Joachim Betz Wolfgang Hein

GIGA Institut fü r Asien-Studien GIGA Institut fü r Lateinamerika-Studien

Joachim Betz · Wolfgang Hein Hamburg, Germany Hamburg, Germany

Globalization
Prerequisites, Effects, Resistance

ISBN 978-3-658-41716-1 ISBN 978-3-658-41717-8 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41717-8

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Migration and Globalization
7
7.1 Introduction
A more strongly interconnected world economy is—as seen—characterized by
the increase in cross-border trade and the mobility of international capital. In
theory, it would also be characterized by free movement of people—especially
by the freedom of establishment of workers—across borders, since globalization
would favor this freedom and make it profitable for (almost) all participants (see
below). However, there can hardly be any talk of free choice of workplace in the
global or even regional context, with the exception of the special situation within
the European Union. This is essentially due to politically motivated immigration
restrictions of almost all potential host countries, followed by the financial, social
and psychological costs of migration for those concerned. Thus, the cross-border
movement of people is globally the least internationalized field. However, this
freedom would be materially (for migrant workers) and politically (for refugees)
by far the most useful globalization factor.
First, however, to make a distinction: Migration is understood to be a spa-
tial change of residence of a person that is intended to be permanent. If this is
beyond the national borders, one speaks of international migration, if not, of
internal migration, if it includes back and forth movements between the coun-
try of origin and the host country, one speaks of circular migration. Migration
accompanies almost the entire history of mankind almost everywhere in ascend-
ing and descending waves. In contrast to migrants, refugees are defined as per-
sons according to the Geneva Convention who are outside the country of their
nationality due to a well-founded fear of persecution because of their religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or their political conviction.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 111
GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023
J. Betz and W. Hein, Globalization,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-41717-8_7
112 7 Migration and Globalization
Economic reasons (such as poverty) are not included in the Geneva Convention.
So you have to at least distinguish between migration and movement of refu-
gees, even if this is practically often difficult, since refugees can also have addi-
tional economic reasons for leaving their homeland or have an eye on the earning
opportunities in potential host countries when fleeing.
In the following, migration and refugee movements should be discussed
mainly in so far as they are related to globalization processes and have an impact
on them. However, one must also consider the respective internal political effects
of waves of migration and refugees, in particular concerning their increasing or
decreasing volume, and the internal social debate in the host countries and the
respective positioning of the political actors and parties. These in turn determine
the intensification or liberalization of the respective national migration and asy-
lum law and thus also the extent of emigration and immigration. This is clearly
visible in relation to the European and North American refugee and immigration
debate and has also contributed to the rise of right-wing populist parties and poli-
ticians there in recent years.
Migration and refugee movements have economic, social and political rel-
evance for both host and home countries because, for example, they can reduce or
increase the supply of labor, potentially also influencing the respective wage level,
and entailing massive financial transfers to the families of origin, which can have
macroeconomic effects. Furthermore, they can relieve political pressure if oppo-
nents have to flee, while on the other hand social tensions in host countries can rise
or these (especially in the less developed world) can be overloaded by migration
and refugee flows. All of this is the subject of sometimes heated political and aca-
demic debate, with positions differing sharply between representatives of host and
home countries as well as according to the respective socio-political groupings.
Development- and peace-promoting migration policy has also been included
in the Sustainable Development Goals. Goal 8.8 stipulates that the rights of all
migrants should be protected, international migration should be facilitated by
appropriate political measures and the costs of remittances should be reduced.
In contrast to the now widespread negative attitude towards migration and large
refugee movements, this and similar documents (the controversial Global Com-
pact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the 2018 Global Compact for
Refugees) explicitly advocate migration. This is remarkable because in the past,
negative migration effects (above all the brain drain from developing countries)
were given greater international prominence.
These considerations point to the fact that there is a strong connection between
globalization and increasing migration flows, even if currently the latter are politi-
cally slowed down and historically there was also emigration and immigration at
7.2 Extent and Geographical Distribution of Refugee and Migration … 113 114 7 Migration and Globalization

times of limited or no globalization tendencies. Migration is, however, tenden-

Fig. 7.1 The proportion of the population with a migrant background in the OECD area, 2010 and 2020. (Source: OECD (2021) Inter-
tially promoted by the global economic, cultural and political context, for exam-
ple by the global communicative networking, which provides information on
employment opportunities in potential host countries, on immigration conditions,
on escape routes and similar topics in a timely manner. Furthermore, the (in abso-
lute terms) still widening wage gap between regions of origin and destination and
the aging-related reduction of the labor force reservoir in the latter and not least
the relative decrease in transport and communication costs stimulate emigration.
Through ongoing migration, the internal debate about the benefits and risks of
increasing immigration and emigration also changes, so that it can also change
the political balance in societies more affected by it.

