Christopher Tancredi Introduction to Semantics for Non-Native Speakers of English

Chapter 8
Necessity Modals
and Intensional Semantics
Formalizing Modals
In Chapter 7, logical translations were given for modal sentences as a whole. In this section,
we show how these translations are derived compositionally. We gave different translations
for modals depending on their modal flavor. For our purposes here, however, those
differences are not important. We take all versions of the sentence John may/ might/ can/
could win to have translations of the following form:

||John MODAL win|| = $w [R (w, w@) & WIN (w, john)]

Here, R gives us a restriction on the worlds w quantified over, and MODAL is one of the
possibility modals may, might, can or could. Below I choose may as a value for MODAL.
The choice of R is determined in part by whether the modal is deontic, epistemic or
teleological, and in part by the context. Notice the inclusion of w@ as an argument of R. This
makes clear something we did not highlight in Chapter 7: all modal interpretations use the
actual world to restrict the worlds quantified over. For deontic modals, this comes as actual
world rules. For epistemic modals, it comes as actual world knowledge. For teleological
modals, it comes as actual world circumstances.

The challenge now is to derive the translation of John may win from three parts: ||John||,
||may||, and ||win||. If the predicate WIN comes from ||win||, ||win|| can no longer be analyzed
as lxe [WIN (x)]. Under that translation, WIN is a one-place predicate, taking only an
individual as argument. We need the translation of win to give us a two-place predicate that
takes a world argument in addition to an individual argument. The simplest way to get this
result is for win to have the following translation:

||win|| = lw's [lxe [WIN (w', x)]]

This translation introduces a new basic semantic type, type s for worlds. Under this analysis,
the type of win is <s,<e,t>>. We can now give a translation for may. Assume that ||John|| =
john. Then the following translation for may will do what is needed:

||may|| = lP<s,<e,t>> [lye [$w [R (w, w@) & P (w) (y)]]]

We show that this gives us the result we want below:

||may win||
= ||may|| (||win||)
= lP<s,<e,t>> [lye [$w [R (w, w@) & P (w)(y)]]] (lw's [lxe [WIN (w', x)]])
= lye [$w [R (w, w@) & lw's [lxe [WIN (w', x)]] (w) (y)]]
= lye [$w [R (w, w@) & lxe [WIN (w, x)] (y)]]
= lye [$w [R (w, w@) & WIN (w, y)]]

||John may win||

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Christopher Tancredi Introduction to Semantics for Non-Native Speakers of English

= ||may win|| (||John||)

= lye [$w [R (w, w@) & WIN (w, y)]] (john)
= $w [R (w, w@) & WIN (w, john)]

The analysis of John may win requires WIN to take a world argument. This affects our
analysis of simple sentences like John wins. In particular, it gives us two problems:

i. If ||win|| = lw's [lxe [WIN (w', x)]], then ||win|| (||John||) is undefined.

ii. If ||win|| = lxe [WIN1 (x)], then ||win|| (||John||) is defined. However, the translation of
win in John wins is then unrelated to the translation of win in John may win, since the
translations contain unrelated logical predicates: WIN, and WIN1.

There are several ways to overcome these problems. The one we choose is to analyze the
sentence John wins as containing something more than just the words John and wins. That
extra something is covert: it affects the interpretation of the sentence but is not pronounced.
There are at least two things this covert expression could be. First, it could be a covert name
of the actual world, say w*. This would translate as w@ in the logic, and would be the first
argument of ||wins||:

||[John [w* wins]]||

= ||w* wins|| (||John||)
= ||wins|| (||w*||) (john)
= lw's [lxe [WIN (w', x)]] (w@) (john)
= WIN (w@, john)

The second thing it could be is a covert operator, say Act, for actuality. Act could be
translated just like a possibility modal, with R (w, w@) replaced with w = w@:

||Act|| = lP<s,<e,t>> [lye [$w [w = w@ & P (w) (y)]]]

||[John [Act wins]]||
= ||Act wins|| (||John||)
= ||Act|| (||wins||) (john)
= lP<s,<e,t>> [lye [$w [w = w@ & P (w) (y)]]] (lw's [lxe [WIN (w', x)]]) (john)
= lye [$w [w = w@ & lw's [lxe [WIN (w', x)]] (w) (y)]] (john)
= lye [$w [w = w@ & WIN (w, y)]] (john)
= $w [w = w@ & WIN (w, john)]

The formulas derived in these two ways differ. However, they each determine the same
denotation: [[WIN (w@, john)]] = True iff [[$w [w = w@ & WIN (w, john)]]] = True.

