SPOUSES BENITO LO BUN TIONG and CAROLINE

SIOK CHING TENG, petitioners, vs. VICENTE BALBOA, respondent.

G.R. No. 158177. January 28, 2008
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Doctrine: Under Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court an action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from an offense charged is necessarily included in the criminal proceedings, unless (1) there is an express waiver
of the civil action, or (2) there is a reservation to institute a separate one, or (3) the civil action was filed prior
to the criminal complaint.

Facts: The spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng (petitioners) charge Vicente Balboa
(respondent) with forum shopping.

On February 24, 1997, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 34), Civil Case No.
9782225 for Collection of Sum of Money against petitioners. The amount sought covers three post-dated checks
issued by petitioner Caroline Siok Ching Teng (Caroline)

On July 21, 1997, separate criminal complaints for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. No. 22) were filed
against Caroline before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Manila (Branch 10), covering the said three checks.
Criminal Case Nos. 277576 to 78.

Thereafter, in a Decision dated December 5, 2001, rendered, the MTC acquitted Caroline of the offenses charged
for failure of prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The MTC, however, found Caroline civilly
liable in favor of respondent for the amounts covered by the checks. Caroline sought partial reconsideration of the
MTC Decision it was denied by the MTC. Thus, Caroline appealed to the RTC.

In the meantime, petitioners brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on appeal the RTC Decision in Civil Case
No.9782225

Petitioners contend respondent’s act of filing Civil Case No. 97-82225 and Criminal Cases Nos.277576 to 78
constitutes forum shopping.

Issue: Whether filing the Civil case and Criminal case for the same cause in this case is tantamount to forum
shopping

Ruling: No. Civil Case No. 97-82225 was filed on February 24, 1997, and Criminal Cases Nos.277576 to 78 on July
21, 1997, prior to the adoption of Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on September 16, 1997 (which was later
adopted as Rule 111 (b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). Thus, at the time of filing of Civil Case
No. 97-82225 and Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78, the governing rule is Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of
Court: SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Under the foregoing rule, an action for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense charged is necessarily
included in the criminal proceedings, unless (1) there is an express waiver of the civil action, or (2) there is a
reservation to institute a separate one, or (3) the civil action was filed prior to the criminal complaint. Since
respondent instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then Civil Case No. 97-82225 may proceed
independently of Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78, and there is no forum shopping to speak of.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated November 20, 2002 and Resolution
dated April 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
 YAKULT PHILIPPINES AND LARRY SALVADO, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, WENCESLAO M. POLO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Br. 19 of the RTC of Manila, and ROY CAMASO, respondents.
G.R. No. 91856 October 5, 1990
GANCAYCO, J.:

Doctrine: Institution of a separate civil action prior to the presentation of prosecution evidence in the criminal case,
with the judge handling the criminal case duly informed of such institution, is even better than compliance with the
requirement of express reservation.—Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous
reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in
the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof, then the actual filing of the civil
action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by
the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence. The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to
prevent the offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission.

Facts: On December 24, 1982, a five-year old boy, Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M. de la Fuente
Street, Sampaloc, Manila, was sideswiped by a Yamaha motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines and driven by its
employee, Larry Salvado. The latter was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical
injuries in an information that was filed on January 6, 1983, with the then City Court of Manila, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 027184. On October 19, 1984 a complaint for damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by
his father, David Camaso, against Yakult Philippines and Larry Salvado in the Regional Trial Court of Manila
docketed as Civil Case No. 84-27317. A decision was rendered in the civil case ordering defendants Yakult and
Salvado to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff sums for actual expenses for medical services and hospital bills,
attorney’s fee, and the costs of the suit.

Issue: Whether a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper even if there was no reservation
to file a separate civil action

Ruling: Yes, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Although the incident in question and the actions arising therefrom were instituted before the promulgation of the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, its provisions which are procedural may apply retrospectively to the present
case. Under the aforecited provisions of the rule, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the right to institute it separately.
Neither has the offended party instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action. However, the civil action in
this case was filed in court before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution in the criminal action of
which the judge presiding on the criminal case was duly informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action
no damages was awarded.
RUBEN MANIAGO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (First Division), HON. RUBEN C. AYSON, in his capacity
as Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Baguio City, and ALFREDO BOADO, respondents.
G.R. No. 104392
MENDOZA, J.:

Doctrine: The right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from
crime (ex delicto) or from quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be
deemed instituted with the criminal action.—After considering the arguments of the parties, we have reached the
conclusion that the right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule
111, §1, otherwise it should be dismissed. To begin with, §1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made
to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been
instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those which arise “from the offense charged,”
as originally provided in Rule 111 before the amendment of the Rules of Court in 1988. In other words, the right of
the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or
from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with
the criminal action.

