ETF Airways FSTD Conversion Candidate Copy Rev 02

CONVERSION FSTD TRAINING PROGRAM
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Dear Colleagues,
It is our pleasure to present the Conversion FSTD Training Program.
Emphasis will be given to the introduction of the company SOP’s company procedures and call outs.
The training session will serve for building some manual flying skills as well as some UPRT elements.
The scenarios will be based on LOFT part (EDDF-EBBR) and area operation around EBBR.
For NARROW RWY training we will use LGSR Airport.
Please read carefully and prepare yourself for training and checking session so as to make the most of the time
available.
Before the simulators we will have Ground Training. On this training we will have classroom for SOP’s as well as for
short briefing for the FFS sessions and will review all the items which shall be covered during FSTD trainings and
checks.
I am strongly encouraging all of You, to take the notes during training and Simulator Briefings and Debriefings as
those notes are always useful for the next sessions and helps a lot to reduce yours as well as instructor’s
interruptions and workload during the session.
In your preparation use all the manuals FCOM/FCTM/QRH/Company OM’s as a lot of procedures and descriptions
can be found in different documents and once you get all the info you can build the whole picture.
On following link You can find additional documents and presentations for FSTD preparation.
FSTD BRIEFING OCC COURSE
Good preparation is a key to get maximum of training and to build and improve the standard in our company.
All the forms required as well as Trainees log book will be given to You before start of OCC course.
Wishing you all nice and successful Training,
Dragan Stefanovski
ETF Airways Training Manager
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Training duration Training done by Check required Validity Revalidation

08:00 ETF Airways approved YES (OPC) 6 Months, same as OPC OPC
04:00 FSTD training TRI/SFI/TRE/SFE
04:00 OPC
OM D Reference Approved FSTD Training Materials

OM D 2.1.3.26 All approved FSTD in OM D Appendix 2* Materials distributed during conversion training,
including ETF Airways and Boeing manuals
* See FSTD Differences list for FSTD differences and briefings to be done by Instructor before Training/checking
For additional trainings (LVO, Narrow RWY operations…) refer to different FSTD training programs
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Briefing:
For CONVERSION Training and OPC next items shall be in a focus of training:
Systems:
1. Hydraulics
2. Flight Controls
3. Ice and Rain protection
4. Communication
5. Engines
Normal, Abnormal and Emergency Procedures
1.Unreliable Airspeed
2. Windshear
3. TCAS
4. Fire drills
5. Engine Failures
6. Evacuation
7. RTO
8. 2D Approach
9. 3D Approach
10. Go around
11. Visual Approach
Additional Trainings
1.LVTO (complete LVO training shall be done on separate FSTD sessions according the approved LVO
training program).
2. EPS for Captains (optional)
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Specific Non-Normal Items for Conversion Training and OPC:
1. Flight Control System/Flaps problems
Please review the system description/operation in FCOM, as well as FCTM Non-Normal operations
chapter 8 Flight Controls.
Leading and trailing edge malfunctions can occur during retraction or extension, which means in flight
phases when cockpit workload is high. PM confirmation of configuration as per ETF SOP is crucial for
early recognition of this malfunctions. Once identified, deal with this malfunction in systematic manner
(as all the other malfunctions) and do not rush.
Maintain the safe maneuvering speed according the configuration and be carefull not to exceed placard
speeds.
If it happens during Approach (Intermediate or final) do not rush into approach but rather discontinue it,
follow the missed approach (lateral) path initially climb to Missed Approach altitude if below, and ask for
holding in order to deal with the problem and make the necessary preparations and calculations for
landing.
The flying technique is fully described in FCTM.
You can expect problems with flaps, so review carefully the QRH as you can easily be mis- leaded to
wrong checklist if You don’t identify the problem correctly.
2. Airspeed Unreliable
There were a lot of incidences/accidents recently related to unreliable airspeed indications not just on B
737 fleet but all around the industry.
Please prepare Yourself as this is a complex failure which needs a lot of attention and fast changeover to
basics the moment it happens.
These events can cause multiple, seemingly unrelated warnings and failures.
It can happen that at the same time You can have Stall/Overspeed warnings which can be false and can
affect Your situational awareness and decision making.
It can of course cause the startle effect but concentrate initially only on pitch and thrust to establish
safe flight path and only than start with trouble shooting and identifying which if any airspeed
indicator is reliable.
Even with none of them are reliable we can still fly and land safely using the tables from QRH, which we
will practice on this simulator sessions.
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The QRH memory items will lead You to establish initially the safe flight path during all phases of the
flight, but hen think that You must land the plane using basic Flight With Unreliable Airspeed table in
the QRH Performance Inflight chapter.
As A/P, A/T and F/D cannot be used, CRM and PM help through the whole flight is very important.
Try to memorize and visualize at least the basic pitch and thrust values, and what indications can You
expect as a result of incorrect pitch and/or thrust setting.
What will You suspect if You are maintaining level flight with constant thrust as per table, but Your pitch
is increasing?
Is the thrust correct? Is the speed decreasing than? What will be Your stabilizer trim requirement? How
to interpret this indication? Do you have to add the thrust in order to maintain the level flight and pitch
will be reduced as a result of that? What about stabilizer trim as a result of speed increased?......
The same reasoning applies for all phases of flight with unreliable speed indication. (Climb/Descent)
Imagine the same in ILS approach and try to find relation between pitch and thrust as well as stabilizer
trim required. During this training we will use standard Boeing Scenario after Takeoff as described on
the picture below.
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WINDSHEAR
Review FCOM Vol 2 Chapter 15 (Warning Systems) & Ops Manual A 8.3.8.D / Ops Manual B 3.29.
Windshear
By definition, windshear is a rapid sustained change in wind component (direction and or speed) along
the aircraft flight path which, owing to the aircraft's inertia, occurs significantly faster than the aircraft's
capability to accelerate or decelerate.
Avoidance
The flight crew should search for any clues to the presence of windshear along the intended flight path.
Presence of windshear may be indicated by:
• Thunderstorm activity
• Virga (rain that evaporates before reaching the ground)
• Pilot reports
• Low level windshear alerting system (LLWAS) warnings.
Stay clear of thunderstorm cells and heavy precipitation and areas of known windshear. If the presence
of windshear is confirmed, delay takeoff or do not continue an approach.
Precautions
If windshear is suspected, be especially alert to any of the danger signals and be prepared for the
possibility of an inadvertent encounter. The following precautionary actions are recommended if
windshear is suspected:
Takeoff
• Takeoff with full rated takeoff thrust is recommended, unless the use of a fixed derate is required to
meet a dispatch performance requirement
• For optimum takeoff performance, use flaps 5, 10 or 15 unless limited by obstacle clearance and/or
climb gradient
• Use the longest suitable runway provided it is clear of areas of known windshear
• Consider selecting WINDSHEAR on RTG (OPT) thereby increasing Vr speed to the performance limited
gross weight rotation speed, not to exceed actual gross weight Vr + 20 knots. Set V speeds for the actual
gross weight.
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Once You select windshear in OPT You will automatically get the alert message for windshear:
Windshear VR is displayed in amber in the OPT output area. Rotate at the adjusted (higher) rotation
speed (PM still calls rotate at the actual VR). This increased rotation speed results in an increased stall
margin and meets takeoff performance requirements. If windshear is encountered at or beyond the
actual gross weight VR, do not attempt to accelerate to the increased VR but rotate without hesitation.
• Be alert for any airspeed fluctuations during takeoff and initial climb. Such fluctuations may be the first
indication of windshear
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• Know the all–engine initial climb pitch attitude. Rotate at the normal rate to this attitude for all non–
engine failure takeoffs. Minimize reductions from the initial climb pitch attitude until terrain and
obstruction clearance is assured, unless stick shaker activates
• Crew coordination and awareness are very important. Develop an awareness of normal values of
airspeed, attitude, vertical speed, and airspeed buildup. Closely monitor vertical flight path instruments
such as vertical speed and altimeters. The pilot monitoring should be especially aware of vertical flight
path instruments and call out any deviations from normal
• Should airspeed fall below the trim airspeed, unusual control column forces may be required to
maintain the desired pitch attitude. Stick shaker must be respected at all times.
Approach and Landing
• Use flaps 30 for landing
• Establish a stabilized approach no lower than 1000 feet above the airport to improve windshear
recognition capability
• Use the most suitable runway that avoids the areas of suspected windshear and is compatible with
crosswind or tailwind limitations. Use ILS G/S, VNAV path or VASI/PAPI indications to detect flight path
deviations and help with timely detection of windshear
• If the autothrottle is disengaged, or is planned to be disengaged prior to landing, add an appropriate
airspeed correction (correction applied in the same manner as gust), up to a maximum of 15 knots
• Avoid large thrust reductions or trim changes in response to sudden airspeed increases as these may
be followed by airspeed decreases
• Crosscheck flight director commands using vertical flight path instruments
• Crew coordination and awareness are very important, particularly at night or in marginal weather
conditions. Closely monitor the vertical flight path instruments such as vertical speed, altimeters, and
glideslope displacement. The pilot monitoring should call out any deviations from normal. Use of the
autopilot and autothrottle for the approach may provide more monitoring and recognition time.
Recovery
Accomplish the Windshear Escape Maneuver found in the Non–Normal Maneuvers section of the QRH &
Ops Manual B 3.29.
Effect of Windshear
Aircraft performance in windshear is presented in the Boeing Flight Crew Training Manual, Chapter 7.
Because severe windshear has caused a significant number of accidents and incidents in the past, it is
ETF Airways policy to minimise the chance of hazard from exposure to windshear. This policy is affected
by dividing crew actions in three areas, Avoidance, Precautions and Recovery. Operating crews shall be
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familiar with the QRH, Non Normal manoeuvres, Windshear Caution, Warning and Windshear Escape
Manoeuvre.
Guidance in these areas is presented in the Boeing FCTM, Chapter 7, and specific crew actions in the
QRH MAN.
Execute the windshear escape manoeuvre, QRH, non-normal manoeuvres when a windshear alert is
received, or when the commander decides that a severe windshear condition is developing.
AFS Operation in Windshear
General
The autopilot and flight director provide positive corrective action to counteract most windshears. The
autothrottle system also aids in windshear recovery by providing quick response to any increase or
decrease in speed. The commanded levels of power may be beyond what the average pilot considers
necessary but, in fact, are required by the situation.
Takeoff or Go–Around
If windshear is encountered during F/D takeoff or go–around, the F/D pitch command bar provides
commands to maintain the target speed until vertical speed decreases to approximately +600 fpm. At
this point, the F/D pitch bar commands a 15 degree nose–up pitch attitude. If vertical speed continues
to decrease, the F/D continues to command a 15 degree pitch attitude until a speed of approximately
stick shaker is reached. It then commands pitch attitudes which result in intermittent activation of the
stick shaker. As the airplane transits the windshear condition, the F/D programming reverses. As climb
rate increases above approximately +600 fpm, the F/D commands pitch attitudes which result in
acceleration back to the target speed. The A/P and F/D both operate in a similar manner during A/P or
F/D go–around.
Approach and Landing
If windshear is encountered during an ILS approach, both the F/D and A/P attempt to hold the airplane
on altitude, or on glideslope after glideslope capture, without regard to angle of attack or stick shaker
limitations. Airspeed could decrease below stick shaker and into a stall if the pilot does not intervene by
pushing the TO/GA switch or disconnecting the A/P and flying manually.
WARNING: Although the F/D, A/P and A/T may be performing as previously described, severe
windshear may exceed the performance capability of the system and/or the airplane. In this situation,
the flight crew must, if necessary to avoid ground contact, be prepared to disconnect the autothrottle,
advance thrust levers to the forward stop, disconnect the autopilot and manually fly the airplane.
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Non-Normal Manoeuvres - Windshear

