Technology in Society 63 (2020) 101424

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Technology in Society
journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/techsoc

Ethics, society, and technology: A Confucian role ethics perspective

Qin Zhu
Division of Humanities, Arts & Social Sciences, Colorado School of Mines, 1005 14 th Street, Stratton Hall 306, Golden, CO, 80401, USA

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This essay provides a very brief overview of Confucian ethics that focuses on the role-based morality. It compares
Confucian ethics Confucian ethics with two dominant schools of thought in Western ethics deontology and consequentialism. This
Confucian society essay then discusses how Confucian ethics provides a unique way to think about social and political issues such as
Technology and society
how the political leaders are selected and evaluated, the ethical justification of political legitimacy, the priori­
Confucian ethics of technology
Global studies
tization of economic, social, and cultural rights over other rights, and moral egalitarianism. Finally, this essay
explores the ways in which Confucian ethics serves as a useful intellectual resource for examining the issues
arising from the ethical assessment of (emerging) technologies and the professional formation of engineers. The
Appendix of this essay includes some teaching resources that instructors can employ to teach students about
ethics, society, and technology from a Confucian role ethics perspective.

1. Introduction
In the philosophy of technology literature, there has been an
increasing interest in incorporating non-Western especially Eastern
Asian ethical traditions such as Confucian ethics into the study of ethical
issues associated with technology and engineering [1,2]. However, it is
rather challenging to find reading materials on Confucian ethics that are
accessible to undergraduate students with limited or no prior knowledge
of Chinese civilization. Instructors who are eager to include one or a few
modules on Confucian ethics and technology in their undergraduate
classes have often found extremely difficult to identify appropriate
readings for their students. It is even more challenging for these in­
structors to find teaching resources (e.g., in-class activities or exercises)
that students can “apply” Confucian ethical teachings to reflect on
realistic social and professional issues.
Therefore, unlike most existing scholarly articles on Confucian ethics
that were often written by scholars for their colleagues, this essay serves
a different purpose. It provides tangible concepts, tools, and resources
that faculty with limited or no prior training in Chinese philosophy can
use to teach their undergraduate students: (1) some fundamentals about
Confucian ethics and society; and (2) how to employ Confucian ethics to
analyze issues in the ethics of technology and engineering.
In doing so, this essay first introduces some fundamental doctrines in
Confucian role ethics by comparing it with two dominant ethical tra­
ditions in the Western context: deontology and consequentialism. It then
introduces the fundamental social and political structures of a Confucian
society and how such society is built upon and justified by Confucian
ethics. This essay also discusses the implications of Confucian ethics for
the governance of contemporary technology and engineering including
emerging technologies. The Appendix of this essay includes some
teaching resources that instructors can employ to teach students about
ethics, society, and technology from the Confucian perspective.
Nevertheless, it is worth issuing some caveats here before we dive
into the details of Confucian ethics. For instance, experts in Chinese
philosophy may challenge that it seems unrealistic to include all his­
torical and contemporary approaches to Confucian ethics in one essay
not to mention the relevance of these approaches to society and tech­
nology. In recent decades, philosophers have employed various ap­
proaches to engage Confucian ethics ranging from overtly historical or
textual approaches to comparative approaches that put ideas from the
classical period into conversation with contemporary Western ethical,
social, and scientific theories [3]. Scholars have tried to understand
Confucian ethics as a species of deontology, virtue ethics, or care ethics
[3]. Until very recently, scholars have attempted to theorize Confucian
ethics as a kind of role-based moral theory [4,5]. Given the diversity of
approaches to Confucian ethics, it is impossible to include all competing
approaches to Confucian ethics in this single essay. Therefore, this essay
limits its scope of discussion to the role-based approach to Confucian
ethics which is one of the most recent and creative efforts to reinterpret
and rediscover the relevance of Confucian ethics to the contemporary
society. Since the history of Confucianism had different periods, this
paper mainly discusses early Confucianism especially the early Confu­
cian classics related to Confucius (551BC-479BC) and Mencius
(372BC-289BC).

E-mail address: qzhu@mines.edu.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2020.101424
Received 9 June 2020; Received in revised form 14 September 2020; Accepted 22 September 2020
Available online 23 September 2020
0160-791X/© 2021 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Q. Zhu
2. Confucian ethics: a comparative perspective
This essay takes a comparative approach to Confucian ethics that
compares fundamental doctrines from Confucian ethics with those from
other dominant traditions in Western ethics such as deontology and
consequentialism. In doing such comparison, this essay mainly focuses
on the role-based approach to Confucian ethics. There are at least
several strengths for taking such comparative approach to Confucian
ethics. For instance, most undergraduate students who have taken
introductory courses on ethics and philosophy are expected to be
familiar with both deontology and consequentialism. Thus, the two
Western theories naturally serve as “frames of reference” for under­
standing Confucian ethics.