Facts: Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of
the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority in
Loakan, Baguio City. On January 7, 1990, one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney
owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. As a result of the accident, a criminal
case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed on March 2,
1990, against petitioner’s driver, Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch III, where it
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7514-R. A month later, on April 19, 1990, a civil case for damages was filed by
private respondent Boado against petitioner himself. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2050-R, was
assigned to Branch IV of the same court. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case
against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver.

Issue: Whether or not the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal action when no reservation of
right to bring it separately was made.

Ruling: No, there is a difference between allowing the trial of civil actions to proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution and requiring that, before they may be instituted at all, a reservation to bring them separately must
be made. Put in another way, it is the conduct of the trial of the civil action—not its institution through the filing of
a complaint—which is allowed to proceed independently of the outcome of the criminal case.

In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convicted
and found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable for damages. But if the right to bring a
separate civil action (whether arising from the crime or from quasi delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility
that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil
liability of the accused. In such a case the institution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil
Code would not result in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission.
 AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners,
vs. MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
G.R. No. 145391
CARPIO, J.:

Doctrine: Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111 what is “deemed instituted” with the criminal action is only the
action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. —Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what
is “deemed instituted” with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or
ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer “deemed
instituted,” and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal
action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code.

Facts: Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya and the other owned by petitioner Roberto
Capitulo and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan
and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089. When the civil case
was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed
a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case.
The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999, and dismissed the civil case.

Issue: Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and
independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.

Ruling: The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is
based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. Any aggrieved person can
invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of
the fault or negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action
under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case
may invoke these articles.

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires the accused
to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any
cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action,
there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where
the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict -
without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently
of each other.
 MADO F. CABAERO and CARMEN C. PEREZ, petitioners, vs.
HON. ALFREDO C. CANTOS in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. VII, and EPIFANIO CERALDE, respondents.
G.R. No. 102942
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Doctrine: Until there are definitive rules of procedure to govern the institution, prosecution, and resolution of the
civil aspect (and the consequences and implications thereof) impliedly instituted in a criminal case, trial courts
should limit their jurisdiction to the civil liability of the accused arising from the criminal case.

Facts: This petition emanated from Crim. Case No. 90-18826 of the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”) of Manila. Said
case commenced 6 on October 18, 1990, with the filing of an Information against petitioners charging them with
estafa for allegedly defrauding private respondent Epifanio Ceralde of the sum of P1,550,000.00

Petitioners conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud one EPIFANIO CERALDE by inducing EPIFANIO CERALDE to advance the total
amount of P1,550,000.00 to bevpaid to M.C. Castro Construction, Co. representing the purchase price of six (6)
parcels of land located in Pangasinan which the Aqualand Ventures & Management Corporation, a joint business
venture organized by accused AMADO F. CABAERO and the said EPIFANIO CERALDE, purchased from the said
company, withthe understanding that the said amount would be returned to the said EPIFANIO CERALDE as soon
as the loan for P1,500,000.00 applied. On April 2, 9 1991, petitioners filed an Answer with Counter-claim
alleging that the money loaned from Solid bank mentioned in the Information was duly applied to the purchase
of the six (6) parcels of land in Pangasinan, and that the filing of said Information was unjustified and malicious.

Issue: Whether or not the counterclaim can be filed in the criminal case

Ruling: Yes, Judge Cantos ruled that “this is a criminal case wherein the civil liability of the accused is impliedly
instituted therein.” This justification begs the question. Basically, that is the reason why petitioners herein filed
their answer with counterclaim for, apparently, in hiring a private prosecutor, Private Respondent Ceralde
intended to prosecute his civil claim together with the criminal action. Hence, as a protective measure, petitioners
filed their counter claim in the same case. Since under Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court, the civil
action which is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action, if not waived or reserved, includes recovery
of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
 NEPLUM, INC., petitioner, vs. EVELYN V. ORBESO, respondent.
G.R. No. 141986
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Doctrine: An offended party’s appeal of the civil liability ex delicto of a judgment of acquittal should be filed within
15 days from notice of the judgment or the final order appealed from; Trial courts are directed to cause, in criminal
cases, the service of their judgments upon the private offended parties or their duly appointed counsels—the
private prosecutors.

