Christopher Tancredi Introduction to Semantics for Non-Native Speakers of English

Chapter 7

Possibility Modals

Semantics aims to give truth conditions for sentences. These describe what the world has to
be like in order for a sentence to be true. For many sentences what matters are the properties
and relations that hold among individuals. For the sentence John wins, for example, we only
need to find John and determine whether he is one of the individuals that wins or not. We can
do this by looking at who does and who does not win in the actual world. Not all sentences
depend only on how things are in the actual world in this way. The truth of some sentences
depends also on how things could possibly have been. Modal sentences fall into this
category.

A modal sentence is a sentence containing a modal expression. Modal expressions express

possibility or necessity. English has a large number of modal expressions, including the
following:

possibility: may, might, can, could

possibly, maybe, perhaps
possible, potential

necessity: shall, should, must, ought to, need, have to, will, would
necessarily, certainly
necessary, certain

To determine whether the sentence John may win is true, or the sentence John must win, it
does not matter whether John actually wins. What matters is whether it is possible, or
necessary, for John to win. That is, the truth of these sentences depends on how things could
possibly be. To model how things could possibly be, we use possible worlds.

Recall from Chapter 1 that a possible world is a rearrangement of things in the actual world,
with the possibility of adding things or taking things away. A possible world includes a
complete history and a complete future. Whether John wins or not (at a given time) in a given
possible world is fixed. In some worlds he does, and in some worlds he does not, including
all worlds in which he does not exist. Modals relate to possible worlds by saying something
about how many relevant possible worlds a proposition is true in. A possibility modal like
may in John may win says there is at least one relevant possible world in which John wins. A
necessity modal like must in John must win says that John wins in every relevant possible
world.

To connect modals to possible worlds, we introduce worlds into the logic. In particular, we
take every predicate of logic to have a world argument in addition to its other arguments.
WIN (john) is no longer taken to be a well-formed formula of logic. It is replaced by WIN
(w, john), where w is either the name of a world or a variable over worlds. We analyze
modals as quantifying over world variables that fill this extra position. In broad outline, the
sentences John may win and John must win are analyzed as follows:

||John may win|| = $w [WIN (w, john)]

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[[$w [WIN (w, john)]]]

= True iff for some world w', [[WIN (w, john)]]w'/w
= True iff for some world w', <[[w]]w'/w , [[john]]w'/w> Î [[WIN]]w'/w
= True iff for some world w', <w', john> Î {<w,x> : x wins in w}
= True iff for some world w', john wins in w'

||John must win|| = "w [WIN (w, john)]

[["w [WIN (w, john)]]]
= True iff for every world w', [[WIN (w, john)]]w'/w
= True iff for every world w', <[[w]]w'/w , [[john]]w'/w> Î [[WIN]]w'/w
= True iff for every world w', <w', john> Î {<w,x> : x wins in w}
= True iff for every world w', john wins in w'

This analysis uses the quantifiers already added to the logic in Chapter 6. Instead of
combining with an individual variable z, however, here they combine with a world variable
w. The denotation is calculated in the same way as for other quantified formulas.

Adding worlds to our logical formulas makes the analyses above possible. However, this
change affects other sentences as well. Consider the sentence John wins, for example. Before,
we translated this sentence as WIN (john). Under our new analysis, this is no longer a well-
formed formula. WIN requires a world argument in addition to an individual argument. We
cannot just add a random world argument, however. That is, we cannot take the translation to
be WIN (w, john), with w being a variable or the name of some random world. If w were a
variable, then [[WIN (w, john)]] would be undefined. This is because there is no expression in
the formula that gives us instructions for how to interpret w, and [[w]], without instructions, is
undefined. If we take w to be the name of a random world, in contrast, we get something that
is defined. The formula will be true iff john wins at the world named by w. However, that is
not what we want. We want the sentence to be true iff john wins at the actual world. To get
this, we need the translation of the sentence to be WIN (w@, john), where w@ is a name of the
actual world.

To get the world argument to be w@, we use the fact that the sentence is produced in the
actual world. The challenge is to get the world variable to be the name w@ for John wins but
to be the variable w for John may win and John must win. We take that challenge up in
Chapter 8. In this chapter, we improve on the translations of our modal sentences.

