Source:

South African Case Law, Juta's (1838 to date)/CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF CASES – 1838 to date/1961/Volume 2: 611 ­ 829 (June)/BODEMER, NO v AMERICAN
INSURANCE CO 1961 (2) SA 662 (A)

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http://jutastat.juta.co.za/nxt/gateway.dll/sacl/3/25970/26249/26262?f=templates$fn=default.htm

BODEMER, NO v AMERICAN INSURANCE CO 1961 (2) SA 662 (A)

1961 (2) SA p662

Citation 1961 (2) SA 662 (A)

Court Appellate Division

Judge Hoexter JA, Van Blerk JA, Ogilvie Thompson JA, Holmes JA and Jennett AJA

Heard March 3, 1961

Judgment March 9, 1961

Annotations Link to Case Annotations

Flynote : Sleutelwoorde
Insurance ­ Personal accident policy ­ Duty of insured to disclose that he had an artificial leg ­ Deceased insuring through an agent ­ Agent at
request of insurance company's branch manager signing proposal on deceased's behalf ­ Agent unaware that deceased had an artificial leg ­
Policy issued ­ Only thereafter that D deceased knew a proposal form had been signed on his behalf ­ Failure to disclose nevertheless fatal to
the policy.
Headnote : Kopnota
When respondent had been sued under a personal accident insurance policy it had repudiated liability on the ground that the deceased had
failed to disclose that he had an artificial leg. It appeared that one R, an employee in a firm of bookkeepers some 27 miles away, had kept the
books E of the deceased, that the firm had also acted as canvassing agents for various insurance companies including the respondent, and that
the deceased had instructed R to have his life insured for the maximum. R had then asked his employer N to make out a cover note as agent for
the respondent in favour of the deceased. which was signed by N but never sent to the deceased, though a copy thereof was sent to the
respondent. Some time afterwards one M, the manager of respondent's local branch, F had visited this firm at Bethal, and was asked by it to
proceed to the deceased at Hendrina to get him to sign the application form. M, however, maintained that it was unnecessary for him to do so
and that N could sign the form. N had then signed the form containing the usual proposal and declaration, and thereafter respondent had issued
the policy. Neither R nor N had been aware that the deceased had an artificial leg, and N had signed the declaration that the deceased suffered
from no physical disability. N had not had the deceased's G authority to sign the proposal form and the deceased had not known, before he
actually received the policy, that a proposal form had been signed on his behalf. The action having been dismissed with costs in a Provincial
Division, in an appeal it was contended on appellant's behalf that the deceased had had no real opportunity of disclosure before the policy was
delivered to him, and that his duty to disclose fell away when the policy was delivered to him.
Held, that the failure to disclose was fatal to the policy.
H Held, further, that an application now made for the first time on appellant's behalf to amend the declaration by introducing a claim for
rectification could not be granted as the issue involved in the new claim had not been properly canvassed at the trial.
The decision in the Transvaal Provincial Division in Bodemer, N.O v American Insurance Company, 1960 (4) SA 428, confirmed.
Case Information
Appeal from a decision in the Transvaal Provincial Division (GAL­GUT, J.). The facts appear from the judgment of HOEXTER, J.A.

