Macgilchrist, Felicitas (2007). Metaphorical Politics: Is Russia western?

In Catherine Baker,
Christopher Gerry, Barbara Madaj, Elizabeth Mellish and Jana Nahodilova (eds.), Nation in Formation:
Inclusion and Exclusion in Central and Eastern Europe London: SSEES Occasional Papers. (pp. 73-
90).

Metaphorical politics: Is Russia ‘western’ or not in the UK, US and German press
coverage of the Russian-Chechen conflict?

One editorial in the aftermath of the Dubrovka theatre siege in 2002 says Russia is in a
‘hellhole of brutish behavior’ (The New York Times, 28 October 2002: 24). Another says it is
part of ‘the civilized world’ (Wall Street Journal, 28 October 2002: 18). Following the
September 2001 attacks in the US, members of the human rights movement focused on the
‘civilised Russia’ comments and voiced concern that ‘the West’ was becoming less critical of
Russia (e.g. Holland and McDowell 2005, Pyati 2005). But was this really the case? This
paper analyses the press coverage of key events in the Russian-Chechen conflict from 1995 to
2004, and argues that the media have two dominant modes of discourse for reporting Russia:
based on the metaphor of nation-as-family, international politics are discussed in two ways –
within what George Lakoff (2002) has called the ‘strict father’ frame and the ‘nurturant
parent’ frame.

Newspaper descriptions create ‘symbolic universes’ for their audiences – as do all event
descriptions (Berger and Luckman 1967: 122). Sometimes notably distinct and mutually
incomprehensible; at other times the universes overlap and merge into one another. This paper
investigates two levels: Firstly, the individual ‘frames’, understood as those largely
unconscious ‘principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit
theories about what exists, what happens and what matters’ (Gitlin 1980: 6), each of which
brings the news stories into a common narrative, with shared priorities and values.1 One set of
news stories, for instance, praises negotiations leading to the release of hostages (a frame
which values compromise for the greater good), while another set criticises the same
negotiators for allowing the hostage-takers to escape unpunished (a frame which values fair
retribution). The second level looks behind these differences to find similarities creating a
dominant discourse – a macro-frame – for producing knowledge about Russia and the world.
Despite some overt attempts to include Russia in what is commonly named ‘the West’, this
macro-frame (‘the West and the rest’) recreates an image of Russia which has flourished in
that West since at least the Enlightenment: Russia is barbaric, backwards, uncivilised,
autocratic, imperialistic, dangerous (cf. Naarden 1992; Neumann 1996; Paul 2001; Paddock
1998). And cold. Larry Wolff has called this the ‘demi-Orientalisation’ of Russia (Wolff
1994: 7).

Other potential frames for describing Russia, such as ‘cold war’, ‘evil empire’ and ‘clash of
civilisations’,2 must be left to other papers, as must descriptions of Chechnya; for the
moment, this paper (i) introduces the nation-as-family metaphor, (ii) outlines the ‘strict father’
and ‘nurturant parent’ frames, (iii) describes these frames as seen in the press coverage from
1995-2004, and suggests that reporting Russia is one means of re-producing a
commonsensical understanding of the world in which ‘the West’ is constructed as separate
from ‘the Rest’.3

Nation-as-family
Metaphor has generally been understood as a ‘mere’ figure of speech: a rhetorical flourish
that compares one thing to another. This Aristotelian view was challenged by I. A. Richards,

1
who shifted the focus from language to cognition, arguing not only that metaphor is 'the
omnipresent principle of language' (1936: 92), but also that 'thinking is radically metaphoric'
(1938: 48). Cognitive linguists developing this approach suggest that 'conceptual metaphors'
structure our understanding of the world, our judgments and our actions, largely without our
being aware of the process (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980). These conceptual metaphors thus
frame our stories and political debates, and naturalise our worldviews.4

The most widespread metaphorical concept when describing countries sees the nation as a
family, with words and phrases such as ‘patriot’, ‘fatherland’, ‘motherland’, founding
‘fathers’, Big ‘Brother’, ‘Uncle’ Sam, and sending ‘our lads’ to war (Lakoff 2002: 153-61).
These are more than mere linguistic expressions – the concept leads to our reasoning about
the role of the state. If the nation is a family, the government is a parent, and the citizens are
the children. The role of the government is to protect its citizens; it is responsible for them,
and has authority over them. Alternative conceptual metaphors could see the nation as a team,
an executive board, or a commune.5 Before expanding on the nation-as-family metaphor in
relation to Russia, however, we should consider the different kinds of ‘ideal families’. The
two main, opposing, ideals – and I stress that they are only ideal types – are, in Lakoff’s
terminology, the ‘strict father’ and ‘nurturant parent’ metaphorical frames.6 The following
descriptions draw on Lakoff’s development of these models in his 2002 book Moral Politics.

‘Strict father’
Taking the metaphor beyond the actual words used, the set of priorities for the ‘strict father’
frame is based around ‘strength’ and ‘independence’.7 Self-discipline is important in order to
be independent and strong; the parent has authority by virtue of ‘his’ (in this traditional view,
the male is generally seen as the authority) position, he knows best, and should be listened to
appropriately. He must be strong, and support, protect and regulate the behaviour of his
children. ‘Tough love’ is a phrase which comes to mind, rather than ‘unconditional
nurturance’: children who misbehave must be punished in order to develop good character.
Strength also comes from individual virtuous characteristics and traits, which are taken to be
inherent and immutable, e.g. self-discipline, restraint, control, courage, temperance, sobriety,
industry, chastity, perseverance.

The family model translates onto the state firstly in the concept of sovereignty – the state is
responsible for itself, other states should not interfere in its domestic matters. Strength is seen
in the nation’s self-discipline, restraint, etc. There is a natural hierarchy of power (with the
more powerful having responsibilities for the less powerful), and an assumption that the
authorities know best (or they would not be the authorities). A ‘strict father’ nation considers
the welfare state to be a ‘nanny state’, smothering individual citizens’ abilities to develop
their independence. The individual characteristics in the ‘strict father’ model are expected of
the leaders of the nation. Security issues predominate; this frame can be seen most clearly in
the discussion of military actions, as I will show below.