Windshear Caution
For predictive windshear caution alert: (“MONITOR RADAR DISPLAY” aural).
Windshear Warning
Predictive windshear warning during takeoff roll: (“WINDSHEAR AHEAD, WINDSHEAR AHEAD” aural)
• prior to V1, reject takeoff
• after V1, perform the Windshear Escape Manoeuvre.
Windshear encountered during takeoff roll:

• If windshear is encountered prior to V1, there may not be sufficient runway remaining to stop if an
RTO is initiated at V1. At VR, rotate at a normal rate toward a 15 degree pitch attitude. Once airborne,
perform the Windshear Escape Manoeuvre.
• If windshear is encountered near the normal rotation speed and airspeed suddenly decreases, there
may not be sufficient runway left to accelerate back to normal take-off speed. If there is insufficient
runway left to stop, initiate a normal rotation at least 2,000 feet before the end of the runway, even if
airspeed is low.
Higher than normal attitudes may be required to lift off in the remaining runway. Ensure maximum
thrust is set.
Predictive windshear warning during approach: (“GO–AROUND, WINDSHEAR AHEAD” aural)

• perform the Windshear Escape Manoeuvre, or, at pilot’s discretion, perform a normal go–
around.
Windshear encountered in flight:
• perform the Windshear Escape Manoeuvre.
Note: The following are indications the airplane is in windshear:
• windshear warning (two–tone siren followed by “WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR, WINDSHEAR”) or
• unacceptable flight path deviations.
Note: Unacceptable flight path deviations are recognized as uncontrolled changes from normal steady
state flight conditions below 1000 feet AGL, in excess of any of the following:
• 15 knots indicated airspeed
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• 500 fpm vertical speed

• 5° pitch attitude
• 1 dot displacement from the glideslope
• unusual thrust lever position for a significant period of time.
On approach both F/D and A/P will maintain glideslope (G/S) or altitude (ALT HOLD) regardless of
airspeed until TO/GA is pressed.
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When TO/GA is pressed:
• F/D commands target speed until reaching +600fpm

• Then 15° pitch up is commanded until stick shaker speed is reached
• It then commands pitch attitudes which result in intermittent stick shaker activation
• As the climb rate goes above +600fpm, F/D commands pitch attitudes which result in
acceleration back to target speed
• The A/P and F/D operate similarly during A/P or F/D go-around
Avoidance, Precautions and Recovery
Crew actions are divided into three areas: Avoidance, Precautions and Recovery. For more information
on avoidance and precautions, see the Windshear Supplementary Procedure in FCOM1, LTSN & OM A
8.3.8.D.
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Maintain wings level to maximize climb gradient, unless a turn is required for obstacle clearance.
This section was added to clarify the need to maintain wings level unless terrain is an issue.
Establishing desired flight path following a windshear escape manoeuvre
When the crew has determined that they are no longer in windshear conditions, establish desired flight
path using the following guide lines:
On Take-off, when no longer in windshear conditions:
• Set Flaps UP Speed
• Set climb thrust
• Retract flaps on schedule
On approach, when no longer in windshear conditions:
• Ensure speed at or above Vref, then:
o Push TOGA
o Follow standard go-around procedures, I.e.:
• Selects flaps 15
• Set Go-around thrust
• Gear Up
• Above 400 feet select a roll mode.
• Retract Flaps on Schedule, or as needed to comply with speed restriction.
• Tune Radios for missed approach or as appropriate to clearance.
Re-engage AFDS using as per SOP.
Predictive Windshear
Aircraft performance in predictive windshear is presented in the Boeing Flight Crew Training Manual,
Chapter 7. Guidance is also presented in FCOM CH 15 and QRH MAN. Operating crews shall be familiar
with the QRH, Non-Normal manoeuvres, Windshear Caution, Warning and Windshear Escape
Manoeuvre. Additionally, Predictive Windshear alerts must be studied.
Spurious Predictive Windshear (PWS) Alerts
The Honeywell PWS alert system as fitted to the 737-800 is prone to spurious Predictive Windshear
alerts (PWS) in certain atmospheric conditions. PWS alerts are most likely to occur in calm conditions
where the approach path is over an area of open water. Certain airports we operated to last year are
known to suffer from this phenomenon (EHAM RW09, GCRR RW03). Refer to the FCOM bulletin ET8-9.
Predictive Windshear Alerts are identified by the following Aural Alerts “WINDSHEAR AHEAD, GO
AROUND WINDSHEAR AHEAD or MONITOR RADAR DISPLAY” and should not be confused by the Two-
tone siren followed by “WINDSHEAR” which is indicative of a Reactive Windshear Warning.
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An ASR shall be filed in all cases of activation of PWS, spurious or otherwise.
Stall Prevention, Recognition and Recovery Training

Study: FCTM Chapter 7: Approach to Stall or Stall
Use of TEM strategies ensures a safe flight. Anticipate, Recognise and Recover.
An airplane upset is not a common occurrence. There are a variety of reasons why upsets occur, including:
• Environmentally-induced
• Systems-induced.
• Pilot-induced
According to the latest AUPRTA rev 3, one of the main reasons for Pilot induced upsets comes with the
misinterpretation of the instruments and/or lack of "active monitoring”.
Prevention
Preventing an Undesired Aircraft State, UAS, such as a stall is the ultimate goal. Application of
procedures, effective active monitoring by the PM and crew as well as effective flight path management
will help prevent an UAS. In the case of Air France 447, the crew where flying in an area of convective
weather leading the pitot probes to ice up. This led to a relatively short period of unreliable airspeed to
which the crew did not react correctly or appropriately. As a result the crew stalled the aircraft and
thereby failed to prevent an UAS developing. Anticipate, make good decision early such as flying around
convective weather, know what to look for and maintain alertness.
Always know your Airspeed Unreliable Memory Items and basic pitch and power settings for each
portion of the flight (PI 10.1). Only then can you truly perform ACTIVE monitoring and are aware at the
first divergence (refer to FCTM 8.41).
Recognition
Once AF 447 had stalled, it is very unlikely that the crew ever fully recognised this, as is evidenced by the
inappropriate control inputs. As they failed to recognise the stall, they didn’t apply the correct recovery.
Anytime the aircraft begin to diverge or deviate from the intended flight path or desired speed, identify
and determine what action must be taken and act accordingly. Fly the aircraft! Stick shaker or buffeting
is often recognised by pilots and are known indications of a stall, however the following are also
characteristics of a stall condition which may come with or without stick shaker and/or buffeting:
• lack of pitch authority
• lack of roll control
• inability to arrest descent rate.
With ice build on the aircraft, for example, the aircraft can stall before stick shaker occurs. The
indication to the pilot may be in the form of the characteristics listed above. A simulator will generally
stall both wings symmetrically. Flight tests however show that most jet aircraft have a tendency for
random wing drop (known as roll off) at the stall angle of attack. This means that it is very likely that the
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aircraft will roll left or right during a stall. This may be further worsened by asymmetric ice build-up,
auto slats moving at different rates, dents on wings and leading edges, to name a few.
To recognise that a stall is about to occur there are several indications on the PFD to look for:
• FMC Buffet alert message (flaps up only)

