MARTIN comfort, safety and welfare of society.
comfort, safety and welfare of society. It is a power not
CASE NO. 1
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: POLICE POWER
Lozano v. Martinez (presiding judge of RTC) –
Consolidated Case
FACTS: Petitioner was prosecuted and charged for the
violation of B.P. 22 (Bouncing Check Law). She moved to
quash the information on the ground that the act charged
did not constitute an offense, the statute being
unconstitutional. She contended that the statute runs
counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights which states,
"No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of
a poll tax." Nonetheless, the motion was denied by the
respondent trial court hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not B.P. 22 is unconstitutional on the
ground that it inhibits the constitutional safeguard against
imprisonment for non-payment of debts and poll tax.
RULING: No. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP
22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment.
It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. It may be constitutionally impermissible for the
legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of a debt
ex contractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the
lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed
pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are
not the only acts which the law can punish. A mala
prohibitum act may also be punished because of the harm
that it inflicts on the community. The state can do this in the
exercise of its police power. Hence, The enactment of BP 22
is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public
policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is
deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of
penal sanctions.
MAIN POINT: The police power of the state has been
described as "the most essential, insistent and illimitable of
powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
respect to the authority of the DOH to regulate tobacco sales
emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but
inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in
organizing the state and imposing upon the government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and
welfare."
MARTIN
CASE NO. 2
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: POLICE POWER
DOH v. Philip Morris Philippines Manufacturing, Inc.
(PMPMI)
FACTS: Respondent applied for a sales promotion permit
before the BFAD (petitioner), now the FDA. The BFAD have
not acted on the request and when consulted by the
respondent, PMPMI was only verbally informed of the
existence of a Memorandum issued by the DOH purportedly
prohibiting tobacco companies from conducting any
tobacco promotional activities in the country. PMPMI,
nevertheless, filed another application and for the same
reason but was outrightly refused by the BFAD. Eventually,
in a letter, the BFAD denied PMPMI’s Gear Up Promo
application based on the provisions of RA 9211 or the
"Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003." PMPMI then filed an
administrative appeal before the DOH. The DOH denied
PMPMI’s appeal but the CA granted respondent’s petition on
the ground that the DOH does not have the authority to
enforce the provisions of RA 9211. Hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the DOH has the regulatory power
on the use, sale, distribution, and advertisements of tobacco
products, as well as all forms of “promotion” which
essentially includes “sales promotion.”
RULING: No. The Court finds that the RA 9211 impliedly
repealed the relevant provisions of the RA 7394 with
promotions. Hence, if the IAC-Tobacco was created and
expressly given the exclusive authority to implement the
provisions of RA 9211 in accordance with the foregoing
State policy, it signifies that it shall also take charge of the
regulation of the use, sale, distribution, and advertisements
of tobacco products, as well as all forms of “promotion”
which essentially includes “sales promotion.” Therefore,
with this regulatory power conferred upon the IAC-Tobacco
by RA 9211, the DOH and the BFAD have been effectively
and impliedly divested of any authority to act upon
applications for tobacco sales promotional permit, including
PMPMI’s.
MAIN POINT: The State’s police power to regulate the use,
sale and advertisements of tobacco products, in order to
promote a healthful environment and protect the citizens
from the hazards of tobacco smoke, is vested with the IAC-
Tobacco and not the DOH.
Note: BFAD = Bureau of Food and Drugs; FDA = Food and
Drug Administration; IAC-Tobacco = Inter-Agency
Committee-Tobacco
MARTIN
CASE NO. 3
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: POLICE POWER
Kabataan Party-List v. Commission on Elections
FACTS: On February 15, 2013, RA 10367 (An Act Providing
for Mandatory Biometrics Voter Registration) was signed
into law which mandates the COMELEC to implement a
mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters in
order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and
updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric
technology. It likewise provides voters who failed to submit
themselves for validation shall be deactivated for purposes
of May 2016 Elections. Thereafter, the COMELEC passed
resolutions 9721, 9863, and 10013 as IRRs of the
mentioned act. Hence, herein petitioners filed a petition for
1
certiorari and prohibition before the SC to question the hotel over a parcel of land in Malay, Aklan. However, the CASE NO. 5
constitutionality of RA 10367 and the COMELEC resolutions Municipal Zoning Administrator denied petitioner’s ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: POLICE POWER
as non-compliance of these has risen to the level of an application on the ground that the proposed construction Ferrer Jr., v. Bautista
unconstitutional substantive requirement in the exercise of site was within the "no build zone." Despite the lack of the
the right of suffrage under the last paragraph of Section 1,necessary zoning clearance, building permit, and business FACTS: Respondent Quezon City Council enacted the
Article V of the 1987 Constitution. and mayor’s permit, the petitioner continued with the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT = 0.5% of assessed value of
ISSUE: Whether or not the State may impose biometrics construction, expansion, and operation of the resort hotel. land in excess of 100K), or Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-
validation as a prerequisite to the right to vote. Consequently, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued 2011, of Quezon City. Under this ordinance, a special
RULING/ MAIN POINT: Yes. The Court has recognized that and implemented EO 10, for the closure and demolition of assessment from all real property owners will be collected
the right to vote is not a natural right but is a privilege and a
Boracay West Cove’s illegally constructed hotel. Hence, the by the City Treasurer which shall accrue to the Socialized
right created by law. One of the requirements of the right of
petitioner contended that the extrajudicial condemnation Housing Programs of the Quezon City Government. In
suffrage is that a voter must not be disqualified by law andand destruction of that as a nuisance per accidens must be addition, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-20135 was enacted in
the only limitation to this statutory power of the State is determined by the ordinary courts of law and not by a mere which garbage fees on domestic households will be
that “No literacy, property, or other substantive resolution of the Sangguinang Bayan. On the other hand, collected by the City Government of Quezon City. Herein
requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.” respondents claim that the municipal mayor has the express petitioner is a registered co-owner of a residential property
However, registration is only a procedural limitation on thepower under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the in the said city hence he insists that the SHT is a penalty
right to vote and it is not one of the elements that makes the
removal of illegally constructed buildings. imposed on real property owners in favor of informal
citizen a qualified voter. Albeit procedural, the right of aISSUE: Whether or not the respondent mayor has the settlers. He further avers that the collection of garbage fee
citizen to vote nevertheless remains conditioned upon it. authority to demolish the illegally constructed hotel. results to double taxation. The respondent, on the other
This biometrics validation requirement is not a RULING/MAIN POINT: Yes. Generally, LGUs have no power hand, argues that the SHT is pursuant to the social justice
"qualification" to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a
to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a principle and that the collection of garbage fee is in the
mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the thing is a nuisance per se. In this case, despite the hotel’s exercise of police power and not of power of taxation.
State has the right to reasonably regulate. Hence, classification as a nuisance per accidens (because of its ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinances in question are valid
proceeding from the significance of registration as a location), the Court found that the LGU may properly order exercises of police power.
necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of RULING/MAIN POINT: Yes. Police power, which flows
undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, police power and the general welfare clause, property from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the
may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and welfare of the people is the supreme law), is the plenary
voter's registration for the ultimate purpose of burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election. government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
MARTIN legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the the people. Property rights of individuals may be subjected
CASE NO. 4 general welfare. Nonetheless, for failure to secure the to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: POLICE POWER necessary permits, the Local Government Code authorizes the government in the exercise of police power. Additionally,
Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan city and municipal governments, acting through their local the Congress enacted the LGC to delegate to various LGUs the
chief executives, to issue demolition orders for the general three great powers (which includes police power) of the
FACTS: Petitioner is the president and CEO of Boracay West welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants. government. In this jurisdiction, it is well-entrenched that
Cove. The company applied for a building permit with the MARTIN taxation may be made the implement of the state’s
municipal government for the construction of a three-storey police power. On the SHT, the tax is not a pure exercise

2
of taxing power or merely to raise revenue; it is levied
with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the
exercise of the police power for the general welfare of the
entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest.
Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to
the underprivileged and homeless constituents but
advantageous to the real property owners as well. Though
broad and far-reaching, police power is subordinate to
constitutional limitations and is subject to the
requirement that its exercise must be reasonable and
for the public good. The police power granted to local
government units must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process
and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be
exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. As with
the State, LGUs may be considered as having properly
exercised their police power only if there is a lawful subject
and a lawful method or, to be precise, if the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. On the
Garbage Fee, it has been held that the authority of a
municipality to regulate garbage falls within its police
power to protect public health, safety, and welfare. A
municipality has an affirmative duty to supervise and
control the collection of garbage within its corporate
limits. The LGC specifically assigns the responsibility of
regulation and oversight of solid waste to local
governing bodies because the Legislature determined that
such bodies were in the best position to develop efficient
waste management programs. Certainly, as opposed to
petitioner’s opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax. Hence, not
being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee violates the
rule on double taxation must necessarily fail.
Note: Guys hinabaan ko ito kasi para may flow to the point na such a thing may not be abated via an ordinance and
pati power to tax mejo sinama ko na. D tlga siya mag make extrajudicially.
sense pag dineretso lang sa main point(police power). Peace! CA reversed and set aside the decision of the Omb and ruled
Sheena
Case No. 6
Art III Section 1. Police Power
Cruz and De la Cruz v. Pandacan Hikers’ Club, Inc.
Facts:
Petitioner Chairperson Natividad Cruz of Barangay 848,
Zone 92, Manila uttered abusive language to the persons
playing basketball within the vicinity of her barangay. She
then ordered Barangay Tanod Benjamin dela Cruz to
destroy the basketball ring by cutting it up with a hacksaw
to which he promptly complied with.
Respondent Pandacan Hiker’s Club, as the group that claims
to be the basketball court's owners, filed a complaint for
Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority before the
Prosecutor's Office and the Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioners maintain that they acted merely with the
intention to regain free passage of people and vehicles over
the street and restore the peace, health and sanitation of
those affected by the basketball court. Cruz asserts that she
merely abated a public nuisance which she claimed was
within her power as barangay chief executive to maintain
peace and order. And that it was a response to the ongoing
clamor of residents to stop the basketball games.
The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint and found that
petitioners are performing their sworn duty, as defined in
the LGC.
Respondents filed a petition for review before the CA to
nullify the Omb's decision and claimed that any actions in
furtherance of the community's welfare must be approved
by ordinance and that unless a thing is a nuisance per se,
that petitioners performed an abatement without following
the proper legal procedure, thus making them liable.
Petitioners filed an MR. CA denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
W/N the barangay chief executive properly exercised police
power by summarily abating public nuisance.
Ruling:
NO. No barangay nor city ordinance was violated; neither
was there one which specifically declared the said
basketball ring as a nuisance per se that may be summarily
abated.
Petitioners were required to justify their abatement via
such an ordinance because the power they claim to have
exercised - the police power under the general welfare
clause - is a power exercised by the government mainly
through its legislative, and not the executive, branch. The
prevailing jurisprudence is that local government units
such as the provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays exercise police power through their
respective legislative bodies (the sanggunians). Sec 16 of
the LGC.
The complete destruction of the basketball ring by the
petitioners is justified neither by law or ordinance nor even
by equity or necessity, which makes the act illegal and
petitioners liable. And even as an action to maintain public
order, it was done excessively and was unjustified. Where a
less damaging action, such as the mere padlocking, removal
or confiscation of the ring would have sufficed, petitioners
resorted to the drastic measure without due process.
Main Point:
3
Jurisprudence defines police power as the plenary power
vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety and general welfare of the people. (the welfare of the
people is the supreme law) Police power is vested primarily
with the national legislature, which may delegate the same
to local governments through the enactment of ordinances
through their legislative bodies (the sanggunians).
Note: (the abusive words uttered)
Abusive words uttered - Bakit nakabukas ang (basketball)
court? Wala kayong karapatang maglaro sa court na 'to,
barangay namin ito! xxx xxx xxx Wala kayong magagawa.
Ako ang chairman dito. Mga walanghiya kayo, patay gutom!
Hindi ako natatakot! Kaya kong panagutan lahat!
Pandacan Hiker’s Club - is a non-stock, non-profit civic
organization engaged in "health, infrastructure, sports and
other so-called poverty alleviation activities" in the Pandacan
area of Manila
Sheena
Case No. 7
Art III Section 1. Police Power
Manila Electric Company v. Sps. Ramos
Facts:
Petitioner MERALCO assails the ruling of the lower court
when it held that the disconnection it conducted was
deemed illegal due to the fact that it was done with the
abuse of their police power. It was done without notice and
the knowledge of the respondent as they were not at home
and their house was closed at the time, thus violating their
right to due process as provided by the law.
MERALCO asserts that due process was observed when;
“there was an inspection conducted in the premises of
respondent with the consent of their authorized
representative; it was discovered during the said inspection
that private respondents were using outside connection; the
nature of the violation was explained to private respondents' Main point in bold.
representative; the inspection and discovery was personally
witnessed and attested to by private respondents' Sheena
representative;” Case No. 8
Respondents claim that MERALCO's failure to observe the Art III Section 1. Police Power
requirements under R.A. 7832 entitled them to damages Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters
which were rightfully awarded by the RTC and affirmed by Association, Inc.
the CA.
Facts:
Issue: Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance
W/N the disconnection without due notice is considered an No. 0309-07, to impose a ban against aerial spraying as an
abuse of police power. agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao
City
Ruling: Respondent PBGEA and two of its members filed their
YES. The distribution of electricity is a basic necessity that is petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the
imbued with public interest. Its provider is considered as a ordinance, alleging that the ordinance exemplified the
public utility subject to the strict regulation by the State in unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal
the exercise of its police power. Failure to comply with protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property
these regulations gives rise to the presumption of bad without due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant
faith or abuse of right. to Section 511[6] of RA 7160
The State also recognizes that electricity is the property of CA did not see any established relation between the
the service provider. R.A. 7832 was enacted by Congress to purpose of protecting the public and the environment
afford electric service providers multiple remedies to against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand,
protect themselves from electricity pilferage. These and the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of all
remedies include the immediate disconnection of the forms of substances, on the other.
electric service of an erring customer, criminal Issues:
prosecution, and the imposition of surcharges. W/N Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due
However, the service provider must avail of any or all of process and equal protection grounds for being
these remedies within legal bounds, in strict unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of
compliance with the requirements and/or conditions police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an
set forth by law. R.A. 7832 affords a private electric agricultural practice; (b) in decreeing a 3-month transition-
utility the right and authority to immediately period to shift to other modes of pesticide application; and
disconnect the electric service of a consumer who has (c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer
been caught in flagrante delicto doing any of the acts zone all agricultural lands in Davao City.
covered by Section 4(a). However, the law clearly states Ruling:
that the disconnection may only be done after serving a
written notice or warning to the consumer.
4
YES. Prohibition against aerial spraying is an unlawfully
permissible method that the city government can adopt to
prevent the effects of the so-called aerial drift":
1. The ordinance violates the due process clause - Davao
City "must not act arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically
regardless of the ordinance's salutary purpose." 3 months
would be inadequate time for the city to shift from aerial to
truck-mounted boom spraying, effectively depriving the city
an efficient means to combat disease.
But High Courts disagreed with PBGEA that the buffer zone
required by the ordinance is in violation of due process
since the purpose is to minimize the effects of aerial
spraying.
2. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause - The
SC said equal protection was violated since the ordinance
made no substantial distinctions when it prohibited aerial
spraying per se regardless of the substance or the level of
concentration of the chemicals to be applied, and when it
imposed the 30-meter buffer zone in all agricultural lands in
Davao City regardless of the size of landholdings.
To be considered as a valid police power measure, an
ordinance must pass a two-pronged test: the formal
(i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the
corporate powers of the local government unit, and
whether it is passed in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law); and the substantive (i.e., involving
inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance
with the limitations under the Constitution and the
statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness
and reason, and its consistency with public policy).
Main point in bold.
Sheena
Case No. 9
Art III Section 1. Police Power
Drugstores Association of the Philippines v. National
Council on Disability Affairs
Facts:
In 1992, RA 7277, the "Magna Carta for Disabled Persons," Issues:
was passed into law. The law defines "disabled persons", W/N the CA erred in ruling the PWD discount as a valid
"impairment" and "disability." In 2007, RA 9442 ("Magna exercise of police power instead of an invalid exercise of the
Carta for Persons with Disability") was enacted amending power of eminent domain (because it fails to provide just
RA 7277. Specifically, Sec. 32 of RA 9442 granted the PWDs compensation to petitioners)
a 20% discount on the purchase of medicine (upon
submission as proof of his/her entitlement thereto: ID Ruling:
issued by mayor or brgy. captain, passport, or NO. Sec. 4 of RA 9257 which grants 20% discount on the
transportation discount fare ID from the National Council purchase of medicine of senior citizens is a legitimate
for the Welfare of Disabled persons) and a tax deduction exercise of police power. Police power is the power of the
scheme was adopted wherein covered establishments may state to promote public welfare by restraining and
deduct the discount granted from gross income based on regulating the use of liberty and property. On the other
the net cost of goods sold or services rendered. The IRR of hand, the power of eminent domain is the inherent right of
RA 9442 (Sec. 6 Rule IV pertains to Other Privileges and the state (and of those entities to which the power has been
Incentives, including the purchase of medicine) was jointly lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public
promulgated by several government agencies. use upon payment of just compensation. In the exercise of
police power, property rights of private individuals are
Respondent NCDA issued AO No. 1, Series of 2008, subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure
prescribing guidelines which should serve as a mechanism the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.
for the issuance of a PWD Identification Card (IDC) which A legislative act based on the police power requires the
shall be the basis for providing privileges and discounts to concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method: (a)
bonafide PWDs. In 2008, the DOF issued Revenue the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
Regulations No. 1- 2009 prescribing rules and regulations to from those of a particular class, should justify the
implement R.A. 9442 relative to the tax privileges of PWDs interference of the state; and (b) that means employed
and tax incentives for establishments granting the discount. are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
In 2009, the DOH issued A.O. No. 2009-0011 specifically purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
stating that the grant of 20% discount shall be provided in
the purchase of branded medicines and unbranded generic As in the case of senior citizens, the discount privilege to
medicines from all establishments dispensing medicines for which the PWDs are entitled is actually a benefit enjoyed by
the exclusive use of the PWDs. the general public to which these citizens belong. The
means employed in invoking the active participation of the
Petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition with application private sector, in order to achieve the purpose or objective
for a TRO/WPI before the CA to annul and enjoin the of the law, is reasonably and directly related. Also, the
implementation of the 5 laws abovementioned. means employed to provide a fair, just and quality health
CA rendered a Decision upholding the constitutionality of care to PWDs are reasonably related to its accomplishment,
RA 7277 as amended, as well as the assailed administrative and are not oppressive, considering that as a form of
issuances. reimbursement, the discount extended to PWDs in the
5
purchase of medicine can be claimed by the establishments the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the
as allowable tax deductions. Ruling: case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the
YES. To be considered reasonable, the government's opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and
Main point in bold. exercise of police power must satisfy the "valid object cause the demolition of its perimeter walls.
and valid means" method of analysis: first, the interest Issue: W/N MMDA possess police power
Sheena of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a Ruling: No. Not being a political subdivision but merely an
Case No. 10 particular class, requires interference; and second, the executive authority it has no police power. Police Powers In
Art III Section 1. Police Power means employed are reasonably necessary to attain the Metro Manila is exercised by cities and Municipalities.
Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, objective sought and not unduly oppressive upon Main Point: Police power is lodged primarily in the
Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc individuals. National Legislature which may delegate the power to the
(GAMCA) President and administrative boards as well as the
These two elements of reasonableness are undeniably lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local
FACTS: present in RA 10022. The prohibition against the government units.
DOH issued AO No. 5-01 which directed the decking and referral decking system is consistent with the State's
equal distribution of migrant workers among several clinics exercise of the police power to prescribe regulations to LJ
who are members of GAMCA. In 2002, an AO was issued promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the Case No. 12
holding in abeyance the implementation of referral decking people. Public interest demands State interference on Section1, Article III
system and in 2004, DOH withdrew, repealed, and revoked health matters, since the welfare of migrant workers is 5. Primacy of Human Rights
said AO reasoning that said decking system did not a legitimate public concern. Republic v. Sandiganbayan
guarantee the migrant workers’ right to safe and quality
health service. Main point in bold. Facts: After the EDSA Revolution Pres. Cory Aquino created
In 2008, DOH Secretary Duque expressed his concern about LJ the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President
the continued implementation of the referral decking Case No. 11 Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
system despite the DOH’s prior suspension directives. In Section1, Article III; Seat of Police Power close associates. The AFP Board investigated various
2010, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8042 MMDA v Bel-Air Village Association reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major
as amended by RA 10022 took effect. General Josephus Q. Ramas. Aside from the military
DOH directed GAMCA to cease and desist from equipment/items and communications equipment, the
implementing the referral decking system and to wrap up Facts: Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent, raiding team was also able to confiscate in the house of
their operations within 3 days from receipt thereof received a letter of request from MMDA (petitioner) to open Elizabeth Dimaano the mistress of the respondent. Dimaano
pursuant to the RA. Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. had no visible means of income and is supported by
GAMCA and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition for The said opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.
a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary convenient movement of persons and to regulate the flow of Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring
restraining order on the ground of grave abuse of traffic in Makati City. the properties confiscated from Dimaano’s house as illegally
discretion. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. Petitioner
restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the claims that the government may confiscate the monies and
Issue: opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence
W/N the prohibition against the referral decking system the perimeter wall. The court denied the issuance of the of a against her since at that time of their seizure, private
under Sec. 16 RA 10022 is a valid exercise of police power. preliminary injunction which the respondent questioned. respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.

6
Issue: W/N the revolutionary government was bound by during the Marcos Regime was filed against the Marcos It is essential that there should be an opportunity to
the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the estate in Hawaii. The US district courts sided in favor of the challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this
interregnum ,that is, after the actual and effective takeover
plaintiff and awarding them $1,964,005,859.90 worth of jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.
of power by the revolutionary government following the damages. Present petitioners filed a complaint in Makati
cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 MarchRTC for the enforcement of final judgement contending that LJ
1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional the decision of the US District Court had become final and Case No. 14
Constitution) executory, and hence should be recognized and enforced in Section1, Article III
Ruling: No. We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973
the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules 6. Hierarchy of Rights: Life, Liberty, Property
Constitution was not operative during the interregnum 1. of Court then in force. The Macros estate filed a motion to Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
However, we rule that the protection accorded to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the (PBMEO) v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc
individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration correct filing fees paying only ₱410 compare to the RTC’s
remained in effect during the interregnum. During the estimation of ₱472 million. Makati RTC dismissed the case. Facts: When the management of Philippine Blooming Mills
interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary
Petitioners invoke “Free access to the courts and quasi- Co. Inc knew that their employees wanted to conduct a mass
government were the supreme law because no constitution judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be demonstration, for the alleged abuses of the Pasig police,
limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders.
denied to any person by reason of poverty,” a mandate the management decided to conduct a meeting. The 1 st
With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the which is essentially defeated by the required exorbitant meeting was to clarify that the meeting was not against the
successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher filing fee. company and that the company asked them to cancel the
than the directives and orders of the revolutionary Issue: W/N the foreign judgment rendered by the US court strike since it would interrupt its business operations. The
government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could may be challenged herein the Philippine court company also gave them a treat if they participate they
not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights Ruling: Yes. There is an evident distinction between a might lose their jobs.
because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights
foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. A second meeting was conducted wherein the company
during the interregnum. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be
Main Point: after the actual and effective take-over of conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in allowed to participate however those from the 1st and
power by the revolutionary government up to 24 March personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate,
1986 —a person could not invoke any exclusionary right conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to
under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a successors in interest by a subsequent title. However, in cancel the plan, the rally took place and the officers of the
constitution nor a Bill of Rights then. both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No
LJ impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of Strike and No Lockout’ clause of their Collective Bargaining
Case No. 13 jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear Agreement (CBA).
Section1, Article III mistake of law or fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by the Issue: W/N the participation of some employees in the
5. Primacy of Human Rights foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the mass demonstration a violation of the their CBA
Mijares v. Ranada enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is Ruling: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property
(sorry po super layo ni case sa topic na assign pero yanessential that there should be an opportunity to challenge rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
lang pos sacease ang based sa rights) the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and
jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society"
Facts: A complaint of 10 Filipinos representing 10,000 Main Point: There is an evident distinction between a and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost
alleged victims who suffered from human right violations foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam; as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they
1
a period when normal government is suspended, especially between successive reigns or regimes

7
"need breathing space to survive," permitting government
regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and
property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished
by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless
attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be
an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of
majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs
—political, economic or otherwise.
Main Point: Human rights supreme to property rights.
LJ
Case No. 15
Section1, Article III
6. Hierarchy of Rights: Life, Liberty, Property
Salonga v. Pano
Facts: Sen. Jovito Salonga along with 39 others was charged
for violation of the Revised Anti- Subversion Act due to the
series of bombings that had occurred in Metro Manila. This
was due to the statement of Mr. Lovely who named him as
the mastermind of the attacks because of the following
reasons (1)the petitioner’s as a contact point and that (2)
his remarks against the political struggle in the PH during
the party of Raul Daza in Los Angeles. The petitioner was
imprison but was under hospital arrest however it took
months before the charges against him was finally revealed.
Issue: W/N Salonga’s remarks alleged remarks protected by
the freedom of speech
Ruling: Yes. We have adopted the concept that freedom of
expression is a “preferred” right and, therefore, stands on a
higher level than substantive economic or other liberties.
The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of
expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional
system. This must be so because the lessons of history, both ISSUE: Whether or not the “right” to join associations
political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor
speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other organization, thus RA 3350, is not unconstitutional.
form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for
political discussions. Political discussion is essential to the
ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of RULING: Yes. The power, whereby an employee may, as he
criminal indictments.
Main Point: Freedom of expression enjoys primacy over
any other rights or freedoms
GOMEZ
CASE NO. 16
ART 3 SEC1: Hierarchy of Rights: Life, Liberty, and
Property
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
G.R. No. L-25246, September 12,1974
FACTS: Herein petitioner, Benjamin Victoriano, is a member
of a religious group named “Iglesia ni Cristo”, a religious
sect which prohibits its members to join any labor
organization, and has been employed in Elizalde Rope
Factory, Inc. Incidental to his employment, he was also
made member of the Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, through
a collective bargaining agreement. A law was passed which
prohibits union agreements from retaining members that
are members of a religious sects that prohibits being part of
any labor organization. With the promulgation of said law,
RA 3350, Victoriano resigned from the union. However, the
union sent a letter to the company’s management of the
petitioner’s violation of the bargaining agreement, where
later on challenged the petitioner with a dismissal if he does
not come in to terms with the union. In the CFI, the Union
raised the collective bargaining agreement and assailed the
constitutionality of the RA 3350, to which the same court
decided in favor of the respondent. Thus, this petition for
the reversal of the decision of the lower court.
pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is,
therefore, the employee who should decide for himself
whether he should join or not an association; and should he
choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which
association he would join; and even after he has joined, he
still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his
membership with said organization at any time. It is clear,
therefore, that the right to join a union includes the
right to abstain from joining any union.
GOMEZ
CASE NO. 17
ART 3 SEC1: Hierarchy of Rights: Life, Liberty, and
Property
Social Justice Society, et. al. v. Atienza, Jr.
G.R. No. L-25246, September 12,1974
FACTS: The petitioners herein complained before the
Mayor of Manila, Atienza Jr., to enforce the law as accorded
in the Local Government Code. The law in question was
Ordinance No. 8027, made by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod, that reclassified the Pandacan area in Manila
from industrial to commercial. From its reclassification, the
petitioners argued that the oil companies operating thereto
should be stopped and closed because of the ordinance.
Thus this petition before the court for the enforcement of
such law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ON 8027 is a valid exercise of
police power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
RULING: Yes. Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its
police power.
8
 In the exercise of police power, property rights of MAIN POINT: Observance of both substantive and case the demolition), there must be a special order, hearing
individuals may be subject restraints and burdens in order procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due process, and reasonable notice to remove.
to fulfill the objective of the government. Otherwise stated, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution
the government may enact legislation that may interfere itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations to promote the general welfare. GOMEZ
GOMEZ CASE NO. 20
GOMEZ CASE NO. 19 ART 3 SEC1: DUE PROCESS IN GENERAL
CASE NO. 18 ART 3 SEC1: DUE PROCESS IN GENERAL Phil. Amusement Gaming Corp (PAGCOR) v. De Guzman
ART 3 SEC1: DUE PROCESS IN GENERAL Asilo v. People
Tupas v. CA FACTS: Respondent, De Guzman, an employee of PAGCOR is
FACTS: Private respondents executed a contract with the required to accomplish a Personal History Statement (PHS),
FACTS: A decision was promulgated by the RTC in relation Municipality of Nagcarlan to lease lot and a store in 1978, herein she states that she has no relatives working in the
to the case of the petitioner on April 3, 1989 and an appeal that would end in 1998. Then in 1993, the accused Mayor same company. However, Atty. Sordan of the Corporate
was made on May 9, 1988. Which is more than the 15-day Comendador and Asilo, are now civilly and criminally investigation unit found out that De Guzman’s nephew is
reglementary period in perfecting an appeal, to which due charged by the private respondents for the demolition working in PAGC. In view that the respondent falsely
to the tardiness of the appeal, the CA dismissed such. Now, order, without obtaining a special order from the court, on declared that she has no relatives working in PAGC, Bailey,
the petitioner argues that he should not be made liable of the lot and store leased by the private respondents. The the OIC of PAGCOR’s Human resource and development,
the mistake of his counsel for failure to comply with the case was heard before the Sandiganbayan where the same found her administratively liable thus resulted to her
reglementary period of producing the appeal. ruled against the accused for violation of RA 3019 or the dismissal, done by the issuance of a memorandum. De
Anti-graft and corrupt practices act. A petition for certiorari Guzman then brought the case to the CSC where it ruled in
ISSUE: Whether or not the reglementary period on before the supreme court was then filed by the counsels of favor of her. An appeal was made before the CA by PAGCOR
perfecting an appeal is against the due process clause the accused on the ground that there can be no liability where it ruled in favor of the respondent stating that due
embedded in the constitution. when a public officer commits in good faith an error of process was not availed by the respondent because it was
judgment. not PAGCOR who issued the memorandum but it was issued
RULING: No. Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the by its employees without authorization. Thus this petition
orderly administration of justice and the protection of ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants or accused herein by PAGCOR before the SC.
substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. followed due process in ordering the demolition on the lot
It is a mistake to suppose that substantive law and adjective and store leased by the private petitioners. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct in ruling that
law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been respondent was deprive of due process because the
suggested, that enforcement of procedural rules should RULING: No. If demolition is necessary, there must be a memorandum issued ordering her dismissal was made by
never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the hearing on the motion filed and with due notices to the PAGCOR’s employees and without authorization.
substantive rights of the litigants. This is not exactly true; parties for the issuance of a special order of
the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the demolition(from the court). In this case, the accused failed RULING: Yes. Since PAGCOR was the one who appointed De
policy of the courts is to give effect to both kinds of law, as to follow such. Guzman to her position then the power to discipline or
complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution remove her is vested in PAGCOR. Accordingly, it should be
of the dispute between the parties. MAIN POINT: As provided by Section 10(d), Rule 39 of the done through its Board of Directors. However, in the case at
rules of court “Before a removal must take place (in this

9
bar, it was Atty. Sordan and OIC HR Bailey who produced RULING: No. The Court held that the minimum standards of petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza, incumbent Solicitor General,
the said memorandum. due process under Guzman v. National University has been for the said petition. Upon acceptance of the nomination,
applied in this case. These standards are that (1) the Jardeleza was included as a candidate and subsequently
MAIN POINT: Section 16 of the Uniform Rules on students must be informed in writing of the nature and interviewed by the JBC. Weeks later, however, Jardeleza
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS) requires cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the received phone calls from Justice Lagman (former CA Assoc.
in administrative disciplinary proceedings that the right to answer the charges against them; (3) they shall be Justice and incumbent JBC member) informing him that
disciplinary authority (PAGCOR in this case) furnish the informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have then CJ Sereno manifested that she would be invoking Sec.
employee concerned a formal charge specifying the latter’s the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him. He was the directed to
acts and/or omissions complained of, and directing him to evidence must be duly considered by the investigating make himself available before the JBC on a certain date
answer the charges stated therein. committee or official designated by the school authorities to during which he would be informed of the objections to his
hear and decide the case. The Court has been consistent in integrity. Petitioner, however, alleged that integrity
AIRA reminding that due process in disciplinary cases involving accusations were made against him without informing him
Case No. 21 students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to of the nature and cause thereof and without affording him
ART. III, SEC. 1, DUE PROCESS: IN GENERAL those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of an opportunity to be heard. JBC countered by insisting that
Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military justice; that the proceedings may be summary; and that the it is not obliged to afford Jardeleza the right to a hearing in
Academy required proof in a student disciplinary action is only the fulfilment of its duty to recommend.
substantial evidence. What is crucial is that official action
FACTS: Cadet 1CL Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of Siklab must meet minimum standards of fairness to the individual, ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available
Diwa Class of 2014 of the PMA and was supposed to which generally encompass the right of adequate notice and in the course of JBC proceedings in cases where an objection
graduate with honors. One of his professors, however, a meaningful opportunity to be heard. or opposition to an application is raised.
issued a delinquency report against him because he was late
for 2 minutes, together with other cadets who were 5 MAIN POINT: A cadet facing dismissal from the military RULING: Yes. While the facets of criminal and
minutes late. He reasoned for a couple of times that the academy for misconduct has constitutionally protected administrative due process are not strictly applicable to JBC
circumstances of his previous class was beyond his control private interests; hence, disciplinary proceedings conducted proceedings, their peculiarity is insufficient to justify the
which caused him to be late and that others could vouch for within the bounds of procedural due process is a must. conclusion that due process is not demandable. The
this. He was later reported to the Honor Committee (HC) for Supreme Court subscribes to the view that in cases
violation of the Honor Code for lying based on the where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is
conversation that the military official had with the professor raised, the observance of due process neither negates
of the previous class who alleged that she did not dismiss AIRA nor renders illusory the fulfilment of the duty of the JBC
the class late. Cudia made a written appeal but the same was Case No. 22 to recommend.
dismissed by the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB). ART. III, SEC. 1, DUE PROCESS: IN GENERAL
Jardeleza v. Sereno MAIN POINT IN BOLD
ISSUE: Whether or not the PMA, the HC, and the CRAB
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Cadet FACTS: Before the retirement of Associate Justice Roberto AIRA
1CL Cudia from the Academy in utter disregard of his right Abad, the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announced the Case No. 23
to due process. opening for application or recommendation for the said ART. III, SEC. 1, DUE PROCESS: IN GENERAL
vacated position. The JBC then received a letter from the Ray Shu v. Dee, et. al.
Dean of the University of the Philippines nominating

10
FACTS: Petitioner, as President of 3A Apparel Corporation, MAIN POINT: Sufficient compliance with the requirements
filed a complaint before the National Bureau of of due process exists when a party is given a chance to be AIRA
Investigation (NBI) charging the respondents of falsification heard through his motion for reconsideration. Case No. 25
of two deeds of real estate mortgage submitted to ART. III, SEC. 1, DUE PROCESS: IN GENERAL
Metrobank. Based on these deeds, Metrobank foreclosed the AIRA Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council
two properties securing the 3A Apparel Corporation’s loan. Case No. 24
After the investigation, NBI filed a complaint with the City ART. III, SEC. 1, DUE PROCESS: IN GENERAL FACTS: Petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as
Prosecutor of Makati City charging the respondents of the Disini v. Secretary of Justice the Presiding Judge of a Municipal Trial Court of Compostela
crime of forgery and falsification of public documents. Valley, which is a first-level court. On September 27, 2013,
Respondents argued that they were denied of their right to FACTS: This case concerns certain provisions of RA 10125 he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in
due process during the NBI investigation because the or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012. Sec. 6 of the said certain Regional Trial Courts. The Judicial and Bar Council
agency never required them and Metrobank to submit the Act was questioned for imposing penalties that are one (JBC)’s Office of Recruitment, however, informed the
standard sample signatures of the petitioners for degree higher when the crimes defined in the RPC and petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates
comparison. Respondents further alleged that the Secretary certain special laws are committed with the use of for the said stations due to the JBC’s long-standing policy of
of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to information and communication technologies (ICT), opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the resolution which including the fact that the prescriptive periods for the incumbent judges who have served in their current position
ruled in favor of the petitioners and of denying the equivalent cybercrimes have become longer. Some of the for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a
respondents’ motion for reconsideration. petitioners insist that Sec. 6 is invalid since it produces an judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the
unusual chilling effect on users of cyberspace that would list. Petitioner argued that JBC’s five-year requirement
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents were denied their hinder free expression. violates the due process clause of the Constitution for lack
right to due process. of publication and non-submission to the UP Law Center
ISSUE: Whether or not prescription is a matter of procedure Office of the National Administrative Registrar (ONAR). JBC
RULING: No. They were not denied of their right to due over which the Court has something to say. averred that there is no violation of due process as the
process when they were not informed by the Secretary of policy is merely internal in nature.
Justice of the pendency of the petitioner’s appeal. The RULING: No. Prescription is substantive law since it
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be assumes the existence of an authority to punish a ISSUE: Whether or not there should have been publication
heard. What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous wrong, which authority the Constitution vests in by the JBC of the five-year rule to qualify for Judge of
notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be Congress alone. Thus, there is no question that Congress second-level courts.
heard. Since the respondents filed with the Sec. of Justice a may provide a variety of periods for the prescription of
motion for reconsideration, any initial defect in due process, offenses as it sees fit. What it cannot do is pass a law that RULING: Yes. The assailed policy involves a qualification
if any, was cured by the remedy the respondents availed of. extends the periods of prescription to impact crimes standard by which the JBC shall determine proven
committed before its passage. competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation,
On the respondents’ allegation that they were denied due because if it were, it would regulate and affect only the
process during the NBI investigation, the Court ruled that MAIN POINT IN BOLD members of the JBC and their staff. However, the petitioner
the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory; thus, no has no legal right to be included in the list of nominees for
denial of the respondents’ due process right could have **Note: Read the full text and super walang connect to due judicial vacancies since the possession of the constitutional
taken place. process aside from the question on prescription being a and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary
matter of procedure. may not be used to legally demand that one’s name be

11
included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One’s becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. to be heard before judgment was rendered, the
inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the The use of the term "private health care institution" in demands of due process were sufficiently met. At the
JBC. Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service hearing stage, while Magcamit was never afforded a
provider," should not be a cause of confusion since they are formal investigation, the Court has consistently ruled
MAIN POINT: As a general rule, publication is indispensable used synonymously. The terms "service" and "methods" are that there is no violation of procedural due process
in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that broad enough to include the providing of information and even if no formal or trial-type hearing was conducted,
are intended to to enforce or implement existing laws, the rendering of medical “procedures”. Further, from their where the party was given a chance to explain his side
attain binding force and effect. plain meaning, “incorrect information”, when used together of the controversy. Before the IAS-PDEA, Magcamit had the
AREEJ in relation to Section 23(a)(l), connote a sense of malice and opportunity to deny and controvert the complaint against
CASE NO. 26 ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the him when he filed his reply to the letter-complaint and his
ART III SEC 1. DUE PROCESS: IN GENERAL nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive answer to the formal charge. He even elevated the case to
Imbong v. Ochoa health. Hence, RH Law does not suffer from vagueness and CSC. He was also duly represented by his counsel. Thus, he
FACTS: Congress enacted RA No. 10354 or the RH Law. The does not violate the due process clause. cannot claim that he was deprived of his right to a formal
petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness hearing because the IAS-PDEA failed to inform him of such
and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution. AREEJ right.
Allegedly, Section 23 (a)(l) thereof mentions a "private CASE NO. 27
health care service provider" among those who may be held ART III Sec 1. DUE PROCESS: IN GENERAL AREEJ
punishable but does not define who is a "private health care Magcamit v. Internal Affairs Service-Philippine Drug CASE NO. 28
service provider." They argue that confusion further results Enforcement Agency (IAS-PDEA) ART III SEC 1. DUE PROCESS: IN GENERAL
since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health FACTS: Magcamit and other PDEA agents were charged Agustin-Se v. Office of the President
care institution." It also unclear if hospitals operated by with Grave Misconduct for demanding and obtaining
religious groups are likewise exempt from giving P200,000.00 from a certain Luciana Jaen in exchange for her FACTS: Petitioners are Assistant Special Prosecutors III of
“reproductive health information” under Section 23(a)(l), or release after she was apprehended in a buy-bust operation the OMB assigned to prosecute cases against Lt. Gen. Acot,
from rendering “reproductive health procedures” under in Lipa City. Petitioners were found liable and were Dulinayan, and several others before the Sandiganbayan, for
Section 23(a)(2). Finally, it is averred that the RH Law subsequently dismissed. In the instant petition, Magcamit alleged ghost deliveries of supplies to the Philippine Air
punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of claims that his right to due process was denied because Force. They later found that there were procedural lapses in
“incorrect information”, but does not define "incorrect gross irregularities attended the administrative the handling of the cases, which they attributed to Casimiro
information." investigation conducted by the IAS-PDEA. He contends that (Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law
ISSUE: Whether or not the RH Law violates the due process he was deprived of his right to seek a formal investigation Enforcement Officers). Hence, they filed a complaint before
clause. because the IAS-PDEA deliberately failed to inform him of the Office of the President, alleging that Casimiro committed
RULING: NO. A statute or act suffers from the defect of this right. administrative infractions. OP dismissed the complaint,
vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that ISSUE: Whether or not Magcamit’s right to due process was which was upheld by the CA, as the delay, if any, was due to
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its denied. the layers of preliminary investigation under different
meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant RULING & MAIN POINT (in bold): NO. Due process in leaderships and is not attributable to Casimiro. Petitioners
to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due administrative cases, in essence, is simply an now allege that their right to due process was violated when
process for failure to accord persons fair notice of the opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek a the OP did not consider the evidence they have presented.
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers reconsideration of the action or ruling. For as long as
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and the parties were given fair and reasonable opportunity

12
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ right to due process was 8 SR (first), but no copy of the Feb 21 SR (second) was
violated. RULING & MAIN POINT: NO. A perusal of the ESA will show attached. AIMS complied through its President and
that it is contrary to the Constitution and the labor laws of answered that AIMS was not liable for recruitment
RULING: NO. The essence of due process is an the Philippines, and hence will not apply. misrepresentation, invoking the Nov 8 SR (first). A hearing
opportunity to be heard – as applied to administrative was later conducted where AIMS representative Lugatiman
proceedings, it is an opportunity to explain one’s side or 1. The ESA does not require any ground for the appeared. POEA ruled, on the basis of the Feb 21 SR
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action early termination of employment. Necessarily, the (second), that AIMS was liable for misrepresentation.
or ruling complained of. In this case, petitioners were employer can dismiss any employee for any ground Hence, in the instant petition, AIMS alleged that its right to
given both opportunities – the opportunity to explain their it so desired. due process was violated because the POEA did not furnish
side by filing their pleadings which contained all their it with a copy of the Feb 21 SR (second), which was the
allegations and evidence in support of their arguments, and 2. The ESA allows the employer to dispense with basis of the POEA Administrator's factual findings.
the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the ruling the prior notice of termination to an employee. ISSUE: Whether or not AIMS’ right to due process was
complained of, as shown by their motions for The employee under the ESA could be immediately violated.
reconsideration and appeals. As long as parties are dismissed without giving him the opportunity to RULING & MAIN POINT: YES. The essence of due process
afforded these opportunities, the requirement of due explain and defend himself. is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
process in administrative proceedings is sufficiently administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain
met. Not only do these provisions collide with the right to one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
security of tenure, but they also deprive the employee of of the action or ruling complained of. Due process is
AREEJ his constitutional right to due process by denying him satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against
CASE NO. 29 of any notice of termination and the opportunity to be him and given an opportunity to explain or defend
ART III SEC 1. DUE PROCESS: IN GENERAL heard. Thus, the Court concurs with the CA that the ESA himself. Since AIMS was provided with only the Nov 8 SR
Industrial Personnel and Management Services is not applicable in this case as it is against our (first), it could only have been expected to respond to the
(IPAMS), Inc. v. Jose G. de Vera and Alberto B. Arriola fundamental and statutory laws. charge contained in the Show Cause Order pursuant to the
FACTS: Arriola, a licensed general surgeon in the Nov 8 SR (first). Considering that AIMS was not furnished
Philippines, was hired by SNC Lavalin Engineers & AREEJ with the Feb 21 SR (second), which contains the factual
Contractors, INC., through its local manning agency, herein CASE NO. 30 allegations of misrepresentation supposedly committed by
petitioner IPAMS, to work as a Safety Officer in Madagascar. ART III SEC 1. DUE PROCESS: IN GENERAL AIMS and which was the basis of the POEA Administrator's
However, after 3 months, he was pre-terminated. Aggrieved, Asian Int’l Manpower Services (AIMS), Inc. v. DOLE factual findings, it cannot be expected to second-guess what
Arriola filed a complaint against the petitioners for illegal charges and issues it needed to clarify or rebut in order to
dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, vacation leave FACTS: On Nov. 8, 2006 (first surveillance), POEA clear itself. Needless to say, its right to due process
and sick leave pay before the Labor Arbiter (LA). Petitioners conducted a surveillance of AIMS to determine if it was consisting of being informed of the charges against it has
argued that the pre-termination was valid, for being operating as a recruitment agency despite the cancellation been grossly violated.
consistent with the Expatriate Policy and Employment of its office. However, this surveillance was fruitless. Hence,
Standards Act (ESA) of Ontario, which did not require any another one was recommended on Feb. 21, 2007 (second ANGELO
ground for early termination of employment, and the only surveillance) and this time, the POEA representatives saw Case No. 31
requirement was the written notice of termination. people standing outside its main entrance, and there were ART III SEC 1: Due Process
ISSUE: Whether or not the pre-termination was valid announcements of job vacancies. Later, POEA issued a Show Figuera v. Ang
pursuant to the ESA (which is a foreign law). Cause Order, directing AIMS to submit its answer to the Nov

13
FACTS: Ang executed a Deed of Assignment of Business Dy v. People ANGELO
Rights transferring all her business rights over the Enhance Case No. 33
Immigration and Documentation Consultants to Figuera. In FACTS: Dy, former general manager of Mandy Commodities ART III SEC 1: Procedural Due Process
addition to the assignment of rights, the parties also agreed Company Inc., was charged with Estafa by the company Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca
that Ang shall pay the bills for electricity, telephone, office through its president Mandy. This is due to Dy’s alleged
rentals, and the employees' salaries. Without Ang's consent, failure to pay for the company’s loan to International China FACTS: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he
Figuera paid all the utility bills amounting to P107,903.21 Bank of Commerce, resulting to the bank’s foreclosure on had his parcel of land as security to his debt. Due to the
but Figuera tendered only the amount of P42,096.79 to Ang. the company’s mortgaged properties. The RTC held that failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed
Ang refused to accept Figuera's payment. Thus, Figuera filed prosecution failed to prove the elements of Estafa in this an instrument to mortgage Engracio’s property. Engracio
a complaint for specific performance before the Regional case. The lower courts further held that a contract of loan however left for China and he never returned until he died.
Trial Court. The RTC ruled in Ang's favor and was eventually was executed between Mandy and Dy, thus Dy is not liable Since Engracio is a non-resident, El Banco must notify
affirmed by the CA. As for the issue regarding legal of Estafa. Despite the acquittal, the lower courts still held Dy Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of
subrogation and compensation which Figuera failed to raise to be civilly liable. publication using a newspaper. The lower court further
before the RTC, the CA held that these issues cannot be ordered the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and
raised for the first time on appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not Dy’s constitutional right to due that it would be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually
process was violated. granted El Banco petition to execute Engracio’s property. 7
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court may consider and resolve years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as
issues even they were raised for the first time on appeal. RULING: YES. The Court held that when the acquittal is due his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling.
to the absence of the crime committed, the civil action Vicente averred that there had been no due process as
RULING: YES. As a general rule, points of law, theories, deemed instituted with the criminal case cannot prosper Engracio never received the summons.
and arguments not brought before the trial court because there is no delict from which any civil obligation
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and will may be sourced. In this case, the Court held that there was ISSUE: Whether or not the conducted proceedings
not be considered by the Court; otherwise, a denial of no crime of Estafa proven. Dy’s liability of around P21 constitute due process of law.
the respondent's right to due process will result. In the million arises from her contractual obligation (loan) to
interest of justice, however, the Court may consider and Mandy, which should be instituted in a separate civil RULING: YES. The Court ruled that the requisites for
resolve issues not raised before the trial court if it is action as to not violate Dy’s constitutional right to due judicial due process had been met. The requisites are:
necessary for the complete adjudication of the rights process.
and obligations of the parties, and it falls within the 1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed
issues found by the parties. Figuera's position falls under Actions focused on proving Estafa is not the proper with judicial power to hear and decide the matter
two of these exceptions, namely— that the determination of vehicle to thresh out civil liability arising from a before it;
the question newly raised is necessary in arriving at a just contract. The Due Process Clause of the Constitution 2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the
decision and complete resolution of the case, and that the dictates that a civil liability arising from a contract must person of the defendant or over the property subject of
resolution of a question properly assigned is dependent on be litigated in a separate civil action. A court ordering an the proceedings;
those which were not assigned as errors on appeal. accused in a fused action to pay his or her contractual 3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be
liability deprives him or her of his or her property without heard;
ANGELO the right to notice and hearing as expressed in the 4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
Case No. 32 procedures and remedies under the Rules of Court.
ART III SEC 1: Due Process ANGELO

14
 Case No. 34 ANGELO possession of firearms as having amended and
ART III SEC 1: Procedural Due Process Case No. 35 superseded the original three informations for
Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines ART III SEC 1: Aspects of the Proceedings homicide and frustrated homicide, there being no
Galvez v. CA substantial rights of herein petitioners which may be
FACTS: The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for affected thereby.
certiorari separately filed by former President Gloria FACTS: Petitioners Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San
Macapagal-Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged Ayeh CASE NO. 36
Office Budget and Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas. On in three separate informations with homicide and two ART. III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged the petitioners in counts of frustrated homicide. Prosecutor Reyes filed a ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
the Sandiganbayan (and some other officials of PCSO and Motion to Defer Arraignment and Subsequent Proceedings State Prosecutor v. Muro
Commission on Audit whose charges were later dismissed to enable him "to review the evidence on record and FACTS: In a letter-complaint dated August 19, 1992,
by the Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to determine once more the proper crimes chargeable against respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the RTC Manila,
evidence were granted, except for Uriarte and Valdes who the accused," which was granted by Judge Villajuan. Before Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C.
were at large) for conspiracy to commit plunder by raiding petitioners could be arraigned in Criminal Cases, Mariano, George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with
the public treasury, unlawfully acquiring ill-gotten wealth in respondent prosecutor filed an Ex parte Motion to ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations
the aggregate amount of PHP365,997,915.00. Thereafter, Withdraw Informations in said cases. This motion was of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial
accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective granted by Judge Villajuan. On the same day, Prosecutor Conduct by dismissing 11 cases against the accused Mrs.
petitions for bail which were denied by the Sandiganbayan Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank
on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, Foreign Exchange Restrictions on the basis of newspaper
strong. After the Prosecution rested its case, respective and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal reports concerning the announcement on August 10, 1992
motions for reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were possession of firearms. by the President of the Philippines of the lifting by the
likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, so they filed their government of all foreign exchange restrictions and the
respective petitions for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment of the information arrival at such decision by the Monetary Board as per
may also be made even if it may result in altering the nature statement of Central Bank Governor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari of the charge. The petitioners further averred that the lightning speed
is proper to assail the denial of the demurrers to evidence. with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the cases may
RULING: YES. For while it is true that the prosecutor has be gleaned from the fact that such precipitate action was
RULING: The special civil action for certiorari is the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a undertaken despite already scheduled continuation of trial
generally not proper to assail such an interlocutory criminal case should be filed in court, once the case had dates set in the order of the court (the prosecution having
order issued by the trial court because of the already been brought therein any disposition the started presenting its evidence) thereby depriving the
availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of prosecutor may deem proper thereafter should be Government of its right to be heard, and clearly exposing his
law. The denial of the demurrers to evidence of the addressed to the court for its reconsideration and approval. bias and partiality.
petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not The only qualification is that the action of the court ISSUE: Whether or not there is blatant denial of due process
terminate the proceedings, and the proper recourse of the must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or committed by the Judge.
demurring accused was to go to trial, and that in case of the right of the People to due process of law. Brushing RULING & MP: YES. The lightning speed, to borrow the
their conviction they may then appeal the conviction and aside procedural technicalities, therefore, it becomes words of complainants, with which respondent judge
assign the denial as among the errors to be reviewed. exigent to now consider and declare the four resolved to dismiss the cases without the benefit of a
informations for murder, frustrated murder and illegal hearing and without reasonable notice to the prosecution

15
inevitably opened him to suspicion of having acted out of
partiality for the accused. Regardless of how carefully he
may have evaluated changes in the factual situation and
legal standing of the cases, as a result of the newspaper
report, the fact remains that he gave the prosecution no
chance whatsoever to show or prove that it had strong
evidence of the guilt of the accused. To repeat, he thereby
effectively deprived the prosecution of its right to due
process.
The very act of respondent judge in altogether
dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without
even a motion to quash having been filed by the
accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the
basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a
written comment or on oral argument, is not only a
blatant denial of elementary due process to the
Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and
partiality. The dismissal of a case without the benefit of
a hearing and any notice to the prosecution violate due
process.
Ayeh CASE NO. 37
ART. III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Martinez v. Court of Appeals
FACTS: Private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and his
sister Manuela De la Paz, entered into an oral contract with
petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante Martinez. The latter completed his
payment but was not given the Deed of Sale by De la Paz. In
the meantime, 3 lots were sold to Spouses Veneracion,
including the lot sold to the petitioner. Petitioner filed a
petition with the MTC who ruled in favor of him. Upon
petition by the respondents, the RTC reversed the decision
of the lower court which was affirmed by the CA. Now, the
petitioner avers that the CA erred in its decision and raised
the issue among others that the respondents failed to pay
the docket fee within the reglementary period of perfecting
an appeal and that the resolution of the Court of Appeals
denying his motion for reconsideration was rendered in
violation of the Constitution because it does not state the
legal basis thereof.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the resolution of the Court of
Appeals denying petitioners motion for reconsideration is
contrary to the constitutional requirement that a denial of a
motion for reconsideration must state the legal reasons on
which it is based.
(2) Whether or not payment of the appellate docket
fee within the period to appeal is not necessary for the
perfection of the appeal after a notice of appeal has been
filed within such period.
RULING/MP: (1) NO. The requirement that no petition for
review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
court shall be refused due course or denied without stating
the basis therefor was fully complied with when the Court
of Appeals, in denying reconsideration of its decision, stated
in its resolution that it found no reason to change its ruling
because petitioner had not raised anything new.
(2) No. It was held that although an appeal fee is
required to be paid in case of an appeal taken from the
municipal trial court to the regional trial court, it is not a
prerequisite for the perfection of an appeal under 20 and
23 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this
Court implementing the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1981 (B.P. Blg. 129). Under these sections, there are only
two requirements for the perfection of an appeal, to wit: (a)
the filing of a notice of appeal within the reglementary
period; and (b) the expiration of the last day to appeal
by any party. Even in the procedure for appeal to the
regional trial courts, nothing is mentioned about the
payment of appellate docket fees. The SC ruled that in
appealed cases, the failure to pay the appellate docket
fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of the
appeal, the dismissal being discretionary on the part of
the appellate court. Thus, private respondents
Venerations failure to pay the appellate docket fee is
not fatal to their appeal.
Ayeh CASE NO. 38
ART. III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Espeleta v. Avelino
FACTS: It is the sad plaint of petitioner in this certiorari
proceeding that he was denied procedural due process
when respondent Judge in a spirit of unwanted
generosity towards private respondent corporation,
Shell Philippines, Inc., acceded to its plea that the
testimony of a witness deemed by him as vital to his
case be ignored and disregarded in its entirety for
failure to be present in court on the day set for her cross-
examination. In view of the decidedly liberal interpretation
of the cardinal precept of due process that justice be done to
the parties both procedurally and substantively,
consistently adhered to from United States v. Ling Su Fan
decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner Judge eroded
petitioner's right to a day in court and that the right to be
heard of petitioner if taken nugatory would render the
concept of fairness that is basic to procedural due process
emasculated.
RULING & MP: YES It cannot be truly asserted then that the
proceedings satisfied the constitutional standard for a
judicious inquiry. To that extent, it would make a mockery
of the requirement that the judgment should be only after a
trial where the litigants are given full and unimpeded
opportunity to sustain their respective claims and to have
their evidence duly considered and weighed. Unless, the
challenged order then was set aside, petitioner can assert a
grievance grounded on the due process guarantee.
Ayeh CASE NO. 39
ART. III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Rabino v Cruz
FACTS: Private respondents, by themselves and through
their predecessors-in-interest, filed complaints docketed as
Civil Cases No. 630 and No. 631 of the Municipal Trial Court
16
of Taytay, Rizal, for the recovery of portions of a parcel of
land located at Sitio Sampalucan, Barangay San Isidro,
Taytay, Rizal against occupants in which the petitioners
herein, although occupants of a portion of the subject parcel
of land, were not impleaded as defendants in said cases.
Occupants of the said parcels of land were asked to vacate
including petitioners herein.
ISSUE: Whether a decision of the Court is binding upon
persons who are not parties to an action.
RULING & MP: No. The rule is anchored on the
constitutional right of a person to due process of law. No
person shall be condemned, or judgment rendered against
him without due process of law. The Court ruled in Lopez v.
Director of Lands, that "contemplates notice and
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered,
affecting one's person or property." As applied to judicial
proceedings, it may be laid down with certainty that the
requirements of due process are satisfied if the
following conditions are present namely: (1) There
must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power
to hear and determine the matter before it; (2)
jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person
of the defendant or over the property which is the
subject of the proceedings; (3) the defendant must be
given an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment
must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Clearly, the second requirement aforementioned was not
obtained for the trial court in said cases did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of petitioners as they were not
impleaded therein and were consequently not summoned to
appear and present their defenses to resist the claims of
private respondents.
Respondent only went to the court to protect her property
from demolition after the judgment in the ejectment cases
had become final and executory. Hence, with respect to the
judgment in said ejectment cases, respondent remains a
third person to such judgment, which does not bind her;
nor can its writ of execution be enforced against her
since she was not afforded her day in court in said cannot now be allowed to raise it for the first time without
ejectment cases. offending basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
MP: A question not raised in the lower courts cannot be
entertained by the higher courts upon appeal as it would go
Ayeh CASE NO. 40 against basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.
ART. III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS ADDALINO
Ysmael v. Court of Appeals CASE NO. 41 - G.R. No. 98328
FACTS: Petitioners brought suit for sum of money against ART III, SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; Aspects of
private respondents in the then Court of First Instance of the Proceedings
Rizal, Branch 29, and obtained judgment in their favor on CARVAJAL VS COURT OF APPEALS
October 2, 1980. The decision remained unexecuted for a FACTS: Petitioner allegedly acquired portions of the
long time so, petitioners filed a case for the revival of the parcel of land by inheritance from his father Felix Carvajal
judgment in the RTC Pasig City, which on March 14, 1990, who came to possess the unregistered land in 1938,
rendered a decision reviving such judgment. continuously, openly, adversely and peacefully in the
Properties were sold in favor of the petitioners, but concept of an owner up to the time of his death. The latter
respondents exercised their right of redemption to which court upheld the trial court filed before RTC. In dismissing
the latter contended to have already prescribed. However, petitioner's application for registration of title of a parcel of
CA ruled in favor of the private respondents and denied land in Antipolo City. The Court recognized
their MR, hence this petition respondent Solid Homes, Inc. as the registered owner of the
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents can still redeem their said parcel of land, situated in Antipolo City. The Court of
property. Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the application for
RULING: Yes. Although it is required that full payment of registration, and denied the subsequent motion for
the redemption price must be made within the redemption reconsideration. Hence, this petition wherein petitioner
period, the rule on redemption is actually liberally maintains that he was denied due process when he, as an
construed in favor of the original owner of the property. The applicant in a land registration case, was not able to take the
policy of the law is to aid rather than to defeat him in the witness stand. According to petitioner, even his counsel
exercise of his right of redemption. At least the defendants hardly participated in the proceeding except to propound
have shown their good faith in trying to settle the clarificatory questions during the examination of Engineer
redemption price within the period provided by law which Silverio Perez of the Land Registration Authority.
was simply ignored by the plaintiffs who appeared to profit
more if the properties are not redeemed by reason of the ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has been denied due
higher value of said properties. process when he was unable to take the witness stand
The issue raised by the petitioner as to the validity of the RULING: NO. While petitioner claims that he was denied
tender of the two checks given to the petitioner’s counsel due process because he was unable to take the witness
contending he has no authority to do was found baseless by stand. The court ruled that the essence of due process is the
the Court. It was later found out that question was never opportunity to be heard. It is the denial of this opportunity
really raised in the courts below and, therefore, petitioners that is repugnant to due process. Petitioner was afforded an
17
opportunity to present witnesses, and he did present three.
However, petitioner did not invoke his right to take the
witness stand even when the trial court ordered the
submission of the parties’ memoranda which signified the
termination of the proceedings. Because he acquiesced to
the termination of the case, he forfeited his right to take the
witness stand.
MAIN POINT: The essence of due process is the opportunity
to be heard. It is the denial of this opportunity that is
repugnant to due process.
ADDALINO
CASE NO. 42 – G.R. No. 120282
ART III, SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; Aspects of
the Proceedings
PEOPLE VS CASTILLO
FACTS: Appellant was charged with murder in connection
with the fatal stabbing of Antonio Dometita in Cola pub
house Q.C. He pleaded not guilty and interposed the defense
of denial and alibi claiming that he was then asleep in his
house at the time of the incident. Prosecution witness
Velasco testified that he was sitting outside the pub house
when appellant suddenly arrived and stabbed the victim on
the left side of the chest causing his death. Another
prosecution witness, Mercad, testified that although she did
not see the actual stabbing, she saw appellant wrapping a
bladed weapon in his shirt. However, defense witness
Marcelino, a tricycle driver, testified that he was about 25
meters away from the crime scene when he saw a 2 persons
ganging up on a person who was later identified as the
victim, and that appellant was not one of them. The trial
court gave full credence to the testimonies of the two
prosecution witnesses and rendered judgment of conviction
with penalty of RP. Hence, this recourse. Appellant is
questioning the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and
the partiality of the trial judge in favor of the prosecution as
shown by his participation in the examination of witnesses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the allegation that the trial judge Sandiganbayan and (b) his guilt was not proven beyond
was biased against the accused for propounding questions reasonable doubt to justify his conviction.
that were well within the prerogative of the prosecution to
explore and ask is correct ISSUE: Whether or not the active participation of the
RULING: NO! It is a judge’s prerogative and duty to ask Justices of the Sandiganbayan, by propounding no less than
clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. The Supreme 68 questions, were indications of partiality or prejudgment
Court finds that the questions propounded by the judge of guilt.
were merely clarificatory in nature. Questions which merely RULING: NO. Admittedly, petitioner, like any other accused
clear up dubious points and bring out additional relevant individual, is entitled to a fair trial before an “impartial and
evidence are within judicial prerogative. neutral judge” as an indispensable imperative of due
MAIN POINT: It is a judge’s prerogative and duty to ask process. Judges must not only be impartial, but must also
clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. Questions appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties
which merely clear up dubious points and bring out that the decision will be just. However, this is not to say
additional relevant evidence are within judicial prerogative. that judges must remain passive or silent during the
proceedings. Since they are in a better position to
ADDALINO observe the demeanor of the witness as he testifies on
CASE NO. 43 - G.R. No. 110353 the witness stand, it is only natural for judges to ask
ART III, SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; Aspects of questions to elicit facts with a view to attaining justice
the Proceedings for the parties. Questions designed to clarify points and
COSEP VS PEOPLE to elicit additional relevant evidence are not improper.
FACTS: Petitioner, Tomas Cosep, was the Municipal Also, the judge, being the arbiter, may properly
Planning and Development Coordination Officer of intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite
Olutanga, Zamboanga del Sur. In 1987, the Municipality and prevent unnecessary waste of time.
decided to construct an artesian well for one of its localities.
Hence, it secured the services of private complainant MAIN POINT: It is only natural for judges to ask questions
Angelino E. Alegre to undertake the said project, under a to elicit facts with a view to attaining justice for the parties.
“pakyaw” arrangement for the contract price of P5,000.00 Questions designed to clarify points and to elicit additional
payable after completion of the project. After the project relevant evidence are not improper. Also, the judge, being
was finished, petitioner secured the amount of P5,000.00 the arbiter, may properly intervene in the presentation of
from the Municipal Treasurer. However, only P4,500 was evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of
given to the private complainant, the balance being time.
allegedly withheld by petitioner as reimbursement for his
expenses in processing the papers in the Municipal
Treasurer’s Office. On April 10, 1992, petitioner entered a
plea of not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial on the ADDALINO
merits ensued. The Sandiganbayan found him guilty of the CASE NO. 44
charge. Petitioner has filed the instant petition contending ART III, SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; Aspects of
that: (a) he was not accorded an impartial trial by the the Proceedings
18
 RODRIGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Petitioners, Mayor and Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator, and former Municipal Treasurer
of San Nicolas, Pangasinan, which entered into an
agreement with Philwood Construction (Larry Lu) for the
electrification of Barangay Caboloan, San Nicolas. Mejica
prepared an Accomplishment Report stating that the
Caboloan Power Generation project was 97.5%
accomplished. Said report was supposedly approved by
Mayor Rodrigo and confirmed by Larry Lu. Subsequently,
payment was effected by the Municipal Treasurer to
Philwood Construction. Petitioners then received a Notice of
Disallowance from the Provincial Auditor of Pangasinan
who found that as per COA evaluation of the electrification
project, only 60.0171% of the project was actually
accomplished. The powerhouse was only 65.635%
completed. The Provincial Auditor thus disallowed the
amount of P160,910.46. Petitioners requested the
Provincial Auditor to lift the notice of disallowance and to
re-inspect the project, which was denied. Provincial Auditor
filed a criminal complaint for estafa before the Ombudsman
against petitioners. Petitioners contend that the institution
by the Provincial Auditor of the complaint despite the
pendency of their opposition to the notice of disallowance
violates their right to due process. They submit that “the
issuance of a notice of disallowance against (them) compels
the provincial auditor to either accept a settlement or
adjudicate and decide on the written explanation for the
purpose of lifting/settling the suspension or extending the
time to answer beyond the ninety (90) day period prior to
its conversion into a disallowance.”
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners’ right to due process was
violated by the filing of the complaint against them by the
Provincial Auditor
RULING: NO. The right to due process of the respondents
to the complaint, insofar as the criminal aspect of the case is
concerned, is not impaired by such institution. The
respondents will still have the opportunity to confront the
accusations contained in the complaint during the ISSUE: Whether or not appellants were denied their right to
preliminary investigation. They may still raise the same an impartial and disinterested tribunal.
defenses contained in their motion to lift the disallowance, RULING: NO. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may
as well as other defenses, in the preliminary investigation. put such question to the witness as will enable him to
MAIN POINT: The Provincial Auditor need not resolve the formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the
opposition to the notice of disallowance and the motion for willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may
re-inspection pending in his office before he institutes such examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound
complaint so long as there are sufficient grounds to support clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness
the same. and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant
and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other
ADDALINO party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory
CASE NO. 45 questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths
ART III, SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS; Aspects of which tend to destroy the theory of one party.
the Proceedings MAIN POINT: A severe examination by a trial judge of some
PEOPLE VS HUI of the witnesses for the defense in an effort to develop the
FACTS: A police informant code-named Stardust arrived at truth and to get at the real facts affords no justification for a
the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in Camp Ricardo Papa, charge that he has assisted the prosecution with an evident
Bicutan, Taguig, and informed Police Sr. Insp. Franklin desire to secure a conviction, or that he had intimidated the
Moises Mabanag of two Chinese nationals who were witnesses for the defense. It cannot be taken against him if
supposedly big time drug pushers. She claimed to have the clarificatory questions he propounded happen to reveal
regular contact with one of the alleged drug pushers, a certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.
certain Carlos Tan Ty. Acting on the information furnished - The questioning of the witnesses by the judge is not
by Stardust, the NARCOM agents organized a buy-bust a sufficient sign of bias.
operation to apprehend the reputed drug pushers (herein
appellants). Appellants were charged. The accused, in their COELI
defense, countered that no buy-bust operation took place. Case No. 46
They denied selling any shabu and accused the police of Art. III, Sec. 1: Aspects of the Proceedings
extortion. The defense (People) offered the testimonies of (Under Procedural Due Process)
Sr. Insp. Franklin Moises Mabanag, who was presented as a PEOPLE vs. CABILES
hostile witness. He testified to certain aspects of the buy-
bust operation that led to the arrest of the accused. RTC FACTS:
ruled against the accused. The case is now before this Court  Panfilo Cabiles, by means of force and violence, robbed,
for automatic review wherein respondent contends the trial from Marites Nas Atienza. Marites was asleep with her 1
court committed a grave error when it knowingly deprived -year old daughter, Erica Dianne Atienza and with their
the accused of the “cold neutrality” of an impartial judge as housemaid Luzviminda. Cabiles was then unidentified.
a part of their right to procedural process. He suddenly barged into the house of Marites by
destroying the kitchen door and poked a 6-inch knife on
19
 the right side of Marites neck. She was told not to shout
otherwise she would be killed.
 Luzviminda was awakened by the crying of Marites’
baby. When she was about to shout, he poked the knife
on her left side, causing her an injury. Then, he raped
Luzviminda.
 Marites went to her neighbor, Arnel Cericos, sought help
but Cericos was stabbed by Cabiles, thereby inflicting
upon him serious phyical injuries.
 After 3 days, Cabiles was arrested. According to him, he
did not know why he was arrested. He denied the
allegations. As regards to his sworn statement admitting
the commission of the crime, he said he was forced by
the policemen to execute and sign the same. He was not
assisted by a counsel at that time. The policemen did not
have a warrant when they made the arrest.
 However, such irregularity was only raised during trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not warrantless arrest, raised during
trial, is deemed waived because of the delay.
RULING: YES.
The Court has consistently ruled that any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person
of an accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived. In regard to
this delay, Verily, the illegal arrest of an accused is not
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered
upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error; such
arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the
accused.
COELI
Case No. 47
Art. III, Sec. 1: Aspects of the Proceedings
(Under Procedural Due Process)
GOZUM VS. LIANGCO RULING: NO.
The purpose of notice is to afford the parties a chance to be
heard—which was not given to Gozun that led to the
demolition of his home. Respondent Judge argues that the
FACTS: resolution he issued was a mere expression of his legal
 This case involves an administrative complaint for opinion and not a judgment. Such argument betrays either
dismissal filed against Judge Daniel Liangco—a gross ignorance or contempt of law. A member of the bench
Municipal Trial Judge at the MTC of San Fernando must keep himself constantly abreast of legal and
Pampanga jurisprudential developments. It is the function of the court
 Complainant Hermogenes T. Gozun was in possession of to adjudicate actual controversies. Legal advice is the job of
subject land for more than 30 years. a lawyer.
 The municipality of San Luis, Pampanga claimed to own
the lot and issued a Resolution stating its ownership and MAIN POINT: When the law violated is so elementary, the
the squatting of Gozun. Respondent Judge issued a failure to know or observe it constitutes gross ignorance of
resolution siding with the municipality and stated the law
the validity of the resolution, the use of reasonable
force through the PNP in removing complainant
from their home and declaring the squatting of COELI
complainant as nuisance per se. Pursuant to the Case No. 48
resolution, the municipal mayor issued E.O. 1 ordering Art. III, Sec. 1: Aspects of the Proceedings
the PNP to implement the Resolution. (Under Procedural Due Process)
 Throughout all of these, Gozun was not served with SORIANO v. ANGELES
summons or given notice of the petition for declaratory
relief. FACTS:
 The agents of the LGU, then, demolished the house.  According to petitioner Soriano (barangay captain),
 Gozun averred that respondent judge issuance of the Ruel Garcia and Pedro Garcia (his uncle), both members
resolution amounted to gross misconduct, gross of the Caloocan police, barged into the barangay hall in
inefficiency and incompetence. The Office of the Court Caloocan City, looking for Soriano. Ruel gave Soriano fist
Administrator submitted the petition to this court. Afterblows on the face while he poked a gun at him with his
the OCA investigation, Court Administrator Alfredo right hand, at the same time cursing him.
Benipayo submitted a memorandum recommending  Although there were 4 barangay tanods in the barangay
respondent judge’s dismissal. hall, they could not come to the aid of Soriano because
they were held at bay by Pedro. The Garcias then left.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent's resolution was a Soriano was treated for his injuries in the hospital.
mere expression of his legal opinion and not a judgment,  Ruel Garcia denied Soriano's allegation. He alleged that
hence, complainant Gozun was not entitled to notice and he went to the barangay hall because his younger
hearing. brother had been reportedly arrested and beaten up by
Soriano. When Garcia insisted on going inside the
20
 barangay hall, Soriano blocked him and then pushed
him on the chest. Garcia also pushed Soriano. Pedro
Garcia then arrived and took him home.
 Garcia was charged with the RTC Caloocan City for
direct Judge Angeles called the parties and their
counsels to her chambers and urged them to settle the
case, and, to which Soriano refused. The first hearing
was postponed to the next day, to give time to the
counsels to prepare.
 The trial court acquitted Garcia. Judge Angeles found it
incredible that Soriano did not resist or even say
anything when Garcia allegedly assaulted him and that
none of the four barangay tanods who were near him
came to his aid. She thought that if Soriano had indeed
been attacked, he would have suffered more serious
injuries. The judge also excluded from the evidence the
testimonies of Soriano and barangay tanod.
 Soriano filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that the
decision is void because it was not rendered by an
impartial tribunal.
Issue: Whether or not the judge was biased and that there
was lack of the objectivity that due process requires.
RULING: NO.
It is settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to
one of the parties is not enough evidence to prove the
charge. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed. There must
be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an
extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion in the merits on
some basis other than what the judge learned from his
participation in the case.
There was no proof showing that the judge decided the
criminal case on grounds other than its merits. A reading of
her decision acquitting Garcia shows that the same was
made on the basis of her evaluation of the evidence of the
prosecution and of the defense.
Because of the conflicting versions of the parties as to what
really happened, her decision was necessarily based on her
appreciation of the eligibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution and the defense.
COELI
CASE NO. 49
Art. III, Sec. 1: Aspects of the Proceedings
(Under Procedural Due Process)
VILLANUEVA VS. MALAYA
FACTS:
 This case originated from an action for rescission of
contract before the RTC of Camarines Sur and entitled
"Irene P. Mariano, plaintiff, versus Francisco M. Bautista,
defendant".
 The subject of the action was a joint venture contract
between Mariano and Bautista for the development of a
memorial park, one of a number of unfinished projects
of Irene Mariano's late husband, Don Macario Mariano.
 The presiding judge Jorge S. Imperial ordered the
rescission of the contract, which decision was later
modified by the then Intermediate Appellate Court in
this manner:
o rescinding the contract of joint venture on
the ground of mutual violations by both
contracting parties
o declaring the subject land as the property of
the Irene Mariano, together with all the
improvements, the income without
prejudice to the right of the other co-owners
o Irene Mariano to reimburse Francisco
Baustista for development costs and cash
advances to the Sto. Niñ o Memorial Park,
Inc.
 For Irene's failure to comply with her obligations, a writ
of execution on the subject property was made.
 Irene conveyed the disputed property to a certain Raul
Santos, by virtue of Deed of Sale. Erlinda Villanueva,
legally adopted daughter of Irene, together with brother
Jose sought to cancel the Deed of Sale on the property
w/Raul Santos on grounds of forgery and simulated
sale.
 A TRO was issued, directing sheriff to desist from
proceeding with the public auction, but it was not
enforced. The land was successfully bought by Ruben
Sia, the highest bidder.
 Erlinda tendered cashier’s check to Sia who refused to
accept the same because he wanted to consult w/lawyer
first.
 Private respondent Sia explained to respondent sheriff
that he was "at a loss" as to who to accept payment
from, considering that several parties, had signified
their intention to redeem the property, including the
Erlinda. Respondent sheriff filed a "Motion to Determine
Rightful Redemptioner"
 Erlinda executed two DOS in favour of the petitioner-
lessees on the subject land, on the condition that she
redeems the property from Sia.
 Petitioner-lessees then wrote respondent sheriff of such
development, which was in turn brought to the
attention of the trial court in the Motion to Determine
Rightful Redemptioner.
 Respondent judge issued an Order passing upon the
right to redeem the subject property to Mariano.
 Respondent deputy sheriffs executed in favor of Sia a
Definite Deed of Sale.
 Sia asked for a Definite Deed of Sale contending that the
period for exercising the right of redemption has
already expired. It was granted to him by Judge Angel S.
Malaya.
 Erlinda and petitioner-lessees contended that in
declaring Sia as the rightful owner, it was without due
process of law, disregarding the significant fact that the
10-door concrete commercial building was not covered
by the questioned and forged deed of sale.
21
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process of the (petitioner) filed an administrative complaint against party runs contrary to the respondent’s earlier claim that
petitioner-lessees was violated Judge Asis for failing to observe the doctrine of res the land was equally divided among the co-owners.
judicata. Respondent judge averred that his decision Since the decision rendered in had reached finality,
merely implemented the CA’s decision and further respondent judge should have refrained from hearing the
RULING: YES claims that the decision was in favor of petitioner since merits of Civil Case No. 214, considering that the issues in
The writ of possession is void because it violated their right the land delineated to him was greater in area and the latter case had been settled in a previous judgment
to due process and was not issued pursuant to a final productivity than the others. involving the same parties. A judge cannot amend a final
judgment in an ejectment case where they were properly  Petitioner filed the third administrative complaint, decision, more so where the decision was promulgated by
impleaded. alleging that Judge Asis exhibited manifest partiality an appellate court. Judges should respect the orders,
The writ of possession may only be issued after the against him so the latter should inhibit himself from all resolutions and decisions of higher courts, specially the
occupants (lessees) are afforded an opportunity to be pending cases involving Antonio. highest court.
heard without need of a separate action. Also, Erlinda  The Supreme Court referred the case to Associate
have exercised her right of redemption before the period Justice Salazar-Fernando for investigation. *Quieting of title: Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
has expired, by tendering the cashier’s checks and property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument,
submitting the redemption price to the court. ISSUES: Whether or not respondent judge failed to observe record, claim, encumberance or proceeding which is
COELI the doctrine of res judicata. apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid,
CASE NO. 50 ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial
Art. III, Sec. 1: Aspects of the Proceedings RULING: YES. to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud
(Under Procedural Due Process) When material facts or questions which were in issue in a or to quiet the title (Art. 476 of the Civil Code).
ALMENDRAS V. ASIS former action were admitted or judicially determined they
FACTS: are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, CASE NO. 51
 Gaudencio Almendra, sibling of the petitioner, filed with such facts or questions become res judicata and may not ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF
the RTC Tacloban an action for quieting of title over again be relitigated in a subsequent action between the PROCEEDINGS)
several parcels of land located in Leyte. After due trial, same parties or their privies regardless of the form of the DAYOT V. GARCIA, 353 SCRA 280
the RTC declared plaintiff Gaudencio Almendra and latter.
defendants Francisco, Vicente, and Antonio Almendra The doctrine of res judicata has the following requisites: Facts: In the present case, Complainant alleges that
co-owners of the parcels of land in question. Both a) the former judgment must be final; respondent judge committed misconduct of office, abuse of
parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over authority and oppression when he issued the warrant of
 The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. the subject matter and the parties; arrest and ordered complainant's detention despite the
 Gaudencio filed a petition for certiorari with the c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and pendency of a motion for reconsideration as this Court had
Supreme Court, but the Court denied the petition. Later, d) there must be, between the first and second yet to resolve the petition with finality; that he filed a
the case was remanded to the court of origin for actions, identity of parties, subject matter and motion to lift the arrest warrant but up to this time the
execution of judgment. causes of action same remained unacted upon; that respondent Judge
 Thelma and Arthur Almendra, legitimate children of Respondent judge’s decision on the quieting of the title further issued an Order discrediting his service of sentence
Gaudencio, filed an action for quieting of title, with clearly manifests that the issues, parties and subject matter from May 6, 1998 up to November 6, 1998, the date of the
Antonio as one of the defendants before RTC Leyte. are identical. A judge cannot modify a final decision, order, after considering that his service of sentence was
 Judge Enrique Asis declared Thelma and Arthur especially if it was decided upon by an appellate court. made outside the prison cell.
Almendra the rightful owners. Antonio Almendra Moreover, the argument that a decision is favorable to a

22
Issue: W/N Complainant was denied the right to the heard.
Ruling: Yes. It appears that the subject Order dated
November 6, 1998 was issued upon oral complaint of the
mother of the offended party that accused-convict Sofronio
Dayot is serving his one (1) year term of imprisonment not
inside the prison cell. It appears that thereafter respondent
Judge issued an order which decreed that such service of
sentence be not credited as service by herein
complainant. It is not disputed that the said order was
issued without a hearing or notice to the accused or his
counsel. As correctly pointed out by the Court
Administrator, respondent Judge may have been prompted
by his desire to get rid of corruption and special treatment
extended to some prisoners, but that is not a license for him
to abuse his judicial discretion by depriving the accused of
his right to be heard. While a judge may not always be
subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order
or decision he renders, that relative immunity is not a
license to be negligent or abusive and arbitrary in
performing his adjudicatory prerogatives. The issuance of
the Order of November 6, 1998 without the benefit of a
hearing is a clear evidence of the judges failure to
understand the limitations of his power and betrays his
ignorance of the cardinal principles of due process. By
unilaterally discrediting the period served outside the jail
without giving complainant a chance to be heard,
respondent Judge failed to observe the requirements of due
process.
CASE NO. 52
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF
PROCEEDINGS)
PEOPLE V. HAPA, GR 125698 July 19, 2001
Facts: Appellants Hapa, Feratero, Espao and Entereso filed a
joint notice of appeal. Accused-appellants contend that the
trial court erred in finding them guilty of murder, instead of
homicide only. They argue that if indeed what they
committed was murder, the trial court would not have sufficient time and opportunity to present further
allowed them to post bail for their temporary liberty.
evidence. Yet, every time that the case was set for
Secondly, they questioned the authority of the judge who
trial, despite due notice to him, accused-appellant Francisco
penned the decision because he was not the one who Hapa never showed up. Hence, the trial would be reset to
conducted the trial and heard the proceedings of the another date. Because accused Francisco jumped bail, his
case. Corollarily, they claimed that the trial court counsel had to rest the case and submit it for
erroneously condemned them for murder without giving decision. Obviously, accused-appellants were given ample
accused Francisco Hapa the opportunity to testify on his
opportunity to present evidence to prove their innocence.
behalf. CASE NO. 53
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF
Issue: W/N appellant were denied of their procedural PROCEEDINGS)
rights AGUIRRE V. PEOPLE GR 144142 Aug. 23, 2001
Ruling: No. The fact that Judge Valencia who decided the FACTS: On at least 3 separate occasions in the month of
case was not the one who heard the testimonies of the February 1993, accused Yolanda Aguirre, knowing that she
witnesses would not automatically warrant a reversal of the does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
decision. Such fact constitutes no compelling reason to bank, with deliberate intent, and with intent of gain and of
jettison his findings and conclusions, and does not per causing damage, issued three separate BPI Family Bank
se render his decision void. It may be true that the trial Checks all payable to Dinah Wei, in payment of an obligation
judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better of said accused, but when presented with said bank, the
position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of same was dishonored for reason of account closed. Despite
the witnesses. However, it does not necessarily follow that a notice and demands made to redeem or make good said
judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a check, Aguirre failed and refused and up to the present time
valid and just decision. still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice
of said Dinah Wei in the amounts of P40,000.00,P50,000.00
MAIN POINT: It is well settled that the right to be heard by and P225,703.10 respectively. At her arraignment,
himself and counsel is one of the constitutional rights petitioner pleaded not guilty to all the charges. Since they
guaranteed to an accused. Not only this, he likewise has the involved substantially similar facts, the cases were
right to present evidence in his defense. Due process of law consolidated. Trial ensued. When it was her turn to adduce
in judicial proceedings requires that he must be given an evidence, petitioner continuously moved for the
opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and postponement of the hearings. Thereafter, the trial court
defend in person at every stage of the proceedings. A declared petitioner to have waived her right to present
decision would only be void for lack of due process if, as a evidence in her defense. On July 15, 1996, the trial
result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard. court then rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty
In the case at bar, the last witness for the defense was ofviolating B.P. Blg. 22.Petitioner appealed her conviction to
accused-appellant Claro Feratero, who took the witness the CA. In essence, she claims that she was deprived of
stand on February 18, 1985. From that time until the due process when the trial court declared that her right
defense rested its case on October 13, 1987, the defense had to present evidence as deemed waived, forfeited and
23
abandoned. The appellate court, however, found no merit collusion, undue influence and/or improper exertion of BARITUA V. MERCADER 350 SCRA 86
in the appeal. The CA declared that petitioner was not ascendancy by one party over the other. He alleges that he Facts: Respondents filed in RTC N. Samar a complaint
deprived of discharged his counsel during the proceedings, because he against damages petitioner alleging among others, that the
due process because she was given ample opportunity to pr felt that the latter was not properly attending to the case. latter’s driver negligently and recklessly operated the bus at
esent her evidence. The CA thus affirmed petitioner’s The judge, however, did not allow him to secure the services fast speed causing it to fell from the bridge on march
conviction. of another counsel. Insisting that petitioner settle the case 17,1883 leading the death of Dominador Mercader. In their
with respondent, the judge practically imposed the answers, petitioners denied specifically all complaint’s
ISSUES: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the settlement agreement on him. material allegation. In one of their affirmative defenses, they
RTC, in declaring the herein petitioner to have waived, argued that the respondents have not yet paid the correct
forfeited and abandoned her right to adduce/present Issue: W/N The Judgment on Stipulations for Entry in docket fees on the reason that the value or amount of
evidence. Judgment in Case #C21-00265 dated December 12, 1991 Mercader’s properties losted during the accident was not
was obtained without the assistance of counsel for specifically alleged in the complaint. The RTC, after due trial
RULING: NO. Contrary to petitioners claim, the records petitioner and without sufficient notice to him and , decided in respondents favor ordering petitioners to pay
show that she was given ample opportunity by the trial therefore, was rendered in clear violation of petitioner's the former damages. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed RTC’s
court to present her evidence. The trial court in view of the constitutional rights to substantial and procedural due decision
absence of either appellant or her counsel granted the process. On April 17,1998. When their motion for
motions of her counsel for continuance to enable the reconsideration was denied on October 19,1998,
defense to present its evidence. Accused-appellant Ruling: The manifestation of petitioner that the judge and petitioners filed the present petition for review
continuously requested postponement of hearing. The trial the counsel for the opposing party had pressured him under Rule 45assailing CA’s decision and resolution.
court was constrained to declare the right of the accused to would gain credibility only if he had not been given
present evidence as deemed waived, forfeited or abandoned sufficient time to engage the services of a new lawyer. Issue: Whether or not petitioners were
due to the non-appearance of appellant or her counsel. Respondent's Affidavit dated May 23, 1994, clarified, denied procedural rights.
Accused-appellant did not file any motion or pleading to however, that petitioner had sufficient time, but he failed to
have said order reconsidered. She cannot now claim that retain a counsel. Having dismissed his lawyer as early as Ruling: No. Judges cannot be expected to rely on the
she was denied her right to be present and present her June 19, 1991, petitioner directly handled his own defense testimonies of every witness. In ascertaining the facts, they
evidence. Court finds that petitioner in this case cannot and negotiated a settlement with respondent and his determine who are credible and who are not. The mere fact
feign denial of due process because she had, indeed, been counsel in December 1991. Respondent also stated that that the decision was based on the testimonies of the
given the opportunity to present her side. petitioner, ignoring the judge's reminder of the importance respondent’s witnesses does not necessarily mean that the
of having a lawyer, argued that "he would be the one to judge did not consider those of petitioner’s.
CASE NO. 54 settle the case and pay" anyway. Eventually, the
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF Compromise Agreement was presented in court and signed • In case of death or injuries to passengers, it is presumed to
PROCEEDINGS) before Judge Ellen James on January 3, 1992. Hence, have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it
PUYAT V. ZABARTE, 352 SCRA 738 petitioner's rights to counsel and to due process were not proves that it observed extraordinary diligence as
violated. prescribed in
Facts: Petitioner contends that the foreign judgment, which
was in the form of a Compromise Agreement, cannot be CASE NO. 55 Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.
executed without the parties being assisted by their chosen ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL PROCESS (ASPECTS OF
lawyers. The reason for this, he points out, is to eliminate PROCEEDINGS)

24
ARZHY
CASE NO. 56
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Aspects of the Proceedings
Barbers v Laguio, 351 SCRA 606
FACTS: Private respondent, Lawrence Wang, was charged
with violation of Dangerous Drugs Act, Illegal Possession of
Firearms, and COMELC Gun Ban after 32 transparent bags
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and
two unlicensed firearms were found in his possession by
police officers. Respondent Judge Laguio dismissed the
cases for lack of evidence upon filing of the accused of
Demurrer to Evidence. Judge Laguio found that the
warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his
person and the car were without probable cause and could
not be licit hence, evidence gathered from the invalid
warrantless search was inadmissible. Petitioner directly
came to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari to
nullify and set aside the resolution of said judge.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution may appeal the trial
court’s resolution granting Wang’s demurrer to evidence
and acquitting him of all the charges against him without
violating the constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy.
RULING: No. For being the wrong remedy taken by
petitioner People of the Philippines in this case, the petition
is outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the
assailed dismissal order of the trial court by appeal without
violating private respondent’s right against double
jeopardy. What petitioner filed with the Court in the present
case is an appeal by way of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 raising a pure question of law,
which is different from a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 (grave abuse of discretion).
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of
due process, it being merely a statutory privilege which may
be exercised only in the manner provided for by law.
Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,
disallows appeal by the People from judgments of acquittal.
An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a
resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an
acquittal.
MAIN POINT: Underlined
ARZHY
CASE NO. 57
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Aspects of the Proceedings
People v. Herida, 353 SCRA 650
FACTS: Respondent Julio Herida was convicted of murder
for the death of Herlito Delara and was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the RTC of Quezon City.
On appeal before the Supreme Court, he averred that the
trial court judge exhibited bias or prejudice against him,
pointing out that over 70% of the testimonies of the
prosecutions material witnesses were elicited by the judge
while the cross-examination of the defense witnesses was to
a large extent conducted by the judge himself. Hence, his
right to a fair and impartial trial was violated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused’s right to a fair and
impartial trial was violated by the intensive questioning of
the witnesses by the judge
RULING: No. Transcripts of the proceedings showed that
the judge intensively questioned witnesses from both the
prosecution and the defense. Judges are, after all, not mere
referees in a boxing bout, whose only task is to watch and
decide the results. Judges have as much interest as counsel
in the orderly and expeditious presentation of evidence and
have the duty to ask questions that would elicit the facts on
the issues involved, clarify ambiguous remarks by
witnesses, and address the points that are overlooked by
counsel.
MAIN POINT: Intensive questioning by the judge in a trial
does not violate the accused’s right to a fair and impartial
trial
ARZHY
CASE NO. 58
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Aspects of the Proceedings
People v. Medenilla, GR 1311638
FACTS: Respondent Loreto Medenilla was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt by the RTC of Pasig for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (possession of 4
transparent bags containing shabu and being a drug
pusher). In his petition for certiorari before the Supreme
Court, he averred that he was denied of due process on the
grounds that the trial court denied his motion to have the
questioned shabu examined (quantitatively and
qualitatively) and the bias attitude of the presiding judge of
the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was denied due process
with the denial of his motion to have the questioned shabu
examined and with the bias attitude of the presiding judge
RULING: No. As held in the previous case of People vs.
Barita, there is no need to examine the entirety of the
submitted specimen since the sample testing is
representative of the whole specimen. On the second
ground, a judge is not prohibited from propounding
clarificatory questions on a witness if the purpose of which
is to arrive at a proper and just determination of the case.
A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may
propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of
the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw
out relevant and material testimony though, that testimony
may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or
the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the
clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal
certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party.
MAIN POINT: Underlined
ARZHY
CASE NO. 59
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Aspects of the Proceedings
25
 People v. Rivera, GR 139180
FACTS: Respondent Rolando Rivera was found by the RTC
of Pampanga guilty of rape and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of death and to pay damages to the offended party
(13 year-old daughter). In his appeal before the Supreme
Court, he averred that the lower court failed to observe his
constitutional right to due process and right to counsel due
to the following reasons: 1) his lawyer was disallowed from
questioning the victim concerning her sworn statements on
the ground of irrelevance and immateriality; 2) his motion
to postpone the cross-examination of the examining
physician was denied resulting to his counsel’s waiver of
such cross-examination; 3) the judge propounded
numerous questions to him during cross-examination by
the prosecutor; and 4) the trial court’s decision was
promulgated a day after his submission of his
memorandum.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused right to due process and
right to counsel have been violated in the case at bar
RULING: No. Procedural due process simply means that a
person must be heard before he is condemned. The due
process requirement is a part of a person’s basic rights, not
a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed
perfunctorily. Considering both the evidence and the law
applicable to this case, the Supreme Court held that
accused-appellant has been accorded his right to due
process.
While the Constitution recognizes the accused’s right to
competent and independent counsel of his own choice, his
option to secure the services of a private counsel is not
absolute. For considering the States and the offended
party’s right to speedy and adequate justice, the court may
restrict the accused’s option to retain a private counsel if
the accused insists on an attorney he cannot afford, or if the
chosen counsel is not a member of the bar, or if the attorney
declines to represent the accused for a valid reason. In this
case, his regular counsel was absent without any
explanation hence, another counsel was given to him.
MAIN POINT: Procedural due process simply means that a
person must be heard before he is condemned.
CASE NO. 60
ART III SEC 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Aspects of the Proceedings
People v. Basquez, GR 144035
FACTS: Respondent Vicente Basquez was adjudged guilty
beyond reasonable doubt by RTC of Davao City of the crime
of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay damages to the victim (6 yrs. 7 mos. 24
days old). On his appeal before the Supreme Court, he
averred that the trial court judge showed manifest bias and
partiality against him by virtually acting as prosecutor and
using the authority of his position in making up for the
shortcomings of the prosecutor. That trial judge went to
unjustifiable lengths in examining some of the witnesses
called for the defense.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was bias and partiality of the
trial judge in the case at bar
RULING: No. Judges are not prohibited from asking
questions when proper and necessary. Supreme Court has
repeatedly ruled that judges must be accorded a reasonable
leeway in asking questions to witnesses as may be essential
to elicit relevant facts and to bring out the truth. Questions
designed to clarify points and to elicit additional relevant
evidence are not improper. Also, the judge, being the
arbiter, may properly intervene in the presentation of
evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary waste of time
The trial judge’s inquisitiveness did not unduly harm
respondent’s substantial rights. Rather, the questions he
propounded to the witnesses showed his intention to elicit
the truth. This conduct is expected of judges who, conscious
of their responsibilities as magistrates, propound questions
to witnesses who give incomplete and obscure answers
MAIN POINT: Underlined
R. Rizon
CASE NO. 61
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Cooperative Development (CDA) vs DOLEFIL G.R. No.
137489.
May 29, 2002
FACTS: A petition for certiorari was filed by Dolefil Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative (DARBCI)
questioning the jurisdiction of the CDA to resolve
the complaints against some of the officers and BOD,
specifically with respect to the authority of the CDA
to issue the freeze order and to create a
management committee that would run the affairs
of DARBCI which replaces such officers. CA denied
the petition of CDA and ordered the reinstatement
of said officers.
.ISSUE: Whether or not the action taken by the Court of
Appeals, nullifying election of the officers and
members of the Board of Directors of DARBCI,
violated the constitutional right of the petitioners-
in-intervention to due process.
RULING: Yes, It was precipitate for the appellate court to
render judgment against the petitioners-in-
intervention in its Resolution dated February 9,
1999 without due notice and opportunity to be
heard.
MAIN POINT: The requirement of due process is satisfied if
the following conditions are present, namely: (1)
there must be a court or tribunal clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired
over the person of the defendant or over the
property which is the subject of the proceedings; (3)
the defendant must be given an opportunity to be
26
 heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon
lawful hearing.
R. Rizon
CASE NO. 62
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Garcia vs Pajaro G.R. No. 141149. July 5, 2002
FACTS: Petitioner Sebastian Garcia was suspended because
of his unsatisfactory performance. However he had
been reporting for work because he did not honor
the suspension order as the City Treasurer acted as
the complainant, investigator and judge and there
was no complaint against him from the Office of the
City Mayor. He did not believe the Order; he did not
submit himself for investigation. Thus his salary was
withheld. Further he argues that his right to due
process was violated, because he was not heard
during the administrative proceedings.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not he was denied due process of law.
RULING: No, the city treasurer of Dagupan has the authority
to institute disciplinary actions against subordinate
officers or employees. The essence of due process in
an administrative proceeding is the opportunity to
explain ones side, whether written or verbal. The
constitutional mandate is satisfied when a petitioner
complaining about an action or a ruling is granted
an opportunity to seek reconsideration.
R. Rizon
CASE NO. 63
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Brioso vs. Mariano G.R. No. 132765. January 31, 2003
FACTS: On May 27, 1977, the Spouses Mariano filed a
complaint for recovery of possession of real
property against Glicerio, Ernesto, Concepcion,
Eusebio and Salvador Brioso. The trial court
awarded damages against Brioso and the return of RULING: Yes, the trial court, without even waiting for
the land. Petitioners averred that the decision is not respondent’s motion for reconsideration denying
valid and binding upon all of the petitioners as there her motion to dismiss, hurriedly set the case for
was no valid substation upon the death of Glicerio. hearing. Also, without allowing the respondent to
file her answer the trial court hastily authorized
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the substitution of the heirs on the petitioner to present his evidence ex-parte. The
liability of Glicerio due to his death violates the right summary proceeding is a patent nullity
to due process.
R. Rizon
RULING: Void as to Felicidad, Glicerio, Jr., Bener and Julito CASE NO. 65
since they were not duly notified of the substitution. ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Valid and binding on: Salvador, Concepcion and Alboir vs Auguis A.M. No. P-01-1472. June 26, 2003
Ernesto. Formal substitution of heirs is not
necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily FACTS: Petitioner charged respondent (Cleck of Court II) of
appeared, shared in the case and presented usurpation of judicial functions and negligence in
evidence in defense of deceased defendant. the performance of duties, in connection with the
detention of his son, Edilberto Albior. The Office of
R. Rizon the Court Administrator found respondents defense
CASE NO. 64 unconvincing and held him administratively liable
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS for issuing the said detention order prior to a
Macias vs Macias G.R. No. 149617. September 3, 2003 preliminary investigation conducted by a judge and
before a warrant of arrest was issued against the
FACTS: Judge Joaquin S. Macias (herein petitioner) filed accused.
with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage against Margie Corpus Macias (herein ISSUE/S: Whether or not respondent violated the right to
respondent). Summons and complaint were due process of Albior.
published in the newspaper. Respondent filed a
motion to dismiss. RTC denies the motion and RULING: Yes, Respondent might have been motivated by a
issued an Order setting the hearing on May 2 and 3, sincere desire to help the accused and his relatives.
2001. Respondent received a copy of this Order only Because of the unauthorized order issued by
on May 8, 2001. Thus, when the case was called for respondent, the accused Edilberto Albior was
hearing as scheduled, respondent and counsel, not deprived of liberty without due process of law for a
being duly notified, did not appear and allowed the total of 56 days, counted from his unlawful
petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. detention. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law, nor shall
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the trial court violated the right of any person be denied the equal protection of the
the respondent to due process. laws.
27
 CASE NO. 67 from any party, or directs a party when and who to present
Art III Section 1: Aspects of Proceedings as a witness and what matters such witness will testify on.
Andalahao Ty vs Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank 422
CASE NO. 66 SCRA 649 Andalahao
Art III Section 1: Aspects of Proceedings GR 149797-98 CASE NO. 68
Republic vs Sandiganbayan, GR 152154 Nov 18, 2003 Art III Section 1: Aspects of Proceedings
Facts: Respondents Banco Filipino filed with RTC of People vs Larranaga, 412 SCRA 530
Facts: Motion for reconsideration was filed in relation to Batangas an action for reconveyance of real property
the forfeiture of the Swiss deposits of the Marcoses. The against petitioner Nancy Ty, et al. Petitioner filed a motion Facts: The case at bar are motions for reconsiderations
Marcoses asserts that the proceedings under RA 1379 are for the voluntary inhibition or disqualification of separately filed by appellants (1) Francisco Juan Larrañ aga,
criminal in nature and all the rights must be in favor of the respondent Judge Tac-an on the grounds of manifest (2) Josman Aznar, (3) Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and
accused under the constitution and the prosecution has the prejudgment and partiality. Ariel Balansag, and (4) James Anthony Uy and James
burden of proving the respondent's guilt beyond reasonable Andrew Uy, assailing our Decision dated February 3, 2004
doubt. The respondents also argue that the letter and intent Respondent judge denied the motion for inhibition and convicting them of the crimes of (a) special complex crime
of RA 1379 forbid and preclude summary judgment as the ruled that all the orders of the court were based on facts and of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and (b) simple
process to decide forfeiture cases under the law. applicable law and jurisprudence. kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

Issue: W/N the Summary Judgement in the forfeiture Separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed Here petitioners alleged SC erred in finding that the trial
proceeding is a violation of due process with the Court of Appeals. court did not violate the rights of the accused to due process
of law in excluding the testimony of other defense
Ruling: NO. The Marcoses are not being deprived of the Appellate Court dismissed the two petitions and affirmed witnesses.
right to due process. Summary judgment in the forfeiture the assailed orders by respondent judge
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan did not violate the Issue: W/N the Supreme Court erred in finding that the trial
substantive rights of respondent Marcoses as the Issue: W/N CA gravely erred in accepting the course of court did not violate the rights of the accused to due process
proceedings are civil in nature, contrary to the claim of the judicial proceeding exercised by RTC Judge Tac-an of law in excluding the testimony of other defense witnesses
Marcoses that it is penal in character. Respondents were
repeatedly accorded full opportunity to present their case, Ruling: YES. CA erred in affirming the decision of the lower Ruling: NO. The trial court made the correct decision in
their defenses and their pleadings. court. The role of the trial judge in the conduct of judicial excluding some of the witnesses of the defense. For an
proceedings should only be confined to promote the archeologist cannot be a credible witness in ascertaining
Main Point: Due process, a constitutional precept, does not expeditious resolution of controversies and prevent validity of finger prints and the affidavit of the NBI Regional
therefore always and in all situations require a trial-type unnecessary waste of time or to clear up some obscurity. Director has nothing on it that would acquit the accused-
proceeding. The essence of due process is found in the There is, however, undue interference where the judge’s appellants of the crimes they have been convicted.
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit ones participation in the conduct of the trial tends to build or
evidence in support of his defense. What the law prohibits is bolster a case for one of the parties. Main Point: In resolving the instant motions, every piece of
not merely the absence of previous notice but the absence evidence presented before the trial court is evaluated in
thereof and the lack of opportunity to be heard. Main Point: There is undue interference if the judge, as in response to appellants plea for the reversal of their
the instant case, orders the presentation of specific conviction. The element of reasonable doubt so seriously
Andalahao documentary evidence without a corresponding motion

28
sought by appellants is an ignis fatuus which has eluded any postpone the hearing must be characterized by Issue: W/N Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
intelligent ratiocination of their submissions. arbitrariness or capriciousness which is totally absent in the discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction depriving
case under consideration. petitioner of due process in ascertaining the application of
Andalahao EO no. 2
CASE NO. 69 It is duty of the witness to complete his testimony and
Art III Section 1: Aspects of Proceedings make himself available for cross examination in Ruling: NO. The Sandiganbayan did not deny petitioners
R. Transport vs Philhino 494 SCRA 630 GR 148150 accordance with fair play and due process. As his oral due process. The petitioner was given an opportunity to
testimony remained incomplete, the same could not be participate in the proceedings when Sandiganbayan
Facts: R Transport purchased from respondent Sales the subject of cross-examination. directed the petitioner to file its comment on the
Corporation 10 brand new units of buses in which the manifestation and motions but failed to do so. Therefore, he
agreed settlement of payments was not met by R. Transport. Main Point: cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Further, the
Here Philhino seeks to recover the payment from the petitioner was afforded the opportunity to be heard. To be
petitioners. Which during proceedings, main witness of R. Andalahao heard does not only mean presentation of testimonial
Transport has to leave for US to represent an off-shore CASE NO. 70 evidence in court one may also be heard through pleadings,
company where she is the managing director which the Art III Section 1: Aspects of Proceedings and where opportunity to be heard through pleadings is
petitioners filed for a motion to transfer dates of hearing Trans Middle East vs Sandiganbayan 499 SCRA 308 GR accorded, as in this case, there is no denial of due process.
129434
This petition is for certiorari which is to nullify CA Main Point: Where the opportunity to be heard, either
resolutions in affirming the decision of the RTC to deny Facts: EO No. 2 was issued by Pres. Corazon Aquino to go through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the
motion of petitioner to transfer the dates of trial and an after illegally acquired properties by the Marcoses and their party can present its side or defend its interests in due
order striking off the records of direct testimony of the relatives, Atty Narciso declared in a letter that the course, there is no denial of procedural due process.
petitioners. Philippine Commercial Int Bank shares are owned by
former Gov. Romualdez under TMEPEI and thus falls under Who digested: jAn
Issue: W/N CA erred in upholding the decision of the RTC in the jurisdiction of PCGG. PCGG then sequestered the shares CASE NO. 71
denying the petitioner's motion for postponement and in for reconveyance of ill-gotten wealth and placed all the PCIB ART III SEC 1
striking off the records the testimony of a witness bank shares under sequestration. Petitioner TMEPEI filed PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: ASPECTS OF THE
with respondent court a Motion to Intervene alleging that PROCEEDINGS
Ruling: NO. Parties asking for postponement have no right PCGG sequestered its shares without due process and Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation (FMISC)
to assume that their motions would be granted nor to exercised all rights of ownership thereof which was granted
expect that their motion for reconsideration of their denied by respondent Court. FACTS: Respondent FMISC filed for a complaint for a sum of
motion for postponement would be reconsidered. They money when the check issued by the petitioner Elpidio Uy
must be prepared on the day of the hearing. The Court However, on a later, decision respondent court ruled that and a certain Robert Uy for the payment for the ordered
cannot make a finding of grave abuse of discretion disclosures of assets or properties constituting ill-gotten deformed steel bars was dishonored upon presentment and
simply because a court decides to proceed with the trial wealth allegedly amassed during the Marcos regime placed the petitioner refused to pay. Various counsels appeared for
of a case rather than postpone the hearing to another in the names of nominees, agents or trustees be governed the petitioner on various dates due to the rescheduling of
day because of the absence of a party or a party's by EO No. 2. the hearings. During the hearing on Feb. 28, 2002, Atty.
witness. To constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting Bañ ares, counsel for the petitioner, arrived late. Upon
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the refusal of the court to motion of FMISC, the trial court ordered that petitioner's

