212 Semantics and Metaphysics analysisyntetie dtncion, We cannot quote such cases, but cis inability may well be the reule of ignorance ofthe sciences. In any case, the existence if they do exist of statements about which iis pointless o pres the question wheter they ae analytic or synthetic, ‘hoes not enti the nonexistence of statements which are clearly cls: Siable in one or othe ofthese ways and of satements ur hestation lover which ha diferent sources, such asthe possiblity of atemaive imerpreatons ofthe linguist forms in which they ar expressed. "This concludes our examination of Quin’ arie- ew be ev dene that our purpose has been wholly negative. We have aimed t0 show merely that Quine case agains the existence of the analytic "thetic dstincon isnot made ot, His article has wo par. In one Of them, the notions of the analytcty group are erie on the round tht they have nt been adequately explained. In the other, a Positive theory of tath is outlined purporting to be incompatible ‘with views 10 which believers inthe analtiesyarhetic disunction {ther must be, or at likely to be, commie. In fact, we have con- tended, no singe point is established which those who accep the no- ‘dons of the analytic group would fel any stain in accommodating in their own system of ef, This snot to deny that many ofthe pins raised ae ofthe fist importance in connection with the probs lem of giving 2 satisfactory general acount of analytic and related concept, We are here onl eizig the contention that these pois justly the rejection, a illusory, ofthe analyc-symthetc distinction and th notions which belong to the same family. Consider the following sentences “Those spots mean (meant) measles.” Those spy did’ mean anything me, but wo the doctor they “The recent budget means that we shall have a hard year” (1 | canoo sa, “Tose pots meat meas, bt he hada ot teas” and I camo ey, The reset get ea that we Sal ves hard yea but we shan hae? Tat io say nce the above, meat that par meas tha peal (2) camo age om “Thx spt ean fea) meas" to ny concasion about "what fs) mea By hse mos fe ela ot ened oy,“ was meu hy hse pos as iar him,” guano hee tot seen badgt the conan Whats meant the ec bet is that we shall have a hard year.” (3) exon argue om “Toe sos meant mess” ro any cone chson othe ete tha someon ober mean by tose sp Sedo, Mats mated he same rote sentence sot he ‘ame buee (For noneof he bore examples cana restatement be od in which te ver “mean flowed ys eect sc gua on ma Ts hoe 0 etl abe em ated a “Tine sp mean neato Those po ean he bas measles!” oc ‘ (5) On the other han, for lhe examples an approximate reae Semantics and Metaphysics statement can be found begining with the phrase “The face that INP for example, “The fact that he had dose spots mean that he ihad measles” and “The fact thatthe recent buaget wat a6 i was ‘meats that we shal havea hard year” "Now contrast he specimen renences with the following “Those thre rings the bell (ofthe bus) mean that the bus is ‘al “That sar, ‘Smith could't get on without his wouble and stif meane tht Smith found hs woe indispensable” (1) cam ase the int ofthese ad go on to 5a, “Buc it isn't in face full—the conductor has made a mistake; and I can use the second ane go, "But in fact Smith deserted he seven yeas ago." That is to say here x means tha p and mean hat p do not ental (2) Tan argue from the St to some statement about "what i (vas) meant” by the rings on the bell and from the second to some statement about “what is (as) meant” by the quoted remark (3) can argue from the fst sentence othe conclusion that some body namely the conductor) meant, of at any rate should have sean, by the rings char the bus fll, and Lean argue analogously forthe second sentence () The fiat ventence can be restated in 2 form in which the verb “mean” followed by «phrase in quotation mark, that is, "Those three rings on the bell mean ‘he busi ful So also can the second (5) Such 4 sentence as *The fact that the ell ha been rang three ‘imes means thatthe busi fll” snot 2 restatement ofthe meaning ofthe fst sentence, Boh may be true, but they do not have, even approximately, the same meaning. ‘When the expresions "mean," “means something” "means that” are wed inthe Kind of way in which they are usd nthe Sst st of| Seovences, shall peak ofthe Senseo Sense, in which they are sed, 15 the natal sense, oF senses, ofthe expressions in question. When the expressions are used inthe kind of way in which dey reused in the second set of sentences, I shal speak of the sens, oF ses, in| which they are used a the monn Sense, or senses, ofthe expres ‘Sons in queson, I shall ure the abbreviation "mesphy.” 