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Chương 5 QTSTD
Chương 5 QTSTD
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Diagnosing
D
iagnosing is the second major phase in the intended to improve organizational functioning.
general model of planned change described (Chapters 10–20 present the major interventions
in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.2). It follows the enter- used in OD today.)
ing and contracting stage (Chapter 4) and precedes This and the next chapter describe different
the planning and implementation phase. When aspects of the diagnostic process. This chapter
done well, diagnosis clearly points the organization presents a general definition of diagnosis and
and the organization development (OD) practitioner discusses the need for diagnostic models in guiding
toward a set of appropriate intervention activities the process. Diagnostic models derive from
that will improve organization effectiveness. conceptions about how organizations function,
Diagnosis is the process of understanding a and they tell OD practitioners what to look for
system’s current functioning. It involves collecting in diagnosing organizations, groups, or jobs. They
pertinent information about existing operations as serve as a road map for discovering current
well as analyzing those data and drawing con- functioning. A general, comprehensive diagnostic
clusions about the reasons for current performance model is presented based on open-systems
and the potential for change and improvement. theory. We then describe and apply the model to
Effective diagnosis provides the systematic know- diagnostic situations at the organization, group,
ledge of the organization needed to design app- and job levels. Chapter 6 completes the diagnostic
ropriate interventions. Thus, OD interventions phase by discussing processes of data collection,
derive from diagnosis and include specific actions analysis, and feedback.
89
90 PART 2 THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
groups, and individual jobs. (Chapters 10–20 present additional diagnostic models that
are linked to specific OD interventions.)
FIGURE 5.1
The Open-Systems Model
© Cengage Learning 2015
CHAPTER 5 DIAGNOSING 93
Environments Environments are everything outside of the system that can directly or
indirectly affect its outputs. Open systems, such as organizations and groups, exchange
information and resources with their environments. Because these external forces influ-
ence the system, organizations cannot completely control their own behavior. Organiza-
tions, for example, are affected by such environmental conditions as the availability of
labor and human capital, raw material, customer demands, competition, and government
regulations. Understanding how these external forces affect the organization can help to
explain some of its internal behavior.
client’s boundaries before diagnosing begins. For example, the boundaries that identify a
particular client system on an organization chart might be well suited for addressing
leadership issues in that unit. However, the client system’s boundaries might have to be
enlarged to include other related departments if the intent of OD is to improve coordi-
nation among interdependent work groups.
Feedback As shown in Figure 5.1, feedback is information regarding the actual per-
formance or the outputs of the system. Not all such information is feedback, however.
Only information used to control the future functioning of the system is considered
feedback. Feedback can be used to maintain the system in a steady state (for example,
keeping an assembly line running at a certain speed) or to help the organization adapt
to changing circumstances. McDonald’s, for example, has strict feedback processes to
ensure that a meal in one outlet is as similar as possible to a meal in any other outlet.
On the other hand, a salesperson in the field may report that sales are not going well
and may insist on some organizational change to improve sales. A market-research
study may lead the marketing department to recommend a change to the organiza-
tion’s advertising campaign.
Alignment How well a system’s different parts and elements align with each other
partly determines its overall effectiveness. This alignment or fit concerns the relation-
ships between the organization and its environment as well as among the components
that comprise the design of the organization. Alignment represents the extent to which
the features and operations of one component support the effectiveness of another com-
ponent. Just as the teeth in the wheels of a watch must mesh perfectly for the watch to
keep time, so do the parts of an organizational system need to mesh for it to be effective.
Diagnosing environmental relationships and the interactions among the various compo-
nents of an organizational system requires taking “a systemic perspective.” This view
suggests that diagnosing often involves the search for misalignments among the various
parts of an organizational system.
FIGURE 5.2
Comprehensive Model for Diagnosing Organizational Systems
The environment is the key input to organization design decisions. Organization design is
an input to group design, which in turn serves as an input to job design. These cross-level
relationships emphasize that organizational levels must fit with each other if the organization
is to operate effectively. For example, organization structure must fit with and support group
task design, which in turn must fit with individual-job design.
96 PART 2 THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
The following sections of this chapter address diagnosing at each of the three
levels—organization, group, and individual job. General overviews of the dimensions
(and their relationships) that need to be understood at each level are presented. It is
beyond the scope of this chapter to describe in detail the many variables and relation-
ships reported in the extensive literature on organizations. However, specific diagnostic
questions are identified and concrete examples are included as an introduction to this
phase of the planned change process.
5-4a Inputs
Figure 5.2 shows that three key inputs or environmental types affect the way an organi-
zation is designed. We first describe these environments and then identify environmental
dimensions that influence how organizations respond to external forces.
suppliers to lower prices or deliver their products in particular ways. Third, an organiza-
tion must be sensitive to the threat of new firms entering into competition. Profits in the
restaurant business tend to be low because of the ease of starting a new restaurant.
Fourth, a company must respond to the threat of new products or services that can
replace existing offerings. Ice cream producers must carefully monitor their costs and
prices because it is easy for a consumer to purchase frozen yogurt or other types of
desserts instead. Finally, an organization must be sensitive to rivalry among existing
competitors. If many organizations are competing for the same customers, then the orga-
nization must be responsive to product offerings, costs, and structures if it is to survive
and prosper. Together, these five forces play an important role in determining an orga-
nization’s success, whether it is a manufacturing or service firm, a nonprofit organiza-
tion, or a government agency.
While the general environment and the task environment describe the objective
pressures an organization faces, the organization must first recognize those forces. The
enacted environment consists of organization members’ perception and representation
of the general and task environments. Environments must be perceived before they can
influence decisions about how to respond to them.11 Organization members must
actively observe, register, and make sense of the environment before it can affect their
decisions about what actions to take. Thus, only the enacted environment can affect
which organizational responses are chosen. The general and task environments, however,
influence whether those responses are successful or ineffective. For example, members
may perceive customers as relatively satisfied with their products and may decide to
make only token efforts at developing new products. If those perceptions are wrong
and customers are dissatisfied with existing products, the meager product development
efforts can have disastrous organizational consequences. As a result, an organization’s
enacted environment should accurately reflect its general and task environments if mem-
bers’ decisions and actions are to be effective.12
Structure is the basic organizing mode for (1) dividing the overall work of an orga-
nization into subunits that can assign tasks to groups or individuals and (2) coordinating
these subunits for completion of the overall work.20 Structure, therefore, needs to be
closely aligned with the organization’s technology. Organization structure can divide
work by function (e.g., accounting, sales, or production), by product or service
(e.g., Chevrolet, GMC, or Cadillac), by customer (e.g., large, medium, or small enter-
prise), or by some combination of both (e.g., a matrix composed of functional depart-
ments and product groupings). Structures can coordinate work across subunits through
the managerial hierarchy or a variety of lateral mechanisms, such as plans and schedules,
budgets, project managers, liaison positions, integrators, cross-departmental task forces,
and matrix relationships. The amount of coordination required in a structure is a func-
tion of (1) the amount of uncertainty in the environment, (2) the degree to which sub-
units differ from each other, and (3) the amount of interdependence among subunits.21
As uncertainty, subunit difference, and interdependence increase, more sophisticated
coordinating devices are required.22 (Chapter 12 discusses structural interventions.)