Necessity Modals
Like possibility modals, necessity modals come in many flavors. Consider the sentence John
must win. This sentence can be used to say any of the following:

i. John is required to win by the speaker / by someone else / by law / …

ii. It follows from what the speaker knows that John wins.
iii. The only way to reach some goal is for John to win.

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These can be put into the same categories as the possibility modals. The uses in (i) show that
must can be a deontic modal. To say that doing something is required is the same as saying
that not doing it is not permitted. In this way, requirement relates to permission. The use in
(ii) shows that must can be an epistemic modal. This is not a typical way of understanding
must when it combines with a verb like win that describes an event. When combined with a
state-denoting predicate as in John must be the winner, however, an epistemic interpretation is
often the most natural. Finally, the use in (iii) shows that must can be a teleological modal.
As with other teleological modals, this understanding is easier to get when a goal is stated, as
in In order to become famous, John must win.

No necessity modals have an ability interpretation. Some necessity modals do have a

circumstantial interpretation, however. In Chapter 7, this is what we used to formally derive
an ability interpretation for can and could. On a circumstantial interpretation, a necessity
modal says what necessarily happens when the circumstances are as they are. The sentence
John will win has a circumstantial interpretation. It says that given the circumstances as they
are, John's winning is the only possibility. This interpretation is described in (iv).

iv. The circumstances guarantee John's winning

The modal would allows for past-shifted interpretations as in (v) and (vi), as well as for
hypothetical interpretations.

v. In the past, the only way to reach some goal was for John to win.
vi. In the past, the circumstances guaranteed John's winning.

The following chart shows the distribution of modal flavors for modal auxiliaries and modal
verbs of necessity.

Modal Flavor Hypothetical

Modal Deontic Epistemic Teleological Circumstantial
must ○ ○ ○ × ×
shall ○ ○ ○ ○ ×
should ○ ○ ○ ○ ×
will × ○ ○ ○ ×
would × ○ ○ ○ ○
ought to ○ ○ ○ ○ ×
need (to) ○ ○ ○ × ×
have to ○ ○ ○ × ×

Differences within Flavors

As with possibility modals, different necessity modals give rise to different interpretations
even when they have the same modal flavor. We can see this by comparing must, should and
will. These modals all have epistemic and teleological interpretations. The interpretations
differ systematically, however.

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Teleological Interpretations
Consider first the teleological interpretations of will, must and should.

To get from Kyoto to Tokyo, you will take the shinkansen

To get from Kyoto to Tokyo, you must take the shinkansen
To get from Kyoto to Tokyo, you should take the shinkansen

The first sentence is true iff taking the shinkansen is the actual way you get from Kyoto to
Tokyo. It allows that there are other possible ways of getting there, but is false if you take
one of these other ways instead. For the second sentence to be true, taking the shinkansen has
to be the only way of getting from Kyoto to Tokyo. Since we know that there are many other
ways of going from Kyoto to Tokyo -- by plane, bus, car or bicycle, for example -- this
second sentence is false as a teleological modal. For the third sentence to be true, taking the
shinkansen has to be the best way of getting from Kyoto to Tokyo according to the speaker.
The sentence does not say what makes it the best way. Perhaps it is because it is the most
convenient for you, or because the speaker is taking the shinkansen and wants to go together
with you, or for some other reason.

In Chapter 7 we analyzed teleological modals as modals that quantify over worlds in which a
certain goal is reached. For can, we limited the relevant worlds to those in which the
circumstances related to reaching that goal are identical to what they are in the actual world.
We made one exception to those circumstances: the circumstances regarding the truth of the
prejacent were allowed to differ. As a possibility modal, can existentially quantifies over
these worlds. The modals we are looking at in this chapter are necessity modals. They
involve universal quantification over worlds rather than existential quantification. Suppose
we use the restrictions on worlds from can to restrict a universal quantification over worlds.
The resulting interpretation is appropriate for must. We show this below.

