2/20/24, 1:22 PM Russia-Ukraine War: U.S.

Intelligence Disclosures Helped Kyiv, World Respond to Invasion

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ARGUMENT

The Age of Intelligence Diplomacy

The Iraq War highlighted its risks. Russia’s war in Ukraine showcased its opportunities.

FEBRUARY 19, 2024, 6:30 AM

By Brett M. Holmgren, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research.

MARK HARRIS ILLUSTRATION FOR FOREIGN POLICY

I will never forget Feb. 22, 2022. That evening, I joined U.S.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a secure room in the State
Department for a meeting of cabinet-level and other senior

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members of the National Security Council (NSC). The

customary intelligence briefing at the top of the meeting
contained a stark warning: Russia was poised to commence its
anticipated full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In the preceding months, the United States had been

strategically downgrading and declassifying intelligence to
warn Ukraine—and the world—about Russia’s plans. That night
at the State Department, NSC leadership concluded that we
needed to share our new urgent threat information with
Ukraine immediately.

Russia’s War in Ukraine

Understanding the conflict two years on.

MORE ON THIS TOPIC

It just so happened that Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro

Kuleba was in the building following earlier meetings with
Blinken. Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Avril Haines asked me
and Haines’s deputy for analysis, Morgan Muir, to leave the NSC
meeting and work with intelligence agencies to clear language
that could be shared with Ukraine. After receiving clearances,
we located Kuleba on the seventh floor of the State Department
and relayed the news. With a look of despair on his face, Kuleba
called Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to prepare their
nation for war.

In the end, exposing Russia’s plans in advance did not avert war.
But U.S. intelligence disclosures enabled Ukraine to defend
itself, mobilized allies and partners to support Kyiv,
undermined Russian disinformation in the eyes of the public,
and restored the credibility of U.S. intelligence—and of the
United States—in the eyes of the world. If the Iraq War
highlighted the risks of intelligence diplomacy, Russia’s war in
Ukraine showcased its opportunities.

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U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken (right) and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba arrive for a news conference at the State
Department in Washington on Feb. 22, 2022. CAROLYN KASTER/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

The United States has always shared threat intelligence with foreign
partners, and intelligence has long been a valuable card in the hand of
U.S. diplomats. But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine symbolized the
remarkable evolution—in scale, scope, and speed—of intelligence
support to U.S. diplomacy. It also marked a turning point in the global
credibility of the U.S. intelligence community, the 18 agencies that
conduct intelligence activities to support U.S. national security
interests.

Strategic, authorized intelligence disclosures played a central

role in enabling the U.S. and allied response to Russia’s invasion
of Ukraine. Intelligence disclosures allowed CIA Director
William Burns to warn Russian President Vladimir Putin in
November 2021 that the United States was aware of Moscow’s
intentions in Ukraine and would respond decisively. They also
provided warnings to the Ukrainian people—and the world—
about Russia’s plans. An example of such a disclosure was U.S.
intelligence that Moscow might fabricate so-called “false flag”
atrocities to justify an invasion of Ukraine.

In light of the intelligence community’s accuracy and success in

exposing Russia’s plots, many in government, the media, and
general public have suggested intelligence disclosures could be

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used as a tool of diplomacy in other global conflicts and

challenges.

There is no commonly accepted definition of “intelligence

diplomacy.” Some view the concept narrowly, as traditional
intelligence sharing with foreign partners. Others regard it as a
means to supercharge public diplomacy campaigns—or to draw
attention to statements from government officials, such as press
releases. At the State Department, we define intelligence
diplomacy as “the use of intelligence to support diplomatic
activities and public diplomacy to advance U.S. foreign policy
objectives, inform partners, build alliances, facilitate
cooperation, drive convergence in approaches and views, and
verify treaties.”

Used strategically and responsibly, downgraded or declassified

intelligence can be a powerful enabler of U.S. foreign policy. In
October 1962, for example, the United States presented
declassified intelligence to the United Nations Security Council
that exposed the presence of Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba.
In April 2017, to garner support for strikes against Syria, the
White House declassified intelligence detailing the Syrian
regime’s use of chemical weapons on its own people.

