B.

Hot Pursuit

Two Requisites:
1. An offense had just been committed.
2. The person making the arrest has probable cause to believe, based on his personal knowledge of facts
and circumstances, that the person to be arrested committed it.
*There must be immediacy between the time the offense is committed and the time of the arrest.

In Go v. CA, where the information had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to
the shooting, such does not constitute "personal knowledge." It must be the arresting officer who shall
have personal knowledge of the crime.

In People v. Manlulu, it was held that "personal gathering of information" is different from "personal
knowledge." The rule requires that the arrest immediately follows the commission of the offense, not
some nineteen hours later.

In People v. Rodrigueza, where NARCOM agent immediately released appellant instead of arresting and
taking him into his custody, it has been held that the term in flagrante delicto requires that the
suspected drug dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drug
to a person acting or posing as a buyer. In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the
NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
employed by peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto.

In People v. Enrile, it was held that an accusation or confession against respondent is in itself does not
justify his warrantless arrest and search because the policemen who later arrested him at his house had
no personal knowledge that he was the source of marijuana. The policemen should have secured a
search warrant on the basis of the information supplied by the informant since he was not caught in
flagrante delicto.

In People v. Jayson, where the accused-appellant had not gone very far (only ten meters away from the
crime scene) although he was then fleeing, it was held that the arresting officers acted on the basis of
personal knowledge of the death of the victim and of facts indicating that accused-appellant was the
assailant.

In People v. Del Rosario, it was held that respondent’s arrest was outside the ambit of the exception on
warrantless arrests because he was arrested on the day after the commission of the offense. The
appreciable lapse of time requires a warrantless arrest, also the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of the offense committed.

In People Samus, where accused was arrested eight days after the killing was consummated and not in
the presence of the arresting officers, it was held that it could not be considered as having just been
committed. A warrantless arrest is invalid.

In People v. Cubcubin, even if the arrest was effected shortly after the victim was killed, it was held that
there was no "probable cause" where the police officers merely relied on information given to them by
others.
In People v. Gorente, a warrantless arrest is valid where the policemen arrested the accused only some
3 hours after he and his companions had killed the victim, saw the victim dead in the hospital, and an
eye-witness pinpointed the accused, the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death.

In Padilla v. CA, it was held that when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed
firearm and ammunition M-16, petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually
committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the
presence of a peace officer.

In People v. Burgos, it was held that it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a
crime must have been in fact or actually have been committed first; it isn’t enough to suspect a crime
may have been committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

In People v. Sucro, it was held that the police officers have personal knowledge of the actual
commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were
the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their
duties.

In People v. Briones, where the police officers only relied on the information of an eyewitness, it was
held that the police officer effected the arrest indubitably had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed the crime.

In People v. Sequino, where the police officers used as basis for arresting accused was his bio-date sheet
found at the crime scene, it was held that his warrantless arrest was illegal because there was no
personal knowledge. The bio-data sheet could have been obtained by anyone and left at the crime scene
long before or after the crime was committed.

In People v. Nazareno, it was held that it is a valid warrantless arrest when an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it.

In People v. Mahusay, it was held that two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid:
first, the person to be arrested must have just committed an offense, and second, the arresting peace
officer or private person must have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested is the one who committed the offense.

In People v. Alvario, it was held that a warrantless arrest may be made by police officers based on their
personal knowledge culled from the information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to the
suspect as the man who raped her at the time of his arrest.

In Larranaga v. CA, where the petitioner was not arrested on September 15, 1997, as his counsel
persuaded the arresting officers that he would instead be presented in the preliminary investigation to
be conducted in Cebu City on September 17, 1997, it was held that his warrantless arrest was unlawful.
Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In People v. Olivarez, it was held that a mere invitation is covered by the proscription on a warrantless
arrest because it is intended for no other reason than to conduct an investigation.

In Cadua v. CA, where through police dispatch to the scene of a crime report and in the presence of
complainants, it was ascertained that a robbery had just been committed, and the arresting officers had
personal knowledge that petitioner was directly implicated as a suspect. In this case, a warrantless
arrest is lawful.

In People v. Compacion, it was held that an accused is not presumed to have waived the unlawful
search simply because he failed to object—a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent
or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.

In Posadas v. Ombudsman, it was held that where the NBI agents only had the supposed positive
identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, the same is insufficient to justify an arrest without a warrant.