To simplify the discussion, let us introduce the following abbreviation:

CIRC@,q,g(w) = "p ((CIRCUMSTANCE (p,w@,g) & p ≠ q & p ≠ ~q)

® (p (w) = p (w@)))

The formula to the right of the first = sign above is taken from the translation of can in
Chapter 7. It represents the restriction described above. Namely, CIRC@,q,g(w) says that
world w shares with the actual world w@ all circumstances related to goal g except perhaps
for q or ~q. With this abbreviation, we give the following as teleological interpretations of
modal sentences made from the modals can and must, with prejacent q and goal g:

||can q|| = $w [(CIRC@,q,g(w) & g(w)) & q (w)]

||must q|| = "w [(CIRC@,q,g(w) & g(w)) ® q (w)]

In both cases, the underlined formula gives a restriction on the quantifier.

In the example sentences under consideration, the goal g is for you to get from Kyoto to
Tokyo, and the prejacent q is you take the shinkansen. We give the translation of the sentence
with must as follows:

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||To get from Kyoto to Tokyo, you must take the shinkansen||
= "w [(CIRC@,q,g(w) & g(w)) ® q (w)]
g = lw [$p [PATH(p) & GET (you, p, w) & FROM (p, kyoto) & TO (p, tokyo)]]
q = lw [TAKE (you, shinkansen, w)]

According to this translation, the sentence is true iff in every world in which (i) circumstances
related to getting from Kyoto to Tokyo are as they are in the actual world, except possibly for
the circumstance of your taking the shinkansen (from CIRC@,q,g(w)), and in which (ii) you get
from Kyoto to Tokyo (from g(w)), you take the shinkansen (from q(w)). Since circumstances
related to getting from Kyoto to Tokyo include the possibility of making the trip by plane,
car, etc., we correctly predict the sentence to be false. There are worlds in which these
circumstances are the same as in the actual world and in which you get from Kyoto to Tokyo
without taking the shinkansen.

The next question we need to answer is how we can account for the differences between must,
will and should. We observed above that teleological interpretations of these three modals
give rise to different truth conditions. Let us look at will and should in turn.

Our example sentence with will above requires that you actually take the shinkansen to get
from Kyoto to Tokyo. The sentence is true even if there are other possible ways of getting
from Kyoto to Tokyo. The easiest way to account for these facts is to make a simple change
to the interpretation given for must q. For must q, we required the circumstances related to
the goal to be the same as they are in the actual world, with an exception made for q. We can
account for the behavior of will q by not making this exception.

Without the exception, the worlds quantified over have to be like the actual world with
respect to all circumstances related to the goal, including q. The sentence To get from Kyoto
to Tokyo, you will take the shinkansen quantifies over every world in which all circumstances
related to you getting from Kyoto to Tokyo are the same as they are in the actual world. It is
true if you take the shinkansen in each of these worlds. Since whether you take the
shinkansen or not is a circumstance related to you getting from Kyoto to Tokyo, if you take
the shinkansen in the actual world, you take the shinkansen in all worlds being quantified
over. This makes the sentence true. If, on the other hand, you do not take the shinkansen in
the actual world, then you do not take the shinkansen in any of the worlds being quantified
over. This makes the sentence false. Whether there are other possible ways of getting from
Kyoto to Tokyo makes no difference to the truth or falsity of the sentence.

We formalize the semantics of will by replacing CIRC@,q,g(w), used in the translation of must
q, with CIRC'@,g(w). We define CIRC'@,g(w) as follows:

CIRC'@,g(w) = "p (CIRCUMSTANCE (p,w@,g) ® (p (w) = p (w@)))

The difference from CIRC@,q,g(w) is that CIRC'@,g(w) does not exclude q or ~q from the
circumstances that have to be the same in w and w@. We can now give the following
translation for teleological will q with understood goal g.

||will q|| = "w [(CIRC'@,g(w) & g(w)) ® q (w)]

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This translation guarantees that w@ itself will be among the worlds quantified over. It will
only be true, then, if q is true.