1961 (2) SA p663

G. Viljoen, Q.C. (with him C. P. Joubert), for the appellant: In die Hof a quo het appellante haar beroep op die sogenaamde 'estoppel by recital'
van die Engelse reg en daar is gesteun op die beslissing in Pearl Life Assurance Co v Greenhalgh & Johnson, 1909 (2) K.B. 288. Die Hof het egter
die beroep op die gemelde beginsel verwerp, omdat, o.a., A die gemelde saak onderskeibaar is op die feite, nl. (i) in die gemelde saak het dit
gegaan oor 'n 'deed duly sealed'; (ii) die persoon wat die aansoekvorm onderteken het, was die agent van respondent; en (iii) die eiseres kon nie
lees of skryf nie, en daar geen voorstelling aan die oorledene gemaak was wat hom genoop het om sy posisie te verander tot sy B eie nadeel
nie. Die onderskeiding gemeld, behalwe die onderskeid wat die seël betref, is van geen wesenlike belang nie. Die feit dat die eiseres nie kon lees
of skryf nie het alleen gedien as bewys dat sy nie die aansoekvorm kon onderteken nie, en dit is nie duidelik dat die sogenaamde 'agent' van
respondent enigiets meer was as die gewone werwingsagent nie; vgl. die Pearl Assurance saak, supra te bl. 290. Wat C die belangrikheid van
die seël betref, vgl. Spencer Bower Estoppel, para. 62, bl. 103 ­ 4, n. 5; Carpenter v Buller, (1841), 8 M. & W. 209; MacGillivray Insurance Law,
(4de druk, para. 693); Williston Contracts (Revised ed., 1936, para. 115 A). Die seël se belangrikheid het grootliks verdwyn. In die geval van
versekering verkry die polis in D elk geval die kenmerk van 'n geseëlde stuk. By die sogenaamde 'estoppel by recital' skyn dit nie asof benadeling
in die Engelse reg 'n vereiste was nie. Dit is bloot 'n reël van die bewysleer dat geen getuienis toelaatbaar is om 'n feit daarin genoem te weerlê
nie; sien Halsbury Laws of England (Simonds uitg., band 15, bl. 215; vgl. bl. 227, para. E 429 en verder); Simm and Others v Anglo­American
Telegraph Co. (1879), 5 Q.B. 188; C.A. te bl. 206; Low v Bouverie, (1891) 3 Ch. te bl. 101; Greer v Kettle, 1938 A.C. te bl. 171. Die beginsel
het wederkerig gewerk. Albei partye tot die ooreenkoms was gebonde. Alleen waar daar eensydige voorstelling is, geld die vereistes van
misleiding en benadeling. Of, anders gestel, in die geval van 'estoppel by recital' F is die voorstelling wederkerig en geld die 'estoppel' teenoor
albei kontrakterende partye; vgl. Spencer­Bower, op. cit. paras. 62, 189, 197. Indien dieselfde feite vandag voor 'n Hof in Engeland dien, sou die
beslissing dieselfde wees? Alhoewel meer resente gewysdes soos Greer se saak, ibid, die beginsel aansienlik gekwalifiseer het, geld die G
oorweging nog dat, hoewel 'n dwaling die estoppel sal vernietig, dit 'n egte dwaling (genuine mistake) moet wees; sien Halsbury, supra, bl. 215
n. (a) en (e); Phipson, Evidence (9e druk, bl. 624 en 706, n. 3). Greer se saak is onderskeibaar aangesien in daardie geval die borge nie bewus
was of die skuld wel deur aandele verseker was nie (soos die aanhef verklaar het) en hulle dus 'n duidelike verskoonbare dwaling begaan het. H
Indien die beslissing dieselfde sou wees, sou dit geld hier te lande of sou dit aansienlike oorredende krag hê? Dit word betoog dat dieselfde
beginsel hier te lande geld; sien Treasurer­General v Lippert, 1 S.C. te bl. 295; Town Council of Heidelberg v Kerkraad van die Nederduitsch
Gemeente Hervormde of Gereformeerde Kerk, Heidelberg, 1930 T.P.D. 543; Cohen v C.I.R. & Another, 1948 (4) SA 616; Tschirpig and Another