• Pitch Limit Indicators
• Airspeed approaching or in the lower amber band
• Amber Flashing box around indicated speed
• “airspeed low, airspeed low” aural alert, coincides with the amber speed box flashing on the PFD
Note that on takeoff the lower amber band is not displayed until the first flap retraction or until a valid
Vref is selected. This makes it more difficult to recognise a low speed condition. Accurate flying by the
PF and good monitoring and by the PM combined with effective teamwork and communication are
essential.
Because there is no amber band displayed, the speed box will not flash amber if the speed is reduced.
This also means that there is no “AIRSPEED LOW, AIRSPEED LOW” aural alert until first flap retraction
or a valid Vref is selected
Recovery
An approach to a stall is a controlled flight manoeuvre; a stall is an out-of-control, but recoverable,
condition. However, the recovery manoeuvre is the same for either an approach to a stall or a fully
developed stall.
Most approach to stall incidents have occurred where there was altitude available for recovery. The
incidents that progressed into accidents often occurred because the crew failed to make a positive
recovery when the stall warning occurred, the condition progressed to a full stall, and the airplane
impacted the ground in a stalled condition. For this reason, emphasis has shifted from a recovery with
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minimum loss of altitude to reducing the angle of attack below the wing stalling angle to complete a
positive and efficient recovery.
A stall warning should be readily identifiable by the pilot, either by initial buffet or an artificial indication
(stick shaker). During the initial stages of a stall, local airflow separation results in buffeting (initial
buffet), giving a natural warning of an approach to stall. At cruise Mach speed, stick shaker activation
occurs just after reaching initial buffet. Recovery from an approach to stall should be initiated at the
earliest recognizable stall warning, either initial buffet or stick shaker.
An airplane may be stalled in any attitude (nose high, nose low, high or low angle of bank) or any
airspeed (turning, accelerated stall). It is not always intuitively obvious that the airplane is stalled.
An airplane stall is characterized by one or more of the following conditions:
• stall warning
• buffeting, which could be heavy
• lack of pitch authority
• lack of roll control
• inability to arrest descent rate.
To recover from a stall, the angle of attack must be reduced below the wing stalling angle.
Smoothly apply nose down elevator to reduce the angle of attack until the wings are unstalled (buffet or
stick shaker stops). Nose down stabilizer trim may be needed if the control column does not provide the
needed response.
Application of forward control column (as much as full forward may be required) and the use of some
nose‐down stabilizer trim should provide sufficient elevator control to produce a nose‐down pitch rate.
It may be difficult to know how much stabilizer trim to use, and care must be taken to avoid using too
much. Pilots should not fly the airplane using stabilizer trim, and should stop trimming nose down when
they feel the g force on the airplane lessen or the required elevator force lessen. The use of too much
trim may result in the loss of control or high structural loads.
If an attempt is made to roll to wings level before the wings are unstalled, the ailerons and spoilers are
ineffective. Unloading the wing by maintaining continuous nose‐down elevator pressure keeps the wing
angle of attack low making the normal roll controls more effective. After the stall is broken, normal roll
controls, up to full deflection of ailerons and spoilers, may be used to roll in the shortest direction to
wings level, if needed. The use of rudder is normally not needed.
The Approach to Stall or Stall Recovery manoeuvre calls for the crew to advance the thrust levers as
needed. Under certain conditions, where high thrust settings are already applied such as during take-off
or go-around, it may be necessary to reduce thrust in order to prevent the angle of attack from
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continuing to increase. This is because airplanes with underwing-mounted engines have an upward pitch
moment relative to increased thrust. Furthermore, when thrust is applied this will cause a pitch up
moment, so trimming forward during the recovery would be prudent and reduce the control forces
present during the recovery. However, do not trim to an extent that could cause further upset.
How much thrust that is applied “as needed” will depend on the situation. Too much thrust whilst the
airspeed is low may cause an additional nose up pitching moment, further increasing the AoA. It is
important to first reduce the AoA with forward pressure on the control column and if needed nose
down trim. If the stall occurred as a result of a slowly reducing airspeed with the autopilot engaged
(such as was the case with the THY B737-800 accident at AMS) then the autopilot may have added a
significant amount of nose up trim which should be trimmed out by the pilot during the initial stall
recovery. This is particularly important if the stall occurs in the landing configuration close to the ground
where a more expeditious application of thrust (up to maximum) is appropriate. If the airplane is in trim
the risk of an uncontrollable nose up pitching moment as a result of adding thrust is reduced and the
pitch attitude is easier to control through the control column and elevator. Remember that turbofan
engines may take up to 8 seconds or longer to spool up from idle.
Note: Use care during recovery from a nose low attitude after the buffet and/or stick shaker have
stopped. If the pull up is too aggressive, a "secondary" stall or sustained stick shaker may result.
Secondary stalls can be avoided by ensuring that the aircraft pitch does not exceed the Pitch Limit
Indicators.
In extreme cases where the application of forward control column coupled with some nose‐down
stabilizer trim and a thrust reduction do not stop an increasing pitch rate in a nose high situation, rolling
the airplane to a bank angle that starts the nose down may be effective. If normal roll control is
ineffective, careful rudder input in the direction of the desired roll may be required. Bank angles of
about 45°, up to a maximum of 60°, could be needed. Too much rudder applied too quickly or held too
long may result in loss of lateral and directional control. Do not change gear or flap configuration during
the recovery, unless a stall warning indication is encountered during lift-off and the flaps were
inadvertently positioned up for take-off. In this case, extend flaps 1 as directed in the Approach to Stall
or Stall Recovery manoeuvre.
Summary of recovery
• Recovery from an approach to stall should be initiated at the earliest recognizable stall
warning, either initial buffet or stick shaker.
• Once stall recovery has been accomplished by reducing angle of attack with nose
down elevator and, if needed, nose down stabilizer trim, thrust is increased as needed to
increase airspeed while remaining below stall angle of attack and to recover altitude if
necessary.
• Subsequently the stall buffet and the stick shaker will stop.
• Check Airspeed and adjust thrust as needed – once the wings have been un
stalled the thrust can be added, bearing in mind the nose up pitch tendency during an increase
in thrust, this can be anticipated.
• Do not use flight director commands during the recovery. Flight director commands are
not designed to provide guidance that will lead to a recovery from an approach to stall or stall.
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• Maintain lateral control with ailerons. Rudder control should not be used because it
causes yaw and the resultant roll is undesirable.
Returning to the desired flight path following a successful stalls recovery.

What is meant by "desired flight path" in the context of a stall with the gear down and/or the flaps
extended? Is it any safe and appropriate flight path or the flight path that existed prior to the stall or
approach to stall?
This is a judgment call by the flight crew. "Desired flight path" can be, but does not necessarily have to
be, the path that existed prior to the stall. For instance, if the stall occurred during the approach, if in
PF's opinion, the previous path can safely be attained without compromising the "stabilized approach"
criteria it would be acceptable to return to it. However, the "desired flight path" can also be a go-around
in the correct configuration or new vectors by ATC if it is safe to do so.
In the case of a stall on approach in landing configuration use the following guidance:
• Complete the approach to stall recovery procedure
• When the stall recovery is complete and the airspeed is at or above Vref:
o Push TOGA, call “Go-Around Flaps 15 Set Thrust”
o Complete a normal go-around
Angle of Attack
As mentioned above, the angle of attack must be reduced to recover from the stall or approach to stall.
Historically, stall recoveries were assessed and graded by the amount of altitude lost during the
recovery. This meant that full thrust and minimum altitude loss was desirable in training. This is no
longer the case. Thrust is added “as needed” once the angle of attack has been reduced below the stall
angle of attack and/or stick shaker or buffet. In certain circumstances considerable thrust may be
needed and judging this is particularly important on the B737 due to the under wing mounted engines.
Once the angle of attack is below the stall AoA thrust is then added.
For Boeing stall recovery manouver reffer to QRH Manouver section.
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UPRT
An airplane upset is an undesired airplane state characterized by unintentional divergences from

parameters normally experienced during operations. Deviations from the desired airplane state will
become larger until action is taken to stop the divergence.
Return to the desired airplane state can be achieved through natural airplane reaction to accelerations,
auto-flight system response or pilot intervention.
An airplane upset may involve pitch and/or bank angle divergences as well as inappropriate airspeeds for
the conditions.
The OEMs believe that flight crew engagement combats complacency through active monitoring.
Therefore, active monitoring is the critical element to ensure awareness and avoidance of undesired
airplane states and provides the strongest countermeasure against startle. An engaged crew is in the best
position to cope with undesired airplane states.
From the early stages of training, pilots acquire Knowledge, Skills and Attitudes to perform active
monitoring throughout all operations and phases of flight. This should become part of the "competent
pilot DNA".
In the context of undesired airplane states, active monitoring means keeping track of the environment,
the airplane's energy state and flight path trajectory. This creates expectations about future airplane
state to detect deviations in order to take timely corrective actions.
Effective monitoring of the environment, the airplane energy state and flight path depends very heavily
on an accurate and comprehensive understanding of the current airplane's energy state and flight path
trajectory based on the relevant indications of its status. This understanding, or mental model, can then
be used to create expectations about future state and deviations from the expected state. These
expectations then serve as a baseline for monitoring.
The monitoring process involves:
• Pilots using their knowledge to formulate an understanding (mental model).