29
right to present evidence is deemed waived and the parties $1.00, plaintiff incurring a total loss of PHP45M. In
were directed to file their respective memorandum. The accordance with the security arrangement between the
case was deemed submitted for decision. Petitioner, parties, the plaintiff applied the defendants’ deposits in the
through Atty. Lucas C. Carpio, Jr. filed a Motion for New Trial Hold-Out Accounts to pay for the loss. According to the
on the ground of gross negligence of petitioner's counsel in plaintiff, there remained an unpaid amount of
failing to attend the hearing for the reception of evidence, ₱11,251,032.47. Despite demands, the defendants failed to
thus impairing his rights to due process. pay the said amount and even denied having made any
investments in US$: ₱ F/X Forwards with and through the
ISSUE: W/N Motion for New Trial can be given to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then prayed that the defendants
petitioner. would pay for the losses incurred and filed their
Objections/Comments to the Plaintiff’s Formal Offer of
RULING: No. The records show that the hearings were Documentary Evidence. TC denied the admission of the
postponed or cancelled without any justification. However, documentary evidences. Plaintiff then filed for a petition for
the trial court accommodated the requests for certiorari with the CA but subsequently was denied.
postponement or resetting to accord petitioner due process. Aggrieved, plaintiff seeks relief to this court claiming that
Under the circumstances, we find petitioner's counsel's the appellate court erred in considering TC judge’s denial of
failure to attend the seven scheduled hearings without admission of the evidences.
justifiable reason tantamount to inexcusable neglect. As
such, it cannot be a ground for new trial. ISSUE: W/N CA erred in considering TC judge’s denial of
admission of the evidences.
MAIN POINT: Negligence to be excusable must be one
which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have RULING: No. In this case, we note that the trial court failed
guarded against. to state its reasons for reconsidering its earlier order, and
for admitting the documentary evidence of the petitioners
jAn only as part of the testimonies of its witnesses. At any rate,
CASE NO. 72 we find that the issue raised in this case is not jurisdictional;
ART III SEC 1 hence, the filing of the petition for certiorari with the CA
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: ASPECTS OF THE was not proper.
PROCEEDINGS
Deutsche bank v. Chua MAINPOINT: Where the issue or question involves or
affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision—not
FACTS: Deutsche bank of Manila filed a complaint for Sum the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision—the
of money against the petitioner spouses. The complaint same is beyond the province of a petition for certiorari.
alleged that the defendants was given a Cut-Loss order to
close their F/X Forward positions once the exchange rate
hits PHP26.45: $1.00. Due to the highly illiquid conditions of Who digested: jAn
the foreign exchange market at that time, the Cut-Loss order CASE NO. 73
was implemented at the average closing rate of PHP30.41: ART III SEC 1
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: ASPECTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS
People v. Santos
FACTS: Respondents is charged for Rape for allegedly
sexually assaulting a 5-year old child. In the Prosecution’s
version of the incident, sometime in between July 17 and 23,
1999, AAA was playing at the northern portion of a certain
bridge in Pampanga when she was taken by the appellant
and brought to his house where he had sexual intercourse
with her. In the Appellant’s version, he testified that his job
was to drive his employer, BBB, whenever the latter had
appointments in Manila. And whenever there were no
appointments, Santos drove a passenger jeepney. And on
July 23, 1999, appellant went to Makati at 10 am and only
returned at 10pm. On July 30, 1999, when he was sweeping
the ground in front of his house, a white van pulled over and
its occupants introduced themselves as police officers and
asked him if he was Rene Santos. Thereafter, he was taken
to the police headquarters for questioning. Once they
arrived at the headquarters, he was detained and remained
in detention up to the time of his trial. The Court found no
reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and CA. It is well
established that the testimony of a rape victim is generally
given full weight and credit, more so, if she is a 5-year-old
child as in this case. Santos faults the trial judge for acting as
the prosecutor and judge at the same time, for allegedly
initiating and propounding the questions, short of supplying
the desired answer from the witness.
The RTC ruled found Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt
and sentenced him to death penalty and to indemnify the
offended party. On appeal, the CA affirmed, and in addition,
ordered Santos to pay moral damages and exemplary
damages.
ISSUE: W/N the right to due process of Santos was violated.
30
RULING: No. The record discloses that the questions
propounded by the judge were intended to elicit the truth
from the child witness. This perceived undue
inquisitiveness of the judge did not unduly harm the
substantial rights of the appellant. Judges should have as
much interest as the counsel in the orderly and
expeditious presentation of evidence, calling attention
of counsel to points at issue that are overlooked,
directing them to ask the question that would elicit the
facts on the issues involved, and clarifying ambiguous
remarks by witnesses. Unless they take an active part in
trials in the above form and manner and allow counsel to
ask questions whether pertinent or impertinent, material or
immaterial, the speedy administration of justice which the
aim of the Government is and of the people cannot be
attained.
MAIN POINT: In Bold
jAn
CASE NO. 74
ART III SEC 1
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: ASPECTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS
Victoriano v. People
FACTS: Petitioner Marianito Victoriano and a certain
Raymond Illustre were charged of the complex crime of
estafa through falsification of commercial documents
supported by various witnesses with their testimonies. The
Sandiganbayan acquitted petitioner of the charge of the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents. However, he was found liable for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner then argued that he
was denied of his right to due process and that he did not
waive his right to participate in the trial or to cross-examine
the witnesses presented by the prosecution.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner was denied of his right to due documents submitted. The Evaluating Panel later submitted
process. to Gonzalez a Report concurring with the DILG Report but
concluding that there was no sufficient basis to proceed
RULING: No. In the instant case, petitioner’s counsel did not with the conduct of a preliminary investigation. NBI-NCR
cross-examine the opposing party’s witnesses due to his recommended DOJ to designate a panel of state prosecutors
failure to cooperate in preparing his defense. In fact, records (Investigating Panel) to conduct a preliminary investigation
show that it was petitioner’s counsel who suggested to the of the case. The Investigating Panel found probable cause to
court to cite him in contempt and to cancel his bail bond for indict the respondents-herein petitioners for Reckless
failure to attend the hearings. Thus, he could not complain Imprudence resulting in Multiple Homicide and Physical
at this stage of the proceedings that he was denied the right Injuries, and recommended the conduct of a separate
to confront the witnesses against him. preliminary investigation against certain public officials.
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the said October
MAIN POINT: The right to confront and cross-examine the 9, 2006 Resolution, filed on October 30, 2006 with
opposing party’s witnesses is indeed a fundamental right abundance of caution, is pending resolution, and in the
which is part of due process. However, the right is a present petition they additionally pray for its annulment. In
personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly asserting their right to due process, specifically to a fair and
by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of impartial preliminary investigation, petitioners impute
cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the reversible errors in the assailed issuances, arguing that:
opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail  Respondents have already prejudged the case, as
himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross- shown by the public declarations of Respondent
examine and the testimony given on direct examination of Secretary and the Chief Executive, and have,
the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the therefore, lost their impartiality to conduct
record. preliminary investigation.
 Respondents have already prejudged the case as
Who digested: jAn shown by the indecent haste by which the
CASE NO. 75 proceedings were conducted.
ART III SEC 1  The alleged complaint-affidavits filed against
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: ASPECTS OF THE Petitioners were not under oath.
PROCEEDINGS  The supposed complaint-affidavits filed against
Santos v. DOJ Petitioners failed to state the acts or omissions
constituting the crime
FACTS: Hours before the show “Wowowee”, an unruly mob
caused a stampede claiming 71 lives and left hundreds ISSUE: W/N petitioner is denied of his right to due process
wounded. Respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzalez specifically to a fair and impartial preliminary investigation.
constituted an Evaluating Panel to evaluate the report made
by the DILG inter-agency fact finding team and determine RULING: No. There was no proof that Gonzalez exerted
whether there is sufficient basis to proceed with the undue pressure on his subordinates to tailor their decision
conduct of a preliminary investigation on the basis of the with his public declarations and adhere to a pre-determined
31
result. Therefore, there was no violation of the petitioners’
right to due process, specifically to a fair and impartial
investigation. The Court also found that there was no
indecent haste of proceedings.
MAIN POINT: There was no proof that Gonzalez exerted
undue pressure on his subordinates to tailor their decision
with his public declarations and adhere to a pre-determined
result.
CHAM
Case No. 76
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
DBP vs. Teston
FACTS
Teston purchased, on installment basis from
petitioner two parcels of land. Respondent was unable to
pay amortizations which had amounted to P3,727,435.57.
DBP thus rescinded their contract by letter. It turned out
that respondent had voluntarily offered the two parcels of
land for inclusion in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Respondent alleged that under Republic
Act No. 6657, his obligation to DBP was assumed by the
government through the Land Bank after the two parcels of
land became covered by the CARP, and that the operation of
said law extinguished DBP's right to rescind the sale. DBP
alleged that since respondent had not acquired title to the
two parcels of land, he had no right to voluntarily offer them
to the CARP. The CA ordered DBP to return to respondent
P1M alleged down payment
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the CA erred in ordering DBP to
return theP1M down payment
RULING
Yes. Rescission of a sale creates the obligation to respondent’s witnesses. Records show that the petitioner
return the things which were the object of the contract, received copies of the private respondent’s witness’s
together with their fruits, and the price with its interests is affidavits but she did not choose to controvert these
undisputed. However, to require DBP to return the alleged affidavits or to file a supplement to her motion for
P1,000,000 without first giving it an opportunity to present reconsideration. She simply maintained in her
evidence would violate the Constitutional provision that "no Manifestation that her receipt of the affidavits did not alter
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without the fact the she was deprived of due process nor cure the
due process of law.” In the case at bar, DBP had no irregularity in the November 4, 2002 Decision.
opportunity to present evidence on its behalf.
ISSUE/S
MAIN POINT WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DENIED OF
The essence of due process is to be found in the THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE TO DUE PROCESS
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any WHEN SHE WAS DEPRIVED OF HER RIGHT TO CONFRONT
evidence one may have in support of one's defense. THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED AGAINST HER BEFORE THE
DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN WAS
CHAM RENDERED.
Case No. 77
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process RULING
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS No. The ruling made by CA is legally correct as
Ruivivar vs. OMB exhaustion of administrative remedies is a requisite for the
filing of a petition for certiorari. Other than this legal
FACTS significance, however, the ruling necessarily carries the
Private respondent filed an Affidavit-Complaint direct and immediate implication that the petitioner has been
charging the petitioner of serious misconduct, conduct granted the opportunity to be heard and has refused to avail
unbecoming of a public official, abuse of authority, and of this opportunity; hence, she cannot claim denial of due
violations of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner, process.
shouted at her in a very arrogant and insulting manner,
hurled invectives upon her person, and prevented her from MAIN POINT
entering the office of the LTO Commissioner. To prove her The exhaustion principle applies when the ruling
allegations, the private respondent presented the affidavits court or tribunal is not given the opportunity to re-examine
of three witnesses. The Ombudsman then directed the its findings and conclusions because of an available
parties to submit their respective memoranda. The opportunity that a party seeking recourse against the court
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that or the tribunals ruling omitted to take. Under the concept of
she was deprived of due process because she was not due process, on the other hand, a violation occurs when a
furnished copies of the affidavits of the private respondent’s court or tribunal rules against a party without giving him or
witnesses. The Ombudsman responded to the petitioner’s her the opportunity to be heard. Thus, the exhaustion
motion for reconsideration by ordering that the petitioner principle is based on the perspective of the ruling court or
be furnished with copies of the affidavits of the private
32
tribunal, while due process is considered from the point of to defend their rights and the court likewise allowed the ISSUE/S
view of the litigating party against whom a ruling was made. parties to file their respective memoranda prior to ruling on Whether or not Cesa’s right to due process violated
the motion for reconsideration. when he was suspended for six months as city treasurer
CHAM
Case No. 78 MAIN POINT RULING
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process The essence of due process is found in the No. The appellate court correctly ruled that
ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any procedural lapses, if any, were cured when Cesa
Borromeo vs. Garcia evidence in support of one’s defense—what the law participated in the preliminary conference, submitted his
FACTS proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be heard. What the counter-affidavit and supplemental counter-affidavit,
On August 17, 1938, Patricia Ruedas Vda. De law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be heard. As actively participated in the proceedings by cross-examining
Andrada (Patricia) executed, for valuable consideration, a long as a party is given the opportunity to defend his witnesses, and filed a motion for reconsideration before the
document granting a road right of way to spouses Gil Garcia interests in due course, he would have no reason to Office of the Ombudsman. Cesa was given every opportunity
and Teresa Escañ o de Garcia (Garcia couple) over Lot No. 6- complain, for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes to explain his side and to present evidence in his defense
H-2. Patricia sold the property to petitioner. On April 17, up the essence of due process. during the administrative investigation. True, the case
1952, the Garcia couple went to the Court of First Instance mutated when the graft investigators discovered evidence
(CFI) of Cebu and moved for the annotation of the August against and impleaded the city officials, but Cesa filed a
17, 1938 document executed by Patricia. Petitioner CHAM supplemental affidavit to controvert the charges and later
contended that the Order of the Court dated July 23, 1997 Case No. 79 participated in the hearings
violated its fundamental right to substantive and procedural ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
due process, that the petition of respondent was for specific ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS MAIN POINT
performance of a private agreement cognizable only by an Cesa vs OMB There is no denial of due process if records show
ordinary court and not a cadastral court, and that the that hearings were held with prior notice to adverse parties.
petition of respondent was a procedural shortcut to enforce FACTS Even without notice, there is no denial of procedural due
a stale order citing Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court, In 1995, government auditors conducted a surprise process if the parties were given the opportunity to be
the statute of limitations and prescription audit at the Cash Division of Cebu City Hall. Paymaster heard. Due process in administrative proceedings simply
` Badana had cash advances of more than P216 million means an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the order
ISSUE/S fraudulently incurred by presenting cash items such as complained of and it cannot be fully equated with that in
Whether or not there was error in the nullity of the payrolls and vouchers already previously credited to her strict jurisprudential sense. A respondent is not entitled to
Order for the denial of petitioner’s substantive and account to cover the balance or shortage during cash counts. be informed of the preliminary findings and
procedural right to due process The OMB found Cesa (city treasurer) and the other city recommendations of the investigating agency; he is entitled
officials guilty of neglect of duty and meted to them the only to a fair opportunity to be heard and to a decision
RULING penalty of six months suspension without pay. Cesa argued based on substantial evidence
No. The records reveal that the court furnished that there was lack of due process because the complaint
petitioner its Order of July 23, 1997, which reiterated its filed against him was not verified. He also argued in his CHAM
previous order of April 17, 1952 through former Judge petition for review that the Ombudsman had no power to Case No. 80
Ignacio Debuque. More importantly, the court heard directly suspend him and that there was no legal and factual ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
petitioners motion for reconsideration in open court basis to suspend him. ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
wherein both parties presented their respective arguments DAR vs. Samson

33
 including respondents’ application for exemption and its life, liberty, honor and property. Furthermore, the petition
FACTS supporting documents. Neither can the DAR be faulted for for certiorari before the CA by the petitioner without the
Samson applied for exemption from the coverage of sending its notices to respondents’ predecessor’s previous benefit of a counsel should have alerted the CA and should
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) over address in Quezon City as it was the same address have required petitioner to cause the entry of appearance of
nine (9) parcels of land. In an undated Order issued appearing in the undated his counsel.
sometime in 1995, the subject lots were declared exempt
from CARP coverage by DAR Regional Director. Petitioners- MAIN POINT MAIN POINT: In criminal cases, the right of an accused
farmers filed an Opposition/Petition alleging that they In administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable.
received the undated Order of DAR only on January 1997. opportunity to explain one’s side suffices to meet the Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due
On August 9, 1999, Samson assailed the Order before the requirements of due process. process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and
Office of the President arguing that he was not notified of executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded
the appeal; that had he been properly apprised, he could PASTOR the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel.
have presented evidence to prove that the properties have a Case No. 81
slope of 18% or over and are not developed; and that Art III Sec 1: Aspects of Proceedings PASTOR
petitioner-farmers are not qualified beneficiaries of the Hilario vs. People Case No. 82
CARP. He denied that he was represented during the alleged 551 SCRA 191; GR 161070, April 14, 2008 Art III Sec 1: Aspects of Proceedings
ocular inspection conducted by DAR on February 1998. The Pasiona, Jr. vs. CA
Office of the President ruled that any alleged procedural FACTS: Petitioner, after being meted a total of 16 years of 559 SCRA 137; GR 165471, July 21, 2008
lapses committed in the proceedings before the DAR were imprisonment for the crime of homicide, insists that the
cured when Samson interposed the appeal before it which failure of his counsel to timely file a notice of appeal of his FACTS: After due investigation, the management of San
gave him an opportunity to present evidence and to judgment of conviction despite his explicit instruction to do Miguel Corp. found petitioner guilty of gross negligence,
substantiate the claim that the subject land is exempt from so constitutes excusable negligence and so his petition for withholding of funds due the company, and
CARP coverage. Likewise, the DAR Secretary considered all relief should have been granted. RTC dismissed the petition. insubordination. Petitioner, after notice, was subsequently
available records including Samson’s application for Without the benefit of a counsel, petitioner filed for terminated. Petitioner in turn filed for a complaint of illegal
exemption thus, there is no denial of due process. certiorari but CA dismissed it and the subsequent motion dismissal. Labor arbiter granted the petition. NLRC however
for reconsideration was likewise dismissed because it was reversed it. CA, on certiorari, assailed NLRC’s decision
ISSUE/S not made within the 15-day reglementary period fixed by holding that petitioner knowingly violated company’s rules
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN law rendered the resolution final and executory. which constitutes just cause for his termination. No motion
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS WERE DENIED DUE for reconsideration was filed and CA’s decision became final
PROCESS OF LAW ISSUE: Whether or not the delay in appealing the instant and executory. Five months later, however, petitioner filed
case due to the defiance of the petitioner’s counsel de oficio for certiorari maintaining that despite inquiries with his
RULING to seasonably file a Notice of Appeal constitutes excusable former counsel, he was not informed by the latter of the
No. It was not shown that farmers-petitioners sent negligence to entitle the undersigned detention CA’s decision and the non-filing of motion for
notices or copies of their Opposition/Petition to prisoner/petitioner to pursue his appeal. reconsideration thereof.
respondents. However, as correctly ruled by the Office of
the President, there is no denial of due process because the RULING: YES. ISSUE: W/N CA’s decision can be nullified for constituting a
DAR Secretary, in issuing the assailed Order, considered all Failure to file within the reglementary period which renders denial of due process of law by reason of counsel’s failure to
available records of the case at the DAR Regional Office, decisions final and executory can be relaxed on matters of file a motion for reconsideration.

34

RULING: NO.
He was not denied of due process of law because he had the
opportunity to be heard at some point of the proceedings
even if they had not been able to fully exhaust all the
remedies available by reason of their counsel’s negligence
or mistake. He had been able to present all his evidence and
fully ventilate his arguments before the Labor Arbiter, then
on appeal before the NLRC, and even in his petition for
certiorari before the CA.
MAIN POINT: So long as a party is given the opportunity to
advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it
cannot be said that there was denial of due process.
PASTOR
Case No. 83
Art III Sec 1: Aspects of Proceedings
Bibas vs. OMB (Visayas) and COA
559 SCRA 591; GR 172580, July 23, 2008
FACTS: OMB charged LOURDESITA M. BIBAS, Disbursing
Officer II in the City Treasurer’s Office, Silay City, with
Dishonesty and meted the penalty of dismissal from service
for failure to account the shortage, amounting to
P990,341.10, from her cash accountability as evidenced by
the cash examination conducted by COA. She answered that
she misplaced two bundles of paid payrolls because COA
personnel would borrow them every now and then. CA, on
certiorari by the petitioner, dismissed it holding that appeal
is the correct remedy and not certiorari. She filed motion for
reconsideration after 22 days but CA again dismissed for
not complying with the reglementary period of 15 days.
0She however maintains that procedural errors were
attributable to her former counsel’s negligence.
ISSUE: W/N her former counsel’s negligence warrants the
relaxation of procedural rules in the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not a conviction of “Grave Misconduct”
RULING: NO. may be meted for the charge of “Conduct Prejudicial to the
Petitioner has failed to present a strong case through the Best interest of the Service”.
pleadings she has submitted to warrant relaxation of rules.
She cannot even finger point any particular COA personnel RULING: NO.
and she eventually admitted that it was all due to her Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the
carelessness and negligence. service does not necessarily include the elements of grave
misconduct. The word “gross” connotes “something beyond
MAIN POINT: In order to secure relaxation of rules due to measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant;
negligence of the counsel, the defendant must satisfy the shameful” while “prejudicial” means “detrimental or
court with a good and meritorious defense sufficient to derogatory to a party; naturally, probably or actually
warrant such relaxation. bringing about a wrong result.” The Petitioner however is
not absolved from liability for acting as a puppet for
PASTOR unscrupulous judges.
Case No. 84
Art III Sec 1: Aspects of Proceedings MAIN POINT: A basic requirement of due process is that a
Espiña vs. Cerujano person must be duly informed of the charges against him
550 SCRA 107; GR 149377, March 28, 2008 and that (b) a person can not be convicted of a crime which
he was not charged. Administrative proceedings are not
FACTS: Petitioner, Jesus Clarito Espiñ a, a Prosecutor of the exempt from this rule.
Office of the Public Prosecutor of Lao-ang, Northern Samar,
signed a Motion to Dismiss for Criminal Case No. 1276 upon PASTOR
Trial Judge’s request. The same trial judge granted the Case No. 85
motion thereafter. Respondents, as a result, filed an admin Art III Sec 1: Aspects of Proceedings
case for Conduct Prejudicial to the best interest of the service Geronga vs. Varela
against Jesus Clarito Espiñ a. The Secretary of Justice later 546 SCRA 429; GR 160846, February 22, 2008
formally charged petitioner with conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and FACTS: Petitioner Benjamin Geronga works as Engineer IV
subsequently found him guilty of grave misconduct which at the General Services Department of the local government
the President affirmed and later meted a dismissal. of Cadiz City. In 1996, he was involved in two administrative
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. CA also cases: 1) Administrative Case (AC) No. 96-04 for Unjust
denied his appeal. Petitioner on Certiorari, argued that he Vexation, Contempt, Insubordination, Conduct Unbecoming
was not afforded due process because he was found guilty a Public Officer, and Alarm and Scandal; and 2)
and penalized for grave misconduct, even though the charge Administrative Case (AC) No. 96-05 for Grave Misconduct
filed against him was for conduct grossly prejudicial to the and engaging in Partisan Political Activity. Both complaints
best interest of the service. resulted to the dismissal of the petitioner as recommended
by the City Legal Officer. CSC, on appeal, sustained the
35
dismissal. CA also upheld the dismissal and dismissed the from service and also dismissed his Motion for ISSUE: WON the petitioner was afforded sufficient Due
petition for review thereafter. reconsideration. The CA reversed the decision on the Process of Law
ground that Magno could not be found guilty of Grave
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was denied due Misconduct without violating his right to due process. RULING: Yes. Petitioner was furnished a copy of the
process under the Resolution/Recommendation of the City charges against him and he was able to file an answer and
Legal Officer. ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman violated Magno’s right to Due present evidence in his defense. Consequently, a decision
Process of Law was rendered by the NTC finding him guilty of an offense
RULING: YES. which was not specifically designated in the Show Cause
In the present case, the records of AC No. 96-04 reveal that RULING: Yes. As found by the CA, Magno was clearly Order, but was still based on acts that were alleged therein,
petitioner was dismissed for an act which was not alleged in deprived of his right to due process when he was convicted which compromised the image and integrity of his public
the administrative charge filed against him. Nowhere in the of a much serious offense, carrying a more severe penalty, office. Clearly, therefore, due process was observed in this
records of AC No. 96-04 does it appear that petitioner was without him being properly informed thereof or being case.
charged with grave misconduct, or that he was held to provided with the opportunity to be heard thereon.
answer for his alleged defamatory statements. AC No. 96- MAINPOINT: In administrative proceedings, due process
05 Resolution should likewise be rendered void ab initio MAINPOINT: In administrative proceedings, due process simply means the opportunity to explain one's side or the
for being in utter contempt of petitioner’s due process. simply means the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
MAIN POINT: complained of.
Two fundamental requirements of due process in AIMAR
administrative cases are that: CASE NO. 88
1. a person must be duly informed of the charges AIMAR ART. III, SEC. 1: Procedural Due Process – Aspects of the
against him; CASE NO. 87 Proceedings
2. and that he cannot be convicted of an offense or ART. III, SEC. 1: Procedural Due Process – Aspects of the Romualdez vs. COMELEC
crime with which he was not charged. Proceedings
A deviation from these requirements renders the Avenido vs. CSC FACTS: Private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit
proceeding invalid and the judgment issued therein a against Sps. Romualdez for violation of the OEC and section
lawless thing that can be struck down anytime. FACTS: Avenido prepared the Order of Payment and 12 of RA 8189 or Voter’s Registration Act, for making false
delivered the same to the Cashier, and made it appear that information as to their residence in their applications as
AIMAR Animus International complied with an application for new voters in Burauen, Leyte, wherein petitioners filed a
CASE NO. 86 Permit to Import its mobile telephone units. NTC issued him Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss. The
ART. III, SEC. 1: Procedural Due Process – Aspects of the a Show Cause Order and later on charged him with Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary
Proceedings Dishonesty, Falsification of Public Documents and investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the
OMB vs. Magno Usurpation of Authority. NTC then found him guilty of evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service which against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial
FACTS: Magno was administratively charged with was not included in the Show Cause Order. CSC affirmed, Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same. But COMELEC
Misconduct and Oppression for his supposed violation of which merits the penalty of dismissal. Petitioner claims that filed with the RTC separate information against
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act but was held guilty of he was deprived of due process of law. petitioners for violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation
Grave Misconduct by the Ombudsman, and dismissed him to Section 45 (j) of the RA 8189. So petitioners are of the

36
view that they were not accorded due process of law. ISSUE: WON petitioner was deprived of its right to Due rife with prime procedural infirmities. Petitioners
Specifically, their right to refute or submit documentary Process of Law claimed that it is within the RTC’s discretion to disregard
evidence against the new charges which COMELEC ordered the procedural formalities.
to be filed against them. RULING: Yes. The negligence of petitioner’s former counsel
is so gross that he was deprived of his day in court, thus ISSUE: WON the CA erred in setting aside the RTC’s decision
ISSUE: WON Due Process of Law was violated denying him due process. While it is settled that negligence
of counsel binds the client, this rule is not without RULING: No. RTC hastily approved the plan in the same
RULING: No. The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private exception. order giving due course to the petition. The RTC also failed
respondent with the COMELEC is understood in a language to refer for evaluation the rehabilitation plan to the
which embraces the allegations necessary to support the Exceptions are 1.) In cases where reckless or gross receiver. Hence, depriving the respondent’s right to Due
charges filed by the COMELEC. The charges are based on the negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of Process of Law, petition is dismissed and CA’s decision is
same set of facts and their nature are the same, such that, law, or 2.) When the application would result in outright affirmed.
petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or deprivation of the client’s liberty or property, or 3.) Where
submit documentary evidence against the charges that the the interest of justice so requires. MAINPOINT: While it is true that the Rules of Procedure
COMELEC filed with the RTC. shall be liberally construed, this does not mean that the
MAINPOINT: In cases where one of the exceptions is courts may disregard the rules, especially when it deprives
MAINPOINT: Petitioners were afforded due process present, the courts must step in and accord relief to a client a person’s right to Due Process of Law.
because they were granted the opportunity to refute the who suffered by reason of the counsel’s gross or palpable
allegations in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. mistake or negligence.
CASE NO. 91
ART 3, SEC 1: Procedural Due Process
AIMAR AIMAR Aspects of the proceedings
CASE NO. 89 CASE NO. 90 Catacutan v. people
ART. III, SEC. 1: Procedural Due Process – Aspects of the ART. III, SEC. 1: Procedural Due Process – Aspects of the FACTS: The appellant raped AAA, an 11 year old girl at
Proceedings Proceedings around 3:00 a.m. of 20 January 2000, AAA, who was
Multi-Trans Agency vs. Oriental Assurance Corp Siochi Fishery Enterprises, Inc. vs. Bank of the sleeping beside her 10-year old brother and 2-year old
Philippine Islands(BPI) nephew inside the store when she was awakened by a
FACTS: The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC ordering mosquito bite and saw appellant lying on top of her. AAA
petitioner to pay respondent a sum of money for its breach FACTS: Petitioners borrowed money from the BPI. When asked permission to urinate first before appellant brought
of contract in the delivery of goods when his counsel failed petitioner filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation, the her to a vacant lot at the back of the store. Appellant raped
to file an answer and to act after receipt of the declaration of BPI filed their comment saying the rehabilitation plan was her while pointing a knife at her chest, and threatening to
default issued by the CA which constituted simple unfeasible and prejudicial to them, but the RTC hastily kill her family if she reports the incident. On the same day
negligence, and as a rule binding to the petitioner, not ruled in favor of petitioners violating the Rules of AAA undergo medical examination which further proved
entitling him to a new trial. Petitioner claims that it has Procedure in Rehabilitation Cases that “if the court is that she lost her virginity. Appellant was guilty of rape. In
been unduly deprived of its rights to be heard and to satisfied that there is merit in the petition, it shall give due his brief appellant contends that the prosecution failed to
present its defense, through no fault of its own, thus course to the petition and immediately refer the same and prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He questions the
violating his right to due process of law. its annexes to the rehabilitation receiver.” So, the CA credibility of the victim’s testimony. Appellant alleges that
reversed the RTC’s ruling stating that the proceeding was the victim’s testimony is "highly incredible and not in

37
consonance with reason and common experience.”
ISSUE: WON the testimony is credible enough to convict the
appellant
RULING: YES. No young woman especially of tender age
would create a story of defloration, allow an examination of
her private parts, and pervert herself by being subjected to
public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to
obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. In the
prosecution of rape cases, conviction or acquittal
depends on the credence to be accorded to the
complainant’s testimony because of the fact that
usually, the participants are the only eyewitnesses to
the occurrences.
MP BOLD
CASE NO. 92
ART 3, SEC 1: Procedural Due Process
Aspects of the proceedings
Mortel v kerr
FACTS: Mortel seeks the reversal of the resolution for his
petition for review on certiorari on his property which was
sold on a public auction because Mortal was in default due
to the incompetence ignorance or inexperience of his
counsel, he was prejudiced and denied his day in court
when Atty Mas did not appear in court. Atty Tumulak filed a
notice of appearance in behalf of Mortel but the RTC did not
act on such notice because of the lack of submission on the
part of Atty Mas’ withdrawal as counsel. With Atty. Tumulak
left out and unaware of the developments in the case,
Mortel, upon receipt of the decision and feeling abandoned
again by Atty. Tumulak, his new counsel, engaged Atty.
Lacambra to collaborate as his counsel.
ISSUE: WON Mortel was deprived of his property without
due process of law.
RULING: YES. Mortel did not have his day in court, because
he was unable to submit his evidence to controvert the
claim of Kerr about the RTC declared Mortel as in default
due to his counsel’s failure to appear at the fifth setting of
the pre-trial. Moreover, he did not offer any explanation for
his non-appearance at the pre-trial despite notice nor did he
take the necessary move to protect the interest of Mortel
upon learning that Mortel had been declared as in default by
the RTC. The negligence and mistakes committed by his
several counsels were so gross and palpable that they
denied due process to Mortel and could have cost him his
valuable asset.
MAIN POINT: The negligence and mistakes committed by
his several counsels were so gross and palpable that they
denied due process to Mortel and could have cost him his
valuable asset. They prevented him from presenting his
side, which was unfair and unjust to him on account of his
defense being plausible and seemingly meritorious.
CASE NO. 93
ART 3, SEC 1: Procedural Due Process
Aspects of the proceedings
Gravides v. COMELEC
FACTS: Borjal and Gravides both ran for the position of
Punong Barangay of Barangay U.P. during the 2010
Barangay Elections. Where Gravides won by 2 votes. Borja
filed an election protest for revision, re appreciation and
recounting of ballots. Gravides filed her answer and move
for the dismissal of the protest for non compliance with Sec
4 rule 9 of A.M no. 07-4-15-SC as to the contents of the
preliminary conference brief. Borja Appelead arguing that
the METC misinformed him of the contents of the
preliminary conference brief in its Notice of Pre Trial
Conference.
ISSUE: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
when it blamed the court for the failure of the counsel for
Gravides to be cognizant of the required contents of his
preliminary conference brief
RULING: No. no grave abuse of discretion by COMELEC who
only warrants a more reasonable and liberal application of
the rules. The mistake committed by Borjal’s counsel in
complying with the court’s directive should not prejudice
his cause, as nointent to unduly prolong the resolution of
the election protest can be gleaned from his actions
MAIN POINT: While procedural rules are intended for the
speedy disposition of election cases, this should not delay
this Commission from compliance with the established
principles of fairness and justice
CASE NO. 94
ART 3, SEC 1: Procedural Due Process
Publicity and TV coverage
Webb v De Leon
FACTS: The NBI filed with the DOJ a letter of complaint
charging petitioners Webb et al with the crime of Rape and
Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in
their home BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30,
1991. Immediately, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors
headed by Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Zuno to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The DOJ Panel for its finding of
probable cause. The credibility of Jessica Alfaro was assailed
as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to her
inconsistencies. They criticize the procedure followed by
the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify
the alleged inconsistencies. Petitioners charge that
respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge
Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them
without conducting the required preliminary examination.
Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to
due process and violation of their right to an impartial
investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that
attended their preliminary investigation
ISSUE: WON DOJ Panel lost its fairness due to the
prejudicial publicity conducted in the press and broadcast
media by the NBI.
RULING: No. media coverage of trials of sensational cases
cannot be avoided and oftentimes, few cases can match the
high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the
preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Even the
principal actors in the case; the NBI, the respondents, their
lawyers and their sympathizers, have participated in this
38
media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threathis right ISSUE: Whether or not the publicity given to this case
to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be RULING: No. We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he impaired the accused-appellants right to a fair trial.
completely closed to the press and the public. was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
Under other circumstances publicity may deprive publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave RULING: No. The Court revisited its pronouncements in
someone his rights to due process; there must be allegation the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile People v. Teehankee, Jr., viz, the Court cannot sustain
and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not and high stake criminal trials. Pervasive publicity is appellants’ claim that they were denied the right to
simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the
not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. The right of an
case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press.
that the tone and content, of the publicity that attended thea day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused’s
investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and
prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible
impartiality of the DOJ Panel judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of
to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal
CASE NO. 95 and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal field. The press does not simply publish information
ART 3, SEC 1: Procedural Due Process cases. There is nothing wrong in Leino's identification of about trials but guards against the miscarriage of
Publicity and TV coverage appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and
People v Teehankee records reveal that this mode was resorted to by the judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
FACTS: Claudio teehankee was identified as the gunman authorities for security reasons. criticism.
who shot Chapman and Maureen Hultman while leino was MP BOLD
walking Maureen Hultman home. Leino being the sole MAIN POINT IN BOLD
survivor and 3 other witness who saw the incident. In E.C. Perez
addition, the NBI conducted line ups where The NBI agents CASE NO. 96 E.C. Perez
forced teehankee to join the lineup and placed him in the ART. III, SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CASE NO. 97
number seven (7) slot. He observed that the man who was PUBLICITY AND TV COVERAGE ART. III, SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
to identify him was already in the room. As soon as he People v. Sanchez (January 25, 1999) PUBLICITY AND TV COVERAGE
walked up to the lineup, Cadenas identified him as the People v. Sanchez (October 18, 2001)
gunman. A second identification was made on the same day FACTS: This case was known as the Allan Gomez-Eileen
at a house in Forbes Park. The NBI agents brought him to Sarmenta rape-slay that drew strong condemnation from an FACTS: This case is a motion for reconsideration of the
Forbes Park but he never saw Jussi Leino who allegedly outraged populace in the middle of 1993. Accused- Supreme Court’s January 25, 1999 decision, affirming in
identified him as the gunman in a lineup. A third appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of toto the judgment of conviction rendered by the RTC finding
identification was conducted on July 24, 1991. He was then seven (7) counts of rape with homicide. The prosecution’s accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
seated at the office of Ranin for he refused to join another version of the events was based mainly on the recollections crime of rape with homicide in the infamous Allan Gomez-
lineup. Despite his protest, the NBI agents insisted on the of its star witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Aileen Sarmenta rape-slay. In his motion for
conduct of the identification and ordered a group of men to Malabanan— who were originally co-conspirators but later reconsideration, one of the accused-appellants Mayor
line up alongside him. While thus seated, he was identified on turned into state witnesses; both admitted having taken Antonio Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and
by Mangubat as the gunman. He complained that he was not part in the abduction of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, conviction by publicity.
assisted by counsel at any stage of said investigation. but denied any personal involvement in the rape of Eileen
and the twin killings that followed.
ISSUE: WON his out-of-court identification is prejudicial to

39
ISSUE: Whether or not Mayor Antonio Sanchez, one of the of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal Perez v. Estrada (September 13, 2001)
accused-appellants, is a victim of trial and conviction by cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada
publicity. before the Sandiganbayan in order to assure the public of FACTS: MR of the June 29, 2001 decision denying
full transparency. In effect, the petition seeks a re- petitioners' request for permission to televise and
RULING: No. The court cannot sustain appellant’s claim that examination of the resolution of the Court in a case for libel broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before
he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial filed by then President Corazon C. Aquino, wherein the the Sandiganbayan filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave Court resolved to PROHIBIT live radio and television the petitioners, who argues that there is really no conflict
the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile coverage of court proceedings. between the right of the people to public information and
and high stake criminal trials. The right of an accused to a the freedom of the press, on the one hand, and, on the other,
fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, ISSUE: Whether or not the petition of allowing live media the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a clash
responsible reporting enhances an accused’s right to a fair coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the
trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. right of the people and the press because the people, as the
been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial Estrada before the Sandiganbayan should be granted. repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and
administration, especially in the criminal field The press that live media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by
does not simply publish information about trials but guards RULING: No. Petition denied. The propriety of granting or any party to use the courts as instruments for the pursuit of
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the selfish interests. On the other hand, former President Joseph
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV and radio
scrutiny and criticism. Pervasive publicity is not per se right to public information, on the one hand, and the coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will
prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along violate the sub judice rule and can trigger massive
mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to- with the constitutional power of a court to control its demonstrations aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to
day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When render a decision one way or the other.
that publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us
and impaired his impartiality. Our judges are learned in that the right of the accused must be preferred to win. Due ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration
the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and process guarantees the accused a presumption of should be granted.
on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is
mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not lifted above its individual settings nor made an FACTS: Yes. In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial,
not per se fatally infect their impartiality. object of public's attention and where the conclusions the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, has resolved to
reached are induced not by any outside force or order the audio-visual recording of the trial. There are
MAIN POINT IN BOLD influence but only by evidence and argument given in several reasons for such televised recording. First, the
open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is hearings are of historic significance. They are an
E.C. Perez demanded. affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the
CASE NO. 98 King is under no man, but he is under God and the law."
ART. III, SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS MAIN POINT IN BOLD. (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et
PUBLICITY AND TV COVERAGE Lege.) Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital
Perez v. Estrada (June 29, 2001) E.C. Perez concern to our people who have a fundamental right to
CASE NO. 99 know how their government is conducted. This right
FACTS: Kapisanan ng mga BroadKaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) ART. III, SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS can be enhanced by audio visual presentation. Third,
filed a petition asking the Court to allow live media coverage PUBLICITY AND TV COVERAGE

40
audio-visual presentation is essential for the education court's judgment. Before the Court could conclude that documents were evidence so inaccessible to them at the
and civic training of the people. appellant was prejudiced by the presence of the media time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence
and Secretary Perez, he must first show substantial they could not be expected to have obtained them.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD. proof, not merely cast suspicions. There must be a
showing that adverse publicity indeed influenced the Administrative bodies, like the CIR, although not strictly
E.C. Perez court's decision. The Court found none in this case. bound by the Rules of Court must also make sure that they
CASE NO. 100 comply to the requirements of due process. Due process can
ART. III, SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS MAIN POINT IN BOLD. be complied with by observing the following:
PUBLICITY AND TV COVERAGE (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to
People v. Roxas AR present one's cause and submit evidence in
CASE NO. 101 support thereof;
FACTS: This is an appeal by way of automatic review of the ART III SEC 1: ADMINISTRATIVE (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence
decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Judgment of IN GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS presented;
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicting appellant Ang Tibay vs. CIR (3) The decision must have something to support
Venancio Roxas y Arguelles for the crimes of Kidnapping itself;
and Serious Illegal Detention with Frustrated Murder, FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a (4) The evidence must be substantial;
Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 6539, or the Anti- leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due (5) The decision must be based on the evidence
Carnapping Act of 1972, and Theft. Respondent Roxas to alleged shortage of leather soles, Toribio caused the lay- presented at the hearing; or at least contained in
challenged the RTC judges neutrality as he invoked that he off of a number of his employees belonging to the National the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
was deprived of his right to due process because of the Labor Union, Inc. (NLU). NLU questioned the validity of said (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must
unexplained presence of the former Secretary of the lay-off because no members of the rival labor union act on its own independent consideration of the
Department of Justice, Hernando Perez, in court. He (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
contended that the RTC was already predisposed to convict that Toribio was discriminating NLU. The case reached the accept the views of a subordinate;
him even before trial. CIR where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to (7) The Board or body should, in all controversial
the SC invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of questions, render its decision in such manner
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in rendering newly discovered evidence (books of business/inventory that the parties to the proceeding can know the
the decision. accounts). various Issue involved, and the reason for the
decision rendered.
RULING: No. The Court is unconvinced. The Court finds no ISSUE: WON the Union was denied due process by CIR. AR
basis for appellant's allegation that he was deprived of due CASE NO. 102
process of law and that the trial conducted was far from HELD: Yes. SC said there was a failure to grasp the ART III SEC 1: ADMINISTRATIVE
impartial and fair. The imputation of bias and partiality is fundamental issue involved due to failure to receive all IN GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
not supported by the record. The fact that the trial judge relevant evidence. Thus, the motion for a new trial was Dazon vs. Yap
opted to believe the prosecution's evidence rather than granted and the entire record of the case is remanded to the
that of the defense is not a sign of bias. Even if the RTC CIR. CIR is required to act according to justice and equity
had allowed the presence of then Secretary Hernando Perez and substantial merits of the case, without regard to FACTS: Respondent Yap is the president of Primetown
and the media, there is no sufficient basis to show that their technicalities or legal forms, and shall not be bound by any Property Group Inc. Petitioner Dazon entered into a
presence or pervasive publicity unduly influenced the technical rules of legal evidence. The newly discovered contract with Primetown for the purchase of Unit C-108 of

41
the condominium project. Dazon made a downpayment and
several installment payments totaling 1M+. Unfortunately,
Primetown failed to finish the condominium project.
Petitioner demanded for the refund of her payments
pursuant to PD957, the Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers’ Protective Decree. Primetime failed to refund
petitioner’s payments. Petitioner filed a criminal complaint
with the Office of the Prosecutor of Lapu-Lapu City. An
information was filed with the RTC. Respondent filed a
petition for Review with DOJ in connection with the
resolution finding probable cause, which eventually led to
the withdrawal of information.
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over a criminal action ISSUE: WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of
arising from violation of PD957. law.
HELD: Yes. The petition has merit. The basis of the DOJ
resolution was, not that there was lack of probable cause
but, the finding that it is the HLURB that has jurisdiction
over the case. It directed the withdrawal of the information
on the erroneous premise that it is the HLURB which has
jurisdiction over the case. The primordial function of the
HLURB, after all, is the regulation of the real estate trade
and business and not the conviction and punishment of
criminals. Not having been specifically conferred with
power to hear and decide cases which are criminal in
nature, as well as to impose penalties therefor, SC finds that
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) has
no jurisdiction over criminal actions arising from violations
of PD 957.
AR
CASE NO. 103
ART III SEC 1: ADMINISTRATIVE
IN GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
Estrada vs. Ombudsman
FACTS: Sometime in Nov and Dec 2013, the Ombudsman
served on Sen. Jinggoy Estrada 2 criminal complaints for
plunder, among others. 18 of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents
in the 2 complaints filed their counter-affidavits. On March
2014, Sen. Estrada filed his Request to be Furnished with
Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents,
Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings. Sen.
Estrada’s request was made pursuant to the right of a
respondent to examine the evidence submitted by the
complainant which he may not have been furnished, and to
have access to the evidence on record. The Ombudsman
denied Sen. Estrada’s request.
HELD: No. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s
constitutional right to due process. (1) there is no law or
rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a
respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to furnish
the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the
supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order
to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent.
What it refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-respondents. (2) A
preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is
only in a trial where an accused can demand the full
exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” (3)
the Ang Tibay guidelines for administrative cases do
not apply to preliminary investigations in criminal
cases. The purpose of the Office of the Ombudsman in
conducting a preliminary investigation, after conducting its
own factfinding investigation, is to determine probable
cause for filing an information, and not to make a final
adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties
under the law, which is the purpose of the guidelines in Ang
Tibay.
The constitutional right of an accused to confront the
witnesses against him does not apply in preliminary
investigations; nor will the absence of a preliminary
investigation be an infringement of his right to confront the
witnesses against him.
AR
CASE NO. 104
ART III SEC 1: ADMINISTRATIVE
IN GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
In Re: Allegations made under oath at the senate blue
ribbon committee against Associate Justice Gregory S.
Ong, Sandiganbayan
FACTS: This administrative complaint was filed by the
Court En Banc after investigation into certain allegations
that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Hearing indicated prima facie violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct by Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
Gregory Ong. Respondent stands accused of gross
misconduct, partiality, and corruption or bribery during the
pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of
his dealing and socializing with Napoles after her acquittal
in the said case. He also failed to disclose in his letter to CJ
Sereno that he had actually visited Napoles at her office in
2012. The Investigating Justice recommended that
respondent be found guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty
and impropriety, and be meted with the penalty of dismissal
from service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits.
ISSUE: WON Justice Gregory Ong is guilty of gross
misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, thus violating the
New Code of the Judicial Conduct.
42

HELD: Yes. The Court adopted the findings and
recommendations of the Investigating Justice. Respondent’s
association with Napoles during the pendency and after the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in
her acquittal, constitutes GROSS MISCONDUCT
notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of
corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.
In administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial
evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to
believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct
complained of, even if such evidence might not be
overwhelming or even preponderant. The testimonies of
Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact
with respondent ("nag-uusap sila") during the pendency of
the Kevlar case. By his act of going to respondent at her
office on two occasions, respondent exposed himself to the
suspicion that he was partial to Napoles.
AR
CASE NO. 105
ART III SEC 1: ADMINISTRATIVE
JUDGES AND DISCIPLINARY PROCESS
OCA vs. Pascual
FACTS: This is an Administrative Case against JUDGE
FILOMENO PASCUAL. One CEFERINO TIGAS, a fictitious
name, wrote a letter addressed to Office of the Court
Administrator of SC, charging that irregularities and
corruption were being committed by the RESPONDENT
Presiding Judge of MTC-Angat Bulacan. Letter was referred
to NBI for “discreet investigation.” They proceeded to the
residence of CANDIDO CRUZ, an accused in respondent’s
sala. In his affidavit, Cruz declared that he was the accused
in a criminal case for Frustrated Murder. Respondent judge
decided that the crime he committed was only physical
injuries in exchange for P2,000. NBI entrapped Respondent
judge with the help of Cruz, for which reason, the judge was
thought to have been caught in flagrante delicto. Executive
Judge NATIVIDAD G. DIZON submitted report and
recommendation that Respondent judge be penalized for
violation of Canons 2 and 3 of Code of Judicial Conduct (A
Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities and a judge should perform
official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence).
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge was denied due process
since he was not able to confront the witnesses against him
and present evidence in his defense.
HELD: Yes. The SC noted that the only bases for the Report
and Recommendation submitted by Executive Judge
Natividad G. Dizon consist of: (1) The Complaint, (2) the
Answer, (3) the Memorandum of the respondent, and (4)
the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing of the
bribery case of respondent judge at the Sandiganbayan. The
respondent was, therefore, not afforded the right to open
trial wherein he can confront the witnesses against him and
present evidence in his defense. This lapse in due process is
unfortunate. The Rules, even in administrative cases,
demand that, if the respondent judge should be disciplined
for grave misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence
against him should be competent and should be derived
from direct knowledge. The Judiciary to which respondent
belongs demands no less. Before any of its members could
be faulted, it should be only after due investigation and after
presentation of competent evidence, especially since the
charge is penal in character. The above-quoted Report and
Recommendation of the investigating judge had fallen short
of the requirements of due process. Hence, the case is
dismissed.
CASE NO. 106
ARTICLE III, SEC 1: ADMINISTRATIVE; QUASI JUDICIAL;
ARBITRATION
(2. JUDGES AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS)
Valenzuela Vs. Bellosillo
Facts: Petitioner, counsel of Colapo in case involving
violation of BP 22 charged respondent with gross violation
of the constitutional right of subject accused to assistance
by counsel of her own choice claiming that respondent,
talked to Colapo before granting bail for her provisional
liberty inside his chambers in the absence of the petitioner
and allegedly respondent was mad and remove him as
counsel for Colapo suggesting a counsel of PAO/PALAO to
represent her, thereby acting with arrogance,
oppressiveness and gross misconduct. Respondent denied
the claim stating that when he inquired from Colapo where
her lawyer was, she answered in a very disappointed
manner that she was going to change her counsel because
she did not like the idea of paying somebody who could not
represent her at the time she needed him most and due to
excessive charge made by petitioner
Respondent likewise denied that he ever referred
complainants client to the PALAO since it cannot not
represent an accused in a BP 22 case. Besides, according to
respondent, it was none of his business whether Colapo
would want to change her counsel. He (respondent) stated
that he is not aware whether Atty. Gusapos, the lawyer who
replaced the complainant, is a PALAO lawyer since he used
his private or residential address when he entered his
appearance."
Issue: WON the respondent can be adjudge guilty of gross
ignorance of the constitution and gross violation of the
constitutional right of accused to assistance by counsel of
her own choice?
Held: No. The employment or profession of a person is a
property right within the constitutional guaranty of due
process of law. Respondent judge cannot therefore be
43
adjudged guilty of the charges against him without affording government service. The right to counsel is not indispensable Held: Yes. Due process of law requires notice and
him a chance to confront the said witness, Meriam Colapo; to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. hearing. Hearing, on the other hand, presupposes a
otherwise, his right to due process would be infringed. competent and impartial tribunal. The right to be heard and,
Case No. 108 ultimately, the right to due process of law lose meaning in
Case No. 107 ARTICLE III, SEC 1: ADMINISTRATIVE; QUASI JUDICIAL; the absence of an independent, competent and impartial
ARTICLE III, SEC 1: ADMINISTRATIVE; QUASI JUDICIAL; ARBITRATION tribunal.
ARBITRATION (3. Aspects of the Proceedings) In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS
(3. Aspects of the Proceedings) Fabella vs CA to hear the administrative charges against private
Lumiqued v Exevea FACTS: respondents did not include “a representative of the local
Facts: On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national
Facts: Arsenio Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR- issued a return-to-work order to all public school teachers teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670.
CAR. He was charged by Jeannette Zamudio, the Regional who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no
Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses dates during the period of September to October 1990. The competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by
under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th them were necessarily void. They could not provide any
receipts for reimbursements and that he had an month pay, allowances and passage of debt cap bill in basis for the suspension or dismissal of private
unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers’
also complained that she was unjustly removed by administrative cases against respondents, who are teachers organization in these committees was indispensable to
Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints. The of Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that
issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the respondents to explain in writing why they should not be would have given substance and meaning to the right to be
complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but punished for having taken part in the mass action in heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural
Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second violation of civil service laws. Administrative hearings due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice
hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to started on December 1990. Respondents, through counsel and a real opportunity to be heard.
enable him to employ the services of counsel. The assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due
committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor process grounds: first, they were not given copies of the Case No. 109
his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation ARTICLE III, SEC 1: ADMINISTRATIVE; QUASI JUDICIAL;
the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. and denied access to evidence; second, the investigation ARBITRATION
The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their (3. Aspects of the Proceedings)
of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally Joson v Ex Sec Torres
Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued. constituted, their composition and appointment violated
Lumiqued appealed averring that his right to due process Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Facts: A complaint was filed against Petitioner Governor
was violated as well as his right to security of tenure. Pending the action assailing the validity of the Joson before the Office of the President for barging violently
ISSUE: W/N the due process clause entails the right to be administrative proceedings, the investigating committee into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the
assisted by counsel in an administrative inquiry? rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty and company of armed men. Private respondents claim that this
Held: No. In administrative investigations, the right to ordered their immediate dismissal. incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending
counsel is not imperative because such inquiries are ISSUE: legislative measure supported by petitioner that the
conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that Whether or not private respondents were denied due province of Nueva Ecija obtains a loan of P150 million from
merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and process? the Philippine National Bank; that petitioner's acts were
employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of intended to harass them into approving this loanThe case

44
was endorsed to the DILG. For failure to file an answer after (CB-SES) Central Bank Supervision and Examination
three (3) extensions, petitioner was declared in default and Section’s director invited BoD of PESALA to a conference to
ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive suspension. discuss findings on said examination, but petitioners did not
respond. Later, the Monetary Board adopted
Petitioner later “Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation”. a resolution including the names of petitioners,
DILG denied the motion declaring that the submission of officers of PESALA in the watch list to prevent them from
position papers substantially complies with the holding responsible positions in any institution under CB
requirements of procedural dueprocess in administrative supervision. Petitioners filed a petition for injunction
proceedings. Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of against the MB in order to prevent their names from being
the President, adopted the findings and recommendation of added in the watch-list. RTC issued the TRO. The
the DILG Secretary. The former imposed on petitioner the MB appealed to the CA which reversed RTV’s decision. Thus,
penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months without a petition for certiorari was filed with the SC where petitioners
pay. claim that Monetary Board’s resolution is null and void for
being violative of petitioners' right to due process.
Issue: Whether or not the denial of petitioner’s motion to Issue: W/N petitioners’ claim that MB’s resolution is null
conduct formal investigation tantamount to denial of his and void for being violative of their right to due process.
due process? Held: No. Petitioners cannot complain of deprivation of
Held:Yes. Rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal their right to due process, as they were given ample
investigation denied him procedural due process. An erring opportunity by the Monetary Board to air their submission
elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional and defences as to the findings of irregularity during the
rights of an accused. These rights are essentially part of said 16th regular examination. The essence of due process
procedural due process. The local elective official has the is to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard
(1) right to appear and defend himself in person or by and to submit any evidence one may have in support of
counsel; (2) the right to confront and cross-examine the his defence. What is offensive to due process is the
witnesses against him; and (3) the right to compulsory denial of the opportunity to be heard. Petitioners having
attendance of witness and the production of documentary availed of their opportunity to present their position to the
evidence. Monetary Board by their letters-explanation, they were not
Case No. 110 denied due process.
ARTICLE III, SEC 1: ADMINISTRATIVE; QUASI JUDICIAL;
ARBITRATION MARTIN
(3. Aspects of the Proceedings)
Busuego vs CA CASE NO. 111
Facts: The 16th regular examination of the books and ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
records of the PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, CSC v. Lucas
Inc. ("PESALA") was conducted from March to April, 1988
by a team of CB examiners. Later, several anomalies and FACTS: Raquel P. Linatok, an assistant information officer of
irregularities were discovered. an agency of Department of Agriculture (DA), filed a
complaint against respondent Jose J. Lucas, a photographer
of the same agency for misconduct. The complainant alleges
that respondent maliciously touched the former’s legs and
had verbal exchanges with her while in the premises of the
office. Nonetheless, the Board of Personnel Inquiry, DA
issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of simple
misconduct (suspension). In due time, respondent appealed
the decision to the CSC however the latter found him guilty
of grave misconduct (dismissal). Thus, he further appealed
the case to the CA. The CA set aside CSC’s decision and ruled
that a basic requirement of due process is that a person
must be duly informed of the charges against him. In the
instant case, Lucas came to know of the modification of the
charge against him only when he received notice of the
resolution dismissing him from the service. Nevertheless,
petitioner assails the decision of CA and contends that an
administrative case need not be drafted with the precision
of an information in a criminal prosecution. On the other
hand, respondent maintains that as he was charged with
simple misconduct, the CSC deprived him of his right to due
process by convicting him of grave misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Lucas was denied due
process when the CSC found him guilty of grave misconduct
on a charge of simple misconduct.
RULING: Yes. The Court sustained the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that: (a) a basic requirement of due process is that
a person must be duly informed of the charges against him
and that (b) a person can not be convicted of a crime with
which he was not charged.
MAIN POINT: Administrative proceedings are not exempt
from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as
the right to due process in investigations and hearings. The
right to substantive and procedural due process is
applicable in administrative proceedings.
MARTIN
45
 CASE NO. 112 answer. He submitted an affidavit answering point by point RULING/MAIN POINT: Yes. A decision is void for lack of
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS the charges against him. He even appealed from the decision due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the
NPC (National Police Commission) v. Bernabe (police chief of the Chief, PNP to the National Appellate Board, and opportunity of being heard. The SC ruled that a finding of
inspector) submitted a memorandum. Respondent was given more guilt for an offense, no matter how light, for which one is not
than adequate opportunity to explain his side. Hence, there properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced without
FACTS: As per a newspaper article, respondent allegedly was no violation of his right to procedural and substantive violating the rudimentary requirements of due process.
headed a syndicate encashing treasury warrants of Police due process. Also, although he was given an opportunity to be heard on
Commission personnel who were already dead, on awol, the multiple and broad charges initially filed against him,
suspended and separated from the service. This led to a MARTIN the absence of specification of the offense for which he
series of investigations, where he was ordered to explain was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance
through affidavit on the charges against him. Subsequently, CASE NO. 113 of due process. Further, it is a requirement of due
he was given notice of complaint/charge and order to ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS process that the parties be informed of how the
answer within five days from receipt of the complaint after Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita (chief inspector) litigation was decided with an explanation of the factual
his suspension. Eventually, a recommendation for his and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the
dismissal was raised and resulted to a decision by the FACTS: Twelve administrative complaints were filed Court. The cursory conclusion of the Dismissal Board that
National Appellate Board sustaining the summary dismissal, against respondent before the Summary Dismissal Board of Torcita “committed breach of internal discipline by taking
made by PNP Chief, of respondent from the PNP for grave the PNP. At the pre-trial, the parties and their respective drinks while in the performance of same” should have been
misconduct and conduct unbecoming a police officer. counsels agreed that the several cases shall be consolidated substantiated by factual findings referring to this particular
Respondent then appealed with the CA challenging his into one for the "conduct unbecoming of a police officer" offense.
dismissal from the police service on the ground of lack of because at one incident he allegedly approached and
due process (the case was decided by the Chief, PNP without entered the compound of the complainant, very drunk, with MARTIN
the benefit of a hearing, and therefore he was not given the back-up vehicle full of armed policemen, and shouted
opportunity to fully present his evidence and was denied the invectives and remarks in a very, very loud voice while in CASE NO. 114
opportunity to cross-examine his accusers). The CA ruled in the performance of duty involving a near vehicular accident. ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
favor of respondent as to the lack of due process allegation. The Board nonetheless, dismissed the Complaint for Velayo v. COMELEC
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was denied due process conduct unbecoming of a police officer and instead charged
in the conduct of the investigation of the charges filed respondent with simple irregularity in the performance of FACTS: Petitioner Arthur V. Velayo and private respondent
against him. duty. Thus, Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the RTC Ernesto Natividad were among the candidates for mayor of
RULING/MAIN POINT: No. Due process does not always questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for Gapan, Nueva Ecija in the May 11, 1998 elections. Private
and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due which he was not charged, “which conviction is a nullity respondent sought the exclusion of Election Return of
process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge because of the lack of procedural due process of law.” Both petitioner on the ground that it is incomplete and contains
against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend the RTC and CA ruled in favor of the respondent hence this material defects. Nonetheless, the Comelec issued a
himself. The essence of due process is simply to be petition. resolution annulling the proclamation of Velayo as mayor.
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an Velayo claimed that he was denied due process because he
opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction by petitioner is a was not furnished any notice of the pre-proclamation
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In nullity because of the lack of procedural due process of law. proceedings against him from beginning to end. All that
this case, the record shows that respondent was given petitioner received from the Comelec was its en banc
notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to resolution annulling his proclamation.

46
 slips. Subsequently, petitioner’s employment was Facts:
ISSUE: Whether or not notice of pre-proclamation terminated for violation of company rules. Notwithstanding Petitioner Nasser Immam and private respondent Hadji
proceeding is necessary for administrative due process in said decision, respondent and Jardine Union (representing Yusoph Lidasan were both candidates for Mayor of
COMELEC cases. petitioner) entered into an agreement that a Panel of Matanog, Maguindanao in 1998 elections.
Voluntary Arbitrators shall decide on the matter of the COMELEC (Office of the Election Officer, Matanog,
RULING/MAIN POINT: Yes. In this case, the records will legality of the termination of petitioner’s employment. Both Maguindanao) issued a certification that only the votes cast
show that petitioner was not furnished any notice of the parties also agreed on the composition of said panel. in 41out of the 55 precincts were counted.
pre-proclamation proceedings against him from beginning Nevertheless, the panel upheld the termination and when Private respondent filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to
to end. Velayo is a real party-in-interest since he was the the decision was appealed to the CA, the same was denied. Count the Ballots and for Holding of Special Elections,
proclaimed mayor. His non-inclusionas respondent and Now, petitioner contends that she was deprived of due alleging that election inspectors of 14 precincts left the
his lack of notice of the proceedings in the Comelec process of law because of the composition and actuations of polling places due to "violence, terrorism, and armed
which resulted to the cancellation of his proclamation the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. threats perpetrated by armed men, hence the continuation
constitute clear denial of due process. Further, It is true ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due of voting did not take place."
that RA No. 7166 provides for summary proceedings in pre- process. Petitioner was proclaimed the duly elected mayor and took
proclamation cases and does not require a trial type his oath of office, despite the pendency of the aforesaid
hearing. Nevertheless, summary proceedings cannot be RULING/ MAIN POINT: No. The essence of due process is petitions.
stretched to mean ex parte proceedings. Summary to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard Private respondent prayed to COMELEC that the
proceedings cannot be stretched to mean ex parte and submit any evidence one may have in support of proclamation of petitioner be declared void.
proceedings—summary simply means with dispatch, with one’s defense. In the instant case, petitioner was apprised COMELEC issued its assailed order which suspended
the least possible delay, signifying that the power may be of the charges against her. During the administrative petitioner's proclamation
exercised without a trial in the ordinary manner prescribed investigation, petitioner attended and was given an Petitioner prayed before COMELEC En Banc for the TRO
by law for regular judicial proceedings. opportunity to give her side. She consented to resorting to directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from enforcing
voluntary arbitration and participated in the selection of and implementing the questioned order.
MARTIN arbitrators. Petitioner submitted herself to the jurisdiction En Banc issued a Resolution directing the parties to
CASE NO. 114 of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, by presenting her maintain the status quo ante and ordering the COMELEC in
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS evidence and sought affirmative relief therein; hence, she the meantime to desist until the validity of the
Ramoran v. Jardine CMG Life Insurance Company, INC cannot now validly question the latter’s jurisdiction. Due Commission on Elections' Order is resolved by this
process does not necessarily require conducting an Court."
FACTS: Petitioner was an accounting employee of Jardine. actual hearing but simply giving the party concerned Petitioner assails the order issued by the COMELEC en banc
The Human Resource Development (HRD) of respondent due notice and affording an opportunity or right to be since the consolidated cases were originally heard by the
received from petitioner overtime (OT) authorization slips heard. COMELEC's First Division.
for alleged OT work on some days on November and
December 1993. The HRD post-auditing officers noticed Sheena Issue: W/N petitioner’s right to due process was violated
some irregularities and tampering in the OT slips submitted Case No. 116 when the case was transferred to the COMELEC en
by petitioner. Hence, respondent conducted an Art III Section 1. Procedural Due Process - Administrative; banc without notice to him
administrative investigation concerning petitioner for Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration - Aspects of the
which the latter’s immediate supervisor denied having Proceedings Ruling:
signed and approved petitioner’s irregular OT authorization Immam v. COMELEC

47
NO. Petitioner himself prayed that the petition be heard by Petitioner received a fax copy of this Resolution at which
the Commission en banc which is correct as the law time voting has ceased and canvassing of votes in some
provides that petitions for a special election must be precincts has already gone underway.
addressed to the COMELEC sitting en banc. Petitioner filed with the COMELEC an Urgent Manifestation
The fact that petitioner was not given notice specifically and a MR the aforesaid Resolution. COMELEC En banc
stating that the case was transferred to the en banc did not denied the motion.
affect the legality of the order. In administrative OSG observed that even if the letter-petition was treated as
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence an election matter which may be properly heard firsthand
are not strictly applied. Administrative process cannot by the COMELEC en banc, COMELEC should have given
be fully equated with due process in the strict judicial notice to petitioner before resolving the issue therein. On
sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be the issue of the validity of the use of nickname, it opined
successfully invoked where a party was given the that petitioner may validly use the same as she is in fact
chance to be heard. Mrs. Jose Tapales Villarosa, and hence, there is no
misrepresentation.
Main point in bold. Issue:
W/N COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling on
Sheena private respondent Restors letter-petition without
Case No. 117 according notice and hearing to petitioner.
Art III Section 1. Procedural Due Process - Administrative; Ruling:
Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration - Aspects of the YES. Due process dictates that before any decision can
Proceedings be validly rendered in a case, the twin requirements of
Villarosa v. COMELEC notice and hearing must be observed. Evidently, the
Facts: conclusion of the Commission in the assailed Resolution
Petitioner was a candidate for Representative of the lone dated May 11, 1998, that “JTV” is not a nickname by which
district of Occidental Mindoro in the 1998 elections and was petitioner is generally or popularly known, was drawn
proclaimed duly elected thereto. She filed her COC in which purely from the allegations of the letter-petition and for this
she stated that her nickname is JTV. reason, the COMELEC acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
Private respondent Restor, a candidate of the same position, We have declared that deprivation of due process cannot be
filed a letter-petition addressed to COMELEC asking for the successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to
invalidation or cancellation of JTV as the official nickname of be heard on his motion for reconsideration. However, we
petitioner, and the nullification of all votes cast in the said find the foregoing rule inapplicable to the circumstances of
nickname, on the ground that petitioner is not publicly the case at bench. Petitioner filed an “Urgent Manifestation
known by that name but instead as Girlie and that JTV and Motion”, which was promptly denied the following day.
actually pertains to the initials of her husband and former Even as it seeks reconsideration of the said resolution by
Congressman. invoking due process, it does not purport to embody
On election day, COMELEC en banc, issued a Resolution petitioner’s grounds and arguments for reconsideration.
granting private respondent’s petition. Main point in bold.
Additional info: this is not administrative but quasi-judicial
matter and may thus be dealt with firsthand by the
Commission en banc since the petition is not only for the
invalidation of “JTV” as petitioner’s authorized nickname, but
also the nullification of all votes cast in that name.
Sheena
Case No. 118
Art III Section 1. Procedural Due Process - Administrative;
Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration - Aspects of the
Proceedings
Go v. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Ma. Catalina Go filed for candidacy for both
Governor and Mayor of Leyte. However, she filed for
withdrawal of her candidacy 28 minutes late after the
deadline thru fax machine.
Private respondents filed separate petitions to deny
Catalina due course and to cancel the COC of Catalina. The
case was then referred to the Law Department of COMELEC
which gave due course to the private respondent’s petitions
without giving Catalina the opportunity to be heard or
submit responsive pleadings. Based on its report, Catalina
was disqualified to run for both positions.
Issue:
W/N Catalina was denied procedural due process of law.
Ruling:
YES. COMELEC Law Department conducted an ex-parte
study of the case without giving Catalina an opportunity to
be heard, or requiring her to submit comment or opposition
or setting the case for hearing. the COMELEC en banc in
approving the report and recommendation of the Law
Department, deprived the petitioner of procedural due
process of law. The COMELEC, acting as a quasi-judicial
48
tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of procedural Corollarily, in a catena of cases, this Court laid down the No rights were violated because CSC is vested with
due process in resolving cases before it. cardinal requirements of due process in administrative appellate jurisdiction and CSC is mandated to hear and
proceedings, one of which is that “the tribunal or body or decide administrative cases.
Main point in bold. any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, Main point in bold.
and not simply accept the views of a subordinate.”
Sheena
Main point in bold. Case No. 121
Case No. 119
Section1, Article III
Art III Section 1. Procedural Due Process - Administrative;
Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration
Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration - Aspects of the
3. Aspects of the Proceedings
Proceedings
Sheena Condilla v. De Venecia
Mollaneda v. Umacob
Facts: Case No. 120
Art III Section 1. Procedural Due Process - Administrative; ( Sorry I tried to relate the topic sa issue wala siya sa
Respondent Umacob was a public school teacher. She went main ruling =( )
to the office of Mr. Rolando Suase to follow up her transfer Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration - Aspects of the
to a different district, but petitioner Mr. Arnold Mollaneda, Proceedings
Cruz v. CSC Facts: Locsin and Codilla are candidates for the 4 th district
the school superintendent, was the one who entertained of Leyte. Codilla won despite having a disqualification case
her. After entertaining her, he was molested by Mollaneda. Facts:
Gilda Cruz took the CSC exam for Zenaida Patim. A fact against him and Locsin came in 2 nd. At the time of the
Respondent reported it to the Police and filed a complaint elections the court has to rule over the disqualification case
with the MTC. She also filed a complaint with the CSC and finding investigation was conducted by CSC, they took the
seat plan with pictures and compared it with prior years. against Codilla. However a Most urgent Motion to suspend
gave copy of the affidavit to DECS. proclamation was filed against Codilla. A copy of the Motion
They found that a prima facie case exist for dishonesty and
The case was heard before the CSC, both parties attended was sent to the petitioner and the corresponding registry
grave misconduct.
together with their counsel. CSC found him guilty and was receipt was attached to the pleading. The records, however,
Cruz filed for answer denying all the allegations. Eventually,
dismissed from service. do not show the date the petitioner received the motion.
she raised that she was deprived of due process because
Petitioner Mollaneda was claiming that he was denied due CSC was the complainant as well as the judge. Petitioner was served a copy of the Second Motion again by
process. Issue: registered mail. A registry receipt was attached evidencing
Issue: W/N Cruz’s right to due process was violated because CSC service of the Second Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner
W/N Mollaneda was denied due process. was the judge as well as the complainant. then the second division issued the suspension of the
Ruling: petitioner’s proclamation on the same day. The
Ruling:
NO. The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself proclamation of the Codilla was then declared void and
NO. he was not denied due process because he even Locsin was declared winner of the election. Petitioner now
attended the hearing with CSC. A person who was given does not mean that it could not be an impartial judge. As an
administrative body, its decision was based on substantial contends that he was deprived of due process since he did
the opportunity to be heard has been given due process. not receive the motion filed against and he only knew the
Under our jurisprudence, an administrative agency may findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being
considered experts in their field, are binding on the about the complaint due to telegraph. respondent Locsin
employ other persons, such as a hearing officer, examiner or filed a Second Most Urgent Motion for the suspension of
investigator, to receive evidence, conduct hearing and make Supreme Court. The records clearly disclose that the
petitioners were duly investigated by the CSC. petitioner’s proclamation.
reports on the basis of which the agency shall render its
decision. Such a procedure is a practical necessity.

49
Issue: W/N the petitioner was denied of due process during Issue: W/N ACWS can plead denial of due process Cauntoy and a deed of agreement. Jose filed a case for
the entire proceeding which led to the proclamation of Ruling: No. Neither could ACWS plead denial of due process recovery of possession and Cauntoy presented a notarized
respondent Locsin as justification for its immediate resort to the court. Section deed of sale. The document was purportedly notarized by
Ruling: Yes. Clearly, the petitioner was not given any 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the “due Atty. Osmondo V. Pomperada the complainants however
opportunity to contest the allegations contained in the process clause” of the Constitution, thus: Section 1. No presented from the book of archives a different document
petition for disqualification. The Order was issued on the person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without based on the docketed number which means that Cauntoy
very same day the Second Most Urgent Motion was filed. due process of law, x x x.” In order to fall within the and Atty. Pomperada falsified the document. Atty. Pompera
The petitioner could not have received the Second Most protection of this provision, two conditions must concur, denied the claims filed a motion for reconsideration
Urgent Motion, let alone answer the same on time as he was namely, that there is a deprivation and that such contending that he was utterly deprived of his fundamental
served a copy thereof by registered mail deprivation is done without proper observance of due right of due process when Commissioner Milagros San Juan
Main Point: The COMELEC, through the Regional Election process. When one speaks of due process of law, a submitted her report, recommending the penalty of
Director, to issue summons to the respondent candidate distinction must be made between matters of procedure suspension from the practice of law and perpetual
together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due disqualification from being appointed Notary Public,
any, within three (3) days from the filing of the petition for
process “refers to the method or manner by which the law is without any formal investigation having first been
disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the enforced,” while substantive due process “requires that the conducted.
respondent candidate the opportunity to answer the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law Issue: W/N the lack of formal investigation deprives the
allegations in the petition and hear his side. would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just.” respondent’s lawyer right of due process
Case No. 122 Main Point: When one speaks of due process of law, a Ruling: Yes. The procedures outlined by the Rules are
Section1, Article III distinction must be made between matters of procedure meant to ensure that the innocents are spared from
Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration and matters of substance—procedural due process “refers wrongful condemnation and that only the guilty are
3. Aspects of the Proceedings to the method or manner by which the law is enforced,” meted their just due. Obviously, these requirements
Associated Communication v. Dumlao while substantive due process “requires that the law itself, cannot be taken lightly. Considering the gravity of the
not merely the procedures by which the law be enforced, is offense charged and the sanction recommended by IBP, a
Facts: Petitioner Associated Communications and Wireless fair, reasonable, and just. formal investigation that would allow respondent lawyer a
Services, Ltd. (ACWS) operated several radio and television full right to be heard is unavoidable.
stations nationwide by virtue of a legislative franchise. PD Case No. 123 Main Point:IN BOLD
576-A terminated all franchises, grants, licenses, permits, Section1, Article III Case No. 121
certificates or other forms of authority to operate radio or Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration Section1, Article III
television broadcasting systems. ACWS continued to 3. Aspects of the Proceedings Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration
operate its radio and television stations through permits Villarosa v. Pomperada 3. Aspects of the Proceedings
issued by the Board of Communications and the Secretary of Facts: Complainants Lina Villarosa and her son Jose Alauya v. Comelec
Public Works and Communications. The NTC granted ACWS Villarosa filed before this Court a complaint for disbarment Facts: There was a declared failure of election in the 2001
renewable temporary permits and licenses for the against Atty. Osmondo Pomperada, charging him with election in the ARMM due to massive substitution.
continued operation of its radio and television broadcasting deceit and gross misconduct Mrs. Villarosa alleged that Nevertheless, the Provincial Board of Canvassers
systems. ACWS prayed that the NTC be ordered to release sometime in 1994 her late husband, Isidro, executed a Deed proclaimed Alexander Menor (“Menor”), who garnered the
ACWS’s already approved and paid for temporary permit to of Absolute Sale in favor of their son, Jose. According to highest number of votes. Tamano also claimed that in
operate Channel 25 or to issue the corresponding Certificate complainants, the deed was neither dated nor notarized. almost all of the precincts in these 5 municipalities, either
of Public Convenience . Subsequently, Jose Villarosa sold the property to Loreto petitioner Saaddudin M. Alauya, Jr. (“Alauya”) or private

50
respondent Usman T. Sarangani (“Sarangani”) obtained
100% of the votes such that their votes equalled the total
number of registered voters. Tamano prayed for the
suspension of proclamation of the winning candidates.
Petitioner Alauya was in the 3rd spot and filed to lift the
suspension of his proclamation. Alauya filed the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order on March 1,2002. On March 5, 2002, the Court
required the respondents to comment on the petition. Based
on the restraining order of the Court, the Provincial Board
of Canvassers proclaimed Alauya who took his oath and has
already assumed the position of Regional Assemblyman of
the Regional Legislative Assembly of the ARMM. Meanwhile,
Sarangani filed his comment joining Alauya in his petition
praying for the setting aside of the subject COMELEC orders.
Specifically, Sarangani prays that the order suspending
proclamation be extended to him so he may also take his
oath and assume office as regionalassembly member.
Issue: W/N petitioner Alauya was denied of due process?
Ruling: No. Alauya claims that the COMELEC did not notify
him of any hearing conducted priorto the issuance of the
order dated January 7, 2002 in violation of Section 242
which requires notice and hearing prior to the suspension
of proclamation. A party cannot successfully invoke
deprivation of due process if he was accorded the
opportunity of a hearing, through either oral arguments or
pleadings. There is no denial of due process when a party is
given an opportunity through his pleadings.
Main Point: A party cannot successfully invoke deprivation
of due process if he was accorded the opportunity of a
hearing, through either oral arguments or pleadings
Case No. 125
Section1, Article III
Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration
3. Aspects of the Proceedings
Spouses Casimiro v. CA
Facts: Respondents were the registered owners of a parcel
of land Adjoining their property on the northern side was
petitioners’ land during a relocation survey it was
discovered that that the Casimiro Village Subdivision,
owned by petitioners. petitioners denied that there was an
encroachment in respondents’ land. They presented
Geodetic Engineers from the Bureau of Lands. Meanwhile,
defendant-lot buyers interposed a cross-claim against
petitioners spouses Casimiro, averring that they were
innocent purchasers in good faith and for value of their
respective lots. The Court of First Instance, Pasay City,
rendered a decision in favor of respondents. Ruling on
petitioners motion for reconsideration, the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch CXI, set aside its earlier decision,
and held that the report of the engineers from the Bureau of
Lands were more credible and accurate, and enjoy the
presumption of regularity and accuracy. Respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeals on the sole question of the
proper location of the common boundary separating the
adjoining lots of petitioners and respondents. Petitioners
complained of irregularities in the conduct of the relocation
survey, the Court of Appeals found nothing irregular in the
conduct of the relocation survey.
Issue: W/N crucial that each party must have a
representative present to ensure that the fixing of the metes
and bounds on the soil is accurately performed
Ruling: Yes. Notice to the landowner, however, cannot be
dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process and
is an essential requisite to enable the landowner himself to
exercise, at the very least, his right of retention guaranteed
under the CARL.
Main Point: Due Process; Indeed, the requirement of notice
and representation in the proceedings is an essential part of
due process of law.
GOMEZ
CASE NO. 126
ART 3 SEC1: ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Sy v. CA
FACTS: Sahot, private respondent, was an employee of the
trucking company owned by herein petitioners. Before his
dismissal, he got ill and cannot go back to work. Due to the
absences, the company illegally dismissed Sahot without
enough notice. The case was first brought to the NLRC
arbiter where petitioners claim that Sahot was not illegally
dismissed but was terminated because he refused to go bac
to work. The NLRC ruled in favor of Sahot and awarded him
with separation pay with additional benefits to be paid by
the petitioners. The Case was then appealed before the CA
which concurred with the ruling of the NLRC. Thus, this
appeal to seek the reversal of the CA’s decision.
ISSUE:Whether or not the dismissal of Sahot, herein private
respondent, followed due process as required by law.
RULING: No. From the records, it clearly appears that
procedural due process was not observed in the separation
of private respondent by the management of the trucking
company.
MAIN POINT: Procedural due process permits in dismissing
an employee two written notices must be furnished to the
employee concerned. First, the particular act of omission
done by the employee which dismissal is sought. Second,
the notice that the employee is dismissed after a reasonable
time has lapse for the employee to respond.
GOMEZ
CASE NO. 127
ART 3 SEC1: ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Namil v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioners herein where the first set of candidates
that was declared the winning candidates for the
Sangguniang Bayan of Palimbag Sultan Kudarat on May 20,
2001. However, on May 21, 2001, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers declared private respondents as winning
51
candidates for the same position. This issue was raised
before COMELEC and after investigation, declared private
respondents as the winning candidates by issuing
Resolution no. 4615. The said resolution was passed
without giving due notice and hearing from the side of the
petitioners. Thus, this action to nullify such resolution for
GAD on COMELEC’s part.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC’s powers is broad enough
to enforce all election laws that in its enforcement of such,
the twin requirement of due notice and hearing may be
forfeited.
RULING: No. Petitioners cannot be removed without due
process of law. Although the COMELEC possesses the power
to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate, the
COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a
proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation
without notice and hearing.
MAIN POINT: Due process in quasijudicial proceedings
before the COMELEC requires due notice and hearing. The
proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if
he has not been notified of any motion to set aside his
proclamation.
GOMEZ
CASE NO. 128
ART 3 SEC1: ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Bautista v. COMELEC
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition of
COMELEC’s resolution nos. 5404 and 5584 that nullifies the
CoC of herein petitioner for the Punong Barangay Position
in Lumbangan, Batangas. The case was brought before
COMELEC’s Law department where it rendered that
Bautista is not eligible to be a candidate. However,
COMELEC en banc failed to issue a resolution to cancel
petitioners CoC. Only after his proclamation did COMELEC ground that the OMB’s decision is tainted with grave abuse
en banc issued resolution no. 5404, that cancels his CoC and of discretion, that the OMG failed to reconsider the credible
resolution no. 5584, which states his ineligibility for not evidence provided by the respondent and that they failed to
meeting the registered voter of the place requirement. justify their decision in dismissing said respondent. Thus,
this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC deprived Bautista of due to reverse the decision of the CA.
process when it issued resolution no. 5404 and 5584.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent-Coronel was denied due
RULING: There is due process when a party is able to process when OMB Desierto’s decision stated(notation)
present evidence in the form of pleadings. However, the “The original decision stands” without giving any legal basis.
COMELEC did not give Bautista such opportunity to explain
his side. The COMELEC en banc issued Resolution Nos. 5404 RULING: No. The notation does not deny respondent of her
and 5584 without prior notice and hearing. right to due process. What is proscribed is the absolute lack
of notice or hearing. In the case at bar, the respondent was
MAIN POINT: The requirements in due process are satisfied given the opportunity to be heard. She was not deprived of
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable the due process as required by the constitution.
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing. MAIN POINT: In administrative proceedings, the essence of
due process lies simply in the opportunity to explain one’s
side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
GOMEZ complained of.
CASE NO. 129
ART 3 SEC1: ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Office of OMB v. Coronel GOMEZ
FACTS: Respondent was a Senior Accounting Processor in CASE NO. 130
Linamon Water District. In October 14, 1988, said ART 3 SEC1: ASPECTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS
respondent called a meeting with different water districts in Erece v. Macalingay
Lanao del Norte. They had a luncheon meeting in one of the
restaurants in Iligan City. The bill amounted to P1213. FACTS: The issue erupted when herein petitioner-Erece,
However, in a letter sent to the OMB, the total should’ve who was the Regional Director of Commission on Human
been P213. After investigation, she, the respondent, was Rights of Region 1, did not allow the respondent employees
dismissed for dishonesty under Rule 14 of the Omnibus to use his vehicle that was issued by the said agency to him.
Rules of the Administrative. After filing for a motion for This issue showed that the petitioner has been dishonest in
reconsideration, before the OMB, and which had been declaring that he is not using that said government vehicle
denied eventually by OMB Desierto and with a notation to collect transportation allowance. The CSC took hold of
“The Original decision stands” and without any justification, this issue and task a fact-finding committee. Erece was later
the case was referred to the CA. The CA resolved the case in on charged with dishonesty and grave misconduct. An
ordering the reinstatement of herein petitioner on the appeal before the CA was also made by the petitioner to
52
which the appellate court concurred with the decision of the ISSUE: Whether or not the reliance by the Ombudsman on received reports that IRC failed to make timely public
CSC. the affidavits in determining respondent’s administrative disclosures of its negotiations with GHB and that some of its
liability was proper and did not deprive the respondent of directors, respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares
ISSUE: Whether or not Erece, herein petitioner, was denied due process. utilizing this material insider information. SEC Chairman
due process as he was not afforded the right to cross then issued an Order finding that IRC violated the Rules on
examine his accusers and their witnesses. RULING: Yes. The fact that no formal hearing took place is Disclosure of Material Facts. In addition, the SEC
not sufficient ground to say that due process was not pronounced that some of the officers and directors of IRC
RULING: No. The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner afforded Bungubung. It is well settled that in entered into transactions involving IRC shares in violation
was not denied due process when he failed to cross- administrative proceedings, including those before the of Section 30, in relation to Section 36, of the Revised
examine the complainants and their witnesses since he was Ombudsman, cases may be submitted for resolution on Securities Act. The motion, however, was dismissed on the
given the opportunity to be heard and present his evidence. the basis of affidavits and pleadings. The standard of due ground that the said Act had no implementing rules and
process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows regulations.
MAIN POINT: In administrative proceedings, the essence of a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored.
due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side. It is, therefore, not legally objectionable for being violative ISSUE: Whether or not the SEC may file a case against the
of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a respondents based on the assailed provisions of the Revised
AIRA case based solely on position papers, affidavits or Securities Act.
Case No. 131 documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits
ART. III, SEC. 1, ADMINISTRATIVE; QUASI-JUDICIAL of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimonies. RULING: Yes. In all, this Court ruled that no implementing
PROCEEDINGS; ARBITRATION: ASPECTS OF THE Undoubtedly, due process in administrative proceedings is rules were needed to render effective Sections 8, 30 and 36
PROCEEDINGS an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to of the Revised Securities Act. Thus, the respondents may be
Ombudsman Marcelo v. Bungubung seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, investigated by the appropriate authority under the proper
FACTS: Bungubung is the Manager and Chairman of the which requirement was afforded Bungubung. rules of procedure of the Securities Regulations Code for
Ports District Security Bids and Awards Committee of the violations of Sections 8, 30, and 36 of the Revised Securities
Port District Office (PDO) of Manila, Philippine Ports MAIN POINT IN BOLD Act.
Authority (PPA). An administrative complaint was filed
against him by a security agency that participated in the AIRA MAIN POINT: The mere absence of implementing rules
bidding for security services of the PPA before the Case No. 132 cannot effectively invalidate provisions of law, where a
Ombudsman for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial ART. III, SEC. 1, ADMINISTRATIVE; QUASI-JUDICIAL reasonable construction that will support the law may be
to the Best Interest of the Service. The same complaint was PROCEEDINGS; ARBITRATION: ASPECTS OF THE given.
decided against Bungubung based on the affidavit of PROCEEDINGS
witnesses. Respondent averred that the reliance by the SEC v. Interport
Ombudsman on the said affidavits in determining his FACTS: The Board of Directors of Interport Resources AIRA
administrative liability, despite the fact that the contents Corporation (IRC) approved a Memorandum of Agreement Case No. 133
thereof were not personally attested to by the affiants with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). IRC alleged that a press ART. III, SEC. 1, ADMINISTRATIVE; QUASI-JUDICIAL
before the Ombudsman, was a clear violation of his right to release announcing the approval of the agreement was sent PROCEEDINGS; ARBITRATION: ASPECTS OF THE
due process. through facsimile transmission to the Philippine Stock PROCEEDINGS
Exchange (PSE) and the SEC, but that the facsimile machine Calinisan v. Roaquin
of the SEC could not receive it. The SEC averred that it

53
FACTS: Respondent Reynaldo Roaquin, a police officer, was
charged by the government with murder for killing Alfredo
Taluyo in a nightclub squabble. Consequently, the PNP
detained him at his assigned station. While Roaquin was
under detention, the PNP Headquarters issued an order
discharging him from the service based on a circular of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines; notwithstanding that he
had not been administratively charged in connection with
the offense of which he was charged in court. Years, later, he
was acquitted upon a finding that he acted in complete self
defense. Following this development, Roaquin asked the
PNP to reinstate him into the police service. The same,
however, was not awarded to Roaquin on the basis of
Finality of Disciplinary Action.
ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative action should have
been filed against Roaquin for the Finality of Disciplinary
Action to take effect.
RULING: Yes. The Rules and Regulations in the Disposition
of Administrative cases involving PNP members before the
PNP Disciplinary Authorities cannot be applied to case of
the petitioner simply because he was not charged of any
administrative case. While the PNP may have validly
suspended Roaquin from the service pending the
adjudication of the criminal case against him, he was
entitled after his acquittal not only to reinstatement but
also to payment of the salaries, allowances, and other
benefits withheld from him by reason of his discharge
from the service.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD
AIRA
Case No. 134
ART. III, SEC. 1, ADMINISTRATIVE; QUASI-JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS; ARBITRATION: ASPECTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS
IBP v. Atienza
FACTS: In 2006, the IBP, through its then National
President Jose Anselmo Cadiz, filed an application with the
Office of the City Mayor of Manila for a permit to rally at the
foot of Mendiola Bridge to be participated in by IBP officers
and members, law students and multi-sectoral
organizations. Respondent Mayor Atienza issued a permit
allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated
Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of the Mendiola Bridge.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed before the CA a petition for
certiorari but having been unresolved within 24 hours from
its filing, petitioners again, filed before the SC assailing the
appellate court’s inaction or refusal to resolve the petition
within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act
of 1985. The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge, and
as alleged by the Petitioners, the participants voluntarily
dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program. A few
days later, the Manila Police District instituted a criminal
action against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in
staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against
Atienza is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed
against him (Cadiz).
RULING: No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of
prejudicial question at this stage and in this certiorari case.
Under the Rules of Court, a prejudicial question is a
ground to suspend the criminal proceeding. However,
Cadiz must first file a petition to suspend the criminal
proceeding in the said criminal case. The determination
of the pendency of a prejudicial question should be
made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not
before the Supreme Court in an appeal from the civil
action.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD
**Note on Case 134: Dyan lang talaga may proceedings
involved re the case so dyan ko nalang finocus. :(
AIRA
Case No. 135
ART. III, SEC. 1, ADMINISTRATIVE; QUASI-JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS; ARBITRATION: ASPECTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS
Domingo v. OMB and SK Officials
FACTS: A complaint-affidavit was filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman by Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) officials
against petitioner as Barangay Chairman and Barangay
Treasurer Fe T. Lao (Lao) for malversation, falsification of
public document, dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Respondents alleged that petitioner and Lao
misappropriated the cash advance taken by respondents
from the SK funds. They added that petitioner gave a false
statement in his Justification supporting the 2003 Barangay
Budget and Expenditures by declaring that his barangay had
no incumbent SK officials at that time, contrary to the fact
that respondents are duly elected and incumbent SK
officials of the barangay. The charge of misappropriation
and falsification of public document were later both
dismissed. However, petitioner was held administratively
liable for the irregular submission of a falsified instrument
to the Manila Barangay Bureau (MBB) in connection with
his barangay’s 2003 budget on the sole basis of the undated
Justification. At the outset, petitioner had questioned the
existence of the Justification, claiming that his purported
signature thereon was forged.
54
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been denial of due RULING & MAIN POINT: YES. Notice and hearing are the
process. bulwark of administrative due process. The right is RULING & MP: NO. Pursuant to Section 24 of RA 6770 (The
guaranteed by the Constitution itself and does not need Ombudsman Act of 1989), the governing law, 2 requisites
RULING and MAIN POINT: Yes. The due process legislative enactment. The right to notice and hearing is must concur to render the preventive suspension order
requirement mandates that every accused or essential to due process and its non-observance will, as valid:
respondent be apprised of the nature and cause of the a rule, invalidate the administrative proceedings. The
charge against him, and the evidence in support thereof records disclose that NEA failed to inform the petitioners 1. That in the judgment of the Ombudsman or the
be shown or made available to him so that he can meet that the audit disallowances contained in the 2003 Audit Deputy Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is strong.
the charge with traversing or exculpatory evidence. Report would constitute additional charges in the 2. The second requisite may be met in three (3) different
administrative proceedings which served as the basis for ways, to wit: (1) that the offense charged involves
AREEJ the petitioners’ removal. Hence, petitioners were never dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
CASE NO. 136 heard on the charges as stated in the 2003 Audit Report. neglect in the performance of duty; (2) the charge
Art III Sec 1. In General: Administrative Due Process would warrant removal from the service; or (3) the
Aspects of the Proceedings AREEJ respondents’ continued stay in office may prejudice
Zambales II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ZAMECO II) CASE NO. 137 the case filed against him.
Board of Directors v. Castillejos Consumers Association Art III Sec 1. In General: Administrative Due Process
(CASCONA) Aspects of the Proceedings While a preventive suspension order may stem from
OMB v. Evangelista a complaint, the Ombudsman is not required to furnish
FACTS: Petitioners are members of the Board of Directors the respondent with a copy of the complaint prior to
of the ZAMECO II. Respondent, an organization of electric FACTS: Respondents Evangelista, Melican and Limos are the ordering preventive suspension. The requisites for the
consumers, filed a letter-complaint with National mayor, municipal treasurer and accountant respectively of Ombudsman to issue a preventive suspension order are
Electrification Administration (NEA) seeking the removal of Aguilar, Pangasinan. Villanueva, the Co-Chair of the Local clearly contained in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770. A prior
the petitioners from the Board based on the NEA’s June 25, School Board of Aguilar, accused them of having notice or hearing is NOT required for the issuance of a
1998 Financial Audit Report. NEA later issued a misappropriated the Special Education Fund (SEF), which preventive suspension order. Hence, the respondents
resolution removing the petitioners from office relying on was allegedly used to purchase speech kit tapes and were not denied due process when they were issued the
the NEA-ADCOM’s Report and Recommendations and the textbooks without the approval of the LSB. The Ombudsman preventive suspension order without first being furnished a
July 24, 2003 Audit Report that was not part of the letter- then placed the respondents under preventive suspension. copy of Villanueva’s complaint.
complaint. Hence, petitioners insist that they were denied Respondents claim that they have been denied due process
due process as they were never heard on the charges as since they were never furnished with a copy of Villanueva’s
stated in the July 25, 2003 Audit Report cited as the bases complaint. The case was elevated to the CA which ruled in AREEJ
for 3 of the 5 offenses in the Resolution of the NEA which favor of the respondents and pointed out that under Section CASE NO. 138
directed their removal from office. Allegedly, petitioners 26(2) of R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman is required to Art III Sec 1. In General Administrative Due Process
had been asked to respond only to the charges under the inform the accused of the charges; yet, the respondents Aspects of the Proceedings
June 25, 1998 Audit Report. learned of the charges against them only upon receipt of the Phil Export v. Pearl City Manufacturing Corporation
suspension order. Hence, the petition. (PCMC)
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were denied due FACTS: The Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA)
process. ISSUE: Whether or not a prior notice or hearing is required officers conducted a physical inventory and special audit on
for the issuance of a preventive suspension order. petitioner Corporation and discovered that it had an

55
unaccounted importation of 8,259,645 kilograms of used
clothing for the period of 15 months. On the basis of the
inventory and audit, the PEZA Board passed a resolution
canceling the PEZA Registration of petitioner Corporation as
an Ecozone Export Enterprise. Upon appeal, CA reversed the
PEZA Resolution and held that there should have been
interrogations or inquiries conducted by the PEZA Board to
give PCMC the opportunity to defend itself from any charge
directed against it. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent PCMC was afforded due
process.
RULING: YES. In administrative proceedings, procedural
due process simply means the opportunity to explain
ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. PCMC was properly
informed of the supposed discrepancies and was given
ample opportunity by the PEZA to be heard or to explain its
side. It was also subsequently informed of the decision of
the PEZA Board to cancel its registration. Hence, PCMC
cannot claim that they were denied their right to due
process of law. In any event, the Court ruled that any
seeming defect in the observance of due process is
cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration,
which PCMC did, and that denial of due process cannot
be successfully invoked by a party who has had the
opportunity to be heard thereon.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 139
Art III Sec 1. In General Administrative Due Process
Aspects of the Proceedings
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
FACTS: Former President Benigno Aquino III issued EO 13
which abolished and transferred the powers of the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) to the Office of
the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA),
more particularly to its Investigative and Adjudicatory by Secretary Purisima. In administrative proceedings, the
Division (IAD). filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for
the person so charged to answer the accusations against
RESPONDENT: Respondent Finance Secretary Purisima him constitute the minimum requirements of due
filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave process, which simply means having the opportunity to
misconduct against petitioner Pichay, Chairman of the explain one’s side.
Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA), which arose from the purchase by AREEJ
the LWUA of 445,377 shares of stock of Express Savings CASE NO. 140
Bank, Inc. Art III Sec 1. In General: Administrative Due Process
Aspects of the Proceedings
PETITIONER: Petitioner contends that E.O. 13 is violative of Arroyo v. DOJ
the equal protection clause and the guarantee of due
process, pointing to the arbitrariness of limiting the IAD- FACTS: The COMELEC and the DOJ issued Joint Order No.
ODESLA's investigation only to presidential appointees 001-2011 creating a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding
occupying upper-level positions in the government. Team on the 2004 and 2007 (to be composed of DOJ and
(Petitioner is a presidential appointee occupying the high- COMELEC officials) which shall conduct preliminary
level position of Chairman of the LWUA.) investigations on the alleged election anomalies during the
2004 and 2007 elections involving herein petitioners. The
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. 13 violates the equal protection Joint Committee later promulgated its Rules of Procedure.
clause and the guarantee of due process. Petitioners now claim that the Joint Panel (refers to the
Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team) does not possess
RULING: NO. The equal protection of the laws is the required cold neutrality of an impartial judge because it
embraced under the due process concept and simply is all at once the evidence-gatherer, prosecutor and judge,
requires that, in the application of the law, "all persons and that the DOJ-COMELEC Joint Order No. 001-2011 and
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, the Joint Committee Rules have not been published, all of
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities which violate their right to due process.
imposed." The equal protection clause is not infringed
by legislation which applies only to those persons ISSUES: (1) Whether or not creation of the Joint Panel and
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all proceedings undertaken pursuant thereto violated the right
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist to due process. (2) Whether or not the nonpublication of the
for making a distinction between those who fall within (a) DOJ-COMELEC Joint Order No. 001-2011 and the (b)
such class and those who do not. There are substantial Joint Committee Rules violated the right to due process.
distinctions that set apart presidential appointees
occupying upper-level positions in government from non- RULING:
presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower (1) NO. It is settled that the conduct of preliminary
positions in government. Further, petitioner was given investigation are subject to the requirements of both
sufficient opportunity to oppose the formal complaint filed substantive and procedural due process. Petitioners
56
failed to prove that the Joint Panel itself showed such United States. On the same day, petitioner designate and wanted in Hong Kong, namely accepting an advantage as an
bias and partiality against them. There was no proof that authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to agent and conspiracy to commit fraud, are not punishable
the Joint Panel made biased statements that would convey handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated by Philippine laws.
to the public that the members were favoring a particular extradition documents, Mark Jimenez through counsel,
party. wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies of the ISSUE: Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction to decide
official extradition request from the U.S Government and whether the rule of double criminality applies.
(2) NO, as far as the (a) DOJ-COMELEC Order 001-2011 is that he be given ample time to comment on the request
concerned as it only enables the COMELEC and the DOJ to after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. RULING: NO. The issue of whether or not the rule of
exercise powers already vested in them by the Constitution double criminality applies was not for the Court of
and other existing laws. Publication is a necessary ISSUE: Whether or not an extraditee have a right of access Appeals to decide in the first place. The trial court in
component of procedural due process so that all to the evidence against him. which the petition for extradition is filed is vested with
persons having an interest in the proceedings may be jurisdiction to determine whether or not the offenses
notified thereof. Administrative rules and regulations RULING: During the executive phase of an extradition mentioned in the petition are extraditable based on the
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or proceeding, an extradite does not have the right of application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid access to evidence in the hands of government. But mentioned in the applicable treaty. In this case, the
delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely during the judicial phase, he has. presiding Judge of Branch 10 of the RTC of Manila has yet to
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel rule on the extraditability of the offenses for which the
of the administrative agency and not the public, need ANGELO respondent is wanted in Hong Kong. Therefore, respondent
not be published. However, the (b) Joint Committee’s Rules Case No. 142 has prematurely raised this issue before the Court of
of Procedure regulate not only the prosecutors of the DOJ ART III SEC 1: Extradition Proceedings Appeals and now, before this Court.
and the COMELEC but also the conduct and rights of Cuevas v. Munoz
persons, or the public in general, and should have been FACTS: Hong Kong Magistrate's Court issued a warrant for ANGELO
published. the arrest of respondent for 7 counts of accepting an Case No. 143
advantage as an agent contrary to the Prevention of Bribery ART III SEC 1: Extradition Proceedings
Ordinance of Hong Kong, and 7 counts of conspiracy to Government of USA v. Purganan
defraud. The Philippine DOJ forwarded the request for
ANGELO provisional arrest to the Anti-Graft Division of NBI. The NBI FACTS: Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v. Hon.
Case No. 141 filed an application for the provisional arrest of respondent Lantion. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez
ART III SEC 1: Extradition Proceedings with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. RTC of Manila copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion issued an Order granting the application for provisional and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to
arrest and issuing the corresponding Order of Arrest. file a comment and supporting evidence. The Government
FACTS: Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in The Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring the Justice, filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition
Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of Order of Arrest null and void on the following grounds: (1) praying for the issuance of an order for his “immediate
the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The that there was no urgency to warrant the request for arrest” in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the
Department of Justice later received from the Department of provisional arrest under the RP-Hong Kong Extradition RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an
Foreign Affairs U.S Note containing a request for the Agreement and (2) that the requirement of dual criminality Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for his
extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the has not been satisfied as the crimes for which respondent is application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After

57
the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted ruling on Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan. The in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high
his Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer lower court, without prior notice and hearing, cancelled the “flight risk”.
that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a
bail in the amount of P100,000. The court ordered the warrant of arrest. Petitioners filed a very urgent motion for ISSUE: Whether or not a potential extraditee can post bail.
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his the reconsideration of the cancellation of their bail which
temporary liberty at P1M in cash. After he had surrendered was denied. RULING: YES. The Philippine authorities are under
his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez obligation to make available to every person under
was granted provisional liberty. ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of petitioner’s bail, detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental
without prior notice and hearing is a violation of co- right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
ISSUE: Whether or not the detention of a potential petitioner’s right to due process tantamount to grave abuse admitted to bail. While the Court in Purganan limited the
extraditee prior to the conclusion of the extradition of discretion. exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings,
proceeding amount to a violation of due process. however, in light of the various international treaties
RULING: YES. The trial court’s immediate cancellation of giving recognition and protection to human rights,
RULING: NO. The Court iterate the familiar doctrine that the the bail of petitioners is contrary to the Court’s ruling particularly the right to life and liberty, a
essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard in Purganan, and it had misread and misapplied our reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in
but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does directive therein. In this case, the cancellation had been order.
not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. issued after the determination that the extraditee is a
Where the circumstances—such as those present in an no-flight risk. The Court believe that the benefits of Ayeh CASE NO. 146
extradition case—call for it, a subsequent opportunity continued temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked ART. III SEC 1: ADMINISTRATIVE; QUASI-JUDICIAL
to be heard is enough. In the present case, respondent will and their grant of bail should not be cancelled, without the PROCEEDINGS; ARBITRATION
be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when co-petitioner being given notice and without her being ARBITRATION
the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. heard why her temporary liberty should not be RCBC Capital Corporation v Banco De Oro Unibank
Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and discontinued. FACTS: The dispute between the parties arose sometime in
fundamental fairness. Extraditee is not entitled to notice May 2003 when RCBC informed respondent and the other
and hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest, ANGELO selling shareholders of an overpayment of the subject
because notifying him before his arrest only tips him of Case No. 145 shares, claiming there was an overstatement of valuation of
his pending arrest. ART III SEC 1: Extradition Proceedings accounts and that the sellers violated their warranty under
Government of Hong Kong v. Olalia Share Purchase Agreement. As no settlement was reached,
ANGELO RCBC commenced arbitration proceedings with the
Case No. 144 FACTS: Private respondent Muñ oz was charged before International Chamber of Commerce-International Court of
ART III SEC 1: Extradition Proceedings Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by Arbitration (ICC-ICA)
Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest Respondents refuses to pay the cost of advance proceedings
was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative and so, the petitioners now pray that the former be
FACTS: After the arrest of petitioners Eduardo and Imelda Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private defaulted from participating in the proceedings and that the
Rodriguez, they applied for bail which the trial court. They respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by hearings be not suspended for the reason of refusal of
posted cash bonds for the bail set for P1M for each. The US the private respondent. The petition for bail was denied by payment of costs by the respondents. The tribunal granted a
government filed a petition where the court directed the reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same partial award to the petitioner and is about to grant a
trial court to resolve the matter of bail guided by this court’s second partial award to RCBC. BDO then filed with the CA a

58
motion for preliminary injunction but it was denied hence, Patawaran for alleged breach of the university's rules and
this case for urgent application for writ of preliminary regulations.
mandatory injunction in the SC. The same incident became also the subject of a criminal
ISSUE: Whether or not the tribunal committed an error in complaint for assault against a person in authority
granting a partial award to RCBC resulting to acting out of instituted by the petitioner Jose Angeles in the Office of the
its jurisdiction. City Fiscal of Manila against the private respondents. The
RULING: Yes. The case at bar does not present a non- case was dismissed against Patawaran and later on the
disclosure issue but conduct allegedly showing an petitioner filed an affidavit of desistance for the case against
arbitrator’s partiality to one of the parties. Even before the
Picar and so that case too was dismissed.
issuance of the Second Partial Award for the reimbursement However, the administrative case was continued by the
of advance costs paid by RCBC, Chairman Barker (of the petitioner Dean Gilberto G. Mercado. Respondents now
tribunal) exhibited strong inclination to grant such relief to
question the authority of the of the Dean and his committee
RCBC, notwithstanding his categorical ruling that the to conduct the administrative investigation as the incident
Arbitration Tribunal "has no power under the ICC Rules to happened outside the premises of the school and that the
order the Respondents to pay the advance on costs sought Petitioner Angeles already desisted from pursuing a
by the ICC or to give the Claimant any relief against the criminal case.
Respondents’ refusal to pay. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal case
MP: Alternative dispute resolution methods or ADRs – like against private respondent Picar upon the filing of the
arbitration, mediation, negotiation and conciliation – are affidavit of desistance of petitioner Jose Angeles has the
encouraged by this Court. By enabling parties to resolve effect of rendering this instant petition moot and academic.
their disputes amicably, they provide solutions that are lessRULING: No. The administrative action before the school
time-consuming, less tedious, less confrontational, and authorities can proceed independently of the criminal
more productive of goodwill and lasting relationship action because these two actions are based on different
But the most important feature of arbitration, is the considerations. In the former, the private respondent's
public’s confidence and trust in the integrity of the suitability or propriety as a student which is the paramount
process. For this reason, the law authorizes vacating an concern and interest of the school is involved, while in the
arbitral award when there is evident partiality in the latter, what is at stake is his being a citizen who is subject to
arbitrators. the penal statutes and is the primary concern of the State.
There being no withdrawal of the complaint filed by
Ayeh CASE NO. 147 petitioner Jose Angeles before the petitioner Dean Gilberto
ART. III SEC 1: ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE Mercado, the administrative investigation should proceed.
IN GENERAL MP: The pendency or the dismissal of the criminal
Angeles v Sison action does not abate the administrative proceeding
FACTS: Petitioner, Jose Angeles, initiated an administrative which involves the same cause of action.
case before the Office of the Dean, Gilberto G. Mercado, of
the Institute of Technology, FEU, by filing a complaint
against the private respondents Edgardo Picar and Wilfredo Ayeh CASE NO. 148
ART. III SEC 1: ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE
IN GENERAL
Malabanan v Ramento
FACTS: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student
Council of respondent University who conducted a rally
inside the school premises. The petitioners were found to be
guilty for their holding of an illegal assembly which was
characterized by the violation of the permit granted
resulting in the disturbance of classes and oral defamation.
The penalty was suspension for 1 academic year.
The validity of such is hereby assailed by the petitioners
contending that the University failed to accord respect to
their constitutional rights of freedom of peaceable assembly
and free speech is the grievance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the university is
violative of the constitutional rights of the students
RULING: Yes. The rights to peaceable assembly and free
speech are guaranteed to students of educational
institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters
affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not to
be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent
punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and
present danger to a substantive evil that the state, has a
right to present.
It does not follow, however, that petitioners can be totally
absolved for the events that transpired. Admittedly, there
was a violation of the terms of the permit but even then, a
one-year period of suspension is much too severe.
MP: If the assembly is to be held in school premises,
permit must be sought from its school authorities, who
are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily
or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be
conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to
avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the
non-academic personnel. Even if, however, there be
violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not
be disproportionate to the offense.
59
 these are, that (1) the students must be informed in semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract
writing of the nature and cause of any accusation either with the students or with the intervening teachers.
against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the Such being the case, the charge of denial of due process is
Ayeh CASE NO. 149 charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if untenable. It is a time-honored principle that contracts are
ART. III SEC 1: ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence respected as the law between the contracting parties. The
IN GENERAL against them; (4) they shall have the right to adduce contract having been terminated, there is no more contract
Guzman v NU evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into
FACTS: Petitioners are students of respondent National be duly considered by the investigating committee or another contract with said students and teachers.
University, have come to the Court to seek relief from their official designated by the school authorities to hear and MP: Under similar circumstances where students have been
school's continued and persistent refusal to allow them to decide the case. refused re-enrollment but without allegation of termination
enroll. Petitioners contends that the respondent university of contracts as in the instant case, this Court has stressed,
subjecting them to the extreme penalty of expulsion without Ayeh CASE NO. 150 that due process in disciplinary cases involving students
cause or if there be any, without being informed of such ART. III SEC 1: ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
cause and without being afforded the opportunity to defend IN GENERAL prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice.
themselves is a violation of their constitutional right to due Alcuaz v PSBA Accordingly, the minimum standards laid down by the Court
process and education. FACTS: Respondent school and the petitioners who are to meet the demands of procedural due process are: (1) the
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the students therein entered into an that will govern their students must be informed in writing of the nature and
constitutional right to due process committed by the activities within the school on the exercise of their cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the
respondent university. democratic rights. In spite of the above-stated agreement right to answer the charges against them, with the
RULING: Yes. It is apparent that the respondent university they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed
had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine was turned down by the school, resulting in commission of of the evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to
whether or not petitioners-students had indeed committed tumultuous and anarchic acts by the petitioners within the adduce evidence in their own behalf and (5) the evidence
any violation or defiance against the school. Petitioners school. The petitioners were then blacklisted and denied must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
were being denied the right "to freely choose their field of admission for the second semester of school year 1986- official designated by the school authorities to hear and
study subject to existing curricula and to continue their 1987. decide the case (Guzman vs. National University, 142 SCRA
course therein up to graduation, except in case of academic Meanwhile, a motion for intervention was filed by the 706-707 [1986]).
deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations" without Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City
due process. Faculty Union on the ground of commonality of issues and ADDALINO
The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires cause of action with that of the petitioners who, later on CASE NO. 151
observance of procedural due process. And it bears were sanctioned by the investigating committee of the ART III, SEC 1: ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE; In general
stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving respondent school. NON VS JUDGE DAMES
students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of FACTS: Petitioners, students in Mabini Colleges, Inc. in
those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of constitutional rights of expression and assembly and of due Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the
justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be process of law of the students who have been barred from school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or
summary; and cross-examination is not, 'contrary to re-enrollment. participating in student mass actions against the school in
petitioners' view, an essential part thereof. RULING: No. It is beyond dispute that a student once the preceding semester. They thus filed a petition in the
MP: There are withal minimum standards which must be admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one Regional Trial Court of Daet seeking their readmission to
met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and semester. It is thus evident that after the close of the first the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. A