Facts: On 29 October 1999, the trial court promulgated its judgment acquitting the accused of the crime of estafa
on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused
and her counsel as well as the public and private prosecutors were present during such promulgation. On 29
November 1999, petitioner filed its 25 November 1999 Motion for Reconsideration (Civil Aspect) of the Judgment.
Considering that 27 November 1999 was a Saturday, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration on 29
November 1999, a Monday. On 31 January 2000, a Monday, petitioner filed its 28 January 2000 Notice of Appeal
from the Judgment. On the same day, petitioner filed by registered mail its 28 January 2000 Amended Notice of
Appeal.

On 17 February 2000, the Trial Court issued its Challenged Order, which petitioner received through the private
prosecutor on 22 February 2000, denying due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of
Appeal.

The RTC refused to give due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal and Amended Notice of Appeal. It accepted
respondent’s arguments that the Judgment from which the appeal was being taken had become final, because the
Notice of Appeal and the Amended Notice of Appeal were filed beyond the reglementary period. The 15-day
period was counted by the trial court from the promulgation of the Decision sought to be reviewed.

Issue: Whether or not the period from which a private offended party may appeal from the civil aspect of a
judgment in a civil action should be reckoned from the date of receipt of a written notice of judgment

Ruling: No, the period for appeal was to be counted from the date of promulgation of the decision.

From the time the offended party had actual or constructive knowledge of the judgment, whether it be during its
promulgation or as a consequence of the service of the notice of the decision.

An offended party’s appeal of the civil liability ex delicto of a judgment of acquittal should be filed within 15 days
from notice of the judgment or the final order appealed from. To implement this holding, trial courts are hereby
directed to cause, in criminal cases, the service of their judgments upon the private offended parties or their duly
appointed counsels—the private prosecutors. This step will enable them to appeal the civil aspects under the
appropriate circumstances.

At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure deleted the requirement of reserving
independent civil actions and allowed these to proceed separately from criminal ones. Thus, the civil actions
referred to in Articles 32,33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code shall remain “separate, distinct and independent” of any
Criminal prosecution based on the same act.
 AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners,
vs. MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
G.R. No. 145391
CARPIO, J.:

Doctrine: Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111 what is “deemed instituted” with the criminal action is only the
action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. —Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what
is “deemed instituted” with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or
ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer “deemed
instituted,” and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal
action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code.

Facts: Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya and the other owned by petitioner Roberto
Capitulo and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan
and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089. When the civil case
was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed
a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case.
The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999, and dismissed the civil case.

Issue: Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and
independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.

Ruling: The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is
based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. Any aggrieved person can
invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of
the fault or negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action
under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case
may invoke these articles.

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires the accused
to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any
cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action,
there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where
the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict -
without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently
of each other.
 SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC. and EDUARDO JAVIER, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Thirteenth Division) and PIONEER INSURANCE and SURETY CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 119771
MARTINEZ, J.:

Doctrine: It is easily deducible from the present wording of Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court as brought
about by the 1988 amendments to the Rules on Criminal Procedure—particularly the phrase “. . . which has been
reserved”—that the “independent” character of these civil actions does not do away with the reservation
requirement. Prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can be
instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action.

Facts: At around 3:30 in the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U.
Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) figured in a vehicular mishap
at the intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking
the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2) passengers in the process. A criminal case was thereafter filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging the driver of the bus, herein petitioner
Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries.

About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety
Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner SILI with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a motor vehicle insurance
policy as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00 (P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00
as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 as
appearance fees. With the issues having been joined upon the filing of the petitioners’ answer to the complaint for
damages and after submission by the parties of their respective pre-trial briefs, petitioners filed on September 18,
1992, a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Civil Proceedings grounded on the pendency of the criminal case
against petitioner Javier in the Pasig RTC and the failure of respondent PISC to make a reservation to file a separate
damage suit in said criminal action. This was denied by the Manila Regional Trial Court.

Issue: The two (2) crucial issues to be resolved in this case:

1)If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case?

2)Can a subrogee of an offended party maintain an independent civil action during the pendency of a criminal
action when no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was made in the criminal action and
despite the fact that the private complainant is actively participating through a private prosecutor in the
aforementioned criminal case?

Ruling: Section 3 of the same rule which states: “When civil action may proceed independently.—In the cases
provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action which
has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.”

There is no dispute that these so-called “independent civil actions” based on the aforementioned Civil Code
articles are the exceptions to the primacy of the criminal action over the civil action as set forth in Section 2 of Rule
111. Further, the Court rules that a subrogee-plaintiff may institute and prosecute the civil action, it being allowed
by Article 2207 of the Civil Code.
 JULIANA P. YAP, petitioner, vs.
MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR.,
Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato, respondents.
G.R. No. 101236
CRUZ, J.:

Doctrine: For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues
raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Facts: On October 31, 1971, according to Yap, Paras sold to her his share in the intestate estate of their parents for
P300.00. The sale was evidenced by a private document. Nineteen years later, on May 2,1990, Paras sold the same
property to Santiago Saya-ang for P5,000.00. This was evidenced by a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. When Yap
learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City. On the same date, she filed a complaint for the nullification of the
said sale with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City. After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor
instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan,
South Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr. On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused,
the trial judge motu proprio issued an order dismissing the criminal case.

