited by the
Commission on Audit or its duly authorized representative.

 Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to
loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such
apparatus, equipment, or supplies and even the services of such employees as can
be spared without serious detriment to public service.

 Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of
the National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and
maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in the General
Appropriations Law.

 Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the

prohibition in the said decree because there are at least two irregularities
committed by PBAC that justified injunction of the bidding and the award of the
project.

 First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of bids
and then changed these deadlines without prior notice to prospective participants.

 Under the Rules Implementing P.D.1594, prescribing policies and guidelines for
government infrastructure contracts, PBAC shall provide prospective bidders
with the Notice of Pre-qualification and other relevant information regarding the
proposed work. Prospective contractors shall be required to file their ARC-
Contractors Confidential Application for Registration & Classifications & the
PRE-C2 Confidential Pre-qualification Statement for the Project (referred to as
PRE-C1) not later than the deadline set in the published Invitation to Bid, after
which date no PRE-C2 shall be submitted and received.

 Invitations to Bid shall be advertised for at least three times within a reasonable
period but in no case less than two weeks in at least two newspapers of general
circulations.

 Notably, the petitioners were disqualified because they failed to meet the new
deadline and not because of their expired licenses.
 The court explained that where the law requires a previous advertisement before
government contracts can be awarded, non-compliance with the requirement will,
as a general rule, render the same void and of no effect.
 The facts that an invitation for bids has been communicated to a number of
possible bidders is not necessarily sufficient to establish compliance with the
requirements of the law if it is shown that other public bidders have not been
similarly notified.

 Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans,

specifications and proposal book forms for the project to be bid thirty days before
the date of bidding if the estimate project cost was between P1M and P5M.
PBAC has not denied that these forms were issued only on December 2, 1988, or
only ten days before the bidding scheduled for December 12, 1988.

 At the very latest, PBAC should have issued them on November 12, 1988, or 30
days before the scheduled bidding. The present controversy involved here is non-
compliance with the procedural rules on bidding which required strict
observance.

 P.D.1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities

committed by administrative agencies such as the anomalies above described.

 Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by the
respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been
denied. Annex Q of the private respondent's memorandum, however, that the
subject project has already been "100% completed as to the Engineering
Standard." This fait accompli has made the petition for a writ of preliminary
injunction moot and academic.

 The liabilities the court attached to private respondents are those for the prejudice
sustained by the petitioners as a result of the anomalies. Petitioners may not be
awarded with compensatory damage as evidence of actual loss is not present and
also moral damages.

 However, the Court cannot close its eyes to the evident bad faith that
characterized the conduct of the private respondents, including the irregularities
in the announcement of the bidding and their efforts to persuade the ISCOF
president to award the project after two days from receipt of the restraining order
and before they moved to lift such order.
 For such questionable acts, they are liable in nominal damages at least in
accordance with Article 2221 of the Civil Code, which states, “Nominal damages
are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant may be vindicated or, recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Thus, each of
petitioners be paid 10,000.The other petitioner, Occeña Builders, is not entitled to
 relief because it admittedly submitted its pre-qualification documents on
December 5, 1988, or three days after the deadline.

DISPOSITIVE:dpr
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: a) upholding the restraining order
dated December 12, 1988, as not covered by the prohibition in P.D. 1818;

 b) ordering the chairman and the members of the PBAC board of trustees, namely
Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., Alfredo Matangga, Enrico Ticar, and Teresita
Villanueva, to each pay separately to petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and
Josieleen Najarro nominal damages P10,000.00 each; and

 c) removing the said chairman and members from the PBAC board of trustees, or
whoever among the

4. United Residents of Dominican Hills, Inc., v. Commission on the

Settlement of Land Problems, 353 SCRA 782

FACTS:

 Dominican Hills, formerly registered as Diplomat Hills in Baguio City, was

mortgaged to the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). It was eventually
foreclosed and acquired later on by the said bank as the highest bidder.

 On December 12, 1986, then President Corazon Aquino issued EO 85 abolishing

the Ministry of Human Settlements. All agencies under the its supervision as well
as all its assets, programs and projects, were transferred to the Presidential
Management Staff (PMS).