1961 (2) SA p664

v. Kohrs, 1959 (3) SA te bl. 290. In elk geval, behoort dit aansienlike oorredende krag te hê aangesien dit met skynbare goedkeuring aangehaal
word in al die belangrikste handboeke; vgl. Halsbury, supra band 22e, s.v. insurance, bl. 206, n. (q), (r), bl. 210, n. (d); band A 15, s.v.
estoppel, bl. 215, n. (e)); Welford, Accident Insurance (2e druk bl. 42 (r), 55 (n), 61 (b), 80 (q), 100 (t), 101 (b), 119 (e), 252 (q); Spencer­
Bower, op. cit. bl. 53 (c), 54, 164 (d), 366 (d), 367 (e)). Dit is wenslik dat daar regssekerheid en eenvormigheid heers op die gebied van die
versekeringsreg
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sal geld, te meer daar ons ou skrywers nie baie geskryf het oor die versekeringswese nie, aangesien dit destyds maar nog in die beginstadium
 v. Kohrs, 1959 (3) SA te bl. 290. In elk geval, behoort dit aansienlike oorredende krag te hê aangesien dit met skynbare goedkeuring aangehaal
word in al die belangrikste handboeke; vgl. Halsbury, supra band 22e, s.v. insurance, bl. 206, n. (q), (r), bl. 210, n. (d); band A 15, s.v.
estoppel, bl. 215, n. (e)); Welford, Accident Insurance (2e druk bl. 42 (r), 55 (n), 61 (b), 80 (q), 100 (t), 101 (b), 119 (e), 252 (q); Spencer­
Bower, op. cit. bl. 53 (c), 54, 164 (d), 366 (d), 367 (e)). Dit is wenslik dat daar regssekerheid en eenvormigheid heers op die gebied van die
versekeringsreg wat 'n belangrike vertakking uitmaak van die Westerse handelsreg en dat die beginsel in die Engelssprekende B Westerse lande
sal geld, te meer daar ons ou skrywers nie baie geskryf het oor die versekeringswese nie, aangesien dit destyds maar nog in die beginstadium
was. Die Engelse en Amerikaanse reg is nog altyd gevolg deur ons Howe; sien Littlejohn v Norwich Union Insurance Society, 1905 T.H. te bl.
378, 385 ­ 6; Ehrig & Weyer v Transatlantic C Fire Insurance Co., 1905 T.S. te bl. 560; Orenstein Arthur Koppel, Ltd v Salamander Fire
Insurance Co., Ltd., 1915 T.P.D. te bl. 501, 502; Law Union & Rock Insurance Co., Ltd v de Wet, 1918 AD te bl. 668; Scottish Union & National
Insurance Co. Ltd v Native Recruiting Corporation, Ltd., 1934 AD te bl. 469. Wat die resepsie van die beginsels van estoppel in die Suid­
Afrikaanse reg betref, sien de Wet, D Estoppel by Representation in die SA Reg (Hoofstuk II, bl. 10 en 15). Dit word dus betoog dat dit nie vir
respondent oopstaan om hom te beroep op die feit dat daar geen aansoekvorm deur die oorledene ingevul en geteken is nie, en dat getuienis in
dié verband ontoelaatbaar was. Indien die Hof a quo reg is in die verwerping van die Pearl Assurance E saak, supra, keer appellante terug tot 'n
behandeling van die ander verwere van respondent. Die sitate uit MacGillivray ibid para. 788 en Carter v Boehm, 1766 (3) Burr bl. 388, is gerig
op die plig van die aspirant versekerde om 'n volledige onthulling te maak voordat die versekeringsmaatskappy die kontrak sluit. Die plig bestaan
omdat die F maatskappy 'n geleentheid gegee moet word om alle relevante feite te oorweeg in die besluit of hy die risiko sal aanvaar, aldan nie.
Daar is niks in die getuienis om aan te dui dat die oorledene verwag het dat die maatskappy aan hom 'n polis sou uitreik onmiddellik nadat hulle
verneem het dat hy belangstel in 'n polis nie. Hy het stellig verwag dat die maatskappy in verbinding met hom sou tree en van hom die nodige
gegewens G sou inwin voordat die polis uitgereik word. In die lig van die feite en aangesien die oorledene geen behoorlike geleentheid gegun is
om 'n volle onthulling te maak van sy fisiese toestand nie, was hy onthef van hierdie verpligting wat bestaan het voor die uitreiking van die polis.
Wat die tweede basis betref, is dit nie duidelik waarom die Hof a quo H beslis dat, nadat die oorledene die polis ontvang het, daar 'n plig op hom
gerus het om die polis te lees en toe die maatskappy in kennis te stel van sy gebrek nie. Dit skyn asof die redenering is dat die oorledene moes
besef het dat die respondent maatskappy 'n dwaling begaan het en dat hy die respondent daarvan moes ingelig het, en 'n locus poenitentiae
toegestaan het. Maar geen sodanige plig het op die oorledene gerus die versuim waarvan 'n breuk van die hoogste goeie trou was aan die kant
van die oorledene nie. Daar is talle regsmiddels