Issue: Whether the Judge is correct in motu proprio dismissing the criminal case?

Ruling: No, the criminal case must not be dismissed but only suspends it. The criminal case shouldn’t be dismissed
outright as it requires a motion first from the proper party.

Section 6, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended by this Court on July 7, 1988, provides
that the suspension by reason of prejudicial question. —A petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon
the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of the fiscal or the court conducting
the preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall
be filed in the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution rests.

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in
another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The order dismissing the criminal action without a motion for suspension in accordance with Rule 111, Section 6,
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended, and even without the accused indicating his defense in the
civil case for the annulment of the second sale, suggests not only ignorance of the law but also bias on the part of
the respondent judge.
 ARTURO ALANO, petitioner,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRICO A. LANZANAS,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 37, and ROBERTO CARLOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 111244
ROMERO, J.:

Doctrine: The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action

A stipulation of facts by the parties in a criminal case is recognized as declarations constituting judicial admissions,
hence, binding upon the parties. The stipulation of facts stated in a pre-trial order amounts to an admission by a
party resulting in the waiver of his right to present evidence on his behalf.

Facts: On or about June 10, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Roberto S. Carlos. The said accused, pretending to be still the owner of a parcel
of land with an area of 1,172 square meters, more or less, located at Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, covered by
Tax Declaration No. 120-004-00398, well knowing that he had previously sold the same to the said Roberto S.
Carlos for P30,000.00, sold the aforesaid property for the second time to one Erlinda B. Dandoy for P87,900.00,
thereby depriving the said Roberto S. Carlos of his rightful ownership/possession of the said parcel of land, to the
damage and prejudice of the said Roberto S. Carlos in the aforesaid amount of P30,000.00, Philippine currency.

Petitioner moved for the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that there was a prejudicial question
pending resolution in another case being tried in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. In relation to the Civil Case filed,
Carlos filed a complaint against the petitioner seeking the annulment of the second sale of said parcel of land
made by the petitioner to a certain Erlinda Dandoy on the premise that the said land was previously sold to them.

Petitioner contends that he never sold the property to the private respondents and that his signature appearing in
the deed of absolute sale in favor of the latter was a forgery, hence, the alleged sale was fictitious and inexistent.
At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that the civil case was filed on March 1, 1985, five years before June 19,
1990 when the criminal case for estafa was instituted.

Issue: Whether or not the stipulation of facts by the parties in a criminal case is recognized as declarations
constituting judicial admissions, hence binding upon the parties.

Ruling: Yes, the stipulation of facts stated in the pre-trial order amounts to an admission by the petitioner resulting
in the waiver of his right to present evidence on his behalf. While it is true that the right to present evidence is
guaranteed under the Constitution, this right may be waived expressly or impliedly.

Since the suspension of the criminal case due to a prejudicial question is only a procedural matter, the same is
subject to a waiver by virtue of the prior acts of the accused. After all, the doctrine of waiver is made solely for the
benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without
infringing on any public right and without detriment to the community at large.

Accordingly, petitioner’s admission in the stipulation of facts during the pre-trial of the criminal amounts to a
waiver of his defense of forgery in the civil case. Hence, we have no reason to nullify such waiver, it being not
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the pre-trial order was signed by the petitioner
himself. As such, the rule that no proof need be offered as to any facts admitted at a pre-trial hearing applies.
 JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, respondents.
G.R. No. 183805
PERALTA, J.:

Doctrine: Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime of
bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage
was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.

He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.

Facts: On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City. The accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said
marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract
a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice of the latter.

Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in
the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3)
the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question
in the instant criminal case. The RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient
invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent
marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning. Thereafter, the
petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for
bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private respondent had already
been declared void by the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the
criminal case of bigamy.

Ruling: No, the elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the
marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that
the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.

In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the Information
was filed on June 28, 2004. It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y.
Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous
nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial
declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the
crime of bigamy. Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime
of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first
marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.

Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense,
and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. It is clear then that the crime
of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent.
Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a
criminal charge for bigamy against him.
 SPS. CAROLINA and REYNALDO JOSE, petitioners, vs.
SPS. LAUREANO and PURITA SUAREZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 176795
TINGA, J.:

Doctrine: Prejudicial Questions; The court ruled that there were prejudicial questions considering that the defense
against the charge of forgery in the civil case is based on the very same facts which would be determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the respondent in the estafa case.