7.2 Extent and Geographical Distribution of Refugee

and Migration Flows

The number of people living outside their home country has risen to 281 mil-
lion in 2020. This is not particularly much, only about 3.6% of the world popula-
tion (IOM 2021). Of course, this proportion has been increasing for years (1970:
84.5 million and 2.3% of the world population), although the growth has been
slower in 2020/21 due to the coronavirus pandemic and the travel restrictions
associated with it. Of all people living outside their home country, about two
thirds are migrant workers, the rest are refugees. Migrants are 52% men, the rest
are women. People of working age make up the largest proportion of immigrants
(78%). In 2020, India (17.5 million) was the largest source country, followed by
Mexico, Russia, China, Syria, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Asia has seen the fast-
est growth in emigration since 2005, followed by Europe, Africa and then Latin
America. In terms of the native population, some island and civil war countries

national Migration Outlook 2021, Paris)

have extremely high emigration rates of up to 40%.
The main destination regions were Europe and Asia (82 and 84 million), fol-
lowed by North America (59 million). Other regions play a relatively small role.
The proportion of migrants to the total population therefore varied regionally,
being highest in Oceania, North America and Europe (21, 16 and 11%), and low-
est in Asia and Africa. However, Asia has seen the strongest growth in immigra-
tion since 2000. In terms of individual host countries within the OECD, there is
also a high degree of geographical concentration of people with a migrant back-
ground (see Fig. 7.1), even stronger in terms of individual urban cores within
these countries. However, the correlation of this concentration with the most
immigration-hostile policies within the OECD world is moderate.
7.2 Extent and Geographical Distribution of Refugee and Migration … 115
In terms of numbers, the United States is the most important destination for
migrants; their number has quadrupled there since 1970 (to 51 million in 2019).
In second place came Germany (2019: 13.1 million), followed by Saudi Arabia,
Russia and the United Kingdom. So migration shows a high concentration on the
wealthier countries in their respective regions; two-thirds migrated to the industri-
alized countries. It is interesting that the proportion of developing countries with
middle incomes has been increasing in recent years (from 12% in 2013 to 19%
in 2019). Causes for this are their disproportionate economic growth and partly
increasing admission restrictions in the West (IOM 2019). A not inconsiderable
part (currently 40%) of migration is due to family reunification (OECD 2019).
Data on the number of people living outside their home country are much less
reliable than those on annual new immigration to host countries, because those
are only partially recorded or only document immigration but not emigration, not
to mention illegal immigration. There are only somewhat reliable data on OECD
countries, which registered a significant increase of immigration from 2010 to
2016 (from almost 4 to over 5 million people per year); since then, however, a
slight decline took place, which was further exacerbated during the Corona pan-
demic due to restrictions on entry and exit and on the issuance of visas. In the
USA, Australia, Japan and Korea, the number of new migrants fell to almost zero
in the first half of 2020 (OECD 2020). Previously, as with the proportion of peo-
ple not born in the country, the USA had been the leader in new arrivals for years,
followed by Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, Canada and France. The order
of the countries of origin of the new arrivals hardly changes compared to the
migrants already living in the country.
In addition to the aforementioned categories of migrants, there is also tempo-
rary labor migration (in the OECD area in 2018: 4.9 million workers), which is
mainly employed in the construction industry, in the health sector, but also in the
IT sector. Here, too, the usual receiving countries predominate with the exception
of Poland, which has become the most important host country for migrants with
(planned) limited stay (mainly from Ukraine). In addition to the aforementioned
categories of migrants, there are also seasonal workers, young people with tem-
porary work permits, trainees, employees transferred to foreign branches of com-
panies and students. The number of the latter was as high as 3.9 million in 2018,
which was about 6% of all students in the OECD, again with dominance of the
USA, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany and France (in this order). China
and India dominate as countries of origin of students.
The number of cross-border and internal refugees has now risen to a record
level of 82.4 million people (UNHCR 2021). The UNHCR also counts asylum
seekers and, more recently, people who have fled the Venezuelan chaos among
116 7 Migration and Globalization
the displaced. Refugees nevertheless account for only a modest share of interna-
tional migration—contrary to often other perceptions—and are also much more
concentrated than migrant workers on certain countries, namely about three quar-
ters on neighbouring states. This particularly affects Turkey, Colombia, Pakistan,
Uganda and Germany in terms of numbers, and Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey as
a proportion of the population, largely as a result of internal wars and conflicts
in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria, the Congo, the Sahel, Somalia, South Sudan;
Venezuela and Central American states. Accordingly, the share of neighbour-
ing states as a receiving area for the global refugee population is large; however,
regionally Western Europe has moved up to third place (World Bank 2018).
The number of internally displaced people (2020: 48 million) was greater
than the number of cross-border refugees (2020: 26.4 million excluding 4.1 mil-
lion asylum seekers) and almost as rapidly increasing. In 2019, they were con-
centrated in (in this order) Syria, Somalia, Afghanistan, Nigeria, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Iraq (IOM 2019; UNHCR 2021).
Politically, the number of new asylum applications per year is in the spot-
light, but quantitatively it is rather moderate. Within the OECD, it has risen
from around 200,000 in 1980 to over 800,000 in 1992, then fell back to about
half in the following period before increasing sharply again in 2015/16 (to over
1.6 million). The subsequent decline in 2017/18 led to another increase before
the outbreak of the Corona pandemic. By far the most applications were made
in the USA, followed by Germany, France, Spain and Greece (UNHCR 2020).
Just over half of the applications were approved. Outside the OECD, Peru, Brazil,
and Costa Rica have become important destinations for asylum seekers in recent
years. Among the applicants were people from Afghanistan, Venezuela, Honduras
and Syria at the top, with Central American asylum seekers applying for admis-
sion to the USA, those from the Middle East and Afghanistan to Western Euro-
pean countries.
As a special case of international migration, intra-regional migration must
also be considered. However, its share of total migration has fallen significantly
compared to earlier periods (1960: 56%), but remains relatively high in sub-Saha-
ran Africa and Europe (between EU states and the rest). For the future, growth
in international migration is to be expected for a number of reasons (see also
below). In surveys carried out some time ago, 30% of African respondents said
they wanted to emigrate, 19% in the Middle East, and 18% in Latin America. The
USA was by far the most desired host country, followed by Germany, Canada,
the United Kingdom and France (World Bank 2018). However, a general desire
7.2 Extent and Geographical Distribution of Refugee and Migration … 117 118 7 Migration and Globalization