To a large extent, both deontology and consequentialism can be
perceived as “rule-based” ethics. For instance, deontology is concerned
about whether one’s action is in accordance with some moral rules or
“categorical imperatives” that can be universalized. Consequentialism
especially utilitarianism emphasizes the unity principle or “rule,” that is,
good actions are those that can bring the maximum amount of net utility
(e.g., happiness, pleasure, welfare) to the greatest number of people.
Both deontology and consequentialism are mainly interested in
“defining what good is” and worry about “how one can come to know
the good”. In contrast, Confucian ethics or Chinese philosophy in general
is mostly concerned about the problem of “how to become good” [6].
However, some scholars may challenge this idea of perceiving
deontology and consequentialism merely as “rule-based” ethics. Instead,
they may further argue that even Confucian ethics includes etiquette or
rituals which may seem to be “rule-based.” For instance, it is quite
common in the Analects to see some rituals that people are expected to
follow are comparable to rules such as “not instructing while eating” and
“not continuing to converse once one has retired to bed” (Analects,
10.10).1 Nevertheless, compared to moral rules in a more traditional
sense, Confucian rituals (at least discussed in this paper) often have a
much stronger emphasis on the “centrality of ritual performance in the
ethical cultivation of character” [7]. Such emphasis on the importance of
rituals for the cultivation of the moral self is not very much discussed in
either deontology or consequentialism. In quite a few passages in the
Analects, rituals are often considered as means of cultivating and
expressing virtues such as ren (benevolence, 仁). Sometimes, even
established ritual practices may be subject to change if the imple­
mentation context of rituals has changed. However, what remains un­
changed is the virtues or the “essential meaning” that the practice of
rituals aims to cultivate. For instance, the passage 9.3 in the Analects
well demonstrates the flexibility of ritual practice:
The Master said, “A ceremonial cap made of linen is prescribed by the
rites, but these days people use silk. This is frugal, and I follow the
majority. To bow before ascending the stairs is what is prescribed by
the rites, but these days people bow after ascending. This is arrogant,
and – though it goes against the majority – I continue to bow before
ascending”. (Analects, 9.3)
Confucius accepted the change of ritual practice that replaced the
linen cap with the silk cap as most of his contemporaries did. Making
such a change does not really change the basic function of the ceremo­
nial cap. In fact, making such a change would express and cultivate the
virtue of frugality. In contrast, Confucius did not agree with his con­
temporaries who bowed after ascending as he argued that such change
will hurt the essential meaning of the ritual. Furthermore, the exten­
sively practical, context-dependent, and sometimes aesthetic aspects of
1
Passages from the Analects are given from Edward Slingerland, trans.,
Confucius Analects: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 2003). Passages from the Mengzi are given from Bryan W. Van Norden,
trans., Mengzi: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 2003).
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Technology in Society 63 (2020) 101424
rituals in the Analects cannot be well captured by deontological or
consequentialist rules.
Another interesting comparison between deontology and conse­
quentialism and Confucian ethics is that the two Western ethical the­
ories often assume an idea of ethical impartiality whereas Confucian
ethics places a much stronger emphasis on ethical partiality. Deontolog­
ical impartiality represented by Kantian ethics requires that “moral
judgments be universalizable” and these moral judgments “be inde­
pendent of any particular point of view” (or any particular person) [8].
Consequentialist impartiality is “strictly impartial in a very direct
manner and in a very rigorous sense” and a consequentialist agent is thus
“not permitted prefer herself, nor any for her loved ones, in choosing a
distribution of benefits and burdens” [8]. In contrast, Confucian ethics
advocates the idea of love with distinction. In other words, our moral
concerns toward others decrease as our relationships with them weaken.
While both deontology and consequentialism place strong emphasis
on the value of following rules (either Kantian categorical imperatives or
consequentialist utility principle) for moral actions, Confucian ethics
argues that the key to become a good person is to live and reflect on the
social roles (e.g., parent, child, citizen, and engineer) one assumes in
specific communal contexts. By nature, humans are social, interdepen­
dent, and related to each other after birth [9].
According to Confucian ethics, the moral actions we take in different
situations are influenced by the specific roles we take in these situations.
We as humans all assume different roles which are determined by the
relationships we have with others. These different relationships and
social roles affect the ways we choose to interact with others. The tone
you use to speak to your parent is different from the one you use to
communicate with a stranger. The nature of a particular role relation­
ship often evokes feelings and expectations characteristic of that rela­
tionship [10]. Through living and reflecting on these social roles, one
gets to cultivate virtues that define the ideal forms of these social roles.