‘Nurturant parent’
The ‘nurturant parent’ model of family life has a different set of priorities. Precedence is
given to empathy and compromise. Problems should be discussed in order to understand what
the other feels and to find a solution. Parents offer their child unconditional nurturance. Love,
time and biscuits must be distributed fairly and equitably. Virtues prioritised in this model are
compassion, fairness, social responsibility, open-mindedness, inquisitiveness, tact, care,
flexibility, generosity.

2
 In its benevolent incarnation this translates into a cosmopolitan view of the world, in which
‘allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings’ (Nussbaum 1996: 4). Highest
priority is given to understanding alternative lifestyles or cultural codes in society, both within
the state and across national boundaries. Conflicts should be resolved through dialogue,
negotiation and compromise. Global equality and human rights are continuously relevant
topics, and policies should accord with the characteristics of compassion, fairness, social
responsibility, etc.8

The ‘nurturant parent’ frame can however also lead to ‘human rights imperialism’, in which
selective NGO evidence is used to show the moral superiority of the West (Beck and Grande
2004: 387). This is not to criticise the human rights groups, which do excellent work
uncovering abuses in many countries.9 The imperial human rights discourse can, nevertheless,
be created by the media and politics, which tend to selectively appropriate NGO knowledge.

Intuitively, these frames seem to indicate the ‘distinct discursivities’ of left-wing and
conservative politics (Foucault 1976: 33). But today’s newspapers no longer fit clearly into a
left-right divide. Even the UK press, generally thought to be highly partisan, no longer
consistently shows party alignment (Deacon, Golding and Billig 2001: 667). From my reading
of these stories on Russia, one division of the press is between those aligned with the
‘nurturant parent’ frame (not always the left) and those prioritising the ‘strict father’ frame
(not always the right).10

‘Our family home’ or ‘the West and the rest’

‘Strict father’ and ‘nurturant parent’, are, then, two different frames appearing in different
newspapers. Linking them is the image of a family home along the lines of, ‘East or West,
home’s best’.11 The New York Post phrases this most clearly after the theatre siege in 2002.
An opinion piece compares the US treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo with the Russian
treatment of Chechen hostage-takers: ‘The contrast between these two examples should cause
all Americans to take a minute and think about what it means to be an American. And to
thank God for the wondrous privilege of having been born or having found a home in this
shining city on a hill.’ (Podhoretz 2002)

The joy of finding a home ‘here’ is not specific to coverage of Russia; the news media in the
US, the UK and Germany often present a dismissive view of most of the ‘non-Western’ world
(Philo 1999). One US editor asks the questions, ‘[d]oes the story pick sides or make subtle
value judgements? Will some people like the story more than they should?’ (Kovach &
Rosenstiel 2001: 88). The answer for much of the fair and balanced reporting in ‘the West and
the rest’ frame is that neither ‘side’ will like it more. But, looking beyond the participants in
the story itself, a third side may like the story more than it should: the domestic audience,
presented with a world ‘out there’ where they are glad they do not live. For ‘the West and the
rest’ macro-frame, Russia provides just one more example of the ‘rest of the world’ being
slightly incompetent, chaotic, brutal, disorganised.12 As one British correspondent in Moscow
said, post-Soviet Russia is forced to fill the ‘funny foreigners’ category of news (TP, pers.
comm, October 2005).

Press representations 1995-2004

Security, strength, human rights, compromise, competence, etc. are age-old themes; their
appearance in the news media is no surprise. And, I reiterate, these are not the only frames for
the news. They do, however, indicate salient shared cultural narratives resonating in the
coverage of Russia from 1995 to 2004. This study is based on four large-scale incidents in

3
Russia, which were reported in most of the ‘elite’ and ‘tabloid’ mainstream press: (1) the
hospital siege in Budennovsk in 1995; (2) the armed invasion into Dagestan which
contributed to the start of the second Chechen war in 1999; (3) the Dubrovka theatre hostage
siege in Moscow in 2002; and (4) the seizure of a school in Beslan in 2004.

Corpus
Nine newspapers have been analysed, three from each country. In the UK, The Guardian, The
Daily Telegraph, and The Sun. In the USA, The New York Times, Wall Street Journal and
New York Post. In Germany, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), Süddeutsche Zeitung
and Bild.13 Keyword searches on the online media databases Lexis Nexis and Factiva were
used to identify all relevant news items printed around the time of each incident.14 As far
fewer articles were published in the 1990s than in 2002 and 2004, different sampling time-
frames were adopted. For Budennovsk all news items printed in the first fortnight of coverage
were collated; for Dagestan all from the first month; for Dubrovka and Beslan all from the
first week. The ensuing corpus of over 1000 news items in total included a sufficient number
of texts to analyse each incident.

1. Budennovsk, southern Russia, 14 June 1995

To summarise the events in Budennovsk in an unbiased way is impossible. Words must be
chosen, grammar constructed, information ‘gerrymandered’ (Potter 1996). Nevertheless, on
14 June 1995 around 200 hostage-takers took over 1,800 people hostage; 147 people were
killed; more than 400 were wounded; and about 160 buildings in the town were damaged or
destroyed. After six days, then-Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin negotiated the release of
the hostages in exchange for the hostage-takers’ safe conduct back to Chechnya.

The coverage
The first few news reports, in the initial confusing moments of each event from 1995 to 2004,
are fairly similar across the publications. Then, at a key moment, the shared version of the
news splits into different, competing, directions. To borrow Robert Entman’s classification,
the turning point generally comes when it is time to ‘diagnose, evaluate and prescribe’
(Entmann 1993: 52). The initial stories are often as stripped of evaluation as possible, before
the frame has been clarified. At that stage, analysis steps in, comment pieces and editorials
appear, and – importantly – the hard news also begins to take on a different shape in each of
the newspapers.

There is much criticism of then-President Boris Yeltsin and his decision to fly to the G7
meeting in Canada, rather than going to Budennovsk. Instead, Chernomyrdin took control of
the situation, making substantial offers to the hostage-takers, and talking with Chechen leader
Shamil Basayev live on television. The latter is reported from two different viewpoints.
Chernomyrdin begged Basayev, and allowed the terrorists to escape unpunished; or
Chernomyrdin made the first move in the democratic process of finding a political solution to
the conflict in Chechnya.