 Petitioner alleges that sometime in 1993, private respondents entered the

Dominican Hills property allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon.
Petitioner was able to secure a demolition order from the city mayor.

 Unable to stop the razing of their houses, private respondents, under the name
DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION
(ASSOCIATION, for brevity) filed an action for injunction before RTC Baguio
City. Private respondents were able to obtain a temporary restraining order but
their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was later denied.

 The ASSOCIATION filed a separate civil case for damages, injunction and
annulment of the said MOA. It was later on dismissed upon motion of United.
The said Order of dismissal is currently on appeal with the Court of Appeals.
  The demolition order was subsequently implemented by the Office of the City
Mayor and the City Engineer's Office of Baguio City. However, petitioner avers
that private respondents returned and reconstructed the demolished structures.

 Without filing a motion for reconsideration from the aforesaid status quo order,
petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP.

ISSUE:

W/O COSLAP is empowered to hear and try a petition for annulment of contracts
with prayer for a TRO and to issue a status quo order and conduct a hearing thereof?

RULING:

 COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy. It

discharges quasi-judicial functions:

 "Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of

public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them,
as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."

 However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency,
albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are
not considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial system nor are they
deemed judicial tribunals.

 The doctrine of separation of powers observed in our system of government

reposes the three (3) great powers into its three (3) branches — the legislative, the
executive, and the judiciary — each department being co-equal and coordinate,
and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not,
by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its own agencies, upon the
judiciary.

 Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered

"to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government."
5. Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
166052, August 29, 2007

FACTS:
  The case involves the constitutionality of executive orders that transformed the
Department of Agrarian Reform and placed other commissions under its control.

 The petitioners, Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN) and Mamalo

Descendants Organization, Inc. (MDOI), argue that the executive orders violate
the principles of separation of powers and the rule of law.

 The petitioners also claim that the executive orders infringe on the constitutional
right of the people and their organizationsto effective and reasonable participation
in decision-making.

ISSUE:
Is it legal to place the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP) and the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) under the department of agrarian
reform (DAR) and can the President’s power to reorganize administrative structures
be exercised in a manner contrary to law

RULING:
 The court rules In favor of the executives order and affirms the President’s power
to reorganize structures.

 The court dismisses the petition and upholds the constitutionality of the executive
orders.

RATIO:
 The President, as the chief executive, has the authority to reorganize the offices
under her supervision and control for the effective and efficient enforcement of
laws.
 The power to reorganize is necessary for achieving simplicity, and efficiency in
delivering social reforms. The legislature, in creating the agencies such as PCUP
and NCIP, must have intended for the President to have the power to reorganize
them.

 The court cannot pass judgment on the wisdom or soundness of the executive
decision. The petitioners have not shown the reorganization by executive fiat
would hamper the exercise of citizens’ rights and privileges.

6. Beja, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 689

FACTS


 The instant petition for certiorari questions the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and/or its
Administrative Action Board (AAB) over administrative cases involving
personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA), an agency attached to the said Department.

 Fidencio Beja Sr. an employee of Philippine ports authority, was hired as Arrastre
supervisor in 1975, and later on appointed as terminal supervisor in 1988. On
October 21, 1988, the General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan filed an
administrative case against Beja Sr. and Villaluz for grave dishonesty.

 Grave misconduct willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently they were
preventively suspended for the charges. After preliminary investigation
conducted by the district attorney for region X, administrative case no. 11-04-88
was considered closed for lack of merit.

 On December 13, 1988 another administrative case was filed against Beja by the
PPA manager also for dishonesty grave misconduct violation of office rules and
regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being
notoriously undesirable. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension
pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807.

 The case was redocketed as administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and

thereafter, the PPA indorsed it to the AAB for appropriate action. The AAB
proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence.
However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental.

 Two days later, he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the
hearing of administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the
pendency of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion
and continued with the hearing of the administrative case. Thereafter, Beja
moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case and proceeded to file before the
Court for a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order.