Modal Flavors
The difference between possibility modals and necessity modals is clear, and the analysis we
gave above captures this difference. However, there are further differences that need to be
explained as well. The differences are of two types: different ways that a single modal can
be understood, and differences in the ways that different modals can be understood. To show
these differences, in this chapter we look at possibility modals.

Possibility Modals
Consider again the sentence John may win. This sentence can be used to say any of a number
of things:

i. The speaker gives John permission to win.

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ii. John has permission, given by someone else, to win.

iii. The law allows John to win.
iv. For all the speaker knows, it is possible that John will win.
v. For all the speaker knows, it is possible that John regularly wins.

We use context to bring out the meaning that we want. The permission reading in (ii) comes
out in a context where John is teaching his son to play chess. John is much better than his
son, and can win every game they play. John’s wife, however, does not allow him to do so.
Some days she tells him to lose. Today, however, she said it is ok for him to win. I can
report this to you by saying, Today, John may win. He has his wife’s permission. For (iv),
consider a situation in which John is playing in a chess tournament. His opponent is as good
as he is at chess. I say John may win, and he may not win. It’s impossible to predict.

The sentence John can win can be used to say any of (i)-(iii), but not (iv) or (v). It can also be
used to say (vi) of (vii):

vi. One way to reach some goal is for John to win.

vii. John has the ability to win

Again, context can help to bring out specific readings. For (vi), imagine that John wants to
become famous. I know he is playing in a very important chess tournament. I can suggest To
become famous, John can win (the chess tournament). For (vii), imagine that John's wife has
strictly prohibited him from beating his son at chess. I tell you: When John plays his son at
chess, you will probably never see John win. John can win -- he is much better at chess than
his son. He is just never allowed to.

The sentence John might win can be used to say any of (iv)-(vi), but not (i)-(iii) or (vii).
Finally, the sentence John could win can be used to say any of (i)-(vii), and can also be used
to say any of the following:

viii. In the past, John had permission, given by someone else, to win.
ix. In the past, the law allowed John to win.
x. One way in the past to reach some goal was for John to win.
xi. In the past, John had the ability to win

Our analysis so far does not account for these differences among possibility modals.
Something more is needed.

We start by grouping cases together. Cases (i)-(iii) involve permission. They differ mainly in
who gives the permission: the speaker in (i), some other individual in (ii), or the government
through its laws in (iii). Whose permission matters is generally determined by the context,
though it can also be stated, as in By law, John may win. A modal used to talk about what is
possible or necessary relative to someone’s permission is called a deontic modal.

Cases (iv) and (v) involve speaker’s knowledge. They say what is possible, either in the
future (iv) or at the time of speech (v), based on what the speaker knows. A modal used to
talk about what is possible or necessary relative to someone’s knowledge is called an
epistemic modal.

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Case (vi) involves reaching a goal. The goal can be stated, as in In order to become famous,
John might (/ can/ could) win, or it can be understood from the context. A modal used to talk
about what is possible or necessary for the purpose of reaching some goal is called a
teleological modal.

Case (vii) involves ability. The ability can be a physical ability, as in John can run because
he has all the muscles needed to run. It can also be a mental ability, as in John can’t smile
because he is too sad. A modal used to talk about abilities is called an ability modal.

Finally, cases (viii-xi) are past tense versions of deontic, teleological and ability modals.

The different possible uses of the modals mentioned above can be summarized as follows:

Modal Flavor
Modal Deontic Epistemic Teleological Ability
may ○ ○ × ×
might × ○ ○ ×
can ○ × ○ ○
could ○ ○ ○ ○

To account for these different patterns of interpretation, we add restrictions to modals.

Deontic Modals
All modals quantify over possible worlds. However, what worlds get quantified over depends
on the type of interpretation. Consider first deontic modals. For a deontic modal, the worlds
quantified over are those worlds in which everything that happens follows some set of rules.
Suppose that there is a rule requiring John to win, and another rule requiring John not to
laugh. Then as far as John’s laughing and/or winning go, there is exactly one type of world in
which everything that happens follows the rules: worlds in which John wins and does not
laugh. If such a world exists, John may win is true when understood deontically. However,
John may laugh is not. There are no worlds that follow the rules in which John laughs.