• Their understanding (mental model) is used to create a set of expectations that directs their
attention and their perception of events, e.g. if you are expecting to level off you are likely to
monitor parameters associated with level off.
• When their expectations are not met, pilots use their knowledge to direct their attention to seek
and perceive additional information to fill any gaps in their understanding that were identified by
the deviations. Actively seeking more information is part of the monitoring process leading to
corrective actions if necessary. Monitoring other parameters, changing the display information,
and communicating with the other crew members are ways to get more information.
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Active monitoring is the responsibility of all crew members to ensure the airplane state is understood
and correct for the situation.
Each pilot should:
• Know and understand the expected airplane state for the situation
• Communicate expectations
• Keep track of current airplane state
• Detect and communicate deviations from expectations
• Assess risk and decide on a response
• Update and communicate understanding
• Take timely corrective actions
CAUSES OF AIRPLANE UPSETS
An airplane upset is not a common occurrence. There are a variety of reasons why upsets occur, including:
• Environmentally-induced
o Air Mass Related (CAT, Mountain Waves, WS)
o Thunderstorm (Air Mass, Frontal, Microburst)
o
• Systems-induced
o Instrument failure (Airspeed Unreliable)

o Autoflight System overreliance
o Flight Control anomalies (flight control, spoiler, flaps problems)
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• Pilot-induced
o Lack of Instrument Crosscheck

o Incorrect Pitch and Power Settings
o Inattention and Complacency (lack of active monitoring)
o Pilot Incapacitation
o Vertigo or Spatial Disorientation
ENERGY STATES
A pilot has three sources of energy available to manage or manipulate the flight path of an airplane.
The term "energy state" describes how much of each kind of energy the airplane has available at any given
time.
Pilots who understand the airplane energy state will be in a position to know instantly what options they
may have to maneuver their airplane and therefore manage the trajectory.
The three sources of energy are:
a. Kinetic energy, which increases with increasing airspeed.

b. Potential energy, which is proportional to altitude.
c. Chemical energy, from the fuel in the tanks which can be converted to thrust.
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These three types of energy can be traded, or exchanged:
• Airspeed can be traded for altitude (kinetic to potential energy)

• Altitude can be traded for airspeed (potential to kinetic energy)
• Thrust can be converted into airspeed and/or altitude (chemical to either kinetic or potential
energy)
Kinetic energy needs to be replenished (from potential or chemical energy), as it is continuously expended
in the process of generating the aerodynamic forces acting on the airplane which result in controlled flight
(lift and drag).
This process of consciously controlling the energy state of the airplane is referred to as "energy
management".
The trading of energy must be accomplished with a view toward the final required energy state.
The objective of energy management is to keep the desired kinetic, potential and chemical energy within
operating limits.
This objective is especially important during an inadvertent upset and the ensuing recovery.The process
of controlling forces to produce a new energy state takes time.
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The amount of time required is a function of the mass of the airplane and the magnitude of the applied
forces.
Airplanes of larger mass generally take longer to change orientation than airplanes of smaller mass. The
longer time requires the pilot to plan ahead more in a large-mass airplane to make sure that the actions
taken will achieve the final desired energy state.
Additionally, the effects of commanded thrust changes on turboprop airplanes are much more rapid than
on large turbofan airplanes.
Excellent guidance on UPRT is found in AUPURTA Rev 3 (ICAO website), FCTM Chapter 7 and Recovery
technique in QRH Manouvers Section.
Elements from UPSET PREVENTION TRAINING to be covered are as follows:
• Aeroplane performance (high and low altitudes)
• Angle of attack (AOA) and stall awareness
• Use of trims
• Positive/negative/increasing/decreasing g-loads
• g-load management
• Kinetic energy vs potential energy vs chemical energy (power)
• Performance and effects of power plant
• Flight at different speeds, including slow flight, and altitudes within the full normal flight
envelope
• Basic flight physics principles concerning flight at high altitude, with a particular emphasis on the
relative proximity of the critical Mach number and the stall, pitch behaviour, and an
understanding of the reduced stall angle of attack when compared with low-altitude flight.
• The requirement to promptly and accurately apply the stall recovery procedure, as provided by the
aircraft manufacturer, at the first indication of an impending stall. Differences between high- altitude
and low-altitude stalls must be addressed.
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Notification of Emergency to cabin Crew- Crew Emergency Briefing (NITS)
NITS” is a two-way communication system: SCCM shall read-back all the information received from the
CMDR to acknowledge NITS briefing. The SCCM shall inform CCM about the situation using the same
NITS structure received from the CMDR. NITS briefing can be conducted over interphone or inside the
cockpit.
In the event of the Pilots wearing oxygen masks, the briefing may have to be conducted via an
interphone. CMDR explains the emergency “NITS” to SCCM who repeats to define clarity. CMDR may be
extremely busy; therefore it may be necessary to ask questions to ascertain exactly what action shall be
taken.
After the declaration of an emergency (emergency alert “Purser to the cockpit!”) CMDR will give SCCM
a “NITS” briefing. This shall be used when communicating emergency situations.
The CMDR shall inform the SCCM about:
N Nature i.e. engine fire, Decompression, Undercarriage Technical or Flying

control malfunction, Pilot Incapacitation, etc
I Intensions i.e. ditching , crash landing, precautionary landing, diversion,
evacuation required etc
T Time avaliable estimated time prior to touchdown / impact (snycronise watches)
Special Any known factors which may affect the escape routes; external
instructions hazards such as fire or known terrain; exits available; confirmation
S of brace for impact signal in the event of the PA being
unserviceable.
Communications- Communicating with the Passengers during NN events
The PA plays an important part in maintaining Passenger confidence and control when a Non-Normal
situation occurs.
During a recent flight we were able (through reports) observe the passenger anxiety levels in the cabin
following a non normal fumes event. All cabin crew procedures were carried out to a good standard and
in accordance with ETF policy. The key point that raised passenger concerns was repetitive relocation of
firefighting equipment from/to the aft galley, where the smell was most intensive, as all of them
together felt the smell without knowing the source. The fact that the fumes reoccurred several times
within 1 hour significantly contributed to the stress levels of the passengers.
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• Imagine the following; the information passed to the passengers by the Captain is; “you may see
some fire engines near and around the aircraft after landing” (or words to that effect). In this
example all the passengers heard was “FIRE!!” and the concern levels shot up.
Response / Actions:
• Every effort must be made by Crews Pilots to consider content of the PA, the impact of the PA on
passengers and the effectiveness of a PA during non normal situations. During simulator training
and checking Instructors and Examiners will insist that Crews include appropriate content when
making PA’s. Think about what message you are passing to the passengers, consider the
negative effect of ‘over-information’, carefully analyse what information is necessary and keep
content to a minimum.
• Ensure that the words “FIRE” or “ENGINE FAILURE”, “Lost an Engine”, “Damaged” etc are not used
in any context that may induce high levels of stress in the passengers. Think about the cabin,
avoid introducing discomfort and increasing stress levels and know that your PA will almost
certainly be quoted by passengers when interviewed by the press. PA’
• It is important that you develop your skills in delivery of passenger announcements, particularly
during non normal situations. Be sure to impart timely information with cues that the aircraft is
being flown by safe, by competent pilots.
CMDR will establish initial contact with the passengers by making the following PA:
“Ladies & Gentlemen

May I have your attention please! I must inform you that due to a technical problem we are
forced to make an emergency landing on land/airport/water in approximately.... minutes.
Please, remain seated, keep calm and follow our instructions carefully. All our crew members
are specially trained for situations of this kind.”
CMDR may ask SCCM to make the announcement due to a heavy workload in the flight crew
compartment. SCCM shall make the following announcement on CMDR’s behalf:
“Ladies and Gentlemen, may I have your attention please. This is your Purser speaking.
On behalf of the Commander I have to inform you that due to a technical fault we have
decided to make an - emergency landing in about ___ minutes.
- emergency landing on water in about ___ minutes.
We have to prepare the cabin and it is important that you remain calm and follow Cabin
Crew’s instructions carefully.”
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CRM – The Decision Making Process (F-O-R-D-E-C)
ETF’s Decision Making process is well known to Crews and is used in a variety of circumstances,
particularly during non-normal situations. A formal, structured process of decision making that is
familiar to both Crewmembers is essential to a safe, coordinated response and resolution by the Crew as
a Team. As a Commander (Team leader), understanding of the F-O-R-D-E-C model greatly improves CRM
concepts in non-normal situations, this in turn enhances safety.
Unexpected events can impose a ‘startle factor’ which may impact significantly in the decision making
process – Good CRM (Communications in Flight deck and with CC), use of F-O-R-D-E-C as a structure to
aid the recovery process are both essential tools.
You should always consider the process to follow a circular pattern or clock face, this has two primary
effects:
1. The decision making process is not linear, it starts with defining a problem accurately and once
an evaluation has been completed you must ascertain whether or not the decision has
effectively dealt with the problem initially defined. If not the process continues.
2. The decision making process may take considerable time and need not be rushed. The nature of
the problem may require a prompt response or a more considered response by the Crew; this is
where effective communications are essential to this process.
REMEMBER: This process is designed as part of a CRM initiative, it is critical that each Crewmember
work as a team to provide support, to disclose pertinent information and advocate themselves. This
process does not absolve any crewmember from using common sense and good judgement in an
environment that can produce an array of non- normal events and emergencies. Work with your Crew,
listen to your Crew, encourage teamwork and advocacy.
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Some important tips when applying the decision making model:
♣ AVIATE NAVIGATE COMMUNICATE- Maintain safe flight and good Situational Awareness.
Always first fly the aircraft, confirm your position and confirm with your colleague the nature of
the problem. Only then perform the MEMORY items, after which ANC starts again to confirm
whether its applicable to complete QRH at current position or point the nose in the right
direction. Followed by After Take off Checklist (or before that any SP if necessary) and
afterwards the structured decision making process F-O-R-D-E-C, as well as any necessary NITS &
PA.
♣ Never start F-O-R-D-E-C with your mind made up!
♣ Analyse the problem - Each Pilot should independently take the time to diagnose the
problem without influencing the other.
♣ Confirmation bias can lead to disastrous decisions. Your own mind acts like a compulsive ‘yes-
man’ who echoes whatever you want to believe. Learn to ignore the ‘yes-man’ and always lead
the Decision Making Process but use the First Officer for initial inputs to each section.
♣ Don't rush. The decision making process may take considerable time. The nature of the
problem may require a prompt response or a more considered response by the Crew.
♣ Actively encourage advocacy between Crewmembers.
♣ Listen to what your Crewmembers are telling you.
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Threat and Error Management (TEM)
Threat and Error Management (TEM) is high on our training agenda. It is essential that during Command
Upgrade training and checking the Crew apply the concepts of TEM. You must be aware of the
importance of TEM and the need to move the concept of TEM from “background thinking” to being
more prominent in your management of normal and non-normal situations.
The use of TEM on the flight deck is an important part of the aviation safety management system. It is
seen as the last line of defence in controlling risks to the system. These risks are the situations and
events which reduce operational safety and the probability of safe flight. TEM on the flight deck has
been compared to defensive driving for a motorist in an aviation context i.e. “defensive flying for pilots”.
It maximizes safety margins through a proactive philosophy of anticipation, recognition, and recovery
through the use of techniques for managing threats, errors and undesired aircraft states.
Threats are:
• Events or errors that occur outside the influence of the flight Crew.
─ Threats increase the complexity of a flight.

