NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
1. Magallona vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 187167 | July 16, 2011
TOPIC: ARTICLE I - National Territory
RA 9522 is a statutory tool to demarcate the
country’s maritime zones and continental shelf
Under UNCLOS III, not to delineate Philippine
territory.
It shortened 1 baseline, optimized the location of
some basepoints around the archipelago, and
classified adjacent territories (like the Kalayaan
Island Group and Scarborough Shoal) as regimes
of islands whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones, is constitutional, and
in fact, increased the Philippines’ total marine
space by 145,216 sq. nautical miles.
UNCLOS III is just an agreement with respect to
environment and maritime resources;it is not a
mode of acquiring ownership where our ocean
boundaries will be measured. It has nothing to
with the loss or acquisition or loss of territory.
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and
Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine
archipelago, the Philippines would have
committed a breach of 2 provisions of UNCLOS
III. One provision states that “the drawing of such
baseline shall not depart to any appreciable
extend from the general configuration of the
archipelago.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant
baselines law for the Philippine archipelago
and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522,
allows an internationally-recognized
delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’
maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522
is therefore a most vital step on the part of the
Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones,
consistent with the Constitution and our
national interest. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS
the petition. SO ORDERED.
UNCLOS- provides for general obligation of
States to protect and preserve the marine
environment and recognizes the sovereign right
of States to exploit their natural resources
ARCHIPELAGO DOCTRINE
a. Connect the outermost points of our
archipelago with straight baselines and
consider all the waters enclosed thereby
as internal waters.
b. Entire archipelago is regarded as one
integrated unit instead of being
fragmented into so many thousand
islands.
BASIS OF ARCHIPELAGO DOCTRINE:
1. Part IV, Art 47(1), UNCLOS- “An
archipelagic State may draw straight
archipelagic baselines joining the
outermost points of the outermost islands
and drying reefs of the archipelago
provided that within such baselines are
included the main islands and an area in
which the ratio of the area of the water to
the area of the land, including atolls, is
between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.”
2. ART 1, 1987 CONSTITUTION
The waters around, between and
connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the PH.
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OCEAN BOUNDARIES UNDER UNCLOS

EFFECT WITHOUT THE DOCTRINE

ZONE COVERAGE RIGHTS

INTERNAL Waters on PH- full a. Will result in the dismemberment of our

WATERS landward sovereignty archipelago- a. Sibuyan Sea- separated
side of from Visayas b. Palawan- isolated from
baseline FOREIGN- the rest of archipelago
no right of b. Part of PH waters would become
innocent international waters or high seas.- Bohol
passage to Camiguin (distance from shore-shore =
TERRITORIAL 12mi. PH- full 29miles): 5 miles will be international
SEA (maritime (22kms) sovereignty waters.
belt) from
baseline FOREIGN-
right of
innocent
passage

CONTIGUOUS 12 mi. PH- limited

ZONE (not part (22kms) jurisdiction-
of territory) from enforce
territorial customs,
sea taxation,
pollution laws

EXCLUSIVE 200 mi. PH- sole

ECONOMIC (370 kms) exploitation
ZONE from rights over all
baseline natural
resources

FOREIGN-
navigation,
overflight, lay
submarine
pipes and
cables

CONTINENTA Not to PH- exclusive

L SHELF exceed 350 right to
mi. harvest
(650kms) mineral and
from non-living
baseline material in
subsoil