to leave does not necessarily translate into immediate emigration, because this is

High and sustained

often limited by financial constraints and continuing family/local ties.

growth countries

high-income
Contrary to the widely held view that the migration regime of Western coun-

countries
tries has become increasingly restrictive over time, empirically, this is only the
case to a limited extent (see United Nations 2020; see Fig. 7.2). In general, the

Fig. 7.2 Average annual change in migration restrictions in the OECD area, 1995–2013. (Source: OECD 2017, p. 33.)
admission of foreign students and family reunification was made easier, in gen-
eral, most OECD countries tried to speed up the processing of applications and to
increase the admission of well-qualified or sectorally scarce workers. In general,
there is also a more stringent approach to irregular migration. The exception to
liberalization also concerns the treatment of asylum seekers. In particular, Euro-
pean countries, Japan and the United States sought to streamline and standard-
ize procedures and to prevent abuse of the asylum system. Since 2019, people
who have illegally crossed the border into the United States have been returned,
the deportation of offenders has been made easier in Germany, Italian authorities

(Note: A value of zero indicates that there was no change in immigration conditions)
have not allowed rescue boats with refugees to land, etc. (OECD 2020).
The employment situation of migrants has improved significantly up to the
outbreak of the Corona epidemic. Almost 70% were employed in regular employ-
ment within the OECD in 2019, the unemployment rate of migrants exceeded that
of the indigenous population weighted by only 1% (unweighted 2.7%). Unem-
ployment was particularly high among migrants in Greece, Spain, Sweden and
Turkey, but in some places (USA) it was lower than that of the natives. However,
the country of origin of migrants plays a significant role: migrants from North
African and Middle Eastern countries had a significantly higher risk of unem-
ployment, while there was no gap between migrants and the resident population
from other countries of origin. Female migrants had a lower participation in the
labour market. The higher proportion of migrants in employment with relatively
low qualifications is not surprising; this gap to the native-born is not inconsider-
able in Germany, especially high among women. If the latter are employed, they
quite often work under their level of qualification. This is particularly annoying
against the background of scarce qualified personnel in OECD countries and a
significantly increased level of education among migrants. It should not be for-
gotten that many Western countries have started to realize this and are trying to
better integrate migrants into the labour market (through language courses, on-
the-job training, etc.).
7.3 Causes of Refugee and Migration Movements 119
7.3 Causes of Refugee and Migration Movements
There is no need to puzzle over the causes of refugee movements for long; the
main reasons for flight are civil wars, violence, expulsion and increasing crime
in the countries of origin, today already and in future probably stronger followed
by environmental reasons. Since refugees usually only want to save their skin and
are usually not excessively well-off financially, they mainly flee to the neighbour-
ing countries (also with a view to the end of the conflict); secondary factors also
include cultural, social and economic reasons (income opportunities) in the host
country (OECD 2017). The latter are much more important in the case of labour
migration. In the past, extensive considerations were made on the push and pull
factors of migration, i.e. unfavourable economic starting conditions in the country
of origin and more favourable ones in the host country.
The most important reason for labour migration is simply wage and income
differences. These are—for job seekers with the same qualifications—enormous.
According to earlier calculations (Clemens 2011), they are on average 1 to 6.5
between the wages in the USA and in the country of origin, and can therefore
easily exceed the costs of migration over the remaining working life (if work is
found and paid for adequately). A 10% income difference between the country of
origin and the host country explains an increase in migration of 3.1% empirically;
migration therefore increases with increasing wage gap. Since the earning poten-
tial for trained personnel is higher, it is also not surprising that, in the OECD
countries, it is mainly the better qualified—measured by the level of education
in the country of origin—who emigrate. This is promoted by increasing efforts of
the host countries to grant entry and work permits mainly to such persons (OECD
2017, 2019).
In addition to the differences in earnings, the costs of emigration also play
a role; they are easier to bear for less poor migrants and their families. Migra-