READ MORE

Does Ukraine Offer Lessons for Taiwan?

Two years in, IR experts are divided on whether the U.S. response to
Russia’s war will deter a Chinese invasion.

ANALYSIS | IRENE ENTRINGER GARCÍA BLANES, IAN HARMAN, SUSAN

PETERSON, MICHAEL J. TIERNEY

The Neurotic Fixations of U.S. Foreign Policy

A close look at several ruts that American policymakers are currently
stuck in.

ARGUMENT | STEPHEN M. WALT

A Self-Absorbed America Means Disorder

for the World
The dam holding back chaos in U.S. foreign policy is cracking.

ARGUMENT | EDWARD ALDEN

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But without appropriate safeguards and oversight, intelligence

diplomacy can also be used in ways that increase risks to
national security, undermine trust with foreign partners, and
erode U.S. interests. Most notoriously, in 2003—before
launching an invasion of Iraq—the Bush administration
declassified intelligence to make the case that Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. That
information turned out to be inaccurate—and sullied the
intelligence community’s reputation around the world for a
generation.

The challenge for the intelligence community and policymakers

is to maximize the benefits of intelligence diplomacy while
guarding against this kind of misuse or abuse. As we
contemplate the future of intelligence diplomacy, we must
never forget the lessons of Iraq. At the same time, it is worth
outlining why intelligence diplomacy was so successful in the
U.S. response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The first reason is President Joe Biden’s decisive leadership. In

late 2021, as Russia was mobilizing its forces and laying the
groundwork for what the intelligence community clearly
assessed was a forthcoming assault on Ukraine, Biden directed
that intelligence on Moscow’s plans and intentions be
downgraded. He sought to level the information playing field—
so that Ukraine and other U.S. allies and partners, as well as the
general public, could see exactly what the United States was
seeing.

Second, the United States’ policy intent was principled and

clear: to prevent war. As Sullivan noted from the White House
podium in early 2022, “in the situation in Iraq, intelligence was
used and deployed from this very podium to start a war. We are
trying to stop a war, to prevent a war, to avert a war.” Blinken
delivered a similar message at the U.N. Security Council just
days before Russia’s invasion.

Third, U.S. intelligence on Russia and Ukraine was—and

continues to be—specific, consistent, and accurate. Intelligence
community analysts had a high degree of confidence in the
credibility and reliability of information they collected on

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Russian activities and intentions—the result of years of

investments in collection and analytic capabilities.

Fourth, new open-source data on Russian activities, such as

commercial imagery and social media, allowed the intelligence
community to downgrade or declassify credible information to
share with foreign partners or the public without jeopardizing
more sensitive collection sources and methods.

U.S. President Joe Biden and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky participate in a bilateral meeting in the East Room of the White
House in Washington on Sept. 21, 2023. DREW ANGERER/GETTY IMAGES

Under Blinken’s leadership, the State Department has taken a focused

and deliberate approach to infuse more diplomacy with intelligence. In
doing so, the department has worked closely with the intelligence
community. Many senior State Department officials—from
ambassadors and other foreign service officers to undersecretaries, the
deputy secretary, and Blinken himself—now regularly seek out
opportunities to use downgraded or declassified intelligence in
international engagements, public remarks, or diplomatic demarches.

Blinken alluded to a “profound synergy between our

intelligence and our diplomacy” during a talk given to the Office

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of the Director of National Intelligence in July 2022. “I think we

really need to continue to make [intelligence diplomacy] part of
our thinking,” he added, “not just when it comes to Russia’s
aggression against Ukraine but across the board.”

In September 2023, Blinken outlined the United States’

approach to diplomacy as it transitions from the end of the
post-Cold War order to a new era of strategic competition
defined by the struggle between democracy and autocracy. At
the core of this strategy, he said, is “reengaging, revitalizing,
and reimagining our greatest strategic asset: America’s alliances
and partnerships.”

