Name: Vincent B.

Bialen Subject: Philosophy of

Language
Program: 1st Year- PhD in Applied Linguistics Teacher: Lawrence Dollente,
PhD

Unveiling Linguistic Complexities: Descriptions Lead to Directions

Bertrand Russell's Theory of Descriptions, first introduced in his seminal

work "On Denoting" (1905), has been a cornerstone of analytic philosophy. Although
Russell's theory has great importance in the field of philosophy of language, it has
encountered several persuasive arguments and critiques that question its ability to
accurately represent the intricate nature of linguistic statements.

Objection 1. According to Russel, the sentence “The present King of

France is bald” is false due to the lack of any such king. According to him, the
sentence is not a simple proposition but a complex one, which can be analyzed into
three constituent parts: there is a King of France, there is only one King of France,
and this King of France is bald. Strawson points out that verdict is implausible or
unbelievable. He didn't agree with this method and stressed how important it was to
assume that specific statements refer to something. He said that when someone
says something like "the present king of France is bald," they are assuming that
there is a present king of France.
I believe that there are challenges that arise when the assumption is applied
to situations that include entities that do not technically exist. Under Russell's theory,
for example, the assertion that "the unicorn is white" seems to be problematic since
there is no real unicorn to whom whiteness can be attributed. This criticism draws
attention to a shortcoming in Russell's theory, which is that it does not fully account
for descriptions that refer to things that do not exist, which brings into question the
theory's capacity to be applied in a general sense.

Objection 2. Strawson further criticizes the claim, which he attributes

to Russell that part of what a speaker would be asserting (in uttering) would be
at present that there is a present existed one and only king of France”.
According to Russell's theory, the sentence implies the existence of a present king of
France who possesses the attribute of baldness.
I firmly believe that the objection of Strawson centered on the pragmatic use
of language and the presuppositions inherent in definite descriptions. Because he
argued that when someone makes a statement like "the present king of France is
bald," it's not solely about asserting the existence of a particular entity; rather, it
involves presuppositions about the entity's existence as a prerequisite for the
assertion. Specifically, the purpose of Strawson's criticism was to bring attention to
the fact that the role of precise descriptions in natural language extends beyond just
asserting existence. The meaning and purpose that lies behind the statements that
are made are shaped by the implicit assumptions and presuppositions that are
included within these descriptions.

Objection 3. Strawson points out that many descriptions are context-

bound. He offers the example of the “The table is covered with books.”
According to Russell's idea, definite descriptions, like "the table," may be reduced to
quantified logical forms without referring to concrete items. In his analysis, "the table
is covered with books" uses the definite description as a quantifier for fulfilling
criteria.
Based on my stand, it is highlighted that this statement does not just affirm
the presence of a table that meets certain requirements; instead, it assumes a
particular table within the common framework of the statement. The interpretation of
"the table" is dependent upon context, such the physical environment, background
information, or the speaker's purpose, which Russell's theory fails to include. It
acknowledges the role of context in shaping meaning enriches our understanding of
language, reflecting its dynamic and nuanced nature beyond mere quantification.

Objection 4. Keith Donellan noticed cases in which we do seem to use

definite descriptions as if they are just tags or names, solely to refer to
individuals. Consider the example “Smith’s murderer is insane.” In the case of
the sentence "Smith's murderer is insane," Russell would argue that the phrase
"Smith's murderer" refers to the person who committed the act of murdering Smith,
and this person is being described as insane.
 Therefore, imagine a situation in which there are two possible perpetrators,
Jones and Brown, and the speaker erroneously assumes that Jones is the guilty
one. If Brown is really the true criminal, the speaker's claim that "Smith's murderer is
insane" may not be inherently untrue. Donnellan's criticism highlights that the phrase
remains potentially accurate as it pertains to the real mentally unstable killer, Brown,
regardless of the speaker's original misidentification.
In conclusion, these objections serve as a crucial lens through which to
reconsider the multifaceted nature of reference, acknowledging the intricate interplay
between language, context, and intended meaning. These complaints and attacks
have led to a few improvements and new theories in the philosophy of language.
Philosophers and logicians are still talking about and researching these problems to
come up with better ideas of language reference and meaning.