To illustrate the connection between possible worlds and rules, consider the diagram below.

John wins John does

not win

John laughs × ×

John does
○ ×
not laugh

In this diagram, the large box represents the set of all possible worlds. These worlds are
divided into four groups based on whether John laughs or not and on whether John wins or
not. Now consider the rules. The rules require John to win. These rules are followed in the
boxes on the left, but not in the boxes on the right. The rules also require John not to laugh.
These rules are followed in the bottom two boxes, but not in the top two. The worlds in

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which both rules are followed are those in the bottom left box, marked ○. In all worlds in
one of the other three boxes, marked ×, at least one rule is not followed.

Call the worlds in which all rules are followed Perfect Rule-following Worlds (PRWs). We
can now analyze deontic modals as quantifying over PRWs. In particular, the sentence John
may win, understood deontically, says that in some PRW, John wins. Intuitively, if there is a
PRW in which John wins, it follows that John’s winning does not break any rules, and so is
permitted by the rules.

Before formalizing our analysis, we have one more thing to account for. Above we saw three
different deontic interpretations: one in which something is permitted by the speaker, one in
which something is permitted by someone else, and one in which something is permitted by
law. We want our analysis of deontic modals to allow for these different interpretations. We
do this by taking PRWs to depend on a set of contextually salient rules R. Then, rather than
saying that some world w is a PRW absolutely, we say that w is a PRW with respect to the
rules in R. We formalize this relation below as PRW (w, iR (RULES (R) & C (R))). Here, C
is some specific property of rules salient in the context. In the cases we have looked at, C can
be the speaker’s requirements, some other person’s requirements, or the law.

Formally, we take may to be ambiguous between a deontic mayd and an epistemic maye.
Taking C to stand for the Speaker’s Requirements (SR), we analyze John may win on one of
its deontic interpretations as follows.

||John mayd win|| = $w [PRW (w, iR (RULES (R) & SR (R))) & WIN (w, john)]

[[$w [PRW (w, iR (RULES (R) & SR (R))) & WIN (w, john)]]]
= True iff for some world w', [[PRW (w, iR (RULES (R) & SR (R)))]]w'/w = T
and [[WIN (w, john)]]w'/w = T
= True iff for some world w',
<[[w]]w'/w, [[iR (RULES (R) & SR (R)))]]w'/w> Î [[PRW]]w'/w
and <[[w]]w'/w, [[john]]w'/w> Î [[WIN]]w'/w
= True iff for some world w',
<w', the unique speaker requirement rules in R> Î [[PRW]]w'/w
and <w', john> Î [[WIN]]w'/w
= True iff for some world w', w' is a Perfect Rule-following World with respect to
the speaker’s requirements, and john wins at w'

Notice that this analysis contains a fixed part and a variable part. The fixed part includes the
existential quantification over Perfect Rule-following Worlds with respect to some unique R
that is a set of rules. The variable part comes from the contextual property that the rules have
to satisfy. Here that variable part was identified as the Speaker’s Requirements. Replacing
this variable part with some other contextual property of rules will give a different deontic
interpretation.

Epistemic Modals
The difference between deontic and epistemic modal interpretations is analyzed as a
difference in the worlds they quantify over. As we just saw, a deontic modal quantifies over a
set of Perfect Rule-following Worlds. An epistemic modal instead quantifies over the set of

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worlds compatible with someone’s knowledge. On its normal epistemic interpretation, John
may win says that in some world compatible with the speaker’s knowledge, John wins. If we
add According to Mary to the sentence, the worlds that count are worlds compatible with
Mary’s knowledge. A world w is compatible with a person's knowledge iff everything that
person knows is true at w.