For instance, to live and reflect on the role as a medical doctor, one gets
to cultivate virtues (e.g., benevolence) that define an ideal medical
doctor. Therefore, the ultimate goal for Confucians is that all individuals
strive to develop their capacities for virtue and eventually aim at sage­
hood through their relationships with others [11]. Confucian ethics
advocates for a kind of relational ontology: if there is only one person,
there are no persons. In other words, becoming benevolent is something
we either do together, or not at all [4].
Confucian ethics distinguishes the different relationships we have
with others and argues that these different relationships have normative
connotations. Confucian ethics defends the value of partiality in ethics.
Our moral obligations are strongest to those we have close relationship
with, and the intensity of our moral obligations diminishes as we go
from these close relationships [12]. However, critics may question
whether such love or care with distinction would lead to ethical egoism
or favoritism. In other words, does Confucian ethics teach us to care
about ourselves and people we have close relationships with at the
expense of those we have no relationship with such as strangers? It is
true that Confucian care or love originates within close relationships
such as familial relationships. Nevertheless, as mainly argued by Men­
cius, such care or love does not stop within the family but will be
extended toward others in much broader communities including our
neighbors, co-nationals, and even strangers. The following passage from
Mencius well describes the idea of extension of moral feelings:
Treat with respect the elders in my family, and then extend that
respect to include the elders in other families. Treat with tenderness
the young in my own family, and then extend that tenderness to
include the young in other families. (Mencius, 1A: 7)
It is worth noting that such extension of moral feelings from within
the family toward others is a natural and effortless process. Once one has
put effort into the development of moral sentiments toward her family
members, these moral feelings will be naturally extended to others
Q. Zhu
outside of her family. Therefore, Confucians do think that one’s moral
virtues developed in the familial context can predict her moral perfor­
mance in much broader contexts such as workplace and the society. The
following passage from Analects demonstrates the close connection be­
tween being a filial child and being a loyal subordinate in the
government,
A young person who is filial and respectful of his elders rarely be­
comes the kind of person who is inclined to defy his superiors, and
there has never been a case of one who is disinclined to defy his
superiors stirring up rebellion. (Analects, 1:2)
It should be noted that the main purpose of citing the passage above
is to show that Confucius noticed the close and “natural” connection
between the moral character formed within the familial context and the
virtues demonstrated in public and professional areas. However, the
major goal here is not to encourage that employees should be blindly or
unconditionally loyal to their supervisors. Some scholars may argue that
in professional settings professionals such as engineers may actually be
encouraged to defy their supervisors and report misconduct committed
by their supervisors.
For Confucians, our lifelong project is to reflect on our moral expe­
rience interacting with others in the society and cultivate virtues through
such self-reflection process. In other words, the ultimate goal for human
development is to learn to become a junzi (superior person, 君子) through
self-reflection. Self-cultivation is about “learning and practice of relating
to and interacting with others appropriately” [13]; p. 76). Therefore,
Confucian ethics perceives moral development as a kind of
practice-oriented activity. Karyn Lai [14] conceptualizes a practical tool
for Confucian self-cultivation that consists of three interrelated pro­
cesses: observation, reflection, and practice. As I argued elsewhere, ac­
cording to Lai’s theory,
we need to observe how moral exemplars behave in different situa­
tions. We need to observe how experienced moral leaders practice li
(social and moral norms, 礼) in different circumstances. Neverthe­
less, observation does not mean “just looking” or imitation. We are
advised to critically evaluate and reflect on these behaviors in
different situations and understand the reasons to act. In this sense,
for Confucius, observing moral failures or incompetent leaders is as
useful as observing moral successes or exemplars. A person should
work to avoid becoming like the failures. Reflection is supposed to
develop moral sensitivity to others and situations and it helps the
moral learner tease out the morally significant factors in particular
situations. Practice is also critical when moral learners apply what
they have observed and learned in new situations. Through practice,
moral learners are able to integrate the moral sensitivity developed
from previous experiences and test to what extent their un­
derstandings of the morally significant factors work in new situa­
tions. In general, the reiteration of the three processes cultivates the
inner virtues of a person [33].
Such reiteration of the three processes allow people to grow virtues
through four levels of Confucian moral development [33]:
• Level 1 The Beginner who is fully in compliance with Confucian
norms li and acting within circumscribed contexts.
• Level 2 Developing Learner who is building her inner disposition and
moral sensitivity and nurturing a virtuous self and expressing her
moral character in her interactions with others.