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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
2. Henares vs. LTFRB
G.R. No. 158290 | Oct. 23, 2006
TOPIC: ARTICLE II (Principles and State
Policies Sec. 15 - Right to Health)
Art II, Sec. 15- The State shall protect and
promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
LTFRB and DOTC cannot be compelled to
require PUVs to use CNG through mandamus,
since the Constitution and the Clean Air Act are
both general mandates that do not specifically
prescribe the use of any kind of fuel, particularly
the use of CNG by public vehicles.
There is no law banning the use of gasoline and
diesel; the government cannot prohibit that
because the use of which is not prohibited;
regardless of the good effects of cng, they cannot
be mandatory.
MANDAMUS- is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial
duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie
to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations
or to compel a course of conduct, nor to control
or review the exercise of discretion.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
It appears to us that more properly, the
legislature should provide first the specific
statutory remedy to the complex environmental
problems bared by herein petitioners before
any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of
a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. SO ORDERED.
3. Oposa vs. Factoran
G.R. No. 101083 | July 30, 1993
TOPIC : Art. II, Sec. 16 - Right to Healthful
Ecology
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature.
Petitioners’ personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility (i.e.,
every generation has a responsibility to the next
to preserve that rhythm and harmony for full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology)
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned.
Locus Standi refers to the legal interest which a
plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the
suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept
of “class” here involved—membership in this
“class” appears to embrace everyone living in the
country whether now or in the future —it appears
to me that everyone who may be expected to
benefit from the course of action petitioners seek
to require public respondents to take, is vested
with the necessary locus standi.
TLAs should be cancelled. Sec. 17 carries with it
the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies the judicious
management of the country’s forests.
Intergenerational responsibility to a balanced and
healthful ecology.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the
instant Petition is hereby GRANTED.
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
4. Carino vs. Insular Govt.
212 US 449 | Feb. 23, 1909
TOPIC : Art. II, Sec. 22 - Right of Indigenous
People
Sec. 22. The State recognizes and promotes the
rights of indigenous cultural communities within
the framework of national unity and
development. Implementation of IPRA: Concept
of ancestral lands or domains; Indigenous
concept of ownership; Rights to ancestral
dominion.
When, as far back as testimony or memory goes,
the land has been held by individuals under a
claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to
have been held in the same way from before the
Spanish conquest, and never to have been public
land (native title).
Every presumption should be indulged against
the US claiming title to land in the Province of
Benguet in the Philippines, which, for more than
50 years prior to the treaty of peace with Spain of
April 11, 1899 has been held by the present
native Igorot holder and his ancestors under claim
of private ownership.
A native title to land which for more than 50
years prior to the treaty of peace with Spain, a
native Igorot and his ancestors have been held in
accordance with Igorot custom as private
property and should be recognized by the insular
government although no title has been issued
from the Spanish crown.
5. Cruz vs. Sec of DENR
G.R. No 135385 | Dec. 6, 2000
TOPIC : Art. II, Sec. 22 - Right of Indigenous
People
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Since the required majority vote cannot be
obtained (7-7 [Buena, De Leon,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Melo, Panganiban, Pardo,
and Vitug ― Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Puno, Quisumbing, and Santiago]),
even after the redeliberation, the
constitutionality of IPRA is upheld.
Decide on merits, not technicalities.
Thye assailed the constitutionality of the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, for granting
ownership of natural resources to indigenous
peoples. The Court ruled that ancestral lands and
domains are not lands of public dominion. They
are private lands belonging to the indigenous
peoples by native title, which in their concept of
private land title, existed irrespective of a royal
grant from the State.
The State recognizes and promotes the rights of
indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development.
(Section 22, Article II, 1987 Constitution)
Chief Justice Puno’s Separate Opinion – Used
Carino as a precedent as well; IPRA recognizes
the ICCs/IPs as a distinct sector, granting them
ownership and possession of their ancestral
domains; customary law traces back to native
title. The IPRA recognizes the existence of the
indigenous cultural communities or indigenous
peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in
Philippine society. It grants these people the
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
ownership and possession of their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands, and defines the
extent of these lands and domains. The ownership
given is the indigenous concept of ownership
under customary law which traces its origin to
native title.
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous
Peoples refer to a group of people or
homogeneous societies who have continuously
lived as an organized community on communally
bounded and defined territory. These groups of
people have actually occupied, possessed and
utilized their territories under claim of ownership
since time immemorial.
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in
two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral
lands and domains; or (2) by torrens title under
the Public Land Act and the Land Registration
Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs' pre conquest rights
to lands and domains held under a claim of
private ownership as far back as memory reaches.
These lands are deemed never to have been
public lands and are indisputably presumed to
have been held that way since before the Spanish
Conquest.
ARTICLE XII: NATIONAL ECONOMY
AND PATRIMONY
Section 2. “All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the
full control and supervision of the State.
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth
in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and
enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.”
Section 3. “Lands of the public domain are
classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands and national parks. Agricultural
lands of the public domain may be further
classified by law according to the uses to which
they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the
public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may
not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not
more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed
one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the
Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve
hectares thereof, by purchase, homestead, or
grant.”
Section 4. “The Congress shall, as soon as
possible, determine, by law, the specific limits of
forest lands and national parks, marking clearly
their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such
forest lands and national parks shall be conserved
and may not be increased nor diminished, except
by law. The Congress shall provide for such
period as it may determine, measures to prohibit
logging in endangered forests and watershed
areas.”
Section 5. “The State, subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and national development
policies and programs, shall protect the rights of
indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral
lands to ensure their economic, social, and
cultural well-being.
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
The Congress may provide for the applicability of
customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent
of ancestral domain.”
Classification of Domains
(1) Agricultural lands (alienable)
(2) Forest or Timber lands
(3) Mineral lands
(4) National Parks
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN- are all areas
belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by
themselves or through their ancestors,
communally or individually since time
immemorial, continuously until the present,
except when interrupted by war, force majeure or
displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a
consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings with government and/or
private individuals or corporations.
ANCESTRAL LANDS- are lands held by the
ICCs/IPs under same conditions as ancestral
domains except that these are limited to lands and
that these lands are not merely occupied and
possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs
under claims of individual or traditional group
ownership. These lands include but are not
limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies,
private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.
6. SJS vs. Atienza
G.R. No. 156052 | Mar. 7, 2007
TOPIC : Art. II, Sec. 25 - Local Autonomy
Ordinance 8027 reclassified the area from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners
and operators of businesses disallowed under Sec.
1 to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within 6 months from the date of
effectivity of the ordinance. Among the
businesses situated in the area are the Pandacan
Terminals of Caltex, Shell and Petron. Mayor has
a duty to enforce the ordinance. It is his
ministerial duty to do so, unless ordinance be
repealed.
Mandamus lies to compel a City Mayor to
enforce an ordinance reclassifying an area from
industrial to commercial and directing the owners
and operators of businesses disallowed therein to
cease and desist from operating their businesses
within 6 months from the date of effectivity of
the ordinance.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after
the PH, along with the rest of the world,
witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001
attack on the Twin
Towers of the World Trade Center in New York
City. The objective of the ordinance is to
protect the residents of Manila from the
catastrophic devastation that will surely
occur in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why
such a protective measure should be delayed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
GRANTED.
Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor
of the City of Manila, is directed to
immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
SO ORDERED.
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
7. Chavez vs. PEA-AMARI
G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002
TOPIC : Art. III, Sec. 7 - Right to Information
A stipulation in a joint venture agreement that
would transfer the subject reclaimed lands to a
private corporation is void for being contrary to
Sec. 3, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission understood that the right to
information contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of
the transaction. A consummated contract is
not a requirement for the exercise of the right
to information.
Atty. Gallant’s discussion:
SC held, if you limit the right to the
consummated contract, then two things can
happen (If consummated contract will be
required, 2 things can happen:
➔ Either the citizen cannot exercise their
rights if there is no consummated
contract, or it is too late if the contract
was already consummated.
If the contract is consummated, that is the only
time the persons or the citizen can exercise their
right to information then it might be too late
already according to the Supreme Court to point
out the defects in the contract or to expose it to
public the defects of the contract especially this
Chavez was saying that the government’s stand to
lose billions of pesos in this arrangement. That is
why he really wanted to know the contents of that
joint venture agreement.
Also the SC said, if on the other hand, you do not
include negotiations that will lead to a
consummated transaction, if the contract is not
eventually concluded or signed then the people
will never exercise their right to information on
matters of public concern. If you limit that to a
consummated contract, then if the contract is not
consummated, the people will never be able to
exercise their right.
3 categories of information which are “matters of
public concern,” namely:
(1) official records; (2) documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions and
decisions; and (3) government research data used
in formulating policies. Constitutional right to
information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final contract. The
information must constitute definite propositions
by the government and should not cover
recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and
similar matters affecting national security and
public order.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Public Estates Authority and Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation are
PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from
implementing the Amended Joint Venture
Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and
VOID ab initio.
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
8. Tano vs. Socrates
G.R. No. 110249. Aug. 21, 1997
TOPIC : Art. X, Sec. 4 - Power of Supervision
over LGUs
Since one of the devolved powers of LGUs under
the LGC is the enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters, the ordinance banning the
shipment of all live fish and lobster outside
Puerto Prinsesa for 5 years and a resolution
prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing,
buying, selling, and shipment of several species
of live marine coral-dwelling aquatic organisms
for 5 years, are valid.
LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant
fishery privileges in municipal waters and impose
rentals, fees or charges therefor. The Sanggunians
are directed to enact ordinances that protect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for
acts which endanger the environment such as
dynamite fishing and destructive fishing. One of
the devolved powers under the Code is the
enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters
including the conservation of mangroves.
Atty. Gallant’s discussion:
Important to remember here is that, even Tano
and his co-petitioners, were invoking that they
were marginalized fishermen and that they have
rights under Social Justice Clause under Art 13 of
the Constitution, we have the right to our
livelihood, we are protected by the Constitution.
But this has conflict also with the power of the
LGU to promulgate their own laws within the
confines of their territorial jurisdiction. And we
see that under the general welfare clause of the
Constitution.
9. Miners Asso. vs. Factoran
G.R. No. 98332. Jan. 6, 1995
TOPIC : Art. XII, Sec. 1 - Exploration of
Natural Resources
The 1987 Constitution does not apply
retroactively to “license, concession or lease”
granted by the government under the 1973
Constitution. Admin Order No. 57 (all existing
mining leases granted after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution, except small scale mining
leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and
quarry resources covering an area of 20 hectares
or less, shall be converted into production-sharing
agreements within 1 year from its effectivity)
applies only to all existing mining leases or
agreements which were granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
The State, in the exercise of its police power, may
not be precluded by the constitutional restriction
on non-impairment of contract from altering,
modifying and amending the mining leases or
agreements granted.
Atty. Gallant’s discussion:
Although non-impairment of contracts is a
Constitutional prohibition, this is subordinate to
the exercise of police power by the State. The
State should not be placed under straitjacket
according to the SC just because there is a
provision against non-impairment of contracts in
the Constitution. Otherwise, the State will be
inutile or unable to respond with the changing
time. Non-impairment clause is subordinate to the
exercise of police power of the State.
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
10. Alvarez vs. PICOP
G.R. No. 162243. Nov. 29, 2006
TOPIC : Art. XII, Sec. 1 - Exploration of
Natural Resources
Licenses concerning the harvesting of timber in
the country's forests are but a mere privilege
granted by the State, and cannot be considered
contracts.
Atty. Gallant’s discussion:
About non-impairment of contract clause also;
according to the SC this is not even a contract so
there is no reason to apply the ruling in Miners vs
Factoran. As correctly implemented by DENR
Sec Alvarez, he did not grant the application for
conversion of the timber licenses agreement
(TLA) unless they comply with certain
requirements because PICOP have been awarded
with vast lands as a concessionaire and PICOP
does not want to comply so when DENR Sec
Alvarez learned that PICOP has not complied
with their responsibilities under the agreement, he
refuses to renew and convert their license
agreement into integrated forest management
agreement until they comply with the
requirements. DENR Sec was upheld by the SC.
A company that has been fortunate enough to
have been awarded a vast track of concession by
the government must at least comply with what
the law requires.
11. Sec. of DENR vs. Yap
G.R. No. 167707 | Oct. 8, 2008
TOPIC : Art. XII, Sec. 3 - lands of the public
domain
In keeping with the presumption of state
ownership, there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes
before such land becomes alienable and
disposable.
Atty. Gallant’s discussion:
There are four types of lands of a public domain:
mineral lands, forest or timber lands, agricultural
lands and national parks.. Agricultural lands, this
part of public domain can better be developed if
they are entrusted to private individuals or
entities for agricultural purposes. But it is not
automatic that agricultural lands can be subject to
alienation, there must be a proclamation, a
positive action from who? legislative thru law or
by executive dept thru president- SC cleared that
IT IS AN EXECUTIVE PREROGATIVE. This
power is delegated already to the president.
Requisites: 1) it must be agricultural land; 2)
there has to be a presidential proclamation
making this agricultural land alienable and
disposable.
In the case of Boracay, this is an unclassified
land, no classification yet. Pres. Arroyo classified
some parts of Boracay as agricultural land
making it subject to alienation and disposition.
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12. Alcantara vs. COSLAP
G.R. No. 145838 | July 20, 2001
TOPIC : Art. XII, Sec. 5 - ancestral lands
Petitioner was granted Forest Land Grazing
Lease agreement by the DENR allowing him to
lease a public forest land for grazing purposes.
Private respondents sought for its cancellation
and the reversion of the area to the B’laan and
Maguindanao tribes. The land area being claimed
by private respondents belongs to the B’laan
Indigenous cultural community since they were
in possession of, and were occupying and
cultivating the same since time immemorial. All
unappropriated agricultural lands forming
part of the public domain are declared part of
the ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural
groups occupying the same, and these lands are
further declared alienable and disposable, to be
distributed exclusively among the indigenous
cultural group concerned.
The cancellation of an FLGLA that was granted
in violation of Sec. 1 of PD No. 410 (which
provides that all unappropriated agricultural lands
forming part of the public domain are declared
part of the ancestral lands of the indigenous
cultural groups occupying the same, and these
lands are further declared alienable and
disposable, to be distributed exclusively among
the members of the indigenous cultural group
concerned) is proper.
A jurisdictional issue, that the indigenous people
are entitled to the ancestral lands because they
have been in possession since time immemorial
of these lands.
13. Cheesman vs. IAC
G.R. No. 74833 | Jan. 21, 1991
TOPIC : Art. XII, Sec. 7 - Acquisition of
Private Lands
Petitioner, an American citizen, has no
personality to question the subsequent sale of the
property by his wife on the theory that in doing
so he is merely exercising the prerogative of a
husband in respect of conjugal property. If the
property were to be held conjugal, this would
accord to the alien husband a substantial interest
and right over the land. This is a right that the
Constitution does not permit him to have.
A land sold to spouses where one is an alien
cannot be held to be conjugal property, for to do
so would be to give the alien spouse a substantial
interest and right over the land which the
Constitution prohibits him from having.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
As already observed, the finding that his wife
had used her own money to purchase the
property cannot, and will not, at this stage of
the proceedings be reviewed and
overturned. But even if it were a fact that said
wife had used conjugal funds to make the
acquisition, the considerations just set out
militate, on high constitutional grounds,
against his recovering and holding the
property so acquired, or any part thereof. And
whether in such an event, he may recover from
his wife any share of the money used for the
purchase or charge her with unauthorized
disposition or expenditure of conjugal funds is
not now
inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a
purely academic exercise. An equally decisive
consideration is that
Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good faith,
both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court
having found that Cheesman’s own conduct
had led her to believe the property to be the
exclusive property of the latter’s wife, freely
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
disposable by her without his consent or
intervention. An innocent buyer for value, she
is entitled to the protection of the law in her
purchase, particularly as against Cheesman,
who would assert rights to the property denied
him by both
letter and spirit of the Constitution itself.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
14. Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS
G.R. No. 122156 | Feb. 3, 1997
TOPIC:Art. XII, Sec.10 Filipino first policy
Provision is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. It is per se judicially
enforceable. Qualified Filipinos should be
preferred. An action may be maintained to
enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of
any legislation on the subject.
Art. XII, Sec. 10, par. 2 of the 1987 Constitution,
providing for the preference to qualified
Filipinos, in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, is a self-executing provision.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, respondents GSIS, MANILA
HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to
CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid
of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51%
of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary agreements
and documents to effect
the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and
to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
GARCIA vs. Board of Investments
G.R. No. 92024 | November 9, 1990
(included sa pointers ni Commsor in relation
to Filipino First Policy)
DOCTRINE: BOI committed grave abuse of
discretion because it repudiates the independent
policy of government to run its affairs the way it
deems best for the national interest. Every
provision of the Constitution on the national
economy and patrimony is infused with the spirit
of national interest. The non-alienation of
national resources, the State full control over the
development and utilization of contributions to
the economic growth and general welfare of the
country and the regulation of foreign investment
in accordance to national goals and priorities are
too explicit not to be noticed and understood.
FACTS:
The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a
Taiwanese private corporation, applied for
registration with the Board of Investments (BOI)
in February 1988 as a new domestic producer of
petrochemicals in the Philippines. It originally
specified the province of Bataan as the site for the
proposed investment but later submitted an
amended application to change the site to
Batangas. Unhappy with the change of the site,
Congressman Enrique Garcia requested a copy of
BPC’s original and amended application
documents. The BoI denied the request on the
11 |kkv
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER

basis that the investors in BPC had declined to
give their consent to the release of the documents
requested, and that Article 81 of the Omnibus
Investments Code protects the confidentiality of
these documents absent consent to disclose. The
BoI subsequently approved the amended
application without holding a second hearing or
publishing notice of the amended application.
Garcia filed a petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the BOI committed grave abuse of
discretion in yielding to the wishes of the
investor, national interest notwithstanding.
RULING:
YES. under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, it is the duty of the State to
"regulate and exercise authority over foreign
investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities."
The development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos is mandated in Section
19, Article II of the Constitution. A
petrochemical industry is not an ordinary
investment opportunity. It should not be treated
like a garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-making
venture, or even an assembler of cars or
manufacturer of computer chips, where the BOI
reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and credit.
The petrochemical industry is essential to the
national interest.
The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI
committed a grave abuse of discretion in
approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant
from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the
change of feedstock from naphtha only to
naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the
final say is in the investor all other circumstances
to the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent
advantage to the government has been shown by
this transfer. This is a repudiation of the
independent policy of the government expressed
in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its
own affairs the way it deems best for the national
interest.`
One can but remember the words of a great
Filipino leader who in part said he would not
mind having a government run like hell by
Filipinos than one subservient to foreign
dictation. In this case, it is not even a foreign
government but an ordinary investor whom the
BOI allows to dictate what we shall do with our
heritage.

In this particular BPC venture, not only has the

Government given unprecedented favors, but
through its regulatory agency, the BOI, it
surrenders even the power to make a company
abide by its initial choice, a choice free from any
suspicion of unscrupulous machinations and a
choice which is undoubtedly in the best interests
of the Filipino people.

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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER

15. Corpuz vs. Sps. Gorospe against the law. However, to punish Corpuz, you
G.R. No. 135297 | June 8, 2000 cannot have your cake and eat it too, so that you
TOPIC : Art. XIII - Social Justice Sec. 6 - will not profit from your wrong that you
agrarian reform committed, because you committed a violation of
the law, SC will allow it, even if the mortgage is
The sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform null and void. Since you foreclosed it and gave it
rights are void in order to prevent a to Samahang nayon, we will consider that as if
circumvention of agrarian reform laws. However, the property has been surrendered to the
in the present case, the voluntary surrender or government. So if it is surrendered to the
waiver of these rights in favor of the Samahang government, then the objective of the law for the
Nayon is valid because such action is deemed property remaining with the State, that the
legally permissible conveyance in favor of the beneficiary didn’t sell is already achieved. That is
government. After the surrender or waiver of said the decision there.
land reform rights, the DAR, which took control
of the property, validly awarded it to private
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
respondents.
We disagree. Petitioner misconstrued the
Cocoma ruling because what was prohibited
The voluntary surrender or waiver of land reform
was the perpetration of the
rights in favor of the Samahang Nayon is valid tenancy or leasehold relationship between the
because such action is deemed a legally landlord and the farmer-beneficiary. The case
permissible conveyance in favor of the did not rule out abandonment or voluntary
government, pursuant to PD 27, which provides surrender by the agricultural tenant or lessee
that title to land acquired pursuant to the land in favor of the government.
reform program shall not be transferable except
through hereditary succession or to the WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED
and the assailed Decision and Resolution
government.
AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed petitioner’s
appeal. Costs against petitioner.
Atty. Gallant’s discussion:
SO ORDERED.
Land reform must be cultivated by farmers
because the purpose of land reform is to make the
farmers the owner of the land that he cultivates to
improve his economic condition. The law
prohibits the sale of such land within 5 yrs, even
mortgage because in a mortgage if you do not pay
the principal obligation, the mortgagee will
foreclose the property then the property will be
sold at public auction and most likely the
mortgagee will buy the property as the highest
bidder so the property will be now owned by the
mortgagee. This is what happened in the case,
Corpuz mortgaged the property to Gorospe, the
foreclosure is supposed to be null and void. The
SC said that it is null and void because it is

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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
16. People vs. Maceren
G.R. No. L-32166 | Oct. 18, 1977
TOPIC : Art. XIII Social Justice, Sec. 7 -
rights of fishermen
The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit
electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned
under that law. The Sec of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the
lawmaking body intended to punish electro
fishing, a penal provision to that effect could
have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries
Law.
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1,
penalizing electro-fishing in freshwater fisheries,
is void since the Sec. of Agriculture and Natural
Resources is without authority to issue the same
sans the express prohibition of electro-fishing
under the Fisheries Law (NOTE: this was decided
under the old Fisheries Law, the present law
[Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, as amended]
penalizes electro-fishing).
What the law does not punish, the
administrative bodies cannot punish.
Administrative bodies exercise only delegated
power so they cannot rise higher than the source
from the law.
Electrofishing is not prohibited under the old
fisheries act but its practice became prominent;
Sec of Agriculture and Natural resources did that
time in order to prosecute those who use
electrofishing, they issued administrative order
prohibiting the use of electrofishing. Maceren
was caught and convicted. He has no other
defense because he was caught in the act. So they
attacked the constitutionality of such
administrative order. The administrative order
issued by the Secretary is invalid because
electrofishing is not prohibited under the old
Fisheries Code.
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an
administrative agency has the right to make rules
and regulations to carry into effect a law already
enacted, that power should not be confused with
the power to enact a criminal statute. An
administrative agency can have only the
administrative or policing powers expressly or by
necessary implication conferred upon it.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the lower court’s decision of
June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate
jurisdiction and the order of dismissal
rendered by the municipal court of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed.
Costs de oficio.
17. Mustang Lumber vs. CA
G.R. No. 104988 | June 18, 1996
TOPIC : DEFINITION OF TERMS:
FORESTRY
Lumber is to be understood as processed log and
timber. The Court said that since the law makes
no distinction between raw or processed timber,
neither should we. Hence, Mustang Lumber will
still be held liable for illegal logging.
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition
of either timber or lumber. While the former is
included in forest products as defined in
paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in
paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of "Processing plant”. This simply
means that lumber is a processed log or processed
forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the
term lumber in its ordinary or common usage.
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
18. Yngson vs. Sec. of Agriculture
G.R. No. L-36847 | July 20, 1983
TOPIC : CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS
Timber or forest lands be released as alienable
and disposable first; the President may establish a
forest reserve.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to
administer and dispose of swamplands or
mangrove lands forming part of the public
domain while such lands are still classified as
forest land or timberland and not released for
fishery or other purposes.
When the applications were filed by the parties in
the instant case, said area was not yet available
for fishpond purposes and the same was only
released for said purpose on January 14, 1954.
DENR then caused the division of the area in
question into three portions giving each party an
area of one-third (1/3) of the whole area covered
by their respective applications.
The Court ruled that all five applications were
filed prematurely for the reason that the
mangrove was made available for fishpond
purposes only after the applications had already
been filed. Thus, there was no land available for
lease permits and conversion into fishponds at the
time all five applicants filed their applications. It
is elementary in the law governing the disposition
of lands of the public domain that until timber or
forest lands are released as disposable and
alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor the
Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant,
sell.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The petitioner has failed to show a contempt of
court which we can take cognizance of and
punish. If any of his
property or other rights over his one-third’s
share of the disputed property are violated, he
can pursue the correct action before the proper
lower court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED. The motion for contempt
is also DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner-appellant.
19. International Hardwood vs. U.P.
G.R. No. 521518 | Aug. 13, 1991
TOPIC: CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS
UP has the right to enjoy and dispose of the land
reserved for them for agricultural purposes,
without any limitations. Hence, Hardwood has
the correlative duty and obligation to pay for the
forest charges or royalties to the new owner, UP.
The Court ruled that when the Republic of the
Philippines ceded and transferred the subject
property to UP, it completely removed said
property from the public domain and, more
specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the
timber license of petitioner, removed and
segregated it from a public forest; thereby
divesting itself of its rights and title thereto and
relinquished and conveyed the same to UP as the
new absolute owner thereof.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the
decision of the trial court; DECLARING that
forest charges due from and payable by
petitioner for timber cut pursuant to its License
Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) within the
area ceded and transferred to the University of
the Philippine pursuant to R.A. No. 3990 shall
be paid to the University of the Philippines;
DECLARING that the University of the
Philippines is entitled to supervise, through its
duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling,
and removal of timber within the aforesaid
area covered by R.A. No. 3990.
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
20. Republic vs. Naguiat,
G.R. No. 134209 | Jan. 24, 2006
TOPIC : CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS
Unclassified lands cannot be acquired by adverse
occupation or possession; occupation thereof in
the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen
into private ownership and be registered as title.
A forested land classified as forest area of public
domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its
cover.
Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the
prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands
of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral
to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the
Executive Branch of the government and not the
court.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The foregoing considered, the issue of whether
or not respondent and her
predecessor-in-interest have been in open,
exclusive and continuous possession of the
parcels of land in question is now of little
moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot
be acquired by adverse occupation or
possession; occupation thereof in the concept
of owner, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership and be registered as title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
GRANTED and assailed decision dated May
29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, respondent’s application for
original registration of title in Land
Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional
Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, is
DENIED.
21. Sec. of DENR vs. Yap
G.R. No. 167707, Oct. 8, 2008
TOPIC : CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS
In keeping with the presumption of state
ownership, there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes
before such land becomes alienable and
disposable.
Except for lands already covered by existing
titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064.
Such unclassified lands are considered public
forest under PD No. 705.
Proc. No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act
needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable
and disposable land. If President Marcos intended
to classify the island as alienable and disposable
or forest, or both, he would have identified the
specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in
Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
Notes.—Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands
not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State—unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private
person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the
government has taken the step necessary to
open up the island to private ownership. This
gesture may not be sufficient to appease some
sectors which view the classification of the
island partially into a forest reserve as absurd.
That the island is
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER

regulations in the exercise of the powers of the

no longer overrun by trees, however, does not
becloud the vision to protect its remaining subordinate officer"
forest cover and to strike a healthy balance
between progress and ecology. Ecological Accordingly, respondent-appellee Secretary of
conservation is as important as economic Agriculture and Natural Resources has the
progress. authority to revoke, on valid grounds, timber
licenses issued by the Director of Forestry. There
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as being supporting evidence, the revocation of
follows: petitioner- appellant’s timber license was a wise
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. exercise of the power of the respondent-appellee
167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals
(Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources)
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118
and therefore, valid.
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No.
Thus, “this Court had rigorously adhered to the
173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. principle of conserving forest resources, as
corollary to which the alleged right to them of
private individuals or entities was meticulously
inquired into and more often than not rejected.
22. Tan vs. Director of Forestry
G.R. No. L-24548 | Oct. 27, 1983
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
TOPIC : Utilization and Management
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE
FOREGOING, THE ORDER APPEALED
A timber license is an instrument in which the
FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
State regulates the utilization and disposition of
COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-
forest resources to the end that public welfare is APPELLANT. SO ORDERED.
promoted. A timber license is not a contract
within the purview of due process clause; it is
merely a license or privilege, which can be
validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare.

The utilization and disposition of forest resources

is directly under the control and supervision of
the Director of Forestry. However, "while Section
1831 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides that forest products shall be cut,
gathered and removed from any forest only upon
license from the Director of Forestry, it is no less
true that as a subordinate officer, the Director of
Forestry is subject to the control of the
Department Head or the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources (Sec, 79 [c], Rev. Adm.
Code), who, therefore, may impose reasonable

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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
23. Oposa vs. Factoran
G.R. No. 101083 | July 30, 1993
TOPIC : Utilization and Management
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We
find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for
the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned.
A timber license is an instrument by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition
of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. A timber license is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause; it
is only a license or privilege, which can be
validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare as in this case.
Respondent Secretary was aware that as correctly
pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber
license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry
Reform Code which provides: “… Provided, That
when the national interest so requires, the
President may amend, modify, replace or rescind
any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any
other form of privilege granted herein…”
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked
or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protected by
the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan
vs. Director of Forestry this Court held: ". . . A
timber license is an instrument by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest
or public welfare as in this case.” Even if it is to
be assumed that the same are contracts, the
instant case does not involve a law or even an
executive issuance declaring the cancellation or
modification of existing timber licenses. Hence,
the non impairment clause cannot as yet be
invoked
24. Provident Tree Farms vs. Batario
G.R. No. 92285, March 28, 1994
TOPIC : Utilization and Management
The only subject of this incentive is a ban against
importation of wood and wood products which is
to be enforced by the Bureau of Customs since it
has under the Tariff and Customs Code the
exclusive and original jurisdiction over seizure
and forfeiture cases. To allow regular courts to
direct the Commissioner is a clear interference
within the BOC’s jurisdiction.
The enforcement of importation ban under Sec.
36 (I) of the Revised Forestry Code is within the
exclusive realm of the Bureau of customs. To
allow the regular court to direct the commissioner
to impound the imported matches is an
interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Customs over seizure and forfeiture
cases. In this case, it is the duty of the Collector
of Customs to exercise jurisdiction over
prohibited importations. Moreover, the
Commissioner has the power to promulgate all
rules and regulations necessary to enforce the
provisions of the Code subject to the approval of
the Secretary of Finance. Where the statute does
not require any particular method, the agency
may adopt any reasonable method. In the case,
the PTFI’s correspondence with the Bureau
contesting the legality of the importations may
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
already take the nature of an administrative
proceeding, the pendency of which would
preclude the court from interfering with it under
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The pendency of petitioner’s request to the
Bureau of Customs for the implementation of the
ban against the importation of matches under the
Forestry Code is impliedly admitted; in fact, it is
apparent from the correspondence of counsel for
petitioner that the Bureau is inclined to sustain
the validity of the importations. Hence, the order
of the trial court granting the dismissal of the
civil case must be upheld.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in
the appealed Order of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila in Civil Case No. 89-48836 dated 8
February 1990, the same is AFFIRMED and,
consequently, the instant petition for review is
DENIED.
25. Momongan vs. Omipon
AM No. MTJ-93-874 | March 14, 1995
TOPIC: CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND
PENALTIES
The confiscation proceedings under AO 59 is
different from the confiscation under the RPC,
which is an additional penalty imposed in the
event of conviction.
According to the Revised Penal Code, Art. 45,
first paragraph: “[E]very penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the
forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the
instrument or tools with which it was
committed.” However, this cannot be done if such
proceeds and instruments or tools “be the
property of a third person not liable for the
offense.”
In this case, the truck, though used to transport
the illegally cut lumber, cannot be confiscated
and forfeited in the event accused therein be
convicted because the truck owner/driver, Mr.
Dionisio Golpe was not indicted. Hence, there
was no justification for the respondent Judge not
to release the truck.
The Court did not find that when the respondent
Judge released the truck after he conducted the
preliminary investigation and satisfied himself
that there was no reason to continue keeping the
truck, he violated Pres. Decree No. 705 and Adm.
Order No. 59. The release of the truck did not
render nugatory the administrative authority of
the DENR Secretary.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The Court takes this opportunity to enjoin the
National Police, the DENR, the prosecutors,
and the members of the bench to coordinate
with each other for a successful campaign
against illegal logging. It behooves all the
concerned agencies to seriously strive for the
attainment of the constitutionally-declared
policy to “protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature” in order to preserve our natural
resources for the benefit of the
generations still to come.
WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
26. Mustang Lumber vs. CA
G.R. No. 104988 | June 18, 1996
TOPIC : CRIMINAL OFFENSES & TOPIC :
PENALTIES
Lumber is a processed log or timber, and is thus
not excluded from the coverage of Sec. 68 of the
RFC, on penalizing possession thereof without
the required legal documents.
The seizure of the petitioner's truck and its cargo
consisting of lauan and almaciga lumber which
were not accompanied with the required invoices
and transporting documents is valid, as it is made
on a moving vehicle.
While lumber is not specifically mentioned in
Sec. 68, it is nonetheless included in the term
“timber”. While “timber” is included in the forest
products as defined in Sec. 3(q) of PD 705, the
lumber is found in Sec. 3(aa) in the definition of
“processing plant”. This simply means that
lumber is a processed log or forest raw material,
or timber.
Under Sec. 68-A of PD 705, as amended by EO
277, the DENR Secretary or his duly authorized
representative has jurisdiction to order the
confiscation and disposition of all conveyances –
by land, water or air – used in illegally cutting,
gathering, removing, possessing or abandoning
forest products.
Punished then in this section are (1) the cutting,
gathering, collection, or removal of timber or
other forest products from the places therein
mentioned without any authority; and (2)
possession of timber forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest
laws and regulations.
27. People vs. Que
G.R. No. 120365 | Dec. 17, 1996
CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND
PENALTIES
There are two (2) distinct and separate offenses
punished under Section 68 of P.D. 705, to wit: In
the first offense, one can raise as a defense the
legality of the acts of cutting, gathering,
collecting or removing timber or other forest
products by presenting the authorization issued
by the DENR. In the second offense, however, it
is immaterial whether the cutting, gathering,
collecting and removal of the forest products is
legal or not. Mere possession of forest products
without the proper documents consummates the
crime. Thus, accused-appellant's possession of
the subject lumber without any documentation
clearly constitutes an offense under Section 68 of
P.D. 705.
Appellant interprets the phrase “existing forest
laws and regulations” to refer to those laws and
regulations which were already in effect at the
time of the enactment of E.O. 277. However, the
suggested interpretation is strained and would
render the law inutile. The phrase should be
construed to refer to laws and regulations existing
at the time of possession of timber or other forest
products. DENR Administrative Order No. 59
series of 1993 specifies the documents required
for the transport of timber and other forest
products. Section 3 of the Administrative Order
provides that the movement of logs, lumber,
non-timber forest products and wood-based or
wood based shall be covered with the appropriate
Certificates of Origin. The transport of lumber
shall be accompanied by CLO (Certificate of
Lumber Origin).
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
28. Dagudag vs. Paderanga
AM No. RTJ-06-2017 | June 19, 2008
TOPIC: CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND
PENALTIES
The DENR is the agency responsible for the
enforcement of forestry laws. Section 4 of
Executive Order No.192 states that the DENR
shall be the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and
proper use of the country’s natural resources.
Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
amended by Executive Order No. 277, states that
possessing forest products without the required
legal documents is punishable. Section 68-A
states that the DENR Secretary or his duly
authorized representatives may order the
confiscation of any forest product illegally cut,
gathered, removed, possessed, or abandoned.
Forest products were confiscated by the
representatives of PNP Regional Maritime Group
(PNPRMG), DENR and the PH Coast Guard for
non-compliance of pertinent documents, and
since no one claimed ownership of the said items
for a reasonable time, it was confiscated in favor
of the government. Respondent-judge, in a case
for issuance of writ of replevin, instituted by
plaintiff Edma, issued and decided in favor of the
plaintiff, for the return of the undocumented
forest products. DENR, CENRO and herein
petitioner filed a motion to quash the writ of
replevin but was thereafter denied by herein
respondent.
The DENR is the agency responsible for the
enforcement of forestry laws. That since the case
is for violation of Section 68 of PD 705 as
amended by EO 277 is under the jurisdiction of
DENR. That respondent should have dismissed
the replevin suit outright for ff reasons:
1. That courts cannot take cognizance of
cases pending before administrative
agencies, under the doctrine of
administrative exhaustion;
2. That also, under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction courts cannot take
cognizance of the cases pending before
administrative agencies of special
competence.
3. That since the undocumented forest
products are in the custody of the DENR,
an administrative proceeding may have
already been commenced;
4. That the forest products are already in
custody of law and thus cannot be the
subject of replevin.
29. Remman Enterprises vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 125018 | Apr. 6, 2000
TOPIC : UTILIZATION OF WATERS -
Prohibitions and conditions for use of waters
Even assuming that the heavy rains constituted an
act of God, by reason of their negligence, the
fortuitous event became humanized, rendering
appellants liable for the ensuing damages.
There exists no natural easement upon the estate
of Lat to receive the waters from Remman’s
estate. Under Article 637 of the Civil Code, it
imposes a natural easement upon the lower estate
to receive the waters which naturally and without
the intervention of man descend from higher
states. The owner of the lower estate cannot
construct works which will impede this easement;
neither can the owner of the higher estate make
works which will increase the burden.
A similar provision is found in the Water Code of
the Philippines (P.D. No. 1067), which provides:
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
Art. 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the
water which naturally and without the
intervention of man flows from the higher estates,
as well as the stone or earth which they carry
with them. The owner of the lower estate cannot
construct works which will impede this natural
flow, unless he provides an alternative method of
drainage; neither can the owner of the higher
estate make works which will increase this
natural flow.
As based on the above provisions, they impose a
natural easement upon the lower estate to receive
the waters which naturally and without the
intervention of man descend from higher estates.
However, where the waters which flow from a
higher estate are those which are artificially
collected in man made lagoons, any damage
occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the
lower or servient estate to compensation. The
collected waters from man made lagoons and pig
manure are not the waters contemplated by law as
waters which naturally and without the
intervention of man descend from higher states.
The negligence of REMMAN in maintaining the
level of waste water in its lagoons has been
satisfactorily established. The extent of damages
suffered by Lat remains unrebutted; in fact, has
been proved.
30. Lovina vs. Moreno
G.R. No. L-17821 | November 29, 1963
TOPIC : Control of Waters
Residents of Municipality of Macabebe
Pampanga had complained to Sec of Public
Works and Communications that appellees had
blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a navigable river in
Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking that the
obstructions be ordered removed, under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 2056 (Act
prohibiting construction of dams, dikes or any
other works in public navigable waters). After
notice and hearing to the parties, the said
Secretary found the constructions to be a public
nuisance in navigable waters, and, in his decision
dated 11 August 1959, ordered the land owners,
spouses Lovina to remove five (5) closures of
Sapang Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary would
order their removal at the expense of the
respondent. After receipt of the decision, the
respondent filed a petition to restrain the
Secretary from enforcing his decision. The trial
court, after due hearing, granted a permanent
Injunction, which is now the subject of the
present appeal.
The position of the plaintiffs-appellees in the
court below was that RA No. 2056 is
unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications with
sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable
authority to pass upon the issues of whether
a river or stream is public and navigable, whether
a dam encroaches upon such waters and is
constitutive as a public nuisance, and whether the
law applies to the state of facts, thereby
constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of
judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications.
SC sustained the power of the Sec. of Public
Works to order the demolition of any
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construction that impedes the natural flow of
water. The law empowering the Secretary of
Public Works who ordered the demolition was
questioned, also the constitutionality of the law
was questioned. But the SC said it is within his
power, anything that obstructs the natural
flow of the water may be ordered demolished
because that will be considered as nuisance.
R.A. 2056 merely empowers the Secretary to
remove unauthorized obstructions or
encroachments upon public streams,
constructions that no private person was anyway
entitled to make, because the bed of navigable
streams is public property, and ownership thereof
is not acquirable by adverse possession.
It is true that the exercise of the Secretary’s
power under the Act necessarily involves the
determination of some questions of fact, such as
the existence of the stream and its previous
navigable character; but these functions, whether
judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to
the exercise of the power granted by law to clear
navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or
encroachments, and authorities are clear that they
are validly conferable upon executive officials
provided the party affected is given opportunity
to be heard, as is expressly required by Republic
Act No. 2056, section 2.
31. Sta. Rosa Realty vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112526 | October 12, 2001
TOPIC: Conservation and Protection of
Waters and Watersheds
The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate
supply of water for future generations and the
control of flash floods that not only damage
property but cause loss of lives. Protection of
watersheds is an “intergenerational
responsibility” that needs to be answered now.
Atty. Gallant’s discussion:
This is a watershed, but registered property in the
name of Sta Rosa Realty, which brings to a
question- if it is a watershed how come it is titled
in the name of a private entity? It is because they
acquired the property before it was declared to be
a watershed by DENR because they have
acquired it first even before it was declared as an
exclusive zone for recreation.
The titling of the property under the name of Sta.
Rosa came before it was established that the
property was actually considered as watershed so
the confirmation of the condition of the property
as watershed came after the property has already
been titled under Sta Rosa Realty.
Being a watershed and not for agriculture, it
cannot longer be subjected to compulsory
acquisition by the government for land reform; if
it will be subjected to compulsory acquisition
then the 200+ hectares will be distributed to the
tenant farmers under the CARP so the watershed
would be affected. (If so, then Sta Rosa could
have been paid because the distribution of
property is an exercise of eminent domain)
Now the second question, what happens now to
the property now that the SC said that this is a
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
watershed? Then Sta Rosa Realty can no longer
utilize this property.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there
was proof showing that the disputed parcels of
land may be excluded from the compulsory
acquisition coverage of CARP because of its
very high slopes. To resolve the issue as to the
true nature of the parcels of land involved in
the case at bar, the Court directs the DARAB to
conduct a re-evaluation of the issue.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE
the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 27234.
In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case
to the DARAB for re-evaluation and
determination of the nature of the parcels of
land involved to resolve the issue of its
coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform
Program.
32. Tanjay Water District vs. Gabaton
G.R. No. L-63742 | April 17, 1989
TOPIC : Administration of Waters and
Enforcement of the Provisions of
this Code
Article 88 of the Water Code pronounces that the
Water Resources Council shall have original
jurisdiction over all disputes relating to the
appropriation, utilization, exploitation,
development, control and protection of waters
within the context of this Code.
Inasmuch the case filed by Tanjay involves, an
action for injunction with preliminary mandatory
injunction and damages, against respondent
Municipality of Pamplona and its officials to
prevent them from interfering in the management
of the Tanjay Waterworks System, an
appropriation, utilization, exploitation-the
jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute in its
first instance pertains to the Water Resources
Council as provided by PD 1067. The CFI only
has appellate jurisdiction.
33. Metro Iloilo Water District vs. CA
G.R. No. 122855 | March 31, 2005
TOPIC : Administration of Waters and
Enforcement of the Provisions of PD 1607
The trial court’s jurisdiction must be upheld
where the issue involved is not the settlement of a
water rights dispute, but the enjoyment of a right
to water use for which a permit was already
granted.
Atty. Gallant’s discussion:
MOST IMPORTANT POWER OF National
Water Resources Council (NWRC) IS THE
POWER TO DETERMINE AND ADJUDICATE
WATER RIGHTS AND THIS IS ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION UNDER ART 88 OF WATER
CODE.
In Tanjay, SC sustained the jurisdiction of NWRC
(National Water Resources Board), while in the
case of Metro Iloilo, involving private
respondents that are extracting waters in the City
of Iloilo then selling it to consumers for a fee
without permit within the concession area of
Iloilo, the SC said when the respondents invoked
the doctrine in Tanjay, SC said it is different from
Tanjay because it is the regular courts that has
jurisdiction in the case of Metro Iloilo and not
NWLRC.
In Tanjay, it was not very clear what was the
dispute between the Municipality of Pamplona
and its officials with the water district because it’s
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
not stated other than the allegation of Tanjay
Water District that the Municipality of Pamplona
is interfering with the management of the water
district.
This has something to do with the power of LGU,
given under LGC. Under LGC there are some
powers that are devoted to the LGU, and one of
those powers is the power to create the Local
Water Board and appoint the board members by
Mayor. But the Local Water Board is just a policy
making body to supervise not to control the
operation of the Local Water Districts because the
control over Local Water Districts belong to the
Local Utilities Administration. The LGU wants to
control the operation of the water district so there
is now a dispute over control of water. There is
still no jurisprudence that determines the extent
of power of the LGU that are vested under LGC
so on the mistaken belief that they have control as
well, because of their power to create the Local
Water Board, they want to interfere with the
management, they want to appoint the General
Manager of local water districts but these are
appointed by the Local Utilities Administration
not by the Local Water Board. The General
Manager of Local Water Districts is an ex-officio
member of the Local Water Board that’s why they
want to interfere. And that is why there is now
dispute over the control of waters because it is
not clear up to what extent are the powers of
LGU and which have now to be resolved by the
NWRC.
In Metro Iloilo, there is no longer a dispute that
will involve the determination and adjudication
of the NWRC because it has already been
determined to be a concession/franchise that has
already been given to Metro Iloilo. For the water,
the appropriation, utilization and control of the
water within the City of Iloilo has already been
determined and adjudicated by the NWRC to
Metro Iloilo, there is no more contest with respect
to that. But the private entities here were
extracting water within the concession area of
Metro Iloilo without its permit. You cannot do
that because it’s also unfair for Metro Iloilo
because for every water extracted therein, it's
Metro Iloilo that pays to the government for its
share to the Local Utilities Administration. So
there is no more dispute to be determined by
NWRC.
Now why is it cognizable by the court?
In CivPro you will learn 3 elements of causes of
action, one is a vested right, 2. An obligation to
observe that right 3. The damages sustained
because of the violation or non-observance of the
right. To illustrate, Metro Iloilo has a right to
extract water within the city of Iloilo, pursuant to
its franchise or concession. So anyone in Iloilo
has the obligation to respect that right of Metro
Iloilo Water District, but what did the private
respondent do, they extracted water without
permit from Metro Iloilo thereby violating the
right of Metro Iloilo. So because it sustained
damages, it is actionable by regular courts not by
NWRC. Metro Iloilo is just exercising their right
under the circumstances.
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
34. Alexandria Condominium vs. LLDA
G.R. No. 169228 | Sept. 11, 2009
TOPIC : Institutional Mechanism
RA 4850, specifically mandating the LLDA to
carry out and make effective the declared
national policy of promoting and accelerating
the development and balanced growth of
Laguna Lake, empowers the LLDA to compel
petitioner to control and abate its waste
effluents and impose fines on the latter
therefore.
PhilReally developed, established and
constructed Alexandria Condominium
Complex from 1987 to 1993. As it was being
built, PhilReally did not turn over the perimeter
drainage layout of the project. Later on, the
LLDA advised PhilReally that its waste water
did not meet the standards set by the
government and upon giving notice of such
violation, directed PhilReally to control its
waste effluents discharged to the Laguna de
Bay. The doctrine of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies requires that resort
must first be made with the administrative
authorities in the resolution of a controversy
falling under their jurisdiction before the
controversy may be elevated to a court of
justice for review.
Under EO 149, DENR only has administrative
power over LLDA. EO 192 created the PAB
under the Office of the DENR Secretary with
assumed powers and functions of the NPCC
with respect to the adjudication of pollution
cases.
35. MMDA vs. Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947, Dec. 18,
2008 (Decision)
TOPIC : Institutional Mechanism
Mandamus lies to compel the MMDA to clean or
rehabilitate Manila Bay.
The complaint by the residents allege that the
water quality of Manila Bay has fallen below the
allowable standards set by law, specifically P.D.
No. 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code
and that all defendants must be jointly and/or
solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean
up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to
class B water fit for swimming, diving and other
forms of contact recreation.
May be compelled. Sec 17 does not in any way
state that the government agencies concerned,
when appropriate, to take such measures as may
be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality
standards. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them
to act even in the absence of a specific pollution
incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated
to a degree where its state will adversely affect its
best usage. This section commands concerned
government agencies, when appropriate, to take
such measures as may be necessary to meet the
prescribed water quality standards. The
underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is
not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution
incident.
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER

35. MMDA vs. Concerned Residents of greatly affected biogenically hard-structured

Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947, Feb. 15, communities such as coral reefs and led stress to
2011(Resolution) the marine life in the Mindoro Sea.” This
TOPIC : Institutional Mechanism constitutes “pollution” as defined by law.

The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the
Court is simply an exercise of judicial power
under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the
execution of the Decision is but an integral part
of the adjudicative function of the Court. None of
the agencies ever questioned the power of the
Court to implement the December 18, 2008
Decision nor has any of them raised the alleged
encroachment by the Court over executive
functions.
Shell is not an agent of the Republic of the
Philippines. It is but a service contractor for the
exploration and development of one of the
country’s natural gas reserves. While the
Republic appointed Shell as the exclusive party to
conduct petroleum operations in the
Camago-Malampayo area under the States full
control and supervision, it does not follow that
Shell has become the States agent within the
meaning of the law.

The writ of continuing mandamus issued means
that until petition-government agencies have
shown full compliance with the Court orders, the
Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them
until full execution of the judgment.
36. Shell Pilipinas vs. Jalos
G.R. No.179918, Sept. 8, 2010
TOPIC : Water Code: Actions - (Sec. 30)
The essence of agency is the agent’s liability to
represent his principal and bring about business
relations between the latter and third persons.
Shell’s primary obligation under the contract is
not to represent the Philippine government for the
purpose of transacting business with third
persons. Rather, its contractual commitment is to
develop and manage petroleum operations on
behalf of the State.

Pollution cases should first be filed with the

Pollution Adjudication board.

A valid judgment for damages can be made in

favor of Jalos, et al., if the construction and
operation of the pipeline indeed caused fish
decline and eventually led to the fishermen’s loss
of income, as alleged in the complaint.

Although the complaint of Jalos does not use the

word “pollution” in describing the cause of the
alleged fish decline in the Mindoro Sea, it is
unmistakable that Shell’s pipeline produced some
kind of poison or emission that drove the fish
away from the coastal areas. While the complaint
did not specifically attribute to Shell any specific
act of “pollution”, it alleged that “the pipeline

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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
37. PICOP Resources vs. Base Metals,
G.R. No. 136509, Dec. 6, 2006
TOPIC : Prohibited Acts - (Secs. 20 of NIPAS)
Sec. 19(f) of RA 7586 does not disallow mining
applications in all forest reserves but only those
proclaimed as watershed forest reserves.
PICOP failed to present any evidence that the
area covered by the Mining Production Sharing
Agreement is a protected wilderness area
designated as an initial component of the NIPAS.
There was likewise no showing that the
declaration of such areas as wilderness came
from a law or a presidential order.
For all those of prohibited acts to be operative,
that area has to be proclaimed first as part of the
protected areas system. All those listed in Sec 20
will not be prohibited if the areas have not yet
been proclaimed as protected areas.
LAWS
1. FORESTRY REFORM CODE P.D. 705
(May 19, 1975)
➔ Prohibited acts and Penal provisions
STATE POLICY
1. To promote the wise utilization,
conservation and development of the
forest resources of the country, including
their associated services relating to water
supply, recreation and wildlife
preservation;
2. To safeguard the national interest in the
maintenance of a wholesome ecological
environment;
3. To accelerate the rehabilitation of
denuded lands, including those under
private ownership; and
4. To provide a stable forestry agency and a
body of laws and regulations adequate to
achieve the national policy.
DECLARATION OF POLICIES
1. The multiple uses of forest lands shall be
oriented to the development and progress
requirements of the country, the
advancement of science and technology,
and the public welfare;
2. Land classification and survey shall be
systematized and hastened;
3. The establishment of wood-processing
plants shall be encouraged and
rationalized; and
4. The protection, development and
rehabilitation of forest lands shall be
emphasized so as to ensure their
continuity in productive condition.
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CRIMINAL OFFENSES AND PENALTIES

In Mustang Lumber v. CA (1996), while
lumber is not specifically mentioned in Sec. 68,
1. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting
it is nonetheless included in the term “timber”.
Timber or Other Products Without License While “timber” is included in the forest
products as defined in Sec. 3(q) of PD 705, the
2 OFFENSES UNDER SEC 68 of PD 705 lumber is found in Sec. 3(aa) in the definition
of “processing plant”. This simply means that
Offense 1: Offense 2: Possession lumber is a processed log or
Cutting, gathering, of timber or other forest raw material, or timber.
collecting, and forest
removing timber or products without the Under Sec. 68-A of PD 705, as amended by
forest products from legal documents EO 277, the DENR Secretary or his duly
any forest required under authorized representative has jurisdiction to
land, or timber from existing forest laws order the confiscation and disposition of all
alienable or and regulations. conveyances – by land, water or air – used in
disposable public illegally cutting, gathering, removing,
land, or from private possessing or abandoning forest products.
land without
authority. In Momongan v. Omipon (1995), the
confiscation proceedings under AO 59 is
Defense: Defense: different from the confiscation under the RPC,
Raise legality of acts Good faith is not a which is an additional penalty imposed in the
by presenting the defense, since event of conviction.
authorization issued violation of
by DENR. this law is a mala
prohibita and the
commission of the
a prohibited act is the 2. Unlawful Occupation or Destruction of
crime itself, Forest Lands
regardless of intent.
Sec. 69 of PD 705:
Person liable: In case of partnership,
association, or corporations, the officers who Punishable Act – any person who [1] enters,
ordered the cutting, gathering, occupies, possesses, or makes kaingin for
collecting, and possession shall be liable, and if his own private use or for others any forest
such officers are aliens, they shall in addition land without authority or [2] in any manner
to the penalty, be deported without further destroys such forest land or part thereof, or
proceeding.
[3] causes any damage to timber stand and
The Court shall further order the confiscation other products and forest growths found
in favor of the government of the timber or any therein.
forest products, cut, gathered, collected,
removed or possessed as well as the machinery, The Court shall further order the eviction of
equipment, implements, and tools illegally the offender from the land and the forfeiture
used in the area where the timber or forest of the government of all improvements
products are found. made and all vehicles, domestic animals and

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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
equipment of any kind used in the
commission of the offense.
In case the offender is a government official
or employee, he shall, in addition to the
above penalties, be deemed automatically
dismissed from office and permanently
disqualified from holding any elective or
appointive position.
3. Pasturing Livestock
Sec. 70 of PD 705: imprisonment, fine, and
confiscation of livestock and all
improvement in favor of the government
shall be imposed upon any person, without
the authority under a lease or permit, graze,
or cause to graze livestock
in forest lands, grazing lands, and A&D
lands which have not as yet been disposed
under CA 141. In case the
offender is a corporation, partnership, or
association, the officers and directors thereof
shall be liable.
4. Illegal Occupation of National Parks
System and Recreation Areas and
Vandalism Therein
Sec. 85 of PD 705:
Punishable act – [1] any person, without
permit, occupy for any length of time any
portion of the national park system or shall,
in any manner, cut, destroy, damage, or
remove timber or any species of vegetation
of forest cover and other natural resources
found therein, or shall mutilate, deface or
destroy objects of natural beauty or of scenic
value within areas of national parks. [2] Any
person who, without proper permit shall
hunt, capture, or kill any kind of bird, fish,
or wild animal life within any area of the
national park system.
5. Survey by Unauthorized Persons
Sec. 73 pf PD 705: Any person who shall,
without permit to survey from Director,
enter any forest lands, whether covered by a
license agreement, lease, license, or permit,
or not, and conduct or undertake a survey
for whatever purpose.
6. Misclassification and Survey by
Government Official or Employee
Sec. 74 of PD 705: any public officer or
employee who knowingly surveys,
classifies, or recommends the release of the
forest lands as A&D contrary to the criteria
and standards established in this code, or the
IRR promulgated. The survey, classification
or release of forest lands shall be null and
void.
7. Arrest; Institution of Criminal Action
A forest officer or employee of the FMB
shall arrest even without warrant any person
who has committed or is committing in his
presence any offenses defined in this code.
In Mustang Lumber v. CA (1996), the
seizure of petitioner’s truck and its cargo
consisting of lauan and almaciga lumber
which were not accompanied with the
required invoices and transporting
documents is valid, as it is made on a
moving vehicle.
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
2. THE WATER CODE P.D. 1607
(Dec. 31, 1976)
➔ What is allowed and what is not
➔ Tanjay Case
➔ Domestic use of water
➔ Jurisdiction of NWRC
OBJECTIVES (Art 2, PD1607)
1. Establish basic principles and framework
relating to appropriation, control and
conservation of water resources.
2. Define the extent of rights and
obligations of water users and owners.
3. Adopt basic law governing the
ownership, appropriation, utilization,
exploitation, development, conservation
and protection of water resources.
4. Identify administrative agencies that will
enforce the Water Code.
OWNERSHIP OF WATERS
❏ ARTICLE 3. The underlying principles of
this code are:
a. All waters belong to the State.
b. All waters that belong to the State
can not be the subject to acquisitive
prescription.
c. The State may allow the use or
development of waters by
administrative concession.
d. The utilization, exploitation,
development, conservation and
protection of water resources shall be
subject to the control and regulation of
the government through the National
Water Resources Council, hereinafter
referred to as the Council.
e. Preference in the use and
development of waters shall consider
current usages and be responsive to
the changing needs of the country.
❏ ARTICLE 5. The following belong to
the State:
a. Rivers and their natural beds;
b. Continuous or intermittent waters
of springs and brooks running in their
natural beds and the beds themselves;
c. Natural lakes and lagoons;
d. All other categories of surface
waters such as water owing over
lands, water from rainfall whether
natural or artificial, and water from
agricultural runoff, seepage and
drainage;
e. Atmospheric water;
f. Subterranean or ground waters;
g. Seawater.
❏ ARTICLE 6. The following waters
found on private lands also belong to
the State:
a. Continuous or intermittent waters
rising on such lands;
b. Lakes and lagoons naturally
occurring on such lands;
c. Rain water falling on such lands;
d. Subterranean or ground waters;
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
e. Water in swamps and marshes.
The owner of the land where the water
is found may use the same for
domestic purposes without securing a
permit, provided that such use shall be
registered, when required by the
Council. The Council, however, may
regulate such use when there is
wastage, or in times of emergency.
NOTE:
Waters found on private land, but despite that,
being said that all waters belong to the State,
although this water is found on private land, they
still belong to the State. Such as waters naturally
occurring from the land; swamp waters-belong to
the State.
EXCEPTION TO RULE ON PROPERTY- that
the owner of the land is also the owner of
everything that is above and underneath, such as
surface waters (surface rights)
APPROPRIATION
❏ ARTICLE 9. Waters may be
appropriated and used in accordance with
the provisions of this Code.
Appropriation of water, as used in this
Code, is the acquisition of rights over
the use of waters or the taking or
diverting of waters from a natural
source in the manner and for any
purpose allowed by law.
❏ ARTICLE 10. Water may be
appropriated for the following purposes:
a. Domestic
b. Municipal
c. Irrigation
d. Power generation
e. Fisheries
f. Livestock raising
g. Industrial
h. Recreational, and
i. Other purposes
PURPOSES FOR WHICH WATERS MAY BE
APPROPRIATED:
1. DOMESTIC PURPOSES- for drinking,
washing, bathing, cooking or other
household needs, home gardens, and
watering of lawns or domestic animals.
2. MUNICIPAL PURPOSES- for
supplying the water requirements of the
community.
3. IRRIGATION- for producing
agricultural crops.
4. POWER GENERATION- for
producing electrical or mechanical
power.
5. FISHERIES- for the propagation
and culture of fish as a commercial
enterprise.
6. LIVESTOCK- for large herds or
flocks of animals raised as a
commercial enterprise.
7. INDUSTRIAL PURPOSES- in
factories, industrial plants and mines,
including the use of water as an
ingredient of a finished product.
8. RECREATIONAL PURPOSES-
for swimming pools, bath houses,
boating, water skiing, golf courses
and other similar facilities in resorts
and other places of recreation.
❏ ARTICLE 12. Waters appropriated for a
particular purpose may be applied for
another purpose only upon prior approval
of the Council and on condition that the
new use does not unduly prejudice the
rights of other permittees, or require an
increase in the volume of water.
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
❏ ARTICLE 13. Except as otherwise
herein provided, no person, including
government instrumentalities or
government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall appropriate water
without a water right, which shall be
evidenced by a document known as a
water permit.
Water right is the privilege granted by the
government to appropriate and use water.
❏ Use and Development of Waters- we
determine the preferential use with
accordance with on a case to case basis.
❏ Section 3. Qualification of Applicants
for Permit/Authority – Only the
following may file an application with
the Board for permit/authority:
a) Citizens of the Philippines;
b) Associations, duly registered
cooperatives or corporations
organized under the laws of the
Philippines, at least 60 percent of the
capital of which is owned by citizens
of the Philippines;
c) Government entities and
instrumentalities, including
government-owned and controlled
corporations.
❏ Section 79. Stay of Execution – The
filing of motion for reconsideration
and/or reinvestigation under the
preceding section or an appeal with the
Regional Trial Court under Article 89 of
the Code shall not stay the execution of
the decision, resolution or order of the
Board unless a bond as provided for in
Article 88 shall have been posted.
Administration of Waters and Enforcement of
the Provisions of This Code:
❏ ARTICLE 88. The Council (NWRC)
shall have original jurisdiction over all
disputes relating to appropriation,
utilization, exploitation, development,
control, conservation and protection of
waters within the meaning and context of
the provisions of this Code.
The decisions of the Council on water
rights controversies shall be immediately
executory and the enforcement thereof
may be suspended only when a bond, in
an amount fixed by the Council to answer
for damages occasioned by the suspension
or stay of execution, shall have been led
by the appealing party, unless the
suspension is by virtue of an order of a
competent court.
All disputes shall be decided within sixty
(60) days after the parties submit the same
for decision or resolution.
The Council shall have the power to issue
writs of execution and enforce its
decisions with the assistance of local or
national police agencies.
❏ ARTICLE 89. The decisions of the
Council on water rights controversies
may be appealed to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the
subject matter of the controversy is
situated within fteen (15) days from the
date the party appealing receives a copy
of the decision, on any of the following
grounds: (1) grave abuse of discretion;
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER

(2) question of law; and (3) questions of shaping its regulatory profile within
fact and law. the acceptable boundaries of public
health and environment; etc

3. CLEAN WATER ACT OF 2004-

R.A.9275 (March 22, 2004) DEFINITION OF TERMS
➔ To pursue policy of economic growth in a
❏ AGRICULTURAL WASTE- waste
manner consistent with the protection,
generated from planting or harvesting of
preservation and revival of the quality of
crops, trimming or pruning of plants and
our fresh, brackish and marine waters.
wastes or run-off materials from farms or
➔ To achieve this end, the framework for
fields;
sustainable development shall be
❏ BULKY WASTE- refers to waste
pursued. As such, it shall be the policy of
materials which cannot be appropriately
the State:
placed in separate containers because of
a) To streamline processes and either its bulky size, shape;
procedures in the prevention, control ❏ SOLID WASTE- all discarded
and abatement of pollution of the household, commercial waste,
country’s water resources; non-hazardous institutional and industrial
waste.
b) To promote environmental ❏ MINING WASTE- waste resulting from
strategies, use of appropriate mining activities, including contaminated
economic instruments and of control soil and debris.
mechanisms for the protection of
water resources; WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT
AREA (sec 5)
d) To formulate an integrated water
quality management framework a. DENR, in coordination with National
through proper delegation and Water Resources Board (NWRB), shall
effective coordination of functions and designate certain areas as water quality
activities; management areas using appropriate
physiographic units such as watershed,
e) To promote commercial and river basins or water resources regions.
industrial processes and products that b. Said management areas shall have
are environment friendly and energy similar hydrological, hydrogeological,
efficient; meteorological or geographic
conditions which affect the
f) To encourage cooperation and physicochemical, biological and
self-regulation among citizens and bacteriological reactions and diffusions
industries through the application of of pollutants in the water bodies, or
incentives and market-based otherwise share common interest or
instruments and to promote the role of
private industrial enterprises in