1961 (2) SA p665

wat 'n persoon wat 'n dwaling begaan het, kan aanwend om verligting te verkry, maar hy kan nie steun op 'n verpligting op die ander party om
hom van sy dwaling in kennis te stel nie. Dus is die beslissing op die tweede basis ook verkeerd. Wat partye se verpligtinge betref by
ooreenkomste uberrimae fidei, sien Wessels Law of Contract in South A Africa (2e druk, para. 1035). Die Hof word gevra om 'n afleiding te
maak dat die bedoeling van respondent se agent met die uitreiking van die polis nie soseer was om aan die oorledene dekking teen die risiko te
verleen nie, maar om die premies van hom te vorder. Indien die Hof hierdie bevinding maak, het die respondent nie die verweer van consensus ad
idem bewys nie. Wat die vereistes van wilsoorstemming by ooreenkomste B betref, vgl. de Wet en Yeats, Kontraktereg en Handelsreg (2e uitg.
bl. 8, bl. 22 et seq., s.v. dwaling); Wessels, op. cit. para. 900 et seq.; de Wet, Dwaling en Bedrog by die Kontraktesluiting (Annale Univ.
Stellenbosch). Op die feite was beide partye dit eens dat 'n polis uitgereik en aanvaar word sonder dat daar 'n behoorlike aansoekvorm van C
die oorledene bestaan. Daar was dus gemeenskaplike dwaling. In die alternatief was daar dwaling aan die kant van die oorledene en dolus aan
die kant van respondent se agent en sou dit onbillik en gewetenloos wees vir respondent om op die vermelding in die aanhef van die
aansoekvorms te steun. 'n Beroep word gedoen op die exceptio doli; sien Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd., 1925 AD te bl. 292; Kahn v African
Life D Assurance Society, Ltd., 1932 W.L.D. te bl. 171; Senekal v Home Sites (Pty.), Ltd. and Another, 1950 (1) SA te bl. 153; Zuurbekom Ltd
v Union Corporation Ltd., 1947 (1) SA te bl. 535 ­ 7; van der Walt v Minnaar, 1954 (3) SA te bl. 939; Sampson v Union & Rhodesia Wholesale E
Ltd., 1929 AD te bl. 468; Spies v Gordon­Wilson (Pty.), Ltd., 1947 (2) SA te bl. 667. Appellante beroep haar gevolglik op, of gemeenskaplike
dwaling of die exceptio doli en ooreenkomstig daarmee, vra wysiging van haar deklarasie in sekere opsigte. Die bedoeling van die partye was in
geskil en al die feite is voor die Hof; vgl. Rosettenville Motor Exchange v Grootenboer, 1956 (2) SA te bl. 630. F Om verbetering te verkry, word
'n voorafgaande mondelinge ooreenkoms nie vereis nie; sien Meyer v Merchants' Trust, Ltd., 1942 AD 244.
H. J. Hanson, Q.C. (with him J. D. Schwartz), for the respondent: An agent's authority is extended to powers expressly granted or necessarily
implied from the express authority and authority will only be implied G where it is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract; see Mullin
(Pty.) Ltd v Benade Ltd., 1952 (1) SA at p. 214. The signing of a proposal form is a step necessarily incidental to the procuring of a contract of
insurance; see Covary v Registrar of Deeds and Others, 1948 (3) SA at p. 189. Thus, an authority to an agent to sell a property has been held
to include an authority to sign an agreement of H sale; see Milne v Sexton, 1937 T.P.D. at p. 277. Irrespectively of whether the deceased
expected a proposal form to be filled in or not, it was his Common Law duty to disclose all facts material to the risk which he was inviting
respondent to undertake. His breach of this duty entitles respondent to repudiate liability. In any event, Pearl Life Assurance Co v Greenhalgh &
Johnson, 1909 (2) K.B. 288, has no application to the present case. The contract of