Turn now to should. Above we noted that our example sentence with should says that taking
the shinkansen is the best way to get from Kyoto to Tokyo. Like will and unlike must, it
allows for other ways of getting from Kyoto to Tokyo. Like must and unlike will, it does not
require that you actually go from Kyoto to Tokyo by shinkansen.

The fact that should does not require that you actually go from Kyoto to Tokyo by shinkansen
shows that with should q, the worlds quantified over do not have to contain the actual world.
We account for this fact the same way we did with must. We take the circumstances that have
to be the same in the worlds quantified over not to include q. Should q, then, includes
CIRC@,q,g(w) in its translation. To account for the fact that should q allows ways of reaching
a goal g other than q, we take should to include a second, often unstated goal. In our traveling
example, this could be the goal of travelling in the most comfortable way available, for
example. We formalize this second goal as C, and assume that the identity of C is given by
the context. This gives us the following as a translation for should q:

||should q|| = "w [(CIRC@,q,g(w) & g(w) & C(w)) ® q (w)]

This translation allows there to be many ways of reaching the stated goal g other than q. For
example, it allows there to be many ways of going from Kyoto to Tokyo other than by
shinkansen. However, it requires q to be the only way to achieve the combined goal of g and
C. For example, going by shinkansen has to be the only way to go from Kyoto to Tokyo in
the most comfortabl way available. This matches our intuitions about should.

Epistemic Interpretation
Consider next the epistemic interpretations of will, must and should. Imagine we are in a
room and hear a knock at the door. If I am convinced that the person who is knocking is
John, I can say any of the following:

That will be John

That must be John
That should be John

All three of these sentences are interpreted as epistemic modal statements in this context.
They all say roughly that that is John is compatible with what I know. The three sentences
are not, however, identical. If we look closely, we find differences among them.

Imagine that the first thing I say after hearing the knock on the door is That might not be
John. I can follow that by saying However, that should be John without contradicting myself.
If I try following with However, that will be John or with However, that must be John, in
contrast, I do contradict myself.

(You hear a knock at the door.)

That may not be John. However, that should/ #must/ #will be John.

Another difference can be seen by changing the situation in a different way. Suppose that
after hearing the knock at the door, someone asks Who is that? I answer I don't know. John

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is the only person in the building. However, Mary is the only person who ever comes here.
Here, I have two pieces of information that point to different answers. The first piece of
information -- that John is the only person in the building -- suggests that the person at the
door is John. The second piece of information -- that Mary is the only person who ever
comes here -- suggests that the person at the door is Mary. If we take both pieces of
information together, it is impossible to draw a definite conclusion about who is at the door.
In this situation, none of the three sentences above would be appropriate on its own.
However, if we relate the sentences to specific pieces of information, things change. In
particular, we can say any of the following:

Given that John is the only person in the building, that should/ must be John.
Given that Mary is the only person who ever comes here, that should/ must be Mary.

In fact, it is possible to say both of these without contradiction. If we change the modal from
should/must to will, however, the sentences each become inappropriate, and saying both of
them together results in a contradiction:

#Given that John is the only person in the building, that will be John.
#Given that Mary is the only person who ever comes here, that will be Mary.

The first of the two contexts we just looked at shows that should behaves differently from
must and will. The second context shows that will behaves differently from should and must.
Our task is to show how to predict these differences. We give an analysis parallel to the
analysis given for teleological interpretations. In particular, the three modals differ in the
worlds they quantify over. With will, these worlds always include the actual world. With
must and should, they need not. Also, will and must only place one restriction on the worlds
quantified over, compatibility with what someone knows. Should places a second restriction,
one that need not be known.

To get will to include the actual world in the worlds it quantifies over, we require the
knowledge that restricts the quantification to be correct. That is, we do not include in the
restriction anything that the relevant person thinks she knows but is wrong about. For should
and must, in contrast, we include any restriction that the relevant person thinks she knows,
regardless of whether it is correct. In this way, will q entails q. For will q to be true in the
actual world, q has to be true in every world compatible with someone's true knowledge. The
actual world is one of those worlds. Should q and must q, in contrast, do not entail q. These
quantify over worlds compatible with what someone thinks she knows, but they allow for the
person to be wrong about what she knows. If that person has any incorrect knowledge, then
the actual world will not be among the worlds quantified over. This makes it possible for q to
be false in the actual world even when should q and must q are true.