• Level 3 Junzi who draws upon her own resources in moral de­
liberations and sometimes improvises on existing norms. For a junzi,
moral norms are flexible and are subject to further improvement.
• Level 4 Sage to whom moral principles are no longer constraints.
What she desires is just what the principles require. The ways in
which she acts set up principles for others.
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Technology in Society 63 (2020) 101424
Among the four different levels of Confucian moral development,
extremely rare people can achieve the sage level. Therefore, moral
development is truly a lifelong, “never-ending” project for most people.
We as humans are always striving for becoming better people. For
people who are beginners and developing learners, what they need to do
is to observe what other people especially moral exemplars do in specific
moral situations. On the one hand, moral learners focus on how moral
exemplars act and try to imitate them. On the other hand, moral ex­
emplars need to acknowledge their moral influence on others and work
diligently to be influential [15]. In this way, through being followed by
less experienced moral learners, moral exemplars are motivated to avoid
making mistakes and further refine their moral selves.
3. The Confucian society
As indicated in the last section, Confucian ethics supports a hierar­
chical, meritocratic approach to moral development. People in the so­
ciety belong to four different groups according to the level of their moral
development. Therefore, it should not be surprising to see that Confu­
cians envision that an ideal society should be governed by those who are
intellectually and morally superior to the average. It is worth noting that
Confucians often give more weight to moral virtues than to intellectual
and technical excellences when selecting, evaluating, and promoting
political leaders [16]. One reason for the prioritization of moral virtues
in politics is to ensure that the political power will not be misused by
morally immature leaders, when democratic checks and balances are
absent in the political system. To ensure that competent politicians are
selected and promoted, their political performance is often evaluated
based on two meritocratic criteria: (1) whether they have demonstrated
intellectual and moral excellence in current and past positions; and (2)
whether their political performance is approved by both their supervi­
sors and subordinates [17].
However, critics may argue that it is quite possible that selected
Confucian politicians forget the promises they have given to their peo­
ple, are corrupted by the power, and thus misuse the power. How would
Confucians respond to such critique of Confucian meritocracy?
Wouldn’t be too risky if the politicians employ their own subjective
moral feelings (rather than objective, public moral standards) to inform
political judgment and policy decision-making? Stephen C. Angle [11]
suggests that Mou Zongsan’s idea of “self-restriction” can be helpful for
thinking through these questions. According to Angle,
Our subjectively felt, internalized morality implicitly points toward
an ideal of full, sagely virtue. Full virtue must be realized in the
public, political world. Without objective structures (like laws), the
public goals of full virtues are inaccessible. Since these objective
structures restrict the ways in which our subjective moral feelings
can be manifested, Mou concludes that the achievement of virtue
requires self-restriction. Objective, public standards are thus related
to inner virtue, but they are also distinct from one another. [11]; p.
29)
According to Mou Zongshan, if Confucian thinkers want to achieve
their political ideals, objective political structures such as the constitu­
tion, laws, and rights are required by Confucian ethics [11]. These po­
litical structures emerge out of but later become independent of moral
values.
Another more specific approach to the examination of how politi­
cians exercise their power is to ask whether their political legitimacy is
ethically justified. As a fundamental concept in political philosophy,
political legitimacy is concerned about questions such as where political
authority comes from and how it is justified. Western political thinkers
such as John Locke argue for a consent theory of political authority: a
political authority is legitimate only if it has acquired the consent of the
ruled [18]. In comparison, Confucian ethics adopts a more pragmatic
approach to political legitimacy: political authority is justified
Q. Zhu
instrumentally by to what extent politicians contribute to the betterment
of people’s lives. The rulers do not possess any natural political right to
rule. The people, or the ruled, have worth independent of the ruler-ruled
relationship, while the ruler’s worth is only derived from the worth of
the ruled [19].
A harmonious society, from the Confucian perspective, is that
everyone appropriately assumes their own social roles and associated
role-based obligations. Social cohesion and flourishing require well-
ordered roles [20]. Fulfillment of one’s social roles is guided by the
Confucian idea of li which refers to “social convention, etiquette, and
other patterns of courteous behaviors and includes norms for formal
occasions” [21]. The meritocratic nature of the Confucian society leads
to the issue that social relationships are often hierarchical: people have
different degrees of virtuousness and virtuous capacity and social
governance should be led by virtuous and capable people [22]. A
morally appropriate relationship between the ruler and the ruled is that
the ruler rules while the ruled respects and obeys [19]. In addition to the
relationship between ruler and minister, there are four other basic re­
lationships that are critical for building a harmonious Confucian society
and they are the relationships between parent and child, between hus­
band and wife, between siblings, and between friends. Among the five
relationships, at least four of them are hierarchical relationships,
although in some cases friendship could also be hierarchical [23].