Intelligence will play a key role in supporting and developing

these relationships. Sharing information can build trust,
establish common views that are informed by credible and
reliable information, and open new areas for cooperation
among partners. Strengthened alliances are also a crucial asset
for the U.S. intelligence community. The Biden administration’s
National Security Strategy and the DNI’s recent National
Intelligence Strategy both make clear that intelligence
diplomacy will play a central part in U.S. strategic competition
against authoritarian and revisionist powers.

The sheer volume of downgrade and declassification requests

by State Department officials and diplomats underscores this
new reality. For instance, in 2021, there were more than 900
requests to downgrade or declassify intelligence. In 2023, there
were more than 1,100 such requests—more than 20 requests per
week.

The State Department has employed intelligence diplomacy

beyond the war in Ukraine. In 2023 alone, downgraded or
declassified intelligence was used publicly—and privately in
diplomatic channels—to warn China about the consequences of
providing lethal weapons to Russia to aid its war in Ukraine.
More recently, the State Department used downgraded
intelligence as part of a larger effort to encourage a country that
was considering importing Chinese military hardware in
violation of bilateral agreements with the United States to
change course. And the State Department has relied heavily on

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downgraded intelligence to engage with countries to prevent

the proliferation of surveillance technologies to governments
tied to human rights abuses.

There is no one-size-fits-all approach to intelligence diplomacy.

Different government agencies, in the United States and
elsewhere, will develop and deploy models consistent with their
own authorities, objectives, and—at least in the U.S. context—
federal guidance from the DNI. For our part, the State
Department has taken several steps to institutionalize best
practices about whether, when, and how to use intelligence
diplomacy with rigor, discipline, and care.

First, we established guiding principles to help inform requests

by State Department personnel to disclose or publicly release
intelligence. These seven core principles complement existing
intelligence community disclosure policy set by the DNI.

Intelligence diplomacy should support a defined policy

objective; be consistent with and reinforce other elements of
national power; prioritize strengthening alliances and
partnerships; rely on credible, reliable, and ideally
multisourced intelligence to maintain U.S. credibility; and
strive to share new, unique information that is not otherwise
available through open sources. Furthermore, intelligence used
in support of diplomacy should be clear, understandable, and
easy to communicate to its intended audience. Intelligence
diplomacy proposals should also carefully weigh the expected
benefits against potential risks to sources and methods.

In January, we codified these principles and guidelines for

using intelligence diplomacy in internal State Department
policy to enhance awareness among our workforce and provide
guidance for future generations of foreign and civil service
officers.

Second, we leveraged technology to expand access to

intelligence diplomacy for U.S. diplomats at home and abroad
by making resources and intelligence-sharing tools available
online across classified and unclassified networks in the State
Department.

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Finally, we have begun developing training to educate new

foreign service officers and ambassadors about intelligence
diplomacy and how to integrate the capability into their
diplomatic activities at U.S. missions worldwide.

The bottom line is this: Intelligence diplomacy is increasingly

vital to supporting—and enabling—the mission of the State
Department, the lead agency responsible for U.S. foreign policy.
But it must be leveraged in a manner consistent with national
security and U.S. values. Without guardrails, there is a risk that
intelligence diplomacy could be misused or abused.

As I return to that solemn night in February 2022, I’m reminded

of how much the world has changed—and how much the
relationship between intelligence and diplomacy has evolved in
just a couple of years. We can no longer afford to regard
intelligence solely as an analytic resource. Instead, intelligence
must be viewed as a critical enabler of U.S. diplomacy on the
frontlines of our competition with strategic adversaries. With
the right safeguards, intelligence diplomacy will play a critical
role in securing America’s future.

This essay was adapted from remarks Holmgren delivered on Oct.

8, 2023, for the Cipher Brief Threat Conference. The topic was
“Intelligence and Diplomacy: A New Model for a New Era.”
Brett M. Holmgren is the assistant secretary for the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR). INR is one of the 18 components of the intelligence community and is the oldest civilian intelligence agency
in the United States.

READ MORE ON FOREIGN & PUBLIC DIPLOMACY | STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE | U.S. FOREIGN POLICY | U.S. STATE
DEPARTMENT | UNITED STATES | WAR

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