Management processes are methods for processing information, making decisions, and
controlling the operation of the organization. They help the organization to understand
how well it is performing, to detect and control deviations from goals, to make relevant
decisions, and to communicate the results. Closely related to structural coordination,
management processes monitor organizational operations and feed data about work
activities to managers and members so that they can better understand current perfor-
mance, make relevant decisions, and coordinate work. Effective information, decision
making, and control systems are linked closely to strategic objectives; provide accurate,
understandable, and timely information; are accepted as legitimate by organization mem-
bers; and produce benefits in excess of their cost.
Human resources systems include mechanisms for selecting, developing, appraising, and
rewarding organization members. These influence the mix of skills, personal characteristics,
and behaviors of organization members. An organization’s strategy and technology provide
important information about the skills and knowledge required if the organization is to be
successful. Appraisal processes identify whether those skills and knowledge are being
applied to the work, and reward systems complete the cycle by recognizing performance
that contributes to goal achievement. Reward systems may be tied to measurement systems
so that rewards are allocated based on measured results. (Chapters 15, 16, and 17 discuss
specific human resources systems, such as rewards and career development.)
Organization culture represents the basic assumptions, values, and norms shared by
organization members.23 Those cultural elements are generally taken for granted and
serve to guide members’ perceptions, thoughts, and actions. For example, McDonald’s
culture emphasizes efficiency, speed, and consistency. It orients employees to company
goals and suggests the kinds of behaviors necessary for success. In Figure 5.2, culture is
shown as an intermediate output from the four design components because it represents
both an outcome and a constraint. Culture initially derives from an organization foun-
der’s values and is reinforced and sustained through organization selection and socializa-
tion processes. It is also an outcome of the organization’s history and environment as
well as of prior choices made about the strategy, technology, structure, management pro-
cesses, and human resources systems. Because organization culture is personally internal-
ized, it can be difficult to change and can restrict an organization’s ability to change its
strategy and organization design components.24 In that sense, culture can either hinder
or facilitate organization change. In diagnosing organizations, the culture needs to be
understood well enough to determine its alignment with the organization’s strategy and
the four design components. (Chapter 18 discusses culture change in more detail.)
100 PART 2 THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
5-4c Outputs
The outputs of organization design are measures of how well the design contributes to
organization effectiveness. This can include three kinds of outcomes. First, organization
performance refers to financial outcomes, such as sales, profits, return on investment
(ROI), or earnings per share (EPS). For nonprofit and government agencies, perfor-
mance often refers to the extent to which costs were lowered or budgets met. Second,
productivity concerns internal measurements of efficiency, such as sales per employee,
waste, error rates, quality, or units produced per hour. Third, stakeholder satisfaction
reflects how well the organization has met the expectations of different groups having
an interest in the organization. For example, customer loyalty can be measured in
terms of market share or focus-group data; employee engagement can be measured in
terms of an opinion survey; investor satisfaction can be measured in terms of stock
price or analyst opinions; and environmental sustainability can be measured by the orga-
nization’s carbon footprint.
5-4d Alignment
Diagnosing the effectiveness of an organization requires knowledge of the above ele-
ments to determine the alignment or fit among them.
1. Does the organization’s strategy fit with the inputs? To be effective, an organi-
zation’s strategy needs to be responsive to the general and task environments.
They include external forces, threats, and opportunities that need to be consid-
ered in making strategic choices about mission, goals and objectives, strategic
intent, and functional policies. The organization makes those choices based on
members’ perceptions of the environment (the enacted environment). Thus, the
organization’s information-processing and strategy-making capabilities must
match the information uncertainty of the general and task environments if the
organization’s perceptions and strategic choices are to accurately reflect external
realities. Environments that change rapidly and are complex are highly uncertain.
In these situations, organizations need to constantly process information and
monitor wide segments of their environments; their strategy-making process
needs to be flexible resulting in strategic choices that can quickly be adapted to
changing external conditions. (Chapter 19 describes dynamic strategy-making
interventions.) Conversely, organizations can periodically assess selected parts of
the environment and make strategic choices that are stable over moderate to long
periods of time when the information uncertainty of their general and task envir-
onments is relatively low.
2. Do the organization design components fit with each other to jointly support the
strategy? For example, if the organization’s strategy is highly flexible and responsive
to environmental change, then the design components must mutually support and
reinforce agile and adaptable organizational behaviors. Successful firms in Silicon
Valley, such as Apple and Oracle, tend to have flexible strategies that promote inno-
vation and change. Their organization design components include leading-edge
technologies that are complex and uncertain; flexible structures that emphasize agil-
ity and fast responses; management processes that provide rapid information and
feedback and promote employee decision making; human resource policies that
select, develop, and reward talented employees. These flexible and agile firms have
organization cultures that value technical sophistication, member commitment,
invention, and customer loyalty.
CHAPTER 5 DIAGNOSING 101
5-4e Analysis
Application 5.1 describes the Steinway organization and provides an opportunity to per-
form an organization-level analysis.25 A useful starting point is to examine outputs and
to ask about the organization’s current effectiveness. Steinway has excellent market share
in the high-quality segment of the grand piano market, a string of improving financial
measures, and strong customer loyalty. However, the data on employee satisfaction are
mixed; there are both long-tenured people and an indication that some workers are leav-
ing for other jobs. Financial improvements appear modest when contrasted with industry
averages. Understanding the underlying causes of these effectiveness issues begins with
an assessment of the inputs and organization design and then proceeds to an evaluation
of the alignments among the different parts.
In diagnosing the inputs, two questions are important.
1. What is the company’s general environment? Steinway’s external environment is
only moderately uncertain and not very complex. Socially, Steinway is an important
part of a country’s artistic culture and the fine arts. It must be aware of fickle trends
in music and display an appropriate sensitivity to them. Politically, the organization
operates on a global basis and its distribution and sales networks must be attuned to
different governmental and country requirements. The manufacturing plant in
Hamburg, Germany, suggests an important political dependency that must be mon-
itored. Technologically, Steinway appears reasonably concerned about the latest
breakthroughs in piano design, materials, and construction. They are aware of alter-
native technologies, such as the assembly-line process at Yamaha, but prefer the
classic methods they have always used. Ecologically, Steinway must be mindful.
Their product requires lumber and they are very selective (some would say wasteful)
about the choices, rejecting many pieces. It is likely that environmentalists would
express concern over how Steinway uses this natural resource. Together, these envi-
ronmental forces paint a relatively moderate level of uncertainty. Most of these
issues are knowable and can be forecast with some confidence. In addition, while
there are several environmental elements that need to be addressed, not all of them
are vitally important. The environment is not very complex.