And here is where the narrative becomes two narratives. Both criticise Yeltsin; both say the
Russian government is not coping well with the situation – the Russian special forces attempt
to storm the building twice but fail both times. Both highlight a ‘lack’. However, they differ
in focus: what exactly is lacking in each case? One narrative focuses on ‘Moscow’s cruel
strategy’ in Chechnya (Neubert 1995); on the Russian military operation (‘suppression’) and
the way its army tactics, which ‘often deserve a terrorist label’, have ‘legitimised the
separatists’ (The Guardian, 16 June 1995: 14). Gorbachev calls the raid ‘an act of despair’

4
(The Guardian, 16 June 1995: 11). This narrative resonates with other cultural narratives by
highlighting the absence of empathy and compromise: this is not a ‘nurturant parent’ – a
humane polis based on consensual politics – working towards a cosmopolitan world where
human rights, liberty and dignity are protected.

A second frame initially supports efforts to storm the hospital, by headlining, for instance,
‘Troops ready to storm Chechen rebels’ (The Daily Telegraph, 17 June 1995: 16, emphasis
added), rather than, for example, ‘Troops threaten to storm the hospital’.15 However, after
the hostage-takers’ successful resistance, this support turns to critique of ‘the fundamental
weakness of the Russian regime’ (The Daily Telegraph, 20 June 1995: 22). This latter
narrative again highlights absence, but of a different sort: Russia is not a ‘strict father’ – a
strong and disciplined sovereign state – competently protecting its citizens from attack.

Finally, the lack of the ‘enlightened leadership Russia so badly needs’ (The New York Times,
30 June 1995:26) is highlighted, resonating directly with the macro-frame of ‘the West and
the rest’. We are not dealing with a developed, civilised, liberal, western nation.

2. Dagestan, 2-26 August 1999

On 2 August 1999, up to 2000 men entered Dagestan, southern Russia. They were apparently
led by Shamil Basayev and Habib Abdurrahman Khattab, a leading Wahhabi commander in
Chechnya, and their stated aim was to set up an independent united Islamic republic (cf.
Gordon 1999, Zakriev 1999). The Russian military exerted enormous effort to combat this.
Most of the fighting took place around a few villages in the mountainous region bordering
Dagestan and Chechnya. The Dagestani population overwhelmingly opposed the idea of
separation from Russia and the founding of an Islamic state. Around the same time, President
Yeltsin sacked his Prime Minister, Sergei Stepashin, and proposed the relatively unknown
Vladimir Putin to take his place. On 9 August, Putin vowed to have the rebels out of Dagestan
within two weeks. By 16 August it seemed the intruders were not making as much progress as
they had expected. On 23 August, the rebels claimed to have withdrawn, and two days later
Russia declared an end to combat activities (cf. Blandy 2000).

The coverage
The lack of sufficient strength or nurturance also frames Dagestan. But here we see two
further frames: the successful ‘strict father’ and ‘the Russian aggressor’. The ‘strict father’ is
the consistent story-line in the German tabloid Bild. All the reports are news briefs of fewer
than 40 words. All depict positive, steady work being done to combat the ‘Muslim-rebels’.
Yeltsin gives the impression of a stately, calm, collected man, making decisive decisions from
a position of strength, and dealing slowly but surely with Islamic fundamentalism. No outside
interference (or help) is necessary. The ‘strict father’ is winning the military conflict. The
coverage here implies ‘the West and the rest’ frame which warmly includes Russia in the
West and excludes the Islamic other.

The elite newspapers, on the other hand, immediately describe the episode as a Russian act
of aggression (cf. Lieven 2000: 326).16 The excessive belligerence and cold war / imperial
behaviour of ‘the Russian aggressor’ is condemned by both ‘strict father’ and ‘nurturant
parent’ frames. While an aggressor is the logical object of criticism for the ‘nurturant parent’,
aggression is also going too far beyond the ‘strict father’ ideal of appropriate authority:
authority is not autocracy.

5
 Several headlines prioritise the Russian troops, e.g. ‘Russian troops to Dagestan’ (FAZ, 6
August 1999: 2), ‘Russia sends troops to border with Chechnya’ (The Guardian, 5 August
1999: 15). Neither the headlines nor the first (lead) paragraphs of the stories – often the only
part of the story read – mention (Chechen) fighters, or indeed against whom the Russian
troops have been sent to battle. What are the aims of those unnamed people? What led to the
troops being sent? What factors are involved in the conflict? Why is there a conflict in this
particular area, with these particular actors? Most news stories either omit these aspects
(referring to agent-less ‘battles’ and ‘border skirmishes’) or compare the situation to Russia’s
‘invasion of Chechnya in November 1994’, again implying Russian aggression (Hearst 1999,
emphasis added).

Historical context is rarely given, and no alternative frames are prioritised, such as one we
could call ‘the Chechen expansionists’, starring fighters who clearly state on their website
(www.kavkaz.org) their intention to overthrow the Dagestani government, arrest the
Dagestani president, Mahomedali Mahomedov, ‘as a traitor to the cause of Muslims’, and
create a united Islamic republic with an Islamic shura (council). This frame describes the
shura declaring Basayev the amir (commander) and installing Sharia law, which was in force
in Chechnya at the time, and quotes Basayev saying that the fighters were an ‘international
corps comprising Chechens, Dagestanis, and other nationals’ who ‘shall always be pleased to
fight the Russians’ (cf. Lieven 2000: 325).17

Instead, ‘the Russian aggressor’ is the shared frame for initial coverage, but again the
publications develop the story in two directions. Although much informational content is
similar, the disparities, gaps, and focal points constitute spaces where two narratives emerge.
In the ‘weak father’ story-line the Russian leadership is weak and ‘deluded’ (FAZ, 16 August
1999: 1).18 The ‘motley collection’ of soldiers ‘lack discipline’ (Avenarius 1999; Warren
1999b, 1999d). The military is unprepared and losing control.19 They will not get the swift
victory they so foolishly – it is implied – promised. The story-line feeds on, and nourishes, a
cultural frame in which quick military victory is valued; in which the leaders of states should
be physically strong (healthy), mentally strong (self-disciplined), and morally strong
(accepting responsibility for protecting their citizens).20

On the other hand, in the ‘neglectful parent’ narrative the military assault only makes
matters worse; the real challenge is to improve social conditions in the region. The criticism
here is not that the military is undisciplined or unmotivated, as above, but that the military is
used at all: ‘Moscow still knows no alternative [to the problem of Islamic guerrillas] to a
military solution, just as previously in neighbouring Chechnya’ (FAZ, 24 August 1999: 1).21

The Guardian consistently foregrounds social conditions: the Russian government should be
nurturing local peace and avoiding ‘excessive and badly-aimed firepower’ (Steele 1999a).
Chechnya is presented as having civilised priorities, e.g. by quoting the ‘moderate’
Maskhadov: ‘One war is enough for us. We now want to create and construct rather than
doom our people to destruction’ (Steele 1999b). The invasion is framed as humanitarian
concern; it is a matter for a societ-ised politics rather than state-based politics.

