CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LATEST JURISPRUDENCE

A. Double Jeopardy

1. People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan and Lauro Baja, G.R. No. 233437, April
26, 2021
Ponente: Justice Marvic Leonen

Doctrine:

Once a demurrer to evidence has been granted in a criminal case, the grant amounts to an acquittal.
Any further prosecution for the same offense would violate the accused's constitutional right against
double jeopardy.

Under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court
may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed
by the accused with or without leave of court. Thus, in resolving the accused's demurrer to evidence,
the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain
the indictment or support a verdict of guilt. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the
sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of
a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to
an acquittal; and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription
on double jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case
made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double
jeopardy.

The only time when assailing the grant of a demurrer to evidence will not violate the right against
double jeopardy is when the trial court is shown to have gravely abused its discretion, such that the
prosecution's right to due process was violated, denying it the opportunity to present its case.

The petitioner must prove that the trial court "blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to
deprive it of its very power to dispense justice."

Here, petitioner argues that its Petition does not violate respondent Baja's right against double
jeopardy because the Sandiganbayan allegedly acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed a "gross misapprehension of facts" tantamount
to grave abuse of discretion, warranting the reversal of the grant of Demurrer to Evidence.

There is a gross misapprehension of facts when the trial court makes findings based on significant
contradictions in the testimonies of witnesses, or when these findings are unfounded, speculative, or
arbitrary.

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan should have found that respondent Baja's expenses were
non-existent or fictitious. It claims that it had convincingly established this:

In the instant case, the negative averment that Baja, Jr.'s expenses were non-existent or fictitious
had been convincingly established by these proven facts: (a) computerized receipts which were not
pre-numbered and did not contain the names of the establishments to which payments were made;
(b) photocopies of Baja, Jr.'s personal checks which he submitted to support his claims for
reimbursements did not show any indication that these were received by the payees and
subsequently paid by the drawee bank.
Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character,
weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the
circumstances. To be considered sufficient, therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission
of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation therein by the accused.

In the case of accused Baja, the prosecution failed to establish sufficient evidence that accused Baja
caused the reimbursement of non existent or fictitious representation expenses. Certainly, the
hearsay statements made by Mr. Sung of Azure could cast doubt on the authenticity of the two (2)
receipts that were submitted by accused Baja for reimbursement. But, it could not lead to certainty
that the said receipts are fictitious or the entries therein fictitious. The provisional receipts attached to
the reimbursement documents do not also indicate that no payments or expenses were incurred.
And, as discussed above, the attached photocopy or original checks without proof that the same
were paid or negotiated does not contradict payment of services or goods.

The Information specifically charged respondent Baja with claiming and receiving reimbursement for
non-existent or fictitious representation expenses, and not for merely submitting incomplete
documents to support his claims. As the Sandiganbayan noted, the irregularities in the supporting
documents are insufficient positive proof of the alleged nonpayment. The prosecution bore the
burden to prove the allegations in the Information. If its evidence was insufficient to establish the
elements of the offense charged, respondent Baja's guilt could not have been proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The grant of the Demurrer to Evidence was proper.

Petitioner was unable to show that the Sandiganbayan, in granting Demurrer, blatantly abused its
authority as to deprive itself of "its very power to dispense justice." The Sandiganbayan did not
commit grave abuse of discretion. To reverse its grant of the Demurrer to Evidence and dismissal of
the case would be to violate respondent Baja's right against double jeopardy.

2. People of the Philippines v. Domingo Arcega, G.R. No. 237489, August 27, 2020
Ponente: CJ Diosdado Peralta

Doctrine:

A judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable,
and immediately executory upon its promulgation.

Thus, Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at
least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent, he may be found guilty."

It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to
the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying
this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal
justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in
the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a
need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the
criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose
innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Related to his right of repose is the defendant's interest in his right to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in a
single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for society's awareness of the heavy
personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in the
willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in
enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal
finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he
fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to
oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the innocence of the
accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a
second trial would be unfair.

With the CA's modification of respondent's conviction from attempted rape to acts of lasciviousness,
it has already acquitted respondent of attempted rape, which is already final and unappealable.
Thus, double jeopardy has already set in and petitioner is already barred from filing the present
petition for review on certiorari assailing respondent's acquittal of attempted rape on such ground.