2. What is the company’s task environment? Steinway’s industry is moderately com-
petitive and profit pressures can be mapped by looking at five key forces. First, the
threat of entry is fairly low. There are some important barriers to cross if an organi-
zation wanted to get into the piano business. For example, Steinway, Yamaha, and
Baldwin have very strong brands and dealer networks. Any new entrant would need
to overcome these strong images to get people to buy their product. Second, the
threat of substitute products is moderate. On the one hand, electronic keyboards
have made important advances and represent an inexpensive alternative to grand
and upright pianos. On the other hand, the sophisticated nature of many of the
artists and audiences suggests that there are not many substitutes for a concert
grand piano. Third, the bargaining power of suppliers, such as providers of labor
and raw materials, is high. The labor union has effective control over the much-
sought-after craft workers who manufacture and assemble grand pianos. Given the
relatively difficult time that most high-end piano manufacturers have in holding
onto these highly trained employees, the organization must expend considerable
resources to retain them. Similarly, given the critical nature of wood to the final
product, lumber suppliers can probably exert significant influence. Fourth, the bar-
gaining power of buyers varies by segment. In the high-end segment, the number of
buyers is relatively small and sophisticated, and the small number of high-quality
102 PART 2 THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
application 5 1
S
teinway & Sons, which turned 160 years old grand pianos were sold. Piano customers can
in April 2013, is generally regarded as the fin- also be segmented into professional artists,
est piano maker in the world. Founded in amateur pianists, and institutions such as con-
1853 by the Steinway family, the firm was cert halls, universities, and music schools. The
sold to CBS in 1972, taken private in 1985 by private (home) market accounts for about 90%
John and Robert Birmingham, and sold again in of the upright piano sales and 80% of the grand
1995 to Dana Messina and Kyle Kirkland, who took piano sales, with the balance being sold to insti-
it public in 1996. Steinway & Sons is the piano tutional customers. New markets in Asia repre-
division of the Steinway Musical Instruments Com- sent important new growth opportunities.
pany that also owns Selmer Instruments and The piano industry has experienced sev-
other manufacturers of band instruments (www. eral important and dramatic changes for such
steinwaymusical.com). Piano sales in 2002 were a traditional product. Industry sales, for exam-
$169 million, down 7.6% from the prior year and ple, dropped 40% between 1980 and 1995.
mirroring the general economic downturn. Since Whether the decline was the result of
going public, Steinway’s corporate revenues have increased electronic keyboard sales, a real
grown a compounded 6–7% a year, while earnings decline in the total market, or some temporary
per share have advanced, on average, a com- decline was a matter of debate in the industry.
pounded 11%. The financial performance for the Since then, sales growth has tended to reflect
overall company in 2002 was slightly below indus- the ups and downs of the global economy.
try averages. Competition in the piano industry has also
The Steinway brand remains one of the changed. In the United States, several hundred
company’s most valuable assets. The com- piano makers at the turn of the century had
pany’s president notes that despite only 2% consolidated to eight by 1992. The Baldwin
of all keyboard unit sales in the United States, Piano and Organ Company is Steinway’s pri-
they have 25% of the sales dollars and 35% of mary U.S. competitor. It offers a full line of pia-
the profits. Their market share in the high-end nos under the Baldwin and Wurlitzer brand
grand piano segment is consistently over 80%. names through a network of over 700 dealers.
For example, 98% of the piano soloists at 30 of In addition to relatively inexpensive upright pia-
the world’s major symphony orchestras chose nos produced in high-volume plants, Baldwin
a Steinway grand during the 2000/2001 con- also makes handcrafted grand pianos that are
cert season. Over 1,300 of the world’s top pia- well-respected and endorsed by such artists as
nists, all of whom own Steinways and perform Dave Brubeck and Stephen Sondheim, and by
solely on Steinways, endorse the brand with- the Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia orches-
out financial compensation. tras. Annual sales are in the $100 million range;
Workers at Steinway & Sons manufacturing Baldwin was recently sold to the Gibson Guitar
plants in New York and Germany have been Company. The European story is similar. Only
with the company for an average of 15 years, Bösendorfer of Austria and Fazioli of Italy
often over 20 or 30 years. Many of Steinway’s remain as legitimate Steinway competitors.
employees are descendants of parents and Several Asian companies have emerged as
grandparents who worked for the company. important competitors. Yamaha, Kawai, Young
Chang, and Samick collectively held about
35% of the vertical piano market and 80% of
THE ENVIRONMENT the grand piano market in terms of units and
The piano market is typically segmented into 75% of global sales in 1995. Yamaha is the
grand pianos and upright pianos, with the former world’s largest piano manufacturer with sales
being a smaller but higher-priced segment. In of over $1 billion and a global market share of
1995, about 550,000 upright pianos and 50,000 about 35%. Yamaha’s strategy has been to
CHAPTER 5 DIAGNOSING 103
produce consistent piano quality through continuous drying is necessary to ensure the best sound-
improvement. A separate handcrafted concert grand producing qualities of the wood. Even after all the
piano operation has also tried to use continuous care of the drying process, the workers reject
improvement methods to create consistently high- approximately 50% of the lumber.
quality instruments. More than any other high- After drying, the parts-making operations begin.
quality piano manufacturer, Yamaha has been able The first of these operations involves bending of the
to emulate and compete with Steinway. piano rim (the curved side giving a grand piano its
familiar shape). These rims are formed of multiple
layers of specially selected maple that are manually
THE STEINWAY ORGANIZATION forced into a unified shape, held in presses for sev-
Steinway & Sons offers several different pianos, eral hours, and then seasoned for 10 weeks before
including two brands (Steinway and the less being joined to other wooden parts. During this
expensive Boston brand) and both upright and time, the sounding board (a specially tapered Alaska
grand piano models. The company handcrafts its Sitka spruce panel placed inside the rim to amplify
grand pianos in New York and Germany, and sells the sound) and many other case parts are made.
them through more than 200 independent dealers. The final critical operation with parts-making
About half of the dealers are in North and South involves the fabrication of the 88 individual piano
America and approximately 85% of all Steinway action sets that exist inside a piano. Piano “actions”
pianos are sold through this network. The company are the intricate mechanical assemblies—made
also owns retail outlets in New York, New Jersey, almost completely of wood and some felt, metal,
London, Munich, Hamburg, and Berlin. and leather—that transmit finger pressure on the
The dealer network is an important part of Stein- piano keys into the force that propels the hammers
way’s strategy because of its role in the “concert that strike the strings. The action is a particularly
bank” program. Once artists achieve a certain sta- important part of a piano because this mechanical
tus, they are invited to become part of this elite linkage gives Steinways their distinctive feel. In the
group. The performer can go to any local dealer, try action department, each operator is responsible for
out different pianos, and pick the one they want to inspecting his or her own work, with all assembled
use at a performance for only the cost of bringing actions further subject to 100% inspection.
the piano to the concert hall. The concert bank con- Piano-making operations include “bellying,”
tains over 300 pianos in more than 160 cities. In finishing, and tone regulating. The bellying process
return for the service, Steinway is given exclusive involves the precise and careful fitting of the
use of the performer’s name for publicity purposes. soundboard, iron piano plate, and rim to each
Creating a Steinway concert grand piano is an other. It requires workers to lean their stomachs
art, an intricate and timeless operation (although against the rim of the piano to complete this task.