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.

What the law punishes is the issuance and/or drawing of a check and upon presentment for deposit or encashment,
it was dishonored due to insufficient funds [or] account closed.

Facts: Respondents, spouses Laureano and Purita Suarez, had availed of petitioner Carolina Jose’s (Carolina) offer
to lend money at the daily interest rate of 1% to 2%. However, Carolina and her husband, petitioner Reynaldo Jose,
later on increased the interest to 5% per day, which respondents were forced to accept because they allegedly had
no other option left. It then became a practice that petitioners would give the loaned money to Purita and the
latter would deposit the same in her and her husband’s account to cover the maturing postdated checks they had
previously issued in payment of their other loans. Purita would then issue checks in favor of petitioners in payment
of the amount borrowed from them with the agreed 5% daily interest.

In 2004, respondents filed a complaint against petitioners seeking the declaration of “nullity of interest of 5% per
day, fixing of interest, recovery of interest payments” and the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, alleging
that the interest rate of 5% a day is iniquitous, contrary to morals, done under vitiated consent and imposed using
undue influence by taking improper advantage of their financial distress. They claimed that due to serious liquidity
problems, they were forced to rely on borrowings from banks and individual lenders, including petitioners, and
that they had to scramble for funds to cover the maturing postdated checks they issued to cover their other
borrowings.

Thereafter, at the instance of Carolina, several cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 226 were filed against respondent
Purita before the MTCC of Cebu City, Branches 2 and 5. Purita, in turn filed motions to suspend the criminal
proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question, on the theory that the checks subject of the B.P. Blg. 22 cases
are void for being contra bonos mores or for having been issued in payment of the iniquitous and unconscionable
interest imposed by petitioners. The motions were denied.

Issue: Whether or not a prejudicial question exists such that the outcome of the validity of the interest rate is
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the respondent spouses in the criminal case.

Ruling: The prejudicial question theory advanced by respondents must fail.

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential
elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Now the
prejudicial question posed by respondents is simply this: whether the daily interest rate of 5% is void, such that the
checks issued by respondents to cover said interest are likewise void for being contra bonos mores, and thus the
cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In the first place, the validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not
determinative of the guilt of respondents in the criminal cases. The Court has consistently declared that the cause
or reason for the issuance of a check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under B.P. Blg. 22.25 In
several instances, we have held that what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the
purpose for which it was issued or the terms and conditions relating to its issuance; and that the mere act of
issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum provided the other elements of the offense are properly proved.
 SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR STEWART ALLAN A. MARIANO, ASSISTANT STATE
PROSECUTOR VIMAR M. BARCELLANO and ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR GERARD E. GAERLAN, petitioners, vs.
MARIO JOEL T. REYES, respondent.
G.R. No. 209330
LEONEN, J.:

Doctrine: Preliminary Investigation; Prosecutors are given a wide latitude of discretion to determine whether an
information should be filed in court or whether the complaint should be dismissed. An accused’s right to a
preliminary investigation is merely statutory; it is not a right guaranteed by the Constitution.

Facts: Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), also known as “Doc Gerry,” was a veterinarian and anchor of several radio
shows in Palawan. On January 24, 2011, at around 10:30 a.m., he was shot dead inside the Baguio Wagwagan
Ukay-ukay in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. After a brief chase with police officers, Marlon B. Recamata
was arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also
implicated Rodolfo “Bumar” O. Edrad (Edrad), Dennis C. Aranas, and Armando “Salbakotah” R. Noel, Jr.

On February 6, 2011, Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salay-say before the Counter-Terrorism Division of the
National Bureau of Investigation where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes who
ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega.

On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department Order No. 0918 creating a special panel
of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation. The First Panel concluded its preliminary
investigation and issued the Resolution dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint.

On June 28, 2011, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation, which, among others,
sought the admission of mobile phone communications between former Governor Reyes and Edrad. On July 7,
2011, while the Motion to Re-Open was still pending, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the Resolution dated June 8, 2011. Both Motions were denied by the First Panel in
the Resolution dated September 2, 2011. On September 7, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order
No. 710 creating a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.

Petitioners’ position was that the First Panel “appear[ed] to have ignored the rules of preliminary investigation”
when it refused to receive additional evidence that would have been crucial for the determination of the existence
of probable cause. They assert that respondent was not deprived of due process when the reinvestigation was
ordered since he was not prevented from presenting controverting evidence to Dr. Inocencio-Ortega’s additional
evidence. Petitioners argue that since the Information had been filed, the disposition of the case was already
within the discretion of the trial court.