Our formal analysis of epistemic modals is very similar to our formal analysis of deontic
modals. Instead of using Perfect Rule-following Worlds, however, we use Knowledge-based
Worlds, or KWs. The specific KWs are determined by a specific individual, the one whose
knowledge matters. We use KW (w, ix (PERSON (x) & C (x))) to mean that w is a world
compatible with the knowledge of the unique person having contextual property C. In a
typical case, C is the property of being the speaker. However, it can also be the property of
being Mary, for example in the sentence According to Mary, John may win. Taking C to be
SP(EAKER) gives us the following analysis of epistemic John may win:

||John maye win|| = $w [KW (w, ix (PERSON (x) & SP (x))) & WIN (w, john)]

[[$w [KW (w, ix (PERSON (x) & SP (x))) & WIN (w, john)]]]
= True iff for some world w', [[KW (w, ix (PERSON (x) & SP (x)))]]w'/w = T and
[[WIN (w, john)]]w'/w = T
= True iff for some world w',
<[[w]]w'/w, [[ix (PERSON (x) & SP (x))]]w'/w> Î [[KW]]w'/w
and <[[w]]w'/w, [[john]]w'/w> Î [[WIN]]w'/w
= True iff for some world w',
<w', the unique person who is the speaker> Î [[KW]]w'/w
and <w', john> Î [[WIN]]w'/w
= True iff for some world w', w' is compatible with the knowledge of the speaker,
and john wins at w'

It is important to see that being compatible with the speaker's knowledge is not the same as
being known by the speaker. Suppose a speaker knows exactly one thing: that it is raining.
Then every world in which it is raining is compatible with the speaker's knowledge. In some
of those compatible worlds, John wins. In some of those compatible worlds, John loses. In
some of those compatible worlds, John does not exist. For that speaker, the sentence John
may win is predicted to be true according to the above analysis.

Teleological Modals
Teleological modals quantify over worlds in which a certain goal is reached. However, not
just any such world counts. To see this, consider the following sentences:

To get from Tokyo to Kyoto in 3 hours, you can take the shinkansen.

To get from Tokyo to Kyoto in 3 hours, you can walk.

Intuitively, the first sentence is true. Shinkansen trains from Tokyo to Kyoto take less than 3
hours, so taking one will get you to Kyoto fast enough. The second sentence is intuitively
false. No one can walk fast enough to get from Tokyo to Kyoto in 3 hours. However, if we
look at possible worlds, there are possible worlds in which you walk from Tokyo to Kyoto in

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3 hours. In some of those worlds, like w7, Tokyo is only 10 kilometers away from Kyoto. In
others, like w13, Tokyo and Kyoto are 450 kilometers apart, as in the real world, but your
walking speed is 200 kilometers an hour. Suppose that teleological modals quantify over
worlds in which you reach your goal of getting from Tokyo to Kyoto in 3 hours. In order to
predict the second sentence to be false, worlds like w7 and w13 have to be ignored.

We ignore these worlds by adding another restriction to the worlds quantified over: they have
to be like the actual world in all ways related to reaching the goal. For example, the distance
between the cities has to be the same. The options for traveling have to be the same. The
speed of the transportation has to be the same. The routes of the transportation have to be the
same. The laws of physics have to be the same. The only exceptions to this restriction are
propositions that the modal sentence itself allows for. In the sentence you can take the
shinkansen, these exceptions include that you take the shinkansen and that you do not take the
shinkansen. To see why these have to be excluded, suppose that in the actual world you do
not take the shinkansen. If this fact had to be kept the same in the worlds quantified over,
then in all of the worlds quantified over you do not take the shinkansen. It follows that in
none of those worlds do you get from Tokyo to Kyoto in 3 hours by taking the shinkansen.
This would predict the sentence to be false. We observe, however, that the sentence is true.
We explain that observation by excluding the fact that you do not take the shinkansen from
the facts that have to be kept the same in the worlds being quantified over.

We turn now to formalizing the restriction on worlds quantified over by teleological modals.
For this purpose, it is useful to have a way to refer to the translation of you take the
shinkansen in the modal sentence you can take the shinkansen. We call this the prejacent.
Suppose we have a teleological modal sentence whose prejacent is q. Then we restrict the
worlds being quantified over to those worlds w for which the following is true: "p
((CIRCUMSTANCE (p,w@,g) & p ≠ q & p ≠ ~q) ® (p (w) = p (w@))). Here,
CIRCUMSTANCE is a three-place predicate, and w@ is a name of the actual world.
CIRCUMSTANCE (p,w@,g) says that p is a circumstance in the actual world w@ that is
related to goal g. The underlined formula above is true for a world w iff for every
circumstance p related to goal g in the actual world w@ other than the circumstances q or ~q,
the truth value of p at w@ is equal to the truth value of p at w. This guarantees that the
relevant circumstances that hold at w are those that hold in the actual world.