10 istn- ‘ish the nonnatual sense o senses T propose, for convenience lio to include under the head of nau ral seme of “mean” sch senses of "mean" as may be exemplified in Meaning as seences ofthe pattern “A means (meant) todo so-and-so (by 2)" ‘where A is a human agent. By contast, a the previous examples show, linclade under the head of nonnaturl senses of mean” any senses of “mean” found in sentences of the parterns "A means {emcan) something by x” of "Aenean (reat) by x that. (Ths ‘overigids bu it wil sre as an indication) do not want to maintain that ll our uss of “mean” fal easily, ‘obviously and ly ato one ofthe two group have distinguished; bot I think that in most ease we should be at leas finy strongly Inlined to assimilate a wee of “mean” to one group rather than to the other The question which now arises is this. “What more can be said about che distinction benween the cases where we should sy that the word is applied ina natural sense and the cass whete we should say that the word i aplid in a nonnatural sense?” Asking this question wil not of course prob us fom eying to give an soanatin af een. ems fone aoe ar ee ‘This question about the distinction between natural and non- ‘narural meaning iy I think, what people are geting at when they splay an interest ina dstincson between "natural" and “conven tional” signs. But I think my formulation is better. For some things ‘hich can mean, something are not signs (words ae ns) and Some are ot conventional im any ordinary sense fig. cesta ge tures; while somethings which mean naturally are not signs of what they mean (cf the recent budget example. want fist to consider briefly, and reject, what I might tem a causal type of answer to the question, “What ie meaning?” We might ty to sy, for instance, more or les with C. Stevens, that forxto mean, someting, x mist have (roughly tendency to pro duce in an audience some atitude (cognitive or otherwise) and a en ‘dency inthe ease ofa speaker, o be prodced by tha atid, these tendencies being dependent on "an elaborate proces of conditioning attending the ste of the sgn in communication This lary wl or do, (1) Lees considera case where an uterance fit qualifies a all as ‘meanings, something, willbe ofa descriptive or informative kind and the relevaneateue, therefore, will be cogiive one, for example, 1 fe nd ona SH,26 Semantics and Metaphysis 4 belie (ae “utterance” a a neutal word to apply to any cand- ‘ate for meaning thas 3 convenient ac-objec ambiguity ei 00 “oubt the ease that many peopl have a tendency to pat on a taleoat when they think shy are about co go to a dance, andi no doubt iso the case that many people, on scing someone put ona tlcoat, would conclude thatthe person in question was about tO go t0 8 ‘ance, Does tis satisfy us that putting on atalloat means that one is about to go toa dance (or indeed means, anything a all? Ob- ously not. eis wo help o eefer othe qualifying phrase “dependent fon an elaborate process of conditioning,” Foe ll his means i that the response to the sight ofa ealcoat being pt oni in some way learned or acquire, it will not exclude the preset case fom being ‘ne of teagan But we hae to take seriously the second part of the qualifying phrase ("attending the use ofthe sign in communica ‘on”) then the account of meaning obviously circa. We might just a6 well sy, "X has meanings fi wsed in communication,” ‘which, though tr, not help (2) if this snot enough, cher isa dfculry—relly the same dt culty, think wich Stevenson recognizes: how we aero avoid say ing for example, that “Jones is tal” is pare of whats meant by “Tomes isan athlete,” since to tell someone that Jones isan athlete would tend to make him believe that Jones i all Stevenson bere ‘sorts to invoking linguiric rules, namely, a peemisive rae of lan tage tht “athletes may be nonal.” This amount to saying that we Ste not prohibited by rue from speaking of "noatll athletes.” But ‘why are we not probed? Not because eis nt bad grammar, ors ‘ot impolite, and so 0, but presumably because its not meaningless (oe if this i too strong, doesnot in any way woate the eues of meaning for the expresions concemed). But this seems to iavo¥e ws in another ice. Moreover one wants to ask why, if i latte to appeal here to rules to distinguish what i mean fom what is sugested, this appeal was not made eal inthe ease of groan, for ‘example, to deal with which Stevenson originally introduced the ‘walifying phrase about dependence on conditioning. 