alternate methods have been created and improved, Because of individual variations in material and the
the basic process hasn’t changed much). It requires high degree of precision required, bellying takes
more than 12,000 mostly handcrafted parts considerable skill and requires several hours per
and more than a little magic. The tone, touch, piano. After the bellying operations, pianos are
and sound of each instrument is unique, and 120 strung and moved to the finishing department. Dur-
technical patents and innovations contribute to the ing finishing, actions and keyboards are individually
Steinway sound. Two years are required to make a fit to each instrument to accommodate differences
Steinway grand as opposed to a mass-produced in materials and tolerances to produce a working
piano that takes only about 20 days. There are instrument. The final piano-making step involves
three major steps in the production process: wood- tone regulating. Here, the pianos are “voiced” for
drying (which takes about a year), parts-making, and Steinway sound. Unlike tuning, which involves the
piano-making. loosening and tightening of strings, voicing
Wood-drying operations convert moisture-rich requires careful adjustments to the felt surround-
lumber into usable raw material through air-drying ing the hammers that strike the strings. This oper-
and computer-controlled kilns. Time is a critical ele- ation is extremely delicate and is performed by
ment in this process because slow and natural only a small handful of tone regulators. The tone
104 PART 2 THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
regulators at Steinway are widely considered to be production. They are represented by the United
among the most skilled artisans in the factory. Furniture Worker’s union. Seventy-five percent of
Their voicing of a concert grand can take as much the workers are paid on a straight-time basis; the
as 20 to 30 hours. All tone regulators at Steinway others, primarily artisans, are paid on piece rates.
have worked for the company in various other posi- Retaining workers has proved increasingly difficult
tions before reaching their present posts, and sev- as well-trained Steinway craftspeople are coveted
eral have more than 20 years with the firm. Finally, by other manufacturers, and many of the workers
after tone regulation, all pianos are polished, could easily set up their own shop to repair or
cleaned, and inspected one last time before pack- rebuild older Steinway pianos. Excess inventories
ing and shipment. due to weak sales both pre and post September 11
Steinway produced more than 3,500 pianos in forced Steinway to adjust its production schedule;
2002 at its New York and Hamburg, Germany, rather than lay off highly skilled workers needed to
plants. Almost 430 people work in the New York build its pianos, workers in the New York plant
plant and all but about 100 of them work in reported to work every other week.
pianos means that customers can put pressure on prices, although they are clearly
willing and able to pay more for quality. In the middle and lower segments,
the number of buyers is much larger and fragmented. It is unlikely that they could
collectively exert influence over price. Finally, the rivalry among firms is severe.
A number of well-known and well-funded domestic and international competitors
exist. Almost all of them have adopted marketing and manufacturing tactics similar
to Steinway’s in the high-end segment, and they are competing for the same custo-
mers. The extensive resources available to Yamaha as a member of their keiretsu, for
example, suggest that it is a strong and long-term competitor that will work hard to
unseat Steinway from its position. Thus, powerful buyers and suppliers as well as
keen competition make the piano industry only moderately attractive and represent
the key sources of uncertainty that Steinway faces. Overall, Steinway executives’
perceptions of the general and task environments seem to be accurate.
The following questions are important in assessing Steinway’s strategy and organiza-
tion design:
1. What is the company’s strategy? Steinway’s primary strategy is a sophisticated
niche and differentiation strategy. It attempts to meet its financial and other objec-
tives by offering a unique and high-quality product to sophisticated artists. However,
its product line does blur the strategy’s focus. With both Boston and Steinway
brands and both upright and grand models, a question about Steinway’s commit-
ment to the niche strategy could be raised. No formal mission or goals are men-
tioned in the case, and this makes it somewhat difficult to judge the effectiveness
of the strategy. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to assume a clear intent to main-
tain its dominance in the high-end segment. However, with new owners in 1995, it
is also reasonable to question whether goals of profitability or revenue growth,
implying very different tactics, have been sorted out.
2. What are the company’s technology, structure, management processes, human
resources systems, and culture? First, Steinway’s core technology is highly uncer-
tain and moderately interdependent. The manufacturing process is craft-based and
CHAPTER 5 DIAGNOSING 105
dependent on the nature of the materials. Each piano is built and adjusted with the
specific characteristics of the wood in mind. So much so that each piano has a dif-
ferent sound that is produced as a result of the manufacturing process. The technol-
ogy is moderately interdependent because the major steps in the process are not
closely linked in time. Making the “action sets” is independent of the “bellying” pro-
cess, for example. Similarly, the key marketing program, the concert bank, is inde-
pendent of manufacturing. Second, the corporate structure is divisional (pianos and
band instruments), while the piano subsidiary appears to have a functional structure.
The key functions are manufacturing, distribution, and sales. A procurement,
finance, and human resources group is also reasonable to assume. Third, manage-
ment processes are focused on the production system. There are specific mentions
of inspections by both the worker and the organization. For example, 100% inspec-
tion (as opposed to statistical sampling) costs time and manpower and no doubt is
seen as critical to quality. In addition, there must be some system of keeping track of
work-in-progress, finished goods, and concert bank inventories. Fourth, the human
resources system is highly developed. It includes a reward system that is both hourly
and piece rate; a unionized employee relationship; worker retention programs; and
global hiring, compensation, benefits, and training programs. Fifth, while there is lit-
tle specific information, Steinway’s culture can be inferred. The dominant focus on
the high-end segment, the craft nature of the production process, the importance of
the concert bank program, and the long history of family influence all point to a
culture of quality, craftsmanship, and responsiveness. These values are manifest in
the way the organization chooses its raw materials, the way it caters to its prized
customers, the care in the production process, and the image it works to retain.
Now that the organization inputs, design components, and outputs have been
assessed, it is time to ask the crucial question about how well they fit together. The first
concern is the fit between the environmental inputs and the strategy. The moderate com-
plexity and uncertainty in the general and task environments argue for a strategy that is
flexible enough to address the few critical dependencies but formal enough to control a
sophisticated production process. Steinway’s focus on the high-end segment of the industry
and the moderate breadth in its product line support this flexibility. It clearly intends to
differentiate its product by serving the high-end segment with unique high-quality pianos.
However, the market for higher-priced and more specialized concert grands is much smal-
ler than the market for lower-priced uprights and limits the growth potential of sales
unless Steinway wants to compete vigorously in the emerging Asian markets where the
Asian companies have a proximity advantage. Steinway’s lack of clear strategic goals in
general and policies that support neither growth nor profitability also would make entry
into new markets difficult. Steinway’s flexible and responsive manufacturing process sup-
ports and defends its preeminence as the top grand piano maker in the world. It also miti-
gates the powerful buyer forces in this segment. Steinway’s moderate product line breadth
gives it some flexibility and efficiency as well. It can achieve some production efficiencies
in the upright and medium-market grand piano segments, and its brand image helps in
marketing these products. Steinway must be careful not to broaden its product line too
much, however, as this could dilute its strategic focus on the high-end market. Overall,
the alignment between Steinway’s environment and its strategy appears sound.