The analysis given so far explains the intuition that That will be John and That will be Mary
are contradictory. The sentence That will be John on this analysis entails that that is John. It
does not allow it to be anyone else, neither in addition to John nor instead of John. The
sentence That will be Mary similarly entails that that is Mary. Since it is not possible for
there to be a unique person at the door who is both John and Mary, it is not possible for both
sentences to be true. It also gives us a reason why neither sentence feels appropriate. To utter
either sentence, the speaker would have to know that the knowledge she bases the sentence on
is correct. She would then have to know that the knowledge she would base the other

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sentence on is incorrect. As the situation is set up, however, this is not something that the
speaker knows.

The analysis so far does not yet explain why must is appropriate to use in this example. If
must quantifies over all worlds in which everything the speaker thinks she knows is true, then
That must be John and That must be Mary should be contradictory, just like with will. In any
world in which the unique person at the door is John, it is false that the unique person at the
door is Mary. If both sentences quantify over the exact same set of worlds, then the
restrictions they place on those worlds cannot both be met. To avoid this consequence, the
worlds quantified over by the two sentences have to differ. If must quantifies over all worlds
compatible with some body of knowledge, this means that the relevant bodies of knowledge
have to differ.

To allow for different bodies of knowledge to count in different cases, we understand the
restriction on worlds quantified over by an epistemic modal to be based on some salient part
of a person's knowledge. This makes it possible to use must in the two ways seen above.
That must be John is true relative to the (possibly incorrect) knowledge that John is the only
other person in the building. That must be Mary, on the other hand, is true relative to the
(possibly incorrect) knowledge that Mary is the only person who ever comes here. Since
there is no requirement that both pieces of knowledge hold at any of the worlds quantified
over, there is no contradiction between the sentences.

If different modal sentences can depend on different parts of a person's knowledge, how do
we decide what knowledge counts? The examples above specifically mention one piece of
knowledge that has to be used. We assume that this is one way of making the decision. What
if the context does not mention any specific knowledge, though? In such a context, most
people find the sentences That must be John and That must be Mary to be contradictory. This
suggests that by default, people expect the same knowledge to be used to interpret different
epistemic modal sentences.

Suppose, then, that the knowledge used to interpret multiple epistemic modal sentences is the
same by default. Then we can explain the difference between should on the one hand and
must and will on the other as follows. In the example that shows the difference, we start with
the sentence That may not be John. In the context given, this is understood as an epistemic
modal. It quantifies over worlds compatible with some part of what the speaker knows. Call
this knowledge K. The next sentence is also an epistemic modal, spoken by the same person.
If we use the same knowledge to restrict our quantification in both sentences, this second
sentence too should involve quantification over worlds in which K holds. Call these worlds
WK. For must and will, no further restrictions are added. They quantify over WK just like
may does. That may not be John says that there is some world in WK in which that is not
John. That must/will be John, in contrast, says that in every world in WK, that is John. This is
a contradiction.

We avoid the contradiction with should by taking should to add some further restriction in
addition to K. Call this restriction C. This could include things the speaker suspects are true
but is not sure of. Adding C to K gives us a different set of worlds to quantify over: WK+C.
This set of worlds is contained inside WK, as shown below.

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WK WC

WK+C

If we use K as our knowledge base for both That may not be John and That should be John,
we get the following. From the first sentence, in some world in WK, that is not John. From
the second sentence, in every world in WK+C, that is John. It is easily possible for both of
these things to be true. It follows that the two sentences are predicted not to be contradictory.
This matches our intuition.

This completes our informal explanation of the differences among will, must and should. All
that is left is to turn the informal explanation into a formal analysis. This is done below by
giving translations for epistemic will q, must q and should q. Here we take KW(w) to say that
w is compatible with some contextually relevant knowledge that an individual has. We
simplify the translations by leaving out the specific individual as well as the contextual
restriction.

||will q|| = "w [(KW(w) & KW(w@)) ® q (w)]

||must q|| = "w [(KW(w)) ® q (w)]
||should q|| = "w [(KW(w) & C(w)) ® q (w)]