3. People v. Lino Alejando, G.R. No. 223099, January 11, 2018

Ponente: Justice Noel Tijam

The 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of the accused against double jeopardy, thus:

Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure strictly adhere to the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy and provide for the requisites in order for double
jeopardy to attach. For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1) a valid
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court
of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused
was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent

Here, all the elements were present. There was a valid information for two counts of rape over which
the RTC had jurisdiction and to which the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. After the
trial, a judgment of acquittal was thereafter rendered and promulgated on July 25, 2011. What is
peculiar in this case is that a judgment of acquittal was rendered based on the mistaken notion that
the private complainant failed to testify; allegedly because of the mix-up of orders with a different
case involving the same accused-appellant. This, however, does not change the fact that a judgment
of acquittal had already been promulgated. Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the
trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation.

The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has
been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has
been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. We find that these exceptions do
not exist in this case. Here, there was no deprivation of due process or mistrial because the records
show that the prosecution was actually able to present their case and their witnesses.

In People v. Laguio, Jr., this Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach
is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus:

The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a
sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in
such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.

In this case, the acquittal was not even questioned on the basis of grave abuse of discretion. It was
only through a supposed mere manifestation of the prosecutor, a copy of which was not in the
records, that the RTC was apprised of the supposed mistake it committed.

A similar instance had been ruled upon by this Court in Argel v. Judge Pascua here the Judge was
sanctioned for gross ignorance of the law for recalling a judgment of acquittal, thus:

As stated earlier, complainant was accused of murder in Crim. Case No. 2999-V of the RTC of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur. On 13 August 1993 judgment was promulgated acquitting him on the ground that
there was no witness who positively identified him as the perpetrator of the crime. However after
respondent's attention was called by the private complainant's counsel to the fact that there was
such a witness and confirmed by respondent upon re-reading her notes, she issued an Order dated
16 August 1993 stating her intention to "revise" the previous judgment of acquittal, branded the
same as "uncalled for" and "not final," and reset the case for another "rendering of the decision." The
reason given was that the judgment of acquittal was rendered without all the facts and
circumstances being brought to her attention.

Respondent Judge explained. that the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimony of
eyewitness Tito Retreta was not attached to the records when she wrote her decision. Thus, in a
Decision dated 19 August 1993, respondent Judge declared herein complainant Miguel Argel guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder on the basis of the eyewitness account of Tito Retreta,
sentenced complainant Argel to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P60,000.00 for actual damages.

Too elementary is the rule that a decision once final is no longer susceptible to amendment or
alteration except to correct errors which are clerical in nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused by an
omission or mistake in the dispositive portion or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a
moro-moro or mock trial. A final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable
regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness.

In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot be
recalled for correction or amendment except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by
another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify
its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case.

Complainant herein was already acquitted of murder by respondent in a decision promulgated on 13

August 1993. Applying the aforestated rule, the decision became final and immutable on the same
day. As a member of the bench who is always admonished to be conversant with the latest legal and
judicial developments, more so of elementary rules, respondent should have known that she could
no longer "revise" her decision of acquittal without violating not only an elementary rule of procedure
but also the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. When the law is so elementary, not
to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

Similarly, in this case, the RTC was reminded of the fact that private complainant AAA testified during
the trial, only after it had already rendered and promulgated the judgment of acquittal. The RTC then
realized that had AAA's testimony been taken into account, the case would have had a different
outcome. Consequently, the RTC issued an Order recalling the judgment of acquittal for the purpose
of rectifying its error, and thereafter, rendered a Decision convicting the accused-appellant for two
counts of rape. This, however, cannot be countenanced for a contrary ruling would transgress the
accused-appellant's constitutionally-enshrined right against double jeopardy.

B. Preliminary Investigation

1. Alejandro Miranda v. People, G.R. No. 232192, June 22, 2020

Ponente: Justice Marvic Leonen

Petitioner's arrest and detention do not fall within the purview of a lawful warrantless arrest under
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The provision states:

SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a wan-ant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with section 7 of Rule 112. (5a)

Here, as the barangay police narrated,28 petitioner went with them to the barangay hall upon their
invitation. He was detained after the victim had identified him as the sexual assaulter. Certainly, the
1âшphi1

barangay police were not present within the meaning of Section 5(a) at the time of the crime's
commission.

Neither do the barangay police have any personal knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner
was the offender. Instead, they only acted on the information they got from the victim's stepfather.
This information did not constitute personal knowledge within the meaning of Section 5(b). As
previously held, "personal gathering of information is different from personal knowledge."29

Since petitioner's warrantless arrest was not lawful, he should have been entitled to a preliminary
investigation before an Information was filed against him. The inquest investigation conducted by the
City Prosecutor is void. Under Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, an
inquest investigation is proper only when the suspect is lawfully arrested without a warrant. It states
in part:

SECTION 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. - When a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or
information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest
investigation has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability
of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly
with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.