The FAZ exhibits a shift in framing during the Dagestan coverage. Whereas The Daily
Telegraph and Wall Street Journal do not waver from their position – with verbs of weakness,
Russia ‘admits’ and ‘concedes’ its lack of success in being a ‘strict father’ (Wall Street
Journal, 20 August: 1; Warren 1999a) – the FAZ undergoes a change from ‘strict father’ to
‘nurturant parent’ frame by redefining politics. A closer probe into one particular news story

6
highlights this shift. Kerstin Holm’s story, headlined ‘The cowardly mountain rabbits film
themselves’ (‘Die feigen Berghasen filmen sich selbst’), articulates the move away from
nation-based politics towards a society-based outlook in two ways. (Holm 1999)

Firstly, the text moves the boundaries from a cold war, East – West, division of nations to a
civilisational demarcation between Islamic fundamentalism and a reasonable West: ‘In the
media it is becoming clear that Russia’s political leadership still tends to think in cold war
categories, and only understands the actual role of the country as a bulwark against Islamic
fundamentalism with great difficulty’ (ibid., emphasis added).22 The threat is thus transferred
from Russia, within the old ‘evil empire’ frame, to Islamic fundamentalism within the
emerging ‘clash of civilisations’ frame in which radical Islam is threatening the ethnic balance
in Dagestan and forcing the locals to take up arms.

Secondly, the Russian leadership is not up to date on its ‘actual role’ in this ‘clash of
civilisations’. It is ‘still’ thinking in terms of land and sovereignty instead of what the article
later calls ‘the idea of fighting for the rights of the subjects [Untertanen] under attack’
(ibid.).23 Politicians are removed from their cold war position of defending or attacking in the
name of the nation/union, and given a new societal position, fighting on behalf of their
citizens. Politics is moving away from purely nation-based actions, but the people to be
defended are still the citizens of the state, not the citizens of the world. Although suggesting
that Russia should be a ‘bulwark’, the embodiment of strength, the text also refers to the
liberal politician Grigory Yavlinsky’s view that ‘the problem of Islamic fundamentalism can
only be sorted out in the long-term by implementing social policies and fighting corruption’
(ibid.).24 Appropriate social policies dealing with the root causes of problems are among the
key priorities for a ‘nurturant parent’ frame. Holm’s article thus blends the ‘strict father’ and
‘nurturant parent’ perspectives on the conflict, and indicates a shift of frame in the FAZ which
become more apparent in later reporting (see below).

Indeed, the Dagestan coverage as a whole is once more divided between the same two major
cultural frames: ‘strict father’ and ‘nurturant parent’. What all the newspapers – except Bild –
do share is a sketch of Russia not coping. For whatever reasons fit the frames, the Russian
authorities are not handling the assault on Dagestan well. When success is finally announced
it is either disbelieved/ignored (The Daily Telegraph), minimally reported (Wall Street
Journal), or not accepted as success (FAZ, The Guardian). It is easy to infer that ‘we’ in the
West would have done it better (‘the West and the rest’). Who else is in a position to criticise
but those who can do it well?25 But the criticism was slight compared to later developments
during the second Chechen war, starting soon after Dagestan and hitting all nine newspapers
when a theatre was attacked in Moscow in 2002.

3. Dubrovka theatre, Moscow, 24 October 2002

During a performance of the musical Nord-Ost, about 40 heavily armed men and women,
identifying themselves as Islamic and Chechen, took the theatre hostage. They demanded an
end to the war in Chechnya. Fifty-seven hours later the Russian special forces pumped a
special gas into the building and stormed it, killing the hostage-takers and rescuing the
hostages. Officially, 129 hostages died; all except two as a result of the gas.

The coverage
To select a description of the events in Moscow during the theatre hostage-taking in 2002 is
even more contentious than describing Budennovsk and Dagestan. Here the newspaper
reports are split most clearly between those focusing on the strength of the state in dealing

7
with terrorists, and those highlighting Russian responsibility for creating the conditions which
(a) led to the siege and (b) led to the deaths of the hostages. The coverage could be
summarised as follows (emphasis added in all extracts):26

‘Strict father’ ‘Nurturant parent’

Phase One:
A group of about forty heavily armed
terrorists, from the ‘mainly Muslim
republic’ stormed the musical, Nord-Ost,
‘demanding an end to Russian army
operations in the breakaway republic’
(Wall Street Journal, 24 October 2002:
15, 1). As ‘elite anti-terrorism units’
awaited their orders (The Daily
Telegraph, 25 October 2002: 11) a Wall
Street Journal lead summarised
‘President Vladimir Putin blamed
international terrorists for a hostage-
taking crisis that has brought the Chechen
war to the heart of Moscow and badly
damaged his image as a guarantor of law
and stability.’ (25 October 2002: 9)
Phase Two:
Fifty-seven hours later, ‘crack Russian
troops launched a daring raid to save the
Moscow theatre hostages’. (The Sun, 26
October 2002: 1)
Phase Three:
The ‘rescue operation’ was a fiasco (Wall
Street Journal, 28 October 2002: 18). ‘Gas’
killed the hostages (The Daily Telegraph,
30 October 2002: 15). ‘Security forces
caused most of the hostage deaths through
misuse of dangerous gas to immobilize the
Chechen terrorists’ (Wall Street Journal, 29
October 2002: 23). Russian officials refused
to give information about the gas.
A group of about forty ‘heavily armed men
and women […] prepared to die for their
cause’, stormed the musical, Nord-Ost,
demanding an end to the war and
independence for Chechnya (The Guardian,
25 October 2002: 1). In an article headlined
‘Moscow reaps the Chechen whirlwind’, The
Guardian summarises: ‘The seizure of
hundreds of theatre-goers in a Moscow
suburb last night is a grim reminder to the
Kremlin of how badly its hardline policies in
Chechnya have failed since the republic first
declared independence as the Soviet Union
stumbled to its end.’ (24 October 2002: 19)
Fifty-seven hours later, Russian special
forces pumped gas into the theatre, and
stormed the building. Two hostages called
from the theatre: ‘They’re pumping gas in.
They want to gas us.’ (FAZ, 28 October
2002: 3)27
The storm was a fiasco. The ‘brutal use of
force’ (FAZ, 30 October 2002: 2) killed the
hostages, who ‘died when troops stormed’
(The Guardian, 31 October 2002: 16). The
use of gas was ‘horrendous’ (The
Guardian, 28 October: 18) and
‘inconsiderate/ruthless’ (‘rücksichtslos’)
(FAZ, 30 October 2002: 2). Russian
officials refused to give information about
the gas.