The second concern is the alignment of the design components to support the strat-
egy. There appears to be a good fit between Steinway’s strategy and the organization
design components. The differentiated strategic intent requires technologies, structures,
and systems that focus on creating sophisticated and unique products, specialized
106 PART 2 THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
marketing and distribution, and the concert bank program. The flexible structure, formal
inspection systems, and responsive culture seem well suited for that purpose. Steinway’s
technology appears aligned with its structure. The production process is craft-based and
deliberately not standardized. The functional structure promotes specialization and
professionalization of skills and knowledge. Specific tasks that require flexibility and adapt-
ability from the organization are given a wide berth. Although a divisional structure over-
lays Steinway’s corporate activities, the piano division’s structure is functional but not rigid
and appears to be responsive to the craft and the artists it serves. In addition, the concert
bank program is important for two reasons. First, it builds customer loyalty and ensures
future demand. Second, it is a natural source of feedback on the instruments themselves,
keeping the organization close to the artist’s demands and emerging trends in
sound preferences. The well-developed human resources system supports the responsive
production and marketing functions as well as the global nature of the enterprise. Finally,
Steinway’s culture of quality and responsiveness promotes coordination among the produc-
tion tasks, serves to socialize and develop people, and establishes methods for moving infor-
mation throughout the organization. Clearly, any change effort at Steinway will have to
acknowledge its long-established culture and design an intervention accordingly. The strong
culture will either sabotage or facilitate change depending on how the change process aligns
with the culture’s values and norms.
Based on this diagnosis of the Steinway organization, at least two OD interventions
seem relevant. First, in collaboration with the client, the OD practitioner could suggest
increasing the clarity of Steinway’s strategy. In this intervention, the practitioner would
want to talk about formalizing—rather than changing—Steinway’s strategy because the
culture would likely resist strategy change. However, there are obvious advantages to be
gained from a clearer sense of Steinway’s future goals, its businesses, and the relation-
ships among them. Second, Steinway could focus on better coordinating its structure,
measurement systems, and human resources systems. The difficulty of retaining key pro-
duction personnel warrants continuously improved retention systems as well as efforts to
codify and retain key production knowledge in case workers do leave. This would apply
to the marketing and distribution functions as well, since they control an important
interface with the customer.
5-5a Inputs
Organization design and culture are the major inputs to group design. They consist
of the design components characterizing the larger organization within which the group
is embedded—technology, structure, management processes, and human resources
CHAPTER 5 DIAGNOSING 107
and resolved.32 Group functioning, therefore, involves task-related activities, such as advo-
cacy and inquiry; coordinating and evaluating activities; and the group-maintenance func-
tion, which is directed toward holding the group together as a cohesive team and includes
encouraging, harmonizing, compromising, setting standards, and observing.33 (Chapter 10
presents interpersonal and group process interventions.)
Performance norms are member beliefs about how the group should perform its task
and what levels of performance are acceptable.34 Norms derive from interactions among
members and serve as guides to group behavior. Once members agree on performance
norms, either implicitly or explicitly, then members routinely perform tasks according
to those norms. For example, members of problem-solving groups often decide early in
the life of the group that decisions will be made through voting; voting then becomes a
routine part of group task behavior. (Chapter 10 discusses interventions aimed at helping
groups to develop appropriate performance norms.)
5-5c Outputs
Team effectiveness has two dimensions: performance and quality of work life. Perfor-
mance is measured in terms of the group’s ability to control or reduce costs, increase
productivity, or improve quality. It is a “hard” measure of effectiveness. In addition,
effectiveness is indicated by group members’ quality of work life. It concerns work satis-
faction, team cohesion, and organizational commitment.
5-5d Alignment
Diagnosing team effectiveness requires assessment of how well the group elements
described above fit with each other.
1. Does the group design fit with the inputs? As shown in Figure 5.2, the key inputs
into group design are the larger organization’s design and culture. Organization
designs and cultures that are highly flexible and promote agile and adaptive orga-
nizational behaviors generally fit with work groups composed of highly skilled and
experienced members performing highly interdependent tasks. Conversely, organi-
zation designs and cultures that are bureaucratic and support standardized beha-
viors generally align with work groups that have clear, quantitative goals and
norms and structures that support routine task behaviors and interactions.
Although there is little direct research on these fits, the underlying rationale is
that congruence between organization design and culture and group design sup-
ports overall integration of task behaviors within the organization. When group
designs are not compatible with organization designs and cultures, groups often
conflict with the organization.35 They may develop norms that run counter to
organizational effectiveness, such as occurs in groups supportive of horseplay,
goldbricking, and other counterproductive behaviors.
2. Do the group design components fit with each other? The nature of a group’s
task determines how the design components should align with each other. When
the task is highly interdependent and requires coordination among group mem-
bers, goal clarity, task structure, group composition, performance norms, and
team functioning all need to promote effective task interaction among members.
For example, task structure might physically locate related tasks together; group
composition might include members with similar interpersonal skills and social
needs; performance norms would support task-relevant interactions; and healthy
interpersonal relationships would be developed. Conversely, when a group’s task
CHAPTER 5 DIAGNOSING 109
5-5e Analysis
Application 5.2 presents an example of applying group-level diagnosis to a top-
management team engaged in problem solving.
Examination of the group’s outputs shows that it is ineffective at problem solving.
Members report a backlog of unresolved issues, poor use of meeting time, lack of
follow-through and decision implementation, and a general dissatisfaction with the
team meetings. Examining group inputs and design components and assessing the fit
among them can uncover the causes of those group problems.
The key inputs into a work group are the design and culture of the larger organi-
zation. The Ortiv Glass Corporation’s decentralized philosophy allows each plant to
set up its own organization design. Freedom to innovate in the manufacturing plants
is probably an outgrowth of the firm’s OD activities and culture, which promote par-
ticipation and innovation. Although little specific data are given about the new plant’s
organization design, tasks are structured into functional departments that must work
together to produce plate glass. The team’s problem-solving activities reflect this inter-
dependence among the departments as coordination among team members is needed
to resolve plantwide issues. The team meetings also seem to involve many issues that
are complex and not easily solved, so there is probably uncertainty in the technology
or work process. This ambiguity is typical in a new plant and makes it difficult for a
problem-solving team to determine the causes of problems or to find acceptable solu-
tions. Consequently, members of the top-management team must process considerable
information during problem solving.
Diagnosis of the team’s design components answers the following questions:
1. How clear are the group’s goals? The team’s goals seem relatively clear: they are to
solve problems. There appears to be no clear agreement, however, on the specific
problems to be addressed. As a result, members come late because they have “more
pressing” problems needing attention.