60
motion for reconsideration was filed, but this was denied by
the trial court on the ground that they waived their
privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent
college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment
form for the first semester of school year 1988-89. In
addition, for the same semester, they duly signed pledges
"to abide and comply with all the rules and regulations laid
down by competent authorities in the College Department
or School in which I am enrolled." Hence, the affected
students filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was accorded to
petitioners.
RULING: NO. It does not appear that the petitioners were
afforded due process, in the manner expressed in Guzman v.
National University, before they were refused re-
enrollment. In fact, it would appear from the pleadings that
the decision to refuse them re-enrollment because of failing
grades was a mere afterthought. It is not denied that what
incurred the ire of the school authorities was the student
mass actions conducted in February 1988 and which were
led and/or participated in by petitioners. Certainly,
excluding students because of failing grades when the cause
for the action taken against them undeniably related to
possible breaches of discipline not only is a denial of due
process but also constitutes a violation of the basic tenets of
fair play.
MAIN POINT: Imposition of sanctions on students requires
observance of procedural due process. The following are
minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process; that (1) the students
must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to
answer the charges against them, with the assistance of
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the
evidence against them; (4) they shall have the right to
adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence
must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and
decide the case. Moreover, the penalty imposed must be
proportionate to the offense committed.
ADDALINO
CASE NO. 152
ART III, SEC 1: ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE; In general
ADMU VS CAPULONG
FACTS: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of
ADMU, died of serious physical injuries after the initiation
rites of Aquila Legis. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo
created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate
and submit a report on the circumstances surrounding the
death of Lennie Villa. Respondent students, through a
notice, where required to submit their written statements
within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt, which they
failed to do so. The Investigating Committee found a prima
facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule
3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline."
Respondent students were then required to file their
written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean
created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against
respondent students, which found them guilty of violating
Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in
hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of
unanimity among the members of the Board on the
penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the
penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly,
Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all
respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC
Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled, which was
granted. A day after the expiration of the temporary
restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board
to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent
students Abas and Mendoza, which was contested by the
respondents and argued that the creation of the Special
Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which
alleged lack of due process. This was granted, thus this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N there was denial of due process against the
respondent students
RULING: NO. It cannot seriously be asserted that the
requirements to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process (refer to prev case) were not met. The Dean of the
Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent
students to submit their written statement on the incident.
Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested
through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and
cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in
petitioners' notices. Granting that they were denied such
opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from
the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases
involving students need not necessarily include the
right to cross examination. An administrative
proceeding conducted investigate students’
participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed
with the attributes of a judicial proceeding.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD
ADDALINO
CASE NO. 153
ART III, SEC 1: ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE; In general
UP VS LIGOT-TELAN
FACTS: Petitoner Ramon Nadal, was among those who
applied for the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance
Program (STFAP), popularly known as the “Iskolar ng
Bayan” program of the University of the Philippines (U.P.).
During a random sampling scheme of verification of data on
1991, a team from UP staff conducted a home investigation
at the residence of Nadal wherein Consolacion Urbino,
Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies between
the report and Nadal’s application form. Nadal was
informed of the result of the investigation which showed
that (1) that he has and maintains a car and (2) the income
of his mother in the USA in support of the studies of his
61
brothers; and he was required to pay back the benefits he
received from the STFAP. The UP Board of Regents imposed
on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one year, non-
issuance of any certificate of good moral character during
the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed
the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest per
annum and non-issuance of his transcript of records until he
has settled his financial obligations with the university.
Nadal complained that he was not afforded due process
when, after the Board Meeting on his case on March 28,
1993 that resulted in a decision of “NOT GUILTY” in his
favor, the Chairman of the UP Board of Regents, without
notice to the petitioner, called another meeting the
following day to deliberate on the Chairman’s Motion
for Reconsideration, which this time resulted in a
decision of “GUILTY.” Upon petition, Nadal was granted
his action for mandamus with preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: W/N Nadal was denied due process.
RULING: No. It is gross error to equate due process in the
instant case with the sending of notice of the March 29,
1993 BOR meeting. University rules do not require the
attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases
are included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is
not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have
been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review
body. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice
given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR
meetings where his case was up for deliberation. Nadal has
sufficiently proven to have violated his undertaking to
divulge all information needed when he applied for the
benefits of the STFAP. Unlike in criminal cases which
require proof beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a
judgment, in administrative or quasi-judicial
proceedings, only substantial evidence is required, that
which means a reasonable mind might accept a relevant
evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.
MAIN POINT: bold
ADDALINO
CASE NO. 154
ART III, SEC 1: ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE; In general
GO VS COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN
FACTS: Kim Go was named among several high school
students involved and present at a hazing rite of Tau
Gamma in the house of one Dulce, in Tondo Manila. Kim’s
mother, Angelita Go, was then informed of her son’s
participation as a fraternity member The fourth year
students involved were to be allowed to graduate from
Letran, whereas those who were not graduating were
allowed to finish their current school year but were to be
barred from subsequent enrollment in Letran. Mrs. Go later
on submitted a request for the deferment of Kim’s
suspension so that he could take a previously scheduled
exam. Several conferences addressing the students involved
in the fraternity were gone unattended by the spouses Go
despite consistent notification. The respondents proposed
that students and their parents sign a pro-forma agreement
to signify their conformity with their suspension to which
Spouses Go did not sign, refusing to accept the findings that
Kim was a fraternity member, and that there was a lack of
due process in the findings. Petitioners filed a complaint for
damages claiming that respondents had unlawfully
dismissed Kim, and for the compensation for “business
opportunity losses” they have suffered while personally
attending to Kim’s disciplinary case.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners were denied due process in the
opportunity to be heard in Kim’s disciplinary case
RULING: NO. Reiterating the ruling in Guzman v. National
University case, due process in student disciplinary cases
does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of Justice.
They may be summary proceedings, and cross-examination
is not an essential part thereof. The viewing and examining
of written statements is admissible in due process. The
written notice rule is to inform the student of the
disciplinary charge against him and to enable him to
suitably prepare a defense. Kim had enough time to prepare
his response. The essence of due process, the opportunity to
be heard, had been given.
MAIN POINT: Due process in student disciplinary cases
does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those
prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of Justice.
They maybe summary proceedings, and cross-examination
is not an essential part thereof.
ADDALINO
CASE NO. 155
ART III, SEC 1: DEPORTATION PROCEEDING; In general
LAO GI VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: In 1958, Filomeno Chia Jr. was declared a Filipino
citizen when the Secretary of Justice rendered Opinion no.
191 as it appears that his father, Filomeno Chia Sr. (Lao Gi)
is a Filipino citizen. In 1980, Minister of Justice rendered
Opinion no. 147, cancelling and setting aside the citizenship
of Lao Gi on the ground that his citizenship was founded on
fraud and misrepresentation. Lao Gi filed a motion for
reconsideration and was denied. Charges of deportation
were filed against the Chia’s which also alleged that they
refused to register as aliens and that they committed acts of
undesirability. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that CID has no authority to reopen a matter long
decided by Opinion no. 191, which was opposed by private
prosecutor and CID's special prosecutor on the ground that
citizenship may be threshed out as occasion may demand
and that due process was accorded to respondents. CID
denied both motions. Respondents filed for certiorari in
which was dismissed by SC en banc for lack of merit. Before
the hearing of the deportation case, Commissioner Nituda
gave respondents 3 days to register as aliens to move for
reconsideration and oppose their arrest. Respondents filed
for reconsideration and opposition but was denied by
Nituda who directed them to register as aliens within 2
days. Hearing for the deportation was set and on the same
day, respondents filed for certiorari and prohibition in the
62
CFI, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. CFI
dismissed the petition for lack of merit and want of
jurisdiction. Respondents appeal to CA and was dismissed,
including their motion for reconsideration. Thus this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was accorded to
petitioners.
RULING: NO! Section 37 of the Immigration Act provides
that arrest and deportation of aliens may be done after a
determination of the Board of Commissioners that a ground
for deportation exists. After the charges are filed,
respondents should be notified of the grounds and a hearing
should be conducted and it is only after a hearing has been
conducted may the alien be deported and the Opinions
rendered will bear weight in the determination of their
citizenship. Nituda can only direct or order respondents to  Meanwhile, the District Court of Straubing rendered a
register as aliens once there is a positive finding that the
respondents are aliens. " This power is the police power to
protect the state from undesirable aliens injurious to the
public good. Since the deportation is a harsh process, due
process must be observed. In the same law, it is provided
that: No alien shall be deported without being informed
of the specific grounds for deportation nor without being  In the meantime, petitioner Immigration Commissioner  By virtue of RA 5514, the Philippine Communications
given a hearing under rules of procedure to be
prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration. The acts
or omissions that they are charged of must be in ordinary
language for the person to be informed and for the CID to
make a proper judgment. Also, the warrants of arrest must be
in accordance with the rules on criminal procedure.
MAIN POINT: in bold
COELI
CASE NO. 156
Art. III, Sec. 1, Deportation Proceedings
Domingo v. Scheer
FACTS:
 Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, a German, was given
permanent status to reside in the Philippines. He
married a Filipina and had 3 children. He also opened a
restaurant in Puerto Prinsesa. One day, the Bureau of ISSUE: Whether or not the BOC Commissioner committed
Immigration and Deportation (BID) received GADLEJ in issuing its Summary Deportation, and the arrest
information that Scheer was wanted by the German and detention of the respondent.
Federal Police that a warrant of arrest had been issued
against him. RULING: YES
 The BOC thereafter issued a Summary Deportation The settled rule is that the entry or stay of aliens in the
against Scheer, relied on the correspondence from the Philippines is merely a privilege and a matter of grace; such
German Vice-Consul on its speculation that a warrant of privilege is not absolute nor permanent and may be
arrest was issued by the District Court of Germany revoked. However, aliens may be expelled or deported
against the respondent for insurance fraud; and on the from the Philippines only on grounds and in the manner
alleged illegal activities of the respondent in Palawan. provided for by the Constitution, the Immigration Act of
Respondent filed an MR. However, the BOC did not 1940, as amended, and administrative issuances
resolve the respondent's motion. The respondent was pursuant thereto.
neither arrested nor deported. MAIN POINT: IN BOLD
Decision dismissing the criminal case against the COELI
respondent for physical injuries. He informed the CASE NO. 157
respondent in a Letter. The BOC still failed to resolve the Art. III, Sec. 1, Fixing Rates and Regulation of Profession
respondent's motion. Commissioner did not respond to PHILCOMSAT VS. Alcuaz
the respondent’s Letter. The respondent remained in December 18, 1989
the Philippines and maintained his business in Palawan. FACTS:
Andrea T. Domingo assumed office. She wrote the Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) was granted the
German Embassy and inquired if the respondent was authority to construct and operate such ground facilities
wanted by the German police. The German Embassy as needed to deliver telecommunications services from
replied on the negative. Scheer was apprehended in his the communications satellite system and ground
residence on orders of the petitioner. He was held in terminal or terminals in the Philippines. PHILCOMSAT
custody while awaiting his deportation. Petitioner provides satellite services to companies like Globe and
refused to release the respondent. Respondent’s counsel PLDT.
filed with the CA. He alleged that his arrest and  PHILCOMSAT was exempt from the jurisdiction, control
detention were premature, unjust, wrongful, illegal and and regulation of the Public Service Commission later
unconstitutional. BOC issued a Resolution denying the known as the National Telecommunications
respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The CA Commission. (RA 5514, Sec. 5)
rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent granting  NTC gave the necessary permit but it however directed
his petition and permanently enjoining the petitioner PHILCOMSAT to reduce its current rates by 15%. NTC
from deporting the respondent. based its power to fix the rates on EO 546
 PHILCOMSAT sued NTC and its commissioner (Jose Luis
Alcuaz) assailed the said directive and holds that the
63
 enabling act (EO 546) of the NTC, empowering it to fix
rates for public service communications, does not
provide the necessary standards which were
constitutionally required, hence, there is an undue
delegation of legislative power, particularly the FACTS:
adjudicatory powers of NTC.
 PHILCOMSAT asserted that:
o nowhere in the provisions of EO 546, granting
its rate-fixing powers
o nor of EO 196, can it be inferred that NTC is
guided by any standard in the exercise of its
rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers.
o That the exercise of which requires a hearing
ISSUE: Whether or not a hearing was required before NTC
ordered PHILCOMSAT to reduce its rates.
RULING: YES.
Temporary rate fixing order is not exempt from the
procedural requirements of notice and hearing.
While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final
determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-  According to petitioners, NTC gravely abused its
fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt
from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and
hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness.
Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not
exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner.
Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not
perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of
statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any
other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided
by the applicable law.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD
COELI
CASE NO. 158
Art. III, Sec. 1, Fixing Rates and Regulation of Profession RULING: NO.
Radio Communications, Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Corporation
v. NTC & PLDT
April 23, 1990
 Respondent PLDT filed an application with respondent
NTC for the Approval of Rates for Digital Transmission
Service Facilities. The respondent Commission
provisionally approved and set the case for hearing
within the prescribed 30-day period allowed by law.
 The respondent Commission issued a notice of hearing
for PLDT's application. Petitioners except Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Corporation were not
included in the list of affected parties.
 At the hearing, petitioner PT & T Co., along with other
petitioners which came to know of the pending petition,
appeared and moved to file an opposition or reply to
said application. Petitioners alleged that neither
respondent Commission nor private respondent PLDT
informed them of the existence of this provisional
authority.
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing provisional authority to private respondent
without prior notice and hearing when its application is
not for rate approval but for authority to engage in
services outside its franchises, that PLDT is limited by
its legislative franchise to render only radiotelephonic
services, exclusive of radiotelegraphic or record
services.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Commission gravely
abused its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing a provisional authority in favor of
PLDT, without prior notice to the petitioners.
Public Service Commission, empowered to approve
provisionally rates of utilities without prior hearing.
Well-settled is the rule that the Public Service Commission
now is empowered to approve provisionally rates of utilities
without the necessity of a prior hearing. Under the Public
Service Act, as amended, the Board of Communications then,
now the NTC, can fix a provisional amount for the
subscriber’s investment to be effective immediately,
without hearing. Further, the Public Service Act makes no
distinction between initial or revised rates. These rates are
necessarily proposed merely, until the Commission
approves them (Republic v. Medina, supra). Moreover, the
Commission can hear and approve revised rates without
published notices or hearing. The reason is easily discerned
from the fact that provisional rates are by their nature
temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity with the
definitive rates approved after final and it was so stated in
the case at bar, in the National Telecommunications
Commission’s order.
COELI
Case no. 159
Art. III, Sec. 1, Fixing Rates and Regulation of Profession
Maceda v. ERB
FACTS:
 Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August
1990, private respondents, the oil companies filed with
the ERB their respective applications on oil price
increases. ERB then issued an order granting a
provisional increase of P1.42 per liter.
 Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition
seeking to nullify said increase.
 On December 18, 1990 the court dismissed the petition
and reaffirm ERB’s provisional increase without hearing
pursuant to Sec. 8 of E.O no. 172. Prior to the issuance of
said order, a hearing was conducted but the petitioner
failed to appear at said hearing.
64
 The petitioner contends that the provisional increase in
the prices of petroleum violated due process for having
been issued without notice and hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not ERB orders granting the provisional
oil increase without prior notice is valid.
RULING: YES
Pursuant to Section 8 of E.O. No. 172, while hearing is
indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering  Petitioner:
a provisional increase subject to final disposition of whether
or not to make it permanent or to reduce or increase it
further or to deny the application.
The Court further noted the Solicitor General’s comments
that:
“Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in
administrative bodies, such as the ERB, which in
matters of rate or price fixing, is considered as
exercising a quasi-legislative,not quasi-judicial,
function. As such administrative agency, it is not bound
by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing
court proceedings.”
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD.
COELI
CASE NO. 160
Art. III, Sec. 1, Fixing Rates and Regulation of Profession a deregulated special feature, therefore, exempted from rate
Globe Telecom v. NTC and SMART
FACTS:
 SMART filed a Complaint with public respondent NTC,
praying that NTC order the immediate interconnection
of SMART’s and Globe’s GSM networks. SMART alleged
that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to
grant SMART’s request for the interconnection of SMS.
 NTC issued the Order now subject of the present
petition.
 Both Smart and Globe were equally blameworthy for
their lack of cooperation in the submission of the
documentation required for interconnection. NTC held
that since SMS falls squarely within the definition of
value-added service or enhanced-
service given in NTC Memorandum Circular, their
implementation of SMS interconnection is mandatory.
The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have
been providing SMS without authority from it.
o filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition to nullify and set
aside the Order and to prohibit NTC from taking
any further action in the case.
o claimed that NTC acted without jurisdiction in
declaring that it had no authority to render SMS,
pointing out that the matter was not raised as
an issue before it at all
 The CA issued a TRO. In its Memorandum, Globe called
the attention of the CA in an earlier NTC decision
regarding Islacom, holding that SMS is a deregulated
special feature and does not require the prior approval
of the NTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Globe was correct that it need not to
secure prior authority from NTC in order to operate SMS as
or tariff regulations of NTC.
RULING: YES
According to NTC’s Memorandum Circular No. 14-11-97,
the Commission deregulates the provision of special
features inherent to the Telephone Network, provided,
that in the provision of the feature, no law, rule, regulation
or international convention on telecommunications is
circumvented or violated. The Commission shall
periodically update the list of special features in the
Telephone Network which, including the charging of
rates therefor, shall be deregulated.
Section 4 of said Memorandum Circular provides:
“Authorized Telephone Service Providers shall
continue to charge their duly approved rates for special
services for 3 months from the effectivity of this circular, after
which they may set their own rates.”
With the passage of the Public Telecommunications Act of
1995 (PTA), it sets forth the regulatory logic, mandating
that “a healthy competitive environment shall be
fostered, one in which telecommunications carriers are
free to make business decisions and to interact with one
another in providing telecommunications services, with
the end in view of encouraging their financial viability
while maintaining affordable rates.”
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD.
CASE NO. 161
ART III SEC 1: FIXING OF RATES AND REGULATION OF
PROFESSION (PROFESSION)
CORONA V. UHPAP, 283 SCRA 31
FACTS: IN ISSUING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-92
(PPA-AO NO.04-92), LIMITING THE TERM OF
APPOINTMENT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO ONE YEAR SUBJECT
TO YEARLY RENEWAL OR CANCELLATION. RESPONDENTS
UNITED HARBOUR PILOTS ASSOCIATION AND THE
MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, THROUGH CAPT.ALBERTO
C. COMPAS, QUESTIONED PPA-AO NO. 04-92. THE Office of
the President ISSUED AN ORDER DIRECTING THE PPA TO
HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PPA-AO
NO. 04-92. THE OP, THROUGH THEN ASSISTANT
EXECUTIVESECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS RENATO C.
CORONA, DISMISSED THE APPEAL/PETITION AND LIFTED
THE RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED EARLIER.
RESPONDENTS FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI,
PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION WITH PRAYER FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND
65
DAMAGES, BEFORE BRANCH 6 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL Sur, of Sergio Villabona and Eduardo Yap, Jr. on the ground dismissal had been cured by respondent's subsequent
COURT that they had been illegally dismissed. For there was no appeal not only to the Civil Service Commission but also to
formal investigation made Petitioner Francisco A. Abalos is the regular courts. Petitioner, however, because it never
ISSUE: WON PPA-AO-04-92 IS CONSTITUTIONAL now before us and prays that the resolution be reversed accorded Evelyn Kintanar an investigation of the charges
because it was issued with grave abuse of discretion. made against her, never disclosed to her either the charges
RULING: YES. THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT PPA-AO or the evidence on the basis of which it had dismissed her.
NO. 04-92 WAS ISSUED IN STARK DISREGARD OF ISSUE: W/N there is violation on due process Evelyn Kintanar, in other words, could not reasonably be
RESPONDENTS' RIGHT AGAINST DEPRIVATIONOF expected to meet and counter charges and evidence which
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE RULING: YES. Although moot and academic, the right to be had never been made known to her.
SUPREME COURTSAID THAT IN ORDER TO FALL WITHIN heard is one of the brightest hallmarks of the free society. ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal is valid.
THE AEGIS OF THIS PROVISION, TWO CONDITIONS MUST We should be proud that in this jurisdiction every person RULING: NO. In the case at bar, private respondent does
CONCUR, NAMELY, THAT THERE IS ADEPRIVATION AND who may be involved in controversy is entitled to present not only face a clear and present danger of loss of
THAT SUCH DEPRIVATION IS DONE WITHOUTPROPER his side, no less than his adversary, at a hearing duly called property or employment, but of liberty itself, which
OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS. AS A GENERAL RULE, for that purpose. This right is available to citizen and alien may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a
NOTICEAND HEARING, AS THE FUNDAMENTAL alike, from the humblest to the most exalted, and covers foreign land. The convergence of petitioner’s favorable
REQUIREMENTS OFPROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, ARE with its protection the offer of arguments and evidence, action on the extradition request and the deprivation of
ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN ANADMINISTRATIVE BODY from the profound to the absurd, in defense of one's life, private respondents liberty is easily comprehensible.
EXERCISES ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION. INTHE liberty and property. That is a right we must all cherish. We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity
PERFORMANCE OF ITS EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE jurisdiction, which is aptly described as "justice outside
FUNCTIONS,SUCH AS ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS, CASE NO. 163 legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and
AN ADMINISTRATIVEBODY NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOV’T BOARDS AND never against, statutory law or judicial
REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE ANDHEARING COMMISSIONS pronouncements.
GSIS V. CSC (should be CA), 201 SCRA 661
THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT PILOTAGE AS A PROFESSION
HAS TAKENON THE NATURE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT. IT IS FACTS: Respondent Evelyn T. Kintanar, a second-grade civil
READILY APPARENT THATPPA-AO NO. 04-92 UNDULY service eligible, was employed by petitioner Government CASE NO. 164
RESTRICTS THE RIGHT OF HARBOR PILOTSTO ENJOY Service Insurance System ("GSIS") at its Cebu Branch, ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOV’T BOARDS AND
THEIR PROFESSION BEFORE THEIR COMPULSORY initially as a casual employee on 3 September 1976, and COMMISSIONS
RETIREMENT. later as records clerk, and then as control clerk. As a control MACAYAYONG V. OPLE, 204 SCRA 372
clerk, she was assigned to the Records and Communication
CASE NO. 162 (mailing) Section, Information and Services Division. FACTS: The records show that before petitioner was
ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOV’T BOARDS AND Sometime in 1979, two (2) members of the GSIS, in separate dropped from the roster of the Department of Labor, he was
COMMISSIONS affidavits, complained that they had not received their notified twice by his home office to report back to work, on
ABALOS V. CSC, 196 SCRA 81 policy loan checks. Petitioner maintains in this Petition for January 5 and on January 19, 1976. In the aforesaid notices,
Review that respondent's summary dismissal from the the petitioner was urged to come back to his home office
FACTS: The Civil Service Commission affirmed the order of service was justified, the charge being serious and the because his services were badly needed, with a warning that
Civil Service Regional Office No. 12 directing the evidence of guilt being strong; and that whatever lack of in case he (petitioner) fails to report, he would be dropped
reinstatement in the Provincial Engineer's Office, Lanao del procedural due process may have attended the summary from the roster of the Department of Labor.

66
 to December 31,1991. He cited as additional reason his ARZHY
desire to take advantage of ". . . a physical check-up free of CASE NO. 166
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal is valid. charge due to my childrens' medical plan benefits". The ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOVERNMENT BOARDS
letter was personally delivered by petitioner's wife. It AND COMMISSIONS
RULING: YES. Even assuming that petitioner’s contentions carried his address in the United States at 149 Declaration Go. v. NPC, 271 SCRA 447
as to his date of receipt of notices were true, it is well settled Way, San Jose, California, 95116. For unknown reason, the FACTS: Petitioner, a member of the Olongapo City Police
that due process contemplates freedom from arbitrariness Director of ATI did not act on the letter-request. It was Department, was dismissed by the Summary Dismissal
and what is required is fairness or justice, the substance neither approved nor disapproved. Three (3) months later, Board of the PC/INP Regional Command for his alleged
rather than the form being paramount. An allegation based ATI started acting adversely on petitioner's request. On involvement in illegal gambling (operation of jai-alai
solely on the lack of opportunity to be heard without notice September 5, 1990, Atty. Ildefonso del Rosario, ATI's bookies). In his petition before the SC, he maintained that he
does vent per se merit unconditional approval. It is said Assistant Director and OIC, wrote to petitioner declaring was not served written charges and informed of the nature
that, “No violation of due process is committed even where him absent without official leave for more than thirty (30) of such charges; that no hearing was held by the summary
no hearing was conducted but the parties were given the days and warning him that should he not report within five dismissal board; and that he was not heard. He claimed that
chance to explain their side.” Likewise, there is no denial of (5) days from receipt of the letter, he would be dropped he appeared before the summary dismissal board but no
due process where petitioner was afforded an opportunity from the rolls. The letter was addressed at 30 Ventura St., hearing was ever held either because the complainant and
to present his case. BF Homes, Quezon City, petitioner's house. The letter, his witnesses did not appear or the members of the board
however, was returned to sender (ATI) on September 27, were absent or all three were absent. He was informed of
MAIN POINT: What the principle of process seeks to 1990. What ATI did was to publish a notice of similar import his dismissal through a memo from the INP District
safeguard is not lack of previous notice but the denial of in the October 4, 11 and 18, 1990 issues of the Philippine Superintendent.
opportunity to be heard. But even if a party had not been Journal, a newspaper, of general ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his right
given prior notice of a motion, he cannot claim denial of due to due process when no copy of the complaint was
process if he was given the opportunity to file a motion for ISSUE: WON there is violation/denial of due process. furnished to him
reconsideration of the order which was issued pursuant to a RULING: Yes. In summary dismissal proceedings, unless
motion without prior notice to him. RULING: Yes, there was. There was no receipt of notice by other fully effective means for implementing the
the Petitioner. When petitioner filed his leave of absence constitutional requirement of notice and hearing are
CASE NO. 165 without pay, ATI knew that petitioner was staying at 149 devised, it is mandatory that charges be specified in writing
ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOV’T BOARDS AND Declaration Way, San Jose, California in 1992. The letter of and that the affidavits in support thereof be attached to the
COMMISSIONS June 25, 1990 of the petitioner requesting this leave clearly complaint because these are the only ways by which
GONZALES V. CSC, 226 SCRA 66 carried his address in the United States. The records do not evidence against the respondent can be brought to his
show that the officials of ATI denied knowledge of knowledge. They take the place of direct examination of
FACTS: The herein Petitioner is an Administrative Officer of petitioner's correct address. Despite this knowledge, witnesses. The formal investigation, which is dispensed
the Agricultural Training Institute (ATI) for 36 years. Early however, the letter of September 5, 1990 written by Atty. with in summary dismissal proceedings, refers to the
in 1990, certain problems beset his two (2) children in the Ildefonso del Rosario, ATI's Asst. Director and OIC, directing presentation of witnesses by their direct examination and
United States. He had to fly to the United States to attend to petitioner to return to work within five (5) days, otherwise, not to the requirement that the respondent in the
his children. He applied for and was granted leaves with pay he would be dropped from the rolls was inexplicably mailed administrative case be notified of the charges and given the
from February 2, to July 16, 1990. On June 25, 1990, to his house at 30 Ventura St., BF Homes, Quezon City. The chance to defend himself.
petitioner wrote to the Director of ATI requesting approval letter was not received by petitioner. MAIN POINT: Underlined
of a leave without pay starting from the second week of July

67
ARZHY
CASE NO. 167
ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOVERNMENT BOARDS
AND COMMISSIONS
CHR v. CSC, 227 SCRA 42
FACTS: Private respondent Atty. Elias Pacete, CHR Region
IX Division Chief, filed an application for optional retirement
due to his failing eyesight. His application was accepted and
approved by the Chairman of CHR despite his subsequent
withdrawal of said application and a new successor was
appointed in his stead. GSIS informed Pacete that his
application for optional retirement cannot be granted due to
his failure to meet the required 3-year continuous service
preceding retirement. Pacete requested to be reinstated but
CHR denied and instead formally charged him with
incompetence, gross inefficiency in the performance of
official duty and failure to account for public funds. On
appeal, Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) of CSC
ordered his immediate reinstatement with payment of back
wages and other benefits allowed by law without prejudice
to the outcome of the formal charges against him. Petitioner
contended that private respondent cannot be reinstated
because it has the right to summarily remove and replace
incompetent employees under the Civil Service Decree.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR failed to observed
administrative due process when it denied the
reinstatement of private respondent
RULING: Yes. Government Service Insurance Act allows an
employer to request retirement of an employee who is
unable to perform satisfactorily and efficiently his duties,
but such request must first be submitted to the Civil Service
Board of Appeals and only after said employee shall have
been notified in writing of the proposed retirement. There
was no request for optional retirement of private
respondent from the CHR to the Civil Service Board of
Appeals based on incompetence and inefficiency. Although
he was furnished a copy of the resolution denying his
application for reinstatement with the attendant charges
against him, he was not afforded the opportunity to refute
them prior to the promulgation of the said resolution. The
attempt to observe due process was made only after he had
been separated from the service.
MAIN POINT: Employer must first notify employee in
writing before requesting Civil Service Board of Appeals to
retire him for inefficiency.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 168
ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOVERNMENT BOARDS
AND COMMISSIONS
Uy v. COA, 328 SCRA 607
FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition for reinstatement before
the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) after being
dismissed from service by former Agusan del Sur Governor
Paredes who was allegedly motivated by political vengeance
when he dismissed petitioners and hired new employees to
replace them. MSPB ordered the reinstatement of
petitioners and the payment of back wages. On inquiry by
Provincial Administrator (on behalf of new Governor Plaza),
COA rendered a decision holding former Governor Paredes
personally liable for the payment of back salaries and other
benefits of reinstated employees and disallowed the
payment by the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur of
such.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA violated due process when it
held former Governor Paredes personally liable for the
payment of back wages and benefits of reinstated
employees without due notice
RULING: Yes. In the case at bar, former Governor Paredes
was never made a party to nor served a notice of the
proceedings before the COA. While administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial powers are not hidebound by
technical procedures, nonetheless, they are not free to
disregard the basic demands of due process. Notice to
enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence
is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any
administrative proceedings but an indispensable ingredient
of due process. It would be unfair for COA to hold former
Governor Paredes personally liable for the claims of
petitioners amounting to millions of pesos without giving
him an opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his
defense. SC rulings holding that public officials are
personally liable for damages arising from illegal acts done
in bad faith are premised on said officials having been sued
both in their official and personal capacities
MAIN POINT: Underlined
ARZHY
CASE NO. 169
ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOVERNMENT BOARDS
AND COMMISSIONS
Lameyra v. Pangilinan, 322 SCRA 117
FACTS: Petitioner, Pedro Lameyra, was dismissed from the
government service as janitor/messenger of Famy, Laguna.
He was informed by respondent Mayor Pangilinan via letter
that he was dropped from the roll of employees due to
insubordination and AWOL. Petitioner filed a notice of
appeal with the Civil Service Commission alleging that he
was a permanent employee and that he was terminated
without prior written notice of the charges and without
investigation and hearing, in violation of his security of
tenure and due process. He alleged that the act of Mayor
Pangilinan was an act of political vengeance as he was
publicly known to have voted for his political rival during
the May 8, 1995 election.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was due process observed in
the dismissal of the petitioner
RULING: No. Although, pursuant to Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 12 Series of 1994, no prior
notice is required to drop from the rolls an employee who
has been continuously absent without approved leave
(AWOL) for at least thirty (30) calendar days, the SC,
however, is not convinced that petitioner did not report for
68
work from July 6, 1995 to August 6, 1995 to constitute such without any case, investigation or due process. For this ISSUE/S: Whether or not PAGCOR violated the right of due
substantial evidence in light of the petitioner’s contentionreason, the rule should be strictly construed in order that it to process on the dismissal of Manahan from
that the Personnel Officer/Human Resources Management may not be used as a tool for harassment, vindictiveness or government service.
Assistant Benito Vicencio, who provided the certification for
removal of any employee who happens to fall out of grace of
his absences, was the same person who prevented him from his supervisor or superior officers. In the case at bar, the RULING: Yes, a cursory reading of the purported formal
signing the logbook. That he has been replaced by one notice required by law was not given to respondent. charge issued to Manahan shows that the same is
Leynes in July, 1995, and that he has been asked to submit Respondent was never notified in writing of his defective as it does not contain the required
his resignation which he refused to do. Under these “Unsatisfactory” rating within 30 days from the end of the statements, and it was not issued by the proper
circumstances, it is believed that, in equity, and in propersemester when the “Unsatisfactory” rating was given. He disciplining authority. Hence, Manahan is not
compliance with the requirements of due process, was never warned in writing that a succeeding deemed to have been formally charged.
petitioner should be given a last full opportunity to prove “Unsatisfactory” performance shall warrant his separation
his contention that the termination of his service was illegal.
from the service. Even the allegation of the oral notice itself
The case was remanded to the CSC for further proceeding. is clearly an afterthought. Furthermore, his unsatisfactory *Required Statements
MAIN POINT: Findings of fact of an administrative agency is ratings were found to be made arbitrary. While its form may vary, it generally embodies a
respected by the Supreme Court provided that such findings MAIN POINT: Procedural due process requires notice to be brief statement of the material and relevant facts
of fact should be supported by substantial evidence. given to the employee before he can be dropped from the constituting the basis of the charge(s); a directive
rolls of employees. for the employee to answer the charge(s) in writing
ARZHY and under oath, accompanied by his/her evidence;
CASE NO. 170 and advice for the employee to indicate in his/her
ART III SEC 1: DISMISSALS IN GOVERNMENT BOARDS R. Rizon answer whether he/she elects a formal
AND COMMISSIONS CASE NO. 171 investigation; and a notice that he/she may secure
NPC v. Zozobrado, 487 SCRA 16 ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 DISMISSALS IN GOVT the assistance of a counsel of his/her own choice.
FACTS: Respondent (permanent employee of National PAGCOR vs CA G.R. No. 185668 December 13, 2011
Power Corporation assigned as pilot) was dropped from the
rolls of employee due to two consecutive unsatisfactory FACTS: Mia Manahan, treasurer officer of CF-Pavilion
performance rating given by Gen Lagera. On appeal, the CA caused the transfer of P4.2M to a certain David R. Rizon
found respondent’s separation to be made with utter lack of Funtabella. However CF-Laog denied that such fund CASE NO. 172
due process and ordered his reinstatement. Petitioner transfer had been transmitted by CF Pavilion. Thus, ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 DISMISSALS IN PRIVATE
contended that actual and constructive notice had been Manahan was called by for investigation. She avers SECTOR
served upon respondent. That the ratings given to that she was deprived of her constitutional right to Hellenic vs Siete G.R. No. 84082 March 13, 1991
respondent resulting to his dropping from the rolls were due process of law when the PAGCOR BOD
official and regular acts by NPC based on his performance outrightly dismissed her from service without FACTS: Siete was employed on May 22, 1985, as Capt of
and by no means a premeditated design to drop respondent informing her of the formal charges and apprising M/V Houda G by Sultan Shipping Co., Ltd. On July 8,
from the rolls. her of the documentary evidence against her. CSC 1985, Capt. Wilfredo Lim boarded the vessel and
ISSUE: Whether or not the dropping of respondent from the and CA dismiss the petition of PAGCOR. advised Siete that he had instructions from the
rolls is a violation of the procedural due process owners to take over its command and he was
RULING: Yes. Dropping from the rolls means separation dismissed from service. It contends that the
from the service. Such separation is made summarily, respondent had been instructed to erase the timber

69
 load line on the vessel; that he had indeed been disobedience and fraud or willful breach of the trust
negligent in supervising the unloading of the cargo reposed on him by the private respondents. RULING: Yes, neither notice nor hearing was afforded to the
at Tripoli, resulting in the replacement of certain petitioners. They were not given an opportunity to
damaged equipment; and that he had not been ISSUE/S: Whether or not Salaw was denied the right to due refute the findings stated in the audit. In order that
denied due process process. the willful disobedience by the employee may
constitute a just cause for terminating his
ISSUE/S: Whether or not Siete was denied the right to due RULING: Yes, the dismissal of the petitioner from his employment, the orders, regulations, or instructions
process. employment was characterized by undue haste. He of the employer or his representative must be: 1)
was not given the opportunity to present his own reasonable and lawful; 2) sufficiently known to the
RULING: Yes. respondent was illegally dismissed because, defense and confront the witnesses and examine the employee; and 3) in connection with the duties
first, he was not accorded a fair investigation as evidence against him nor was he granted counsel or which the employee has been engaged to discharge.
required by law, and second, because the grounds representative during the hearing. The rudimentary
invoked for his separation have not been proved by requirements of due process — notice and hearing
the petitioner. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a — must also be observed before an employee may R. Rizon
worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the be dismissed.
particular acts or omission constituting the grounds CASE NO. 175
for his dismissal. The employer shall afford the R. Rizon ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 DISMISSALS IN PRIVATE
worker ample opportunity to be heard and to SECTOR
defend himself with the assistance of his CASE NO. 174 Aparente vs NLRC G.R. No. 117652. April 27, 2000
representative. ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 DISMISSALS IN PRIVATE
SECTOR
R. Rizon Conti vs NLRC G.R. No. 119253. April 10, 1997 FACTS: Petitioner Rolando Aparante, Sr., an advertising
CASE NO. 173 foreman of Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. (CCBPI).
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 DISMISSALS IN PRIVATE Petitioner met an accident in which he sideswiped
SECTOR FACTS: Petitioner Amor Conti was employed by respondent Marilyn Tejero and was driving without a valid
Salaw vs NLRC G.R. No. 90786 September 27, 1991 Corfarm as cashier. On 13 January 1993, petitioners driver’s license. The Insurance Company refused to
received a memorandum, from private respondents reimburse upon finding that petitioner was driving
terminating their services, allegedly for two reasons: without a valid drivers license. And was dismissed
FACTS: Espero Santos Salaw was employed by respondents 1) the expiration of their employment contracts, for violating Company Rules and Regulations
as a credit investigator-appraiser. On November 27, these being coterminous with the management resulting to damages of P19,534.45.
1984, the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the contract between Corfarm and MERALCO, and; 2)
Philippine Constabulary, extracted from the the on-going evaluation of their past performances, ISSUE/S: Whether or not Petitioner was denied the right to
petitioner without the assistance of counsel a Sworn and investigation of the internal auditor of Corfarm due process.
Statement which made it appear that the petitioner, of certain anomalous transactions involving them
in cahoots with a co-employee. Petitioner was (petitioners). RULING: No, due process does not necessarily mean or
terminated from his employment effective March require a hearing but simply a reasonable
27, 1985, for alleged serious misconduct or willful ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner was denied the right to opportunity or a right to be heard or as applied to
due process. administrative proceedings, an opportunity to

70
 explain ones side. In labor cases, the filing of Ruling: NO. Lopez was not illegally dismissed since Ruling: NO. The Court rule that the preventive suspension
position papers and supporting documents fulfill the respondent company’s loss of trust and confidence arising of a civil service employee or officer can be ordered even
requirements of due process. Further, petitioner has from petitioner’s smuggling out of the scrap iron without a hearing because such suspension is not a penalty
misrepresented himself and led the private constituted just cause for terminating his services. The case but only a preliminary step in an administrative
respondent to believe that he had procured another of Cruz v. Court of Appeals has laid down the basis of investigation. The purpose is to prevent the accused from
driver’s license. Thus, he was permitted to drive loss of trust and confidence namely (1) willful breach of using his position or office to influence prospective
again. the trust reposed in the employee by the employer (2) witnesses or tamper with the records which may be vital in
based on substantial evidence (3) act is work related the prosecution of the case against him.
Andalahao (4) employee holds a position of responsibility (5)
CASE NO. 176 employee is concerned with delicate matters like Main Point: Preventive Suspension. — The proper
Art III Section 1: Dismissal in Private Sector handling or care and protection of the property and disciplining authority may preventively suspend any
Lopez vs Alturas 647 SCRA 568 GR 191008 assets of the employer. Respondent company’s charge subordinate officer or employee under his authority
against petitioner was amply proven by substantial pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer
Facts: Petitioner was dismissed after being caught by evidence consisting of the affidavits of various or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
respondent’s security guard in the act of attempting to employees of respondent. misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if
smuggle out of the company premises 60 kilos of scrap iron. there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of
Finding petitioner’s explanation unsatisfactory, respondent charges which would warrant his removal from the service.
company terminated his employment on the grounds of loss Main Point:
of trust and confidence, and of violation of company rules Andalahao
and regulations. The labor arbiter dismissed the petitioner’s Andalahao CASE NO. 178
complaint saying that the latter’s dismissal was justified CASE NO. 177 Art III Section 1: Preventive Suspension
given that he held a position of trust and confidence. It was Art III Section 1: Preventive Suspension Castillo-Co vs Barbers 290 SCRA 717 GR 129952
also held that the respondent paid the correct wages Alonzo vs Capulong 244 SCRA 80
contrary to the claims of the petitioner. Facts: Congressman Junie Cua filed a complaint before the
Facts: Fajardo was preventively suspended from her post at Office of the Ombudsman against Governor Castillo-Co and
NLRC ruled that the evidence is not sufficient to terminate the Pag-ibig Fund Foundation. The decision for her Provincial Engineer Virgilio Ringor for alleged fraud against
the employee. MR was denied but CA reversed the ruling preventive suspension was based on a recommendation by the public treasury and malversation. (Sections 3(e) and
and upheld the dismissal on the ground that the act f Pag-ibig’s legal department, which found a prima facie case 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
smuggling had been sufficiently established. after investigating the circumstances surrounding a letter amended, and Articles 213 and 217 of the Revised Penal
sent to the CEO of Pag-ibig by a contractor complaining of Code.) for anomalous purchases of construction equipment.
However, it was also held that that due process was not improper conduct on Fajardo’s part. Fajardo claims she was
observed when respondent company failed to give him a deprived of due process for being suspended on the basis of A week after the complaint was filed, Governor Castillo-Co
chance to defend his side in a proper hearing. The company an unverified letter and not being allowed to give her side. and Provincial Engineer Ringor were placed under
then was ordered to pay nominal damages of P30,000. preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months which
Issue: W/N preventive suspension of a public officer needs was approved by the Deputy Ombudman for Luzon
ISSUES: W/N Lopez was illegally dismissed to undergo due process
Petitioners thereafter filed separate motions for
reconsideration but were denied by the Deputy

71
Ombudsman for Luzon. Which now leads to he special civil including all the accessory penalties. She appealed from CSC working in said city up to present. However, these
action for certiorari seeking to nullify the suspension order and was further denied and the decision was by CSC- properties were not declared in his SALN particularly the
due to the fact the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon has no ARMM. cars registered under his name. Thus, he was charged with
authority to issue such order. violation of RA 6713, RA 3019 and other pertinent laws.
She requested a 30-day extension of time to file for a
Issue: W/N petitioner was denied due process because she petition for review, however, still failed to file the petition Carabeo denied the liability but during the pendency of
was not afforded the opportunity to controvert the evidence within the extended period. Again, she filed for a motion to investigation, he was preventively suspended.
against her before the order of preventive suspension was admit but the CA dismissed the petition for having been
issued. tardily filed and for lack of merit due to her failure to file the Issue: W/N the suspension rendered by the Ombudsman is
intended petition for review within the 30-day period which valid.
Ruling: NO. A preventive suspension, can be decreed on rendered the CSC decision final and executory.
an official under investigation after charges are brought Ruling: YES. Preventive suspension order is not a
and even before the charges are heard since the same is Issue: W/N petitioner Bacsasar was denied due process penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative
not in the nature of a penalty but merely a preliminary investigation. There is nothing in the law, specifically
step in an administrative investigation. In connection Ruling: NO. Petitioner was not denied due process. Her Section 24 of RA 6770, or The Ombudsman Act of 1989,
with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his failure to file her appeal on time allowed the CSC resolutions which requires that notice and hearing precede the
answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that to lapse into finality which goes beyond the power of the preventive suspension of an erring public official.
the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts Court’s review. Also, she was the one who waived her right
of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a to a formal investigation which denied herself the Main Point:
preventive measure. A suspension is a preliminary step in opportunity to present evidence, to confront the witnesses
an administrative investigation against her, and to object to the evidence adduced against Who digested: jAn
her. CASE NO. 181
Main Point: She was also given ample time and opportunity to defend ART III SEC 1
herself. The essence of due process is simply to be given DISMISSALS, SUSPENSION, REINSTATEMENT ETC.:
Andalahao an opportunity to be heard or to explain one’s side; and PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
CASE NO. 179 this she was accorded but denied herself when she Villasenor v. OMB
Art III Section 1: Preventive Suspension waived her right to a formal investigation.
Bacsasar vs CSC 576 SCRA 787 FACTS: Petitioner Villaseñ or, an electrical inspector from
Main Point: NB Preventive suspension not required as the electrical division, and Mesa, inspector from the
Facts: Bcasasar was charged with dishonesty by the CSC- violation is falsification of public document Electrical Engineering Office, both from Quezon City, were
ARMM due falsifying the entry of the Personal Data Sheet administratively charged in connection with the Manor
indicating a passing score of 87.54% rating, in support of Andalahao Hotel fire tragedy killing 74 people and causing injury to
the issuance of the appointment as Municipal Assessor CASE NO. 180 others. In its Joint Decision, the Investigating Panel of the
under permanent status. She denied the allegation and Art III Section 1: Preventive Suspension Office of the Ombudsman ruled that both were guilty of the
claimed that a man approached her and convinced her to Carabeo vs CA 607 SCRA 390 appropriate charges of their negligent acts. The
obtain eligibility from him without examination. Ombudsman approved the findings in the Joint Decision.
She waived her right to a formal investigation. The CSC- Facts: Liberato Carabeo, City Treasurer of Paranaque was Petitioners, then filed their separate MR of the Joint
ARMM imposed a penalty of dismissal from service alleged to have acquired properties from the time he started Decision. The Ombudsman denied the MR filed by Mesa and

72
those by the accused and affirmed the Joint Decision, but
Villaseñ or’s MR was not enumerated as one of the pleadings
resolved. Mesa appealed to the CA, Villaseñ or made no
appeal because the MR before the Ombudsman was not yet
resolved. Villaseñ or and Mesa filed a special civil action for
certiorari before the CA assailing immediate
implementation of the Joint Decision despite the pendency
of Villaseñ or’s motion for reconsideration and Mesa’s
appeal. They prayed that the said order be annulled, and an
injunction be issued to restrain its implementation. The CA
held that the Ombudsman decision was immediately
executory pending appeal and would not be stayed by the
filing of the appeal or issuance of an injunctive relief.
Villaseñ or argues that the order of dismissal cannot be
deemed executory as it has not yet attained finality because
of his unresolved motion for reconsideration invoking. On
the other hand, Mesa argues that the order of suspension
against him should not have been implemented pending his
appeal with the CA.
ISSUE: W/N the Ombudsman’s order of dismissal from the
service and suspension of one year can be implemented
pending resolution of petitioner Villaseñ or’s motion for
reconsideration before the Ombudsman, and petitioner
Mesa’s appeal before the CA?
RULING: Yes. Petitioner Mesa was ordered suspended for
one year without pay, while petitioner Villaseñ or was
ordered dismissed from the service. These are plainly
appealable decisions which are immediately executory
pending appeal.
MAIN POINT: Unappealable decisions are final and
executory, and they are as follows: (1) respondent is
absolved of the charge; (2) the penalty imposed is public
censure or reprimand; (3) suspension of not more than one
month; and (4) a fine equivalent to one month’s salary.
Appealable decisions are those which fall outside said
enumeration and may be appealed to the CA within 15 days National Government which owns them, the Government
from receipt of the written notice of the decision or order never shared in the profits they had generated. It is
denying the motion for reconsideration. therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax
under the said ordinances.
jAn
CASE NO. 182 MAINPOINT: It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
ART III SEC 1 respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
ORDINANCE/STATUS/MEMO CIR/RULES persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
People v. Nazario the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
FACTS: On 1968, This defendant is charged of the crime of becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
Violation of Municipal Ordinance in an information filed by
the provincial Fiscal for failing to pay the municipal tax of
P326.62 required of him as fishpond operator as provided
for under Ordinance No. 4, series of 1955. TC ruled against Who digested: jAn
the defendant invoking the amendments of the said CASE NO. 183
ordinance, namely Ordinance No. 15 series of 1965 and ART III SEC 1
further amended by Ordinance No. 12 series of 1966. He Ordinance/Status/Memo Cir/Rules
then appleaed to the CA contending that being a mere lessee Fransisco v. CA
of the fishpond, he is not covered since the said ordinances
speak of "owner or manager." He likewise maintains that FACTS: Gregoria Fransisco owned a quonset building which
they are vague insofar as they reckon the date of payment: stands on a lot owned by the PPA. By virtue of Proc. No. 83,
Whereas Ordinance No. 4 provides that parties shall said land was declared for the exclusive use of port facilities.
commence payment "after the lapse of three (3) years PPA issued to Tan Gin San, surviving spouse of Fransisco, a
starting from the date said fishpond is approved by the permit to occupy the lot for one year from January to
Bureau of Fisheries." Ordinance No. 12 states that liability December 1989. On May 1989, Respondent mayor notified
for the tax accrues "beginning and taking effect from the Tan Gin San to remove or relocate its building citing Zoning
year 1964 if the fishpond started operating before the year Ordinance No. 147 stressing the clean-up campaign on
1964." illegal squatters and unsanitary surroundings along Strong
boulevard. Respondent Mayor, then, ordered the demolition
ISSUE: W/N the ordinance is vague as not to satisfy the due on 24 May 1989. Aggrieved, petitioner sought a Writ of
process need for notice. Prohibition before the RTC but was denied and upheld the
power of the Mayor to order the demolition without judicial
RULING: No. As the actual operator of the fishponds, he authority which led to the demolition of the Quonset
comes within the term " manager." He does not deny the building. CA initially reversed the decision of the TC and
fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, issued a Writ of Prohibition. However, the respondent court
introduced fish fries into the fishponds, and had employed reversed its decision upon the reconsideration sought by
laborers to maintain them. While it appears that it is the the respondent officials. Petitioner's plea for
73
reconsideration having been denied, it is now before the SC Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. overruling of decisions is inherent in the interpretation of
seeking a reversal. DOF laws.

ISSUE: W/N Respondent Mayor could summarily, without FACTS: Petitioner, a domestic corporation whose members, Who digested: jAn
judicial process, order the demolition of petitioner's individually or collectively, are engaged in the buying and CASE NO. 185
Quonset building. selling of copra in Misamis Oriental, alleges that prior to the ART III SEC 1
issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular 47-91 which Ordinance/Status/Memo Cir/Rules
RULING: No. Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot implemented VAT Ruling 190-90, copra was classified as Estrada v. Sandiganbayan
and quonset building by virtue of a permit from the agricultural food product under $ 103(b) of the National
Philippine Ports Authority (Port of Zamboanga) when Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, exempt from VAT at FACTS: Respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution
demolition was effected. It was not squatting on public land. all stages of production or distribution. On June 11, 1991, finding probable cause that petitioner Estrada, then
Its property was not of trifling value. It was entitled to an respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the President of the Philippines, has committed the offense of
impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized to decide circular in question, classifying copra as an agricultural non- plunder and that he be prosecuted under RA 7080 (Plunder
whether the quonset building did constitute a nuisance in food product and declaring it "exempt from VAT only if the Law). Petitioner, then, moved to quash the information
law. There was no compelling necessity for precipitate sale is made by the primary producer pursuant to Section claiming the facts alleged therein did not constitute an
action. It follows then that respondent public officials of the 103(a) of the Tax Code, as amended." The reclassification indictable offense since the law on which it was based was
Municipality of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their authority had the effect of denying to the petitioner the exemption it unconstitutional for vagueness and the amended
in abating summarily petitioner’s quonset building. They previously enjoyed when copra was classified as an information for plunder charged more than one offense.
had deprived petitioner of its property without due process agricultural food product under §103(b) of the NIRC.
of law. The fact that petitioner filed a suit for prohibition Petitioner challenges RMC No. 47-91 on various grounds, ISSUE: W/N Plunder Law requires less evidence for
and was subsequently heard thereon will not cure the which will be presently discussed although not in the order providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore
defect, as opined by the Court of Appeals, the demolition raised in the petition for prohibition. violates the rights of the accused to due process.
having been a fait accompli prior to hearing and the
authority to demolish without a judicial order being a ISSUE: W/N the petitioner was denied of his right to due RULING: No. The legislature did not in any manner
prejudicial issue. process. refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of
plunder. The burden remains with the prosecution to prove
MAIN POINT: Violation of a municipal ordinance neither RULING: No. In the case at bar, we find no reason for beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to
empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of extra-judicial holding that respondent Commissioner erred in not constitute a crime. What the prosecution needs to prove
remedies. On the contrary, the Local Government Code considering copra as an "agricultural food product" within beyond reasonable doubt is only several acts sufficient to
imposes upon him the duty "to cause to be instituted the meaning of § 103(b) of the NIRC. As the Solicitor General form a combination or series which would constitute a
judicial proceedings in connection with the violation of contends, "copra per se is not food, that is, it is not intended pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00.
ordinances" for human consumption. Simply stated, nobody eats copra There is no need to prove every other act alleged in the
for food." That previous Commissioners considered it so, is information to have been committed by the accused in
jAn not reason for holding that the present interpretation is furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to
CASE NO. 184 wrong. amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
ART III SEC 1
Ordinance/Status/Memo Cir/Rules MAIN POINT: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not MAIN POINT: The legislature did not in any manner
bound by the ruling of his predecessors. To the contrary, the refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of

74
plunder. The burden remains with the prosecution to prove of due process. Due process of law implies the right of the MAIN POINT
beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to person affected thereby to be present before the tribunal Lack of notice regarding the pending appeal and the
constitute a crime. which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, hearing of said appeal is cured by the filing of a motion for
liberty, and property in its most comprehensive sense; to be reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot be
CHAM heard, by testimony or otherwise, and to have the right of successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to
Case No. 186 controverting, by proof, every material fact which bears on be heard on his motion for reconsideration
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process the question of the light in the matter involved.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION CHAM
Mendenilla vs CSC Case No. 188
FACTS CHAM ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
Medenilla was a contractual employee of DPWH Case No. 187 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
who detailed as Technical Assistant in the Office of the ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process Rodreguez vs Proj 6
Assistant Secretary for Administration and Manpower MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Management. Private respondents jointly lodged a protest Mendiola vs CSC FACTS
before the DPWH task force on reorganization contesting Rodriguez is a vendor occupying and leasing one of
the appointment of the petitioner to the position. They FACTS the stalls at the Project 6 Market. The Cooperative sought to
alleged that since they are next-in-rank employees, one of Petitioner is an employee of Economic Intelligence eject petitioner from his market stall and recover from him
them should have been appointed to the said position. The and Investigation Bureau. Petitioner received a notice of arrears in his monthly rent over the property. Petitioner
petitioner contends that she was not notified by the Civil termination from service effective at the close of office contends that he was deprived of procedural due process
Service Commission of the existence of the appeal before it. hours of April 30, 1988. Alleging that he was not informed when the trial court issued the order of August 31, 1987
The resolutions, therefore, were allegedly issued in of the cause of his dismissal, petitioner appealed his case to without any hearing and without him having been furnished
violation of the petitioner's constitutionally guaranteed due the chairman of the Appeals Board. His appeal was denied. a copy of the Cooperative's opposition to his motion to
process of law. Subsequently, he appealed to the Commission and averred quash. However, petitioner admits that when he moved for
that he was denied due process when he was dismissed reconsideration of said order, he received his copy of the
ISSUE/S from the service. opposition and respondent judge conducted a hearing on
Whether or not CSC, without giving notice to the his motion.
petitioner of the existence of an appeal filed before the CSC, ISSUE/S
denied the petitioner of due process Whether or not the respondent Commission erred in ISSUE/S
giving due course to the motion for reconsideration of Whether or not petitioner was denied due process
RULING respondent Bureau in the issuance of the order
No. In the case at bar, any defect was cured by the RULING
filing of a motion for reconsideration. Since the petitioner No. With respect to petitioner's contention that he RULING
filed a motion for reconsideration, she cannot now complain was denied due process when the Commission heard the No. The court found that long before petitioner
that she was deprived of due process. Bureau's motion for reconsideration without notice to him, entered into the said contract, he already knew that the land
SC agreed with private respondent Bureau's argument that was owned by the NHA and that the Cooperative was to
MAIN POINT the defect was cured by the filing by petitioner of his lease this land with the option to purchase after 25 years,
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be Omnibus Motion on July 30, 1990 construct the market, building thereon and operate the
heard. The presence of a party is not always the cornerstone market. In, short, petitioner was aware of the kind of

75
agreement he had with the Cooperative over his market rechecking the examination papers of petitioner without his RULING
stall. presence. Petitioner was given the right to be heard, but, as No. Due process was never denied petitioners
already said, he did not make good use of it by showing that Salonga and Solid Intertain Corporation because the trial
MAIN POINT his actual score was 76.46%, and not 34.48%. For that court had given them a reasonable opportunity to be heard
Deprivation of due process cannot be successfully matter, even here petitioner does not allege that his grade in and present their side in all the proceedings before it. The
invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on the civil service examination is 76.46% and not 34.48%. All records reveal that the judgment by default was rendered
his motion for reconsideration. he is alleging is that he should have been given a chance to by the trial court in faithful compliance with Rule 18 of the
see the examination sheet himself. Rules of Court and the constitutional guaranty of due
CHAM process. The failure of petitioners and their counsel to take
Case No. 189 CHAM full advantage of this opportunity to be heard does not
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process Case No. 190 change the fact that they were accorded such opportunity.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Procedural Due Process
Lazo vs. CSC MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAIN POINT
Salonga vs CA The "essence of due process is to be found in the
FACTS reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
Paraguyan, employee, reported to CSC that Lazo had FACTS evidence one may have in support of one's defense. 'To be
boasted to him that he had bought his career service On November 26, 1991 private respondent (Paul heard' does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one
eligibility from the Civil Service Commission for P7,000.00. Geneve Entertainment Corporation) filed a complaint for may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to
The Regional Office found that the complainant was a specific performance with temporary restraining order and be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
fictitious individual and there being no witnesses to support preliminary injunction with prayer for damages against accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process
the allegation. However, due to the severity of the claim, a petitioners to enforce a memorandum of agreement that
re-check was made. The rechecking disclosed that was supposedly perfected between the parties. On PASTOR
petitioner's actual score was 34.48%, not 76.46%. November 29, 1991 petitioners received a copy of the Case No. 191
Petitioner asked for a reconsideration, alleging that summons and complaint, including a copy of the restraining Art III Sec 1: Motion for Reconsideration
Resolution No. 92-837(revocation) was issued in violation order issued in the said civil case by public respondent. Bernardo vs. CA
of his right to due process and that the CSC had found him to During the scheduled hearing for injunction on December 4, 275 SCRA 413; GR 106153, July 14, 1997
have failed the Civil Service Examinations without evidence 1991, only private respondents appeared despite notice. On
being presented to support the finding. December 9, 1991, petitioners and their counsel failed to FACTS: During the proceedings for recovery of possession
appear on the date set for hearing the motion for issuance of of a lot, the counsel of Florencio Bernardo, General Manager
ISSUE/S the writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioner claims that he of NHA, was replaced by Atty. Marcelo Abibas due to death
Whether or not CSC committed grave abuse of received a copy of the decision only on October 7, 1992, yet, of the former’s counsel. But it was only 4 months later that a
discretion when it revoked his license without a formal a Motion for Reconsideration was filed on July 28, 1992 by notice of appearance as a new counsel was presented. As a
investigation or an opportunity given to him to examine and his counsel. result, even prior to the presentation of Bernardo of his
go over his answer sheet evidence, Trial Court issued a decision against Bernardo.
ISSUE Trial Court, upon motion for reconsideration, refused to
RULING/MAIN POINT Whether or not there was denial of due process in grant new trial and/or to reopen the case in spite of the fact
No. The filing of the motion for reconsideration the case of the petitioner that the defendant (Bernardo) was unable to participate
remedied whatever defect there might have been in and to present his evidence due to the death of the handling

76
lawyer of the law firm representing him and the failure of Casuela, as a member of POEA Administrative Complaints said area happens to cover a 10-hectar fully developed
the new attorney to follow the rules on substitution of Committee, conducted a hearing before the defendant could fishpond of Roberto Cordenilla. Petitioner Cordenilla filed a
counsel. CA, on review, ordered the trial court to reopen the file an answer which is a total disregard of Section 38 of the motion for reconsideration before the Office of the
proceeding to enable the petitioner to present his evidence. Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. President but was denied holding that Bolivar has the
However, upon motion for reconsideration, CA reversed Casuela sought for reconsideration but the OMB still legitimate and preferential right over the said area.
itself and affirmed the trial court’s ruling maintaining that it
dismissed it holding that the acts of Casuela shows Petitioner Cordenillo now filed an injunction case arguing
was due to petitioner’s fault or negligence. excessive use of authority, inefficiency and incompetence in that he was deprived of the land and its improvements
the performance of official duties. Casuela, upon petition for without due process and would therefore unjustly enrich
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court denied the petitioner review, raises that he was not duly informed of the true Jose Bolivar at his expense. Trial Court denied the petition.
due process by its refusal to grant new trial and/or to charges against him and was not accorded the opportunity CA also dismissed the case upon petition for review.
reopen the case in spite of the fact that the defendant was to refute the same.
unable to participate and to present his evidence due to the ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of Cordenillo that he
death of the handling lawyer. ISSUE: Whether or not Casuela was denied due process of was denied due process is meritorious.
law.
RULING: NO. RULING: NO.
Petitioner failed to comply with the requirements for RULING: NO. The petitioner was in fact heard, for purposes of
substitution of counsel and no verified certificate of death Petitioner’s claim that ‘the Ombudsman virtually deprived administrative due process, when he filed a motion for
was presented. It should be also stressed that petitioner him of his right to due process by failing to inform [him] of reconsideration before the Office of the President.
was able to file his motion for reconsideration in which he the charges against him is bereft of merit since the
presented his legal defenses with respect to the main petitioner himself, in a motion for consideration, was able MAIN POINT:
subject of the original complaint. His arguments were to allege the lack of sufficient opportunity to be informed of Any contention of denial of due process must fail as the
substantially discussed and debunked by the trial court in the charges against him. same is cured by the filing of the Motion for
its order disposing of said motion. Such motion for Reconsideration.
reconsideration cured whatever defect there may have MAIN POINT: This Honorable Court has repeatedly stressed
been, if any, as regards the alleged denial of due process. that the requirements of due process are complied with PASTOR
when a party is heard on a motion for reconsideration. Case No. 194
MAIN POINT: There was no denial of due process since the Art III Sec 1: Motion for Reconsideration
petitioner was afforded with the opportunity to be heard. PASTOR Chua vs. CA
Case No. 193 287 SCRA 33; GR 116835, March 5, 1998
PASTOR Art III Sec 1: Motion for Reconsideration
Case No. 192 Cordenillo vs. Executive Secretary FACTS: Florita Vallejo, after her common law husband
Art III Sec 1: Motion for Reconsideration 276 SCRA 652; GR 115903, August 4, 1997 Roberto Lim Chua died intestate, subsequently filed for
Casuela vs. OMB guardianship over the persons and property of their 2
276 SCRA 635; GR 112354, August 4, 1997 FACTS: The office of the President favorably endorsed a 20- illegitimate children and for letters of administration of the
hectar fishpond lease to Jose Bolivar. As a result, the estate of the deceased. Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de
FACTS: Petitioner, Casuela, was found liable for inefficiency Secretary and the Regional Director of the Department of Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto
and incompetence in the official duties and was meted out a Agriculture enforced a 20-hectar fishpond lease to Jose Chua, moved to recall the petitions of Florita Vallejo on
penalty of 3 months suspension by the Ombudsman. Bolivar situated at Barrio Malag-it, Pontevedra, Capiz. The grounds of improper venue. Trial Court dismissed the

77
motion ruling that Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua had no by Certificate of Land Title (CLT) No. 0-064711 issued to proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as she is not Balbino dela Cruz. Hence, said land title of Balbino dela Cruz action or ruling complained of.
related to the deceased, nor does she have any interest in was automatically cancelled. The heirs of Balbino dela Cruz
his estate as creditor or otherwise. Motion for moved to dismiss such order contending that Balbino dela AIMAR
reconsideration was likewise denied. Chua was not able to Cruz is deemed the owner of subject property after paying CASE NO. 196
prove her status as the surviving wife of the decedent. Trial annual rent for 19 years which thereby entitled them to ART. III, SEC. 1: Motion for Reconsideration
Court, on the other hand, granted the petition for emancipation patent pursuant to P.D. No. 27. But the same Rodriguez vs. CA
guardianship and letters of administration of Florita Vallejo. was denied by the Regional Director in October 21, 1992.
As a result, Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua raised that she Motion for reconsideration was subsequently filed before FACTS: PNP launched OPLAN AJAX to minimize the
was not given due notice to the grant of guardianship and the Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform but was extortion activities of traffic policemen. Petitioner was
letters of administration which is a violation of due process. also dismissed in June 20, 1994 for lack of merit and held found in possession of the entrapment money so an
that the land title in favor of Balbino dela Cruz is only an administrative case was filed with NAPOLCOM against him
ISSUE: Whether or not Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua was inchoate right and can be cancelled administratively for for his summary dismissal. The case was elevated to the CA
denied due process. justifiable reason. Petition for review and motion for but was denied for lack of merit, so petitioner filed a motion
reconsideration were both dismissed by the Court of for reconsideration, but it was also denied.
RULING: NO. Appeals. They are now contending that they were denied
Petitioner, not able to prove her marriage, was not entitled due process of law considering that Balbino dela Cruz was ISSUE: WON the CA denied petitioner of his constitutional
to notice of the proceedings. Even granting that she was not already deemed owner of the subject property and they right to due process
notified of the proceedings, nonetheless, she was duly heard were not given a day in court to question the order of the
in her motion to recall letters of administration. Also, a Regional Director of DAR. RULING: No. Lack of due process cannot be invoked where
motion of reconsideration of the order of denial of her a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
motion for recall was duly heard by the trial court but was Emancipation Patent – legal instrument to secure the reconsideration. The resolution denying petitioner’s motion
however subsequently denied. ownership and tenure of the farmers to the land. for reconsideration clearly shows that petitioner was given
every opportunity to air his side.
MAIN POINT: Denial of due process cannot be successfully ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Balbino dela Cruz were
invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to be heard denied of due process. MAINPOINT: Lack of due process cannot be invoked where
on his motion for reconsideration. a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
RULING: NO. reconsideration.
PASTOR Petitioners were given the opportunity to be heard as they
Case No. 195 raised in issue the validity of the cancellation of the said CLT AIMAR
Art III Sec 1: Motion for Reconsideration which was resolved by DAR Regional Director Eligio P. Pacis CASE NO. 197
Dela Cruz vs. Abille in his Order dated October 21, 1992 and also in their ART. III, SEC. 1: Motion for Reconsideration
352 SCRA 691; GR 130196, February 26, 2001 (petitioners’) motion for reconsideration which was treated Gonzales vs. CSC
as an appeal by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform and
FACTS: On April 1989, the Regional Director of Bureau of resolved in his Order dated June 20, 1994. FACTS: Petitioner was the casino operations manager of
Agrarian Legal Assistance of La Union issued an order PAGCOR, He was administratively charged for dishonesty,
granting right of retention over an agricultural land to the MAIN POINT: The essence of due process is simply an misconduct and violation of company rules and regulations
deceased Herminio Abille which included an area covered opportunity to be heard or as applied to administrative when he committed a scheme which cost a loss of 7million

78
pesos. PAGCOR dismissed him from service and denied his RULING: No. It was proved that Petitioner was notified RULING: No. Petitioner was given ample time to prepare his
motion for reconsideration. The case was elevated to the CA, about the Conversion. And even assuming for the sake of defense. He was even able to seek reconsideration through
but it denied the case and his motion for reconsideration. argument that petitioner were not notified, this lack of his appeals. He had the opportunity to be heard, present his
notice had been cured when he actively intervened and case and to submit his evidence. Even the absence of private
ISSUE: WON the CA denied petitioner of his constitutional participated in the proceedings, by making appeals and respondent in some hearings does not affect the fact that he
right to due process repeatedly moved for the reconsideration of each decision was accorded due process. Respecting the findings of the
that was adverse to them. Ombudsman, there is substantial evidence to warrant
RULING: No. Petitioner was able to respond in the charges herein petitioner’s dismissal.
against him, testify and participate in the administrative MAINPOINT: Due process is satisfied when the parties are
proceedings. Therefore, he was given the opportunity afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their MAINPOINT: In an administrative context, a formal type of
explain his side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration side of the controversy or an opportunity to move for a hearing is not always necessary as long as the petitioner
of the action or ruling complained of and any seeming defect reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. was given the opportunity to explain his side or the
in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
reconsideration. AIMAR complained of.
CASE NO. 199
MAINPOINT: Lack of due process cannot be invoked where ART. III, SEC. 1: Motion for Reconsideration AIMAR
a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for Atty. Emmanuel Pontejos vs. Ombudsman Aniano CASE NO. 200
reconsideration. Desierto ART. III, SEC. 1: Suretyship
Stronghold Insurance vs. CA
FACTS: Private respondent filed an administrative
AIMAR complaint with the Ombudsman (Respondent) against FACTS: Petitioner and Urtesula, a seaman, executed a surety
CASE NO. 198 petitioner for allegedly demanding and receiving monetarybond for the protection of a Filipino seaman. Urtesula filed a
ART. III, SEC. 1: Motion for Reconsideration consideration in exchange for offers of assistance in complaint against Petitioner, when his employer Pan Asian
Berboso vs. CA securing a favorable decision in a pending case. Respondent
Logistic breached their contract and cannot indemnify the
then convicted petitioner of estafa and direct bribery. damages caused to him. The petitioner invokes due process
FACTS: The Conversion Order issued by former DAR Petitioner moved to reconsider with the Respondent which on the ground that it was not notified thereof nor did it
Secretary Estrella declaring private respondent’s parcel of was denied. It was then forwarded to the CA which the participate in the hearing, therefore deprived of the
land suitable for residential, commercial, industrial and appellate court also denied. He contended that he was notopportunity to defend itself. It further contend that the
other urban purposes was declared as null and void, for lack able to challenge the allegations filed to him and was not
stipulation of “notice to the Principal is a notice to surety”
of due process, because petitioner were not notified thereof. able to confront Private Respondent who failed to appear in
cannot be applied for it is unconstitutional and contrary to
The Office of the President, reversed the decision when two hearings which constitute a violation of his right to due
public policy, because it is "a virtual waiver" of the right to
private respondent brought it for appeal, and reinstated the process. be heard and "opens wide the door for fraud and collusion
Conversion Order. Petitioner brought the case to the CA but between the principal and the bond obligee" to the
it denied the case and his motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: WON the CA erred in not declaring that the prejudice of the surety.
petitioner was denied of his right to due process by the
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ruling that Petitioner’s right to Ombudsman ISSUE: WON due process was denied to the Petitioner
due process was observed

79
RULING: No. The Court cannot agree. The argument that the
right to a hearing is absolute and may not be waived in any
case under the due process clause is not correct. As a matter
of fact, the right to be heard is as often waived as it is
invoked, and validly as long as the party is given an
opportunity to be heard on his behalf. The circumstance
that the chance to be heard is not availed of does not
disparage that opportunity and deprive the person of the
right to due process.
MAINPOINT: Due process is not violated where a person is
not heard because he has chosen, for whatever reason, not
to be heard. It should be obvious that if he opts to be silent
where he has a right to speak, he cannot later be heard to
complain that he was unduly silenced.
CASE NO. 201
ART 3, SEC 1: Tariff and Customs Code
Feeder v CA
FACTS: The M/T "ULU WAI" foreign vessel owned and
operated by Feeder International Shipping Lines of
Singapore, bound to Zamboanga carrying on 1,100 metric
tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil was found in
at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying
the Iloilo customs authorities thus, liable under Section
2530(a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines.
the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure
and Detention over the same was issued after due
investigation.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner was deprived of property without due
process of law and the right to be presumed innocent was not
recognized
RULING: No. a forfeiture proceeding under tariff and
customs laws is not penal in nature. the petitioner, which
is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the
right to be presumed innocent which right is available
only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal
case. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code,
seizure proceedings, such as those instituted in this case,
are purely civil and administrative in character, the main
purpose of which is to enforce the administrative fines or
forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their
deliberate possession. The penalty in seizure cases is
distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might
be imposed against the indicted importer or possessor and
both kinds of penalties may be imposed.
MP BOLD
CASE NO. 202
ART 3, SEC 1: Appeal
Alba v Deputy Ombudsman
FACTS: Dr. Ramon Y. Alba in his capacity as Director III of
DECS was charged with violating certain provisions of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards For Public Officials
and Employees (R.A. 6713). For such gross misconduct,
petitioner was meted a suspension of thirty (30) days
without pay, after he was given all opportunity to be heard,
albeit through pleadings. When petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing resolution was denied by
the Ombudsman, he filed an "Appeal Petition for
Certiorari ..." with the SupremeCourt
ISSUE: WON the 30 day no pay and unappelable imposed by
the Deputy Omb is in accordance with the constitutional
right of due process
RULING: YES. The thirty (30)-day suspension of Petitioner,
without pay and "unappealable", is valid or constitutional
law/legislation. Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (otherwise known
as the "Ombudsman Act of 1989") states that:...Findings of
fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by
substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or
decision imposing the penalty of public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month's
salary shall be final and unappealable
MP: The right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of
due process; it is merely a statutory privilege. Due process
may be satisfied notwithstanding the denial of the right to
appeal for the essence of due process is simply
the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in
support of one's case
CASE NO. 203
ART 3, SEC 1: Appeal
Telan v CA
FACTS: Petitioner Telan is a retired government employee,
the Government needed the land and Telan was compelled
to transfer his residence who is owned by Luciano Sia
where he rented and paid monthly. Soon after the DBP as
mortgagee of Sia’s lot, foreclosed the mortgage. Spouses
Telan filed a suit before the RTC. Spouses wanted to appeal
however the CA issued a resolution which considered the
appeal as abandoned and dismissed for “failure to file an
appeal brief within the reglementary period” pursuant to
Sec 1 (f), Rule 50 of the rules of court. The petitioners were
not aware of the dismissal of their appeal. They only came
to know about it when somebody in the Isabela Provincial
Ilagan informed Telan. immediately verified the facts. "Atty.
Palma" could no longer be found and the existence of “Atty
Palma” in the Roll of Attorneys This was followed by the
filing of Criminal Case for Estafa against "Atty. Palma."
Telan had realized that "Atty. Palma" was fake
ISSUE: WON the representation of the petitioner by a fake
lawyer amounts to a deprivation of his right to counsel and
hence a lack of due process
RULING: YES. They had not been accorded due process
because they lost their right to appeal when deprived of
the right to counsel. Telan had lost their right to appeal
because of the negligence of their counsel “Atty Palma” and
the client is bound by the actions of his counsel in the
management of a litigation even by the attorney’s mistake
or negligence in procedural technique. But in the case at
80
bar, the addressed lawyer is fake thus, no person shall be
deprived of his right to counsel unless he expressly waives
his right through writing
MP BOLD
CASE NO. 204
ART 3, SEC 1: Appeal
Rivera v CSC
FACTS: Petitioner George I. Rivera was the Manager of
Corporate Banking Unit I of the Land Bank of the Philippines
("LBP") and was charged which various offenses under Anti
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Rivera and LBP appealed to
the CSC. The Commission resolves to dismiss the appeal of
Rivera. Moreover, the Commission finds him guilty of Grave
Misconduct for which he is meted out the penalty of
dismissal from the service. The court dismissed the petition
for failure of petitioner to show why CSC acted in GAD.
Rivera filed a motion for reconsideration asserting that he
was denied due process when Gaminde who participated in
her capacity as Board Chariman of MSPB and later took part
as a CSC commissioner in the resolution of the latter’s
motion for reconsideration with the CSC.
ISSUE: WON CSC committed grave abuse or discretion in
imposing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of
unsubstantiated finding and conclusions
RULING: Yes. It should have befitted Commissioner
Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation
in resolving Rivera's appeal to CSC if we are to give full
meaning and consequence to a fundamental aspect of
due process. The argument that Commissioner Gaminde
did not participate in MSPB's decision of 29 August 1990 is
unacceptable. It is not denied that she did participate,
indeed has concurred
MP BOLD
CASE NO. 205
ART 3, SEC 1: Appeal
Singson v NLRC
FACTS: Singson was employed by PAL as traffic
representative passenger which consist of checking in
passengers and baggage for a particular flight. Among the
passengers, Ms Kondo lodged a complaint that petitioner
required her to pay $200 for excess baggage without issuing
a receipt. A confrontation took place. The investigation
committee found petitioner guilty and recommended his
dismissal. Petitioner lodged a complaint against PAL for
illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Aquino declared petitioner’s
dismissal and ordered his reinstatement. PAL appealed,
NLRC commissioners where Aquino is also part,
promulgated its resolution.
ISSUE: WON NLRC acted with GAD when the Hon. Aquino,
in his capacity as Presiding Commissioner and promulgated
the decision and in the consultation of the members in
reaching the conclusion before it was assigned to the
ponente, Hon. Calaycay.
RULING: YES. Petitioner was denied due process when
Commissioner Aquino participated, as presiding
commissioner of the Second Division of the NLRC, in
reviewing private respondent PAL's appeal. He was
reviewing his own decision as a former labor
arbiter. Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered
impartial since he was the arbiter who decided the case
under review. He should have inhibited himself from any
participation in this case
MP: The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his
appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is not
only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his
motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his right is to an
impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of
petitioner's right to an impartial review of his appeal is
not an innocent error. It negated his right to due
process. MP BOLD
E.C. Perez
CASE NO. 206
ART. III, SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
ARBITRATION;
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; APPEAL
Building Care v. Macarag
FACTS: Petitioners are in the business of providing security
services to their clients. They hired respondent Myrna
Macareg as a security guard assigning her at Genato
Building in Caloocan City. However, respondent was
relieved of her post. She was re-assigned to Bayview Park
Hotel from March 9-13, 2008, but after said period, she was
allegedly no longer given any assignment. Respondent filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
Respondent filed a notice of appeal but it was dismissed for
having been filed out of time. CA however reversed the
Labor Arbiter’s decision and declared respondent to have
been illegally dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in reversing the Labor
Arbiter’s decision.
RULING: Yes. While procedural rules may be relaxed in the
interest of justice, it is well-settled that these are tools
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. The
relaxation of procedural rules in the interest of justice was
never intended to be a license for erring litigants to violate
the rules with impunity. Liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules can be invoked only in proper cases
and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While
litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Clearly, allowing an appeal, even if belatedly filed,
should never be taken lightly. The judgment attains
finality by the lapse of the period for taking an appeal
without such appeal or motion for reconsideration
being filed. In Ocampo v. Court of Appeals, the Court
81
reiterated the basic rule that when a party to an original
action fails to question an adverse judgment or decision
by not filing the proper remedy within the period
prescribed by law, he loses the right to do so, and the
judgment or decision, as to him, becomes final and
binding. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter, therefore,
became final and executory as to respondent when she
failed to file a timely appeal therefrom.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
E.C. Perez
CASE NO. 207
ART. III, SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
ARBITRATION;
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; CLOSURE
PROCEEDING
CB V. CA
FACTS: Based on examination reports submitted by the
Supervision and Examination Sector of the Central Bank the
financial condition of Triumph Savings Bank (TSB) is one of
insolvency and its continuance in business would involve
probable loss to its depositors and creditors, hence the
Monetary Board issued a RESOLUTION ordering the closure
of Triumph Savings Bank and placing it under receivership.
TSB filed a complaint against Central Bank challenging in
the process the constitutionality of Sec. 29 of R.A. 269,
otherwise known as "The Central Bank Act," as amended,
insofar as it authorizes the Central Bank to take over a
banking institution even if it is not charged with violation of
any law or regulation, much less found guilty thereof. The
RTC granted a TRO against the CB resolution. Central Bank
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint before the RTC for
failure to state a cause of action (i.e., it did not allege
ultimate facts showing that the action was plainly arbitrary
and made in bad faith). The motion was dismissed. The case
was elevated to the CA, which upheld the orders of the RTC. operations consisting of loans to unknown and fictitious
Hence, this petition. borrowers. The promissory notes evidencing these loans
were rediscounted with the Central Bank for cash. As a
ISSUE: Whether or not a Monetary Board resolution placing result thereof, the bank became insolvent and prejudiced its
a private bank under receivership may be annulled on the depositors and creditors. Respondent, Consolacion V. Odra,
ground of lack of prior notice and hearing. submitted a report recommending to the Monetary Board of
the Central Bank the placing of Buhi under receivership. The
RULING: No. Contrary to the notion of private respondent, Monetary Board, finding the report to be true, adopted
Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice and hearing Resolution No. 583 placing Buhi under receivership and
before a bank may be directed to stop operations and placed designated respondent, Consolacion V. Odra, as Receiver,
under receivership. A previous hearing is nowhere pursuant to the provisions of Section 29 of Republic Act No.
required in Sec. 29 nor does the constitutional 265 as amended.
requirement of due process demand that the
correctness of the Monetary Board's resolution to stop ISSUE: Whether or not under Sec. 29, R.A. 265, as amended,
operation and proceed to liquidation be first adjudged the monetary board (MB) of the Central Bank may place a
before making the resolution effective. It is enough that rural bank under receivership without prior notice to said
a subsequent judicial review be provided. Sec. 29 of R.A. rural bank.
265 is a sound legislation promulgated in accordance
with the Constitution in the exercise of police power of RULING: Yes. There is no requirement whether express
the state. or implied, that a hearing be first conducted before a
banking institution may be placed under receivership.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD. On the contrary, the law is explicit as to the conditions
prerequisite to the action of the Monetary Board to forbid
E.C. Perez the institution to do business in the Philippines and to
CASE NO. 208 appoint a receiver to immediately take charge of the bank's
ART. III, SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS assets and liabilities. They are: (a) an examination made by
ARBITRATION; the examining department of the Central Bank; (b) report
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; CLOSURE by said department to the Monetary Board; and (c) prima
PROCEEDING facie showing that the bank is in a condition of insolvency or
Rural Bank v. CA so situated that its continuance in business would involve
probable loss to its depositors or creditors.
FACTS: An examination of the books and affairs of
petitioner Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. (Buhi) was ordered MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
conducted by the Department of Rural Banks and Savings
and Loan Association (DRBSLA), Central Bank of the
Philippines. A general examination of the bank's affairs and E.C. Perez
operations was conducted and there were found by CASE NO. 209
DRBSLA, among others, massive irregularities in its ART. III, SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
82
 ARBITRATION;
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; CLOSURE
PROCEEDING
Phil Merchants v. CA
FACTS: PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC.
(PMMSI), was established in Manila to train and produce
competent marine officers. For several times prior to 1985,
respondent Department of Education, Culture and Sports
(DECS) disapproved petitioner’s requests for renewal of
permit/recognition because of recurrent violations. Despite
these violations, petitioner still continued to enrol students
and still offered courses in Marine Engineering and Marine
Transportation. The DECS informed petitioner that it had
received reports that petitioner enrolled freshmen for its
maritime programs which were ordered phased out.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration regarding the non-
compliance of the DECS’ minimum requirements and
subsequently moved for reconsideration regarding the
phasing out of the two marine courses stated. Both motions
were denied by the DECS. Petitioner appealed to the Office
of the President (OP). Pending appeal, DECS issued a closure
order. The OP dismissed the appeal. Petitioner assailed the
resolutions of the OP before the CA by way of certiorari and
alleged that the resolutions failed to meet the constitutional
requirement of due process because the basis for affirming
the DECS closure order was not sufficiently disclosed.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process.
RULING: No. The narration of facts clearly demonstrates
that before the DECS issued the phase-out and closure
orders, petitioner was duly notified, warned and given
several opportunities to correct its deficiencies and to
comply with pertinent orders and regulations. Petitioner
has gone all the way up to the Office of the President to seek
a reversal of the phase-out and closure orders. There is thus
no reason to complain of lack of opportunity to explain its
side as well as to comply with the alleged deficiencies. As
long as the parties were given opportunity to be heard
before judgment was rendered, the demands of due
process were sufficiently met. It should also be noted that
petitioner herein repeatedly sought reconsideration of the
various orders of respondent DECS and its motions were
duly considered by respondent DECS to the extent of
allowing and granting its request for re-inspection of its
premises. The opportunity to be heard is the essence of
procedural due process and that any defect is cured by
the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
E.C. Perez
CASE NO. 210
ART. III, SEC. 1: PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
ARBITRATION;
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; BIDDINGS
Concerned Officials of the MWSS v. Hon. Vasquez
FACTS:
The Ombudsman in its 19th October 1992 Order directed
the Board of Trustees of Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS) to set aside the recommendation
of its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee for
Construction Services and Technical Equipment (PBAC-
CSTE) that its Contract No. APM-01 be given to a contractor
offering fiberglass pipes and to instead award the contract
to a complying and responsive bidder pursuant to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1594. A motion by
herein petitioners for the reconsideration of the Order was
denied on 01 March 1993. After the required pleadings
were filed by the parties, the Court gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their
memoranda. In compliance therewith, the parties filed their
respective memoranda.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rudiments of due process have
been properly observed in the issuance of the assailed 19th
October 1992 and 01st March 1993 orders of the
Ombudsman.
RULING: Yes. The petitioners have been amply accorded the
opportunity to be heard. The essence of due process is an
opportunity to be heard. One may be heard, not solely
by verbal presentation but also through pleadings. In
administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules
of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative due process cannot be fully equated to
due process in its strict judicial sense.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
AR
CASE NO. 211
ART III SEC 1: UDHA – RA7279
Perez vs. Madrona
FACTS: Respondents Spouses Madrona are registered
owners of a residential property in Marikina City where
they built their house enclosed with concrete fence and
steel gate. Petitioner James Perez, Chief Demolition Officer,
sent a letter to the spouses ordering them to remove the
fence encroaching the public drainage. Madrona sent a
response letter condemning the order of demolition
contending that the accusation is libelous as it is
condemning him and his property without due process, and
there is no court order authorizing the demolition.
Respondents sought the issuance of TRO to enjoin
petitioner. The RTC held that petitioner’s threat to demolish
the concrete fence around their property is tantamount to a
violation of their rights as property owners who are entitled
to protection under the Constitution. There is also no
showing that respondents’ fence is a nuisance per se and
83
presents an immediate danger to the community’s welfare right to due process of law was violated and that GTEB chance to present its side before its export quota allocations
to justify its summary demolition. decision was not supported by substantial evidence. were revoked and its officers suspended. While it is true
However, in 1984, Glorious filed a manifestation of its that such allocations as alleged by the Board are mere
ISSUE: WON the respondents are denied due process when intention to withdraw such petition, to which the Court privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may deem
their property is ordered to be summarily demolished granted. After 2 years, Glorious filed with GTEB a petition fit, these privileges have been accorded to petitioner for
without judicial intervention. for restitution of its export quota allocation and requested so long that they have become impressed with property
for a reconsideration of the GTEB decision, alleging that the rights especially since not only do these privileges
HELD: Yes. If petitioner indeed found respondents’ fence to cancelling of its export quota was rendered as a result of determine the continued existence of the petitioner but
have encroached on the sidewalk, his remedy is not to duress and undue influence exercised by former Minister also the livelihood of some 700 workers and their
demolish the same summarily after respondents failed to Roberto V. Ongpin in order to transfer Glorious export families.
heed his request to remove it. Instead, he should go to court quotas to “Marcos crony-owned” corporations. Glorious AR
and prove respondents’ supposed violations in the further alleged that it was coerced by Mr. Roberto Ongpin to CASE NO. 213
construction of the concrete fence. Indeed, unless a thing withdraw its petition and to enter into joint venture ART XII SEC 1: CANCELLATION OF PROPERTY
is nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily agreements paving the way for the creation of De Soleil RIGHTS/PRIVILEGES
without judicial intervention. Respondents’ fence is not a Apparel and American Inter-Fashion Corporation (AIFC). Alliance of DFLO v. Laguesma
nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the GTEB denied the petition of Glorious. An appeal was then
health or comfort of the community. It was built primarily taken to the Office of the President. AIFC, herein petitioner,
to secure the property of respondents and prevent filed its opposition to Glorious’ appeal claiming that the FACTS: The Alliance of Democratic Free Labor Organization
intruders from entering it. And as correctly pointed out by GTEB decision has long been final. The Office of the (ADFLO) filed an application for registration as a national
respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If petitioner believes President ruled in favor of Glorious and remanded the case federation alleging among others that it has 12 affiliates.
that respondents’ fence indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, to GTEB for further proceedings. Hence, this petition. After evaluation and compliance of requirements, the
it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) issued the Certificate of
purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, its summary ISSUE: WON Glorious Sun Fashion was accorded due Registration. The Confederation of Labor and Allied Social
abatement without judicial intervention is unwarranted. process in relation to the 1984 GTEB decision. Services (CLASS) filed a petition for the cancellation of the
Registration Certificate issued to ADFLO on the ground that
AR RULING: No. Glorious was denied due process when GTEB the documents submitted by ADFLO were simulated. The
CASE NO. 212 failed to disclose evidence used by it in rendering a BLR, through Director Pura, cancelled the registration of
ART XII SEC 1: CANCELLATION OF PROPERTY resolution against Glorious. Contrary to the petitioner’s ADFLO. ADFLO appealed to Secretary of labor Torres which
RIGHTS/PRIVILEGES posture, in cancelling the export quotas of the private was granted, and the case was remanded to the BLR. On the
American Inter-Fashion vs. OP respondent GTEB violated the private respondent’s first hearing, CLASS was not yet ready with its evidence.
constitutional right to due process. Before the cancellation, CLASS was given 10 days to submit its exhibits, and ADFLO
Glorious had been enjoying export quotas granted to it since to comment thereon. CLASS files its Formal Offer of
FACTS: Private Respondent Glorious Sun Fashion was 1977. In effect the private respondent’s export quota Evidence. ADFLO filed an Objection to Admission of Exhibits
found guilty by Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB) allocation which initially was a privilege evolved into some on the ground that they were not marked nor identified by
of dollar salting and mis-declaration of importations. As a form of property right which should not be removed from it any witness during the hearing of the case. BLR Director
result, its export quotas were cancelled. After GTEB arbitrarily and without due process only to hurriedly confer Pura, without first ruling on the admissibility of the exhibits
rendered its decision, Glorious filed with the Court a it on another. In the case of Mabuhay Textile Mills of CLASS and without any further hearing, rendered an
petition for certiorari and prohibition contending that its Corporation v. Ongpin, the petitioner was never given the order affirming its previous decision. ADFLO moved to

84
reconsider such decision on the ground that it was denied
the right to a hearing. Undersecretary Laguesma issued an
Order denying ADFLO's Motion for Reconsideration. ADFLO
appealed to the Secretary of Labor but failed to act on its
appeal. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the decision of cancelling the registration of
petitioner is a violation of the due process clause.
RULING: Yes. While, in general, administrative agencies
exercising quasi-judicial powers, like the DOLE, are free
from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements, they
are nonetheless bound by law and practice to observe the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in
justiciable cases presented before them. The most basic
tenet of due process is the right to be heard, and as
applied in administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one's side. Such opportunity
was denied petitioner in this case. The cancellation of a
certificate of registration is the equivalent of snuffing out
the life of a labor organization. For without such
registration, it loses its rights under the Labor Code. Under
the circumstances, petitioner was indisputably entitled to
be heard before a judgment could be rendered cancelling its
certificate of registration.
AR
CASE NO. 214
ART XII SEC 1: CANCELLATION OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS/PRIVILEGES
ABAKADA vs. Ermita
FACTS: This is a consolidated case. Petitioners ABAKADA
GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No.
9337 for authorizing the President to raise the VAT to 12%
after meeting certain conditions. The Association
of Pilipinas Shell Dealers, Inc. also assail R.A. No. 9337 for
requiring that the input tax on depreciable goods be
amortized over a 60-month period, and for imposing a 70%
limit on the amount of input tax to be credited against the
output tax. Petitioners argue that the law is
unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress
of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes. Also, they
contend that these provisions are unconstitutional for being
arbitrary and oppressive for imposing limitations on the
amount of input tax that may be claimed. Input tax partakes
the nature of a property that may not be confiscated,
appropriated, or limited without due process of law. Like
any other property or property right, the input tax credit
may be transferred or disposed of, and that by limiting the
same, the government gets to tax a profit or value-added
even if there is no profit or value-added. Petitioners also
believe that these provisions violate the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the law as the limitation on
the creditable input tax is not based on real and substantial
differences to meet a valid classification.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation of the due process and
equal protection under Article III Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution.
RULING: No. The doctrine is that where the due process
and equal protection clauses are invoked, considering
that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards,
there is a need for proof of such persuasive character as
would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing,
the presumption of validity must prevail. Petitioners
claim that the limitations on the amount of input tax that
may be claimed would result to a portion of the input tax
which cannot now be credited against the output tax.
Petitioners argument assumes that the input tax exceeds
70% of the output tax, and therefore, the input tax in excess
of 70% remains uncredited. Their analysis of the effect of
the 70% limitation is incomplete. It ends at the net effect
that there will be unapplied/unutilized inputs VAT for a
given quarter. It does not proceed further to the fact that
such unapplied/unutilized input tax may be credited in the
subsequent periods as allowed by the carry-over provision.
The input tax is not a property or a property right within
the constitutional purview of the due process clause. A VAT-
registered persons entitlement to the creditable input tax is
a mere statutory privilege. The state may change or take
away rights, which were created by the law of the state,
although it may not take away property, which was vested
by virtue of such rights.
AR
CASE NO. 215
ART XII SEC 1: CANCELLATION OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS/PRIVILEGES
British American Tobacco vs. Camacho
FACTS: Petitioner British American Tobacco introduced and
sold 3 kinds Lucky Strike cigarettes w/ SRP P9.90/pack.
They were initially assessed with excise tax of 8.96php.
RMO 6-2003 provides for the guidelines and procedures in
establishing current net retail prices of new brands of
cigarettes and alcohol products. RR 22-2003 was issued to
implement the revised tax classification of certain new
brands introduced in the market after January 1, 1997
based on the survey of their current net retail prices. This
increased the excise tax to P13.44. This cause petitioner to
file before the RTC of Makati a petition for injunction with
prayer for issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction sought to enjoin the implementation on the
ground that they discriminate against new brands of
cigarettes in violation of the equal protection and
uniformity provisions of the Constitution. RTC dismissed
the petition. While petitioner's appeal was pending, RA
9334 took effect which increased petitioners excise tax to
P25/pack. Petitioner prayed for a downward classification
85
of Lucky Strike products at the bracket taxable at P
8.96/pack.
ISSUE: WON RA 9334 of the classification freeze provision
is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection and
uniformity provisions of the Constitution.
RULING: No. It suffices that the laws operate equally and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances,
the conditions not being different. Thus, classification if
rational in character is allowable. SC previously held:
"Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable
articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed
at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to
make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of
taxation.” Under the rational basis test, a legislative
classification, to survive an equal protection challenge, must
be shown to rationally further a legitimate state interest.
Since every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality, the burden of proof is on the one attacking
the constitutionality of the law to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that the legislative classification is without rational
basis. The presumption of constitutionality can only be
overcome if classification is a hostile and oppressive
discrimination against particular classes, and that there is
no conceivable basis which might support it. The
classification is considered valid and reasonable if:
(1) it rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) it is germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it applies, all things being equal, to both present and
future conditions; and
(4) it applies equally to all those belonging to the same
class.
CASE NO. 216
ARTICLE III, SEC 1:
P. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation-
Ombudsman
Roxas vs. Vasquez
Fats:Petitioner Roxas was the Chairman, while
Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and Awards
Committee of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated
National Police (PC-INP). The PC-INP invited bids for the
supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. The Bids and Awards
Committee voted to award the contract to the Tahei Co.,
Ltd., manufacturer of Nikko-Hino. Accordingly, the contract
was executed between PC-INP and Tahei Co. The COA later
discovered that there was a discrepancy in the amounts
indicated on the disbursement voucher and the purchase
order. Thus, the DILG Secretary filed a complaint
with the Ombudsman against officers of PC-INP and
the petitioners.
After prelim investigation, the deputy omb for the
militaryrecommended the indictment of all respondents
except Ramirez. On review the office of the special
prosecutor recommended the dismissal of complaints
against roxas nacpil and other. Formal charges were filed
with the SB against Nazareno, Flores, Tanchanco, Custodio,
Osia, Espeñ a and Santos. Flores and Tanchanco moved for a
reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter, the Office of
the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the
charges against Flores and Tanchanco. In the same
resolution, however, the Special Prosecutor made a sudden
turn about as regards Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan, and ordered
their inclusion as accused.
Issue: Whether or not the inclusion of the petitioners as
accused impaired their constitutional rights and as such SC
may interfere?
Held: Yes. Ordinarily, SC will not interfere with the
discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there
exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probable guilty thereof
and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with
the appropriate courts. However, SC find that the case at bar
falls under one of the recognized exceptions to this rule,
more specifically, the constitutional rights of the accused
are impaired and the charges are manifestly false. In cases
where the Ombudsman and the Special Prosecutor were
unable to agree on whether or not probable cause exists, the
Supreme Court may interfere with the findings and
conclusions.
CASE NO. 217
ARTICLE III, SEC 1:
P. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation-
Ombudsman
Ocampo v Omb
Facts: Petitioner is the Training Coordinator of.
NIACONSULT, INC., a subsidiary of the National Irrigation
Administration. NIACONSULT conducted the training
program for six Nepalese Junior Engineers from February 6
to March , 1989. ADBN, thru its representative, Gmbh
Technical Cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany
paid to the petitioner the agreed training fee in two
installments of P61,488.00 and P143,472.00. NIACONSULT
demand the total training fee paid by ADBN which
petitioner personally received. Petitioner failed to remit
such thus, NIACONSULT filed an admin case before
respondent for serious misconduct before the Omb
Omb issued an order requiring petitioner to file a
counter-affidavit within 10 days from receipt with
a caveat that failure to file the same would be deemed a
waiver of his right to present evidence. Petitioner failed to
comply with the said order. Omb again issued same order a
year later. Likewise petitioner did not respond. Later Omb
issued the assailed Resolution, dismissing petitioner from
the service, with forfeiture of benefits and special perpetual
disqualification to hold office in the government or any
goccs. Petitioner filed his MR raising the denial of his due
process but was denied. Hence, the petition.
86
Issue: W/N the petitioner was deprived of due process in
the case at bar?
Held: No. The essence of due process is an opportunity to
be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more
creditably and practicable than oral argument, through
pleadings. In administrative proceedings, moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated
to due process in its strict judicial sense. A party who
chooses not to avail of the opportunity to answer the charges
cannot complain of a denial of due process.—Petitioner’s
failure to present evidence is solely of his own making and
cannot escape his own remissness by passing the blame on
the graft investigator.
CASE NO. 218
ARTICLE III, SEC 1:
P. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation-
Ombudsman
Serapio vs SB
Facts: Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees
and the Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation,
a non-stock, non-profit foundation providing educational
opportunities. In 2000 Petittioner, received a donation of
(P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Singson. Later
Gov. Singson publicly accused President Estrada and his
cohorts of anomalies and filed with the Omb several
criminal charges against Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada
and petitioner, together with other persons.
Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit.
The Office of the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary
investigation of the complaints and later issued a joint
resolution recommending, inter alia, that Joseph Estrada,
petitioner and several others be charged with the criminal
offense of plunder.
Later Omb filed an amended Information with SB
charging Estrada and several co-accused, including
petitioner, with plunder. Petitioner filed MR before SB to
Direct the Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation of the
Charges against him. Later the SB finding probable cause in
the case issued warrant of arrest to which the petitioner
voluntarily surrendered. Petitioner later filed motion to
quash upon cancellation of the bail which they sought
earlier which was denied. Hence the petition for review
where the petitioner raised an argument that SB committed
GAD in denying his earlier MR to direct the Ombudsman to
conduct a reinvestigation of the charges him thus,
prejudicial to his rights and interest.
Issue: WON SB committed GAD amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in denying petitioner’s MR, notwithstanding
that the ombudsman had totally disregarded exculpatory
evidence and committed grave and manifest errors of law
seriously prejudicial to his rights and interests?
Held: No. the right to a preliminary investigation is not
a constitutional right, but is merely a right conferred by
statute. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not
impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render
the same defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction
of the court over the case or constitute a ground for
quashing the Information. If the lack of a preliminary
investigation does not render the Information invalid nor
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case, with more
reason can it be said that the denial of a motion for
reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust
the court of its jurisdiction over the case. Neither can it be
said that petitioner had been deprived of due process. He
was afforded the opportunity to refute the charges against
him during the preliminary investigation.
CASE NO. 219
ARTICLE III, SEC 1:
P. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation-
Ombudsman
US v Toribio
Facts: Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license
to have his carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied
because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He
nevertheless slaughtered his carabao without the necessary
license. He was eventually sued and was sentenced by the
trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that
the law mandating that one should acquire a permit to
slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of Toribio’s counsel
that “said law mandating one to acquire a permit to
slaughter his carabao is invalid exercise of police power” is
proper?
Held: No. the law in question "is not a taking of the
property for public use, within the meaning of the
constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the
power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such
particular use of the property as would be inconsistent with
or injurious to the rights of the public. All property is
acquired and held under the tacit condition that it shall
not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or
greatly impair the public rights and interest of the
community.
MP: The State may interfere wherever the public
interests demand it, and in this particular a large
discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to
determine, not only what the interests of the public
require, but what measures are necessary for the
protection of such interests.
CASE NO. 220
ARTICLE III, SEC 1:
P. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation-
Ombudsman
Churchill v. Raferty
Facts: Appellees, Francis A. Churchill and Stewart Tait are
involved in the advertising business, particularly in
billboard advertising. Their billboards located upon private
lands in the Province of Rizal were removed upon
complaints and by the orders of the defendant Collector of
Internal Revenue by virtue of the provisions of subsection
(b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339.
87

Appellees, in their supplementary complaint challenge the
power of the of the Collector of Internal Revenue to remove
any sign, signboard, or billboard upon the ground that the
same is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a nuisance and
maintain that the billboards in question “in no sense
constitute a nuisance and are not deleterious to the health,
morals, or general welfare of the community, or of any
persons.” Defendant Collector of Internal Revenue avers that
after due investigation made upon the complaints of the
British and German Consuls, the defendant “decided that the
billboard complained of was and still offensive to the sight
and is otherwise a nuisance.”
Issue: Was the enactment assailed by the plaintiffs was a
legitimate exercise of the police power of the Government?
Held: Yes. From whatever direction the social, economic,
or general welfare of the people is menaced, there is legal
justification for the exercise of the police power; and the use
of private property may be regulated or restricted to
whatever extent may be necessary to preserve inviolate
these declared essentials to the well being of the public.
MARTIN
CASE NO. 221
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: Substantive Due Process
People v. Fajardo, et al.
FACTS: Due to a typhoon, respondents’ residential house
got destroyed. As they were only leasing a residential house
due to the aforementioned fact, they sought permit from the
incumbent mayor of Baao, CamSur to construct a building
adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land
registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national
highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek.
The request was nonetheless denied for the reason that the
proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the
public plaza. The basis of the denial was the ordinance, now FACTS: The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition
in question, passed by Fajardo himself when he was then against Ordinance No. 4760 (approved by Astorga, then
mayor of the mentioned municipality. The said ordinance acting mayor) for being violative of the due process clause,
states, “Any person or persons who will construct or repair contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary,
a building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a unreasonable or oppressive but also vague, indefinite and
written permit from the Municipal Mayor.” Even in the uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion of the right to
absence of the permit, herein respondents proceeded with privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination.
the construction of the building hence a complaint was filed
against them. Both the justice of the peace court and Court Ordinance No. 4760 has the following provisions:
of First Instance ruled (convicted, ordered to pay and 1. Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or
demolish the constructed building) in favor of the customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in
municipality while the CA forwarded the case to the SC open view;
because of the attack on the constitutionality of the said 2. prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;
ordinance. Hence this instant petition. 3. usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o
150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also);
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance may stand to restrict 4. making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24
respondents’ lawful use of their property. hours; and
5. cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
RULING: No. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive,
in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the
right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the appeal.
bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellants property without just compensation. To legally ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is violative of the due
achieve the preservation of the aesthetic appearance of the process clause.
community by prohibiting structures offensive to the sight,
the municipality must give appellants just compensation RULING/MAIN POINT: No. The due process contention is
and an opportunity to be heard. untenable. There is no controlling and precise definition of
due process. There is no controlling and precise
MAIN POINT: Aesthetics may be used as reason for definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard
“taking,” but then there must be due process and just to which governmental action should conform in order
compensation. (Bernas Commentary) that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
MARTIN appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due process
which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive
CASE NO. 222 requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: Substantive Due Process governmental action for that matter, from imputation of
Ermita-Malate Hotel & Operator v. City of Manila legal infirmity, is responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason. obedience to the dictates of justice. It would be an
affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted
88
precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body lawful subject as the original executive order (for the
considers an evil of rather serious pro portions as an benefit of the small farmers who rely on carabaos for energy RULING: No. The Letter of Instruction is a valid police
arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. What needs), it cannot be said with equal certainty that it power measure. Police power has a broad and expansive
should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to complies with the second requirement (lawful method). The scope to meet the exigencies of the times. Hence, the
an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face questioned order imposes an absolute ban not on the exercise of such great power of the state is given the
of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement thus there presumption of validity. It was thus a heavy burden to be
is no reasonable connection between the means employed shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that the
MARTIN and the purpose sought to be achieved. Hence, The SC ruled particular police power measure challenged was clearly
that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the intended to promote public safety. The issuance of such
CASE NO. 223 police power because the method employed to conserve Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful
ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: Substantive Due Process the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose study by the Executive Department. To set it aside for
Ynot v. Intermediate Court of Appeals (IAC) of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is to give
is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even the
FACTS: EO No. 626-A was enacted prohibiting the inter- denied the right to be heard in his defense and is broadest permissible limits of a pleader's well known
provincial movement of carabaos. Herein petitioner, immediately condemned and punished. penchant for exaggeration.
however, had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from MARTIN
Masbate to Iloilo and for this reason, the carabaos were MAIN POINT: The exercise of police power, such as the
outrightly confiscated by the police for the violation of the CASE NO. 224 regulation requiring cars to be equipped with “early
above measure. Hence, the petitioner sued for recovery ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: Substantive Due Process warning devises” (EWD), does not require notice and
(carabaos were returned), but when the RTC sustained the Agustin v. Edu (Land Transportation Commissioner) hearing in the promulgation of general regulations for
confiscation of the carabaos, the bond was ordered the benefit of general welfare. (Bernas Commentary)
confiscated upon failure to return the carabaos. When the FACTS: Former President Marcos issued a letter of
petitioner appealed the decision to the IAC, the latter upheld instruction (LOI), effective immediately and to be
the trial court’s decision. Thus, the petitioner now implemented immediately, directing all owners, users or MARTIN
challenges the constitutionality of the EO as it authorizes drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their
outright confiscation of the carabao being transported motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of early warning device. CASE NO. 225
across provincial boundaries. The issuance of the LOI was by virtue of the exercise of the ARTICLE III, SEC. 1: Substantive Due Process
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A State’s police power in order to prevent fatal or serious Balacuit v. CFI
unconstitutional because it violates the due process of law. accidents in land transportation for the interest of safety on
RULING/ MAIN POINT: Yes. Due process, generally all streets and highways. Now, herein petitioner, an owner FACTS: The Municipal Board of the City of Butuan passed an
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are of a Volkswagen Beetle car assails the constitutionality of ordinance penalizing the selling of admission tickets to any
intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. To the LOI for it being an oppressive, unreasonable exercise of movie or other public performances that require children
justify the State’s exercise of police power, it must appear, police power because it violates the guarantee of due between seven (7) and twelve (12) years of age to pay full
first, that the interests of the public generally require such process. payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably only one-half of the said ticket. Herein petitioners are all
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not ISSUE: Whether or not the letter of instruction providing for managers of theaters and they filed a complaint before the
unduly oppressive upon individuals. In this case, while an early seaming device for motor vehicles is violative of the Court of First Instance praying that the said ordinance be
conceding that the amendatory measure has the same constitutional guarantee of due process. declared unconstitutional on the ground that it is an invalid