tion aspirations therefore increase—up to a considerable per capita income of
migrants and their families in the country of origin—and not decrease. Poverty
makes the realization of migration impossible. This is in contrast to the common
popular perception in the host countries. Costs also play a not unimportant role
in the choice of migration destinations. It is not by chance that emigration from
Mexico to the USA (relatively) is significantly higher than further away coun-
tries such as Colombia or even Brazil, despite approximately the same per capita
income in the home countries. Other, migration-promoting factors are of course
the same language in the host country and the cultural proximity to this. Even
more important, but related to this, is the existence of social networks of already
120 7 Migration and Globalization
employed workers from the countries of origin, which can assist with the first
accommodation, acclimatizaion and job search. Their existence is particularly
important for migrants from very poor countries (OECD 2017). Furthermore, of
course, the social and psychological costs of migration play a role, i.e. the loss of
the familiar environment, of friends and acquaintances, etc. Last but not least, a
decisive factor in migration and the choice of destination are the fluctuating legal
barriers in the respective host countries.
7.4 Consequences of Migration for the Host
Countries
The consequences of migration for the labor market, social security systems,
social cohesion and the political climate in the host countries are hotly debated.
In popular, especially in right-wing populist discourses, the negative conse-
quences for the host countries are grossly exaggerated. This begins with the fact
that the number of migrants and the unemployment rate are greatly overestimated
(usually by more than double), as are the proportions of Muslims and North Afri-
cans in the identification of their origins, with the overestimation being signifi-
cantly correlated with the level of education of the respondents. The same applies
to the assessment of state transfers to migrants/refugees. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that there is a close relationship between the attitude towards migration
and the support for state redistribution. It is interesting that simpler minds do not
even want to know exactly, in surveys they prefer not to take notice of offered
data might correct their opinion (Alesina et al. 2018).
First of all, the consequences for the labor market: Young and dynamic
migrants can increase the employment rate in receiving countries, partially com-
pensate for a rising shortage of less and better qualified workers, and relieve the
public finances and social security funds of aging societies in the medium term.
This is even the case with less qualified immigrants if they take over care and
nursing tasks and allow women to participate more in the local labor market. This
is offset by the facts that they can compete with local workers for their jobs and
put pressure on their wages or sometimes fail to integrate into the labor market.
Empirically, an increase in the immigration of migrant workers by 1%
increases economic growth by 0.2% in the medium term. It also increases pro-
ductivity in the long term (Jaumotte et al. 2016). The standard answer of classi-
cal economics to the influence of immigration on employment would actually be
7.4 Consequences of Migration for the Host Countries 121
that it would have to reduce employment and wages of the resident population,
especially those of the less qualified workers, because of the increased supply.
However, according to some controversial studies, this is only the case to a lim-
ited extent. First, because the educational level of immigrants has risen sharply
in recent years, they do no longer necessarily compete with the low-skilled in the
host country. Second, because migrants and the domestically born workforce are
often employed in complementary and not competing activities, migrants earn
less, at least at the beginning, even if they are equally qualified. Moreover, it
would be very difficult to determine the development of the wage and employ-
ment situation in the country in the absence of immigration, especially since
migrants mainly migrate to countries/regions with strong growth, natives some-
times migrate when immigration increases, and the latter also increases con-
sumption in the country. The available empirical studies show only a very weak
(negative) influence of labour migration on wages and employment (National
Academies 2017; World Bank 2018; Banerjee and Duflo 2019), which tends to
zero in the long term. With regard to individual national regions and subgroups,
the situation is different; less well-qualified natives (e.g. dropouts) suffer less
from the immigration of less qualified migrants, but benefit from the immigra-
tion of highly educated migrants. It should also be mentioned that migrants have