Issue: Whether the Secretary of Justice erred in filing the case against the respondent thru the 2nd Panel despite
the dismissal of the 1st Panel of prosecutors for lack of sufficient evidence in the preliminary investigation

Ruling: No, in a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused.
The prosecutor only determines “whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.”

The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of any finding or recommendation by the First Panel or
the Second Panel, that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against respondent. Probable
cause has been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the case, therefore, has transferred to the trial court. A
petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary investigation in any other venue has been
rendered moot by the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment.
 SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, petitioner, vs.
HON. EPHREM S. ABANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Hilongos, Leyte, Branch 18
G.R. No. 176830
SERENO, CJ.:

Doctrine: A preliminary investigation is “not a casual affair.” It is conducted to protect the innocent from the
embarrassment, expense and anxiety of a public trial. While the right to have a preliminary investigation before
trial is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a substantive right and a component of due process in the
administration of criminal justice.

Facts: On 26 August 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army discovered a mass grave
site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP at Sitio Sapang Daco, Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte. Recovered from the grave
site were 67 severely deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims of Operation Venereal Disease

Police Chief Inspector George L. Almaden (PC/Insp. Almaden) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional
Office 8 and Staff Judge Advocate Captain Allan Tiu (Army Captain Tiu) of the 8th Infantry Division of the Philippine
Army sent 12 undated letters to the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte through Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rosulo
U. Vivero (Prosecutor Vivero). The letters requested appropriate legal action on 12 complaint-affidavits attached
therewith accusing 71 named members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army/National
Democratic Front of the Philippines (CPP/NPA/NDFP) of murder, including petitioners herein along with several
other unnamed members.

They claimed that copies of the subpoena, the complaint and other supporting documents never reached them so
that they were denied due process during the preliminary investigation, but the Court held that efforts were made
by sending these to their addresses. Also, the judge complied with the Constitutional requirements in his
determination of probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ right to due process was violated during the preliminary investigation

Ruling: No, Section 3(d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, allows Prosecutor Vivero to resolve the complaint based on
the evidence before him if a respondent could not be subpoenaed. As long as efforts to reach a respondent were
made, and he was given an opportunity to present countervailing evidence, the preliminary investigation remains
valid. The rule was put in place in order to foil underhanded attempts of a respondent to delay the prosecution of
offenses.

In this case, the Resolution stated that efforts were undertaken to serve subpoenas on the named respondents at
their last known addresses. This is sufficient for due process. It was only because a majority of them could no
longer be found at their last known addresses that they were not served copies of the complaint and the attached
documents or evidence.
 JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE, petitioner, vs. HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON.
EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 182677
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

Doctrine: A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where
the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day without regard to fine. As an
exception, the rules provide that there is no need for a preliminary investigation in cases of a lawful arrest without
a warrant involving such type of offense, so long as an inquest, where available, has been conducted.

There is no substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are
conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and
should be held for trial.

Facts: Jose Antonio C. Leviste was, by Information3 of January 16, 2007, charged with homicide for the death of
Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Branch 150 to which the
case was raffled, presided by Judge Elmo Alameda, forthwith issued a commitment order against petitioner who
was placed under police custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center.

After petitioner posted a P40,000 cash bond which the trial court approved, he was released from detention, and
his arraignment was set on January 24, 2007.

The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent
Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-
examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.

The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24, 2007 deferring petitioner’s arraignment and allowing the
prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense and submit a recommendation within 30
days from its inception, inter alia; and (2) Order of January 31, 2007 denying reconsideration of the first order.
Petitioner assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.

The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders, viz: (1) Order of February 7, 2007, that admitted the
Amended Information for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and (2) Order of February 8,
2007 which set the arraignment on February 13, 2007. Petitioner questioned these two orders via supplemental
petition before the appellate court. The appellate court dismissed petitioner’s petition.

Issue: Whether or not in cases when an accused is arrested without a warrant, the remedy of preliminary
investigation belongs only to the accused.

Ruling: No, the Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation, subject to and in light of the
ensuing disquisition. All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor. The private complainant in a criminal case is merely a witness and
not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the reinvestigation of the case after the information had
been filed in court, the proper party for that being the public prosecutor who has the control of the prosecution of
the case. Thus, in cases where the private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal action,
and is granted the authority to prosecute, the private complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the
public prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation.