 Petitioner anchors his contention that the PPA general manager cannot subject
him to a preventive suspension on the following provision of Sec. 8, Art. V of
Presidential Decree No. 857 reorganizing the PPA:
 (d) the General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, appoint and
remove personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager. (Emphasis
supplied.)

 Petitioner contends that under this provision, the PPA Board of Directors and not
the PPA General Manager is the "proper disciplining authority.

ISSUE:

Whether the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB has jurisdiction to initiate and hear the
administrative cases against PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant General
Manager

HELD:

THE COURT QUALIFIEDLY RULES NO.

 Under that Law, the corporate powers of the PPA were vested in a governing
Board of Directors known as the Philippine Port Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of
the same decree gave the Council the power "to appoint, discipline and remove,
and determine the composition of the technical staff of the Authority and other
personnel."

 P.D. No. 857, See. 4(a) thereof created the Philippine Ports Authority which
would be "attached" to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Communication. When Executive Order No. 125 dated January 30, 1987
reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communications was issued, the
PPA retained its "attached" status. Even Executive Order No. 292 or the
Administrative Code of 1987 classified the PPA as an agency "attached" to the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). Sec. 24 of Book IV,
Title XV, Chapter 6 of the same Code provides that the agencies attached to the
DOTC "shall continue to operate and function in accordance with the respective
charters or laws creating them, except when they conflict with this Code."

 Attachment of an agency to a Department is one of the three administrative

relationships mentioned in Book IV, Chapter 7 of the Administrative Code of
1987, the other two being supervision and control and administrative supervision.
"Attachment" is defined in Sec. 38 thereof as follows:

 (3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the
Department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for
 purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination shall be
accomplished by having the department represented in the governing board of the
attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or
without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached
corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall
reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its
equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, which
shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation
or agency;

 An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to

which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control
or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship"
between the Department and the attached agency.

 The attachment is merely for "policy and program coordination." With respect to
administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from
Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced by the fact that even
an agency under a Department's administrative supervision is free from
Departmental interference with respect to appointments and other personnel
actions "in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions" under the
Administrative Code of 1987. 11 Moreover, the Administrative Code explicitly
provides that Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and control shall not apply to
chartered institutions attached to a Department.

 Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the management of

personnel, an attached agency is, to a certain extent, free from Departmental
interference and control. This is more explicitly shown by P.D. No. 857, Sec. 8(b)
and (d). By vesting the power to remove erring employees on the General
Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the law impliedly
grants said officials the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of
Assistant Manager who may be charged with an administrative offense.

 During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, as earlier stated, may
subject the employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation
should be conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D.
No. 807. 13 Only after gathering sufficient facts may the PPA General Manager
impose the proper penalty in accordance with law. It is the latter action which
requires the approval of the PPA Board of Directors.
 From an adverse decision of the PPA General Manager and the Board of
Directors, the employee concerned may elevate the matter to the Department
Head or Secretary. Otherwise, he may appeal directly to the Civil Service
Commission.
 It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the PPA General
Manager to the AAB was premature. The PPA General Manager should have first
conducted an investigation, made the proper recommendation for the imposable
penalty and sought its approval by the PPA Board of Directors. It was
discretionary on the part of the herein petitioner to elevate the case to the then
DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then could the AAB take jurisdiction of the case.

 The AAB, which was created during the tenure of Secretary Reyes under Office
Order No. 88-318 dated July 1, 1988, was designed to act, decide and recommend
to him "all cases of administrative malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of
corruption in the Department." Composed of a Chairman and two (2) members,
the AAB came into being pursuant to Administrative Order No. 25 issued by the
President on May 25, 1987. 15 Its special nature as a quasi-judicial administrative
body notwithstanding, the AAB is not exempt from the observance of due process
in its proceedings.

7. Eugonio v. Civil Service Commission, 243 SCRA 196

FACTS:

 Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She
applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank on
August 2, 1993, she was given a CES eligibility On September 15, 1993, she was
recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service
Board.