The specific analysis we give for John can win with respect to the goal of John being famous
is given below. Here, cant is the teleological version of can. The goal of John's being famous
is given as lw [FAMOUS (w, john)]. This denotes the property true of those worlds in which
John is famous, and false of those worlds in which he is not. The prejacent q is given as lw
[WIN (w, john)]. This denotes the property true of those worlds in which John wins, and
false of those worlds in which he does not. We will see how to derive these properties in the
next chapter.

||John cant win||

= $w [("p ((CIRCUMSTANCE (p, w@, lw [FAMOUS (w, john)])
& p ≠ lw [WIN (w, john)] & p ≠ lw [~WIN (w, john)])
® (p (w) = p (w@))) & FAMOUS (w, john))
& WIN (w, john)]

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[[$w [("p ((CIRCUMSTANCE (p, w@, lw [FAMOUS (w, john)])

& p ≠ lw [WIN (w, john)] & p ≠ lw [~WIN (w, john)])
® (p (w) = p (w@))) & FAMOUS (w, john))
& WIN (w, john)]]]

= True iff for some world w',

[[("p ((CIRCUMSTANCE (p, w@, lw [FAMOUS (w, john)])
& p ≠ lw [WIN (w, john)] & p ≠ lw [~WIN (w, john)])
® (p (w) = p (w@))) & FAMOUS (w, john))]]w'/w = T
and [[WIN (w, john)]]]w'/w = T

= True iff for some world w',

For every proposition p',
< <[[p]]w'/w,p'/p, [[w@]]w'/w,p'/p, [[lw [FAMOUS (w, john)]]]w'/w,p'/p>
Î [[CIRCUMSTANCE]]w'/w,p'/p
and [[p]]w'/w,p'/p ≠ [[ lw [WIN (w, john)]]]w'/w,p'/p
and [[p]]w'/w,p'/p ≠ [[lw [~WIN (w, john)]]]w'/w,p'/p ,
[[p (w)]]w'/w,p'/p = [[p (w@]]w'/w,p'/p> Î [[®]]w'/w,p'/p
and <[[w]]w'/w,p'/p, [[john]]w'/w,p'/p > Î [[FAMOUS]]w'/w,p'/p
and <[[w]]w'/w, [[john]]w'/w> Î [[WIN]]w'/w

= True iff for some world w',

For every proposition p',
< <p', w@, [[lw [FAMOUS (w, john)]]]> Î [[CIRCUMSTANCE]]
and p' ≠ [[ lw [WIN (w, john)]]]
and p' ≠ [[lw [~WIN (w, john)]]] ,
p' (w') = p' (w) > Î {<T,T>, <F,T>, <F,F>}
and <w', john> Î [[FAMOUS]]
and <w', john> Î [[WIN]]

= True iff for some world w',

For every proposition p',
if (i) at the actual world, p' is related to John being famous and (ii) p' is not
the proposition that John wins and (iii) p' is not the proposition that John
does not win, then the truth value of p' at the actual world is equal to the truth
value of p' at w',
and John is famous at w'
and John wins at w'

= True iff for some world w',

The circumstances regarding John's being famous are the same in w' and w@,
except possibly for the circumstances of John winning and John not winning,
and John is famous at w'
and John wins at w'

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Ability Modals
Ability modals quantify over worlds in which certain abilities are the same as what they are in
the actual world. That is, like teleological modals, they require certain circumstances to hold
in all the worlds quantified over. Ability modals, however, do not come with a goal. In this
way, they differ from teleological modals. As an ability modal sentence, John can win says
only that John has the ability to win. It does not imply that winning is a way of achieving
some other goal.

Despite the differences between teleological modals and ability modals, we analyze ability
modals as a special type of teleological modal. In particular, we take an ability modal to be a
teleological modal where the goal is the prejacent. In the sentence John can win, when
analyzed as an ability modal the goal is that John win. John can win on this analysis says that
one way to reach the goal of John winning, given the circumstances as they are, is for John to
win. This will only be possible if the circumstances by themselves make it possible for John
to win. Since John's abilities are among the circumstances relevant to John winning, these
abilities have to hold in all the worlds quantified over. If John wins in one of them, that
means that John has the ability in the actual world needed in order to win.

Other Distinctions among Possibility Modals

Our goal in analyzing modals is to explain all of their behavior with the smallest number of
tools possible. Above, we reduced the analysis of ability modals to the analysis of
teleological modals. This is one way of explaining more data using fewer tools. The
analysis, however, is not yet complete. The reduction suggests that any modal that has a
teleological interpretation should also have an ability interpretation. This is not correct for
might, however. Might has a teleological interpretation, but it does not have an ability
interpretation. If we wish to keep the reduction analysis of ability modals, we need an
explanation of why might behaves differently from can.

The best explanation we can give has the following form. Both might and can have
teleological interpretations. Both allow for the goal to be identified as the prejacent. With
can, identifying the goal as the prejacent gives rise to an ability interpretation. With might, in
contrast, it does not. For such an explanation to work, can has to have a different
interpretation from might, even when both are interpreted teleologically. Does it?

The analyses given in the previous sections suggest that all possibility modals with the same
flavor -- deontic, epistemic, teleological or ability -- have the same meaning. When we
compare sentences using different modals with the same flavor, however, we find that this
does not fit our intuition. To see this, compare the following:

To go to Tokyo from Seoul, you can take a train

To go to Tokyo from Seoul, you could take a train
To go to Tokyo from Seoul, you might take a train

All of these are teleological modal sentences. They all tell you one possible way of achieving
the goal of going to Tokyo from Seoul. However, they differ in important ways. At present,
there is no train service between Korea and Japan, and there are no current plans to connect
Japan to the Asian continent by train. If talking about the present, then, all three sentences are
false. However, suppose we are talking about the distant future, imagining different ways that

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things may end up being. To describe one of these future possibilities, the third sentence,
with might, is appropriate. The other two sentences, with can and could, are not.

Another difference among these modals can be seen by looking at a non-real present situation.
Suppose we are imagining how things would be now if Japan and Korea had decided to build
a train line connecting Seoul and Tokyo back in the 1960s. Then, the second and third
sentences, with could and might, are appropriate and true. The first sentence, with can, is not.

We can describe these differences as follows. Teleologically, can, could and might can all
talk about possibilities based on present, actual-world circumstances. Could and might can
also talk about possibilities based on hypothetical -- that is, imagined, not actual -- present
circumstances. In addition to these, might can also talk about possibilities based on
hypothetical future circumstances. We want our analyses of can, could and might to account
for these differences. They can only do so if each of the modals has a different interpretation.

We do not yet have the tools needed to distinguish all of these cases formally. In particular,
we do not have the tools needed to analyze situations as being present or future. However, we
can see intuitively how the differences just seen among can, could and might can be used to
explain the fact that might does not have an ability interpretation.

Above, we derived the ability interpretation of John can win by taking can to be teleological
can, and taking the goal to be the prejacent, John win. This gives an ability interpretation in
the following way. Can quantifies over worlds that share all circumstances in the actual
world related to John winning. John's current abilities are among the circumstances in the
actual world related to John winning. Because of this, his abilities have to be the same in all
the worlds quantified over. If John wins in one of those worlds, then, it follows that John's
winning is compatible with his actual abilities.

Now consider might. Might also quantifies over worlds in which certain circumstances are
fixed. However, it places looser restrictions on those circumstances. They do not have to be
current actual circumstances. They could instead be hypothetical circumstances. There is no
guarantee that John's actual abilities hold in worlds at which only hypothetical circumstances
are fixed, however. To say that John wins at such a world, then, tells us nothing about his
actual abilities. This means that even if we analyze John might win as a teleological modal
with John win as the goal, we do not expect the sentence to tell us anything about John's
actual abilities.

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