a measurable and positive impact on the exports of host countries and their direct
investments in source countries.
Of course, immigration increases the cultural diversity of a population, could
thus undermine the social cohesion of a society if it assumes too large dimensions
and the immigrants can no longer be reasonably assimilated or integrated (see
Collier 2013). Then, the resident population does not see this as an enrichment,
but fears for its own cultural identity and opposes it. There are relatively few
studies on this. These show that the majority of the population in OECD countries
appreciates the import of new ideas by immigrants, but an almost equally high
proportion believes that migrants would undermine their own culture (IISP 2013).
Otherwise, the electoral gains of right-wing populist parties in the West, which
correlate strongly with immigration, would hardly be comprehensible,. With the
presumed negative consequences for one’s own income and employment secu-
rity, these gains can hardly be explained (Papademetriou et al. 2018). Of course,
migrant workers are easier identified as risks than the somewhat nebulous globali-
zation.
122 7 Migration and Globalization
7.5 Consequences of Migration for Countries
of Origin
The emigration of migrant workers, especially of those with higher qualifications
from developing countries, was often criticized in the past because of the outflow
of largely state-financed human capital (‘brain drain’) to the industrialized coun-
tries. This should not be minimized either. It seems outrageous that in countries
with considerable medical under-supply, trained personnel emigrate to the global
North and save this training cost. Of course, developing countries with a policy
of education reflecting the needs of the labor market and tolerable institutional
quality (as well as less corruption) have lower emigration rates. Moreover, it is
not certain that the well-trained migrants would have been able to find work eas-
ily in their home country and empirically, for example, the emigration of medical
personnel to the global North has not worsened the health indicators of the popu-
lation in the home country on average, because this personnel traditionally con-
centrates in the larger cities and is also numerically too small to meet the need for
medical personnel in the country of origin (Clemens 2014). Furthermore, emigra-
tion also has development- and social-political advantages for the home countries
(‘brain gain’). First, it relieves the domestic labor market of unemployment and
underemployment and, under otherwise equal conditions, increases the wages of
those remaining in the country. This was particularly the case in Eastern Europe
after the fall of the Berlin Wall (OECD 2017). Migrants also bring new devel-
opment-friendly norms and behaviors from abroad or transfer them through their
diaspora in the host countries. For example, the birth rates of emigrating families
abroad are significantly lower than those remaining in the country. They may also
contribute to a more liberal political awareness and, through remittances, increase
the social influence of the remaining families. Their influence on conflicts in the
home countries is ambivalent; in part they contributed to social pacification, in
part to intensification of conflict (for example by financing rebel groups as in Sri
Lanka). Migration can also lead to those remaining at home intensifying their
educational efforts with a view to their economic usefulness and thus raising the
overall level of education (World Bank 2018). Returning migrants, whose number
is not inconsiderable—in Europe only one thirds of migrants remain after more
than 20 years of activity, in the USA, Canada and Australia however considerably
more (Dustmann and Gö rlach 2016)—are an important development factor. With
the help of their savings, they often become more entrepreneurial than those who
stay at home, but mostly in endeavours of a limited size (OECD 2017). Above all,
returnees increase the human capital of their home countries through their profes-
7.5 Consequences of Migration for Countries of Origin 123
sional experience. Finally, migrants contribute significantly to alleviating the cur-
rent account deficits of their home countries through their remittances. More on
this below.
Of course, mass migration also has social disadvantages for the sending coun-
tries. At the level of the family, the remaining members have to work more or
accept income losses. This affects women in the countries of origin negatively,
especially because of the predominance of male labor migration. The effects
of remittances on the domestic labor markets are also ambivalent because they
reduce the demand for employment by alternative sources of income for the ben-
eficiaries (OECD 2017).
Remittances from migrant workers back to their home countries have
increased significantly (estimated at $548 billion in 2019, $508 billion in 2020