 On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission passed Resolution No.

93-4359 which resolves to streamline reorganize and effect changes in its
organizational structure.
.
 Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the
Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission.

 Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the

Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career
Executive Service. The above resolution became an impediment to the
appointment of petitioner as Civil Service Officer, Rank IV.

 Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive

Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished,
petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, resolution No. 93-
4359.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CSC usurped the legislative functions of Congress when it
abolished CESB, an office created by law, through the issuance of CSC Resolution
No. 93-4359

RULING:

 Yes. The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was
created in the Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 1974 which
adopted the Integrated Plan.

 It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only
be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that
the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function
Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public
offices is primarily legislative function.

 In so far as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional

provisions, it supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices are
suitable, necessary, or convenient.

 When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and define duties,

the legislative department has the discretion to determine whether additional
offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be attached to and become
ex-officio duties of existing offices.

 An office created by the legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and
it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and duties of the
incumbent, and if it sees fit, abolish the office..

 As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be

autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up executive
manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook.

 The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment
to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall
within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of
1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency
to another is to attain "policy and program coordination."

RATIO:

 Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or
its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and
program coordination.
 The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in
the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or
as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter;

 having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic

reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects, and having
the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its
representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal
policies of the attached corporation or agency.

8. Luzon Development Bank vs. Association of Luzon Development Bank

Employees, 249 SCRA 162

FACTS:

 Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's

Position Paper, on the other hand, LDB failed to submit its Position Paper despite
a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so.

 Without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered decision that
LDB has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the
Memorandum of Agreement on promotion.

 LDB filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision
of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same with the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

 No. A voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a quasi-judicial

capacity."

 It follows that the voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys
in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart from,
the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter.

 A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators

should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure
outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, just like those of the quasi-
judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.

 CREDIT T CRIMINA CRIMINAL Under Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as

amended by Republic Act No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall
exercise:

 ELECTION ENTERTAIN EVIDENCE (B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over

all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial
 Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions,
including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission;

 except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

 DOCTRINE Arbitration is the reference of a labor dispute to an impartial third

person for determination on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by
such parties who have bound themselves to accept the decision of the arbitrator as
final and binding.

9. Iron and Steel Authority v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 538

Facts:

 The Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by Presidential Decree No. 272 in
1973 to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. ISA
had the power to initiate expropriation of land for iron and steel facilities.

 The National Steel Corporation (NSC), a government-controlled private

corporation, planned to construct an integrated steel mill in Iligan City. ISA
initiated eminent domain proceedings against Maria Cristina Fertilizer
Corporation (MCFC) to acquire the land needed for the expansion.

 During the trial, ISA's statutory existence expired. MCFC filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that no valid judgment could be rendered against ISA, which had
ceased to be a juridical person. The trial court granted MCFC's motion to dismiss,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.

Issue:

Whether the Republic of the Philippines can be substituted for ISA after its term
expired

Ruling:
 The Republic of the Philippines, as the principal of ISA, is entitled to be
substituted in the expropriation proceedings. The expiration of ISA's term does
not require the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings.

 The Republic, as a body corporate and juridical person, can initiate or participate
in actions involving its agents. No new legislative act is necessary for the
Republic to continue the expropriation proceedings. The Republic, as the
substitute party-plaintiff, can continue the expropriation proceedings.

Ratio:

 ISA, as an agent or delegate of the Republic, had the authority to initiate the
expropriation proceedings on behalf of the government. The powers, duties, and
functions of a non-incorporated agency like ISA revert back to the Republic when
its statutory term expires.

 The Republic of the Philippines is a body corporate and juridical person vested
with "legal personality."

 The President of the Philippines, exercising the power of eminent domain

delegated by law, determined that it was necessary and advantageous to exercise
the power of eminent domain on behalf of the government.

 The Republic, as the substitute party-plaintiff, can continue the expropriation

proceedings without the need for a new legislative act. The case is remanded to
the trial court to allow the substitution of the Republic of the Philippines for ISA
and for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision