The case of Crescent Petroleum v.

M/V Lok Maheshwari is about a dispute over the payment

of bunker fuels delivered to a vessel that was owned by an Indian corporation, chartered by a
South Korean company, and sub-chartered by two Canadian companies. The main question was
whether the Philippine courts had jurisdiction and authority to apply Philippine law to the case,
or whether they should defer to the foreign law and forum clauses in the contracts of the parties.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that the Philippine courts had jurisdiction and
authority to apply Philippine law, because the case involved a maritime contract that was
performed in Philippine waters and affected Philippine interests. The Court also rejected the
foreign law and forum clauses, because they were contrary to public policy and would deprive
the petitioner of its right to due process and access to courts.
The Court applied the subject matter test to determine whether the case fell within its admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction. This test considers whether the contract is of a maritime nature, that is,
whether it relates to the navigation, business, or commerce of the sea. The Court held that the
contract for the delivery of bunker fuels was a maritime contract, because it was essential for the
operation and maintenance of the vessel.
The Court also considered the multiple and substantive contacts between Philippine law and the
parties and the subject matter of the case. These contacts included: (a) the performance of the
contract in Philippine waters; (b) the use of Philippine currency in paying for the bunker fuels; ©
the issuance of checks drawn against a Philippine bank; (d) the filing of a complaint with the
Philippine Coast Guard; (e) the attachment of the vessel by a Philippine court; and (f) the impact
of the case on Philippine maritime commerce and security.
The Court further held that the foreign law and forum clauses were invalid and unenforceable,
because they would deprive the petitioner of its right to due process and access to courts. The
Court reasoned that applying foreign law and forum clauses would result in undue
inconvenience, expense, and delay for the petitioner, who was a Canadian corporation with no
presence or assets in India or South Korea. The Court also noted that foreign law and forum
clauses were against public policy, because they would undermine the sovereignty and
jurisdiction of Philippine courts over matters affecting Philippine interests.

The case of J.A. Sison v. Board of Accountancy is about a petition for certiorari filed by J.A.
Sison, a Filipino certified public accountant, against the Board of Accountancy and Robert Orr
Ferguson, a British chartered accountant, who was granted a certificate as a public accountant in
the Philippines without examination. The main issue was whether the Board of Accountancy had
the authority to issue such certificate based on the principle of reciprocity between the
Philippines and the United Kingdom regarding the practice of accountancy.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that the Board of Accountancy had no authority to
issue such certificate, because there was no reciprocity between the Philippines and the United
Kingdom regarding the practice of accountancy. The Court held that the certificate issued by the
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, which Ferguson possessed, did not
meet the requirement of section 41 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, which states that a foreign
certificate must be issued by an authority duly recognized by the Philippine government. The
Court also held that the negative statement in Ferguson’s certificate, which says that it does not
entitle him to practice as an accountant in any part of His Majesty’s dominions where special
qualifications are prescribed by law, does not establish the existence of reciprocity. The Court
ordered the Board of Accountancy to revoke Ferguson’s certificate and to refrain from issuing
similar certificates to other British subjects.

he case of Georgia Babcock v. William Jackson is about a conflict of laws issue arising from a
car accident that occurred in Ontario, Canada, involving two New York residents. The main
question was whether the New York courts should apply the Ontario guest statute, which bars the
recovery of a guest passenger from a negligent driver, or the New York law, which allows such
recovery.
The New York Court of Appeals ruled that the New York law should apply, because it reflects
the policy and interest of the state where the parties reside and have their relationship. The court
rejected the traditional rule that the law of the place of the tort governs, and adopted a more
flexible approach that considers the contacts and interests of the states involved in the case. The
court held that applying the Ontario guest statute would be contrary to the reasonable
expectations and needs of the parties, and would undermine the deterrence and compensation
functions of tort law.

The case of LWC Construction v. Dupo is about a claim for service award or longevity pay by
a Filipino worker who was employed in Saudi Arabia by a foreign company through a local
recruiter. The main issue was whether the worker was entitled to the service award under the
Saudi Labor Law, and whether his claim was barred by prescription.
The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that the worker was not entitled to the service award,
because he had already received it for his latest contract of employment. The Court also ruled
that his claim was barred by prescription, because he filed it more than one year after the
termination of his contract.
The Court applied the principle of lex loci contractus, which means that the law of the place
where the contract was made governs its validity and interpretation. The Court held that the
Saudi Labor Law was the applicable law, because the worker signed his contracts in Saudi
Arabia and performed his work there.
The Court interpreted Article 87 of the Saudi Labor Law, which provides for the payment of
service award at the end or termination of a labor contract concluded for a specific period. The
Court found that the worker had signed six fixed-period contracts, each for one year, and that he
had received his service award for each contract upon its expiration. The Court also found that
his sixth and last contract ended on April 30, 1999, when he left Saudi Arabia, and that he had
received his service award for that contract as well.
The Court further held that the worker’s claim was barred by prescription, because he filed it on
December 11, 2000, or more than one year after his contract ended. The Court cited Article 212
of the Saudi Labor Law, which states that an action to enforce payment of the service award
must be filed within one year from the termination of a labor contract for a specific period.