The five relationships belong to three social spheres: (1) family
sphere: the parent-child relationship, the husband-wife relationship, and
the relationship between siblings; (2) intermediary sphere: friendship;
and (3) the social/political sphere: the ruler and minister relationship.
Cheryl Cottine [20] has argued that family relations are foundational for
individual moral development and state governance. For instance, being
a filial child is preconditional for being a loyal minister.
However, Western political thinkers worry that such hierarchical,
unbalanced distribution of political power in a Confucian society may
potentially jeopardize some social and political ideals such as human
rights, equality, and justice. In response, Henry Rosemont invites
Western political thinkers who advocate for universal human rights to
consider the following scenario,
If … a majority of the world’s peoples live in cultures which do not
have a concept of rights, or have concepts incompatible with that
concept, then how could, or should, the members of those cultures
imagine what it would be like to have rights, or that it would be right
and good and proper for them to so imagine? [5]; p.35)
Historically, Confucian ethics was not developed in a social and
cultural environment dominated by Western liberal, universalistic ap­
proaches to human rights. Therefore, it will be challenging for Confu­
cians to imagine or adopt the idea that humans are all born with
absolutely equal, inalienable, individualistic political rights. For Con­
fucians, it is unrealistic to overlook the existence of hierarchical re­
lationships in our society. A more worthwhile issue for us to consider is
to distinguish justified or “just hierarchies” from other hierarchies that
are not ethically justified (e.g., racial discriminations). In other words,
what is central to moral discussions on social hierarchy is not the ethical
quality of hierarchical structure per se but whether the rankings of
people are morally justified or based on valued social dimensions (e.g.,
virtue, academic achievement, government rank, experience) [23].
Confucians would further argue that in any given society there are
always different kinds of human rights and some rights are prioritized
over others. Heather Widdows [24] categorizes human rights into three
different groups or “generations”: first generation rights are civil and
political rights, second generation rights are economic, social, and cul­
tural rights, and third generation rights are rights of (indigenous) peo­
ples. In contrast to Western thinkers who consider civil and political
rights as the most fundamental human rights, Confucians tend to pri­
oritize economic, social, and cultural rights (e.g., social wellbeing) over
civil and political rights [25]. In particular, the right to subsistence is an
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Technology in Society 63 (2020) 101424
essential part of Confucian constitutional rights [26].
So far, we probably can draw a tentative conclusion that Confucian
ethics does not subscribe to political egalitarianism. However, it is worth
noting that some Confucian thinkers especially Mencius do support a
kind of moral egalitarianism. Mencius believed that humans are all born
with equal potential to be morally good, despite that equal moral
endowment does not mean that actually everyone becomes equally good
[27]. The reason why humans in the society have arrived at different
levels of moral development is that they put different efforts into moral
learning and self-reflection. By using Mencius’s words, such equal moral
potential is something that “if you seek it you will get it whereas if you
abandon it you will lose it” (Mencius, 6A6). Also as pointed out by
Donald Munro, “men are malleable, since none of them have innate
defects; hence the direction of a man’s moral growth depends very much
on education” [28]; p. 15). A harmonious society is one where you can
find all people feel joyful in the pursuit of their own moral projects that
strive to be better persons, regardless of their social and economic
classes. Junzi can literally be found in every profession. Instead of saying
that everyone can achieve certain social and economic goals in a society
if they work diligently, Confucian ethics believes that all people do have
equal access to becoming junzi if they put a lot of efforts into their moral
projects.
4. Confucian ethics of technology and engineering
From the Confucian perspective, technology is never value neutral.
Good technologies should always help promote the values respected and
maintained in the communities such as harmony. Therefore, Confucian
approach to the ethics of technology evaluates to what extent and in
what ways technology contributes to a process of harmonization. Reli­
able technological development often leads to “a continuous negotiation
and adjustment of relationships between human beings, society and
technology” [13]; p. 81).
More specifically, a major task for the Confucian ethics of technology
is to investigate whether practices engendered by technology “are
conducive or detrimental to our performance of the social roles” [13]; p.
83). In this sense, the development of technologies such as AI can and
should be encouraged by our political communities if these technologies
help us realize our constitutive commitments or moral obligations pre­
scribed by our social roles (e.g., child, parent). Similarly, technologies
that undermine the realization of our constitutive commitments should
be restricted [23]. Daniel Bell and Wang Pei (2020) imagine two
example scenarios that involve AI and robots and can be assessed by
using Confucian ethics:
• If an AI-enabled technology can free us from socially necessary work
so that we can be easier to spend time caring for our parents with
love and compassion, then such technology should be supported.
• If a cute-looking robot relives all of our caring obligations and our
parents are convinced that the robot truly cares about their well-
being, then the parents care more about the robots than their own
children. Such robotic technology should be restricted, from the
Confucian perspective.
The two scenarios demonstrate that the moral quality of technology
is assessed on the basis of to what extent technology helps us practice
our role-based obligations and cultivate virtues for better living these
social roles. Such role-based morality in Confucian ethics has been in­
tegrated into recent efforts to design ethical guidelines for socially in­
tegrated robots. JeeLoo Liu argues that a robot inspired by Confucian
ethics “must and foremost fulfill its assigned roles” and need to “render
assistance to other human beings in their pursuit of moral improvement”
[29]. In this sense, to design and evaluate moral agency in a robot is to:
(1) assess to what extent such robot well assumes its assigned social roles
(e.g., a social companion robot working with elderly people); and (2)
what capabilities and dispositions are required to define a good robot
Q. Zhu
that fulfills its assigned roles. Also, as suggested earlier, Confucian moral
development is a social and collaborative process between the moral
learner and others. A truly socially integrated robot has the obligation to
offer assistance to other humans in their moral development projects.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the social roles we assume and the
relationships we have with others are taken by Confucian role ethics to
be “natural.” As pointed out by one reviewer of this paper, such
assumption in Confucian role ethics can be problematic. It is unclear
who gets to decide the roles we should play. The challenge becomes
more visible when we introduce the Confucian role-based morality to
the design of human-robot interaction. It seems even more challenging
to answer the question that who gets to decide what roles and role-based
moralities robots should play.
Despite that emerging technologies such as AI and robotics can
improve the efficiency of work and free us from some role obligations,
philosophers also feel concerned that these technologies may also lead
to the issue of “technology-driven moral deskilling” [2,21] that tech­
nologies negatively affect our moral cultivation. For instance, robot
caregivers are morally questionable as they reduce the precious oppor­
tunities for nurses to exercise and cultivate the virtues defined by their
role as professional nurses. One implication for the design of AI and
robotics is whether engineers can be creative enough to design tech­
nologies that allow or create opportunities for users to develop their
moral skills and cultivate role-based virtues.
Confucian ethics that focuses on role-based morality and relationship
also has profound implications for assessing biomedical technologies
such as gene editing technology. For instance, conducting moral
assessment of gene enhancement technology for children needs to
answer at least two questions: (1) what is the appropriate role of chil­
dren in the familial context? and (2) what are the role-based moral re­
sponsibilities of parents? In the Confucian tradition, children are
perceived as gifts from ancestors [30]. They are critical for promoting
the family’s prosperity and integrity [31].
Confucian ethics emphasizes the sociocultural practicality of genes
[30]. Confucians may accept some types of gene enhancement while
reject others. Again, a single most important criterion for assessing the
moral quality of technology is to examine whether and how such tech­
nology helps to promote the values upheld by a Confucian community
and how it helps community members realize and live their assigned
social roles and associated moral obligations. Ruiping Fan [30] invites
us to consider the following thought experiment: if a genetic enhance­
ment technology for changing skin and hair color is possible, a Confu­
cian Chinese wants genetically to change his children’s skin color from
yellow to white, or hair color from black to blond. Is it morally
acceptable for this Confucian Chinese person to do so? Such a gene
enhancement technology to change the color of skin or hair may be
rejected by Confucian ethics. The reasoning behind such rejection is
quite straightforward. In the Confucian tradition, a child is considered as
a gift from ancestors. Such gift is not from a particular ancestor but from
all the ancestors of the family [30]. As a child, our moral obligation is to
respect and love our ancestors including our lives given as their gifts and
continue the family lineage. As parents, our moral responsibility re­
quires us to respect all of the ancestors of the family and to not change
the appearances of our children. As our ancestors were yellow skin and
black hair, we do not want our children to look more like the image of
other people’s [30].
However, it is worth noting that a much deeper reason why Confu­
cian ethics may reject certain genetic enhancement technologies that
change children’s skin and hair colors is not simply that these technol­
ogies change children’s resemblance to their ancestors. Instead, what is
at stake here is how the changes made by these technologies (or other
means) “stand in relation to our respect to ancestors or our virtue of filial
piety” [30]; p. 69). In other words, it can be totally okay for a family to
adopt a child from a different family as long as the inclusion of the
adopted child demonstrates and enhances a set of core values central to
the Confucian family: (1) venerating ancestors, (2) strengthening basic
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human relations, (3) promoting the continuity, integrity, and prosperity
of the family, and (4) practicing family determination on important is­
sues of family members. Adopting a child especially in a family which
has challenges having their own children will be likely to enhance these
values if following appropriate Confucian rituals. In particular, in the
Confucian culture, promoting the continuity, integrity, and prosperity of
the family is the key to the cultivation of the virtue of filial piety. Given
the valuable role of the adopted child in promoting the continuity of the
family, it is ethically justifiable and required that the parents should
treat the adopted child as their own child. Similarly, the adopted child is
expected to treat the adoptive parents as their own parents. Through
such a reciprocal relationship, both adoptive parents and the adopted
child can cultivate virtues related to their familial roles and such culti­
vation of virtues in the familial context is critical for a harmonious
society.
However, some gene enhancement technologies might be approved
by Confucian ethics as these technologies can enhance certain abilities
of the children which demonstrate the respect for the gifts granted by the
ancestors and the promotion of family fame [30]. For instance, Confu­
cian ethics may approve a gene enhancement technology that is able to
improve children’s IQ (intelligence quotient). The Confucian ethics of
“giftedness” leads to some interesting questions for future research. For
instance, let us imagine a scenario that a child born in a non-Chinese
culture was adopted by a Chinese couple. In this scenario, there are a
couple of questions worth further philosophical exploration:
• whether this child can and should still be considered as a gift given
by the ancestors of the adoptive family;
• if so, how to understand and justify the connection between a child
adopted from a non-Chinese culture and the ancestors of the adop­
tive family;
• to what extent this adopted child is culturally Confucian despite that
this child was not born in a culture with the Confucian heritage.
Confucian ethics also has implications for rethinking the professional
formation of engineers. The meritocratic approach to selecting and
promoting leaders can also be found in contemporary Chinese technical
companies. My own dissertation research that examined the everyday
cultures of Chinese engineers discovered that the idea of meritocracy
affected the selection of technical managers on the factory floor in
Chinese companies [34]. Chinese engineers who became managers may
not possess any initial interest in management. Nevertheless, there has
been a widely acknowledged assumption in most Chinese companies
that competent technical experts are expected to be placed in manage­
ment positions. Conversely, if later a manager is found to be not tech­
nically competent, the political legitimacy of this manager will be
challenged by the subordinates. In a professional setting, challenging a
manager’s technical competency is to question this manager’s political
legitimacy of being a leader. One of the interviewees explained how the
selection of engineers to leadership roles was practiced in his company:
Our management often start from the very bottom technicians and
learn from every project and discipline. If you start from the lowest
level and then move up step by step, you can encounter different
people and projects and expand your knowledge scope. As the higher
position you move up to, the more you will be responsible for. You
need to know a little bit about everything. Otherwise, how can you
arrange production and organization?.. We have an assumption, a
person who is doing well in one position will be likely to do well and
adapt easily in a different position [34].
On the factory floor, in fact, a Chinese engineer who has demon­
strated technical excellence is often expected by the company to exert
moral power on other members, especially when the leader is assigned
to formulate or lead a new team. As analyzed earlier in this essay,
qualified leaders are often assumed to be intellectually and morally
Q. Zhu
superior to others. As described by another interviewee who was a lead
engineer at a private computer engineering company:
Suppose you are excellent in technological development… However,
the company might expect you to assume more responsibility. You
are expected to extend your (moral) power or influence. The way you
extend your influence is to lead a new team. You transfer your in­
fluence to others. Or, by leading a team, through your project, by
using your own deep and broad understanding of technology, you
teach your team members’ competency [34].
Again, similar to how political leaders are chosen, the process in
which technical managers are selected in Chinese technical companies
often places more emphasis on moral competence than technical or in­
tellectual competence.
5. Conclusion and reflection
This essay provides a very brief overview of Confucian ethics that
focuses on the role-based morality. It compares Confucian ethics with
two dominant schools of thought in Western ethics deontology and
consequentialism. This essay then discusses how Confucian ethics pro­
vides a unique way to think about social and political issues such as how
the political leaders are selected and evaluated, the ethical justification
of political legitimacy, the prioritization of economic, social, and cul­
tural rights over other rights, and moral egalitarianism. Finally, this
essay explores the ways in which Confucian ethics serves as a useful
intellectual resource for examining the issues arising from the ethical
assessment of (emerging) technologies and the professional formation of
engineers.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the comparative philosophical
methodology employed in this paper may have some potential chal­
lenges. My ambitious project that aims to introduce “fundamental
thoughts” of Confucian ethics (even from a role ethics perspective) in
this paper obviously has the danger of oversimplifying or even stereo­
typing about Confucian ethics. Such a “comparative” approach also has
the danger of depicting a “Confucianism” that is completely different
from and irrelevant to “Western” thought while overlooking connections
or similarities across cultures. Edward Slingerland has criticized such
“an almost universally accepted truism among scholars of Chinese phi­
losophy” that simply perceives “‘Western’ thoughts as dualistic in na­
ture” and “early Chinese thought as profoundly ‘holistic’” [32]; p. 324).
Such widely accepted “radical holistic” position in Chinese philosophy
further assumes that “some essential Chinese holism can serve as a
corrective to an equally essentialized Western thought” [32]; p. 324). To
have a more accurate understanding of Confucian ethics and its con­
nections with other traditions of philosophical thought, a promising
approach is the movement of “empirically responsible philosophy” that
integrates empirical findings from the sciences such as cognitive and
evolutionary science into Chinese philosophy. Therefore, philosophical
speculations in Confucian ethics can be “informed and constrained by
our current best empirical accounts of how the human mind works”
[32]; p. 323).
Another limitation of this paper worth noting is that it cites some
secondary sources on Confucian ethics. Although my initial goal of cit­
ing these secondary sources was to represent diverse views on Confucian
ethics, it is also likely that these sources are often based on their authors’
own readings of Confucian ethics. It is important to have a much clearer
understanding of the contexts in which these authors make their
arguments.
Acknowledgement
The author would like to thank the Arthur Lakes Library’s Open
Educational Resources (OER) Program and the Daniels Fund Program in
Professional Ethics Education at the Colorado School of Mines that
6
Technology in Society 63 (2020) 101424
provided funding for the preparation of this essay and the teaching re­
sources included in the Appendix. Special thanks to my students who
have inspired me to explore more relevant ways to teach Confucian
ethics.
AppendixTeaching Resources
This section includes exercises that instructors can use to teach
Confucian ethics, society, and technology in undergraduate courses in
the fields such as the ethics of technology and engineering, comparative
philosophy and religion, global studies, and world religions. They can
also be used in engineering courses with a focus on contemporary af­
fairs, cross-cultural communication, and/or globalization.
Exercise 1 Role Ethics and Social Justice
Reflect on the following scenario adapted from a passage from the
Analects (13:18) and then ask yourself three questions: (1) what would
you do in this scenario and why? (2) what is your ethical obligation
prescribed by your role as a son or a daughter? (3) how is your role-
based obligation reconciled with the idea of social justice?
When you find that your father took a sheep on the sly, what would
you do? (1) report him to the authority; and (2) cover for his father.
More in-depth discussions on this classic scenario can be found in:
Huang, Y. (2017). Why an upright son does not disclose his father
stealing a sheep: A neglected aspect of the Confucian conception of filial
piety. Asian Studies, 5(1), 15–45. https://doi.org/10.4312/as.2017.
5.1.15-45.
Exercise 2 Confucian Reflective Observation on the Street
You will have 40 min walking on the street and observing others. You
are welcome to walk in groups or by yourself. BE SAFE! While you are
observing what other people (observe at least THREE persons) are doing
on the street, taking notes, and asking yourself the following questions:
Who are they? What are their roles?
How do their roles specify or prescribe their responsibilities?
Exercise 3 Who Would be More Confucian or Chinese?
Compare the following two scenarios and discuss who would be
more Confucian (or Chinese) from the Confucian perspective.
Scenario #1: Andrew Jackson, who was born in China but later
adopted by a couple of Americans, barely speaks any mandarin.
Scenario #2: 齐安德 (birth name Andrew Jackson), was born in the
United States into a white family but was later adopted by a Chinese
couple. He was growing in a Chinese family and speaks very fluent
Chinese and wears Chinese clothing. He cannot speak any English.
Exercise 4 The Moral Assessment of Technology
From the Confucian ethical perspective, what are the “good” or “bad”
technologies in our society? Please explain why.
A.cell phone
B.nuclear weapons
C.laptop
D.aircraft
E.organ transplant technologies
F.a mathematical equation without immediate practical use
G.a gene editing technology that improves children’s moral
reasoning skills
Exercise 5 Designing Confucian Robots
Imagine you are designing the following social robots inspired by
Q. Zhu
Confucian ethics, what features do you want to program into the robots?
Or, what features you may not want to program? Explain why.
1.A learning companion robot for university students enrolled in a
Chemistry class
2.An elder care robot
3.A therapy robot teaching social skills to children with autism
4.A robot that takes care of your daily schedule and helps you
manage time
5.A robot nanny that takes care of your children while you are busy
at work
6.A nutritionist robot who gives you advice on your dietary habit
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