Nonetheless, the absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the trial court's jurisdiction,
but merely the regularity of the proceedings. It does not impair the validity of the information or
render it defective.30

Besides, in this case, it is too late now for petitioner to protest his arrest and detention. He voluntarily
pleaded not guilty on arraignment. By so pleading, he is deemed to have submitted his person to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, curing any defect in his arrest. Also, by entering a plea without objection,
he waived his right to question any irregularity in his arrest or the absence of a preliminary
investigation.31 This Court has held:

[A]n accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move to quash the
information against him before his arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in
the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Even in instances not allowed by law, a warrantless
arrest is not a jurisdictional defect, and objection thereto is waived when a person arrested submits
to arraignment without objection. The subsequent filing of the charges and the issuance of the
corresponding warrant of arrest against a person illegally detained will cure the defect of that
detention.32

At any rate, any irregularity in the arrest of petitioner will not negate the validity of his conviction, as
this has been duly proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.

C. Bail

1. People v. Novo Tanes, G.R. No. 240596, April 03, 2019

Ponente: Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa

Procedure when bail is discretionary

In this case, Tanes was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 which carries the
penalty of life imprisonment. Hence, Tanes' bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion if the
evidence of his guilt is not strong.

To determine whether evidence of guilt of the accused is strong, the conduct of bail hearings is
required where the prosecution has the burden of proof, subject to the right of the defense to cross-
examine witnesses and introduce evidence in rebuttal. The court is to conduct only a summary
hearing, consistent with the purpose of merely determining the weight of evidence for purposes of
bail.

The main thrust of the RTC's Order granting bail is that based on the evidence presented during the
bail hearings, the prosecution failed to prove that the chain of custody over the seized drug had been
preserved; hence, the evidence of Tanes' guilt was not strong. The Court wholeheartedly agrees.

To recall, Tanes was charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5,
Article II of R.A. 9165. The elements for conviction under said provision are: (1) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.[36] The burden is on the State to prove not only these elements but also the
corpus delicti or the body of the crime.

In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law.[37]
Consequently, compliance with the rule on chain of custody over the seized illegal drugs is crucial in
any prosecution that follows a buy-bust operation. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the
prohibited drug recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit;
and that the identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that
requisite to make a finding of guilt.[38]

In this regard, Section 21,[39] Article II of R.A. 9165 lays down the following procedure to be followed
in order to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence: (1) the seized items
must be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) the physical
inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her
representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a
representative from the DOJ, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.

The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and
photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of
apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the
buy-bust team reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team.[40] In this connection, this also means that the three required witnesses should already
be physically present at the time of the conduct of the physical inventory of the seized items which,
as mentioned, must be immediately done at the place of seizure and confiscation - a requirement
that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by
its nature, a planned activity.

In the present case, it appears that the buy-bust team committed several procedural lapses
concerning the chain of custody of the seized drug. In particular, the RTC and the CA found that: (1)
there was no representative from the DOJ present during the buy-bust operation and the inventory;
(2) the two other witnesses (i.e., the media representative and the elected public official) were not
present during the apprehension and seizure of the illegal drug but were merely called to sign the
inventory sheet; and (3) no photograph was presented showing the inventory of the seized shabu in
the presence of Tanes and the witnesses. These lapses in the chain of custody created doubt as to
the identity and integrity of the seized drug. Consequently, the evidence as to Tanes' guilt cannot be
characterized as strong.

There being non-compliance with the rule on chain of custody of the drug seized during the buy-bust
operation, the evidence of guilt for the crime of illegal sale of drugs against Tanes is deemed not
strong. Accordingly, he is entitled to bail.

The present ruling, however, should not prejudge the RTC's ruling on the merits of the case. Indeed,
there are instances when the Court had ruled that failure to strictly comply with the procedure in
Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
void. In such cases, the prosecution must still satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground
for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.[49] The prosecution must be able to adequately explain the reasons behind the
procedural lapses.[50]

The Court emphasizes that no part of this Decision should prejudice the submission of additional
evidence for the prosecution to prove Tanes' guilt in the main case. After all, a grant of bail does not
prevent the RTC, as the trier of facts, from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial
on the merits.