2. What is the group’s task structure? The team’s task structure includes face-to-face
interaction during the weekly meetings. This structure allows members from differ-
ent functional departments to come together physically to share information and to
solve problems mutually affecting them. It facilitates coordination of problem
110 PART 2 THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
application 5 2
T
he Ortiv Glass Corporation produces and meetings were often interrupted by “urgent”
markets plate glass for use primarily in phone messages for various members, includ-
the construction and automotive industries. ing the plant manager, and in most cases, the
The multiplant company has been involved recipient would leave the meeting hurriedly to
in OD for several years and actively supports par- respond to the call.
ticipative management practices and employee The group had problems arriving at clear
involvement programs. Ortiv’s organization design decisions on particular issues. Discussions
is relatively flexible, and the manufacturing often rambled from topic to topic, and mem-
plants are given freedom and encouragement bers tended to postpone the resolution of pro-
to develop their own organization designs and blems to future meetings. This led to a backlog
approaches to participative management. It of unresolved issues, and meetings often
recently put together a problem-solving group lasted far beyond the two-hour limit. When
made up of the top-management team at its group decisions were made, members often
newest plant. reported problems in their implementation.
The team consisted of the plant manager and Members typically failed to follow through on
the managers of the five functional departments agreements, and there was often confusion
reporting to him: engineering (maintenance), about what had actually been agreed upon.
administration, human resources, production, Everyone expressed dissatisfaction with the
and quality control. In recruiting managers for team meetings and their results.
the new plant, the company selected people Relationships among team members were
with good technical skills and experience in their cordial yet somewhat strained, especially
respective functions. It also chose people with when the team was dealing with complex
some managerial experience and a desire to issues in which members had varying opinions
solve problems collaboratively, a hallmark of par- and interests. Although the plant manager pub-
ticipative management. The team was relatively licly stated that he wanted to hear all sides of
new, and members had been working together the issues, he often interrupted the discussion
for only about five months. or attempted to change the topic when mem-
The team met formally for two hours each bers openly disagreed in their views of the
week to share pertinent information and to problem. This interruption was typically fol-
deal with plantwide issues affecting all of the lowed by an awkward silence in the group. In
departments, such as safety procedures, inter- many instances, when a solution to a pressing
departmental relations, and personnel prac- problem did not appear forthcoming, members
tices. Members described these meetings as either moved on to another issue or they infor-
informative but often chaotic in terms of deci- mally voted on proposed options, letting major-
sion making. The meetings typically started ity rule decide the outcome. Members rarely
late as members straggled in at different discussed the need to move on or vote; rather,
times. The latecomers generally offered these behaviors emerged informally over time
excuses about more pressing problems occur- and became acceptable ways of dealing with
ring elsewhere in the plant. Once started, the difficult issues.
solving among the departments in the plant. The structure also seems to provide
team members with the freedom necessary to regulate their task behaviors in the
meetings. They can adjust their behaviors and interactions to suit the flow of the
discussion and problem-solving process.
CHAPTER 5 DIAGNOSING 111
3. What is the composition of the group? The team is composed of the plant man-
ager and the heads of the five functional departments. All members appear to have
task-relevant skills and experience, both in their respective functions and in their
managerial roles. They also seem to be interested in solving problems collabora-
tively. That shared interest suggests that members have job-related social needs and
should feel relatively comfortable participating in group problem-solving situations.
4. What are the group’s performance norms? Group norms cannot be observed directly
but must be inferred from group behaviors. The norms involve member beliefs about
how the group should perform its task, including acceptable levels of performance.
A useful way to describe norms is to list specific behaviors that complete the sentences
“A good group member should …” and “It’s okay to ….” Examination of the team’s
problem-solving behaviors suggests the following performance norms:
• It’s okay to come late to team meetings.
• It’s okay to interrupt meetings with phone messages.
• It’s okay to leave meetings to respond to phone messages.
• It’s okay to hold meetings longer than two hours.
• A good group member should not openly disagree with others’ views.
• It’s okay to vote on decisions.
• A good group member should be cordial to other members.
• It’s okay to postpone solutions to immediate problems.
• It’s okay not to follow through on previous agreements.
5. What is the nature of team functioning in the group? The case strongly suggests
that interpersonal relations are not healthy on the management team. Members do
not seem to confront differences openly. Indeed, the plant manager purposely
deflects issues when conflicts emerge. Members feel dissatisfied with the meetings
but spend little time talking about those feelings. Relationships are strained, but
members fail to examine the underlying causes.
The problems facing the team can now be explained by assessing how well the group
design fits the inputs. The plant’s organization design requires coordinated problem solv-
ing among functional departments. The newness of the plant and the uncertainty of the
technology result in complex, plantwide issues that require considerable information
processing to resolve. The weekly team meetings are an attempt to address and resolve
these interdependent and complex problems. The plant’s culture promotes participation
in problem solving and the team meetings are a reflection of that involvement. Although
it is too early to tell whether the team will succeed, there does not appear to be signifi-
cant incongruity between the plant’s organization design and culture and what the team
is trying to do.
Next, alignment among the group design components is assessed to determine how
well they fit together to promote interdependent and complex problem solving. The
team’s task structure and composition appear to fit the type of issues that the team is sup-
posed to address. The face-to-face meetings help to coordinate problem solving among the
department managers, and except for interpersonal and group problem-solving skills,
members seem to have the necessary task-relevant expertise to address the plantwide pro-
blems. There appears, however, to be a conflict in the priority between the problems to be
solved by the team and the problems faced by individual managers. Moreover, there seems
to be a mismatch between the demands of the problem-solving task and the team’s perfor-
mance norms and interpersonal relations. Complex, interdependent problems require per-
formance norms that support sharing of diverse and often conflicting kinds of
information. The norms must encourage members to generate novel solutions and to
assess the relevance of problem-solving strategies in light of new issues. Members need to
112 PART 2 THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
address explicitly how they are using their knowledge and skills and how they are weighing
and combining members’ individual contributions. The team’s performance norms fail to
support complex problem solving; rather, they promote a problem-solving method that is
often superficial, haphazard, and subject to external disruptions. Members’ interpersonal
relationships reinforce adherence to the ineffective norms. Members do not confront per-
sonal differences or dissatisfactions with the group process. They fail to examine the very
norms contributing to their problems. In this case, diagnosis suggests the need for group
interventions aimed at improving performance norms and developing healthy interper-
sonal relationships. (Chapter 10 describes interpersonal and group process interventions.)
5-6a Inputs
Four major inputs affect job design: organization design, culture, group design, and the
personal characteristics of jobholders.
Organization design is concerned with the larger organization within which the indi-
vidual job is the smallest unit. Organization design is a key part of the larger context
surrounding jobs. An organization’s technology, structure, management processes, and
human resources systems can have a powerful impact on the way jobs are designed and
on people’s experiences in them. For example, company reward systems can orient
employees to particular job behaviors and influence whether people see job performance
as fairly rewarded. In general, technology characterized by relatively uncertain tasks is
likely to support job designs allowing employees flexibility and discretion in performing
tasks. Conversely, low-uncertainty tasks are likely to promote standardized job designs
requiring routinized task behaviors.40
Culture represents the values and norms shared by organization members. Because
they are generally taken for granted, they guide members’ perceptions, thoughts, and
actions. Culture can influence the kinds of work designs that organizations consider
and that members perceive as legitimate. The more an organization culture promotes
member participation and innovation, the more likely job designs will be highly flexible
and involve member decision making.