1961 (2) SA p666

HOEXTER JA
insurance only came into existence on the acceptance by the deceased of the policy and on the payment by him of the premium. The contract
therefore included as part of its basis a term or condition that the insured suffered from no material disability. It is not necessary for A
respondent to demonstrate its case. It is sufficient if the case is established on a balance of probability; see Lindeque v Hall, 1927 T.P.D. at bl.
422.
Viljoen, Q.C., in reply.
Cur. adv. vult.
B Postea (March 9th).
Judgment
HOEXTER, J.A.: On the 31st October, 1956, the respondent signed an C accident policy for £15,000 in favour of the late W. J. Bodemer, who
died on the 7th June, 1957, and to whom I shall refer as the deceased. On the latter date the deceased fell in front of a power­driven plough
and was crushed to death. The accident which caused his death was one covered by the policy and the appellant as the executrix in his estate
accordingly claimed the sum of £15,000 from the respondent. When the D latter refused to pay, she brought an action on the policy in the
Transvaal Provincial Division. Her action was dismissed with costs and it is against that order that she now appeals to this Court.
The circumstances in which the respondent issued the policy now relied upon to the deceased are testified to by one Rossouw, who was the E
bookkeeper and chief clerk of Oos Transvaalse Boekhouers en Agente, to which I shall refer as the firm, and which carried on business as
bookkeepers and as canvassing agents for various insurance companies. Rossouw, who became a partner in the firm in July, 1959, was the
employee of the firm who during 1956 went to Hendrina, 27 miles from Bethal, every Tuesday to do the books of the deceased who was inter
alia F the proprietor of a café at Hendrina. Rossouw had known the deceased for about a year when the latter broached the subject of an
accident policy to him. 'Hy het gesê' ­ I quote from the evidence of Rossouw ­ 'ek moet vir hom reël vir 'n ongevallepolis vir die maksimum
bedrag wat ek kan kry.' On his return to Bethal, Rossouw discovered that the G maximum was £15,000, obtainable from the respondent. He
accordingly asked his employer, van Niekerk, to make out a cover note as agent for the respondent in favour of the deceased. It is clear from
the period of insurance provided in the policy now being relied upon that the cover note was signed by van Niekerk on the 31 August, 1956,
because the period of insurance is stated in the policy to be from the 31st August, H 1956, to the 31st Agust, 1957. For some reason not
satisfactorily explained by Rossouw, the cover note was not sent to the deceased although a copy thereof was sent to the respondent.
Thereafter nothing was done by Rossouw in furtherance of the mandate given to him by the deceased until, on the 6th September, 1956, the
manager of the respondent's Pretoria branch, one van der Merwe, visited the firm at Bethal. According to Rossouw he had a discussion

1961 (2) SA p667

HOEXTER JA
with van der Merwe and van Niekerk in the latter's office. Van der Merwe was told that the deceased was interested in a policy with the
respondent and was asked by Rossouw to touch at Hendrina, on his way back to Pretoria, in order to get the deceased to complete the
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application form (exh. 'A'). Van der Merwe then pointed out ­ according to Rossouw ­ that it was unnecessary for him to do so A because any
member of the staff of the firm could sign the application form. Van der Merwe handed a form to Rossouw, who gave it to van Niekerk, who
 1961 (2) SA p667

HOEXTER JA
with van der Merwe and van Niekerk in the latter's office. Van der Merwe was told that the deceased was interested in a policy with the
respondent and was asked by Rossouw to touch at Hendrina, on his way back to Pretoria, in order to get the deceased to complete the
application form (exh. 'A'). Van der Merwe then pointed out ­ according to Rossouw ­ that it was unnecessary for him to do so A because any
member of the staff of the firm could sign the application form. Van der Merwe handed a form to Rossouw, who gave it to van Niekerk, who
signed exh. 'A', a form containing the usual proposal and declaration. The signed exh. 'A' was then taken by van der Merwe to B Pretoria, but for
some unknown reason the policy was signed by the respondent only on the 31st October. It was sent to the firm at Bethal, but again it was
only on the 27th November, that Rossouw went to Hendrina to hand over the policy to the deceased, who thereupon paid him the first premium
on the policy. It appears from the above summary of Rossouw's evidence that he was the only one who was ever personally in C touch with the
deceased. He testified that during the period from the 31st August, to the 27th November, neither he himself nor the deceased ever spoke a
further word about the policy to each other. It was on the 31st August, that the deceased gave his mandate, and it was on the 27th November,
that Rossouw handed over the policy to him. In view of the D fact that Rossouw went over to Hendrina every Tuesday to do the books of the
deceased, it is very difficult to believe that he never mentioned to the deceased that a cover note had been made out or that a proposal form
had been signed in respect of the policy which the deceased was apparently anxious to obtain, and it is still more difficult to believe that the
deceased never questioned Rossouw at to what he had done in E pursuance of his mandate to obtain a policy. The trial Judge assessed the
credibility of Rossouw as follows:
'Rossouw, in my view was an unsatisfactory witness and I am of the opinion that in many ways he was reconstructing events. Nevertheless I do
not find that he was deliberately untruthful.'
F In any case there was no evidence to contradict that of Rossouw as to what happened between himself and the deceased, and I shall
accordingly approach the appeal on the basis that in this respect his evidence must be accepted. The trial Judge found as a fact that van
Niekerk did not have the deceased's authority to sign the proposal form and that the G deceased did not know, before he actually received the
policy, that a proposal form had been signed on his behalf. It was admitted by the appellant that one of the deceased's legs was an artificial
one and the trial Judge found that the deceased had failed to inform the respondent of this fact and that the respondent was unaware thereof
both at the time when the policy was signed, and when it was tendered to the H deceased. Indeed even Rossouw himself testified that he was
ignorant of the deceased's physical disability. Van Niekerk was similarly ignorant when, professing to act on behalf of the deceased, he signed
the declaration that the deceased suffered from no physical disability.
In the view I take of the appeal I need deal with one only of the various defences set up by the respondent to the claim by the appellant.