89
exercise of police power and violates the due process clause
of the Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust,
confiscatory, and an undue restraint of trade. Respondent
court ruled in favor of respondent city whose contention is
that the questioned ordinance is for the welfare of the
public.
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned ordinance violates
the due process clause of the Constitution.
RULING: Yes. It is already settled that the operation of
theaters, cinematographs and other places of public
exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council
in the exercise of delegated police power by the local
government. However, to invoke the exercise of police
power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public
generally requires an interference with private rights , but the
means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. In this case, the ordinance is not
justified by any necessity for the public interest. The
ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive
upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no
discernible relation between the ordinance and the
promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general
welfare.
MAIN POINT: There can be no valid exercise of police
power if there is no discernible relation between the
ordinance (or law) and the promotion of public health,
safety, morals, and the general welfare. (Bernas reviewer)
Sheena
Case No. 226
Art III Section 1. Substantive Due Process
National Development Co. (NDC) & New Agrix v. Phil
Veterans Bank (PVB)
Facts:
AGRIX had executed in favor of private respondent
Philippine Veterans Bank a real estate mortgage over 3
parcels of land in Los Bañ os, Laguna. During the existence of
the mortgage, AGRIX went bankrupt. It was for the
expressed purpose of salvaging this and the other Agrix
companies that the PD 1717 was issued, which ordered the
rehabilitation of the Agrix Group of Companies to be
administered mainly by the NDC. The law outlined the
procedure for filling claims against the Agrix Companies and
created a Claims Committee to process these claims.
Private respondent PVB filed a claim with the AGRIX Claims
Committee for the payment of its loan credit pursuant to PD
1717.
Petitioner NDC invoking Sec. 4 (1) of the decree, filed a
petition with the RTC, for the cancellation of the mortgage
lien against it.
Respondent took steps to extrajudicially foreclose the
mortgage, prompting the petitioner to file a second case
with the same court to stop the foreclosure.
Respondents argue that property rights, like all rights, are
subject to regulation under the police power for the
promotion of the common welfare.
RTC to held in favor of the respondent on the ground of
unconstitutionality of the decree for violating the equal
protection clause. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
W/N PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police power thus
entitling Philippine Veterans Bank as creditor of Agrix for
payment.
Ruling: Yes. PD 1717 is an invalid exercise of the police
power, the extinction of the mortgage and other liens and of
the interest and other charges pertaining to the legitimate
creditors of Agrix constitutes taking without due process of
law, and this is compounded by the reduction of the secured
creditors to the category of unsecured creditors in violation
of the equal protection clause.
A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract
and so comes under the protection of Bill of rights so do
interests on loans, as well as penalties and charges, which
are also vested rights once they accrue. Private property
cannot simply be taken by law from one person and
given to another without just compensation and any
known public purpose.
Main point in bold.
Sheena
Case No. 227
Art III Section 1. Substantive Due Process
Maranaw Hotel v. NLRC
Facts:
Eddie Damalerio, a room attendant for Maranaw Hotel, was
seen by hotel guest Jamie Glaser with left hand inside the
latter's suitcase.
Glaser lodged a written complaint before shift-in-charge of
security of the hotel which was brought to the chief.
Damalerio was given a Disciplinary Action Notice. An
administrative hearing was conducted on the matter. Taking
the witness stand on his own behalf, Damalerio denied the
accusation against him,
Damalerio received a memorandum issued stating that he
was found to have committed qualified theft in violation of
House Rule No. 1, Section 3 of Hotel Rules and Regulations.
The same memorandum served as a notice of termination of
his employment.
Damalerio filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for
illegal dismissal against the petitioner. After the parties had
sent in their position papers, Labor Arbiter Diosana decided
the case in favor of the respondent.
Issue:
W/N not respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that
90
petitioner failed to adduce conclusive evidence in support of
its version of the incident, considering the fact that the
evidence on record ineluctably shows that private
respondent was caught in flagrante delicto; and
Ruling:
NO. Records disclose petitioner's failure to substantiate such
imputation against him. During the investigation presided
over by the Labor Arbiter, unsubstantiated suspicions and
baseless conclusions by employers are not legal
justification for dismissing employees. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the employee, in keeping
with the principle of social justice enshrined in the
Constitution.
Damalerio was illegally dismissed thus he is entitled to be
paid full back wages and be reinstated.
Main point in bold.
Sheena
Case No. 228
Art III Section 1. Substantive Due Process
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro
City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce
Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the
same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the
Christmas season.
Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening as violative of
Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business
permit and canceling existing business permit to the
establishment for the operation of the casino, and
Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the
casino and providing a penalty for its violation. Main point in bold.
Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the
ground that they both violated PD 1869 which created Sheena
PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate games of chance.
Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the LGC, they have the Bennis v. Michigan
police power authority to prohibit the operation of casino Facts:
for the general welfare. Bennis's husband was convicted of gross indecency
CA ruled in favor of respondents. Hence, the petition for following his sexual activity with a prostitute in the couple's
review. jointly-owned car. The local county prosecutor filed a
complaint alleging the car was a public nuisance subject to
Issue: abatement (i.e., to eliminate or confiscate the car). The
W/N the ordinances are valid. Circuit Court entered the abatement order, but the Appeals
Court reversed. After granting leave to appeal, the Supreme
Ruling: Court of Michigan reversed the appellate court's decision
NO. CDO City, like other local political subdivisions, is and re-entered the abatement order. Bennis appealed to the
empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated Supreme Court.
in the LGC. It is expressly vested with the police power
under what is known as the General Welfare Clause. Issue:
W/N the abatement order entered against Bennis's car
However, an ordinance must conform to the following constitute a taking of private property for public use.
substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. Ruling:
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. NO. The abatement order against Bennis's car did not
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. violate the takings clause. Her innocence and lack of
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. knowledge concerning her husband's illegal and indecent
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. activity, in the couple's jointly owned car, could not serve as
6) It must not be unreasonable. a defense against her vehicle's forfeiture. Furthermore,
under the present circumstances, the vehicle's forfeiture
Ordinances should not contravene a statute. Casino did not violate Bennis's property rights without due
gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the process. Michigan's abatement policy, aimed at
status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified deterring criminal uses of property, lawfully
by a mere ordinance. Local councils exercise only transferred her vehicle to the state. As such, Michigan is
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by not required to compensate Bennis for the vehicle's
Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate forfeiture.
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter. Main point in bold.
Sheena
Case No. 230
Art III Section 1. Substantive Due Process
Case No. 229 Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri
Art III Section 1. Substantive Due Process Facts:
91
Nancy Beth Cruzan was involved in an automobile accident
which left her in a "persistent vegetative state." She was
sustained for several weeks by artificial feedings through an
implanted gastronomy tube. Cruzan's parents attempted to
terminate the life-support system. State hospital officials
refused to do so without court approval. Missouri Supreme
Court ruled in favor of the state's policy over Cruzan's right
to refuse treatment.
Issue:
W/N the Due Process Clause permits Cruzan's parents to
refuse life-sustaining treatment on their daughter's behalf.
Ruling:
YES. While individuals enjoyed the right to refuse medical
treatment under the Due Process Clause, incompetent
persons were not able to exercise such rights. Absent "clear
and convincing" evidence that Cruzan desired treatment to
be withdrawn, the Court found the State of Missouri's
actions designed to preserve human life to be constitutional.
Because there was no guarantee family members would
always act in the best interests of incompetent patients,
and because erroneous decisions to withdraw
treatment were irreversible, the Court upheld the
state's heightened evidentiary requirements.
Main point in bold.
Case No. 231
Section1, Article III
Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration
9. Substantive Due Process
JMM Promotion and Management Inc. v. CA
Facts: Following the death of Maricris Sioson, President
Cory Aquino ordered a total ban against deployment of
performing artist abroad, However after some protest the
ban was removed provided that the performing artist shall
have an artist record book (ARB) before the processing of
their papers. Now promoters are now questioning the
validity of the ARB requirement contending that it is
discriminatory, illegal and unconstitutional since it violates
various rights.
Issue: W/N requiring ARB deprived individual artists of
their licenses without due process of law
Ruling: No. Locally, the Professional Regulation
Commission has begun to require previously licensed
doctors and other professionals to furnish documentary
proof that they had either re-trained or had undertaken
continuing education courses as a requirement for renewal
of their licenses. It is not claimed that these requirements
pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under
the due process clause. So long as professionals and other
workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no such
deprivation exists.
Main Point: IN BOLD
Case No. 232
Section1, Article III
Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration
9. Substantive Due Process
Corona v. United Harbor
Facts: PPA issued an administrative order PPA-AO No. 04-
92 limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one
year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation. Respondents
now contend that they are deprived due process since there
was no hearing or consultation done before the passing of
the administrative order. Especially since there is no doubt
that pilotage is a property right.
Issue: W/N the yearly “renewal “apparent that PPA-AO No.
04-92 constitutes to deprivation of property without due
process of law
Ruling: Yes. It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92
unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy their
profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past,
they enjoyed a measure of security knowing that after
passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-
job training, they would have a license which they could use
until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for
mental or physical unfitness….Renewal of their license is
now dependent on a “rigid evaluation of performance”
which is conducted only after the license has already been
cancelled. Hence, the use of the term “renewal.” It is this
pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO
No. 04-92 unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a
real sense, it is a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
Main Point: An administrative order that provides for pre-
evaluation cancellation of a license is unreasonable and
constitutionally infirm—in a real sense, it is a deprivation of
property without due process of law.
Case No. 233
Section1, Article III
Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration
9. Substantive Due Process
Kelly v. Johnson
(guys sorry tlg if ung mainpoint is like that wala kasi full txt
na free pero legit naganito ang case)
Facts: Johnson (plaintiff), the president of the Suffolk
County Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, sued to
challenge regulations established by Kelley (defendant), the
former commissioner of the Suffolk County Police
Department, The regulations dictated the style and length of
hair worn by male members of the police force. Johnson
argued that the regulations violated his liberty interest that
was guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The district
court dismissed the case. The court of appeals reversed.
Kelley appealed.
Issue: W/N petitioner’s determination that such regulations
should be enacted is so irrational that it may be branded
‘arbitrary,’ and therefore a deprivation of respondent’s
‘liberty’ interest in freedom to choose his own hairstyle.”
Ruling: No. State and federal employers could impose
considerable restrictions on their employees that could not
be imposed on citizens outside that employment context.
The Court concluded that the respondent failed to show the
92
regulation was so irrational that it was arbitrary and
unconstitutional.
Main Point: A county regulation limiting the length of
county policemen's hair held not to violate any right
guaranteed
Case No. 234
Section1, Article III
Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration
9. Substantive Due Process
Chavez v. Romulo
Facts: President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a
speech before the members of the PNP stressing the need
for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the
rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief,
respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of Permits to
Carry Firearms Outside of Residence (PTCFOR). Petitioner
Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a
PTCFOR has been issued, requested the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed Guidelines. However, his
request was denied.
Issue: W/N revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to
property hence denial of substantive due process
Ruling: No. All property in the state is held subject to its
general regulations, necessary to the common good and
general welfare. In a number of cases, we laid down the
test to determine the validity of a police measure, 1) The
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those
of a particular class, require the exercise of the police
power; and (2) The means employed are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. Deeper reflection will
reveal that the test merely reiterates the essence of the
constitutional guarantees of substantive due process, equal
protection, and non-impairment of property rights.
Main Point: IN BOLD
Case No. 235
Section1, Article III
Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration
9. Substantive Due Process
Cruz v. Flavier
Facts: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit
for prohibition and mandamus, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights
Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and
regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions
of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to
an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands
of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources In addition, petitioners question the provisions of
the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP
and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands on
the ground that these provisions violate the due process
clause of the Constitution
Issue: W/N the IPRA violate the due process clause of the
Constitution since it only includes the indigenous people
Ruling: No. The fact that the NCIP is composed of
members of the indigenous peoples does not mean that
it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be so
incapable, of delivering justice to the non-indigenous
peoples. A person’s possession of the trait of impartiality
desirable of a judge has nothing to do with his or her ethnic
roots. In this wise, the indigenous peoples are as capable of
rendering justice as the non-indigenous peoples for,
certainly, the latter have no monopoly of the concept of
justice.
Main Point: IN BOLD
GOMEZ
CASE NO. 236
ART 3 SEC1: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Smith Kline v. CA
FACTS: Petitioner herein was granted a patent for the
manufacture, use, and sell of Cimetidine, which is useful as
an antihistamine and in the treatment of ulcers, by the
Bureau of Patents, Trademark and Technology Transfer
(BPTTT). Years after the grant of such patent, private
respondents applied for compulsory patent for the use and
manufacture of medicines using Cimetidine. That under Sec
43 (1) (e) of RA 165 or the Patent Law, that application for
compulsory patent may be issued upon the lapse of 2 year
from the date of grant of such patent, provided that its use
and manufacture is necessary for public health or public
safety. Petitioner oppose the issuance of this compulsory
patent to private respondent. However, BPTTT still issued
the patent with the payment to the former by the latter of
2.5% of net sales from the sale of such as royalties. Still in
dismay, Petitioner went to appeal to the CA, however the
appellate court only concurred
ISSUE: Whether or not the grant of a compulsory license to
private respondent results in the deprivation of petitioner’s
property without just compensation.
RULING: No. It must be pointed out that as owner of Letters
Patent No. 12207, petitioner had already enjoyed exclusive
rights to manufacture, use and sell Cimetidine for at least
two years from its grant, Even if other entities like private
respondent are subsequently allowed to manufacture, use
and sell the patented invention by virtue of a compulsory
license, petitioner as owner of the patent would still receive
remuneration for the use of such product in the form of
royalties
GOMEZ
CASE NO. 237
ART 3 SEC1: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Pareno v. COA
93
FACTS: After retiring from the AFP and receiving pension
benefits, herein petitioner, Salvador Pareno, migrated to
Hawaii and became a naturalized American Citizen. The
AFP, invoking Section 27 of PD 1638 (which provides the
guidelines for AFP’s retirement and separation benefits),
stopped releasing petitioner’s monthly pension. In the said
PD, those retirees who losses their Filipino citizenship will
have their benefits terminated. The petitioner wanting to
reinstate his monthly pension payment, went to COA and
filed a claim for the continuance of his monthly pension.
However, COA dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1638 deprives or impairs
petitioners right to property (receiving monthly pension)
and due process as provided in the constitution.
RULING: No. PD 1638, as amended, does not impair any
vested right or interest of petitioner. There was no denial of
due process in this case. When petitioner lost his Filipino
citizenship, the AFP had no choice but to stop his monthly
pension in accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended.
MAIN POINT: Since petitioner abandoned his Filipino
citizenship, it is unequivocal that such vested right to
receive monthly pension has been terminated. Thus, due
process guarantee may not be invoked when no vested right
is present.
GOMEZ
CASE NO. 238
ART 3 SEC1: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Esponcilla v. Bagong Tanyag
FACTS: Upon failure of the petitioners, who has been
occupying in the disputed lots since 1978, to comply with
the requirements of the Community Mortgage Program
(CMP) of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) for the grant of loan to be paid out the land FACTS: Municipal Ordinance No. 97-08 was passed
owners of the land where they have been occupying. The converting El Grande and Aguirre Avenue inside of BF
Bagong Tanyag Homeowners’ Association Inc. (BATAHAI), Homes Paranaque to commercial zones. The petitioners,
herein respondents and the organization in charge for the United BF Homeowners’ Association Inc, (UBFHAI),
distribution of such land to the occupants, delisted said questioned the said ordinance before the Court of Appeals.
petitioners and reassigned the lots to others. Contending That such ordinance would amount to impairment of
that they have been deprived of due process, petitioners contract between the lot buyers and the developer which
brought the case before the Home Insurance and Guaranty states that such lot are residential lots and will tantamount
Corporation (HIGC), which sustained the action of BATAHAI to invalid exercise of police power. Public Respondents
to delist them. The CA also sustained the ruling of HIGC. contends that the issuance of such ordinance is a valid
Thus, this petition for review on certiorari to reverse the exercise of their police power. The CA ruled in favor of the
decision of the CA. respondents citing the general welfare clause of RA 7160
(Local Government Code). Still not contented with the
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents subdivided the lots decision of the appellate court, a petition for review of the
which they(petitioner) have been occupying since 1978 CA decision was submitted before the SC.
without their knowledge and consent, reassigned the lots
without observing due process of law. ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of Municipal Ordinance
No. 97-08 is a valid exercise of police power by the
RULING: No. The petitioners have been given sufficient respondents.
information of the action that may result if they failed to
comply with the requirement of obtaining the loan and the RULING: Yes. Under Section 447 of RA 7160, the
period during which petitioners occupied the lots, no matter Sangguniang Bayan or the Municipal Council, as the
how long, did not vest them with any right to claim legislative body of the municipality, has the power to enact
ownership since it is a fundamental principle of law that ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and
acts of possessory character executed by virtue of license or its inhabitants.
tolerance of the owner, no matter how long, do not start the
running of the period of acquisitive prescription. MAIN POINT: That while non-impairment of contracts is
constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, the
MAIN POINT: The due process guarantee cannot be exercise of police power may be judicially inquired into and
invoked when no vested right has been acquired. corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
GOMEZ
CASE NO. 239
ART 3 SEC1: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
BF Homeowners’ Association v. The City Mayor, GOMEZ
Paranaque CASE NO. 240
ART 3 SEC1: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
94
 St. Luke’s v. NLRC ART. III, SEC. 1, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS Case No. 242
Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. DSWD ART. III, SEC. 1, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
FACTS: Before the passage of RA 7431 or also known as Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines
Radiologic Technology Act of 1992, which requires Radio FACTS: This case questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4(a)
Technicians to acquire certification before they could of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9257) FACTS: BP Blg. 33 was enacted to penalize illegal trading,
practice, Private petitioner, Maribel Santos, was hired at St. on the ground that it violates Art. III, Sec. 1 of the hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and
Lukes in the Radiology department. After the passage or RA Constitution. Said section provided the grant of twenty underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for
7431, the HR department of St. Lukes notified Santos to percent (20%) discount in the purchase trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled
comply with the requirement of the said RA. Failure to of unbranded generic medicines from all establishments liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders which sets P20,000
comply of Santos, led to her dismissal from the said hospital. dispensing medicines for the exclusive use of the senior and P50,000 as the minimum and maximum penalties,
Before the NLRC, a decision was ruled in favor of Santos citizens. Petitioner contends that said law is respectively. The Department of Energy issued a circular to
subjecting the hospital to pay her separation pay. The same unconstitutional because it constitutes deprivation of implement the law. Respondent filed a petition to nullify the
ruling was given by the CA upon appeal by herein private property, alleging that the law failed to provide a circular on the ground that it introduced offenses not
petitioner. Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for certiorari scheme whereby drugstores will be justly compensated for included in the law and by providing penalties on a per
with the CA which, as previously mentioned, affirmed the the discount. cylinder basis for each violation which might exceed the
decision of the NLRC. maximum penalty under the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed section is
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner by dismissing private unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the due ISSUE: Whether or not the amount of imposable fine
petitioner, Maribel Santos, amounts to the deprivation of process clause for undue taking of property. prescribed under the assailed Circular is excessive to the
due process as required by law. extent of being confiscatory and thus offends the Bill of
RULING: No. R.A. No. 9257 is a legitimate exercise of police Rights of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING: No. It is undeniable that her continued power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
employment without the required Board certification general welfare for its object; when the conditions so RULING: No. The Circular is not confiscatory in providing
exposed the hospital to possible sanctions and even to a demand as determined by the legislature, property rights penalties on a per cylinder basis. Those penalties do not
revocation of its license to operate. Certainly, private must bow to the primacy of police power because property exceed the ceiling prescribed in Section 4 of B.P. Blg. 33, as
respondent could not be expected to retain petitioner rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to amended, which penalizes “any person who commits any
Santos despite the inimical threat posed by the latter to its general welfare act [t]herein prohibited.” Thus, violation on a per cylinder
business. basis falls within the phrase “any act” as mandated in
MAIN POINT: Subject to the determination of the courts as Section 4. To provide the same penalty for one who violates
MAIN POINT: No malice or ill-will can be imputed upon an to what is a proper exercise of police power using the due a prohibited act in B.P. Blg. 33, as amended, regardless of
employer where the separation of an employee is process clause and the equal protection clause as yardsticks, the number of cylinders involved would result in an
undertaken by it conformably to an existing statute. Justice, the State may interfere wherever the public interests indiscriminate, oppressive and impractical operation of B.P.
fairness and due process demand that an employer should demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is Blg. 33, as amended. The equal protection clause
not be penalized for situations where it had no participation necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only demands that “all persons subject to such legislation
or control. what interests of the public require, but what measures are shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
necessary for the protection of such interests. conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the
AIRA liabilities imposed.”
Case No. 241 AIRA

95
MAIN POINT IN BOLD legislation safeguarding the interest of the people. Even RULING: Yes. “The life to which each person has a right is
then, for reasons which bear reiteration, the MMDA cannot not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
**Note for Case 242: Dyan lang talaga may connect sa Art. order the closure of respondents’ terminals not only because unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life
III no authority to implement the Project has been granted nor lived with the assurance that the government he established
legislative or police power been delegated to it, but also and consented to, will protect the security of his person and
AIRA because the elimination of the terminals does not satisfy the property. The ideal of security in life and property pervades
Case No. 243 standards of a valid police power measure. the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man’s
ART. III, SEC. 1, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS existence.”
MMDA v. Viron MAIN POINT: A bus company’s certificate of public
convenience confers no property right, and are mere MAIN POINT: While the right to life under Article III,
FACTS: To solve the worsening traffic congestions problem licenses or privileges which must yield to legislation Section 1 of the Constitution guarantees essentially the right
in Metro Manila, the President issued Executive Order (E.O.) safeguarding the interests of the people. to be alive, the right to security of person is a guarantee of
179―Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila the secure quality of this life; In a broad sense, the right to
Mass Transportation System. To decongest traffic, **Note on Case No. 243: As to deprivation of property, security of person “emanates in a person’s legal and
petitioner Metropolitan Manila Development Authority undue siya. However, the same EO was still declared uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his
(MMDA) came up with a recommendation, proposing unconstitutional because the it should have been the DOTC health, and his reputation, including the right to exist, and
the elimination of bus terminals located along major Metro who should implement the law. MMDA has no police power. the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is
Manila thoroughfares, and the construction of mass AIRA invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those
transport terminal facilities to provide a more convenient Case No. 244 things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life
access to the commuting public. MMDA was designated as ART. III, SEC. 1, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of
the implementing agency. The respondents, which are Sec. of DND v. Manalo the individual.”
engaged in the business of public transportation with a
provincial bus operation assailed the constitutionality of FACTS: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, **Note on Case No. 244: This is the first Amparo case. You
said E.O. They alleged that the E.O., insofar as it permitted farmers from Bulacan who were suspected of being might want to read further about this just in case. :)
the closure of existing bus terminal, constituted a members of the New People’s Army, were forcibly taken AIRA
deprivation of property without due process because from their home, detained in various locations, and tortured Case No. 245
provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real by CAFGU and military units. After several days in captivity, ART. III, SEC. 1, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
properties without due process of law should they be respondents recognized their abductors as members of the Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board
required to use the common bus terminals. armed forces led by General Jovito Palparan. They also
learned that they were being held in place for their brother, FACTS: R.A. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
ISSUE: Whether or not the said EO is unconstitutional on Bestre, a suspected leader of the communist insurgents. Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36 thereof requires
the ground that it constituted deprivation of property After eighteen months of restrained liberty, torture and mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
without due process. other dehumanizing acts, the brothers were able to escape students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
and file a petition for the writ of amparo. employees of public and private offices, and persons
RULING: No. As to the alleged confiscatory character of the charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses.
E.O., it need only to be stated that respondents’ certificates ISSUE: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner, a
of public convenience confer no property right, and are can be protected by existing laws. registered political party, seeks to prohibit DDB and PDEA
mere licenses or privileges. As such, these must yield to from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f) and (g) of Sec. 36 of

96
RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm
on the ground that the provisions trench in the equal
protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass
people.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed sections of R.A. 9165
should be struck down as unconstitutional for violating the
due process clause.
RULING: No as to paragraphs (c) and (d) covering
students of secondary and tertiary schools and those
covering officers and employees of public and private
offices. The Court deduced that schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their
students and that they have the right to impose conditions
on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-
discriminatory. As to employees and officers, the reduced
expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the
compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and
the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide
authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold
that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the
limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional. Yes as to paragraphs (f) and (g) covering
persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with
certain offenses and candidates for election. In the case
of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's
office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a
tool for criminal prosecution. Drug testing in this case
would violate a person’s right to privacy. As applied to
electoral candidates, the requirement is unconstitutional
because it adds to the exclusive qualifications for such
offices as prescribed by the Constitution.
MAIN POINT: In the case of persons charged with a crime regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can public policy and (6) must not be unreasonable. Such
never be random or suspicionless; To impose mandatory
drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to
the stated objectives of RA 9165.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 246
Art III Sec 1. Substantive Due Process
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza
FACTS: The SJS sought to compel respondent former Manila
City Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 which
reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial, and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease
and desist from operating their businesses, which included
the Pandacan Terminals of the oil
companies, Chevron, Shell, Petron. The oil companies
sought for the nullification of the ordinance, contending that
it is unfair and oppressive because they have invested
billions of pesos in the depot; it has discriminated against
and singled out the Pandacan Terminals; and that it
contravenes RA 7638 (Department of Energy Act of 1992)
and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Law
of 1998) which vests upon the Department of Energy the
jurisdiction over the administration of the oil companies.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 8027 is
constitutional.
RULING: YES. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only comply with the procedural requirements of law
but also with the ff. substantive requirements: it (1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
are satisfied in the case at bar. Ordinance No. 8027 was
passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the
exercise of its police power. It is not unfair nor oppressive
as the properties of the oil companies remain theirs and
only their use is restricted although they can be applied to
other profitable uses permitted in the commercial zone. It
was not partial nor discriminatory as there was reasonable
classification because unlike the depot, the surrounding
community is not a high-value terrorist target. Any damage
caused by fire or explosion occurring in those areas would
be nothing compared to the damage in the depot itself.
Further, the ordinance does not violate RA 7638 and RA
8749 as nothing in these statutes prohibits the City of
Manila from enacting ordinances in the exercise of its police
power.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 247
Art III Sec 1. Substantive Due Process
SEC v. Interport
FACTS: The SEC received reports that Interport Resources
Corporation (IRC) failed to make timely public disclosures
of its negotiations with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). SEC
later issued an Omnibus Order where it created a special
investigating panel to hear and decide the case in
accordance with the Prosecution and Enforcement
Department (PED) Rues of Practice and Procedure. Upon
appeal, the CA ruled that the PED Rules of Practice and
Procedure did not comply with the statutory requirements
contained in the Administrative Code of 1997, as it affords a
party the right to be present but without the right to cross-
examine witnesses presented against him, in violation of
Section 12(3), Chapter 3, Book VII of the Administrative
Code
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ISSUE: Whether or not the PED Rules of Practice and are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts, thereby operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. They
Procedure was invalid since Section 8, Rule V thereof failed violating their constitutionally-guaranteed right to due contend that it is unconstitutional and void since it violates
to provide for the parties’ right to cross-examination. process .The lower court declared Art 202 (2) as the right to privacy and the freedom of movement, is an
unconstitutional. Hence, the petition. invalid exercise of police power, and it is an unreasonable
RULING: NO. Firstly, Section 4, Rule I of the PED Rules of and oppressive interference in their business. RTC declared
Practice and Procedure provides that subject to the ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC committed a reversible it unconstitutional but upon appeal to the CA, the ruling was
requirements of due process, proceedings before the PED of error in declaring unconstitutional Article 202 (2) of the reversed. Hence, the petition.
the SEC shall be summary in nature not necessarily RPC.
adhering to or following the technical rules of evidence ISSUE: Whether or not the City Ordinance No. 7774 is
obtaining in the courts of law. Further, PED exercises RULING & MAIN POINT: YES. In exercising its power to constitutional.
powers which are investigative in nature and Section 12, declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must
Chapter 3, Rule VII of the Administrative Code affects only inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it RULING & MAIN POINT: NO. The primary constitutional
the adjudicatory functions of administrative bodies. In intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain question in the instant case is one of due process, as
proceedings before administrative or quasi-judicial understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is his guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the
bodies created under laws which authorize summary duty to avoid. This requirement has come to be known as Constitution. The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent
proceedings, decisions may be reached on the basis of the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that a arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life,
position papers or other documentary evidence only. statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an liberty and property of individuals. Specifically,
They are not bound by technical rules of procedure and act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence substantive due process inquires whether the
evidence. Thus, it is not necessary for the rules to must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its government has sufficient justification for depriving a
require affiants to appear and testify and to be cross- application, violates the first essential requisite of due person of life, liberty, or property. There are very
examined by the counsel of the adverse party. In order process of law. The said underlying principle that legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out
to comply with the requirements of due process, what is Article 202 (2) fails to give fair notice of what more than twice a day. A person in need of comfortable
required, among other things, is that every litigant be constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no application here private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other
given reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his because under our legal system, ignorance of the law than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look
right and to introduce relevant evidence in his favor. excuses no one from compliance therewith. This to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
principle is of Spanish origin, and we adopted it to govern The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the
AREEJ and limit legal conduct in this jurisdiction. businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the
CASE NO. 248 rights of their patrons without sufficient justification.
Art III Sec 1. Substantive Due Process AREEJ Individual rights may be adversely affected only to the
People v. Siton CASE NO. 249 extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate
Art III Sec 1. Substantive Due Process demands of public interest or public welfare.
FACTS: Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate White Light Corporation v. City of Manila
Sagarano, charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 AREEJ
(2) of the RPC, question the constitutionality of the said FACTS: City Mayor Alfredo Lim signed into law City CASE NO. 250
provision, claiming that the definition of the crime of Ordinance No. 7774 prohibiting short time admission in Art III Sec 1. Substantive Due Process
vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations
results in an arbitrary identification of violators, since the establishments in the City of Manila. Petitioners argue that (CREBA) v. Romulo
definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who the ordinance directly affects their business interests as

98
FACTS: Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section repugnant to the constitutional guarantee of due constitutionality of a statute, its provisions which are
27 (E) of RA 8424 which imposes minimum corporate process. More importantly, the due process alleged to have been violated in a case must be
income tax (MCIT) on corporations and creditable requirement applies to the power to tax. The CWT examined in the light of the conduct with which the
withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real properties classified does not impose new taxes nor does it increase taxes. It defendant is charged. Absent of an actual or imminent
as ordinary assets. Petitioner claims that the MCIT violates relates entirely to the method and time of payment. charge against the petitioner, a limited vagueness
the due process clause because it levies income tax even if analysis of the assailed statute is legally impermissible.
there is no realized gain, because said provision is pegging ANGELO Therefore, in this case, since the petitioners have not been
the tax base of the MCIT to a corporation’s gross income, Case No. 251 charged with violation of the assailed law, the vagueness
which is tantamount to a confiscation of capital because ART III SEC 1: Substantive Due Process doctrine is not applicable.
gross income, unlike net income, is not realized gain. Southern Hemisphere v. ATC
Petitioner also avers that the imposition of CWT on real ANGELO
estates deprives its members of their property without due FACTS: The case consists of 6 petitions challenging the Case No. 252
process of law because, in their line of business, gain is constitutionality of RA 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007). ART III SEC 1: Substantive Due Process
never assured by mere receipt of the selling price. As a Petitioners assailed the said law for being intrinsically Roxas v. Macapagal Arroyo
result, the government is collecting tax from net income not vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime
yet gained or earned. of terrorism under the said law in that terms like FACTS: Melissa Roxas is enrolled in an exposure program to
"widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the the Philippines. After doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the imposition of the MCIT on populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an and her companions rested. While they were resting, 15
domestic corporations is unconstitutional and; (2) whether unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement heavily armed men in civilian clothes forcibly entered the
or not the imposition of CWT on income from sales of real agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts. house and dragged them inside a van. When they alighted
properties classified as ordinary assets is unconstitutional. Respondents, through the OSG, countered that the doctrine from the van, she was informed that she is being detained
vagueness find no application in the present case. for being a member of Communist Party of the Philippines-
RULING & MAIN POINT: New People’s Army. She was interrogated and tortured for 5
(1) NO. The due process clause may properly be invoked ISSUE: Whether or not a penal statue may be assailed for straight days to convince her to abandon her communist
to invalidate, in appropriate cases, a revenue being vague. beliefs. Eventually, Roxas was released. After her release,
measure when it amounts to a confiscation of Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo
property. Certainly, an income tax is arbitrary and RULING: YES, but only in an as-applied challenge. A and Habeas Data before the Supreme Court, impleading the
confiscatory if it taxes capital because capital is not statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it high-ranking officials of military and Philippine National
income. However, the MCIT is not a tax on capital but is lacks comprehensible standards that men of common Police (PNP), on the belief that it was the government
imposed on gross income which is arrived at by intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ agents who were behind her abduction and torture.
deducting the capital spent by a corporation in the sale of as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution
its goods, i.e., the cost of goods and other direct expenses because it violates due process for failure to accord persons, ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of command
from gross sales. Clearly, the capital is not being taxed. especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the responsibility is applicable in a Writ of Amparo petition.
(2) NO. The CWT is creditable against the tax due from the conduct to avoid.
seller of the property at the end of the taxable year. The RULING: NO. The doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. It
seller will be able to claim a tax refund if its net income is In this jurisdiction, penal statutes found vague as a matter of must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of
less than the taxes withheld. Nothing is taken that is due process typically are invalidated only “as applied” to a the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification
not due so there is no confiscation of property defendant. This means that in determining the in impleading the public respondents in her amparo

99
petition, is legally inaccurate. The doctrine of command
responsibility is a rule of substantive law that
establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a
proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an
amparo petition.
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of
the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo
proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude
impleading military or police commanders on the
ground that the complained acts in the petition were
committed with their direct or indirect agreement. In
which case, commanders may be impleaded—not
actually on the basis of command responsibility—but
rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability.
ANGELO
Case No. 253
ART III SEC 1: Substantive Due Process
Meralco v. Lim
FACTS: A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department
in Bulacan denouncing Lim, an administrative clerk. She
was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns
over her safety. She complained under the premise that the
transfer was a denial of her due process. She asked for
deferment thereafter. Since the company didn’t respond,
she filed for a writ of habeas data in the Bulacan RTC due to
Meralco’s omission of providing her with details about the
report of the letter. To her, this constituted a violation of her
liberty and security. She asked for disclosure of the data and
measures for keeping the confidentiality of the data.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of Lim’s right ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted on petitioner’s the business of handling the recruitment and migration of
to privacy.
RULING: NO. There was no violation of respondent’s right
to privacy. Respondent said that the letters were mere jokes RULING: NO. The constitutional guarantee is not a
and even conceded the fact that the issue was labor related prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of
due to references to real intent of management. "unreasonable" searches and seizures. The SC found that
Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with he had no actual expectation of privacy on his work
MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her reassignment to computer. He did not have a separate office space, nor
the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for did he use a password for his computer. The CSC also
information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, implemented a policy that its employees on notice that
does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data. they have no expectation of privacy in anything on their
Habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or office computers, and that the CSC may monitor their
commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in use. The validity of the seizure of the files should be limited
support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. to the need for determining whether or not the petitioner
Employment is a property right in the due process unjustly utilized official resources of the Commission for
clause. Respondent was concerned with her personal purposes and should not extend to the reading of
employment, one that can be solved in the NLRC. the files’ contents, which would be violative of his right to
privacy.
ANGELO
Case No. 254 ANGELO
ART III SEC 1: Substantive Due Process Case No. 255
Pollo v. Karina Constantino ART III SEC 1: Substantive Due Process
Sto. Tomas v. Paneda
FACTS: CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David received
a document from an anonymous source, making her aware FACTS: These consolidated cases pertain to the
that there is a corrupt official in the Commission. She then constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 8042 otherwise
formed personnel and directed them to back up all the files known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of
of the computers found therein. Respondent found, in Bricio 1995. RA 8042’s purpose, among others, is to set
Pollo, petitioner, legal pleading or documents that are government’s policies on overseas employment. It also
related to administrative cases and were for on the behalf of establishes a higher standard of protection and promotion
parties who were facing charges. He asserted that the CSC of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and
conducted a fishing expedition and his right to privacy was overseas Filipinos in distress.
violated and that the source of the complaint was
anonymous. The CSC charged Pollo in violation of RA 6713
Assailed provisions: Sections 29 and 30 of the Act
(Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials).
commanded the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) to begin deregulating within one year of its passage
office computer and the copying of his personal files overseas Filipino workers and phase out within five years
without his knowledge and consent constituted a violation the regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas
of his constitutional right to privacy. Employment Administration (POEA).
100
 reasonable classification. And the classification, to be a distinction between those who fall within such class and
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8042 is constitutional. reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; those who do not.
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3)
RULING: YES. R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4)
to regulate the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It must apply equally to all members of the same class.
aims to curb, if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act
suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work abroad. The was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing and
rule is settled that every statute has in its favor the designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-
presumption of constitutionality. The Court cannot inquire Christian tribes.
into the wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by the
Legislative Department. Hence, in the absence of a clear and Ayeh CASE NO. 257
unmistakable case that the statute is unconstitutional, the ART. III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
Court must uphold its validity Ichong v Hernandez Ayeh CASE NO. 258
FACTS: Petitioner and in behalf of other alien residents, ART. III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
Ayeh CASE NO. 256 corporations and partnerships adversely affected assails the Villegas v Hui Chiong Tsai Pao Ho
ART. III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW constitutionality of the RA 1180 or An Act to Regulate the FACTS: Respondent herein assailed the constitutionality of
People v Cayat Retail Business contending among others that contending Ordinance No. 6537 which prohibits aliens from being
FACTS: Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, that it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the employed or to engage or participate in any position or
Mountain Province, and a member of the non-Christian laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due occupation or business enumerated therein, whether
tribes, was found guilty of violating Act No. 1639 which process of law for prohibiting non-filipino citizens to engage permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an
prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a member of a directly or indirectly in retail trade. employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying
non-Christian tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the right of the the permit fee of P50.00 on the ground among others that t
receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, petitioner to equal protection of the law. is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied
ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than RULING: No. The disputed law was enacted to remedy a real only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life,
the so-called native wines and liquors which the members actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process
of such tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage dominance and control of the retail business and free and equal protection clauses of the Constitution which had
of the law. citizens and country from dominance and control. The law been ruled in favor of the former by the trial court. Hence,
Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the does not violate the equal protection clause of the this petition.
grounds that it is discriminatory and denies the equal Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 6537 is
protection of the laws, violates due process clause, and is an distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the unconstitutional.
improper exercise of police power. occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, RULING: Yes. The ordinance in question violates the due
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.
constitutional right to the equal protection of the law in the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a
specifically classifying non-Christian tribes in the and reasonably protects their privilege. permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or
prohibition provided for under the said law. MP: The equal protection clause is not infringed by refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right
RULING & MP: No. It is an established principle of legislation which applies only to those persons falling of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of
constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is
of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien

101
is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due
process of law. This guarantee includes the means of
livelihood.
MP: The guarantee of equal protection of laws includes the
means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due
process and equal protection clause is given to all persons,
both aliens and citizens.
Ayeh CASE NO. 259
ART. III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
Dumlao v COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and
contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees
of the Constitution by prohibiting any retired elective
provincial city or municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled
under the law, and who shall have been 65 years of age at
the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks
to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same
elective local office from which he has retired
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of BP 52 is
unconstitutional for violating equal protection of laws.
RULING: No. The purpose of the law is to allow the
emergence of younger blood in local governments. The
classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it
cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be
susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical
inconsistencies"
MP: In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection
clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is
proscribed is a classification which is arbitrary and
unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated
by a reasonable classification based upon substantial
distinctions, where the classification is germane to the
purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the
same class.
Ayeh CASE NO. 260
ART. III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
Goesart v Cleary
FACTS: Valentine Goesaert owned a bar inside the city of
Michigan which had a law prohibiting females unless she be
"the wife or daughter of the male owner" of a licensed liquor
establishment from getting a bartender's license. Goesaert
challenged the law, and the case made its way to the U.S.
Supreme Court. She argued that the law violated her 14th
Amendment rights under the equal protection clause, which
required that the state government treat everyone equal
under the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject law violated the equal
protection of the law clause.
RULING: No. The Court concluded that the Constitution
"does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line
between the sexes" or "to reflect sociological insight, or
shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to
keep abreast of the latest scientific standards."
MP: Since there may be a reasonable and valid desire in
the legislature to protect female bartenders, the court
cannot second-guess the legislature and decide that the
real purpose here was for male bartenders to
monopolize the industry.
ADDALINO
CASE NO. 261
ART III, SEC 1: REQUISITES OF VALID CLASSIFICATION;
Standards of Judicial Review
ORMOC SUGAR CENTRAL VS ORMOC CITY
FACTS: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed an
ordinance imposing “on any and all productions of
centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.,
in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum
(1%) per export sale to USA and other foreign countries.”
Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc.. Said company filed before the Court of
First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the City of Ormoc
as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor alleging
that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of
the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of
taxation. The court rendered a decision that upheld the
constitutionality of the ordinance. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of
taxation, specifically the equal protection clause and rule of
uniformity of taxation, were infringed
RULING: YES. Equal protection clause applies only to
persons or things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where 1) it is based upon
substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to the
purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only to
present conditions, but also to future conditions
substantially identical to those present; and 4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same
class. A perusal of the requisites shows that the questioned
ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal
sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc. and none other. At the time the ordinance was
enacted, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. Was the only sugar
central in the City of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be
reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future
conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be
singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central for the coverage of the tax. As it is
now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be
subject to a tax because the ordinance expressly points only
to Ormoc City Sugar Company, Inc. As the entity to be levied
upon.
MAIN POINT: Equal protection clause applies only to
persons or things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where 1) it is based upon
substantial distinctions; 2) these are germane to the
102
purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only to
present conditions, but also to future conditions
substantially identical to those present; and 4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same
class.
ADDALINO
CASE NO. 262
ART III, SEC 1: REQUISITES OF VALID CLASSIFICATION;
Standards of Judicial Review
BASCO VS PAGCOR
FACTS: In 1977, the Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by Presidential Decree
1067-A. PD 1067-B meanwhile granted PAGCOR the power
“to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on
land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines.” PAGCOR’s operation was a success hence in
1978, PD 1399 was passed which expanded PAGCOR’s
power. In 1983, PAGCOR’s charter was updated through PD
1869. PAGCOR’s charter provides that PAGCOR shall
regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by
existing franchise or permitted by law. Atty. Humberto
Basco and several other lawyers assailed the validity of
the law creating PAGCOR. Basco et al argued that PD
1869 violates the equal protection clause because it
legalizes PAGCOR-conducted gambling, while most
other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.
ISSUE: W/N PD 1869 violates the equal protection clause
RULING: No. Just how PD 1869 in legalizing gambling
conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is
not clearly explained in Basco’s petition. The mere fact that
some gambling activities like cockfighting (PD 449) horse
racing (RA 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes,
lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by BP 42) are
legalized under certain conditions, while others are
prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, PD. 1869 foreign loans and this compelled PHILGUARANTEE to
for one, unconstitutional. Basco’s posture ignores the well- assume its obligation as guarantor. Needless to state, the de
accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the Venecia group of companies and PHILGUARANTEE were
laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of sequestered by the petitioner, through the PCGG. A case was
individuals who may be accorded different treatment filed against the De Venecia, Bondoc and et al. However,
under the law as long as the classification is not Bondoc’s complaint or case was dismissed.
unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation on the equal
operate in equal force on all persons or things to be protection clause the dismissal of the complaint to Bondoc.
conformable to Article III, Sec 1 of the Constitution. The
“equal protection clause” does not prohibit the RULING: No. The dismissal of the Complaint against
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or Bondoc and company is compelled by the equal protection
objects upon which different rules shall operate. The clause of the Constitution. De Venecia Jr, and the
Constitution does not require situations which are respondents Bondoc and company are similarly situated.
different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as Respondent Bondoc, et al. were included in the Complaint
though they were the same. only because they allegedly gave unwarranted favors to De
MAIN POINT: in bold Venecia, Jr., in guaranteeing the latter’s foreign loans. When
petitioner admitted that no undue favour was granted to de
ADDALINO Venecia, Jr. in the grant of such guaranty facilities and
CASE NO. 263 dismissed its complaint against respondents Bondoc and
ART III, SEC 1: REQUISITES OF VALID CLASSIFICATION; company. To give a more favoured treatment to de Venecia,
Standards of Judicial Review Jr., when the parties are equally situated is to indulge in
REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN invidious discrimination.
MAIN POINT: To give a more favored treatment to de
FACTS: Before 1986, the Landoil Group of Companies Venecia, Jr., when the parties are equally situated is to
spearheaded by then Congressman Jose de Venecia, Jr., was indulge in invidious discrimination
able to obtain foreign loans syndicated by various banks. In
view of the magnitude of the loans and the project risks
involved, the banks required that their loans be fully ADDALINO
covered by the absolute and unconditional guarantee of the CASE NO. 264
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, thus, de ART III, SEC 1: REQUISITES OF VALID CLASSIFICATION;
Venecia applied for Philippine Government guarantee from Standards of Judicial Review
the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee HIMAGAN VS PEOPLE
Corporation (Philguarantee), whose Board of Directors was FACTS: Petitioner Ishmael Himagan, a policeman assigned
then composed of private respondents, Rosendo D. Bondoc, with the medical company of the Philippine National Police
et.al. He however misused the proceeds of the loans by Regional Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was
diverting them to other uses and/or appropriation, then for implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the
his own personal benefit. Congressman de Venecia’s group attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the
of companies was unable to seasonably service these information for murder and attempted murder were filed
103
with the Regional Trial Court, the trial court issued an Order
suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on
the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, or DILG Act of 1990,
which provides that upon filing of a complaint against a PNP
member for grave felonies, the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office until the case is
terminated. Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his
suspension, relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil
Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to
ninety (90) days, which was denied by the judge, pointing
out that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused shall
be suspended from office until his case is terminated. The
motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was,
likewise, denied. Hence, this petition wherein petitioner
claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over
90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a
violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of
laws.
ISSUE: W/N the imposition of the preventive suspension of
over 90 days against the petitioner violates his
constitutional right to equal protection of laws.
RULING: NO! The imposition of preventive suspension for
over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate
the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal
protection of the laws. The special law for police officers is
justified by their status. In upholding the provision, the
Court said that the reason why members of the PNP are
treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the
application of the rule on preventive suspension is
concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge
of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate
witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the
legislative discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally
charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while
his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him
are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily
cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in known reticence of the people which keep them from
uniform and armed. complaining against official wrongdoings. The Office of the
Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and
MAIN POINT: The equal protection clause exists to prevent prosecutory agencies of the government because those
undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss
Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, investigations held against them.
the equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated MAIN POINT: The Office of the Ombudsman is different
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are
public officials who, through official pressure and influence,
ADDALINO can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against
CASE NO. 261 them.
ART III, SEC 1: REQUISITES OF VALID CLASSIFICATION;
Standards of Judicial Review COELI
ALMONTE VS VASQUEZ CASE NO. 266
Art. III, Sec. 1, Equal Protection of the Law
Facts: Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of TELEBAP & GMA Network, Inc. v. COMELEC
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to [289 SCRA 337; G.R. NO. 132922; 21 APR 1998]
produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds
yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for FACTS:
1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection  Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast
with the investigation of funds representing savings from Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an
unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. organization of lawyers of radio and television
Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous activities that broadcasting companies.
circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the  Petitioner GMA Network had the requisite standing to
subpoena duces tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates
the Government. radio and television broadcast stations in the
Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92,
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of petitioners’ B.P. No. 881.
right to the equal protection of the laws.  Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No.
881 which provides:
RULING: NO. In the first place, there can be no objection to o “Comelec Time shall be allocated equally
this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution and impartially among the candidates
itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting within the area of coverage of all radio
the filing of complaints “in any form and in a manner,” the and television stations. For this purpose,
framers of the Constitution took into account the well- the franchise of all radio broadcasting
104
 and television stations are hereby CASE NO. 267 (2) be germane to the purpose of the law,
amended so as to provide radio or Art. III, Sec. 1, Equal Protection of the Law (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and
television time, free of charge, during the Tiu v. CA (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
period of campaign.”
 Petitioner contended that: FACTS: The real concern of Republic Act 7227 is to convert the
o While Section 90 of the same law requires  RA 7227 seeks to accelerate the conversion of military lands formerly occupied by the US military bases into
COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers reservations into other productive uses. Section economic or industrial areas.
and magazines with payment, 12 thereof granted special privileges to the creation of
o Section 92 provides that air time shall be the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), which includes COELI
procured by COMELEC free of charge. the: CASE NO. 268
 Petitioner GMA Network claims that it suffered losses o City of Olongapo Art. III, Sec. 1, Equal Protection of the Law
running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC o Municipality of Subic, and the Aguinaldo v. COMELEC
Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election o Lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and. FACTS:
and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer  EO 97 was issued to clarify the application of the  Petitioners, at the time of the filing of the petition, were
even more should it be required to do so again this year. incentives provided by RA 7227. incumbent provincial or municipal officials in
 Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of o Sec. 1- tax and duty-free importations shall only Cagayan. Petitioners seek to prevent the COMELEC from
the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to be applied raw materials, capital goods and enforcing during the 1998 elections Section 67 of the
advertisers and to require these stations to provide free equipment brought in by business enterprises Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) is violative of the
air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. into the SSEZ. equal protection clause of the Constitution, as its
o Except for these items, importations of other classification of persons running for office is not a valid
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC TIME denies radio and goods into the SSEZ, whether by business classification.
television broadcast companies the equal protection of the enterprises, resident individuals are subject to  According to petitioners, candidates for elective office
laws, and that it constitutes taking of property without due the taxes and duties under Philippine laws. are classified into the following groups under Section 67:
process of law and without just compensation. o Section 1.1 - enjoyment of the tax and duty o Sec. 67. Candidates holding elective office. — Any
incentives to the business and enterprises and elective official, whether national or local, running for
RULING: NO. residents within the presently fenced-in any office other than the one which he is holding in a
The said provision expressly provided that the COMELEC former Subic Naval Base only. It excludes the permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
Time should be considered as part of the public service first two component cities as provided for by RA President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
time said stations are required to furnish the 7227. his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Government for the dissemination of public  According to petitioners, candidates for elective office
information and education under their respective ISSUE: Whether EO 97-A violates the equal protection of the are classified into the following groups under Section
franchises or permits. laws? 67:
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the o First classification: an incumbent elective official
airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement RULING: NO. who runs for the same position as his present
that they provide air time to the COMELEC. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is incumbency . . . (and) another incumbent elective
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD. not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification. official running for another position; and
Classification, to be valid, must o Second Classification: an incumbent elective official
COELI (1) rest on substantial distinctions, who runs for president or vice-president . . . (and)

105
 another incumbent elective [official] running for any
other position (i.e., not his incumbency nor for
president or vice president) . . .
 Petitioners also argue that Section COELI
67 effectively shortens the terms of office of elected
officials, in violation of Article X, Section 8 of the
Constitution
 Respondent’s Claim:
o The classification embodied in Section 67 is
reasonable and based on substantial distinction:
incumbents running for the same position are not
considered resigned because the intention of the law
is to allow them to continue serving their
constituents and avoid a disruption in the delivery
of essential services; those running for different
positions are considered resigned because they are
considered to have abandoned their present position
by their act of running for other posts.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed section violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
RULING: NO
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code was crafted with
the intention of giving flesh to the constitutional
pronouncement that public service is a public trust.
Rather than cut short the term of office of elective public
officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such
officials serve out their entire term of office by
discouraging them from running for another public
office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making
it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they
cannot go back to their former position. This is
consonant with the constitutional edict that all public
officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not
trifle with the mandate which they have received from their RULING: NO.
constituents.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD. Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption of validity,
and the Court discerns no ground to invalidate it.
The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the
impartiality of election officials by preventing them from
CASE NO. 269 developing familiarity with the people of their place of
Art. III, Sec. 1, Equal Protection of the Law assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of
De Guzman, et. al v. COMELEC the Constitution. It can be discerned that the legislature
FACTS: thought the noble purpose of the law would be
 Petitioners assailed the validity of Section 44 of the sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the
Voters Registration Act of 1996. chain of corruption than by breaking up each and every
o SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No link thereof.
Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or MAIN POINT: IN BOLD.
municipality for more than four (4) years. Any
election officer who, either at the time of the COELI
approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has CASE NO. 270
served for at least four (4) years in a particular city Art. III, Sec. 1, Equal Protection of the Law
or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by People v. Mercado, et. al.
the Commission to a new station outside the original November 29, 200
congressional district. FACTS:
o Petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election  The accused, being them members of the PNP,
Officers, were reassigned to different stations by the kidnapped one Richard Buama, a 17 year old minor and
COMELEC. boarded him in a car against his will thus depriving him
o Petitioners contend that the said law is of his freedom of liberty, brought him to Tanay, Rizal in
unconstitutional because it violates the equal a safe house and there subjected him to extreme/brutal
protection clause guaranteed by the 1987 physical violence, and thereafter with abuse of superior
Constitution because it singles out the City and strength and evident premeditation hacked and
Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as bludgeoned/clubbed said Richard Buama who thereby
prohibited from holding office in the same city or sustained mortal wounds which directly caused his
municipality for more than four (4) years. They death.
maintain that there is no substantial distinction  The defendants were convicted by the trial court with
between them and other COMELEC officials, and the crime of kidnapping with murder and sentencing
therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the them the punishment of death.
objective of the provision of law under attack.  The defendants raised the constitutionality of death
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the penalty and the alleged haste of the trial court in
equal protection clause. deciding the case resulting in grave and serious errors
committed in convicting the accused.
106
ISSUE: Whether or not death penalty is unconstitutional performance of legitimate and even essential duties by entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal
and "cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment." public officers has never been an excuse to free a person protection unless there is shown to be present in it an
validly in prison. element of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
RULING: NO MAIN POINT: The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall
As settled in People vs. Echagaray, death penalty is not a any person be denied the equal protection of laws." This Furthermore, the presumption is that the prosecuting
"cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment." It is simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be officer’s regularly performed their duties, and this
an exercise of the state's power to "secure society treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary,
against the threatened and actual evil". Procedural and imposed. The organs of government may not show any not by mere speculation.
substantial safeguards to insure its correct application are undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither
established. partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed. MAIN POINT: The mere allegation that appellant, a
However, this case was decided on November 29, 2000 Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime,
when death penalty was not yet suspended. It was CASE NO. 272 while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellants eyes, is
suspended on 2006. ART III SEC 1: 10. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD. PEOPLE V. PIEDRA, 350 SCRA 163 officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.
CASE NO. 271 Appellant has failed to show that, in charging appellant in
ART III SEC 1: 10. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW FACTS: Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra questions court, that there was a clear and intentional discrimination
PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS, 324 SCRA 689 her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and on the part of the prosecuting officials.
assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and
FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full- penalizing said crime. Appellant also invokes the equal CASE NO. 273
fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the protection clause in her defense. She points out that ART III SEC 1: 10. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS V.
on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is Alejandro handed out application forms and even received QUISUMBING, JUNE 01, 2000
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion Lourdes Modestos payment, appellant was the only one
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained FACTS: Private respondent International School, Inc. is a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions scot-free. From this, appellant concludes that the domestic educational institution established primarily for
and committee meetings despite his having been convicted prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other
in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a temporary residents. Accordingly, the School hires both
Zamboanguena, and the alleged crime took place in foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
ISSUE: WON there is a violation of equal protection of the Zamboanga City. classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2)
law. local-hires. Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that election to the ISSUE: WON equal protection of the law was denied to the classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
position of Congressman is not a reasonable basis for valid appellant. Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions hires constitutes racial discrimination. Filipino teachers in
and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions RULING: NO. The prosecution of one guilty person while the International School challenge the legality of the
which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by school’s practice of giving higher pay for foreign hires than
their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The Filipinos of equal rank.
arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its
law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. The face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are ISSUE: WON the practice is constitutional.

107

RULING: NO. The court held that there was no reasonable
distinction between the services rendered by “foreign hires"
and “local hires” as to justify the disparity in salaries paid to
these teachers. While we recognize the need of the School to
attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an
enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires
perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought
to be paid the same salaries as the latter.
MAIN POINT: The Court finds the principle of “equal pay for
equal work” requires that persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries.
CASE NO. 274
ART III SEC 1: 10. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASS’N V. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas,
446 SCRA 299
FACTS: Petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees
Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP
and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to
restrain respondents from further implementing the
last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on
the ground that it is unconstitutional. The provision in R.A.
7693 (The Central Bank Act) which creates two classes of
employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those
exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization
Law (SSL) (the exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file
(Salary Grade 19 and below) (non-exempt class). It is
contended that this classification is "a classic case of class
legislation," allegedly not based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP
personnel's position. Petitioner posits that the classification
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso
has no force and effect of law, respondents' implementation classification made in the Central Bank Act is not based on
of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no any substantial distinction vis-à -vis the particular
appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in circumstances of each GFI.
the ordinary course except through this petition for
prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of, MAIN POINT: The concept of relative constitutionality. The
considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be
involved. determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with
applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute
Respondent BSP contends that the provision does not may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts
violate the equal protection clause and can stand the and invalid in its application to another.
constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with
other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and A statute valid at one time may become void at another time
administrative autonomy of BSP," and the mandate of the because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its
Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its
excellence at all levels in accordance with sound principles validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is
of management." open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed
conditions
ISSUE: Whether or not a provision of law, initially valid,
become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that DISSENTING OPINION: Justice Panganiban, “For the
its continued operation would violate the equal protection record, I am not against the exemption from the Salary
of the law? Standardization Law of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP) rank and file employees (with Salary Grade 19 and
RULING: YES. The court ruled that with the passage of the below). Neither am I against increases in their pay. I simply
subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other submit that (1) the factual milieu of this case does not show
governmental financial institutions (GFIs) removing a denial of equal protection, (2) the theory of relative
limitations on employees, the continued operation the constitutionality does not come into play, and (3) petitioner
limitation on Central Bank employees under Sec. 15c, Art. II should have addressed its plaint, not to this Court, but to
of the Central Bank Law constitutes invidious Congress in the first instance. I am confident that given
discrimination on the 2994 rank-and-file employees of the sufficient opportunity, the legislature will perform its
BSP. This is a case of relative constitutionality. The Supreme constitutional duty accordingly. Hence, there is no need or
Court said that while the “policy determination” argument warrant for this Court to intervene in legislative work.”
may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-
and-file and the officers of BSP, it cannot justify the CASE NO. 275
inequality of treatment between the BSP rank-and-file ART III SEC 1: 10. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
employees and those of other Government Financing YCASUEGI V. PAL, 569 SCRA 467
Institutions (GFIs) (who, in their respective charters, are
exempt from the provisions of SSL). These rank-and file FACTS: This case talks about an international flight steward
employees (of BSP and GFIs) are similarly situated; thus, the who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the
108
weight standards of the airline company. He is now before
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming
that he was illegally dismissed. He argues that (1) his
dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2)
continuing adherence to the weight standards of the
company is not a bona fide occupational qualification; and
(3) he was discriminated against because other overweight
employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.
Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as
a convenient excuse to discriminate against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was not unduly
discriminated against when he was dismissed while other
overweight cabin attendants were either given flying duties
or promoted.
RULING: NO. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by
simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who are
allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must
be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated and
the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite
the similarity of his situation with other employees. To
make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the
equal protection clause guaranty of the Constitution.
However, in the absence of governmental interference, the
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked.
MAIN POINT: The Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked
against acts of private individuals. Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,
which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is
consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no
shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot
violate the equal protection guarantee.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 276
ART III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
SJS v. Atienza, 545 SCRA 92
FACTS: Respondent Mayor Atienza approved Ordinance No.
8027 which reclassified certain areas (Pandacan Pasig and
Sta. Ana, among others) from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed
under the reclassification to cease and desist from
operation within six months from the effectivity of the
ordinance. The oil companies take the position that the
ordinance has discriminated against and singled out the
Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the Pandacan area
is congested with buildings and residences that do not
comply with the National Building Code, Fire Code, and
Health and Sanitation Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 8027 is partial and
discriminatory
RULING: No. An ordinance based on reasonable
classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of
the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid
and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only and (4) it must apply equally to all members
of the same class.
MAIN POINT: An ordinance based on reasonable
classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of
the equal protection of the law
ARZHY
CASE NO. 277
ART III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
Gobenciong v. CA, 550 SCRA 502
FACTS: Petitioner was charged before the Office of the
Ombudsman with Falsification of Public Documents and
Misconduct relative to the anomalous purchase of the
expensive hemoanalyzer. Office of the Ombudsman ordered
his preventive suspension. Gobenciong parlayed the theory
that the application of RA 6770 which authorized the
Ombudsman to impose a six-month preventive suspension
instead of the civil service provisions of the Administrative
Code (which limits the disciplining authority’s prerogative
to only imposing a prevention suspension for a period not
exceeding 90 days) violates the equal protection guarantee.
ISSUE: Whether or not application of RA 6770 violates the
equal protection guarantee
RULING: No. The fundamental guarantee is not breached by
a law which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class and provided further that there is a substantial
distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.
MAIN POINT: The equal protection clause is against undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination; it does not demand absolute equality.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 278
ART III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
MIAA v. Olongapo, 543 SCRA 269
FACTS: MIAA did not renew the janitorial and maintenance
service contract of respondents Olongapo Maintenance
Services Inc. (OMSI) and Triple Crown Services Inc. (TCI)
but instead awarded such contract to a new service
contractor through negotiated contract and without the
benefit of public bidding. Respondents contended that such
was a violation of their right to equal protection of laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of the service contracts to
new service contractor by MIAA without public bidding
violates the respondents’ right to equal protection of law.
RULING: Yes. The constitutional right of respondents to
equal protection was violated by petitioner when no public
bidding was called precisely because the latter was going to
award the subject service contracts through negotiation.
Worse, the acts of petitioner smacked of arbitrariness and
discrimination as they not only did not call for the required
public bidding but also did not even accord respondents the
opportunity to submit their proposals in a public bidding.
Such act is illegal and irregular because of the wrong
109
application of the laws by MIAA and not because the
pertinent laws are discriminatory against them.
MAIN POINT: Although the law be fair on its face and
impartial on its appearance, yet if applied and administered
by the public authorities charged with their administration
with an evil eye and unequal hand so as to practically make
unjust and illegal determination, the denial of equal justice
is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 279
ART III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
Nicolas v. Romulo, 578 SCRA 438
FACTS: Private respondent Lance Corporal Daniel Smith of
the US Armed Forces was convicted of the crime of rape
committed against petitioner. Pursuant to the VFA
agreement, Smith’s custody was transferred to the US
government and he was transferred to the US Embassy
Compound for detention. Petitioner contended that to allow
the transfer of custody of an accused to a foreign power is to
provide for a different procedure for that accused which
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer of custody of the
accused violated the equal protection clause
RULING: No. The equal protection clause was not violated
because there was a substantial basis for a different
treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces
allowed to enter our territory and all other accused. The
rule on international law is that a foreign armed forces
allowed to enter one’s territory is immune from local
jurisdiction, except to the extent agreed upon.
MAIN POINT: The equal protection clause was not violated
because there was a substantial basis for a different
treatment of a member of a foreign military armed forces
allowed to enter our territory and all other accused
ARZHY
CASE NO. 280
ART III SEC 1: EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
League of Cities v. COMELEC, 608 SCRA 636
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of 16 laws 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code
converting the municipality covered thereby into a city as it violates the Equal Protection Clause that it
(cityhood laws) and sought to enjoin the COMELEC from unduly discriminates against appointive officials
conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws. To the because of the differential treatment of persons
petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special treatment holding appointive offices and those holding elective
to respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of exemption positions. It provides that appointive officials and
from the standard P100 million minimum income employees shall be considered ipso facto resigned
requirement, violated the equal protection clause of the from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
Constitution. candidacy, which the same does not apply to elective
ISSUE: Whether or not such exemption granted to officials.
respondent municipalities violated the equal protection
clause ISSUE/S: Whether or not it violates the equal protection
RULING: No. No deprivation of property results by virtue of clause of the Constitution.
the enactment of the cityhood laws. The conversion of a
municipality into a city will only affect its status as a RULING: No, the equal protection clause does not require
political unit. The fundamental right of equal protection the universal application of the laws to all persons
does not require absolute equality. It is enough that all or things without distinction. What it simply
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, requires is equality among equals as determined
both as to rights and privileges conferred and according to a valid classification. The test
responsibilities or obligations imposed. It does not preclude developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that
the state from recognizing and acting upon factual of reasonableness which has four requisites: (1) The
difference between individuals and classes. Equality granted classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It
is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It is not
classification. limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
MAIN POINT: A law need not operate with equal force on equally to all members of the same class.
all persons or things to be conformable with Sec. 1, Art. III of
the Constitution R. Rizon
CASE NO. 282
R. Rizon ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
CREBA vs Romulo G.R. No. 160756 March 9, 2010
CASE NO. 281
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Quinto vs COMELEC G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010 FACTS: Petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Associations, Inc.(CREBA) is questioning the
constitutionality of Section 27 (E) of Republic Act
FACTS: A petition to declare the unconstitutionality of (RA) 8424 and the revenue regulations (RRs) issued
Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to
110
 implement said provision and those involving
creditable withholding taxes and MCIT or the ISSUE/S: Whether or not it violates the equal protection
imposition of 2% tax on gross income. Petitioner
also claims that the revenue regulations are
violative of the equal protection clause because the RULING: No, Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the
CWT is being levied only on real estate enterprises
and were not similarly imposed to manufacturing
enterprise.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not it violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
RULING: No, MCIT applies to all corporations and the taxing
power has the authority to make reasonable
classifications for purposes of taxation. Inequalities
which result from a singling out of one particular
class for taxation, or exemption, infringe no
constitutional limitation. The real estate industry is,
by itself, a class and can be validly treated Rizon
differently from other business enterprises.
. Rizon
CASE NO. 283
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
NPC vs Pinatubo G.R. No. 176006 March 26, 2010
FACTS: National Power Corporation questions the decision
of the trial court declaring NPC Circular No. 99-75
which sets the guidelines in the disposal of scrap
aluminum conductor steel-reinforced and provides
that qualified bidders are only limited to
partnerships or corporations that directly use
aluminum as the raw material in producing finished
products either purely or partly out of aluminum, or
their duly appointed representatives. These bidders
may be based locally or overseas.
clause of the Constitution.
equal protection clause as these were based on a
reasonable classification intended to protect, not the
right of any business or trade but the integrity of
government property, as well as promote the
objectives of RA 7832. Limiting qualified bidders in
this case to partnerships or corporations that
directly use aluminum as the raw material in
producing finished products made purely or partly
of aluminum was an exercise of discretion by the
NPC. Unless the discretion was exercised arbitrarily
or used as a subterfuge for fraud, the Court will not
interfere with the exercise of such discretion.
CASE NO. 284
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Biraogo vs PTC G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity and
constitutionality of EO 1 dated July 30, 2010
creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010.
Petitioners contended that it violates the equal
protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and
personnel of the previous administration and does
equally apply to all members of the same class. The
OSG maintains that it does not violate the equal
protection clause as it was created for laudable
purpose.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not it violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
RULING: Yes, EO 1 should be struck down as violative of the
equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the
envisioned truth commission is to investigate and
find out the truth concerning the graft and
corruption of the previous administration. The EO 1
does not even mention any particular act, event or
report to be focused on unlike other investigation
commissions created in the past.
Rizon
CASE NO. 285
ARTICLE III, SECTION 1 EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
League vs COMELEC G.R. No. 176951 November 18,
2008
FACTS: Petitioners filed a petitioner for prohibition
assailing the assailing the constitutionality of the
subject Cityhood Laws. Congress enacted into law
Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), increasing the
annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common
provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009
was passed. Petitioners filed the present petitions to
declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of the equal protection clause.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not it violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.
RULING: Yes, the exemption provision merely states,
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 ─ The City of
111
 x x x shall be exempted from the income
requirement prescribed under Republic Act No.
9009. This one sentence exemption provision
contains no classification standards or guidelines
differentiating the exempted municipalities from
those that are not exempted. To be valid, the
classification in the present case must be based on
substantial distinctions, rationally related to a
legitimate government objective which is the
purpose of the law, not limited to existing conditions
only, and applicable to all similarly situated.
Andalahao
CASE NO. 286
Art III Section 1: Standards of Judicial Review
PAGCOR vs BIR 645 SCRA 338 GR 172087
Facts: PAGCOR, for the longest time is excluded from paying
taxes except from the franchise tax of 5% of the gross
revenue. Based on RA 9337 which ammended the National
Internal Revenue Code, 10% Value-added tax was imposed
to PAGCOR which is specifically included in BIR regulations
order as one of the franchisees subject to 10% VAT.
PAGCOR now raises the issue of constitutionality in
imposing such taxes.
Issue: W/N RA 9337 is unconstitutional for being
repugnant to the equal protection clause embodied in the
constitution
Ruling: NO. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9337, amending
Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1997, by excluding petitioner Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation from the enumeration of government-
owned and controlled corporations exempted from
corporate income tax is valid and constitutional. While BIR
Revenue Regulations insofar as it subjects PAGCOR to 10%
VAT is null and void for being contrary to the National Ruling: YES. The structures were illegally demolished.
Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by Republic Act power to enforce building code is vested in DPWH, and no
No. 9337 showing that MMDA was delegated by the agency to enforce
such power on their behalf. Instead, it merely prescribes a
Main Point: Equal protection requires that all persons or punishment of a fine or by imprisonment, or both, at the
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to discretion of the court. The ordinance itself clearly states
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar that it is the regular courts that will determine whether
subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, there was a violation of the ordinance
so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate
against others. The guarantee means that no person or class Main Point: The government may enact legislation that
of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.
circumstances. The "equal protection of the laws is a pledge However, the interference must be reasonable and not
of the protection of equal laws." It limits governmental arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or
discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to means used to protect public health, morals, safety or
artificial persons but only insofar as their property is welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.
concerned.
Andalahao
Andalahao CASE NO. 288
CASE NO. 287 Art III Section 1: Standards of Judicial Review
Art III Section 1: Standards of Judicial Review Mendoza vs People GR 183891 Oct 19, 2011
Gancayco vs Quezon City 658 SCRA 853 GR 172087
Facts: Petitioner, Romarico Mendoza seeks for the reversal
Facts: The MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice of the court's decision convicting him in violation of RA
Gancayco in violation to the the National Building Code of 8282 or the Social Security Act. The court finds that the
the Philippines in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. Due to decree of conviction was founded on proof beyond
non-compliance, the demolition proceeded. The City reasonable doubt.
Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was
a valid exercise of police power. Petitioner filed a petition However, during the pendency of the appeal, petitioner
for TRO and RTC ruled that ordinance was unconstitutional. voluntarily paid the due amount to settle his delinquency.
CA reversed the ruling and declared that ordinance was a He now then claims that in view of RA 9903 and its IRR, the
valid exercise of the right of the local government unit to settlement of his delinquent contributions entitles him to an
promote the general welfare of its constituents pursuant to acquittal
its police powers.
Issue: W/N the petitioner can benefit from the terms of RA
Issue: W/N MMDA illegally demolished the property and 9903 and invokes equal protection clause
violated the owner’s right to equal protection of laws
112
Ruling: NO. The clear intent of the law is to grant
condonation only to employers with delinquent
contributions or pending cases for their delinquencies and
who pay their delinquencies within the six (6)-month
period set by the law. Mere payment of unpaid
contributions does not suffice; it is payment within, and
only within, the six (6)-month availment period that
triggers the applicability of RA No. 9903.
By paying outside of the availment period, the petitioner
effectively placed himself outside the benevolent sphere of
RA No. 9903. This is how the law is written: it condones
employers and only those employers with unpaid SSS
contributions or with pending cases who pay within the six
(6)-month period following the laws date of effectivity
Main Point: It is an established principle of constitutional
law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is
not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1)
must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class.
Andalahao
CASE NO. 289
Art III Section 1: Standards of Judicial Review
Bureau of Customs vs Tevez GR 181704 Dec 6, 2011
Facts: R.A. No. 9335 Attrition Act of 2005 to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the (BIR)
and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) was enacted to encourage
BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their
revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives
Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and
the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of CASE NO. 290
employment status. Art III Section 1: Standards of Judicial Review
Pichay vs Office of Deputy Executive Secretary
BOCEA filed a petition against the respondents contending
that R.A. 9335 and its IRR (1) gives an undue delegation of Facts: Finance Secretary Purisima filed before the IAD-
legislative power to the Board; (2) violates the rights of ODESLA a complaint for grave misconduct against Pichay,
BOCEA’s members to: (a) equal protection of laws, (b) Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water
security of tenure and (c) due process because R.A. No. 9335 Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent
and its IRR unduly discriminates against BIR and BOC members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, due to the
employees as compared to employees of other revenue purchase by the LWUA of 445k shares of stock of Express
generating government agencies which are not subject to Savings Bank, Inc. Pichay was ordered by Executive
attrition, (2) that the assailed law because it inflicts Secretary Ochoa, Jr. to submit their respective written
punishment upon a particular group or class of officials and explanations under oath. Pichay filed a Motion to Dismiss
employees without trial. This is evident from the fact that stating that a same case is already pending before the Office
the law confers upon the Board the power to impose the of the Ombudsman.
penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their
revenue targets. This petition seeks to declare unconstitutional EO No. 13
(Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC
Issue: W/N RA 9335 violates BOCEA members’ rights to created by PGMA, EO No. 12) and Transferring Its
equal protection of laws Investigative, Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions
to the Investigatory and Adjudicatory Division, Office Of The
Ruling: NO. RA 9335 does not violate equal protection of Deputy Executive Secretary For Legal Affairs, IAD-ODESLA).
laws. Equal protection simply provides that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated in a Issue: W/N EO 13 is unconstitutional for violating the
similar manner, both as to rights conferred and guarantee of due process and equal protection clause
responsibilities imposed. Both the BIR and the BOC are
bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the Ruling: No. The equal protection of the law clause is
special function of being the instrumentalities through against undue favor and individual or class privilege. It does
which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
— taxation. Indubitably, such substantial distinction is requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
germane and intimately related to the purpose of the circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to conferred and liabilities enforced. Presidential appointees
the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the come under the direct disciplining authority of the
demands of equal protection. President. Having the power to remove and/or discipline
presidential appointees, the President has the authority to
Main Point: investigate such public officials and look into their conduct
in office.
Andalahao
113
Main Point: The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty
against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. It is embraced under the due process concept
and simply requires that, in the application of the law, “all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.”
The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but
subject to reasonable classification so that aggrupation
bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently
from each other.
Who digested: jAn
CASE NO. 291
ART III SEC 1
EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
Alvarez v. People
FACTS: This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the
Decision dated June 29, 2011 affirming the conviction of
petitioner for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Petitioner contends
that bad faith, manifest partiality and gross negligence were
not proven by the respondent. He stresses that there was
substantial compliance with the requirements of R.A. No.
7718, and while it is true that petitioner may have deviated
from some of the procedures outlined in the said law, the
essential purpose of the law – that a project proposal be
properly evaluated and that parties other than the opponent
be given opportunity to present their proposal – was
accomplished. Petitioner maintains such actions are
presumed to be regular and the burden of proving
otherwise rests on the respondent. Because all the
transactions were done by him with the authority of the
Sangguniang Bayan, petitioner argues that there can be no
dispute that he endeavored in good faith to comply with the
requirements of R.A No. 7718. Moreover, petitioner asserts
that the non-inclusion of all the other members of the
Sangguniang Bayan denied him the equal protection of the was initially confined at his quarters at Camp General
laws. Emilio Aguinaldo before he was transferred to the
Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
ISSUE: W/N the court failed to consider that the (ISAFP) Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame
Sandiganbayan disregarded the right of Mayor Alvarez to Custodial Detention Center. Hence, on September 16, 2011,
the equal protection of the laws or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of the court
martial against him, Garcia was arrested and detained and
RULING: No. It bears stressing that the offense defined continues to be detained, for 2 years, at the maximum-
under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed even security compound of the National Penitentiary in
if bad faith is not attendant. Thus, even assuming that Muntinlupa. The OP stated that Art 29 of the RPC is not
petitioner did not act in bad faith, his negligence under the applicable in Military Courts for it is separate and distinct
circumstances was not only gross but also inexcusable. from ordinary courts.
MAIN POINT: Protection of the law will be extended to all ISSUE: W/N the application of Article 29 of the Revised
persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, Penal Code in the Articles of War is in accordance with the
but no person has the right to demand protection of the law Equal Protection Clause.
in the commission of a crime.
RULING: Yes. According to a long line of decisions, equal
jAn protection simply requires that all persons or things
CASE NO. 292 similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
ART III SEC 1 conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
EQUAL PROTECTION LAW bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated
Garcia v. People individuals in a similar manner.
FACTS: Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial MAINPOINT: The concept of equal justice under the law
NR 2, was charged with and convicted of violation of the requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not
96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences
Gentleman) and violation of the 97th Article of War that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. It,
(Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) however, does not require the universal application of the
for failing to disclose all his assets in his Sworn Statement of laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as simply requires is equality among equals as determined
required by RA 3019, as amended in relation to RA 6713. according to a valid classification.
Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued
by the OP directing his two-year detention in a penitentiary Who digested: jAn
had already been fully served following his preventive CASE NO. 293
confinement subject to Article 29 of the RPC (Revised Penal ART III SEC 1
Code). He was released on December 16, 2010 after a EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
preventive confinement for six years and two months. He Arroyo v. DOJ
114
 treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
FACTS: Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001- enforced. Who digested: jAn
2011 creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact- CASE NO. 295
Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections jAn ART III SEC 1
electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The Joint Committee CASE NO. 294 EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
then reported several people, including the petitioner GMA, ART III SEC 1 Republic v. Daisy Yahon
to be subjected to the preliminary investigation for electoral EQUAL PROTECTION LAW
sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in Sto. Tomas v. Paneda FACTS: Sgt Yahon was married to respondent. A TPO has
North and South Cotabato. Petitioners claim that the been issued against Sgt Yahon to protect the respondent
creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in FACTS: Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. from further abuses. In the TPO, Sgt Yahon was ordered to
violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution (PASEI) questioned the validity of the Section 6 of RA 8042 provide reasonable financial spousal support to the
because its sole purpose is the investigation and which defines the term “illegal recruitment”. PASEI claims respondent. In his failure to appear before the court with a
prosecution of certain persons and incidents. They insist that the definition by the law is vague as it fails to counsel and with an answer to the charges against him, the
that the Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. court has granted PPO for the respondent against Sgt Yahon.
Administration as well as public officials linked to the RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI It was also reiterated that Sgt Yahon should provide for the
Arroyo Administration. and he declared the said provisions of RA 8042 as void. financial spousal support to his wife from his retirement
Secretary Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of the benefits. However, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
ISSUE: W/N the creation of the joint committee via the joint RTC judgment. Finance Center contended that half of the retirement
order is contrary to the due process and equal protection benefits of Sgt Yahon cannot be given to the respondent as it
clause of the constitution. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 6 of RA 8042 violates the right to equal is from a military institution. The petitioner contended that
protection of those that operate with government license or money due to government employees is not liable to the
RULING: No. The Joint Committee was created for authorities. creditors of the said employees in the process of
conducting preliminary investigation of election offenses garnishment.
during the 2004 and 2007 elections. While GMA and Mike RULING: No. "illegal recruitment" as defined in Section 6 is
Arroyo were among those subjected to preliminary clear and unambiguous and, contrary to the RTC’s finding, ISSUE: W/N the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon be subject
investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to makes a distinction between licensed and non-licensed to the ruling of the court to provide for the financial spousal
GMA as there were public officers who were investigated recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in support of respondent in compliance with a protection
upon in connection with their acts in the performance of "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.
their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers" without the
to the investigation by the Joint Committee. appropriate government license or authority are guilty RULING: Retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon are subject to the
of illegal recruitment whether they commit the financial spousal support of respondent. As a rule in
MAIN POINT: The equal protection guarantee exists to wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other statutory construction, when the law does not distinguish,
prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate hand, recruiters who engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. the court should not distinguish. As section 8 (g) of RA No.
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. of OFWs, although with the appropriate government license 9262 used the general term 'employer', it includes in its
Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they coverage the military institution, which is the employer of
does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that commit any of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6. Sgt Yahon.
all persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be MAIN POINT: R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not
MAIN POINT: BOLD violate the equal protection clause. The court ruled that R.A.

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No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions which justify Good faith, in relation to the requirement of refund RULING
the classification under the law: the unequal power of disallowed benefits or allowances, is "that state of mind No. the fact that the PHIC officers had an unclear
relationship between women and men; the fact that women denoting 'honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of a ruling by this Court categorically prohibiting
are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder the particular disbursement herein is a badge of good faith,
widespread bias and prejudice against women. upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking especially in light of the COA's failure to overturn the
any unconscientious advantage of another, even though presumption of regularity in the performance of their
CHAM technicalities of law, together with absence of all official duties.
Case No. 296 information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which
ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Equal Protection of the law render transactions unconscientious.” MAIN POINT
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW It is unfair to penalize public officials based on
ZCWD vs COA overly stretched and strained interpretations of rules which
CHAM were not that readily capable of being understood at the
FACTS Case No. 297 time such functionaries acted in good faith. If there is any
Genel, Audit Team Leader for ZCWD, Zamboanga ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Equal Protection of the law ambiguity, which is actually clarified years later, then it
City, issued the following Notices of Disallowance (ND) for STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW should only be applied prospectively.
ZCWD's various payments. LAO (Legal Adjudication Office) PHIC vs COA
rendered a decision upholding all the NDs in the aggregate CHAM
amount of P27,293,621.40. In the said decision, the COA FACTS Case No. 298
highlighted that the incentives should not be paid because The instant case stems from petitioner PHIC's grant ARTICLE III SECTION 1: Equal Protection of the law
ZCWD failed to prove compliance with PSLMC Resolution of several allowances to its officers and employees that STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
No. 2, particularly: (a) identifying specific cost-cutting were subsequently disallowed by respondent COA. Rama vs Moises
measures; and (b) proof that the funds for the incentives Petitioner PHIC insists that all its employees should be
were taken from savings as a result of the cost-saving treated equally, regardless of whether they rendered their FACTS
measures. service to the PHIC or to its predecessor, PMCC. It concluded Pres. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 198
that all employees must be paid their back COLA that was (Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973). By virtue of P. D. No.
ISSUE/S unduly withdrawn from them after the issuance of the DBM 198, Cebu City formed the Metro Cebu Water District
Whether or not, in the event the disbursements Circular 10, and for the entire duration that the circular was (MCWD). Thereafter, the Cities of Mandaue, Lapu-Lapu and
were improper, the petitioner is liable to refund the in legal limbo. According to petitioner, the term "functions" Talisay, and the Municipalities of Liloan, Compostela,
amounts necessarily means to include then PMCC's obligation to pay Consolacion, and Cordova turned over their waterworks
the benefits due to its employees who have been absorbed systems and services to the MCWD. Since then, the MCWD
RULING by PHIC such as the COLA that was unduly withdrawn from has distributed water and sold water services to said cities
No. Although the disbursements made by ZCWD their salaries after the issuance of DBM CCC 10. and municipalities.
may have been made without legal basis, the petitioner may
be absolved from refunding the disbursements if it is shown ISSUE/S ISSUE/S
that they were made in good faith. GRANTING THAT THE PAYMENTS WERE NOT WHETHER OR NOT THE JUDGMENT VIOLATES
PROPER, WHETHER THE PHIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES DUE PROCESS AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF
MAIN POINT CAN BE REQUIRED TO REFUND THE AMOUNTS RECEIVED. THE CONSTITUTION

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RULING
Yes. although Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 provided
for substantial distinction and was germane to the purpose
of P.D. No. 198 when it was enacted, the intervening
reclassification of the City of Cebu into an HUC(highly-
urbanized city) and the subsequent enactment of the 1991
Local Government Code rendered the continued application
of Section 3(b) in disregard of the reclassification
unreasonable and unfair. firstly, it ignored that the MCWD
was built without the participation of the provincial
government; secondly, it failed to consider that the MCWD
existed to serve the community that represents the needs of
the majority of the active water service connections; and,
thirdly, the main objective of the decree was to improve the
water service while keeping up with the needs of the
growing population.
MAIN POINT
Substantive due process "requires that the law itself,
not merely the procedures by which the law would be
enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just." 35 It demands the
intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of
the person to life, liberty or property. In short, to be
determined is whether the law has a valid governmental
objective, like the interest of the public as against that of a
particular class. The fundamental right of equal protection
of the law is not absolute, but subject to reasonable
classification. Classification, to be valid, must: (1) rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) apply equally to all members of the same class.
CHAM
Case No. 299
ARTICLE III SECTION 2: Scope of Protection
Moncada vs People’s Court
FACTS
The petitioner was accused of the crime of treason.
He alleges that he was arrested by the members of the CIC
of the United States Army at his residence. Petitioner
contended that the evidence that was illegally acquired in
his domicile cannot be used against him and was not
admissible in court as it violated his constitutional rights.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the seizure of documents were
unconstitutional
RULING
YES. The SC concurred with the appellant's claim
tha he had the right to have his house respected, his
documents should not be confiscated by any authority or
agent of authority, without a writ of registration duly
issued. HOWEVER,
These constitutional limitations, however, do not go so far
as to exclude as evidence the documents obtained illegally
or unduly. The Rules of the Courts, Rule 123, determines
which are the evidence that should be excluded, which are
the admissible and competent, and does not classify as
incompetent evidence those obtained illegally.
MAIN POINT
The means used in the acquisition of the document
does not alter its probative value. There is no constitutional
or legal provision that frees the accused of all criminal
liability because there was no search warrant. The public
vindicta demands that offenders of the penal law be
punished. Releasing the blame for the simple fact that the
evidence against him has not been obtained legally is
sanctioning the crime judicially.
CHAM
Case No. 300
ARTICLE III SECTION 2: Scope of Protection
Stonehill vs Diokno
FACTS
Several judges issued a total of 42 search warrants
against petitioners directed to the any peace officer, to
search the persons above-named and/or the premises of
their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize
and take possession of properties as "the subject of the
offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the adverted to above as "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners argued that
items not under the seize list were seized. An injunction was
partially granted. Thus, the documents, papers, and things
seized are those found and seized in the offices of the
aforementioned corporations, and those found and seized in
the residences of petitioners herein.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the said act violated equal
protection of the law
RULING
No. Petitioners herein may not validly object to the
use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively
to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity.
MAIN POINT
It is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed
of by third parties. Clauses of the constitutional proscription
on illegal searches and seizures do not withhold the mantle
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of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or the one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the
nature. agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the Constitution.
NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected
PASTOR by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure ISSUE: Whether or not the check is inadmissible as evidence
Case No. 301 proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look violating constitutional rights if privacy of communication
Art III Sec 2: Scope of the Protection at that which is in plain sight is not a search. and against unreasonable searches and seizures.
People vs. Marti
193 SCRA 57; GR 81561, January 18, 1991 MAIN POINT: The constitutional proscription against RULING: NO.
unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a The Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from
FACTS: On August 14, 1987, Andre Marti and his common- restraint directed only against the government and its unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private
law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging and agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not individuals. It clearly appears however that Catolico’s
Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. dismissal was based on hearsay information which carried
It was received by Anita Reyes and asked if she could no probative value. Catolico’s dismissal then was obviously
inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually PASTOR grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an
convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for Case No. 302 employee’s dismissal.
shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, Art III Sec 2: Scope of the Protection
husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier Waterous Drug Corp. vs. NLRC MAIN POINT: The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against
company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of 280 SCRA 735; GR 113271, Oct. 16, 1997 acts of private individuals, being directed only against the
standard operating procedures. Upon opening the package, government and its law-enforcement agencies as a
he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample FACTS: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist limitation on official action.
of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI by Waterous Drug Corp. She allegedly received a check
and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the amounting to P640 representing as payment for the PASTOR
presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious overpriced purchase order she made to YSP, Inc., a supplier Case No. 303
package and found dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case of medicine. Said check was sent in an envelope addressed Art III Sec 2: Scope of the Protection
was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and to Catolico. Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. People vs. Mendoza
was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in confirmed that she saw an open envelope with a check 301 SCRA 66; GR 109279-80, Jan. 18, 1999
the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right of amounting P640 payable to Catolico. Waterous Drug Corp.
privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from ordered the termination of Catolico for acts of dishonesty. FACTS: Accused-appellant Octavio Mendoza allegedly shot
his package was inadmissible as evidence against him. Catolico insist that she only received a token gift from YSP, his wife Cecilia Eusebio Mendoza which resulted to the
Inc. and argued that Saldana invaded her privacy when the latter’s death. The trial court, upon the testimony of their
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence obtained run against she opened an enveloped addressed to herself. Labor sole child, Charmaine Mendoza, who was present during the
Marti's constitutional rights against unreasonable search Arbiter and NLRC opposed the termination but rather alleged shooting incident, found the accused guilty beyond
and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. enforced separation with pay. It found that petitioner’s reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide. Cecilia’s father,
III, Constitution) and therefore inadmissible in evidence. evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by Alipio Eusebio, having been informed of his daughter’s
YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw death, decided to remove pieces of property in the victim’s
RULING: NO. when the latter opened the envelope. But NLRC also house including the accused’s personal effects which
It will be recalled that Mr. Job Reyes, Anita’s husband, declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence included a Mission Order No. 86-580-893 that authorized
proprietor of the courier and a private individual, was the accused to carry a Colt Revolver, .38 caliber. As a result,

118
accused-appellant claims that these documents which was Nothing was found after the body search. But when a motorcar in a residential district, followed and stopped
relied s evidence were illegally procured in grave violation requested by the security, the accused opened his the car, arrested petitioner and another man who were in it,
of his constitutional right to privacy of communication and Samsonite suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic searched the car, and found and seized cartons containing
papers, and/or his right against unreasonable search and packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the radios stolen from an interstate shipment. At petitioner's
seizure. substance to be "shabu," the security personnel trial for unlawfully possessing radios stolen from an
immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and interstate shipment, his timely motion to suppress the
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant’s constitutional took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its evidence so seized was overruled and he was convicted.
right to privacy of communication was violated by the contents. Accused was convicted of violation of Dangerous Petitioner was convicted of unlawfully possessing three
seizure of his personal effects by the Father of the victim. Drugs Act. cartons of radios valued at more than $100 which had been
stolen from the said interstate shipment.
RULING: NO. ISSUE: Whether or not when the Samsonite suitcase was
Such right applies as a restraint directed only against the allegedly opened forcibly and searched without his consent ISSUE: Whether or not there was probable cause for the
government and its agencies. In the instant case, the is a violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable arrest leading to the search that produced the evidence on
memorandum receipt and mission order were discovered search and seizure. which the conviction rests
by accused-appellant’s father-in-law Alipio Eusebio, a
private citizen. Certainly, a search warrant is dispensable. RULING: NO. Held: NO.
In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant On the record in this case, the officers did not have probable
MAIN POINT: The constitutional protection against was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only cause for the arrest when they stopped the car; the search
unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity after they found “shabu” inside the suitcase that they called was illegal; the articles seized were not admissible in
of one’s person from interference by government and it the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and evidence; and the conviction is reversed.
cannot be extended to acts committed by private seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was
individuals. therefore carried out without government intervention, and MAIN POINT:
hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring: The statute states the
PASTOR search and seizure does not apply. constitutional standard, for it is the command of the Fourth
Case No. 304 Amendment that no warrants for either searches or arrests
Art III Sec 2: Scope of the Protection MAIN POINT: The vessel security officer in the case at bar is shall issue except "upon probable cause, supported by oath
People vs. Bongcarawan a private employee and does not discharge any or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
GR 143944, July 11, 2002 governmental function. searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

FACTS: On March 11, 1999, the accused boarded M/V Super
Ferry 5, sailing from Manila to Iligan City. At about 3:00 a.m.
on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port
of Iligan City when its security officer, Mark Diesmo,
received a complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about a
missing jewelry. Diesmo and four (4) other members of the
vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the
suspect whom they later found at the economy section. The
suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan.
PASTOR MR. JUSTICE CLARK, Chief Justice, dissenting: In my view,
Case No. 305 the time at which the agents were required to have
Art III Sec 2: Scope of the Protection reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner was
Henry vs. US committing a felony was when they began the search of the
361 US 98 automobile, which was after they had seen the cartons with
interstate labels in the car. The earlier events certainly
FACTS: Without a warrant for search or arrest, federal disclosed ample grounds to justify the following of the car,
officers who were investigating a theft from an interstate the subsequent stopping thereof, and the questioning of
shipment of whiskey twice observed cartons being placed in petitioner by the agents. This interrogation, together with

119
the sighting of the cartons and the labels, gave the agents FACTS: As a result of the entrapment operation conducted
indisputable probable cause for the search and arrest. by the PNP at Jaguar KTV Bar, a criminal complaint for
violation of RA 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act
AIMAR was filed against petitioners. In defense, petitioner denied
CASE NO. 306 ownership of Jaguar but six (6) women - who all worked at
ART. III, SEC. 2: Requisites for a valid warrant – Jaguar as GROs (AAA Group) - executed affidavits
Probable Cause - Arrest identifying petitioners as Jaguar's owners. The OCP found
Webb vs. De Leon probable cause and ordered the indictment of petitioners.
When the RTC reversed the decision, the CA found that the
FACTS: The NBI filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
charging petitioners with the crime of Rape with Homicide. case for lack of probable cause.
Petitioners then filed a complaint against respondent Judge
who issued warrants of arrest against them without ISSUE: WON the CA erred in finding grave abuse of
conducting the required preliminary examination. discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing the criminal
case against petitioners for lack of probable cause
ISSUE: WON respondent gravely abused their discretion
when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination RULING: No. The evidence presented does not reveal the
before issuing warrants of arrest against them. unmistakable and clear-cut absence of probable cause
against petitioners. Instead, a punctilious examination
RULING: No. Section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that thereof shows that the prosecution was able to establish a
“upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may prima facie case against petitioners for violation of RA 9208.
issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.” Clearly, our
laws reject the contention of petitioners that respondent MAINPOINT: Judicial determination of probable cause
judges should have conducted “preliminary investigation” refers to the prerogative of the judge to ascertain if a
before issuing warrants of arrest against them. warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. A
judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only
MAINPOINT: In arrest cases, there must be probable cause in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails
that a crime has been committed and that the person to be to establish probable cause - that is when the records
arrested committed it. Before issuing warrants of arrest, the readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts
judges merely determine personally the probability, not the which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of
certainty of guilt, of an accused. the crime charged.
AIMAR
AIMAR CASE NO. 308
CASE NO. 307 ART. III, SEC. 2: Requisites for a valid warrant –Probable
ART. III, SEC. 2: Requisites for a valid warrant – Cause- For Search
Probable Cause - Arrest People vs. Sy Juco
Young vs. People
FACTS: The crime alleged against respondent is fraud of
revenue against the Government. Pursuant to a search
warrant issued, the officers searched the building occupied
by Santiago Sy Juco. The validity of a search warrant is
questioned for it is based upon affidavits which contained
the statement of "It has been reported to us by a person
whom I considered reliable that in said premises are
fraudulent books, correspondence and records.”
ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid
RULING: No. It is not stated in the affidavit that the books,
documents or records are being used used in the
commission of fraud against the Government, and,
notwithstanding the lack of such allegation; the warrant
avers that they are actually being used for such purpose
MAINPOINT: The true test of the sufficiency of an affidavit
to warrant the issuance of a search warrant is whether it
has been drawn in such a manner that untruthfulness could
be charged thereon in case the allegations contained therein
prove false.
AIMAR
CASE NO. 309
ART. III, SEC. 2: Requisites for a valid warrant –
Probable Cause-For Search
Alvarez vs. CFI
FACTS: Petitioner asks that the warrant issued by Judge
Gutierrez ordering the search and seizure of certain
accounting documents be declared illegal. He contends that
Agent Almeda has no personal knowledge of the facts and
that he got it only from a reliable source which was served
as the basis for the issuance of the warrant, and that the
articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who
issued the search warrant.
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 ISSUE: WON such allegation if sufficient to establish from verified sources" that the holders are not licensed
ISSUE: WON the requirements to find probable cause was probable cause to possess.
sufficiently made by the judge 2. Yes. The rule is, that a description of a place to be
RULING: No. The reason for the seizure must be well stated, searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can,
RULING: NO. The affidavit in this case, was insufficient as well as the specifications and the particularities of the with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place
because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but alleged subverssive material that the petitioner has intended. The search warrant itself described the place
merely hearsay. The judge who issued the search warrant published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization to be searched
relied exclusively upon the affidavit and he did not require will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement is a mere 3. Yes. the application for search warrant was captioned:
nor take the deposition of any other witness. The provisions conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of "For Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
of the constitution require that there be not only probable probable cause. The warrant is constitutionally Firearms, etc.) the term "etc." referred to ammunitions
cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the objectionable because they are in the nature of general and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was
search warrant must be based upon an application warrants. issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of
supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the search
may produce. MAINPOINT: Probable cause for a search is defined as such warrant to mention the particular provision does not
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably render the warrant invalid.
MAINPOINT: When the affidavit of the applicant of the discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has MP: Essential reqs of a valid warrant Bernas page 41
complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal and been committed and that the objects sought in connection CASE NO. 312
direct knowledge, it is sufficient the judge is satisfied that with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. ART 3, SEC 2: Requisite of a Valid Warrant: For Search
there existed probable cause; but when the applicant's United States v Jones
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one CASE NO. 311 FACTS: The case concerned Antoine Jones, who was the
or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact ART 3, SEC 2: Requisite of a Valid Warrant: For Search owner of a Washington nightclub when the police came to
is necessary. Prudente v Dayrit suspect him of being part of a cocaine-selling operation.
FACTS: Police officers applied for a search warrant which They placed a tracking device on his Jeep Grand
AIMAR was subsequently issued by respondent judge Dayrit that Cherokeewithout a valid warrant, tracked his movements
CASE NO. 310 Petitioner Prundente (PUP) is found in violated of PD No. for 28 days and used the evidence they gathered to convict
ART. III, SEC. 2: Requisites for a valid warrant –Probable 1866 Petitioner assailed the validity of the search warrant him of conspiring to sell cocaine. He was sentenced to life in
Cause- For Search ISSUE: prison.
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff 1. WON the search warrant is valid on the ground that it is ISSUE: WON the FBI violated Jones’ rights
based on hearsay evidence RULING: Yes. The Government’s attachment of the GPS
FACTS: A search warrants for the newspaper WE Forum 2. WON the search warrant is valid on the ground that it device to the vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor
were issued on the basis of a broad statement of the military failed to particularly describe the place & there were the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a search under
that Burgos, Jr. “ is in possession of has in his control several rooms the Fourth Amendment which states that “right of the
printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news 3. WON search warrant is valid on the ground that it people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
publications and other documents which are used and are violated the rule that it can be issued only with one effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Here,
all continuously being used as a means of committing the specific offense. the Government’s physical interference on an “effect” for
offense of subversion.” RULING: the purpose of obtaining information constitutes a “search.”
1. Yes. The police authorities had conducted continuous Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court: The
surveillance for several days and "gathered information Government physically occupied private property for the

121
purpose of obtaining information
MP: “right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures.”
CASE NO. 313
ART 3, SEC 2: Requisite of a Valid Warrant:
Who determines probable cause
People v CA
FACTS: The case is about the fatal shooting of Petitioner
Dy’s Mother at pointblank range by private respondent
Jonathan Cerbo in the presence and at the office of his
father, private respondent Billy Cerbo. After an information
for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo, petitioner Dy,
daughter of the victim Rosalinda Dy, executed an affidavit-
complaint charging private respondent Billy Cerbo of
conspiracy in the killing. The prosecution filed a murder
case including Billy Cerbo. The latter filed a motion to quash
warrant of arrest arguing that the same was issued without
probable cause
ISSUE: WON CA committed GAD in finding probable cause
against cerbo
RULING: Yes. The determination of probable cause
during a preliminary investigation is a function that
belongs to the public prosecutor. It is
an executive function. Whether there is reasonable ground
to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged
and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes
upon. The determination of probable cause to hold a
person for trial must be distinguished from the
determination of probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest, which is judicial function. The judge, on the other
hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a
necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice. The judge must decide
independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence,
other than the prosecutor’s bare report. The
determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is
for the purpose different from that made by the judge.
MP BOLD.
CASE NO. 314
ART 3, SEC 2: Requisite of a Valid Warrant:
kinds of evidence needed to establish probable cause
Micrososft Corp. v Maxicorp
FACTS: NBI agent Samiano filed several applications for
search warrant in the RTC against Maxicorp for alleged
violations of Sec. 29 of Intellectual Property and Art 189 of
the RPC(unfair competition). Maxicorp filed a motion to
quash the search warrants alleging that there was no
probable cause for its issuance and the warrants are general
warrants. RTC found probable cause after examining NBI
agent Saiano, Sacriz and comp. technician Pante. The three
testified on what they discovered during visits to Maxicorp.
The CA held that NBI Agent Samiano failed to present
conclusive evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the
counterfeit products. The CA pointed out that the NBI Agent
Samiano presented as evidence that he bought the products
from Maxicorp was in the name of Joel Diaz.
ISSUE: WON there was probable cause to issue search
warrant
RULING: Yes. probable cause for a search warrant
requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and the objects sought in connection
with that offense are in the place to be searched. The
judge determining probable cause must do so only after
personally examining under oath the complainant and his
witnesses. The oath required must refer to the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause.
MP: The applicant must have personal knowledge of the
circumstances. Reliable information is insufficient. Mere
affidavits are not enough, and the judge must depose in
writing the complainant and his witnesses.
CASE NO. 315
ART 3, SEC 2: Requisite of a Valid Warrant: Probable
cause
In general
Nala v Barroso
FACTS: SPO3 Alcosar applied for the issuance of a warrant
to search the person and residence of petitioner Nala, for
violating Illegal Possession of Firearms. Petitioner filed an
Omnibus Motion seeking to quash Search and Seizure
Warrant. Respondent judge denied the Omnibus Motion to
Quash but ordered the return of the air rifle to petitioner. As
to the validity of the search warrant, respondent found that
probable cause was duly established from the deposition
and examination of witness Ruel Nalagon and the testimony
of PO3 Macrino L. Alcoser who personally conducted a
surveillance to confirm the information given by Nalagon.
ISSUE: WON there is probable cause for the issuing a
warrant
Ruling: No. the search & seizure warrant is void for lack of
probable cause. While Alcoser testified before the
respondent judge that the firearms in the possession of
petitioner are not licensed, this does not qualify as
"personal knowledge" but only "personal belief" because
neither he nor Nalagon verified or secured, a certification
from the that petitioner was not licensed to possess a
firearm. The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant
has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. This probable cause must be
shown to be within the personal knowledge of the
complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not
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based on mere hearsay.In determining the existence of RULING: Yes. In the case at bar, the search and seizure
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, the warrant was issued in connection with the offense of illegal
examining magistrate must make probing and possession of firearms, the elements of which are: (1) the
exhaustive, not merely routine or pro existence of the subject firearm; and (2) the fact that the
forma examination of the applicant and the witnesses. accused who owned or possessed it does not have the
MP BOLD license or permit to possess the same. Probable cause as
E.C. Perez applied to illegal possession of firearms would therefore be
CASE NO. 316 such facts and circumstances which would lead a
ART. III, SEC. 2: REQUISITES FOR A VALID WARRANT reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that a
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR SEARCH; person is in possession of a firearm and that he does not
IN GENERAL have the license or permit to possess the same. Nowhere,
Betoy v. Judge however, in the affidavit and testimony of the witness nor in
the application for the issuance of a search warrant was it
FACTS: A Letter-Complaint signed by Petitioner Bernardo mentioned that petitioner had no license to possess a
Betoy, Sr. charges Respondent Judge with Dereliction of firearm. While the witness testified before the
Duty in an illegal possession of firearm case. Petitioner respondent judge that the firearms in the possession of
alleged that the Search & Seizure Order by the respondent petitioner are not licensed, this does not qualify as
was issued solely relying on the mere affidavits of "personal knowledge" but only "personal belief"
deponents police officers which should be considered because the witness neither verified, much more
hearsay and no information personally known to the secured, a certification from the appropriate
respondent Judge as required by settled jurisprudence government agency that petitioner was not licensed to
through examination with probing and exhaustive possess a firearm.
questions of witnesses in order to determine probable
cause. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
submitted to the Court a Memorandum wherein it found
that respondent Judge was able to establish probable cause
for the issuance of the questioned search warrant; however, E.C. Perez
respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for CASE NO. 317
having failed to conduct a judicial inquiry as to the ART. III, SEC. 2: REQUISITES FOR A VALID WARRANT
whereabouts of the seized firearms and ammunitions, in PROBABLE CAUSE FOR SEARCH;
violation of Section 12(b), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of IN GENERAL
Criminal Procedure. 20th Century Fox v. CA
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge failed to FACTS: In a letter-complaint petitioner 20th Century Fox
thoroughly examine in a manner that would sufficiently Film Corporation through counsel sought the NBI’s
establish the existence of a probable cause to justify the assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in
issuance of a search warrant. connection with the latter's anti-film piracy campaign. The
NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets
pinpointed by the petitioner and filed 3 applications for
search warrants against the video outlets owned by the
private respondents. The applications were consolidated
and heard by the RTC which issued the desired search
warrants. Armed with the search warrants, the NBI
accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video
outlets and seized the items described therein. An inventory
of the items seized was made and left with the private
respondents. However, a motion was filed by private
respondents to lift the 3 search warrants issued earlier and
the same was granted by the RTC. Subsequently, RTC denied
the MR filed by the petitioner. The petitioner then filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA to annul the ruling of the
RTC. CA dismissed. Hence, this petition. Petitioner
maintains that the RTC issued the questioned search
warrants after finding the existence of a probable cause
justifying their issuance and that the RTC arrived at this
conclusion on the basis of the depositions of applicant NBI's
two witnesses which were taken through searching
questions and answers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrants were valid.
RULING: No. In the instant case, the RTC lifted the three
questioned search warrants against the private respondents
in the absence of probable cause, on the ground that it acted
on the application for the issuance of the said search
warrants and granted it on the misrepresentations of
applicant NBI and its witnesses that infringement of
copyright or a piracy of a particular film have been
committed. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
protects a citizen against wanton and unreasonable
invasion of his privacy and liberty as to his person,
papers and effects. The Court has explained in previous
cases why this right is important: it is deference to one's
personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could
be also looked upon as a recognition of a
constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home,
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but not necessarily thereto confined. What is sought to 20th Century Fox was not yet promulgated hence the 20th violation of RA 3019Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On June 4, 2014,
be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is Century Fox ruling cannot be retroactively applied to justify the Ombudsman issued a Joint Order denying, among
allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, the quashal of Search Warrant. Petitioners' consistent others, the MR filed by petitioners. This led to the filing of
his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice position that the search warrant was properly issued, the 4 petitions before this Court, docketed as, commonly
of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of there having been satisfactory compliance with the then assailing the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the June
objects he wants around him. prevailing standards under the law for determination of 4, 2014 Joint Order of the OMB. A total of 16 Informations
probable cause, is indeed well taken. The lower court were filed by the the OMB before the Sandiganbayan,
MAIN POINT IN BOLD. could not possibly have expected more evidence from charging, Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis with one (1)
petitioners in their application for a search warrant count of Plunder; and Reyes, Janet Napoles, the Napoles
E.C. Perez other than what the law and jurisprudence, then siblings, and De Asis with fifteen (15) counts of violation of
CASE NO. 318 existing and judicially accepted, required with respect Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Resolving the Criminal Case,
ART. III, SEC. 2: REQUISITES FOR A VALID WARRANT to the finding of probable cause. The instant case also "along with several other related cases," the Sandiganbayan
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR SEARCH; differs from 20th Century Fox in that what herein private issued a Resolution finding probable cause for the issuance
IN GENERAL respondent put in issue was the application of the ruling in of warrants of arrest against "all the accused.”
Columbia Pictures v. CA that case, not the conduct of the Judge in the issuance of the
Search Warrant. From the records, it is clear that the Judge ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its
FACTS: In 1986, the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB) observed all the requirements necessary before the search discretion in this case in finding probable cause.
applied for a warrant against Jose Jinco (Jingco), owner of warrant was issued: he heard the testimonies and studied
Showtime Enterprises for allegedly pirating movies the despositions of the witnesses for the petitioners on the RULING: No. The Court finds that the Ombudsman did not
produced and owned by Columbia Pictures and other existence of probable cause before issuing the warrant. gravely abuse its discretion. In assessing if the Ombudsman
motion picture companies. Jingco filed a motion to quash had committed grave abuse of discretion, attention must be
the search warrant but the same was denied in 1987. MAIN POINT IN BOLD. drawn to the context of its ruling—that, is: preliminary
Subsequently, Jinco filed an Urgent Motion to Lift the Search investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering
Warrant and Return the Articles Seized. In 1989, the RTC E.C. Perez whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a
judge granted the motion. The judge ruled based on the CASE NO. 319 crime has been committed and that the person charged
ruling in the 1988 case of 20th Century Fox Film ART. III, SEC. 2: REQUISITES FOR A VALID WARRANT should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on
Corporation v. CA. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR SEARCH; opinion and belief, "a finding of probable cause does not
IN GENERAL require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence
ISSUE: Whether the 20th Century Fox decision promulgated Reyes v. Ombudsman to secure a conviction." Probable cause does not mean
on August 19, 1988 is applicable to the Motion to Quash 'actual or positive cause nor does it import absolute
Search Warrant. FACTS: Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
their respective participations in the anomalous Priority belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry
RULING: No. In the recent Columbia Pictures, et al. v. Court Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, involving, as whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
of Appeals, et al. the case which resolved the same issue reported by whistleblowers the illegal utilization and conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
involving the same petitioners but with different pillaging of public funds sourced from the PDAF of Senator omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
respondents, the Court en banc held that mindful as it is of Juan Ponce Enrile. On March 28, 2014, the Ombudsman In Estrada v. Ombudsman, the Court declared that since a
the ramifications of the doctrine of stare decisis and the (OMB) issued a 144-joint resolution finding probable cause preliminary investigation does not finally adjudicate the
rudiments of fair play, In 1986, obviously the 1988 case of against petitioners on 1 count of Plunder and 15 counts of rights and obligations of parties, "probable cause can be