Group design concerns the work group containing the individual job. Like organiza-
tion design, group design is an essential part of the job context. Task structure, goal clar-
ity, group composition, performance norms, and team functioning serve as inputs to job
design. They typically have a more immediate impact on jobs than do the larger, organi-
zation design components. For example, group task structure can determine how indi-
vidual jobs are grouped together—as in groups requiring coordination among jobs or in
ones comprising collections of independent jobs. Group composition can influence the
kinds of people who are available to fill jobs. Group performance norms can affect the
kinds of job designs that are considered acceptable, including the level of jobholders’ per-
formances. Goal clarity helps members to prioritize work, and group functioning can
CHAPTER 5 DIAGNOSING 113
affect how powerfully the group influences individual-job behaviors. When members
maintain close relationships and the group is cohesive, group norms are more likely to
be enforced and followed.41
Personal characteristics of individuals occupying jobs include age, education, experi-
ence, skills, and abilities. All of these can affect how people react to job designs and per-
form. Individual needs and expectations also can affect employee job responses. For
example, individual differences in growth needs—the need for self-direction, learning,
and personal accomplishment—can determine how much people are satisfied by jobs
with high levels of skill variety, autonomy, and feedback about results.42 Similarly, work
motivation can be influenced by people’s expectations that they can perform a job well
and that good job performance will result in valued outcomes.43
5-6c Outputs
Individual-job effectiveness includes two kinds of outputs, those related to how well the
job is performed and those having to do with how people experience their job. Perfor-
mance is measured in terms of the quantity, quality, time, and cost of producing a
114 PART 2 THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
5-6d Alignment
The diagnostic model in Figure 5.2 suggests that the job-design elements just described
must align with each other to produce effective job outputs, such as high quality and
quantity of individual performance, low absenteeism, and high job satisfaction.
1. Does the job design fit with the inputs? Job design should be congruent with the
larger organization design, culture, and group design within which the job is embed-
ded.45 Both the organization and the group serve as powerful contexts for individual
jobs or positions. They support and reinforce particular job designs. Highly flexible
organization designs, participative cultures, and work groups that permit members
to self-regulate their behavior align with enriched jobs. These organization and
group inputs promote autonomy, flexibility, and innovation at the individual-job
level. Conversely, bureaucratic organizations and cultures and groups relying on
external controls are congruent with job designs scoring low on the five design com-
ponents. These organization and group inputs reinforce standardized, routine jobs.
As suggested earlier, congruence across different levels of organizational design pro-
motes integration of the organization, group, and job levels. Whenever the levels do
not fit each other, conflict is likely to emerge.
Job design also should fit jobholders’ personal characteristics if they are to
perform effectively and derive satisfaction from work. Generally, enriched jobs fit
people with strong growth needs.46 These people derive satisfaction and accomplish-
ment from performing jobs involving skill variety, autonomy, and feedback about
results. Enriched jobs also fit people possessing moderate-to-high levels of task-
relevant skills, abilities, and knowledge. Enriched jobs generally require complex
information processing and decision making; people must have comparable skills
and abilities to perform effectively. Jobs scoring low on the five job-design compo-
nents generally fit people with rudimentary skills and abilities and with low growth
needs. Simpler, more routinized jobs requiring limited skills and experience fit better
with people who place a low value on opportunities for self-direction and learning.
However, because people can develop growth needs and expertise through educa-
tion, training, and experience, job design must be monitored and adjusted from
time to time to fit jobholders’ changing needs and enhanced knowledge and skills.
2. Do the job-design components fit with each other? The five job-design compo-
nents must align with each other to provide a clear and consistent direction to how
the job should be performed. Enriched job designs that score high on skill variety,
task identity, task significance, autonomy, and feedback of results signal the need for
flexibility, active engagement, and decision making to perform the job. Conversely,
traditional job designs that score low on the design components indicate the need
for routine and standardized job performances.
5-6e Analysis
Application 5.3 presents an example of individual-level diagnosing. As part of a larger
cost-cutting initiative, the university is considering a change in the job design of a
program administrator. The application provides information about the administrator’s
current job. Diagnosing the individual-level elements and the alignment among them
can help to address whether or not the proposed change makes sense.
CHAPTER 5 DIAGNOSING 115
T
he Graziadio School of Business and Man- enrollment and graduation processes including
agement (GSBM) at Pepperdine University their interface with the university’s registrar
is one of the largest business schools in the and finance office and the school’s financial
country and has the third largest part- aid office; and coached students through the
time MBA program. The school also provides program. After graduation, the Program Admin-
graduate education aimed at different istrator served as an unofficial placement ser-
markets including an executive MBA (EMBA), vice, hooking up eligible graduates with
a presidential/key executive MBA (PKE), and a prospective employers who called looking for
specialized master’s degree in organization MSOD talent, provided career guidance, and
development (MSOD). The MSOD program’s worked with the program’s alumni organization
curriculum consists of 10 four-unit classes to sponsor conferences and other alumni
over 22 months. Eight of the classes are con- activities.
ducted off-site during eight-day sessions at Each of the above activities was some-
both domestic and international locations. The what programmable; they occurred at specific
MSOD program office consists of a faculty times of the year and could be scheduled.
director, a program administrator, and an However, because each applicant, student,
administrative assistant. In response to cost- class, or graduate was somewhat unique, the
cutting initiatives at the university level, a pro- specific tasks or actions could not always be
posal was being considered to alter the job specified in advance and there were a number
designs of the MSOD program staff. of exceptions and unique situations that arose
The MSOD Program Administrator, the during each day, month, or year.
focus of this application, was responsible for The MSOD Program Administrator has
marketing and recruiting new students, man- worked with the MSOD program for over 15
aging the delivery logistics of the off-site pro- years and was a fixture in both the MSOD
gram, managing the students’ registration and and the general OD communities. Year over
financial relationships with the university, and year, the Program Administrator delivered qual-
maintaining relationships with the MSOD ified applicants in excess of available space
alumni. The marketing and recruiting duties although that task had become increasingly dif-
involved working with the Program Director ficult in the face of tuition increases, increas-
and the Director of Marketing for GSBM to ingly restrictive corporate policies on tuition
develop marketing tactics including advertise- reimbursement, and the ups and downs of
ments, brochures, conference marketing and the economy. He handled both routine and
support, and other market development activi- nonroutine administrative details profes-
ties. The recruiting process involved explaining sionally, displays and reports a high level of
the curriculum to prospective applicants, over- job satisfaction and commitment to the pro-
seeing the application process for each appli- gram, and has been complimented formally
cant, working with the faculty to have qualified and informally by the students in the program.
applicants interviewed, and managing the In fact, each cohort develops its own relation-
admissions process. This too had to be coordi- ship with the administrator and he becomes a
nated with the director and the administrative de facto member of almost every class. The
assistant. Once a class was admitted, the Pro- alumni considered the Program Administrator
gram Administrator worked with various off- a key and integral part of the MSOD program.