There is again – particularly in phase three – a heavy focus on mistakes made by the
Russian authorities. A new element, in what is now the third year of Putin’s presidency is the
use of ‘secrecy’ in both frames, described as, for instance, ‘Soviet-style disinformation’
(Strauss 2002), ‘Soviet-era secrecy’ (Wall Street Journal, 28 October 2002: 18) and
‘deception tactics’ (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30 October 2002: 4).28 Although this is more
relevant in the Beslan stories discussed below, at Dubrovka any information withheld under
Putin is much more likely to be compared to Soviet behaviour than to the confidentiality

8
often expected of (Western) governments dealing with sensitive information, such as was
‘understandable’ when the British police gave very little information after the London
underground bombings in July 2005 (BBC World News, 8 July 2005, 10pm). The simplest
way of justifying behaviour, i.e. by giving reasons for it, is largely omitted in these Dubrovka
reports. Far from offering explanations or analyses of why the information may have been
kept secret, the press is, with one voice, horrified and perplexed by the secrecy.29

Whereas at Budennovsk the ‘strict father’ frame – in several newspapers – first supports a
strong hand, then criticises the weakness of making a deal, here the frame first supports the
strong hand, then criticises Russia’s incompetent response in, for example, the way it used the
gas. Leaders and troops have failed to achieve a seemingly valid aim, i.e. to ‘immobilize the
terrorists’. At Budennovsk the focus is on a lack of resolve and discipline; at Dubrovka on a
lack of control and competence.

The ‘nurturant parent’ frame again focuses on excessively brutal military actions in
Chechnya, which have radicalised the population and forced them to drastic measures to bring
attention to their ‘plight’ (Traynor & Paton-Walsh 2002). The message is that this theatre
siege would not have happened if Russia had been more understanding, more willing to
negotiate with the moderate Maskhadov, and more ready to help rebuild Chechnya, giving the
young people career options beyond fighting and suicide missions. Also, the use of gas during
the storm was questionable: it shows that ‘human life is worth nothing in Russia’ compared to
the state (Wehner 2002).30 Numerous articles imply or argue that negotiations should have
continued.

The Dubrovka theatre siege saw the heaviest criticism of Russian actions in these four
episodes under investigation. There was more empathetic response in Beslan because children
were attacked.

4. Beslan, 1 September 2004

Various versions of Beslan are in circulation: On 1 September 2004, about thirty armed
masked men and women stormed a school in Beslan, taking over 1000 hostages (children,
relatives and teachers). Official estimates initially suggested 120 to 350 hostages. Twenty
male hostages were shot on day one; twenty-six nursing mothers and infants were released on
day two.

On the third and final day an explosion led to wild shooting from the hostage-takers, the
Russian forces and armed locals. All newspapers reported that hostage-takers were shooting
escaping hostages in the back. Russian soldiers, special forces, and Interior Ministry troops
were forced to shoot back to cover the hostages’ escape. Over 330 civilians died, of whom
186 were children. Thirty-one of the thirty-two hostage-takers were killed. Shamil Basayev
denied involvement at the time, but later claimed responsibility.

The coverage
The New York Times coverage of Beslan certainly supports the theory that Western criticism
of Russian actions in Chechnya has been decreasing during the ‘war on terror’. At Dubrovka
(2002), The New York Times cited the hostage-takers’ demands for an end to the war in
almost every report, and often quoted analysts or observers on Russian brutality towards
Chechen civilians. Of the forty five Beslan texts, however, only seven, including three letters
and one comment piece, allude to a need to ‘understand the root causes’ (The New York Times
letter, 9 September 2004: 32), with few details of what these root causes may be.31 Whether

9
this decrease in The New York Times criticism of Russia is related to the ‘war on terror’ or to
the very difficult and emotional nature of reporting an assault on young children is not clear.
However, the only editorial to suggest Russia must negotiate and find a compromise to end
the conflict receives angry responses in the readers’ letters, e.g. that these recommendations
are ‘both misguided and dangerous’. Other letters reflect – and create – The New York Times’
change in tone by including Russia with ‘us’ (against ‘them’) in their calls for ‘free nations’ to
coordinate their ‘elite troops’ to combat terrorism (The New York Times editorial 4 September
2004: 16; letters 8 September 2004: 22). This suggests a change in the readers’ views of
‘global terrorism’ since the Dubrovka siege, and the newspaper’s adaptation to what its
consumers want.32 Or perhaps the correspondents’/editors’ opinions also changed to become
more understanding of the Russian government’s precarious situation.

Despite this salient reframing, however, The New York Times is not synonymous with
‘Western criticism’ in general. Other newspapers remain within the news frames they had
adopted/re-created for previous siege reports. The ‘strict father’ frame of The Daily Telegraph
and Wall Street Journal – as before – lauds the soldiers before the rescue, laments the
incompetence after it, and never criticises Russian actions in Chechnya; the ‘nurturant parent’
frame in The Guardian criticises Russian brutality very heavily, as it did in earlier reports.
Similarly, the FAZ is still critical, but at the same time, openly reflects on hostage-takers’
strategic use of the news media in assaults of this sort. A report published in the media section
on 6 September 2004, for instance, strongly criticises the news media for showing the
suffering in graphic detail (Thomann 2004).