124
established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is come out with the warrant. The issuance of a warrant is recommendation of no bail. Petitioners filed a verified
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise petition for change of venue from the RTC-Masbate to the
of judicial discretion on the part of issuing magistrate. RTC-Makati. The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided
MAIN POINT IN BOLD. Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge by respondent Judge Felix. Petitioners filed with the
must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause respondent court several motions and manifestations,
E.C. Perez before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the among others was an order be issued requiring the
CASE NO. 320 information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary
ART. III, SEC. 2: REQUISITES FOR A VALID WARRANT disregard the fiscal’s certification and require submission of investigation for the best enlightenment in its personal
FOR SEARCH; the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at the determination of the existence of a probable cause.
PERSONALLY DETERMINED BY THE JUDGE conclusion as to existence of probable cause. Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit
Placer v. Villanueva the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of
MAIN POINT: Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.
FACTS: Petitioners, The City Fiscal of Butuan City and his — The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
assistants filed Informations in the City Court of Butuan. houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches ISSUE: WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without
These Informations were certified by the respective and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and
investigating Fiscals. Upon receipt of said Informations, be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest recommendation that a probable cause exists.
respondent Judge set the hearing of the criminal cases to shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
determine propriety of issuance of warrants of arrest. After personally by the judge after examination under oath or HELD: No. If a Judge relies solely on the certification of
the hearing, respondent Judge issued an order requiring affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of
petitioners to submit to the court affidavits of prosecution produce, and particularly describing the place to be the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not
witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of searched and the persons or things to be seized. personally determined probable cause. The
the Informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of AR determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The
judicial review of the findings of probable cause by CASE NO. 321 constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. What the
petitioners. A petition for certiorari with mandamus to ART III SEC 2: REQUISITES FOR A VALID WARRANT Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
compel respondent Judge to issue warrants of arrest was PERSONALLY DETERMINED BY THE JUDGE responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
filed by the petitioners as they contended that the fiscal’s Lim vs. Judge Fenix existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not
certification in the Informations of the existence of probable required to personally examine the complainant and his
cause constitutes sufficient justification for the Judge to witnesses. Following established doctrine, he shall: (1)
issue warrants of arrest. FACTS: Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security personally evaluate the report and the supporting
escorts were attacked and killed by a lone assassin documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence
ISSUE: Whether the certification of the investigating fiscal somewhere in the Masbate Domestic Airport road. Dante of probable cause, or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no
in the information as to the existence of probable cause Siblante, a security escort, survived the assassination plot. probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
obligates respondent City Judge to issue a warrant of arrest. For the crime of multiple murder and frustrated require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
murder, one of the accused is herein petitioner Vicente Lim, to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
RULING: No. Petition dismissed. The Judge may rely upon Sr. The RTC of Masbate concluded that a probable cause has probable cause. Mere Prosecutor's certification of probable
the fiscal’s certification for the existence of probable been established for the issuance of warrants of arrest. cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the
cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of Fiscal Alfane filed with the RTC-Masbate, 4 separate transcripts of stenographic notes and all other supporting
arrest. But, such certification does not bind the judge to informations of murder against the 12 accused with a

125
documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are make the determination of probable cause. The Judge does said respondent the records of preliminary investigation of
material in assisting the Judge to make his determination. not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. The the above criminal cases for purposes of determining a
determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is probable cause.
AR made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper-
CASE NO. 322 whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that HELD: Yes. When the COMELEC, through its duly authorized
ART III SEC 2: REQUISITES FOR A VALID WARRANT the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an
PERSONALLY DETERMINED BY THE JUDGE whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable
People vs. Inting rigors and embarrassment of trial is the function of the cause, files the information in the proper court, said court
Prosecutor.AR thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. The records of
FACTS: Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against CASE NO. 323 the preliminary investigation required to be produced by
OIC-Mayor Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the ART III SEC 2: REQUISITES FOR A VALID WARRANT the court must be submitted by the COMELEC. The trial
COMELEC for allegedly transferring her, a permanent PERSONALLY DETERMINED BY THE JUDGE court may rely on the resolution of the COMELEC to file
Nursing Attendant, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a People vs. Delgado the information, by the same token that it may rely on
very remote barangay and without obtaining prior the certification made by the prosecutor who conducted
permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law. the preliminary investigation, in the issuance of the
After a preliminary investigation of Barba’s complaint, FACTS: COMELEC received a report-complaint from the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless the court may require
Provincial Election Supervisor Atty. Lituanas found a prima Election Registrar of Toledo City against private that the record of the preliminary investigation be
facie case. He filed with the respondent RTC-Dumaguete respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is probable
City a criminal case for violation of section 261 of the Code. The COMELEC directed the Provincial Election cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of
Omnibus Election Code. The respondent court issued a Supervisor of Cebu to conduct the preliminary investigation arrest. The refusal of the COMELEC to comply with the
warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor. However, of the case who eventually recommended the filing of an order of the trial court on the ground that only this Supreme
before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set information against each of the private respondents. The Court may review its actions is untenable.
aside its order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not COMELEC en banc resolved to file the information against
authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section the private respondents as recommended. Private AR
2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court later on respondents filed MRs and the suspension of the warrant of CASE NO. 324
quashed the information. Hence, this petition. arrest with the respondent court on the ground that no ART III SEC 2: REQUISITES FOR A VALID WARRANT
preliminary investigation was conducted. Later, an order PERSONALLY DETERMINED BY THE JUDGE
ISSUE: WON the COMELEC through its Provincial Election was issued by respondent court directing the COMELEC Allado vs. Diokno
Supervisor lacks jurisdiction to determine the existence of through the Regional Election Director of Region VII to
probable cause in an election offense which it seeks to conduct a reinvestigation of said cases. The COMELEC
prosecute in court. Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and FACTS: Petitioners, Allado and Mendoza, were both
opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein implicated as the masterminds of the kidnapping and
RULING: Yes. The determination of probable cause is a that it is only the Supreme Court that may review the murder of Eugen Alexander Van Twist. An information for
function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the COMELEC. the said crime was filed against the petitioners primarily on
or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to This was denied by the court. the strength of a sworn statement by Escolastico Umbal,
ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this who admitted that he was among those who kidnapped and
determination. The preliminary inquiry made by a ISSUE: WON the respondent Court has the power or killed the victim upon the orders of the petitioners.
Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to authority to order the Comelec Law Department to furnish Thereafter, respondent judge, Roberto C. Diokno, ordered

126
the arrest of the petitioners and no bail was recommended.
Petitioners, contending that their arrests was effected
whimsically as there is no probable cause, questioned their
arrests. They further contend that the judge did not
personally determine the admissibility and sufficiency of
the evidence where the investigation was based from.
ISSUE: WON the respondent Judge committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest of petitioners
because he did not personally examine the evidence nor did
he call for the complainant and his witnesses.
RULING: Yes. Respondent judge merely relied on the
certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed.
For, otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence
thus far presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the
arrest of petitioners. Probable cause may not be established
simply by showing that a trial judge subjectively believes
that he has good grounds for his action. In the instant case
that the prosecutors have similarly misappropriated, if not
abused, their discretion. If they really believed that
petitioners were probably guilty, they should have armed
themselves with facts and circumstances in support of that
belief; for mere belief is not enough. They should have
presented sufficient and credible evidence to demonstrate
the existence of probable cause.
AR
CASE NO. 325
ART III SEC 2: REQUISITES FOR A VALID WARRANT
PERSONALLY DETERMINED BY THE JUDGE
Gozos vs. Tac-an
FACTS: A shooting incident happened during a school party
in Conception Aguila Memorial College in Batangas. Several
drunk men were trying to force their way through the
school’s main gate. One of them was Dyogi, who was armed
with a handgun. Herein private respondents, who are
members of the PNP, arrived and demanded from Dyogi to
surrender his gun and go with them to the station. Later on,
the two were grappling for possession of the
gun. Apparently, Blanco fired at Gilbert Dyogi twice. Varez,
Investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman, charged
private respondents with murder in an information filed
with the RTC-Batangas. Private respondents prayed that the
Court first determine WON there is probable cause before
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner Edna Dyogi
opposed the motion. Respondent Judge Tac-an heard the
parties and concluded that there is probable cause to hold
the accused to stand trial for Homicide. Petitioner Dyogi
moved for a reconsideration, arguing that the crime
committed was murder, and that there was probable cause.
Respondent judge partially reconsidered his order but
maintained the finding of probable cause for homicide.
Petitioner filed another MR, contending that the power to
determine the nature of the offense to be charged was
vested in the Provincial Prosecutor and not in the
RTC. However, petitioners motion was denied.
ISSUE: WON the Respondent Judge committed grave abuse
of discretion in conducting another preliminary
investigation in a proceeding to determine probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
HELD: Yes. While the power of an investigator of the Office
of the Ombudsman for the Military is undoubted, no similar
authority is vested in judges of Regional Trial Courts as they
are not among those authorized to conduct preliminary
investigations. In this case, respondent judge conducted an
inquiry, not only for the purpose of determining whether
there was probable cause to order the arrest of private
respondents but for the purpose of determining whether
there was sufficient evidence to prosecute them as well. He
did not only determine the existence of probable cause for
the issuance of warrants of arrest, but also what the charge
should be and who should be charged. In so doing,
respondent judge exceeded his authority. Article III
Section 2 applies to the issuance of arrest and search
warrants, which should be distinguished from a
preliminary investigation. The determination of
probable cause for the issuance of such orders is vested
in the courts, but the conduct of preliminary
investigations is entrusted to the executive branch.
CASE NO. 326
ARTICLE III, SEC 2: 3. Requisite for a Valid Warrant
B. Personally Determined by the Judge
Flores vs. Sumaljag
Facts: Petitioners, et.al are members of the Sangguniang
Pambarangay in Leyte, and were charged with three counts
of falsification of public document as defined in Art. 171, of
the RPC. On November 25, 1996, respondent judge
conducted a preliminary examination, during which the
complainant, Gualberto Parmis, and his witness, Diego Cala,
Jr., testified in each of the criminal cases. Thereafter,
respondent judge ordered the arrest of herein
complainants. By virtue of warrants of arrest, the herein
complainants were arrested and detained. They were later
released on bail.
The complainants later instituted an administrative
case against respondent judge upon which they raised
claims and one of them is that there was no cause under the
law to arrest them as the possibility of fleeing to escape the
hands of justice is remote as they are barangay officials.
Issue: W/N the arrest of complainants ordered by
respondent was without justification of doing so in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice?
Held: Yes. What differentiates the present rule from the
previous one before the 1985 revision of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure is that while before, it was mandatory
for the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the
arrest of the accused if he found probable cause, the
rule now is that the investigating judges power to order
the arrest of the accused is limited to instances in which
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there is a necessity for placing him in custody in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice. The arrest of the
accused can be ordered only in the event the prosecutor
files the case and the judge of the Regional Trial Court finds
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
It is entirely new rule, and it is plain to see that it is not
obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating
judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, even
after having personally examined the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers,
for the determination of whether a probable cause exists
and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound
judgment or discretion.
Accordingly, in Mantaring v. Roman,[7] we reprimanded
a judge in a preliminary investigation for issuing a warrant
without any finding that it was necessary to place the
accused in immediate custody in order to prevent a
frustration of justice. In this case, it appears that respondent
ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest solely on his
finding of probable cause, totally omitting to consider
whether it was necessary to do so in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice
MP in Bold
CASE NO. 327
ARTICLE III, SEC 2: 3. Requisite for a Valid Warrant
C. Personal Examination
Bache & Co v Ruiz
Facts: On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal
Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting the
issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for
violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73,
208 and209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner de Leon
make and file the application for search warrant which was
attached to the letter. The next day, de Leon and his
witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant.
At that time J Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means
of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the
depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had
adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the depositions had
already been taken. The stenographer read to him her
stenographic notes; and thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent
Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his
deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he
could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leon’s
application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition.
The search was subsequently conducted. Later Petitioners’
lawyers protested that no formal complaint or transcript of
testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents
nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded six
boxes of documents.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a petition with the CFI
of Rizal praying that the search warrant be declared null
and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay
petitioners damages and attorney’s fees but was dismissed
by respondent judge hence the petition.
Issue: W/N there was a valid search warrant conducted
in the case at bar?
Held: No. The participation of respondent Judge in the
proceedings which led to the issuance of search warrant
was limited to listening to the stenographer’s reading of her
notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of
perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant
and his witness. Thus, cannot be considered as a personal
examination. If there was an examination at all of the
complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by
the Deputy Clerk of Court. But the Constitution and the rules
required a personal examination by the judge.
MP: The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent
judge did not constitute sufficient compliance with the
constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner
respondent judge did not have opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to
propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial
mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to
conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound
inference on the all-important question of whether or not
there was probable cause.
CASE NO. 328
ARTICLE III, SEC 2: 3. Requisite for a Valid Warrant
C. Personal Examination
Soliven V. Makasiar
Facts: Information for libel was filed against petitioners
Luis Beltran, a broadcast journalist and newspaper
columnist and Maximino Soliven journalist and newspaper
publisher and founder of Philippine Star. Pres Cory Aquino
filed the libel suit in 1991 against Beltran, who wrote in
his column that the then president 'hid under the bed'
during a bloody coup attempt staged by military
rebels in December 1989. The article appeared in the
newspaper. The Philippine Star so its publisher, Maximo
Soliven, was included in the suit. Mrs. Aquino said she
filed the libel suit because she was insulted by Beltran's
article which ridiculed her stature as Philippines
president and chief of staff of the Armed Forces. Mr was
filed by petitioners but On March 30, 1988, the Secretary
of Justice denied petitioners' MR and upheld the resolution
of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's
finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was
denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988.
On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary,
affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2,
1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioners' contention that they have been
denied the administrative remedies available under the law
has lost factual support.
128
Issue: whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran
were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant
for his arrest without personally examining the complainant
and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.
Held and MP: NO. What the Constitution underscores is
the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In
satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence
of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant
of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.
CASE NO. 329
ARTICLE III, SEC 2: 3. Requisite for a Valid Warrant
C. Personal Examination
Luna v Plaza
Held: The Constitution, in Section 1(3), Article III, provides
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination of witnesses
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce. Conformably to said provision,
Republic Act No. 3828, approved June 22, 1963, inserted in
Section 87 (c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 this paragraph:
"No warrant of arrest shall be issued by any justice of the
peace in any criminal case filed with him unless he first
examines the witness or witnesses personally, and the
examination shall be under oath and reduced to writing in
the form of searching questions and answers.
Facts: The respondent MTC judge, after examining the conditions must first be fulfilled: (1) he must examine the
affiants and having them signed their respective affidavits in
witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under
his presence, who also signed after administering the oathoath; and (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in
and after considering other evidence opined that there wasthe form of searching questions and answers. The existence
reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had of probable cause depends to a large degree upon the
been committed and the petitioner was probably guilty finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination.
thereof hence, the issuance of warrant of arrest. Petitioner
In line with this principle is the view that Republic Act No.
later filed a motion that he be awarded bail due to weak 3828 does not prohibit the Municipal Judge from adopting
evidence of guilt established, respondent issued an order the questions asked by a previous investigator. In the
granting it, fixing it at P30,000.00; which however, instant case, the respondent Judge personally examined
respondent later revoked, and denied. The case was under oath the witnesses by asking questions, that were
subsequently remanded to CFI, after petitioner filed a adopted from a previous investigation, and considered by
waiver of his right to preliminary investigation. Petitioner
him as sufficiently searching and which questions and the
was charged with the crime of murder and was then answers thereto were in writing and sworn to before him
detained. Subsequently, petitioner filed a petition for a writ
prior to his issuance of the order of arrest
of habeas corpus with the CFI claiming that he was being While it is true that the respondent Municipal Judge did not
deprived of liberty without due process of law, on the himself personally cause to be reduced to writing in the
ground that the imprisonment and detention was the result form of questions and answers the examination of
of a warrant of arrest issued by respondent Judge in witnesses presented before him by the person who filed the
violation of Republic Act No. 3828, and praying for the criminal complaint, SC is satisfied that, as shown by the
annulment of the order for his arrest and his discharge from
evidence, respondent Judge had personally examined
confinement. Herein respondents filed their answer, the witnesses under oath and that the questions asked
alleging that RA. 3828 had been substantially complied by the Judge and the answers of the witnesses were
with; that a motion to quash, and not a petition for habeas
reflected in writings which were actually subscribed
corpus was the proper remedy; and that petitioner’s and sworned to before him. Moreover, the court are of the
application for bail constituted a waiver of the right to considered view that no substantial right of the petitioner
question the validity of the arrest. After trial, CFI rendered
had been violated because, as hereinbefore adverted to,
its decision holding that respondent had substantially petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation
complied with RA. 3828, and consequently petition. Hence after he was arrested, and he took the step of applying for
the appeal where petitioner raised that the issuance of the
bail before respondent Municipal Judge. These acts of the
warrant of arrest was a violation of the Constitution and of
petitioner subsequent to his arrest constitute an implied
procedural due process
admission on his part that there was a probable cause for
the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. Those acts
Issue: W/N the issuance of the warrant of arrest of of the petitioner constitute a waiver of whatever
respondent was a violation of the Constitution thus irregularity, if any there was, that attended his arrest.
impairing substantial right of the petitioner? MP in Bold
Held: No. Before a Municipal Judge may issue a warrant of
arrest under the foregoing provisions, the following CASE NO. 330
129
 ARTICLE III, SEC 2: 3. Requisite for a Valid Warrant
C. Personal Examination
Kho vs. Judge Makalintal
Facts: NBI received confidential information that the two
houses of the petitioner in Paranaque were being used as
storage centres for unlicensed firearms and “chop-chop”
vehicles. Teams of NBI agents had conducted a personal
surveillance and investigation in the two houses referred
Respondent NBI applied for the issuance of search warrant
by Judge Roberto Makalintal and sought for the issuance of
search warrants in anticipation of criminal cases to be
instituted against petitioner Kho. Respondent Judge
conducted the necessary examination of the applicants and
the witnesses and thereby issuing a search warrant. The
next day, NBI agents searched subject premises at BF
Homes, Paranaque, and they recovered various high-
powered firearms and hundreds of rounds of ammunition.
Another team of NBI agents searched at Brgy. Moonwalk,
Paranaque yielded several high-powered firearms with
explosives and more than a thousand rounds of
ammunition. The simultaneous searches also resulted in the
confiscation of various radio and telecommunication
equipment, two units of motor vehicles (Lite-Ace vans) and
one motorcycle. The confiscated firearms have never been
issued a license. Likewise, the radio transceivers recovered
and motor-vehicles were unlicensed and unregistered.
Petitioners questioned the issuance of search warrant
alleging that it has no probable cause.
Issue: W/N the search warrant was valid?
Held: Yes. Nothing improper is perceived in the manner the
respondent Judge conducted the examination of subject
applicants for search warrants and their witnesses. He
personally examined them under oath, and asked them
searching questions on the facts and circumstances
personally known to them, in compliance with prescribed
procedure and legal requirements. It can be gleaned that the
sworn statements and affidavits submitted by the witnesses
were duly attached to the pertinent records of the
proceedings. It was within the discretion of the
examining Judge to determine what questions to ask
the witnesses so long as the questions asked are
germane to the pivot of inquiry - the existence or
absence of a probable cause.
MP in Bold
MARTIN
CASE NO. 331
ARTICLE III, SEC. 2: Personal Examination
Alvarez v. Court
FACTS: Herein petitioner is a money-lender, allegedly
charging usurious rates. According to a reliable information,
the petitioner kept in his house articles in connection with
the alleged activities violative of the law. The chief of the
secret service of the Anti-Usury Board presented to Judge
David affidavit of the allegation and thereafter made an
oath. However, he did not swear to the truth of his
statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon
the information received by him from a reliable person.
Nonetheless, the judge issued the search warrant based on
the affidavit presented. Hence, petitioner prays that said
warrant be declared illegal (agent has no personal
knowledge of the facts under oath) and that all articles
confiscated be returned to him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the personal examination made by
the Judge is sufficient to determine probable cause.
RULING/ MAIN POINT: No. The oath required must refer to
the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is
to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the
warrant, of the existence of probable cause. Thus, when the
affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains
sufficient facts within his personal and direct
knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that
there exists probable cause; when the applicant’s
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of
one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of
the facts is necessary. As in this case, the judge relied
exclusively on the affidavit executed by the agent whose
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay and not personal.
Hence, the warrant issued is illegal.
MARTIN
CASE NO. 332
ARTICLE III, SEC. 2: Personal Examination
Bache v. Cruz
FACTS: Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue
requested from respondent Judge the issuance of a search
warrant against petitioners (corporation and its president)
for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code. Then on
the day when respondents (De Leon and his witness
Logronio) went to court to present the papers, relating to
the requested search warrant, the judge was hearing a
certain case. So, respondent judge instructed his Deputy
Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents. After
the session had adjourned, respondent Judge asked his
stenographer to read the depositions aforementioned.
Thereafter, the judge asked Logronio to take the oath, and
proceeded to sign respondent de Leon’s application for
search warrant and other pertinent documents.
Nonetheless, the agents were able to yield six boxes of
documents 3 days after the signing of the questioned
warrant. Thus, petitioners sought from the Court of First
Instance the declaration of nullity of the search warrant in
question. Said petition, nevertheless, was dismissed by the
respondent judge hence this instant petition.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the personal examination made by documents were allegedly falsified. Hence, four (4) counts for unlawfully possessing crushed marijuana and bricks of
the Judge is in accordance with the mandate of the of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents were filed marijuana. During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that a
Constitution and the rules. against petitioners for which the City Prosecutor found search was conducted in the supposed residence of
probable cause. Subsequently, MTCC trial judge issued the respondent. However, respondent questions the validity of
RULING/MAIN POINT: No. In the case at bar, no personal warrants for the arrest of the petitioners. Nonetheless, the search warrant because the transcript of the searching
examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of petitioner filed Recall Warrants of Arrest due to denial of questions and answers made by Executive Judge Eugenio G.
the complainant and his witness. Respondent Judge did not due process on the ground that the the trial judge merely Ramos in connection with the application for Search
ask either of the two any question the answer to which relied on the complaint-affidavit (because petitioners were Warrant cannot be found; and based on the records, there is
could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not not afforded to file counter-affidavit) and attachments of the no stenographic notes. Nonetheless, the trial court ruled
there was probable cause against herein petitioners. The respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest. against respondent hence this petition.
participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which
led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were denied due process ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was illegally
limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her when the trial judge merely considered the complaint- issued.
notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of affidavit, and its attachments, in the issuance of the
perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant warrants of arrest. RULING: Yes. In determining the existence of probable
and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal cause, it is required that: (1) the judge must examine the
examination. If there was an examination at all of the RULING/MAIN POINT: No. A judge is not required to complainant and his witnesses personally; (2) the
complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by conduct a personal examination of the complainant and examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination
the Deputy Clerk of Court. The Constitution and the rules witnesses. Rather, what is emphasized merely is the must be reduced in writing in the form of searching
require a personal examination by the judge and not exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to questions and answers. Although it is possible that Judge
merely delegated examination. satisfy himself as to the existence of probable cause. To this Ramos examined the complainant and his witnesses in the
end, he may: (a) personally evaluate the report and the form of searching questions and answers, the fact remains
MARTIN supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor that there is no evidence that the examination was put into
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis writing as required by law. Otherwise, the depositions in
CASE NO. 333 thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b) if on the basis writing of the complainant and his witnesses would have
ARTICLE III, SEC. 2: Personal Examination thereof he finds no probable cause, disregard the been attached to the record, together with the affidavits that
Borlongan v. Pea (Compare with Bache case) prosecutor's report and require the submission of the witnesses submitted, as required by Section 5, Rule 126
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining of the Rules of Court.
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Pea claims that a Contract of its existence.
Agency was entered between him and herein petitioner, MAIN POINT: The examining Judge has to take depositions
wherein the former undertook to perform such acts MARTIN in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may
necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from produce and to attach them in record in order that the Judge
unlawfully occupying Urban Banks property. Consequently, CASE NO. 334 may be able to properly determine the existence or non-
respondent instituted a civil case for recovery of agents ARTICLE III, SEC. 2: Personal Examination existence of the probable cause. (Bernas reviewer)
compensation and expenses, damages, and attorneys fees People v. Mamaril
against the petitioners. When the petitioner filed a motion MARTIN
to dismiss the complaint against them, the former presented FACTS: An Information was filed against respondent
several documents supporting their case, but these Mamaril for the violation of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 CASE NO. 335

131
 ARTICLE III, SEC. 2: Personal Examination
Ortiz v. Palaypayon
FACTS: Respondent Judge Lucio Palaypayon of the
Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur is
administratively charged with gross ignorance of the law
tainted with vindictiveness and oppression relative to a
criminal case pending before him. Herein complainant got
involved, as a party to a criminal a case of a collision
between a mini-truck and Toyota Corolla. However, it
appears that respondent judge issued an order for the
arrest of accused, including complainant, on the basis of
mere affidavits by the offended party and without
conducting the preliminary investigation required by Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, this
administrative charge against respondent was filed by
complainant.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge did not personally
examine the complainant and the witnesses as required by
the Constitution.
RULING: Yes. In this case, respondent judge adopted the
sworn statements of the owner and driver of the car
involved in the reckless imprudence case as his own
preliminary examination without personally examining the
complainant and her witnesses. Hence, it is evident that
there was no preliminary investigation conducted. Thus,
respondent judge did not personally examine the
complainant and her witnesses by asking searching
questions and answers to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause as mandated by law.
MAIN POINT: A Judge must personally examine the
complainant and witnesses to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause as mandated by law.
Sheena
Case No. 336
Art III Section 2. Particularity of Description
People v. Veloso
Facts:
The building at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was
used by an organization known as the Parliamentary Club
which was owned and managed by Congressman Jose Ma.
Veloso.
The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-
called Parliamentary Club was a gambling house.
The Chief of the gambling squad Townsend had been to the
club and verified this fact. Detective Geronimo of the secret
service, applied for, and obtained a search warrant
describing the building from the municipal court judge.
Respondent Veloso was one of the 50 persons apprehended
by the police in the Parliamentary Club.
Townsend showed Veloso the search warrant. Veloso
defended that he is Representative Veloso and not John Doe,
and that the police had no right to search the house.
Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John
Doe.
Long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards,
and chips were taken from his pockets.
Issue:
W/N a “John Doe” warrant satisfy the requirement of
particularity of description.
Ruling:
YES. Provided that it contains a descriptio personae such
as will enable the officer to identify the accused.
In this case, the affidavit for the search warrant and the
search warrant itself described the building to be searched
as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,
Philippine Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient
designation of the premises to be searched.
As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling
apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him
at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John
Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police
could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
Main point in bold. Detailed version below.
A "John Doe" or "Richard Roe," "whose other or true name
in unknown," warrant is void, without other and further
descriptions of the person to be apprehended, and such
warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a
warrant must, in addition, contain the best descriptio
personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons
to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient
to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon whom
the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal
appearance and peculiarities, give his occupation and place
of residence, and any other circumstances by means of
which he can be identified.
Sheena
Case No. 337
Art III Section 2. Particularity of Description
Alvarez v. CFI
Facts:
The Anti-Usury Board of the DOJ presented to Judge David a
sworn affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in
possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as
money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of
law.
The chief of the task force didn’t say that the information
was based on his personal knowledge but was only received
by him from a reliable source.
Judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez’
house.
Agents raided the subject place and seized different
documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs,
cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc.
The articles seized were not brought immediately to the
custody of the judge who issued the SW.
132
Petitioner Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be
declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in
question be returned to him because the SW issued was
illegal.
Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain
custody of the articles seized for further investigation.
CFI Judge sustained the board’s motion.
Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the
search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing
the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and
void.
Issue:
W/N the search warrant does not satisfy the constitutional
requirement of particularity of the description.
Ruling:
YES. Reference to "books, documents, receipts, lists, chits
and other papers used by him in connection with his
activities as money-lender, charging usurious rates of
interest in violation of the law" in the search warrant is so
general, loose and vague as to confer unlimited discretion
upon the officer serving the warrant to choose and
determine for himself just what are the "books, documents,
receipts, lists, chits and other papers" used by the petitioner
in connection with his alleged activities as money-lender.
The evident purpose and intent of the constitutional
requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those,
and only those, particularly described in the search
warrant, to the end that unreasonable searches and
seizures may not be made, — that abuses may not be
committed.
Main point in bold.
Sheena
Case No. 338
Art III Section 2. Particularity of Description
Corro v. Lising
Facts: Sheena
Respondent judge issued a search warrant authorizing the
search and seizure of printed copies of Philippine Times;
manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the
Philippine Times; newspaper dummies of the Philippine
Times; subversive documents, articles, printed matters,
handbills, leaflets, banners; typewriters, duplicating
machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines,
video machines and tapes which have been used and are
being used as instrument and means of committing the
crime of inciting to sedition.
Petitioner filed and urgent motion to recall warrant and to
return documents alleging that the properties seized are not
connected with the offense of inciting to sedition.
Respondent judge denied the motion. Hence, this petition.
Respondents pray for dismissal of this petition justifying
that articles seized were adequately described in the search
warrant and the padlocking of the searched premises was
with the consent of petitioner’s wife.
Issue:
W/N the search warrant does not satisfy the constitutional
requirement of particularity of the description.
Ruling:
YES. The search warrant issued by respondent judge
allowed seizure of printed copies of the Philippine Times,
manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper
dummies, subversive documents, articles, etc., and even
typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape
recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all
embracing as to include all conceivable records and
equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are
legal or illegal. The search warrant under consideration
was in the nature of a general warrant which is
constitutionally objectionable.
Main point in bold.
Case No. 339
Art III Section 2. Particularity of Description
Pangandaman v. Casar
Facts:
5 persons dead and 2 wounded in a shooting incident
occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur. What in fact
transpired is still unclear, either that a residence was
attacked or the group was ambushed.
Atty. Batuampar, claiming to represent the widow of one of
the victims, filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial
Fiscal, asking for a "full blast preliminary investigation" of
the incident.
Respondent Judge received criminal complaint for multiple
murder by Sergeant Laruan, but no case relative to the
incident was filed before him.
Respondent Judge "examined personally all 3 witnesses
(brought by the sergeant). Thereafter "approved the
complaint and issued the corresponding warrant of arrest"
against the fourteen (14) petitioners (who were named by
the witnesses) and fifty (50) "John Does."
Atty. Batuampar filed an "ex-parte" motion for
reconsideration seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and
subsequent holding of a "thorough investigation" on the
ground that the Judge's initial investigation had been "hasty
and manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions"
having been propounded.
Respondent Judge denied the motion for "lack of basis;"
hence the present petition.
Issue:
W/N the issuance of a warrant of arrest against 50 "John
Does" transgressed the Constitutional provision requiring
that such warrants should particularly describe the persons
or things to be seized.
Ruling:
YES. Insofar as said warrant is issued against 50 “John Does”
not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or
would identify. Clearly such was violative of the
133
constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should
particularly describe the person or persons to be seized,
the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be
voided. Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued
against fifty “John Does.” The respondent Judge is directed
to forward to the Provincial Fiscal of Lanao del Sur the
record of the preliminary investigation of the complaint of
his court for further appropriate action.
Main point in bold.
Sheena
Case No. 340
Art III Section 2. Particularity of Description
Stonehill v. Diokno
Facts:
Respondent made possible the issuance of 42 search
warrants against the petitioner and the corporation to
search persons and premises of several personal properties
due to an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws. of the
Philippines. As a result, search and seizures were conducted
in the both the residence of the petitioner and in the
corporation's premises. The warrant described the items to
searched and seized as describing books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence etc.
Petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and
void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the
Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus, he filed a
petition with the SC for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
and injunction to prevent the seized effects from being
introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against the
petitioner.
SC issued the writ only for those effects found in the
petitioner's residence. Hence this petition.
Issue: W/N the description in the warrant is sufficient.
Ruling: NO. Reference to books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, journals, correspondence etc.
amounts to a general warrant authorizing the officer to
pick up anything he pleases.
Main point in bold.
Case No. 341
Section2, Article III
IV. In General
D. Particularity of Description
People v. Martinez
Facts: Accused-appellant Alexander Martinez, alias
Abelardo Martinez y Montesor, was charged with (1)
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act and possession of
illegal firearms in the Zamboanga City RTC after a buy bust
operation; Wherein the authorities w able to recover shabu
and .38 caliber gun. The accused appellant filed not guilty.
accused-appellant argues that he is not the person named in
the search warrant issued in connection with the buy-bust
operation, his name being Abelardo Martinez and not
Alexander Martinez. That being the case, all things seized by
virtue of the said warrant are inadmissible in evidence.
Issue:W/N the wrong name in the search warrant in a buy
bust operation invalidates the search warrant
Ruling: No. Granting arguendo that the search warrant
issued against accused-appellant was invalid because his
true name is Abelardo Martinez and not Alexander Martinez
as stated in the search warrant, the same cannot render the
articles seized inadmissible as evidence in court. As a matter
of fact the information filed identify him as “Alexander
Martinez alias Abelardo Martinez y Montesor, accused.” The
accused-appellant was arrested as a result of a “buy-bust”
operation and the ensuing search of the premises was made
as an incident to a lawful arrest. It is therefore clear that
regardless of the alleged defect of the search warrant in
erroneously designating his first name, the seized
articles may still be used as evidence against accused-
appellant, having been obtained from him and as such,
fruits of a lawful search incidental to a valid arrest.
Main Point: IN BOLD
Case No. 342
Section 2, Article III
IV. In General
D. Particularity of Description
Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp
Facts: an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He
observed that Microsoft Softwares (Windows Operating
Systems) were being produced and packaged within the
premises of Maxicorp. They then bought a computer unit
from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated
copy of Windows, Using it as evidence. a computer
technician, who showed the judge that the software in the
computer unit bought by Samiano from Maxicorp was
pirated. The RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable
cause for a case of copyright infringement and unfair
competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the
corresponding warrant. Maxicorp argues that the warrants
issued against it are too broad in scope and lack the
specificity required with respect to the objects to be seized.
After examining the wording of the warrants issued, the
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and reversed
the RTC’s Order
Issue: W/N THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE “GENERAL
WARRANTS.” Meaning that the warrant issued lacks
description
Ruling: Yes. The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2)
of Article III of the Constitution renders inadmissible in
any proceeding all evidence obtained through
unreasonable searchesand seizure. Thus, all items seized
under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling
under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f, should be returned to
Maxicorp.
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Main Point: IN BOLD
Case No. 343
Section 2, Article III
IV. In General
D. Particularity of Description
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP
Facts: The military applied for a search warrant for 2
addresses of the newspaper WE Forum: 728 units C & , RMS
Building Quezon Avenue, QC and No 19, Road 3, Project 6,
QC 2 warrants nonetheless was made of the RMS Building
address. The search of the latter is sought to be invalidated
on the ground that the place was not sufficiently describe.
Issue: W/N the not sufficiently described hence enough
invalidate the search warrant
Ruling: The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical
error. In determining the sufficiency of description of the
address, the executing officer’s prior knowledge to the
intended in the warrant is relevant. In this case the
executing officer was also the affiant on whose affidavit of
warrant had been issued. Therefore he knew were the
addresses refereed to.
Main Point: Typographical error in specifying the address
to be search not sufficient to invalidate a search warrant
where the address intended to be searched also appears on
the face of the warrant
Case No. 344
Section 2, Article III
IV. In General
D. Particularity of Description
Frank Uy v. BIR
Facts: A certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing
Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in
activities constituting violations of the National Internal
Revenue Code. 3 search warrants were issued for different
violations. The authorities searched in the premises.
Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the
subject warrants that command their nullification. They
point out inconsistencies in the description of the place to
be searched in Search Warrant A-1, as well as
inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom
Search Warrants A-1 and A-2 were issued. they claim that
the things to be seized were not described with
particularity. These defects, according to petitioners, render
the objects seized inadmissible in evidence
Issue: W/N if a warrant for the search pf the place there is a
mistake in the identification of the owner of the place, does
it invalidate the warrant
Ruling: Not if the place if properly described (Bernas p.47)
The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place
intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. Any designation or description known to the
locality that points out the place to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it,
satisfies the constitutional requirement. In this case, it was
not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes
could be found in Cebu City. Nor was it established that the
enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises
of Petitioner Corporation. That Search Warrant A-1
therefore, inconsistently identified the city where the
premise to be searched is, is not a defect that would spell
the warrant’s invalidation in this case.
Main Point: IN BOLD AND UNDERLINED
Case No. 345
Section 2 , Article III
IV. In General
D. Particularity of Description
Yousex Al-Ghoul v. CA
Facts: Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, FACTS: A search warrant was applied by Inspector James
Branch 125, Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-953 Brillantes, against Mr . Azfar Hussain, private respondent,
and 55-954 for the search and seizure of certain items in for allegedly possessing explosives and firearms at Abigail
Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road,
Kalookan City. The police found unlicensed firearms and
explosive and a caliber in Apartment 8 in the same area.
Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders
violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights because the
place searched and articles seized were not described with
particularity. Solicitor General avers that the search of
Apartment 2 was legal, and the items seized therein are
admissible in evidence. However OSG agrees with petitioner
since There was no mention of Apartment No. 8. Thus, we
find that the search conducted at Apartment No. 8 clearly
violated Sections 2 and 3 (2) of the Bill of Rights, in relation
to Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: W/N items recovered from Apartment no. 8 cannot
be used as evidence
Ruling: Yes. We note that the Court of Appeals ruled that
petitioners waived their right to raise any attack on the
validity of the search warrants at issue by their failure to file
a motion to quash. But, in conducting the search at
Apartment No. 8, not just Apartment No. 2 as ordered
specifically in the search warrants, the police committed a
gross violation we cannot condone. Thus, we conclude that
the gun seized in Apartment No. 8 cannot be used in
evidence, but those articles including guns, ammunitions,
and explosives seized in Apartment No. 2 are admissible in
evidence.
Main Point: Items recovered without particularity of
description in search warrant cannot automatically used as
evidence.
GOMEZ
CASE NO. 346
ART 3 SEC2: PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
People v. CA
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Variety Store, Apartment 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Paper Industries v. Asuncion Newport, Quezon City. After the search, herein petitioners
Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte Bulacan. After argue that the warrant was issued outside their jurisdiction,
issuance of such search warrant, the PNP searched the FACTS: Police inspector Pascua applied for a search that only the RTC located in RTC may issue such warrant
address other than the one indicated in the search warrant, warrant before the RTC of Quezon City. After having the because it is the only court that has jurisdiction over the
instead of Abigail Variety Store they went to an immediate joint deposition, Judge Asuncion issued the contested area where the search warrant was initiated.
adjacent area or Apartment 1 where the alleged possessors warrant against Paper Industries Corporation of the
of prohibit paraphernalia were found, they raised that the Philippines (PICOP), herein petitioner, by only stating ISSUE: Whether or not the court may take cognizance of an
reason for the difference in the address was just a “PICOP COMPOUND”, Thus, an appeal is made by herein application of a search warrant in connection with an
typographical error. However, the Solicitor General, in petitioner to quash the warrant made by Judge Asuncion on offense allegedly committed outside its territorial
behalf of the people, appealed that such search warrant to the ground that it does state particularity the place where jurisdiction and to issue warrant to conduct a search on a
be declared null and void for having contravene the search such warrant is to be enforced. place likewise outside its territorial jurisdiction.
and warrant procedure in the constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the statement “PICOP COMPOUND” RULING: Yes. Petitioners argument that the search warrant
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been unreasonable search complies with the particularity description in a search is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing judge is
and seizure committed by the police for having searched a warrant as required by the constitution. erroneous. It would be an exacting imposition upon the law
place which is different from that stated in the warrant and enforcement authorities or the prosecutorial agencies to
that there was only a typographical error in the address. RULING: No. The warrant only contains PICOP compound, unerringly determine where they should apply for a search
which has multiple building and structures. The warrant warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to
RULING: Yes. The case at bar, however, does not deal with failed to indicate what building or particular location in that the ultimate venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It
the correction of an “obvious typographical error” involving compound where the search warrant is to be made. In view would be doubly so if compliance with that requirement
ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, but of the manifest objective of the constitutional safeguard would be under pain of nullification of said warrant should
the search of a place different from that clearly and without against unreasonable search, the Constitution and the they file their application therefor in and obtain the same.
ambiguity identified in the search warrant. Rules limit the place to be searched only to those
described in the warrant. MAIN POINT: A search warrant is defined in our
MAIN POINT: It is neither fair nor licit to allow police jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the
officers to search a place different from that stated in the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a
warrant on the claim that the place actually searched, GOMEZ peace officer, commanding him to search for personal
although not that specified in the warrant, is exactly what CASE NO. 348 property and bring it before the court.
they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had ART 3 SEC2: PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material Malalaon v. CA GOMEZ
in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in CASE NO. 349
the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their *an issue regarding RTC’s territorial jurisdiction to ART 3 SEC2: PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted issue a warrant, outside the topic. People v. Estrada
to the court issuing the warrant.
FACTS: An application for a search warrant was made by Lt. FACTS: A search warrant was made and 52 boxes of drugs
GOMEZ Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Center before the RTC of were confiscated. In the search warrant, it failed to indicate
CASE NO. 347 Kalookan City. That a violation of PD 1866 or the illegal whether such drugs are fake, misbranded, adulterated or
ART 3 SEC2: PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION possession of firearms and ammunition is perpetrated at unregistered. The accused now asking for the return of such

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drugs on the ground that there was an unreasonable search MAIN POINT: Only a Judge may issue a warrant of search
warrant for the warrant to failed to particular indicate the and arrest. AIRA
item to be seized. Case No. 352
ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT
ISSUE: Whether or not the invalidity of the warrant, for Esteban Morano, Chan Sau Wah, and Fuh Yan Fun v.
failure to particularly indicate the item to be seized, is AIRA Hon. Martiniano Vivo
subject to the return of the confiscated drugs. Case No. 351
ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT FACTS: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen arrived in the
Ruling: No. Although the search warrant was declared Republic v. Sandiganbayan Philippines to visit her cousin. She arrived in the Philippines
illegal for not complying with the requirement of with Fu Yan Fun, her minor son by the first marriage. She
particularity of description in a warrant. The confiscated FACTS: The Presidential Commission on Good Governance and her minor son were permitted only into the Philippines
items cannot be returned as the possessor thereof, the (PCGG) issued separate orders against private respondents under a temporary visitor's visa for two months and after
accused, have not acquired a licensed to possess the items, Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied Banking they posted a cash bond of 4,000 pesos. Months later, she
though they are legal. Corporation to effect their sequestration. PCGG also issued a married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. To
“Search and Seizure Order” against Allied Banking prolong their stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu
GOMEZ Corporation. On the basis of the PCGG’s order which read in Yan Fun obtained several extensions. Upon the expiration of
CASE NO. 350 part, “you are hereby directed to submit for search and the last extension, a letter from the Commissioner of
ART 3 SEC2: ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE A WARRANT seizure all bank documents in the above-mentioned Immigration ordered Chan Sau Wah and her son to leave the
Salazar v. Achacoso premises which our representative may find necessary and country upon a certain date with a warning that upon
relevant to the investigation being conducted by this failure to do so, he will issue a warrant for their arrest and
FACTS: Then Secretary of Labor and public respondent Commission,” Allied contended that this is not one for will cause the confiscation of their bond.
herein Tomas D. Achacoso issued a warrant to seized the sequestration but is particularly a general search warrant
documents and paraphernalia used by hererin petitioner in which fails to meet the constitutional requisites for its valid ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the warrant of arrest
running his illegal recruitment agency. The warrant was issuance. by the Commissioner is valid.
made in pursuance of PD 1920 and EO 1022, which was
enacted during the Marcos Era. ISSUE: Whether or not PCGG may validly issue a search and RULING: Yes. Power to deport aliens is an attribute of
seizure order. sovereignty planted on the accepted maxim of international
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor may issue a law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent
warrant of search and arrest. RULING: No. The PCGG has no authority to issue the order. in sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid
It is not a judge, as clarified by the Court in “Baseco,” and the the entrance of foreigners within its dominions. Article III of
RULING: No. The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may PCGG cannot be considered as “such other responsible the Constitution, does not require judicial intervention in
no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the officer as may be authorized by law” because Executive the execution of a final order of deportation issued in
authorities must go through the judicial process. The 1987 Order No. 1 did not expressly nor impliedly grant the PCGG accordance with law. The constitutional limitation
constitution also made it clear under Sec 2 of Article 3 that the power to issue search warrants/orders. contemplates an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial
such warrant of search and arrest may only be done by a power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or
Judge. MAIN POINT: Only a “judge” and “such other responsible proceeding for a given offense or administrative action, not
officer as may be authorized by law” were empowered by as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a
the Freedom Constitution to issue search warrants. competent official, such as a legal order of deportation,

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issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in pursuance of citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special
a valid legislation. FACTS: Petitioner, Lucien Tran Van Nghia, is a French inquiry. The then Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum
national with temporary address in Sta. Ana, Manila. directing the Board of Commissioners to review all
MAIN POINT: The constitutional guarantee set forth in Originally admitted to the Philippines as a temporary cases where entry was allowed on the ground that
Article III of the Constitution requiring that the issue of visitor, his status was changed to that of an immigrant the entrant was a Philippine citizen, including that of
probable cause be determined by a judge does not extend to based on his representation that he is financially capable respondents Gatchalian. Petitioner Board reversed the
deportation proceedings. and will invest in the Philippines. However, petitioner has decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, admitting
not made any investment and has engaged only in French respondents Gatchalian as Filipino citizens. Petitioner
AIRA tutoring and practice of acupressure. Respondent CID Commissioner of Immigration issued a mission order
Case No. 353 Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag received a sworn complaint commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian.
ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT from petitioner’s landlord, accusing petitioner of being an
Sy v. Commissioner of Immigration undesirable alien for “committing acts inimical to public ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by
safety and progress.” Respondent issued a warrant of arrest Commissioner of Immigration was valid.
FACTS: Chiu Wan Hong, a Chinese citizen, came to the against petitioner after the latter twice refused to go to the
Philippines and was admitted as a non-immigrant or CID headquarters for verification of his status. RULING: No. A warrant of arrest issued by the
temporary visitor. Over five (5) years later, the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the
Commissioner of Immigration caused petitioner who now ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued and sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A
claims to be Aurora Villamin Sy, to be arrested preparatory petitioner’s subsequent arrest were valid and legal. warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner
to proceedings for her deportation for overstaying. of Immigration for purposes of investigation only is null
Petitioner claimed that she is entitled to a writ of habeas RULING: No. Petitioner was “invited” by a combined team and void for being unconstitutional. A reading of the
corpus because the warrant for her deportation is allegedly of CID agents and police officers at his apartment unit on the mission order/warrant of arrest issued by the
illegal or void. Having been issued in compliance with a strength of a mission order issued by the Commissioner on Commissioner of Immigration clearly indicates that the
decision of the Board of Commissioners of Immigration, the Immigration based on a sworn complaint of a single same was issued only for purposes of investigation of the
legality of said warrant depends upon that of said decision. individual. The essential requisite of probable cause was suspects, respondent Gatchalian included.
conspicuously absent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant issued by the MAIN POINT IN BOLD
Commissioner is valid. MAIN POINT: It is essential that there should be a specific
charge against the alien to be deported and arrested. AREEJ
RULING and MAIN POINT: Yes. The Supreme Court held Case No. 356
that the Bureau of Immigration may issue a warrant of AIRA Art III Sec 2. Only a Judge May Issue a Warrant
arrest only for the purpose of carrying out a final decision of Case No. 355 Harvey v. Santiago
deportation or when there is sufficient proof of the guilt of ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT FACTS: Petitioners Harvey, Sherman (both Americans) and
the alien. Board of Commissioners v. Judge dela Rosa Van Elshout (Dutch) were suspected alien pedophiles after
3 months of close surveillance by the Commission of
AIRA FACTS: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Immigration and Deportation (CID) agents. Respondent
Case No. 354 Gatchalian, was recognized by the BOI as a native born Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Warrants
ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT Filipino citizen. William Gatchalian, then a twelve year old of Arrest against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45
Lucien Tran Van Nghia v. Liwag minor, arrived in Manila and sought admission as Filipino and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised

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Administrative Code. Petitioners question the validity of information were the resolution of Graft Investigation
their detention as there is no provision in the Philippine Officer (GIO) Labrador and the memorandum of Special AREEJ
Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Prosecution Officer (SPO) Tamayo. Pursuant to such Case No. 358
Revised Administrative Code, which legally clothes the information, the Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest Art III Sec 2. Only a Judge May Issue a Warrant
Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain against petitioners who questioned such issuance, alleging Board of Commissioners v. Judge De La Rosa and
petitioners pending determination of the existence of a that in determining probable cause for the issuance of the William Gatchalian
probable cause leading to an administrative investigation. warrant for their arrest, the Sandiganbayan merely relied
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest was valid. on the information and the resolution attached thereto, filed FACTS: The Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum
RULING: YES. One of the constitutional requirements of by the Ombudsman without other supporting evidence, in directing petitioner Board of Commissioners to review all
a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it violation of Art III Sec 2 of the Constitution and settled cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the
must be based upon probable cause. The 1985 Rules on jurisprudence. entrant was a Philippine citizen, which included the case of
Criminal Procedure also provide that an arrest wit a respondent William Gatchalian. Respondent and his
warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a ISSUE: May a judge issue a warrant of arrest solely on the companions came from Hongkong and sought admission as
private person (1) when such person has committed, basis of the report and recommendation of the investigating Filipino citizens which the Board of Special Inquiry granted.
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an prosecutor, without personally determining probable cause The Board of Commissioners later reversed the decision of
offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense has, in by independently examining sufficient evidence submitted the Board of Special Inquiry admitting respondent and his
fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of by the parties during the preliminary investigation? companions as Filipino citizens and a warrant of exclusion
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has RULING: NO. Art III Sec 2 states that xxx no search was thereafter issued. Commissioner Domingo of the
committed it (Rule 113, Section 5). The arrest of warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon Commission of Immigration and Deportation issued a
petitioners was based on probable cause determined after probable cause to be determined personally by the mission order commanding the arrest of respondent
close surveillance for 3 months, which justified the arrest
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of William Gatchalian.
and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and the complainant and the witnesses he may produce xxx.
posters without warrant. Further, that petitioners were not
Following established doctrine and procedure, the ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by
"caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal because
judge shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the Commissioner Domingo of the Commission of Immigration
they found with young boys in their respective rooms, and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding and Deportation was valid.
Sherman was even naked. Under those circumstances the the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
CID agents had reasonable grounds to believe that issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he RULING: NO. In matters of implementing the
petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are
"psychosexual perversion involving children". report and require the submission of supporting concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a warrants of arrest only after a determination by the
AREEJ conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. In the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground
Case No. 357 instant case, the public respondent relied fully and for deportation as charged against the alien. In other
Art III Sec 2. Only a Judge May Issue a Warrant completely upon the resolution of the graft investigation words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner
Ho v. People officer and the memorandum of the reviewing prosecutor, of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose
attached to the information. It had no other documents from of executing a final order of deportation. In the case at
FACTS: Petitioners were charged in an information with a which to sustain its own conclusion that probable cause bar, the warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of
violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt exists and issued challenged warrant of arrest on the sole Immigration was for purposes of investigation only and is
Practices Act) before the Sandiganbayan. Attached to the basis of the prosecutors findings and recommendation. therefore null and void for being unconstitutional. The

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mission order/warrant of arrest made no mention that the prohibited unreasonable searches. Sarreal has an
same was issued pursuant to a final order of deportation or interest in the books and documents in question because RULING: NO. The records in the instant case present no
warrant of exclusion. such contain evidence material to the matters involving the question of actual search and seizure, but raise only the
issues between him and petitioners, that justice will be question whether orders of court for the production of
AREEJ better served if all the facts pertinent to the controversy are specified records have been validly made; and no sufficient
Case No. 359 placed before the trial court. showing appears to justify setting them aside. No officer or
Art III Sec 2. Of Whatever Nature and for Any Purpose Rule 21 of the Rules of Court: xxx Upon motion of any party other person has sought to enter petitioners' premises
Material Distributions (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Felipe showing good cause therefor, the court may (a) order any against their will, to search them, or to seize or examine
Natividad and Lope Sarreal party to produce and permit the inspection of any designated their books, records or papers without their assent,
FACTS: Lope Sarreal filed a complaint seeking a money documents, papers, books oraccounts which constitute or otherwise than pursuant to orders of court authorized by
judgment against petitioners Material Distributors (Phil.) contain evidence material to any matter involved in the law. The very purpose of the subpoena and of the order,
Inc. and Harry Lyons, and filed a motion for the production action and which are in his possession, custody or control xxx as of the authorized investigation, is to discover and
and inspection of the books or papers of said petitioners, procure evidence, not to prove a pending charge or
which the respondent Judge granted and consequently AREEJ complaint, but upon which to make one. Further,
required the petitioners to produce the same. Petitioners Case No. 360 petitioners were corporations. The only records or
argued that Sarreal is not entitled to the production and Art III Sec 2. Of Whatever Nature and for Any Purpose documents sought were corporate ones and were
inspection of the said documents because his only purpose, Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling (U.S. Case) relevant to the authorized inquiry, the purpose of which
was to find out if a case of falsification has been made. NOTE: Walling was the federal official authorized by law to was to determine two issues, whether petitioners were
Sarreal contended that the inspection of said documents investigate whether certain businesses were acting subject to the Act and, if so, whether they were violating
was to enable him to designate with particularity in consistently with the Federal Labor Standards Act. it. These were subjects of investigation authorized by
the subpoena duces tecum, to be obtained in connection with FACTS: The instant case concerns Administrator Walling’s Section 11(a) of the act. It is not to be doubted that
the trial of the case, the specific books and papers right to judicial enforcement of subpoenas duces tecum (an Congress could authorize investigation of these matters.
containing the entry of receipts and payments made by the order to compel the production of documents). The
petitioners, such books and papers being material to the subpoenas sought the production of specified records to ANGELO
case. determine whether petitioners were violating the Fair Case No. 361
ISSUE: Whether or not the production and inspection of the Labor Standards Act. Petitioners, newspaper publishing ART III SEC 2: Of Whatever Nature and for Any Purpose
books and papers would violate the petitioners’ right corporations, refused to have their books and records Camara v. Municipal Court
against unreasonable searches and seizure of whatever examined, claiming that the enforcement of the subpoenas
nature and for any purpose. would permit the Administrator to conduct general fishing FACTS: A housing inspector from San Francisco’s health
RULING: NO. The orders in question, issued in virtue of expeditions into petitioners' books, records and papers, in department entered an apartment building to conduct a
the provisions of Rule 21 of the Rules of Court, pertain order to secure evidence that they have violated the Act, routine inspection to locate possible code violations. The
to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or without a prior charge or complaint and simply to secure building manager informed the inspector that Camara might
confused with the unreasonable searches prohibited by information upon which to base one, all allegedly in be using his space contrary to permitted policy. The
the Constitution. But in the erroneous hypothesis that violation of the search and seizure provisions inspector approached Camara to enter the area, but the
the production and inspection of books and documents Camara denied entrance for lack of a search warrant. The
in question is tantamount to a search warrant, the ISSUE: Whether or not the enforcement of the subpoenas inspector returned twice more, again without a search
procedure outlined by Rule 21 and followed by duces tecum would violate the provisions on search and warrant, and was again denied entry. A complaint was
respondent Judge placed them outside the realm of the seizure.

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subsequently filed against Camara, and he was arrested for inside the vehicle. Afterwards, the informant waved at PO3
violating a city code. FACTS: Abe Valdez was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto Corbe. When PO3 Corbe was approaching the appellant, the
and without authority of law, planted, cultivated and latter went out of the vehicle and ran away. They chased the
ISSUE: Whether or not Camara has a constitutional right to cultured 7 fully grown marijuana plants. The prosecution appellant; PO3 Corbe was able to grab Oliver, causing the
refuse an inspection without a warrant. presented its witnesses, all members of the police force, latter to fall on the ground. PO3 Corbe recovered a "knot-
who testified how the information was received, the tied" transparent plastic bag from the appellant’s right
RULING: YES. Administrative searches of the kind at commencement of their operation and its details under the hand, while PO3 Alcancia seized a gun tucked in the
issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests specific instruction of Inspector Parungao. Accordingly, they appellant’s waist. The other members of the police arrested
protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such found appellant alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded Siochi. Thereafter, the police brought the appellant, Siochi
searches, when authorized and conducted without a to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and and the seized items to the police station for investigation.
warrant procedure, lack the traditional safeguards saw 7 five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two
which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to an rows. They uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid.
individual. In other words, building inspection by photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and
administrative officers shall comply with the warrant arrested him. RULING: NO. In this case, a peace officer or a private
procedure. person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when,
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid. in his presence, the person to be arrested has
ANGELO committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
Case No. 362 RULING: NO. In the instant case, there was no search commit an offense. Considering that the appellant’s
ART III SEC 2: Warrantless Search and Seizure warrant issued by a judge after personal determination warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure
People v. Aminuddin of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the
of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline substances
FACTS: On the basis of a tip, Aminuddin was arrested and least 1 day to obtain a warrant to search appellant’s farm. seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come
searched upon disembarking from M/V Wilcon in Iloilo City. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place from an invalid search and seizure. Moreover, trying to run
The detention and search yielded marijuana. The officers where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. away when no crime has been overtly committed, and
were not armed with a warrant although the officers had at From the information in their possession, they could without more, cannot be evidence of guilt.
least two days to obtain a warrant. have convinced a judge that there was probable cause
to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. ANGELO
ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the Case No. 365
accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours ART III SEC 2: Warrantless Search and Seizure
RULING: NO. As a general rule, an officer shall first and inconvenient to them. Dale Grady v. North Carolina
obtain a warrant before conducting a search and
seizure. In this case, the officers had all the time to ANGELO FACTS: Dale Grady was convicted of two sexual offenses.
obtain a warrant. Case No. 364 After being released for the second time, a trial court civilly
ART III SEC 2: Warrantless Search and Seizure committed Grady to take part in North Carolina’s satellite-
ANGELO People v. Oliver Edano based monitoring program for the duration of his life. The
Case No. 363 program required participants to wear a GPS monitoring
ART III SEC 2: Warrantless Search and Seizure FACTS: Oliver arrived on board a space wagon driven by bracelet so that authorities can make sure that participants
People v. Valdez Siochi. The informant approached Oliver and talked to him are complying with prescriptive schedule and location

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requirements. Grady challenged the constitutionality of the Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which and otherwise quell the mutiny or rebellion without having
program and argued that the constant tracking amounted to are reasonable are not forbidden. to secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of
an unreasonable search. Both the trial court and the North What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and Rights.
Carolina Court of Appeals held that wearing a GPS monitor seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, MP: The individual's right to immunity from such invasion
did not amount to a search. determinable from a consideration of the circumstances of his body was considered as "far outweighed by the value
involved. of its deterrent effect" on the evil sought to be avoided by
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of GPS monitoring bracelet MP: A reasonable search is not to be determined by any the police action.
constitutes a search. fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of
each case. Ayeh CASE NO. 368
RULING: YES. The Court held that participation in the ART. III SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
North Carolina program amounted to a search because Ayeh CASE NO. 367 NO PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN SEARCH CASES
requiring someone to wear a bracelet that tracks the ART. III SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES People v Tudtud
person’s whereabouts constitutes a “physical WHEN IS A SEARCH A SEARCH? FACTS: Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report
occupation of private property for the purpose of Guazon v De Villa from civilian asset Bobong Solier about a certain Noel
obtaining information.” FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary Tudtud allegedly engaged in selling illegal drugs, specifically
injunction to prohibit the military and police officers Marijuana. Upon information that Tudtud is about to
Ayeh CASE NO. 366 represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal engaged in another transaction of selling from Cotabato
ART. III SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in Metro Manila. The City, a team of police officers sought and cornered Tudtud
WHEN IS A SEARCH A SEARCH? petitioners claim that the saturation drives follow a and his company and asked if they can see the contents of
Valmonte v General De Villa common pattern of human rights abuses. In all these drives, the box to which Tudtud said “it was alright”. When the
FACTS: As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the the police officers conduct this having no specific target bundles were unwrapped, there contained marijuana
National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) house in mind, in the dead of the night or early morning leaves.
installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro hours, police and military units without any search warrant The police arrested Tudtud and his comapanion. They were
Manila. Petitioners herein aver that, because of the or warrant of arrest cordon an area of more than one charged with illegal possession of prohibited drugs before
installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela residence and sometimes whole barangay or areas of the RTC of Davao City which convicted the accused. Hence,
are worried of being harassed and of their safety being barangay in Metro Manila. Most of them are in civilian this appeal by Tudtud.
placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical clothes and without nameplates or identification cards. A ISSUE: Whether or not the search and arrest conducted by
disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, ISSUE: Whether or not the saturation drive conducted by the police officers were valid and lawful.
considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected the police force violated the rights guaranteed under RULING: No. There was no waiver of right on the part of the
to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at Section 2 of Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution. appellee. For a lawful waiver of right against unreasonable
dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court RULING: No. The Court believes it highly probable that searches and seizures to be effective the following
order. some violations were actually committed. However, the requisites must be present: (1) It must appear that the
ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of the checkpoints is remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the rights exist; (2) The person involved had knowledge,
constitutional. essential and legitimate ones. We see nothing wrong in actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; (3)
RULING: Yes. No proof has been presented before the Court police making their presence visibly felt in troubled areas Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the right.
military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' police or military may go in force to the combat areas, enter Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and
right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights. affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels third requisites. Records disclose that when the police

142
officers introduced themselves as such and requested bar, the answers of Agent Lavin and his witnesses to the RULING: No. The Court is of the irresistible conclusion that
appellant that they see the contents of the carton box public respondents searching questions, particularly those there was no probable cause for conducting an extensive
supposedly containing the marijuana, appellant Tudtud said relating to how they knew that the compact discs they search in the house occupied by appellants. The Court
it was alright. He did not resist and opened the box himself.purchased or received were illegal, unauthorized or cannot also uphold the trial courts conclusion that the
The fundamental law and jurisprudence require more infringing, were based on certifications and not personal policemen regularly performed their duties as public
than the presence of these circumstances to constitute a knowledge. officers Besides, the presumption of regularity in the
valid waiver of the constitutional right against The more decisive consideration determinative of performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the
unreasonable searches and seizures. The fact that a whether or not a probable cause obtains to justify the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof of guilt
person failed to object to a search does not amount to issuance of a search warrant is that they had personal beyond reasonable doubt.
permission thereto. knowledge that the discs were actually infringing, The law attaches to the fundamental right of an individual
MP: Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against pirated or unauthorized copies. Based as it were on against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article
waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. hearsay and false information, its issuance of the search III, Section 3 of the Constitution. Any evidence obtained in
warrant was without probable cause and, therefore, invalid. violation of this or the preceding section shall be
MP: To prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
depreciation of the right to privacy, a liberal construction in Of course, there are certain cases where the law itself allows
Ayeh CASE NO. 369 search and seizure cases is given in favor of the individual. a search even in the absence of a warrant. Jurisprudence
ART. III SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES Consistent with this postulate, the presumption of mentions the following instances under which a warrantless
NO PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN SEARCH CASES regularity is unavailing in aid of the search process when an search and seizure may be effected, to wit: 1. Search which
Sony Music v Judge Espanol officer undertakes to justify it. is incidental to a lawful arrest (Rule 126, Section 12,
FACTS: In a criminal complaint filed with the Department of Rules of Court); 2. Seizure of evidence in plain view; 3.
Justice (DOJ), the Videogram Regulatory Board (VRB) Search of a moving vehicle; 4. Consented warrantless
charged herein private respondents James Uy, David Chung, Ayeh CASE NO. 370 search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; 7. Exigent
Elena Lim and another officer of respondent Solid Laguna ART. III SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES and emergency circumstances.
Corporation (SLC) for infringing on the petitioner Sony INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND MP: Any evidence obtained in violation of Article III, Section
Music Inc.’s copyright as testified by the agent who SEIZURES 3 of the Constitution or the preceding section shall be
conducted the preliminary investigation. People v Adoracia Sevilla inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
A search warrant was issued by the respondent judge and FACTS: Both Adoracion Sevilla and Joel Gaspar were
executed by the agents. A resolution was issued by DOJ arrested, and the bricks of dried marijuana leaves and ADDALINO
prompting private respondents to move anew for the flowering tops confiscated without a warrant of arrest. The CASE NO. 371
quashal of the search warrants. Citing such resolution, prosecution claims that is incidental to the lawful arrest of ART III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND
respondent judge granted the motion to quash by the Adoracion Sevilla who had been long wanted by the police SEIZURES; Incidental to a Lawful Arrest
private respondents. authorities, and so, relying on the presumption that the PADILLA VS COURT OF APPEALS
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Judge allowing arresting officers performed their official duties regularly
the private respondents to quash the search warrant is and rejecting appellants defense of denial, the trial court FACTS: One night, Enrique Manarang noticed the accused
valid. convicted appellants and sentenced them to DEATH. appellant’s car running fast. After a while, a screech of tires
RULING: Yes. A core requisite before a warrant shall validly ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure was heard and thus, made the officer run out and
issue is the existence probable cause, that should be known was valid. investigate. Not so long, the car continued to run, so a hot-
by the one who wishes to obtain such warrant. In the case at pursuit took place. Manarang then radioed the incident to

143
the Police. When the car was put to a stop, the driver rolled
down the windows with his hands raised. The officers then
noticed that it was the famous actor, Robin Padilla. While
apprehended, because of the hit-and-run incident, the police
saw the revolver tucked in the left waist of Robin. So, the
police insisted that the gun be shown in the office if it was
legal. A magazine clip of a rifle was also found in his
possession which made the police suspect that there is a
rifle inside the vehicle. Then the rifle was seen. The other
firearms were voluntarily surrendered by Robin. Now,
Robin’s defense was that his arrest was illegal and
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the
course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule.
ISSUE: W/N the firearms and ammunitions seized from
petitioner without a search warrant is an inadmissible
evidence
RULING: NO. There are instances warrantless search and
seizure of property is valid, are as follows: 1. warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest 2. seizure of evidence in
plain view; 3. search of a moving vehicle. 4. consented
warrantless search, and 5. customs search. their seizure
without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified
under a search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance).
Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may
undertake a protective search of the passenger
compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within
petitioner’s grabbing distance regardless of the nature of
the offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an
incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was
within the arrestee’s custody or area of immediate control
and (ii) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest.
MAIN POINT: Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest is recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence. But the tests for a
valid warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest are:
(1) the item to be searched was within the arrestee’s
custody or area of immediate control; (2) the search was MAIN POINT: An exception rule of freedom against
contemporaneous with the arrest. unreasonable searches and seizures provided in Article III,
Sec 2 of the Constitution is a warrantless search incidental
ADDALINO to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons or anything which
CASE NO. 372 may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. It
ART III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
SEIZURES; Incidental to a Lawful Arrest include the premises or surroundings under his immediate
ESPANO VS COURT OF APPEALS control. In the case at bar, the ten cellophane bags of
FACTS: Police operatives went to Zamora and Pandacan marijuana seized at petitioner’s house after his arrest
Streets, Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in the at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do not fall under the
area. They saw petitioner Rodolfo Espano selling said exceptions.
“something” to another person. After the alleged buyer left,
they approached petitioner, identified themselves as ADDALINO
policemen, and frisked him. The search yielded two plastic CASE NO. 373
cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had ART III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND
more marijuana, he replied that there was more in his SEIZURES; Incidental to a Lawful Arrest
house. The policemen went to his residence where they PEOPLE VS DE LARA
found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner
was brought to the police headquarters where he was FACTS: Appellant was arrested in a buy-bust operation.
charged with possession of prohibited drugs. Petitioner was During the investigation, he was apprised of his
convicted of the crime charged by the trial court, which he constitutional rights to remain silent and to have the
appealed to the CA. said court affirmed the decision of the assistance of counsel. When asked to give a written
TC thus this petition wherein petitioner contends that the statement, he refused to do so pending arrival of his lawyer.
trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him on the However, he was still forced to sign the photocopy of the
basis that the pieces of evidence seized were inadmissible. marked twenty-peso bill, Receipt of Property Seized, and
ISSUE: W/N the evidence seized by the policemen were the Booking and Information Sheet which were all
admissible presented and admitted in evidence. He was subsequently
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Thus this
RULING: The articles seized from petitioner DURING HIS appeal. In his appeal, appellant questions the legality of his
ARREST were valid under the doctrine of search made arrest and the seizure of prohibited drugs found inside his
incidental to a lawful arrest. A peace officer may, without a house. Furthermore, he claims that he was not assisted by
warrant, arrest a person caught in flagranti as a result of a counsel during his custodial interrogation
buy-bust operation, and the marijuana thereby seized after ISSUE: W/N arrest and the seizure of prohibited drugs
searching the latter are admissible in evidence, being the found inside his house was legal
fruits of the crime. The warrantless search made in his house, RULING: YES. The SC finds that the police operatives acted
however, which yielded ten cellophane bags of marijuana within the bounds of law. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985
became unlawful since the police officers were not armed Rules on Criminal Procedure dealing with warrantless
with a search warrant at the time. arrests provides: A peace officer or a private person may,
144
without a warrant, arrest a person; a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it xxx. In the case at bench,
appellant was caught red-handed in delivering two tin foils
of marijuana to Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer. Applying
the aforementioned provision of law, appellant’s arrest was
lawfully effected without need of a warrant of arrest.
MAIN POINT: A contemporaneous search may be
conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the
immediate vicinity where the arrest was made. The seizure
of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs was the result
of appellantÊ s arrest inside his house. A contemporaneous
search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee
and the immediate vicinity where the arrest was made.
ADDALINO
CASE NO. 374
ART III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES; Incidental to a Lawful Arrest
PEOPLE VS LEANGSIRI
FACTS: Suchinda Leangsiri was arrested in the NAIA in the
act of bringing into the country heroin. In his arrest, he
informed the arresting officers that the heroin is meant to
deliver to three other people in Las Palmas Hotel in Manila.
Immediately, the NARCOM formed a group for a follow up
operation in the said Hotel. In the accused’s cooperation, he
was allowed to check in to Room 504, where the others will
meet him to give the drugs. Around 10 pm, Amidu and two
other co-appellants entered Room 504 and Leangsiri gave
them the drugs, before the appellants leave the room, the
NARCOM officers barged in and arrested the appellants.
Amidu, told the officers that he is staying in Rm 413 and ADDALINO
that the two others are in royal Palm Hotel. The officers
then went to the room of Amidu, searching for evidence and
subsequently confiscated a telephone address bearing the
name of Leangsiri, other possessions and documents of
Amidu were also confiscated. In the case of the two other,
the police confiscated a suit case and masking tape and
empty transparent bag, allegedly will be use in transporting
the drugs. The appellants were charged and was convicted
in conspiring to transport heroin violative of RA 6425.
Hence this petition, alleging that the search is illegal being
conducted not in the direct premises of the arrest.
ISSUE: W/N the piece of paper found in Amidu’s hotel
room, with the name “SUCHINDA LEANGSIRI” written on it
is admissible
RULING: NO. The inadmissibility of evidence obtained
in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest
outside the suspect’s person and the premises under his
immediate control admits of an exception. The
exception obtains when the Plain View Doctrine applies
as explained in People vs. Musa, in this wise: “x x x
Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to
seizure and may be presented as evidence.”. In the case
at bar, appellants were arrested in Room 504 of the Las
Palmas Hotel. The piece of paper bearing Leangsiri’s name
was obtained through a warrantless search of Room 413 of
the same hotel, and found tucked within the pages of
appellant Amidu’s telephone and address book. Clearly, the
warrantless search is illegal and the piece of paper bearing
Leangsiri’s name cannot be admitted as evidence against
appellants. The inadmissibility of this evidence will not,
however, exculpate appellants. Its exclusion does not
destroy the prosecution’s case against appellants. The
remaining evidence still established their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
MAIN POINT: in bold
CASE NO. 375
ART III, SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES; Incidental to a Lawful Arrest
PEOPLE VS CUENCO
FACTS: After the conduct of surveillance operations, a
group of police officers reported the result of the same to
their commanding officer who instructed them to apply for
a search warrant. The police officers applied for and were
issued a search warrant. They then returned to their
commanding officer who hatched a plan that a buy-bust
operation be first conducted on the accused Cuenco before
the implementation of the search warrant. As planned, the
informant introduced PO1 Camantigue to Cuenco who at
that time was standing by the door of his store which is just
an extension of the house where he was staying. Cuenco
asked Camantigue how much worth of marijuana was he
buying to which the latter replied he wanted to buy
marijuana worth P150.00. Cuenco got the money, called his
common-law wife, Florida Fajardo, and instructed her to get
marijuana worth P150.00. Fajardo went inside the house
and when she returned, she handed Camantigue the
marijuana. Camantigue then removed his cap as a signal to
his companions that the sale has been consummated. The
police officers arrested Cuenco and proceeded with the
search, in the course of which, SPO1 Sarmiento found a box
which contained dried flowering tops of marijuana. The
corresponding criminal complaints were filed against the
accused Ferdinand Cuenco and Florida Fajardo for the sale
and possession of a prohibited drug. The trial court
convicted both accused. Cuenco appealed questioning his
conviction because of the illegality of the search made in his
house. Appellant insinuates a frame-up.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search of the house
consequent to a lawful arrest is valid.
RULING: Yes. The search of the house is valid as the latter
is still within the permissible area of search. The arrest of
appellant has been made in the course of a buy-bust
145
operation, thus, in flagrante delicto. When the operation Chun Ting lived at a house located at Parañ aque. transferring cargo from the former to the latter. As they
took place, it becomes advisable, for the peace officers to Further, 2 NARCOM officers suddenly forced their way moved closer, the fishing boat sped away. The officers
forthwith undertake a search of the house as being within inside and searched the premises without search were only able to reach the speed boat and found the
the permissible area. The arrest was made in the course of warrant. respondents with transparent, plastic bags containing
an entrapment, following a surveillance operation, normally  Che Chun Ting was found guilty by the trial court. He shabu. Their identification papers were asked but
performed by police officers in the apprehension of was meted two (2) death sentences, for violation of the respondents failed to do so. They didn’t know how to
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In the absence of Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. speak English, the officers had to get an interpreter to
proof of any odious intent on the part of the police tell them of their Miranda rights.
authorities to falsely impute a serious crime, the court will ISSUE: Whether the search of Unit 122 is within the  The Trial Court found the respondents guilty and the CA
not allow their testimony to be overcome by the self-serving purview of the warrantless search incidental to an arrest affirmed the said decision.
and uncorroborated claim of ‘frame-up.’  Respondents’ contention: there was a violation of
RULING: NO. their constitutional rights against unreasonable
MAIN POINT: In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty The search in Unit 122 and the seizure therein of shabu searches and seizures. The warrantless arrest and the
and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a were illegal for being violative of one's basic constitutional consequent search and seizure on their persons and
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect but right and guarantee against unreasonable searches and possessions are unjustified, hence, the confiscated bags
also in the permissible area within his reach, i.e., that point seizures, and thus are inadmissible in evidence under the of regulated drugs were inadmissible against them.
which is within the effective control of the person arrested, exclusionary rule. A warrantless search should be limited
or that which may furnish him with the means of to the premises and surroundings that are under the ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the
committing violence or of escaping. immediate control of the accused. Unit 122 is not even respondents’ constitutional right on unreasonable search
the house of the accused but that of his girlfriend. and that the confiscated bags were inadmissible against
COELI them.
CASE NO. 376 The inadmissibility of such however does not totally
Art. III, Sec. 2, Warrantless Searches and Seizes exonerate the accused. His arrest was lawful and the seized RULING: NO.
People v. Che Chun Ting bag of shabu was admissible in evidence, being the fruit of The Court did not find the consequent warrantless search
the crime. and seizure UNREASONABLE in view of the fact that the
FACTS: bags containing the drugs were in plain view of arresting
 NARCOM deployed a team of agents for the entrapment COELI officers, one of the judicially recognized exceptions to the
and arrest of Che Chun Ting, with the cooperation of CASE NO. 377 requirement of obtaining a search warrant.
Mabel Cheung Mei Po (a suspected drug courier who Art. III, Sec. 2, Warrantless Searches and Seizes
was apprehended, and revealed the source of the drugs) People v. Chi Chan Liu PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
 Upon entrapment, the NARCOM agents immediately The objects falling in the plain view of the officer, who has
arrested Che Chun Ting in Unit 122 of Seafront Garden. FACTS: the right to be in the position to have that view, are subject
A black bag with several plastic bags containing a white  SPO2 Paglicawan and SPO3 Yuzon, after receiving radio to seizure and may be presented as evidence.
crystalline substance was seized. The accused and the message from the Barangay Captain, headed towards Requisites:
evidence were brought to Camp Crame. The contents of Ambil Island, Looc, Oriental Mindoro and noticed 2 a) The law enforcement officer in search of the
the bank were tested and found positive for shabu. boats anchored side by side, one of which was a fishing evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion, or
 The Defense denied the allegation. It contended that boat and the other, a speed boat. They noticed 1 person is in a position from which he can view a particular
that Unit 122 is owned by Nimfa Ortiz and that Che on the fishing boat and 2 on the other, who were area

146
 b) The discovery of the evidence in the plain view is
inadvertent, and
c) It is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
COELI
CASE NO. 378
Art. III, Sec. 2, Plain View Doctrine
People v. Evaristo & Carillo
FACTS:
 Peace officers, while on routine patrol duty, heard burst
of gunfire. Proceeding to the approximate source of the
same, they saw one Baraquiel Rosillo who was firing
gun into the air. He ran to the nearby house of Evaristo.
Rosillo escaped thru the window.
 Carillo was found to have in possession a calibre gun
which was confiscated, and he was invited for
questioning.
 As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, they
investigated in the house of Evaristo where they were
given permission to enter. They accidentally discovered
the firearms in the latter’s possession. Accused-
appellant found guilty of illegal possession of firearms
contended that the seizure of the evidence is
inadmissible because it was not authorized by a valid
warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence obtained without
warrant in an accidental discovery of the evidence is
admissible.
RULING: YES
The firearms seized was valid and lawful for being
incidental to a lawful arrest. An offense was committed in
the presence or within the view of an officer, within the arrest of Rommel. She was asked by the policement to
meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant. spread it out, then the package containing the packs of
What constitutional provisions prohibit are unreasonable marijuana sticks were thus exposed.
searches and seizures. Yet, one of the exceptions is the plain  The accused were then convicted of the offense charged
view doctrine which provides that objects inadvertently against them in the trial court.
falling in the plain view of an officer who has the right  On appeal, respondent presented her argument that the
to be in that view, are subject to seizure and may be lower court erred in admitting the evidence against her
introduced as evidence. when there wasn’t any search warrant. Therefore,
violating the constitutional guarantee against
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE unreasonable searches and seizures.
The objects falling in the plain view of the officer, who has
the right to be in the position to have that view, are subject ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation against the
to seizure and may be presented as evidence. constitutional guarantee of individuals against
Requisites: unreasonable searches and seizures.
a) The law enforcement officer in search of the
evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion, or RULING: NO.
is in a position from which he can view a particular The accused, who voluntarily unrolled the pair of pants
area with the package containing packs of marijuana sticks,
b) The discovery of the evidence in the plain view is thereby exposing the same to the plain view of the
inadvertent, and police officers, could lawfully be arrested and searched
c) It is immediately apparent to the officer that the without the corresponding arrest and search warrants.
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, A crime was thus committed in the presence of the
contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. policemen.
d) Further, when one voluntarily submits to a search and
COELi consent to have it made of his person or premises, he is
CASE NO. 379 precluded from later voluntary surrender to the search and
Art. III, Sec. 2, Plain View Doctrine seizure without warrant, deemed waiver of one’s
People v. Tabar constitutional right relative thereto.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD.
FACTS:
 Respondent-accused, Carmelina Tabar, was charged, COELI
together with her nephew, Rommel Arriesgado, for CASE NO. 380
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in an information Art. III, Sec. 2, Plain View Doctrine
which provided that the said accused sold and delivered Roan v. Gonzales
3 sticks of marijuana cigarettes and prohibited drugs.
She placed the packs of marijuana sticks under the FACTS:
rolled pair of pants which she was then carrying at the  The challenged search warrant was issued by the
time she hurriedly left her shanty after noticing the respondent judge on a specific date. The petitioner's
147
 house was searched two days later but none of the
articles listed in the warrant was discovered. However,
the officers conducting the search found in the premises
one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live bullets
which they confiscated and were used as the bases of
the charge against the petitioner.
 Respondent Judge said that when a police officer
personally filed his application for a search warrant, he
appeared before him in the company of his 2 witnesses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant and seizure of
illegal articles were violative of constitutional guarantee.
RULING: YES.
The respondents cannot even claim that they stumbled
upon the revolver and the bullets for the fact is that these
things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view
when they were taken. Hence, the rule having been violated
and no exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the
petitioner’s pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and
therefore protected by the exclusionary principle.
CASE NO. 381
ART III SEC 2: D. INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (ii. Plain View)
UNITED LABORATORIES V. ISIP, GR 163858 June 28,
2005
FACTS: UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a
place purported to be manufacturing fake UNILAB products,
especially Revicon multivitamins. UNILAB then sought the
help of the NBI, which thereafter filed an application for the
issuance of search warrant. The warrant specifically
authorized the officers only to seize counterfeit Revicon
multivitamins, finished or unfinished, and the documents
used in recording, manufacture and distribution of the said
vitamins. The implementing officers failed to find any
counterfeit Revicon multivitamins, and instead seized
sealed boxes which, when opened at the place where they
were found, turned out to contain Inoflox and Disudrin. The CASE NO. 382
respondents then filed a motion to quash the search ART III SEC 2: D. INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS
warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging that the seized SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (ii. Plain View)
items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, PEOPLE V. DORIA, GR 125299 Jan. 22, 1999
and therefore inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the FACTS: A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police
boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox were seized under the plain which caught accused Doria red-handed of selling
view doctrine. prohibited drugs and during the operation, the police
officers searched for the marked bills that they used in
ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes buying said drugs which happened to be in the house of
which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and Inoflox, Gaddao, according to Doria. When they reached her house,
were valid under the plain view doctrine. the police officers came upon a box. He saw that one of the
box's flaps was open and inside the box was something
RULING: NO. It is true that things not described in the wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents
warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine. appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by
However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot "Jun." His suspicion aroused and took hold of the box. He
be presumed as plain view. It is not enough that the sealed peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10)
boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. Both
the NBI failed to present any of officers who were accused were convicted of the crime charged. Hence, this
present when the warrant was enforced to prove that the present petition.
sealed boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such
boxes and their contents were incriminating and ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the search of
immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of
enforcing officers had personal knowledge whether the evidence obtained therefrom was valid under the plain view
sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating doctrine.
and that they were immediately apparent. There is even no
showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed RULING: NO. Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught
boxes before they were opened. In sum then, the petitioner red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground
and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine for her arrest. She was not committing any crime. This
applies to the seized items. brings us to the question of whether the trial court correctly
MAIN POINT: The doctrine is not an exception to the found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making
warrant. It merely serves to supplement the prior its warrantless seizure valid. The marijuana was not in plain
justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant
hot pursuit, search as an incident to a lawful arrest or some was in violation of the law and the Constitution. In other
other legitimate reason for being present, unconnected with words, if the package is such that an experienced observer
a search directed against the accused. It would be needless could infer from its appearance that it contains the
to require the police to obtain another warrant. prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view.
148
MAIN POINT: Where the object seized was inside a closed
package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore
cannot be seized without a warrant. However, if the package
proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its contents are obvious
to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may
be seized.
CASE NO. 383
ART III SEC 2: D. INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (ii. Plain View)
DEL ROSARIO V. PEOPLE, GR 142295 May 31, 2001
FACTS: Petitioner Vicente del Rosario appeals via certiorari
from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court-Branch
20 and finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of P. D. No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act No.
8294 (illegal possession of firearms). Petitioner submits
that the search conducted at his residence was illegal as the
search warrant was issued in violation of the
Constitution and consequently, the evidence seized was
inadmissible. He also submits that he had a license for
the .45 caliber firearm and ammunition seized in his
bedroom. The other firearm, a .22 caliber revolver seized in
a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a magazine for 5.56
mm. cal. Armalite rifle, and two 2-way radios found in his
daughter’s bedroom, were either planted by the police or
illegally seized, as they were not mentioned in the search
warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the seizure of items not mentioned
in the search warrant was illegal.
RULING: YES. The Supreme Court said that the search
warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize the
firearm which was not mentioned, much less described with
particularity, in the warrant. In this case, the firearm was
not found unintentionally and in plain view. It was found as
a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioner’s
house. This firearm, to emphasize, was not mentioned in the
search warrant. Hence, the seizure was illegal. True that as
an exception, the police may seize without warrant illegally
possessed firearm or any contraband for that matter,
inadvertently found in plain view.
Main Point: Plain view applies only in the seizure of
evidence when the police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but unintentionally comes
across an incriminating object. Specifically, seizure of
evidence in plain view is justified when there is: (a) a prior
valid intrusion in to a place; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to
be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.
CASE NO. 384
ART III SEC 2: D. INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (iii. Moving Vehicle)
HIZON V. COURT OF APPEALS, 265 SCRA 517 (1996)
FACTS: On the strength of the report submitted by the Task
Force Bantay Dagat, the PNP Maritime Group boarded and
inspected a big fishing boat with the consent of the boat
captain. In the course of the inspection, the police
discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and
assorted fish weighing approximately one ton at the bottom
of the boat. Some of the fishes were tested to contain
cyanide. The petitioners primarily question the
admissibility of the evidence against petitioners in view of
the warrantless search of the fishing boat and the
subsequent arrest of petitioners. More concretely, they
contend that the NBI finding of sodium cyanide in the fish
specimens should not have been admitted and considered
by the trial court because the fish samples were seized from
the F/B Robinson without a search warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search of the fishing boat was
lawful.
RULING: YES. Search and seizure without search warrant of
vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws have
been the traditional exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant. It is rooted on the
recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles,
can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the search warrant must be sought and secured. The
same exception ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels
and boats breaching our fishery laws. These vessels are
normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them
to elude arresting ships of the Philippine Navy, the Coast
Guard and other government authorities enforcing our
fishery laws.
Main Point: A fishing vessel found to be violating fishery
laws may be seized without a warrant on two grounds:
firstly, because they are usually equipped with powerful
motors that enable them to elude pursuit, and secondly,
because the seizure would be an incident to a lawful arrest.
CASE NO. 385
ART III SEC 2: D. INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (iii. Moving Vehicle)
BAGALIHOG V. FERNANDEZ 198 SCRA 614
FACTS: Petitioner was the owner of a motorcycle suspected
to be the get-away vehicle of the assailant of the late Rep.
Moises Espinosa who was shot shortly after disembarking
at the airport. Witnesses said that one of the gunmen fled on
a motorcycle. Petitioner’s house was searched with his
consent but the search proved fruitless by the members of
the Philippine Constabulary. The motorcycle was seized two
days after the killing and impounded the same on the
suspicion that it was one of the vehicles used by the killers.
There was no warrant for the seizure obtained by the
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respondent. When petitioner sought to recover the vehicle,
police claimed that it was needed for the prosecution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure
of the motorcycle was lawful.
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the
confiscation, without warrant, was unlawful. The
constitutional provision protects not only those who appear
to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but
are nevertheless presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. The necessity for the immediate seizure of the
motorcycle had not been established; neither can the
vehicle be detained on the ground that it is a prohibited
article.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 386
ART III SEC 2: INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES
Moving Vehicle
Aniag, Jr v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 424
FACTS: Pursuant to the COMELEC Gun Ban, petitioner
(Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan) instructed his
driver to return the two firearms issued to him to the
Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representative. The
driver was apprehended by the PNP at a checkpoint outside
the Batasan Complex after PNP searched the car and found
two firearms in the trunk of the car. When prosecuted,
petitioner questioned the manner which PNP conducted the
search. He contended, among others, that the firearms were
not tucked in the waist nor within the immediate reach of
his driver but instead neatly packed in their gun cases and
wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of the car. Hence, the
search of his car that yielded the evidence for the
prosecution was violative of Section 2 Article III of the
Constitution
ISSUE: Whether or not the extensive search at a checkpoint
was violative of the Constitutional proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures
RULING: Yes. An extensive search without warrant could
only be resulted to if the officers conducting the search had
reasonable cause to believe before the search that either the
motorist was a law offender or that they would find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to the commission of
a crime in the vehicle to be searched. The existence of
probable cause justifying the warrantless search is
determined by the facts of the case. In the case at bar,
records did not show that the manner by which the package
was bundled led the PNP to suspect that it contained
firearms.
MAIN POINT: A warrantless search is not violative of the
Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched
nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search.
. CASE NO. 388
ARZHY
CASE NO. 387
ART III SEC 2: INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES
Moving Vehicle
People v. Aminuddin, 163 SCRA 402
FACTS: Petitioner was arrested by PC officers after
disembarking from M/V Wilcon 9 at 8:30PM in Iloilo City.
The PC officers (had earlier received a tip from their
informer) who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted
him, inspected his bag, and finding what looked like
marijuana leaves, took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspected articles were
confiscated and taken to the NBI laboratory for
investigation. When prosecuted, he claimed that he was
arrested and searched without warrant, making the
marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible as
evidence against him under the Bill of Rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest and search
upon the person of the petitioner is legal
RULING: No. The petitioner was not caught in flagrante nor
was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not
be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as
PC officers received the tip from their informant two days
before the arrest within which they can persuade the judge
that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of the
warrant of arrest and search. The Bill of Rights was ignored
and the head of the arresting team had determined on his
own authority that such search warrant was not necessary.
MAIN POINT: The warrantless arrest did not come under
the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court hence, the
warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence
obtained thereby was inadmissible.
ARZHY
ART III SEC 2: INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES
Moving Vehicle
People v. Malmstedt, G. R. No. 91107
FACTS: Due to persistent reports that vehicles coming from
Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited
drugs, checkpoints were set-up at Tublay Mountain
Province. Furthermore, an information was received by the
Commanding Officer of Narcotics Command (NARCOM) that
a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs. The bus where respondent Mikael
Malmstedt (Swedish national) was riding was stopped for
inspection. NARCOM officer noticed a bulge on respondent’s
waist. Suspecting it to be a gun, he was asked to present his
passport and identification papers but he failed to do so. He
was then required to bring out whatever it was bulging on
his waist which turned out to be a pouch bag containing
hashish (derivative of marijuana) wrapped in brown
packing tape. He was invited outside the bus for
questioning. But before he alighted, he got two travelling
bags from the luggage carrier which upon inspection of the
officer contained two teddy bears stuffed with hashish. He
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was brought to the headquarters for further investigation. respondent and his companion to search the luggage he would probably board MV Doñ a Virginia from Manila to
Seeking the reversal of the trial court’s decision finding him
contained therein. Tin cans containing 56 teabags of Dumaguete City was received by the officers on the same
guilty of violation of Dangerous Drugs Act, he argued that Metamphetamine (shabu) were found inside the luggage. On morning he arrived. Pursuant to this, a checkpoint was set
the search of his personal effects was illegal because it wasappeal after conviction, he contended that the warrantless at the Pier where Saycon was identified by NARCOM police
made without a search warrant and therefore, the search and seizure made against him was illegal. That the officer. He was invited to Coast Guard Headquarter where
prohibited drugs discovered in his custody were anti-narcotics agents had both time and opportunity to he was asked to open his bag which was found to contain a
inadmissible as evidence. secure a search warrant given that they were informed of Marlboro pack containing suspected “shabu”. He was then
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search was legal the date and time of his arrival two days prior. arrested without warrant and brought to the NARCOM
RULING: Yes. Accused was searched and arrested while ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure made against office, together with his bag and the suspected shabu which
transporting prohibited drugs hence, the search made upon the respondent is illegal was later brought to PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
his personal effects falls under paragraph 1 of warrantless RULING: No. The circumstances of the case showed that the In seeking reversal of the trial court’s conviction of him, he
search incidental to a lawful arrest (i.e when in his search in question was made as regards as moving vehicle. argued that the search of his bag was illegal due to lack of
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the warrant thus, the shabu discovered in his possession was
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense). search on respondent and his co-accused. Warrantless inadmissible as evidence.
The information received by NARCOM plus respondent’s search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest and search upon the
suspicious failure to produce his passport led the officers to
is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle person of the respondent is illegal
believe that he was hiding something illegal. There was can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in RULING: No. There was probable cause for the authorities
probable cause which justified the warrantless search made which the warrant must be sought. Based on intelligence to believe that Saycon would be carrying or transporting
on the personal effects of the respondent. Dissenting reports gathered from surveillance activities, the authorities prohibited drugs upon arriving in Dumaguete City. Probable
opinions of Justice Narvasa and Justice Cruz say otherwise. had reasonable ground to believe that respondent would cause in the case at bar consisted of two parts, the test-buy
MAIN POINT: Where the search is made pursuant to a attempt to bring contraband and transport it within the conducted by police authorities and the confidential
lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. country. information received on the day of his arrest. Also it was not
MAIN POINT: Warrantless search of a moving vehicle is possible for the NARCOM agents and the Coastguard
ARZHY justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a Officers to obtain a judicial search warrant or warrant of
CASE NO. 389 warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the arrest given that it was only in the morning of his arrival
ART III SEC 2: INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. that the specific information confirming his arrival was
AND SEIZURES received by authorities.
Moving Vehicle ARZHY MAIN POINT: Warrantless search and arrest would be
People v. Lo Ho Wing, G.R. No. 88017 CASE NO. 390 constitutionally permissible only if the officer conducting
FACTS: Special Operations Group received a tip from one of ART III SEC 2: INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES the search had reasonable or probable cause to believe that
its informers about an organized group, of which the AND SEIZURES the accused was violating some law.
respondent was a member, engaged in the importation of Moving Vehicle
illegal drugs. Respondent, together with the deep People v. Saycon – 236 SCRA 325 Rizon
penetration agent hired by the operatives, arrived in Manila FACTS: NARCOM agents had conducted a test-buy which
from China. They rode a taxicab from the airport but were confirmed that Saycon was engaged in transporting and CASE NO. 391
intercepted by the readily awaiting operative team. The taxi selling of “shabu”. The police authorities did not arrest him ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 MOVING VEHICLE
driver was asked to open the back compartment of the on that occasion but his identity as drug courier or People vs CFI
vehicle and the operatives requested permission from the distributor was established. A confidential information that

151
 for ignoring manifest absence of the mandatory officer or employee. The search was conducted on a
FACTS: A light blue Dodge car speed away after giving the warrant in the arrest and search. moving vehicle. Search of a moving vehicle is one of
toll receipt. The Regional Anti-Smuggling Action the five doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
Center (RASAC) gave a chase, overtook them and ISSUE/S: Whether items seized in a moving vehicle without constitutional mandate that no search or seizure
ordered them to stop but Sgt. Hope made a U-turn a warrant of seizure are admissible for evidence shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued
and tried to escape. An inspection of the dodge car by a judge after personally determining the
revealed boxes containing more or less 4,441 wrist RULING: No, record failed to show probable cause for the existence of probable cause.
watches and more or less 11,075 watch bracelets peace officers to search the carton box allegedly
which were all untaxed. At the time Hope and owned by appellant Barros. When, a vehicle is R. Rizon
Medina were apprehended, the RASAC Agents were stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
not armed with a warrant of arrest and seizure. warrantless search is permissible only if the officers CASE NO. 394
conducting the search have reasonable or probable ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 MOVING VEHICLE
ISSUE/S: Whether items seized in a moving vehicle without cause to believe, before the search, that either the People vs Lacerna G.R. No. 109250. September 5, 1997
a warrant of seizure are admissible for evidence motorist is a law-offender or the contents or cargo
of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the FACTS: Noriel and Marlon Lacerna were inside a taxi when
RULING: Yes, searches and seizures without warrant are subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal a group of police signaled them to park on the side
valid if made upon probable cause. The RASAC offense. of the road for inspection. The police officers went
agents were vested with authority under the Tariff about searching the luggages and found several
and Customs Code, they did not exceed such blocks of marijiuana. They claimed that the bag was
authority. The Court also held that there were rare R. Rizon sent by their uncle
cases which can be exempted from the requirement
of a warrant, such as that of a moving vehicle. It not CASE NO. 393 ISSUE/S: Whether or not the search seizure was lawfully
being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 MOVING VEHICLE conducted
searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly Mustang Lumber vs CA G.R. No. 104988. June 18, 1996
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the RULING: Yes, though probable cause is not evident, we hold
warrant may be sought. FACTS: Petitioner's truck with Plate No. CCK-322 was that appellant and his baggage were validly
coming out from the petitioner's lumberyard loaded searched. The police expressly sought appellants
Rizon with lauan and almaciga lumber of different sizes permission for the search. Only after appellant
and dimensions which were not accompanied with agreed to have his person and baggage checked did
CASE NO. 392 the required invoices and transport documents, the the actual search commence. It was his consent
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 MOVING VEHICLE truck together with its cargo and impounded at the which validated the search, waiver being a generally
People vs Barros G.R. No. 90640 March 29, 1994 DENR. recognized exception to the rule against warrantless
search
FACTS: Bonifacio Barros was charged with violating the ISSUE/S: Whether or not the seizure was lawfully
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for possession of four conducted. R. Rizon
(4) kilos of marijuana while being a passenger to
Baguio City. Petitioner now questions the judgment RULING: Yes, the seizure of such truck and its cargo was a CASE NO. 395
valid exercise of the power vested upon a forest ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 MOVING VEHICLE

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 People vs Lacerna G.R. No. 109250. September 5, 1997
FACTS: PO3 Din personally witnessed a robbery incident. In
pursuit of the robbers and a day after such incident,
P03 Din set up a checkpoint. The red Toyota being
driven by Manago, passed by the checkpoint,
prompting the police officer to stop the vehicle. As
the search produced no contraband, the police
officer then frisked Manago, resulting to the
discovery of one sachet of shabu.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the search seizure was lawfully
conducted
RULING: No, the court found that the lawful warrantless
arrest of a moving vehicle on Manago’s car was not
tenable. It can only be valid as long as the search
have reasonable or probable cause. In the case at
bar, the police officers had already conducted a
thorough investigation and verification proceedings
prior to the set up of a checkpoint, the pieces of
information obtained therefrom were already
enough for the police officers to secure a warrant.
The checkpoint was really meant to capture Manago.
Andalahao
CASE NO. 396
Art III Section 2: Consent / Waiver
De Garcia vs Locsin 65 Phil 689
and other pertinent papers relating to her activities as a was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers
usurer, all of which is contrary to the Anti-Usury Law. flagged down the vehicle. With appellant's alleged consent,
the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered
After the seizure, Leona de Garcia on several occasions, bundles of galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned
demanded from the Anti-Usury Board the return of her by National Power Corporation (NPC). Thereafter, appellant
documents. When 6 criminal cases were initiated against and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to
her, she challenged the legality of the search warrant. The the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of
trial judge denied her motion because there was a waiver on the appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires which were
her part. turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan,
Laguna. Appellant was incarcerated for 7 days in the
Issue: W/N there has been a waiver on the part of Leona de Municipal jail. In defense, appellant interposed denial and
Garcia. alibi. Thus, the court rendered judgment finding the accused
Ruling: YES. There was implied waiver on her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft. On
constitutional immunity against unreasonable search and appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
seizure. She could have objected the legality of the search conviction
warrant when the search was conducted without her
presence because she was such, but no objection was made. Issue: W/N the warrantless search without consent is
Since the constitutional right against unreasonable valid?
search and seizure is a personal one, it can be waived,
expressly or impliedly. Ruling: NO. The Court ruled that in case of consented
searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee
It is well-settled that to constitute a waiver of a against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to
constitutional right, it must appear, first, that the right constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the
exists; secondly, that the persons involved had right exists; (2) that person involved had knowledge,
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the either actual or constructive, of the existence of such
existence of such right; and, lastly, that said person had right, and (3) said person had an actual intention to
an actual intention to relinquish the right. relinquish the right. The evidence is lacking that the
petitioner intentionally surrendered his right against
Main Point: unreasonable searches.