Once the trial court grants the prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to
the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the
prosecution is thus equipped with discretion – wide and far reaching – regarding the disposition thereof, subject to
the trial court’s approval of the resulting proposed course of action.
TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA, ARTURO E. MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H. DIZON,
BENJAMIN DE LEON, DELFIN C. GONZALEZ, JR., and BEN YU LIM, JR., petitioners, vs.
MAGDALENO M. PEÑA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Bago City, respondents.
G.R. No. 143591
NACHURA, J.:

Doctrine: The general rule is that this Court does not review the factual findings of the trial court, which include the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest—it is only in exceptional cases when this
Court may set aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence of probable cause, that is,
when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of
justice.

Facts: Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses,
damages, and attorney’s fees,2 against Urban Bank and the petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Negros Occidental, Bago City. The case was raffled to Branch 62 and was dock-eted as Civil Case No. 754.
Respondent anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of agency3 allegedly entered into with the
petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter
from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s property located along Roxas Boulevard Pasay City. Petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Attached to the motion
were the following documents: 1) a letter dated December 19, 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad on
behalf of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property; 2) an unsigned letter dated
December 7, 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; 3) a letter dated December 9, 1994
addressed to Teodoro Borlongan and signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and 4) a Memorandum dated November 20, 1994
from Enrique Montilla III. Said documents were presented in an attempt to show that the respondent was
appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners. In a Resolution dated September 23, 1998,
the City Prosecutor concluded that the petitioners were probably guilty of four (4) counts of the crime of
Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully
stated that ISCI was the principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were falsified
considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and that the documents formed part of the record of Civil
Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in
their answer and later, in their Pre-Trial Brief. Subsequently, the corresponding Informations were filed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 6683, 6684,
6685, and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners.

Petitioners insisted that they were denied due process because of the non-observance of the proper procedure on
preliminary investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether petitioners were deprived of their right to due process of law because of the denial of their right to
preliminary investigation and to submit their counter-affidavit.

Ruling: Yes, records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the complaint-affidavit of the respondent and did
not require the petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits. The prosecutor should not be faulted for taking this
course of action, because it is sanctioned by the Rules. To reiterate, upon the filing of the complaint and affidavit
with respect to cases cognizable by the MTCC, the prosecutor shall take the appropriate action based on the
affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant. It means that the prosecutor may either
dismiss the complaint if he does not see sufficient reason to proceed with the case, or file the information if he
finds probable cause. The prosecutor is not mandated to require the submission of counter-affidavits. Probable
cause may then be determined on the basis alone of the affidavits and supporting documents of the complainant,
without infringing on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.
 SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIELD INVESTIGATION OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and ATTY. LEVITO D. BALIGOD, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 212761-62
CARPIO, J.:

Doctrine: In determining probable cause, the average person weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to
the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he or she has no technical knowledge.—Under Sections 1 and 3,
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, probable cause is needed to be established by the investigating
officer, to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial, during preliminary
investigation.

Facts: Petitioners are charged as coconspirators for their respective participation in the illegal pillaging of public
funds sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) of Estrada for the years 2004 to 2012. The
charges are contained in two (2) complaints, namely: (1) a Complaint for Plunder filed by the National Bureau of
Investigation and Atty. Levito D. Baligod (NBI Complaint) on 16 September 2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0313;
and (2) a Complaint for Plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 30196 filed by the Field Investigation Office of
the Ombudsman (FIO Complaint) on 18 November 2013, docketed as OMB-C-C-13-0397, both before the
Ombudsman. After considering the testimonial and documentary evidence, the Ombudsman concluded that
petitionersconspired with the DBM personnel, and the heads of the Implementing Agencies (IAs), specifically
National Agribusiness Corporation (NABCOR), National Livelihood Development Corporation (NLDC), and
TechnologyResource Center (TRC), in amassing ill-gotten wealth by diverting the PDAF of Estrada from its intended
projectrecipients to Janet Lim Napoles (JLN)-controlled non-government organizations (NGOs), specifically
Masaganang Ani Para sa Magsasaka Foundation, Inc. (MAMFI) and Social Development Program for Farmers
Foundation, Inc. (SDPFFI). Estrada, in particular, took advantage of his official position and amassed,accumulated,
and acquired ill-gotten wealth by receiving money from Napoles, through Tuason and Labayen, inthe amount of
P183,793,750.00 in exchange for endorsing JLN-controlled NGOs to the IAs of his PDAF-funded projects.

Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed any grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed
Resolution and order ultimately finding probable cause against Estrada, De Asis, and Napoles for the charges
against them.