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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
face similar development programs,
prospects, or problems.
MANAGEMENT OF
NON-ATTAINMENT AREAS (sec 6)
a. DENR, shall designate water bodies or
portions thereof, where specific
pollutants from either natural or
non-made source have already exceeded
water quality guidelines as
non-attainment areas for the exceeded
pollutants.
b. DENR, shall, in coordination with
NWRB, Department of Health (DOH),
Department of Agriculture (DA),
governing board and other concerned
government agencies and private sectors
shall take such measures as may be
necessary to upgrade the quality of such
water in non-attainment areas to meet
the standards under which it has been
classified.
c. LGUs shall prepare and implement
contingency plans and other measures
including relocation, whenever
necessary, for the protection of health
and welfare of the residents within
potentially affected areas
FINANCIAL LIABILITY OR
ENVIRONMENTAL REHABILITATION
(sec 15)
a. DENR shall require program and project
proponents to put up an environmental
guarantee fund (EGF) as part of the
environmental management plan attached
to the environmental compliance
certificate pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1586 and its implementing rules and
regulations.
b. EGF shall finance the maintenance of the
health of the ecosystems and specially
the conservation of watersheds and
aquifers affected by the development, and
the needs of emergency response,
clean-up or 9 rehabilitation of areas that
may be damaged during the program’s or
project’s actual implementation.
c. Liability for damages shall continue even
after the termination of a program or
project and, until the lapse of a given
period indicated in the environmental
compliance certificate, as determined by
the Department.
REWARDS (sec 25)
Rewards, monetary or otherwise, shall be
provided to individuals, private organizations and
entities, including civil society, that have
undertaken outstanding and innovative projects,
technologies, processes and techniques or
activities in water quality management. Said
rewards shall be sourced from the Water Quality
Management Fund herein created.
INCENTIVE SCHEME (sec 26)
An incentive scheme is hereby provided for the
purpose of encouraging LGUs, water districts
(WDs), enterprises, or private entities, and
individuals, to develop or undertake an effective
water quality management, or actively participate
in any program geared towards the promotion
thereof as provided in this Act.
KINDS OF INCENTIVE:
1. NON-FISCAL INCENTIVE- inclusion
in the Investment Priority Plan:
a. Industrial wastewater treatment;
b. Water pollution control
technology;
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
c. Cleaner production and waste
minimization technology
2. FISCAL INCENTIVES
a. Tax and Duty Exemption on
Imported Capital Equipment
b. Tax Credit on Domestic Capital
Equipment
c. Tax and Duty Exemption of
Donations, Legacies and Gifts
3. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
a. An incentive scheme is hereby
provided for the purpose of
encouraging LGUs, water
districts (WDs), enterprises, or
private entities, and individuals,
to develop or undertake an
effective water quality
management, or actively
participate in any program geared
towards the promotion thereof as
provided in this Act.
4. GRANTS TO LGUs
a. Cities and municipalities which
shall establish or operate
sewerage facilities may be
entitled to receive grants for the
purpose of developing technical
capabilities.
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
ROLE OF LGUs
a. Local government units shall share the
responsibility in the management and
improvement of water quality within
their territorial jurisdictions
b. Each local government unit shall within 6
months after the establishment of the
water quality management area action
plan prepare a compliance scheme in,
accordance thereof subject to review and
approval of the governing board.
4. NATIONAL INTEGRATED
PROTECTED AREAS SYSTEM ACT OF
1992 R.A. 7586, June 1, 1992, as amended
by R.A. 11038 (EXPANDED NIPAS ACT,
June 22, 2018)
➔ There are now 107 (13 from old law +
94 in new law) protected areas as of the
date
➔ To secure for the Filipino people of
present and for future generations, the
perpetual existence of all native plants
and animals; through the establishment of
a comprehensive system of integrated
protected areas.
➔ The protected areas have been put under
the control and supervision of the
DENR, through its Biodiversity
Management Bureau.
❏ DEFINITION:
NIPAS is the classification and
administration of all designated
protected areas to maintain essential
ecological processes and life-support
systems, to preserve genetic diversity, to
ensure sustainable use of resources
found therein, and to maintain their
natural conditions to the greatest extent
possible;
❏ CLASSIFICATIONS OF
PROTECTED AREAS
a) NATIONAL PARKS- lands of
public domain, primarily designated
for the conservation of native plants
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
and animals, their associated
habitats and cultural diversity
b) NATURAL PARKS- a relatively
large are not materially altered by
human activity where extractive
resources uses not allowed and is
maintained to protect outstanding
natural and scenic areas of national
use
c) NATURAL MONUMENTS- a
relatively small area focused on the
protection of small features to
protect or preserve nationally
significant natural features on
account of their special interest or
unique characteristics
d) PROTECTED LANDSCAPES
AND SEASCAPES- areas of
national significance which are
characterized by the harmonious
interaction of man and land and
water while providing opportunities
for public enjoyment through
recreation etc
e) NATURAL BIOTIC AREA- an
area set aside to allow the way of
life of societies living in harmony
with the environment to adapt to
modern technology at their pace
f) WILDLIFE SANCTUARY- an
area which assures the natural
conditions necessary to protect
nationally significant species
g) RESOURCE RESERVES- an
extensive, relatively isolated, and
uninhabited area which is difficult
to access and is designated to
protect the natural resources of the
area for future use
h) GAME REFUGE AND BIRD
SANCTUARIES- a forest land
designated for the protection of
game animals, birds and fishes and
closed to hunting and fishing
i) WILDERNESS AREAS- large
tract of public land maintained
essentially in its natural state and
protected against introduction of
intrusive artifacts
j) WATERSHED FOREST
RESERVES- land area drained by a
stream or fixed body of water and
its tributaries having a common
outlet for surface run-off
DEFINITION OF TERMS
➔ BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY OR
BIODIVERSITY- refers to the variability
among living organisms from all sources
including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and
other aquatic ecosystems and the
ecological complexes of which they are
part; this includes diversity within species,
between species and of ecosystems;
➔ BUFFER ZONES- refer to identified
areas outside the boundaries of and
immediately adjacent to designated
protected areas that need special
development control in order to avoid or
minimize harm to the protected areas;
➔ INTEGRATED PROTECTED AREA
FUND- refers to the special account
established for the purpose of financing
projects of the NIPAS and individual
protected areas.
➔ MULTIPLE-USE ZONE- refers to the
area where settlement, traditional and
sustainable land use including agriculture,
agroforestry, extraction activities may be
allowed to extent prescribed in the
protected area management plan
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 NATRES MIDTERMS REVIEWER
❏ PROCEDURE FOR INCLUSION IN
THE SYSTEM
a. DENR makes a recommendation
to the President based on the
views and comments gathered
from public consultations;
b. President, upon receipt of the
DENR recommendation, issues a
proclamation establishing the
proposed protected areas and
providing for measures for their
protection until the time when
Congress shall have enacted a
law finally declaring the
recommended areas as part of the
System;
c. President, upon completion of
the appropriate review,
recommends to the Senate and
the HoR the designations of
protected areas or reclassification
of each area.
❏ ADMINISTRATION AND
MANAGEMENT OF THE SYSTEM
➔ NIPAS is under the control and
administration of DENR through
BMB (Biodiversity Management
Bureau
❏ INTEGRATED PROTECTED AREA
FUND
➔ To finance the projects and sustaining the
operation of protected areas and the
System
➔ Income from fees and charges from the
use of resources and facilities of
protected areas
➔ SHARING OF INCOME: 75% PAMB
(Protected Area Management Board);
25% general fund for financing the
projects of the System
❏ Section 4. Section 5 of Republic Act No.
7586 is hereby amended to read as
follows: "Sec. 5. Establishment and
Extent of the System. - The establishment
and operationalization of the System shall
involve the following:
(a) All areas or islands in the
Philippines proclaimed,
designated or set aside,
pursuant to a law, presidential
decree, presidential proclamation
or executive order as national
park, game refuge, bird and
wildlife sanctuary, wilderness
area, strict nature reserve,
watershed, mangrove reserve,
fish sanctuary, natural and
historical landmark, protected
and managed landscape/
seascape are hereby designated
as initial components of the
System. The initial components
of the System shall be governed
by existing laws, rules, and
regulations, not inconsistent with
this Act.
❏ The following parcels of land and/or
bodies of water are hereby established
as protected areas within the
classification of national park pursuant
to the Philippine Constitution, such as:
➔ Tañon Strait in Cebu and
Negros Islands (534,589.05
hectares);
➔ Kalawit Island
➔ Ticao-Burias Pass in Albay,
Masbate and Sorsogon
provinces (414,244 ha);
➔ Samar Island Natural Park in
Samar (335,105.57 ha);
➔ Siargao Island in Surigao del
Norte (283,974.77 ha);
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➔ Turtle Island Wildlife and leaving roads and trails;

Sanctuary in Tawi-Tawi littering; possessing or using
(242,958.29 ha); blasting caps or explosives.
➔ Agusan Marsh Wildlife ➔ Occupying or dwelling in any
Sanctuary in Agusan del Sur; public land; building any
and structure, fence or enclosure;
➔ Sarangani Bay in General conducting any business
Santos City (210,887.69 ha). enterprise without permit; and
❏ Also declared as protected areas are: purchasing or leasing lands.
➔ Taal Volcano in Batangas and
Cavite; Ninoy Aquino Parks
and Wildlife Center in
Quezon City; the Chocolate
Hills Natural Monument in
Bohol; Aliwagwag Protected
Landscape in Davao Oriental;
Bulusan Volcano Natural Park
in Sorsogon; Hinulugang
Taktak falls in Rizal; Apo
Reef in Occidental Mindoro;
Las Piñas-Paranaque Wetland
Park; the Panglao Island
Protected Seascape in Bohol;
and Mt. Mayon Natural Park
in Albay.

❏ PROHIBITED ACTS IN THE

PROTECTED AREAS ARE:
➔ poaching and disturbing any
wildlife; hunting, taking or
collecting any wildlife or
by-products; cutting, gathering or
removing timber without permit.
➔ Possessing or transporting any
timber, forest products, wildlife
or by-products; using any fishing
gear and indulging in practice
that destroys marine life;
dumping toxic chemical,
untreated sewage or animal
waste.
➔ The practice of “kaingin,” or
causing forest fires; damaging

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