'A farther decency ina causal theory of the type jst expounded seems to be that, even if we acepe it a8 it stands, we are furnished ‘with an analysis only of statement about the stndard meaning, oF ‘the meaning in general ofa “sgn.” No provision is made for deal with statements about what 2 paricular speaker oe weiter means By 4 sign on » particular occasion (which may well diverge from the Moning 27 standard meaning ofthe ig): nist obvios how the theory could be adapted to make such provision. One might even go futher in iim and mainiain thatthe causal theory ignores the Fact ha the ‘meaning in general ofa sign needs to be explained interme of what ers ofthe sign do (or should) mean by it on particule ocessons tnd so the later notion, which i unexplained bythe causal theory, in face che fundamental one. Iam sympathetic to this more radial ‘iticsm, though Tam aware thatthe point is controversial ido not propose to consider any father theories of the “casa: tendency” type. Isuspet no such theory could avoid dickies anal ‘ogour 9 those Ihave outlined without uly losing its lim to rank ‘8a theory ofthis ype Twill sow ty 2 dierent and, | hope more promising line we can elucidate the meaning of ‘x meant something (on a paticular occasion)” and ‘x mean that so-and-so (ona partculatoccaion)® and of A meant, something by «(ona particular oecssion)” and “A meant, by x that So-andso (om 3 particular oceason),” ‘his might reasonably be expected wo help us with ‘x means timeless something (hat so-and-so)” “A means (imeles) by something (hat so-and so” and with the explication of “means che same as" “undertands”“en- tals and soon. Let us forthe moment pretend that we have to desl only with uterances which might be informative or desripaive. ‘Aft shot would bet suggest that "x meant, something” would be true if = was intended by it tere to induce a bli in some audience" and that say what the belie was wold be to say what 2xmeantge This will not do. I might lave BY handkerchief near the Scene of murder in orde to induce the detective to believe that B ‘wae the murderer; but we should not want to say thatthe handler het or my leaving it there) meant anything ofthat had means. by leaving ie that B was the madre, Cleary we musta east 24d thas, for to have mean. anything, aot merly must ie have been “tered withthe intention of inducing 3 certain ble bu also the err must have intended an *2udince™ to recognize the intention behind the uerance.218 Semantics and Metaphysis “This, though pethaps beter i not god enough. Consider the fol lowing eases: (1) Herod presents Salome with the head of St.John the Bapist on charge. (2) Feeling fang, child lets its mother se how pale its thoping ‘that she may draw her own conclusions and bel) (3) Ileave the china my daughter has broken Ing around fr my wife ose. Here we seem so have cases which satisfy the conditions so far gven for meanings For example, Hered inended to make Salome believe thar St. Jon the Baptit was dead and no doubt ls intended Salome to recognize chat he intended her to Believe that St.John the Baptist wae dead, Similarly for the other eases. Yee etainly do not think that we should want to say that we have hee cases of meaning. ‘What we want to inde the diferenceberween, for example, “e- liberately and openly leting someone know” and “telling” and be ‘seen “getting someone to think” and “telling” “The way out is perhaps a follows. Compare the following 80 (0) [show Mr-X a photograph of Me. Y displaying undue falar ity wo Me X, (2) I draw » picure of Me, ¥ behaving in this manner and show it fo Ms. X ‘find that 1 wane o deny that in (1) the phorograph (or my showing ieeo Me X) meant anything all while wane oasert that in (2) the picture (or my drawing and showing if) mean, something (hat ‘Mr. Yhad been unduly familiar) ora las that Ha mean by it that Me. Vhad been unduly familie. Wha is he ference between the wo cases? Surely that in ca (1) Me. Xs recopition of my ite tion to mae him believe tha there is something between Me ¥ and Mrs. Xie (more oles) irrelevant to the produsion ofthis eect by the photograph. Me X would be ld bythe photograph at leas to Suspect Mrs. X even if instead of showing to im, had lef his room by accident; and I (the photograph shower) would not be tanaware of thi. Buti will make a dierence tothe effec of my pic ture on Mi. X whether or not he takes me te intending to inform him (make him believe something) about Mrs. X, and no tobe ust doodling or teyng to produce a work of art. Meaning 219 ‘But now we seem tobe landed in a further dificult if we accept this account. For consider now, sa, owning. IT fown sponta ‘neously the ordinary course of evens, someone looking a me may ‘wel teat the frown asa natural sgh of dspeasre. But | fown elberstly (to convey my displeasure), an onlooker may be ex pected, provided he recognizes my intention, silo conclude that fam diplesed, Ought we not then to say ence could no be ex pected to make any difference tothe onlookers reaction whether he Tegatds my frown ae spontaneous or as intended to be informative, thar my frown (deliberate) docs mo! meamn anything? I tink this dliiculty can be met; fr though in general a deliberate frown may have the same effec (wih espct