In keeping with this reflection on the media spectacle is the FAZ’s own relatively sparse use
of images during the Beslan siege. As the media section explains, the criticism of Russian
policies in Chechnya – still frequent and vivid – is also toned down compared to the
Dubrovka reports. The FAZ has a dilemma here: how to articulate its criticism of Russian
military brutality in Chechnya (the ‘nurturant parent’ frame) while avoiding those semiotic
forms which could make more – and more brutal, more spectacular – attacks seem attractive
and worthwhile. During such an attack newspapers have readers' attention. It is an opportune
moment to bring into the limelight those critical background details which convey the
newspaper’s understanding (the newspaper’s version) of the situation to the readers. But does
this type of attention not give attackers a reason to attack again? The FAZ attempts to balance
critique of all sides. The hostage-takers have indeed grabbed attention, but by denying them
vivid images, the spectacle of the attack is diminished.

Finally, the Süddeutsche Zeitung makes a sharp excluding turn for the first time at Beslan.
After day one, when the ‘theme of the day’ is ‘the internationality of terror’ – which includes
Russia in the besieged West, along with The New York, Madrid and Israel (2 September 2004:
2)33 – the following days are dominated by reports of the Russian authorities’ disinformation
and secrecy. These aspects play a central role in building the ‘nurturant parent’ frame: a truly
nurturing parent is honest, open and interested in dialogue, not only with the opponent, but
also with all other parties (at institutional, local and individual levels). How else can the
global project of mutually respectful coexistence be furthered?

Conclusions
Newspapers tell stories. Each individual story articulates and co-constructs larger cultural
narratives. This paper focused on three narrative frames, and will now (i) recall these frames,
(ii) consider their implications and (iii) answer the question posed in the title: ‘Is Russia

10
‘Western’ or not in the UK, US and German press coverage of the Russian-Chechen
conflict?’

The macro-frame of ‘the West and the rest’ at times quite overtly describes Russians
(politicians or public) as ‘funny foreigners’, far less developed and enlightened than
Westerners. More often, however, Western superiority is merely implied within the two
discursive worlds created.

George Lakoff’s (2002) work on conceptual metaphors in political communication offers a

useful model to shed light on the structure of these two discursive worlds. The ‘strict father’
frame strictly abides by international rules: sovereign nation-states interact with other
sovereign nation-states; each state should take responsibility for the defence and security of
its citizens, with appropriate military means – not weak, not brutal – if this is deemed
necessary. Western states, initially including Russia, are gathered together as one
‘civilisation’ clashing with anOther civilisation, based around Islam. But as soon as Russia
acts, it is deemed too weak, brutal or incompetent to join the club.

The ‘nurturant parent’ frame seems to break down these national boundaries and think in
terms of global justice. Boundaries are being redrawn; politics is moving away from nation-
based issues to humanity-based issues. A dilemma arises, however: one of the first priorities
is respect for other values/cultures. How then to react to a culture of government that goes
against the grain of ‘nurturant parent’ values? Perhaps in the hierarchy of priorities: ‘The
fundamental idea that every society should respect human dignity and personal autonomy is
more basic than the cosmopolitan love of variety’ (Appiah 1997, emphasis added). This opens
up the question of who decides what is ‘more basic’, a theme discussed at length in the
intellectual journals.34 The point here, however, is that Russia – as a ‘society’, a ‘culture’ – is
still othered within this ‘nurturant parent’ frame. A boundary is drawn between civilised
(respecting human dignity and personal autonomy) and non-civilised.

Although the publications have different emphases, the descriptions of Russia also share
certain common characteristics, which distance Russia from the readers. Shared themes
include the Soviet Union as a comparison of current events, which could possibly be the
strongest single indicator of otherness, considering that the majority of readers were brought
up in the Cold War, with the USSR as the ultimate Other. Also, a backwards, uncivilised
Russia is portrayed by shared images of the chaos and incompetence of the government and
military, brutal military actions, and a general unconcern of the government for the lives of
citizens (both Russian and Chechen).

These representations are not new. But is it not remarkable that representations of Russia
remain unchanged, and that the press – the discourse – has the power to make these frames
seem so self-evident? Despite political upheavals and various radical changes of leadership
and style, Russia is still the Russia of the barbarians, the tsars and the Soviet Union.

The purpose of this paper was to investigate the media discourses surrounding these events
rather than the reception or effects of the coverage. Nevertheless, if we agree that
representations inform attitudes and behaviour, we can speculate on the implications of these
news stories for, inter alia, international foreign policy towards Russia, the (prejudiced)
treatment of Russian immigrants, e.g. the 2.5 million immigrants and Aussiedler (Russian-
Germans) from the former Soviet Union now living in Germany (cf. Loew and Pfeifer 2001),
and commercial relations, e.g. dissuading potential investors and tourists.35

11
 More generally, we could ask about the role of a dominant cultural narrative of military
strength, built up by the ‘strict father’ frame. These stories are reported within the general
news context of war, conflict, 9/11, terrorism, etc. Naturalising the need for a competent
military legitimises not only specific military campaigns being reported at the same time as
these attacks, e.g. Iraq, but also military spending in general, which in the USA is almost
thirty times foreign aid (official development assistance); in the UK nine times, in Germany
six times (Sachs 2005: 330). Readers supporting the concept of military strength could be
concerned about the dominant cultural narrative of negotiation/compromise which the
‘nurturant parent’ frame articulates.

Finally – and in answer to the question posed in the title – the news coverage reported here
leads to an imagining of the West as one type of unified community (cf. Anderson 1991). It is
the ‘right’ type of community, with the right values, norms, political practices, etc., and
Russia is still reported as outwith this ‘western’ community. Occasionally, the newspapers
slip Russia into the West, for example in the initial stages of ‘strict father’ reporting on
Budennovsk and Dubrovka, only to re-exclude it shortly after on the grounds of
incompetence, lack of discipline and/or self-restraint. It seems the ambiguous position created
for Russia at the ‘gate’ of Europe can be instrumentalised to other anOther (Islamic
fundamentalism) as a greater threat, but this cannot be sustained for any length of time (cf.
Neumann 1999: 77).