Facts: Leona de Garcia’s office were searched, and some Andalahao Main Point:
packages of records and documents were seized by Mariano CASE NO. 397
Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board. He conducted the Art III Section 2: Consent / Waiver Andalahao
search and seizure with a warrant. The search warrant was Caballes vs CA GR 136292 Jan 15, 2002 CASE NO. 398
issued upon the affidavit executed by Almeda saying that he Art III Section 2: Consent / Waiver
had a probable cause to believe that Leona de Garcia keeps Facts: Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while People vs Agbot 106 SCRA 325 L-37641
and conceals in her house and office certain books, receipts on a routine patrol, spotted a passenger jeep unusually
covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the jeep

153
Facts: Antonio Agbot was charged and convicted of murder room when they entered. There was no clear evidence as to of (1) its being hearsay, immaterial or irrelevant and (2)
for the death of her sister Leona Agbot-Subat. When the the consent in allowing the operatives inside the room or illegal for lack of a search warrant.
police officers went to the scene of the crime, took the whether the officers forcibly opened the luggages and
“paltik” gun as well as brought him to the station. He seized the documents. A special civil action for certiorari is Issue: W/N the search was valid and the evidence seized
admitted the crime and thus, he was convicted. He appealed filed to determine whether the search conducted is violative can be admissible in Court to convict Damaso
his case asserting that there was no search warrant when of the constitution
the gun was taken from the house and cannot be used as an Ruling: No. There is no substantial and credible evidence to
evidence against him. Issue: W/N there was consent on the part of the person establish the fact that the appellant is allegedly the same
who was the occupant of the hotel room when the police person as the lessee of the house where the M-14 rifle and
Issue: W/N the seizure was valid officers took the documents owned by Mr. Velasco other subversive items were found or the owner of the said
items. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures
Ruling: YES. The Supreme Court said that Agbot’s Ruling: No. Without proper search warrant, no public is a personal right. The constitutional immunity from
admission is an express consent. His admission does not official has the right to enter the premises of another unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal
constitute a violation of the constitutional guarantee without his consent for the purpose f search and one, cannot be waived by anyone except 1) the person
against inadmissibility of illegally seized objects as seizure. It does not admit of doubt therefore that a whose rights are invaded or 2) one who is expressly
evidence against an accused. Also, the Supreme Court search or seizure cannot be stigmatized as authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
found that the confession itself can only be supplied by unreasonable and thus offensive to the Constitution if
the accused only and the police officers cannot make up consent be shown. This immunity from unwarranted Who digested: jAn
such stories according to their imaginations. intrusion is a personal right which may be waived CASE NO. 401
either expressly or impliedly. ART III SEC 2
Main Point: CONSENT/WAIVER
Andalahao People v. Asis
Andalahao CASE NO. 400
CASE NO. 399 Art III Section 2: Consent / Waiver FACTS: Upon arriving at his uncle’s store, George Huang
Art III Section 2: Consent / Waiver People vs Damaso 212 SCRA 547 GR 93516 discovered the body of his dead uncle, Yu Hing Guan. RTC
Lopez vs Commissioner of Customs 68 SCRA 320 (1975) then charged respondents for the crime of Robbery with
L-27968 Facts: The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the dwelling of homicide although there was no witness to the actual killing
Damaso without a valid warrant when the latter was absent. presented, the circumstantial evidence including the
Facts: M/V Jolo Lema had been under strict surveillance by They requested the persons in the house to allow them to recovery of bloodstained clothing from both accused proved
the combined team agents due to the suspicion that the look around. In one of the rooms, they saw subversive that the two committed the crime. Aggrieved, respondents
vessel loaded copra and coffee beans from Indonesia. materials appealed contending that the search was illegally done,
Various merchandise were brought from the Philippines which they confiscated. They likewise brought the persons making the obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal and
using the vessel which were exchanged and bartered for the found in the house to the headquarters for investigation and taints them as inadmissible. The prosecution, on the other
identified items which were then taken to Davao. The vessel the persons revealed that Damaso was the lessee of the hand, contends that it was the wife of appellant who
was searched and discovered that the vessel is carrying house and owned the items confiscated. The counsel for the voluntarily surrendered the bag that contained the
smuggled copra and coffee which was charted by Tomas accused-appellant interposed his objections to the bloodstained trousers of the victim. Her act, it claims,
Velasco. Another combined task force headed Velasco's admissibility of the prosecution’s evidence on the grounds constituted a valid consent to the search without a warrant.
room to ask for said document but Velasco was not in the

154
ISSUE: W/N the waiver can come from any other person. leading to the discovery and confiscation of hand guns and FACTS: Accused Conway B. Omaweng was originally
magazines in certain rooms. The petitioners question the indicted for the violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic
RULING: No. In the present case, the testimonies of the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in violation of Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
prosecution witnesses show that at the time the their constitutional right against unreasonable search and of 1972, as amended, in a criminal complaint filed with the
bloodstained pair of shorts was recovered, Appellant seizure. Municipal Trial Court of Bontoc, Mountain Province on 12
Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present. September 1988. Upon his failure to submit counter-
Being the very subject of the search, necessarily, he himself ISSUE: W/N the admissibility in evidence of the articles affidavits despite the granting of an extension of time to do
should have given consent. Since he was physically present, seized is a violation of their constitutional right against so, the court declared that he had waived his right to a
the waiver could not have come from any other person. unreasonable search and seizure. preliminary investigation and, finding probable cause
against the accused, ordered the elevation of the case to the
MAIN POINT: Primarily, the constitutional right against RULING: Yes. None of the exceptions pertains to the case at proper court. MTC ruled that the accused is guilty of the said
unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, bar. The reason for searching the house of the petitioners is law. Aggrieved, he then appealed to the RTC.
cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights that it was reportedly being used as a hideout and ISSUE: W/N the contraband subject of the instant case is
are invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so on his recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero inadmissible in evidence for having been obtained in
or her behalf. was able to enter the compound, he did not enter the house violation of the constitutional right of the accused against
because he did not have a search warrant and the owners unreasonable search (sic) and seizure.”
jAn were not present. This shows that he recognized the need
CASE NO. 402 for a search warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering RULING: No. Accused was not subjected to any search
ART III SEC 2 the house but rather contacted the Veroys to seek which may be stigmatized as a violation of his
CONSENT/WAIVER permission to enter the same. Permission was indeed Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
Spouses Veroy v. Layague granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the house but only to seizures. If one had been made, this Court would be the first
ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers and not to take to condemn it “as the protection of the citizen and the
FACTS: Petitioner Spouses owns a house in Davao City. items which are products of an illegal search. Under the maintenance of his constitutional rights is one of the highest
Upon his promotion to the position of Assistant circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had duties and privileges of the Court.” He willingly gave prior
Administrator of the SSS, Leopoldo and his family ample time to procure a search warrant but did not. consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it
transferred to Quezon City and left the house to two house conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. Thus, the
boys and under the supervision of a certain Edna Soguilon MAINPOINT: The recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a accused waived his right against unreasonable searches and
who only has the key to the kitchen were the circuit search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving seizures.
breakers are in case of emergency. Capt. Orbero of the vehicle; and (3) seizure of evidence in plain view
Talomo Patrol Station raided the said house upon an MAIN POINT: When one voluntarily submits to a search or
information that it was used as a safe house of rebel consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is
soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of Who digested: jAn precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be
the caretakers but did not enter the house since the owner CASE NO. 403 secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be
was not present and they did not have a search warrant. ART III SEC 2 waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or
Capt. Orbero then contacted petitioner Luisa for permission CONSENT/WAIVER impliedly.
to search the house for the said information which she People v. Omaweng
agreed only if it would be conducted in the presence of jAn
Major Macaset. The next day, the search was conducted CASE NO. 404

155
 ART III SEC 2
CONSENT/WAIVER
People v. Corea
FACTS: Accused Antonio Correa, Rito Gunida and Leonardo
Dulay conspired together, not being authorized by law to
possess, sell, deliver, and transport 8 bundles of dried
flowering tops of Marijuana wrapped in pieces of papers
and plastic tapes. An Information was filed with the RTC
Manila indicting appellants for having violated Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The defense,
however, contends that the 3 accused were arrested
without warrant in Camarin D, Caloocan City, enroute to
Dulay’s house to get the things of his child allegedly rushed
previously to the Metropolitan Hospital, for an alleged
charge of trafficking on 'shabu,' and were brought to the
WPDC headquarters at U.N. Avenue, where they were
detained. The lower court found the appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the evidence allegedly confliscated is
inadmissible being the fruit of an illegal search conducted
without any search warrant.
RULING: No. The appellants never protested when SPO3
Jesus Faller, after identifying himself as a police officer,
opened the tin can loaded in the appellants’ vehicle and
found 8 bundles. And when Faller opened one of the
bundles, it smelled of marijuana. The NBI later confirmed
the eight 8 bundles to be positive for marijuana. Again, the
appellants did not raise any protest when they, together
with their cargo of drugs and their vehicle, were brought to
the police station for investigation and subsequent
prosecution.
MAIN POINT: When one voluntarily submits to a search or
consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is
precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be
secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be
waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or MAIN POINT: When one voluntarily submits to a search or
impliedly. consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is
precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be
Who digested: jn secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be
CASE NO. 405 waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or
ART III SEC 2 impliedly.
CONSENT/WAIVER
People v. Ramos CHAM
Case No. 406
FACTS: Following a tip from an informer, police operatives ARTICLE III SECTION 2: Instances of Warrantless
patrolled Miranda Subdivision for a possible engagement Searches
with the suspects of a series of armed robbery incidents. CONSENT/WAIVER
Accompanied by one of the victims, the lawmen chanced People vs Tudtud
upon petitioner Felimon Ramos who the victim identified as
one of the armed men he encountered during the robbery. FACTS
When accosted and frisked by the lawmen, Ramos yielded in Tudtud was reported to have been allegedly
his waistline a .38 caliber snub nosed “paltik” revolver responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area.
loaded with two (2) live bullets. At the police headquarters, Police gathered information and learned that Tudtud was
Ramos admitted involvement in the robbery incidents and involved in illegal drugs. A man who identified himself as a
identified all his cohorts, one of home is Antonio Contreras. police officer approached him, pointing a gun. Tudtud raised
his arms and asked, Sir, what is this about. The man
ISSUE: W/N there was a violation of the constitutional right answered that he would like to inspect the plastic bag
against unreasonable search and seizure. Tudtud was carrying, and instructed Tudtud to open the
bag, which revealed several pairs of pants. On appeal,
RULING: No. The evidence for the prosecution clearly Tudtud assigned, among other errors, the admission in
discloses that accused Ramos voluntarily allowed himself to evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were
be frisked and that he gave the gun to Pat. Alfredo Rodillas. seized in violation of their right against unreasonable
This evidence remained unrebutted by Ramos because his searches and seizures. The RTC justified the warrantless
testimony on cross-examination was, as earlier noted, search of appellant’s belongings under the first exception, as
stricken off from the records. Moreover, his counsel did not a search incident to a lawful arrest.
object to any of the questions asked during the direct
examination of witness Lardizabal concerning the frisking ISSUE/S
of Ramos and the recovery from him of the gun.On cross- Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure
examination, counsel for Ramos did not suggest or in the case at bar is constitutional as it is part of one of the
insinuate, even obliquely, that Ramos did not voluntarily exceptions
allow himself either to be frisked or dispossessed of the gun
by Pat. Rodillas. RULING
156
 No. Appellant’s implied acquiescence, if at all, could Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the by the police authorities and demanded from the
not have been more than mere passive conformity given evidence apprehending officers a copy of a search warrant and/or
under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, RULING warrant of arrest for the search made and for his
considered no consent at all within the purview of the No. The evidence for the prosecution discloses that apprehension; In the police headquarters, the accused was
constitutional guarantee. Consequently, appellant’s lack of the appellant placed the packs of marijuana sticks under the made to undergo custodial investigation for which a plastic
objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a rolled pair of pants which she was then carrying at the time bag was presented to him allegedly containing the subject
waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission she hurriedly left her shanty after noticing the arrest of marijuana leaves.
to the warrantless search and seizure. Rommel(accomplice). When she was asked to spread it out,
which she voluntary did, the package containing the packs ISSUE/S
MAIN POINT of marijuana sticks were thus exposed in plain view to the Whether or not the lower court erred in finding
The Bill of Rights is the bedrock of constitutional member of the team. A crime was thus committed in the that search and the arrest of the accused without a warrant
government. If people are stripped naked of their rights as presence of the policemen. would fall under the doctrine of warrantless search as
human beings, democracy cannot survive and government incident to a lawful arrest
becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, MAIN POINT
contained as it is in Article III of the Constitution, occupies a When one voluntarily submits to a search and RULING
position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the consent to have it made of his person or premises, he is No. In this case, appellant was not committing a
articles on governmental power. precluded from later complaining. The right to be secure crime in the presence of the Surigao City policemen.
from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived Moreover, the lawmen did not have personal knowledge of
CHAM and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
Case No. 407 committed an offense. The search cannot be said to be
ARTICLE III SECTION 2: Instances of Warrantless CHAM merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Raw intelligence
Searches Case No. 408 information is not a sufficient ground for a warrantless
CONSENT/WAIVER ARTICLE III SECTION 2: Instances of Warrantless arrest. Bolonias’ receipt of the intelligence information
People vs Tabar Searches regarding the culprit’s identity, the particular crime he
CONSENT/WAIVER allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts
FACTS People vs Encinada underscored the need to secure a warrant for his arrest. But
Tabar was charged with the selling of marijuana he failed or neglected to do so. Such failure or neglect
sticks, cigarettes and drugs to people. The trial court FACTS cannot excuse him from violating a constitutional right of
discredited the bare denials of Tabar and unfavorably SPO4 Bolonia received a tip from an informant that the appellant.
considered against her an admission that she had been Encinada would be arriving in Surigao bringing with him
arrested before by the CANU for possession of marijuana, marijuana. Upon arrival, he was forcibly stopped by persons MAIN POINT
was charged for the violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. who ordered the passengers to disembark. Thereafter, all The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was
No. 6425 and was convicted therein, but is now on the baggage of the passengers and the driver were ordered any, could not have been more than mere passive
probation. Tabar challenged the decision of the trial court to stand in a line for which a body search was made conformity given under intimidating or coercive
on grounds that evidence was seized from her without any individually. After the search was made, the accused was circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
warrant. singled out in the line and ordered to board the service within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.
vehicle of the police and was brought to the PNP Police Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to
ISSUE/S Station. Encinada was openly protesting to the action taken such search.

157
 marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The Whether or not the search conducted by the BOC is
CHAM NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused- valid
Case No. 409 appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant
ARTICLE III SECTION 2: Instances of Warrantless because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, RULING
Searches there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that Yes. Except in the case of the search of a dwelling
CONSENT/WAIVER accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the house, persons exercising police authority under the
People vs Aruta pointing finger of the informant. customs law may effect search and seizure without a search
warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
FACTS MAIN POINT
Accused-appellant was arrested and charged with Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace MAIN POINT
violating Act No. 6425. Lt. Abello was tipped off by his against which the constitutional guarantees afford full The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable
informant that a certain Aling Rosa would be arriving from protection. While the power to search and seize may at searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a
Baguio City the following day with a large volume of times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house
marijuana. Acting on said tip, he formed a team that led to exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may
the search and seizure of Aruta. Aruta claimed that constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of readily be obtained. A search of a ship, motorboat, wagon,
immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not
Choice Theater. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. to the basic principles of government practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
Domingo arrested her and asked her to go with them to the quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
NARCOM Office. Moreover, she added that no search CHAM warrant must be sought.
warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers. After Case No. 410 PASTOR
the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense ARTICLE III SECTION 2: Instances of Warrantless Case No. 411
filed a Comment and/or Objection to Prosecutions Formal Searches Art III Sec 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures;
Offer of Evidence contesting the admissibility of the items CUSTOMS SEARCH Custom Search
seized as they were allegedly a product of an unreasonable Papa vs Mago Pacis vs. Pamaran
search and seizure. 56 SCRA 16; L-23996, March 15, 1974
FACTS
ISSUE/S Mago, the owner of the goods that were seized, FACTS: Respondent Ricardo Santos is an owner of a car
Whether or not the trial court erred in not when the truck transporting the goods was intercepted by which he bought from a tax-exempt individual. He paid
finding that the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of the BOC who was acting under a tip, questioned the validity P311.00 for customs duty and taxes. Pedro Pacis, the Acting
accused-appellant violated the latter’s constitutional rights of the search conducted by them since. He also questioned if Collector of Customs, received a letter stating that Santos'
the BOC had jurisdiction over the forfeited goods. The items car was a hot car. The amount collectible was P2,500.00, not
RULING were allegedly misdeclared and undervalued and was said just P311.00. Based on such discrepancy, Pacis instituted
Yes. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the to be released the following day from the customs zone of seizure proceedings and issued a warrant of seizure and
street and was not acting in any manner that would the port and loaded on two trucks, police officers detention. The car was taken by agents who were
engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to intercepted and seized said trucks. authorized to do so by virtue of the said warrant. Santos
suspect and conclude that she was committing a crime. It wrote to Pacis about the seizure. Santos also filed a case of
was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant ISSUE/S usurpation of judicial authority of against Pacis. Manuel
and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the

158
Pamaran, an Assistant Fiscal, proceeded with the charge Laboratory Service of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Art III Sec 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures;
against Pacis. and concluded that the entire substance, with a total weight Custom Search
of 5,579.80 grams, is heroin. During the investigation of U People vs. Susan Canton
ISSUE: May petitioner effect the seizure without any search Aung Win, the agents of the Customs Police and the 394 SCRA 478; GR. 148825, DEC. 27, 2002
warrant issued by a component court? Narcotics Command (NARCOM) gathered the information
that U Aung Win had a contact in Bangkok and that there FACTS: February 12, 1998 at the NAIA, Canton was a
RULING: YES. were other drug couriers in the Philippines. The members departing passenger bound to go to Saigon, Vietnam. She
The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant of the team were able to establish the identity of other two passed through a metal detector which emitted a beeping
in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having persons as Nigel Richard Gatward and one Zaw Win Naing sound. Mylene Cabunoc, who was a civilian employee of the
police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and who were scheduled to leave for Bangkok. While on board, National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism
Customs Code to such search and seizure. Except in the case Gatward was requested to disembark and was invited by (NACHT) and the frisker duty called Canton’s attention.
of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police the police officers for investigation. Gatward’s luggage, with They subsequently checked Canton. Cabunoc felt something
authority under the customs law may effect search and his consent, was subjected to x-ray examination and there bulging in several parts of Canton. This was reported
seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of also found powdery substance which was concluded to be thereafter to her supervisor. Canton was requested to go the
customs laws. 5,237.70 grams of heroin by the chemists. comfort room for a physical examination wherein she was
asked to take her clothes off. The packages that she carried
MAIN POINT: The collector of customs has the requisite ISSUE: Whether Gatward’s and U Aung Win’s luggages may was examined and turned out to be 998.2809 grams of
authority to issue a warrant of seizure and detention for an be searched without warrant. methamphetamine hydrochloride or SHABU, a regulated
Automobile whose duties and taxes not been paid for. In drug, without the corresponding prescription or license. She
exercising this authority, the Collector has not violated the
RULING AND MAIN POINT: YES. was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the
constitutional right against unreasonable search and While no search warrant had been obtained for that Article 3, Section 16 of the RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs
seizures and he may not be prosecuted for criminal offense purpose, when Gatward checked in his bag as his personal Act. Canton filed for Motion for reconsideration but this was
of usurpation of judicial function. luggage as a passenger of KLM Flight 806 he thereby agreed denied.
to the inspection thereof in accordance with customs rules
PASTOR and regulations, an international practice of strict ISSUES: Whether or not there was a valid search and arrest.
Case No. 412 observance, and waived any objection to a warrantless
Art III Sec 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures; search. His subsequent arrest, although likewise without a RULING: YES
Custom Search warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the The search was made pursuant to routine airport security
People vs. Gatward discovery and recovery of the heroin in his bag, or in procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act
267 SCRA 785; GR Nos. 119772-72, February 7, 1997 flagrante delicto. The conviction of U Aung Win is likewise No. 6235, “ Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline
unassailable. The evidence thus presented convincingly or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the
FACTS: In 30 August 1994, U Aung Win, a Passenger of the proved his having imported into this country the heroin following condition printed thereon: “Holder hereof and his
Thai Airways which had just arrived from Bangkok, found in his luggage which he presented for customs hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for, and
Thailand, presented his luggage for examination to Customs examination upon his arrival at the international airport. seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. which shall
Examiner Busran Tawano. When opened, the bag revealed constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and
two packages containing the substance neatly hidden in PASTOR the air carrier. In this case, after the metal detector
between its partitions. Representative samples of the Case No. 413 alarmed, R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited
substance were examined by 2 chemists of the Crime materials or substances. Corollarily, her subsequent

159
arrest, although likewise without warrant, was justified that her constitutional rights were infringed when such FACTS: De la Cruz, an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island
since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of search was conducted. vessel, was found to have 3 firearms in his possession after
“shabu” in her person in flagrante delicto. placing his bag on the x-ray scanning machine in Cebu
ISSUE: Whether or not a valid search and arrest was made. Domestic Port. The x-ray operator called a port-personnel
MAIN POINT: Persons may lose the protection of the search for inspection. De la Cruz admitted to the port-personnel
and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property RULING: YES. that he is the owner of the bag and consented for its
to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as inspection. The port-personnel later called a port police
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is she was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the officer to whom De la Cruz also admitted that he is the
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Travelers are often provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of owner of the bag with firearms but failed to procure
notified through airport public address systems, signs, and Criminal Procedure which provides: documents to prove authority to carry them. De la Cruz was
notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer charged with illegal possession of firearms and a violation
and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: of COMELEC Resolution against gun ban. The trial court
such would be subject to seizure. These announcements (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested dismissed the case for illegal possession ruling that
place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional has committed, is actually committing, or is Republic Act No. 8294, which penalizes simple illegal
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do attempting to commit an offense; possession of firearms, will apply only when the person
not apply to routine airport procedures. (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, arrested committed ‘no other crime’. He was therefore
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating convicted for the violation against COMELEC Gun Ban
that the person to be arrested has committed it; resolution.
PASTOR and…
Case No. 414 The arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a) ISSUES:
Art III Sec 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures; or (b) of the Rule above cited. The drug seized from her 1. Was there a valid CUSTOMS search?
Custom Search during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired 2. Was there a valid waiver of his right against
People vs. Johnson legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. unreasonable search and seizure?
384 SCRA 526
MAIN POINT: Persons may lose the protection of the search RULING:
FACTS: Leila Johnson was arrested at the airport after she and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property 1. NO. Here, the facts reveal that the search was part of a
was found to have in her possession more than 500 grams to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective routine port security measure. The search was not
of shabu when she was initially frisked by a security expectation of privacy, which expectation society is conducted by persons authorized under customs law. It
personnel at a gate in the airport. The security personnel prepared to recognize as reasonable. (Same MAIN POINT was also not motivated by the provisions of the Tariff
felt something hard in respondent’s abdominal area and with the LAST case, People vs. Susan Canton) and Customs Code or other customs laws. Although
when asked she said that she had to wear 2 girdles because customs searches usually occur within ports or
of an operation. Unconvinced, the security personnel went PASTOR terminals, it is important that the search must be for the
to her supervisor. Subsequently, after a thorough search on Case No. 415 enforcement of customs laws. NEVERTHELESS, searches
respondent, packets of shabu were seized from her. Accused Art III Sec 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures; pursuant to port security measures are not unreasonable
(respondent) was subsequently convicted and sentenced to Custom Search per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and the
reclusion perpetua. In the present appeal, respondent De la Cruz v. People inspection in domestic post are akin to routine security
contended that the search made upon her was not valid and 779 SCRA 34; GR. 209387, Jan. 11, 2016 procedure in airports.

160
2. YES. Accused permitted authorities to conduct search
without a warrant, therefore, the petitioner is now
precluded from claiming an invalid warrantless search
when he voluntarily submitted to the search on his
person.
MAIN POINT:
To be a valid customs search, the requirements are:
(1) the person/s conducting the search was/were
exercising police authority under customs law;
(2) the search was for the enforcement of customs law; and
(3) the place searched is not a dwelling place or house.
AIMAR
CASE NO. 416
ART. III, SEC. 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures VI.
Stop and Frisk Situation
Terry vs. Ohio
FACTS: The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with
another individual on a street corner while repeatedly
walking up and down the same street. The officer believed
that the Petitioner and the other men were “casing” a store
for a potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the
men for questioning, and given the nature of the behavior
the officer decided to perform a quick search of the men
before questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner
produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was
charged with carrying a concealed weapon.
ISSUE: WON a search for weapons without probable cause
for arrest is an unreasonable search
RULING: No. it is a reasonable search when an officer
performs a quick seizure and a limited search for weapons
on a person that the officer reasonably believes could be
armed. A typical beat officer would be unduly burdened by
being prohibited from searching individuals that the officer maintain the status quo momentarily while the police
suspects to be armed. officer seeks to obtain more information.
MAINPOINT: An officer may perform a search for weapons
without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the AIMAR
officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed CASE NO. 418
and dangerous. ART. III, SEC. 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures VI.
Stop and Frisk Situation
People vs. Solayao
AIMAR
CASE NO. 417
ART. III, SEC. 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures VI. FACTS: SPO3 Jose Nio in conducting an intelligence patrol
Stop and Frisk Situation proceeded to Barangay Onion to stop any potential
Posadas vs. CA disturbance in the area where they met the group of Solayao
who was then drunk and wearing a camouflage uniform,
FACTS: While Pat. Ungab and Umpar were conducting a suspicion arised. Solayao’s companions, upon seeing the
surveillance along Magallanes Street,Davao City, they government agents, fled. Confiscated from Solayao is a
spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they noticed homemade firearm and was charged with illegal possession
him to beacting suspiciously.They approached the of firearm.- Solayao was found guilty, then he appealed to
petitioner and identified themselves asmembers of the INP. the court against the admissibility of the firearm as
Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless
wasthwarted by the two notwithstanding his search.
resistance.They then checked the "buri" bag of the
petitioner where they found unlicensed firearms. ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in admitting in evidence
the homemade firearm
ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest and search was valid
RULING: No. Firearm is admissible as evidence. There are
RULING: Yes. The search in the case at bar is reasonable many instances where a search and seizure can be effected
considering that it is effected on the basis of a probable without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of
cause. When the petitioner acted suspiciously and which is stop-and-frisk in the case at bar. There was
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant when
cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag his companions fled upon seeing the government agents.
and it was the right and duty of the police officers to inspect Under the circumstances, the government agents could not
the same. possibly have procured a search warrant first. Suspicion
also arouse when the group was spotted dressed in
MAINPOINT: The assailed search and seizure is justified as camouflage.
akin to a "stop and frisk" situation whose object is either to
determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to
161
MAINPOINT: An officer may perform a search for weapons was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was
without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the bulging object in his person actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they
officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed found marijuana in petitioners possession and is an
and dangerous. MAINPOINT: Mere suspicions are not sufficient to validate admissible evidence against him.
warrantless arrest. While probable cause is not required to
AIMAR conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere MAINPOINT: A stop-and-frisk is defined as the vernacular
CASE NO. 419 suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on
ART. III, SEC. 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures VI. genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s).
Stop and Frisk Situation experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the
Malacat vs. CA belief that the person detained has weapons concealed CASE NO. 421
about him. ART 3, SEC 2: Stop and frisk
People v Aruta
FACTS: Petitioner was arrested for having in his possession AIMAR FACTS: P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a
a hand grenade after he was searched by a group of CASE NO. 420 certain “Aling Rosa” will be arriving from Baguio City with a
policemen when he was said to be acting suspiciously with ART. III, SEC. 2: Warrantless Searches and Seizures VI. large volume of marijuana and assembled a team. The next
his eyes moving fast together with other Muslim-looking Stop and Frisk Situation day they waited for the bus, When Abello asked “aling Rosa”
men in a Plaza. When the policemen approached the group Manalili vs. CA about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the
of men, they scattered in all directions which prompted the police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a
police to give chase and petitioner was then apprehended FACTS: Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City plastic bag marked “cash katutak”. Instead of presenting its
and a search was made on his person. He was then conducted surveillance along Mabini Street after receiving evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging
convicted under PD 1866 in the lower court. He contended information that drug addicts were roaming around said the illegality of the search and seizure of the items. In her
that the lower court erred in holding that the search made area. The policemen chanced upon the petitioner, in front of testimony, the accused claimed that she had just come from
on him and the seizure of the hand grenade from him was the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner theatre While about to cross the road an old woman asked
an appropriate incident to his arrest. had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner. her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later
Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the on arrested by the police. She has no knowledge of the
ISSUE: WON the search and seizure conducted by the police officers were able to introduce themselves and asked him identity of the old woman and Also, no search warrant was
was valid. what he was holding in his hands. Policeman Espiritu found presented during investigation
suspected crushed marijuana residue inside his wallet. He ISSUE: WON the warrantless search is in violation of Art 3
RULING: No. There are at least three (3) reasons why the kept the wallet and its marijuana contents and took Sec 2
stop-and-frisk was invalid. 1. There is grave doubt that petitioner to headquarters to be further investigated. RULING: Yes. There was no indicator that could have
Malacat is a member of the group which attempted to bomb aroused the suspicion of the NARCOM agents as to cause
the plaza 2. There was nothing in petitioner’s behaviour or ISSUE: WON search and seizure conducted was valid them to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant. She was merely
conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere crossing the street when apprehended. There was no legal
suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast RULING: Yes. The search was valid, being akin to a stop- basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accused’s bag,
and 3. There was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to and-frisk. The police, from his experience as a member of there was no probable cause and the accused was not
believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such lawfully arrested. The seized marijuana was illegal and
When the policemen approached the accused and his suspicious behavior of petitioner was characteristic of drug inadmissible evidence
companions, they were not yet aware that a hand grenade addicts who were high. The policemen therefore had

162
MP: The Stop and frisk rule, should not become unbridled marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject MP BOLD
licenses for law enforcement officers to trample upon the to apprehension
constitutionally guaranteed right of persons against MP BOLD CASE NO. 424
unreasonable search and seizures. The essential requisite of ART 3, SEC 2: Exigent and Emergency Circumstances
probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless CASE NO. 423 People v De Gracia
search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. ART 3, SEC 2: Stop and frisk FACTS: Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the
People v Victor Cogaed Y Romana Filipino People (RAM-SFP) staged a coup d’état on
CASE NO. 422 FACTS: Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan received a December 1989 against the Government. At that time,
ART 3, SEC 2: Stop and frisk text message from an unidentified civilian informer that one various government establishments and military camps in
People v Sy Chua Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) would be Metro Manila were being bombarded. The search team
FACTS: The police received information that the accused transporting marijuana. The police organized checkpoints in raided the Eurocar Sales Office (and confiscated 6 cartons of
will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn order “to intercept the suspect.” A passenger jeepney from M-16 ammunition, 5 bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of
Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at the checkpoint. The jeepney different calibers, and molotov.) Obenia, who first entered
and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The driver disembarked and signaled to SPO1 Taracatas the establishment, found De Gracia holding a C-4 and
search is valid being akin to a stop-and-frisk indicating a male passenger was carrying marijuana. SPO1 suspiciously peeping through the door in the office of a
ISSUE: WON the stop& frisk is a valid in the case at bar Taracatas approached the male passenger who was certain Colonel Matillano, No search warrant was secured
RULING: No. stop-and-frisk is a limited protective search identified as Victor who was carrying a blue bag. SPO1 by the raiding team because, according to them, there was
of outer clothing for weapons. However, mere suspicion or a Taracatas asked Victor about the contents of his bag and he so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp
hunch will not validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason said he did not know since he was transporting the bag as a Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and
must exist, in light of the police officers experience and favor to his barrio mate named Marvin. After this exchange, there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the Victor opened the blue bag revealing three bricks of Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were
person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, marijuana. SPO1 arrested Victor and was brought to the closed
a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the police station. The RTC and the CA found Victor guilty ISSUE: WON the warrantless search is valid
general interest of effective crime prevention and beyond reasonable doubt for violation of RA 9165 when RULING: Yes. The military operatives had reasonable
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police Victor waived his right against warrantless searches ground to believe that a crime was being committed
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an “without prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, he voluntarily because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of opened his bag. marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
investigating possible criminal behavior even without ISSUE: WON there was a valid search and seizure of accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and
probable cause; and (2) The safety and self-preservation marijuana attempted to flee. Furthermore, the raiding team had no
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure RULING: No. “Stop and frisk” are conducted to prevent opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed the occurrence of a crime. Its object is either to determine the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that when the
with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such
be used against the police officer status quo temporarily while the police officer to obtain urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant
.In this case, accused-appellant was not, at the more information. The balance lies in the concept could lawfully be dispensed with. The absence of a
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown of"suspiciousness". Experienced police officers have the judicial warrant is valid by the exigencies of the
that he was about to do so or that he had just done so and ability to discern whether an individual is acting in a situation that involves the survival of society and its
there was no overtact that called for his arrest. It was only suspicious manner and the search is illegal because of government and duly constituted authorities.
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the the absence of the requisite of “suspiciousness.”

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 CASE NO. 425
ART 3, SEC 2: Exigent and Emergency Circumstances
Lacerna v DDB
FACTS: Sec. 36 of R.A. No. 9165 imposes the requirement
of mandatory, suspicionless and random drug
tests nationwide among all high school and college students,
all public and private officers, workers and employees, all
local and national candidates for elective and appointive
government positions, and all respondents facing
preliminary investigations of the criminal complaints filed
against them with an imposable penalty exceeding 6 years
and 1 day
ISSUE: WON the mandatory drug testing violate the right to
privacy & the right against unreasonable searches
RULING: Yes. In the case of students, the constitutional
viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing for students starts from the waiver of their right to
privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their
voluntarily submitting to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
becomes a policy and requirement. The persons thus
charged, and submit themselves to drug testing, do not
necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their
right to privacy. The situation is entirely different in the
case of persons charged before the public prosecutors office
with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one
(1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are randomness and
suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime
before the prosecutors office, a mandatory drug testing can
never be random or suspicionless.
To impose mandatory drug testing is a blatant attempt
to violate a person’s right to privacy and forced to
incriminate themselves.
E.C. Perez
CASE NO. 426
ART. III, SEC. 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would
SEIZURES work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument
INSTANCES OF WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND may be accorded plausibility if the drug test
SEIZURES; requirement is optional. But the particular section of
EXIGENT AND EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES; the law, without exception, made drug-testing on those
DRUG, ALCOHOL AND BLOOD TESTS covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the
Pimentel Jr. v. COMELEC obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse
consequences for not adhering to the statutory
FACTS: In these consolidated petitions, (one of which is command. And since the provision deals with candidates
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., vs. COMMISSION ON for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse
ELECTIONS) the constitutionality of Section 36(g) of consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the around the election and the assumption of public office of
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it the candidates.
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
and employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, E.C. Perez
among other personalities, is put in issue. In essence, CASE NO. 427
Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC ART. III, SEC. 2: WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
qualification on senatorial candidates. People v. Dela Cruz
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be FACTS: After receiving a confidential report from an
declared unconstitutional insofar as it imposed an informant, a "buy-bust" operation was conducted by the
additional qualification on senatorial candidates. 13th Narcotics Regional Unit through a team with P/Pfc.
Adolfo Arcoy as poseur-buyer and Pat. Deogracias Gorgonia
RULING: Yes. It is basic that if a law or an administrative to catch the pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy acted as the
rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is poseur-buyer to buy marijuana worth P10.00 from the two
null and void and has no effect. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as accused Juan de la Cruz and Reynaldo Beltran. After
sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC ascertaining that the foil of suspected marijuana was really
resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification marijuana, Arcoy gave the prearranged signal to his
requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the teammates who were strategically positioned in the vicinity,
Constitution. The right of a citizen in the democratic process and they converged at the place, identified themselves as
of election should not be defeated by unwarranted NARCOM agents and effected the arrest of De la Cruz and
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Beltran. Accused-appellants were charged in the RTC with
Constitution. It may of course be argued, in defense of violations Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of
the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision 1972). From this decision, accused Juan de la Cruz y
does not expressly state that non - compliance with the
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Gonzales and co-accused Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban MAIN POINT IN BOLD. inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Search and
interposed the instant appeal. E.C. Perez seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
CASE NO. 428 obtained there from may be admissible in the following
ISSUE: Whether or not the Buy-Bust Operation being done ART. III, SEC. 2: WARRANTLESS ARRESTS instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; 2) search
to enforce Republic Act 6425 is unconstitutional and any IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
evidence acquired under such method should not be People v. Doria customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5)
admissible in court. when the accused himself waives his right against
FACTS: Accused-appellants Doria and Gaddao were charged unreasonable searches and seizures. Accused-appellant
RULING: No. There being no violation of the constitutional with violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A buy- Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust
right against unreasonable search and seizure, the bust operation was conducted by the police which caught operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a)
confiscated articles are admissible in evidence. While the accused Doria red-handed of selling prohibited drugs and of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to
Court is not unmindful of the fact that the common modus during the operation, the police officers searched for the the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for
operandi of narcotic agents in utilizing poseur-buyers does marked bills that they used in buying said drugs which appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her
not always commend itself as the most reliable way to go happened to be in the house of Gaddao, according to Doria. arrest in "hot pursuit.” In fact, she was going about her daily
after violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the proliferation When they reached her house, the police officers came upon chores when the policemen pounced on her.
of drug addiction and trafficking has already reached an a box which contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to
alarming level and experience has proven entrapment to be be dried marijuana leaves. MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
an effective means of apprehending drug peddlers as
exemplified by this case. The Solicitor General explains that ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Doria and E.C. Perez
a buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace Gaddao as well as the search of the latter’s person and CASE NO. 429
officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante delicto house was valid. ART. III, SEC. 2: WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
which is essentially a form of entrapment since the peace IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
officer neither instigates nor induces the accused to commit RULING: Yes as to warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Espiritu v. Lim
a crime. Entrapment is the employment of such ways and Doria. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as
means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a provided by Section 5 of Rule 113. Under Section 5 (a), a FACTS: 8 petitions have been consolidated because of the
lawbreaker from whose mind the criminal intent originated. person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of the
While it is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to writ of habeas corpus ordering the respective respondents
is seizure of evidence from one's person without a commit an offense." Appellant Doria was caught in the act to produce the bodies of the persons named therein.
search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is of committing an offense. When an accused is Particularly in Espiritu v. Lim, Deogracias Espiritu through
not necessary, the search being incident to a lawful apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy- tri-media, was heard urging all drivers and operators to go
arrest. A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a bust operation, the police are not only authorized but on nationwide strike to force the government to give into
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. their demands to lower the prices of spare parts,
has committed, is actually committing or is attempting commodities, water and the immediate release from
to commit an offense. It is a matter of judicial No as to the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the detention of the president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang
experience that in the arrest of violators of the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the Samahan ng Tsuper Operators Nationwide). Further,
Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the box of marijuana and marked bills. Our Constitution Espiritu, taking the place of PISTON president Medardo
malefactors were invariably caught red-handed. proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant Roda likewise announced the formation of the Alliance
and any evidence obtained without such warrant is Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike. In their

165
respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not available to
the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are
detained by virtue of valid informations filed in court
against them. The petitioners counter that their detention is
unlawful as their arrests were made without warrant and,
that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so
that the informations filed against them are null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the persons detained have been
illegally arrested or arbitrarily deprived of their
constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances
attending these cases warrant their release on habeas
corpus.
RULING: No. The Court has carefully reviewed the
contentions of the parties in their respective pleadings, and
it finds that the record of the instant cases would show that
the persons in whose behalf these petitions for habeas
corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were
actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that
their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and
that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid
informations filed against them in court. In Espiritu vs. Lim,
the release on habeas corpus of the petitioner Deogracias
Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an Information for
Violation of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting
to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is
similarly not warranted. The arrest of a person without a
warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in
law. The occasions or instances when such an arrest
may be effected without a warrant are clearly spelled
out under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, as amended, when the person
arrested is caught in flagrante delicto, viz., in the act of
committing an offense; or when an offense has just been
committed and the person making the arrest has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the
person arrested has committed it. arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that
he was committing as offense when arrested. The
MAIN POINT IN BOLD. crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
E.C. Perez commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed
CASE NO. 430 in furtherance therefore in connection therewith
ART. III, SEC. 2: WARRANTLESS ARRESTS constitute direct assaults against the state and are in
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO the nature of continuing crimes.
Umil v. Fidel Ramos
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
FACTS: Military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes AR
Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a CASE NO. 431
confidential information which was received by their office, ART III SEC 2: WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That People vs. Sucro
the wounded man in the said hospital was among the 5 male
"sparrows" who murdered 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols the
day before at about noon, before a road hump along FACTS: Fulgencio was monitoring activities of appellant
Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded Sucro because of an information that Sucro was selling
man's name was listed by the hospital management as marijuana. Sucro was seen to have talked and exchanged
"Ronnie Javellon," 22 years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City things three times. During the transaction with the 3 rd
Homes, Biñ an, Laguna however it was disclosed later that buyer, Macabante, police officers intercepted. Macabante
the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the
view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from
the Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security Sucro. The police thereafter arrested Sucro without an
reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified arrest warrant. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of
by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 marijuana.
CAPCOM mobile patrols.
ISSUE: WON appellant’s arrest without warrant is lawful.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Rolando Dural was lawfully
arrested. HELD: YES. A peace officer or private person may, without
RULING: Yes. It clearly appears that Dural was not arrested warrant, arrest a person:
while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers  When in his presence, the person to be arrested has
aforementioned nor was he arrested just after the committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day to commit an offense;
after the said shooting incident; seemingly, his arrest  When an offense has in fact just been committed,
without warrant is unjustified, however Dural was arrested and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive that the person to be arrested has committed it;
166
It would suffice if the overt acts were to be seen by a RULING: Yes. The NARCOM agents’ procedure in the
police officer, although from a distance. Fulgencio, within entrapment of the accused failed to meet the qualification
a distance of 2 meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious that the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed
activity, and the fact that Macabante, was caught throwing in the act of selling marijuana to a person posing as a buyer,
the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted since the operation was conducted after the actual
that he bought the same from accused-appellant clearly exchange. Said raid also violated accused’ right against
indicates that Sucro had just committed an illegal act of unreasonable search and seizure, as the situation did not
which the police officers had personal knowledge. fall in the circumstances wherein a search may be validly
made even without a search warrant, i.e. when the search is
AR incidental to a lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited
CASE NO. 432 articles in plain view. The NARCOM agents could not have
ART III SEC 2: WARRANTLESS ARRESTS justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO of the situation because the testimonies of the
People vs. Rodrigueza prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already
been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it
been their intention to conduct the raid, then they
FACTS: NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after should, because they easily could, have first secured a
gaining information that there was an ongoing illegal traffic search warrant during that time.
of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents AR
were given money treated with ultraviolet powder. One of CASE NO. 433
the agents went to said location, asked for a certain Don. ART III SEC 2: WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him and “a IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
certain object wrapped in a plastic” later identified as People vs. Yap
marijuana was given in exchange for P200. The agent went
back to headquarters and made a report, based on which, a
team was subsequently organized and a raid was conducted FACTS: Accused-appellant Yap were charged with a
in the house of the father of the accused. During the raid, the
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act for having sold in
NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana Ozamiz City six sticks of marijuana for a consideration of
leaves and a plastic syringe among others. There was no 10php. 2 buy-bust operations were scheduled to be
authorization by any search warrant. The accused was conducted simultaneously inside the public market of
found positive of ultraviolet powder. The lower court, Ozamiz City. Upon seeing appellant Yap, poseur-buyer
considering the evidences obtained and testimonies from Raterta approached and offered to buy marijuana,
the prosecution, found him guilty of violating the Dangerouswhereupon six sticks thereof were delivered to him after he
Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua. handed the marked ten-peso bill to Yap. Immediately after
the consummation of said sale of the six sticks of marijuana,
ISSUE: WON the arrest and seizure were illegally conducted. Sgt. Mugot, who was four to five meters away, saw appellant
go inside the public market. They did not immediately
arrest the latter as they were still waiting for the result of
the other buy-bust operation conducted by another group in
the same vicinity, and knowledge of their presence might
alarm other drug pushers who may be present therein.
When the other group informed Sgt. Mugot that their
operation failed, he and his companions forthwith arrested
both appellants and brought them to their headquarters.
ISSUE: WON there was a valid warrantless arrest.
HELD: Yes. A peace officer or a private person may effect
an arrest without a warrant when an offense has in fact
just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it. Sgt. Mugot had personal knowledge of the
commission of the crime, having been present in the locus
criminis and having actually witnessed the unlawful
transaction. The interval between the commission of the
crime and the time of the arrests was only four to five
minutes. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
employed by peace officers to apprehend a malefactor
in flagrante delicto, that is, to catch him red-handed while
selling marijuana to a person acting as a poseur-buyer.
AR
CASE NO. 434
ART III SEC 2: WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
People vs. Alolod
FACTS: Accused Alolod was found guilty of Robbery with
Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearm. A passenger
jeepney driven by one Alberto Juan was cruising along
Quirino Highway. On board were four (4) passengers
including accused Alolod. All of a sudden Alolod grabbed
the plastic bag held by one of the passengers. The latter
resisted. Alolod then pulled out a gun and shot de Vera
point-blank. As a result, blood oozed from the body of de
167
Vera. But, despite his wound, he insisted on wrestling with
Alolod for the possession of the bag until the latter fired a
second shot. As they grappled they fell from the jeepney. As
Alolod and de Vera continued to struggle, SPOI Eduardo
Liberato arrived but Alolod succeeded in running away with
the bag. Liberato pursued Alolod until he caught up with
him. Accused now comes on appeal contending that the trial
court erred in appreciating evidence for the prosecution
that were manifestly "fruits of the poisonous tree."
ISSUE: WON there was a valid warrantless arrest.
RULING: Yes. The police officers, particularly SPOI Liberato,
appropriately responded to the call of duty by immediately
chasing the suspected criminal. A peace officer may effect
warrantless arrest when in his presence the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense or, an offense has just
in fact been committed, and he has reasonable
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it. SPOI Liberato arrived when
accused Alolod and victim Romeo de Vera were still
wrestling with each other. As the officer approached them
Alolod ran away so that Liberato had no recourse but
pursue him until he was arrested. That was a legitimate
arrest without warrant. Alolod was actually committing a
crime in the presence of the police officer or at least had just
committed it, and the police officer had personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that Alolod had committed the
crime. In this case, the warrantless arrest being legal, any
evidence gathered as a result thereof cannot be considered
"fruit of a poisonous tree;" consequently, it is admissible.
AR
CASE NO. 435
ART III SEC 2: WARRANTLESS ARRESTS
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
People vs. Mengote
being committed in their presence. Moreover, a person
FACTS: The Western Police District received a call from an may not be stopped and frisked in a broad daylight or
informer that there were 3 suspicious looking persons at on a busy street on unexplained suspicion.
the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo,
Manila. A surveillance team was forthwith dispatched. The CASE NO. 436
patrolmen saw two men looking from side to side, one of ARTICLE III, SEC 2: 7 Warrantless Arrests
whom holding his abdomen. They approached the persons A. In Flagrante Delicto
and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two Pp v Elamparo
tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen Facts: Joel Elamparo (D) has been convicted with Illegal
surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of Possession of Drugs and penalized with reclusion perpetua.
them the accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber The case was raised for automatic review.
with live ammunitions in it, while his companion had a fan
knife. An information was filed before the RTC convicting Police Officer Baldonado of Caloocan City Police received a
the accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. Accused report from an informant that "some people are selling
claims that the weapon was planted on him at the time of shabu and marijuana somewhere in Bagong Bario, Caloocan
his arrest. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not City." Thus, Baldonado organized a buy-bust team and
admissible as evidence against him because it had been deployed at a known "market" for buyers of marijuana.
illegally seized. Thereafter, a runner approached the poseur-buyer to
confirm an order. The runner then left and returned with
ISSUE: WON the warrantless search and arrest was illegal. the marijuana. Gaviola, the poseur-buyer and buy-bust team
member then handed over the marked money and arrested
HELD: Yes. An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal the runner who freed himself and ran.
search and seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any
purpose. An arrest without warrant is lawful when: (a) the The buy-bust team pursued the runner, who ran inside a
person to be arrested has committed, is actually bungalow-type house with steel gate. Having trapped the
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when runner inside the house, the police officers frisked him and
the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has recovered the marked money. The police officers likewise
personal knowledge of the facts indicating the person found Joel Elamparo (D) repacking five bricks of
arrested has committed it and (c) the person to be arrested "marijuana" wrapped in a newspaper on top of the round
has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he table inside the house. Elamparo (D) was then arrested.
is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his Issue: W/N the warrantless arrest of Elamparo valid?
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred Held: Yes. The members of the buy bust team were
from one confinement to another. These requirements have justified in running after him and entering the house
not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the without a search warrant for they were hot in the heels
arrest in question, the accused appellant was merely of a fleeing criminal. Once inside the house, the police
looking from side to side and holding his abdomen, officers cornered Spencer and recovered the buy-bust
according to the arresting officers themselves. There was money from him. They also caught appellant
apparently no offense that has just been committed or was
168
in flagrante delicto repacking the marijuana bricks
which were in full view on top of a table.
Five generally accepted exceptions to the right against
warrantless searches and seizures have been judicially
formulated: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2)
search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4)
customs searches, and (5) waiver by the accused
themselves of their right against unreasonable search and
seizure. This case falls squarely under the plain view
doctrine
MP in Bold:
CASE NO. 437
ARTICLE III, SEC 2: 7 Warrantless Arrests
A. In Flagrante Delicto
Cajili v PP
Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of RA 9165.
Prosecution claims that arresting officers allegedly caught
him coming out of the house of certain Jacinta Mariano who
is contended to be selling prohibited drugs. The officers
further claimed that they chased the tricycle and after
catching up with it, they requested Rizaldy to alight and
noticed that he ws holding a match box., SPO1 Amposta
while examining it found a small transparent plastic sachet
which contained a white crystalline substance. Suspecting
that the substance was a regulated drug, the group accosted
Rizaldy and the tricycle driver. The group brought the two
to the police station. Defense on the other hand claimed
that petitioner was on his way home together with Darwin
Reyes after transporting a passenger with his passenger
jeep, when they were apprehended by 4 armed men who
claimed to be police claiming that he bought drugs from
Alapan.
RTC rendered its decision finding that Sanchez was
caught in flagrante delicto,in actual possession of shabu.
Sanchez appealed before the CA but the latter upheld RTC’s
decision. MR of petitioner was likewise denied. Hence the
petition where Sanchez raised the issue
Issue: W/N the warrantless arrest and search on him were pot session (1) lighter; (1) rolled tissue paper; (1)
invalid due to the absence of probable cause on the part of aluminium tin foil.
the police officers to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest
under Section 15, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court? The confiscated the items were placed in the plastic
Held: Yes. The evidence on record reveals that no overt pack of misua wrapper, and made initial markings. At the
physical act could be properly attributed to Sanchez as to police station, the paraphernalia recovered from Saraum
rouse suspicion in the minds of the police operatives that he were also marked. After the case was filed, the subject items
had just committed, was committing, or was about to were turned over to the property custodian of the Office
commit a crime. Sanchez was merely seen by the police of City Prosecutor. Saraum denied the commission of
operatives leaving the residence of a known drug peddler, the alleged offense. He testified that he was just passing
and boarding a tricycle that proceeded towards the when he was held by men with firearms. He learned of
direction of Kawit, Cavite. Such acts cannot in any way be the criminal charge only when he was brought to the court.
considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Sanchez had RTC find Saraum guilty of the charge. CA affirmed the
exhibited unusual or strange acts, or at the veryleast decision of the RTC. On appeal, Saraum questioned the
appeared suspicious, the same would not have been decision of the lower court in finding him guilty of illegal
considered overt acts in order for the police officers to possession of paraphernalia and the chain of custody of the
effect a lawful warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of items seized.
Section 5, Rule 113.
MP: For warrantless arrest under paragraph (a) of Section 5 Issue: W/N the arrest conducted was valid?
(in flagrante delicto arrest) to operate, two elements must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt Held & MP: Yes. Saraum was arrested during the
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually commission of a crime, which instance does not require a
committing, or is attempting tocommit a crime; and (2) such warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
overt act is done in the presence or withinthe view of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.11 In arrest in
arresting officer. flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very
moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has
CASE NO. 438 just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting
ARTICLE III, SEC 2: 7 Warrantless Arrests officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
A. In Flagrante Delicto requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
Saraum vs PP execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
Facts: On August 17, 2006, a telephone call was received by actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
PO3 Larrobis regarding the illegal drug activities in Sitio and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the
Camansi, Barangay Lorega, CebuCity. A buy-bust team was view of the arresting officer.
then formed in coordination with the (PDEA) against a
certain "Pata."During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as CASE NO. 439
he tried to run towards his shanty. The operatives entered ARTICLE III, SEC 2: 7 Warrantless Arrests
the shanty where Saraum and Esperanzawere holding drug A. In Flagrante Delicto
paraphernalia apparently in preparation to have a "shabu" PP vs. Badilla
169
Facts: On September 6, 2010, around 10:15 p.m., PO2 Paras
received a phone call from a concerned citizen informing
him that someone was indiscriminately firing a gun at
BMBA Compound, 4th Avenue, Caloocan City. PO2 Paras and
his companions responded to the call and reached the target
area around 10:25 p.m. There they saw the petitioner,
standing along the alley. Appellant was suspiciously in the
act of pulling or drawing something from his pocket; thus,
as a precautionary measure, and thinking that a concealed
weapon was inside his pocket, PO2 Paras immediately
introduced himself as a police officer, held appellant's arm,
and asked the latter to bring out his hand from his pocket. It
turned out that appellant was holding a plastic sachet with
white crystalline substance. PO2 Paras confiscated the
plastic sachet from appellant, informed him of his
constitutional rights, and arrested him. Appellant and the
confiscated plastic sachet were brought to the Station Anti-
Illegal Drags-Special Operation Task Group (SAID-SOTG)
Office where PO2 Paras marked the plastic sachet with
"BP/EBB 07 Sept 2010."9chanrobleslaw
In the trial before the RTC it was held that appellant was
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
Aggrieved, appellant appealed the aforesaid Decision to the
CA but the latter affirmed RTC’s decision. Hence, the appeal
before the SC where petitioner claimed:
Issue: W/N the arrest of the petitioner was illegal?
Held & MP: No. Appellant was arrested during the
commission of a crime, which instance does not require a
warrant in accordance with Section 5(a) of Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Such arrest is
commonly known as in flagrante delicto. For a warrantless
arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid,
two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to Held: No. Considering that PO3 Peñ amora was at a
commit a crime; and, (2) such overt act is done in the considerable distance away from the alleged criminal
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. transaction (five [5] to ten [10] meters), not to mention the
atomity of the object thereof (0.04 gram of white crystalline
substance contained in a plastic sachet), the Court finds it
CASE NO. 440 highly doubtful that said arresting officer was able to
ARTICLE III, SEC 2: 7 Warrantless Arrests reasonably ascertain that any criminal activity was afoot so
A. In Flagrante Delicto as to prompt him to conduct a lawful in flagrante
Sindac vs Pp delicto arrest and, thereupon, a warrantless search. It
Facts: Sindac was charged with illegal possession of DD should also be pointed out that no criminal overt act could
under RA 9165. Prosec alleged that Sindac was under be properly attributed to Sindac so as to rouse any
surveillance and that PO3Peñ amora and PO1 PO1 Asis saw reasonable suspicion in the mind of either PO3 Peñ amora or
Sindac headed for Barangay Poblacion Uno, prompting them PO1 Asis that Sindac had just committed, was committing,
to follow him. Along the national road of said barangay, the or was about to commit a crime. Sindac's actuations of
2 officers saw Sindac meet with a certain Cañ on who sold talking to and later on, receiving an unidentified object from
and handed over a plastic sachet to him. Suspecting that the Cañ on, without more, should not be considered as ongoing
sachet contained shabu, PO3 Peñ amora and PO1 Asis rushed criminal activity that would render proper an in flagrante
to the scene and introduced themselves as police officers. delicto arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised
Cañ on escaped but the policemen were able to apprehend Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Sindac. When ordered to empty his pocket, Sindac brought
out his wallet which contained a small plastic sachet MARTIN
containing white crystalline substance. After initially
determining that such substance is shabu, the policemen CASE NO. 441
arrested Sindac and brought him to the police station. The ARTICLE III, SEC. 2: Hot Pursuit
substance was positively found as Shabu after laboratory Go v. CA
examination.
FACTS: Petitioner entered a one-way street and travelled in
Later the RTC found Sindac guilty beyond reasonable doubt the “wrong” direction. When Magauan (victim) and
of the crime charged. On appeal the CA affirmed Sindac's petitioner’s cars almost nearly bumped each other,
conviction, holding that the prosecution had established the petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot
presence of all the elements of the crime of illegal Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and
possession of DD. Sindac filed MR but was denied hence, left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was
ythe petitionwhere he raised issue of : able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police
arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting (plate
Issue: w/n Sindacs conviction for violation of Section 11, number turned out to be registered in petitioner’s wife
Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld. name). Eventually, the victim succumbed to his wounds. Six
(6) days after the shooting incident, petitioner presented
himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news
170
reports that he was being hunted by the police and has been
positively identified by an eyewitness to the shooting. The
police forthwith detained him. Hence, counsel for petitioner
filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate
release alleging that the warrantless arrest of petitioner was
unlawful.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest made by the
police was lawful.
RULING/MAIN POINT:: No. Under the Sec. 5, Rule 113,
Rules on Criminal Procedure, a peace officer or a private
person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When,
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to
be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. The "arrest" effected six (6) days after the
shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when the
shooting had in fact just been committed" could not be
within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the
"arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of
facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had
shot Maguan. The information had been derived from
statements made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting
and such does not constitute "personal knowledge." Thus, it
must be the arresting officer who shall have personal
knowledge of the crime.
MARTIN
CASE NO. 442
ARTICLE III, SEC. 2: Hot Pursuit
People v. Manlulu ARTICLE III, SEC. 2: Hot Pursuit
People v. Rodrigueza
FACTS: Herein accused were convicted by the trial court of
the crime of Murder. Alfaro, the victim, was stabbed by FACTS: Accused-appellant Rodrigueza was found guilty of a
Alfaro (accused) in the chest with a 6-inch double-bladed violation (possession and sale of marijuana leaves) of the
knife then Manlulu (accused) followed suit and stabbed Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The issue stemmed when an
Alfaro in the abdomen several times with an ice pick. informer told a Narcotics Regional Unit of an ongoing illegal
Moreover, Samson (using the gun of Alfaro) also shot the traffic of prohibited drugs involving herein accuse. After a
victim in the neck. The incident happened during a drinking buy-bust operation conducted against accused, a team was
session and at around one o'clock in the morning. ordered to arrest the accused even without warrant of
Nonetheless, Patrolman Reynaldo Perez recounted that at arrest when the latter was apprehended. However, the next
around seven o'clock in the evening of the same day of the day after the arrest, Rodrigueza was released from
incident, he, together with some other officers, arrested detention.
Manlulu (without warrant) on the information given by
Manlapaz (witness). ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest made against
Rodrigueza was valid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of Manlulu, without
warrant, was valid. RULING/MAIN POINT: No. A buy-bust operation is a form
of entrapment employed by peace officers to trap and catch
RULING/ MAIN POINT: No. In the instant case, neither did a malefactor in flagrante delicto. Applied to the case at bar,
Pat. Perez have "personal knowledge," nor was the the term in flagrante delicto requires that the suspected
offense "in fact just been committed." The killing took drug dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of
place at one o'clock in the morning. The arrest and the selling marijuana or any prohibited drug to a person acting
consequent search and seizure came at around seven or posing as a buyer. In the instant case, however, the
o'clock that evening, some nineteen hours later. This procedure adopted by the NARCOM agents failed to meet
instance cannot come within the purview of a valid this qualification. Based on the very evidence of the
warrantless arrest. Moreover, while Pat. Perez may have prosecution, after the alleged consummation of the sale of
personally gathered the information which led to the arrest dried marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately released
of Manlulu, that is not enough. The law requires "personal appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking him
knowledge." Obviously, "personal gathering of into his custody. This act of CIC Taduran, assuming
information" is different from "personal knowledge." arguendo that the supposed sale of marijuana did take
The rule requires that the arrest immediately follows place, is decidedly contrary to the natural course of
the commission of the offense, not some nineteen hours things and inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of
later. a buy-bust operation. It is rather absurd on his part to
let appellant escape without having been subjected to
MARTIN the sanctions imposed by law. It is, in fact, a dereliction of
duty by an agent of the law.
CASE NO. 443
171
MARTIN MARTIN
CASE NO. 444
ARTICLE III, SEC. 2: Hot Pursuit CASE NO. 445
People v. Enrile ARTICLE III, SEC. 2: Hot Pursuit
People v. Jayson
FACTS: Enrile was charged for the violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act. The issue stemmed when Abugatal FACTS: Patrolmen received a radio message that there was
(Enrile’s co-accused but killed because of an attempted jail a shooting incident in Ihaw-Ihaw on Bonifacio Street.
break), who was caught from a buy-bust operation, together Because of this, they proceeded to the scene and saw the
with the policemen, went to a house where Enrile was victim. Bystanders pointed to accused-appellant as the one
staying. Thereafter, the former pointed he latter and who had shot Jordan. They then arrested accused-appellant.
accused him as the source of the marijuana confiscated from Hence, there was a warrantless arrest conducted.
the mentioned operation. This then caused the policemen to
immediately arrest herein accused Enrile absent any ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid.
warrant of arrest. Hence, accused challenges the trial court’s
decision for violation of the Constitutional right against RULING/ MAIN POINT:: Yes. The Supreme Court has held
unlawful arrest. in analogous circumstances from several decided cases that
a warrantless arrest is valid when an offense has in fact just
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest made against been committed, and he has personal knowledge (even if
Enrile is valid. did not personally witnessed the crime) of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it provided
RULING/MAIN POINT: No. Abugatal’s that the incident only happened moments before the arrest
accusation/confession against Enrile is in itself does not and attendant by other related circumstances such as the
justify Enrile's warrantless arrest and search. Under Rule fleeing of accused or obvious manifestations of the crime
113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, paragraphs (a) and (b) connecting the accused to the incident. In the case at bar
are clearly inapplicable. Paragraph (b) is also not in point there was a shooting. The policemen summoned to the
because the policemen who later arrested Enrile at his scene of the crime found the victim. Accused-appellant was
house had no personal knowledge that he was the source pointed to them as the assailant only moments after the
of marijuana. According to the policemen themselves, what shooting. In fact accused-appellant had not gone very far
happened was that they asked Abugatal who gave him the (only ten meters away from the Ihaw-Ihaw), although he
marijuana and were told it was Enrile. It was for this reason was then fleeing. The arresting officers thus acted on the
that they proceeded to Enrile's house and immediately basis of personal knowledge of the death of the victim
arrested him. What the policemen should have done was and of facts indicating that accused-appellant was the
secure a search warrant on the basis of the information assailant.
supplied by Abugatal, and then, with such authority,
proceeded to search and, if the search was fruitful, arrest Sheena
Enrile. Enrile was not caught in flagrante delicto. Case No. 446
Art III Section 2. Warrantless Arrests - Hot Pursuit
People v. Joselito Del Rosario
Facts:
Accused Rosario, a tricycle driver, was found guilty as co-
principal for committing the special complex crime of
Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Bernas, a 66-yo
businesswoman.
Witness Alonzo, also a tricycle driver testified that there
were two men who alighted from the tricycle. Who are,
accused Visaya who snatched the victim’s purse, and
accused Marquez who chased away the man who was trying
to assist the victim. Victim was shot on the head.
Afterwards, they boarded the tricycle. Alonzo reported the
incident to the police.
Rosario pleaded not guilty on the ground that he was unable
to flee the scene of the crime or to assist the victim because
he was being threatened at gun point by Accused Santos
that if he reports the incident to the police, his family would
be in danger.
During the police raid a day after, Rosario was handcuffed
by the police because allegedly they had already gathered
enough evidence against him.
Rosario alleged that his arrest was unlawful because there
was no warrant of arrest.
Issue:
W/N an arrest a day after the commission of the crime
without a warrant is a lawful warrantless arrest.
Ruling:
NO. Respondent was arrested during the police raid at the
place of accused Marquez, his arrest was invalid because he
wasn’t caught in the act or caught immediately after the
consummation of the act. Therefore, his arrest was outside
the ambit of the exception on warrantless arrests
because he was arrested on the day after the
commission of the offense. The appreciable lapse of
time requires a warrantless arrest, also the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge of the offense
committed.
172
Main point in bold. Detailed version below. threat. fitted Cubcubin, and who said he knew where Cubcubin
2 stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be Issue: W/N appellant’s arrest was a valid warrantless lived and accompanied the police team to Cubcubin’s house.
effected: (1) an offense has just been committed; and (2) the arrest. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. found a bloodied white t-shirt upon
person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts Ruling: entering the house. When he picked up the t-shirt, two spent
indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it. NO. The killing of the Balisis was not done in the presence of .38 caliber shells fell from it.
Hence, there must be a large measure of immediacy the arresting officers. Since it took place on September 2, The police investigators asked Cubcubin where the fatal gun
between the time the offense was committed and the time 1996, it could not have been considered as having just been was then was taken to the police station for evaluation of
of the arrest, and if there was an appreciable lapse of time committed. Evidently, they unlawfully arrested appellant on the evidence. A criminal complaint for murder was filed
between the arrest and the commission of the crime, a September 10, 1996. In order for a warrantless arrest to against Cubcubin.
warrant of arrest must be secured. be valid, the peace officer or private individual must: 1.) Cubcubin contends that his arrest, effected on August 26,
when, in their presence, the person to be arrested has 1997 without a warrant, was illegal.
Sheena committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to Issue:
Case No. 447 commit, an offense; 2.) when an offense has just been W/N an arrest without personal knowledge that a criminal
Art III Section 2. Warrantless Arrests - Hot Pursuit committed, and they have probable cause to believe, committed the act is valid.
People v. Guillermo Samus based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, Ruling:
Facts: that the person to be arrested has committed it and 3.) NO. 2 conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to
On September 2, accused Samus, a farmer in the land in when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has be valid: first, the offender has just committed an
Laguna, was found guilty for the killing of Balisi, the 62-yo escaped while being transferred from one confinement offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or
neighbor of Samus’ father, and her 6-year old grandson by to another, or from a penal establishment where he or private person has personal knowledge of facts
strangling and banging their heads to a concrete which she is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
caused their death. while the case is pending. None of these circumstances it. It has been held that "'personal knowledge of facts' in
Senior Inspector Garcia received an order to investigate the was present when the CIG arrested Samus. He was not a arrests without a warrant must be based upon probable
murder then discovered that the elder Balisi’s earrings were prisoner. cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
missing. On September 10, the Criminal Investigation Group Main point in bold. grounds of suspicion."
(CIC) went to the Vallejo’s house where Samus was sighted In this case, the arrest of Cubcubin was effected shortly after
and asked permission to enter, which was granted. Samus Sheena the victim was killed. The question, therefore, is whether
was seen crawling on the roof then jumped from the roof. Case No. 448 there was "probable cause" the arresting officers, to believe
They ordered him to stop. The CIG closed in on Samus, who Art III Section 2. Warrantless Arrests - Hot Pursuit that Cubcubin committed the crime. They did not have
admitted the killings upon a query from Rolly Vallejo. People v. Cubcubin "personal knowledge of facts". They merely relied on
Samus was then brought to PNP Investigation Office where Facts: information given to them by others.
he was informed of his constitutional rights and in the In August 26, 1997, Cavite PNP station received a report Main point in bold.
following day, was assisted by Atty. Juliano while accused that a man had been killed along Julian Felipe Boulevard; an
gave his statement admitting the killings. alleged witness saw Cubcubin and the victim coming out of Sheena
Samus alleged that the CIG did not have a warrant for his the Sting Cafe; the waitress at the Sting Café said that the Case No. 449
arrest. He was brought to PNP Office where he was man who was last seen with the victim was lean, Art III Section 2. Warrantless Arrests - Hot Pursuit
tortured until he lost his consciousness and was brought to mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was wearing a white People v. Gerente
a hospital. He was forced by the CIG to admit the killing of t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; a tricycle driver told Facts:
the victims and the sale of jewelry by means of torture and them that the physical description given by the waitress

173
Gerente killed of certain Blace and was arrested by the
police.
Valenzuela Police Station patrolman Urrutia received a
report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling
incident. The patrolman went to the Valenzuela District
Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by
that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was
massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy
object.
Patrolman Urrutia with police team proceeded to where the
mauling incident took place and found a piece of wood with
blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana.
Witness informed them that she saw the killing and she
pointed to Gerente as one of the three men who killed Blace.
The policemen proceeded to the house of the Gerente who
was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house
and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman
Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his
pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette
foil. The dried leaves were sent to the NBI for examination.
Gerente was arrested without a warrant. Hence this
petition.
Issue: W/N the policemen had personal knowledge of the
facts rendering the warrantless arrest valid.
Ruling:
YES. The arrest without warrant was lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;"
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed,
and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it;
The policemen arrested Gerente only some 3 hours after
Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Issue:
Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the
scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death. The
eye-witness reported the happening to the policemen and
pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers.
Under those circumstances, since the policemen had
personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of
facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him,
they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant.
Main point in bold.
Sheena
Case No. 450
Art III Section 2. Warrantless Arrests - Hot Pursuit
Padilla v. CA
Facts:
Robin Padilla was involved in a hit and run accident in Oct
26, 1992 as reported to the police. The police stationed
themselves at the Abacan bridge in response said report, he
was later on apprehended there. Upon arrest 4 high
powered firearms and ammunitions were found in his
possession. Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home.
His arrest for hit and run incident modified to include
grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no papers.
On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal
Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC. RTC
convicted him and sentenced to reclusion temporal without
bailbond.
CA confirmed decision. RTC was directed to issue order of
arrest.
Padilla filed Motion for reconsideration but was denied by
CA.
All of a sudden, Solicitor General made a complete
turnaround and filed “Manifestation in Lieu of Comment”
praying for his acquittal after Padilla filed lots of other
petitions.
W/N Padilla’s the arrest which has been set in motion in a
public place for want of a warrant as the police was
confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action is
a valid arrest.
Ruling:
YES. The exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit, a
fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public place and
the raining nighttime - all created a situation in which
speed is essential and delay improvident.
The Court acknowledges police authority to make the
forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable
and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle
has been engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, when
caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an
unlicensed firearm and ammunition (M-16, petitioner's
warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually
committing another offense (illegal possession of
firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence
of a peace officer.
Main point in bold. Additional info.
The policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could
likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact
just committed an offense. There was no supervening event
or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and
the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed
themselves at the Abacan bridge in response to a report, the
policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero
of petitioner, its dangling plate number, and the dented
hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the
arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle
involved in the hit and run incident. The arresting police
officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on
unreliable hearsay information.
Case No. 451
174
 Section2, Article III
7. Warrantless Arrests
B. Hot Pursuit
People v. Burgos
Facts: Burgos was charged with illegal possession of
firearms and accused to be a member of the NPA. This
allegation was made after the surrender of a former
member of the NPA Masinlok. Mainsinlok claims that
Burgos forced him to join the NPA and threaten to kill his
family. Burgos was then arrested without a warrant. The
police also searched his house without a search warrant
however they found gun buried underneath the land where
the house is located. Burgos denies the allegation charges
against him he contend that it was Masinlok who buried the
gun himself.
Issue: W/N Burgos warrantless arrest justified
Ruling: No. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer
arresting a person who has just committed, is committing,
or is about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed
in his presence or within his view.
Main Point: Personal knowledge required of an officer
arresting a person who has just committed, is committing,
or is about to commit an offense
Case No. 452
Section2, Article III
7. Warrantless Arrests
B. Hot Pursuit
People v. Sucro
Facts: Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo,
Aklan, was under surveillance and saw the accused Sucro
selling drugs in a chapel. Seeing the transaction made he
radioed his commanding officer but was told to continue the
surveillance. After two days the police apprehended Sucro
and was charge in violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The
Accused now contends that his arrest was illegal, being a
violation of his rights granted under Section 2, Artilce III of
the 1987 Constitution. He stresses that there was sufficient
time for the police officers to apply for a search and arrest
warrants considering that Fulgencio informed his Station
Commander of the activities of the accused two days before
the date of his arrest.
Issue: W/N the warrantless arrest don’t towards Sucro
illegally done since it violates his constitutional rights
Ruling: No. An offense is committed in the presence or
within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule
authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer
sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the
disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the
scene thereof.
Main Point: When a police officer sees the offense, although
at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby, and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an
arrest without a warrant.
Case No. 453
Section2, Article III
7. Warrantless Arrests
B. Hot Pursuit
People v. Briones
Facts: Briones, Javier and Allied conspired and stole money
from the Sps Gutirrez. During the commission of the
robbery the accused-appellants hit the spouses with
different objects that resulted to their death. The following
morning the “eye witness” disclosed the information the
police. The police formed teams and apprehended the
culprits thereafter.
Issue: W/N the accused- appellant were under an invalid
since there was no warrant
Ruling: Yes. It is unequivocally clear that no valid arrest
was made on the accused-appellants, the arrest having been
made without any warrant at all. Neither can the appellants'
arrest qualify as a lawful arrest without a warrant under
Sec. 5 (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
because the police officer who effected the arrest
indubitably had no personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed the crime. It is
eyewitness Francisco who had such personal knowledge, In
like manner, We cannot accept appellee's bare allegation
that Briones was a fugitive from justice at the time of the
latter's arrest because it is not supported by the evidence on
record. In sum, therefore, the warrantless arrest of the
appellants is illegal.
Main Point:Mere allegations and without the proper
authorities witnessing the actual crime constitutes to illegal
arrest
Case No. 454
Section2, Article III
7. Warrantless Arrests
B. Hot Pursuit
People v. Sequino
Facts: A robbery had took place after some armed men tried
to stop the delivery of wages to a hacienda in Cebu. After the
robbery the police received a report and found the getaway
motorcycle without the perpetrators but they found a paper
which was a biodata containing the “Melvida, Nenito” and
the entry for the father’s name filled in with “Elpidio
Melvida”. Luna the policeman took Melvida to the police
station instead kept him there the whole night and placed a
bail only then he was allowed to leave. During the
investigation Melvina was without a counsel.
Issue: W/N a valid warrantless arrest was effected
Ruling: No. Luna’s basis for arresting Melvida was the bio-
data sheet with Melvida’s name on it found at the crime
scene. By no means can this indicate that Melvida
committed the offense charged. It does not even connote
that Melvida was at the crime scene for the biodata sheet
could have been obtained by anyone and left at the crime
scene long before or after the crime was committed. Luna,
therefore, had no personal knowledge of facts indicating
175
Melvida’s guilt; at best, he had an unreasonable suspicion.
Melvida’s arrest was thus illegal.
Main Point: Where a policeman had no personal knowledge
of facts indicating a suspect’s guilt—at best, only an
unreasonable
suspicion—then the warrantless arrest effected was illegal
Case No. 455
Section2, Article III
7. Warrantless Arrests
B. Hot Pursuit
People v. Nazareno
Facts: Bunye rode a tricycle and crossed the road then One
of the men jumped out of a tricycle and shot Bunye at the
back of the head. When Bunye fell face down, the assailant
fired another shot at Bunye’s head. Then, the other man
approached Bunye and shot him also in the head. the
tricycle drivers, executed sworn affidavits relating what
they had witnessed.2 The two described the assailants and
stated that they could recognize the killers if they saw them
again. Ramil Regala, Narciso Nazareno, Orlando Hular and
Manuel Laureaga were arrested. Regala and Nazareno were
put in a police line-up. They were identified and pointed to
as the assailants
Accused-appellants claim that their arrests without warrant
were illegal and justify the nullification of the proceedings
of the trial court.
Issue: W/N Accused-appellants claim that their arrests
without warrant were illegal and justify the nullification of
the proceedings of the trial court tenable
Ruling: The contention is untenable. The warrantless arrest
of accused-appellant Narciso Nazareno was upheld by this
Court in 1990 in a petition for habeas corpus. It appears
that, on January 9, 1989, Nazareno filed a motion for bail.11
As the trial court denied his motion, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed on his behalf with this Court. It was alleged
that Nazareno’s arrest was illegal because it was made
without warrant fourteen days after the killing of Romulo
Bunye II. This Court dismissed the petition in its decision of
July 9, 1990.12 He filed a motion for reconsideration which ART 3 SEC2: WARRANTLESS ARREST- HOT PURSUIT
the Court also denied on the ground that the warrantless People v. Alvario
arrest was in accordance with Rule 113, §5(b) of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.13 FACTS: Esterlina, the offended party, looking for a job as a
Main Point: When an offense has just been committed and house helper. During the search, with the assistance of a
he has probable cause to believe based on personal friend, found an opening in one of the residences in Bel-Air
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be Subdivision, Makati. The one who hired her was herein
arrested has committed it. accused. After days of being employed, Alvario routinely
went inside the room of Esterlina with a gun, and started
GOMEZ raping her. After gaining courage, she called her sister who
CASE NO. 456 then reported such heinous act to the authorities. Alvario
ART 3 SEC2: WARRANTLESS ARREST- HOT PURSUIT was then arrested at his residence without a warrant of
People v. Mahusay arrest.
FACTS: On April 19, 1988, in Leyte, the house of the Bughao ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest without a warrant is
family was entered by men, herein accused, and took items justifiable in the case at bar.
from their dwelling and raped one of the daughters,
Marilou. Immediately the day after the unfortunate event, RULING: Yes. The Court notes that during the trial, Alvario
the family went to Integrated National Police to report the consistently protested his warrantless arrest. Suffice it to
case. Which prompted the quick dispatch of officers and say that his arrest falls within the purview of Rule 113,
later, without any warrant, arrested the accused. Section 5(b) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The
personal knowledge of the arresting officers in the case at
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest is of hot pursuit where bar was culled from the information supplied by the victim
warrant of arrest is not necessary. herself who pointed to Alvario as the man who raped her at
the time of his arrest.
RULING: No. Their contention is wrong that what
transpired is of the nature of a hot pursuit, thus the case MAIN POINT: A warrantless arrest may be made by police
does not warrant a warrantless arrest. Under Section 5(b) of officers based on their personal knowledge culled from the
Rule 113 of Rules on Criminal Procedure., two conditions information supplied by the victim herself who pointed to
must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the the suspect as the man who raped her at the time of his
person to be arrested must have just committed an offense, arrest.
and second, the arresting peace officer or private person
must have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the GOMEZ
person to be arrested is the one who committed the offense. CASE NO. 458
In the instant case, the second condition is not attendant. ART 3 SEC2: WARRANTLESS ARREST- HOT PURSUIT
Larranaga v. CA
GOMEZ
CASE NO. 457
176
FACTS: On September 15, 1997, Francisco Larranaga (aka
Paco) was arrested without warrant by PNP CIG at Center
for Culinary Arts located in Quezon City. The arrest was
made in connection of the kidnapping and serious illegal
detention of 2 women. However, upon the assistance of
Paco’s counsel, asked that they would be furnish a copy of
the affidavits and be given 20 days to file their defense, and
that Paco should be subjected to a regular preliminary
investigation, not undergo an inquest investigation.
However, this was denied by the City Prosecutor of Cebu.
Thus this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest is lawful.
RULING: No. The records do not show that petitioner was
“lawfully arrested.” For one, the petitioner was not arrested
on September 15, 1997, as his counsel persuaded the
arresting officers that he would instead be presented in the
preliminary investigation to be conducted in Cebu City on
September 17, 1997. For another, the arresting officers had
no legal authority to make a warrantless arrest of the
petitioner.
MAIN POINT: Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A
peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another. FACTS: PO3 Joselito Burdeous and companions received a
radio call, during their duty, that there was an alleged
GOMEZ holdup in the vicinity of Fairview, Quezon City. Upon
CASE NO. 459 arriving at the place, the police officers found two (2)
ART 3 SEC2: WARRANTLESS ARREST- HOT PURSUIT complainants and asked them to board their patrol car.
People v. Olivarez Upon exchange of information, the complainants were able
to describe herein accused, Cadua. While patrolling with the
FACTS: A robbery with homicide was allegedly made by the complainants, they were able to identify the accused and
accused in a house located in Tanada Subdivision found that he was holding an unlicensed firearm in his
Venezuela, Metro Manila. During the investigation, accused, possession, which then proceeded his arrest without a
Olivarez was pointed out. In pursuit of the accused, the PNP warrant.
went to its former employer were the workers stated that
Olivarez has not been reporting since the incident. Later on, ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless is in line with
upon receiving a reliable information, the arresting officers Section 5(b) of Rule 113 of Rules on Criminal Procedure,
went to the address where they found the accused and thus is valid.
without warrant or order, asked the latter to come with
them to the police precinct and conducted a investigation. RULING: Yes. The findings of the trial court, accepted by the
appellate court, show the pertinence of paragraphs (a) and
ISSUE: Whether or not the invitation of the accused to the (b) of Section 5 abovecited. Through police dispatch to the
police precinct is a prohibition that is not wanting in a scene of a crime report and in the presence of complainants,
warrantless arrest. it was ascertained that a robbery had just been committed,
and the arresting officers had personal knowledge that
RULING: Yes. Probably aware of the illegality of the arrest petitioner was directly implicated as a suspect.
they made, the arresting officers testified that appellants
were merely invited to the police precinct. Such invitation, MAIN POINT: Personal knowledge of facts in arrests
however, when construed in the light of the circumstances without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which
is actually in the nature of an arrest designed for the means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
purpose of conducting an interrogation. AIRA
Case No. 461
MAIN POINT: Mere invitation is covered by the ART. III, SEC. 2, WARRANTLESS ARREST: HOT PURSUIT
proscription on a warrantless arrest because it is intended People v. Cubcubin
for no other reason than to conduct an investigation.
FACTS: The Cavite City Police Station has received a
GOMEZ telephone call that a person had been shot. For this reason,
CASE NO. 460 a police team responded to the call and found the vicitm
ART 3 SEC2: WARRANTLESS ARREST- HOT PURSUIT slumped dead on his tricycle. A tricycle driver then told a
Cadua v. CA police officer that the accused-appellant and the victim were
177
last seen together coming out of a café located about a
kilometer and a half away from the crime scene. A waitress
at the said café told the investigators that she had seen the
accused arrive together with the victim but did not know if
they left together. She described the accused-appellant in
which then another tricycle driver told the investigators
that he knows a person that fits the description given by the
waitress and told them where his house is. As the police
went to the house and upon entering, SPO1 Malinao noticed
a “bloodied” shirt. As he picked up the shirt, two (2)
spent .38 caliber shells fell. As they proceeded the search,
PO3 Estoy found on top of a plastic water container a
homemade Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver and five
live ammunitions. The police station then took custody of
Cubcubin and the evidence found. After an evaluation of the
evidence, a formal criminal complaint was filed against the
accused-appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest of the
accused-appellee was valid.
RULING: No. Two conditions must concur for a
warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender has
just committed an offense and, second, the arresting
peace officer or private person has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it. It has been held that “‘personal
knowledge of facts’ in arrests without a warrant must
be based upon probable cause, which means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.” The arresting
officers did not have ‘personal knowledge of the facts as
their knowledge of the circumstance from which they
allegedly inferred that the accused was probably guilty was
based entirely on what they had been told by others. They
merely relied on information given to them by others.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD
AIRA
Case No. 462 MAIN POINT: An accused is not presumed to have waived
ART. III, SEC. 2, WARRANTLESS ARREST: HOT PURSUIT the unlawful search simply because he failed to object—a
People v. Compacion peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent
or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of
FACTS: Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police regard for the supremacy of the law.
informant that accused-appellant was growing and
cultivating marijuana plants, police officers of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) conducted a surveillance of the AIRA
residence of accused-appellant who was then the barangay Case No. 463
captain. During the said surveillance, they saw two (2) tall ART. III, SEC. 2, WARRANTLESS ARREST: HOT PURSUIT
plants in the backyard of the accused-appellant which they Posadas v. Ombudsman
suspected to be marijuana plants. A team was immediately
formed. The team proceeded at the residence of accused FACTS: Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the
despite failure to obtain a search warrant. Police officers University of the Philippines, was killed in a rumble
alleged that the accused-appellant opened the gate and between his fraternity and another fraternity. Petitioner
permitted them to come in. Compacion, however, contended Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P. Diliman, asked the Director
that after he opened the gate, four (4) persons who he of the NBI for the assistance in
thought were members of the military, entered the determining the persons responsible for the crime.
premises then went inside the house. One of the four men With that, respondent Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations
told him to sit in the living room. Some went upstairs while Group of the NBI and his men went to U.P. and, on the basis
theothers went around the house. None of them asked for of the supposed positive identification of two alleged
his permission to search his house. eyewitnesses; they attempted to arrest Francis Carlo
Taparan and Raymundo Narag, officers/members of the
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search on the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of
backyard of the accused. Venturina. It appears that the two suspects had come that
day to the U.P. Police Station for a peace talk between their
RULING: No. While the right to be secure from fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity.
unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be
waived either expressly or impliedly, such waiver must ISSUE: Whether or not the attempted arrest of the student
constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily, knowingly and suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a
intelligently—the act of the accused in allowing the warrant.
members of the police force to enter his premises and his
consequent silence during the unreasonable search and RULING: No. The NBI agents in the case at bar tried to
seizure could not be construed as voluntary submission or arrest Narag and Taparan four days after the commission of
an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact
especially so when members of the raiding team were which might indicate that the two students were probably
intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed. guilty of the crime. What they had were the supposed
178
positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is that the person to be arrested has committed it.” The police this ground. Thus, any irregularity attendant to his arrest
insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the team was formed and dispatched to look for the persons was cured when he voluntarily submitted himself to the
NBI. responsible for the crime on account of the information jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty
related by Tan that they had just been robbed. And since and by participating in the trial.
MAIN POINT: Where the NBI agents only had the supposed accused’s arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made
positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, the same incidental thereto was valid. Moreover, the unlicensed MAIN POINT: Any irregularity attendant to an arrest is
is insufficient to justify an arrest without a warrant. firearms were found when the police team apprehended the cured when the accused voluntarily submits himself to the
accused for the robbery and not for illegal possession of jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty
AIRA firearms and ammunition. and by participating in the trial.
Case No. 464
ART. III, SEC. 2, WARRANTLESS ARREST: HOT PURSUIT MAIN POINT: Warrantless arrest and seizure was valid AREEJ
People v. Acol where it was done by a police team dispatched to look for Case No. 466
persons responsible for the crime based on information Art III Sec 2. Procedural Rules
FACTS: Percival Tan was driving his jeepney when two men related by victims who have just been robbed. People v. Lopez
boarded the vehicle, together with two other companions,
announced a hold-up. After the incident, Percival Tan and AIRA FACTS: Accused Lopez was charged with the murder of
his passengers went to Fort Bonifacio to report the crime. A Case No. 465 Jesus Reyes. On arraignment, he entered a plea of not
team was formed to track down the culprits. Tan saw four ART. III, SEC. 2, WARRANTLESS ARREST: PROCEDURAL guilty and a trial ensued where the RTC later found him
persons, one of whom was wearing his stolen jacket, RULES guilty of the said charge. Appellant, in the instant petition,
walking casually towards Fort Bonifacio; he told the police People v. Rabang challenges the trial court’s decision because he insists that
authorities to waylay said persons. After the officers he is innocent and raises the question of his arrest without a
introduced themselves, the four men scampered to different FACTS: After the happening of a stabbing incident which warrant.
directions but three of them, namely, Tirso Acol, Pio Boses, caused the death of one and the injury of the witness, herein
and Albert Blanco, were apprehended. Acol and Boses were accused-appellant was held in custody by police officers ISSUE: Whether or not the accused may still assail the
each found in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber upon the giving of testimony. Upon the case reaching the illegality of his arrest.
revolver with bullets. After the arrest, the three men were Supreme Court, appellant assailed the legality of his arrest
brought to Fort Bonifacio and were identified by Tan and by the police investigators allegedly for the reason that it RULING: NO. It is well-settled that any objection
the passengers as the hold-uppers. Acol and Boses denied “was based solely on the basis of the tip and say-so from a involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the
the charges alleging that they were arrested without cause telephone informant who refused to identify himself.” acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person
and were forced to admit ownership of guns which were of an accused must be made before he enters his plea,
shown to them. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant may assail the legality otherwise the objection is deemed waived. When
of his arrest during trial. accused-appellant was arrested and a case was filed against
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid arrest on the basis him, he pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, participated
of the circumstances. RULING: No. The Court considers that appellant is estopped in the trial and presented his evidence. Appellant is thus
from questioning the legality of his arrest. An examination estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. Besides,
RULING: Yes. This falls under the exception which states of the record reveals that this issue is being raised for the this issue is being raised for the first time by appellant. He
“when an offense has in fact been committed, and the first time by appellant before this Court. He had not moved did not move for the quashal of the information before the
arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating for the quashing of the information before the trial court on trial court on this ground. Consequently, any irregularity

179
attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial
court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in
the trial.
AREEJ
Case No. 467
Art III Sec 2. Procedural Rules
Velasco v. CA
FACTS:
1. A warrant of arrest was issued against accused Larkins
for violation of BP 22. Later, a certain Desiree Alinea
filed a complaint-affidavit before the NBI accusing
Larkins of rape, pursuant to such, Larkins was arrested
and detained, but Judge Padolina later issued an order
for his release. Special Investigators Resurreccion and
Erum refused, as Larkins was still detained for another
cause, which was rape.
2. Consequently, Alinea filed a complaint for rape with the
RTC. Larkins filed a motion for its dismissal based on
the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest, which
was denied. Hence, his common-law wife filed a petition
for habeas corpus which the CA granted because the
complaint presented to the NBI by Desiree Alinea on
the basis of which Larkins was detained without a
warrant of arrest for rape did not meet the legal
requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioners insist that the petition for habeas
corpus could no longer be granted because Larkins had
already been charged with the crime of rape.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for habeas corpus should
be granted in the case at bar, in view of the accused’s illegal
arrest and detention.
RULING: NO. Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, ISSUES: (1) W/N appellants may still question the validity FACTS: Respondent, the lawyer of a certain Josie who filed
supervening events may bar his release or discharge of their arrest; (2) W/N their constitutional rights were criminal charges against petitioner for an allegedly botched
from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality violated during custodial investigation for lack of counsel; procedure on her buttocks, wrote a series of posts on his
of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the (3) W/N the lack of preliminary investigation render the
application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the proceedings in the trial court invalid.
detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of
some supervening events be no longer illegal at the RULING:
time of the filing of the application. Among such
supervening events is the filing of a complaint or
information for the offense for which the accused is
detained, as in the instant case. By then, the restraint of
liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information
and, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer
available. It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here
considered, Criminal charges have been filed against
petitioner. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or
make the order, or if such person is charged before any
court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
Larkins’ detention has become legal by virtue of the
complaint before the trial court.
AREEJ
Case No. 468
Art III Sec 2. Procedural Rules
People v. Buluran
FACTS: Appellants Buluran and Valenzuela were charged
with the crime of murder. Upon arraignment, they entered a
plea of not guilty but were later convicted of the crime
charged. Appellants now argue that their warrantless arrest, AREEJ
lack of counsel during custodial investigation, and the lack
of preliminary investigation render the criminal
proceedings against them illegal for violation of their
constitutional rights.
(1) Appellants are estopped from questioning the
validity of their respective arrests since they never
raised this issue before arraignment. Any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or the acquisition
of jurisdiction over the person of an accused
must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived.
(2) There is no violation of the constitutional rights of
the accused during custodial investigation since
neither one executed an extrajudicial confession or
admission. Any allegation of violation of rights
during custodial investigation is relevant and
material only to cases in which an extrajudicial
admission or confession extracted from the
accused becomes the basis of their conviction.
(3) The failure to accord appellants their right to
preliminary investigation did not render the
proceedings invalid. While the right to
preliminary investigation is a substantive right,
nevertheless, the right to preliminary
investigation is deemed waived when the
accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of
entering a plea at arraignment. Appellants only
raised said issue during appeal.
Case No. 469
Art III Sec 3. Privacy of Communication and
Correspondence
Belo-Henares v. Atty. Roberto Guevarra
180
Facebook account, which petitioner contends were written
in a vulgar and obscene language and intended to destroy
her reputation. Petitioner filed a complaint for respondent’s
disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Respondent claims that his right to privacy was violated as
the posts were "private remarks" on his "private
account" that can only be viewed by his circle of friends.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s right to privacy was
violated.
RULING: NO. Facebook is currently the most popular
social media site where a user can post a statement, a
photo, or a video which can be made visible to anyone,
depending on the user's privacy settings. To address
concerns about privacy, Facebook was armed with
different privacy tools designed to regulate the
accessibility of a user's profile, as well as information
uploaded by the user. Utilization of these privacy tools
is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user's
invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
Respondent has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any
of the privacy tools or features of Facebook available to him
to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a
select few. Further, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook
posts to "Friends" does not guarantee absolute protection
from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to
one's circle of friends. Hence, respondent's claim of
violation of right to privacy is negated.
AREEJ
Case No. 470
Art III Sec 3. Privacy of Communication and
Correspondence
Disini v. Secretary of Justice
FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) 10175 or the cybercrime law
aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace.
Petitioners claim Section 12 thereof, which permits the NBI
and the PNP “with due cause” to engage in real time
collection of traffic data without the benefit of the
intervention of a judge, violates their Constitutionally-
protected right to the privacy of communications, and that
said section is too broad and does not provide ample
safeguards against crossing legal boundaries and invading
the people’s right to privacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 12 of RA 10175 violates the
right to privacy of communications and is therefore
unconstitutional.
RULING: YES. Traffic data refer only to the communication’s
origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type
of underlying service, but not content, nor identities, but
when random bits of traffic data are gathered in bulk
and analyzed, they reveal patterns of activities which
can then be used to create profiles of the persons under
surveillance. Analysts may then be able to determine a
person’s close associations, religious views, political
affiliations, even sexual preferences, which information
clearly falls within matters protected by the right to
privacy. The authority that Section 12 gives law
enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint, as
nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies holding
these data in their hands from looking into the identity
of their sender or receiver and what the data contains.
This will unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked
information or, worse, to extortion from certain bad
elements in these agencies. The Court must ensure that
laws seeking to take advantage of technologies be
written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure
respect for the rights that the Constitution guarantees.
ANGELO
Case No. 471
ART III SEC 3: Scope: Tangible and Intangible Objects
Katz v. United States
FACTS: Acting on a suspicion that Katz was transmitting
gambling information over the phone to clients in other
states, Federal agents attached an eavesdropping device to
the outside of a public phone booth used by Katz. Based on
recordings of his end of the conversations, Katz was
convicted under an eight-count indictment for the illegal
transmission of wagering information from Los Angeles to
Boston and Miami. On appeal, Katz challenged his
conviction arguing that the recordings could not be used as
evidence against him. The Court of Appeals rejected this
point, noting the absence of a physical intrusion into the
phone booth itself.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the FBI agents in
electronically recording a conversation violated petitioner’s
right to privacy and constituted a search and seizure.
RULING: YES. The US Supreme Court held that the
petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in using
the enclosed booth to make a personal telephone call. In the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was further
noted that the existence of privacy right involved a two-
fold requirement: (1) that a person has exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and (2) that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable (objective).
ANGELO
Case No. 472
ART III SEC 3: Scope: Tangible and Intangible Objects
Riley v. California
FACTS: Riley belonged to the Lincoln Park gang. He and
others opened fire on a rival gang member driving past
them. Almost three weeks later, the police pulled Riley over
driving a different car; he was driving on expired license
registration tags. Before a car is impounded, police are
required to perform an inventory search. During the search,
181
police located two guns and subsequently arrested Riley for recognized certain similarities with earlier ones. As a result, and invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff
possession of the firearms. Riley had his cell phone in his the government obtained a search warrant for Graham’s of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce
pocket when he was arrested, so a gang unit detective residence; the search uncovered, among other things, two evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
analyzed videos and photographs of Riley making gang cell phones. Investigators then obtained two court orders proceeding concerning matters within its official
signs and other gang indicia that were stored on the phone directed at Sprint/Nextel, the provider of the two cell cognizance.”
to determine whether Riley was gang affiliated. Riley was phones, which commanded the company to disclose cell site
subsequently tied to the shooting via ballistics tests, and location information associated with the defendants' ISSUE: Whether or not the government violate such
separate charges were brought. devices. reasonable expectation of privacy exhibited by the
PHILCOMSAT directors.
ISSUE: Whether or not warrantless cell phone search ISSUE: Whether or not government’s warrantless
violated Riley’s right to privacy. procurement of extended cell site location information RULING: NO. In evaluating a claim for violation of the right
violated the appellants’ right to privacy. to privacy, a court must determine whether a person has
RULING: YES. The Court held that the warrantless exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so,
search exception following an arrest exists for the RULING: YES. The Majority emphasized that there is a whether that expectation has been violated by
purposes of protecting officer safety and preserving “recognized privacy interest in the comprehensive unreasonable government intrusion. Obviously, the
evidence, neither of which is at issue in the search of accounts of one’s movements and location” and that the inquiry focuses on petitioners’ acts committed in the
digital data. The digital data cannot be used as a extended nature of the cell site location information discharge of their duties as officers and directors of the said
weapon to harm an arresting officer, and police officers collection and inspection, which allowed the corporations, particularly Philcomsat Holdings Corporation.
have the ability to preserve evidence while awaiting a government to account for the defendants’ movements Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of
warrant by disconnecting the phone from the network was unreasonable. privacy over matters involving their offices in a
and placing the phone in a "Faraday bag." The Court corporation where the government has interest.
characterized cell phones as minicomputers filled with ANGELO Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over
massive amounts of private information, which Case No. 474 which the people have the right to information.
distinguished them from the traditional items that can be ART III SEC 3: Factors to Determine Violation of the
seized from an arrestee's person. Nonetheless, the Court Right to Privacy ANGELO
held that some warrantless searches of cell phones might be In the matter of the petition for issuance of the writ of Case No. 475
permitted in an emergency: when the government's habeas of Camilo I. Sabio ART III SEC 3: Factors to Determine Violation of the
interests are so compelling that a search would be Right to Privacy
reasonable. FACTS: Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced a Briccio Pollo v. Chairperson Karina David
resolution “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the
ANGELO anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas FACTS: CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David received
Case No. 473 Telecommunications Corporations and Philippine a document from an anonymous source, making her aware
ART III SEC 3: Scope: Tangible and Intangible Objects Communications Satellite Corporation Holdings that there is a corrupt official in the Commission. She then
US v. Graham Corporation, due to the alleged improprieties in their formed personnel and directed them to back up all the files
operations by their respective Board of Directors.” Pursuant of the computers found therein. Respondent found, in Bricio
FACTS: Defendant-Appellants Graham and Jordan were to this, Senator Richard Gordon, wrote Chairman Sabio of Pollo, petitioner, legal pleading or documents that are
charged as co-conspirators in a string of armed robberies. the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in related to administrative cases and were for on the behalf of
Police caught Graham during the last robbery and the public meeting. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation parties who were facing charges. He asserted that the CSC