─ Threats lead to flight crew errors.
─ Threats require crew attention and management.
Errors are:
• Actions or inactions by the Flight Crew
─ Errors lead to unexpected events

─ Errors reduce safety margins
─ Errors increase the probability of incidents or accidents
Example: A wet runway is a threat to a landing operation – more landing distance required.
The failure of the crew to anticipate the need for more landing distance or to adjust the level of braking
would be an error related to the threat.
Threats
A threat or hazard is any situation, event, or circumstance that may affect the safety of flight:
• The effects of threats occur in the future – so plan ahead, ANTICIPATE.

• Threats are not errors, but they increase the potential for error.
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Error
It is human nature to make errors, thus error management is a vital safety device; the process is similar
to threat management:
• Anticipate situations that could lead to errors

• Avoid these situations and circumstances that promote errors
• Recognise and Identify an error, take corrective action to Recover to safe flight
Checklist Discipline
During your Command training and checking Instructors and Examiners will be assessing you on your
ability to correctly use the QRH checklists in an effective, structured and disciplined manner. This is an
essential function and responsibility of every Commander. Essential study: QRH Checklist Instructions -
Non-Normal Checklists – Non Normal checklist use.
Non–normal checklist use starts when the airplane flight path and configuration are correctly
established. Only a few situations need an immediate response (such as CABIN ALTITUDE WARNING or
Rapid Depressurization). Usually, time is available to assess the situation before corrective action is
started. All actions must then be coordinated under the captain's supervision and done in a deliberate,
systematic manner. Flight path control must never be compromised. When a non–normal situation
occurs, at the direction of the pilot flying, both crewmembers do all memory items in their areas of
responsibility without delay.
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The pilot flying calls for the checklist when:
• the flight path is under control

• the airplane is not in a critical phase of flight (such as takeoff or landing)
• all memory items are complete.
The pilot monitoring reads aloud:
• the checklist title

• as much of the condition statement as needed to verify that the correct checklist has been
selected
• as much of the objective statement (if applicable) as needed to understand the expected result
of doing the checklist.
Note: it is good airmanship and CRM for Captains to verbally agree and state that the correct non normal
checklist has been opened .
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Tailstrike Avoidance
Tailkstrike Prevention Dos & Don’ts
Takeoff – Dos:
• DO Use Normal Rotation Technique (i.e. 2o to 2.5o per sec)

• DO Ensure Takeoff V speeds are correctly entered and that they are appropriate for prevailing
conditions.
• DO Use Flap 5 to provide additional tail clearance unless the airfield brief states otherwise.
• DO know your airplane! Have an idea of approximate T/O and Approach speeds.
• DO Consider using Full Thrust during gusty/crosswind conditions
Takeoff – Don’ts:
• DONT rotate early

• DON’T Over-rotate
• DON’T Assume! Double check takeoff data, especially if something doesn’t look right. Double
check ZFW entry with the other crewmember. Crosscheck with the Loadsheet.
Landing – Dos:
• DO Maintain a specific target airspeed for landing (Vref + 5 Minimum to start of flare)
• DO Ensure the aircraft is in trim at start of flare
• DO Fly a stabilised approach in accordance with ETF’s procedures, if not stabilized then Go-
Around
• DO Fly the nose wheel onto the runway immediately after main landing gear touchdown
• DO Remember – Sometimes a Go around is the correct option
Landing – Don’ts:
• DON’T Hold off in the flare

• DON’T trim in the flare or after touchdown
• DON’T Allow pitch to increase after touchdown
Remember - If a tailstrike occurs – Follow the Checklist!
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Other important references are shown below:

Flight Crew Training Manual Section 3: Takeoff and Initial Climb
• Rotation and Liftoff – All engines

• Typical Takeoff Tail Clearance
• Effect of Rotation Speed and Pitch Rate on Liftoff
• Gusty Wind and Strong Crosswind Conditions
• Rotation and Liftoff – One Engine Inoperative (Typical Takeoff Tail Clearance)
Flight Crew Training Manual Section 8: Tail Strike
• Takeoff Risk Factors

• Landing Risk Factors
General Information
• More tail strikes occur on landing than on takeoff (70% of 737-800 tail strikes occurred on
landings)
• The 737-800 tailskid protects the aircraft on takeoff not on landing. The 737-800 does however
have adequate aft body landing clearance when correct landing techniques are used.
Takeoff Risk Factors
• Mis-trimmed stabilizer
• Improper rotation techniques
• Improper use of the flight director
• Rotation prior to Vr
• Excessive initial pitch attitude
• Flight control abuse (over controlling) during gusty/crosswind conditions
Takeoff Risk Factors Explained
Mis-trimmed Stabilizer
• Usually results from using erroneous/incorrect performance data

• Incorrect weights
• Incorrect center of gravity (CG)
• Nose up mis-trim can present problems
• Normal recommended rotation rate is 2 to 2.5 degrees per second
• Nose up mis-trim can produce a rotation rate of 5 degrees per second or more
• Aircraft may try to fly off runway without any pilot input
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Improper Rotation Techniques
• Too early or too late rotation

• Too fast or too slow rotation
• Excessive rotation rate
• Excessive initial pitch attitude
• Rotation at incorrect Vr for the weight and flap setting
Effects of Improper Rotation
• Slow or late rotation uses additional runway – lower height at runway end
• Early, over or fast rotation - decreases initial climb performance
• Early and/or fast rotation increases chance of tail strike
Improper Use of the Flight Director
• Do not use Flight Director guidance during rotation

• Flight directors are designed to provide pitch guidance only after the aircraft is airborne,
nominally passing 35 feet
• Proper rotation rate reaches 35 feet with about 15 degrees and a speed of V2 + 15
• An aggressive rotation into the pitch bar may rotate the tail into the ground
Considerations during Gusty wind and Crosswind Conditions
• Consider a thrust setting near or at maximum takeoff thrust

• Manage Gusty winds and use proper amount of flight controls during crosswinds
• Use just enough control wheel input to maintain wings level (Crosswind T/O)
• Avoid excess control wheel displacement
• Momentarily delay rotation during a gust
• Transition smoothly from slip after liftoff by slowly neutralising the controls
• Avoid tendency to ‘pop’ the airplane off the ground during rotation
• Use normal rate of rotation (a bit slower is better than faster)
• If after reaching takeoff attitude and the airplane is NOT airborne avoid the tendency to
increase the rotation rate. Slow or momentarily stop the rotation rate, Do not increase the
rotation rate
• The Crew must IDENTIFY and DISCUSS the THREAT of tailstrike during Takeoff and /or
Approach briefings.
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Landing Risk Factors
• Unstabilised approach
• Holding airplane off the runway in the flare
• Mis-handling of crosswinds
• Over-rotation during go-around
• Note: Tail strikes on landing generally cause more damage. The tail may strike the runway
before the main gear damaging the aft pressure bulkhead.
Landing Risk Factors Explained
Unstabilised Approach
• Usually a factor appearing in every landing tail strike

• Flight recorders show if not stabilized by 500 feet, you will never get the approach stabilized
• Excessive or insufficient airspeed in the flare
• Increases tendency towards large pitch and power changes in the flare
• Spoilers add nose up pitching force when deployed
• Increases tendency toward vigorous nose up pull at touch down causing a tail strike
• If the airplane is slow, pulling the nose up in the flare does not reduce the sink rate, but may
increase it
• Thrust levers above idle at touchdown add to instability
Holding Off in the Flare
• Allowing airspeed to decrease below Vref prior to landing flare resulting in high pitch attitude
• Trimming the stabilizer nose up just prior to or during landing flare
• Holding the airplane off with increasing pitch attitude in an attempt to make an excessively
smooth touchdown
• Increases pitch attitude at touchdown
• Do not attempt to use aerobraking. Fly nose gear onto runway immediately after main gear
touchdown
Mis-handling of Crosswinds
• Crosswind landings may increase the tail strike risk, especially in gusty conditions
• To stay on glide path at high ground speeds, descent rates of 700 to 900 feet are required
(remember to bring VSI digital readout into your scan)
• Cross controlling prior to touch down, reduces lift, increases drag, and may increase rate of
descent. In ETF we use the de-crab during flare and the touchdown with crab techniques for
crosswind landings on slippery runways. Please Refer to LTSN.
• Combined effects of high closure rate, shifting winds plus turbulence, can increase tail strikes
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Over Rotation During Go-around
• Go-arounds initiated during flare and after a bounced landing, can cause tail strikes
• If a touchdown far down the runway is likely, consider a go-around
• ETF supports go-arounds. There is a no blame policy in force.
Bounced Landing
• If a bounce occurs, hold or re-establish a normal landing attitude and add thrust as necessary
to control rate of descent
• Thrust need not be added for a shallow bounce or skip
• When a high, hard bounce occurs, initiate a go-around.
• Apply go-around thrust and use normal go-around procedures. A second touchdown may
occur during the go-around.
Takeoff – Engine failure at V1
• On Recognition of the engine failure, if the decision is to keep going, the PF must control the
aircraft on the ground using rudder.
• The PM must call out “Engine failure” or “Engine fire” to alert the PF. This call is NOT to indicate
which engine has failed or to determine the cause of the failure.
• At Vr the PF will rotate the aircraft to an initial target attitude of 12.5 degrees nose up. The rate
of rotation is 1.5 - 2.0 degrees per second.
• Directional control in the air is achieved with use of rudder and aileron.
When a positive rate of climb is achieved the PM will call ‘’Positive Rate’’ and the PF will call
“Gear Up”.
• When the gear is up the PF shall establish the aircraft in a climb by reference to the Flight
directors and the PFD.
• The PM shall immediately assist in correct tracking by alerting the PF to any required correction.
• At 400AGL:
PF verifies/calls for HDG SEL and calls “State malfunction”.