The dominant discourses imagine Russia today – as in the eighteenth century – as the West’s
‘complimentary other half’ (Wolff 1994: 4). The elite newspapers subtly imply what the New
York Post makes explicit: ‘Thank God’ we’re not like them (Podhoretz 2002).

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1
‘Frame analysis’ is perhaps best known via Erving Goffman’s book of that name (Goffman 1974). Since then it has
developed in several different directions. For this paper, Todd Gitlin’s (1980) simple definition, with the emphasis on the
largely non-deliberate use of frames suggested be Goffman, should suffice. For more detailed explanations of the heated
debates about frames in media analysis, see e.g. de Vreese (2005), Entman (1993), Fisher (1997); for examples of framing in
cognitive linguistics, see e.g. Chilton (1996), Lakoff (2002); Lakoff and Johnson (1980).
2
Each of these frames has been – or is – articulated in news reporting of international issues.
3
Discourse analyses are inevitably constrained by similar discursive practices as the texts they analyse. This analysis should
properly refer to ‘a selection of the press in Britain, Germany and the USA’. Nevertheless, I will refer to the ‘Western’ press
coverage. This analysis thereby adopts one of the practices that the media itself can be criticised for: selecting an elegant yet
inadequate shorthand rather than an inelegant phrase which consumes valuable ‘column inches’.
4
Although the focus at this stage is primarily on conceptual metaphors, other approaches to language-in-use stress the social
construction of the world through discourse in general, not only metaphor (e.g. Fairclough 1995; Potter 1996; Fowler 1991;
Fowler et al. 1979).
5
See Petro (1995) for an alternative frame for Russian politics through history which stresses joint, communal decision-
making.
6
It is not that a political party or government will rule according to exactly these models, nor that these are the only two
models for understanding social actions; also – to borrow Lakoff’s hedge – individuals are unlikely to have an entirely
coherent view of politics or adopt only one of these models throughout their lives: they may prefer several aspects of one
model in politics; in family life or at work perhaps the other (Lakoff 2002: 15).
7
Similarly, in his metaphorical analysis, Shimko (2004: 207) employs the term ‘speech formula’ to highlight that ‘part of the
power of certain metaphors lies not in their explicit repetition but in their reliance on the familiar and that which goes without
being said’ (emphasis added).
8
See Hannerz (2004) for a consideration of cosmopolitanism in relation to global news coverage.
9
Human Rights Watch, for example, are bringing their reports of worldwide human rights abuse to public attention in Russia,
in order to increase local acceptance of their findings on Russian abuses. Hassel (2003) is a vivid example of the construction
of a ‘human rights empire’.
10
The different discursivities could indeed – in the early 90s – be seen as a division between progressive and conservative,
but in more recent years the arch-conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung is most similar in reporting Russia to The
Guardian, renowned for its ‘left-wing’ stance.
11
Billig (1995) describes the ‘flagging of the nation’ through e.g. deixis: ‘our’, ‘we’. Chilton (2004) looks in greater depth at
the use of space-time (‘here’, ‘now’) in political discourse.
12
Some call it the path metaphor, others Evolutionism: the idea that there is only one path of development; the West is the
forerunner and other countries are (and should be) trying to catch up. The West does things well, copes well with difficult
situations, does not provoke conflict, is honest and open with information, respects human rights, etc.
13
For purposes of comparison, two ‘quality’ newspapers (one generally considered to be ‘progressive’ and one considered to
be ‘conservative’) and one poplar ‘tabloid’ newspaper were analysed from each country. It should be noted that the US
publications are all based in New York. Although the USA has no national newspapers, (i) the Wall Street Journal has by far
the largest circulation of the quality publications (2,068,439), (ii) the New York Times, with the second largest circulation
(1,627,062), has long been widely regarded as the most influential US publication, used as a source for other regional media
(cf. Gitlin 1980) and (iii) the New York Post, owned by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, is the most comparable
publication to The Sun and Bild, despite its smaller circulation (741,099, compared to The Sun and Bild, each distributing
over 3 million daily copies). Figures from the Audit Bureau of Circulations, 2007
(http://www.accessabc.com/products/top200.htm).
14
The two large online databases, Lexis Nexis and Factiva, which include most major media publications, were consulted to
locate news texts for analysis. Keywords ‘Russia, Russian, Chechnya, Chechen’ (with plurals and variant spellings) were
searched for each event, as were specific terms associated with each (e.g. ‘theatre, Dubrovka, Nord-Ost, siege, hostage-
taking, hostage-taker, terrorism’). Irrelevant texts resulting from this general search were then eliminated to finalise the
corpus for analysis. The final corpus consisted of 1089 news items in total (Budennovsk: 144, Dagestan: 190, Dubrovka: 346,
Beslan: 409). The increasing number of news items dealing with each event is in itself an interesting topic for further
analysis, illuminating as it does the changing salience of the topos of terror (and terror in Russia) for the Western news
media.
15
In The Daily Telegraph at Budennovsk every instance of ‘threaten’ refers to Chechen actors. A ‘strict father’ perspective
does not combine ‘threaten’ with official military action, since military action is a legitimate part of the state’s role. The
Guardian, on the other hand, also positions the Russian military as threatening, e.g. ‘Gen Kulikov threatened to re-start
Russia's military operation’ (Hearst 1995).
16
The Sun and New York Post did not cover the story.
17
Chechen website http://www.kavkaz.org. The website has since been removed from the Internet, therefore all quotes are
from Lieven’s (2000) ‘frame’ for reporting the events.