Ruling: No, given the ample supporting evidence it has on hand, the Ombudsman’s exercise of prerogative to
charge Estrada with plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 was not whimsical, capricious, or arbitrary, as
to amount to grave abuse of discretion. Estrada’s bare claim to the contrary cannot prevail over such positive
findings of the Ombudsman. In Reyes, we unanimously ruled that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse its
discretion in finding probable cause to indict Reyes of plunder and violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 after its
consideration that the testimonial and documentary evidence are substantial enough to reasonably conclude that
Reyes had, in all probability, participated in the PDAF scam and, hence, must stand trial therefor. The testimonial
and documentary evidence relied upon by the Ombudsman in Reyes are: (a) the declarations of the whistle-
blowers Luy, Sula, and Suñas; (b) Tuason’s verified statement which corroborated the whistle-blowers accounts; (c)
the business ledgers prepared by witness Luy, showing the amounts received by Senator Enrile, through Tuason
and Reyes, as his “commission” from the so-called PDAF scam; (d) the 2007-2009 COA Report documenting the
results of the special audit undertaken on PDAF disbursements — that there were serious irregularities relating to
the implementation of PDAF-funded projects, including those endorsed by Senator Enrile; and (e) the reports on
the independent field verification conducted in 2013 by the investigators of the FIO which secured sworn
statements of local government officials and purported beneficiaries of the supposed projects which turned out to
be inexistent.
 CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175013
CARPIO, J.:

Doctrine: A preliminary investigation is the crucial sieve in the criminal justice system which spells for an individual
the difference between months if not years of agonizing trial and possibly jail term, on the one hand, and peace of
mind and liberty, on the other hand. Thus, we have characterized the right to a preliminary investigation as not “a
mere formal or technical right” but a “substantive” one, forming part of due process in criminal justice. This
especially holds true here where the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua and may be non-bailable
for those accused as principals.

Facts: Following the issuance by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 on 24
February 2006 declaring a “State of National Emergency,” police officers arrested Beltran on 25 February 2006,
while he was en route to Marilao, Bulacan, and detained him in Camp Crame, Quezon City. Beltran was arrested
without a warrant and the arresting officers did not inform Beltran of the crime for which he was arrested. On that
evening, Beltran was subjected to an inquest at the Quezon City Hall of Justice for Inciting to Sedition under Article
142 of the Revised Penal Code based on a speech Beltran allegedly gave during a rally in Quezon City on 24
February 2006, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution. The inquest was based on the joint
affidavit of Beltran’s arresting officers who claimed to have been present at the rally. The inquest prosecutor
indicted Beltran and filed the corresponding Information with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
(MeTC).The authorities brought back Beltran to Camp Crame where, on 27 February 2006, he was subjected to a
second inquest, with 1st Lt. Lawrence San Juan (San Juan), this time for Rebellion. A panel of State prosecutors
from the DOJ conducted this second inquest. The inquest was based on two letters, both dated 27 February 2006,
of Yolanda Tanigue (Tanigue) and of Rodolfo Mendoza (Mendoza). Tanigue is the Acting Executive Officer of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG), Philippine National Police (PNP), while Mendoza is the Acting
Deputy Director of the CIDG. The letters referred to the DOJ for appropriate action the results of the CIDG’s
investigation implicating Beltran, the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 172074-76, San Juan, and several others as “leaders
and promoters” of an alleged foiled plot to overthrow the Arroyo government. The plot was supposed to be
carried out jointly by members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Makabayang Kawal ng
Pilipinas (MKP), which have formed a “tactical alliance.” The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-452,
was raffled to Branch 137 under Presiding Judge Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-Delorino (Judge Delorino).Beltran moved
that Branch 137 make a judicial determination of probable cause against him. Before the motion could be
resolved, Judge Delorino recused herself from the case which was re-raffled to Branch 146 under Judge
Encarnacion Jaja-Moya (Judge Moya).

Issue: Whether there was an irregularity in the Preliminary Investigation

Ruling: Yes, Preliminary Investigation is with irregularities. The procedure for preliminary investigation of offenses
punishable by at least four years, two months and one day is outlined in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.The respondent shall have the right to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant
which he may not have been furnished and to copy them at his expense. If the evidence is voluminous, the
complainant may be required to specify those which he intends to present against the respondent, and these shall
be made available for examination or copying by the respondent at his expense. Instead of following this
procedure scrupulously, as what this Court had mandated in an earlier ruling, “so that the constitutional right to
liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any material damage,”38 respondent prosecutors
nonchalantly disregarded it. Respondent prosecutors failed to comply with Section 3(a) of Rule 112 which provides
that the complaint (which, with its attachment, must be of such number as there are respondents) be
accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, subscribed and sworn to before any
prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, before a
notary public.