182
conducted a fishing expedition and his right to privacy was
violated and that the source of the complaint was
anonymous. The CSC charged Pollo in violation of RA 6713
(Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials).
ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted on petitioner’s
office computer and the copying of his personal files
without his knowledge and consent constituted a violation
of his constitutional right to privacy.
RULING: NO. In evaluating a claim for violation of the right
to privacy, a court must determine whether a person has
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so,
whether that expectation has been violated by
unreasonable government intrusion. The SC found that
he had no actual expectation of privacy on his work
computer. He did not have a separate office space, nor
did he use a password for his computer. The CSC also
implemented a policy that its employees on notice that
they have no expectation of privacy in anything on their
office computers, and that the CSC may monitor their
use.
Ayeh CASE NO. 476
ART. III SEC 3: FACTORS TO DETERMINE VIOLATION OF
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Anonymous Letter-Complaint Against Atty. Miguel
Morales
FACTS: Atty. Miguel Morales is a clerk of the Court in the
MeTC of Manila charged in an anonymous letter with
misconduct for allegedly using working hours filing and
attending to personal cases, using office supplies,
equipment and utilities. On a spot investigation conducted,
evidences were discovered on hi personal computer. The
accused now contends that since the evidences were
acquired from his personal computer without any valid
search and seizure order, such evidence should be
considered as the fruits of a poisonous tree as it violated his
right to privacy. While the investigating officer claims that it
was obtained with the consent of the former.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidences found in Atty.
Morales's personal computer admissible in the present
administrative case against him.
RULING: No. Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable
right of the people to be secure in their persons and
properties against unreasonable searches and seizures,
which is provided for under Section 2, Article III thereof.
The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the
Constitution also bars the admission of evidence obtained in
violation of such right. The fact that the present case is
administrative in nature does not render the above
principle inoperative.
The contention that it was obtained with consent is not
sufficient to have it fall under a valid warrantless search
into the personal computer of Atty. Morales. Consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred and must be shown by
clear and convincing evidence with which burden of proving
lies with the State.
MP: Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to
be presumed and courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights.
To constitute a valid consent or waiver of the constitutional
guarantee against obtrusive searches, it must be shown that
(1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention
to relinquish the right.
Ayeh CASE NO. 477
ART. III SEC 3: FACTORS TO DETERMINE VIOLATION OF
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Syhunliong v Rivera
FACTS: Syhunliong instituted against Rivera a complaint for
libel, the origin of the instant petition. The said accused with
a text message saying that she had suffered a lot in
collecting her last pay, meant and intended to convey and to
destroy the good name and reputation of Ramon
Syhunliong. Rivera filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that
her text message was not prompted by ill will or spite but
was merely sent as part of her duty to defend her own
interests. RTC denied the said motion and her MR. Upon
appeal to the CA, the decision was reversed ruling that the
matter contained in the text message is privileged
communication under Article 354 of the RPC. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA committed reversible error in
ordering the outright dismissal of the case on the putative
ground that the allegedly libelous text messages were
privileged communication.
RULING: No. The Court stresses that the text message which
Rivera sent to Lumapas falls within the purview of a
qualified privileged communication. Rivera's text message
falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged
communication since she "was speaking in response to duty
[to protect her own interest] and not out of an intent to
injure the reputation" of Syhunliong. Besides, "[t]here was
no unnecessary publicity of the message beyond [that] of
conveying it to the party concerned."
MP: The rule on privileged communication means that a
communication made in good faith on any subject matter in
which the communicator has an interest, or concerning
which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having
a corresponding duty.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 4200
“AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING
AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF
COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.”
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
183
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder,
or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant
or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies
thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured
either before or after the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any
other person or persons; or to communicate the contents
thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any
copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3
hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or
who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of the acts
declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who
violates the provisions of the following section or of any
order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such
violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six
years and with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification from public office if the offender be a public
official at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if
the offender is an alien he shall be subject to deportation
proceedings.
Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall
render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who
is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any
of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding
sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage,
provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny
in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy
to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as
defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of
Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other
offenses against national security: Provided, That such
written order shall only be issued or granted upon written
application and the examination under oath or affirmation
of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a
showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been
committed or is being committed or is about to be
committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the
offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to
commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority
shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or
acts of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or
are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the
conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the
prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no
other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.
The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of
the person or persons whose communications,
conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be
overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of
telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph
line or the telephone number involved and its location; (2)
the identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear,
intercept, or record the communications, conversations,
discussions, or spoken words; (3) the offense or offenses
committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of
the authorization. The authorization shall be effective for
the period specified in the order which shall not exceed
sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless
extended or renewed by the court upon being satisfied that
such extension or renewal is in the public interest.
All recordings made under court authorization shall, within
forty-eight hours after the expiration of the period fixed in
the order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope
or sealed package, and shall be accompanied by an affidavit
of the peace officer granted such authority stating the
number of recordings made, the dates and times covered by
each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records
included in the deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or
copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made, or
if made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in the
envelope or package deposited with the court. The envelope
or package so deposited shall not be opened, or the
recordings replayed, or used in evidence, or their contents
revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be
granted except upon motion, with due notice and
opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose
conversation or communications have been recorded.
The court referred to in this section shall be understood to
mean the Court of First Instance within whose territorial
jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to
be executed.
Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
the same or any part thereof, or any information therein
contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of
the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
Section 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed or accordingly amended.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: June 19, 1965
Ayeh CASE NO. 478
ART. III SEC 3: FACTORS TO DETERMINE VIOLATION OF
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Ramirez v CA
FACTS: Petitioner filed a civil case against the private
respondent Ester Garcia alleging that the latter vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood"
and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and
184
personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy evidenced by a tape recording of the said
confrontation. Respondent then filed a criminal case against
the petitioner for violation of RA 4200 or An Act to
prohibit and penalize wiretapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other
purposes. Petitioner contends that the said law does not
apply as the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to the
taping of a communication by a person other than a
participant to the communication. RTC ruled in favor of
herein petitioner but the CA reversed the decision of the
trial court. Hence, the case at bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not “private communication” in RA 4200
also contemplates “private conversation”.
RULING: Yes. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the
use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent
Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person)
privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the
latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A.
4200.
MP: The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the private
communication. The nature of the conversations is
immaterial to a violation of the statute.
Ayeh CASE NO. 479
ART. III SEC 3: FACTORS TO DETERMINE VIOLATION OF
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Navarro v CA
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeal affirming the decision of the
trial court finding petitioner Felipe Navarro guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide based on a voice recording
between the petitioner and the deceased inside the police
station the night the incident happened.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recording is admissible in view
of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wiretapping.
RULING & MP: Yes. The RA 4200 prohibits the overhearing,
intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since
the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was
not private as it was inside a police station, its tape
recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A
voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a
witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation;
(2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded;
and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons
such are claimed to belong.
Ayeh CASE NO. 480
ART. III SEC 3: RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
NOT COVERED
Alejano v Cabuay
FACTS: This is a petition to review which seeks to nullify
the decision rendered by the CA dismissing the petition for
habeas corpus filed by the counsels of detained officers who
committed a coup d’état on the 23 rd of July 2003 renouncing
their support for the administration and called for the
resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and
several cabinet members.
Petitioners bewail the regulation adopted by Gen. Cabuay in
the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (ISAFP) Detention Center preventing petitioners
as lawyers from seeing the detainees their clients any time
of the day or night. The regulation allegedly curtails the
detainees right to counsel. Petitioners also point out that the
officials of the ISAFP Detention Center violated the
detainees right to privacy of communication when the
ISAFP officials opened and read the personal letters of
Trillanes and Capt. Milo Maestrecampo.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the writ of habeas corpus is the
proper remedy for the petitioner’s complaint at bar.
(2) Whether or not opening, inspection and reading
of the letter of the detainee is an infringement of his right to
privacy.
RULING & MP: (1) No. The purpose of the writ is to
determine whether a person is being illegally deprived
of his liberty. If, however, the detention is proven lawful,
then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. Petitioners
themselves admit that they do not question the legality of
the detention of the detainees. Neither do they dispute the
lawful indictment of the detainees for criminal and military
offenses. Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writs
application to circumstances where there is deprivation
of a person’s constitutional rights. However, a mere
allegation of a violation of one’s constitutional right is
not sufficient.
(2) No. That a law is required before an executive
officer could intrude on a citizen’s privacy rights is a
guarantee that is available only to the public at large
but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. By
the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and
convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of
privacy rights. The letters were not in a sealed envelope.
The inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it
serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for
the inspection of contraband. The letters alleged to have
been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential
letters between the detainees and their lawyers.
ADDALINO
CASE NO. 481
ART III, SEC 3: NOT COVERED
IN RE: WENCESLAO LAURETA
FACTS: Maravilla Illustre wrote to the justices of the SC,
complaining about the dismissal of the her case(a land
dispute involving large estate) by a minute-resolution.
Illustre claims that it was an unjust resolution deliberately
185
and knowingly promulgated by the 1st Division, that it was
railroaded with such hurry beyond the limits of legal and
judicial ethics. Illustre’s letter basically attacks the
participation of Justice Pedro Yap in the first division. The
letters were referred to the SC en banc. The SC clarified that
when the minute-resolution was issued, the presiding
justice then was not Justice Yap but Justice Abad Santos
(who was about to retire), and that Justice Yap was not
aware that Atty Ordonez was the opponents counsel. It was
also made clear that Justice Yap eventually inhibited himself
from the case. Still, Illustre wrote letters to the other
justices (Narvasa, Herrera, Cruz), again with more threats to
“expose the kind of judicial performance readily
constituting travesty of justice. True to her threats, Illustre
later filed a criminal complaint before the Tanodbayan,
charging the Justices with knowingly rendering an unjust
Minute Resolution. Justice Yap and Solgen Ordonez were
also charged of using their influence in the First Division in
rendering said Minute Resolution. Atty Laureta was the
counsel of Illustre. He circulate copies of the complaint to
the press, without any copy furnished the Court, nor the
Justices charged. It was made to appear that the Justices
were charged with graft and corruption. The Tanodbayan
dismissed the complaint. Now, the SC is charging them with
contempt. They claim that the letters were private
communication, and that they did not intend to dishonor the
court.
ISSUE: WON the letters addressed to the individual Justices
were private in character and is covered by protection to
privacy of communications
RULING: NO. The letters formed part of the judicial record
and are a matter of concern for the entire court. There is no
vindictive reprisal involved here. The Court’s authority and
duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to
preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of
an irate lawyer, mouthed by his client, and to safeguard the
morals and ethics of the legal profession.
MAIN POINT: A letter individually addressed to some
Justices of the SC is not covered by the constitutional right
to "privacy of communication" when the same pertain to
their exercise of judicial functions.
ADDALINO
CASE NO. 482
ART III, SEC 3: NOT COVERED
PEOPLE VS ALBOFERA
Facts: Sometime in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and
3 others killed Teodoro Carancio, a forester. Rodrigo Esma
was at the house of one of the accused but did not
participate in the killing. The matter was later brought to
the attention of the authorities by a certain Sisneros and
accused Albofera was arrested. The accused Lawi-an was
subsequently arrested. Albofera executed an extra-judicial
confession before the Municipal Circuit Judge. He stated
therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for
fear of his life; that said group had ordered the “arrest” of
the victim, Carancio, and that the group “sentenced him (the
victim) to die by stabbing.” Esma testified against the
accused during the trial. While in prison, accused Albofera
sent a letter to Esma. Said letter was thereafter introduced
as evidence by prosecution. In his letter, accused Albofera
was asking Esma to change his declaration in his Affidavit
and testify in his favor instead. Later the accused were
convicted of murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Albofera’s letter to Esma should
be excluded as evidence in light of alleged unwarranted
intrusion or invasion of the accused’s privacy.
RULING: No. The production of that letter by the
prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and
seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion or
invasion into Albofera’s privacy. Albofera admitted having
sent the letter and it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma
himself, who produced and identified the same in the course
of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really
self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded
that Esma change his declaration in his Affidavit and testify
in his (Albofera’s) favor. Furthermore, nothing Albofera
stated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a
determination of his culpability.
MAINPOINT: Albofera’s letter is not covered by the Sec 3,
Art III provision as it was not the result of an unlawful
search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted
intrusion or invasion into Albofera’s privacy.
ADDALINO
CASE NO. 483
ART III, SEC 3: NOT COVERED
DR LEE VS P/SUPT ILAGAN
FACTS: Neri, a police officer, filed a petition for the issuance
of Writ of Habeas Data against Joy, her former common law
partner, for allegedly violating his right to privacy and
security. According to him, sometime in July 2011, he visited
Joy’s condominium and rested for a while. When he arrived
at his office, he noticed his digital camera missing. On
August 23, 2011, Joy confronted him about a purported sex
video she discovered from the digital camera showing him
and another woman. He denied the video and demanded the
return of the camera, but she refused. They had an
altercation where Neri allegedly slammed Joy’s head against
a wall and then walked away. Because of this, Joy filed
several cases against him, including a case for violation of
Republic Act 9262 and administrative cases before the
Napolcom, utilizing the said video. After finding the petition
sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued the writ
and directed Joy to appear before the RTC and produce
Neri’s digital camera, as well as the original and copies of
the video, and to make a return within five days from
receipt. The RTC found that her acts of reproducing the
same and showing it to other persons (Napolcom) violated
186
Neri’s right to privacy and humiliated him. It clarified that it
ruling only on the return of the video and not on its
admissibility as evidence. Dissatisfied, Joy filed the instant
petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: W/N the right to privacy of Neri was violated
RULING: NO. In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was
not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life,
liberty or security was or would be violated through the
supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the
subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest
in the suppression of this video, he failed to explain the
connection between such interest and any violation of his
right to life, liberty or security. As the rules and existing
jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and
eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy
right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are
crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on
either account certainly renders a habeas data petition
dismissible, as in this case.
MAINPOINT: in bold
ADDALINO
CASE NO. 484
ART III, SEC 3: NOT COVERED
GAMBOA VS P/SUPT CHAN
FACTS: Gamboa alleged that the PNP–Ilocos Norte
conducted a series of surveillance operations against her
and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a
Private Army Group (PAG). Purportedly without the benefit
of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the
information gathered on her to the Zeñ arosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s
enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs. Contending
that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation
maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the ADDALINO
issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in
their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ
of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is
invoked as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the
right to life, liberty or security.
RULING: NO. The writ of habeas data is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to
the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a
person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being
collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for
the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist
a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand,
and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. In
this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove
through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of
individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters
susceptible to harassment and to increased police
surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently
explained that the investigations conducted against her
were in relation to the criminal cases in which she was
implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of
regularity, which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest
of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on
the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection
and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was
pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the
writ of habeas data must be denied.
MAIN POINT: in bold
CASE NO. 485
ART III, SEC 3: NOT COVERED
GAANAN VS IAC
FACTS: Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel
Montebon were in the living room of complainant's
residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault. That same morning, Laconico,
another lawyer, telephoned the appellant to come to his
office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault
case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went
on a business trip. When complainant called up, Laconico
requested petitioner to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear
personally the proposed conditions for the settlement.
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask
Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions, which the
latter answered in affirmative. Complainant then told
Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the
money, he told Laconico to give the money to his wife but
the latter insisted that complainant himself should receive
the money. And when he received the money at a
restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary. Appellant Laconico executed on
the following day an affidavit stating that he heard
complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the
case for direct assault. Complainant then charged Laconico
with violation of RA 4200 for listening to the telephone
conversation without complainant's consent. The lower
court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The Intermediate
Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court,
holding that the communication between the complainant
and Laconico was private in nature therefore was covered
by RA 4200; and that the petitioner overheard such
communication without the knowledge and consent of the
complainant; and that the extension telephone which was
used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone
conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered
in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.
ISSUE: W/N extension telephone is among the prohibited
devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear
187
a private conversation would constitute unlawful
interception of communications between the two parties
using a telephone line
RULING: NO. The phrase “device or arrangement” in
Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend
instruments of the same or similar nature, that is,
instruments the use of which would be tantamount to
tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments
whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the
party or parties being overheard because, by their very
nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is
precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.
MAIN POINT: Mere act of listening to a telephone
conversation in an extension line is not punished by Anti-
Wiretapping Law.
COELI
CASE NO. 486
Art. III, Sec. 3, Exclusionary Rule
SALCEDO-ORTANEZ v. CA
FACTS:
 Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon
City RTC a complaint for annulment of marriage against
petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack
of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of
the petitioner.
 Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were
3 cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations
between petitioner and unidentified persons.
 Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s
oral offer of evidence. However, the trial court admitted
all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on
denied her motion for reconsideration, prompting
petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to
assail the admission in evidence of the aforementioned
cassette tapes.
 These tape recordings were made and obtained when
private respondent allowed his friends from the military
to wire tap his home telephone.
 CA denied the petition because tape recordings are
not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant
thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain
purposes, depending on how they are presented and
offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the
interest of truth and fairness and the even handed
administration of justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recordings of the telephone
conversations are admissible in evidence
RULING: NO
Unauthorized tape recordings of telephone
conversations not admissible in evidence.
RA 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire
Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of
Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes
such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:
o Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described. . . .
o Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the
existence, contents, substance, purport, or meaning
of the same or any part thereof, or any information
therein contained, obtained or secured by any person
in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall
not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-
judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD (1ST SENTENCE IN RULING)
COELI
CASE NO. 487
Art. III, Sec. 3, Exclusionary Rule
Zulueta v. CA
FACTS:
 Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. Zulueta
entered the clinic of her husband and forcibly opened
the drawers and cabinet therein and took 157
documents consisting of private correspondence
between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs.
 The documents and papers were seized for use in
evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which
Zulueta had filed against her husband.
 Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the
documents and papers against Zulueta, with Manila
RTC, which ruled in favor of Martin, and ordered
Zulueta to a immediately return the properties to Dr.
Martin
 On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the privacy of communication and
correspondence is inviolable even when aggrieved party is
the spouse.
RULING: YES
The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence.
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is
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if there is a lawful order from a court or when public safety
or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.
Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any
one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as
an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her. The law insures absolute
freedom of communication between the spouses by
making it privileged.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD.
COELI
CASE NO. 488
Art. III, Sec. 3, Exclusionary Rule
Ople v. Torres
FACTS:
 A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos for
the Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System. Petitioner filed the instant petition
against respondents, on the grounds that:
o it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate,
o it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s
protected zone of privacy.
 Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents,
then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and heads of
government agencies, who were charged of the
implementation of the subject law.
ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of the right to privacy.
RULING: YES.
A.O. No. 308 is unconstitutional. The right to privacy does
not bar all incursions into individual privacy. It
requires that the law be narrowly focused and a
compelling interest justify such intrusions.
The vagueness of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will
put our people’s right to privacy in clear and present
danger. In the case at bar, the threat comes from which by
issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their
privacy by giving information about themselves on the
pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD.
COEL
CASE NO. 489
Art. III, Sec. 3, Exclusionary Rule
Waterous Drug v.. NLRC
FACTS:
 Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner
Waterous Drug Corporation.
 Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (YSP, Inc.), a supplier of
medicine, sold to Waterous, through Catolic, 10 bottles
of Voren Tablets. However, previous purchase orders
issued to YSP showed that the price was lower by Php
64.00 per unit than the original price.
 YSP Accounting Dept. confirmed paying through check
to Catolico. Catolico denied receiving the same.
However, a clerk of Waterous confirmed that she saw an
open envelope with a check payable to Catolico.
 Waterous ordered the termination of Catolico.
 NLRC dismissed the petition. Evidence of the
respondents (check from YSP) being rendered
inadmissible by virtue of the constitutional right
invoked by complainants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the check is admissible as evidence.
RULING: YES
The incident involving the opening of the envelope
addressed to Catolico does not warrant the application of
constitutional provisions. There was no violation of the
right of privacy of communication in this case.
In light of the decision in People vs. Marti, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refer
to the immunity of one’s person from interference by
government and cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit
of alleged unlawful intrusion of the government.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD.
COELI
CASE NO. 490
Art. III, Sec. 3, Exclusionary Rule
People vs. Marti
FACTS:
 Accused-appellant went to a forwarding agency to send
four packages to a friend in Zurich. The proprietress
asked if the packages can be examined. However, he
refused. Before delivering the packages to the Bureau of
Customs and the Bureau of Posts, the husband of the
proprietress opened said boxes for final inspection.
From that inspection, included in the standard
operating procedure and out of curiosity, he took
several grams of its contents.
 He brought the said sample to the NBI. The contents,
after examination by forensic chemists, were found to
be marijuana flowering tops.
 The appellant contended that the marijuana leaves were
fruits of an illegal search and therefore under
exclusionary rule of Sec. 3 (2) of Bill of Rights.
 The appellant was invited by the agents for questioning.
Later on, the trial court found him guilty of violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act.
189
ISSUE: Whether or not an act of private individual, allegedly shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested by the police. the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be
in violation of appellant’s constitutional rights, be invoked She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating
against the State? the woman was nowhere to be found. Also, no search measure.
warrant was presented.
RULING: NO. The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the ISSUE: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial
In the absence of governmental interference, the dangerous drugs of 1972. review over the controversy regarding facial challenge.
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked against the State. The Bill of Rights is ISSUE: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and RULING: YES. In United States (US) constitutional law, a
not meant to be invoked against act of private seized the drugs from the accused. facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
individuals, but it is directed only against the Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of
government and its agencies tasked with the RULING: NO. The Court invalidated the search and seizure statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all
enforcement of the law. It governs the relationship made on a woman, “Aling Rose”, who, upon alighting from a other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious
between the individual and the state. Its concern is not the bus, was pointed out by the informant. freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to
relation between individuals, between a private individual peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
and other individuals. The Supreme Court declared that in a search and seizure as redress of grievances. In this jurisdiction, the application of
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD. an incident to a lawful arrest, it is necessary for probable doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
CASE NO. 491 cause to be present, and probable cause must be based on maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this
ART III SEC 3: EXCLUSIONARY RULE reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
PEOPLE V. ARUTA, 288 SCRA 626 been committed or is about to be committed. In this case, strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover
the accused was merely crossing the street and was not statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those
FACTS: On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his acting in any manner which would engender a reasonable involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.
informant that a certain “Aling Rose” will be arriving from ground to believe that she was committing or about to The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For
Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled commit a crime. unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
a team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law
waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when the informer [Note that in this case, there was the additional fact that the not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
pointed out who “Aling Rose” was, the team approached her identity of the accused had been priorly ascertained and the which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When police officers had reasonable time within which to obtain a determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
Abello asked “Aling Rose” about the contents of her bag, the search warrant] discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
latter handed it out to the police. They found dried CASE NO. 492 part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked “cash ART III SEC 4: FACIAL CHALLENGE CONCEPT Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a
katutak”. IMBONG V. OCHOA, GR 204819 April 08, 2014 proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain
the supremacy of the Constitution. To dismiss these
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual
demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the search the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive
and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental
claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre where 2012. Challengers from various sectors of society are Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino
she watched a movie “Balweg”. While about to cross the questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The OSG people.
road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by

190
 CASE NO. 493
ART III SEC 4: STATE REGULATION OF DIFFERENT
TYPES OF MASS MEDIA
DIVINAGRACIA V. CBS, INC., GR 162272, April 07, 2009
FACTS: Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System,
Inc. (CBS) and People’s Broadcasting Service, Inc. (PBS) are
radio networks both involved in the operation of radio
broadcasting services in the Philippines, they being the
grantees of legislative franchises. Following the enactment
of these franchise laws, NTC issued Provisional Authorities
allowing them to install, operate and maintain various AM
and FM broadcast stations in various locations throughout
the nation. Petitioner Santiago C. Divinagracia, alleging that
he was a stockholder of respondent companies, filed two
complaints with the NTC alleging that despite the provisions
of the law mandating the public offering of at least 30% of
the common stocks of Respondents, both entities had failed
to make such offering. Petitioner prayed for the cancellation
of all the Provisional Authorities or CPCs of Respondents.
The NTC dismissed both complaints, positing that although
it had full jurisdiction to revoke or cancel a Provisional
Authority or Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) for
violations or infractions of the terms and conditions, it
refrained from exercising the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not NTC has the power to cancel
Provisional Authorities and CPCs of entities which Congress
has issued franchises to operate.
RULING: NO. The various functions of the NTC, as
established by E.O. No. 546. One can readily notice that even
as the NTC is vested with the power to issue CPCs to
broadcast stations, it is not expressly vested with the power
to cancel such CPCs, or otherwise empowered to prevent
broadcast stations with duly issued franchises and CPCs
from operating radio or television stations.
MAIN POINT: The fact that broadcast media already labors
under this concededly valid regulatory framework
necessarily creates inhibitions on its practitioners as they
operate on a daily basis. Newspapers are able to print out
their daily editions without fear that a government agency
such as the NTC will be able to suspend their publication or
fine them based on their content.. However, the cancellation
of a CPC or license to operate of a broadcast station, if we
recognize that possibility, is essentially a death sentence,
the most drastic means to inhibit a broadcast media
practitioner from exercising the constitutional right to free
speech, expression and of the press.
CASE NO. 494
ART III SEC 4: STATE REGULATION OF DIFFERENT
TYPES OF MASS MEDIA
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP. V. DANS, JR.
137 SCRA 628, July 19, 1985
FACTS: This petition was filed to compel the respondents to
allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been
summarily closed on grounds of national security. The
petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it
was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was
used to incite people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing
was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a
factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not
informed beforehand why administrative action which
closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was
taken by the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the
reconsideration of the closure action. The petitioner alleged
that it has already sold its radio broadcasting station in
favor of Manuel B. Pastrana as well as its rights and interest
in the radio station DYRE in Cebu including its right to
operate and its equipment, and that they are not anymore
interested in pursuing the case any further. The case has
become moot and academic. But, for the guidance of inferior
courts and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial
functions, the Court still issued the guidelines regarding the
matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the closure of DYRE is a violation of
the Constitutional Right of Freedom of Expression.
RULING: YES. The closure of the radio station is a violation
of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and
expression. The court stresses that all forms of media,
whether print or broadcast are entitled to this
constitutional right. Although the government still has the
right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the
listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for the limitation
of freedom of expression is the “clear and present danger”
rule. If in the circumstances that the media is used in such
nature as to create this danger that will bring in such evils,
then the law has the right to prevent it. However, Radio and
television may not be used to organize a rebellion or signal
a start of widespread uprising.
Main Point: The freedom to comment on public affairs is
essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The
people continues to have the right to be informed on public
affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive
influence to the people being the most accessible form of
media. Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the special
protection given to all forms of media by the due process
and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
CASE NO. 495
ART III SEC 4: PRIVATE AND GOV’T SPEECH (VALID
PRIOR RESTRAINT)
NEAR V. MINNESOTA, 238 SCRA 31
FACTS: In a Minneapolis newspaper called The Saturday
Press, Jay Near and Howard Guilford alleged that the police
chief, the mayor, a prosecutor, and grand jury members
were neglecting their duties to prosecute known criminal
activity. The anti-Semitic newspaper suggested that these
authority figures were colluding with Jewish gangs. Despite
two ensuing assassination attempts on Guilford, the
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newspaper's disclosures resulted in the conviction of a local
gangster.
The prosecutor, Floyd Olson, sought a permanent injunction
against The Saturday Press on the grounds that it violated
the Public Nuisance Law because it was malicious,
scandalous, and defamatory. He received a temporary
injunction after an ex parte hearing, prior to a hearing at
which Near and Guilford would be required to show cause
for why they should not be permanently enjoined from
publishing the newspaper.
The state Supreme Court upheld both the temporary
injunction and the permanent injunction that eventually
issued from the trial court. With assistance from the
publisher of the Chicago Tribune, Robert R. McCormick,
Near appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition of “prior restraint” is
absolute.
RULING: NO. The government does not have the right to
prohibit negative speech about it if there is some truth to it.
There must be a case-specific analysis to determine whether
the allegations have a basis in truth, although war or other
types of national emergency may reduce the protections of
the press. Although any system of prior restraint comes to
court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutionality, there are exceptions to the rule. "When a
nation is at war, many things that might be said in time of
peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance
will not be endured so long as men fight, and that no Court
could regard them as protected by any constitutional right."
No one would question but that a government might
prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the
publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number
and location of troops. On similar grounds, the primary
requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene
publications. The security of the community life may be
protected against incitements to acts of violence and the
overthrow by force of orderly government. The
constitutional guaranty of free speech does not "protect a
man from an injunction against uttering words that may Note: Ruling is in Bernas page 67.
have all the effect of force.” These limitations are not
applicable here. ARZHY
CASE NO. 497
ARZHY ART III SEC 4: PEOPLE V. GOVERNMENT SPEECH
CASE NO. 496 Prior Restraint
ART III SEC 4: PEOPLE V. GOVERNMENT SPEECH New York Times Co. v. US, 403 US 713
Prior Restraint FACTS: US Government sought to enjoin the New York
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 US 51 Times and the Washington Post from publishing the
FACTS: Maryland required that all films be submitted to a contents of a classified study entitled “History of U.S.
board censors before being exhibited. The board can Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy”. The
disapprove films that were obscene, debased or corrupted Government argued that despite the First Amendment’s
morals or tended to incite crime. There was no time limit command, the three branches of government can make laws
on the decision-making process. Ronald Freedman enjoining publication of current news and abridging
challenged Maryland motion picture censorship statute as freedom of the press in the name of national security,
unconstitutional due to the procedure to obtain approval equity, and presidential power.
which provided no judicial participation for prompt judicial ISSUE: Whether or not the executive branch may restrain
review. However, he did not suggest that prior approval petitioner from publishing the classified material
itself was unconstitutional. He exhibited the film “Revenge RULING: No. The First Amendment tolerates absolutely no
at Daybreak” at his Baltimore theatre without first prior restraints of the press predicated upon surmise or
submitting the picture to the State Board of Censors. conjecture that untoward consequences may result. Only
ISSUE: Whether or not the Maryland law is a valid prior when the Nation is at war can the First Amendment’s ban on
restraint prior judicial restraint may be overridden.
RULING: No. The law provided the danger of unduly MAIN POINT: Any system of prior restraint of expression
suppressing protected expression. The board was allowed bears a heavy presumption against its constitutional
overly broad licensing discretion with a lack of statutory validity. Thus, Government carries a heavy burden of
provisions for judicial participation in the procedure to showing justification for the imposition of such restraint.
prohibit a film. The Court established three guidelines as
adequate safeguards to protect against undue inhibition of ARZHY
protected expression: 1) place the burden of proving film is CASE NO. 498
unprotected expression on the censors; 2) require judicial ART III SEC 4: PEOPLE V. GOVERNMENT SPEECH
determination to impose a valid determination; and 3) Prior Restraint
require prompt determination within a specified time Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance, G. R. No. 115444
period. FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of RA 7716
MAIN POINT: Non-criminal process which requires prior (Expanded Value-Added Tax Law) contending that by
submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional removing the exemption of the press from VAT while
infirmity only if it takes place under procedural safeguards maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates
designed to obviate dangers of a censorship system. against the press. It averred that even nondiscriminatory
192
taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is
unconstitutional. Furthermore, the discriminatory
treatment of the press is highlighted by the fact that profit-
oriented transactions continue to enjoy exemption under
RA 7716.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law
is a prior restraint to press freedom
RULING: No. Press is not exempt from the taxing power of
the State and what the constitutional guarantee of free press
prohibits are laws which single out the press or target a
group belonging to the press for special treatment or which
in any way discriminate against the press on the basis of the
content of the publication and RA No. 7716 is none of these.
VAT is not a license tax. It is imposed on the sale, barter,
lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or
exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for
revenue purposes
MAIN POINT: Since the law granted the press a privilege,
the law could take back the privilege without offense to the
Constitution.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 499
ART III SEC 4: PEOPLE V. GOVERNMENT SPEECH
Prior Restraint
Alexander v. US, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 125 L. Ed. 2d. 441
FACTS: Petitioner, who was the owner of numerous
businesses (stores and theatres) dealing in sexually explicit
materials, was convicted of, inter alia, violating federal
obscenity laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). District Court ordered the
forfeiture of certain assets directly related to his
racketeering activity. Petitioner contended that the
forfeiture, which effectively shut down his adult
entertainment business, constituted a prior restraint on
speech and was overbroad.
ISSUE: Whether or not the forfeiture of petitioner’s assets
constituted a prior restraint on speech
RULING: No. The forfeiture in the case at bar is a
permissible criminal punishment and not a prior restraint
on speech. The order imposed no legal impediment to
petitioner’s ability to engage in any expressive activity; it
merely prevented him from financing those activities with
assets derived from his prior racketeering offenses. The
assets in question were not forfeited because they were
obscene but because they were directly related to past
racketeering violations. The RICO forfeiture statute calls for
the forfeiture of assets because of the financial role they
play in the operation the racketeering enterprise.
MAIN POINT: Prior restraint refers to administrative and
judicial orders forbidding certain communications when
issued in advance of the time that such communications are FACTS: Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to
to occur.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 450
ART III SEC 4: PEOPLE V. GOVERNMENT SPEECH
Prior Restraint
INC v. CA, 259 SCRA 529
FACTS: Respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures
and Television x-rated the TV Program “Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo” which presents and propagates petitioner’s religious ISSUE/S: Whether or not 5.4 R.A. No. 9006 constitutes an
beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative
studies with other religions on the ground that they offend
and constitute an attack against other religions. Petitioner
was then required to submit its VTR tapes for review of the RULING: Yes, the curtailment of the right of expression is
Board. Petitioner contended that the Board has no power to
review its religious program.
ISSUE: Whether or not the censorship of petitioner’s TV
Program is a prior restraint on religious speech
RULING: Yes. Respondent Board failed to apply the clear
and present danger rule. The decision of the board which
was affirmed by CA was bereft of finding of facts to justify
the conclusion that the subject program constitutes
impermissible attacks against another religion.
MAIN POINT: Prior restraint on speech, including religious
freedom, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only
by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which
has taken the life of a reality already on ground.
R. Rizon
CASE NO. 501
ARTICLE III, SECTION 4 PRIOR RESTRAINT
SWS vs COMELEC G.R. No. 147571. May 5, 2001
enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing
5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act),* Petitioners
intends to publish the result of the survey up to the
last day of election. Petitioners argue that the
restriction on the publication of election survey
results constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise
of freedom of speech without any clear and present
danger to justify such restraint.
unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech,
expression, and the press.
direct, absolute, and substantial because (1) it
imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of
expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of
a category of expression even though such
suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be
achieved by means other than the suppression of
freedom of expression.
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 * Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be R. Rizon
published fifteen (15) days before an election and
surveys affecting local candidates shall not be
published seven (7) days before an election.
R. Rizon
CASE NO. 502
ARTICLE III, SECTION 4 PRIOR RESTRAINT
CHAVEZ vs GONZALES G.R. No. 168338 February 15,
2008
FACTS: In 2004, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo won in
the presidential elections against her nearest rival,
Fernando Poe, Jr. The NTC, on one hand, issued a
press release warning radio and television stations
that those who will air the Garci Tapes will face
suspension or revocation of their license. Petitioner
Francisco I. Chavez, as citizen, filed a petition to
nullify the “acts, issuances, and orders” of the NTC
and respondent Gonzalez (DOJ Secretary) on the
grounds that it violated the freedom of expression ISSUE/S: Whether or not the action of the Cauayan City ISSUE/S: Whether or not the action of MTRCB is an
and the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.
CASE NO. 503
ARTICLE III, SECTION 4 PRIOR RESTRAINT
CHAVEZ vs GONZALES G.R. No. 168338 February 15,
2008
FACTS: Newsounds is a radio station which was denied a
mayor’s permit due to its failure to present an
approved land conversion papers from the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) an approved
resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or
Sangguniang Panglungsod that the property had
been duly converted for commercial use thus, they
were ordered by the Cauayan City to cease
operation. Petitioners were able to continue
operations until the end of the election period.
Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus and
preliminary mandatory injunction to the RTC and
CA but was denied.
government an impermissible prior restraint on
freedom of expression.
FACTS: Respondent aired Prosti-tuition, an episode of The
Inside Story produced and hosted by respondent
Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting
as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition
fees. The Philippine Womens University (PWU) was
named as the school of some of the students
involved and the facade of PWU Building at Taft
Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the
background of the episode. The showing of The
Inside Story caused uproar in the PWU community.
Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU
Parents and Teachers Association filed letter-
complaints with petitioner MTRCB. Both
complainants alleged that the episode besmirched
the name of the PWU and resulted in the harassment
of some of its female students. Petitioner asserts
that the program violated the PD No. 1986 and
ordered that all subsequent programs of the The
Inside Story be submitted for approval.
impermissible prior restraint on freedom of
expression.

ISSUE/S: Whether the NTC warning constitutes an RULING: Yes, because of the preferred status of the RULING: No, the court was not called upon to determine
impermissible prior restraint on freedom of constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the whether petitioner violated Section 4, Article III (Bill
expression. press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty of Rights) of the Constitution. Petitioner did not
presumption of invalidity. The Government thus disapprove or ban the showing of the program.
RULING: Yes, it is clear that the challenged acts need to be carries a heavy burden of showing justification for Neither did it cancel respondents permit.
subjected to the clear and present danger rule, as the enforcement of such restraint. Respondents were merely penalized for their failure
they are content-based restrictions. The exceptions, to submit to petitioner The Inside Story for its review
when expression may be subject to prior restraint, R. Rizon and approval.
apply in this jurisdiction to only four categories of
expression namely: a. pornography, false or CASE NO. 504 R. Rizon
misleading advertisement, advocacy of imminent ARTICLE III, SECTION 4 PRIOR RESTRAINT
lawless action, and danger to national security. MTRCB vs ABS-CBN G.R. No. 155282. January 17, 2005 CASE NO. 505

194
 ARTICLE III, SECTION 4 PRIOR RESTRAINT
RE: Request for Radio-TV Coverage of the Estrada Trial
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. June 29, 2001
FACTS: This is a request to the Court to allow live media
coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and
other criminal cases filed against former President
Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in
order" to assure the public of full transparency in
the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our
history
RULING: Petition Denied. Live radio and television coverage
of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video
footages of court hearings for news purposes shall
be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom,
the judicial officers, the parties and their counsel
taken prior to the commencement of official
proceedings. No video shots or photographs shall be
permitted during the trial proper. The courts
recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of
the press and the right to public information.
Nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
consideration is still the paramount right of the
accused to due process which must never be
allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional
proportions.
Andalahao
CASE NO. 506
Art III Section 4: Valid Prior Restraint
Soriano vs Laguardia GR 164785 April 29, 2009
Facts: Petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan,
made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before
the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-
complaints were lodged against petitioner in connection
with the above broadcast. The petitioner’s show was The electoral candidates were classified according to their
suspended. vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise
known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of
Issue: W/N Soriano‘s statements during the televised ―Ang the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team
Dating Daan part of the religious discourse and is exempted Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team
from governmental restraint Buhay.” Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was
neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners
Ruling: NO. The SC ruled that Soriano‘s statement can be also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of
treated as obscene, at least with respect to the average candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who
child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not
protected speech. The utterances are considered obscene candidates for that election.
given the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the
time of the show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are Issue: W/N COMELEC may regulate expressions made by
all factors that made the utterances susceptible to children private citizens
viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words
could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in Ruling: NO. Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and
the context that they were used. jurisprudence to support their position that they had the
power to regulate the tarpaulin. However, the Court held
Main Point: The suspension is not a prior restraint, but that all these provisions pertain to candidates and political
rather a form of permissible administrative sanction or parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they
subsequent punishment. In affirming the power of the belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the
MTRCB to issue an order of suspension, the majority said authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred
that it is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-
under its charter without running afoul of the free speech candidate in this case.
clause.
Main Point:
Andalahao
CASE NO. 507 Andalahao
Art III Section 4: Valid Prior Restraint CASE NO. 508
The Diocese of Bacolod vs Comelec GR 205728 747 Art III Section 4: Valid Prior Restraint
SCRA 1 GMA Network vs Comelec GR 205357 Sept 2, 2014
Facts: Petitioners posted a tarpaulin within a private Facts: Petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged
compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution
which is in the front walls of the cathedral within public No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of
view. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” candidates and political parties for national election
and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120)
a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes,
195
respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among The officers and members of the NAMADACWAD was found
on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national guilty as charged with penalties ranging from suspension to
impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to
candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as dismissal from service. They appealed before CSC which
information relative to the exercise of their right to choose possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his was partly granted and held that the collective act of
who to elect during the forthcoming elections. message through his advertisements in languages and respondents in wearing t-shirts with grievance inscriptions
dialects that the people may more readily understand and during office hours was not within the abit of the definition
Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime relate to. of prohibited mass action punishment since there was no
instead of the previous “per station” airtime for political intent to cause work stoppage. However, CSC ruled that
campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior Main Point: While Comelec is authorized by the Cagula's act of posting of grievances outside the designated
COMELEC approval for candidates’ television and radio Constitution to enforce election laws, it cannot exercise its areas was a clear violation. The said act was agreed and
guesting and appearances. power w/out limits or reasonable basis. Those governed by conspired by the other officers of NAMADACWAD which
administrative regulations are entitled to a reasonable and makes them liable and be reprimanded.
Issue: W/N Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 rational basis for any changes in those rules.
on airtime limits is a valid prior government restraint and is Issue: W/N government employees' constitutional right to
constitutional Andalahao freedom of speech may be regulated
CASE NO. 509
Ruling: NO. The Court held that the assailed rule on Art III Section 4: Valid Prior Restraint Ruling: YES. Although the Court finds no merit in ruling a
“aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and Davao City Water District vs Aranjuez GR 194192 June suspension or dismissal to those who violated the rules
arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of 16, 2015 governing the posting of posters with grievances only
candidates and political parties to reach out and within the designated places, the court affirmed that they
communicate with the people. The contention of leveling Facts: Private respondents Aranjuez et al., are officers and violated the said rule and must be reprimanded. It is correct
the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuno sa Davao City Water to conclude that those who enter government service are
interest which would justify such a substantial restriction District (NAMADACWAD). They were charged with several subjected to a different degree of limitation on their
on the freedom of candidates and political parties to administrative cases due to acts committed during the freedom to speak their mind; however, it is not
communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and anniversary celebration of DCWD such as wearing of t-shirts tantamount to the relinquishment of their
programs of government. And, this is specially so in the with inscriptions and posting of bond papers outside the constitutional right of expression otherwise enjoyed by
absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a designated places. The inscriptions and postings bore citizens just by reason of their employment.
prohibitive measure. employees' grievances.

Unarguably, a citizen who accepts public employment to liberty that they cannot be bargained away in a these fundamental rights by virtue of working for the
"must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom." contract for public employment. It is the Court's government.
But there are some rights and freedoms so fundamental responsibility to ensure that citizens are not deprived of
1-UTAK vs Comelec GR 20620 April 7, 2015 operator of the transportation service and/or terminal
Main Point: liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act
Facts: The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615 No. 9006.
Andalahao which provides that the violation of items 5 and 6 under
CASE NO. 510 subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the Petitioner sought for clarification requesting the COMELEC
Art III Section 4: Valid Prior Restraint public utility franchise and will make the owner and/or to reconsider the implementation of such provisions and

196
allow private owners of PUVS and transport terminals to
post election campaign materials on their vehicles and
transport terminals. The COMELEC en banc issued a
resolution denying petitioner’s request to reconsider the
implementation of the assailed provisions.
Issue: Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in
relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are
constitutional
Ruling: NO. Said provisions of Resolution No. 9615 are null
and void for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution. The prohibition constitutes a
clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of
the owners of PUVs and transport terminals. As a result
of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport
terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from
expressing their preferences under the pain of
indictment for an election offense and the revocation of
their franchise or permit to operate
Who digested: jAn
CASE NO. 511
ART III SEC 4
PRIOR RESTRAINT
Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioners brought this action for prohibition to
enjoin the Commission on Elections from enforcing Section
5.4 of RA. No.9006 (Fair Election Act), which provides that:
“Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be
published fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys
affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7)
days before an election”. Petitioners argue that the
restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of
speech without any clear and present danger to justify such
restraint. Respondent Commission on Elections justifies the
restrictions in §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006 as necessary to prevent
the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before the People v. Perez
election. It contends that (1) the prohibition on the
publication of election survey results during the period FACTS: Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar,
proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that
objective of the law, i.e., the prevention of the debasement municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1,
of the electoral process resulting from manipulated surveys, 1992, in the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a
bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; (2) it is narrowly discussion regarding the administration of Governor-
tailored to meet the "evils" sought to be prevented; and (3) General Wood, which resulted in Perez stating seditious
the impairment of freedom of expression is minimal, the statements. The witnesses for the defense did not deny that
restriction being limited both in duration, i.e., the last 15 an altercation took place on the morning of April 1, 1922, in
days before the national election and the last 7 days before which the accused participated. But they endeavored to
a local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election explain that the discussion was between Perez and one
survey results but only require timeliness. Severo Madrid, the latter maintaining that the fault was due
to the Nacionalista Party, while Perez argued that the
ISSUE: W/N Section 5.4 of RA 9006 constitutes an Governor-General was to blame. The accused testified that
unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of speech, the discussion was held in a peaceful manner, and that what
expression and the press. he wished to say was that the Governor-General should be
removed and substituted by another.
RULING: Yes. It constitutes an unconstitutional
abridgement of freedom of expression, speech and the ISSUE: W/N Subsequent punishment of expression can be
press. It has been held that mere legislative preferences or invoked in the case at bar.
beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well
support regulation directed at other personal activities but RULING: Yes. Here, the person maligned by the accused is
be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official
rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. position, like the Presidency of the United States and other
MAIN POINT: To summarize, the Supreme Court held that high offices, under a democratic form of government,
§5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous comment,
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance,
suppression of a category of expression even though such the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest
suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the bounds of free speech was intended. There is a seditious
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be tendency in the words used, which could easily produce
achieved by means other than suppression of freedom of disaffection among the people and a state of feeling
expression. incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the
Government and obedient to the laws.
jAn
CASE NO. 512 MAINPOINT: Criticism, no matter how severe, on the
ART III SEC 4 Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the
197
range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only and present danger to it should not be determined
seditious. for purposes of the arrest according to whether such an attempt will be likely to
be successful. Instead, the appropriate standard is whether
Who digested: jAn MAIN POINT: In Bold the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability,
CASE NO. 513 warrants a restriction on free speech that is needed to avoid
ART III SEC 4 jAn the danger. A clear and present danger existed here,
SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT CASE NO. 514 considering the strength and sophistication of the
Espiritu v. General Lim ART III SEC 4 organization as well as the unstable nature of governments
SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT around the world, tensions between the U.S. and Communist
FACTS: Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested Dennis v. US countries, and recent revolutions abroad in similar
without warrant, on the basis of the attestation of certain situations.
witnesses: that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 FACTS: Petitioners, leaders of the Communist Party in this
November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and country, were indicted in a federal district court under § 3 MAIN POINT: In each case must ask whether the gravity of
Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of the Smith Act for willfully and knowingly conspiring (1) the evil, discounted by its improbability, justified such
of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other to organize as the Communist Party a group of persons to invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.
things: Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction of the
magkagulona. and that the police authorities were present Government of the United States by force and violence, and Who digested: jAn
during the press conference held at the National Press Club (2) knowingly and willfully to advocate and teach the duty CASE NO. 515
(NPC) on 22 November 1988 where Espiritu called for a and necessity of overthrowing and destroying the ART III SEC 4
nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 Government of the United States by force and violence. The SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
November 1988. Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not trial judge instructed the jury that they could not convict Gonzales v. COMELEC
for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for uttering unless they found that petitioners intended to overthrow
the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the the Government "as speedily as circumstances would FACTS: The Revised Election Code under RA 4880 was
arresting officers, was inciting to sedition. permit," but that, if they so found, then, as a matter of law, amended to include two new sections which prohibits the
ISSUE: W/N was the arrest valid. there was sufficient danger of a substantive evil that too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period
Congress has a right to prevent to justify application of the of election campaign or partisan political activity.
RULING: Yes. Many persons may differ as to the validity of statute under the First Amendment. Petitioners were Petitioners alleges that RA 4880 is unconstitutional because
such perception and regard the language as falling within convicted, and the convictions were sustained by the Court its enforcement would prejudice basic rights, such as the
free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, then, of Appeals. freedom of speech, the freedom of assembly and the right to
Espiritu had not lost the right to insist, during the pre-trial form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right to ISSUE: W/N Subsequent punishment of expression can be law, guaranteed under the Constitution.
free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which invoked in the case at bar.
it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to ISSUE: W/N the contention is valid.
make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words RULING: Yes. The government has a compelling interest in
were uttered, or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In preventing its overthrow by force or violence, so it is RULING: No. The prohibition of too early nomination of
the balancing of authority and freedom, which justified in placing some limits on speech to protect that candidates presents a question that is not too formidable in
obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in interest, notwithstanding the First Amendment. Whether character. According to the act: “It shall be unlawful for any
an attempt to overthrow the government poses a clear political party, political committee, or political group to

198
nominate candidates for any elective public office voted for ISSUE/S hand, asserts a right of privacy and claims that the
at large earlier than one hundred and fifty days immediately Whether or not the shutting down of the radio production and filming of the projected mini-series would
preceding an election, and for any other elective public station was unconstitutional constitute an unlawful intrusion into his privacy which he is
office earlier than ninety days immediately preceding an entitled to enjoy.
election.” The right of association is affected. Political RULING
parties have less freedom as to the time during which they Yes. Broadcast stations deserve the special ISSUE/S
may nominate candidates; the curtailment is not such, protection given to all forms of media by the due process Whether or not the described motion picture is
however, as to render meaningless such a basic right. Their and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution. The unconstitutional as to private respondent’s privacy
scope of legitimate activities, save this one, is not unduly closure of the petitioner's radio station on grounds of
narrowed. Neither is there an infringement of their freedom national security without elaboration of the grounds and RULING
to assemble. They can do so, but not for such purpose. without hearing deserves to be condemned in no uncertain No. Private respondent is a "public figure" precisely
terms for it is manifest that due process was not observed. because of his participation as a principal actor in the
MAIN POINT: In determining the validity of the law, free culminating events of the change of government in February
speech as a social value must be weighed against the MAIN POINT 1986. Because his participation therein was major in
political process as a social value. The government has a right to be protected against character, a film reenactment of the peaceful revolution that
broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow fails to make reference to the role played by private
CHAM it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a respondent would be grossly unhistorical.
Case No. 516 rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the
ARTICLE III SECTION 4: Gov’t vs Private Speech same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio MAIN POINT
SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT and television would have little reason for existence if The right of privacy of a "public figure" is
Eastern Broadcasting vs. Dans Jr. (Case is moot and broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.
academic) entertaining utterances. Since they are the most convenient Private respondent has not retired into the seclusion of
and popular means of disseminating varying views on simple private citizenship. He continues to be a "public
FACTS public issues, they also deserve special protection. figure."
This petition was filed to compel the respondents to
allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been CHAM CHAM
summarily closed on grounds of national security. Case No. 517 Case No. 518
Petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it ARTICLE III SECTION 4: Gov’t vs Private Speech ARTICLE III SECTION 4: Gov’t vs Private Speech
was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT
used to incite people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing Ayer Prod PTY LTD vs. Judge Capulong Kelley vs Johnson
was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a
factual basis for the closure. The petitioner also raised the FACTS FACTS
issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that The petitioner proposed motion picture would be An order had been put into effect requiring that
the respondents' general charge of "inciting people to essentially a re-enactment of the events that made possible male members of the police force abide by certain hair-
commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift the EDSA revolution. Petitioners' claim that in producing grooming standards. Police officers were forbidden from
towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and "The Four Day Revolution," they are exercising their having beards or goatees, and the length of hair and
and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs. freedom of speech and of expression protected under our sideburns were likewise regulated. There was an exception
Constitution. Private respondent (Enrile), upon the other for medical need. The action was said to violate Johnson’s

199
First Amendment right of free expression, as well as his "crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of Valmonte, lawyer for the students, submitted a letter to the
Fourteenth Amendment rights of due process and equal terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political Discipline Committee reiterating his clients position that
protection. reform," as well as assembling "with any society, group, or said Committee had no jurisdiction over them. According to
assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the Atty. Valmonte, the Committee was trying to impose
ISSUE/S doctrines of criminal syndicalism." discipline on his clients on account of their having written
Whether or not the regulated hair style of police articles and poems in their capacity as campus journalists.
personnel violated Johnson’s rights ISSUE/S Hence, he argued that what applies is Republic Act No. 7079
Whether or not the law is unconstitutional as it [The Campus Journalism Act] and its implementing rules
RULING violates freedom of speech and regulations. He also questioned the partiality of the
No. The Court ruled that the regulations were not so members of said Committee who allegedly had already
irrational as to be deemed “arbitrary,” and therefore RULING articulated their position against his clients.
respondent had not been deprived of liberty. On the Yes. SC ruled that (1) speech can be prohibited if it
contrary, the Court determined that similarity in is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless ISSUE/S
appearance of police officers was desirable and served as a action" and (2) it is "likely to incite or produce such action." Whether or not Miriam College has the jurisdiction
rational basis for the regulations imposed by the police The criminal syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and over the complaints against the students
force. teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not that
advocacy and teaching would actually incite imminent RULING
MAIN POINT lawless action. The failure to make this distinction rendered Yes. Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act should
The promotion of safety of persons and property is the law overly broad and in violation of the Constitution. be read in a manner as not to infringe upon the school's
unquestionably at the core of the State's police power, and right to discipline its students. At the same time, however,
virtually all state and local governments employ a MAIN POINT we should not construe said provision as to unduly restrict
uniformed police force to aid in the accomplishment of that The Court held that hate speech is protected under the right of the students to free speech.
purpose. Choice of organization, dress, and equipment for the First Amendment as long as it does not provoke
law enforcement personnel is a decision entitled to the violence. MAIN POINT
same sort of presumption of legislative validity as are state Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act to mean that
choices designed to promote other aims within the CHAM the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the
cognizance of the State's police power. Case No. 520 basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such
ARTICLE III SECTION 4: Gov’t vs Private Speech articles materially disrupt classwork or involve substantial
CHAM SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT disorder or invasion of the rights of others
Case No. 519 Miriam College Foundation vs CA
ARTICLE III SECTION 4: Gov’t vs Private Speech
SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT FACTS PASTOR
Brandenburg vs Ohio Obscene, vulgar, indecent, gross, sexually explicit, Case No. 521
injurious to young readers, and devoid of all moral values. Art III Sec 4: Speech and the Electoral Process
FACTS This was how some members of the Miriam College Sanidad vs. COMELEC
Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a community allegedly described the contents of the 181 SCRA 529; GR 90878, January 29, 1990
speech at a Klan rally and was later convicted under an Ohio September-October 1994 issue (Vol. 41, No. 14) of Miriam
criminal syndicalism law. The law made illegal advocating Colleges school paper and magazine. Atty. Ricardo

200
FACTS: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an National Press Club (NPC) vs. COMELEC Davide, Jr. J., concurring: Freedom of speech and of the
organic act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) was 207 SCRA 1 press or of expression which the Bill of Rights guarantees is
enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January not an absolute right now settled.
1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the FACTS: It is principally argued that Section 11 (b) of RA No. Padilla, J., concurring: It is fundamental that these
1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6646 invades and violates freedom of expression. Said freedoms are not immune to regulation by the state in the
6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated section provides that for “it is unlawful any newspapers, legitimate exercise of its police power.
Resolution 2167 to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on radio broadcasting or television station, other mass
the said Organic Act. Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper media, or any person making use of the mass media to Gutierrez, Jr., J., dissenting: R.A. No. 6646 will certainly
columnist of “Overview” for the “Baguio Midland Courier” sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for achieve one result—keep the voters ignorant of who the
assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on campaign or other political purposes except to the candidates are and what they stand for.
columnists, commentators or announcers) of the said Commission on Elections as provided under Section 90 Cruz, J., dissenting: The most important objection to
resolution, which provides “During the plebiscite and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.” Petitioners who Section 11 (b) is that it constitutes prior restraint on the
campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite were representatives of mass media assails its dissemination of ideas.
day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer constitutionality on the ground that it amounts to Paras., J., dissenting: The freedom to advertise one’s
or personality shall use his column or radio or television censorship because it single’s out for suppression only political candidacy in the various forms of media is clearly a
time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.” publications of a particular content and it abridges freedom significant part of our freedom of expression and of our
of speech of candidates. right of access to information.
ISSUE: Whether or not the regulation violates petitioner’s
freedom of expression. ISSUE: Whether or not the aforementioned section of RA
6646 is unconstitutional for violating freedom of
RULING: YES. expression. PASTOR
We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to a Case No. 523
restriction of petitioner’s freedom of expression for no RULING: NO. Art III Sec 4: Speech and the Electoral Process
justifiable reason. While the limitation does not absolutely The fundamental purpose of such “supervision or Adiong vs. COMELEC
bar petitioner’s freedom of expression, it is still a restriction regulation” has been spelled out in the Constitution as the 207 SCRA 712; GR 103956, March 31, 1992
on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. ensuring of “equal opportunity, time, and space, and the
No reason was advanced by respondent to justify such right to reply,” as well as uniform and reasonable rates of FACTS: Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate
abridgement. charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection in the May 11, 1992 elections, now assails the COMELEC’s
with “public information campaigns and forums among Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
MAIN POINT: Plebiscite issues are matters of public candidates. stickers in “mobile” places like cars and other moving
concern and importance. The people’s right to be informed vehicles (Sec. 21, COMELEC Resolution No. 2347). The
and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision MAIN POINT: The Constitution has expressly authorized petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and
would be better served by access to an unabridged the Comelec to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the
discussion of the issues, including the forum. utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury
media of communication and information. with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on
PASTOR cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to
Case No. 522 inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the
Art III Sec 4: Speech and the Electoral Process May 11, 1992 elections.

201
 ISSUE: Whether or not the aforementioned section of RA official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count
ISSUE: Whether or not the prohibition of posting of decals 6646 is unconstitutional for violating freedom of of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). In
and stickers on “mobile” places except in designated areas expression. other words, they allege that the exit survey/poll has a clear
by the COMELEC is unconstitutional. and present danger of destroying the credibility and
RULING: NO. integrity of the electoral process. It also noted that it had
RULING: YES. The term political “ad ban,” when used to describe §11(b) of not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit
The prohibition is null and void. The prohibition unduly R.A. No. 6646, is misleading, for even as §11(b) prohibits the survey.
infringes on the citizen’s fundamental right of free speech sale or donation of print space and air time to political
enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to procure and itself ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC Resolution restraining
public interest substantial enough to warrant the kind of allocate to the candidates space and time in the media. survey polls infringes the Freedom of Speech and of the
restriction involved in this case. There is no suppression of political ads but only a regulation Press.
of the time and manner of advertising.
MAIN POINT: Freedom of expression calls all the more for RULING: YES.
the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the MAIN POINT: Here, there is no total ban on political ads, Such arguments are purely speculative and clearly
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the much less restriction on the content of the speech. Given the untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the
equally vital right of suffrage. fact that print space and air time can be controlled or interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that
dominated by rich candidates to the disadvantage of poor the results will as much as possible be representative or
PASTOR candidates, there is a substantial or legitimate reflective of the general sentiment or view of the
Case No. 524 governmental interest justifying exercise of the regulatory community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not
Art III Sec 4: Speech and the Electoral Process power of the COMELEC. meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec
Osmena vs. COMELEC count. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the
288 SCRA 447; GR 132231, March 31, 1998 PASTOR integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are
Case No. 525 separate and independent from the exit polls.
FACTS: NPC v. COMELEC (Case No. 522) upheld the validity Art III Sec 4: Speech and the Electoral Process
of §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646 against claims that it abridged ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC MAIN POINT: A limitation on the freedom of expression
freedom of speech and of the press. Petitioners are NOW 323 SCRA 811; GR 133486, January 28, 2000 may be justified only by a danger of such substantive
seeking a reexamination of the validity of §11(b) of R.A. No. character that the state has a right to prevent.
6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which FACTS: COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the
prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS CBN or any other AIMAR
print space or air time for campaign or other political groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit CASE NO. 526
purposes, except to the Commission on Elections. surveys. The Resolution was issued by the Comelec ART. III, SEC. 4: 3.Speech and Electoral Process
Petitioners are candidates for public office in the allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS- SWS vs. COMELEC
forthcoming elections. Petitioner Emilio M.R. Osmeñ a is CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project to conduct radio-
candidate for President of the Philippines, while petitioner TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of FACTS: Section 1 of R.A. 9006, the Fair Election Act, says
Pablo P. Garcia is governor of Cebu Province, seeking the vote during the elections for national officials “Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be
reelection. particularly for President and Vice President, results of published 15 days before an election and surveys affecting
which shall be broadcasted immediately.” The electoral local candidates shall not be published 7 days before an
body believed that such project might conflict with the election.” The provision as well as the implementing

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resolution of the COMELEC is challenged as violative of campaign period. She was found guilty of premature conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates
freedom of expression. The COMELEC, however, justifies campaigning. for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in
the rule as necessary to prevent the manipulation and the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that
corruption of electoral process by unscrupulous and ISSUE: WON petitioner guilty of premature campaigning election.
erroneous survey just before election.
RULING: No. Any act is lawful unless expressly declared ISSUE: WON the assailed notice and letter for the removal of
ISSUE: WON the Act violates the freedom of expression unlawful by law. It is enough that Congress stated that “any the tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental right to
unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take freedom of expression.
RULING: Yes. The power of the COMELEC over media effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” So, it is
franchise is limited to ensuring “equal opportunity, time, lawful if done before the start of the campaign period. This RULING: Yes. The respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin
space and the right to reply” as well as to reasonable rates plain language of the law need not be construed further. is election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing
of charges for the use of media facilities for “public Moreover, on the day of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting
information and forums among candidates.” Here the candidate for. those who voted for it, holds no water. The Court held that
prohibition of speech is direct, absolute and substantial. Nor while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of
does the rule pass the O’Brien test for content related MAINPOINT: Prior to the campaign period, even if the the named candidates and political parties, this does not
regulation because it supresses one type of expression candidate has filed his/her certificate of candidacy, he/she necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin
while allowing other types such as editorials, etc. and the is not yet considered as a candidate for purposes other than was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by
restriction is greater than what uis needed to protect the printing of ballots. Hence, she cannot be guilty of any candidate, political party, or party-list group. The
government interest because the interest can be protected premature campaigning for in the first place there is no content of the tarpaulin is a political speech. Political speech
by narrower restriction such as subsequent punishment. candidate to talk about. What she did was an exercise of refers to speech “both intended and received as a
her freedom of expression. contribution to public deliberation about some issue,”
MAINPOINT: No law shall be passed abridging the freedom “fostering informed and civic minded deliberation.”
of speech, of expression, or of the press .
MAINPOINT: The Court held that every citizen’s expression
AIMAR AIMAR with political consequences enjoys a high degree of
CASE NO. 527 CASE NO. 528 protection.
ART. III, SEC. 4: 3.Speech and Electoral Process ART. III, SEC. 4: 3.Speech and Electoral Process
Penera vs. COMELEC The Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC AIMAR
CASE NO. 529
FACTS: Petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy on the FACTS: Petitioner posted tarpaulins within a private ART. III, SEC. 4: 4.Commercial Speech
day before the prescribed campaign period and thereafter, compound which contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” Rubin vs. Coors Brewing
had a motorcade convincing the residents to vote for her. and the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as
Due to this, private respondent filed a petition against her either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro- FACTS: Coors Brewing Co. (Coors) applied to the Bureau of
alleging premature campaigning as provided in the RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for an approval of proposed
Omnibus Election Code Section 80 which says “It shall be were classified according to their vote on the adoption of labels. The approval was rejected because it violated the
unlawful for any person, … to engage in an election Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Federal Alcohol Administration Act’s (FAAA) prohibition of
campaign or partisan political activity except during the Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither disclosing the alcohol content on beer labels or
sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also advertisements to prevent “strength wars” among brewers.

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Coors filed a claim arguing the regulation violated the First FACTS: The case arose when the City of Cincinnati decided abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
Amendment’s protection of commercial speech. The district to revoke permits allowing the Discovery Network to press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
court upheld the ban of alcohol content in advertising, but distribute advertisements from 38 news racks on city petition the government for redress or grievances)
not on labels. The government appealed, and the court of property because of an ordinance prohibiting the ISSUE: WON the ban is in violation of Free Speech
appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court by distribution of commercial handbills on public property. RULING: Yes. In Central Hudson, the U.S. Supreme Court
concluding that the label ban did not prevent strength wars. Cincinnati claimed that it served the significant public ruled that the ban on advertisements for electricity violated
interests of safety and aesthetics. The far more numerous the First Amendment. In doing so, the Court established a
ISSUE: Does the Federal Alcohol Administration Act’s (1500) newspaper racks were not affected. Discovery four-part test, balancing government and commercial-
prohibition of displaying alcohol content on beer labels Networks challenged the legality of the ordinance under the speech interests to determine when commercial- speech
violate the First Amendment’s protection of commercial First Amendment. regulations encroach on free-speech rights. If
speech? the commercial speech is truthful and relates to a lawful
ISSUE: WON the ordinances violated the free speech activity, the regulation must directly advance a substantial
RULING: Yes. For the government to regulate commercial protection government interest and not more extensive than necessary
speech, the government must have a substantial interest to serve that interest. Although energy conservation
that the regulation directly affects. In this case, the interest RULING: Yes. The restrictions on the distribution of represented a substantial government interest, the
the government intended to protect by banning the display commercial flyers in news racks violated the First restriction was more extensive than necessary, as it banned
of alcohol content on beer labels was to limit the “strength Amendment. Despite the undisputed fact that flyers were even advertisements for products and services that use
wars” of competing beer companies, which could lead to commercial advertisements, the Court refused to diminish energy efficiently. Therefore the prohibition encroached the
greater alcoholism. However, the Court concluded that this their free speech protections. The removal of a small right to free speech
interest was not substantial enough, since there was no number of news racks did little to advance the city’s
reason to believe that banning the alcoholic content on beer interests in safety and aesthetics. In short, it was not a MP BOLD
labels would prevent such social harms. The regulation was reasonable fit.
more extensive than necessary, since there were available CASE NO. 532
and effective alternatives that would not violate the First MAINPOINT: Commercial speech remains a lower category ART 3, SEC 4: Commercial Speech
Amendment. The regulation is unconstitutional because it of protected speech, but this decision indicates that Pharmaceutical v Sec. of Health
did not increase consumer awareness, but instead blinded governments cannot ban or restrict it without a reasonable FACTS: Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by
the public to the truth of the alcohol content. justification. President Corazon Aquino, a code adopted by the World
CASE NO. 531 Health Assembly (WHA) that breastfeeding should be
MAINPOINT: The regulation violated the First ART 3, SEC 4: Commercial Speech supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be
Amendment’s of protection of commercial speech, that it Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission New ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted
should not be false or misleading. York for breastmilk substitutes.
FACTS: In 1973, when an oil embargo caused fuel shortages, ISSUE: WON the DOH violated the constitutional freedom
AIMAR the New York Public Service Commission issued a on free trade for breastmilk substitutes
CASE NO. 530 regulation prohibiting electric companies from advertising RULING: Yes. The framers of the constitution were well
ART. III, SEC. 4: 4.Commercial Speech to promote electricity use. Central Hudson Gas & Electric, a aware that trade must be subjected to some form of
Cincinnati vs. Discovery Network public utility company, challenged the regulation, arguing regulation for the public good. Public interest must be
that its advertisements were commercial speech protected upheld over business interests. "free enterprise does not
by the First Amendment. (Sec 4: No law shall be passed call for removal of ‘protective regulations’." It must be

204
clearly explained and proven by competent evidence FACTS: Rappler filed a petition for certiorari and
just exactly how such protective regulation would MP BOLD prohibition against bautista in his capacity as chariman of
result in the restraint of trade. petitioner failed to show the COMELEC that the Memorandum of Agreement for the
that the proscription of milk manufacturers’ participation CASE NO. 534 Presidential and vice presidential debates (PiliPinas 2016
would hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes and failed ART 3, SEC 4: Commercial Speech debates) for violating fundamental rights..The MOA
to demonstrate that the provisions of the RIRR is Disini v Sec. of Justice recognizes the public function of the debates and the need
unreasomable and oppressive for being in restraint of trade FACTS: Petitioner seeks to declare several provisions of the for the widest possible dissemination of the
MP BOLD RA 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 as debates. Rappler has concerns regarding certain provisions
unconstitutional and void beacause it violated the freedom of the MOA particularly regarding online streaming and the
CASE NO. 533 of speech. The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to imposition of a maximum limit of two minutes of debate
ART 3, SEC 4: Commercial Speech and use of the cyberspace and because linking with the excerpts for news reporting. Respondent assured petitioner
City of Laduc v Gilleo internet opens up a user to communications from others, that its concerns will be addressed afterwards, but it has to
FACTS: A City of Ladue ordinance prohibited homeowners the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing sign the MOA because time was of the essence. Petitioner
from displaying any signs to prevent visual clutter, except theft by hacking into or sneakily accessing his bank account alleged that it made several communications with
for residence identification, for sale signs and signs warning or credit card or defrauding him through false respondent however the former received no response.
of safety hazards. Margaret Gilleo hammered a sign into her representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for ISSUE: WON the MOA violates the freedom of the press
lawn in Ladue City which reads “Say No to War in the illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography RULING: Such freedom of the press to report and
Persian Gulf. Call Congress Now”. When Gilleo learned that guileless children who have access to the internet. For this disseminate the live audio of the debates is now
the sign violated a city ordinance, she approached the city reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate protected and guaranteed under Section 4, Article III of
council for an exemption and was denied. Gilleo then sued the use of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings. the Constitution, which provides that "[N]o law shall be
the city, claiming that the ordinance violated her right of ISSUE: WON the Cybercrime prevention act violated passed abridging the freedom of the press. The
free speech. Later, she removed the sign and placed it on freedom of speech presidential and vice-presidential debates are held
window that read “For Peace in the Gulf.” The City expanded RULING: Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of primarily for the benefit of the electorate to assist the
the resolution on the prohibition on signs thus, the sign in unsolicited commercial electronic communications, electorate in making informed choices on election day. The
the window also violated the city ordinance commonly known as spams, the prohibition on transmitting political nature of the national debates and the public's
ISSUE: WON the ban on signs in the City of Ladue is unsolicited communications “would deny a person the right interest in the wide availability of the information for the
Unconstitutional to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads voters' education certainly justify allowing the debates to be
RULING: Yes. While signs pose distinctive problems and addressed to him.”. Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of shown or streamed in other websites for wider
thus are subject to municipalities' police powers, measures the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 as unconstitutional. dissemination, in accordance with the MOA
regulating them affect communication itself. Such a It held that Section 4(c)(3) violated the right to freedom MP BOLD
regulation may be challenged on the ground that it restricts of expression by prohibiting the electronic
speech because its exemptions discriminate on the basis of transmission of unsolicited commercial E.C. Perez
signs' messages, or on the ground that it prohibits too much communications CASE NO. 536
protected speech. The ordinance forbade most signs but ART. III, SEC. 4: PRIVATE V. GOVERNMENT SPEECH
allowed others, such as “For Sale” signs, the circuit CASE NO. 535 LIBEL; UNPROTECTED SPEECH
court ruled the law is unconstitutional because it failed ART 3, SEC 4: Commercial Speech Policarpio v. Manila Times
to be content neutral; it favored commercial speech Rappler inc v. Bautista
over noncommercial speech.

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FACTS: Peitioner Policarpio was executive secretary of
UNESCO Nat’l Commission. She had filed charges against
Herminia Reyes, one of her subordinates in the Commission
and caused the latter to be separated from the service.
Reyes, in turn, filed counter-charges which were referred
for investigation. Pending completion, Reyes filed
complaints against Policarpio for alleged malversation of
public funds and for estafa through falsification of public
documents. Policarpio filed a libel suit to Manila Times
Publishing Co. for publishing two defamatory, libelous and
false articles/news items in Saturday Mirror and in the
Daily Mirror. The articles contain news on Reyes’ charges
against Policarpio. CFI dismissed the complaint on the
ground that petitioner had not proven that respondent had
acted maliciously in publishing the articles, although
portions thereof were inaccurate or false.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Manila Times is guilty of
having published libelous/defamatory articles,
RULING: Yes. Newspapers must enjoy a certain degrees of
discretion in determining the manner in which a given
event should be presented to the public, and the importance
to be attached thereto, as a news item, and that its
presentation in a sensational manner is not per se illegal.
Newspapers may publish news items relative to judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings, which are not of
confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know
the truth with respect to such proceedings. But, to enjoy
immunity, a publication containing derogatory
information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and it
must be made in good faith and without any comments
or remarks. Art. 354, RPC provides that “Every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious even if it be true, if
no good intention & justifiable motive for making it is
shown, except, “A fair and true report, made in good faith,
without any comments or remarks….” In the case at bar,
aside from containing information derogatory to the
petitioner, the articles presented her in a worse Respondent Fidel G. Cruz sued petitioners in the CFI of
predicament than that in which she in fact was. Said articles Manila for the recovery of damages alleging the defamatory
were not a fair and true report of the proceedings therein character of the publication of his picture.
alluded to.
ISSUE: Whether or not an action for libel would lie arising
MAIN POINT IN BOLD. from the publication of the picture of Fidel G. Cruz.
E.C. Perez RULING: Yes. An action for libel would lie arising from the
CASE NO. 537 publication of the photograph of Cruz even though the
ART. III, SEC. 4: PRIVATE V. GOVERNMENT SPEECH publisher made a correction of their mistake immediately
LIBEL; UNPROTECTED SPEECH upon discovery thereof. Publication of a person's
Lopez v. CA photograph in connection with an article libelous of a
third person, is a libel on the person whose picture is
FACTS: On the front page of the Manila Chronicle, as well as published, where the acts set out in the article are
on other daily newspapers, was a news story of Fidel Cruz, a imputed to such person. While a newspaper should not be
sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands who held accountable for honest mistakes owing to the pressure
gave a “hoax” report informing authorities in Manila that of a daily deadline, there is no such pressure to meet, and no
the people in the Babuyan Islands were living in terror, due occasion to act with haste in a weekly magazine.
to a series of killings committed since Christmas of 1955
when in truth, there were no killers and Fidel Cruz merely MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
wanted transportation home to Manila. This Week Magazine
of the Manila Chronicle devoted a pictorial article in its two E.C. Perez
issues regarding the incident. The magazine on both CASE NO. 538
occasions carried photographs of the person purporting to ART. III, SEC. 4: PRIVATE V. GOVERNMENT SPEECH
be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the pictures that were LIBEL; UNPROTECTED SPEECH
published on both occasions were that of private New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
respondent Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman contractor from
Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the photographs of FACTS: Sullivan was one of the 3 Commissioners of
respondent Cruz and that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector, Montgomery, Alabama, who claimed that he was defamed in
were on file in the library of the Manila Chronicle in a full-page ad entitled, “Heed Their Rising Voices” taken out
accordance with the standard procedure observed in other in the New York Times. The advertisement charged in part
newspaper offices, but when the format was prepared, the that an unprecedented wave of terror had been directed
two photographs were in advertently switched. As soon, against those who participated in the civil rights movement
however, as the inadvertent error was brought to the in the South. Some of the particulars of the advertisement
attention of petitioners, the following correction (i.e. the were false. Although the advertisement did not mention
correct photo) was immediately published along with an Sullivan by name, he claimed that it referred to him
apology, stating that the mistake was made die to the fact indirectly because he had oversight responsibility of the
that they were rushing to meet the deadline of publication. police. New York Times Co. claimed that it authorized
206
publication of the advertisement because it did not have any  In US Laws, the First Amendment guarantees RULING: Yes. The US Supreme Court held in this case that
reason to believe that its contents were false. There was no freedom concerning religion, expression, assembly, the “knowingly and recklessly false” standard applied
independent effort to check its accuracy. Sullivan demanded and the right to petition. because the story was a matter of public concern. It did
that the corporation retract the advertisement. The jury not matter that Rosenbloom was a private citizen. The
found the ad libelous per se and actionable without proof of Court also held that the evidence in the case did not support
malice and awarded damages to Sullivan. The Alabama E.C. Perez the damages award under the proper constitutional
Supreme Court affirmed. New York Times Co. appealed. CASE NO. 539 standard.
ART. III, SEC. 4: PRIVATE V. GOVERNMENT SPEECH
ISSUE: Whether or not New York Co. is liable for defamation LIBEL; UNPROTECTED SPEECH MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
for printing an advertisement which criticized a public Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc.
official’s official conduct. Additional Information:
FACTS: George Rosenbloom distributed nudist magazines in  In libel cases in the US, the difference between
RULING: No. The Supreme Court of the United States the Philadelphia area. Police arrested him at his home on defamation of a public figure versus defamation of a
(Supreme Court) holds that the Constitution delimits a obscenity charges and seized several of the magazines. A private person is that a private person who claims
State’s power to award damages for libel in actions brought local news broadcast, run by Metromedia, Inc., reported on defamation only needs to prove that the defamer
by public officials against critics of their official conduct. In the arrest, but failed to use the words “allegedly” or acted negligently, while a public figure who claims
this case, the rule requiring proof of actual malice is “reportedly” in during one broadcast. In subsequent defamation has to prove that the defamer acted
applicable. It is not adequate evidence of malice that New broadcasts, the reporters called Rosenbloom and other intentionally or recklessly.
York Co. failed to check the advertisements accuracy. Also, similar distributors “girlie look peddlers” and “smut E.C. Perez
the evidence was constitutionally defective in another distributors”. Eventually, Rosenbloom was acquitted on the CASE NO. 540
respect: it was incapable of supporting the jury’s finding obscenity charges. Rosenbloom then sued Metromedia for ART. III, SEC. 4: PRIVATE V. GOVERNMENT SPEECH
that the allegedly libelous statements were made of and libel. The district court held that the First Amendment LIBEL; UNPROTECTED SPEECH
concerning Sullivan. The State cannot, under the First standard, which allowed recovery of damages only for Rosenbloom v. Metromedia Inc.
and Fourteenth Amendments, award damages to a rendering “knowingly and recklessly” false statements, did
public official for defamatory falsehood relating to his not apply because Rosenbloom was not a public official or FACTS: Gertz was an attorney hired by a private family to
official conduct unless he proves "actual malice"—that figure. The court instead instructed the jury to award sue a police officer who had killed said family's son. In a
the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or damages where Metromedia did not use reasonable care to magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society
with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false. discern the truth before broadcasting. The jury awarded accused Gertz of being a "Leninist" and a "Communist-
Factual error, content defamatory of official reputation, Rosenbloom general and punitive damages, although the fronter" because he chose to represent clients who were
or both, are insufficient to warrant an award of district court reduced the punitive damages. The U.S. Court suing a law enforcement officer. Gertz won a jury verdict
damages for false statements unless "actual malice" is of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the and an award of $50,000 but lost his libel suit because the
alleged and proved. knowingly and recklessly false standard applied. trial judge found that the magazine had not violated the
actual malice test for libel which the Supreme Court had
MAIN POINT IN BOLD. ISSUE: Whether or not the knowingly and recklessly false established in New York Times v. Sullivan. The Court of
standard for defamatory statements apply to private Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial judge's
Additional Information: individuals. ruling.

207
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in New York Times v. immoral drunks. In response, Falwell sued Hustler FACTS: Senator JPE et al. were charged by the State with
Sullivan which necessitates proof of actual malice may be Magazine claiming damages for libel, invasion of privacy, Rebellion complexed with murder, in contravention of the
applied in this case. and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The federal Hernandez doctrine which states that Rebellion absorbs
district court found for Falwell on the emotional distress murder. While the SC was deliberating their decision, the
RULING: No. The Court reversed the lower court decision, claim, awarding him damages in the amount of $150,000. Manila Standard published an article by Atty. Emil Jurado
holding that Gertz's rights had been violated and ordering a The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s judgment. stating that “Rebellion complex does not exist SC” and that
new trial. The application of the New York Times v. Sullivan Hustler appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. “State back to square one in cases v. Enrile et al.” His article
standard in this case was inappropriate because Gertz was claimed that the SC had reaffirmed the Hernandez doctrine
neither a public official nor a public figure. First, the ISSUE: WON a public figure recover damages for a claim by a 14- 1 vote according to “sources in the SC”. He
recklessness standard applies only to defamation of public alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress if the published another article that stated that the SC was
figures or public officials. Second, even for private public figure does not show actual malice. expected to promulgate a decision within the day or the
individuals, states may not impose strict liability on news next day. He divulged information, such as the revised vote
media. And third, any standard of fault less than HELD: No. Public figures and officials must show actual of 14-0 and that the decision would be penned by Assoc.
recklessness limits private persons to actual injury. malice in order to recover damages from intentional Justice Narvasa. New articles showed that the SC was “still
Because private individuals characteristically have less infliction of emotional distress from a publication. Falwell is deliberating” on the issue. On that same day, the SC issued a
effective opportunities for rebuttal than do public a public figure and cannot recover damages absent a resolution branding as false the news reports and claimed
officials and public figures, they are more vulnerable to showing of the actual malice. Public figures must prove that no decision had been signed as of the date, and
injury from defamation. Because they have not more than outrageous conduct as citizens receive First required Atty. Jurado to respond within 5 days why he
voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of Amendment protections related to speech. More than mere should not be dealt with administratively. Atty. Jurado
injury from defamatory falsehoods, they are also more outrageous conduct must be shown. The Court held that claimed freedom of the press and justified the article on the
deserving of recovery. The state interest in deciding otherwise would assign damage awards to political people’s right to know about decisions.
compensating injury to the reputation of private cartoonists for caricatures that play up the negative features
individuals is therefore greater than for public officials of their public figures. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell ISSUE: WON the report and comments in question are
and public figures. established that Public Figures could not recover damages protected by freedom of the press and right of the people to
for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress know information on matters of a public concern.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD. absent a showing of actual malice. Actual malice requires
that the statement was made with knowledge that it RULING: No. Publication regarding judicial action in a
AR was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or pending case, which tends to impede, embarrass or
CASE NO. 541 not it was true. obstruct the court and constitutes a clear and present
ART III SEC 4: FREEDOM OF SPEECH danger to the administration of justice is not protected
LIBEL (UNPROTECTED SPEECH) AR by the guarantee of press freedom and is punishable as
Hustler Magazine vs. Falwell CASE NO. 542 contempt. Freedom of the press and administration of
ART III SEC 4: FREEDOM OF SPEECH justice are both equally sacred and neither should be
LIBEL (UNPROTECTED SPEECH) violated by the other. In order to dispose of judicial business
FACTS: Jerry Falwell was a nationally known minister and In Re Jurado AM No. 90-5-2373 unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to
active commentator on both political and public issues. impair the impartiality of the verdicts, the court will not
Hustler Magazine printed a parody article about Falwell hesitate to exercise the power to punish for contempt. His
inferring Falwell and his mother were incestuous and article published comments on a non-existent decision and

208
obstructed the proper functioning of the SC. The premature
revelation placed the court in an unfavorable light as an
inept and incompetent guardian of its own confidential
proceedings.
AR
CASE NO. 543
ART III SEC 4: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
LIBEL (UNPROTECTED SPEECH)
In Re Jurado 243 SCRA 299
FACTS: Jurado, a journalist who writes in a newspaper of
general circulation, the “Manila Standard,”had been writing
about alleged improprieties and irregularities in the
judiciary over several months. The case at bar is related to
“controversial case” of “PLDT v. Eastern Telephone
Philippines, Inc. (ETPI).” In that decision, the Court was
sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the
petitioner PLDT. “Philippine Daily Inquirer” and other
newspapers published a report of the purported affidavit of
a Mr. David Miles Yerkes, an alleged expert in linguistics. He
examined and analyzed the decision of Justice Gutierrez in
relation to a few of his prior ponencias and the writings of
one of the lawyers of PLDT, Mr. Eliseo Alampay, to ascertain
if the decision had been written, in whole or in part, by the
latter. Yerkes proffered the conclusion that the Gutierrez
decision “looks, reads and sounds like the writing of the
PLDT’s counsel.” The Chief Justice issued an administrative
order “Creating an Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Reports
of Corruption in the Judiciary,” to investigate the said
reports of corruption in the judiciary.
ISSUE: WON Jurado’s allegations constitute criminal libel.
HELD: Yes. Jurado’s actuations, in the context in which they
were done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and
indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might
cause to the name and reputation of those of whom he
wrote. They constitute contempt of court, directly tending
as they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice ISSUE: WON there is actual malice to warrant criminal
and the judges engaged in that function. The norm does not liability for libel.
require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says
or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless RULING: No. Even if the defamatory statement is false,
disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating no liability can attach if it relates to official conduct,
defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to unless the public official concerned proves that the
ascertain the truth thereof. statement was made with actual malice — that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard
Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further of whether it was false or not.
the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the
follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published charges made by petitioner were false but also that
about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. The petitioner made them with knowledge of their falsity or
knowingly false statement and the false statement with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy
constitutional protection. The Civil Code lays down the If the defamatory statement is made against a public official
norm for the proper exercise of any right, constitutional with respect to the discharge of his official duties and
or otherwise, i.e. to act with justice, give everyone his functions and the truth of the allegation is shown, the
due, and observe honesty and good faith. accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does
not prove that the imputation was published with good
AR motives and for justifiable ends. In this case, petitioner was
CASE NO. 544 able to prove the truth of his charges against the barangay
ART III SEC 4: FREEDOM OF SPEECH official. His allegation was based on the letter of NHA
LIBEL (UNPROTECTED SPEECH) Inspector General Fernandez to petitioners. A rule placing
Vasquez vs. CA on the accused the burden of showing the truth of
allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and
FACTS: Petitioner Vasquez and some 37 families from the justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only
Tondo Foreshore Area went to see then National Housing be contrary to the RPC. It would, above all, infringe on the
Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito Atienza regarding constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
their complaint against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime
Olmedo, a public official. After the meeting, petitioner and AR
his companions were interviewed by reporters of the CASE NO. 545
newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. The article was published ART III SEC 4: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
containing such statements from the petitioner imputing LIBEL (UNPROTECTED SPEECH)
that Olmedo, through connivance with NHA officials, was Borjal vs. CA
able to obtain title to several lots in the area and that he was
involved in illegal activities such as attempted murder, FACTS: A civil action for damages based on libel was filed
gambling and stealing. Olmeda filed a complaint for libel. before the court against Borjal and Soliven for writing and
209
publishing articles that are allegedly derogatory and
offensive against Francisco Wenceslao, attacking among
others the solicitation letters he send to support a
conference to be launch concerning resolving matters on
transportation crisis that is tainted with anomalous
activities. Wenceslao however was never named in any of
the articles nor was the conference he was organizing. The
lower court ordered petitioners to indemnify the private
respondent for damages which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. A petition for review was filed before the SC
contending that private respondent was not sufficiently
identified to be the subject of the published articles.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of libel.
HELD: No. Malice is further defined as the presence of spite
or ill will; when a person acts not out of response to duty,
but for some unjustifiable motives or bad intentions.
Petitioner acted out of a sense of civic duty and in the
performance of his job as a newspaperman in exposing
alleged anomalies in the government. A reading of the
imputations of petitioner Borjal against respondent
Wenceslao shows that all these necessarily bore upon the
latter's official conduct as Executive Director of the First
National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT).
Generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words,
the privileged character of a communication destroys the
presumption of malice. The burden of proving actual malice
then lies on private respondent Wenceslao.
Qualifiedly privileged communications containing
defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to
have been made without good intention justifiable motive.
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for
libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that
while in general every discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public Held: Yes. The prosecution failed to establish express
person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily malice on the part of petitioner by positive proof, its cause
actionable. It must either be a false allegation of fact or perforce must fail.
a comment based on a false supposition. The law presumes that malice is present in every
defamatory imputation; Exemption is a qualifiedly
CASE NO. 546 privileged communication. Art. 354. 2. A fair and true
ARTICLE III, SEC 4: 5. Libel(Unprotected Speech) report, made in good faith, without any comments or
546 Vicario v. CA remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
Facts: Petitioner was charged with by MTC resp judge, as proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
complaining witness. Allegedly the crime was committed statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings,
when Vicario circulated in the vicinity of the Northern or of any other act performed by public officers in the
Samar Provincial Hospital in Catarman photocopies of page exercise of their functions (emphasis supplied).
7 of the 20 March 1992 issue of the Philippine Daily Paragraph 2 aforequoted refers to a qualifiedly privileged
Inquirer which is about the filing of OMBwith the SB graft communication, the character of which is a matter of
charges against the Resp judge who allegedly pocketed defense that may be lost by positive proof of express malice
the P1,000.00 cash bond posted by a respondent in one of on the part of the accused. Once it is established that the
several cases pending in his sala. Said article named the article is of a privileged character, the onus of proving
respondent. Hence, a complaint was filed by resp against the actual malice rests on the plaintiff who must then convince
petitioner alleging that the latter’s act greatly prejudiced his the court that the offender was prompted by malice or ill
reputation as a member of the bench and caused him great will. When this is accomplished the defense of privilege
distress. becomes unavailing.14 Since the prosecution failed to
Petitioner Vicario on the other hand disclaimed establish express malice on the part of petitioner by positive
responsibility for the distribution of the alleged libelous proof, its cause perforce must fail.
article, and raised that the libel suit against him was ill- MP in Bold
motivated for he had filed a criminal charge for graft and
corruption against respondent before the Omb and an CASE NO. 547
admincomplaint for dishonesty with SC, both due to the ARTICLE III, SEC 4: 5. Libel(Unprotected Speech)
latter's unjustified refusal and failure to return petitioner's Pader v. Pp
cash bond of P1,000.00. Facts: On April 20, 1995, at about 8:00 p.m., Atty. Benjamin
Later RTC found Vicario guilty of libel and sentenced C. Escolango was conversing with his political leaders at the
him to pay a fine of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment terrace of his house at Morong, Bataan when petitioner
in case of insolvency. On appeal CA affirmed in toto the appeared at the gate and shouted “putang ina mo Atty.
decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition for review Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo!” The latter was dumb-
on certiorari where petitioner raised the issue founded and embarrassed. At that time, Atty. Escolango was
Issue: W/N the news item in question is a privileged matter a candidate for vice mayor of Morong, Bataan in the
thus, not a libelous act? elections of May 8, 1995. On June 16, 1995 Atty. Escolango
filed with the Municipal Trial Court, Bagac, Bataan a
complaint against petitioner for grave oral defamation, to
210
which petitioner pleaded “not guilty.” MTC after trial held
that petitioner was guilty. On appeal, RTC affirmed the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court in toto. On appeal the
CA affirmed the RTC’s decision but with modification as to
the penalty imposed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: w/n petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral
defamation.
Held: No. Unquestionably, the words uttered were
defamatory. Considering, however, the factual backdrop of
the case, the oral defamation was only slight. The
expression “putang ina mo” is a common enough
utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not
really to slander but rather to express anger or
displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that
punctuates one’s expression of profanity. SC do not find it
seriously insulting that after a previous incident involving
his father, a drunk Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango
would utter words expressing anger. Obviously, the
intention was to show his feelings of resentment and not
necessarily to insult the latter. Being a candidate running
for vice mayor, occasional gestures and words of
disapproval or dislike of his person are not uncommon.
MP in Bold
CASE NO. 548
ARTICLE III, SEC 4: 5. Libel(Unprotected Speech)
Fermin v PP
Facts: Cristy Fermin is the publisher and Bogs Tugas is the
editor-in-chief of Gossip Tabloid. The June 14, 1995
headline and lead story of the tabloid says that it is
improbable for Annabelle Rama to go to the US should it be
true that she is evading her conviction in an estafa case
herein the Philippines for she and husband Eddie have more Facts: In 1971, Marvin Miller, an owner/operator of a
problems/cases to confront there. This was said to be due to California mail-order business specializing in pornographic
their, especially Annabelle's, using fellow Filipinos’ money,
failure to remit proceeds to the manufacturing company of
the cookware they were selling and not being on good terms
with the latter. Respondents filed libel cases against petitioner
and Tugas before RTC of QC, Br. 218.
RTC held Fermin and Tugas guilty of libel. On appeal CA:
acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation but
Fermin's conviction was affirmed. Fermin's MR was denied
hence, the petitionwhere she argues that she had no
knowledge and participation in the publication of the
article, that the article is not libelous and is covered by the
freedom of the press.
Issue: W/N the article is not libelous and is covered by the
freedom of the press?
Held: No. petitioner cannot take refuge in the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press. Although a
wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against
public officials in the performance of their official duties, or
against public figures on matters of public interest, such
criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of
constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are
false, malicious or unrelated to a public officers
performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of
public interest involving public figures, the same may
give rise to criminal and civil liability. While
complainants are considered public figures for being
personalities in the entertainment business, media people,
including gossip and intrigue writers and commentators
such as petitioner, do not have the unbridled license to
malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing
fabricated and malicious comments, whether in broadcast
media or in print, about their personal lives
CASE NO. 549
ARTICLE III, SEC 4: 5. Obscenity(Unprotected Speech)
Miller v. California
films and books, sent out a brochure advertising books and
a film that graphically depicted sexual activity between men
and women. The brochure used in the mailing contained
graphic images from the books and the film. Five of the
brochures were mailed to a restaurant in Newport
Beach, California. The owner and his mother opened the
envelope and seeing the brochures, called the police. [2]
Miller was arrested and charged with violating California
Penal Code. Miller was tried by jury in the Superior Court of
Orange County. Hence the question befeore the court was:
Issue: W/N the sale and distribution of obscene material
was protected under the First Amendment's guarantee
of Freedom of Speech.
Held: NO. However, the Court acknowledged "the inherent
dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression",
and said that "State statutes designed to regulate obscene
materials must be carefully limited." The Court, in an
attempt to set such limits devised a set of three criteria
which must be met for a work to be legitimately subject to
state regulation:
1. whether the average person, applying contemporary
"community standards", would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
2. whether the work depicts or describes, in an
offensive way, sexual conduct or excretory
functions, as specifically defined by applicable state
law (the syllabus of the case mentions only sexual
conduct, but excretory functions are explicitly
mentioned on page 25 of the majority opinion); and
3. whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
CASE NO. 550
ARTICLE III, SEC 4: 5. Obscenity(Unprotected Speech)
Gonzales v Kalaw-katigbak
211
Facts:The principal petitioner is Jose Antonio U.
Gonzalez, President of the Malaya Films, a movie
production outfit duly registered as a single proprietorship
with the Bureau of Domestic Trade. The respondent is the
Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television, with
respondent as its Chairman. In a resolution of respondent, a
permit to exhibit the film Kapit sa Patalim under the
classification "For Adults Only," with certain changes and
deletions enumerated was granted. MR reconsideration was
filed by petitioners stating that the classification of the film
"For Adults Only" was without basis. Respondent later
released its decision: "Acting on the applicant's MR, the
Board, after a review of the resolution of the sub-committee
and an examination of the film, Resolves to affirm in toto the
ruling of the sub-committee. Considering, however, certain
vital deficiencies in the application, the Board further
Resolves to direct the Chairman of the Board to Withheld
the issuance of the Permit to exhibit until these deficiencies
are supplied. Hence this petition.
Respondents alleged that the petition is moot as
"respondent Board has revoked its questioned resolution,
replacing it with one immediately granting petitioner
company a permit to exhibit the film Kapit without any
deletion or cut "The modified resolution of the Board, of
course, classifies Kapit as for-adults-only, but the petition
does not raise any issue as to the validity of this
classification. All that petitioners assail as arbitrary on the
part of the Board's action are the deletions ordered in the
film. The prayer was for the dismissal of the petition. An
amended petition was then filed. The main objection was
the classification of the film as "For Adults Only." For
petitioners, such classification "is without legal and factual
basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic
expression. For respondents, the question of the sufficiency
of the standards remains the only question at issue.
Issue: W/N the respondent erred for subjecting the
producer to difficulty and for entertaining a narrow view of
obscenity,
Held & MP: Yes. Movies are within the constitutional
protection of freedom of expression, so that censorship RULING/MAIN POINT: No. In the case at bar, there is no
is presumed to be valid as constituting prior restraint. challenge on the right of the State, in the legitimate exercise
The only case whe the Board of Censors can order a of police power, to suppress smut provided it is smut.
deletion is when there is a clear and present danger of a Undoubtedly, "immoral" lore or literature comes within the
substantive evil against national security or public ambit of free expression, although not its protection. In free
morals or other public interest. In all other cases, the expression cases, the SC has consistently been on the side of
Board can only classify. the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and present
danger" that would warrant State interference and action.
Additional: But a different standard must be followed in But, “the burden to show the existence of grave and
television because of the pervasive and intrusive influence imminent danger that would justify adverse action ... lies on
of the medium on people who watch its programs without the. . . authorities.” "There must be objective and convincing,
having to pay anything. not subjective or conjectural, proof of the existence of such
clear and present danger." "It is essential for the validity
MARTIN of ... previous restraint or censorship that the ... authority
does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what the public
CASE NO. 551 welfare, peace or safety may require." "To justify such a
ARTICLE III, SEC. 4: Obscenity limitation, there must be proof of such weight and
Pita v. CA sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test." The
fact that the instant case involves an obscenity rap
FACTS: Respondent Bagatsing, Mayor of City of Manila, makes it no different from Burgos, a political case,
initiated the seizure and confiscation of reading materials because, and as indicated, speech is speech, whether
along Manila sidewalks that are believed to be obscene, political or "obscene". Nonetheless, the fact that the
pornographic and indecent, and later burned the seized former respondent Mayor's act was sanctioned by
materials in public. Among the publications seized, and later "police power" is no license to seize property in
burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co- disregard of due process. Thus, the raid was not valid,
edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. Hence, the petitioner seeks the although for an anti-smut campaign, because it is without a
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, rejecting his lawful search warrant.
appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
dismissing his complaint for injunctive relief against MARTIN
respondents. He invokes, in particular, the guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizures of the Constitution, as CASE NO. 552
well as its prohibition against deprivation of property ARTICLE III, SEC. 4: Obscenity
without due process of law. Barnes v. Glen Theater
ISSUE: Whether or not obscene materials, as freedom of FACTS: Respondents, two Indiana establishments wishing
speech or expression, may be seized by authorities in the to provide totally nude dancing as entertainment and
exercise of police power without due process of law. individual dancers employed at those establishments,
212
brought suit in the District Court to enjoin enforcement of
the state public indecency law -- which requires respondent
dancers to wear pasties and a G-string -- asserting that the
law's prohibition against total nudity in public places
violates the guarantee of freedom of expression. The court
held that the nude dancing involved here was not
expressive conduct. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling
that nonobscene nude dancing performed for entertainment
is protected expression, and that the statute was an
improper infringement of that activity because its purpose
was to prevent the message of eroticism and sexuality
conveyed by the dancers.
ISSUE: Whether or not nude dancing is a protected
expression.
RULING MAIN POINT:: No. Indiana's public indecency
law to prevent totally nude dancing does not violate the
First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression.
The law is clearly within the State's constitutional power.
And it furthers a substantial governmental interest in
protecting societal order and morality. Public indecency
statutes reflect moral disapproval of people appearing in
the nude among strangers in public places, and this
particular law follows a line of state laws, dating back to
1831, banning public nudity. The States' traditional police
power is defined as the authority to provide for the public
health, safety, and morals, and such a basis for legislation.
MARTIN
CASE NO. 553
ARTICLE III, SEC. 4: Obscenity
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
FACTS: Entertainer George Carlin had a comic routine
called "Filthy Words" that contained certain expletives. A
Pacifica Foundation radio station in New York City, WBAI,
broadcast the routine during the day. A father complained city's favor, holding that the ordinance did not violate the
that his son had heard it and that it contained language First Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding
inappropriate for children. The Federal Communications that the ordinance constituted a substantial restriction on
Commission (FCC) sent a letter of reprimand to Pacifica for First Amendment (guarantee of freedom of expression)
violating its rules against broadcasting indecent content. interests, and remanded the case for reconsideration as to
whether the city had substantial governmental interests to
ISSUE: Whether or not indecent content in broadcasting support the ordinance.
may be regulated by the State.
ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinance may be passed by local
RULING: Yes. Although the content was not obscene, the authorities to regulate adult motion picture theaters.
Majority still found that the FCC could regulate it because it
was indecent. Stevens argued that the FCC was responsible RULING/MAIN POINT: Yes. The ordinance is a valid
for protecting children from corrupting forms of speech and governmental response to the serious problems created by
shielding it from entering private homes when their adult theaters and satisfies the dictates of the First
residents do not want it. As a result, the FCC could regulate Amendment. Since the ordinance does not ban adult
the hours when such content could be broadcast, limiting it theaters altogether, it is properly analyzed as a form of time,
to times when children were unlikely to be exposed. The place, and manner regulation. "Content-neutral" time,
FCC also was owed deference in defining indecency. place, and manner regulations are acceptable so long as
they are designed to serve a substantial governmental
MAIN POINT: The State has substantial powers over interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative
controlling indecency in broadcasting, which is less avenues of communication. It is clear that the ordinance
protected by the guarantee of freedom of expression meets such a standard. A city's "interest in attempting
because it is so pervasive. to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be
accorded high respect.
MARTIN
CASE NO. 554 MARTIN
ARTICLE III, SEC. 4: Obscenity
Renton v. Playtime Theater CASE NO. 555
ARTICLE III, SEC. 4: Obscenity
FACTS: Respondents purchased two theaters in Renton, Bethel School District v. Fraser
Washington, with the intention of exhibiting adult films and,
at about the same time, filed suit in Federal District Court, FACTS: In April 1983 Matthew Fraser, a student at Bethel
seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that the High School in Washington state, gave a nominating speech
First and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by a city for a classmate who was running for an office in student
ordinance that prohibits adult motion picture theaters from government. The speech— which occurred at a school
locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or assembly that was attended by approximately 600 students
multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school. The —featured numerous sexual innuendos
District Court ultimately entered summary judgment in the
213
and references, causing the audience to react in a variety of
ways; some appeared embarrassed, while others yelled and
made obscene gestures. Prior to the student assembly, two
educators had warned Fraser that he should not give the
speech and that if he did, serious consequences could result.
The following day, the assistant principal told Fraser that he
had violated the school’s policy prohibiting the use of
obscene language. As punishment, school officials
suspended Fraser for three days and removed his name
from the list of possible graduation commencement
speakers. After Fraser was unable to get his punishment
overturned through the school board’s grievance procedure,
his father filed suit on his behalf, alleging that officials
infringed on his First Amendment right to freedom of
speech.
ISSUE: Whether or not a speech with sexual content is
protected by the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech.
RULING/MAIN POINT: No. The school officials did not
violate a student’s free speech and due process rights when
he was disciplined for making a lewd and vulgar speech at a
school assembly. A speech of sexual content is not the same
as a protected political speech. The court ruled that the state
has an interest in protecting children from vulgar and
offensive language and that school boards should thus have
the authority to determine what speech is inappropriate.
Although school officials should allow controversial views
to be expressed, they must balance that interest with those
of other students who may be offended by certain language
Sheena
Case No. 556
Art III Section 4. Obscenity (Unprotected Speech)
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier
Facts:
2 of the articles submitted for publication in the school’s
paper, edited by students enrolled in Journalism class in
Hazelwood, contained stories on divorce and teenage
pregnancy. The divorce article featured a girl who blamed
her father's actions for her parents' divorce. The teenage
pregnancy article featured pregnant Hazelwood students
and their experiences. Subjects’ names were change to
ensure privacy.
Hazelwood principal felt that the subjects of these two
articles were inappropriate. He concluded that the father in
the divorce article be informed of the story and be given an
opportunity to comment and that simply changing the
names of the girls in the teenage pregnancy article may not
be sufficient to protect their anonymity and that this topic
may not be suitable for the younger students. As a result, he
prohibited these articles from being published in the paper.
Because there was no time to edit the paper if it were to go
to press before the end of the school year, entire pages were
eliminated.
The student journalists then brought suit to the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, alleging that their
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech had been
violated.
U.S. District Court concluded that they were not.
The students appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, which reversed the ruling, stating that the
students' rights had been violated.
The school appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
granted certiorari.
Issue:
W/N the decision of a principal to prohibit the publishing of
certain articles, which he deems inappropriate, in the school
newspaper violate the student journalists' First Amendment
right of freedom of speech.
Ruling:
NO. It was held that the principal's actions did not violate
the students' free speech rights. The Court noted that the
paper was sponsored by the school and, as such, the
school had a legitimate interest in preventing the
publication of articles that it deemed inappropriate and
that might appear to have the imprimatur of the school;
that the paper was not intended as a public forum in
which everyone could share views; rather, it was a
limited forum for journalism students to write articles
pursuant to the requirements of their Journalism II
class, and subject to appropriate editing by the school.
Main point in bold.
Sheena
Case No. 557
Art III Section 4. Obscenity (Unprotected Speech)
Fernando v. CA
Facts:
PNP Criminal investigation and detection group in the
NCR conducted police surveillance on the store bearing
the name of Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair. Judge
Laguio of the RTC, issued a search warrant against
petitioner. The warrant ordered the search of Music Fair
and the seizure of obscene pictures and pornographic
shows. After searching the premises and confiscating 25
VHS tapes and 10 different magazines, which they deemed
pornographic.
Petitioners were charged with selling and exhibiting
obscene copies of x-rated VHS tapes pursuant to Art. 201 of
the RPC. Hence this petition.
Issue:
W/N obscenity is a ground for the state to exercise its police
power to restrain the Constitutional guarantee of freedom
of speech.
Ruling:
YES. As obscenity is an unprotected speech which the
State has the right to regulate, the State in pursuing its
mandate to protect, as parens patriae, the public from
obscene, immoral and indecent materials must justify
the regulation or limitation.
214

Main point in bold.
Sheena
Case No. 558
Art III Section 4. Obscenity (Unprotected Speech)
Soriano v. Laguardia
Facts:
Petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on
UNTV 37 at 10pm, made obscene remarks against INC.
Respondent Galapon and seven others, all members of the
Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), filed separate but almost identical
affidavit-complaints before the MTRCB against petitioner in
connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Sandoval,
who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then
a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang
Tamang Daan.
Petitioner Soriano contends that his utterances should
considered protected speech.
Issue:
W/N the statement made by Soriano may be deemed as
obscene which would violate Sec 4 of Article 3 of the
Constitution.
Ruling:
YES. Soriano‘s statement can be treated as obscene, at least
with respect to the average child, and thus his utterances
cannot be considered as protected speech. Citing decisions
from the US Supreme Court, the High Court said that the
analysis should be ―context based and found the
utterances to be obscene after considering the use of
television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the
show, and the ―G rating of the show, which are all
factors that made the utterances susceptible to children
viewers. The Court emphasized on how the uttered words
could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in
the context that they were used.
parks for communication may beregulated in the interest of
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; all, said privilege is not absolute. It must be exercised in
subordination to the general comfort and convenience and
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa in consonance with peace and good order, but it must not
putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae guise of regulation be abridged or denied.
ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] The right to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly,
kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! though granted by the constitution, is not absolute for it
O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng may be regulated in order that it may not be injurious
lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right
Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga of community and society, this power may be exercised
demonyong ito under the police power of the state, which is the power
Main point in bold. of the state, which is the power to prescribe regulations
Sheena to promote the health, morals, peace, education, and
Case No. 559 good order, safety and general welfare of the people.
Art III Section 4. Assembly and Petition
Navarro v. Villegas Main point in bold.
Facts: Sheena
Petitioner acting in behalf of the movement of a Democratic Case No. 560
Philippines, wrote a letter to the respondent, the mayor of Art III Section 4. Assembly and Petition
the City of Manila, applying to hold a rally at a Plaza PBM Employees v. PBM (Philippine Blooming Mills)
Miranda from 4-11 pm. Facts:
On the same day of request, respondent replied denying his Petitioners informed the respondent employers of their
request on the grounds that, they have temporarily adopted schedule for a mass demonstration at Malacañ ang in protest
the policy of not issuing any permit for the use of Plaza for the alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Respondent
Miranda for rallies or demonstrations during weekdays. He invoke that the demonstration is a violation of their
instead gave the petitioner an option to use the Sunken Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) however petitioners
Garden near Intramuros for its rally and for it to be held contend it is an exercise of their freedom to peaceable
earlier and to end before dark. assembly to seek redress of their grievances against the
Petitioner filed suit contesting the Mayor’s action on the abusive Pasig police and not a strike against their employer.
ground that it violates the petitioner’s right to peaceable Respondent dismissed the petitioners and the court
assembly. sustained their demonstration is one of bargaining in bad
faith.
Issue: W/N respondents’ act on denying the request of the
petitioner violates the petitioner’s right to peaceable Issue:
assembly. W/N there was a restraint in the exercise of the right to
peaceable assembly of the petitioners.
Ruling:
NO. While the privilege of the citizen to use streets and Ruling:
215
YES. The court held that the primacy of human rights
such as freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly
and of petition for redress of grievances over property
rights has been sustained.
The obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by
the workers of the respondent firm was for their mutual aid
and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which
was interference with or restraint on the right of the
employees to engage in such common action to better shield
themselves against such alleged police indignities. Apart
from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech
and assembly as well as the right to petition for redress of
grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the 8 leaders
of the workers for proceeding with the demonstration and
consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial
of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to
these lowly employees.
Main point in bold.
Case No. 561
Section 4, Article III
7. Assembly and Petition
JBL Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing
Facts: Retired Justice JBL Reyes, in behalfof the Anti-Bases
Coalition sought a permit from the Mayor of Manila for the
use of the emptyfiled in front of Luneta and Rozas
Boulevard in front of the US embassy. Petitioners sponsored
an international conference for the general disbarment,
World Peace, and removal of all foreign military bases in the
PH and a march for the PH sovereignty. The march was
supposed to end until the front gate of the US embassy with
a short program. The Mayor denied their request oin the
following grounds (1) a police report which strongly
militate the advisability of issuing such permit at the time
and place applied for (2) an ordinance which was in
accordance of the Vienna convention which prohibits the
rallies and demonstration within the 500 feet radius of any
foreign mission or chancery
Issue: W/N the permit should be issued in accordance with
the right to assembly
Ruling: Yes. The permit should be issued. (1) To justify
limitations on freedom of assembly there must be proof of
sufficient weight to satisfy the danger test. (2) There is no
showing that the distance of the gate and chancery is 500
feet. And even if it were, the ordinance would not be
conclusive since because it still have to measure against the
requirement of the Constitution. (bernas)
Main Point: It is an indispensable condition to such refusal
or modification that the clear and present danger tests be
the standard for the decision reached.
Case No. 562
Section 4, Article III
7. Assembly and Petition
PCIB v. Philnabank Employees
Facts: Philnabank Employees’ Association (PEMA), a labor
organization composed of the rank and file employees of the
Philippine National Bank, declared a strike. During the said
strike, which lasted up to the following day, members of the
PEMA paraded and displayed placards in front of the PNB
building tit Escolta, Manila, one of which contained the
following words: ‘PCIB BAD ACCOUNTS TRANSFERRED TO
PNB-NIDC?’ It is an admitted fact that PCIB stands for
plaintiff Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, while
PNB refers to Philippine National Bank, and NIDC stands for
National Investment Development Corporation, a subsidiary
of the PNB.” To prove its claim for the recovery of damages
both actual and exemplary, as well as for attorney’s fees
Issue: W/N the display of a peaceful picket a placard
libelous
Ruling: No. Peaceful picketing is constitutionally protected.
The offending question in the placard and the reaction of
the PCIB both illustrates the strong emotional undertones of
labor disputes. Iun the continuing confrontation between
the mangament andf labor. “it is as far from likely that the
language employed would be both courteous and polite.”
The guarantee of free speech protects the strikers.
Main Point: Peaceful picketing is part of the freedom of
speech. That the language employed by the picketers is far
from being courteous and polite does not give rise to a
cause for libel and damages.
Case No. 563
Section 4, Article III
7. Assembly and Petition
Malabanan v. Ramento
Facts: After having obtained a permit from university
authorities, students of Gregoria Araneta University
Foundation held a rally but in places around the university
other than the specified by the permit . The speeches and
other activities resulted disturbance of classes and other
activities in the university. After due hearing, a suspension
of one year was imposed to the student leaders. The
student appealed on the ground that the suspension is
violative of their right to assembly and speech.
Issue: W/N the university has the right to suspend the
students due to their demonstration since it the student
have the right of assembly and speech
Ruling: Yes. The authority of educational institutions over
the conduct of students must be recognized, it cannot go so
far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards. On a more
specific level, there is persuasive force to this formulation.
Student’s rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the
classroom hour he may express his opinions with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of
the school’ and without colliding with the rights of others.
Main Point: Whether it stems from time, place, or type of
behaviour— materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of
course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech.”
Case No. 564
Section 4, Article III
7. Assembly and Petition
De la Cruz v. CA
216
Facts: These consolidated petitions1 are among several
petitions filed with this Court arising from the much-
publicized public school teachers’ mass actions of
September/October 1990. Petitioners are public school
teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were
simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and
eventually dismissed.
Issue: W/N Court of Appeals grievously erred in affirming
the CSC resolutions finding them guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service when their only
“offense” was to exercise their constitutional right to
peaceably assemble and petition the government for
redress of their grievances.
Ruling:No. we denied the claim that the teachers were
thereby denied their rights to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances reasoning
that this constitutional liberty to be upheld, like any other
liberty, must be exercised within reasonable limits so as not
to prejudice the public welfare. But the public school
teachers in the case of the 1990 mass actions did not
exercise their constitutional rights within reasonable limits.
On the contrary, they committed acts prejudicial to the best
interest of the service by staging the mass protests on
regular school days, abandoning their classes and refusing
to go back even after they had been ordered to do so. Had
the teachers availed of their free time—recess, after classes,
weekends or holidays—to dramatize their grievances and to
dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of
law, no one—not the DECS, the CSC or even the Supreme
Court—could have held them liable for their participation in
the mass actions.
Main Point: The rights to peaceably assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances to be upheld must
be exercised within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice
the public welfare.
Case No. 565
Section 4, Article III
7. Assembly and Petition
Bangalisan v. CA
Facts: Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the
800 public school teachers who staged “mass actions” to
dramatize their grievances concerning, in the main, the
alleged failure of the public authorities to implement in a
just and correct manner certain laws and measures
intended for their material benefit. Secretary of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) issued
a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners failed to comply with
said order, hence they were charged by the Secretary with
“grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of
Civil Service law which resulted to their preventive
suspension.
Issue: W/N the suspension of the petitioners valid since it
the petitioner contends that it violative on their right to
assembly
Ruling: Yes. Further, herein petitioners, except Mariano, are
being penalized not because they exercised their right of
peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances
but because of their successive unauthorized and unilateral
absences which produced adverse effects upon their
students for whose education they are responsible. The
actuations of petitioners definitely constituted conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, punishable
under the Civil Service law, rules and regulations.
Main Point: The public school teachers who went on strike
are penalized not because they exercised their right of
peaceable assembly and petition for redress of grievances
but because their successive unauthorized and unilateral
absences produced adverse effects upon their students for
whose education they are responsible
GOMEZ
CASE NO. 566
ART 3 SEC 4: ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
Ruiz v. Gordon
FACTS: The violation of the constitutional rights to free
speech and assembly is filed against Richard Gorder-
respondent, who was the City Mayor of Olongapo. The case
started when Petitioner-Hector Ruiz, Coordinator of
Olongapo Citizens’ Alliance for National reconciliation, sent
a letter to respondent for a permit for a prayer-rally and
parade which will be don’t at the Rizal Triangle of Olongapo
City. Respondent Mayor failed to approve such permit
without any reason as to why.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Mayor infringes on
the constitutional right of petitioners to assembly by not
issuing them a permit.
RULING: Yes. In the case at bar, respondent Mayor failed to
act prudently in the issuance of the permit. As reiterated in
the J.B.L. Reyes case, wherein the Mayor as the licensing
authority has in compliance with the guidelines granted all
subsequent applications for such permits, seeing to it only
that there be no conflict in the scheduling of such
assemblies and thereby eliminated the need for the
applicant's having to go to court, would be emulated by all
other cities and towns concerned. The granting of such
permits for the exercise of a fundamental right, absent
any clear and present danger, is after all practically a
ministerial duty.
GOMEZ
CASE NO. 567
ART 3 SEC 4: ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
BAYAN v. Ermita
FACTS: Petitioners herein were in a rally on October 6,
2005, on the said day police troops stormed the rally and
dispersed it with violence. Invoking BP 880, “no rally no
permit policy”. Herein, respondent, ordered the PNP to stop
such rally. Now a petition before the SC to declare the
217
unconstitutionality of BP 880 for securing a permit before RULING: No. Employees in the public service may not FACTS: Petitioner Aglipay, the head of Philippine
holding an assembly is violative of a constitutional right. engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized Independent Church, filed a writ of prohibition against
stoppage of work; that the right of government employees respondent Ruiz, the Director of Post, enjoining the latter
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 880 with a clause of requiring to organize is limited to the formation of unions or from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of
permits before a rally or assembly be permitted is a associations, without including the right to strike the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by
violation of a constitutional right. the Roman Catholic. The petitioner invoked that such
GOMEZ issuance and selling contemplates religious purpose – for
RULING: No. While the right to freedom of speech, and to CASE NO. 569 and 570 the benefit of a particular sect or church.
peaceably assemble and petition the government for ART 3 SEC 4: ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
redress of grievances are fundamental personal rights of the In Re Valmonte ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance and sale of
people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of In Re to Annul 98-7-02 commemorative stamps violate the non-establishment
democratic countries, it is likewise a settled principle clause of the Constitution.
growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that FACTS: Petitioner Valmonte applied for a Mayor’s Permit to
the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so hold a rally in front of the Justice of Peace of Las Pinas to RULING: No. The issuance and sale of commemorative
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal protest the delay in the disposition of his client’s case stamps by the respondent does not contemplate any favor
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the bending before the said court. The same was denied upon a particular sect or church, but the purpose was only
rights of the community or society. because AM 98-07-02-SC prohibits the staging of rallies ‘to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourist’ and
within 200 m radius of any courts of justice. Petitioner went the government just took advantage of an event considered
GOMEZ to the Supreme Court to challenge the said resolution of international importance, thus, not violating the
CASE NO. 568 because it abridges free speech. Constitution on its provision on the separation of the
ART 3 SEC 4: ASSEMBLY AND PETITION Church and State.
GSIS v. Kapisanan ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may validly
restrict demonstrations or assembly within the vicinity on MAIN POINT: The Court has allowed the issuance of
FACTS: With grievances against the management style of its courts. religious commemorative stamps as giving merely
then GSIS Manager Garcia, a total of 131 members incidental benefits to religion.
(employees of the GSIS) of Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa RULING: Yes. Resolution prohibiting demonstration within
GSIS (KMG), a union, walked out from work and held a a radius of 200 meters from the boundary of any hall of AIRA
strike. As a result, the manager of the investigating unit justice. The court, it would seem, has the power to Case No. 572
charged 110 members administratively for their promulgate “rules concerning conduct of demonstrations in ART. III, SEC. 5, NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
participation in the rally. In response, the respondents the vicinity of the courts to assure the people of an impartial Garces v. Estenzo
contends that participating in such rally is permissible as and orderly administration of Justice.
provided in the constitution. FACTS: The barangay council, through funds obtained by
AIRA solicitations and donations from residents, purchased a
ISSUE: Whether or not government employees may exercise Case No. 571 statue of San Vicente Ferrer and placed it under the care of
the constitutional right to assembly, strikes as in this case, ART. III, SEC. 5, NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE the hermano mayor. On the occasion of the fiesta, the statue
without any restraints or limitation. Aglipay v. Ruiz was lent to the church. Subsequently, the parish priest
refused to return the statue. The council passed a number of
resolutions towards taking steps to recover the statue. The

218
validity of these resolutions was challenged on the ground, ISSUE: Whether or not the government aid in this case for RULING: No. Parochial schools, in addition to their
among others, of violating the non-establishment clause and the benefit of religion is allowable. sectarian function, perform the task of secular education,
the prohibition against the use of public money for religious and, on the basis of this meager record, the Court cannot
purposes. RULING: No. The Non-Establishment Clause constrains agree with appellants that all teaching in a sectarian school
government from involving itself in religious matters. is religious, or that the intertwining of secular and religious
ISSUE: Whether or not the resolutions violated the non- Therefore, government action that promotes or inhibits training is such that secular textbooks furnished to students
establishment clause of the Constitution. religion violates the Constitution. The state may not draft or are, in fact, instrumental in teaching religion. The express
conduct religious prayers in schools filled with captive purpose of the statute was the furtherance of educational
RULING: No. The questioned resolutions do not directly or audiences of children. opportunities for the young, and the law merely makes
indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious available to all children the benefits of a general program to
liberty, nor appropriate public money or property for MAIN POINT: To be allowable, government aid (1) must lend school books free of charge, and the financial benefit is
benefit of any sect, priest or clergyman. The image was have a secular legislative purpose; (2) must have a primary to parents and children, not to schools.
purchased with private funds, not with tax money. If there is effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3)
nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and must not require excessive entanglement with recipient MAIN POINT: Because the stated legislative purpose and
having a patron saint for the barrio, then any activity institutions. Thus, State sponsored Bible readings and necessary effects of the statute did not advance nor inhibit
intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint cannot prayers in public schools have been invalidated for violation any one religion or religion in general, the lending of secular
be branded as illegal. The barrio fiesta is a socio-religious of (1) and (2). textbooks to parochial school children and the grant of
affair. Its celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural construction aid for science buildings have been allowed.
communities. AIRA
Case No. 574 AIRA
MAIN POINT: A resolution of the Barangay Council for ART. III, SEC. 5, NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE Case No. 575
soliciting contributions to buy a statue of the barangay’s Board of Education v. Allen ART. III, SEC. 5, NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
patron saint and the use of such fund for said purpose does Lemon v. Kurtzman
not violate the Constitution’s provision prohibiting use of FACTS: A 1965 amendment to New York's Education Law
public funds for religious purposes. required public school boards to lend textbooks to FACTS: Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes provided
elementary and secondary school students enrolled in state aid to church-related elementary and secondary
AIRA private and parochial schools. The Board of Education for schools. A group of individual taxpayers and religious
Case No. 573 New York Central School District No. 1, contended that the liberty organizations filed suit, challenging the
ART. III, SEC. 5, NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE law violated the Non-Establishment Clause, filed suit against constitutionality of the program. They claimed that, since
School District v. Schempp James Allen, Commissioner of Education, requesting a the program primarily aided parochial schools, it violated
declaratory injunction to prevent enforcement of the the Non-Establishment Clause.
FACTS: Pennsylvania state law required that "at least ten statute.
verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, ISSUE: Whether or not states can create programs that
at the opening of each public school on each school day." ISSUE: Whether or not the Non-Establishment Clause provide financial support to nonpublic elementary and
Two families sued, claiming this violated the Non- prohibits the requirement for public school boards to loan secondary schools by way of reimbursement for the cost of
Establishment Clause. textbooks to parochial schools without cost. teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in
specified secular subjects or pay a salary supplement
directly to teachers of secular subjects in religious schools.