15
18
The weakness of the Russian leadership is constructed through various textual strategies, e.g. (i) the popular ‘loathing’ for
Yeltsin, (ii) the ‘unpredictability’ of his actions, and (iii) explicit lexicalisations such as ‘weakest’ and ‘weakening’. For
example, (i) ‘Mr. Yeltsin's popularity rating has been in the single digits’ and ‘universal loathing’ (Bohlen 1999c),
‘unpredictability’ (Siegle 2004); (ii) ‘sudden decision’ (Bohlen 1999a), ‘continuous personnel changes’ (Bohlen 1999b),
‘cavorting’ (‘Kapriolen’) and ‘chaos’ (FAZ, 16 August 1999: 2), ‘deluded and confused’ (‘im Verlauf seiner von Irrungen
und Wirrungen gekennzeichneten Amtszeit’; FAZ, 16 August 1999: 1), ‘Mr. Yeltsin's next move is anyone's guess’ (Wall
Street Journal, 10 August 1999: 24), ‘many impulsive, stupid and bizarre things’ (‘Jelzin hat als Präsident viele impulsive,
dumme und eigenartige Dinge gemacht’; FAZ, 13 August 1999: 2); (iii) ‘lame-duck politician’ (Bohlen 1999c), ‘the ailing
Boris Yeltsin’ (Wall Street Journal, 10 August 1999: 24), ‘weakest point’ and ‘faced with mounting Russian nationalism and
weakening control over Russia's regions’ (Wall Street Journal, 13 August 1999: 10).
19
That the forces are unprepared is articulated in several places, for example, ‘Russia missed its opportunity, following the
disaster in Chechnya, to prepare its army better to fight in the mountains. The armed forces are already underpaid, poorly
equipped and have little motivation.’ (‘Russland hat es versaeumt, nach dem Desaster in Tschetschenien seine Armee besser
für Kämpfe im Gebirge auszubilden. Ohnehin sind die Streitkraefte nach wie vor unterbezahlt, schlecht ausgeruestet und
wenig motiviert’, Hoffmann 1999a). Lack of preparation is also implied in, for example, reports that Russia ‘learnt nothing’
from the Chechen conflict (‘keine Lehre gezogen’, FAZ, 16 August 1999: 1; and ‘nichts gelernt’ Urban 1999 and FAZ, 10
August 1999: 2), and that the military failed to resist: ‘In its most recent failure to defend Russia's security, guerrillas from
Chechnya invaded the neighbouring republic of Dagestan, apparently without meeting any resistance’ (Warren 1999c). In
addition to Yeltsin’s personal lack of control (see above), the military are walking into ‘a trap’ in the FAZ headline ‘Die Falle
ist aufgestellt’ (18 August 1999: 2). Russia is ‘losing control over the region’ (‘Russland [verliert] die Kontrolle ueber diese
Region’, FAZ, 10 August 1999: 2). Similarly: ‘Contrary to statements from politicians and the military, the Russian
government has not managed to bring the situation in Dagestan under control by the end of this week.’ (‘Entgegen den
Äußerungen von Politikern und Militärs ist es der russischen Regierung bis zum Ende der Woche nicht gelungen, die Lage in
Dagestan unter Kontrolle zu bringen’, Hoffmann 1999b).
20
Much of this was made explicit after Yeltsin sacked Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin on 9 August 1999 and proposed
Putin as the next premier and as his preferential candidate for president when Yeltsin’s own second term was finished in June
2000. Putin was confirmed Prime Minister on 17 August after which The Daily Telegraph focused an entire article on Putin’s
calls to be ‘tough on law and order’ and introduce ‘elementary discipline’ in Russia (17 August 1999: 9). The Süddeutsche
Zeitung translates this phrase from Putin as ‘elementary order’ (‘elementare Ordnung’; 17 August 1999: 1).
21
Original: ‘Moskau weiss darauf bisher ebenso wenig wie vormals im benachbarten Tschetschenien eine andere als eine
militärische Antwort.’
22
Original: ‘In den Medien wird deutlich, dass Rußlands politische Führung noch immer dazu neigt, in Kategorien des
Kalten Kriegs zu denken, und die eigentliche Rolle des Landes als Bollwerk gegen den islamischen Fundamentalismus nur
mit Mühe begreift.’
23
Original: ‘Die Vorstellung, für die Rechte der angegriffenen Untertanen zu streiten.’
24
Original: ‘Allein der liberale Abgeordnete Jawlinski [...] gab zu bedenken, dass man dem Problem des islamischen
Fundamentalismus langfristig nur durch Sozialpolitik und Korruptionsbekämpfung beikommen könne.’
25
The implications involved in criticism (and praise) are described in various approaches to conflict-resolution, e.g. Rojzman
1992; Rosenberg 2004.
26
These are clearly very selective extracts. The aim here is to provide a glimpse of what is ‘sayable’ (natural) in each frame –
and would seem absurd in the other – rather than provide statistical analysis of the most frequently articulated phrases.
27
Original: ‘“Sie leiten Gas ein. Sie wollen uns vergasen”, riefen sie’.
28
The particularly critical editorial in the Süddeutsche Zeitung writes, ‘Much reminds us of earlier, as deception tactics and
manipulation of public opinion were par for the course.’ (‘Vieles erinnert an früher, als Verschleierungstaktik und
Manipulation der öffentlichen Meinung an der Tagesordnung waren.’, 30 October 2002: 4).
29
I should be careful to state that I do not deny the legitimacy of speculating about reasons why the authorities did not
immediately publicise the name of the gas, or at least give more information to the doctors treating the patients. However, the
news-writers here gerrymander the mass of potential knowledge of events into a simple narrative for their readers. They do
include slightly more complexity in their stories than I have indicated here, which I will describe in more detail elsewhere.
30
Original: ‘Ein Menschenleben ist in Rußland nichts wert.’
31
The only New York Times example of these root causes in Chechnya is that one Chechen singer had lost three cousins
(Kishkovsky 2004).
32
For critiques of the extent and effects of corporate ownership of the media see e.g. Bagdikian 2004; McChesney 2004;
Pedelty 1995.
33
‘Nairobi, New York, Madrid, Moscow – no one and nothing is safe from terrorism any more. Osama bin Laden and his al-
Qaida network have set the direction for an increasingly excessive terror.’ (‘Nairobi, New York, Madrid, Moskau – vor dem
Terrorismus ist nichts und niemand mehr sicher. Osama bin Laden und sein Netzwerk al-Qaida haben die Richtung
vorgegeben für immer maßloseren Terror.’ Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2 September 2004: 2).
34
Debate about cosmopolitanism in the pages of e.g. International Relations, vol. 19, no. 1 or Boston Review, Fall 1994. The
latter was later published as a book (Cohen 1996).
35
It should be noted at this stage that established business figures working in Russia generally voice positive feelings towards
security, politics and living conditions (e.g. Sinus Gesellschaft 2000). This has not, however, had any effect on the general
news coverage.

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