due to the pandemic, see World Bank 2020) and are now the largest source of
capital inflows to developing countries (see Fig. 7.3). They far exceed develop-
ment assistance from donors, and this trend is increasing, they increase foreign
exchange reserves and relieve the balance of payments. In addition, remittances
are also relatively stable (the estimated decline for 2020–2021 is due to the
Corona crisis and its aftermath). The largest beneficiaries of remittances are
East and South Asia, Africa much less. This also shows that migration is posi-
tively correlated with the per capita income of the home countries. The largest
recipients of remittances in 2019 were India (83.1 billion $), China (68.4 billion
$), Mexico (38.5 billion $), the Philippines (35.2 billion $) and Egypt (26.8 bil-
Fig. 7.3 Capital inflows to developing countries in billion USD, 1990–2020. (Source:
World Bank 2020, p. 7)
124 7 Migration and Globalization
lion $). With these inflows, India, for example, was able to plug half of its trade
deficit in the same year. Measured by gross domestic product, of course, micro-
states were the top performers: in Tonga the remittances accounted for 37.6% of
GDP, in Haiti for 37.1%, in South Sudan for 34.4% and in Kyrgyzstan for 29.2%.
These are considerable magnitudes. It has often been assumed that remittances
from migrants would mainly be used for (unnecessary) consumption and property
acquisition by the families of origin. This is only partly true. Studies have shown
that remittances had a significant impact on poverty rates in the countries of ori-
gin, that families receiving remittances invested significantly more in the health
and education of their offspring or started small businesses (Newland 2013).
A development policy annoyance for migrants and their families are the high
transfer costs that are imposed on them for remittances to their home countries.
Despite the international community’s self-commitment to reduce them, only
little has been done. On average, 6.79% of fees are charged for transfers to the
home country (2020), in sub-Saharan Africa even 8.90% (World Bank 2020); eve-
rywhere far above the target value of the Sustainable Development Goals (3%). In
addition, the quality of the financial services concerned is apparently more than
meager. There is no question that domestic and foreign financial institutions are
milking these services.
7.6 The Future of Migration
As already mentioned above, the intention and execution of migration increases
with per capita income and educational level. Clemens (2011) has calculated on
various occasions at which income the willingness to emigrate again decreases
and comes to the somewhat sobering result that this (at prices from 2010) is
only the case at an average per capita GDP of more than 7200 dollars (see also
Fig. 7.4). Most developing countries are still far from this; even if the economic
growth of these countries were to double on average, it would take until 2198 for
the peak of migration from the Global South to be exceeded (Clemens and Postel
2018; similarly OECD 2017), especially since the nominal difference in per cap-
ita incomes would not decrease. The hope cherished by the European Union and
the German government that the wave of emigration from developing countries
could be combated at the root through development cooperation and the pacifica-
tion of armed conflicts in Africa and elsewhere appears completely absurd against
this background. This is due to the—in view of the problem—rather meager
financial expenditure of the EU, the unimaginable utopia of how Germany and
the European Union should settle civil wars in the Global South and finally due to
References 125
Fig. 7.4 Share of migrants depending on GDP per capita, 2010. (Source: OECD 2017, p.
118)
(Note: The middle curve shows the statistical relationship between per capita income
and emigration, the upper or the lower curve corrected by one standard deviation)
the immigration policy of the industrial countries, which increasingly favors more
highly qualified migrants. As the level of education in source countries increases
and better educated people have stronger emigration intentions, this fuels migra-
tion. This is by no means to say that immigration necessarily has to be stopped
or slowed down. From the perspective of migrants, given the enormous wage
differences between workers in source and host countries—with the same quali-
fications—the reduction of immigration barriers would be the best form of devel-
opment aid, as its material effects would far exceed those of the target groups
(Pritchett 2006; Clemens 2011), and would also be more helpful for source coun-
tries than an even more resolute liberalization of world trade (World Bank 2018).
What social consequences this would have for Western societies is another ques-
tion, but from a certain perspective of global justice, it would probably be the
most appropriate policy.
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