1961 (2) SA p668

HOEXTER JA
That defence is that the deceased failed to disclose to the respondent that he had an artificial leg. Counsel for the appellant rightly conceded
that the physical disability of the deceased was material to the risk and that in a contract of insurance, being one uberrimae fidei, A there
would under ordinary circumstances be a legal duty on the deceased to disclose his disability to the respondent. But in the present case, so his
argument ran, the deceased had had no real opportunity of disclosure before the policy was delivered to him, and his duty to disclose fell away
when the policy was delivered to him. I find it impossible to say that the deceased had no opportunity of disclosing his physical disability before
the contract of insurance was concluded. The B evidence shows that the deceased had on two previous occasions made applications for
accident insurance policies by signing a proposal and declaration, and the most probable inference is that he was expecting to be asked to sign
a proposal and declaration before the policy could be C issued to him. But that is no reason for saying that his duty to disclose fell away when
the policy was delivered to him.
Counsel for the appellant argued that the contract of insurance was concluded either (1) by an offer made by the deceased to Rossouw as the
employee of the firm and accepted by the respondent when it delivered D the policy to the deceased, or (2) by an offer made by the
respondent to the deceased when Rossouw tendered the policy to him and accepted by the deceased by receiving the policy and paying the
first premium.
In the first case counsel found it very difficult to define the terms of the offer alleged to have been made by the deceased, but I shall assume
E in his favour that there was an offer made by the deceased to such company as would give him the maximum cover. On that assumption it
was obviously the duty of the deceased to disclose his physical disability in the offer which he made, because he knew that, if the respondent
or any other company accepted his offer, it would do so without knowing F that he had an artificial leg. And if it was the respondent which
made an offer by tendering the policy, the deceased knew that that offer was made without knowledge of his physical disability. In these
circumstances it was his obvious duty to notify the respondent of his disability before accepting its offer.
The well­established proposition that a failure to disclose of the kind G found in the present case renders the policy void, was not contested by
counsel for the appellant.
The conclusion to which I have come, viz., that there was a failure to disclose, fatal to the policy, probably makes it unnecessary to deal with
the application made for the first time in this Court by counsel H for the appellant to amend her declaration by introducing a claim for
rectification. In any case that application cannot be granted because the issues involved in the new claim were not properly canvassed at the
trial.
I ought to add that in arriving at my conclusion I have not found it necessary to express any opinion as to the correctness or applicability of
the English case of Pearl Assurance Co v Greenhalgh and Johnson, 1909 (2) K.B. 288.
In my judgment the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

1961 (2) SA p669

HOEXTER JA
VAN BLERK, J.A., OGILVIE THOMPSON, J.A., HOLMES, J.A., and JENNETT, A.J.A., concurred.
Appellant's Attorneys: Tim du Toit & Co., Pretoria; Naudé & Naudé, Bloemfontein. Respondent's Attorneys: Henry Nankin, Pretoria; Simler &
Cooper, Johannesburg; Claud Reid, Bloemfontein.

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