PM must re-confirm the failure by crosschecking the engine indications out loud.
PM will callout the specific failure e.g. “engine flameout, number 1 / 2 engine”. The PF
shall confirm this.
If memory items are applicable the PF must call for the correct QRH NN Checklist by
title. e.g. “Engine Fire Severe Damage or Separation memory items”
• Above 400AGL: Ideally, after completion of Memory items and before “Set Flaps Up Speed”, call
ATC with a PAN or MAYDAY as appropriate (Memory items should not get in a way of
acceleration at MFRA!)
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• After PM calls “Flaps up no lights”, PF calls “LVL CHG, MCT” and engages the Autopilot. PM shall
select LVL CHG and set MCT.
• PF shall then briefly pause for Aviate Navigate Communicate and check weather QRH checklist
can be accomplished at this moment or should ATC be advised for a specific direction (i.e. away
from terrain, towards TO Alternate, etc.)
• PF shall then call for appropriate Non Normal checklist e.g. “QRH, Engine Fire or Severe Damage
or Separation checklist” or “QRH, Engine failure or shutdown checklist” and “My radios”. PM will
commence the appropriate QRH Non Normal Checklist.
• The following sequence of events should be followed:
1. Fly at the UP speed until above MSA.

2. Complete the appropriate QRH Non Normal Checklist
3. Complete the AFTER T/O CHECKLIST
4. FORDEC, NITS, PA
5. Complete the QRH Recovery Checklist (if applicable)
Correct identification of an engine malfunction is essential in leading the crew to perform the correct
QRH procedure. (i.e. is it severe damage, flameout, stall/surge, etc).
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Engine Failure Recognition/ Turbofan malfunctions
ENGINE FAILURE ENGINE SEVERE DAMAGE
The above indications are typical of an Theabove indications t are typical of an

engine flameout/failure or rundown. No engine having severe damage/ seizure.
apparent damage is evident, engine This is recognizable by the lack of rotation
spools down normally. No Airframe of the N1 and/or N2 gauge. Damage is
vibration present. therefore evident.
The Engine in this situation is generally The Engine in this situation is not suitable
considered acceptable for an Engine for an Engine Inflight start attempt.
Inflight start unless other conditions
would indicate damage such as noise, A condition such as this example would
smell etc. regularly be accompanied by a noise/bang
or vibration.
The Engine Failure alert appears on the
EGT gauge when N2 drops below 50%. The Engine Failure alert appears on the
EGT gauge when N2 drops below 50%.
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ENGINE SEPARATION ENGINE TURBINE FAILURE
The above indications are typical of an The above indications are typical of an
engine separation. This is recognizable by engine turbine blade detaching from the
Engine In-Flight
the loss of signalStart
to theProcedure
engine turbine. Effects can include a loud bang,
instrumentation.
High or Rapidly rising EGT, High vibrations
Refer to QRH NNC Engine In-Flight Start.
at high thrust settings (see VIB indicator).
Of course in this situation an Engine Inflight
Decrease in N1 efficiency and or decrease
start attempt is pointless.
in available thrust. Damage is therefore
A condition such as this example could be
evident.
accompanied by a noise/ bang or vibration
etc. The engine in this situation should be shut
down and is not suitable for an Engine
Asymmetry associated with a separated Inflight start attempt.
engine condition is generally less than sever
damage due to the removal of drag from
that wing.
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Engine Inflight Start
Crews must be cognitive that all items listed in the condition statement must be met prior to attempting
an in-flight engine start.
It is ETF’s policy to attempt an Engine In-flight Start after an engine shutdown with no fire or
apparent damage.
The Crew will assess the failure using all available engine instruments.
Indications of apparent damage could be:
• A fire that has been extinguished
• Seizure of either N1 or N2
• High Vibration
• High EGT or
• If the engine failure was the result of FOD or Birdstrike etc.
An engine start should be attempted for a simple run down e.g. due heavy rain etc.
There is no EEC protection during an in-flight start
The following are changes from a ground start:
• GRD or FLT may be used (for crossbleed or windmill start)
• Start lever is raised to idle detent at a minimum of 11% N1
• The crew must manually monitor the start limit of 725 degrees
• 30 seconds is allowed for EGT increase
• The start may be very slow at altitude, it may be incorrectly interpreted as a hung start
Due to the issues described above the part of the checklist explaining the start should be read
through before the actual start attempt. It is still important to be aware of the engine conditions
and restart requirements before attempting the restart.
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S/E ILS and Go-Around
Review the profiles for SE ILS and Go-Around.

Ref. QRH MAN section.
Reasons to Reject and RTO procedure
A high speed RTO is a demanding and high risk manoeuvre. The company mitigates the risks associated
with the RTO by clearly specifying the circumstances when an RTO above 80kts must be carried out:
• Fire or Fire Warning

• Engine Failure
• Predictive Windshear warning
• Airplane is unsafe or unable to fly (Pilot Incapacitation falls under this category)
From OFDM feedback and other airlines statistics, generally the Crew perception of the RTO initiation
speed, is considerably less than the actual speed achieved in the manoeuvre with many cases achieving
speeds in excess of 130kts.
As speed approaches V1, the successful completion of an RTO becomes increasingly more difficult. FAA
studies of 97 rejected takeoff runway excursion accidents/incidents have revealed that 55% were
initiated at speeds in excess of V1. Additionally, when the accident records involving Go/No Go decisions
were reviewed, virtually no revenue flight was found where a ‘GO’ decision was made and the aircraft
was incapable of continuing the takeoff. V1 is the maximum speed at which the rejected takeoff must
have been initiated to allow the aircraft to stop within the remaining field length. Conducting RTOs at
speeds above 80kts for reasons other than those specified above is not recommended as any benefits in
these circumstances are at best questionable.
Crews are reminded that the RTO ‘REJECT’ call is a Commanders call, it is made only for the reasons
described above and the call must be made before the aircraft reaches V1.
Furthermore a commander should never decide to reject a takeoff at or after V1 unless he/she is certain
that the safety of the aircraft would be endangered if it became airborne.
Deviations from these very prescriptive requirements will put crews and passengers at risk and may
expose the crew should an incident or accident occur as a result of the RTO manoeuvre.
Background information and Statistics:
The FAA studies highlight that in more than half of the 97 accident the crew rejected the takeoff after
V1. The diagram below categorises the speed at which these RTOs were initiated:
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Reasons why these unsuccessful RTOs were initiated vary, but approximately one fifth were prompted
by engine failures or engine indication warnings.
Although historically training has centered on engine failure as the primary reason to reject, the
statistics show that wheel or tire problems have caused just about as many accidents and incidents as
have engine events.
Other reasons that rejects occurred were for unsafe configuration, indication or light, crew coordination
problems, bird strikes, or ATC. Undetermined causes make up the rest. What is important to note here is
that the majority of past RTO accidents were not engine failure events. Full takeoff power from all
engines was available.
Analysis of the available data suggests that of these RTO accidents and incidents, approximately 82%
were avoidable.
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These potentially avoidable accidents can be divided into three categories:
1) Roughly 15% of the RTO accidents of the past were the result of improper preflight planning. Some of
these instances were caused by loading errors and others by incorrect preflight procedures.
2) About 15 % of the accidents and incidents could be correlated with incorrect pilot technique or
procedures in the stopping effort. Delayed application of the brakes, failure to deploy the speedbrakes,
and the failure to make a maximum effort stop until late in the RTO were the chief characteristics of this
category.
3) Finally, in approximately 52% of these events, the airplane was capable of continuing the takeoff and
landing safely.
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The US NTSB concludes: “...pilots faced with unusual or unique situations may perform high-speed RTOs
unnecessarily or may perform them improperly.” Therefore a review of the reason to reject above 80
knots and the RTO maneuver is completed every day by the Captain during the initial emergency
briefing.
What should all these statistics tell a pilot?
First, RTOs are not a very common event. This speaks well of equipment reliability and the
preparation that goes into operating commercial jet airplanes.
Second, and more important, the infrequency of RTO occurrence may lead to complacency. Be
prepared to make the correct “Go/No Go” decision on every takeoff.
V1
Studies have shown that many pilots may not clearly understand the definition of V1 or how the choice
of V1 can affect their takeoff performance.
V1 is defined as the maximum speed in the takeoff at which the pilot must take the first action (e.g.,
apply brakes, reduce thrust, deploy speed brakes) to stop the airplane within the accelerate-stop
distance. V1 also means the minimum speed in the takeoff, following a failure of the critical engine at
VEF, at which the pilot can continue the takeoff and achieve the required height above the takeoff
surface within the takeoff distance.
V1 is not a decision speed. The decision to continue the take-off has already been made when V1 is
reached.
Maximum Stopping Performance