site facilities to establish room and board The set of duties described above has evolved
rates and catering services; managed the considerably over the Program Administrator’s
faculty’s travel and teaching requirements; tenure. In particular, he has become more
managed various intersession activities includ- involved and responsible for marketing and
ing the final exam; managed the students’ recruiting activities, and the alumni relations
116 PART 2 THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT
duties have been added in response to alumni program, including working with faculty to support
requests that cannot be filled by traditional univer- their teaching efforts, managing textbook ordering
sity departments. processes, and providing different facilities logistics
In an effort to improve efficiencies, and in activities. It would not include marketing, recruiting,
recognition of the MSOD Program Administrator’s and alumni development activities. The Program
outstanding productivity, a proposal was being con- Administrator would receive additional compensa-
sidered by GSBM administration to change the tion for the increased responsibilities and a title
design of his job. The proposal suggested that the change. The new position would include joint super-
MSOD Program Administrator continue to perform vision, with the EMBA program administrator, of an
all of the current duties of the position and, in addi- assistant program administrator, who would in turn
tion, provide administrative support to two PKE clas- manage a pool of administrative assistants. In addi-
ses from their initial class to graduation. The duties tion, the new program administrator job would
of administrating the PKE program would be similar report to both the MSOD program director and the
in nature to the delivery aspects of the MSOD director of EMBA/PKE programs.
EMBA programs that it warrants such independence, or there are some important
opportunities for improved efficiencies from the proposed change. There also seems to
be only a partial fit between Graziadio School of Business and Management’s culture
and the administrator’s job design. The culture includes values that promote both
employee involvement and efficiency, with the former supporting an enriched job and
the latter potentially impeding enrichment. The program administrator job and the
other jobs in the program office closely interact with each other to form a team that is
cohesive and mostly self-managed. This suggests a good fit between the enriched
program administrator job and the design of the office team. Finally, the design of the
program administrator job aligns well with the personal characteristics of the Program
Administrator.
In the current context, the proposed change to the program administrator job needs
to be considered very carefully. Will the change likely improve productivity, enhance
quality, or increase job satisfaction? In general, the answer appears to be “no.” For exam-
ple, the proposed change argues that adding new responsibilities will increase task vari-
ety, task identity, and task significance. However, the additional administrative tasks of
the EMBA classes do not increase the skill variety of the existing program administrator
job. There are, in fact, no new skills required to administer those classes, and adding
these responsibilities may actually unbalance the existing skill mix. That is, under the
proposed new job, the program delivery component of the job will increase dramatically
with respect to the other job components and more or less dominate the mix. This could
actually result in decreased task variety.
The proposed change also contends that task significance will increase because the
program administrator job will be able to affect the lives of both the MSOD program
participants and the EMBA students. There is some merit to this idea, but it must be
tempered with the chance that task identity might decrease. The task identity of the pro-
gram administrator job, as described in the application, is high while the task identity for
the EMBA program is relatively low. In the EMBA program, the program administrator
job would interact with the students only during the program; it would have little
involvement with them in the recruiting process and later as alumni. Thus, any increase
in the number of people the proposed new job affects (task significance) is likely to be
offset by the reduced involvement it would have with about half of these people (task
identity).
Finally, the proposed change claims that the Program Administrator is being given
more responsibility, which is true, but he will have less autonomy. The new program
administrator job will report to two bosses: the MSOD program director and the
EMBA/PKE director. Thus, the Program Administrator will probably have more, not
less, supervision as the MSOD program director ensures that the MSOD program objec-
tives are addressed, and the EMBA/PKE program director ensures that his or her
program objectives are being addressed.
Examining the proposed changes in relation to the design components of the
program administrator job suggests an intervention dilemma in this case. Should the
business school’s administration continue with the proposed change? The hoped-for effi-
ciencies may or may not materialize. The Program Administrator’s extensive skills and
knowledge may in fact be applied to improve productivity. However, will it do so at a
cost to his work satisfaction? Over time, such a solution may not be sustainable. If the
change is implemented, OD interventions probably should be aimed at mitigating the
negative effects on task identity, task significance, and autonomy. The MSOD director
and the EMBA/PKE director need to work with the Program Administrator to set out
clear expectations for his new job. They need to figure out methods to allow the Program
CHAPTER 5 DIAGNOSING 119
SUMMARY
This chapter presented information for diagnosing the behaviors of its departments. It is open to exchanges
organizations, groups, and individual jobs. Diagnosis with the larger environment and is influenced by exter-
is a collaborative process, involving both organization nal forces. As open systems, organizations are hierar-
members and OD practitioners in collecting pertinent chically ordered; that is, they are composed of groups,
data, analyzing them, and drawing conclusions for which in turn are composed of individual jobs. Organi-
action planning and intervention. Diagnosis may be zations also display five key open-systems properties:
aimed at discovering the causes of specific problems, environments; inputs, transformations, and outputs;
or it may be directed at assessing the organization or boundaries; feedback; and alignment.
department to find areas for future development. Diag- A comprehensive model for diagnosing organiza-
nosis provides the necessary practical understanding to tional systems was described and applied to three orga-
devise interventions for solving problems and improv- nizational levels—organization, group, and individual
ing organization effectiveness. job. It consists of inputs; a set of design components;
Diagnosis is based on conceptual frameworks and a variety of outputs, such as performance, produc-
about how organizations function. Such diagnostic tivity, and stakeholder satisfaction. For each organiza-
models serve as road maps by identifying areas to tional level, diagnosing involves understanding each of
examine and questions to ask in determining how an the parts in the model and then assessing how the
organization or department is operating. design components align with each other and with
The model presented here views organizations as the inputs. Effective outputs are likely to result from
open systems. The organization serves to coordinate good alignment.
NOTES
1. C. Lundberg, “Organization Development Diagnosis,” in 3. M. Weisbord, “Organizational Diagnosis: Six Places to
Handbook of Organization Development, ed. T. Cummings Look for Trouble with or without a Theory,” Group and
(Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2008), 137–50; D. Nadler, Organizational Studies 1 (1976): 430–37.
“Role of Models in Organizational Assessment,” in Organi- 4. D. Nadler and M. Tushman, Competing by Design: The
zational Assessment, ed. E. Lawler III, D. Nadler, and Power of Organizational Architecture (New York: Oxford
C. Cammann (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980), University Press, 1997).
119–31; R. Burton, B. Obel, H. Starling, M. Sondergaard,
and D. Dojbak, Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and 5. J. Galbraith, Designing Organizations (San Francisco:
Design: Developing Theory for Application, 2nd ed. Jossey-Bass, 2002).
(Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 6. J. Kotter, Organizational Dynamics: Diagnosis and Inter-
2001). vention (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).
2. M. Poole and A. Van de Ven, eds., Handbook of Organi- 7. M. Tushman and E. Romanelli, “Organization Evolution:
zational Change and Innovation (New York: Cambridge A Metamorphosis Model of Convergence and Reorienta-
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CHAPTER 5 DIAGNOSING 121
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