to inducing belie in ny displeasure 25a spontaneous frown, i an be expected to have the same effect ‘only provided the audience takes it ak ntended vo convey diplesure “Thats, f we take aoray the recognition of intention, leaving the ote circumstances including the ecogition ofthe frown as deliberate, the blit-producng tendency of the frown must be regarded 35 being impaired or destroyed. echape we may sum up whats necessary for Ato mean something by. as follows. A mus imend o induce by x a ble in an audience, tnd he mus alo intend his urerance tobe recognized 3 0 intended. But ehese intentions are not independent; the ecogiton i intended by A to play its par in inducing he bell, andi dos not do 0 someching will have gone wrong withthe flllmen of A’ intetions. “Moreover A's intending thatthe ceconition should play this pare lips, ink, char he assumes that here is ome chance that wil in fac play this pare, that he docs not regard it ea foregone cont son that he bli wl be induced in the audience whether or nt the fneention behind the utterance is recognized. Short, pethaps, we tay say that “A meant, something by x" is roughly equivalent "uttered » with the intention of inducing a belie by means of the sccogiion ofthis intention.” (This Seems to involve a elexve par sido, bu it doesnot realy do 30) "Now pethaps i is time to drop the pretense that we have to deal only with “informative” cases. Let us start with some examples of| imperatives or quastimperatives. have 2 very avaricious main my ‘oom, and T wane him to go: so [throw a pound note out of the window: Is thee hee any uterance with 4 meaning? No, becase in behaving aI did Id not intend his recognition of my prpose to bein anyway elective in geing him to go. This parallel wo the220 Semantics and Metaphysis photograph cas. If, on the other hand, I had pointed ro the door of iver him Ile pur, then my behavior might well be held to con state a meaningfl, utterance, ast because the recognition of my intention would be intended by me to be ellecive in speeding his de- parnure, Another pair of cases would be 1) a policeman who stops 2 ‘ar by standing in is way and (2) a policeman who stops a car by ‘waving. ‘Or to tur briey co another ype of cas if, 8am examine, ail mda, | may wel cause him distress or indignation or hamilaion; ndil Lam vindictive, may intend this elec apd even intend him 0 fecognize my intention, But T should not be inlined to say that my failing him meant anything. On the other hand, if cut someone im the sret, 1 do eel inclined to assimilate this to the eases of ‘eating and this inclination seems o me dependent on the fet that I could noe easonaby expect hi tobe dressed (indignant, hunted) unless he recognized my intention to affect hin in this sway If my college stopped my salary altogether, should acase them ‘of ruining me if they cut it by one pound, I might accuse them of tnsking me; with some lager eutsT might no know quite what Tethap then we may make the following generalization. (() “A meant, something by 3” is roughly) equialen to “A in- tended the witerance of to produce some eet in an audience by means ofthe recognition ofthis intention"; and we may add that to tse what A meant i to ask fora specication of the intended efece though, of cours, ¢ may nor always be posible to get a straight answer involving a “that” clause, for example, °abebet that). (2) "x meant something” is (oughly) equivalent to “Somebody ‘mean, something by x.” Here agai there wil be eases where thi will ot quite work. el inclined to say that (a regards traf ight) the change to red meant, that che tae was fStop; but it would be very unnatural to say, “Somebody (eg the Corporation) mean. by the relight change thatthe teafic was ro stop.” Nevertheless, there sem tobe some sort of reference somebody intentions. (2) "x means, (mcs) that so-and-0” might asa Bs shot be ‘uated with ome statement or dnjunction of statement about what “people” (vague) intend with qualfcations about “recognition” cffct by | shall have a wotd to say about this. ‘Will any kind of intended eect do or may there be cates where an eects intended (with the required Gualifcations) and yet we should Meaning aa ot want to talk of meaning? Suppose I discovered some person constituted that, when I old him that whenever I granted in 2 Sec ‘way I wanted him to blush or to incur some physical mad, there alter whenever he recognized the grunt (and with fey intention), be ‘id blush or incur the malady: Should we then want fo say tha the ‘grunt meant, something? T donor think so. This pont 0 the fact that for x to have meanings the intended elect mast be something hich in some sense is within the contol ofthe audience, otha in Some sense of “reason” the recognition ofthe intention behind i forthe audience a reason