219

RULING: No. Both programs violate the Non-
Establishment Clause because they create excessive
entanglement between a religious entity and the state.
Political division along religious lines was one of the evils at
which the First Amendment aimed, and in these programs,
where successive and probably permanent annual
appropriations that benefit relatively few religious groups
are involved, political fragmentation and divisiveness on
religious lines are likely to be intensified.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD
AREEJ
CASE NO. 576
ART III SEC 5. PURPOSE: NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Tilton v. Richardson (U.S. case)
FACTS: The Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963
authorizes federal grants to institutions of higher education 2. A Chanukah menorah, owned by a Jewish group, was
for the construction of "academic facilities” excluding any
facility used or to be used for religious instruction, training,
or worship. The United States will retain a 20-year interest
in any facility constructed with funds under the Act, and if,
during this period, the recipient violates the statutory
conditions, the Government is entitled to recovery of funds.
The Act is challenged for having the effect of promoting
religion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 20-year period of Federal the Establishment Clause; (2) W/N the display of the
interest violates the Establishment Clause.
RULING: YES. Limiting the prohibition for religious use
of the structure to 20 years obviously opens the facility
to use for any purpose at the end of that period. It
cannot be assumed that a substantial structure has no
value after that period, and, hence, the unrestricted use
of a valuable property is, in effect, a contribution of
some value to a religious body. If, at the end of 20 years,
the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or
otherwise used to promote religious interests, the
original federal grant will, in part, have the effect of
advancing religion. To this extent, the Act therefore
trespasses on the Religion Clause
AREEJ
CASE NO. 577
ART III SEC 5. PURPOSE: NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union
(U.S. case)
FACTS:
1. A crèche, donated by the Holy Name Society (a Roman
Catholic group), was placed on the Grand Staircase of the
Allegheny County Courthouse. Its manger had at its crest
an angel bearing a banner proclaiming "Gloria in Excelsis
Deo," meaning "Glory to God in the Highest."
placed just outside the City-County Building next to the
city’s Christmas tree. At the foot of the tree was a sign
bearing the mayor's name and containing text declaring
the city's "salute to liberty." Respondents seek to enjoin
the county from displaying the creche and the city from
displaying the menorah on the ground that the displays
violated the Establishment Clause.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the display of the crèche violated
Chanukah menorah violated the Establishment Clause.
RULING:
(1) YES. The angel in the crèche was bearing a banner
proclaiming "Glory to God in the Highest!", or Glory to ISSUE: Whether or not providing the deaf child enrolled in a
God because of the birth of Jesus. This praise to God in Roman Catholic high school with the requested interpreter
Christian terms is indisputably religious. Allegheny would violate the Establishment Clause.
County has transgressed this line. It has chosen to
celebrate Christmas in a way that has the effect of
endorsing a patently Christian message: Glory to God
for the birth of Jesus Christ.
(2) NO. The menorah is the primary visual symbol for a
holiday. Because government may celebrate Christmas as a
secular holiday, it follows that government may also
acknowledge Chanukah as a secular holiday. The
combination of the tree and the menorah
communicates not a simultaneous endorsement of both
the Christian and Jewish faiths, but instead, a secular
celebration of Christmas coupled with an
acknowledgment of Chanukah as a contemporaneous
alternative tradition.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 578
ART III SEC 5. PURPOSE: NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Zobrest et al v. Catalina Foothills School District (U.S.
case)
FACTS:
PETITIONERS: Petitioners, a deaf child and his
parents, filed a suit after respondent school district refused
to provide a sign-language interpreter to accompany the
child to classes at a Roman Catholic high school. They
alleged that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) required respondent to provide the interpreter and
that the Establishment Clause did not bar such relief.
RESPONDENT: The interpreter would act as a
conduit for the child's religious inculcation, thereby
promoting his religious development at government
expense in violation of the Establishment Clause.
220

RULING: NO. Government programs that neutrally
provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined
without reference to religion does not readily offend
the Establishment Clause just because sectarian
institutions may also receive an attenuated financial
benefit. The service at issue in this case is part of a general
government program that distributes benefits neutrally to
any child qualifying as "disabled" under the IDEA, without
regard to the "sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic
nature" of the school the child attends. By according parents
freedom to select a school of their choice, the statute
ensures that a government-paid interpreter will be present
in a sectarian school only as a result of the private decision
of individual parents. The IDEA creates a neutral
government program dispensing aid not to schools but
to individual handicapped children.
AREEJ
CASE NO. 579
ART III SEC 5. PURPOSE: NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette et al (U.S. case)
FACTS: Ohio law makes Capitol Square a forum for
discussion of public questions and for public activities, and
gives petitioner Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board
(Board) responsibility for regulating access to the square.
To use the square, a group must simply fill out an official
application form and meet several “neutral speech” criteria.
The Board denied respondent Ku Klux Klan’s application to
place an unattended cross on the square as its display in a
public forum violates the Establishment Clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the display of the cross would be an
endorsement of Christianity by the State and would
therefore violate the Establishment Clause.
RULING: NO. Religious expression cannot violate the ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of clergy who offer
Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely private and prayers as part of an official public school graduation
(2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, ceremony violates the Establishment Clause.
publicly announced and open to all on equal terms. Such
conditions are satisfied in the case at bar. Respondents' RULING: YES. A school official, the principal, decided that an
religious display in Capitol Square was private expression. invocation and a benediction should be given; this is a
Private religious speech is as fully protected under the Free choice attributable to the State. It is as if a state statute
Speech Clause as secular private expression. Further, decreed that the prayers must occur. The principal chose
Capitol Square is a genuinely public forum, is known to be a the religious participant, here a rabbi, and that choice is also
public forum, and has been widely used as a public forum attributable to the State. He even advised the rabbi that his
for many, many years. A State's right to limit protected prayers should be nonsectarian and therefore he directed
expressive activity on government property that has by and controlled the content of the prayers. It is a
law or tradition been given the status of a public forum, cornerstone principle of the Establishment Clause that
is sharply restricted. It may regulate "it is no part of the business of government to compose
expressive content only if such a restriction is official prayers for any group of the American people to
necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling recite as a part of a religious program carried on by
state interest. government. To satisfy the Establishment Clause, a
governmental practice must (1) reflect a clearly secular
AREEJ purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither
CASE NO. 580 advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) avoid excessive
ART III SEC 5. PURPOSE: NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE government entanglement with religion. The State's
Lee v. Weisman (U.S. case) involvement in the school prayers challenged today
violates these central principles.
FACTS: Principals of public middle and high schools in
Providence, Rhode Island, are permitted to invite members ANGELO
of the clergy to give invocations and benedictions at their Case No. 581
schools' graduation ceremonies. Petitioner Lee, a middle ART III SEC 5: Non-Establishment Clause
school principal, invited a rabbi to offer such prayers at the Manosca v. CA
graduation ceremony for Deborah Weisman's class, gave the
rabbi a pamphlet containing guidelines for the composition FACTS: The National Historical Institute declared the parcel
of public prayers at civic ceremonies, and advised him that of land owned by Petitioners as a national historical
the prayers should be nonsectarian. Weisman sought a landmark, because it was the site of the birth of Felix
permanent injunction barring Lee from inviting clergy to Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Republic of the
deliver invocations and benedictions at graduations on the Philippines filed an action to appropriate the land.
ground that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Petitioners argued that the expropriation was not for a
Amendment. public purpose.
221
ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation was for a public ANGELO Church of Christ in the Philippines to the Cebu Conference
use. Case No. 583 Inc. UCCP favored CCI and the series of events then followed
ART III SEC 5: Non-Establishment Clause led to the breakup of BUCCI from UCCP. BUCCI then
RULING: YES. The Court upheld the expropriation for public Taruc v. Dela Cruz disaffiliated itself from UCCP and filed its Amended Articles
use under the broadened definition of public use. of Incorporation and By-Laws which provided for and
Moreover, the non-establishment objection was FACTS: Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine effected its disaffiliation from UCCP. UCCP filed a complaint
answered by the argument that whatever benefits the Independent Church. Bishop Dela Cruz declared petitioners for rejection of decision, alleging that separate
adherents of Iglesia would reap would only be expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent incorporation and registration of BUCCI is not allowed
incidental to the public historical purpose. Church for disobedience to duly constituted authority in the under the UCCP Constitution and By-laws. It further
Church; inciting dissension, resulting in division to various maintains that it has the sole power to decide whether
ANGELO parishes when they celebrated an open mass; and for BUCCI could disaffiliate from it as this involves a purely
Case No. 582 threatening to forcibly occupy the Parish Church causing ecclesiastical affair.
ART III SEC 5: Non-Establishment Clause anxiety and fear among the general membership reasons.
Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines v. Executive Petitioners filed a complaint contending that their expulsion ISSUE: Whether or not the determination of the validity of
Secretary was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating disaffiliation of respondents is purely an ecclesiastical affair.
their right to due process of law.
FACTS: Petitioner, is a non-governmental organization that RULING: NO. The issue is not a purely ecclesiastical affair.
conducts seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities and grantees
issue halal certifications to qualified products and entertain a complaint about an expulsion or of primary franchises, are subject to the jurisdiction of
manufacturers. Respondent issued an executive order excommunication from a church. the SEC. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A
creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and provides that SEC shall have absolute jurisdiction,
designating respondent Office on Muslim Affairs to oversee RULING: NO. The Court agree with the Court of Appeals supervision and control over all corporations. Even
its implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the that the expulsion/excommunication of members of a with their religious nature, SEC may exercise
exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and perform religious institution is a matter best left to the jurisdiction over them in matters that are legal and
other related regulatory activities. Petitioner contends that discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of corporate.
it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate said institution. It is not for the courts to exercise
policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme control over church authorities in the performance of ANGELO
because said scheme is a function only religious their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is Case No. 585
organizations, entity or scholars can lawfully and validly for the members of the religious institutions to conform ART III SEC 5: Factors to Determine Violation of the
perform for the Muslims. to just church regulations. Right to Privacy
Imbong v. Ochoa
ISSUE: Whether or not the certification of food as halal, that ANGELO
is, suitable for consumption by Muslims according to their Case No. 584 FACTS: Challengers from various sectors of society are
religious belief, a religious exercise. ART III SEC 5: Non-Establishment Clause questioning the constitutionality of the RA 10354,
UCCP v. Bradford otherwise known as the RH Law. The petitioners are
RULING: YES. Hence, it may not be performed by a assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the ground that
government agency. FACTS: Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. built a fence it violates their right to religious freedom.
that said to encroach the right of way allocated by United

222
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court stands with ISSUE: Whether or not Escritor can invoke religious shall not cover members of any religious sects which
authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters. freedom to avoid administrative liability.M prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
RULING: Yes. The Court has repeatedly declared that organization. The Union now assails the constitutionality of
RULING: NO. While the Supreme Court stands without religious freedom means government neutrality in religious the said act.
authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of matters and the Court has also repeatedly interpreted this ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3350 infringes on the
the Constitution, it does have authority to determine policy of neutrality to prohibit government from acting fundamental right to form lawful associations when it
whether the Reproductive Health Law contravenes the except for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily prohibits all the members of a religious sect from joining
guarantee of religious freedom. In the case at bench, it is secular effects. any labor union if those religious sects ban their members
not within the province of the Court to determine whether MP: In the area of religious freedom, however, man stands from joining thereto.
the use of contraceptives or one’s participation in the accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the RULING: No. Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso
support of modern reproductive health measures is moral state interest sought to be upheld must be so jure from the application and coverage of the closed shop
from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects
wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. For the Court of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor
has declared that matters dealing with “faith, practice, absence of a showing that such state interest exists, organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is that
doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom man must be allowed to subscribe to the infinite. members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or
and rule of a church are unquestionably ecclesiastical coerced to join labor unions even when said unions
matters which are outside the province of the civil Ayeh CASE NO. 587 have closed shop agreements with the employers; that
courts.” The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to ART. III SEC 5: FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said
public and secular morality. TEST: (c) CONSCIENCE OBJECTOR TEST religious sects cannot be refused employment or
Victoriano v Elizalde dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they
Ayeh CASE NO. 586 FACTS: Since 1958, Victoriano, a member of Iglesia ni Cristo are not members of the collective bargaining union.
ART. III SEC 5: FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor MP: If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members
TEST: (b) COMPELLING STATE INTEREST TEST organization, is an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union,
Estrada v Escritor Inc. which had a collective bargaining agreement containing they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious
FACTS: Respondent Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter, is a closed shop provision requiring membership in its labor faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does
living with a man not her husband, and having borne a child union for all permanent employees. And so, petitioner not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit
within this live-in arrangement. Due to this arrangement, presented his resignation to the Union in 1962 but no action them from joining; and neither may the employer or
herein petitioners filed a complaint against respondent for was taken by the latter. labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350,
committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the The Union then wrote a formal letter to the Company asking therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on
court. The respondent’s contention is that their conjugal for the separation from service of the petitioner in view of freedom of association.
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. Ayeh CASE NO. 588
and has the approval of their congregation (Jehova’s The management of the Company sided with the Union. ART. III SEC 5: FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
Witnesses). Further, a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” Hence, petitioner filed a case with the CFI invoking TEST: (c) CONSCIENCE OBJECTOR TEST
has been executed thus their conjugal arrangement is paragraph 4(a) of section 4 of RA 3350 which provides that Cantwell v Connecticut
recognized by their congregation and as such, there can be the employer was not precluded from making an agreement FACTS: Jesse Cantwell, a Jehovah’s Witnesses, was
no immoral act that would make herein respondent with a labor organization to require as a condition of convicted on the charge of breach of the peace for stopping
administratively liable. employment membership therein, if such labor organization two men in the street, asked, and received, permission to
is the representative of the employees, but such agreement play a phonograph record, and played the record "Enemies,"

223
which allegedly attacked the religion and church of the two
men, who were Catholics. The petitioners pressed the
contention that the statute under which the charge was
drawn denied them freedom of speech and prohibited their
free exercise of religion.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was an infringement of the
constitutional guaranty of religious liberty.
RULING: Yes. Under the constitutional guaranty, freedom
of conscience and of religious belief is absolute; although
freedom to act in the exercise of religion is subject to
regulation for the protection of society. Such regulation,
however, in attaining a permissible end, must not unduly
infringe the protected freedom.
The record played by Cantwell embodies a general attack on
all organized religious systems as instruments of Satan and
injurious to man. There is no showing that his deportment
was noisy, truculent, overbearing or offensive. He requested
of two pedestrian’s permission to play to them a
phonograph record. The permission was granted. It is not
claimed that he intended to insult or affront the hearers by
playing the record. It is plain that he wished only to interest
them in his propaganda. Thus far, he had invaded no right
or interest of the public, or of the men accosted.
MP: The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the
subject of religion has a double aspect. Freedom of
conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious
organization or form of worship as the individual may
choose cannot be restricted by law (freedom to believe). On
the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen
form of religion (freedom to act).
The first is absolute, but, in the nature of things, the second
cannot be.
Ayeh CASE NO. 589
ART. III SEC 5: FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
TEST: (c) CONSCIENCE OBJECTOR TEST
US v Ballard
FACTS: Respondents were indicted and convicted for using, thereof throughout the Philippines and translating the same
and conspiring to use, the mails to defraud by organizing into several Philippine dialects.
and promoting a religion called the I Am movement through Acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed
the use of the mails claiming that they had been selected aspetitioner that it was conducting the business of general
divine messengers through which the words of the alleged merchandise without providing itself with the necessary
'ascended masters,' including the alleged Saint Germain Mayor's permit and municipal license violating the local
were communicated to mankind and by reason of ordinances of the City. Petitioner was required to secure the
supernatural attainments, the power to heal persons of within three days, the corresponding permit and license
ailments and diseases and to make well persons afflicted fees, together with compromise covering the period from
with any diseases, injuries, or ailments. the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the
ISSUE: Whether or not the falsity or verity of a religious total sum of P5,821.45.
belief is subject to judicial inquiry. ISSUE: Whether or not the said there is infringement on the
RULING: No. The Court do not agree that the truth or verity free exercise and enjoyment of the religious profession and
of respondents' religious doctrines or beliefs should have worship of petitioner.
been submitted to the jury. The First Amendment has a RULING: Yes. The constitutional guaranty of the free
dual aspect. It not only "forestalls compulsion by law of exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form carries with it the right to disseminate religious
of worship," but also "safeguards the free exercise of information. Any restraints of such right can only be
the chosen form of religion." Freedom of thought, which justified like other restraints of freedom of expression on
includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any
of free men. It embraces the right to maintain theories of substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent it.
life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresyIt may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the
to followers of the orthodox faiths because men may believe bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances
what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same, but this
their religious doctrines or beliefs. cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or
MP: Religion is determined by the sincerity and depth of theoccupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this
belief, not by whether it is true or false. The right to reason, the Court believes that the provisions of city
religious belief is absolute. ordinance, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it
would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
Ayeh CASE NO. 590 profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination
ART. III SEC 5: FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION of religious beliefs.
TEST: (c) CONSCIENCE OBJECTOR TEST MP: The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and
American Bible Society v City of Manila enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with
FACTS: Petitioner is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, it the right to disseminate religious information.
religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing
business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency
established in Manila. Its Philippine agency has been ADDALINO
distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel portions CASE NO. 591
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 ART III, SEC 5: PURPOSE; Free Exercise of Religion
EBRANILAG VS DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT
FACTS: All of the petitioners in both (consolidated) cases
were expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required
by Republic Act No. 1265 (An Act making flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions) and by
Department Order No. 8 (Rules and Regulations for
Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational
Institutions) of the DECS making the flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions. Petitioners are
Jehovah’s Witnesses believing that by doing these is
religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their
teachings. They contend that to compel transcends
constitutional limits and invades protection against
official control and religious freedom. The respondents
relied on the precedence of Gerona et al v. Secretary of
Education where the Court upheld the expulsions. Gerona
doctrine provides that we are a system of separation of the
church and state and the flag is devoid of religious
significance and it doesn’t involve any religious ceremony.
The children of Jehovah’s Witnesses cannot be exempted
from participation in the flag ceremony. They have no valid
right to such exemption. Moreover, exemption to the
requirement will disrupt school discipline and demoralize
the rest of the school population which by far constitutes
the great majority. The freedom of religious belief
guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean
exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and
non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated
by competent authority.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expulsion of petitioners violated RULING:
their freedom of religion?
RULING: YES. The Court held that the expulsion of the
petitioners from the school was not justified. Religious
freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority and the
amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the
relationship of man to his Creator. The right to religious
profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis.,
freedom to believe and freedom to act on one’s belief.
The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought. The second is subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare. The only limitation to
religious freedom is the existence of grave and present
danger to public safety, morals, health and interests
where State has right to prevent.
MAIN POINT: in bold
ADDALINO
CASE NO. 592
ART III, SEC 5: PURPOSE; Free Exercise of Religion
WISCONSIN VS YODER
FACTS: Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and
Adin Yutzy are members of the Amish religion. Wisconsin’s
compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause
their children to attend public or private school until they
reach 16. Respondents declined to send their children to
public school after completion of the eighth grade because it
is contrary to the Amish beliefs. Respondents were
convicted of violating the law and fined $5 each.
ISSUE: W/N the application of the compulsory
attendance law violate respondent’s rights to free exercise
of religion
YES. The State has the power to impose
reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic
education. Previous precedent has held that this power ISSUE: W/N the military regulation prohibiting Goldman
must yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent from wearing a yarmulke violates freedom from religion
education in a privately operated system. The State’s power
is subject to a balancing test when it impinges on
fundamental rights such as those protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional
interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing
of their children.
MAIN POINT: The State cannot require children to continue
schooling beyond a certain age in the honest and sincere
claim of parents that such schooling would be harmful to
their religious upbringing. Only those interests of the State
is the primary interest of parents in the religious upbringing
of their children.
ADDALINO
CASE NO. 593
ART III, SEC 5: PURPOSE; Free Exercise of Religion
GOLDMAN VS WEINBERGER
FACTS: S. Simcha Goldman (plaintiff) was an ordained
rabbi who was stationed at a military base in California.
Goldman was formally reprimanded for wearing a religious
yarmulke in violation of a military regulation that
prohibited headgear from being worn while indoors on the
military base. Goldman brought suit against Weinberger
(defendant), the secretary of defense of the United States,
arguing that the prohibition of the yarmulke violated
Goldman’s right to free exercise of religion under the First
Amendment. The district court found in favor of Goldman,
and Weinberger appealed. The court of appeals reversed,
finding that the appropriate level of scrutiny for a military
regulation was a deferential standard. Goldman appealed,
arguing that the military regulation should be reviewed
under a higher standard. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
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RULING: NO. Military regulations are reviewed under a
deferential standard when challenged under the First
Amendment. Members of the military do not have the same
degree of autonomy as ordinary citizens. The military
requires subordination and obedience, and there is no need
to encourage free speech and debate or free exercise of
religion on a military base. Although members of the
military are still protected under the First Amendment, the
executive and legislative branches of government, not the
judicial branch, are the appropriate parties to determine
military regulations and evaluate the impact of such
regulations on discipline. Here, Goldman does not have the
same degree of autonomy as an ordinary citizen. The
military regulation may prohibit Goldman from wearing a
religious yarmulke on the military base, even though such a
prohibition interferes with Goldman’s free exercise of
religion. In summary, military regulations are subject to a
deferential standard under the First Amendment, and the
military regulation prohibiting Goldman from wearing a
yarmulke is constitutional. The judgment of the court of
appeals is affirmed.
MAIN POINT: The military regulation may prohibit
Goldman from wearing a religious yarmulke on the military
base, even though such a prohibition interferes with
Goldman’s free exercise of religion
ADDALINO
CASE NO. 594
ART III, SEC 5: PURPOSE; Free Exercise of Religion
GERMAN VS BARANGANAN
FACTS: Reli German et al went to JP Laurel Sreet to pray
and worship at the St. Luke Chapel. But they were barred by
General Santiago Barangan from entering the church
because the same is within the vicinity of the Malacañ ang.
And considering that German’s group is expressively known
as the August Twenty One Movement who were wearing
yellow shirts with clench fists, Barangan deemed that they
were not really there to worship but rather they are there to
disrupt the on-goings within the Malacañ ang.
ISSUE: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners to
worship and pray at St. Luke’s is a violation of their freedom
to worship and locomotion.
RULING: No. In the case at bar, German et al were not
denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice of
their religion, but only in the manner by which they had
attempted to translate the same into action. There has been
a clear manifestation by Barangan et al that they allow
German et al to practice their religious belief but not in the
manner that German et al impressed. Such manner
impresses “clear and present danger” to the executive of the
state hence the need to curtail it even at the expense of
curtailing one’s freedom to worship.
MAIN POINT: Exercise of right to religious freedom must he
done in good faith without any ulterior motive, e.g., political.
ADDALINO
CASE NO. 595
ART III, SEC 5: PURPOSE; Free Exercise of Religion
TOLENTINO VS SEC OF FINANCE
FACTS: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale,
barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the
sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax
base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue
Code. There are various suits challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. One
allegation is by the Philippine Bible Society which contends
that the removal of the exemption of printing, publication or
importation of books and religious articles, as well as their
printing and publication, likewise violates freedom of
thought and of conscience.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Sec 4 of Bill of
Rights
RULING: NO. The Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not
prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax
on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization.
The fact is that this limitation does not apply to the press
alone but to all sales. Nor is impermissible motive shown by
the fact that print media and broadcast media are treated
differently. The press is taxed on its transactions involving
printing and publication, which are different from the
transactions of broadcast media. There is thus a reasonable
basis for the classification.
MAIN POINT: The Free Exercise of Religion Clause does not
prohibit imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax
on the sale of religious materials by a religious organization.
COELI
CASE NO. 596
Art. III, Sec. 5, Free Exercise of Religion
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos
FACTS:
 The officers of a civic organization composed of elderly
men known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng
Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of
renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan.
 Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group,
together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Angeles, a
resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution.
 The solicitation was made without a permit from the
DSWD. An information was filed against petitioner
Martin Centeno, and 2 others for violation of
Solicitation Permit Law.
 The respondent Judge of RTC of Malolos, Bulacan
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 rendered judgment finding accused Vicente Yco and
petitioner Centeno guilty.
 Sec. 2. of the subject law provides:
o Any person, corporation, organization, or association
desiring to solicit or receive contributions for
charitable or public welfare purposes shall first
secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the
Department of Social Services and Development…
 Petitioner contended that the term "religious purpose"
is not expressly included in the provisions of the statute,
hence what the law does not include, it excludes.
ISSUES: 1) Whether or not charitable purposes can be
construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious
purpose.
2) Whether or not solicitations for religious
purposes cannot be penalized under the law for, otherwise,
it will constitute an abridgment or restriction on the free
exercise clause guaranteed under the Constitution.
RULING: NO TO BOTH
1) Framers of the subject law never intended to include
solicitations for religious purposes within its
coverage. This rule is expressed in the familiar
maxim "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." Where a
statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others.
2) It does not follow from the constitutional
guaranties of the free exercise of religion that
everything which may be so called can be
tolerated. Conduct remains subject to regulation for
the protection of society. The State has authority
under the exercise of its police power to determine
whether or not there shall be restrictions on
soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for fraudulent
causes.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD.
not compelling. Therefore, the city ordinances violate the
COELI Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution.
CASE NO. 597 MAIN POINT: IN BOLD.
Art. III, Sec. 5, Free Exercise of Religion
Church of Lukumi v. City of Hialech
COELI
FACTS: CASE NO. 598
 Santeria is a religion that fused African religion with Art. III, Sec. 5, Free Exercise of Religion
Roman Catholicism. It called for animal sacrifices to Lamb's Chapel v. School District
keep the orishas (spirits) alive. FACTS:
 In response to the news that a Santeria church was to be  Sec 414 of the New York Education Law authorizes
built in the city of Hialeah, Florida, the city council held local school boards to adopt reasonable regulations for
an emergency public session in order to pass three laws the use of school property for 10 specified purposes
outlawing any animal sacrifices in connection with when the property is not in use. Among the permitted
Santeria rituals. uses is the holding of “social, civic and recreational
 All ordinances were passed by a unanimous vote. meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining
Violations were punishable by fines not exceeding to the welfare of the community; but such meetings,
$500.00 or imprisonment no longer than sixty days, or entertainment and uses shall be non-exclusive and open
both. to the general public”.
 Rule 7 provides that the school premises shall not
ISSUE: Whether or not the city ordinances violate the Free be used by any group for religious purposes.
Exercise Clause of the Constitution.
 Petitioners are Lamb’s Chapel, an evangelical church in
RULING: YES. the community and its pastor, John Steigerwald. The
City ordinances passed to prevent animal sacrifices in church applied to the district for permission to use
connection with Santeria rituals were held invalid by the school facilities to show a 6-part film series containing
Supreme Court of the United States. If the object of the law lectures by Dr. James Dobson. The film series discusses
is to restrict or infringe upon practices because of their the Dr. Dobson’s views on the undermining influences of
religious motivation, the law is not neutral and it is the media that could only be counterbalanced by
invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and returning to traditional Christian family values instilled
is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. at an early age.
A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not  The district denied the first application, saying that this
of general application must undergo the most rigorous of film does appear to be church-related and therefore the
scrutiny. Where the government restricts only conduct request must be refused. The second application was
protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution and denied as well because it was using identical language.
fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct
producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same ISSUE: Whether or not the subject law violated the Free
sort, the interest given in justification of the restriction is Speech Clause of the First Amendment, to deny a church
227
access to school premises to exhibit for public viewing and
for assertedly religious purposes, a film dealing with family
and child-rearing issues faced by parents today.
RULING: YES
There was a violation of the First Amendment.
The film involved here no doubt dealt with a subject  Civil Service Commmission then promulgated a
otherwise permissible under Rule 10, and its exhibition was
denied solely because the film dealt with the subject from a
religious standpoint. The principle that has emerged from
our cases “is that the First Amendment forbids the
government to regulate speech in ways that favor some
viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others”. This
constituted viewpoint discrimination and could not
withstand First Amendment scrutiny.
MAIN POINT: IN BOLD.
COELI
CASE NO. 599
Art. III, Sec. 5, Free Exercise of Religion
In Re Request of Muslim Employees in the Different
Court ruling of Iligan City
FACTS:
 Muslim employees sent a letter to Judge Salazar of the
RTC of Iligan City requesting him to grant them said
privileges:
o to hold office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.
without lunch break or coffee breaks during the
month of Ramadan;
o to be excused from work from 10:00a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
every Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire
calendar year
 Judge Salazar favored the first request but not the
second. He then forwarded the letter to the Office of the
Court Administrator. Muslim employees invoked:
o Sec. 2 of P.D. 322 which excuses them from
reporting to office during recognized Muslim
holidays.
o Sec. 3 of the same decree substantially provides that
during Ramadan, Muslim employees shall observe
office hours from7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without
breaks.
resolution granting the two privileges mentioned above
and even clarified that Fridays referred herein pertain
to the calendar year. However, CSC prescribed a flexible
working schedule to accommodate Muslims' Friday
prayer day and so as not to violate E.O. 292 requiring
civil servants to work not less then 40 hours a week.
The Court Administrator favored the said resolutions.
ISSUE: Whether or not Muslim employees be granted of
their two requests, as an exercise of freedom of religion.
RULING: NO.
Only the first request can be granted and not the second
one. Said requests are grounded on Section 5, Article 3 of
the Constitution, particularly the free exercise clause to
one's religion. The court said that this clause is of two-
fold, freedom to believe which is absolute and freedom
to act on one's beliefs as subject to regulation since it
involves matters affecting public welfare.
The Court recognizes that the observance of Ramadan and
the Friday Muslim Prayer Day is integral to the Islamic faith.
However, only the first request finds support in Section 3
(a) of P.D.No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322, there is no
basis for the second request. In fact, allowing the second
request would mean diminution of 12 hours from the
prescribed government working hours. The performance of
religious practices, whether by the Muslim employees or
those belonging to other religious denominations, should
not prejudice the courts and the public. Indeed, the exercise
of religious freedom does not exempt anyone from
compliance with reasonable requirements of the law,
including civil service laws.
COELI
CASE NO. 600
Art. III, Sec. 5, Free Exercise of Religion
Estrada v. Escritor
FACTS:
Escritor, a member of the Jehovah’s Witness, was charged
for immoral conduct for co‐habiting with a man without the
benefit of a marriage, their relationship bearing a child. She
secured a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness,” indicating
their church’s approval of their union in accordance with
the beliefs of the Jehovah’s Witness.
ISSUES: Whether or not Escritor may be sanctioned in light
of the free exercise clause.
RULING: NO.
The state has the burden of satisfying the “compelling state
interest” test to justify any possible sanction to be imposed
upon Escritor.
This test involves three steps:
1) The courts should look into the sincerity of the
religious belief without inquiring into the truth of the
belief.
2) The state has to establish that its purposes are
legitimate and compelling.
3) The state used the least intrusive means possible.
The case was remanded to the Office of the Court
Administrator so that the government would have the
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it
seeks to uphold in opposing Escritor’s position that her
conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it
comes within the scope of free exercise protection.
228
The Supreme Court held that, Escritor’s sincerity is beyond
serious doubt. She procured the certificate 10 years after
their union began and not merely after being implicated.
The free exercise of religion is a fundamental right that
enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights. The
Constitution adheres to the benevolent neutrality approach
that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. Even assuming that
there was a compelling state interest, the state failed to
show evidence that the means the state adopted in pursuing
this compelling interest is the least restrictive to Escritor’s
religious freedom.
CASE NO. 601
ART III SEC 5: II. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
IMBONG V. OCHOA, GR 204819
FACTS: Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as
the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes
the use of public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds
for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs
is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious
freedom.
ISSUE: WON the RH Law violates the right to religious
freedom.
RULING: NO. The Court cannot determine whether or not
the use of contraceptives or participation in support of
modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious
standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma
or belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine
whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives
without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion.
To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other
groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the
Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause
the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus,
establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its
population control program through the RH Law even if the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious
beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
CASE NO. 602
ART III SEC 5: II. FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
CAPIN-CADIZ V. BRENT HOSPITAL AND COLLEGES, INC.
GR 187417, Feb. 24, 2016
Facts: Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of Brent
Hospital and Colleges, Inc. Brent is an institution of the
Episcopal Church in the Philippines. She was suspended
from employment in 2006 on the grounds of
Unprofessionalism and Unethical Behavior resulting to
Unwed Pregnancy. The Labor Tribunal ruled that there was
just cause for her dismissal. She was not entitled to
reinstatement until the marriage. Cadiz also lambasts
Brent's condition for her reinstatement - that she gets
married to her boyfriend - saying that this violates the
stipulation against marriage under Article 136 of the Labor
Code. Brent argues, among others, that for Cadiz to limit
acts of immorality only to extra-marital affairs is to "change
the norms, beliefs, teachings and practices of BRENT as a
Church institution of the x x x Episcopal Church in the
Philippines." Cadiz appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), which affirmed the LA
decision. The Court of Appeals also dismissed her petition
due to technical defects in the petition (July22, 2008).
ISSUE: Whether or not Brent can impose its religious
standard of morality to Cadiz.
RULING: NO. The fact that Brent is a sectarian institution
does not automatically subject Cadiz to its religious
standard of morality absent an express statement in its
manual of personnel policy and regulations, prescribing
such religious standard as gauge as these regulations create
the obligation on both the employee and the employer to
abide by the same. The rights to personal liberty and
privacy are embodied in the Due Process Clause and
expounded by jurisprudence. These rights pertain to the
freedom to make personal choices that define a human
being's life and personhood. The decision to marry and to
whom are two of the most important choices that a woman
can make in her life. The State has no business interfering
with this choice. Neither can it sanction any undue burden
of the right to make these choices. Brent, in conditioning
Christine Joy's reinstatement on her marriage, has
effectively burdened her freedom. She was forced to choose
to lose her job or marry in order to keep it. Contrary to this
position, the State cannot countenance placing a woman
employee in a situation where she will have to give up one
right (the right to marry as a component of personal liberty
and privacy) for another (the right to employment)
CASE NO. 603
ART III SEC 5: NO RELIGIOUS TEST
TORCASO V. WATKINS, 367 US 488
FACTS: Appellant was appointed by the Governor of
Maryland to the office of Notary Public, but he was denied a
commission because he would not declare his belief in God,
as required by the Maryland Constitution. Claiming that this
requirement violated his rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, he sued in a state court to compel
issuance of his commission, but relief was denied. The State
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the state
constitutional provision is self-executing, without need for
implementing legislation, and requires declaration of a
belief in God as a qualification for office. After the Maryland
courts refused to find Article 37 in violation of the state or
federal constitutions, Torcaso appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
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 “…in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a Administrative Code still stands because there is no implied
ISSUE: Whether or not the state can require office holders to municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, repeal.
subscribe to a certain religious belief. persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial
or national funds, or contractors for public works of the Dissenting Opinion
RULING: NO. This Maryland test for public office cannot be municipality.”
enforced against appellant, because it unconstitutionally J. Teehankee –The Comelec further ruled that as to the two
invades his freedom of belief and religion guaranteed by the In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge remaining categories formerly banned under the Revised
First Amendment and protected by the Fourteenth Victorino Teleron ruled that the Administrative Code is Administrative Code, “ecclesiastics and contractors for
Amendment from infringement by the States. The Torcaso repealed by the Election Code of 1971 which now allows public works of the municipality are allowed to run for
Court thus held that ‘‘neither a State nor the Federal ecclesiastics to run. The challenged Administrative Code municipal elective offices under the maxim, ‘Inclusio unius
Government can constitutionally force a person ‘to profess a provision, certainly insofar as it declares ineligible est exclusio alterius’, they being not included in the
belief or disbelief in any religion.’’’ The Court then pushed ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its enumeration of persons ineligible under the New Election
this neutrality principle even farther, stating that face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by Code. The rule is that all persons possessing the necessary
government could not pass laws favoring religion over the Constitution. To so exclude them is to impose a religious qualifications, except those expressly disqualified by the
nonreligion or favoring theistic religions over nontheistic test. election code, are eligible to run for public office.”
religions.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2175 of the Revised CASE NO. 605
Although Article VI of the U.S. Constitution provides that ‘‘no Administrative Code of 1917 is no longer operative? ART III SEC 5: NO RELIGIOUS TEST
religious test shall ever be required’’ for federal office- MCDANIEL V. PATY, 435 US 618
holding, individual states were not initially prohibited from RULING: NO. The Supreme Court decision was indecisive.
maintaining religious tests (or professions of faith) as Under the 1935 Constitution, “No religious test shall be FACTS: At issue in McDaniel was a Tennessee statute that
prerequisites to state office. In Torcaso v. Watkins, the U.S. required for the exercise of civil or political rights.” If the barred ministers from serving as delegates to Tennessee’s
Supreme Court struck down all such state religious tests as doctrine of constitutional supremacy is to be maintained, 1977 constitutional convention. (The statute arose as a
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. then Section 2175 shall not prevail, thus, an ecclesiastic may cousin to a long-standing state constitutional provision
run for elective office. However, this issue proved to have barring ministers from serving as legislators.) Paul
CASE NO. 604 divided the Supreme Court because it failed to obtain the McDaniel, an ordained Baptist minister from Chattanooga,
ART III SEC 5: NO RELIGIOUS TEST majority vote of eight (8) which is needed in order to Tennessee, filed as a candidate to the convention. An
PAMIL V. TELERON, 86 SCRA 413 declare Section 2175 of the RAC to be unconstitutional. For opposing candidate, Selma Cash Paty, sued for a declaratory
this, the petition filed by Pamil must be granted and the judgment that McDaniel should be disqualified from serving
FACTS: In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the decision of the lower court reversed and set aside. Fr. and that his name should be removed from the ballot. The
election for mayoralty in Alburquerque, Bohol. He was later Gonzaga is hereby ordered to vacate the mayoralty position. lower court held that the statute violated the First
proclaimed as mayor therein. Fortunato Pamil, a rival Amendment and permitted McDaniel to remain on the
candidate filed a quo warranto case against Gonzaga It was also pointed out (in the dissenting opinions) that how ballot. On appeal (after McDaniel convincingly won the
questioning the eligibility of Gonzaga. He argued that as can one who swore to serve the Church’s interest above all election), the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, holding
provided for in Section 2175 of the 1917 Revised be in duty to enforce state policies which at times may the clergy disqualification statute constitutional. McDaniel
Administrative Code: conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of the appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
separation of the church and state. The Revised

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ISSUE: Whether or not the state can exclude them from the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of MAIN POINT: An ecclesiastical affair is one that concerns
having a religious belief. religion. COMELEC reiterated that petitioner did not have a doctrine, creed or form of worship of the church, or
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit adoption and enforcement within a religious association of
RULING: NO. All eight justices who heard the case voted to the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on needful laws and regulations for the government of the
reverse, permitting McDaniel to serve as a delegate to the moral grounds. membership, and the power of excluding from such
convention, but they did not agree on a rationale. The four- ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC’s denial of petitioner’s associations deemed unworthy of membership.]
member plurality opinion, authored by Chief Justice Burger, registration is violative of the constitutional directive that
held that the clergy disqualification statute violated no religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or ARZHY
McDaniel’s free exercise right to act upon his religious political rights CASE NO. 608
beliefs by conditioning that action upon the surrender of his RULING: Yes. Ang Ladlad’s right of political participation ART III SEC 5: ECCLESIASTICAL MATTERS
right to seek public office. McDaniel could not was unduly infringed when the COMELEC, swayed by Long and Almeria v. Basa, G.R. No. 134963
constitutionally be forced to choose between these two private biases and personal prejudices of its constituent FACTS: Petitioners who were members of the religious
rights. The plurality averred that McDaniel’s freedom to act members, arrogated unto itself the role of religious court or corporation CHURCH were expelled thereof on purely
upon his religious beliefs could be limited only by worse, a morality police. It was grave violation of the non- spiritual and religious grounds since they refused to follow
government ‘‘interests of the highest order’’. Tennessee establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible its teachings and doctrines. The decision of the Board of
attempted to meet this compelling interest test by asserting and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. CHURCH was appealed to SEC which ruled in favor of
an establishment clause interest in preventing the MAIN POINT: Non-establishment clause calls for petitioners. Respondent then, appealed the decision of SEC
establishment of a state religion. But when balanced against “government neutrality in religious matters.” to CA which ruled in its favor hence, the present petition
McDaniel’s free-exercise right to act upon his religious brought before the Supreme Court. Petitioners questioned
beliefs (including vocationally), the state interest was ARZHY the legality of their expulsion, contending that no notice or
insufficient and outdated, the Court held. CASE NO. 607 hearing was given to them since their names were just
ART III SEC 5: ECCLESIASTICAL MATTERS simply excluded from the list of members.
The plurality did not think that Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. Austria v. NLRC, 310 SCRA 293 ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the church tribunal is
488 (1961), which it said held the ‘‘freedom of belief’’ to be FACTS: Pastor Austria has been a pastor for the Seventh appealable to the civil tribunal
inviolable, governed. The plurality stated that Tennessee’s Day Adventist for 28 years. An investigation by the RULING: No. A church member who was expelled or
statute did not affect McDaniel’s belief but rather operated congregation authorities revealed that Austria could not minister who was by then deprived of his sacred office is
specifically against his status as a minister. account for church tithes and offerings collected by his wife. without remedy in the civil courts which will not inquire
He was dismissed and the dismissal was upheld by NLRC. into the correctness of the decisions of the ecclesiastical
ARZHY Austria challenged the jurisdiction of the NLR contending tribunal.
CASE NO. 606 that the matter was an ecclesiastical affair outside the MAIN POINT: In matters purely ecclesiastical the decisions
ART III SEC 5: NO RELIGIOUS TEST jurisdiction of the NLRC. of the proper church tribunals are conclusive upon the civil
Ang Ladlad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582 ISSUE: Whether or not his petitioner’s dismissal for failure tribunals.
FACTS: COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s to account for his collections is an ecclesiastical matter
application for accreditation as a party-list organization RULING: No. What is involved in the case at bar is the ARZHY
principally on the ground that it tolerates immorality which relationship of the church as an employer and the minister CASE NO. 609
offends religious (i.e. Christian and Muslim) beliefs. as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relationship ART III SEC 5: ECCLESIASTICAL MATTERS
Petitioner argued that the denial of accreditation insofar as whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines Taruc v. Dela Cruz, 453 SCRA 123
it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated of the church.

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FACTS: Respondent Bishop Dela Cruz
expelled/excommunicated petitioners from the Philippine
Independent Church for their disobedience, inciting
dissension, and for threatening to forcibly occupy the Parish
Church causing anxiety and fear among the general
membership. Due to this, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages with preliminary injunction against respondent in
the RTC of Surigao City, contending that their expulsion was
illegal because it was done without trial thus, violating their
right to due process. RTC ruled in petitioners’ favor
however CA reversed the decision on appeal by respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not courts have jurisdiction to entertain
complaint about expulsion or excommunication from
church
RULING: No. It is not for the courts to exercise control over
church authorities in the performance of their discretionary
and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of
religious institutions/organizations to conform to just
church regulations.
MAIN POINT: In disputes involving religious institutions or
organizations, there is one area which the Court should not
touch: doctrinal and disciplinary differences.
ARZHY
CASE NO. 610
ART III SEC 5: ECCLESIASTICAL MATTERS
UCCP v. Bradford, 674 SCRA 92
FACTS: Petitioner United Church of Christ in the Philippines
(UCCP) was a national confederation of incorporated and
unincorporated self-governing Evangelical churches of
different denominations, devised for fellowship, mutual
counsel and cooperation. Bradford Evangelical Church, a
constituent church of UCCP, disaffiliated itself from UCCP
due to increased enmity between both parties. Petitioner
filed a protest before SEC against the separate incorporation
and registration of Bradford on the ground that it was not
allowed under the UCCP Constitution and by-laws. SEC
ruled in favor of Bradford. On appeal before SC after being
denied by CA, UCCP maintained that disaffiliation of
Bradford was purely an ecclesiastical affair on which UCCP
had the sole power and authority to decide/declare.
ISSUE: Whether or not disaffiliation of a constituent church
is merely an ecclesiastical matter outside the jurisdiction of
SEC and courts
RULING: No. Both parties, being corporate entities and
grantees of primary franchises, are subject to the
jurisdiction of SEC regarding legal and corporate matters RULING: No, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as
despite their religious nature. Bradford’s decision was
recognized by SC as it concerned its legal right as a religious
corporation to disaffiliate from another religious
corporation via legitimate means – a secular matter well
within the civil court’s purview.
MAIN POINT: State can meddle on legal and corporate
matters of religious corporations. Ecclesiastical affairs to
which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for
excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, R. Rizon
administration of sacraments and other activities attached
with religious significance.
R. Rizon
CASE NO. 601
ARTICLE III, SECTION 6 Watch List Hold Departure
Order
Reyes vs CA G.R. No. 182161 December 3, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner Father Robert Reyes was among those
arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on
November 30, 2007. On December 1, 2007, upon the
request of the (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary
Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO).
On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant ISSUE/S: Whether or not the right to return to one’s
petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the
rebellion case against petitioner by the RTC, HDO
No. 45 still subsists, that every time petitioner
would leave and return to the country, the
immigration officers at the NAIA detain and
interrogate him for several minutes because of the
existing HDO.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the HDO was unlawful and
infringes on his right to travel.
a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case
filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has
also failed to establish that his right to travel was
impaired in the manner and to the extent that it
amounted to a serious violation of his right to life,
liberty and security, for which there exists no
readily available legal recourse or remedy.
CASE NO. 602
ARTICLE III, SECTION 6 RETURN TO ONE’S COUNTRY
Marcos vs Manglapus G.R. No. 88211 September 15
1989
FACTS: Former President Marcos, after his and his family
spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to
return to the Philippines. This is a petition for
mandamus and prohibition asking the Courts to
order the respondents to issue travel documents to
Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his
family and to enjoin the implementation of the
President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.
country is covered in the right to travel or the
liberty of abode.
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RULING: No, the right to return to one's country is not States, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either
among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the CASE NO. 605
of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode executive of a municipality, who acts within a ARTICLE III, SECTION 6 RIGHT TO TRAVEL
and the right to travel, it is separate and distinct sphere of delegated powers. No official, no matter Silverio vs CA G.R. No. 94284 April 8, 1991
although related to such right. However it is our how high, is above the law
well-considered view that the right to return may be FACTS: Two (2) after the filing of the criminal case against
considered, as a generally accepted principle of R. Rizon Ricardo Silverio for violation of the Revised
international law and, under our Constitution, is Securities Act, respondent People of the Philippines
part of the law of the land. CASE NO. 604 filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the
ARTICLE III, SECTION 6 LIBERTY OF ABODE passport of and to issue a Hold-Departure Order
R. Rizon Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindanao G.R. No. L-14078 (HDO) against accused-petitioner on the ground that
he had gone abroad several times without the
CASE NO. 603 FACTS: This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of necessary Court approval resulting in
ARTICLE III, SECTION 6 LIBERTY OF ABODE Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of postponements of the arraignment and scheduled
Villavicencio vs Lukban G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being hearings. Petitioner avers that such action impairs
1919 illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial on his to right to travel.
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions
FACTS: Justo, Mayor of the City of Manila ordered the are said to be held on the reservation established at ISSUE: Whether or not such HDO impairs the petitioner’s
deportation and isolation of 170 ill repute women Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos right to travel.
and were inmates of the houses of prostitution is said to be held under the custody of the provincial
situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away RULING: No, he has posted bail but has violated the
Sampaloc. The mayor's reason for doing this was to from the reservation. Respondent avers that it is conditions thereof by failing to appear before the
preserve the morals of the people of Manila. He deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one Court when required. Holding an accused in a
claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao, place in order to make a permanent settlement. criminal case within the reach of the Courts by
purportedly, to work for an haciendero named preventing his departure from the Philippines must
Feliciano Ynigo. The families of the prostitutes came ISSUE/S: Whether or not the act infringes on the be considered as a valid restriction on his right to
forward to file charges. During the trial, it revealed petitioners’ liberty of abode. travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance
that the women were deported without their with law. The Courts may use all means necessary to
consent in fact there was no law or order RULING: No, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen carry their orders into effect in criminal cases
authorizing Lukban's deportation. is unduly interfered without when the degree of pending before them.
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the act of the mayor in deporting are restrained for their own good and the general Andalahao
these women valid. good of the Philippines. The law seems to be CASE NO. 616
reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular Art III Section 6: Liberty of Abode and Right to Travel
RULING: No, the privilege of domicile is deemed as methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies Santiago vs Vasquez 217 SCRA 127
important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the alike to all of a class.
Constitution. Even the Governor-General of the Facts: Miriam Defensor-Santiago charged with violation of
Philippine Islands nor the President of the United R. Rizon Section 3(e), RA 3019, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

233
before the Sandiganbayan. Wherein a hold departure order Art III Section 6: Liberty of Abode and Right to Travel
was issued for the pronouncement she made that she would Facts: Former First Lady Imelda Marcos after being Yap vs CA GR 141529 June 6 2001
be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship at Harvard convicted for violations of RA 3019, files a motion to leave
University. She directly filed a "Motion to Restrain the and travel abroad to seek diagnostic tests and treatment in Facts: Petitioner Francisco Yap (Yap) was convicted of the
Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order China because of a serious and life threatening medical crime of estafa for misappropriating amounts equivalent to
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining condition requiring facilities not available in the Philippines P5.5 M. After the records of the case were transmitted to the
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction" with the SC. which Sandiganbayan denied due to the report received CA, he filed a motion to fix bail pending appeal. The CA
from Philippine Heart Center which contained findings granted the motion and allowed Yap to post bail on
She argued that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in contrary to the conclusions claimed by the petitioner's condition that he will secure “a certification/guaranty from
excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in physicians. the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident
issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not of the area and that he will remain to be so until final
acquired jurisdiction over her person as she has neither However, petitioner claims that it is her basic constitutional judgment is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it
been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered. The hold right to travel abroad and avail of medical treatment to must be with prior notice to the court and private
departure order was also issued sua sponte without notice uphold her right to health. complainant.”
and hearing. She likewise argued that the hold departure
order violates her right to due process, right to travel and Issue: W/N Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in Yap sought the reduction of the bail but it was denied.
freedom of speech. denying petitioner's request to tavel abroad for medical Hence, he appealed to the SC. He contended that the CA, by
treatment setting bail at a prohibitory amount, effectively denied him
Issue: W/N Sandiganbayan erred when it issued the hold his right to bail. He also contested the condition imposed by
departure order and the right to travel has been impaired Ruling: NO. SC Ruled in favor of the Sandiganbayan and the CA that he secure a certification/guaranty, claiming that
upheld expert opinions given by medical practitioners. The the same violates his liberty of abode and travel.
Ruling: NO. The Court upheld the course of action adopted biochemical tests abroad proposed by the petitioner's
by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such medical team is questionable and according to the resident Issue: W/N the condition imposed by the CA was violative
plan of the petitioner to go abroad, by issuing a hold medical experts an alternative medical test can be availed of the liberty of abode and right to travel.
departure order in connection to the presiding court's within the Philippines. The present facilities and expertise
inherent power to preserve and maintain the in the Philippines are more adequate to diagnose and treat Ruling: No. The right to change abode and travel within the
effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and over patients with hypertension and coronary heart disease. The Philippines, being invoked by petitioner, are not absolute
the accused. Posting bail always holds the accused person's right to travel is subject to the usual rights. Order of CA releasing petitioner on bail constitutes
amenable to the orders and processes of the court, thus, constraints imposed by very necessary of safeguarding such lawful order as contemplated under the constitution.
may be legally prohibited from leaving the country the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused The condition imposed by the CA is simply consistent with
during the pendency of the case. should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure
humanitarian reason is a matter of the court's sound that petitioner will make himself available at all times
Main Point: discretion. whenever the Court requires his presence. Besides, a closer
look at the questioned condition will show that petitioner is
Andalahao Main Point: not prevented from changing abode; he is merely required
CASE NO. 617 to inform the court in case he does so.
Art III Section 6: Liberty of Abode and Right to Travel Andalahao
Marcos vs Sandiganbayan 247 SCRA 127 CASE NO. 618

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Main Point: Right to abode and travel is not absolute. motorcycle and other forms of transport enough to justify person from doing something; to "regulate" is to govern
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states: The its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll or direct according to rule.
liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits ways. A classification based on practical convenience
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful and common knowledge is not unconstitutional simply Main Point:
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be because it may lack purely theoretical or scientific
impaired except in the interest of national security, public uniformity. Who digested: jAn
safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. CASE NO. 621
Main Point: ART III SEC 6
Andalahao LIBERTY OF ABODE AND RIGHT TO TRAVEL
CASE NO. 619 Andalahao Genuino v. De Lima
Art III Section 6: Liberty of Abode and Right to Travel CASE NO. 620
Mirasol vs DPWH 490 SCRA 318 Art III Section 6: Liberty of Abode and Right to Travel FACTS: The case is a consolidated case of Petition for
OAS vs Judge Macarine 677 SCRA 1 Certiorari and Prohibition against former DOJ Secretary
Facts: Petitioners filed before the trial court a Petition for Delima for her issuance of DOJ circular no. 41. Series of
Declaratory Judgment with Application for Temporary Facts: The Office of the Court Administrator filed an 2010, known as the “Consolidated Rules and Regulations
Restraining Order and Injunction to nullity of the following administrative case against Judge Macarine for violation of Governing Issuance and Implementation of Hold Departure Orders
administrative issuances for being inconsistent with the OCA Circular No. 49-2003 which requires that judges and (HDO), Watchlist Orders (WLO) and Allow Departure
provisions of court personnel secure a travel authority from OCA. Such Orders (ADO)”. The Petitioners questions the
Republic Act 2000, entitled "Limited Access Highway Act" requirements be completed two weeks before the departure constitutionality of this DOJ circular claiming it infringes the
enacted in 1957: (a) DPWH Administrative Order No. 1, date and failure to complete will be subjected to disciplinary constitutional right to travel. The petitioners in these
Series of 1968; (b) DPWH Department Order No. 74, Series action. consolidated cases are former President Arroyo and her
of 1993; and (c) Art. II, Sec. 3 (a) of the Revised Rules on husband, and Efraim and Erwin Genuino. Former DOJ
Limited Access Facilities promulgated in 199[8] by the Judge Macarine wrote to Court Administrator requesting Secretary De lima issued HDO and WLO against petitioners
DPWH thru the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB). that he be allowed to travel to Hong Kong with his family on on the ground that criminal charges of plunder, qualified
his 65th birthday and the travel shall be charged to his theft and violation of the Omnibus Election Code were filed
Issue: W/N AO No. 1 introduces an unreasonable annual forced leave. However, he failed to submit 1 of the against them. Petitioners, particularly Spouses Arroyo, file
classification by singling-out motorcycles from other requirements but still went to Hong Kong. His application temporary restraining order against the issued HDO and
motorized modes of transport and violates the right to was denied, and the absences be deducted from his salary WLO of DOJ seeking relief and grant from court to allow
travel. not from his leave credits. them to travel so that former president Arroyo may seek
medical treatment abroad. The court granted relief sought
Ruling: No. Petitioners are not being deprived of their right Issue: W/N the right to travel is absolute on a condition that petition will file a bond of PhP2M, an
to use the limited access facility. They are merely being undertaking that petitioners shall report to Philippine
required, just like the rest of the public, to adhere to the Ruling: No. The right to travel is guaranteed by the consulate in the countries they are to visit (Germany,
rules on how to use the facility. AO 1 does not infringe upon Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is not Singapore, USA, Italy, Spain and Austria) and shall appoint a
petitioners’ right to travel but merely bars motorcycles, absolute. OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but representative to receive on their behalf subpoena, orders
bicycles, tricycles, pedicabs, and any non-motorized vehicles merely regulates, by providing guidelines to be complied by and other legal processes. Petitioners complied all the
as the mode of traveling along limited access highways. judges and court personnel, before they can go on leave to conditions Instead of following the order of the court, DOJ
There exist real and substantial differences between a travel abroad. To "restrict" is to restrain or prohibit a

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caused for the refusal to process the petitioners travel they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any
documents. Hence, this case. travel without substantive due process. renegotiation of the JVA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issued DOJ circular 41 infringes ISSUE: W/N Minor’s right to travel is violated. ISSUE: W/N the constitutional right to information includes
the constitutional rights of the petitioners to travel. official information on on-going negotiations before a final
RULING: No. The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, agreement.
RULING: Yes. In this case, the right to travel is a guarantee specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and prevention
of the constitution under the Bill of rights. There are of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public RULING: Yes. Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Philippine
allowable restrictions in the exercise of this right which are safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and Constitution provides that “…Access to official records,
for the interest of national security, public safety or public activities within the confines of their residences and their and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
health as may be provided by law. The ground of the immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
respondent in the issuance of DOJ circular 41 is for the reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
petitioners to be present during the preliminary getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
investigation of their cases which is outside the allowable second requirement, that the limitation "be provided by provided by law.”
restrictions provided by the constitution, hence, it is an law," our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the
ultra vires and has no effect. State's duty to afford special protection to children. MAIN POINT: Armed with the right information, citizens
MAIN POINT: There are allowable restrictions in the can participate in public discussions leading to the
exercise of this right which are for the interest of national MAINPOINT: As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State formulation of government policies and their effective
security, public safety or public health as may be provided may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, implementation.
by law. provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are jAn
jAn provided by law. CASE NO. 624
CASE NO. 622 ART III SEC 7
ART III SEC 6 Who digested: jAn RIGHT TO INFORMATION: LIMITATION ON THE RIGHT
MINOR’S RIGHT TO TRAVEL CASE NO. 623 Chavez v. PCGG
Spark v. Quezon ART III SEC 7
RIGHT TO INFORMATION: SCOPE OF THE RIGHT FACTS: Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and
FACTS: Following the campaign of President Duterte to Chavez v. PEA the extent of the people’s constitutional right to information
implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local on matters of public concern. Petitioner, invoking his
governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement FACTS: Public Estates Authority (PEA), the central constitutional right to information and the correlative duty
their curfew ordinances on minors through police implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation of the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving
operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan projects nationwide sought the transfer to the Amari the national interest, demands that respondents make
Rody." Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private public all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s
Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an association of young corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth.
adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just Freedom Islands. PEA also sought 290.156 hectares of Respondents answer that they do not deny forging a
society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari. Petitioner compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim,
of the youth and minors filed this present petition, arguing contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there
that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. He then is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the

236
negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG decided by the Supreme Court for purposes of the adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner
may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the Impeachment Complaint. prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of
proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to
become effective and binding. ISSUE: W/N the members of the Supreme Court may be disclose said information.
compelled to testify in the impeachment proceedings. ISSUE/S
ISSUE: W/N the constitutional right to information Whether or not the civil service eligibility is open to
guarantees access to information regarding ongoing RULING: No. Such act violates judicial privilege as it public access
negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement. pertains to the exercise of the constitutional mandate of
adjudication. If they testify, there will be a disclosure of RULING
RULING: Yes. It is incumbent upon the PCGG and its confidential information that could subject them to criminal Yes. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or
officers, as well as other government representatives, to prosecution. deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to
disclose sufficient public information on any proposed cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit
settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible MAIN POINT: The right to information, by its very the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not,
owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, nature and by the Constitution’s own terms, is not civil service eligible. When, as in this case, the government
though, must pertain to definite propositions of the absolute. On the part of private individuals, the right to employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the
government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency privacy, similarly inviolable, exists. Institutions also enjoy public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their
recommendations or communications. their own right to confidentiality, that, for governmental professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.
departments and agencies, is expressed in terms of their
MAIN POINT: The following are some of the recognized need to protect the integrity of their mandated tasks under MAIN POINT
restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence the Constitution and the laws; these tasks, to state the The constitutional guarantee to information on
information, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) obvious, are their reasons for their being. matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open
criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information. every door to any and all information. Under the
CHAM Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are
Who digested: jAn Case No. 626 "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III,
CASE NO. 625 ARTICLE III SECTION 5: Right to information Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt
ART III SEC 7 IN GENERAL; Access to court records, gov’t contract certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as
LIMITATION ON THE RIGHT negotiations, diplomatic negotiations, etc. those affecting national security. The threshold question is,
In Re: Production of Court Records, 14 Feb. 2012 LEGASPI VS CSC therefore, whether or not the information sought is of
public interest or public concern.
FACTS: During the impeachment proceedings against Chief FACTS
Justice Corona, the prosecution panel manifested in a The respondent denied Legaspi's request for CHAM
compliance that it would present about 100 witnesses information on the civil service eligibilities of certain Case No. 627
which included Justices of the Supreme Court, and Court persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department ARTICLE III SECTION 5: Right to information
officials and employees who will testify on matters internal of Cebu City. These government employees had allegedly IN GENERAL; Access to court records, gov’t contract
to the Court. Almost a thousand letters were sent to the represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed negotiations, diplomatic negotiations, etc.
Supeme Court asking for the examination of records, and the civil service examinations for sanitarians. Claiming that BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT vs COMELEC
the issuance of certified true copies of the rollos and the his right to be informed of the eligibilities is guaranteed by
agenda and minutes of the deliberations of various cases the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and FACTS

237
 Comelec issued a Resolution prescribing rules and
regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to
participate and submission of names of nominees under the
party-list system of representation in connection with the
May 2007 elections. Petitioners impugn Comelec Resolution
effectively denying their request for the release or
disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14)
accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in
petitioner Rosales previous letter-request.
ISSUE/S
Whether respondent, by refusing to reveal the
names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has
violated the right to information and free access to
documents as guaranteed by the Constitution
RULING
Yes. Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of
the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the right to
information enshrined in the self-executory.
Complementing and going hand in hand with the right to
information is another constitutional provision enunciating
the policy of full disclosure and transparency in the
government.
MAIN POINT
The right to information is a public right where the
real parties in interest are the public, or the citizens to be
precise. And for every right of the people recognized as
fundamental lies a corresponding duty on the part of those
who govern to respect and protect that right. This is the
essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime.
CHAM
Case No. 628
ARTICLE III SECTION 5: Right to information
IN GENERAL; Access to court records, gov’t contract official records," the Constitution does not accord them a
negotiations, diplomatic negotiations, etc. right to compel custodians of official records to prepare
VALMONTE vs BELMONTE Jr. lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to
acquire information on matters of public concern. It must be
FACTS stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue
Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to the respondent that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal
Feliciano Belmonte, then GSIS General Manager, requesting right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative
to befurnished with the list of names of the defunct interim duty of defendant to perform the act required.
and regular Batasang Pambansa including the ten (10)
oppositionmembers who were able to secure a clean loan of CHAM
P 2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. Case No. 629
Belmonte, aware that such request contains serious ARTICLE III SECTION 5: Right to information
legalimplications seek the help of a deputy General Counsel. IN GENERAL; Access to court records, gov’t contract
Belmonte, in his reply, stated that a confidential negotiations, diplomatic negotiations, etc.
lrelationship exists between the GSIS and all those who AQUINO-SARMIENTO vs MORATO
borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a
duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and FACTS
that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this Petitioner, a member of respondent(MTRCB), wrote
confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts. its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine
the board's records pertaining to the voting slips
ISSUE/S accomplished by the individual board members after a
Whether or not that Mr. Valmonte, together with his review of the movies and television productions.
co-petitioners, are entitled to the documents sought, by Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent
virtue of their constitutional right to information Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the
board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as
RULING reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of
Yes. In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely
documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to private and personal. Petitioner argues, on the other hand,
reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate that the records she wishes to examine are public in
relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end character and other than providing for reasonable
that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that conditions regulating the manner and hours of examination,
undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the respondents Morato and the classification board have no
records may be prevented and that the right of other authority to deny any citizen seeking examination of the
persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured board's records. Respondent Board issued Resolution No.
10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal,
MAIN POINT the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips
Although citizens are afforded the right to of the members.
information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to ISSUE/S
238
 WHETHER OR RESPONDENTS, BY APPROVING AND
ENFORCING RESOLUTION NO. 10-89, ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION SAME VIOLATES ARTICLE III
SECTION 7 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
RULING
Yes. There can be no invasion of privacy in the case
at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of
action undertaken in the course of performing official
functions. To declare otherwise would be to clothe every
public official with an impregnable mantle of protection
against public scrutiny for their official acts.
MAIN POINT
The constitutional recognition of the citizen's right
of access to official records cannot be made dependent upon
the consent of the members of the board concerned,
otherwise, the said right would be rendered nugatory.
CHAM
Case No. 630
ARTICLE III SECTION 5: Right to information
IN GENERAL; Access to court records, gov’t contract
negotiations, diplomatic negotiations, etc.
ECHEGARAY vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
FACTS
The Secretary of Justice promulgated the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 and
directed the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to
prepare the Lethal Injection Manual. Petitioner filed to
enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and Director of the
Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution by lethal
injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its
implementing rules as these are unconstitutional and void
for being: (a) cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment per
se as well as by reason of its being (b) arbitrary,
unreasonable and a violation of due process, (c) a violation
of the Philippines' obligations under international injection shall be set forth in a manual to be prepared by the
covenants, (d) an undue delegation of legislative power by Director. The manual shall contain details of, among others,
Congress, (e) an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary the sequence of events before and after execution;
of the power to legislate, and (f) an unlawful delegation of procedures in setting up the intravenous line; the
delegated powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent administration of the lethal drugs; the pronouncement of
Director. death; and the removal of the intravenous system.
Said manual shall be confidential and its
ISSUE/S distribution shall be limited to authorized prison
WHETHER OR NOT LETHAL INJECTION, AS personnel."
AUTHORIZED UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 AND THE
QUESTIONED RULES, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT PASTOR
IS AN UNNECESSARY AND WANTON INFLICTION OF PAIN Case No. 631
ON A PERSON AND IS, THUS, A CRUEL, DEGRADING, AND Art III Sec 7: In General: Access to Court records, Gov’t
INHUMAN PUNISHMENT. contract negotiations, Diplomatic negotiations, etc.
Gonzales vs. Narvasa
RULING 337 SCRA 733; GR 140835, August 14, 2000
Yes. But only insofar as to the second paragraph
of section 19. The Court finds the requirement of FACTS: Petitioner, Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a
confidentiality of the contents of the manual even with citizen and taxpayer, alleged that in 1995 and 1996, the
respect to the convict unduly suppressive. It sees no legal President created seventy (70) positions in the Office of the
impediment for the convict, should he so desire, to obtain a President and appointed to said positions twenty (20)
copy of the manual. The contents of the manual are matters presidential consultants, twenty-two (22) presidential
of public concern "which the public may want to know, advisers, and twenty-eight (28) presidential assistants.
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply Petitioner asserts that, the President does not have the
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an power to create these positions but only the Legislatures.
ordinary citizen Consequently, petitioner asked the Court to issue a writ of
mandamus ordering Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora
MAIN POINT to answer his letter dated October 4, 1999 requesting for
The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee the names of executive officials holding multiple positions
of access to information of public concern is a recognition of in government, copies of their appointments, and a list of
the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a the recipients of luxury vehicles seized by the Bureau of
democracy. In the same way that free discussion enables Customs and turned over to Malacañ ang.
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
time, access to information of general interest aids the ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may validly obtain such
people in democratic decision-making by giving them a information invoking his right to public information (Sec. 7,
better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation. Bill of Rights).
"SEC. 19. EXECUTION PROCEDURE. - Details of the
procedure prior to, during and after administering the lethal RULING: YES.
239
Respondent Zamora, in his official capacity as Executive
Secretary, has a constitutional and statutory duty to answer
petitioner’s letter dealing with matters which are
unquestionably of public concern—that is, appointments
made to public offices and the utilization of public property.
With regard to petitioner’s request for copies of the
appointment papers of certain officials, respondent Zamora
is obliged to allow the inspection and copying of the same
subject to the reasonable limitations required for the
orderly conduct of official business.
MAIN POINT: When a mandamus proceeding involves the
assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a
citizen, and therefore, part of the general ‘public’ which
possesses the right.” However, Congress may provide for
reasonable conditions upon the access to information.
PASTOR
Case No. 632
Art III Sec 7: In General: Access to Court records, Gov’t
contract negotiations, Diplomatic negotiations, etc.
Re: Request for Radio-TV Coverage
365 SCRA 248
FACTS: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting this
Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of
the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former
President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The
petitioners invoked other than the freedom of the press, the
constitutional right of the people to be informed of matters
of public concern which could only be recognized, served
and satisfied by allowing live radio and television coverage
of the court proceedings. Moreover, the live radio and
television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the
dual purpose of ensuring the desired transparency in the
administration of justice.
against attempts by any party to use the courts as
Issue: Whether or not the constitutional guarantees of instruments for the pursuit of selfish interests.
freedom of the press and right to information of public
concern be given more weight than the fundamental rights Issue: Whether or not the constitutional guarantees of
of the accused. freedom of the press and right to information of public
concern be given more weight than the fundamental rights
RULING AND MAIN POINT: NO. of the accused.
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied
freedom of the press and the right to public information. It RULING: NO.
also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most Motion for reconsideration is denied voting 9-6. However,
accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the the court voting 8-7, has resolved to order the audio-visual
proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public with recording of the trial for documentary purposes. The
the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the recordings will not be for live or real time broadcast but for
courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for
paramount right of the accused to due process which public showing, after the Sandiganbayan shall have
must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its promulgated its decision in every case to which the
constitutional proportions. recording pertains.
PASTOR MAIN POINT: First, the hearings are of historic significance.
Case No. 633 Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to
Art III Sec 7: In General: Access to Court records, Gov’t our people who have a fundamental right to know how their
contract negotiations, Diplomatic negotiations, etc. government is conducted. This right can be enhanced by
Re: Request for Live Radio-TV Coverage audio-visual presentation. Third, audio-visual presentation
365 SCRA 62 is essential for the education and civic training of the
people. Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision records of the hearings for documentary purposes.
denying petitioners' request for permission to televise and
broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before VITUG, J., dissenting opinion: I still find it hard to believe
the Sandiganbayan. The motion was filed by the Secretary of that the presence of the cameras inside the courtroom will
Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is not have an untoward impact on the court proceedings. It
really no conflict between the right of the people to public does not seem right to single out and make a spectacle of
information and the freedom of the press, on the one hand, the cases against Mr. Estrada. Dignity is a precious part of
and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that personability innate in every human being, and there can be
if there is a clash between these rights, it must be resolved no cogent excuse for impinging it even to the slightest
in favor of the right of the people and the press because the degree.
people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to
information; and that live media coverage is a safeguard
PASTOR
240
 Case No. 634
Art III Sec 7: In General: Access to Court records, Gov’t
contract negotiations, Diplomatic negotiations, etc.
Hilado vs. Reyes (Access to Court Records)
496 SCRA 282; GR 163155, July 21, 2006
FACTS: Julita Campos Benedicto (private respondent), is the
surviving spouse of the deceased Roberto Benedicto. She
was appointed Administratrix of his estate and the letters of
administration were issued in her favor. The case was
presided by Judge Amor Reyes (public respondent).
Petitioners (Hilado, et. al.) had during the lifetime of
Benedicto, filed before the RTC of Bacolod two separate
complaints for damages or collection of sums of money
against Roberto Benedicto et al. Petitioners’ counsel was
denied access to the last folder-record of the case, which,
according to the clerical staff, could not be located and was
probably in the chambers of the public respondent. The
judge denied their request for access to the files, as they
were not parties to the case. Likewise, their request for
certified true copies of the order issued by the court during
hearing, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes
taken thereon was denied. Thus the present petition for
mandamus and prohibition.
ISSUE: W/N a writ of mandamus may issue to compel public
respondent to allow petitioners to examine and obtain
copies of any or all documents forming part of the records
of the case.
RULING: YES.
Petitioners’ stated main purpose for accessing the records—
to monitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the
preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the
estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory
and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual
accounting49—appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in
the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto
et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the Consequently, the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is
settlement of his estate. They are in fact “interested not only intended to benefit Congress but also the citizenry.
persons” under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court. The people are equally concerned with this proceeding and
have the right to participate therein in order to protect their
MAIN POINT: The right of the people to information on interests. In other words, the right to information really
matters of public concern shall be recognized. As long then goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full
as any party, counsel or person has a legitimate reason to public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is
have a copy of court records and pays court fees, a court meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
may not deny access to such records. governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse
in the government.
PASTOR
Case No. 635 MAIN POINT: Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of
Art III Sec 7: In General: Access to Court records, Gov’t Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff
contract negotiations, Diplomatic negotiations, etc. information and other data in aid of its power to legislate.
Sabio vs. Gordon
504 SCRA 704; GR 174340, October 17, 2006 AIMAR
CASE NO. 636
FACTS: Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator ART. III, SEC. 7: Right to Information – Limitation
Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his Bantay vs. COMELEC
Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public
meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on FACTS: COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 which
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and prescribed the rules and regulations to govern the filing and
Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the submission of names under the party-list list of
invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same representation. Petitioner Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA
time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No member or staff 7941) and Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with
of the Commission shall be required to testify or the COMELEC an urgent petition to disqualify the nominees
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or of certain party-list organization and requested for the list
administrative proceeding concerning matters within of the group’s nominees. COMELEC issued an en banc
its official cognizance.” Gordon’s Subpoenae Ad Resolution declaring the names as confidential. Petitioners
Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he commonly seek to compel the COMELEC to disclose or
threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt. publish the names of the nominees of the various party-list
groups.
ISSUE: Whether or not the above-stated section runs
counter against constitutional provision ensuring people’s ISSUES: WON COMELEC has violated the right to
access to information. information and free access of documents as guaranteed by
the Constitution
RULING: YES.
241
RULING: Yes. The refusal of the COMELEC to reveal the
names of the party-list seats violates the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern. The people
have the right to elect their representatives on the basis of
an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list
elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would
be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would
eventually sit in the House of Representatives. The Court
frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that
would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of
the votes in an election.
MAINPOINT: Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
AIMAR
CASE NO. 637
ART. III, SEC. 7: Right to Information – Limitation
Berdin vs. Mascarinas
FACTS: The Sangguniang Bayan of Tubigon enacted a Tax
Ordinance increasing the taxes and fees of the municipality.
Petitioner Berdin, as President of the Tubigon Market
VendorsAssociation, wrote to respondent Municipal
Treasurer requesting a copy of Tax Ordinance No. 88-11-36.
They assert the ordinance does not exist by virtue of
respondent officials’ delay in furnishing them with a copy of
the questioned ordinance.
ISSUE: WON the ordinances are valid and enforceable
RULING: Yes. The Municipal Treasurer in the case at bar
exercised this discretion by requiring petitioners to pay for
the cost of reproduction of Tax Ordinance No. 88-11-36.
Such a requirement is reasonable under the circumstances
considering that the ordinance is quite voluminous
consisting of more than a hundred pages. So Petitioners’
misgivings on the existence of Tax Ordinance No. 88-11-36
are baseless. The reason for the delay was adequately
explained and was even attributed to petitioners’ failure to
pay for the cost of reproduction of the ordinance.
MAINPOINT: The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern is recognized under Sec. 7, Art. III
of the 1987 Constitution and is subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. Thus, while access to official
records may not be prohibited, it certainly may be
regulated. The regulation may come either from statutory
law and from the inherent power of an officer to control his
office and the records under his custody and to exercise
some discretion as to the manner in which persons desiring
to inspect, examine, or copy the record may exercise their
rights.
AIMAR
CASE NO. 638
ART. III, SEC. 7: Right to Information – Limitation
Chavez vs. NHA
FACTS: In his capacity as taxpayer, Solicitor General
Francisco Chavez petitioned the Court directly for, among
other things, access to all documents and information
relating to the Smokey Mountain Development and
Reclamation Project, including its underlying Joint Venture
Agreement between the National Housing Authority, a
government body, and R-II Builders, Inc. for it is a state
sponsored infrastructure development project that had
gone awry.
ISSUE: WON the NHA must be compelled to disclose all
information related to the Project
RULING: Yes. Article II, Section 28 and Article III, Section 7
of the Constitution, taken together as “twin provisions,”
adopt a policy of full public disclosure on all transactions
involving public interest and acknowledge the people’s right
to information.” Because no enabling law exists providing
government agencies with the procedural mechanics to
disclose such information, the NHA cannot be faulted for an
inability to disclose. Nevertheless, where a duty to disclose
does not exist, there still may exist a duty to permit access,
and so the Court ordered the NHA to permit access to all
information related to the Project
MAINPOINT: The 1987 Constitution provides that there is a
duty on the government to permit access to information
related to government projects and policies even though
there is no enabling law that imposes a duty on government
bodies to publicly disclose such information.
AIMAR
CASE NO. 639
ART. III, SEC. 7: Right to Information – Limitation
Senate vs. Ermita
FACTS: The Senate Committees sent invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials for
them to appear before Senate. The President issued EO 464,
effective immediately, which, among others, mandated that
“all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the
government shall secure the consent of the President prior
to appearing before either House of Congress.”
242
ISSUE: WON EO 464 violates the right of the people to RULING: Yes. It appears that during one of the Senate context in which it is made.
information on matters of public concern hearings on the NBN project, copies of the supply contract MP: the right to information does not extend to matters
were readily made available to petitioners. Evidently, the recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation
RULING: Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between said prayer has been complied with and is, thus, mooted. of powers, by which the Court meant Presidential
the right to Congress to information which underlies the conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-
power of inquiry and the right of the people to information MAINPOINT: The right of the people to information on door Cabinet meetings
on matters of public concern, any executive issuance matters of public concern is recognized under Sec. 7, Art. III CASE NO. 642
tending to unduly limit disclosures of information on of the 1987 Constitution and is subject to such limitations as ART 3, SEC 7: Limitation of the right to information
investigations in Congress necessarily deprives the people may be provided by law. Akbayan v Aquino
of information which, being presumed to be in aid of CASE NO. 641 FACTS:The Petitioners demanded the full text of the Japan-
legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. ART 3, SEC 7: Limitation of the right to information Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA)
Neri v Senate including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
MAINPOINT: The right of the people to information on FACTS: the case is about the claim of executive privilege by during the negotiation process. The respondent alleged that
matters of public concern is recognized under Sec. 7, Art. III the President, on the one hand, and the respondent Senate the request of the Petitioners must be denied on the ground
of the 1987 Constitution and is subject to such limitations as Committees’ assertion of their power to conduct legislative that the issue is under the executive privileged and is due
may be provided by law. inquiries, on the other. confidential. The petitioners argue that the contents of the
Petitioner appeared before respondent Committees JPEPA are matter of public interest, and thus it covers by
AIMAR and testified for about eleven (11) hours about the "NBN their right to information.
CASE NO. 640 Project” a project awarded by the DOTC to ZTE. Petitioner ISSUE: WON the negotiation of the JPEPA is under the
ART. III, SEC. 7: Right to Information – Limitation disclosed that COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered executive privileged and thus must be confidential
Suplico vs. NEDA him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN RULING: YES. By disclosing the documents of the JPEPA
Project. He further narrated that he informed President negotiations, the Philippine government runs the risk of
FACTS: Pres. GMA, acting in her official capacity informed Arroyo of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him betraying the trust reposed in it by the Japanese
Pres. Hu Jintao of China that the Philippine Government had not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on representatives. In determining whether an information
decided not to continue with the ZTE-NBN project. It was President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the is covered by the right to information, a specific
settled that there is no more justiciable controversy for the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer questions "showing of need" for such information is not a relevant
Court to resolve. Petitioners pray that they be furnished involving the president, invoking "executive privilege. consideration, but only whether it is a matter of public
certified true copies of the contract or agreement covering ISSUE: WON there is a recognized presumptive presidential concern. The government has claimed executive privilege,
the NBN project but respondents further oppose petitioners communications privilege in our legal system and it has established that the information is indeed
claim of the right to information, which they contend is not RULING: yes. There are certain types of information which covered by the same. The party demanding it, if it is to
an absolute right. They contend that the matters raised the government may withhold from the public, that there is overcome the privilege, must show that that the
concern executive policy, a political question which the a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with information is vital, not simply for curiosity, but for its
judicial branch of government would generally hesitate to respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social,
pass upon other national security matters"; the courts, or the public, is political, and economic decision-making
recognized only in relation to certain types of information of MP BOLD
ISSUE: WON petitioners be furnished of the certified true a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a
copy of the contract constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not
depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the

243
 CASE NO. 643
ART 3, SEC 7: Limitation of the right to information
Province of North Cotabato v GRP peace panel
FACTS: Government of the Republic of the Philippines
(GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons were
scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur. The
outcome of the meeting was the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement 2001 containing the basic principles and agenda
on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect,
Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. The
Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel
Piñ ol filed a petition Invoking the right to information on
matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and
official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and
to prohibit the signing of the MOA-AD, pending the
disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of
a public consultation thereon. Supplementary, petitioners
pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON there is a violation of the people's right to
information on matters of public concern
RULING: Yes. The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern
because sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State,
which directly affects the lives of the public at large.
The policy of full public disclosure enunciated
complements the right of access to information on
matters of public concern. The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand information.
MP BOLD
CASE NO. 644
ART 3, SEC 7: Limitation of the right to information
Guingona v COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioners filed a special civil action for mandamus determine for herself why and how she failed and to ensure
invoking the right to suffrage and information compelling that the Board properly performed its duties. She argues
respondent COMELEC to fully explain the complete details that the Constitution as well as the Code of Conduct and
of its preparations for the May 100 2010 elections
ISSUE: WON the petitioner in his mandamus can compel
COMELEC to disclose informations
RULING: the constitutional duty to disclose information of
public concern may be compelled by mandamus. In order
that a petition for mandamus may be given due course, it
must be instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged
inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person,
which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of
a legal right However, if the petition is anchored on the
people’s right to information on matters of public
concern, any citizen can be the real party in interest.
The requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the
mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part
of the general public which possesses the right. There is no
need to show any special interest in the result. It is
sufficient that petitioners are citizens and, as such, are
interested in the faithful execution of the laws.
MP: The people’s constitutional right to information is
intertwined with the government’s constitutional duty
of full public disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest. For every right of the people, there is a
corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to
protect and respect that right.
CASE NO. 645
ART 3, SEC 7: Limitation of the right to information
Antolin v Domondon
FACTS: Petitioner took CPA Board Exams, unfortunately,
petitioner did not make it. Convinced that she deserved to
pass, she wrote to respondent Domondon, Acting Chairman
of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that her answer
sheets be re-corrected. Petitioner argues that she has a right
to obtain copies of the examination papers so she can
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees support
her right to demand access to the Examination Papers
ISSUE: WON she has the right to demand access to the
Examination Papers.
RULING: No. Any claim for re-correction or revision of
her 1997 examination cannot be compelled by
mandamus PRC has the power to review, coordinate,
integrate and approve the policies, resolutions, rules and
regulations, orders or decisions however, the PRCs power to
review and approve in Section 5(c) only refers to appeals in
decisions concerning administrative investigations and not
to instances where documents are being requested
MP:The function of reviewing and re-assessing the
petitioner’s answers to the examination questions is a
discretionary function of the Medical Board, not a
ministerial and mandatory one, hence, not within the scope
of the writ of mandamus.
E.C. Perez
CASE NO. 646
ART. III, SEC. 7: ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS; GOV’T
CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS, DIPLOMATIC
NEGOTIATIONS, ETC.;
IN GENERAL
Center for People v. COMELEC
FACTS: This case concerns the duty of the COMELEC Commission
on Elections
to disclose the source code for the AES Automated Election
System
technologies it used in the 2010 national and local
elections. Petitioner CenPEG Center for People Empowerment in Governance
wrote respondent COMELEC, requesting a copy of the
source code of the PCOS Precinct Count Optical Scan programs, the BOC
CCSBoard of Canvassers Consolidation/Canvassing System programs for the
municipal, provincial, national, and congressional canvass,
the COMELEC server programs, and the source code of the
in-house COMELEC programs called the DCSData Capturing System
utilities. CenPEG invoked the pertinent portion of Sec. 12 of
R.A. 9369, which provides: Once an AES technology is
244
selected for implementation, the Commission shall
promptly make the source code of that technology available
and open to any interested political party or groups which
may conduct their own review thereof. The COMELEC
granted the request for the source code of the PCOS and the
CCS, but denied that for the DCS. Still, the COMELEC
apparently did not release even the kinds of source code
that it said it was approving for release for the reason that
the source code CenPEG wanted did not yet exist. CenPEG
filed a petition for mandamus in this case notwithstanding
the fact that the elections for which the subject source code
was to be used had already been held. It claimed that the
source code remained important and relevant not only for
compliance with the law, and the purpose thereof, but
especially in the backdrop of numerous admissions of
errors and claims of fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for mandamus should be
granted.
RULING: Yes. The pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A.
9369 is clear in that once an AES technology is selected
for implementation, the Commission shall promptly
make the source code of that technology available and
open to any interested political party or groups which
may conduct their own review thereof. The COMELEC
has offered no reason not to comply with this requirement
of the law. Indeed, its only excuse for not disclosing the
source code was that it was not yet available when CenPEG
asked for it and, subsequently, that the review had to be
done, apparently for security reason, under a controlled
environment. The elections had passed and that reason is
already stale.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
E.C. Perez
CASE NO. 647
ART. III, SEC. 7: ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS; GOV’T hearing. Unfortunately for petitioners, and notwithstanding
CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS, DIPLOMATIC its presumptive validity, they did not assail the initial toll
NEGOTIATIONS, ETC.; rates within the timeframe provided by law which was
IN GENERAL within the period of 90 days after the date of publication of
Francisco, Jr. v. TRB the initial toll rate.
FACTS: There are 4 consolidated petitions (Francisco Jr. v. MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
TRB included) which are special civil actions under Rule
65Injunctions and Restraining Orders, assailing and seeking to nullify E.C. Perez
certain statutory provisions, presidential actions and CASE NO. 648
implementing orders, toll operation-related contracts and ART. III, SEC. 7: ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS; GOV’T
issuances on the construction, maintenance and operation CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS, DIPLOMATIC
of the major tollway systems in Luzon. The petitions NEGOTIATIONS, ETC.;
likewise seek to restrain and permanently prohibit the IN GENERAL
implementation of the allegedly illegal toll fee rate hikes for Initiatives v. PSALM
the use of the NLEXNorth Luzon Expressway, SLEXSouth Luzon Expressway and
the SMMSSouth Metro Manila Skyway. FACTS: PSALMPower Sector Assets and Liabilities Management is a
government-owned and controlled corporation created by
ISSUE: Whether or not the TRB Toll Regulatory Board is authorized to virtue of the EPIRAElectric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001. The EPIRA
approve the initial toll rates without the necessity of a provided for the privatization of the assets of the NPC National
hearing. Power Corporation
thereby mandating PSALM to commence with
the auction of the AHEPPAngat-Hydro-Electric Power Plant. K-Water was
RULING: Yes. A clear distinction must be made between the the highest bidder. The sale to K-Water was sought to be
statutory prescription on the fixing of initial toll rates, on enjoined by petitioners who contend that PSALM gravely
the one hand, and of periodic/interim or subsequent toll abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the bidding it
rates, on the other. First, the hearing required refers to violated the people’s right to information without having
notice and hearing for the approval or denial of petitions for previously released to the public critical information about
toll rate adjustments or the subsequent toll rates, not to the the sale.
fixing of initial toll rates. By express legal provision, the
TRB is authorized to approve the initial toll rates ISSUES:
without the necessity of a hearing. It is only when a (a) Whether or not the bid documents, etc. used in the on-
challenge on the initial toll rates fixed ensues that going negotiation for the privatization and sale of AHEPP
public hearings are required. As to subsequent toll rate may be accessed via the right to information; and
adjustments, such are mandated by law to undergo both (b) Whether or not the duty to disclose information the
the requirements of public hearing and publication. same with the duty to permit access to information on
matters of public concern.
In the instant consolidated cases, the fixing of the initial toll
rates may have indeed come to pass without any public RULING:
245
(a) Yes. The court reiterated that the constitutional right to
information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The information,
however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions
like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets
and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.
(b) No. Unlike the disclosure of information which is
mandatory under the Constitution, the duty to permit access
to information requires a demand or request for one to gain
access to documents and paper of the particular agency.
Moreover, the duty to disclose covers only transactions
involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has
a broader scope of information which embraces not only
transactions involving public interest, but any matter
contained in official communications and public documents
of the government agency
MAIN POINT: The people’s constitutional right to
information is intertwined with the government’s
constitutional duty of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest.
E.C. Perez
CASE NO. 649
ART. III, SEC. 7: ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS; GOV’T
CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS, DIPLOMATIC
NEGOTIATIONS, ETC.;
IN GENERAL
Belgica v. Executive Secretary
FACTS: Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork
Barrel System unconstitutional—as the Court did so in the
context of its pronouncements made in this Decision—
petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or
the DBM be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public:
(a) the complete schedule/list of legislators who have MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013
and (b) the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary E.C. Perez
funds, including the proceeds from the Malampaya Funds CASE NO. 650
and remittances from the PAGCOR from 2003 to 2013. ART. III, SEC. 7: ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS; GOV’T
CONTRACT NEGOTIATIONS, DIPLOMATIC
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to information under Sec. 7, NEGOTIATIONS, ETC.;
Article III accord petitioners the right to compel custodians IN GENERAL
of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and Villafuerte, Jr. v. Robredo
the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of
public concern. FACTS: CoA conducted an examination and audit on the
manner the local government units utilized their IRA Internal
RULING: No. Although citizens are afforded the right to Revenue Allotment for the calendar years 1993-1994. The
information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to examination yielded an official report, showing that a
official records," the Constitution does not accord them a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some
right to compel custodians of official records to prepare LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but
lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to was diverted to expenses properly chargeable against the
acquire information on matters of public concern. Further, Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark violation of
case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the Section 287 of R.A. No. 7160 Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). In 2010,
right to information is to file a petition for mandamus. Jesse Robredo, in his capacity as DILG Secretary, issued the
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of assailed MCMemorandum Circular No. 2010-83 (Full Disclosure of Local Budget and
mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well- Finances, and Bids andPublic Offerings) which aims to promote good
defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing governance through enhanced transparency and
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of accountability of LGUs. Robredo issued another MC,
defendant to perform the act required. The request of the reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall be utilized
petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty for desirable social, economic and environmental outcomes.
on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested. It also enumerated a list for which the fund must not be
Aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the utilized. Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur filed
nature of mandamus actions, petitioners did not assert any the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the
law or administrative issuance which would form the bases assailed issuances of the respondent.
of the latter‘s duty to furnish them with the documents
requested. While petitioners prayed that said information ISSUE: Whether or not the issuances went beyond the letter
be equally released to the CoA, it must be pointed out that and spirit of Section 352 of the LGC and R.A. No. 9184
the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these cases Government Procurement Reform Act, by requiring that budgets,
nor has it filed any petition before the Court to be allowed expenditures, contracts and loans, and procurement plans
access to or to compel the release of any official document of LGUs be publicly posted.
relevant to the conduct of its audit investigations.
246
RULING: No. The Constitution strongly summoned the
State to adopt and implement a policy of full disclosure
of all transactions involving public interest and provide
the people with the right to access public information.
Section 352 of the LGC is a response to this call for
transparency. It is a mechanism of transparency and
accountability of local government officials and is in fact
incorporated under Chapter IV of the LGC which deals with
“Expenditures, Disbursements, Accounting and
Accountability.” In the same manner, R.A. No. 9184
established a system of transparency in the procurement
process and in the implementation of procurement
contracts in government agencies. It is the public
monitoring of the procurement process and the
implementation of awarded contracts with the end in view
of guaranteeing that these contracts are awarded pursuant
to the provisions of the law and its implementing rules and
regulations, and that all these contracts are performed
strictly according to specifications.
MAIN POINT IN BOLD.
AR
CASE NO. 651
ART III SEC 7: RIGHT TO INFORMATION
IN GENERAL: ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS
Sereno vs. Committee on Trade and Related Matters of
NEDA
FACTS: Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the
Philippines (APMP), through its Executive Director Mario
Jose E. Sereno, filed a case before the Pasig City RTC to
compel the Committee on Tariff and Related Matters
(CTRM) to release documents, research data and other
papers which were used as basis in issuing Executive Order
No. 486 in 2006 that lifted the suspension of the tariff
reduction on petrochemical resins and other plastic
products under the ASEAN Free Trade Area-Common between the right of the people and the interest of the
Effective Preferential Tariff (AFTA-CEPT) Scheme. Government to be protected. Here, the need to ensure the
protection of the privilege of non-disclosure is necessary to
ISSUE: WON meetings of the CTRM and the minutes thereof allow the free exchange of ideas among Government
exempt from the Constitutional right of access to officials as well as to guarantee the well-considered
information. recommendation free from interference of the inquisitive
public.
HELD: Yes. The constitutional guarantee of the right to
information on matters of public concern complements the AR
State's policy of full public disclosure in all transactions CASE NO. 652
involving public interest. These provisions are aimed at ART III SEC 8: RIGHT TO FORM UNIONS
ensuring transparency in policy-making as well as in the SCOPE
operations of the Government, and at safeguarding the Volkschel Labor Union vs. Bureau of Labor Relations
exercise by the people of the freedom of expression. But the
people's right to information is not absolute. The
constitutional guarantee to information "does not open FACTS: Petitioner was once affiliated with the Associated
every door to any and all information." It is limited to Labor Union for Metal Workers (ALUMETAL). Both unions,
matters of public concern. jointly entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
respondent companies. One of the subjects dealt with is the
Two requisites must concur before the right to information payment of union dues. Later on, a majority of petitioner's
may be compelled by writ of mandamus. Firstly, the members decided to disaffiliate from respondent federation,
information sought must be in relation to matters of public ALUMETAL, in order to operate on its own as an
concern or public interest. And, secondly, it must not be independent labor group. ALUMETAL wrote respondent
exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional companies advising them to continue deducting union dues
guarantee. In the 2nd requisite, the court said the and remitting them to said federation.
constitutional guarantee of the people’s right to
information does not cover national security matters ISSUE: WON petitioner union’s disaffiliation from
and intelligence information, trade secrets and banking respondent federation valid.
transactions and closed-door Cabinet meeting, among
others. The court said CTRM has managed to establish that RULING: Yes. The right of a local union to disaffiliate from
the information sought to be obtained by APMP was its mother union is well-settled. It has been held that a
classified because it was a closed-door Cabinet meeting. local union, being a separate and voluntary association,
However, the court noted that the petrochemical industry is free to serve the interest of all its members including
centers on the manufacture of plastic and other related the freedom to disaffiliate when circumstances
materials, thus, an essential contributor to the overall warrant. This right is consistent with the Constitutional
growth of our country’s economy. This easily makes the guarantee of freedom of association. The disaffiliation was
information sought a matter of public concern or interest. In prompted by the federation's deliberate and habitual
case of conflict, there is a need to strike a balance dereliction of duties as mother federation towards
247
petitioner union. In the case at bar, it would go against the of disenabling barangay officials from adequately
spirit of the labor law to restrict petitioner's right to self- performing their function as agents of a neutral community. AR
organization due to the existence of the CBA. Nowhere in CASE NO. 655
the record does it appear that the contract entered into by AR ART III SEC 8: RIGHT TO FORM UNIONS
the petitioner and ALUMETAL prohibits the withdrawal of CASE NO. 654 RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION
the former from the latter. ART III SEC 8: RIGHT TO FORM UNIONS Bel-Air Village Association vs. Dionisio
RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION
AR UPCSU vs. Laguesma
CASE NO. 653 FACTS: The Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject
ART III SEC 8: RIGHT TO FORM UNIONS parcel of land issued in the name of Virgilio Dionisio,
RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION FACTS: The petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner
Occena vs. COMELEC The union filed a petition for certification on behalf of the becomes an automatic member of Bel-Air Village
route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. Association, and must abide by such rules and regulations
However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on laid down by the Association in the interest of the
FACTS: Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of some appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the
sections of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222) ground that the route managers are managerial employees community. The petitioner questioned the collection of the
which prohibits any political party, political group, political and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under the dues on many grounds, one of them is that the acts of
committee from intervening in the barangay election, i.e., first sentence of Art 245 of the Labor Code, which provides plaintiff in compelling the defendant to be a member is
from representing or allowing himself to be represented as that managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist, or unconstitutional and outside the scope of its corporate
a candidate of any political party; and prohibit any party form any labor organization. Petitioner contends that the power.
from giving aid or support, directly or indirectly, favorable first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, contravenes the
to or against a barangay candidate’s campaign for election. right to form association. ISSUE: WON such annotation violate the right freely to join
or not to join associations.
ISSUE: WON the ban on the intervention of political parties ISSUE: WON Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial
in the barangay election violates the right to form employees from forming, joining or assisting labor unions, HELD: No. The fact that the obligation is annotated in the
associations. violates Article III, Section 8 of the Constitution. title does not make it a government act forcing one to join
an association. Rather, the buyer freely buys the lot
HELD: No. The right to form associations for purposes RULING: No. The guaranteed right in Art. III, Section 8 is knowing that the purchase will entail an obligation. The SC
not contrary to law is neither absolute nor illimitable; it subject to the condition that its exercise should be for held that the purchasers of a registered land are bound by
is always subject to the pervasive and dominant police the purposes “not contrary to law.” In the case of Art 245, the annotations found at the back of the certificate of title
power of the State and may constitutionally be there is rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees covering the subject parcel of land. The constitutional
regulated or curtailed to serve appropriate and from forming or joining labor organization. For the reason proscription than no person can be compelled to be a
important public interests. The ban is narrow, not total. It that these managerial employees would belong to or be member of an association against his will applies only
operates only on concerted or group action of political affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of to governmental acts and not to private transactions
parties. Members of political and kindred organizations, their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of like the one in question. The petitioner cannot legally
acting individually, may intervene in the barangay election. interest. The union also becomes company-dominated with maintain that he is compelled to be a member of the
The law is intended to meet a clear and imminent danger of the presence of managerial employees in Union association against his will because the limitation is
the debilitation of the electoral process and also the danger membership. imposed upon his ownership of property. If he does not

248
desire to comply with the annotation or lien in question, he Held: No. PADCOM was never forced to join the devoid of factual basis. The registration prescribed in
can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing association. It could have avoided such membership by not paragraph (b) of said Section is not a limitation to the right
of the property and free himself from the burden of buying the land from TDC. Nobody forced it to buy the land of assembly or association, which may be exercised with or
becoming a member of the association. when it bought the building with the annotation of the without said registration. The latter is merely a condition
condition or lien on the Certificate of Title thereof and sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by labor
CASE NO. 656 accepted the Deed. PADCOM voluntarily agreed to be bound organizations, associations or unions and the possession of
ARTICLE III, SEC 8: Right to Association by and respect the condition, and thus to join the the "rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
PADCOM vs. Ortigas Center Asso Inc. Association. organizations." The Constitution does not guarantee
these rights and privileges, much less said personality,
Facts: Petitioner Padcom Condominium Corporation CASE NO. 657 which are mere statutory creations, for the possession
(PADCOM) owns and manages the Padilla Office ARTICLE III, SEC 8: Right to Association and exercise of which registration is required to protect
Condominium Building (PADCOM BUILDING). The land on QC PTCA Federation Inc. vs. Deped both labor and the public against abuses, fraud, or
which the building stands was originally acquired from the Facts: On June 1, 2009, the Department of Education, impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership, by Tierra through Former Secretary Jesli A. Lapus, issued Department accredited agents of the union they purport to
Development Corporation (TDC) under a Deed of Sale with a Order No. 54, Series of 20093 entitled Revised Guidelines represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the
condition that the transferee and its successor-in-interest Governing Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs) at the police power, because the activities in which labor
must become members of an association for realty owners School Level. The Department Order sought to address the organizations, associations and union of workers are
and long-term lessees in the area later known as the Ortigas limitations of the guidelines set forth in D.O. No. 23, s. 2003 engaged affect public interest, which should be
Center. Subsequently, the said lot, together with the and was issued in response to increasing reports of protected.
improvements thereon, was conveyed by TDC in favor of malpractices by officers or members of PTAs, such as, but MP in Bold
PADCOM in a Deed of Transfer. not limited to (1) officers absconding with contributions
Thereafter, respondent Ortigas Center Association, Inc. and membership fees; (2) non-disclosure of the status of CASE NO. 658
(ASSOCIATION) was organized to advance the interests and funds and non-submission of financial statements; and (3) ARTICLE III, SEC 8: Gov’t Employees (Right to Strike)
promote the general welfare of the real estate owners and misuse of funds.4 (Citations omitted) TUCP v. NHC
long-term lessees of the lots in the Ortigas Center and Petitioner QC PTCA Federation filed the present Petition in
sought the collection of membership dues from PADCOM. In the belief that the above-quoted provisions undermine the Facts: On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the
view of PADCOM'S failure and refusal to pay its arrears in independence of PTAs and PTCAs, effectively amend the conduct of a certification election with Regional Office No.
monthly dues, the Association filed a complaint for constitutions and by-laws of existing PTAs and PTCAs, and IV of the Department of Labor in order to determine the
collection of sum of money before the trial court. petitioner violate its constitutional rights to organize and to due exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC.
claimed that the provisions of the Associations By-laws and process, as well as other existing laws. It was claimed that its members comprised the majority of
the Deed of Transfer did not contemplate automatic Citing Article III, Section 8, of the 1987 Constitution, the employees of the corporation. The petition was
membership. RTC dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that PTCAs are "independent voluntary dismissed by med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order,
CAreversed and set aside the trial court's dismissal. Hence, organizations "enjoying constitutional protection. dated November 7, 1977, holding that NHC "being a
this petition where petitioner argued that it could not be Issue: PTCAs are "independent voluntary organizations government-owned and/or controlled corporation its
compelled to become a member without violating its right enjoying constitutional protection? employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist
to freedom of association. Held: No. The theory to the effect that Section 23 of any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining
Issue: W/N the contention of petitioner was correct? Republic Act No. 875 unduly curtails the freedom of pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and
assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is Regulations Implementing the Labor Code."

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From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the Bureau
of Labor Relations where, acting thereon, Director Carmelo
C. Noriel reversed the order of dismissal and ordered the
holding of a certification election.This order was, however,
set aside by Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his
resolution of November 21, 1978 upon a motion for
reconsideration of respondent NHC.
In the instant petition for certiorari, TUPAS seeks the
reversal of the said resolution and prays that a certification
election be held among the rank and file employees of NHC.
Issue: W/N employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right
to strike?
Held: Yes. The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly
have the right to form unions or employees' organizations.
The right to unionize or to form organizations is now
explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the
governmental and the private sectors. The Bill of Rights
provides that “(t)he right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law
shall not be abridged.” This guarantee is reiterated in the
second paragraph of Section 3, Article XIII, on Social Justice
and Human Rights, which mandates that the State “shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law.
CASE NO. 659
ARTICLE III, SEC 8: Gov’t Employees (Right to Strike)
SSS Employees vs. CA
Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to
act upon the union’s demands concerning the
implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court
action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike.
The court issued a temporary restraining order pending the
resolution of the application for preliminary injunction
while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the
court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Issue: W/n employees in public service prohibited in
Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in conducting strikes.
taking cognizance on the subject matter since the
jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor RelationsHeld: Yes, The SC held that the mass actions held by the
Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS teachers shall be considered strikes because their main
contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by purpose was the stoppage of or absence from work.
the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no Employees in public service do not have the right to strike
right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE because this constitutes a disturbance in public service. In
therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.addition, employment in the government is governed by law
and the terms and conditions of employment are affected
Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to through statutes and administrative rules and regulations,
strike not by collective bargaining agreements. In this case
the teachers absented from their work in order
Held: No. in the absence of any legislation allowing to participate in the mass action that was happening on a
government employees to strike, recognizing their right to Monday
do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are
prohibited from striking by express provision of
Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180.
CASE NO. 660
ARTICLE III, SEC 8: Gov’t Employees (Right to Strike)
MPSTA vs. Secretary of Ed
Facts: There were mass actions by 800 Public School
Teachers which was caused by the alleged failure of
authorities to act upon the teacher’s grievances such as the
immediate payment of due chalk, clothing allowances, 13th
month pay arising from the salary standardization law, and
a few others more. Even on September 17, 1990, the mass
actions continued which was a Monday and a school
day. Some of the teachers who participated in the mass
actions did not hold classes that day. The secretary of
education filed cases against those teachers who
participated in the mass actions on the grounds of
grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of
Civil Service Law, absence without official leave and the
likes and placed them on a 90-day preventive suspension
period.
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