The objective of the rejected takeoff procedure is to quickly reconfigure the airplane to produce the
maximum retarding forces possible under the prevailing conditions. The “correct” procedure for
accomplishing a rejected takeoff is contained in the QRH. It is important that these procedures be
followed in order to achieve the maximum stopping performance.
Basically, thrust must come to idle, full brakes must be applied, the speedbrakes/spoilers must be
raised, and maximum reverse thrust consistent with airplane controllability must be applied until the
crew is assured that the airplane will stop within the remaining runway.
A review of overrun accidents indicates that, in many cases, the stopping capability available was not
used to the maximum during the initial and mid portions of the stop maneuver, because there appeared
to be “plenty of runway available”. In some cases, less than full reverse thrust was used and the brakes
were released for a period of time, letting the airplane roll on the portion of the runway that would have
produced good braking action. When the airplane moved onto the final portion of the runway, the crew
discovered that the presence of moisture on the top of rubber deposits in the touchdown and turnoff
areas resulted in very poor braking capability, and the airplane could not be stopped on the runway.
When an RTO is initiated on wet or slippery runways, it is especially important to use full stopping
capability until the airplane is completely stopped.
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Tires and Brakes
A tire failure can go unnoticed by the crew. On the other hand tire failures have in some cases been
incorrectly interpreted as engine problems due to the bang and vibration it may produce. If engine
parameters are normal and engines are producing the required thrust, the takeoff should not be
rejected after 80 knots following a tire failure.
You may only have a second or two to analyze the problem and decide. The UK AAIB has been
investigating tire failure and RTO decisions. They reported that pilots often incorrectly interpret a tire
failure as an event that threatens the safety of flight. As a result the pilots do an unnecessary RTO.
When a tire fails at high speed it is possible that pieces of it can be thrown against the aft body or the
flaps, but it is usually not going to affect the ability of the airplane to fly.
Unless a tire failure in the high speed regime has produced damage that puts the ability of the airplane
to fly in serious doubt, the crew should be “Go” minded and the takeoff continued.
There will be more distance available for the stop with a blown tire if the takeoff is continued and the
airplane returns to land. Braking capability and directional control during an RTO will be greatly
reduced with a tire failure; therefore the aircraft may not be able to stop on the remaining runway.
Clear Communication
The few seconds of communication regarding a non-normal situation during takeoff can mean the
difference between success and disaster. For this reason, communications must be precise, effective,
and efficient. Standard callouts contribute to situational awareness. The callouts, coupled with both
crew members monitoring airspeed, leave the crew with a common perception of what actions are
proper in the event of a non-normal indication. The crew member noting a problem should
communicate this clearly and precisely without inferring things that may not be true.
When making the RTO decision the Captain should clearly announce the decision to reject or continue
the takeoff using the standard phrase “REJECT” or “CONTINUE”.
Basic operating procedures call for the pilot flying the airplane to include airspeed in his/her instrument
scan during the takeoff ground roll. Hence he/she is always aware of the approximate speed. The pilot
monitoring monitors airspeed in more detail and calls “V1” as a confirmation of reaching this critical
point in the acceleration.
The pilot flying cannot react properly to V1 unless the V1 call is made in a timely, clear, and audible
manner. The V1 callout should be completed by the time the airplane reaches V1. This should preclude a
situation where the “NO GO” decision is inadvertently made after V1.
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During takeoff roll the 80kt call has three functions:
1. An incapacitation check.
2. Airspeed crosscheck.
3. It defines the high and low speed RTO
It is expected that if the 80kts incapacitation check is failed due to an incapacitated crewmember it is
expected that the takeoff will be rejected. This is in keeping with the policy of rejecting the takeoff
above 80kts if the aircraft is unsafe to fly.
If the 80kt incapacitation check was successful and a crewmember becomes incapacitated at a later
point in the takeoff roll the decision to reject the takeoff is more complex. The remaining crewmember
will be required to make a judgment based on the prevailing circumstances for that takeoff - such as
runway condition / runway length available / headwind - tailwind component etc, and the condition /
position of the incapacitated crewmember in relation to the flight controls.
In general, having had a successful 80kt incapacitation check, statistics would suggest that it is safer to
continue the takeoff.
Even though, obviously, there may be genuine reasons to reject a takeoff above 80 kts, the crew
should be GO minded.
If a takeoff can be continued, the crew has the entire runway to land back on or the option to fly to a
different runway. There is also a lot more time to evaluate the situation when airborne.
The following expands on some of the reason to reject before 80 kts (Ref. QRH MAN.1.2 for a full list of
reason to reject before 80 kts):
System Failure
o MASTER CAUTION During Takeoff Roll
• It must be clear that if any MASTER CAUTION is annunciated below 80kts during the
Takeoff, the Takeoff may be rejected. Equally it may be continued depending on the
circumstances.
• Any MASTER CAUTION annunciation not associated with an engine failure above 80kts
requires the crew to continue.
Tire Failure
o Ref. FCTM chapter 8, landing gear
o The takeoff may be rejected prior to 80 kts
o Do not reject above 80 kts
o Braking capability and directional control during an RTO will be greatly reduced
o It is safer to get airborne, you will have the entire runway or a different runway available to land
on.
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Configuration warning
o The takeoff must be rejected if it happens prior to 80 knots
o It is NOT acceptable to change configuration during the takeoff roll
Above 80 knots (Between 0 kts and V1)
o Fire or Fire warning

o Engine failure
o Predictive windshear warning
o Airplane unsafe or unable to fly
Operations Part B 3.2.1 REJECTED TAKE-OFF :
The decision to reject a take-off will be made by the Commander, unless incapacitated. The F/O shall
indicate to the Commander if he disagrees with a course of action during any flight phase, e.g. a
continued take-off with a CONFIG WARNING.
1. The rejected take-off procedures are presented in Operations Part B 3.2.1 REJECTED TAKE-OFF &
QRH MAN.
2. Additional guidance material and best operating practice is provided in the Boeing Flight Crew
Training Manual for Rejected take-off.
RTO > 80 kt and runway vacated:

o Ask ATC for parking on taxiway/return to stand
o Call MCC and report a high energy RTO?
o Do not take-off again until released by MCC/Duty Pilot/FOM
o Calculate the turnaround time required from the brake cooling schedule
o File a Report on completion of duty (required for any RTO, low or high speed, ref OM A
11.3.1.1.3).
Understanding Takeoff Speeds:
Pilots are used to calculating takeoff speeds and, therefore, understand the operational significance of
V1, VR, and V2. However, they are slightly less familiar with the definitions of VMCG, and VMCA.
Takeoff speeds are a safety key element for takeoff, and enable pilot situational awareness and
decision- making in this very dynamic situation. The use of erroneous takeoff speeds can lead to tail
strikes, high-speed rejected takeoffs or initial climb with degraded performance.
The objective of the following guidance is to provide, from an operational perspective, an overall review
of takeoff speeds, and of the factors that affect the calculation and use of V speeds.
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VMCG (Velocity of Minimum Control on Ground)
This is the minimum speed at which there is sufficient rudder authority available to continue the take-off
in the event of an engine failure. V1 must not be lower than VMCG.
V1
V1 is the maximum speed at which a rejected takeoff can be initiated, in the event of an emergency.
V1 is also the minimum speed at which a pilot can continue a takeoff after an engine failure. If an engine
failure is detected after V1, the takeoff must be continued. This implies that the aircraft must be
controllable on ground. Therefore, V1 must always be greater than VMCG.
“V1 is the end of the Go/ No Go decision process, not the beginning. If you have not applied the
brakes by the time you hear the V1 call, you have made the Go decision by default”.
VR : Rotation Speed
The rotation speed ensures that, in the case of an engine failure, lift-off is possible and V2 is reached at
35 feet at the latest.
Note: Therefore, at 35 feet, the actual speed is usually greater than V2. The rotation of the aircraft
begins at VR, which makes lift-off possible, at the end of the maneuver.
VMCA (Velocity of Minimum Control in the Air)
The rudder is used to compensate for the yaw moment caused by thrust asymmetry. There is a
minimum speed at which full rudder will be necessary, in order to fly a constant heading with level
wings. To reduce sideslip, this speed can be reduced even more, if the aircraft is banked on the live
engine’s side.
The lower the speed, the greater the necessary bank angle. A maximum of 5 degrees bank is allowed
during certification.
V2: Takeoff Safety Speed
V2 is the minimum speed that needs to be maintained up to acceleration altitude, in the event of an
engine failure after V1. Flight at V2 ensures that the minimum required climb gradient is achieved, and
that the aircraft is controllable. V2 speed is always greater than VMCA, and facilitates control of the
aircraft in flight.
In an all-engines operative takeoff, V2+20 provides a better climb performance than V2. If one engine is
lost before reaching V2, then the initial climb is flown at V2. If thrust is lost at a speed between V2 and
V2+20, then the current speed is maintained, to ensure the most efficient climb speed.
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It is not necessary to increase pitch, in order to reduce the speed to V2, when a higher speed has already
been reached, unless complying with a ETF (ETP) Emergency Turn Procedure which is normally flown at
V2 (unless otherwise specified).
Summary:
A successful rejected takeoff is dependent upon the Captain making timely decisions and using the
proper procedures.
The FCTM Chapter 3, Rejected Takeoff Decision, Rejected Takeoff Maneuver, Go/Stop Decision Near V1,
RTO Execution Operational Margins contain valuable information on the RTO maneuver including effects
of various configuration items and procedural variations on the stopping performance of the airplane.
CRM plays an important role in the successful execution of a RTO. A common observation made by
Examiners is the tendency for the Captain to rush the F/O before he/she can effectively complete their
required items. It is important that the execution of the RTO procedure is done in a timely manner and
as stated in the QRH MAN chapter. Once the aircraft has stopped the Crew must act in a methodical
manner, action individual memory items as specified in the OM B 3.2.1 REJECTED TAKE-OFF procedures
section and work as a team. The Captain needs to evaluate the situation and then call for the
appropriate action. Not every RTO requires an evacuation!
Captains should not demand that the F/O completes actions before they have completed their required
functions. For example – the aircraft is stopped after a RTO and before the First Officer is able to select
F40 the Captain interrupts and calls for the memory items for the condition. This interruption leaves the
F/Os requirement to select F40 and contact ATC incomplete. Each Pilot must monitor each other’s
actions and ensure that the required actions are complete.
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TCAS
Any TCAS TA/RA’s should be actioned as per the QRH non-normal manoeuvres section. Description of
the procedures are also found in OM B. Once you are “clear of conflict” the correct method of re-
engaging the automatics after a TCAS RA is the same as for Stall recovery and Windshear Escape
Manoeuvre etc.
This shall be performed in a formal sequence which will ensure that the PF is at all times in control of
aircraft attitude and thrust requirements:
1. PF calls for desired Roll/Pitch modes on the MCP
2. PF ensures that the aircraft is following the FD commands, is in trim about all axes and
that there is no pressure on the control column/wheel
3. PF engages the A/P
4. PF will verify A/P engagement and call “Autopilot A/B engaged in Command”
5. PF engages the A/T
6. The PF will verify A/T engagement and call “Autothrottle Engaged”
Both pilots must verify all mode annunciations in the FMA following each selection made on the MCP.
GO AROUNDS
Go arounds from different stages
Standard ETF Go Around Procedures can be found in OM B 2.2.11 & QRH Manouvers section. Great
guidance of normal 2 engine and single engine Go Arounds is available in FCTM section 5.
Great care has to be taken when executing a Go Around above Missed Approach Altitude (MAA). Avoid
rushed execution and exit the APP mode depending on the automation level in use by:
• Disengaging A/P and Recycling FD