and not merely 4 case. Ie might lok a if there isa sort of pun here ("eeason for beeving™ and “reason for sing”), but Ido no think this is Sevios. For though no doube fro ‘one pine of view questions about reasons fr believing ar questions about evidence and so quite different from uetions about reasons for doing, nevertheless to recognize an uterer intention in uteing 2 (descripve uuerance), to have 2 reason for belering that so-and So, isa eat quite like “having a motive foe” accepting so-and-so, Decisions “that” seem to involve decisions “to™ (and thsi why we fan “refuse 10 believe” and aso be “eompelled to believe”). (The “euting” case needs slightly diferent ueatment, for one ean in any straightforward sense “decide” to he fended; bu one can etuse tobe ofende,) Ie looks, then, 25 the intended effect must be some thing within the control ofthe audience, or atleast the srt of hig which is within ts contol (One point before passing to an objection of two. think follows that from what Ihave said about the connection between mesniniva and recognition of intention that (insofar as Tam right) only what may call the primary intention of an utterer is eelevant to the meaning. ofan unterance. Forfar intending (wit thea of the ecogition of chi intention to induce an eft E, and intend this cfc Eto lead wo a farther elect F, then insoae a the ocarrence of Fis thought tobe dependent solely on F,Leannot reperd F asin the least dependent on recognition of my intention to induce E. Thats, f(y) Timend to get man to do something by giving bit some Jnformation, it cannot be regarded at rlevant 0 the meatig. of my uterance to desrbe what Iiend him odo Now some question maybe raised about my se fay fee of uch words as intention” and "recognition." must disclaim any inten on of peopling all our talking life with armies of complicated py- chological cccurtences.I donot hope to salve any philosophical pus22 Semantics and Metaphysics es about intending, but I do wane briefly to argue that no special {icles ae erred by my ase of the word “intention” i connection ‘vith meaning Firs, there wl be eases where an uteranc is 2c panied or preceded by a conscious “plan,” or explicit formulation of| Intevion (eg. I delare how Lam going to wee or ask myself how to "get something across”). The presence of such an expii “plan” obviously counts fay heavily In favor of the utere’s intention (meaning) being as “planned”; though iis not, think, conclusive: forexample, speaker who has declared an intention psc familar cxpresion in an unfamiliar way may slip nto the familia se Sin layin onlingusc eases: we are asking about an agen iten- ‘on previous expresion counts heavily; nevertheless aman might plan to throw alee inthe dustbin and yet take iw the post; when lifting his hand he mighe "come to" and say either “dn intend to do ths a all” oF “I suppose I must have been intending £0 pt Explicitly formulated linguistic (or quasinguisie)incentons ae ro doubt compatatively eae. In thir absence we would seem rely fon very much the sme kinds of extern a8 we dom he case of son- linguist imentions where there i a general sage. An teers held to imtend to convey whats normally conveyed (or normally intended to be conveyed), and we fequte a good reason for accepting that 2 particular use diverges fom the general usage eg he never knew or had forgotten the general usage Similarly in nonlingusi ass: we are presimed to intend the normal consequences of ou actions. ‘Again, incase where there is doube, say, about which of wo oF ‘more things am utere intends to convey, we tend 0 rele othe co ‘ext (linguistic or etberwse) of the uterance and ak which ofthe alternatives would be elevant o other things he is saying or doing, for which intention ina partcular situation would Bein with some Durpose e obviously hs (eg # man who cls for a “pump” ata fre ‘would not wane a bieye pump. Nonlingustic parallels ae obvious: ‘context is 2 eiterion in sting the question of why a tan who has just put a cgarene in his mouth has put his hand in bis pocker; ele ‘vance to an obvious end criterion in sting why a man running say from a bal certain linguistic eases we ask the uterer afterward abou hi Jncenion, and in fe ofthese case (che very dificult one, sch 38 4 philosopher being asked to explain the meaning ofan unclear pas ‘26 n oe of is works) the answer is nr based on what he femem- Meaning 23 bers bucis mor like a decision, a decision about how wha he sid is tobe taken. canoe ind 2 noelingusic parallel here; but the case S0 special as not to seem to contribute a vital diflerence. {All this i very obvious; but surly 0 show thatthe criteria for jing linguistic intentions ae very ike the ete for edging non linguistic intentions ito show that Linguistic intentions are very like onlnguiscitetions.