• Re-tuning the NAVs
Afterwards, selection of basic vertical mode should allow smooth transition into the level off.
If performing a G/A with manual thrust, a great care must be taken to set GA thrust. Start by pressing
TO/GA and extending your arm and pushing the thrust levers forward to approximately 90% N1. PM can
then set full GA thrust if necessary or leave it at 90% N1 for approximate reduced GA thrust.
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Hydraulics Problems
Study: FCTM Chapter 8.47/48 & FCOM HYD CHAPTER 13
How we recognize a Loss of hydraulic system?
Related System Hydraulic Pressure near 0 PSI OR

Related System Hydraulic Quantity near 0 USG AND
Both Hydraulic Pump LOW PRESSURE amber lights AND
Related System Flight Control LOW PRESSURE amber light AND
FEEL DIF amber light (when TE Flaps UP)
Note: Although the first indication of a impending loss, or already actual loss of Hydraulic system will be
MASTER CAUTION Hydraulic Pump LOW PRESSURE, Flight Control LOW PRESSURE & FEEL DIF, pilots
MUST verify the state of Hydraulics on MFD SYS page.
Review the FCOM System description for affected systems in case of loss of Hydro systems.
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FSTD TRAINING SESSION:
AIRCRAFT FLIGHT NUMBER

B 737 800 EZZ 100
ROUTE ALTERNATE
EDDF/EBBR EHAM
ZFW FOB ANTI ICE A/C FLAPS FLEX RWY COND CODE
TEMP
60,0 T Crew Crew Crew OPT Crew EDDF 01011100 25C 5/5/5
100/100/100 03/03/03
WATER/WATER/ WATER
SPEEDS
V1
VR
V2
Aircraft Position ON GATE
Performance calculation and OEI procedure from OPT.
ATC CLEARENCE
EZZ 100 CLEARED TO BRU VIA OBOKA 2G SID RWY 25C SQUACK 1000
WEATHER FOR LOFT: Consider weather reports as fresh one at time of briefing. (Departure at 12:00)
EDDF: METAR EDDF 101120Z 300/10 100 FG RVR 25C 125 OVC 010 05/00 1013 NOSIG
TAF EDDF 101100 1011/1111 300/10 500 FG BKN 005 OVC 010 BECM 1011/1015 300/15 2000 BR
EBBR: METAR EBBR 101120Z 280/17G25 3000 -SHRA BKN 005 OVC 010 15/09 1013 NOSIG
TAF EBBR 101100 1011/1111 270/15G30 5000 BKN 005 OVC 010 TEMPO 1011/1015 3000
-TSRA SCT CB 005 BECMG 1015/1017 9999 BKN 020
EHAM: METAR EBMB101120Z 250/20 9999 SCT 010 BKN 025 17/8 1010 NOSIG
TAF EBMB 101100 1011/1111 270/15G25 9999 BKN 025 TEMPO 1012/1017 300/25 -TSRA FEW CB 020
NOTAM EDDF, EBBR, EBMB NIL
MEL NIL
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ELEMENTS TO BE COVERED DURING OCC FSTD TRAINING:
ITEMS
1 LVTO
2 TCAS
3 Hydro single System Loss
4 Airspeed Unreliable
5 Windshear
6 Engine Failure/Fire after V1
7 RTO
8 Emergency Evacuation
9 UPRT/FPM
10 Anti-Ice
11 OEI approaches and landings
12 OEI G/A
13 ILS/VOR/RNP, Circling and Visual Approaches, LVTO operation
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FSTD OPC/LPC SESSION:
AIRCRAFT FLIGHT NUMBER

B 737 800 EZZ 100
ROUTE ALTERNATE
EDDF/EBBR EHAM
ZFW FOB ANTI ICE A/C FLAPS FLEX RWY COND CODE
TEMP
60,0 T Crew Crew Crew OPT Crew EDDF 01011100 25C 5/5/5
100/100/100 03/03/03
WATER/WATER/ WATER
SPEEDS
V1
VR
V2
Aircraft Position ON GATE
Performance calculation and OEI procedure from OPT.
ATC CLEARENCE
EZZ 100 CLEARED TO BRU VIA OBOKA 2G SID RWY 25C SQUACK 1000
WEATHER FOR LOFT: Consider weather reports as fresh one at time of briefing. (Departure at 12:00)
EDDF: METAR EDDF 101120Z 300/10 100 FG RVR 25C 125 OVC 010 05/00 1013 NOSIG
TAF EDDF 101100 1011/1111 300/10 500 FG BKN 005 OVC 010 BECM 1011/1015 300/15 2000 BR
EBBR: METAR EBBR 101120Z 280/17G25 3000 -SHRA BKN 005 OVC 010 15/09 1013 NOSIG
TAF EBBR 101100 1011/1111 270/15G30 5000 BKN 005 OVC 010 TEMPO 1011/1015 3000
-TSRA SCT CB 005 BECMG 1015/1017 9999 BKN 020
EHAM: METAR EBMB101120Z 250/20 9999 SCT 010 BKN 025 17/8 1010 NOSIG
TAF EBMB 101100 1011/1111 270/15G25 9999 BKN 025 TEMPO 1012/1017 300/25 -TSRA FEW CB 020
NOTAM EDDF, EBBR, EBMB NIL MEL NIL
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ELEMENTS TO BE COVERED DURING OCC OPC
ITEMS
1 LVTO and Taxi
2 TCAS
3 Hydro single System Loss
4 Engine Start malfunctions
5 Cargo fire
6 Windshear
7 Engine Failure/Fire after V1
8 Runaway Stabilizer
19 RTO
10 Emergency Evacuation
11 OEI approaches and landings
12 OEI G/A
13 ILS/VOR/RNP, Circling and Visual Approaches, LVTO operation
55 | P a g e 10.10.2022 Rev 02

ETF Airways FSTD Conversion Candidate Copy Rev 02

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CONVERSION FSTD TRAINING PROGRAM

INSTRUCTORS COPY Rev 02

It is our pleasure to present the Conversion FSTD Training Program.

FSTD BRIEFING OCC COURSE

Wishing you all nice and successful Training,

ETF Airways Training Manager

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Training duration Training done by Check required Validity Revalidation

OM D Reference Approved FSTD Training Materials

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3. Ice and Rain protection

Normal, Abnormal and Emergency Procedures

11. Visual Approach

2. EPS for Captains (optional)

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Specific Non-Normal Items for Conversion Training and OPC:

1. Flight Control System/Flaps problems

The flying technique is fully described in FCTM.

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Non-Normal Manoeuvres - Windshear

Windshear encountered during takeoff roll:

Predictive windshear warning during approach: (“GO–AROUND, WINDSHEAR AHEAD” aural)

• 500 fpm vertical speed

When TO/GA is pressed:

• F/D commands target speed until reaching +600fpm

Avoidance, Precautions and Recovery

An ASR shall be filed in all cases of activation of PWS, spurious or otherwise.

Stall Prevention, Recognition and Recovery Training

• FMC Buffet alert message (flaps up only)

An airplane stall is characterized by one or more of the following conditions:

• buffeting, which could be heavy

• lack of pitch authority

• lack of roll control

• inability to arrest descent rate.

Returning to the desired flight path following a successful stalls recovery.

For Boeing stall recovery manouver reffer to QRH Manouver section.

An airplane upset is an undesired airplane state characterized by unintentional divergences from

• Pilots using their knowledge to formulate an understanding (mental model).

Each pilot should:

CAUSES OF AIRPLANE UPSETS

o Instrument failure (Airspeed Unreliable)

o Lack of Instrument Crosscheck

The three sources of energy are:

a. Kinetic energy, which increases with increasing airspeed.

These three types of energy can be traded, or exchanged:

• Airspeed can be traded for altitude (kinetic to potential energy)

Elements from UPSET PREVENTION TRAINING to be covered are as follows:

• Aeroplane performance (high and low altitudes)

• Angle of attack (AOA) and stall awareness

• Kinetic energy vs potential energy vs chemical energy (power)

• Performance and effects of power plant

Notification of Emergency to cabin Crew- Crew Emergency Briefing (NITS)

The CMDR shall inform the SCCM about:

N Nature i.e. engine fire, Decompression, Undercarriage Technical or Flying

Communications- Communicating with the Passengers during NN events

“Ladies & Gentlemen

CRM – The Decision Making Process (F-O-R-D-E-C)

Some important tips when applying the decision making model: