Expert Evidence Law Practice Procedure and Advocacy 6nbsped 9780455238425

EXPERT EVIDENCE
Law, Practice, Procedure and Advocacy

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EXPERT EVIDENCE
Law, Practice, Procedure and Advocacy
IAN FRECKELTON QC
LLD (Melb), PhD (Griff), BA (Hons), LLB (Syd), Dip Th M (ANH), FAAL,
FASSA, FACLM (Hon)
SIXTH EDITION
THOMSON REUTERS 2019

Published in Sydney
by Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited ABN 64 058 914 668
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Printed by Ligare Pty Ltd, Riverwood, NSW, Australia
First edition .......................................................................................................................................... 1999

Second edition ...................................................................................................................................... 2002
Third edition ......................................................................................................................................... 2005
Fourth edition ....................................................................................................................................... 2009
Fifth edition........................................................................................................................................... 2013
National Library of Australia
Cataloguing-in-Publication entry
Australia
Freckelton, Ian R.
Title: Expert evidence : law, practice, procedure and advocacy / Ian Freckelton.
Edition: 6th ed.
ISBN: 978 0 455 238425 (pbk.)
Notes: Includes biblography and index.
Evidence, Expert. Evidence, Expert – Australia. Evidence, (Law). Evidence, (Law) –
Australia.
347.94067
© 2019 Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Limited
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Editors: Zehra Bharucha, Michelle Nichols
Publisher: Virginia Barton
Printed by Ligare Pty Ltd, Riverwood, NSW
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In memory of
Brian Freckelton (1929-2010);
Maureen Molloy (1925-2011);
Joan Freckelton (1920-2012); and
John Lloyd (1923-2013).
For John Molloy (the patriarch) and Lloyd Freckelton (the future).
– IF
v
ALSO BY ...
Ian Freckelton QC
• The Law Reform Digest (et al), Vols 1 and 2 (1983; 1987)
• The Trial of the Expert (1987)
• Police in Our Society (with Hugh Selby) (1988)
• Expert Evidence (7 Vols, with Hugh Selby) (1993–current)
• Controversies in Health Law (with Kerry Petersen) (1999)
• Indictable Offences in Victoria (4th ed, 1999; 5th ed with D Andrewartha, 2010; 6th ed, with Kerryn
Cockroft, 2015)
• The Law of Expert Evidence (with Hugh Selby) (1999)
• Expert Evidence in Criminal Law (with Hugh Selby) (1999)
• Expert Evidence in Family Law (with Hugh Selby) (1999)
• Australian Judicial Attitudes toward Expert Evidence (with Prasuna Reddy and Hugh Selby) (1999)
• Victorian Criminal Law, Investigation and Procedure (7 Vols) (2000–current)
• Australian Magistrates’ Attitudes toward Expert Evidence (with Prasuna Reddy and Hugh Selby) (2001)
• Criminal Injuries Compensation: Law, Practice and Policy (2001)
• Causation in Law and Medicine (with Danuta Mendelson) (2002)
• Expert Evidence: Law, Practice, Procedure and Advocacy (with Hugh Selby) (2002; 2005; 2009; 2013)
• Involuntary Detention: International Perspectives (with Kate Diesfeld) (2003)
• Disputes and Dilemmas in Health Law (with Kerry Petersen) (2006)
• Death Investigation and the Coroner’s Inquest (with David Ranson) (2006)
• Regulation of Health Practitioners (2006)
• The COAT Practice Manual for Tribunals (with Pamela O’Connor and Peter Sallmann) (2006);
• Appealing to the Future (with Hugh Selby) (2010)
• Coercive Care: Law and Policy (with Bernadette McSherry) (2013)
• Expert Evidence and Criminal Jury Trials (with Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Jacqui Horan and Blake
McKimmie) (2016);
• Scholarly Misconduct: Law, Regulation and Practice (2016)
• Tensions and Traumas in Health Law (with Kerry Peterson) (2017)
vii
FOREWORD
The Hon. Justice John Dixon
Judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria
Since the first edition of this book was published 20 years ago, it has become
an essential tool for practitioners and students. It is a very valuable reference
book providing an authoritative exposition and a comprehensive survey of
law and practice governing expert evidence.
Evidence that is relevant in a proceeding is admissible. The Opinion Rule
excludes opinion evidence to prove the existence of a fact about the existence
of which the opinion was expressed. This book is about the exceptions to the
opinion rule, but it is about much more than that.
Expert evidence benefits courts enormously in their daily work. The
ever-expanding study of scientific principle and human interaction with our
environment and with each other has created much greater scope for courts
and tribunals to be assisted by expert evidence in quelling disputes than in
past times. However, the seduction of expert evidence produces many
challenges.
Developments in medicine, neuropsychology, psychiatry and risk prediction,
social sciences, forensic sciences, survey and statistics, finance and
accounting, engineering and construction, and intellectual property, to single
out some broad areas, present judges with a clear and compelling need to be
educated about the impact of understanding expert subjects to find the just,
efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of disputes.
The capture of expert evidence by litigants and its use as an adversarial tool
has long been of great concern to courts. This concern has led to the
development of different techniques for taking expert evidence, particularly
through ‘hot tubs’ or concurrent expert evidence sessions in court that follow
upon conclaves or conferences between experts to identify the precise points
of disagreement. This process has been enthusiastically adopted by many
judges as beneficial in discharging the judicial role. Yet it creates novel
problems both for experts and for advocates.
What I find particularly impressive is the structure Dr Freckelton has adopted
for organisation of the material contained in this book, especially the
separation and collation of material on particular areas of expertise. It enables
the reader to dive deeply into the myriad issues that can arise with expert
evidence either by reference to principle or by reference to subject matter.
The breadth of scholarship and the mass of material that the author has
accumulated since the early 1980s make it highly likely that the answer to
any conceivable question arising about expert evidence will be found within
these covers.
Dr Freckelton has not simply explained the law and procedure in relation to
expert evidence; this book provides valuable guidance in relation to practice
and advocacy.
The unlimited scope of disputes likely to be assisted by expert evidence
means this substantial textbook is not so much a virtue as a necessity. Legal
text books, however authoritative, must be kept up to date or they become
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Expert Evidence
neglected. With this subject, that is no mean feat and Dr Freckelton is to be

commended for the substantial scholarship in this sixth edition that meets this
objective.
I congratulate Dr Freckelton for this book. His assiduous research and
scholarship will be reflected in its value to the reader, whether a student, a
legal practitioner or an expert witness. This book should find a place in every
personal library.
2 September 2019
x
PREFACE
It is now two decades since the first edition of this book was published in 1999. It has
evolved considerably during that time as a result of continuing controversies over the role
of forensic experts and expert opinion evidence; the recommendations of law reform
commission reports (see, eg, New South Wales Law Reform Commission (2005);
Australian Law Reform Commission, New South Wales Law Reform Commission and
Victorian Law Reform Commission (2006); Law Reform Commission of Ireland (2008);
South African Law Reform Commission (2008); Law Reform Committee of the Singapore
Academy of Law (2011); and Law Commission of England and Wales (2011)); continuing
scholarship; statutory law reform; a very substantial volume of case law; and the
implementation of important changes to court and tribunal procedures.
My work on expert evidence now dates back a longer time than generally I care to
acknowledge. It was in 1983 that my research paper on Opinion Evidence was published by
the Australian Law Reform Commission, as part of the sequence of 16 consultation papers
which eventually led to the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), followed by The Trial of the Expert
(Freckelton (1987) and then a series of three empirical studies undertaken on behalf of the
Australian Institute of Judicial Administration (Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999; 2001);
Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016)). Inevitably, this volume
draws upon all of those publications, in particular the 2016 empirical work which has
highlighted a number of procedural issues which still need to be addressed if expert
evidence (especially in criminal matters) is to be understood and evaluated more
effectively by triers of fact.
In the period of time since 1999, the landscape for the reception and utilisation of expert
opinion evidence has changed in major respects, not least because of the passage of what
has optimistically (although inaccurately) become known as the Uniform Evidence
legislation in Australia and of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZ). More than those formal changes
have occurred, though, with the evolution of a critical scholarship of expert evidence,
debating not just the best mechanisms for avoiding miscarriages of justice but also how
both judges and juries (as well as tribunals) can most effectively be assisted in their
decision-making role. Suggestions continue to be made too about how expert witnesses
can most effectively discharge their forensic roles (see, eg, Cohen (2007)) and how
advocates can best make expert witnesses accountable.
While relatively little use continues to be made of court-appointed experts (Ch 6.0) and
assessors (Ch 6.5) in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom (see Hodgkinson
and James (2015)), single experts have become the norm in many jurisdictions (such as the
United Kingdom, and in the Australian Family Court (Ch 6.12), and referees (Ch 6.10) as a
mechanism for evaluating and determining which expert opinions are to be preferred
have become increasingly popular. In addition, expert conclaves (Ch 6.15) are now
standard in civil jurisdictions and are frequently also being availed of in criminal
proceedings, while concurrent evidence (Ch 6.20) is becoming the principal means of
courts hearing expert evidence where different parties wish to adduce expert opinions. In
addition, commencing in 1997, court rules and codes of expert conduct (see Chs 5.0 and
5.5) have come to articulate the requirements of the courts for the ethical and admissible
preparation of expert reports. Contraventions of such requirements have the potential to
result in sanctions, including wasted costs orders against both experts and the lawyers
who have commissioned them (see Ch 5.10) and determinations of inadmissibility.
While DNA evidence (Ch 12.20) is a vital part of forensic scientific evidence, especially in
criminal proceedings, the focus upon statistical interpretation of scientific testing
(Ch 12.25) has spilled over into all areas of scientific evidence (Ch 12.0), creating
expectations that expert opinions will be provided in a rigorous form which enables triers
of fact to understand informedly what inferences they can draw from an apparent match,
including those forms of scientific evidence which can be classified as ‘novel’ (see Ch 12.5).
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Expert Evidence
Evidence from health practitioners, particularly medical practitioners (Ch 9.0), remains
fundamental to the resolution of many forms of litigation, but other health practitioners,
such as nurses (Ch 9.10) and dentists (Ch 9.05), are now making an important forensic
contribution. Accountants and other finance practitioners (Ch 16.5), as well as forensic
valuers (Ch 16.0), provide vital assistance to courts in all forms of litigation to enable
accurate and fair calculation of losses sustained and likely to be sustained.
This sixth edition has further consolidated the reorganisation of the volume undertaken in
the fourth and fifth editions in an effort to make it more accessible to legal practitioners
and experts from a range of disciplines and to expand its scope.
A feature of this edition is its international focus, with significant legal authority from the
United Kingdom, Ireland, South Africa, New Zealand, Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada
and the United States being referred to more extensively and more critically. This reflects
the fact that expert evidence law, while it varies to some degree from country to country, is
showing increasing signs of following approaches that are consistent and transcending
national boundaries.
The exegesis of the law as to admissibility is divided into sections on the common law
exclusionary rules: the expertise rule (Ch 2.5), the area of expertise rule (Ch 2.10), the
common knowledge rule (Ch 2.15), the basis rule (Ch 2.20), and the ultimate issue rule
(Ch 2.25), as well as on matters such as the so-called discretions to exclude (Ch 2.35) and
judicial notice (Ch 2.30), and on the statutory reforms in Australia (Ch 3.0), New Zealand
(Ch 3.5) and the United States (Ch 3.10). In Australia, increasingly substantial analysis of
the law arising from the uniform evidence scheme (Ch 3.0) has been required as a result of
the volume of case law from outside Queensland, Western Australia and South Australia.
In Australia, the momentum toward national evidentiary law consistency is building with
the same statutory scheme applying at Commonwealth level and in the Australian Capital
Territory, New South Wales, Norfolk Island, Victoria, Tasmania and the Northern Territory.
It is likely that in due course further jurisdictions will join the scheme. There remains
much to be said for national consistency in relation to evidence law generally.
In order to make the text more user-friendly, the admissibility chapters have been further
decluttered by taking out of them material on particular areas of expertise. An example of
this is the creation of a new chapter on expert evidence about foreign law (Ch 15.0). There
are chapters on a wide variety of different areas of technical subject matter that have been
ruled upon by the courts internationally, such as the health areas, the scientific areas, the
financial areas, the accident investigation areas, the planning and environmental impact
areas, including evidence by both architects (Ch 17.5) and engineers (Ch 17.0), and the
intellectual property areas (Ch 18.0). The plan is to expand upon these additions in
subsequent editions, as has previously occurred with chapters on evidence given by
historians (Ch 11.5), by cultural experts (Ch 11.15) and by linguists (Ch 11.20).
Readers will identify new chapters on a number of areas: wasted costs orders (Ch 5.15),
single joint experts (Ch 6.12), conclaves (Ch 6.15), consecutive evidence (Ch 6.25), foreign
law evidence (Ch 15.0), engineers’ evidence (Ch 17.0), architects’ evidence (Ch 17.5) and
planning evidence (Ch 17.15). My hope is that by consolidating and expanding the large
number of separate chapters, now numbering 66, some of which as yet are short, readers
will readily be able to locate analysis on both law and practice which is relevant to their
particular litigation needs.
The chapter on concurrent evidence (Ch 6.20) has been substantially rewritten to reflect
important changes to practice in many jurisdictions. There are now additional chapters too
on the phenomena of consecutive expert evidence (Ch 6.25) and expert conclaves
(Ch 6.15).
In the criminal law area, a number of important decisions have been handed down since
the fifth edition. These have included a sequence of decisions in the United Kingdom in
respect of novel areas of scientific evidence (see Ch 12.5) that have led to a changed
emphasis upon reliability as a yardstick for expert evidence admissibility. They are
xii
Preface
analysed in detail in this volume in the chapters on scientific evidence (Ch 12.0) and novel
scientific evidence (Ch 12.5). In addition, new case law is included from the Australian
High Court, as well as the New South Wales and Victorian Courts of Appeal, and from the
Privy Council and the New Zealand Supreme Court and Court of Appeal, that has had an
impact upon admissibility law in both Australia (see Ch 3.0) and New Zealand (see
Ch 3.5). Important changes have also taken place with regard to court rules in relation to
the reliability of expert opinions as a condition precedent to admissibility in the United
Kingdom.
The chapters on the use of referees (Ch 6.10), costs and legal privilege (Ch 5.10), DNA
testing (Ch 12.20) and post-traumatic stress disorder evidence (Ch 10.45) have all been
substantially revised to take account of important developments.
Expert Evidence is a work of considerable proportions with no small potential for error,
inconsistency and being overtaken by the avalanche of ongoing case law, statutory
amendment, procedural change and scholarship. Latterly, a significant number of books
on expert evidence and advocacy have been published in Ireland (see Joyce, Dockrell,
Madden, Prendergast and Tottenham (2018)); the United Kingdom (see Hackman, Raitt
and Black (2019); Roberts and Stockdale (2018); Hodgkinson and James (2015)); in the
United States (see Lubet and Boals (2014); Bowers (2013)); in Australia (see Stevens (2008);
Watts (2009); White, Day, Hackett and Dalby (2015)); and in Canada (see Gold (2009)). An
important book has also been published on expert evidence and international criminal
justice (Appazov (2016)) This book has drawn upon that scholarship. Recent works on
miscarriages of justice, too, have focused on the unfortunate contributions made by expert
evidence to convictions that should not have taken place (see, eg, Campbell (2018); Gill
(2014); Sangha, Moles and Roach (2010); Huff and Killias (2008); Vollen and Eggers (2008)).
In Australia, this issue has been highlighted confrontingly by the Eastman Inquiry (Martin
(2014)), the Royal Commission into the Conviction of the Chamberlains (Morling (1987)),
and the Splatt Royal Commission (Shannon (1984)), while in Canada the risks have been
illustrated by the Goudge Inquiry (2008). Reference is made in the succeeding pages to
each of these inquiries and their recommendations for systemic reform.
Expert Evidence is an international publication in more senses than one. It has been written
before and after court hours, at weekends, and during respites in other countries,
particularly in Manitoba and Nunavut in Canada; Tel Aviv in Israel; sundry locations in
Iceland; Nauru; the Lofoten Islands and Bergen in Norway; Kuching in Malaysia; Saffron
Walden (with thanks to Lucy Lloyd) and Manchester in England; Lanzarote in the Canary
Islands (with thanks to Serena Lloyd); Newcastle and Dungog (with thanks to Paul
Walker) in New South Wales; Airey’s Inlet in Victoria; Strahan in Tasmania; Lombok and
Bali in Indonesia; Tokyo in Japan; and Northern Ethiopia. I have been appreciative too of
the facilities provided in each of these locations that enabled inroads to be made on the
many tasks that needed to be addressed.
I am appreciative of my long term scholarly homes at the University of Melbourne in the
Law Faculty and the Department of Psychiatry, and at Monash University in the
Department of Forensic Medicine, where I have received great support from the respective
Deans and from my academic colleagues. It would be remiss too if I did not record my
gratitude to the Hon Tim Smith and the Hon Michael Kirby AC CMG who mentored me
so generously during my days at the Australian Law Reform Commission working,
amongst other things, on the Evidence Reference; to Professor John Devereux from the
University of Queensland, the supervisor of my PhD thesis in 1998 from Griffith
University which in 2019 did me the great honour of awarding me Outstanding Alumnus
status; and to my esteemed friend and colleague, Professor Warren Brookbanks from
Auckland University of Technology, who has been such a source of support and
encouragement for so many years.
I am grateful too for the longstanding relationship with Korda Mentha, whose volumes on
Expert Evidence alerted me to aspects of judgments that I might well not otherwise have
encountered.
xiii
Expert Evidence
I acknowledge the contributions made by Hugh Selby to the thinking lying behind
previous editions of the book and trust that he will find the next phase of his life satisfying
and rewarding.
I would like to record my gratitude for the constructive intervention by Virginia Barton of
Thomson Reuters to deal with difficult issues and to bring the current edition to the point
of publication; the heroic efforts by Julia Moulding with the bibliography; the coordination
undertaken by Ariel Galapo and then Rebecca Beech; and, most particularly, the editing by
Michelle Nichols who has laboured with patience and good-humoured commitment over
multiple drafts of what has become a very substantial manuscript, finding and correcting
any number of my errors and missing citations. I am also grateful for the efficient,
generous and responsive contributions way beyond the call of duty by Zehra Bharucha,
Senior Editor, Content Operations, who has overseen the final phases of preparing the
manuscript for publication.
I am delighted to have this work commence with a foreword by the Hon Justice John
Dixon of the Victorian Supreme Court. I acknowledge too the generosity of the Chief
Justice of Victoria, the Hon Anne Ferguson, in giving permission for me to photograph the
witness box of one of her courts for inclusion on the front cover.
No book, least of all this one, is written in isolation. The pleasures and travails of writing
impact upon others. I am very grateful for the support of my extraordinary wife, Trish,
who makes each day of my life so precious; the pillar of support for all of the Molloy
family, John Molloy; as well as the pleasure brought by my much-loved children, Leo,
Julia and Lloyd, for whom the future holds so much, and of whom I am so proud.
Ian Freckelton QC
9 September 2019
xiv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Also by ............................................................................................................................................................. vii
Preface................................................................................................................................................. xi
Author information ......................................................................................................................... xxix
Table of Cases.................................................................................................................................... xxxi
Table of Statutes .................................................................................................................................. xci
Part 1 – Introduction ........................................................................................ 1

Chapter 1.0: Introduction ................................................................................ 3
Purpose and scope of the book .......................................................................................... 3
Law reform activity and empirical research .................................................................... 4
Rules of admissibility ........................................................................................................... 5
Evolving areas of expertise ................................................................................................. 6
Experts’ participation in litigation ..................................................................................... 8
The hearing ............................................................................................................................. 13
Evidence for sentencing ....................................................................................................... 14
Issues for the future .............................................................................................................. 14
Part 2 – Common law evidentiary rules..................................................... 17

Chapter 2.0: The common law exclusionary rules of expert
evidence ......................................................................................................... 19
The exclusionary rules ......................................................................................................... 19
The role of the expert witness ............................................................................................ 20
Anxieties generating the rules’ development .................................................................. 23
The role of exclusionary rules outside criminal and civil litigation ............................ 25
Exclusion on the basis of lack of independence .............................................................. 29
Discretionary exclusion ........................................................................................................ 29
Judicial notice ......................................................................................................................... 29
The need for statutory reform ............................................................................................ 29
Chapter 2.05: The expertise rule................................................................... 31

The role of the expert ........................................................................................................... 31
The expertise rule: experts must be experts ..................................................................... 35
Increased rigour in application of expertise rule ............................................................ 35
Independence of experts ...................................................................................................... 36
An expert who is a party ..................................................................................................... 38
The unrepresentativeness of an expert’s views ............................................................... 39
Unusual nature of expertise ................................................................................................ 40
Inferences of expertise from expert reports ...................................................................... 40
Ad hoc expertise .................................................................................................................... 41
Application of the expertise rule ........................................................................................ 41
Legislative definitions ........................................................................................................... 45
The United States approach ................................................................................................ 47
Existence of formal qualifications ...................................................................................... 47
Chapter 2.10: The area of expertise rule..................................................... 55

An exclusionary rule? ........................................................................................................... 55
The approach of Madden CJ ............................................................................................... 56
The Frye test ........................................................................................................................... 57
Reliability and the area of expertise test: English and Welsh authority ..................... 58
Reliability and the area of expertise test: Australian authority .................................... 59
United States controversy over the Frye test ................................................................... 63
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Expert Evidence
United States case law interpreting the Frye test ............................................................ 65

The Williams departure ......................................................................................................... 66
The Jacobetz refinement ......................................................................................................... 67
The Kelly-Frye test ................................................................................................................. 67
The Dyas test .......................................................................................................................... 68
A lower standard for the defence? ..................................................................................... 68
The Daubert test ..................................................................................................................... 68
The Joiner postscript .............................................................................................................. 72
The Kumho gloss .................................................................................................................... 72
Post-Kumho decisions ............................................................................................................ 73
United States Federal law reform ...................................................................................... 73
New Zealand authority ........................................................................................................ 74
Canadian authority ............................................................................................................... 77
Likely developments in Australasia .................................................................................. 81
Chapter 2.15: The common knowledge rule ............................................. 83

The common knowledge exclusion ................................................................................... 84
The common knowledge rule: the traditional formulation ........................................... 84
The common knowledge rule: a more flexible formulation ......................................... 87
Counterintuitive evidence ................................................................................................... 90
Rationales for the common knowledge rule .................................................................... 92
The normal versus abnormal dichotomy .......................................................................... 95
Murphy v The Queen .............................................................................................................. 96
The law after Murphy v The Queen ..................................................................................... 99
Expert evidence of intoxication by alcohol ...................................................................... 102
Expert evidence on memory and identification .............................................................. 102
Expert evidence on community standards, human nature and understanding ........ 102
Expert evidence on the meaning of words ...................................................................... 105
Expert evidence on foreign law .......................................................................................... 110
Evidence of professional practice ....................................................................................... 111
Expert evidence in passing off cases ................................................................................. 111
Appendix: Potential areas of expert evidence by mental health professionals ......... 114
Chapter 2.20: The basis rule ......................................................................... 115

The controversy ..................................................................................................................... 116
The Dasreef gloss .................................................................................................................... 117
The significance of the issue ............................................................................................... 119
The underlying inconsistency ............................................................................................. 119
The basis rule of exclusion .................................................................................................. 122
A matter of weight ................................................................................................................ 129
The rule against self-serving evidence .............................................................................. 133
Acceptable bases of expert evidence ................................................................................. 133
Contemporaneous statements as to health, made to an expert ................................... 136
Unacceptable bases of expert evidence ............................................................................. 137
Persuasive presentation of expert evidence ..................................................................... 137
Chapter 2.25: The ultimate issue rule ....................................................... 139

Uncertainty of formulation .................................................................................................. 141
The traditional formulation ................................................................................................. 144
The Eggleston formulation .................................................................................................. 144
Criticism of the rule .............................................................................................................. 145
A variation on the traditional formulation ....................................................................... 146
Expert evidence involving legal standards ...................................................................... 146
An exception – civil, non-jury cases .................................................................................. 149
Family Court litigation ......................................................................................................... 150
A warning about circumvention ........................................................................................ 151
Diminished responsibility evidence in New South Wales ............................................. 151
Canadian evolution of the law ........................................................................................... 151
United States evolution of the rule .................................................................................... 151
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Table of Contents
Chapter 2.30: Judicial notice ....................................................................... 153

An alternative to expert evidence? .................................................................................... 153
Matters of common knowledge .......................................................................................... 154
The primary parameter for judicial notice ....................................................................... 155
Departure from strict principle ........................................................................................... 155
The fluid nature of judicial notice ...................................................................................... 157
Reference to works of authority ......................................................................................... 158
Ramifications for expert evidence ...................................................................................... 159
Legislative instruments ........................................................................................................ 159
Chapter 2.35: Discretionary exclusion of expert evidence ..................... 161

The prejudice/probative discretion under the criminal law ......................................... 161
The prejudice/probative discretion under the civil law ................................................ 162
Common law interpretation of the prejudice/probative discretion ............................ 163
United States discretionary exclusion ............................................................................... 171
Discretionary exclusion on the ground of the unavailability of the expert’s work for
scrutiny .................................................................................................... 171
Permanent stay for abuse of process ................................................................................. 173
Discretionary exclusion on the basis of incomprehensibility or irrationality ............ 173
Unfairness discretion ............................................................................................................ 173
Exclusion on the basis of prosecution non-disclosure of expert testing ..................... 174
Discretionary exclusion on the ground of bias ................................................................ 175
Part 3 – Statutory evidentiary rules..........................................................179

Chapter 3.0: Statutory law in Australia..................................................... 181
Australia’s uniform evidence legislation .......................................................................... 181
The opinion rule .................................................................................................................... 182
The admissibility regime ...................................................................................................... 183
Knowledge .............................................................................................................................. 183
Specialised knowledge ......................................................................................................... 184
Behaviour, competency and development of children ................................................... 189
Abolition of the ultimate issue rule ................................................................................... 192
The bases of expert opinions .............................................................................................. 194
The assumption identification, proof of assumption and statement of reasoning
rules .......................................................................................................... 199
Expert evidence and hearsay .............................................................................................. 201
Expert evidence and reliability ........................................................................................... 201
Expert evidence about credibility ...................................................................................... 202
Judicial notice ......................................................................................................................... 203
Mandatory exclusion ............................................................................................................ 203
Unreliable identification evidence ...................................................................................... 207
Meaning of words ................................................................................................................. 207
Certificates of expert evidence ............................................................................................ 207
Chapter 3.05: Statutory law in New Zealand ......................................... 209

Background to the 2006 legislation .................................................................................... 209
Admissibility of expert opinions ........................................................................................ 211
Abolition of ultimate issue rule and common knowledge rule ................................... 212
‘Discretionary’ exclusion ...................................................................................................... 212
Admissibility decision-making ........................................................................................... 212
Counterintuitive expert opinions ....................................................................................... 213
Novel scientific evidence ..................................................................................................... 216
Reliability ................................................................................................................................ 217
Duties of expert witnesses ................................................................................................... 218
Chapter 3.10: Statutory law in the United States .................................... 221

Statutory law in the United States ..................................................................................... 221
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Expert Evidence
Chapter 3.15: Law reform proposals ......................................................... 225

International law reform proposals ................................................................................... 225
Lord Woolf’s 1996 reform proposals .................................................................................. 225
Evolving admissibility issues in criminal matters .......................................................... 226
The 2011 Law Commission of England and Wales recommendations ....................... 227
The Law Reform Commission of Ireland recommendations ........................................ 232
Singapore Academy of Law, Law Reform Committee recommendations .................. 233
Part 4 – Appeals ............................................................................................ 235

Chapter 4.0: Appeals in relation to expert evidence .............................. 237
Appeals against determinations on admissibility ........................................................... 237
Role of the tribunal of fact .................................................................................................. 239
Approach of appellate courts in civil matters ................................................................. 240
The fallacy of the existence of inevitable error when experts disagree ...................... 242
When expert evidence is uncontradicted ......................................................................... 243
Conflicts and reasonable hypotheses ................................................................................. 244
Judicial directions to juries .................................................................................................. 245
The Shepherd direction .......................................................................................................... 247
Use of expert as filter ........................................................................................................... 247
Experts exceeding parameters of expertise ...................................................................... 248
Disinclination of appellate courts to overturn trial decisions as to expert evidence
admissibility ............................................................................................ 248
The significant impact criterion .......................................................................................... 250
Appeal against the exercise of discretion ......................................................................... 251
Appeal on the ground of the wrong admission of expert evidence ........................... 253
Appeal on the basis of failure to hold a voire dire ........................................................ 255
Appeal on the ground of the wrong rejection of expert evidence .............................. 255
Appealable directions when expert evidence conflicts .................................................. 256
Appealable directions when expert evidence is uncontradicted .................................. 257
Foreign law ............................................................................................................................. 258
Appeal on the ground of the absence of expert evidence ............................................. 259
Appeal on the ground of failure to call expert evidence .............................................. 260
Appeal on the ground of findings made without expert evidence ............................. 260
Appeal on the ground of judge’s failure to provide findings and reasons ............... 260
Appeal where conflict between expert and lay evidence .............................................. 261
Appeal on the ground of fresh or new expert evidence ............................................... 261
Fresh evidence of prior inconsistent expert evidence .................................................... 264
Part 5 – Procedure ........................................................................................ 265

Chapter 5.0: Forensic reports...................................................................... 267
Strengths and weaknesses in forensic reports ................................................................. 267
Commissioning of reports ................................................................................................... 270
Obligations to the court ....................................................................................................... 270
Contingency fees ................................................................................................................... 271
No property in an expert ..................................................................................................... 271
Expert reports: definitions ................................................................................................... 272
Medical reports: treaters and assessors ............................................................................. 273
Content of reports ................................................................................................................. 274
Joint reports ............................................................................................................................ 277
Expert reports and forensic reports: Victoria ................................................................... 278
Draft reports ........................................................................................................................... 279
Shadow expert reports/consulting expert reports .......................................................... 279
Supplementary reports ......................................................................................................... 280
Lawyers settling expert reports .......................................................................................... 280
Pre-trial exchange of expert reports ................................................................................... 283
Obligation to submit to expert medical examination ..................................................... 284
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Failure to serve expert material .......................................................................................... 285

Expert evidence via the certification procedure .............................................................. 286
Disclosure of expert evidence in criminal cases .............................................................. 286
The implied undertaking ..................................................................................................... 288
Chapter 5.5: Court rules............................................................................... 291

Enforcement of Court Rules for expert witnesses .......................................................... 291
Chapter 5.10: Client legal privilege and confidentiality .......................... 303

Client legal privilege ............................................................................................................ 303
Communications with experts ............................................................................................ 310
Draft reports ........................................................................................................................... 315
Experts and protection of trade secrets ............................................................................. 318
Breach of confidentiality by experts .................................................................................. 319
Appendix: Form of undertaking to be made by independent expert ......................... 323
Chapter 5.15: Wasted costs orders.............................................................. 325

Costs orders against third parties ...................................................................................... 325
United Kingdom authority .................................................................................................. 327
Australian authority ............................................................................................................. 330
Procedural fairness ................................................................................................................ 339
Impetus towards costs orders ............................................................................................. 340
Responsibility of the forensic expert to correct misimpressions .................................. 340
Obligation of the expert to exercise proper care over forensic reports ...................... 341
Role of lawyers in respect of forensic reports ................................................................. 341
Future of costs orders in relation to expert evidence ..................................................... 342
Chapter 5.20: Remuneration of experts .................................................... 345

Award of expert fees by courts .......................................................................................... 345
Contractual obligations of solicitors .................................................................................. 347
English authority ................................................................................................................... 348
United States authority ........................................................................................................ 350
Medico-Legal Joint Standing Committee of the Law Institute of Victoria ................. 351
Contingency fees for experts ............................................................................................... 351
Appendix: Sample agreement between expert and client ............................................. 353
Part 6 – Expert witnesses and decision-making...................................... 355

Chapter 6.0: Court-appointed experts ....................................................... 357
Court-appointed experts ...................................................................................................... 358
Role of court-appointed experts ......................................................................................... 358
Courts’ power to call experts .............................................................................................. 359
Controversies over court appointment of expert witnesses .......................................... 365
Chapter 6.05: Assessors ............................................................................... 367

Assessors ................................................................................................................................. 367
Role of assessors .................................................................................................................... 368
Use of assessors ..................................................................................................................... 369
The status of assessors’ advice ........................................................................................... 371
Procedural fairness ................................................................................................................ 372
Canadian practice .................................................................................................................. 375
Chapter 6.10: Referees.................................................................................. 377

Preliminary ............................................................................................................................. 379
The conduct of the referee’s inquiry ................................................................................. 386
The adoption or rejection of the referee’s report by the trial judge ............................ 390
Chapter 6.12: Single joint experts ............................................................. 403

Single expert regimes ........................................................................................................... 403
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Expert Evidence
The Australian Family Court regime ................................................................................. 405

The New South Wales regime ............................................................................................ 406
The Queensland regime ....................................................................................................... 407
The Victorian regime ............................................................................................................ 408
Appointment of further experts ......................................................................................... 408
Chapter 6.15: Conclaves/Joint conferences of experts............................. 411

Purpose of expert conclaves ................................................................................................ 411
Role of lawyers ...................................................................................................................... 414
Designation of issues for expert conclaves ....................................................................... 414
Materials to be provided ...................................................................................................... 415
Role of a moderator/facilitator .......................................................................................... 416
Role of a scribe ...................................................................................................................... 416
Role of experts ....................................................................................................................... 416
Confidentiality of discussions ............................................................................................. 417
The joint report ...................................................................................................................... 417
Immunity for a conclave ...................................................................................................... 418
Preparation for a conclave ................................................................................................... 418
Pre-trial expert meetings in criminal matters .................................................................. 418
Controversies about conclaves ............................................................................................ 419
The future ............................................................................................................................... 420
Chapter 6.20: Concurrent expert evidence................................................ 421

Concurrent evidence as an option ..................................................................................... 421
The background ..................................................................................................................... 423
International uptake .............................................................................................................. 424
Procedures for concurrent expert evidence ...................................................................... 426
Concurrent evidence in the courts ..................................................................................... 427
Concurrent evidence before administrative tribunals .................................................... 428
Controversies .......................................................................................................................... 429
Directions for concurrent evidence orders ....................................................................... 432
Concurrent evidence in criminal litigation ....................................................................... 434
The future ............................................................................................................................... 436
Chapter 6.25: Consecutive expert evidence ............................................. 439

Procedure for consecutive expert evidence ...................................................................... 439
Order and directions powers .............................................................................................. 440
The role of consecutive evidence ....................................................................................... 441
Part 7 – Expert evidence in court .............................................................. 443

Chapter 7.0: Preparation and examination of the expert
witness .................................................................................... 445
Advice to expert witnesses before court ........................................................................... 447
Exclusion of expert witnesses ............................................................................................. 457
Demonstrating appropriate expertise ................................................................................ 458
Bias ........................................................................................................................................... 460
Unacceptable advocacy ........................................................................................................ 462
Language ................................................................................................................................. 466
Bases of evidence .................................................................................................................. 467
The hypothetical question ................................................................................................... 468
Evidence of speculation ....................................................................................................... 469
An expert’s change of opinion ........................................................................................... 470
Eliciting of evidence ............................................................................................................. 470
Use of diagrams, slides and other forms of demonstrative exhibit ............................ 471
Evidence of experiments ...................................................................................................... 475
Avoidance of admissibility traps ........................................................................................ 478
Re-examination of the expert witness ............................................................................... 479
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Chapter 7.05: Cross-examination of the expert witness ........................ 483

Strategic cross-examination ................................................................................................. 484
Approach of competent cross-examiners .......................................................................... 486
Conferences by counsel with expert witnesses ............................................................... 488
Challenging the expert’s expertise ..................................................................................... 490
Arguing with the witness or the advocate ....................................................................... 491
Tried and tested cross-examination techniques ............................................................... 492
Dealing with hypothetical questions ................................................................................. 513
Examination of the expert’s notes ...................................................................................... 513
Utilisation of draft reports ................................................................................................... 515
Chapter 7.10: Sentencing evidence by expert witnesses......................... 517

The role of the expert ........................................................................................................... 518
Expert evidence in mitigation ............................................................................................. 519
Existence of remorse ............................................................................................................. 521
Circumstances of offender ................................................................................................... 521
Cultural factors ...................................................................................................................... 522
Drug and alcohol addiction of offender ........................................................................... 525
Illness of offender .................................................................................................................. 525
Stress ........................................................................................................................................ 527
Prospects of rehabilitation ................................................................................................... 527
Harsh consequences of imprisonment .............................................................................. 528
Mentally ill offenders ............................................................................................................ 530
Limits to the relevance of symptomatology to moral culpability ................................ 532
The Verdins restatement ....................................................................................................... 532
The law after Verdins ............................................................................................................ 534
Mental conditions potentially relevant to sentencing .................................................... 536
Intellectually disabled offenders ......................................................................................... 538
Unusual impact of imprisonment ...................................................................................... 550
Availability of rehabilitative services ................................................................................. 550
Impact of executive policy ................................................................................................... 550
Welfare of children ................................................................................................................ 551
Expert evidence for the prosecution .................................................................................. 551
Prediction of dangerousness ............................................................................................... 553
Proving bases of testing ....................................................................................................... 555
Expert evidence as to the nature of the offence .............................................................. 555
Part 8 – Liability of experts ........................................................................ 557

Chapter 8.0: Criminal and civil liability of expert witnesses.................... 559
Civil liability for expert witnesses: the immunity rule .................................................. 560
Immunity applying to reports and affidavits ................................................................... 561
Rationales for the witness immunity rule ........................................................................ 564
Limitations to the immunity rule ....................................................................................... 565
Preparatory work .................................................................................................................. 568
Traditional English authority .............................................................................................. 569
Reforming English authority ............................................................................................... 571
Scottish authority .................................................................................................................. 577
New Zealand authority ........................................................................................................ 580
Criminal liability for experts ............................................................................................... 582
Chapter 8.05: Regulatory liability of expert witnesses.......................... 585

United Kingdom authorities ............................................................................................... 586
The Meadow decisions: a resolution to the witness immunity argument ................... 587
The Southall decision ............................................................................................................ 592
United States authorities ...................................................................................................... 593
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Australian authorities ........................................................................................................... 594

The role of regulatory bodies .............................................................................................. 596
Timing of investigations by regulators ............................................................................. 597
Part 9 – Medical, dental and nursing evidence....................................... 599

Chapter 9.0: Medical evidence.................................................................... 601
Causation ................................................................................................................................ 603
Fibromyalgia and chronic pain syndrome ........................................................................ 605
Unorthodox treatments ........................................................................................................ 606
Aetiology of cancer ............................................................................................................... 607
Aetiology of HIV/AIDS ....................................................................................................... 608
Pathologists’ evidence on injury causation ...................................................................... 613
Pathologists’ evidence in SIDS cases ................................................................................. 615
Chapter 9.05: Dental evidence ................................................................... 623

Dental evidence in the Chamberlain Case .......................................................................... 623
Bitemark evidence ................................................................................................................. 625
Chapter 9.10: Nursing evidence ................................................................ 629

Nurses as experts .................................................................................................................. 629
Forensic nurses as experts ................................................................................................... 630
Part 10 – Mental health evidence ................................................... .......... 633

Chapter 10.0: Psychiatrists’ and psychologists’ evidence:
general principles ................................................................................... 635
The parameters of mental health professionals’ expertise ............................................ 636
Diagnostic expertise of psychologists ................................................................................ 636
Bases of mental health expert testimony .......................................................................... 641
Expert evidence on intellectual impairment .................................................................... 642
Mental health expert evidence about normal persons .................................................... 643
The repercussions of Murphy v The Queen ....................................................................... 646
Mental health expert evidence about intention ............................................................... 648
Mental health expert evidence about children ................................................................ 649
Mental health expert evidence about child development and child behaviour ........ 649
Mental health expert evidence as to character, credit and credibility ......................... 650
Definitions of ‘character’, ‘credit’ and ‘credibility’ ......................................................... 650
Mental health expert evidence about character ............................................................... 651
Mental health expert evidence about credit and credibility ......................................... 652
Expert evidence about conditions impacting upon credibility ..................................... 656
Expert evidence about truthfulness and lying ................................................................. 660
Other credibility evaluation techniques ............................................................................ 671
Expert evidence about admissions and confessions ....................................................... 676
Mental health expert evidence about behaviour ............................................................. 677
Chapter 10.05: Fitness for interview evidence ........................................ 681

The concept of fitness for interview .................................................................................. 682
The significance of fitness for interview ........................................................................... 683
Legal framework in Australia ............................................................................................. 684
Legal framework in the United Kingdom ........................................................................ 686
Expert assessments ................................................................................................................ 687
Chapter 10.10: Fitness to stand trial evidence ........................................ 693

Fitness to stand trial ............................................................................................................. 694
Legal framework ................................................................................................................... 695
International criminal law ................................................................................................... 702
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Expert assessments ................................................................................................................ 702
Chapter 10.15: Identification evidence......................................................... 715

Eyewitness identification evidence .................................................................................... 716
Expert evidence about the fallibilities of identification evidence ................................ 719
Expert evidence: digiboard evidence ................................................................................. 720
Voice identification evidence ............................................................................................... 731
The future in Australia ......................................................................................................... 741
Chapter 10.20: Memory evidence............................................................... 743

Expert evidence on the operation of memory ................................................................. 743
A misinformation effect exception ..................................................................................... 723
Drug-impaired memory ....................................................................................................... 766
Chapter 10.25: Mental state evidence........................................................ 769

Expert evidence on intent .................................................................................................... 769
Expert evidence about insanity/mental impairment ..................................................... 773
Expert evidence about diminished responsibility ........................................................... 778
Expert evidence about automatism/involuntariness ..................................................... 783
Expert evidence about provocation ................................................................................... 784
Expert evidence about testamentary capacity ................................................................. 784
Chapter 10.30: Syndrome evidence............................................................ 789

Psychological syndromes ..................................................................................................... 790
Battered woman syndrome evidence ................................................................................ 792
Administrative law ............................................................................................................... 814
Likely developments ............................................................................................................. 814
Rape trauma syndrome evidence ....................................................................................... 817
Battered child/shaken baby syndrome evidence ............................................................ 822
Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) evidence .......................... 824
Repressed memory syndrome and false memory syndrome evidence ...................... 843
Premenstrual syndrome evidence ...................................................................................... 861
Parental alienation syndrome evidence ............................................................................ 864
Chapter 10.35: Profiling evidence ................................................................ 875

The psychological autopsy/equivocal death analysis .................................................... 878
The impediments to admissibility ...................................................................................... 880
Criminal profiling/crime scene analysis evidence .......................................................... 890
A limited future for profiling evidence ............................................................................. 893
Chapter 10.40: Prediction of risk evidence.............................................. 895

Risk prediction under Australian legislation ................................................................... 896
An overview of commonly used actuarial instruments ................................................ 907
Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 929
Appendix: Brief overview of actuarial prediction instruments analysed in
Ch 10.40 ................................................................................................... 930
Chapter 10.45: Post-traumatic stress disorder evidence......................... 935

Development of PTSD criteria ............................................................................................ 938
DSM and ICD PTSD criteria ............................................................................................... 941
Compensability of psychiatric injuries in Australia ....................................................... 953
Current status of PTSD in the law ..................................................................................... 957
The stressor criterion ............................................................................................................ 965
Expert witness bias ............................................................................................................... 968
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Late-onset PTSD: An explanation for delayed claims .................................................... 969

Diagnostic issues ................................................................................................................... 973
PTSD and criminal law ........................................................................................................ 973
Chapter 10.50: Critical incident stress intervention evidence................. 977

Employers’ and occupiers’ duties for exposure to traumatic incidents ..................... 977
Acute stress disorder ............................................................................................................ 978
Critical incident stress intervention: debriefing ............................................................... 979
Critical incident stress intervention: the controversy ..................................................... 982
Civil actions for inadequate response to psychogenic trauma ..................................... 985
The evolving law ................................................................................................................... 992
Part 11 – Social scientists’ evidence ......................................................... 995

Chapter 11.0: Survey evidence................................................................... 997
Admissibility of survey evidence ....................................................................................... 1000
Early Australian civil authorities on survey evidence ................................................... 1005
The use of survey evidence in criminal cases ................................................................. 1007
Survey evidence as a defence ............................................................................................. 1014
Evidentiary issues in the use of surveys .......................................................................... 1018
Survey questions ................................................................................................................... 1019
Practical steps ......................................................................................................................... 1021
Later Australian civil authority permitting survey evidence ....................................... 1022
The leading Australian authority ....................................................................................... 1024
The pragmatic and perhaps even generous approach ................................................... 1025
A third phase ruling ............................................................................................................. 1027
Further guidance on survey methodology ....................................................................... 1027
Federal Court Practice Note ................................................................................................ 1028
The impact of the Uniform Evidence Acts ....................................................................... 1032
An English note of caution .................................................................................................. 1033
Principles arising from the case law .................................................................................. 1033
Methodology required .......................................................................................................... 1034
Chapter 11.05: Historians’ evidence......................................................... 1037

Diverse examples of historians’ evidence in the courts ................................................. 1039
Factual history and social history ...................................................................................... 1041
Nature of history ................................................................................................................... 1041
Qualifications as an historian .............................................................................................. 1041
Objectivity ............................................................................................................................... 1042
Native title cases .................................................................................................................... 1043
Planning cases ........................................................................................................................ 1044
Veterans’ pension entitlement cases .................................................................................. 1044
Tobacco litigation ................................................................................................................... 1045
Damages calculation ............................................................................................................. 1045
Statutory provisions .............................................................................................................. 1045
Chapter 11.10: Anthropologists’ evidence .............................................. 1045

Expertise .................................................................................................................................. 1049
The bases of anthropologists’ evidence ............................................................................ 1050
Avoidance of advocacy ........................................................................................................ 1055
Distinction between facts and opinions ............................................................................ 1055
Role of lawyers ...................................................................................................................... 1056
Self-referential reports .......................................................................................................... 1056
Gender restriction issues ...................................................................................................... 1056
Compliance with ethical codes ........................................................................................... 1057
Physical anthropology evidence ......................................................................................... 1057
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Chapter 11.15: Cultural experts’ evidence ............................................... 1057

Criminal law .......................................................................................................................... 1059
Family law matters ............................................................................................................... 1061
Native title claims ................................................................................................................. 1062
Chapter 11.20: Linguists’ evidence........................................................... 1061

Assistance for the trier of fact ............................................................................................. 1063
Meaning of words ................................................................................................................. 1063
Voice recognition ................................................................................................................... 1064
Creation of transcripts .......................................................................................................... 1064
Voluntariness of confessions or admissions ..................................................................... 1065
Distinctiveness of expression .............................................................................................. 1066
Trademark cases .................................................................................................................... 1066
Immigration and refugee claims ........................................................................................ 1068
Native title claims ................................................................................................................. 1068
Family law cases .................................................................................................................... 1070
Part 12 – Scientists’ evidence.................................................................... 1069

Chapter 12.0: Scientific evidence ............................................................... 1071
Definition of scientific evidence ......................................................................................... 1072
Admissibility .......................................................................................................................... 1072
Controversies .......................................................................................................................... 1073
The status of scientific evidence ......................................................................................... 1073
Scientific evidence as circumstantial evidence ................................................................. 1074
Epidemiology and evidence of possibility in civil cases ............................................... 1076
Evaluation of scientific evidence ........................................................................................ 1078
Continuity of evidence ......................................................................................................... 1080
Computer simulations .......................................................................................................... 1081
Destruction of exhibits ......................................................................................................... 1082
Scientific instruments: the presumption of accuracy ...................................................... 1082
The National Measurement Act 1960 (Cth) ......................................................................... 1085
Facilitation of proof ............................................................................................................... 1088
Chapter 12.05: Novel scientific evidence .................................................. 1087

The obligation of the party adducing novel scientific evidence at common law ..... 1090
Reliability of evidence .......................................................................................................... 1091
Photographic and x-ray evidence ...................................................................................... 1093
Fingerprinting evidence ....................................................................................................... 1093
Polygraph evidence .............................................................................................................. 1094
Voice identification evidence ............................................................................................... 1094
Downloading of data from mobile phones ...................................................................... 1095
DNA profiling evidence ....................................................................................................... 1096
Psychological autopsy evidence ......................................................................................... 1096
Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome evidence .............................................. 1096
Facial mapping/body mapping evidence ........................................................................ 1097
Australian authorities ........................................................................................................... 1100
Lip-reading evidence ............................................................................................................ 1107
Ear print comparison evidence ........................................................................................... 1110
Chapter 12.10: Fingerprinting, footprint and footwear

evidence.................................................................................................. 1109
Settled law relating to fingerprinting ................................................................................ 1111
Experts as convenient helpers ............................................................................................ 1115
Other authorities ................................................................................................................... 1117
Fabrication/transposition of fingerprints ......................................................................... 1119
United States case authority ................................................................................................ 1120
Sufficiency of expert fingerprinting evidence .................................................................. 1123
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Expert Evidence
Footprint evidence ................................................................................................................ 1123

Barefoot impression evidence ............................................................................................. 1124
Shoeprint impression evidence ........................................................................................... 1124
Shoe evidence ......................................................................................................................... 1124
Biometric identification evidence ....................................................................................... 1126
Assessing fingerprint and associated evidence ............................................................... 1126
Chapter 12.15: Document analysis evidence........................................... 1125

Area of expertise ................................................................................................................... 1125
Presentation of evidence ...................................................................................................... 1126
Disputed evidence ................................................................................................................. 1126
The control document .......................................................................................................... 1126
Basis of evidence ................................................................................................................... 1127
Availability of disputed document for jury ..................................................................... 1128
Judicial warnings ................................................................................................................... 1128
United States post-Daubert developments ........................................................................ 1131
Chapter 12.20: D NA profiling evidence................................................. .... 1131
DNA technology .................................................................................................................... 1132
Applications of DNA analysis ............................................................................................ 1133
Presentation of DNA evidence ........................................................................................... 1135
The prosecutor’s fallacy ....................................................................................................... 1137
Limitations of DNA profiling .............................................................................................. 1140
Paternity index evidence: R v GK and R v JCG ............................................................. 1154
Key historical cases from Australia and Britain .............................................................. 1160
United States case law .......................................................................................................... 1168
Canadian case law ................................................................................................................ 1175
English case law .................................................................................................................... 1177
New Zealand case law ......................................................................................................... 1178
Australian case law ............................................................................................................... 1179
The early setbacks: Tran, Lucas and Green ...................................................................... 1179
Chapter 12.25: Statistical and probability evidence .............................. 1187

DNA evidence ........................................................................................................................ 1189
Rejection of Bayesian Analysis ........................................................................................... 1192
Epidemiology evidence ........................................................................................................ 1197
Ethical Responsibilities in the use of statistics ................................................................ 1204
Part 13 – Police evidence ............................................................................ 1205

Chapter 13.0: Police evidence .................................................................... 1207
The risk of prejudice ............................................................................................................. 1208
The bias issue ......................................................................................................................... 1208
Expertise in relation to drug supply, cultivation and consumer practices ................. 1209
The Sekhon warning note ..................................................................................................... 1210
Subgroup activities ................................................................................................................ 1210
Meaning of drug culture terminology ............................................................................... 1212
Meaning of street jargon ...................................................................................................... 1213
Evidence about crime scene investigation ........................................................................ 1213
Effects of intoxication ........................................................................................................... 1213
Engagement in counter-surveillance techniques ............................................................. 1215
Identification of voices ......................................................................................................... 1215
Identification from CCTV Footage ..................................................................................... 1216
Evidence by dog handlers ................................................................................................... 1217
Behaviour of prison escapees .............................................................................................. 1217
Re-enactments/experiments ................................................................................................ 1217
Ballistics evidence ................................................................................................................. 1217
Fingerprinting evidence ....................................................................................................... 1219
Effects of stress on accuracy of perception and memor ................................................. 1220
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Chapter 13.05: Tracker and sniffer dog evidence .................................. 1221

The case authorities .............................................................................................................. 1222
Internationally accepted requirements for admissibility of tracker dog evidence .... 1230
Search by dogs ....................................................................................................................... 1231
Part 14 – Accident reconstruction evidence............................................. 1233

Chapter 14.0: Accident reconstruction evidence .................................... 1235
Parameters of expertise ........................................................................................................ 1235
Permissible evidence ............................................................................................................. 1235
Calculation of vehicle speed ............................................................................................... 1237
Calculation of friction co-efficients ..................................................................................... 1237
Course of a vehicle ............................................................................................................... 1237
Part 15 – Foreign law evidence................................................................. 1239

Chapter 15.0: Foreign law .......................................................................... 1241
The role of the expert on foreign law ............................................................................... 1242
Qualifications and experience ............................................................................................. 1243
The need for particular care ................................................................................................ 1245
Important Australian authority .......................................................................................... 1245
Proof of foreign law in Australia under statute .............................................................. 1246
International law ................................................................................................................... 1247
Canon law ............................................................................................................................... 1247
Conflicting evidence ............................................................................................................. 1247
Privilege .................................................................................................................................. 1247
Part 16 – Financial evidence ..................................................................... 1249

Chapter 16.0: Valuation evidence.............................................................. 1251
Independence ......................................................................................................................... 1252
Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 1252
Assumptions ........................................................................................................................... 1254
Making adjustments ............................................................................................................. 1254
Market value and special value .......................................................................................... 1254
Valuation of land ................................................................................................................... 1256
Valuation where experts disagree ...................................................................................... 1258
Chapter 16.05: Financial evidence ............................................................ 1261

Contentious admissibility issues ........................................................................................ 1261
General admissibility principles ......................................................................................... 1262
Expertise .................................................................................................................................. 1262
Common knowledge rule .................................................................................................... 1265
Methodology issues: probative value of evidence .......................................................... 1266
Orderly and clear presentation: potential for prejudice ................................................ 1268
Accessibility of evidence: superannuation calculation by actuaries ............................ 1269
Opinions based on assumed facts ...................................................................................... 1269
Hypothetical facts .................................................................................................................. 1270
Delineation of reasoning processes .................................................................................... 1270
Proof of bases ......................................................................................................................... 1271
Reference to material discounted or rejected ................................................................... 1272
Delegation of work by a financial expert ......................................................................... 1273
Multiple experts ..................................................................................................................... 1273
Advocacy ................................................................................................................................ 1274
Ultimate issue rule ................................................................................................................ 1274
Questions of law .................................................................................................................... 1275
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Expert Evidence
Discretionary exclusion for bias ......................................................................................... 1275

Interpretive evidence from an economic perspective ..................................................... 1276
Forensic Accounting Services: APES 215 .......................................................................... 1277
Part 17 – Construction evidence................................................................ 1279

Chapter 17.0: Engineers’ evidence............................................................. 1281
Forensic engineering ............................................................................................................. 1281
Inappropriate forensic conduct by engineers ................................................................... 1283
Engineers as experts ............................................................................................................. 1283
Engineers as valuers ............................................................................................................. 1284
Parameters of evidence ........................................................................................................ 1284
Limitations on expert engineering evidence .................................................................... 1288
Reliability of opinions .......................................................................................................... 1289
Amendment of opinions ...................................................................................................... 1290
Destruction of exhibit material ........................................................................................... 1290
Regulation of engineers ....................................................................................................... 1290
Chapter 17.05: Architects’ evidence ......................................................... 1293

Forensic architecture ............................................................................................................. 1293
Expertise .................................................................................................................................. 1294
The need to avoid advocacy ............................................................................................... 1294
Subjectivity ............................................................................................................................. 1295
Chapter 17.10: Quantity surveyors’ evidence......................................... 1297

The Australian Institute of Quantity Surveyors Register of Expert Witnesses ......... 1297
Expertise of quantity surveyors .......................................................................................... 1297
Evidence about cost to complete ........................................................................................ 1298
The need for objectivity ....................................................................................................... 1298
The need for reliability and independence ...................................................................... 1299
Chapter 17.15: Planning evidence ............................................................ 1301

Role of planning witnesses .................................................................................................. 1301
Required neutrality ............................................................................................................... 1302
Need for exposure of reasoning and assumptions ......................................................... 1303
Specificity of specialised knowledge ................................................................................. 1303
Restrictions on expert evidence .......................................................................................... 1303
Weight of evidence ................................................................................................................ 1303
Expert conclaves and concurrent evidence ...................................................................... 1304
Part 18 – Intellectual property evidence................................................. 1305

Chapter 18.0: Patent evidence.................................................................... 1307
The permissible scope of expert evidence ........................................................................ 1307
Expert evidence on obviousness ........................................................................................ 1311
Concurrent evidence ............................................................................................................. 1311
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................... 1313
Index ................................................................................................................................................. 1385
xxviii
AUTHOR INFORMATION
Ian Freckelton QC
BA (Hons) LLB (Syd), PhD (Griff), LLD (Melb), Dip Th M (ANH), FAAL, FASSA, FACLM (Hon)
Dr Freckelton has been a barrister in full-time practice in Victoria since 1988, appearing in many leading
cases throughout Australia. He took silk in 2007. He practises from Crockett Chambers in Melbourne,
principally in the administrative law, criminal law, compensation law, commercial law and coronial law
areas, both at appellate and trial levels, and also in an advisory capacity.
Since 2017, Dr Freckelton has been a judge of the Supreme Court of Nauru (on a fly-in fly-out basis) and
has served as a member of the Social Security Appeals Tribunal; the Medical Practitioners Board of
Victoria; the Psychologists Registration Board of Victoria, including as Acting President; the Psychosurgery
Review Board of Victoria; the Mental Health Review Board and Mental Health Tribunal of Victoria,
including as Acting President; the Disciplinary Appeals Board of Victoria; the Suitability Panel of Victoria;
the Investigation Review Panel of Victoria; and the Northern Football League Tribunal. He has been an
active member of the Board of the Council of Australian Tribunals (Victorian branch) and is an inaugural
member of Victoria’s Coronial Council, a member of the Netherlands Centre of Forensic Expertise, and an
elected Fellow of the Australian Academy of Law and of the Academy of Social Sciences, Australia. He is
an Honorary Fellow of the Australasian College of Legal Medicine and was elected a life member of the
Australian and New Zealand Association of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law in 1997. He was awarded
Outstanding Alumnus status by Griffith University in 2019.
Dr Freckelton is a Professorial Fellow in the Law Faculty and the Department of Psychiatry at the
University of Melbourne, where he is a Co-Director of the Masters Health Law Program. He is an Adjunct
Professor of Forensic Medicine at Monash University, and of Research Integrity at Johns Hopkins
University in the United States. He holds adjunct professorial appointments at La Trobe University, the
National Institute of Public Health and Mental Health Research at the Auckland University of Technology,
and the Australian Centre for Health Law Research at the Queensland University of Technology. He has
previously held honorary professorial appointments at Sydney, La Trobe and Macquarie Universities.
Since 1993, Dr Freckelton has been the foundation Editor of the Journal of Law and Medicine and since
1994 the foundation Editor-in-Chief of the journal Psychiatry, Psychology and Law. He has been an
international editor of the United States journal Behavioral Sciences and the Law and of Law and Context,
and a member of the Editorial Advisory Board of the International Journal of Law and Psychiatry.
Currently, he is an international editor and board member of the New Zealand journal Family Law, and is
a member of the editorial board of the Deakin Law Review and the Australian Journal of Forensic
Sciences.
Dr Freckelton is the author and editor of books on health law, coronial law, administrative law, disciplinary
law, expert evidence, criminal law, policing, mental health law, and therapeutic jurisprudence, as well as a
festschrift for the Hon Michael Kirby AC CMG, and more than 600 peer-reviewed articles and chapters of
books. He has given addresses to professional gatherings in more than 30 countries.
Dr Freckelton may be contacted at:
C/o Foley’s List, Owen Dixon Chambers, 205 William Street, Melbourne, VIC 3000
AUSTRALIA
Telephone: +61 (03) 9225 7777
Fax: +61 (03) 9914 2790 Website: http://www.ianfreckelton.com.au
Email: I.Freckelton@vicbar.com.au
xxix
TABLE OF CASES
A & W Food Services of Canada Inc v McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Ltd (2005)
253 DLR (4th) 736 .................................................................................................................. [11.20.120]
A and B v Director of Family Services (1996) 132 FLR 172; 20 Fam LR 549 .......................... [2.0.40]
A/S Tallinna Laevauhisus v Estonian State SS Line (1947) 80 Ll L Rep 99 ......................... [4.0.440]
AAPT Ltd v Cable & Wireless Optus Ltd (1999) 32 ACSR 63; [1999] NSWSC 509 ......... [2.05.350],
[16.05.120]
AH v Western Australia (2014) 247 A Crim R 34; [2014] WASCA 228 ................................ [7.10.260]
AMP Fire & General Insurance Co Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (unreported,
NSW Court of Appeal, CA 40346 of 1993, 14 July 1993) ................................................... [6.10.70]
AOTC Ltd v McAuslan (1993) 47 FCR 492 ............................................................ [10.45.01], [10.45.40]
ARA v Mutual Rental Cars [1987] 2 NZLR 647 ................................... [11.0.70], [11.0.410], [11.0.630]
AT & NR Taylor & Sons Pty Ltd v Brival Pty Ltd [1982] VR 762 ......................... [6.10.01], [6.10.70]
Abadom v The Queen [1983] 1 WLR 126 ................................................................ [2.20.160], [4.0.390]
Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167 .................................. [4.0.80], [4.0.360]
Abbey v Wallace (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, Newton J, 10 March 1967) ..... [2.15.400]
Abbey National Mortgages plc v Key Surveyors Nationwide Ltd [1996] 3 All ER 184 ...... [6.0.50]
Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v BPB Pty Ltd [2000] VSC 261 ............................................... [6.10.01]
Aboriginal Affairs, Minister for v Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24 ................................... [5.0.260]
Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v Maurice (1986) 10 FCR 104 .................... [11.10.320]
Action Waste Collections Pty Ltd (in liq), Re; Crawford v O’Brien [1981] VR 691 .............. [2.0.05]
Adami v The Queen (1959) 108 CLR 605 ................................................................................ [12.15.240]
Adams v Canon (1621) 1 Dyer 53b; 73 ER 117 .......................................................................... [8.0.460]
Adams v Indiana Bell Telephone Co 2 F Supp 2d 1077 (1998) ........................................... [16.05.200]
Adams v Rau (1931) 46 CLR 572 ................................................................................................ [2.15.460]
Addington v Texas 441 US 418 ................................................................................................. [10.10.320]
Adelaide Chemical & Fertilizer Co Ltd v Carlyle (1940) 64 CLR 514 ................................. [2.20.480]
Adelaide Stevedoring Co Ltd v Forst (1940) 64 CLR 538 ........................................................ [4.0.120]
Adhesives Pty Ltd v Aktieselskabet Dansk Gaeringindustri (1936) 55 CLR 523 .............. [6.05.220]
Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 179 FLR 1 .............. [16.05.120]
Aerospatiale Holdings Australia Pty Ltd v Elspan International Ltd (1992) 28 NSWLR
321 ................................................................................................................................................ [6.10.70]
“Agent Orange” Prod Liability Litigation, Re 611 F Supp 1223 ........................................... [7.05.180]
Agriculture (NSW), Department of v Allen [2000] NSWCA 141 .............................................. [9.0.40]
Ah Toy v Registrar of Companies (1986) 10 FCR 356 ............................................................ [6.10.200]
Ahmad v Inner London Education Authority [1978] 1 QB 36 .............................................. [7.10.170]
Ahmedi v Ahmedi (1991) 23 NSWLR 288 .................................................................................... [4.0.80]
Ahousaht Indian Band v Canada 2008 BCSC 768; [2009] 2 WWR 159 .............................. [11.05.220]
Aid, The (1881) 6 PD 84 ................................................................................................................. [6.05.60]
Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd [1986] 1 AC 965 ........................................................ [5.15.50]
Air New Zealand v Commerce Commission (No 6) [2004] BCL 996; (2004) 11 TCLR
347 ......................................................................................................................... [6.20.120], [16.05.200]
Ajami v Comptroller of Customs [1954] 1 WLR 1405 .............................................................. [15.0.80]
Akkus v The Queen (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 4 September
1975) ........................................................................................................................................... [7.10.370]
Alagic v Callvar [1999] NTSC 90 .............................................................................................. [10.45.170]
Albrecht v Ainsworth [2015] QCA 220 .................................................................................... [17.05.120]
Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310; [1991] 4 All ER
907 ....................................................................................................................... [10.45.340], [10.45.560]
Aldersea v Public Transport Corp [2001] 3 VR 499; [2001] VSC 169 ................................. [10.45.340]
Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395 ....................................................... [10.15.40], [12.20.820]
Alfred, The (1850) 7352 ................................................................................................................... [6.05.60]
Allanson v Toncich [2002] WASCA 216 ....................................................................................... [10.0.80]
Allewalt v State 487 A 2d 664 (Md Ct Spec App 1985) ........................................................ [10.45.740]
Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1983] 1 NSWLR
1 .................................................................................................................................................... [7.05.10]
Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 5)
(1996) 64 FCR 73 ..................................................................... [2.0.05], [2.05.20], [3.0.10], [11.05.240]
xxxi
Expert Evidence
Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 6)
(1996) 64 FCR 79 ............................................................... [3.0.140], [15.0.40], [15.0.160], [16.05.640]
Alphapharm Pty Ltd v Wyeth (2009) 82 IPR 71; [2009] FCA 945 .......................................... [18.0.80]
Alucraft Pty Ltd (in liq) v Grocon (No 1) [1996] 2 VR 377 ..................................................... [5.05.18]
Aluminium Goods Ltd v Registrar of Trademarks (1954) 19 CPR 93 ................................... [11.0.60]
Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group v Northern
Territory (2004) 207 ALR 539; [2004] FCA 472 ................................................................... [11.10.01]
Amaca Pty Ltd (formerly James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd) v Hannell (2007) 34 WAR 109;
[2007] WASCA 158 ................................................................................................................ [12.25.170]
Amaratunga v Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization [2013] 3 SCR 866 .................... [15.0.240]
Amaratunga v Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization [2010] NSSC 34; (2010) 295
NSR (2d) 331 ............................................................................................................................. [15.0.240]
American Footwear Corp v General Footwear Co 609 F 2d 655 ............................................ [11.0.80]
American Home Products Corp v Johnson & Johnson 654 F Supp 568 ............................. [11.0.630]
Amys v Barton [1912] 1 KB 40 .................................................................................................... [2.20.480]
Ancher, Mortlock, Murray and Woolley Pty Ltd v Hooker Homes Pty Ltd [1971] 2
NSWLR 278 .......................................................................................... [2.25.330], [4.0.40], [17.05.160]
Anchorage Management Services Ltd (1999) 72 BCLR (3d) 389 .......................................... [5.15.150]
Anderson v Laverock 1976 JC 9 .................................................................................................. [2.35.240]
Anderson v Minister for Infrastructure Planning & Natural Resources (2006) 151
LGERA 229; [2006] NSWLEC 725 ........................................................................................... [5.0.140]
Anderson v The Queen [1972] AC 100 ........................................................................................ [4.0.430]
Anderson v The Queen (1991) 53 A Crim R 421 ..................................................................... [10.25.80]
Anderson v The Queen (1992) 60 SASR 90 ........................... [2.0.40], [2.05.490], [2.20.160], [13.0.80]
Anderson on behalf of the Wulli Wulli People v Queensland (No 3) [2015] FCA 821 .... [11.20.200]
Andrews v State 533 So 2d 841; cert den 542 So 2d 1332 (Fla 1988) ................................. [12.20.580]
Angell, Re (1860) 29 LJCP 227 ....................................................................................................... [5.20.30]
Anglim v Thomas [1974] VR 363 ................................................................................................ [2.05.490]
Anikin v Sierra (2004) 79 ALJR 452 ............................................................................................ [11.10.80]
Ann and Mary, The (1843) 2 Wm Rob 189 ................................................................................. [6.05.60]
“Antares II” v “Victory” [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 482 ................................................................. [6.05.260]
Anthony v State 68 SE 2d 150 (1951) ....................................................................................... [12.10.290]
Anti-Monopoly v General Mills Fun Group 684 F 2d 1316 (9th Cir 1982) ........................... [11.0.80]
Antrim Truck Centre Ltd v Ottawa (City) [2009] OMBD No 1 .............................................. [16.0.20]
Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR
175; [2009] HCA 27 .................................................................................................................... [5.05.18]
Apollo 169 Management Pty Ltd v Pinefield Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] VSC
475 ................................................................................................................................................ [5.15.50]
Appeal of Garry Webb, Re (1990) 1 MHRBD (Vic) 160 .......................................................... [2.15.130]
Apple Inc v Motorola, Inc 757 F 3d 1286 .................................................................................. [2.05.150]
Apple Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks (2014) 227 FCR 511; [2014] FCA 1304 .................... [11.0.480]
Aqua Max Pty Ltd v MT Associates Pty Ltd , unreported Victorian Supreme Court,
19 June 1998 .............................................................................................................................. [2.30.120]
Aquila Coal Pty Ltd v Bowen Central Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 82 ............................................. [15.0.360]
Archibald v Byron Shire Council (2003) 129 LGERA 311; [2003] NSWCA 292 .................... [4.0.200]
Arcus Shopfitters Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission (2002) 125
LGERA 180; [2002] WASC 174 ........................ [16.0.01], [16.0.40], [16.0.80], [16.0.120], [16.0.160]
Argyle Lane Corp Pty Ltd v Tower Holdings Pty Ltd (1993) 10 BCL 273 ........ [6.10.70], [6.10.190]
Arkaba Holdings Ltd v Commissioner of Highways [1970] SASR 94 ................................ [16.0.120]
Arndt v Smith (1997) CanLII 360 .................................................................................................... [8.0.01]
Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313; 97 ALR 555 ...................... [2.05.30],
[2.20.280], [2.25.01], [2.25.140], [4.0.280], [4.0.370], [4.0.450], [5.0.110], [7.0.90], [7.0.170], [10.0.120],
[11.0.50], [11.0.450], [11.0.470], [11.0.610]
Arrow Metal Products Corp v Federal Trade Commission 249 F 2d 83 ............................... [11.0.80]
Arrowsmith v The Queen (1994) 55 FCR 130 ........................................................................... [7.10.100]
Arroyo v Equion Energia Ltd (formerly known as BP Exploration Co (Colombia) Ltd)
[2016] EWHC 3348 .................................................................................................................... [5.20.30]
Arshad v Her Majesty’s Advocate [2006] ScotHC HCJAC 28 ............................ [11.20.20], [11.20.80]
Assi v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 257 .................................................................................... [7.10.230]
Astbury v Wood (2009) 23 VR 302; [2009] VSCA 126 ............................................................... [5.20.10]
Astor Properties Pty Ltd v L’union Des Assurance De Paris (1989) 17 NSWLR 483 ....... [6.10.300]
Atkins v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 .................................................... [12.05.340], [12.25.01]
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co v Phillips 332 US 168 .......................................................... [2.15.460]
Atlantic Harvesters (Namibia) v Unterweser Reederei GmbH (Bremen) (1986) 4 SASR
865 ................................................................................................................................................ [15.0.80]
Attorney-General v 2UE (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 16 October 1997) .............. [11.0.290]
xxxii
Table of Cases
Attorney-General v Birmingham, Tame and Rea District Drainage Board [1912] AC

788 .................................................................................................................................................. [6.0.40]
Attorney-General v David [1992] 2 VR 46 ............................................................. [2.15.130], [7.10.410]
Attorney-General v Equiticorp Industries Group [1995] 2 NZLR 135 .................. [2.15.30], [3.05.10]
Attorney-General v Martin (1909) 9 CLR 713 .......................................................................... [10.05.90]
Attorney-General v Wynstanley (1831) 2 D & C 302 .............................................................. [2.15.460]
Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475 ..................................... [5.10.140], [11.10.320]
Attorney-General (Ruddy) v Kenny (1960) 94 ILTR 185 ............................................................ [2.0.10]
Attorney-General (SA) v Brown (1960) 44 Cr App R 100 ..................................... [2.25.40], [2.25.220]
Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1992) [1993] 4 All ER 683 ..................................... [10.25.160]
Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 2002) [2003] 1 Cr App R 321 ............................... [12.05.340]
Attorney General (NSW) v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 318 ........... [11.0.01],
[11.0.180], [11.0.290]
Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd (2016) 259 CLR 1; [2016] HCA 16 ..................... [8.0.420]
Audsley v The Queen [2014] VSCA 321 .................................................................................. [10.20.260]
Austin v American Association of Neurological Surgeons 253 F3d 967 (7th Cir 2001) .... [8.05.140],
[8.05.280]
Austin v The Queen (1996) 87 A Crim R 570 ........................................................................... [7.10.170]
Australian Cement Holdings Pty Ltd v Adelaide Brighton Ltd [2001] NSWSC 645 ........... [3.0.30],
[16.05.120], [16.05.600]
Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 ....................................... [11.05.40]
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Liquorland (Australia) Pty Ltd
[2005] FCA 630 ....................................................................................................................... [16.05.120]
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Liquorland (Australia) Pty Ltd
[2006] ATPR 42-123; [2006] FCA 826 .................................................................................. [16.05.120]
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lux Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 89 ...... [5.10.140],
[5.10.200]
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Nuera Health Pty Ltd [2007]
FCA 695 ....................................................................................................................................... [9.0.160]
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v SensaSlim Australia Pty Ltd
(in liq) (No 5) [2014] FCA 340 ............................................................................................... [11.20.60]
Australian Development Corp Pty Ltd v White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd
(unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Giles J, 55041/91, 14 October 1993) ..................... [6.10.310]
Australian Federal Police, Commissioner of v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188
CLR 501 ..................................................................................................................................... [5.10.140]
Australian Gas Light Co v Valuer-General [1940] NSWStRp 9; (1940) 40 SR (NSW)
126 .............................................................................................................................................. [2.15.460]
Australian Oil Refining Co Ltd v Bourne (1980) 54 ALJR 192 ................................................ [2.15.10]
Australian Provincial Assurance Association v Commissioner of Land Tax [1945] ALR
(CN) 501 ...................................................................................................................................... [5.20.10]
Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1098 ...................... [3.0.140]
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler (No 1) (2002) 20 ACLC
222; [2001] NSWSC 1103 .................................................................................... [2.15.600], [16.05.120]
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mining Projects Group Ltd
(2007) 164 FCR 32; [2007] FCA 1620 ...................................................................................... [5.0.350]
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Plymin (2002) 4 VR 168; [2002]
VSC 56 ......................................................................................................................................... [5.0.350]
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 190 FLR 242; [2005]
NSWSC 149 ...... [2.0.65], [16.05.80], [16.05.120], [16.05.320], [16.05.400], [16.05.440], [16.05.480],
[16.05.520], [16.05.700]
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 218 ALR 764; [2005]
NSWCA 152 ...................................................................................... [3.0.150], [16.05.440], [16.05.700]
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Southcorp Ltd (2003) 46 ACSR
438; [2003] FCA 804 .............................................................................................. [5.10.140], [5.10.200]
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Vines (2003) 48 ACSR 291;
[2003] NSWSC 1095 ..................................................................... [16.05.120], [16.05.240], [16.05.360]
Australian Stevedoring Industry Authority v Patrick Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd (1969)
16 FLR 139 .................................................................................................................................. [2.30.40]
Australian Union of Students, Re (1997) 147 ALR 458 ......................................................... [16.05.720]
Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation Ltd v McAuslan (1993) 47
FCR 492 ....................................................................................................................................... [2.30.40]
Avert v McCormick 271 SE 2d 832 (1980) ................................................................................... [9.10.40]
Aytugrul v The Queen (2010) 205 A Crim R 157; [2010] NSWCCA 272 ......... [12.20.80], [12.20.90],
[12.20.370]
Aytugrul v The Queen (2012) 247 CLR 170; [2012] HCA 15 ................................................. [12.20.90]
Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139 ........................................... [6.10.290]
xxxiii
Expert Evidence
B v Burns 1994 SLT 250 .................................................................................................................. [8.0.260]

B (a child) v Potts (1992) 59 A Crim R 136 ............................................................................... [10.05.90]
B (child sexual abuse: standard of proof), Re [1995] 1 FLR 904 .............................. [2.0.30], [2.25.40]
BGP Properties Pty Ltd v Lake Macquarie City Council (2004) 138 LGERA 237; [2004]
NSWLEC 399 .............................................................................................................................. [6.20.80]
BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v The National Competition Council [2007] ATPR
42-141; [2006] FCA 1764 ....................................................................................................... [16.05.720]
BJS v The Queen [2013] NSWCCA 123 ................................................................................... [10.20.220]
BLM, Re (unreported, NSW District Court, 14 September 2005) ....................................... [12.05.420]
BMG (Mansfield) Ltd v Galliford Try Construction Ltd [2013] EWHC 3183 ..................... [17.05.80]
BP Australia Pty Ltd v Nyran Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 679 ............................................................ [3.0.150]
BT Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 221 ........................................... [8.0.01]
Baby X, Re [2011] EWHC 590 ........................................................................................................ [6.20.60]
Badische Anilin Und Soda Fabrik v Levinstein (1883) 24 Ch D 156 ....................................... [6.0.40]
Bailey v Bailey (1924) 34 CLR 558 ............................................................................................ [10.25.200]
Bailey v Barbour 2013 ONSC 7397 ............................................................................................. [5.15.150]
Bailey v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 62 ALJR 319 ................................................ [7.10.100]
Baines v Baines (1981) FLC 91-045 ............................................................................................... [6.0.110]
Baird v Adeli 573 NE 2d 279 (1991) ........................................................................................... [2.20.520]
Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52 ........................................................................................ [5.10.100]
Bakic v Yamasa Seafood Australia Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 309 .................................................... [5.0.230]
Balenzuela v De Gail (1959) 101 CLR 226 ................................................................................... [4.0.370]
Bales v Shelton 399 SE 2d 78 (1990) ........................................................................................... [2.05.570]
Ballou v Henri Studios Inc 656 F 2d 1147 ................................................................................. [2.35.200]
Banabelle Electrical v New South Wales [2005] NSWSC 714 ................................................ [6.10.260]
Banjima People v Western Australia (No 2) (2013) 305 ALR 1; [2013] FCA 868 ............... [11.10.01],
[11.10.200]
Bank of Ireland v Watts Group Plc [2017] EWHC 1667 ....................................................... [17.10.200]
Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549 ................................................................................ [10.25.200]
Bannon v The Queen (1995) 185 CLR 1 ........................................................................................ [2.0.40]
Banque des Marchands de Moscou (Koupetschesky), Re [1958] 1 Ch 182 ........................... [4.0.440]
Barak v WTH Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 649 .................................................................................. [5.05.10]
Barber v Police [2010] SASC 329; (2010) 108 SASR 520 .......................................................... [2.30.300]
Bare v Small (2013) 47 VR 255; [2013] VSCA 204 .................................................................... [5.15.200]
Barford v Barford [1918] P 140 ...................................................................................................... [15.0.80]
Barings plc v Coopers & Lybrand [2001] PNLR 22 ................................................................... [5.20.30]
Barker v The Queen (1988) 34 A Crim R 141 ........................................................................... [2.20.160]
Baron de Bode’s Case (1845) 8 QB 208 ..................................................................... [2.15.560], [15.0.40]
Barossa Region Residents v DC Angaston and Grosser [1996] EDLR 667 ......................... [17.15.30]
Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75 .................................................................................... [11.0.180]
Bassett v Host [1982] 1 NSWLR 206 .............................................................................................. [6.0.90]
Basto v The Queen (1954) 91 CLR 628 ...................................................................................... [10.05.90]
Beale v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1997) 48 NSWLR 430 .................................... [4.0.470]
Bechtel v State 840 P 2d 1 .......................................................................................................... [10.30.100]
Becke v Cattell (1841) 3 M & G 480; 13 ER 1232 ....................................................................... [5.20.30]
Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol-Myers Co (No 2) [1980] 1 NZLR 192 ..................................... [6.05.40]
Belhaven and Stenton Peerage (1875) 1 App Cas 278 ............................................................ [12.0.140]
Bell v FS & U Industrial Benefit Society Ltd (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 9
September 1987) ..................................................................................................................... [12.15.200]
Bell v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 207 ....................................................................................... [9.10.80]
Bellamy v Payne 403 SE 2d 326 (1991) ...................................................................................... [2.05.390]
Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 170 A Crim R 1; [2006] TASSC 111 ....................... [3.0.90], [10.30.490]
Bellevarde Constructions Pty Ltd v CPC Energy Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 228 ................ [6.10.190],
[6.10.280]
Bellevue Crescent Pty Ltd v Marland Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 364 ............... [11.05.80]
Bendeich (No 2), Re (1994) 53 FCR 422 ....................................................................................... [5.15.50]
Bendix Autolite Corp v Midwesco Enterprises Inc 486 US 888 .............................................. [2.35.05]
Bendixen v Coleman (1943) 68 CLR 401 ................................................................................... [2.15.460]
Beneficial Finance Corp Ltd v ABW Nominees Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 1475 ....................... [17.10.120]
Benic v New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 1039 ................................................ [10.50.240], [10.50.340]
Bennell v Western Australia (2006) 153 FCR 120; [2006] FCA 1243 ..................................... [11.10.01]
Bennett v Vaughan (1998) 100 A Crim R 228 ........................................................................... [2.05.490]
xxxiv
Table of Cases
Bensegger v The Queen [1979] WAR 65 .................................................................................... [7.10.310]

Benson v Lee [1972] VR 879 ...................................................................................................... [10.45.340]
Benson v The Queen (2014) 46 VR 563; [2014] VSCA 51 ......................................................... [9.10.80]
Bernal v The Queen [1997] UKPC 18 ......................................................................................... [10.0.450]
Berthon v Loughman (1817) 2 Starke 258; 171 ER 639 ........................................................... [2.15.130]
Beryl, The (1884) 9 PD 137 ............................................................................................................. [6.05.40]
Bestcare Foods v Origin Energy [2012] NSWSC 574 ............................................................... [6.10.260]
Bethan v Faumuina (1960) 3 ASR 537 ........................................................................................ [2.30.120]
Bevan v Western Australia (2010) 202 A Crim R 27; [2010] WASCA 101 ...... [12.0.420], [12.05.190]
Bevan Investments Ltd v Blackhall & Struthers (No 2) [1978] 2 NZLR 97 ...... [2.20.20], [2.20.200],
[11.0.01], [11.0.70]
Bever v Bassan [2019] NSWCA 50 ................................................................................................ [5.0.112]
Beveridge v Dontan Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 13 ................................................................. [6.10.180]
Bill Express Ltd (in liq) v Pitcher Partners (a firm) [2014] VSC 482 ...................................... [6.10.01]
Bird v Adams [1972] Crim LR 174 ............................................................................................. [2.05.490]
Birkai Pty Ltd v Permanent Custodians Ltd (1994) 35 NSWLR 178 ..................... [5.20.20], [6.10.70]
Birks v Western Australia (2007) 33 WAR 291; [2007] WASCA 29 ......................................... [7.0.490]
Bisley Investment Corp Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1982) 59 FLR 132 ......... [4.0.470]
Blackie v Police [1966] NZLR 910 ............................................................................................... [2.25.220]
Blake v The Queen (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, Lush J, 9
August 1983) ............................................................................................................................... [7.10.90]
Blatchford v Dempsey [1956] SASR 285 .................................................................................... [2.15.460]
Bleta v The Queen [1964] SCR 561; 48 DLR (2d) 139 ............................................ [2.20.280], [4.0.280]
Bluewater Energy Services BV v Mercon Steel Structures BV [2014] EWHC 2132 ............. [6.20.60]
Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84; [2008] FCAFC 63 .................... [2.20.01], [11.10.01], [11.10.80],
[11.10.160]
Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH v Pharmadyne Laboratories 532 F Supp 1040 (DNJ
1980) ........................................................................................................................................... [11.0.630]
Boland v Yates Property Corporation Pty Ltd (1999) 74 ALJR 209; [1999] HCA 64 ........ [5.10.360],
[16.0.120], [16.0.130]
Bold Park Senior Citizens Centre & Homes Inc v Bollig Abbott & Partners (Gulf) Pty
Ltd (1998) 19 WAR 281 .......................................................................................................... , [6.10.01]
Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 ................................................................................... [8.05.110]
Bolton and Repatriation Commission [2001] AATA 584 ....................................................... [11.05.320]
Bond Corp Holdings Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Commission (unreported, NSW
Court of Appeal, 28 June 1989) ............................................................................................. [2.30.120]
Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 ......................................... [12.0.200], [12.25.170]
Bonny Products v Robinson Knife Manufacturing Co 14 USPQ 2d 1666 ............................. [11.0.40]
Booth v Di Francesco [2002] NSWSC 154 ................................................................ [6.15.40], [6.15.560]
Boral Besser Masonry Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
(2003) 215 CLR 374; [2003] HCA 5 ..................................................................................... [16.05.720]
Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382 .......................................................... [2.15.460], [2.20.60], [2.20.400]
Borriello, In Marriage of (1989) 97 FLR 211 .............................................................................. [16.0.160]
Borum v United States 380 F 2d 595 (DC Cir 1967) .............................................................. [12.10.290]
Botton v Wilton (1302) YB 30 & 31 Edw 1 (RS) 256 .................................................................. [2.30.02]
Bourgeois v Roudolfich 580 So 2d 699 (1991) .............................................................................. [4.0.40]
Bourne v Swan & Edgar Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 211 ......................................................... [2.15.10], [2.15.400]
Bourns Inc v Raychem Corp [1999] 1 All ER 908 ...................................................................... [5.0.360]
Bow Spring (Owners) v Manzanillo II (Owners) [2005] 1 WLR 144; [2004] EWCA Civ
1007 ............................................................................................................................................ [6.05.220]
Bradshaw v Wallis (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 23 February 1996) ........................ [5.0.260]
Brailey v Rhodesia Consolidated Ltd [1910] 2 Ch D 95 ........................................................... [15.0.80]
Branagan v Robinson [2006] ACTSC 66 ...................................................................................... [9.0.120]
Brannon v The Queen (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, McInerney J, 3
February 1982) .......................................................................................................................... [7.10.370]
Bratt v Western Air Lines (1946) 166 ALR 1061 ........................................................ [4.0.380], [4.0.390]
Bratty v Attorney-General (Northern Ireland) [1963] AC 386 ....... [2.15.130], [10.25.80], [10.25.160]
Breedon v Kongras (1996) 16 WAR 66 ....................................................................................... [12.0.460]
Breedon v Kongras (1996) 85 A Crim R 472 ............................................................................. [12.0.460]
Bremer v Freeman (1857) 1 Deane Ecc R 192; 164 ER 546; 10 Moo PC 306; 14 ER 508 .... [2.15.560]
Brewarrana Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Highways (No 2) (1973) 6 SASR 541 .................. [16.0.01],
[16.0.130]
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34 ................................................. [5.15.50]
Brilliant Gold Mining Co v Craven (1898) 9 QLJ 144 .......................................... [2.15.460], [2.30.120]
Brimbella Pty Ltd v Mosman Municipal Council (1985) 79 LGERA 367 .............................. [4.0.470]
Brinkley v Brinkley [1965] P 75 ................................................................................................... [2.15.460]
Brisbane City Council v Attorney-General (Qld) [1979] AC 411; 19 ALR 681 ................... [2.15.460]
xxxv
Expert Evidence
Briscoe v LaHue 460 US 325 (1983) .............................................................. [8.0.40], [8.0.120], [8.0.300]

Bristow v Sequeville (1850) 5 Ex 275; 155 ER 118 ..................................................................... [15.0.80]
Britax Childcare Pty Ltd v Infa-Secure Pty Ltd (2012) 290 ALR 47; [2012] FCA 467 ........ [18.0.01],
[18.0.80], [18.0.140]
British Celanese Ltd v Courtaulds Ltd (1935) 152 LT 537 ....................................................... [2.25.01]
British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v Adams Lake Band [2006] 3 CNLR 1 ................. [11.15.01]
Broad v The Queen (unreported, SA Court of Criminal Appeal, 24 June 1994) ............... [7.10.170]
Brokenshire v Equity Trustees Executors & Agency Company Ltd (1998) 8 VR 659;
[1998] VSC 183 ....................................................................................................................... [10.25.200]
Bromley v Housing Commission (NSW) (1988) 30 Valuer 49 ............................................... [7.05.180]
Bromley v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 315 .......................................................... [10.0.380], [10.20.200]
Bromley Investments Pty Ltd v Elkington (2002) 43 ACSR 584; [2002] QSC 427 ............ [2.20.280],
[16.05.240]
Bronzel v State Planning Authority (1979) 21 SASR 513 ................... [16.0.01], [16.0.120], [16.0.130]
Brookfield v Yevad Products Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1180 .......................................................... [5.10.140]
Brown v Guss (No 2) [2015] VSC 57 ............................................................................................ [5.15.50]
Brown v State of Mississippi 297 US 278 (1936) ...................................................................... [10.05.50]
Brown v State 266 SE 2d (1980) .................................................................................................. [2.05.570]
Brown v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 48 ........................................................................... [13.0.80]
Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 ................................................................... [7.05.10], [7.05.20], [7.05.180]
Bruce v Beall 41 SW 445 (1897) ................................................................................................... [12.05.60]
Bruce v Byrne-Stevens & Assoc Engineers Inc 776 P 2d 666 .................................................. [8.0.300]
Brunskill v Sovereign Marine & General Insurance Co (1985) 62 ALR 53 ............................. [4.0.01]
Brunson v State 349 Ark 300; 79 SW 3d 304 (2002) ................................................................. [10.35.10]
Brunswick Corp v Spinit Reel Co 832 F 2d 513 ......................................................................... [11.0.40]
Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854 ................................................................................................... [2.15.460]
Bryan v Brambles Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, 14
October 1968) ............................................................................................................................ [12.0.460]
Buckley v Bennell Design & Constructions Pty Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 1 ................................. [6.10.01]
Buckley v Rice Thomas (1554) 1 Plowd 118; 75 ER 182 ......................... [2.0.10], [2.05.30], [2.15.460]
Buckley v Wathen [1973] VR 511 ............................................................................... [2.15.10], [2.15.400]
Budworth v Repatriation Commission (2001) 33 AAR 48; [2001] FCA 317 ...................... [10.45.420]
Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442 ............................................ [2.05.110], [2.05.310], [2.20.520], [2.35.80]
Building Products Ltd v BP Canada Ltd (1961) 36 CPR 121 ................................................... [11.0.60]
Built Environs Pty Ltd v Saunders International Ltd (2012) 281 LSJS 183; [2012] SASC
111 ................................................................................................................................................. [6.10.70]
Bulejcik v The Queen (1996) 185 CLR 375; [1996] HCA 50 ......... [10.15.40], [10.15.130], [12.05.180]
Bulic v Harwoods [2012] EWHC 3657 ....................................................................................... [6.12.240]
Buljabasic v Ah Lam (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, Priestley JA, 3 September
1997) ......................................................................................................................................... [10.45.560]
Bull v Fulton (1942) 66 CLR 295 ............................................................................................... [10.25.200]
Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 .......................................................................... [2.35.05], [2.35.360]
Bunyan v Jordan (1937) 57 CLR 1 ............................................................................................ [10.45.340]
Burchielli v The Queen (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 10 June
1977) ........................................................................................................................................... [7.10.230]
Burger King Corp v Registrar of Trade Marks (1973) 128 CLR 417 ...................................... [2.15.30]
Burger King Corp v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd (2001) 69 NSWLR 558; [2001] NSWCA
187 .................................................................................................................................................. [2.0.25]
Burk v Commonwealth [2006] VSC 25 .......................................... [10.45.160], [10.45.420], [10.45.800]
Burk v Commonwealth [2008] VSCA 29 ................................................................................. [10.45.420]
Burns v Edman [1970] 2 QB 541 ................................................................................................. [2.30.120]
Bush v The Queen (1993) 115 ALR 654; 43 FCR 549 ............. [5.0.10], [5.0.150], [11.0.01], [11.0.180],
[11.0.330]
Bushell v Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408 ......................................................... [4.0.200]
Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 .... [2.05.270], [7.0.40], [7.0.450],
[11.20.65], [13.0.280]
Buttrose v Versi (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Brownie J, No 3568/90, 20 July
1993) ........................................................................................................................................... [6.10.170]
Byrd and Byrd (2012) 48 Fam LR 117; [2012] FamCAFC 170 ................................................ [5.15.200]
Byrne v The Queen [1960] 1 QB 396 ............................................................................................ [4.0.120]
C v The Queen (1993) 60 SASR 467 .................................. [3.0.90], [10.30.50], [10.30.490], [12.05.300]
C, S and T (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, Gleeson CJ, 12 October
1989) ............................................................................................................................................. [7.10.70]
xxxvi
Table of Cases
C & C [2004] FamCA 708 ........................................................................................................... [10.30.850]

C (No 2), Re (1992) 106 FLR 82 ................................................................................................. [12.20.180]
CD v The Queen [2013] VSCA 95 ................................................................................................. [7.10.60]
CG (Deceased) on behalf of the Badimia People v Western Australia [2015] FCA 204 .... [11.10.01]
CIR v Atlas Copco [1991] 2 NZLR 732 ....................................................................... [2.25.01], [2.25.40]
CM [2011] QCAT 693 ..................................................................................................................... [11.15.01]
CMG v The Queen [2011] VSCA 416 ........................................................................................... [3.0.158]
CSR Ltd v Maddalena (2006) 80 ALJR 458; [2006] HCA 1 ........................................................ [4.0.80]
Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao (No 2) [2018] FCA 527 .................................................... [6.10.01]
Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130 .................................................................................. [8.0.40], [8.0.420]
Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2006) 228 ALR
719; [2006] FCA 363 .............................................................. [2.15.10], [2.15.640], [3.0.30], [11.0.530]
Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2007) 159 FCR
397; [2007] FCAFC 70 ............................................................... [3.0.30], [3.0.170], [11.0.40], [11.0.50]
Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006]
ATPR 42-113; [2006] FCA 364 ............................................................................. [11.0.510], [11.0.530]
Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 3) (2006) 229
ALR 179; [2006] FCA 386 ....................................................................................................... [11.0.530]
Cadwallader v Bajco Pty Ltd (2001) 189 ALR 370 ................................................................. [16.05.440]
Caldipp Pty Ltd t/as Slaven Motors v Delov [2002] FCAFC 352 .......................................... [9.0.120]
Caldwell v Caldwell (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 30 August 1996) ....................... [10.0.80]
Caldwell v State 393 SE 2d 436 ....................................................... [12.20.370], [12.20.670], [12.20.830]
California v Halik (Cal Super Ct .............................................................................................. [12.20.690]
California v Singh 37 Cal App 4th 1343 (1995) ...................................................................... [10.35.280]
Calwood v Calwood [1960] AC 659 ............................................................................................. [4.0.440]
Camden Marquis v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1914] 1 KB 641 ................................ [2.15.460]
Cameron v The Queen (1990) 2 WAR 1 ................................................ [2.15.10], [10.25.40], [13.0.200]
Campbell v Rickards (1833) 5 B & Ad 840; 110 ER 1001 .................................... [2.15.560], [2.25.260]
Campton v Centennial Newstan Pty Ltd (No 1) [2014] NSWSC 304 .................................... [2.20.22]
CanBev Sales & Marketing Inc v Natco Trading Company (1996) 30 OR (3d) 778 ............ [16.0.60]
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Odynsky 1999 CanLII 18486 ............................ [11.05.220]
Canada (Minister for Citizenship and Immigration) v Oberlander [1999] 1 FC 88 ........ [11.05.220]
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Fast (2003) 240 FTR 161 ............... [11.05.220]
Canadian Schenley Distillers Ltd v Canada’s Manitoba Ltd (1975) 25 CPR (2d) 1 ............ [11.0.60]
Canning and Hartigan [2016] FamCA 25 .................................................................................. [5.15.200]
Cannings v The Queen [2004] 1 All ER 725; [2004] EWCA Crim 1 ..................................... [12.25.01]
Cape v Maidment (1991) 98 ACTR 1 ......................................................................................... [6.10.280]
Caratti v The Queen (2000) 22 WAR 527; [2000] WASCA 279 ............................. [2.0.10], [16.05.160]
Carberry v Cook (1906) 3 CLR 995 ............................................................................................ [2.30.120]
Carbotech-Australia Pty Ltd v Yates [2007] NSWSC 1304 ..................................................... [6.10.170]
Cardi v The Queen (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 3 December 1987) .... [7.10.120]
Carlock v State 609 SW 2d 787 (1981) .......................................................................................... [11.0.80]
Carnahan v Coates (1990) 71 DLR (4th) 464 .............................................................. [8.0.120], [8.0.340]
Carpentaria Gold Pty Ltd v Hood [2015] QLC 36 .................................................................. [6.12.240]
Carr v Radkey 393 SW 2d 806 (Tex 1965) ................................................................................... [2.25.40]
Carr v The Queen (2000) 117 A Crim R 272; [2000] TASSC 183 ........................................... [10.15.40]
Carr Boyd Minerals Ltd v Queen Margaret Gold Mines NL; Hill Minerals NL v
Spargos Exploration NL (1989) 7 ACLC 1,029 ....................................................................... [8.0.01]
Carroll v The Queen (1985) 19 A Crim R 410 .................................... [2.10.140], [7.05.180], [7.05.520]
Carter v Boehm(1766) 3 Burr 1905 ............................................................................................. [2.10.140]
Cartledge v E Jopling & Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758 .................................................................. [10.45.520]
Cartwright v Cartwright (1878) 26 WR 684 ................................................................................ [15.0.80]
Caruana v Darouti [2014] NSWCA 85 ....................................................................................... [6.20.200]
Casey v Pel-Air Aviation Pty Ltd (2015) 89 NSWLR 707; [2015] NSWSC 566 ................. [10.45.220]
Casley-Smith v FS Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 4) (1988) 49 SASR 339 ................................ [2.30.220]
Casley-Smith v FS Evans & Sons Pty Ltd and District Council of Stirling (No 1)
(1988) 49 SASR 314 .................................................................................................................. [2.10.140]
Casley-Smith v FS Evans and Sons Pty Ltd and District Council of Stirling (No 9)
(1989) 151 LSJS 151 .................................................................................................................. [2.20.160]
Castel Electronics Pty Ltd v Toshiba Singapore Pte Ltd (2011) 277 ALR 116; [2011]
FCAFC 55 ................................................................................................................................ [16.05.160]
Castillo v State 739 SW 2d 280 .................................................................................................... [10.0.450]
Cat Media Pty Ltd v Opti-Healthcare Pty Ltd [2003] ATPR 41-933; [2003] FCA 133 ...... [2.15.640],
[11.0.40], [11.0.50]
Catrique v Imrie (1870) LR 4 HL 414 ......................................................................................... [2.15.560]
Cavanett v Chambers [1968] SASR 97 ....................................................................................... [2.30.220]
Cavenett v Commonwealth [2005] VSC 333 ................................. [10.45.160], [10.45.420], [10.45.800]
xxxvii
Expert Evidence
Cavenett v Commonwealth [2007] VSCA 88 .......................................................................... [10.45.420]

Ceccattini v ICM 2000 Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1196 ............................................................... [6.10.170]
Ceepee Pty Ltd v Roads and Maritime Services [2014] NSWCATAD 196 ........................... [6.15.80]
Cement Linings Ltd v Rocla Ltd (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 491 ................................... [6.05.60], [6.05.220]
Cerebos (Australia) Ltd v Koehler [2003] WASCA 322 ............................................................ [9.0.120]
Certain Children v Minister for Families and Children (No 2) [2017] VSC 304 ................... [3.0.15],
[5.10.360], [7.05.540]
Chamberlain v The Queen (1983) 72 FLR 1 .............................................. [2.35.80], [9.05.01], [9.05.40]
Chamberlain v R (No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521 ............. [2.10.380], [2.35.80], [4.0.250],
[4.0.370], [7.05.180], [9.05.01], [9.05.40], [9.05.80], [12.0.140], [12.0.380]
Chambers v Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1 ............................................................... [7.05.180], [10.45.400]
Chan v Chen [2013] VSC 538 ...................................................................................................... [5.15.200]
Chan Man Ching v The Queen [1977] HKLR 97 ..................................................................... [2.30.120]
Channon v The Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433 ................................................................................ [7.10.230]
Chanter v Blackwell (No 3) (1904) 1 CLR 456 ........................................................................... [5.20.10]
Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 4) (2001) 123 FCR 62; [2001] FCA 1106 ..... [11.10.01], [11.10.80],
[11.10.120]
Chapman v Walton (1833) 10 Bing 57 ........................................................................................ [2.15.130]
Chaudhary v CBI (unreported, High Court of Delhi, 15 May 2009) ................................... [12.05.30]
Chemeq Ltd v Shepherd Investments International Ltd [2007] WASCA 117 ................... [16.05.640]
Cherwell Creek Coal Pty Ltd v BHP Queensland Coal Investments Pty Ltd (No 17)
[2018] QLC 45 ........................................................................................................................... [17.15.20]
Chiropractic Board of Australia v Hooper [2013] VCAT 417 .................................................. [5.05.18]
Chiropractic Board of Australia v Hooper [2013] VCAT 878 ............................... [7.05.180], [9.0.160]
Chloride Batteries Australia Ltd v Glendale Chemical Products Ltd (1989) 17 NSWLR
60 ................................................................................................................................................ [6.10.280]
Chocolate Factory Apartments v Westpoint Finance [2005] NSWSC 784 ........................... [6.10.260]
Christophers v The Queen [2003] WASCA 214 ...................................................................... [10.30.600]
Christopherson v Allied-Signal Corp 939 F 2d 1106 (5th Cir ................................................ [2.10.380]
Churnside v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 146 ................................................................ [7.10.260]
Clambake Pty Ltd v Tipperary Projects Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 35 WAR 394; [2007]
WASCA 244 ............................................................................................................. [2.20.60], [2.20.140]
Clan Lamont, The (1946) 79 LlL Rep 521 .................................................................................. [6.05.120]
Clare v Peach [1995] 2 Cr App R 333 ...................................................................................... [16.05.160]
Clark v Adie (1876) 2 App Cas 423 .............................................................................................. [2.25.01]
Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486; [1960] HCA 42 .............. [1.0.01], [2.05.30], [2.05.450], [2.05.490],
[2.10.140], [2.15.10], [2.15.400], [2.20.520], [2.25.01], [3.0.30], [4.0.370], [4.0.380], [4.0.390],
[6.05.120], [7.05.180], [10.0.460], [10.30.220], [14.0.40], [14.0.45], [17.0.200]
Clark v The Queen [2000] All ER (D) 1219; [2000] EWCA Crim 54 ...................................... [9.0.320]
Clark Equipment Credit of Australia Ltd v Como Factors Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR
552 ................................................................................................................................. [6.0.90], [6.10.70]
Clayton v Hardwick Colliery Co Ltd [1915] WN 395 ............................................................ [2.30.120]
Cleary v Congregation of the Sisters of the Holy Family of Nazareth (unreported,
NSW Supreme Court, 23 December 1996) ........ [10.45.140], [10.45.160], [10.45.490], [10.45.550],
[10.45.800]
Clough v Tameside and Glossop Health Authority [1998] 2 All ER 971 .......................... [16.05.480]
Clune v The Queen (No 1) [1975] VR 723 ................................................................................ [2.20.160]
Clyne v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1981) 12 ATR 557 ............................................ [15.0.160]
Coastal Coaches v Ball 234 SW 2d 474 (1950) .......................................................................... [2.20.400]
Cobey v State 533 A 2d 944 (1987); cert den 538 A 2d 778 (1988) ........................................ [2.10.460]
Cobey v State 559 A 2d 391; cert den 565 A 2d 670 (Md 1989) .......................................... [12.20.580]
Cocks v Bruce, Searl and Good (1904) 21 TLR 62 ..................................................................... [5.20.30]
Cocks v Purday (1846) 2 Car & Kir 269; 175 ER 111 ................................................................. [2.20.60]
Cole v Dyer (1999) 74 SASR 216 ................................................................................................. [5.10.200]
Cole v Terry (1861) 5 LT 347 .......................................................................................................... [5.20.30]
Coles Myer Ltd v Bailey (1991) 105 FLR 465 ............................................................................. [5.0.260]
Collaroy Services Beach Club Ltd v Haywood [2007] NSWCA 21 ........................................ [14.0.45]
Collector of Customs v Agfa-Gevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389 .......................................... [16.05.720]
Collier v Nokes (1849) 2 C & K 1012; 175 ER 426 ................................................................... [2.30.120]
Collier v Simpson (1831) 5 C & P 73; 172 ER 883 .................................................. [2.20.60], [2.20.400]
Collins v The Queen (1980) 31 ALR 257 ................................................................................... [10.05.90]
Collins Thomson Pty Ltd v Clayton [2002] NSWSC 366 ............... [2.05.150], [2.35.460], [16.05.700]
Colls v Home & Colonial Stores Ltd [1904] AC 179 ................................................................... [6.0.40]
Commerce Commission v NZ Bus Co Ltd HC WN CIV 2006 485 585 ............................... [6.20.120]
Commissioner for Superannuation v Scott (1987) 13 FCR 404; 71 ALR 408 .......................... [3.0.30]
Commonwealth v Bormack 827 A 2d 503 (Pa Super .............................................................. [10.15.90]
Commonwealth v Crawford 364 A 2d 660 (Penn 1976) ....................................................... [12.10.280]
xxxviii
Table of Cases
Commonwealth vCumin 565 NE 2d 440 ............................................................................... [12.20.670]

Commonwealth vDunkle 529 Pa 168; 602 A 2d 830 (1992) ........................... [10.30.400], [10.30.460]
Commonwealth vGallagher 547 A 2d 355 (Pa 1988) ...................................... [10.30.300], [10.30.320]
Commonwealth vGraves 456 A 2d 561 (1983) ...................................................................... [12.10.280]
Commonwealth vGriffiths [2007] 70 NSWLR 268; [2007] NSWCA 370 ............. [5.15.400], [8.0.40],
[8.0.80], [8.0.120], [8.0.420]
Commonwealth v Lanigan 596 NE 2d 311 (Mass 1992) ....................................................... [12.20.670]
Commonwealth v Medina 364 NE 2d 203 (1977) .................................................................. [12.10.280]
Commonwealth v Milledge (1953) 90 CLR 15 ...................................................... [16.0.120], [16.0.160]
Commonwealth v Paquette 301 A 2d 837 .......................................................... [10.30.400], [10.30.460]
Commonwealth v Rodgers 364 Pa Super 477; 528 A 2d 610 .......................... [10.30.400], [10.30.460]
Commonwealth v Rose 725 SW 2d 588 (Ky 1987) ............................................. [2.25.540], [10.30.100]
Commonwealth v Simmons 541 Pa 211; 662 A 2d 621 (1995) ............................................... [10.15.90]
Commonwealth v Trainor 374 Mass 796; 374 NE 2d 1216 (1978) ........................................... [11.0.80]
Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2000) 101 FCR 171; [1999] FCA 1668 ........................................ [11.10.80]
Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001) 208 CLR 1; [2001] HCA 56 ............................................. [11.10.120]
Commonwealth Custodial Services Ltd v Valuer-General (NSW) (2006) 148 LGERA
38; [2006] NSWLEC 400 .......................................................................................................... [16.0.130]
Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Pty Ltd v Cassegrain [2002] NSWSC
980 ................................................................................................................................................ [5.05.10]
Commonwealth Shipping Representative v P & O Service [1923] AC 191 .......................... [2.30.02]
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Walker 92 A 3d 766 (2014) ............................................ [10.15.90]
Companhia Souza Cruz Industria E Comercio v Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia)
Ltd (1998) 41 IPR 497; [1998] FCA 689 .............................................................................. [11.20.120]
Complete Technology Pty Ltd v Toshiba (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 125 ............. [5.10.200]
Concentrated Foods Ltd v Champ [1944] 1 KB 342 .................................................................. [2.15.10]
Concha v Murieta (1889) 40 Ch D 543 ...................................................................... [2.15.560], [2.20.60]
Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Plumbers & Gasfitters Employees’ Union (Aust)
(1987) 72 ALR 415 .................................................................................................................... [11.0.390]
Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1312 ....... [17.10.160]
Conroy v Unsworth-Smith [2004] QSC 81 .............................................................................. [10.25.200]
Consolidated Credit Network v Illawarra Retirement Trust [2005] NSWSC 1004 .............. [5.05.18]
Construction Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd v Adams Consulting Engineering Pty Ltd
(Ruling No 2) [2016] VSC 209 ................................................................................................. [6.10.70]
Coombe v Bessell (1994) 4 Tas R 149 ....................................................................................... [10.20.210]
Cooper v Bech (No 2) (1975) 12 SASR 151 ................................................................................. [14.0.40]
Cooper-King v Cooper-King [1900] P 65 ................................................................................... [15.0.160]
Coopers (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Deutsche Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekämpfung
Mbh 1976 (3) SA 352 .............................................................................................. [2.20.40], [2.20.400]
Coors Brewing Co v Anheuser Busch Companies 802 F Supp 965 ..................................... [11.0.630]
Corke v Corke [1958] P 93 ...................................................................................... [2.20.380], [10.20.210]
Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319 ..................................... [5.10.200]
Corporation of the City of Adelaide v City of Port Adelaide Enfield (2000) 110
LGERA 153; [2000] SASC 271 .................................................................................................. [16.0.01]
Corporation of the Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane v Greenway [2018] 1 Qd R 344;
[2017] QCA 103 ...................................................................................................................... [10.50.340]
Cosgrove v Pattison [2000] All ER 1387 .................................................................................... [6.12.240]
Coyne v Calabro [2009] NSWSC 1023 ....................................................................................... [6.12.240]
Council for the Regulation of Healthcare Professionals v General Medical Council
[2005] EWHC 579 .................................................................................................. [8.05.110], [8.05.280]
Council of the City of Liverpool v Turano [2008] NSWCA 270 ............................................. [4.0.470]
Coursey v Superior Court 194 Cal App 3d 147 ..................................................................... [10.30.850]
Covell v Hart 14 Hun 252 (1878 NY) ........................................................................................... [5.20.60]
Cowley v People 83 NYR 478 (1881) ......................................................................................... [12.05.60]
Craig v The King (1933) 49 CLR 429 ........................................................................................... [4.0.490]
Cramar v Manningham CC (1997/90125) [1998] VICCAT 502 ........................................... [11.05.280]
Crawley v Laidlaw [1930] VLR 370 ........................................................................................... [12.0.420]
Hannan v The Queen (1982) 653 ................................................................................................ [7.10.100]
Critch v Repatriation Commission (unreported, Federal Court, 8 October 1996) ............... [4.0.200]
Crocker v The Queen (1992) 58 A Crim R 359 ......................................................................... [13.0.200]
Crosthwaite v Loader (1995) 77 A Crim R 348 ........................................................................ [12.0.420]
Crowe v Graham (1968) 121 CLR 375 ........................................................................................ [2.15.400]
Crown Glass & Aluminium Pty Ltd v Ibrahim [2005] NSWCA 195 ..................................... [3.0.160]
Cubbon v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2004) 42 MVR 153; [2004] NSWCA 326 .... [10.45.340]
Cubillo v Commonwealth [1995] FCA 1006 ........................................................................... [12.25.170]
Cubillo v Commonwealth (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 14 December
1995) ............................................................................................................................................. [7.0.170]
xxxix
Expert Evidence
Cubillo v Commonwealth (No 2) (2000) 103 FCR 1; [2000] FCA 1084 ................................ [11.05.40]
Culver v Sekulich 80 Wyo 437 .................................................................................................... [2.20.280]
Curran, Re [1985] NI 261 .............................................................................................................. [2.30.120]
Curtis v Peek (1864) 13 WR 230 .................................................................................................. [2.15.460]
Customglass Boats Ltd v Salthouse Bros Ltd [1976] 1 NZLR 36 ....... [11.0.01], [11.0.70], [11.0.120],
[11.0.410]
Cvetkovic v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 329 ......................................................................... [10.25.40]
D v S [2009] QSC 446 .................................................................................................................... [6.12.240]

DH v The Queen [2015] 1 NZLR 625; [2015] NZSC 35 .............................. [1.0.01], [3.0.90], [3.05.90]
D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; [2005] HCA 12 .......... [5.15.400], [8.0.40],
[8.0.80], [8.0.120], [8.0.230], [8.0.420]
DPP v Clarke [2014] IECA 27 ...................................................................................................... [7.10.250]
DPP v Maeda [2015] VCC 620 ..................................................................................................... [11.20.40]
DPP v O’Neill (2015) 47 VR 395; [2015] VSCA 325 ................................................................. [7.10.220]
DPP v Taleski [2007] VSC 183 ..................................................................................................... [10.25.80]
DPP (WA) v Mangolamara (2007) 169 A Crim R 379; [2007] WASC 71 .............................. [7.10.430]
DR, HR and DW v The Queen (1996) 107 CCC (3d) 289 .................................................... [10.30.480]
Dairy Farmers Co-Op Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458 .................................... [4.0.370]
Dalgety Spillers Foods Ltd v Food Brokers Ltd [1994] FSR 504 .......................... [2.15.10], [2.15.640]
Dalton v Miller 984 P 2d 666 (Col 1999) ..................................................................................... [8.0.300]
Daniel v Western Australia (2000) 178 ALR 542; [2000] FCA 858 ........................................ [2.35.150]
Daniel v Western Australia [2000] FCA 1334 ............................................................................ [11.10.80]
Daniel v Western Australia [2000] FCA 1356 ............................................................................ [11.10.80]
Daniel v Western Australia [2003] FCA 666 ............. [11.05.120], [11.05.240], [11.10.120], [11.20.200]
Daniels v Walker [2000] 1 WLR 1382; [2000] EWCA Civ 508 ............................................... [6.12.240]
Daniels v Western Australia (2000) 178 ALR 542; [2000] FCA 858 ..................... [3.0.150], [11.10.01],
[11.10.80]
Danisco v Novozymes (No 2) (2011) 91 IPR 209; [2011] FCA 282 .......................................... [18.0.80]
Darby Properties Ltd v Lloyds Bank Plc [2016] EWHC 2494 ................................................. [5.20.30]
Darker v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2001] 1 AC 435 ............... [8.0.40], [8.0.80],
[8.0.120], [8.0.160], [8.0.220], [8.0.230], [8.0.420]
Darwin v Samuels (1971) 1 SASR 411 .......................................................................................... [7.10.60]
Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21 .............. [1.0.01], [1.0.10], [2.0.65],
[2.20.22], [2.20.40], [2.20.540], [3.0.10], [3.0.15], [3.0.152], [5.15.200], [7.0.290], [7.0.330], [10.0.120],
[10.30.100], [16.05.440], [17.0.200]
Datson v The Queen (unreported, WA Supreme Court, 1972) ............................................... [7.10.60]
Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993) .................. [1.0.01],
[2.0.60], [2.10.140], [2.10.550], [2.10.580], [2.10.620], [2.10.630], [2.10.635], [2.10.640], [2.10.680],
[2.10.720], [2.10.770], [2.10.830], [3.0.20], [3.0.30], [3.0.40], [3.0.157], [3.05.120], [3.10.01], [3.10.20],
[3.15.10], [3.15.50], [7.05.190], [10.15.01], [10.15.90], [10.20.230], [10.30.220], [10.30.240], [10.30.730],
[10.35.90], [12.0.10], [12.10.260], [12.05.01], [12.05.10], [12.05.30], [12.05.440], [12.15.320],
[12.20.300], [12.20.460], [12.20.470], [12.20.480], [12.20.670], [17.0.320]
Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 43 F 3d 1311 (9th Cir 1995) ........................ [12.0.210],
[10.20.230], [12.0.260], [12.25.170]
David v Vamiso Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 326 ............................................................................ [6.10.170]
David v Wallace 565 SE 2d 386 (W Va 2002) ................................................................................ [8.0.40]
David Syme & Co Ltd v Mather [1977] VR 516 ........................................................................ [2.35.40]
Davie v Magistrates of Edinburgh [1953] SC 34 ....................... [2.0.07], [2.05.30], [2.15.10], [2.20.60]
Davies v The King (1937) 57 CLR 170 ....................................................................................... [10.15.40]
Davis v Davis (2007) 38 Fam LR 671; [2007] FamCA 1149 .................................................... [11.15.80]
Davis v Wallace 565 SE 2d 386 (W Va 2002) .............................................................................. [8.0.300]
Davis v Spring (2007) 38 Fam LR 671; [2007] FamCA 1149 ................................................... [11.15.01]
Davy v Morrison [1932] OR 1; [1931] 4 DLR 619 ...................................................................... [2.25.40]
Dawkins v Lord Rokeby (1873) LR 8 QB 255 ............................................................................... [8.0.40]
De Faria v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 116 ................................................................... [7.10.265]
De Gobeo v de Gobeo 2003 MBQB 274 ....................................................................................... [16.0.20]
De Rose v South Australia [2002] FCA 1342 ................................... [11.05.240], [11.10.01], [11.10.120]
De Rose v South Australia (No 2) (2005) 145 FCR 290; [2005] FCAFC 110 ...................... [11.20.200]
DeLuca v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 911 F 2d 941 ............................... [2.10.380], [12.25.170]
Deacon v Australian Capital Territory (2001) 172 FLR 123 ....................................................... [5.0.50]
Dean-Willcocks v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2003) 45 ACSR 564; [2003]
NSWSC 466 ........................................................................................... [3.0.140], [3.0.150], [16.05.600]
xl
Table of Cases
Deatherage v State of Washington Examining Board of Psychology 948 P 2d 828

(Wash 1997) ............................................................................................................................... [8.05.140]
Decor Corp Pty Ltd v Australian Housewares Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 1479 ........................... [5.10.360]
Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1991) 79 DLR (4th) 185; [1991] 5 CNLR 5 ................. [11.20.200]
Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1997) 153 DLR (4th) 193 ................................................. [11.10.80]
Delgamuukw v The Queen (1987) 40 DLR (4th) 685 ............................................................ [11.05.240]
Dellavedova v HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd (unreported, ACT Supreme
Court, SC217 of 1995, 8 October 1997) ................................................................................ [2.15.460]
Demasi v Fraser [1965] SASR 284 ................................................................................................. [14.0.40]
Den v Vancleve 5 NJL ................................................................................................................. [10.25.200]
Dencher and Repatriation Commission [2007] AATA 1530 ................................................. [11.05.320]
Denver v Cosgrove (1972) 3 SASR 130 ...................................................................................... [2.30.120]
Devonald v Rosser [1906] 2 KB 728 ........................................................................................... [2.15.460]
Dew v Richardson [1999] QSC 192 ............................................................................................... [9.0.120]
Di Sora v Phillipps [1863] Eng R 875; 11 ER 1168 ....................................................................... [15.0.1]
Dickins v Randerson [1901] 1 KB 437 ........................................................................................ [2.20.400]
Dillon v Baltic Shipping Co (1989) 21 NSWLR 614 .............................................................. [10.45.400]
Dingwall v Commonwealth of Australia (1992) 39 FCR 521 ................................................ [5.10.140]
Dinner v Thorp 54 Wash 2d 90; 388 P 2d 137 (1959) .............................................................. [2.20.400]
Direct Winters Transport Ltd v Duplate Canada Ltd (1962) 32 DLR (2d) 278 .................. [15.0.160]
Director of Consumer Affairs v Scully (No 2) [2011] VSC 239 ............................................. [5.15.500]
Director of Public Prosecutions v A & BC Chewing Gum Ltd [1967] 2 All ER 504 ............. [2.0.30]
Director of Public Prosecutions v A & BC Chewing Gum Ltd [1968] 1 QB 159 ................ [2.25.01],
[2.25.40], [10.0.160]
Director of Public Prosecutions v Bayly (No 3) (1996) 89 A Crim R 542 .............................. [2.35.80]
Director of Public Prosecutions v Christie (1914) 10 Cr App R 141 ......................... [2.0.25], [2.0.40]
Director of Public Prosecutions v Darby [2002] NSWSC 1157 ............................................ [13.05.260]
Director of Public Prosecutions v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 .......... [7.05.180], [12.0.300], [12.20.820]
Director of Public Prosecutions v Lynch (2006) 16 Tas R 49; [2006] TASSC 89 ................... [3.0.165]
Director of Public Prosecutions v Parsons [1993] 1 VR 1 ......................................................... [4.0.480]
Director of Public Prosecutions v Paulino (2017) 54 VR 109; [2017] VSCA 38 ................. [12.20.40],
[12.20.80]
Director of Public Prosecutions v Secretary (unreported, NT Supreme Court, 12
December 1995) ...................................................................................................................... [10.30.220]
Director of Public Prosecutions v Spencer [1999] VSC 301 ................................................... [12.0.300]
Director of Public Prosecutions v Williams [2014] VSC 304 ................................................ [10.30.100]
Director of Public Prosecutions v Wise [2016] VSCA 173 ................................. [12.20.80], [12.20.125]
Director of Public Prosecutions v Gargasoulas [2019] VSC 87 .............................................. [10.25.80]
Director of Public Prosecutions v Hore (2004) 10 VR 179; [2004] VSCA 192 ..................... [13.0.200]
Division of Corrections v Wynn 436 So 2d 446 (Fla Dist Ct App 1983) ........................... [10.30.320]
Dixon v Whisprun Pty Ltd (formerly known as Northwest Exports Pty Ltd) [2001]
NSWCA 344 ................................................................................................................................ [14.0.45]
Dobler v Halverson (2007) 70 NSWLR 151; [2007] NSWCA 335 .............................................. [9.0.40]
Dobson v Morris (1975) 4 NSWLR 681 ...................................................................................... [11.0.390]
Docker v West Midlands Police [1998] EWCA Civ 522 ............................................. [8.0.40], [8.0.120]
Dodd v Tamigi [2007] WASC 42 ................................................................................ [2.25.40], [2.25.260]
Doe v Davies (1847) 10 QB 314; 116 ER 122 ........................................................................... [12.15.160]
Doe d Devine v Wilson (1855) 10 Moo PCC 502; 14 ER 581 ............................................... [12.15.160]
Doe d Mudd v Suckermore (1837) 5 Ad & El 703; 111 ER 1331 .................... [12.15.120], [12.15.160]
Doe d Perry v Newton (1836) 5 Ad & E 514; 111 ER 260 .................................................... [12.15.160]
Doheny and Adams v The Queen [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 ................... [2.0.25], [7.0.290], [12.0.140],
[12.05.220], [12.20.90], [12.20.300], [12.20.370], [12.20.460], [12.20.660], [12.20.720], [12.25.60]
Doherty v New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 450 .................................................................. [10.45.420]
Domain Names Australia Pty Ltd v .au Domain Administration Pty Ltd (2004) 139
FCR 215; [2004] FCAFC 247 ................................................................. [2.15.640], [3.0.160], [11.0.40]
Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555 ........................................ [4.0.240], [10.15.40], [10.20.200]
Donnell v Dovey (2010) 237 FLR 53; [2010] FamCAFC 15 .................................................... [11.10.01]
Donohue v Tasmania (2016) 262 A Crim R 63; [2016] TASCCA 17 ........................................ [3.0.165]
Dowling v Pontypool, Caerleon & Newport Railway Co (1874) LR 18 Eq 714 ................ [2.15.460]
Drew v Newfoundland and Labrador (Minister of Government Services and Lands)
2006 NLCA 53 (CanLII); [2007] 1 CNLR 34 ........................................................................ [11.20.40]
Driscoll v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 517 ............ [2.35.05], [2.35.80], [4.0.370], [4.0.390], [10.0.360]
Drope v Missouri 420 US 162; 95 S Ct 896 (1975) ............................................ [10.10.320], [10.10.360]
Duffy v The Minister for Planning [2003] WASCA 294 ............................................................ [16.0.01]
Duke v The Queen (1979) 1 A Crim R 39 ................................................................................... [2.35.80]
Duke Group (in liq) v Arthur Young (1990) 54 SASR 498 ......................................................... [8.0.01]
Duke Group Ltd (in liq) v Pilmer (1998) 144 FLR 1 ............................................................. [16.05.120]
xli
Expert Evidence
Duke of Wellington, Re [1947] Ch 506 ....................................................................................... [2.15.560]

Dumbleton v Town of Bassendean [2005] WASAT 145 .......................................................... [6.20.160]
Duncan v Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee [1986] 1 NZLR 513 ................... [5.10.400]
Duncan v The Queen (1983) 47 ALR 746 .................................................................................. [7.10.120]
Duncan, Re [1968] P 306 ............................................................................................................... [15.0.360]
Dupas v The Queen (2012) 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328 ...... [3.0.157], [3.0.158], [10.15.70],
[10.15.170], [10.20.102]
Dura (Australia) Constructions Pty Ltd v Hue Boutique Living Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011]
VSC 518 ....................................................................................................................................... [5.05.18]
Dura (Australia) Constructions Pty Ltd v Hue Boutique Living Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012]
VSC 99 ........................................................................................................................................... [3.0.15]
Dura Constructions Pty Ltd v Hue Boutique Living Pty Ltd (No 5) (2014) 48 VR 1;
[2014] VSC 400 ...................................................................................................... [5.15.200], [5.15.500]
Duroux v Martin (1993) 116 FLR 141 ....................................................................................... [12.20.180]
Dusky v United States 362 US 402; 80 S Ct 788 (1960) ........................................................ [10.10.320]
Dyas v United States 376 A 2d 827 (1977) ....................... [2.10.500], [2.15.60], [10.15.90], [10.30.220]
Dyce Sombre, Re (1849) 1 Mac & G 116; 41 ER 1207 .............................................................. [2.20.120]
Dykstra v Head (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 6 October 1989) .............................. [2.30.120]
Dyson v Pharmacy Board of New South Wales (2000) 50 NSWLR 523; [2000] NSWSC
981 .............................................................................................................................................. [2.15.460]
E v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) 105 ALR 53 ............................................................. [2.15.400]

E v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) 31 FCR 299 ............................................................... [2.15.30]
E v The Queen (1997) 96 A Crim R 489 .................................................................................. [10.30.600]
EMI Records Ltd v Wallace Ltd [1983] 1 Ch 59 ......................................................................... [5.20.10]
Eagles v Orth [1976] Qd R 313 ................................................................................. [2.10.140], [2.15.100]
Earl Ferrers Case (1760) 19 How St Tr 885 ............................................................................... [10.0.120]
Easter v Griffith (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 17 June 1994) ................................... [10.25.200]
Easterday v The Queen (2003) 143 A Crim R 154; [2003] WASCA 69 ................................... [4.0.490]
Eastman v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 1; [2000] HCA 29 .................................................... [10.10.530]
Eaton v ISS Catering Services Pty Ltd (2013) 423 VR 635; [2013] VSCA 361 ..................... [5.15.200]
Eckersley v Binnie (1988) 18 Con LR 1 ........................................................................................ [4.0.200]
Edmeades v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1969] 2 QB 67 .............................................................. [5.0.230]
Edwards-Tubb v JD Wetherspoon [2011] EWCA Civ 136 ........................................................ [6.12.40]
Egmont Towing & Sorting Ltd v The Ship Telendos (1982) 43 NR 147 ................................ [6.05.80]
Elgin National Watch Co v Elgin Clock Co 26 F 2d 376 .......................................................... [11.0.80]
Elliott v Ivey [1998] NSWSC 116 .............................................................................................. [16.05.320]
Ellis v South Australia [2006] WASC 270 ............................................................. [12.0.200], [12.25.170]
Ellison v Karnchanit (2012) 48 Fam LR 33; [2012] FamCA 602 ............................................. [12.20.40]
Elrick v Terjesen [1948] VLR 184 ................................................................................................ [2.30.120]
Engert v The Queen (1995) 84 A Crim R 67 ............................................................................. [7.10.190]
English Exporters (London) Ltd v Eldonwall Ltd [1973] 1 Ch 415 .................. [2.20.140], [2.20.200],
[2.20.400], [7.0.290], [16.0.40]
Enoch and Zaretsky, Bock & Co’s Arbitration, Re [1910] 1 KB 327 ......................................... [6.0.90]
Enoch’s Arbitration, Re [1910] 1 KB 327 ....................................................................................... [6.0.90]
Enright v Windley (unreported, ACT Supreme Court, 1 June 1995) ..................................... [10.0.80]
Environment, Minister of v Petroccia (1982) 30 SASR 333 .................................................... [16.0.130]
Epperson v Dampney (1976) 10 ALR 227 ........... [2.15.30], [2.15.100], [4.0.40], [10.0.160], [10.0.280]
Epstein v Sichel 107 NYS 2d 248 (1951 Sup) .............................................................................. [5.20.60]
Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1999) 201 CLR 49;
[1999] HCA 67 .................................................................................... [5.10.120], [5.10.140], [5.10.180]
Estate of Griffith, Re; Easter v Griffith (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 7 June
1995) ......................................................................................................................................... [10.25.200]
Estate of Hodges, Re; Shorter v Hodges (1988) 14 NSWLR 698 ......................................... [10.25.200]
Estate of Rochester [2013] NSWSC 884 ....................................................................................... [5.05.10]
Evans v London Hospital Medical College (University of London) [1981] 1 WLR 184 ..... [8.0.40],
[8.0.120], [8.0.200], [8.0.340], [8.05.90]
Evans Deakin Pty Ltd v Sebel Furniture Ltd [2003] FCA 171 ...................... [16.05.240], [16.05.440],
[16.05.560]
Everingham v Clarke [1994] 1 Qd R 34 ....................................................................................... [6.10.70]
xlii
Table of Cases
F v F [1990] 1 IR 348 .................................................................................................. [2.20.160], [2.20.400]

F v M [2004] EWHC 727 ............................................................................................................ [10.30.850]
F v The Queen (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 ............ [2.05.110], [2.05.310], [3.0.90], [10.0.40], [10.30.490],
[12.05.300]
F (Orse C) v C [1991] 2 IR 330 ........................................................................................................ [4.0.40]
F and S (Minors), Re [1966] 1 FCR 666 .......................................................................................... [2.0.30]
F: Litigants in Person Guidelines, Re (2001) 161 FLR 189; [2001] FamCA 348 ...................... [2.0.30]
FGT Custodians Pty Ltd v Fagenblat [2003] VSCA 33 ...................................... [2.35.460], [16.05.700]
FGT Custodians Pty Ltd (formerly Feingold Partners Pty Ltd) v Fagenblat [2003]
VSCA 33 .................................................................................................................................... [2.05.150]
FJ Mancer Company Pty Ltd v St Mary’s Private Hospital Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW
Supreme Court, 30 March 1990) ......................................................................................... [17.05.120]
Faatamala v Haleck (1963) 4 ASR 888 ....................................................................................... [2.05.430]
Fabian v Mergulies (1986) 53 OR (2d) 380 .................................................................................. [8.0.340]
Factortame (No 8) [2003] QB 381 .................................................................................................. [5.20.90]
Fagenblat v Feingold Partners Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 454 ......................................................... [2.35.460]
Fahey and Fahey (unreported, 3 August 1994) ...................................................................... [12.20.180]
Fairlie v Fenton (1870) LR 5 Ex 169 ............................................................................................. [5.20.20]
Falconer v The Queen (1989) 46 A Crim R 83 ................................ [10.0.160], [10.45.640], [10.45.680]
Farewell v Coker (1728) 2 P Wms 460; 24 ER 814 ..................................................................... [5.20.30]
Farley v Warringah Shire Council (1948) 17 LGR (NSW) 9 ................................................. [17.05.160]
Farnell v Penhalluriack (No 2) [2008] VSC 214 ........................................................................ [12.20.40]
Farrell v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 286; [1998] HCA 50 ...... [2.0.10], [2.15.10], [3.0.30], [10.0.260],
[10.0.320], [10.0.360], [10.0.380]
Farrugia and Comcare [2006] AATA 438 ..................................................................................... [9.0.160]
Fedele v The Queen [2017] VSCA 363 ....................................................................................... [7.10.265]
Fenwick v Bell (1844) 1 C & K 312; 174 ER 825 ........................................................................ [2.25.40]
Ferebee v Chevron Chemical Co 736 F 2d 1529 ...................................................................... [2.10.430]
Ferguson v Steel [2007] ABQB 596 .............................................................................. [9.10.01], [9.10.40]
Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; [2001] HCA 72 .... [2.35.80], [3.0.165], [3.0.165], [10.15.40],
[12.10.380]
Ficarra v City Moonee Valley [2000] VCAT 2571 .................................................................. [11.05.280]
Field v Leeds City Council [2001] CPLR 833 ........................................................................... [2.35.460]
Filipowski v Island Maritime Ltd [2002] NSWLEC 177 ...................................... [5.10.140], [5.10.360]
Finnegan v Fall River Gas Works Co 34 NE 523 ..................................................................... [2.20.400]
Firebelt Pty Ltd v Brambles Australia Ltd [2002] HCA 21 .................................................... [18.0.120]
Fisher v Brown [1968] SASR 65 .................................................................................................... [14.0.40]
Fisher v The Queen (1961) 130 CCC 1 ......................................................................................... [2.15.30]
Fitzgerald v The Queen (2014) 88 ALJR 779; [2014] HCA 28 .............................................. [12.20.125]
Fizzell v The Queen (1987) 31 A Crim R 213 .......................................................... [2.20.160], [4.0.390]
Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 377 ..................................................... [4.0.200]
Flogineering Pty Ltd v Blu Logistics SA Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 1479 ...................................... [2.30.120]
Florida v Jardines 569 US 1 (2013) ............................................................................................. [13.05.40]
Flynn v The Queen (1993) 68 A Crim R 294 ............................................................................. [7.10.120]
Folkes v Chadd (1782) 3 Doug KB 157; 99 ER 589 ............. [2.05.430], [2.15.10], [2.25.260], [8.0.460]
Foody v Horewood (No 2) [2004] VSC 222 ................................................................................ [7.0.170]
Forbes v The Queen (2009) 167 ACTR 1; [2009] ACTCA 10 .................................................. [12.20.80]
Forbes v The Queen [2010] HCATrans 120 ............................................................................. [12.20.120]
Forder v Hutchinson [2005] VSCA 281 ........................................................................................ [9.0.120]
Forrester v HM Advocate [1952] JC 28 ...................................................................................... [2.20.200]
Forrester v Harris Farm Pty Ltd (1996) 129 FLR 431 ............................................. [2.20.140], [7.0.170]
Foster v Blakelock (1826) 5 B & Cr 328; 108 ER 122 ................................................................. [5.20.30]
Fowler (1985) 39 SASR 440 .......................................................................................................... [10.0.120]
Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22 ......................................................................... [4.0.80]
Franks v Berem Constructions Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 2
December 1998) ........................................................................................................................ [6.10.260]
Friday v The Queen (1984) 14 A Crim R 471 .......................................................... [7.10.80], [7.10.170]
Friends of Tumblebee Inc v ATB Morton Pty Ltd (No 2) [2014] NSWLEC 134 ............... [17.15.40],
[17.15.50]
Friends of Tumblebee Inc v ATB Morton Pty Ltd (No 3) [2014] NSWLEC 133 ................ [17.15.40]
Frith’s Case 22 How St Tr 307 (1790) ......................................................................................... [10.10.40]
Fritz Thyssen, The [1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 104 .............................................................................. [6.05.60]
Frost v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [1997] 1 All ER 540 ..................... [10.45.560]
Frucor Beverages Ltd v The Coca-Cola Company [2017] FCA 298 ...................................... [11.0.480]
xliii
Expert Evidence
Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923) ...... [1.0.01], [2.0.60], [2.10.60], [2.10.140], [2.15.10],
[2.35.90], [3.0.30], [3.05.10], [3.10.01], [3.15.10], [7.05.180], [10.0.450], [10.0.460],[10.15.90],
[10.15.140], [10.15.150], [10.20.180], [10.30.220], [10.30.320], [10.30.710], [12.0.260], [12.20.300],
[12.20.460], [12.20.470], [12.20.480], [12.20.580], [12.20.590], [12.20.670], [12.20.690]
Frymire-Brinati v KPMG Peat Marwick 2 F 3d 183 (1993) .................................................. [16.05.200]
Furlong Estate v Newfoundland Light & Power Co 2000 CanLII 28332 .......................... [11.05.340]
Fussell v Deigan [2018] NSWSC 1419 ........................................................................................ [2.30.120]
G v DPP [1997] 2 All ER 755 ....................................................................................................... [2.15.100]

G v Director of Public Prosecutions [1997] 2 All ER 755 ....................................................... [10.0.280]
G v H (1994) 181 CLR 387 ......................................................................................................... [12.20.180]
G & H Montage GmbH v Irvani [1990] 1 WLR 667 ................................................................. [15.0.40]
G Heileman Brewing Co v Anheuser-Busch Inc 873 F 2d 985 .............................................. [11.0.630]
GB v The Queen (1990) 56 CCC (3d) 201 ................................................................................ [10.30.490]
Gage v Her Majesty’s Advocate [2011] HCJAC 40 .................................................................. [10.15.60]
Galbraith v HM Advocate 2002 JC 1 ....................................................................................... [10.25.120]
Galganov v Russell (Township) (2012) 350 DLR (4th) 679 .................................................... [5.15.150]
Gallagher v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 392 ............................................................................... [4.0.490]
Galvin v Murray [2001] 1 ILRM 234 ............................................................................................ [2.05.70]
Gangemi and Shire of Augusta–Margaret River [2005] WASAT 113 ................................... [6.20.160]
Gannet, The [1900] AC 234 ............................................................................................................ [6.05.60]
Gardner Peerage (1824) Le Marchants’ Reporter 169 ............................................................. [2.20.480]
Gasso v Love [1980] VR 163 ........................................................................................................ [2.15.460]
Gate Gourmet Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Gate Gourmet Holding AG [2004] NSWSC
768 .............................................................................................................................................. [5.10.140]
Gattellaro v Westpac Banking Corp (2004) 78 ALJR 394; [2004] HCA 6 ............................... [3.0.160]
Gawne v Gawne [1979] 2 NSWLR 449 .................................................................................... [12.15.120]
Geders v United States 425 US 80 (1976) ...................................................................................... [7.0.90]
Gellatly v Laird [1953] JC 16 ....................................................................................................... [2.25.100]
General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp v Commissioner of Payroll Tax (1982)
56 ALJR 775 .............................................................................................................................. [2.15.460]
General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp Ltd v Commissioner of Pay-Roll Tax
(NSW) (1982) 56 ALJR 775 ..................................................................................................... [2.15.460]
General Electric Co v Joiner 522 US 136, 118 S Ct 512 (1997) ............... [1.0.01], [2.10.630], [3.10.02]
General Medical Council v Meadow [2007] 1 All ER 1 ............................................................ [8.0.160]
General Medical Council v Meadow [2007] 1 QB 462; [2006] EWCA Civ 1390 .............. [12.25.240]
Genetic Institute Inc v Kirin-Amgen Inc [No 2] (1997) 78 FCR 368 .................................... [6.05.220]
George v Biggs (No 2) [2015] NSWDC 43 .................................................................................. [5.20.10]
Ghebrat v The Queen (2011) 214 A Crim R 140; [2011] VSCA 299 .................................... [12.10.165]
Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543 ................................................................... [8.0.230], [8.0.420]
Gibson v Cotter HC AK Civ 2005-404-6935 [2006] NZHC 592 ................................ [8.0.40], [8.0.380]
Gibson v The Queen (2001) 120 A Crim R 543 .............................. [12.20.300], [12.20.370], [12.25.60]
Gibson v The Queen [2001] TASSC 59 ...................................................................................... [12.20.80]
Gibson v The Queen (unreported, WA Court of Criminal Appeal, Pidgeon, Ipp and
Scott JJ, 15 November 1995) .................................................................................................... [7.10.90]
Gieselmann v The Queen (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, No 60692 of
1995, 12 November 1996) ......................................................................................................... [4.0.120]
Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269; [2003] HCA 33 ........ [10.45.01],
[10.45.340]
Gilbey v Great Western Railway (1910) 102 LT 202 ................................................................ [2.20.480]
Gilham v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 22; [2012] NSWCCA 131 .................................. [6.20.260]
Gilmore v The Queen [1977] 2 NSWLR 935 ............................................................................. [12.0.100]
Girl Scouts (USA) v Hollingsworth 188 F Supp 707 (DC ED NY 1910) ................................ [11.0.80]
Glaxo Wellcome UK Ltd (t/a Allen & Hanburys) v Sandoz Ltd [2017] EWHC 3196 ........ [6.20.60]
Glenister v Glenister [1945] P 30 ................................................................................................. [2.30.120]
Glennon v Director of Public Prosecutions (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court,
Crockett J, 25 July 1990) ................................ [11.0.01], [11.0.180], [11.0.200], [11.0.260], [11.0.350]
Godfrey v New South Wales (No 1) [2003] NSWSC 160 .................................. [10.35.10], [10.35.160]
Godinez v Moran 125 L Ed 2d 321; 113 S Ct 2680 (1993) .......... [10.10.320], [10.10.450], [10.10.510]
Goffin v Donnelly (1881) LR 6 QBD 307 ..................................................................................... [8.0.120]
Goldberg v Ng (1995) 185 CLR 83 .............................................................................................. [5.10.140]
Goldsborough v O’Neill (1996) 131 FLR 104 .............................................................................. [2.30.40]
Gonzales v Texas 1991 WL 67061 (Tex App Hous (14 Dist) 1991) ......................................... [9.10.80]
xliv
Table of Cases
Good Health Wanganui v Burberry (unreported, Employment Court, Wellington, NZ,

Shaw J, 10 December 2002) .................................................................................................... [11.15.01]
Goods of Bonelli, Re (1875) 1 PD 69 ............................................................................................ [15.0.80]
Goodwin, In Marriage of (1990) 101 FLR 386 .......................................................................... [16.0.160]
Gordon v The Queen (1982) 41 ALR 64 .................................................................................... [2.20.280]
Gordon M Jenkins v Coleman (1989) 87 ALR 477 ................................................................... [2.15.460]
Gordon M Jenkins & Associates Pty Ltd v Coleman (1989) 87 ALR 477 .............................. [2.30.40]
Government Transport, Commissioner for v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292 ...... [2.20.22], [3.0.152],
[7.0.330], [9.0.200], [9.0.240]
Graat v The Queen (1983) 2 CCC (3d) 365 .............................................................. [2.05.10], [2.15.200]
Grace v Southern [1978] VR 75 ................................................................................................... [2.05.490]
Graham Brand v Digi-Tech (Australia) Ltd [2002] NSWSC 996 ......................................... [16.05.120]
Grainger v Williams [2009] WASCA 60 .................................................................. [2.05.430], [17.10.80]
Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674 ........................................................................................... [5.10.120]
Graves v Lovick (1904) 29 VLR 641 ............................................................................................. [5.20.10]
Gray v Hopcroft [2000] QCA 144 ................................................................................................. [5.0.230]
Gray v Minister for Planning (2006) 152 LGERA 258; [2006] NSWLEC 720 ...................... [17.15.20]
Grayden v The Queen [1989] WAR 208 .................................................................................. [12.15.240]
Green v DB Group Services (UK) Ltd [2006] EWHC 1898 .................................................... [10.50.01]
Green v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 334 ............................................................ [10.25.180], [10.30.240]
Grey v Australian Motorists & General Insurance Co Pty Ltd [1976] 1 NSWLR 669 ...... [2.25.260]
Greynor Investments Pty Ltd v Hunter Douglas Ltd (unreported, Federal Court of
Australia, 12 September 1979) ............................................................................................... [11.0.630]
Griffiths v Northern Territory (2007) 165 FCR 391; [2007] FCAFC 178 ............................... [11.10.01]
Griffiths, Re (1862) 3 De G J & S 388; 46 ER 685 ....................................................................... [5.20.30]
Grismore v Consolidated Products Co 5 NW 2d 646 ............................................................. [2.25.260]
Grynberg v Muller [2001] NSWSC 532 .................................................................................... [10.25.200]
Guaranty Trust Corp (New York) v Hannay [1918] 2 KB 623 .............................................. [2.15.560]
Guerin v Watts [2002] NSWSC 692 .............................................................................................. [5.05.20]
Guest v Nominal Defendant [2006] NSWCA 77 .......................................................................... [4.0.80]
Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dog Association of New
South Wales & ACT (1998) 154 ALR 527 ............................. [2.0.05], [2.20.520], [3.0.10], [3.0.150]
Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457; [2005] FCA 50 .................. [2.20.01], [11.05.240],
[11.10.160]
Gundry v The Queen (1989) 39 A Crim R 227 ........................................................................... [7.10.90]
Guntrip v Cheney Coaches Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 392 ............................................................ [6.12.40]
Gyles v Wilcox [1740] EngR 76; (1740) 2 Atk 141; 26 ER 489 .................................................. [6.10.01]
H v H (2003) 198 ALR 383; [2003] FMCAfam 31 ..................................................................... [11.10.01]

H v H [2008] 2 FLR 2092; [2008] EWHC 935 ............................................................................... [1.0.20]
H v Schering Chemicals Ltd [1983] 1 All ER 849 ...................................................................... [2.20.60]
H v The Queen (1995) 81 A Crim R 88 ..................................................................................... [7.10.170]
H, B & E v Crimes Compensation Tribunal [1997] 1 VR 608 ................................................ [10.45.01]
H Lundbeck A/S v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2009) 177 FCR 151; [2009] FCAFC 70 .............. [18.0.80]
HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999] HCA 2 ............... [1.0.120], [2.0.07], [2.0.65], [2.15.10],
[3.0.10], [3.0.30], [4.0.410], [5.0.110], [7.0.370], [7.05.180], [12.0.260], [12.0.380]
HH (Mogadishu: armed conflict: risk) Somalia CG [2008] UKAIT 00022 ......................... [11.20.160]
HM Advocate v McGinlay [1983] SLT 562 ................................................................................ [2.25.100]
Haakanson v State of Alaska 760 P2d 1030 ............................................................................ [10.35.280]
Hadid v Lenfest Communications Inc (1996) 70 FCR 403 ..................................................... [5.10.360]
Halford v Seed Hawk Inc (2002) 20 CPR (4th) 474; 222 FTR 232 ........................................ [17.0.120]
Hall v Baxter Healthcare Corp 947 F Supp 1387 ................................................................... [12.25.170]
Hall v Florida 134 S Ct 1986 (2014) ............................................................................................ [7.10.250]
Hall v Hall (1979) FLC 90-713 ....................................................................................................... [6.0.110]
Hall v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615 ..................................................................................................... [8.0.230]
Hallatt v Canada [2001] 1 CTC 2626 ............................................................................................ [16.0.60]
Halliburton Energy Services Inc v Smith International (North Sea) Ltd (No 2) [2007]
RPC 17; [2006] EWCA Civ 1599 ............................................................................................ [6.05.220]
Halverson v Dobler [2006] NSWSC 1307 ............................................................... [6.20.120], [6.20.200]
Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell (1998) 19 WAR 316 .............................................................. [5.0.360]
Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v Porteous (unreported, WA Supreme Court, Anderson
J, 15 February 1999) ............................................................................................................... [16.05.440]
Hanna v Richmond Properties Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, No
40361/90, 15 November 1991) ............................................................................................... [6.10.210]
xlv
Expert Evidence
Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 205 FLR 217; [2006]
NSWCCA 373 .............................................................................................................. [3.0.10], [3.0.170]
Hanrahan v Merck Sharp & Dohme [1988] 1 ILRM 629 ............................................................ [4.0.40]
Hansen v The Queen (unreported, SA Court of Criminal Appeal, King CJ, Matheson
and Millhouse JJ, 22 February 1995) .................................................................................... [7.10.250]
Hansford v The Queen (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, 5 October 1973) ............. [7.10.100]
Hanson v Joseph 685 NE 2d 71 (1987) .................................................................................... [10.30.850]
Haq v HM Advocate [1987] SCCR 433 ...................................................................................... [2.05.430]
Harding v Hayes [1974] Crim LR 713 ....................................................................................... [2.15.460]
Hargreaves v Bretherton [1959] 1 QB 45 ....................................................................................... [8.0.40]
Haris v Bulldogs Rugby League Club [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-838; [2006]
NSWCA 53 .............................................................................................................................. [13.05.260]
Harland-White v The Queen (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, 10 May 1994) ..... [7.10.230]
Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280 ............................ [5.0.360]
Harmony Shipping Co SA v Davis [1979] 1 WLR 1380; [1979] 3 All ER 177 .... [2.20.160], [5.0.50],
[5.10.200], [7.05.60]
Harper v State 292 SE 2d 389 (1982) .......................................................................................... [2.10.380]
Harradine v The Queen (1992) 61 A Crim R 201 .................................................... [7.10.80], [7.10.110]
Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590 ............................................................................... [2.35.05]
Harrington v Fry (1824) 1 C & P 289; 171 ER 1199 ............................................................... [12.15.120]
Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 ......... [2.05.20],
[2.35.150], [3.0.150], [5.0.110], [5.0.150], [5.10.360], [5.15.450], [11.05.240], [11.10.80], [11.10.240]
Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 8) (2004) 207 ALR 483; [2004] FCA 338 ....... [11.10.01],
[11.10.200]
Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 9) (2007) 238 ALR 1; [2007] FCA 31 .............. [5.0.140],
[11.20.200]
Harris v The Queen [1967] SASR 316 .......................................................................................... [7.10.60]
Harris Scarfe Ltd (rec & mgrs apptd) (in liq) v Ernst & Young (No 6) [2006] SASC
148 .................................................................................................................................................. [5.0.60]
Harrison v Shepherd Homes Ltd [2011] EWHC 1811 ............................................................... [6.20.60]
Hartnett & Sampson (Costs) [2007] FamCA 1456 .................................................................... [5.15.200]
Hartop, Ex Parte (1806) 12 Ves 349; 33 ER 132 .......................................................................... [5.20.30]
Hastings Point Progress Association v Tweed Council [2010] NSWCA 39 .......................... [6.10.70]
Hatherley v The Queen (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 6 May
1986) ........................................................................................................................................... [7.10.230]
Haughey, Re [1971] IR 217 ............................................................................................................. [8.0.120]
Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 CLR 539 .................................................................................. [10.45.520]
Hawkins v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500 .......................................... [2.25.01], [10.25.40], [10.25.80]
Hawthorne v State 470 So 2d 770 (1985) ................................................................................. [10.30.100]
Haynes v Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13 ................................................................................................ [2.25.260]
Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; [2008] HCA 36 ................................................................ [5.0.360]
Heffernan v The Queen (2005) 194 FLR 370; [2005] NTCCA 14 ......................................... [10.10.260]
Hegarty v Queensland Ambulance Service [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-919; [2007]
QCA 366 .......................................................................................... [10.50.01], [10.50.240], [10.50.340]
Heinze v Burnley and Myers (1992) 63 A Crim R 83 ............................................................. [2.35.280]
Helbig and Rowe [2016] FamCAFC 117 .................................................................................. [10.30.850]
Heller (1970) (4) SA 679 .................................................................................................................... [6.0.01]
Helpard v The Queen (1979) 10 CR (3d) 76 ............................................................................. [10.25.40]
Henley v Queensland [2005] QDC 94 .......................................................................................... [5.20.10]
Henson v State 535 NE 2d 1189 (Ind 1989) ........................................................ [10.30.320], [10.45.740]
Herbert Adams Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1932) 47 CLR 222 ........... [2.15.460]
Higgins v Ewing’s Trustees 1925 SC 440 .................................................................................. [2.15.560]
Highways, Commissioner of v Tynan (1982) 53 LGRA 1 ...................................................... [16.0.120]
Hilder v The Queen (1997) 97 A Crim R 70 .......................... [2.20.20], [2.20.160], [3.0.150], [4.0.120]
Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB 277 ..................................................................................... [2.25.40], [2.25.220]
Hill v Commonwealth [2003] NSWSC 1025 ...................................................... [10.45.420], [10.45.800]
Hill v United States 507 So 2d 554 ........................................................................................... [10.30.100]
Hillier v The Queen [2005] ACTCA 48 .................................................................................... [12.20.125]
Hillier, Re [2003] ACTSC 50 ......................................................................................................... [10.35.10]
Hillstead v The Queen [2005] WASCA 116 ............................................................................... [12.05.10]
Hinch v Attorney-General (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 15 ................................................................ [11.0.290]
Hind v Attorney-General (Tas) (unreported, Tasmanian Supreme Court, Cox J, 29
September 1995) ................................................................................................ [10.50.240], [10.50.340]
Hinz v Berry [1970] 2 QB 40 ...................................................................................................... [10.45.340]
Hirtenstein v Hill Dickinson LLP [2014] EWHC 2711 ............................................................ [17.0.160]
Ho, Van Duoc [2003] MRTA 7636 ............................................................................................... [11.15.01]
Hoban’s Glynde Pty Ltd v Firle Hotel Pty Ltd (1973) 4 SASR 503 ................... [11.0.120], [11.0.450]
xlvi
Table of Cases
Hobartville Stud Pty Ltd v Union Insurance Co Ltd (1990) 6 ANZ Insurance Cases
61-032 ......................................................................................................................................... [6.10.280]
Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292 ...................................................................................... [2.35.05]
Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430 ............................................................................... [4.0.40], [12.0.100]
Hodder Rook & Associates Pty Ltd v Genworth Financial Mortgage Insurance Pty
Ltd [2011] NSWCA 279 ............................................................................................................. [5.05.10]
Hodge v State 98 Ala 10 (1893) ................................................................................................... [13.05.40]
Hodge v Williams (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 489 ............................................................. [7.0.450], [12.10.80]
Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2011] VSC 309 ........................................................................................ [5.05.18]
Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v Beauty Box [1987] 2 SALR 600 .................................................. [11.0.630]
Hoffman v Barone [2014] FamCA 52 ........................................................ [5.05.100], [6.0.110], [6.12.80]
Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 .......................................................... [2.30.02], [2.30.80], [2.30.120]
Hollingham v Head (1858) 27 LJCP 241; 140 ER 1135 ......................................... [7.05.180], [12.0.300]
Holmden v Bitar (1987) 27 A Crim R 255 ................................................................................. [2.35.280]
Holt v Auckland City Council [1980] 2 NZLR 124 .............................................. [2.20.400], [12.0.420]
Homebase Ltd v Rengasamy [2015] EWHC 68 .......................................................................... [6.20.60]
Homebush Abattoir Corp v Bermria Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 605 .................................. [6.10.280]
Hone v Western Australia (2007) 179 A Crim R 138; [2007] WASCA 283 ............................. [4.0.160]
Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; [2014] HCA 29 .................. [1.0.01], [2.15.01], [3.0.20],
[3.0.30], [3.05.40], [12.05.445]
Honeywell Pty Ltd v Austral Motors Holdings Ltd [1980] Qd R 355 ................................... [6.10.01]
Hood v Crimes Compensation Tribunal (unreported, Victorian Administrative
Appeals Tribunal, 24 March 1994) .......................................................................................... [10.0.80]
Hood v United States 73 L Ed 2d 1370; 102 Sup Ct 3489 (1982) .......................................... [10.15.90]
Hoogerdyk v Condon (1990) 22 NSWLR 171 ........................................................................... [6.10.280]
Hopes and Lavery v HM Advocate [1960] Crim L R 560 ................................... [2.05.270], [2.05.430]
Hopp v Lepp [1980] 2 SCR 192 ....................................................................................................... [8.0.01]
Hopper v The Queen [2003] WASCA 153 ................................................................................. [7.10.230]
Horne v Wilson (unreported, Tasmanian Supreme Court, 19 March 1998) ..................... [10.45.340]
Hough v Ah Sam (1912) 15 CLR 452 ......................................................................................... [10.05.90]
Houghagen v Charra (1989) 50 SASR 419 ................................................................................... [7.10.80]
Houghton v The Queen (2004) 28 WAR 399; [2004] WASCA 20 ............................................ [4.0.250]
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 .......................................................................................... [5.0.260]
Household Finance Corp v Federal Finance Corp F Supp 164 ............................................... [11.0.80]
Howell v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (unreported, NSW Supreme
Court, Newman J, 7 May 1998) ....................................................................... [10.50.01], [10.50.340]
Howell v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (No 1) [1996] NSWSC 179 ............. [10.50.240]
Howell v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (No 2) (unreported, NSW
Supreme Court, Newman J, 7 May 1998) ......................................................................... [10.50.240]
Howson v The Queen (2007) 210 FLR 288; [2007] WASCA 83 ...................... [12.20.120], [12.20.125]
Hudd v The Queen (1987) 75 ALR 143 ....................................................................................... [4.0.370]
Hudson v Howes [2010] NSWSC 1503 ........................................................................................ [6.15.40]
Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] VSC
14 ................................................................................................................................. [5.0.20], [5.15.200]
Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (2014) 42 VR 236;
[2014] VSCA 3 .......................................................................................................................... [5.15.200]
Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd [2014] VSCA 78 ..... [5.15.200]
567 ........................................................................................... [1.0.30], [5.0.150], [5.15.200], [5.15.500]
622 .............................................................................................................................................. [5.15.200]
Hughes v Rogers (1841) 8 M & W 123; 151 ER 975 .............................................................. [12.15.160]
Hull Pty Ltd v Thompson [2001] NSWCA 359 .......................................................................... [4.0.160]
Hunt v Gormley [2019] IEHC 316 ................................................................................................ [4.0.450]
Hurst v The Queen [1995] 1 Cr App R 82 .................................................................................. [2.15.10]
Huseyin v Qantas Airways [2010] NSWSC 372 ...................................................... [6.20.120], [9.0.120]
Hussein v William Hill Group [2004] EWHC 208 ........................ [8.05.280], [10.45.140], [10.45.160],
[10.45.490], [10.45.510], [10.45.800]
Huysse v Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority [1975] 1 NSWLR 401 ................. [10.45.400]
IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 ........ [1.0.01], [2.35.85], [3.0.157], [3.0.165],
[3.0.170], [12.05.30]
ITC Film Distributors Ltd v Video Exchange Ltd [1982] Ch 413 ........................................... [2.35.40]
Ibn-Tamas v United States 407 A 2d 626 (1979) ................................................ [10.30.100], [10.30.220]
xlvii
Expert Evidence
Ibrahim v The King [1914] AC 599 .............................................................................................. [2.35.40]

Ibrahim v The Queen [2014] EWCA Crim 121 ......................................................................... [7.10.230]
Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [1999] NSWSC 828 .................... [2.0.65], [2.05.150],
[2.10.140], [3.0.30]
Igloo Regeneration (General Partner) v Powell Williams Partnership [2013] EWHC
1718 .......................................................................................................................................... [17.10.160]
Illawarra Hotel Company Pty Ltd v Walton Construction Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 6 ..... [6.10.280]
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Minister for v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 ......................... [7.10.170]
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Minister for v SBAA [2002] FCAFC 195 ........... [11.20.160]
Imperial Group plc v Philip Morris Ltd [1984] RPC 293 .................................... [11.0.490], [11.0.630]
In the Review of HL (1997) 2 MHRBD (Vic) 485 ..................................................................... [10.45.40]
Independent Muti-Funds Inc v The Bank of Nova Scotia [2004] OJ No 340 ....................... [16.0.60]
Information Clearing House Inc v Find Magazine 492 F Supp 147 ....................................... [11.0.40]
Ingles v The Queen (unreported, Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal, 4 May 1993) ...... [3.0.90],
[4.0.390], [10.20.210], [10.30.490], [12.05.300]
Ingram v Macari [1983] SLT 61 ................................................................................................... [2.25.100]
Instant Colour Pty Ltd v Canon Australia Pty Ltd [1995] FCA 870 .............. [5.10.140], [16.05.160],
[16.05.440]
Integer Computing Pty Ltd v Facom Australia Ltd (unreported, Victorian Supreme
Court, 10 April 1987) ................................................................................................................ [6.10.01]
Interchase Corp Ltd (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd (No 1) [1999] 1 Qd R 141 .... [5.10.140],
[5.10.200]
Interlego v Croner Trading (1992) 111 ALR 577 ................................. [2.15.400], [11.0.490], [11.0.630]
Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1991) 102 ALR 379 ............. [11.0.01], [11.0.490], [11.0.630]
Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1992) 111 ALR 577 ................................ [2.25.100], [11.0.01]
International Fund for Animal Welfare (Australia) Pty Ltd and Minister for
Environment and Heritage, Re (2006) 42 AAR 262; [2006] AATA 94 ............................ [6.20.200]
Investmentsource v Knox Street Apartments [2007] NSWSC 1128 ....................... [3.0.155], [5.05.10]
Irani v The Queen (2008) 188 A Crim R 125; [2008] NSWCCA 217 ................... [2.05.270], [3.0.165],
[10.15.140], [10.15.160], [13.0.280]
Ireland v Taylor [1949] 1 KB 300 ................................................................................................ [2.25.260]
Irish & Michelle [2009] FamCA 66 ........................................................................................... [10.30.850]
Irving v Penguin Books Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1197 .............................................................. [11.05.40]
Irwin v Irwin [2016] FCA 1565 ...................................................................................................... [6.10.70]
Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire Ministries Inc [2004] VCAT 2510 ................. [11.05.40]
Italform Pty Ltd v Sangain Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 427 ........................................................ [6.10.310]
J v C [1970] AC 668 ........................................................................................................................... [4.0.40]

J v The Queen (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 .......... [2.05.310], [2.10.140], [7.05.180], [10.0.40], [10.0.120],
[12.05.300]
J, Re [1990] FCR 193 ...................................................................................................................... [5.15.500]
JAT v The Queen (1998) 103 A Crim R 345 ............................................................................ [10.20.220]
JMVB Enterprises Pty Ltd v Camoflag Pty Ltd (2005) 67 IPR 68; [2005] FCA 1474 ........... [18.0.80]
JS (a minor), Re [1980] 1 All ER 1061 ........................................................................................ [12.25.01]
JTT, Re; Ex parte Victoria Legal Aid (1998) 195 CLR 184; [1998] HCA 44 .......................... [5.15.200]
JW v VW [1990] 2 IR 437 .................................................................................................................. [4.0.40]
Jackson v The Queen (1962) 108 CLR 591 ....................... [2.15.170], [2.20.480], [10.0.240], [10.0.360]
Jackson [1996] 2 Cr App R 420 .................................................................................................... [2.20.200]
Jacobs v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2015 (1) SA 139 ................................................................ [7.0.170]
Jadurin v The Queen (1982) 7 A Crim R 182 .............................................................................. [7.10.80]
Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 ....................................................................................... [10.45.340]
Jago v District Court of NSW (1989) 168 CLR 23 .................................................................... [11.0.180]
James v Keogh [2008] SASC 156 .............................................................................. [8.05.180], [8.05.280]
James v Medical Board (SA) (2006) 95 SASR 445; [2006] SASC 267 .................. [8.05.01], [8.05.180],
[8.05.280]
James Hardie & Co v Hall (1998) 43 NSWLR 554 ................................................................... [2.15.560]
Jameson v Drinkald (1826) 12 Moore CP 148 ........................................................................... [2.25.260]
Jamieson v The Queen (1992) 60 A Crim R 68 ......................................................................... [2.10.140]
Jan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 100 .......................... [11.20.160]
Jango v Northern Territory (2006) 152 FCR 150; [2006] FCA 318 ......................................... [11.10.01]
Jango v Northern Territory (No 2) [2004] FCA 1004 ....... [2.35.150], [3.0.150], [11.10.01], [11.10.80],
[11.10.160], [11.10.240]
Jango v Northern Territory (No 4) (2004) 214 ALR 608; [2004] FCA 1539 ........................ [11.05.240]
Jango v Northern Territory of Australia [2006] FCA 318 ....................................................... [11.10.40]
xlviii
Table of Cases
Jarrett v The Queen (1994) 73 A Crim R 160 .......................................... [4.0.40], [12.0.100], [12.0.420]
Jeans v Cleary [2006] NSWSC 647 ............................................................................................ [12.15.240]
Jeffrey v The Queen (1991) 60 A Crim R 384 ............................................................................ [2.20.200]
Jenkins v United States 307 F 2d 637 (1962) ............................................................................... [10.0.85]
Jermen v Shell Co of Australia Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1106 ......................................................... [5.05.10]
Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23 ............................................................................................... [10.30.100]
Jines v Greyhound Corp 210 NE 2d 562 (1965) .................................................... [7.05.180], [12.0.300]
Joam v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 107 ....................... [11.20.160]
John v Henderson (No 1) [2013] NSWSC 1435 ....................................................... [6.15.120], [6.20.20]
Johnson v Johnson (unreported, Full Court of the Family Court of Australia, 7 July
1997) ......................................................................................................................................... [10.30.850]
Johnson v Johnson 701 F Supp 1363 ........................................................................................ [10.30.670]
Johnson v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co [1998] OJ No 3139 ...................... [8.0.340]
Johnson v State 393 So 2d 1069 ................................................................................................... [10.15.90]
Johnson & Johnson Australia Pty Ltd v Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (1991) 101
ALR 700 ................................................................................................. [11.0.01], [11.0.390], [11.0.470]
Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation, Re 758 F Supp 199 ................... [12.0.200],
[12.25.170]
Jones v Bartlett (2000) 205 CLR 166; [2000] HCA 56 ................................................................. [17.0.80]
Jones v Bradley [2003] NSWCA 81 ............................................................................................... [4.0.200]
Jones v Davies & Sons Ltd [1914] 2 KB 549 ............................................................................... [5.20.10]
Jones v Eagle Ford Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1084 ....................................................................... [9.0.120]
Jones v Hyde (1989) 63 ALJR 349 ................................................................................................. [4.0.360]
Jones v Kaney [2010] EWHC 610 .................................................................................................. [8.0.230]
Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] UKSC 13 ...... [1.0.01], [1.0.10], [2.0.03], [2.05.10], [5.15.400],
[6.15.280], [6.20.280], [7.05.520], [8.0.01], [8.0.40], [8.0.230], [8.0.300]
Jones v McKenzie (1859) 13 Moo PC 1 .......................................................................................... [2.0.05]
Jones v Multiple Sclerosis Society [1996] 1 VR 499 ............................. [2.05.110], [2.05.490], [7.0.450]
Jones v Scully (2002) 120 FCR 243; [2002] FCA 1080 .............................................................. [11.05.80]
Jones v Skelton [1963] SR (NSW) 644 ........................................................................................ [2.15.400]
Jongen v CSR Ltd [1992] Aust Torts Reports 61,706 ............................................................. [16.05.280]
Joseph Crosfield & Sons Ltd v Techno-Chemical Laboratories Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 378 .... [2.15.460],
[2.25.01], [2.25.40], [2.25.260], [7.05.180]
Joseph E Seagram & Sons Ltd v Seagram Real Estate Ltd (1990) 33 CPR (3d) 454 .......... [11.0.630]
Jovanovic v Woods [2001] TASSC 96 ........................................................................................... [8.0.420]
Joyce v Yeomans [1981] 1 WLR 549 ............................................................................................. [4.0.360]
Joyce-Courch v De Silva 602 NE 2d 286 (Ohio 1991) ........................................................... [10.20.230]
Judd v Amaca Pty Ltd [2003] NSWDDT 12 ........................................................ [12.0.200], [12.25.170]
Juli v The Queen (1990) 50 A Crim R 31 ..................................................................................... [7.10.80]
Julie Dawn Rhodes v Christine Elizabeth Fletcher & Quasar Professionals ACT Pty
Ltd [2000] NSWSC 797 ........................................................................................................... [6.10.170]
Jumbunna Coalmine NL v Victorian Coal Miners Association (1908) 6 CLR 309 ............. [7.10.170]
K v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 157 ................................................................. [4.0.160], [4.0.240]

K (Infants), Re [1963] Ch 381 ....................................................................................................... [2.15.460]
KM v HM (1992) 96 DLR (4th) 291 ................................................ [10.30.480], [10.30.670], [10.45.520]
KMJ v Tasmania (2011) 20 Tas R 425; [2011] TASCCA 7 .......................................................... [3.0.165]
Kabadanis v Panagiotou (1980) 30 ALR 374 ............................................................................... [4.0.370]
Kadam v MiiResorts Group 1 Pty Ltd (No 4) (2017) 252 FCR 298; [2017] FCA 1139 ........ [6.10.01],
[6.10.70]
Kafcar v Police [2011] SASC 162 ................................................................................................. [2.30.300]
Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd [2013] HCA 25 .................................................................. [7.10.230]
Kantor v Vosahlo [2004] VSCA 235 .......................................................................................... [10.25.200]
Karen B v Clyde M 574 NYS 2d 267 ........................................................................................ [10.30.850]
Karling v Purdue [2004] Scots SC 221 ............................................................................ [8.0.40], [8.0.80]
Karout v Stratton (2007) 180 A Crim R 154; [2007] NSWSC 1034 ...................................... [13.05.260]
Katanas v Transport Accident Commission [2016] VSCA 140 .................................................. [3.0.30]
Kavanagh v The Queen [2011] VSCA 234 ................................................................................. [7.10.265]
Keenan and Repatriation Commission [2000] AATA 707 ....................................................... [6.20.160]
Keir v The Queen (2002) 127 A Crim R 198; [2002] NSWCCA 30 ................. [12.20.300], [12.20.370]
Kelleher v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 534 ............................................................................... [10.15.40]
Keller v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 204 ................................................................................. [13.0.160]
Kelly v Fletcher (unreported, Full Court of the WA Supreme Court, Library No
970535, 22 October 1997) ...................................................................................................... [16.05.280]
xlix
Expert Evidence
Kelly v London Transport Executive [1982] 2 All ER 842 ........................................................ [5.0.150]

Kelly v Western Australian Planning Commission [2006] WASC 208 ................................. [16.0.130]
Kennard v Ashman (1894) 10 TLR 213 .......................................................................................... [6.0.40]
Kennedy v Hamill (p/a Gerry Hamill, Chartered Architect) [2005] NIQB 23 ................... [17.05.40]
Kennedy v Wallace (2004) 142 FCR 185; [2004] FCAFC 337 ................................................. [15.0.360]
Kenny & Good Pty Ltd v MGICA (1992) Ltd (1999) 199 CLR 413; [1999] HCA 25 ......... [16.0.130]
Kentish and Telstra Corporation Ltd [1999] AATA 661 ............................................................ [9.0.160]
Kern v Pullen 138 Or 222; 6 P2d 224; 82 ALR 434 (1931) ...................................................... [2.20.400]
Kerr v Kennedy [1942] 1 KB 409 ................................................................................................ [2.15.460]
Kerry v State Transport Authority (1985) 38 SASR 502 .......................................................... [16.0.120]
Kesavarajah v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 230 ............................ [10.10.120], [10.10.360], [10.10.530]
Kettle Chip Co v Apand (1993) 119 ALR 156 .......................................................... [11.0.01], [11.0.630]
Kheir v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 308; [2014] VSCA 200 ................................. [10.15.130], [10.15.140]
Kian v Mirro Aluminium Co 88 FRD 351 ................................................................................... [6.0.160]
Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460 .................................................................................. [10.30.490]
Kilpatrick v Commonwealth (1985) 9 FCR 36 .......................................................................... [2.15.460]
Kiltie v The Queen (1974) 9 SASR 452 ...................................................................................... [7.10.250]
Kimberly-Clark Australia Pty Ltd v Multigate Medical Products Pty Ltd (2011) 92 IPR
21; [2011] FCAFC 86 .................................................................................................................. [18.0.80]
King v Brandywine Reinsurance Company (UK) Ltd [2005] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 665; [2005]
EWCA Civ 235 ........................................................................................................................... [15.0.40]
King v Great Lakes Shire Council (1986) 58 LGRA 366 ......................................................... [2.20.120]
King v Thomas McKenna Ltd [1991] 1 All ER 653 ................................................................. [6.10.320]
King-Seeley Thermos Co v Aladdin Industries Inc 321 F 2d 577 ......................................... [11.0.610]
Kirch Communications Pty Ltd v Gene Engineering Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 485 .......... [2.05.150],
[2.05.350], [2.35.460], [5.05.10], [16.05.700]
Klemenko v Huffa (1978) 17 SASR 549 ..................................................................................... [10.05.90]
Klimoski v Water Authority (WA) (1989) 5 SR (WA) 148 ........................................................ [10.0.80]
Kline v State 444 So 2d 1102 (Fla App 1984) .............................................................................. [8.0.460]
Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd v Harvest Bakeries Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 129 ................... [11.0.01],
[11.0.70], [11.0.630]
Kluck v Borland 413 NW 2d 90 ............................................................................... [2.10.430], [10.0.460]
Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 ................................................................. [5.15.50]
Knight v The Queen (1992) 175 CLR 495 .................................................................................... [4.0.360]
Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd (2005) 222 CLR 44; [2005] HCA 15 ............. [9.0.120], [10.50.01],
[10.50.240], [10.50.340]
Kohai v The Queen [2015] 1 NZLR 833; [2015] NZSC 36 ......................................... [3.0.90], [3.05.90]
Kohn v Eimer 265 F 900 ................................................................................................................. [18.0.01]
Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672 ..................................................... [10.50.240]
Koning Willem II, The [1908] P 125 ............................................................................................. [6.05.60]
Kores v Franzi (1970) 17 FLR 445 ................................................................................................. [5.20.10]
Korgbara v The Queen (2007) 170 A Crim R 568; [2007] NSWCCA 84 ....... [10.15.130], [10.15.140],
[10.15.160], [12.05.180]
Kosciusko Thredbo Pty Ltd v Milson Projects Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Supreme
Court, McLelland J, 9 August 1990) ....................................................................................... [7.0.570]
Koushappis v Western Australia (2007) 168 A Crim R 51; [2007] WASCA 26 ................. [12.20.290]
Koutroumanis v TAC [2003] VCAT 439 ...................................................................................... [9.0.120]
Koutsouras v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (unreported, NSW Court of
Appeal, 28 November 1991) .................................................................................................... [2.35.40]
Kozomara v Hollows [2013] WASC 68 .................................................................................... [11.20.100]
Kozul v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 221; [1981] HCA 19 ................... [7.0.450], [12.10.80], [13.0.400]
Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC v Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc 735 F 3d 735
(7th Cir Ill 2013) ......................................................................................................................... [11.0.40]
Krcmar v Czech Republic (35376/97) [2000] ECHR 99; (2001) 31 EHRR 41 ...................... [6.05.220]
Krijestorac v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 35 ................................................................. [7.10.210]
Kumho Tire Co Ltd v Carmichael 526 US 137; 119 S Ct 1167 (1999) .... [1.0.01], [2.0.60], [2.10.635],
[3.10.02], [12.0.10], [12.10.280], [17.0.320]
Kyte-Powell v William Heinemann Ltd [1960] VR 425 .......................................................... [2.15.400]
L, Re [1997] AC 16 ............................................................................................................................. [5.0.50]

L, V, M and H (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 194 ................................................................... [10.30.850]
LCM v Western Australia (2016) 262 A Crim R 1; [2016] WASCA 164 ............................... [7.10.260]
LLMD of Michigan, Inc v Jackson-Cross Co 740 A 2d 186 (Pa 1999) ..................... [8.0.40], [8.0.300]
l
Table of Cases
LM v Crimes Compensation Tribunal (unreported, coram Ms A Coghlan, 2

September 1994) ..................................................................................................................... [10.30.230]
LM v Crimes Compensation Tribunal (No 2) (unreported, coram M Macnamara, 10
May 1995) ................................................................................................................................ [10.30.230]
La Roche and Repatriation Commission [2003] AATA 151 .................................................. [11.05.320]
Labatt Brewing Co v Molson Breweries (1996) 73 CPR (3d) 544 ......................... [11.0.60], [11.0.630]
Lakatoi Universal Pty Ltd v Walker [2000] NSWSC 633 ............................................................ [3.0.30]
Lakeman v Finlay (1959) 59 SR (NSW) 5 ................................................................................ [16.05.440]
Lancaster v The Queen (1991) 58 A Crim R 290 ..................................................... [7.10.80], [7.10.270]
Landall v Dennis Faulkner [1994] 5 Med LR 268 ...................................................................... [8.0.200]
Lane & Arthurs [2006] FamCA 87 ............................................................................................ [10.30.850]
Langbourne v State Rail Authority [2003] NSWSC 537 ........................................................... [5.05.10]
Langford v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 1 ..................................................................... [3.0.152], [3.0.165]
Langridge v Lynch (1876) 34 LT 695 ............................................................................................ [5.20.30]
Lansell House Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2010] FCA 329; ATC 20-173 ........... [2.15.460]
Lardil v Queensland [2000] FCA 1548 ................................................... [3.0.150], [11.10.01], [11.10.80]
Larrakia People v Northern Territory [2003] FCA 1175 ................................... [11.10.200], [11.10.260]
Latcha v The Queen (1998) 104 A Crim R 390 ........... [12.0.140], [12.05.220], [12.20.90], [12.20.290],
[12.20.370], [12.20.660], [12.20.670], [12.25.60]
Lattimore v The Queen (1975) 62 Cr App R 53 ......................................................................... [4.0.490]
Lavallee v The Queen [1990] 1 SCR 852; (1990) 55 CCC (3d) 97 ...................... [4.0.410], [10.30.100],
[10.30.490], [10.30.710]
Laverty v The Queen (No 2) (1979) 47 CCC (2d) 60 ................................................................ [4.0.420]
Lawless v The Queen (1979) 142 CLR 659 .................................................................................. [4.0.490]
Lawrence v Campbell [1859] Eng R 385; (1859) 4 Drew 485; 62 ER 186 ............................. [15.0.360]
Lawrence v Kempsey Shire Council (1995) 87 LGERA 49 ..................................................... [12.0.340]
Lawrence v The Queen (1980) 2 Cr App R 463 ......................................................................... [7.10.90]
Laws v ABT (1990) 64 ALJR 412 ................................................................................................. [11.0.200]
Lawson v Schumacher & Blum Chevrolet 687 SW 2d 947 (1985); 64 ALR 4th 109
(1985) ............................................................................................................................................ [7.0.450]
Lazard Bros v Midland Bank [1933] AC 289 ................................................................................ [15.0.1]
Lee v Everest (1857) 2 H & N 285; 157 ER 118 .......................................................................... [5.20.30]
Lee v Loudes Martinez (unreported, New Mexico, No CS2003-00026, Supreme Court
No 27,915, 25 August 2003) ................................................................................ [10.0.450], [10.0.460]
Lee v Loudes Martinez NMSC 27 (2004); 96 P3d 291; 2004 NM LEXIS 378 (2003) .......... [10.0.500]
Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594 .......................................................................................... [3.0.150]
Leech v Peters (1988) 40 A Crim R 350 ....................................................................................... [7.10.80]
Lego System Aktieselskab v Lego M Lemelstrich Ltd [1983] FSR 155 ............... [11.0.01], [11.0.390]
Leichhardt Municipal Council v Seatainer Terminals Pty Ltd (1981) 48 LGRA 409 .......... [16.0.01],
[16.0.80]
Leigh v The Queen (unreported, Tasmanian Supreme Court, 23 December 1991) ........... [2.20.200]
Leighton Contractors (SA) Pty Ltd v Hazama Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) 56 SASR 47 .... [6.10.70]
Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153 .................. [5.15.250]
Lenehan v Town of East Fremantle [2004] WATPAT 145 ..................................................... [11.05.280]
Leonardis v Sartas No 1 Pty Ltd (1996) 67 FCR 126 ................................................................. [18.0.80]
Levi Strauss & Co v Kimbyr Investments Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 332 ...................................... [11.0.630]
Levick v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 102 FCR 155; [2000] FCA 674 ............. [5.15.50]
Levine v Wiss & Co 478 A 2d 397 (NJ 1984) .............................................................................. [8.0.300]
Lewis v Port of London Authority (1914) 111 LT 776 ............................................................... [6.05.60]
Lewis v Sapio (1827) Mood & M 39; 173 ER 1073 ................................................................ [12.15.120]
Lewis v The Queen (1987) 29 A Crim R 267 ....... [2.35.90], [7.0.130], [9.05.01], [9.05.80], [12.0.100],
[16.05.240]
Li v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 281; [2003] NSWCCA 290 .................... [2.05.270], [12.05.440],
[13.0.280]
Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Ltd v S&P Global Inc [2018] FCA 379 ......................... [6.10.01]
Lincoln v Daniels [1962] 1 QB 237 .............................................................................. [8.0.120], [8.0.160]
Lincoln v R Co 23 Wend 425 ......................................................................................................... [2.25.01]
Linke v TT Builders Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 672 ............................................................................. [6.10.70]
Linter Group Ltd v Price Waterhouse (a firm) [1999] VSC 245 ......................... [5.10.140], [5.10.360]
Lipovac v Hamilton Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported, ACT Supreme Court, 13
September 1996) ......................................................... [2.0.40], [2.0.65], [2.25.01], [3.0.150], [7.0.370]
Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; [2011] HCA 36 ................ [3.0.10], [10.15.140]
Lithuanian Commerce Corp v Sara Lee Hosiery 179 FRD 450 (1998) ............................... [16.05.120]
Little v Kobos 877 P 2d 752 (Wyo 1994) ...................................................................................... [8.0.460]
Little, Ex parte [1909] St R Qd 83 ............................................................................................... [2.15.560]
Liverpool City Council v McGraw-Hill Financial, Inc [2018] FCA 1289 ............................... [6.10.01]
Liverpool Roman Catholic Archdiocese Trust v Goldberg [2001] EWHC Ch 396 ............ [2.35.460]
li
Expert Evidence
Liyanage v Western Australia (2017) 51 WAR 359; [2017] WASCA 112 .......... [2.10.140], [2.15.170],
[10.0.240], [10.30.50], [10.30.100], [10.30.240], [12.05.30]
Liyanage v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 112 ................................................................ [10.30.100]
Llanover, The (1945) 78 LlL Rep 461 ............................................................................................ [6.05.60]
Lloyd v Guibert (1865) LR 1 QB 115; 122 ER 1134 .................................................................. [2.15.560]
Lloyd Cheynham & Co Ltd v Littlejohn & Co [1987] BCLC 303 ....................................... [16.05.120]
London Underground Ltd v Kenchington Ford plc (1998) 63 Con LR 1 .............................. [17.0.80]
London and North-East Railway v Berriman [1946] AC 278 ................................................ [2.15.460]
Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79 ............................................................................... [10.15.40]
Looney v Bank of Ireland [1996] 1 IR 157 .................................................................... [8.0.80], [8.0.160]
Lord Abinger v Ashton (1873) 17 LR Eq 358 .............................................................................. [8.0.460]
Louizos v The Queen (2009) 194 A Crim R 223; [2009] NSWCCA 71 ................................... [3.0.165]
Louth v Diprose (1992) 110 ALR 1 ............................................................................................... [4.0.360]
Lovatt v Tribe (1862) 3 F & F 9; 176 ER 5 .................................................................. [2.25.260], [4.0.40]
Love v Acuity Investment Management Inc (2009) 74 CCEL (3d) 272 ................. [16.0.20], [16.0.60]
Loveday v Renton [1990] 1 MLR 1 ........................................................................................... [12.25.170]
Lovell and Christmas Ltd v Wall (1911) 104 LT 85 ................................................................. [2.15.460]
Lower v Stasiuk (2013) 367 DLR (4th) 241 ................................................................................ [5.15.150]
Lowery v The Queen [1974] AC 85 .................................................. [10.0.340], [10.35.120], [10.35.200]
Lualemana v Brown (1958) 3 ASR 348 ...................................................................................... [2.30.120]
Luc Liet Thuan v The Queen [1996] 2 All ER 1033 ............................................................... [10.30.100]
Lucas v Beale (1851) 10 CB 739; 138 ER 292 ............................................................................... [5.20.20]
Lucas v The Queen (1970) 120 CLR 171 .................................................................................... [10.25.80]
Lucas v The Queen [1992] 2 VR 109 .......................................................................................... [12.0.100]
Luder v Luder (1963) 4 FLR 292 ................................................................................................. [15.0.160]
Lundy v The Queen [2014] 2 NZLR 273; [2013] UKPC 28 ................................. [2.10.720], [3.05.120]
Lundy v The Queen [2018] NZCA 410; [2013] UKPC 28; [2014] 2 NZLR 273 ...................... [1.0.01],
[2.10.720], [12.05.30]
Lundy v The Queen [2019] NZSC 45 ......................................................................................... [2.10.720]
Lustgarten, In Re 629 SE 2d 886 (NC Ct App 2006) ............................................................... [8.05.140]
Lynch v Knight (1861) 9 HL Cas 577; 11 ER 854 ................................................................... [10.45.340]
M v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 487 .......................................................................................... [2.30.120]

M (A Minor) v Newham London Borough Council [1995] 2 AC 633 .................. [8.0.200], [8.0.220]
M (CA23/2009) v The Queen [2011] NZCA 191 ......................................................... [3.0.90], [3.05.90]
M and R (Minors), Re [1996] 4 All ER 239 .................................................................. [2.0.30], [2.25.40]
MB v Protective Commissioner (2000) 50 NSWLR 24; [2000] NSWSC 717 ....................... [2.15.600],
[16.05.120]
MCC Proceeds Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust Plc (No 4) [1999] CLC 417 ................. [15.0.40]
MWJ v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; [2005] HCA 74 ........................................................... [7.05.10]
Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 .......................................................................... [11.10.01]
MacIndoe v Parbery [1994] Aust Torts Reports 61,535 ........................................................... [2.15.600]
MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512 ........................................................................ [10.05.90]
Maccallum of Havelock North Broadcaster Television New Zealand Ltd, Re [2001]
NZBSA 71 ................................................................................................................................ [11.05.160]
Macguire v Macguire [2018] FamCA 750 .................................................................................. [2.30.120]
Mackay Sugar Co-operative Association Ltd v CSR Ltd (1996) 137 ALR 183 ................... [5.10.360]
Mackley v Chillingworth (1877) 2 CPD 273 ............................................................................... [5.20.10]
Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney Local Health District [2013]
NSWSC 970 ............................................................................................................ [5.15.200], [5.15.500]
Macteldir Pty Ltd v Roskov [2007] FCAFC 49 ........................................................................... [5.15.50]
Maddalena v CSR Ltd [2004] WASCA 231 ............................................................................. [10.45.340]
Magellan Petroleum Australia Ltd v Sagasco Amadeus Pty Ltd (1993) 25 IPR 455 ......... [5.10.360]
Magna Charta, The (1871) 1 Asp MLC 153 ............................................................... [6.05.40], [6.05.60]
Mahomed v Shaik (1978) 4 SA 523 ............................................................................................. [2.05.540]
Maile v Mann (1848) 2 Exch 608; 154 ER 634 ............................................................................. [5.20.30]
Mainwaring v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 207 ................................................................... [12.10.390]
Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 ........... [1.0.01],
[2.0.07], [2.0.65], [3.0.150], [4.0.490], [5.0.110], [16.0.40], [16.05.440], [16.05.480], [17.0.80], [17.0.240]
Mallard v The Queen (2003) 28 WAR 1; [2003] WASCA 296 ............. [4.0.410], [4.0.490], [10.0.460],
[12.05.01], [12.05.10], [12.05.140]
Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] Ch 334 .............................................. [13.05.260]
Malone v Smith (1945) 63 WN (NSW) 54 .............................................................. [2.15.460], [2.30.120]
Maloney v Wake Hospital Systems 262 SE 2d 680 (1980) ........................................................ [9.10.40]
lii
Table of Cases
Malott v The Queen (1998) 155 DLR (4th) 513 ................................................. [10.30.100], [10.30.240]
Mamado v Fridson 2016 ONSC 4080 ........................................................................................... [7.0.170]
Mamarika v The Queen (1982) 5 A Crim R 354 ......................................................................... [7.10.80]
Manado (on behalf of the Bindunbur Native Title Claim Group) v Western Australia
[2017] FCA 1367 ....................................................................................................................... [11.10.01]
Manakee v Brattle [1970] 1 WLR 1607 ......................................................................................... [5.20.10]
Manenti v Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR 115 ......................... [2.35.40]
Manko v United States 636 F Supp 1419 (1986) ................................................. [12.0.200], [12.25.170]
Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; [1999] HCA 66 ............................................... [5.10.100], [5.10.180]
Mann v O’Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204 ............................................................................................ [8.0.420]
Marcalus Manufacturing Co v Watson 156 F Supp 161 ........................................................... [11.0.80]
March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506 ........................................................... [9.0.40]
Marchesano v The Queen (2000) 116 A Crim R 237; [2000] WASCA 225 ............................. [13.0.80]
Marinovich v The Queen (1990) 46 A Crim R 282 ........... [2.15.460], [2.20.160], [2.20.280], [13.0.80]
Maritime Services Board of NSW v Australian Shipping Commission (1991) 27
NSWLR 258 ............................................................................................................................... [6.10.280]
Markman v Westview Instruments Inc 517 US 370 (1996) ...................................................... [18.0.01]
Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 38 ACSR 404 .............. [2.15.600]
Marquis Camden v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1914] 1 KB 641 ................................ [2.15.460]
Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 234 ............................................................................... [8.0.40], [8.0.120]
Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 528 ............................................. [8.0.40], [8.0.120], [8.0.200], [8.0.460]
Marshall v Osborne 571 NE 2d 492 (1991) ............................................................................... [2.20.520]
Martin v Crimes Compensation Tribunal (1994) 8 VAR 39 ................................................... [10.45.01]
Martin v Department of Transport, Energy Infrastructure (2010) 269 LSJS 403 ................ [2.30.300]
Martin v Johnston (1858) 1 F & F 122; 175 ER 654 .................................................................. [2.25.260]
Martin v Martin [2018] EWCA Civ 2866 ....................................................................................... [1.0.20]
Martin v McDonald’s Corp 572 NE 2d 1073 (1991) .................................................................. [2.15.60]
Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v Ann Arbor School District
Board 473 F Supp 1371 (ED Mich 1979) .............................................................................. [11.20.40]
Martinez v Lewis 969 P 2d 213 (Colo 1998) ............................................................................... [8.0.300]
Martinez v State 549 So 2d 694 (Fla 1989) .............................................................................. [12.20.580]
Mary D v John D 264 Cal Rptr 633 .......................................................................................... [10.30.670]
Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58 ................................................. [10.25.180], [10.30.100]
Masolatti v The Queen (1976) 14 SASR 124 ............................................................................. [7.10.250]
Mason-Stuart v The Queen (1993) 61 SASR 204 ...................................................................... [7.10.250]
Mateu v Hagen (King County Superior Court ...................................................................... [10.20.230]
Matheson v The Queen [1958] 1 WLR 474 ................................................................................. [4.0.120]
Mathias v Canada 2001 FCT 480 ............................................................................................... [11.20.200]
Mattco Forge Inc v Arthur Young & Co 6 Cal Rptr 2d 781 (Cal Ct App 1992) ................... [8.0.300]
Matthews v AusNet Electricity Services Pty Ltd (Ruling No 40) [2015] VSC 131 .............. [6.10.01]
Matthews v AusNet Electricity Services Pty Ltd (Ruling No 44) [2016] VSC 732 .............. [6.10.01]
Matthews v Collins (t/a Herbert Collins & Sons) [2013] EWHC 2952 ............................... [17.0.280]
Matthews v SPI Electricity (No 19) [2013] VSC 180 .................................................................. [6.10.70]
Matthews v SPI Electricity (No 32) [2013] VSC 630 ................................................................ [6.05.220]
Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 10) [2012] VSC 379 ................................................. [6.15.120]
Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 2) [2013] VSC 86 ..................................................... [5.15.200]
Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 3) [2013] VSC 116 ................................................... [5.15.200]
Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 38) [2014] VSC 102 ...................................... [2.20.22]
Mattioli v Parker (No 2) [1973] Qd R 499 ....... [2.05.110], [2.05.450], [2.05.490], [2.10.140], [14.0.40]
Maudsley v Proprietors of Strata Plan Number 39794 (2002) 24 NSWCCR 101; [2002]
NSWCA 244 .................................................................................................................................. [2.0.07]
Maurer & Van Laren [2012] FamCA 8 ..................................................................................... [10.30.900]
Max Cooper & Sons Pty Ltd v City of Sydney (1980) 54 ALJR 234 .................................... [2.15.460]
Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501 ............................................................................. [10.25.120]
Mayaseva v Hale 118 F 3d 1371 ................................................................................................ [16.05.120]
Maybery v Mansfield (1846) 9 QB 754; 115 ER 1465 ................................................................. [5.20.30]
Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634 .......................... [4.0.360]
Mazinski v Bakka (1979) 20 SASR 350 ......................................................................................... [2.35.40]
McAllister v Richmond Brewing Co (NSW) Pty Ltd (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 187 .................. [2.05.490]
McAlpin v McAlpin (1993) 114 FLR 452 ................................................................................... [5.15.200]
McBeath v Sheldon [1990] ACLD 596 ........................................................................................ [6.10.310]
McDermott v Director of Mental Health; Ex parte A-G (Qld) (2007) 175 A Crim R
461; [2007] QCA 51 ................................................................................................................ [10.25.120]
McDermott v The King (1948) 76 CLR 501 ............................................................................... [10.05.90]
McDonald’s System (Aust) Pty Ltd v McWilliam’s Wines Pty Ltd (No 2) (1979) 41
FLR 436 ................................................................................................................... [11.0.120], [11.0.450]
McFadden v Murdock (1867) 1 ICLR 211 ................................................................................. [2.05.430]
liii
Expert Evidence
McFarlane v McFarlane: [2006] 1 FLR 118; [2006] UKHL 24 ..................................................... [1.0.20]

McFarlane v Western Australia [2002] WADC 5 ........................................................................ [5.0.110]
McGhee v The Queen (unreported, Tasmanian Supreme Court, 17 March 1994) ............. [13.0.400]
McGowan v Belling & Co [1983] SLT 77 ..................................................................................... [2.20.60]
McGraddie v McGraddie [2009] ScotCS CSOH 142 ................................................................ [7.10.230]
McHugh v Australian Jockey Club Ltd (No 9) [2011] FCA 1138 .......................................... [6.15.360]
McIlkenny v The Queen (1991) 93 Cr App R 287 ..................................................................... [4.0.490]
McKay v Commissioner of Main Roads (No 7) [2011] WASC 223 ..................... [16.0.01], [16.0.130]
McKay v Page (1971) 2 SASR 117 ................................................................................................. [14.0.40]
McKenzie v Lichter [2005] VSC 61 ........................................................................................... [10.45.800]
McKie v Strathclyde Joint Police Board [2003] Scot CS 353 .................................................... [8.0.260]
McLaughlin v City Bank of Sydney (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 491 ................................................. [5.20.10]
McLean v Commonwealth (1996) 41 NSWLR 389 ........................................... [10.45.400], [10.45.420]
McLean v Commonwealth (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 28 February 1997) ........ [10.45.01],
[10.45.170], [10.45.190], [10.45.420], [10.45.800]
McLean v Commonwealth (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 28 June 1996) ............... [10.45.420]
McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410 .................................................................................. [10.45.340]
McMillan v The Queen (1975) 23 CCC (2d) 160; 7 OR (2d) 750 ......................................... [10.35.200]
McMullen v Clancy [1999] IEHC 252 ............................................................................................ [8.0.40]
McMullen v Farrell [1993] 1 IR 123 ........................................................................... [2.05.450], [2.25.40]
McNamara v Owners of SS Hatteras [1933] IR 675 ................................................................ [15.0.320]
McNeill v Appel 197 A 2d 152 (Col 1964) ................................................................................... [5.20.60]
McQuaker v Goddard [1940] 1 KB 687 ..................................................................................... [2.30.120]
McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2005] Scot CS SCOH 69 ............. [12.0.200], [12.0.260], [12.25.170]
Meadow v General Medical Council [2006] 1 WLR 1452; [2006] EWHC 146 ...... [8.0.80], [8.0.120],
[8.0.200], [8.05.180]
Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462; [2006] EWCA Civ 1390 ...... [1.0.01], [8.0.230],
[8.05.01], [8.05.100], [8.05.280]
Medcalf v Mardell [2003] 1 AC 120 ............................................................................. [5.15.50], [8.0.230]
Medcalf v Weatherill [2003] AC 120; [2002] UKHL 27 ............................................................. [5.15.50]
Medina v California 120 L Ed 2d 353 ...................................................................................... [10.10.320]
Medina v The Queen (1990) 3 WAR 21 ................................................................................... [12.15.280]
Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission (1995) 182 CLR 1 .................................. [9.0.40]
Meehan v HM Advocate [1970] JC 11 ...................................................... [2.15.10], [2.25.01], [10.0.430]
Meer Houssain, Ex parte (1899) 15 WN (NSW) 286 ............................................................... [2.30.120]
Mehesz v Redman (No 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244 ........................................................................ [12.0.420]
Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1; [1991] HCA 32 .................................................. [10.0.330]
Melhuish v Morris [1938] 4 All ER 98 ....................................................................................... [12.0.420]
Mellin v Monico (1877) 3 CP 142 .................................................................................................... [6.0.40]
Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [1998] FCA 1606 ............ [11.10.01],
[11.10.40], [11.10.80]
Menday v Protea Assurance Co (Pty) Ltd 1976 (1) SA 565 ..................................................... [2.05.30]
Menday v Protea Assurance Co Ltd (1976) 1 SA 565 ............................................................. [2.20.400]
Mengiste v Endowment Fund for Rehabilitation of Tigray [2013] EWHC 1087 ............... [5.15.100]
Mengiste v Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray [2013] EWHC 598 .......... [5.15.100]
Mengiste v Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray [2013] EWHC 599 .......... [5.15.100]
Mennen Co v Gillette Co 565 F Supp 648 ................................................................................. [11.0.630]
Meredith v Innes (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 104 .................................................................................. [7.0.570]
Metcalfe v Commonwealth [2006] VSC 105 ............................................................................. [10.45.40]
Micallef v The Queen (1990) 50 A Crim R 465 ......................................................................... [7.10.120]
Michael, Re; Ex parte Epic Energy (WA) Nominees Pty Ltd (2002) 25 WAR 511; [2002]
WASCA 231 ...................................................................................... [2.15.460], [2.25.330], [16.05.720]
Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259; [1989] HCA 35 .......................... [4.0.490], [12.10.240]
Mickelberg v The Queen (2004) 29 WAR 13; [2004] WASCA 145 ..................... [4.0.490], [12.10.240]
Middleton v The Queen (2000) 114 A Crim R 258; [2000] WASCA 213 ............ [2.05.310], [4.0.240],
[4.0.390], [9.0.280]
Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Hett Stubbs & Kemp [1979] 1 Ch 384 ............................... [16.05.360]
Miechel v The Queen (2010) 207 A Crim R 334; [2010] VSCA 225 .................................... [12.20.230]
Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 .......... [2.05.310], [2.20.280], [2.20.400], [2.25.330],
[4.0.390], [7.0.290], [11.10.01], [11.10.40], [11.10.80]
Miller v Appleton (1906) 50 Sol Jo 192 ........................................................................................ [5.20.30]
Miller v Miller [2006] 2 AC 618 ...................................................................................................... [1.0.20]
Miller v The Queen (2015) 252 A Crim R 486; [2015] NSWCCA 206 ................................ [10.15.130]
Miller v Universal City Studios 650 F 2d 1365 (5th Cir 1981) .................................................. [7.0.90]
Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd v Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd [1963] NSWR 737 .............. [7.05.180]
Mills v Western Australia (2008) 189 A Crim R 411; [2008] WASCA 219 ............................ [10.15.40]
Miln v Maher 1979 SLT (Notes) 10 ............................................................................................. [2.35.240]
liv
Table of Cases
Milne & Erleigh (1951) (1) SA 791 .................................................................................................. [6.0.01]

Milner v Australian Capital Territory (unreported, ACT Supreme Court, 15 December
1994) ............................................................................................................................................. [10.0.80]
Minnesota v Schwartz 447 NW 2d ............................................................................................. [2.35.410]
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Company v Tyco Electronics Pty Ltd [2002]
FCAFC 31 .................................................................................................................................. [18.0.120]
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company v Beiersdorf (Australia) Ltd (1980)
144 CLR 253 ................................................................................................................................ [18.0.80]
Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966) ....................................................................................... [10.05.50]
Mister Figgins Pty Ltd v Centrepoint Freeholds Pty Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 23 ........................ [2.35.40]
Mitchell v Forsyth 472 US 511 (1985) ........................................................... [8.0.40], [8.0.120], [8.0.300]
Mitchell v WS Kimpton & Sons Pty Ltd [1971] VR 583 ......................................................... [12.0.460]
Mitsubishi Electric Australia Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority (2002) 4 VR
332; [2002] VSCA 59 ................................................................................................................ [5.10.100]
Mizzi v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 659 ...................................................................................... [4.0.240]
Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Guina Developments Pty Ltd [1996] 2 VR 34 ........................... [5.10.360]
Mobil Oil Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks [1984] VR 25 ...................... [11.0.120], [11.0.450]
Moffa v The Queen (1977) 138 CLR 601 ............................................................. [10.25.180], [10.30.100]
Mohajer v Virginia (unreported, Virginia Court of Appeals, 15 April 2003) ........................ [9.10.80]
Mokbel v The Queen (2013) 40 VR 625; [2013] VSCA 118 ..................................................... [15.0.200]
Molamphy v Nenagh Co-Operative Creamery Ltd (1952) 89 ILTR 159 .................................. [4.0.40]
Money Max Int Pty Ltd (Trustee) v QBE Insurance Group Ltd [2018] FCA 1030 .............. [6.10.01]
Montecatini’s Patent, Re (1973) 47 ALJR 161 ..................................................... [16.05.160], [16.05.440]
Montgomerie v United Kingdom Steamship Association [1891] 1 QB 370 .......................... [5.20.20]
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] 1 AC 14; [2015] UKSC 11 .......................... [8.0.01]
Montoya v Bebensee 761 P 2d 285 (1988) ............................................................................... [10.20.230]
Mood Music Publishing Co Ltd v De Woolfe Ltd [1976] 1 Ch 119 ....................................... [2.35.40]
Mooloolaba Slipways Pty Ltd v Cashlaw Pty Ltd [2011] QSC 236 .................................... [16.05.560]
Moore v Guardianship and Administration Board [1990] VR 902 ........................................... [2.0.40]
Moore v Medley (The Times, 3 February 1995) ....................................................................... [2.05.200]
Moreshead v Police [1999] SASC 162 ......................................................................................... [12.10.40]
Morgan v Attorney-General (1986) 24 A Crim R 342 ............................................................. [2.15.200]
Morgan v Attorney-General [1987] 2 Qd R 627 ...................................................... [4.0.430], [13.0.200]
Morgan v Tame (2000) 49 NSWLR 21 ................................................................... [10.45.01], [10.45.490]
Morgan v The Queen (2011) 215 A Crim R 33; [2011] NSWCCA 257 ................................ [12.05.442]
Morocz v Marshman [2015] NSWSC 149 ...................................................................................... [9.0.01]
Morocz v Marshman [2016] NSWSCA 202 ................................................................................... [9.0.01]
Moroney v Zegers [2018] VSC 446 ............................................................................................... [6.0.100]
Moses v Barton [2008] FamCA 590 ............................................................................................. [11.15.01]
Moses v Western Australia (2007) 160 FCR 148; [2007] FCAFC 78 ...................................... [11.10.01]
Moss v Baines [1974] WAR 7 ....................................................................................................... [12.0.140]
Mostyn v Mostyn (1870) 5 Ch App 457 ...................................................................................... [5.20.30]
Mothercare UK Ltd v Penguin Books Ltd [1988] RPC 113 ................................. [11.0.570], [11.0.630]
Moultrie v Martin 690 F 2d 1078 .................................................................................................. [11.0.80]
Mount Isa Mines Ltd v Pusey (1971) 125 CLR 383 ............................................................... [10.45.340]
Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission (2004) 29 WAR
273; [2004] WASCA 149 ............................................................................................................ [16.0.01]
Mount Lawley Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission (2007) 34 WAR
499; [2007] WASCA 226 ......................................................................................... [16.0.01], [16.0.130]
Mouvement Laïque Québécois v Saguenay (City) [2015] 2 SCR 3 ....................................... [2.05.150]
Moylan v Nutrasweet Company [2000] NSWCA 337 ............................................................... [4.0.200]
Mraz v The Queen (1955) 93 CLR 493 ......................................................................................... [4.0.390]
Muir v Stewart [1938] SC 590 ........................................................................................................ [4.0.450]
Mukevski v State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 138 .................................................. [12.20.80]
Muldoon v The Queen (2008) 192 A Crim R 105; [2008] NSWCCA 315 .......... [13.0.315], [13.05.40]
Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39 ................................................ [7.10.250]
Mullis v State 282 SE 2d 334 (1981) ......................................................................................... [10.30.100]
Multicon Engineering Pty Ltd v Federal Airports Corp (unreported, NSW Court of
Appeal, CA 40220/96 CommD 55004/91, 15 October 1997 ............................................ [6.10.280]
Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v HSH Hotels (Australia) Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1069 ..... [6.10.310]
Munster v Lamb (1883) LR 11 QBD 588 ...................................................................................... [8.0.120]
Muoi Ly Principal: Chee Yoon Lai [1993] MRTA 1981 ............................................................ [11.15.01]
Murdoch v The Queen (1987) 37 A Crim R 118 ....................................................................... [11.0.220]
Murdoch v The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1 ............. [12.05.440], [12.05.450]
Murnaghan Bros v O’Maoldomhnaigh [1991] 1 IR 461 .............................................................. [4.0.40]
Murphy v AA Matthews 841 SW 2d 671 (Mo 1992) ................................................................. [8.0.300]
lv
Expert Evidence
Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 ............. [2.0.10], [2.05.110], [2.05.310], [2.15.30], [2.15.60],
[2.15.130], [2.15.160], [2.15.170], [2.20.160], [2.25.40], [3.0.30], [4.0.380], [4.0.410], [7.05.100],
[10.0.200], [10.0.240], [10.0.590], [10.30.480], [10.30.490], [10.30.710], [11.0.200], [11.0.220],
[11.20.80], [12.20.480]
Murphy v The Queen (1994) 625 ASR 121 .............................................................................. [12.10.380]
Murray on behalf of the Yilka Native Title Claimants v Western Australia (No 5)
[2016] FCA 752 ......................................................................................................................... [11.10.01]
Mushroom Makers Inc v RG Barry Corp 441 F Supp 1220 ..................................................... [11.0.40]
Mustac v Medical Board (WA) [2004] WASCA 156 ............................. [5.05.40], [8.05.180], [8.05.280]
Mutemeri v Cheesman [1998] 4 VR 484 .................................................................................... [2.30.120]
Myers v Director of Public Prosecutions [1965] AC 1001 ..................................... [2.20.200], [2.35.05]
Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282 .................................................................................. [5.15.200], [5.15.500]
N (a minor) (sexual abuse: video evidence), Re [1996] 4 All ER 225 ...................................... [2.0.30]
NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 7) (1999) 161 ALR 576; [1999] FCA 252 ........ [3.0.30]
NRMA Insurance Ltd v Tatt (1990) 94 FLR 339 ......................................................................... [4.0.470]
NSW Crime Commission v Ollis [2006] NSWSC 316 ............................................................... [8.0.460]
Naidu v Group 4 Securitas Pty Ltd (2005) 57 AILR 200-181; [2005] NSWSC 618 ............. [10.50.01]
Najjar v Haines (1991) 25 NSWLR 224 ........................................................................................ [6.10.90]
Napier v Ferguson (1879) 2 P & B 415 ...................................................................................... [2.20.400]
Narrier v Western Australia [2016] FCA 1519 ..................................................... [11.10.01], [11.20.200]
Nasrallah v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 188 ................................................... [10.15.130], [10.15.140]
National Hockey League v Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd (1992) 92 DLR (4th) 349 ...................... [11.0.60]
National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Espagne (1961) 105 CLR 569 ........................ [9.0.40]
National Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The Ikarian
Reefer) [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 379 .......................................................................................... [5.15.500]
National Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The Ikarian
Reefer) [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68 ............................................................................... [1.0.30], [8.05.90]
National Mutual Holdings Pty Ltd v Sentry Corp (1989) 22 FCR 209 .................. [15.0.1], [15.0.40],
[15.0.160]
Natuna Pty Ltd v Cook [2006] NSWSC 1367 ........................................................ [5.10.160], [5.10.360]
Naylor v Preston Area Health Authority [1987] 2 All ER 353 ................................................ [5.0.260]
Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305 .................................................... [7.10.60], [7.10.80], [7.10.110]
Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 331; [2005]
HCA 54 ..................................................................................................................... [15.0.40], [15.0.120]
Neill-Fraser v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 2 ................................................................................. [3.0.165]
Nekoosa Packaging Co v AMCA International Ltd (1994) 56 CPR (3d) 470 ..................... [17.0.120]
Nelson v Bridport (1845) 8 Beav 527; 50 ER 207 ...................................................... [15.0.1], [2.20.400]
Nelson v State 362 So 2d 1017 (Fla 1978) .................................................................................. [10.15.90]
Nelson Barbados Group Ltd v Cox 2008 CanLII 4265 ............................................................ [11.20.40]
Neowarra v Western Australia (2003) 134 FCR 208; [2003] FCA 1399 .................................. [3.0.150]
Neowarra v Western Australia (2003) 205 ALR 145; [2003] FCA 1399 ............ [2.35.150], [11.10.01],
[11.10.80]
Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402 .......... [11.05.240], [11.10.01], [11.10.40], [11.10.80],
[11.10.120], [11.20.200]
Nepi v Northern Territory [1997] NTSC 153 ............................................................. [4.0.410], [10.0.80]
“Neptune” (Owners) v Humber Conservancy Board (1937) 59 Ll LR 158 ......................... [6.05.260]
Nerano, The v The Dromedary (1895) 22 R 237 ........................................................................ [4.0.450]
Netanya Noosa Pty Ltd v Evans Harch Constructions Pty Ltd (unreported,
Queensland Supreme Court, No 381 of 1993, 7 October 1994) ........................................ [6.10.70]
New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd (in liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007]
NSWSC 258 ............................................................................................................ [5.10.160], [5.10.360]
New Cap Reinsurance Corporation Ltd (In Liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007]
NSWSC 258 ............................................................................................................................... [5.10.360]
New South Wales v Burton [2006] Aust Torts Reports 81-826; [2006] NSWCA 12 ......... [10.50.240]
New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; [2007] HCA 20 .......................................... [10.50.240]
New South Wales v Godfrey [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-741; [2004] NSWCA 113 ....... [13.0.320]
New South Wales v Haouchar [2018] NSWSC 1436 ................................................................... [6.0.01]
New South Wales v Napier [2002] NSWCA 402 .................................................................... [10.45.340]
New South Wales v Seedsman (2000) 217 ALR 583; [2000] NSWCA 119 ...... [10.45.40], [10.50.340]
New South Wales v Sleeman [2018] NSWSC 1360 ...................................................................... [6.0.01]
New South Wales v Whaley [2018] NSWSC 759 ......................................................................... [6.0.01]
New York v McDonald 231 AD 2d 647 (1996) ....................................................................... [10.35.280]
Newark Pty Ltd v Civil & Civic Pty Ltd (1987) 75 ALR 350 .................................................. [6.0.100]
lvi
Table of Cases
Newton v Chambers (1844) 8 Jur 244 .......................................................................................... [5.20.30]

Newton; Gandy (1984) 11 Cr App R 564 ..................................................................................... [7.10.50]
Ngatayi v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 1 ............................................................... [10.10.80], [10.10.120]
Ngulkurr v O’Brien (1989) 64 NTR 36 ......................................................................................... [7.10.90]
Nguyen v The Queen (2002) 26 WAR 59; [2002] WASCA 181 ............................................ [10.15.130]
Nguyen v The Queen (2007) 173 A Crim R 557; [2007] NSWCCA 249 ............................... [13.0.160]
Nguyen v The Queen (2007) 180 A Crim R 267; [2007] NSWCCA 363 ............................... [13.0.290]
Nguyen v The Queen (2017) 264 A Crim R 405; [2017] NSWCCA 4 ................................. [12.05.180]
Nicholas v Penny [1950] 2 KB 466 .............................................................................................. [12.0.420]
Nicholas v The Queen (1989) 45 A Crim R 299 ........................................................ [4.0.120], [4.0.420]
Nichols v McCoy 235 P 2d 412 (1951) .................................................................... [7.05.180], [12.0.300]
Nickisson v The Queen [1963] WAR 114 ................................................................................... [2.05.490]
Nightingale v Biffen (1925) 18 BWCC 358 ................................................................................ [2.05.110]
Nine Network Pty Ltd v Kennedy Miller Television Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Court
of Appeal, No 40641 of 1993, 8 June 1994) ......................................................................... [6.10.280]
Noble, Re [2002] PRBD (Vic) 6 ................................................................ [5.05.40], [8.05.180], [8.05.280]
Noel Leeming Television Ltd v Noel’s Appliance Centre Ltd (1985) 5 IPR 249 ................ [11.0.390]
Nolan v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd [2001] Aust Torts Reports 81-590 .................................. [16.05.280]
Nolan v The Queen (unreported, WA Court of Criminal Appeal, 22 May 1997) ........... [10.45.400]
Nolan v The Queen (unreported, WA Court of Criminal Appeal, Library No 970260,
22 May 1997) .............................................................................................................................. [4.0.490]
Nominal Defendant v Clancy [2007] NSWCA 349 ..................................................... [4.0.80], [4.0.200]
Nominal Defendant v Dowedeit (2016) 78 MVR 472; [2016] NSWCA 332 ......................... [12.0.340]
Non-drip Measure Co Ltd v Strangers Ltd (1942) 59 RPC 1 .................................................. [4.0.120]
Noor Mohamed [1949] AC 182 ..................................................................................................... [2.35.80]
Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 ........................................................................................... [5.0.260]
North Cheshire & Manchester Brewery Co v Manchester Brewery Co Ltd [1899] AC
83 .................................................................................................................................................. [2.25.40]
North Glamorgan NHS Trust v Walters [2002] EWCA Civ 1792 ....................................... [10.45.550]
North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Ltd (1995) 87 LGERA 435 ....................................... [4.0.200]
Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim
Group (2005) 145 FCR 442; [2005] FCAFC 135 .................................................................. [11.10.01]
Notaras v Hugh [2003] NSWSC 167 ............................................................................................ [3.0.150]
Novak v The Queen (1993) 69 A Crim R 145 ........................................................................... [7.10.230]
O (A Child), Re [2003] EWHC 3031 ......................................................................................... [10.30.850]

O’Brien v Gillespie (1997) 41 NSWLR 549 ................................................................... [3.0.30], [3.0.140]
O’Callaghan v O’Sullivan [1925] 1 IR 90 .................................................................. [4.0.440], [15.0.280]
O’Connell v The Queen (1844) 1 Cox CC 413 .......................................................................... [11.0.220]
O’Halloran v Averal Pty Ltd [2008] VSC 361 ........................................................................... [2.05.490]
O’Keefe v Kilcullen [2001] IESC 84 .............................................................. [8.0.80], [8.0.120], [8.0.160]
O’Leary v Oolong Aboriginal Corp Inc [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-747; [2004]
NSWCA 7 ................................................................................................................................ [10.45.340]
O’Neill v Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 655 ........................................................................................ [2.05.170]
OP v HM (2002) 168 FLR 465; [2002] FamCA 454 ................................................................... [12.20.40]
O’Reilly v Western Sussex NHS Trust (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1659 ....................................... [5.05.10]
OY v Complaints Hearing Committee [2013] NZAR 629; [2013] NZCA 107 ....................... [3.05.90]
Oasis Hotel Ltd v Zurich Insurance Co (1981) 28 BCLR 230 ................................................ [5.15.150]
Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Association (Europe) OV v Jetopay Pty Ltd (2000)
120 FCR 146; [2000] FCA 1463 .............................................................................................. [2.05.230]
Ockley & Whitlesbye’s case (1622) Palm 294; 81 ER 1089 ....................................................... [8.0.460]
Okudzeto v Commissioner of Police [1964] GLR 588 ............................................................... [7.0.570]
Oliveri v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 38 ................................................................................... [4.0.250]
Ollett v Bristol Aerojet Ltd (Practice Note) [1979] 3 All ER 544 ............................................. [5.0.350]
Ollis v New South Wales Crime Commission [2007] NSWCA 311 .......................................... [8.0.80]
Olsen v Identix Australia Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 157 ......................................................... [12.10.400]
Olympic Holdings Pty Ltd v Lochel [2004] WASC 61 .......................................................... [10.50.240]
Omodei v Western Australia (2006) 166 A Crim R 40; [2006] WASC 210 ........................... [13.0.400]
Optical 88 Ltd v Optical 88 Pty Ltd (No 2) (2010) 275 ALR 526; [2010] FCA 1380 ........... [11.0.480]
Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd (2012) 230 FCR 520; [2012] FCA
558 ................................................................................................................................................ [6.10.01]
Ordukaya v Hicks [2000] NSWCA 180 .......................................................................................... [2.0.25]
Orrong Strategies Pty Ltd v Village Roadshow Ltd (2007) 207 FLR 245; [2007] VSC 1 ..... [7.0.400]
Osburn v Anohor Laboratories 825 F 2d 908 ........................................................................... [2.10.430]
lvii
Expert Evidence
Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; [1998] HCA 75 .............. [3.0.30], [10.30.100], [10.30.220],
[10.30.240]
Otway v The Queen [2011] EWCA Crim 3 ................................................................................. [3.15.10]
Ourdi v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 46 ................................................................................... [7.10.230]
Owners and Bareboat Charterers of the Vessel “Global Mariner” v Owners and
Bareboat Charterers of the Vessel “Atlantic Crusader” [2005] EWHC 380 .................. [6.05.220]
Owners of Motor Ship Sapporo Maru v Owners of Steam Tanker Statute of Liberty
[1968] 1 WLR 739 ..................................................................................................................... [12.0.420]
Owners of SS Australia v Owners of Cargo of SS Nautilus [1927] AC 145; 25 LlL Rep
141 ........................................................................................... [4.0.40], [6.05.60], [6.05.120], [6.05.260]
Owners of SS Melanie v Owners of SS San Onofre [1927] AC 162 ....................................... [6.05.40]
Owners of Strata Plan 58577 v Banmor Development Finance Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA
325 .............................................................................................................................................. [6.12.240]
Owners of the Ship “Sun Diamond” v The Ship “Erawan” (1975) 55 DLR (3d) 138 ....... [6.05.260]
P, Re (1997) 137 FLR 367 ............................................................................................................... [11.10.01]

PA v The Queen [2012] VSCA 294 ............................................................................................ [10.20.220]
PGH Environmental Planning v Wollongong City Council [2009] NSWLEC 138 ............. [11.15.01]
PQ v Australian Red Cross Society [1992] 1 VR 19 ......... [2.20.60], [2.20.200], [2.20.400], [5.10.400]
Page v Smith [1994] 4 All ER 522 ............................................................................................. [10.45.400]
Palmer v Durnford Ford [1992] QB 483 .................................................... [8.0.160], [8.0.210], [8.0.420]
Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd (in liq) v Selim [2008] FCA 416 ........................................ [3.0.20], [7.0.170]
Panaune Trading Pty Ltd v GB Nathans & Co Pty Ltd (in liq) (unreported, NSW
Supreme Court, Cole J, No 52008/91, 16 September 1992) ............................................... [6.10.70]
Panitz v Behrend 632 A 2d 562 (1983) ........................................................................................... [8.0.40]
Papadopoulos v New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corp [1999] NSWCA 116 ......... [4.0.200]
Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; [1999] HCA 37 .............................. [2.0.25], [3.0.165]
Paparone v The Queen (2000) 112 A Crim R 190 ................................................... [7.10.20], [7.10.230]
Papazoglou v The Queen (2014) 45 VR 457; [2014] VSCA 194 ..................... [10.20.230], [10.30.610],
[10.30.630]
Pard v United States 589 F Supp 518 (1984) ........................................................................... [10.45.680]
Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844 .................. [2.20.160], [2.20.280],
[2.20.480], [7.0.330]
Paric v John Holland Constructions Pty Ltd [1984] 2 NSWLR 505 ..................................... [2.20.280]
Parish v DPP (2007) 17 VR 412; 179 A Crim R 304; [2007] VSC 494 ................................... [7.10.230]
Parish v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 90 ....................................................................... [12.10.390]
Park Rail Developments Pty Ltd v RJ Pearce Associates Pty Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 123 .... [6.10.70]
Parker v The King (1912) 14 CLR 681 ....................................................................................... [2.30.120]
Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610 ................................................................................. [10.30.100]
Parker v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 665 ................................................................................. [10.25.180]
Pastoral Finance Association Ltd v The Minister [1914] AC 1083 ........................................ [16.0.120]
Paterson v Paterson (1953) 89 CLR 212 ......................................................................................... [4.0.01]
Paterson, Re (unreported, Professional Conduct Committee, General Medical Council,
3 April 2004) ........................................................................................... [5.05.40], [8.05.40], [8.05.280]
Patterson v Nixon (1960) Sc LT 220; SC (J) 42 .......................................................................... [13.05.40]
Payton & Co Ltd v Snelling, Lampard & Co Ltd (1900) 17 RPC 628 .................................. [11.0.630]
Peace and Repatriation Commission [2003] AATA 1013 ...................................................... [11.05.320]
Peace Mark Holdings Pty Ltd (In liq) v Patrick [2017] HKCU 2782 .................................... [6.12.01]
Peacock v The Queen (2008) 190 A Crim R 454 ......................................................................... [3.0.158]
Peake v Benedict (Costs) (2014) 53 Fam LR 476; [2014] FCCA 2723 .................................... [5.15.200]
Pearce v Button (1985) 60 ALR 537 .............................................................................................. [2.35.40]
Pearce v Button (1986) 8 FCR 408 ................................................................................................... [2.0.40]
Pedigo v Commonwealth 44 SW 143 ......................................................................................... [13.05.40]
Pel-Air Aviation Pty Ltd v Casey (2017) 93 NSWLR 438; [2017] NSWCA 32 .................. [10.45.220]
Penfolds Wines (NZ) Ltd v Pacific Vineyards Ltd (unreported, New Zealand
Supreme Court, Barker J, 3 August 1979) ............................................................................. [11.0.70]
Pennell v State 602 A 2d 48 (Del Sup 1991) .............................................................................. [10.35.10]
Pennsylvania v Baldwin 502 A 2d 253 (1985) ......................................................................... [10.30.460]
Penola High School and Geographical Indications Committee [2001] AATA 844 ............ [6.20.160]
People v Anderson 421 NW 2d 200 (1988) ............................................................................... [2.25.540]
People v Axell 235 Cal App 3d 836 .................................................... [2.10.430], [2.10.490], [12.20.670]
People v Barber 452 NE 2d 725 (1983) .................................................................................... [12.10.280]
People v Barney and Howard 92 Daily Journal DAR 10924 (1992) ................. [2.10.430], [2.10.490],
[12.20.580], [12.20.670]
lviii
Table of Cases
People v Bledsoe 36 Cal 3d 236; 681 P 2d 291 (1984) ................. [10.30.320], [10.30.330], [10.45.740]
People v Brooks 128 Misc 2d 608 (NY 1985) ............................................................................ [10.15.90]
People v Buss 72 Cal App 4th 1093; 95 Cal Rptr 2d 655 (1999) ......................................... [12.20.670]
People v Castro 144 Misc 2d 956 (1989) .................................................................................... [7.05.180]
People v Castro 144 Misc 2d 956; 545 NYS 2d 985 (NY 1989) ....... [2.10.380], [2.10.490], [11.0.630],
[12.20.160], [12.20.180], [12.20.370], [12.20.590], [12.20.600], [12.20.620], [12.20.630], [12.20.650],
[12.20.670], [12.20.820], [12.20.860]
People v Collins 438 P 2d 33 (1968) ............................................................................................. [2.25.01]
People v Collins 94 Misc 2d 704 ................................................................................................. [2.10.380]
People v Davis 185 Ill 2d 317; 706 NE 2d 473 (1999) ............................................................ [12.20.670]
People v Ferguson 526 NE 2d 525 (1988) ................................................................................ [12.10.280]
People v Gordon 419 NE 2d 66 (1981) ..................................................................................... [12.10.280]
People v Hampton 746 P 2d 947 ............................................................................................... [10.30.320]
People v Jennings 252 Ill 534; 96 NE 1077 (1911) ................................................. [12.10.40], [12.10.80]
People v Kelly 17 Cal 3d 24; 549 P 2d 1240; 130 Cal Rptr 144 (1976) .............. [2.10.380], [2.10.490]
People v Leon 263 Cal Rptr 77 (1989) ...................................................................................... [10.30.460]
People v Lippert 466 NE 2d 276 (5th Dist 1984 ) .................................................................... [10.0.450]
People v Loomis 658 NYS 2d 787 (NY Co Ct 1997 ............................................................... [10.30.850]
People v McAlpin 812 P 2d 563 (1991) ............................................................... [10.30.460], [10.30.490]
People v McDonald 690 P 2d 709; 46 ALR 4th 1011 (1984) ................................................... [10.15.90]
People v Miles 577 NE 2d 477 (Ill 1991) ......................................... [12.20.370], [12.20.670], [12.25.60]
People v Nelson 410 NE 2d 476 (1980) ........................................................................................ [11.0.80]
People v Payan 220 Cal Rptr 126 (1985) ................................................................................. [10.30.460]
People v Pizarro 12 Cal Rptr 2d 436 (Ct App 1992) ............................................................. [12.20.670]
People v Powell 102 Misc 2d 775; 424 NYS 2d 626 (1980) .................................................. [10.30.100]
People v Wallace 17 Cal Rptr 2d 721 (Ct App 1993) ............................................................ [12.20.670]
People v Wesley 140 Misc 2d 306; app den 551 NE 2d 1238 (NY 1988) ........................... [12.20.580]
People v Young 391 NW 2d 270 (1986) ..................................................................................... [2.10.430]
People (AG) v Kelly (1862) 1 Frewen 267 ..................................................................................... [4.0.40]
People (DPP) v Kehoe [1992] ILRM 481 ...................................................................................... [2.15.10]
People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Allen [2003] 4 IR 295 ........................................ [12.20.90]
People (New York) v Torres 488 NYS 2d 358 (1985) ............................................................. [10.30.220]
People of California v Guerra 37 Cal 3d 385 (1984) ........................................ [10.20.180], [10.20.190]
Pepsi Seven-Up Bottlers Perth Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 62 FCR 289 .... [2.15.460],
[3.0.30], [3.0.140], [16.05.720]
Pepsi Seven-Up Bottlers Perth Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 62
FCR 289 ..................................................................................................................................................... ,
Perish v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 90 ....................................................................... [12.10.380]
Perlak Petroleum Maatschappij v Deen [1924] 1 KB 111 ......................................................... [15.0.80]
Permanent Trustee Aust Ltd v Boulton (1994) 33 NSWLR 735 ...... [2.15.600], [2.25.260], [7.05.180]
Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v Boulton (1994) 33 NSWLR 735 .....................................................
Permanent Trustee Co Ltd v Keogh [1999] NSWSC 967 ........................................................ [6.10.260]
Permanent Trustee Co of NSW v Salwey [1964-5] NSWR 121 ............................................. [2.30.120]
Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v George (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Einstein J, No
108276 of 1996, 1 December 1997) ........................................................................... [3.0.30], [3.0.150]
Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180 [1999] HCA 36 .................................................. [2.30.120]
Perry v New Hampshire 132 S Ct 716 ....................................................................................... [10.15.01]
Perry v The Queen (1982) 150 CLR 580 ........................................................................................ [2.0.25]
Perry, Ex Parte (No 89-1534) 1991 WL 84132 (Ala, 19 April 1991) ................. [2.10.490], [12.20.590],
[12.20.670]
Persinger v Norfolk and Western Railway Co 920 F 2d 1185 (1990) ..................................... [2.15.60]
Pesa v The Queen [2011] VSCA 31 ............................................................................................. [12.0.340]
Peter Croke Holdings Pty Ltd v Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW (1998) 101
LGERA 30 .................................................................................................................................. [16.0.160]
Peters Slip Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1979] Qd R 123 ........................................................... [6.05.60]
Peterson v Commonwealth [2008] VSC 166 ................................... [10.45.40], [10.45.170], [10.45.800]
Peterson v Homes [1927] SASR 419 ........................................................................................... [12.0.420]
Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets Inc v Darling-Delaware Co 998 F 2d 1224 ........................... [2.10.550]
Pettitt v Dunkley [1971] 1 NSWLR 376 ....................................................................................... [4.0.470]
Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461 .............................................................................. [10.20.200]
Pham v The Queen (1991) 55 A Crim R 128 ............................................................................... [7.10.70]
Phillion v The Queen (1977) 74 DLR (3d) 136 ...................................................... [10.0.450], [10.0.460]
Phillips v AWH Corp 415 F 3d 1303 ............................................................................................ [18.0.01]
Phillips v Symes [2004] EWHC 2330 (Ch); [2005] 4 All ER 519 ......................... [5.15.200], [5.15.500]
Phillips v Symes (No 2) [2005] 1 WLR 2043; [2004] EWHC 2330 ........................ [5.15.100], [8.0.230]
Phillips v The Queen [2012] VSCA 140 ....................................................................................... [7.10.60]
Philpott v Boon [1968] Tas SR 97 ................................................................................................ [12.0.420]
lix
Expert Evidence
Phoenix Trade Mark [1985] RPC 122 .......................................................................................... [11.0.630]

Phosphate Co-operative Co of Aust Ltd v Shears (No 3) (1988) 14 ACLR 323 ............... [16.05.240]
Phosphate Co-operative Co of Aus Pty Ltd v Shears [1989] VR 665 ................ [5.0.150], [5.10.360],
[7.0.40]
Pickering v Barkley (1649) Styles 132; 82 ER 587 .................................................................... [2.15.460]
Piddington v Bennett (1940) 63 CLR 533 .................................................................................... [4.0.370]
Pierides v Monash Health [2017] VSC 342 ............................................................................... [5.10.100]
Pieterson and Holloway [1995] 2 Cr App R 11 ........................................................................ [13.05.40]
Pioneer Construction Material Pty Ltd v Millsom [2002] NSWCA 258 ....... [10.50.240], [10.50.340]
Pitkin v The Queen (1995) 80 A Crim R 302 .......................................................................... [12.10.380]
Players Pty Ltd v Corporation of City of Adelaide [2001] SASC 369 ................................. [16.0.160]
Plumbers and Gasfitters, Re (1987) 72 ALR 415 ........................................................................ [2.20.60]
Police v Bannin [1991] 2 NZLR 237 .......................................................................... [2.25.40], [2.25.220]
Police v Hall (2006) 95 SASR 482; [2006] SASC 281 ................................................................ [2.35.240]
Police v Sinclair [1991] 3 NZLR 569 ........................................................................ [2.15.10], [10.30.690]
Polites v The Commonwealth (1945) 70 CLR 60 ..................................................................... [7.10.170]
Politi v Tyler 751 A 2d 788 (Vt 2000) ........................................................................................... [8.0.300]
Pollard v The Queen (1992) 176 CLR 177 ................................................................................. [10.05.90]
Pollock v Panjabi 781 A 2d 518 (Conn Super 2000) ................................................... [8.0.40], [8.0.300]
Pollock v Wellington (1996) 15 WAR 1 .................................................. [2.20.280], [2.35.320], [16.0.40]
Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries (1995) 36 NSWLR 49 .............................. [2.0.70], [2.35.40]
Pope v Ewendt (1977) 17 SASR 45 ............................................................................................. [2.30.120]
Pora v The Queen [2015] UKPC 9 .............................................................................................. [7.10.260]
Portal Software v Bodsworth [2005] NSWSC 1228 .................................................................... [5.05.10]
Porter v Kirtlan [1917] 2 IR 144 .................................................................................................... [5.20.30]
Porter v Kolodzeij [1962] VR 75 .................................................................................................. [12.0.420]
Porter v Le [2014] NSWSC 883 ................................................................................................... [6.15.120]
Porter v Whitehall Laboratories Inc No IP88-1192C ............................................................... [2.10.550]
Porter Capital Corporation v Masters [2017] EWHC 2215 ...................................................... [15.0.40]
Porto Seguro Companhia De Seguros Gerais v Belcan SA (1997) 153 DLR (4th) 577 ...... [6.05.260]
Potter v Austin 190 NYS 712 (1921 Sup App T) ........................................................................ [5.20.60]
Potts v Miller (1940) 64 CLR 282 ......................................................................... [16.05.160], [16.05.440]
Powerco Ltd v Commerce Commission [2006] NZHC 662 ................................................... [6.20.120]
Powley v Crimes Compensation Tribunal (1997) 11 VAR 146 .............................................. [10.45.01]
Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370 .......... [2.20.140], [2.35.320], [4.0.410],
[16.0.40]
Poynton v Poynton (1903) 371 ILTR 54 ......................................................................................... [2.0.07]
Preece v HM Advocate (1981) CLR 783 ................................................................. [2.35.130], [7.05.180]
Preiss v General Dental Council [2001] 1 WLR 1926 .............................................................. [8.05.100]
Prescott v Bulldog Tools Ltd [1981] 3 All ER 869 ...................................................................... [5.0.230]
Preston-Jones v Preston-Jones [1951] AC 391 ............................................................................. [2.25.01]
Price v The Queen [1981] Tas R 306 ................... [2.05.490], [2.15.100], [4.0.380], [4.0.390], [13.0.200]
Processed Plastic Co v Warner Bros Inc 218 USPQ 86 ............................................................. [11.0.40]
Prus-Czarnecka v Alberta [2003] ABQB 698 ............................................................................. [11.15.01]
Psychology Board of Australia v Vicary [2013] FCWA 7 ...................................... [5.0.360], [8.05.300]
Public Transport Authority (WA) v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2007) 34 WAR 279;
[2007] WASCA 151 ...................................................................................................................... [5.0.50]
Public Trustee v Commonwealth (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, Kirby P,
Mahoney and Clarke JJA, 20 December 1995) ....................................................................... [4.0.80]
Public Works, Minister for v Thistlethwayte [1954] AC 475 ................................................. [16.0.120]
Pyramid Pacific Pty Ltd v Ku-ring gai Council [2006] NSWLEC 522 ................................. [17.15.70]
Qantas Airways Ltd [2004] ACompT 9 ............................................. [6.20.200], [6.20.240], [16.05.200]

Queen v Drew 2003 NLSCTD 105 .............................................................................................. [11.20.40]
Queen Mary, The (1947) 80 LlL Rep 609 .................................................................. [6.05.60], [6.05.120]
Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd, Re (1995) 132 ALR 225 ...................................... [6.20.40]
Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 77 ....... [16.05.720]
Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 1998) (1998) 70 SASR 281 ............................................ [2.35.240]
Question of Law Reserved (No 3 of 1998) (1998) 71 SASR 223 .......................................... [13.05.260]
Quick v Stoland (1998) 87 FCR 371 .......................................................................................... [16.05.440]
Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 157 ALR 615 ................................................................ [2.0.05], [2.0.10]
Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371 ...... [2.05.20], [3.0.30], [3.0.150], [11.0.530], [11.05.240],
[16.05.120], [16.05.160]
lx
Table of Cases
R v AI [2013] ACTCA 16 ........................................................................................... [10.0.260], [10.25.40]

,
R v Abadom [1983] 1 WLR 126; 1 All ER 364; 76 Crim App R 48 ...... [2.20.20], [2.20.60][2.20.200],
[2.20.400], [2.20.480], [12.25.110]
R v Abbey (1982) 68 CCC (2d) 394 ............................................................. [2.15.10], [2.20.280], [4.0.40]
R v Abbey (2009) 246 CCC (3d) 301 ........................................................................................... [11.15.40]
R v Abbey [2009] ONCA 624 ....................................................................................................... [2.10.770]
R v Abdallah (2005) 157 A Crim R 219; [2005] NSWCCA 365 .............................................. [13.0.400]
R v Abdi (1997) 116 CCC (3d) 385 ............................................................................................ [12.15.240]
R v Abisaab (2006) 166 A Crim R 440; [2006] SASC 349 ........................................................ [2.35.240]
R v Accused [1989] 1 NZLR 714 .................... [3.0.90], [4.0.390], [10.30.470], [10.30.490], [10.30.680],
[12.05.300]
R v Accused [1991] 2 NZLR 277 ................................................................................................. [7.10.330]
R v Adami (1959) 108 CLR 605 ............................................................................ [12.15.160], [12.15.240]
R v Adami (1989) 42 A Crim R 88 .............................................................................................. [7.10.170]
R v Adams [1996] 2 Cr App R 467 ................................................. [12.20.370], [12.20.460], [12.25.110]
R v Adams (No 1) [1996] 2 Cr App R 467 .................................................................................... [2.0.25]
R v Adams (No 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377 .................................................................................... [2.0.25]
R v Addabbo (1990) 47 A Crim R 329 ....................................................................................... [7.10.410]
R v Adler (2000) 52 NSWLR 451; [2000] NSWCCA 357 ....................................................... [10.15.130]
R v Adonis (1918) TPD 411 .......................................................................................................... [13.05.40]
R v Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889 ........................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v Al Kaheir (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 20 June 1994) ..................... [13.0.160]
R v Alcantara (2012) ABQB 225 ............................................................ [2.05.150], [12.05.10], [13.0.120]
R v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737 .......................................................................... [2.20.20], [2.20.160]
R v Ali [2015] NSWCCA 72 ....................................................................................................... [12.20.200]
R v Allen, Kesavarajah and Moses (1993) 66 A Crim R 376 ................................................ [10.10.120]
R v Allen (No 2) (1979) 46 CCC (2d) 477 .................................................................................. [10.0.430]
R v Amuso (1987) 32 A Crim R 308 ........................................................................................... [7.10.170]
R v Anderson (1914) 16 DLR 203; 22 CCC 455 ..................................................... [2.20.400], [7.05.180]
R v Anderson [1972] 1 QB 304 ................................................................................. [2.15.400], [10.0.160]
R v Anderson [1981] VR 155 .................................................................................... [7.10.190], [7.10.250]
R v Anderson (2000) 1 VR 1; [2000] VSCA 16 ..................... [2.05.110], [2.05.310],[12.0.140] [9.0.280]
R v Andrakakos [2003] VSCA 170 ................................................................................................ [4.0.240]
R v Andrews [2003] NSWCCA 7 ................................................................................................ [13.0.400]
R v Angeli [1979] 1 WLR 26 ...................................................................................................... [12.15.160]
R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 ............................................................................................. [6.0.120]
R v Apostilides (1984) 53 ALR 445 ............................................................................................. [11.0.240]
R v Appulonappa (2014) 11 CR (7th) 154 ................................................................................. [15.0.240]
R v Aramah (1982) 76 Cr App R 190 ......................................................................................... [7.10.470]
R v Architects Registration Tribunal ex parte Jaggar [1945] 2 All ER 131 .......................... [17.05.40]
R v Arico (No 1) [2002] VSCA 229 ............................................................................................. [13.0.400]
R v Arnott (No 3) [2006] VSC 524 .............................................................................................. [13.0.400]
R v Ashcroft [1965] 1 Qd R 81 ......... [2.15.10], [2.15.100], [2.15.130], [2.25.01], [2.25.260], [10.0.360]
R v Atkins [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 ............................................................................................ [3.15.10]
R v Atkins [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 ........................................................................................ [12.25.110]
R v Audy (No 2) (1977) 34 CCC (2d) 231 ................................................................................. [10.15.80]
R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13 ................... [6.20.40]
R v Aydin [2008] VSC 388 ............................................................................................................ [11.10.01]
R v Aylward (1992) 71 CCC (3d) 71 ............................................................................ [2.15.30], [2.15.60]
R v B [1987] 1 NZLR 362 ................ [2.15.10], [3.0.90], [10.0.340], [10.0.360], [10.30.470], [10.30.490],
[12.05.300]
R v B (1993) 79 CCC (3d) 112 .................................................................................................... [10.20.210]
R v B(CR) [1990] 1 SCR 717 ........................................................................................................... [4.0.360]
R v B(G) (1990) 56 CCC (3d) 201 .................................................................................................. [2.15.60]
R v B(SC) (1997) 119 CCC (3d) 530 .......................................................................................... [10.35.200]
R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 ..................................................................................... [2.0.25], [3.0.165]
R v BDX (2009) 24 VR 288; [2009] VSCA 28 ...................................................... [10.20.105], [10.20.110]
R v BL [2015] NTSC 85 ................................................................................................................. [11.20.80]
R v Baartman [2000] NSWCCA 298 ........................................................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Baartman (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 18 December 1998) .............................. [13.0.400]
R v Badger [1996] 1 SCR 771 ..................................................................................................... [11.05.240]
R v Baftiroski [2018] SASFC 83 ..................................................................................................... [4.0.250]
R v Bagerow 2010 ONSC 937 ...................................................................................................... [10.15.80]
lxi
Expert Evidence
R v Bailey (1977) 66 Cr App R 31 ................................................................................................. [4.0.160]

R v Baker [1989] 3 NZLR 635 ....................................................................................... [7.0.450], [7.0.490]
R v Baptiste (1994) 88 CCC (3d) 211 ................................................................... [12.20.480], [12.20.690]
R v Barker (1988) 34 A Crim R 141 ............................................................................................ [2.15.100]
R v Barnes (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 1 December 1988 .................... [13.05.40]
R v Barry [1984] 1 Qd R 74 ...................................................................... [2.15.30], [10.0.160], [10.0.360]
R v Bartlett [1996] 2 VR 687 ........................................ [10.20.103], [10.20.230], [10.30.700], [10.30.710]
R v Basett [1952] VLR 535 ................................................................................................................ [7.0.90]
R v Bates [2006] EWCA Crim 1395 ............................................................................................ [12.20.80]
R v Baxter [2012] QCA 12 ............................................................................................................ [7.10.230]
R v Bebic (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Maxwell J, 23 September 1980) ................. [11.05.80]
R v Beland [1987] 2 SCR 398; (1987) 43 DLR (4th) 641; 36 CCC (3d) 481 ........ [2.05.30], [2.10.770],
[2.15.30], [10.0.320], [10.0.360], [10.0.450], [10.0.460], [10.20.210], [10.30.490], [12.0.100]
R v Benecke (1999) 106 A Crim R 282; [1999] NSWCCA 163 ................................................ [13.05.40]
R v Bentley (Dec’d) [1998] EWCA Crim 2516 .......................................................................... [11.20.80]
R v Bentum (1989) 153 JP 538 ................................................................................................... [10.15.150]
R v Bernard 2003 NBCA 55 .......................................................................................................... [11.15.01]
R v Berry (1977) 66 Cr App R 156 .............................................................................................. [10.10.80]
R v Berry (2007) 17 VR 153; [2007] VSCA 202 ..................... [2.0.07], [7.0.40], [12.10.380], [12.20.80],
[12.20.125], [12.20.130], [12.20.140], [12.20.370], [12.20.890]
R v Beydoun (1990) 22 NSWLR 256 ............................................................................................. [8.0.420]
R v Beynon (1957) 2 QB 111 ......................................................................................................... [10.10.40]
R v Bicanin (1976) 15 SASR 20 ........................................................................................................ [7.0.90]
R v Bingley [2017] 1 SCR 170; (2017) 407 DLR (4th) 384; (2017) 345 CCC (3d) 306 ............ [1.0.01],
[2.0.01], [13.0.200]
R v Bjordal (2005) 93 SASR 237; [2005] SASC 422 ................. [4.0.400], [4.0.420], [14.0.40], [14.0.80],
[14.0.120]
R v Blackburn [2005] EWCA Crim 1349 .................................................................................... [11.20.80]
R v Boardman [1969] VR 151 ...................................................................................................... [10.15.40]
R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45; 15 A Crim R 364 .......... [1.0.01], [2.05.490], [2.10.100], [2.10.140],
[2.15.30], [2.35.90], [3.0.30], [9.0.240], [10.0.460], [10.30.700], [12.05.490], [12.15.40], [12.20.860]
R v Boswell (2011) 277 CCC (3d) 156 ......................................................................................... [11.15.40]
R v Bouchard (1996) 84 A Crim R 499 ....................................................................................... [7.10.230]
R v Bowman [2006] EWCA Crim 417 ...................................................................................... [10.20.110]
R v Boyd [1984] WAR 236 ............................................................................................................ [7.10.170]
R v Bradley (1980) 2 Cr App R 12 ................................................................................................ [7.10.90]
R v Bradley (1986) 40 NTR 6 ..................................................................................................... [10.10.360]
R v Bradshaw (1985) 82 Cr App R 79 ........................................................................................ [2.20.280]
R v Bradshaw [1985] Crim LR 733 ............................................................................................... [2.20.60]
R v Brampton (1808) 10 East 282 .................................................................................................. [15.0.80]
R v Bridger [2002] NZCA 298 ..................................................................................................... [7.10.220]
R v Broughton (unreported, Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal, 22 September
1988) ........................................................................................................................ [2.05.110], [2.05.310]
R v Brown (1869) WW & A’B (L) 239; 1 AJR (NC) 59 .......................................................... [12.15.240]
R v Brown (unreported, High Court, New Zealand, 19 September 1997) .......................... [2.10.720]
R v Brown (unreported, NZ High Court, 19 September 1997) ............................................... [3.05.10]
R v Browne-Kerr [1990] VR 78 .................................................................................................. [12.15.160]
R v Brownlowe (1986) 7 NSWLR 461 ....................... [10.15.130], [10.15.140], [12.05.180], [12.20.820]
R v Bryan (2003) 175 CCC (3d) 285 ............................................................................................ [2.25.500]
R v Bryant [1980] 1 NZLR 264 ...................................................................................................... [7.10.50]
R v Buchanan [1966] VR 9 ........................................................................................ [10.0.360], [10.05.90]
R v Buckley [1999] EWCA Crim 1191 ................................................................... [12.10.40], [12.10.200]
R v Buisson [1990] 2 NZLR 542 .............................................................. [4.0.40], [12.10.40], [12.10.120]
R v Bulmer (1987) 25 A Crim R 155 ............................................................................................. [7.10.80]
R v Burgess [1991] 2 WLR 1206; 2 All ER 769 .................................................... [2.15.130], [10.25.160]
R v Burnett (1994) 70 A Crim R 469 ........................................................................................... [7.10.100]
R v Burns (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 193 ............................................................................................ [10.20.210]
R v Burns (2001) 123 A Crim R 226; [2001] SASC 263 .......................................................... [12.15.240]
R v Bush (unreported, ACT Supreme Court, No SCC of 1992) ......................... [11.0.180], [11.0.350]
R v Bux (2002) 132 A Crim R 395; [2002] VSCA 126 ............................................................... [7.10.250]
R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396 ................................................................... [2.15.400], [10.25.120], [13.0.200]
R v C (1990) 57 CCC (3d) 522 ............................................................. [2.15.60], [10.30.480], [10.30.490]
R v C (1991) 55 A Crim R 478 ....................................................................................................... [7.10.70]
R v C (1993) 60 SASR 467 ........................................................................................... [2.15.60], [2.15.170]
R v C (G) (1995) 110 CCC (3d) 233 9Nfld CA ........................................ [2.0.20], [4.0.360], [10.30.480]
R v C (LT) (1994) 35 CR (4th) 337 ............................................................................................. [10.30.480]
R v C (an infant) [1976] Qd R 341 .............................................................................................. [10.0.360]
lxii
Table of Cases
R v CPK (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 21 June 1995) .............................. [2.35.410]
R v CS (1993) 11 CRNZ 45 ......................................................................................................... [10.30.470]
R v Calder [1969] 1 QB 151 .......................................................................................................... [10.0.160]
R v Calder (unreported, NZ High Court, Tipping J, 12 April 1995) ................... [2.10.720], [3.05.10]
R v Camilleri (2001) 127 A Crim R 290; [2001] NSWCCA 527 ............................. [3.0.175], [13.0.280]
R v Camm (1883) 1 QLJ 136 ....................................................................................... [2.10.140], [2.15.10]
R v Campbell (1977) 38 CCC (2d) 6 ............................................................................................. [7.0.490]
R v Campbell [1997] 1 NZLR 16 ............................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v Cannell [2012] SADC 80 ...................................................................................................... [12.10.380]
R v Cannings [2004] 1 All ER 725; [2004] EWCA Crim 1 ....................................... [3.15.10], [9.0.320]
R v Carn (1981) 5 A Crim R 234 ................................................................................ [4.0.410], [10.25.40]
R v Carn (1982) 5 A Crim R 466 ................................................................................ [2.15.10], [10.25.40]
R v Carr [1972] 1 NSWLR 608 ................................................................................................... [12.10.240]
R v Carrel [1992] 1 NZLR 760 ................................................................................................... [10.10.280]
R v Carroll (1985) 19 A Crim R 410 ............................................................................ [9.05.01], [9.05.80]
R v Carroll [2010] SASC 156 ..................................................................................... [12.20.80], [12.20.90]
R v Carter [1959] VR 105 .............................................................................................................. [10.25.80]
R v Carusi (1997) 92 A Crim R 52 ................................................................................................ [3.0.165]
R v Castillo (2004) 181 Man R (2d) 259; 2004 MBQB 45 ........................................................ [13.0.120]
R v Castleton (1909) 3 Cr App R 74 ............................................................................................. [2.10.40]
R v Kavanagh [2002] EWCA Crim 904 ................................................................. [10.35.10], [10.35.120]
R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153 .................................................................................................... [2.35.80]
R v Chamberlain (1984) 153 CLR 521 ................ [2.35.360], [4.0.40], [4.0.420], [7.05.180], [12.20.830]
R v Champion (1992) 64 A Crim R 244 ..................................................................................... [7.10.250]
R v Chandler (1964) 48 Cr App R 143 ....................................................................................... [11.0.220]
R v Chapman (1838) 8 C & P 558; 173 ER 617 ........................................................................... [6.0.120]
R v Chard (1971) 56 Cr App R 268 ....................................................................... [10.25.40], [10.35.200]
R v Charlton [1972] VR 758 ......................................................................................................... [2.35.410]
R v Chatwood [1980] 1 WLR 874 ............................................................................................... [2.05.490]
R v Cheatham [2002] NSWCCA 360 ........................................................................................ [10.25.120]
R v Chee [1980] VR 303 .............................................................................................................. [12.20.820]
R v Chenia [2003] 2 Cr App R 6; [2002] EWCA Crim 2345 .............................. [10.15.01], [10.15.150]
R v Choi [2005] VSC 335 ............................................................................................ [11.15.01], [11.15.40]
R v Chow (1991) 65 CCC (3d) 162 ............................................................................ [4.0.450], [12.0.420]
R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26; [2006] VSCA 263 ................................................... [12.0.420], [12.20.130]
R v Clark (1983) 1 DLR (4d) 46 ................................................................................................... [10.0.360]
R v Clark [2003] 2 FCR(UK) 447; [2003] EWCA Crim 1020 .................................. [2.35.410], [3.15.10]
R v Clark (2004) 182 CCC (3d) 1 ............... [2.25.500], [10.35.10], [10.35.90], [10.35.280], [10.35.340],
[13.0.180]
R v Clark (Sally) (Appeal against conviction) (No 2) [2003] EWCA Crim 1020 .................. [8.05.80]
R v Clarke (1975) 61 Cr App R 320 ............................................................................................ [7.10.290]
R v Clarke [1995] 2 Cr App R 425 ................................. [2.10.100], [2.10.720], [12.05.340], [12.05.490]
R v Clausen (1981) 95 LSJS 194 ................................................................................................... [7.10.250]
R v Clayton [1989] 2 Qd R 439 ..................................................................................................... [7.10.20]
R v Cleary (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, Southwell J, 18 September 1979) ....... [4.0.120]
R v Cleghorn [1967] 2 QB 584 ....................................................................................................... [6.0.120]
R v Clune (No 1) [1975] VR 723 ................................................................................................... [7.0.570]
R v Cockburn [2008] EWCA 316 ................................................................................................. [17.0.280]
R v Colley (unreported, WA Supreme Court, Brinsden J, 14 April 1978) ............................. [7.10.80]
R v Collie (1991) 56 SASR 302 ..................................................................................................... [10.05.90]
R v Collings [1976] 2 NZLR 104 ............................................................................................... [12.20.820]
R v Collins (1976) 12 SASR 501 ................................................................................................... [2.15.100]
R v Collins (2001) 160 CCC (3d) 85 ............................................................................................ [13.0.360]
R v Connell (No 3) (1993) 8 WAR 542 ............................... [11.0.180], [11.0.240], [11.0.260], [11.0.310]
R v Contin [2004] VSCA 210 ........................................................................................................ [12.0.300]
R v Cooke (1995) 1 Cr App R 318 ............................................................................................ [12.20.480]
R v Coroner Maria Doogan [2005] ACTSC 74 ......................................................................... [5.10.360]
R v Coulston (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 12 April 1995) .............. [13.0.400]
R v Cox (No 12) [2006] VSC 233 ................................................................................................. [10.15.40]
R v Creemar [1968] 1 CCC 14 ....................................................................................................... [7.0.450]
R v Crocker (1992) 58 A Crim R 359 ...................................................... [2.30.120], [7.10.50], [7.10.470]
R v Crozier (1990) 12 Cr App R (S) 206 .................................................................................... [5.10.400]
R v Cullen [1951] VR 335 ............................................................................................................. [11.0.220]
R v Cumberbatch [2002] VSC 235 .............................................................................................. [10.05.01]
R v Curtis [2006] VSC 377 ............................................................................................................ [10.05.01]
R v Cusack [2009] VSCA 207 ....................................................................................................... [7.10.230]
R v Côté [1996] 3 SCR 139 ......................................................................................................... [11.05.240]
lxiii
Expert Evidence
R v D (1992) 74 CCC (3d) 481 .................................................................................. [2.15.60], [10.30.480]

R v D (1995) 13 CRNZ 306 ......................................................................................................... [10.30.690]
R v DAR (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 8 November 1995) ....................... [2.15.10]
R v DD 2000 SCC 43 ........... [1.0.01], [2.0.03][2.0.05], [2.0.20], [2.0.60], [2.0.65], [2.10.770], [2.15.10],
[2.15.30], [2.15.60], [2.15.100], [2.25.01], [3.0.170], [3.05.90], [4.0.360], [4.0.390], [10.0.360],
[10.30.480], [10.30.490], [12.0.100]
R v DHM [1998] VSCA 11 ............................................................................................................ [7.10.100]
R v Dahlman (2007) BCSC 1912 .................................................................................................... [9.10.80]
R v Daley [2005] QCA 162 ........................................................................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Dallagher [2003] 1 Cr App R 12; [2002] EWCA Crim 1903 ........... [1.0.01], [2.10.100], [3.15.10],
[12.05.540], [12.05.490]
R v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 ................................................................. [4.0.40], [6.0.120], [11.0.240]
R v Darren Walsh (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, 29 March 1993) ..................... [12.10.165]
R v Darrington [1980] VR 353 ......... [2.05.110], [2.05.310], [2.15.10], [2.15.130], [2.15.400], [2.25.01],
[2.25.40], [2.25.260], [2.25.420], [10.25.40], [13.0.200]
R v Darwiche [2006] NSWSC 848 ............................................................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Darwiche [2006] NSWSC 929 ............................................................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Davey (unreported, Federal Court of Aust, Bowen CJ, Muirhead and Evatt JJ, 13
November 1980) ......................................................................................................................... [7.10.80]
R v David (1986) 6 NSWLR 278 .................................................................................................. [10.0.460]
R v David (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 10 October 1995) ..................... [13.0.160]
R v Davies (unreported, English Court of Appeal, 3 November 1995) ............................... [2.15.100]
R v De Jesus (1986) 20 A Crim R 402 .......................................................................................... [7.10.90]
R v De Voss (unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, 24 November 1995) .................... [4.0.430]
R v De Vroome (1988) 38 A Crim R 146 .................................................................................... [7.10.170]
R v Debs & Roberts [2005] VSCA 66 ......................................................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Decha-Iamsakun (1992) 8 CRNZ 470 .................................................................................... [2.15.30]
R v Decha-Iamsakun [1993] 1 NZLR 141 ................................................................... [3.05.10], [7.0.290]
R v Deen (The Times, 10 January 1994) .................................................................. [12.20.480][12.25.60]
R v Defrutos [2008] VSCA 55 ...................................................................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Demiri [2006] BSCA 64 ............................................................................................................ [4.0.240]
R v Demirok [1976] VR 244 ........................................................................................................... [4.0.370]
R v Dennison (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 3 March 1998) .................... [10.05.40]
R v Dent (1843) 1 Car & K 97; 174 ER 729 ................................................................................. [15.0.80]
R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner; Ex parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456 ............. [2.20.400]
R v Devenish [1969] VR 737 ................................................................................... [12.15.80], [12.15.240]
R v Dick [1966] Qd R 301 ............................................................................................................... [4.0.430]
R v Dickie (1984) 79 Cr App R 213 ............................................................................................ [2.15.130]
R v Dieffenbaugh (1993) 80 CCC (3d) 97 ................................................................................ [12.20.690]
R v Dietschmann [2003] UKHL 10 ........................................................................................... [10.25.120]
R v Dimitrov (2003) 68 OR (3d) 641; 181 CCC (3d) 554 .................................... [12.05.10], [12.10.360]
R v Discon (1968) 67 DLR (2d) 619 ............................................................................................ [2.20.280]
R v Dix (1982) 74 Cr App R 306 ................................................................................ [2.25.40], [2.25.260]
R v Dixon-Jenkins (1991) 55 A Crim R 308 ............................................................................... [7.10.370]
R v Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2 ................... [1.0.01], [12.05.10], [12.05.30], [12.20.80], [12.20.220]
R v Do [2007] VSCA 308 .............................................................................................................. [7.10.230]
R v Doe (1986) 31 CCC (3d) 353 ................................................................................................. [2.10.770]
R v Doherty (2003) 6 VR 393; [2003] VSCA 158 ......................................................................... [4.0.240]
R v Donald (1983) 11 A Crim R 47 ............................................................................................. [7.05.180]
R v Doney (2001) 126 A Crim R 271; [2001] NSWCCA 463 ................................................ [12.15.240]
R v Doogan (2005) 158 ACTR 1; [2005] ACTSC 74 ................................................................... [5.0.150]
R v Dougherty (1996) 14 CRNZ 145 ................................................................... [12.20.370], [12.20.780]
R v Dowd (1998) 120 CCC (4th) 360 ........................................................................................ [10.35.200]
R v Dowding (2000) 159 FLR 204; [2000] VSC 274 ................................................................. [7.05.180]
R v Dowding [2000] VSC 222 ........................................................................................................ [7.0.170]
R v Drummond (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 27 May 1994) ................. [10.05.40]
R v Dubois (1976) 30 CCC (3d) 412 .......................................................................... [2.15.10], [2.15.100]
R v Duffy [1967] 1 QB 63 ........................................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v Dugandzic (1981) 57 CCC (2d) 517 ..................................................................................... [2.05.430]
R v Duke (1979) 22 SASR 46; 1 A Crim R 39 ................... [2.35.80], [2.35.90], [12.0.100], [12.20.480],
[12.20.860]
R v Duncan [1969] 2 NSWR 675 ................................................................................................... [4.0.380]
R v Dupas (2011) 211 A Crim R 81; [2011] VSC 180 .......................................... [10.15.70], [10.20.102]
R v Dyke (2009) 197 A Crim R 558; [2009] QCA 339 ................................................................ [7.0.490]
R v Dziduch (1990) 47 A Crim R 378 ....................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v E (1997) 96 A Crim R 489 ................................................................................................... [10.30.700]
R v EJ (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 1 April 1997) ................................... [7.10.220]
lxiv
Table of Cases
R v EJ Smith [1984] 1 NSWLR 462 ........................................................................................... [12.05.180]

R v Easom (1981) 28 SASR 134 ..................................................................................................... [5.0.350]
R v Edwards [2001] EWCA Crim 2185 ........................................................................................ [13.0.80]
R v Edwards [2003] VSC 510 ....................................................................................................... [13.0.400]
R v El-Yanni (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, Finlay J, 6 July 1993) ......... [2.05.450],
[2.15.30], [4.0.370]
Rv Elchami (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 15 December 1995) .............. [7.10.250]
Rv Eliasen (1991) 53 A Crim R 391 ........................................................................................... [7.10.100]
Rv Elliott (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Hunt J, 6 April 1990) ............... [2.35.90], [12.0.100],
[12.20.820], [12.20.860]
R v Ellis (2003) 58 NSWLR 700; 144 A Crim R 1 ......................................................................... [3.0.30]
R v Emery (1985) 18 A Crim R 49 ............................................................................................ [10.30.100]
R v Enright [1990] 1 Qd R 563 ............................................................................... [10.10.40], [10.10.360]
R v Evan (2006) 175 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 527 .................................................................. [10.15.40]
R v Ewing [1983] QB 1039 ......................................................................................................... [12.15.160]
R v F (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 ................................................................................... [2.15.60], [10.30.490]
R v F(DS) (1999) 132 CCC (3d) 97 ............................................................................................ [10.35.200]
R v F(DS) (1999) 43 OR (3d) 609 ................................................................................................... [4.0.360]
R v FD [2016] ABPC 40 ................................................................................................................ [7.10.260]
R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30 ..................................... [2.15.130], [10.25.80], [10.25.160], [10.45.640]
R v Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410; [2009] VSCA 307 ......... [4.0.240], [4.0.360], [12.0.340], [14.0.45],
[14.0.150]
R v Farrar [1992] 1 VR 207 ......................................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v Faulkner [1987] 2 Qd R 263 ......... [2.05.450], [2.05.490], [2.10.140], [2.15.10], [4.0.390], [14.0.40]
R v Ferguson (2000) 142 CCC (3d) 353 .................................................................................... [12.10.320]
R v Ferguson (2009) 24 VR 531; [2009] VSCA 198 ............................................ [16.05.160], [16.05.320]
R v Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58 ........................................................................................... [7.10.80]
R v Fernando [1999] NSWCCA 66 ........................................................................................... [12.10.320]
R v Ferrers (1760) 19 How St Tr 885 ............................................................................................ [7.0.290]
R v Field & Other (Justices); Ex parte White (1895) 64 LJMC 158 ......................................... [2.30.02]
R v Fisher [1961] OWN 94; 34 CR 320 ....................................................................................... [2.25.260]
R v Fisher (2003) 179 CCC (3d) 138 .................................................................... [12.20.290], [12.20.690]
R v Fleming [2007] NSWSC 328 ................................................................................................ [12.20.215]
R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005] NSWCCA 338 .................................................... [3.0.30]
R v Folbigg (2005) 152 A Crim R 35; [2005] NSWCCA 23 ....................................................... [9.0.320]
R v Fong [1981] Qd R 90 ................................................... [2.15.10], [2.15.340], [10.20.100], [10.30.710]
R v Forbes [2004] NSWSC 421 .................................................................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Forbes (2005) 160 A Crim R 1; [2005] NSWCCA 377 ...................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Ford (1994) 75 A Crim R 398 .................................................................................................. [7.10.20]
R v Forde (1986) 19 A Crim R 1 .................................................................................................... [10.0.80]
R v Forrester (1982) 31 SASR 312 ............................................................................................. [10.10.530]
R v Forsti [2010] ACTSC 85 ....................................................................................................... [10.30.700]
R v Fosse [2003] NSWCCA 347 ................................................................................................... [7.10.220]
R v Fowler (1985) 39 SASR 440 .............................................. [4.0.280], [7.0.330], [10.25.40], [13.0.200]
R v Fowler (2003) 151 A Crim R 166; [2003] NSWCCA 321 .................................................. [13.0.400]
R v Friend [2004] EWCA 2661 ..................................................................................................... [7.10.230]
R v Frimpong 2013 ONCA 243 ................................................................................................... [10.15.80]
R v Frost (1839) 4 State Tr NS 385 ................................................................................................ [6.0.120]
R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317; [2001] NSWCCA 413 ......... [2.0.25], [3.0.165], [12.20.80], [12.20.90],
[12.20.275], [12.20.280], [12.20.300], [12.20.370]
R v GMB (2002) 130 A Crim R 187 ........................................................................................... [10.25.120]
R v GZ [2015] ACTSC 229 .......................................................................................................... [12.20.125]
R v Gabriel [2010] NSWSC 13 ..................................................................................................... [7.10.265]
R v Gadd (unreported, Queensland Supreme Court, 27 March 1995) ......... [10.30.240], [10.30.480]
R v Gallagher [2001] NSWSC 462 ..... [2.0.65], [2.05.150], [2.10.140], [2.10.430], [3.0.30], [12.20.460],
[12.20.470]
Rv Galli (2001) 127 A Crim R 493; [2001] NSWCCA 504 ........... [12.20.90], [12.20.140], [12.20.280],
[12.20.300], [12.20.370], [12.20.490]
R v Gardiner [1980] Qd R 531 ................................................................. [2.20.20], [2.20.160], [2.20.280]
R v Gardner [2004] EWCA Crim 1639 ..................................................................................... [12.05.340]
R v Geesing (1984) 39 SASR 111 .......................................................................... [10.20.180], [10.20.200]
R v Gemmill (2004) 8 VR 242; [2004] VSCA 72 ..................... [4.0.160], [4.0.240], [4.0.430], [10.25.80]
R v George 2002 BCPC 207 .......................................................................................................... [11.15.01]
R v Gibson (1887) 18 QBD 537 ...................................................................................................... [4.0.370]
R v Gibuma (1991) 54 A Crim R 347 ............................................................................................ [7.10.80]
R v Gidley [1984] 3 NSWLR 168 ................................................................................................... [4.0.370]
R v Gieselmann (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 12 November 1996) .... [10.25.120]
lxv
Expert Evidence
R v Giles (2008) BCSC 76 ............................................................................................................. [13.0.120]

R v Gilfoyle [2001] 2 Cr App R 57 ................ [2.10.100], [2.15.10], [10.35.10], [10.35.50], [10.35.120],
[10.35.340], [12.05.490]
R v Gilfoyle [2001] 2 Cr App R 5; [2000] EWCA Crim 81 ................................................... [12.05.260]
R v Gillard (2008) 181 A Crim R 210; [2008] SASC 38 ............................................................ [13.0.400]
R v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935 ................. [2.10.140], [4.0.01], [10.0.510], [10.15.140], [12.05.180],
[12.20.480]
R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592 ........................... [2.0.10], [11.0.01], [11.0.180], [11.0.200], [11.0.350]
R v Gloster (1888) 16 Cox 471 ..................................................................................................... [2.20.480]
R v Glynn [1998] SASC 6923 ..................................................................................................... [10.30.330]
R v Gommers [2005] SASC 493 ............................................................. [7.10.190], [7.10.200], [7.10.250]
R v Gordon [1995] 1 Cr App R 290 ................................................ [12.20.370], [12.20.480], [12.20.730]
R v Governor of Stafford Prison [1909] 2 KB 81 ...................................................................... [10.10.80]
R v Graat (1980) 55 CCC (2d) 429; 116 DLR (3d) 143; affd 2 CCC (3d) 365; 144 DLR
(3d) 267 ..................................................................................................................... [2.25.01], [2.25.180]
R v Graat (1982) 2 CCC (3d) 365 .................................................................................................. [13.0.40]
R v Graham (1972) 7 CCC (2d) 93 ............................................................................................ [10.20.210]
R v Graham [1982] 1 WLR 294 ................................................................................................. [10.30.100]
R v Grant and Lovett [1972] VR 423 .......................................................................................... [11.0.220]
R v Gray [2003] EWCA Crim 1001 ..................................................... [3.15.10], [12.05.340], [12.05.440]
R v Green (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 26 March 1993) ..................... [12.20.480],
[12.20.490], [12.20.840], [12.20.870]
R v Greening [1957] NZLR 906 ................................................................................................... [11.0.220]
R v Griffin [2006] ACTSC 77 ........................................................................................................ [13.0.400]
R v Guingab [2010] VSC 256 ................................................................................ [12.20.200], [12.20.495]
R v Gummerson [1999] Crim LR 680 .................................................................... [2.10.830], [10.15.150]
R v Gunewardene [1951] 2 KB 600 .......................................................................... [10.0.330], [10.0.360]
R v Guyatt (1998) 119 CCC 304 ................................................................................................... [2.35.160]
R v Gwaze [2010] 3 NZLR 734; [2010] NZSC 52 ...................................................... [3.05.40], [3.05.80]
R v H (1989) 51 SASR 489 ..................................................................................... [10.20.180], [10.20.200]
R v H(JR) (Childhood Amnesia) [2006] 1 Cr App R 195; [2005] EWCA Crim 1828 ...... [10.20.105],
[10.20.110]
R v Haas (1962) 35 DLR (2d) 172 ............................................................................................... [13.05.40]
R v Hadfield (1800) 27 St Tr 1282 ............................................................................................... [10.25.80]
R v Haidley (1983) 10 A Crim R 1 .............................................................................................. [2.25.260]
R v Haidley [1984] VR 229 ...................................................... [2.20.20], [2.20.160], [2.20.280], [7.0.290]
R v Hakopian (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 11 December 1991) .... [7.10.170],
[7.10.370]
R v Haleth (1982) 4 Cr App R 178 .............................................................................................. [7.10.170]
R v Hall (1988) 36 A Crim R 368 .................................................................................................. [4.0.160]
R v Hallam (1985) 42 SASR 126 .................................................................................................. [10.15.40]
R v Hallam (1990) 49 A Crim R 316 ............................................................................................. [4.0.120]
R v Hallwood (unreported, Court of Appeal, 22 February 1990, 305/80) .......................... [2.05.550]
R v Hally [1962] Qd R 214 ............................. [2.15.560], [2.25.100], [4.0.390], [16.05.440], [16.05.600]
R v Hamitov (1979) 21 SASR 596 ................................................................................................. [7.0.450]
R v Hammer Ltd [1987] 1 CTC 199 ............................................................................................ [11.0.630]
R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359; [2000] NSWCCA 503 ........................................................ [12.15.160]
R v Harbour [1995] 1 NZLR 440 ................................................................................................... [7.0.490]
R v Harden [1963] 1 QB 8 ............................................................................................. [4.0.40], [12.10.80]
R v Hardie [1985] 1 WLR 64 ........................................................................................................ [13.0.200]
R v Harris [1927] 2 KB 587 ............................................................................................................ [6.0.120]
R v Harris [1990] VR 310 ............................................................................................................ [12.05.180]
R v Harris (1997) 94 A Crim R 454 ............................................................................................. [2.05.490]
R v Harris [2006] 1 Cr App R 5; [2005] EWCA Crim 1980 ...................................................... [3.15.10]
R v Harris (No 3) [1990] VR 310 ............................................................................ [2.10.140], [10.15.140]
R v Hartmann (1975) (3) SA 532 ..................................................................................................... [6.0.01]
R v Harvey (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, Beazley J, 11 December
1996) ............................................................................................................................................. [3.0.150]
R v Hatfield [1999] NSWSC 998 ................................................................................................. [13.0.400]
R v Haynes (1997) 121 CCC (3d) 1 ............................................................................................. [10.0.340]
R v Haywood [1971] VR 755 ..................................................................................................... [10.25.160]
R v Haywood (1994) 73 A Crim R 41 ............................................ [10.20.180], [10.20.200], [10.20.210]
R v Hector [1953] VLR 543 ........................................................................................................ [10.30.100]
R v Helpard (1979) 49 CCC (2d) 35 ........................................................................................... [10.0.360]
R v Hemsley [2004] NSWCCA 228 ............................................................................................. [7.10.190]
R v Henderson [2009] 7 WWR 489 ............................................................................................. [10.15.80]
R v Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287 ............................................................................................... [10.25.160]
lxvi
Table of Cases
R v Henry [1977] Qd R 204 ......................................................................................................... [2.20.280]

R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346; [1999] NSWCCA 111 .................. [2.30.120], [7.10.190], [7.10.230]
R v Henry [2006] 1 Cr App R 6 .................................................................................................. [10.0.160]
R v Hersey [1998] Crim LR 281; [1997] EWCA Crim 3106 ............................... [2.10.830], [10.15.150]
R v Hickey (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 27 September 1994) ................. [7.10.80]
R v Hickey (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 14 April 1992) .......................................... [10.30.220]
R v Hickey and Komljenovic (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, 16 October
1995) ........................................................................................................................................... [2.15.100]
R v Higgins (1994) 71 A Crim R 429 ............................................................................................ [5.0.350]
R v Higginson (1843) 1 C & K 129 ............................................................................................. [2.25.100]
R v Hodge (1985) 19 A Crim R 129 ............................................................................................ [10.25.80]
R v Hodges [2003] 2 Cr App R 15; [2003] EWCA Crim 290 ................................................... [13.0.80]
R v Hoey [2007] NICC 49 .......................................................................................................... [12.20.240]
R v Hohana (1993) 10 CRNZ 92 ................................................................................................... [2.15.30]
R v Holden (1838) 8 C & P 606 ..................................................................................................... [6.0.120]
R v Holden [2009] VSCA 254 ....................................................................................................... [11.10.01]
R v Holland (1981) 6 WCB 177 ................................................................................................... [10.0.360]
R v Holmes [1953] 1 WLR 686 .................................................................................................... [2.25.260]
R v Holmes (1953) 37 Cr App R 61 ............................................................................................ [2.25.260]
R v Holmes (2002) 169 CCC (3d) 344 ........................................................................................ [13.05.40]
R v Holt (unreported, High Court, 5 November 1996) ........................................................ [12.10.200]
R v Honner [1977] Tas SR 1 ................................................................... [2.25.260], [10.25.40], [13.0.200]
R v Hookway [1999] Crim LR 750 ........................................................................................... [12.05.340]
R v Horvath (1979) 93 DLR (3d) 1 ............................................................................................. [10.05.90]
R v Howe (1958) 100 CLR 448 .................................................................................................. [10.30.100]
R v Huckerby [2004] EWCA Crim 3251 ............................................................... [10.20.210], [10.25.40]
R v Humphrey (1999) 103 A Crim R 434 ........................................................... [12.20.370], [12.20.870]
R v Hurd (1988) 38 A Crim R 454 ................................................................................................ [7.10.60]
R v Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 526 ................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v Huynh (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, No 60032 of 1994, 13 May
1996) ........................................................................................................................................... [13.0.160]
R v I, R & T [2012] EWCA Crim 1288 ....................................................................................... [12.05.10]
R v INCO Ltd (2006) 80 OR (3d) 594 ......................................................................................... [2.05.150]
R v Ibrahim [2001] VSC 210 ...................................................................................................... [10.30.610]
R v Inch (1990) 91 Cr App R 51 ................................................................................. [2.05.310], [4.0.390]
R v Inhabitants of Eriswell (1790) 3 Term Rep 707 .................................................... [2.0.70], [2.35.40]
R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321 .................................................................................................. [2.35.360]
R v Ireland (No 2) [1971] SASR 6 ................................................................................................. [7.0.490]
R v Isequilla [1975] 1 All ER 77 .................................................................................................. [10.05.90]
R v Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255 ................................................................................................... [7.10.190]
R v J (1989) 53 CCC (3d) 64 ...................................................................................... [2.15.60], [10.30.490]
R v J (1990) 74 CR (3d) 269 ................................................................................... [10.30.480], [10.30.490]
R v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 ............................................................... [7.0.290], [10.30.240], [10.30.490]
R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600; 2000 SCC 51 ........ [1.0.01], [2.0.20], [2.0.10], [2.0.60], [2.0.65], [2.10.720],
[2.10.770], [2.15.10], [2.15.30], [3.05.120], [3.15.10], [4.0.390], [4.0.410], [10.0.360], [10.35.200],
[10.35.280], [10.35.340], [12.05.10]
R v J (FE) (1989) 53 CCC (3d) 64 .............................................................................................. [10.30.480]
R v J (FE) (1990) 74 CR (3d) 269 ..................................................................................................... [3.0.90]
R v JCG (2001) NSWCCA 504 ..................................................................................................... [12.20.90]
R v JH; R v TG (deceased) [2005] EWCA Crim 1828 ............................................................ [10.20.110]
R v Jamal (1993) 69 A Crim R 544 .................................................. [10.20.180], [10.20.200], [10.20.220]
R v Jamieson (1992) 60 A Crim R 68 .............................................................................................. [2.0.60]
R v Jarrett (1994) 62 SASR 443; 73 A Crim R 160 ................ [2.0.70], [2.35.80], [2.35.90], [12.05.220],
[12.20.860]
R v Jeffries (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 284 ........................................................................................... [10.05.90]
R v Jenkins; Ex parte Morrison [1949] VLR 277 ...................................... [6.0.90], [6.05.60], [6.05.120]
R v Jenkins; Ex parte Morrison (No 2) [1949] Argus LR 468 ................................................ [7.05.180]
R v Jenkyns (1993) 32 NSWLR 712 ..................................................................... [10.20.180], [10.20.200]
R v Jensen [2007] VSC 199 ........................................................................................................... [7.10.230]
R v Jiminez [1999] NSWCCA 7 ................................................................................................... [7.10.190]
R v John David (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 10 October 1995) ........................... [12.20.480]
R v Johnson (1847) 2 Car & K 354; 175 ER 146 ....................................................................... [2.20.480]
R v Johnson [1964] Qd R 1 ........................................................................................................ [10.30.100]
R v Johnston (1992) 69 CCC 395 ...................................... [2.10.480], [2.10.720], [2.10.770], [12.20.690]
R v Jones (1986) 22 A Crim R 42 .............................................................................................. [10.25.120]
R v Jones (1993) 70 A Crim R 449 .............................................................................................. [7.10.100]
R v Jones [2016] 2 Qd R 310; [2015] QCA 161 ......................................................................... [2.15.170]
lxvii
Expert Evidence
R v Jones (Harvey) (1979) 5 P Sess Rev 2059 ........................................................................... [7.05.520]

R v Joyce (2002) 173 FLR 322; [2002] NTSC 70 ............................ [12.05.220], [12.20.125], [12.20.890]
R v Jung [2006] NSWSC 658 .......................................................................................................... [3.0.152]
R v Jungarai (1981) 9 NTR 30 ........................................................................................................ [7.10.80]
R v Juric (2002) 4 VR 411; [2002] VSCA 77 .............. [2.0.70], [2.35.80], [2.35.90], [4.0.390], [7.0.450],
[12.05.220], [12.20.370], [12.20.890]
R v Juric [2003] VSC 382 ....................................................................................... [12.20.130], [12.20.890]
R v K(A) (1999) 45 OR (3d) 641 ............................................................................... [4.0.360], [10.30.480]
R v KAL [2013] QCA 317 ............................................................................................................... [9.10.80]
R v KAP (2016) 264 A Crim R 162; [2016] QCA 349 ................................................................. [4.0.240]
R v KB (1999) 176 NSR (2d) 283 ............................................................................................... [10.35.200]
R v Kagan (2007) 261 NSR (2d) 285 ........................................................................................... [7.10.230]
R v Kai-Whitewind [2005] 2 Cr App R 31; [2005] EWCA 1092 .............................................. [9.0.320]
R v Kanaan (2005) 64 NSWLR 527; [2005] NSWCCA 385 ..................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1; [2001] SASC 64 ...... [2.0.25], [2.05.490], [2.20.40], [2.20.60], [2.35.80],
[2.35.90], [7.05.180], [12.05.220], [12.20.20], [12.20.370], [12.20.460], [12.20.470], [12.20.880]
R v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135; [2002] SASC 294 ................................................................... [12.20.80]
R v Keating (1993) 65 A Crim R 315 ........................................................................................ [10.45.760]
R v Keir (2002) 127 A Crim R 198; [2002] NSWCCA 30 ......................................................... [12.20.90]
R v Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399 ......................................................................................................... [10.25.160]
R v Khallouf [1981] VR 360 ........................................................................................ [2.25.40], [2.25.260]
R v Kilmartin (1989) 41 A Crim R 22 ......................................................................................... [7.10.250]
R v King [1983] 1 WLR 411; 1 All ER 929 ................................................................ [5.0.350], [5.10.200]
R v Kingston [1986] 2 Qd R 114 .................................................................................................. [7.05.520]
R v Kingswell (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 2 September 1998) ............ [13.0.240]
R v Klamo (2008) 18 VR 644; [2008] VSCA 75 ........................................................................... [4.0.160]
R v Klassen 2003 MBQB 253 ........................................................................................................ [2.05.150]
R v Klymchuk (2005) 203 CCC (3d) 341 ...................... [10.35.10], [10.35.90], [10.35.200], [10.35.280],
[10.35.340], [13.0.180], [13.05.40]
R v Klymchuk [2006] OJ No 4166 ............................................................................................. [10.35.280]
R v Klymchuk 2008 CanLII 23495 .................................................... [10.35.10], [10.35.280], [10.35.340]
R v Knight (2001) 120 A Crim R 381; [2001] NSWCCA 114 ................................................ [12.15.240]
R v Knight (2001) 160 FLR 465; [2001] NSWCCA 114 .......................................................... [12.15.160]
R v Kontinnen (unreported, SA Supreme Court, 30 March 1992) ................. [10.30.220], [10.30.800]
R v Kostuck (1969) 29 CCC 190 .................................................................................................. [10.0.360]
R v Kotzmann [1999] 2 VR 123; [1999] VSCA 27 ................................................ [12.20.130], [13.0.400]
R v Krausch (1913) 15 GLR 664 ................................................................................. [2.10.40], [12.10.40]
R v Kray (1969) 53 Crim App R 412 .......................................................................................... [11.0.220]
R v Kucma (2005) 11 VR 472; [2005] VSCA 58 ........................................................................... [10.0.80]
R v Kyselka (1962) 133 CCC 103 ........................................................................... [10.0.360], [10.20.210]
R v LM [2004] QCA 192 ............................................................................................ [2.35.120], [10.0.600]
R v LRG (2006) 16 VR 89; [2006] VSCA 288 ............................................................................... [4.0.240]
R v Lafferty (1992) 80 CCC (3d) 150 ........................................................................................ [12.20.480]
R v Lam (2002) 121 A Crim R 272 .............................................................................................. [2.05.490]
R v Lam (2002) 135 A Crim R 302; [2002] NSWCCA 377 ...................................................... [13.0.160]
R v Lam (No 18) [2005] VSC 292 .................................................................................................. [4.0.240]
R v Lane (2007) 176 A Crim R 471; [2007] VSCA 222 ............................................................. [7.10.170]
R v Lange [2007] SASC 243 ....................................................................................................... [10.45.680]
R v Lanigan [1987] NI 367 ........................................................................................................... [2.20.200]
R v Larmour [2004] NICC 4 ........................................................................................................ [7.10.265]
R v Latta [1985] 2 NZLR 504 ....................................................................................................... [7.10.470]
R v Lauritsen (2000) 114 A Crim R 333 ..................................................................................... [7.10.190]
R v Lavallee (1990) 55 CCC (3d) 97 .............. [2.10.770], [2.15.60], [2.15.400], [2.20.280], [10.20.130],
[10.20.200], [10.30.100], [10.30.220], [10.30.240]
R v Lavallee (2011) SKQB 299 ..................................................................................................... [10.15.80]
R v Laverty (No 2) (1979) 47 CCC (2d) 60 ................................................................. [4.0.420], [7.0.490]
R v Lavery (No 2) (1979) 20 SASR 430 ........................................................................................ [7.0.570]
R v Lawless [1974] VR 398 ......................................................................... [4.0.40], [12.10.40], [12.10.80]
R v Layton (1849) 4 Cox CC 149 ................................................................................ [2.25.01], [2.25.260]
R v Leach (2004) 14 NTLR 44; [2004] NTSC 60 ....................................................................... [7.10.230]
R v Lean (1993) 66 A Crim R 296 ............................................................................................. [10.30.100]
R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133 ........................................................................................ [2.35.360], [10.05.90]
R v Lee (1989) 42 A Crim R 393 .............................................................. [2.05.310], [2.20.20], [2.20.160]
R v Legere (1994) 95 CCC (3d) 139 .......................................................................................... [12.10.360]
R v Leigh (1996) 86 A Crim R 261 .............................................................................................. [7.10.230]
R v Leilua [1986] NZ Recent Law 118 ..................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v Lepore [2013] SASCFC 13 ..................................................................................................... [7.10.265]
lxviii
Table of Cases
R v Leroy [1984] 2 NSWLR 441 ................................................................................. [4.0.40], [12.15.280]

R v Letteri (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 18 March 1992) .... [7.10.190], [7.10.250]
R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287 ................... [2.05.270], [3.0.10], [10.15.130],
[10.15.140]
R v Leusenkamp (2003) 40 MVR 108; [2003] VSCA 193 .......................................................... [4.0.240]
R v Lewis (1987) 29 A Crim R 267 .............. [2.10.140], [2.35.140], [4.0.390], [12.20.820], [12.20.830],
[12.20.860]
R v Liddle (1928) 21 Cr App R 3 .................................................................................................. [6.0.120]
R v Lieu (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 486 ........................................................................................... [10.25.40]
R v Likiardopoulos [2009] VSC 217 ............................................................................................ [11.10.01]
R v Lindsay [1970] NZLR 1002 ................................................................................................... [13.05.40]
R v Lisoff [1999] NSWCCA 364 ..................................................................... [2.0.25], [2.35.80], [2.35.90]
R v Liu (2004) 190 CCC (3d) 233 .................................................................................................. [9.10.80]
R v Lloyd [1967] 1 QB 175 ........................................................................................................... [13.0.200]
R v Lo Presti [1992] 1 VR 696 .......................................................................................................... [4.0.40]
R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24 .................................................................................................... [2.35.240]
R v Lorenz (unreported, ACT Supreme Court, 18 August 1998) ....................................... [10.30.100]
R v Loughran [1999] Crim LR 404 ............................................................................................. [10.25.40]
R v Lowe [1997] 2 VR 465 ............................................................................................................ [5.10.400]
R v Lowe [2016] SASCFC 118 ...................................................................................................... [13.05.40]
R v Lucas (1982) 9 A Crim R 268 ................................................................................................ [7.10.270]
R v Lucas [1992] 2 VR 109; (1992) 55 A Crim R 361 ....... [2.05.110], [2.35.90], [7.0.450], [12.05.220],
[12.20.370], [12.20.830], [12.20.860], [12.20.890]
R v Lucky (1974) 12 SASR 136 ...................................................................................................... [7.10.50]
R v Lundy [2014] NZHC 2527 .................................................................................................... [2.10.720]
R v Lupien (1970) 2 CCC 193; 9 DLR (3d) 1; [1970] SCR 263 ............................................. [10.35.200]
R v Lupien [1970] SCR 263 .......................................................................................................... [10.25.40]
R v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31; [2004] EWCA Crim R 1344 ......... [1.0.01], [2.10.100], [2.10.830],
[3.15.10], [10.15.150], [12.05.490]
R v Lyons (1987) 37 CCC (3d) 1 ................................................................................................. [7.10.410]
R v M [1976] Qd R 344 ................................................................................................................. [10.0.360]
R v M [2002] QCA 464 ................................................................................................................ [10.10.200]
R v M(W) (1997) 115 CCC (3d) 233 ......................................................................... [2.15.10], [10.20.120]
R v MCO [2018] QCA 140 ............................................................................................................ [7.10.230]
R v M’Naghten (1843) 10 Cl & F 200 ......................................................................................... [10.25.80]
R v MacKenney (1983) 76 Cr App R 271 ................................................................. [10.0.80], [10.0.360]
R v Mackenney (1981) 76 r App R 271 ...................................................................................... [10.0.360]
R v Madigan [2005] NSWCCA 170 ....................................................................... [10.15.160], [13.0.280]
R v Maguire [1992] 1 QB 936 ..................................................................................... [2.35.410], [5.0.350]
R v Mahomed [2015] NZCA 419 ................................................................................................... [3.05.80]
R v Majdalawi (2000) 113 A Crim R 241; [2000] NSWCCA 240 .......................................... [10.25.120]
R v Majors (1991) 54 A Crim R 334 .............................................................................................. [7.10.50]
R v Makoare [2001] 1 NZLR 318 .................................................................................................... [3.0.30]
R v Malboeuf [1997] OJ No 1398 .............................................................................................. [10.35.200]
R v Mallinder (1986) 23 A Crim R 179 ...................................................................................... [7.10.370]
R v Man (1990) 50 A Crim R 79 .................................................................................................... [7.10.20]
R v Manson [1974] Qd R 191 ....................................................................................................... [11.0.220]
R v Maragh (2003) 59 WCB (2d) 126 ......................................................................................... [10.15.80]
R v Markus [1974] 3 WLR 645 ...................................................................................................... [7.10.70]
R v Marquard [1993] 4 SCR 223; (1993) 85 CCC (3d) 193 ............... [2.05.310], [7.05.180], [10.0.360],
[10.0.380], [10.20.210], [10.20.230], [10.30.480], [10.30.680]
R v Martin (No 1) (2005) 159 A Crim R 314; [2005] VSC 518 ............................................... [10.25.80]
R v Martinez (1984) 6 Cr App R (S) 364 ................................................................................... [7.10.470]
R v Masih (unreported, English Court of Appeal, 27 January 1986); [1986] Crim LR
395 .............................................................................................................................................. [10.0.160]
R v Mason (1911) 7 Cr App R 67 ............................................................ [2.05.310], [2.25.260], [9.0.280]
R v Massey (1994) 62 SASR 481 ............................................................................... [2.15.170], [10.0.200]
R v Matheson [1958] 2 All ER 87; 42 Cr App R 145 ................................................ [4.0.160], [4.0.430]
R v Matthey (2007) 177 A Crim R 470; [2007] VSC 398 ......................................... [9.0.320], [12.25.01]
R v Matusevich and Thompson [1976] VR 470 .......................................................................... [4.0.240]
R v Mawbey (1796) 6 Term Rep 619 ............................................................................................ [8.0.460]
R v May [1997] EWCA Crim 467 .............................................................................................. [10.20.110]
R v Maynard (1979) 69 Cr App R 309 ..................................................................................... [12.20.820]
R v McAllister (1984) 1 CRNZ 248 ............................................................................................. [13.0.200]
R v McCarthy [1992] 2 NZLR 550 ................................................................................................ [3.05.10]
R v McCartney [1976] 1 NZLR 472 ............................................................................................ [13.05.40]
R v McCormack [1981] VR 104 ................................................................................................... [7.10.270]
lxix
Expert Evidence
R v McCracken (1988) 38 A Crim R 92 ...................................................................................... [7.10.120]

R v McDonald (1988) 38 A Crim R 470 ..................................................................................... [7.10.100]
R v McEndoo (1981) 5 A Crim R 52 .................. [2.15.10], [2.15.100], [2.15.130], [2.25.260], [4.0.410],
[10.0.340]
R v McFarlane [1992] 3 NZLR 424 ............................................................................................. [7.10.470]
R v McFelin [1985] 2 NZLR 750 ...................................................... [10.20.180], [10.20.200], [10.20.220]
R v McGarvie (1986) 5 NSWLR 270 ......................................................................................... [10.25.120]
R v McGregor [1962] NZLR 1069 ............................................................................................. [10.30.100]
R v McHardie [1983] 2 NSWLR 733 ............. [2.10.140], [4.0.410], [10.0.460], [10.15.140], [12.05.180]
R v McIntosh (1997) 35 OR (3d) 97; 117 CCC (3d) 385 ..................................... [10.15.80], [10.20.120]
R v McIntyre [2001] NSWSC 311 ................................... [3.0.157], [12.05.220], [12.20.470], [12.20.880]
R v McKay [1967] NZLR 139 .................................................................................... [2.20.280], [10.0.430]
R v McLean [1991] 1 Qd R 231 .................................................................................... [2.35.05], [2.35.80]
R v McMahon (1953) Cr App R 95 ............................................................................................... [6.0.120]
R v McMillan (1975) 29 CRNS 191 ............................................................................................. [10.25.40]
R v McMillan (1976) 23 CCC (2d) 160 ....................................................................................... [2.15.100]
R v McNair (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, 8 May 1997) ..................................... [12.0.300]
R v McNeill (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, 8 October 1996) ...... [10.45.210], [10.45.400],
[10.45.760]
R v McNeill (No 2) [2007] NFSC 3 ...................................................................... [12.20.230], [12.20.370]
R v Meads [1996] Crim L Rev 519 .............................................................................................. [12.15.40]
R v Meddings [1966] VR 306 ....................................................................................................... [10.25.80]
R v Medvedew (1978) 43 CCC (3d) 434 ............................................................... [2.10.770], [10.15.150]
R v Melaragni (1992) 73 CCC (3d) 348 ................................. [2.0.60], [2.05.430], [2.10.720], [2.10.770]
R v Melaragni (1992) 76 CCC (3d) 348 ........................................................................................ [2.15.60]
R v Menzies [1982] 1 NZLR 40; [1982] NZCA 19 ........ [2.05.270], [7.0.450], [10.15.130], [10.15.140],
[13.0.280]
R v Merritt [1999] NSWCCA 29 .................................................................................................. [13.0.400]
R v Merryment (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, Street CJ, 27 March
1980) ........................................................................................................................................... [2.20.480]
R v Meyboom (2011) 208 A Crim R 551; [2011] ACTSC 13 ...................... [12.20.213A], [12.20.213B],
[12.20.213C], [12.20.213D]
R v Miaponoose (1996) 30 OR (3d) 419 ..................................................................................... [10.15.80]
R v Michaux [1984] 2 Qd R 159 .................................................................................................... [4.0.430]
R v Mickelberg (1984) 13 A Crim R 365 ...................................................................................... [7.10.60]
R v Miers [1967] Qd R 547 ............................................................................................................. [4.0.370]
R v Milat (1996) 87 A Crim R 446 ........ [12.20.300], [12.20.370], [12.20.490], [12.20.850], [12.20.870]
R v Millar (1989) 49 CCC (3d) 193 ........................................................................ [2.05.310], [10.30.480]
R v Miller (1995) 81 A Crim R 278 ....................................................... [7.10.220], [7.10.265], [7.10.370]
R v Millward [1985] 1 WLR 532 ................................................................................................... [8.0.460]
R v Minnani (2005) 63 NSWLR 490; [2009] NSWCCA 226 .................................................... [10.25.40]
R v Minor (1992) 59 A Crim R 227 ............................................................................................... [7.10.80]
R v Mitchell [1974] VR 629 .......................................................................................................... [7.10.170]
R v Mitchell (1997) 98 A Crim R 32 .......................................................................... [2.0.25], [12.20.370]
R v Miyatatawuy (1996) 135 FLR 173 .......................................................................................... [7.10.80]
R v Moase (1989) 51 CCC (3d) 77 .......................................................................... [2.20.380], [10.20.210]
R v Mohan (1992) 71 CCC (3d) 321 .................................................... [2.15.60], [10.20.230], [10.30.680]
R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402 ...... [1.0.01], [2.0.01], [2.0.03], [2.0.20], [2.0.60],
[2.0.65], [2.10.770], [2.15.30], [2.15.60], [2.25.01], [3.15.10], [2.25.500], [10.0.360], [10.15.80],
[10.20.120], [10.30.480], [10.35.10], [10.35.200], [10.35.280], [10.35.340], [12.05.10], [12.05.30],
[12.05.260], [15.0.240]
R v Molnar (1990) 55 CCC (3d) 446 ............................................................................................. [4.0.420]
R v Montgomery [1966] NI 120 .................................................................................................. [13.05.40]
R v Mooney (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, 21 June 1978) .................................... [7.10.190]
R v Moore [1982] 1 NZLR 242 ................................................................................. [10.0.160], [10.25.40]
R v Morgan (1996) 87 A Crim R 104 .......................................................................................... [7.10.100]
R v Morgentaler (No 2) (1973) 14 CCC (2d) 450 ....................................................................... [2.05.70]
R v Morhall [1995] 3 All ER 659 ............................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v Morin (1988) 44 CCC (3d) 193; [1988] 2 SCR 345 .......................................................... [10.35.200]
R v Morris (1983) 7 CCC (3d) 97; 1 DLR (4th) 385; [1983] 2 SCR 190 ................................. [2.10.770]
R v Munday (Ruling No 1) [2016] VSC 26 ............................................................................... [10.05.90]
R v Muratovic [1967] Qd R 15 .................................................................................................. [10.30.100]
R v Murdoch (No 4) (2005) 195 FLR 421; [2005] NTSC 78 ............................. [12.05.430], [12.05.440]
R v Murdock (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 14 December 1987), p 76 .... [2.15.10]
R v Murphy (1969) 4 DLR (3d) 289 .............................................................................................. [11.0.01]
R v Murphy (1980) 71 Cr App R 33 ............................................................................................. [4.0.380]
R v Murray (1982) 7 A Crim R 48 .............................................................................................. [10.0.460]
lxx
Table of Cases
R v Musicka (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 11 April 1995) ................ [7.10.250]
R v Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1 .............................................................................. [10.25.180]
R v Myrie (2003) 57 WCB (2d) 72 ............................................................................................... [10.15.80]
R v N, GF and N, SG (No 2) [2010] SASC 8 .......................................................................... [12.10.390]
R v NCT (2009) 26 VR 247; [2009] VSCA 240 ................................... [4.0.160], [10.10.120], [10.10.220]
R v Narayan [1996] EWCA Crim 1623 ........................................................................................ [9.05.01]
R v Nedrick [1997] EWCA Crim 190 .......................................................................................... [11.20.80]
R v Neil [1957] SCR 685; 11 DLR (2d) 545 ................................................................................ [2.25.260]
R v Neilan [1992] 1 VR 57 .............................................................................................................. [7.0.490]
R v Neville (1960) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 501 ............................................................................ [2.15.400]
R v Newell (1980) 71 Cr App R 331 ......................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v Newman [2011] SASCFC 36 ............................................................................................... [12.10.390]
R v Ngo (2001) 122 A Crim R 467; [2001] NSWSC 595 .......................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Ngo (2003) 57 NSWLR 55; [2003] NSWCCA 82 ............................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Nguyen [2003] NSWSC 1068 ................................................................................................ [13.0.400]
R v Nichols (1991) 57 A Crim R 391 ............................................................................................ [7.10.70]
R v Nielsen (1984) 16 CCC (3d) 39 ........................................................................................... [12.10.120]
R v Nielsen (1990) 47 A Crim R 268 ........................................................................................ [10.45.720]
R v Nikitin (2003) 176 CCC (3d) 225 ......................................................................................... [13.0.360]
R v Nilsson [2000] NZCA 144 ..................................................................................................... [7.10.220]
R v Nolan (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, 2 December 1998) .... [7.10.230]
R v Noll [1999] 3 VR 704; [1999] VSCA 164 ......................................... [2.05.70], [2.20.40], [12.20.370]
R v Noonan [2002] NSWCCA 150 .............................................................................................. [13.0.400]
R v Norman (1993) 87 CCC (3d) 153 .................................................................. [10.20.230], [10.30.680]
R v Norman [2008] EWCA Crim 1810 ....................................................................................... [7.10.265]
R v Norris [2007] VSCA 241 ........................................................................................................ [7.10.250]
R v O’Brien (1994) 12 CRNZ 237 .................................................................................................. [3.05.90]
R v O’Brien [2003] NSWCCA 121 ............................................................................................. [10.30.100]
R v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 441 .................................................................................. [2.15.10], [10.0.340]
R v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 676 ................................................................. [4.0.40], [12.10.40], [12.10.80]
R v O’Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64 ............................................................................................... [13.0.200]
R v O’Doherty [2003] 1 Cr App R 5 ............................................... [10.15.140], [10.15.150], [12.05.180]
R v O’Donnell (1936) 65 CCC 299 ................................................................................................ [7.0.450]
R v O’Neill [2001] VSCA 227 ......................................................................................................... [4.0.250]
R v O’Sullivan [1969] 1 WLR 497 ................................................................................................. [7.0.450]
R v Oakley [1979] RTR 417 .......................................................................................................... [2.05.490]
R v Oakley (1980) 70 Cr App R 7 ................................................................................................. [4.0.380]
R v Oinonen (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 6 April 1998) ........................................... [13.0.400]
R v Olbrich (1999) 108 A Crim R 464 ........................................................................................... [7.10.20]
R v Olscamp (1994) 95 CCC (3d) 466 ...................................................................................... [10.30.480]
R v Ormsby [1985] 1 NZLR 3 ...................................................................................................... [10.15.40]
R v Osborne [2010] EWCA Crim 547 ......................................................................................... [7.10.230]
R v Ostojic (1978) 18 SASR 188 ................................................................................................... [10.05.90]
R v Owen (No 2) [1964] NZLR 828 .......................................................................................... [10.10.280]
R v Oxford (1840) 4 St Tr (NS) 498 ............................................................................................. [10.25.80]
R v Oxford (1840) 9 Car & P 525; 173 ER 941 .......................................................................... [10.25.80]
R v Oznek [2007] VSC 192 ........................................................................................................... [7.10.210]
R v P (1992) 39 FCR 276 ............................................................................................................... [7.10.370]
R v P (2001) 53 NSWLR 664; [2001] NSWCA 473 ....................................................................... [5.0.50]
R v P(H) (1992) 15 CR (4th) 121 ................................................................................................ [10.30.480]
R v Pabon [2018] EWCA Crim 420 ................................................................................................. [1.0.10]
R v Palmer [1981] 1 NSWLR 209 ........................................................ [2.25.260], [2.25.540], [10.25.200]
R v Palmieri (1997) 91 A Crim R 120 ....................................................................................... [10.45.760]
R v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554 ............ [2.10.140], [4.0.360], [7.05.180], [12.05.220], [12.20.300],
[12.20.370], [12.20.480], [12.20.490], [12.20.850], [12.20.870], [12.25.01]
R v Papandrea [1999] NSWSC 978 ............................................................................................. [13.0.400]
R v Parenzee (2007) 248 LSJS 99; [2007] SASC 143 ................................................................... [9.0.240]
R v Parenzee [2007] SASC 142 ...................................................................................................... [2.05.30]
R v Parenzee (2007) SASR 456; [2007] SASC 316 ....................................................................... [9.0.240]
R v Parker [1912] VLR 152 ................... [2.0.60], [2.05.30], [2.10.40], [4.0.390], [12.05.100], [12.10.40],
[12.10.80], [16.05.160]
R v Parks (1992) 75 CCC (3d) 287 ............................................................................................ [10.25.160]
R v Parnell (1983) 9 CCC (3d) 353 ................................................................................................ [4.0.420]
R v Pathare [1981] 1 NSWLR 124 ................................................................................................... [4.0.40]
R v Pearce (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 1 November 1996) .................. [7.10.190]
R v Pearson [2004] NSWCCA 129 .............................................................................................. [7.10.190]
R v Pedley (1784) 1 Leach 325; 168 ER 265 ................................................................................ [8.0.460]
lxxi
Expert Evidence
R v Peirce [1992] 1 VR 273 ............................................................................................................. [2.35.80]

R v Peisley (1990) 54 A Crim R 42 ............................................................................................... [10.0.80]
R v Pengelly (1991) 7 CRNZ 333; [1992] 1 NZLR 545 .......................................................... [12.20.780]
R v Penn (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 9 May 1994) ........ [7.10.20], [7.10.370]
R v Perez-Vargas (1986) 8 NSWLR 559 ...................................................................................... [7.10.100]
R v Perlett [1999] OJ No 1695 .................................................................................................... [10.35.200]
R v Perlett (2006) 212 CCC (3d) 11 ........................................................................................... [10.20.120]
R v Perry (1990) 49 A Crim R 243 ........................................... [2.15.10], [2.15.30], [2.20.20], [2.20.160]
R v Perry (No 4) (1981) 28 SASR 119 ....................................................... [2.05.20], [3.0.10], [11.05.240]
R v Peruta (1992) 78 CCC (3d) 350 ............................................................................................... [7.0.570]
R v Petecherini (1855) 7 Cox CC 7 ........................................................................ [2.20.380], [10.20.210]
R v Peters (1886) 16 QBD 636 ...................................................................................................... [2.15.460]
R v Peters [2002] NSWSC 1234 ................................................................................................. [10.30.100]
R v Petroulias (No 36) [2008] NSWSC 626 .............................................................. [7.10.230], [10.0.80]
R v Pfennig (1992) 57 SASR 507 .................................................................................................. [2.05.110]
R v Pfennig [2018] SASCFC 27 .................................................................................................. [12.20.125]
R v Pham [2005] NSWCCA 9 ...................................................................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Phillion (1977) 33 CCC (2d) 535 .......................................................................................... [2.20.280]
R v Pipeline News Ltd (1971) 5 CCC (2d) 71 ....................................... [11.0.01], [11.0.160], [11.0.630]
R v Pipeline News (1972) 1 WWR 241 ......................................................................................... [11.0.60]
R v Pitt (1968) 3 CCC 342 .......................................................................................................... [10.20.200]
R v Platt [1981] Crim LR 332 ......................................................................................................... [4.0.420]
R v Podola [1960] 1 QB 325 ......................................................................................................... [10.10.80]
R v Podola (1960) 43 Cr App R 220 ........................................................................................... [10.05.40]
R v Polanski [2005] SASC 361 ..................................................................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Porritt [2008] ACTSC 33 ........................................................................................................ [7.10.230]
R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182 ...................................................................................................... [10.25.80]
R v Prairie Schooner News Ltd (1970) 75 WWR 585; (1971) 1 CCC (2d) 251 ................... [2.15.400],
[11.0.01], [11.0.60], [11.0.160], [11.0.630]
R v Presser [1958] VR 45 ......................................................................................... [2.25.260], [10.10.120]
R v Price [1981] Tas R 301 ............................................................................................................ [13.0.200]
R v Pritchard (1836) 7 C & P 103; 173 ER 135 ......................................................................... [10.10.80]
R v Purdy [1982] 2 NSWLR 964 ................................................................................................ [10.25.120]
R v Quashia (2005) 198 CCC (3d) 337 ......................................................................................... [9.10.80]
R v Quesada (2001) 122 A Crim R 218; [2001] NSWCCA 216 ................................ [3.0.30], [10.0.320]
R v Quick [1973] 1 QB 91 ........................................................................................................... [10.25.160]
R v Quick [1973] QV 910 ............................................................................................................ [10.25.160]
R v Quinn [1961] 3 All ER 88 ........................................................................................................ [7.0.450]
R v R (1992) 73 CCC (3d) 225 ............................................................. [2.15.60], [10.30.480], [10.30.490]
R v R [1994] 1 WLR 758 ................................................................................................................. [5.0.350]
R v R (1994) 11 CRNZ 402 .................................................................................... [10.20.230], [10.30.690]
R v RAC (1990) 57 CCC 3d 522 ................................................................................. [3.0.90], [10.30.490]
R v Raby (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, 31 October 1994) .................................. [10.30.220]
R v Radford (1985) 20 A Crim R 388; 42 SASR 266 ...................... [10.25.80], [10.25.160], [10.45.640]
R v Rahme [2004] NSWCCA 233 .................................................................................................. [3.0.165]
R v Ramsay [2012] ABCA 257 ..................................................................................................... [7.10.260]
R v Ranger (2003) 178 CCC (3d) 375 ......... [10.35.10], [10.35.90], [10.35.280], [10.35.340], [13.0.180]
R v Rawcliffe [1977] 1 NSWLR 219 ............................................................................................ [11.0.220]
R v Redenbach (1991) 52 A Crim R 95 ........................................................................................ [7.10.90]
R v Reed [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 ................................................................... [12.20.213D], [12.20.240]
R v Reed [2010] 1 Cr App R 23; [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 ............................... [12.05.10], [12.20.220]
R v Reed (unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, 23 May 1996) ................................... [7.05.180]
R v Rees [2000] NSWSC 544 ................................................................................................... [12.20.213D]
R v Reid [2009] NZCA 281 ......................................................................................................... [12.20.240]
R v Reynolds [1989] Crim LR 220 .............................................................................................. [10.0.380]
R v Richards (1858) 1 F & F 87; 175 ER 638 ............................................................ [2.25.01], [2.25.260]
R v Richards (2001) 123 A Crim R 14; [2001] NSWCCA 160 ................................................... [3.0.170]
R v Richards (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, 6 August 1981) ................................ [7.10.370]
R v Richardson [1981] BCL 697 ................................................................................................... [7.10.470]
R v Riscuta [2003] NSWCCA 6 ................................................................................................. [10.15.160]
R v Roadley (1990) 51 A Crim R 336 ......................................................................................... [7.10.250]
R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161 ..................... [1.0.01], [2.05.190], [2.10.100], [3.15.10], [10.15.150],
[12.05.490]
R v Roberts [1954] 2 QB 329 ........................................................................................................ [10.10.80]
R v Roberts [2000] Crim LR 183 ............................................................................ [2.10.830], [10.15.150]
R v Robertson (1968) 62 Cr App R 690 ..................................................................................... [10.10.80]
R v Robertson (1975) 21 CCC (2d) 385 ...................................................................................... [10.25.40]
lxxii
Table of Cases
R v Robinson (1994) 98 Cr App R 370 .................................................................. [10.0.360], [10.20.210]

R v Rodriguez [2010] NSWSC 198 ............................................................................................... [4.0.160]
R v Rongonui [2000] NZCA 273 ............................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v Rose (1993) 69 A Crim R 1 .............................................................................. [2.05.490], [12.10.390]
R v Rosik [1971] 2 OR 47; 2 CCC (3d) 351 ............................................................ [2.20.280], [10.0.360]
R v Rosser (1836) 7 C & P 648; 173 ER 284 ................................................................................ [2.30.02]
R v Rowe (1982) 7 A Crim R 39 .................................................................................................... [7.10.60]
R v Rowe [2004] SASC 424 .......................................................................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Runjanjic (1991) 53 A Crim R 362 ............. [2.10.140], [2.10.500], [4.0.410], [7.10.80], [10.45.700]
R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114 ...................... [2.15.10], [2.15.60], [2.15.100], [2.15.170], [2.15.400],
[2.35.110], [10.15.170], [10.20.130], [10.20.200], [10.30.50], [10.30.100], [10.30.220], [10.30.490]
R v Russell (1994) 95 CCC (3d) 190 ......................................................................................... [10.30.680]
R v Ryan (1993) 80 CCC (3d) 514 ................................................................................................. [2.15.60]
R v Ryan (1995) 90 A Crim R 191 ............................................................................ [4.0.120], [10.25.120]
R v Ryan [2002] VSCA 176 .......................................... [12.05.220], [12.20.290], [12.20.300], [12.20.370]
R v Ryan (2013) 353 DLR (4th) 387 .......................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v Rye (2007) 178 A Crim R 345; [2007] VSCA 247 ............................................................. [12.20.230]
R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 .............................................................................................................. [10.25.80]
R v S [1995] 3 NZLR 674 ................................................................................................................ [3.05.90]
R v SCB (1997) 119 CCC (3d) 530 ............................................................................................. [10.35.200]
R v SJRC [2007] NSWCCA 142 ..................................................................................................... [3.0.165]
R v SMR [2002] NSWCCA 258 .................................................................................................... [12.10.40]
R v Salama [1999] NSWCCA 105 ................................................................................................ [13.0.400]
R v Sams (1990) 46 A Crim R 468 ................................................................................................... [4.0.40]
R v Sandford (1994) 33 NSWLR 172 .............................................................................................. [7.0.40]
R v Sang [1980] AC 402 ............................................................................................. [2.35.05], [10.20.200]
R v Sanghera 2012 BCSC 995 ...................................................................................................... [13.0.170]
R v Saxon [1998] 1 VR 503 ........................................................................................................... [10.15.40]
R v Schafferius [1977] Qd R 213 ................................................................................................. [2.20.280]
R v Schlesinger (1847) 10 QB 670; 116 ER 255 ........................................................................... [8.0.460]
R v Schmit (1992) 8 CRNZ 376 ................................................................................................. [10.30.470]
R v Schultz (1981) 5 A Crim R 234 .................................... [2.15.160], [2.25.260], [10.0.160], [10.0.200]
R v Scognamiglio (1991) 56 A Crim R 81 .................................................................................. [7.10.250]
R v Scopelliti [1981] 34 OR (2d) 524 .......................................................................................... [10.0.360]
R v Scott [2003] NSWSC 627 ..................................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v Scott (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, Tadgell, Charles and Southwell JJ,
19 February 1996) .................................................................................................................... [7.10.190]
R v Sebalj [2003] VSC 181 ............................................................................................................ [10.25.80]
R v Sebalj [2006] VSCA 106 ...................................................................................... [7.10.200], [7.10.210]
R v Seifert (1956) 73 WN (NSW) 358 ....................................................................................... [16.05.160]
R v Sekhon [2014] 1 SCR 272; 2014 SCC 15 ................................................................................ [13.0.90]
R v Serra (1997) 92 A Crim R 511 ............................................................................................... [12.05.01]
R v Sewell (1981) 5 A Crim R 204 ................................................................................................ [7.10.90]
R v Shafia (2016) 341 CCC (3d) 354 ............................................................................................ [11.15.40]
R v Shamouil (2006) 66 NSWLR 228; [2006] NSWCCA 112 ................. [2.35.80], [3.0.157], [3.0.165],
[13.0.280]
R v Sharp [2012] QCA 342 ............................................................................................................. [4.0.250]
R v Shepherd (1988) 85 ALR 387 ................................................................................................ [12.25.01]
R v Sheppard 2002 MBQB 99 ...................................................................................................... [10.15.80]
R v Shields [1967] VR 706 ............................................................................................................ [2.25.260]
R v Siddiqui (2004) BCSC 1717 ..................................................................................................... [9.10.80]
R v Silcot, Braithwaite and Raghip , the Court of Appeal (unreported, ............................. [7.10.250]
R v Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766 .................................................................................................... [2.05.450]
R v Simmonds (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 29 October 1992) ....... [10.15.40]
R v Simon (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Vince Bruce J, 21 July 1995) ................... [10.45.760]
R v Sinclair (1990) 51 A Crim R 418 ........................................................................................... [7.10.170]
R v Sing (2002) 54 NSWLR 31; [2002] NSWCCA 20 .................. [12.05.220], [12.20.290], [12.20.300],
[12.20.370]
R v Singleton (1994) 72 A Crim R 117 ..................................................................................... [10.30.240]
R v Skalij (1972) 2 P Sess Rev ...................................................................................................... [7.05.520]
R v Skinner (1772) Lofft 54; 98 ER 529 .......................................................................................... [8.0.40]
R v Skirving [1985] 2 WLR 1001 ............................................................. [2.15.100], [4.0.390], [13.0.200]
R v Skura [2004] VSCA 53 ........................................................................................................... [7.10.210]
R v Slattery [2002] NSWCCA 367 ............................................................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Smart (2008) 182 A Crim R 490; [2008] VSC 79 ............................................... [2.0.07], [12.10.380]
R v Smit (1952) 3 SA 447 ............................................................................................................ [12.15.120]
R v Smith (1915) 11 Cr App R 234 ............................................................................................... [2.25.01]
lxxiii
Expert Evidence
R v Smith [1984]
1 NSWLR 462 ................................................................................................ [10.15.130]
R v Smith (1984)
12 A Crim R 439 ........................................................................................... [12.20.820]
R v Smith (1986)
7 NSWLR 444 ................................................................................................ [10.15.130]
R v Smith (1987)
44 SASR 587 ..................................................................................................... [7.10.100]
R v Smith [1987]
VR 907 ................ [2.15.10], [2.15.30], [2.15.340], [10.15.70], [10.15.80], [10.15.140],
[10.20.100], [10.20.200]
R v Smith [1989] 3 NZLR 405 ..................................................................................... [2.20.280], [3.05.10]
R v Smith (1998) 104 A Crim R 1 ............................................................................................. [12.20.370]
R v Smith [1998] 4 All ER 387 ................................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v Smith (2000) 116 A Crim R 1; [2000] NSWCCA 388 ................................... [10.15.70], [10.20.102]
R v Smith (unreported, WA Court of Criminal Appeal, 2 June 1994) ................................. [7.10.170]
R v Smith (No 5) (2011) 217 A Crim R 297; [2011] NSWSC 1459 ..................... [3.0.165], [12.10.380],
[12.10.390]
R v Smith (Stanley) [1979] 3 All ER 605 .................................................................................... [2.15.130]
R v Smith 1994 CanLII 2146 ........................................................................................................ [10.15.80]
R v Smith 2005 BCSC 1624 ........................................................................................... [9.05.01], [9.05.80]
R v Snell [2007] 2 All ER 974; [2006] EWCA Crim 1404 ....................................................... [10.20.110]
R v Snewin (1997) 190 LSJS 487 ................................................................................................ [10.45.760]
R v Sodo (1975) 61 Cr App R 131 .............................................................................. [4.0.120], [12.0.140]
R v Sollitt [2019] QCA 44 ............................................................................................................... [9.10.80]
R v Solomon (2005) 92 SASR 331; [2005] SASC 265 .............................................................. [10.15.130]
R v Somers [1963] 1 WLR 1306 ................................................................................................... [2.20.400]
R v Sood [2007] NSWCCA 214 ...................................................................................................... [3.0.165]
R v Sopher (1992) 74 A Crim R 21 ...................................................................... [12.20.830], [12.20.860]
R v Sophonow [1986] 2 WWR 481 ............................................................................................. [10.15.80]
R v Souleyman (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Levine J, 5 September 1996) ................ [3.0.90]
R v Southammavong [2002] NSWSC 854 .................................................................................. [13.0.400]
R v Sparkes (1996) 6 Tas R 178 ................................................................................................. [10.20.200]
R v Spero (2006) 13 VR 225; [2006] VSCA 58 ........................................................................... [10.15.40]
R v St Pierre (1974) 17 CCC (2d) 489 ......................................................................................... [2.15.400]
R v Stagg (unreported, Central Criminal Court, 14 September 1994) ............................... [10.35.120]
R v Stamford [1972] 2 QB 391 .................................................................................. [2.15.400], [10.0.160]
R v Stanyard [2012] NSWDC 78 ................................................................................................. [6.20.260]
R v Starecki [1960] VR 141 ........................................................................................................... [10.0.360]
R v Stead (unreported, High Court, Williamson J, 21 November 1990, T58/1990) .......... [2.05.550]
R v Steels (1987) 24 A Crim R 201 .............................................................................................. [7.10.230]
R v Stephenson [1979] 1 QB 695 .............................................................................. [2.25.260], [10.25.40]
R v Stevens [2004] QCA 99 .......................................................................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Stewart (1991) 7 CRNZ 489 .................................................................................................... [3.05.90]
R v Stewart (1994) 72 A Crim R 17 ............................................................................................ [7.10.170]
R v Stillman [1997] 1 SCR 607 ...................................................................................... [9.05.01], [9.05.80]
R v Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260 ................................................................... [2.25.40], [12.05.340]
R v Stone (1994) 71 A Crim R 417 ............................................................................................ [10.45.760]
R v Stone (1995) 84 A Crim R 218 ................................................................................................ [7.10.80]
R v Stone (1997) 113 CCC (3d) 158 ............................................................................................... [5.0.350]
R v Stone [1999] 2 SCR 290 ........................................................................................................ [10.25.160]
R v Storey [1998] 1 VR 359 ........................................................................................... [7.10.20], [7.10.70]
R v Strudwick (1994) 99 Cr App R 326 .................................................................. [10.0.360], [10.25.40]
R v Stuart [1974] Qd R 297 .......................................................................................................... [11.0.220]
R v Sullivan [1984] 1 AC 156 .................................................................................. [2.15.130], [10.25.160]
R v Suluape [2002] NZCA 6 ...................................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159; [1998] HCA 1 .................................................................... [2.35.240]
R v Sykes [1997] Crim LR 752 ..................................................................................................... [13.05.40]
R v T [2010] EWC A Crim 2439 ................................................................................. [1.0.01], [12.25.110]
R v TP [2018] NSWSC 369 ......................................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v Taaka [1982] 2 NZLR 198 .................................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v Tait [1963] VR 520 ...................................................................................................................... [7.0.90]
R v Tamatea [2013] QCA 399 ....................................................................................................... [13.05.40]
R v Tandy [1989] 1 WLR 350 ..................................................................................................... [10.25.120]
R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; [2006] NSWCCA 167 .......... [3.0.20], [3.0.30], [3.0.157], [12.05.30],
[12.05.440]
R v Taouk (2005) 154 A Crim R 69; [2005] NSWCCA 155 ..................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Taranto [1999] NSWCCA 396 ............................................................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Tarrant [2018] NSWSC 774 .............................................................................. [10.30.50], [10.30.100]
R v Tartaglia (2011) 110 SASR 378; [2011] SASCFC 88 ............................................................. [4.0.250]
R v Taylor (1992) 11 OR (3d) 323 .............................................................................................. [10.10.300]
R v Taylor (unreported, SA Supreme Court, 3 February 1994) ...................... [10.30.100], [10.30.220]
lxxiv
Table of Cases
R vTe Whiu [1964] NZLR 748 .................................................................................................... [13.05.40]

R vTelford (1996) 86 A Crim R 427 ............................................................................................. [7.0.370]
R vTelford [2004] SASC 248 ........................................................................................................ [7.10.230]
R vTempler [2003] NZCA 85 ............................................................................... [12.20.200], [12.20.370]
R vTeng (2009) 22 VR 706; [2009] VSCA 148 ............................................................................. [6.25.40]
R vTerceira (1998) 123 CCC (3d) 1 .................................................. [12.05.10], [12.20.290], [12.20.690]
R vTheos [1996] VSC 48 .............................................................................................................. [10.15.40]
R vThomas (2006) 207 CCC (3d) 86 ...................................................... [9.10.80], [11.15.01], [11.15.40]
R vThompson (2008) 21 VR 135; [2008] VSCA 144 .................................................................. [4.0.240]
R vThorne (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 9 June 1995) ................... [10.30.710]
R vThornton (No 1) [1992] 1 All ER 305 ................................................................................ [10.30.100]
R vThornton (No 2) [1996] 2 All ER 1023 ......................................................... [10.30.100], [10.30.240]
R vTiddy [1969] SASR 575 ............................................................................................................ [7.10.60]
R vTihi [1990] 1 NZLR 540 ......................................................................................................... [2.35.130]
R vTilley [1961] 1 WLR 1309 ....................................................................................... [4.0.40], [12.10.80]
R vTilley [1985] VR 505 ...................................................... [2.05.310], [2.10.140], [2.15.10], [12.05.180]
R vTillott (1995) 38 NSWLR 1 ........................................................ [10.20.200], [10.20.220], [10.45.490]
R vTimes Square Cinema Ltd (1971) 4 CCC (2d) 229 ........................ [11.0.01], [11.0.160], [11.0.630]
R vTodd [1976] Qd R 21 .............................................................................................................. [7.10.100]
R vToki (2000) 116 A Crim R 536; [2000] NSWSC 999 .............................................................. [2.0.25]
R vTonkin [1975] Qd R 1 ...................................................... [2.15.100], [2.20.280], [2.25.01], [2.25.260]
R vToohey [1965] AC 595 ............................................................................................................ [10.0.360]
R vTran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233 .......... [2.10.140], [2.35.90], [4.0.40], [7.0.370], [7.0.450], [12.0.100],
[12.05.220], [12.10.80], [12.20.180], [12.20.370], [12.20.820], [12.20.860], [12.20.890]
R v Tran (2007) 16 VR 673; [2007] VSCA 164 ............................................................................. [4.0.250]
R v Trochym [2000] 1 SCR 239 .................................................................................................... [12.05.30]
R v Trochym [2007] 1 SCR 239 ..................................................................................... [2.0.01], [2.10.770]
R v Trotter (1993) 35 NSWLR 428 .......................................................................... [10.25.120], [13.0.200]
R v Trupedo (1920) SALR 58 .................................................................................... [13.05.01], [13.05.40]
R v Truscott (1967) 62 DLR (2d) 545 ............................................................................................ [7.0.450]
R v Trussler [1988] Crim LR 446 ............................................................................................... [10.05.110]
R v Tsiaras [1996] 1 VR 398 ...................................................................................... [7.10.190], [7.10.210]
R v Tumanako (1992) 64 A Crim R 149 ................................................................................... [10.25.120]
R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 ......................................................................................................... [10.15.40]
R v Turner (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 .................................................................................................. [2.0.10]
R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 ................ [1.0.01], [2.15.10], [2.15.30], [2.15.100],
[2.15.130], [2.15.160], [2.20.20], [2.20.120], [2.20.160], [2.20.200], [3.0.30], [4.0.40], [4.0.390],
[10.0.160], [10.0.200], [10.0.340], [10.0.360], [10.30.490], [10.15.60], [10.15.70], [10.20.200],
[10.20.210], [10.25.40], [10.35.120], [10.35.200] .................................................................................. 0
R v Ulla (2004) 148 A Crim R 356; [2004] VSCA 130 .............................................................. [7.10.250]
R v Vachalec [1981] 1 NSWLR 351 ............................................................................................. [7.10.100]
R v Van Beelen (1973) 4 SASR 353 ............................................................................................. [12.0.140]
R v Van Bree 2011 ONSC 4273 ...................................................................................................... [13.0.60]
R v Van Roosmalen (1989) 43 A Crim R 358 ............................................................................ [7.10.170]
R v Vaughan (1982) 4 Cr App R 83 ............................................................................................ [7.10.170]
R v Velevski [1999] NSWCCA 96 .............................................................................................. [10.35.160]
R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269; [2007] VSCA 102 ................................................... [7.10.210], [7.10.230]
R v Vernege [1982] Crim LR 598 ................................................................................ [2.25.40], [2.25.260]
R v Vinayagamoorthy (2008) 238 FLR 117; (2008) 200 A Crim R 186; [2008] VSC 599 .... [11.05.40],
[11.15.01], [11.15.40]
R v Violette (2008) BCSC 920 ................................................ [2.05.150], [3.15.10], [12.05.10], [13.0.120]
R v Vivona (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 12 September 1994) ......... [2.20.60],
[2.20.400], [12.20.290], [12.20.300], [12.20.830]
R v Vrabcenjak [2008] VSCA 143 ................................................................................................ [13.05.01]
R v Wagstaff [1983] Crim LR 1652 ............................................................................................ [10.20.110]
R v Wakefield [2004] NSWCCA 288 .................................................................... [12.20.200], [12.20.370]
R v Wald (1989) 47 CCC (3d) 319 .......................................................................... [2.05.430], [10.20.120]
R v Walizadah (2007) 223 CCC (3d) 28 .................................................................... [13.0.40], [13.0.360]
R v Walker (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, Hayne JA, Southwell and Smith
AJJA, 31 May 1996) ................................................................................................................... [7.10.90]
R v Wallace [1982] Qd R 265 ......................................................................................................... [4.0.430]
R v Wallace [2010] NZCA 46 ..................................................................................................... [12.20.240]
R v Walsh (1991) 60 A Crim R 419 ...................................................................... [10.45.400], [10.45.720]
R v Wang [1990] 2 NZLR 529 .................................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v Ward [1993] 2 All ER 577 ..................................................................................... [5.0.350], [10.0.360]
R v Weatherall (1981) 27 SASR 238 ............................................................................................ [12.0.420]
R v Webb [1971] VR 147 ............................................................................................................... [7.10.370]
lxxv
Expert Evidence
R v
Weise [1969] VR 953 ............................................................................... [4.0.40], [4.0.240], [12.10.80]
R v
Weller [2010] EWCA Crim 1085 .................................................................... [12.20.220], [12.25.110]
R v
Whitbread (1995) 78 A Crim R 452 ........... [2.05.310], [2.15.170], [2.20.160], [10.0.80], [10.0.240]
R v
White (1926) 3 DLR 1; 45 CCC 328 .................................................................. [13.05.01], [13.05.40]
R v
Whittle [1994] 2 SCR 914 .................................................................................................... [10.10.510]
R v
Whitworth [1989] 1 Qd R 437 ............................................................................................ [10.25.120]
R v
Whiu [2007] NZCA 591 ....................................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v
Whyms [2012] ACTSC 7 ....................................................................................................... [12.20.80]
R v
Williams (1993) 11 CRNZ 34 .................................................................................................. [2.15.10]
R v
Williams [1999] OJ No 1923 ................................................................................................... [4.0.360]
R v
Williams [2000] VSCA 174 .................................................................................................... [7.10.250]
R v
Williams [2016] SASC 67 ..................................................................................................... [10.20.260]
R v
Williams [2017] SASCFC 65 .................................................................................................. [10.45.01]
R v
Williams (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, 18 September 1995) ...................... [7.10.100]
R v
Wills [1983] 2 VR 201 ........................................................................................................... [10.30.100]
R v
Wilson (2002) 166 CCC (3d) 294 .......................................................................................... [13.0.120]
R v
Wiskich (2000) 207 LSJS 431 .............................................................................. [7.10.190], [7.10.200]
R v
Wogandt (1988) 33 A Crim R 31 ........................................................................................ [10.25.160]
R v
Wong (1977) 1 WWR 1 .......................................................................................................... [10.0.450]
R v
Wong [2005] VSC 66 ............................................................................................ [11.15.01], [11.15.40]
R v
Woodley (1994) 76 A Crim R 302 ....................................................................... [7.10.80], [7.10.370]
R v
Woods (1982) 65 CCC (2d) 554 ............................................................................................ [2.05.110]
R v
Woolsey (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 19 August 1993) .................................... [10.30.100]
R v
Wray (1970) 11 DLR (3d) 673 ................................................................................................. [7.0.450]
R v
Wright (1821) Russ & Ry 456 ............................................................................................... [2.25.100]
R v
Wright [1980] VR 593 ....................................................................... [2.15.30], [2.15.130], [12.15.120]
R v
Wright (1989) 45 A Crim R 423 ............................................................................................ [7.10.120]
R v
Wright (1997) 93 A Crim R 48 .............................................................................................. [7.10.200]
R v
Wyatt (1991) 28 FCR 61 ......................................................................................................... [2.35.360]
R v
XY (2013) 84 NSWLR 363; [2013] NSWCCA 121 ................................................................ [3.0.157]
R v
Xie (No 18) [2015] NSWSC 2129 .................................................................... [12.20.80], [12.20.248]
R v
Yaldiz (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, 4 December 1996) ............................ [10.45.760]
R v
Yates [1985] VR 41 .................................................................................................................. [7.10.310]
R v
Yates [2002] NSWCCA 520 ..................................................................................................... [2.35.80]
R v
Yatno [2018] NTSC 53 .............................................................................................................. [2.30.40]
R v
Yeo [2003] NSWSC 315 .......................................................................................................... [13.0.400]
R v
Yeo (unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, Fitzgerald P, McPherson JA and
Helman J, 22 August 1995) ................................................................................. [2.15.170], [10.0.240]
R v Yi Yi Wang [2009] VSCA 67 .................................................................................................. [7.10.230]
R v Yildiz (1983) 11 A Crim R 115 ....................................... [2.15.400], [7.10.80], [11.15.01], [11.15.40]
R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1 ............................................................................................ [10.25.160]
R v Zammit (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, 21 February 1996) ......................... [10.45.760]
R v Zandel (1987) 31 CCC (3d) 97 .............................................................................................. [2.20.400]
R v Zhou (unreported, High Court, Auckland, 8 October 1993, T.7/93) .......................... [10.30.100]
R v Zilm (2006) 14 VR 11; [2006] VSCA 72 ................................................................................. [4.0.240]
R v Zoef [2005] NSWCCA 268 .................................................................................................... [13.0.400]
R v Zundel (1987) 35 DLR (4th) 338; 31 CCC (3d) 97 ........................................................... [11.05.220]
R (Doughty) v Ely Magistrates’ Court [2008] EWHC 522 ....................................................... [3.15.50]
R on the Application of Factortame Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport (No 8)
[2002] 3 WLR 1104; [2002] EWCA Civ 932 ......................................................................... [2.35.460]
R on the application of A v Liverpool City Council [2007] EWHC 1477 ............. [9.05.01], [9.05.80]
RA v The Queen [2010] NZCA 57 ................................................................................................ [3.05.90]
RGM v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 89 ...................................................................................... [3.0.158]
RM (Sierra Leone) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ
541 ............................................................................................................................................. [11.20.160]
RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; [2000] HCA 3 .............................................................. [4.0.240]
RST v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 59 ............................................................................. [2.15.400]
RT v VP [1990] 1 IR 545 ................................................................................................................. [2.20.60]
RW Miller & Co Pty Ltd v Krupp (Australia) (1991) 34 NSWLR 129 ................ [2.25.40], [2.25.260]
RW Miller & Co Pty Ltd v Krupp (Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 34 NSWLR 129 ................... [2.05.20],
[11.05.240]
Rabelais Pty Ltd v Cameron (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 8 February 1993) ........ [2.25.260]
Rabey v The Queen (1977) 37 CCC (2d) 461; [1980] 2 SCR 513 ........................................... [2.15.130]
Rabey v The Queen (1977) 79 DLR (3d) 414 ............................................................................ [10.25.80]
Rabey v The Queen [1980] 2 SCR 513 ..................................................................................... [10.25.160]
Rabey v The Queen (1981) 54 CCC 1 ...................................................................................... [10.25.160]
Radney v State 342 So 2d 942 (1977) ........................................................................................... [7.0.450]
lxxvi
Table of Cases
Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 ................. [2.20.160], [2.20.280], [2.20.480], [4.0.40], [7.0.330]
Ramsdale v Ramsdale (1945) 173 LT 393 .................................................................................... [2.20.60]
Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd v AstraZeneca AB (2013) 101 IPR 11; [2013] FCA 368 ............ [6.20.200]
Ratten v The Queen [1972] AC 378 .............................................................................................. [2.20.60]
Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 510 ..................................................................................... [4.0.490]
Re Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations Inc v Tobacco Institute of
Australia Ltd (1991) 27 FCR 149; [1991] FCA 17 ............................................................. [12.25.170]
Re H v A (Children) (Paternity: Blood Tests) [2002] 1 FLR 1145 .......................................... [12.20.40]
Read v Bishop of Lincoln [1892] AC 644 ................................................................ [2.30.180], [11.05.40]
Read v Carmody (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 23 July 1998) ............................... [10.25.200]
Real Estate Institute of New Zealand Inc v Lewis and Callinan (unreported, High
Court of New Zealand, 22 June 1994) ................................................................................... [2.25.40]
Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989 ............................... [2.15.460]
Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] 1 WLR 491 ........................................ [11.0.630]
Reed v State 283 Md 374 .............................................................................................................. [2.10.490]
Reed v State 391 A 2d 364 ......................................................................................... [2.10.140], [2.10.380]
R v Reed and another; R v Garmson [2010] 1 Cr App R 23; [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 ..... [3.15.10]
Reelaw v Queensland Heritage Council [2004] QPEC 79 .................................................... [11.05.280]
Rees v Sinclair [1974] 1 NZLR 180 ............................................................. [8.0.160], [8.0.420], [8.05.90]
Rees v The Queen (2010) 200 A Crim R 83; [2010] NSWCCA 84 ........................................... [4.0.250]
Regano Industries v Director of Planning and Meadows District Council [1969] SAPR
89 ................................................................................................................................................ [17.15.30]
Reibl v Hughes [1980] 2 SCR 880 ................................................................................................... [8.0.01]
Reidy v The National Maternity Hospital [1997] IEHC 143 .................................................... [4.0.450]
Reid v Wright t/as D M Wright & Associates Solicitors [2016] NSWSC 466 .................... [6.15.120]
Reiffel v ACN 075839226 Ltd (2003) 21 ACLC 469 ..................................................................... [8.0.01]
Reilly, Supple & Wishchusen, LLP v Malcolm Blum v Michael Ambrosio (NJ App
Div ................................................................................................................................................ [8.0.300]
Relf v Webster (1978) 24 ACTR 3 ............................................................................................... [2.05.490]
Rendell v Paul (1979) 22 SASR 459 ............................................................................................ [2.30.120]
Repatriation Commission v Robertson [2004] FCA 173 ........................................................ [11.05.320]
Repatriation Commission v Vietnam Veterans’ Association of Australia NSW Branch
Inc (2000) 48 NSWLR 548; [2000] NSWCA 65 .................................................................. [12.25.170]
Research Laboratories Inc v Harrison 166 NYS 706 (1917 Sup App T) ................................ [5.20.60]
Revis v Smith (1856) 18 CB 126 ...................................................................................................... [8.0.40]
Reynolds v Kingston (Police Services Board) [2007] ONCA 166 ............................. [8.0.40], [8.0.120]
Reynolds v The Queen [1989] Crim LR 122 ............................................................................. [2.15.100]
Rhoden v Wingate (2002) 36 MVR 499; [2002] NSWCA 165 ................................................... [5.0.110]
Rice v Sockett (1912) 8 DLR 84 ................................................................................................... [2.05.530]
Rich v Pierpont (1862) 3 F & F 35; 176 ER 16 ........................................ [2.25.01], [2.25.40], [2.25.260]
Richards v Kadian (2005) 64 NSWLR 204; [2005] NSWCA 328 ................................................ [5.0.50]
Richardson v Redpath, Brown & Co Ltd [1944] AC 62 ......................................... [6.05.60], [6.05.120]
Richmond v Richmond (1914) 111 LT 273 ..................................................................................... [4.0.40]
Rickards v Murdock (1830) 10 B & C 527 ................................................................................. [2.15.130]
Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1977] QB 881 .................................................................... [5.0.360]
Ridehalgh v Horsefield [1994] EWCA Civ 40; [1994] Ch 205 .................................................. [5.15.50]
Riggins v Nevada 112 S Ct 1810 (1992) ................................................................................... [10.10.450]
Riley v Tasmania [2007] TASSC 61 ............................................................................................. [13.0.400]
Riley v Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 525; [2005] WASCA 190 ..................................... [12.20.80]
Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 569; [2003] FCA 933 .......................... [3.0.155]
Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404 .... [2.05.20], [11.05.200], [11.10.01], [11.10.80], [11.15.01],
[11.15.120]
Ritchie v Pirie [1972] JC 7 ............................................................................................................ [2.20.200]
Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz (Nos 15 and 16) (1987) 14 NSWLR 107 .................... [11.05.40]
Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158 ....... [2.15.10], [2.15.400], [11.0.50],
[11.0.410], [11.0.630]
Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 4) (1987) 14 NSWLR 100 ............................. [15.0.360]
River Bank Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1974) 48 ALJR 483 ..................................................... [16.0.40]
Roadley v The Queen (1990) 51 A Crim R 336 ........................................................................ [7.10.290]
Roadrunner Properties Ltd v Dean [2003] EWCA Civ 1816 .................................................. [6.12.240]
Roads Corporation v Love [2010] VSC 253 .............................................................................. [5.10.200]
Roberts v Maryland 469 A 2d 442 .............................................................................................. [13.05.40]
Roberts v Maryland 469 A 2d 442 (Md 1983) ........................................................................... [13.05.40]
Roberts v The Queen [1990] Crim LR 122 ................................................................................ [2.15.100]
Roberts v Western Australia (2007) 34 WAR 1; [2007] WASCA 48 ....................................... [11.10.01]
Robertson v Jackson (1845) 2 CB 412; 135 ER 1006 ................................................................. [2.15.460]
Robertson v The Queen (1989) 44 A Crim R 224 ..................................................................... [7.10.470]
lxxvii
Expert Evidence
Robins v Bridge (1837) 3 M & W 114; 150 ER 1079 .................................................................. [5.20.30]

Robins v State 798 P 2d 558 (1990) ........................................................................................... [10.30.460]
Robinson v Malcolm & Co Ltd (1899) 5 ALR 204 ..................................................................... [5.20.10]
Rodi v Western Australia (2018) 92 ALJR 960; [2018] HCA 44 ............................ [4.0.500], [7.05.180]
Rodi v Western Australia [2018] HCA 44 .................................................................................... [1.0.120]
Rodriguez v Pacificare of Texas, Inc 980 F 2d 1014 ................................................................ [2.05.150]
Roe v Warner Auto-Marine Inc (1996) 3 CPC (4th) 110 ......................................................... [17.0.400]
Roe v Western Australia (No 2) [2011] FCA 102 ................................................... [11.10.01], [11.10.40]
Rogers v The Queen (1989) 44 A Crim R 301 ............................................................ [7.10.20], [7.10.80]
Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479 ......................................................................................... [8.0.01]
Rolland v Lothian Health Board (unreported, 27 August 1981) ............................................. [7.10.20]
Romeyko v Samuels (1971) 2 SASR 529 .................................................................................... [2.15.400]
Rondel v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191 ............................................................................................... [8.0.220]
Rose v Central Queensland University [2002] QSC 304 ........................................................... [9.0.120]
Rose v The Queen [1961] AC 496 ............................................................................................. [10.25.120]
Rose v The Queen (1993) 69 A Crim R 1 .................................................................................... [2.15.10]
Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434; [2001] HCA 18 ........................................................ [8.0.01]
Rosher, Re (1884) 26 Ch D 801 .................................................................................................... [2.30.120]
Rossano v Manufacturers’ Life Insurance Co [1963] 2 QB 352 ............................................... [4.0.440]
Rotary Offset Press Pty Ltd v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1972) 46
ALJR 609 ................................................................................................................................... [2.15.460]
Roughley v The Queen (1995) 5 Tas R 8 ............................................................ [10.20.200], [10.20.220]
Rowe v AusNet Electricity Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 553 ................................................................ [6.15.120]
Rowe v AusNet Electricity Pty Ltd (Ruling No 9) [2016] VSC 731 ....................................... [6.10.01]
Rowley v London & North Western Railway Co (1873) LR 8 Exch 221 ............................. [2.20.400]
Roy v Prior [1971] AC 470 ........................................... [8.0.40], [8.0.120], [8.0.160], [8.0.460], [8.05.90]
Royal Insurance v GIO [1994] 1 VR 123 .................................................................................... [2.15.460]
Royal Insurance Australia Ltd v Government Insurance Office (NSW) [1994] 1 VR 123 .... [16.05.720]
Royal Warrant Holders Association v Edward Deane & Beal Ltd [1912] 1 Ch 10 ............ [2.15.400]
Royce v Donovan [2012] FamCA 168 .......................................................................................... [6.12.80]
Royle v Busby (1880) 6 QBD 171 .................................................................................................. [5.20.30]
Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533 ......................................................................... [2.35.80], [10.20.200]
Rozmus v Illawarra Area Health Service (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 23
December 1996) ...................................................................................................................... [16.05.480]
Rubibi Community v Western Australia (No 5) [2005] FCA 1025 ........................................ [11.10.01]
Rudman v Rudman [2010] FamCA 961 ................................................................................... [10.30.900]
Rufo v Hosking (2004) 61 NSWLR 678; [2004] NSWCA 391 ............................................... [10.50.240]
Ruka v Department of Social Welfare (1996) 14 CRNZ 196 ................................................ [10.30.100]
Ruka v The Queen [1997] 1 NZLR 154 .................................................................................... [10.30.100]
Russell v Commonwealth [1999] VSC 437 ........................................................... [10.45.01], [10.45.420]
Russell v HM Advocate [1946] JC 37 ......................................................................................... [2.20.200]
Russell v The Queen (1995) 84 A Crim R 386 ............................................................................ [7.10.80]
Russell v The Queen (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, Kirby ACJ, Allen
and Dowd JJ, 15 December 1995) ......................................................................................... [7.10.250]
Russian Commercial & Industrial Bank v Comptoir d’Escompte de Mulhouse [1923]
2 KB 631 .................................................................................................................................... [2.15.560]
Ryan v The Queen (1969) 121 CLR 205 ................................................................................... [10.25.160]
Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267; [2001] HCA 21 ........................................................ [10.0.330]
Ryder v Frohlich [2005] NSWSC 1342 ....................................................................................... [5.10.140]
S v
G [1995] 3 NZLR 681 ............................................................................................................ [10.45.520]
S v
Haasbroek (1969) 2 SA 624 ...................................................................................................... [2.25.01]
S v
Kimimbi (1963) 3 SA 250 ....................................................................................................... [2.20.400]
S v
Nala (1965) 4 SA 360 .............................................................................................................. [12.10.80]
S v
Nel 1990 (2) SACR 136 ............................................................................................................. [2.15.10]
S v
New South Wales [2008] NSWSC 933 ............................................................................... [10.50.340]
S v
R (1999) 149 FLR 149; [1999] FamCA 12 ................................................................................ [2.0.30]
S v
September 1996 1 SACR 325 ................................................................................................... [2.25.40]
S v
Shabalala 1986 4 SA 734 ...................................................................................................... [13.05.220]
S v
The Queen (2001) 125 A Crim R 526; [2001] QCA 501 ............... [3.0.90], [10.30.50], [10.30.490],
[12.05.300]
S 663B of the Criminal Code, In the Matter of (unreported, Queensland Supreme
Court, 24 February 1995) ...................................................................................................... [10.45.400]
S and B (Minors) (Child abuse: evidence), Re [1990] 2 FLR 489 .......... [2.0.30], [2.25.40], [10.0.360]
lxxviii
Table of Cases
SHJB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003]
FCA 502 ..................................................................................................................................... [11.10.01]
SS Hontestroom v SS Sagaporack [1927] AC 37 ......................................................... [4.0.01], [4.0.360]
SSE Generation Ltd v Hochtief Solutions AG [2018] CSIH 26 ................................................ [6.20.60]
SZUVE v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 1942 ........................................................ [10.30.100]
Saad v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 98 ..................................................................................... [13.0.400]
Saadati v Moorhead [2017] 1 SCR 543 ..................................................................................... [10.45.340]
Saccu v The Queen (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 13 February
1980) ........................................................................................................................................... [13.05.40]
Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell & Co [1980] AC 198 ....................................................... [8.0.220], [8.0.420]
St Chad, The [1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 107 ........................................................................................ [6.05.60]
St George Club Ltd v Hines (1962) 35 ALJR 106 ................................................ [12.0.200], [12.25.170]
St John, City of v Irving Oil Co Ltd [1966] SCR 581; 58 DLR (2d) 404 ............. [2.20.140], [11.0.60],
[16.0.40]
Saint Leger v Bailey [1962] Tas SR 131 ...................................................................................... [2.30.120]
Salama v Pisarek (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Cole J, No 55041/91, 10
September 1992) ....................................................................................................................... [6.10.300]
Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777 ............................................................................ [11.20.200]
Samuel Manu-Tech Inc v Redipac Recycling Corp (1999) 38 CPC (4th) 297 ......... [8.0.40], [8.0.120]
Samuels v Flavel [1970] SASR 256 ...................... [2.25.40], [2.25.220], [2.25.260], [4.0.430], [7.05.180]
Santos v The Queen (1987) 75 ALR 161 .................................................................................... [13.05.40]
Saskatchewan v Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (2012) 390 Sask R 743 .................... [15.0.240]
Saul v Manon [1980] 2 NSWLR 314 ........................................................................................... [2.30.120]
Saxton, Re [1962] 1 WLR 968 ......................................................................................................... [6.0.160]
Saxton (Deceased), Re [1962] 1 WLR 968 .................................................................................. [5.05.100]
Scarce v Tampalini (unreported, WA Supreme Court, Kennedy J, 21 March 1990) .......... [7.10.170]
Scattini v Matters [2004] QSC 459 ............................................................................................ [10.25.200]
Schneider NO v AA 2010 (5) SA 203 ............................................................................................. [1.0.30]
Schultz v The Queen [1982] WAR 171 ........................................................................ [2.15.10], [2.25.01]
Schutz v Schutz 581 So 2d 1290 (Fla 1991) ............................................................................. [10.30.850]
Schwartz v Resi Corp (2003) 85 SASR 357; [2003] SASC 118 .................................................. [9.0.120]
Schwerdt, Re [1939] SASR 333 .................................................................................................... [2.30.120]
Scott v Moses (1957) 75 WN (NSW) 101 ................................................................................... [2.15.460]
Scott v Numurkah Corp (1954) 91 CLR 300 ............................................................ [6.10.210], [7.0.450]
Scott v Numurkah Corporation (1954) 91 CLR 300 ................................................................ [12.10.80]
Scott v Sears 789 F 2d 1052 (4th Cir ........................................................................................... [10.15.90]
Scrace v Whittington (1823) 2 B & C 11; 107 ER 287 ................................................................ [5.20.30]
Scruples Imports Pty Ltd v Crabtree & Evelyn Pty Ltd (1983) 1 IPR 315 .......................... [15.0.160]
Seal v Hudson (1847) 4 Dowl & L 760 ........................................................................................ [5.20.30]
Seaman v Netherclift (1876) 2 CPD 53 ........................................................................................ [8.0.120]
Sears v Rutishauser 466 NE 2d 210 .............................................................................................. [8.0.460]
Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v B (1992) 175 CLR 218 ......... [2.30.40]
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs v Charlesworth, Pilling & Co [1901] AC 373 ........... [16.0.01]
Secretary of State for Home Department v MN and KY (Scotland) [2014] UKSC 30 .... [11.20.160]
Secretary to the Department of Business and Innovation v Murdesk Investments Pty
Ltd (2011) 184 LGERA 288; [2011] VSC 581 .......................................................................... [5.0.150]
Securities and Exchange Commission v Lipson 46 F Supp 2d 758 (1999) ........................ [16.05.200]
Sederis v Opet [2008] FamCA 982 ............................................................................................ [16.05.525]
See R v Reed [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 .................................................................................... [12.20.125]
Seed v Higgins (1860) 8 HLC 550 ............................................................................................... [2.25.260]
Seeley v Back – Estate of John Michael Pegus Seeley [2005] NSWSC 68 ......................... [10.25.200]
Seeley International Pty Ltd v Jeffrey [2013] VSCA 288 ........................................................... [7.0.400]
Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332 ......................................................... [10.50.240]
Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; [2000] NSWCA 29 .......... [9.0.40], [12.0.200],
[12.0.260], [12.25.170]
Semple v Noble (1988) 49 SASR 356 .......................................................................................... [2.20.160]
Sendy v Commonwealth [2002] NSWSC 1109 ............................................................................. [5.0.50]
Sever v The Queen (2007) 179 A Crim R 110; [2007] NSWCCA 339 .................................... [13.05.40]
Sevi v Mat’afa (1963) 4 ASR 333 ................................................................................................. [2.30.120]
Shannon v The Queen (1991) 56 A Crim R 56 ........................................................................... [7.10.80]
Sharkawy v Toman [2007] NSWSC 621 ..................................................................................... [2.05.350]
Sharwood v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 157 ....................................................................... [12.20.125]
Shaw v The Queen (1952) 85 CLR 365 ........................................................................................ [6.0.120]
Shaw v Wolf (1998) 83 FCR 113 .................................................................................................. [11.10.80]
Shawinigan Engineering Co v Naud [1929] 4 DLR 57 ............................................................... [4.0.40]
Shea v TruEnergy Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2013] FCA 937 ................................................... [5.10.360]
Shears v Chisholm [1994] 2 VR 535 ............................................................................................... [8.0.01]
lxxix
Expert Evidence
Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1989) 53 SASR 97 ......................................................................... [2.35.40]

Shellharbour City Council v Minister for Planning (2011) 189 LGERA 348; [2011]
NSWCA 195 ............................................................................................................. [2.15.460], [3.0.176]
Shepherd v State 51 Okl Cr 209; 300 Pac 421 (1931) ................................................................. [7.0.490]
Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573 .............................................................. [4.0.240], [4.0.250]
Shepherd v The Queen [2012] 2 NZLR 606; [2011] NZCA 666 .............. [1.0.01], [3.05.50], [3.05.80],
[3.05.100]
Sherman v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria [2005] VCAT 644 ................................ [7.10.220]
Sherrard v Jacob [1965] NI 151 ..................................................................................................... [2.05.10]
Sherry v Australasian Conference Association (t/as Sydney Adventist Hospital)
[2006] NSWSC 75 ....................................................................................................................... [9.10.01]
Ship Sun Diamond, The v The Ship Erawan (1975) 55 DLR (3d) 138 ................ [6.05.60], [6.05.220]
Shorten v Shorten [2001] NSWSC 100 ..................................................................................... [10.25.200]
Shoshana Pty Ltd v 10th Cantanae Pty Ltd (1987) 79 ALR 279 ....... [10.0.360], [11.0.01], [11.0.390],
[11.0.450], [11.0.610], [11.0.630]
Sienkiewicz v Greif (UK) Ltd [2011] UKSC 10 ....................................................................... [12.25.170]
Silcott v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1996] EWCA Civ 1311; (1996) 8
Admin LR 633 .............................................................................................................................. [8.0.40]
Silcott v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [1996] EWCA Civ 1311 ................. [8.0.460]
Silk v Eberhardt [1959] QWN 29 .................................................................................................. [6.05.60]
Simic v The Queen (1980) 144 CLR 319 ...................................................................................... [4.0.390]
Simmons v Liberal Opinion Ltd; Re Dunn [1911] 1 KB 996 .................................................... [5.20.30]
Simmons v State 504 NE 2d 575 (Ind 1987) ......................................................... [10.35.10], [10.30.320]
Simpson v Buckney (unreported, Tasmanian Supreme Court, 28 April 1995) ................ [10.45.210]
Simpson v Fraser (1894) 5 QLJ 89 .............................................................................................. [2.30.120]
Simpson v State 111 Ala 6 (1896) ................................................................................................ [13.05.40]
Sinclair v The King (1946) 73 CLR 316 ................................................................... [10.0.360], [10.05.90]
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2001] FCA 327 ........... [15.0.1]
Sir Richard Scott VC in Bennett v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1997) 10
Admin LR 245 .............................................................................................................................. [8.0.80]
Sisters of Mercy Property Ass v Melbourne CC [2002] VCAT 198 .................................... [11.05.280]
Skinner & Edwards (Builders) Pty Ltd v Australian Telecommunications Corp (1992)
27 NSWLR 567 ......................................................................................................................... [6.10.290]
Skrijel v Mengler [2003] VSC 270 ............................................................................................... [13.0.400]
Smith v Advanced Electrics Pty Ltd [2005] 1 Qd R 65; [2003] QCA 432 .......................... [10.45.520]
Smith v Buller (1875) LR 19 Eq 473 .............................................................................................. [5.20.10]
Smith v Cook (1875) 1 QBD 79 ................................................................................................... [2.15.400]
Smith v Grant 29145 (1896) .......................................................................................................... [12.05.60]
Smith v Jones (1999) 132 CCC (3d) 225 ..................................................................................... [5.10.400]
Smith v Midland Railway (1887) 57 LT 813 .............................................................................. [2.15.400]
Smith v Robinson (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 23 March 1995) ............................ [10.45.400]
Smith v The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 588 ................................................ [2.15.10], [10.15.70], [10.15.80]
Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; [2001] HCA 50 ..................................................... [10.15.140]
SmithKline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd v Chipman (2003) 131 FCR 500; [2003] FCA
796 ........................................................................................................................... [2.05.150], [2.35.460]
Snider v Commonwealth [1947] VLR 285 ................................................................................... [5.20.10]
Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 .......................... [4.0.200], [4.0.470]
Southern Equities Corp Ltd (in liq) v Arthur Andersen & Co (No 9) [2002] SASC 118 .... [16.05.640]
Southland Coal Pty Ltd (rec and mgrs apptd) (in liq), Re (2006) 203 FLR 1; [2006]
NSWSC 899 ............................................................................................................ [5.10.140], [5.10.160]
Southport Corp v Esso Petroleum Co [1953] 2 All ER 1204 .................................................... [6.05.60]
Sovereign Motor Inns v Howarth Asia Pacific [2003] NSW SC 1120 .................................... [8.0.120]
Sovereign Motor Inns Pty Ltd v Howarth Asia Pacific Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1120 ....... [8.0.220],
[8.0.420]
Sparkes v The Queen (1998) 8 Tas R 21 .................................................................................. [10.20.200]
Spasovic v Sydney Adventist Hospital [2002] NSWSC 164 ..................................................... [6.15.40]
Spassked Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (No 4) (2002) 50 ATR 70 ........................... [5.10.140]
Spassked Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (No 2) (2002) 49 ATR 642; [2002] FCA
489 ....................................................................................................................... [16.05.160], [16.05.440]
Spencer v Commonwealth (1907) 5 CLR 418 ........................................................ [16.0.120], [16.0.130]
Spencer v Commonwealth 384 SE 2d 775; reaff’d en banc 384 SE 2d 785; cert den
(US) 107 L Ed 2d 1073 (1989) .............................................................................................. [12.20.580]
Spencer v Commonwealth 393 SE 2d 609 (1990) ................................................................... [12.20.580]
Spengler & Thomas [2017] FamCa 747 .................................................................................... [11.20.240]
Spika Trading Pty Ltd v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (1985) 3 ANZ Ins Cas 60-663 ..... [6.20.40]
Spika Trading Pty Ltd v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (unreported, NSW Supreme
Court, 3 October 1985) ................................................................................................................ [6.0.01]
lxxx
Table of Cases
Springfield Nominees Pty Ltd v Bridgelands Securities Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 217 ................. [5.0.360]
Sprowles v Makita [1999] NSWSC 1239 ...................................................................................... [9.0.120]
Squirt Co v Seven-Up Co 628 F 2d 1086 (8th Cir 1980) ........................................................... [11.0.80]
Stafford v Director of Public Prosecutions [1974] AC 878 ........................................................ [4.0.490]
Stallwood v David [2006] EWHC 2600 ........................................................................................ [6.12.40]
Stanbrook v The Queen (1993) 65 A Crim R 107 ..................................................................... [7.10.370]
Standard Oil Co v Standard Oil Co 252 F 2d 65 ....................................................................... [11.0.80]
Stanizzo v Paussi (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 17 September 1985) ....................... [2.30.180]
Stankowski v Commonwealth [2004] NSWSC 198 ................................................................ [10.45.420]
Stannard v Sperway Constructions Pty Ltd [1990] VR 673 ..................................................... [6.10.70]
Stanton v Callaghan [2000] 1 QB 75 ............................................................................................. [8.05.90]
Stanton v Callaghan [2000] QB 75 ................................................. [8.0.40], [8.0.80], [8.0.120], [8.0.220]
Stanton v Collinson [2010] EWCA Civ 81 ................................................................................. [17.0.200]
Starkey on behalf of the Kokatha People v South Australia (2018) 261 FCR 183; [2018]
FCAFC 36 ............................................................................................................... [11.10.01], [11.10.80]
Starr v National Coal Board [1977] 1 All ER 243 ....................................................................... [5.0.230]
State v Allewalt 308 Md 89; 517 A 2d 741 (1986) .................................................................. [10.30.320]
State v Anderson 853 P 2d 135 (NM Ct App 1993) ............................................................... [12.20.670]
State v Batangan 799 P 2d 48 (Haw 1990) .............................................................................. [10.30.460]
State v Bible 858 P 2d 1152 (Ariz 1993) ................................................................................... [12.20.670]
State v Black 109 Wash 2d 336; 745 P 2d 12 (1987) ............................................................... [10.30.320]
State v Boyd 331 NW 2d 480 ..................................................................................................... [12.20.670]
State v Bullard 322 Se 2d 370 (NC ........................................................................................... [12.10.360]
State v Carlson 360 NW 2d 442 (Minn 1985) ......................................................................... [10.30.460]
State v Cass 356 So 2d 396 (La 1978) ....................................................................................... [12.10.280]
State v Castore 435 A 2d 321 (RI 1981) .................................................................................... [10.30.460]
State v Catsam 148 Vt 366; 534 A 2d 184 (1987) .................................................................... [10.30.320]
State v Chapple 660 P 2d 1208 (Ariz 1983) ............................................................................... [10.15.90]
State v Clopten 223 P 3d 1103 ..................................................................................................... [10.15.90]
State v Cofield 127 NJ 328 ............................................................................................................ [10.35.10]
State v Davis 33 SE 449 (1899) .................................................................................................... [2.05.530]
State v Davis 422 NW 2d 296 (1988) ........................................................................................ [10.30.460]
State v Dorsey 532 P 2d 912 (1975) ............................................................................................ [2.10.510]
State v Gettier 438 NW 2d 1 (Iowa 1989) ................................................................................ [10.30.320]
State v Goettina 61 Wyo 420; 158 P 2d 865 (1945) ................................................................... [2.20.400]
State v Hasan 534 A 2d 877 (1987) ........................................................................................... [12.10.280]
State v Haseltine 352 NW 2d 673 (Wis 1984) ......................................................................... [10.30.460]
State v Hennum 441 NW 2d 793 ................................................................................................ [2.25.540]
State v Huey 145 Ariz 59; 699 P 2d (1985) .............................................................................. [10.30.320]
State v Jackson 641 P 2d 498 (1982) ......................................................................................... [10.30.320]
State v Jones 541 SE 2d 813 (2001) ........................................................................................... [12.10.360]
State v Kelly 478 A 2d 364 ...................................................................................... [2.15.400], [10.30.100]
State v Kersting 623 P 2d 1095 (1981) ................................................................... [10.0.450], [12.10.280]
State v Kim 64 Haw 598; 645 P 2d 1330 (1982) ................................................. [10.30.320], [10.30.460]
State v Kuhl 175 P 190 (Wa 1918) ............................................................................ [7.0.450], [12.10.280]
State v Lash 699 P 2d 49 (Kan 1985) ........................................................................................ [10.30.460]
State v Liddell 685 P 2d 918: 42 ALR 4th 865 (1988) ............................................................ [10.30.320]
State v Marks 647 P 2d 1292 (1982) .......................................................................................... [10.30.320]
State v Martin 666 SW 2d 895 (Mo Ct App 1984) ................................................................. [10.30.100]
State v McGee 324 NW 2d 232 (Minn 1982) ........................................................................... [10.30.320]
State v McQuillen 236 Kan 161; 689 P 2d 822 (1984); aff’d 239 Kan 590; 721 P 2d 740
(1986) ........................................................................................................................................ [10.30.320]
State v Middleton 294 Or 427; 657 P 2d 1215 (1982) ............................................................. [10.30.320]
State v Miller 440 P 2d 792 (1968) ............................................................................................ [12.10.280]
State v Mulder 29 Wash App 513; 629 P 2d 462 .................................................................... [10.30.480]
State v Murphy 575 P 2d 448 (1978) ........................................................................................ [12.10.280]
State v Myers 359 NW 2d 604 (Minn 1984) ............................................................................ [10.30.460]
State v Pappas 369 F 3d 516 (2004) ..................................................................... [12.20.300], [12.20.670]
State v Pollard 719 SW 2d 38 ...................................................................................................... [2.10.140]
State v Radjenovich 674 P 2d 333 (1983) ................................................................................. [10.30.320]
State v Robinson 146 Wis 2d 315; 431 NW 2d 165 (1988) .................................................... [10.30.320]
State v Saldana 324 NW 2d 227 (Minn 1982) ......................................................................... [10.30.320]
State v Schwartz 447 NW 2d 422 (Minn 1989) ....................................................................... [12.20.580]
State v Scott 1999 WL 547460 .................................................................................................... [12.20.670]
State v Shaw 369 NW 2d 772 .................................................................................................... [12.10.280]
State v Sim [1980] PNGLR 424 .................................................................................................... [2.30.120]
State v Sims 369 NE 2d 24 (1977) ............................................................................................... [2.10.510]
lxxxi
Expert Evidence
State v Strickland 96 NC App 642; 387 SE 2d 62 .................................................................. [10.45.760]

State v Tanner 675 P 2d 539 ....................................................................................................... [10.30.480]
State v Taylor 663 SW 2d 235 (Mo 1984) ................................................................................. [10.30.320]
State v Thomas 423 NE 2d 137 (1981) ..................................................................................... [10.30.100]
State v Tinno 497 P 2d 1386 (Idaho 1972) ................................................................................. [11.20.40]
State v Vandebogart 616 A 2d 483 (NH 1992) ........................................................................ [12.20.670]
State v Walstad 351 NW 2d 469 .................................................................................................. [2.10.460]
State v Weygandt 581 P 2d 1376 (1978) ....................................................................................... [7.0.450]
State v Wilson 429 A 2d 931 ........................................................................................................ [13.05.40]
State (New Mexico) v Gallegos 719 P 2d 1268 ....................................................................... [10.30.220]
State Bank (NSW) v Lawrence (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, No 5407 of 1987) ...... [2.15.30]
State Government Insurance Commission v Laube (1984) 37 SASR 31 .................................. [2.0.25]
State Government Insurance Corporation v Government Insurance Office (NSW)
(1991) 28 FCR 511 ................................................................................. [11.0.01], [11.0.470], [11.0.630]
State Rail Authority v Howell (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 19 December
1996) ......................................................................................................................................... [10.50.240]
State Rail Authority (NSW) v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 73 ALJR
306; [1999] HCA 3 ................................................................................................... [4.0.360]; [10.0.460]
State of California v Hernandez 55 Cal App 4th 225 (1997) ................................................. [10.35.10]
State of California v Prince 40 Cal 4th 1179 (2007) ................................................................. [10.35.10]
State of Idaho v Parkinson 128 Idaho 29 (1996) ...................................................................... [10.35.10]
State of New Hampshire v Hungerford and Morahan (unreported, State of New
Hampshire, Hillsborough County, Superior Court, Groff J, 23 May 1995) ................ [10.30.600],
[10.30.630], [10.30.690], [10.30.710]
State of New Jersey v Fortin 178 NJ 540; 843 A 2d 974 (2004) ..... [10.35.10], [10.35.90], [10.35.340]
State of New Jersey v Fortin 318 NJ Super 577 (1999) ........................................................... [10.35.10]
State of Ohio v Lowe 75 Ohio App 3d 404 ............................................................................... [10.35.10]
State of Ohio v Roquemore 85 Ohio App 3d 448 (1993) ................................... [10.35.10], [10.35.280]
State of Tennessee v Stevens 78 SW 3d 817 (2002) .................................................................. [10.35.10]
State of Washington v Russell 125 Wn 2d 24 (1994) ............................................................... [10.35.10]
Steele v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 348 .......................................................... [11.0.410]
Steffen v Ruban [1996] 2 NSWR 622; (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 264 ........... [2.20.280], [2.35.320],
[4.0.410], [16.05.520]
Stephens v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 664 ............................................................... [2.35.05], [2.35.80]
Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Johnson & Johnson Pty Ltd (1990) 96 ALR 277 ......... [11.0.50],
[11.0.430], [11.0.450]
Stevens v The Queen (2005) 227 CLR 319; [2005] HCA 65 .................................................... [13.0.400]
Stevens v Vancleve 4 Wash CC 262 .......................................................................................... [10.25.200]
Stewart v Australian Crime Commission (2012) 206 FCR 347; [2012] FCAFC 151 ........... [15.0.360]
Stingel v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 312 ........................................................... [10.25.180], [10.30.100]
Stockdale v Hansard (1837) 3 St Tr (NS) 932 ................................................................................ [15.0.1]
Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd v Darryl I Coombs Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 323 .......... [17.10.80]
Stokes v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 279 ..................................................................................... [4.0.370]
Stolfa v Owners Strata Plan 4366 (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 531 .................................................. [5.05.30]
Story v David Sasson & Partner Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Rogers J,
CommD No 50646/90, 19 June 1991) .................................................................................. [6.10.320]
Straker v The Queen (1977) 15 ALR 103 ..................................................... [2.0.65], [2.35.80], [7.0.370]
Strbak v Newton (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 18 July 1989) ................................. [6.10.280]
Strinic v Singh (2009) 74 NSWLR 419; [2009] NSWCA 15 ....................................................... [4.0.465]
Strong Wise Ltd v Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd (2010) 185 FCR 149; [2010] FCA
240 .............................................................................................................................................. [6.20.120]
Strudwick and Merry (1994) 49 Cr App R 326 .......................................................................... [2.15.10]
Stuart Bros Pty Ltd v Posei Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, No 55045/91,
9 November 1993) ................................................................................................ [6.10.280], [6.10.320]
Su v Chang (1999) 25 Fam LR 558; [1999] FamCA 1203 ............................................................ [2.0.30]
Subramanian v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965 ................................................................ [2.20.60]
Subway Systems Australia v Ireland (No 2) [2013] VSC 693 ................................................ [5.15.200]
Succession Duties (South Australia), Commissioner of v Executor Trustee and Agency
Company of South Australia Ltd (1947) 74 CLR 358; [1947] HCA 10 .......................... [16.0.130]
Sullivan v Read-Bloomfield [1983] 1 NSWLR 649 .................................................... [4.0.40], [10.0.280]
Sultan v The Queen [2008] EWCA Crim 6 ............................................................................... [7.10.230]
Sun Insurance Office v Roy [1927] SCR 8 ................................................................................... [2.25.40]
Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada v Sunlife Juice Ltd (1988) 22 SPR (3d) 244 ................... [11.0.40],
[11.0.50]
Sunbeam Corp v Morphy-Richards (Aust) Pty Ltd (1961) 180 CLR 98 ................................ [18.0.80]
Sunland Waterfront (BVI) Ltd v Prudential Investments Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 237 ........ [5.15.200]
lxxxii
Table of Cases
Super Pty Ltd v SJP Formwork (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 29 NSWLR 549 ............. [6.10.01], [6.10.260],
[6.10.280]
Super Pty Ltd (formerly known as Leda Constructions Pty Ltd) v SJP Formwork
(Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 29 NSWLR 549 ............................................................... [6.10.195], [6.10.280]
Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11 Cl & F 85; 8 ER 1034 ............. [2.15.560], [2.20.60], [15.0.1], [15.0.80]
Sutcliffe v The Queen (unreported, Court of Appeal, 1982, No 2697/R/81) ....................... [4.0.430]
Suvaal v Cessnock City Council (2003) 77 ALJR 1449; [2003] HCA 41 ................................... [4.0.80]
Swanland, The (1855) 2 Spinks 107; 164 ER 333 ........................................................................ [6.05.60]
Switz Pty Ltd v Glowbind Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1296 ..................................................... [16.05.440]
Sych v Hunter (1974) 8 SASR 118 ............................................................................................... [2.20.140]
Sydney City Council v Griffin Corp Pty Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20,675; [2003] NSWSC 26 .... [11.05.160],
[11.05.280]
Sydney South West Area Health Service v Stamoulis [2009] NSWCA 153 ....... [4.0.410], [5.15.500]
Sydney Water Co v Caruso (2009) 170 LGERA 298; [2009] NSWCA 391 ........................... [16.0.160]
Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd (2002) 234 FCR 549;
[2002] FCAFC 157 ...................................................................................................................... [3.0.150]
Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd (2002) 55 IPR 354 ........ [16.05.440]
Symonds Cider & English Wine Co Ltd v Showerings (Ireland) Ltd [1997] IEHC 1 ........ [2.15.10],
[2.15.640]
Symphony Group Plc v Hodgson [1994] QB 179 ................................................... [5.15.50], [5.15.100]
T v South Australia (1992) 60 A Crim R 273 .......................................................................... [10.45.340]

T v The Queen [2010] EWCA Crim 2439 .................................................................................... [3.15.10]
TMW, Re 553 So 2d 260 (Fla Dist Ct App 1989) .................................................................... [10.30.850]
TNL and CYT (2005) 33 Fam LR 167; [2005] FamCA 77 ........................................................ [12.20.40]
TV-AM plc v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1988] ATPR 40-891 ..................... [11.0.01]
Ta v Lucky Import and Export Co Pty Ltd [2002] WASCA 65 ............................................... [10.0.80]
Tagatz v Marquette University 861 F 2d 1040 (7th Cir 1988) ................................................ [2.05.150]
Talacko v Talacko [2009] VSC 98 ................................................................................. [6.10.01], [6.10.70]
Talacko v Talacko [2013] VSC 712 .............................................................................................. [5.15.200]
Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; [2002] HCA 35 ....................... [10.45.01], [10.45.340]
Tancred, Arrol & Co v Steel Co (Scotland) (1890) 17 R (HL) 31 ........................................... [2.15.460]
Tang, Re (2017) 52 VR 786; [2017] VSCA 171 ............................................................ [15.0.1], [15.0.200]
Tarasoff v Regents of the University of California 551 P 2d 334 (1976) .............................. [5.10.400]
Tasmania v Farhat [2017] TASSC 66 ............. [2.35.95], [3.0.165], [10.15.140], [10.15.160], [12.05.180]
Tasmania v Lowe (2004) 13 Tas R 120; [2004] TASSC 62 ..................................................... [10.30.400]
Taub v The Queen (2017) 95 NSWLR 388; NSWCCA 198 ...................................... [2.20.22], [3.0.152]
Taupau v HVAC Constructions (Queensland) Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 293 ....................... [17.0.240]
Taxation, Federal Commissioner of v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 251 ......... [2.15.460],
[2.20.60], [2.20.400]
Taxation, Federal Commissioner of v Henderson (1943) 68 CLR 29 ................................... [2.15.460]
Taxation, Federal Commissioner of v ICI (Aust) Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 529 ......................... [2.15.460]
Taxation, Federal Commissioner of v Woodside Energy Ltd (2006) 64 ATR 405; [2006]
FCA 1375 ................................................................................................................................. [16.05.720]
Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia, Commissioner of v ICI Australia
Limited [1972] HCA 75; 127 CLR 529 .................................................................................. [2.15.460]
Taylor v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [1999] 2 AC 177 ............. [8.0.120], [8.0.160], [8.0.200]
Taylor v Harvey [1986] 2 Qd R 137 .............................................................................................. [2.35.40]
Taylor v O’Connor [1971] AC 115 ............................................................................................. [16.05.120]
Taylor v The Queen (1978) 22 ALR 599 ..................................................................................... [10.25.80]
Taylor v The Queen (1978) 45 FLR 343 ..................................................... [4.0.160], [4.0.240], [4.0.430]
Teague (A Pseudonym) v The Queen [2018] VSCA 77 ........................................................... [10.25.40]
Telecomputing PCS Pty Ltd v Bridge Wholesale Acceptance Corp (Aust) Ltd (1991)
24 NSWLR 513 ..................................................................................... [6.10.70], [6.10.170], [6.10.200]
Telstra Corporation Ltd v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd (2014) 316 ALR 590;
[2014] FCA 568 ......................................................................................................................... [11.0.610]
Temilkovski v Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 211 .............................. [4.0.440]
Temple and Repatriation Commission [2001] AATA 490 ....................................................... [6.20.160]
Temwell Pty Ltd v DKGR Holdings Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 948 ............................................. [16.05.480]
Temwell Pty Ltd v DKGR Holdings Pty Ltd (in liq) [2003] FCA 948 ................................. [5.10.140]
Tenth Vandy Pty Ltd v Natwest Markets Australia Pty Ltd [2012] VSCA 103 ................ [16.05.560]
Terrell v State of Maryland 239 A 2d 128 (1968) ...................................................................... [13.05.40]
Thannhauser v Westpac Banking Corp (1991) 31 FCR 572 ............... [2.15.130], [2.25.40], [2.25.180],
[2.25.330]
lxxxiii
Expert Evidence
The Environment, Minister for v Florence (1979) 21 SASR 108 ............................................ [16.0.130]
Theophanous v Gillespie [2001] QSC 177 ............................................................................... [10.25.200]
Thiel v State 762 P 2d 478 (Alaska App 1988) ....................................................................... [12.10.280]
Thomas v The Queen [1972] NZLR 34 ...................................................................................... [10.0.360]
Thomas v Wignall [1987] QB 1098 ........................................................................................... [16.05.120]
Thomason v Western Australia [2007] WASCA 153 ................................................................ [12.20.80]
Thompson v Kovacs [1959] VR 229 ............................................................................................ [12.0.420]
Thompson v The Queen (1986) 13 FCR 165 ............................................................................... [7.0.490]
Thompson v The Queen (2005) 157 A Crim R 385; [2005] WASCA 223 ............................. [7.10.220]
Thorn v Worthing Skating Rink Co (1877) 6 Ch D 415n ........................................................... [6.0.40]
Thornton v Royal Exchange Co (1791) Peake 37; 170 ER 70 ................................................... [2.20.60]
Tickle v Tickle [1968] 2 All ER 154 ............................................................................................. [2.20.480]
Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd v AMIEU (1979) 42 FLR 331 ...................................................... [3.0.30]
Timbury v Coffee (1941) 66 CLR 277 ................................ [2.15.100], [2.30.40], [2.30.120], [10.25.200]
Timmins v Yandilla Park Ltd [2000] QSC 281 ............................................................................ [5.0.230]
Tinnock v Murrumbidgee Local Health District [2015] NSWSC 151 ..................................... [6.15.01]
Tirango Nominees v Dairy Vale Foods Ltd (1998) 156 ALR 364 .......................................... [5.10.200]
Tirango Nominees Pty Ltd v Dairy Vale Foods Ltd (No 2) (1998) 83 FCR 397 ................. [5.10.140]
Titheradge v The King (1917) 24 CLR 107 ................................................................... [6.0.90], [6.0.120]
Tomko v Tomko [2007] NSWSC 1486 ....................................................................... [5.05.30], [6.12.240]
Tomlinson v Tomlinson [1980] 1 All ER 593 ................................................................................. [7.0.90]
Tonville Pty Ltd v Stokes (A/asia) Ltd (1985) 10 ACLR 449 .................................................... [8.0.01]
Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC 595 ............................. [2.15.100], [10.0.340]
Toomatau v Vea (1950) 2 ASR 564 .............................................................................................. [2.30.120]
Toronto Police Association v Board of Commissioners [1975] 1 SCR 630 ........................... [11.20.40]
Tovarich, The [1930] P 1 ................................................................................................................. [6.05.60]
Towie v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria [2008] VSCA 157 ........................................ [5.0.350]
Trade Practices Commission v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd
(1978) 32 FLR 305 ...................................................................................................................... [4.0.280]
Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (1989) 89 ALR 131 .............................................. [6.0.100]
Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (No 5) (1990) 21 FCR 324 .................................. [5.0.110]
Trade Practices Commission v Australian Meat Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) 83 ALR 299 ..... [2.05.30]
Trade Practices Commission v Sterling (1979) 36 FLR 244 .................................................... [5.10.140]
Tran v The Queen [2016] VSCA 79 ................................................... [10.15.130], [10.15.140], [11.20.20]
Transport Publishing Co Pty Ltd v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 ........ [2.10.140],
[2.15.10], [2.15.130], [2.15.400], [2.15.640], [2.25.01], [11.0.160]
Trebilcock v Nominal Defendant (1991) 58 SASR 213 .............................................................. [5.0.260]
Trial of Edward Arnold (1724) 16 St Tr 695 .............................................................................. [10.25.80]
Triden Properties Ltd v Capita Financial Group Ltd (1993) 30 NSWLR 403 ..................... [6.10.190]
Trinity Western University v Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society 2014 NSSC 395 ................. [11.05.200]
Trudgett v Commonwealth [2006] NSWSC 575 ......................................................................... [10.0.80]
Trudgett v The Queen (2008) 70 NSWLR 696; [2008] NSWCCA 62 ..................................... [10.15.40]
Trust Co Ltd, The v Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act 1989 (2012) 211
LGERA 158; [2012] NSWLEC 73 ........................................................................................... [17.15.40]
Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Management Ltd [1998]
FCA 419 ..................................................................................................................................... [5.10.200]
Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia 2004 BCSC 1237 ....................................................... [11.05.220]
Tufano v Vincenti [2006] EWHC 1496 ........................................................................................... [8.0.80]
Tuite v The Queen (2015) 49 VR 196; [2015] VSCA 148 ......................... [3.0.20], [3.0.157], [12.05.30]
Tumanako v The Queen (1993) 64 A Crim R 149 ...................................................................... [4.0.430]
Turnbull v Janson (1878) 3 CPD 264 ............................................................................................ [5.20.10]
Turner v Eastern Sydney Area Health Service [1998] SASC 6815 .......................................... [5.0.190]
Turner v Eastern Sydney Health Service (1999) 72 SASR 529; [1999] SASC 1 ..................... [5.0.190]
Turner Corp Ltd v Co-ordinated Industries Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Supreme
Court, No 055112/92, 13 July 1993) ....................................................................................... [6.10.70]
Turney [1975] 1 QB 834 ................................................................................................................. [10.0.120]
Tutton v Darke (1816) 5 H & N 647; 157 ER 1338 ................................................................... [2.30.120]
Tyler v Thomas (2006) 150 FLR 357; [2006] FCAFC 6 .............................................................. [16.0.01]
ULV Pty Ltd v Scott (1990) 19 NSWLR 190 .......................................... [2.25.260], [2.25.330], [11.0.01]
UPL Europe v Agchemaccess Chemicals Ltd [2016] EWHC 2889 .......................................... [5.20.30]
US v Baller 519 F 2d 463 (1975) .................................................................................................. [10.0.510]
Uber BV v Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCA 110 ........................................................... [2.15.460]
Udall & Oaks [2010] FMCAfam 1482 ...................................................................................... [10.30.850]
lxxxiv
Table of Cases
Underwood v Gayfer [1999] WASCA 56 ................................................................................... [11.10.01]

Uniline Australia Ltd v SBriggs Pty Ltd (2009) 81 IPR 42; [2009] FCA 222 ......................... [18.0.80]
United Development Corp v State Highway Dep 4p 133 NW 2d 439 (ND 1965) .............. [5.20.01]
United Rural Enterprises Pty Ltd v Lopmand Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 870 ......................... [5.05.10]
United States v 88 Cases, More or Less 187 F 2d 967 (1951) ................................ [11.0.80], [11.0.390]
United States v Abel 469 US 45 .................................................................................................... [7.0.170]
United States v Addison 498 F 2d 741 (1974) ........................................................ [2.10.140], [2.10.380]
United States v Alvarez 837 F 2d 1024 (1988) .......................................................................... [2.25.540]
United States v Amaral 488 F 2d 1148 (1973) .......................................................... [2.15.60], [10.15.90]
United States v Baller 519 F (2d) 463 (1975) .......................................................... [2.10.140], [12.0.100]
United States v Barnard 490 F 2d 907 ........................................................................................ [10.0.420]
United States v Beale 736 F 2d 1289 (1984) ............................................................................ [13.05.260]
United States v Beverly 256 Conn 854; 776 A 2d 1091 (2001) ........................ [12.20.300], [12.20.670]
United States v Bonds 12 F 3d 540 (6th Cir 1993) .............................................. [2.10.550], [12.20.670]
United States v Bronstein 521 F 2d 459 (1975) ....................................................................... [13.05.260]
United States v Bynum 3 F 3d 769 ............................................................................................. [2.10.550]
United States v Cheape 889 F 2d 477 (3rd Cir ........................................................................... [7.10.80]
United States v Crumbie 895 F Supp 1354 (1995) ................................................................... [10.0.450]
United States v Distler 671 F 2d 954 .......................................................................................... [2.10.430]
United States v Downing 753 F 2d 1224 (3rd Cir 1985) .................. [2.10.380], [2.10.460], [10.15.01],
[10.15.90]
United States v Eagle 586 F 2d 1193 (8th Cir 1978) .................................................. [11.0.01], [11.0.80]
United States v Edwards 819 F 2d 262 (1987) .......................................................................... [2.25.540]
United States v Ferri 778 F 2d 985 (3rd Cr ............................................................................. [12.10.280]
United States v Franks 511 F 2d 25 (6th Cir ............................................................................. [2.10.460]
United States v Frazier 387 F 3d 1244 ........................................................................................... [2.0.20]
United States v Gates 680 F 2d 1117 (6th Cir 1982) ................................................................ [13.05.40]
United States v Hankey 203 F 3d 1160 (9th Cir 2000) ............................................................ [2.10.770]
United States v Havvard 117 F Supp 2d 848 (2000) .............................................................. [12.10.280]
United States v Heiden 508 F 2d 898 ......................................................................................... [12.0.380]
United States v Hines 55 F Supp 2d 62 (1999) ................................... [2.0.20], [12.10.280], [12.15.320]
United States v Hiss 88 F Supp 559 (SDNY 1950) ....................................................................... [7.0.90]
United States v Jakobetz 747 F Supp 250 (1990) .............................. [2.10.480], [2.10.770], [12.20.690]
United States v Johnson No 90-30344 (9th Cir ........................................................................... [7.10.80]
United States v Kozminski 821 F 2d 1186 ................................................................................. [2.10.430]
United States v Ladd 885 F 2d 954 ......................................................................... [7.05.180], [12.0.300]
United States v Langan 263 F 3d 613 (6th Cir ......................................................................... [10.15.90]
United States v McNiece 558 F Supp 612 (EDNY 1983) ........................................................ [13.05.40]
United States v Meeks 35 MJ 64 ................................................................................................. [10.35.10]
United States v Moore 936 F 2d 1508 (7th Cr ........................................................................ [12.10.280]
United States v Neresian 824 F 2d 1294 .................................................................................. [12.20.480]
United States v Piccinonna 729 F Supp 1336; 1338 (SD Fla 1990) ........................................ [10.0.450]
United States v Piccinonna 925 F 2d 1474 (11th Cir 1991) ..................................................... [10.0.450]
United States v Place 462 US 696 ............................................................................................. [13.05.260]
United States v Plaza 179 F Supp 2d 492 (2002) ............................................... [12.10.280], [12.15.320]
United States v Plaza 188 F Supp 2d 549 (2002) ............................ [2.10.640], [12.10.165], [12.10.280]
United States v Pollak 188 F Supp 2d 549 (2002) .................................................................. [12.10.280]
United States v Porter (unreported, Sup Ct DC, Crim Div, Fo 6277-89, 1991) ................ [12.20.690]
United States v Porter 618 A 2d 629 (1992) ............................................................................ [12.20.670]
United States v Rosenberg 108 F Supp 798 (1952); aff’d 200 F 2d 666 (1952) .................... [10.15.90]
United States v Roustio 455 F 2d 366 (1972) .............................................................................. [7.0.450]
United States v Scheffer 523 US 303 (1998) ............................................................................... [10.0.450]
United States v Tranowski 659 F 2d 750 (1981) ....................................................................... [2.10.430]
United States v Two Bulls 918 F 2d 56 (8th Cir 1990) .................. [2.10.490], [12.20.590], [12.20.670]
United States v Vurgess 691 F 2d 1146 (4th Cir 1982) ................................................................ [7.0.90]
United States v Wade 388 US 218 ............................................................................................... [10.15.01]
United States v Whitetail 956 F2d 857 (8th Cir 1992) ............................................................... [7.10.80]
United States v Williams 443 F Supp 269 (1977) ..................................................................... [2.10.430]
United States v Williams 583 F 2d 1194 (1978) ................................ [2.10.460], [2.10.480], [12.20.460]
United States v Winters 729 F 2d 602 (9th Cir 1984) ............................................................ [10.45.700]
United States v Yee 134 FRD 161 (ND Ohio 1991) .................................................................. [2.10.430]
United States v Yost 24 F 3d 99 (1994) .................................................................................... [10.35.280]
United States Shipping Board v The St Albans [1931] AC 632 ............................................... [4.0.450]
United States Surgical Corp v Hospital Products International Pty Ltd (unreported,
NSW Supreme Court, McLelland J, 19 April 1982) ........................................................... [15.0.160]
United States Trust Co of New York v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group
Ltd (1995) 37 NSWLR 131 ........................................................................................................ [15.0.40]
lxxxv
Expert Evidence
United Telecasters v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 89 ALR 591 ........................... [2.15.400]
Uniting Church Homes Inc v City of Stirling [2005] WASAT 191 ....................................... [6.20.160]
Unwin v Hanson [18901] 2 QB 115 ............................................................................................ [2.15.460]
Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd (No 2) [2017]
EWHC 2988 ................................................................................................................................ [6.20.60]
Upjohn Co v American Home Products Corp 598 F Supp 550 ............................................ [11.0.630]
Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 ........................................................ [1.0.30], [7.05.180], [11.0.200]
Valentine v PPG Industries Inc 158 Ohio App 3d 615 ............................................................ [12.0.260]
Valentine’s Settlement, Re [1965] Ch 831 .................................................................................... [4.0.440]
Van Soest v Residual Health Management Unit [2000] 1 NZLR 179 ................................ [10.45.340]
Van Vliet v Griffiths (1978) 19 SASR 195 ................................................................................. [10.20.200]
Van Vreden v The Queen (1973) 57 Cr App R 818 .................................................................. [2.20.160]
Van de Wetering v Capital Coast Health Ltd (unreported, High Court, New Zealand,
19 May 2000) ............................................................................................................................ [5.10.400]
Vander Donckt v Thellusson (1849) 8 CB 812 ............................................................................ [15.0.80]
Varghese v Landau (2004) CanLII 5084 ....................................................................................... [8.0.340]
Vartozkas v Zanker (1989) 44 A Crim R 243 ............................................................................ [7.10.120]
Veen v The Queen (No 1) (1979) 143 CLR 458 ...................................................... [7.10.290], [7.10.410]
Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 ......................................................................... [7.10.230]
Velasquez v Virginia 557 SE 2d 213 (2002) ................................................................................. [9.10.80]
Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; [2002] HCA 4 ....... [2.0.10], [2.35.80], [2.35.90], [3.0.30],
[4.0.460], [6.0.120], [7.05.180], [9.0.280], [10.35.160], [12.0.140]
Veljanovska v Socobell OEM Pty Ltd [2005] VSCA 227 ........................................................... [9.0.120]
Verhoeven v The Queen (1998) 101 A Crim R 24 .................................................................. [10.30.100]
Vernon v Bosley (No 1) [1997] 1 All ER 577 ................................. [10.45.210], [10.45.550], [10.45.800]
Vernon v Bosley (No 2) [1999] QB 18 .......................................................................................... [5.0.150]
Victoria v Tymbook Pty Ltd () [2008] VCAT 965 ................................................................... [11.05.160]
Victorian Railways Commission v Coultas (1888) 13 App Cas 222 ................................... [10.45.340]
Vilca v Xstrata Ltd [2016] EWHC 2757 ........................................................................................ [5.20.30]
Villari v Terminix International Inc 692 F Supp 568 (1988) ................................................... [2.10.430]
Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2003) 131 FCR
300; [2003] FCA 977 ......................................................................... [2.15.460], [2.25.330], [16.05.720]
Visy Packaging Pty Ltd v Siegwerk Australia Pty Ltd (2013) 301 ALR 560; [2013] FCA
231 .............................................................................................................................................. [6.20.200]
Vocisano v Vocisano (1974) 130 CLR 267 .................................................................................... [4.0.370]
Vokalek v Commonwealth (2008) 101 SASR 588; [2008] SASC 256 .................. [2.15.400], [2.25.260]
W v Egdell [1990] 1 Ch 359; 1 All ER 835 ................................................................................ [5.10.400]

W v M (1983) 12 A Crim R 90 ....................................................................................................... [7.10.70]
W v The Queen (2006) 16 Tas R 1; [2006] TASSC 52 ........................................... [3.0.165], [10.15.160]
W & W v R & G (unreported, Family Court of Australia, 21 April 1994) ........................... [10.0.80]
W (Sex Abuse: Standard of Proof), Re (2004) 32 Fam LR 249; [2004] FamCA 768 ............ [2.05.30],
[2.25.40], [2.25.380], [4.0.320]
W (Sex Abuse: Standard of Proof), Re [2004] 32 Fam LR 249; Fam CA 768 ...................... [5.05.100]
W and W, Re (2001) 164 FLR 18; [2001] Fam CA 216 ......... [2.25.40], [2.25.380], [4.0.320], [7.0.170],
[7.05.180]
W and W, Re [2001] FLC 93-085 ................................................................................................... [2.05.30]
W and W (Abuse Allegations, Re; Expert Evidence) (2001) 164 FLR 18; [2001] Fam
CA 216 ....................................................................................................................................... [5.05.100]
WAHN v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002]
FMCA 336 ................................................................................................................................ [11.20.160]
WR Carpenter Properties Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2006]
WASAT 200 ............................................................................................................................... [6.20.160]
Waddle v Wallsend Shipping Co (No 1) [1952] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 131 ........................................ [6.05.60]
Wade v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 85 ................................................................................. [10.30.610]
Wakefield v Duckworth [1915] 1 KB 218 .................................................................................... [5.20.30]
Wakefield, Re (1958) 75 WN (NSW) 66 ................................................................................... [10.25.160]
Wakely v Hanns; Director of Court Counselling (Intervener) (1993) 116 FLR 63 ................. [2.0.30]
Walbank v Quarterman (1846) 3 CB 94; 136 ER 38 ................................................................... [5.20.30]
Walden v Hensler (1987) 29 A Crim R 85 ................................................................................... [7.10.80]
lxxxvi
Table of Cases
Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority [2008] NSWLEC
282 .............................................................................................................................................. [6.12.240]
Walker v John Doe 2014 BCSC 830 ............................................................................................ [5.15.150]
Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630 ........................................................................................... [7.05.520]
Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority (2004) 134
LGERA 195; [2004] NSWLEC 315 ........................................................................................... [6.20.80]
Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority (2008) 233 CLR
259; [2008] HCA 5 .................................................................................................................... [16.0.130]
Waller v Holmes (1860) 1 J & H 239; 70 ER 735 ........................................................................ [5.20.30]
Wallfire Pty Ltd v Andwendrod Services Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 348 ...................................... [6.10.260]
Walsh v Department of Social Security (1996) 89 A Crim R 65 ............................................ [7.10.170]
Walsh v Legge (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Cohen J, 12 March 1997) ................. [10.25.200]
Walton v The Queen [1978] AC 788 ........................................................... [4.0.120], [4.0.160], [4.0.430]
War Pensions Entitlements Tribunal; Ex parte Bolt (1933) 50 CLR 228 ................................... [2.0.40]
Ward v The Queen (1981) 3 A Crim R 171 ................................................................................. [7.05.60]
Ward v The Queen (1993) 96 Cr App R 1 ................................................................................. [7.05.180]
Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483; [1998] FCA 1478 ................... [11.05.240], [11.10.01],
[11.10.40], [11.10.80], [11.20.200]
Warner-Lambert Co v Glaxo Laboratories Ltd [1975] RPC 354 ............................................ [5.10.360]
Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531 ........................................................................................ [4.0.01]
Warren v Pilkington [1960] Tas SR 6 .......................................................................................... [2.30.120]
Warren Corp v Goldwert Textile Sales Inc 581 F Supp 897 ..................................................... [11.0.40]
Waterways Authority of New South Wales v Coal and Allied (Operations) Pty Ltd
[2007] NSWCA 276 .................................................................................................................... [4.0.470]
Watkins v Sowders 449 US 341 ................................................................................................... [10.15.01]
Watson v Jones [1905] AC 480 ....................................................................................................... [8.0.120]
Watson v Lazarevic (1991) 22 NSWLR 159 ............................................................................... [6.10.280]
Watson v McEwan [1905] AC 480 ................................................................ [8.0.40], [8.0.120], [8.0.260]
Watson v McEwan; Watson v Jones [1905] AC 480 ................................................................... [8.0.200]
Watson-Munro, Re [2000] PRBD (Vic) 4 ................................................................. [8.05.180], [8.05.280]
Watt or Thomas v Thomas [1947] AC 484 ................................................................... [4.0.01], [4.0.360]
Wavish v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1959] VR 57 .............................................................. [2.15.400]
Wayne v Baldiston (1993) 85 NTR 8 .......................................................................................... [7.10.170]
Weal v Bottom (1966) 118 CLR 696 ................................................................................................ [1.0.01]
Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436 .... [2.05.450], [2.05.490], [4.0.370], [6.05.120], [13.0.80], [14.0.40]
Weatherford Global Products Ltd v Hydropath Holdings Ltd [2014] EWHC 2725 ......... [17.0.360]
Webb v Page (1843) 1 Carr & K 23; 174 ER 695 ........................................................................ [5.20.01]
Weightman v The Queen [1991] Crim LR 204 ..................................... [2.15.10], [2.15.100], [10.0.380]
Welker v Rinehart (No 6) [2012] NSWSC 160 ............................................................................ [5.05.10]
Welsh v The Queen (1996) 90 A Crim R 364 .............................................................................. [3.0.150]
Wendo v The Queen (1963) 109 CLR 559 ................................................................................ [12.15.160]
Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 .................................................................. [7.0.570]
Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534 ........................................... [10.20.180], [10.20.200]
Wessel v Energy Rentals Inc (2004) .............................................................................................. [18.0.80]
Western Australia v Brown [No 3] [2013] WASC 349 ........................................................... [10.45.680]
Western Australia v Carlino (No 2) [2014] WASC 404 .................................... [10.30.100], [10.30.240]
Western Australia v Elliott [2012] WASC 174 ............................................................................. [2.25.01]
Western Australia v Gardin (2015) 48 WAR 494; [2015] WASC 97 .................................... [12.20.125]
Western Australia v Gibson (2014) 243 A Crim R 68; [2014] WASC 240 ............................. [11.20.80]
Western Australia v Liyanage [2016] WASC 12 ................................................ [10.30.100], [10.30.240]
Western Australia v Muller [2015] WASC 199 ......................................................................... [12.20.80]
Western Australia v Rayney (No 3) [2012] WASC 404 ........................................................... [11.10.01]
Western Australia v Sebastian [2008] FCAFC 65 ..................................................................... [11.10.01]
Western Mining Corp and Collector of Customs (WA), Re (1984) 5 ALN N456 .............. [2.15.460]
Westpac Banking Corp v Jury (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Rolfe J, 17 October
1995) ............................................................................................................................................. [3.0.140]
Wheat v State 527 A 2d 269 (Del 1987) .................................................................................... [10.30.320]
Wheatley v The Queen [2004] WASCA 71 ................................................................................ [13.0.400]
Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881) 17 Ch D 675 ............................................................................. [5.10.140]
Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 77 ALJR 1598; [2003] HCA 48 .......................................... [4.0.360]
Whitbread v The Queen (1995) 78 A Crim R 452 ...................................................................... [7.0.290]
White v Bywater (1887) 19 QBD 582 .......................................................................................... [2.20.400]
White v Violent Crimes Compensation Board 76 NJ 368; 388 A 2d 206 (1978) ............... [10.30.320]
White Burgess Langille Inman v Abbott and Haliburton Co [2015] 2 SCR 182 .... [1.0.01], [2.0.01],
[2.0.03], [2.0.20], [2.0.68], [2.05.150], [7.0.170], [12.05.10]
White Constructions (NT) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1990) 7 BCL 193 ............................ [6.10.280]
White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 ................... [5.15.50]
lxxxvii
Expert Evidence
Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657 ............................................................ [4.0.460], [6.0.120]
Whitehouse v Jordan [1980] 1 All ER 650 ................................................................ [5.0.150], [5.15.450]
Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246 ............ [2.35.460], [4.0.360], [5.0.150], [5.15.450], [7.05.180]
Whitsed v The Queen [2005] WASCA 208 ................................................................................ [13.0.400]
Whitton v Falkiner (1915) 20 CLR 118 ....................................................................................... [2.15.460]
Wiki v Atlantis Relocations (NSW) Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 127; [2004] NSWCA 174 .... [4.0.80]
Wikner v Commissioner of Police [2006] NSWCA 217 ............................................................ [9.0.120]
Wilband v The Queen [1967] 2 CCC 6 ...................................................................................... [2.20.280]
Wilbraham v The Queen (unreported, WA Court of Criminal Appeal, 21 December
1979) ........................................................................................................................................... [10.25.40]
Willers v Joyce [2016] UKSC 43 ...................................................................................................... [8.0.40]
Willett v William J Burns International Detective Agency 176 NYS 722 (1919 Sup App
T) ................................................................................................................................................... [5.20.60]
Williams v Baz [1997] ACTSC 65 .................................................................................................. [9.0.120]
Williams v Crimes Compensation Tribunal (unreported, Victorian Administrative
Appeals Tribunal, 29 March 1994) .......................................................................................... [10.0.80]
Williams v Public Trustee of New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 921 ..................... [3.0.150], [3.0.170]
Wilma Freddie on behalf of the Wiluna Native Title Claimants/Western
Australia/Kingx Pty Ltd [2011] NNTTA 170 ...................................................................... [11.10.01]
Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074 ............................................................ [4.0.80]
Wilson v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission
Referral) [2009] Scot HC HCJAC 5 ....................................................................................... [2.20.200]
Wilson v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission
Referral) [2009] ScotHC HCJAC 58 .................................................... [2.20.01], [2.25.40], [10.0.590]
Wilson v Horne (1999) 8 Tas R 363; [1999] Tas SC 33 ........................................................... [10.45.520]
Wilson v Porter (1988) 46 SASR 547 ............................................................................................ [5.0.260]
Wilson, In the Will of (1897) 23 VLR 197 ................................................................................ [10.25.200]
Wingfoot Australia Partner Pty Ltd v Jovevski [2014] VSCA 21 .......................................... [5.15.200]
Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 ............ [10.15.01], [10.15.40],
[10.15.55]
Wirth v The Queen (1976) 14 SASR 291 .................................................................................... [7.10.170]
Woelfle v Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co 103 F 2d 417 (8th Cir 1939) .................. [2.20.400]
Wogandt v The Queen (1983) 33 A Crim R 31 ......................................................................... [2.20.280]
Wolper v Poole (1972) 2 SASR 419 ............................................................................ [2.05.490], [14.0.40]
Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21 ......... [4.0.250], [7.0.170], [7.0.490]
Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; [2002] HCA 9 ........................ [2.30.02]
Woodside Energy Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2006) 155 FCR 357; [2006]
FCA 1303 ................................................................................................................................. [16.05.720]
Woodward v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 44 .......................................................................... [7.10.265]
Woolf v 52 Birriga Road Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 921 ............................................................. [6.10.170]
Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 362 ........................................................................................... [10.25.80]
Woolworths Ltd v BP plc (No 2) (2006) 154 FCR 97; [2006] FCAFC 132 ............................ [11.0.480]
Workcover Corporation of South Australia v Trask [2007] SASC 339 ................................... [9.0.120]
World Hosts Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 189 ............................... [11.0.410]
Worth v Clasohm (1952) 86 CLR 439 ....................................................................................... [10.25.200]
Wrap Properties Pty Ltd v Yarra CC [2002] VCAT 1499 ...................................................... [11.05.280]
Wright v Commonwealth [2005] VSC 200 ...................................... [10.45.40], [10.45.170], [10.45.180]
Wright v Doe d Tatham (1838) 4 Bing (NC) 489; 132 ER 877 .............................. [2.05.10], [2.20.120]
Wright v Municipal Council of Sydney (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 348 ....................... [2.20.140], [16.0.40]
Wright v The Queen [2016] NSWCCA 122 ............................................................................... [7.10.265]
Wu v Statewide Developments Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 587 ................................................. [6.12.240]
Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 ................................................................... [10.50.240]
X v Trimega Laboratories Ltd [2014] 2 FLR 232; [2013] EWCC 6 ........................................ [5.15.100]
X (Children) (Morgan and Others Intervening), Re [2012] 1 WLR 182 ................................. [8.0.230]
X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 ............... [8.0.200], [8.0.220], [8.0.420],
[8.05.90]
X and Y (by her Tutor X) v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26 ........................................... [4.0.360], [7.05.180]
XYZ v Schering Health Care Ltd (2002) 70 BMLR 88; [2002] EWHC 1420 ....................... [12.0.200],
[12.25.170]
Xuereb v Viola (1989) 18 NSWLR 453 ...................................................................... [6.10.70], [6.10.195]
lxxxviii
Table of Cases
YCO v Firearm Appeals Committee () [2008] VCAT 966 ..................................................... [11.05.160]

Yara Australia Pty Ltd v Oswal (2013) 41 VR 302; [2013] VSCA 337 ................. [5.15.50], [5.15.500]
Yarmirr v Northern Territory (1998) 82 FCR 533 ............................... [11.10.01], [11.10.40], [11.10.80]
Yates v The Queen [1985] VR 41 ................................................................................................. [7.10.100]
Yates Property Corp Pty Ltd (in liq) v Darling Harbour Authority (1991) 24 NSWLR
156 ............................................................................................................ [4.0.200], [16.0.01], [16.0.120]
York v Yorkshire Insurance Co [1918] 1 KB 662 ........................................................................ [2.25.40]
Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [1998] FCA 1606 ........................................ [11.05.240]
Yougie v The Queen (1986) 33 A Crim R 301 ............................................................................. [7.10.80]
Young v Hones [2014] NSWCA 337 .......................................................................... [6.15.400], [8.0.420]
Zaharoudis and Salihos (1986) 22 A Crim R 233 ..................................................................... [7.10.310]

Zanker v Vartokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11 ............................................................................... [10.30.100]
Zappia v Webb [1974] WAR 15 ................................................................................................... [12.0.420]
Zecevic v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 645 ............................................................................... [10.30.100]
Zehir v The Queen (1998) 104 A Crim R 109 ........................................................................... [7.10.100]
071594635 [2007] RRTA 229 .......................................................................................................... [11.10.01]
Zetco Pty Ltd v Austworld Commodities Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 848 ......................... [18.0.140]
Zippo Manufacturing Co v Rogers Imports Inc 216 F Supp 670 ......................... [11.0.80], [11.0.410]
lxxxix
TABLE OF STATUTES
COMMONWEALTH s 146(1): [12.0.500]

s 146(2): [12.0.500]
Access to Justice (Civil Litigation Reforms) s 174: [15.0.200]
Amendment Act 2009 ss 174 to 176: [2.15.560]
s 37M(2): [6.10.70] s 177: [5.0.310]
s 177(2): [5.0.310]
Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation Act s 177(3): [5.0.310]
1980 s 190: [2.0.30]
s 40Y: [6.20.160] s 190(3): [11.0.530]
Pt 3.9: [10.15.160]
Companies Code: [5.10.200]
Evidence Amendment Bill 2008: [3.0.90]
Corporations Act 2001
s 9: [2.05.350] Family Law Act 1975
Pt 6A.2: [16.05.240] s 11A: [6.0.110]
s 18ZH: [6.0.110]
Crimes Act 1914: [10.10.180]
s 55A(2): [6.0.110]
s 16: [10.10.180]
s 60CC(2)(a): [10.30.850]
s 16A(2)(p): [7.10.170]
s 61G: [11.15.80]
s 29B: [10.30.240]
s 62G(1): [6.0.110]
Pt IB, Div 6: [10.10.130], [10.10.360]
s 62G(5): [6.0.110]
Criminal Code Act 1995 s 62G(8): [6.0.110]
s 7.3: [10.25.80] s 66P(1): [12.20.180]
s 69W: [12.20.40]
Criminal Procedure Rules 2015: [2.10.20] s 102B: [6.05.80]
Pt 19: [12.05.30] s 117(2): [5.15.200]
s 117(3): [5.15.200]
Customs Act 1901: [2.35.280]
s 233(1)(b): [2.15.400] Family Law Rules 2004: [5.05.100]
rr 15.37 to 15.39: [6.05.80]
Evidence Act 1905 r 15.41: [5.05.100]
s 7B: [11.0.390] r 15.42: [5.05.100]
Evidence Act 1995: [1.0.10], [2.0.10], [2.0.30], r 15.43: [2.05.350], [5.0.60]
[2.0.65], [2.0.85], [2.05.20], [2.05.230], r 15.44: [5.05.100], [6.0.110]
[2.15.460], [2.20.160], [3.0.01], [3.0.90], r 15.44(1): [5.05.100]
[5.10.160], [5.10.200], [7.05.10], [10.0.280], r 15.45: [6.0.110]
[11.0.610], [11.05.240], [11.10.80], [16.05.440] r 15.45(2): [5.05.100]
s 35: [7.05.520] r 15.49: [6.0.110]
s 39: [7.0.570] r 15.49(2): [6.0.110]
s 55: [12.0.300] r 15.50: [6.0.110]
s 59: [3.0.155] r 15.50(1): [5.05.100]
s 60: [11.10.80] r 15.50(2): [5.05.100]
s 64: [11.10.80] r 15.51(1): [5.05.100]
s 67: [11.10.80] r 15.52(2): [5.05.100]
s 72: [11.0.530] r 15.52(3): [5.05.100]
s 74: [11.10.120] r 15.52(4): [5.05.100]
s 78: [3.0.150] r 15.55: [5.05.100]
s 79: [2.05.350], [7.0.370], [7.05.180], r 15.59: [5.05.100]
[11.05.240], [13.0.160], [16.05.440], r 15.60: [5.05.100]
[16.05.480] r 15.63: [5.05.100]
s 79(2): [10.0.300], [10.30.490], [10.30.760] r 15.69(3): [5.05.100]
s 80: [2.15.01], [2.25.40], [2.25.180], [7.0.370] r 15.70: [5.05.100]
s 85(2): [10.05.90]
Federal Court Act 1976
s 85(3)(a): [10.05.90]
s 54A: [6.10.01]
s 90: [10.05.90]
s 126: [5.10.200] Federal Court Rules: [5.05.100], [6.0.100]
s 135: [2.0.70], [11.0.510], [11.0.530], O 33: [11.0.450]
[12.0.300], [16.05.440] O 34: [6.0.100]
s 136: [11.0.510], [11.0.530], [11.10.80]
s 137: [2.0.70], [12.0.300], [13.0.160] Federal Court Rules 2011
s 144: [2.30.02] r 23.01: [6.0.100]
xci
Expert Evidence
Federal Court Rules 2011 — cont Civil Procedure Act 2005

r 23.13: [5.0.110] s 56: [5.15.200]
r 23.15: [6.20.240] s 56(3): [5.15.200]
r 34.1A: [2.05.350] s 61(2)(c): [5.15.200]
Sch 1: [2.05.350]
Crimes Act 1900
National Measurement Act 1960: [12.0.10] s 23: [10.25.180]
s 10: [12.0.460] s 23A: [10.25.120]
s 23A(1)(b): [2.25.460]
Quarantine Act 1908: [2.35.280] s 23A(2): [2.25.460]
Supreme Court Rules: [5.05.100] s 396: [10.10.360]
s 442B(3): [7.10.370]
Trade Practices Act 1974 s 447C: [7.10.370]
s 44B: [16.05.720]
s 50: [4.0.450] Crimes Amendment (Diminished
s 52: [6.10.280], [11.0.530] Responsibility) Act 1997: [2.25.460]
s 53(c): [11.0.530] Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000
s 53(d): [11.0.530] s 50: [9.10.80]
Pt IIIA: [16.05.720]
Pt IV: [4.0.280] Equity Act 1901: [6.10.280]
Veterans Entitlement Act 1986 Evidence Act 1995: [1.0.10], [2.0.10], [2.0.65],
s 120: [4.0.200] [2.0.70], [2.0.85], [2.05.230], [2.05.350],
[2.15.01], [2.15.460], [2.15.560], [2.30.02],
[3.0.01], [3.0.90], [3.0.155], [5.0.310],
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL [5.05.10], [5.10.160], [7.0.370], [7.0.570],
TERRITORY [7.05.10], [7.05.180], [7.05.520], [10.0.300],
[10.05.90], [10.15.160], [10.30.490],
Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 [10.30.760], [11.10.120], [12.0.500],
s 34: [10.45.340] [15.0.200]
s 3(1): [2.35.85]
Court Procedures Rules 2006 s 13(7): [3.0.90]
r 1242: [5.0.140] s 55: [3.0.140], [12.0.300]
r 1530: [6.05.80] s 59: [3.0.155]
Crimes Act 1900: [10.10.250] s 59(1): [3.0.150]
s 13: [10.25.180] s 60: [3.0.01], [3.0.150]
s 14: [10.25.120] s 69: [3.0.155], [5.05.10]
s 311: [10.10.250] s 72: [3.0.150]
s 320: [10.25.80] s 76: [3.0.01], [3.0.10]
s 396: [10.10.360] s 76(1): [3.0.10]
Pt XIA: [10.10.130], [10.10.360] s 78: [10.15.140]
s 79: [2.05.270], [3.0.01], [3.0.20], [3.0.30],
Criminal Code [3.0.140], [3.0.150], [3.0.152],
s 28: [10.25.80] [7.0.370], [10.15.130], [11.05.80],
[12.05.440], [12.20.470], [16.05.440]
Evidence Act 1971 s 79(1): [3.0.20], [3.0.30], [3.0.157]
s 75: [5.0.310] s 79(2): [3.0.90]
Evidence Act 2011:[1.0.10], [2.0.10], [2.0.70], s 79A: [3.0.90]
[2.0.80], [2.05.200], [2.05.350], [2.15.01], s 80: [2.15.460], [2.25.180], [3.0.01], [3.0.30],
[2.15.560], [2.30.02], [3.0.01], [3.0.90], [3.0.140], [3.0.170]
[3.0.155], [5.0.310], [5.15.200], [7.0.570], s 80(a): [3.0.140]
[7.05.10], [7.05.310], [12.0.300], [16.05.480] s 80(b): [3.0.30]
s 137: [12.20.125] s 102: [3.0.90]
s 106: [3.0.90]
Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994: s 106(d): [3.0.90]
[10.10.250] s 108: [3.0.90]
s 68: [10.10.250] s 108(1): [3.0.90]
ss 68 to 70: [10.10.130] s 108(3): [3.0.90]
s 70: [10.10.250] s 108C: [3.0.158]
s 108C(1): [3.0.158]
NEW SOUTH WALES s 108C(2): [3.0.158]
s 114: [10.15.160]
Civil Liability Act 2002 s 114(1): [10.15.160]
s 5D: [9.0.40] s 115: [10.15.160]
s 30: [10.45.340] s 116: [3.0.175], [13.0.280]
s 31: [10.45.340] s 116(1): [10.15.160]
xcii
Table of Statutes
Evidence Act 1995 — cont r 20.14: [6.10.70]

s 135: [2.35.85], [3.0.30], [3.0.140], [3.0.150], r 20.20: [6.10.180], [6.10.190]
[3.0.157], [3.0.170], [5.05.10], r 20.20(2)(b): [6.10.195]
[12.0.300], [12.10.390], [12.20.90], r 20.20(3): [6.10.195]
[12.20.290] rr 20.23(1)(a) to (b): [6.10.280]
s 135(a): [3.0.150], [3.0.170] r 23.2: [5.0.230]
s 135(c): [10.15.70] r 23.4: [5.0.230]
s 136: [3.0.150] r 31.17(f): [5.15.200]
s 137: [2.35.85], [2.35.95], [3.0.30], [3.0.150], r 31.18: [2.05.350], [5.0.60], [5.05.10]
[3.0.157], [3.0.165], [3.0.170], r 31.22: [5.0.30], [5.20.90]
[10.15.140], [10.15.160], [12.0.300], r 31.23: [5.05.10]
[12.10.390], [12.20.90], [12.20.290], r 31.23(1): [5.05.10], [5.15.200]
[13.0.280] r 31.23(3): [5.05.10]
s 137(1): [3.0.157] r 31.23(4): [5.05.10]
s 144: [3.0.160] r 31.24(2): [6.15.200]
s 165: [3.0.175], [10.15.160], [13.0.280] r 31.26: [5.0.112]
s 165(1)(b): [3.0.175] r 31.29: [5.0.190]
s 165(2): [3.0.175] r 31.34: [5.0.140]
s 177: [3.0.01], [3.0.180] r 31.44: [5.05.30]
r 31.46: [6.0.100]
Evidence Act 2008 r 42.1: [6.10.70]
s 137: [13.05.40] Pt 20, Div 3: [6.10.70], [6.10.190], [6.10.290]
Evidence Amendment Bill 2007: [3.0.90] Sch 7: [5.05.10]
Legal Profession Act 1987

s 198M: [5.15.250]
NORFOLK ISLAND
Lie Detectors Act 1983 Evidence Act 2004: [3.0.01]
s 4: [10.0.460]
s 5(2): [10.0.460] NORTHERN TERRITORY
Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990:
Criminal Code Act
[10.10.190]
s 37: [10.25.120]
s 7: [10.10.360]
s 43: [10.10.260]
s 14: [10.10.190]
s 43C: [10.25.80]
s 16(1): [10.10.190]
s 158: [10.25.180]
s 17: [10.10.190]
s 345: [10.10.360]
s 18: [10.10.190]
s 357(1): [10.10.360]
s 21: [10.10.190]
Pt 2, Div 3: [10.10.130]
s 22: [10.10.190]
Pt 2: [10.10.130], [10.10.360] Criminal Code Amendment (Mental
Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act
Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990
2002: [10.10.260]
s 38: [10.25.80]
s 43: [10.10.260]
Property (Relationships) Act 1984: [10.45.340]
Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act
Suitors’ Fund Act 1951: [6.10.70] 2011: [1.0.10], [2.0.70], [2.0.85], [2.05.230],
s 6C: [6.10.70] [2.05.350], [2.15.01], [2.15.560], [2.30.02],
[3.0.01], [3.0.90], [3.0.155], [5.0.310],
Suitors; Fund Act 1951: [6.10.70] [5.10.160], [7.05.10], [7.05.180], [7.05.520],
[10.0.300], [10.05.90], [10.15.160],
Supreme Court Rules [10.30.490], [10.30.760], [12.0.500],
Pt 36, r 13C: [5.05.10] [15.0.200]
Supreme Court Rules 1970 s 39: [7.0.570]
Pt 36, r 13C: [5.05.10] r 11-403: [10.0.450]
Pt 72: [6.10.70], [6.10.190], [6.10.290] r 11-608B: [10.0.450]
Pt 72, r 8: [6.10.180] r 11-707: [10.0.450]
Pt 72, r 8(2)(a): [6.10.190] Supreme Court Rules
Sch K: [5.05.10] r 33.03: [5.0.260]
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005
r 31.24: [6.15.40] QUEENSLAND
r 31.26: [6.15.40]
Civil Liability Act 2003
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005: [6.10.70] s 11: [9.0.40]
s 3(1): [5.15.200]
r 8.5: [6.10.290] Criminal Code Act 1899: [10.10.200]
r 13: [6.10.280] s 27: [10.25.80]
xciii
Expert Evidence
Criminal Code Act 1899 — cont TASMANIA

s 304: [10.25.180]
s 304A: [10.25.120] Civil Liability Act 2002
s 601: [10.10.360] s 13: [9.0.40]
s 613: [10.10.130], [10.10.360] s 34: [10.45.340]
s 645: [10.10.360]
Criminal Code
Evidence Act 1977 s 16: [10.25.80]
s 9A: [10.0.280]
s 9C: [3.0.90] Criminal Justice (Mental Impairment) Act
1999
Mental Health Act 1974: [10.10.200] s 8: [10.10.230]
ss 33 to 34: [10.10.130], [10.10.360] s 8(2): [10.10.230]
Pt 4: [10.10.360] Pt 2: [10.10.130], [10.10.360]
Planning and Environment Court Rules 2010 Evidence Act 2001: [1.0.10], [2.0.10], [2.0.70],
r 19(5)(xi): [6.25.80] [2.0.85], [2.05.230], [2.05.350], [2.15.01],
[2.15.560], [2.30.02], [3.0.01], [3.0.155],
Professional Engineers Act 2002: [17.0.450] [5.0.310], [5.10.160], [7.0.570], [7.05.10],
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 [7.05.520], [10.05.90], [10.15.160],
r 285: [6.05.80] [11.10.120], [12.0.500], [15.0.200],
r 425: [5.0.60] [16.05.440], [16.05.480]
r 428(3): [5.0.110] s 55: [12.0.300]
r 429A: [5.0.140] s 79: [10.30.490]
r 429I: [6.0.100] s 79(2): [10.30.490]
r 429J: [6.0.100] s 79A: [3.0.90], [7.05.180], [10.0.300],
reg 501: [6.10.70] [10.30.490], [10.30.760]
s 80: [2.25.180]
s 135: [12.0.300]
SOUTH AUSTRALIA s 137: [12.0.300]
Civil Liability Act 1936 Evidence Amendment Act 2010: [3.0.90]

s 33: [10.45.340]
s 34: [9.0.40] Supreme Court Rules 2000
s 53: [10.45.340] r 461: [5.0.110]
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935:

[10.25.80]
VICTORIA
s 29(1): [9.0.240] Civil Liability Act 2002: [5.15.500]
s 284(2): [10.10.360]
Pt 8A: [10.10.360] Civil Procedure Act 2008: [5.15.50]
Pt 8A, Div 3: [10.10.130], [10.10.360]
Civil Procedure Act 2010
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1996 s 10: [5.15.200]
s 269H: [10.10.210] s 16: [5.15.200]
s 269K(2): [10.10.530] s 17: [5.15.200], [5.15.500]
s 18: [5.15.200]
Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 s 19: [5.15.200]
s 7: [7.10.370] s 21: [5.15.200], [5.15.500]
Evidence Act 1929 s 22: [5.15.200]
s 30: [12.15.160] s 25: [5.15.200], [5.15.500]
s 64: [2.30.220], [11.05.360] s 26: [5.15.200], [5.15.500]
s 29: [5.15.200]
Evidence Act 1989 s 29(1): [5.15.200]
s 35: [2.30.300] s 65K: [6.20.240]
s 65M: [6.0.100]
Rules of the Supreme Court 1947 s 226: [5.15.500]
O 38: [5.0.190]
County Court Act 1958
Supreme Court Act 1935 s 78A(1): [5.20.10]
ss 65 to 67: [6.10.70]
s 71: [6.05.80] Crimes Act 1958
s 392: [10.10.360]
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006
r 4: [5.0.60] Crimes (Criminal Trials) Act 1999: [11.0.350]
r 161: [5.0.130] s 9: [7.05.60]
Supreme Court Rules 1987 Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to
r 38: [5.0.260] be Tried) Act 1997: [7.10.220], [10.25.80]
r 76: [6.10.70] s 6(1): [10.10.220]
xciv
Table of Statutes
Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be r 44.01: [5.0.100]

Tried) Act 1997 — cont O 33: [5.0.190]
s 6(2): [10.10.220]
s 20: [10.0.80], [10.25.80] Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure)
s 80: [10.0.240] Rules 2015: [5.15.200], [6.15.40]
Pt 2: [10.10.130], [10.10.360] r 44.03: [5.15.200]
r 44.03(3): [5.15.200]
Criminal Procedure Act 2009: [6.10.70] r 63.23: [5.15.50], [5.15.200]
s 50: [5.0.350] O 44: [5.15.200]
s 232A: [6.25.80] O 50: [6.10.70]
App B: [5.20.10]
Disability Act 2006
s 3: [7.10.250] Supreme Court (Intellectual Property) Rules
2016
Engineers Registration Bill 2018: [17.0.450]
r 10.01: [6.0.100]
Evidence Act 1958
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
s 37E: [10.30.490]
Act 1998
s 75A: [5.0.310]
s 148: [12.15.160] s 94(1): [6.0.100]
Evidence Act 2008: [1.0.10], [2.0.10], [2.0.70], Wrongs Act 1958

[2.0.85], [2.05.230], [2.05.350], [2.15.01], s 51: [9.0.40]
[2.15.560], [2.30.02], [3.0.01], [3.0.90], s 72: [10.45.340]
[3.0.155], [5.0.310], [5.15.200], [7.0.570], s 73: [10.45.340]
[7.05.10], [7.05.180], [7.05.520], [10.0.300],
[10.05.90], [10.15.160], [10.30.490], WESTERN AUSTRALIA
[10.30.760], [11.10.120], [12.0.500],
[15.0.200], [16.05.440], [16.05.480] Civil Liability Act 2002
s 55: [12.0.300] s 5C: [9.0.40]
s 108C: [10.20.260] s 5S: [10.45.340]
s 117: [5.10.160]
s 118: [5.10.160], [5.10.180] Criminal Code Act
s 118(a): [5.10.160] s 27: [10.25.80]
s 118(b): [5.10.160] s 609A: [10.10.360]
s 119: [5.10.160], [5.10.180] s 611A: [11.0.350]
s 119(a): [5.10.160] s 619: [10.10.130], [10.10.360]
s 119(b): [5.10.160] s 652: [10.10.360]
s 120: [5.10.180] s 653: [10.10.360]
ss 122(3)(a) -(b): [5.10.180]
s 122(4): [5.10.180] Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused)
s 122(5): [5.10.180] Act 1996: [10.10.240]
s 126: [5.10.180] s 8: [10.10.240]
s 135: [12.0.300] s 9: [10.10.240]
s 137: [12.0.300] ss 11 to 13: [10.10.360]
s 12: [10.10.240]
Professional Engineers Registration Bill 2019: s 14: [10.10.240]
[8.05.01] ss 16 to 19: [10.10.240]
Road Safety Act 1986 s 18: [10.10.240]
s 49(1)(b): [13.0.200] s 19: [10.10.240]
s 49(1)(f): [13.0.200] s 24: [10.10.240]
ss 57 to 58: [5.0.310] s 25: [10.10.240]
s 35: [10.10.240]
Sentencing Act 1991: [7.10.370] Pt 3, Div 1: [10.10.130], [10.10.360]
s 5(2): [7.10.370]
Evidence Act 1906
Sentencing (Victim Impact Statement) Act s 72: [2.30.220], [11.05.360]
1994: [7.10.370]
Juries Act 1957
Supreme Court Act 1928 s 32FA: [11.0.350]
s 123: [6.0.90] s 34B: [11.0.350]
Sch 4: [11.0.350]
Supreme Court Act 1986: [6.10.70]
s 77: [6.05.80] Justices Act 1902
s 138A: [10.10.360]
Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure)
Rules 2005: [5.0.60] Mental Health Act 1996: [10.10.240]
r 33.03: [5.0.60], [5.0.190]
r 33.04: [5.0.230] Rules of the Supreme Court 1971
r 33.07: [5.0.190] O 36A: [5.0.60]
xcv
Expert Evidence
Supreme Court Act 1935 UNITED STATES

s 56: [6.05.80]
Californian Evidence Code: [10.20.200]
s 795(a)(3)(D): [10.20.190]
CANADA
Federal Rules of Evidence: [2.10.380],
Criminal Code: [10.10.460] [2.15.60], [3.10.02]
s 2: [10.10.300], [10.10.460] r 403: [3.10.02]
Evidence Act 1985 r 701: [3.10.02]
s 7: [6.05.260] r 702: [3.10.02], [17.0.320]
r 703: [3.10.02]
Evidence Code r 704(b): [3.10.02]
s 59: [2.25.01] r 705: [3.10.02]
r 706: [3.10.02]
Federal Court Civil Procedure Rules r 803(18): [7.05.180]
r 52: [6.05.40]
Federal Rules of Evidence 1975: [2.0.85],
Federal Court Rules 1978: [6.05.260] [2.10.60], [2.10.430], [2.10.550], [2.10.630],
[2.25.540], [3.0.30], [3.05.10], [10.30.710]
NEW ZEALAND r 102: [2.35.200]
r 201(b): [12.10.280]
Crimes Act 1961 r 403: [2.35.200]
s 48: [10.30.100] r 615: [7.0.90]
s 169(2): [10.30.100] r 702: [2.05.570], [2.10.430], [2.10.460],
s 389: [12.20.780] [2.10.550], [2.10.680], [2.15.60],
[2.25.540], [10.30.320]
Criminal Justice Act 1985 r 703: [11.0.80]
s 108: [10.10.280] r 704: [2.25.540]
r 704(a): [2.25.01]
Evidence Act 1908 r 704(b): [2.25.540]
s 23G: [3.05.10], [3.05.90] r 706: [6.0.160]
Evidence Act 2006: [1.0.10], [2.0.10], [2.0.85], r 803(3): [11.0.80]
[3.05.01], [3.05.40], [3.05.90]
s 4: [3.05.40], [3.05.80] UNITED KINGDOM
s 7: [3.05.40]
s 8: [3.05.70] Arbitration Act 1889: [6.10.01]
s 23: [3.05.40]
s 23C: [3.05.90] Arbitration Act 1950
s 23G: [3.05.90] s 22: [6.10.320]
s 24: [3.05.40]
s 25: [3.05.80], [7.05.520] Civil Evidence Act 1972
s 25(1): [3.0.90], [3.05.40] s 3: [2.25.40]
ss 25(2) to(5): [3.05.50] s 3(1): [2.25.01]
s 26: [3.05.150] Civil Procedure Rules
s 126: [3.05.90] Pt 35: [6.20.60]
High Court Rules 2016 Civil Procedure Rules 1998
Sch 4: [3.05.150] Pt 35.2: [2.05.350]
Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Compensation Act 2006: [12.25.170]
Rehabilitation) Act 2003
s 3: [12.25.170]
s 7(1): [7.10.250]
s 7(1)(a): [7.10.250] Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to
s 7(1)(b): [7.10.250] be Tried) Act 1997
s 7(2): [7.10.250] s 76: [7.10.250]
s 7(3): [7.10.250] s 76(2)(b): [7.10.250]
s 7(4): [7.10.250] s 78: [7.10.250]
Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Criminal Lunatics Act 1800: [10.25.80]
Treatment) Act 1992: [10.10.280]
Criminal Procedure Act 1865
Victims of Offences Act 1987 s 8: [12.15.160]
s 8: [7.10.370]
Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to
Plead) Act 1991: [10.10.80]
SINGAPORE
Criminal Procedure Rules: [3.15.50]
Evidence Act r 19.3: [3.15.50]
s 47: [3.15.200] r 19.6: [3.15.50]
xcvi
Table of Statutes
Criminal Procedure Rules — cont s 31: [17.0.280]

r 19.7: [3.15.50]
Pt 33: [3.15.50] Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984:
[10.05.01], [10.05.110]
Criminal Procedure Rules 2010 s 76(2): [10.05.110]
r 19.2: [3.15.50]
Senior Courts Act 1981
r 33.4(1): [3.15.50]
s 70: [6.05.80]
r 33.4(2): [3.15.50]
Pt 19: [3.15.50] Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1884
s 9: [6.10.01]
Criminal Procedure Rules 2015
r 19.6: [6.15.480]
TREATIES AND
Evidence Act 1972: [6.05.260]
CONVENTIONS
Human Rights Act 1998
Sch 1: [6.05.220] European Charter of Human Rights
Art 6: [6.05.220]
Misuse of Drugs Act 1971: [2.15.460]
European Convention for the Protection of
National Health Service Reform and Health Human Rights and Fundamental
Care Professions Act 2002 Freedoms
s 25: [8.05.110] Art 6(1): [6.05.220]
Offences against the Person Act 1861 Montreal Convention: [10.45.220]
xcvii
PART 1 – INTRODUCTION
Chapter 1.0: Introduction.............................................................................. 3
1
Chapter 1.0
INTRODUCTION
Purpose and scope of the book .......................................................................................... [1.0.01]
Law reform activity and empirical research .................................................................... [1.0.05]
Rules of admissibility ........................................................................................................... [1.0.10]
Evolving areas of expertise ................................................................................................. [1.0.20]
Experts’ participation in litigation ..................................................................................... [1.0.30]
The selection of experts ........................................................................................................ [1.0.40]
Other factors to be considered ............................................................................................ [1.0.50]
Making good forensic decisions ......................................................................................... [1.0.70]
Pre-hearing meetings between legal representatives and experts ............................... [1.0.80]
Usage of expert reports ........................................................................................................ [1.0.90]
Referees, assessors, court-appointed experts and single joint experts ........................ [1.0.100]
Consecutive evidence, expert conclaves and concurrent evidence .............................. [1.0.105]
Unethical and incompetent expert evidence .................................................................... [1.0.107]
The hearing ............................................................................................................................. [1.0.110]
Presence of expert in court .................................................................................................. [1.0.110]
Giving evidence at a hearing .............................................................................................. [1.0.120]
Evidence for sentencing ....................................................................................................... [1.0.130]
Issues for the future .............................................................................................................. [1.0.150]
‘Juries may attach great weight to the opinions of experts on
matters outside the competence of the layman to understand.
It is essential that everything possible be done to ensure that
opinions expressed by experts, especially Crown experts, be
soundly based and correct.’
J Morling, Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Chamberlain Convictions, Report
(1987).
Purpose and scope of the book
[1.0.01] The purpose of this book is to assist legal practitioners and experts to understand
one another’s perspectives better and to acquire knowledge so that cases are well prepared
and arguments are persuasively presented. Sound preparation may culminate in a
courtroom hearing. However, contested court hearings only eventuate a modest
proportion of the time in the context of actions filed in court. Because many defendants in
criminal matters opt to plead guilty and the overwhelming majority of commercial,
personal injury, professional liability and family law disputes are settled before a hearing,
parties have a need to evaluate the evidence, including the expert evidence, upon which
the other side proposes to rely in order to determine how they wish to formulate their
litigation decision-making and, where appropriate, their settlement negotiations.
Consequently, the contents of Expert Evidence address legal and advocacy issues arising
out of the contributions that experts can make both inside and outside the courtroom in all
forms of litigation.
The admissibility law of expert evidence has many features which are shared
internationally: developments in science, medicine and engineering, to name but some,
transcend national boundaries. Hence, particular emphasis in this sixth edition of Expert
Evidence: Law, Practice, Procedure and Advocacy is given to the most influential cases in a
number of jurisdictions:
• Australia:
– Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486
– Weal v Bottom (1966) 118 CLR 696
– R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45; 15 A Crim R 364
– Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305
– Dasreef v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21
[1.0.01] 3
Part 1 – Introduction
– Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; [2014] HCA 29

– IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14
• Canada:
– R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402
– R v DD 2000 SCC 43
– R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600; 2000 SCC 51
– White Burgess Langille Inman v Abbott and Haliburton Co [2015] 2 SCR 182
– R v Bingley [2017] 1 SCR 170; (2017) 407 DLR (4th) 384; (2017) 345 CCC (3d) 306
• The United Kingdom:
– R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80
– R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161
– R v Dallagher [2003] 1 Cr App R 12; [2002] EWCA Crim 1903
– R v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31; [2004] EWCA Crim R 1344
– Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462; [2006] EWCA Civ 1390
– R v T [2010] EWC A Crim 2439
– Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] UKSC 13
– R v Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2
• The United States:
– Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923)
– Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993)
– General Electric Co v Joiner 522 US 136, 118 S Ct 512 (1997)
– Kumho Tire Co Ltd v Carmichael 526 US 137; 119 S Ct 1167 (1999)
• New Zealand
– Shepherd v The Queen [2012] 2 NZLR 606; [2011] NZCA 666
– DH v The Queen [2015] 1 NZLR 625; [2015] NZSC 35
– Lundy v The Queen [2014] 2 NZLR 273; [2013] UKPC 28; Lundy v The Queen [2018]
NZCA 410; Lundy v The Queen [2019] NZSC 45
As the likelihood of a settlement in civil matters can usually only be assessed once a case
is thoroughly understood and prepared, it is helpful for there to be a clear appreciation of
the framework within which expert evidence and opinion can be received by courts.
Hence this book begins with a discussion of the various roles which an expert may
undertake. That is done in this chapter. The following chapters contain a detailed
exposition of the law which governs the reception of expert evidence in litigation. These
‘legal’ chapters address not merely the substantive rules of evidence, and appellate
jurisprudence, but also procedural requirements and courtroom presentation skills.
Acknowledgement of the rules is not enough. Unless the facts of a case can be
presented intelligibly and persuasively to lay people, then a witness’s technical expertise
has little point. For this reason, chapters are included on expert reports and on the manner
in which opinion evidence can best be presented in the courts and the purposes of
examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination (see Ch 7.0 and Ch 7.05). Also
included is an explanation of the role of experts in the sentencing process (see Ch 7.10).
This is followed by a series of chapters in which the legal issues arising out of their
particular disciplines are explored.
As an introduction both to the roles of experts and how those roles are conditioned by
various rules, this chapter briefly identifies the major rules that govern expert evidence of
fact and opinion, and the stages at which experts may be commissioned and deployed in
the litigation process.
4 [1.0.01]
Introduction | CH 1.0
Law reform activity and empirical research

[1.0.05] The area of expert evidence has attracted considerable amounts of law reform
activity and now also empirical research.
In Lord Woolf’s Access to Justice: Interim Report (1995), he observed:
In many cases the expert, instead of playing the [independent and impartial] role
identified by Lord Wilberforce, has become … a very effective weapon in the parties’
arsenal of tactics. A similar point was made by the Commercial judges … when they
summarised the present faults as follows:
• polarisation of issues and unwillingness to concede issues from the start;
• insufficient observance of the confines of expert evidence and expansion into the realms
of rival submissions; and
• insufficient willingness to strip out, agree or concede all but the essential issues
following exchange of reports.
An outcome of Lord Woolf’s report was the creation of a single expert regime in the
United Kingdom in an effort to reduce the culture of ‘experts for hire’. In due course, this
was emulated in parts of Australia and, in particular, by the Family Court (2002).
The Australian Law Reform Commission in 1999 identified some of the main
challenges of expert evidence as being:
• The court hears not the most expert opinions, but those most favourable to the
respective parties, and partisan experts frequently appear for one side.
• Experts are paid for their services and instructed by one party only; some bias is
inevitable and corruption a possibility.
• Questioning by lawyers may lead to the presentation of an inaccurate picture, which
will mislead the court and frustrate the expert.
• Where a substantial disagreement concerning a field of expertise arises, it is irrational to
ask a judge to resolve it; the judge has no criteria by which to evaluate the opinions.
• Success may depend on the plausibility or self-confidence of the expert, rather than the
expert’s professional competence.
In 2008, the Law Reform Commission of Ireland advanced major proposals for change for
the admission and processes regarding expert evidence. In 2011, the Law Reform
Commission of England and Wales also made thoroughgoing suggestions for reform for
the role of expert evidence in criminal proceedings. These resulted in Practice Directions
33A.5 and 33.6, which set out guided criteria for the reception of expert evidence,
predicated upon determinations of reliability.
Between 2011 and 2016, a team of researchers on behalf of the Australian Institute of
Judicial Administration (Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016))
built upon studies published in 1999 (Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999)) and 2001
(Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (2001)). It was the product of interviews with expert
witnesses, litigation lawyers, jurors and judges in 55 criminal trials that had taken place in
Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria. This provided further empirical evidence in
relation to contemporary issues arising in respect of expert evidence in Australian courts.
The 2016 study is referred to throughout this book, in particular in relation to issues of
advocacy (see Ch 7.0 and Ch 7.05).
Rules of admissibility
[1.0.10] The best-known feature that distinguishes the evidence of the expert from that of
the layperson is that the expert is permitted to offer opinions to the court as to the
meaning and implications of other factual evidence and also on occasion to commentate
upon the opinions expressed by other expert witnesses. The expert in Australia (as against
[1.0.10] 5
in the United Kingdom after Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] UKSC 13 ) also enjoys
immunity from negligence and defamation proceedings, although not from regulatory/
disciplinary accountability.
As it is likely that an expert’s opinions will have a significant bearing upon the
outcome of the litigation, the courts have long been concerned to ensure that those
opinions are offered by reputable people following recognised disciplines of knowledge
and applying scientifically well-regarded methodologies. The courts have also been
sensitive to any trend that could result in ‘experts’ usurping or being seen to usurp the
tribunal of fact’s function of deciding what occurred and what inferences should be
drawn. In addition, courts have been concerned to erode the culture of the ‘ipse dixit’, in
which experts have advanced assertions without any transparency of their reasoning
processes. Increasingly, they have also been concerned to preclude experts giving evidence
of speculation, masquerading as expert opinion evidence.
In response to these concerns, five rules of evidence which specifically apply to the
reception of expert evidence have arguably evolved under the common law. (See Ch 2.0.)
These are strictly, although somewhat unpredictably, applied in the criminal courts –
especially if there is a jury – but rather more leniently in the civil jurisdictions. Each rule is
the subject of a following chapter. First, the ‘expertise rule’: Does the witness have
knowledge and experience sufficient to entitle him or her to be held out as an expert who
can assist the court? Put another way, ‘Expert evidence must be expert’ (see R v Pabon
[2018] EWCA Crim 420 at [54]). (See Ch 2.05.) Secondly, the ‘area of expertise rule’: Is the
claimed knowledge and expertise sufficiently recognised as from a credible area by others
capable of evaluating its theoretical and experiential foundations? (See Ch 2.10.) Thirdly,
the ‘common knowledge rule’: Is the information sought to be elicited from the expert
really something upon which the tribunal needs the help of any third party, or can the
tribunal rely upon its general knowledge and common sense? (See Ch 2.15.) Fourthly, the
‘ultimate issue rule’: Is the expert’s contribution going to have the effect of supplanting the
function of the tribunal to decide the issue before the court? If so, it is likely to be rejected.
(See Ch 2.25.) And, finally, the ‘basis rule’: To what extent can an expert’s opinion be based
upon matters not directly within the expert’s own observations? Such reliance on material
that cannot be directly evaluated by the court falls foul of a fundamental principle of
evidence. (See Ch 2.20.) Lying behind the exclusionary rules and carrying a particularly
important role under statute is the prejudice/probative discretion. This is analysed in
Ch 2.35, Ch 3.0 and Ch 3.05.
In addition, in Dasreef v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21, Heydon J
postulated the existence at common law and under the uniform evidence scheme of three
further rules: the assumption identification rule; the proof of assumption rule; and the
statement of reasoning rule. These too are scrutinised in Ch 2.20 and Ch 3.0.
However, in Australia under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW),
the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), the Evidence (National Uniform
Legislation) Act (NT) and the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), and in New Zealand under the
Evidence Act 2006 (NZ), there are statutory codes for the admissibility of expert evidence.
These focus, in Australia, on whether an expert’s opinion is based on specialised
knowledge and, in New Zealand, upon whether the fact-finder is likely to derive
substantial help from the opinion in understanding other evidence. Both schemes purport
to abolish the preclusion on expert evidence simply because it is about an ultimate issue to
be determined in the proceedings or about a matter of common knowledge. Extensive case
law has evolved under the statutory evidence schemes of Australia (see Ch 3.0), New
Zealand (see Ch 3.05) and the United States (see Ch 3.10). This is charted and evaluated in
Part 3 of this book.
6 [1.0.10]
Evolving areas of expertise

[1.0.20] In an era of rapid advances in knowledge and technology, the rules are stretched,
sometimes to breaking point, as courts grapple with the problems of how to apply them to
new developments in evolving areas of expertise. An example of the problems of fitting
old law to new endeavours is the approach to survey evidence. This is discussed in depth
below, in Ch 11.0. Another example is the reception of a form of novel psychological
evidence, battered woman syndrome, which is discussed in Ch 10.30. Still others are
evidence about criminal profiling (Ch 10.35), parental alienation syndrome (Ch 10.30) and
post-traumatic stress disorder (Ch 10.45). In addition, there are specialist chapters written
in relation to the legal issues relevant to fingerprinting evidence (Ch 12.10), document
analysis evidence (Ch 12.15), tracker and sniffer dog evidence (Ch 13.05), valuation
evidence (Ch 16.0), financial evidence (Ch 16.05), mental state evidence (Ch 10.25),
medical evidence (Ch 9.0), dental evidence (Ch 9.05) and nursing evidence (Ch 9.10). The
increasing role of social science evidence in the courts is addressed by chapters on survey
evidence (Ch 11.0), historians’ evidence (Ch 11.05), anthropologists’ evidence (Ch 11.10),
cultural experts’ evidence (Ch 11.15) and linguists’ evidence (Ch 11.20). In addition, this
edition deals with expert evidence given by engineers (Ch 17.0), architects (Ch 17.05) and
quantity surveyors (Ch 17.10), as well as expert evidence about foreign law (Ch 15.0).
Even when a new development offers litigation possibilities, there may be problems
which justify the courts being hesitant to accept the opinions of its proponents.
Chapter 2.10 explores these difficulties. A current example of the need to exercise
considerable caution is in the use of psychological profiling evidence (see Ch 10.35).
Another is in relation to DNA evidence in English, United States and Australian courts.
The notion of DNA profiling providing incontestable proof of the identity of the
perpetrator of a crime has been controversial. Although DNA evidence has been a
transformative advance for forensic science, its evolution has been marked by many
controversies and challenges, most latterly related to the potential for DNA samples to be
‘planted’ or for transference of samples to give rise to risks of erroneous inferences (see
Ch 12.20). A further area is in relation to the reception of techniques such as lip-reading
evidence, facial mapping evidence and gait interpretation evidence (see Ch 12.05).
There are inherent challenges posed by common areas of expert evidence too, such as
valuation evidence. As Moylan J highlighted in H v H [2008] 2 FLR 2092; [2008] EWHC 935
(Fam) at [5], the vulnerability of valuations had been specifically recognised by the House
of Lords in Miller v Miller [2006] 2 AC 618 and McFarlane v McFarlane: [2006] 1 FLR 118;
[2006] UKHL 24 at [26]: ‘The experts agree that the exercise they are engaged in is an art
and not a science. As Lord Nicholls said in Miller v Miller [2006] 2 AC 618 at [26]:
‘valuations are often a matter of opinion on which experts differ. A thorough investigation
into these differences can be extremely expensive and of doubtful utility’.’ (See too Martin
v Martin [2018] EWCA Civ 2866.)
The courts’ concern to avoid being overborne by expert opinions is illustrated by their
continuing reluctance to accept evidence about the problems of identification or the
attributes of ‘normal’ people. In particular, this has inhibited courts’ preparedness to
receive evidence about processes of memory and about the perils of eyewitness and voice
identification evidence (see Ch 10.20). Throughout the appellate decisions, there are
references to the dire consequences of letting experts take over or ‘usurp’ the task of
fact-finders (be they a jury or a judge sitting alone). This has particularly been canvassed
in the context of certain kinds of evidence put before juries – fingerprinting evidence (see
Ch 12.10), handwriting and documentary evidence (see Ch 12.15) and DNA profiling
evidence (see Ch 12.20) – where a risk of jurors overreaching their competence by
themselves acting as experts has been identified. It is not only a question of subject matter.
The discussion of distinctive approaches in jury and non-jury cases (see Ch 2.20) shows a
concern that juries in particular need protection from the potential partisanship and
[1.0.20] 7
beguiling impressiveness of forensic experts. The courts have also been concerned to
avoid the appearance, including in judge-alone trials, that experts are dictating outcomes.
Experts’ participation in litigation
Overview
[1.0.30] Testing the value of proffered expert evidence and opinion is essential not only in
cross-examination, but also during the preparation for hearing. The possible sources of
attack upon evidentiary admissibility can be based on any one of, or a combination of, the
issues raised in the rules of expert evidence referred to above.
Most commonly, legal practitioners will be concerned about attempts by experts to
express opinions outside their real expertise or opinions that have defective methodology
and therefore are unreliable. They should also be alert for weak or non-existent
connections between the bases advanced for an expert’s opinion and what is asserted by
an expert in opinion evidence. Following the Commissions of Inquiry into the Splatt,
Chamberlain and Thomas convictions, as well as more latterly into the expert evidence
given in the trial of David Eastman (see Martin (2014); Hamer (2015)), Australasian
counsel have become more alert to problems in the chain of custody of exhibits and in
poor scientific method. In addition, the inquiry by the Honourable Frank Vincent QC in
Victoria into the Jama conviction highlighted the risk that poor procedures can result in
scientific opinions that are fundamentally flawed and such as to give rise to a miscarriage
of justice (Vincent (2010)).
Experts too must take suitable steps to ensure that their approach to the task of
assisting the court by their opinions is balanced and dispassionate, even if, for instance,
they have previously been a patient’s treating medical practitioner. The common law in
this respect was set out more than a quarter of a century ago by Creswell J in National
Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (‘The Ikarian Reefer’) [1993] 2
Lloyd’s Rep 68 at 81–82:
1. Expert evidence presented to the Court should be and should be seen to be the
independent product of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the
exigencies of litigation.
2. An expert witness should provide independent assistance to the Court by way of
objective unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise … An
expert witness … should never assume the role of an advocate.
3. An expert witness should state the facts or assumptions upon which his opinion
is based. He should not omit to consider material facts which detract from his
concluded opinion …
4. An expert witness should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls
outside his expertise.
5. If an expert’s opinion is not properly researched because he considers that
insufficient data is available, then this must be stated with an indication that the
opinion is no more than a provisional one …
These principles have since been incorporated into many codes of ethics and practice for
expert witnesses, including in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand. The role
of these codes is explored. In South Africa, their essence was captured in Schneider NO v
AA 2010 (5) SA 203 (WCC) by Davis J, who emphasised that:
an expert comes to Court to give the Court the benefit of his or her expertise. Agreed, an
expert is called by a particular party, presumably because the conclusion of the expert,
using his or her expertise, is in favour of the line of argument of the particular party. But
that does not absolve the expert from providing the Court with as objective and unbiased
opinion, based on his or her expertise, as is possible. An expert is not a hired gun who
dispenses his or her expertise for the purposes of a particular case. An expert does not
8 [1.0.30]
assume the role of an advocate, nor give evidence which goes beyond the logic which is
dictated by the scientific knowledge which that expert claims to possesses.
To forestall breach of the admissibility rules, a number of pragmatic criteria for selecting
experts, as well as the distinct stages of a dispute at which experts may be involved, can
be identified.
The selection of experts

[1.0.40] The selection of experts to assist in gathering and presenting relevant information
during a dispute bears features in common with choosing players for a sports team.
Particular players are better in some positions than in others. Further, during the course of
the game, it may be advantageous tactically to replace one player with another. Sound
case strategy does not merely dictate the areas selected for expert involvement; it also
highlights the need to draw distinctions among experts within the one area on the basis of
their comparative abilities to be up-to-date with the latest developments, their
report-writing skills, and their capacity to express their opinions robustly in an expert
conclave or during concurrent evidence and lucidly and memorably in the witness box if
traditional procedures are utilised.
Thus, in a minor criminal matter where a young person is pleading guilty to causing
wilful damage to property, to reassure the court that it can safely deal leniently with the
young offender, a psychologist may be asked to prepare a short written report, after
consultation with the young person, which explains both why the criminal offending
occurred and what risk there is of it happening again. This may involve reference to the
existence or absence of psychopathology in the child. By having a clinician who is known
and respected by magistrates prepare the written report, it is often possible to avoid the
expense of the expert having to appear, and the submission that pleads for a light
disposition is authoritatively enhanced.
On other occasions, it will be up to the lawyer and an expert to recognise the
advantages of dividing the expert’s role, and then to select an appropriate person for each
stage.
For experts such as psychologists, psychiatrists and social workers, significant
problems can arise if the assessment and treatment roles are performed by the one person.
The consequence of such mixing can be to cloud the person’s capacity to make a detached
evaluation of both elements. Examples drawn from several fields illustrate the point. In
family law disputes about a child’s residence, a psychologist requested to prepare an
evaluation on the family members should not be involved in the active counselling of any
member of that unit. In building disputes, a builder who provides a report on defects in
the building finish should not have, or have any prospect of obtaining, the contract to
rectify the problems. In medico-legal disputes, the specialist who critiques a procedure
should not be the one to perform a corrective procedure. The reason is the same in all
cases: it opens up an inference, which will be highlighted in cross-examination, that the
expert had the prospect of personal gain from the assessment and that the assessment
therefore went beyond a detached evaluation and was influenced by self-interest.
Other factors to be considered

[1.0.50] Apart from those skills of research, writing and presentation already mentioned,
there are other factors to be borne in mind by legal practitioners when selecting an expert.
Foremost, of course, is cost. Just as it can be uneconomical to pursue or defend small
claims, so the expense of retaining an expert, or a particular expert, may be
disproportionate to the value of the dispute. However, the lawyer and client must always
consider whether an expert is necessary, or at least whether his or her involvement is
likely to assist the case materially. If so, then there needs to be further discussion about the
[1.0.50] 9
budget for the work to be done by the expert. There is much to be said in favour of clear
articulation of the expert’s brief in a formal letter from the commissioning solicitor (see
Ch 5.20).
Previous experience as an expert witness is useful too. Some experts have the added
advantage of possessing experience as arbitrators in building disputes, or as the health
practitioner members of tribunals which make disability pension or regulatory
determinations. Then there are witnesses with an innate brilliance, such as the late
Bernard Spilsbury, the great English pathologist: see Browne and Tullett (1980). On the
other hand, experienced practitioners are all aware of the tales of the medico-legal hack,
the practitioner whose consistent views – always for the plaintiff, or always for the
insurance company – are so well known as to be the cause of wry smiles and little, if any,
evidential weight: see Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568. No amount of eloquent
advocacy by counsel will allay impressions of persistent bias in such an expert witness.
Concern about the lack of neutrality among expert witnesses is among the most
prominent of findings in a 1999 study of Australian judges (Freckelton, Reddy and Selby
(1999)), a 2001 study of Australian magistrates (Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (2001)), and a
2016 empirical survey of judges, jurors, experts and litigation practitioners (Freckelton,
Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016)). This is not a phenomenon confined
to Australian courts: see Malsch and Freckelton (2005; 2008).
But experts who have not previously appeared in court should have little to fear if they
are properly prepared by the lawyers. Such preparation needs to embrace a thorough
review of the expert’s academic and experiential credentials and ensure that the opinions
to be expressed are objectively reasonable and well grounded in specialised knowledge
possessed by the expert arising directly from his or her skills, training and experience. It is
also helpful for the expert to take the time to sit in on another hearing where an expert is
being examined-in-chief and cross-examined so as to orient himself or herself to the
culture of the court in which the expert will be giving his or her expert opinions.
Participation in well-organised courses to assist experts to understand the forensic
environment better can also be highly advantageous for those experts minded to
undertake forensic roles.
In sum, the selection of an expert or experts to help the resolution of a dispute should
be in response to a considered case strategy and an assessment of the costs of the exercise.
Once experts are involved, it is important that they understand their role, can give a
reliable estimate of their cost, adopt reliable and transparent methodologies, and are
adequately instructed by the lawyers as to the relevant issues to be addressed in their
report and in the courtroom.
Making good forensic decisions

[1.0.70] Before any informed decision can be made by a party about participation in civil
litigation, it is often very helpful for the lawyer to consult with an expert or experts so as
to be advised at firsthand about the issues of fact and opinion that will arise. Too often,
this is not done (see Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016)). At
this very early stage, both the lawyer and the client need to appreciate what the technical
issues are and to have some understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the client’s
position.
As this stage often needs to be completed quickly to meet court deadlines for filing
documents or to protect the client’s interests by seeking urgent orders from the court,
contact between the lawyer and the expert may be by telephone or by an urgent
conference. Typically, the expert’s preliminary advice will not be in writing, but it is likely
10 [1.0.70]
to be followed by a formal request from the solicitor (probably not counsel: see Hudspeth v
Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (No 8) [2014] VSC 567) for a full and
detailed report.
The preliminary advice and the later well-researched opinions provided by the expert,
together with the assessment of their legal implications, provide the basis for lawyers’
well-reasoned advice to their clients about the conduct of the litigation. It may mean that
a defence is futile and an immediate offer of settlement should be made in a civil matter;
that an early plea of guilty should be entered in a criminal matter; or, from the plaintiff’s
point of view, that the action should be discontinued or a pleading amended.
The advice being given both for these purposes and subsequently is privileged,
provided that it is directed to the party’s lawyer for the predominant use by that lawyer in
relation to existing or anticipated litigation: see Ch 5.10. This means that it will not be
available to opposing parties before the hearing unless the rules of court provide for
formal exchange prior to hearing of the reports of those experts who will be called to give
evidence.
Pre-hearing meetings between legal representatives and experts

[1.0.80] For preparation of both possible settlement negotiations and the hearing, be it civil
or criminal, ideally the experts should meet with counsel and the instructing solicitor. The
advantages of this include informing counsel of the contribution to be made by each
expert, including subtleties in the expert’s views, orienting the expert witness, and
forewarning counsel of the strengths and weaknesses in the other parties’ cases. When
such meetings do not occur, it is frustrating for the expert witnesses (see Freckelton,
Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016)) but also is likely to exercise an
adverse impact upon the quality of the evidence adduced.
Possible agenda items for such a conference include:
(1) assisting the legal team to understand the expert issues by providing background
material such as reports, articles, passages from standard texts etc;
(2) enabling the legal team to appreciate in a more sophisticated way the subtleties of
the expert’s views and the concessions that he or she might be inclined to make
during cross-examination;
(3) discussing possible evidence from opposing experts and the implications of
evidence by opposing lay witnesses;
(4) identifying the issues that counsel intends to focus upon when leading evidence
from the expert during examination-in-chief; and
(5) preparing the expert for the probable bases of cross-examination and the likely
style or styles that opposing counsel will adopt.
A telephone conference, where time and logistics make a face-to-face meeting difficult, is a
constructive ‘second-best’.
Usage of expert reports

[1.0.90] The management of a dispute for any party is, or should be, within the context of
a strategy that is understood by lawyers and clients. A simple defence strategy in a civil
matter is to delay in the hope that the plaintiff will lose momentum or incentive or that the
passage of time will make proof more difficult. A matching plaintiff’s strategy is to hurry
through the pre-litigation process, keeping the defence to timetables set by the court
through motions seeking directions and orders for costs. A stratagem often used where
one side is financially better off than the other is to raise the stakes by a combination of
delay and the use of multiple interlocutory steps. On occasion, the questionable tactic is
adopted by one side attempting to ‘take an expert out of play’ by briefly consulting him or
her in order to dissuade the other party from commissioning that expert.
[1.0.90] 11
Rather more important, but less often discussed, is the careful formulation of a plan of
attack or defence which embraces not merely the kinds of procedural tactics mentioned
above, but also the ways in which the evidence is to be gathered and how and when it is
to be packaged. For example, a written report, prepared by an eminent expert and shown
to the other side at a predetermined time in negotiations in a civil matter, may be
specifically tailored to promote acceptance of a settlement offer or to induce an offer to be
made. It is important for experts not to become involved in such tactics and to descend in
any way into an advocacy role.
North American personal injury plaintiff lawyers employ a variant of this technique.
They have demonstrative videos made of the plaintiff’s post-accident lifestyle, which are
shown at pre-trial conferences. The message is that the defendant should consider the
likely impact of the video upon the jury that is to make findings about negligence and the
amount of damages. (For a detailed study of the preparation and use of demonstrative
evidence, see Dombroff (1988); Maher (2011); Santee (2012).)
Referees, assessors, court-appointed experts and single joint experts

[1.0.100] Courts have long recognised that in some disputes they require assistance from
specialists to determine complex and recondite issues of fact: see Freckelton (1987); Jones
(1994); Golan (2004); Dwyer (2009). An option for courts seeking to understand better the
technical issues upon which they require assistance is the use of assessors (see Ch 6.05). In
addition, there is the potential for courts to utilise experts whom they themselves appoint
(see Ch 6.0). As well, specialists, termed ‘referees’ or ‘special referees’, may be appointed
to report to the court on a specific issue. The referee may take evidence and make findings
which a judicial officer can accept in whole or in part, or reject (see Ch 6.10). The courts’
practice of referring certain issues in a case, especially issues of fact, to a referee with
specific directions under the rules of court is becoming more common – especially in New
South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and the Federal Court. In this edition, the chapter on
referees has been rewritten and substantially updated.
Another dynamic in the contemporary use of experts is the requirement for parties to
be limited to a single joint expert (see Ch 6.12). This has been a controversial innovation,
including in the United Kingdom, Queensland, New South Wales and the Family Court of
Australia. The strict implementation of the requirements of a single expert regime is
variably implemented.
Consecutive evidence, expert conclaves and concurrent evidence

[1.0.105] In a number of jurisdictions in Australia, evidence is received from experts ‘out of
order’ and one after another. This procedure is known as ‘consecutive evidence’ and is
directed toward enabling improved appreciation of the issues in respect of which the
experts are agreeing and disagreeing (see Ch 6.25).
It has become standard in civil matters, and increasingly common in criminal matters,
for experts to be ordered to meet before a hearing in order to identify those points in
relation to which there is concurrence or difference. These meetings are often termed
‘expert conclaves’ (see Ch 6.15).
After such conclaves, it has become common in civil matters for experts to give
‘concurrent evidence’ (see Ch 6.20). It has also occurred on a small number of occasions in
criminal matters. The procedure is often described as ‘hot-tubbing’ (see Ch 6.20). It
involves multiple experts being sworn in at the one time and, with the use of judicial
management, being asked questions by both the judicial officer and the parties. This
involves dynamics significantly different from those traditionally employed in adversarial
litigation. ‘Concurrent evidence’ (see Ch 6.20) is much enthused about by some judicial
officers and is generally embraced by expert witnesses (see Freckelton, Goodman-
12 [1.0.100]
Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016)). However, it is a procedure still in a state of

evolution and subject to change as methodologies are honed to harness its potential most
effectively.
Unethical and incompetent expert evidence

[1.0.107] The fact that courts have issued codes of conduct for expert evidence and
enunciated clear expectations about the procedures for the adducing of expert evidence
means that there are likely to be adverse consequences for infractions of the rules. These
can vary from determinations of inadmissibility to determinations that costs wasted
should be paid by a party who has breached rules, delayed proceedings or generated costs
by breaching fundamental obligations to the courts, whether as officers of the court or in
the discharge of the forensic role as an expert. A corpus of such case law is in the process
of development (see Ch 5.15).
The hearing
Presence of expert in court

[1.0.110] Because the weight to be given to a witness’s evidence can be adversely affected
by the witness being present during the hearing of other evidence, generally experts are
ordered to be ‘out of court’ while other experts are giving evidence until they are called to
give evidence. However, the practice in this regard is not invariable. A discussion of the
issues surrounding the presence or exclusion of an expert when evidence is being given by
another witness may be found in Ch 7.0.
Giving evidence at a hearing

[1.0.120] Upon being called and sworn, experts are first asked questions to establish their
credentials. The court’s preparedness to accept witnesses as experts, who are therefore
entitled to express opinions, depends upon the court’s assessment of the witness’s
academic and practical background. (See Ch 7.0 and Ch 2.05 generally.)
The evidence given by experts is a mixture of fact and opinion. It should not be in the
form of speculation: HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999] HCA 2. Experts, like other
witnesses, are often asked to describe what they saw, heard and did etc. This can be a very
potent form of evidence, as experts are often skilled recorders and observers of
information. On the basis of these perceptions and actions, they may then draw inferences
and express opinions. Alternatively, experts may be asked to assume a number of facts
and then be requested to express an opinion based upon those assumptions.
There are a number of rules which govern both the situations in which experts will be
permitted to offer opinion evidence and the form of that evidence. For example, where
judges believe that an ordinary person can reach a decision, they may refuse to admit an
expert opinion on that issue on the basis that such evidence is not ‘specialised’, or of its
being either in breach of the common knowledge rule or more prejudicial than probative.
Even if experts have been allowed to express an opinion, during cross-examination
they may be challenged on such grounds as their credentials, their possible bias, their
sampling processes, their methodology and their reasoning, as well as opinions they may
have expressed in previous cases (see, eg, Rodi v Western Australia [2018] HCA 44) and
whether their views are inconsistent with those of professional colleagues. They may also
be accused of being out of step with leaders in their area of specialty, or it may be
suggested that they are less experienced than the experts called by the other side. They
may be challenged about whether their tests were the best and most comprehensive, and
whether other plausible inferences could also be drawn from the same set of assumptions
or facts that have formed the basis for their opinions.
[1.0.120] 13
In criminal trials, the issue of whether scientific tests were performed in accordance
with the particular laboratory’s protocols or whether the expert adhered to an applicable
code of ethics may be determined as an issue outside of what is to be presented to the jury.
Such a mini hearing, or a trial within a trial, is known as a ‘voire dire’.
One example is found in the use of DNA testing (see Ch 12.20). The importance of
proving the integrity of the sampling, analysis and reporting procedures was highlighted
in the 1987 report of Justice Morling’s Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Chamberlain
Convictions (Morling (1987, pp 76, 86, 129–130, 503)). The Commission’s views echoed the
earlier conclusions of Shannon QC in his Royal Commission Report Concerning the
Conviction of Edward Charles Splatt (Shannon (1984, p 51)). More latterly the findings of
the Eastman Judicial Inquiry (Martin (2014)) raised the issues pointedly.
A new yardstick for evaluating the fairness of utilising expert reports and testimony is
whether they comply with court rules and protocols such as those that are now standard
among superior and intermediate level courts in Australia and also in the United
Kingdom. Further issues that arise concern compliance by forensic testing facilities with
accreditation procedures, as well as with processes and safeguards that guard against the
contamination of exhibits (see Vincent (2010)).
Evidence for sentencing

[1.0.130] It is common for both magistrates and judges to request pre-sentence reports and
for the defence to enlist experts to put material that can influence sentencing (see Ch 7.10).
Psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers and youth workers are often called.
In sentencing, the expert’s contribution is directed toward helping to assess the level of
the offender’s culpability, an issue that can be influenced by factors such as mental illness,
brain injury, intellectual disability and perhaps personality disorder and intoxication, the
appropriateness of one or another form of punishment, the likelihood of repetition of the
offence, the danger that the convicted person may present to the community, and the
prospects for the offender’s rehabilitation. To this end, risk prediction (see Ch 10.40) can be
very significant. Such evidence is most commonly given by psychologists on the basis of
the deployment of risk assessment tools and structured assessments. The application of
the results of such evaluations to the likelihood of recidivism by a particular offender,
including an Indigenous offender, can take the form of highly contested expert evidence.
Issues for the future

[1.0.150] Expert evidence is an area of continuing vibrancy and controversy. It is
fundamental to the resolution of disputes in all areas of contemporary litigation. This
edition incorporates fresh analysis of important decisions by the High Court of Australia,
the Supreme Court of Canada, and many decisions by United Kingdom, New Zealand,
United States, South African and other courts. It has also extended the scope of the work
into areas such as expert conclaves (Ch 6.15) and concurrent evidence (Ch 6.20), as well as
wasted costs orders against experts and litigation lawyers by reason of their commissioning
and use of expert reports (Ch 5.15). It has also incorporated new chapters on engineers’
(Ch 17.0) and architects’ evidence (Ch 17.05).
Issues relating to the admissibility of expert evidence and, in particular, the role of
reliability as a determinant or indicium in this regard have emerged as a controversial
focus for current debate in the courts, and among law reformers and scholarly
commentators. These matters are traversed in the pages that follow.
In addition, the quest continues for a compromise between maintaining parties’
entitlements to run their cases largely as they wish and the need for case management and
the exercise of control by judicial officers in the interests of cost containment and efficiency.
This has driven the impetus toward single expert reforms, and greater use of referees,
14 [1.0.130]
innovative ways of identifying issues actually in dispute, such as concurrent evidence, and
the means of presenting evidence so that it can be understood and evaluated more
effectively. All the while, technologies evolve and the courts look to benefit from such
advances while also ensuring adequate means of encouraging witnesses to write reports
and testify, and, at the same time, be adequately accountable. While in Australia experts
still cannot be sued for negligence or defamation in discharge of their forensic
responsibilities, they can be the subject of disciplinary action for such work. The
compatibility between these two scenarios will undoubtedly be explored further in due
course.
The crucible of scholarly discourse and of review of the legitimacy of scientific
methodologies has been intense since 2009 when the National Research Council published
its report Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward. This important
report was followed in 2016 by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology, Report to the President: Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific
Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods, and then the report by the American Academy for
the Advancement of Science, Forensic Science Assessments, A Quality and Gap Analysis:
Latent Fingerprint Examination (Thompson, Black, Jain and Kadane (2017)). There have
been and will be many outcomes from these reviews. In the United Kingdom there is now
a detailed incorporation of reliability into the criteria for admissibility of expert evidence
in criminal trials, but elsewhere a fillip has been given to scrutinise more informedly the
bases for apparently sound scientific evidence. At a time when another generation of new
technologies for DNA testing evidence is emerging, this is important.
The dynamics in relation to the adducing, testing and evaluation of expert evidence
will continue to shift and will generate further controversies and pressures for reform to
admissibility criteria and court procedures for the reception and testing of expert opinions.
In many respects, such developments are a barometer for attitudes toward, and concerns
about, contemporary systems of litigation and dispute resolution.
[1.0.150] 15
PART 2 – COMMON LAW
EVIDENTIARY RULES
Chapter 2.0: Common law exclusionary rules of expert

evidence................................................................................... 19
Chapter 2.05: The expertise rule.............................................................. 31
Chapter 2.10: The area of expertise rule............................................. 55
Chapter 2.15: The common knowledge rule.................................... 83
Chapter 2.20: The basis rule..................................................................... 115
Chapter 2.25: The ultimate issue rule ................................................ 139
Chapter 2.30: Judicial notice .................................................................... 153
Chapter 2.35: Discretionary exclusion of expert evidence....... 161
17
Chapter 2.0
THE COMMON LAW
EXCLUSIONARY RULES OF EXPERT
EVIDENCE
The exclusionary rules ......................................................................................................... [2.0.01]
The privilege of expert witnesses ...................................................................................... [2.0.03]
Evidence of fact and opinion .............................................................................................. [2.0.05]
The limitations of expert evidence ..................................................................................... [2.0.07]
The purpose of expert evidence ......................................................................................... [2.0.10]
Anxieties generating the rules’ development .................................................................. [2.0.20]
The exclusionary rules and jury trials ............................................................................... [2.0.25]
The exclusionary rules in family law litigation ............................................................... [2.0.30]
The role of exclusionary rules outside criminal and civil litigation ............................ [2.0.40]
Rationales for the exclusionary rules ................................................................................ [2.0.50]
The conservative basis of the rules .................................................................................... [2.0.60]
Limits to expert opinions – the accountability issue ...................................................... [2.0.65]
Exclusion on the basis of lack of independence .............................................................. [2.0.68]
Discretionary exclusion ........................................................................................................ [2.0.70]
Judicial notice ......................................................................................................................... [2.0.80]
The need for statutory reform ............................................................................................ [2.0.85]
‘To the jury’s collective mind, a phrase such as “consistent
with coming from the same source” might well be translated,
in the particular circumstances of this case, “bearing the
insignia of coming from the same source” and from there to
“in my scientific opinion, in fact come from the same source”.
And thus the very phrase “consistent with having come from
the same source” would appear to come very close to an
answer to the very question which the jury had to determine
for itself.’
Royal Commission Report Concerning the Conviction of Edward Charles Splatt
(Shannon (1984, p 39)).
The exclusionary rules
[2.0.01] As the Supreme Court of Canada observed in White Burgess Langille Inman v Abbott
and Haliburton Co [2015] 2 SCR 182 at [1]:
Expert opinion evidence can be a key element in the search for truth, but it may also pose
special dangers. To guard against them, the Court over the last 20 years or so has
progressively tightened the rules of admissibility and enhanced the trial judge’s
gatekeeping role. These developments seek to ensure that expert opinion evidence meets
certain basic standards before it is admitted.
The admissibility framework was described by the same court in R v Bingley [2017] 1 SCR
170; (2017) 407 DLR (4th) 384; (2017) 345 CCC (3d) 306 at [13] as guarding against ‘the
dangers of expert evidence. It ensures that the trial does not devolve into “trial by expert”
and that the trier of fact maintains the ability to critically assess the evidence. … The trial
judge acts as gatekeeper to ensure that expert evidence enhances, rather than distorts, the
fact-finding process’.
The following chapters deal with the five common law ‘rules of expert evidence’ as
they have evolved in Australia:
• the expertise rule (see Ch 2.05);
• the area of expertise rule (see Ch 2.10);
• the common knowledge rule (see Ch 2.15);
• the basis rule (see Ch 2.20); and
[2.0.01] 19
Part 2 – Common law evidentiary rules
• the ultimate issue rule (see Ch 2.25).

Chapters 3.0, 3.05 and 3.10 deal with the statutory regimes for expert evidence in
Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Liberal reference is also made to the
admissibility regime in Canada, which is set out in White Burgess Langille Inman v Abbott
and Haliburton Co [2015] 2 SCR 182; R v Trochym [2007] 1 SCR 239; and R v Mohan [1994] 2
SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402.
Chapter 3.15 addresses issues involving contemporary proposals for law reform
relating to expert evidence.
Another means by which expert (and other) evidence can be regarded as proved is via
‘judicial notice’. This is analysed in the common law context (see Ch 2.30) and under
statutory law (see [3.0.160]). Finally, at common law, the exclusionary discretion, in
particular in criminal trials and under the statutory provisions for both civil and criminal
trials, is analysed (see Ch 2.35).
The role of the expert witness
The privilege of expert witnesses

[2.0.03] Fundamental to understanding the exclusionary rule regime for expert opinion
evidence under the common law is the fact that expert witnesses are extended a privilege
that is not, for the most part, permitted lay witnesses – that of giving evidence in the form
of opinions and inferences. In addition, witnesses (including experts) cannot be sued in
defamation or for negligence for the evidence that they give in court and the reports that
they prepare for courts – they have immunity (see Ch 2.15), save to some degree in the
United Kingdom as a result of the decision of Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] UKSC
13.
However, the role of experts is fundamental to the accurate and informed resolution of
litigation. As Sopinka J noted in R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402 at 21:
There is a danger that expert evidence will be misused and will distort the fact-finding
process. Dressed up in scientific language which the jury does not easily understand and
submitted through a witness of impressive antecedents, this evidence is apt to be accepted
by the jury as being virtually infallible and as having more weight than it deserves.
There have been longstanding concerns about whether ‘expert witnesses hired by the
parties are impartial in the sense that they are expressing their own unbiased professional
opinion and whether they are independent in the sense that their opinion is the product of
their own, independent conclusions based on their own knowledge and judgment’: White
Burgess Langille Inman v Abbott and Haliburton Co [2015] 2 SCR 182 at [11]. It is well
understood internationally that if an expert’s evidence is infected by incompetence, or lack
of impartiality, it can result in a miscarriage of justice (see R v DD 2000 SCC 43).
Evidence of fact and opinion

[2.0.05] In principle, difficulties exist in relation to the distinction between ‘fact’ and
‘opinion’ (see Australian Law Reform Commission (1985, Vol 1, para 156); Freckelton
(1987); Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 5) (1996)
64 FCR 73 at 75; Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dog Association of New
South Wales & ACT (1998) 154 ALR 527 at 531; R v DD 2000 SCC 43 per Major J). This
dichotomy continues to pose practical problems, as exemplified by the debate about
whether a statement by a liquidator that a company is insolvent is a statement of fact or
opinion: see Jones v McKenzie (1859) 13 Moo PC 1 at 9; 15 ER 1 at 4; Re Action Waste
Collections Pty Ltd (in liq); Crawford v O’Brien [1981] VR 691 at 703, on the one hand, and
Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 157 ALR 615 at 618, on the other. However, generally courts
have classified evidence as falling into the categories of ‘fact’ and ‘opinion’ without undue
resort to technicality or subtlety of reasoning.
20 [2.0.03]
The common law exclusionary rules of expert evidence | CH 2.0
The limitations of expert evidence

[2.0.07] Lord President Cooper in Davie v Magistrates of Edinburgh [1953] SC 34 at 40 was
specific about the limitations of experts’ evidence:
Expert witnesses, however skilled or eminent, can give no more than evidence. They
cannot usurp the functions of the jury or judge sitting as a jury, any more than a technical
assessor can substitute his advice for the judgment of the Court … Their duty is to furnish
the judge or jury with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of their
conclusions, so as to enable the judge or jury to form their own independent judgment by
the application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence. The scientific opinion
evidence, if intelligible, convincing and tested, becomes a factor (and often an important
factor) for consideration along with the whole of the evidence in the case, but, the decision
is for the judge or jury. In particular the bare ipse dixit of a scientist, however eminent,
upon the issue in controversy, will normally carry little weight, for it cannot be tested by
cross-examination nor independently appraised, and the parties have invoked the decision
of a judicial tribunal and not an oracular pronouncement by an expert.
(See also Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 at
[59]; Maudsley v Proprietors of Strata Plan Number 39794 (2002) 24 NSWCCR 101; [2002]
NSWCA 244 at [52].)
It is not legitimate for experts to guess or speculate: HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR
414; [1999] HCA 2; R v Berry (2007) 17 VR 153; [2007] VSCA 202 at [69]; R v Smart (2008)
182 A Crim R 490; [2008] VSC 79 at [27]; Poynton v Poynton (1903) 371 ILTR 54.
The purpose of expert evidence

[2.0.10] Saunders J, in the old case of Buckley v Rice Thomas (1554) 1 Plowd 118 at 124; 75
ER 182 at 191, voiced a similar sentiment: ‘[I]f matters arise in our laws which concern
other sciences and faculties we commonly call for the aid of that science or faculty which
it concerns, which is an honourable and commendable thing for thereby it appears that we
do not despise all other sciences but our own, but we approve of them and encourage
them.’ Laughton LJ, in R v Turner (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 at 83, expressed a similar
sentiment and held: ‘An expert’s opinion is admissible to furnish the court with scientific
information which is likely to be outside the experience of a judge or jury.’ Finkelstein J
put the same approach succinctly in 1998: ‘The function of the expert is to provide the trier
of fact, judge or jury, with an inference which the judge or jury, due to the technical nature
of the facts, is unable to formulate’: Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 157 ALR 615 at 625.
Expert evidence has been held to be ‘necessary’ on occasions to enable a court to evaluate
matters observed and the drawing of correct inferences from facts: Attorney-General
(Ruddy) v Kenny (1960) 94 ILTR 185 at 190.
Binnie J, in the important Canadian Supreme Court decision of R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR
600; 2000 SCC 51 at [56], made an additional point, holding that the purpose of expert
evidence is ‘to assist the trier of fact by providing special knowledge that the ordinary
person would not know. Its purpose is not to substitute the expert for the trier of fact.
What is asked of the trier of fact is an informed judgment, not an act of faith’.
The exclusionary rules of expert evidence have functioned to contract substantially
what might have been a dominating role in the courtroom for forensic experts.
Historically, their entrance into the courts in the 18th century was accompanied by
cynicism because of a perceived danger that they would engage in conjecture, merely
offering opinions and not saying what they had seen, heard or experienced with their
other senses: see Hand (1901); Wigmore (1975); McCormick (1984); Freckelton (1987);
Stone and Wells (1991); Jones (1994); Golan (2004).
Ironically, although the role of specialist witnesses is of daily importance in courts of
every jurisdiction, few conceptual analyses are to be found of the operation and
jurisprudence of the rules of expert evidence. Such exegesis and analysis are attempted in
[2.0.10] 21
the following chapters, with liberal reference to decided cases which have considered the
many difficult questions that pervade the utilisation of experts as witnesses.
Today’s judicial ambivalence about the ability of jurors to evaluate complex expert
evidence (see Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999; 2001); Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty,
Horan and McKimmie (2016)) is the product of three centuries of uncertainty about the
role of judges and jurors, as well as an escalating consciousness of the influence that
experts can wield, one aspect of which is sometimes termed the ‘CSI effect’ (see, eg, Byers
and Johnson (2009); Ramsland (2007)). In the 18th century, rules of evidence were almost
non-existent and the control of the judge over courtroom proceedings was limited to little
more than preventing chaos and confusion. However, the mid-19th century in England,
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States saw an increase in judicial
authority, as the mistrust by those holding the reins of power toward the growing
influence of the populace led to a reduction in the role and scope of juries’ involvement in
the court system (see Jackson (1937); Stone and Wells (1991); Jones (1994); Freckelton (1994;
1997d); Golan (2004)). A major instrument in the execution of this political stance was the
rules of evidence, which have been aptly described as representing ‘the judges’ evaluation
of the mental calibre of the jury’: Stone and Wells (1991, p 55). They constitute a
construction of the parameters within which the law is prepared to regard as safe the
potential contribution by experts from disciplines outside the law.
A number of contemporary changes in judges’ evaluation of the capacities of jurors can
be discerned. While the rules of expert evidence are still being used to filter from juries
information that they are regarded as being ill-positioned to evaluate, jurors are no longer
being regarded as having the fragilities with which they were previously invested. They
are being asserted by contemporary judges as having the capacity to conduct a variety of
difficult tasks in the trial process and the exclusionary evidentiary rules are being
interpreted so as to allow more and different forms of expert evidence before jurors.
Mason CJ and Toohey J exemplified this approach in 1992 in R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR
592 at 603:
[I]n the past too little weight may have been given to the capacity of jurors to assess
critically what they see and hear and their ability to reach their decisions by reference to
the evidence before them.
(See too Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; [2002] HCA 4 at [182]; Caratti v The Queen
(2000) 22 WAR 527; [2000] WASCA 279 at [282].)
As Dawson J termed it in 1989, ‘the modern attitude towards expert evidence is,
perhaps, less exclusionary than in the past’: Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 at
130–131; see also Farrell v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 286; [1998] HCA 50. The result is that
greater numbers of expert witnesses are being permitted to testify on a broader base of
subject matter than has hitherto been permitted. The change means that a more
conceptually coherent approach is being developed by the common law to those rules of
expert evidence which are being strictly enforced and to those which are being interpreted
with liberality. In Australia, this process has been furthered by the passage of the Uniform
Evidence Legislation.
Anxieties generating the rules’ development
Overview
[2.0.20] Until recent times, courts regularly expressed their anxiety about the risks of
expert evidence. Such judicial concerns had been generated by a range of factors,
including notorious miscarriages of justice in which cross-examination by well-known
counsel had failed to expose significant deficiencies in expert evidence. The principal
grounds for judicial concern have been that:
22 [2.0.20]
(1) jurors may not comprehend complex, conflicting expert evidence sufficiently well
to evaluate it effectively;
(2) jurors may be overborne by the articulateness and impressiveness of expert
witnesses;
(3) triers of fact may be deceived by the undisclosed partisanship,
unrepresentativeness and even dishonesty of expert witnesses;
(4) expert evidence may unduly prolong litigation without significantly assisting the
trier of fact, be it judge or jury;
(5) the role of triers of fact may be ‘usurped’ by evidence which trespasses into their
domain; and
(6) cross-examination may not act as an effective check and balance to these risks.
For example, in R v C (G) (1995) 110 CCC (3d) 233 9Nfld CA at 259, the Newfoundland
Court of Appeal accepted the presence of an underlying concern in admitting any form of
expert evidence, namely, that the aura surrounding the requisite specialised knowledge
and the expert’s credentials may result in the evidence being given more weight than is
warranted by the proven facts:
Thus, cases speak of apprehension that expert testimony cloaked as it generally is in
scientific language, will acquire a mystical air of infallibility that technical vocabularies
often communicate to those not versed in the expert’s discipline. The fear is, therefore,
rather than assist laypersons in forming judgments, that the use of expert evidence will
usurp the function of the trier of fact and distort the proceedings by bolstering the
evidence of parties and overwhelm a jury. For these reasons, even if relevant, where the
trier of fact is able to form a conclusion without the professional’s help, the expert opinion
will not be admitted.
(See, too, R v DD 2000 SCC 43.)

The court noted that it has been for these reasons that in Canada the Supreme Court
has found that in order for expert evidence to be admitted, four criteria must be met:
relevance, necessity, the absence of the applicability of any exclusionary rule, and the
qualification of the expert: see R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402; R v J-LJ
[2000] 2 SCR 600; 2000 SCC 51 at [25]–[26]; White Burgess Langille Inman v Abbott and
Haliburton Co [2015] 2 SCR 182.
Thus, in R v DD 2000 SCC 43 at [53], Major J observed: ‘Faced with an expert’s
impressive credentials and mastery of scientific jargon, jurors are more likely to abdicate
their role as fact-finders and simply attorn to the opinion of the expert in their desire to
reach a just result.’ In United States v Frazier 387 F 3d 1244 at 1263 (11th Cir 2004), for
instance, it was observed that such testimony ‘may be assigned talismanic significance in
the eyes of lay jurors’, while in United States v Hines 55 F Supp 2d 62 at 64 (1999), it was
noted that a ‘certain patina attaches to an expert’s testimony unlike any other witness; this
is “science”, a professional’s judgment, the jury may think, and give more credence to the
testimony than it may deserve’.
The exclusionary rules and jury trials

[2.0.25] Although each one of the exclusionary rules has from time to time been enforced
in civil cases, some of them by judge-alone, the strict application of the rules occurs
particularly in criminal jury trials. There is also a differential in the extent to which they
are enforced. As Lord Reading put it in Director of Public Prosecutions v Christie (1914) 10 Cr
App R 141 at 164: ‘The principles of the laws of evidence are the same whether applied at
civil or criminal trials but they are not enforced with the same rigidity against a person
accused of a criminal offence as against a party to a civil action.’ The rules have been the
subject of a vast amount of litigation in recent decades. There is no sign of this changing in
[2.0.25] 23
the aftermath of the passage of the Australian and New Zealand statutory reforms of the
last decade of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century.
One of the major challenges lies within ascertaining the circumstances in which close
control will be exercised over expert evidence under discretions to exclude evidence as
more prejudicial than probative – especially in criminal trials. It is apparent that courts
tend to exclude evidence where an attempt is made to encourage decision-making,
particularly by jurors, on the basis of mathematical formulae (see Doheny and Adams v The
Queen [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 at 375, approving R v Adams (No 1) [1996] 2 Cr App R 467 at
482 that: ‘To introduce Bayes’ Theorem, or any similar method, into a criminal trial
plunges the jury into inappropriate and unnecessary realms of theory and complexity,
deflecting them from their proper task’). See also R v Adams (No 2) [1998] 1 Cr App R 377
at 383–384; R v Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1; [2001] SASC 64 at [661]; R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR
317; [2001] NSWCCA 413 at [26]. To similar effect, Hodgson (1995, p 736) commented that
‘decision-making generally involves a global assessment of a whole complex array of
matters which cannot be given individual numerical expression’. He warned that
concentration on mathematical probabilities can prejudice the commonsense process
which depends upon experience of the world and belief as to how people generally
behave: see also State Government Insurance Commission v Laube (1984) 37 SASR 31 at 32–33;
R v Mitchell (1997) 98 A Crim R 32 at 37–38; Burger King Corp v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd (2001)
69 NSWLR 558; [2001] NSWCA 187 at [591]. Statistical evidence falls into the category of
evidence that can be particularly difficult for jurors to evaluate (see Perry v The Queen
(1982) 150 CLR 580 at 594 per Murphy J), but it does not follow that the mathematics of
probability will generally be excluded: see Ch 12.25. Under s 137 of the Australian uniform
evidence legislation, the key question is whether in criminal proceedings in evidence
adduced by the prosecutor the probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice to the defendant. ‘Unfairness’ has been held to refer to evidence creating ‘a real
risk that the evidence will be misused by the jury in some unfair way’: R v BD (1997) 94 A
Crim R 131 at 139 per Hunt CJ at CL. See also Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297;
[1999] HCA 37 at 325–326; Ordukaya v Hicks [2000] NSWCA 180; R v Lisoff [1999] NSWCCA
364 at [52]; R v Toki (2000) 116 A Crim R 536; [2000] NSWSC 999 at [79]; R v GK (2001) 53
NSWLR 317; [2001] NSWCCA 413 at [30]. Further elucidation of this concept will no doubt
be generated (see [3.0.170]).
The exclusionary rules in family law litigation

[2.0.30] A number of decisions in England have addressed the extent to which the rules of
expert evidence apply in family law cases. The situation is clearer in Australia by virtue of
the application of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).
In Re M and R (Minors) [1996] 4 All ER 239 at 249, the United Kingdom Court of Appeal
sought to resolve uncertainties arising from earlier authority, including S and B (Minors)
(Child abuse: evidence), Re [1990] 2 FLR 489; see also Re F and S (Minors) [1966] 1 FCR 666;
Re N (a Minor) (sexual abuse: video evidence) [1996] 4 All ER 225. The court adopted the
comment by Lord Parker CJ in Director of Public Prosecutions v A & BC Chewing Gum Ltd
[1967] 2 All ER 504 at 506 that when dealing with children, the court needs ‘all the help [it]
can get’. It noted that in cases involving suspected child abuse, the expert evidence may
relate to the presence and interpretation of physical signs, and also the more problematic
area of the presence and interpretation of mental, behavioural and emotional signs (at
249):
That evidence often necessarily includes, if not a conclusion, at least strong pointers as to
the witness’s view of the likely veracity of the child (ie credibility): indeed his diagnosis
and the action taken by the local authority may depend on the conclusion reached.
24 [2.0.30]
The court noted (at 251) that family law judges in England had received ‘(without, it
would seem, objection, demur, embarrassment, or prejudice) expert opinion evidence,
including evidence as to the accuracy or truthfulness of child complainants’: see also Re B
(child sexual abuse: standard of proof) [1995] 1 FLR 904. Such evidence would normally be
regarded as inadmissible, but latitude had been extended to the reception of such
evidence in the best interests of the child. The court found (at 253–254) that there was no
reason why it should be obliged to waste its time listening to superfluous and
cumbersome testimony, but that the judge was obliged never:
[to lose] sight of the central truths: namely that the ultimate decision is for him, and that
all questions of relevance and weight are for him. If the expert’s opinion is clearly
irrelevant, he will say so. But, if arguably relevant but in his view ultimately unhelpful, he
can generally prevent its reception by indicating that the expert’s answer would carry
little weight with him. The modern view is to regulate such matters by way of weight,
rather than admissibility. But when the judge is of the opinion that the witness’s expertise
is still required to assist him to answer the ultimate questions (including, where
appropriate, credibility) then the judge can safely and gratefully rely on such evidence,
while never losing sight of the fact that the final decision is for him.
Similar common law principles were articulated under the common law in Australia. For
instance, in Wakely v Hanns; Director of Court Counselling (Intervener) (1993) 116 FLR 63,
McGovern J accepted that the principle that concern for the welfare of a child may modify
the rules of evidence was well established.
However, the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) now apply to proceedings in the
Family Court. Thus, in Su v Chang (1999) 25 Fam LR 558; [1999] FamCA 1203, the Full
Court of the Family Court held that the court is obliged to determine disputes before it
according to the rules of evidence. However, s 190 of Australia’s uniform evidence
legislation allows the parties to dispense with the rules of evidence. The court held that
this provision gives the parties a significant degree of control over the application of the
rules of evidence, such as the opinion rule (at [70]). Where a litigant appears in person,
though, the court is obliged to alert the unrepresented person to their rights in respect of
evidence sought to be adduced but which may be inadmissible by application of the rules
of evidence: S v R (1999) 149 FLR 149; [1999] FamCA 12 at [68]–[72]; Re F: Litigants in
Person Guidelines (2001) 161 FLR 189; [2001] FamCA 348 at [233].
In practice, the provisions of Australia’s uniform evidence legislation have resulted in a
somewhat more formal approach than previously existed in relation to evidentiary
admissibility, but still a level of ‘flexibility’ applies and it is not uncommon for the
technical rules to be dispensed with informally. This particularly applies in relation to the
reception of expert evidence.
The role of exclusionary rules outside criminal and civil litigation
Overview
[2.0.40] Although there are many forums in which the rules of expert evidence do not
strictly apply, such as before coroners’ courts (see Freckelton and Ranson (2006)),
children’s courts on occasions (A and B v Director of Family Services (1996) 20 Fam LR 549),
tribunals and boards, and during hearings on sentence, the Australian High Court has
pointed out that in such contexts ‘every attempt must be made to administer “substantial
justice”’: War Pensions Entitlements Tribunal; Ex parte Bolt (1933) 50 CLR 228 at 256. It has
been held that ‘the rules relating to expert evidence at common law are largely based on
good sense and fairness’ and thus should be applied in substance: see Lipovac v Hamilton
Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported, ACT Supreme Court, 13 September 1996) per Higgins J at
102. To similar effect, Lockhart J, in Pearce v Button (1986) 8 FCR 408 at 422, has held that a
judge should be ‘slow’ to invoke a power to dispense with rules of evidence ‘where there
[2.0.40] 25
is a real dispute about matters which go to the heart of the case’, while the High Court in
1995 reaffirmed the underlying justification in terms of public policy for the hearsay rule:
Bannon v The Queen (1995) 185 CLR 1.
The better view is that courts and tribunals should not act on material that is of little
probative value but of significant prejudicial effect: Moore v Guardianship and Administration
Board [1990] VR 902; Anderson v The Queen (1992) 60 SASR 90 at 98–99; A and B v Director of
Family Services (1996) 132 FLR 172. This may well mean that there needs to be substantial
compliance with a number of the rules of expert evidence (see Freckelton (1992; 1994)),
such rules simply being ‘rules of prudence and discretion’: Director of Public Prosecutions v
Christie (1914) 10 Cr App R 141 at 164 per Lord Reading.
Rationales for the exclusionary rules

[2.0.50] While there is an increasing liberality about the enforcement of certain of the rules
of expert evidence, a number of common law decisions have also manifested a recognition
that the privilege of expressing opinions may have vital consequences for the outcome of
litigation. Thus, certain of the rules are, if anything, being more strictly enforced when the
alternative would be to have expert evidence being admitted which would not be
susceptible to any kind of meaningful evaluation by judges or jurors. An example is that
experts must be experts (the ‘expertise rule’) – they must be sufficiently qualified by
training and/or experience to be able to assist the court in performing its fact-finding
function: see Ch 2.05.
Traditionally, the courts were concerned to restrict expert evidence by reducing the
areas regarding which it may be given. Restriction has been by reference to the principle
that ‘what is generally known ought not to be the subject of expert evidence’ (the
‘common knowledge rule’: see Ch 2.15). It is possible to perceive something of a change in
this rule at common law with increasing judicial recognition of the fact that the public
may have an inkling about various matters that can form the subject of expert study, but
that their understanding may be misinformed and uninformedly intuitive. Thus, a shift in
orientation toward consideration of whether triers of fact would be assisted by proposed
expert evidence can be discerned. Allied with this has been a trend in some contexts to
admit evidence of a counterintuitive nature (eg, in relation to battered woman syndrome,
and the operation of memory, at least when repression of memories is claimed), so as to
disabuse jurors of misperceptions under which their deliberations might otherwise labour.
Fear that jurors may be overwhelmed by the impressiveness of experts has led to the
persistent operation of the rule that proscribes expert evidence upon matters central to the
trier of fact’s responsibility (the ‘ultimate issue rule’: see Ch 2.25). However, criticism from
many quarters appears to have resulted in an attenuation of this rule at common law (as
well as under statute) so that it now operates primarily to prevent experts from employing
legal terminology or interpreting legal standards.
The conservative basis of the rules

[2.0.60] Attempts are made from time to time to call experts to give evidence on ‘fringe’
areas – that is, areas that are yet to be generally accepted among their peers as valid or
reliable. The ‘area of expertise rule’ (often referred to in the past as the Frye test: see
Ch 2.10) has the potential to regulate the introduction of such ‘novel’ evidence, as do the
exclusionary discretions. The rule may be traced in Australasia to an early decision on
fingerprinting (R v Parker [1912] VLR 152), although in this case it was not formally
invoked. However, its actual origin is customarily said to be a 1923 United States decision
on the admissibility of polygraph evidence: Frye v United States 293 F 1013 at 1014 (DC Cir
1923). It has found expression in Australian, New Zealand and United Kingdom common
law in a variety of areas of novel scientific or psychological theory, in an attempt to sift the
26 [2.0.50]
valuable wheat from the dangerous chaff. It has functioned avowedly as a conservative
mechanism to protect triers of fact from having to be arbiters of reliability and validity on
areas that are still the subject of disputation within their disciplines. Its application has
resulted in evidence being rejected when it was not established to be ‘expert opinion in a
recognised field of expertise’: see, eg, ‘stylometrics’ in R v Jamieson (1992) 60 A Crim R 68
at 77. A number of leading decisions in Australia, as well as in the United States and
Canada, have also focused upon whether expert evidence emanates from a reliable field of
expertise as a mechanism for determining whether evidence can safely be admitted. A
series of decisions in the United Kingdom in relation to the reliability of new areas of
scientific endeavour is starting to refocus principles of evidentiary admissibility: see
Ch 12.05. The impact of the United States Supreme Court decisions of Daubert v Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993) and Kumho Tire Co Ltd v
Carmichael 526 US 137; 119 S Ct 1167 (1999), and of the Canadian decisions of R v Melaragni
(1992) 73 CCC (3d) 348 at 352 and R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402; R v
J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600; 2000 SCC 51; and R v DD 2000 SCC 43, which refocus away from the
general acceptance of theories or techniques within the relevant scientific community to
reliability, ascertained in part by reference to falsifiability, remains to be seen in Australia
and New Zealand.
Limits to expert opinions – the accountability issue

[2.0.65] Australian courts have embraced the notion that expert opinions based upon the
findings or theories of others are not susceptible of meaningful evaluation. That found
expression in the statutory and common law context in Dasreef v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR
588; [2011] HCA 21, where Heydon J asserted the existence at common law of an
‘assumption identification rule’ (at [64]–[65]), a ‘proof of assumption rule’ (at [66]–[90]),
and a ‘statement of reasoning rule’ (at [91]–[94]). It is unclear whether, as yet, these
analyses form part of the common law of Australia.
The ‘basis rule’ at common law provides that the basis for expert opinions must be
admitted in evidence as a precondition to admissibility of the expert opinion. This is
essentially a protective device to safeguard the integrity of the trier of fact’s responsibility
to evaluate evidence. Expert opinions that function as a conduit for the work and opinions
of others cannot adequately be tested by cross-examination and so cannot effectively be
evaluated by triers of fact.
Evidence of speculation about a fact by an expert witness is not permitted where there
is no evidence to support the conclusion that the fact was established: see Straker v The
Queen (1977) 15 ALR 103 at 114; Lipovac v Hamilton Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported, ACT
Supreme Court, 13 September 1996). See also HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999]
HCA 2 and see [7.05.370] below.
The expertise rule, the area of expertise rule, and the basis rule at common law all
endeavour to ensure that the tribunal of fact has information which it can evaluate in a
meaningful way. These three ‘threshold’ rules function as protective mechanisms:
(1) to ensure that magistrates, judges and juries are not misled by persons who may
be expert in other areas but are not on the area in question;
(2) to preclude evidence that relates to fringe or spurious techniques or theories that
are not accepted within the relevant expert community, or are inherently
unreliable; and
(3) to prevent experts from acting as conduits for the work of others, thereby
precluding those views from proper critique.
The common knowledge and ultimate issue rules at common law, however, are in a
different category. Of their very nature they postulate that the integrity of the tribunal of
fact’s deliberations could be adversely affected by exposure to such testimony from expert
[2.0.65] 27
witnesses. Part of the courts’ underlying concern has been expressed in terms of jurors’
lack of capacity to discern that what an expert says should not necessarily be adopted, or
in terms of the perception that jurors have difficulty in comprehending the subtleties of
certain kinds of expert evidence. In essence, the common knowledge and ultimate issue
rules presuppose that jurors confronted by expert witnesses may either misconstrue the
evidence or not deal with it appropriately. The common law until recently adopted the
position that as such evidence was not necessary – in the one case, because it overlapped
with what the juror knew about already, and in the other, because it was going to a stage
in the decision-making process that was the juror’s and not the expert’s – it should be
excluded at least out of an abundance of caution. A shift in focus is now permitting many
forms of such evidence if it would assist jurors in their deliberations. This does not extend
to the reasoning of the courts in Canada, however, where a key question asked in
admissibility determination is whether expert evidence is ‘necessary’: see R v Mohan [1994]
2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402; R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600; 2000 SCC 51; R v DD 2000 SCC
43.
Looking back at the law prior to when the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) came into force,
Einstein J in Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [1999] NSWSC 828 at [239] (see,
too, R v Gallagher [2001] NSWSC 462 at [24]) held that the requirements for expert
evidence admissibility under Australian common law were that:
(1) the opinion had to be relevant to a fact in issue;
(2) there had to be evidence capable of proving the facts upon which the opinion was
based;
(3) the witness had to disclose the facts upon which the evidence was based;
(4) there had to be a relevant field of expertise, which was sufficiently organised or
recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience;
(5) the witness had to be an expert in that field;
(6) the opinion could not be related to a matter of common knowledge; and
(7) the opinion could not concern the ultimate issue – that is, the expert was not
permitted to give an opinion on the very issue of fact or law which the court had
to determine.
By contrast, Heydon JA summed up the impact of the rules and discretions under the
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) in Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v
Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 at [85]:
[I]f evidence tendered as expert opinion evidence is to be admissible, it must be agreed or
demonstrated that there is a field of ‘specialised knowledge’; there must be an identified
aspect of that field in which the witness demonstrates that by reason of specified training,
study or experience, the witness has become an expert; the opinion proffered must be
‘wholly or substantially based on the witness’s expert knowledge’; so far as the opinion is
based on facts ‘observed’ by the expert, they must be identified and admissibly proved by
the expert, and so far as the opinion is based on ‘assumed’ or ‘accepted’ facts, they must
be identified and proved in some other way; it must be established that the facts on which
the opinion is based form a proper foundation for it; and the opinion of an expert requires
demonstration or examination of the scientific or other intellectual basis of the conclusions
reached: that is, the expert’s evidence must explain how the field of ‘specialised
knowledge’ in which the witness is expert by reason of ‘training, study or experience’, and
on which the opinion is ‘wholly or substantially based’, applies to the facts assumed or
observed so as to produce the opinion propounded. If all these matters are not made
explicit, it is not possible to be sure whether the opinion is based wholly or substantially
on the expert’s specialised knowledge. If the court cannot be sure of that, the evidence is
strictly speaking not admissible, and, so far as it is admissible, of diminished weight. And
an attempt to make the basis of the opinion explicit may reveal that it is not based on
specialised expert knowledge, but, to use Gleeson CJ’s characterisation of the evidence in
HG v The Queen [(1999) 197 CLR 414] (at 428 [41]), on ‘a combination of speculation,
28 [2.0.65]
inference, personal and second-hand views as to the credibility of the complainant, and a
process of reasoning which went well beyond the field of expertise’.
(See, too, Dasreef v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21; Australian Securities and
Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 190 FLR 242; [2005] NSWSC 149.)
Exclusion on the basis of lack of independence

[2.0.68] Whether Australia will follow the Canadian initiative in White Burgess Langille
Inman v Abbott and Haliburton Co [2015] 2 SCR 182 of excluding expert evidence on the
basis that they have breached experts duty to the court to ensure that their evidence is not
fair, objective and non-partisan remains to be seen.
Discretionary exclusion
[2.0.70] The balance of authority suggests that in civil trials no residual discretion exists at
common law to exclude prejudicial evidence: Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries (1995)
36 NSWLR 49 at 64. In criminal matters, however, the discretionary safety net of exclusion
operates when the probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial impact. The status of this discretion in cases where it is difficult for jurors to
evaluate the nature of expert disagreement is uncertain following the decision of
Mullighan J in R v Jarrett (1994) 62 SASR 443; 73 A Crim R 160; R v Juric (2002) 4 VR 411;
[2002] VSCA 77.
While the general effort of the common law in relation to the admission or rejection of
evidence has been to reduce the dependence upon the discretion of judges (see R v
Inhabitants of Eriswell (1790) 3 Term Rep 707 at 714; 100 ER 815 at 819; Polycarpou v
Australian Wire Industries (1995) 36 NSWLR 49 at 60), ss 135 and 137 of the Evidence Act
1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the Evidence Act 2008
(Vic), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT)and the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT),
in the context of the opinion evidence regimes in place at the federal level and in New
South Wales, Tasmania, Victoria and the Northern Territory, have resulted in a major shift
in expert evidence law orientation. The discretionary provisions provide a key focus for
determinations of admissibility, including when there is non-compliance with court rules
and codes of expert conduct. Arguments will often henceforth be directed toward issues
such as the extent of probative value and the nature of consequential prejudicial effect of
expert opinion evidence, the danger of the tribunal of fact being misled or confused (see
Ch 2.35), and the inefficiencies and cost consequences of non-adherence to experts’
obligations.
Judicial notice
[2.0.80] Courts take judicial notice of a variety of matters that would otherwise be the
subject of expert evidence (see Ch 2.30). This is a facilitative mechanism to reduce the
incidence and extent of technical legal arguments that would serve little useful purpose.
Regimes are in place also for presumptive accuracy of scientific instruments. Generally,
these permit rebuttal expert evidence to be led, but only upon notice. While judicial notice
as a concept is one of some antiquity, its parameters remain far from clear but do ease
what would otherwise be cumbersome demands in relation to proof of expert opinions
and, more particularly, the bases upon which expert opinions rest.
The need for statutory reform

[2.0.85] The common law rules of expert evidence have become overly technical and
convoluted. Whether they are going to incorporate the Frye and Daubert rules from the
United States has not been finally resolved. Controversies continue too as to whether
reliability should constitute a stand-alone admissibility criterion.
[2.0.85] 29
In addition, thoroughgoing and, at times, searing critiques of the ultimate issue and
common knowledge rules have been made. It is not surprising then that the common law
has been overtaken in Australia by the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995
(NSW), the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT)
and the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) (see Ch 3.0), in New Zealand by
the Evidence Act 2006 (NZ) (see Ch 3.05), and in the United States by the Federal Rules of
Evidence 1975 as amended (see Ch 3.10). Further change in other jurisdictions is likely: see
Ch 3.15.
30 [2.0.85]
Chapter 2.05
THE EXPERTISE RULE

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [2.05.01]
The special privilege of experts .......................................................................................... [2.05.10]
Distinctions between evidence of fact and evidence of opinion .................................. [2.05.20]
The role of expert evidence ................................................................................................. [2.05.30]
The expertise rule: experts must be experts ..................................................................... [2.05.70]
Increased rigour in application of expertise rule ............................................................ [2.05.110]
Independence of experts ...................................................................................................... [2.05.150]
An expert who is a party ..................................................................................................... [2.05.170
The unrepresentativeness of an expert’s views ............................................................... [2.05.190]
Unusual nature of expertise ................................................................................................ [2.05.200]
Inferences of expertise from expert reports ...................................................................... [2.05.230]
Ad hoc expertise .................................................................................................................... [2.05.270]
Application of the expertise rule ........................................................................................ [2.05.310]
Legislative definitions ........................................................................................................... [2.05.350]
The United States approach ................................................................................................ [2.05.390]
Existence of formal qualifications ...................................................................................... [2.05.430]
Australian High Court authority ....................................................................................... [2.05.450]
Australian State authority .................................................................................................... [2.05.490]
Canadian authority ............................................................................................................... [2.05.530]
South African authority ....................................................................................................... [2.05.540]
New Zealand authority ........................................................................................................ [2.05.550]
United States authority ........................................................................................................ [2.05.570]
‘In the lush pastures of the Common Law a number of sacred
cows graze and no-one dares to cull them or even try to make
them healthier. One answers to the name of “expert evidence”
… It is a scraggy animal, despised by many, yet its continued
existence is essential for the proper administration of justice.
Properly cared for it could provide good progeny but the
breeding would have to be selective as some strains may not
be worth encouraging.’
LJ Lawton, “The Limitations of Expert Scientific Evidence” (1980) 20 Journal of
Forensic Science 237.
Introduction
[2.05.01] This chapter identifies the role of experts at common law in providing opinions
to assist the courts and scrutinises the parameters of the ‘expertise rule’ which permits
opinions in most circumstances only to be given by persons designated as ‘experts’.
The special privilege of experts

[2.05.10] Experts have a privileged position among witnesses in the court system. Like
other witnesses they cannot be sued in negligence or defamation for their forensic work
(see Ch 8.05; and see in the United Kingdom Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] UKSC
13) but, in addition, they are allowed to give expert evidence in the form of opinion in
much broader circumstances than lay witnesses. Laypersons are only permitted to express
their evidence in the form of opinions where it is not possible to separate the primary facts
from an inference or where grounds of convenience exist in the following restricted
categories:
(1) identification of handwriting, persons and things;
(2) apparent age;
(3) the bodily plight or condition of a person, including death and illness;
(4) the emotional state of a person, eg, whether the person is distressed, angry,
aggressive, affectionate or depressed;
[2.05.10] 31
(5) the condition of things, eg, worn, shabby, used or new;

(6) questions of value; and
(7) estimates of speed and distance.
(See Sherrard v Jacob [1965] NI 151 at 156 per Lord MacDermott LCJ; Graat v The Queen
(1983) 2 CCC (3d) 365; Wright v Doe d Tatham (1838) 4 Bing (NC) 489 at 543–544; 132 ER 877
at 898–899.)
Distinctions between evidence of fact and evidence of opinion

[2.05.20] The line between an opinion and the fact upon which the opinion is based is not
always clear (Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404 at [472]) and can be somewhat
arbitrary. In Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893
at [40], Lindgren J noted that the word ‘opinion’ is not defined in the Evidence Act 1995
(Cth) but is generally understood as an inference drawn from facts: see Allstate Life
Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 5) (1996) 64 FCR 73 at 75;
Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371 at 373. Another definition is ‘a conclusion,
usually judgmental or debatable, reasoned from facts’: RW Miller & Co Pty Ltd v Krupp
(Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 34 NSWLR 129 at 130 per Giles J; and see R v Perry (No 4) (1981)
28 SASR 119 at 123–126 per Cox J.
In Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371, a case involving the expert evidence of a
‘qualified accountant and registered auditor with extensive experience as an insolvency
practitioner’, Branson J said (at 375) that ‘the distinction between evidence of “fact” and
evidence of “opinion” assumes a dichotomy which is not always easy to draw’.
In R v Perry (No 4) (1981) 28 SASR 119 at 126, Cox J discussed what he categorised as
different types of scientific opinions. First, his Honour gave the example of opinion
evidence from a psychiatrist, in relation to the diagnosis of a mental condition, and a
pathologist, in relation to a person’s cause of death. His Honour said about this type of
evidence that ‘much depends on the expert’s judgments and it is recognised that the views
of informed persons on such matters may reasonably differ’. Cox J compared this type of
evidence with evidence from an expert analytical chemist. His Honour said that where a
reliable method requiring little independent judgment was used to measure the level of
arsenic in a person’s blood, any statement regarding the presence or absence of arsenic
was to be regarded as a statement of fact.
The essence of such an approach is to discern whether an inference has been drawn
from facts or whether facts essentially speak for themselves.
The subtleties of the distinctions between ‘facts’ and ‘opinions’ led Mansfield J in Risk
v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404 at [473] to comment:
[W]hilst the clear separation of fact and premise from opinion is clearly desirable, it is
necessary to accept that there is sometimes difficulty in discerning between the facts upon
which an opinion is based and the opinion itself in an expert anthropology report. Such a
difficulty should not be regarded as a fatal flaw that may render the report or the opinion
inadmissible.
The role of expert evidence

[2.05.30] The earliest description of the forensic role of expert evidence is that of
Saunders J in Buckley v Rice Thomas (1554) 1 Plowd 118 at 124; 75 ER 182 at 191:
[I]f matters arise in our law which concern other sciences or faculties, we commonly apply
for the aid of that science or faculty which it concerns. Which is an honourable and
commendable thing in our law. For thereby it appears that we do not despise all other
sciences but our own, but we approve of them and encourage them as things worthy of
commendation.
32 [2.05.20]
The expertise rule | CH 2.05
But the archetypal description of the expert’s role in the court system is that of Cooper LP
in Davie v Magistrates of Edinburgh [1953] SC 34 at 40:
Their duty is to furnish the judge or jury with the necessary scientific criteria for testing
the accuracy of their conclusions, so as to enable the judge or jury to form their own
independent judgment by the application of these criteria to the facts proved in evidence.
Similarly, in R v Beland [1987] 2 SCR 398; (1987) 43 DLR (4th) 641; 36 CCC (3d) 481 at 493,
McIntyre J, speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, stated:
The function of the expert witness is to provide for the jury or other trier of fact an
expert’s opinion as to the significance of, or the inference which may be drawn from,
proved facts in a field in which the expert witness possesses special knowledge and
experience going beyond that of the trier of fact. The expert witness is permitted to give
such opinions for the assistance of the jury. Where the question is one which falls within
the knowledge and experience of the triers of fact, there is no need for expert evidence and
an opinion will not be received.
Field (1988, p 335) has put it well:

As science advances and it is increasingly possible to establish the truth or otherwise of
certain allegations by technical processes, so the courts have more need of experts to
explain to them what they have done, why, and what conclusions they draw from the
results of their inquiries.
In R v Parker [1912] VLR 152, an early fingerprinting evidence case, a further role of the
expert witness was articulated. Hodges J was content in principle to allow the admission
of expert evidence in spite of the fact that he was of the view that the jury could look at
fingerprint impressions for themselves and judge as to the identity of the marks – an
expert could help a jury ‘to use the evidence of their own eyes’ (at 158).
Cussen J, though, went a little further and held (at 159) that certain evidence from the
experts should not be admitted ‘because their knowledge or the knowledge of anyone else
on the subject does not profess to be based on any universal law, but is merely empirical’.
He held that experts could make statements based on their experience or study, such as
that there are certain broadly marked differences in character between the fingerprints of
different people and that these can be classified and described.
However, when fingerprinting experts pointed out similarities (at 160):
they are not, in one sense, speaking as experts at all, but are merely pointing out to the
jury matters which the jury could determine for themselves – they are merely convenient
helpers of the court.
In a leading South African decision, Addleson J in Menday v Protea Assurance Co (Pty) Ltd
1976 (1) SA 565 at 569 made the important point that expertise is more than the possession
of credentials:
However eminent an expert may be in a general field, he does not constitute an expert in
a particular sphere unless by special study or experience he is qualified to express an
opinion on that topic. The dangers of holding otherwise – of being overawed by a recital
of degrees and diplomas – are obvious: the Court has then no way of being satisfied that it
is not being blinded by pure ‘theory’ untested by knowledge or practice. The expert must
either himself have knowledge or experience in the special field on which he testifies
(whatever general knowledge he may also have in pure theory) or he must rely on
knowledge or experience of experts other than themselves who are shown to be acceptable
experts in that field.
Another analysis of the role of the expert is that of Sir Richard Eggleston, who argued
(1983, p 145) that there are four separate functions performed by expert witnesses:
‘generalising from experience, acting as librarian, acting as statistician and acting as
advocate’. His analysis was applied by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Arnotts Ltd v
Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 350ff. Sir Richard pointed out that experts
[2.05.30] 33
quite properly generalise regularly from their training and professional experience – this
may be in the form of assertions of fact or of opinion.
So far as the librarian function is concerned, Sir Richard maintained (pp 153–154):
In many cases the expert does not himself know the answer to the problem from his own
study or experience. But being trained in the relevant discipline, he is able to refer to
works of authority in which the answer is given. In such a case the expert himself is not
generalising, but is making available the fruits of generalisations by other people, either
from their own experience or from the experience of others whose writings form part of
the literature. The expert witness here is not giving evidence of his own opinion, except to
say that in his expert opinion the books to which he is making reference are of sufficient
standing to be accepted by the court.
He also argued (at p 154) that a function of the expert is to apply statistical methods to the
material available from other sources and to draw significant conclusions: see Trade
Practices Commission v Australian Meat Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) 83 ALR 299.
Finally, Sir Richard maintained that the expert has a proper role in advocacy to the
extent that, having expounded to the tribunal the rules applicable to the case, his or her
evidence may then consist of argument as to the conclusions that should be drawn from
those facts, interpreted in the light of the rules. He stressed (at p 154) that difficulties can
arise:
because the expert often finds it difficult to distinguish between arguments on the
assumption that the ‘facts’ put forward by his side are the correct ones, and telling the
judge or jury which facts they should accept as true. If he makes his assumptions clear,
there is no objection to his arguing what the consequences of accepting those assumptions
should be; but he is not to do the jury’s fact-finding for it, where this depends on
accepting one or the other set of contradictory witnesses.
(See also Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486.)

The requirement, in short, is that the expert should be an advocate for his or her
opinion but not for the client or for the expert himself or herself.
The role of the expert witness as an educator of the court in relation to issues in dispute
is a useful conceptualisation of one of the forensic functions of the expert witness (see eg
Beryessa (2017)). However, this has provide controversial in the Australian Family Court.
In Re W and W [2001] FLC 93-085, Nicholson CJ and O’Ryan J (with whom Kay J agreed on
the point) warned of giving weight to expert evidence of a psychiatrist who had not seen
the parties nor the children but had reviewed the material. Their Honours said (at [147]):
‘[T]here are grave dangers in reliance upon expert evidence given in such circumstances.’
In Re W (Sex Abuse: Standard of Proof) (2004) 32 Fam LR 249; [2004] FamCA 768 at [39], the
court commented of the earlier decision:
Whilst much of their Honours’ rejection of the evidence of the psychiatrist in Re W [2004]
FamCA 768 appears to turn on the fact he was retained by one side and must have
brought unconscious bias to his task, in our view the criticism of relying upon an opinion
about the ultimate issue from a witness who has not seen the parties nor the children
remains just as valid when the witness is called by the court. If an expert witness still
purports to give an opinion as to the ultimate issue then such opinion would be expected
to be heavily qualified by the expert having regard to the fact that the expert had not seen
the parties nor the children.
In addition, in R v Parenzee [2007] SASC 142 at [130], Sulan J appeared to take a similar
view, holding that in some situations practical experience is essential over and above the
reading of articles and books, noting that a witness:
has not undertaken any formal study in any of the disciplines of specialised medicine of
which she seeks to express an opinion. She is self-taught to the extent that she has read
much on the various subjects. There may be circumstances in which a person can become
expert in a particular area of expertise, simply by reading and self-teaching. However, I do
not consider that the areas in which she sought to give evidence are such areas. In my
34 [2.05.30]
view, it is virtually impossible to develop an expertise in medical science, sufficient upon

which others can rely, simply by reading textbooks and research papers.
(See further Freckelton (2005a).)

The need for experts actually to possess specialised knowledge on an issue on which
they can assist a court is fundamental. It endures under statutory changes to expert
evidence law in Australia and it is a common feature of most common law and statutory
provisions in relation to expert evidence. A shift can be observed in terms of modern
courts’ attitudes toward the expertise requirement. Courts have come to recognise that
expertise can be obtained through a number of means, not just through formal courses of
tertiary study. This has led to a variety of different forms of expert evidence being
admitted since the 1980s which might have fallen foul of technical requirements, but
which had currency in previous times. However, the challenge remains to identify when a
person crosses the line from having a level of knowledge about an area of expertise to
being an ‘expert’. Inevitably, the line is difficult to draw with precision and will depend
upon the subject matter, the discipline of the expert and, often, the extent of the person’s
experience. Fundamentally, it is a question of fact.
The expertise rule: experts must be experts

[2.05.70] Expert witnesses have been permitted to give expert evidence on a myriad of
subjects, but it has always been a fundamental tenet of evidence law that they are not
permitted the privilege of giving evidence in the form of opinions if they are not properly
designated experts. The more modern formulation in this regard is that they must possess
specialised knowledge, obtained in an acceptable way. It may well be that they will be
permitted to give evidence, nonetheless, in the form of facts – for instance, of the
experiments they have conducted and matters such as a person’s behaviour or objects
they have observed.
In Galvin v Murray [2001] 1 ILRM 234 at 239, Murray J held that ‘an expert may be
defined as a person whose qualifications or expertise give an added authority to opinions
or statements given or made by him within the area of his expertise’.
The expert need not be a leading or even senior practitioner in the field (see R v
Morgentaler (No 2) (1973) 14 CCC (2d) 450 at 452; McWilliams (1988, ch 9); Chayko,
Gulliver and MacDougall (1991, p 17)), but must be sufficiently skilled to be accounted an
expert.
The question of whether the expert witness is to be permitted to testify in the form of
opinions often devolves to the sufficiency and the relevance of his or her specialised skills,
rather than to any strict questions of definition. The day of the all-purpose expert within
medicine, science, accounting or engineering now appears to be well over. As Ormiston JA
held in R v Noll [1999] 3 VR 704; [1999] VSCA 164 at [3]:
Professional people in the guise of experts can no longer be polymaths; they must, in this
modern era, rely on others to provide much of their acquired expertise. Their particular
talent is that they know where to go to acquire that knowledge in a reliable form.
Nonetheless, the line over which a person crosses to ‘become’ an expert can be difficult for
the person himself or herself to identify, as well as for legal advisers and the courts.
Evaluation of the issue takes place on the basis of facts properly placed before a court in a
particular case.
Increased rigour in application of expertise rule

[2.05.110] There is an apparent trend by courts, frequently on their own instigation, to
query the sufficiency of experts’ expertise for the case before them: cf the plaint of Best
(1849, para 348). A psychologist’s qualifications to give evidence on psycholinguistics have
been queried in the Australian High Court (Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94); the
[2.05.110] 35
appropriateness of eminent scientists giving evidence involving statistics has been

doubted (R v Lucas [1992] 2 VR 109; (1992) 55 A Crim R 361 at 114); a motor vehicle
repairer has been denied the right to give evidence about the causation of accidents (Bugg
v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442 at 462 per Dixon J); a psychologist has been held not to have
sufficient qualifications and experience to give psychopharmacology evidence on the
effects of the ingestion of drugs on an accused person’s capacity to form a criminal intent
(R v Darrington [1980] VR 353 at 380); non-forensically experienced doctors (a general
practitioner and a surgeon) have been found to lack expertise to give evidence on whether
wounds were self-inflicted (R v Anderson (2000) 1 VR 1; [2000] VSCA 16); an experienced
police officer has been held not to be qualified to offer expert opinions about the causes of
a traffic accident (Mattioli v Parker (No 2) [1973] Qd R 499 at 506); biologists have been held
not to be experts on blood spatter patterns (R v Broughton (unreported, Queensland Court
of Criminal Appeal, 22 September 1988)); a handyman has been confined to evidence
about the maintenance of chairs, rather than engineering or related matters (Jones v
Multiple Sclerosis Society [1996] 1 VR 499 at 505); a pharmacologist has been allowed to give
evidence of the effects of drugs on the mind but not on whether the accused formed the
requisite intent to commit a robbery because of his use of drugs (that was held to be the
province of a psychiatrist) (R v Woods (1982) 65 CCC (2d) 554 at 560); as long ago as 1925,
a research student in toxicology was not permitted to give evidence on a point of medicine
(Nightingale v Biffen (1925) 18 BWCC 358); and a paediatrician has been held not to have
been correctly permitted to have given evidence in relation to the reactions of children
who have been sexually abused (F v The Queen (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 at 509).
In 1992 Cox J allowed a dog breeder, in spite of her not having engaged in formal
study, to give expert evidence based upon many years of breeding, exhibiting and selling
cattle dogs, but restricted its ambit to evidence about characteristics of the breed (R v
Pfennig (1992) 57 SASR 507 at 512–513). His Honour declined to allow the witness to
express her views on how a particular dog which she ‘hardly knew’ would behave in
certain circumstances or about whether a heeler ‘can sense if there is an evil intent’. See
Ch 13.05, ‘Tracker and sniffer dog evidence’.
Independence of experts
[2.05.150] The degree to which the expert is independently objective and impartial (see
Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999; 2001)) will impact upon the evaluation by the trier of
fact of the probative value of the expert evidence. However, the fact that the expert is a
treater or is employed in the relevant area does not preclude the reception of the evidence
or its being accorded considerable weight. For instance, in R v Gallagher [2001] NSWSC
462, where this objection was made about a DNA scientist who worked on a day-to-day
basis with the Profiler Plus system, Barr J rejected the concern (at [138]–[139]) that his lack
of independence meant that his evidence should not be received:
I was not prepared to conclude that Mr Goetz’s evidence lacked objectivity merely because
it derived from the use of a scientific system he was responsible for installing, maintaining
and using. The court routinely accepts evidence from professional witnesses who in effect
stake their reputation on the reliability of the opinions they put forward. In my opinion far
more is needed to demonstrate bias than that a witness gives evidence about results from
a system with which he or she is intimately connected.
I thought that if applied the approach contended for might work another mischief. So
specialised is the nature of typing DNA profiles by systems using the methods of
extraction, amplification and interpretation of results by fluorescent technology in
computerised equipment as in Profiler Plus that no scientist not actually engaged in the
work is likely to understand sufficient detail of it to be able to give reliable evidence about
it. There appears no reason to suppose that there existed university staff or scientists other
than those using the system in their daily work who might be able to give evidence of the
detail the court might expect. If the principle contended for were right, the result might
36 [2.05.150]
very well be that those who knew about the system because they used it in their work
would be unable to give evidence because the court thought them unreliable, whereas the
remaining members of the scientific community would know too little to qualify as
experts.
Similarly, in Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [1999] NSWSC 828 at [275],
Einstein J held that the fact that a witness had an interest in the resolution meant that he
was partisan and partial, with the result that, although his evidence as an expert was
admissible, it needed to be ‘very closely scrutinised indeed’. The fact that a witness is
partisan is not a legitimate reason per se for the witness’s evidence to be held to be
inadmissible (see Ch 2.35); see also FGT Custodians Pty Ltd (formerly Feingold Partners Pty
Ltd) v Fagenblat [2003] VSCA 33; Collins Thomson Pty Ltd v Clayton [2002] NSWSC 366; Kirch
Communications Pty Ltd v Gene Engineering Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 485; SmithKline Beecham
(Australia) Pty Ltd v Chipman (2003) 131 FCR 500; [2003] FCA 796.
In the United States, at the federal level, the independence of the expert is a
consideration that goes to the weight of the evidence, and a party may testify as an expert
in his or her own case: Rodriguez v Pacificare of Texas Inc 980 F 2d 1014 at 1019 (5th Cir
1993); Tagatz v Marquette University 861 F 2d 1040 (7th Cir 1988); Apple Inc v Motorola Inc
757 F 3d 1286 at 1321 (Fed Cir 2014).
A similar approach has been taken in Canada. In R v INCO Ltd (2006) 80 OR (3d) 594 at
[44], Hennessy J held that the fact a witness was employed in the Investigations and
Enforcement Branch as a technical enforcement specialist was not a sufficient basis upon
which to find him incapable of providing an independent opinion. Mewett and Sankoff
(1991) observed: ‘So long as parties are given freedom to choose their own experts, a
certain amount of favouritism from these witnesses is simply a reality of the adversarial
process. Moreover, it is not entirely clear why partiality should be treated as a
precondition of admissibility.’ The general approach has been that the degree of
independence of an expert goes to the probative value of their evidence: see R v Violette
(2008) BCSC 920 at [104]; R v Klassen 2003 MBQB 253 (CanLII).
Similarly, in R v Alcantara (2012) ABQB 225 (CanLII) at [130], Greckol J summarised the
Canadian authorities:
The law does not yet require the gold standard: that to qualify as an expert for the
purposes of providing opinion evidence, the person must be free of predisposition on the
issue before the court.
However, in White Burgess Langille Inman v Abbott and Haliburton Co [2015] 2 SCR 182, one
of Canada’s most significant decisions on expert evidence, the Supreme Court took a
different tack, determining that lack of independence in some unusual circumstances can
result in the inadmissibility of expert opinion evidence. In a unanimous judgment of the
court, Cromwell J commenced the analysis of the admissibility of expert evidence by
observing that expert witnesses have a duty to the court to give fair, objective and
non-partisan opinion evidence: ‘They must be aware of this duty and able and willing to
carry it out. If they do not meet this threshold requirement, their evidence should not be
admitted. Once this threshold is met, however, concerns about an expert witness’s
independence or impartiality should be considered as part of the overall weighing of the
costs and benefits of admitting the evidence’ (at [10]). Taking into account the various
provincial formulations of the rules of civil procedure, he concluded that they were
formulated on the basis of three related concepts: impartiality, independence and absence
of bias (at [32]):
The expert’s opinion must be impartial in the sense that it reflects an objective assessment
of the questions at hand. It must be independent in the sense that it is the product of the
[2.05.150] 37
expert’s independent judgment, uninfluenced by who has retained him or her or the
outcome of the litigation. It must be unbiased in the sense that it does not unfairly favour
one party’s position over another.
Applying Mouvement Laïque Québécois v Saguenay (City) [2015] 2 SCR 3 at [106], and
reviewing jurisprudence in the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia, the
court held that an expert’s lack of independence and impartiality goes to admissibility, as
well as the weight to be given to the evidence, if admitted (at [45]). However, Cromwell J
moderated what could otherwise be the burdensome nature of establishing both
independence and impartiality (at [49]):
This threshold requirement is not particularly onerous and it will likely be quite rare that
a proposed expert’s evidence would be ruled inadmissible for failing to meet it. The trial
judge must determine, having regard to both the particular circumstances of the proposed
expert and the substance of the proposed evidence, whether the expert is able and willing
to carry out his or her primary duty to the court. For example, it is the nature and extent
of the interest or connection with the litigation or a party thereto which matters, not the
mere fact of the interest or connection; the existence of some interest or a relationship does
not automatically render the evidence of the proposed expert inadmissible. In most cases,
a mere employment relationship with the party calling the evidence will be insufficient to
do so. On the other hand, a direct financial interest in the outcome of the litigation will be
of more concern. The same can be said in the case of a very close familial relationship with
one of the parties or situations in which the proposed expert will probably incur
professional liability if his or her opinion is not accepted by the court. Similarly, an expert
who, in his or her proposed evidence or otherwise, assumes the role of an advocate for a
party is clearly unwilling and/or unable to carry out the primary duty to the court. I
emphasize that exclusion at the threshold stage of the analysis should occur only in very
clear cases in which the proposed expert is unable or unwilling to provide the court with
fair, objective and non-partisan evidence. Anything less than clear unwillingness or
inability to do so should not lead to exclusion, but be taken into account in the overall
weighing of costs and benefits of receiving the evidence.
On the facts, though, the court found that the auditor in question did not lack sufficient
independence for her evidence to be determined inadmissible. The court held that the fact
that one professional firm discovers what it thinks is or may be professional negligence
does not, on its own, disqualify it from offering that opinion as an expert witness:
‘Provided that the initial work is done independently and impartially and the person put
forward as an expert understands and is able to comply with the duty to provide fair,
objective and non-partisan assistance to the court, the expert meets the threshold
qualification in that regard’ (at [60]). In addition, it rejected the argument that because the
auditor had incorporated some of the work done at another office of her firm she lacked
the threshold qualification in relation to the duty to give fair, objective and non-partisan
evidence (at [61]).
It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court decision of White Burgess Langille
Inman v Abbott and Haliburton Co [2015] 2 SCR 182 will be applied outside Canada.
An expert who is a party

[2.05.170] Occasionally a person who is a party to proceedings also seeks to function in
litigation as an expert in spite of their lack of independence. Generally, this is not a sound
forensic strategy but on occasion it is not wholly unreasonable, especially when the
person’s specialised knowledge or their application of it is a question in issue in the
proceedings. Insofar as a party seeks to provide expert opinion evidence, the usual rules
in relation to expert reports apply. In O’Neill v Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2019]
NSWSC 655 at [144], for instance, the plaintiff, a medical practitioner who was a ringside
doctor, filed an expert report and gave evidence about concussion, including as an expert.
McCallum J acknowledged that the plaintiff had the requisite specialised knowledge but
pragmatically also took into account his role in the litigation: ‘He readily conceded that he
38 [2.05.170]
is not an independent witness in the matter but considered it appropriate to reduce his
opinion to the form of a report so as to be admissible at all. I have approached his opinion
evidence with caution because of his personal interest in the matter. That said, I found no
reason to doubt it.’
The unrepresentativeness of an expert's views

[2.05.190] The curious decision of R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161 provides an important
analysis of the factors that are focused upon by courts to determine whether a witness is
sufficiently skilled to be entitled to give expert opinion evidence. The reasoning in the case
is affected by a significant concession by the parties – that voice identification is an expert
field. The definition of the field in question was not qualified in terms of voice
identification by auditory means alone, without the assistance of acoustic analysis,
resulting in the focus of the decision being upon the adequacy of the expert’s expertise.
The expert made major concessions in relation to his expertise. He held a doctorate in
phonetics and could undoubtedly be designated an expert phonetician. However, the
question at issue was whether he was an expert in voice identification. He acknowledged
that his approach to voice identification was not shared by many of his colleagues and
that a unit in Germany under a respected director rejected his view that identification
based on auditory techniques alone could be reliable. He agreed that other Western
European countries did not receive such evidence. He accepted the proposition put to him
that there were only a handful of others, and they were in England, who shared his
approach to voice identification. He had published no material which would allow his
methods to be tested or his results checked. He had conducted no experiments or tests on
the accuracy of his conclusions but, despite all this, his view was (at 165) that ‘acoustic
analysis itself called for interpretation’. He agreed that voice identification was not an
exact science and, while accepting that he could be wrong, he believed that his conclusions
were reliable and that acoustic analysis was not an essential supplement to auditory
identification techniques.
The Court of Appeal pronounced itself (at 166):
alive to the risk that if, in a criminal case, the Crown are permitted to call an expert
witness of some but tenuous qualifications the burden of proof may imperceptibly shift
and a burden be cast on the defendant to rebut a case which should never have been put
before the jury at all. A defendant cannot fairly be asked to meet evidence of opinion given
by a quack, a charlatan or an enthusiastic amateur.
That acknowledgment made, however, the court found that, in spite of being significantly
out of step with most acknowledged experts in his area, the witness did qualify as an
expert for relevant purposes. It held him (at 166) to be entitled to be regarded as a
‘phonetician well qualified by academic training and practical experience to express an
opinion on voice identification’. As its apparent criterion, the court analogised the
situation with a handwriting expert whose judgment is ‘superior to that of the man in the
street’ (at 166) and held that this witness’s evidence too ‘would have a value significantly
greater than that of the ordinary untutored layman’. It commented (at 166) that his
reliance on auditory techniques ‘must, on the evidence, be regarded as representing a
minority view but he had reasons for his preference and on the facts of this case at least he
was shown to be wrong’. It seems that the court was confirmed in its views by the
impression that the expert’s credibility had been sufficiently punctured during cross-
examination for his views to be unlikely to hold much sway: ‘It might not be surprising if
the answers given by Dr B in cross-examination had led the jury to conclude that they
should receive his evidence with caution or that they should place little or no reliance
upon it’ (at 165–166).
[2.05.190] 39
However, the result of the decision is that it would seem that a person who has
academic qualifications touching upon a field of expertise, even if he or she is quite out of
step with colleagues, and has views which have not been subjected to the rigour of
effective peer review, may still be accounted an expert in English courts. Notably, though,
the laissez-faire approach of R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161 appears to be undergoing
re-exploration in the United Kingdom with an escalating requirement in terms of
reliability: see Ch 12.05. In Australia, the question canvassed in Robb is likely to be
scrutinised by reference to whether the expert’s opinions are based on specialised
knowledge or, in the common law jurisdictions, potentially whether the area of
competence constitutes an area of expertise.
Unusual nature of expertise

[2.05.200] The fact that evidence is arcane or unorthodox is not necessarily a bar to a
person being accounted an expert. Thus, for instance, in Moore v Medley (The Times,
3 February 1995) a member of the Inner Circle of Magic was allowed to testify as a highly
expert magician that there were various ways ‘one could have a fraudulent manipulation
of coins’ (see too Corcos (2010)). However, it has been held that particular obligations rest
upon prosecutors adducing expert evidence that is novel:
It is a primary duty imposed on experts in giving opinion evidence to furnish the trier of
fact with the criteria to enable the evaluation of the expert conclusion: Makita (Australia)
Pty Ltd v Sprowles ....
In criminal cases the prosecutor has a clear duty to acquaint the Judge and jury in
ordinary language, through the evidence which is led, with those aspects of the expert’s
discipline and methods necessary to put the court in a position to make some sort of
evaluation of the opinion that the expert expresses. Where the evidence is of a
comparatively novel kind, the duty resting on the prosecutor is even higher. Then the
evidence should demonstrate the scientific reliability of the opinion expressed: Lewis v The
Queen [1987] NTCCA 3; (1987) 88 FLR 104 at 123-124 per Maurice J; Makita (Australia) Pty
Ltd v Sprowles (supra) at [73]. It is the role of the prosecutor to strip forensic evidence of its
mystery so far as is possible. The ‘bare ipse dixit’ of a scientist upon an issue in controversy
should carry little weight: Davie v Magistrates of Edinburgh (1953) SC 34 at 39–40.
(Hillstead v The Queen [2005] WASCA 116 at [48]–[49].)
Inferences of expertise from expert reports

[2.05.230] On their face, some reports suggest that their authors are expert or inexpert. In
Ocean Marine Mutual Insurance Association (Europe) OV v Jetopay Pty Ltd (2000) 120 FCR
146; [2000] FCA 1463, the Full Court of the Australian Federal Court was called upon to
determine whether the author of a report was expert by reference to the context of the
report. At first instance, it was held that it was legitimate in determining whether the
author of the report was an expert to take into account the factual context in which the
report was produced; the description and designation of the author of the report; the
contents and language of the report and the nature of the assertions made in it; the form of
the report; and the expressed qualifications of the person making it as set out in the report.
However, the Full Court held (at [22]) that it is not permissible to conclude from those
matters alone that an author of a report has any specialised knowledge except to the
extent that the report states (or it otherwise appears from admissible evidence) what that
knowledge is. It held that it is not permissible to conclude, simply because a person
expresses an opinion on a particular subject, referring to particular technology, that that
person has any specialised knowledge in relation to the subject: ‘There must be specific
evidence as to specialised knowledge of the person in relation to that subject and as to the
training, study or experience upon which that specialised knowledge is based’: at [22]. The
court conceded (at [23]) that the further requirement under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and
40 [2.05.200]
the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) (see also the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the Evidence Act 2008
(Vic), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT))
that an opinion be based on specialised knowledge would normally be satisfied by the
person who expresses the opinion demonstrating the reasoning process by which the
opinion is reached:
Thus, a report in which an opinion is recorded should expose the reasoning of its author
in a way that would demonstrate that the opinion is based on particular specialised
knowledge. Similarly, opinion evidence given orally should be shown, by exposure of the
reasoning process, to be based on relevant specialised knowledge.
Ad hoc expertise
[2.05.270] In R v Menzies [1982] 1 NZLR 40; [1982] NZCA 19 at 49, Cooke, McMullin and
Somers JJ and Sir Clifford Richardson concluded that a person could become a ‘temporary
expert in the sense that by repeated listening to the tapes he had qualified himself ad hoc’.
The notion of ad hoc expertise has been the subject of academic criticism (see, eg, Edmond
and Roque (2009)).
In Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 195, Dawson J
adopted the concept of ‘ad hoc expertise’. He held that where words in a tape recording
are inaudible or unintelligible, ‘expert evidence of its contents may be required and it has
been held that an ad hoc expertise may be acquired by a witness by playing and replaying
a tape so as to become more familiar with its contents than could be done by playing it
only once or twice’. (See too Hopes and Lavery v HM Advocate [1960] Crim L R 560.)
In R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405 at 412–413, Simpson J (with whom Spigelman CJ
and Sperling J agreed) further endorsed the concept and Sperling J expressed the view
that s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) accommodated the notion of an ‘ad hoc expert’. In
Li v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 281; [2003] NSWCCA 290 at 287–288, Ipp JA endorsed
the approach and further applied the notion of ‘ad hoc expertise’ in the context of an
interpreter and translator who had spent many hours listening to an individual’s voice.
In principle, the concept of ‘ad hoc expertise’ may have significantly broader
application: see possibly Li v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 281; [2003] NSWCCA 290 at
[106] in relation to evidence about observation of posture (see Edmond and Roque (2009);
see also Irani v The Queen (2008) 188 A Crim R 125; [2008] NSWCCA 217 at [31]–[32]).
However, the role of police as ad hoc experts in relation to the recognition of voices
may be problematic in its practical application (see Fraser (2018)).
Application of the expertise rule

[2.05.310] The responsibility for ensuring that inexpert evidence does not go before a jury
lies with the presiding judge. In R v Inch (1990) 91 Cr App R 51, a Royal Artillery gunner
had been accused of a serious assault on a bombardier, allegedly perpetrated with a pair
of nunchukas. The defendant claimed that the wounds were occasioned by a clash of
heads. A medical orderly who attended the bombardier gave opinion evidence, without
objection from the defence, that the wound, because of its size and shape, was caused by
a blow from an instrument and not from a head-butt. The Courts-Martial Appeal Court
held that the orderly should not have been permitted to give expert evidence and,
regardless of the fact that no objections had been registered by defence counsel, the verdict
should be overturned as unsafe and unsatisfactory.
As the areas of expertise accepted by the courts expand, there is a need for stringent
scrutiny of experts’ qualifications to give what can be influential evidence. One example
occurs where evidence is given of the consistency of marks, bruises and the like with
well-known patterns of child abuse. Thus, the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Millar (1989)
49 CCC (3d) 193 at 220 subjected the evidence of a Dr M to the following analysis:
[2.05.310] 41
The subject of child abuse is a specialty and clearly the training and experience of this
witness fell considerably short of that of the other Crown witnesses on the subject. …
When I refer to the narrowness of Dr M’s experience, I have regard to his evidence that in
his practice as a family physician he had only one case of child abuse, which he described
as ‘one of the most profound cases of child abuse in P County’ and, since becoming
regional coroner, he had been involved in ‘the investigation and evaluation of four deaths
that have been believed to be associated with intent and [intentional?] child abuse’.
A similar point was made forcefully by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in
F v The Queen (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 at 509, where the court determined that the evidence
of a paediatrician had been wrongly admitted at trial, in part because it had not been
shown that the witness was ‘properly qualified to give evidence about matters within the
expertise of a psychiatrist or a psychologist’. The witness had been called by the Crown
among other things to give rebuttal evidence about the kinds of reactions that were said to
be exhibited by some children who have been sexually abused – in particular, in terms of
the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (see [12.30.450]-[10.30.560], below), that
children can be erratic in their reporting to adults of what has been done to them.
In Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 at 120, Brennan J quoted a passage from the
leading United States textbook, Wigmore on Evidence (1979, Vol 2, p 750):
The object is to be sure that the question to the witness will be answered by a person who
is fitted to answer it. His fitness, then, is a fitness to answer on that point. He may be fitted
to answer about countless other matters, but that does not justify accepting his views on
the matter in hand. … Since experiential capacity is always relative to the matter in hand,
the witness may, from question to question, enter or leave the class of persons fitted to
answer, and the distinction depends on the kind of subject primarily, not on the kind of
person.
Brennan J held that neither the psychologist’s report nor his statement of qualifications
revealed any expertise which would have permitted him to form a view about the accused
man’s understanding of particular questions or his use of particular words or phrases. He
found that the crucial link in the chain of proof of the witness’s qualifications to give the
expert evidence was missing – it had not been shown that the general expertise of
well-qualified psychologists enables them to say whether a subject understands particular
words and phrases or enables them to assert the unlikelihood of the subject’s use of such
words or phrases. This is a further example of courts acknowledging subspecialisation of
expertise. See, too, J v The Queen (1994) 75 A Crim R 522; F v The Queen (1995) 83 A Crim R
502.
Similarly, in R v Tilley [1985] VR 505 at 509, Beach J accepted that the stylistic analysis
of documents was a science such that, ‘in appropriate cases’, expert opinion based on such
analysis might be received in evidence. In the particular case, though, he found that the
expert witness, whose credentials in relation to the authenticity of documents were not
questioned, was not entitled to express his opinions. This was because it was not the
authenticity of documents that was in question but rather the oral answers given by the
accused. He refused to accept the proposition that an individual’s manner or style of
speech is the same as his or her manner or style of writing, and rejected the expert’s
assertion to that effect and so disallowed the evidence.
In 2000, the Victorian Court of Appeal was asked to consider the admissibility of
Crown evidence by medical practitioners that wounds found on the accused man had
been self-inflicted: R v Anderson (2000) 1 VR 1; [2000] VSCA 16. Evidence on the subject
was admitted from a surgeon and a general practitioner, both of whom treated the
accused, and from a forensic pathologist and a forensic physician. The controversy related
to the admissibility of the evidence given by the treaters.
Winneke P, with reservations, accepted the concession made before the Court of
Appeal that there was an organised body of knowledge and experience, based on the
42 [2.05.310]
observation of wounds alone, which would entitle a person, skilled in the area, to express
an expert opinion on the question of whether particular wounds observed are
self-inflicted.
He found (at 23), though, that the body of knowledge:
does not derive from recognised principles of medical science, but rather from the study of
characteristics and patterns of wounds from which one may infer, by comparison with
recognised standards, that the wounds being studied are themselves self-inflicted.
Winneke P found that such expertise would not necessarily be limited to medical
practitioners, although by reason of their experience they would be the more likely
possessors of it. He found that the field of expertise would necessarily be ‘an imprecise
one simply by reason of the infinite variety of circumstances in which wounds are
produced and can be suffered’ (at 23).
The court held that neither of the treaters should have been permitted to give opinion
evidence as to whether the accused’s wounds were self-inflicted. Winneke P found that
neither witness had shown himself to be qualified to express an opinion in the field of
expertise claimed and neither had demonstrated any factual or scientific foundation for
the opinion expressed. He also commented that ‘at the very least’ the trial judge should
have directed the jury to disregard the opinions of the two doctors because by the end of
their evidence it was clear that they lacked the relevant expertise. (Compare R v Mason
(1911) 7 Cr App R 67, where a surgeon was permitted to give evidence that a fatal stab
wound was not self-inflicted.)
Winneke P stressed (at 25) that it is incumbent upon the party seeking to elicit expert
opinion evidence to provide a factual or scientific foundation for the opinion expressed:
Although it is, of course, true that it is for the trial judge to decide whether an expert’s
opinion is admissible, and for the jury to decide whether the opinion is credible and what
weight it should be given, it is also true that an opinion is only as good as the factual or
scientific basis upon which it is expressed; and if no such basis is given then the opinion
will be worthless: R v Turner [1975] QB 834 at 840 per Lawton LJ. In that sense the
existence of such a foundation, or proper foundation, for the expression of opinion is a
matter relevant to be taken into account on the question of admissibility: R v Bonython
(1984) 38 SASR 45; 15 A Crim R 364 per King CJ; R v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 at 531–532 per
Brooking J.
The Anderson decision can be contrasted with the decision of the Western Australian Court
of Criminal Appeal in Middleton v The Queen (2000) 114 A Crim R 258; [2000] WASCA 213,
where the Crown sought to assert that the wounds apparent upon the chest of the accused
were self-inflicted after he had attacked the deceased. The prosecution called a
Dr Margolius, a highly qualified forensic pathologist, who testified that the wounds
displayed the ‘classical signs of self-inflicted wounds’. The Court of Appeal held (at [21])
that the matter upon which Dr Margolius expressed opinions were:
matters the full significance of which might not be appreciated by a layman unaided by
evidence from a person skilled in interpreting wounds. Although the untrained layman is
able to see wounds and observe their severity and the pattern of them and where they are
on the body and so on, the question as to what features are significant and the inferences
to be drawn from them are questions of judgment, assessment and opinion.
The court found that the qualifications of the expert were primarily a question of fact for
the trial judge and that an appellant court should be slow to reverse the decision to admit
expert evidence.
Another Victorian criminal law case, R v Lee (1989) 42 A Crim R 393, demonstrated the
uncertainty that pervades the area, however. The only evidence against the applicant was
his disputed confession to police. The trial judge refused to allow a psychiatrist to be
called by the defence to give evidence about the mental retardation of the defendant in
order to suggest that the statement claimed by the police to have been made by the
[2.05.310] 43
defendant had not in fact been made by him. The Full Court of the Supreme Court
distinguished the decision in Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 (see [10.0.240]),
noting that that decision concerned the admissibility of expert evidence regarding the
educational and literacy standard of the defendant as compared with the standard
revealed by his confession – the debate in that case being as to whether the proposed
evidence should be given by an expert or whether it came within the common experience
of jurors. The Full Court found that the psychiatric evidence could not be given in R v Lee
(1989) 42 A Crim R 393, in part because the psychiatrist did not have adequate
qualifications to give evidence on the issue of the applicant’s intellectual capacity.
By contrast, Phillips CJ, in R v Whitbread (1995) 78 A Crim R 452, assumed that opinion
evidence was evidence in the form of opinions ‘based on facts established, or to be
established, by admissible evidence’ and held (at 456) that a trial judge was justified in
excluding a psychologist’s evidence on the basis that:
While there was admissible evidence in the trial proper upon which a relevant opinion
might be based, there was nothing before the judge to show that the prospective expert
witness was prepared to so base it.
Speaking of the determination of the expert’s qualification, Blackburn J observed in

Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 at 160:
In such a matter, it seems to me, there can be no precise rules. The court is expected to rule
on the qualifications of an expert witness, relying partly on what the expert himself
explains, and partly on what is assumed, though seldom expressed, namely that there
exists a general framework of discourse in which it is possible for the court, the expert and
all men according to their degrees of education, to understand each other. Ex hypothesi
this does not extend to the interior scope of the subject which the expert professes. But it is
assumed that the judge can sufficiently grasp the nature of the expert’s field of knowledge,
and thus decide whether the expert has sufficient experience of a particular matter to make
his evidence admissible. The process involves an exercise of personal judgment on the part
of the judge, for which the authority provides little help.
In R v Darrington [1980] VR 353 at 380, the evidence of a psychologist as to the capacity of

an accused person under the influence of alcohol and LSD was refused on the basis that:
it would be more difficult, for a psychologist as well as for the untrained observer, to
divine the intention of a person under the influence of the drug than to divine the
intention of a person not under the influence of the drug, because the validity of reasoning
from proved behaviour to intention is undermined by those effects. Nowhere in [the
expert’s] evidence is there an indication of a means which his science had afforded to
enable him to form at the time of the trial a better opinion than one unversed in that
science whether intoxication by LSD diminishes the capacity of a person to will death or
grave harm to another …
In Bugg v Day (1949) 79 CLR 442, a motor vehicle repairer of considerable experience was
permitted to give expert evidence about the condition of a motor cycle that had been
damaged in a collision. However, he went on to assert that his examination of the cycle
enabled him to deduce that the car that struck it had been travelling at 40 miles per hour.
On appeal, this was held to be inadmissible (at 462 per Dixon J):
This opinion was received in evidence over the objection of the defendant’s counsel. In my
opinion it ought not to have been received in evidence … his conclusion would involve a
problem far beyond his capacity and qualifications and one to which he did not purport to
address himself. It was not evidence based upon a branch of knowledge or an art in which
the witness was skilled but a wild and unsophisticated conjecture.
Similarly, in the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal decision of R v Broughton

(unreported, Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal, 22 September 1988), Matthews, Carter
and Ambrose JJ, in a joint judgment, bemoaned the failure on the part of counsel to
44 [2.05.310]
adequately qualify two forensic biologists, specifically in terms of their own expertise and
also in terms of whether such an area of expertise existed at all (at p 18):
Whether in fact there is a specialised field of learning and training which permits a person
exposed to it to deduce from the size and shape of blood stains found on articles of
clothing and shoes that those stains resulted from blood splashing onto those items at a
certain speed or velocity within a certain distance of the source from which the blood
splashed was not established by the evidence. No doubt there are laws of physics which
might determine how far blood splashes of a certain size would travel from their source
but the validity of such a determination would depend on a wealth of factual data. The
evidence in this case however did not disclose that either Miss B or Mr F had such
specialised knowledge or the necessary factual bases for opinion.
(See subscription service Ch 97, ‘Bloodstain pattern interpretation’.)

In R v Marquard [1993] 4 SCR 223; (1993) 85 CCC (3d) 193, the Supreme Court of
Canada dealt with a case in which a number of experts had given evidence that was
technically beyond their expertise. The majority held that it would be inappropriate to
reject expert evidence ‘merely because the witness ventures an opinion beyond the area of
expertise in which he or she has been qualified’ (at 225). The majority pointed out that, for
the most part, it is for opposing counsel to object if a witness goes beyond the proper
limits of his or her expertise. Thus, if the witness exceeds those parameters without
objection, that does not mean that ‘the witness’s evidence should be struck. However, if
the witness is not shown to have possessed expertise to testify in the area, his or her
evidence must be disregarded and the jury so instructed’ (at 225). Regardless of the tactics
adopted by counsel, this remains the responsibility of the presiding judge in a criminal
trial.
Legislative definitions
[2.05.350] Little legislative or quasi-legislative guidance is available in Australia upon
what constitutes an expert. However, s 9 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides:
expert, in relation to a matter, means a person whose profession or reputation gives authority
to a statement made by him or her in relation to that matter.
Schedule 1 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) defines an ‘expert’ as ‘a person who has
specialised knowledge, based on the person’s training, study or experience’. Rule 34.1A
states that an ‘expert’ in relation to a question means ‘a person who has specialised
knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience’.
Rule 15.43 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) provides that an expert ‘means an
independent person who has specialised knowledge, based on the person’s training, study
or experience’, but does not include:
(a) a mediator employed by a Family Court (including a person appointed under
regulation 8 of the Regulations); or
(b) an expert who has been appointed by a party for a purpose other than the giving
of advice or evidence, or the preparation of a report for a case or anticipated case.
Section 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the Evidence Act
2001 (Tas), the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence
(National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT) indirectly defines an expert by providing that the
preclusion of the ‘opinion rule’ does not apply in certain circumstances ‘if a person has
specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience’. Expert
evidence may only be given by a witness insofar as it constitutes the requisite form of
knowledge based upon the requisite bases. Thus, in AAPT Ltd v Cable & Wireless Optus Ltd
(1999) 32 ACSR 63; [1999] NSWSC 509 at [13], Austin J commented of a witness:
[2.05.350] 45
However, Mr Lonergan’s field of specialisation has its limits. He is an expert in the

valuation of businesses and companies and company shares, and the interpretation of
financial statements and other financial information. That expertise qualifies him to
provide financial advice to shareholders and others, and he frequently gives such advice.
Specialised knowledge and experience of those kinds does not, in my opinion, qualify him
to give evidence of the kind which he purports to give … The opinions … are expressed
too widely to be wholly or substantially based on Mr Lonergan’s specialised financial
knowledge. He purports to speak ‘from a commercial perspective’ rather than strictly
from a financial perspective.
‘Expert witness’ is defined in r 31.18 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) as:
An expert engaged or appointed for the purpose of:
(a) providing an expert’s report for use as evidence in proceedings or proposed
proceedings, or
(b) giving opinion evidence in proceedings or proposed proceedings.
In Kirch Communications Pty Ltd v Gene Engineering Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 485, Campbell J
said (at [11]) in relation to the same Code as it was formerly in the Supreme Court Rules:
It does not seem to me that the definition of ‘expert witness’ is able to catch the situation
involved here, where an officer of a party, not engaged for any particular purpose, has, at
a time before court proceedings were contemplated, expressed an expert opinion in a
report, and that report is tendered in later proceedings.
(See too Sharkawy v Toman [2007] NSWSC 621.)

The Code and Guidelines for Assessment and Valuation of Mineral Assets and Mineral
Securities for Independent Expert Reports (the VALMIN Code, derived from the NCSC
Policy Statement 149, Expert Reports on Mining and Petroleum Securities, now adopted by
the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and the Australian
Securities Exchange (ASX)), differentiate between two kinds of ‘expert’, as follows:
A ‘natural person’ (as opposed to a ‘legal person’, which is a legally constituted body)
must take overall responsibility for the physical preparation and contents of a Report. This
person is termed an ‘Expert’.
An ‘Expert’ may be either:
(a) an Independent individual who prepares and accepts responsibility for a Report,
or
(b) a Representative Expert who is the nominated representative of a legally
constituted body. He or she supervises the preparation of a Report and accepts
responsibility for it on behalf of that body.
An ‘Independent individual’ Expert should:
(a) be Competent in and have had at least ten years of relevant and recent experience
in the Mining or Petroleum Industries, as may be appropriate;
(b) have had at least five years of relevant and recent experience in the assessment
and/or valuation of Mineral or Petroleum Assets or Securities, as may be
appropriate;
(c) hold appropriate licences;
(d) be a member of a Professional Association having an enforceable code of ethics.
A ‘Representative Expert’ should preferably have the same length of experience and
degree of Competence as is required of an Independent individual Expert. If this is not the
case, he or she must engage a ‘Senior Specialist’ who does.
In the United Kingdom, Pt 35.2 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) defines an expert for
the purposes of the Rules as ‘an expert who has been instructed to give or prepare
evidence for court proceedings’.
46 [2.05.350]
The United States approach

[2.05.390] A longstanding characteristic of the United States law on expert evidence has
been a preparedness on the part of judges to refuse witnesses the right to give evidence as
experts if their qualifications are not relevant and sufficient (see generally Conley and
Moriarty (2007)). A typical example is Bellamy v Payne 403 SE 2d 326 (1991), where an
orthopaedic surgeon was held not to be qualified to serve as an expert witness in a
malpractice case involving podiatry as he admitted to keeping up with podiatric literature
only on a yearly basis, to have seen only a small number of patients treated by podiatrists,
and never to have attended a course given by podiatrists.
However, given the increasing scrutiny applied by Australian courts to the proved
relevant expertise of experts, it can no longer be said that a major difference exists between
the United States stringency on this issue and that applied in Australia.
Existence of formal qualifications
Introduction
[2.05.430] Experts may express opinion evidence upon proven facts within their own
science: Folkes v Chadd (1782) 3 Doug KB 157 at 159; 99 ER 589 at 590 per
Lord Mansfield CJ; see also McFadden v Murdock (1867) 1 ICLR 211. Formerly, controversy
existed about whether expertise that is acquired in a non-academic, informal way by the
osmosis of understanding and the cumulation of skills was sufficient at law to designate a
person an expert. Australian High Court cases on the subject are cryptic and confuse what
in practice is a simple question, unfettered by the intellectualism of what became an
unhelpful debate – does the expert have sufficient knowledge to qualify him or her as
skilled enough to help the court? 1
A number of writers argued that the provenance of the expert’s expertise is not critical
so long as the court can be satisfied that it does exist and that the witness is fit to guide the
court in an area that is beyond its expertise: see, for example, Field (1988, p 336); Gillies
(1991, p 382). Schiff (1983, p 465) summed the law up well as it applies in Canada and as
it applies in practice in Australia, the United Kingdom and New Zealand:
The way the witness learned what he knows – through schooling, by private reading and
research, in the course of a business, or by a hobby – relates only to the weight the trier of
fact may give to his opinion and not to its admissibility. However, in instances where the
subject of inquiry falls within the scope of a complex professional discipline, the court
may rule that only a member of the particular profession is qualified to speak.
In R v Wald (1989) 47 CCC (3d) 319 at 350, Hetherington JA summed up the Canadian
stance in the clearest possible way:
The fact that Dr D did not have clinical experience with respect to diagnosing memory
loss of the kind in question did not render her evidence inadmissible. An expert does not
have to acquire his skill or knowledge in a particular way: see R v Godfrey (1974) 18 CCC
(2d) 90; [1974] 4 WWR 677 (Alta SCAD) at 102–104 (CCC (2d)).
(See also R v Dugandzic (1981) 57 CCC (2d) 517; R v Melaragni (1992) 73 CCC (3d) 348 at
355.)
Similarly, in Hopes and Lavery v HM Advocate [1960] Crim L R 560 at 114, Lord Sorn held
that a typist might have become an expert on the authenticity of a transcript from a tape
recording on which she had worked since there was ‘no rigid rule that only witnesses
possessing some technical qualifications can be allowed to expound their understanding
of any particular item of evidence’. (See also Haq v HM Advocate [1987] SCCR 433.)
1 In American Samoa the position has long been clear: in Faatamala v Haleck (1963) 4 ASR
888, it was held that it was not necessary for a witness to have attended mechanical school
to testify as to damage caused to a car involved in a collision.
[2.05.430] 47
In McFadden v Murdock (1867) 1 ICLR 211 at 217–218, it was affirmed for Ireland that an
expert could be so designated by reason of experience, training or knowledge. This meant
that a shopkeeper was allowed to testify as to the amount of wastage that it was
reasonable to expect in the course of the running of a grocery business. However, while
there is legitimacy in experientially acquired expertise, it has been held that ‘a childhood
spent on a farm falls manifestly short of the training or expertise required in order to
admissibly express an opinion’ in the area of agriculture or agricultural science: Grainger v
Williams [2009] WASCA 60 at [56].
Australian High Court authority

[2.05.450] Two Australian High Court cases have dominated the case law in relation to the
formal qualifications of experts. They have highlighted the latitude given when evidence
from experts is classified as non-opinion or non-expert evidence.
Clark v Ryan: In Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486, the appeal point was the
admissibility of opinion evidence in relation to the causes of a highway collision between
two motor vehicles. The plaintiff had successfully contended that, having regard to the
nature of the defendant’s vehicle (an articulated semitrailer), the wet roadway and the
approach of the plaintiff’s van, the defendant attempted to turn a bend at an excessive
speed. A witness for the plaintiff, testifying as an expert, gave evidence that a vehicle such
as the defendant’s had a characteristic of swinging out when taking a bend, meaning that
special care needed to be exercised in such circumstances.
The defence contended that this witness was not an expert and that his was not an area
of specialised knowledge. The witness had no engineering diploma or certificate, but from
1907 to 1912 had served an apprenticeship with an engineering company and at night had
studied applied mechanics, drawing, physics and mathematics at a technical college. He
had claimed 50 years of engineering experience in Australia and over many years had
been engaged in investigating road accidents for insurance companies and others and in
assessing losses.
Dixon CJ held that if it were desired to prove how in fact such semitrailers behave,
witnesses experienced in their use might give evidence of fact: see Weal v Bottom (1966) 40
ALJR 436, discussed below at [2.05.450]. If technical evidence of the physics involved in
such collisions were called, he held that there might have been a problem with how
intelligible to a jury such evidence might have been and what useful purpose it would
have served, but it might have been given by someone more highly academically qualified
than this expert.
His Honour noted the observation of Vaughan Williams J during argument in R v
Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766 at 769 that ‘no one should be allowed to give evidence as an
expert unless his profession or course of study gives him more opportunity of judging
than other people’. His Honour commented (at 492) that the words ‘profession or course
of study’ have ‘a wide meaning and application’. (See also R v El-Yanni (unreported, NSW
Court of Criminal Appeal, Finlay J, 6 July 1993).)
Dixon CJ held that the expert’s evidence was partly evidence of opinion that lay
outside any qualifications that he could be said to possess and in part offended against the
common knowledge rule in that it intruded upon matters which it was within the
ordinary capacity of jurors to determine for themselves. Thus he declared it inadmissible.
On this latter point, McTiernan J had a different approach (at 495):
The plaintiff sought to prove that speed could be a factor contributing to the jack-knifing
of a semi-trailer travelling on a winding road such as that on the Gosford side of the
bridge and taking the severe bend in the road. The jury or some of them may not have
needed any enlightenment on this subject. But it is not possible to determine a priori the
amount of knowledge which a jury may have of the subject or that they have sufficient
48 [2.05.450]
experience of the behaviour of articulated vehicles to be capable of forming a correct

judgment on it. The plaintiff’s advisers acted wisely in calling an expert to give evidence
on the subject.
McTiernan J repeated the question asked by Russell J in R v Silverlock [1894] 2 QB 766 at

771:
Is he peritus? Is he skilled? Has he an adequate knowledge? Looking at the matter
practically, if a witness is not skilled the judge will tell the jury to disregard his evidence.
… When once it has been determined that the evidence is admissible, the rest is merely a
question of its value or weight, and this is entirely a question for the jury, who will attach
more or less weight to it according as they believe the witness to be peritus.
He held (at 389) that there was sufficient evidence before the trial judge to hold the witness
to have ‘sufficient knowledge and experience on the subject of the jack-knifing of
semi-trailers to warrant the opinion which he expressed as to what are the probable causes
of jack-knifing’.
Menzies J (at 591–592) expressed the view that the expert was not qualified to:
express his conjectures which paraded as scientific opinion … opinion evidence to account
for a happening that is described to a witness is admissible only when the happening can
be explained by reference to an organised branch of knowledge in which the witness is an
expert. … Such skill as he has was derived from experience rather than from any course of
study. … This … is a case where a review of his evidence reveals that Mr Foster Joy had no
expert qualifications in the branch of knowledge upon which he was allowed to speak as
an authority.
(See R v Faulkner [1987] 2 Qd R 263 at 265; Mattioli v Parker (No 2) [1973] Qd R 499.)
Windeyer J was similarly dismissive of the attempt to turn a lay witness into an expert,
criticising the plaintiff (at 507) for ‘thinking apparently that by describing him as an
“expert” they could enlist him as an advocate’. His Honour found the witness suitably
qualified to give evidence of fact only.
Weal v Bottom: In Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436, a case whose result turned on the
possibility of the rear end of a tanker trailer being over the midline of a road at a critical
time, Barwick CJ held (at 438) that evidence of what an articulated vehicle was capable of
doing in such circumstances:
could be given by an expert, properly so called, that is to say, by a person who by study
and instruction in some relevant scientific or specialised field was able to express an
opinion, founded on scientific or specialised knowledge thus acquired, as to the likely
behaviour of such a vehicle so placed.
However, he held that it could also be established by a person who either had actual
experience of or had observed such behaviour. The Chief Justice pointed out (at 438) that,
strictly speaking, such evidence is not opinion, nor is the giver of it ‘strictly within the
category of an expert’. He held the evidence to have been correctly admitted.
The evidence that was given in Weal v Bottom was from a witness who had been
driving motor vehicles for 30 years, had many times driven articulated vehicles and in
particular had driven vehicles, including articulated ones, around the curve in question.
He had also observed many vehicles of the kind in question driving around the bend, both
when loaded and when unloaded. He was put forward as a witness qualified by
experience and observation to give evidence of the tendencies of articulated vehicles when
driven around such a curve.
Barwick CJ held (at 439) that the decision in Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 was
appropriate to the case of an inexperienced witness whose ability to offer an admissible
opinion depended entirely upon a course of study:
[The decision] cannot be read as excluding the admission of evidence as to its capability
grounded on practical experience in the use of or on adequate observation of the vehicle
or apparatus whose nature or behaviour is in question. It would be most surprising if a
[2.05.450] 49
course of study by reading and instruction warranted the admission of a statement as to

the behaviour of a vehicle derived from its nature whereas a long course of actual
experience in the use of the vehicle or of observation of its actual behaviour in relevant
circumstances did not qualify a person to speak of such behaviour.
Taylor J similarly commented (at 441):

I am by no means convinced that persons of long experience in the servicing of motor cars
are not qualified to express an opinion on the question whether a tyre is, apparently, in a
reasonably safe condition.
He also was prepared to receive evidence of fact from those well experienced in the
driving and observation of such vehicles that the vehicles had a tendency to swing out
when rounding a curve and that there was a need for them to be driven skilfully and
carefully in such circumstances, especially when the road was wet.
Menzies J disagreed, holding the evidence inadmissible. He pointed out (at 445) that
those called to give the evidence about the behaviour of such vehicles were not
eyewitnesses and that their:
expert knowledge – such as it was – was not scientific. … The so-called experts’ evidence
gave no explanation of proven facts by reference to some organised branch of knowledge.
He expressed the view that the decision of the High Court in Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR
486 had not been observed in the conduct of the trial and declared the evidence
inadmissible, resulting in the need in his view for a new trial.
Kitto J expressed agreement with the decisions of Barwick CJ and Taylor J, while
McTiernan J agreed generally with the majority decision. The approach taken toward
description of observations, that often it will be evidence of fact, whether given by an
expert or a lay witness, may also have been taken in the Irish case of McMullen v Farrell
[1993] 1 IR 123, where it was held that the everyday practice of solicitors is not something
of which the courts will necessarily be aware, so evidence in relation to it is admissible.
Such evidence may well be evidence of fact, although emanating from qualified solicitors.
Australian State authority

[2.05.490] In the face of the divergent positions adopted by members of the High Court, it
is not surprising that reported State decisions have been similarly disparate. However, in
general they have confirmed the view expressed in particular by Dixon CJ that expertise
can be acquired by ‘previous habit’. It is standard for persons qualified mainly and even
solely by experience to testify as experts. This has traditionally been permitted with
fingerprinting experts, crime scene examiners, ballistics and firearms experts, and
document examiners, most of whom, at least until recently in Australasia, have been
police-trained and have acquired their expertise on the job by a process of tutelage.
A New South Wales example of this latitude occurred where an experienced hotelier
was allowed to give evidence that he had, over a period of time, observed the bar trade in
a particular hotel with a view to making an offer for the licence, and that in his opinion the
volume of business being done was sufficient to warrant a representation being made by
the defendant as to the takings: McAllister v Richmond Brewing Co (NSW) Pty Ltd (1942) 42
SR (NSW) 187. The Full Court of the New South Wales Supreme Court held the testimony
admissible as expert evidence.
Similarly, in Grace v Southern [1978] VR 75 at 80, Crockett J held that the expertise of a
witness who called himself a ‘blood alcohol consultant’ was wholly within the discretion
of the trial judge and so long as there was some cogent reason (which there was) for his
deciding as he did, the decision was not reversible. His Honour referred to the headnote
in Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486, which contemplates the acquisition of expertise by
50 [2.05.490]
‘previous habit’, and noted that evidence had been led before him as to the witness’s
course of study, his academic qualifications, and his ‘previous habit’ and experience in the
field.
In Jones v Multiple Sclerosis Society [1996] 1 VR 499 at 505, Ormiston J accepted that a
handyman could ‘no doubt’ be treated as an expert on the question of the maintenance (of
chairs), but ‘one would doubt his expertise in engineering or related matters’ – ‘he could
therefore describe only how the particular wheels were attached to chairs and his
experience in relation to those wheels’. Similarly, in O’Halloran v Averal Pty Ltd [2008] VSC
361, it was held that knowledge of safe practices in restaurant kitchens gained over
26 years of experience could constitute subject matter for expert evidence.
Likewise, in R v Harris (1997) 94 A Crim R 454, Bailey J of the Northern Territory
Supreme Court accepted that the evidence of an Aboriginal tracker as to his location of
bare footprints and footprints made by runners in the general vicinity of the body of the
deceased, his opinion that the bare footprints were made by the same person, his opinion
that the footprints made by runners that he located were made by one of the deceased’s
runners, and his opinion that the inked impression of the accused’s foot matched the bare
footprints he located was admissible expert evidence.
In a 2001 decision by the Queensland Court of Appeal, it was held along similar lines
that a witness should be accounted an expert on the rules and procedures of a card game
and of video surveillance of such games, having very extensive experience in both: R v
Lam (2002) 121 A Crim R 272 at 290; see too R v Rose (1993) 69 A Crim R 1 at 9.
In Wolper v Poole (1972) 2 SASR 419 at 421, Bray CJ made specific reference to the
Dixonian point of view, quoting the catholic approach expressed in Clark v Ryan (1960) 103
CLR 486, but then held that ‘accident investigation has now become an organised branch
of knowledge in which there is an organised course of study’: see R v Faulkner [1987] 2 Qd
R 263 at 265; Mattioli v Parker (No 2) [1973] Qd R 499. These words are reminiscent of those
employed by Menzies J and suggest a possible prejudice in favour of ‘peritia’ that is
formally acquired as a criterion for a finding of expertise. By contrast, though, in Anderson
v The Queen (1992) 60 SASR 90 at 103, Olsson J remarked that ‘the basic principle involved
is that the person must, through knowledge, however acquired, have reliable knowledge
and/or skill reaching beyond that in the possession of the trier of fact’. In R v Karger (2001)
83 SASR 1; [2001] SASC 64, Mullighan J was emphatic on the point, holding that the
question involved in the admissibility determination is one of whether the witness has
sufficient skill and knowledge. He accepted that experience and supervision can be
important, even essential, matters, but held that the ‘necessary knowledge’ can be
obtained in a number of ways.
In the Tasmanian case of Price v The Queen [1981] Tas R 306, the question was whether
addicts who claimed to be familiar with white powders which they had always assumed
to be heroin could give opinion evidence as to the nature of a particular powder. It was
held that the identification of a substance was a matter of opinion and that the proper test
as to admissibility is whether the witness’s experience or study in the field is such that his
or her opinion has more weight than that of an ordinary person (at 323 per Cosgrove J). It
was held that as there was ample evidence that the addicts had a considerable
acquaintance with what passes for heroin in the streets, evidence of their opinion would
be of assistance to the jury and should be admitted.
However, Green CJ in dissent held that evidence of an opinion based merely on what is
said in a trade and not on the study of an organised body of knowledge is inadmissible as
hearsay, since only such study entitles a witness to rely upon others’ statements. The Chief
Justice found that the addicts’ statements – that the substance with which they were
familiar and with which they had previously had dealings was heroin – were based upon
hearsay and so not admissible to prove that the drug was heroin. His Honour found no
[2.05.490] 51
assistance in decisions such as Bird v Adams [1972] Crim LR 174; R v Chatwood [1980] 1
WLR 874; Anglim v Thomas [1974] VR 363; or Relf v Webster (1978) 24 ACTR 3, which deal
with the admissibility and probative value of admissions as to the identity of drugs by a
defendant who had no direct personal knowledge of the facts admitted.
In the Western Australian decision of Nickisson v The Queen [1963] WAR 114, Jackson J
took an apparently harder line approach, consistent with that espoused by Menzies J in
Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 and Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436. He was called upon
to look at evidence given by a police officer on the circumstances of an accident and held
(at 116, with Negus J agreeing):
This was of course only an opinion on his part, and in my view the fact that he had had
12 years’ experience in investigating traffic accidents in no way qualifies him as an expert
to express such an opinion.
The decision is best regarded as influenced by the scant regard in which his Honour held
the particular kind of evidence that the alleged expert was giving. In the same case,
though, D’Arcy J expressed precisely the opposite opinion (at 120) to that of Jackson J,
stating that he considered the police officer’s testimony to be analogous to that of a
handwriting expert or of a native tracker stating his or her conclusions from observations
made in the light of experience:
I conclude that in the light of the experience of his occupation, and stating it to be such,
the witness was entitled to testify at that level as he did.
(See R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45; 15 A Crim R 364 at 48 per King CJ in relation to
qualifications for expert evidence on writing; see also below, [12.15.40].)
His Honour then introduced a further refinement by citing Wigmore on Evidence (2nd
ed, Vol 2, p 635) to suggest that expertise acquired simply on the basis of experience is on
an inferior footing to that provided by a professor with both academic and practical
qualifications. While this appears to accord with common sense, it can only be viewed as
a matter of weight and differing from case to case. In 1998, by contrast, the Western
Australian Court of Criminal Appeal in Bennett v Vaughan (1998) 100 A Crim R 228 at 233
held unequivocally that ‘[a] person may be viewed as being an expert in an area of skill or
knowledge by virtue of nothing more than his or her practical experience in the field’,
citing as authority Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436 and Anderson v The Queen (1992) 60
SASR 90.
The Chief Justice, Lord Widgery, in R v Oakley [1979] RTR 417 came to a similar
conclusion that a road-transport investigator with a number of years’ experience was
correctly to be regarded as an expert witness. In doing so, he expressly dissented from the
majority judgment in Nickisson v The Queen [1963] WAR 114 and affirmed the approach
adopted by D’Arcy J as the correct one for Western Australia and for England, asserting
that the English position was the more liberal attitude.
Canadian authority
[2.05.530] The Canadian position in relation to the source of experts’ expertise is of long
standing. In Rice v Sockett (1912) 8 DLR 84 at 85, quoting from State v Davis 33 SE 449
(1899), Falconbridge CJ held that an expert is one:
who by experience has acquired special or peculiar knowledge of the subject of which he
undertakes to testify, and it does not matter whether such knowledge has been acquired
by study of scientific works or by practical observation.
South African authority

[2.05.540] The South African approach is the same, with the expert having to satisfy the
court that he or she has sufficient skill, training or experience to assist it (Mahomed v Shaik
(1978) 4 SA 523) and the source of that knowledge has not been considered critical.
52 [2.05.530]
New Zealand authority

[2.05.550] In a number of New Zealand cases it has been held that an expert need not
necessarily have professional qualifications. The judge or magistrate must determine
whether the witness (a) has undergone such a course of special study and/or (b) is so
experienced in a particular field as to render that person expert in a particular subject: see
R v Hallwood (unreported, Court of Appeal, 22 February 1990, 305/80).
Similarly, in R v Stead (unreported, High Court, Williamson J, 21 November 1990,
T58/1990), it was held that the law requires no minimum standard to determine whether
a witness qualified as an expert. Williamson J held that persons may qualify as expert
witnesses ‘in a number of ways’.
United States authority

[2.05.570] The position in the United States is quite clear and was restated in Bales v
Shelton 399 SE 2d 78 (1990) – special knowledge to qualify an expert may be derived from
experience as well as from study. Formal education in the subject at hand is not a
prerequisite for expert status in the courts: see also Brown v State 266 SE 2d (1980).
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 1975 (US) provides, after a change that came
into force on 1 December 2000:
If the scientific, technical, or other specialised knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws created a drafting

committee to develop a rule that reflected the best of the various standards – Uniform
Rule 702 for State courts. Uniform Rule 702 is as follows:
(a) General Rule. If witness testimony is based on scientific, technical, or other
specialised knowledge, the witness may testify in the form of opinion or
otherwise if the court determines the following are satisfied:
(1) the testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding evidence or
determining a fact in issue;
(2) the witness is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education as to the scientific, technical, or other specialised field;
(3) the testimony is based upon principles or methods that are reasonably
reliable, as established under subdivision (b), (c), (d), or (e);
(4) the testimony is based upon sufficient and reliable facts or data; and
(5) the witness has applied the principles or methods reliably to the facts of
the case.
(b) Reliability deemed to exist. A principle or method is reasonably reliable if its
reliability has been established by controlling legislation or judicial decisions.
(c) Presumption of reliability. A principle or method is presumed to be reasonably
reliable if it has substantial acceptance within the relevant scientific, technical, or
specialised community. A party may rebut the presumption by proving that it is
more probable than not that the principle or method is not reasonably reliable.
(d) Presumption of unreliability. A principle or method is presumed to be not
reasonably reliable if it does not have substantial acceptance within the relevant
scientific, technical, or specialised community. A party may rebut the presumption
by proving that it is more probable than not that the principle or method is
reasonably reliable.
(e) Other reliability factors. In determining the reliability of a principle or method,
the court shall consider all relevant additional factors, which may include:
[2.05.570] 53
(1) the extent to which the principle has been tested;

(2) the adequacy of the research methods employed in testing the principle
or method;
(3) the extent to which the principle or method has been published and
subjected to peer review;
(4) the rate of error in the application of the principle or method;
(5) the experience of the witness in the application of the principle or
method;
(6) the extent to which the principle or method has gained acceptance
within the relevant scientific, technical, or specialised community; and
(7) the extent to which the witness’s specialised field of knowledge has
gained acceptance with the general scientific, technical, or specialised
community.
(Compare at [3.10.20].)
54 [2.05.570]
Chapter 2.10
THE AREA OF EXPERTISE RULE

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [2.10.01]
An exclusionary rule? ........................................................................................................... [2.10.20]
The approach of Madden CJ ............................................................................................... [2.10.40]
The Frye test ........................................................................................................................... [2.10.60]
Reliability and the area of expertise test: English and Welsh authority ..................... [2.10.100]
Reliability and the area of expertise test: Australian authority .................................... [2.10.140]
United States controversy over the Frye test ................................................................... [2.10.380]
United States case law interpreting the Frye test ............................................................ [2.10.430]
The Williams departure ......................................................................................................... [2.10.460]
The Jacobetz refinement ......................................................................................................... [2.10.480]
The Kelly-Frye test ................................................................................................................. [2.10.490]
The Dyas test .......................................................................................................................... [2.10.500]
A lower standard for the defence? ..................................................................................... [2.10.510]
The Daubert test ..................................................................................................................... [2.10.550]
The majority view ................................................................................................................. [2.10.560]
The minority view ................................................................................................................. [2.10.570]
Problems posed by the Daubert test ................................................................................... [2.10.580]
Post-Daubert decisions .......................................................................................................... [2.10.620]
The Joiner postscript .............................................................................................................. [2.10.630]
The Kumho gloss .................................................................................................................... [2.10.635]
Post-Kumho decisions ............................................................................................................ [2.10.640]
United States federal law reform ....................................................................................... [2.10.680]
Likely developments in Australasia .................................................................................. [2.10.830]
‘Just when a principle crosses the line between the
experimental and the demonstrable stages is difficult to
define.’
Frye v United States 293 F 1013 at 1014 (DC Cir 1923).
‘Expert opinion … is only an ordinary guess in evening

clothes.’
Earl M Kerstetter Inc v Commonwealth 171 A 2d 163 at 165 (Pa 1961)
Introduction
[2.10.01] This chapter examines the history of how the courts have dealt with novel
scientific and mental health expert evidence (see below, Ch 10.0) and explores the criteria
for reception of such evidence, as they are being developed by the common law in
Australasian and other jurisdictions.
An exclusionary rule?
[2.10.20] It has not yet been finally resolved whether in Australia a common law
evidentiary rule of exclusion exists to bar expert evidence on areas that are not defined as
ones of expertise, regardless of the expert’s skills, training or knowledge. Nor have British,
Canadian and Australasian courts pronounced definitively what they consider to be the
criteria for admitting or rejecting evidence of new scientific techniques or theories. The
issue of how to deal at common law with areas that have not yet fully emerged from their
developmental stages remains unresolved.
Until the 1980s, the approach in Australia tended generally to be laissez-faire, allowing
the evidence to be put before the tribunal of fact so long as it was relevant and did not
offend one of the traditionally recognised rules of evidence. In the United Kingdom, this
[2.10.20] 55
approach continued until the early years of the century, resulting in recommendations
from the Law Commission (2011) to promote exclusionary decisions based upon the
yardstick of ‘reliability’. These were implemented in the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 and
Criminal Practice Directions.
During the 1980s and thereafter, there were a number of Australian decisions that
focused upon the potentially prejudicial nature of expert scientific, psychiatric,
psychological and financial evidence. They advanced the contention that evidence on
specialised fields of endeavour that cannot be described as ‘areas of expertise’ ought not to
be admitted (the ‘area of expertise rule’). Such language has at times been reminiscent of
the Frye test (see below, [2.10.60]), and at others has stopped just short of explicitly
adopting it, although the Frye test’s focus upon general acceptance within the relevant
professional community on occasions was applied to determine admissibility. The clear
direction of decisions in the United States, New Zealand and Canada since the 1990s,
however, has been to refocus courts’ attention upon the reliability of scientific techniques
and theories as the predominant criterion for admissibility. It remains to be seen whether
courts outside those jurisdictions will follow their lead.
The criteria to be applied in determining admissibility of fields of scientific endeavour
have arisen in reported cases in Australia in relation to fingerprinting evidence, the use of
seatbelts, the causes of traffic accidents, voice identification evidence, stylometry evidence,
polygraph evidence, bushfire behaviour evidence, DNA profiling evidence, facial and
body mapping evidence, and battered woman syndrome evidence. It will arise in many
more contexts. An example is what has been asserted to be the ‘pseudoscience’ of
synergology (see Denault et al (2019)).
The approach of Madden CJ

[2.10.40] In the early years of the 20th century, attempts were made to introduce expert
evidence about the then new technique of fingerprinting. At first, significant doubts were
entertained about the uniqueness of a person’s fingerprint and the focus was upon the
lack of unanimity among ‘scientific men’: see below, [12.10.40]. The criterion employed by
Madden CJ in R v Parker [1912] VLR 152 at 154 for evaluation (as against admission) of the
evidence has since been echoed in many contexts:
We are asked to accept the theory that the correspondence between two sets of
fingerprints is conclusive evidence of the identity of the person who made those prints as
an established scientific fact, standing on the same basis as the propositions of Euclid or
other matters vouched for by science and universally accepted as proved. If this
fingerprint theory were generally recognized by scientific men as standing on this basis, there
would be no more to be said.
(Emphasis added.)
Madden CJ’s criterion for evaluation (as against admissibility), therefore, was general
recognition within the scientific community, and his focus thereafter in the judgment was
on whether fingerprinting in 1912 could properly be described as having attained that
status.
Madden CJ noted (at 154) that it was claimed that the markings on the fingers of any
individual retained their special characteristics from cradle to grave and that they were
unique to the individual. However, he remarked upon the disagreements within the
scientific community of the time:
My difficulty arises from the fact that the subject of fingerprints has not been sufficiently
studied to enable these propositions to be laid down as scientific facts. Fingerprints have
been studied by Monsieur Bertillon in France from an anthropometrical point of view, and
Sir Francis Galton and a few others, doubtless highly intelligent persons, from the
standpoint of mere observers. But the matter has not been investigated by scientists
generally so that we can say that the propositions relied upon by the Crown are accepted
56 [2.10.40]
The area of expertise rule | CH 2.10
scientific facts. But it is said that Detective Potter has himself examined 29,000 persons and
found the fingerprints of no two alike. It must be assumed Detective Potter is a perfectly
honest man. But let it be assumed that he was not an honest witness, but desired to injure
the prisoner. How could his evidence be tested? He says he has examined 29,000 persons
with this result. Who can say he has not, and how can his statement be tested on
cross-examination?
The Chief Justice in R v Parker [1912] VLR 152 adverted (at 154–155) to the peculiar
character of such scientific evidence, so far removed from the experience of people’s
ordinary lives:
This is that kind of evidence that is particularly dangerous, for it carries with it a savour of
mystery, as in this case the detective swears that no two men’s markings are alike, and it is
assumed not only that that is true, but that there is some mysterious brand implanted on
man’s hand for some definite purpose of characterising him physically.
(See also R v Castleton (1909) 3 Cr App R 74 and Ch 12.10.)

His Honour held (at 156) that fingerprinting evidence from the alleged expert had been
wrongly admitted – the print found on a ginger beer bottle ‘might have been made’ by a
number of people or ‘it might conceivably have been handled by the prisoner somewhere
before it came to the owner of the house which was broken into’. Cussen J agreed (at 159)
that the statement by the expert witnesses that ‘there could not be two fingerprints alike’
should not have been admitted, but for his part was of that view ‘because their knowledge
or the knowledge of anyone else on the subject does not profess to be based on any
universal law, but is merely empirical’.
By 1913, the New Zealand Supreme Court, with a similar occasion to determine the
admissibility of expert evidence on the interpretation of similarities in fingerprints, came
to a fundamentally different result. It found that ‘in comparing prints of two individuals
you may chance to find a close agreement as to a particular point, but the whole weight of
scientific testimony shows that even this is rare’ (emphasis added): R v Krausch (1913) 15
GLR 664; see below, [12.10.40].
In terms of the principles expressed by Madden CJ, the standing of scientific
knowledge was able to be proved to have changed and fingerprint theory could be shown
to be generally recognised by scientific men. Expert evidence on fingerprinting since has
generally been admitted unreservedly and generally accorded substantial weight. Not
surprisingly, the status of expert evidence then, as now, depends upon the view held of
the legitimacy and reliability of the relevant area.
The Frye test

[2.10.60] A decade after the Madden decision, the United States judgment in Frye v United
States 293 F 1013 at 1014 (DC Cir 1923) set out principles which have survived for a
lengthy period (until Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786
(1993); see [2.10.550]) and have played a significant role under Australian common law.
Ironically, Madden CJ’s earlier decision was undeservedly overlooked by the United States
judgment. It was held in Frye (emphasis added):
Just when a principle crosses the line between the experimental and the demonstrable
stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone, the evidential force of the
principle must be recognised, and while the courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognised scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs.
No authority was cited by the court for its test.

In Frye the defendant unsuccessfully endeavoured to introduce the results from a
predecessor to the modern polygraph: see below, Ch 10.0; see also Freckelton (2004). The
court held the evidence inadmissible because physiological and psychological authorities
[2.10.60] 57
had not by that stage accepted the new technique. The case was determined in the context
of judicial anxiety about juries’ capacity to evaluate scientific evidence adequately (Frye v
United States 293 F 1013 at 1014 (DC Cir 1923)) and suspicion of purportedly scientific
methods: Osborne (1990, p 499).
The general acceptance test became the governing law in almost all United States
federal courts and at least 45 of the 50 States prior to the Federal Rules of Evidence 1975
(US), which in due course were accepted by most States. Its application to specific cases
and the justifications for its criterion for admissibility have always been extremely
controversial: see below, [2.10.430].
Reliability and the area of expertise test: English and Welsh authority
[2.10.100] A series of cases dealing with matters such as voice identification, facial
mapping, lip-reading and gait analysis has established a modern and distinctive approach
in England and Wales toward the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. However, as a
result of the impetus built by appellate decisions and subsequent law reform, the role of
‘reliability’ as a condition precedent to admissibility has now been resolved by court rules.
The most important of the modern line of decisions is the Court of Appeal decision in
R v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31; [2004] EWCA Crim R 1344, which dealt with the
admissibility of lip-reading (see below at [12.05.490]).
The court addressed general principles of admissibility. It held that for expert evidence
to be admissible, two conditions must be satisfied: first, that study or experience will give
a witness’s opinion an authority which the opinion of one not so qualified will lack; and
second, the witness must be qualified to express the opinion (at [32]). In respect of the first
matter, it explicitly adopted the interpretation of King CJ in R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR
45; 15 A Crim R 364 at 46 that the question:
may be divided into two parts: (a) whether the subject matter of the opinion is such that a
person without instruction or experience in the area of knowledge or human experience
would be able to form a sound judgment on the matter without the assistance of witnesses
possessing special knowledge or experience in the area, and (b) whether the subject matter
of an opinion forms part of a body of knowledge or experience which is sufficiently
organised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience, a special
acquaintance with which by the witness would render his opinion of assistance to the
court.
In short, if the conditions are met, the question becomes one of weight (see at [33]); see
also R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161 at 165; R v Dallagher [2003] 1 Cr App R 12; [2002]
EWCA Crim 1903 at [23]).
The court rejected the proposition that reliability constitutes a criterion for admissibility
(at [34]):
In established fields of science, the court may take the view that expert evidence would
fall beyond the recognised limits of the field or that methods are too unconventional to be
regarded as subject to the scientific discipline. But a skill or expertise can be recognized
and respected, and thus satisfy the conditions for admissible expert evidence, although the
discipline is not susceptible to this sort of scientific discipline.
However, the court accepted that in some cases the reliability of the evidence might be
relevant to the conditions of admissibility. It noted that, in the psychological autopsy
decision of the court in R v Gilfoyle [2001] 2 Cr App R 57 at [25] (see [10.35.50]; [10.35.120]),
it was observed that English law will not consider expert evidence properly admissible if
it is ‘based on a developing new brand of science or medicine … until it is accepted by the
scientific community as being able to provide accurate and reliable opinion’. Similarly, in
R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161, a case dealing with the admissibility of voice
identification, which was acknowledged to be an ‘expert field’, the court focused upon
whether the particular witness’s techniques were sufficiently recognised within his
58 [2.10.100]
profession for him to be properly qualified to give expert evidence. In addition, it was
held in R v Clarke [1995] 2 Cr App R 425 at 432 that evidence may be so lacking in ‘prima
facie reliability’ that it has no probative force or its probative force is too slight to influence
a decision.
However, the court held that while reliability of evidence can be relevant to whether
conditions of admissibility are met, in itself reliability goes to weight.
The court held that lip-reading evidence from a video, like facial mapping, is a species
of real evidence. It observed (at [37]) that while in earlier times a more conservative
approach was adopted, the policy of the English courts in more recent times ‘has been to
be flexible in admitting expert evidence and to enjoy “the advantages to be gained from
new techniques and new advances in science”’ (see R v Clarke [1995] 2 Cr App R 425 at
430). The court held that the better approach, so long as an expert field is sufficiently well
established to pass the ordinary tests of relevance and reliability, is for no enhanced test of
admissibility to be applied. However, the weight of the evidence should be established by
the same adversarial techniques applicable generally (at [37]).
The result in terms of the decision in R v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31; [2004] EWCA
Crim R 1344 was that lip-reading evidence was permitted in spite of its fallibilities.
However, the court found (at [42]) that lip-reading evidence fell into the category of cases
where a ‘special warning’ is necessary:
if experience, research or common sense has indicated that there is a difficulty with a
certain type of evidence that requires giving the jury a warning of its dangers and the
need for caution, tailored to meet the needs of the case.
The court observed that the trial judge should spell out to the jury the risk of mistakes as
to the words that the lip-reader believes were spoken; the reasons why the witness may be
mistaken; and the way in which a convincing, authoritative and truthful witness may yet
be a mistaken witness. In addition, the court ruled that the trial judge should deal with the
particular strengths and weaknesses of the material in the particular case, carefully setting
out the evidence, together with the criticisms that can properly be made of it because of
other evidence (at [44]):
The jury should be reminded that the quality of the evidence will be affected by such
matters as the lighting at the scene, the angle of the view in relation to those speaking, the
distances involved, whether anything interfered with the observation, familiarity on the
part of the lip-reader with the language spoken, the extent of the use of single syllable
words, any awareness on the part of the expert witness of the context of the speech and
whether the probative value of the evidence depends on isolated words or phrases or the
general impact of long passages of conversation.
Reliability and the area of expertise test: Australian authority

[2.10.140] A series of Australian decisions at common law has confirmed that an
exclusionary condition precedent relating to areas of expertise probably exists at common
law in relation to admissible expert evidence. In the context of accident investigation,
Dixon CJ in Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 491 held that experts could not testify on
areas which were not part of a formal sphere of knowledge, expressly approving of the
way in which the matter was put by JW Smith (1876, p 577) in his notes to Carter v Boehm
(1766) 3 Burr 1905 per Smith LC:
On the one hand it appears to be admitted that the opinion of witnesses possessing
peculiar skill [the expertise criterion] is admissible whenever the subject matter of inquiry is
such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct
judgment on it without such assistance [the common knowledge criterion], in other words,
when it so far partakes of the nature of a science as to require a course of previous habit,
or study, in order to the attainment of a knowledge of it [the expertise criterion]. … While,
on the other hand it does not seem to be contended that the opinions of witnesses can be
[2.10.140] 59
received when the inquiry is into a subject matter the nature of which is not such as to
require any peculiar habits or study in order to qualify a man to understand it.
(See also R v Camm (1883) 1 QLJ 136; R v Faulkner [1987] 2 Qd R 263 at 265; Mattioli v Parker
(No 2) [1973] Qd R 499.)
The most authoritative decision in this respect (at common law) is that of R v Bonython
(1984) 38 SASR 45; 15 A Crim R 364 at 46–47, a case dealing with the admissibility of police
handwriting evidence, King CJ was explicit as to the tests to be applied before admission
of expert evidence (emphasis added):
[T]he judge must consider and decide two questions. The first is whether the subject
matter of the opinion falls within the class of subjects upon which expert testimony is
permissible. This first question may be divided into two parts: (a) whether the subject
matter of the opinion is such that a person without the assistance of witnesses possessing
special knowledge or experience in the area; and (b) whether the subject matter of the opinion
forms part of a body of knowledge or experience which is sufficiently organised or recognised to be
accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience, a special acquaintance with which by the
witness would render his opinion of assistance to the court.
Thus, there is a focus upon the need for a body of knowledge or experience to be accepted
(in some way which is not defined) as reliable (again, not defined) (see also Cole (2011)). In
relation to ‘new or unfamiliar techniques or technology’, King CJ held (at 47, emphasis
added):
[T]he court may require to be satisfied that such techniques or technology have a sufficient
scientific basis to render results arrived at by that means part of a field of knowledge which is
a proper subject of expert evidence.
Unfortunately, his Honour did not proceed to the next step and articulate the criteria to be
applied in reaching such satisfaction.
In the 1988 decision of Casley-Smith v FS Evans & Sons Pty Ltd and District Council of
Stirling (No 1) (1988) 49 SASR 314, Olsson J re-examined the issue, this time in the context
of expert evidence as to the behaviour of bushfires. His Honour reiterated the criteria of
King CJ in R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45; 15 A Crim R 364. In canvassing the ‘established
expertise’ of the proposed witness, Olsson J referred to the general acceptance criterion
enunciated in Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923) and applied in United States v
Addison 498 F 2d 741 (1974). His Honour determined that ‘there is no organised or
recognised body of knowledge which either erects or amounts to any such principles, as
scientific principles of universal application, or from which such principles may
reasonably be extracted’ (at 326) as those advanced by the witness. However, Olsson J held
that in general the topics in respect of which it was sought to lead expert evidence ‘derive
from or relate to a body or bodies of knowledge or experience which is sufficiently
organised or recognised as to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience’
(at 328). He found the witness in principle able to give evidence on some areas because of
their status as areas of organised knowledge, but not in relation to others. The focus of
Olsson J’s decision, once again, therefore was upon the extent to which it could be said
that the body of knowledge in relation to the area is sufficiently organised to be accepted
as a reliable body of knowledge or experience. The approach is one of deference to the
relevant intellectual community and the question to be posed is whether members of that
community would consider the area to be ‘reliable’. It is not prescribed by the test how
large a cross-section of the community would need to subscribe to the view that the area
had become sufficiently organised to be reliable. Nor is it clear what role ‘organisation’
within the area is to play with regard to the assessment of reliability.
In the same year, Beach J, in R v Tilley [1985] VR 505 at 509, found that ‘stylistic analysis
of documents is a science’ and that, in ‘appropriate cases’, expert opinion based on such
analysis could be received in evidence when dispute had arisen concerning the
authenticity of documents and, in particular, whether or not the words appearing in a
60 [2.10.140]
document were the words of a particular person. However, his Honour’s analysis of the
significance of classification of an area as a science or the logical consequences of such a
decision was not developed further. Ironically, in 1992 Gleeson CJ complained of a failure
in the case before him to establish that stylometrics evidence was a ‘recognised field of
scientific expertise’: Jamieson v The Queen (1992) 60 A Crim R 68 at 77.
In 1976, Dunn J in Eagles v Orth [1976] Qd R 313 at 320, in a case involving expert
evidence on the effect of wearing seatbelts, had focused on the need of the judge to find as
a fact that ‘there exists relevant technical or scientific knowledge’ not possessed by the
fact-finder. He held:
The state of the evidence was such that, in my opinion, whilst there may be some room for
difference of opinion upon the matter, it has not been shown that the learned trial judge
was wrong in the relevant sense in his conclusion that ‘the study of seat belts’ has become
a recognised field of specialist knowledge.
He went on to hold that (at 321, emphasis added):

If a subject is demonstrated to be a proper subject for expert evidence, and it is a subject in which
his theoretical rather than empirical knowledge is important, or one in which theoretical
as well as empirical knowledge is important, it appears to me that an expert may express
an opinion on the subject, based wholly upon his study and evaluation of well-regarded
publications.
Significantly, the question asked was not in terms of the later Bonython and Casley-Smith
search for reliability.
In the earlier High Court judgment of Dixon CJ and Kitto and Taylor JJ in Transport
Publishing Co Pty Ltd v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 at 119, it was held that
before evidence can be given on a subject – in this instance, upon the characteristics,
responses or behaviour of any special category of person – it must be shown that it is a
subject of special study or knowledge and that only the opinions of a person qualified by
special training or experience may be received. This same criterion was stressed by the
Full Court of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in R v McHardie [1983] 2
NSWLR 733 at 763, where it was held that the witness’s evidence relating to tapes of
telephone conversations was within a ‘field of specialist knowledge’ and that there was no
good legal reason why the expert witness’s opinions on the subject of voice identification
should be rejected ‘merely because his method of analysis of the output of the sonograph
has not been used in a court before’.
In 1977, the New South Wales Court of Appeal in R v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935
went some way toward introducing the Frye test into Australia, citing the United States
case, adopting its language of ‘field of expertise’, and using it in the context of voice
identification evidence. Gilmore was followed in 1983 by the same court in R v McHardie
[1983] 2 NSWLR 733 at 753. Ironically, the Gilmore decision relied heavily on the case of
United States v Baller 519 F (2d) 463 (1975), which had expressly declined to apply the Frye
v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923)Frye general acceptance test, holding that every
useful development must have its first day in court and preferring the approach of
admitting expert evidence and allowing its weight to be determined in the face of
cross-examination and the calling of inconsistent evidence. The status of the Frye test as a
clear part of the New South Wales common law was made clear by R v Gallagher [2001]
NSWSC 462 and Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [1999] NSWSC 828 at [239],
applying R v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935 and R v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554 at 558.
In R v Harris (No 3) [1990] VR 310 at 318, Ormiston J once more employed the
expression ‘field of expertise’ in holding that voice recognition was not an area on which
only experts could give evidence. In making his decision, he took into account, in
particular, expert evidence from a witness who maintained that there are relatively few
[2.10.140] 61
means of distinguishing voices: intonation, accentuation, the quality and duration of

segmented sounds, speed, expressed or apparent emotions, dialect and ‘socialect’
(pronunciation).
In 1985, the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal noted major problems in the
odontology evidence that had been led about the identity of bite marks found on the body
of a victim. It cited in part the absence of unanimity within the discipline about the
reliability of comparing bruise marks with dental impressions, as well as multifarious
discrepancies in the evidence, as their grounds for overturning the jury’s decision as
unsafe and unsatisfactory: Carroll v The Queen (1985) 19 A Crim R 410. Kneipp J used the
language of the Frye test without specifically acknowledging its pedigree.
Similar evidence relating to bite marks on a victim and their similarity to the dentition
of the accused person fell to be considered by the Northern Territory Court of Criminal
Appeal in 1987 in the case of R v Lewis (1987) 29 A Crim R 267, where Maurice J
specifically referred (at 269) to the previous Queensland odontology case and commented:
‘One can extract from Carroll a principle similar, if not identical to that laid down in the
famous lie-detector case: Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923).’ He held (at 271):
It could not be asserted that the Frye 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923) test has become law in
Australia; [sic] none the less it provides a useful guideline in determining whether novel
forensic evidence should go before a jury, and it cannot be argued that the underlying
concerns it was formulated to meet are not as important today as they were in 1923.
Maurice J also held (at 274):

[T]he jury should [not] have been permitted to place any reliance on the dentists’ opinions.
It really matters not whether that conclusion is supported by saying the evidence was
strictly inadmissible, or its prejudicial effect far outweighed any probative value it may
have had, or simply that it would be unwise to place any reliance on it.
Muirhead J, in the same case, noted pointedly that there was ‘no established universal
view’ as to the reliability of the technique in identifying, as opposed to excluding, a
suspect. Implicitly, therefore, he, too, was looking at the general view of the viability of the
technique, once again focusing upon the state of the informed perspective as a criterion
for its admissibility or discretionary exclusion.
He pointed out, too, how dangerous such evidence could be before a jury, in a passage
that was later quoted with approval by McInerney J in R v Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233 at
242:
Forensic [sic] evidence, especially if it goes to a vital issue implicating an accused person
in the commission of an offence, may often have a prejudicial effect on the minds of a jury
which far outweighs its probative value. The jury, being people without scientific training,
may often be impressed by an expert’s qualifications, appointments and experience and
the confident manner in which he expresses his opinion. And yet it ought not be left to
such matters alone to provide a foundation for the jury making an assessment of the
probative value of forensic evidence, particularly where there are conflicts in expert
testimony, or where it is acknowledged that other experts of more or less equal distinction
are unlikely to agree.
(Compare the comment in United States v Addison 498 F 2d 741 at 744 (1974): ‘Scientific
proof may in some instances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury’.
See Reed v State 391 A 2d 364 at 371 (Md 1978) and the concern in State v Pollard 719 SW 2d
38 at 41 (Mo 1986) that expert evidence can inappropriately bestow a ‘scientific cachet’.)
In 1991, the clearest indication of the trend came in the battered woman syndrome case
of R v Runjanjic (1991) 53 A Crim R 362, where King CJ explicitly adopted a United States
judgment which unmistakably employed the Frye test as the criterion for admissibility of
novel psychological evidence: see below, [10.30.220]. Compare, however, the different
approach taken by Brooking J in J v The Queen (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 at 535–536.
62 [2.10.140]
This evolution in approach, applying the Bonython formulation, was confirmed by the
Western Australian Court of Appeal in Liyanage v Western Australia (2017) 51 WAR 359;
[2017] WASCA 112 at [150], where the admissibility question posed was ‘whether the
subject matter forms part of a body of knowledge or experience that is sufficiently
organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience’.
The court explicitly applied its own authority, holding that (at [151]):
The recognition and acceptance referred to in this formulation is acceptance by the
relevant scientific community as a reliable body of knowledge and experience. That was
the test applied by this Court in [Mallard v The Queen (2003) 28 WAR 1; [2003] WASCA 296]
and was the approach taken in the United States until the 1993 decision of the Supreme
Court of that country in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct
2786 (1993). More recently in Australia, the Victorian Court of Appeal [in Tuite v The Queen
(2015) 49 VR 196; [2015] VSCA 148 [101]–[106]] has adopted the Daubert approach under the
Evidence Act of that State, which focusses on the validity and reliability – or trustworthiness
– of the evidence.
The extent to which Australian superior courts will unequivocally adopt at common law
the Mallard/Liyanage/Tuite test for determining whether new scientific or psychological
theories and techniques should be admitted as evidence is unclear and may be affected by
jurisprudence arising from interpretation of the uniform evidence scheme. A number of
key cases have combined a focus on the views of the scientific community as to the
‘reliability’ of a technique or theory. It does appear likely, though, at the very least, that in
formulating the criteria to determine the substance of the ‘area of expertise’ test, judges
will utilise Frye and perhaps Daubert considerations and focus upon the degree of
dissension about any new technique within the scientific community and whether it is
regarded as reliable. The discretion to reject evidence whose prejudicial value significantly
outweighs its probative value affords an effective way of keeping material that might be
unduly misleading or confusing away from jurors. See below, Ch 2.35.
United States controversy over the Frye test

[2.10.380] Generally speaking, the critics of the Frye test have maintained that it lacks
clarity, is unduly rigid, has too broad a sweep, and is inconsistent with the traditional
judicial prerogative to decide the accuracy and reliability of expert testimony: see, eg,
McCormick (1981, p 906); Saltzburg (1975, p 292); Gianelli (1980, pp 1247ff); Imwinkelried
(1981; 1983; 1990); Bourke (1993); Golan (2004). Adherents of the test have argued that its
conservatism is its strength, maintaining that:
(1) It is likely to promote consistency of decision-making: Brown (1988, p 27); People v
Kelly 17 Cal 3d 24; 549 P 2d 1240 at 1247; 130 Cal Rptr 144 (1976); Christopherson v
Allied-Signal Corp 939 F 2d 1106 (5th Cir 1991).
(2) It eliminates the need for time-consuming hearing of the validity and reliability of
innovative techniques: Reed v State 391 A 2d 364 at 378 (1978).
(3) It fosters a high degree of reliability by focusing upon the views of those best
qualified to assess reliability: Gianelli (1980, p 1207).
(4) It guarantees a pool of experts who are able to ‘critically examine the validity of a
scientific determination in a particular case because general acceptance presumes
wide familiarity’: Gianelli (1980, p 1207), citing United States v Addison 498 F 2d
741 (1974).
(5) It shields juries from the unrealistic expectation that they will be able to evaluate
complex conflicting expert evidence about a new scientific technique effectively:
Imwinkelried (1983, p 580).
(6) It excludes unaccepted scientific methods from misleading the trier of facts.
(7) Amendments that are proposed to Frye often confront and do not solve the
problems that lead others to recommend its abolition: Kreiling (1990, p 924).
[2.10.380] 63
Within the United States, the Frye test has been subject to considerable and at times
stringent criticism. It has been said that:
(1) It unduly defers the making of legal decisions to scientists: Imwinkelried (1990,
p 61); cf Gianelli (1980, p 1207).
(2) The test unacceptably excludes potentially valuable, demonstrably reliable
scientific evidence merely because the theories upon which such evidence is based
are too new for sufficient scientists to be familiar with them for them to have
gained general acceptance within the scientific community; that is, it is too
conservative: Imwinkelried (1981); Osborne (1990, p 546); United States v Downing
753 F 2d 1224 at 1236 (3rd Cir 1985).
(3) The test can let through unreliable and invalid theories and techniques simply
because they have widespread support in their professional community: eg, the
‘paraffin’ test for gunshot residue: Gianelli (1980, p 1224); Pearsall (1989, p 686);
Kreiling (1990, p 928); Chayko, Gulliver and MacDougall (1991, p 12).
(4) It is prone to selective and erratic application: Hoeffel (1990, p 497).
(5) It proceeds upon a possibly erroneous assumption that jurors are unable to deal
effectively with complex scientific evidence: Imwinkelried (1983).
(6) It is unduly difficult to determine what constitutes ‘general acceptance’ within the
scientific community: Kreiling (1990, pp 919–920).
(7) The primitive process of counting heads within the scientific community is a
process prone to error: DeLuca v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 911 F 2d 941 (3rd
Cir 1990); Harper v State 292 SE 2d 389 (1982); Starrs (1987, p 97).
(8) It is too difficult to determine what the relevant scientific community should be
regarded as being at any one time (eg, is the relevant scientific community in
relation to DNA profiling the community of forensic scientists or of molecular
biologists and geneticists?), particularly in areas where a range of professionals
practice (eg, in relation to ‘rape trauma syndrome’ (see below, Ch 10.30)):
Moennsens (1984, p 548); Gianelli (1980, p 1208); Kreiling (1990, p 919); Chayko,
Gulliver and MacDougall (1991, p 12); see also People v Collins 94 Misc 2d 704 at
707; 405 NYS 2d 365 at 368 (1978).
(9) It is unclear how one determines the ‘scienticity’ of a theory or technique in the
first place, and thus whether the test should apply to mental health and other
‘theories’ and ‘techniques’: see Osborne (1990, p 507); McCord (1987, p 30);
Chayko, Gulliver and MacDougall (1991, p 12); Kubiak (1991, p 266). (A
comparable difficulty was highlighted by Murphy J in Chamberlain v R (No 2)
[1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 575.)
(10) The test only applies to theory and not application, which can be the most
problematic aspect of many theories or techniques: Kreiling (1990, p 920);
Freckelton (1987b); see also the discussion by Nace (1992).
(11) It is contradictory to the underlying theme of the Federal Rules of Evidence (US),
which is to admit all reliable evidence unless it is unduly misleading, confusing or
time-wasting: Weinstein and Berger (1985, paras 702(03), 702(06)).
A significant criticism of the Frye test also came from a consensus statement issued by
scientists employed by both the prosecution and the defence in the leading early United
States case on the admissibility of DNA evidence, People v Castro 144 Misc 2d 956; 545 NYS
2d 985 (NY 1989) (quoted in Lewin (1989, p 1035)):
All experts have agreed that the Frye 293 F 1013 (1923) (DC Cir 1923) test and the setting of
the adversary system may not be the most appropriate method for reaching scientific
consensus. … The Frye hearing is not the appropriate time to begin the process of peer
review of the data. Initiating peer review at this time wastes a great deal of the court’s and
experts’ time. The setting also discourages many experts from agreeing to participate in
the careful scientific review of the data.
64 [2.10.380]
(See further below, Ch 12.20; see also Freckelton (1987a, ch 8); Conley and Moriarty, 2007.)
United States case law interpreting the Frye test

[2.10.430] Although the Federal Rules of Evidence 1975 (US) made no mention of the Frye
criterion, subsequent cases evidenced patchy, but apparently increasing, application of the
Frye test to determine whether, pursuant to r 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 1975,
expert scientific evidence would be ‘helpful’ to the tribunal of fact: see, eg, United States v
Tranowski 659 F 2d 750 (1981); Freckelton (1987a, p 243; 1987b). It became the general rule
for the courts to decide upon the helpfulness of novel scientific and novel psychological
evidence by having regard to whether the theories from which the technique emerges
have gained general acceptance within the relevant community of professionals.
During the 1980s, United States courts strove to resolve some of the uncertainty
surrounding the implementation of the Frye test. Thus, in 1984 it was stressed that the Frye
test only applied to novel scientific techniques and methodologies, as against opinion
testimony, which, while controversial in its conclusions, is based on ‘well-founded
methodologies’: Ferebee v Chevron Chemical Co 736 F 2d 1529 at 1535 (1984); Villari v
Terminix International Inc 692 F Supp 568 (1988). It was held that disagreements about
results of tests are to be distinguished from disagreements about the processes that
generate those tests. Even in the case of novel scientific evidence, the opinion expressed
need not be generally accepted, but the methods by which the opinion was reached must
be methods upon which other scientists in the field would reasonably rely to reach their
own conclusions, even though those may possibly be different: Osburn v Anohor
Laboratories 825 F 2d 908 at 915 (1987). However, what was expressed as the Kelly-Frye test
in People v Barney and Howard 92 Daily Journal DAR 10924 at 10933 (1992) was applied to
statistical interpretation of DNA profiling results: see below.
The party offering the novel scientific evidence has the burden of demonstrating that it
has been accepted as reliable among impartial and disinterested experts within the
scientific community: Kluck v Borland 413 NW 2d 90 at 91 (1984) (thermography evidence);
People v Axell 235 Cal App 3d 836 at 859 (1991); People v Barney and Howard 92 Daily
Journal DAR 10924 at 10928 (1992) (DNA profiling). Such impartial experts’ livelihood
must not be intimately connected with the new technique: People v Young 391 NW 2d 270
(1986) (electrophoresis of evidentiary blood stains). But some degree of ‘interest’ is
allowable (People v Axell 235 Cal App 3d 836 at 859 (1991); People v Barney and Howard 92
Daily Journal DAR 10924 at 10928 (1992)) if scientists familiar with a technique are to be
allowed to testify in respect of it – the standard is whether the expert’s livelihood is
intimately acquainted with the new technique. See also R v Gallagher [2001] NSWSC 462 at
[38]. However, it is significant that these criteria for the most part were not strictly applied
in the DNA profiling context: Hoeffel (1990, pp 499ff). It was not until the 1992 case of
United States v Yee 134 FRD 161 (ND Ohio 1991) (see Sherman (1992, pp 1, 10)) that the
personal stakes of scientists adopting stances on the question of the general acceptance of
DNA profiling within the relevant scientific community became a major forensic issue: see,
however, People v Axell 235 Cal App 3d 836 at 859 (1991).
Thus, in People v Young 391 NW 2d 270 (1986), it was held that the evidence of a State
police detective who performed tests on evidence at a State crime laboratory failed the
criterion, but that the evidence of two college professors who had done research into
electrophoresis did not. This was despite the fact that one of them had engaged in a
dispute with a former colleague as to the reliability of the test and had been an unpaid
consultant to a crime laboratory, and the other professor had been a paid consultant to
such a laboratory and had contributed to an amicus curiae brief in a similar case pending
before another court.
[2.10.430] 65
In the same case, it was held that the relevant community of scientists was the
community of known forensic scientists using the technique so long as it was large
enough to obtain adequate sampling of scientific opinion and the scientists had sufficient
theoretical understanding and practical experience to be able to evaluate the evidence:
People v Young 391 NW 2d 270 (1986).
To determine whether consensus exists within the field, courts will look at papers
written by scientists in the field or like fields (United States v Kozminski 821 F 2d 1186 at
1202 (1987)), whether any trade organisation has recognised a test (United States v
Kozminski 821 F 2d 1186 at 1202 (1987); United States v Distler 671 F 2d 954 at 962 (1981)),
and the statistical reliability of a test (United States v Distler 671 F 2d 954 at 962 (1981);
United States v Williams 443 F Supp 269 at 272 (1977)).
The Williams departure

[2.10.460] Some decisions have departed absolutely from the Frye test. For example, the
court in United States v Williams 583 F 2d 1194 at 1198 (1978) asserted:
[T]he established considerations applicable to admissibility of evidence come into play
and the probativeness, materiality, and reliability of the evidence on the one side, and any
tendency to mislead, prejudice, or confuse the jury on the other, must be the focal points of
inquiry.
(See also State v Walstad 351 NW 2d 469 at 485 (1984).)

The court identified five indicators of reliability:
(1) the potential rate of error in use of the technique;
(2) the existence and maintenance of standards among its users;
(3) the care with which the technique was employed in the case;
(4) the correspondence of the technique to others whose results are admissible; and
(5) the presence of safeguards in the characteristics of the technique: see Bessner
(1987, p 315).
(Ironically, some decisions have confused ‘general acceptance’ with ‘reliability’: see United
States v Franks 511 F 2d 25 (6th Cir 1975); cert den 422 US 1042 (1972).)
The concentration of the court on reliability addresses the problem raised by Gianelli
(1980) that unreliable techniques may pass the Frye test simply because scientists of the
day labour under a misapprehension about a technique or theory. Gianelli cited the
example of the ‘paraffin test’, which was claimed to detect gunshot residue on a person
who had recently fired a weapon. Courts accepted the test from the 1930s until the 1950s,
applying the Frye criteria. It was not until its comprehensive evaluation in a 1967 test that
the paraffin test was generally recognised as unreliable (Gianelli (1980, p 1225)), enabling
its rejection under Frye.
The important decision of United States v Downing 753 F 2d 1224 (3rd Cir 1985) took a
similar approach, establishing a middle course between the Frye standard and a
concentration upon relevance of the evidence and evaluation of its propensity to mislead
or confuse. The result was a stringent standard which focuses both upon relevancy and
reliability, rather than merely upon acceptance within the profession. The Downing
decision was one of the many cases which have examined the propriety of allowing expert
evidence upon the reliability of eyewitness identification. The appellate court held that,
under certain circumstances, such testimony could satisfy the ‘helpfulness standard’
under r 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 1975 (US).
The court explicitly rejected the Frye standard (at 1237) and made reliability of the
expert evidence its criterion for admissibility. It held that reliability depends upon a
number of factors. Acceptance within a particular scientific community is numbered
66 [2.10.460]
among them, but it is not determinative. Other relevant matters include the relationship of
the technique to more established modes of scientific analysis, the existence of specialised
literature dealing with the technique (see, eg, the investigations undertaken in Cobey v
State 533 A 2d 944 (1987); cert den 538 A 2d 778 (1988) by a Maryland appellate court
before rejecting the technique chromosome variant analysis), the qualifications and stature
of the expert, any non-forensic uses of the technique, its error rate, and expert testimony
either supporting or disputing the validity of the technique. Once reliability is established,
its prejudicial impact and its relevance become the criteria determining admissibility.
The Jacobetz refinement

[2.10.480] In the DNA profiling case of United States v Jakobetz 747 F Supp 250 (1990),
Billings CJ suggested a further nine factors which he considered to be relevant to
admissibility determinations beyond those set out in United States v Williams 583 F 2d 1194
(1978). However, he asserted (at 255) that these were congruous with the court’s reasoning
in United States v Williams 583 F 2d 1194 (1978)Williams:
(1) the expert’s qualifications and stature;
(2) the existence of specialised literature;
(3) the novelty of the technique and its relationship to more established areas of
scientific analysis;
(4) whether the scientific technique has been generally accepted by experts in the
field;
(5) the nature and breadth of the inference adduced;
(6) the clarity with which the technique may be explained;
(7) the extent to which basic data may be verified by court and jury;
(8) the availability of other experts to evaluate the technique; and
(9) the probative significance of the evidence.
(See also McCormick (1981, pp 911–912).)

The United States Court of Appeals (unreported, 2nd Cir, 10 January 1992) (see R v
Johnston (1992) 69 CCC 395 at 406) upheld the decision of Billings CJ and held that,
although the District Court had said that it was applying the Williams standard, its
findings would also satisfy the Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923)Frye and
Castro standards: see below, [12.20.650].
The Kelly-Frye test

[2.10.490] In People v Kelly 17 Cal 3d 24; 549 P 2d 1240; 130 Cal Rptr 144 (1976), by contrast,
the court adopted what has become the majority stance and maintained that the
essentially conservative standard of the Frye test shielded the jury from the unwarranted
impact that a new scientific discovery could exert upon their otherwise reasoned
considerations. However, it effectively extended the Frye test in a very important practical
direction by asserting that admissibility of expert testimony upon the application of a new
scientific technique involves a two-step process (at 30):
(1) the reliability of the method must be established, usually by expert testimony,
and
(2) the witness furnishing such testimony must be properly qualified as an expert to
give an opinion on the subject.
However, the court went further and held that the proponent of the evidence must
demonstrate that correct scientific procedures were used in the particular case and defined
‘reliability’ in terms of Frye general acceptance. This approach has since been expressly
followed in People v Axell 235 Cal App 3d 836 at 866, 867 (1991) and in the important DNA
profiling case of People v Barney and Howard 92 Daily Journal DAR 10924 at 10928 (1992):
[2.10.490] 67
see below. In addition, the ‘third prong inquiry’ was pursued in the landmark case of
People v Castro 144 Misc 2d 956; 545 NYS 2d 985 (NY 1989) and thereafter in United States
v Two Bulls 918 F 2d 56 (8th Cir 1990) and Perry, Ex Parte (No 89-1534) 1991 WL 84132 (Ala,
19 April 1991) (see Fontg (1992)).
In Reed v State 283 Md 374 at 387–389; 391 A 2d 364 at 371–372 (1978), too, the
Maryland Court of Appeals reasoned that judges and juries are not equipped to assess the
reliability of scientific techniques when scientists are disagreeing on the issues, the danger
being inconsistency of results. The court also voiced the fear that such a dispute over
reliability could distract the jury from the real merits of the case. It held that the basis of
the scientific opinion must be accepted as reliable within the expert’s scientific field before
the opinion will be admitted into evidence.
The Dyas test

[2.10.500] Limited support has been forthcoming for the tests proposed in Dyas v United
States 376 A 2d 827 at 832 (1977) and, in particular, the third limb – that expert testimony
be regarded as inadmissible if ‘the state of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge does
not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted even by an expert’. The Dyas test in fact
received judicial approval from one judge in R v Runjanjic (1991) 53 A Crim R 362 at 372.
However, the Dyas test again focuses upon the contemporary state of the art in the
scientific area in question, an estimation that is generally once more made by reference to
the views held within the relevant scientific community. Notably, however, the question
asked is not whether the underlying theory holds general acceptance but whether a
‘reasonable opinion’ can be advanced by an expert. Once again, this opens a wide range of
difficult issues, not least of which is determining what constitutes ‘reasonableness’ for the
purposes of the test.
A lower standard for the defence?

[2.10.510] In a few cases, United States courts have allowed accused persons to present
critical exculpatory evidence where the techniques or theories upon which it was based
had not sufficiently emerged from the developmental into the demonstrable stages to
comply with the Frye test (see, eg, State v Dorsey 532 P 2d 912 (1975); State v Sims 369 NE
2d 24 (1977)), but this has been rare.
The Daubert test

[2.10.550] In June 1993, the question of whether the Frye test was the proper criterion for
the admissibility of ‘novel scientific evidence’ was finally resolved by the United States
Supreme Court in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786
(1993); also reproduced in (1994) 2(1) The Judicial Review 37. Twenty-two amicus briefs
were filed in the case and the court’s opinion contained 37 citations to amicus briefs and
other secondary sources. The matter had arisen from the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, which had applied the Frye test to exclude expert evidence on behalf
of two children and their parents that the drug Bendectin could cause human birth
defects.
The Court of Appeals had determined that, given the vast body of epidemiological
data concerning the drug, expert opinion not based on epidemiological evidence was
inadmissible to establish causation. This had the effect of excluding expert evidence
derived from animal studies, live-animal studies, and chemical structure analyses
research. The crucial aspect of the research which had been excluded related to reanalyses
of epidemiological studies which had not as yet been published or subjected to peer
review.
68 [2.10.500]
It was a classic case of the rules of evidence not permitting opinions held by
professionals, who on any view were experts, to be aired in the courtroom. The reason
was that the bases from which their views were derived were not the subject of consensus
within the scientific population that had worked upon the area. The effect was that the
scientific majority exercised a tyranny over those who had formulated a different
approach. The legal consequence was that the plaintiffs in their product liability action
against a major pharmaceutical company were denied critical information which,
potentially, shed light upon the dangers of the drug Bendectin.
The Supreme Court found that the Frye test had not survived the Federal Rules of
Evidence 1975 (US), which had made no mention of it and had concentrated instead on
whether scientific evidence would ‘assist a trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue’. The court unanimously found that a ‘rigid “general acceptance”
requirement would be at odds with the “liberal thrust” of the Federal Rules and their
general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to “opinion” testimony’.
The majority view
[2.10.560] The majority noted the distinction between scientific ‘validity’ (does the
principle support what it purports to show?) and ‘reliability’ (does application of the
principle produce consistent results?) and held that in a case involving scientific evidence,
evidentiary reliability was necessary. This would be based upon scientific validity. It held that
the requirement that the evidence ‘assist’ the trier of fact necessitates a valid scientific
connection to the pertinent inquiry as a condition of admissibility.
The majority made the point that the test that they were enunciating related not just to
‘novel scientific evidence’, as had the Frye test, but to scientific evidence generally. They
held that a series of indicia would generally be relevant to the inquiry of whether
particular scientific evidence would assist the trier of fact:
(1) whether it can be or has been tested – the court cited Popper, ‘The criterion of the
scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability’;
(2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication as a means of increasing the likelihood that substantive flaws in
methodology will be detected;
(3) the known or potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique’s operation; and
(4) whether a technique has gained general acceptance within the scientific
community.
The majority confirmed that the focus of the inquiry continues to be upon principles and
methodology rather than upon the conclusions that they generate.
The majority rejected as ‘overly pessimistic’ the view that their decision would result in
a ‘free-for-all in which befuddled juries are confounded by absurd and irrational
pseudo-scientific assertions’. They expressed confidence in the capacity for ‘vigorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence and careful instruction on the
burden of proof’ as the appropriate means for attacking shaky but admissible evidence.
They also addressed the contrasting argument that their approach would sanction a
stifling and repressive scientific orthodoxy and be inimical to the search for truth. It had
been put to the court that allowing the judge a ‘screening’ or ‘gatekeeping’ role would
prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and innovations. The majority
accepted that this would be so but held that the balance struck by the Federal Rules of
Evidence 1975 (US) was ‘designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding
but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes’ and so that the judge should have
an essentially conservative role on occasions to exclude otherwise apparently relevant
evidence.
[2.10.560] 69
The minority view

[2.10.570] In dissent, Rehnquist CJ and Stevens J agreed that the Frye rule did not survive
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence 1975 (US) but did not join in the ‘general
observations made by the majority’, describing them as ‘vague and abstract’. The minority
denied that r 702, in conferring on the trial judge ‘some gatekeeping responsibility’,
imposed ‘the obligation or the authority to become amateur scientists’. It queried whether
the indicia outlined by the majority were intended to apply just to ‘scientific knowledge’
or more generally to technical and other specialised knowledge. It also queried ‘what is
meant when it is said that the scientific status of a theory depends on its “falsifiability”’.
Problems posed by the Daubert test
[2.10.580] The Daubert decision has proved highly controversial, with different views being
given as to its likely impact upon the reception of expert evidence: see Underwager and
Wakefield (1993); Appelbaum (1994); Freckelton (1993); Imwinkelried (1993); Bernstein
(1994); Mack (1994); Richardson (1994); Redmayne (2001); Golan (2004). Initially, it was
proclaimed by the American Trial Lawyers’ Association President, Barry Nace, that the
Daubert decision would help to ‘ensure that injury victims … will get their day in court’
(Cortes (1993)), but it is in fact clear that the test which focuses upon the acceptability of
scientific methodology introduces a more rigorous test for admissibility than the previous
conclusive focus upon the views of most contemporary experts.
As has been agreed (see Imwinkelried (1993); Freckelton (1993)), the demotion of
‘general acceptance’ to merely one of four factors in the judicial assessment of reliability
opens up to scrutiny techniques and theories which have been well accepted within the
scientific community but which might not survive the crucible of falsifiability analysis.
Underwager and Wakefield (1993, p 158) made the telling point that:
Proper and effective assimilation of this revolutionizing construct [falsifiability] into the
justice system will require a major educational and training effort for all players involved
– scientists, attorneys and judges.
They argued that two different meanings reside within the concept of falsifiability: the first
is that the theory or concept in question must be precise enough and specific enough to be
capable of being falsified; and the second is whether a persuasive practical demonstration
has taken place using scientific procedures to produce a proof of falsity.
They drew attention to the fact that the critique of Freud by Popper (who is quoted
directly by the Supreme Court), in his two-volume work, The Open Society and Its Enemies,
concentrates on the first, and more common, meaning attributed to the concept of
falsifiability. They argued that Freud’s psychoanalytic theory is unscientific because it
provides post hoc explanation and is fundamentally unscientific because it is inherently
incapable of being disproved. They made the provocative point that much of the
taxonomy of the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM may also be at risk under the
falsifiability criterion. There is a significant likelihood that syndrome evidence will
encounter major problems in jumping the Daubert hurdle because of its conceptual
uncertainty and its dependence upon data susceptible of more than one explanation (see
Freckelton (1994; ch 13)).
While peer review will be an important means by which the validity of a technique or
theory can be measured, peer review in an eminent context will be more significant than
peer review in obscurity. As Bernstein (1994, p 2152) has argued, peer review is now a
necessary, but not a determinative, reference point for admissibility: ‘An even more
significant threshold test of a study’s scientific validity is requiring the study’s data,
methodology, and underlying premises to be sufficiently clear and complete to allow other
competent scientists to assess the strength of its arguments and conclusions.’
The question also arises under Daubert of how far a court should look at the
conclusions of an expert. Primarily, of course, the Daubert focus is upon theories and
techniques. The Sixth Circuit Court in United States v Bonds 12 F 3d 540 at 563 (6th Cir
70 [2.10.570]
1993) appeared to express the view that its inquiry was only directed under Daubert to
principles and methodology rather than conclusions. However, principles and
methodology are means to an end and necessarily the assessment of a technique’s
reliability is connected integrally with the legitimacy of conclusions born of the
technique’s implementation and its application to particular factual circumstances. The
Supreme Court recognised this by holding that ‘[i]n a case involving scientific evidence,
evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity’ (Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993)), that is, does the principle show what
it purports to show? As Bernstein (1994, p 2166) has commented, ‘Daubert therefore not
only allows, but requires, courts to determine whether an expert’s extrapolations from
underlying studies or data are proper, or whether the expert has committed scientific or
mathematical errors’. Issues that arise in assessing scientific method include:
• the potential to mistake the hypothesis for an extrapolation of a phenomenon,
substituting logic and reason for the performance of performing experiments;
• the potential to reject data that do not support the hypothesis or theory; and
• the potential to estimate quantitatively all errors, and possibly rejecting new
phenomena.
(See Pyrek (2007, p 242).)
Post-Daubert decisions
[2.10.620] A number of decisions at the federal level in the United States have applied the
Daubert decision. Mack (1994, p 23) commented:
The courts appear to have had little difficulty shifting from a general acceptance analysis
to a scientific validity analysis without any change in results. The science that judges
previously considered generally accepted is now scientifically valid and reliable. The
science that previously was found not to be generally accepted now appears to be lacking
scientific validity.
In a number of key decisions affirming admissibility, the courts have characterised the
Federal Rules of Evidence 1975 (US) (in the expert evidence context) in the post-Daubert era
as ‘flexible’ and ‘liberal’. Thus, the Sixth Circuit, in upholding the admissibility of DNA
profiling, characterised Daubert as establishing ‘a more lenient test that favors the
admission of any scientifically valid expert testimony’: United States v Bonds 12 F 3d 540 at
564 (6th Cir 1993).
An indication of the impact of Daubert is seen in the decision of a federal appeals court
in the United States where expert evidence that the drug ibuprofen had caused the
plaintiff’s renal failure was declared inadmissible in part because the experts had not
conducted animal or clinical studies: Porter v Whitehall Laboratories Inc No IP88-1192C, 1993
WL 439148 (7th Cir No 1 1993) (see Cortes (1994, p 12)). The court examined the testimony
of each of the experts and found insufficient basis to remove their opinions from the realm
of subjective belief or speculation.
In Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets Inc v Darling-Delaware Co 998 F 2d 1224 at 1241 (3rd Cir
1993), the appellate court found a reversible error to lie in the exclusion of economists’
testimony that had relied on multiple regression analysis. The court found that even
where there is a danger of misleading the jury, Daubert suggests that ‘vigorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
burden of proof are the traditional means of attacking shaky but admissible’ evidence.
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in United States v Bynum 3 F 3d 769 at 773 (4th Cir 1993)
held that testimony concerning chromatographic analysis of crack cocaine coming from
the same batch was admissible under Daubert. It found that the prosecution had explained
the hypotheses behind gas chromatography, listed numerous publications through which
the technique had been peer reviewed, and shown that it enjoyed general acceptance in
the field of forensic chemistry.
[2.10.620] 71
As Mack (1994, p 28) pointed out, ‘Whether Daubert will have any effect on how lower
courts use judgments as a matter of law to resolve cases turning on disputed scientific
testimony is yet to be seen’. It will be some time before an analysis can be made of
whether courts are conflating the criteria of reliability and sufficiency of evidence in their
gatekeeping function under Daubert. For the moment, it appears that admissibility
decision-making has assumed Daubert language, but that clear trends toward either more
common or less common admissibility determinations cannot yet be predicted.
The Joiner postscript

[2.10.630] Shortly after the Daubert decision, the Supreme Court re-engaged with the
issues concerning the admissibility of expert evidence in General Electric Co v Joiner 522 US
136; 118 S Ct 512 (1997), where the issue was whether Joiner’s long-term exposure to
electric transformer chemicals at work contributed to his lung cancer, even though he was
a smoker. The trial judge excluded expert evidence adduced on behalf of Joiner on the
basis that it did not rise above ‘subjective belief or unsupported speculation’ (S Ct at 516).
There was not a sufficient link between Joiner’s lung cancer and the exposure of chemicals.
Although the appellate court reversed the trial judge’s decision, the Supreme Court
reinstated it, holding that the legal standard for allowing expert testimony to be put before
a jury is the same as that which the relevant professional community uses. The Supreme
Court found that the animal studies cited by Joiner’s experts were so dissimilar to the facts
before the court that it was not an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to have rejected the
experts’ reliance on the studies. It found too that the trial court had not erred in
concluding that the four epidemiological studies upon which Joiner relied were not a
sufficient basis for the experts’ opinions. It concluded that nothing in the Daubert decision
or the Federal Rules of Evidence 1975 (US) required admission of opinion evidence that is
connected to existing data only by the ‘ipse dixit’ of the expert. The court’s reasoning
emphasised the need for specific and identifiable reasoning in relation to matters such as
expert opinions about causation (see Roisman (1998–99); Grudzinskas and Appelbaum
(1998); Neal (1999)).
The Kumho gloss

[2.10.635] The most important post-Daubert decision on expert evidence is that of the
Supreme Court in Kumho Tire Co Ltd v Carmichael 526 US 137; 119 S Ct 1167 (1999). The
court was required to decide whether the Daubert decision applied to the testimony of
engineers and other experts who are not scientists. The court affirmed that it did, holding
that Daubert general determination applies not only to testimony based on ‘scientific’
knowledge but also to testimony ‘based on technical and other specialised knowledge’. It
repudiated any arbitrary distinction between scientific and technical or other specialised
knowledge:
There is no clear line that divides the one from the others. Disciplines such as engineering
rest upon scientific knowledge. Pure scientific theory itself may depend for its
development upon observation and properly engineered machinery. And conceptual
efforts to distinguish the two are unlikely to produce clear legal lines capable of
application in particular cases.
Breyer J, delivering the opinion of the court, rejected the need to make such a distinction,
observing that experts of all kinds tie observations to conclusions through the use of
general truths derived from specialised knowledge.
The court also concluded that a trial court may consider one or more of the specific
factors that Daubert referred to when doing so would help determine the reliability of the
testimony. However, it emphasised that the Daubert test of reliability is ‘flexible’ and that
the list of factors enunciated in Daubert ‘neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all
72 [2.10.630]
experts or in every case. Rather, the law grants a District Court the same broad latitude
when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability
determination’. It stressed that the list of factors spelled out in Daubert:
was meant to be helpful, not definitive. Indeed, those factors do not all necessarily apply
even in every instance in which the reliability of scientific testimony is challenged. It
might not be surprising in a particular case, for example, that a claim made by a scientific
witness has never been the subject of peer review, for the particular application at issue
may never previously have interested any scientist.
The court emphasised, too, that the presence of the Daubert general acceptance factor helps
to show that an expert’s testimony is reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability ‘as,
for example, do theories grounded in any so-called generally accepted principles of
astrology or necromancy’.
In Kumho, the District Court had noted that the proposed witness’s qualifications
included a master’s degree in mechanical engineering, 10 years of work at Michelin
America, and testimony as a tyre consultant in other tort cases. However, it excluded his
evidence because, despite his qualifications, it initially doubted, and then found
unreliable, the methodology he had employed in analysing the data obtained in a visual
inspection he had conducted, as well as the scientific basis for his analysis. The Supreme
Court endorsed the District Court’s analysis, finding that the issue before the District
Court had not been the reasonableness in general of a tyre expert’s use of a visual and
tactile inspection to determine whether overinflatedness had caused the tyre’s tread to
separate from its steel-belted carcass, but the reasonableness of using such an approach,
coupled with the witness’s particular method of analysing the data thereby obtained, to
draw a conclusion regarding the matter to which the testimony was directly relevant –
namely, the likelihood that a defect in the tyre in issue caused the tread to separate from
the carcass. It found that there was considerable doubt about the reliability of both the
witness’s ‘explicit theory’ (about the need for two signs of abuse) and the ‘implicit
proposition’ (about the significance of visual inspection in the case).
The Kumho decision emphasises the significance and the flexibility of the Daubert
decision. It confirms that the Daubert indicia do not all need to be satisfied and that the
analysis required of a trial judge is a flexible exercise whose primary object is to determine
whether proffered expert testimony is reliable. Most importantly, though, it establishes
that the Daubert analysis is required in most areas of expert endeavour, not just those that
are of traditionally ‘scientific designation’. This makes it likely that the Supreme Court
will apply the Daubert analysis also to areas of specialised knowledge such as medicine
and even psychology. This may have highly significant repercussions.
Post-Kumho decisions
[2.10.640] In the aftermath of Kumho, a number of cases have dealt with the ramifications
of evidence from ‘non-scientists’ (see Cheng and Yoon (2005)). An important example is
United States v Plaza 188 F Supp 2d 549 (2002), where Pollak J found that fingerprint
examiners are not ‘scientists’ and hence that the forensic journals in which their writings
appear are not ‘scientific journals’ in the Daubert peer-review sense. He held, too, that the
fingerprint community’s general acceptance of its methods should not be discounted
because fingerprint specialists – like accountants, vocational experts, accident-
reconstruction experts, appraisers of land or of art, experts in tyre analysis, and others –
have technical or specialised knowledge (see Ch 12.10).
United States federal law reform

[2.10.680] In an effort to bring r 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 1975 (US) into closer
harmony with both Daubert and Kumho, Congress has amended the rule:
[2.10.680] 73
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

[2.10.720] There is no clear line of authority in New Zealand in relation to the criteria in
respect of the area of expertise rule for expert evidence. However, in R v Calder
(unreported, NZ High Court, Tipping J, 12 April 1995), Tipping J gave significant
endorsement to the Daubert test, as did McGechen J in R v Brown (unreported, High Court,
New Zealand, 19 September 1997); see Belt (1999) and Los J in R v Lundy [2014] NZHC
2527.
In Calder, the accused was charged with attempting to murder a professor by the
administration of poison–acrylamide. The professor, after falling ill, lapsed into a coma
and survived, but with quadriplegia and blindness. Samples of blood and hair taken from
the professor were said by an expert witness to show levels of a chemical compound
(known as CEC) about 50 times higher than the average level found in control samples.
The blood level of CEC was said to be approximately four times higher than the mean for
control samples. CEC is a compound which is formed by the bonding of acrylamide with
cysteine, which is part of haemoglobin in blood. Objection was taken to evidence of the
results of the hair analysis on the basis that it amounted to a scientific experiment,
properly to be classified as novel scientific evidence. Tipping J analysed the law on the
area of expertise rule in England, Australia, the United States and Canada and noted a
range of cases dealing with evidence in respect of sexual assaults in New Zealand. He
decided that before expert evidence, such as that before him, could be put before a jury by
a suitably qualified person, it must be shown to be both relevant and helpful. He found (at
p 7) that for evidence to be relevant it must logically tend to show that a fact in issue is
more or less likely, while to be helpful, the evidence must pass a threshold test which:
can conveniently be called the minimum threshold of reliability. This means that the
proponent of the evidence must show that it has a sufficient claim to reliability to be
admitted. If this threshold is crossed the weight of the evidence and its probative force can
be tested by cross-examination and counter evidence and is ultimately a matter for the
jury.
His Honour found that if the minimum threshold of reliability is not crossed, the evidence
is to be deemed unhelpful and should be excluded. However, he framed this not in terms
of an exclusionary rule of evidence, but in terms of the evidence being more prejudicial
than probative. However, he further found that the proponent of expert evidence must
show that the evidence in question is (a) relevant; (b) helpful; and (c) more probative than
prejudicial, thereby tending to suggest that the helpfulness requirement, defined in terms
of reliability, is a separate requirement. However, he also noted that even if the threshold
test of reliability is crossed, the evidence may still be more prejudicial than probative. He
found that ‘[t]here are various subsidiary points which it may be useful to consider in
deciding whether the threshold has been crossed’ and made reference to the Canadian
decisions of R v Johnston (1992) 69 CCC 395 and R v Melaragni (1992) 73 CCC (3d) 348. On
the facts, Tipping J admitted the expert evidence as to analysis of hair, finding that it was
not a new field of scientific endeavour as it had been carried out ‘many times in the
scientific world’. He found it to be a logical development within the field of toxicological
analysis of body samples.
74 [2.10.720]
It is unclear what significance Tipping J gave to the question of whether the scientific
evidence was or was not novel. In terms of the Daubert test, this becomes a dead issue. His
Honour did not expressly purport to be applying the Daubert test but did adopt a
precondition for admissibility that expert evidence be ‘reliable’, as to which he referred to
the Canadian cases of R v Johnston (1992) 69 CCC 395 and R v Melaragni (1992) 73 CCC
(3d) 348, which set out a list of criteria along similar lines to Daubert, but more extensive
than Daubert.
In R v Brown (unreported, High Court, New Zealand, 19 September 1997), two men
were charged with the aggravated robbery of a service station. They had been captured, as
it were, on security videos but the quality of the film was poor and thus the evaluation of
the likeness of the accused to the men seen on the video was problematic.
The accused sought to adduce evidence from Mr McEwan, a highly qualified and
experienced craniofacial plastic and reconstructive surgeon, to cast doubt on whether they
were the men seen on the video. They sought to have him do so by, among other things,
the use of sophisticated computer imaging identification technology. The expert employed
a video imaging technique developed by Professor Varnezis in Glasgow, which had been
recognised by the English Court of Appeal in R v Clarke [1995] 2 Cr App R 425.
Mr McEwan took stills from the video, removed the background, and computerised the
faces. Then he photographed the head of the accused, uncovered at first, at a close
approximation to the same angle and at the same degree of enlargement, being careful to
keep proportion among the features. Then he superimposed the images and ran a ‘wipe’
down the superimposed image, revealing the other image underlying it on a progressive
basis (p 3):
As this is done, and at slow speed, it is possible to compare the alignment as progressive
alignment (or otherwise) of the head shape and of the features of the head as so disclosed.
It can show to the eye an apparent divergence between the two images, or it can show an
absence of such divergence and an apparent identity between the two images.
In Brown (p 4), Mr McEwan formed the view that there were divergences, using controls:
by way of superimposing images of the accused’s head over other images of the accused’s
head and indeed putting in effect an electronically painted balaclava over the accused’s
head. These controls tended to illustrate under those conditions a correspondence between
the images concerned, affording a degree of verification.
McGechen J adopted the reasoning of Tipping J in R v Calder (unreported, NZ High Court,

Tipping J, 12 April 1995) and quoted extensively from Daubert. He commented that ‘the
former strictures of the Frye approach requiring general acceptance by the scientific
community are no longer mandatory’ and found that the role of the trial judge was that of
a ‘gatekeeper’ to ‘guard against suspect and deceptive science’ and that the judge ‘should
be cautious over letting in novel and untried material. There are indeed risks in
enthusiasms which have not yet been fully tested, however convinced and persuasive the
proponents may be’ (p 6).
McGechen J also permitted the application of histiogram technology to tattoos, such
technology customarily being employed in the medical context to measure skin
discolouration, subject to evidence being led from Mr McEwan as to the existence of a
significant margin of error due to the difference in photo quality between the hands
concerned and the histiograms.
His Honour found the photographs of the offenders to be ‘obscure to a point where the
unassisted lay eye will obtain relatively little’ from them: ‘It needs the expert assistance of
a plastic surgeon and accompanying explanations’ (pp 6–7). He considered (p 7) that the
threshold of reliability was met by the video superimposition:
The methodology is clear and can be replicated. What is done empirically can be tested by
others. What is done, to my mind, makes sense. In substance, it is an overlay of images
[2.10.720] 75
followed by a peeling back and a comparison. Obviously there is a subjective element

required in the ultimate evaluation, but that is by no means unknown in forensic evidence
admitted in courtrooms.
McGechen J pointedly noted the novelty of the technique being employed but found that
it should not be exaggerated. He found the absence of peer review of the technique in
New Zealand not to be problematic, as ‘it would appear such an evaluation could be
made abroad if need be’. Thus, he conceded that such information was not yet available.
In addition, he acknowledged that there was no information before the court in relation to
the potential error rate of the technique but commented that ‘there are times when judges
must simply rely upon their own judgment and common sense in allowing the
development of a new technique of forensic evidence to come before the court’ (pp 7–8).
He concluded, without further elaboration, that this was such a case.
McGechen J found that the evidence was not ‘disproportionately prejudicial. Once
explained and followed, it can be weighed on a rational basis without difficulty. It is not
likely to divert a jury, or overwhelm a jury, so as to cause lack of proper attention to other
matters’ (p 8).
The decision of McGechen J tends to suggest that primacy will be given to the first of
the Daubert indicia in New Zealand, with much less significance being accorded to the
presence of peer review of techniques and to the use of controls to ensure low levels of
potential error. It seems as though his Honour was particularly influenced by the need for
expert evidence of the kind sought to be made available by the defence in Brown, by the
fact that the methodology could be replicated, and by the fact that the jury, in his view,
would be in a position to evaluate the evidence rationally and without difficulty. However,
it is far from clear how jurors could embark on such an assessment given how novel the
technique was, in the absence of real controls, and without the methodology having been
subject to standard forms of peer scrutiny.
In R v Lundy [2014] NZHC 2527, Hos J ruled on the admissibility of DNA testing on a
shirt of the accused which was said to have two stains of the deceased woman’s DNA and
tissue from her central nervous system. He noted that in Lundy v The Queen [2014] 2 NZLR
273; [2013] UKPC 28 at [138], the Privy Council, applying R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600; 2000
SCC 51, had endorsed the Daubert test as having the potential to be ‘helpful in evaluating
the soundness of novel scientific evidence’. He held that (at [55]):
a tentative list of general principles regarding the receipt of scientific opinion evidence
may be attempted:
(a) Relevance, relative probativeness versus unfair prejudice, and substantial
helpfulness under s 25, are distinct filters that should each be applied to any
scientific opinion evidence, as is the case for all expert opinion evidence.
(b) It follows that scientific opinion evidence may be excluded where the scientific
technique: (1) cannot yet be said to be reliable (that is to say, its reliability has not
been demonstrated to the Court’s satisfaction so as to be of substantial help to the
jury); (2) is reliable, but the witness is not expert in its application; (3) is reliable,
but the evidence is not relevant, because it does not tend to prove or disprove
any fact in issue; (4) is reliable, and the evidence is relevant, but it does not
provide the fact finder with substantial help (perhaps because of flaws in
performance of the technique, or in the inferences and conclusions drawn from
it); and (5) is reliable, and the evidence is relevant, but its admission would be
unfairly prejudicial to the defendant.
(c) The novelty of a scientific technique is not a per se basis for exclusion. Novel
scientific evidence can be received by the Courts in both criminal and civil trials
(and often is). As Steyn LJ once said, it would be ‘wrong to deny the law of
evidence the advances to be gained from new techniques’.
76 [2.10.720]
(d) Rather, where a scientific technique appears novel, the Court must take particular
care to be satisfied that that evidence, if relevant and not unduly prejudicial, has
a ‘sufficient claim to reliability’ to be put to the jury.
(e) In considering whether scientific evidence has a ‘sufficient claim to reliability’, the
‘Daubert factors’ are relevant, particularly in the evaluation of novel scientific
techniques. They include: (1) whether the theory or technique can be or has been
tested and, if false, disproved; (2) whether the technique has been subjected to
peer review and/or publication; (3) the known or potential error rate, or the
existence of standards; and (4) whether the technique has been generally
accepted. The Daubert factors are not, however, a closed list. Nor are they a test,
where failure to meet one of the factors identified is fatal to admission.
(f) In deciding whether particular scientific evidence has a ‘sufficient claim to
reliability’ to be put to the jury, it is important to bear in mind the role of the jury.
As noted at [20] to [24] above, it is not there to arbitrate scientific disputes, but it
is there to decide whether the Crown has proved each essential element of a
charge beyond reasonable doubt. Where a particular fact alleged is crucial to
establish the charge, that fact (perhaps expressed as a scientific proposition) may
have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise it does not.
(g) ‘Substantial helpfulness’, for the purposes of s 25, may entail wider considerations
than simply whether the scientific technique has a ‘sufficient claim to reliability’.
The ability of a jury to process information which is both uncertain and highly
complex, in the whole context of the case, will need to be borne in mind. The
nature of the evidential contest will be important.
In 2018, the Court of Appeal in Lundy v The Queen [2018] NZCA 410; [2013] UKPC 28;
[2014] 2 NZLR 273 at [241]–[242] applied the ‘Daubert considerations’, determining that
mRNA evidence that the Crown sought to adduce at trial should have been admitted. It
noted that they:
Are clearly intended to reject a wider category of evidence than idiosyncratic and plainly
unsatisfactory theories. This is because in the scientific field whether a methodology is
satisfactory or unsatisfactory must depend ultimately on the response that is given to it by
the relevant scientific community. The robustness of a methodology cannot legitimately be
established by an inexpert judge or jury. The essential work of validation must occur
before the courtroom is entered. That is why Daubert considerations require testing of the
technique, peer review and publication, known or potential rate of error and whether the
theory or technique has been generally accepted. Those considerations are not satisfied by
accepting novel science because it has come from an apparently reputable source, such as
the NFI in this case. What is required is a track record of acceptance by a body of scientific
opinion. This will be demonstrated when analysed in accordance with the Daubert
considerations.
The result should be that what is proffered as evidence is no longer theoretical in
nature but can be shown by reference to a number of factors to have passed muster in the
scientific community as something worthy of acceptance in a court of law. It is that kind of
generalised support that enables courts to admit with confidence DNA evidence and the
kinds of likelihood ratios which form part of it. The complications in the science have been
resolved, the techniques broadly accepted and the probative value of their application
agreed in th4 scientific community.
The Supreme Court declined to give leave to appeal: Lundy v The Queen [2019] NZSC 45.
The Lundy decisions authoritatively incorporate the Daubert considerations as part of
New Zealand’s admissibility regime in respect of expert evidence
Canadian authority
[2.10.770] Only since 1994 has Canadian case law on the criteria properly to be adopted for
the reception of novel scientific evidence been clarified. In the voice spectograph case of R
v Medvedew (1978) 43 CCC (3d) 434, O’Sullivan JA, in a dissenting opinion, cited the Frye
test as the relevant legal standard for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence.
[2.10.770] 77
The more modern tendency, however, evolved in favour of application of a less guided
relevancy standard, not distinguishing between novel scientific evidence and other forms
of expert evidence. An early authority to take this approach was R v Doe (1986) 31 CCC
(3d) 353, in which Kurisko J concluded that there is no ‘special test’ or ‘threshold issue’
requirement applicable to the determination of admissibility. He held that the resolution of
the question depended on relevance and helpfulness determinations.
This approach was also adopted by the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court in R v
Beland [1987] 2 SCR 398; (1987) 43 DLR (4th) 641; 36 CCC (3d) 481 (see Federico (1990,
pp 221–222); Chayko, Gulliver and MacDougall (1991, p 11)), which based its decision not
on Frye but on traditional evidentiary rules, including the rule against oath-helping, the
rule against past consistent statements, the rule relating to character evidence, and the
ultimate issue rule. In her dissent, however, Wilson J explicitly rejected the Frye test,
maintaining that even in the United States it had been ‘considerably eroded’. She argued
that it had given way to the ‘reasonable reliability’ test as propounded by McCormick
(1981, p 880), which maintains that the traditional tests of relevance and helpfulness, as
well as the discretion to exclude evidence on prejudicial grounds, are sufficient to deal
with the criteria for reception of novel scientific evidence. Bessner (1987, p 311) criticised
this approach as being too vague and unfair to the party against whom the evidence is led.
However, it has since been followed by Langdon J in the leading DNA profiling case of
R v Johnston (1992) 69 CCC 395 at 413, which viewed Wilson J’s judgment as:
persuasive authority for the proposition that the Frye 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923) test should
not be adopted in Canada. It recommends adoption of a more expansive admissibility
standard, relevancy and helpfulness. It suggests by reference to cross-examination and
opposing experts, that if the evidence meets initial standards of relevancy and helpfulness,
further objections are relevant to weight and not to admissibility.
Langdon J noted that the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Lavallee (1990) 55
CCC (3d) 97 was consistent with this approach and said that the analysis of the factors
relevant to helpfulness set out by Billings CJ in United States v Jakobetz 747 F Supp 250 at
262 (1990) and by the United States Court of Appeals in the same case were compelling.
He suggested consideration of a fusion of the Williams and Jakobetz factors to determine
whether novel scientific evidence is helpful (at 415):
(1) the potential rate of error;
(2) the existence and maintenance of standards;
(3) the care with which the scientific technique has been employed and whether it is
susceptible to abuse;
(4) whether there are analogous relationships with other types of scientific techniques
that are routinely admitted into evidence;
(5) the presence of failsafe characteristics;
(6) the expert’s qualifications and stature;
(7) the existence of specialised literature;
(8) the novelty of the technique and its relationship to more established areas of
scientific analysis;
(9) whether the technique has been generally accepted by experts in the field (in the
application of this criterion, the Frye test becomes a portion of the Williams-Jakobetz
test, but not in itself determinative);
(10) the nature and breadth of the inference adduced;
(11) the clarity with which the technique may be explained;
(12) the extent to which basic data may be verified by the court and jury;
(13) the availability of other experts to evaluate the technique; and
78 [2.10.770]
(14) the probative significance of the evidence.
The issue arose once again in R v Melaragni (1992) 73 CCC (3d) 348 at 352 in relation to
scientific evidence relating to the point at which a bullet entered a car window. Moldaver J
held that merely because prosecution scientific evidence passes a minimum threshold test
of reliability does not necessarily lead to its admission. He held that a number of factors
should be canvassed when the Crown seeks to tender evidence that involves a new
scientific technique or body of scientific knowledge, including:
1. Is the evidence likely to assist the jury in its fact-finding mission or is it likely to
confuse and confound the jury?
2. Is the jury likely to be overwhelmed by the ‘mystic infallibility’ of the evidence, or
will the jury be able to keep an open mind and objectively assess the worth of the
evidence?
3. Will the evidence, if accepted, conclusively prove an essential element of the crime
which the defence is contesting or is it simply a piece of evidence to be
incorporated into a larger puzzle?
4. What degree of reliability has the proposed scientific technique or body of
knowledge achieved?
5. Are there a sufficient number of experts available so that the defence can retain its
own defence expert if desired?
6. Is the scientific technique or body of knowledge such that it can be independently
tested by the defence?
7. Has the scientific technique destroyed the evidence upon which the conclusions
have been based, or has the evidence been presented for defence analysis if
requested?
8. Are there clear policy or legal grounds which would render the evidence
inadmissible despite its probative value?
9. Will the evidence cause undue delay or result in needless presentation of
cumulative evidence?
The most important Canadian decision on the admissibility of expert evidence is the
decision of the Supreme Court in R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402 (see
[10.30.680]), where the court determined that admission of expert evidence depends on the
application of four criteria:
(1) relevance;
(2) necessity in assisting the trier of fact;
(3) the absence of any exclusionary rule; and
(4) a properly qualified expert.
The court held that relevance is a threshold requirement for the admission of expert
evidence as with all other evidence. It found that although evidence is prima facie
admissible if so related to a fact in issue that it tends to establish it, that does not end the
inquiry as it merely determines the ‘logical relevance’ of the evidence. It held that other
considerations enter into the admissibility decision, describing the further inquiry as ‘a
cost benefit analysis’, cost to be understood in terms of its impact on the trial process:
‘Evidence that is otherwise logically relevant may be excluded on this basis if its probative
value is overborne by its prejudicial effect, if it involves an inordinate amount of time
which is not commensurate with its value or if it is misleading in the sense that its effect
on the trier of fact, particularly a jury, is out of proportion to its reliability’: at 411. It
affirmed an earlier decision, R v Morris (1983) 7 CCC (3d) 97; 1 DLR (4th) 385; [1983] 2 SCR
[2.10.770] 79
190 (SCC), that, while frequently considered as an aspect of legal relevance, the exclusion
of logically relevant evidence ‘is more properly regarded as a general exclusionary rule’: at
411. The court noted (at 411):
There is a danger that expert evidence will be misused and will distort the fact-finding
process. Dressed up in scientific language which the jury does not easily understand and
by a jury as being virtually infallible and as having more weight than it deserves.
(See also R v Beland [1987] 2 SCR 398; (1987) 43 DLR (4th) 641; 36 CCC (3d) 481 at 667; R v
Melaragni (1992) 73 CCC (3d) 348.)
The court rejected a test of ‘helpfulness’ as setting too low a standard for the admission
of expert evidence, preferring a requirement that the opinion be necessary in the sense of
providing information outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury. The court
accepted that there was a concern inherent in this criterion ‘that experts not be permitted
to usurp the functions of the trier of fact. Too liberal an approach could result in a trial
becoming nothing more than a contest of experts with the trier of fact acting as referee in
deciding which expert to accept’. The court held that, although the ultimate issue rule no
longer applied in Canada, the concerns were of continuing relevance and meant that the
criteria of relevance and necessity should be applied strictly on occasion to exclude
evidence as to an ultimate issue.
The court emphasised that expert evidence must be given by a witness who is shown
to have acquired ‘special or peculiar knowledge through study or experience in respect of
matters on which he or she undertakes to testify’: at 414. The result of the decision is that
expert evidence which advances a novel scientific theory or technique is subjected to
special scrutiny to determine whether it meets a basis threshold of reliability and whether
it is essential in the sense that the trier of fact will be unable to come to a satisfactory
conclusion without the assistance of the expert. The closer that the expert evidence
approaches an opinion on an ultimate issue, the stricter the application of this principle.
The Mohan approach has since been applied by the Supreme Court of Canada in R v
J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600; 2000 SCC 51; R v DD 2000 SCC 43; and R v Trochym [2007] 1 SCR 239.
However, the applicability of the Daubert considerations to ‘soft science’ evidence is not
wholly unresolved. In R v Abbey [2009] ONCA 624 (CanLII) at [109], which concerned
evidence of a sociologist, who was an expert in urban street gang culture in Canada, about
a tattoo in the shape of a teardrop, the Court of Appeal of Ontario reviewed the Daubert
indicia and concluded (at [109]–[110]) that they should not be applied to evidence of such
a kind:
Scientific validity is not a condition precedent to the admissibility of expert opinion
evidence. Most expert evidence routinely heard and acted upon in the courts cannot be
scientifically validated. For example, psychiatrists testify to the existence of various mental
states, doctors testify as to the cause of an injury or death, accident reconstructionists
testify to the location or cause of an accident, economists or rehabilitation specialists
testify to future employment prospects and future care costs, fire marshals testify about
the cause of a fire, professionals from a wide variety of fields testify as to the operative
standard of care in their profession or the cause of a particular event. Like Dr Totten, these
experts do not support their opinions by reference to error rates, random samplings or the
replication of test results. Rather, they refer to specialized knowledge gained through
experience and specialized training in the relevant field. To test the reliability of the
opinion of these experts and Dr Totten using reliability factors referable to scientific
validity is to attempt to place the proverbial square peg into the round hole.
Tested exclusively against the Daubert factors, much of the expert evidence routinely
accepted and acted upon in courts would be excluded despite its obvious reliability and
value to the trial process. However, Daubert does not suggest that the factors it proposes
are essential to the reliability inquiry. Instead, Daubert, at p. 484, describes that inquiry as
‘a flexible one’. This flexibility was subsequently emphasized in Kumho Tire Co Ltd v
Carmichael 526 US 137; 119 S Ct 1167 (1999). Unlike Daubert, Kumho did not involve an opinion,
80 [2.10.770]
the validity of which relied upon the scientific method. The expert’s opinion in Kumho
depended in part on scientific principles but also upon the knowledge of the witness gained
through his experience and training.
(To a similar effect, see United States v Hankey 203 F 3d 1160 (9th Cir 2000).)
The court found that the proper question to be answered when addressing the
reliability of the sociologist’s opinion was not whether it was scientifically valid, but
whether his research and experiences had permitted him to develop a specialised
knowledge about gang culture, and specifically gang symbology, that was sufficiently
reliable to justify placing his opinion as to the potential meanings of the teardrop tattoo
within that culture before the jury.
Likely developments in Australasia

[2.10.830] The designation of an area as one of new scientific endeavour, or as not yet
having emerged from the experimental into the demonstrable, or as being of uncertain
reliability, is a fluid evaluation, likely to change as technology and the state of knowledge
waxes and wanes. Maguire’s words of 1947 (1947, p 30) remain true:
The field of expertness is bounded on one side by the great area of the commonplace,
supposedly within the ken of every person of moderate intelligence, and on the other by
the even greater area of the speculative and uncertain. Of course both these boundaries
constantly shift, as the former area enlarges and the latter diminishes. Only a few years
ago it would have been necessary to take expert evidence on issues with respect to the
operation of motor cars, airplanes, or radios which are now so completely inside the
domain of popular understanding that such evidence would be rejected as superfluous. A
century ago purportedly expert evidence on these topics would have been rejected as
visionary.
As the critics of the Frye test add steadily to their numbers in the United States, and as
their grievances with this 1923 test become more persuasive with the difficulties of the
paraffin test and the DNA cases demonstrating Frye weaknesses, it is ironic that the Frye
test has entered into the common law of Australia in a number of jurisdictions, in
particular in South Australia.
A further issue that remains is the extent to which courts will determine that warnings
in respect of areas of expert endeavour whose probative value is low or which pose
particular difficulties will be employed. This has emerged as a major check and balance in
cases involving voice identification (see R v Hersey [1998] Crim LR 281; [1997] EWCA Crim
3106; R v Gummerson [1999] Crim LR 680; R v Roberts [2000] Crim LR 183) and lip-reading
(see R v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31; [2004] EWCA Crim R 1344 at [43]) in the United
Kingdom.
However, there is likely to be an ongoing convergence between the common law and
statutory law in respect of expert evidence and the absence of explicit incorporation of
either the Frye test or the Daubert indicia leaves the role of reliability as a yardstick for
common law admissibility uncertain.
[2.10.830] 81
Chapter 2.15
THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE RULE

The common knowledge exclusion ................................................................................... [2.15.01]
The common knowledge rule: the traditional formulation ........................................... [2.15.10]
Categories of evidence on which expert opinion has
been regarded as inadmissible ............................................................ [2.15.20]
The common knowledge rule: A more flexible formulation ......................................... [2.15.30]
Evidence accepted in practice ............................................................................................. [2.15.40]
Criterion of utility ................................................................................................................. [2.15.50]
Counterintuitive evidence ................................................................................................... [2.15.60]
Battered woman evidence ................................................................................................... [2.15.70]
Sexual abuse evidence .......................................................................................................... [2.15.80]
The United States interpretation of the common knowledge rule .............................. [2.15.90]
Rationales for the common knowledge rule .................................................................... [2.15.100]
Underlying assumptions ...................................................................................................... [2.15.110]
Divergence on admissibility ................................................................................................ [2.15.120]
The normal versus abnormal dichotomy .......................................................................... [2.15.130]
Application of the dichotomy ............................................................................................. [2.15.140]
Mental illness ......................................................................................................................... [2.15.150]
Murphy v The Queen .............................................................................................................. [2.15.160]
Inutility of the normal versus abnormal dichotomy ...................................................... [2.15.162]
Psychological evidence of intellectual functioning ......................................................... [2.15.164]
Expertise rule versus common knowledge rule .............................................................. [2.15.166]
The law after Murphy v The Queen ..................................................................................... [2.15.170]
Reconciling Murphy v The Queen with Jackson v The Queen .......................................... [2.15.172]
Admissibility of evidence of intellectual disabilities ...................................................... [2.15.174]
Expert evidence of intoxication by alcohol ...................................................................... [2.15.200]
Expert evidence on memory and identification .............................................................. [2.15.340]
Expert evidence on community standards, human nature and understanding ........ [2.15.400]
Canadian and United Kingdom approaches .................................................................... [2.15.410]
General knowledge of the community .............................................................................. [2.15.420]
Special situations ................................................................................................................... [2.15.430]
Special insights ...................................................................................................................... [2.15.440]
Expert evidence on the meaning of words ...................................................................... [2.15.460]
Non-statutory words ............................................................................................................ [2.15.480]
Circumstances of admissibility ........................................................................................... [2.15.490]
Foreign and trade words ..................................................................................................... [2.15.500]
Words in statutes ................................................................................................................... [2.15.510]
Technical terms ...................................................................................................................... [2.15.520]
Expert evidence on foreign law .......................................................................................... [2.15.560]
Evidence of professional practice ....................................................................................... [2.15.600]
Expert evidence in passing off cases ................................................................................. [2.15.640]
Appendix: Potential areas of expert evidence by mental health professionals ......... [2.15.1000]
‘Consequently we must always pay attention in our speeches
to the question whether we shall find our hearers possessed
of a personal knowledge of the thing we are speaking of, as
that is the sort of statement they are most likely to believe …
[I]t happens that certain persons … have often done the thing
in question themselves, or again feel a pleasure or a desire, …
or have experienced in mind or body or any other field of
sensation some other feeling of the sort that we jointly
experience; for these and similar feelings being common
experiences of human nature are intelligible to the audience.’
Aristotle, Rhetoric to Alexander, VII.
The common knowledge exclusion
[2.15.01] Courts in the Anglo–Australasian legal system have traditionally informed
themselves about matters that they have classified as within their own knowledge without
[2.15.01] 83
the assistance of expert evidence. They have refused to hear expert evidence proffered on
matters that they have classified as areas of common knowledge, asserting that they do
not in such circumstances require assistance from specialist witnesses. This has become
known as ‘the common knowledge rule’. The result has been the exclusion of certain
forms of otherwise relevant and probative evidence, especially that of mental health
experts: see Freckelton (1991); Sheldon and MacLeod (1991, pp 815ff).
The operation of the common knowledge rule goes to the heart of the way in which
courts inform themselves of matters of fact and the criteria which they apply to draw
upon expert opinions to interpret, evaluate and make inferences from those matters of
fact.
This chapter analyses the divergent interpretations of the controversial common
knowledge rule, assesses its practical ramifications for the adducing of expert evidence,
and explores the various justifications that have been cited for its operation. It notes the
impact of the apparent abolition of the common knowledge rule by s 80 of the Evidence Act
1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the Evidence Act 2008
(Vic), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT),
which is discussed in more detail at [3.0.50], but the fact, nonetheless, that it is
‘specialised’ knowledge only that is permitted as an exception to the preclusion on
evidence in the form of opinion. In Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; [2014] HCA
29 at [23], the High Court made an important distinction: ‘“Specialised knowledge” is to
be distinguished from matters of “common knowledge”’. However, it went on to observe
that: ‘Specialised knowledge is knowledge which is outside that of persons who have not
by training, study or experience acquired an understanding of the subject matter. It may
be of matters that are not of a scientific or technical kind and a person without any formal
qualifications may acquire specialised knowledge by experience.’
The common knowledge rule: the traditional formulation

[2.15.10] One of the mechanisms most frequently adopted by judges concerned to
circumscribe the opinion evidence of experts has been the ‘common knowledge rule’. This
common law rule has traditionally precluded the giving of expert evidence on matters
‘which may be competently approached’ (emphasis added) or adequately dealt with by the
lay tribunal of fact, the judge or jury: R v Smith [1987] VR 907; Smith v The Queen (1990) 64
ALJR 588; see also R v B [1987] 1 NZLR 362 at 367; Doyle (1987, p 692). As late as 1995,
Sperling J in R v DAR (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 8 November 1995)
described the rule in terms of evidence from an expert not being ‘admissible on a question
within the capacity of lay persons to decide without expert assistance’ (p 8).
The fact that a person can properly be described as an expert does not mean that he or
she can give evidence on matters within the ordinary ken of juries – such evidence may be
particularly prejudicial if it is given under cover of scientific credentials but in fact relates
to an area about which jurors have adequate knowledge: R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974)
60 Cr App R 80 at 841; see also Bourne v Swan & Edgar Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 211 at 214; Folkes v
Chadd (1782) 3 Doug KB 157; 99 ER 589 per Lord Mansfield; Transport Publishing Co Pty Ltd
v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 at 119; R v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 441 at 446.
See, too, R v McEndoo (1981) 5 A Crim R 52 at 55; S v Nel 1990 (2) SACR 136; Meintjes-Van
Der Walt (2001, p 160). Similarly, if the evidence expresses no more than speculations (for
instance, about the long-term effect of sexual assault), upon which a jury would be in as
good a position as a psychiatrist to assess, it will not be admissible: Hurst v The Queen
[1995] 1 Cr App R 82 at 88; R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600; 2000 SCC 51. See, too, HG v The
Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999] HCA 2.
Expert evidence has been held not to be admissible upon matters about which the
court can be expected to use, unaided, its knowledge of people and affairs in order to
84 [2.15.10]
The common knowledge rule | CH 2.15
evaluate the weight and significance of evidence placed before it: see R v Abbey (1982) 68
CCC (2d) 394 at 409 per Dickson J: ‘An expert’s function is precisely this: to provide the
judge and jury with a ready-made inference which the judge and jury, due to the technical
nature of the facts, are unable to formulate.’ See also R v Murdock (unreported, NSW Court
of Criminal Appeal, 14 December 1987), p 76; Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988)
15 NSWLR 158 at 186 per McLelland J. In the words of Blackburne J in Dalgety Spillers
Foods Ltd v Food Brokers Ltd [1994] FSR 504 at 527 and of Laffoy J in Symonds Cider &
English Wine Co Ltd v Showerings (Ireland) Ltd [1997] IEHC 1 at [20], opinion evidence will
not be admissible where ‘the experience which a judge must be taken to possess as an
ordinary shopper or consumer will enable him, just as well as any other, to assess the
likelihood of confusion’ (see too Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty
Ltd (2006) 228 ALR 719; [2006] FCA 363 at [11]). Conversely, ‘the courts will receive the
relevant opinions of witnesses possessing particular qualifications when the subject matter
is such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to be capable of forming a correct
judgment without expert assistance’: R v Perry (1990) 49 A Crim R 243 at 249 per
Gleeson CJ, citing Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486.
Thus, it was held that no expert evidence was necessary to show that allowing water to
lie on a steel platform would increase the risk of slipping (Australian Oil Refining Co Ltd v
Bourne (1980) 54 ALJR 192; see also Davie v Magistrates of Edinburgh [1953] SC 34 at 40;
Concentrated Foods Ltd v Champ [1944] 1 KB 342); or that a person’s style or manner of
speaking on a particular occasion may well be quite different from his or her manner or
style of speaking on another occasion well removed in point of time: R v Tilley [1985] VR
505 at 509; or that the comparison of a tattoo in a bank photograph with a tattoo worn by
the accused was a matter for the jury, not a non-expert police officer: R v Williams (1993) 11
CRNZ 34; see also Police v Sinclair [1991] 3 NZLR 569 at 575, 576. But the leading
Australian case of Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 593 per Menzies J provides a typical
example of the application of the common knowledge rule to exclude a form of evidence
that is frequently, in practice, led in the courts:
This is a case where I would have thought that the jury, unassisted by any expert
evidence, could on the factual evidence have reached the conclusion that the defendant’s
transport did first protrude across, and then cross, the centre line of the road because the
trailer did not follow the prime-mover in taking the curve. … It may be that in the
circumstances there was no room for the reception of the opinions of experts, because the
tendency of a trailer to overrun a prime-mover as it changes course might be thought to be
something of which an intelligent but unskilled person would be aware.
In 1993, Bollen J in the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal reaffirmed the test
enunciated by the High Court in Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486, holding that it was
sufficient for the purposes of determining admissibility that podiatry ‘is something in the
nature of a science which requires a course of study in order to obtain knowledge of it’:
Rose v The Queen (1993) 69 A Crim R 1 at 10. Although issues surrounding the Frye test
(Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923)) were argued before the court, it declined to
go further than the Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 criterion as a test for admissibility.
Bollen J held that the criterion for admissibility of podiatry evidence was whether the
characteristics or points of comparison between the feet and certain shoes (at 8):
are not, or are not wholly, within the knowledge and experience of ordinary persons and
are such that a person, without instruction or experience in the specialised area of
knowledge or human experience to do with podiatry, would not be able to form a sound
judgment without the assistance of witnesses possessing special knowledge or experience
in the area.
[2.15.10] 85
Similarly, McPherson J in R v Faulkner [1987] 2 Qd R 263 at 265–266 held that ‘a moment’s

reflection is sufficient to tell the average juror in Australia’ that if damage to two vehicles
involved in a collision of some speed is sustained at the front of each vehicle, it is plain
that they collided head-on:
that if the damage does not extend across the whole of those fronts, but only at the right
hand fronts of each of them, the inevitable conclusion is that they were, to some extent at
least, offset at the moment of impact; and, that being so, there would be a tendency for
each of them to revolve about the point of impact in the direction providing least
resistance to forward movement.
McPherson J held, referring to Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 491 and R v Camm (1883)
1 QLJ 136, that when an area is not such as to require peculiar habits or study to qualify a
person to understand it, it will fall:
within the ordinary range of human experience which each juror is presumed to possess
and to exercise in the performance of his function of assessing the evidence at trial and
drawing inferences reasonably to be gathered from it.
Likewise, Malcolm CJ in Cameron v The Queen (1990) 2 WAR 1 at 18 (discussing Schultz v

The Queen [1982] WAR 171 at 174 per Burt CJ) held:
Expert evidence is admissible if the relevant facts cannot be made known to the jury
without the aid of expert opinion.
Categories of evidence on which expert opinion has been regarded as inadmissible
[2.15.20] In the leading English decision on the common knowledge rule, R v Turner [1975]
QB 834 at 841; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80, it was held:
An expert’s opinion is admissible to furnish the court with scientific information which is
likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury. If on the proven facts
a judge or jury can form their own conclusions without help, then the opinion of an expert
is unnecessary. In such a case if it is given dressed up in scientific jargon it may make
judgment more difficult. The fact that an expert witness has impressive scientific
qualifications does not by that fact alone make his opinion on matters of human nature
and behaviour within the limits of normality any more helpful than that of the jurors
themselves; but there is a danger that they may think it does. …
We all know that both men and women who are deeply in love can, and sometimes do,
have outbursts of blind rage when discovering unexpected wantonness on the part of their
loved ones. … Jurors do not need psychiatrists to tell them how ordinary folk who are not
suffering from any mental illness are likely to react to the stresses and strains of life. …
The same reasoning applies to its suggested admissibility on the issue of credibility.
(See also People (DPP) v Kehoe [1992] ILRM 481 at 485; R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114 at
120.)
Similarly, in Weightman v The Queen [1991] Crim LR 204, it was held that psychiatric
evidence is not admissible to tell a jury how a person not suffering from a mental illness is
likely to react to the stresses and strains of life (see also Strudwick and Merry (1994) 49 Cr
App R 326 at 332; R v Gilfoyle [2001] 2 Cr App R 57 at 68).
The common knowledge rule, thus interpreted, has operated to create particular
categories of evidence on which expert opinion has been regarded as inadmissible, such
as:
(1) the voluntariness of admissions (R v McEndoo (1981) 5 A Crim R 52 at 54);
(2) the credit of witnesses (see Farrell v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 286; [1998] HCA 50
at [28]; R v Ashcroft [1965] 1 Qd R 81 at 85; Meehan v HM Advocate [1970] JC 11 at
14; R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 at 846–847; R v B [1987] 1
NZLR 362; Magner (1989));
(3) the susceptibility of an ordinary person to stress (R v McEndoo (1981) 5 A Crim R
52 at 54; R v Dubois (1976) 30 CCC (3d) 412 at 414);
86 [2.15.20]
(4) the capacity of an accused person to form an intent to do a criminal act (R v Carn
(1982) 5 A Crim R 466; R v Darrington [1980] VR 353 at 363–363);
(5) the behaviour of ‘normal’ children (quaere Buckley v Wathen [1973] VR 511 at 515
per Smith ACJ);
(6) the operation of memory (R v Fong [1981] Qd R 90 at 95; R v M(W) (1997) 115 CCC
(3d) 233);
(7) the processes of identification (R v Smith [1987] VR 907 per Vincent J; Smith v The
Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 588);
(8) the reasons why sexually abused children fail to complain of their abuse (R v DD
2000 SCC 43); and
(9) leaving water on a steel platform would result in a risk of slipping (Australian Oil
Refining Co Ltd v Bourne (1980) 54 ALJR 192).
The common knowledge rule: a more flexible formulation

[2.15.30] A more liberal approach to the interpretation of the rule has been followed in a
number of recent cases in Australia, England and Canada. Instead of the focus being upon
whether a matter is within the ken or ordinary experience of the trier of fact and therefore
‘unnecessary’, the question is asked: Would expert evidence be useful to the determination
of a matter in issue? An advantage of this approach is that it is not constrained by
particular categories of evidence which have been held to be within the ‘range of human
experience which must be determined by the assessment of the jury’: R v Smith [1987] VR
907; cf Doyle (1987, p 692).
The Canadian approach is that expert evidence must be ‘necessary’ for the trier of fact:
see R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402; see also R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600;
2000 SCC 51; R v DD 2000 SCC 43. However, this is in the sense that it provides
information likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of the trier of fact and
necessary to enable the trier of fact to master the issues in dispute due to their technical
nature. The evidence must be more than merely helpful, but necessity need not be judged
by ‘too strict a standard’: R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402.
The most prominent case of authority in Australia on the common knowledge rule is
Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94, in which Mason CJ and Toohey J (at 110), Deane J
(at 126) and Dawson J (at 130) apparently applied as a test the simple question of whether
expert evidence ‘would be likely to assist’ the trier of fact. Mason CJ and Toohey J held (at
112):
It does not follow that, because a lay witness can describe events and behaviour, expert
evidence is inadmissible to explain those events and behaviour. Expert evidence will often
build upon lay observations.
The focus upon whether the admissibility of proposed expert evidence would actually
render assistance has tended to be the criterion for admissibility applied in the United
States. It is likely that this less arbitrary interpretation of the common knowledge rule will
increasingly supersede the more traditional formulation of the rule in English, Australian
and New Zealand courts.
The result of such an approach to the admissibility of expert evidence is a
preparedness on the part of some courts to admit expert evidence on subjects with which
members of the public can be expected to have some acquaintance. It means that expert
evidence is given in order to enhance the understanding of the tribunal of fact or to
remedy misconceptions that may be harboured by individual jurors. An example of
evidence fulfilling such a function is counterintuitive evidence – see, arguably, battered
woman syndrome evidence at [10.30.100]. Such a ‘liberal’ approach to admissibility has
tended to be applied more frequently in non-jury cases.
[2.15.30] 87
Thus, in E v Australian Red Cross Society (1991) 31 FCR 299 at 335, a trade practices and
negligence case, Pincus J on appeal was prepared to permit expert evidence on a question
in respect of which understanding did not require ‘special study’. His Honour explicitly
recognised (at 335) the fundamental difference between the tests:
One difficulty about the view that opinions from experts will not be received except where
the field of study is one which requires expertise for its understanding is that much useful
evidence may be lost by such a rule.
He pointed out (at 335) that where, for instance, the question concerns the likely human
reactions to particular forms of words, studies may have been done which enable those
familiar with the studies ‘to help the court, even though the court may reach a sound
opinion without reference to such studies’ (emphasis added).
Evidence accepted in practice
[2.15.40] Moreover, as is the case with the ultimate issue rule (see Ch 2.25), Pincus J
pointed out that much evidence is accepted in practice which would breach the traditional
formulation of the common knowledge rule. His Honour noted (at 335) that ‘a person
other than a trained valuer may be able to form an excellent opinion as to the value of an
ordinary residence, yet qualified valuers’ opinions are received as to that subject’. He also
recalled (at 335) that in R v Wright [1980] VR 593, the Victorian Full Supreme Court held
(at 608 per Young CJ) expert evidence admissible as to the likely effect of misleading
information on the price of certain listed shares: ‘That was justified as admissible
non-expert opinion (at 596, 597), but it is surely difficult to see why evidence of a person
who is undoubtedly an expert on that subject should be excluded.’ Pincus J concluded (at
335):
Although I have difficulty, with respect, in agreeing that the Professor’s evidence ‘would
meet any of the tests enunciated in Clark v Ryan [(1960) 103 CLR 486]’ as his Honour said,
I have concluded that, whatever the scope of the ‘common knowledge’ rule, it should not
exclude such evidence.
Thayer in 1898 (p 525) did not confine his comparable views to non-jury cases:
There is ground for saying that, in the main, any rule excluding opinion evidence is
limited to cases where, in the judgment of the court, it will not be helpful to the jury.
This was the pre-R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402 Canadian
interpretation of the approach adopted in England:
The basic reasoning which runs through the authorities here and in England, seems to be
that expert opinion evidence will be admitted where it will be helpful to the jury in their
deliberation and it will be excluded only where the jury can as easily draw the necessary
inferences without it.
(See Fisher v The Queen (1961) 130 CCC 1 at 17; see also R v Beland [1987] 2 SCR 398; (1987)
43 DLR (4th) 641; 36 CCC (3d) 481; R v Aylward (1992) 71 CCC (3d) 71 at 76: see later,
though, R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402; see also R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR
600; 2000 SCC 51; R v DD 2000 SCC 43.)
This clouds the present status of the rule. The emerging approach may be seen as
focusing upon:
• whether the expert evidence is relevant, helpful and probative; and possibly
• whether the judge or jury can adequately discharge their functions without it, namely
whether the evidence is ‘necessary’.
(See Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 at 127 per Deane J; see also R v Perry (1990) 49
A Crim R 243 at 249.)
Even in the important case of R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 at 841, it
was upon the need experienced by the jury for expert ‘help’ that Lawton LJ focused: see
88 [2.15.40]
also R v Barry [1984] 1 Qd R 74 at 98 per Thomas J; State Bank (NSW) v Lawrence

(unreported, NSW Supreme Court, No 5407 of 1987), at p 56 of the transcript as quoted by
Magner (1989, p 241).
Thus, in R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45; 15 A Crim R 364 at 46 (a criminal case),
King CJ held that the criterion for reception of opinion evidence should be expressed in
the following terms:
On … subjects [which are not, or are not wholly, within the knowledge or experience of
ordinary persons] a witness may be allowed to express opinions if the witness is shown to
possess sufficient knowledge or experience in relation to the subject upon which the
opinion is sought to render his opinion of assistance to the court.
Criterion of utility
[2.15.50] The capacity of a tribunal of fact to arrive at appropriate conclusions without
expert assistance has been isolated as an important criterion for the admission of expert
evidence in a number of cases: can the issues ‘be competently approached’ without expert
evidence? (See, eg, R v Smith [1987] VR 907.) Similarly, in Burger King Corp v Registrar of
Trade Marks (1973) 128 CLR 417, Gibbs J invoked the concept of ‘competence’ to form an
opinion without expert evidence, and three years later Hutley J in Epperson v Dampney
(1976) 10 ALR 227 at 233–234 stressed the limited experience of judges and the role of
expert evidence in expanding such experience.
The criterion of utility to the jury to have the benefit of expert evidence was employed
by Hunt CJ at CL in R v El-Yanni (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, Finlay J, 6
July 1993) in relation to evidence refused in a drug importation case by a trial judge. The
evidence would have been given by a sociologist about the political structure of Lebanon,
the lack of law and order, and the inability to have recourse to the normal processes of
law. As the defence was one of duress, the court found that ‘an Australian jury could be
helped to appreciate such matters by expert evidence’ and that the trial judge had erred in
excluding such evidence.
This more flexible approach was also adopted by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in
the important decision of R v Decha-Iamsakun (1992) 8 CRNZ 470, where it was held that
an expert’s opinion may be admitted even if it relates to matters within the province of the
jury where the opinion can be of real assistance, such as by causing the jury to review its
assumptions or qualify its judgments. Cooke P held in relation to evidence proposed to be
led from a linguistics expert that the accused did not have sufficient ability in the English
language to have said the words attributed to him by a prosecution witness (at 475–476):
Matters which to a considerable extent are within the experience of a Judge trying the facts
or a jury can arise, yet expert evidence may help materially in coming to a conclusion. The
ordinary experience test need not be interpreted so as to exclude such evidence. The
information provided may well be outside ordinary experience and cause the Judge or
jury to review impressions or instinctive judgments based on ordinary experience, and to
do so in the direction of either confirmation or doubt of what ordinary experience
suggests. Scientific knowledge is constantly advancing. The fear and risk of allowing trials
to degenerate into contests of psychiatric or other expert evidence are entirely real, but the
law would be reactionary if as a general rule it rejected the help of modern scientific
insights into human behaviour and cognition.
Similarly, in R v Hohana (1993) 10 CRNZ 92, Fisher J framed his inquiry in terms of
whether the expert evidence could be of real assistance to the tribunal of fact. He found
that to be admissible, it was first necessary for the expert evidence to be relevant to a
matter which had properly been put in issue by admissible evidence from others. Second,
the evidence had to be capable of materially assisting the jury. In R v Hohana (1993) 10
CRNZ 92, it was held that so long as the evidence would materially assist the jury to
decide whether the confession was authentic and reliable, it should be admitted whether
[2.15.50] 89
or not the jury might have some experience of people like the accused; see also
Attorney-General v Equiticorp Industries Group [1995] 2 NZLR 135 at 139.
Counterintuitive evidence
[2.15.60] The status of evidence which is likely to disabuse of misimpressions or
misunderstandings (often called counterintuitive evidence), albeit about a matter to some
extent of common knowledge, is unclear internationally – particularly in Australia and
Canada. In New Zealand, the Law Commission (1998, vol 2, C110) described
counterintuitive evidence as:
not diagnostic. Rather, the purpose of the evidence is educative: to impart specialised
knowledge the jury may not otherwise have, in order to help the jury understand the
evidence of and about the complainant, and therefore be better able to evaluate it. Part of
that purpose is to correct erroneous beliefs that juries may otherwise hold intuitively. That
is why such evidence is sometimes called ‘counter-intuitive evidence’: it is offered to show
that behaviour a jury might think is inconsistent with claims of sexual abuse is not or may
not be so; that children who have been sexually abused have behaved in ways similar to
that described of the complainant; and that therefore the complainant’s behaviour neither
proves nor disproves that he or she has been sexually abused. The purpose of such
evidence is to restore a complainant’s credibility from a debit balance because of jury
misapprehension, back to a zero or neutral balance. This is similar to the use of expert
evidence to dispel myths and misconceptions about the behaviour of battered women.
(See Seymour et al (2014).)

Battered woman evidence
[2.15.70] It was this criterion which was employed by King CJ in R v Runjanjic (1991) 56
SASR 114 at 121 (see Freckelton (1992b, p 18; 1994); see also Ch 10.30), Australasia’s first
battered woman evidence case. In overturning the decision to reject such evidence, the
Chief Justice reflected (at 121) upon the insights available from the special study of the
subject, ‘insights which I am sure would not be shared or shared fully by ordinary jurors.
… It seems to me that a just judgment of the actions of women in those situations requires
that the court or jury have the benefit of the insights which have been gained’. He stated
that he was fortified in his view by the judgment of Wilson J in R v Lavallee (1990) 55 CCC
(3d) 97 at 112:
Expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives and common law
partners must it seems to me be both relevant and necessary in the context of the present
case. How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The average
member of the public (or of the jury) can be forgiven for asking: Why would a woman put
up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How
could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalisation? We would
expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not
cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person
confronted with the so-called ‘battered wife syndrome’. We need help to understand it and
help is available from trained professionals.
Sexual abuse evidence
[2.15.80] This theme of permitting expert evidence to disabuse jurors of potential
misapprehensions was a characteristic of Canadian decisions during the 1980s and 1990s,
and may well be followed in due course in Australia and New Zealand. In R v C (1990) 57
CCC (3d) 522 at 530, for instance, opinion evidence from a sexual abuse therapist was held
to have been properly admitted to explain delay in making complaints by victims, as well
as why victims might continue to associate with their assailant and why their memory
might improve with the effluxion of time. Such matters were held to constitute ‘evidence
which tends to show that the inferences which might well be drawn on the basis of
commonsense and common experience should not be drawn as a matter of course in cases
of sexual abuse’.
90 [2.15.60]
Similarly, evidence that children often recant allegations of sexual abuse (R v J (1989) 53
CCC (3d) 64), that assailants may at the one time be homosexual and heterosexual in
orientation (R v Aylward (1992) 71 CCC (3d) 71 at 76, 77), and of behavioural changes
characteristic of child victims of sexual assault (R v B(G) (1990) 56 CCC (3d) 201; R v R
(1992) 73 CCC (3d) 225 at 230; R v D (1992) 74 CCC (3d) 481) has been permitted in
Canada to assist juries to evaluate allegations of sexual assault free from erroneous
expectations and from popular misconceptions. A similar counterintuitive rationale has
led to the admission of evidence about why a patient may not actively resist the sexual
overtures of her sexually exploitative doctor: R v Ryan (1993) 80 CCC (3d) 514.
Finlayson JA in R v Mohan (1992) 71 CCC (3d) 321 at 328 summed up what he
identified as a ‘more receptive’ approach to the admission of psychiatric opinion:
I think it has become apparent that our juries are now being forced to wrestle with issues
which require more of them than reliance upon their God-given common sense. When
they are triers of fact with respect to complex psychological issues, they are entitled to the
assistance of those with special knowledge.
In R v Aylward (1992) 71 CCC (3d) 71, psychiatric evidence was admitted on behalf of the
Crown that a person may be concurrently both heterosexual and homosexual to rebut an
anticipated defence of heterosexuality by the accused and to dispel misunderstandings
that might otherwise be harboured by the jury about the nature of sexuality. In another
Canadian decision, it was held, in 1992, that the defence could lead evidence to dispel
misperceptions that might exist about the conduct of police in situations of extreme stress:
R v Melaragni (1992) 76 CCC (3d) 348.
However, notably the Canadian Supreme Court in R v DD 2000 SCC 43, in the context
of psychological evidence purporting to explain delay in children’s complaints of sexual
abuse, applied R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402 and held that expert
evidence must be necessary in order for it to be admissible.
For the present, the decision of the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal in R v C
(1993) 60 SASR 467 sounds a warning for the Australian context about assuming that
merely because a jury may learn something additional to their own knowledge by reason
of the admission of expert evidence, such evidence will be admissible. King CJ, referring
to various of the Canadian authorities, as well as to R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114, held
that the criterion for admissibility of evidence to assist jurors’ understanding is whether it
is ‘necessary in order to enable a jury to reach a just decision’. He held that he was ‘far
from convinced’ that the value of expert insights in the child sexual assault case before
him would outweigh the impairment of the trial process which would result from
introducing expert opinion, and probably conflicting expert opinion, into child sexual
abuse cases.
In reaching his decision, King CJ noted that jurors are commonly required to be the
judges of situations and the behaviour of people in situations which are outside their
experience. However, he found (at 474):
Jurors are not ignorant of the behaviour and reactions of children or of the effect on such
behaviour and responses, of family relationships. They have been children themselves.
Most have experienced, and all have observed, family relationships. The effect of the
relationship with the parent on a child’s willingness to report abuse, is not, in my mind,
beyond the capacity of a juror to appreciate without the assistance of psychological
evidence. Neither is the desire of a child for the family relationship to continue and to
avoid family disruption, nor is the influence of force or threats, or the beguiling influence
of the shared secret, beyond a juror’s unaided understanding.
(See below, Ch 10.30.)

It is doubtful whether the approach of King CJ, with whom Mohr J agreed, is
consistent with the reasoning of the High Court in Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94,
given its focus on ‘need’ rather than ‘helpfulness’. (See below, Ch 10.30.) However, notably
[2.15.80] 91
in R v F (1995) 83 A Crim R 502, Gleeson CJ expressed real doubts about the utility of
evidence about the typical responses of children to having been sexually abused and
imposed strict criteria upon the reception of such evidence.
The United States interpretation of the common knowledge rule
[2.15.90] In the United States, the position prior to the 1975 passing of the Federal Rules of
Evidence was summed up by the court in United States v Amaral 488 F 2d 1148 (1973):
1. The subject matter must be beyond the common understanding of the average
juror or must assist the juror in understanding the evidence;
2. The expert must be sufficiently qualified so that his or her opinion or inference
will aid the jury;
3. The evidence about which the expert testifies must be scientifically reliable and
generally accepted in the scientific community; and
4. The probative value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect.
Rule 702 of the United States Federal Rules of Evidence 1975 provides that:
This and the previous formulation of r 702 have allowed the common knowledge rule to
survive to some extent. Thus, in the 1990 decision of Persinger v Norfolk and Western
Railway Co 920 F 2d 1185 (1990), it was held that the amount of weight it is safe for a
person to lift is within the common knowledge of jurors. The effect of the determination
was to rule inadmissible expert evidence from a person who would have said that he
applied complex industry safety formulas based on a variety of variables to determine the
actual safety of a particular lift. It was held that lifting was a matter within the ken of the
ordinary person and so expert evidence on the subject would not assist the trier of fact.
However, it is the practice in some jurisdictions to exclude expert evidence on matters
of common knowledge unless the subject matter is difficult to comprehend and expert
evidence would be useful for the jury: see Martin v McDonald’s Corp 572 NE 2d 1073
(1991).
Some States continue to rely on the Dyas test (Dyas v United States 376 A 2d 827 (1977)),
which requires that the subject matter of the testimony be beyond the ken of the average
layperson; that the expert have sufficient knowledge or experience of the field to make it
appear that his or her opinion will aid the trier of fact; and that the state of the art of the
field of expertise is such that an opinion can be formed by an expert.
Rationales for the common knowledge rule

[2.15.100] At the heart of the many cases that have interpreted the common knowledge
rule is the notion that ordinary people understand ordinary things and do not require
expert evidence to assist them. To allow such evidence, it has been suggested, would be to
usurp the province of the jury (R v Ashcroft [1965] 1 Qd R 81 at 85; R v Tonkin [1975] Qd R
1 at 39; R v McEndoo (1981) 5 A Crim R 52 at 55) or even to ‘attorn’ the trier of fact: R v DD
2000 SCC 43 at [54]. It could be dangerous because of the status of expert witnesses: R v
Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 at 846–847. It is noteworthy that this same
principle is invoked to justify the reception by ‘judicial notice’ of material that is generally
well known and does not withstand rational disagreement: see Ch 2.30.
Thus, in Eagles v Orth [1976] Qd R 313 at 315, Matthews J held:
92 [2.15.90]
If a person claiming no special knowledge is able to appreciate the nature of a seat belt
and the general restraint of movement on the body of the wearer which results from its
use, the opinions of persons professing to have acquired special skills in that behalf should
not be admitted.
By contrast, in R v McMillan (1976) 23 CCC (2d) 160 at 202, per Martin LJ, a man charged
with murdering his two-and-a-half-week-old baby, who raised a question of mistaken
identity, was permitted to call a psychiatrist to give expert opinion evidence about the
violent inclinations of his wife because the ‘cluster of characteristics’ exhibited by her was
‘diagnostic of an abnormal group’. The decision in Toohey v Metropolitan Police
Commissioner [1965] AC 595 at 608 spelt out the dichotomy:
Human evidence shares the frailties of those who give it. It is subject to many
cross-currents such as partiality, prejudice, self-interest and above all imagination and
inaccuracy. Those are matters with which the jury, helped by cross-examination and
commonsense must do their best. But when a witness through physical (in which I include
mental) disease or abnormality is not capable of giving a true or reliable account to the
jury, it must surely be allowable for medical science to reveal this vital hidden fact to
them.
However, in Roberts v The Queen [1990] Crim LR 122, the English Court of Appeal declared
expert evidence as to self-control inadmissible on the basis that the accused was not
abnormal, although he was accepted as being physically abused, immature, prelingually
deaf and emotionally disturbed. (See also Reynolds v The Queen [1989] Crim LR 122;
Weightman v The Queen [1991] Crim LR 204.)
Underlying assumptions
[2.15.110] On a more practical level, in R v Skirving [1985] 2 WLR 1001 at 1008–1009; [1985]
2 All ER 705 at 711 (cf Price v The Queen [1981] Tas R 306), the English Court of Appeal
held that expert evidence on the effects of cocaine and the methods by which it is taken
are ‘not in the experience of the ordinary person … without it the jury would have been in
the dark’. Thus, while the court was of the view that the effects of ‘some corrupting
material’ were ‘within the experience of the ordinary man or woman’, the effects of
cocaine were not. They commented: ‘On which side of the line any particular matter lies
will be a question for the judge to decide. It may not be a decision which is easy to make.’
This, not surprisingly, has proved to be an understatement. A similar decision was made
by the Victorian Court of Appeal in R v Hickey and Komljenovic (unreported, Victorian
Court of Appeal, 16 October 1995) in relation to a trial judge’s refusal to allow expert
evidence in relation to the effects of benzodiazepam (at p 19):
Whilst the regrettable increase in the abuse of prescription and non-prescription drugs in
our society over recent years could have been expected to have increased the general level
of awareness in the community of the consequences of the ingestion of such materials, we
do not consider that, in the absence of any evidence of this matter, a jury could be
assumed to possess the specific knowledge in question. It could be appropriately the
subject of expert evidence.
Of course, the acquaintance of members of the community with scientific and other
developments and areas of human knowledge will be dependent upon a myriad of
geographic and sociocultural factors. It will also wax and wane:
One can only compare the understanding of the child since the concept of childish
innocence has been replaced by an understanding of infant sexuality to which … the
general knowledge and experience of judges did not contribute, to appreciate that judges
even in their special fields have to be free to utilise the evidence of the learned.
It was said in argument that human nature does not change. Even if it were true,
which it is not – it merely changes more slowly than those who want to change it would
like – it is plainly false to suggest that the knowledge of human nature does not change. In
the last three-quarters of a century it has grown enormously and is continuing to grow. It
is principally through the evidence of the learned that judges acquire new knowledge.
[2.15.110] 93
(See Epperson v Dampney (1976) 10 ALR 227 at 233–234. See also Timbury v Coffee (1941) 66
CLR 277 at 283–284.)
However, the underlying assumption of the many judges’ decisions that have
interpreted the common knowledge rule is that there is a residuum of matters on which
juries need no assistance. This is essentially a positivist view, which contemplates the
division of the world into black and white – that which is commonly understood and that
which is not, the normal and the abnormal, special and ordinary classes of humanity. It is
inevitably predicated upon a stereotypical conception of knowledge, inherent in which are
many unarticulated assumptions as to ethnicity, gender, culture and socioeconomic status.
Divergence on admissibility
[2.15.120] Not surprisingly, therefore, expert evidence is not permitted on whether a person
is intoxicated by alcohol, but it is on whether a person is a drug addict (R v Collins (1976)
12 SASR 501 at 506 per Bray CJ) or whether bongs are used in the consumption of
marijuana: R v Barker (1988) 34 A Crim R 141 at 143 per King CJ. Similarly, the effects of
stress have been held to be within the ken of juries (R v McEndoo (1981) 5 A Crim R 52 at
54; R v Dubois (1976) 30 CCC (3d) 412 at 414), but mental illness generally and the
experience of a victim of domestic violence have been held to be matters on which triers of
fact require assistance: R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114.
However, significant divergence has now occurred on a number of the areas in which
counsel have sought to adduce expert opinion evidence. Even within the ranks of
psychiatrists and psychologists, those most affected by the common knowledge exclusion
of expert evidence, there are those who dispute that the knowledge of mental health
experts:
is of a kind that is not accessible to laypeople through common experience. To say this
slightly differently, I do not believe that most psychological research ‘discovers’
phenomena that are unknown to laypeople in general.
(See Pachella (1988, p 113). See also Bartholomew (1986); Bartholomew and Milte (1976);
Ziskin (1995).)
In G v DPP [1997] 2 All ER 755 at 759, the admissibility of evidence about the
truthfulness of children was canvassed by the English High Court and again the rationale
pronounced for exclusion was a concern that the role of the court would be taken over by
the expert witness. Phillips LJ confirmed the need for ‘meticulous care and for expertise in
interviewing young children’ and emphasised the need for the employment of guidelines,
such as those recommended by LJ Butler-Sloss (1992) and implemented in the Home Office
and Department of Health in A Memorandum of Good Practice on Video Recorded Interviews
with Child Witnesses for Criminal Proceedings. He found that where the guidelines and the
memorandum are not followed, the evidence of young children can be ‘dangerously
suspect’ (at 759). He confirmed that the riskiness of the evidence is a legitimate area for
expert evidence, ‘although this will be of much greater value to a jury with no knowledge
of this topic than to a magistrate or judge who may have a great experience of it’.
Phillips LJ affirmed (at 759–760) the decision of Swinton Thomas LJ in R v Davies
(unreported, English Court of Appeal, 3 November 1995):
It is fundamental that experts must not usurp the function of the jury in a criminal trial.
Save in particular circumstances, it is the task of the jury to make judgments on the
questions of reliability and truthfulness. Particular circumstances arise where there are
characteristics of a medical nature in the make-up of a witness, such as mental illness,
which would not be known to the jury without expert assistance. Those circumstances do
not arise in the case of ordinary children who are not suffering from any abnormality. It
may well be open to parties in a particular case to call general expert evidence in relation
to the Cleveland guidelines and, for example, to tell the judge or jury that over-
interviewing as a matter of generality has been shown by expert research to have a much
94 [2.15.120]
more adverse effect on children than on adults but the witness cannot express an opinion
whether a particular child witness is a reliable or truthful witness. That is precisely the
province of a jury in a criminal case.
Thus, Phillips LJ, with Hooper J agreeing, found that a report of an expert employing a
graphic technique called THEMA (Thematic Emergence of Anomaly), in which the expert
traced the process which he said led to children’s evidence becoming ‘comprehensive
exercises in confabulation’, was held to have been properly excluded. They held (at 760):
It may be that the time will come when this technique is recognised as a better means for
evaluating truth and determining guilt or innocence than trial by judge and jury, or
magistrate, for Dr S almost wholly usurps the function of the court, but that time is not yet
come.
The normal versus abnormal dichotomy

[2.15.130] In respect of expert mental health evidence, the requirement that expert
testimony be outside the experience and knowledge of the ordinary jury has repeatedly
been translated to mean that experts can only testify on the ‘abnormal’. ‘Jurors do not
need psychiatrists to tell them how ordinary folk who are not suffering from any mental
illness are likely to react to the stresses and strains of life’: R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974)
60 Cr App R 80 at 841; see also R v McEndoo (1981) 5 A Crim R 52 at 55; R v Ashcroft [1965]
1 Qd R 81 at 85 per Gibbs J; and see Bates (1983, pp 280ff).
At the same time, though, the 1980s and 1990s saw the term ‘mental illness’ come
under much more exacting curial and tribunal scrutiny: see Hopper and McSherry (2001).
Thus, the English Court of Appeal found in R v Dickie (1984) 79 Cr App R 213 that
psychiatric evidence could be led on the likelihood of a defendant understanding the
nature of his acts, which had led to a charge of arson, when that defendant was found to
be suffering from ‘hypomania’. By contrast, the Victorian Mental Health Review Board, in
a 1990 decision involving 16 days of hearings and 2,100 pages of transcript, determined
that ‘anti-social personality disorder’ should not be regarded as a mental illness: Re Appeal
of Garry Webb (1990) 1 MHRBD (Vic) 160; Attorney-General v David [1992] 2 VR 46. This was
in the case of a man who had been institutionalised for most of his life, had repeatedly
mutilated himself, and had behaved in an unprovokedly aggressive way on many
occasions: see Bartholomew (1991); Greig (2002). Under the traditional interpretation of
the common knowledge rule, such a determination would mean that expert evidence
could not be given on the issue of, among other things, such a person’s capacity to form
the necessary intent to commit a serious offence: R v Darrington [1980] VR 353 at 362–363
per Anderson J. This unsatisfactory situation allows a glimpse into the arbitrariness
inherent in the normal versus abnormal dichotomy and, for that matter, the distinction
between what were Axes 1 and 2 of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR, 2004).
Application of the dichotomy
[2.15.140] By contrast, the judgments of the judges of the Australian High Court in Murphy
v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 recognised the unsatisfactory nature of the distinction
between the normal and the abnormal individual. They cast substantial judicial doubt on
the utility of the normal versus abnormal dichotomy as a determinant of whether
information is familiar to the average jury member. Unfortunately, after Murphy v The
Queen, the law still remains somewhat uncertain on this important subject. The judgments
in this case are analysed in detail below.
But the common knowledge rule has been applied in fields other than those relating to
mental states. Expert evidence has been permitted in relation to behaviour that is
abnormal as a result of circumstances peculiar to the individual’s history or situation:
Transport Publishing Co Pty Ltd v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 at 181. The
manner in which persons pursuing a special vocation would reason about a matter of
[2.15.140] 95
business may be the subject of expert evidence. Practice has established the admissibility
of expert evidence about how a disclosure of information in relation to an insurance policy
would affect an underwriter: Berthon v Loughman (1817) 2 Starke 258; 171 ER 639; Chapman
v Walton (1833) 10 Bing 57 at 64; 131 ER 826 at 829; Rickards v Murdock (1830) 10 B & C 527
at 540–541; 109 ER 546 at 552. More recently, evidence from persons experienced in the
affairs of the stock market and the likely behaviour of investors consequent upon
knowledge of the contents of a letter to the stock exchange was held admissible: R v
Wright [1980] VR 593 at 609 per Young CJ; Thannhauser v Westpac Banking Corp (1991) 31
FCR 572.
In R v Smith (Stanley) [1979] 3 All ER 605 (see also R v Burgess [1991] 2 WLR 1206; 2 All
ER 769; and, in Canada, Rabey v The Queen (1977) 37 CCC (2d) 461; [1980] 2 SCR 513), those
suffering from non-insane automatism were included in the categories of the ‘abnormal’:
see Fairall (1981, p 144). Subsequently, the Australian High Court has permitted expert
evidence to be led for the purpose of proving that an accused person at the time of a
killing was in a state of non-insane automatism: R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30.
Mental illness
[2.15.150] In general, there is a correlation between the admissibility of expert evidence and
the existence of mental illness – although this is by no means an exhaustive parameter for
the admissibility of expert evidence in the mental health context (see Appendix). If a
malfunctioning of the mind or a mental disorder is found which has its source primarily
in some subjective condition or weakness internal to the accused (whether fully
understood or not) and it prevents the accused from knowing what he or she is doing,
expert evidence about the mental state is likely to be admissible. Transient disturbances of
consciousness due to certain specific external factors do not fall within the concept
‘disease of the mind’ and so may preclude the admission of expert evidence: ‘the ordinary
stresses and disappointments of life which are the common lot of mankind do not
constitute an external cause constituting an explanation for a malfunctioning of the mind
which takes it out of the category of a “disease of the mind”’: R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR
30; Rabey v The Queen (1977) 37 CCC (2d) 461; [1980] 2 SCR 513 at 519–520; R v Sullivan
[1984] 1 AC 156 at 172; Bratty v Attorney-General (Northern Ireland) [1963] AC 386 at 412; R
v Burgess [1991] 2 WLR 1206 at 1212–1214; 2 All ER 769; Coles and Armstrong (1998).
Murphy v The Queen

[2.15.160] The leading Australian case on the common knowledge rule is the 1989 decision
of Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94, involving considerable discussion by members
of the High Court about the circumstances in which mental health professionals can give
admissible opinion evidence about the reliability of confessional evidence.
The case involved one of Australia’s most notorious murders – that of the New South
Wales beauty queen, Anita Cobby. A ground of appeal to the High Court was that the trial
judge had erred in ruling inadmissible certain expert evidence proposed to be called on
behalf of one of the accused men. The evidence was that of Ricki Sharpe, a consultant
psychologist, whose evidence would have been that one of the accused was of limited
intellectual capacity and that the confessional material adduced through the police record
of interview with him was thereby rendered inadmissible or at any rate dangerously
unreliable.
The trial judge had rejected the proposed expert evidence on the basis that Mr Sharpe’s
report had excluded brain damage and mental retardation. In those circumstances, he was
of the view that the evidence related to matters of human nature and behaviour within the
limits of ‘normality’ – it was therefore an issue on which the members of the jury were
competent to form their own views. The relevant parts of the expert’s report are as follows
(at 108–109):
96 [2.15.150]
Leslie Murphy is functioning intellectually at the level of a ten year old person. He shows
adequate adaptive functioning and could not be considered to be mentally retarded. His
poor educational performance would seem to be almost entirely due to a disturbed
childhood and inadequate educational opportunities and not due to any biological or
anatomical reasons.
Leslie Murphy shows great impairment in most of the basic educational skills. The
greatest deficits are in his reading and comprehension skills. Spelling, vocabulary,
arithmetic, reading and comprehension (silent and auditory) are in the nine to ten year old
range.
In my opinion, Leslie Murphy would have had great difficulty in reading and fully
comprehending the record of interview. It would have taken him five to ten minutes to
read each page with 50 per cent comprehension. If the record was read to him at normal
speech rate, he would have had approximately 25 per cent comprehension. His auditory
comprehension is very much dependent on the speed with which things are read or
spoken, whether or not he is able to make interruptions so as to mark his own copy to
‘jog’ his memory at the conclusion of the reading. I strongly doubt that he could fully
comprehend the medical authorisations he signed, whether he read them himself or they
were read out to him. I believe that the words mentioned in the medical authorisations
would not have been within his vocabulary.
Inutility of the normal versus abnormal dichotomy
[2.15.162] Mason CJ and Toohey J began their analysis of the case law in the area by
accepting the statement of Lawton LJ in R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 at
841 that: ‘An expert’s opinion is admissible to furnish the court with scientific information
which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury.’ However,
they cavilled at the assertion (at 841) that:
suffering from any mental illness are likely to react to the stresses and strains of life.
Their Honours pointed out that such a statement assumes that terms such as ‘ordinary’
and ‘normal’ have a clearly understood meaning and that the distinction between ‘normal’
and ‘abnormal’ is well recognised. They continued (at 111):
Further, it assumes that the commonsense of jurors is an adequate guide to the conduct of
people who are ‘normal’ even though they may suffer from some other relevant disability.
And it assumes that the expertise of psychiatrists (or, in the present case, psychologists)
extends only to those who are ‘abnormal’.
Their Honours focused instead on whether the expertise that the witness could bring to
bear was ‘outside the experience and knowledge of the judge and jury’: at 111 (emphasis added).
They accepted that the distinction between normality and abnormality could be of value
in some cases, in spite of its ‘inherent difficulties’, but held that ‘it tends to obscure the fact
that in a particular case evidence may be offered to which the distinction has no
relevance’. They held the case before them to be an example of the inutility of such a
dichotomy, as the issue was not the accused’s normality or abnormality but the standard
of his vocabulary and literacy, and so of his comprehension. They held that the expert had
been called to give evidence on a matter calling for his expertise and should have been
permitted to give his evidence.
In broad terms, Deane J agreed with the Chief Justice and Toohey J. He expressed the
view (at 125–126) that the evidence sought to be given by the expert was properly the
subject of expert evidence by a qualified psychologist if the accused’s ‘extraordinarily low
levels of intellectual function, silent and auditory comprehension and linguistic ability
were themselves relevant to a question to be decided by the jury’. He held that the
witness’s evidence was at least relevant to, and may have been of great assistance in,
determining the question of the reliability of the accused’s allegedly voluntary
confessional statements. The evidence would have been by a qualified expert on a subject
[2.15.162] 97
susceptible of expert evidence, it would have been useful, and it would not have been
precluded by the objection that it was on the very question that the jury had to decide: see
Ch 2.25.
Psychological evidence of intellectual functioning
[2.15.164] Most importantly, Deane J rejected the view that psychological evidence should
not be admitted in those situations where there is no evidence of ‘abnormality’. He held
(at 127) that:
Expert psychological evidence of identified and significant difficulty in intellectual
functioning or in comprehension and expression could well be admissible on the question
of the reliability of a confessional statement notwithstanding that the identified difficulty
did not take the case out of the lower range of what would be classified as normal.
However, his Honour decided the case on the basis that the relevant evidence relating to
the level of the accused’s functioning was evidence of abnormality (at 127). His Honour
completed his judgment with these words (at 127):
It appears to me to be irrelevant that those abnormally low levels of intellectual function,
comprehension and linguistic ability were the result of environmental factors rather than
innate mental defect.
However, Brennan and Dawson JJ took a different approach and denied that an error had
been made by the trial judge in refusing to allow Mr Sharpe to give expert evidence. They
pointed out that the evidence was being proffered to contradict the police evidence that
the accused had given the incriminating answers that they alleged he had given in
response to the questions they had asked him. Brennan J quoted a passage (at 120) from
the leading United States textbook, Wigmore on Evidence (1979, Vol 2, p 750):
person.
His Honour held that neither the expert’s report nor his statement of qualifications
revealed any expertise which would have permitted him to form a view about the
accused’s understanding of particular questions, or his use of particular words or phrases.
He found that the crucial link in the chain of proof of the witness’s qualifications to give
the expert evidence was missing – it had not been shown that the general expertise of
words and phrases or to assert the unlikelihood of the subject’s use of such words or
phrases: see above [2.05.310].
Expertise rule versus common knowledge rule
[2.15.166] Brennan J disputed that the proper approach in this case was to ask whether a
psychologist’s evidence should be admissible to prove the state of mind of a ‘normal’
accused. Rather, his view was that the expertise of the witness to give the evidence had
not been sufficiently proved. Thus, Brennan J’s approach is not necessarily inconsistent
with that of Mason CJ, Toohey or Deane JJ; rather, he resolved the issue before him by
reference to the expertise rule, rather than application of the common knowledge rule.
Dawson J adopted a slightly different approach but agreed with the result of Brennan J.
His Honour was of the view that the psychologist’s qualifications, as presented to the trial
judge, would equip him to do no more than to express the view that the accused was
poorly educated and of limited intellectual capacity. There was no material before the
court which would indicate that the witness was qualified to express an expert opinion
about whether the use in the record of interview of phrases and sentence structures was
uncharacteristic of the accused.
98 [2.15.164]
As the expert’s potential evidence was significantly circumscribed in Dawson J’s view,
the issue arose in his approach of whether, in effect, it was helpful to the jury (see Thayer
(1898, p 525)) to hear such evidence from the mouth of an expert. He decided that in fact
the jury was sufficiently equipped by their ‘ordinary, everyday experience adequately to
assess the applicant’s capabilities’.
At the same time, his Honour acknowledged (at 131) that difficulties could exist in
relation to the traditional formulation of the common knowledge rule:
One such rule is that which says that expert evidence is not admissible to prove the
behavioural characteristics of normal people. Normal behaviour, it is said, is within the
range and experience of the ordinary human being and hence the ordinary juror. See R v
Chard (1971) 56 Cr App R 268 at 271; R v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 441 at 444.
While the difference between normal and abnormal behaviour, where it is apparent,
may offer considerable guidance, the true principle does not rest upon the drawing of a
line which must often be difficult, if not impossible. The principle is simply that evidence
which is put forward to tell the jury something that is within their own knowledge or
experience is not helpful and not admissible for that reason. … But the distinction between
helpful and unhelpful evidence cannot of its nature be very precise.
His Honour inclined to the approach that as there are real dangers in receiving evidence
from experts, it is incumbent on the courts to be stringent in their decisions to admit it. In
the particular case, he found that opinion evidence concerning the accused’s behavioural
characteristics was not admissible unless the significance of those characteristics could not
be understood without the aid of that evidence: see R v Schultz (1981) 5 A Crim R 234 at
237 per Burt CJ.
The law after Murphy v The Queen

[2.15.170] No clear approach has emerged from the Australian High Court about the
application of the common knowledge rule at common law. It appears to be agreed by the
judges of the High Court that evidence that is within the ordinary understanding and
experience of the jury will be inadmissible if provided by an expert witness. However,
doubt remains about how such areas are to be recognised. Mason CJ and Toohey J
perceived ‘inherent difficulties’ with the normal versus abnormal dichotomy, but remained
convinced that it nonetheless ‘could be of value’. In this they were joined by Dawson J,
who said that the difference between ‘normal and abnormal behaviour’ (emphasis added)
may offer considerable guidance, but focused upon the criterion of helpfulness to the
judge and jury. It is unclear whether his Honour meant something different by this
expression to the words ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’ as employed by the Chief Justice
and Toohey J.
Deane J decided that evidence could be given by psychologists even when there is no
evidence that the accused should be designated abnormal, but then found the problem a
non-issue in the case because the accused was abnormal. Brennan J simply did not employ
the dichotomy, but neither accepted nor rejected its validity or utility.
It can therefore be said with some confidence that the majority of the High Court has
exhibited unease with employing the dichotomy as a determinative factor for deciding
whether expert evidence relates to matters of common knowledge. At least two, and
probably three, of the judges believed that the distinction between normality and
abnormality could be useful. However, further than this the High Court has not gone. The
situation in fact has been confused by the decision in Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR
94, because the status of the distinction between the normal and abnormal person is now
utterly unclear. A person’s normality is a relevant factor in deciding whether expert
evidence about intellectual capacity should be admissible in relation to a question in issue.
However, it is not at this time possible to say how significant a factor it is.
[2.15.170] 99
Furthermore, the High Court has foresworn any attempt to define ‘normality’. This
means that the presence or absence of a mental illness has significance but, once more, it is
not possible to say how much significance. The situation is further confused by the
preparedness of Deane J to take a very wide view of abnormality so that it encompasses
abnormally low levels of intellectual function, comprehension and linguistic ability,
whether they are the result of environmental factors or innate mental defect.
A significant decision subsequent to R v Murphy is R v Whitbread (1995) 78 A Crim R
452. It was sought by the accused at his trial to lead evidence from a psychologist to
establish that untruths told by the accused, and relied upon by the Crown as
consciousness of guilt, could have been the result of a psychological state resulting from
stress. Hampel J held (at 461) that the evidence in principle should have been admitted:
It would have been tempting for the jury to treat the matter as one of credibility based on
the proposition that the failure to remember the incriminating events was all too
convenient in the circumstances. The jury may well have taken the view that whilst a
person may forget some acts during a traumatic incident it was unlikely that he would
forget only those facts which were ultimately incriminating. In my view it was therefore
essential from the point of view of the defence that the jury understood the precise
psychological condition and mechanism which is capable of producing the result for
which the defence was contending.
Both Hampel and Teague JJ (purporting to apply the reasoning in Murphy v The Queen
(1989) 167 CLR 94) held that the trial judge was in error in excluding the evidence on the
basis that it fell within the realm of normal human experience as it amounted to normal
behaviour in abnormal circumstances.
A decision to similar effect is that of the Queensland Court of Appeal in R v Yeo
(unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, Fitzgerald P, McPherson JA and Helman J,
22 August 1995), where the trial judge was held to have wrongly excluded the evidence of
a clinical psychologist that an intellectually disabled complainant may have dreamed of,
rather than experienced, an assault. Helman J referred to the decision of Murphy v The
Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 and held that:
The dreaming and other processes of children and adults who are not disabled would no
doubt have been within the experience and knowledge of the jury and so would not have
called for any assistance from an expert. The mental processes of one who, like the
complainant, was disabled would however not have been, it is reasonable to conclude,
within their experience and knowledge. It follows that this was a case in which the
evidence of an expert could have helped the jury in its task of deciding the case.
In addition, in R v Massey (1994) 62 SASR 481 at 487, King CJ, sitting on the South
Australian Court of Criminal Appeal, observed of the evidence of a psychologist whose
evidence that the majority of people placed in the position of the appellant would have
similarly yielded to temptation that: ‘The matters upon which the psychologist’s evidence
was sought were matters of ordinary human experience upon which expert evidence is
not admissible.’
Similarly, in R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114 at 120–121, King CJ stated:
Not all knowledge, however, which is relevant to an issue and which forms part of an
organised field of knowledge may be imparted to a court by means of expert testimony.
The law jealously guards the role of the jury, or the court where it is the trier of the facts,
as the judge of human nature, of the behaviour of normal people and of situations which
are within the experience of ordinary persons or are capable of being understood by them:
see R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80. It is not sufficient, in order to justify
the admission of expert evidence of the battered woman syndrome, as was argued by counsel
for the appellant, that the ordinary juror would have no experience of the situation of a
battered woman. Jurors are constantly expected to judge of situations, and of the behaviour of
people in situations, which are outside their experience. Much conduct which occupies the
attention of the criminal courts occurs in the criminal underworld, or in sordid conditions and
100 [2.15.170]
situations, of which jurors would generally have no experience. It is not considered to be

beyond the capacity of juries, or of the court if it is the trier of the facts, to judge of the
reactions and behaviour of people in those situations. Expert evidence of how life in criminal
or sordid conditions might affect a person’s responses to situations would not be admitted.
…
This is an area in which the courts must move with great caution. The admission of expert
evidence of patterns of behaviour of normal human beings, even in abnormal situations or
relations, is fraught with danger for the integrity of the trial process. The risk that, by degrees,
trials, especially criminal trials, will become battle grounds for experts and that the capacity of
juries and courts to discharge their fact-finding functions will be thereby impaired is to be
taken seriously. I have considered anxiously whether the situation of the habitually battered
woman is so special and so outside ordinary experience that the knowledge of experts should
be made available to courts and juries called upon to judge behaviour in such situations. In
the end, I have been impressed by what I have read of the insights which have been gained by
special study of the subject, insights which I am sure would not be shared or shared fully by
ordinary jurors. It seems to me that a just judgment of the actions of women in those
situations requires that the court or jury have the benefit of the insights which have been
gained.
(See too R v C (1993) 60 SASR 467 at 474; R v Jones [2016] 2 Qd R 310; [2015] QCA 161 at
[18]; Liyanage v Western Australia (2017) 51 WAR 359; [2017] WASCA 112 at [86]–[105].)
Reconciling Murphy v The Queen with Jackson v The Queen
[2.15.172] The decision of the High Court in Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 must
also be reconciled with the same court’s pronouncement in the earlier case of Jackson v The
Queen (1962) 108 CLR 591, in which a trial judge’s rejection of evidence from a psychiatrist
about an accused’s state of mind at the time of an alleged confession was held to be
incorrect. The court pointed out (at 596) that where the mental condition of a person who
makes a confession is relevant to determining the person’s guilt of a particular offence, ‘no
authority is needed for the proposition that all the circumstances surrounding the making
of it which tend to show either that it can safely be relied upon or that it would be unwise
to do so are admissible’. In Jackson, the view of the psychiatrist was that the accused
person made a confessional statement at a time when he was mentally abnormal and
suffering from acute fear based upon an irrational belief that he was in danger of death,
and believed that he might secure his removal from danger by making a false confession.
This, of course, brings the accused person into the category of ‘abnormal’, a category
which expert psychiatric evidence would relate to matters that were traditionally outside
common knowledge.
It appears that expert evidence may be led about those special characteristics of the
victim, accused or other witness which place the assessment of the person’s credit and
possibly the credibility of the person’s evidence beyond the unassisted capacity of the
ordinary juror. Such evidence may be directed toward the removal of misconceptions,
such as why a victim of domestic violence would not leave her situation or report abuses
promptly to the police.
Admissibility of evidence of intellectual disabilities
[2.15.174] On the issue of whether an admission has been made voluntarily, considerable
leeway is customarily extended in relation to the admissibility of expert evidence. Such
evidence may cover the gamut from character through credit and even to credibility. No
doubt this is because of the absence of a jury during the voire dire and so the absence of a
concern that their fact-finding role will be usurped by the expert evidence.
It appears to be permissible for expert witnesses to give evidence about the likelihood
of a person’s intellectual disabilities (even should they fall short of ‘official’ retardation),
brain injuries or extreme youth affecting the weight that should be attached to admissions
that have been declared voluntary by the trial judge. However, it would seem prudent for
such evidence to stop well short of an assertion that the accused could not have
understood, would not have comprehended, or did not make such admissions. So long as
[2.15.174] 101
such evidence relates to the limitations of the accused person in contrast to the ordinary
person, and gives examples of the practical effects of such limitations upon his or her
functioning in circumstances analogous to the making of the record of interview, the
evidence is likely to be admitted. This allows the final step to be taken by the jury: relating
the problems of the accused to the circumstances in which he or she is said to have made
inculpatory statements and then to the weight that should be attached to such utterances.
It appears also to be the case that the expertise of witnesses called to give such
evidence will be strictly construed and that skills in psycholinguistics, the behaviour and
speech of children, and the effects of brain damage will on occasions be required, in
addition to standard psychological or psychiatric qualifications.
Expert evidence of intoxication by alcohol

[2.15.200] A number of decisions have held that those who are not experts are qualified to
give evidence of the indicia of intoxication. It was held a matter of common knowledge in
Morgan v Attorney-General (1986) 24 A Crim R 342 at 367 per Dowsett J:
It is sometimes said that a jury is entitled to use its experience of the consumption of
alcohol in judging the conduct of an accused person, and in an appropriate case this is no
doubt true. In such a case, the use of expert evidence as to the effects of alcohol should not
be permitted if its effect is to exclude a matter which can reasonably be taken to be within
the knowledge and experience of a jury. However, the complex interrelationship between
the consumption of alcohol and the mental abnormality of the accused in this case was not
such a matter.
It has also been explicitly stated in a leading Canadian case, Graat v The Queen (1983) 2
CCC (3d) 365 at 380, that it has been long accepted that:
[I]ntoxication is not such an exceptional condition as would require a medical expert to
diagnose it. An ordinary witness may give evidence of his opinion as to whether a person
is drunk. This is not a matter where scientific, technical or specialised testimony is
necessary in order that the tribunal properly understands the relevant facts. Intoxication
and impairment of driving ability are matters which the modern jury can intelligently
resolve on the basis of common ordinary knowledge and experience. The guidance of an
expert is unnecessary.
Although certain aspects of the level and causation of a person’s intoxication by alcohol
are matters requiring specialist evidence from those with expert training and skills, the
general estimation of a person’s lack of sobriety has been regarded as a matter of common
knowledge on which an expert is unlikely to provide evidence of a higher calibre than that
of a lay witness. It follows, therefore, that expert evidence upon whether a person was
intoxicated may well be inadmissible.
Expert evidence on memory and identification

[2.15.340] Australian courts have applied the common knowledge rule to exclude expert
opinions about the operation of memory (see R v Fong [1981] Qd R 90) and the perils of
eyewitness identification (see, eg, R v Smith [1987] VR 907 at 910–911) (see Ch 10.20).
Expert evidence on community standards, human nature and understanding

[2.15.400] There is considerable Anglo-Australian authority that expert evidence is not
admissible to prove those matters that are acceptable under current community standards:
Wavish v Associated Newspapers Ltd [1959] VR 57; Kyte-Powell v William Heinemann Ltd
[1960] VR 425; R v Neville (1960) 83 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 501; Abbey v Wallace (unreported,
Victorian Supreme Court, Newton J, 10 March 1967); Crowe v Graham (1968) 121 CLR 375
at 395–396; R v Anderson [1972] 1 QB 304 at 313; R v Stamford [1972] 2 QB 391; Buckley v
Wathen [1973] VR 511 at 515 per Smith ACJ. It has been suggested that when such
evidence is given, it is a ‘usurpation of the function of the jury’ (R v Darrington [1980] VR
102 [2.15.200]
353 at 362 per Anderson J) on the basis that it involves opinion evidence on a matter
within the understanding of the jury and on which they are required to make their own
finding. The likelihood is that such evidence will be found to offend both the common
knowledge and ultimate issue rules: see Ch 2.25.
The High Court in Transport Publishing Co Pty Ltd v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99
CLR 111 at 119 held that ‘ordinary human nature, that of people at large, is not a subject of
proof by evidence’, but qualified that statement by holding that the characteristics,
responses or behaviour of a special group of people may be the subject of expert evidence,
if they form a subject of special study and knowledge: see RST v Western Australia [2016]
WASCA 59 at [26]–[27]; Coady (1992, p 301). Thus, Webb J held (at 126) that the reaction to
erotic literature by ‘adolescents, mentally, psychologically or sexually abnormal’ could
properly be the subject of expert evidence.
The 1991 Federal Court of Australia decision of Pincus J in E v Australian Red Cross
Society (1991) 105 ALR 53 at 87–88 took a different approach (see though Interlego v Croner
Trading (1992) 111 ALR 577 at 619, citing Bourne v Swan & Edgar Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 211 at 224).
The expert evidence in question related to the adequacy of the language of a form devised
to screen out potential blood donors likely to be infected with the HIV virus. His Honour
noted the view of Doyle (1987, p 692):
If the subject matter is one on which the average man is capable of forming an opinion
unaided by expert evidence, then the expert evidence is inadmissible. In the area of
common knowledge there are no degrees of expertise. The test seems to be not whether
the opinion of the expert would assist, but whether the judge or jury is capable of forming
an opinion.
In a pragmatic approach, Pincus J accepted that his decision was not consistent with
Dixon CJ’s decision in Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 and permitted the evidence on the
basis that it would offer substantial assistance to the court, reflecting (at 88) that the
witness had made ‘a much more extensive study of communication with individuals,
especially on health and medical matters, than would be made by ordinary people’.
A very similar issue arose once more in Vokalek v Commonwealth (2008) 101 SASR 588;
[2008] SASC 256 per Gray J. The question was whether expert evidence should be
permitted from a forensic psychologist and criminologist and from a writer, teacher and
dominatrix in relation to the community acceptance of sexually explicit material with
resonances of violence in the context of the criminal charge of importing a prohibited
import contrary to s 233(1)(b) of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth). Gray J noted that there was
little scope for going to what had been published elsewhere or to the opinions of experts,
citing Romeyko v Samuels (1971) 2 SASR 529 at 560–561 and Crowe v Graham (1968) 121 CLR
375. He conceded that the High Court in Transport Publishing Co Pty Ltd v Literature Board
of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 at 119 had observed that it was conceivable that opinion
evidence may in some circumstances be given on the characteristics, responses or
behaviour of a special category of persons, but did not find the case before him to fall into
such a category. He concluded that a magistrate was capable of viewing the material,
seeing the images and applying the relevant standard without the assistance of an expert.
He commented that the assessment of whether the publications breached contemporary
standards was ‘the ultimate question for the magistrate’ (at [54]) and declined to allow the
expert evidence.
Canadian and United Kingdom approaches
[2.15.410] The Canadian approach has been markedly different, with the court in R v Prairie
Schooner News Ltd (1970) 75 WWR 585; (1971) 1 CCC (2d) 251 at 265–267 expressly
departing from the approach of the Australian High Court in Transport Publishing Co Pty
Ltd v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 to hold in the first of a series of cases on
obscenity and indecency issues that expert evidence, scientifically informed, on community
standards is in principle admissible. Thus, in a case interpreting whether the act of
[2.15.410] 103
cunnilingus should be classified as gross indecency, the court noted that attitudes toward
sexual behaviour are ‘constantly changing’ and so expert evidence about contemporary
attitudes toward which practices are regarded as abnormal or perverted is likely to be
admissible on the ground of its helpfulness to the trier of fact: R v St Pierre (1974) 17 CCC
(2d) 489 at 496.
The reasons given for the Australian prohibition on providing such information to the
courts, which at first glance might seem to have probative value, given the development
of statistical analysis of data by those commissioned to compile public survey material,
have varied from case to case. The issue has repeatedly arisen for consideration in
passing-off and trade mark cases, where the effect of a representation by a manufacturer or
distributor of a product has been the subject of disputation, and expert evidence has been
sought to be adduced.
The early English case of Bourne v Swan & Edgar Ltd [1903] 1 Ch 211 at 224 rejected
expert evidence as to human nature on the ground that what the expert witnesses were
being asked was:
not what would happen to them individually, but what they think the rest of the world
would suppose or believe. They are not experts in human nature, nor can they be called to
give such evidence.
The capacity of a sexually abnormal person to resist his impulses was held ‘incapable of
scientific proof’ in R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396 at 404 and, in Royal Warrant Holders
Association v Edward Deane & Beal Ltd [1912] 1 Ch 10 at 152, it was held that there was no
such thing as an expert in human nature.
General knowledge of the community
[2.15.420] In Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158 at 180, the same
prohibition functioned to prevent an expert statistician and market researcher from giving
evidence about whether, by virtue of questions asked in a ‘quasi-survey’, the answers of
the interviewees were likely to be unprompted and reliable. McLelland J held that what
was involved was ‘an assessment of how the ordinary person would be likely to be
influenced by questions framed in particular ways’. He found this to be a matter for the
court and not properly the subject of expert evidence. Similarly, McLelland J held (at
180–181) that evidence from the same expert about whether, in the absence of evidence of
proper sampling procedures or of the responses by all of those interviewed, any
generalisation would be valid should be disallowed. He held:
the only relevant effect of this aspect of Dr O’Toole’s evidence would be to establish the
proposition that the mere fact that some members of a class have a particular opinion does
not as a matter of logic or mathematical probability lead to the conclusion that other
members of that class have that opinion. That is not a proposition of which the court
would need to be informed by evidence.
The courts have repeatedly expressed their disinclination to allow extrinsic evidence as to
what is within the general knowledge of the community. That common knowledge (such
as whether the name ‘Winfield’ is synonymous with cigarettes (United Telecasters v Director
of Public Prosecutions (1988) 89 ALR 591 at 597)) is regarded as being a question of fact to be
ruled upon as such (see Crowe v Graham (1968) 121 CLR 375 at 394, 398–399; Jones v Skelton
[1963] SR (NSW) 644 at 650) and not to require expert evidence.
Thus, even the opinions of cattle drovers are not admissible on the question of how an
accident to cattle in a rail truck must have happened (Smith v Midland Railway (1887) 57 LT
813), nor as to the prudence of an agistor who had put horses to graze among horned
cattle: Smith v Cook (1875) 1 QBD 79, but quaere whether these same issues would now be
accounted as of general knowledge.
104 [2.15.420]
Special situations
[2.15.430] The protectiveness of the role of the jury in dealing with matters of human
nature and the experience of ordinary persons extends to many scenarios (see R v
Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114 at 120 per King CJ):
Jurors are constantly expected to judge of situations, and of the behaviour of people in
situations, which are outside their experience. Much conduct which occupies the attention
of the criminal courts occurs in the criminal underworld, or in sordid conditions and
situations, of which jurors would generally have no experience. It is not considered to be
beyond the capacity of juries, or of the court if it is the trier of the facts, to judge of the
reactions and behaviour of people in those situations. Expert evidence of how life in
criminal or sordid conditions might affect a person’s responses to situations would not be
admitted.
Some human situations or relations, or the attitudes or behaviour of some categories of

people, may be so special and so outside the experience of jurors, or of the court if it is the
tribunal of fact, that:
evidence of methodical studies … may be admissible. … This is an area in which the
courts must move with great caution. The admission of expert evidence of patterns of
behaviour of normal human beings even in abnormal situations or relations is fraught
with danger for the integrity of the trial process. The risk that by degrees, trials, especially
criminal trials, will become battle grounds for experts and the capacity of juries and courts
to discharge their fact-finding functions will be thereby impaired, is to be taken seriously.
(See R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114 at 121 per King CJ.)

Special insights
[2.15.440] King CJ in R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114 at 121 held that the situation of a
battered woman can be the subject of insights gained by the special study of the subject
‘which I am sure would not be shared or shared fully by ordinary jurors’. An area such as
the behaviour of women who are the subject of domestic violence may be regarded as
‘beyond the ken of the average juror and thus suitable for expert testimony’ (State v Kelly
478 A 2d 364 at 379 (1984)) because so many myths abound about battered women and
expert evidence is necessary to disabuse jurors of them: R v Lavallee (1990) 55 CCC (3d) 97
at 113.
Similarly, in R v Yildiz (1983) 11 A Crim R 115, an interpreter was permitted to give
evidence of the attitudes within members of the Turkish community in Australia to the
allegation that a person is a passive participant in homosexual intercourse.
Expert evidence on the meaning of words

[2.15.460] In general, courts have been resistant to permitting experts to give opinion
evidence on the meaning of words. This is especially so in relation to words or terms of
ordinary English usage. In part this has traditionally been because such evidence may be
regarded as a breach of either the common knowledge rule or the ultimate issue rule, or,
alternatively, to be unnecessary. However, when words are used in special contexts or are
asserted to have have specialised or technical meanings, including within a statute on
occasions, expert evidence is frequently permitted to assist the court’s understanding (see.
Hodgkinson and James (2015; pp 278–283).
Non-statutory words
[2.15.480] As a general matter of principle, expert evidence on the meaning of words of
normal parlance is not admissible: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd
(1980) 33 ALR 251 at 272 per Gobbo J; Australian Gas Light Co v Valuer-General (1940) 40 SR
(NSW) 126 (plant); Bendixen v Coleman (1943) 68 CLR 401 (bottle); Scott v Moses (1957) 75
WN (NSW) 101 (perimeter); Brisbane City Council v Attorney-General (Qld) [1979] AC 411; 19
ALR 681 (showground); Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854 at 861; Joseph Crosfield & Sons Ltd v
Techno-Chemical Laboratories Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 378 at 379; see also Wigmore on Evidence
[2.15.480] 105
(1979, Vol 7, p 85); Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co v Phillips 332 US 168 at 171 (1946). The
rationale for the prohibition was clearly expressed by Neville J in Joseph Crosfield & Sons
Ltd v Techno-Chemical Laboratories Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 378 at 379:
An expert would read a document precisely as any other man would read it who
possessed his knowledge of the technical meaning of the words employed and had such
scientific information as might be necessary for the comprehension of the matter to which
the words of the document refer. It is this technical information which the expert witness
should be asked to give; not his opinion of the meaning of a document. This is no narrow
or verbal distinction, but a matter the misunderstanding of which accounts for the
prodigious waste of time in the trial of patent actions.
In Shellharbour City Council v Minister for Planning (2011) 189 LGERA 348; [2011] NSWCA
195 at [7], Hodgson J observed:
The experience of the Court generally is that expert evidence in judicial review
proceedings, including cases which raise issues of statutory construction, is of very limited
assistance. That observation applies to the statutory instruments in question in this case.
The usual principles of statutory construction in relation to the consideration of extrinsic
aids which apply to assist in statutory construction do not generally include evidence of
what a particular expert considers the phrases appearing in a statute mean. Most of the
terms about which expert evidence is sought to be adduced are defined in the instrument
in question.
An example of the preclusion is to be seen in the ruling of Cooper J in Dellavedova v HIH

Casualty and General Insurance Ltd (unreported, ACT Supreme Court, SC217 of 1995,
8 October 1997) at pp 31–32:
The defendants called [a] chartered accountant to express an opinion as to whether a
reasonable accountant in the circumstances of the assured [plaintiff] would have been
aware of circumstances which ought to have been disclosed upon renewal of the policy.
[The expert] has close ties to insurer interests … The evidence of this witness amounted to
his construction of the correspondence, his interpretation of the obligation to make
disclosure and as to the meaning of question 9 of the proposal. His report … purports to
conclude as a statement of expert opinion that the ultimate issues of disclosure and
misrepresentation in these proceedings ought to be found against the plaintiffs. The
evidence was not expert evidence relevant to the profession of an accountant and was
merely the expression of an opinion as to the ordinary meaning of language and the
inferences he would draw from the contents of the correspondence and the fact of its
receipt. This was outside his field of expertise and in my view not a matter for expert
evidence. The proper construction of the proposal, the duty of disclosure and the meaning
and relevance of the correspondence are questions of law or mixed law and fact, which are
properly the preserve of the court and not the subject of expert opinion.
No formal objection was taken to the expert’s evidence by the plaintiff’s lawyers; the trial
judge declined to give it any weight (at p 32).
The interpretation of words not apparently used in a trade or technical fashion should
be based on the ordinary or popular meaning of the words (Attorney-General v Wynstanley
(1831) 2 D & C 302 at 310; Adams v Rau (1931) 46 CLR 572 at 577–578; Unwin v Hanson
[18901] 2 QB 115 at 119; Rotary Offset Press Pty Ltd v Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation
(1972) 46 ALJR 609; Tancred, Arrol & Co v Steel Co (Scotland) (1890) 17 R (HL) 31); expert
evidence is neither necessary nor appropriate. The meaning of an ordinary word of the
English language is not a question of law: Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854 at 861.
It is standard practice for judges to have regard to dictionaries in order to ascertain the
ordinary meaning or the common use of a word in question: see Ch 2.30. However,
according to Lord Coleridge in R v Peters (1886) 16 QBD 636 at 641:
[D]ictionaries are not to be taken as authoritative exponents of the meanings of words
used in Acts of Parliament, but it is a well-known rule of courts of law that words should
be taken to be used in their ordinary sense, and we are therefore sent for instruction to
these books.
106 [2.15.480]
(See also Kerr v Kennedy [1942] 1 KB 409 at 413 per Asquith J.)
Pearce and Geddes (1988, p 63) summarised the contemporary position:
But care must be taken when considering a compound expression not to look up the
meaning of each word and from that construct the meaning of a phrase which may, in fact,
have acquired a special meaning: Lee v Showmen’s Guild (Great Britain) [1952] 2 QB 329
particularly per Somervell LJ at 338 (‘unfair competition’). Finally, there is no
‘authoritative’ dictionary. A court is free to consult whichever it pleases: cf Nairne v Stephen
Smith & Co Ltd [1943] 1 KB 17 where judge and counsel cited different dictionaries.
Reference must usually be to English dictionaries; cf the rejection by Davies LJ in Hardwick
Game Farm v Suffolk Agricultural Poultry Producers Association [1966] 1 WLR 287 at 310 of
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1961) on the basis that it provided the
American usage of the term ‘poultry’ not the British. But if words have, as it were, an
international meaning, reference may be made to other dictionaries: cf the use by
Northrop J of American dictionary definitions of a medical expression in Jackson v
Secretary, Department of Health (1987) 75 ALR 561 at 571. In Australia it is appropriate to
consult the Macquarie Dictionary: John While & Sons Pty Ltd v Changleng (1985) 2 NSWLR
163 at 164.
Circumstances of admissibility
[2.15.490] The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia has also held that it is
permissible for a tribunal to have regard to a medical dictionary for the purpose of
ascertaining the meaning of a term such as ‘compensation neurosis’: Kilpatrick v
Commonwealth (1985) 9 FCR 36 at 41–42. However, if the passage in a dictionary raises a
new point, the parties have to be given an opportunity to deal with it: Re K (Infants) [1963]
Ch 381 at 405–406 per Upjohn LJ; Brinkley v Brinkley [1965] P 75 per Scarman J; Kilpatrick v
Commonwealth (1985) 9 FCR 36 at 41–42; Gordon M Jenkins v Coleman (1989) 87 ALR 477 at
484–485.
However, textbooks are not in the same category as dictionaries; they contain the
opinions of experts not called to give evidence: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Hamersley
Iron Pty Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 251 at 273. When experts rely on material in textbooks and
journals to refresh or confirm their memory or as the basis for their general views, such
material does not thereby become independent evidence and ‘in the ordinary course will
not be admitted into evidence’: Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd
(1980) 33 ALR 251 at 273.
However, once a word is used in a specialist, foreign or unusual sense, expert evidence
may well be able to be adduced in proof of that fact: Pepsi Seven-Up Bottlers Perth Pty Ltd v
Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 62 FCR 289 at 297; Marquis Camden v Inland Revenue
Commissioners [1914] 1 KB 641 at 650; Herbert Adams Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of
Taxation (1932) 47 CLR 222 at 227. ‘The principal respects in which expert evidence in
relation to meaning may be adduced are where a customary meaning within a particular
market or trade or where the court wishes to place itself in the “factual matrix” of the
parties’: Hodgkinson (1990, p 159); see also Reardon Smith Line Ltd v Yngvar Hansen Tangen
[1976] 1 WLR 989 at 997; Marinovich v The Queen (1990) 46 A Crim R 282 at 299.
Thus, expert evidence has been admitted in relation to the words ‘in turn to deliver’ in
a charterparty because the words only assumed meaning when interpreted in terms of the
regulations and practices of the port of Algiers (Robertson v Jackson (1845) 2 CB 412; 135 ER
1006); and in relation to the terms ‘Penang pink’, ‘pink rock’ and ‘hammer’ in the drug
underworld context. Similarly, as ‘beneficiation’ is not a word used in ordinary parlance
and as the word ‘drossing’ was not used in its ordinary sense in Re Western Mining Corp
and Collector of Customs (WA) (1984) 5 ALN N456, expert evidence was held to be
appropriate to explain their meanings. In Max Cooper & Sons Pty Ltd v City of Sydney (1980)
54 ALJR 234 at 239, expert evidence was given about the meaning understood within the
building industry of the terms ‘loading’ and ‘pay loading’.
[2.15.490] 107
To a similar effect, in Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia

(2003) 131 FCR 300; [2003] FCA 977 at 431, Tamberlin J held that expert evidence is
admissible on the meaning of words on the basis that it is of assistance in understanding
more fully the relevance and practical content of concepts that can have a technical
meaning, such as ‘competition’, ‘efficiency’ and ‘market’.
Foreign and trade words

[2.15.500] Facts notorious to people in a particular locality or a particular profession or
trade may be judicially noticed after the judge has been appropriately informed: Malone v
Smith (1945) 63 WN (NSW) 54; Blatchford v Dempsey [1956] SASR 285; Gasso v Love [1980]
VR 163; Brilliant Gold Mining Co v Craven (1898) 9 QLJ 144; Marinovich v The Queen (1990)
46 A Crim R 282 at 299.
If a document contains words in a foreign language, an interpreter is used and expert
evidence may be given of the laws and practice in the foreign jurisdiction. If a document
contains technical terms, ‘an expert may explain them’: Lovell and Christmas Ltd v Wall
(1911) 104 LT 85. Thus, in 1494, in construing a bond which contained certain doubtful
words, the court called to its assistance a number of ‘masters of grammar’: anon 98 HV 11
16, 18. Later, in 1555, there is a statement that the court was accustomed to call for
grammarians when its Latin ‘halted a little’: Buckley v Rice Thomas (1554) 1 Plowd 118; 75
ER 182. This same procedure became well established in the interpretation of commercial
instruments: see Pickering v Barkley (1649) Styles 132; 82 ER 587; Biggs (1985, p 314).
If, according to the custom of a trade or the usage of the marketplace, a word or
expression has acquired a specialised or secondary meaning, expert evidence may be
given to prove that fact. Thus, in Lovell and Christmas Ltd v Wall (1911) 104 LT 85, reference
was made to the description ‘100 oysters’ as meaning 120 and evidence was permitted in
relation to the meaning of the term ‘provision merchant’. In the 1864 case of Curtis v Peek
(1864) 13 WR 230, experts from the colonial broking trade were permitted to give evidence
that the word ‘vermicelli’ was generally taken within the trade’s contractual arrangements
to mean ‘sound vermicelli’. In Herbert Adams Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation
(1932) 47 CLR 222, trade evidence was permitted as to the phrase ‘pastry but not including
cakes or biscuits’. However, Byles J sounded a warning for counsel seeking to adduce
expert evidence to show that the real meaning of words in the trade was at variance with
the normal everyday meaning, pointing out that the custom must first be established
before the question is put as to the specialised meaning. The custom must be certain and
notorious, and not unreasonable in the circumstances: Devonald v Rosser [1906] 2 KB 728.
However, expert evidence may not be given about how a ‘follow the settlement’ clause
would be expected to be applied to the circumstances of a case and, in particular, how the
reinsurance market would interpret a reinsurance clause: Royal Insurance v GIO [1994] 1
VR 123 at 133.
Hodgkinson (1990, p 157) suggested a further category in which expert evidence may
be admissible: ‘where words carry an ordinary meaning which the court can elucidate
unassisted, but one party asserts that although no trade custom (in the legal sense) is
advanced, the words were intended to bear a special meaning’. (See Joseph Crosfield & Sons
Ltd v Techno-Chemical Laboratories Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 378 at 379.)
Words in statutes
[2.15.510] Evidence as to the meaning of words in statutes was held in 1914 to be ‘wholly
inadmissible … the court must take judicial cognisance of the language used without
evidence’: Camden Marquis v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1914] 1 KB 641 at 650; see also
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 251 at 272 per
Gobbo J. This approach was affirmed more recently by the Privy Council in General
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp v Commissioner of Payroll Tax (1982) 56 ALJR 775 at 777;
[1982] UKPC 26, when the prima facie position was stated to be that ‘expert evidence as to
108 [2.15.500]
the meaning of ordinary English words in a modern Act of Parliament of general

application is not admissible’. However, the Judicial Committee went on to comment: ‘It is
not possible to construe any statute entirely in the air. Like any written document, it must
be viewed against a background of surrounding circumstances, and this commonly
emerges upon proof of the factual situation to which the statute is sought to be applied.’ It
ruled that evidence from an expert as to the behaviour of insurance company
representatives and the understanding of such representatives of the term ‘insurance
canvasser or collector’ was admissible. The reason given was that the term was not ‘one of
general application’ but confined to the insurance industry and its practices.
Australian law was summarised by Griffiths J in Uber BV v Federal Commissioner of
Taxation (2017) 247 FCR 462; [2017] FCA 110 at [104]: (noting that his Honour’s decision
was upheld on appeal (see [129] below)).
(a) It is well-established that the courts will refuse to admit evidence for the purpose
of interpreting a word used in a statute in accordance with its ordinary English
meaning (see Australian Gas Light Company v Valuer-General (1940) 40 SR (NSW)
126 at 137 per Jordan CJ).
(b) Evidence may, however, be admitted as to the meaning of a word used in a statute
where that word is used in a trade or technical sense and that usage differs from the
ordinary English meaning of the word (see Herbert Adams at 227-228).
(c) Even where a word is used in its ordinary meaning, evidence may be admitted to
understand the context of the legislation under consideration, such as the evidence of
experts as to what constituted ‘mining’ in interpreting the phrase ‘mining operations’
in s 122(1) of the then Income Tax Assessment Act 1936-1966 (Cth) in Commissioner of
Taxationv ICI Australia 127 CLR 529 at 544–545 per Walsh J.
Technical terms
[2.15.520] It is only if the court is satisfied that expert evidence is necessary for the
construction of technical terms in a statute that it will be permitted: London and North-East
Railway v Berriman [1946] AC 278 at 294 per Lord MacMillan; Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR
382 at 386 per Gowans J; see also Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Henderson (1943) 68
CLR 29; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v ICI (Aust) Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 529 (‘mining
operations’: evidence given without objection). The language of an Act of Parliament ‘is to
be taken in its ordinary signification, unless some secondary meaning is proved’: Whitton
v Falkiner (1915) 20 CLR 118 at 127; see also Bendixen v Coleman (1943) 68 CLR 401 at 420.
Where a term commonly employed in litigation (such as ‘biodiversity’) is used, a court
may determine that it needs no expert evidence in relation to it, especially if it is a
specialist court: Shellharbour City Council v Minister for Planning (2011) 189 LGERA 348;
[2011] NSWCA 195 at [12].
Hill J has summarised the principles as follows:
In construing a statute, evidence may be given of the meaning and usage of a word in a
trade:
(1) Where it is clear that a word in the statute is used in a specialised or trade sense
and that usage differs from the ordinary English usage of the word. The courts
will be more ready to conclude that the word is used in a specialised or trade
usage where the statute to be construed is a revenue law directed to commerce.
(2) Where the word is used in a specialised or trade sense in the statute, the word
has an accepted trade usage and it is necessary to determine whether that trade
usage differs from the ordinary English usage.
(3) Where the word is used in a specialised or trade sense in the statute and it is
necessary to determine whether there is an accepted trade usage as a preliminary
to showing that that usage differs from the ordinary English usage.
(4) Where the word used in the statute is directed to a particular trade and there has
not been occasion for a widespread adoption by the general public of the word or
a particular denotation of a word.
[2.15.520] 109
(5) Where the trade usage assists in supplying the context or background of
surrounding circumstances necessary to the construction of a word used in the
statute.
(6) Where the trade usage may assist the court by way of background to determine
whether the word used in the statute is used in a specialised or trade usage or in
accordance with ordinary English usage.
(See Pepsi Seven-Up Bottlers Perth Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 62 FCR 289 at
298–299; see also Michael, Re; Ex parte Epic Energy (WA) Nominees Pty Ltd (2002) 25 WAR
511; [2002] WASCA 231; General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp Ltd v Commissioner of
Pay-Roll Tax (NSW) (1982) 56 ALJR 775.)
Expert evidence has been admitted in England as to whether cannabis leaves were part
of the ‘flowering and fruiting tops’ referred to in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (UK)
(Harding v Hayes [1974] Crim LR 713), but engineers have not been permitted to interpret
certain words in a statutory railway plan: Dowling v Pontypool, Caerleon & Newport Railway
Co (1874) LR 18 Eq 714.
With the passage of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the
admissibility of evidence on the meaning of words was revisited: see, eg, Pepsi Seven-Up
Bottlers Perth Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 62 FCR 289; Dyson v Pharmacy Board
of New South Wales (2000) 50 NSWLR 523; [2000] NSWSC 981 per Austin J. In Dyson,
Austin J held that since s 80 has abolished the ultimate issue rule, the general position is
that evidence going to an ultimate issue which is tendered in the form of expert evidence
is admissible unless it is not relevant or the witness does not have specialised expertise.
However, he found that the rule that evidence cannot be given as to the meaning of an
ordinary English word in a statute or document is not just an application of the ultimate
issue rule but a special and particular rule: at [36]. He found the justification to lie with the
special responsibility of judges in interpreting the written word, which requires them to
balance considerations relating to the context of particular words in a statute or document,
the circumstances surrounding the making of the instrument, and admissible evidence
about the intention of the authors: at [36]. He concluded, therefore, that a lexicographer’s
evidence about the ordinary meaning of a word used in a statute or document remains
generally inadmissible under the uniform evidence legislation in Australia. However, he
found an exception to permit evidence to be given that the ordinary meaning of a word
has changed since the last publication of the dictionary meaning (at [38]):
No traditionally published dictionary can keep up with changes to modern language,
especially where new technology (such as the Internet and modern telephony) touches
everyday lives. In an area where the court most needs assistance in giving a contemporary
meaning to language, it must be permissible for it to receive expert evidence of a changed
or new meaning.
Expert evidence on foreign law

[2.15.560] An expert is not permitted to give evidence of opinion on a matter of legal or
moral obligation: R v Hally [1962] Qd R 214 at 228; Campbell v Rickards (1833) 5 B & Ad 840
at 845; 110 ER 1001 at 1003; Ex parte Little [1909] St R Qd 83 at 87. However, foreign law
and its meaning are not matters of common knowledge (see Ch 15.0). Thus, expert
evidence in respect of them is generally permitted by the courts. It is standard for a rule of
foreign law to be proved by calling an expert witness, rather than merely by producing a
copy of a legislative text: Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11 Cl & F 85; 8 ER 1034.
The importance of adducing expert evidence is highlighted by the longstanding
presumption that the law outside the jurisdiction is the same as that obtaining within it
unless the contrary is proved: Law Reform Committee (1970, p 27). Such a finding,
however, is treated as one of fact in the particular case (Concha v Murieta (1889) 40 Ch D
543 at 550; Bremer v Freeman (1857) 1 Deane Ecc R 192; 164 ER 546; 10 Moo PC 306; 14 ER
110 [2.15.560]
508) and does not constitute binding precedent for later cases: Law Reform Committee
(1970, p 27). If the same point again arises, it must be proved afresh by expert evidence.
Though generally regarded as a question of fact and not a subject for expert opinion,
foreign law is decided by the judge alone and is not properly a subject for judicial notice:
Lloyd v Guibert (1865) LR 1 QB 115; 122 ER 1134; Sykes and Pryles (1991). Fentiman (1992,
p 149) has suggested that the version of foreign law ‘eventually applied by the court is a
novel alloy of the judge’s own making which surprises both parties and probably satisfies
neither’. He notes that when rules of foreign law are satisfactorily proved but the foreign
rules of statutory interpretation are not, the court will interpret the rules according to
English canons of construction: Baron de Bode’s Case (1845) 8 QB 208 at 251, 265–266; 115 ER
854 at 870, 875–876; Catrique v Imrie (1870) LR 4 HL 414 at 430; Higgins v Ewing’s Trustees
1925 SC 440. And where the point in issue ‘is uncertain or ambiguous under foreign law
the court will undertake to decide the point itself’ (Fentiman (1992, p 149)), as it will
resolve conflicting testimony where it must: Concha v Murieta (1889) 40 Ch D 543; Guaranty
Trust Corp (New York) v Hannay [1918] 2 KB 623; Russian Commercial & Industrial Bank v
Comptoir d’Escompte de Mulhouse [1923] 2 KB 631; Re Duke of Wellington [1947] Ch 506.
Under ss 174–176 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the
Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the
Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT), simplified measures are put in place for
proving aspects of foreign law by appropriate documentation. In James Hardie & Co v Hall
(1998) 43 NSWLR 554 at 573, Sheller JA affirmed that it remains possible after the passage
of the legislation for foreign law to be proved as a fact by skilled expert witnesses. He
noted that even if the evidence of such a witness is uncontradicted, the court is not bound
to accept it, but found that a court should be reluctant to reject it unless it is patently
absurd or inconsistent: ‘An Australian court should only in exceptional circumstances
make a finding about the meaning and effect of a foreign statute, over many years applied
daily in the country concerned, contrary to the uncontradicted evidence of a qualified
expert in the law of that country’ (at 573).
Evidence of professional practice

[2.15.600] Evidence about professional practice by lawyers or other professionals is
admissible in limited circumstances. The issue of admissibility has been particularly
canvassed in relation to solicitors’ practice. Evidence of the existence of relevant practices
among solicitors of good repute and competency is admissible and can be established by
expert evidence: Maronis Holdings Ltd v Nippon Credit Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 38 ACSR 404
at 449; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler (No 1) (2002) 20 ACLC 222;
[2001] NSWSC 1103. However, evidence of what a particular solicitor herself or himself
would have done is not admissible: Permanent Trustee Aust Ltd v Boulton (1994) 33 NSWLR
735 at 738; MacIndoe v Parbery [1994] Aust Torts Reports 61,535. In addition, it has been
held in MB v Protective Commissioner (2000) 50 NSWLR 24; [2000] NSWSC 717 at [10] that:
so long as the evidence is not directed at the legal standard to be applied, so long as it is
based on fully stated hypothetical facts, and so long as the witness is properly qualified,
then an opinion can be given as to what a competent and careful professional would do in
those stated circumstances.
Expert evidence in passing off cases

[2.15.640] The requirement that expert evidence provide a perspective or source of
assistance to tribunals of fact above and beyond what they would already appreciate has
been particularly pertinent to passing off cases. As Branson J observed in Cat Media Pty Ltd
v Opti-Healthcare Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 133 at [55], after noting that both sides had called
evidence of marketing consultants which was received without objection:
[2.15.640] 111
However, I consider it appropriate to record that in the particular circumstances of this

case, which is concerned with the packaging of a product intended to appeal to a wide
segment of the general public, I have found the expert evidence of no real assistance. This
is not only because there is, as is common in cases of this kind, conflict between the
evidence of the two experts. It seems to me that evidence of opinions based on market
research and expert appreciation of consumer behaviour will rarely be of assistance in
litigation where the court’s primary concern is with the behaviour to be expected of, and
the judgments likely to be made by, ordinary (even if it might be thought, somewhat
credulous) members of the community intent on making a relatively modest purchase in a
conventional way. I endorse the comment of Beaumont J in Pacific Publications Pty Ltd v
IPC Media Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 104 at [92] that where a claim is essentially a matter for the
court’s impression, expert views which are merely ‘impressionistic’ can be given no more
than nominal weight. These observations are not intended in any way to belittle the
importance of market research and expert appreciation of consumer behaviour in other
types of cases and for other purposes.
In Domain Names Australia Pty Ltd v .au Domain Administration Pty Ltd (2004) 139 FCR 215;
[2004] FCAFC 247 at [22]–[23], a Full Court of the Federal Court noted that there is
‘practical wisdom’ in the:
firm rule that the likelihood of conduct being misleading or deceptive is a question for the
tribunal of fact and not for any witness to decide: General Electric Co (USA) v General
Electric Co Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 729 at 738 per Lord Diplock, applied in a s 52 context by
Gummow J, with whom Black CJ and Lockhart J agreed, in Interlego AG v Croner Trading
Pty Ltd (1992) 39 FCR 348 at 387.
Lord Diplock points out in General Electric that a different rule applies in the case of
sales not to the general public but in specialised markets concerning persons engaged in a
particular trade. In the present case the relevant market is that in which the consumers are
business users of domain names. Such users constitute large sections of the public and are
not participants in a specialised market in the sense discussed by Lord Diplock.
In Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2006) 228 ALR 719;
[2006] FCA 363, the issue arose acutely before Heerey J. In the context of a case involving
the adoption by a rival company of a colour in marketing chocolates that was said to be
associated with another brand, the plaintiff sought to rely on affidavits by an Associate
Professor of Marketing and Behavioural Science in the Melbourne Business School at the
University of Melbourne. His proposed evidence in summary (at [5]) was that:
Misidentification is when consumers seeking to buy Cadbury chocolate mistakenly
identify a Darrell Lea product as a Cadbury product, and therefore buy the Darrell Lea
product by mistake. Harm to Cadbury from misidentification can take the form of sales
lost to Darrell Lea, induced ‘trailing’ of Darrell Lea’s products, blame from consumers for
the confusing common use of colour by the two brands, and damaged consumer attitudes
toward Cadbury due to cognitive dissonance …
Miscuing is when consumers use purple as a spurious cue in decision making and
choice; in this capacity the colour can function as a decision-heuristic [a shorthand rule or
‘rule of thumb’ functioning to reduce decision-making effort while maintaining an
acceptable level of accuracy] cue, an operant-conditioning [a form of learning in which
modification of behaviour is brought about by the consequences that follow upon the
occurrence of the behaviour (for example, reward)] cue, or a behaviour-instigating cue.
Harm to Cadbury from miscuing takes the form of sales lost to Darrell Lea.
Misinference is when consumers, in trying to make sense of the common use of purple
by Darrell Lea and Cadbury, draw mistaken inferences about one or both of the brands.
Harm to Cadbury from misinference can take the form of enhanced consumer attitudes
towards its competitor Darrell Lea, reduced brand control by Cadbury, and perhaps,
damaged consumer attitudes toward Cadbury.
Misassociation is when consumers mistakenly link Cadbury brand associations with
Darrell Lea, and vice versa, as a result of the two brands’ associative networks [a framework
for understanding how pieces of semantic information interact in an individual’s memory
112 [2.15.640]
in which concepts or other information stored in memory are represented by nodes that
are interconnected in a network of links] having become connected in consumers’ minds
through the common use of purple.
However, while Heerey J accepted that marketing and behavioural science is an organised
and recognised area of specialised knowledge and that the witness had training, study
and experience within that area, he held that the issues which arose before him concerning
the making of consumer decisions for the purchase of everyday items of commerce ‘are
not outside the knowledge or experience of ordinary persons’. He held the evidence of the
expert inadmissible. In part, he relied upon the decision of Transport Publishing Co Pty Ltd
v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 at 119, where Dixon CJ, Kitto and Taylor JJ
said: ‘[I]t may be said at once that ordinary human nature, that of people at large, is not a
subject of proof by evidence, whether supposedly expert or not.’ He found (at [16]) that
the ‘raison d’être’ of the expert’s evidence is:
to attempt to persuade the Court what ordinary human nature will lead people to do
when making purchasing decisions about Darrell Lea chocolates, given the respective
packaging, advertising etc of that firm and Cadbury. As the very name of Dr Gibbs’
discipline conveys, he is concerned with the science of human behaviour. That is without
doubt an area of specialised knowledge. But Transport Publishing says that ordinary human
behaviour is not a matter to be proved in courts by opinion evidence, whether expert or
otherwise.
The decision is consistent with those of Dalgety Spillers Foods Ltd v Food Brokers Ltd [1994]
FSR 504 at 527 and Symonds Cider & English Wine Co Ltd v Showerings (Ireland) Ltd [1997]
IEHC 1 at [20]. In Dalgety, Blackburne J held that opinion evidence will not be admissible
where ‘the experience which a judge must be taken to possess as an ordinary shopper or
consumer will enable him, just as well as any other, to assess the likelihood of confusion’.
[2.15.640] 113
APPENDIX 1
APPENDIX: POTENTIAL AREAS OF EXPERT EVIDENCE BY
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS
[2.15.1500]
Sentencing
Impairment post-accident
Eyewitness identification
Aural identification
Involuntary admission under mental health legislation
Competence to give evidence
Fitness to be interviewed
Fitness to plead/stand trial
Criminal responsibility; diminished responsibility
Capacity to work
Degree and impacts of intellectual disability
Effects of trauma
Effects of stress
Behaviour common to victims of trauma
Insanity/Mental impairment defence
Operation of memory
Propensity to lie because of mental illness or personality disorder
Trademark infringement and fraudulent advertising
Professional malpractice
Causation of death as a result of mental state
Need for guardianship
Custodial and access arrangements
Effects of discrimination
Capacity to understand instructions
Capacity to write or speak at a certain level of sophistication
Responses common to victims of physical or sexual assault
Consequences of torture
Psychological autopsy
Suicidality
114 [2.15.1500]
Chapter 2.20
THE BASIS RULE

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [2.20.01]
The controversy ..................................................................................................................... [2.20.20]
The Dasreef gloss .................................................................................................................... [2.20.22]
The significance of the issue ............................................................................................... [2.20.40]
The underlying inconsistency ............................................................................................. [2.20.60]
Evidence not of truth but of the basis of opinion ........................................................... [2.20.80]
Application of the rule ......................................................................................................... [2.20.100]
The basis rule of exclusion ..................................................................................................
The leading authority? ......................................................................................................... [2.20.120]
Civil authorities: Australia .................................................................................................. [2.20.140]
Criminal authorities: Australia ........................................................................................... [2.20.160]
Pervasive uncertainty ........................................................................................................... [2.20.180]
United Kingdom authorities ............................................................................................... [2.20.200]
Primary facts v secondary facts in R v Abadom ............................................................... [2.20.220]
Extension of the category of admissible hearsay ............................................................ [2.20.240]
The position in Scotland and Northern Ireland .............................................................. [2.20.260]
A matter of weight ................................................................................................................ [2.20.280]
The principle in Ramsay v Watson ...................................................................................... [2.20.300]
Extension of the principle .................................................................................................... [2.20.320]
Weight, not inadmissibility .................................................................................................. [2.20.340]
Sufficiency of similarity between opinion and facts ....................................................... [2.20.360]
The rule against self-serving evidence .............................................................................. [2.20.380]
Acceptable bases of expert evidence ................................................................................. [2.20.400]
Reliance on professional reading ....................................................................................... [2.20.420]
Partly forming the basis of opinions ................................................................................. [2.20.440]
Attitude of the courts ........................................................................................................... [2.20.460]
Contemporaneous statements as to health, made to an expert ................................... [2.20.480]
Patient’s declarations admissible as evidence as to truth ............................................. [2.20.500]
Unacceptable bases of expert evidence ............................................................................. [2.20.520]
Persuasive presentation of expert evidence ..................................................................... [2.20.540]
‘And since among men dwelling together one man should
deal with another as with himself in what he is not
self-sufficient, therefore it is needful that he be able to stand
with as much certainty on what another knows but of which
he is ignorant, as upon the truths which he himself knows.
Hence it is that in human society faith is necessary in order
that one man give credence to the words of another, and this
is the foundation of justice.’
Aquinas, Commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate, qv III, art i 3.
‘As a matter of principle, as exemplified by the authorities,

experts can speak of many matters with authority if their
training and experience entitle them to do so, notwithstanding
that they cannot describe in detail the basis of knowledge in
related areas. Professional people in the guise of experts can
no longer be polymaths; they must, in this modern era, rely
on others to provide much of their acquired expertise. Their
particular talent is that they know where to go to acquire that
knowledge in a reliable form.’
Ormiston JA in R v Noll [1999] 3 VR 704; [1999] VSCA 164 at [3].
Introduction
[2.20.01] Expert witnesses may give evidence in two forms: evidence of fact – what they
have perceived with their senses; and evidence of opinion – the views that they have
formed by way of inference from facts: see, eg, Wilson v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Scottish
Criminal Cases Review Commission Referral) [2009] ScotHC HCJAC 58.
[2.20.01] 115
A high percentage of the evidence given by experts is in the first category –

descriptions of what they have perceived. When they give evidence in this form, in spite
of the fact that one of their attributes as experts may be their discernment as observers and
recorders of information, they are subject to the same rules of evidence as apply to lay
witnesses: Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457; [2005] FCA 50 at [156]; Bodney
v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84; [2008] FCAFC 63 at [94]. Thus, in principle, they cannot give
evidence which is in the form of hearsay when the evidence is as to the truth of the
hearsay material: eg, ‘the director of the company told me that …’; ‘my technician saw the
following reaction’.
However, when they give evidence of opinion, some leeway has regularly been
extended to them by a pragmatic bending of the hearsay rule. The extent of this leeway
has become problematic. Probably because of this sensible but somewhat unconceptual
circumvention of the hearsay rule, the most controversial and most litigated issue in
expert evidence law in modern times has been the status of expert opinion evidence when
not all of its factual bases have been proved to the court: that is to say, when the opinion
evidence is wholly or in part based upon hearsay. If a basis rule exists at common law,
such basis material, at least in some contexts, must be proved by admissible evidence. If it
does not, the issue is merely one of the weight to be given to evidence that relies upon
material not adduced to the court. This chapter addresses the issue of the extent to which
experts can give opinions which are wholly or partly based upon material which is:
• not identified;
• not proved;
• not adduced as dismissible evidence;
• generally understood or resorted to by professionals of the kind giving evidence; or
• in the form of assumptions.
In respect of each of these categories, the difficulty is that such material, if not properly
placed before a court so that it can be evaluated, may play a significant and possibly
unclear part in influencing the expert opinions, and therefore can affect their probative
value. Part of the difficulty for fact-finders goes to how reports and even oral evidence are
presented to courts, but also to the substantive issue of the reasoning process employed by
experts which underlies the progression from data to opinions and inferences.
The controversy
[2.20.20] In the 1980s, it was argued by some authors (Phipson (1982); Field (1988);
Freckelton (1983; 1987)) that a rule was emerging or already existed which precluded the
giving of expert opinions where the bases of the experts’ opinions were not proved to the
satisfaction of the court: this is ‘the basis rule’. A question is whether at common law this
operates as an exclusionary rule of evidence (like, for instance, the hearsay rule), or
whether it is no more than a guideline which impacts upon the probative value of
evidence.
Decisions from the New South Wales, Queensland and Victorian Supreme Courts have
made it clear that while flexibility is applied in civil proceedings where a jury is absent,
the presence of a jury in criminal proceedings has led to the development of an
exclusionary common law rule of admissibility when expert opinion evidence is proffered
to the court without its bases having been proved to the requisite degree: R v Turner [1975]
1 QB 834; R v Abadom [1983] 1 WLR 126; 1 All ER 364; 76 Crim App R 48 at 369; Hilder v
The Queen (1997) 97 A Crim R 70 at 79; R v Perry (1990) 49 A Crim R 243 at 249; R v Aldridge
(1990) 20 NSWLR 737 at 774; R v Haidley [1984] VR 229 at 234 per Young CJ; R v Lee (1989)
116 [2.20.20]
The basis rule | CH 2.20
42 A Crim R 393; R v Gardiner [1980] Qd R 531 at 535 per Lucas J, with whom Stable and
Campbell JJ agreed; see also Bevan Investments Ltd v Blackhall & Struthers (No 2) [1978] 2
NZLR 97 at 122.
The approach regularly adopted by judges in civil cases has long been flexible,
allowing leeway in the giving of expert evidence in the expectation or on the assurance
that foundational material will duly be adduced. If it is not, or if there is ambiguity over
the quality of the basis material, little or no weight is attached to the opinion evidence
constructed upon it.
The Dasreef gloss

[2.20.22] While the balance of common law authority in Australia is in favour of a basis
rule which excludes expert opinion evidence, especially in criminal trials before juries,
where its bases (other than materials generally relied on by experts in the relevant area)
are not the subject of admitted evidence, a different view was expressed by Heydon J in
Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21. His Honour concluded that
at common law there exists:
• an assumption identification rule, which provides that expert evidence is inadmissible
unless the facts on which the opinion is based are stated by the expert by way of proof
if the expert can admissibly prove them, otherwise as assumptions to be proved in
other ways (at [64]). He contended that the rule facilitates the ‘proof of assumption rule’
(see below), helping to distinguish between what the expert has observed and what the
expert has been told; to ensure that the expert is basing the opinion only on relevant
facts; to ensure that experts do not pick and choose for themselves what aspects of the
primary evidence they reject, what they accept, how they interpret it, and what the
court should find; and to ascertain whether there is substantial correspondence between
the facts assumed and the evidence admitted to establish them (at [65]);
• a proof of assumption rule, which provides that an expert opinion is not admissible unless
evidence has been, or will be, admitted, whether from the expert or from some other
source, which is capable of supporting findings of fact which are sufficiently similar to
the factual assumptions on which the opinion was stated to be based to render the
opinion of value (at [66]); and
• a statement of reasoning rule, which provides that an expert opinion is inadmissible
unless the expert states in chief the reasoning by which the expert conclusion arrived at
flows from the facts proved or assumed by the expert so as to reveal that the opinion is
based on the expert’s expertise. The court does not have to be satisfied that the
reasoning is correct: ‘the giving of correct expert evidence cannot be treated as a
qualification necessary for giving expert evidence’ (Commissioner for Government
Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292 at 303 per Menzies J). But the reasoning must be
stated. The opposing party is not to be left to find out about the expert’s thinking for
the first time in cross-examination (at [91]). He contended that the rule ‘protects
cross-examiners by enabling them to go straight to the heart of any difference between
the parties without the delay of preliminary reconnoitring. It also aids the court in a
non-jury trial, because at the end of the trial it is the duty of the court to give reasons
for its conclusions. And it aids jurors, because at the end of the trial they have the duty
of assessing the rational force of expert evidence. If there is not some exposition of the
expert’s reasoning it will be impossible for the court to compose a judgment stating,
and for the jurors to assemble, reasons for accepting or rejecting or qualifying the
expert’s conclusion’ (at [93]).
His Honour contended that each of these rules survived into the uniform evidence scheme
(see [3.0.152]).
The plurality in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21 found the
trial judge to have erred in concluding that the expert’s numerical or quantitative opinion
[2.20.22] 117
was wholly or substantially based on his specialised knowledge based on training, study
or experience. It was noted (at [41]–[42]) that:
What has been called the basis rule is a rule directed to the facts of the particular case
about which an expert is asked to proffer an opinion and the facts upon which the expert
relies to form the opinion expressed. The point which is now made is a point about
connecting the opinion expressed by a witness with the witness’s specialised knowledge
based on training, study or experience.
A failure to demonstrate that an opinion expressed by a witness is based on the
witness’s specialised knowledge based on training, study or experience is a matter that
goes to the admissibility of the evidence, not its weight.
They provided no endorsement to the existence of any form of a basis rule, still less an
‘assumption identification rule’, a ‘proof of assumption rule’ or a ‘statement of reasoning
rule’.
The plurality (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) found the trial
judge to have erred in concluding that the expert’s numerical or quantitative opinion was
wholly or substantially based on his specialised knowledge based on training, study or
experience. It noted (at [41]): ‘what has been called “the basis rule”: a rule by which
opinion evidence is to be excluded unless the factual bases upon which the opinion is
proffered are established by other evidence. Whether that rule formed part of the common
law of evidence need not be examined.’
The plurality made no reference to, and did not employ the terminology of, an
‘assumption identification rule’, a ‘proof of assumption rule’, or a ‘statement of reasoning
rule’. In these circumstances, the views of Heydon J must be categorised as those of the
minority, with the result that their status is yet to be finally determined. However, his
analysis has been applied on a significant number of occasions: see, eg, Campton v
Centennial Newstan Pty Ltd (No 1) [2014] NSWSC 304; Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd
(Ruling No 38) [2014] VSC 102.
In Taub v The Queen (2017) 95 NSWLR 388 at [30]–[32], Simpson JA made the important
and, with respect, clearly correct point that in Dasreef:
The plurality declined to engage with the question whether the ‘proof of assumption rule’
(what their Honours called the ‘basis rule’) existed at common law; such a rule, their
Honours said, was directed to the facts of a particular case. From that it might be inferred
that their Honours considered that whether the facts upon which the opinion was based
are established as true is a question that goes not to admissibility, but to the weight to be
attributed to the opinion expressed. This is also the analysis of Schmidt J in Kyluk Pty Ltd
v Chief Executive, Office of Environment and Heritage (2013) 298 ALR 532; [2013] NSWCCA
114 at [176]–[177].
It seems to me that the difference between Heydon J and the plurality lies in the rigour
with which Heydon J would insist on the availability of evidence to prove the truth, or
correctness, of the assumptions or facts forming the foundation of the opinion as a
condition of admissibility and at the time admissibility is being considered. It is not the
position of Heydon J that, before evidence of the opinion could be admitted, it was
necessary that the assumptions or facts be proved to be true or correct; rather, it was
necessary that it be shown that ultimately the evidence would be capable of establishing
that the facts or assumptions were true or correct. To insist on the availability of evidence
to prove the truth of the assumptions enhances efficiency of the trial process (see [127]).
Whether the evidence succeeds in establishing the truth of the facts is a question for the
trier of fact.
The plurality, on the other hand, would allow admission of the opinion evidence
provided the reasoning was exposed, reserving to the tribunal of fact whether the
evidence was sufficient to establish the truth or correctness of the assumptions or facts.
Failure to prove the truth of the assumptions would render the opinion evidence of little
or no value.
118 [2.20.22]
The significance of the issue

[2.20.40] The issue arises in many practical contexts – for instance, doctors regularly form
and express views which have their genesis in tests done by other doctors or technicians,
discussions with colleagues, and information provided by relatives and friends of the
patient. Likewise, the documents relied upon by a forensic accountant can be extremely
extensive. Logistical difficulties of no mean proportion would be posed if every person
who had provided information to the doctor giving expert evidence and every person
responsible for the creation of every document to which a forensic accountant had
reference had to be called to court before the doctor or accountant was permitted to
express his or her view. In short, many jurisdictions in the court system would become
unworkable.
The general approach of the courts has been articulated by Ormiston JA in R v Noll
[1999] 3 VR 704; [1999] VSCA 164 at [3]:
As a matter of principle, as exemplified by the authorities, experts can speak of many
matters with authority if their training and experience entitle them to do so,
notwithstanding that they cannot describe in detail the basis of knowledge in related
areas. Professional people in the guise of experts can no longer be polymaths; they must,
in this modern era, rely on others to provide much of their acquired expertise. Their
particular talent is that they know where to go to acquire that knowledge in a reliable
form.
(See, too, R v Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1; [2001] SASC 64 at [69].) However, without clear
explication of the bases upon which experts purport to offer expert opinions, evaluation of
those opinions has been regarded by the courts as at least problematic, if not impossible.
As Heydon J in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21 at [90]
explained:
If the expert’s conclusion does not have some rational relationship with the facts proved, it
is irrelevant. That is because in not tending to establish the conclusion asserted, it lacks
probative capacity. Opinion evidence is a bridge between data in the form of primary
evidence and a conclusion which cannot be reached without the application of expertise.
The bridge cannot stand if the primary evidence end of it does not exist. The expert
opinion is then only a misleading jumble, uselessly cluttering up the evidentiary scene.
A similar approach was taken by Wessels JA in Coopers (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekämpfung Mbh 1976 (3) SA 352 at 371:
an expert’s opinion represents his reasoned conclusion based on certain facts or data,
which are either common cause, or established by his own evidence or that of some of her
competent witnesses. Except possibly where it is not controverted, an expert’s bald
statement of his opinion is not of any real assistance. Proper evaluation of the opinion can
only be undertaken if the process of reasoning which led to the conclusion, including the
premises from which the reasoning proceeds, is disclosed by the expert.
The underlying inconsistency

[2.20.60] Fundamental issues underlie debate about the use to which basis material can be
put by experts in the formulation and expression of their opinion evidence. All experts
employ hearsay to some degree in forming their views:
The use of hearsay by experts occurs both at an explicit level, at which particular hearsay
sources are specifically referred to or produced in evidence, and at an implicit level, at
which it is assumed that many of the expert’s views will be informed by knowledge
gained externally to the case, and in particular from the books, articles, papers and
statistics through which the learning of a specialist discipline is disseminated to its
members.
[2.20.60] 119
(See Hodgkinson and James (2015, pp 305ff); see also Gillies (1991, p 385); Cross (1986,
p 723); Eggleston (1983, pp 153–154); Freckelton (1987, pp 92ff); R v Abadom [1983] 1 WLR
126; 1 All ER 364; 76 Crim App R 48.)
The question has always been one of determining the appropriate balance that allows
tribunals of fact adequately to evaluate the quality and reliability of expert evidence before
them. Too much hearsay as the basis of expert opinion makes it impossible to evaluate and
turns the expert into a conduit for someone else who cannot be cross-examined to test the
substance of his or her evidence.
As a matter of convenience, the courts have tended not to insist upon proof of the
extrinsic materials customarily employed by experts to perform their work – namely,
understanding obtained from the use of professional libraries and knowledge acquired in
the discharge of professional duties: see, eg, Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382 at 386; PQ v
Australian Red Cross Society [1992] 1 VR 19 at 35ff; H v Schering Chemicals Ltd [1983] 1 All
ER 849; R v Vivona (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 12 September 1994); R
v Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1; [2001] SASC 64 at [67]. An expert witness, in relying upon data
in authoritative publications, is not confined to confirming or correcting a recollection of
what is stated in the data. The witness can rely upon the data, which may be in the form
of a statement of either fact or opinion, without a previous knowledge of it: R v Karger
(2001) 83 SASR 1; [2001] SASC 64 at [67]. The distinction drawn has been expressed as an
insistence that when a particular passage (Davie v Magistrates of Edinburgh [1953] SC 34) of
another person’s work is cited, basis evidence must be adduced. Only a passage referred
to or quoted from as correctly stating a fact becomes part of an expert’s evidence and may
be relied upon as such by the judge and jury: PQ v Australian Red Cross Society [1992] 1 VR
19 at 35; Concha v Murieta (1889) 40 Ch D 543 at 554; Collier v Simpson (1831) 5 C & P 73;
172 ER 883; Cocks v Purday (1846) 2 Car & Kir 269; 175 ER 111; Sussex Peerage Case (1844) 11
Cl & F 85; 8 ER 1034 at 1046–1047; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd
(1980) 33 ALR 251 at 273–274. When an expert bases evidence on data in, for instance, an
authoritative scientific publication, it is the evidence of the witness which is put before the
court. The publication itself is not evidence of the truth of the statement it makes as to
data. If the witness refers to or quotes from an authoritative publication as correctly
stating a fact, what is referred to or quoted forms part of the testimony of the witness: R v
Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1; [2001] SASC 64 at [67]; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v
Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 251 at 273–274.
In Clambake Pty Ltd v Tipperary Projects Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 35 WAR 394; [2007]
WASCA 244 at [38]–[39], EM Heenan J observed:
It is well accepted that an expert may rely upon notice of notorious facts, even arcane
facts, which are known and accepted within his or her particular discipline, or which can
be ascertained from reputable and accepted sources of reference within that or other
disciplines. For example, a medical specialist may give an opinion which relies upon the
characteristic structures of DNA, or epidemiological theories about the aetiology of a
disease, even though that individual expert may not have carried out the studies to
demonstrate the theories or conclusions arrived at, or personally conducted or supervised
the research which led to the conclusions. Another example may be that a specialist in
Egyptian antiquities may very well, and could be expected to, examine the literature in
various libraries and other museums and repositories about the state of knowledge
concerning a particular dynasty before offering an opinion that some particular relic or
fragment was, or probably was, an example of the work of a particular period.
Part of the special qualifications of any expert must also be regarded as including the
knowledge and experience of that expert to identify and select suitable sources of
reference which can be treated as reliably contributing to, or underpinning, the opinion
offered by the individual. So, for example, if an expert is engaged to express an opinion
about the identity of an artist of a particular work, it could be expected that that expert
would consult and acknowledge reliable sources which contained examples of, or analysis
of, known works of such an artist or his contemporaries. The expert might also undertake
120 [2.20.60]
research into the materials available at the period when the artist lived and examine other
sources which the expert may accept as trustworthy in allowing him or her to form an
opinion as to the authenticity or otherwise of the individual work. Part of the expertise of
an individual specialist is to know where to look and to know how much reliability can be
given to various sources of reference and, on occasion, when to reject or to question
information coming from those sources.
Evidence not of truth but of the basis of opinion
[2.20.80] However, psychologists and psychiatrists, for instance, have been held to be able
to give evidence of what a person said to them in order to explain why they reached
certain opinions about the person’s state of mind or behaviour. This is because it is
evidence not of the truth of what was said, but merely of the basis of the opinion formed:
Ratten v The Queen [1972] AC 378 at 397; Subramanian v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965;
Re Plumbers and Gasfitters (1987) 72 ALR 415 at 433–434; see also R v Bradshaw [1985] Crim
LR 733. As a safety net, it is crucial that cross-examiners be stringent in ensuring that
experts not give important evidence which is based on the views of others – namely,
opinion evidence based on opinion. The unproven assumed information upon whose
basis experts provide opinions cannot be allowed to attain the status of facts simply
because the expert assumes them. Thus, when a doctor expressed an opinion based on the
reports of others as to whether adultery could be inferred from the fact that a wife had
contracted syphilis but her husband had not, it was pointed out that this did not assist in
the proof of the facts themselves. Evidence of the character of the disease from which she
was suffering could only be given by those who had personally examined her when she
first came to the hospital: Ramsdale v Ramsdale (1945) 173 LT 393 at 394; see also Thornton v
Royal Exchange Co (1791) Peake 37; 170 ER 70; Hodgkinson (1990, p 168). This is a problem
that regularly occurs when a medical officer is subpoenaed to court and seeks to give
evidence based entirely on a treating doctor’s notes of the condition of a patient and the
utterances of the patient when presenting at hospital (provisions relating to business
records can assist in the admissibility of such evidence).
Application of the rule
[2.20.100] The Scottish decision in McGowan v Belling & Co [1983] SLT 77 at 78 made the
commonsense point that there are real dangers in expert evidence when its bases cannot
be subjected to critical scrutiny. The plaintiffs had been injured in a house fire. They sued
the manufacturers of an electric heater which, it was alleged, suffered from defects of
design and manufacture which had caused it to catch alight. The heater itself was not
available at any time during the proceedings, but expert evidence was given by two
witnesses who had each examined another fire of a comparable type three years and one
year previously, respectively. They said that the design of this type of heater made it
susceptible to cable-overheating. The heaters examined were not proved to be identical to
the one in the particular case. The court framed its decision in terms of the best evidence
rule, holding that the rule required the production of the heater: ‘An oral description of its
condition in its absence was inadmissible, and any expert evidence based on its alleged
condition was also inadmissible.’
It has been held also in Ireland that the primary facts upon which the opinion of an
expert is based must be proved by admissible evidence: RT v VP [1990] 1 IR 545 at 551.
The critical issue is best posed by Wigmore (3rd ed, para 672):
The key to the situation, in short, is that there may be two distinct subjects of testimony –
premises, and inferences or conclusions; that the latter involves necessarily a consideration
of the former; and that the tribunal must be furnished with the means of rejecting the
latter if upon consultation they determine to reject the former; ie of distinguishing
conclusions properly founded from conclusions improperly founded.
The tribunal of fact must be placed in a position whereby it can adequately evaluate the
weight that it should give to opinions expressed by expert witnesses. Without knowing
anything of the basis of such opinions, it is ill positioned to conduct such evaluations.
[2.20.100] 121
The tendency, at least since the 1970s, has been and continues to be for a basis rule to
be applied under the common law to expert evidence adduced before juries so as to
ensure that jurors’ fact-finding efforts can realistically be undertaken. As an exception to
the broad rule that the bases of expert evidence must be admitted in evidence, experts are
permitted to express views based upon literature and experience customarily gained
within their professional fields. Where particular material is apposite to their views, as a
matter of common sense, it must be adduced.
The basis rule of exclusion
The leading authority?

[2.20.120] The most authoritative expression of the view that an exclusionary rule exists is
that of Lawton LJ in the criminal case of R v Turner [1975] 1 QB 834:
It is not for this court to instruct psychiatrists how to draft their reports, but those who call
psychiatrists as witnesses should remember that the facts upon which they base their
opinions must be proved by admissible evidence. This elementary principle is frequently
overlooked.
Notably, though, no specific sanction, such as inadmissibility of the opinion evidence, was
specifically referred to. Nonetheless, as long ago as 1990, the authors of Phipson on Evidence
(1990, para 32.14) formulated the rule thus:
An expert may give his opinion upon facts which are either admitted, or proved by
himself, or other witnesses in his hearing, at the trial, or are matters of common
knowledge; as well as upon an hypothesis based thereon. An expert’s opinion is therefore
inadmissible as to material which is not before the court, or which have merely been
reported to him by hearsay.
(See also King v Great Lakes Shire Council (1986) 58 LGRA 366 at 371.)
The 15th edition of Phipson on Evidence (2000, para 32.14) cited a number of ancient
cases in support of the contention, including Wright v Doe d Tatham (1838) 4 Bing (NC) 489;
132 ER 877 and Re Dyce Sombre (1849) 1 Mac & G 116; 41 ER 1207. In the former,
Coleridge J rejected the opinion of lay witnesses on the sanity of a testator. The opinion
had been formed on the basis of facts ‘not before the jury’ – namely, letters written by
others to the deceased near the time of his death apparently on the basis that he was at
that stage of sound mind. A difficulty with inferring from Wright v Doe d Tatham (1838) 4
Bing (NC) 489;132 ER 877 a rule as to admissibility of expert evidence when its bases are
not proved is that, in this case, it may well be that the lay witnesses were not entitled to
express their views, regardless of how they formed them, on the ground that these were
the kind of views only able to be expressed by expert witnesses – they certainly were not
shorthand expressions of fact: see above, [2.05.10]. Furthermore, Coleridge J expressly
articulated an exception relating to the evidence of expert witnesses, which he described
as a ‘departure from the general rule’.
In Re Dyce Sombre (1849) 1 Mac & G 116; 41 ER 1207, Lord Cottenham made a number
of remarks about the weakness of expert evidence not adequately sourced in admitted
evidence, but ultimately admitted the evidence.
From the fact that neither of the cases cited by Phipson appears to support the
proposition argued for, Stone (Stone and Wells (1991, p 443)) argued that Phipson’s
assertion was wrong and that the fact that the opinion evidence is based on hearsay is not
a criterion for determining the inadmissibility of the evidence. Wells preferred another
approach (Stone and Wells (1991, pp 443–444)):
One may agree with Stone’s conclusion without accepting the reasoning by which he
reached it. With all respect, it appears to me that Phipson wrote elliptically. The passage,
‘which are not before the jury’ does not refer to the very point in the hearing when the
question is put, and to no other point. The passage may fairly be construed to mean that,
122 [2.20.120]
at the final state in the case when the jury is making definitive findings of fact, an expert’s
opinion may not be used as probative unless it is based on facts found by the jury as
proved, either because they accept testimony of an expert-observer with respect to those
facts, or because the assumptions of fact upon which a pure expert has given his opinions
have been made good, to their satisfaction, by other evidence.
However, whether or not Phipson’s views can be properly sourced in 19th-century

authority, in Australia, and to a degree in England, they have been overtaken by the
decisions in recent cases, only some of which cite Phipson.
Civil authorities: Australia

[2.20.140] In the civil case of Sych v Hunter (1974) 8 SASR 118 at 119, Bray CJ excluded
opinion evidence based on what a psychiatrist had learned from the plaintiff’s mother,
who was not called to give evidence:
I can understand how desirable it may be in a scientific sense for the psychiatrist to
acquaint himself with the opinions, the attitudes, and the personalities of the patient’s
close relatives and friends, but it cannot be too clearly emphasised that from the point of
view of the law, all this, if it takes place in the parties’ absence, is hearsay or opinion
founded on hearsay and has to be excluded in justice to those who have no opportunity of
testing it.
The exclusionary approach was less prominent in the 1996 decision of Forrester v Harris
Farm Pty Ltd (1996) 129 FLR 431 at 438, where Miles CJ was clear that the value of the
opinion rested upon the ‘assumed facts’ being proved:
It is a trite principle of evidence law that the opinion of an expert, whatever the field of
expertise, is worthless unless founded upon a substratum of facts, which facts are proved
by the evidence in the case, exclusive of the evidence of the expert, to the satisfaction of
the court according to the appropriate standard of proof. Whether or not the expert
believes in the substratum of facts or knows them to be true or is satisfied that they are
true, is completely beside the point. The expert’s function is to express an opinion based
on assumed facts, not to express a view on whether the assumptions are justified.
Three valuation cases are significant in terms of the civil law in Australia and England. In
Wright v Municipal Council of Sydney (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 348 at 359, Sly J held that an
expert could give evidence on sales of comparable land only if other direct evidence was
provided:
An expert in land values can in my opinion give evidence that he has experience of sales
in a district, and also that he has kept in touch with sales not made by himself in the
district, to show that he is competent to give evidence as to value in the particular case. He
can in my opinion give direct evidence of sales of other lands comparable to support his
valuation of the land in question, provided he gives proper legal evidence of such sales, or
such evidence has already been given. But he has no privilege beyond any other witness
to speak in detail of the prices realised for other lands unless he can give legal evidence of
such sales, or that evidence has already been given by the witnesses. It would be a most
dangerous thing to allow an expert to speak of the details of sales of which he really
knows nothing, and see the difficulty the plaintiff in a case like this would be in if he had
to answer such evidence not knowing whether the sales were really existent or not.
Megarry J in English Exporters (London) Ltd v Eldonwall Ltd [1973] 1 Ch 415 at 422–423
provided a very helpful analysis, dividing expert valuation evidence into four categories,
stating that the witness:
(a) may express the opinions that he has formed as to values even though substantial
contributions to the formation of those opinions have been made by matters of
which he has no first-hand knowledge;
(b) may give evidence as to the details of any transactions within his personal
knowledge, in order to establish them as matters of fact; and
[2.20.140] 123
(c) may express his opinion as to the significance of any transactions which are or
will be proved by admissible evidence (whether or not given by him) in relation
to the valuation with which he is concerned; but
(d) may not give hearsay evidence stating the details of any transactions not within
his personal knowledge in order to establish them as matters of fact.
He held (at 421) that a valuer may not:

give factual evidence of transactions of which he has no direct knowledge, whether per se
or whether in the guise of giving reasons for his opinion as to value. It is one thing to say
‘From my general experience of recent transactions comparable with this one, I think the
proper rent should be #x’: it is another thing to say ‘Because I have been told by someone
else that the premises next door have an area of #x square feet and were recently let on
such-and-such terms for #y a year, I say the rent of these premises should be #z a year’.
(Compare, however, City of St John v Irving Oil Co Ltd [1966] SCR 581; 58 DLR (2d) 404.) He
was explicit and pointed in saying:
The other party to the litigation is entitled to have a witness whom he can cross-examine
on oath as to the facts deposed to. … I know of no special rule giving experts the right to
give hearsay evidence of facts.
In 1995, the matter was once again considered, with the key authorities being reviewed.
The Full Court of the Western Australian Supreme Court accepted that an expert valuer
might rely upon information obtained by her or his professional brethren to formulate her
or his opinion and to express ‘working truths’, but could not use hearsay information
related to particular comparable transactions to infer the value of the property in issue:
Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370. The court endorsed the
proposition that the primary facts relied upon by an expert must be proved before the
expert’s opinion can be admitted into evidence. It held that where the inadmissible
evidence and the admissible expert evidence are so intertwined because of the poverty of
proof of primary facts, the entire body of evidence should be rejected. (See also Clambake
Pty Ltd v Tipperary Projects Pty Ltd (No 2) (2007) 35 WAR 394; [2007] WASCA 244.)
There is also a substantial line of authority in relation to the significance, or otherwise,
of a failure to prove the bases of expert opinions in relation to public opinion surveys: see
Ch 11.0.
Criminal authorities: Australia

[2.20.160] Gleeson CJ in R v Perry (1990) 49 A Crim R 243 at 249, a New South Wales
decision prior to the passage of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), was specific about the
contemporary existence of an exclusionary rule:
Since opinion evidence involves the drawing of inferences and conclusions from facts, the
admissibility of such evidence depends upon proof or admission of the facts upon which
the opinion is based.
(See also Hilder v The Queen (1997) 97 A Crim R 70 at 79, citing as authority for this
proposition: Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94; Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642;
Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844 at 846; R v Turner [1975] 1
QB 834 at 840; Harmony Shipping Co SA v Davis [1979] 1 WLR 1380; [1979] 3 All ER 177. He
indicated: ‘There is a detailed discussion of this subject in the judgment of Beaumont J in
Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (1990) 21 FCR 324.’ It must be doubted whether all
these cases are authority for the proposition asserted.)
In the same year, Hunt J found a police officer’s opinion that a person was drunk
admissible, ‘although it should not have been permitted without first obtaining from the
witness the factual basis for that opinion’: R v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737 at 744.
However, the major decision on the issue is that of the New South Wales Court of
Criminal Appeal in Fizzell v The Queen (1987) 31 A Crim R 213, in which one of the
124 [2.20.160]
grounds of appeal was that the Crown had not been entitled to have the results of a blood
analysis considered by the jury as no evidence had been led as to who had actually placed
the blood which she had removed from a boot on a PGM plate and had recorded various
entries in a laboratory book. Yeldham, Campbell and Allen JJ held that in order to render
the evidence of the result of an analysis admissible, it is incumbent on the Crown to call
the actual person who did the analysis, or at least someone who saw him or her do it and
noted the accuracy of the recording. Without such evidence, the Crown was only able to
rely upon evidence of usual practice which will not be sufficient to prove what occurred
on the occasion in question: see also Van Vreden v The Queen (1973) 57 Cr App R 818; Clune
v The Queen (No 1) [1975] VR 723 at 730–731. The court applied R v Abadom [1983] 1 WLR
126; 1 All ER 364; 76 Crim App R 48 at 131. However, it should be noted that another way
of interpreting the decision is by reference to the ‘relevance rule’.
Earlier, in R v Gardiner [1980] Qd R 531 at 535, Lucas J refused evidence sought to be
led from a police officer as an expert on the market value of cannabis:
That evidence, as it seems to me, was inadmissible. It was based completely on hearsay,
and while there is no doubt that Sergeant Cummins knew the market price of cannabis,
that knowledge was derived from what he had read and what other people had told him.
This was a matter which had to be proved by admissible evidence.
However, in the Western Australian case of Marinovich v The Queen (1990) 46 A Crim R 282
at 301, the Full Court declined to follow Gardiner and held:
[T]he evidence of police officers based on their accumulated experience combining
personal observation with information received concerning characteristics, prices,
packaging, terminology and availability of heroin by comparison with other illicit drugs
was relevant and admissible. Such evidence is in the nature of expert evidence although it
may also involve factual evidence of personal experience and observation … Expert
evidence about such matters necessarily involves some hearsay evidence. It would be
quite artificial and place an unnecessary restraint on prosecution and police work to limit
such evidence to those who had been involved in undercover work in the illicit drug
market.
The question could be viewed in terms of the Abadom distinctions. In the South Australian
case of Anderson v The Queen (1992) 60 SASR 90, Olsson J also declined to follow Lucas J in
R v Gardiner [1980] Qd R 531 and held that the evidence of a police officer in such a
situation is not properly to be characterised as expert evidence (see also Casley-Smith v FS
Evans and Sons Pty Ltd and District Council of Stirling (No 9) (1989) 151 LSJS 151; Semple v
Noble (1988) 49 SASR 356 at 359; Barker v The Queen (1988) 34 A Crim R 141). His Honour
held that to the extent that a police officer’s evidence of market rates for illicit drugs is
derived from deals which he had observed at first hand, from information gleaned by him
from speaking to offenders who had been apprehended, or from speaking with informants
in the marketplace, it was ‘primary and not hearsay evidence’. To the extent to which it
was to be viewed as expert evidence, he followed the decision in Marinovich v The Queen
(1990) 46 A Crim R 282 at 301.
By contrast, in the Victorian criminal case of R v Haidley [1984] VR 229 at 234, Young CJ
considered the admissibility of a well-known forensic psychologist’s evidence and held:
It would have been necessary to prove by admissible evidence the facts upon which such
an expert may base his opinion before the opinion can be received. An expert could not,
for instance, take a history from an accused person and then give evidence of his opinion
upon that history unless the history had first been proved by admissible evidence. In the
present case the application had not proceeded far enough to reveal precisely upon what
basis Mr Joblin was to be asked to express an opinion.
(See also at 250–251 per Kaye J, referring to Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 at
648–649; cf F v F [1990] 1 IR 348 at 353.)
[2.20.160] 125
Pervasive uncertainty
[2.20.180] A 1989 Victorian criminal case demonstrated the uncertainty that still pervades
the area: R v Lee (1989) 42 A Crim R 393. The only evidence against the applicant was his
disputed confession to police. The trial judge refused to allow a psychiatrist to be called by
the defence to give evidence about the mental retardation of the defendant in order to
suggest that the statement claimed by the police to have been made by the defendant had
not in fact been made by him. The Court of Criminal Appeal distinguished the decision in
Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 (see [10.0.200]) and found that the psychiatric
evidence before them should not be admitted, among other things, on the basis that the
proposed opinion evidence related to two matters that had not been the subject of
evidence at the trial. The first was the existence of pressure or duress on the applicant in
respect of which no evidence had been led. The second was the alleged susceptibility of
the applicant to adopt or to believe matters which he did not believe to be true.
By contrast, Phillips CJ in R v Whitbread (1995) 78 A Crim R 452 at 456 assumed that
opinion evidence was evidence in the form of opinions ‘based on facts established, or to be
established, by admissible evidence’ and held that a trial judge was justified in excluding
a psychologist’s evidence on the basis that while there was admissible evidence in the trial
proper upon which a relevant opinion might be based, there was nothing before the judge
to show that the prospective expert witness was prepared to so base it.
United Kingdom authorities

[2.20.200] In England, the leading, although controversial, authority subsequent to R v
Turner [1975] 1 QB 834 is R v Abadom [1983] 1 WLR 126; 1 All ER 364; 76 Crim App R 48 at
369, a criminal case in which scientists from the Home Office gave evidence of the
similarity of glass samples taken from the appellant’s shoes and the composition of a
window found to be broken at the scene of the crime. One of the experts testified that the
refractive index of the particles found embedded in the appellant’s shoes was identical to
that of the window glass and gave evidence that, according to statistics compiled by the
Home Office, only 4% of glass samples tested possessed that refractive index.
Primary facts v secondary facts in R v Abadom
[2.20.220] An appeal point was that the expert evidence was based upon hearsay and so
should not have been admitted, the experts having had no personal knowledge of the tests
from which the statistics had been assembled. The Court of Appeal did not uphold the
appeal and made an important distinction between ‘primary facts’ as bases of expert
evidence, which they said had to be strictly proved, and ‘secondary facts’, such as those at
hand, which they held were exempt from the operation of the hearsay rule.
Their Lordships summed up previous authority thus:
First, where an expert relies on the existence or non-existence of some fact which is basic
to the question on which he is asked to express his opinion, that fact must be proved by
admissible evidence: see English Exporters (London) Ltd v Eldonwall Ltd [1973] 1 Ch 415 at
421 and R v Turner [1975] 1 QB 834 at 840. Thus, it would no doubt have been inadmissible
if Mr Cooke had said in the present case that he had been told by somebody else that the
refractive index of the fragments of glass and of the control sample was identical, and any
opinion expressed by him on this basis would then have been based on hearsay. If he had
not himself determined the refractive index, it would have been necessary to call the
person who had done so before Mr Cooke could have expressed any opinion based on this
determination. In this connection it is to be noted that Mr Smalldon was rightly called to
prove the chemical analysis made by him which Mr Cooke was asked to take into account.
Secondly, where the existence or non-existence of some fact is in issue, a report made by
an expert who is not called as a witness is not admissible as evidence of that fact merely
by the production of the report, even though it was made by an expert: see for instance R
v Crayden (1978) 67 Cr App R 1 at 3, 4. …
These, however, are in our judgment the limits of the hearsay rule in relation to
evidence of opinion given by experts, both in principle and on the authorities. In other
126 [2.20.180]
respects their evidence is not subject to the rule against hearsay in the same way as that of
witnesses of fact: see English Exporters (London) Ltd v Eldonwall Ltd [1973] 1 Ch 415 at 420.
… Once the primary facts on which their opinion is based have been proved by admissible
evidence, they are entitled to draw on the work of others as part of the process of arriving
at their conclusions. However, when they have done so, they should refer to the material
in their evidence so that the cogency and the probative value of their conclusion can be
tested and evaluated by reference to it. … it does not seem to us, in relation to the
reliability of opinion evidence given by experts, that they must necessarily limit
themselves to drawing on material which has been published in some form. Part of their
experience and expertise may well lie in their knowledge of unpublished material and in
their evaluation of it.
(See also PQ v Australian Red Cross Society [1992] 1 VR 19 at 36; Leigh v The Queen
(unreported, Tasmanian Supreme Court, 23 December 1991).)
The Scottish High Court of Justiciary in Wilson v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Scottish
Criminal Cases Review Commission Referral) [2009] Scot HC HCJAC 5 affirmed (at [61]) that:
an expert’s report must state the facts upon which opinions are based, and if assumptions
are made, these must be clearly identified. Reasons must be given for conclusions.
Whether instructed for the prosecution or defence, the principal duty of an expert witness
is to the court, and this overrides any duty he owes to the party which instructed him.
Again, explanations should be given for the basis on which all relevant material is either
accepted or rejected.
The court set out the general law as follows (at [63]):
It is abundantly clear therefore, and has been for many years in our courts, that an expert
witness is not in the position to provide the court with a statement of unqualified
conclusions about the question of fact on which his opinion bears. If he does so, the effect
of his testimony may well be much diminished. In this context, it is perhaps worth noting
that an expert witness is in a particularly privileged position in our courts. Prior to the
decision, he is the only person permitted to express an opinion. Other witnesses must
confine themselves to facts. Further, an expert witness will routinely rely on assumptions,
hearsay evidence, his impression of testimony that he has not heard, and reports,
statements and other secondary sources of information, all of which might be incompetent
in a court of law if presented as factual evidence. It is therefore of the utmost importance
that any expert witness carefully describes the source and assesses the worth of all manner
of material on which his opinion is based.
Extension of the category of admissible hearsay
[2.20.240] The problem with the decision is that although it purports to follow English
Exporters (London) Ltd v Eldonwall Ltd [1973] 1 Ch 415, it is in fact inconsistent with it. In
English Exporters it had been held that experts may express their views, even though their
knowledge is based on secondary sources that are standard in their discipline. It is:
no authority for the proposition that those sources of background knowledge might
themselves be admitted as factual evidence, even for purposes of comparison.
See Phipson on Evidence (1990, para 21.24).

The decision of the Court of Appeal broke new ground in England by extending the
category of admissible hearsay, the approach expressly proscribed by the House of Lords
in Myers v Director of Public Prosecutions [1965] AC 1001. It was followed in 1996 by the
Court of Appeal in Jackson [1996] 2 Cr App R 420, where the court had occasion to examine
the way in which a trial judge dealt with defective DNA evidence. The critical evidence
against the accused had consisted of blood stains found on his shoes and trousers. Expert
evidence was given at trial by forensic scientists who expressed the view that by reference
to STR DNA typing (see Ch 12.20 and subscription service Ch 80), it was the victim’s
blood on the accused’s trousers. However, in giving such evidence, the scientists relied on
work carried out by other members of the laboratory staff. These facts had neither been
proved nor admitted in evidence, meaning that there was no evidential foundation for the
experts’ opinions. When counsel for a co-accused drew attention to this after the accused
[2.20.240] 127
had given evidence, the Crown made a belated application, which was allowed, to
provide the necessary foundational evidence by serving statements as additional evidence
and by then calling the relevant witnesses. The Court of Appeal accepted that without
these steps the scientific evidence had been ‘fatally flawed’ (at 423). The court discussed
the way in which such defects should be remedied, quoting from the Report of the Royal
Commission on Criminal Justice (1993, ch 9, para 78):
It has been brought to our attention that, because of the rules on hearsay evidence, an
expert witness may not strictly speaking be permitted to give an opinion in court based on
scientific tests run by assistants unless all those assistants are called upon to give
supporting evidence in court. It seems to us that this rule is badly in need of change and
we recommend that it be considered by the Law Commission as part of the review of the
rules of evidence … Meanwhile, although the defence must have the right to examine the
assistants of expert witnesses if it so chooses, we look to the courts and to the parties to
make maximum use of the facility to present the evidence of assistants in written form
until such time as the law is changed. Any unreasonable exploitation of the system should
be met by sanctions against the counsel concerned if he or she is found to be responsible.
See also Law Commission (1995, p 210). The court expressed some dissatisfaction with the
cumbersome way in which an issue which had not earlier been in dispute was resolved,
but declined to interfere in the jury’s finding of guilt subsequent to the resolution of the
matter.
The major Australian authority, Jeffrey v The Queen (1991) 60 A Crim R 384 at 389, to
give extensive consideration to the principles set out in R v Abadom [1983] 1 WLR 126; 1
All ER 364; 76 Crim App R 48, purported to follow it and to apply the distinction drawn
by the Court of Appeal between an expert’s reliance on basic facts peculiar to the
particular case and on facts of general application. A forensic scientist from the South
Australian State Forensic Science Centre gave evidence on the basis of the various blood
groupings within the Tasmanian population without their being fully formally proved in
evidence. Objection was taken and Cox J of the Tasmanian Supreme Court took the view
that the evidence was not inadmissible as hearsay (at 388) and held that the evidence
upon which the witness gave his evidence was ‘part of the corpus of his field of science’
(at 390):
The rule against hearsay does not operate to prevent the use of statistical or scientific data
proved to come from a reliable source even though its author does not directly attest to it.
The law in New Zealand was enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Bevan Investments Ltd
v Blackhall & Struthers (No 2) [1978] 2 NZLR 97 at 122, where the court accepted the
proposition that ‘[t]he facts upon which an expert’s opinion is based must be proved by
admissible evidence’.
The position in Scotland and Northern Ireland
[2.20.260] The Scottish High Court of Justiciary in Wilson v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Scottish
Criminal Cases Review Commission Referral) [2009] Scot HC HCJAC 5 affirmed (at [61]) that:
an expert’s report must state the facts upon which opinions are based, and if assumptions
are made, these must be clearly identified. Reasons must be given for conclusions.
Whether instructed for the prosecution or defence, the principal duty of an expert witness
is to the court, and this overrides any duty he owes to the party which instructed him.
Again, explanations should be given for the basis on which all relevant material is either
accepted or rejected.
The court set out the general law as follows (at [63]):
It is abundantly clear therefore, and has been for many years in our courts, that an expert
witness is not in the position to provide the court with a statement of unqualified
conclusions about the question of fact on which his opinion bears. If he does so, the effect
of his testimony may well be much diminished. In this context, it is perhaps worth noting
that an expert witness is in a particularly privileged position in our courts. Prior to the
128 [2.20.260]
decision, he is the only person permitted to express an opinion. Other witnesses must
confine themselves to facts. Further, an expert witness will routinely rely on assumptions,
hearsay evidence, his impression of testimony that he has not heard, and reports,
statements and other secondary sources of information, all of which might be incompetent
in a court of law if presented as factual evidence. It is therefore of the utmost importance
that any expert witness carefully describes the source and assesses the worth of all
material on which his opinion is based.
In the Scottish context, the existence of a basis rule appears reasonably clear. Thus, in
Forrester v HM Advocate [1952] JC 28 (see also Ritchie v Pirie [1972] JC 7; Russell v HM
Advocate [1946] JC 37), the accused was acquitted of safe-blowing charges by the High
Court, which held that a jury should not have been permitted to hear evidence relating to
a small piece of cotton bedspread material which was allegedly found in the accused’s
pocket, and which, forensic scientists concluded, corresponded with material from a
bedspread used in the commission of the crime, because the Crown had not satisfactorily
established that the material was found in the accused’s pocket.
Similarly, the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal in R v Lanigan [1987] NI 367 at 376
confirmed that when the evidence of a forensic scientist depends upon facts observed and
found by someone else, that person must be called to give evidence ‘since the principle is
that the facts relied on must be proved by admissible evidence’.
A matter of weight
[2.20.280] The clearest expression of the ‘admit but mistrust’ approach is the decision of
Blackburn J in the civil case of Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 (the Gove
Case). His Honour had occasion to consider (at 162) the basis upon which an
anthropologist had given his expert evidence:
The anthropologist should be able to give his opinion, based on his investigation by
processes normal to his field of study, just as any other expert does. To rule out any
conclusion based to any extent upon hearsay – the statements of other persons – would be
to make a distinction, for the purposes of the law of evidence, between a field of
knowledge directly concerned with the behaviour of human beings, such as anthropology.
A chemist can give an account of the behaviour of inanimate substances in reaction, but an
anthropologist must limit his evidence to that based upon what he has seen the
Aboriginals doing, and not upon what they have said to him.
His Honour pointed out that it is the expert who is most qualified to distinguish between
the relevant and the irrelevant and the worthwhile and the worthless. While prepared to
affirm the existence of a policy that demands that ‘every opinion must be shown to be
based either on proved facts or on stated assumptions’ (at 162), Blackburn J elected (at
162–163) to approach the issue in a flexible way:
It seems to me that the question is one of weight, rather than of the admissibility, of the
evidence, and that the court must be astute to inquire how far any conclusion proffered to
an expert is indeed based on facts and to weigh it accordingly.
(See Wilband v The Queen [1967] 2 CCC 6 at 11: ‘The value of a psychiatrist’s opinion may
be affected by the extent to which it rests on second-hand material; but that goes to the
weight and not to the receivability in evidence of the opinion.’ See also R v Abbey (1982) 68
CCC (2d) 394 at 412; R v Discon (1968) 67 DLR (2d) 619.)
His Honour recited (at 161) the normal methods by which social scientists arrive at
their views:
I do not think it is correct to apply the hearsay rule so as to exclude evidence from an
anthropologist in the form of a proposition of anthropology – a conclusion which has
significance in that field of discourse. It could not be contended – and was not – that the
anthropologists could be allowed to give evidence in the form: ‘Munggurrawuy told me
that this was Gumatj land.’ But in my opinion it is permissible for an anthropologist to
give evidence in the form: ‘I have studied the social organisation of these Aboriginals. This
[2.20.280] 129
study includes observing their behaviour; talking to them; reading the published work of
other experts; applying principles of analysis and verification which are accepted as valid
in the general field of anthropology. I express the opinion as an expert that proposition X
is true of their social organisation.’ In my opinion such evidence is not rendered
inadmissible by the fact that it is based partly on statements made to the expert by the
Aboriginals.
(See also Freckelton (1986a).)

A strongly worded Western Australian decision applied similar principles in 1990 in
relation to evidence given by police officers concerning the value, purities and
nomenclature of various forms of illegal drugs:
The evidence of police officers based on their accumulated experience combining personal
observation with information received concerning characteristics, prices, packaging,
terminology and availability of heroin by comparison with other illicit drugs was relevant
and admissible. Such evidence is in the nature of expert evidence although it may also
involve factual evidence of personal experience and observation. Expert evidence about
such matters necessarily involves some hearsay evidence. It would be quite artificial and
place an unnecessary restraint on prosecution and police work to limit such evidence to
those who have been involved in undercover work in the illicit drug market. … In the end
it must be a matter of weight, but I do not consider that the mere fact that the experience
relied upon includes both personal observation and experience, as well as information
received through intelligence reports or from informants, means that an attempt has to be
made to isolate the two areas of knowledge so as to establish the admissibility of evidence
based on the one source and exclude evidence based on the other.
(See Marinovich v The Queen (1990) 46 A Crim R 282 at 301; disagreeing with R v Gardiner
[1980] Qd R 531 at 533.)
The principle in Ramsay v Watson
[2.20.300] The Australian High Court decision of Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 has
been cited in favour of the proposition that opinion evidence without a basis that is
admitted or admissible in evidence is itself inadmissible: R v Haidley [1984] VR 229 at 250;
see too Bromley Investments Pty Ltd v Elkington (2002) 43 ACSR 584; [2002] QSC 427.
However, with respect, this is not the proposition for which Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108
CLR 642 stands. The closest that the High Court came to such a proposition is (at 649): ‘If
the man whom the physician examined refuses to confirm in the witness box what he said
in the consulting room, then the physician’s opinion may have little or no value, for part
of the basis is gone.’ (See also R v Schafferius [1977] Qd R 213; Wogandt v The Queen (1983)
33 A Crim R 31.) The High Court later interpreted the earlier pronouncement in these
terms: ‘It is trite law that for an expert medical opinion to be of any value the facts upon
which it is based must be proved by admissible evidence’: Paric v John Holland
(Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844 at 846; see also Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices
Commission (1990) 97 ALR 555 at 591; Pollock v Wellington (1996) 15 WAR 1 at 3.
In Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642, counsel for the defendant had sought to lead
evidence from a medical practitioner not only of what he had observed in the course of
various examinations but of what various men, not called as witnesses, had told him of
their state of health in the past. It had been contended that the answers would have been
admissible as a statement made by persons out of court concerning their bodily
sensations. The High Court held that a ‘sounder argument for admitting evidence of what
the men had told the examining doctor might have been that it was part of the material on
which he formed the opinion that he gave in evidence’. But the court found (at 649) that
the trial judge was entitled to refuse to admit the evidence of the doctor about what
people who were not being called as witnesses had told him: ‘Hearsay evidence does not
become admissible to prove facts because the person who proposes to give it is a
physician.’
130 [2.20.300]
The most significant subsequent High Court analysis of the principle enunciated in
Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 was in Gordon v The Queen (1982) 41 ALR 64 at 64,
where it was recapitulated that:
statements made to an expert witness are admissible if they are the foundation, or part of
the foundation, of the expert opinion to which he testifies but that if such statements,
being hearsay, are not confirmed by evidence, the expert testimony based on them is of
little or no value.
(See also R v Schafferius [1977] Qd R 213 at 217.)

Extension of the principle
[2.20.320] Probably Kneipp J of the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal has summed up
most clearly the view that bases of experts’ opinions must be proved in R v Tonkin [1975]
Qd R 1 at 17 (emphasis added):
In general, the facts on which an expert’s opinion is based not only may be proved, but
must be proved by admissible evidence. … In the case of a medical witness, the facts on
which he relies may include, among others, his own observations, the results of tests or
experiments, and what the patient has told him of the patient’s history or symptoms. Of
course, if what the patient has told him is not confirmed by evidence from the plaintiff or
other sources, this may weaken and destroy the effect of his evidence: Ramsay v Watson
(1961) 108 CLR 642. It seems to me that the same principles are applicable to the evidence
of a psychiatrist as to the evidence of any other medical witness, subject to the observation
that what the patient of a psychiatrist says or has said, whether to him or in his presence
or not, may be relevant to him, and admissible in evidence, quite irrespective of proof of
any facts stated in the statement. The words used by a person, irrespective of the truth or
any facts stated, might to a psychiatrist be just as significant and objective a symptom as
might the presence of a rash to a physician.
It has not been finally resolved how far the judgment in Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR
642 extends. The High Court refused to disturb a trial judge’s refusal to admit expert
opinion evidence based on inadmissible hearsay but at the same time elected to speak in
terms of the minimal weight that could be accorded to evidence when its basis is
impugned.
It may be that when an opinion is founded predominantly upon hearsay (eg, when a
parent tells a doctor of his or her child’s psychological history), as a matter of common
sense, particularly in light of its potentially prejudicial impact, a court will not permit the
opinion at all by the exercise of its discretion rather than by application of an exclusionary
rule: see, eg, Steffen v Ruban [1996] 2 NSWR 622; (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 264 at 266.
Alternatively, a warning can be given:
It may be the better course not to reject such hearsay but to admit it with a direction that,
if not sworn by the patient, it is not evidence of the existence in fact of his past sensations,
experiences and symptoms and a warning that the expert evidence based upon it may
have little or no value.
(See R v Schafferius [1977] Qd R 213 at 217.)

The same uncertainty also appears to obtain under English case law. In R v Bradshaw
(1985) 82 Cr App R 79 at 83, Lord Lane LCJ expressed the view that:
If the doctor’s opinion is based entirely on hearsay and is not supported by direct
evidence the judge will be justified in telling the jury that the defendant’s case (if that is
so) is based upon a flimsy or non-existent foundation and that they should reach their
conclusion bearing that in mind.
Weight, not inadmissibility
[2.20.340] No mention is made of inadmissibility – the question posed is whether weight
should be attached to the evidence. The classic statement of this position is that of
Fauteux J in Wilband v The Queen [1967] 2 CCC 6 at 11:
[2.20.340] 131
The value of a psychiatrist’s opinion may be affected to the extent to which it may rest on
second-hand source material; but that goes to the weight and not to the receivability in
evidence of the opinion, which opinion is not evidence of the truth of the information but
evidence of the opinion formed on the basis of that information.
(See also R v Henry [1977] Qd R 204 at 212; R v Smith [1989] 3 NZLR 405; R v Rosik [1971]
2 OR 47; 2 CCC (3d) 351.)
The same sentiments were repeated 15 years later in Canada in R v Abbey (1982) 68
CCC (2d) 394 at 412: ‘Before any weight can be given to an expert’s opinion, the facts upon
which the opinion is based must be found to exist.’ This appears to be the settled
Canadian position: see R v Lavallee (1990) 55 CCC (3d) 97 at 130 per Wilson J.
The issue also arose for determination in R v Smith [1989] 3 NZLR 405 (see also R v
McKay [1967] NZLR 139), where the defence was permitted to call a psychiatrist to whom
the accused had made advantageous statements, although the accused himself did not
give evidence. The Crown objected on appeal to the admissibility of the evidence. The
Court of Appeal applied Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642, finding that a physician
may be allowed to state the history procured by him or her from a patient as part of the
material on the basis of which the physician arrived at opinions, although such statements
do not themselves constitute evidence of the truth of what was said by the patient. The
court adopted (at 409) the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R v Phillion (1977) 33
CCC (2d) 535 at 539:
Statements made to psychiatrists and psychologists are sometimes admitted in criminal
cases and when this is so it is because they have qualified as experts in diagnosing the
behavioural symptoms of individuals and have formed an opinion which the trial Judge
deems to be relevant to the case, but the statements on which such opinions are based are
not admissible in proof of their truth but rather as indicating the basis upon which the
medical opinion was formed in accordance with recognised professional procedures.
In Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844 at 509–510, Samuels JA
had occasion to consider the required closeness between facts proved and questions put
hypothetically. His Honour adopted a statement from the Wyoming case of Culver v
Sekulich 80 Wyo 437 at 458 (1959):
From our analysis of the record it appears to us that there was some evidence to support
every hypothetical question to which objection was made. Such evidence was not always
complete, was sometimes hazy as to time, distance and other vital words, but in general,
furnished a fair climate for the consideration of the views of the expert witnesses.
Sufficiency of similarity between opinion and facts
[2.20.360] Samuels JA found (at 510) that there was no need for complete consonance
between the material put and the material previously or subsequently provided;
nonetheless: ‘Discrepancies may be fatal; in some cases even slight discrepancies may be
fatal; in other cases even broad departures are not likely to affect the force of the expert
opinion.’
On appeal (Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844 at 846), the
High Court proceeded from the contention that for an expert medical opinion to be of any
value, the facts upon which it is based must be proved by admissible evidence. The court
rejected the argument that the facts so proved must correspond ‘with complete precision’
to the proposition on which the opinion is based and preferred the view that it is a
question of fact whether the case supposed is sufficiently like the one under consideration
to render the opinion of the expert of any value. The court cited (at 846) a passage in
Wigmore on Evidence, Vol 2 (1979, para 942) with approval:
The failure which justifies rejection must be a failure in some one or more important data,
not merely in a trifling respect.
(See also Starke (1986, pp 301–302)).
132 [2.20.360]
In Canada, the courts have gone further and suggested that on some occasions it is
appropriate for the trial judge to intervene to establish the basis of an expert’s opinion ‘if
he feels this to be the best way in which he can be assured of the matter being fully
understood by the jury’: Bleta v The Queen [1964] SCR 561; 48 DLR (2d) 139.
The rule against self-serving evidence

[2.20.380] Regardless of whether a basis rule exists, it is impermissible for the defence to
adduce self-serving evidence by leading from expert witnesses exculpatory statements
uttered by the accused, unless they contain elements of inculpation or form part of a
relevant act so that they can be said to form part of the res gestae: R v Petecherini (1855) 7
Cox CC 7; Corke v Corke [1958] P 93. This alone may prove a ground for excluding
evidence from a mental health professional about exculpatory statements made by the
accused – particularly if the accused does not give evidence in relation to making such
statements: R v Moase (1989) 51 CCC (3d) 77 at 83; see also, [10.0.320].
Acceptable bases of expert evidence

[2.20.400] In general, the courts have accepted the practical proposition that it is
inappropriate for them to demand that any significant amount of an expert witness’s
knowledge acquired in the course of his or her professional training and experience be
proved. While it is clear that an expert witness may quite properly rely upon accumulated
knowledge, acquired in the usual maintenance and development of his or her professional
position, the boundaries of such knowledge and the permissible use of it are not easy to
fix.
Megarry J in English Exporters (London) Ltd v Eldonwall Ltd [1973] 1 Ch 415 at 420 drew
attention to the various sources of the expert’s acquisition of competence and, referring
specifically to the formulation of an expert valuer’s opinions, commented:
In building up his opinions about values, he will no doubt have learned much from
transactions in which he has himself been engaged, and of which he could give first-hand
evidence. But he will also have learned much from many other sources, including much of
which he could give no first-hand evidence. Textbooks, journals, reports of options and
other dealings, and information obtained from his professional brethren and others, some
related to particular transactions and some more general and indefinite, will all have
contributed their share. Doubtless much or most of this will be accurate, though some will
not; and even what is accurate so far as it goes may be incomplete, in that nothing may
have been said of some special element that affects values. Nevertheless, the opinion that
the expert expresses is none the worse because it is in part derived from the matters from
which he could give no direct evidence.
See too Hodgkinson and James (2015), p 324.
See also Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382 at 386; S v Kimimbi (1963) 3 SA 250; Menday v
Protea Assurance Co Ltd (1976) 1 SA 565; Coopers (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekämpfung Mbh 1976 (3) SA 352 (A); Meintjes-Van Der Walt (2001,
pp 166ff).
This permits the expert to rely upon the general training and skills which have
rendered him or her an expert. Similarly, the Court of Appeal in R v Abadom [1983] 1 WLR
126; 1 All ER 364; 76 Crim App R 48 at 51 acknowledged that when an expert has to
consider the likelihood or unlikelihood of some occurrence or factual association in
reaching a conclusion, the statistical results of the work of others must inevitably form an
important ingredient in the cogency or probative value of the expert’s conclusions in the
particular case:
Relative probabilities or improbabilities must frequently be an important factor in the
evaluation of any expert opinion and, when any reliable statistical material is available
which bears upon this question, it must be part of the function and duty of the expert to
take this into account.
[2.20.400] 133
However, it is also inherent in the nature of any statistical information that it will
result from the work of others in the same field, whether or not the expert in question will
himself have contributed to the bank of information available on the particular topic on
which he is called upon to express his opinion. Indeed, to exclude reliance upon such
information on the ground that it is inadmissible under the hearsay rule, might inevitably
lead to the distortion or unreliability of the opinion which the expert presents for
evaluation by a judge or jury. … The cogency or otherwise of the expert’s conclusion … in
the light of, inter alia, the available statistical material against which this conclusion falls
to be tested, must then be a matter for the jury.
Reliance on professional reading
[2.20.420] Further along the continuum, though, is the Irish case of F v F [1990] 1 IR 348,
where a psychiatrist’s opinions were held to be inadmissible even though they were in
part based on hearsay statements that were made to him in the course of his profession.
Some of the difficulties were further explored by Gowans J in the Victorian case of
Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382 at 386. His Honour referred at length to the exposition of
the issue in Wigmore on Evidence (1961–1979):
The data of every science are enormous in scope and variety. No one professional man can
know from personal observation more than a minute fraction of the data which he must
every day treat as working truths. Hence a reliance on the reported data of fellow scientists,
learned by perusing their reports in books and journals. The law must and does accept
this kind of knowledge from scientific men. On the one hand, a mere layman, who comes
to court and alleges a fact which he has learned only by reading a medical or a
mathematical book, cannot be heard. But, on the other hand, to reject a professional
physician or mathematician because the fact or some facts to which he testifies are known
to him only upon the authority of others would be to ignore the accepted methods of
professional work and to insist on finical and impossible standards.
However, Wigmore on Evidence, Vol 2 (1979, pp 784–785) acknowledges:

It is not easy to express in usable form that element of professional competency which
distinguishes the latter case from the former. In general, the considerations which define
the latter are (a) a professional experience, giving the witness a knowledge of the
trustworthy authorities and the proper source of information, (b) an extent of personal
observation in the general subject, enabling him to estimate the general plausibility, or
probability of soundness, of the views expressed, and (c) the impossibility of obtaining
information on the particular technical detail except through reported data in part or
entirely. The true solution must be to trust the discretion of the trial judge, exercised in the
light of the nature of the subject and the witness’s equipments. The decisions show in
general a liberal attitude in receiving technical testimony based on professional reading.
Gowans J permitted (at 387) statements by a witness, shown or assumed to be conversant

with the industry, trade or calling of retail pharmacy, that sources commonly relied upon
in retail pharmacy identify Evacillin as a form of penicillin:
It is not a sufficient answer to say that this amounts to hearsay from the manufacturers or
from the publishers of the Guide. There is a further element stated explicitly or implicitly
that it is information commonly relied upon in the calling of pharmacy. Records and
materials of that kind may be the basis of evidence by one who is qualified as familiar
with the business activity or calling in question.
This view is in accordance with authority that has held that an accountant giving evidence
as to people’s average duration of life could have regard to the ‘Carlisle Tables’ used by
insurance officers (Rowley v London & North Western Railway Co (1873) LR 8 Exch 221) – the
average duration of life of two persons of the given age was a fact and the source was
hearsay. Similarly, drug standards have been proved by reference to the British
Pharmacopoeia: see White v Bywater (1887) 19 QBD 582; Dickins v Randerson [1901] 1 KB 437.
Gowans J appeared to follow the contention of Wigmore that the admissibility of this
form of expert evidence constitutes a limited exception to the hearsay rule, enabling
recognition to be given to ‘certain commercial and professional lists, registers and reports’:
134 [2.20.420]
Their admissibility in some instances is placed upon judicial principle; in others it arises
from statutory innovation. … The necessity … in all of these cases lies partly in the
inaccessibility of the authors, compilers or publishers in other jurisdictions; but chiefly in
the great practical inconvenience that would be caused if the law required the summoning
of each individual whose personal knowledge has gone to make up the final result.
Partly forming the basis of opinions
[2.20.440] An early line of cases (see, eg, Collier v Simpson (1831) 5 C & P 73; 172 ER 883; R
v Somers [1963] 1 WLR 1306) suggested that the evidence of doctors could incorporate
their knowledge acquired from books so long as it formed only part of the basis of their
opinions and so long as they did not purport merely to restate what the authors’ views
were: see also Nelson v Bridport (1845) 8 Beav 527; 50 ER 207; Napier v Ferguson (1879) 2 P &
B 415; Holt v Auckland City Council [1980] 2 NZLR 124 at 127. The development of this line
of authority in the United States began in Finnegan v Fall River Gas Works Co 34 NE 523 at
523 (1892), in which Holmes J held:
When one who is confident on the general subject accepts from his reading, as probably
true, a matter of detail which he had not verified, the fact gains an authority which it
would not have had from the printed page alone, and, subject, perhaps, to the exercise of
some discretion, may be admitted.
Rheingold (1961, pp 507ff) pointed out that the view expressed by Holmes J has been
adopted in many jurisdictions and has spread to cover not only authoritative and
standard works but also journals, statistical records, the results of experiments, and even
information on how to perform tests. This has become the rationale in the United States
for allowing reliance on a number of types of medical evidence which would otherwise
have been classified as hearsay. Generally, the justification adduced for the practice has
been ‘necessity’ (see Coastal Coaches v Ball 234 SW 2d 474 (1950); State v Goettina 61 Wyo
420; 158 P 2d 865 (1945)), although some courts have characterised it as an exception to the
hearsay rule: Dinner v Thorp 54 Wash 2d 90; 388 P 2d 137 (1959); Kern v Pullen 138 Or 222;
6 P2d 224; 82 ALR 434 (1931); see, however, Woelfle v Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co
103 F 2d 417 (8th Cir 1939).
In the Canadian case of R v Anderson (1914) 16 DLR 203; 22 CCC 455, Beck J held that
an expert medical witness, in giving an opinion, could state that it is based partly upon his
or her experience and partly upon the opinions of text writers who have been recognised
by the medical profession as being of authority. The witness may name the text writers
and add that his or her opinions coincide with those of the text writers. Further, experts
may refer to the opinions of other experts to show that theirs ‘was not an isolated opinion,
but was shared by other members of the profession’: R v Deputy Industrial Injuries
Commissioner; Ex parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456 at 483.
General approach by courts
[2.20.460] Little case law on this issue exists in England, Canada, Australia or New
Zealand, but the indication from the decisions of Gowans J in Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR
382 and of Muirhead J in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 and the cases that
have followed them is that a liberal attitude will be taken by the courts when called upon
to receive technical evidence based on customary professional means of acquiring skills
and knowledge.
It appears that an expert may give an opinion on an issue before a court based on the
general state of the literature within the area of expertise in question or on the history of a
series of well-known events: Chayko, Gulliver and MacDougall (1991, p 18). In R v Zandel
(1987) 31 CCC (3d) 97 at 143–146, it was held, citing Pattenden (1982, pp 90–91), that there
are several exceptions to the proposition that expert evidence founded on hearsay will be
of no weight:
There are two exceptions to the hearsay rule which are relevant, and in the circumstances
of this case, are, in our opinion, mutually supportive. The first is that events of general
[2.20.460] 135
history may be proved by accepted historical treatises on the basis that they represent
community opinion or reputation with respect to an historical event of general interest.
The historical event must be one to which it would be unlikely that living witnesses could
be obtained, and in addition, the matter must be one of general interest, so that it can be
said that there is a high probability that the matter underwent general scrutiny as the
reputation, evidenced by the historical treatises, was formed: see Wigmore on Evidence, Vol
5 (3rd ed, p 462); McCormick on Evidence (1984, p 906).
The second exception which is relevant in this case is that an expert witness may give
evidence based on material of a general nature which is widely used and acknowledged as
reliable by experts in that field. This exception, however, has hitherto been confined to a
few narrow classes of cases such as, eg, mortality tables and a standard pharmaceutical
guide.
It appears that when articles from learned journals are referred to by experts to explain or
justify their opinions, they should be referred to in such a way ‘that the cogency and
probative value of their conclusion can be tested and evaluated by reference to it’: R v
Abadom [1983] 1 WLR 126; 1 All ER 364; 76 Crim App R 48 at 131. There is no entitlement
to have such articles admitted as exhibits, although there might be a discretion in a
particular case to admit them to preserve a proper balance between the parties.
Considerations of convenience may also be relevant: PQ v Australian Red Cross Society
[1992] 1 VR 19 at 36; see also Collier v Simpson (1831) 5 C & P 73; 172 ER 883; Federal
Commissioner of Taxation v Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 251 at 273, particularly
when the evidence given by the expert may not be classed as opinion evidence (R v Vivona
(unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 12 September 1994), concerning DNA
databases).
Contemporaneous statements as to health, made to an expert

[2.20.480] The Australian case of Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 at 647 (see also Paric
v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844 at 846) drew attention to what
may be termed either an important qualification to the hearsay rule or a restriction upon
the operation of the basis rule:
The most satisfactory brief statement of the doctrine relied upon is a passage in Wills on
Evidence, 3rd ed (1938, p 209) as follows: ‘whenever there is an issue as to some person’s
state of health at a particular time, the statements of such person at that time or soon
afterwards with regard to his bodily feelings and symptoms are admissible evidence.’
The High Court noted that the exception is not confined to statements of ill-health but
extends to statements made by a man (deceased) as to his state of health before poison
was alleged to have been administered to him: R v Johnson (1847) 2 Car & K 354; 175 ER
146. The rationale is clearly that the evidence in this form is the best available and
potentially of high probative value. The editors of Phipson on Evidence (1990, p 346) stated
the position as follows:
The statements of patients to medical men and others are presumptive evidence of their
state of health, provided they are confined to contemporaneous symptoms, and are not in
the nature of a narrative as to how, or by whom such symptoms were caused.
(See also Gardner Peerage (1824) Le Marchants’ Reporter 169 at 169–179; R v Gloster (1888)
16 Cox 471; Gilbey v Great Western Railway (1910) 102 LT 202; Amys v Barton [1912] 1 KB 40.)
Patient's declarations admissible as evidence as to truth
[2.20.500] Similarly, if the condition of the patient before or after the time in issue is or
becomes material, the patient’s declarations at such times, such as to a doctor, are
admissible as evidence as to their truth: Tickle v Tickle [1968] 2 All ER 154. This has been
regarded both as an exception to the hearsay rule (Adelaide Chemical & Fertilizer Co Ltd v
Carlyle (1940) 64 CLR 514 at 530 per Dixon J; Stone (1939, pp 84–85)) and as a situation in
136 [2.20.480]
which the statements admitted were themselves relevant facts because of being
‘spontaneous and natural expressions of suffering forming part of a res gesta’: Ramsay v
Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 at 647–648.
As discussed at [2.20.160]–[2.20.180], a basis rule of exclusion appears to apply in
criminal cases. However, it seems that the rule can be avoided if the patient–client
subsequently authenticates what he or she said to a doctor by giving appropriate sworn or
semble unsworn evidence or an unsworn statement. The doctor’s opinion evidence will
then become admissible: see Jackson v The Queen (1962) 108 CLR 591; R v Abadom [1983] 1
WLR 126; 1 All ER 364; 76 Crim App R 48; Glissan (1988, p 647). It may even be that
precise repetition of the material is not necessary and that adoption of the version of the
statements allegedly made in the course of professional consultation will be sufficient to
render the material admissible: see R v Merryment (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal
Appeal, Street CJ, 27 March 1980).
Unacceptable bases of expert evidence

[2.20.520] From the notion that the basis of opinion evidence must be admitted or at least
be admissible evidence, the principle emerges that an expert’s opinion cannot be based on
surmise or conjecture. Thus, in the United States case of Marshall v Osborne 571 NE 2d 492
(1991), it was held that a medical expert’s opinion could not be based on ‘conjecture or
guesswork’: see also Baird v Adeli 573 NE 2d 279 (1991). There is no reason why the law in
this respect should differ in Australasia from that in the United States: see Bugg v Day
(1949) 79 CLR 442 at 462; Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 491; Guide Dog Owners’ &
Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dog Association of New South Wales & ACT (1998) 154 ALR
527 at 530.
Persuasive presentation of expert evidence

[2.20.540] Regardless of the technical status of a basis rule, the assumption identification
rule, the proof of assumption rule, or the statement of reasoning rule (see Dasreef Pty Ltd v
Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21), either under common law or under the
uniform evidence regime, as to both of which some controversy remains, a number of
observations can be made about effective and persuasive presentation of expert evidence,
whether it be in the form of written reports or oral evidence in court.
So that expert opinion evidence will be both admissible and command significant
weight:
• a clear distinction should be drawn between evidence of fact and evidence of opinion;
• evidence in the form of speculation should be avoided;
• assertions without reasoning (formerly known as an ipse dixit) should be eschewed;
• there should be clear identification of any assumptions made and the reasons for such
assumptions;
• the material that constitutes any significant basis for opinions expressed should be
identified and proved; and
• the reasons for any opinions should be clearly set out.
[2.20.540] 137
Chapter 2.25
THE ULTIMATE ISSUE RULE

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [2.25.01]
Uncertainty of formulation .................................................................................................. [2.25.40]
A matter of form rather than substance ........................................................................... [2.25.50]
Circumvention/Transgression of the rule ........................................................................ [2.25.60]
The traditional formulation ................................................................................................. [2.25.100]
The Eggleston formulation .................................................................................................. [2.25.140]
Criticism of the rule .............................................................................................................. [2.25.180]
A variation on the traditional formulation ....................................................................... [2.25.220]
Expert evidence involving legal standards ...................................................................... [2.25.260]
The continuing trend ............................................................................................................ [2.25.270]
Opinion of psychiatrist regarding guilt or innocence .................................................... [2.25.280]
Other disallowed opinion evidence ................................................................................... [2.25.290]
An exception – civil, non-jury cases .................................................................................. [2.25.330]
The problem for the court ................................................................................................... [2.25.340]
Family Court litigation ......................................................................................................... [2.25.380]
A warning about circumvention ........................................................................................ [2.25.420]
Diminished responsibility evidence in New South Wales ............................................. [2.25.460]
Canadian evolution of the law ........................................................................................... [2.25.500]
United States interpretation and application of the rule ............................................... [2.25.540]
‘Some ne’er advance a Judgment of their own,
But catch the spreading notion of the town;
They catch and conclude by Precedent,
And own stale Nonsense which they ne’er invent …
Some praise at morning what they blame at Night;
But always think the last Opinion right.’
Alexander Pope, An Essay on Criticism (1709).
Introduction
[2.25.01] A common law exclusionary rule of expert evidence provides that an expert
witness may not be asked to give evidence about a matter which is an ‘ultimate issue’ in
the case. In practice, this cryptic description is generally taken to refer to the central
question which it is the responsibility of the judge or jury to determine – an important
issue of fact or law: Joseph Crosfield & Sons Ltd v Techno-Chemical Laboratories Ltd (1913) 29
TLR 378 at 379; McCormick (1984, p 30).
This contrasts with s 80 of the uniform evidence scheme in Australia (applying at the
Commonwealth level and in New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, the Northern Territory
and the Australian Capital Territory), which provides: ‘Evidence of an opinion is not
inadmissible only because it is about … a fact in issue or an ultimate issue.’
At common law, the preclusion on evidence in the form of an ultimate issue has
variously been justified on the basis that:
(1) such evidence would involve unstated assumptions as to either disputed facts or
propositions of law (Eggleston (1983, pp 147–148), applied in Arnotts Ltd v Trade
Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 351);
(2) such evidence would lead to a plethora of opinions by persons claiming to be
experts (British Celanese Ltd v Courtaulds Ltd (1935) 152 LT 537 at 543; Clark v Adie
(1876) 2 App Cas 423; Joseph Crosfield & Sons Ltd v Techno-Chemical Laboratories Ltd
(1913) 29 TLR 378 at 379);
(3) such evidence can function as advocacy in the guise of expert opinion (Clark v
Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 490–491, 492 per Dixon CJ and Windeyer J);
(4) such evidence might trespass on the court’s domain (Transport Publishing Co Pty
Ltd v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 at 127);
[2.25.01] 139
(5) such evidence would usurp the functions of the court or overwhelm the duty of
the tribunal of fact to make up its own mind (R v Tonkin [1975] Qd R 1 at 39; R v
Ashcroft [1965] 1 Qd R 81 at 85; R v Darrington [1980] VR 353 at 133; Meehan v HM
Advocate [1970] JC 11 at 14; Joseph Crosfield & Sons Ltd v Techno-Chemical Laboratories
Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 378 at 379; Preston-Jones v Preston-Jones [1951] AC 391; R v Layton
(1849) 4 Cox CC 149; R v Richards (1858) 1 F & F 87; 175 ER 638; R v Smith (1915)
11 Cr App R 234 at 238; Rich v Pierpont (1862) 3 F & F 35; 176 ER 16; CIR v Atlas
Copco [1991] 2 NZLR 732 at 740; S v Haasbroek (1969) 2 SA 624);
(6) such evidence might result in attornment to the opinion of the expert, especially if
cross-examination is not effective in making the expert accountable (R v DD 2000
SCC 43 at [54]);
(7) evidence about an issue is not a matter for non-legal evidence, nor a recognised
field of ‘specialised knowledge’ (Lipovac v Hamilton Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported,
ACT Supreme Court, 13 September 1996) per Higgins J at p 106);
(8) such evidence goes beyond the witness’s area of expertise (Lipovac v Hamilton
Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported, ACT Supreme Court, 13 September 1996) per
Higgins J at p 106);
(9) such evidence would be confusing for the tribunal of fact and would be
unhelpful;
(10) expert evidence is apt to be misunderstood, and if on the ultimate issue may
distort the fact-finding process (R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402
at 411); and
(11) special instructions to the jury may not remedy the prejudice of expert evidence
(R v DD 2000 SCC 43 at [55]).
It appears that the rule is an outgrowth of the ancient rule that witnesses were not allowed
to testify in terms of opinion, only in terms of fact, as the formation of opinions and the
drawing of inferences were the tasks of the jury. 1 Because expert evidence was at its most
helpful to courts when put in terms of inferences which could not so readily be drawn by
lay jurors, an exception to the rule was drawn for expert witnesses. The quid pro quo was
that they were not permitted to express their views on the fundamental issues to be ruled
upon by jurors – on the ultimate issues: see Wigmore (1904, p 2555); Hand (1901, p 40);
Brown (1990, p 679).
The maintenance of the prohibition of opinion evidence in terms of the ultimate issues
emanates from concerns about the inappropriate influence that expert evidence may exert
upon lay jurors, 2 potential bias of expert witnesses, and jurors’ capacity effectively to
evaluate expert information with whose terms and concepts they are not familiar: see
Freckelton (1987). However, it seems clear enough that the rule continues to operate in
jurisdictions where s 80 of the uniform rules of evidence has not been promulgated: see,
eg, Western Australia v Elliott [2012] WASC 174, applying Schultz v The Queen [1982] WAR
171, which is echoed in the judgment of the High Court in Hawkins v The Queen (1994) 179
CLR 500 at 517.
1 See, for instance, Lincoln v R Co 23 Wend 425 at 432 (1840), cited in McCord (1987, p 74,
n 246): ‘Opinions, belief, deductions from facts, and such like, are matters which belong to
the jury and by which they arrive at their verdict; when the examination extends to these
and the judgment, belief and inferences of a witness are inquired into as matters proper
for the consideration of a jury, their province is in a measure usurped: the judgment of
witnesses is substituted for that of the jury.’
2 In People v Collins 438 P 2d 33 (1968), reference was made to the fear that expert testimony
would ‘cast a spell’ over jurors.
140 [2.25.01]
The ultimate issue rule | CH 2.25
The rule has been partially abolished by statute under r 704(a) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence 1975 (US) and s 59 of the Evidence Code (Can). 3 Judicial inroads have been made
upon it in England (Director of Public Prosecutions v A & BC Chewing Gum Ltd [1968] 1 QB
159 at 164 per Lord Parker CJ; s 3(1) of the Civil Evidence Act 1972 (UK); see Hodgkinson
(1990, p 150)) and the English Criminal Law Revision Committee (1972, para 268) has even
expressed the view that ‘it would now be probable that the prohibition no longer exists’.
However, at common law, in Australia and New Zealand the ultimate issue rule
technically remains intact, a trap for the unwary and unsuspecting.
This chapter reviews the case law in relation to the content and significance of the
ultimate issue rule.
Uncertainty of formulation
[2.25.40] There have been many different formulations of the ultimate issue rule, leading
to a measure of ongoing uncertainty about its formulation: see, eg, Dodd v Tamigi [2007]
WASC 42 at [17].
Probably the most strident condemnation of the practice of permitting experts to
express views that trespass upon the jury’s fact-finding duties is that of Neville J in Joseph
Crosfield & Sons Ltd v Techno-Chemical Laboratories Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 378 at 379:
But the waste of time is not the whole of the mischief, for the admission of the opinion of
eminent experts upon the issues leads to the balancing of opinions and tends to shift
responsibility from the bench or the jury to the witness box. The evil of this becomes
apparent when one considers that, whereas the expert witnesses called for the plaintiff
almost invariably take a strong view in his favour on each and all of the issues in the
action, the expert witnesses for the defendants are equally confident the other way.
His Honour stated (at 379) the ultimate issue prohibition to be a rule by which ‘it is not
competent in any action for witnesses to express their opinion upon any of the issues,
whether of fact or law, which the court or a jury has to determine’: see also North Cheshire
& Manchester Brewery Co v Manchester Brewery Co Ltd [1899] AC 83 per Earl of
Halsbury LC.
If the description ‘any of the issues’ were construed literally, the ultimate issue rule
would have the potential to eliminate expert opinion evidence in relation to any matter in
dispute between the parties in a civil case and on any matter which the Crown seeks to
prove in a criminal case: see Freckelton (1987); Jackson (1984); Thannhauser v Westpac
Banking Corp (1991) 31 FCR 572 at 573–574. Experts would only be able to provide
evidence of fact, no different from that able to be given by lay witnesses. This would be
ridiculous. It is significant that Neville J in the leading early case on the ultimate issue rule
(Joseph Crosfield & Sons Ltd v Techno-Chemical Laboratories Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 378 at 379)
acknowledged that in a great many cases, a ‘very large proportion’ of evidence ‘is devoted
to questions which either openly or under more or less skilful disguise are directed to
eliciting the opinion of witnesses upon one or other of the issues in the case, or the
construction of the documents relied upon’. This same consideration led Mason CJ and
Toohey and Deane JJ to reject a broad application of the rule in the important case of
Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 at 110, 127: see also RW Miller & Co Pty Ltd v Krupp
(Australia) (1991) 34 NSWLR 129 at 130.
3 The Ontario Court of Appeal concluded in R v Graat (1980) 55 CCC (2d) 429; 116 DLR (3d)
143; affd 2 CCC (3d) 365; 144 DLR (3d) 267 at 443–444 (CCC):
In Canada the ultimate issue doctrine may now be regarded as having been
virtually abandoned or rejected. Where evidence has been rejected on the basis of
the doctrine such rejection can be explained on other grounds. … In the final
analysis, even with the benefit of the expert’s evidence the jury still has to make the
final determination of the issue, so that the expert is not really usurping the jury’s
function.
[2.25.40] 141
A matter of form rather than substance

[2.25.50] Thus, Greenhill J in Carr v Radkey 393 SW 2d 806 (Tex 1965) went so far as to hold
that there may be many occasions on which a witness may be asked the same question as
the jury must answer:
An automobile intersection case may turn on whether a party saw a red light, failed to
stop at a stop sign, gave a particular signal and the like. In all of these, witnesses may
testify if they know, that the person did or did not do all these things, and the jury is then
asked the same question. Many authorities would permit questions even on the ultimate
issues.
This led Jackson (1984, pp 77–78) to maintain that the rule is better rephrased as meaning
that witnesses are barred from testifying to all ultimate issues, otherwise admissible under
the opinion evidence rule, that involve them making inferences from primary facts.
Perhaps because of the uncertainty of the rule’s formulation and its exceptions, or
possibly because of ignorance of its existence, objection is comparatively rarely taken on
the ground of the ultimate issue rule. As Samuels J put it in 1970 (quoted in Glass (1970,
p 153)):
Expert opinion is commonly given without objection upon various ‘ultimate issues’ which
the jury has to determine, eg, the plaintiff’s incapacity to work, or the causal connection
between injury and incapacity. … Similarly, an expert may be permitted to express ‘an
ultimate opinion’ where questions of handwriting, identity and value are in issue. In some
contract cases, the ultimate issue of breach or no breach can be determined only by expert
opinion upon the very point; and so too in non-disclosure of material facts in actions upon
policies of insurance.
Similarly, Lord Parker CJ in Director of Public Prosecutions v A & BC Chewing Gum Ltd [1968]
1 QB 159 at 164 commented thus on the practice in the criminal courts:
[W]ith the advance of science more and more inroads have been made into the old
common law principles. Those who practise in the criminal courts see everyday cases of
experts being called on the question of diminished responsibility, and although technically
the final question ‘Do you think he was suffering from diminished responsibility’ is
strictly inadmissible, it is allowed time and time again without objection.
Consequently, he allowed evidence (at 165) on the effect of the allegedly obscene material
upon different age groups of children on the ground that ‘any jury and any justices need
any help they can get, information which they may not have’. Subsequently, and after the
effective abolition of the rule in civil proceedings by the Civil Evidence Act 1972 (UK), s 3,
Lord Taylor CJ said in R v Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260 at 265:
The rationale behind the supposed prohibition [on the ultimate issue question] is that the
expert should not usurp the functions of the jury. But since counsel can bring the witness
so close to opining on the ultimate issue that the inference as to his view is obvious, the
rule can only be … a matter of form rather than substance.
In the English family law context too, a more benign attitude toward the extent to which
expert evidence is permitted to touch on the ultimate issue is readily discernible. Johnson J
in Re B [1995] 1 FLR 904 (child sexual abuse: standard of proof), for instance, lists a few
out of many examples where such evidence has been permitted without question: see also
S and B (Minors) , Re [1990] 2 FLR 489 (Child abuse: evidence). Butler-Sloss J in M and R
(Minors), Re [1996] 4 All ER 239 (sexual abuse: expert evidence) at 253 expressed the view
that, after the 1972 legislation, experts’ views may continue to be inadmissible, but for a
different reason – that they have no expertise on the final question of whether one witness
should be preferred to another, or because the evidence was not relevant. A similar
approach may be seen in the decision of the Australian Family Court in Re W (Sex Abuse:
Standard of Proof) (2004) 32 Fam LR 249; [2004] FamCA 768 and Re W and W (2001) 164 FLR
18; [2001] FamCA 216, both of which are decisions subject to the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth),
s 80.
142 [2.25.50]
Circumvention/Transgression of the rule

[2.25.60] In the English context, Hodgkinson (1990, p 233) described the rule as ‘daily
transgressed’ – particularly by mental health professionals. Opinion evidence is
customarily received on matters which the court has to decide, including:
(1) the materiality of a representation in an application for insurance (York v Yorkshire
Insurance Co [1918] 1 KB 662; Sun Insurance Office v Roy [1927] SCR 8 at 13);
(2) where the issue in a marine case is proper seamanship (Fenwick v Bell (1844) 1 C &
K 312; 174 ER 825);
(3) malpractice actions (Davy v Morrison [1932] OR 1 at 9; [1931] 4 DLR 619 a);
(4) negligence actions (Rich v Pierpont (1862) 3 F & F 35; 176 ER 16);
(5) fitness to plead trials (R v Khallouf [1981] VR 360 at 364);
(6) insanity (Samuels v Flavel [1970] SASR 256 at 262; Attorney-General (SA) v Brown
(1960) 44 Cr App R 100 at 112–113; R v Dix (1982) 74 Cr App R 306 at 311; R v
Vernege [1982] Crim LR 598);
(7) automatism (Police v Bannin [1991] 2 NZLR 237 at 241; Hill v Baxter [1958] 1 QB
277 at 285); and
(8) disability, as well as impairment: see Lasky (1983); see also Ch 51 of the
subscription service.
While the formulation of the rule is not wholly clear in Scotland, in 2009 in Wilson v Her
Majesty’s Advocate (Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission Referral) [2009] ScotHC
HCJAC 58, the Scottish High Court of Justiciary rejected evidence from a psychologist that
confessions by suspects were unreliable, stating (at [63]):
That is not a conclusion that an expert witness should draw. His role is to place his
opinion before a court or jury in the fashion described above, in order to allow the court or
the jury to reach a proper conclusion on the matter.
Sometimes, if expert evidence would intrude upon an ultimate issue but would be
‘helpful’ to the court, a blind eye will be turned to the rule, even in the face of objections:
CIR v Atlas Copco [1991] 2 NZLR 732 at 740. However, in R v Darrington [1980] VR 353 at
158, Jenkinson J (with whom Young CJ agreed) pointedly refused to ‘express any
concluded opinion upon whether the law now included such a rule’ (referring to Cross
(1991, pp 430–434); Glass (1970, pp 150–154); Eggleston (1983, p 124)).
In Ireland, the rule has been regarded as obsolete: McMullen v Farrell [1993] 1 IR 123.
In the New Zealand context, Fisher J of the High Court has expressed the view that
expert opinion evidence should be accepted on ultimate issues whenever it is helpful to a
court to do so: Real Estate Institute of New Zealand Inc v Lewis and Callinan (unreported,
High Court of New Zealand, 22 June 1994), following Cross on Evidence (4th NZ ed), p 437.
In South Africa, the rule remains (see Meintjes-Van Der Walt (2001, p 163)); the
Supreme Court of Appeal in S v September 1996 1 SACR 325 (A) inferentially at least
maintained support for the rule, stating:
[I]n the ultimate analysis, the crucial issue of the appellant’s criminal responsibility for his
actions at the relevant time is a matter to be determined, not by psychiatrists, but by the
court itself. In determining the issue the court … must of necessity have regard not only to
the expert medical evidence but also to all the other facts of the case, including the
reliability of the appellant as witness and the nature of his proved action throughout the
relevant period.
The traditional formulation

[2.25.100] The traditional formulation of the ultimate issue rule was expressed in the old
case of R v Wright (1821) Russ & Ry 456 at 457–458; 168 ER 895, in which a medical witness
was not permitted to give evidence about the mental state of the defendant at the time of
[2.25.100] 143
committing the offence in terms of whether the particular facts before the court constituted
insanity. However, he was allowed to express his view on whether certain ‘appearances’
were symptoms of insanity, leaving it unexceptionably to the jury to draw their own
inferences in the particular case.
Similarly, in R v Higginson (1843) 1 C & K 129 at 130; 174 ER 743 at 744, it was held that
‘the proper mode is to ask what are the symptoms of insanity, or to take particular facts,
and, assuming them to be true, to say whether they indicate insanity on the part of the
prisoner’.
Likewise, in the Scottish case of Gellatly v Laird [1953] JC 16 (followed in Ingram v
Macari [1983] SLT 61; but cf HM Advocate v McGinlay [1983] SLT 562), a magistrate was
held to have correctly refused to hear expert evidence on whether or not publications were
indecent or obscene since that was the ‘very matter remitted to the opinion of the
magistrate’.
A more modern, strict application of the rule came in a case which has the potential to
be very important for white-collar crime prosecutions, R v Hally [1962] Qd R 214 at 229,
where Gibbs J held that it was not open to an expert witness to say that in his or her view
a party has acted dishonestly. In that case, an accountant had adverted to various
irregularities in the keeping of the appellant’s trust accounts, and on several occasions
expressed the view that the appellant had been guilty of ‘dishonest contrivance’. He had
said that a transfer of balances made by the appellant had been ‘quite a clever move’ and
that ‘the inference to me as an auditor is that it was changed to cover that position’ (ie,
that there was a deficiency). He had referred to the appellant’s ‘manipulations of the
balances’ and, in relation to the moneys shown in accounts as ‘cash on hand’, had
commented: ‘I have my own opinion as to whether it was on hand, but I am not
expressing that.’ On several occasions, he expressed the opinion that the appellant had
misappropriated his client’s moneys. He said at one stage in his evidence: ‘In fact, as I
said, there was no record of bonds being purchased, and the thousand pounds was
incorrectly posted to the credit of D’s estate which at that stage had no legal right to it and
it was – or at least – Mr H proceeded to spend it according to the evidence of his ledger.’
Gibbs J did not differentiate among the foregoing expressions of opinion but held that
the accountant’s evidence strikingly infringed the rules of expert evidence. He pointed out
that: ‘Certainly, in a criminal case in which fraud is alleged, it is not open to an expert to
say that in his opinion a party has acted dishonestly: R v Hart (1898) 9 QLJ 95.’
Even in 1992, though, Gummow J was prepared to disallow expert evidence as to the
results of a survey on the impact of the presentation of various kinds of bricks, alleged to
be similar to Lego products, since the question of whether consumers would be deceived
‘is the very question the court has to determine’: Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd
(1992) 111 ALR 577 at 619.
The Eggleston formulation

[2.25.140] One of the underlying rationales of the ultimate issue rule has been that a jury
may be overwhelmed by an expert’s expression of opinion that assumes a certain set of
facts which is in contention or does not clearly enough disclose its bases. It may result in
ill-considered adoption of one possible interpretation of the facts and so inadequate
evaluation by the tribunal of fact. Eggleston (1983, pp 147–148) argues:
What the rule really means is that an expert must not express an opinion if to do so would
involve unstated assumptions as to either disputed facts or propositions of law. Thus an
expert who says ‘In my opinion this accident was caused by …’ in a case where the facts
are disputed is assuming the right to make a decision as to which of the parties is telling
the truth, and is therefore usurping the function of the tribunal. Similarly, if a valuer is
called in a case where the ‘unimproved value’ of a property is in issue, and there is
144 [2.25.140]
uncertainty as to the meaning of the term as a matter of law, the expert should not say ‘In
my opinion the unimproved value is …’ without stating on what the interpretation of the
term his opinion is based.
Eggleston’s analysis of the role of the expert witness was quoted at length with approval
by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24
FCR 313 at 351.
Criticism of the rule

[2.25.180] Stoebuck (1964, p 226) has argued that: ‘The mist the gods drew about them on
the battlefield before Troy was no more dense than the one enshrouding the origins of the
[ultimate issue] rule.’ Wigmore (1904, p 2557) described the rule as ‘simply one of those
impossible and misconceived utterances which lack any justification in principle’ and its
justification as avoiding usurpation of the function of the jury as a ‘mere bit of empty
rhetoric’ (1904, p 2556). Morgan (1962, p 194) termed it ‘sheer nonsense’, and McCormick
(1984, p 26) maintained it to be ‘unduly restrictive’ and ‘pregnant with close questions of
application’, ‘often unfairly obstruct[ing] the party’s presentation of his case’. (See, too,
Goldstein (1989); Jackson (1984); McSherry (2001).)
The Australian Law Reform Commission (1987, para 413), the Ontario Law Reform
Commission (1976, pp 153–158), the Scottish Law Commission (1980), the South
Australian Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee (1975, para 6), the
Federal/Provincial Task Force of Canada (1982) and the New Zealand Law Commission
(1991, p 16) have all recommended the abolition of the ultimate issue rule. Compare,
though, the views of Australian judges (Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999)) and
magistrates (Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (2001)). The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 80, the
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 80, and the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), s 80, theoretically, have
gone a long way toward abolishing the rule.
Even in those jurisdictions that retain the common law, there is likely to be recognition
that the distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate issues is impossible to draw; that it
is difficult to couch testimony in anything other than ultimate facts; and that the rationale
most frequently advanced in defence of the rule – that it protects against usurpation of the
jury’s function by experts – is conceptually unsound, as jurors are always free to reject
expert evidence: R v Graat (1980) 55 CCC (2d) 429 at 443–444; 116 DLR (3d) 143; affd 2
CCC (3d) 365; 144 DLR (3d) 267 (CCC). It is likely that the rule will continue to be diluted
by the effluxion of time.
In 1991, Pincus J in Thannhauser v Westpac Banking Corp (1991) 31 FCR 572 at 573–574
referred with apparent approval to the comments in a recent North American text by
Delisle (1989, p 463):
A broader formulation of the ultimate issue rule foreclosing other opinion testimony, over
and above opinions respecting guilt or innocence, not only lacks justification but, in
theory, is unworkable. The doctrines of relevance and materiality dictate that all evidence
given at a trial must be with respect to matters that are necessary to the prosecution or
defence in the matter at issue. All testimony is then with respect to an ultimate issue in the
sense that failure of proof with respect to anything necessary to a successful prosecution
must yield an acquittal. In theory, then, no expert, bound by the rules of relevancy and
materiality, would be permitted to testify to anything under a broad formulation of the
ultimate issue rule. In practice, of course, expert opinion testimony is received and the
supposed ultimate issue rule which developed in the 19th century is seen, to be kind, as
amorphous, and is applied or withheld with a great deal of discretion.
[2.25.180] 145
A variation on the traditional formulation

[2.25.220] In Blackie v Police [1966] NZLR 910 at 919–920, Turner J, in a dissenting
judgment, acknowledged the dangers for the defendant of allowing any witness to answer
the very question which the court has to decide. However, he postulated an exception to
the ultimate issue rule:
The only justification which can be advanced for allowing the question must be the
impossibility or extreme difficulty of arriving at the truth in any other way; and even in
such cases it is indispensable that there must be both a high degree of skill and a complete
impartiality in the witness called.
In this notion of there being an exception to the rule in the form of ‘necessity’, Turner J has
been supported by a decision of Bray CJ in Samuels v Flavel [1970] SASR 256 at 262, who
noted that in the case of evidence of insanity within the M’Naghten rules, ‘it is impossible
for the opinion of an expert to be conveyed in any other form’. (See also Blackie v Police
[1966] NZLR 910 at 919–920; Attorney-General (SA) v Brown (1960) 44 Cr App R 100 at
112–113; Gillies (1991, p 389).) Devlin J has commented in a similar vein in relation to pleas
of automatism: ‘I do not see how the layman can safely attempt without the help of some
medical or scientific evidence to distinguish the genuine from the fraudulent’: Hill v Baxter
[1958] 1 QB 277 at 285. However, there is nothing magical about the terminology that an
expert employs about such a subject and it is for the court to categorise the condition in
appropriate legal terms: Police v Bannin [1991] 2 NZLR 237 at 241.
Expert evidence involving legal standards

[2.25.260] The formulation of the rule propounded by the editors of Phipson on Evidence
(1990, p 561) has been influential:
(a) Where the issue involves other elements besides the purely scientific, the expert
must confine himself to the latter, and must not give his opinion upon the legal or
general merits of the case; 4
(b) Where the issue is substantially one of science or skill merely, the expert may, if
he has himself observed the facts, be asked the very question which the jury have
to decide. 5
(See, too, Phipson on Evidence (15th ed, 2000), para 37-12.)

The authoritative modern case on the interpretation of the ultimate issue rule is the
New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal decision of R v Palmer [1981] 1 NSWLR 209.
In that case, Glass JA pointed out that it is a commonplace experience in both civil and
criminal trials for evidence of opinion to be received from expert witnesses in relation to
ultimate issues for jury determination. He held (at 214) the ‘true rule’ to be that:
No evidence can be received upon any question, the answer to which involves the
application of a legal standard.
(See also Grey v Australian Motorists & General Insurance Co Pty Ltd [1976] 1 NSWLR 669 at
675–676 per Glass JA; RW Miller & Co Pty Ltd v Krupp (Australia) (1991) 34 NSWLR 129 at
130.)
4 Citing Seed v Higgins (1860) 8 HLC 550 at 565–566; 11 ER 544 at 550–551; Joseph Crosfield &
Sons Ltd v Techno-Chemical Laboratories Ltd (1913) 29 TLR 378; Jameson v Drinkald (1826) 12
Moore CP 148; Campbell v Rickards (1833) 5 B & Ad 840; 110 ER 1001; Rich v Pierpont (1862)
3 F & F 35; 176 ER 16.
5 Citing Folkes v Chadd (1782) 3 Doug KB 157; 99 ER 589; R v Layton (1849) 4 Cox CC 149; R
v Richards (1858) 1 F & F 87; 175 ER 638; Martin v Johnston (1858) 1 F & F 122; 175 ER 654;
Lovatt v Tribe (1862) 3 F & F 9; 176 ER 5; R v Mason (1911) 7 Cr App R 67; see also Ireland v
Taylor [1949] 1 KB 300 at 312; R v Holmes [1953] 1 WLR 686.
146 [2.25.220]
Elsewhere, Glass (1987, p 49) and Dunn J (R v Tonkin [1975] Qd R 1 at 42–43) cite with
approval the following passage in the United States case of Grismore v Consolidated
Products Co 5 NW 2d 646 at 663 (1942) (emphasis added):
No witness should be permitted to give his opinion directly that a person is guilty or
innocent, or is criminally responsible or irresponsible, or that a person was negligent or
not negligent, or that he had the capacity to execute a will, or deed, or like instrument …
but the reason is that such matters are not subjects of opinion testimony. They are mixed
questions of law and fact. When a standard, or a measure, or a capacity has been fixed by
law, no witness whether expert or non-expert, nor however qualified, is permitted to
express an opinion as to whether or not the person or the conduct, in question, measures
up to that standard. On that question the court must instruct the jury as to the law, and the jury
must draw its own conclusions from the evidence.
Unfortunately, the apparent importance of the jury and the fear that jurors might be
overwhelmed by expert evidence adopting legal terminology and employing legal
standards was not the subject of further comment by the court.
In 1993, Hodgson J cited Grey with approval and noted that the authors of Cross on
Evidence (3rd ed, p 719) referred to the ultimate issue rule as ‘an exercise in playing on
words’: Rabelais Pty Ltd v Cameron (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 8 February 1993);
see also Permanent Trustee Aust Ltd v Boulton (1994) 33 NSWLR 735 at 739.
However, the proscription upon expert witnesses employing legal terminology which,
in effect, replicates the task of the tribunal of fact is not new. For instance, in Haynes v
Doman [1899] 2 Ch 13, it was held in an action by a trader against his servant for breach of
contract, restricting him from plying his trade within a certain area in competition with his
old employer, that evidence from persons in the trade about the ‘reasonableness’ or
otherwise of the contract was not admissible. The ground for the determination was that
the reasonableness of a contract depends upon its correct construction and its legal effect.
These were adjudged to be matters for the court alone and not for expert opinion.
The continuing trend
[2.25.270] The continuing trend in the interpretation of the ultimate issue rule was
maintained in ULV Pty Ltd v Scott (1990) 19 NSWLR 190. A town-planning witness before
the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales had been permitted to give
evidence, based on his examination of a council’s files, that the decision reached by the
council to grant development approvals was such that no reasonable body could have
made it. On appeal, the Court of Appeal dealt, inter alia, with the propriety of expert
witnesses giving ‘evidence of an ultimate fact in issue’. It accepted the view expressed in a
research paper of the Australian Law Reform Commission (Freckelton (1983)) that:
One of the few things that can be asserted with confidence in relation to the ultimate issue
rule is, therefore, that a witness, be he expert or common, may not offer his opinion on any
matter which involves his use of a ‘legal’ term.
Thus, Priestley JA held that a court might be ‘helped’ by expert explanation of what
material was before a council if the task before the court was to determine whether there
was material before a council upon which it could properly exercise its decision-making
powers and discretions. However, he doubted whether the expert could go further and,
for example, give evidence to the court that although there was some evidence upon
which the council could exercise its powers and discretions, nevertheless it would be
unreasonable from a town-planning point of view for a decision to be made such as was
made. The reason why such an opinion could not be given was that, although put in the
language of town-planning expertise, ‘such an opinion is also an opinion on the question
of law to be decided by the court’ (at 204).
Where the opinion requested involves a mixed question of law and fact, the opinion
will not generally be admissible: R v Fisher [1961] OWN 94; 34 CR 320. Thus, a doctor may
not be asked whether an accused man is a criminal psychopath: R v Neil [1957] SCR 685;
[2.25.270] 147
11 DLR (2d) 545. Theoretically, this should also mean that a doctor or other expert may not
be asked questions relating to disability (as distinguished from impairment) because this
is a legal construct.
Opinion of psychiatrist regarding guilt or innocence
[2.25.280] A psychiatrist may not express an opinion about the guilt or innocence of the
accused. Moreover, ‘the question whether at the relevant time the accused voluntarily and
intentionally did some act with the necessary intent … is entirely a question of fact for the
jury’ and will not be permitted: R v Honner [1977] Tas SR 1 at 6 per Chambers J; see also R
v Darrington [1980] VR 353 at 362, 381; R v Schultz (1981) 5 A Crim R 234 at 239; R v Haidley
(1983) 10 A Crim R 1 at 7. However, exceptions to the rule appear to exist which allow
experts to express opinions on states of insanity, diminished responsibility (R v Tonkin
[1975] Qd R 1 at 18 per Kneipp J; R v McEndoo (1981) 5 A Crim R 52 at 55), capacity to form
intent (quaere R v Stephenson [1979] 1 QB 695 at 699), automatism and fitness to plead in
terms of R v Presser [1958] VR 45 (R v Khallouf [1981] VR 360 at 364). Thus, for instance, in
R v Shields [1967] VR 706 at 708, it is recorded without exception by the Full Court of the
Victorian Supreme Court that a psychiatrist called by the defence gave evidence that ‘the
accused suffers from a personality disorder with poor control of his impulses, and that the
combination of drugs, liquor and lack of sleep, by which he was affected, would result in
an inability to control his behaviour and form an intent to kill’.
In the case of insanity, it has been held that for a judge to refuse to admit a question in
cross-examination of an expert relating to whether a defendant knew the nature of his or
her act and that it was wrong ‘would put an insuperable difficulty … in the way of the
defence whenever they were trying to establish insanity’: R v Holmes (1953) 37 Cr App R
61 at 64.
In England, it is clear that psychiatric evidence may be led as to the existence of
abnormality of mind; whether the abnormality arose from arrested or retarded
development of mind or from any inherent cause, or was induced by disease or injury;
and whether it was such as to have substantially impaired the defendant’s mental
responsibility for his or her acts in connection with a homicide: R v Dix (1982) 74 Cr App
R 306 at 311; R v Vernege [1982] Crim LR 598; Hodgkinson (1990, p 235).
Other disallowed opinion evidence
[2.25.290] In R v McEndoo (1981) 5 A Crim R 52, in spite of an accused being weak-willed,
vacillating, a poor judge of others, obsequious, submissive and dependent, the
Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal ruled that a trial judge was correct in refusing to
allow a psychiatrist to express the view that an interrogation was most likely to have led
to the accused man making a false confession in the sense of his agreeing with almost
anything put to him: ‘that was the issue for the jury and expert witnesses cannot be
permitted to usurp the jury’s function’. (See also R v Ashcroft [1965] 1 Qd R 81 at 85 per
Gibbs J; R v Tonkin [1975] Qd R 1 at 39 per Dunn J.) The answer may have been for the
expert to have been asked questions phrased in such a way to enable the expert to reply
that the accused would be likely to agree with almost anything put to him. Such an
approach would have allowed the accused’s counsel to have argued in summing up to the
jury that no weight whatever should be given to the confession made by him, considering
the expert evidence about his general behaviour.
Nor may a person be asked whether on the evidence there had been negligence in
medical treatment, although the witness may be allowed to say whether there had been
anything improper, in his view, about the treatment: Rich v Pierpont (1862) 3 F & F 35; 176
ER 16.
Nor may a forensic psychologist and criminologist or a writer, teacher and dominatrix
give expert evidence in relation to the community acceptance of sexually explicit material
with resonances of violence, among other things because this ‘was the ultimate question
for the magistrate’: Vokalek v Commonwealth (2008) 101 SASR 588; [2008] SASC 256 at [54].
148 [2.25.280]
If an opinion is expressed in terms of a statutory or contractual expression, the

interpretation of which is in dispute in the case, that may offend the ultimate issue rule:
von Doussa (1987, p 620). A danger is that the expert may employ language found in the
legislation but use it in a sense at variance to that found in the legislation. Just this
occurred in Samuels v Flavel [1970] SASR 256 at 262 per Bray CJ, where a forensic
pathologist expressed the opinion that the defendant with a blood alcohol level of 0.18
must have been ‘appreciably’ affected by alcohol:
[P]resumably he chose [the term] because he knew that it appeared in the statute, but it
appeared subsequently from the cross-examination that he did not attach to it, or at least
that he may not have attached to it, the meaning which this court have held that it bears.
That illustrates the danger of the practice.
Dunn J in R v Tonkin [1975] Qd R 1 at 43 attempted to address the problem by the

commonsense suggestion that if an expert employs the actual words of a statute, such as:
[I]n a ‘diminished responsibility’ case … [to] speak of a ‘substantially impaired capacity’
… the jury should be cautioned that, whilst the words chosen by the doctor are words
which he finds apt to express his personal point of view, it is the sole province of the jury
to determine – having regard to the directions as to the law to be given by the judge –
whether the accused has a ‘substantially impaired capacity’ within the meaning of [the
legislation]; and that the medical evidence may be used in appraising all the evidence, but
is not to be treated as definitive of capacity.
Similarly, in Dodd v Tamigi [2007] WASC 42 at [17], Johnson J noted: ‘More recent
formulations of the rule tend to confine its exclusionary effect to expressions of opinion
which depend on the application of some legal standard.’
An exception – civil, non-jury cases

[2.25.330] Apart from ULV Pty Ltd v Scott (1990) 19 NSWLR 190, the prohibition upon
expression of an opinion concerning a legal standard has almost exclusively been applied
in jury cases. This is consistent with the argument advanced throughout the chapters
dealing with the law on expert evidence: that the fetters imposed are primarily directed
toward protecting jurors against the pronouncements of expert witnesses which the jurors
might not adequately evaluate.
In the more relaxed circumstances of a court functioning without a jury, considerable
flexibility has traditionally existed in terms of the extent to which experts may express
views on issues which, properly speaking, are the sole province of the judge. Thus, it was
held in Ancher, Mortlock, Murray and Woolley Pty Ltd v Hooker Homes Pty Ltd [1971] 2
NSWLR 278 at 286:
The decision upon the issue of similarity is an original decision for the court itself. It is to
be reached upon an assessment of such similarities and dissimilarities as appear to the
court between the plans of buildings under consideration. The fact that one particular
expert of the highest authority and of unimpeachable credit is permitted to swear to an
opinion on similarity or dissimilarity does not relieve the court of the responsibility of
forming its own opinion on this issue. In this sense the expert evidence in a suit such as
the present fills a somewhat unusual role. It is almost as if each side calls an expert to
argue out with counsel in examination-in-chief and cross-examination the similarity or
dissimilarity which that particular expert sees between the plans and houses. By attending
to the progress of this argumentative process between counsel and expert the court is
enabled to perceive and more readily to appreciate the points of similarity and
dissimilarity. In this way the tendering of expert evidence is of value in exposing the facets
of the ultimate question to which the expert opinion is directed. But the important point is
that, in distinction from the judicial process in relation to expert evidence such as is
normally encountered in litigation, a court in the present type of litigation is entitled, and,
indeed, bound, to form and act on its own original opinion.
[2.25.330] 149
(See too Visa International Service Association v Reserve Bank of Australia (2003) 131 FCR 300;
[2003] FCA 977 at [663]; Michael, Re; Ex parte Epic Energy (WA) Nominees Pty Ltd (2002) 25
WAR 511; [2002] WASCA 231 at [107].)
A practical problem
[2.25.340] The distinction between the practices obtaining when a jury is present and when
one is not empanelled was specifically adverted to by Blackburn J in Milirrpum v Nabalco
Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 at 165. His Honour was confronted by the argument in a civil
case involving Indigenous peoples’ rights to land that questions and answers by expert
witnesses expressing the idea of ‘rights’ of clans of Aborigines to particular land were
objectionable on the basis not merely that the court should not permit an expert to decide
a question which it was for the court to decide, but also that the experts tended to
‘conceptualise’ rather than state facts objectively. He held (at 164) that it was fallacious to
require the expert altogether to avoid the use of words involving key concepts:
To do so would be to deny his utility as a channel for the communication to the court of
the science he professes. It seems to me to be a function of an expert witness to talk in
terms of concepts which are appropriate both to his field of knowledge and to the court’s
understanding.
His Honour held that the problem for the court was to decide with the expert witnesses’
assistance, as a matter of fact, what the Aborigines’ rights were in the Aborigines’ eyes. He
found (at 165) it to be acceptable, and in fact preferable:
to allow the expert to answer questions in terms of ‘rights’ and ‘claims’, etc, provided that
the court at all times remembers that there are two questions which are solely for it to
decide. The first is that already mentioned: whether the conclusion of the expert, be it
expressed in terms of ‘rights’, etc, or not, is one to which the court should come. This is a
question of fact. In deciding it, the court must be alert to the danger of allowing its
conclusions to be unjustifiably affected by the use of words which are only tentatively
appropriate. The matter might in practice be difficult, though it would not in practice be
impossible, to explain to a jury. The second is whether what is tentatively called the ‘right’
can be subsumed under some category which enables it to be recognised. … This is a
matter of law. In other words, if the expert talks about ‘the land-owning or
land-possessing group’ the court can accept this without prejudice to its task of deciding
whether such is in fact a proper jurisprudential analysis of the relationship. Bearing all this
in mind, I do not reject as inadmissible, nor do I necessarily set aside as of no weight, that
expert evidence which was expressed in conceptual terms.
Similarly, in Thannhauser v Westpac Banking Corp (1991) 31 FCR 572 at 574, a negligence
action in the Federal Court, Pincus J indicated that in his view it would be ‘absurd’ if the
effect of the ultimate issue rule were simply to prevent employment by experts of terms
such as ‘negligence’ rather than ‘contrary to good practice’:
Whether or not, where negligence is in issue, there is a ban upon use of the word
‘negligence’ itself and its synonyms in the framing and answering of questions of those
called to give their opinion on what was done, I cannot accept that there is any longer an
established practice preventing a suitably qualified expert from saying that what is
complained of was not in accordance with good practice, was excessively risky, poorly
conceived or other such criticisms. That is so, in my view, even if acceptance of evidence
of that kind might lead fairly directly to a conclusion that what was done was negligent.
Family Court litigation

[2.25.380] In Re W and W (2001) 164 FLR 18; [2001] FamCA 216, Nicholson CJ and O’Ryan
J (with whom Kay J agreed on this point) warned of giving weight to expert evidence of a
psychiatrist who had not seen either the parties or the children but had reviewed the
material. Their Honours said (at [147]): ‘[T]here are grave dangers in reliance upon expert
evidence given in such circumstances.’ Much of the rejection of the evidence of the
psychiatrist in Re W turned on the fact that he was retained by one side and must have
150 [2.25.340]
brought unconscious bias to his task. However, it was held in Re W (Sex Abuse: Standard of
Proof) (2004) 32 Fam LR 249; [2004] FamCA 768 that the criticism of relying upon an
opinion about the ultimate issue from a witness who had not seen either the parties or the
children remained as valid when the witness is called by the court. If an expert witness
still purports to give an opinion as to the ultimate issue, then such an opinion should be
heavily qualified by the expert having regard to the fact that the expert has not seen either
the parties or the children.
A warning about circumvention

[2.25.420] Many of the thorny problems posed by the continuing existence of the ultimate
issue rule are solved in practice by judicious employment of language by counsel in
asking their questions of experts and by experts in answering them. However, on at least
one occasion, the circuitous eliciting of opinions which in substance touched upon an
ultimate issue elicited an adverse reaction from the Bench. Jenkinson J (with whom
Young CJ agreed), in referring to the ultimate issue rule and an objection that an expert’s
views should have been rejected on the basis that such a witness may not be asked the
very question which the tribunal of fact is ultimately to answer by its verdict or finding,
commented (R v Darrington [1980] VR 353 at 158):
If there now be such a rule, its operation is not in my opinion to be avoided by such
devices as posing the question as one concerning the capacity to do an act or to conceive
an intention, in lieu of one as to whether the act was in fact done or the intention in fact
conceived.
Diminished responsibility evidence in New South Wales

[2.25.460] The Crimes Amendment (Diminished Responsibility) Act 1997 (NSW) changed the
defence of diminished responsibility in New South Wales. The new s 23A(1)(b) introduced
a test of substantiality. The new s 23A(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) provides, too, that
‘evidence of an opinion that an impairment was so substantial as to warrant liability for
murder being reduced to manslaughter is not admissible’. This is a significant
re-emergence of the ultimate issue rule in a jurisdiction in which it had been substantially
abolished.
Canadian evolution of the law

[2.25.500] The fact that expert evidence may trespass over an ultimate issue continues to
be relevant to the exercise of the prejudice–probative discretion: R v Clark (2004) 182 CCC
(3d) 1. However, in general, the ultimate issue rule is no longer applied in Canada: R v
Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402 at 24–25; R v Bryan (2003) 175 CCC (3d) 285
at 289.
United States interpretation and application of the rule

[2.25.540] The Federal Rules of Evidence 1975 (US), which have since been matched in most
American States, abolished the ultimate issue rule under r 704. However, the prohibition
on testimony which employs legal conclusions has continued in some cases on the ground
that such evidence is not helpful to the trier of fact (and so breaches r 702), or is more
prejudicial than probative: see, eg, People v Anderson 421 NW 2d 200 (1988).
Thus, in State v Hennum 441 NW 2d 793 at 798 (Minn 1989), the Minnesota Supreme
Court found that battered woman syndrome evidence had gained ‘substantial enough
scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility’, but limited the expert’s testimony to
general evidence on the characteristics of battered woman syndrome as exhibited by a
typical sufferer. It refused to allow the witness to express a view on whether the accused
[2.25.540] 151
woman suffered from it, justifying its stance in terms of such testimony not being of
assistance to the jury and so inappropriate for admission as expert evidence.
In a significant development in 1984, Congress partially reinstituted the ultimate issue
rule by an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence 1975. Rule 704(b) states:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in
a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did
not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or a
defence thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone.
The amendment has spawned a new generation of United States case law on the ultimate
issue prohibition (see Buchanan (2013)). Although the impetus for the reversal was John
Hinckley’s insanity defence after his attempted assassination of President Reagan, the
language of r 704(b) does not limit its effect to insanity defences.
Cases interpreting the amendment by and large have sought to construe it narrowly,
preferring to permit expert witnesses to testify in most terms, save ones which clearly
intrude upon the ultimate decision needed to be made by a jury considering an accused
person’s state of mind at the time of the commission of an offence. Thus, in Commonwealth
v Rose 725 SW 2d 588 (Ky 1987) at 591, the Kentucky Supreme Court applied r 704(b) to
limit battered woman testimony, holding that although the nurse who had been offered as
an expert on the subject was sufficiently qualified to give expert opinions, she would not
have been permitted to express a view as to whether the accused woman reasonably
believed that it was necessary to use deadly force at the moment that she pulled the
trigger on the gun that killed the deceased.
Similarly, in United States v Edwards 819 F 2d 262 (1987), the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld a trial judge’s decision to permit a prosecution psychiatrist’s statement of
opinion that an accused charged with armed robbery was not in an active manic state at
the time of his offence. It held (at 265) that Congress’s intention in passing the amendment
was not to ‘limit the flow of diagnostic and clinical information’ to courts but to redefine
the way in which questions may be asked of and answered by expert witnesses. Thus, all
relevant facts relating to the accused man’s mental condition at the relevant time
continued to be admissible – the relevant symptomatology could be placed before the jury.
In United States v Alvarez 837 F 2d 1024 (1988), the Eleventh Circuit again construed the
language of r 704(b) as meaning that the expert is not permitted to state expressly a
conclusion about the ultimate legal issues. So long as this function is left to the jury, the
province of the jury is not breached and the rule is not broken.
Such an approach to the ultimate issue rule, such as it still exists in the United States, is
consistent with the proscription as it is defined by Glass JA in R v Palmer [1981] 1 NSWLR
209 and by the learned authors of Phipson on Evidence (2000, para 37-12).
152 [2.25.540]
Chapter 2.30
JUDICIAL NOTICE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [2.30.01]
An alternative to expert evidence? .................................................................................... [2.30.02]
Matters of common knowledge .......................................................................................... [2.30.40]
The primary parameter for judicial notice ....................................................................... [2.30.80]
Departure from strict principle ........................................................................................... [2.30.120]
The fluid nature of judicial notice ...................................................................................... [2.30.180]
Reference to works of authority ......................................................................................... [2.30.220]
Ramifications for expert evidence ...................................................................................... [2.30.260]
Legislative instruments ........................................................................................................ [2.30.300]
‘There is an approach in the contemplation of unaccustomed
refinement which gains no favour from the less cultivated. We
sympathise only with those who dress like ourselves, whether
the habit be of ideas or broadcloth. We always suspect the
honesty of those who are actuated by motives which would
not influence ourselves.’
Mr Justice Darling, Scintillae Juris, 1877 (Ibex, 1992).
Introduction
[2.30.01] This chapter sets out the law in relation to judicial notice insofar as it relates to an
alternative to formal expert evidence proof.
An alternative to expert evidence?

[2.30.02] Courts take ‘judicial notice’ of a variety of matters which might otherwise have
to be proved by expert or lay evidence (compare the more limited s 144 of the Evidence Act
1995 (Cth), Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), Evidence (National Uniform
Legislation) Act (NT), Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), Evidence Act 2011 (ACT)). In the words of
Lord Sumner in Commonwealth Shipping Representative v P & O Service [1923] AC 191 at 212,
judicial notice means that:
[A]t the stage when evidence of material facts can be properly received, certain facts may
be deemed to be established, although not proved by sworn testimony, or by the
production, out of the proper custody, of documents, which speak for themselves. Judicial
notice refers to facts which a judge may be called upon to receive and act upon, either
from his own general knowledge of them or from inquiries to be made by himself for his
own information from sources to which it is proper for him to refer.
See also: Woods v Multi-Sport Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 460; [2002] HCA 9 at
[64]–[65].
Wherever a fact is so generally known that ‘every ordinary person may be reasonably
presumed to be aware of it’, a court is entitled to take judicial notice of it: Holland v Jones
(1917) 23 CLR 149 at 153. Though the power to receive evidence of fact without formal
proof has been exercised by judges from an early time (see Botton v Wilton (1302) YB 30 &
31 Edw 1 (RS) 256 at 258), the word ‘judicial’ is given an extended meaning and juries
have been permitted to take notice of matters of common notoriety: see R v Rosser (1836) 7
C & P 648; 173 ER 284. Theoretically, the doctrine of judicial notice is wholly objective, so
the actual knowledge of a judge or magistrate is irrelevant – the fact that a particular
judge does not personally know what is regarded in the abstract as generally known is not
to the point: Gillies (1991, p 103). Similarly, specialist knowledge by a judge, jury or
magistrate ought not to be the subject of judicial notice if such knowledge is not generally
current (see Giudice and Kraft (1968)).
However, it has been suggested that background knowledge may be highly
specialised, ‘but this does not constitute an impediment to its use, not as a substitute for
[2.30.02] 153
evidence, but as part of the yardstick for the assessment of evidence’: Carter (1982, p 95).
In R v Field & Other (Justices); Ex parte White (1895) 64 LJMC 158, for instance, the
Divisional Court did not object to the lay justices’ preparedness to use knowledge that
they had acquired in the Navy on the issue of the composition of cocoa when assessing
evidence on the issue as to whether it must necessarily contain foreign matter. Carter
(p 95) noted that Wills J, himself a distinguished mountaineer, said (at 160):
[N]o one in determining a case of this kind can discard his own particular knowledge of a
subject of this kind. I might as well be asked to decide a question as to the sufficiency of an
alpine rope without bringing my own personal knowledge into play.
Counsel for the parties affected by a decision to take judicial notice of a matter which
could be in dispute must be given the opportunity to comment on the ‘judicial’ decision as
a matter of natural justice. This highlights the fact that judicial notice constitutes a
significant encroachment on the ordinary requirements of proof. It is for this reason that
the parameters and rationale for the doctrine have repeatedly come under courts’ scrutiny,
as well as the fairness of its invocation in certain circumstances.
Matters of common knowledge

[2.30.40] Matters of common knowledge or common sense, about which there cannot be
said to be controversy, namely points upon which experience and knowledge are
invariable (Stone and Wells (1991, p 155); Gillies (1991, p 101); Morgan (1956, pp 36ff; 1963,
p 61); Wills (1938); Young (1990, p 199); Thayer (1898); Taylor (1931, p 17); Nokes (1962,
pp 60–61); Cross (2017); Odgers (2018)), may be the subject of judicial notice, as may facts
that are within the cognisance of the tribunal of fact by virtue of its office. A judge may
refer to learned works for the purpose of ‘refreshing his memory’ (Gordon M Jenkins &
Associates Pty Ltd v Coleman (1989) 87 ALR 477 at 485), just as he or she may to standard
textbooks or dictionaries: Timbury v Coffee (1941) 66 CLR 277 at 284–285; Australian
Stevedoring Industry Authority v Patrick Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd (1969) 16 FLR 139 at 144;
Goldsborough v O’Neill (1996) 131 FLR 104 at 107; Australian and Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation Ltd v McAuslan (1993) 47 FCR 492 at 508; Secretary, Department of Health and
Community Services v B (1992) 175 CLR 218 at 297 per Deane J.
A category of judicial notice is as to the use, nature and purpose of many mechanical or
scientific instruments in common use, such as watches, thermometers, barometers,
speedometers and the like:
These instruments are of a class which by the general experience are known to be
trustworthy, even if not infallible, so that there is a presumption of fact, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that readings taken from such instruments are correct, and hence
it is not necessary to show that at the relevant time the instrument has been tested and
found to be working correctly. But the acceptance of a particular instrument without proof
of its function, operation, and accuracy depends upon the extent to which it is commonly
used within the community, so that a mechanical or scientific device recently invented will
usually require expert evidence to establish what it can measure or accomplish and
whether it can be relied on. Later, as the device and its use becomes known, a stage may
be reached where the Courts will be sufficiently familiar with it, not to require proof of
what it is and what it does, but may still require evidence of its accuracy at the relevant
time.
(See R v Yatno [2018] NTSC 53 at [14].)

The parameters of judicial notice have a clear relationship to the common knowledge
rule: see above, [2.15.10]. Matters of common knowledge may not be the subject of expert
evidence but may be the subject of judicial notice as being within the general domain of
the community and so not requiring formal proof, expert or lay. Thus, judicial notice
functions as an expedited means of proof of facts which might otherwise require further
evidence.
154 [2.30.40]
Judicial notice | CH 2.30
While conceptually this is clear enough, the erratic use of judicial notice has meant
that, on occasions, it substitutes as a limited form of expert evidence for the trier of fact.
The primary parameter for judicial notice

[2.30.80] A number of academic works and judicial pronouncements have approached the
procedure in similar but distinguishable ways. The authoritative Australian
pronouncement is that of Isaacs J, who held:
The only guiding principle – apart from statute – as to judicial notice which emerges from
the various recorded cases, appears to be that wherever a fact is so generally known that
every ordinary person may be reasonably presumed to be aware of it, the court ‘notices’ it,
either simpliciter if it is once satisfied of the fact without more, or after such information
or investigation as it considers reliable and necessary in order to eliminate any reasonable
doubt.
(See Holland v Jones (1917) 23 CLR 149 at 153.)

Isaacs J added:
The basic essential is that the fact is to be of a class that is so generally known as to give
rise to the presumption that all persons are aware of it. This excludes from the operation
of judicial notice what are not ‘general’ but ‘particular’ facts.
Departure from strict principle

[2.30.120] However, many of the cases appear to have departed from principle in pursuit
of convenience. The result is that, ‘[a]s to purely factual matters, the scope of the power of
the court is in doubt with decisions departing from the original formulations of principle.
Also the mandatory and discretionary aspects of the power are unclear’: Australian Law
Reform Commission (1985, Vol 2, p 312); see also Young (1990, pp 199ff).
Thus, Sir Owen Dixon was prepared, at least in part, to inform himself of the
consequences of acute alcoholism for a testator’s capacity to draw a will, but in doing so
adverted to the problems inherent in the process upon which he was embarking:
How far a court should go in treating the consequences of acute alcoholism as common
general knowledge it is not easy to say, but in the present case the evidence makes it clear
enough that the testator was an alcoholic paranoiac. With the withdrawal of alcohol from
such a patient, physical signs of his condition disappear: … But at the same time his
judgment may continue in a state of disorder for a considerable length of time. We are not
bound to go on applying views held over a century ago about mental disturbance and
insanity and to disregard modern knowledge and understanding of such conditions. In
Stoddart’s work, on Mind and Its Disorders, 5th ed. (1926), p 415, the case of such a patient
as the testator is described in terms which almost fit the present case: ‘Disturbance of
judgment is the essential feature of the disease, the patient seeing hidden meanings in the
most commonplace incidents. As a rule, the erroneous judgments have reference to his
wife’s fidelity. He sees evidence of her infidelity in the fact that she bows to an old
acquaintance in the street, that some man unknown to him hurries past the window, that
his wife is not prepared for his return from the office an hour earlier than usual or that the
cushions on the sofa are not in their usual positions.’
(See Timbury v Coffee (1941) 66 CLR 277 at 283–284.)

In the same case, Williams J felt able to comment (at 293):
The mind of a dipsomaniac, suffering from toxaemia and cirrhosis of the liver, not to
mention several gastric ulcers, must have been a congenial ground for the rapid growth of
the obsession. … It is well known that a person may be quite normal except on one
particular subject, so that there would be nothing unusual if the testator’s mental
condition was such that he may be able to transact his ordinary business but his mind had
become hopeless prey to insane delusions in the case of his wife.
While matters such as the identity of the Minister for Defence (Holland v Jones (1917) 23
CLR 149) and the standards of weight and measure, the public coin and currency (Saul v
[2.30.120] 155
Manon [1980] 2 NSWLR 314) provide classical examples of matters that may be the subject
of judicial notice, many more specialist matters, that might otherwise have required expert
evidence, have been treated the same way:
(1) the fact that venereal disease may lie dormant for a long time (Glenister v Glenister
[1945] P 30 at 36);
(2) the construction of a craypot (Saint Leger v Bailey [1962] Tas SR 131);
(3) facts of local history and customs that are of common knowledge (Lualemana v
Brown (1958) 3 ASR 348; Sevi v Mat’afa (1963) 4 ASR 333; Bethan v Faumuina (1960)
3 ASR 537);
(4) the fact that bushland was cleared and occupied with claims made on behalf of
the clearers’ families (Toomatau v Vea (1950) 2 ASR 564);
(5) the fact that ‘pak fan’ (white powder) is a term reserved for heroin in the form in
which it is commonly used in Hong Kong (Chan Man Ching v The Queen [1977]
HKLR 97);
(6) that the effects of ‘notorious’ illicit drugs are well known (R v Crocker (1992) 58 A
Crim R 359 at 364);
(7) the behaviour of camels (McQuaker v Goddard [1940] 1 KB 687);
(8) the fact that young boys have playful habits (Clayton v Hardwick Colliery Co Ltd
[1915] WN 395);
(9) the fact that the life of the criminal is an unhappy one (Burns v Edman [1970] 2 QB
541);
(10) the individuality of the corrugations of the skin on the fingers of the human hand
(Parker v The King (1912) 14 CLR 681);
(11) the fact that in South Australia the same farmland may be cropped only once
every third year (Re Schwerdt [1939] SASR 333);
(12) the practices within the conveyancing (Re Rosher (1884) 26 Ch D 801) and mining
professions (Brilliant Gold Mining Co v Craven (1898) 9 QLJ 144);
(13) notorious professional practices: Carter (1982, p 90);
(14) the policy and aims of Sinn Fein and the nature of terrorist violence (Re Curran
[1985] NI 261 at 263);
(15) general economic trends, the effects of inflation, prevailing rates of interest and
returns on investments (Rendell v Paul (1979) 22 SASR 459 at 465–466);
(16) sentencing statistics (R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346; [1999] NSWCCA 111);
(17) the consumer price index (Aqua Max Pty Ltd v MT Associates Pty Ltd (unreported,
Victorian Supreme Court, 19 June 1998));
(18) that cancer is a major health problem and little progress has been made in
controlling it (Re Murry (deceased); Permanent Trustee Co of NSW v Salwey [1964–5]
NSWR 121 at 122);
(19) that HIV is a life-endangering illness (Mutemeri v Cheesman [1998] 4 VR 484 at
492);
(20) that a child victim of sexual assault may be reluctant to resist, protest or complain
about the sexual assault due to fear of punishment or rejection (M v The Queen
(1994) 181 CLR 487 at 515);
(21) that legal aid is often unavailable to litigants in tort cases (Perre v Apand Pty Ltd
(1999) 198 CLR 180; [1999] HCA 36 at [89]);
(22) that dairy farmers are not only interested in the revenues they derive from the
production and sale of milk but that such a matter is a critical question of interest
(Flogineering Pty Ltd v Blu Logistics SA Pty Ltd [2018] FCA 1479 at [156]);
156 [2.30.120]
(23) that it would be unusual for one individual to consistently win $2,500 each year
for many years by betting on rugby league games and horse races (Macguire v
Macguire [2018] FamCA 750 at [189]); and
(24) it is for the purchaser to initiate settlement in conveyances of land (Fussell v
Deigan [2018] NSWSC 1419 at [199]).
While the fact that sunset at Powranna (21 miles from Launceston) is never as late as at a
quarter to nine at night (Warren v Pilkington [1960] Tas SR 6 at 8, 18) has been permitted to
be the subject of judicial notice (see also Malone v Smith (1945) 63 WN (NSW) 54; but cf
Collier v Nokes (1849) 2 C & K 1012; 175 ER 426; Tutton v Darke (1816) 5 H & N 647; 157 ER
1338), as has the fact that every ordinary person can be presumed to know that the
Electricity Commission generates electricity and supplies it to the suburbs of Port Moresby
(State v Sim [1980] PNGLR 424). A judge has been held not to be able to take judicial notice
of the fact that Bourke is more than 150 miles from Sydney: Ex parte Meer Houssain (1899)
15 WN (NSW) 286; Simpson v Fraser (1894) 5 QLJ 89 at 92; Carberry v Cook (1906) 3 CLR 995
at 996. The tribunal of fact has been permitted to use local knowledge of general
topographical features (although not of precise distances) (Pope v Ewendt (1977) 17 SASR
45 at 48–49 per Bray CJ) and of the nature of a particular bend in the road (Elrick v Terjesen
[1948] VLR 184 at 188–189), but a justice was held not to be able to use his knowledge of a
small section of road or the distance between a sign and a road-crossing: Denver v Cosgrove
(1972) 3 SASR 130 at 133.
Young (1990, p 201) quotes the following comments of Kirby P in Bond Corp Holdings
Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Commission (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 28 June 1989):
The broadcast in question occurred in the ‘PM’ programme which the respondent put to
air on 4 November 1988. Most judges occasionally listen to the radio. They are entitled to
take note that the programme [‘PM’] is a major item of the respondent’s current affairs
service. It has a large audience and is broadcast throughout the country. It is generally
speaking a serious and responsible programme, making an important contribution to the
community’s understanding of news events at home and abroad.
Commenting on Kirby P’s remarks, Meagher JA differed in the extreme:
There was certainly no evidence before the court to that effect, and it would defy belief
that judicial notice could be taken that any programme of [the respondent] fitted that
extravagant description.
See Young (1990, p 201).

However, Samuels JA, speaking on the same subject, has held in the Court of Appeal
(Dykstra v Head (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 6 October 1989)) that it is a mistake to
apply the doctrine of judicial notice ‘with undue rigidity’:
Judges are criticised in one breath for living in ivory towers, and another for attempting to
steal out of their seclusion, and indicating the very basic knowledge that they do in fact
have of the real world. Obviously, the doctrine of judicial knowledge must be maintained.
Its purpose is really to ensure fairness of trials. One cannot have a tribunal using secret
information which is not open to checking and cross-examination.
This is the fundamental principle and the most important restriction upon a judicial or
magisterial officer using what could otherwise be designated expert specialist information
by the mechanism of judicial notice.
The fluid nature of judicial notice

[2.30.180] What was arcane yesterday may be commonplace today (see Stanizzo v Paussi
(unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 17 September 1985)), but what is perhaps more to the
point is that the criteria for distinguishing that which is within the realm of common
knowledge from that which is recondite or abstruse are difficult indeed to isolate.
Moreover, the means by which a court may form a view appear to be very flexible. For
[2.30.180] 157
example, in Read v Bishop of Lincoln [1892] AC 644, a case dealing with the mixing of
communion wine with water, Lord Halsbury indicated that it was permissible for a judge
to rely on personal historical learning and noted (at 653) that ‘where it is important to
ascertain ancient facts of a public nature the law does permit historical facts to be referred
to’. He held (at 653):
Without considering further how far an ecclesiastical judge has a right to act upon his own
historical learning, when it becomes important to ascertain what was the ecclesiastical
practice, or what were the views entertained by eminent theologians, in remote times, it is
enough to say here, dealing with the objection generally, that it is impossible to contend
that if in other respects the archbishop’s judgment was well founded, it could be
invalidated by his having called to his aid for this purpose his own historical researches.
Theoretically, the categories of facts of which courts may take judicial notice are
circumscribed (Nokes (1962, pp 53–54)) because only those matters may be excepted from
proof about which there cannot be said to be controversy, that is to say, points upon which
experience and knowledge are invariable. The operation of judicial notice has served as a
convenient and time-saving way of doing without expert evidence in a wide variety of
cases where the expert evidence that would otherwise have been required is not in dispute
between the parties and for one reason or another relates to matters that are well known
to the tribunal of fact.
Reference to works of authority

[2.30.220] In a number of jurisdictions, legislation exists which allows reference to works
of authority. This can function as an effective alternative to the calling of expert evidence.
For instance, in Western Australia it is provided:
All courts and persons acting judicially may, in matters of public history, literature, science
or art, refer, for the purpose of evidence, to such published books, maps, or charts as such
courts or persons consider to be of authority on subjects to which they respectively relate.
(See Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 72.)

In South Australia, s 64 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) provides:
All courts may, in matters of public history, literature, science, or art, refer, for the
purposes of evidence, to such published books, calendars, maps, or charts as such courts
consider to be of authority on the subjects to which they respectively relate: provided that
nothing herein contained shall be deemed to require any such court to accept or act upon
any such evidence when tendered, unless it thinks fit.
It was held in Casley-Smith v FS Evans & Sons Pty Ltd (No 4) (1988) 49 SASR 339 at 341 that
the section did not confer a licence on the judge ‘to roam at large amongst relevant
published textbooks without the prior knowledge of the parties’: see Cavanett v Chambers
[1968] SASR 97. In Casley-Smith, Olsson J was asked to accept the tender of a volume of the
Journal of Applied Meteorology, a volume of the Australian Journal of Ecology, a volume of
Nature and a volume of a journal entitled Australian Forestry.
Olsson J noted that the definition of ‘science’ can be very broad, connoting ‘a particular
recognised branch of knowledge or study, with “specific emphasis upon the systematic
study of man and his environment based upon deductions and inferences which can be
made, and the general laws which can be formulated, from reproducible observations and
measurements of events and parameters within the universe”: The Macquarie Dictionary’.
His Honour rejected the contention that the contents of the book must be universally
accepted and free from controversy. He held that the section did not state that the book
must contain pronouncements which are absolute and incontrovertible; rather, ‘in the
professional or other environment to which the subject matter relates, the content of the
book commands the respect of and general acceptance by responsible, experienced and
relevantly qualified persons, that is, that its overall contents are viewed by relevantly
158 [2.30.220]
informed persons as being sufficiently reliable to be entitled to general acceptance’ (at 345).
His Honour found the volumes to be ‘books’ with contents relating to matters of science
within the meaning of the Act but that the evidence before him had not sufficiently
established their authority.
Ramifications for expert evidence

[2.30.260] The preparedness of some judges to take judicial notice of matters of common
knowledge about which there is no apparent disagreement in principle has no impact
upon the possible operation of expert evidence. The common knowledge rule at common
law (see [2.15.10]) prohibits the giving of expert evidence on matters that are within the
general ken of the public or at least where general knowledge of the relevant area means
that expert evidence would not assist the tribunal of fact. Theoretically, at least, if there is
expert or other disputation about a matter which is sufficiently within the public domain
to be classified as of general currency, it ought not be the subject of judicial notice. Little
more can be said about the interaction between the rules of expert evidence and the
doctrine of judicial notice than that the erratic application of the doctrine is such that from
time to time, it intersects unsatisfactorily with the rules of evidence.
Legislative instruments
[2.30.300] It is standard for courts to take legislative instruments. In South Australia, it is
mandated by s 35 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA): see Kafcar v Police [2011] SASC 162; Martin
v Department of Transport, Energy Infrastructure (2010) 269 LSJS 403; Barber v Police (2010)
108 SASR 520; [2010] SASC 329 .
[2.30.300] 159
Chapter 2.35
DISCRETIONARY EXCLUSION OF
EXPERT EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [2.35.01]
The prejudice/probative discretion under the criminal law ......................................... [2.35.05]
The prejudi ce/probative discretion under the civil law .............................................. [2.35.40]
Common law interpretation of the prejudice/probative discretion ............................ [2.35.75]
General principles ................................................................................................................. [2.35.80]
Statutory exclusion ................................................................................................................ [2.35.85]
DNA cases .............................................................................................................................. [2.35.90]
Voice identification evidence ............................................................................................... [2.35.95]
Statistical evidence ................................................................................................................ [2.35.100]
Syndrome evidence ............................................................................................................... [2.35.110]
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy ...................................................................................... [2.35.120]
Equivocal scientific evidence .............................................................................................. [2.35.130]
Bitemark evidence ................................................................................................................. [2.35.140]
Anthropologists’ evidence ................................................................................................... [2.35.150]
Appeals ................................................................................................................................... [2.35.160]
United States discretionary exclusion ............................................................................... [2.35.200]
Discretionary exclusion on the ground of the unavailability
of the expert’s work for scrutiny ........................................................ [2.35.240]
Permanent stay for abuse of process ................................................................................. [2.35.280]
Discretionary exclusion on the basis of incomprehensibility or irrationality ............ [2.35.320]
Unfairness discretion ............................................................................................................ [2.35.360]
Exclusion on the basis of prosecution non-disclosure of expert testing ..................... [2.35.410]
Discretionary exclusion on the ground of bias ................................................................ [2.35.460]
‘It is best, we may observe, where the laws are enacted upon
right principles, that everything should, as far as possible, be
determined absolutely by the laws, and as little as possible
left to the discretion of the judges.’
Aristotle, The Rhetoric, Bk 1, Ch 1.
‘Absolute discretion is a ruthless master. It is more destructive

of freedom than any of man’s other inventions.’
United States v Wunderlich 342 US 98 (1951) at 101.
Introduction
[2.35.01] The discretion of courts, both criminal and civil, to disallow expert evidence, even
when other criteria for its being admitted are satisfied, is a vital part of contemporary
courts’ processes for determining whether to draw upon the information available from
expert witnesses. This chapter reviews the evolving role of the discretions in excluding
expert evidence
The prejudice/probative discretion under the criminal law

[2.35.05] Traditionally, courts have had the discretion to exclude evidence, expert or lay,
when it has been adduced by the prosecution in a criminal trial before a jury, on the basis
of its being classified as unduly prejudicial. This discretion allows a trial judge to exclude
evidence if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused in
circumstances where the evidence is of little weight and its probative effect is out of
proportion to its true evidential value: Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 300;
Harriman v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 590 at 594–595; Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54 at
73–74; Driscoll v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 517 at 541; Stephens v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR
[2.35.05] 161
664 at 669; Myers v Director of Public Prosecutions [1965] AC 1001 at 1024; R v Sang [1980]
AC 402 at 444–445; R v McLean [1991] 1 Qd R 231 at 236, 240, 252ff.
However, the criteria for the exercise of the discretion have been relatively little
articulated by English, Australian and New Zealand courts. At the heart of the
jurisprudence is that a balancing of disparate considerations is being called for – as Scalia
J put it in Bendix Autolite Corp v Midwesco Enterprises Inc 486 US 888 at 897 (1988): it is like
asking ‘whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy’.
In a number of decisions in relation to then newly emerging areas of scientific evidence
– fingerprinting evidence, voice identification, tracker dog evidence and DNA profiling
evidence, for instance – the discretion has been used to ‘protect’ jurors from the provision
of information which judges maintained it would be difficult for them to evaluate
effectively: see Freckelton (1997d). After the initial phase of concern to exclude evidence
regarded as potentially unreliable, the practice of judges in a number of jurisdictions,
particularly South Australia and New South Wales, has been thereafter to admit the
previously excluded class of evidence and to rely upon jurors’ discernment. It remains
unclear what guidelines should be employed to distinguish evidence that is unduly
misleading, confusing or unreliable from that which is not. Empirical information about
those categories of evidence which jurors find particularly difficult to understand and to
assimilate has not been utilised thus far in judicial rulings.
The exclusionary discretion is regularly invoked as a ground for arguing that expert
evidence should be excluded, but less often used by judges actually to exclude evidence in
criminal trials. It appears that it is applied more often in criminal trials where jurors are
the decision-makers of fact, but it is almost unknown for the principles upon which the
discretion to exclude is exercised to be articulated. What is more common is for a formula
such as that ‘the evidence is substantially more prejudicial than it is probative’ to be
uttered without explication of the way in which this evaluation was arrived at.
The prejudice/probative discretion under the civil law

[2.35.40] It has long been unclear whether in a civil trial there is a residual judicial
discretion to exclude probative evidence. The general approach of the common law in
relation to the admission or rejection of evidence has been to formulate rules rather than to
rely upon the discretion of judges: R v Inhabitants of Eriswell (1790) 3 Term Rep 707 at 714;
100 ER 815 at 819; Polycarpou v Australian Wire Industries (1995) 36 NSWLR 49 at 60.
In Ibrahim v The King [1914] AC 599 at 610, the Privy Council held that in a tort action,
evidence could not be excluded against a tortfeasor even though made under
circumstances of hope, fear, interest or otherwise, and in Manenti v Melbourne and
Metropolitan Tramways Board [1954] VLR 115, Sholl J rejected a submission by a plaintiff in
a negligence action that certain evidence which was otherwise admissible should be
excluded as unduly prejudicial. He held that the discretion which had evolved in the
context of a criminal trial had no place in the conduct of a civil trial (at 120); see also David
Syme & Co Ltd v Mather [1977] VR 516 at 531; Mister Figgins Pty Ltd v Centrepoint Freeholds
Pty Ltd (1981) 36 ALR 23 at 31; Sheldon v Sun Alliance Ltd (1989) 53 SASR 97 at 147;
Koutsouras v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal,
28 November 1991) per Meagher JA at p 10.
However, in Taylor v Harvey [1986] 2 Qd R 137, Carter J held that the prejudicial effect
of similar fact evidence was so substantial, when weighed against its probative value, that
it should be excluded. In reaching his decision, he relied heavily upon the judgment of
Lord Denning MR in Mood Music Publishing Co Ltd v De Woolfe Ltd [1976] 1 Ch 119 at 127:
In civil cases the courts followed a similar line but have not been so chary of admitting
[such evidence]. In civil cases courts will admit evidence of similar facts if it is logically
162 [2.35.40]
Discretionary exclusion of expert evidence | CH 2.35
probative, that is if it is logically relevant in determining the matter which is in issue:

provided that it is not oppressive or unfair to the other side and also that the other side
has fair notice and is able to deal with it.
In Pearce v Button (1985) 60 ALR 537, Pincus J, then of the Federal Court of Australia,
doubted the universality of the proposition that a civil court cannot exclude improperly
obtained evidence as an exercise of its discretionary powers: see also ITC Film Distributors
Ltd v Video Exchange Ltd [1982] Ch 413 at 440; Mazinski v Bakka (1979) 20 SASR 350 at 361;
Forbes (1988, p 215).
In the most thorough judicial analysis of the issue, Kirby P, in Polycarpou v Australian
Wire Industries (1995) 36 NSWLR 49, reviewed the authorities in detail and concluded (at
64–65):
The state of legal authority in Australia appears to support the proposition that, by our
common law, no residual discretion exists in a judge conducting a court trial. But this
cannot be conclusive. The law in this subject, in criminal proceedings, has itself been
developing. The Australian developments have not always adhered to the approach taken
in England. Some recent decisions in Australian courts suggest that a residual discretion
may exist in civil trials. Whilst this authority has been doubted or criticised, it nonetheless
competes for acceptance in this State where no binding rule has yet been laid down. …
The old authority was clearly against a discretion. The more recent authority (at least in
some jurisdictions) has tended to favour its existence.
His Honour did not reject outright the proposition that in appropriate cases there may be
discretionary bases for excluding evidence, but declined to enunciate such bases in
advance.
Common law interpretation of the prejudice/probative discretion
General principles
[2.35.80] Evidence which is probative of a fact in issue will often be prejudicial to the
interests of the accused merely because it assists in proving the case against him or her.
That is not a basis for excluding the evidence in the exercise of judicial discretion. It is only
when its weight or probative value is slight or trifling but its impact so ‘exceedingly
prejudicial as to outweigh its probative value’ that the exercise of the discretion is called
for (see R v McLean [1991] 1 Qd R 231 at 252), or when the evidence has ‘little or no
weight, but may be gravely prejudicial’ (Driscoll v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 517), that the
exercise of the discretion is called for. Thus, there must be a significant discrepancy
between the quality of the evidence and the adverse impact that it is likely to have upon
evaluation of the case against the accused.
The discretion was articulated by Lord Du Parq in Noor Mohamed [1949] AC 182 at 192:
[I]n all such cases the judge ought to consider whether the evidence which it is proposed
to adduce is sufficiently substantial, having regard to the purpose to which it is
professedly directed, to make it desirable in the interests of justice that it should be
admitted. If, so far as that purpose is concerned, it can in the circumstances of the case
have only trifling weight, the judge will be right to exclude it. To say this is not to confuse
weight with admissibility. The distinction is plain, but cases must occur in which it would
be unjust to admit evidence of a character gravely prejudicial to the accused even though
there may be some tenuous ground for holding it technically admissible. The decision
must then be left to the discretion and the sense of fairness of the judge.
(See also Duke at 40–41.)

Thus, the discretion is exercisable when there is a significant discrepancy between how
relevant and germane the evidence is to the fact-finder’s evaluation of issues in dispute in
a trial, on the one hand, and, on the other, the prejudicial impact which it is liable to have
upon the evaluation process.
[2.35.80] 163
Similarly, in Driscoll v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 517, reiterated in Stephens v The Queen
(1985) 156 CLR 664 and followed in R v Chai (1992) 27 NSWLR 153, Gibbs J (as he then
was) confirmed (emphasis added):
It has long been established that the judge presiding at a criminal trial has a discretion to
exclude evidence if the strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against the
accused. The exercise of this discretion is particularly called for if the evidence has little or
no weight, but may be gravely prejudicial to the accused.
While it has been held that ‘a point must arise, where the background suggests such
inherent unreliability of the evidence of the witness that the very integrity of the trial
process could be seen to be compromised by the acceptance of any verdict based upon it’
(R v Peirce [1992] 1 VR 273 at 274 per Vincent J), it appears that there may be no separate
discretion to exclude evidence on the basis per se of its unreliability: Rozenes v Beljajev
[1995] 1 VR 533 at 559; Director of Public Prosecutions v Bayly (No 3) (1996) 89 A Crim R 542
at 549 per Olsson J. It seems, according at least to the Victorian Court of Appeal, that it
will only be in ‘exceptional circumstances’ that such evidence will be determined
inadmissible by exercise of the discretion: Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533 at 559; Director
of Public Prosecutions v Bayly (No 3) (1996) 89 A Crim R 542 at 549.
Evidence of a smash repairer as to the speed of a vehicle from the impact damage it
caused has been rejected as a ‘wild and unsophisticated conjecture’: Bugg v Day (1949) 79
CLR 442 at 463 per Dixon CJ. This highlights the fact that dissatisfaction with the quality
of evidence can result in discretionary exclusion.
Carter J, in R v McLean [1991] 1 Qd R 231 at 252–253, canvassed the formulation of the
discretion at length and placed it in the context of fairness discretions generally (emphasis
added):
Firstly, in respect of confessional material, such evidence may be properly excluded in the
exercise of the trial judge’s discretion when it would be unfair to the accused to admit it or
because such evidence was unlawfully or improperly obtained: Cleland v The Queen (1982)
151 CLR 1; McDermott v The King (1948) 76 CLR 501; R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133. Secondly, it
is unfair to the accused to admit evidence which is of relatively slight probative value but which is
highly prejudicial to the accused. No other basis for excluding in the exercise of a trial judge’s
discretion admissible evidence, which has more than slight probative value, has been
authoritatively determined by the High Court other than that expounded in R v Ireland
(1970) 126 CLR 321 and Bunning v Cross (1978) 141 CLR 54.
McHugh J in Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; [2001] HCA 72 at [51] summarised
contemporary law on the issue:
It is only when the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect
that the Crown can be deprived of the use of relevant but weak evidence. And evidence is
not prejudicial merely because it strengthens the prosecution case. It is prejudicial only
when the jury are likely to give the evidence more weight than it deserves or when the
nature or contents of the evidence may influence the jury or divert the jurors from their
task.
(See also R v Lisoff [1999] NSWCCA 364 and R v Yates [2002] NSWCCA 520 at [252]; R v
Shamouil (2006) 66 NSWLR 228; [2006] NSWCCA 112 at [73].)
The prejudice versus probative discretion has a very important operation in the expert
evidence context. Thus, in Straker v The Queen (1977) 15 ALR 103, the High Court
prevented a doctor who had performed a post-mortem on the body of a deceased from
speculating on a possibility directly relevant to the issue or to a fact in issue when the
speculation was adverse to the accused and there was no evidence to support a conclusion
that the fact was established. Gibbs J stated (at 694):
Doctor James was an expert and entitled to give evidence of his opinion of the causes of
the physical condition which he had himself observed, if it was relevant to the fact in issue
to know how that condition was caused. But it was not right to allow him to express his
164 [2.35.80]
opinion that anal intercourse was a possible, but unlikely, cause of the condition, when
there was no evidence that the appellant, or indeed anyone, had had anal intercourse with
the deceased. In the absence of evidence that the appellant had had anal intercourse with
the deceased the evidence of Doctor James was so highly prejudicial and of such slight
evidential value, that even if it might be thought to be technically relevant, it should have
been rejected.
(See Ch 2.20.)
Another instance in which the discretion was canvassed by the High Court was in the
context of Chamberlain v R (No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 558, citing
Chamberlain v The Queen (1983) 72 FLR 1 at 81–82 where Gibbs CJ and Mason J approved
of a passage in the judgment of Jenkinson J, one of the judges in the intermediate court of
appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court:
Those means of evaluating evidence which the jury enjoys by hearing and watching
witnesses, and which are denied an appellate tribunal, could not in my opinion have
enabled the jury reasonably to have eliminated the doubt, as to whether the matter tested
contained foetal haemoglobin, which a careful consideration of the transcript of evidence
and the exhibits raises in the mind. It may be conceded, as counsel for the Crown
submitted, that idiosyncrasies of manner and voice may undermine confidence in the
reliability of a witness. But the evidence of Professor Boettcher and of Professor Nairn
claimed the consideration of the jury upon grounds which could not rationally be shaken
substantially by those things which the eyes and ears of a jury receive, but which a
transcript does not reveal. Each of them was giving his opinion on matters of science
within disciplines of which each was a master, and at a level of difficulty and
sophistication above that at which a juror, or a judge, might by reasoning from general
scientific knowledge subject the opinions to wholly effective critical evaluation. The
reasoning by which other expert witnesses criticised the conclusions of Professor Boettcher
and Professor Nairn, as well as the reasoning by which the latter two witnesses supported
those conclusions and criticised the conclusions of the others, were all matters for the
jury’s evaluation. But in my opinion no juror could reasonably have failed to acknowledge
that, reason as he might, he was not in a position to assure himself of the correctness of a
conclusion against the opinions of the two professors to the degree which would eliminate
reasonable doubt as to that conclusion.
Later, in Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; [2002] HCA 4 at [181]–[182], Gummow
and Callinan JJ also adopted Jenkinson J’s analysis and noted:
The correct position is, in our opinion, that conflicting expert evidence will always call for
careful evaluation. So too, because expert evidence by definition deals with generally
unfamiliar and technical matters, it will always need careful, and usually more elaborate
treatment by the trial judge in directing a jury about it.
Juries are frequently called upon to resolve conflicts between experts. They have done
so from the inception of jury trials. Expert evidence does not, as a matter of law, fall into
two categories: difficult and sophisticated expert evidence giving rise to conflicts which a
jury may not and should not be allowed to resolve; and simple and unsophisticated expert
evidence which they can. Nor is it the law, that simply because there is a conflict in respect
of difficult and sophisticated expert evidence, even with respect to an important, indeed
critical matter, its resolution should for that reason alone be regarded by an appellate court
as having been beyond the capacity of the jury to resolve.
However, Gaudron J (at [85]) readily conceived of circumstances in which the discretion
should be exercised to exclude the expert evidence (citing Chamberlain v The Queen (1983)
72 FLR 1 at 82, cited with approval in Chamberlain v R (No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR
521 at 558 per Gibbs CJ and Mason J):
If the conflicting evidence of experts is not based on matters or assumptions with respect
to matters upon which the jury can reach its own conclusions but, instead, is evidence of
‘opinion on matters of science within disciplines of which each [is] a master, and at a level
of difficulty and sophistication above that at which a juror … might by reasoning from
[2.35.80] 165
general scientific knowledge subject the opinions to wholly effective critical evaluation’, a
jury cannot, by reference solely to that evidence, resolve that conflict in a manner ‘which
would eliminate reasonable doubt’.
The issue was examined in detail in the context of DNA profiling by the Victorian Court of
Appeal in R v Juric (2002) 4 VR 411; [2002] VSCA 77 at [18], with the court observing:
In a criminal trial where the Crown proposes to lead expert opinion evidence which, if
accepted, is of critical importance to the case which it is making, the jury must be able to
evaluate the strength of that evidence by reference to its factual or scientific basis. Whether
it can properly do so is a matter initially for the judge in determining whether that
evidence is admissible. The evidence will not necessarily become inadmissible simply
because experts express differing opinions upon the factual or scientific bases in respect of
which their opinions are expressed. However, the admissibility of such evidence must
depend upon the judge’s satisfaction that the jury can, on the basis of material put before
them, properly and reasonably evaluate the differing opinions expressed and make a
responsible determination as to which of them is to be preferred.
Similarly, in R v Duke (1979) 22 SASR 46; 1 A Crim R 39, the South Australian Supreme
Court was asked to review a decision by a trial judge to exclude otherwise admissible
expert evidence identifying blue fibres found in the accused’s car as coming from the
alleged victim’s dress on the ground that the prejudicial effect of the evidence was
disproportionate to its probative value. The appellate court held that in deciding whether
to exercise the discretion to exclude evidence on such a ground, the weight of the evidence
must be assessed upon a consideration of the evidence which the prosecution proposes to
present and that it is not the function of the judge in deciding the question to hear
conflicting evidence in order to determine for himself or herself the disputed scientific
issues. Where, however, the admissibility of any piece of evidence depends upon the
existence of a fact or state of facts, the judge must determine the existence of the fact or
state of facts to rule on the admissibility of the expert evidence. King CJ stated (at 48):
[A] trial judge must assume, in my view, that the jury is capable of understanding that it is
not bound to accept the expert evidence, that it is capable of resolving conflicts in expert
opinion amongst the expert witnesses, and that it will not be overawed by the scientific
garb in which the evidence is presented to it. It is to be remembered, moreover, that for the
purpose of allowing the judge to decide as to the exercise of his discretion the question of
weight is to be judged upon the evidence which the prosecution proposes to present. It is
not the function of the trial judge to hear conflicting expert evidence as to the significance
of the physical evidence in order to determine for himself the disputed scientific issues.
(See also R v Jarrett (1994) 62 SASR 443; 73 A Crim R 160 at 453; R v Karger (2001) 83 SASR
1; [2001] SASC 64 at [179].)
Statutory exclusion
[2.35.85] A series of decisions under the uniform evidence legislation has dealt with the
interpretation of ss 135 and 137 (see Ch 3.0). The resultant jurisprudence will be highly
influential in the evolution of the common law jurisprudence.
Section 137 of the uniform evidence legislation provides that in criminal proceedings a
court is obliged to refuse to admit evidence adduced by the prosecution if its probative
value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. It does not
involve the exercise of a discretion; it is ‘an evaluative judgment mandating exercise’:
IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 at [16].
‘Probative value’ is defined in s 3(1) of the uniform evidence legislation to mean ‘the
extent to which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the
existence of a fact in issue’. In IMM, the approach to assessment of probative value was
authoritatively established. The majority, comprising French CJ, Kiefel J (as she then was),
Bell and Keane JJ, held at [44] that the assessment of ‘the extent to which the evidence
could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue’
166 [2.35.85]
requires that the possible use to which the evidence might be put must be taken at its
highest. When assessing the probative value of evidence for the purposes of s 137, a trial
judge is obliged to proceed on the assumption that the jury will accept the evidence.
Issues of credibility and reliability are irrelevant to the assessment. At [52], the plurality in
IMM stated:
Once it is understood that an assumption as to the jury’s acceptance of the evidence must
be made, it follows that no question as to credibility of the evidence, or the witness giving
it, can arise. For the same reason, no question as to the reliability of the evidence can arise.
If the jury are to be taken to accept the evidence, they will be taken to accept it completely
in proof of the facts stated. There can be no disaggregation of the two – reliability and
credibility …
DNA cases
[2.35.90] The issue has arisen in a number of Australian cases determining the
admissibility and the prejudicial impact of admission of the results of DNA profiling. For
instance, in R v Elliott (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Hunt J, 6 April 1990), Hunt J did
not invoke the Frye criteria (Frye v United States 293 F 1013 at 1014 (DC Cir 1923)) but
focused instead on the dangers posed to considerations by a jury of evidence that cannot
be trusted:
If scientific testing in the particular case is unreliable or if it has a tendency to produce a
misleading or confusing impression for the jury, or if the weight to be afforded in the
results is so minimal as to preclude the jury being satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that
the Crown has established the fact which it seeks to prove then clearly I have a duty to
exclude it from the jury – whether it is a result of ruling that the evidence is inadmissible
or whether it is excluded in the exercise of my discretion.
Similarly, McInerney J in R v Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233 at 242 excluded DNA profiling
evidence on the basis that it was not capable of proper evaluation by a jury, but noted that
even if he had not excluded it on this ground, he would have rejected it as more
prejudicial than probative. In similar vein, Hampel J, in R v Lucas [1992] 2 VR 109; (1992)
55 A Crim R 361 at 118, excluded evidence of DNA profiling on the basis that:
The jury has no basis on which it can evaluate the evidence. There is no way the jury can
properly weigh the value of such evidence before it as to the frequency of a match in the
general population. … I think that there is in this case the danger that consistency could
assume the colour of identity, or at least of probability.
It follows that in my view evidence of the DNA testing, its results and conclusions is
not admissible because it lacks sufficient probative value compared with its possible
prejudicial effect.
This, too, was the approach adopted by the Victorian Court of Appeal in R v Juric (2002) 4
VR 411; [2002] VSCA 77 at [19], where the court held that a trial judge had erred in
admitting DNA evidence where it ‘would have been virtually impossible for a jury to
arrive at any meaningful conclusion from the “Profiler Plus analysis” when the experts
putting it forward could not themselves attribute a rational explanation for the aberrations
appearing in the readings at such a large number of sites’.
The decision of Mullighan J in R v Jarrett (1994) 62 SASR 443; 73 A Crim R 160 may well
have an impact upon subsequent courts’ preparedness to exclude evidence pursuant to
the discretion. His Honour found that expert evidence about the PCR technique of DNA
profiling should not be excluded simply because the differences could not be resolved by
the jury (at 175). The combination of the High Court decision in Velevski v The Queen (2002)
76 ALJR 402; [2002] HCA 4 and the Victorian Court of Appeal decision in R v Juric (2002)
4 VR 411; [2002] VSCA 77 suggests that the South Australian approach of Mullighan J in R
v Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1; [2001] SASC 64 and, to a lesser degree, in R v Jarrett (1994) 62
SASR 443; 73 A Crim R 160 may have gone too far in declining to withdraw complexities
[2.35.90] 167
not capable of being dealt with by a jury. Ultimately, though, it may be that there is not a
great deal between the apparently conflicting lines of authority. In R v Jarrett (1994) 62
SASR 443; 73 A Crim R 160, Mullighan J held (at 453) that ‘[o]nce the expert testimony is
found to be admissible, it should be admitted even though challenged and it is a matter
for the jury, properly and adequately directed, to decide in the context of all of the
evidence in the case, whether the evidence should be accepted’.
Mullighan J accepted, however, that an admissibility test existed in relation to the use
of new or unfamiliar techniques or technology and applied the test enunciated in R v
Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45; 15 A Crim R 364 at 366: the court may require to be satisfied
that the technique or technology has a ‘sufficient scientific basis to render results arrived at
by that means part of a field of knowledge which is a proper subject of expert evidence’.
After reviewing the cases of Lewis v The Queen (1987) 29 A Crim R 267; R v Duke (1979)
22 SASR 46; 1 A Crim R 39; R v Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233; R v Elliott (unreported, NSW
Supreme Court, Hunt J, 6 April 1990); and R v Lucas [1992] 2 VR 109; (1992) 55 A Crim R
361, his Honour was prepared to go no further than to hold (at 457) that:
[I]t is no function of the trial judge, in advance of the trial, to assess expert witnesses and
testimony and withhold evidence from the jury if of the view that the jury could not
resolve the conflict or understand the evidence.
However, his Honour was prepared to accept in principle that ‘there may be
circumstances in which expert evidence, like any type of other evidence, may be excluded
on the ground that its probative value is slight and is far outweighed by substantial
prejudice to the accused if it is admitted’ (at 457–458). He did not accept that expert
evidence should be excluded under the exercise of the discretion ‘where the evidence is
admissible but is contested and may be difficult to understand. Such a view denigrates the
intelligence and capacity of juries and is contrary to principle’ (at 458). He held that the
judgment that the jury could not understand the evidence or resolve an expert dispute
‘can only be made when all of the evidence in the case is before the jury and then it is a
judgment, on a question of fact, for the jury to make, with proper directions’ (at 458).
By 2001, however, his Honour went further in R v Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1; [2001] SASC
64 at [179], commenting:
I confess to not being able to imagine a case where relevant scientific evidence would be
excluded in the exercise of discretion because of a tendency to mislead, prejudice or
confuse a jury. If the prosecution, defence counsel, expert witness and the judge discharge
their respective functions adequately and appropriately, juries should be able to
understand the relevant matters of science insofar as it is necessary for them to resolve
matters in issue.
(See, too, R v Lisoff [1999] NSWCCA 364.)

There is an important distinction between prejudice and unfair prejudice. It has been
noted that: ‘All evidence that may tend to convict an accused person is prejudicial, but
that does not mean that it is unfairly prejudicial. What is meant by unfair prejudice is that
the jury may use the evidence to make a decision on an improper, perhaps emotional
basis. If there is a real risk that the evidence may be misused by the jury in some way, then
it may be unfairly prejudicial.’ (Neill-Fraser v Tasmania [2012] TASCCA 2at [184]; see also R
v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 139, 151; Langford v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 1 at [58]).
Voice identification evidence

[2.35.95] In a series of cases, courts have declined to exercise their powers under s 137 of
Australia’s uniform evidence legislation to exclude evidence offered by interpreters and
police officers identifying persons from recordings, generally on telephone intercepts. For
instance, in Tasmania v Farhat [2017] TASSC 66 at [44], Pearce J concluded that directions
and warning to the jury in relation to issues arising from a police officer’s identification of
168 [2.35.95]
the voice of the accused were sufficient and did not accept that any shortcomings in the
identification should result in an exclusion of the evidence under s 137.
Statistical evidence
[2.35.100] The issue of when probabilities of coincidental matching are unacceptably low
and so unduly prejudicial to the accused that they should not be admitted against him or
her has not yet been resolved by a superior Australasian or English court. Ironically, the
issue arises frequently in a wide variety of contexts: for example, in blood typings using
traditional ABO or group-specific component (Gc) analysis, with DNA profiling results, in
the analyses of physical fit comparisons or shoe impressions and tyre marks, as well as in
hair, fibre, paint and glass analysis. The tendency of trial courts is to admit such evidence
even when the results are of a low order of magnitude (eg, blood discovered at the scene
of a crime belongs to a grouping possessed by 39% of the population) on the basis that it
is merely one element of a circumstantial case against an accused person.
Syndrome evidence
[2.35.110] The possibility of excluding expert evidence on the existence of battered woman
syndrome in the exercise of the judicial prejudice versus probative discretion was raised
by Bollen J in R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114. His Honour expressed the view that
battered woman syndrome evidence, when led for the defence, may result in a focus on
the batterer, but was sanguine about the employment of appropriate trial safeguards. He
found that the right of the accused to put his or her defence ‘is so fundamental that it must
tip the scales in favour of the probative value of the proffered testimony over its
potentially prejudicial impact’ (at 125, quoting Baumann (1983, p 434)).
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy

[2.35.120] In R v LM [2004] QCA 192, the Queensland Court of Appeal held that evidence
about Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy was inadmissible: see [10.0.600]. McMurdo P went
further and, lest (contrary to the court’s decision) the expert evidence about the syndrome
should have been regarded as technically admissible, he held that it should at any rate
have been excluded in the exercise of the judge’s discretion. He held (at [68]) that judges
and prosecutors must take particular care to ensure fairness in cases where jurors are
likely to feel sympathy towards:
the completely vulnerable and dependant child victims and abhorrence towards any
mother who might act so unnaturally towards her babies. The danger of admitting the
evidence is that lay jurors may place undue emphasis on its very limited relevance and
probative value. It comes from a psychiatrist using impressive medical expressions to
address in a general way facts potentially apposite here, for example, that the behaviour
known as factitious disorder by proxy is sometimes perpetrated by apparently caring,
rational mothers who may sometimes harm themselves and more than one of their
children. … A jury was likely to place great weight on the existence of a term to describe
the behaviour which the prosecution alleged the appellant exhibited, instead of
concentrating on whether the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt that
the appellant had committed acts causing symptoms, or reported or caused false
symptoms, intending to harm the children through subsequent unnecessary medical
procedures. The evidence given by [the expert] had minimal probative value but it had the
potential to be extremely prejudicial. It should have been excluded.
Equivocal scientific evidence

[2.35.130] In another area altogether, the following interchange in R v Tihi [1990] 1 NZLR
540 at 548 sparked some important dicta from the New Zealand Court of Appeal:
Q: Why is it called a non-specific chemical test?
[2.35.130] 169
A: Blood is not the only substance that will give a positive result, some plant material,
some oxidising agents present in paints, bleaches etc will produce positive results.
Q: Are you saying that during, throughout your evidence you could have equally said
that some of those items had a positive response in a non-specific chemical test for paint or
dyes or plants that would have been equally applicable?
A: That is another way of putting it yes.
The court noted (at 548):
[J]uries pay particular regard to scientific forensic evidence and therefore it must be
carefully presented so that it is an accurate account of the result of any analysis of exhibits
in the case and fairly presented. It must give a complete picture including results
favourable to an accused as well as those favourable to the Crown. For example, if the
Crown calls specific evidence of similarities, the witness should also refer to any
dissimilarities in the same exhibit. To simply say, as suggested by Mr G, that the tests are
inconclusive would leave the jury wondering what that meant. Juries are entitled to know
the nature of the test and its result so that they understand the evidence.
(Compare the evidence of Dr Clift in Preece v HM Advocate (1981) Crim LR 783; Jones
(1994, pp 230ff); Freckelton (1987, pp 125ff); Robertson and Vignaux (1995, p 49).)
Bitemark evidence
[2.35.140] Maurice J had spoken in a similar vein in the bitemark evidence case of R v Lewis
(1987) 29 A Crim R 267 at 271:
Forensic evidence, especially if it goes to a vital issue implicating an accused person in the
commission of an offence, may often have a prejudicial effect on the minds of a jury which
far outweighs its probative value. The jury, being people without scientific training, may
often be impressed by an expert’s qualifications, appointments and experience and the
confident manner in which he expresses his opinion. And yet it ought not be left to such
matters alone to provide a foundation for the jury making an assessment of the probative
value of forensic evidence, particularly where there are conflicts in expert testimony, or
where it is acknowledged that other experts of more or less equal distinction are unlikely
to agree.
In the same case, Maurice J determined that the admission of odontology evidence had
constituted a miscarriage of justice and commented (at 274): ‘It really matters not whether
the conclusion is supported by saying the evidence was strictly inadmissible, or its
prejudicial effect far outweighed any probative value it may have had, or simply that it
would be unsafe to place any reliance on it.’
Anthropologists' evidence
[2.35.150] The courts have heard submissions in a series of land rights cases that they
should exclude anthropologists’ evidence where its bases are not fully proved. Generally
they have declined to do so (see Ch 11.10), holding the matter to be one of weight: see
Daniel v Western Australia (2000) 178 ALR 542; [2000] FCA 858 at [30]; Neowarra v Western
Australia (2003) 205 ALR 145; [2003] FCA 1399 at [39]; Harrington-Smith v Western Australia
(No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at [79]; Jango v Northern Territory (No 2) [2004]
FCA 1004 at [74].
Appeals
[2.35.160] Discretionary decisions to reject evidence or not to reject evidence on the basis of
its prejudicial impact and its relationship to its probative value are appealable pursuant to
the general principles of discretionary review: see Pattenden (1990). However, such
appeals are rarely successful. A typical example of an unsuccessful appeal can be found in
R v Guyatt (1998) 119 CCC 304, where evidence had been admitted at trial from an FBI
expert about the similarity between a plastic bag containing the head of the deceased and
plastic bags found in the possession of the accused. The expert testified at trial that the
170 [2.35.140]
bags shared the same class characteristics – colour, size and manufacturing process. He
testified that only one company produced bags which had a certain distinctive marking. In
cross-examination, he conceded that the mark on the bag containing the deceased’s head
may have been caused by a defective blade in the manufacturing process. The appellate
court declined to find that the prejudice-probative discretion had been wrongly exercised
in permitting the expert’s evidence to go to the jury. It noted that in re-examination the
expert had reasserted his views about what had caused the marks on the bag and
provided reasons for them.
(See also Ch 4.0.)
United States discretionary exclusion

[2.35.200] In the United States, the general responsibility of a trial judge in making
evidentiary rulings is set out in r 102 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 1975:
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
(See Leonard (1990, p 937).)

Rule 403 provides that the trial judge may exclude relevant evidence if he or she finds
that its probative value is ‘substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of unfair delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence’. Rule 403 is strongly biased
towards admissibility of evidence. Evidence is regarded as having probative value if it
enhances the accuracy of fact-finding in the case (see Gold (1984, p 59)) and it has been
held that ‘[w]eighing probative value against unfair prejudice … means probative value
with respect to a material fact if the evidence is believed, not the degree to which the court
finds it believable’: Ballou v Henri Studios Inc 656 F 2d 1147 at 1154 (5th Cir, 1981). Gold has
suggested (1984, p 73) that:
[E]vidence is unfairly prejudicial when it detracts from the accuracy of factfinding by
inducing the jury to commit an inferential error. Inferential errors occur when the jury
perceives evidence to be logically probative of a fact when it is not, perceives the evidence
to be more probative of a fact than it logically is, or bases its decision on improper bias.
(See also Gold (1983 p 497). 1)
Discretionary exclusion on the ground of the unavailability of the expert's work for
scrutiny
[2.35.240] It is an element of the best evidence rule that where goods are perishable, they
need not be produced in court, but it has been held that the accused ought at least be
given the opportunity to examine them where their condition is critical to the outcome of
the case: see Anderson v Laverock 1976 JC 9 (salmon); Miln v Maher 1979 SLT (Notes) 10
(deer). Fundamentally, it is a matter of fairness and accountability. The court must be able
to assure itself that each party has the opportunity reasonably to test the other’s evidence.
If the Crown is responsible for avoidably depriving the accused of the possibility to
1 However, Gold (1984, p 84) commented: ‘The law is not unaccustomed to evaluating
human cognitive behaviour … In fact, the courts have frequently resolved Rule 403 issues
by relying upon their lay assumptions about juror psychology … Unfortunately, many of
the assumptions made by the courts seem at best unproven and all too frequently
unsound. Recent empirical research in cognitive psychology, however, is helpful in
evaluating Rule 403 problems … That research suggests that people, hence jurors, will
predictably commit profound inferential errors under certain circumstances. These
patterns of human decision-making provide the courts with a guide to evaluating the
effect of evidence on the reliability of the jury’s inferential processes.’
[2.35.240] 171
engage in reanalysis or retesting of an exhibit, this may ground an application for a

permanent stay of proceedings on the basis of abuse of process (see generally Pattenden
(1985; 1990); Choo (1993)) or for discretionary exclusion of the expert evidence of the
Crown.
The destruction of key exhibits subsequent to trial was the subject of criticism in an
infamous New Zealand case. The 1980 New Zealand Royal Commission to ‘Inquire into
and Report Upon the Circumstances of the Convictions of Arthur Thomas for the Murders
of David Crewe and Jeanette Crewe’ had occasion to examine the propriety of police
disposal of key exhibits subsequent to the convicted man’s trial. A .22 long rifle cartridge
had been found in a shed at the suspect’s premises. It was examined and subsequently
fired from a .22 rifle at a police station. Instead of being returned in accordance with usual
practice to the suspect’s family or his legal representatives, it was destroyed by being
deposited at a tip. The Royal Commissioner (Report (1980, p 90)) commented:
[The value of the exhibits] to Thomas and his legal advisers was immense since they were
the exhibits on which Thomas’s fight for freedom had been based. Equally, so long as they
existed, they were a threat to the prosecution case, and although Mr Morris may have said
that the dismissal of the appeal was the end of the road, enough had been said, seen and
done up to this stage to make it clear that this was not so as far as Thomas and his
supporters were concerned.
The Royal Commissioner found that the destruction of the exhibits constituted
impropriety and supported the allegation by Thomas that a cartridge case at the murder
scene had been planted by police and that the exhibit which was disposed of was a
suspect exhibit for which an unfired shell had been substituted.
In R v Lobban (2000) 77 SASR 24, the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal was
asked to deal with the argument that material suspected to be drugs seized and
inappropriately destroyed by the Crown should not have been allowed to be the subject of
identification evidence. Martin J for the court held that destruction of the material did not,
without more, lead to the inference that the evidence of identification of the material by
analysis or other means was unreliable (at [24]). He conceded that the destruction
deprived the defence of an opportunity to challenge the reliability of the evidence, but
because the evidence remained capable of some probative weight he found it retained
relevance. He found that the history of the public policy discretion to exclude evidence
centred upon the discretion only being enlivened when the evidence is obtainable by
unlawful, improper or unfair conduct on the part of the law enforcement authorities: see,
too, Question of Law Reserved (No 1 of 1998) (1998) 70 SASR 281. He doubted the
applicability of the general fairness discretion after the determination of the High Court in
R v Swaffield (1998) 192 CLR 159; [1998] HCA 1. However, he said that he inclined toward
the view that the prejudice-probative discretion should be regarded as an example of the
general unfairness discretion which permits the exclusion of evidence where its admission
would be unfair to the accused. The court declined to exercise such a discretion to exclude
the evidence in the circumstances of the case (see too Police v Hall (2006) 95 SASR 482;
[2006] SASC 281, which declined to overrule Lobban).
Similarly, in R v Abisaab (2006) 166 A Crim R 440; [2006] SASC 349, the South Australian
Court of Criminal Appeal was urged to exclude DNA evidence on the basis that a syringe
cap, where it had been discovered, was destroyed by a police officer as part of a routine
clearance of items thought to have no further use. This precluded independent re-testing
of the cap. Reliance was placed by the appellant on the general fairness discretion
discussed in Lobban. It was accepted by a prosecution witness that it would have been
good practice for the extracted DNA to have been divided so as to retain one part for
potential re-testing. However, the Court of Criminal Appeal declined to find the admission
of the DNA evidence in such circumstances to have rendered the trial unfair. Among the
considerations leading it to that conclusion was the absence of any other evidence raising
172 [2.35.240]
a doubt about the reliability of the prosecution DNA evidence; that opportunities for
checking substantial portions of the forensic science work were still available; the absence
of a suggestion of bad faith by the police in the destruction of the cap; and the absence of
evidence suggesting that the cap, even if retained, would contain residual DNA not
collected at the time of its original examination.
Permanent stay for abuse of process

[2.35.280] The problem was addressed at an earlier stage in Holmden v Bitar (1987) 27 A
Crim R 255, where Cox J held that the destruction of tins of meat paté, grounding charges
under the Quarantine Act 1908 (Cth) and the Customs Act 1901 (Cth), without adequate
justification (in spite of the right of government officers to destroy the tins), amounted to
an abuse of process. However, he found that, in some circumstances, if evidence is led ‘to
show that the very prompt destruction of the evidence … was justifiable’, such as to avoid
contamination or the introduction of exotic diseases, the destruction may not amount to
an abuse of process. The question is whether the accused is denied a fair trial by virtue of
being precluded from the opportunity of having his or her expert test the exhibit.
By contrast, in Heinze v Burnley and Myers (1992) 63 A Crim R 83 at 98, an abuse of
process application was held to have been correctly rejected when police had disposed of
a brandy bottle that they had seized as evidence in a drink-driving case. On appeal,
Debelle J held (at 99) that the action of the police was ‘most undesirable’, but found that
he could not envisage how their ‘conduct could possibly lead to the highly prejudicial and
irretrievable result which prompted the court in Holmden to arrive at the conclusion to
which it there came’.
Discretionary exclusion on the basis of incomprehensibility or irrationality

[2.35.320] In Steffen v Ruban [1996] 2 NSWR 622; (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 264, it was
held that, as with any other evidence, expert opinion must be comprehensible and the
conclusions reached must be rationally based. A court ought not to act on an expert
opinion the basis for which is not explained by the witness expressing it. In Pollock v
Wellington (1996) 15 WAR 1 at 4, these same deficits formed the basis for Anderson J
determining that medical evidence should not have been admitted. He applied the earlier
decision of Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370 at 390 in finding that
‘[u]nless the process of inference by which an opinion is reached is expressed in a manner
which permits the conclusions to be scrutinised and a judgment made as to its reliability,
the opinion can carry no weight’.
Unfairness discretion
[2.35.360] In R v Wyatt (1991) 28 FCR 61, the appellant had been charged with engaging in
sexual intercourse without consent by inserting several fingers into a woman’s vagina
when she was menstruating heavily. He was seen shortly afterwards by a medical officer
associated with the Australian Federal Police. The doctor gave evidence that he had taken
blood from the appellant for analysis and had examined the appellant’s right hand to
decide whether a minor injury should be treated. He agreed that the victim had been
menstruating heavily and that the appellant’s nails and cuticles could have been examined
for residual blood.
The appellant appealed, claiming, among other things, that because the police had not
investigated fairly, thoroughly and competently by taking nail scrapings from the
appellant, he had been deprived of the benefit of the evidence which such a scientific
examination might have provided for his rebuttal of the victim’s allegation of sexual
intercourse.
[2.35.360] 173
Jenkinson J found that the argument could not easily be subsumed under the principle
expounded in R v Ireland (1970) 126 CLR 321 at 334–335 and Bunning v Cross (1978) 141
CLR 54 at 65, 72–76. (Note also R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133 at 154.) Thus, the appeal focused
predominantly on whether there had been a miscarriage of justice in the broadest sense as
a result of the failure to conduct the examination to locate blood under the appellant’s
nails. Jenkinson J held (at 64) that:
It may be assumed, without deciding, that a failure by a person in authority to cause to be
undertaken some scientific examination of available material by means of which cogent
evidence for or against a suspected person’s guilt of a serious crime could reasonably be
expected to be obtained might in some circumstances result in the conclusion, before trial,
that a fair trial of the suspected person could not be had and, after trial, that he had not
had a fair trial. Much would depend, in determining whether either conclusion should be
drawn, on the actual beliefs, and on what would have been the beliefs, of the person in
authority concerning the availability and the likely cogency of such evidence, and
concerning the capacity of other persons – particularly persons acting in the suspected
person’s interest – to get the evidence which the person in authority had failed to get.
Some techniques of DNA testing are constrained by the patents held over their processes
by the corporations owning them. This can mean, for example, that it is difficult for the
defence to assess the results of testing adequately: see Thompson and Ford (1989, p 59).
The result is that the defence is not in an adequate position to cross-check the testing
process and to have equal access to the new technology. Morling J in the Australian Royal
Commission of Inquiry into the Convictions of Lindy and Michael Chamberlain (1987,
p 312) was extremely critical of testing in the Chamberlain investigations, which denied
the defence access to the testing processes employed by the investigating scientists. It is
likely that the courts in Australia at least would not react kindly to testing processes in
relation to DNA profiling which did not allow the defence, or the prosecution for that
matter at a proper time, to evaluate the initial profiling results in a full and fair manner:
see below, Ch 5.05.
In a radical approach which has not been followed elsewhere, Murphy J in Chamberlain
v R (No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521 suggested that destruction of scientific
materials reduces the value of evidence based on them because of the inability to test
material and cross-check the results to such an extent as to render it non-scientific and
therefore non-expert. His Honour (at 574–575) quoted Weisz:
[A] scientific observation is not taken at face value until several scientists have repeated
the observation independently and have repeated the same thing. That is also a major
reason why one-time, unrepeatable events normally cannot be science.
The consequence of the general adoption of this approach would be to determine expert
evidence inadmissible if retesting was impossible because of the destruction or
consumption of scientific exhibits as a result of testing. It would negative much DNA
profiling and other blood analysis evidence, as well as the fruits of many other scientific
tests using chemistry, which has an adverse impact upon the material tested.
Although it is most unlikely that Murphy J’s approach will be fully adopted, it is
possible that the inability of the defence to conduct its own tests on scientific evidence
seized by the prosecution might in some circumstances be judged to constitute either an
abuse of process or a ground for exclusion of such evidence as more prejudicial than
probative – particularly if it can be shown that materials have been needlessly destroyed,
preventing further testing.
Exclusion on the basis of prosecution non-disclosure of expert testing

[2.35.410] In criminal trials, where material expert opinions are not disclosed by the
prosecution, a jury’s verdict may be set aside. In R v Maguire [1992] 1 QB 936 at 958, the
English Court of Appeal held that if a forensic scientist advising the prosecution failed to
174 [2.35.410]
disclose the results of tests that he or she had conducted, that could amount to a material
irregularity justifying appellate court intervention. It held that the failure of the Crown to
inform the defence of:
• the negative result of a test on samples taken from the appellants to try to detect the
presence of nitrotoluols; and
• the result of a nail scrape test which was designed to see whether nitroglycerine could
be accumulated under the nails if they were scraped across the palm of a hand which
was contaminated by nitroglycerine and, if so, how long it persisted,
amounted to material irregularity.
As a matter of principle, it determined that a forensic scientist who is an adviser to the
prosecuting authority is under a duty to disclose material of which he or she is aware and
which may have some bearing on the offence charged and on the surrounding
circumstances of the case:
The disclosure will be to the authority which retains him and which must in turn (subject
to sensitivity) disclose the information to the defence. We hold that there is such a duty
because we can see no cause to distinguish between members of the prosecuting authority
and those advising it in the capacity of a forensic scientist. Such a distinction could involve
difficult and contested inquiries as to where knowledge stopped but, most importantly,
would be entirely counter to the desirability of ameliorating the disparity of scientific
resources as between the Crown and the subject.
However, the success of an appeal on this ground is subject to the proviso that the
prosecution’s failure to provide such information must both be a material irregularity (ie,
real significance) and have the potential to effect a miscarriage of justice (see R v Clark
[2003] 2 FCR(UK) 447; [2003] EWCA Crim 1020).
R v Maguire [1992] 1 QB 936 has since been applied in R v CPK (unreported, NSW
Court of Criminal Appeal, 21 June 1995), where Gleeson CJ (Clarke and Hulme JJA
agreeing) overturned a jury’s conviction in a repressed memory syndrome sexual assault
case. The court determined that the Crown’s failure to provide to the defence an expert
report obtained by the Crown from a psychiatrist amounted to non-disclosure resulting in
a miscarriage of justice: see R v Charlton [1972] VR 758 at 761. The report suggested that
one of the complainants had ‘serious psychological and emotional problems’, had sought
counselling and psychotherapeutic therapy from counsellors in two capital cities, and had
attended a body called the ‘Incest Survivors Association’.
In the United States the position is even more stringent. It has been held in Minnesota v
Schwartz 447 NW 2d 422 at 427(1989) that even if a laboratory has followed reliable
procedures to ensure accurate test results, due process requirements may still prevent
admissibility of such evidence:
The fair trial and due process rights are implicated when data relied upon by a laboratory
in performing tests are not available to the opposing party for review and cross-
examination. … Ideally, a defendant should be provided with the actual DNA sample(s) in
order to reproduce the tests. As a practical matter, this may not be possible because
forensic samples are often so small that the entire sample is used in testing. Consequently,
access to the data, methodology, and actual results is crucial so a defendant has at least an
opportunity for independent expert review. … Prejudicial failure to disclose information
may result in the imposition of harsh sanctions, such as conviction reversal and the
granting of a new trial.
Discretionary exclusion on the ground of bias

[2.35.460] For a short period, it appeared that, in England, opinion evidence from an
expert who was found to be biased could be excluded. In Liverpool Roman Catholic
Archdiocese Trust v Goldberg [2001] EWHC Ch 396, the matter was considered by
Evans-Lombe J. He did so in the context of a claim by the corporate trustee of the Roman
[2.35.460] 175
Catholic Diocese against a Queen’s Counsel for professional negligence in relation to

advice provided. Mr Goldberg QC sought to rely upon expert evidence from another
Queen’s Counsel who, it transpired, had a close personal relationship with
Mr Goldberg QC.
Evans-Lombe J accepted that the evidence was expert but concluded (at [13]) that the
court should disregard it on the ground that the witness was ‘unable to fulfil the role of an
expert witness because of his close personal relationship’ with Mr Goldberg QC:
[W]here it is demonstrated that there exists a relationship between the proposed expert
and the party calling him which a reasonable observer might think was capable of
affecting the views of the expert so as to make them unduly favourable to that party, his
evidence should not be admitted however unbiased the conclusions of the expert might
probably be. The question is one of fact, namely, the extent and nature of the relationship
between the proposed witness and the party.
However, the more orthodox, and, with respect, a better, approach was adopted by the
Court of Appeal in R on the Application of Factortame Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport
(No 8) [2002] 3 WLR 1104; [2002] EWCA Civ 932, where the issue was regarded as one of
weight rather than admissibility. The Court of Appeal followed its earlier decision in Field
v Leeds City Council [2001] CPLR 833, where Woolf MR held that the fact that the expert
was employed by the council did not automatically disqualify him from giving evidence.
Whether or not he was qualified to give such evidence could not be determined without
sight of the report that he intended to give and his background and qualifications.
In concurring, Waller LJ said (at [26]):
The question whether someone should be able to give expert evidence should depend on
whether, (i) it can be demonstrated whether that person has relevant expertise in an area
in issue in the case; and (ii) that it can be demonstrated that he or she is aware of their
primary duty to the court if they give expert evidence.
May LJ, also concurring, held that there was no objection in principle to a properly
qualified person giving evidence on the basis only that he is employed by one of the
parties to litigation; the issue is one of weight.
In Factortame, the court held that Evans-Lombe J in Liverpool Roman Catholic Archdiocese
Trust v Goldberg [2001] EWHC Ch 396 had erred in applying the apparent bias test
applicable to judges to the role of expert witnesses. However, the court commented (at
[73]):
To give evidence on a contingency fee basis gives an expert, who would otherwise be
independent, a significant financial interest in the outcome of the case. As a general
proposition, such an interest is highly undesirable. In many cases the expert will be giving
an authoritative opinion on issues that are critical to the outcome of the case. In such a
situation the threat to his objectivity posed by a contingency fee agreement may carry
greater dangers to the administration of justice than would the interest of an advocate or
solicitor acting under a similar agreement. Accordingly, we consider that it will be in a
very rare case indeed that the court will be prepared to consent to an expert being
instructed under a contingency fee agreement.
The Victorian Court of Appeal examined the same issue in FGT Custodians Pty Ltd v
Fagenblat [2003] VSCA 33 on appeal from the decision of Pagone J in Fagenblat v Feingold
Partners Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 454. The argument was put that the consequence of the
statement of Lord Wilberforce in Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246 at 256–257, that ‘it
[is] necessary that expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen to
be, the independent product of the expert, uninfluenced as to form or content by the
exigencies of litigation’, was that noncompliant expert evidence was inadmissible. The
evidence sought to be excluded was evidence from a valuer who was the brother-in-law of
the plaintiff and which might have been regarded as subconsciously favouring his relative.
Pagone J at first instance (Fagenblat v Feingold Partners Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 454), and then
176 [2.35.460]
the Court of Appeal, rejected the proposition unequivocally that an interest or a perceived
interest in the outcome of litigation constituted a justification for exclusion of expert
evidence. The Court of Appeal emphasised that, however desirable the rules and protocols
which had been initiated by courts in relation to expert evidence and expert witnesses,
‘they cannot establish changes to the principles underlying the law of evidence, for they
can do no more than change the relevant practice in particular jurisdictions’ (at [15]).
The same approach has since been taken by Austin J in Collins Thomson Pty Ltd v
Clayton [2002] NSWSC 366 and Kirch Communications Pty Ltd v Gene Engineering Pty Ltd
[2002] NSWSC 485, and by Weinberg J in SmithKline Beecham (Australia) Pty Ltd v Chipman
(2003) 131 FCR 500; [2003] FCA 796.
[2.35.460] 177
PART 3 – STATUTORY EVIDENTIARY
RULES
Chapter 3.0: Statutory law in Australia ............................................. 181

Chapter 3.05: Statutory law in New Zealand............................... 209
Chapter 3.10: Statutory law in the United States......................... 221
Chapter 3.15: Law reform proposals .................................................. 225
179
Chapter 3.0
STATUTORY LAW IN AUSTRALIA

Australia’s uniform evidence legislation .......................................................................... [3.0.01]
The opinion rule .................................................................................................................... [3.0.10]
The admissibility regime ...................................................................................................... [3.0.15]
Knowledge .............................................................................................................................. [3.0.20]
Specialised knowledge ......................................................................................................... [3.0.30]
Fields of expertise ................................................................................................................. [3.0.40]
Abolition of the common knowledge rule ....................................................................... [3.0.50]
Behaviour, competency and development of children ................................................... [3.0.90]
Specialised knowledge of child behaviour ....................................................................... [3.0.100]
Queensland: expert evidence about witness’s ability to give evidence ...................... [3.0.120]
Abolition of the ultimate issue rule ................................................................................... [3.0.140]
The bases of expert opinions .............................................................................................. [3.0.150]
The assumption identification, proof of assumption
and statement of reasoning rules ....................................................... [3.0.152]
Expert evidence and hearsay .............................................................................................. [3.0.155]
Expert evidence about credibility ...................................................................................... [3.0.157]
Judicial notice ......................................................................................................................... [3.0.160]
Mandatory exclusion ............................................................................................................ [3.0.165]
Unreliable identification evidence ...................................................................................... [3.0.175]
Meaning of words ................................................................................................................. [3.0.176]
Certificates of expert evidence ............................................................................................ [3.0.180]
‘The enemy of law reform is the empty page.’

Justice Michael Kirby, 1981.
Australia's uniform evidence legislation
[3.0.01] In Australia, the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) applies in federal courts. The Evidence Act
1995 (NSW) applies in proceedings, federal and State, before New South Wales courts and
some tribunals. In 2001, Tasmania passed legislation that essentially mirrors the
Commonwealth and New South Wales Acts: Evidence Act 2001 (Tas). In 2004, Norfolk
Island passed legislation mirroring the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW): Evidence Act 2004 (NI). In
2008, Victoria passed the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), which came into force on 1 January 2010.
In the Australian Capital Territory the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) applies.The Evidence
(National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011 (NT) came into force on 1 September 2012. This
combination of legislation, which in respect of ss 60, 76, 79, 80 and 177 of the Evidence Act
1995, is to most intents and purposes identical, will herein be referred to as ‘the uniform
evidence legislation’ (see Heydon (2017); Odgers (2019)).
The uniform evidence legislation is substantially based upon reports (1985; 1987) of the
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) (see too New South Wales Law Reform
Commission (1988); Odgers (2018)).
The remaining States (Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia) have not
yet adopted similar legislation. However, there is a growing momentum toward the
harmonisation of evidence laws in Australia based on the uniform evidence legislation.
By their Terms of Reference, both the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) and
the Northern Territory Law Reform Committee were directed to collaborate with the
ALRC and the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC) in their inquiry
which recommended in 2005 that there be national evidence legislation. In 2005, the
NSWLRC also produced a report on Expert Witnesses. Its recommendations were
principally procedural (see further Freckelton (2005)).
[3.0.01] 181
Part 3 – Statutory evidentiary rules
The Attorney-General of Western Australia and the Attorney-General of South

Australia have both formally placed the introduction of the uniform evidence legislation
on the legislative agenda. In March 2005, the Queensland Attorney-General asked the
Queensland Law Reform Commission (QLRC) to undertake a review of its legislation. The
QLRC report was tabled in the Queensland Parliament in November 2005.
However, interpretation of the provisions of the uniform evidence legislation cannot be
undertaken in a vacuum. It needs to occur against the historical and continuing evolution
of the common law rules of evidentiary admissibility.
This chapter focuses upon the interpretation of the provisions in the Australian
uniform evidence scheme under Commonwealth law, as well as the law in New South
Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and the Northern Territory.
The opinion rule

[3.0.10] Under s 76 of the uniform evidence legislation, the ‘opinion rule’ provides that:
(1) Evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact about the
existence of which the opinion was expressed.
Notably, opinions are not admissible to prove the strength or probative value of facts –
simply the existence of a fact, about the existence of which a view is given.
The phrasing of the ‘opinion rule’ requires a series of distinctions to be drawn between:
• evidence in the form of fact;
• evidence in the form of opinion; and
• evidence in the form of speculation.
None of these expressions are defined under the uniform evidence legislation. Cox J in R v
Perry (No 4) (1981) 28 SASR 119 at 126 (quoting GC Lewis, An Essay on the Influence of
Authority in Matters of Opinion (1849), as referred to in Wigmore, Evidence (3rd ed, Vol 8,
para 1919)) took an approach to the definition of opinion evidence different from the more
traditional ‘inference from observed … data’, suggesting:
The essential idea of opinion seems to be that it is a matter about which doubt can
reasonably exist, as to which two persons can, without absurdity, think differently …
When testimony is divided, or uncertain, the existence of a fact may become doubtful,
and, therefore, a matter of opinion.
The distinction between opinion evidence and evidence of fact is not always clear (see R v
Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287 at [43]), but to most intents and
purposes opinion evidence can be regarded as evidence in the form of ‘an inference from
observed and communicable data’: Lithgow City Council v Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352;
[2011] HCA 36 at [10]; Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group
Ltd (No 5) (1996) 64 FCR 73 at 75; Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dog
Association of New South Wales & ACT (1998) 154 ALR 527 at 532. Whether the description
‘and communicable’ is necessary or appropriate, however, is open to question.
From the courts’ perspective, though, the conceptual distinction between opinions and
facts means that it is important for evidence in reports and oral evidence to differentiate
clearly between facts and opinions (see Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588;
[2011] HCA 21 at [31]). Notably, s 76(1) underlines the distinction by providing that:
‘Evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact about the
existence of which the opinion was expressed.’
When evidence is in the form of speculation – hypotheses or theories which do not
derive from specialised knowledge – it will not be opinion evidence that is admissible: HG
v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999] HCA 2 at [44].
In Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 205 FLR 217; [2006]
NSWCCA 373 at [286], Barr and Hall JJ held that:
182 [3.0.10]
Statutory law in Australia | CH 3.0
it is necessary to identify each relevant fact about which an opinion is asserted. However,
an opinion is usually an inference derived from assumed or observed facts: see, eg, Guide
Dog Owners’ and Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dog Association of NSW and ACT (1998) 154
ALR 527 at 532 (30) (Sackville J). Sometimes there may be expertise involved in observing
primary facts, sometimes not. Furthermore, a distinction may be drawn between the
inference and a process of reasoning which explains why the inference was drawn.
The admissibility regime

[3.0.15] In the aftermath of the decision of the High Court in Dasreef v Hawchar (2011) 243
CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21, implementing in particular the judgment of Heydon J, Dixon J of
the Victorian Supreme Court in Dura (Australia) Constructions Pty Ltd v Hue Boutique Living
Pty Ltd (No 3) [2012] VSC 99 at [98] summarised the statutory rules as follows:
(a) is the opinion relevant (or of sufficient probative value) (the relevance rule);
(b) has the witness properly based ‘specialised knowledge’ (the expertise rule);
(c) is the opinion to be propounded ‘wholly or substantially based’ on specialised
knowledge (the expertise basis rule);
(d) is the opinion to be propounded ‘wholly or substantially based’ on facts assumed
or observed that have been, or will be, proved, or more specifically (the factual
basis rules):
i. are the ‘facts’ and ‘assumptions’ on which the expert’s opinion is
founded disclosed (the assumption identification rule);
ii. is there evidence admitted, or to be admitted before the end of the
tendering party’s case, capable of proving matters sufficiently similar to
the assumptions made by the expert to render the opinion of value (the
proof of assumptions rule);
iii. is there a statement of reasoning showing how the ‘facts’ and
‘assumptions’ relate to the opinion stated to reveal that that opinion is
based on the expert’s specialised knowledge (the statement of reasoning
rule)?
(See too Certain Children v Minister for Families and Children (No 2) [2017] VSC 304.)
Knowledge
[3.0.20] The word ‘knowledge’ in s 79 of the uniform evidence legislation has a different
connotation to that which it has in the context of the common law common knowledge
rule (see Ch 2.15). The meaning of ‘knowledge’ for the purposes of s 79 was held by
Spigelman CJ in R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; [2006] NSWCCA 167 at [138] to be that
given to it by Blackmun J of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993):
[T]he word ‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.
The term ‘applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such
facts or accepted as truths on good grounds’.
A similar approach was taken in Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd (in liq) v Selim [2008] FCA 416 at
[30].
In Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; [2014] HCA 29 at [23], the High Court (in
a unanimous judgment) provided authoritative guidance on the issue. It held that the
word ‘knowledge’ is used in s 79(1) as it is defined in the Macquarie Dictionary, namely
‘acquaintance with facts, truths, or principles, as from study or investigation’. It also
concluded (at [23]) that the ‘concept is captured’ by Blackmun J’s formulation.
In Tuite v The Queen (2015) 49 VR 196; [2015] VSCA 148, Maxwell ACJ, Redlich and
Weinberg JJA explicitly addressed the argument that reliability constitutes a yardstick for
admissibility, an argument advanced by the academic Gary Edmond (2014) (see also
Edmond (2017)).
[3.0.20] 183
The distinctions employed by the courts counterpoint ‘knowledge’ on the one hand
and ‘understanding’ on the other hand of a lesser status by reason of its failure to derive
from:
• a body of known facts;
• a corpus of ideas inferred from known facts; or
• a corpus of ideas accepted as truths on a sound basis.
Thus, inquiry for the purposes of s 79 needs to be directed toward the status of the
asserted body of facts or corpus of ideas – for the most part, but not exclusively, within the
relevant intellectual marketplace or discipline. On occasions, too, the reasonableness of the
status will also be a yardstick because there is the potential for acceptance of ideas as
‘truths’ to be unreasonable, illogical or unscientific; in such circumstances, the status of
such ideas, properly speaking, falls short of ‘knowledge’.
Specialised knowledge
[3.0.30] Section 79(1) of the uniform evidence legislation provides that:
If a person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or experience,
the opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion of that person that is wholly or
substantially based on that knowledge.
A consequence of the formulation of s 79 has been a series of judgments (the most

prominent being that of the High Court in HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999]
HCA 2 at [39]) which have stated that the framing of s 79 requires ‘attention to
requirements of form. By directing attention to whether an opinion is wholly or
substantially based on specialised knowledge based on training, study or experience, the
section requires that the opinion is presented in a form which makes it possible to answer
that question’. Part of this is a clear delineation between evidence in the form of fact and
evidence in the form of opinion.
Another aspect of the requirement is that evidence be presented in such a way as to
identify how it is based wholly or substantially on ‘specialised knowledge’ which in turn
is based on the person’s training, study or experience. Without such a clear delineation,
the process of decision-making by judicial officers about whether s 79 is complied with is
prohibitively problematic. The result is inadmissibility of the evidence.
Under these provisions, the source of the expert’s expertise ceases to be the focus of
judicial inquiry. There is no mention of experts at all, never mind concepts such as ‘peritia’
which traditionally have been important under the common law.
The focus is upon whether the ‘person’ has ‘specialised knowledge’. Prima facie, if the
person does, his or her opinions will be admissible, so long as the opinions are at least
substantially referable to that knowledge. This acts as a fetter upon experts proffering
views on areas beyond their sphere of specialist knowledge.
The term ‘specialised knowledge’ is not defined but relates to understanding of an area
which is outside the acquaintance or experience of ordinary people. As noted above, in
Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993), the majority of
the United States Supreme Court held that ‘knowledge’ connotes:
184 [3.0.30]
… more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. The term ‘applies to any body
of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on
good grounds.’ Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1252 (1986) … Proposed
testimony must be supported by [appropriate validation] – ie ‘good grounds’, based on
what is known.
Evidence is admissible if it is wholly or partly based upon specialised knowledge based

on the person’s training, study or experience. Section 79 has been held to be concerned not
with the factual basis of an expert’s opinion, but rather with the view, estimation or
judgment inherent in the inference drawn by the expert from that factual basis: Quick v
Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371 at 373 per Branson J. However, the fact that there must
be a nexus between the opinion and the knowledge, on the one hand, and then again
between the knowledge and the training, study or experience, on the other, entails
significant potential for examining (a) whether the opinion actually flows out of the
purported expert’s knowledge; and (b) whether the proposed witness has knowledge that
arises from his or her training, study or experience. This occurred in HG v The Queen
(1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999] HCA 2 (see Freckelton and Henning (1999)), where Gleeson CJ
found that a psychologist’s opinions, as expressed, did not emanate from his specialised
knowledge as a psychologist but rather were speculation, inference and personal and
second-hand views outside his field of expertise.
In Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; [2014] HCA 29 at [24], the High Court
concluded:
The second condition of admissibility under s 79(1) allows that it will sometimes be
difficult to separate from the body of specialised knowledge on which the expert’s opinion
depends ‘observations and knowledge of everyday affairs and events’. It is sufficient that
the opinion is substantially based on specialised knowledge based on training, study or
experience. It must be presented in a way that makes it possible for a court to determine
that it is so based.
The decisions in HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999] HCA 2; O’Brien v Gillespie
(1997) 41 NSWLR 549; and Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371 have made it clear
that the burden of establishing that opinions are based upon specialised knowledge,
which in turn has arisen out of training, study or experience, rests upon the proponent of
such evidence. Failure to discharge the burden may result in an inadmissibility
determination: see, for example, NMFM Property Pty Ltd v Citibank Ltd (No 7) (1999) 161
ALR 576; [1999] FCA 252; see also Australian Cement Holdings Pty Ltd v Adelaide Brighton
Ltd [2001] NSWSC 645 per Barrett J.
In HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999] HCA 2 at [41], Gleeson CJ held that the
evidence of a psychologist about a complainant’s transposition of the identities of her
sexual assailant from her biological father to her stepfather had not been shown to be
based on his specialised expert knowledge, rather being ‘based on a combination of
speculation, inference, personal and second-hand views as to the credibility of the
complainant, and a process of reasoning which went well beyond the field of expertise of
a psychologist’. Thus, what occurred was that Gleeson CJ examined what it was that the
psychologist had done in his evaluation in order to determine whether his proffered
opinions arose out of his specialised knowledge. Notably, Einstein J in Lakatoi Universal Pty
Ltd v Walker [2000] NSWSC 633 at [4] commented that s 79 constitutes ‘a direct rejection of
the American Frye test’ (Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923)). (See also Berman
(1996).) However, his Honour found that it is appropriate for a trial judge to examine
evidentiary reliability under s 79: at [9]; see also R v Gallagher [2001] NSWSC 462 at [35]
per Barr J; Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v George (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Einstein J,
No 108276 of 1996, 1 December 1997).
It is essential to give operation to the adjective ‘specialised’. In Honeysett v The Queen
(2014) 253 CLR 122; [2014] HCA 29 at [23], the High Court emphasised that: ‘Specialised
[3.0.30] 185
knowledge is knowledge which is outside that of persons who have not by training, study
or experience acquired an understanding of the subject matter.’
The requirement of ‘specialised knowledge’ has functioned to maintain important
aspects of the common knowledge rule in that it confines expert opinion evidence to
evidence needed by the tribunal of fact, namely outside their knowledge and experience.
As Gaudron J put it in Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; [2002] HCA 4 at [82]:
The concept of ‘specialised knowledge’ imports knowledge of matters which are outside
the knowledge or experience of ordinary persons and which ‘is sufficiently organized or
recognized to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience’.
Significantly, her Honour cited in support of this proposition a series of the core cases
relating to the common knowledge rule: Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 491 per
Dixon CJ; Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 at 111 per Mason CJ and Toohey J, at 130
per Dawson J; Farrell v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 286; [1998] HCA 50 at [10] per Gaudron J,
at [28]–[29] per Kirby J; R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 at 841 per
Lawton LJ; R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45; 15 A Crim R 364 at 46–47 per King CJ, cited
with approval in HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999] HCA 2 at [58] per Gaudron J,
and adopted in R v Makoare [2001] 1 NZLR 318 at [23] per Blanchard J on behalf of the
New Zealand Court of Appeal; Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; [1998] HCA 75 at
[53] per Gaudron and Gummow JJ.
The words of Lawton LJ in R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 at 841
remain pertinent:
likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury.
Heerey J has observed in Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd
(2006) 228 ALR 719; [2006] FCA 363 at [11] that:
… the Turner rule, adopted in Murphy, is a separate requirement. Even if a proffered
opinion is that of a person suitably qualified within an organized area of knowledge, if
that area is not outside the experience of ordinary persons, the opinion will not be
admissible … there are good policy reasons for this distinction.
It may well be that ‘substantially’ means something akin to ‘predominantly’ or ‘in the
main’ (see Commissioner for Superannuation v Scott (1987) 13 FCR 404; 71 ALR 408) although
there is also a strong argument that it does not require to be based at so high a level, and
simply means ‘significantly’ (see eg Katanas v Transport Accident Commission [2016] VSCA
140 at [100] or ‘real, not remote’. Although, the analysis was undertaken in different
contexts, it is relevant too that ‘substantial’ has been held to mean ‘large, weighty or big’
and indicative of ‘an absolute significance’ in R v Fletcher (2005) 156 A Crim R 308; [2005]
NSWCCA 338 at [119]; Tillmanns Butcheries Pty Ltd v AMIEU (1979) 42 FLR 331; R v Ellis
(2003) 58 NSWLR 700; 144 A Crim R 1 at [94] – [95].
Fields of expertise
[3.0.40] In its 1985 and 1988 reports, the ALRC did not recommend the incorporation
within its proposed Evidence Bill of a rule of evidentiary exclusion based upon either the
Frye criterion of general acceptance or that of reliability. However, it needs to be observed
that both of these reports preceded the decision of Daubert and that in the mid-1980s there
were only limited indications that Australia was tending in the direction of embracing a
rule of evidentiary exclusion by reference to a requirement of a ‘field of expertise’.
The uniform evidence legislation does not incorporate an area of expertise rule: see R v
Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; [2006] NSWCCA 167 at [152]. Taking into account the extrinsic
interpretative material to be found in the ALRC reports upon which the legislation is
based, it is apparent that the intention of the legislatures has been to omit both a general
acceptance and a reliability criterion for admissibility: Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v George
186 [3.0.40]
(unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Einstein J, No 108276 of 1996, 1 December 1997);

Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [1999] NSWSC 828 at [242].
However, as has become apparent with the Daubert interpretation of the Federal Rules of
Evidence 1975 (US), which similarly did not include either criterion, this may not be
conclusive. The United States Supreme Court found in Daubert that a duty lies upon a trial
judge to ensure that any expert evidence admitted is not only relevant, but also reliable. A
significant distinguishing factor of the 1995 Australian legislation is that it does not require
as a precondition to admissibility that expert evidence will assist the trier of fact.
However, it could plausibly be asserted that such a requirement is implicit in the structure
of the Evidence Acts. Einstein J in Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd v George (unreported, NSW
Supreme Court, Einstein J, No 108276 of 1996, 1 December 1997) at p 3 has been explicit in
this regard:
It is appropriate then that a trial judge examine evidentiary reliability under s 79.
However, this was not the approach adopted by the New South Wales Court of Criminal
Appeal in R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; [2006] NSWCCA 167 at [152].
It remains arguable that unreliable expert opinion evidence will not be relevant
because it does not carry with it the capacity to impact upon the rational evaluation of
primary data before the court. Certainly, it will not assist the tribunal of fact, be it judge or
jury.
In HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999] HCA 2 at [41]–[42], Gleeson CJ found
opinions expressed by a psychologist to be the product of, in effect, lay speculation:
He did not put to the complainant, for her comment, the suggestion that she had been
abused by her father; the complainant told him [that] she could not remember her father.
He does not appear to have considered or investigated the possibility of abuse by some
third party. He appears to have inferred, for no apparent reason, that the words ‘stop it
daddy’, attributed to the complainant by her mother, referred to sexual as distinct from
some other form of abuse …
It was not demonstrated, and it is unlikely, that it is within the field of expertise of a
psychologist to form and express an opinion as to [whom she had been abused by].
Importantly, therefore, the notion of ‘field of expertise’ was framed by the departure from
the parameters of what constituted ‘specialised knowledge’.
The application of the Daubert definition of knowledge to s 79 is highly significant
because it has the potential to open up inquiry into matters relevant to the approach of
both Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923) and Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993) in that both the status of bodies of facts
and ideas and the sound basis (quaere reliability) for them are pertinent. However,
notably Spigelman CJ in R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; [2006] NSWCCA 167 at [137] has
observed that:
The focus of attention [under s 79] must be on the words ‘specialised knowledge’, not on
the introduction of an extraneous idea such as ‘reliability’. (Cf Velevski v The Queen (2002)
76 ALJR 402 at 417 [82], 426 [154]–[160]; 187 ALR 233 at 253 [82], 267 [154]–[160]; Perpetual
Trustee Co Ltd v George (Einstein J, 1 December 1997, unreported); Idoport Pty Ltd v National
Australia Bank Ltd [1999] NSWSC 828 at [242].
The expert evidence provisions in both pieces of legislation need to be read closely with
ss 135 and 137 (see below) which permit discretionary exclusion of evidence.
In order to determine what constitutes probative value, and also unfair prejudice,
criteria or at least indicia are needed. Both the general acceptance Frye rule and the
reliability rule of the Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786
(1993) decision offer such criteria. To this extent, it is probable that the Daubert v Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993) decision in particular will exercise
an ongoing influence upon the development of Australian expert evidence law. It provides
a sophisticated means of distinguishing between evidence that is not yet capable of being
[3.0.40] 187
effectively evaluated by courts and that which is falsifiable and has been tested within the
medium of peer review and debate among those constituting the intellectual marketplace.
However, as yet this is not the law, and reliability is not a criterion for admissibility of
expert evidence (see [3.0.157]).
Abolition of the common knowledge rule
[3.0.50] Section 80(b) of the uniform evidence legislation provides that:
Evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about:
(a) …
(b) a matter of common knowledge.
This permits the giving of opinion evidence by expert witnesses whenever it is relevant to
the determination of a fact in issue. The abolition is phrased in terms of providing that
evidence is ‘not inadmissible only because it is about a matter of common knowledge’: see
Freckelton (2005). This still leaves open the potential for a trial judge to exercise a
discretionary judgment about the probative value of proffered expert evidence, taking into
account that it concerns a matter of common knowledge.
The conventional view is that the impact of the abolition of the common knowledge
rule is modest in light of the ongoing requirement that evidence be ‘specialised’. Heydon
(2004, p 930) similarly observed:
If the court comes to the conclusion that the subject of investigation does not require a
sufficient degree of specialised knowledge to call for the testimony of an expert, evidence
of opinion will generally be excluded, especially where the witness is produced merely to
present in a cogent and vivid form the case of the party calling that witness. The danger of
this evidence is that it dresses up matters which are within the ordinary experience of the
tribunal of fact in a beguiling scientific garb which may conceal the blemishes within.
Hill J noted in Pepsi Seven-Up Bottlers Perth Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 62 FCR
289 at 301:
No doubt the 1995 Act operates to widen the circumstances in which expert testimony
may be proffered.
However, it may be that ‘experience will lead to s 80 being given a restrictive
interpretation … cf Westpac Banking Corp v Jury (unreported, Supreme Court, NSW, Rolfe J,
17 October 1995)’: Pepsi at 301 per Hill J.
When an expert witness gives evidence about a matter of common knowledge, such as
why an accused person, with no particular pathology, told lies, it is common for a trial
judge to exclude the evidence on the basis that the expert does not have specialised
knowledge in the relevant area that is based on their training, study or experience: see R v
Quesada (2001) 122 A Crim R 218; [2001] NSWCCA 216 at [49]. By this means, in effect, the
common knowledge preclusion has a continuing existence.
What can be asserted with confidence is that if an expert witness, qualified by training,
study or experience, possesses specialised knowledge that is relevant to a particular case,
the evidence will prima facie be admissible, notwithstanding that it is a matter about
which ordinary members of the public may have some understanding.
This is likely to have a major continuing effect upon evidence that can be led from
mental health professionals. In practical terms the change to the law means, among other
things, that evidence relating to the general workings of memory or to the perils of
identification evidence would be admissible in principle provided it is clear that it is
relevant to the specific factual circumstances before the court. The different criteria for
admission under the common knowledge rule – namely, whether evidence is necessary or
whether it would be helpful or whether it trespasses upon an area of common knowledge
– cease to be determinative in any way.
A question that arose in the High Court decision of Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR
402; [2002] HCA 4 was whether an expert witness can have regard to matters that are
188 [3.0.50]
within the knowledge of ordinary persons in formulating her or his opinion. In particular,
the issue arose in the context of a pathologist evaluating the significance for a potential
inference of suicide that a victim’s nightdress had been disarranged, some of its buttons
were missing and a hairclip was displaced. Gaudron J, in particular, addressed the issue,
holding that an expert may have regard to matters of common knowledge and that the
s 80 preclusion did not impact upon this (at [82]).
In Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2007) 159 FCR 397;
[2007] FCAFC 70, the Full Court of the Federal Court considered the ruling by Heerey J
that an expert’s opinions about, among other things, the usage by Darrell Lea of the colour
purple were inadmissible because they went only to a matter that was within the
knowledge and experience of an ordinary person. Heerey J (Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v
Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2006) 228 ALR 719; [2006] FCA 363) characterised the
proceeding as being concerned with the brand names, colours and get-up of rival
manufacturers of chocolate and the likely effect of those features on retail purchasing
decisions by consumers. His Honour considered that virtually the whole of the Australian
population over the age of about eight years are purchasers or potential purchasers of
chocolate, an inexpensive everyday product sold in hundreds of thousands of retail outlets
throughout the country. Heerey J did not consider that consumers of chocolates could be
considered as a special category of persons that would constitute an exception to the rule
under the common law. His Honour characterised the questions thrown up by the
proceeding as quintessentially questions of fact within the experience and knowledge of a
trier of fact (for criticism of the approach, see Beaton-Wells (2006)).
The Full Court disagreed (at [54]–[55]), finding error in Heerey J’s approach:
Such an approach appears to ignore the language of ss 79 and 80 of the Evidence Act.
Certainly, opinion evidence will not be admissible unless the opinion is based on
specialised knowledge and that specialised knowledge is in turn based on the opinion
holder’s training, study or experience. However, the former rule of the common law that
excluded opinion evidence as to a matter of common knowledge no longer applies. Under
s 80, evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is a matter of common
knowledge.
Clearly enough, if the matter about which expert evidence is to be given is patent and
known to all, the Court’s time would normally be wasted by such evidence. Section 135
may be called in aid in those circumstances. Nevertheless, the evidence may still be strictly
admissible. Further, an expert may still be of assistance to the Court, even in an area about
which most people know something. So long as s 79 is satisfied, and the opinion evidence
is based on specialised knowledge and that specialised knowledge is based on training,
study or experience, that opinion evidence will be admissible, whether or not it might
then be excluded in the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 135 (see generally the Law
Reform Commission, Interim Report on Evidence, Canberra (1985), paragraph 43).
Behaviour, competency and development of children

[3.0.90] Expert evidence about the typical patterns of behaviour of child sexual abuse
victims has been admitted in some jurisdictions to assist jurors where they might
otherwise, using their common knowledge and sense, draw an adverse inference against a
child witness due to their behaviour: see, for example, R v J (FE) (1990) 74 CR (3d) 269; R
v RAC (1990) 57 CCC 3d 522. However, this more liberal approach has been most
prominent in Canada. Such evidence has tended not to be admitted by Australian courts
(see [10.30.710]).
The ALRC and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC), in
their 1997 Report (see ALRC and Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission
(1997, ch 14)), concluded that changes to Australian law were necessary to address the
traditional view that children’s evidence is unreliable, based on perceptions about
children’s limited memory capacity and their ability to recall events accurately. They
[3.0.90] 189
recommended that the uniform Evidence Acts be clarified to ensure that expert evidence
that may assist a decision-maker in understanding children’s disclosures, patterns of
behaviour and demeanour in and out of court be made admissible in civil or criminal
proceedings where the child is an alleged victim of abuse.
The ALRC and HREOC considered (at [14.77]) that the provisions of the Evidence Act
1995 (Cth) and the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) were insufficient to ensure that appropriate
evidence about a child witness’s disclosures, behaviour or demeanour is admitted to
explain why general assumptions about such matters may not reflect adversely on a
particular child’s credibility. They recommended that the rules of evidence should ‘clearly
indicate’ that such evidence is admissible. The Royal Commission into the New South
Wales Police Service (1997) (the Wood Royal Commission) supported this amendment (at
[15.131]).
Specialised knowledge of child behaviour

[3.0.100] In Victoria, the Commonwealth, New South Wales and the Northern Territory, a
new provision to facilitate the giving of evidence about the development and behaviour of
children, s 79(2), was introduced by the Evidence Amendment Bill 2008 (Cth), the Evidence
Amendment Bill 2007 (NSW), the Evidence Amendment Act 2010 (Tas), the Evidence Act 2008
(Vic), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act 2011
(NT):
(2) To avoid doubt, and without limiting subsection (1):
(a) a reference in that subsection to specialised knowledge includes a reference to
specialised knowledge of child development and child behaviour (including
specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their
development and behaviour during and following the abuse); and
(b) a reference in that subsection to an opinion of a person includes, if the person has
specialised knowledge of the kind referred to in paragraph (a), a reference to an
opinion relating to either or both of the following:
(i) the development and behaviour of children generally;
(ii) the development and behaviour of children who have been victims of
sexual offences, or offences similar to sexual offences.
The provisions have been included in all jurisdictions to remove uncertainty about the
admissibility of such evidence. The ALRC (2004, p 103) (see also Odgers (2019)) canvassed
such amendments.
Section 79(2) enables information to be provided by experts, generally psychiatrists or
psychologists, about the behaviour of children in the context of their being victims of
sexual offences. The provision applies in criminal proceedings and permits evidence to be
given on behalf of both the prosecution and the defence. It is only relevant where it can be
established to the court’s satisfaction that the witness has the requisite specialised
knowledge of child behaviour. This includes, but is not limited to, knowledge of the
impact of sexual abuse on children and their behaviour during and after abuse. It also
includes information about the effects of sexual abuse upon child development. Examples
of such evidence would be:
• expert evidence that many children are slow to complain or report and, when they do
so, are imprecise in their disclosures and may even retract their allegations;
• expert evidence that some children continue to manifest affection to an intra-familial
sexual abuser, in spite of being the victim of ongoing interference; and
• expert evidence that, while some children who have been sexually abused manifest
sexualised behaviours, self-harming conduct, distress and deteriorating performance at
school, not all victims of sexual abuse do so (see DH v The Queen [2015] 1 NZLR 625;
[2015] NZSC 35; Kohai v The Queen [2015] 1 NZLR 833; [2015] NZSC 36).
190 [3.0.100]
Under s 13(7) of the uniform evidence legislation, courts can inform themselves as they
think fit in relation to questions of competence. Arguably, this gives them the power to
explore a child witness’s competence to give sworn, unsworn or any evidence, including
by using an expert or a person the child witness trusts. However, s 79(2) goes further by
enabling expert evidence to be admitted to assist a jury in understanding the behaviour of
child witnesses so that jurors can give proper weight and consideration to the evidence.
One of the reasons why expert evidence about the behaviour of child victims has been
excluded by Australian and New Zealand courts is that it has been viewed as principally
dealing with the credibility of a complainant, a topic that is not generally an appropriate
subject for expert evidence (see, eg, Ingles v The Queen (unreported, Tasmanian Court of
Criminal Appeal, 4 May 1993)) or because the evidence is not a fit subject for expert
opinion (see, eg, R v B [1987] 1 NZLR 362; R v Accused [1989] 1 NZLR 714; F v The Queen
(1995) 83 A Crim R 502; C v The Queen (1993) 60 SASR 467 per Duggan J; S v The Queen
(2001) 125 A Crim R 526; [2001] QCA 501). Section 79(2) overcomes the traditional
reluctance to accept that this kind of evidence is a subject of specialised knowledge.
However, the extent of its effect as yet is unclear because s 79(2) does not explicitly
override the credibility rule (s 102, which is not dissimilar to the common law), which
precludes (subject to exceptions set out in s 106) evidence solely about credibility.
Section 106(d) of the uniform evidence legislation may enable expert evidence to be
adduced which impugns the credibility of a child witness as it allows an exception to the
credibility rule preclusion for ‘evidence that tends to prove that a witness is, or was,
unable to be aware of matters to which his or her evidence relates’. This has been
interpreted broadly to include ‘psychological, psychiatric or neurological considerations’
creating ‘a proneness to lying’: R v Souleyman (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Levine J,
5 September 1996). However, it is significant that the s 106 exceptions only apply where
the evidence is a rebuttal of a denial in cross-examination of matters put to a witness that
are relevant only to credibility. Section 79(2) goes considerably further.
Under the uniform evidence legislation, ‘rehabilitative evidence’ about credibility can
only be introduced by the prosecution to re-establish credibility under s 108(1) via
re-examination of the witness. Section 108(3) arguably allows expert evidence to be
adduced; however, it has application only where the rehabilitating evidence is of a prior
consistent statement where an inconsistent statement has been admitted or there is
otherwise an implied or express suggestion of fabrication or reconstruction.
Under Australian and New Zealand common law, rehabilitation evidence appears to
be broader in principle – it can be provided by an expert as long as the subject matter is
proper for expert opinion: see, eg, R v B [1987] 1 NZLR 362; R v Accused [1989] 1 NZLR
714; F v The Queen (1995) 83 A Crim R 502; C v The Queen (1993) 60 SASR 467 per Duggan J;
S v The Queen (2001) 125 A Crim R 526; [2001] QCA 501. The exceptions in s 108 of the
uniform evidence legislation are more limited in application.
In New Zealand, by virtue of s 25(1) of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZ), evidence must
provide ‘substantial help’ in understanding other evidence in the proceeding or in
ascertaining any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the proceeding. This
has been interpreted to give significant scope to counter-intuitive evidence: M (CA23/2009)
v The Queen [2011] NZCA 191; DH v The Queen [2015] 1 NZLR 625; [2015] NZSC 35; Kohai
v The Queen [2015] 1 NZLR 833; [2015] NZSC 36.
This highlights the significance of s 79(2) for Australian practice. It is likely that its
principal effect will be to facilitate the provision of possibly counter-intuitive information
about the range of behavioural and developmental responses of children to being sexually
assaulted, allowing jurors to better evaluate the credibility of the particular complainant,
[3.0.100] 191
armed with the extra information. It is likely that s 79(2) will not be interpreted to give
authorisation to evidence by experts about whether a particular complainant should or
should not be believed.
In Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 16 Tas R 364; [2006] TASSC 111, the Tasmanian Supreme
Court was required to consider the new s 79A of the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) (which has
since been repealed and replaced with the similar provisions in s 79(2)). The majority
found evidence by a psychiatrist admissible, even though it described how victims of
sexual abuse are likely to be affected by their experience and also tended to prove that the
complainant had been sexually abused as a child. Crawford J noted that the evidence,
which was admitted to assist the jury to understand the question of delay in the
complainant’s complaint, was of only slight probative value because there were many
potential explanations for her behaviour (at [55]–[56]).
Blow J explored the issue of whether there is a recognised field of specialised
knowledge in terms of the behaviour of sexually abused children. He concluded that the
wording of s 79A (referring to ‘specialised knowledge of child behaviour’) had overcome
the problems identified in other cases as to the existence of a relevant area of expertise (at
[211]).
Queensland: expert evidence about witness's ability to give evidence
[3.0.120] Under s 9C of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld):
(1) This section applies to a proceeding if –
(a) under section 9A, the court is deciding whether a person is able to give an
intelligible account of events which he or she has observed or experienced; or
(b) under section 9B, the court is deciding whether a person understands the matters
mentioned in section 9B(2)(a) and (b); or
(c) the evidence of a child under 12 years is admitted.
(2) Expert evidence is admissible in the proceeding about the person’s or child’s level
of intelligence, including the person’s or child’s powers of perception, memory and
expression, or another matter relevant to the person’s or child’s competence to give
evidence, competence to give evidence on oath, or ability to give reliable evidence.
Abolition of the ultimate issue rule

[3.0.140] Section 80(a) of the uniform evidence legislation provides that:
Evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about:
(a) a fact in issue or an ultimate issue …
However, as noted below, some interpretation of the provision has tended to construe it in
a limited way and, in effect, to continue an ongoing preclusion upon evidence that utilises
legal standards or encroaches in a fundamental way upon the province of the finder of
fact.
Hill J gave an indication of the likely approach of the courts, albeit in a particular
context, in Pepsi Seven-Up Bottlers Perth Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 62 FCR
289 at 301:
No doubt the Evidence Act operates to widen the circumstances in which expert testimony
may be proffered. With both the common knowledge rule and the ultimate issue rule
abolished, there would seem to be but two relevant obstacles to the admission of evidence
going to the meaning of words as used in a statute. These would be (assuming the
evidence is properly to be characterised as within the opinion rule enunciated by s 76 [of
the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)]), whether the testimony is relevant to the issue to be
determined, that is to say the meaning of the particular word in the statute, and whether
the witness does have specialised knowledge based on training, study or experience to
support the opinion evidence he or she is to give.
The extent to which s 80 precludes evidence by expert witnesses that touches upon
fundamental issues to be decided by the trier of fact remains uncertain. In Pepsi Seven-Up
192 [3.0.120]
Bottlers Perth Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1995) 62 FCR 289 at 301, Hill J commented
that ‘[i]t may well be that experience will lead to s 80 being given a restrictive
interpretation’: see also Westpac Banking Corp v Jury (unreported, NSW Supreme Court,
Rolfe J, 17 October 1995). Its impact was further canvassed in Allstate Life Insurance Co v
Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 6) (1996) 64 FCR 79 at 83–85, where
Lindgren J was called upon to rule upon the admissibility of expert evidence concerning
the omission of the existence of guarantees in the context of the registration of securities in
the United States. He found (at 83) that s 80 did not refer to expert legal opinion:
… which impinges upon the essential curial function of applying law, whether domestic
or foreign, to facts. I confess to finding it most difficult to accept that the Australian Law
Reform Commission or the legislature intended by the modest terms of s 80 to make
admissible in all cases before the courts the opinions of those trained, studied or
experienced in the law as to how the curial function is properly to be performed.
Lindgren J emphasised that expert opinion, both before and after the 1995 legislation, is
not admissible as to the identification of the relevant law or as to its proper application.
He articulated (at 83) reasons for this proposition as being able to be expressed in three
ways:
(1) ‘to admit such evidence would be to permit abdication of the judicial duty and
usurpation of the judicial function’;
(2) ‘such evidence cannot be allowed to be probative or to rise higher than a
submission’; and
(3) ‘such evidence is necessarily irrelevant’.
Lindgren J held that the use in s 80 of the words ‘only’ and ‘about’ signifies that the
provision leaves untouched the fundamental common law principle which excludes legal
opinion evidence as intruding upon the essential judicial function and duty. Second, he
found that the expression ‘an ultimate issue’ does not catch ‘the ultimate legal issue’ for
decision by a court. Third, he found that no issue arose under s 80 because s 55 was not
satisfied since the evidence in question was not evidence that could rationally affect the
assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue. Fourth, he held that
reference to the legislative background of s 80 ‘shows that the reference in s 80(a) to the
“ultimate issue” was intended to refer to opinion by non-legal expert witnesses or
non-expert witnesses on an ultimate issue of fact expressed in language which applies a
legal standard’ (at 85). See also Australian Rugby Union Ltd v Hospitality Group Pty Ltd
[1999] FCA 1098 per Sackville J.
In O’Brien v Gillespie (1997) 41 NSWLR 549, the ongoing status of the ultimate issue
rule was further considered, on this occasion by Levine J, in the context of proffered
evidence about the solicitor–client relationship and about the duty of care owed by a
solicitor to a client. Levine J noted that there was no evidence before the court about the
entitlement of the deponent of the affidavit of the proposed witness to establish his
specialised knowledge within the terms of s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). He
excluded the evidence on that ground but went on to hold that the evidence was also
inadmissible as falling ‘within “ultimate issues” to an extent beyond any such exception to
the exclusion of such testimony to which the section [s 80] seems to point’: at 551–552. He
concluded that s 80 ‘does not and cannot represent a complete codification of the law of
evidence to the exclusion of the development of a body of principles referred to in the
cases decided prior to its enactment’: at 557. He expressly adopted the approach of
Lindgren J in Allstate and held that ‘the proposed testimony of this witness is on the
essential matters of fact and law to be decided by the application of legal standards upon
the evidence of the actual transactions which the court will hear and thus does no more
than intrude upon the exercise of the essential judicial function’: at 557. Highlighting the
role of the discretionary provisions, Levine J also indicated that he would be prepared,
[3.0.140] 193
regardless of his rulings under ss 79 and 80, to find the proffered opinion inadmissible by
reason of s 135 on the basis that it ‘would cause or result in an undue waste of time’ and
would be of ‘minimal probative value’: at 558.
In the important decision of Dean-Willcocks v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (2003) 45
ACSR 564; [2003] NSWSC 466, Austin J in effect reasserted the rationales underlying the
ultimate issue rule, holding that if an expert chooses to address the ultimate issue which is
a mixed use of fact and law, and does not have expertise in the law and in the assessment
of evidence, there is a probability that the opinion will be regarded as outside the scope of
the expert’s specialised knowledge.
It remains sound advocacy for the most part for counsel to have expert witnesses
refrain from trespassing upon what has traditionally been regarded as the domain of the
court – drawing the ultimate inference. It is good advocacy practice for the decision-maker
to be provided with the data so that it is they who move logically to the final conclusion,
rather than feeling that they are having it dictated to them by a witness.
The bases of expert opinions

[3.0.150] In its 1987 Report on Evidence, the ALRC recommended against recognition of the
basis rule. Since that time, Australia’s common law has increasingly clearly embraced the
existence of the basis rule: see Hilder v The Queen (1997) 97 A Crim R 70 at 79; Perpetual
Trustee Co Ltd v George (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Einstein J, No 108276 of 1996,
1 December 1997).
The uniform evidence legislation implements the ALRC’s recommendations, but is
likely only to have a limited effect on the law in practice because of the operation of the
discretionary exclusion provisions.
Section 59(1) provides that:
Evidence of a previous representation made by a person is not admissible to prove the
existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by
the representation.
Section 60 provides that:
The hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of a previous representation that is admitted
because it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of an asserted fact.
This excuses proof of the truth of the history given but has been held not to excuse the
need to disclose the history as the basis of the opinion: Hilder v The Queen (1997) 97 A Crim
R 70 at 79 (n 15); Welsh v The Queen (1996) 90 A Crim R 364.
Similarly, s 72 provides that the hearsay preclusion does not apply to evidence of a
contemporaneous representation made by a person about his or her health, feelings,
sensations, intention, knowledge or state of mind.
However, s 136 gives the court a power to preclude such evidence where there is a
danger that use of the evidence (that is, as evidence of the truth of what was said) might
be unfairly prejudicial to a party or misleading or confusing.
In Welsh v The Queen (1996) 90 A Crim R 364 at 368, the New South Wales Court of
Appeal observed:
Section 60 has extraordinarily wide ramifications. Its most obvious effect is in relation to
prior inconsistent statements. Before the Evidence Act, a prior inconsistent statement was
admissible only to prove that the statement had been made, and so was relevant to the
credit of the witness; it did not by itself prove the truth of what had been said. Once that
statement is admitted for that purpose, s 60 now makes it evidence of the truth of what
had been said. Evidence of complaint in sexual cases was previously admissible only to
establish the complainant’s credit as a witness but not as evidence as to the truth of what
was said. Section 60 now operates to make it such evidence. The effect of s 60 in other
situations is fast becoming one of the real growth areas in the law.
In respect of medical history evidence, the court held (at 369):
194 [3.0.150]
Evidence of the history taken by a doctor has always been admissible … as establishing
the basis upon which the doctor framed the expert evidence to be given by him or her in
evidence, but not (except for statements of the type now made admissible by s 72) in order
to establish the truth of what was said. As a result of s 60, evidence by a doctor of the
history given to him or her by the patient and upon which the doctor bases his or her
expert opinion is therefore now evidence of the truth of that history. This is so whether or
not the facts stated in the history were at the time of giving the history fresh in the
patient’s mind, whether or not the history was given in circumstances which made it
highly probable that it was reliable or which made it unlikely to be a fabrication, and
whether or not what was said was within the patient’s personal knowledge – unless an
order is made limiting the use which may be made of that evidence pursuant to s 136.
[Footnote omitted]
In addition, the ss 135 and 137 discretions have a significant role to play in excluding
expert evidence which is incapable of being effectively evaluated by reason of a failure to
establish its bases. Thus, in Williams v Public Trustee of New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 921
at [13]–[14], Palmer J excluded under s 135(a) a doctor’s report which did not sufficiently
disclose its bases, commenting that:
In the course of his report the doctor refers to certain documents provided to him.
Sometimes an expert is presented with material for the purpose of giving an opinion, but
does not refer to some of it in his report. When cross examined as to why some material
provided is not referred to, he may demonstrate that his opinion has not properly taken
into account important relevant material which he had in his possession. In other words,
when assessing the weight to which an expert’s opinion is entitled, it is often the case that
the Court must look at material produced but not referred to, just as much as to material
produced to the expert and referred to.
Without precise identification of the documentary material provided to Dr Parmegiani
for the purpose of his report, the Defendant is seriously hampered in its ability to assess
the weight to which the report is entitled. It seems to me that the report of Dr Parmegiani
is flawed in this respect … The documentary material provided to Dr Parmegiani ought to
have been identified to the Defendant’s solicitors at the time the doctor’s report was
provided to them.
The High Court has held that s 60 was intended to work a considerable change to the
common law but not intended to provide a gateway for the proof of any form of hearsay:
Lee v The Queen (1998) 195 CLR 594 at 604. Thus, in Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR
371 at 377, Branson J held that the report of a qualified accountant and registered auditor
with extensive experience as an insolvency practitioner, to the extent that it did not
amount to evidence of his opinion based wholly or substantially on his specialised
knowledge of accounting and insolvency matters, was admissible. The basis of admission
was that it was relevant for a purpose other than proof of the facts thereby asserted,
namely the purpose of establishing the factual basis upon which the expert held the
opinions expressed in his report. That purpose was served in respect of the weight to be
accorded to the opinions expressed by the expert which depended to a significant extent
upon the factual basis for the opinions – evidence of the factual basis for the opinions was
thus found relevant in the proceeding as evidence which, if it were accepted, could
rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in the
proceeding, namely the duration of the insolvency of the company. However, Emmett J (at
381) considered that there was a real question as to whether the opinions expressed by the
expert concerning the insolvency of the company were admissible because the opinion at
least in part was not based on his specialised knowledge based on training, study or
experience. Finkelstein J agreed with Branson J to the extent that when an expert relies on
hearsay as a basis for her or his opinion, it can be admissible under s 60 (at 382). He
concluded that the effect of s 60 can be overcome by an order under s 136 limiting the use
to be made of the evidence. He agreed with Emmett J that if an accountant seeks to do no
more than state what is otherwise obvious from records, the evidence is not receivable on
[3.0.150] 195
the basis that it involves no application of expertise (at 383). He expressed the view that as
the trial judge had received some assistance from the opinions expressed by the expert,
that constituted a sufficient basis for holding the evidence admissible.
In Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 at
[85], Heydon JA held:
In short, if evidence tendered as expert opinion evidence is to be admissible, it must be
agreed or demonstrated that there is a field of ‘specialised knowledge’; there must be an
identified aspect of that field in which the witness demonstrates that by reason of specified
training, study or experience, the witness has become an expert; the opinion proffered
must be ‘wholly or substantially based on the witness’s expert knowledge’; so far as the
opinion is based on facts ‘observed’ by the expert, they must be identified and admissibly
proved by the expert, and so far as the opinion is based on ‘assumed’ or ‘accepted’ facts,
they must be identified and proved in some other way; it must be established that the
facts on which the opinion is based form a proper foundation for it; and the opinion of an
expert requires demonstration or examination of the scientific or other intellectual basis of
the conclusions reached: that is, the expert’s evidence must explain how the field of
‘specialised knowledge’ in which the witness is expert by reason of ‘training, study or
experience’, and on which the opinion is ‘wholly or substantially based’, applies to the
facts assumed or observed so as to produce the opinion propounded. If all these matters
are not made explicit, it is not possible to be sure whether the opinion is based wholly or
substantially on the expert’s specialised knowledge. If the court cannot be sure of that, the
evidence is strictly speaking not admissible, and, so far as it is admissible, of diminished
weight. And an attempt to make the basis of the opinion explicit may reveal that it is not
based on specialised expert knowledge, but, to use Gleeson CJ’s characterisation of the
evidence in HG v The Queen [(1999) 197 CLR 414;; [1999] HCA 2 at [41]], on ‘a combination
of speculation, inference, personal and second-hand views as to the credibility of the
complainant, and a process of reasoning which went well beyond the field of expertise’.
However, in Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd (2002) 234 FCR 549;
[2002] FCAFC 157 at [87], Weinberg and Dowsett JJ observed that it would be very rare
indeed for a court at first instance to reach a decision as to whether tendered expert
evidence satisfied all of the requirements set out by Heydon J before receiving it as
evidence. They commented that, more commonly, once the witness’s claim to expertise is
made out and the relevance and admissibility of the opinion evidence is demonstrated, it
is received. In turn, this prompted Austin J in Dean-Willcocks v Commonwealth Bank of
Australia (2003) 45 ACSR 564; [2003] NSWSC 466 at [13] to regard the observations of
Weinberg and Dowsett JJ as having qualified the analysis of Heydon J (cf Notaras v Hugh
[2003] NSWSC 167 at [3]–[18]).
In Daniels v Western Australia (2000) 178 ALR 542; [2000] FCA 858 at [30], Nicholson J
set out the following principles in the context of determining the admissibility of an
anthropologist’s evidence in a land claim case:
(1) The opinion will only be admissible if it can satisfy the requirements of s 79.
(2) Section 79 does not require that for an expert testimony to be admitted it can only
be founded on admitted evidence. However, … that does not mean that regard
must not be had to the factual basis of the opinion.
(3) For admissibility to follow from the section it is necessary for the court to find
that the opinion is wholly or substantially based on knowledge based on the
expert witnesses’ training, study or experience.
(4) As the expression of the opinion in oral testimony will precede findings
concerning the matters on which it is based, the opinion could not be admitted
into evidence until the court has made a finding that it is based wholly or
substantially on knowledge of the type made requisite by s 79. For the court to
make the findings it will be necessary for examination and cross-examination to
make apparent the extent to which the opinion is the product of an inference of
the requisite type …
196 [3.0.150]
(5) The focus for the court will be on the view, estimation or judgment inherent in
the inference drawn by the expert from the factual basis … [T]hat does not
preclude reference to the factual basis of the opinion in order for a finding to be
made whether the specialised knowledge itself is the basis of the opinion. To the
extent the evidence considered by the expert, hearsay or otherwise, is able to be
considered by the court without reference to the specialised knowledge of an
expert, the opinion of the expert will not be an inference in the exercise of the
specialised knowledge.
(6) To the extent to which the opinion is akin to the form found permissible by
Blackburn J in Milirrpum [Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141], it would
seem that it would be likely to fall within the description of knowledge
derivative from the expert’s training, study or experience.
(7) Hearsay evidence from which the opinion is inferred, will (subject to the
application of ss 135 and 136) qualify for admission pursuant to s 56 as relevant
to the purpose of the basis upon which the expert holds the opinion so that its
weight can be assessed. It could then be used for a hearsay purpose as a
consequence of the application of s 60.
(8) Admission of hearsay evidence with that consequence under s 60 leads inevitably
to the need for the court to consider whether that admission should be limited
under s 136 to the stated purpose of testing the knowledge on which the opinion
is based.
(9) Admission with the consequences flowing from s 60 would not occur if the court
considered admission should be precluded in exercise of its discretion under
s 135 …
(10) If as a result of the court’s consideration of the foundations for the opinion, it is
found not to be wholly or substantially based on the type of knowledge specified
in s 79, the opinion will not qualify for admission.
He commented (at [30]) that hearsay evidence comprising a statement as to the existence
of native title made to an expert by a party not called (and being an issue central to the
case) would qualify for exclusion or admission limited to testing the opinion in the
manner required by s 78 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); see also BP Australia Pty Ltd v
Nyran Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 679.
The issue was revisited in further cases concerning anthropology evidence determined
by Cooper J in Lardil v Queensland [2000] FCA 1548 and by Sundberg J in Neowarra v
Western Australia (2003) 134 FCR 208; [2003] FCA 1399 (see Ch 11.10). In Lardil, Cooper J
declined to limit the use to which the hearsay material could be put but said (at [17]) that
this refusal would not prevent the respondents from contending in due course that in the
circumstances of the case the hearsay statements should be given little or no weight and
should not be relied on:
Included in the circumstances to be considered in determining what weight should be
given to the material, will be the circumstances in which the statement was made, whether
or not that which was said was within the personal knowledge of the person making the
statement, the likelihood or otherwise that the statement has been fabricated, whether the
maker of the statement has been called to give evidence, and if so, the nature and effect of
that evidence, including whether the maker has been cross-examined on the statement or
generally, and whether the respondents have had a real opportunity to test the accuracy of
the matters asserted in the report. These are not the only circumstances which need to be
taken into account. Much will depend on the relevant circumstances identified in each
particular proceeding.
His Honour emphasised that s 60 does not endow hearsay evidence with any greater
weight than the circumstances warrant.
In Neowarra, Sundberg J held specifically that because the common law basis rule has
not been imported into s 79, the fact that an expert’s opinion is based in part on a fact
supported by hearsay is not a ground upon which the opinion must be rejected. His
Honour followed the approaches in Daniel and Lardil, admitting anthropological evidence
[3.0.150] 197
based on hearsay and leaving the main question as the weight which should be accorded
to the evidence. See Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003]
FCA 893 at [79]; Jango v Northern Territory (No 2) [2004] FCA 1004 at [74].
The New South Wales Court of Appeal revisited the issue in Australian Securities and
Investments Commission v Rich (2005) 218 ALR 764; [2005] NSWCA 152. Its ruling is the
most authoritative on the subject to this point. Spigelman CJ, for the court, reviewed the
preceding case law, in particular, the decision of Heydon CJ in Makita and (at [136]) held:
The issue for a trial judge is whether the opinion expressed to be based on the facts proved
or assumed is correct. In determining this issue, the judge will have regard, amongst other
things, to the reasoning process (based on those facts) used by the expert. The mere fact
that the expert’s opinion is based on facts that are assumed (and not proved) at the time
the expert gives evidence is no reason to exclude the evidence at that stage. The assumed
facts may be proved later by other evidence. The fact that the opinion was initially formed
or later reinforced by reference to other facts, not said by the expert in his evidence to be
proved or assumed, is irrelevant to the question of admissibility. Once the opinion is
capable of being based on the proved facts, it is admissible. The fact that the expert’s
opinion was at one time – or even still is – reinforced by undisclosed facts and reasoning
processes is irrelevant to the admissibility of the opinion (although these matters may go
to weight).
His Honour (at [156]) observed:

It may be the case that with respect to particular matters, the underlying fact or facts said
to be the basis of specific opinion, whether final or of an intermediate character, are so
weak that the probative evidence of the opinion will be extremely weak.
The new statutory provisions are likely to implement more broadly the liberal approach
adopted by the Federal Court in relation to the admissibility of survey evidence. The likely
concentration of the courts subsequent to the passage of the uniform evidence legislation
in the survey context will continue to be upon the methodological soundness of survey
evidence and so upon whether expert evidence in relation to survey results genuinely has
probative value for the determination of facts in issue between the parties. Section 135,
which permits discretionary exclusion of evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to a party, or
might be misleading or confusing, or cause or result in undue waste of time, should have
this result.
The effect of the uniform evidence legislation is to remove the formal requirement that
the bases of expert opinions must be proved by admissible evidence: see R v Harvey
(unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, Beazley J, 11 December 1996); Guide Dog
Owners’ & Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dog Association of New South Wales & ACT (1998)
154 ALR 527 at 531 per Sackville J. However, the probative value of opinions whose bases
are not formally proved will be so low that they will often be excluded as lacking
relevance. Even should such opinions pass the threshold of admissibility, their probative
value will be so low as to make them nearly useless if their bases are not formally proved.
The result is likely to be a ruling of inadmissibility under the discretionary provisions of
ss 135 and 137: see R v Harvey (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, Beazley J,
11 December 1996); Guide Dog Owners’ & Friends’ Association Inc v Guide Dog Association of
New South Wales & ACT (1998) 154 ALR 527 at 531 per Sackville J. Thus, the absence of an
exclusionary basis rule in the uniform evidence legislation in all probability will be fully
addressed by the flexible discretionary exclusionary mechanisms. For instance, Higgins J
in Lipovac v Hamilton Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported, ACT Supreme Court, 13 September
1996), p 100, has held that:
an opinion which went no further than to suggest the existence of a fact in issue or that of
an ultimate issue, for example, negligence, would be of no value or relevance unless the
facts upon which the conclusion is based are proved.
198 [3.0.150]
The assumption identification, proof of assumption and statement of reasoning rules

[3.0.152] In Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21, Heydon J held
that three rules that he contended existed at common law survived into the uniform
evidence scheme under s 79:
• An ‘assumption identification rule’, which provides that expert evidence is inadmissible
unless the facts on which the opinion is based are stated by the expert by way of proof
if the expert can admissibly prove them, otherwise as assumptions to be proved in
other ways (at [64]). He contended that the rule facilitates the ‘proof of assumption rule’
(see below), helping to distinguish between what the expert has observed and what the
expert has been told; to ensure that the expert is basing the opinion only on relevant
facts; to ensure that experts do not pick and choose for themselves what aspects of the
primary evidence they reject, what they accept, how they interpret it, and what the
court should find; and to ascertain whether there is substantial correspondence between
the facts assumed and the evidence admitted to establish them (at [65]). He held (at
[101]) that:
A construction of s 79 as abolishing the common law rule should be rejected because
silence about the factual assumptions being made would have very unsatisfactory
consequences. First, the court may not be able to understand the opinion so as to
decide what weight to accord it. Secondly, the court will not be able to assess whether
it corresponds with the facts which the court finds at the end of the trial. Thirdly, the
court will not be able to assess whether the opinion is one wholly or substantially
based on the expert’s knowledge. Fourthly, there would be unacceptable difficulties for
the cross-examiner, who should not have to perform, in the dark, particularly in
relation to lengthy and complex expert opinion evidence, the ‘task of teasing out in
cross-examination all the circumstances that the witness had in mind’. Fifthly, the
cross-examining party should not be left at a disadvantage in deciding whether and
how to meet the evidence. Sixthly, the respondent’s construction reduces the chance of
the parties getting to grips, or at least getting to grips quickly. It would thus cause trials
to become slower, more complicated and more costly.
• A ‘proof of assumption rule’, which provides that an expert opinion is not admissible
unless evidence has been, or will be, admitted, whether from the expert or from some
other source, which is capable of supporting findings of fact which are sufficiently
similar to the factual assumptions on which the opinion was stated to be based to
render the opinion of value (at [66]). He held (at [127]) that:
A construction of s 79 which holds that there is no proof of assumption rule in relation
to s 79 tenders is difficult to reconcile with the practical exigencies pursuant to which
parties conduct their cases. It is necessary for trials to be conducted in a businesslike
and efficient way. That is a matter of context pointing to the view that there is a proof of
assumption rule with which those tendering expert opinion evidence must comply by
reason of ss 55, 56 and 79 read against the background of the common law.
• A ‘statement of reasoning rule’, which provides that an expert opinion is inadmissible
unless the expert states in chief the reasoning by which the expert conclusion arrived at
flows from the facts proved or assumed by the expert so as to reveal that the opinion is
based on the expert’s expertise. The court does not have to be satisfied that the
reasoning is correct: ‘the giving of correct expert evidence cannot be treated as a
qualification necessary for giving expert evidence’ (Commissioner for Government
Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292 at 303 per Menzies J). But the reasoning must be
stated. The opposing party is not to be left to find out about the expert’s thinking for
the first time in cross-examination (at [91]). He contended (at [93]) that:
The rule protects cross-examiners by enabling them to go straight to the heart of any
difference between the parties without the delay of preliminary reconnoitring. It also
aids the court in a non-jury trial, because at the end of the trial it is the duty of the court
to give reasons for its conclusions. And it aids jurors, because at the end of the trial they
have the duty of assessing the rational force of expert evidence. If there is not some
exposition of the expert’s reasoning it will be impossible for the court to compose a
judgment stating, and for the jurors to assemble, reasons for accepting or rejecting or
[3.0.152] 199
qualifying the expert’s conclusion. (See too Coopers (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Deutsche
Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekämpfung Mbh 1976 (3) SA 352 at 371 per Wessels JA.)
He held (at [130]) that:

There is nothing in s 79 which suggests that the corresponding common law rule has been
abolished. And the language of s 79 positively supports its continuance: without a
statement of the expert’s reasoning it is not possible to say whether the opinion is wholly
or substantially based on the specialist knowledge claimed.
However, the plurality of the High Court (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel
and Bell JJ) did not endorse the analysis of Heydon J, instead observing (at [37]):
It should be unnecessary, but it is nonetheless important, to emphasise that what was said
by Gleeson CJ in HG (and later by Heydon JA in the Court of Appeal in Makita (Australia)
Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305; (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 at 743–744 [85]) is to be read
with one basic proposition at the forefront of consideration. The admissibility of opinion
evidence is to be determined by application of the requirements of the Evidence Act rather
than by any attempt to parse and analyse particular statements in decided cases divorced
from the context in which those statements were made. Accepting that to be so, it remains
useful to record that it is ordinarily the case, as Heydon JA said in Makita [2001] NSWCA
305; (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 at 744 [85], that ‘the expert’s evidence must explain how the
field of “specialised knowledge” in which the witness is expert by reason of “training,
study or experience”, and on which the opinion is “wholly or substantially based”, applies
to the facts assumed or observed so as to produce the opinion propounded’. The way in
which s 79(1) is drafted necessarily makes the description of these requirements very long.
But that is not to say that the requirements cannot be met in many, perhaps most, cases
very quickly and easily. That a specialist medical practitioner expressing a diagnostic
opinion in his or her relevant field of specialisation is applying ‘specialised knowledge’
based on his or her ‘training, study or experience’, being an opinion ‘wholly or
substantially based’ on that ‘specialised knowledge’, will require little explicit articulation
or amplification once the witness has described his or her qualifications and experience,
and has identified the subject matter about which the opinion is proffered.
The plurality found the trial judge to have erred in concluding that the expert’s numerical
or quantitative opinion was wholly or substantially based on his specialised knowledge
based on training, study or experience. It noted (at [41]–[42]) that:
What has been called the basis rule is a rule directed to the facts of the particular case
about which an expert is asked to proffer an opinion and the facts upon which the expert
relies to form the opinion expressed. The point which is now made is a point about
connecting the opinion expressed by a witness with the witness’s specialised knowledge
based on training, study or experience.
A failure to demonstrate that an opinion expressed by a witness is based on the
witness’s specialised knowledge based on training, study or experience is a matter that
goes to the admissibility of the evidence, not its weight.
They provided no endorsement to the existence of any form of a basis rule, still less an
‘assumption identification rule’, a ‘proof of assumption rule’ or a ‘statement of reasoning
rule’. In these circumstances, the views of Heydon J must be categorised as ‘unorthodox’,
although adherence to them is prudent in terms of sound advocacy practice.
Generally the requirement to explain the bases of opinions and in turn of specialised
knowledge will require little explicit articulation or amplification once the witness has
described his or her qualifications and experience, and has identified the subject matter
about which the opinion is proffered. (Taub v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 198). Whether an
opinion is substantially based on specialised knowledge is a question of degree and
requires an evaluative assessment by a court when determining admissibility (see R v Jung
[2006] NSWSC 658 at [57] ; Langford v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 1). The fact that an expert
relies upon some information not proved in the context of the overall formation of an
opinion does not eliminate the capacity of the evidence to be relevant (Langford v Tasmania
[2018] TASCCA 1 at [48]).
200 [3.0.152]
Expert evidence and hearsay

[3.0.155] Under s 59 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), Evidence Act
2001 (Tas), Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT), Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and
Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), evidence of a previous representation made by a person is not
admissible to prove the existence of a fact that the person intended to assert by the
representation. Section 69 sets out a number of exceptions, including in subss (1), (2) and
(3):
(1) This section applies to a document that:
(a) either:
(i) is or forms part of the records belonging to or kept by a person,
body or organisation in the course of, or for the purposes of, a
business; or
(ii) at any time was or formed part of such a record; and
(b) contains a previous representation made or recorded in the document in
the course of, or for the purposes of, the business.
(2) The hearsay rule does not apply to the document (so far as it contains the
representation) if the representation was made:
(a) by a person who had or might reasonably be supposed to have had
personal knowledge of the asserted fact; or
(b) on the basis of information directly or indirectly supplied by a person
who had or might reasonably be supposed to have had personal
knowledge of the asserted fact.
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the representation:
(a) was prepared or obtained for the purpose of conducting, or for or in
contemplation of or in connection with, an Australian or overseas
proceeding; or
(b) was made in connection with an investigation relating or leading to a
criminal proceeding.
Opinion evidence falls within s 69: Ringrow Pty Ltd v BP Australia Ltd (2003) 130 FCR 569;
[2003] FCA 933, where the ‘asserted fact’ for the purposes of s 59 is the expert’s opinion on
the basis that:
• section 69 deals with representations of ‘asserted facts’;
• the relevant ‘asserted fact’ was the valuer’s expression of opinion;
• the value of property at a particular date is a question of fact, as is the existence of
valuable goodwill attaching to a particular business at a particular date, and those facts
are usually established through opinion evidence from qualified experts;
• although there is no clear-cut distinction between fact and opinion, there are authorities
supporting the fact that a fact may include an opinion;
• section 69 is facilitative and to be construed broadly; and
• section 69 is capable of operation if the asserted fact is an opinion in relation to a matter
of fact (see also Investmentsource v Knox Street Apartments [2007] NSWSC 1128 at [21]).
Expert evidence and reliability

[3.0.157] In a series of decisions, it has become apparent that reliability is itself not a
stand-alone criterion for admissibility of expert evidence in Australia, nor an explicit
yardstick for determination of admissibility under ss 135 and 137.
In R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; [2006] NSWCCA 167 at [137], Spigelman CJ urged a
focus upon the words ‘specialised knowledge’ rather than what he described as ‘the
introduction of an extraneous idea such as “reliability”’. In R v McIntyre [2001] NSWSC
311 at [14], Bell J concluded that ‘whether a field is one of “specialised knowledge” for the
[3.0.157] 201
purpose of s 79 of the Act does not require proof of the matters with which the Court was
concerned in Daubert … which include proof of capacity for testing, actual testing, peer
review, publication and the like’.
In Tuite v The Queen (2015) 49 VR 196; [2015] VSCA 148 at [70], Maxwell ACJ, Redlich
and Weinberg JJA similarly held that the language of s 79(1) ‘leaves no room for reading in
a test of evidentiary reliability as a condition of admissibility’.
The relevance of reliability when considering the probative value of evidence for the
purpose of the exclusionary rule in s 137(1) was contentious for a time. In both Dupas v
The Queen (2012) 40 VR 182; [2012] VSCA 328 at [164] and Tuite v The Queen (2015) 49 VR
196; [2015] VSCA 148 at [102]–[106], the Victorian Court of Appeal concluded that in
considering the probative value of expert evidence under s 137, a trial judge retained the
common law function of assessing reliability and weight. In doing so, the court in Tuite
was influenced by the analysis of Edmond and Roque (2014). The Victorian position was
inconsistent with the analysis of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in R v
Shamouil (2006) 66 NSWLR 228; [2006] NSWCCA 112 and R v XY (2013) 84 NSWLR 363;
[2013] NSWCCA 121.
The divergence of approach was resolved by the High Court in IMM v The Queen
(2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14, where the plurality of French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and
Keane JJ concluded that it is not necessary for a trial judge to determine whether evidence
is reliable because in evaluating the probative value of evidence the question is whether it
has the capability rationally to affect findings of fact (at [39]). In short, therefore, the
determination by a 4:3 majority was that ‘[t]he Evidence Act contains no warrant for the
application of tests of reliability’ (at [54]).
Expert evidence about credibility

[3.0.158] Section 108C(1) of the uniform national legislation permits expert opinion
evidence about the credibility of another witness if:
(a) the person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or
experience;
(b) the evidence is evidence of an opinion of the person that:
(i) is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge; and
(ii) could substantially affect the assessment of the credibility of the witness;
and
(c) the court gives leave to address the evidence.
Section 108C(2) includes as specialised knowledge a reference to specialised knowledge of

child development and child behaviour, including specialised knowledge of the import of
sexual abuse on children and their behaviour during and following the abuse, and
opinions similarly defined. In Peacock v The Queen (2008) 190 A Crim R 454 at [57],
Simpson J and McClellan CJ at CL (see too RGM v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 89 at
[72]–[73]) considered that there is a distinction between evidence going to the credibility of
a witness and evidence going to the credibility of the evidence given by the witness.
However, in Dupas v The Queen (2012) 40 VR 182; [2012] VSCA 328 at [271], the Victorian
Court of Appeal held that the s 108C exception:
is thus directed to expert testimony of substantial probative value, relevant to the
assessment of the reliability of a witness to facts in issue. It deals with the capacity of a
witness to give credible evidence having regard to some behavioural or other factor which
may have affected that witness’s capacity to give accurate evidence. The exception permits
expert evidence to be called as to behavioural factors – environmental, cognitive or
otherwise – which would assist the court’s understanding of the capacity of a witness to
give credible evidence.
(See too CMG v The Queen [2011] VSCA 416.)
202 [3.0.158]
Judicial notice
[3.0.160] Under s 144 of the uniform evidence legislation, it is provided that:
(1) Proof is not required about knowledge that is not reasonably open to question and is:
(a) common knowledge in the locality in which the proceeding is being held or
generally; or
(b) capable of verification by reference to a document the authority of which cannot
reasonably be questioned.
This provision has replaced the common law judicial notice doctrine: Gattellaro v Westpac
Banking Corp (2004) 78 ALJR 394; [2004] HCA 6 at [17]; Domain Names Australia Pty Ltd v
.au Domain Administration Pty Ltd (2004) 139 FCR 215; [2004] FCAFC 247 at [14]; see also
Crown Glass & Aluminium Pty Ltd v Ibrahim [2005] NSWCA 195. The judge may acquire
knowledge of that kind in any way that the judge thinks fit.
These provisions are considerably narrower than the statutory provisions applying in
Western Australia and South Australia (see [2.30.220]) in relation to reference to books and
other publications of authority. They are also narrower than some formulations of
common law powers for courts to take judicial notice. However, the traditional criterion of
‘common knowledge’ remains. Because of the inherent elusiveness of the concept,
considerable flexibility can confidently be predicted to remain, as well as an element of
difference of approach among courts.
Mandatory exclusion
[3.0.165] The role of discretionary exclusion is likely to grow considerably as a result of the
passage of the uniform evidence legislation.
Section 137 of those Acts entrenches the traditional discretion by providing that:
In a criminal proceeding, the court must refuse to admit evidence adduced by the
prosecutor if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant. [Emphasis added.]
In Director of Public Prosecutions v Lynch (2006) 16 Tas R 49; [2006] TASSC 89 at [14], Blow J
made the point that s 137 is not discretionary in that it is framed in mandatory language,
requiring exclusion where its preconditions are made out.
The term ‘probative value’ is defined in the legislative Dictionary as ‘the extent to
which the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the
existence of a fact in issue’.
The use of the term ‘probative value’ and the word ‘extent’ rest upon the premise that
relevant evidence can rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of
a fact in issue to different extent: ‘Taken by itself, the evidence may, if accepted, support an
inference to a high degree of probability that the fact in issue exists. On the other hand, it
may only, as in the case of circumstantial evidence, strengthen that inference, when
considered in conjunction with other evidence. The evidence, if accepted, may establish a
sufficient condition for the existence of the fact in issue or only a necessary condition. The
ways in which evidence, if accepted, could affect the assessment of the probability of the
existence of a fact in issue are various.’ (IMM v The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA
14 at [45]. Thus in Langford v Tasmania [2018] TASCCA 1 at [55] it was determined that: ‘In
this case, that must mean the extent to which Mr Catterall’s opinion that the fire was
highly likely to have originated at the rear and on the external surface of the vehicle,
affected the assessment by the jury as to whether the appellant was responsible for the fire.
In making this assessment, the trial judge was entitled to consider the significance of the
evidence in the context of other evidence presented by the prosecution. This included the
improbable coincidence that the fire started spontaneously at the precise moment that the
appellant is seen on the CCTV footage walking away from the vehicle, particularly having
[3.0.165] 203
regard to the evidence that the vehicle had been parked in that location for several hours
by that time. On any reasonable view of the prosecution case, on the assumption that the
jury accepted Mr Catterall’s opinion in proof of the fact about which the opinion was
expressed, that is, that the fire had started on the external surface of the vehicle, it was
highly probative of the fact in issue, that is, that the appellant had started the fire.’
Significantly, all that is needed is that the probative value be exceeded by the danger of
unfair prejudice – it need not be substantially outweighed. Moreover, upon such a finding
being reached, the exclusion is mandatory. The ALRC explained the provision thus (ALRC
26 (1985, Vol 1, para 957)):
Under present law, a trial judge in criminal cases has a discretion to exclude evidence
adduced by the prosecution if it is more prejudicial than probative. There are a number of
uncertainties with this discretion. Some courts weight the discretion against the exclusion
of evidence, but the better view is that the trial judge should balance probative value and
the danger of prejudice without any preconceptions – accused persons should be
protected against evidence which is more prejudicial than probative. This will help to
provide a fair trial by excluding evidence which, while relevant, may be misused by the
tribunal of fact. There is some uncertainty over the meaning of ‘prejudice’. But, clearly, it
does not mean simply damage to the accused’s case. It means damage to the accused’s
case in some unacceptable way, by provoking some irrational, emotional response, or
giving evidence more weight than it should have. It is proposed to retain this judicial
discretion in its conventional form.
When considering the danger of unfair prejudice, care must be taken not to confuse
prejudice with unfair prejudice. It has been noted that: ‘Too often, defence counsel fail to
distinguish between them. All evidence that may tend to convict an accused person is
prejudicial, but that does not mean that it is unfairly prejudicial. What is meant by unfair
prejudice is that the jury may use the evidence to make a decision on an improper,
perhaps emotional basis. If there is a real risk that the evidence may be misused by the
jury in some way, then it may be unfairly prejudicial.’ (Neill-Fraser v Tasmania [2012]
TASCCA 2 at [184]; see also R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 139, 151; Langford v Tasmania
[2018] TASCCA 1 at [58]).
‘Unfairness’ has been held to refer to evidence creating ‘a real risk that evidence will be
misused by the jury in some unfair way’: R v BD (1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 137; see also
Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; [1999] HCA 37 at [93]; R v GK (2001) 53
NSWLR 317; [2001] NSWCCA 413 at [30]. Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial to an
accused for the purposes of s 137 merely because it makes it more likely that the accused
will be convicted: Festa v R (2001) 208 CLR 593; [2001] HCA 72 at [20] per Gleeson CJ; at
[51] per McHugh J. Evidence is not prejudicial merely because it strengthens or supports
the prosecution case. McHugh J, in Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; [2001] HCA 72 at
[51], stated:
It is prejudicial only when the jury are likely to give the evidence more weight than it
deserves or when the nature or content of the evidence may inflame the jury or divert the
jurors from their task.
It is conventionally said that part of the jury’s job is to weigh evidence; the fact that
evidence can suggest an interpretation other than that contended for by the prosecution
does not make evidence unduly prejudicial: R v SJRC [2007] NSWCCA 142 at [39] per
James J; see also Louizos v The Queen (2009) 194 A Crim R 223; [2009] NSWCCA 71 at
[30]–[36]; R v Smith (No 5) (2011) 217 A Crim R 297; [2011] NSWSC 1459 at [40].
In W v The Queen (2006) 16 Tas R 1; [2006] TASSC 52, Blow J (as he then was) at [43]
referred to and applied the comments in Report No 26 of the ALRC (1985), Vol 1 at [644]:
By risk of unfair prejudice is meant the danger that the fact-finder may use the evidence to
make a decision on an improper, perhaps emotional, basis, ie on a basis logically
unconnected with the issues in the case. Thus evidence that appeals to the fact-finder’s
sympathies, arouses a sense of horror, provokes an instinct to punish, or triggers other
204 [3.0.165]
mainsprings of human action may cause the fact-finder to base his decision on something
other than the established propositions in the case. Similarly, on hearing the evidence the
fact-finder may be satisfied with a lower degree of probability than would otherwise be
required.
In general, courts have given a restrictive interpretation to the words ‘probative value’:
see, for example, R v Carusi (1997) 92 A Crim R 52 at 66; R v Rahme [2004] NSWCCA 233;
R v Shamouil (2006) 66 NSWLR 228; [2006] NSWCCA 112; Irani v The Queen (2008) 188 A
Crim R 125; [2008] NSWCCA 217 at [25]. Spigelman CJ stated as follows in Shamouil:
The preponderant body of authority in this Court is in favour of a restrictive approach to
the circumstances in which issues of reliability and credibility are to be taken into account
in determining the probative value of evidence for purposes of determining questions of
admissibility. There is no reason to change that approach.
In my opinion, the critical word in this regard is the word could in the definition of
probative value as set out above, namely, ‘the extent to which the evidence could
rationally affect the assessment…’. The focus on capability draws attention to what it is
open for the tribunal of fact to conclude. It does not direct attention to what a tribunal of
fact is likely to conclude. Evidence has ‘probative value’, as defined, if it is capable of
supporting a verdict of guilty.
…
To adopt any other approach would be to usurp for a trial judge critical aspects of the
traditional role of a jury. In the case of evidence of critical significance, such a ruling by a
trial judge would, in substance, be equivalent to directing a verdict of acquittal on the
basis that the trial judge was of the view that a verdict of guilty would be unsafe and
unsatisfactory. As the High Court said in a different, but not irrelevant, context in Doney v
The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 207 at 215, this is not a permissible ‘basis for enlarging the
powers of a trial judge at the expense of the traditional jury function’. In my opinion, the
same is true if a trial judge can determine the weight of evidence when applying s 137.
This approach was ultimately accepted by the plurality of the High Court in IMM v The
Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14. The majority, comprising French CJ, Kiefel J (as
she then was), Bell and Keane JJ, held at [44] that the assessment of ‘the extent to which
the evidence could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a
fact in issue’ requires that the possible use to which the evidence might be put must be
taken at its highest. The plurality of the High Court confirmed the correctness of the
approach of the Court of Criminal Appeal in New South Wales in R v Shamouil (2006) 66
NSWLR 228; [2006] NSWCCA 112 and R v Sood [2007] NSWCCA 214, applied in Tasmania
in KMJ v Tasmania (2011) 20 Tas R 425; [2011] TASCCA 7. When assessing the probative
value of evidence for the purposes of s 137, a trial judge is obliged to proceed on the
assumption that the jury will accept the evidence. Issues of credibility and reliability are
irrelevant to the assessment. At [52], the majority in IMM stated:
Once it is understood that an assumption as to the jury’s acceptance of the evidence must
be made, it follows that no question as to credibility of the evidence, or the witness giving
it, can arise. For the same reason, no question as to the reliability of the evidence can arise.
If the jury are to be taken to accept the evidence, they will be taken to accept it completely
in proof of the facts stated. There can be no disaggregation of the two – reliability and
credibility …
(See too Donohue v Tasmania (2016) 262 A Crim R 63; [2016] TASCCA 17; Tasmania v Farhat
[2017] TASSC 66 at [37].)
[3.0.170] An important provision introduced by s 135 further provides that a court in both
the civil and criminal jurisdictions may refuse to admit evidence if:
… its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might:
(a) be unfairly prejudicial to a party; or
[3.0.170] 205
(b) be misleading or confusing; or

(c) cause or result in undue waste of time.
This will have major application in relation to expert evidence and is likely to lead to the
application in the civil law of principles previously confined to the criminal law.
The ALRC explained the provision thus (ALRC 26 (1985, Vol 1, para 643)):
The proposal changes the form but not the substance of the present law. An express
discretion is created under which the court must balance the advantages of admitting the
evidence against the disadvantages of doing so. The proposal, consistently with the
primary objective of admitting all relevant evidence, prevents exclusion of the evidence
unless the disadvantages substantially outweigh the advantages.
An issue that exists in the aftermath of the High Court’s decision in IMM v The Queen
(2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 is whether the consideration of ‘probative value’ for
the purposes of s 135 incorporates evaluation of reliability. The better view is that it does
not. It would be anomalous if ‘probative value’ incorporated reliability for the purposes of
s 135 but did not for the purposes of s 137.
Section 135 has particular application in trials before juries but enables broad-ranging
arguments in relation to the quality, as against the dangers, of expert evidence. Thus,
while evidence may no longer be excluded under Commonwealth, New South Wales,
Tasmanian, Victorian or Northern Territory law only because it touches upon a matter of
common knowledge (s 80) or because it contravenes the ultimate issue rule (s 80), it may
well be that these rules retain a residual life under the ss 135 and 137 discretions.
In R v DD 2000 SCC 43 at [36], McLachlin CJ, Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ held that
probative value is determined by considering the reliability, materiality and cogency of
expert testimony. While the relevance of reliability has not been accepted for Australia, it
may be that the materiality and cogency considerations retain some relevance for
Australia, on the basis that the importance of the evidence in the particular case, its
complexity and the degree of conflict surrounding it are pertinent.
In Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2007) 159 FCR 397;
[2007] FCAFC 70, the Full Court of the Federal Court observed (at [74]) that:
Section 135 calls for a balancing exercise. First it is necessary to consider the probative
value of the opinion evidence in question. Next it is necessary to assess the danger that the
evidence might cause or result in undue waste of time. Finally, the section requires
determination of whether the former substantially outweighs the latter.
The court suggested that there was a defect in the approach of the primary judge in that
he could not be identified (not having been pressed to do so by counsel: at [76]) as having
embarked on any assessment of the time that might have been taken by the disputed
evidence, much less of the time that might have been wasted by the disputed evidence.
In R v Richards (2001) 123 A Crim R 14; [2001] NSWCCA 160 at [39], it was pointed out
that ‘[t]he power vested by s 135 is to refuse to admit evidence when there is danger that
the evidence … might be unfairly prejudicial to a party’. Factors such as the absence of
clear identification of the bases to expert opinions may result in s 135(a) being applied to
exclude expert opinions: see, for example, Williams v Public Trustee of New South Wales
[2007] NSWSC 921 at [13]–[14]. It is likely in the wake of the passage of the uniform
evidence legislation that the focus of much argument concerning the admissibility of
expert evidence will shift from interpretation of the exclusionary rules of expert evidence
to an evaluation of the value of the evidence when compared with the dangers that its
admission will carry. In this way, the exclusionary rules will retain a relevance as indicia
for discretionary exclusion, assisting courts and tribunals to determine whether expert
evidence is capable of useful evaluation, whether it is unacceptably cumulative or
repetitive, whether it is reliable or deceptive, and whether it has been assembled and
presented in a way which is fair to all sides to the litigation.
206 [3.0.170]
Under s 135, there must be ‘substantial’ disproportion between ‘probative value’ and
‘danger’. The qualifying adjective has been held to invoke ‘an imprecise but understandable
qualification’: Hannes v Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) (No 2) (2006) 205 FLR 217; [2006]
NSWCCA 373 at [54]. Barr and Hall JJ observed in Hannes (at [314]–[315]) that:
The form of ss 135, 136 and 137 differs. Just as s 135 refers to the danger that the evidence
might be unfairly prejudicial, s 136 refers to the danger that a particular use of the
evidence might be unfairly prejudicial. That language is not repeated in s 137. This Court
has dealt with the operation of s 137 in R v Cook [2004] NSWCCA 52, in which Simpson J
(Ipp JA and Adams J agreeing) stated at [36]–[37]:
What s 137 called for was a consideration of the probative value of the evidence of
flight relative to its prejudicial effect to the extent that that could or would be unfair. …
The balancing exercising required by s 137 cannot, however, be undertaken without
an appreciation of any explanation an accused person might seek to advance in order
to nullify the adverse inferences that would, absent explanation, arise. … What the
appellant told the judge was that his explanation for his flight would necessarily
disclose to the jury a prior history of violence towards a female, disregard of the law
and contravention of restraining orders serious enough to warrant his incarceration.
There was no other way (on the appellant’s case) that he could remove the sting from
the flight evidence. But the explanation carried its own, serious, sting – disclosing his
history of violence and breach of the law. … The prejudicial effect of the explanation
was what s 137 required to be balanced against the probative value the Crown
evidence would otherwise have had.
In our view, that approach should be followed. There is no reason to read an implied
limitation into s 137, based on the different language adopted in the two preceding
sections, nor otherwise to limit it according to former general law principles. Care must, of
course, be taken in identifying unfair prejudice resulting from the practical consequences
for the accused of admitting the evidence.
Unreliable identification evidence

[3.0.175] Under s 116 of the uniform legislation, if ‘identification evidence’ has been
admitted, the judge is obliged to give a warning about the special need for caution before
accepting it and of the reasons for the caution. Under s 165, if there is a jury and a party so
requests, a judge must warn the jury if evidence may be unreliable (including
identification evidence (s 165(1)(b)) and inform the jury of matters that may cause it to be
unreliable, as well warn the jury of the need for caution in determining whether to accept
the evidence and the weight to be given to it (s 165(2)). This provision has been applied in
relation to voice identification undertaken by a police officer: see R v Camilleri (2001) 127 A
Crim R 290; [2001] NSWCCA 527 at [53]ff.
Meaning of words
[3.0.176] It appears likely that the common law (see [2.15.480]–[2.15.520]) in relation to the
admissibility of expert evidence as to the meaning of words persists under the uniform
evidence law: Shellharbour City Council v Minister for Planning (2011) 189 LGERA 348; [2011]
NSWCA 195.
Certificates of expert evidence

[3.0.180] Under s 177 of the uniform evidence legislation:
(1) Evidence of a person’s opinion may be adduced by tendering a certificate (expert
certificate) signed by the person that:
(a) states the person’s name and address; and
(b) states that the person has specialised knowledge based on his or her training,
study or experience, as specified in the certificate; and
[3.0.180] 207
(c) sets out an opinion that the person holds and that is expressed to be wholly or
substantially based on that knowledge.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply unless the party seeking to tender the expert
certificate has served on each other party:
(a) a copy of the certificate; and
(b) a written notice stating that the party proposes to tender the certificate as
evidence of the opinion.
(3) Service must be effected not later than:
(a) 21 days before the hearing; or
(b) if, on application by the party before or after service, the court substitutes a
different period – the beginning of that period.
(4) Service for the purposes of subsection (2) may be proved by affidavit.
(5) A party on whom the documents referred to in subsection (2) are served may, by
written notice served on the party proposing to tender the expert certificate, require the
party to call the person who signed the certificate to give evidence.
(6) The expert certificate is not admissible as evidence if such a requirement is made.
(7) The court may make such order with respect to costs as it considers just against a
party who has, without reasonable cause, required a party to call a person to give
evidence under this section.
208 [3.0.180]
Chapter 3.05
STATUTORY LAW IN NEW ZEALAND

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [3.05.01]
Background to the 2006 legislation .................................................................................... [3.05.10]
Admissibility of expert opinions ........................................................................................ [3.05.40]
Abolition of ultimate issue rule and common knowledge rule ................................... [3.05.50]
‘Discretionary’ exclusion ...................................................................................................... [3.05.70]
Admissibility decision-making ........................................................................................... [3.05.80]
Counterintuitive expert opinions ....................................................................................... [3.05.90]
Novel scientific evidence ..................................................................................................... [3.05.100]
Reliability ................................................................................................................................ [3.05.120]
Duties of expert witnesses ................................................................................................... [3.05.150]
‘An expert is someone who knows some of the worst
mistakes that can be made in his subject and who manages to
avoid them.’
Werner Heisenberg, ‘Der Tail und das Ganze’, 1969, Ch 17 (trans AJ
Poomerans as ‘Physics and Beyond’, 1971).
Introduction
[3.05.01] In New Zealand, the Evidence Act 2006 (NZ) governs the admissibility of expert
evidence (see Mahoney, McDonald and Optican (2014); McDonald (2012; 2018); Katz
(2018)). This short chapter refers to significant trial and appellate decisions that have
interpreted the relevant provisions and provided guidance as to the criteria by which the
admissibility of experts’ opinions is to be determined.
Background to the 2006 legislation

[3.05.10] The New Zealand Law Commission (NZLC) in its 1991 Preliminary Paper on
Evidence Law: Expert Evidence and Opinion Evidence recommended the retention of the
common law requirement that experts be qualified by demonstrating that they have
specialised knowledge or skill gained from study, training or experience. In its draft
legislation and commentary found in its 1999 Report on Evidence (NZLC (1999)), the NZLC
proposed in cl 4 that ‘expert’ should mean ‘a person with specialised knowledge or skill
based upon training, study or experience’. The NZLC stated (Vol 2, p 9):
[E]xpert evidence is evidence offered by a properly qualified expert that is within the
expert’s area of expertise. The court is required to consider both whether the witness has
the requisite knowledge and skill, and whether the proposed testimony is within the
witness’s competence.
The NZLC in its 1991 Preliminary Paper recommended against the codification of a
common knowledge rule and set out two options for reform: what it designated as the
‘Australian approach’, by which properly qualified expert opinion evidence is admitted,
subject to the general exclusionary power as a quality control; or the Federal Rules of
Evidence 1975 (US) approach, by which opinion evidence is admitted ‘which would help
the court’ to determine the facts in a proceeding.
In 1999, it defined ‘opinion evidence’ as ‘an opinion offered in evidence tending to
prove or disprove a fact’ (cl 4). It proposed in cl 23 that:
… a witness may offer expert evidence that is opinion evidence in a proceeding if that
opinion evidence is likely to substantially help the fact-finder to understand other
evidence in the proceeding or to ascertain any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the proceeding.
The NZLC recommended that opinion evidence not be inadmissible by reason only that it
is about a matter of common knowledge (cl 23(2)). It noted that the substantial helpfulness
test should continue to govern the admissibility of expert opinion evidence about child
[3.05.10] 209
and mentally disabled complainants in sexual assault cases, which was currently admitted
under the controversial s 23G of the Evidence Act 1908 (NZ). It commented (Vol 2, p 25)
that evidence about whether the complainant’s behaviour was consistent or inconsistent
with the behaviour of sexually abused children of the same group would generally satisfy
the substantial helpfulness test. However, it noted that it was desirable to retain an explicit
provision admitting the evidence in order to prevent arguments that a change in the law
was intended.
Similarly, it recommended against the codification of the ultimate issue rule, setting out
two options for reform along the same lines as with respect to the common law
knowledge rule. It recommended that opinion evidence not be inadmissible by reason
only that it is about an ultimate issue (cl 23(2)).
In its 1991 Preliminary Paper prior to the Daubert decision (Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993)), the NZLC recommended against the
inclusion of a Frye criterion (Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923)). However,
subsequent to the Preliminary Paper, the decisions of R v Calder (unreported, NZ High
Court, Tipping J, 12 April 1995) and R v Brown (unreported, NZ High Court, 19 September
1997) were handed down.
The NZLC in its 1999 report recommended (Vol 2, cl 23(1)):
Subject to section 25, a witness may offer expert evidence that is opinion evidence in a
proceeding if that opinion evidence is likely to substantially help the fact-finder to
understand other evidence in the proceeding or to ascertain any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the proceeding.
This was consistent with approaches already adopted under New Zealand common law in
R v Decha-Iamsakun [1993] 1 NZLR 141 at 147–148; Attorney-General v Equiticorp Industries
Group [1995] 2 NZLR 135 at 149–150.
The NZLC (1999, Vol 2, p 57) commented of the provision:
It functions as an additional safeguard, supplementing the qualification requirements and
will exclude even opinion evidence coming from a properly qualified expert, if it is
unsatisfactory for other reasons. Examples are where the evidence is based on an
underlying scientific theory whose validity has not been established; or where questions
about the reliability of the procedures and techniques used in a particular case have not
been satisfactorily answered.
It noted (1999, Vol 2, p 59) that the Daubert factors referred to in Calder and Brown would
‘continue to be important in the inquiry about reliability that is inherent in the substantial
helpfulness test’.
The NZLC recommended against the codification of a basis rule proposed under
cl 23(3) that:
[T]o the extent that expert evidence that opinion evidence is based on fact, the opinion
evidence may be relied on by the fact-finder only to the extent that the facts on which it is
based, other than facts pertaining to the general body of knowledge or skill comprising
the witness’s expertise, are or will be established in that proceeding by admissible
evidence or will be judicially noticed.
The NZLC commented (Vol 2, p 63) that the practical effect of the provision was intended
to be that if expert opinion evidence is offered with no evidence laying the factual
foundation for the opinion and counsel declines to undertake to the court that such
evidence will be offered later in her or his case, the judge can decline to admit the opinion
evidence. If the evidence of the underlying facts was offered, then the jury could be
directed that it must find those facts proved before it can rely on the expert’s opinion. The
NZLC’s intention was that the wording would not preclude expressions of opinion on, or
the formulation of, hypotheses or theories that do not depend on a factual basis for their
validity.
Clause 23(4) of the 1999 report provided that:
210 [3.05.10]
Statutory law in New Zealand | CH 3.05
If expert evidence that is opinion evidence is offered in relation to the sanity of a person,
evidence of any statement about that person’s state of mind made to the expert by that
person is admissible to establish the facts on which the expert’s opinion is based and
neither the hearsay rule nor the previous consistent statements rule applies to evidence of
any such statement.
The NZLC noted (Vol 2, p 24) that under the then existing New Zealand law, psychiatrists
testifying about the insanity or state of mind of a defendant in a criminal case could rely
on an out-of-court statement of the defendant in coming to their opinion: R v Smith [1989]
3 NZLR 405; R v McCarthy [1992] 2 NZLR 550. Under the proposals, such statements
would be admissible as hearsay if the defendant chooses not to testify. The provision
allowed a statement made to an expert about the person’s state of mind to establish the
basis of the expert’s opinions.
Admissibility of expert opinions

[3.05.40] The Evidence Act 2006 (NZ) largely implemented the NZLC’s proposals in respect
of an admissibility regime. All relevant evidence is prima facie admissible (see Evidence
Act 2006 (NZ), s 7; R v Gwaze [2010] 3 NZLR 734; [2010] NZSC 52). This, however, is
subject to other exclusionary rules.
Under s 4 of the Act, an ‘expert’ and ‘expert evidence’ are defined as follows:
expert means a person who has specialised knowledge or skill based on training, study, or
experience
expert evidence means the evidence of an expert based on the specialised knowledge or
skill of that expert and includes evidence given in the form of an opinion
Much therefore depends, as in the uniform evidence legislation in Australia, upon the
interpretation of ‘specialised knowledge’. It is likely that Australian law on the subject, set
out by the High Court in Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; [2014] HCA 29 at [23],
will be applied:
Specialised knowledge is knowledge which is outside that of persons who have not by
training, study or experience acquired an understanding of the subject matter. It may be of
matters that are not of a scientific or technical kind and a person without any formal
qualifications may acquire specialised knowledge by experience. However, the person’s
training, study or experience must result in the acquisition of knowledge. The Macquarie
Dictionary defines ‘knowledge’ as ‘acquaintance with facts, truths, or principles, as from
study or investigation’ (emphasis added) and it is in this sense that it is used in s 79(1).
The concept is captured in Blackmun J’s formulation in Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993): ‘the word “knowledge” connotes more
than subjective belief or unsupported speculation. … [It] applies to any body of known facts
or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.’
Under s 23, the ‘opinion rule’ is formulated as follows:

A statement of an opinion is not admissible in a proceeding, except as provided by
section 24 or 25.

A witness may state an opinion in evidence in a proceeding if that opinion is necessary to
enable the witness to communicate, or the fact-finder to understand, what the witness saw,
heard, or otherwise perceived.

An opinion by an expert that is part of expert evidence offered in a proceeding is
admissible if the fact-finder is likely to obtain substantial help from the opinion in
understanding other evidence in the proceeding or in ascertaining any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the proceeding.
[3.05.40] 211
Abolition of ultimate issue rule and common knowledge rule

[3.05.50] Section 25(2)–(5) of the Act provide that:
(2) An opinion by an expert is not inadmissible simply because it is about –
(a) an ultimate issue to be determined in the proceeding; or
(b) a matter of common knowledge.
(3) If an opinion by an expert is based on a fact that is outside the general body of
knowledge that makes up the expertise of the expert, the opinion may be relied
on by the fact-finder only if that fact is or will be proved or judicially noticed in
the proceeding.
(4) If expert evidence about the sanity of a person is based in whole or in part on a
statement that the person made to the expert about the person’s state of mind,
then –
(a) the statement of the person is admissible to establish the facts on which
the expert’s opinion is based; and
(b) neither the hearsay rule nor the previous consistent statements rule
applies to evidence of the statement made by the person.
(5) Subsection (3) is subject to subsection (4).
In Shepherd v The Queen [2012] 2 NZLR 606; [2011] NZCA 666 at [82]–[87], the Supreme
Court wrestled with the language that an expert is entitled to use in relation to similarities
in images between CCTV and other images. It noted that an opinion by an expert is not
inadmissible simply because it is about an ultimate issue to be determined but
commented: ‘There may be a risk of the jury placing disproportionate weight on the
evidence once a hierarchical scale is used, particularly if reference is made to a numerical
scale.’ On this basis, it considered it ‘prudent’ to avoid reference to a numerical scale of
likelihood but was prepared to permit evidence in terms of the level of similarity using
narrative descriptors rather than numbers: ‘This is to avoid any risk that the jury might
conclude there is some objective or mathematical element supporting the opinion
expressed’ (at [103]).
‘Discretionary’ exclusion
[3.05.70] The broad exclusionary provision of s 8 gives substantial latitude to judges
making admissibility decisions:
(1) In any proceeding, the Judge must exclude evidence if its probative value is
outweighed by the risk that the evidence will –
(a) have an unfairly prejudicial effect on the proceeding; or
(b) needlessly prolong the proceeding.
(2) In determining whether the probative value of evidence is outweighed by the risk
that the evidence will have an unfairly prejudicial effect on a criminal proceeding,
the Judge must take into account the right of the defendant to offer an effective
defence.
Importantly, therefore, the ‘discretionary’ obligation is mandatory if its preconditions are
satisfied.
Admissibility decision-making
[3.05.80] The substantial helpfulness criterion and the discretionary exclusionary
mechanism are the keys to admissibility decision-making in relation to expert opinion
evidence in New Zealand.
The key to the way in which the law relating to the interpretation of s 25 develops will
lie in the criteria that evolve in respect of when ‘substantial help’ should be provided (see,
eg, R v Gwaze [2010] 3 NZLR 734; [2010] NZSC 52 at [47]–[48]), this inevitably depending
upon the nature of the other evidence adduced in the proceeding.
212 [3.05.50]
In Shepherd v The Queen [2012] 2 NZLR 606; [2011] NZCA 666 at [4], the Court of
Appeal held that the s 4 definition of ‘expert’ was intended to be wide and flexible, not
requiring the possession of formal qualifications – training, study or experience may be
sufficient. Importantly, it accepted (at [37]) that the statutory criterion for admissibility by
reference to substantial helpfulness necessitates consideration of an amalgam of relevance,
reliability and probative value (see too R v Mahomed [2015] NZCA 419 at [35]).
The court noted (at [87]) that an opinion expressed by an expert is not inadmissible
because it is about an ultimate issue to be determined but there may be a risk of the jury
placing disproportionate weight on the evidence, particularly if reference is made to a
numerical scale.
Counterintuitive expert opinions

[3.05.90] The Evidence Act 2006 (NZ) repealed the controversial s 23G of the Evidence Act
1908 (NZ), in which specific permission was given for forms of expert evidence which
otherwise would probably have been inadmissible, in particular by offending against the
common knowledge rule. It applied to sexual offences and other specified offences (s 23C).
Section 23G provided that an expert may give evidence on the following matters:
(a) The intellectual attainment, mental capability, and emotional maturity of the
complainant, the witness’s assessment of the complainant being based on –
(i) Examination of the complainant before the complainant gives evidence;
or
(ii) Observations of the complainant giving evidence, whether directly or on
a videotape;
(b) The general development level of children of the same age group as the
complainant;
(c) The question whether any evidence given during the proceedings by any person
(other than the expert witness) relating to the complainant’s behaviour is from
the expert witness’s professional experience or from his or her knowledge of the
professional literature, consistent or inconsistent with the behaviour of sexually
abused children of the same age group as the complainant.
For the purposes of the section, an ‘expert’ was defined as a medical practitioner
registered as a psychiatric specialist, practising or having practised in the field of child
psychiatry and with experience in the professional treatment of sexually abused children;
or a registered psychologist practising or having practised in the field of child psychology
and with experience in the professional treatment of sexually abused children. The section
was held to ‘limit the expert to saying whether the behaviour is consistent or inconsistent
with that of abused children, and does not permit comment on the likelihood of abuse’: R
v S [1995] 3 NZLR 674 at 677. If an expert describes highly sexualised behaviour as
‘possibly highly suggestive of abuse’, the expert would be going too far: R v S [1995] 3
NZLR 674.
In R v Stewart (1991) 7 CRNZ 489 at 493, Casey J accepted that, under s 23G:
The behaviour of sexually abused children of the same age group [as the complainant] is
therefore a benchmark against which the complainant’s evidence is to be measured.
In R v O’Brien (1994) 12 CRNZ 237, the attempt was then made to call a psychologist who
had examined the accused to express the opinion that the accused’s personality profile
made it unlikely that he committed the alleged sex offences, and to say that, based on her
judgment, her professional experience, her reading of the literature, her reading of the
depositions and the court file, and her observations of the complainant at the trial, the
complainant wrongly ascribed to the accused another person’s conduct in abusing the
complainant. Her opinion rested on five propositions:
[3.05.90] 213
(1) that the therapist who attended K inadvertently reinforced a disclosure of events
that had not occurred;
(2) that K’s memory for events was suspect because she was traumatised by prior
abuse;
(3) that the new, close relationship into which the accused had entered produced a
grief reaction in K as a displaced person and thereby led her to make a false
allegation of abuse;
(4) that K created a new stressor in her family by means of falsely complaining
against the accused; and
(5) that by a process of disassociation K substituted unreality, that is that she was
abused by the accused, for reality, that is that she was abused by a previous
abuser.
It was held that the evidence by the psychologist was not admissible on the ground that it
did not fall within the compass of s 23G because it was not ‘age-related’ evidence. It was
found (at 244) that the evidence of the psychologist was, in effect, an attack on the
credibility and veracity of the complainant which ‘would be taking over the function of
the jury if the evidence was allowed to be adduced. Rather it is for the jury to assess the
credibility and the reliability’ of the complainant.
In M (CA23/2009) v The Queen [2011] NZCA 191, the Court of Appeal provided
guidance on the law subsequent to the repeal of s 23G. It was called upon to determine the
admissibility of expert evidence by a clinical psychologist, Dr Blackwell, concerning
behaviour by children who alleged they had been sexually abused. The psychologist, who
was called by the prosecution, gave evidence as to why such children might deny that
abuse has occurred even when directly asked about it, or delay reporting the abuse, and
also why children might continue to display love or affection for their abusers (at [13]).
The appeal was brought by M on the basis that such evidence had been wrongly admitted.
The court (applying what it had said in RA v The Queen [2010] NZCA 57) addressed the
differences between New Zealand law and Canadian law on the subject, distinguishing (at
[30]) the Canadian Supreme Court decision of R v DD 2000 SCC 43 in part on the basis
that in Canada the requirement for admissibility is ‘necessity’ while in New Zealand it is
the lesser requirement of ‘substantial helpfulness’.
It noted (at [25]) that the Law Commission had said (at [110]–[111]) that:
The purpose of such evidence is not diagnostic. Rather the purpose of such evidence is
educative: to impart specialized knowledge the jury might not otherwise have, in order to
help the jury understand the evidence of and about the complainant, and therefore be
better able to evaluate it.
Part of that purpose is to correct erroneous beliefs that juries might otherwise hold
intuitively. That is why such evidence is sometimes called ‘counter-intuitive evidence’: it is
offered to show that behavior a jury might think is inconsistent with claims of sexual
abuse is not or may not be so; that children who have been sexually abused have behaved
in ways similar to that described of the complainant; and that therefore the complainant’s
behavior neither proves nor disproves that he or she has been sexually abused. The purpose of
such evidence is to restore a complainant’s credibility from a debit balance because of jury
misapprehension, back to a zero or neutral balance.
The court noted that under s 126 of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZ), where it is suggested that
a complainant has failed to make a timely complaint about having been sexually abused,
the judge is entitled to explain to the jury that there can be good reasons for such a failure
and observed (at [26]) that ‘[t]he possibility of judicial comment does not obviate the
helpfulness for expert evidence as to the reasons for delay, however’. However, it stated
(at [32]) that where such evidence is permitted:
the judge must take care to instruct the jury as to the purpose for which the expert
evidence has been led and that the evidence says nothing about the credibility of the
particular complainant. This is because there may be a tendency for the jury to reason that:
214 [3.05.90]
• delayed reporting (for example) is common where children have been sexually abused;
• this is a case where there was delayed reporting by a child alleging sexual abuse;
• given that there was delayed reporting, the child must have been sexually abused.
The court considered that, in the circumstances of the case, there was a risk that some or
all members of the jury might have been under the misapprehension that if a person did
not report sexual abuse promptly or continued to express affection for the alleged abuser,
the abuse could not have occurred. Thus, it concluded that the prosecution was entitled to
dispel any such misconception by leading counterintuitive evidence. It considered that the
evidence thereby met the ‘substantial helpfulness test’ (at [38]). The court concluded that it
would have been better had the trial judge clearly identified the role of the expert
evidence, but concluded that in the circumstances there was no risk of a miscarriage of
justice and so dismissed the M appeal.
In the associated appeal, that relating to W, the same psychologist was called by the
prosecution in relation to grooming behaviours. The court rejected the challenge to the
admissibility of the expert evidence, finding that the evidence was relevant to the issues in
the case.
The same issue arose before the Supreme Court in DH v The Queen [2015] 1 NZLR 625;
[2015] NZSC 35 in respect of counterintuitive evidence given by the same psychologist,
Dr Blackwell, for the prosecution in a sexual assault trial (at [22]):
(a) delay in disclosure of sexual abuse, including:
(i) dead-end disclosures; and
(ii) reporting rates to police and other authorities;
(b) reasons for delayed reporting, including:
(i) a close relationship between child and perpetrator;
(ii) grooming and normalisation procedures;
(iii) perceived maternal support; and
(iv) other common reasons;
(c) retraction of allegations of sexual abuse;
(d) continuing contact between victims and perpetrators;
(e) the impact of sex education classes on disclosure of abuse; and
(f) the proximity of others during sexual offending.
Dr Blackwell said that she did not wish to discuss the statistics on false complaints
because ‘while it is certain that there are some false complaints, there is no mainstream
research literature specific to this area’ (at [23]).
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal that the evidence
given by the psychologist was substantially helpful. It noted that no objection was taken
in principle by the appellant to the admissibility of counterintuitive expert evidence. It
accepted that the evidence given by the witness was unduly long and commented (at
[100]) that such evidence should be kept as brief as possible to avoid the concern that a
jury will treat it as having a greater significance than it warrants. However, it found no
legal error in the evidence having been admitted. (See also OY v Complaints Hearing
Committee [2013] NZAR 629; [2013] NZCA 107.)
In a further decision delivered at the same time as DH v The Queen, Kohai v The Queen
[2015] 1 NZLR 833; [2015] NZSC 36, the Supreme Court dealt with expert psychological
evidence given by Dr Blackwell, who at trial addressed the following topics (at [14]):
(a) Delayed or non-reporting of sexual abuse: Dr Blackwell stated that a common
assumption was that a child or teenager who had been sexually abused either did
not report it or delayed reporting for many years. She referred to a study on the
behaviour of children whose sexual abuse was confirmed by the presence of
gonorrhoea, none of whom had reported their abuse prior to diagnosis.
[3.05.90] 215
(b) Incremental reporting of sexual abuse: research indicated that even if children
report sexual abuse, they often give an incomplete account of what happened. It
may take some time for the full account to emerge.
(c) Denial of sexual abuse: research indicates that some children who have been
sexually abused will deny it when asked about it directly, or minimise the extent
to which it has occurred.
(d) Dead end reporting: children sometimes tell a same-age friend or an adult about
sexual abuse against them, but the matter is not taken further at the time.
(e) Reasons for delayed reporting of sexual offending: Dr Blackwell identified a
number of reasons why children delay reporting sexual abuse, such as the abuser
being close to the child.
(f) Sexual offending while others are in close proximity: Dr Blackwell said that while
sexual abuse often occurs in secret, it also happens in close proximity to others.
(g) Continued contact with abusers: Dr Blackwell asserted that some children who
have suffered sexual abuse do not actively avoid contact with their abuser, or
have an adverse relationship with them. This is because sexual abuse is often
committed by someone to whom the child is emotionally attached or with whom
the child cannot avoid contact (such as a close relative or a family friend) or
because there is normalisation of the abuse by the offender and the child.
The Supreme Court accepted that Dr Blackwell’s evidence ‘could have been shorter, that
some (relatively minor) aspects of her evidence went beyond what might have been
strictly relevant to the circumstances’ of the particular case (at [52]), and that the
prosecutor should not have spoken of the appellant’s ‘taste for young girls’. However, it
found that the deficits had ‘little potential for any adverse effect’ and declined to rule that
the trial had been unfair, including on the basis of the expert evidence adduced.
A significant and distinctive body of appellate law has therefore evolved in New
Zealand in relation to counterintuitive evidence about the typical characteristics of child
sexual abuse (see Palmer (2016); Seymour et al (2014)). A sequence of decisions has
affirmed that such evidence has the potential to be ‘substantially helpful’ in assisting
informed evaluation by jurors of accounts given by complainants about assaults
perpetrated upon them by disabusing them of erroneous assumptions and reasoning
processes. In this regard, New Zealand has led the world in pioneering this means of
enhancing the quality of juror decision-making by determining it to be of assistance to
triers of fact.
Novel scientific evidence

[3.05.100] New Zealand has a small number of decisions which have addressed how trial
judges should receive and deal with new forms of scientific evidence on which the
prosecution seeks to rely in criminal matters.
In Shepherd v The Queen [2012] 2 NZLR 606; [2011] NZCA 666, for instance, the Court of
Appeal was required to rule on the admissibility of facial mapping evidence. It reviewed
Australian and English authority on the risks of such evidence and concluded (at [59]) that
there was no reason in principle why such evidence should not be admitted in appropriate
cases. It rejected the proposition that the absence of a database, which would give a means
of quantifying the statistical likelihood of a match between, for example, an image of an
offender captured on CCTV and a photograph of the accused, is a disqualifying factor. It
held such evidence not to be different in substance from circumstantial evidence about an
offender’s clothing or physical appearance, such evidence not positively identifying the
offender but, in conjunction with other evidence, tending to do so.
While the Court of Appeal found facial mapping evidence potentially admissible as
substantially helpful, it stated (at [62]) that it is important for the trial judge to give
directions to the jury regarding the use to which such evidence may be put. It commented
(at [106]) that:
216 [3.05.100]
It is especially important to make it clear to the jury that facial mapping evidence:
(a) Is circumstantial in nature;
(b) Is necessarily subjective in the absence of a database of the kind we have
described;
(c) Is not, by itself, capable of positively identifying the accused as the offender; but
(d) May, depending on the circumstances, be taken into account as tending to prove
identity.
It held (at [107]) that trial judges should also assist the jury by summarising the key
features of the expert’s evidence and any opposing evidence. The positive and any
negative factors affecting the probative value of the evidence should be canvassed. This
could relate, for example, to the clarity of the images and factors going to the authenticity,
integrity and reliability of any relevant aspects of the process by which the images were
collected, transmitted, processed and analysed.
The court also remarked on the desirability of soundly based protocols or guidelines in
relation to such evidence, given the growing use of CCTV (at [112]).
Reliability
[3.05.120] Recent New Zealand decisions have clarified that (by contrast with the position
in Australia) reliability is a consideration which the courts can take into account in
determining whether to receive scientific evidence.
In Lundy v The Queen [2014] 2 NZLR 273; [2013] UKPC 28, the Privy Council, on an
appeal from New Zealand, referred to the endorsement by the Supreme Court of Canada
in R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600; 2000 SCC 51 of the factors listed in Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993). The Privy Council commented (at
[139]) that ‘this list provides a useful template for the examination of the issue whether
evidence based on a novel technique … should be admissible’ (see too Lundy v The Queen
[2018] NZCA 410 at [37], [238]).
By 2018, in Lundy v The Queen [2018] NZCA 410; [2013] UKPC 28; [2014] 2 NZLR 273 at
[239], the Court of Appeal was emphatic about what constitutes ‘substantial help’ in such
a context:
We consider it is axiomatic that if the fact-finder is to be helped to ascertain facts, expert
opinion evidence must meet a threshold reliability. Otherwise the evidence will hinder,
and potentially mislead rather than help. So the majority of this Court was clearly right
when in the pre-trial appeal it identified that one purpose of what it called (with reference
to Daubert) the ‘superadded admissibility requirements’ is to protect the jury from ‘what is
sometimes colloquially called pseudo-science, meaning idiosyncratic and plainly
unsatisfactory theories’ (Lundy v The Queen [2014] 2 NZLR 273; [2013] UKPC 28 at [72]). It
contrasted this with the concept of ‘evidence from a reputable source which is robustly and
carefully researched and analysed’, and observed that the fact of disagreement among
scientific experts about the degree of reliability of evidence would not be in itself a reason for
withholding it from the jury, provided it is substantially helpful and not unfairly prejudicial.
The Court of Appeal commented (at [241]) that the Daubert considerations:
are clearly intended to reject a wider category of evidence than idiosyncratic and plainly
unsatisfactory theories. This is because in the scientific field whether a methodology is
satisfactory or unsatisfactory must depend ultimately on the response that is given to it by
the relevant scientific community. The essential work of validation must occur before the
courtroom is entered. That is why the Daubert considerations require testing of the
technique, peer review and publication, known or potential rate of error and whether the
theory of technique has been generally accepted. These considerations are not satisfied by
accepting novel science because it has come from an apparently reputable source … What
is required is a track record of acceptance by a body of scientific opinion. This will be
demonstrated when analysed in accordance with the Daubert considerations.
[3.05.120] 217
Duties of expert witnesses

[3.05.150] Section 26 of the Evidence Act 2006 (NZ) deals with the conduct of experts in
civil proceedings. It provides that:
(1) In a civil proceeding, experts are to conduct themselves in preparing and giving
expert evidence in accordance with the applicable rules of court relating to the
conduct of experts.
(2) The expert evidence of an expert who has not complied with rules of court of the
kind specified in subsection (1) may be given only with the permission of the
Judge.
New Zealand courts have clearly articulated expectations for the conduct of expert
witnesses and, for instance, by Schedule 4 of the High Court Rules 2016 (NZ):
Duty to the court
1. An expert witness has an overriding duty to assist the court impartially on
relevant matters within the expert’s area of expertise.
2. An expert witness is not an advocate for the party who engages the witness.
2A. If an expert witness is engaged under a conditional fee agreement, the expert
witness must disclose that fact to the court and the basis on which he or she will
be paid.
2B. In subclause 2A, conditional fee agreement has the same meaning as in
rule 14.2(3), except that the reference to legal professional services must be read
as if it were a reference to expert witness services.
Evidence of expert witness
3. In any evidence given by an expert witness, the expert witness must
(a) acknowledge that the expert witness has read this code of conduct and
agrees to comply with it:
(b) state the expert witness’ qualifications as an expert:
(c) state the issues the evidence of the expert witness addresses and that the
evidence is within the expert’s area of expertise:
(d) state the facts and assumptions on which the opinions of the expert
witness are based:
(e) state the reasons for the opinions given by the expert witness:
(f) specify any literature or other material used or relied on in support of
the opinions expressed by the expert witness:
(g) describe any examinations, tests, or other investigations on which the
expert witness has relied and identify, and give details of the
qualifications of, any person who carried them out.
4. If an expert witness believes that his or her evidence or any part of it may be
incomplete or inaccurate without some qualification, that qualification must be
stated in his or her evidence.
5. If an expert witness believes that his or her opinion is not a concluded opinion
because of insufficient research or data or for any other reason, this must be
stated in his or her evidence.
Duty to confer
6. An expert witness must comply with any direction of the court to
(a) confer with another expert witness:
(b) try to reach agreement with the other expert witness on matters within
the field of expertise of the expert witnesses:
(c) prepare and sign a joint witness statement stating the matters on which
the expert witnesses agree and the matters on which they do not agree,
including the reasons for their disagreement.
218 [3.05.150]
7. In conferring with another expert witness, the expert witness must exercise
independent and professional judgment, and must not act on the instructions or
directions of any person to withhold or avoid agreement.
[3.05.150] 219
Chapter 3.10
STATUTORY LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [3.10.01]
Statutory law in the United States ..................................................................................... [3.10.02]
Lay opinion evidence ........................................................................................................... [3.10.10]
Expert evidence ..................................................................................................................... [3.10.20]
Bases of expert opinion testimony ..................................................................................... [3.10.30]
Expert opinions on an ultimate issue ................................................................................ [3.10.40]
Disclosure of facts and data underlying expert opinions .............................................. [3.10.50]
Court-appointed experts ...................................................................................................... [3.10.60]
Discretionary exclusion of evidence .................................................................................. [3.10.70]
‘If the world should blow itself up, the last audible voice
would be that of an expert saying it can’t be done.’
Peter Ustinov (1921–2004).
Introduction
[3.10.01] This chapter outlines in summary form the statutory law applying to the
admissibility of expert evidence in the United States. Other chapters in this work deal
with specific subjects, such as the role of Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 509 US 579;
113 S Ct 2786; 43 s 3d 1311 (1993) (see too Farrell (1994); Bernstein (1994); Solomon and
Hackett (1996); Goodman-Delahunty (1997); Edmond and Mercer (1997); Roberts and
Stockdale (2018)) and Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923) (see too Giannelli
(1980); Starrs (1982; 1986); Weiss, Watson and Xuan (2014); Lepore (2015)).
Statutory law in the United States

[3.10.02] The United States Federal Rules of Evidence, which came into force in 1975,
prescribe the circumstances in which expert opinion evidence is admissible.
Lay opinion evidence
[3.10.10] Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (US) deals with the limited circumstances
in which lay witnesses can give evidence in the form of opinions:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to
one that is:
(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact
in issue; and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope
of Rule 702.
Expert evidence
[3.10.20] Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (US) is the fundamental rule which
determines the admissibility of expert evidence in federal courts in the United States. It
prescribes an ‘assistance’ prerequisite for the admissibility of expert evidence. It defines
the permitted provenances of expertise broadly: knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education:
[3.10.20] 221
Importantly, in response to Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 509 US 579; 113 S Ct

2786; 43 s 3d 1311 (1993), General Electric Co v Joiner 522 US 136, 118 S Ct 512 (1997) and
Kumho Tire Co Ltd v Carmichael 526 US 137; 119 S Ct 1167 (1999), r 702 was amended to
incorporate stringent preconditions in terms of the bases of expert testimony and also
reliability of principles, methods and application to facts. The Advisory Committee on the
Rules has noted that:
Courts both before and after have found other factors relevant in determining whether
expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact. These factors
include:
(1) Whether experts are ‘proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and
directly out of research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or
whether they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying.’
Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 43 F 3d 1311 (9th Cir 1995).
(2) Whether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an accepted premise to an
unfounded conclusion. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (noting
that in some cases a trial court ‘may conclude that there is simply too great an
analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered’).
(3) Whether the expert has adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations.
See Claar v. Burlington N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994) (testimony excluded where
the expert failed to consider other obvious causes for the plaintiff’s condition).
Compare Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C.Cir. 1996) (the possibility of some
uneliminated causes presents a question of weight, so long as the most obvious
causes have been considered and reasonably ruled out by the expert).
(4) Whether the expert ‘is being as careful as he would be in his regular professional
work outside his paid litigation consulting.’ Sheehan v. Daily Racing Form, Inc., 104
F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1997). See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1176
(1999) ( requires the trial court to assure itself that the expert ‘employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an
expert in the relevant field’).
(5) Whether the field of expertise claimed by the expert is known to reach reliable results
for the type of opinion the expert would give. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119
S.Ct. 1167, 1175 (1999) ( general acceptance factor does not ‘help show that an
expert’s testimony is reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for
example, do theories grounded in any so-called generally accepted principles of
astrology or necromancy.’); Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 151 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998)
(en banc) (clinical doctor was properly precluded from testifying to the toxicological
cause of the plaintiff’s respiratory problem, where the opinion was not sufficiently
grounded in scientific methodology); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188
(6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting testimony based on ‘clinical ecology’ as unfounded and
unreliable).
All of these factors remain relevant to the determination of the reliability of expert
testimony under the Rule as amended. Other factors may also be relevant. See Kumho, 119
S.Ct. 1167, 1176 (‘[W]e conclude that the trial judge must have considerable leeway in
deciding in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular expert
testimony is reliable.’). Yet no single factor is necessarily dispositive of the reliability of a
particular expert’s testimony.
(See https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_702 (viewed 1 September 2019).)

Bernstein and Lasker (2015, p 7) have argued: ‘Although many courts have faithfully
applied amended Rule 702, the same divisions that existed in the courts prior to 2000
continue to exist today.’ They have argued that courts have increasingly allowed experts
to cherry-pick studies (p 35) and have argued (p 44) in favour of reform to the wording of
the rule so that it reads:
222 [3.10.20]
Statutory law in the United States | CH 3.10

education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the testimony satisfies each
of the following requirements:
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data that reliably support the expert’s
opinion;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable and objectively reasonable principles and
methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case
and reached his conclusions without resort to unsupported speculation.
Bases of expert opinion testimony

[3.10.30] Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (US) allows a broad range of bases for
expert opinion testimony and provides latitude in relation to the admissibility of the
bases:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made
aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on
those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be
admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be
inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their
probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect.
Expert opinions on an ultimate issue

[3.10.40] The ultimate issue rule has been subject to sustained academic attack in the
United States. Wigmore (1904, p 2557), for instance, described the rule as ‘simply one of
those impossible and misconceived utterances which lack any justification in principle’
and its justification as avoiding usurpation of the function of the jury as a ‘mere bit of
empty rhetoric’ (1904, p 2556). Morgan (1962, p 218) termed it ‘sheer nonsense’, and
McCormick (1984, p 26) maintained it to be ‘unduly restrictive’ and ‘pregnant with close
questions of application’, ‘often unfairly obstruct[ing] the party’s presentation of his case’.
(See, too, Goldstein (1989).)
However, the rule has been resuscitated by r 704(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence (US)
in relation to expert evidence as to mental state in criminal cases:
(a) In General – Not Automatically Objectionable. An opinion is not objectionable
just because it embraces an ultimate issue.
(b) Exception. In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about
whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that
constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for
the trier of fact alone.
Disclosure of facts and data underlying expert opinions

[3.10.50] Rule 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (US) permits expert testimony without
initial revelation to the bases of the testimony, subject to court order to the contrary:
Unless the court orders otherwise, an expert may state an opinion – and give the reasons
for it – without first testifying to the underlying facts or data. But the expert may be
required to disclose those facts or data on cross-examination.
Court-appointed experts
[3.10.60] Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (US) establishes processes for the
appointment and payment of court experts:
[3.10.60] 223
(a) Appointment Process. On a party’s motion or on its own, the court may order
the parties to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed and may
ask the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert that the
parties agree on and any of its own choosing. But the court may only appoint
someone who consents to act.
(b) Expert’s Role. The court must inform the expert of the expert’s duties. The court
may do so in writing and have a copy filed with the clerk or may do so orally at
a conference in which the parties have an opportunity to participate. The expert:
(1) must advise the parties of any findings the expert makes;
(2) may be deposed by any party;
(3) may be called to testify by the court or any party; and
(4) may be cross-examined by any party, including the party that called the
expert.
(c) Compensation. The expert is entitled to a reasonable compensation, as set by the
court. The compensation is payable as follows:
(1) in a criminal case or in a civil case involving just compensation under
the Fifth Amendment, from any funds that are provided by law; and
(2) in any other civil case, by the parties in the proportion and at the time
that the court directs – and the compensation is then charged like other
costs.
(d) Disclosing the Appointment to the Jury. The court may authorize disclosure to
the jury that the court appointed the expert.
(e) Parties’ Choice of Their Own Experts. This rule does not limit a party in calling
its own experts.
Discretionary exclusion of evidence

[3.10.70] Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (US) identifies the considerations which
can lead a trial judge to exclude evidence, including expert opinion evidence, on the basis
of its prejudicial effect:
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.
‘Unfair prejudice’ within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.
224 [3.10.70]
Chapter 3.15
LAW REFORM PROPOSALS

International law reform proposals ................................................................................... [3.15.01]
Lord Woolf’s 1996 reform proposals .................................................................................. [3.15.05]
Evolving admissibility issues in criminal matters .......................................................... [3.15.10]
The 2011 Law Commission of England and Wales recommendations ....................... [3.15.50]
The Law Reform Commission of Ireland recommendations ........................................ [3.15.150]
Singapore Academy of Law, Law Reform Committee recommendations .................. [3.15.200]
‘I know of no method to secure the repeal of bad or
obnoxious laws so effective as their stringent execution.’
Ulysses S Grant, Inaugural Address (4 March 1869).
‘Lawyers do not take law reform seriously – there is no reason

why they should. They think the law exists as the atmosphere
exists, and the notion that it could be improved is too
startling to entertain.’
Lord Goodman, Sydney Morning Herald (17 July 1982), p 38.
International law reform proposals
[3.15.01] There has been an ongoing sequence of law reform endeavours in relation to
expert evidence since the 1980s. These have included publications by:
• the Australian Law Reform Commission (1985; 1987);
• Lord Woolf in the United Kingdom (1996);
• the New Zealand Law Commission (1999);
• the Family Court of Australia (2004);
• the Australian, New South Wales and Victorian Law Reform Commissions (2006);
• the Law Reform Commission of Ireland (2008);
• the South African Law Reform Commission (2008);
• the Law Reform Committee of the Singapore Academy of Law (2011); (Wong (2014))
and
• the Law Commission of England and Wales (2011).
The issues canvassed have been (and continue to be) admissibility criteria, especially in
relation to the role of reliability and the bases of expert evidence, disclosure of reports,
experts’ ethics, the appropriateness of single and court-appointed experts, and procedures
in respect of pre-trial conferencing of experts and the giving of evidence concurrently. This
chapter summarises the controversies and proposals.
Lord Woolf's 1996 reform proposals

[3.15.05] In 1996 Lord Woolf’s Access to Justice Report set in train reconceptualisation of the
way in which judges should exercise responsibility for procedures employed in civil
litigation and for how expert evidence should be adduced. Lord Woolf contended (at 13.7)
that:
The purpose of the adversarial system is to achieve just results. All too often it is used by
one party or the other to achieve something which is inconsistent with justice by taking
advantage of the other side’s lack of resources or ignorance of relevant facts or opinions.
Expert evidence is one of the principal weapons used by litigators who adopt this
approach. The present system allows them to withhold from their opponents material
which may be damaging to their own case or advantageous to their opponents’. This
practice of non-disclosure cannot be justified, because it inevitably leads to unnecessary
cost and delay, and in some cases to an unfair result.
[3.15.05] 225
The premise of his approach was that the expert’s function is to assist the court: ‘There
should be no expert evidence at all unless it will help the court, and no more than one
expert in any one speciality unless this is necessary for some real purpose’ (13.11). He
advanced recommendations in relation to the default use of single experts (13.17),
articulation of clear responsibilities of experts toward the court, rather than parties to
litigation (13.29), transparency in the giving of instructions to experts (13.33), mandatory
declarations by experts that their reports have included everything they consider relevant
(13.34), procedures for experts’ meetings (or conclaves) to narrow issues in dispute (13.42),
strategies for improving the quality of expert reports (13.52), and greater use of expert
assessors (13.58).
Lord Woolf’s recommendations have for the most part been implemented in the United
Kingdom. The recommendations, and the thinking lying behind them, have been very
influential in other countries, including in Australia and New Zealand.
Evolving admissibility issues in criminal matters

[3.15.10] A series of decisions in United Kingdom courts over two decades about a series of
medical and scientific issues has prompted concern as to whether the rules and
procedures applicable in criminal matters in relation to the reception of expert evidence
are sufficiently stringent, and, if not, what needs to be done to reduce the potential for
miscarriages of justice – in terms of both innocent people being found guilty, and charges
not being proved against guilty accused persons. This has included the following
controversial decisions:
• R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161 (voice identification);
• R v Clark [2003] 2 FCR(UK) 447; [2003] EWCA Crim 1020 (paediatric evidence about
SIDS);
• R v Dallagher [2003] 1 Cr App R 12; [2002] EWCA Crim 1903 (earprint analysis);
• R v Gray [2003] EWCA Crim 1001 and R v Atkins [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 (facial
mapping);
• R v Cannings [2004] 1 All ER 725; [2004] EWCA Crim 1 (pathologist evidence about
SIDS);
• R v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31; [2004] EWCA Crim R 1344 (lip-reading);
• R v Reed and another; R v Garmson [2010] 1 Cr App R 23; [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 and
Otway v The Queen [2011] EWCA Crim 3 (gait analysis);
• R v Harris [2006] 1 Cr App R 5; [2005] EWCA Crim 1980 (shaken baby syndrome); and
• T v The Queen [2010] EWCA Crim 2439 (forensic statistics).
The United Kingdom has not followed the United States approaches of Frye v United States
293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923) and Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S
Ct 2786 (1993), which has meant that its criteria for admissibility have become at odds
with those utilised in the United States and also in Canada (see R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9;
(1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402; R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600; 2000 SCC 51; R v Violette (2008) BCSC
920). In general, the approach to admissibility at common law in England, Wales and
Ireland has been significantly more liberal than in jurisdictions that have specified
reliability criteria or indicia relevant to admissibility.
In 2011, the issues were canvassed at length by the Law Commission’s report Expert
Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales, which advanced detailed proposals
for change.
In 2008, the Law Reform Commission of Ireland also issued a consultation paper on
Expert Evidence.
226 [3.15.10]
Law reform proposals | CH 3.15
The 2011 Law Commission of England and Wales recommendations

[3.15.50] The Law Commission noted the observation in R (Doughty) v Ely Magistrates’
Court [2008] EWHC 522 (Admin) at [24] that ‘[w]hether the claimant is a good expert or
not is neither here nor there. The quality of his report is neither here nor there … These
matters are not a sufficient basis for having ruled the claimant to be simply not competent
to give expert evidence at all’. It concluded that there was uncertainty as to the role of
‘reliability’ in admissibility determinations and observed (at 2.17) that:
The first limb of the common law admissibility test (‘the Turner test’) ensures that expert
evidence is admitted only when it has sufficient probative value, in the sense that the
evidence is likely to help the court resolve a disputed issue. The purpose of the other
limbs is to ensure that such expert evidence is admitted in criminal proceedings only
when it satisfies a minimum threshold of general reliability, what might be called
‘reliability in the round’.
It expressed the view that there should be ‘greater scrutiny of expert evidence at the
admissibility stage more generally, and the parties and judiciary should be provided with
the information they need to challenge and assess the trustworthiness of such evidence
(and the individuals called to provide it) before it is placed before a jury in a criminal trial’
(at 1.27). It espoused the opinion that a more enquiring approach to expert evidence in the
criminal courts would be likely to encourage higher standards among expert witnesses
and the wider expert communities, in turn resulting in expert evidence of higher quality
being tendered for admission in all criminal proceedings and therefore reducing the risk
that unreliable evidence will be placed before juries (at 1.28).
The Commission recommended (at 9.1) a statutory admissibility test that an expert’s
opinion evidence should only be admissible in criminal proceedings if it is ‘sufficiently
reliable to be admitted’ (the ‘reliability test’). To this extent, the recommendations
constitute a significant move away from the laissez-faire United Kingdom approach
toward preconditions to admissibility that are more aligned with contemporary scientific
values and methodology. This too is the United States and Canadian approach.
The Commission proposed (at 9.2) that if there is any doubt on the matter, expert
evidence presented as evidence of fact should be treated as expert opinion evidence.
It suggested (at 9.3) that trial judges should be provided with a single list of generic
factors to help them apply the reliability test and that these factors should be set out in the
primary legislation containing the test.
The Commission advocated flexibility, suggesting (at 9.4) that trial judges should be
directed to take into consideration the factors which are relevant to the expert opinion
evidence under consideration and any other factors they consider relevant.
It proposed (at 9.5) that criminal courts should have a limited power to disapply the
reliability test so as to avoid its being applied routinely and unnecessarily, but that the
power to disapply should not be such that the reliability test becomes only a nominal
barrier to the adducing of unreliable expert opinion evidence.
So as to clarify the onus, where reliability of expert evidence is unclear, it proposed (at
9.6) that where the test is applied, the party wishing to adduce the expert opinion
evidence should bear the burden of demonstrating that it is sufficiently reliable to be
admitted. It proposed that primary legislation (at 9.8) should provide that expert evidence
is admissible in criminal proceedings only if the court is likely to require the help of an
expert witness, and it is proved on the balance of probabilities that the individual claiming
expertise is qualified to give such evidence. The commission also recommended (at 9.9)
that this legislation should provide that expert evidence is inadmissible ‘if there is a
significant risk that the expert has not complied with, or will not comply with, his or her
duty to provide objective and unbiased evidence, unless the court is nevertheless satisfied
[3.15.50] 227
that it is in the interests of justice to admit the evidence’. This approach proposes to
achieve a measure of synchronicity between procedures relating to civil and criminal
litigation in the United Kingdom.
The Commission proposed (at 9.10) amendment to the Criminal Procedure Rules to
include the following additional requirements:
(1) before giving oral evidence, an expert witness should be referred to his or her
overriding duty to give expert evidence which is
(a) objective and unbiased, and
(b) within his or her area (or areas) of expertise;
(2) the trial judge or magistrates’ court should rule on the expert witness’s area (or
areas) of expertise before he or she gives evidence and monitor the position to
ensure that he or she does not give expert evidence on other matters.
The Commission recommended (at 9.11) for criminal proceedings:

(1) a statutory provision in primary legislation which would provide that expert
opinion evidence is admissible only if it is sufficiently reliable to be admitted;
(2) a provision which would provide our core test that expert opinion evidence is
sufficiently reliable to be admitted if –
(a) the opinion is soundly based, and
(b) the strength of the opinion is warranted having regard to the grounds on
which it is based;
(3) a provision which would set out the following key (higher-order) examples of
reasons why an expert’s opinion evidence is not sufficiently reliable to be
admitted:
(a) the opinion is based on a hypothesis which has not been subjected to
sufficient scrutiny (including, where appropriate, experimental or other
testing), or which has failed to stand up to scrutiny;
(b) the opinion is based on an unjustifiable assumption;
(c) the opinion is based on flawed data;
(d) the opinion relies on an examination, technique, method or process
which was not properly carried out or applied, or was not appropriate
for use in the particular case;
(e) the opinion relies on an inference or conclusion which has not been
properly reached;
(4) a provision which would direct the trial judge to consider, where relevant, more
specific (lower-order) factors in a Schedule to the Act and to any unspecified
matters which appear to be relevant.
The mixing of ‘reliability’ and a sound basis for an opinion is somewhat problematic. In
addition, the notion of opinions that have ‘stood up to scrutiny’ is imprecise and
unhelpful, by contrast with the clearer formulation of the Daubert indicia. In addition, the
yardstick of an opinion relying on an inference of conclusion that has not been properly
reached, while an attempt to engage with flawed reasoning processes is circular and
unhelpful.
The Law Commission proposed (at 9.12) that a trial judge who has to determine
whether an expert’s opinion evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted should be
directed to have regard to:
(1) the following factors (insofar as they appear to be relevant):
(a) the extent and quality of the data on which the expert’s opinion is based,
and the validity of the methods by which they were obtained;
228 [3.15.50]
(b) if the expert’s opinion relies on an inference from any findings, whether
the opinion properly explains how safe or unsafe the inference is
(whether by reference to statistical significance or in other appropriate
terms);
(c) if the expert’s opinion relies on the results of the use of any method (for
instance, a test, measurement or survey), whether the opinion takes
proper account of matters, such as the degree of precision or margin of
uncertainty, affecting the accuracy or reliability of those results;
(d) the extent to which any material upon which the expert’s opinion is
based has been reviewed by others with relevant expertise (for instance,
in peer-reviewed publications), and the views of those others on that
material;
(e) the extent to which the expert’s opinion is based on material falling
outside the expert’s own field of expertise;
(f) the completeness of the information which was available to the expert,
and whether the expert took account of all relevant information in
arriving at the opinion (including information as to the context of any
facts to which the opinion relates);
(g) whether there is a range of expert opinion on the matter in question;
and, if there is, where in the range the expert’s opinion lies and whether
the expert’s preference for the opinion proffered has been properly
explained;
(h) whether the expert’s methods followed established practice in the field;
and, if they did not, whether the reason for the divergence has been
properly explained;
(2) approved factors, if any, for assessing the reliability of the particular type of
expert evidence in question (insofar as they appear to be relevant); and
(3) any other factors which appear to be relevant.
For criminal proceedings, the Commission contended (at 9.13) that:

(1) there should be a presumption that expert opinion evidence tendered for
admission is sufficiently reliable to be admitted, but this presumption would not
apply if:
(a) it appears to the court, following a reasoned challenge, that the evidence
might not be sufficiently reliable to be admitted, or
(b) the court independently rules that the presumption should not apply;
(2) if the presumption no longer applies, the court should direct that there be a
hearing to resolve the question of evidentiary reliability, unless the question can
be properly resolved without a hearing; and
(3) for Crown Court jury trials, the reliability hearing should ordinarily take place
before the jury is sworn, but, exceptionally, it should be possible to hold a hearing
during the trial in the absence of the jury.
The Commission proposed (at 9.14) enhanced capacity to appeal expert admissibility
decisions so that the trial judge’s ruling under the reliability test should be approached by
the appellate court as the exercise of a legal judgment rather than the exercise of a judicial
discretion. This proposal appears to be a ‘quid pro quo’ – the admissibility criteria are
strengthened but appeals are made easier. Whether prescribing an admissibility decision
not be discretionary is appropriate or will make a real difference is dubious.
The Commission recommended (at 9.15) that a Crown Court judge (for a trial on
indictment) should be provided with a statutory power to appoint an independent expert
to assist him or her when determining whether a party’s proffered expert opinion
evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted, permitting a Crown Court judge to appoint
an independent expert only if he or she is satisfied that it would be in the interests of
justice to make an appointment, having regard to:
[3.15.50] 229
(a) the likely importance of the expert opinion evidence in the context of the case as
a whole;
(b) the complexity of that evidence, or the complexity of the question of its reliability;
and
(c) any other relevant considerations.
It argued (at 9.16) that the judge should make his or her appointment from a shortlist of
individuals prepared by an independent panel of legal practitioners, chaired by a Circuit
Judge, reflecting the interests of both the prosecution and the defence. Such a reform
would be a significant incursion upon the traditional balance in the criminal trial in which
the prosecution calls evidence and the accused selects its own experts. Such a provision
would probably be rarely used; whether it is worthwhile is questionable.
The Commission advanced recommendations (at 9.17) to bridge the gap between
requirements for experts in civil and criminal trials, including that Pt 33 of the Criminal
Procedure Rules be amended to incorporate:
(1) a rule requiring an appendix to the expert’s report, setting out –
(a) sufficient information to show that the expertise and impartiality
requirements are satisfied; and
(b) a focused explanation of the reliability of the opinion evidence with
reference to the test and relevant examples and factors in our draft Bill,
concisely set out in a manner which would be readily understood by a
trial judge, along with a summary of:
(i) other cases (if any) where the expert’s opinion evidence has
been ruled admissible or inadmissible after due enquiry under
the reliability test; and
(ii) other judicial rulings after due enquiry which the expert is
aware of (if any) on matters underlying the expert’s opinion
evidence;
(2) a rule requiring an expert’s report to include –
(a) a statement explaining the extent to which the expert witness’s opinion
evidence is based on information falling outside his or her own field of
expertise and/or on the opinions of other (named) experts;
(b) a schedule identifying the foundation material underpinning the expert
witness’s inferences and conclusions; and
(c) a rule that where an expert witness is called by a party to give a
reasoned opinion on the likelihood of an item of evidence under a
proposition advanced by that party, the expert’s report must also
include, where feasible, a reasoned opinion on the likelihood of the item
of evidence under one or more alternative propositions (including any
proposition advanced by the opposing party);
(3) an extension of rule 33.4(2) of the Criminal Procedure Rules so that, if a party
seeking to adduce expert evidence does not comply with the above requirements,
the evidence would be inadmissible unless all the parties agree that it should be
admitted or the court gives leave for it to be admitted.
This proposal constitutes a constructive alignment of experts’ responsibilities between

civil and criminal litigation.
The Commission recommended (at 9.19) that the Criminal Procedure Rules should
require pre-trial disclosure by the parties of the following matters to the other parties and
to the court:
(1) information relevant to the application of the expertise and impartiality tests;
(2) if requested, information relevant to the application of the reliability test
(including, in particular, the evidence underpinning the expert’s opinion); and
230 [3.15.50]
(3) information which could substantially undermine the credibility of the experts
being relied on.
It also recommended (at 9.20), in line with the current position under r 33.4(2) of the
Criminal Procedure Rules 2010, that a party’s failure to comply with the requirements of
subr (1) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2010 or with a request for disclosure under subr (2)
of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2010 should render that party’s expert evidence
inadmissible, unless the judge gives leave (or all the parties agree that the evidence should
be admitted).
The Commission recommended (at 9.21) that:
(1) Part 33 of the Criminal Procedure Rules be amended to make explicit provision for
a judge-led meeting of the parties’ legal representatives and experts if there is a
dispute on the expert issues and the judge believes that such a meeting would be
beneficial in resolving or reducing the dispute; and
(2) this power be supported by a provision similar to that now set out in rule 33.6(4)
of the Rules.
Finally, it proposed (at 9.22) that the Criminal Procedure Rules should provide that, for trials
on indictment (before a judge and jury), if the judge determines at the end of the trial that
the prosecution case depends wholly or substantially on disputed expert opinion
evidence, the judge should consider whether to provide the jury with a cautionary
warning in relation to that evidence; and if a cautionary warning is thought to be
appropriate, provide the jury with an appropriate warning tailored to the facts of the case.
The proposals of the Law Commission were substantially implemented by changes to
Part 19 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2010 and the Criminal Practice Directions. (See
Roberts and Stockdale (2018).)
Rule 19.2 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2010 prescribes the expert’s obligation to help
the court to achieve the overriding objective by giving opinions which are unbiased,
within the expert’s area or areas of expertise and actively assisting the court in fulfilling its
case management obligations. Rule 19.3 prescribes that an expert’s report must –
(a) give details of the expert’s qualifications, relevant experience and accreditation;
(b) give details of any literature or other information which the expert has relied on
in making the report;
(c) contain a statement setting out the substance of all facts given to the expert which
are material to the opinions expressed in the report, or upon which those
opinions are based;
(d) make clear which of the facts stated in the report are within the expert’s own
knowledge;
(e) where the expert has based an opinion or inference on a representation of fact or
opinion made by another person for the purposes of criminal proceedings (for
example, as to the outcome of an examination, measurement, test or experiment)
–
(i) identify the person who made that representation to the expert,
(ii) give the qualifications, relevant experience and any accreditation of that
person, and
(iii) certify that that person had personal knowledge of the matters stated in
that representation;
(f) where there is a range of opinion on the matters dealt with in the report –
(i) summarise the range of opinion, and
(ii) give reasons for the expert’s own opinion;
(g) if the expert is not able to give an opinion without qualification, state the
qualification;
[3.15.50] 231
(h) include such information as the court may need to decide whether the expert’s
opinion is sufficiently reliable to be admissible as evidence;
(i) contain a summary of the conclusions reached;
(j) contain a statement that the expert understands an expert’s duty to the court, and
has complied and will continue to comply with that duty; and
(k) contain the same declaration of truth as a witness statement.
Rule 19.6 explicitly permits a court to direct experts to discuss issues in the proceedings
and prepare a statement for the court on the matters upon which they agree and disagree.
Rule 19.7 also permits a court to direct that evidence be given by a single expert.
Part 19A of the Criminal Practice Directions notes that factors which the court may take
into account in determining the reliability of expert opinion, and especially of expert
scientific opinion, include:
(a) the extent and quality of the data on which the expert’s opinion is based, and the
validity of the methods by which they were obtained;
(b) if the expert’s opinion relies on an inference from any findings, whether the
opinion properly explains how safe or unsafe the inference is (whether by
reference to statistical significance or in other appropriate terms);
(c) if the expert’s opinion relies on the results of the use of any method (for instance,
a test, measurement or survey), whether the opinion takes proper account of
matters, such as the degree of precision or margin of uncertainty, affecting the
accuracy or reliability of those results;
(d) the extent to which any material upon which the expert’s opinion is based has
been reviewed by others with relevant expertise (for instance, in peer-reviewed
publications), and the views of those others on that material;
(e) the extent to which the expert’s opinion is based on material falling outside the
expert’s own field of expertise;
(f) the completeness of the information which was available to the expert, and
whether the expert took account of all relevant information in arriving at the
opinion (including information as to the context of any facts to which the opinion
relates);
(g) if there is a range of expert opinion on the matter in question, where in the range
the expert’s own opinion lies and whether the expert’s preference has been
properly explained; and
(h) whether the expert’s methods followed established practice in the field and, if
they did not, whether the reason for the divergence has been properly explained.
Criminal Practice Direction 19A.6 provides that:

In addition, in considering reliability, and especially the reliability of expert scientific
opinion, the court should be astute to identify potential flaws in such opinion which
detract from its reliability, such as:
(a) being based on a hypothesis which has not been subjected to sufficient scrutiny
(including, where appropriate, experimental or other testing), or which has failed
to stand up to scrutiny;
(b) being based on an unjustifiable assumption;
(c) being based on flawed data;
(d) relying on an examination, technique, method or process which was not properly
carried out or applied, or was not appropriate for use in the particular case; or
(e) relying on an inference or conclusion which has not been properly reached.
The Law Reform Commission of Ireland recommendations

[3.15.150] In its 2008 consultation paper on Expert Evidence, the Law Reform Commission of
Ireland recommended that:
232 [3.15.150]
• the term ‘expert’ should be defined; ‘the Commission invited’ submissions on whether,
for example, experience-only based knowledge should be sufficient or whether formal,
professional qualifications, study or training is necessary to be considered an expert;
• there should be detailed guidelines containing a list of factors which can be used to
help the court assess the reliability of expert evidence;
• there should be a formal guidance code for expert witnesses (which could be statutory
on non-statutory) which would outline the duties owed by expert witnesses;
• there should not be a prohibition on experts giving evidence where they have a
pre-existing relationship with one of the parties, including where this is as a therapist;
• the expert witness should continue to owe a duty to the court which supersedes any
duty owed to the instructing party;
• there should be a ban on any fee arrangements with expert witnesses which are
conditional on the outcome of a case, because these are likely to impede the
independence of the experts;
• both parties should be required to exchange expert reports prior to any civil claims;
• there should be a set form and structure for expert reports;
• jointly appointed experts should be considered; the Commission invited submissions
on whether this would be preferable to making available to parties a panel of experts to
choose from or having a single expert imposed by the court;
• the relevant professional bodies should be encouraged to introduce their own
regulatory and disciplinary processes for professionals who wish to act as expert
witnesses; and
• the traditional immunity for expert witnesses should be considered, and the
Commission invites submissions on whether it should be retained.
Singapore Academy of Law, Law Reform Committee recommendations

[3.15.200] In 2011, the Law Reform Committee of the Singapore Academy of Law
recommended (at p 4) that s 47 of the Evidence Act be amended to read as follows:
(1) When the court is likely to derive substantial assistance from an opinion upon a
point of scientific, technical or other specialised knowledge, such an opinion is a
relevant fact.
(2) Persons with such specialised knowledge or skill based on training, study or
experience are called experts.
(3) The opinions of an expert may be relevant facts even if the opinions relate to a
matter of common knowledge.
The Committee provided the following reasons for its recommendations (at pp 4–5):
(a) The amendments make the test of ‘assistance’ and not ‘necessity’ the overarching
basis of admissibility of expert evidence.
(b) However, to guard against the danger of letting in too much expert evidence or
expert evidence of marginal utility, the assistance which the court expects to
derive must be ‘substantial’. Further, the court must consider it ‘likely’ that the
opinion will render the requisite level of assistance.
(c) The replacement of specified, enumerated fields of expertise with the general
phrase ‘scientific, technical or other specialised knowledge’ will broaden the
types of evidence which may be admitted by precluding arguments that expert
evidence arising out of fields of expertise not listed in section 47 are ipso facto
inadmissible. This inclusionary rule ought to be subject to safeguards to ensure
admission of only reliable evidence arising from novel fields of scientific
endeavour. But we recommend that these safeguards should not be legislated but
should be judicially developed so as to cater for developments in science and
technology.
[3.15.200] 233
(d) This inclusionary rule should also be subject to an express exclusionary discretion
permitting the court to exclude otherwise admissible evidence if it is unfairly
prejudicial, misleading or confusing or will lead to an undue waste of judicial
time. However, as that exclusionary discretion will cut across all categories of
admissible evidence and not just expert evidence, we have not suggested the
shape that that exclusionary discretion should take other than drawing attention
to section 135 of the Australian Uniform Evidence Acts.
(e) The amendments make clear that the common knowledge rule is no long in itself
a bar to admissibility if the new section 47(1) criteria are otherwise met. Thus the
new section 47(3) acknowledges that ‘the mere fact that lay persons have a
common sense perspective on some issues does not necessarily mean that an
expert opinion on that issue will not be permitted’. Such evidence will now be
permitted if the ‘substantial assistance’ test is met to the required degree of
certainty.
(f) We do not recommend amending section 47 to permit experts to give opinions
which are substantially but not entirely based on their expert knowledge as has,
on one view, been done in Australia.
(g) The difficulties caused by the intersection of the hearsay rule and the basis rule in
excluding highly reliable opinion evidence if the factual basis is not made out by
admissible evidence need to be addressed as part of an overall overhaul of the
hearsay regime under the Evidence Act. This is the model which has been adopted
in England (in civil cases), in Australia and in the United States. This overarching
solution is therefore beyond the scope of this paper.
(h) The weight of authority is that there is no strict basis rule in Singapore at
common law. Any failure to establish, or to establish satisfactorily, the underlying
basis on which an expert opinion rests therefore goes only to weight and not
admissibility of the expert opinion. There is therefore no need to modify this rule
by legislation.
234 [3.15.200]
PART 4 – APPEALS
Chapter 4.0: Appeals in relation to expert evidence.................. 237
235
Chapter 4.0
APPEALS IN RELATION TO EXPERT
EVIDENCE
Appeals against determinations on admissibility ........................................................... [4.0.01]
Role of the tribunal of fact .................................................................................................. [4.0.40]
Approach of appellate courts in civil matters ................................................................. [4.0.80]
The fallacy of inevitable error when experts disagree ................................................... [4.0.120]
When expert evidence is uncontradicted ......................................................................... [4.0.160]
Conflicts and reasonable hypotheses ................................................................................. [4.0.200]
Trial judge’s duty to give reasons ...................................................................................... [4.0.210]
Judicial directions to juries .................................................................................................. [4.0.240]
The Shepherd direction .......................................................................................................... [4.0.250]
Use of expert as filter ........................................................................................................... [4.0.280]
Experts exceeding parameters of expertise ...................................................................... [4.0.320]
Disinclination of appellate courts to overturn
trial decisions as to expert evidence admissibility .......................... [4.0.360]
The significant impact criterion .......................................................................................... [4.0.370]
Appeal against the exercise of discretion ......................................................................... [4.0.380]
Appeal on the ground of the wrong admission of expert evidence ........................... [4.0.390]
Appeal on the basis of failure to hold a voire dire ........................................................ [4.0.400]
Appeal on the ground of the wrong rejection of expert evidence .............................. [4.0.410]
Appealable directions when expert evidence conflicts .................................................. [4.0.420]
Appealable directions when expert evidence is uncontradicted .................................. [4.0.430]
Foreign law ............................................................................................................................. [4.0.440]
Appeal on the ground of the absence of expert evidence ............................................. [4.0.450]
Appeal on the ground of failure to call expert evidence .............................................. [4.0.460]
Appeal on the ground of findings made without expert evidence ............................. [4.0.465]
Appeal on the ground of judge’s failure to provide findings and reasons ............... [4.0.470]
Appeal where conflict between expert and lay evidence .............................................. [4.0.480]
Appeal on the ground of fresh/new expert evidence ................................................... [4.0.490]
Fresh evidence of prior inconsistent expert evidence .................................................... [4.0.500]
‘Where there is a division of opinion among the witnesses, the

king should accept [the evidence of] the majority; where the
numbers are equal, [he should accept] those whose qualities
are superior [to the others]; where the qualities are equally
divided, [he should accept the evidence of] the priests.’
The Laws of Manu, Vol 8, p 73 (Penguin, 1991).
‘An experienced judge places no confidence in an oath; he has

seen it so often prostituted to the ends of falsehood. His
whole attention is directed to the nature of the testimony; he
scrutinises the witness, examines his tones, his air, the
simplicity of his language, or his embarrassment, his
variations, his agreement with himself and with others; he has
marks by which to judge the probity of the witness.’
Bentham, A Treatise on Judicial Evidence, Ch 12 (1825).
Appeals against determinations on admissibility
[4.0.01] This chapter reviews bases upon which appeals have been brought to appellate
courts in relation to the admissibility of expert evidence or the weight given to it.
Appeals are regularly brought in civil, criminal and family matters on the basis that the
decision at trial on the admissibility of expert evidence was wrong and so the decision of
the tribunal of fact miscarried. On occasions, it is also contended that the discretion to
exclude or not to exclude expert evidence on the basis that it was more prejudicial than
probative was not properly exercised.
[4.0.01] 237
Part 4 – Appeals
Decisions at common law on whether or not to admit expert evidence may be reduced
to the following:
(1) Is the witness qualified to give evidence as an expert? (See Ch 2.05.)
(2) Is this a field which can properly be the subject of expert testimony? (See R v
Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935 at 938–939; Ch 2.10.)
(3) Would the tribunal of fact be assisted by expert evidence on this issue, or does the
tribunal require assistance in the form of expert evidence on this issue? (See
Ch 2.15.)
(4) Is this expert evidence based upon admitted evidence already before the court or
guaranteed to be proffered? (See Ch 2.20.)
(5) Is this expert evidence trespassing too closely upon the issues which ultimately
have to be decided by the court? (See Ch 2.25.)
(6) Should this expert evidence be excluded as unacceptably more prejudicial than
probative? (See Chs 2.05, 11.0 and 13.05.)
For those jurisdictions with a statutory scheme, such as the uniform evidence law in
Australia, the questions relate to whether the statutory preconditions, such as the
existence of specialised knowledge, have been complied with and whether the bases of the
opinion evidence have been satisfied, as well as issues arising from discretionary
admission or rejection of such evidence.
The trial judge or magistrate decides admissibility of evidence as a question of law,
applying the relevant legal test to the facts before him or her. It is a two-stage process. A
decision is made on the relevant facts (including, for instance, what the field of expertise is
that is being asserted), and the law (ie, the rules of expert evidence) is applied to the facts
to determine the admissibility of the expert evidence.
Thus, the admissibility of expert evidence at common law, depending upon the
assessment of whether a witness possesses sufficient qualifications to be permitted to give
evidence as an expert, whether an area is one of common knowledge, whether a given
area of expertise exists, whether expert evidence is based on admitted evidence, and
whether an expert’s views have trespassed upon the ultimate issue, is a question of law
and involves the application of legal principle to specific facts. It is inherently part of the
judicial officer’s function to make such determinations of admissibility applying the rules
of expert evidence and the admissibility discretions. That decisions of fact are the
underpinnings to the application of the law to a particular situation, such as determining
whether the expert has or has not undertaken a formal course of study, does not detract
from the proposition that the exercise is fundamentally one of mixed law and fact.
The characterisation of the error the subject of the complaint is important because it
impacts upon the permissible grounds for appeal against the judge’s or magistrate’s
decision to admit or reject expert evidence. Where it is a question of fact that is decided at
first instance, the appellate court is obliged to ‘attach the greatest weight’ to the
determination because the tribunal of fact had the opportunity to hear and see the
witnesses, and on appeal the appellate court should only disturb such findings if they are
‘plainly unsound’ (Watt or Thomas v Thomas [1947] AC 484) or if it can be shown that the
trial judge ‘has failed to use or has palpably misused his advantage’: Brunskill v Sovereign
Marine & General Insurance Co (1985) 62 ALR 53 at 57; SS Hontestroom v SS Sagaporack
[1927] AC 37 at 47; Paterson v Paterson (1953) 89 CLR 212 at 222; Warren v Coombes (1979)
142 CLR 531 at 537. (Compare the situation with inferences drawn from incontrovertible
facts: Brunskill v Sovereign Marine & General Insurance Co (1985) 62 ALR 53 at 57.)
238 [4.0.01]
Appeals in relation to expert evidence | CH 4.0
Role of the tribunal of fact

[4.0.40] Central to the role of the appellate courts in appeals in expert evidence
determinations is the role of the court of first instance. It has repeatedly been held that the
tribunal of fact is responsible for determining the weight, if any, to be accorded to the
opinions expressed by expert witnesses: Richmond v Richmond (1914) 111 LT 273 per
Neville J; F (Orse C) v C [1991] 2 IR 330; Bourgeois v Roudolfich 580 So 2d 699 (1991); cf
Lovatt v Tribe (1862) 3 F & F 9; 176 ER 5. The fact that a witness is regarded as being of the
highest authority and of unimpeachable credit, and that he or she cites authoritative
textbooks in support of an interpretation of facts, cannot ever relieve the court of its
responsibility to form its own opinion on the issue: Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430 at 496
per Dixon J. 1 In Chamberlain v R (No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 598, Brennan J
expressed the problem as follows:
There were opposed scientific opinions, some accepting the sufficiency of the tests to prove
the existence of foetal blood, some rejecting their sufficiency for the purpose. The jury,
having the duty to decide whether the tests were sufficient and having credible evidence
either way from acknowledged experts, were not precluded from acting upon the opinion
of the prosecution witnesses because the defence witnesses gave credible evidence to
contradict it. The question whether one body of evidence should be accepted over another
is not a question for an appellate court; conflicts of evidence are to be resolved by the jury
as the constitutional judge of fact: see Latham CJ in Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430 at
440.
(See also Ancher, Mortlock, Murray and Woolley Pty Ltd v Hooker Homes Pty Ltd [1971] 2
NSWLR 278; Jarrett v The Queen (1994) 73 A Crim R 160 at 169.)
The crux of the matter is that the trier of fact’s responsibility to assess and evaluate
expert opinions cannot be ceded to the expert:
A qualified medical practitioner may, as an expert, express his opinion as to the nature and
cause, or probable cause, of an ailment. But it is for the jury to weigh and determine the
probabilities. In doing so they may be assisted by the medical evidence. But they are not
simply to transfer their task to the witnesses.
(See Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642 at 645; see also Shawinigan Engineering Co v Naud
[1929] 4 DLR 57.)
The role of the expert in this sense is no different from that of any other witness in
court proceedings – it is merely to set material before the court to enable it to make its
own determination about issues in dispute when it could not competently deal with such
issues without expert assistance: R v Abbey (1982) 68 CCC (2d) 394 at 409; R v Turner [1975]
1 QB 834. The privilege of drawing inferences from data is extended to the expert witness,
but it is the task of the tribunal of fact to weigh such inferences and accord them such
importance as it deems appropriate.
It has been held in Ireland that courts are not obliged to accept or act upon expert
evidence (Molamphy v Nenagh Co-Operative Creamery Ltd (1952) 89 ILTR 159 at 162;
Hanrahan v Merck Sharp & Dohme [1988] 1 ILRM 629 at 645), although generally they will
do so: JW v VW [1990] 2 IR 437 at 459; Murnaghan Bros v O’Maoldomhnaigh [1991] 1 IR 461;
see generally McGrath (2005, p 322). However, it is straightforward that even a (lay) jury is
not obliged to accept evidence about insanity: People (AG) v Kelly (1862) 1 Frewen 267.
Jurors, however, are not to be allowed to act as experts themselves in a matter such as
fingerprint comparison, which is a ‘matter for expertise not possessed by the ordinary run
of mankind’ (R v Lawless [1974] VR 398 at 423), by being permitted or encouraged to make
a comparison themselves between fingerprints and to form a conclusion as to whether or
1 See the similar situation in relation to the input of assessors: Owners of SS Australia v
Owners of Cargo of SS Nautilus [1927] AC 145; 25 LlL Rep 141 at 150; see also below,
Ch 6.05.
[4.0.40] 239
Part 4 – Appeals
not they are identical. That is not to say that a jury cannot examine exhibits such as X-rays
or photographs of fingerprints or striations on bullets for the purpose of determining
whether they are satisfied to the necessary degree by the evidence – the determination is
for them, ‘but the provision of evidence was for the experts’: R v Lawless [1974] VR 398 at
423; see also R v Buisson [1990] 2 NZLR 542; R v Weise [1969] VR 953 at 972 per Smith J; R
v Tilley [1961] 1 WLR 1309; R v Harden [1963] 1 QB 8; R v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 676 at 678;
Ch 12.10; R v Leroy [1984] 2 NSWLR 441; Ch 12.15. The same may be said of jurors
examining autoradiographs in DNA cases or contested documents: see, eg, R v Tran (1990)
50 A Crim R 233 at 242.
Nor can jurors embark themselves upon cross-examination of expert (or lay)
witnesses. 2 In R v Lo Presti [1992] 1 VR 696 at 702, the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal
summarised the limited role of juror questioning as follows:
1. Juries should not be told of any right possessed by them to question a witness.
2. A juror who wishes to put, or have put, a question to a witness has a right for
that to be done provided that the question or questions is or are limited to the
clarification of evidence given or the explanation of some matter about which
confusion exists.
3. It is not essential that the question asked be formulated by the foreman.
4. It is highly desirable that the question sought to be asked first be submitted to the
judge so that he may consider its relevance and admissibility.
5. If the judge allows the question it is immaterial whether it is actually asked by
the juror or the judge. However, if the judge puts the question there will be
removed the risk that exists when a layman is the questioner of the generation of
a spontaneous exchange of questions and answers in the course of which
improper material may emerge.
(See also R v Pathare [1981] 1 NSWLR 124; R v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750; R v Sams (1990)
46 A Crim R 468.)
In the areas where children’s welfare is to be assessed, Street CJ has similarly stated
that in drawing upon the assistance of expert opinion, ‘it is unsafe for a judge to regard
himself, in the case of a healthy child, as constrained or compelled in his conclusion by the
terms of the expert evidence’: Epperson v Dampney (1976) 10 ALR 227 at 229. It is
appropriate for a judge to decide in the face of contrary medical evidence ‘if on a
consideration of all the circumstances the judge considers that the paramount welfare of
the infant on the balance of probabilities … points to a particular course as being the
proper one’: J v C [1970] AC 668 at 726. (See also Sullivan v Read-Bloomfield [1983] 1
NSWLR 649 at 651.)
Approach of appellate courts in civil matters

[4.0.80] Appellate courts have some limitations when evaluating the evidence of experts
at first instance. However, the inability to observe the conduct and demeanour of experts
does not relieve appellate courts of the obligation to review the transcript of expert
evidence stringently: see CSR Ltd v Maddalena (2006) 80 ALJR 458; [2006] HCA 1 at
[44]–[45]. Callinan and Heydon JJ have even observed (at [180]):
There are cases in which the advantages enjoyed by trial judges over appellate courts are
exaggerated. A complete written record, a degree of detachment from the trial itself, and
the sum of the collective knowledge of three or more judges may themselves on occasions
place the appeal court in a superior position to that of the trial judge to decide the case.
In Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22, Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ said
(at [25]):
2 The same restriction applies to assessors: see Ch 6.05.
240 [4.0.80]
Within the constraints marked out by the nature of the appellate process, the appellate
court is obliged to conduct a real review of the trial and, in cases where the trial was
conducted before a judge sitting alone, of that judge’s reasons. Appellate courts are not
excused from the task of ‘weighing conflicting evidence and drawing [their] own
inferences and conclusions though [they] should always bear in mind that [they have]
neither seen nor heard the witnesses, and should make due allowance in this respect’
[Dearman v Dearman (1908) 7 CLR 549 at 564, citing The Glannibanta (1876) 1 PD 283 at 287].
In Warren v Coombes [(1979) 142 CLR 531 at 551], the majority of this Court reiterated the
rule that:
[I]n general an appellate court is in as good a position as the trial judge to decide on
the proper inference to be drawn from facts which are undisputed or which, having
been disputed, are established by the findings of the trial judge. In deciding what is the
proper inference to be drawn, the appellate court will give respect and weight to the
conclusion of the trial judge but, once having reached its own conclusion, will not
shrink from giving effect to it.
In giving ‘respect and weight to the conclusion of the trial judge’, regard must be had to
the fact that he or she saw and heard the expert witnesses, as this may have contributed to
the assessment of credibility and the allocation of weight to subtleties and nuances of
evidence (see Guest v Nominal Defendant [2006] NSWCA 77 at [102]; Suvaal v Cessnock City
Council (2003) 77 ALJR 1449; [2003] HCA 41 at [75]–[76]).
In some disputes between experts, demeanour is crucial. This may occur where a
witness has given dishonest or misleading evidence, or has become an advocate for a
party, or where the evidence given is inherently unreliable for other reasons. Demeanour
may also be crucial in other cases where the evidence is not so tainted. Situations may
arise where, after due consideration of the reasoning of the differing views of the expert
witnesses, the judge is unable to decide the issue otherwise than by impression and
demeanour. Demeanour may also be crucial in situations of the kind described by
Mahoney JA in Public Trustee v Commonwealth (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, Kirby P,
Mahoney and Clarke JJA, 20 December 1995) when making the following remarks:
[N]ot infrequently, the court may not be in a position to decide whether the facts on which
the witness relies are true and may not be able to judge the scientific or professional
accuracy of the principles … And where experts state different conclusions and rely for
them upon facts which differ and principles which do not agree, it may not be able to form
its conclusion by reference to those facts or those conclusions alone. When a judgment
must be made between the facts and the principles advocated at the trial, the court may
not be in a position to give objectively convincing reasons for its choice. It may, in the end,
have to depend upon the impression which the witness has made.
Demeanour can also play a partial role in a decision whether to prefer one expert over
another. A judge may be persuaded by a combination of the material force of an expert’s
views together with the way in which the evidence was given (see Wiki v Atlantis
Relocations (NSW) Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 127; [2004] NSWCA 174 at [60]). But where the
issue in dispute involves differences between expert witnesses that are capable of being
resolved rationally by examination and analysis, and where the experts are properly
qualified and none has been found to be dishonest, or misleading, or unduly partisan, or
otherwise unreliable, a decision based solely on demeanour will not provide the losing
party with a satisfactory explanation for his or her lack of success. A justifiable grievance
as to the way in which justice was administered will then arise.
Where there is thoroughgoing disagreement between experts in relation to technical
matters, the presence of the trial judge will weigh heavily against appellate intervention.
In Ahmedi v Ahmedi (1991) 23 NSWLR 288 at 299–300, Clarke JA (with whom Handley JA
agreed) expressed the view that in a case where the trial judge’s conclusion depended
upon his assessment and evaluation of contradictory expert oral evidence, the principles
[4.0.80] 241
Part 4 – Appeals
in Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167, imposing restraint on
appellate interference, applied. He referred to Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988]
AC 1074, where Lord Bridge said (at 1091):
Where expert witnesses are radically at issue about complex technical questions within
their own field and are examined and cross-examined at length about their conflicting
theories, I believe that the judge’s advantage in seeing them and hearing them is scarcely
less important than when he has to resolve some conflict of primary fact between lay
witnesses in purely mundane matters.
(See too Nominal Defendant v Clancy [2007] NSWCA 349 at [119] per McColl JA.)
Where the conclusion of a trial judge depends upon inferences drawn from undisputed
facts or facts that have been found but can be redetermined by the appellate court
‘without relevant disadvantage’, the appellate court should not ‘shrink’ from giving effect
to its own conclusions, having given weight and respect to those of the trial judge: see
CSR Ltd v Maddalena (2006) 80 ALJR 458; [2006] HCA 1 at [22]–[23].
The fallacy of the existence of inevitable error when experts disagree

[4.0.120] Although experts called by opposing sides in a civil or criminal case may
disagree, a jury may quite properly find a case proved in spite of such disagreement.
Widgery LCJ in R v Sodo (1975) 61 Cr App R 131 at 133 was very clear on the issue:
Basic to the issues before us today is the proposition which one hears a great deal
nowadays, namely, that if experts differ there must be a reasonable doubt in the jury’s
mind which will lead to an acquittal. This is heresy, and the more often it can be pointed
to as heresy the better. To apply such a principle would be to have trial by expert instead
of trial by jury. The truth of the matter is that juries are perfectly entitled when experts
before them differ to decide, if they think fit, that one expert is telling them the right and
proper answer and the other is not, and if they reach such a conclusion beyond reasonable
doubt it is proper for them to act on the opinion of one expert although that is
contradicted by another expert.
See also R v Cleary (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, Southwell J, 18 September

1979); R v Hallam (1990) 49 A Crim R 316; Non-drip Measure Co Ltd v Strangers Ltd (1942) 59
RPC 1 at 24.
The question whether a jury is able to decide between conflicting bodies of expert
evidence on highly technical matters is one which properly falls for consideration by a
Court of Criminal Appeal in the course of deciding whether a conviction by the jury,
although supported by evidence, should be set aside on appeal as unsafe and
unsatisfactory: R v Hallam (1990) 49 A Crim R 316 at 326.
Issues in dispute are not always resolved on the basis of preferring the evidence of one
expert over that of another. For example, in Adelaide Stevedoring Co Ltd v Forst (1940) 64
CLR 538 at 563–564, Rich ACJ said:
I do not see why a court should not begin its investigation, ie, before hearing any medical
testimony, from the standpoint of the presumptive inference which this sequence of events
would naturally inspire in the mind of any common-sense person uninstructed in
pathology. When he finds that a workman of the not-so-young standing attempts in a
posture calculated by reason of the pressure on the stomach to disturb or arrest the
rhythm of the heart a very strenuous task not forming part of his ordinary work and then
collapses almost immediately and dies from a heart condition, why should not a court say
that here is strong ground for a preliminary presumption of fact in favour of the view that
the work materially contributed to the cause of death? From this standpoint the
investigation of physiological and pathological opinion shows no more than the current
medical views find insufficient reason for connecting coronary thrombosis with effort. Be it
so. That to my mind is not enough to overturn or rebut the presumption which flows from
the observed sequence of events.
242 [4.0.120]
However, the fact that genuine and profound differences exist between experts may create
a reasonable doubt in a criminal case or may result in a case not being proved in the civil
context, but such a result does not necessarily follow. Particular care must be exercised by
judges during summing up when expert witnesses have disagreed about key issues:
Nicholas v The Queen (1989) 45 A Crim R 299 at 311.
The trier of fact is entitled to decide in accordance with evidence which conflicts with
expert opinion and which outweighs it: Hilder v The Queen (1997) 97 A Crim R 70 at 76;
Byrne v The Queen [1960] 1 QB 396 at 403; R v Matheson [1958] 2 All ER 87; 42 Cr App R 145
at 478–479; Walton v The Queen [1978] AC 788 at 793; R v Ryan (1995) 90 A Crim R 191 at
195; Gieselmann v The Queen (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, No 60692 of
1995, 12 November 1996) at pp 32–34.
When expert evidence is uncontradicted

[4.0.160] It does not follow necessarily that because expert evidence is all the one way, that
it is uncontradicted, that a jury must accept it: R v Klamo (2008) 18 VR 644; [2008] VSCA 75
at [44]. At the same time, ‘juries are not entitled to disregard it capriciously’: R v Hall
(1988) 36 A Crim R 368 at 370 (Roden J); Hone v Western Australia (2007) 179 A Crim R 138;
[2007] WASCA 283 at [124] (Miller JA, Steytler P relevantly agreeing and Wheeler JA
agreeing); R v Klamo (2008) 18 VR 644; [2008] VSCA 75 at [44]; K v Western Australia [2010]
WASCA 157 at [43], [126]; R v Rodriguez [2010] NSWSC 198 at [45].
There is a line of authority to this effect in relation to cases in respect of the defences of
insanity and diminished responsibility. It commenced with Lord Goddard, who showed
the other side of the coin in R v Matheson [1958] 2 All ER 87; 42 Cr App R 145, saying (at
151):
While it has often been emphasised, and we would repeat that the decision in these cases,
as in those in which insanity is pleaded, is for the jury and not for doctors, the verdict
must be founded on evidence. If there are facts which would entitle a jury to reject or
differ from the opinions of the medical men, this court would not, and indeed could not,
disturb their verdict, but if the doctors’ evidence is unchallenged and there is no other on
this issue, a verdict contrary to their opinion would not be ‘a true verdict in accordance
with the evidence’.
In R v Bailey (1977) 66 Cr App R 31, another diminished responsibility case, Lord Parker CJ
applied R v Matheson and said (at 32):
The court has said on many occasions that of course juries are not bound by what the
medical witnesses say, but at the same time they must act on evidence, and if there is
nothing before them, no facts and no circumstances shown before them which throw
doubt on the medical evidence, then that is all that they are left with, and the jury, in those
circumstances, must accept it.
These principles were subsequently applied by the Privy Council in Walton v The Queen
[1978] AC 788 at 793–794, where it was held that the jury had been entitled to depart from
the conclusion of the experts, but the Privy Council stated:
[I]nsofar as [their Lordships] can judge of the medical evidence from the trial judge’s
notes, the jury were entitled to regard it as not entirely convincing … It is plain that the
quality and weight of this medical evidence fell a long way short of that in Matheson and
in Bailey.
A jury is still entitled to reject expert evidence if there is other evidence which can throw
doubt or displace expert evidence: see, eg, Taylor v The Queen (1978) 45 FLR 343 at 364; R v
Gemmill (2004) 8 VR 242; [2004] VSCA 72 at [56].
In Taylor v The Queen (1978) 45 FLR 343, Connor and Franki JJ held that a jury could not
reject unanimous medical evidence where there was no other evidence casting doubt on it
(at 364). Smithers J, in a separate judgment, held (at 351–354) that the direction given in
that case might have induced an impression in the jury that the distinction it drew
[4.0.160] 243
Part 4 – Appeals
between evidence of fact and opinion meant they could decide the question of insanity on
facts other than the opinion stated by the expert witnesses, thus calling on the latter
evidence only if they felt the need to be assisted by it in reaching their conclusions. Were
they to have approached the case in that way, then the jury, his Honour held (at 353),
would not have properly understood the evidentiary basis of the case for the accused
where ‘the only real evidentiary basis of that case was that constituted by the medical
opinions considered as evidence of the critical facts’. He observed (at 355) that:
Where the fact in issue was the state and capacity of mind and the only evidence thereof is
expert opinion, the jury should understand that where the competence and honesty of the
expert are accepted his skill in the area should be respected and should only be rejected
for good reason. But if the jury are under the impression that on the relevant issue they
must look at the ‘facts’ given in evidence other than by the experts as the source or
primary source of proof of insanity, and that they are not bound by the opinions and are
free to make up their own mind contrary to those opinions, then it is hard to think that
they would be performing their task according to law.
(See R v NCT (2009) 26 VR 247; [2009] VSCA 240.)

To a similar effect, Rolfe JA, with Sheller and Davies AJJA agreeing, accepted in Hull
Pty Ltd v Thompson [2001] NSWCA 359 at [21] that where there is no cross-examination of
an expert, prima facie there is no basis for a judge not to accept the unchallenged
evidence.
Conflicts and reasonable hypotheses

[4.0.200] Under s 120 of the Veterans Entitlement Act 1986 (Cth), the Repatriation
Commission, and then the Veterans Review Board, is required to determine whether an
injury or disease is ‘war-caused’. It is obliged to find beyond reasonable doubt that there is
no sufficient ground for finding such an aetiology if it is of the opinion that the material
before it does not cause a reasonable hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death
with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person. In Bushell v
Repatriation Commission (1992) 175 CLR 408 at 414, Mason CJ, Deane and McHugh JJ held:
‘Conflict with other medical opinions is not sufficient to reject a hypothesis as
unreasonable … [I]t is not the function of s 120(3) to require the Commission to choose
between competing hypotheses or to determine whether one medical or scientific opinion
is to be preferred to another.’ However, they held (at 415) that in performing its functions
under s 120, the Commission, or the Board, cannot have regard to the medical or scientific
material which is opposed to the material that supports the veteran’s claim:
Indeed, the Commission is bound to have regard to the opposing material for the purpose
of examining the validity of the reasoning which supports the claim that there is a
connection between the incapacity or death and the service of the veteran. But it is vital
that the Commission keep in mind that that hypothesis may still be reasonable although it
is unproved and opposed to the weight of the informed opinion.
(See also Critch v Repatriation Commission (unreported, Federal Court, 8 October 1996) per
Merkel J.)
Trial judge's duty to give reasons
[4.0.210] A trial judge is not obliged to spell out every detail of his or her process of
reasoning (Yates Property Corp Pty Ltd (in liq) v Darling Harbour Authority (1991) 24 NSWLR
156 at 171, 182), but is obliged to expose his or her reasons for resolving a point critical to
the contest between the parties: North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Ltd (1995) 87 LGERA
435 at 442 per Kirby ACJ; Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247 at
270 per Mahoney JA, at 280 per McHugh JA. This obligation lies upon the trial judge to
enable the parties to identify the basis of his or her decision and the extent to which their
arguments have been understood and accepted: Soulemezis at 279 per McHugh JA. To this
extent, it is necessary for the trial judge to ‘“enter into” the issues canvassed and explain
244 [4.0.200]
why one case was preferred over another’: Jones v Bradley [2003] NSWCA 81 at [129] per
Santow JA (with whom Meagher and Beazley JJA agreed); see too Bingham LJ in Eckersley
v Binnie (1988) 18 Con LR 1 at 77–78; Nominal Defendant v Clancy [2007] NSWCA 349 at
[121].
In Moylan v Nutrasweet Company [2000] NSWCA 337, Sheller JA (with whom Beazley
and Giles JJA agreed) referred to and adopted much of the reasoning of Henry LJ in
Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 377. His Honour quoted the following
remarks of Henry LJ (reported in Flannery at 381–382) with approval:
It is not a useful task to attempt to make absolute rules as to the requirement for the judge
to give reasons. This is because issues are so infinitely various. For instance, when the
court, in a case without documents depending on eye witness accounts is faced with two
irreconcilable accounts, there may be little to say other than that the witnesses for one side
were more credible … But with expert evidence, it should usually be possible to be more
explicit in giving reasons: see Bingham LJ in Eckersley v Binnie (1988) 18 Con LR 1 at 77–78:
In resolving conflicts of expert evidence, the judge remains the judge; he is not obliged
to accept evidence simply because it comes from an illustrious source; he can take account
of demonstrated partisanship and lack of objectivity. But, save where an expert is guilty of
a deliberate attempt to mislead (as happens only very rarely), a coherent reasoned opinion
expressed by a suitably qualified expert should be the subject of a coherent reasoned
rebuttal, unless it can be discounted for other good reasons.
In Archibald v Byron Shire Council (2003) 129 LGERA 311; [2003] NSWCA 292, Sheller JA
(with whom Beazley JA agreed) adopted the same approach, stating at [54]:
Where a dispute, such as this one, involves something in the nature of an intellectual
exchange with reasons and analysis advanced on either side, the parties are entitled to
have the judge enter into the issues canvassed before the court and to an explanation by
the judge as to why the judge prefers one case over the other. This is particularly so where
there is disputed expert evidence. In the present case, the parties were entitled to be told if
Dr Button’s estimates were to be accepted, on what basis they were to be accepted, in
preference to those of Mr Loomes and Mr Thompson. This had to be done if the court was
properly to perform the duty of stating with certainty the extent to which the respondent
was entitled to rely upon continued use.
(See also Papadopoulos v New South Wales Insurance Ministerial Corp [1999] NSWCA 116 at
[17].)
Where a reason is given for preferring the evidence of one expert to that of another, it
has to have substance. In Wiki v Atlantis Relocations (NSW) Pty Ltd (2004) 60 NSWLR 127;
[2004] NSWCA 174, Ipp JA (with Bryson and Stein JJA agreeing) held that there were
several bases upon which it was open to the trial judge in the case before him to
determine, on a rational basis, which body of expert evidence should be preferred.
Instead, the trial judge had wrongly relied ‘merely’ upon the ‘eminence’ of a particular
expert and his view that the expert was ‘the most impressive witness’. He held that there
was also a serious question as to how the trial judge determined that the expert was the
‘most eminent’ of the medical practitioners called and observed that if the trial judge
relied on facts known to him outside the evidence led at the trial, it was incumbent on him
to inform the parties of the material to which he intended to have regard and to give them
an opportunity to deal with it. His failure to do so was a further error.
Judicial directions to juries

[4.0.240] The task of the trial judge in giving a jury instructions is ‘to ensure a fair trial of
the accused’: RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; [2000] HCA 3 at [41] per Gaudron ACJ,
Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. That requires instructions about matters such as the
elements of the offence, the burden and standard of proof, and the respective functions of
judge, jury and perhaps counsel. Trial judges are expected too to identify the issues in the
case and to relate the law to those issues, putting the case which the accused person is
[4.0.240] 245
Part 4 – Appeals
advancing. ‘In some cases it will require the judge to warn the jury about how they should
not reason or about particular care that must be shown before accepting certain kinds of
evidence’: RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620; [2000] HCA 3 at [41] per Gaudron ACJ,
Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ.
There is no rule of law that at every criminal trial in which expert opinion evidence is
adduced the trial judge must give a direction that the weight to be given by the jury to
expert evidence, whether contested or uncontested, is exclusively a matter for the jury,
and the jury is not bound to accept the expert’s opinion: K v Western Australia [2010]
WASCA 157 at [42]. However, it is standard for a direction to be given to the jury that
expert evidence is led to enable the jury to understand the evidence better, that it is no
better than the facts on which it is based, that it is for the jury to be satisfied of the facts in
issue, and that ultimately it is the opinion of the jury that counts: Middleton v The Queen
(2000) 114 A Crim R 258; [2000] WASCA 213 at [49] per Anderson J. A judge’s direction
must deal with expert issues raised during the trial. It must be tailored to the
circumstances of the case so that the jurors have sufficient knowledge and understanding
of the relevant evidence and the legal issues to which it relates to discharge their duty to
decide the case according to the evidence: see generally Domican v The Queen (1992) 173
CLR 555; [1992] HCA 13; R v Demiri [2006] BSCA 64; R v Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410;
[2009] VSCA 307 at [103]. These obligations have been held to be the more onerous when
the trial is lengthy and involving expert evidence which is in controversy: R v Zilm (2006)
14 VR 11; [2006] VSCA 72; R v Leusenkamp (2003) 40 MVR 108; [2003] VSCA 193; R v
Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410; [2009] VSCA 307 at [103]. It is for the trial judge to craft the
oral directions in such a way that ensures that the oral exposition is sufficient: R v
Thompson (2008) 21 VR 135; [2008] VSCA 144 at [139]. There is no set formula that needs be
followed: R v Andrakakos [2003] VSCA 170 at [11], [19]–[20]; R v Farquharson (2009) 26 VR
410; [2009] VSCA 307 at [103].
There is no authority that a trial judge has the right, let alone the duty, to direct a jury
that where there is conflict between experts they should regard one as superior to another
– such is ‘a radical notion, which cuts across the boundaries between the functions of
judge and jury’: R v Gemmill (2004) 8 VR 242; [2004] VSCA 72 at [41].
The test for appellate review of jury instructions is whether they were sufficient to
instruct the jury about so much of the law as they need to know in order to dispose of
relevant issues in the case (R v KAP (2016) 264 A Crim R 162; [2016] QCA 349 at [47]).
Judges are entitled to tell jurors that they can examine the nature and quality of expert
evidence and should do so in a broad and commonsense way: Taylor v The Queen (1978) 45
FLR 343; R v Weise [1969] VR 953. However, in cases involving the defences of ‘insanity’ or
‘mental impairment’, a jury should be warned about the danger of discounting expert
evidence by applying the reasoning of sane people to the conduct of the accused person:
Mizzi v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 659. On occasions, it is incumbent on a judge to warn a
jury that they should not attribute to a mentally ill person the kind of reasoning that a
person without mental illness would employ: see Mizzi v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 659; R
v Weise [1969] VR 953; R v Matusevich and Thompson [1976] VR 470; R v Gemmill (2004) 8 VR
242; [2004] VSCA 72 at [50]. These principles derive from the obligation of a trial judge to
provide an adequate explanation of the real meaning and effect of expert evidence.
Expert evidence adduced by the prosecution in a criminal trial can constitute a strand
in a cable or it can constitute a link in a chain (see Ch 12.0), in which case it must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The fact that expert evidence is not a link in a chain of
reasoning does not dispose of the question whether such a direction should be given to
the jury. Such a direction may be required in relation to a piece of evidence if that
evidence, ‘although logically only a strand in a cable, is of such practical importance that
it is prudent to direct the jury that they must be satisfied about it beyond reasonable
246 [4.0.240]
doubt’ (R v LRG (2006) 16 VR 89; [2006] VSCA 288 at [39]). Such a direction has been held
(R v Doherty (2003) 6 VR 393; [2003] VSCA 158 per Winneke P) to be able to be reconciled
with the statements of Dawson J in Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573. Even in a
‘strands in a cable’ case, there may be some facts on which the prosecution relies which
are so influential that, standing alone, they should be treated as though they were
indispensable links in a chain of reasoning towards guilt (R v Doherty (2003) 6 VR 393;
[2003] VSCA 158 at [26], followed in R v Lam (No 18) [2005] VSC 292 per Redlich J). In such
a situation, the trial judge, as a matter of prudence, should so direct a jury to ensure that
a perceptible risk of a miscarriage does not occur.
The Shepherd direction

[4.0.250] It is common to refer to a ‘Shepherd direction’ being required in relation to
intermediate facts ‘which constitute indispensable links in a chain of reasoning towards an
inference of guilt’: Shepherd v The Queen (1990) 170 CLR 573 at 579. The obligation for a
trial judge to give what is now known as a Shepherd direction was discussed in
Chamberlain v R (No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 626–627. In Shepherd at 585, the
principle was explained by Dawson J in the following terms:
if it is necessary for the jury to reach a conclusion of fact as an indispensable, intermediate
step in the reasoning process towards an inference of guilt, then that conclusion must be
established beyond reasonable doubt.
In principle, it can be an appealable error for such a direction not to be given when it
should have been: see, however, Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA
21 at [555] per McClellan CJ at CL. The question of whether a Shepherd decision was
required must be considered on a case-by-case basis and, in particular, by reference to the
way in which the evidence, expert and lay, has been put by the prosecution: R v Tartaglia
(2011) 110 SASR 378; [2011] SASCFC 88 at [13]–[26]; R v Sharp [2012] QCA 342 at [18]; Rees
v The Queen (2010) 200 A Crim R 83; [2010] NSWCCA 84; see too Oliveri v The Queen [2011]
NSWCCA 38 at [15]; R v Tran (2007) 16 VR 673; [2007] VSCA 164 at [31]; R v Baftiroski
[2018] SASFC 83.
It is important that the Shepherd direction not be given in such a way as to water down
the burden of proof direction (Houghton v The Queen (2004) 28 WAR 399; [2004] WASCA 20
at [73]).
Care needs to be taken by trial judges in the use of metaphors, such as pieces in a
jigsaw puzzle, and suitable explanations need to be provided to a jury (R v O’Neill [2001]
VSCA 227 at [110]).
Use of expert as filter

[4.0.280] The use of an expert to filter the facts – asking the witness to hear or read all the
evidence and then express factual conclusions – is a practice which grew up in litigation
involving Pt IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). It was rejected in Trade Practices
Commission v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd (1978) 32 FLR 305 and then
unequivocally castigated by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Arnotts Ltd v Trade
Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 353:
Whatever its origin, the practice is illegitimate. It must be stopped. Part IV litigation is
usually complex and expensive enough. It does not need this embellishment.
Similarly, in R v Fowler (1985) 39 SASR 440 at 443, the practice of asking an expert in effect
to make findings of fact has been held unacceptable:
The course which was sought to be adopted in the present case of asking the opinion of
the witness as to the possible mental condition of the accused at the time of the alleged
crime, based not upon assumed facts, but upon a reading of the whole of the evidence and
the accused’s account of his drug ingestion, is not acceptable and such evidence cannot be
[4.0.280] 247
Part 4 – Appeals
admissible. It involves the expert in making his own unstated findings of fact and his own
interpretation of them. The jury might arrive at different conclusions of fact and a different
interpretation of the facts. Clearly a witness cannot be permitted to express his findings
and interpretations of fact, and there would therefore be no way by which the jury could
know whether the opinion could stand in the light of the jury’s view of the facts.
(See also Bleta v The Queen [1964] SCR 561; 48 DLR (2d) 139; von Doussa (1987, p 618).)
Furthermore, even if the expert has been present throughout the evidence given by
other specialist witnesses, it has been held to be inappropriate for him or her to express an
opinion based upon the evidence that he or she has heard ‘because the answer to such a
question involves the expert in having to resolve the conflict in accordance with his own
view of the credibility of the witnesses and the jury has no way of knowing upon what
evidence he based his opinion’: Bleta v The Queen [1964] SCR 561; 48 DLR (2d) 139.
However, significant leeway is customarily extended in this regard when juries are not
involved.
In practice, the limitation placed on experts evaluating evidence previously given is
easily and regularly circumvented by cross-examining counsel putting to the witness, in
hypothetical form or in summary, what a previous witness said and asking for a reaction
or response. Thus, if an opinion is to be elicited from an expert about an accused person’s
mental condition at the time of a killing and the opinion is arrived at on the basis of the
effects of ingestion of drugs upon the accused’s alleged behaviour around the time of the
killing, all the assumptions of fact must be clearly stated and the evidence must be
confined to inferences drawn from the facts stated.
Phipson (1976, p 561) asserted that questions may be put to the expert which relate to
the very question to be decided by the jury if the expert has personally observed the facts:
If, however, his opinion is based merely upon facts proved by others, such a question is
improper, for it practically asks him to determine the truth of their testimony, as well as to
give an opinion upon it; the correct course is to put such facts to him hypothetically, but
not en bloc, asking him to assume one or more of them to be true, and to state his opinion
thereon. Where, however, the facts are not in dispute, it has been said that the former
question may be put as a matter of convenience, though not as of right.
Experts exceeding parameters of expertise

[4.0.320] In Re W and W (2001) 164 FLR 18; [2001] FamCA 216, Nicholson CJ and O’Ryan J
(with whom Kay J agreed on the point) warned of giving weight to expert evidence of a
psychiatrist who had not seen the parties, nor the children the subject of the decision, but
had reviewed the material. Their Honours said (at [147]): ‘[T]here are grave dangers in
reliance upon expert evidence given in such circumstances’. Much of the rejection of the
evidence of the psychiatrist in Re W turned on the fact that he was retained by one side
and must have brought unconscious bias to his task. However, it was held in Re W (Sex
Abuse: Standard of Proof) (2004) 32 Fam LR 249; [2004] FamCA 768 that the criticism of
relying upon an opinion about the ultimate issue from a witness who had not seen the
parties nor the children remained as valid when the witness is called by the court. If an
expert witness still purports to give an opinion as to the ultimate issue, then such an
opinion should be heavily qualified by the expert having regard to the fact that the expert
has not seen the parties nor the children. Failure to do so can result in appealable error:
see Freckelton (2005).
Disinclination of appellate courts to overturn trial decisions as to expert evidence

admissibility
[4.0.360] In some instances, such as where a discretion to admit or refuse expert evidence
has miscarried, appellate courts will intervene to overturn an inferior court’s decision. As
McLachlin CJ put it in R v DD 2000 SCC 43 at [12]–[13]:
248 [4.0.320]
The point was clearly enunciated in R v F (DS) (1999) 43 OR (3d) 609 (CA), at p 625:
The trial judge has the advantage of hearing the evidence in issue, observing the jury and
being able to appreciate the dynamics of the particular trial … [T]he trial judge may also
be in a better position to determine what may come within the normal experience of the
average juror in the community in which the case is being tried.
Finally, the trial judge may be in the best position to determine whether the probative
value of the evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the trial. The trial judge
knows the issues, the evidence and the jury and is charged with the ultimate responsibility
of running a fair trial.
For these reasons appellate courts owe deference to decisions of trial judges to admit
or reject expert evidence.
(R v F(DS) (1999) 43 OR (3d) 609; R v B(CR) [1990] 1 SCR 717. See also R v K(A) (1999) 45
OR (3d) 641; R v Williams [1999] OJ No 1923 (QL) (CA); R v C (G) (1995) 110 CCC (3d) 233
9Nfld CA.)
However, where expert evidence has been contradictory and the decision of the
tribunal of fact has depended upon ‘feel’ or ‘judgment’, a superior court will not lightly
interfere to substitute its own views: X and Y (by her Tutor X) v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26 at
34. Thus, in Joyce v Yeomans [1981] 1 WLR 549 at 556, it was held:
There are various aspects of such evidence in respect of which the trial judge can get the
‘feeling’ of a case in a way in which an appellate court, reading the transcript, cannot.
Sometimes expert witnesses display signs of partisanship in a witness box or lack of
objectivity. This may or may not be obvious from the transcript, yet it may be quite plain
to the trial judge. Sometimes an expert witness may refuse to make what a more wise
witness would make, namely, proper concessions to the viewpoint of the other side. Here
again, this may or may not be apparent from the transcript, although plain to the trial
judge. I mention only two aspects of the matter, but there are others.
In Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority [1984] 1 WLR 634, where the House
of Lords affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal to reverse a judgment for medical
negligence given in favour of a plaintiff by a trial judge, Lord Scarman referred with
approval to the above passage and commented (at 637):
These are wise words of warning. … The relevant principle remains, namely that an
appellate court, if disposed to come to a different conclusion from the trial judge on the
printed evidence, should not do so unless satisfied that the advantage enjoyed by him of
seeing and hearing the witnesses is not sufficient to explain or justify his conclusion. But if
the appellate court is satisfied that he has not made a proper use of his advantage, ‘the
matter will then become at large for the appellate court’: Watt or Thomas v Thomas [1947]
AC 484 at 488.
Kirby J, in State Rail Authority (NSW) v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) (1999) 73
ALJR 306; [1999] HCA 3 at [93] (see, too, Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon (2003) 77 ALJR 1598;
[2003] HCA 48 at [98]) outlined cases where appellate intervention had occurred and been
upheld:
• cases where the primary judge’s conclusion, although expressed in terms of credibility,
was ‘plainly wrong’ as demonstrated by incontrovertible facts or uncontested
testimony;
• where the conclusion was based on evidence wrongly admitted, occasioning a
substantial miscarriage of the trial;
• where the reasons, going beyond credibility, indicated a consideration at trial of
irrelevant matters or a failure to weigh all relevant issues;
• where the circumstances in which evidence was given, relevant to credibility, were
unsatisfactory;
• where the primary judge had made it plain that credibility considerations or
impressions were not determinative for the judgment in question;
[4.0.360] 249
Part 4 – Appeals
• where the credibility determination leaves untouched other evidence which requires
separate evaluation with no obstacle of a credibility finding; and
• where, notwithstanding the credibility finding, the ‘extreme and overwhelming
pressure’ of the rest of the evidence at the trial is such as to render the conclusion
expressed at first instance so ‘glaringly improbable’ or ‘contrary to compelling
inferences’ of the case that it justifies and authorises appellate disturbance of the
conclusion reached at trial and the judgment giving it effect.
(Compare R v Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410; [2009] VSCA 307.)

The inability of appellate judges to observe the subtleties of demeanour (see Louth v
Diprose (1992) 110 ALR 1 at 16; Jones v Hyde (1989) 63 ALJR 349 at 351; Abalos v Australian
Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167 at 178; Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246 at 263)
and other matters only apparent at the trial itself has resulted in an unpreparedness by
appellate courts to overturn findings of fact unless they are satisfied ‘that any advantage
enjoyed by the trial judge by reason of having seen and heard the witnesses, could not be
sufficient to explain or justify the trial judge’s actions’: Watt or Thomas v Thomas [1947] AC
484 at 488; see also SS Hontestroom v SS Sagaporack [1927] AC 37; Knight v The Queen (1992)
175 CLR 495 at 511. Merely because a trial judge or, of course, a jury makes no reference to
demeanour or credibility, that is not to be construed as meaning that such matters played
no part in their determinations: Abalos v Australian Postal Commission (1990) 171 CLR 167 at
178.
This is especially the case where the steps in the expert reasoning process have
depended upon clinical experience or ‘feel’. It does not mean that appellate courts will not
subject expert evidence to critical scrutiny, focusing upon manifest errors of fact or
inadequacies of reasoning, but it does result in a further inhibition on the part of appellate
courts in relation to looking behind the decisions of tribunals of fact. An example of this
disinclination is to be found in the views of Abadee J in the important DNA profiling
decision of R v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554, where his Honour held (at 577):
When experts are at issue about complex technical matters the tribunal of fact may
determine credibility, reliability and acceptability by reference to its seeing and hearing
them. The jury are entitled to have regard to credibility, reliability and demeanour in
deciding their own assessment of the experts by reference to seeing them and hearing
them: Wilsher v Essex Area Health Authority [1988] AC 1074; Ahmedi v Ahmedi (1991) 23
NSWLR 288 per Clarke JA at 299–300; Public Trustee v Commonwealth (unreported, NSW
CA, 20 December 1995).
The significant impact criterion

[4.0.370] If a decision is made on the basis of the reception of inadmissible evidence or in
the absence of evidence that should have been admitted, in principle, the decision is
appealable: R v Gibson (1887) 18 QBD 537; Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486. However, if the
admissibility decision is determined to be wrong but the reception or rejection of evidence
would have had no impact upon the overall result of the case, in accordance with general
principles, the decision of the trier of fact at first instance will not be disturbed by the
appellate court: see R v Miers [1967] Qd R 547 at 552; R v Gidley [1984] 3 NSWLR 168 at
170–172; R v Demirok [1976] VR 244 at 251.
The starting point was explained by Dixon J in Piddington v Bennett (1940) 63 CLR 533
at 554:
The reception of inadmissible evidence gives an unsuccessful party against whom it was
tendered a prima facie right to a new trial. But if it appears that the verdict cannot have
been influenced by the inadmissible evidence or that independently of that evidence a
verdict other than that found would have been unreasonable or unsustainable the prima
facie right to a new trial is displaced.
250 [4.0.370]
(See also Balenzuela v De Gail (1959) 101 CLR 226 at 232; Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at
504–505; Hudd v The Queen (1987) 75 ALR 143; Driscoll v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 517;
Chamberlain v R (No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 615.)
Where the original trial was before a jury, a new trial may be refused where the
material ‘is of such a nature that it could not reasonably be supposed to have influenced
the result’ (Stokes v The Queen (1960) 105 CLR 279 at 284–285) or where the court ‘is
satisfied that if the rejected evidence had been received it could not have affected the
jury’s verdict’: Dairy Farmers Co-Op Milk Co Ltd v Acquilina (1963) 109 CLR 458 at 463; see
also Weal v Bottom (1966) 40 ALJR 436 at 442 per Taylor J. In the case of a trial before a
judge sitting alone, the appeal court is able to read the reasons of the trial judge for
reaching his or her findings. Dealing with a case of wrongful admission of evidence,
Barwick CJ, with whom Stephens and Jacobs JJ agreed, held in Vocisano v Vocisano (1974)
130 CLR 267 at 274–275:
Consequently, it is necessary to scan those reasons carefully to ensure that the
inadmissible material has not entered in any substantial degree into the conclusion which
the trial judge has formed. In my opinion, before a new trial is ordered in a case where the
verdict is in accordance with the evidence, it should be seen that the inadmissible matter
has been used by the judge in reaching his verdict.
(See also Kabadanis v Panagiotou (1980) 30 ALR 374 at 380; Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices
Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 353.)
Applying the same principle, the Full Court of the Federal Court in Arnotts Ltd v Trade
Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 354 held that certain material from an expert
economist had been wrongly rejected but determined that the error would make no
difference to the ultimate resolution of the case and so declined to grant a new trial on the
basis of the erroneous admissibility determination at first instance.
However, in the case of R v El-Yanni (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal,
Finlay J, 6 July 1993), where it was held that a trial judge in a drug importation matter
wrongly rejected evidence from a sociologist about contemporary lawlessness in Lebanon,
a somewhat more generous approach appears to have been adopted. It was held that the
appellant’s chance of acquittal ‘may only have been slim’ but the rejection of the expert
evidence, when coupled with an inappropriate direction concerning duress, removed such
slim chance as he had (at p 31). In the result, the appellant had been denied a fair trial and
a new trial was ordered.
Appeal against the exercise of discretion

[4.0.380] Appellate courts are slow to interfere with a discretionary decision of a trial
judge in relation to the admission of expert evidence.
In a leading New South Wales case, R v Duncan [1969] 2 NSWR 675 at 678, review of
the decision on expertise was held to depend on the rules relating to the exercise of
judicial discretion:
In a proper case [the judge] has a discretion to decide as a question of fact whether a
witness is possessed of the required qualifications. In systems governed by English law it
has repeatedly been declared that the decision upon the experimental qualifications of
witnesses should be left to the determination of the trial judge.
It has been held that an appellate court should not interfere except where the ‘discretion’
has been abused, such as where there is absolutely no evidence that the witness had the
qualifications of an expert and yet his or her evidence has been admitted as expert opinion
testimony, or ‘where in deciding upon the issue of his competency the trial court has
proceeded upon erroneous legal standards’: Bratt v Western Air Lines (1946) 166 ALR 1061,
followed by Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 503.
[4.0.380] 251
Part 4 – Appeals
The decision in R v Duncan [1969] 2 NSWR 675 at 678 appears to have its genesis in a
passage in Wigmore on Evidence (1970–1981, Vol 2, para 561), where it was argued that ‘the
trial court must be left to determine, absolutely and without review, the fact of possession
of the required qualification by a particular witness’. This view was specifically disavowed
in Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 502–503 by Menzies J, who pointed out that the
American cases cited to support the proposition:
show that courts of appeal will review the decision of a primary judge upon a witness’s
qualifications when the qualifying facts relied upon are undisputed, or where there was
no evidence of any qualifications, or the primary judge has made a palpable mistake or his
decision appears on the evidence to be erroneous or to have been founded upon some
error of law.
This highlights the unpreparedness of appellate courts to countenance appeals asserting

errors of fact – that aspect of the judge’s decision is reviewable only if it is completely
against the weight of evidence, while its legal component is reviewable if an error of law
can be demonstrated.
Menzies J (at 503) indorsed the annotation to the United States decision of Bratt v
Western Air Lines (1946) 166 ALR 1061 at 1067:
The qualification and competency of one to give opinion evidence as an expert is
primarily in the discretion of the trial court, and the admission or exclusion of such
testimony on the ground that the witness was or was not qualified to testify as to his
opinion as an expert, will not be reviewed or reversed by the appellate court except where
such discretion has been abused or where there is absolutely no evidence that the witness
had the qualifications of an expert, or where in deciding upon the question of his
competency the trial court has proceeded upon erroneous legal standards.
Specifically applying the words of Menzies J, Brennan J in Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167
CLR 94 at 122 commented that if the trial judge had determined that the psychologist in
question ‘did not possess the relevant expertise, his decision would not have been readily
reviewed’.
However, the correctness of describing the decision as to expertise as an exercise of
discretion has been called into question by Green CJ in Price v The Queen [1981] Tas R 306
at 312–313. His Honour argued that the determination of the issue does not involve:
the exercise of a discretion in the sense in which that word is usually understood: cf Grace
v Southern [1978] VR 75. When a judge is determining whether a witness is qualified to
give opinion evidence he is not making a value judgment of the kind which is made when
he is exercising a discretion involving criteria such as fairness, reasonableness or public
policy. He is determining as a matter of fact whether the witness’s expertise or experience
are such as to qualify him to give opinion evidence. No doubt the determination of that
question can involve difficulties in borderline cases and no hard and fast rules can be laid
down, but in the end, although it might involve making a judgment, it is not a matter of
discretion.
The Chief Justice pointed out that the passage in Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 503
where Menzies J approved of a statement made in a United States case that ‘the
qualification and competency of one to give opinion evidence as an expert is primarily in
the discretion of the trial court’ was preceded by the following:
In truth, the decision of a trial judge that a witness is qualified to give expert evidence is
very much a question of fact and it is entitled to all, but no more than, the weight that a
court of appeal gives to a finding of fact upon the hearing of an action.
It appears that confusion has crept into the two-step judicial decision on admissibility.
Properly analysed, the decision of the judicial officer on what qualifications the expert
possesses is one of fact and only reviewable by an appellate court if it is against the weight
252 [4.0.380]
of evidence. The decision on whether those qualifications are sufficient to designate the
witness for relevant purposes as an expert is one of law, involving the application of the
legal standard in the expertise rule.
Similarly, it is a question for the judge’s determination whether a witness will exceed
the parameters of his or her expertise by giving evidence on a particular area: R v Oakley
(1980) 70 Cr App R 7 at 11; R v Murphy (1980) 71 Cr App R 33 at 35; see Pattenden (1990).
Conceptually, such a finding is one of fact and subject to review only on the criteria
relating to decisions of fact rather than discretionary decisions. However, to the extent that
the exclusionary rule is applied to the facts, the decision is reviewable as a matter of law.
A decision as to whether a witness’s evidence transgresses the common knowledge
rule, the basis rule or the ultimate issue rule similarly has a factual and a legal component
and may be reviewed accordingly.
Appeal on the ground of the wrong admission of expert evidence

[4.0.390] Much of the appellate case law regarding expert evidence relates to assertions
that expert evidence should or should not have been admitted on the ground that the
expert was not adequately qualified – that is, the expertise rule has not been complied
with adequately: see, eg, Price v The Queen [1981] Tas R 306 at 312–313 per Green CJ
dissentient; Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 503; Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17
FLR 141 at 160; R v Darrington [1980] VR 353 at 133.
Courts of appeal are slow to reverse the decision to admit the evidence of a witness
determined at first instance to be an expert: Bratt v Western Air Lines (1946) 166 ALR 1061
at 1067; Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 503 per Menzies J; Middleton v The Queen (2000)
114 A Crim R 258; [2000] WASCA 213 at [21]. The qualification and competency of a
witness to give opinion evidence as an expert have been repeatedly held to be
quintessentially a decision of the trial court and not readily reviewable on appeal: see, eg,
Middleton v The Queen (2000) 114 A Crim R 258; [2000] WASCA 213 at [21].
However, appeals have been brought successfully by parties adversely affected by the
admission of inadmissible expert evidence when each one of the rules of expert evidence
admissibility has been improperly interpreted by courts of first instance. For instance, in
1989, the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Accused [1989] 1 NZLR 714 was called upon
to rule the correctness of a decision at first instance allowing the Crown to call as a witness
a psychologist, who was also a school guidance counsellor, to counter the suggestion
arising from cross-examination that the complainant had fabricated her allegations. She
gave evidence that the complainant had exhibited behavioural characteristics consistent
with the characteristics of sexually abused children: see also R v Inch (1990) 91 Cr App R
51.
The Court of Appeal held (at 720–721) that it had not been properly established that
children subject to sexual abuse demonstrate ‘certain characteristics or act in peculiar
ways which are so unmistakable that they can be said to be concomitants of sexual abuse;
or that expert evidence in this field was able to indicate with a sufficient degree of
compulsion features which establish that the evidence of the complainant was indeed
truthful’. (See also R v Parker [1912] VLR 152 at 154 per Madden CJ; R v Lewis (1987) 29 A
Crim R 267.)
In a not dissimilar case involving ‘child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome’, the
Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal overturned convictions for indecent assault on the
basis that expert evidence led for the prosecution had not been shown to be relevant and
that it had functioned to bolster or buttress the complainant’s credibility: Ingles v The
Queen (unreported, Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal, 4 May 1993). Crawford J held
that he had not been persuaded ‘that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually
occurred’, while Zeeman J held that there was a ‘substantial risk that the jury used [the
[4.0.390] 253
Part 4 – Appeals
expert’s evidence] to bolster the credit of the complainant’. To similar effect, the Supreme
Court of Canada by majority held in R v DD 2000 SCC 43 that a trial judge had erred in
admitting evidence by a psychologist that a child’s delay in alleging sexual abuse does not
support an inference of falsehood.
In R v Faulkner [1987] 2 Qd R 263, the Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal held that
expert evidence had been wrongly admitted at first instance in a criminal law case of
dangerous driving as to the direction of travel and the relative position at the time of
impact of two vehicles. It held that the opinions admitted were within the ordinary range
of human experience and that the jurors would have been capable of assessing the
evidence upon which the opinions were based. However, the opinions advanced by an
expert witness, who was a principal research fellow in mechanical engineering from the
University of Queensland, were based on an assumption as to the point of collision which
was not squarely put to the jury for their assessment.
Speaking on behalf of the court, McPherson J found that the witness’s evidence ‘served
to obscure the real question in the case’ (at 266) and held:
Because the question whether the impact took place at the point (if it can be so described)
where the debris was found was not squarely put to the jury as a matter of fact for their
critical evaluation and decision, rather than that of an engineering expert, I am disposed to
consider that the trial miscarried.
A further problem in the conduct of the trial was highlighted – the trial judge incorrectly
summed up the expert’s evidence, using the wording of the expert’s report to which he
had had regard for the admissibility determination. However, the report was never
admitted into evidence so in effect the judge introduced extraneous evidence to the jury in
his summing up. The Court of Criminal Appeal applied the test expounded by the High
Court in Simic v The Queen (1980) 144 CLR 319 at 326:
[I]f it is considered reasonably possible that the mis-statement may have affected the
verdict and if the jury might reasonably have acquitted the appellant if the mis-statement
had not been made, there will have been a miscarriage of justice, and a substantial one.
Along the same lines, it was held in R v Hally [1962] Qd R 214 at 231 that the admission of
inadmissible expert evidence that a party had acted dishonestly was ‘so damaging that it
cannot be said that the Crown has made it clear that there is no real possibility that justice
has miscarried’: see Mraz v The Queen (1955) 93 CLR 493 at 514.
The criterion was put slightly differently by the New South Wales Court of Criminal
Appeal in Fizzell v The Queen (1987) 31 A Crim R 213, in which one of the successful
grounds of appeal was that the Crown should not have been permitted to have the results
of a blood analysis conducted by a scientist considered by the jury as no evidence had
been led as to who had actually placed the blood which she had removed from a boot on
a PGM plate and as to who had recorded various entries in a laboratory book. The court
held that, in those circumstances, the expert evidence that had been led as to the analysis
should not have been admitted. The court applied Abadom v The Queen [1983] 1 WLR 126
at 131 and held (at 220) ‘not without regret, in view of what we regard as the strength of
the Crown case’ and the probable correctness of the expert’s evidence, that it was
‘impossible to say’ that the error had not affected the result or that ‘the jury would
certainly have returned the same verdict if it had not occurred’: see Driscoll v The Queen
(1977) 137 CLR 517 at 543 per Gibbs J (as the Chief Justice then was).
An important ground for the duty of a trial judge in a criminal matter before a jury to
exclude expert evidence is where a jury is not in a position to evaluate the expert
evidence. An example occurred in R v Juric (2002) 4 VR 411; [2002] VSCA 77 at [18], where
the Victorian Court of Appeal held that a trial judge had erred in failing to exclude DNA
profiling evidence in circumstances where the jury could not have ‘intelligently
interpreted’ the results of testing and where the results were in large part open to
254 [4.0.390]
competing hypotheses, none of which could be preferred to the other upon any scientific
basis. It appears that where there is ‘no underlying basis of fact or science which would
enable a reasonable jury to adequately assess the strength of an opinion’, and expert
evidence is not withdrawn from a jury, an appealable error may lie (at [18]):
In a criminal trial where the Crown proposes to lead expert opinion evidence which, if
accepted, is of critical importance to the case which it is making, the jury must be able to
evaluate the strength of that evidence by reference to its factual or scientific basis.
In R v DD 2000 SCC 43, the Canadian Supreme Court found that psychological evidence
led by the prosecution that delayed disclosure of sexual abuse could occur for a variety of
reasons and does not indicate that the truth of an allegation had been wrongly admitted
because it was not necessary. It set aside the jury decision and ordered a new trial.
More often than not, though, appeals asserting erroneous admission or incorrect
rejection of expert evidence have failed. An example is to be found in the leading case of R
v Turner [1975] 1 QB 834 at 846–847, where the Court of Appeal held that on a charge of
murder, evidence from a psychiatrist that the defendant was not suffering from a mental
illness and was not violent by nature, but that his personality was such that he could have
been provoked and was likely to be telling the truth, had been correctly held inadmissible
at first instance.
Similarly, in R v Skirving [1985] 2 WLR 1001 at 1029 (see also Price v The Queen [1981]
Tas R 306), the English Court of Appeal held that expert evidence on the effects of cocaine
and the methods by which it is taken had been correctly admitted at first instance, as such
substances are ‘not in the experience of the ordinary person … without it the jury would
have been in the dark’. (See, too, R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600; 2000 SCC 51, where a trial
judge’s exclusion of profiling evidence was held to have been correct.)
Appeal on the basis of failure to hold a voire dire

[4.0.400] Where a substantive issue is raised on behalf of a litigant in relation to the
admissibility of expert evidence, the correct course is for there to be a voire dire. A failure
to convene such a voire dire can itself be a ground for appeal: R v Bjordal (2005) 93 SASR
237; [2005] SASC 422.
Appeal on the ground of the wrong rejection of expert evidence

[4.0.410] A number of significant appeals have been decided in the appellant’s favour on
the ground that a trial judge wrongly refused to allow expert opinion evidence to be
admitted. However, appeals against discretionary determinations pursuant to the
prejudice–probative discretion are very rare.
In the leading case of Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94, the majority of the
Australian High Court held that a psychologist’s evidence, which had been declared
inadmissible by the trial judge, ought to have been admitted. The evidence would have
been led to cast doubt upon the reliability of the appellant’s allegedly voluntary
confessional statements. As the court found that if the record of interview had been
rejected, the appellant may not inevitably have been convicted, it determined that there
had been a ‘substantial miscarriage of justice’ (at 49) as a result of the wrongful exclusion
of the expert evidence: see also R v Darrington [1980] VR 353 at 133; R v McEndoo (1981) 5
A Crim R 52 at 54.
In R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600; 2000 SCC 51, the Canadian Supreme Court held that
evidence about the incompatibility of the personality of the accused with a predisposition
to commit sexual assaults on young male children had been correctly excluded on the
basis that the possibility that such evidence would distort the fact-finding process was
very real.
[4.0.410] 255
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It has also been held that if an expert gives an opinion which is based on matters that
the law prevents being the subject of opinion, that opinion should be rejected: Steffen v
Ruban [1996] 2 NSWR 622; (1966) 84 WN (Pt 1) (NSW) 264 at 269; Pownall v Conlan
Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370 at 376–377. McHugh J put it that ‘[t]o allow the
opinion to stand would mean that it would be based on material that could not be the
subject of curial examination’: HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999] HCA 2 at [95].
An appeal is open upon such a ground.
Similarly, in the landmark case of R v Runjanjic (1991) 53 A Crim R 362 at 369, the South
Australian Court of Criminal Appeal overturned the decision to reject expert evidence at
first instance determined to be inadmissible, in this instance relating to battered woman
syndrome: see also Lavallee v The Queen [1990] 1 SCR 852; (1990) 55 CCC (3d) 97 at 112.
It is an error to reject evidence that is opinion evidence based on specialised
knowledge requiring specified training, study or experience in a field in which the witness
is an expert as not constituting expert evidence: Sydney South West Area Health Service v
Stamoulis [2009] NSWCA 153 at [186].
In R v Carn (1981) 5 A Crim R 234, the Western Australian Court of Criminal Appeal
held that the trial judge should not have ruled inadmissible evidence of a psychologist
that the accused was of borderline mentally defective intelligence and might have a brain
impairment. It confirmed, though, that it was not possible for the expert to go further and
give an opinion as to whether the effect of this evidence in the particular case was or was
not such as to negative a finding of intent: see Ch 2.15. In Nepi v Northern Territory [1997]
NTSC 153, Martin CJ upheld an appeal on the basis that a psychologist’s evidence in
relation to PTSD had wrongly been determined to be inadmissible on the basis that he was
not competent to express opinions on the subject.
If evidence is rejected on the basis that the technique, instrument or methodology has
not been used before, this constitutes an appealable error: R v McHardie [1983] 2 NSWLR
733 at 763; Mallard v The Queen (2003) 28 WAR 1; [2003] WASCA 296 at [270].
Appealable directions when expert evidence conflicts

[4.0.420] Little appellate case law exists on the appropriate directions to be given by a trial
judge when evidence by forensic experts is in diametric or even substantial opposition. In
Laverty v The Queen (No 2) (1979) 47 CCC (2d) 60 at 62, it was held that no special warning
for a jury was necessary on the basis that ‘any frailty that may attend a case containing
conflicting opinion evidence is adequately encompassed by the concept of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt’.
In R v Platt [1981] Crim LR 332, a case involving conflicting evidence by pathologists as
to the maximum time between the infliction of certain head injuries and the brain death of
the deceased, the English Court of Appeal held (at 332):
The only safe way of directing the jury was either to tell them that before they accepted
the opinion of the prosecution’s pathologist they must feel sure that he was correct, or else
to tell them that they were to assume that the defence pathologist was right and, therefore,
to approach the case on the other evidence solely and not base their approach on the
pathologist’s evidence at all.
The court overturned the jury’s decision on the basis that the trial judge’s direction had
done neither of these things but had simply asked the jury to decide which of the two
bodies of medical evidence they preferred: see also R v Parnell (1983) 9 CCC (3d) 353 at
363–364; R v Molnar (1990) 55 CCC (3d) 446. In R v Bjordal (2005) 93 SASR 237; [2005] SASC
422 at [42], for instance, Debelle J held that, where there was a clear conflict between the
evidence of expert witnesses (about the calculation of a vehicle’s speed), ‘it was necessary
for the trial judge to direct the jury on that conflict and the means by which to evaluate
that evidence’. Part of the responsibility can extend to the obligation to direct the attention
of a jury to the defence case as to the unreliability of particular expert evidence.
256 [4.0.420]
It is clear that it is inappropriate for the trial judge simply to ask the jury to determine
which expert or which version of expert evidence they prefer. Expert evidence is only one
factor in a case to be considered in deciding whether the Crown has discharged its onus of
proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt: Chamberlain v R (No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153
CLR 521; R v Laverty (No 2) (1979) 47 CCC (2d) 60 at 62; R v Parnell (1983) 9 CCC (3d) 353
at 364; Nicholas v The Queen (1989) 45 A Crim R 299 at 311.
Similarly, a summing up to a jury which is unjustifiably weighted in favour of one
expert’s evidence over another’s may give ground for grievance to be expressed
successfully on appeal. The standard principles apply, included among which is the
principle that the judge’s summing up must be balanced and fair to all parties.
Appealable directions when expert evidence is uncontradicted

[4.0.430] In a number of cases, judges have been held to have instructed jurors correctly
that they should accept expert evidence on central issues where it is of such a kind that it
could only be provided by an expert and where it is unchallenged by any other evidence:
see, eg, R v Matheson [1958] 2 All ER 87; 42 Cr App R 145 at 89; R v Michaux [1984] 2 Qd R
159 at 164, 177–178; Morgan v Attorney-General [1987] 2 Qd R 627; see also Nokes (1962,
p 177). Similarly, a court of appeal has been found able properly to find rejection of expert
evidence to have been erroneous when ‘there is unchallenged evidence … and no facts or
circumstances appear that can displace or throw doubt on that evidence’: R v Matheson
[1958] 2 All ER 87; 42 Cr App R 145; Samuels v Flavel [1970] SASR 256 at 258.
Thus, it has been held to be a serious misdirection for a trial judge to direct members of
a jury that they were entitled to form their own opinion and to disregard expert evidence
led for the accused that there was no blood on the boots worn by the accused at the time
of an alleged murder, when this was the only evidence on the issue and only a scientist
would have been qualified to give such evidence: Anderson v The Queen [1972] AC 100 at
106.
Similarly, in R v Dick [1966] Qd R 301, Gibbs J adopted the words used by the Court of
Criminal Appeal in R v Matheson [1958] 2 All ER 87; 42 Cr App R 145 at 90:
If, then, there is unchallenged evidence that there is abnormality of mind and consequent
substantial impairment of mental responsibility, and no facts or circumstances appear that
can displace or throw doubt on that evidence, it seems to the court that we are bound to
say that a verdict of murder is unsupported by the evidence.
(See also Tumanako v The Queen (1993) 64 A Crim R 149 at 173–174.)

In Taylor v The Queen (1978) 45 FLR 343 at 364, the Full Court of the Federal Court said
in reference to the view of Gibbs J:
This passage is a clear illustration of the inability of the jury to reject unanimous medical
evidence unless there is other evidence which can displace or throw doubt on that
evidence. In our opinion the medical evidence was not put to the jury by the trial judge in
this way but it was invited to reject or accept that evidence as it wished without any
explanation that it was only entitled to reject that evidence if there were other facts or
circumstances which it accepted and which were sufficient to cause it to reject the medical
evidence.
(See too R v Gemmill (2004) 8 VR 242; [2004] VSCA 72.)

An important issue is whether any form of challenge is mounted to the expert
evidence. The notion of challenging has been held to be a broad one and to encompass the
leading of contrary expert evidence; the querying of the expert’s qualifications during
cross-examination; challenge to the factual basis of the expert’s views (R v Wallace [1982]
Qd R 265 (note); Morgan v Attorney-General [1987] 2 Qd R 627 at 648–649 per Dowsett J);
the leading of contrary evidence from lay witnesses (see Walton v The Queen [1978] AC 788
at 793); and an invitation by counsel to reject the whole or material parts of the expert’s
[4.0.430] 257
Part 4 – Appeals
testimony: Morgan v Attorney-General [1987] 2 Qd R 627 at 637 per McPherson J. In Morgan

v Attorney-General [1987] 2 Qd R 627 at 638, McPherson J provided the striking example of
Sutcliffe v The Queen (unreported, Court of Appeal, 1982, No 2697/R/81) (the ‘Yorkshire
Ripper’ case), where there was a verdict contrary to the expert evidence, which had been
contradicted in effect by the accused himself:
[T]he Crown had been prepared to accept a plea of guilty to manslaughter on the ground
of diminished responsibility; but the trial judge required the matter to be determined by a
jury, who in due course found the accused guilty of murder. On appeal the conviction was
upheld notwithstanding the unanimous opinion of three doctors at the trial that the
accused was suffering from a form of insanity called encapsulated paranoid schizophrenia.
Their opinion was based on the claim by the accused that he genuinely believed that he
had a divine mission to kill prostitutes. As to that, Lord Lane said:
… much of what he had told the police and said to others, was inconsistent with the
existence of a genuine belief. We take the view that where there is room for a genuine
difference of opinion on facts of this nature and importance, it is, generally speaking,
better left to a jury to decide the issue, particularly where, as in this case, there is a
suggestion that the doctors were being hoodwinked by the defendant.
If there is reason on the basis of the information before the court, whether arising from the
experts reaching their views on different bases or because of other material available to the
court, it may be appropriate for a jury to reject unanimous expert evidence. The
Queensland Court of Appeal in R v De Voss (unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal,
24 November 1995) held that ‘the only basis on which the jury was entitled to reject the
psychiatric evidence was that there was reason to doubt the accuracy of the factual basis
on which the psychiatrists arrived at their medical conclusions’. However, the court was at
pains to stress that a jury is ‘not entitled to reject rational opinions based on evidence and
to substitute their own opinion based on some of the same evidence’ (p 20).
In Morgan v Attorney-General [1987] 2 Qd R 627 at 639, the majority found that the only
medical evidence before the jury was unanimous and that the defence witnesses all said
that the accused was suffering from diminished responsibility. However, the evidence,
while uncontradicted, was not unchallenged – counsel for the Crown sought to elicit from
the medical witnesses the concession that it was the influence of alcohol that caused the
killing (McPherson J, dissenting, at 639).
On the reasoning outlined above, any attempt to detract from the credibility of the
expert’s evidence would be sufficient to enable a jury to be instructed that they could, at
least potentially, make a finding contrary to the expert’s evidence.
Foreign law
[4.0.440] If expert evidence is given on foreign law and it is not contradicted, it has been
held that the court must accept it even if the conclusions are surprising: Re Banque des
Marchands de Moscou (Koupetschesky) [1958] 1 Ch 182 at 194. However, if the uncontradicted
evidence is ‘extravagant’, ‘blatantly absurd’ or ‘obviously false’ (Rossano v Manufacturers’
Life Insurance Co [1963] 2 QB 352 at 374; A/S Tallinna Laevauhisus v Estonian State SS Line
(1947) 80 Ll L Rep 99 at 108; O’Callaghan v O’Sullivan [1925] 1 IR 90 at 119), or if the
witness never ‘applied his mind to the real point of law’ (Re Valentine’s Settlement [1965]
Ch 831 at 835 per Salmon LJ (dissenting), cf Calwood v Calwood [1960] AC 659), the court
may reject it and examine the foreign sources to form its own conclusions. Dicey and
Morris (1980, Vol II, p 1211) have summarised the position thus:
The court may reject an expert’s opinion as to the meaning of a foreign statute if it is
inconsistent with the text or the English translation and is not justified by reference to any
special rule of construction of foreign law. If the evidence of several expert witnesses
conflicts as to the effect of foreign sources the court is entitled and indeed bound to look
itself at those sources in order to make an informed decision between the conflicting
testimony.
258 [4.0.440]
It may also be that where the evidence as to the constitutionality or vires of foreign
legislation conflicts, so long as the evidence is ordinarily justiciable, the court can
determine it: Mann (1943, p 155).
It is not sufficient for experts to prove a foreign statute or code by a translation and to
leave the court to place its own construction on it; it must be interpreted by experts in
foreign law. When they vouch a statute to support their evidence, that statute forms part
of their evidence and must be considered with the evidence as a whole: Re Banque des
Marchands de Moscou (Koupetschesky) [1958] 1 Ch 182 at 194. The expert witness in foreign
law may, but need not, incorporate into his or her evidence extracts from appropriate
statutes, authorised decisions and leading academic writings. Failure to produce a
relevant statute or code will affect the weight which the tribunal will attach to the
evidence but will not of itself determine its admissibility: Temilkovski v Australian Iron &
Steel Pty Ltd (1966) 67 SR (NSW) 211 at 216.
Appeal on the ground of the absence of expert evidence

[4.0.450] There are a number of litigation scenarios in which a plaintiff in civil litigation
has no proper basis for success without a supportive independent expert medical report.
An example is medical negligence litigation against, for instance, a hospital, where it is the
responsibility of those representing a plaintiff to ascertain whether ‘there are reasonable
grounds’ for commencing the action: ‘Initiation and prosecution of an action in negligence
on behalf of the plaintiff against the hospital necessarily requires appropriate expert
evidence to support it.’ (Reidy v The National Maternity Hospital [1997] IEHC 143 at [24] per
Barr J). Without such a basis in expert opinion evidence for an action, the civil action may
constitute an abuse of process (Hunt v Gormley [2019] IEHC 316 at [4] per Barrett J).
Occasionally, a case is overturned on appeal when expert evidence should have been
led but was not: United States Shipping Board v The St Albans [1931] AC 632; R v Chow (1991)
65 CCC (3d) 162. Thus, in Muir v Stewart [1938] SC 590, a reparation action against a
pharmacist failed because of the plaintiff’s failure to establish the relevant professional
standards of care, using expert evidence.
For the most part, the cases have held that in some circumstances it simply will not be
possible for one or the other side to discharge its evidentiary onus without calling expert
evidence in support of the contentions which it wishes to advance. The issue is one of
common sense rather than law – in some circumstances, the absence of supportive expert
evidence will so weaken a party’s case that a finding in its favour would be against the
weight of evidence.
Thus, in Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 354, the Full
Court of the Federal Court responded to submissions that the respondents could not
succeed in the litigation involving s 50 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) without calling
an expert witness. The court acknowledged that economics – like law, medicine and
science – is not a static body of learning, but held that it does not follow that expert
evidence is essential to success in s 50 cases:
In order to make out a contravention of s 50 an applicant must establish a number of facts.
They include either existing or likely future dominance of a market. It is true that the
notion of market domination stems from the science of economics; but the words used in
the section are ordinary English words and it is for the judge to construe them. Expert
evidence will often be important, sometimes critical, because it may enable the application
of the concept of market domination to the facts of a particular case. But counsel go too far
in submitting that such evidence is critical to an applicant’s success.
On some occasions, courts have refused to make a particular finding when there is a
dearth of evidence, in particular expert evidence, on a specific point. Thus, in The Nerano v
The Dromedary (1895) 22 R 237, a case involving the collision between two ships during a
thick fog on the Clyde, the court refused to draw inferences concerning the speed of one of
[4.0.450] 259
Part 4 – Appeals
the vessels at the time of the collision from the nature and extent of the damage to the
other. It refused on the ground that no expert evidence had been led on the point, and
although the court was sitting with a nautical assessor, it was held to be inappropriate
simply to procure his opinion on the issue.
Appeal on the ground of failure to call expert evidence

[4.0.460] In general terms, it is incumbent upon the Crown to call ‘all witnesses whose
testimony is necessary for the presentation of the whole picture, to the extent that it can be
presented by admissible and available evidence … unless valid reason exists for refraining
from calling a particular witness or witnesses, such as that the interests of justice would be
prejudiced rather than served by the calling of an unduly large number of witnesses to
establish a particular point’: Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 664 per Deane J;
see also 674–675 per Dawson J (with whom Gibbs CJ and Brennan J agreed on the point at
660). Where a failure to call witnesses, including expert witnesses, constitutes a
miscarriage of justice in the sense of depriving the accused of a chance of acquittal that
was fairly open, this will constitute a legitimate ground of appeal.
However, as held by Gaudron J in Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; [2002] HCA
4 at [118], the law does not stipulate that where there is a conflict in the evidence of expert
witnesses, ‘the interests of justice require the prosecution to call all experts who are known
to have expressed opinions on the matter in issue’.
Appeal on the ground of findings made without expert evidence

[4.0.465] Even though a court or tribunal may be a specialist body, well accustomed to the
adducing of particular kinds of expert evidence, this does not entitle it to make decisions
which are not based on the evidence adduced before it: Strinic v Singh (2009) 74 NSWLR
419; [2009] NSWCA 15 at [60].
Appeal on the ground of judge's failure to provide findings and reasons

[4.0.470] Where there is conflicting expert evidence in a civil case and the view taken by
the tribunal of fact on the expert evidence is critical for the ultimate decision, it is
appropriate that the trial judge articulate findings and provide reasons for his or her
decision which include discussion of the evidence given by the different expert witnesses.
Failure to provide such findings and reasons may well be appealable: see generally Kirby
(1994, p 121).
In a significant appellate decision, the majority of the New South Wales Court of
Appeal in NRMA Insurance Ltd v Tatt (1990) 94 FLR 339 upheld submissions by the
appellant that the trial judge had failed to make findings on material issues in a case
involving considerable amounts of expert evidence in which arson was alleged.
Samuels JA (Hope JA agreeing and McHugh JA dissenting) applied the principle
expounded by Asprey JA in Pettitt v Dunkley [1971] 1 NSWLR 376 at 382 (see also
Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247; Beale v Government Insurance
Office (NSW) (1997) 48 NSWLR 430; Waterways Authority of New South Wales v Coal and
Allied (Operations) Pty Ltd [2007] NSWCA 276) that failure to state findings and reasons for
a judicial decision constitutes an error of law and held (at 351) that:
[His Honour] has explained the nature of the appellant’s case, the reasoning which
informed it and the general character of the technical matters upon which it relied. But
although the judgment recounts the submissions, it does not pass upon any of them.
Indeed, when his Honour comes to list his ‘three principal observations’, the three respects
in which he regarded the appellant’s argument as defective, the response in point of
explicit findings was limited to Dr S’s agreement with his Honour’s view that fires were
unpredictable and their investigation ‘a fairly unscientific field, and to the final conclusion
vindicating the respondents on the ground of their demeanour and the objective facts of
260 [4.0.460]
their circumstances’ … There was no mention of such objective facts as burn patterns or
other aspects of the appearance of wreckage or any discussion of the expert evidence. He
does not say whether he prefers Dr S to Dr B and Mr S; he expresses no view as to
whether the opinions of Mr D and Mr C about the likelihood of electrical fires were well
or ill founded. He makes no finding about the accuracy or otherwise of the observations of
Mr W, the fire captain … nor does he say anything about the observations and opinions
expressed by the police officers who conducted the investigation. Findings about all of
these matters were, in my view, essential to a proper assessment of the case.
By contrast, McHugh JA (at 354) was not prepared to disturb the trial judge’s
disinclination ‘to accept the logical consequence of the opinions of the defendant’s experts
which was that the plaintiffs were involved in setting their home alight’. He noted that
‘the evidence of the defendant’s experts on paper is cogent. But there was a contrary
expert opinion which listed the chance of an electrical fault of some kind as equally
probable’. McHugh JA agreed (at 354) that the trial judge ‘should have expressed in more
detail his reasons for rejecting the defendant’s case’, but as the reasons appeared to relate
to his assessment of the credibility of lay witnesses, he was not inclined to disturb such
assessments which the trial judge was peculiarly in a position to make.
In Council of the City of Liverpool v Turano [2008] NSWCA 270 at [218], Almond J referred
to the judicial obligation to give reasons and held that it ‘extends to engaging with the
expert evidence and to explain why expert evidence is accepted or rejected: Flannery v
Halifax Estate Agencies Ltd [2000] 1 WLR 377; Moylan v The Nutrasweet Company [2000]
NSWCA 337; Wiki v Atlantis Relocations (NSW) Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 174; (2004) 60
NSWLR 127’.
Kirby P has pointed out that although a high standard has been set out, particularly in
New South Wales, for legally trained judicial officers in relation to the obligation to
provide reasons for decisions, ‘the Court of Appeal has adopted a somewhat different
approach to the reasons stated by non-lawyers who make up specialised bodies subject to
its review’: see Kirby (1994, p 130). In Brimbella Pty Ltd v Mosman Municipal Council (1985)
79 LGERA 367 (see also Bisley Investment Corp Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1982)
59 FLR 132 at 157), his Honour remarked:
[I]t is undesirable in an appeal from a lay tribunal, where the appeal court is confined to a
question of law, that it should examine too narrowly the words used in the decision, at
least unless the words are central to the decision involved. Increasingly courts have to
review, on questions of law, expert specialist tribunals. … I am not by these words
suggesting double standards; simply that the Court should take into proper account the
composition of the tribunal, as it has been created by Parliament.
Appeal where conflict between expert and lay evidence

[4.0.480] In some cases, such as voice identification evidence and in relation to the
recognition of a device or detector, both lay and expert evidence are admissible. Where in
such instances expert and lay evidence conflict, expert evidence must be preferred. If
expert evidence is called to the effect, for example, that a device is not a radar detector but
used for some other purpose (see Director of Public Prosecutions v Parsons [1993] 1 VR 1 at
5), it would be a legitimate ground of appeal if any weight were attached to a lay witness’s
evidence that a device was a radar detector.
Appeal on the ground of fresh or new expert evidence

[4.0.490] ‘Fresh evidence’ is evidence which either did not exist at the time of trial or
which could not then with reasonable diligence have been discovered.
‘New evidence’ is evidence which was available at trial or which could then, with
reasonable diligence, have been discovered (see Freckelton (2008)).
Appellate courts are loath to set aside convictions on the basis of new evidence. In
Lawless v The Queen (1979) 142 CLR 659, Mason J said (at 675–676):
[4.0.490] 261
Part 4 – Appeals
However, it is not permissible for a court of criminal appeal to set aside a conviction if the
newly adduced evidence, not being fresh evidence strictly so called, reveals no more than
a likelihood that the jury would have returned a verdict of not guilty. Two considerations
operate to bring about this result. The first is that in a criminal trial the accused is entitled
to decide how his case will be conducted, in particular, what evidence he will call. He
makes this decision in the light of the knowledge that he is tried but once, unless error or
miscarriage of justice results in a successful appeal. He cannot therefore conduct his
defence by keeping certain evidence back in the expectation that, if he is convicted, the
existence of the uncalled evidence will provide a ground for a second trial at which a
different or refurbished defence may be presented. Accordingly, an accused person, if
convicted, generally cannot complain of a miscarriage of justice if he deliberately chooses
not to call material evidence, it being actually available to him at the time of the trial, or if
he fails to exercise reasonable diligence in seeking out material evidence.
The second consideration is that there must be powerful reasons for disturbing a
conviction obtained after a trial which has been regularly conducted … If the evidence
newly adduced falls short of establishing that the accused should not have been convicted,
there is no overwhelming reason why the conviction, regularly obtained after a fair trial
should not be allowed to stand.
Similarly, in Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259; [1989] HCA 35, Toohey and
Gaudron JJ held (at 301):
There is no miscarriage of justice in the failure to call evidence at trial if that evidence was
then available, or, with reasonable diligence, could have been available: see Ratten v The
Queen (1974) 131 CLR 510, at pp 516–517, per Barwick CJ.
While it has been suggested that the distinction between fresh and new evidence is not as
significant as it once was (see, eg, Nolan v The Queen (unreported, WA Court of Criminal
Appeal, Library No 970260, 22 May 1997) per Malcolm CJ, with whom Pidgeon and
Murray JJ were in agreement), the balance of recent authority suggests otherwise. In
Mallard v The Queen (2003) 28 WAR 1; [2003] WASCA 296 at [12]–[13], it was held that the
distinction is one which is soundly based in principle and which continues to be
recognised: see, eg, Easterday v The Queen (2003) 143 A Crim R 154; [2003] WASCA 69 at
[204]; Mickelberg v The Queen (2004) 29 WAR 13; [2004] WASCA 145 at [415] per Steytler J,
although, as was noted in Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 510 at 517, and again in
Mickelberg (at 301), there may be somewhat greater latitude in the case of criminal trials
than in the case of civil trials (see also Mallard at [14]).
Before fresh evidence (expert or otherwise) will be admitted, it must be such that when
viewed in combination with the evidence given at trial, it can be said that the jury would
have been likely to entertain a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the accused if all the
evidence had been before it or, if there be a practical difference, that there is a significant
possibility that the jury, acting reasonably, would have acquitted the accused: Mickelberg v
The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259; [1989] HCA 35 at 301; see also Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131
CLR 510 at 519, 528; Lawless v The Queen (1979) 142 CLR 659 at 666, 670, 686; Gallagher v
The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 392 at 409–410; Mickelberg v The Queen (2004) 29 WAR 13; [2004]
WASCA 145 at [415]. The test has sometimes been expressed not in terms of ‘likely’ but in
terms of ‘might’ (Stafford v Director of Public Prosecutions [1974] AC 878 at 893, 907, 912;
Gallagher v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 392 at 399, 421) or in terms of ‘significant possibility’:
Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259; [1989] HCA 35 at 301; Gallagher v The Queen
(1986) 160 CLR 392 at 402.
There is no precise formulation of the quality that must attach to fresh evidence before
it will ground a successful appeal, but it has variously been said that it must be ‘credible’,
‘cogent’, ‘relevant’ and ‘plausible’: Gallagher v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 392 at 395–396,
401–402, 408–409; Craig v The King (1933) 49 CLR 429 at 439; Ratten v The Queen (1974) 131
CLR 510 at 519–520; Lawless v The Queen (1979) 142 CLR 659 at 671, 676–677.
262 [4.0.490]
Two important examples within the curial system of the use of fresh expert evidence
are to be found in the cases of Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259; [1989] HCA 35
at 301 (and Mickelberg v The Queen (2004) 29 WAR 13; [2004] WASCA 145) and McIlkenny v
The Queen (1991) 93 Cr App R 287. Another forum in which new expert evidence has been
led has been in the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Convictions of Lindy and
Michael Chamberlain (1987), the Royal Commission Concerning the Conviction of Edward
Charles Splatt (1984)and the Eastman Inquiry: see Martin (2014); Freckelton (1992a;
1997d).
In Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259; [1989] HCA 35 at 301 per Deane, Toohey
and Gaudron JJ, the Australian High Court formed the view that the Western Australian
Court of Criminal Appeal had been justified in reaching the conclusion that further expert
evidence about the theoretically possible fabrication of an alleged fingerprint would not
have been likely to have created a reasonable doubt in the minds of jurors.
By contrast, in McIlkenny v The Queen (1991) 93 Cr App R 287, the English Court of
Appeal found that in the light of fresh scientific evidence about explosives residue, the
appellants’ convictions were unsafe and unsatisfactory. In 1975, the six appellants had
been convicted of murder, but between that date and 1991, technology for detecting
contact with high explosives had become much more sophisticated.
However, among other things, it was further experimentation by scientists about
substances that could produce positive results to the ‘Griess test’ that persuaded the court
that an unreliable result had been arrived at: ‘Dr B’s statement is important because it
shows that even in 1974 the Griess test should only have been regarded as a screening test’
(at 300). The result was a finding that there was no satisfactory evidence that two of the
appellants had nitroglycerine contamination on their right hands.
In addition, by 1991, the technique of electrostatic document analysis was available to
facilitate the reading of sheets of paper which may have received impressions from the
writing on the sheets above them. 3 Crucial documents in the trial of the appellants were
allegedly contemporaneous notes compiled by the police. The findings of the new analysis
were that the pages examined did not all come from the same pad, that they were not
written by the same pen, and that the pads were not the standard ones issued by the
Lancashire constabulary in 1974: see also Lattimore v The Queen (1975) 62 Cr App R 53.
Thus, the new evidence was such that it was found to be unsafe and unsatisfactory to
allow the convictions to stand.
An increasingly significant ground upon which a decision can be overturned is where
at first instance a decision has been arrived at on the basis of expert evidence which is
fundamentally flawed. For instance, if the basis for an expert opinion has not been
properly proved, the reliance of a tribunal of fact upon the opinion can lead to an
unacceptable result: ‘the trier of fact must arrive at an independent assessment of the
opinions and their value, and … this cannot be done until their basis is explained. …
Examining the substance of an opinion cannot be carried out without knowing the
essential integers underlying it’: Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR
705; [2001] NSWCA 305 at [68], [72] per Heydon JA.
In a case dealing with an expert who gave evidence upon the dangerousness of stairs,
the New South Wales Court of Appeal in examining the soundness of the judgment asked
in respect of the uncontradicted expert evidence:
[G]iven that the court is not obliged to take the opinion of an expert as conclusive, even
though no other expert is called to contradict it, can it be said that Professor Morton’s
3 A sheet is placed on a metal plate and covered with a very thin film. The plate is given an
electrostatic charge and sprinkled with a fine powder. The result is that indentations show
up black on the electrostatic detection apparatus (ESDA) foil and the writing on the sheet
shows up as white.
[4.0.490] 263
Part 4 – Appeals
report goes beyond a series of oracular pronouncements? Does it usurp the function of the
trier of fact? More vitally, did it furnish the trial judge with the necessary scientific criteria
for testing the accuracy of its conclusions? Did it enable him to form his own independent
judgment by applying the criteria furnished to the facts proved? Was it intelligible,
convincing and tested? Did it go beyond a bare ipse dixit? Did it contain within itself
materials which could have convinced the trial judge of its fundamental soundness? … It
is significant that the trial judge himself did not identify any scientific criteria within the
report for testing the accuracy of its conclusions.
(See Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 at
[87]–[88].)
This meant that a decision-maker, so far as Heydon JA was concerned, was in no
position to determine, for instance, what significance the coefficients of friction had in the
reasoning of the witness’s opinions. This precluded safe acceptance of his views.
Fresh evidence of prior inconsistent expert evidence

[4.0.500] If, subsequent to a criminal trial, it is identified that an expert witness has
previously given relevantly inconsistent evidence on a prior occasion, unbeknown to the
defence at the trial, evidence of this fact may be permitted on appeal and result in a
determination that the criminal trial miscarried. In Rodi v Western Australia (2018) 92 ALJR
960; [2018] HCA 44, the High Court quashed a conviction and ordered a retrial of a man
found guilty of possession of a prohibited drug, namely cannabis, with intent to sell or
supply it to another. The issue related to the amount of cannabis found in the appellant’s
possession. A detective gave evidence that it was his experience that:
• mature naturally grown female cannabis plants typically yield between 100 g and 400 g
of cannabis head material;
• it was rare to see a cannabis plant produce 300 g to 400 g of head material; and
• he would expect the yield from the two plants located at the rear of the appellant’s
house to be at the lower end of the 100 g to 400 g scale.
However, it was subsequently identified that the detective had given evidence in earlier
trials that naturally grown female cannabis plants may yield between 300 g and 600 g of
head material. In the Court of Appeal, he gave evidence that:
• it was possible for a cannabis plant to yield less than 100 g, and that he has seen plants
yield between 500 g and 600 g;
• he would not be surprised by a plant yielding between 500 g and 600 g; and
• in his experience, plants yielding very large amounts of cannabis were grown naturally
(as the appellant’s plants had been), rather than hydroponically.
The High Court concluded that the detective’s evidence at trial as to the likely yield of the
particular plants from which the appellant claimed to have harvested his cannabis was
inextricably linked with his evidence as to typical yield: ‘his evidence was apt to exclude
any possibility of those plants having a significantly greater yield than the upper limit of
his typical yield range’ (at [41]). This meant that the new evidence was credible and cogent
and the anomaly in relation to the detective’s expert evidence gave rise to a miscarriage of
justice, resulting in the need for the appellant’s conviction to be quashed.
264 [4.0.500]
PART 5 – PROCEDURE
Chapter 5.0: Forensic reports.................................................................. 267

Chapter 5.05: Court rules and ethical obligations....................... 291
Chapter 5.10: Client legal privilege and confidentiality.......... 303
Chapter 5.15: Wasted costs orders ....................................................... 325
Chapter 5.20: Remuneration of experts ............................................ 345
265
Chapter 5.0
FORENSIC REPORTS
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [5.0.01]
Strengths and weaknesses in forensic reports ................................................................. [5.0.05]
Commissioning of reports ................................................................................................... [5.0.10]
Obligations to the court ....................................................................................................... [5.0.20]
Contingency fees ................................................................................................................... [5.0.30]
No property in an expert ..................................................................................................... [5.0.50]
Expert reports: definitions ................................................................................................... [5.0.60]
Medical reports: treaters and assessors ............................................................................. [5.0.100]
Content of reports ................................................................................................................. [5.0.110]
Joint reports ............................................................................................................................ [5.0.112]
Expert reports and forensic reports: Victoria ................................................................... [5.0.115]
Draft reports ........................................................................................................................... [5.0.120]
Shadow expert reports/consulting expert reports .......................................................... [5.0.130]
Supplementary reports ......................................................................................................... [5.0.140]
Lawyers settling expert reports .......................................................................................... [5.0.150]
Pre-trial exchange of expert reports ................................................................................... [5.0.190]
Obligation to submit to expert medical examination ..................................................... [5.0.230]
Failure to serve expert material .......................................................................................... [5.0.260]
Expert evidence via the certification procedure .............................................................. [5.0.310]
Disclosure of expert evidence in criminal cases .............................................................. [5.0.350]
The implied undertaking ..................................................................................................... [5.0.360]
‘My definition of an expert in any field is a person who
knows enough about what’s really going on to be scared.’
PJ Plauger, Computer Language (March 1983).
The author acknowledges the helpful suggestions and comments of Dr Patricia Molloy on an
earlier draft of this chapter.
Introduction
[5.0.01] Expert reports for the courts, often known as ‘forensic reports’, are a mainstay of
litigation in all areas of the law. Most of the time, those who write reports for the courts do
not give oral evidence; in the vast majority of civil cases, matters are settled pre-trial. Not
surprisingly, Allan, Martin and Allan (2000) surveyed 70 Australian psychologists who
regularly prepared forensic reports and found that they rarely were called upon to testify.
There have been suggestions that forensic reports are becoming longer and more complex
(Matson (2012, p 59)), although 48% of judges (Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999)) and
57% of magistrates (Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (2001)) who answered a survey about
expert evidence classified most of the reports tendered to them as ‘good’ or ‘very good’
(see too Day et al (2000); Lander and Heilbrun (2009)).
This chapter identifies deficits and problems in forensic reports. It addresses the
commissioning of reports; the attributes and purposes of different kinds of reports,
including draft, shadow and supplementary reports; and the ethical and court-imposed
obligations imposed upon experts for the writing of such reports, in particular focusing
upon the strictures imposed by court rules and courts’ codes for experts. Accordingly, the
chapter needs to be read along with Ch[5.05].
Strengths and weaknesses in forensic reports

[5.0.05] Expert reports are as diverse in content and style as is contemporary litigation (see
Speight (2009)). However, asking the right question in a commissioning letter to an expert
is vital; otherwise opinions in a report may even fail the relevancy test. What is required in
a forensic report is generally quite different from what is required in a document that
[5.0.05] 267
Part 5 – Procedure
might be written by an expert in their ordinary (non-forensic) professional role (see Smith
and Bace (2002, p 188)). Forensic reports are written to meet the demands of legal forums,
decision-makers and the legal process. Thus, they will often differ from reports produced
for clinical, academic, commercial or peer purposes.
There is a significant level of controversy about what constitutes good practice in terms
of the writing of forensic reports (see Wettstein (2010)). Inevitably, forensic reports from
health practitioners are required to synthesise and evaluate material from a wide variety
of sources, including interviews, test results, information from third parties, and official
records from a variety of investigative sources (see Witt (2010)). This involves the exercise
of judgment and is a process that incorporates both subjective factors and biases (see
Griffith, Stankovic and Baranoski (2010); Allnutt and Chaplow (2000)).
The most substantial literature on report writing is in relation to reports by medical
practitioners and psychologists (see, eg, Conroy (2006); Conroy and Murrie (2007); White,
Day and Hackett (2007); Lander and Heilbrun (2009); Robinson and Acklin (2010);
Wettstein (2010); Witt (2010); Goodman-Delahunty and Dhami (2012); Witt and Conroy
(2012); Groth-Marnat and Davis (2013); Karson and Nadkarni (2013); Brown, Bowen and
Prescott (2017)), although there is scholarly/practical writing about reports by engineers
(see, eg, Speight (2009); Houck (2017)), scientists (see, eg, Koppenhaver (2007, especially ch
15); Conley and Moriarty (2014); Houck (2015)), anthropologists (see, eg, Dirkmaat (2012)),
and accountants (see, eg, Pagano and Buckhoff (2005)). However, much of this literature
can be generalised usefully to other forms of forensic reports.
Grisso (2010) (Lander and Heilbrun (2009)) organised for the independent evaluation
of 62 forensic reports written by 36 United States forensic mental health professionals. The
results (Grisso (2010, pp 110–111)) confirmed a propensity to omit both important
information (see too Robinson and Acklin (2010); Doyle, Ogloff and Thomas (2011)) and a
variety of defects in the presentation and reasoning process:
1. Opinions without sufficient explanations (56%)
Major interpretations or opinions were stated without sufficiently explaining their
basis in data or logic (regardless of whether the report’s data could have
sustained the opinion)
2. Forensic purpose unclear (53%)
The legal standard, legal question, or forensic purpose was not stated, not clear,
inaccurate, or inappropriate
3. Organization problems (36%)
Information was presented in disorganized manner (usually without a reasonable
logic for its sequence)
4. Irrelevant data or opinions (31%)
Data and/or some opinions included in the report were not relevant for the
forensic or clinical referral questions
5. Failure to consider alternative hypotheses (30%)
Data allowed for alternative interpretations, while report did not offer
explanations concerning why they were ruled out (often response style/
malingering alternative, sometimes diagnostic)
6. Inadequate data (28%)
The referral question, case circumstances, or final opinion required additional
types of data that were not obtained or were not reported, and for which absence
was not explained in report
7. Data and interpretation mixed (26%)
Data and interpretations frequently appeared together in section that reports data
8. Over-reliance on single source of data (22%)
An important interpretation/opinion relied wholly on one source of data when
corroborating information from multiple sources was needed (often over-reliance
on examinee’s self-report)
268 [5.0.05]
Forensic reports | CH 5.0
9. Language problems (19%)

Multiple instances of jargon, biased phrases, pejorative terms, or gratuitous
comments
10. Improper test uses (15%)
Test data were used in inappropriate ways when interpreted and applied to the
case, or tests were not appropriate for the case itself.
On a more positive note, though, Conroy (2006) advanced a number of key factors for
good forensic report writing:
(a) identification of forensic reason for referral;
(b) documentation of confidentiality warning;
(c) listing of all sources of collateral data;
(d) listing of procedures followed;
(e) provision of reasoning for forensic conclusions;
(f) explanation of evidence that seems to contradict one’s conclusions (entertain
alternative interpretations);
(g) avoidance of jargon;
(h) avoidance of details not related to the forensic issue; and
(i) avoidance of prejudicial or pejorative information.
Conroy and Murrie (2007) later urged that reports avoid ‘red herring information’, which
they defined as material with no demonstrable relationship to the psycho-legal referral
question, but which constitutes a distraction from the issue the subject of referral.
Witt and Conroy (2012, p 69), in the context of sex offender reports, provided the
following advice:
The report should document the sources of information, the observations drawn from
those sources of information, and the inferences and conclusions that result, drawing clear,
logical connections between the underlying observations and the resultant conclusions.
There should be a separation between the observations and inferences and a clear
articulation of the reasoning that led to the conclusions. The report should be tailored to
any jurisdictional requirements.
Grisso (2010, p 103) was more prescriptive:

Advice offered in the published works cited at the beginning of this introduction suggests
that a consensus has arisen about the general organization of a forensic report. It should
begin with an introductory section that identifies the reason for the referral, the sources of
data, and the manner in which the examinee was informed of the limits of confidentiality.
A section that reports all relevant data that were obtained to address the forensic question
should follow this. The final section should offer the examiner’s interpretations that are
relevant for the forensic referral question. This general outline allows (as it should) for
considerable variation in subheadings within such sections, in response to local
jurisdictional demands, different types of forensic questions, and the examiner’s own
preferences for the sequencing of content that best communicates a particular case.
The rules and codes promulgated by Australian and New Zealand courts since 1998 are
consistent with the research findings to which reference is made above. They are intended
to save time and expense and to impose transparency and accountability upon both
reports and the processes by which they are commissioned. As there remains some
variation among jurisdictions, the following discussion highlights common practices in
relation to obligations and best practice for those who write reports for courts and
tribunals. No attempt has been made to describe the numerous subtle variations which
occur not only among jurisdictions, but also within the court hierarchies of each
jurisdiction. Readers are advised to refer in this regard to their local rules and practice
[5.0.05] 269
manuals. This chapter also identifies guidance that has been provided by superior court
decisions and from scholarly writers about the content and form of expert reports.
Commissioning of reports
[5.0.10] Under the adversary system, while expert reports are commissioned to assist the
courts, the authors of reports are selected in the anticipation that their opinions will be
helpful to the party commissioning them. In civil litigation, the commissioning party
hopes to recover at least part of the cost of such reports from the other side.
Prudent practice (on the part of both solicitors and experts) will clarify, at the time of
commissioning, the parameters of what is sought from the expert, the material provided
to the expert, the timing for provision of the report, the fees to be charged by the expert,
and how payment will be made. On occasions, ‘shadow experts’ (see [5.0.130]) are used to
assist solicitors to frame the letter commissioning the forensic experts. Such a practice has
the advantage of protecting the forensic experts from the allegation that they were overly
involved with and ‘captured by’ the legal team. The prevalence of the practice is in
relation to accounting and, to a lesser degree, engineering reports.
An expert report is usually commissioned by a detailed letter from a solicitor which
sets out the task or tasks for the expert and identifies and/or includes proposed data
sources. It is not uncommon for counsel to settle such commissioning letters so that the
tasks given to experts are thoroughly consonant with the exigencies of the litigation. The
data sources may be held by the solicitor’s clients or by unrelated entities. They may
include reports, letters, diagrams and raw information such as patient notes, books of
account, test results, and production measures. Because of the perceived relevance of such
documentation to the expert’s task, the other side in the litigation is likely to be interested
in also viewing such data and in assessing their significance. If handling of the case is
proceeding efficiently, an opponent may well take steps to examine both an expert’s report
and the bases for its conclusions well before the trial.
There is nothing ethically improper about a solicitor or barrister asking an expert to
address particular issues and to express views in relation to certain matters rather than
others. It is up to the expert whether, ethically, he or she feels comfortable with so
confining the report that has been commissioned. However, it is important that the expert
is not misled. Lawyers are expected by courts to provide their experts with information
which may have a significant bearing on the opinions formed by the expert. In Bush v The
Queen (1993) 43 FCR 549, the expert only found out in court that the accused, who was on
trial for strangling his wife, had previously been convicted of strangling an earlier wife.
This problematically undermined the weight to be given to his views. Drummond J found
(at 564) that:
for the defence, to … call an expert witness to give an opinion favourable to the accused’s
case when counsel has refrained from drawing the expert’s attention to material that may
be detrimental to the accused, but which is of clear possible relevance to the expert’s
opinion, in my view, involves the same sort of impropriety that occurs when a party’s
lawyers ‘settle’ an expert’s report …
Obligations to the court

[5.0.20] Court rules throughout Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom
stipulate that experts’ primary responsibility is to the court and that they are not
advocates for the party calling them. Courts have wide powers to facilitate the just,
efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of issues in dispute before them. Increasingly,
courts issue directions to clarify matters pre-trial that are in dispute between parties. It is
not unusual for courts dealing with civil litigation to order pre-trial conferences between
270 [5.0.10]
experts to clarify issues relating to the commissioning of reports. Thus, in Hudspeth v

Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] VSC 14 at [22], Dixon J
commented:
That nature of [the duties of experts] is such that the court need not be reticent in
requiring a full and frank account of the circumstances surrounding the preparation of
expert opinion that is given in evidence in a proceeding. There is an overarching
obligation on solicitors and expert witnesses to cooperate with the court in connection
with the conduct of a civil proceeding. Plainly, the court’s inquiry is resolved if it receives
a satisfactory explanation of the matters of concern. This does not involve an open-ended
inquiry.
Contingency fees
[5.0.30] A significant percentage of experts release their reports upon payment of their
fees. Few experts, for good reason, write reports on a ‘no win, no fee’ or discounted basis.
It is very rare, and poor practice, for arrangements to be made for payment of expert
reports contingent upon the result of the litigation (see New South Wales Law Reform
Commission (2005, paras 9.20–9.35)). There is a good argument that such a practice is
unethical for experts and a breach of the spirit of Australia’s increasingly uniform civil
litigation rules. This is because it provides a financial incentive to express opinions of a
particular kind and thus has the potential to lead to both the appearance and reality of
partisanship. In New South Wales, r 31.22 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)
provides that:
(1) A person who is engaged as an expert witness in relation to any proceedings must
include information as to any arrangements under which:
(a) the charging of fees or costs by the expert witness is contingent on the
outcome of proceedings; or
(b) the payment of any fees or costs to the expert witness is to be deferred, in,
or in an annexure to, any report that he or she prepares for the purposes
of the proceedings.
(2) If a report referred to in subrule (1) indicates the existence of any such
arrangement, the court may direct disclosure of the terms of the engagement
(including as to fees and costs).
No property in an expert
[5.0.50] It is clear law that there is no property in a witness. In Harmony Shipping Co SA v
Davis [1979] 1 WLR 1380; [1979] 3 All ER 177 at 1384, a case dealing with a handwriting
expert who had provided a report to the plaintiff on the authenticity of a document and
was subsequently engaged by the defendants to advise them on the same issue, Lord
Denning MR said:
There is no property in a witness. The reason is because the court has a right to every
man’s evidence. Its primary duty is to ascertain the truth. Neither one side nor the other
can debar the court from ascertaining the truth either by seeing a witness beforehand or
by purchasing his evidence or by making communication to him.
(See too Deacon v Australian Capital Territory (2001) 172 FLR 123; Richards v Kadian (2005) 64
NSWLR 204; [2005] NSWCA 328 at [147]–[150].)
In Public Transport Authority (WA) v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (2007) 34 WAR 279;
[2007] WASCA 151, McLure JA (Steytler P and Miller JA agreeing) observed to similar
effect that:
There is no restriction on an independent witness who has provided a witness statement
from providing the information the subject of the witness statement to any other person.
The privilege would only prevent the witness disclosing what the opposing lawyer asked
the witness and what the witness said to the lawyer. Disclosure of those communications
[5.0.50] 271
would at best enable the other side to identify possible prior inconsistent statements made
by the witness (much court time is often spent by counsel on such issues for little if any
forensic reward) and any breach by the opposing lawyer of his or her duties in relation to
the proofing of witnesses. These are not compelling grounds for resisting the privilege. It
would also provide the other side with access to and the benefit of the opposing lawyer’s
work product. The lawyer is not a passive recipient of information volunteered by a
witness. In all but the simplest litigation, the preparation of a quality witness statement
requires the proofing lawyer to have a good grasp of the relevant law, understand all the
relevant issues (which in this jurisdiction are not often apparent from the pleadings) and
be familiar with the discovered documents. Many insights into an opponent’s case can be
gleaned from access to communications between the lawyer and a witness, including from
successive drafts of witness statements.
This means, among other things, that a party to litigation may still approach an expert
witness who has written a report for another party to litigation, and whose report may or
may not have been exchanged. It also means that the opinions of such witnesses remain
admissible: R v P (2001) 53 NSWLR 664; [2001] NSWCA 473 at [56]. As was stated by Lord
Nicholls of Birkenhead in Re L [1997] AC 16 at 34:
The fact that an expert or other potential witness has already been approached by one
party, and given a statement to that party, does not excuse him from giving evidence at the
hearing at the behest of another party. If necessary his attendance can be compelled by
service of a subpoena. He cannot be required to disclose the contents of communications
between himself and the first party’s legal adviser. But his evidence on the issue before the
court, which is all that is material, can be compelled.
For a useful example and amplification of these principles, see Sendy v Commonwealth
[2002] NSWSC 1109. It is still surprisingly rare for counsel to confer with experts prior to
trial. However, such communication to clarify the content of reports and shades of grey
which may arise in them has the potential to assist advocacy considerably (see Henry
(2016); Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016); Howes (2015);
Wheate (2008)).
Expert reports: definitions

[5.0.60] An expert report in a forensic context is a report prepared for a court (or tribunal)
and commissioned by parties to litigation or the court (or tribunal). It has been suggested
that there are five conceptually distinct roles in a forensic report:
• communicating information;
• preparing the ground for depositions or in-court testimony;
• facilitating treatment;
• demonstrating the proper conduct of an evaluation; and
• measurement of clinical and forensic practice.
(Weiss et al (2011, p 17).)

The form and content of expert reports vary according to the nature of the litigation,
the needs and means of the commissioning party, and the personal style of the report
writer. It is also affected by requirements articulated by courts and tribunals and by court
and tribunal rules. What is or is not an ‘expert report’ can become important because of
the protections and immunities that are provided to expert reports generated for forensic
purposes.
The notion of an ‘expert report’ is also defined in a number of places. For instance, for
the purposes of r 4 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA), an ‘expert report’ means ‘a
report in written or electronic form by a medical or other expert on a question involved in
an action (including a report by a medical or other expert on another expert report)’.
272 [5.0.60]
Rule 31.18 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) defines an ‘expert’s report’
as ‘a written statement by an expert (whether or not an expert witness in the proceedings
concerned) that sets out the expert’s opinion and the facts, and assumptions of fact, on
which the opinion is based’.
Rule 425 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) defines a ‘report for a
proceeding’ as ‘a document giving an expert’s opinion on an issue arising in the
proceeding’.
The Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic) do not contain a relevant
definition, although a ‘medical report’ is defined very broadly (r 33.03):
medical report –
(a) means a statement on medical matters concerning the plaintiff whether in writing
or oral made by a medical expert; and
(b) includes any document which the medical expert intends should be read with the
statement whether the document was in existence at the time the statement was
made or was a document which the expert obtained or caused to be brought into
existence subsequently.
Order 36A of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) also focuses upon ‘medical reports’,
which are unhelpfully defined as reports ‘containing medical evidence’. In the context of
the Australian Family Court, an ‘expert report’ is defined simply as ‘a report by an expert
witness, including a notice under r 15.59(5)’: r 15.43 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
Justice Bleby in Harris Scarfe Ltd (rec & mgrs apptd) (in liq) v Ernst & Young (No 6) [2006]
SASC 148 has held that a report must be something:
[O]ther than what the expert has written for his own edification or as part of the process of
forming his opinion. Any professional accustomed to writing opinions will often prepare
or amend or discard drafts before being satisfied with the version to be produced for the
client’s consumption. Drafts of that nature are not reports. They report to no-one … it
means an account prepared for the benefit of others, not merely for the benefit of the
author.
Medical reports: treaters and assessors

[5.0.100] There are many circumstances in which a report is commissioned from a treating
health practitioner. There is a fallacy that such a report is not an ‘expert report’. In fact,
such reports are expert reports – their authors possess specialised knowledge based upon
their training, study or experience (see, eg, r 44.01 of the Supreme Court (General Civil
Procedure) Rules 2005 (Vic)). Moreover, the facts and opinions in such reports are often
particularly valuable for litigation because the treater is likely to have a longitudinal
perspective in relation to the patient’s condition – for instance, detailed knowledge of the
patient that spans the pre- and post-injury periods and which is uncontaminated by, or
much less contaminated by, the litigation process (see Rimmer (1989, p 23)). An issue for
such report writers is the expectation of the courts that as soon as an expert provides a
report for use by the courts, the author has a primary responsibility to the court and not to
be an advocate for their patient (Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria (2006)). This
transmogrification of role is not always as well appreciated as it needs to be by treating
medical practitioners, but it can be addressed – at least to some extent – by the provision
by commissioning solicitors of the relevant code of ethics or practice guidelines for expert
report writers. In Victoria, the responsibilities of doctors were explicitly set out by the
Medical Practitioners Board (2006, pp 26–27).
Many reports are commissioned from assessors who do not treat the patient but are
asked as part of the forensic process to provide an independent assessment of the patient.
These are often called ‘third party reports’. The advantage of such reports is that they are
generally commissioned from practitioners who are familiar with the needs and
expectations of the litigation process. In addition, they are unaffected by contaminants
[5.0.100] 273
such as therapeutic bias or treatment advocacy. However, their limitation is that they are
commissioned for forensic purposes and, often, comparatively little time is spent by the
assessor with the patient, meaning that the assessment is either somewhat superficial or
heavily dependent upon patient self-report.
Content of reports
[5.0.110] A forensic report that is tendered as evidence has the obvious advantage over
‘mere’ oral evidence in that it is hardcopy and readily accessible, by contrast with the
vagaries of the recollections and brief notes of the judge, jury or magistrate. Aside from
the content of the expert report, presentational issues are important. Gleeson CJ observed
in HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999] HCA 2 at [39]:
[T]he provisions of s 79 [of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)] will often have the practical effect
of emphasising the need for attention to requirements of form. By directing attention to
whether an opinion is wholly or substantially based on specialised knowledge based on
training, study or experience, the section requires that the opinion is presented in a form
which makes it possible to answer that question.
A number of constructive suggestions have been made to assist experts in writing

medico-legal reports for the courts. Allnutt and Chaplow (2000) recommend that report
writers initially clarify their role and professional boundaries with clients in respect of
whom they are writing expert reports, obtain their informed consent, explain the limits of
confidentiality applying in the circumstances, and ensure that they respect the person’s
autonomy. Parker (2004) has advocated a structured format when preparing a ‘police
statement’: see also Paul (1981); Young and Wells (1995); Parker, Kelly and Wells (2000);
Bird (2004). White, Day and Hackett (2007, ch 3) have also set out a series of matters which
psychologists can usefully advert to in writing reports for civil and criminal proceedings.
A number of general propositions can be enunciated concerning the attributes of an
expert report which is likely to meet the needs of the court for assistance. A forensic report
should meet the expectations of busy people by using a brief summary, a list of contents
(if it is substantial), a glossary (if a number of technical terms are employed), headings,
paragraphs that are not excessive in length, and a chronology where appropriate. It should
be logically and engagingly set out and it should avoid jarring repetition (see Telpner and
Mostek (2003, p 242)). The font of the report should not be small and room should be left
on the margins for the reader to make notes. Annexures should have clear titles and be
numbered.
Different views exist about the numbering of paragraphs in expert reports. Certainly,
numbering has no down-side and a number of practical advantages. In a complex case
before him, Lindgren J observed:
The absence of paragraph numbering has made identification and discussion of passages
objected to, uncertain, time-consuming, and generative of misunderstandings. (The
absence of the numbering of objections in lengthy lists of objections gives rise to similar
difficulty.)
(See Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at
[29].)
Under r 23.13 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), this is formalised.
Any forensic report should be accompanied by a suitable curriculum vitae of the
author which is crafted so as to be relevant to the particular case. Many experts with a
forensic practice will ‘run’ several such documents, selecting the apposite one in
accordance with the sub-specialised area upon which they are asked to express forensic
opinions. Such detail can provide considerable assistance to lawyers (and judicial officers)
who may otherwise not be aware of the eminence of the expert report writer or his or her
274 [5.0.110]
particular expertise in the area in question. Such documentation also facilitates

appropriate questioning of experts’ credentials and asserted expertise (see Stryker (1932,
p 146)).
Expert reports should be drafted to ‘inform the Court of the relevant opinions of
independent witnesses and for that reason the purpose of such reports is not to advance
or espouse the cause of a particular party to an action’ (McFarlane v Western Australia
[2002] WADC 5 at [6]). They should be clearly even-handed and balanced (Telpner and
Mostek (2003, p 241)), as much as possible lacking distorting factors such as hindsight bias
(see Hugh and Tracy (2002)). Expert report writers owe their primary duty to the court
and should not in any sense function as advocates. This independent function of expert
report writers was identified as inadequately perceived by a problematic percentage of
experts in surveys of judges and magistrates undertaken for the Australian Institute of
Judicial Administration (AIJA) (see Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999; 2001)) and also by
a discussion paper which formed the basis for reforms to expert evidence in the Family
Court (Family Court of Australia (2002, p 7)).
In most jurisdictions, authors of reports in non-criminal matters are obliged to make a
formal declaration that accompanies their report. For instance, in a report for the Federal
Court of Australia, there is the following mandatory declaration:
I [the expert] have made all the inquiries which I believe are desirable and appropriate
and no matters of significance which I regard as relevant have to my knowledge, been
withheld from the Court.
In Queensland, the expert must confirm at the end of their report:

(a) the factual matters stated in the report are, as far as the expert knows, true; and
(b) the expert has made all inquiries considered appropriate; and
(c) the opinions stated in the report are genuinely held by the expert; and
(d) the report contains reference to all matters the expert considers significant; and
(e) the expert understands the expert’s duty to the court and has complied with the
duty.
(See r 428(3) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld).)

Such declarations significantly unleash the expert from the oppressive strictures of the
adversary process, obliging the expert to conduct himself or herself in the forensic context
of writing a forensic report in the way in which the expert would behave in his or her
ordinary professional work – namely, to make ordinary inquiries to obtain that which the
expert needs in order to undertake the relevant task (cf Jones (1994, p 170)) and to indicate
clearly the status, from their point of view, of the document that they have written. In
particular, the declarations are formulated so as to reduce the phenomenon of experts
being provided with only a small cross-section of data and yet expert reports being
written on the basis of such limited information, without the expert’s dissatisfaction with
such an artificial exercise being apparent.
A clear distinction should be drawn between facts and opinions in reports and
speculation should be avoided (see Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (No 5) (1990) 21
FCR 324 at 327–330 per Beaumont J, upheld on appeal in Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices
Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 347–353; HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999] HCA
2 at [39] per Gleeson CJ; Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001]
NSWCA 305 at [85] per Heydon JA; Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130
FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at [21]). Lindgren J in Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7)
(2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at [25] has commented that:
If I cannot discern in a report, distinguishing between them, the expert’s opinion and all
facts assumed by the expert on which that opinion is based, I will not be able to be
satisfied:
[5.0.110] 275
• that the assumed facts are, to a sufficient degree, the actual facts as I find them to be, to
make that opinion ‘relevant’ for the purposes of s 56 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (cf
Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371 at 374 per Branson J; Sydneywide Distributors
Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd (2002) 55 IPR 354; [2002] FCAFC 157 at [14] per
Branson J (‘Sydneywide’); or
• (perhaps) that the opinion proffered is one substantially based on the expert’s
specialised knowledge, for the purposes of s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (cf Makita
(Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 at [85] per
Heydon JA).
All assumptions should be clearly articulated, together with the reasons why the
assumptions have been made. Again, this is an issue of transparency and accountability.
A clear distinction should also be made between opinions and assumptions made. In
this regard, Lindgren J in Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424;
[2003] FCA 893 at [25] observed:
While perhaps it cannot be said that in all cases evidence of expert opinion will be
inadmissible if an expert does not separately list all the factual assumptions underlying
his or her report, if this is not done, there is a substantial risk that the court will not be able
to be satisfied on reading the report, as to what they were, with the result that the opinion
will be inadmissible. If the expert does not state and distinguish between all the factual
assumptions underlying the opinion and the opinion itself, can I be satisfied that the two
criteria of admissibility mentioned are met?
Opinions should be clear and comprehensible, as much as possible avoiding ambiguities
(see Brodsky (1999, p 122)). Significantly, the quality in expert opinions most identified as
valuable by both Australian judges and magistrates in response to a survey was ‘clarity’
(Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999, p 47; 2001, p 39)).
Reasons should be set out for all opinions so that the reasoning process from data to
opinions can be scrutinised effectively by parties and decision-makers (see, eg, Reynolds
and King (1988, p 107)). On occasions, this will require an explanation of why certain
approaches have been adopted and others eschewed. There should also be clear
enunciation of opinions, wherever that is possible, and avoidance of unnecessarily long
quotations from informants without explanation of any conclusions to be drawn from
such quotations.
Where reports are preliminary or qualified, this should be identified. Where opinions
are tentative or contingent, this too should be stated.
Where tests of any kind are employed, they should be explained, together with the
extent to which their results need to be qualified or seen in any particular context. On
occasions, it is appropriate too for an expert report writer to explain why a particular test
was selected, and its status in the intellectual marketplace, by contrast with another that
was not employed.
Where plans, models, photographs, videos, re-enactments, simulations or similar are
included in or attached to a report, a clear description of the non-vernal material should
be included so that the parties can effectively make submissions to the court about
whether the material should be admitted at trial (see, further, Cohen (2008, p 24)). In some
jurisdictions, procedures are set out for how the court should deal with such material. For
instance, in Tasmania, reg 461 of the Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas) provides that:
(1) Any plan, model, photograph, film, tape, disk, soundtrack or other device in
which sounds, data or visual images are embodied is not receivable in evidence
at the trial of an action unless –
(a) the parties agree to its admission into evidence without further proof
after having been given an opportunity to inspect it –
(i) before the trial, at a time fixed by a judge; or
(ii) if no time is fixed by a judge, within a reasonable period before
the commencement of the trial; or
276 [5.0.110]
(b) the Court or judge, at or before the trial, otherwise orders.

(2) A party may make an application for an order in the absence of any other party if
the application is made before the trial.
(3) The Court or a judge is to determine any application for an order, whether made
at or before the trial, on any materials and in any manner the Court or judge
thinks fit.
(4) The Court or a judge may give directions on any application for an order,
including directions that notice of the application be given to another party.
(5) In this rule,
‘inspect’ includes the following, with or without the aid of equipment:
(a) to view data or visual images embodied in any device;
(b) to listen to sounds embodied in any device;
(c) to reproduce sounds, data or visual images embodied in any device.
The content of an expert report should be in conformity with the expert admissibility rules
in force in the particular jurisdiction; otherwise, substantial parts of a report may need to
be excised with the potential for the value of the remainder to be impaired – hence, the
utility of some, appropriate, input from commissioning lawyers. Hearsay is a particular
issue in this regard.
Expert reports should refrain from indulgence in speculation, summary description of
facts, opinions beyond the writer’s field of specialised knowledge, significant use of
hearsay, unsourced assertion, and sweeping generalisation: Harrington-Smith v Western
Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at [28].
If in an expert report, which is tendered, facts are assumed which are legitimately in
issue and have to be proved, or if the report is to be admitted conditionally upon those
facts being proved, the facts to be proved should be clearly identified: Rhoden v Wingate
(2002) 36 MVR 499; [2002] NSWCA 165 at [2]. The opinions expressed by experts in their
reports are of little value unless the facts upon which those opinions were based are
proved (Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 at
[64]–[86]).
Regardless of what the scholarly conventions of a particular academic discipline may
allow, an expert’s report should attribute all derived statements to their sources ‘so that
verification or falsification of the witness’s assumptions is facilitated’: Harrington-Smith v
Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at [30]–[31] per Lindgren J.
Such an approach satisfies the obligation of the expert to ‘furnish the trier of fact with
criteria enabling the evaluation of the validity of the expert’s conclusions’, an obligation
that has been described as ‘a primary duty of experts in giving opinion evidence’: Makita
(Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; [2001] NSWCA 305 at [59] per
Heydon JA.
To avoid misunderstanding and embarrassment, an expert report should be responsive
to clear, written instructions from the lawyer as to its scope. It is a common practice, and
a good one, for the commissioning letter to be attached to the report. This enhances the
transparency of the commissioning exercise and is likely to conduce to greater confidence
in the independence of the expert’s opinions.
Joint reports
[5.0.112] In many jurisdictions joint reports by experts on different sides in litigation are
permitted to identify or specify matters agreed and not agreed, together with the reasons
for disagreement (see eg Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 31.26; Bever v Bassan
[2019] NSWCA 50). However, this does not provide licence for additional matters to be the
subject of further expert evidence.
[5.0.112] 277
Expert reports and forensic reports: Victoria

[5.0.115] In Victoria, a 2017 Practice Note, ‘Expert Evidence in Criminal Trials’ (SC CR 3),
has established a scheme for criminal matters in the County and Supreme Courts in
Victoria. It sets out, amongst other things, the content required for ‘expert reports’ and
‘forensic reports’, which are defined as reports ‘prepared in the course of an investigation
into an alleged offence by a person with specialised knowledge or training, setting out the
results of a forensic examination in the form of facts or opinions or a combination of both,
eg an autopsy report’. The Practice Note distinguishes between ‘primary expert reports’,
namely reports that do not respond to an expert report served by the other party, and
‘responding expert reports’, which respond to reports served by the other party. It also
distinguishes between ‘observed facts’, ‘reported facts’ and ‘assumed facts’.
Where a forensic report has been prepared and served on the accused by the
prosecution, the accused may request the prosecution to obtain an expert report in relation
to a matter (or matters) that will be contested at the trial of the accused: at 5.2.
The Practice Note requires that all expert reports (including forensic reports) upon
which either the prosecution or the defence proposes to rely must include (at 6.1):
(a) the expert’s name and place of employment;
(b) an acknowledgement that the expert has read this Practice Note and agrees to be
bound by it;
(c) whether and to what extent the opinion(s) in the report are based on the expert’s
specialised knowledge, and the training, study [and] experience on which that
specialised knowledge is based;
(d) the material, observed facts, reported facts, assumed facts and other assumptions
on which each opinion expressed in the report is based (a letter of instructions
may be annexed);
(e)
(i) the reasons for,
(ii) any literature, research or other materials or processes relied on in
support of,
(iii) a summary of
each such opinion;

(f) (if applicable) that a particular question, issue or matter falls outside the expert’s
specialised knowledge;
(g) any examinations, tests or other investigations on which the expert has relied,
identifying the responsible laboratory by which, and the relevant accreditation
standard under which, the examination, test or other investigation was performed;
(h) a declaration that the expert has made all the inquiries and considered all the
issues which the expert believes are desirable and appropriate, and that no
matters of significance which the expert regards as relevant have, to the
knowledge of the expert, been withheld;
(i) any qualification of an opinion expressed in the report, without which the report
would or might be incomplete or misleading;
(j) any limitation or uncertainty affecting the reliability of
(i) the methods or techniques used; or
(ii) the data relied on
to arrive at the opinion(s) in the report; and

(k) any limitation or uncertainty affecting the reliability of the opinion(s) in the report
as a result of
278 [5.0.115]
(i) insufficient research; or

(ii) insufficient data.
It is also obligatory, when an expert is aware of any significant and recognised

disagreement or controversy within the relevant field of specialised knowledge, which is
directly relevant to the expert’s ability, technique or opinion, for the expert to disclose the
existence of that disagreement or controversy: at 6.2.
Draft reports
[5.0.120] In some areas of practice, such as in forensic accounting, draft reports are
commonly written by experts (see further [5.10.360]). This enables reassurance from the
commissioning lawyers to the expert that the report has addressed the matters raised in
the commissioning communications and, importantly, that inadmissible matters are not
canvassed within the report.
However, from the perspective of cross-examiners, drafts are always welcome because
they create the opportunity for scrutinising different versions and evolutions of a report.
This can show how the report writer’s thinking has changed and, problematically,
depending upon the changes, enable the suggestion that sinister (lawyer-generated)
reasons have generated the changes – that lawyers have improperly ‘settled’ the report.
For this reason, there is little to be said in favour of draft reports, save where they are
really necessary.
The law relating to whether legal professional privilege attaches to draft reports
remains to be resolved finally.
Shadow expert reports/consulting expert reports

[5.0.130] Sometimes (especially in large accounting cases) lawyers seek one expert’s advice
to frame the commissioning letter to another expert. This helps to correctly identify the
issues and avoids suggestions that the reporting expert was partisan in suggesting the
terms of reference and thereby functioning too integrally as part of the legal team. Such
experts are sometimes termed ‘shadow experts’ or ‘consulting experts’ (see Smith and
Bace (2002, p 96)). They are specifically provided for in r 161 of the Supreme Court Civil
Rules 2006 (SA):
(1) A shadow expert is an expert who –
(a) is engaged to assist with the preparation or presentation of a party’s case
but not on the basis that the expert will, or may, give evidence at the
trial; and
(b) has not previously been engaged in some other capacity to give advice
or an opinion in relation to the party’s case or any aspect of it.
(2) An expert will not be regarded as a shadow expert unless, at or before the time
the expert is engaged, the expert gives a certificate, in an approved form,
certifying that –
(a) the expert understands that it is not his or her role to provide evidence
at the trial; and
(b) the expert has not been previously engaged in any other capacity to give
advice or an opinion in relation to the party’s case or any aspect of it.
(3) Evidence of a shadow expert is not admissible at the trial unless the Court
determines that there are special reasons to admit the evidence.
(4) If a party engages a shadow expert, the party must –
(a) notify the other parties of –
(i) the engagement; and
(ii) the date of the engagement; and
[5.0.130] 279
(iii) the name, address and qualifications of the relevant expert; and
(b) serve copies of the expert’s certificate under subrule (2) on the other
parties.
(5) The notification must be given –
(a) if the engagement takes effect before the time for disclosing expert
reports expires – before that time expires;
(b) in any other case – as soon as practicable after the engagement takes
effect.
Supplementary reports
[5.0.140] There are many occasions on which a further or supplementary report needs to
be commissioned from an expert. This can be because time has passed and circumstances,
such as the medical condition of a patient or the trading status of a company, have
changed. Alternatively, it may be because the opinions expressed in the initial report were
only provisional or preliminary: see, eg, Anderson v Minister for Infrastructure Planning &
Natural Resources (2006) 151 LGERA 229; [2006] NSWLEC 725. Or it may be because other
expert reports have been filed with a court and it would be helpful for the first expert to
make comment upon the opinions expressed in them. Otherwise, it may be because
evidentiary admissibility decisions have been made on the initial reports (see, eg,
Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 9) (2007) 238 ALR 1; [2007] FCA 31). Or it may be
because the first expert has changed his or her mind, or would like to qualify what he or
she initially asserted, either because of the emergence of additional information or because
of reconsideration. Or it may be because of the discovery of an error.
In some rules, there is specific provision for such an eventuality. An example is r 429A
of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), which provides that:
(1) If an expert changes in a material way an opinion in a report that has been
disclosed, the expert must, as soon as practicable, provide a supplementary
report stating the change and the reason for it.
(2) The supplementary report must comply with rule 428 and be disclosed as soon as
practicable.
(See also r 31.34 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).)
Similarly, r 1242 of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) provides that:
(1) If an expert witness changes in a material way an opinion in an expert report that
has been served, the expert witness must provide a supplementary expert report
(a supplementary report) to the party who engaged the expert witness (the engaging
party) stating the change and the reason for it.
(2) The expert witness may provide the engaging party with other supplementary
reports (also a supplementary report).
(3) If an expert witness provides a supplementary report under this rule, the
engaging party, and any other party having the same interest as the engaging
party, must not use an earlier expert report (including an earlier supplementary
report) on an issue to which the earlier report relates unless the engaging party
has served a copy of the supplementary report on all active parties on whom the
engaging party served the earlier report.
Lawyers settling expert reports

[5.0.150] It is unacceptable for a lawyer to ‘settle’ an expert’s report if that involves making
any significant contribution to the content of the report and a fortiori to tamper with the
expert’s opinions (see Blake and Gray (2012–2013)). In addition, if the commissioning
process involves deviousness or is such as to result in the expert foreseeably failing to
comply with their obligations to the court, it will be improper (Vernon v Bosley (No 2)
280 [5.0.140]
[1999] QB 18 at 58) and may even have ramifications in the award of costs: Hudspeth v
Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (No 8) [2014] VSC 567.
However, there are advantages to lawyers reviewing and editing expert reports as
early as possible by contributing to form and style (Secretary to the Department of Business
and Innovation v Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd (2011) 184 LGERA 288; [2011] VSC 581 at
[103]–[104]) or presentational clarity, as well as identifying issues of admissibility or
compliance with court rules that may arise from how they are framed (R v Doogan (2005)
158 ACTR 1; [2005] ACTSC 74 at [119]). Such a review can avoid unnecessary arguments
about admissibility by ensuring compatibility with codes of conduct and court rules. It can
also circumvent a problem that occurs in the criminal context – that of reports being
unusable because they disclose criminal convictions or antecedents which are not asserted
by the prosecution against the defendant. The psychologist or psychiatrist, for instance,
when advised of the problem by the lawyer, can revise his or her draft document so as to
refer in general terms to the defendant’s criminal background rather than being specific
about matters that would not otherwise come to the attention of the sentencer.
There are occasions when the report produced by an expert does not focus upon the
issues upon which the commissioning lawyers wish to concentrate. For example, a
psychiatrist may be commissioned to provide a report for use in an application that a
prosecution not proceed (a nolle prosequi) on the basis of the mental state of a person who
has committed a serious assault. If the report were to canvass issues related to insanity or
insane automatism, it might run contrary to what the accused person’s solicitors and
barristers believe to be in the best interests of their client. There is nothing wrong with
their requesting that the report be rewritten to deal exclusively with the capacity of the
person to have formed the requisite intent to commit the act, thus removing from potential
consideration issues which might lead the prosecution to raise the question of insanity,
thereby creating the possibility of the accused person being consigned to detention at the
Governor’s pleasure or under the supervision of the sentencing court.
Lord Denning in Whitehouse v Jordan [1980] 1 All ER 650 at 655 observed of a report
with excessive involvement by lawyers:
[The] joint report suffers to my mind from the way in which it was prepared. It was the
result of long conferences between the two professors and counsel in London and it was
actually ‘settled’ by counsel. In short, it wears the colour of special pleading rather than an
impartial report. Whenever counsel ‘settle’ a document, we know how it goes. ‘We had
better put this in’, ‘we had better leave this out’ and so forth. A striking instance is the way
in which Professor T’s report was ‘doctored’. The lawyers blocked out a couple of lines in
which he agreed with Professor S that there was no negligence.
Lord Wilberforce on appeal in Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246 at 276 warned about
the consequences of too close a relationship between report writer and legal team:
While some degree of consultation between experts and legal advisers is entirely proper, it
is necessary that expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen to
exigencies of litigation. To the extent that it is not, the evidence is likely to be not only
incorrect, but self-defeating.
(See also at 284 per Lord Fraser; Kelly v London Transport Executive [1982] 2 All ER 842 at
851; Bush v The Queen (1993) 43 FCR 549 at 564.)
In Phosphate Co-operative Co of Aust Pty Ltd v Shears [1989] VR 665 at 683, Brooking J
observed to a similar effect:
It is impossible to lay down specific rules dealing with communications between the
expert, on the one hand, and the company and those representing it, on the other:
everything depends on the circumstances. The guiding principle must be that care should
be taken to avoid any communication which may undermine, or appear to undermine, the
independence of the expert. What happened here was quite unsatisfactory.
[5.0.150] 281
Nearly one in five judges responding to the AIJA survey concluded that lawyers ‘often’
played a role in the composition of reports (Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999, p 42)).
Another, more modern, formulation of the issue is that of Lindgren J in Harrington-
Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at [19], which urged
that lawyers be involved in the construction of experts’ reports ‘not, of course, in relation
to the substance of the reports (in particular, arriving at the opinions to be expressed); but
in relation to their form, in order to ensure that the legal tests of admissibility are
addressed’.
The issue was traversed in detail by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Moore v Getahun
2015 ONCA 55; (2015) 381 DLR (4th) 471, where the propriety of counsel meeting with a
forensic expert to discuss a draft report was canvassed. The trial judge had found that the
expert’s opinion, although not changed, ‘was certainly shaped by defence counsel’s
suggestions’ (at [42]). She expressed strong disapproved of the practice of counsel
reviewing draft expert reports and stated that ‘the practice of discussing draft reports with
counsel is improper and undermines both the purpose’ of the rules in respect of the expert
witness’s responsibilities ‘as well as the expert’s credibility and neutrality’ (at [43]). The
Court of Appeal disagreed. It noted that both the Advocates’ Society and the Canadian
Institute of Chartered Business Valuators had struck taskforces to develop a response to
the concerns raised by the trial judge. A number of interveners also argued that the trial
judge’s views were wrong.
Sharpe JA (with whom Laskin and Simmons JJA agreed) concluded (at [55]) that while
some judges have expressed concern that the impartiality of experts may be tainted by
discussions with counsel, banning undocumented discussions between counsel and expert
witnesses or mandating disclosure of all written communications is unsupported by, and
contrary to, existing authority. He noted (at [57], [60]) that the ethical and professional
standards of the legal profession forbid counsel from engaging in practices likely to
interfere with the independence and objectivity of expert witnesses and that the ethical
standards of a number of professional bodies place an obligation upon their members to
be independent and impartial when giving expert evidence. He observed (at [61]) that the
adversarial process, particularly through cross-examination, provides:
an effective tool to deal with cases where there is an air of reality to the suggestion that
counsel improperly influenced an expert witness. Judges have not shied away from
rejecting or limiting the weight to be given to the evidence of an expert witness where
there is evidence of a lack of independence or impartiality.
Sharpe JA stated (at [63]) that consultation and collaboration between counsel and expert
witnesses are essential to ensure that the expert witness understands his or her duties. He
also noted that reviewing a draft enables counsel to ensure that a forensic report complies
with an expert code of conduct and with the rules of evidence, that it addresses and is
restricted to the relevant issues, and that it is written in a style that is accessible and
comprehensible. He concluded (at [63]–[65]) that:
Counsel need to ensure that the expert witness understands matters such as the difference
between the legal burden of proof and scientific certainty, the need to clarify the facts and
assumptions underlying the expert’s opinion, the need to confine the report to matters
within the expert witness’s area of expertise and the need to avoid usurping the court’s
function as the ultimate arbiter of the issues.
Counsel play a crucial mediating role by explaining the legal issues to the expert
witness and then by presenting complex expert evidence to the court. It is difficult to see
how counsel could perform this role without engaging in communication with the expert
as the report is being prepared.
Leaving the expert witness entirely to his or her own devices, or requiring all changes
to be documented in a formalized written exchange, would result in increased delay and
cost in a regime already struggling to deliver justice in a timely and efficient manner. Such
a rule would encourage the hiring of ‘shadow experts’ to advise counsel. There would be
282 [5.0.150]
an incentive to jettison rather than edit and improve badly drafted reports, causing added
cost and delay. Precluding consultation would also encourage the use of those expert
witnesses who make a career of testifying in court and who are often perceived to be hired
guns likely to offer partisan opinions, as these expert witnesses may require less guidance
and preparation
The reasoning of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Moore v Getahun is consistent with
Australian and English authority. The key issue in discerning whether impropriety has
attended the commissioning process is whether the lawyers have impacted in any
substantive way on the content of an expert report; mere involvement or editing is not
itself indicative of improper conduct (see R v Doogan (2005) 158 ACTR 1; [2005] ACTSC 74
at [119]).
Pre-trial exchange of expert reports

[5.0.190] Courts and tribunals often require pre-trial disclosure (increasingly, in criminal
matters as well as civil) – namely, that some time before trial each party supply other
parties with copies of the expert reports which they intend to use at trial, or at least
provide an indication of the evidence that such an expert is expected to give. In increasing
numbers of jurisdictions, in civil litigation a party is obliged to supply reports – even if the
conclusions in them are unfavourable to the commissioning party and the party does not
intend to rely upon the conclusions. This is an issue that particularly affects defendants in
personal injury matters.
Both before and during trial, there are well-established general principles, along with
the particular rules of court, which govern the content, structure and form of expert
reports
Notwithstanding the common law claim of client legal privilege, the courts have found
it necessary to abrogate that claim in certain types of cases so as to promote out-of-court
settlement and to avoid ambush and surprise at hearings. So it is commonplace for the
rules to require the reports of experts to be exchanged between the parties prior to the
hearing. If a party wishes to rely upon such expert evidence when it has not provided the
other party or parties with a report before the hearing, then it will need either the consent
of those other parties or the leave of the court. There may be cost penalties for causing the
court and/or other parties inconvenience and delay.
In actions which allege personal injury as a result of professional negligence, the
requirement still exists that the expert reports be exchanged; however, any view on the
question of liability which is stated in such a report can be deleted from the copy given to
any other party: see, eg, O 33 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic).
To save time and expense, the rules provide that a report that has been given to the
other party or parties is admissible as evidence of the expert’s opinion. Further, where the
report contains factual statements which the expert would be permitted to give as oral
evidence, then those statements will be admissible as evidence of those facts. So, unless
the opposing party calls for the expert to attend for cross-examination, the report becomes
evidence without the expert having to attend court: see r 31.29 of the Uniform Civil
Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). See also [5.0.310] in relation to certification procedures.
To assess the quality of such a report and, therefore, to decide whether to issue a notice
to the expert to attend for cross-examination, the opposing party must be able to evaluate
its quality – not only in terms of its professional content, but also in terms of its
compliance with the evidential rules affecting expert evidence: see further Chs 2.0–2.25.
Obligations to disclose expert material are not confined in some jurisdictions to reports
upon which parties intend to rely. In Victoria, for instance, in cases where the plaintiff
claims damages for bodily injury, a defendant, or a third or subsequent party, is obliged to
serve on other parties ‘any medical report (other than a medical report served on or
supplied to him by another party) in his possession, custody or power or made to him or
[5.0.190] 283
obtained by or for him’: see r 33.07 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015
(Vic). A ‘medical report’ is broadly defined to include a report from a ‘medical expert’,
which includes a medical practitioner, dentist or psychologist: see r 33.03.
Similarly, in South Australia, the application of O 38 of the Rules of the Supreme Court
1947 (SA) has entailed full disclosure, even of reports obtained inadvertently. In Turner v
Eastern Sydney Area Health Service [1998] SASC 6815, the plaintiff received advice that she
would be a good candidate for a particular type of surgery. She underwent that surgery,
but it was not successful and it was claimed that her situation deteriorated as a result. The
plaintiff contended that she was given negligent advice in relation to her suitability for the
surgery and she alleged that the surgery and post-operative care were carried out
negligently.
The first defendant requested an expert to discuss his opinion by telephone before
forwarding his written report. However, the expert forwarded his written report without
first discussing his opinions, some of which were critical of the post-operative care. The
plaintiff’s own expert report did not make the same criticisms. The first defendant sought
an order (pursuant to the Rules of the Supreme Court 1947, O 38) that it need not disclose
that adverse report. Nevertheless, the court held that it was not unfair to require
disclosure. Master Burley noted (at [11]–[12]):
On the question of unfairness, I think it is necessary to take into account not only that the
first defendant received a written report that it did not request; it is also necessary to take
into account that the court is being asked to exclude from discovery evidence which is
material to one of the issues in question in the action. I do not accept the first defendant’s
argument that the question of post-operative treatment was not significantly material …
Secondly, I think it is necessary to take into account that the procedure adopted by the
first defendant’s solicitor smacks of shopping around for a favourable expert witness. In
one sense it seeks to subvert the obvious intention of SCR r 38.01 that all relevant expert
evidence obtained by the parties, favourable or unfavourable, is disclosed to the other
parties. The procedure of obtaining an oral report from the expert involved prior to asking
the expert to commit himself or herself to writing lends itself to the criticism that the party
seeking expert advice on such a basis is attempting to get around the purpose of the Rule.
To say that the requirement to disclose the report would be unfair to the first defendant
would be to say that the first defendant’s failed attempt to avoid the effect of SCR r 38.01
constituted the necessary unfairness required to be established under SCR r 38.01(5). I do
not think that the court can condone such a practice and there would be an obvious
condonation if the order exempting the first defendant from compliance as sought were
granted by the court.
The master’s decision was affirmed on appeal: see Turner v Eastern Sydney Health Service
(1999) 72 SASR 529; [1999] SASC 1.
In ‘merits review’ tribunals, such as the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and
the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT), the respondent decision-maker is
expected to file all documents – for example, in medically related matters, this will include
all medical reports, whether or not those reports support the decision about to be
reviewed by the AAT.
Obligation to submit to expert medical examination

[5.0.230] In the absence of statutory authority, the power to order a person to be medically
examined depends on the inherent jurisdiction of a court: Timmins v Yandilla Park Ltd
[2000] QSC 281 at [18]. The right to have a plaintiff medically examined has been regarded
as a defendant’s right to be heard: Bakic v Yamasa Seafood Australia Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 309
at [26]. It is also enshrined in many court rules: see, eg, r 23.2 and r 23.4 of the Uniform
Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). This approach is replicated in a number of Supreme
Court rules. For instance, under r 33.04 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules
2015 (Vic):
284 [5.0.230]
(1) The defendant may request the plaintiff in writing to submit to appropriate
examinations by a medical expert or experts at specified times and places.
(2) Where a plaintiff refuses or neglects, without reasonable cause, to comply with a
request under paragraph (1), the Court may, if the request was on reasonable
terms, stay the proceeding.
Scarman LJ in Starr v National Coal Board [1977] 1 All ER 243 at 247 held that where a
plaintiff refuses to undergo a medical examination requested by a defendant, the court has
an inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay until such time as he or she submits to such an
examination when it is ‘just and reasonable to do so’. This is on the basis that the conduct
of a plaintiff in refusing a reasonable request for medical examination is such as to prevent
the just determination of the case: Edmeades v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1969] 2 QB 67 at 71
per Lord Denning LJ. In general, defendants in civil litigation have the right to choose
those expert examiners in whose forensic ability and expertise they have confidence: Gray
v Hopcroft [2000] QCA 144.
The issue is one of balance between plaintiffs’ rights to personal liberty and
defendants’ rights to defend as they or their legal representatives think fit.
In Prescott v Bulldog Tools Ltd [1981] 3 All ER 869 at 874, Webster J found that three
principles apply, though, where tests would cause significant physical discomfort:
First that the decision whether or not to grant a stay involves the exercise of the court’s
discretion, second that in exercising that discretion it is necessary for the court to balance
the right of one party, the plaintiff, to personal liberty, against the right of the other party,
the defendant, to defend himself in litigation as he thinks fit, and third that in determining
whether either party is being reasonable the question is not whether in the case of the
plaintiff his objection is objectively reasonable, or in the case of the defendant whether his
request is objectively reasonable, but whether the objection or the request as the case may
be is reasonable in the light of the information or the advice which the respective parties
receive from their respective advisers.
Failure to serve expert material

[5.0.260] Most Australian jurisdictions have provision for an expert witness not to give
expert evidence unless a copy of an expert’s statement has been served or the judge so
directs. Such a decision by a judge is an exercise of discretionary judgment. It is
reviewable in accordance with the principles in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at
504–505; Norbis v Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 518–519, 535; Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v
Peko-Wallsend (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 47–48. It has been determined that it is not necessary
for a judge to give reasons for the exercise of such a discretionary determination: Bradshaw
v Wallis (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 23 February 1996) per Mahoney P at p 2.
In Naylor v Preston Area Health Authority [1987] 2 All ER 353 at 359–360, Sir John
Donaldson MR emphasised the importance of the proper exchange of reports:
Although the English courts adhere in the main to what is known as an adversarial
procedure, we have moved far and fast from a procedure whereby tactical considerations
which did not have any relation to the achievement of justice were allowed to carry any
weight. This is as it should be. Justice is not achieved by a war of attrition in which
survival is a prize to be awarded to the party with the greatest determination and longest
purse. Nor is justice normally achieved by the surprise attack … But nowadays the
general rule is that, whilst a party is entitled to privacy in seeking out the ‘cards’ for his
hand, once he has put his hand together, the litigation is to be conducted with all the cards
face up on the table. Furthermore, most of the cards have to be put down well before the
hearing. This is not the product of a change of fashion or even a recognition that
professional judges approach their duties on the basis of mental equipment, training and
attitudes of mind which are far removed from those of juries. It is the product of a
growing appreciation that the public interest demands that justice be provided as swiftly
and economically as possible.
[5.0.260] 285
In Trebilcock v Nominal Defendant (1991) 58 SASR 213, the South Australian Supreme Court
emphasised that it would not allow subtleties and subterfuges to impede the obligation of
the parties to exchange expert reports before a pre-trial conference, this being an
important part of the case flow management scheme.
The extent of required disclosure varies under the different rules of court. In Wilson v
Porter (1988) 46 SASR 547, it was held that the term ‘report’, under r 38 of the Supreme
Court Rules (SA), did not extend to material which was relied upon by the expert in
compiling the report, but which was not included within the body of the report. However,
in Coles Myer Ltd v Bailey (1991) 105 FLR 465, the commissioning letter of a solicitor to a
surgeon requesting a report on certain topics was held to be part of the report and to be
subject to compulsory disclosure. This was because r 33.03 of the Supreme Court Rules (NT)
defined a medical report to include any document intended to be read with the report.
Expert evidence via the certification procedure

[5.0.310] Section 177 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the
Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), the Evidence (National Uniform
Legislation) Act (NT) and the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) reduces the need for calling expert
witnesses. It provides that an expert’s opinion may be adduced by the tendering of a
certificate signed by the person. The certificate must state the expert’s name and address
and that the person has specialised knowledge based on his or her training, study or
experience, as specified in the certificate. It must also set out an opinion that the person
holds and that is expressed to be wholly or substantially based on that knowledge. These
provisions do not apply unless the party seeking to tender the expert certificate has served
on each other party a copy of the certificate and a written notice that the party proposes to
tender the certificate as evidence of the opinion: s 177(2). Service must be effected not later
than 21 days before the hearing or if, on application by the party before or after the
service, the court substitutes a different period, the beginning of that period: s 177(3). A
party on whom the documents are served may, by written notice, require the party to call
the person who signed the certificate to give evidence. The expert certificate is not
admissible as evidence if such a requirement is made. It is specifically provided that the
court may make such an order with respect to costs as it considers just against a party
who has, without reasonable cause, required a party to call a person to give evidence
under s 177.
Disclosure of expert evidence in criminal cases

[5.0.350] It is increasingly clear that the prosecution in a criminal trial is obliged to
disclose all expert material which it has assembled in the course of investigation of the
allegations against the accused. This is so whether the evidence is advantageous to the
prosecution or to the defence. The law has moved some distance since 1981, when it was
held that photographs of footprints and a plaster cast of footprints made by the police did
not have to be disclosed where the prosecution did not seek to identify the defendant with
the footprints: R v Easom (1981) 28 SASR 134. It is likely that this issue would now be
differently decided in light of the authoritative determinations in R v Maguire [1992] 1 QB
936 and R v Ward [1993] 2 All ER 577: see especially 618–629, 642–643. See also R v King
[1983] 1 WLR 411; 1 All ER 929.
The Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal has referred to the duty to disclose as a lonely
and heavy responsibility imposed upon prosecutors ‘which must be discharged with the
object of fairness in mind’: R v Higgins (1994) 71 A Crim R 429.
In the absence of legislation, there is generally no requirement upon the defence to
disclose its expert reports to the prosecution before trial (Australian Securities and
Investments Commission v Plymin (2002) 4 VR 168; [2002] VSC 56; Australian Securities and
286 [5.0.310]
Investments Commission v Mining Projects Group Ltd (2007) 164 FCR 32; [2007] FCA 1620 at
[11]–[13]; Towie v Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria [2008] VSCA 157). Hence the defence
may use its expert material to cross-examine prosecution witnesses without ‘assisting’ the
prosecution. It may then decide whether to call or not call the expert in the defence case.
Until the expert gives evidence, the prosecution will have no call upon the expert material.
In R v Stone (1997) 113 CCC (3d) 158, the British Columbia Court of Appeal found that the
trial judge had erred in allowing the Crown access to a defence psychiatrist’s report to
enable cross-examination by the Crown of the accused. Although counsel for the accused
had signalled that he would call the psychiatrist, the Court of Appeal held that a
document prepared for the purposes of litigation was privileged and, in the absence of
any other requirement for it to be disclosed to the Crown, should not be the subject of an
order for coerced disclosure.
In R v R [1994] 1 WLR 758, the Court of Appeal considered the correctness of a trial
judge having compelled evidence from an expert called in the prosecution case about
DNA tests that she had conducted on the accused at the request of the accused’s legal
representatives. The results were not going to be used by the accused in the course of the
trial. The court found that such material was privileged. In all circumstances where legal
professional privilege applies (subject to a potential exception in England at least
involving cases relating to the welfare of children, although the court did not specifically
refer to this exception), the privilege entitles the witness to refuse to answer questions in
chief by the prosecution as to the content of work commissioned on behalf of the accused.
Of course, if the witness had not objected to answering such questions, then an objection
from the defence should be upheld.
In Victoria, s 50 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) provides that:
(1) If the accused intends to call a person as an expert witness at the hearing of the
charge, the accused must serve on the informant in accordance with section 392
and file in court a copy of the statement of the expert witness in accordance with
subsection (2) –
(a) at least 7 days before the day on which the contest mention hearing is to
be held; or
(b) if there is no contest mention hearing, at least 7 days before the
summary hearing; or
(c) if the statement is not then in existence, as soon as possible after it comes
into existence.
(2) The statement must –
(a) contain the name and business address of the witness; and
(b) describe the qualifications of the witness to give evidence as an expert;
and
(c) set out the substance of the evidence it is proposed to adduce from the
witness as an expert, including the opinion of the witness and the acts,
facts, matters and circumstances on which the opinion is formed.
Common practice is that an expert report is disclosed in toto on the basis that the
substance of the evidence is defined inclusively very broadly.
This requirement is not as broad as the obligation pertaining to the prosecution under
the common law, but it does mean that the contents of any statement by an expert will
become known to the prosecution pre-trial. It highlights the need for there to be
communication between the experts and lawyers who are commissioning statements prior
to the completion of the statements so that what makes its way into formal statements is
consistent with what is commissioned and does not emanate from any kind of
misunderstanding on the part of the expert.
[5.0.350] 287
There is some caselaw on what constitutes ‘the substance’ of a report. Ackner J, for
instance, in Ollett v Bristol Aerojet Ltd (Practice Note) [1979] 3 All ER 544 at 544, observed:
An expert, unlike other witnesses, is allowed because of his special qualifications and/or
experience, to give opinion evidence. It is for his opinion evidence that he is called, not for
a factual description of the machine or the circumstances of the accident, although it is
often necessary in order to explain and/or justify his conclusions. When the substance of
the expert’s report is to be provided, that means precisely what it says, both the substance
of the factual description of the machine and/or the circumstances of the accident and his
expert opinion in relation to that accident, which is the very justification for calling him.
The implied undertaking

[5.0.360] There is a substantive rule of law known as ‘the implied undertaking’, pursuant
to which, when a party to litigation is compelled to disclose documents or information,
either by reason of a rule of court or by reason of a specific order of the court or otherwise,
the party obtaining the disclosure cannot use it for any purpose other than that for which
it was given (unless it is received into evidence) without obtaining leave from the primary
court: Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; [2008] HCA 36 at [96]; Bourns Inc v Raychem Corp
[1999] 1 All ER 908 at 916 [19]; aff’d [1999] 3 All ER 154 at 169–170; Springfield Nominees Pty
Ltd v Bridgelands Securities Ltd (1992) 38 FCR 217 at 221. This is said to arise from an
undertaking impliedly made by the person gaining access to the material. In some
jurisdictions, this is buttressed by rules of court. The implied undertaking also binds
others to whom documents and information are given. For example, expert witnesses,
who are not parties, commonly receive such documents and information and are bound
by the obligation: Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125; [2008] HCA 36 at [109]. In Hamersley
Iron Pty Ltd v Lovell (1998) 19 WAR 316 at 334–335, Anderson J (Pidgeon and Ipp JJ
concurring) said:
The implied undertaking is binding upon anyone into whose hands the discovered
documents come, if he knows that they were obtained by way of discovery.
However, the terminology is somewhat anachronistic. It has been held that ‘[a] party who
seeks discovery of documents gets it on condition that he will make use of them only for
the purpose of that action, and no other purpose’ (Riddick v Thames Board Mills Ltd [1977]
QB 881 at 896; see also Harman v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1983] 1 AC 280
at 313). The implied undertaking extends beyond discovery to documents such as an
expert’s report, with the result that, without the granting of leave, such documents cannot
be used for collateral litigious purposes.
The ‘implied undertaking’ imposes limitations upon the use to which reports can be
put in other proceedings. In Psychology Board of Australia v Vicary [2013] FCWA 7, a father,
in dispute in relation to parenting matters, came into possession of a psychologist’s notes
after they were subpoenaed during family law proceedings. Contrary to permission, he
copied them and remitted them along with a notification to the Psychology Board of
Australia, expressing agreement about the conduct of the psychologist. The Board
required the files in order to undertake its investigation and sought permission to use
them. Moncrieff J declined, observing (at [43]) that:
The public interests that must be weighed against one another in the present case are, on
the one hand, the need for the role of child therapists to remain child-focused in
circumstances where their file notes may be subpoenaed for the purposes of parenting
proceedings, and on the other hand, the need for psychologists or other health
professionals involved in the care of children to be subject to disciplinary scrutiny to
ensure they maintain high professional standards of practice.
He held (at [47]–[48]) that:

The limited evidence before the court regarding the complaint is not sufficient to satisfy
the court that the applicants should be released from their implied undertaking. This is
288 [5.0.360]
particularly so in circumstances where condoning the misuse of a child therapist’s notes

subpoenaed for child-related proceedings could have negative consequences for the
therapeutic services provided to children in the future and potentially open the floodgates
for the misuse of documents produced under subpoena by disgruntled litigants.
Allowing the applicants to be released from the undertaking would effectively
condone or even reward the misuse of the subpoenaed material by the father.
This constitutes a significant limitation to the capacity of a regulator to investigate

notifications of unprofessional conduct and professional misconduct.
[5.0.360] 289
Chapter 5.05
COURT RULES AND ETHICAL
OBLIGATIONS
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [5.05.01]
Reports written in non-compliance with Code of Conduct .......................................... [5.05.10]
The obligation to address relevant matters in a forensic report .................................. [5.05.18]
Joint conferences .................................................................................................................... [5.05.20]
Further experts in addition to single experts .................................................................. [5.05.30]
Disciplinary ramifications for non-compliance ................................................................ [5.05.40]
Family Court Rules 2004 (Cth) .............................................................................................. [5.05.100]
‘[T]he musts and the must-nots which rule from morning to
night are so bewilderingly many that you wonder that a race
which boasts exuberantly of its freedom will continue to put
up with them.’
Thomas Wood, Cobbers (1936, p 123).
Introduction
[5.05.01] In most jurisdictions, superior (and inferior) courts have promulgated rules
concerning the reception of expert evidence and codes of conduct setting out the
obligations with which expert report writers must comply in the discharge of their
forensic role. This chapter reviews certain of the effects of these rules for the admissibility
of expert evidence.
Enforcement of court rules for expert witnesses
Reports written in non-compliance with Code of Conduct

[5.05.10] Where there is non-compliance with expert evidence court rules, there can be
adverse consequences. The jurisprudence emerging in New South Wales suggests that
when an expert report is written by an expert who is unaware of the Expert Code of
Conduct, the question as to admissibility of the report is whether unfair prejudice will be
occasioned by reason of the risk that the report writer has expressed opinions
contaminated by her or his failure to understand the ethical responsibilities of an expert
witness.
In Kirch Communications Pty Ltd v Gene Engineering Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 485,
Campbell J dealt with a report that had not provided an acknowledgment in terms of
Sch K of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW). He concluded that the author of the report
was not an ‘expert witness’ as the definition in Pt 36 r 13C did not ‘catch the situation …
where an officer of a party, not engaged for any particular purpose, has, at a time before
court proceedings were contemplated, expressed an expert opinion in a report, and that
report is tendered in later proceedings’ (at [11]). Thus, Campbell J held that failure to
comply with the rule did not require rejection of the report.
In Barak v WTH Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 649, the plaintiff filed an expert report which
did not contain an acknowledgment that the expert had read the Code of Conduct in
Sch K to the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) and agreed to be bound by it. The defendant,
relying on Pt 36 r 13C(2)(b), submitted that the report was not validly served and should
not be admitted into evidence.
The court gave leave for the expert to be examined on matters relevant to the
defendant’s objection. He was examined about the Code of Conduct along the following
lines (paraphrased by the editors):
Q: Are you aware of the requirements of the Experts’ Code of Conduct that is laid down in
the Rules of this court?
[5.05.10] 291
Q:Have you read Sch K in those Rules?

Q: In approaching the material that is set out in your report, did you comply with Sch K to the
best of your ability?
Q: Did you and do you agree to be bound by the Code set out in Sch K?
The court was satisfied from the affirmative answers that the expert had had the
obligations in mind when preparing his report. It followed that, as the intent of the rules
had been satisfied, it was appropriate for the court to admit the report.
A similar approach was taken by Levine J in Langbourne v State Rail Authority [2003]
NSWSC 537 at [13]–[14]; see also Jermen v Shell Co of Australia Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1106;
Portal Software v Bodsworth [2005] NSWSC 1228. Likewise, in United Rural Enterprises Pty
Ltd v Lopmand Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 870, Campbell J considered whether it would be
appropriate to exclude an expert report under s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). He
determined (at [19]) that the question was whether ‘there is a risk that the fact that Mr [B]
formed his opinions without having Schedule K at the forefront of his mind will result in
a real possibility that the Court might be misled, or the opposite party unfairly prejudiced,
because he might be expressing an opinion to the Court which is infected by failure to
understand his responsibilities as an expert’. On the facts he concluded that there was not
such a risk.
In Commonwealth Development Bank of Australia Pty Ltd v Cassegrain [2002] NSWSC 980
at [9], Einstein J, dealing with an expert who had produced a report unaware of the New
South Wales Code of Expert Conduct, took a robust position. He held that ‘considerable
significance attaches to enforcing strict compliance in the expert witness provisions now
found in Pt 36 r 13C’ (at [5]). He observed that the Code was promulgated ‘with the clear
intent that only reports by experts who have proceeded in accordance with the stated
norms of conduct, should be relied upon and may be admitted into evidence’ (at [9]). He
declined to receive the report, noting (at [11]):
[T]he problems which confront the opposing party when such an otherwise order is
sought, clearly include, importantly, the fact that an expert not having committed to the
Code of Conduct at or as soon as practicable after his or her engagement in circumstances
such as the present, will have committed to a particular form of opinion. Whilst the party
applying for an otherwise order may submit that there is no difficulty in the putative
experts adopting Schedule K in an ex post facto fashion, it seems to me that this is a course
which the court should strain against insofar as the proper administration of justice is
concerned and in terms of fundamental fairness.
Einstein J was of the view that non-compliance with the rules was sufficient of itself
notwithstanding the facultative provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) to empower the
court to reject the evidence. He also concluded that there was ‘likely a high prospect that
the report could be rejected under s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)’, the reasons being
that although the expert had been untutored by the provisions of Sch K, the party against
whom the expert’s report sought to be pressed, in the absence of Sch K, should not be
placed in a position in which a report has come forward which may very well have been
in a different form had the expert at the time of signing the report been aware of Sch K (at
[14]).
(Compare, though, Jermen v Shell Co of Australia Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1106 at [16], where
the court emphasised that court rules should be the servant, not the master, of justice.)
In Investmentsource v Knox Street Apartments [2007] NSWSC 1128, McDougall J observed
the marked difference between the provisions of the New South Wales Supreme Court Rules
(SCR, Pt 36 r 13C) and the relevant provisions of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005
(NSW) ((UCPR), rr 31.18, 31.23). He noted that although r 31.23(1) of the UCPR applies to
an ‘expert witness’, the exclusionary provisions of r 31.23(3) apply to an ‘expert’s report’.
This led him to conclude that the rules have been deliberately structured to ensure that
expert reports that do not acknowledge Sch 7, whether prepared by an expert engaged for
292 [5.05.10]
Court rules and ethical obligations | CH 5.05
the purpose of giving evidence in the proceedings or otherwise, should not be admitted
unless the court otherwise orders (at [43]). Subrule (4) defines an equivalent position in
relation to oral evidence from an expert. McDougall J was satisfied that the intention of
this change to the regulatory framework was to reinforce the position that ‘as a general
rule, expert evidence should not be admitted unless the expert has at the relevant time
subscribed to the obligations now to be found in Sch 7’ (at [44]).
McDougall J observed too that s 69 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) does not state that
‘records of the kind to which it refers should be admitted. It provides that the hearsay rule
set out in s 59 does not apply to such opinion evidence. In other words, it removes one bar
to admissibility. It does not follow that any other bar is also removed’ (at [46]). He
concluded (at [50]) that he should not ‘otherwise order’ so as to admit the expert report in
dispute on the following bases:
(1) Mr Williams did not prepare his report with a conscious appreciation of the
obligations imposed by Schedule K (which was applicable at the time it was
prepared) or Schedule 7 (which is applicable now).
(2) There is a real difference between the role of an expert retained to advise a client
and the role of an expert engaged to give evidence. The former owes his or her
primary obligation to the client; the latter owes his or her primary obligation to
the Court. It cannot be assumed that those obligations are identical, or that in any
given case performance of them would lead to the same outcome in terms of
opinion.
(3) For the reasons given by Einstein J in Cassegrain and Campbell J in United Rural
Enterprises, there is a real risk that an expert who has not prepared a report under
the discipline of the applicable schedule will form an opinion from which,
thereafter, he or she would find it difficult to retreat, even if circumstances arise
that might raise this as a possibility.
(4) An expert retained to advise a client is not usually confronted with alternative
expert evidence. An expert retained to give evidence usually is. In the latter case,
the expert’s obligations under the applicable schedule require that he or she
consider the alternative material, and reconsider his or her position in its light.
(5) Under the usual order for hearing that applies in the Commercial and Technology
and Construction Lists, experts are required to confer with a view to defining,
refining and where possible limiting the real issues in dispute between them. The
ordinary workings of the human mind to which Campbell J pointed in United
Rural Enterprises at para [15] might make this process more difficult for an expert
who did not start out with an appreciation of his or her obligations under the
applicable schedule.
(6) In those circumstances, I think that there is a real risk of significant prejudice … if
the Colliers material is admitted to prove Mr Williams’ opinions.
(7) That prejudice is exacerbated because Mr Williams is not available for
cross-examination.
(8) Further, the agreement between Messrs Hillier and Feilich, which appears to
draw a distinction between a valuation report and the exercise undertaken by
Mr Williams, and which implicitly suggests that the latter is not to be regarded as
a valuation, enhances the risk of prejudice.
McDougall J indicated that in the alternative, and if necessary, he was prepared to rely on
these same reasons to reject the tender under s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).
The issue was canvassed further in an authoritative decision on the subject, Hodder
Rook & Associates Pty Ltd v Genworth Financial Mortgage Insurance Pty Ltd [2011] NSWCA
279. At first instance, Einstein J had rejected the admission of an expert report for
non-compliance with UCPR r 31.23. In doing so, his Honour summarised (at [57]) the
relevant principles in these terms:
[5.05.10] 293
i. Unless the Court ‘otherwise orders’, the reports not containing the
acknowledgement that the expert agrees to be bound by the expert code of
conduct should not be admitted into evidence (UCPR 31.23(3));
ii. The Court must be satisfied that there are ‘exceptional circumstances’ justifying
the admission of the reports …;
iii. In preparing reports without having agreed to be bound by the code of conduct,
there is a real risk that the expert will have committed to a particular form of
opinion which an ex post facto adoption of the code cannot cure …
On appeal, the Court of Appeal did not accept those principles. Young JA (with whom
Beazley JA and Handley AJA agreed) rejected the second principle and said the following
of the third (at [63]):
Principle iii enunciated by the primary judge has some validity, but it must not be
elevated into a general rule. Each case must be considered on its merits. The court may
consider that the assumed ‘real risk’ is non-existent or minor. If so, in the case where an
expert makes an initial report without having the Code in mind and then is shown the
Code and swears that in fact he or she did abide by it and now affirms the original report,
the evidence should be admitted. Again, if the court can see that he or she is not just
rubber stamping the original report, the later report should be admitted into evidence.
(See further Welker v Rinehart (No 6) [2012] NSWSC 160 at [35].)

In O’Reilly v Western Sussex NHS Trust (No 2) [2013] NSWSC 1659, Garling J dealt with
the admissibility of an expert report where the experienced expert had not made the
required declaration. The objection to his evidence was made. Garling J permitted the
report to be admitted and the witness to give oral evidence on the basis that he had no
reason to doubt that the expert knew the proper role of the expert witness and that the
omission could be laid at the feet of an inadvertence by the lawyers who commissioned
him: ‘I am not confronted with a circumstance in which the expert witness has been
provided with the Code and has, in the full knowledge of it, expressly refrained from
acknowledging or adopting it’ (at [32]).
In Estate of Rochester [2013] NSWSC 884, McDougall J also gave latitude in the face of a
failure by a general practitioner to make the required declaration. He took into account,
among other things, that the evidence was that of the general practitioner who cared for
the deceased for many years and that there was no reason for concluding that the witness
may not be truly independent. He emphasised that (at [12]):
In the ordinary way, I would not have been inclined to exercise the discretion to allow the
report to be admitted in evidence. The rules relating to expert evidence serve a very
important function. They are intended to ensure that the court can rely upon expert
evidence as representing the independent view of the expert, not a view tailored to the
needs of the person on whose behalf the report is commissioned.
However, he concluded that the course that he was taking in allowing the evidence was
‘exceptional’ and did not detract from his general expression of practice.
The obligation to address relevant matters in a forensic report

[5.05.18] A variety of provisions in both legislation and court rules mandate the filing and
serving of expert reports, or at least the substance of what it is proposed that an expert
will state in his or her oral evidence prior to trial.
The question has arisen in a number of contexts of what a court or tribunal should do
in the face of significant non-compliance with this obligation. A potential sanction is to
disallow such departure from the compass of an expert report or the award of costs (in a
civil case) and, potentially, either an adjournment or the reopening of the opposing party’s
case.
In Dura (Australia) Constructions Pty Ltd v Hue Boutique Living Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] VSC
518 at [29], Dixon J emphasised the need to strike a balance between case management
294 [5.05.18]
considerations and the dictates of a fair trial, referring to Hodgson v Amcor Ltd [2011] VSC
309. He noted that there has been criticism of the courts that they have become too
tolerant of non-compliance with orders but also the identification by the High Court in
Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175; [2009]
HCA 27 of the priority of doing justice between the parties while recognising the increased
contemporary importance of active case management. He concluded (at [41]) that:
As tempting as it is to impose firm sanctions to deal with non-compliance with court
directions and seek to enhance a culture of expeditious preparation of disputes for trial, I
am satisfied that the real issues in dispute between the parties cannot be properly and
appropriately evaluated if Dura is denied reliance upon the filed evidence now
challenged.
(See also Alucraft Pty Ltd (in liq) v Grocon (No 1) [1996] 2 VR 377; Consolidated Credit Network
v Illawarra Retirement Trust [2005] NSWSC 1004.)
In Chiropractic Board of Australia v Hooper [2013] VCAT 417 at [29]–[30], Garde J, in
dealing with an application for reconstitution on the basis of a ruling not to allow experts
for a respondent to give evidence outside the terms of their reports, stated:
It is obvious that the later in the final hearing that the request to file or lead additional
expert evidence is left, the more problematic the position and the less likely that an
application for leave to file or lead additional expert evidence can or should be granted by
the Tribunal. In any hearing involving experts, it is essential for each expert to be
cross-examined as to the opposing expert’s opinions so that the Tribunal has the benefit of
the opposing and tested opinions on which to make the decision. Indeed, to fail to put
evidence to be led from later expert witnesses to the expert witnesses earlier called by an
opposing party may itself give rise to a lack of procedural fairness and injustice to the
party which presented its case in ignorance of the opposing evidence to be led later from
other witnesses.
Clearly a court or tribunal cannot permit parties to be subject to a predicament such as
this. Sometimes, when confronted by a situation where unfairness would or might
develop, a court or tribunal might permit witnesses to be recalled after opposing witnesses
have been called and cross-examined. Whether such course of action is open, feasible,
convenient or fair can only be assessed by the tribunal hearing the matter. There may be
reasons of fairness, cost or convenience that preclude or mitigate against such a course of
action.
Joint conferences
[5.05.20] The application of the Rules and Practice Direction concerning a joint conference
of experts was considered by Simpson J in Guerin v Watts [2002] NSWSC 692. This was an
application by the defendant that a joint meeting of experts take place preliminary to the
hearing of the plaintiff’s claim in negligence for damages against a medical practitioner.
The defendant proposed that some 10 experts attend at a joint meeting in order to
attempt some resolution of a number of issues. Apparently, the experts who provided
reports had formed their opinions on the basis of assumptions provided to them by the
solicitors acting for the parties they represented, but had not turned their minds to the
contrary assumptions. The defendant’s counsel submitted that this was the sort of case in
which, even if the proceedings are not resolved by such a meeting, there was a real chance
that either the issues would be narrowed or the evidentiary scope reduced.
Counsel for the plaintiff opposed the application, partly on the basis of cost, which
would have been prohibitive for her, and partly on the basis that any benefits were
outweighed by the cost and inconvenience.
Bearing in mind this issue of costs, the judge agreed to the joint experts’ meeting but,
since it was the defendant’s application, made it conditional upon the defendant’s
agreement to pay the disbursements of the conference. These included the fees of any
medical practitioner retained by the plaintiff and who required payment as a condition of
her or his attendance, and also the costs of the conference itself, although this could be
[5.05.20] 295
done by the provision of the necessary facilities, including the preparation of material to
be circulated to the medical practitioners. The question of who would ultimately bear all
those costs if the plaintiff was not successful was specifically not decided. The judge
directed the parties to prepare a set of assumptions, which included both the alternative
assumptions and questions for the assembled experts.
Further experts in addition to single experts

[5.05.30] The issue arises in a percentage of cases that, where a single expert is appointed,
parties wish subsequently to call their own experts (eg, under UCPR r 31.44). In principle,
this is inconsistent with the rationale for the use of single experts. However, there are
many scenarios where there is a real impetus for an alternative perspective to be placed
before the court to that advanced by the single expert and where collateral issues arise
from the single expert’s report. Jurisprudence upon when parties should be permitted to
call their own experts in such instances is emerging in Australia.
In Tomko v Tomko [2007] NSWSC 1486 at [8], Brereton J commented:
It has been said that proper exercise of the discretion to grant leave only requires
satisfaction that there is an appropriate basis to permit a party to adduce additional
evidence and that relevant considerations include the nature and complexity of the issues,
the existence of an objective basis to question the conclusion arrived at by the joint expert,
the existence of significant competing expert opinion, and the actual or apprehended bias
of the joint expert. [Daniels v Walker [2000] 1 WLR 1382; Cosgrove v Pattison [2001] CP Rep
68.]
(See, too, Stolfa v Owners Strata Plan 4366 (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 531.)
However, Brereton J expressed the view (at [9]) that courts:
should be relatively ready to grant leave to adduce evidence from a separate expert, lest
trial by single expert otherwise become substituted for trial by judge. Where some
arguable basis is shown for challenging the report of a single expert, the court should be
disposed to grant such leave.
Disciplinary ramifications for poor forensic work

[5.05.40] A series of decisions (see Ch 8.05) has highlighted the potential for adverse
regulatory consequences for experts whose forensic role is poorly or unsatisfactorily
performed: see Freckelton (2004a). For instance, in Mustac v Medical Board (WA) [2004]
WASCA 156, the suspension of a psychiatrist for an improper use of a psychometric
instrument (the TOMM) was upheld by the Western Australian Court of Appeal. In Re
Paterson (unreported, Professional Conduct Committee, General Medical Council, 3 April
2004), the Professional Conduct Committee of the General Medical Council struck off a
doctor for improper diagnosis in medico-legal reports and evidence of temporary brittle
bone disease. The Victorian Psychologists Registration Board in Re Noble [2002] PRBD (Vic)
6 found a psychologist to have failed to accept his professional responsibilities for having
provided a report to the Family Court that fell short of acceptable standards, for having
failed to carry out appropriate and adequate assessments that should have been done
before proffering forensic opinions, and for acting without therapeutic neutrality by
inappropriately supporting one party against another in Family Court litigation.
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)

[5.05.100] A response to the recommendations of the majority in Re W and W (Abuse
Allegations; Expert Evidence) (2001) 164 FLR 18; [2001] Fam CA 216 (see Freckelton (2005a))
was the drafting of the expert evidence provisions of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth),
which implemented highly significant reforms to the adducing of expert evidence in the
Family Court. Their purposes, in relation to expert evidence, are stipulated to be (r 15.42):
296 [5.05.30]
(a) to ensure that parties obtain expert evidence only in relation to a significant issue
in dispute;
(b) to restrict expert evidence to that which is necessary to resolve or determine a
case;
(c) to ensure that, if practicable and without compromising the interests of justice,
expert evidence is given on an issue by a single expert witness;
(d) to avoid unnecessary costs arising from the appointment of more than one expert
witness; and
(e) to enable a party to apply for permission to tender a report or adduce evidence
from an expert witness appointed by that party, if necessary in the interests of
justice.
Significantly, therefore, there is an attempt to confine expert evidence to only those

situations where it is likely to advance decision-making and to place evidence by single
expert witnesses as the default setting.
Rule 15.44 makes explicit that ‘if parties agree that expert evidence may help to resolve
a substantial issue in a case, they may agree to jointly appoint a single expert witness to
prepare a report in relation to the issue’ (r 15.44(1)). The court may, on application or on its
own initiative, order that expert evidence be given by a single expert witness. It remains to
be seen whether, and in what circumstances, the court will be prepared to appoint its own
experts and whether it will be prepared to order parties to pay the costs when it makes
such an appointment.
Rule 15.45(2) provides that a judicial officer considering whether to make such an order
may take into account factors relevant to the making of such an order, including:
(a) the main purpose of [the] Rules (see rule 1.04) and the purpose of [the] Part (see
rule 15.42);
(b) whether expert evidence on a particular issue is necessary;
(c) the nature of the issue in dispute;
(d) whether the issue falls within a substantially established area of knowledge; and
(e) whether it is necessary for the court to have a range of opinion.
The court can make a variety of facilitative orders in relation to the appointment and
conduct of single expert witnesses.
A regime has been created to enable cross-examination of single expert witnesses. A
party wishing to cross-examine must inform the witness at least 14 days before the
hearing date that the witness is required to attend the court for cross-examination:
r 15.50(1). There is specific provision that the court ‘may limit the nature and length of
cross-examination of a single expert witness’: r 15.50(2). However, no criteria are
enunciated on the basis of which such a limitation can be imposed. It is likely that judicial
officers would be loath to do so, save on the traditional bases of irrelevance or harassment.
Importantly, and separately from the single expert witness regime, a party, other than a
child representative (in respect of one expert) wishing to tender an expert report or to
adduce expert evidence, must now apply for permission: r 15.51(1). Such an application
must be supported by an affidavit stating the facts relied upon in support of the orders
sought and stating (r 15.52(2)):
(a) whether the party has attempted to agree on the appointment of a single expert
witness with the other party and, if not, why not;
(b) the name of the expert witness;
(c) the issue about which the expert witness’s evidence is to be given;
(d) the reason the expert evidence is necessary in relation to that issue;
(e) the field in which the expert witness is expert;
[5.05.100] 297
(f) the expert witness’s training, study or experience that qualifies the expert witness
as having specialised knowledge on the issue; and
(g) whether there is any previous connection between the expert witness and the
party.
For the viability of the single expert system, the default setting for the Family Court
described previously, much depends upon whether parties can be induced to agree to a
joint expert. If parties routinely are unable or unprepared to agree to single experts, the
system of party-called experts critiqued by Nicholson CJ and O’Ryan J in Re W and W
(Abuse Allegations; Expert Evidence) (2001) 164 FLR 18; [2001] Fam CA 216 will largely
remain. One mechanism for ‘encouraging’ parties to opt into the single expert system
would be for judges to be uncooperative with applications to call own-experts where there
has not been a ‘genuine attempt’ to agree on a single expert. However, such occasions may
well prove hard to discern in highly contested cases where it is plausible that there would
be a continuum of expert approaches on the issues to be the subject of expert opinions.
When considering whether to permit a party to tender a report or adduce evidence
from an expert witness, the court may take into account (r 15.52(3)):
(a) the purpose of [the relevant] Part [of the Rules] (see r 15.42);
(b) the impact of the appointment of an expert witness on the costs of the case;
(c) the likelihood of the appointment expediting or delaying the case;
(d) the complexity of the issues in the case;
(e) whether the evidence should be given by a single expert witness rather than an
expert witness appointed by one party only; and
(f) whether the expert witness has specialised knowledge, based on the person’s
training, study or experience:
(i) relevant to the issue on which evidence is to be given; and
(ii) appropriate to the value, complexity and importance of the case.
There is variability in the preparedness of judicial officers to deny parties the right to call
evidence from experts outside the single expert regime. What can be observed is that the
onus rests upon the party seeking to adduce ‘party-called’ or additional expert evidence to
establish the utility, relevance and parameters of such evidence – to persuade the court
that the evidence is likely to assist its fact-finding function. It is a significant decision to
deny to a party the entitlement to call a witness who may have been commissioned at the
party’s sincere instigation, who may have been expensive, and whose views may not
coincide with those of the single expert. It may well be that the single expert regime in
time is undermined by parties demanding, and being permitted, to call their own
witnesses in response to the single expert, with the result that the concern expressed by
Lord Denning in Re Saxton (Deceased) [1962] 1 WLR 968 at 972 about court-appointed
experts becomes telling:
I suppose that litigants realise that the court would attach great weight to the report of a
court expert, and are reluctant thus to leave the decision of the case so much in his hands.
If his report is against one side, that side will wish to call its own expert to contradict him,
and then the other side will wish to call one too. So it would only mean that the parties
would call their own experts as well.
If the court grants a party permission to tender a report or adduce evidence from an
expert witness, the permission is limited to the expert witness named, and the field of
expertise stated, in the order: r 15.52(4). Parties are not entitled to adduce evidence from
an expert witness if the expert’s report has not been disclosed or a copy has not been
given to the other party.
There are strong obligations of disclosure; parties cannot ‘hide’ reports that they have
obtained in parenting cases. Where a party has obtained an expert’s report for a parenting
298 [5.05.100]
case, it must provide it to the other parties, as well as any supplementary or amending
reports: r 15.55. However, it is notable that this disclosure obligation applies only when a
report has been obtained. It would not apply, for instance, where an expert has been asked
to see relevant people and then to discuss (orally) what might be the contents of her or his
report, were such a report to be generated. Unclear territory might be entered if the expert
reduced such thoughts to writing in an email or similar communication.
Once a report has been disclosed, any party may seek to tender it; to that extent, legal
professional privilege is removed. The obligation to disgorge reports that may be
unhelpful to a party is a major change brought about by the Rules. It means that, in
practice, great care must be exercised by solicitors in the experts whom they commission
because if problematic reports are penned, the results may be disastrous. An ironic, and
unfortunate, side-effect of the Rules may be a polarisation of the sources of expert
evidence commissioned by parties needing to be confident ahead of time of the views
likely to be expressed by the experts they commission.
The expert’s duties to the court are set out under r 15.59. They are very similar to those
enunciated by the Federal Court Rules and by many of the Supreme Court Rules. The
emphasis is upon the expert having an overriding, independent duty to the court, separate
and apart from any loyalties which the payment of a fee to the expert might subtly
engender in the expert’s approach. A particular example is the obligation of the expert to
consider all material facts, including those which are inconsistent with the expert’s
opinions.
A single expert witness is given standing herself or himself to seek procedural orders
to facilitate the witness carrying out her or his function: r 15.60. Once more, this is an
attempt to erode the ties which might exist between the expert and those commissioning
her or him. It militates against many of the traditional constraints within the adversary
system, even giving the expert standing to approach the court for direction in the carrying
out of her or his tasks.
The affidavit verifying the expert’s report must state the following:
I have made all the inquiries I believe are necessary and appropriate and to my knowledge
there have not been any relevant matters omitted from this report, except as otherwise
specifically stated in this report.
I believe that the facts within my knowledge that have been stated in this report are
true.
The opinions I have expressed in this report are independent and impartial.
I have read and understand Part 15.5 of the Family Law Rules 2004 and have used my
best endeavours to comply with it.
I have complied with the requirements of the following professional codes of conduct
or protocol, being [state the name of the code or protocol].
I understand my duty to the court and I have complied with it and will continue to do
so.
On occasions, where such a declaration has not been provided by the expert, parties have
been permitted to adduce the declaration orally.
There are significant prescriptions in the Rules, too, in relation to the substance of
experts’ reports. They are directed toward maximising the accountability and transparency
of the reasoning processes underlying experts’ opinions (r 15.63):
An expert’s report must:
(a) state the reasons for the expert witness’s conclusions;
(b) include a statement about the methodology used in the production of the report;
and
(c) include the following in support of the expert witness’s conclusions:
(i) the expert witness’s qualifications;
(ii) the literature or other material used in making the report;
[5.05.100] 299
(iii) the relevant facts, matters and assumptions on which the opinions in the
report are based;
(iv) a statement about the facts in the report that are within the expert
witness’s knowledge;
(v) details about any tests, experiments, examinations or investigations
relied on by the expert witness and, if they were carried out by another
person, details of that person’s qualifications and experience;
(vi) if there is a range of opinion on the matters dealt with in the report – a
summary of the range of opinion and the basis for the expert witness’s
opinion;
(vii) a summary of the conclusions reached;
(viii) if necessary, a disclosure that:
(A) a particular question or issue falls outside the expert witness’s
expertise;
(B) the report may be incomplete or inaccurate without some
qualification and the details of any qualification; or
(C) the expert witness’s opinion is not a concluded opinion because
further research or data is required or because of any other
reason.
Among other things, non-compliance with the Rules can lead to determinations of
inadmissibility or partial inadmissibility of the expert’s report, can impact upon the
weight given to the expert’s evidence, and can have ramifications for the award of costs.
Another characteristic of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) is that limited provision is
made for pre-trial questioning of single experts. It is mandatory for a party wanting to ask
a single expert questions about their report to do so before the hearing or trial. The
questions must be put once only and within 21 days of receipt of the report. They must be
only for the purpose of ‘clarifying’ the expert’s report and must not be vexatious or
oppressive. They must not require the expert to undertake an unreasonable amount of
work to answer them. This initiative is an important one, as it requires questioning within
unclear parameters to be undertaken as an apparent precondition of the entitlement to
cross-examine. It is part of an attempt by the court to clarify and crystallise matters in
dispute as much as possible before the commencement of the trial.
In Hoffman v Barone [2014] FamCA 52 at [94]–[100], Faulks DCJ observed that:
… The task of a single expert witness is never easy. The opportunities for observation and
consultation are rarely if ever entirely satisfactory, because of constraints of time and
money. Usually, each party is seeking some corroboration from the single expert witness of
his or her position.
Although the expert may give evidence about the ‘ultimate issue’, more frequently the
determination of that matter will fall to the Trial Judge. Each party and the Judge may
confront the single expert witness with hypothetical sets of facts to see if the expert will or
could modify or qualify his or her opinion. Frequently, with a necessarily limited database
a single expert witness faces challenges to his or her opinion.
It is important therefore that single expert witnesses follow the pathway prescribed by
authority to prepare and present his or her report.
The pathway accords with common sense. First, the expert must have primary and
particular qualifications and experience. For example, expert evidence on the health of
children should come not only from a medical doctor but desirably from one specialised in
child medicine and moreover someone experienced in such an area of practice and
knowledge.
Second, the expert should clearly indicate the information and facts upon which he or
she has relied and identify the assumptions upon which he or she proceeded.
To the extent that the expert relies on research to form his or her opinion, it may be
wise to identify that research, particularly if it is likely to be controversial and invite
cross-examination. An expert becomes an expert through knowledge of and reliance upon,
research other than his or her own and the expert’s opinion must necessarily be a
300 [5.05.100]
synthesis of knowledge in the field of expertise. However, comments such as ‘research

shows’ may indicate a lack of specialist acuity.
Third, the pathway of reasoning to the opinion must be discernible. This would seem
to be a statement of the obvious but surprisingly from time to time it is overlooked by the
single expert witness …
For family lawyers, the procedure has a range of advantages in that it replicates United
States civil processes and enables a range of matters to be brought into focus prior to
litigation. For experts, the new process allows them the luxury of giving careful thought in
the comfort of their own environment to the complexities of the issues raised by the
questions.
An aim of pre-trial questioning is to facilitate informed decision-making by parties at
an early juncture. Matters that are less than straightforward in an expert’s reasoning,
uncertainties about materials relied upon, and shades of grey in opinions can all be
canvassed in pre-trial written questions, which usually will be drafted by counsel. This
aspect of the Rules provides a further incentive for early preparation of cases. Experts are
entitled to charge for reasonable costs incurred in answering the written questions – it is
the party who asks the questions who pays.
Other innovative initiatives in the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) are the provision for
pre-trial conferences where there is more than one expert and for flexible methods for
giving evidence. Where it is proposed that more than one witness is to be called to give
evidence about the same or a similar question, the parties must arrange for them to confer
at least 14 days before the pre-trial conference. The court can make a range of orders to
facilitate the process. At the conference, the experts are obliged to (r 15.69(3)):
(a) identify the issues that are agreed and not agreed;
(b) if practicable, reach agreement on any outstanding issue;
(c) identify the reason for disagreement on any issue;
(d) identify what action (if any) may be taken to resolve any outstanding issues; and
(e) prepare a joint statement specifying the matters mentioned in paragraphs (a) to
(d) and deliver a copy of the statement to each party.
The joint statement may be tendered as evidence of matters agreed on and to identify the
issues on which evidence will be called. For the most part, expert reports will constitute
experts’ evidence-in-chief.
The hallmark of the Rules is provision of flexibility to the court in the way in which
expert evidence is provided, so that decision-making is optimised. This ranges from more
than one expert giving evidence at a time to re-ordering of the sequence of evidence by
experts. At a trial, the court may make an order, including an order that (r 15.70):
(a) an expert witness clarify the expert witness’s evidence after cross-examination;
(b) the expert witness give evidence only after all or certain factual evidence relevant
to the question has been led;
(c) each party intending to call an expert witness is to close that party’s case, subject
only to adducing the evidence of the expert witness;
(d) each expert witness is to be sworn and available to give evidence in the presence
of each other;
(e) each expert witness give evidence about the opinion given by another expert
witness; or
(f) cross-examination, or re-examination, of an expert witness is to be conducted:
(i) by completing the cross-examination or re-examination of the expert
witness before another expert witness; or
(ii) by putting to each expert witness, in turn, each question relevant to one
subject or issue at a time, until the cross-examination or re-examination
of all witnesses is completed.
[5.05.100] 301
The Rules are expressed not to apply to evidence from medical practitioners and others
who in the past have provided, or who are currently providing, treatment to a party or
child, but only if the evidence relates only to (r 15.41):
(a) the results of an examination, investigation or observation made;
(b) a description of any treatment carried out or recommended; or
(c) expressions of opinion limited to the reasons for carrying out or recommending
treatment and the consequences of the treatment.
This means that the Rules do apply to any expressions of opinion, for instance in relation to
contact or residence suitability expressed by medical practitioners or psychologists.
The Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) signal unequivocally that the Family Court expects
clarity, transparency and objectivity in expert reports. Whether the encouragement that the
Rules give to single expert reports, the identity of whose authors are agreed upon by the
parties, translates into practice remains to be seen. Widespread failure to agree on who
should write such reports and insistence by parties on the ‘right’ to call their own experts
have the potential to undermine the aspirations underlying the single expert regime. The
decisions of the court in Re W and W (Abuse Allegations; Expert Evidence) (2001) 164 FLR 18;
[2001] Fam CA 216 and Re W (Sex Abuse: Standard of Proof) [2004] 32 Fam LR 249; Fam CA
768 (see Freckelton (2005a)) make it clear that the court is highly sensitised to the potential
for witnesses to be partisan, in spite of ethical and other strictures that they be neutral and
objective. If witnesses convey any sign that they are prepared to overreach their assigned
role and function as an advocate, particularly if they have not seen all relevant parties,
their opinions are liable to be accorded little weight. This is so whether the witnesses at
fault are court-appointed or party-appointed. Their evidence may not even be admitted.
The role of pre-trial questioning of experts remains to be clarified by the experience of
practice. It has the potential to function as an opportunity for thoughtful initial
cross-examination of experts, thereby crystallising those few matters that remain to be
worked through by traditional in-court cross-examination. It offers the chance for
important issues to be dealt with away from the pressures of court in such a way as to
elicit from experts the subtleties and nuances of their views and the connections between
the available data and their opinions. It is likely to constitute an important initial aspect of
rendering experts accountable for the contents of their reports.
The Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) pick up from a range of issues that troubled the Full
Court in Re W and W (Abuse Allegations; Expert Evidence) (2001) 164 FLR 18; [2001] Fam CA
216 and have attempted to reduce the usage of multiple experts in the Family Court. Their
rationale is to identify issues upon which experts differ before trial, to ensure that experts’
opinions are capable of real evaluation by demanding that their reasoning be transparent,
to unleash experts from many of the constraints of the adversary system, and to make it
ineluctably clear, beyond just rhetoric, that experts’ responsibilities are to the court, not the
parties. The significance of the changes is yet to be determined. It lies principally in the
potential for trial judges to give teeth to the new requirements by requiring compliance
with them rather than being merely critical when cooperation with their letter and spirit is
at such a low level as to render them ineffectual.
302 [5.05.100]
Chapter 5.10
CLIENT LEGAL PRIVILEGE AND
CONFIDENTIALITY
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [5.10.01]
Client legal privilege ............................................................................................................
The ‘dominant purpose’ test ............................................................................................... [5.10.120]
Australian common law ....................................................................................................... [5.10.140]
Australian statutory protection ........................................................................................... [5.10.160]
Waiver of the privilege ......................................................................................................... [5.10.180]
Communications with experts ............................................................................................ [5.10.200]
Disclosure for the purposes of the proceedings .............................................................. [5.10.220]
Whether the material is privileged .................................................................................... [5.10.240]
Whether disclosure is required ........................................................................................... [5.10.260]
Where privilege cannot be claimed ................................................................................... [5.10.280]
Extension and limitation of the principles ....................................................................... [5.10.300]
Draft reports ........................................................................................................................... [5.10.360]
Experts and protection of trade secrets ............................................................................. [5.10.380]
Breach of confidentiality by experts .................................................................................. [5.10.400]
Only in exceptional circumstances ..................................................................................... [5.10.420]
Best interests of the patient versus duty of care to the public ..................................... [5.10.440]
English authorities ................................................................................................................ [5.10.460]
Where strong public interest in disclosure ....................................................................... [5.10.480]
Confidentiality cannot be assumed .................................................................................... [5.10.500]
Appendix: Form of undertaking to be made by independent expert ......................... [5.10.600]
‘Litigation is the pursuit of practical ends, not a game of
chess.’
Felix Frankfurter, Indianapolis v Chase National Bank Trustee 314 US 63 (1941).
The author acknowledges with appreciation the contribution made to earlier versions of this
chapter by Hugh Selby.
Introduction
[5.10.01] This chapter reviews the law of client legal privilege as it relates to expert reports,
including draft reports. It also summarises relevant considerations in relation to the
protection of commercial trade secrets in expert reports and the nature of confidentiality in
the context of the forensic work undertaken by experts.
Client legal privilege
General principles
[5.10.100] The doctrine of ‘client legal privilege’ (previously termed ‘legal professional
privilege’) protects communications between a legal adviser and client from compulsory
disclosure. It recognises that adequate legal advice in an adversarial system not be feasible
if it was usual for the communications passing between lawyers and clients to be available
to investigative bodies, litigation opponents or the courts. The privilege against revealing
the content of lawyer–client communication belongs to the client. It is the client who
asserts that he or she wishes a communication to remain confidential or who ‘waives’ the
privilege so that his or her communication to the lawyer, or the lawyer’s communication
to the client, becomes public.
The privilege extends also to communications to experts commissioned to generate
reports for the courts, although this principle has been subject latterly to significant
erosion. As Clayton JR observed in Pierides v Monash Health [2017] VSC 342 at [58]: ‘There
[5.10.100] 303
are good reasons for all practitioners in conducting litigation of this sort to assume, as a
starting point, that all communications with experts are likely to be discoverable
documents in a proceeding and that the service of any expert report may result in the
waiver of a client legal privilege over those documents.’
Parties to litigation are often keen to know the content of lawyer–client communications
engaged in by their adversaries. Such knowledge can be invaluable in assessing the
prospects for success in litigation. Hence, there is often a tussle in which one side will
claim that particular communications are protected by the privilege, while the other will
assert either that the communications do not fall within the privileged category or that the
cloak of the privilege protection has been lost.
At common law, to establish legal professional privilege the following elements must
be satisfied:
• communications must pass between the client and the client’s legal adviser;
• the communications must be made for the dominant purpose of enabling the client to
obtain legal advice (advice privilege) or for the purpose of actual or contemplated
litigation (litigation privilege); and
• the communications must be confidential (Baker v Campbell (1983) 153 CLR 52).
In addition, there must not have been waiver of the privilege, either express or implied
(Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; [1999] HCA 66).
There is no doubt about the application of the privilege to cover communications that
take place between a lawyer and his or her client during a face-to-face conference. Those
communications can only be reported to third parties with the client’s consent (save for
very limited exceptions, such as communications that are for unlawful purposes). The
problems begin as soon as the communications created outside of that conference are
considered, and especially those communications which involve a third party, such as an
expert.
For example, suppose that some machinery often breaks down. The operators are
unhappy with the service provided by the manufacturer and ask their solicitor to
commission an ‘independent’ report on the machinery and the services done to it. After
the report is received from the ‘expert’ (a third party), the operators refuse to pay the next
service accounts from the manufacturer, who then sues them. When discovery of
documents is required, the operators do not want the plaintiff manufacturer to see the
‘independent’ report. The basis of their ‘privilege’ claim is that the report was created for
the dominant purpose of litigation which was reasonably anticipated. The plaintiff
manufacturer disputes that characterisation, asserting that there had been no mention of
litigation when that report was requested and received by the defendant operator.
In Mitsubishi Electric Australia Pty Ltd v Victorian WorkCover Authority (2002) 4 VR 332;
[2002] VSCA 59 at [17], Batt JA held that ‘litigation is reasonably anticipated or in
contemplation if its initiation is likely or reasonably probable’. He added (at [19]) that, ‘as
a general rule at least, there must be a real prospect of litigation, as distinct from a mere
possibility, but it does not have to be more likely than not’. Applying this test, the
defendant operator will be required to give discovery of the report to the plaintiff.
In the above example, the report is disclosed because, as a factual matter, when it was
commissioned there was no actual litigation on foot and no real prospect of it either.
However, suppose that the facts change as follows. The machinery breaks down as before.
The operators call for service, which is provided by the manufacturer. The manufacturer
sends an account, which the operator refuses to pay. The manufacturer sues to recover the
amount of the unpaid account. Litigation is now on foot. Then the operator commissions a
report from a third party – an expert – requesting an overall evaluation of the machinery
so that it can decide, among other things, whether to enter another service contract,
304 [5.10.100]
Client legal privilege and confidentiality | CH 5.10
whether to replace the machinery, and whether to settle or fight the claim from the
manufacturer. In this scenario, the reasons for seeking the report are a combination of
business, engineering and legal.
The ‘dominant purpose’ test

[5.10.120] From the mid-1970s until 1999, the Australian approach was that such a
communication was only ‘privileged against disclosure’ if the sole purpose in its creation
was tied to actual or anticipated litigation. Hence, if a document was created for a
litigation and some other purpose, such as for the client’s internal administrative purpose,
then the privilege against disclosure could not be claimed. The document had to be
released to the opponent. If that test still applied, then, even though litigation was on foot,
at least parts of the expert report would still have to be disclosed to the plaintiff
manufacturer because the report has rather more than one purpose.
This ‘sole purpose’ test was only applied in Australia. In 1999, the High Court in Esso
Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1999) 201 CLR 49; [1999] HCA 67
abandoned it and opted for the ‘dominant purpose’ test (see also Grant v Downs (1976) 135
CLR 674 at 678 for the distinction between dominant and sole purposes). Consequently,
there is a considerably broader class of communications over which the privilege can now
be claimed. The court was divided in Esso, with two judges in dissent pointing out that a
likely consequence of the new rule would be more pre-trial disputation: it will be in the
interests of many litigants to argue that documents in their possession or control should
not be revealed to the opponent because the dominant purpose (among two, three or more
purposes) in creating those documents was seeking and obtaining legal advice. Kirby J
noted that the new test will ‘advantage corporations and administration at the cost of
ordinary individuals’ (at 362).
Applying the dominant purpose test in the above example, the expert report will not
have to be shown to the plaintiff manufacturer at the discovery stage of the litigation.
Australian common law

[5.10.140] At common law, given the centrality of communication as a determinant to
privilege (see Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) (1999) 201 CLR
49; [1999] HCA 67 at [80]), much depends upon whether draft reports are sent to lawyers
and are properly to be viewed as communications. For the most part, they are likely to be
seen as communications, unless the drafts remained entirely internal to experts and were
not communicated to the commissioning lawyers.
In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Southcorp Ltd (2003) 46 ACSR 438;
[2003] FCA 804 at [21], Lindgren J suggested that drafts are not necessarily to be viewed as
‘communications’. He held that the following principles apply generally to privilege and
expert reports:
1. Ordinarily the confidential briefing or instructing by a prospective litigant’s
lawyers of an expert to provide a report of his or her opinion to be used in the
anticipated litigation attracts client legal privilege: cf Wheeler v Le Marchant (1881)
17 Ch D 675; Trade Practices Commission v Sterling (1979) 36 FLR 244 at 246; Interchase
Corp Ltd (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd (No 1) [1999] 1 Qd R 141 (‘Interchase’) at
151 per Pincus JA, at 160 per Thomas J.
2. Copies of documents, whether the originals are privileged or not, where the copies
were made for the purpose of forming part of confidential communications between
the client’s lawyers and the expert witness, ordinarily attract the privilege:
Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501
(‘Propend’); Interchase, per Pincus JA; Spassked Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (No 4)
(2002) 50 ATR 70 at [17].
[5.10.140] 305
3. Documents generated unilaterally by the expert witness, such as working notes, field
notes, and the witness’s own drafts of his or her report, do not attract privilege
because they are not in the nature of, and would not expose, communications: cf
Interchase at 161–162 per Thomas J.
4. Ordinarily disclosure of the expert’s report for the purpose of reliance on it in the
litigation will result in an implied waiver of the privilege in respect of the brief or
instructions or documents referred to in (1) and (2) above, at least if the appropriate
inference to be drawn is that they were used in a way that could be said to influence
the content of the report, because, in these circumstances, it would be unfair for the
client to rely on the report without disclosure of the brief, instructions or documents;
cf Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475 at 481 per Gibbs CJ, 487–488
per Mason and Brennan JJ, 492–493 per Deane J, 497–498 per Dawson J; Goldberg v Ng
(1995) 185 CLR 83 at 98 per Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ, 109 per Toohey J; Instant
Colour Pty Ltd v Canon Australia Pty Ltd [1995] FCA 870; Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission v Lux Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 89 (‘ACCC v Lux’) at [46].
5. Similarly, privilege cannot be maintained in respect of documents used by an expert
to form an opinion or write a report, regardless of how the expert came by the
documents; Interchase at 148–150 per Pincus JA, at 161 per Thomas J.
6. It may be difficult to establish at an early stage whether documents which were
before an expert witness influenced the content of his or her report, in the absence of
any reference to them in the report: cf Dingwall v Commonwealth of Australia (1992) 39
FCR 521; Tirango Nominees Pty Ltd v Dairy Vale Foods Ltd (No 2) (1998) 83 FCR 397 at
400; ACCC v Lux at [46].
Lindgren J’s analysis has been approved by Ryan J in Temwell Pty Ltd v DKGR Holdings Pty
Ltd (in liq) [2003] FCA 948, Einstein J in Gate Gourmet Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Gate
Gourmet Holding AG [2004] NSWSC 768 and Barrett J in Ryder v Frohlich [2005] NSWSC
1342. In the latter case, Barrett J concluded that a draft expert report did not attract the
common law privilege and said (at [11]–[12]):
Lindgren J’s item (3) refers to the judgment of Thomas J in Interchase Corp Ltd (in liq) v
Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd (No 1) [1999] 1 Qd R 141. It is pertinent to quote from his Honour’s
judgment (at p 162):
We are concerned in this case with discovery and production of documents. A
necessary basis for privilege to attach to anything – document or otherwise – is that it
records a communication. The material in categories B, C, D and E has remained in
Richard Ellis’s possession, and has not been the subject of any communication with the
solicitors, or for that matter anyone else. The basis upon which privilege was claimed
for these documents is confined to the claim that they were ‘brought into existence by
Richard Ellis solely for use in this litigation since its commencement and have been kept
confidential.’ (my italics). The italicised words draw attention to what is missing, and
expose a deficiency in the claim. The documents consist mainly of working papers and
valuations of other properties, and lack the quality of confidentiality. There is no
reason to think that the documents were made for any confidential purpose. The other
deficiency is that they were not communicated or intended to be communicated to
anyone. In Commissioner of Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd (1997) 188 CLR 501,
552, McHugh J underlined the fundamental point that the subject matter of privilege is
communications.
This point, however trite it may seem, is fundamental to the determination of the
present appeal. Much of the confusion present in the case law arises from a failure
to apply it. Legal professional privilege is concerned with communications, either
oral, written or recorded, and not with documents per se.
In the present matter, shortly put, the documents in no way make or record
communications, let alone confidential communications.
I would hold that in general, when an expert is engaged by a solicitor for the
purpose of giving evidence in a case, documents generated by the expert and
information recorded in one form or another by the expert in the course of forming an
opinion are not a proper subject for a claim of legal professional privilege. Privilege
306 [5.10.140]
may however be claimed in relation to communications between the expert and the
solicitor (both ways) when such communication is made for the purpose of
confidential use in the litigation. Beyond this there is no sufficient reason why any
material relevant to the formation of the expert’s opinion should be subject to a claim
of legal professional privilege. It is as well to add that an expert or solicitor may not
artificially manufacture privilege by, for example, the expert sending in his or her file
to the solicitor. Documents of this kind simply are not confidential.
The point made here is that privilege can only attach to documents which embody
communication between the expert and the litigant by whom the expert is retained (or the
litigant’s lawyer). A draft report prepared by the expert is not, of its nature, such a
communication. It may be that the draft report is, in fact, given or sent by the expert to the
litigant or the litigant’s lawyer, but that does not change its character as something
prepared by the expert which is not intended to be a means of communication with the
litigant or lawyer.
The Southcorp and Interchase cases to which Barrett J referred dealt with legal professional
privilege at common law, rather than under the uniform Evidence Acts.
However, in Brookfield v Yevad Products Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1180 at [15], Mansfield J said:
I do not think that Lindgren J’s principle (3) in Southcorp should be read as suggesting that
a draft report provided by an expert to solicitors for the purpose of litigation is not itself
privileged. It operates precisely as a communication for the purposes for which privilege
exists … Provided that document was brought into existence for such a purpose, that is to
record information to be submitted to a solicitor for the purpose of litigation, it may be
privileged even in the hands of the expert.
His Honour held that a draft expert report was privileged from production at an
interlocutory stage.
Similarly, privilege was held to apply to draft reports in Re Southland Coal Pty Ltd (rec
and mgrs apptd) (in liq) (2006) 203 FLR 1; [2006] NSWSC 899 at [16]–[20]; Linter Group Ltd v
Price Waterhouse (a firm) [1999] VSC 245 at [16]; and Filipowski v Island Maritime Ltd [2002]
NSWLEC 177 at [22].
Australian statutory protection

[5.10.160] The key provisions under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995
(NSW), the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), the Evidence (Uniform
National Legislation Act) (NT) and the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) are ss 118 and 119:
118 Legal advice
Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing
the evidence would result in disclosure of:
(a) a confidential communication made between the client and a lawyer; or
(b) a confidential communication made between 2 or more lawyers acting for the
client; or
(c) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) prepared by
the client, lawyer or another person;
for the dominant purpose of the lawyer, or one or more of the lawyers, providing legal
advice to the client.
119 Litigation
Evidence is not to be adduced if, on objection by a client, the court finds that adducing
the evidence would result in disclosure of:
(a) a confidential communication between the client and another person, or between
a lawyer acting for the client and another person, that was made; or
(b) the contents of a confidential document (whether delivered or not) that was
prepared;
for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services
relating to an Australian or overseas proceeding (including the proceeding before the
[5.10.160] 307
court), or an anticipated or pending Australian or overseas proceeding, in which the client

is or may be, or was or might have been, a party.
Thus, the considerations generally applying to communications under the common law
apply to s 119(a): New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd (in liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007]
NSWSC 258. However, a not wholly resolved issue is also whether a draft expert report
constitutes a ‘confidential document’ for the purposes of s 119(b): Natuna Pty Ltd v Cook
[2006] NSWSC 1367 at [10] per Biscoe AJ.
Section 117 defines a ‘confidential document’ as:
a document prepared in such circumstances that, when it was prepared:
(a) the person who prepared it; or
(b) the person for whom it was prepared;
was under an express or implied obligation not to disclose its contents, whether or not the
obligation arises under law.
Sections 118(b) and 119(b), therefore, go outside the area of communications with which
ss 118(a) and 119(a) and common law concepts of privilege are concerned. It applies to
‘documents’. As Austin J expressed it in Re Southland Coal Pty Ltd (rec and mgrs apptd) (in
liq) (2006) 203 FLR 1; [2006] NSWSC 899 at [17]:
Both s 118 and s 119 literally protect not only certain confidential communications, but also
the contents of certain confidential documents (whether delivered or not). If, therefore, a
document satisfies the requirements of either section – if, that is, it is a confidential
document that was prepared by the requisite person for the requisite dominant purpose –
the contents of the document are not to be disclosed, regardless of whether those contents
have been or are to be communicated. To say that the statutory provisions protect the
‘communication constituted by the document’, rather than the document as such, is
correct only in the sense that the privilege attaches to the information contained in the
document (whether communicated or not) rather than to the piece of paper upon which
that information is recorded.
In Natuna Pty Ltd v Cook [2006] NSWSC 1367, Briscoe J held that a draft report by an expert
retained by a party or parties is not stripped of its character of confidentiality by the
expert witness code of conduct. He rejected the submission that the overriding duty of an
expert to assist the court impartially, as stated in various expert witness codes of conduct,
means that it can no longer be said that an expert report is prepared for the dominant
purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services relating to
proceedings. He held too that service of an expert report does not waive privilege in
relation to a draft.
Waiver of the privilege

[5.10.180] Even where a communication falls within the protected category as having the
required dominant purpose and a ‘real prospect of litigation’, there may be some scope to
argue that the privilege has been lost because of the conduct of the client. This is known as
‘waiver of the privilege’. Once again, there have been a number of cases in which the
criteria for deciding whether or not waiver has occurred have been analysed. Some of
these are discussed below. It is important to bear in mind that those cases decided
between 1976 and 1999 took place in the shadow of the ‘sole purpose’ test. This was also a
period in which it was commonly believed that the High Court was narrowing the ambit
of the privilege claim.
The court’s decisions in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth)
(1999) 201 CLR 49; [1999] HCA 67 and in Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1; [1999] HCA 66
(the two decisions were handed down on the same day) entail that the conclusions drawn
in the earlier cases may be reviewed in future cases. Thus, if the High Court wishes to
maintain a narrow ambit for ‘privilege’ claims, then a broadening approach to client
conduct which is characterised as ‘waiver of the privilege’ is a possible trend. However, if
308 [5.10.180]
the decision in Esso signals a new preparedness to bolster ‘client legal privilege’, then
there may be more instances which enlarge the Mann v Carnell decision, which found that
the client’s conduct had not waived the privilege.
It is an inconsistency between the conduct of the client and maintenance of
confidentiality which entails that the privilege has been waived. So, if the client declares
that he or she does not wish to claim the privilege, then it is gone. Such express waivers
do not cause problems. It is the arguments about ‘implied’ waiver which lead to court
determination. A typical and straightforward ‘implied’ waiver is when a client gives to a
third party his or her version of a communication with the client’s lawyer. That lawyer is
then entitled to give his or her account of that communication. This situation arises when
a client complains about the lawyer – what they allegedly said, or did not say, etc – to a
third party.
Rather more difficult is when ‘privileged’ information is voluntarily passed by a client
to a ‘third party’ for a limited and confidential purpose. Experts are often the third party
and they receive personal or ‘in confidence’ business information from an individual or
corporate client as part of the commissioning or preliminary data phase of their expert
report. Does that passing of information constitute a waiver of the privilege, so that others
also can now demand access? This was the issue in Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1;
[1999] HCA 66. The court decided by majority that the privilege was not lost in the
particular circumstances of that case. However, the judgments also provide some guidance
of more general application. The majority rejected the notion that a voluntary disclosure to
a third party necessarily waives the privilege (at 385). In each case, the courts are to
examine the asserted inconsistency having in mind considerations of fairness. This is to be
contrasted with the ‘purist’ dissenting line that ‘[o]nce there is voluntary disclosure of
privileged material to a stranger to the privileged relationship … privilege in that material
is waived as against the world’ (at 401).
Under s 122 of the uniform evidence legislation, there is waiver of the privilege if the
client or party has acted in such a way that is inconsistent with their objecting to evidence
because it would result in a disclosure of a kind referred to in s 118, s 119 or s 120. A client
or party is taken to have acted in such a way if the party has knowingly and voluntarily
disclosed the substance of the evidence to another person; or the substance of the evidence
has been disclosed with the express or implied consent of the client or party
(s 122(3)(a)–(b)). The reference to a knowing and voluntary disclosure does not include a
reference to a disclosure by a person who was, at the time of the disclosure, an employee
or agent of the client or party or of a lawyer of the client or party unless the employee or
agent was authorised by the client, party or lawyer to make the disclosure (s 122(4)).
A client or party is not taken to have acted in a manner inconsistent with the client or
party objecting to the adducing of the evidence merely because:
(a) the substance of the evidence has been disclosed:
(i) in the course of making a confidential communication or preparing a
confidential document; or
(ii) as a result of duress or deception; or
(iii) under compulsion of law; or
(iv) if the client or party is a body established by, or a person holding an
office under, an Australian law – to the Minister, or the Minister of the
Commonwealth, the State or Territory, administering the law, or part of
the law, under which the body is established or the office is held; or
(b) of a disclosure by a client to another person if the disclosure concerns a matter in
relation to which the same lawyer is providing, or is to provide, professional legal
services to both the client and the other person; or
[5.10.180] 309
(c) of a disclosure to a person with whom the client or party had, at the time of the
disclosure, a common interest relating to the proceeding or an anticipated or
pending proceeding in an Australian court or a foreign court.
In addition, s 126 provides that:

If, because of the application of section 121, 122, 123, 124 or 125, this Division does not
prevent the adducing of evidence of a communication or the contents of a document,
those sections do not prevent the adducing of evidence of another communication or
document if it is reasonably necessary to enable a proper understanding of the
communication or document.
Communications with experts

[5.10.200] When experts are engaged to advise clients and their lawyers and to prepare
reports for litigation, then in principle those communications are caught by ‘client legal
privilege’. The content of the communication has a dominant purpose connected with the
provision of legal advice or, more commonly, litigation. It is the entitlement of the client to
preserve or waive that privilege. For example, if an expert is retained and advises that the
client’s case is hopeless, then that advice cannot be revealed to a third party unless and
until the client does some act which waives the privilege. It is the umbrella of this
privilege which permits some litigants to conceal the reality of their position while they
hunt for an ‘expert’ who will support their case.
There is a sharp distinction between the communications that flow between expert and
lawyer/client and the notes, memos and drafts that the expert produces as he or she
works toward that communication. The former attract the protection of the privilege; the
latter may not and it is best to assume that they will not. An illustrative decision in this
regard is that of Vickery J in Roads Corporation v Love [2010] VSC 253, where he reiterated
the principles set out in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Southcorp Ltd
(2003) 46 ACSR 438; [2003] FCA 804 at [21]:
1. Ordinarily the confidential briefing or instructing by a prospective litigant’s
lawyers of an expert to provide a report of his or her opinion to be used in the
anticipated litigation attracts client legal privilege.
2. Copies of documents, whether the originals are privileged or not, where the
copies were made for the purpose of forming part of confidential communications
between the client’s lawyers and the expert witness, ordinarily attract the
privilege.
3. Documents generated unilaterally by the expert witness, such as working notes, field
notes, and the witness’s own drafts of his or her report, do not attract privilege because
they are not in the nature of, and would not expose, communications.
4. Ordinarily disclosure of the expert’s report for the purpose of reliance on it in the
litigation will result in an implied waiver of the privilege in respect of the brief or
instructions or documents referred to in (1) and (2) above, at least if the
appropriate inference to be drawn is that they were used in a way that could be
said to influence the content of the report, because, in these circumstances, it
would be unfair for the client to rely on the report without disclosure of the brief,
instructions or documents.
5. Similarly, privilege cannot be maintained in respect of documents used by an
expert to form an opinion or write a report, regardless of how the expert came by
the documents.
6. It may be difficult to establish at an early stage whether documents which were
before an expert witness influenced the content of his or her report, in the absence
of any reference to them in the report.
310 [5.10.200]
Difficulties can occur when a number of experts gather to plan for the evidence that they
propose to give at trial. Vickery J held (at [36]) that meetings between experts to be called
by a party for the purpose of ensuring a ‘common line’ have a variety of vices:
The exercise is ultimately self-defeating. In the first place the essential independence of the
witness is compromised – the witness is no longer giving exclusively his or her own
opinion – the evidence is in danger of becoming a ‘team presentation’. As a consequence,
the overriding duty to assist the Court on the expert subject matter is compromised and
the witness approaches the role of the advocate for the person retaining him or her.
Secondly, adequate testing of the evidence and the information relied upon becomes
problematic. The content of discussions at such meetings is rarely likely to be recorded,
and the influences which are brought to bear are not likely to be assessed with any degree
of confidence. The credibility of the participating witnesses will suffer accordingly.
The following discussion looks first at instances where a court has found that the
‘privilege’ is maintained, and then at situations where the ‘privilege’ is either non-existent
or is lost.
Disclosure for the purposes of the proceedings
[5.10.220] In Complete Technology Pty Ltd v Toshiba (Australia) Pty Ltd (1994) 53 FCR 125, the
plaintiffs sought to prevent the use by the defendants of experts whose reports had been
exchanged between parties to earlier proceedings. In those earlier proceedings, the present
plaintiffs had likewise been the plaintiffs. Further, the advocates for the earlier defendants
were expected to be the advocates for Toshiba in the present proceedings. As those earlier
proceedings had settled, the exchanged expert reports had never been tendered in
evidence.
Hill J noted (at 132): ‘where information or documents are required to be disclosed by
rules of court or order of the court, that disclosure is subject to an implied undertaking
that the information or documents will not be used otherwise than for the purposes of the
proceedings.’ One common reason which necessitates this principle is that the exchanged
documents may contain sensitive commercial matters and be initially exchanged on the
understanding that their contents will not be published to any other parties. It follows that
if a party to earlier proceedings wishes to make use of such material in later proceedings,
it must first obtain the court’s consent.
Whether the material is privileged
[5.10.240] A difficult question arises as to whether the material being used by the expert as
a basis for his or her opinions is privileged. The approach seems to be as follows. If the
expert is using material that is not privileged because, for example, it fails the dominant
purpose test of being created only for the purposes of the litigation, then that material is
discoverable.
Where, however, some material is privileged, it will retain its privileged, ‘non-
discoverable’ status even when referred to in another report which is supplied to the
opposing party. In Cole v Dyer (1999) 74 SASR 216, the question before Doyle CJ was
whether a waiver of legal professional privilege in relation to some documents referred to
by experts was to be imputed.
The plaintiff, Mr Cole, claimed damages for personal injury. He was riding a bicycle
when he was hit from behind by a truck being driven by the first defendant, Mrs Dyer.
She was travelling in the same direction as the plaintiff. Just before the collision, an
unidentified vehicle was being driven in the opposite direction. The nominal defendant
was the second defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the impact was caused by the
negligent driving of Mrs Dyer and of the driver of the unidentified vehicle. Mrs Dyer was
alleged to have failed to keep a proper lookout and to have driven at a time when her
eyesight and visual capacity were significantly impaired. The solicitors for Mrs Dyer
obtained expert reports. Each report referred to things said by Mrs Dyer about the
[5.10.240] 311
circumstances of the accident. On appeal, it was agreed that the experts were referring to
two statements given by Mrs Dyer to assessors engaged by the solicitors for Mrs Dyer.
On appeal, the only issue argued was the entitlement of the plaintiff to a copy of the
two statements made by Mrs Dyer to the assessors. Doyle CJ observed (at 222–228,
emphasis added):
The claim that a waiver of legal professional privilege is to be imputed to the first
defendant as a matter of fairness must be based ultimately upon one of a number of
possible matters, or upon those matters in combination. The first matter is the fact that the
solicitors provided the statements to the experts for their consideration and use in
preparing an expert report that would have to be disclosed to the plaintiff. The disclosure
is at least a limited waiver of privilege. If that submission succeeds, it would seem to
follow that any privileged material disclosed to an expert for use in connection with the
preparation of a report that must be disclosed loses the protection of legal professional
privilege. The second matter upon which the plaintiff’s argument might be based is the
actual disclosure of the report, and the fact that the report indicates that the expert has
based his opinion upon material contained in the statements of Mrs Dyer. The third matter
is the possibility of unfairness or inconvenience should the expert later be called, and
should it emerge that the expert has based his opinion upon material not adequately
particularised. The fourth matter is the requirement that if the expert be called, each
matter upon which the expert’s opinion is based be expressly stated and ultimately
proved: see Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (1990) 21 FCR 324 …
I am dealing with a situation which has undoubtedly occurred before, and which is
likely to be repeated. It is the provision of privileged material to an expert for use in
connection with the provision of a report by that expert, which material has been relied
upon in part by that expert as a basis for the expert’s opinion. The material that has been
so relied upon is set out in the expert report delivered pursuant to r 38.01(1). The party
that has disclosed the report maintains that the report meets the requirements of r 38.01(8)
and on its face it appears to do so. The expert has not yet been called to give evidence …
However, because the ultimate issue is one of fairness, the question of whether the
disclosure is voluntary or not cannot be decisive when considering whether a waiver of
privilege is to be imputed. The fact that the disclosure is not voluntary is important, but
not decisive.
When the solicitors for Mrs Dyer provided the material to the experts, they knew that
any report from the experts would have to be disclosed. They knew that r 38.01 entitled
the plaintiff to particulars identifying any material from Mrs Dyer’s statement upon which
the expert based his opinion. Those particulars are to be taken to have been provided,
counsel for the first defendant accepting that the report itself is in each case to be treated
as containing the particulars. It is not a case in which the provision of adequate particulars
of itself requires disclosure of the statements.
As the parts of Mrs Dyer’s statements upon which the experts have based their
opinion are particularised, I do not regard it as unfair that the defendant should be
permitted to withhold from production the balance of Mrs Dyer’s statements. The
plaintiff’s solicitors should be able to prepare adequately for trial with the material that
they have. They know the facts drawn from Mrs Dyer’s statements that apparently have
been relied upon by the experts. I can find no unfairness in connection with the
preparation for trial. It is possible, as is contemplated in some of the decisions referred to,
that at trial the position will change. It might emerge that material not particularised has
been relied upon. For some other reason it may become necessary to consider the whole of
Mrs Dyer’s statement. But that is a matter to be dealt with by the trial judge. So fairness in
the sense of preparation for trial does not require that a waiver of privilege be imputed …
These days courts require and encourage the maximum disclosure of material before
trial. It is in the interests of justice and efficiency that the trial should begin with each party
having a full understanding of the case of the other party. But legal professional privilege
remains as an important doctrine. A rule that privilege is waived if material is submitted
to an expert for use in connection with an expert report, would be a very substantial
intrusion on legal professional privilege. And such an intrusion would be for little gain, in
terms of justice or efficiency, if particulars of any matter relied upon by the expert must be
provided. The party to whom the report is disclosed will be able to identify privileged
material upon which the expert has based the expert’s opinion.
312 [5.10.240]
A distinction is to be drawn between imputing a waiver of privilege before trial and

because of what happens at trial. A distinction must also be drawn between cases like the
present, when the particulars required by r 38.01(7) are provided, and cases in which they
are not. When the required particulars are not provided, the relevant report is
inadmissible, unless leave is obtained to call the report: r 38.01(7).
A party to whom a report is disclosed under r 38.01 is not entitled or limited,
ordinarily, to a list of the material submitted to the expert in connection with the report.
The entitlement is to particulars under r 38.01(7). Of course, there may be cases in which
the provision of a list of material submitted is the only way of providing the relevant
particulars.
Finally, for what it is worth, I mentioned that some of the problems that have arisen in this case
could be avoided if a solicitor instructing an expert does so by means of a letter of instructions that
sets out the matters upon which the expert is asked to base the expert’s opinion. The provision of a
bundle of secondary material to an expert for consideration is no doubt convenient, but will often
give rise to difficulty in determining the material upon which the expert has based the expert’s
opinion. If the matters not to be used are set out in the letter of instructions, that difficulty or doubt
should not arise. If it does arise, the disclosure of the letter of instructions need not give rise to the
disclosure of other privileged material.
Whether disclosure is required
[5.10.260] In Tirango Nominees v Dairy Vale Foods Ltd (1998) 156 ALR 364, which was
decided in the context of the provisions of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) dealing with
privilege and its waiver, Mansfield J held (at 368) that the calling of an expert witness does
not of itself amount to a disclosure of the substance of the instruction or instructions given
to the witness. However, he acknowledged that there will be cases where the nature of the
issue being addressed may elicit such a conclusion and where the operation of s 126 of the
Act will require that materials provided to an expert, even if not identified by the expert,
will need to be disclosed notwithstanding that they may be the subject of client legal
privilege: see also Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Management Ltd
[1998] FCA 419 per Foster J for another instance where disclosure was not required.
Where privilege cannot be claimed
[5.10.280] In Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319, the High Court
held (by a bare majority) that legal professional privilege could not be claimed so as to
prevent the investigators of the now defunct National Companies and Securities
Commission having access to certain materials under the Companies Code. Where the
lawyer for the party under investigation (now being conducted by the Australian
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)) makes the claim, the lawyers will be
required to disclose the identity of the client to the ASIC investigator. That client will then
be required to give the investigator access to the materials. Now, suppose that an expert
prepares a report or reports specifically for commercial litigation and that both the lawyer
and the client receive copies. If an investigation is carried out into the client, then the
investigator may require production of that report by the client and no privilege can be
claimed: see Longo (1991).
It should not be forgotten that there is no property in a witness’s evidence of fact, so a
court can compel an expert witness to attend to give evidence on behalf of a party other
than the party that first commissioned him or her. This principle was clearly stated by
Lord Denning MR in Harmony Shipping Co SA v Davis [1979] 1 WLR 1380 at 1386; [1979] 3
All ER 177 at 182. A handwriting expert was first approached by the plaintiffs. He advised
them that a document was not genuine. When discussing his fee, he explained that it was
his rule not to give advice to both sides in a dispute. Later, and quite by mischance, he
advised the defendants that the same document was not genuine, an opinion which was
most helpful to the defendants. When the expert realised that he had breached his own
rule, he advised the defendants that he could not accept instructions and would not
appear. The defendants issued a subpoena and the plaintiffs applied to have it set aside.
The trial judge refused the application and held that the expert was a compellable witness.
[5.10.280] 313
The appeal court agreed and also noted (at 1386, 1388 (WLR); 182, 184 (ER)) that any
contract by which a witness binds himself or herself not to give evidence before a court on
a matter on which the judge could compel the witness to give evidence is contrary to
public policy and unenforceable.
There is also a rule, applicable to both civil and criminal proceedings, that in the case of
expert witnesses, the client legal privilege which attaches to confidential communications
between a solicitor and an expert does not extend to those (otherwise unprotected)
documents upon which the expert relies to form his or her opinion. In R v King [1983] 1
WLR 411; 1 All ER 929, the Court of Criminal Appeal held that the Crown could call a
handwriting expert who was consulted, but not called, by the defence, and that the Crown
was also entitled to production of the documents sent to the expert by the defence for
expert examination (provided the documents were not themselves protected by the
privilege). The reasoning (at 414 (WLR); 931 (ER)) was that ‘the court is entitled, in order
to ascertain the truth, to have the actual facts which the expert has observed adduced
before it in considering his opinion’.
Extension and limitation of the principles
[5.10.300] A Queensland Court of Appeal decision has extended the principles in the
Harmony Shipping Co SA v Davis [1979] 1 WLR 1380; [1979] 3 All ER 177 and R v King
[1983] 1 WLR 411; 1 All ER 929 cases. In Interchase Corp Ltd (in liq) v Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty
Ltd (No 1) [1999] 1 Qd R 141, Pincus JA posed the issue (at 145): ‘If an expert witness
provides a statement of his opinion to one of the parties to an action, are documents in the
possession of the expert, connected with the preparation of the opinion, the subject of
legal professional privilege?’ His Honour set out a detailed analysis of the relevant
principles, drawing upon both Australian and United Kingdom authority. Thomas J noted
(at 161):
It is difficult to see any justification in principle or policy for protection of documents
which the expert generates and the information which he or she collects in order to form
an opinion. The important principle that there is no property in a witness means that an
adverse party may subpoena a witness retained by the original party and require that
expert to give all relevant information in his possession … to the court … It is difficult …
to justify extending privilege [which is allowed for lawyer–expert communications] to
other documents which come into existence in the course of formation of an expert’s
opinion.
Thereafter (at 162), Thomas J stated a policy position with which all experts and solicitors
need to be familiar:
When an expert is engaged by a solicitor for the purpose of giving evidence in a case,
documents generated by the expert and information recorded in one form or another by
the expert in the course of forming an opinion are not a proper subject for a claim of legal
professional privilege. Privilege may however be claimed in relation to communications
between the expert and the solicitor (both ways) when such communication is made for
the purpose of confidential use in the litigation … It is as well to add that an expert or
solicitor may not artificially manufacture privilege by, for example, the expert sending in
his or her file to the solicitor.
(See also Mendelow (2001); Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lux Pty Ltd
[2003] FCA 89 at [44].)
It follows that experts should be systematic when researching, compiling and drafting
their reports. Implicit within the principles stated by Thomas J is an assumption that an
expert must be able to explain the development of his or her opinion and be accountable
for that development through ‘working papers’. Destruction of ‘draft’ work may entail a
cross-examination which destroys the bona fides of the expert.
However, it is important to keep in mind the limits that apply. The opposing party
cannot get access to the expert’s unused, but nevertheless privileged, report, even if it
314 [5.10.300]
chooses to call that expert in its case. In another English decision, Re Derby v Weldon,
Financial Times Law Reports, 21 November 1990, the Court of Appeal noted (at 34): ‘An
expert witness’s report prepared by a party to litigation for the purposes of the trial, is
privileged until disclosed by that party; and if he expressly disclaims any intention to
adduce oral evidence on the topic of the report, the court cannot override the privilege by
ordering disclosure.’ The plaintiffs had unsuccessfully sought an order for disclosure of a
report prepared by an expert accountant for Weldon, the defendant.
Finally, it is important to note that the requirement to exchange information sometimes
extends to include the exchange of demonstrative aids to be used by experts, such as
photos, charts, diagrams and the like. In fact, as all such evidence requires a proper
foundation of admissible evidence, it is prudent to disclose it to any other party before the
hearing and seek that party’s consent.
Draft reports
[5.10.360] Controversy attends the strategic, ethical and practical advantages of experts
writing draft reports. The risk, tactically, is that the existence of drafts will come to the
notice of other parties in litigation and, whether or not the drafts are obtained, the
damaging suggestion will be made that either the lawyers or the clients played an
inappropriate role in ‘settling’ the reports.
The law on the question of whether client legal privilege protects draft expert reports is
not yet finally resolved: see Mendelow (2001); Hand (2017). It is affected by broad policy
considerations, endeavouring to provide protection for experts who change their minds
and adjust their expression as their understanding of issues evolves. Such matters have
been canvassed in a number of judgments which ultimately leave the status of draft
reports in a number of scenarios somewhat unclear.
In Linter Group Ltd v Price Waterhouse (a firm) [1999] VSC 245 at [16], Harper J
commented:
As [a draft report] it would only be of relevance to the first defendant if it could be shown
that it differed from Mr Spencer’s witness statement, not because Mr Spencer had had a
genuine change of opinion but because he was motivated by a desire simply to improve
the plaintiffs’ case. Such would of course be entirely improper; but an expert is surely
permitted, indeed to be encouraged, to change his or her mind, if a change of mind is
warranted. Just as a judge ought never to allow publication of a draft of a judgment, in
part because it is necessary to preserve the freedom to change his or her mind on further
reflection about the case, so experts should not be inhibited by fear of exposure of a draft
from changing their minds when such change is warranted by the material then before the
expert.
This decision was followed for policy reasons by Lloyd J in Filipowski v Island Maritime Ltd
[2002] NSWLEC 177, where his Honour held, in criminal proceedings, that a draft expert
report was privileged from production. Lloyd J said (at [22]):
The comparison by Harper J of a draft expert’s report with a draft judgment is, in my
opinion, valid. In my experience, it is not unusual for a judge to walk off the Bench at the
end of a case and prepare a draft judgment leading to a particular conclusion. However, as
one’s reading and thinking about the case develops over the ensuing weeks, it is not
unusual for successive drafts to be completely rewritten, leading to the opposite
conclusion. I agree with Harper J that this is to be encouraged. So too, with experts. They
may be discouraged from reformulating their opinions and conclusions, or changing their
minds after further reading or examination if their drafts were not the subject to privilege.
(See too Natuna Pty Ltd v Cook [2006] NSWSC 1367 at [15]; New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd
(in liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 258 at [22].)
[5.10.360] 315
In Thiess Pty Ltd v Dobbins Contracting Pty Ltd at [21]–[22], McDougall J supported the
involvement of lawyers in the drafting of statements of expert evidence, but within
circumscribed limits:
Lawyers must play an active, and important, part in the preparation of statements of
expert evidence. First of all, the lawyers for a party who proposes to rely on expert
evidence must inform the expert of the assumed facts on which his or her opinion is to be
based. To enable the opinion to have any value, the statement of assumed facts (and of
course, those facts include documents) must be comprehensive.
Next, the lawyers should do what they can to ensure that the expert expresses his or
her opinions in a way that demonstrates clearly the application of specialised knowledge
to those assumed facts and the reasoning process that leads to the opinions expressed. Of
course, it is a matter for the expert, and only the expert, to formulate those opinions, and
to employ an appropriate reasoning process in doing so. However, if the expert’s
statement of evidence is to be of any real utility, the lawyers who have retained the expert
must do what they can to ensure that the reasoning process is adequately displayed. In
this case, the lawyers for both the plaintiffs and Mr Bate appeared to be either ignorant of,
or uncaring as to, their responsibilities in this regard.
(See more generally Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424;
[2003] FCA 893 at [19]; R v Coroner Maria Doogan [2005] ACTSC 74 at [118]; cf Boland v Yates
Property Corporation Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 64 at [279] per Callinan J.)
There have been occasions when lawyers have played too substantive a role in making
suggestions and in essence influencing the content of expert reports, and thereby
detracting from experts’ independence after being provided with a draft: see, eg, Phosphate
Co-operative Co of Aust Pty Ltd v Shears [1989] VR 665 at 681,683 per Brooking J; Certain
Children v Minister for Families and Children (No 2) [2017] VSC 304 per Dixon J. The nature
of such an improper role only becomes apparent when a contrast can be made between a
draft report and a final report. This reality has played a role in the law, as it has
developed, in relation to the privilege attaching to draft expert reports.
In terms of the status of draft reports in respect of privilege, White J in New Cap
Reinsurance Corporation Ltd (In Liq) v Renaissance Reinsurance Ltd [2007] NSWSC 258 at
[29]–[30], [34]–[37] made influential observations:
The dominant purpose for which a final expert’s report or final witness statement is
brought into existence would presumably be for the purpose of being laid before the
Court as the witness’ evidence. Prima facie, it would not be privileged (Attorney-General
(NT) v Maurice at 480). However, draft reports, and notes used in preparing a report, may
stand at a different position, particularly where the expert has been retained by the party’s
solicitors and it is expected that the party’s lawyers will advise on the contents of, and
settle the form of, the report. There is nothing improper in such a course. It is not
inconsistent with the expert’s paramount duty being the duty to the Court and not to the
client retaining him or her.
It will be a question of fact, to which the expert may be required to put his or her oath,
as to whether any draft reports prepared and kept by him, and working notes prepared by
him or his staff, were brought into existence for the dominant purpose of the plaintiffs
being provided with professional legal services. If they were prepared for the dominant
purpose of a draft report being submitted for advice or comment by the plaintiffs’ lawyers,
then they would be privileged under s 119. However, if they were brought into existence
for the dominant purpose of the expert forming his or her opinions to be expressed in the
final report, then it could be arguable that they were not made for the dominant purpose
of the plaintiffs being provided with professional legal services relating to the proceedings.
…
Section 119(b) of the Evidence Act extends the privilege to confidential documents,
whether communicated or not, provided they were brought into existence with the
requisite dominant purpose. The question however is what that purpose is. If an expert
prepares a draft report, or notes for the report, with the dominant purpose of a draft
report (whether the precise draft then prepared by the expert or an intended later draft)
being furnished for comment or advice by the lawyer, then it is privileged. If not, it is not.
316 [5.10.360]
The issue may not be an easy one to determine. In all probability, an expert witness
retained by a lawyer for a party will prepare a draft report with the intention (and
purpose) that it will set out the evidence which he or she expects to give, but also with the
intention and purpose of its being considered and commented on by the party’s lawyers.
If the latter purpose is dominant, the document so produced is privileged. If not, it is not
privileged.
In this way, in the case of claims for privilege over working notes and expert’s draft
reports not communicated to a client’s lawyer, the same practical outcome may be reached
in many cases whether the privilege is claimed at common law or under s 119 of the
Evidence Act. However, the analysis of the claims must proceed on different paths.
It suffices to say that the draft reports which are the subject of the notice of motion are
privileged because they were copies of the draft report sent to the plaintiffs’ lawyers for
the purposes of comment. Whether the same documents in the hands of the expert were
produced for the same dominant purpose will be a different question, the resolution of
which may depend upon the expert’s oath. Instructions in relation to draft reports, or
requests for such instructions, are also privileged under s 119(b) as they were brought into
existence for the dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal
services in connection with the proceedings.
In Shea v TruEnergy Services Pty Ltd (No 5) [2013] FCA 937, Dodds-Streeton J considered the
decision in New Cap and concluded that (at [56]–[60]):
Drafts of expert reports, and commentary and communications passing between an expert
and the client’s lawyers, are not ipso facto the subject of client legal privilege. Nor, in my
opinion, is such privilege in draft expert reports and communications passing between an
expert and the client’s lawyers automatically waived by reliance on the final report,
whether by its service, the expert witness’ entry into the witness box or otherwise.
Rather, draft expert reports and communications passing between an expert and the
client’s lawyers will attract client legal privilege if, inter alia, they satisfy the conditions of
s 119 of the Evidence Act, in that they are confidential and were prepared or made ‘for the
dominant purpose of the client being provided with professional legal services in relation
to an Australian overseas proceeding (including the proceeding before the court) or an
anticipated or pending Australian or overseas proceeding, in which the client is or may be,
or was or might have been, a party’ (‘the specified purpose’). In my opinion, as White J
accepted in New Cap, ‘professional legal services’ encompasses representing the client in
legal proceedings.
The means of establishing that documents and communication were prepared or made
for the specified purpose may vary according to the context.
Client legal privilege subsisting under s 119 may be waived under s 122(2) if the client
or party acted inconsistently with objecting to adducing evidence because it would result
in a disclosure of the relevant documents or communications. An example of such
inconsistency relevant to the present case is contained in s 122(3) (that is, where the
substance of the evidence has been disclosed with the express or implied consent of the
client or party), which invokes the doctrine of imputed consent applicable to common law
legal professional privilege.
Recent persuasive authority, such as New Cap, makes clear that relevant inconsistency
may subsist where the draft reports or communications may have influenced the content
of the final report in a substantial sense, as in such a case, there would be inconsistency
informed by notions of fairness between, on the one hand, withholding the documents or
communications while, on the other hand, relying on the final report. If, however, the
relevant documents or communications have not influenced the content of the final report,
or may have influenced it but in relation only to form or peripheral matters, the
inconsistency would be unlikely to be established.
Dodds-Streeton J concluded that it was ‘probable’ that the draft reports and the
correspondence before her were privileged. Although the expert had not given evidence
as to the nature of any changes he made to the draft report, he had testified that the
changes to the later report were in the nature of editing rather than matters of any
substance. That was a relevant factor in her Honour’s decision to refuse to order
production of the draft reports and the correspondence.
[5.10.360] 317
In light of the uncertainty in the law, and the subtle distinctions postulated by White J
and Dodds-Streeton J, the preferable approach in most scenarios is to regard draft reports
that have been sent to lawyers for comment as failing to retain privilege. This in turn
emphasises the need for considerable care to be taken by solicitors and barristers alike in
generating suggestions for change to reports proffered by experts for ‘feedback’ or ‘input’.
Experts and protection of trade secrets

[5.10.380] A particular problem with access to documents arises when there is a need to
protect trade secrets. In such litigation, experts are likely to be used by opposing parties
and these experts require access to confidential trade and production information, of both
the party calling them and the other side. An example of how a court will ensure
confidentiality is the orders made in 1998 by Sundberg J of the Federal Court in Decor Corp
Pty Ltd v Australian Housewares Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 1479. The plaintiff, Decor, alleged that it
carried on the business of manufacturing, marketing and wholesale-selling of plastic
containers, and was the owner of the copyright in product drawings and tool drawings
relating to various containers. It claimed that the respondents infringed its copyright in
those drawings by reproducing them or a substantial part of them. Decor’s evidence on
the question of liability included affidavits sworn by the following experts:
(1) A design architect engaged by Decor to prepare data in relation to the dimensions
of various Decor tool drawings and to create overlay drawings of Decor’s and
Houseware’s product drawings. Exhibited to his affidavit were Decor tool
drawings, tool drawing printouts, a chart containing measurements, and overlay
drawings.
(2) A mechanical engineer engaged by Decor to measure particular dimensions of its
products. Exhibited to his affidavit were product drawings received from Decor’s
solicitors, charts recording the dimensions of Decor’s products, and two
photographs.
(3) A product designer whose company was frequently used by Decor to design
products. Exhibited to his affidavit were product drawings for certain of Decor’s
products and concept drawings.
(4) Decor’s technical manager. Exhibited to his affidavits were charts recording the
dimensions of Decor’s and Houseware’s products, documents recording his
comparison of the dimensions of Decor’s and Houseware’s products, and Decor
tool drawings.
In a later affidavit, the technical manager said that the product drawings contained
technical information concerning the design of particular products, and often included a
great number of specific dimensions. Information contained in a product drawing is
essential for the preparation of tool drawings, which are then used to manufacture tools
which are necessary to make the product depicted in the product drawing. The detail
contained in product and tool drawings made them extremely valuable, particularly to
persons who wished to copy the product in the drawing or construct a tool to produce it.
The plaintiff feared that, if those documents were supplied to the respondent company
and its directors, then they would have access to the very confidential information they
sought to obtain through the process of reverse engineering.
In an affidavit in response to the above material, a director of the respondent
complained that Decor’s affidavits did not make much sense to him because he did not
have access to the confidential exhibits. He said that he required access to product, design,
tool, section and part drawings whose copyright the respondents were alleged to have
infringed; overlay drawings which compared the parties’ respective products; charts of
measurements comparing Houseware’s products with Decor’s products or drawings; and
photographs of various aspects of the parties’ products.
318 [5.10.380]
Sundberg J noted that ‘the plaintiff was seeking to protect its trade secrets’. This
attracts the courts’ jurisdiction to restrict access to discovered documents – for example, to
a party’s legal advisers, nominated officers and independent experts: see Warner-Lambert
Co v Glaxo Laboratories Ltd [1975] RPC 354; Magellan Petroleum Australia Ltd v Sagasco
Amadeus Pty Ltd (1993) 25 IPR 455; Mobil Oil Australia Ltd v Guina Developments Pty Ltd
[1996] 2 VR 34; Mackay Sugar Co-operative Association Ltd v CSR Ltd (1996) 137 ALR 183;
and Hadid v Lenfest Communications Inc (1996) 70 FCR 403. In Warner-Lambert (at 360),
Buckley LJ, with whom Russell and Orr LJJ agreed, accepted that facts disclosed to a
litigant’s advisers should normally be available to the litigant himself, and that strong
grounds are required before the principal will be denied knowledge which his agents have
properly acquired on his behalf. But this principle must be subject to some modification if
trade secrets are to be protected from disclosure to possible competitors.
In Mobil Oil (at 38), Hayne JA (with whom Winneke P and Phillips JA agreed) said:
Once the documents are inspected by the principals of the trade rival the information
which is revealed is known to the trade rival and cannot be forgotten. Confidentiality is
destroyed once and for all (at least so far as the particular trade rival is concerned). To say
that the trade rival is bound not to use the documents except for the purposes of the action
concerned is, in a case such as this, to impose upon the trade rival an obligation that is
impossible of performance by him and impossible of enforcement by the party whose
secrets have been revealed.
Hayne JA observed that while a party is usually entitled to inspect the documents of an
opposite party whether by himself or by his servants or agents, in trade secret cases it is
common for material to be made available only to the legal advisers of the parties and
nominated experts in order that a legitimate claim to confidentiality not be destroyed.
Applying those dicta, Sundberg J made orders in the manner of a schedule, which
prescribes:
• to whom the ‘trade secrets’ information may be disclosed;
• when and what form of consent is required for access to the information;
• how ‘independent experts’ are to validate their status;
• the form of undertaking which an independent expert is required to enter (see sample
in the Appendix at [5.10.600]);
• the use to which the information may be put;
• the number of copies that may be made of the information; and
• the procedure for return to each party of all copies of its respective documents and any
notes derived from those documents when the proceedings are over.
Breach of confidentiality by experts

[5.10.400] A series of modern cases has suggested that mental health professionals in some
circumstances are entitled to breach their obligation of confidentiality (see Kampf,
McSherry, Ogloff and Rothschild (2009)). The judgments have been delivered in a variety
of circumstances and as yet cannot be said to constitute a coherent corpus of law on the
subject.
The seminal modern case in relation to the obligations of health professionals to breach
their duty of confidentiality is that of the Supreme Court of California in Tarasoff v Regents
of the University of California 551 P 2d 334 (1976); see further Mackay (1990); Mendelson
and Mendelson (1991); McMahon (1999; 2005). A client of a university health centre
psychologist informed the psychologist that he was planning to kill an identifiable
student, Tatiana Tarasoff, when she returned from a holiday in South America. The
psychologist formed the view that the client suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and
was likely to act on the threat. He informed the police but did not warn Ms Tarasoff. A few
weeks later, the client killed Ms Tarasoff. The family sued, arguing that the psychologist
[5.10.400] 319
had a positive duty to breach his duty of confidentiality and to warn the prospective
victim. Ultimately, the family succeeded, the Supreme Court of California holding that a
psychotherapist has a positive duty to exercise reasonable care to protect an intended
victim.
Only in exceptional circumstances
[5.10.420] In 1986, the New Zealand High Court dealt with an appeal from a medical
disciplinary committee in the context of a bus driver who had complained that a doctor
had breached his duty of confidentiality after the doctor had revealed to a bus passenger
and to the local police that the bus driver had suffered two heart attacks and, in his
opinion, was unfit to be a bus driver: Duncan v Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Committee
[1986] 1 NZLR 513. The committee had found the doctor guilty of professional
misconduct. The doctor sought judicial review. Jeffries J dismissed the application for
review and commented (at 521):
[T]here may be occasions … when a doctor receives information involving a patient that
another’s life is immediately endangered and urgent action is required. The doctor must
then exercise his professional judgment based upon the circumstances, and if he fairly and
reasonably believes such a danger exists then he must act unhesitatingly to prevent injury
or loss of life even if there be a breach of confidentiality.
However, he accepted that such disclosure should only take place in exceptional
circumstances and where the public interest in disclosure was paramount.
Best interests of the patient versus duty of care to the public
[5.10.440] A similar approach was taken by Master Thomson in Van de Wetering v Capital
Coast Health Ltd (unreported, High Court, New Zealand, 19 May 2000). A man who had
been under psychiatric care with the defendant hospital absconded, killed four people and
wounded another. He was found not guilty on the ground of insanity. Eight persons who
had been present at the time of the shootings sued the hospital in negligence, claiming
that the hospital owed a duty to the public to protect them from the foreseeable conduct of
the absconder. Master Thomson declined to find such a duty of care to the public, holding
(at p 16):
A responsible clinician has to be able to focus on the best interests of the patient. It would
impose an intolerable burden on a clinician to be under the constant threat of legal
responsibility for the conduct of his/her patients. Otherwise, and plainly contrary to
public policy, the clinician will inevitably sublimate or deprioritise the patient’s best
interests in favour of cautious self-protection.
The decision clearly departs from the approach of the Supreme Court of California in
Tarasoff.
English authorities
[5.10.460] There are two significant English authorities on the issue. In W v Egdell [1990] 1
Ch 359; 1 All ER 835, the plaintiff sued a psychiatrist for damages for breach of confidence.
The patient, ‘W’, who was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, was detained in a
secure hospital after being found guilty on the basis of diminished responsibility to the
manslaughter of five of his neighbours. W sought to be transferred to another institution
as part of a rehabilitation program. Dr Egdell was asked by W’s solicitors to examine him
for the purpose of lodging an application with the Mental Health Review Tribunal in
support of the transfer application. Dr Egdell saw W and concluded that not only should
he not be transferred but that his fantasies suggested that he was extremely dangerous. On
the basis of Dr Egdell’s report, W’s solicitors withdrew W’s application. However,
Dr Egdell asked them to provide his report to the Assistant Medical Director of the secure
hospital and when the solicitors declined, did so himself and also sent the report to the
Home Office. W sued him for breach of confidence. He lost. The Court of Appeal affirmed
the instance determination and held that for confidential information to be able to be
disclosed by a mental health professional it must be shown that:
320 [5.10.420]
(1) there is a real, immediate and serious risk to public safety;

(2) the risk will be substantially reduced by the disclosure;
(3) the disclosure is no greater than is reasonably necessary to minimise the risk; and
(4) the consequent damage to the public interest protected by the duty of
confidentiality is outweighed by the public interest in minimising the risk.
Where strong public interest in disclosure
[5.10.480] In a case decided shortly afterwards, R v Crozier (1990) 12 Cr App R (S) 206, the
Court of Appeal applied the guidelines it had set out in W v Egdell [1990] 1 Ch 359; 1 All
ER 835. Crozier was charged with the attempted murder of his sister. While on remand
awaiting the sentencing hearing, Crozier’s solicitors instructed a psychiatrist,
Dr McDonald, to see the prisoner and write a report for the forthcoming hearing.
Dr McDonald did so but formed the view that Crozier represented an ongoing threat to
his family and, in particular, his sister. His recommendation in the report was that Crozier
be detained in a secure hospital. The report was not provided to Crozier’s barrister as it
was not going to assist Crozier’s case. Dr McDonald attended court on the day of the
sentencing hearing and, after hearing the judge pronouncing sentence, provided the
Crown with the report. The Crown applied successfully for a variation of sentence.
Crozier appealed arguing, among other things, that Dr McDonald had breached his duty
of confidentiality. The court dismissed the appeal and held that Crozier’s instance was an
example of where there was a strong public interest in the disclosure of the information
learned by the psychiatrist. It found that Dr McDonald had behaved quite properly.
Confidentiality cannot be assumed
[5.10.500] In the important decision of the Canadian Supreme Court of Smith v Jones (1999)
132 CCC (3d) 225 (see McSherry (2000)), a similar issue was confronted. Jones was charged
with the aggravated rape of a prostitute. Dr Smith was asked by Jones’ lawyers to prepare
a forensic report. Dr Smith concluded that in fact Jones was very dangerous and that more
likely than not he would commit further offences unless he received appropriate
treatment. Dr Smith informed Jones’ solicitors of his views and once again, not
surprisingly, the legal representatives for Jones decided against calling the psychiatrist.
Dr Smith sought a declaration that he was entitled to disclose the information that he had
acquired in the course of his forensic assessment in the interests of public safety.
It was accepted from the outset that the relationship between Jones and Dr Smith
attracted lawyer–client privilege and the focus of the decisions of the courts that
addressed the issue, including the Supreme Court of Canada, was upon the existence of a
public interest exception to lawyer–client privilege. As McSherry (2001) has noted, this
was not an issue traversed by the Court of Appeal, somewhat surprisingly, in either Egdell
or R v Crozier (1990) 12 Cr App R (S) 206. Cory J for the majority in the Supreme Court
held that there are three factors which must be considered in determining whether such a
disclosure could or should be made (at 249):
First, is there a clear risk to an identifiable person or group of persons? Second, is there a
risk of serious bodily harm or death? Third, is the danger imminent?
The majority found the conditions made out in the circumstances of the case before them
and, in relation to the requirement of imminence, held that the threat posed must simply
be such that it creates a sense of urgency. The majority also found a risk of ‘serious
psychological harm’ to fall within the rubric of ‘serious bodily harm’.
The decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and of the English Court of Appeal
appear to leave a significant hole in terms of the obligation of a mental health practitioner
to maintain as confidential the information that he or she learns in the course of their
relationship. In addition, it appears to be inherent in the English decisions, and it is
explicit in the Canadian decision, that even legal professional privilege contains a
significant qualification in terms of risk to the public. As a practical matter, it is difficult, if
[5.10.500] 321
the English and Canadian cases are read together, to identify many circumstances in
which a mental health professional could not breach confidentiality in terms of the
information learned, especially in a forensic context, which bona fide led the professional
to harbour a serious concern about the risk posed to an identifiable person or group of
persons if confidentiality is not breached. It is likely that this line of authority will be
followed in Australia: see generally R v Lowe [1997] 2 VR 465; PQ v Australian Red Cross
Society [1992] 1 VR 19 at 25. This approach has significant ramifications in terms of forensic
practice, both for lawyers and mental health professionals. The principal outcome is that
confidentiality in terms of the fruits of a forensic assessment cannot be assumed.
322 [5.10.500]
APPENDIX 1
APPENDIX: FORM OF UNDERTAKING TO BE MADE BY
INDEPENDENT EXPERT
[5.10.600]The following is a draft form of undertaking which can be made by an

independent expert:
Sample undertaking
I, …, do hereby acknowledge that I have read the Order dated …, made in respect of the
Confidential Documents and Confidential Information and the Special Confidential
Documents and Special Confidential Information in the action … before the Federal Court
of Australia (‘these proceedings’), and I HEREBY UNDERTAKE to the Court with respect
to the Applicant’s/Respondents’ [delete inapplicable party] Confidential Documents and
Special Confidential Documents and the Applicant’s/Respondents’ [delete inapplicable
party] Confidential Information and Special Confidential Information that –
(1) I have provided the solicitors acting for the Applicant/Respondents [delete
inapplicable party] with a true and complete statement in writing of my
qualifications as an expert and my affiliations both past and present, and I have no
affiliation and no other communication with:
(a) any party to this proceeding;
(b) any person or company involved in the manufacture or sale of [the
disputed product];
(c) the solicitors for the Applicant/Respondents [delete inapplicable party];
other than is stated in my statement.

(2) I have received none of the Applicant’s/Respondents’ [delete inapplicable party]
Confidential Documents or Special Confidential Documents or Confidential
Information or Special Confidential Information prior to execution of this
undertaking.
(3) As to each of the Applicant’s/Respondents’ [delete inapplicable party] Confidential
Documents and Special Confidential Documents and such of the Confidential
Information and Special Confidential Information, as comes into my possession,
the same shall be used only for the purposes of these proceedings, shall be kept
confidential by me at all times, and will not be used by me or disclosed by me to
the Applicant/Respondents [delete inapplicable party] or representatives of the
Applicant/Respondents [delete inapplicable party] except as provided under the
following paragraph.
(4) As to each of the Confidential Documents and such of the Confidential
Information as comes into my possession, the same shall be used, handled, kept
and stored by me in such manner as will keep the same at all times safe from
disclosure except as may be required for me to advise the Applicant/Respondents
[delete inapplicable party] and counsel, solicitors and other independent experts
acting for the Applicant/Respondents [delete inapplicable party] herein or as may be
required (but subject to any order for protection of the confidentiality of the same)
in my giving evidence in the action.
(5) As to each of the Special Confidential Documents and such of the Special
Confidential Information as comes into my possession, the same shall be used,
handled, kept and stored by me in such manner as will keep the same at all times
safe from disclosure except as may be required for me to advise counsel, solicitors
and other independent experts acting for the Applicant/Respondents [delete
inapplicable party] herein or as may be required (but subject to any order for
protection of the confidentiality of the same) in my giving evidence in the action.
[5.10.600] 323
(6) I will make no copy of the Applicant’s/Respondents’ [delete inapplicable party]

Confidential Documents or Special Confidential Documents provided to me, save
for the purpose of preparing an overlay drawing to an exhibit to an affidavit.
(7) Within 7 days of receiving notice of the final determination of these proceedings, I
shall deliver up to the Applicant/Respondents [delete inapplicable party] all
Confidential Documents and Special Confidential Information in my possession.
Dated, signed and witnessed.
324 [5.10.600]
Chapter 5.15
WASTED COSTS ORDERS

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [5.15.01]
Costs orders against third parties ...................................................................................... [5.15.50]
United Kingdom authority .................................................................................................. [5.15.100]
Australian authority ............................................................................................................. [5.15.200]
Procedural fairness ................................................................................................................ [5.15.250]
Impetus towards costs orders ............................................................................................. [5.15.300]
Responsibility of the forensic expert to correct misimpressions .................................. [5.15.350]
Obligation of the expert to exercise proper care over forensic reports ...................... [5.15.400]
Role of lawyers in respect of forensic reports ................................................................. [5.15.450]
Future of costs orders in relation to expert evidence ..................................................... [5.15.500]
‘Put not your trust in money, but put your money in trust.’
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Autocrat of the Breakfast-Table, 1859.
Introduction
[5.15.01] The potential for costs to be ordered against experts and also against solicitors
and counsel as a result of court findings of gross deficiencies in expert evidence is an
important emerging form of accountability in respect of expert evidence (Freckelton
(2016)). However, as yet the law on the issue is limited and evolving.
This chapter locates wasted costs orders within the legal framework (in respect of the
award of costs against non-parties to litigation (see Evans (2001); Andrews (2005)) and
traces the emergence of such orders in respect of expert evidence. It predicts that such
orders will become more common and argues that they have the potential to constitute an
important check and balance against unsatisfactory expert evidence and the commissioning
of expert evidence.
Costs orders against third parties

[5.15.50] The ordering of costs against either forensic experts or litigation lawyers
constitutes the making of orders against those who are not parties to litigation; they are a
form of third-party orders. The facility for making such orders is relatively recent and
remains highly unusual. In Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd [1986] 1 AC 965, the
House of Lords reversed the position that there was no power to order costs of an action
against any entity other than a party and concluded that it was possible ‘in appropriate
circumstances’. Eight years later, in Symphony Group Plc v Hodgson [1994] QB 179 at 192,
Balcombe LJ concluded that in deciding whether to make such orders, a series of
considerations should be taken into account:
(1) An order for the payment of costs by a non-party will always be exceptional: see
per Lord Goff in Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd [1986] AC 965, 980F. The
judge should treat any application for such an order with considerable caution.
(2) It will be even more exceptional for an order for the payment of costs to be made
against a non-party, where the applicant has a cause of action against the
non-party and could have joined him as a party to the original proceedings.
(3) Even if the applicant can provide a good reason for not joining the non-party
against whom he has a valid cause of action, he should warn the non-party at the
earliest opportunity of the possibility that he may seek to apply for costs against
him.
(4) An application for payment of costs by a non-party should normally be
determined by the trial judge: see Bahai v Rashidian [1985] 1 WLR 1337.
[5.15.50] 325
(5) The fact that the trial judge may in the course of his judgment in the action have
expressed views on the conduct of the non-party constitutes neither bias nor the
appearance of bias.
(6) The procedure for the determination of costs is a summary procedure, not
necessarily subject to all the rules that would apply in an action. Thus, subject to
any relevant statutory exceptions, judicial findings are inadmissible as evidence
of the facts upon which they were based in proceedings between one of the
parties to the original proceedings and a stranger: see Hollington v Hewthorn & Co
Ltd [1943] KB 587; Cross on Evidence, 7th ed (1990), pp 100–101. Yet in the
summary procedure for the determination of the liability of a solicitor to pay the
costs of an action to which he was not a party, the judge’s findings of fact may be
admissible: see Brendon v Spiro [1938] 1 KB 176, 192 … This departure from basic
principles can only be justified if the connection of the non-party with the
original proceedings was so close that he will not suffer any injustice by allowing
this exception to the general rule.
(7) Again, the normal rule is that witnesses in either civil or criminal proceedings
enjoy immunity from any form of civil action in respect of evidence given during
those proceedings. One reason for this immunity is so that witnesses may give
their evidence fearlessly: see Palmer v Durnford Ford [1992] QB 483, 487. In so far
as the evidence of a witness in proceedings may lead to an application for the
costs of those proceedings against him or his company, it introduces yet another
exception to a valuable general principle.
(8) The fact that an employee, or even a director or the managing director, of a
company gives evidence in an action does not normally mean that the company
is taking part in that action, in so far as that is an allegation relied upon by the
party who applies for an order for costs against a non-party company …
(9) The judge should be alert to the possibility that an application against a
non-party is motivated by resentment of an inability to obtain an effective order
for costs against a legally aided litigant.
(See also Galganov v Russell (Township) 2012 ONCA 410 (CanLII); 350 DLR (4th) 679.)
In Australia, it was held by Dawson J in Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR
178 at [20] that there is ‘a long-asserted jurisdiction to award costs in appropriate cases
against a person who is not a party to the proceedings where that person is the effective
litigant standing behind an actual party or where there has been a contempt or abuse of
the process of the court’.
For a time it was thought that the power to order costs against lawyers as officers of the
court was inhibited by the immunity attached to them. However, in Ridehalgh v Horsefield
[1994] EWCA Civ 40; [1994] Ch 205 at 238–239, the Court of Appeal rejected this protection
and held that costs could be awarded, but only in limited circumstances and where the
context thoroughly justified it:
Any judge who is invited to make or contemplates making an order arising out of an
advocate’s conduct of court proceedings must make full allowance for the fact that an
advocate in court, like a commander in battle, often has to make decisions quickly and
under pressure, in the fog of war and ignorant of developments on the other side of the
hill. Mistakes will inevitably be made, things done which the outcome shows to have been
unwise. But advocacy is more an art than a science. It cannot be conducted according to
formulae. Individuals differ in their style and approach. It is only when, with all
allowances made, an advocate’s conduct of court proceedings is quite plainly unjustifiable
that it can be appropriate to make a wasted costs order against him.
(See too Medcalf v Weatherill [2003] AC 120; [2002] UKHL 27.)

Courts have consistently expressed their reservations about making costs orders
against legal practitioners. In White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998)
156 ALR 169 at 239; [1998] FCA 806, for instance, Goldberg J stated that a serious
dereliction of duty, gross negligence or serious misconduct on the part of a legal
326 [5.15.50]
Wasted costs orders | CH 5.15
practitioner must be established on the balance of probabilities, in accordance with the

principles in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; [1938] HCA 34, before an order for
costs will be made against them:
… the jurisdiction to order costs against an unsuccessful party’s solicitors is enlivened
when they have unreasonably initiated or continued an action when it had no or
substantially no prospects of success but such unreasonableness must relate to reasons
unconnected with success in the litigation or to an otherwise ulterior purpose or to a
serious dereliction of duty or serious misconduct in promoting the cause of and the proper
administration of justice. Further, the cases establish the proposition that it is a relevant
serious dereliction of duty or misconduct not to give reasonable or proper attention to the
relevant law and facts in circumstances where if such attention had been given it would
have been apparent that there were no worthwhile prospects of success.
A variety of reasons have been identified for the exercise of such caution (Apollo 169
Management Pty Ltd v Pinefield Nominees Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] VSC 475), including the risk
that too ready an exposure of lawyers may inhibit their conduct of litigation (Re Bendeich
(No 2) (1994) 53 FCR 422 at 426–427; [1994] FCA 1504); that it will often be difficult for a
court to know the details and circumstances of lawyers’ instructions (Levick v Deputy
Commissioner of Taxation (2000) 102 FCR 155; [2000] FCA 674 at [43]; Macteldir Pty Ltd v
Roskov [2007] FCAFC 49); and that the jurisdiction has the potential to generate ‘a new and
costly form of satellite litigation’ (Medcalf v Mardell [2003] 1 AC 120 at 136).
However, in Victoria, under the provisions relating to ‘overarching obligations’, these
principles are qualified by the changes to the language in r 63.23 of the Supreme Court
(General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic) (see Yara Australia Pty Ltd v Oswal (2013) 41 VR
302; [2013] VSCA 337) and by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Act 2008 (Vic) (see
Brown v Guss (No 2) [2015] VSC 57 at [120]).
United Kingdom authority

[5.15.100] In two important decisions to which reference has been made in both Australia
and Canada, Smith J of the High Court of England and Wales has ruled on applications for
costs orders against both expert witnesses and a solicitor in respect of problematic expert
opinion evidence. Other decisions are not following this line of authority.
Phillips v Symes: The most significant modern authority on the issue from the United
Kingdom arose in the course of the Phillips v Symes litigation, which was a complex and
fiercely contested series of hearings arising from the sale of antiquities by a person who
entered bankruptcy. In Phillips v Symes (No 2) [2005] 1 WLR 2043; [2004] EWHC 2330 (Ch),
Smith J was required to deal with an application for a wasted costs order against an expert
witness, a psychiatrist. Smith J stated explicitly that he was not averse, in principle, to
making such an order, concluding that the Symphony decision (Symphony Group Plc v
Hodgson [1994] QB 179) was authority for the proposition that, in appropriate
circumstances, a third-party costs order can be made against an expert witness as a result
of the manner in which he or she gave evidence. He noted that this was said in the context
of the court in Symphony, acknowledging that normally a witness is immune from suit (at
[63]). He held (at [71]) that the only warning required to be given to an expert against
whom a court contemplates making a wasted costs order:
is the self evident one set out in the [Civil Procedure Rules (CPR)] and the declaration that
he signs. That declaration brings it home graphically to the Expert, because he is warned,
in effect, that he could be the subject matter of contempt proceedings. Bearing in mind the
severity of those sanctions one would expect an Expert to be alive to potentially adverse
consequences in the event that he breaches his duty to the Court.
Framing the circumstances narrowly in which the power to order costs against an expert
might be exercised, Smith J held (at [95]) that:
[5.15.100] 327
in the administration of justice, especially, in spite of the clearly defined duties now
enshrined in CPR 35 and [Practice Direction] 35, it would be quite wrong of the Court to
remove from itself the power to make a costs order in appropriate [sic] against an Expert
who, by his evidence, causes significant expense to be incurred, and does so in flagrant
reckless disregard of his duties to the Court.
Importantly, he commented that he did not regard other sanctions against experts as either
effective or ‘anything other than blunt instruments’ (at [96]–[97]):
The proper sanction is the ability to compensate a person who has suffered loss by reason
of that evidence. … I do not accept that Experts will, by reason of this potential exposure,
be inhibited from fulfilling their duties. That is a crie de coeur often made by
professionals, but I cannot believe that an expert would be deterred, because a costs order
might be made against him in the event that his evidence is given recklessly in flagrant
disregard for his duties. The high level of proof required to establish the breach cannot be
ignored. The floodgates argument failed as regards lawyers and is often the court of last
resort.
Equally, there is no reason why an expert who, for example, has difficulties, cannot
seek directions from the Court under CPR 35.14 as to his evidence and in any such
enquiry in the way which I have set out above, the Court will be alert to ensure that the
Expert is given a full opportunity to present his case.
He acknowledged that this constituted the first occasion for considering the issue but
emphasised that the proposition that an expert witness should be immune from the most
significant sanction that could be applied by the court for breaching his or her duties to
the court – a wasted costs order – ‘seems to be an affront to the sense of justice’ (at [98]).
This meant that he concluded that the psychiatrist had a case to answer in relation to
whether he had breached his duties to the court.
Mengiste v Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray: In a later decision by the
same judge, Mengiste v Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray [2013] EWHC 599
(Ch), Smith J found (at [32]) that an expert’s evidence about Ethiopian law showed that:
1. He had very little appropriate qualification to give expert evidence on these
matters.
2. He did not understand his duties as an expert to the Court.
3. These duties and his potential exposure if his evidence was given recklessly or
negligently were not explained to him by the Claimants’ lawyers when he signed
his experts report (contrary to the Expert Witness Protocol). … In effect [the
expert] was thrown to the wolves without any proper protection or advice as to
the nature of his role and his duties and his potential liabilities.
Smith J observed of the expert (at [85]) that he had repeatedly strayed into the
argumentative and made strongly worded criticisms which were not sustainable on the
thought processes in his report. He found that those commissioning the expert had failed
signally to ensure that he appreciated or was able to discharge his forensic responsibilities
(Mengiste v Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray [2013] EWHC 598 (Ch)). In the
follow-up decision of Mengiste v Endowment Fund for Rehabilitation of Tigray [2013] EWHC
1087 (Ch), Smith J upheld a submission that the solicitors should not have associated
themselves with litigation based on reports by an expert that were ‘particularly poor’. He
observed (at [29]) that, for a wasted costs order to be made, (a) the applicant must be able
to demonstrate that the solicitor has been guilty of conduct which is (i) negligent, (ii)
unreasonable or (iii) improper; (b) the applicant is able to demonstrate such conduct has
resulted in costs being incurred by the applicant which would otherwise have been
avoided; and (c) it is fair, just and equitable for the court to exercise its discretion so as to
make an order against the solicitors in favour of the applicant. Smith J concluded that
there was a strong prima facie case to seek an order that the solicitors in the case before
him pay some or all of the defendants’ costs in the action.
328 [5.15.100]
In X v Trimega Laboratories Ltd [2014] 2 FLR 232; [2013] EWCC 6 (Fam) at [13], it was
held that the test need not be as high as flagrant, reckless disregard of the forensic duties
of an expert but a simple human error can be sufficient to justify the making of a wasted
costs order against an expert.
While it is premature to assert that these decisions establish a line of authority in
respect of costs being ordered against forensic experts or those commissioning them, they
constitute significant indications that such an option may arise in cases where the wastage
of court resources or the disadvantage to a party is significant and the expert’s or legal
representative’s culpability for this is significant.
Canadian authority
[5.15.150] The law in Canada is straightforward that costs can be awarded against a
non-party, generally, only in ‘special circumstances’ where the non-party has engaged in
fraudulent conduct, an abuse of process, or gross misconduct during the litigation (see, eg,
Anchorage Management Services Ltd (1999) 72 BCLR (3d) 389; Walker v John Doe 2014 BCSC
830 (CanLII); Oasis Hotel Ltd v Zurich Insurance Co (1981) 28 BCLR 230). This includes the
potential for costs orders against expert witnesses in highly unusual and exceptional
circumstances (Walker v John Doe 2014 BCSC 830 (CanLII) at [12]). However, it has been
held necessary that the witness must be acting as an expert witness in this regard;
otherwise, the witness immunity rule protects even expert witnesses in respect of evidence
of fact (Lower v Stasiuk (2013) 367 DLR (4th) 241).
Galganov v Russell (Township): In Galganov v Russell (Township) (2012) 350 DLR (4th)
679, for instance, the Ontario Court of Appeal heard an appeal against a decision by a trial
judge to decline to quash a by-law and to order costs against an unsuccessful party to
litigation, and to order that 40% of the costs be payable by their lawyer. The Court of
Appeal accepted that the usage of one of the parties as an expert witness when he lacked
any qualifications for the role fell below the standard of care expected of a reasonably
competent lawyer. However, the step taken was with the consent of the clients. This led
the court to overturn the first instance decision to award costs against the lawyer on the
basis that although the lawyer’s conduct resulted in blind alleys being entered, this
occurred with the clients’ instructions and approval. Thus, the costs order against the
lawyer was overturned.
Bailey v Barbour: In Bailey v Barbour 2013 ONSC 7397 (CanLII), a cognate issue was
explored. Healey J of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice heard an appeal against the
granting of possessory title to certain land. Issues arose in relation to both possessory title
and whether the applicant had an interest in the land in the nature of a prescriptive title or
right of way. The hearing was lengthy and there were multiple mid-trial rulings on issues
of evidence and procedure. Her Honour commented (at [17]–[18]):
It is a trite principle of trial procedure that an expert witness should provide independent
assistance to the court and should never assume the role of advocate. This is an easy
principle to articulate, but the inherent conflict that experts are in as a result of their
unique position has historically created tension within the litigation arena. Experts are
sought out and paid because they are able to generate evidence and reach conclusions that
support the interests of the party who retains them. And yet, as stated by Lord Wilberforce
in The Ikarian Reefer (1993) 2 Lloyds Reports 68, ‘It is necessary that expert evidence
presented to the court should be and should be seen to be the independent product of the
expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litigation’.
The most important thing for an expert to retain throughout the litigation process is a
position of distance from the interests of the party who engages them, in order that his or
her impartiality remains intact. By contrast, the worst thing for an expert to devolve into is
advocating for his client’s view, or to become a champion for his client’s cause. It is only
where the expert can reliably be seen by the Court to have reached his opinions through
an objective and neutral lens that his evidence can have potential value to the Court. The
[5.15.150] 329
evidence of an expert who advocates for a client’s position, simply because it is his client’s
position, loses considerable value and will ultimately be a waste of the Court’s time if
rejected outright due to partisanship.
She noted that one of the experts had written notes about the evidence of one of the
opposing experts that were highly suggestive of bias and concluded that the expert
engaged in strategising in the litigation and functioned as an advocate in concert with his
commissioning solicitor. She stated that she considered it ‘of grave seriousness’ that the
solicitor, ‘being aware as he was of all of this, still proffered [the expert] to the court as an
expert witness. It should go without saying that lawyers have a duty to the court to not
seek to elicit expert testimony from a witness who they know to be unable to provide an
objective, unbiased opinion in relation to matters within his expertise’ (at [323]). This led
her to determine that the witness’s evidence should be accorded no weight.
In subsequent proceedings (Bailey v Barbour 2014 ONSC 3698 (CanLII)), Healey J dealt
with an application for costs against the commissioning lawyer. She distinguished the
decision of the Court of Appeal in Galganov and found (at [49]) that the case before her
was one ‘where there is no benefit of any doubt that can be given to the lawyer’. She
concluded that a costs order against the lawyer was warranted on the basis that the
lawyer had breached his obligation to the court in using the expert and in so doing had
not acted in good faith and was directly responsible for wasting costs.
Australian authority
[5.15.200] Two important decisions by Dixon J of the Victorian Supreme Court have placed
squarely on the agenda of Australian courts the potential for costs orders to be made
against forensic experts and legal representatives alike. However, the decisions are not
alone. Dicta from the New South Wales Supreme Court and the Family Court of Australia
have also identified such an option.
Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney Local Health District: The
Macquarie International Health Clinic litigation was lengthy, complex and at times
convoluted. It included many interlocutory issues and rulings. An issue that delayed the
progress of the litigation was non-compliance by the plaintiff with court orders relating to
the filing of expert reports. In Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney Local
Health District [2013] NSWSC 970, Kunc J ordered the filing of expert reports by a specified
date and ordered that if non-compliance was caused or contributed to by the action or
inaction of the expert by delay or otherwise, ‘the party wishing to call that expert is to
procure and the expert is to provide an affidavit from the expert explaining the reasons for
the non-compliance and providing reasons why an order should not be made against the
expert that he or she pay any costs occasioned to any party by reason of the
non-compliance’, and that the expert attend before the court personally.
Kunc J accepted that experts are dependent on the timely provision of instructions and
information from the party briefing them and observed that in New South Wales a party is
subject to the obligations set out in s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), in particular
s 56(3), to assist the court in furthering the overriding purpose of the just, quick and cheap
resolution of the real issues in the proceedings. However, in the scenario of non-
compliance with that obligation in providing timely instructions and information to the
expert, he was pointed in stating (at [7]) that:
the Court wishes to make it clear that experts must understand that they themselves bear
a direct responsibility to the Court for compliance with the Court’s directions in relation to
when their report is to be ready for filing and service and the form of the report itself.
Section 61(2)(c) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) empowers the court to give such
other directions with respect to the conduct of proceedings as the court considers
appropriate. Rule 31.17(f) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), dealing with
330 [5.15.200]
evidence, identifies that one of the main purposes of that division is to declare the duty of
an expert witness in relation to the court and the parties to proceedings, while UCPR
r 31.23(1) requires an expert witness to comply with the Code of Conduct set out in Sch 7,
cl 3(1) of which requires that ‘an expert witness must abide by any direction of the Court’.
Kunc J concluded that it followed that, once an expert accepts a retainer to provide
expert evidence for the purposes of proceedings before the Supreme Court, that expert
himself or herself becomes subject to the directions of the court and is amenable to orders
from the court: ‘This must extend to explaining why there has been non-compliance with
any order of the Court in relation to the expert’s report insofar as that non-compliance is
the fault of the expert rather than some difficulty or inefficiency on the part of those
instructing the expert’ (at [6]).
He made it clear that, ‘in appropriate cases’, the court will require personal
explanations from experts (rather than through a solicitor’s affidavit) as to why they have
not been able to comply with the court’s orders. Furthermore, he stated that ‘in cases
which the court hopes will be extremely rare, experts could themselves be subject to costs
orders insofar as any party to the proceedings suffers additional costs by reason of the
non-compliance with a direction as to the timely preparation of an expert’s report where
the reason for that non-compliance can be visited upon the expert’ (at [7]).
Kunc J acknowledged that experts are generally professional people with
responsibilities to other clients and undoubtedly will have other matters claiming their
attention, but emphasised that (at [8]–[9]):
in general the court would not regard it as being acceptable for experts simply to say they
are unable to comply with timetables fixed by the Court because of the pressure of other
business. The Court expects experts to take into account the other business that they must
attend to in making a decision whether or not they will accept a retainer in a particular
matter and when informing the party instructing them as to the time they require to do
their work. … It is … appropriate to remind the profession and the expert community
generally of the obligations that experts themselves bear directly to the Court in the
discharge of what is a very important role in the due administration of justice by assisting
the Court to arrive at just outcomes in the particular cases before it.
What is most apparent from the Macquarie International Health Clinic decision is the
confirmation that lawyers and forensic experts alike have a responsibility of efficiency,
timeliness and compliance with court requirements. This approach is consistent with the
jurisprudence of the various superior courts of the states and territories which have
enacted civil procedure legislation that has identified the desire of the courts to ensure that
litigants do not consume the court’s resources in litigating proceedings or portions thereof
needlessly or without a clear and active focus upon the resolution of a dispute (see, eg,
Peake v Benedict (Costs) (2014) 53 Fam LR 476; [2014] FCCA 2723 at [79]; Wingfoot Australia
Partner Pty Ltd v Jovevski [2014] VSCA 21 at [59]; Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and
Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (No 4) [2013] VSC 14; Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 3)
[2013] VSC 116 (Derham J); Chan v Chen [2013] VSC 538; Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd
(No 2) [2013] VSC 86; Bare v Small (2013) 47 VR 255; [2013] VSCA 204; Sunland Waterfront
(BVI) Ltd v Prudential Investments Pty Ltd [2013] VSCA 237; Eaton v ISS Catering Services Pty
Ltd (2013) 423 VR 635; [2013] VSCA 361; Talacko v Talacko [2013] VSC 712 at [79]; Subway
Systems Australia v Ireland (No 2) [2013] VSC 693). An integral part of court efficiency is the
commissioning of expert reports, and their delivery, in ways which are timely, ethical and
in conformity with court rules.
Byrd and Byrd: In Byrd and Byrd (2012) 48 Fam LR 117; [2012] FamCAFC 170, Coleman,
Thackray and Austin JJ considered the appropriateness of following Phillips v Symes [2004]
EWHC 2330 (Ch); [2005] 4 All ER 519. They noted (at [33]–[34]) that Phillips v Symes
[5.15.200] 331
specifically addressed the issue of costs sought against witnesses, but drew upon
principles espoused in Myers v Elman [1940] AC 282, which related to costs applications
made against a party’s lawyer.
Canning and Hartigan: In Canning and Hartigan [2016] FamCA 25, Hogan J of the
Family Court ruled on an application by a father that a single expert pay his costs said to
have been incurred as a result of the expert repeatedly failing to comply with court orders
requiring him to produce documents. It had previously been determined that orders for
costs could be made by the Family Court against non-parties (McAlpin v McAlpin (1993)
114 FLR 452; Re JTT; Ex parte Victoria Legal Aid (1998) 195 CLR 184; [1998] HCA 44 per
Kirby J at [64]; Hartnett & Sampson (Costs) [2007] FamCA 1456; Family Law Act 1975 (Cth),
s 117(2)), including against lawyers under s 117(3) of the Act. Ultimately, Hogan J
determined not to make such an order but pointedly stated (at [31]):
My dismissal of the father’s application should not, therefore, be read as suggesting that
those engaged as single expert witnesses or who provide expert opinion intended to assist
the Court in its deliberations are empowered to exercise a discretion in determining
whether documents sought by parties in respect of whom their opinion is proffered are
relevant or useful or not. Such persons must always remember that their evidence – while
often important and occasionally decisive – is but one piece of the evidence before the
Court whose role it is to determine parenting orders, the nature of which can have
extremely significant and long-lasting consequences for both parents and children.
Hogan J expressed no unpreparedness in principle to make a costs award against an
expert witness, including a single expert witness.
The Hudspeth litigation: The Hudspeth litigation is Australia’s most significant
authority in relation to the making of costs orders in respect of defective expert evidence.
It was personal injury litigation that related to the entitlement to compensation of a
cleaner at a boys’ school who slipped in a toilet block and sustained physical injuries. A
Victorian jury returned a verdict of no negligence, which in due course was followed by a
successful appeal. At the trial, the plaintiff called evidence from an engineer who was an
experienced forensic expert. Before the commencement of the trial, the expert signed three
different versions of a report, two of them in error bearing the same date, and one a date
seven months later. It was during the trial that evidence emerged of the different versions
of the report.
The trial judge, Dixon J, became concerned about the circumstances surrounding the
third version of the expert report and concluded that that there was need of an
explanation about whether senior counsel, the solicitors and the expert may not properly
have discharged their overarching obligations to the court to act honestly at all times, not
to engage in conduct that was deceptive or misleading, and to disclose the existence of
documents.
‘Overarching obligations’ are prescribed under s 10 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic)
(the Act) to apply to expert witnesses (other than those specified in ss 18, 19, 22 and 26), as
well as to legal practitioners in civil proceedings. The overarching obligations include that
those to whom they apply have a ‘paramount duty’ to further the administration of justice
in civil proceedings (s 16), to act honestly at all times (s 17), and to act promptly and
minimise delay (s 25). In addition, under s 21:
A person to whom the overarching obligations apply must not, in respect of a civil
proceeding, engage in conduct which is –
(a) misleading or deceptive; or
(b) likely to mislead or deceive.
Further, under s 26 of the Act:
(1) Subject to subsection (3), a person to whom the overarching obligations apply
must disclose to each party the existence of all documents that are, or have been,
in that person’s possession, custody or control –
332 [5.15.200]
(a) of which the person is aware; and

(b) which the person considers, or ought reasonably consider, are critical to
the resolution of the dispute.
(2) Disclosure under subsection (1) must occur at –
(a) the earliest reasonable time after the person becomes aware of the
existence of the document; or
(b) such other time as a court may direct.
Under s 29(1) of the Act:

If a court is satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, a person has contravened any
overarching obligation, the court may make any order it considers appropriate in the
interests of justice including, but not limited to –
(a) an order that the person pay some or all of the legal costs or other costs or
expenses of any person arising from the contravention of the overarching
obligation;
(b) an order that the legal costs or other costs or expenses of any person be payable
immediately and be enforceable immediately;
(c) an order that the person compensate any person for any financial loss or other
loss which was materially contributed to by the contravention of the overarching
obligation, including –
(i) an order for penalty interest in accordance with the penalty interest rate
in respect of any delay in the payment of an amount claimed in the civil
proceeding; or
(ii) an order for no interest or reduced interest;
(d) an order that the person take any steps specified in the order which are
reasonably necessary to remedy any contravention of the overarching obligations
by the person;
(e) an order that the person not be permitted to take specified steps in the civil
proceeding;
(f) any other order that the court considers to be in the interests of any person who
has been prejudicially affected by the contravention of the overarching
obligations.
Experts’ forensic conduct is also regulated in Victoria by the Supreme Court (General Civil
Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic), which contain an Expert Code of Conduct (located in
Form 44A). It bears many features in common with comparable rules of court and codes in
Australia, New Zealand, Canadian jurisdictions such as Ontario, and also England and
Wales. Order 44 of the Victorian Rules defines ‘expert’ in the same terms as the Evidence
Act 2008 (Vic) and prohibits a party, save with the leave of the court or by consent of the
parties affected, except in cross-examination, from adducing any expert evidence at the
trial of a proceeding unless the substance of the evidence is contained within a report or
reports which the party has served under the Order. The relevant procedural requirements
are that the engaging party, as soon as practicable after the engagement of the expert and
before the expert makes a report under the Rule, must provide the expert with a copy of
the Code. The expert’s report, prepared in accordance with r 44.03, must be served
forthwith on each other party not later than 30 days before the day fixed for trial. It has
become commonplace for the Victorian Supreme Court to direct that the parties exchange
expert reports at an earlier time, particularly to facilitate alternative dispute resolution.
An expert report, which must be signed by the expert, must state the opinion of the
expert and must state, specify or provide, among other things, an acknowledgement that
the expert has read the Code and agreed to be bound by it and a declaration that the
expert has made all the inquiries which the expert believes are desirable and appropriate,
[5.15.200] 333
and that no matters of significance which the expert regards as relevant have, to the
knowledge of the expert, been withheld from the court. Rule 44.03(3) provides that:
If the expert provides to a party a supplementary report, including a report indicating that
the expert has changed his or her opinion on a material matter expressed in an earlier
report –
(a) that party shall forthwith serve the supplementary report on all other parties; and
(b) in default of such service, the party and any other party having a like interest
shall not use the earlier report or the supplementary report at trial without the
leave of the Court.
Of his own motion, Dixon J decided to consider whether any order under s 29(1) should
be made. He directed the solicitors and senior and junior counsel, as well as the expert, to
attend before the court and file affidavits of explanation. In due course, he excused junior
counsel from further attendance as he was satisfied that he had not breached his duties to
the court. Ultimately, he drew very serious conclusions:
• Senior counsel, in relation to the third version of the expert’s report, breached his
paramount duty to the court, in particular the overarching obligation to disclose the
existence of documents under s 26 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) and the
overarching obligation not to engage in misleading or deceptive conduct in respect of a
civil proceeding under s 21 of that Act, concerning the expert’s evidence.
• The expert, in relation to the third version of his report, breached the overarching
obligation not to engage in misleading or deceptive conduct in respect of a civil
proceeding, and he failed to adhere to the Expert Code of Conduct.
• The solicitors, by the conduct of a principal in relation to the third version of the
expert’s report, breached the overarching obligation to disclose the existence of
documents under s 26 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic), but did not breach the
overarching obligation not to engage in misleading or deceptive conduct in respect of a
civil proceeding under s 21 of that Act.
The expert was engaged by the solicitors for the plaintiff to express expert opinions about
the human factors in design, work and movement, and also on the functioning of
machines and structures, including the actions and effects of forces, with particular
reference to the condition of the toilet block. An important aspect of the latter was the
presence of soap dispensers on the walls above the hand troughs in the school toilet that
were the source of the spill of liquid soap (Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy
Services Pty Ltd (No 8) [2014] VSC 567 at [43]).
In particular, he was asked to prepare an expert report providing an assessment of the
workplace and the circumstances in which the plaintiff was injured. The expert was
instructed that the plaintiff’s accident had occurred when cleaning up a spill of liquid soap
from a vandalised soap container and was invited to consider that ‘the school was in fact
aware of previous incidents of vandalism in the toilet block and in particular to the
dispensers’. In the first report, the expert stated that:
It is understood that the soap dispensers had been fitted to the walls in this toilet perhaps
six months before the date of the accident, in response to a request from the student
council, who had complained at the lack of availability of soap in the toilets.
Ms Hudspeth said that she had not previously seen any evidence of vandalism or
missing soap dispensers during the few months over which they had been installed.
Without consulting the expert, the solicitors, who spoke to a person in the expert’s office,
amended the first version of the report to read in the second version (which bore the same
date):
Ms Hudspeth said that she had not previously seen any evidence of vandalism on the or
missing soap dispensers during the few months over which they had been installed, to which
she had advised her employer.
334 [5.15.200]
Clearly, what took place administratively in the expert’s office was unsatisfactory,
although the failure by the solicitors to communicate about so serious a matter with the
expert directly was also problematic.
The second report was served on the other parties without the principal for the
solicitors’ firm having her attention drawn to what had occurred. A consequence of the
amended report was that the school’s solicitors wrote to the plaintiff’s solicitors, noting the
expert’s criticism of the fastening and installation of the soap dispensers in the school, and
third-party proceedings were issued against the entity which had installed and was
responsible for maintaining the soap dispensers. The plaintiff joined that entity as a
defendant but did not serve on it any copies of the expert’s reports. The school’s solicitors
served only the second version.
Shortly before trial, senior counsel for the plaintiff engaged in unorthodox conduct for
a barrister: he contacted the expert by telephone and unilaterally asked him to consider a
new set of assumptions. This resulted in the expert’s third report, in which the expert
adhered to his earlier views. In light of this forensic problem for the plaintiff, senior
counsel elected to lead the expert’s views by putting the plaintiff’s evidence to him as his
assumed facts. He was later to say that this resulted from a mistaken reading of r 44.03(3).
The plaintiff’s solicitors did not receive a copy of the third report, although senior counsel
for the plaintiff did. Senior counsel decided not to serve the third report. However, the
expert stated that he assumed the report had been served. On the evening before the
expert was to give evidence, a supplementary report dealing with other matters was
served: a fourth report. Dixon J held that the plaintiff could not rely upon it.
Dixon J concluded (at [54]) that:
First, [the expert] accepts that [a person in his office] acted with his authority and he
accepts responsibility for the second version of his report. Second, the date of the report
was not changed and no note was added informing the reader that the report was revised
on 1 July 2010. Third, section 3 of the report where [the expert’s] sources were recorded,
was not amended to record that additional instructions were provided orally by the
solicitors on 1 July 2010. Fourth, the changes that were made to the text of the report were
not tracked or otherwise identified. Fifth, the fact that the report was amended was
disguised by the overwriting process, by which an electronic copy of the first version was
lost.
In respect of the third report, Dixon J observed that the expert did not either carefully
consider his instructions or take appropriate care in setting out the assumptions on which
his opinion was based (at [76]), as the expert made adjustments to the report on the basis
of a statement by the plaintiff with which he had not been provided. In respect of
problems that arose in the course of the expert giving evidence, Dixon J did not accept the
expert’s explanation that he felt it was inappropriate to refer to the report and was waiting
for senior counsel to take him to it. He concluded that ‘bearing in mind his experience as
a forensic witness, [the expert] was acting as an advocate for the plaintiff because he was
complicit with [senior counsel] in not disclosing the third version of the report’ (at [108]).
While the expert maintained before Dixon J that he had adhered to the Expert Code of
Conduct, Dixon J observed that the third version of his report did not state that the facts,
matters and assumptions on which each of his opinions was based were in part based on
information provided to his secretary by senior counsel for the plaintiff, nor that a second
conversation with the expert’s secretary constituted the basis for the second report (at
[121]). Dixon J employed strong and dismissive language about the issue, rejecting the
expert’s justifications for his conduct as ‘fatuous’ (at [123]), and stated that he was
persuaded that the expert knew well, when giving evidence-in-chief, that the third version
was being withheld from the court (at [124]). He stated (at [131]–[132]):
[The expert]’s methodology was not consistent with his declaration of compliance with the
Expert Code. There is no comment, by way of qualification, about the variance between
[5.15.200] 335
the new assumed facts, provided by the legal representative and instructions received
directly from the plaintiff. There is no comment, by way of qualification, that the new
assumed facts leave his opinions unaffected, with a statement of his reasoning why that is
so. In the first instance, [the expert] permitted a procedure that allowed his instructing
party, without his knowledge, to change a report that bore his signature. In the second
instance, [the expert] simply made the amendments requested, added the word ‘amended’
to the title and changed the date, before applying his signature to the version and
publishing it. He maintained at trial that his opinions were unaffected by the variations in
his assumed facts, from which it must follow that the third version of the report presented
his reasoning process from assumed facts to opinion.
[The expert] endorsed a process that created an unexplained conflict between the
history of the incident as he recorded the plaintiff’s instructions and the plaintiff’s own
instructions to her legal representatives. I am satisfied that [the expert] has sufficient
experience as an expert witness to appreciate the implications that might follow on such a
conflict. In my opinion, a prudent expert adhering to the Code would not abandon a
version of a report based on direct instructions from the client without assessing whether
his error or the altered instructions from the client caused the change.
Dixon J concluded that s 21 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) did not require that the
proscribed misleading or deceptive conduct be intentional. He invited the Legal Services
Board and the Institute of Engineers Australia to review his judgment in respect of the
potential for disciplinary proceedings against the lawyers and the expert witness (at
[194]). This constitutes a rare example in the modern era of a judicial officer drawing the
conduct of an expert (and a legal practitioner) to the attention of regulatory authorities.
He noted that, in the appellate proceedings, it had been found that senior counsel had
misled the court (Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (2014) 42
VR 236; [2014] VSCA 3 at [211]) when he led expert evidence from the witness because, as
r 44.03(3) made plain, the existence of the unserved third version of the report required
that the plaintiff obtain the leave of the court to lead evidence relating to it from the
witness. Senior counsel did not seek such leave and the defendants were unaware of his
attempt to circumvent his forensic difficulties and so were deprived thereby of the
capacity to take the point that leave was required. The result was that senior counsel ‘led
the court into the error of assuming [the expert] had not prepared and adopted as correct
a supplementary report, and that, without leave, evidence could be led based on the
original report that was served’ (at [198]). In argument as to the admissibility of the
expert’s report, senior counsel submitted that the second version of the report was
relevant and admissible as the assumed facts would ultimately be established, in spite of
the fact that the expert had signed off on a third version which did not contain such
assumptions: his conduct ‘led the court and the defendants into the error of assuming that
he was so basing his opinion and that the plaintiff could establish those assumed facts
before her case was closed’ (at [202]). The attempt to deceive was exposed when the expert
was cross-examined.
Dixon J also observed that the way in which senior counsel dictated to the expert’s
secretary the changes to be made to the expert report ‘went beyond proper conduct by
counsel in dealings with an expert witness’ (at [204]). The reason for this finding was that
his conduct effectively directed the expert away from duly observing the Expert Code
with the sources for the expert’s assumptions remaining unaltered and thereby being
misleading. In addition, ‘there was conflict between instructions provided by [the expert]
and instructions provided in conference by the plaintiff that was disguised. The legal
practitioner’s role is to transparently instruct an expert, not to write or amend his report.
How a report is amended following a variation in instruction is a matter for the expert’ (at
[204]).
Dixon J also found the expert’s conduct in failing to reveal the existence of the report
commissioned by senior counsel to be misleading and deceptive. He found the expert to
336 [5.15.200]
have led the court into the error of assuming that there was not a third version of the
report by remaining silent about having signed and sent to the plaintiff’s legal team a
further amended version of the report. He found the expert to have perpetuated this error
during examination-in-chief by failing to inform the court of the third version. In response
to the defence asserted by the expert that it was not for him to mention the third report if
senior counsel did not go into it, Dixon J concluded that the expert’s conduct constituted a
breach of the Expert Code of Conduct in that the expert was not assisting the court
impartially on matters relevant to his expertise and was acting as an advocate for the
plaintiff by his acquiescence in senior counsel’s tactics: ‘It is difficult to conceive of
circumstances where it would be proper for an expert to engage in forensic tactics’ (at
[207]). Dixon J emphasised the unsatisfactory failure of the expert to both identify clearly
the different versions of his report and record in the report his instructions to amend it.
Dixon J did not find that the principal of the plaintiff’s solicitors engaged in misleading
or deceptive conduct in relation to the report. However, he noted that in the appellate
proceedings the Court of Appeal had considered the principal’s conduct in respect of the
second version of the report (in altering it and serving it without notifying the other
parties of what had happened) to have been ‘unsatisfactory’. (See Hudspeth v Scholastic
Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd [2014] VSCA 78 at [39].)
Dixon J addressed in detail the s 26 obligation of disclosure of documents. He found
without difficulty that senior counsel was aware of the third version of the expert report
and was knowingly in possession of a copy provided directly by the expert. He classified
it as a critical document and found that senior counsel should so have regarded it. He
found that the principal of the instructing solicitors was responsible for supervising the
engagement of the expert and subsequent management of that engagement. He noted that
when senior counsel commissioned the third version of the report, he so informed the
principal (after the fact) and the instruction to the expert by senior counsel was on behalf
of and received by the expert as from the solicitor. He was critical of the fact that the
principal ‘did not explain why she acquiesced in that manner of a discharge of a solicitor’s
responsibilities in preparing expert evidence for trial’ (at [224]). He classified as of no
consequence the fact that the principal never later turned her mind to the existence of the
third version of the report after the conversation with senior counsel.
Dixon J observed that the barrister is to be regarded as the alter ego of the solicitor and
held that the overarching obligation of disclosure under s 26 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010
(Vic) does not depend on the diligence, or lack of it, exhibited by the solicitor and the
barrister in their dealings with each other. He held that where a solicitor has arranged
matters so that the retained counsel undertakes on the solicitor’s behalf dealings with an
expert witness, the solicitor not only authorises the barrister to perform all necessary steps
but also places the barrister in the position of acquiring firsthand knowledge of relevant
facts. Thus, if the dealings by the barrister invest him or her with actual personal
knowledge of the document, those dealings will bind the solicitor with that knowledge:
‘The duly authorised conduct of the barrister, who has acquired the relevant knowledge,
will, without either conduct or actual knowledge on the solicitor’s part, constitute an
effective awareness of the document’ (at [226]). Such a ruling should constitute a strong
disincentive for solicitors to allow counsel informally to take over their role of
commissioning an expert witness, as occurred in the Hudspeth litigation.
Thus, Dixon J found that both senior counsel and the principal of the plaintiff’s
solicitors breached their overarching obligation of disclosure under s 26 of the Civil
Procedure Act 2010 (Vic).
The additional party alleged that the plaintiff’s solicitors and the expert, in their failure
to disclose the first version of the report to them, breached their obligation not to mislead
or deceive and that the solicitors breached their s 29 obligation to disclose the existence of
[5.15.200] 337
documents. Pursuant to s 29 of the Act, the additional party sought compensation for their
costs arising from the failure to disclose. However, the impediment to this claim was that
the additional party settled the proceedings during the trial, resulting in a dismissal of all
claims without adjudication on their merits. Dixon J found that this precluded the claim,
especially in light of the fact that at the time of settlement the additional party was aware
of the facts upon which it now relied in its application, and that the claim was made after
the conclusion of the litigation.
Dixon J then considered whether he should make a non-party costs order, noting that
such an order can only be made where the interests of justice justify a departure from the
general rule that only parties to proceedings can be made subject to costs orders. He
summarised the following factors as relevant to the exercise of discretion (at [250],
citations omitted):
(a) The non-party’s connection both with the proceeding and with the incurrence of
the costs. … this involves an inquiry into the connection between both the
non-party and the proceeding, which is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
for the exercise of the discretion, and the causal connection between the
non-party and the costs. A non-party will not ordinarily be held liable for costs
that would have been incurred without the non-party’s involvement. That
connection must be real and direct.
(b) Whether the non-party could have been joined as a party to the proceedings. A
costs order against a non-party who could have been joined will only be made in
exceptional circumstances, because of the failure of the party seeking the costs
order to have afforded to the non-party the protections conferred by rules of
court. Similarly, whether the non-party was warned that costs might be sought
against it may be relevant.
(c) Whether the conduct of the non-party was unnecessary or unreasonable. Plainly,
improper conduct may influence the discretion but proof of a want of good faith
or of improper conduct is not a necessary condition for exercise of the
jurisdiction.
(d) Whether the party that would ordinarily be liable for costs can meet a costs order
and, possibly, the reasons for any inability to do so. This in turn may raise the
question of whether security for costs was, or ought to have been sought at an
early stage in the proceeding.
He noted that in Victoria, where the costs liability of a legal practitioner is in issue, r 63.23
applies – where a solicitor (or a barrister) for a party has caused costs to be incurred
improperly or without reasonable cause or to be wasted by a failure to act with reasonable
competence and expedition, the court may order that costs as between solicitor and client
be disallowed or that the practitioner repay to the client the whole or part of any money
paid on account of costs. The court may also order that the practitioner pay to his or her
client all or any of the costs which the client has been ordered to pay to any party, or that
the practitioner pay all or any of the costs payable by any party other than the client.
Dixon J concluded that s 29 of the Act had effected a significant statutory change to the
law relating to the liability of both lawyers and experts through the creation of a power to
sanction breaches of the overarching obligations, including by compensation orders. He
held the court’s jurisdiction to make such orders to be as broad, wide and deep as the
statutory context and the particular circumstances demand. He took into account that the
plaintiff succeeded in her appeal and the judgment in favour of the defendant and a costs
order were both set aside. The consequence was that the plaintiff ceased to be the person
most plainly adversely affected by the breach of the overarching obligations by senior
counsel and the expert. In addition, he took into account that, among other things, senior
counsel and the solicitors each were to indemnify the school for 40%, making 80% in total,
of the school’s liability to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal on a party/party basis to
a particular date, and otherwise on a standard basis, were disallowed any costs and
338 [5.15.200]
disbursements to which they would otherwise be entitled in the appeal, and were to pay
equally any legal costs and disbursements incurred by the appellant in relation to the
appeal which she did not otherwise recover. He stated that it was his wish that his orders:
have a significant but proportionate disciplinary impact upon the contraveners. Each has
already reported, or intends to report, my findings of their contraventions to their
professional regulatory bodies and there is a prospect of direct sanctions affecting each of
the contraveners following on any response from those regulators. Further, each of the
contraveners faces public opprobrium from publication of adverse findings in respect of
their conduct by both the Court of Appeal and by me. Further, there is the financial impact
upon each of the contraveners through the time and expense of this inquiry and the
likelihood of reputational damage into the future that may carry an adverse financial
impact.
(Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (No 9) [2014] VSC 622.)
Ultimately, he ordered the expert to indemnify each of senior counsel and the solicitors
for 13.33% respectively, making a total of 26.67% in total, in respect of their liability to pay
the costs of the plaintiff and the Roman Catholic Trust Corporation for the Archdiocese of
Melbourne under orders of the Court of Appeal. He also ordered the expert, senior
counsel and the solicitors to pay a one-ninth part of the costs, including reserved costs, of
the Roman Catholic Trust Corporation for the Archdiocese of Melbourne of and incidental
to the inquiry commenced by order of the court.
Dura Constructions: In Dura Constructions Pty Ltd v Hue Boutique Living Pty Ltd (No 5)
(2014) 48 VR 1; [2014] VSC 400, Dixon J again was presented with an application for costs
to be awarded against solicitors – among other things, for their commissioning of expert
reports. It occurred in the context of a lengthy construction dispute. He reviewed the law
in relation to awards of costs and accepted (at [97]) that the jurisdiction to award costs
against a party’s legal representatives should be exercised with ‘considerable caution’,
acknowledging that there is the potential for the jurisdiction to be abused by lengthy
hearings and to become a means to ‘browbeat, bludgeon or threaten the other side’ (at
[100]).
It was asserted in the application that Dura’s solicitors wilfully or negligently withheld
important materials from Dura, briefed experts without the relevant expertise, procured
irrelevant opinions, obtained opinions that were briefed on assumptions that could not be
briefed, and allowed Dura’s witnesses to brief and assist Dura’s experts in the preparation
of the reports. Dixon J accepted that one of the experts had no specialised knowledge in
the relevant area (programming) and on its face his evidence was inadmissible. However,
no objection had been taken to its admissibility.
Dixon J found that the evidence of another of Dura’s experts was inadmissible on the
basis that ‘the expertise basis rule and the statement of reasoning rule had been satisfied’,
and another report inadmissible (at [220]) on the basis that it was derivative of the first
and failed to satisfy the statement of reasoning rule and the factual basis rule referred to
by Heydon J in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21. Dixon J
found (at [223]) that the ‘performance of the expert witnesses, like that of [the solicitors] in
processing their reports, fell below the standards expected by the court’. However, it was
not suggested that this amounted to a breach of the experts’ overarching obligations.
Ultimately, he was not satisfied that the solicitors’ conduct in briefing the experts, ‘while
hardly a model of prudent litigation practice, can properly be described as so plainly
unjustifiable as to warrant the making of a wasted costs order’ (at [237]).
Procedural fairness
[5.15.250] In a number of decisions, concern has been raised that those at risk of being
made subject to wasted costs orders be placed in a proper position to be able to defend
their position. In Lemoto v Able Technical Pty Ltd (2005) 63 NSWLR 300; [2005] NSWCA 153
at [149], for instance, McColl JA (with whom Ipp and Hodgson JJA agreed) emphasised
[5.15.250] 339
the need for procedural fairness to apply when costs orders are contemplated against
lawyers under s 198M of the Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) and suggested that a court:
(1) consider whether there is a prima facie case that a solicitor or barrister has
provided legal services to a party without reasonable prospects of success within
the meaning of s 198J; the solicitor or barrister should be given an opportunity to
be heard on whether a prima facie case has been made out; full particulars of the
basis of the application should be provided;
(2) if the court considers there is a prima facie case, the legal practitioner should be
given the opportunity to show cause why a s 198M order should not be made;
again this requires giving the solicitor or barrister sufficient particulars of the
prima facie case;
(3) after any explanation is provided, the court should determine whether a finding
that the legal practitioner has provided legal services to a party without
reasonable prospects of success within the meaning of s 198J should be made; in
considering this issue the onus of proof may differ depending upon whether or
not the rebuttable presumption in s 198N(1) and (2) is operative;
(4) if the court concludes the legal practitioner has provided legal services to a party
without reasonable prospects of success within the meaning of s 198L the court
should consider whether it is, in all the circumstances, just to make a s 198M
order;
(5) if an order is made, it should specify whether it is a repayment order or an
indemnity order and whether the solicitor or barrister is ordered to pay ‘the
whole or any part of’ the relevant costs;
(6) provide reasons for the decision.
These suggestions are equally applicable to where contemplation is given to the ordering
of costs against an expert.
Impetus towards costs orders

[5.15.300] It is apparent that there is preparedness in a number of different courts to
contemplate, and even in some circumstances actually to order, costs against forensic
experts, and also against legal practitioners, where forensic reports or expert evidence in
court miscarry. The drivers for this preparedness are several. Where conduct by experts or
lawyers results in wrong impressions being given and the misleading of other parties
and/or the court, this is seriously improper conduct that has measurably deleterious
consequences. It is appropriate that, among other things, it be marked by financial
consequences. Given the reliance of courts in all jurisdictions on the opinions of experts, it
may also attract disciplinary repercussions – for experts and lawyers. In addition, where
experts misconceive their role and allow themselves to act as advocates, once again this
can result in miscarriages of justice and so such conduct needs to be deterred robustly by
courts. Furthermore, where conduct by experts is non-compliant with court orders or
processes, it results in wastage of scarce judicial resources and is likely to have a
consequence in terms of the incurring of expense for other parties.
The combination of these factors and the establishment of the start of precedents in this
respect is likely to give a fillip to the award of costs in a small cross-section of cases where
the conduct of experts or lawyers in respect of forensic experts is seriously unacceptable.
The passage of legislation in Victoria that specifies ‘overarching obligations’ for both
experts and lawyers has much to commend it and will be a further factor in that state for
the award of costs against forensic experts and legal practitioners alike in suitable cases.
Responsibility of the forensic expert to correct misimpressions

[5.15.350] Integral to the reasoning of Dixon J in Hudspeth was his view that it is the
responsibility of forensic experts to take those actions that are reasonably open to them to
correct misimpressions that their evidence and their reports have given. The expert cannot
340 [5.15.300]
fob off the responsibility to counsel by saying that he or she only answered the questions
posed by counsel during examination-in-chief or, perhaps, cross-examination. To do so,
from the perspective of Dixon J, is to cross the line into acting as an advocate. Thus, what
is postulated is an independent duty on the part of experts to take such steps as are
necessary and reasonably open to ensure that misimpressions are not given as to their
reports, and probably the actual nature of their opinions, as well as to ensure that the trier
of fact is not misled. This is a complex ethical requirement whose parameters will require
further reflection. If accepted more broadly, it will need to be incorporated into the
forensic training provided to experts.
Obligation of the expert to exercise proper care over forensic reports

[5.15.400] When experts fail to exercise due care over the contents of their reports, they
abrogate their responsibility to both the commissioning client and the court. This occurred
in respect of the expert’s second report in Hudspeth, but it was also the vice at the heart of
the decision in Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] UKSC 13 (see Ch 8.0), where the
psychologist who was sued by her client failed to ensure that the contents of a joint report
with the opposing expert, a psychiatrist, properly reflected her views about the propensity
of the plaintiff to exaggerate or fabricate symptomatology. Both decisions highlight the
fundamental obligation of a forensic expert to ensure that the report on which they sign
off actually contains the views which they hold, as well as that such views are reasoned
and defensible. A failure to do so now has particular consequences in liability in the
United Kingdom, a consequence unlikely to apply in Australia in the short term (see, eg,
D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; [2005] HCA 12; Commonwealth v
Griffiths (2007) 70 NSWLR 268; [2007] NSWCA 370). However, in Australia, it may also be
relevant to the issue of a wasted costs order.
Role of lawyers in respect of forensic reports

[5.15.450] Another issue that emerged in Hudspeth was the fact that senior counsel himself
commissioned one of the expert reports and that changes were made to an expert report
by solicitors. The role of lawyers in contributing to expert reports has been controversial
insofar as it has the potential to adversely impact the independence of the expert’s work
product and to contaminate the non-partisan role of the expert. In Whitehouse v Jordan
[1980] 1 All ER 650 at 655, Lord Denning expressed concerns about lawyers ‘settling’
forensic reports and on appeal Lord Wilberforce (Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246 at
276) was critical about the formation of too close a relationship between a report writer
and those who commission a report:
is necessary that expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen to
exigencies of litigation. To the extent that it is not, the evidence is likely to be not only
incorrect, but self-defeating.
A more modern formulation of the issue is that by Lindgren J in Harrington-Smith v

Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at [19], urging that lawyers be
involved in the construction of experts’ reports ‘not, of course, in relation to the substance
of the reports (in particular, in arriving at the opinions to be expressed); but in relation to
their form, in order to ensure that the legal tests of admissibility are addressed’.
At the heart of what appears to have prompted the award of costs against senior
counsel in Hudspeth was the fact that although the role of the legal practitioner (whether
solicitor or barrister) in commissioning a report is to instruct an expert with transparency,
[5.15.450] 341
namely, ordinarily in writing, it is not in any sense, directly or indirectly, to write or

amend an expert’s report. It was this which in effect occurred in respect of the third report
of the expert in Hudspeth.
Future of costs orders in relation to expert evidence

[5.15.500] It is apparent that courts have a residual power to order costs against both legal
practitioners and forensic experts when costs are generated by defective discharge of
responsibilities in respect of expert evidence. Such an option particularly arises where
there has been a breach of experts’ obligations under an expert code of conduct. The
response of wasted costs orders is part of courts’ entitlement to supervise the conduct of
litigation.
The power of courts to take action against legal representatives when they do not
exercise properly their duties owed to the court is longstanding. In Myers v Elman [1940]
AC 282 at 319, for instance, Lord Wright identified the underlying principle to be that ‘the
court has a right and duty to supervise the conduct of those appearing before it, and to
visit with penalties any conduct of a lawyer which is of such a nature as to defeat justice
in the very cause in which he is engaged professionally’. However, the extent of courts’
powers in respect of expert witnesses, as Dixon J put it in Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning
and Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (No 8) [2014] VSC 567 at [139], is ‘open to question.
Primarily, the law of evidence and rules of court, notably the Expert Code of Conduct,
regulate expert evidence’. However, what this means in terms of the powers of courts
remains uncertain. As Ipp JA stated in Sydney South West Area Health Service v Stamoulis
[2009] NSWCA 153 at [205], ‘expert witnesses owe a duty to the court, the content of that
duty, and the powers of the court in enforcing that duty, are yet to be determined finally’.
Experts are as obligated as any other third party to comply with orders of the court. When
they fail to do so, they may be subject to costs orders, especially when their conduct
results in extra expense being incurred by parties in the course of litigation.
There have been important rulings that at common law costs can also be awarded
against forensic experts. As noted above at [5.15.100], in Phillips v Symes [2004] EWHC
2330 (Ch); [2005] 4 All ER 519 at [95], Smith J held that, in part because of the duties
enshrined in an expert code of conduct, ‘it would be quite wrong of the Court to remove
from itself the power to make a costs order in appropriate [sic] against an Expert who, by
his evidence, causes significant expense to be incurred, and does so in flagrant reckless
disregard of his duties to the Court’. However, the language employed by Smith J set the
bar high. In the Ontario Supreme Court of Justice in Bailey v Barbour 2014 ONSC 2343
(CanLII), the approach of Healey J was one of preparedness to order costs against a lawyer
who persisted in the use of an expert witness who was manifestly biased and whose
evidence ‘was a waste of resources’ (at [26]).
In Macquarie International Health Clinic Pty Ltd v Sydney Local Health District [2013]
NSWSC 970 at [7], Kunc J held that at least in some circumstances costs orders can be
made against experts: ‘insofar as any party to the proceedings suffers additional costs by
reason of the non-compliance with a direction as to the timely preparation of an expert’s
report where the reason for that non-compliance can be visited upon the expert’. In this
context, the potential for a costs order was conceptualised as being contingent upon
breach of court directions. While in principle this confines the parameters for such orders
within reasonably narrow parameters, in practice such orders have been made in many
jurisdictions pursuant to courts’ powers in respect of expert reports and in implementation
of courts’ codes of expert conduct.
The important contribution made by Dixon J’s interpretation and application of ss 226
and 229 of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) in Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and
Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (No 8) [2014] VSC 567 is in his construction of the duties of
342 [5.15.500]
both expert witnesses and legal practitioners who commission them. Under the Victorian
legislation, explicit requirements, termed ‘overarching obligations’, are imposed upon
forensic experts and legal practitioners alike. These include the duties to refrain from
misleading or deceptive conduct (s 21); to disclose documents in their possession, custody
or control (s 26); and to conduct themselves honestly (s 17) and promptly (s 25). The
sanctions for non-compliance with any of the overarching obligations include orders as to
costs.
Dixon J construed broadly the obligations of both candour (not to be misleading or
deceptive) and disclosure, rejecting rationalisations about the need for a quasi-criminal
intentionality and imposing squarely upon commissioning lawyers obligations of fair
dealing and to refrain from devices and manipulations. This is consistent with the
approach of courts in the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia in requiring of legal
representatives that they conduct themselves in a fair and responsible way in civil
litigation. This includes their conduct in respect of expert witnesses.
A number of judgments have suggested that while the cornerstone of Victoria’s Civil
Liability Act 2002 relates to the ‘overarching purpose’ of litigation, namely, ‘to facilitate the
just, efficient, timely and cost-effective resolution of the real issues in dispute’, this is
consistent with the approach taken by Australian courts over many years to facilitate the
efficient utilisation of scarce court resources. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in 2013 in Yara
Australia Pty Ltd v Oswal (2013) 41 VR 302; [2013] VSCA 337 at [10] referred with approval
to the observations of Hargrave J in Director of Consumer Affairs v Scully (No 2) [2011] VSC
239 at [21]–[22] to the effect that obligations of the kind embodied in the ‘overarching
obligations’ have, in fact, ‘always existed’. To the extent that this is so, the power to order
costs against lawyers and forensic experts in cases where expert evidence has miscarried
through delay, subterfuge or incompetence is likely to be utilised more frequently and in
jurisdictions other than Victoria.
In principle, much of the reasoning of Dixon J in Hudspeth v Scholastic Cleaning and
Consultancy Services Pty Ltd (No 8) [2014] VSC 567 and then later in Dura Constructions Pty
Ltd v Hue Boutique Living Pty Ltd (No 5) (2014) 48 VR 1; [2014] VSC 400 could be applied
outside the statutory regime of Victoria’s Civil Liability Act 2002 if the conduct engaged in
by an expert is in breach of a court’s code of conduct for experts or is in flagrant or
reckless disregard of experts’ forensic duties, thereby resulting in costs to a party. Such
duties have been set out in authoritative decisions which now have some longevity (see,
eg, National Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The Ikarian Reefer)
[1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 379 at 386; Re J [1990] FCR 193).
While relatively few scenarios will occur which bear features in common with what
occurred in the Hudspeth litigation, a number of the authorities to which reference has
been made in this chapter have involved experts functioning unacceptably as advocates.
Where this occurs or where documentation is hidden and deceit is wrought on other
parties and upon a court, or where the commissioning of an expert or the expression of
expert opinions is characterised by rank incompetence, a useful role can be played by the
award, or the threat of the award, of costs against experts and the lawyers who
commission them. Such a financial inducement for forensic experts and legal practitioners
to act ethically and to be suitably accountable in relation to the commissioning and
content of expert reports has the potential to be a constructive and sharp-edged addition
to the enunciation of principle in civil liability statutes, court rules and codes of conduct
for experts.
[5.15.500] 343
Chapter 5.20
REMUNERATION OF EXPERTS
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [5.20.01]
Award of expert fees by courts .......................................................................................... [5.20.10]
Contractual obligations of solicitors .................................................................................. [5.20.20]
English authority ................................................................................................................... [5.20.30]
Expenses for which solicitors are responsible ................................................................. [5.20.40]
Expert witnesses’ expenses .................................................................................................. [5.20.50]
Consistency with English cases .......................................................................................... [5.20.70]
Medico-Legal Joint Standing Committee of the Law Institute of Victoria ................. [5.20.80]
Contingency fees for experts ............................................................................................... [5.20.90]
Appendix: Sample agreement between expert and client ............................................. [5.20.200]
‘[The witness] has no course of dealing with the attorney; he
knows it is for the party that he is to give evidence; his
obligation is to the party, and if he fails to attend, it is to the
party’s loss.’
Robins v Bridge (1837) 3 M & W 114 at 119; 150 ER 1079 at 1081.
The author acknowledges the contribution of Hugh Selby to earlier versions of this chapter.
Introduction
[5.20.01] Since 1843, special fees to remunerate experts for the provision of reports and
their attendance at court have been regarded as their common law right: Webb v Page
(1843) 1 Carr & K 23; 174 ER 695. Until 1562 (Statute of Eliz, 5 Eliz 1), the obligation of all
members of society to assist in the administration of justice was interpreted to mean that
witnesses’ fees were not paid – this included sums owing to experts: see United
Development Corp v State Highway Dep 4p 133 NW 2d 439 (ND 1965). The Elizabethan
statute required witnesses to be given their reasonable charges according to their
‘countenance or calling’. It entitled expert witnesses to receive higher costs than those
given to lay witnesses. In time, the practice became that when experts gave evidence of
fact, including what they had seen or heard, then although this evidence was admitted
because of their expertise, they received only the basic statutory fee. The reasons given in
justification for the payment of experts have included that an expert’s time is especially
valuable; an expert’s specialised knowledge is his or her property; and, if not properly
paid, the best experts would be carrying an undue burden as they would be the most
sought after. However, difficulties arise from time to time over issues such as the amount
of fees that can be asked for by witnesses and the person responsible for payment of such
fees. Generally, such difficulties can be addressed by clear communication between the
solicitor and expert (see Pamplin (2007)).
Award of expert fees by courts

[5.20.10] The amount allowed by the taxing officer in any court is the amount that the
losing party must pay to the successful party. This does not amount to a prescription of
what the expert may charge his or her client. That is a matter of solicitor–client costs and
an issue that should be determined in advance by private negotiation, albeit that in a
number of instances there will be prescriptions or guidelines laid down by governments,
professional bodies or both.
The current Australian position is that the rules of the various courts make provision
for the amount of expert witnesses’ costs that can be awarded on taxation. Typically, the
rules provide for the payment of ‘reasonable’ expenses. Determination of what is
‘reasonable’ allows regard to be had to the time spent by the expert at court, the loss of
[5.20.10] 345
income that results from attending court, and the degree of preparation, which includes
time spent in conference with counsel and even the ‘apparently vexatious character’ of the
case: see Graves v Lovick (1904) 29 VLR 641 at 645. The fundamental issue, however, is
whether the expert loses money by attendance at court or preparation for such attendance:
see Kores v Franzi (1970) 17 FLR 445 at 452. However, this is not a licence for unreasonable
generation of costs: see Henley v Queensland [2005] QDC 94, applying EMI Records Ltd v
Wallace Ltd [1983] 1 Ch 59.
It is up to the Taxing Master to determine what should be allowed: see Smith v Buller
(1875) LR 19 Eq 473; Mackley v Chillingworth (1877) 2 CPD 273; Turnbull v Janson (1878) 3
CPD 264; McLaughlin v City Bank of Sydney (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 491. A ‘qualifying fee’
tends to be allowed only where it is necessary for an expert to do extra work or to make
extra efforts to become au fait with the facts of the case for the purpose of giving evidence:
Robinson v Malcolm & Co Ltd (1899) 5 ALR 204; see, too, Jones v Davies & Sons Ltd [1914] 2
KB 549; Snider v Commonwealth [1947] VLR 285. The fact that a witness is not called does
not of itself disentitle a party from obtaining the costs of the witness’s preparation and
attendance: McLaughlin v City Bank of Sydney (1916) 16 SR (NSW) 491; Chanter v Blackwell
(No 3) (1904) 1 CLR 456.
For example, App B to Ch 1 of the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015
(Vic), effective 1 January 2017, allowed a claim on taxation for each hour or part thereof of
up to $271–$540.90 per hour for a person engaged as an expert, with a daily maximum of
$3,244.20. Further, the Costs Court was empowered to allow an expert ‘an amount
reasonably and properly incurred and paid to the witness for qualifying to give that
evidence’. In addition, the Costs Court could allow an expert ‘a special fee for any
attendance at the Supreme Court … when the witness assists counsel or solicitors as an
expert for a period during the trial or hearing’.
In George v Biggs (No 2) [2015] NSWDC 43, the District Court of New South Wales was
called upon to consider the quantum of expert witness expenses claimed by a witness
retained by the plaintiff and subpoenaed by the defendants to attend court for
cross-examination. The amount claimed was $31,350 by reference to an hourly rate of
$1,500. It was observed (at [9]) that:
The timing of the attendance of [the witness] at the hearing to give evidence required that
a series of timetabling adjustments be made to accommodate the progress of the trial,
which had become complicated. This was due to a number of factors that can be
conveniently characterised as the accidents occurring in the course of litigation and having
the effect of disrupting the plans of the parties concerning the progress of the litigation,
including the timing of the calling of witnesses. This had the effect of causing considerable
inconvenience to the professional schedule of [the witness] and to his patients.
The defendant proposed payment by reference to a Law Society of New South Wales and
Australian Medical Association (NSW) Ltd revised Statement of Medico-Legal Relations
that included a schedule of allowances and suggested fees. An hourly rate of $790 was
proposed, only for the duration of the court attendance and travel time – some five hours
(at [53]). However, Levy SC DCJ held (at [97]) that it was not a reasonable answer to the
expert witness that he rescheduled his patients and therefore suffered no loss: ‘He had to
do so because a material portion of his professional time was taken up with compliance
with the demands of the subpoena issued on behalf of the defendants, which in turn
required him to utilise other time when he could have been attending to other tasks.
Opportunity costing of professional time is a relevant matter to be taken into account.’
The defendant’s submission that the witness had suffered no loss because the cancelled
patient procedures and appointments were rescheduled was rejected at [106]. The
defendant was ordered to pay the fees claimed by the expert witness.
It has been acknowledged that ‘the scale of compensation must necessarily be
somewhat arbitrary and it has long been recognised that courts may give much less than a
346 [5.20.10]
Remuneration of experts | CH 5.20
full compensation to a particular witness’: Kores v Franzi (1970) 17 FLR 445 at 452.
However, a necessary inference from the requirement of ‘reasonableness’ is that the
expenses of witnesses who were called unnecessarily or who incurred expenses on matters
which proved to be peripheral or irrelevant to the proceedings will not be allowed on
taxation: see Kores v Franzi (1970) 17 FLR 445 at 452. There is no general rule as to the
number of expert witnesses whose expenses can be allowed on taxation; it depends on the
circumstances of the case: Australian Provincial Assurance Association v Commissioner of Land
Tax [1945] ALR (CN) 501. In Astbury v Wood (2009) 23 VR 302; [2009] VSCA 126, Ashley
and Redlich JJA held that the expression ‘costs’ in s 78A(1) of the County Court Act 1958
(Vic) should be given a ‘broad meaning’, with the consequence that a trial judge can
determine the amount of expenses such as travel expenses to be paid to an expert witness.
They held too (at [96]–[97]) that an evaluation of the quality and importance of a witness’s
evidence is not necessarily irrelevant in the exercise of the discretion.
In England, it has been explicitly held that a successful party may obtain on taxation
the costs incurred in the preparation of documents by experts where those documents
have been prepared for the purpose of the litigation: Manakee v Brattle [1970] 1 WLR 1607.
Contractual obligations of solicitors

[5.20.20] There is surprisingly little discussion in the authorities about the role of, and
constraints upon, the practices properly to be followed by forensic experts in the United
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Typical of the uncertainty that
envelops the ‘rules of expert evidence’ is the haziness that surrounds the contracting
parties when experts are commissioned to do work that is preparatory to, or integral to,
the conduct of litigation in either the civil or the criminal context. Thus, the question
arises: between whom is the contract for expert work made?
There is a common misapprehension that solicitors are personally liable to pay the
properly incurred costs of expert work done en route to, or in the course of, litigation. This
is in spite of longstanding English case law to the contrary, United States authority to the
same effect, and no significant Australian indication that English precedent has been, or
should be, departed from. The practice of assuming personal responsibility to meet
experts’ bills has been encouraged by those working in the personal injuries jurisdiction,
who frequently cannot receive significant funds from their clients and are reliant on the
final judgment to satisfy their own and experts’ costs. Some experts have also adopted the
practice of refusing to prepare reports without a personal guarantee for payment from the
solicitor with whom they have contact.
Nonetheless, the perception that solicitors are as a matter of course under a personal
obligation to pay experts is inconsistent with standard agency law that dictates that where
a contract is made with a third party by a person who is avowedly and disclosedly acting
on behalf of another, it is the principal who is liable: see Lucas v Beale (1851) 10 CB 739; 138
ER 292; Fairlie v Fenton (1870) LR 5 Ex 169; Montgomerie v United Kingdom Steamship
Association [1891] 1 QB 370 at 371.
An example of legal principle being qualified by ethical obligation may be found in
Birkai Pty Ltd v Permanent Custodians Ltd (1994) 35 NSWLR 178. A court-appointed referee
had not been paid that part of his fee due from the plaintiffs. The referee sought orders
that the plaintiff’s solicitors pay that outstanding amount. The court found that there was
no inference that the solicitors had acted as principals; nevertheless, after noting the terms
of a Law Society resolution concerning solicitors’ relations with third parties (such as
experts and referees), and considering the range of options, the order was made against
the solicitors.
[5.20.20] 347
English authority
[5.20.30] There is clear English authority of some antiquity that a solicitor acting under an
authority from his or her client, which is known to a third person, is not as a general rule
liable to pay:
(1) the charges of a photographer (Wakefield v Duckworth [1915] 1 KB 218);
(2) sheriff’s fees (Maybery v Mansfield (1846) 9 QB 754; 115 ER 1465; Seal v Hudson
(1847) 4 Dowl & L 760; Cole v Terry (1861) 5 LT 347; Royle v Busby (1880) 6 QBD
171); or
(3) witnesses’ expenses (Robins v Bridge (1837) 3 M & W 114; 150 ER 1079; Lee v Everest
(1857) 2 H & N 285; 157 ER 118; Simmons v Liberal Opinion Ltd; Re Dunn [1911] 1
KB 996).
Solicitors are under no common law duty to pay the fees of counsel whom they have
briefed, this being an obligation of professional conduct, regardless of whether or not the
clients have paid the solicitors sufficient to cover the fees of counsel: Re Angell (1860) 29
LJCP 227; Mostyn v Mostyn (1870) 5 Ch App 457.
By contrast, should the solicitor be pursuing a personal matter, something that may be
termed a ‘frolic’ not clearly commissioned by the client – for example, a speculative action
– there is some authority that a contract to make the solicitor personally liable for
witnesses’ expenses may be implied: Miller v Appleton (1906) 50 Sol Jo 192. Moreover, if it
can be assumed in any way that ‘by the known course of business’ the ‘attorney’ intended
to be liable, even though he or she has expressly contracted as attorney, personal liability
will be insisted upon by the courts: Robins v Bridge (1837) 3 M & W 114; 150 ER 1079;
Hartop, Ex Parte (1806) 12 Ves 349; 33 ER 132; Foster v Blakelock (1826) 5 B & Cr 328; 108 ER
122. Presumably, this would be on the ground that the solicitor ceases to function as an
agent and transmogrifies into a principal. This notion is further explicated by the United
States cases: see [5.20.60].
Expenses for which solicitors are responsible
[5.20.40] Solicitors are responsible at common law for persons whom they have employed,
or for expenses that could reasonably be regarded as those of the office. These have been
held to include:
(1) Costs of engaging other solicitors as agents (Scrace v Whittington (1823) 2 B & C 11;
107 ER 287):
The attorney who does the business universally gives credit to the attorney who
employs him and not to the client for whose benefit it is done. An attorney doing
business for another attorney may therefore give credit to that person for whom
it is given in the usual course of such business, viz to the attorney and not to the
client.
(See also Porter v Kirtlan [1917] 2 IR 144, following Waller v Holmes (1860) 1 J & H
239; 70 ER 735; Farewell v Coker (1728) 2 P Wms 460; 24 ER 814.) This phenomenon
shares the same rationale as that applying to the obligation of solicitors to pay for
the stationery that they use. It is said that solicitors employing agents do so as
part of generating their own profit.
(2) Payment of fees to officers of court: Robins v Bridge (1837) 3 M & W 114; 150 ER
1079; Re Griffiths (1862) 3 De G J & S 388; 46 ER 685; see also Becke v Cattell (1841)
3 M & G 480; 13 ER 1232. This is on the basis that it cannot be presumed that the
client would authorise the solicitor to pledge credit where no credit is given, these
being ready money transactions for which the person engaged in the business of
the court has always been liable.
(3) Payment of fees to officers requested to levy execution: Walbank v Quarterman
(1846) 3 CB 94; 136 ER 38; Maile v Mann (1848) 2 Exch 608; 154 ER 634; Newton v
Chambers (1844) 8 Jur 244.
348 [5.20.30]
(4) Payment of fees to shorthand writers to take notes of a trial: Cocks v Bruce, Searl
and Good (1904) 21 TLR 62.
(5) Stationery costs: Hartop, Ex Parte (1806) 12 Ves 349; 33 ER 132 at 133.
(6) Costs of entering an appeal: Langridge v Lynch (1876) 34 LT 695.
Further subsets of these categories are known in the United States: 7 Am Jur 2d 153 at 213.
Expert witnesses' expenses
[5.20.50] The liability of an attorney or solicitor for expert witnesses’ expenses tends not to
be discussed in standard modern works on costs, and it is to mid-19th century cases and
texts that recourse should be had to discover the principles. The seminal case is that of
Robins v Bridge (1837) 3 M & W 114; 150 ER 1079, in which Lord Abinger CB was called
upon to decide the general question ‘whether an attorney, who has caused a witness to be
subpoenaed, without any express contract, and without any circumstances from which a
special contract can be inferred, is liable to be sued by the witness for his expenses at the
trial’. He held (at 119; 1080–1081):
[T]here is no implied contract by the attorney to pay the witness. The attorney is known
merely as the agent – the attorney of the principal, and is directed by the principal himself.
The agent, acting for and on the part of the principal, does not bind himself, unless he
offers to do so by express words; he does not make himself liable for any thing, unless it is
for those charges which he is himself bound to pay, and for which he makes a charge … It
is known the marshal does not receive his fees from the party, but on the contrary from the
attorney, who is daily practising there, and who is bound to pay, and not his client. But in
the case of a witness, it is different; he has no course of dealing with the attorney; he
knows it is for the party that he is to give evidence; his obligation is to the party, and if he
fails to attend, it is to the party’s loss.
A few years later, Bramwell B in Lee v Everest (1857) 2 H & N 285; 157 ER 118, delivering
the judgment of the court, held (at 121):
It is undoubtedly more convenient that the engagement of the witness should be
supposed to be with the party rather than with the attorney. The attorney may die, or be
changed before the witness has finished the entire duty of qualifying himself to give
evidence, and giving it. Then suppose he gives unfair evidence, dishonestly suppressing
something for the benefit of the party, or does not properly qualify himself by the previous
survey which he has undertaken, and thereby the party sustains a loss; who is to sue him
for breach of duty, the party or the attorney, for the engagement must be taken to be with
him if he has to pay for its performance? We are of opinion, therefore, that prima facie the
party, and not the attorney, is liable for such a claim as the present.
In Lee v Everest (1857) 2 H & N 285; 157 ER 118, an expert witness, a surveyor, sued his
attorney for his charges in relation to surveys and plans which he made to qualify himself
to give evidence at the trial, and also for the expense of his attendance.
The second edition of Marshall’s Law of Costs (1862, p 462) was unequivocal on the
principles to be applied, maintaining that the attorney is the agent of the client and only
binds himself or herself in limited circumstances – primarily by the expression of clear
words to that effect. There is no reason to believe that the law would be interpreted
differently today.
In Arroyo v Equion Energia Ltd (formerly known as BP Exploration Co (Colombia) Ltd) [2016]
EWHC 3348, the unsuccessful claimant was penalised in part for the unreasonable
behaviour of its experts. Stuart-Smith J held that when deciding whether to order the
payment of indemnity costs, it is appropriate for a court to consider and assess the
conduct of both a party’s advisers and its experts. Stuart-Smith J penalised the
unsuccessful claimant by ordering indemnity costs based on: (i) the service of unreliable
schedules of loss whose later amendments affected the progress of proceedings; (ii) a
misleading interdisciplinary approach to expert evidence which resulted in defective
[5.20.50] 349
evidence; (iii) the claimant’s refusal to accept a reasonable settlement offer in the form of a
Calderbank offer; and (iv) the claimant’s deliberate and serious breach of an order limiting
expert evidence by its service of a new expert report five weeks before the trial which was
in itself defective.
Failure by a party to engage constructively on issues in respect of expert evidence can
result in a costs penalty: see UPL Europe v Agchemaccess Chemicals Ltd [2016] EWHC 2889
(Ch).
If expert evidence is adduced, a court in determining whether to make a costs order
including the expert evidence will consider carefully whether the evidence was necessary
for the successful party: see, eg, Darby Properties Ltd v Lloyds Bank Plc [2016] EWHC 2494
(Ch).
Similarly, if evidence purporting to be expert evidence does not constitute expert
evidence, that may result in disentitlement to costs in respect of it (see, eg, Barings plc v
Coopers & Lybrand [2001] PNLR 22; Vilca v Xstrata Ltd [2016] EWHC 2757 (QB)).
Failure to comply with an expert’s code of conduct may also have adverse
ramifications in respect of costs orders.

[5.20.60] Divergent views have been expressed by United States courts on the liability of
an attorney for obligations incurred on behalf of the client (see Minan and Lawrence
(1997); Bomar (1935)). Again, however, there is scant and predominantly old authority. The
better view is that the attorney is not liable for such expenses, unless he or she has
pledged personal credit either expressly or by necessary implication.
The most cited ‘recent’ authority is that of Epstein v Sichel 107 NYS 2d 248 (1951 Sup),
in which the court held that the law was well settled that an attorney’s negotiation for
work to be done by an expert in a lawsuit is the act of an agent for a known principal, and
the agent does not become personally responsible for the expense of that service. In
Epstein’s case, there was evidence showing that the defendant was an attorney who
represented the administrator of an estate at the time he hired the plaintiff, who thereafter
submitted an appraisal which stated that it was ‘made at the request’ of the attorney for
the administrator. There was other evidence that the appraiser did not claim that he had
made an independent contract with the attorney, looking to him for payment; he had
merely said that he had not made any arrangement with the administrator. It was held
that that was not sufficient to establish liability in the defendant attorney: see also Research
Laboratories Inc v Harrison 166 NYS 706 (1917 Sup App T).
Along the same lines, it was held in Willett v William J Burns International Detective
Agency 176 NYS 722 (1919 Sup App T) that the rule applicable was that when the principal
is known, the agent is not liable in these circumstances in the way that he is in others,
unless he has assumed personal liability in ‘clear and unmistakable language’: see also
Potter v Austin 190 NYS 712 (1921 Sup App T); Covell v Hart 14 Hun 252 (1878 NY).
Consistency with English cases
[5.20.70] The ‘modern’ case that reflects the earlier uncertainty is McNeill v Appel 197 A 2d
152 (Col 1964), where there was a dispute as to whether an attorney undertook to be
personally bound when obtaining the services of a handwriting expert in a probate
proceeding, or merely sought to pledge his client’s credit. On the facts, there was held to
be ample evidence to support the trial court’s finding of the attorney’s personal liability,
and his non-disclosure of his alleged principal’s identity at the time of the making of the
contract was regarded as critical. The court went to lengths to point out that this was
neither a case in which the attorney expressly assumed or disclaimed responsibility at the
time of employing the expert, nor a case in which nothing was said by either the attorney
350 [5.20.60]
or the handwriting expert as to whom the latter should look to for payment. Rather, it was
a case presenting solely questions of fact for the determination of the trial court.
The better view of the cases in the United States (see 15 ALR 3d 557; 7 Am Jur 2d 153)
is that the law is consistent with that in England, but that there have been more occasions
for the courts to determine whether the attorney has been acting on an ambiguous basis
for an undisclosed principal. This has unnecessarily muddied the waters but, carefully
viewed, gives no reason to suppose that different principles are being applied.
Medico-Legal Joint Standing Committee of the Law Institute of Victoria

[5.20.80] The Victorian Medico-Legal Joint Standing Committee, consisting of
representatives of the Australian Medical Association (Victorian Branch), the Victorian Bar
Council and the Law Institute of Victoria, has been called upon to address difficulties in
relation to the payment of fees to doctors for forensic work. The Victorian Medico-Legal
Joint Standing Committee (2015, 1.5.3), in its Guidelines for Co-operation between Doctors and
Lawyers, recommended the following arrangements:
When a solicitor, insurer or authority requests a medico-legal report, the payment for this
service is the responsibility of the party making the request.
If the doctor does not request pre-payment, the solicitor should ensure that they either
have funds in their trust account sufficient to pay the fee or be prepared to bear the costs
from their general account.
The Committee recommended (2015, 1.5.2) that fees and arrangements for the preparation
of a report, such as payment before the release of a report, should be agreed before the
assessment is undertaken. It has proposed that, as far as practicable, the fee on an account
for a medical report should reflect the effort, skills and resources associated with the
provision of the report, and should take into account the following factors:
• What amount of the doctor’s income is forgone in completing the report?
• Are other employees involved in the preparation and at what cost are their services to
be provided?
• Are there any other costs directly associated with the service (eg, photocopying,
telephone calls, etc)?
Contingency fees for experts

[5.20.90] In Factortame (No 8) [2003] QB 381, the Court of Appeal held that a contingency
fee between the claimants and a firm of accountants which provided support services to
the experts who were to give evidence in court was not champertous. However, it added
that it would be a ‘rare case indeed’ that the court would be prepared to admit expert
evidence under a contingency fee arrangement (at [73]).
For some time, there has been a lively debate among Australasian lawyers as to the
desirability of allowing lawyers to engage with a client on the basis that a fee for
professional service will only be paid if and when the litigation is settled or finalised on
terms favourable to the client. A fee that is conditional on such a win is a contingency fee
(see Bomar (1935); Shaper (1977) for the United States tradition; see too Bubela (2004) in
relation to Alberta, Canada). If the fee is based on the usual method of charging for
services according to scale, or on a time-based calculation, then the arrangement is known
as ‘spec’ or ‘a punt’. Such an arrangement is acceptable, as the lawyers will only recover
the amount to which they would otherwise be entitled. However, in Australia, a ‘success
fee’ (in lieu of, or in addition to, the usual professional fees), based on an agreed
percentage of the judgment sum that the client is awarded, is prohibited. By contrast, such
fee arrangements are common in the United States.
While there is no prohibition upon experts agreeing to be retained on a ‘success fee’ or
‘no win, no fee’ basis, cross-examination about bias in such a scenario would be well-nigh
[5.20.90] 351
impossible to refute. Professor Boettcher argued to the New South Wales Law Reform
Commission (2005, 9.23), leading up to its 2005 report on Expert Witnesses, that:
I believe that ‘no win no fee’ encourages vexatious actions. It places the expert in the
position immediately of being a member of the team. It seems to me that the suggestions
as follows are all reasonable:
Such arrangements could be treated as contempt of court or an abuse of process.
The relevant code of conduct could expressly forbid such arrangements.
The Court could decline to receive evidence of an expert witness who had been shown
to have made such an arrangement.
The making of such arrangements could be expressly stated to be unprofessional
conduct by lawyers. (Although such a rule would not apply to unrepresented litigants.)
If there were to be some form of accreditation, such behaviour could disentitle the
expert to be accredited.
However, ultimately, the New South Wales Law Reform Commission did not recommend
banning such arrangements (2005, 9.38):
Rather than prohibition, a more constructive approach for the law to take would be to
ensure, as far as possible, that the terms on which experts are engaged are made known to
the other parties and to the court. This would make it possible for a party to cross-examine
the expert (and perhaps other witnesses) in order to bring out the funding arrangements
and their potential implications. Submissions could then be made as to the effect of the
funding arrangements on the objectivity of the expert. It would be open to a party to
submit that, in all the circumstances, the funding arrangements should lead the court to
attach little weight to the expert’s evidence, or even, perhaps, disregard it entirely.
Under r 31.22 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), experts providing their
services on a contingency or deferred fee basis must disclose that information in any
report they prepare for proceedings.
In 2008, the Victorian Law Reform Commission, in its Civil Justice Review: Report
(p 250), recommended that:
Expert witnesses shall, at the time of service of their reports or at any other time ordered
by the court, disclose (a) the basis on which they are being remunerated for services as an
expert witness, including whether any payment is contingent on the outcome of the
proceedings; (b) the details of any hourly, daily or other rate; and (c) the total amount of
fees incurred to date.
No win, no fee arrangements should not be executed between lawyers and forensic
experts. They are both unethical and highly forensically imprudent.
352 [5.20.90]
APPENDIX 1
APPENDIX: SAMPLE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EXPERT AND
CLIENT
[5.20.200]The purposes of this agreement are to clarify the services which AB (‘the expert’)
is to provide for CD (‘the client’) and the terms upon which AB provides the services.
1. CD’s solicitor has requested AB in writing, by letter of [date], to provide a written
report on the topics raised in that letter.
2. Although AB’s report is to be forwarded to the solicitor, AB accepts that
responsibility for the payment of his/her fee rests with CD.
3. CD undertakes to lodge with his/her solicitor for deposit in the solicitor’s trust
account the sum of $[amount] within [period] on account of the anticipated costs
for the preparation of AB’s advice and report.
4. CD undertakes to pay AB’s fee within [period] of the receipt of AB’s account by
CD’s solicitor, and hereby authorises his solicitor to draw upon the moneys held
in trust to pay such account.
5. CD acknowledges that the fees chargeable by AB will be calculated as follows:
[Prescribe as required a rate for time spent on research; a flat fee for the report; charges for
court attendance; arrangements for travel and/or accommodation; interim billing terms,
etc.]
[5.20.200] 353
PART 6 – EXPERT WITNESSES AND
DECISION-MAKING
Chapter 6.0: Court-appointed experts................................................ 357

Chapter 6.05: Assessors ............................................................................. 367
Chapter 6.10: Referees ................................................................................ 377
Chapter 6.12: Single joint experts........................................................ 403
Chapter 6.15: Conclaves ............................................................................. 411
Chapter 6.20: Concurrent expert evidence ...................................... 421
Chapter 6.25: Consecutive expert evidence ................................... 439
355
Chapter 6.0
COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [6.0.01]
Court-appointed experts ...................................................................................................... [6.0.40]
Role of court-appointed experts ......................................................................................... [6.0.50]
Courts’ power to call experts
Modern civil authority ......................................................................................................... [6.0.90]
Statutory powers ................................................................................................................... [6.0.100]
Family Court powers: family consultants and single experts ...................................... [6.0.110]
Criminal authority ................................................................................................................ [6.0.120]
Controversies over court appointment of expert witnesses .......................................... [6.0.160]
‘Caprice has no place in law. … An unbiased appraisal of our
present methods of presenting expert testimony forcibly
illustrates its shortcomings. Parties choose their experts for
what they can contribute to their cause, consequently we end
up with the inevitable battle of experts, which unnecessarily
prolongs the litigation and precludes a fair determination of
the issues, by the triers of fact. … The public is demanding
expeditious disposition of pending litigation. Unless many of
the complex and cumbersome legal procedures are replaced
by simpler and more practical methods, the usurpation will
continue to grow.’
Joseph F Franzoi, Expert Witnesses Appointed by the Court (1945) 29 Marquette
Law Review 49.
Introduction
[6.0.01] There are several means of providing professional opinions to a court in a form
not directly contaminated by the partisanship of the parties appearing in litigation. This
chapter deals with the use of court-appointed expert witnesses.
The role of such ‘neutral’ experts has been internationally controversial from the 1970s
onwards: see, eg, Basten (1977); Ogilvie (1979); Kenny (1983); Freckelton (1987; 1988); Gee
(1987); Howard, Crane and Hochberg (1990); Howard (1991); Spencer (1991); Gross (1991);
Jones (1994); Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999); Van Kampen (1998); New Zealand Law
Commission (1999); Meintjes-Van Der Walt (2001); Victorian Law Reform Commission
(2008); Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016); Friis and Åström
(2017). However, courts in Australia, New Zealand, England, Canada and the United
States have tended to avail themselves only rarely of these alternatives to the traditionally
adversarial forms of expert evidence (see, eg, Lee (1988)), 1 in spite of the fact that the
independent evidence of court-appointed experts is particularly valued by judicial officers
(see, eg, Stridbeck, Grøndahl and Grønnerød (2015); Grøndahl, Stridbeck and Grønnerød
(2013); see also Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016)). This is in
spite of the fact that provision exists for courts to appoint their own experts and to use
assessors in many jurisdictions. It is also in spite of the fact that considerable in-principle
support has been expressed for enhanced use of assessors: see Freckelton, Reddy and
Selby (1999).
However, the tendency toward increasing technical complexity of both civil and
criminal trials is likely to reinforce the pressure on the legal system to scrutinise other than
the conventional adversarial means of ensuring adequate evaluation of expert evidence. In
1 See, however, Rogers (1984, pp 616–617) for a discussion of the South African cases of
Milne & Erleigh (1951) (1) SA 791, Heller (1970) (4) SA 679 and R v Hartmann (1975) (3) SA
532, where assessors were used in the criminal jurisdiction. His Honour also allowed
‘group expert evidence’ in Spika Trading Pty Ltd v Royal Insurance Australia Ltd (unreported,
NSW Supreme Court, 3 October 1985): see Freckelton (1987, pp 234–235).
[6.0.01] 357
Part 6 – Expert witnesses and decision-making
light of this, the role of court-appointed experts and assessors may in time be enhanced.
An example of modern uptake of court-appointment of experts has been in the context of
high risk offender proceedings in applications for supervision orders: see, eg, New South
Wales v Haouchar [2018] NSWSC 1436; New South Wales v Sleeman [2018] NSWSC 1360; New
South Wales v Whaley [2018] NSWSC 759.
Court-appointed experts
[6.0.40] A number of early English and Australian cases expressed the view that courts
had an inherent power to appoint their own expert witnesses. The earliest reference to the
appointment of court experts is said by Jones (1994, p 35) to be traceable to 1345, when
surgeons were called to rule whether a wound was fresh, while in 1353 surgeons were
asked their opinion upon whether a wound was mayhem. She states (at 35):
In the case of R v Coningsmark in 1682, a surgeon was asked his opinion upon the nature of
the bullet wounds and cause of death (see R v Ferrers (1758) 97 ER 483 and 522). Court
experts were frequently doctors but this was not always the case. In 1554, in the case of
Buckley v Rice Thomas (1554) 75 ER 182 the judges referred to an earlier case (7 Hen VI) in
1429 in which the court listened to one Huls ‘as men that were not above being instructed
and made wise by him’. The issue on which they needed to be made wiser was the
meaning of the Latin word ‘licet’.
For instance, in Kennard v Ashman (1894) 10 TLR 213, Wills J found the evidence of the
surveyors before him so contradictory that, despairing of being able to ascertain the ‘true
facts of the case from their evidence’, he adjourned proceedings, apparently without
objection being formally registered, to enable an independent surveyor to inspect the
premises in question. Less than a decade later, Lord McNaughten commented, once again
referring to surveyors, ‘I have often wondered why the court does not more frequently
avail itself of the power of calling a competent adviser to report to the court’: Colls v Home
& Colonial Stores Ltd [1904] AC 179 at 192. He regarded it as irrelevant that one of the
parties to the litigation might object.
Similarly, in Badische Anilin Und Soda Fabrik v Levinstein (1883) 24 Ch D 156 at 167 (see
also Attorney-General v Birmingham, Tame and Rea District Drainage Board [1912] AC 788),
Pearson J maintained that he was entitled to the assistance of a professor to inform himself
of matters relevant to his decision, 2 while in Thorn v Worthing Skating Rink Co (1877) 6 Ch
D 415n at 417n, Lord Jessel MR had noted that courts ‘sometimes’ appoint their own
expert witnesses and commented that there was ‘no doubt’ that they had power to do so.
Nonetheless, even in the 19th century, court appointment of expert witnesses was a rare
phenomenon: see Champagne (1996); Cecil and Willging (1993); Freckelton (1997d);
Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999).
Role of court-appointed experts

[6.0.50] Very little case law exists in explication of when court-appointed experts should
be appointed, and which kinds of matters are appropriate for their evidence.
In Abbey National Mortgages plc v Key Surveyors Nationwide Ltd [1996] 3 All ER 184,
Sir Thomas Bingham MR said that he strongly suspected that the drafters of the order
envisaged its use to resolve questions of a scientific or technical kind. However, he
expressed the view that the resolution of questions was directed toward subsidiary
matters, rather than the major issues in the case. He found (at 189) that the expert is not
2 However, he used as his direct authority the case of Mellin v Monico (1877) 3 CP 142 at 149,
which confirmed the appropriateness of use of an official or special referee’s inquiry or
report at the initiative of the court pursuant to legislative provisions.
358 [6.0.40]
Court-appointed experts | CH 6.0
strictly bound by the rules of evidence and that a valuation expert, appointed as a court
expert, is not confined to giving evidence based on comparables of which he or she has
firsthand knowledge:
In the course of his everyday practice, a surveyor asked to express a view on the open
market value of a particular property will of course have regard to his own personal
experience, if he has any relevant experience. He will also, however, have regard to the
sales experience of his office, whether that is within his direct firsthand knowledge or not.
He will also have regard to all sources from which information can be gleaned concerning
market trends and conditions. This is the sort of information which customarily circulates
among practitioners in any particular market, and it is information to which a competent
surveyor will properly pay attention so long as the information appears to be reasonably
reliable.
Sir Thomas held that the same approach to valuation is applicable in relation to cars, ships
and properties: a surveyor was found to be entitled to rely upon what reasonably appears
to him or her to be reliable information (at 190). In Abbey National, it was argued that the
trial judge ought not to have appointed an expert valuer on the basis that such a person
needs to have an intimate firsthand knowledge of property values and market conditions
in the area of the property to be valued, and that a single witness cannot give reliable
evidence related to widely separated areas of the country of which he or she will
necessarily have no detailed personal knowledge. Sir Thomas Bingham rejected the
submission and found that it was not self-evident that a valuer, having made appropriate
inquiries and investigations, cannot express a reliable opinion on values within an area
where the valuer has not worked. Thus, he found that the trial judge had not exceeded his
jurisdiction in appointing as a court expert a valuer from outside the district in which the
property was to be valued.
It had been argued that the appointment of a court expert in the case was ‘pointless’,
since it merely meant the instruction of an additional expert whose opinion would carry
no more weight than any other. Sir Thomas’ response (at 191) was straightforward:
We feel bound to say that in our opinion this argument ignores the experience of the
courts over many years. For whatever reason, and whether consciously or unconsciously,
the fact is that expert witnesses instructed on behalf of parties to litigation often tend, if
called as witnesses at all, to espouse the cause of those instructing them to a greater or
lesser extent, on occasion becoming more partisan than the parties. There must be at least
a reasonable chance that an expert appointed by the court, with no axe to grind but a clear
obligation to make a careful and objective evaluation, may prove a reliable source of
expert opinion. If so, there must be a reasonable chance at least that such an opinion may
lead to settlement of a number of valuation cases.
Courts’ power to call experts
Modern civil authority

[6.0.90] There is clear authority that, in both England and Australia, judges in civil
matters cannot call witnesses not called by either party, save at the joint request of both
parties or at least with their express or implied consent: see Clark Equipment Credit of
Australia Ltd v Como Factors Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR 552 at 568 per Powell J, following Re
Enoch and Zaretsky, Bock & Co’s Arbitration [1910] 1 KB 327 at 331 per Cozens-Hardy MR,
and at 332 per Fletcher Moulton LJ; see also Ch 5.10. 3
3 See the critical comments of Hope JA in Bassett v Host [1982] 1 NSWLR 206 at 207:
A trial is not a game; it is an attempt, on behalf of the community, to resolve in
accordance with the law the questions at issue between the parties. A system which
requires courts to resolve those issues in the circumstances in which the issues in
this case have had to be resolved is surely deficient, for instead of assisting the
finding of the truth, the system has prevented the court from having before it the
[6.0.90] 359
Australia’s best-known case involving discussion of the court appointment of experts

in a civil case is R v Jenkins; Ex parte Morrison [1949] VLR 277 (the Whose Baby Case), in
which Barry J called in aid the services of an assessor under what was then s 123 of the
Supreme Court Act 1928 (Vic).
His Honour noted the argument that to appoint a person to take a blood test, in this
instance from the putative parents and from the child in question, involved a disregard of
the limitation imposed upon a trial judge by the English Court of Appeal in Re Enoch’s
Arbitration [1910] 1 KB 327, which was applied by the High Court in Titheradge v The King
(1917) 24 CLR 107. However, he held (at 284) that the cases:
proceed upon the view that a trial judge should not take upon himself the conduct of a
case and call a witness to the events in dispute in the litigation before him whom the
parties are not willing to call, but the reasoning of the judgment which states the
proposition at its highest, that of Fletcher Moulton LJ, in Re Enoch’s Arbitration [1910] 1 KB
327, may have no application in a proceeding where the welfare of a child is the issue
before the court. But in any event, where the judge appoints an expert to perform an
examination he is not calling a witness in the sense discussed in those cases; he is really
supplementing by scientific technique the natural limitations of his own powers of
observation. The expert is skilled in the specialty and disinterested in the result; he is
appointed to perform a physical experiment which can be observed and checked by the
parties if they so desire; and in the proper exercise of its discretion the court would always
allow the parties the opportunity of cross-examination.
It is unclear whether his Honour’s distinctions between civil cases and those involving
children, and between the court-appointed expert and the expert appointed to conduct an
examination or to perform a test, will subsequently be applied. However, Family Court
and Children’s Court legislation emphasising the paramountcy of the welfare of children
may well have an impact upon the interpretation of such courts’ capacity to call and
question witnesses.
Statutory powers
[6.0.100] Under a variety of court rules, expert witnesses can be appointed by courts. For
instance, under s 65M of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic), a court can make an order
appointing an expert to assist the court or to inquire into and report on any issue in a
proceeding. In deciding whether to do so, it must consider:
(a) whether the appointment of a court appointed expert would be disproportionate
to –
(i) the complexity or importance of the issues in dispute; and
(ii) the amount in dispute in the proceeding;
(b) whether the issue falls within a substantially established area of knowledge;
(c) whether it is necessary for the court to have a range of expert opinion;
(d) the likelihood of the appointment expediting or delaying the trial;
(e) any other relevant consideration.
(See, eg, Moroney v Zegers [2018] VSC 446; see too Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld),
rr 429I and 429J.)
In addition, under r 10.01 of the Supreme Court (Intellectual Property) Rules 2016 (Vic), in
any intellectual property case:
only witnesses who could have spoken directly as to what the truth was. In some
other parts of the world where the adversary system prevails, this patent defect has
been remedied as regards civil cases by enabling courts to call, or to require the
calling of, witnesses with adequate protection to the parties by the giving of
directions as to examination and cross-examination, either generally or in respect of
particular issues.
360 [6.0.100]
which in the opinion of the Judge involves a question for an expert witness, the Judge
may, at any time on the application of a party or on the Judge’s own motion, appoint an
independent expert –
(a) to inquire into and report on a question of fact or of opinion (not involving
questions of law or construction); or
(b) to provide a demonstration for the Court.
‘Expert’ is broadly defined to include ‘any skilled person whose opinion on a question
relevant to any issue in dispute in a proceeding would be received by the Court’.
Similarly, r 23.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) permits the court to appoint an
expert on application or its own motion.
(See also r 31.46 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW); s 94(1) of the Victorian
Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic).)
Practical difficulties in relation to the implementation of Federal Court Rules were
encountered in Newark Pty Ltd v Civil & Civic Pty Ltd (1987) 75 ALR 350, a case involving
a contractual dispute and issues surrounding work and labour done. The applicant’s
liquidator had a limited sum of money available to meet debts and there was a danger
that the litigation would consume the whole sum. Counsel for the respondents resisted the
application for appointment of a court expert ‘to investigate matters of opinion relevant to
the case’. It was suggested to Pincus J that courts should be cautious in applying rules
permitting court appointment of experts. His Honour, however, did not find any need for
caution in the circumstances of the case before him and determined that the case was
‘peculiarly suited’ to the use of such an expert (at 351):
The amount in issue is very much less than the expected cost of the litigation and a
competent person is available to look into the central questions requiring expert
resolution, on behalf of the court. Experience suggests that too often expert witnesses
display a degree of partiality, whereas the court-appointed expert may be expected to be
indifferent as to the result of the case.
In Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (1989) 89 ALR 131, a court expert was appointed
under O 34 of the Federal Court Rules, with the consent of both parties, to inquire into and
report to the Federal Court about certain survey material prepared by the Roy Morgan
Research Centre. Beaumont J held that the expert’s findings must be, and were, a genuine
attempt to address the questions referred to him.
Family Court powers: family consultants and single experts

[6.0.110] In Hall v Hall (1979) FLC 90-713 at 78,814, the Full Court of the Family Court
authorised the calling of a welfare officer as a court witness who could be cross-examined
by both sides: cf Baines v Baines (1981) FLC 91-045.
Provision also exists under s 62G(1) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) for the court,
where it thinks it desirable, to direct a ‘family consultant’ (appointed under s 18ZH of the
Act, or under the regulations) to furnish to the court a report on such matters relevant to
the proceedings involving the care, welfare and development of a child under 18. The
court may make such orders or give such further directions as it considers necessary for
the preparation of a report: s 62G(5). Such a report may be received in evidence: Family
Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 62G(8) (see Meagher (2012)).
Under s 11A of the Family Law Act 1975, the functions of family consultants are to:
provide services in relation to proceedings under this Act, including:
(a) assisting and advising people involved in the proceedings; and
(b) assisting and advising courts, and giving evidence, in relation to the proceedings;
and
(c) helping people involved in the proceedings to resolve disputes that are the
subject of the proceedings; and
[6.0.110] 361
(d) reporting to the court under sections 55A and 62G; and
(e) advising the court about appropriate family counsellors, family dispute resolution
practitioners and courses, programs and services to which the court can refer the
parties to the proceedings.
Under s 55A(2), where, in proceedings for the dissolution of a marriage, the court is in
doubt about the propriety of arrangements for the care, welfare and development of a
child of the marriage, the court may adjourn proceedings until a report regarding the
adequacy of such arrangements has been obtained from a family consultant.
Under r 15.44 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth), if the parties agree that expert
evidence may help to resolve a substantial issue in a case, they may agree to jointly
appoint a single expert witness to prepare a report. Pursuant to r 15.45:
(1) The court may, on application or on its own initiative, order that expert evidence
be given by a single expert witness.
(2) When considering whether to make an order under subrule (1), the court may
take into account factors relevant to making the order, including:
(a) the main purpose of these Rules (see rule 1.04) and the purpose of this
Part (see rule 15.42);
(b) whether expert evidence on a particular issue is necessary;
(c) the nature of the issue in dispute;
(d) whether the issue falls within a substantially established area of
knowledge; and
(e) whether it is necessary for the court to have a range of opinion.
(3) The court may appoint a person as a single expert witness only if the person
consents to the appointment.
(4) A party does not need the court’s permission to tender a report or adduce
evidence from a single expert witness appointed under subrule (1).
If a single expert witness has been appointed to prepare a report or give evidence in
relation to an issue, a party is not able to tender a report or adduce evidence from another
expert witness on the same issue without the court’s permission (r 15.49). The court may
allow a party to tender a report or adduce evidence from another expert witness on the
same issue if it is satisfied that (r 15.49(2)):
(a) there is a substantial body of opinion contrary to any opinion given by the single
expert witness and that the contrary opinion is or may be necessary for
determining the issue;
(b) another expert witness knows of matters, not known to the single expert witness,
that may be necessary for determining the issue; or
(c) there is another special reason for adducing evidence from another expert
witness.
If a party wishes to cross-examine a single expert witness, they must so inform the expert
within 14 days of the date fixed for the hearing or trial. The court may limit the nature and
length of cross-examination of a single expert witness (r 15.50).
Faulks DCJ in Hoffman v Barone [2014] FamCA 52 at [94]–[100] made the following
observations of the single expert regime:
The task of a single expert witness is never easy. The opportunities for observation and
a single expert witness faces challenges to his or her opinion.
362 [6.0.110]
It is important therefore that single expert witnesses follow the pathway prescribed by
authority to prepare and present his or her report.
knowledge.
single expert witness.
Criminal authority
[6.0.120] An important divergence exists between English and Australian authority as to
the inherent power of criminal courts to call their own witnesses, both lay and expert. In
England, the trial judge has been held to have the power to call a witness not called by
either the prosecution or defence, even without their consent (see R v Holden (1838) 8 C &
P 606 at 610; 173 ER 638 at 640; R v Chapman (1838) 8 C & P 558; 173 ER 617), if he or she
considers it to be in the interests of justice: R v Liddle (1928) 21 Cr App R 3; R v McMahon
(1953) Cr App R 95. However, it has been held that such a witness should not be called
after the close of the defence case, except in a matter arising ‘ex improviso which no
human ingenuity could foresee’ (R v Frost (1839) 4 State Tr NS 385 at 386; R v Harris [1927]
2 KB 587; R v Cleghorn [1967] 2 QB 584; cf Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 684)
and only where no injustice or prejudice could be caused to the defendant.
Australian authority is much less accepting of the practice of judicial officers intruding
into the arena of conflict and themselves calling and questioning witnesses. However, the
circumstances in which Australian judges are at liberty to call their own witnesses, expert
or lay, remain most unclear.
The seminal Australian case is that of Titheradge v The King (1917) 24 CLR 107, where
the accused was charged with assault on a girl under the age of 16 with intent to know her
carnally. It was the Crown case that the accused had struggled with her in a bedroom
prior to assaulting her. The victim said in her evidence that while she was struggling, she
had been observed by a man named Payne. Payne was not called by the Crown or the
defence, but the trial judge formed the view that his evidence was indispensable to a
proper consideration of the case. The judge called Payne and recalled two others to whom
Payne was said to have made prior inconsistent statements.
The High Court held that a miscarriage of justice had occurred, but its members were
not in agreement in relation to their reasons. Barton J noted the English approach and held
that a trial judge does have power to call a witness but indicated that such a power should
be circumscribed by limitations consequent upon the nature of the adversarial system. He
appeared to draw a distinction between the calling and questioning of witnesses. His
Honour held that while in civil cases there must be consent by the parties or acquiescence
‘from which the strong inference is consent’ (at 116–117), in criminal cases the defence
[6.0.120] 363
must be asked whether it consents. 4 Isaacs and Rich JJ, however, drew no distinction in
their language between a judge calling and examining witnesses, and held that it:
is impossible to see any reason why a judge has power to call any evidence ex mero motu
in a criminal trial – except where the Crown raises no objection and, by statute, the
accused may and in fact does consent in manner provided by law or where the court has
special statutory authority otherwise.
They held that the necessary consent in this matter had not been given and so there had
been a miscarriage of justice. Gavan Duffy J merely held there had been a miscarriage of
justice and ‘was at pains to distance himself from any enunciation of principle’: see also R
v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 at 758.
After consideration of the various judgments in Titheradge v The King (1917) 24 CLR
107, Street CJ in R v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 at 758 came to the conclusion that the
earlier decision was not binding authority ‘to the effect that there is no power in a trial
judge to call a witness’. He concluded (at 762–763):
1. A judge presiding at a criminal trial has power ex mero motu and regardless of
the attitude of the parties to call a witness where the interests of justice make that
course necessary.
2. The English restraints that deny the judge power to call a witness after the jury
has retired and after the close of the defence case do not apply in Australia.
3. The judge may either elicit evidence-in-chief himself or invite (but not require)
one or other of the parties to assist by eliciting evidence-in-chief. Both parties
should be afforded the unrestricted right of cross-examination unless the party
thinks it just to confine to some extent the Crown’s right of cross-examination.
4. A judge does not have the right to require the Crown to call a witness and in
effect put that witness forward as part of the Crown’s evidence with the
prosecutor being precluded from cross-examining the witness.
5. It is permissible for the judge to ask a question or questions to elucidate answers
given by the witness where he or she considers it necessary in the interests of
justice.
6. The power to recall is normally exercised in response to a request from the jury
but is not necessarily so limited.
7. A judge may, at the request of a jury, ask questions but jurors should not: see R v
Pathare [1981] 1 NSWLR 124.
However, in Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 684, Dawson J expressly
disagreed with Street CJ’s interpretation of Titheradge v The King (1917) 24 CLR 107 (see
also Shaw v The Queen (1952) 85 CLR 365 at 379) and held (at 681) that since Titheradge:
the rule is the same in civil and criminal cases and that a witness cannot be called by the
judge save with the consent of both parties and then only in exceptional circumstances.
Gibbs CJ and Brennan J (at 660) expressly reserved their opinion on the question and
Murphy and Deane JJ did not find it necessary to discuss it.
In 1984, the question arose once more for the High Court in R v Apostilides (1984) 154
CLR 563, which was an appeal from a decision of the Full Court of the Victorian Supreme
Court that a new trial for rape should be ordered on the basis that the prosecution had
failed to call material witnesses. Inter alia, the High Court held (at 575) in a joint judgment
that ‘[s]ave in the most exceptional circumstances, the trial judge should not himself call a
4 It is possible that his Honour, in using the expression ‘conduct of the examination’ and
saying that it must be ‘used with extreme caution’, was really speaking of the trial judge
calling witnesses and not seeking to draw a distinction between calling and questioning, a
distinction which he at no stage articulates unequivocally.
364 [6.0.120]
person to give evidence’. The court held (at 576) that ‘there was no clear statement of the
principles involved which commanded the assent of a majority of the court’ in Titheradge v
The King (1917) 24 CLR 107. 5
After R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 (see, too, Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR
402; [2002] HCA 4 at [175]), the law in Australia remains most unclear on the
circumstances which would justify a trial judge so intruding into the conduct of a trial that
he or she would be justified in calling a witness. It is even more unclear whether the fact
that the witness proposed to be called by the court was an expert would further qualify
the proposition expressed in R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 that such a course of action
would only be justified in ‘the most exceptional circumstances’.
Controversies over court appointment of expert witnesses

[6.0.160] The extent to which, as a matter of principle, a trial judge should risk being seen
to remove the garb of the neutral umpire by actually calling expert witnesses is extremely
controversial. For the potential significance of such a step, see Brekke et al (1991).
Lord Denning MR in Re Saxton [1962] 1 WLR 968 at 972 was far from positive about the
utility of judicial intrusion into the adversarial arena:
It is said to be a rare thing for it to be done. I suppose that litigants realise that the court
would attach great weight to the report of a court expert, and are reluctant thus to leave
the decision of the case so much in his hands. If his report is against one side, that side
will wish to call its own expert to contradict him, and then the other side will wish to call
one too. So it would only mean that the parties would call their own experts as well. In the
circumstances, the parties usually prefer to have the judge decide on the evidence of
experts on either side, without resort to a court expert.
It is significant that r 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence 1975 (US) provides for court
appointment of expert witnesses, but that it has almost fallen into disuse: see, further,
Champagne (1996); Freckelton (1997d). In Kian v Mirro Aluminium Co 88 FRD 351 at 356
(Mich 1980), the reason was highlighted: ‘The presence of a court-sponsored witness, who
would most certainly create a strong, if not overwhelming, impression of “impartiality”
and “objectivity”, could potentially transform a trial by jury into a trial by witness.’ (See,
further, Charles (2016); Gross (1991); Freckelton (1987); Basten (1977); Myers (1965); Menin
and Leeds (1961); Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999); Levy (1961); De Parq (1956); Note
(1954); Victorian Law Reform Commission (2008).) There have been calls for revision of
the rule (see, eg, Cope (2003–2004)).
5 The majority distinguished the decision of the High Court in Shaw v The Queen (1952) 85
CLR 365 at 379, where Dixon, McTiernan, Webb and Kitto JJ had said: ‘The decisions in
England allow the presiding judge at a criminal trial to call a witness if he thinks the
imperative demands of justice require it. This view was acted upon in Victoria: R v Collins
[1907] VLR 292. But in Titheradge v The King (1917) 24 CLR 107 this court denied the
power.’
[6.0.160] 365
Chapter 6.05
ASSESSORS
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [6.05.01]
Assessors ................................................................................................................................. [6.05.40]
Role of assessors .................................................................................................................... [6.05.60]
Use of assessors ..................................................................................................................... [6.05.80]
The status of assessors’ advice ........................................................................................... [6.05.120]
Early authority ....................................................................................................................... [6.05.130]
Modern authority .................................................................................................................. [6.05.140]
Procedural fairness ................................................................................................................ [6.05.220]
Canadian practice .................................................................................................................. [6.05.260]
‘The assessment of the expert should proceed in similar
manner to the assessment of the lay witness. Inconsistency,
over-confidence, vagueness, vested interest, prejudice,
previous history of deceit or incompetence, clashing testimony,
all have to be taken into account as with lay witnesses. In
either case there are difficulties, imponderables, and risks, but
in neither case is this a reason for abandoning the insights
and values which the system embodies, however imperfectly.’
CAJ Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press, 1992,
p 297).
Introduction
[6.05.01] The use of assessors provides an alternative means of providing to a court
professional opinions not contaminated by the partisanship of the parties appearing in
litigation. The role of such ‘neutral’ experts became controversial from the 1970s onwards:
see, eg, Basten (1977); Ogilvie (1979); Kenny (1983); Freckelton (1987; 1988); Gee (1987);
Howard, Crane and Hochberg (1990); Howard (1991); Spencer (1991); Gross (1991); Jones
(1994); Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999; 2001); Van Kampen (1998); New Zealand Law
Commission (1999); Meintjes-Van Der Walt (2001); New South Wales Law Reform
Commission (2005); Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016).
However, courts in Australia, New Zealand, England, Canada and the United States have
tended to avail themselves comparatively rarely of this alternative to the traditionally
adversarial form of expert evidence (see Hodgkinson and James (2015, p 160)). This is in
spite of the fact that provision exists for courts to appoint their own experts and to use
assessors in many jurisdictions. It is also in spite of the fact that considerable in-principle
support has been expressed for enhanced use of assessors: see Freckelton, Reddy and
Selby (1999).
However, the tendency toward increasing technical complexity of both civil and
criminal trials is likely to reinforce the pressure on the legal system to scrutinise other than
the conventionally adversarial means of ensuring adequate evaluation of expert evidence.
In light of this, the role of assessors may in time be enhanced.
Assessors
[6.05.40] Etymologically, ‘assessors’ are persons who sit with others, or are assistants. In
law, they are persons who, by virtue of some special skill, knowledge or experience, sit
with a judge during court proceedings to answer any questions that may be posed by the
judge on the area in which they are expert: The Magna Charta (1871) 1 Asp MLC 153 at 154;
The Beryl (1884) 9 PD 137 at 141. They act as ‘expert guides of the court’: Owners of SS
Melanie v Owners of SS San Onofre [1927] AC 162; or to provide technical assistance: Federal
Court Civil Procedure Rules SOR 98-106, r 52 (Can).
The assistance provided by assessors has the potential to add constructively to the
cogency of the judge’s technical reasons (see Beach (2015)). In Beecham Group Ltd v
[6.05.40] 367
Bristol-Myers Co (No 2) [1980] 1 NZLR 192, Barker J commended such assistance provided
to him by an adviser (equivalent to an assessor).
Role of assessors
[6.05.60] Assessors are appointed by the court – they are not called by the parties, are not
sworn and are not subject to cross-examination: The Ship Sun Diamond v The Ship Erawan
(1975) 55 DLR (3d) 138 at 144. While the appointment of assessors is a discretionary
matter, ‘the attitude of the parties is a factor to be taken into account in exercising the
discretion’: Peters Slip Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1979] Qd R 123 at 130. (Compare the
attitude of Rogers (1984, p 617).)
Their expert advice is given in private and is not usually disclosed to the parties. The
task of assessors is generally regarded as being to provide advice to the judge, not to
perform experiments or inspect a person or property, unless they have a legislative
mandate to do so: Richardson v Redpath, Brown & Co Ltd [1944] AC 62 at 71; Dickey (1970,
p 505); see, however, R v Jenkins; Ex parte Morrison [1949] VLR 277; Cement Linings Ltd v
Rocla Ltd (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 491 at 494. As they are not themselves judges, assessors
should not put questions directly to witnesses: Richardson v Redpath, Brown & Co Ltd [1944]
AC 62 at 70; cf Lewis v Port of London Authority (1914) 111 LT 776 at 778.
In Waddle v Wallsend Shipping Co (No 1) [1952] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 131, and later in Southport
Corp v Esso Petroleum Co [1953] 2 All ER 1204 at 1206, it was held by Devlin J that it was
undesirable for a judge sitting in the Queen’s Bench Division in matters involving
seamanship or navigation to proceed without an assessor. By contrast, though, it was
noted in Peters Slip Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1979] Qd R 123 at 130 (see also Silk v Eberhardt
[1959] QWN 29) that in Queensland it was not the practice for judges to use assessors
when matters of seamanship were in issue. It is clear that the use of assessors in different
jurisdictions continues to go in and out of judicial fashion.
In The Tovarich [1930] P 1 at 7, Scrutton LJ described the interaction of judiciary and
assessors:
The judge in the Admiralty Court talks to them and gets information from them. The
parties do not know what the witnesses are telling the judge; they have no opportunity of
cross-examining the so-called witnesses. Indeed, in the Admiralty Court, the practice is
not followed which we – in obedience to the House of Lords follow – the practice of
asking questions in writing and obtaining answers in writing, and sending them up to the
superior court.
The trial judge is not bound to put in writing the points on which he or she seeks or
receives assessors’ advice (The Queen Mary (1947) 80 LlL Rep 609 at 612; Owners of SS
Australia v Owners of Cargo of SS Nautilus [1927] AC 145; 25 LlL Rep 141 at 150) but the
House of Lords suggested in The Llanover (1945) 78 LlL Rep 461 at 469 that if a court
refuses to follow the advice of assessors, it should explain its reasons. Judges frequently
disclose in their judgments the advice that they have received from assessors and whether
or not they have accepted it – but they are ‘under no obligation to do so and practice is not
uniform among all judges’: Law Reform Committee (England and Wales) (1970).
Although assessors’ advice may be treated as highly persuasive, it remains the
responsibility of the judge to assess its worth, ascribing to it the weight that it merits, and
to decide all matters of fact and law in the case in which the assessor assists: Owners of SS
Australia v Owners of Cargo of SS Nautilus [1927] AC 145; 25 LlL Rep 141 at 150. If the court
entertains an opinion contrary to the advice given, it is entitled, and even bound, to give
effect to its view: Owners of SS Australia v Owners of Cargo of SS Nautilus [1927] AC 145; 25
LlL Rep 141 at 152; Alfred, The (1850) 7352 at 354; The Swanland (1855) 2 Spinks 107; 164 ER
333; The Magna Charta (1871) 1 Asp MLC 153; The Aid (1881) 6 PD 84; The Koning Willem II
[1908] P 125 at 137; The Gannet [1900] AC 234 at 236.
368 [6.05.60]
Assessors | CH 6.05
It has also been held that a court assisted by one or more nautical assessors has a
discretion whether or not to allow the parties to bring expert evidence on matters within
the expertise of the assessors, but the firm practice in England and at least Queensland is
not to allow such evidence: The Ann and Mary (1843) 2 Wm Rob 189 at 196–197; 166 ER 725
at 728; The Fritz Thyssen [1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 104; Peters Slip Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1979]
Qd R 123 at 130. The reason is that the tribunal of fact’s knowledge, bolstered by that of
the assessors, would render the provision of such information supernumerary – the
rationale is similar to that for excluding expert evidence on matters of common
knowledge. An exception exists where there are very unusual circumstances. Thus, in The
St Chad [1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 107, expert evidence was allowed where the fishing practice
at issue was of such recent origin that it might be outside the practical experience of a
fishery assessor.
Use of assessors
[6.05.80] Assessors have been used in a number of jurisdictions to ascertain customary
laws and habits: Hennessy (1984); McCaulay (1960); Weisbrot (1984); Freckelton (1988);
Prakash (2017). 1 Anthropologists have also been used as assessors in the preparation of
land claim hearings in the Northern Territory (see Freckelton (1985, p 360)), but the main
use of assessors in Anglo-Australian jurisprudence has been in the admiralty context, to
advise on matters of navigation and seamanship in collision and marine damage actions,
salvage actions, and actions for personal injury or death aboard ship: see Dickey (1970);
McGuffie, Fugeman and Gray (1964).
However, in the United States the use of nautical assessors was discontinued in the
19th century, and in New Zealand no provision is made for them. By contrast, in Canada
the use of nautical assessors ‘is authorised by statute and the tendency seems to have been
to extend rather than to restrict or abolish it’: Egmont Towing & Sorting Ltd v The Ship
Telendos (1982) 43 NR 147 at 165. 2 In United States court rules, ‘assessors’ are often
referred to as ‘technical advisers’.
In a variety of jurisdictions, superior courts are empowered to call to their aid the
services of assessors. An example is s 70 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 (UK):
(1) In any cause or matter before the High Court the court may, if it thinks it
expedient to do so, call in the aid of one or more assessors specially qualified, and
hear and dispose of the cause or matter wholly or partially with their assistance.
(2) The remuneration, if any, to be paid to an assessor for his services under
subsection (1) in connection with any proceedings shall be determined by the
court, and shall form part of the costs of the proceedings.
(3) Rules of court shall make provision for the appointment of scientific advisers to
assist the Patents Court in proceedings under the Patents Act 1949 and the Patents
Act 1977 and for regulating the functions of such advisers.
1 In a leading Indian judgment, Ayyangar J held:

Assessors are analogous to expert witnesses and in principle the opinion of an
assessor is substantially on the same footing as the opinion evidence of expert
witnesses. … Thus it would seem that provision was made by the legislature for
Europeans administering justice in a foreign land and therefore deficient in their
knowledge of the customs and habits of the parties and witnesses appearing before
them, and also deficient in judging of their demeanour in the witness-box, having
the benefit of the opinion of two or more respectable natives of the land as
assessors possessing such knowledge and judgment. … the opinion of an assessor
given upon the whole case tried before a Court of Session or any portion of such a
case is, in principle, on the same footing as the opinion evidence of a person
especially skilled in foreign law, science or art.
2 For a full discussion of issues for reform in the admiralty context, see Australian Law
Reform Commission (1986).
[6.05.80] 369
(4) The remuneration of any such adviser shall be determined by the Lord Chancellor
with the concurrence of the Minister for the Civil Service and shall be defrayed
out of money provided by Parliament.
(5) Subsections (1) and (2) apply in relation to the family court as they apply in
relation to the High Court.
Section 77 of the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) provides that:

(1) The Court may in any proceeding call in the assistance of one or more specially
qualified assessors and hear the proceeding wholly or partially with their
assistance but shall not be bound by their opinion or findings.
(2) The Court may determine the remuneration of assessors.
(See also Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 71; Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 56; Uniform
Civil Procedure Rules (Qld), r 285; Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT), r 1530.)
Under s 102B of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), there is provision for the use of
assessors:
In any proceedings under this Act (other than prescribed proceedings), the court may, in
accordance with the applicable Rules of Court, get an assessor to help it in the hearing and
determination of the proceedings, or any part of them or any matter arising under them.
Specific provision for such a step exists under rr 15.37–15.39 of the Family Law Rules 2004
(Cth):
15.37 Application of Part 15.4
This Part applies to all applications except:
(a) an application for divorce;
(b) an application for an order that a marriage is a nullity; or
(c) an application for a declaration as to the validity of a marriage, divorce or
annulment.
15.38 Appointing an assessor
(1) A party may apply for the appointment of an assessor by filing:
(a) an Initiating Application (Family Law) and an affidavit; or
(b) after a case has commenced – an Application in a Case and an affidavit.
(2) The affidavit filed with the application must:
(a) state:
(i) the name of the proposed assessor;
(ii) the issue about which the assessor’s assistance will be sought;
and
(iii) the assessor’s qualifications, skill and experience to give the
assistance; and
(b) attach the written consent of the proposed assessor.
(3) The court may appoint an assessor on its own initiative only if the court has:
(a) notified the parties of the matters mentioned in subrule (2); and
(b) given the parties a reasonable opportunity to be heard in relation to the
appointment.
15.39 Assessor’s report
(1) The court may direct an assessor to prepare a report.
(2) A copy of the report must be given to each party and any independent children’s
lawyer.
(3) An assessor must not be required to give evidence.
(4) The court is not bound by any opinion or finding of the assessor.
Note: This rule applies unless the court orders otherwise (see rule 1.12).
15.40 Remuneration of assessor
370 [6.05.80]
Assessors | CH 6.05
(1) An assessor may:

(a) be remunerated as determined by the court; and
(b) be paid by the court, or a party or other person, as ordered by the court.
(2) The court may order a party or other person to pay, or give security for payment of,
the assessor’s remuneration before the assessor is appointed to assist the court.
The status of assessors' advice

[6.05.120] There remains significant uncertainty as to the status of the advice given to
judges by assessors. However, persuasive House of Lords’ authority suggests that their
contribution is not properly to be classed as evidence: Richardson v Redpath, Brown & Co
Ltd [1944] AC 62 at 70–71. See Ch 6.10.
Early authority
[6.05.130] In The Clan Lamont (1946) 79 LlL Rep 521 at 524, Scott LJ held in obiter dicta that
assessors’ advice itself ‘is expert evidence, admissible in Admiralty Courts on all issues of
fact about seamanship’: see also The Queen Mary (1947) 80 LlL Rep 609 at 612 per Scott LJ.
Similarly, it was held in The Queen Mary (1947) 80 LlL Rep 609 at 612 that:
The function of the assessors is only to give to the court expert evidence on technical
questions of seamanship or navigation, such as would be admissible in evidence if given
by an independent expert witness. Although the assessors thus give evidence, they are not
subject to the litigants’ normal safeguard of cross-examination, because being protected by
the impartiality of the Court the parties do not need it.
(See also Owners of SS Australia v Owners of Cargo of SS Nautilus [1927] AC 145; 25 LlL Rep
141 at 143–144.)
This same sentiment was echoed by Lord Sumner in Owners of SS Australia v Owners of
Cargo of SS Nautilus [1927] AC 145; 25 LlL Rep 141 at 152:
In Admiralty practice [assessors] are not only technical advisers; they are sources of
evidence as to facts. In questions of nautical science and skill relating to the management
and movement of ships, a court, assisted by nautical assessors, obtains its information
from them, not from sworn witnesses called by the parties (The Sir Robert Peel (1880) 4 Asp
MLC 321; The Assyrian (1890) 6 Asp MLC 525) and can direct them to inform themselves
by a view or by experiments and to report thereon: 24 Vict c 10, s 18(1).
Lord Dunedin expressed similar sentiments (at 150):

[Assessors] are technical advisors, sources of evidence as to facts. Now, however much
Admiralty judges may from time to time seem to have treated the Elder brethren as
members of the tribunal, however informal these consultations may have been, the
principles stated above have never been in doubt. The function of the Court of Appeal is
to urge upon the courts below and to impose upon itself the duty of making up its own
mind alike on questions of nautical skill and on the value of the advice given.
However, as Jones (1994, p 44) put it:

The law imposes its own realpolitik. By the 1960s, the judiciary again found itself in
something of a cleft stick. It did not wish to be seen to be bound by the advice of its
experts. On the other hand, the legitimacy of its decisions within a specialist client
community depended upon their being backed by the appropriate expertise. In a complete
reverse of its former position, the judiciary was now castigated for failing to place a
proper value on the advice of assessors. Thus in The Marinegra (1960) 2 Ll Rep, Wilmer LJ
was criticized for not having given good enough reason for going against the advice of his
assessors.
This raises the issue of whether the task of the assessor is to give evidence at all, and if so,
whether it is confined to matters of fact – for example, matters of maritime practice.
Inherent in the latter categorisation is the difficult and unresolved distinction of when
evidence of fact merges into evidence of inference and opinion: see Freckelton (1987);
Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999).
[6.05.130] 371
Modern authority
[6.05.140] However, the input of assessors is better not to be regarded as evidence. The
view of Viscount Simon LC, expressed in Richardson v Redpath, Brown & Co Ltd [1944] AC
62 at 70, castigated the practice of medical assessors examining workers and reporting
their opinions to the judge:
To treat … any assessor, as though he were an unsworn witness in the special confidence
of the judge, whose testimony cannot be challenged by cross-examination and perhaps
cannot even be fully appreciated by the parties until judgment is given, is to
misunderstand what the true functions of an assessor are. He is an expert available for the
judge to consult if the judge requires assistance in understanding the effect and meaning
of technical evidence.
(Compare R v Jenkins; Ex parte Morrison [1949] VLR 277.)

The suggestion in this passage is that the input of the assessor does not have the same
status as evidence, but also that it is not confined to matters of fact: ‘The judge may
consult him in case of need as to the proper technical inferences to be drawn from proved
facts, or as to the apparently contradictory conclusions in the expert field’ (Richardson v
Redpath, Brown & Co Ltd [1944] AC 62 at 70). However, Viscount Simon LC was even more
specific, denying (at 71) that an assessor’s giving evidence of facts:
is within the scope of an assessor’s legitimate contribution. Earl Loreburn’s judgment in
Woods v Thomas Wilson, Sons & Co, Ltd 8 BWCC 228 at 229 puts the medical assessor’s
functions as high as they can properly be put. Lord Parmoor (at 311) in that case aptly
defines the medical assessor’s function as being ‘not to supply evidence but to help the
judge or arbitrator to understand the medical evidence’ – a view in which Lord Parker
concurred.
This more clearly represents the role in practice of the assessor, and as a matter of
principle is preferable to the views expressed in the earlier authorities.
The description of the advice provided by the assessors in The Queen Mary (1947) 80
LlL Rep 609 at 631 is illustrative of the input given in practice by assessors:
Having regard to … advice given to the learned judge, the court asked our assessors what
their views were on this matter. They advised us that the Curacoa as an anti-aircraft
defence ship had every right to expect the Queen Mary (1947) 80 LlL Rep 609 to keep out of
the way. One of the assessors with special knowledge on the subject also advised us that in
order to obtain the most efficient anti-aircraft visual look-out, the cruiser should proceed
on a steady course, and that the Queen Mary (1947) 80 LlL Rep 609 when overtaking the
cruiser could and should have given way, as by doing so she would not in any way
detract from the efficiency of her defence against submarine attack.
Clearly, therefore, the ‘advice’ given by the assessors was a mixture of fact and opinion –
where it was opinion it even trespassed upon the ultimate issue: see Ch 2.25. To the extent
that it canvassed the behaviour of ships under certain circumstances, the information
provided is reminiscent of that in Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 and Weal v Bottom
(1966) 40 ALJR 436: see Ch 2.05. The surprising element in it is that the judge was
prepared to hear and repeat the views expressed by the assessors, which went to the
absolute nub of the case, and so risked usurping the role of the trier of fact.
Procedural fairness
[6.05.220] As long ago as 1935, in Adhesives Pty Ltd v Aktieselskabet Dansk Gaeringindustri
(1936) 55 CLR 523 at 580, Rich J of the Australian High Court conceded the difficulties
confronted by courts where complex matters of scientific evidence are raised:
Courts cannot hope to obtain the necessary standpoint [in certain patent matters] … This
fact has been emphasised in a recent case discussed in Industrial and Engineering Chemistry,
Vol 26, No 11, November 1934, Editor’s Page 1125, 1126. It is said there that if full justice is
to be done in the adjudication of patents, the judges should have associated with them in
a confidential and intimate capacity unbiased, thoroughly competent, scientific aides. It is
372 [6.05.140]
Assessors | CH 6.05
becoming more and more apparent that the courts as now constituted can barely reach just
conclusions in matters where new and complicated scientific truths must be interpreted
and serve as the only guide posts. In the past we believe there have occasionally been
competent judges wise enough to realise this situation. They have known intimately
scientists who were qualified and who could be called privately to their assistance to help
interpret the mass of highly scientific data recorded by experts in the course of a trial.
Such judges have been able to reach the right decisions after they understood the law and
they found a proper way to have the science interpreted to them. … Apparently the
protection of both science and the public interests requires that provision be made so that
authoritative, capable and unbiased scientific aid may be available to the courts in all
patent litigation.
His Honour’s ‘advice’ was taken in Cement Linings Ltd v Rocla Ltd (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 491
at 494 by Nicholas CJ in Eq, who requested the Dean of the Faculty of Engineering at the
University of Sydney to arrange for experiments to be carried out to determine if tools
removed moisture or slurry. His report was forwarded to the judge but not disclosed to
the parties. His Honour annexed it with the relevant correspondence to his judgment.
However, others have expressed anxiety about the assessor’s advice not being made
public and not being able to be tested by cross-examination, although it functions in effect
as the provision of expert evidence. In The Ship Sun Diamond v The Ship Erawan (1975) 55
DLR (3d) 138 at 144, Collier J stated:
While the impartiality of the court may, to some extent and to some eyes only, appear to
assuage the hurt of not being able to cross-examine the assessors, this presumes
omniscience in the particular judge: that he will ask the proper questions and by judicial
private cross-examination elicit thoughtful, unbiased opinions worthy perhaps of
adoption in deciding the case.
(See also Freckelton (1987, p 232); Ogilvie (1979, p 138).)

Given the increasingly common use of referees, and the stringently interpreted
demands that the principles of natural justice be adhered to, it is likely and desirable that
assessors in their traditional role will rarely henceforth be used in Australian courts.
In the United Kingdom, where Art 6 of the European Charter of Human Rights applies to
provide a right to a fair trial (compare Victoria, Queensland and the ACT in Australia), it
has been held that:
any consultation between the assessors and the court should take place openly as part of
the assembling of evidence. Because the judge is not bound to accept the advice he
receives from the assessors … the parties are entitled to an opportunity to contend that he
should or should not follow it. In many, perhaps most, cases the questions and advice
taken together will be susceptible of little or no argument that has not already been
directed to the issues which have prompted the questions. But fairness requires the
opportunity to be given …
The nautical assessor is a time-honoured example of the statutory court-appointed
expert.
… it is right that, except in cases where such a discussion is unnecessary in the light of
submissions made earlier, the preferable modern practice of putting questions to the
assessors after discussion with counsel should be complemented by a practice of
disclosing their answers to counsel, either orally or in writing – in order that any
appropriate submission can be made as to whether the Judge should accept their advice.
(Bow Spring (Owners) v Manzanillo II (Owners) [2005] 1 WLR 144; [2004] EWCA Civ 1007 at
[59]–[61].)
A further development in this regard was the formulation by Gross J in Owners and
Bareboat Charterers of the Vessel ‘Global Mariner’ v Owners and Bareboat Charterers of the Vessel
‘Atlantic Crusader’ [2005] EWHC 380 (Admlty) at [14]:
i) The range of topics on which advice might be sought from the Assessors should
be canvassed with counsel by, latest, the stage of final submissions.
[6.05.220] 373
ii) Ordinarily, the questions asked of the Assessors by the Judge should not stray
outside the range previously discussed with counsel; should they do so, however,
there are safeguards contained in iii) and iv) below.
iii) The questions ultimately put by the Judge, together with the answers given by
the Assessors, should be disclosed to counsel before any draft judgment is
handed down.
iv) Counsel should thereafter be given the opportunity to make submissions to the
Judge, as to whether the advice given by the Assessors should be followed.
Ordinarily, any such submissions should be in writing; but if there is good reason
for doing so, an application could be made for an oral hearing. The Judge will
consider any such submissions before finalising his judgment.
v) Generally speaking, the interests of proportionality and finality will make it
unnecessary to repeat the procedure after the Judge and the Assessors have had
the opportunity of considering the parties’ submissions and any suggested
further or revised questions. Accordingly, unless the Judge in his discretion
thinks it appropriate to disclose them to counsel before the judgment is finalised,
any further or revised answers will simply be recorded in the judgment, together
with the Judge’s decision as to whether or not to accept the Assessors’ advice and
his reasons for doing so.
A perceived failure to accord procedural fairness by the use of assessors was addressed in
Genetic Institute Inc v Kirin-Amgen Inc [No 2] (1997) 78 FCR 368 by Heerey J, who held that
it was not a valid ground to oppose the appointment of an assessor. Forrest J in Matthews
v SPI Electricity (No 32) [2013] VSC 630 similarly identified little difficulty, provided that
any necessary disclosures are made. He noted that the primary role of assessors is to assist
the court and set out as follows the role of assessors in the case before him (at [27]):
(b) The assessors will sit with me during the concurrent evidence sessions. If they
wish, they may question the experts (or counsel) in this context. Such questioning
however will be limited to clarification of the evidence; that is, where they
consider the evidence to be ambiguous, unclear or incomplete.
…
(d) I will consult with the assessors whilst in chambers on matters raised by the
experts in their oral evidence and in their individual and joint reports. This may
include advice as to any questions the assessors think I should ask counsel or the
experts in order to determine the questions at hand.
…
(f) If the assessors raise a theory or opinion that has not previously been identified
by the parties, I will discuss this with counsel.
…
(h) I anticipate that I will consult with the experts immediately after the conclusion
of the concurrent evidence session and, from time to time, while drafting the
judgment. This is likely to include seeking confirmation from them that I have
properly understood the meaning of the expert evidence of conclaves 1, 3 and 4.
I repeat, however, that their role is confined to providing advice and ensuring
that I have comprehended the evidence given. I also repeat that the decision on
these issues is mine and mine alone.
The issue of a perceived lack of procedural fairness has also been considered by English
courts in the admiralty jurisdiction and in relation to patent litigation (see, eg, Halliburton
Energy Services Inc v Smith International (North Sea) Ltd (No 2) [2007] RPC 17; [2006] EWCA
Civ 1599 at [18]–[21]), including with respect to Art 6(1) of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Sch 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998
(UK)), which provides that litigants are entitled to a fair and public hearing, within a
reasonable time, by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. This
requirement was argued to conflict with some aspects of the earlier practice of using
nautical assessors, where assessors would provide advice to the court without the parties
having the opportunity to comment thereon.
374 [6.05.220]
Assessors | CH 6.05
In Bow Spring (Owners) v Manzanillo II (Owners) [2005] 1 WLR 144; [2004] EWCA Civ
1007, regarding a dispute arising from a nautical collision, the Court of Appeal held that
the practice of an Admiralty judge putting questions to assessors after discussion with
counsel was appropriate, but should also be complemented by the practice of disclosing to
counsel the assessors’ answers in order to comply with Art 6(1).
Beach (2015) has noted that this approach contributed to establishing a more
transparent procedure, allowing counsel to make appropriate submissions, orally or in
writing, as to whether the judge should accept an assessor’s advice. This updated
procedure has been viewed as being more consistent with the notion – implicit in the
concept of a fair hearing – that the parties ought to have the opportunity to ‘have
knowledge of, and comment on, all evidence adduced or observations filed, with a view to
influencing the court’s decision’ (referring to Krcmar v Czech Republic (35376/97) [2000]
ECHR 99; (2001) 31 EHRR 41 at [40]).
A similar view was expressed in Owners and Bareboat Charterers of the Vessel ‘Global
Mariner’ v Owners and Bareboat Charterers of the Vessel ‘Atlantic Crusader’ [2005] EWHC 380
(Admlty), where the Admiralty Court (Gross J, sitting with nautical assessors) expanded
upon Manzanillo to recommend that the following procedure be adopted in relation to the
use of nautical assessors:
• The range of topics on which advice may be sought from the assessors should be
canvassed with counsel, at the latest, by the stage of final submissions.
• The questions asked of assessors by the judge should not stray outside the range
previously discussed with counsel.
• The questions ultimately put by the judge, and the assessors’ answers, should be
disclosed to counsel before the draft judgment is handed down.
• Counsel should thereafter be given the opportunity to make submissions to the judge
as to whether the assessors’ advice should be followed.
Canadian practice
[6.05.260] The most significant decision in Canada on the role of assessors is the 1997
judgment of the Supreme Court in Porto Seguro Companhia De Seguros Gerais v Belcan SA
(1997) 153 DLR (4th) 577. The appellant appealed on the basis that the trial judge refused
to hear the evidence of three expert witnesses and because the advice of the two assessors
appointed to sit with the court was not disclosed. The trial judge had followed what had
evolved into settled practice under the Federal Court Rules 1978 (Can), whereby, when
assessors were appointed, expert evidence was not allowed. This was a rule which found
its origin in English practice, where a judge sat with two Elder Brethren of Trinity House
who would give their advice on technical matters of navigation and seamanship. Expert
evidence was not permitted and the advice, although not binding, was generally followed.
However, in England the rule was not absolute, with expert evidence being allowed on
occasions such as where the expertise of the witnesses surpassed that of the assessors
(‘Neptune’ (Owners) v Humber Conservancy Board (1937) 59 Ll LR 158 at 167) or where the
parties had prepared their case on the basis of an exchange of expert reports: ‘Antares II’ v
‘Victory’ [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 482 at 491–493. The Evidence Act 1972 (UK) also made expert
evidence admissible.
The court found that it was open to it to change the procedural rule barring expert
evidence where judges sat with assessors if it was established that the change was
required for reasons of justice or fairness. The court found that the rule suffered from four
defects. First, it violated the audi alteram partem rule on the basis that ‘To say that a litigant
cannot call any expert evidence on matters that are at issue in the litigation is to deny the
litigant’s fundamental right to be heard’ (at 589). It also found such a rule to be out of step
with modern trial practice which permits expert evidence on matters of opinion at issue
[6.05.260] 375
on a trial, save under s 7 of the Evidence Act 1985 (Can), where limitations are imposed on
the numbers of witnesses able to be called by a party. Second, the court found that the
traditional preclusion was founded on the mistaken premise that assessors will be masters
of all matters of expertise that arise at the trial. However, it found this to be out of touch
with the complexity of developments in relation to matters maritime: Owners of SS
Australia v Owners of Cargo of SS Nautilus [1927] AC 145; 25 LlL Rep 141 at 150 per
Viscount Dunedin; Owners of the Ship ‘Sun Diamond’ v The Ship ‘Erawan’ (1975) 55 DLR (3d)
138 at 145. The court noted that assessors can function to enhance the understanding of
the court and in explaining technical evidence that the parties have put before the court,
thereby having the potential to ‘be of assistance to judges in complex, technical cases
without trenching on the rules of natural justice’ (at 591). Third, the court found that the
rule did not permit disclosure to the parties of what passed between the judge and the
assessor: ‘There is no longer any justification for assessors to advise judges on matters of
fault without disclosure to, and opportunity for comment by, the parties. Nor is there
justification for preventing parties from calling expert witnesses’ (at 592). Finally, the court
found that excluding expert evidence when an assessor assists the judge may create the
impression that it is the assessor, and not the judge, who is deciding important questions
of fact.
The court held that assessors should be permitted to assist judges in understanding
expert evidence. It also held that assessors may go further and advise the judge on matters
of fact in dispute between the parties, but only on condition of disclosure and a right of
response sufficient to comply with the requirements of natural justice (at 593).
376 [6.05.260]
Chapter 6.10
REFEREES
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [6.10.01]
Preliminary ............................................................................................................................. [6.10.70]
Decision to order a reference .............................................................................................. [6.10.75]
Consent of the parties .......................................................................................................... [6.10.80]
Status of the referee .............................................................................................................. [6.10.90]
Reference and arbitration ..................................................................................................... [6.10.100]
Amending the referee’s terms of the reference ............................................................... [6.10.110]
Calling the referee to give evidence .................................................................................. [6.10.120]
Costs ........................................................................................................................................ [6.10.130]
The conduct of the referee’s inquiry .................................................................................
Fairness ................................................................................................................................... [6.10.170]
Extent of cross-examination ................................................................................................ [6.10.180]
Legal representation .............................................................................................................. [6.10.190]
Rules of evidence .................................................................................................................. [6.10.195]
Task delegation ...................................................................................................................... [6.10.200]
A view ..................................................................................................................................... [6.10.210]
Inquiry procedure ................................................................................................................. [6.10.220]
The adoption or rejection of the referee’s report by the trial judge ............................
Summary of principles to be applied ................................................................................ [6.10.260]
Adequacy of reasons ............................................................................................................ [6.10.280]
Disputing issues of fact and law ........................................................................................ [6.10.290]
Severance ................................................................................................................................ [6.10.300]
Further argument and evidence ......................................................................................... [6.10.310]
Remittal for further inquiry ................................................................................................ [6.10.320]
Implications of widespread challenge ............................................................................... [6.10.330]
‘Seek simplicity and distrust it.’

AN Whitehead in WH Auden and L Kronenberger, The Viking Book of
Aphorisms (Dorset Press, 1981), p 354.
The author acknowledges the substantial contribution made by Hugh Selby on earlier versions of
this chapter.
Introduction
[6.10.01] When there is a complicated technical issue to be decided, a superior court may
refer an issue or issues to an independent expert, known as a ‘referee’ or ‘special referee’,
whose role it is to make inquiries, evaluate competing information, deliver findings of
fact, and report the analysis and the findings to the court. There is a lengthy history to the
option, including s 9 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1884 (UK), which allowed the
court to order the whole cause of matter to be tried before an official referee who had
power to direct in what manner the judgment of the court should be entered and to
exercise the same discretion as to costs as the court or judge could have exercised (see too
Arbitration Act 1889 (UK)): see, eg, Gyles v Wilcox [1740] EngR 76; (1740) 2 Atk 141; 26 ER
489; for a history, see Buckley v Bennell Design & Constructions Pty Ltd (1978) 140 CLR 1 at
1–22; Kadam v MiiResorts Group 1 Pty Ltd (No 4) (2017) 252 FCR 298; [2017] FCA 1139.
An example of empowering legislation is s 54A of the Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth),
which empowers the court to refer a proceeding or one or more questions arising in a
proceeding to a referee for inquiry and report: see Kadam v MiiResorts Group 1 Pty Ltd
(No 4) (2017) 252 FCR 298; [2017] FCA 1139 at [35]–[62]; Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao
(No 2) [2018] FCA 527 at [122]–[153]; Money Max Int Pty Ltd (Trustee) v QBE Insurance Group
Ltd [2018] FCA 1030 at [5]–[6]; Liverpool City Council v McGraw-Hill Financial, Inc [2018]
[6.10.01] 377
FCA 1289 at [69]. In his second reading speech (Hansard, House of Representatives,
3 December 2008 at 12296), the Attorney-General, the Hon Robert McClelland MP (as his
Honour then was), said (emphasis added):
Court efficiency is important if we are to ensure that the cost of justice remains
proportionate to the relief being sought … and it is also important that commercial
disputes be resolved as expeditiously and economically as possible. … this is an important
reform and will enable the court to more effectively and efficiently manage large litigation
… the procedural flexibility with which a referee can deal with a question, along with their
technical expertise, will allow a referee to more quickly get to the core of technical issues and reduce
the cost and length of trial of litigants.
The broader, relevant statutory context for the referral power is set out in the decision of
Rares J in Optiver Australia Pty Ltd v Tibra Trading Pty Ltd (2012) 230 FCR 520; [2012] FCA
558 at [11]–[15].
Subject to arguments by the parties before the trial judge, the referee’s report is then
adopted by the court and forms part, or even all, of its reasons for decision. Such a
reference with its resulting report to the trial judge can be most helpful to a quicker, more
final and less costly resolution of a dispute. As Marks J noted in Integer Computing Pty Ltd
v Facom Australia Ltd (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, 10 April 1987):
It is wrong to think that the interests of justice can only be met in the curial environment.
In the present case, the curial system could not match the investigation which a highly
qualified scientific mind of independent spirit was able to apply in the field to the
resolution of what was wrong, if anything, with the computer.
Shortly afterwards, Gleeson CJ, the then Chief Justice of New South Wales, observed in
Super Pty Ltd v SJP Formwork (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 29 NSWLR 549 at 558: ‘The proposition
that all litigants are entitled to have a judge … decide all issues of fact and law that arise
in any litigation, is unsustainable.’
The Commercial Division of the Supreme Court of New South Wales has played a
significant role in developing the role of referees. It also has responsibility for the
Construction and Admiralty Lists. Hence the development of case law involving referees
in relation to engineers and accountants. However, the procedure is used in a number of
jurisdictions, including in Victoria, to assess the reasonableness of costs incurred in
administering settlement distribution schemes (see, eg, Matthews v AusNet Electricity
Services Pty Ltd (Ruling No 40) [2015] VSC 131 at [29]; Rowe v AusNet ElectricityPty Ltd
(Ruling No 9) [2016] VSC 731; Matthews v AusNet Electricity Services Pty Ltd (Ruling No 44)
[2016] VSC 732). However, for a long time there was a reluctance in the Victorian Supreme
Court to use the referee procedure. As Beach J said in AT & NR Taylor & Sons Pty Ltd v
Brival Pty Ltd [1982] VR 762 at 765–766, where refusing the application for the
appointment of a referee:
Where a party to litigation wishes the sort of dispute which normally calls for judicial
determination to be tried by a judicial tribunal it will only be in cases of an exceptional
nature that his wishes will be disregarded and the matter referred to an arbitrator or
special referee. In my opinion, the so-called complexities of the matters pointed to by the
plaintiff in support of its application do not constitute special circumstances in the present
case. It is by no means unusual for a judge of this Court to be called upon to investigate
and resolve such matters assisted as he invariably is by expert witnesses called by the
parties. The fact that such a process may be time consuming is of itself no reason to
deprive a party of its right to have the matter or matters determined by a judicial tribunal.
(See also Honeywell Pty Ltd v Austral Motors Holdings Ltd [1980] Qd R 355 at 359–360 per
WB Campbell J; Bold Park Senior Citizens Centre & Homes Inc v Bollig Abbott & Partners
(Gulf) Pty Ltd (1998) 19 WAR 281 at 285 per Ipp J; Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v BPB Pty
Ltd [2000] VSC 261 (Byrne J).)
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However, attitudes have changed, including in Victoria (see Talacko v Talacko [2009]
VSC 98 at [27] per Kyrou J and Bill Express Ltd (in liq) v Pitcher Partners (a firm) [2014] VSC
482 at [28] per Macaulay J).
In 2018, Lee J of the Australian Federal Court commented that: ‘[i]t may be the time has
come for the Court to establish a regular practice of appointing a referee to inquire and
provide a report to the Court’ (Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Ltd v S&P Global Inc [2018]
FCA 379 at [41]).
This chapter reviews the use of referees as expert decision-makers on matters of
complexity that come before the courts.
Preliminary
[6.10.70] Referees offer disputing parties and the courts an expert and speedy answer on
technical and complex issues. When court lists are long and both case management and
commercial objectives have quick determination as a primary goal, expert references are
an attractive option. On the other hand, when parties bring their dispute to court, they
believe that it is a judge who is going to hear their dispute. This expectation was
undoubtedly much stronger until the alternative dispute resolution movement gathered
force.
Decision to order a reference
[6.10.75] The starting and often finishing point of whether a judge should order a reference
is the overarching purpose. For the Federal Court, assistance is provided by s 37M(2) of
the Access to Justice (Civil Litigation Reforms) Amendment Act 2009 (Cth), which comprises
the following:
(a) the just determination of all proceedings before the Court [justice factor];
(b) the efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available for the
purposes of the Court [efficiency factor];
(c) the efficient disposal of the Court’s overall caseload [efficiency factor];
(d) the disposal of the proceedings in a timely manner [timeliness factor]; and
(e) the resolution of disputes at a cost that is proportionate to the importance and
complexity of the matters in dispute [cost-effectiveness factor] (cp Order 50 of the
Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic)).
However, these factors are not an exclusive list of the considerations to which regard can
be had. They should not be treated as ‘tick box’; an evaluative process must be
undertaken: see Irwin v Irwin [2016] FCA 1565 at [37] per Charlesworth J.
Importantly, in Linke v TT Builders Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 672, an issue arose as to the
appointment of a referee in circumstances of a number of claims for damages and
compensation, including a misleading and deceptive conduct claim under the Australian
Consumer Law, arising out of a building dispute. In forming the conclusion that referral to
a referee was not appropriate, White J observed (at [37]–[44]) that: first, there were some
difficulties in defining discrete issues to be referred to a referee and it was ‘not practical’ to
refer certain claims to a referee; secondly, there was a prospect of the court having to
determine certain matters, which may have caused an overlap with the matters to be
determined by the referee; thirdly, significant weight was given to the attitude of the
parties, being described as ‘important’; fourthly, one party contemplated that ‘the referee
may enlist the assistance of further experts’, but, in his Honour’s view, ‘the engagement of
others in this way does not seem to be contemplated by the terms of s 54A’; fifthly, issues
commonly arise when a court is asked to adopt a report of a referee and, in this regard, his
Honour referred to the decision of the Supreme Court of South Australia in Built Environs
Pty Ltd v Saunders International Ltd (2012) 281 LSJS 183; [2012] SASC 111 as an example of
the kinds of difficulties which can arise on adoption.
[6.10.75] 379
In Kadam v MiiResorts Group 1 Pty Ltd (No 4) (2017) 252 FCR 298; [2017] FCA 1139 at
[61]–[62], Lee J has subsequently observed of the decision of White J that:
First, it is obviously necessary that there be precision at to what is referred to a referee
although, in appropriate circumstances, this does not require only granular questions to be
referred; indeed s 54A(1)(a) of the FCAA expressly contemplates an entire proceeding being
referred to a referee. Secondly, an overlap in the matters to be determined by the Court and
by the referee can be avoided by careful calibration of the orders for reference. Thirdly,
although the attitude of the parties may be a relevant consideration, the notion that the
parties’ views can rise to the level of being some form of veto or barrier has now been
rejected (see [46] above). Fourthly, there is nothing either textually or contextually which
would suggest that a referee is necessarily fettered, in appropriate cases, from enlisting the
‘assistance of further experts’; the involvement of additional experts in the reference depends
on the order for reference and the nature of the reference. Indeed, pursuant to orthodox
orders very regularly made, as specified in the Supreme Court of New South Wales by
adoption of annexure 2 of Practice Note No. SC Eq 3 Supreme Court Equity Division –
Commercial List and Technology and Construction List, references very commonly provide for
a referee, in conducting proceedings under the reference in a manner as will, without
undue formality or delay, enable a just determination, to communicate and engage with
experts retained on behalf of the parties.
Fifthly, his Honour referred to issues that commonly arise when a Court is asked to
adopt a report of a referee. Of course, the seminal judgment as to adoption of a report of a
referee is that of Gleeson CJ in SJP Formwork. In that case, the Chief Justice made plain (at
563–564) that in deciding whether to adopt, vary or reject a report, what is involved is a
judicial discretion to be exercised consistently with both the object and purpose of the
Rules of Court and the wider setting in which they take their place. The very purpose of
the reference procedure is to provide, where the interests of justice dictate, ‘a form of
partial resolution of disputes alternative to orthodox litigation, and it would frustrate that
purpose to allow the reference to be treated as some kind of warm-up for the real contest’.
Of course, if the referee’s report reveals some error of principle, excess of jurisdiction,
patent misapprehension of the evidence, or perversity or manifest unreasonableness in
fact-finding, it will ordinarily be rejected but, critically, the ‘right to be heard does not
involve the right to be heard twice’: see also McDougall J’s distillation of these principles
(with additions) in Chocolate Factory Apartments Ltd v Westpoint Finance Pty Ltd [2005]
NSWSC 784 at [7], which has been applied and approved by intermediate appellate courts
in New South Wales and Victoria, and by this Court: see Cordon Investments Pty Ltd v
Lesdor Properties Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 184; (2013) 29 BCL 329; Illawarra Hotel Company Pty
Ltd v Walton Construction Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 6; (2013) 84 NSWLR 410 at 412–414 [15]
per Barrett JA (Meagher and Ward JJA agreeing); Wenco Industrial Pty Ltd v WW Industries
Pty Ltd [2009] VSCA 191; (2009) 25 VR 119; Shannon (in his capacity as receiver and manager of
North East Wiradjuri Co Limited) v North East Wiradjuri Co Limited (No 3) [2012] FCA 106
(Jacobson J). Of course, it is to be expected that in some cases problems will arise if a
reference is conducted maladroitly or a report has deficiencies, but that is not a reason to
eschew a reference that would, consistently with the mandates of the overarching
purpose, otherwise be appropriate.
In determining whether the relevant position under Indian law should be made the
subject of a reference, Lee J in Kadam reasoned as follows (at [88]–[89]):
• In respect of the justice factor, there was no reason to conclude that the reference would
inhibit the just determination of the proceedings.
• In respect of the efficiency factor, adoption of the reference procedure would amount to
a very efficient use of the judicial and administrative resources available and facilitate
the efficient disposal of the Court’s overall caseload.
• In respect of the timeliness factor, obtaining a report from a referee would take no
longer than the alternative which would require supplementary reports, a conclave and
potentially cross-examination for the experts at hearing.
• In respect of the cost-effectiveness factor, given the counterfactual, there were likely to
be real cost-savings but, at least, there would no additional costs.
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Lee J also took into account the fact that the issue of fact to be determined as to the status
and rights under Indian domestic law was a matter of some difficulty which was not
within the usual range of matters considered by the court (at [90]).
Consent of the parties
[6.10.80] Although court rules often permit a judge of his or her own motion to refer to a
referee, there is often an expectation that both parties will agree. Traditionally, there has
been some hesitation on the part of courts to order a reference where the parties do not
agree, although this approach is now diminishing.
In Park Rail Developments Pty Ltd v RJ Pearce Associates Pty Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 123 at
129–130, Smart J set out that:
Each opposed application [for the appointment of a referee] has to be considered on its
own merits. … The matters which will generally require consideration include:
(a) the suitability of the issues for determination by a referee and the availability of a
suitable referee;
(b) the delay before the court can hear and determine the matter and how quickly a
suitable referee can do so …;
(c) the prejudice the parties will suffer by any delay;
(d) whether the reference will occasion additional costs of significance or is likely to
save costs;
(e) the terms of any reference including the issues and whether they should be
referred for determination or inquiry or [sic] report.
The provisions covering referees in South Australia (Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), ss 65–67;
Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA), r 76) were examined by Debelle J in Leighton Contractors
(SA) Pty Ltd v Hazama Corp (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) 56 SASR 47. The action had been
transferred from the New South Wales Supreme Court, but both parties were agreed on
the benefits of the New South Wales system’s flexibility in the use of referees. A feature of
the South Australian provisions was that the Supreme Court Act allowed the court to
appoint experienced lawyers as referees without the consent of the parties. However,
where the reference was to a technical but non-lawyer referee, the consent of the parties
was required.
In Queensland, the scope of referral to referees was discussed in Everingham v Clarke
[1994] 1 Qd R 34 and with considerable attention to the historical antecedents of the
legislation and rule provisions by Lee J in Netanya Noosa Pty Ltd v Evans Harch
Constructions Pty Ltd (unreported, Queensland Supreme Court, No 381 of 1993, 7 October
1994). His Honour noted (at 12) that the New South Wales provisions and the philosophy
behind them were so dissimilar to the Queensland provisions that ‘no useful comparison
can be made of them’. Under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), reg 501, though,
a court in a proceeding other than a trial by jury is able to refer ‘a question of fact’ to a
‘special referee’ to decide the question, or to give a written opinion on the question to the
court (see also Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 20.14).
In Victoria in Matthews v SPI Electricity (No 19) [2013] VSC 180 at [19], J Forrest J
considered the position determined by Beach J in AT & NR Taylor and Sons Pty Ltd v Brival
Pty Ltd [1982] VR 762, where his Honour held that, where a party does not consent, only
cases of an exceptional nature should have a special referee appointed. However, in
Matthews (No 19), J Forrest J considered that (at [20]): ‘Times have changed, particularly
with the introduction of the [Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic)]. The Court is now obliged
to consider far more than a party’s tactical or forensic position.’
In Matthews (No 19), Beach J made reference to the decision of Kyrou J in Talacko v
Talacko [2009] VSC 98, a case determined prior to the introduction of the Criminal Procedure
Act 2009 (Vic). Kyrou J held that a special referee can be appointed where a party does not
consent to the appointment (at [27]): ‘Although the absence of consent by a party and the
[6.10.80] 381
reasons given for withholding consent are clearly relevant to the exercise of the court’s
power under O 50 of the Rules to appoint a special referee, I am not persuaded that the
power to appoint a special referee over the objection of a party can only be exercised in
special circumstances as suggested by AT & NR Taylor and Sons. O 50 does not contain
such a requirement, and one should not be read into it, so that the discretion conferred by
the rules is not unduly constrained.’
In Matthews (No 19), all of the parties were opposed to the referral of questions to a
special referee. Nevertheless, J Forrest J held that this opposition alone would not preclude
a court from taking the step of appointing a special referee. This series of decisions and
developments led Vickery J in Construction Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd v Adams Consulting
Engineering Pty Ltd (Ruling No 2) [2016] VSC 209 at [19] to conclude that the way had been
opened in Victoria for a ‘wider use of special referees by the Court where it is appropriate
to do so’.
In Matthews (No 19), J Forrest J expressed the following reasons for utilising the
services of a special referee (at [23]–[27]):
First, the cause of the failure is a critical issue in the case. It is to be contrasted to, say, a
referral to a special referee to determine a question of quantum or a side issue. The cause
of the failure and the role played by Aeolian vibration is central to SPI’s putative liability.
In a case in which so much turns upon a resolution of this issue, I think I should be wary
of abdicating responsibility for the determination unless absolutely persuaded as to the
necessity of that course. Given, as I shall discuss in a moment, that I have the alternative
course of seeking the assistance of an assessor or assessors, I think that referral to a special
referee on this matter is less desirable.
Second, it is likely that there will be issues of reliability and credit of one, if not more,
of the expert witnesses. This would then be a factor that a special referee may have to
consider in making a determination. Gauging and determining the effect of such an attack
and the application of Part 3.7 of the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) in an expert witness session
can be difficult for a judge, let alone a legally unqualified expert, no matter how
experienced. Moreover, such attacks may require assessment of evidence given in the trial
and outside the expert evidence session.
Third, the questions will not be solely scientific but will consist of a hybrid of legal and
factual issues. For a special referee determining the issue, he or she would need to
understand the factual scenario and, to an extent, the legal concepts of breach and
causation. These concepts can of course be addressed by way of the questions posed to the
referee but it still leaves a potential problem with the adoption of the report to which I will
return in a moment.
Fourth, a referral to a special referee would have a negative impact in terms of timing
and subsequent fragmentation of the entire trial. At this point in time, the expert evidence
will be heard between October and December this year. In the instance of a referral to a
special referee, the Court and the parties will need to wait until a special referee provides
findings which then, in turn, would need to be considered by the Court. It is not in the
interests of justice to allow the determination of these proceedings to be further delayed.
Finally, there is the question of adoption of the report. In Victoria University of
Technology v Wilson [2006] VSC 186 at [26], Harper J noted some of the problems associated
with adoption of a special referees’ report:
The relevant authorities, which have considerably increased in number since the
lament of Brooking J in Nichols v Stamer, are as one in stressing that, in exercising the
responsibilities vested in him or her, the special referee is not conducting a mere
prelude to further litigation. Although the courts have declined to catalogue the
grounds upon which they may refuse to adopt a special referee’s report, their
discretion to adopt or reject it, in whole or in part, is confined only by the interests of
justice. This will depend upon the particular circumstances attending particular cases.
While r 50.04 includes no guidance to those who must exercise the discretion that it
confers upon them, no judicial discretion may be exercised wilfully. This means that, in
deciding whether or not to adopt or decline to adopt the report of a special referee, the
court must exercise its discretion ‘in a manner consistent with the object and purpose
of the rules and the place they play in the administration of justice according to law.’ If
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the dissatisfied party has identified an error in the law, then because there can be no
implied authority to make such errors, the report may be set aside or remitted. A like
result would normally–if not inevitably–follow if the referee has acted perversely or
unreasonably (as he or she would if his or her decision was against the weight of the
evidence). But a court cannot interfere simply because a number of alternative factual
findings are open, and the special referee has chosen one or more of them rather than
another or others.
In Construction Engineering (Aust) Pty Ltd v Adams Consulting Engineering Pty Ltd (Ruling
No 2) [2016] VSC 209 at [35]–[41], Vickery J set out in detail the reasons why he opted to
appoint an assessor rather than ordering a reference to a special referee.
Status of the referee
[6.10.90] In New South Wales, a referee is neither deemed to be, nor appointed as, an
officer of the court: see Xuereb v Viola (1989) 18 NSWLR 453, where Cole J considered the
history of references in New South Wales. For a contrary view, which Cole J declined to
follow, see Clark Equipment Credit of Australia Ltd v Como Factors Pty Ltd (1988) 14 NSWLR
552 per Powell J.
There is still scope for further development in the law protecting referees and those
who submit to their inquiries. In Victoria, the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) was amended
in 1990 to provide that referees have the same immunities as judges. In New South Wales,
however, rather than receiving legislative attention, the status of the referee has been left
to the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeal was confronted with the issue in Najjar v
Haines (1991) 25 NSWLR 224 (see Tyrril (1992)). In the usual manner, a building dispute
had been sent to a referee. The hearing before the referee took more than 20 days so the
costs were considerable. The court had adopted his report and there was judgment for the
defendant. The defendant was a government department. Some time later, the
unsuccessful plaintiff discovered that at and around the time of the reference, the referee
had links to a company which had commercial dealings with that same defendant
department. Thereupon, the plaintiff sought to have the judgment set aside on the basis
that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.
In the conduct of the appeal, the plaintiff also sought to join the referee as a party to the
proceedings and, if successful on the appeal, to have a costs order against the referee.
Although the plaintiff was successful in having the earlier judgment set aside (for
reasons which are discussed later in this chapter), he was unsuccessful both in seeking to
join the referee and in seeking to recover costs from the referee. The court was unanimous
in finding that, ‘as a matter of policy, at least where there is no question of fraud or good
faith involved, a referee appointed under Pt 72 (now Pt 20, Div 3 of the Uniform Civil
Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)) should be accorded an immunity from action’ (at 250 per
Clarke J). This conclusion was reached following an extensive discussion of overseas
developments, especially in the United Kingdom and in the United States of America, and
comment upon the similarities and differences between arbitrators and court-appointed
referees.
Notwithstanding the calibre of the court in Najjar, being the President and two judges
with extensive experience in the Commercial Division, it would be unwise for any referee
to believe that they are now safe from attack. The judgments do not go as far as that. The
court noted that the apprehension of bias, while sustainable, was a long way from the
strongest instances of that kind. Further, there was no attack upon the actual report; that
is, no-one was attacking the findings and analysis of the referee. Rogers J chose to end his
judgment with these words (at 276), ‘[e]xtending to a referee the immunity of a judge does
not carry the necessary consequence that the referee may not be called upon to return the
fees paid by the parties’, and left this issue as one to be decided on a future occasion.
Unless they receive the benefit of legislative protection, referees are not cloaked or not
with the ‘immunity of a judge’.
[6.10.90] 383
It follows that any referee should ensure that he or she has sufficient professional
indemnity cover to meet any later allegation that the referee was negligent in his or her
conduct of the inquiry, that comprehensive arrangements are made to ensure that the
funds for the referee’sr services are ‘in hand’ before he or she commences work, and that
the referee is especially wary of any step which might open the possibility of he or she
becoming a defendant to a defamation action.
As the approach to the status of a referee can vary from one court to another, before
accepting an appointment as a referee, it is advisable for an expert to take independent
legal advice on the status, the obligations and the protection which the particular court
affords such an appointment.
Reference and arbitration
[6.10.100] The relationship between an arbitration and a possible referee inquiry was
discussed in Aerospatiale Holdings Australia Pty Ltd v Elspan International Ltd (1992) 28
NSWLR 321. Some issues in a commercial dispute had been referred to arbitration;
however, the plaintiff was keen to have the remaining issues determined. An issue was
whether the arbitrator (a former judge) could also be appointed as referee (pursuant to the
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), Pt 72, now Pt 20, Div 3) and determine all the
matters concurrently.
Cole J (at 325–327) held that the rules provided clear power to appoint a person who
was already an arbitrator upon some issues as referee to hear and report upon associated
matters in dispute between the same, and additional, parties. Further, it was appropriate
for the court to fix the hearing of the reference at the same time as the arbitration and to
give directions regarding the conduct of the arbitration. The factors to be considered
before taking such an approach include protection of privacy (if there are additional
parties), proximity between issues and parties to the litigation, any claimed unfairness,
savings of cost and time, and the desire to avoid both the duplication of hearings and the
chance of inconsistent findings of fact or law.
Amending the referee's terms of the reference
[6.10.110] The apparent issues in a case can ebb and flow during a hearing. Evidence that
seemed during preparation to have certain implications takes on a different complexion at
the hearing. Of course, good litigators do their best to identify the issues of fact and law as
early as possible: the pleadings are a first step in structuring the adversarial contest to the
advantage of the pleading party. Similarly, an astute litigator will strive to settle the
questions for determination by the referee in such a way as to put their client in the best
possible light. Unsurprisingly, then, a party may seek some redefinition of the questions
being examined by the referee.
An example of an attempt to redefine the issues came before O’Keefe J in Turner Corp
Ltd v Co-ordinated Industries Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, No 055112/92,
13 July 1993). Following 12 days of hearing by the referee and an interim report on some
issues, the defendant submitted that the court should alter the terms of the reference. The
practical effect would have been to render clearly admissible some evidence which was
disputed under the prevailing terms of the reference.
His Honour noted the clear power to amend the terms and that the exercise of such
power was discretionary. A referee could approach the court for guidance (citing Panaune
Trading Pty Ltd v GB Nathans & Co Pty Ltd (in liq) (unreported, NSW Supreme Court,
Cole J, No 52008/91, 16 September 1992)). However, the usual course for the parties is to
await the end of the reference and then correct any actual injustice when dealing with the
referee’s report. As a matter of principle, O’Keefe J (at p 7) noted that the court usually
will only interfere during a reference with reluctance and so as to secure procedural
fairness or otherwise ensure justice.
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In the instant case, O’Keefe J declined to interfere. Some of his reasons (at pp 7 and 8)
were that the parties had agreed to the terms of the reference; those terms were
appropriate and clear; the referee was competent and experienced; and it was unjust to
allow the amendment at the time.
A different approach applies when the referee is an experienced lawyer. In such cases,
it is usual to empower the referee explicitly to amend the pleadings as seems appropriate.
This may be done by using the ‘usual order’ for a reference or by the customised terms in
a particular reference. An instance of this practice is discussed in AMP Fire & General
Insurance Co Ltd v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, CA
40346 of 1993, 14 July 1993), where Kirby P, for the court, held that the referee had, by the
terms of the order of reference, the power to amend pleadings. In the exercise of that
power, the referee should exercise his or her own independent judgment. His Honour
observed: ‘It would usually be undesirable that an experienced referee should be confined
to pleadings as they stood at the time of the reference, irrespective of any developments
which might occur during the hearing of the reference.’
Calling the referee to give evidence
[6.10.120] The question of whether the referee can be called upon to give evidence, either
oral or upon affidavit, in the main proceedings arose in Telecomputing PCS Pty Ltd v Bridge
Wholesale Acceptance Corp (Aust) Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR 513 at 517. Rogers J was careful to
state that the question as to the appropriateness of the procedure followed in the case
remained open to argument. The referee was informed of various allegations and asked
whether he wished to be joined as a party. The referee chose instead to supply an affidavit
which was read to the court, and to make himself available for cross-examination. (See
also Stannard v Sperway Constructions Pty Ltd [1990] VR 673 at 682.)
In Najjar v Haines (1991) 25 NSWLR 224, the referee opposed being joined as a party,
although he made submissions through his solicitor. The court agreed that he should not
be made a party: judges against whom allegations of bias are made do not become parties
to the proceedings; when prerogative relief is sought, the member named in the
application appears but takes no part in the proceedings. There was, held the court, no
reason to join the referee as a party in the instant case.
Costs
[6.10.130] For the parties, there is both the cost of engaging the referee and the costs of
arguing the case before the referee. These costs will usually be costs in the cause and so
paid for by the eventual loser. Under r 42.1 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005
(NSW), for instance, the court is to order that the costs follow the event unless it appears
to the court that some other order should be made as to the whole or any part of the costs.
It has been noted that the rule ‘speaks for itself. However, judicial exposition has noted
that it means that a person seeking to displace its prima facie effect must show that there
is something out of the ordinary in the case in order to justify the departure’: Hastings
Point Progress Association v Tweed Council [2010] NSWCA 39 at [18] (per Young JA). But
who pays if, ultimately, the referee’s report is not accepted? In Xuereb v Viola (1989) 18
NSWLR 453, Cole J determined that the costs of the non-adopted report of the referee
were likewise to be costs in the cause. He suggested that it would be appropriate to
amend the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW) so that, in suitable cases, that fund could meet
the costs incurred in preparing material that is not utilised. The inapplicability of the
Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 was confirmed in Najjar. This entailed that although the plaintiff
was successful in having the judgment based upon the referee’s report set aside, it seems
to have been a hollow victory as the plaintiff did not recover any costs.
The message has been repeated on a number of occasions. In Argyle Lane Corp Pty Ltd v
Tower Holdings Pty Ltd (1993) 10 BCL 273, the Chief Judge of the Commercial Division
rejected a referee’s report and required the plaintiff to pay the costs, including the costs of
the hearing before the referee and the costs and expenses of the referee. He continued:
[6.10.130] 385
If the reference had been a proceeding before a judge the parties against whom an order
for costs has been made would … be entitled to a certificate under the Suitors’ Fund Act
1951, but … there is no provision which would entitle me to make an order in their favour.
… This … is a serious omission from the legislation. The Court and the public have the
benefit that accrues from matters being referred to referees. A considerable amount of
court time is saved by the adoption of such a procedure. That means that members of the
public who are litigants in other matters and who would not otherwise be able to have
their cases heard quickly, are able to have their case dealt with more expeditiously. That
public benefit is not acknowledged in the legislation
(There is limited scope for a discretionary payment (as of 2012, to a maximum of $10,000
only) pursuant to s 6C of the Suitors’ Fund Act 1951 (NSW).)
Who pays if one or other of those parties which has agreed to meet the costs of the
reference defaults? In Birkai Pty Ltd v Permanent Custodians Ltd (1994) 35 NSWLR 178, the
referee had sent his account to both parties, claiming half of the fee from each. The
defendants paid, but nothing was received from the plaintiff. The applicant referee sought
an order that the plaintiff’s solicitors personally pay the balance of the fees together with
interest.
Before the court, the first question debated was whether the implied promise to pay the
referee’s fees was made by the plaintiff’s solicitors as agents for the plaintiff or by the
solicitors as principals. Brownie J found that he could not infer that the solicitors accepted
responsibility, as principals, to pay the referee’s fees. For further discussion of this issue,
see [5.20.20] and the following paragraphs, below.
However, Brownie J then turned to the resolution of the Law Society of New South
Wales concerning conduct by solicitors when dealing with third parties of whom they are
asking some service on behalf of a client. The relevant text states (at 180):
[T]he solicitor must, at the time of involving the third party, make a clear and
unambiguous arrangement with the third party as to the payment of that party’s fees. The
arrangement must clearly identify the person responsible for payment of the fees and the
time within which the fees are to be paid. If it is intended that a ceiling be placed on the
level of the third party’s fees, this must be specified at the time of engagement.
His Honour noted that the resolution reflects an ethical rather than a legal obligation;
however, after considering the options, he made the order that the plaintiff’s solicitors pay
the balance of the referee’s fees.
The conduct of the referee’s inquiry
Fairness
[6.10.170] In the conduct of an inquiry, the referee must, first and foremost, ensure fairness.
In Telecomputing PCS Pty Ltd v Bridge Wholesale Acceptance Corp (Aust) Ltd (1991) 24
NSWLR 513 at 523, Rogers J explained what this means in practice:
Fairness demands that each party be afforded a proper opportunity of putting before the
referee particulars of the contentions relied upon and an opportunity to comment, not just
on the information adduced by the other side, but also any information on contentious
matters which may have been gathered by the referee. Further it means that a referee
should not form a concluded opinion, or close his or her mind to the contentions of the
parties before all the evidence is in.
A referee must not make use of materials gathered by her or him without advising the
parties as to the use of that material and providing them with the opportunity to make
submissions about it. This requirement of fairness was breached by the referee in Ceccattini
v ICM 2000 Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 1196. In this case, the referee reviewed various files only
after having reached his conclusions. That did not alter the demands of fairness. As
386 [6.10.170]
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Santow J explained (at [29]): ‘The very fact he saw fit to refer to the files means they had a
potential significance … That can be tested by assuming that instead of being confirmatory
they negated a conclusion earlier reached.’
Each party should have the opportunity to comment upon information provided to the
referee by another party. See, eg, Rhodes v Fletcher & Quasar Professionals ACT Pty Ltd [2000]
NSWSC 797 at [18] and Woolf v 52 Birriga Road Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 921 at [26]–[29].
It should come as no surprise that referees must be especially careful to avoid any
suggestion of bias arising from some connection with a party. The pursuit of fairness
dictates that if there is a reasonable apprehension of bias, then the referee should decline
to proceed. Najjar is the leading authority. ‘It is inescapable’, said Kirby J (at 228), ‘that the
rules which govern judicial officers … as to the disclosure of pertinent interests must also
govern referees.’ He continued (at 230): ‘The fundamental requirement of patent neutrality
permits no wavering as far as the obligations to reveal interests in, or associations with, a
party are concerned.’ The various decisions that have examined how the courts are to
approach an inquiry into whether or not there is a reasonable apprehension of bias are
usefully summarised in Najjar. The essence of the decisions is that it is the referee who
should take the responsibility to ensure that there are no grounds upon which an
uninvolved third party might have suspicions about the referee’s impartiality and
independence. In Buttrose v Versi (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Brownie J,
No 3568/90, 20 July 1993), the defendant was concerned that the independence of the
accountant referee was compromised by alleged dealing between the plaintiff and the
accountant’s firm. Brownie J referred to Najjar and to testing the concerns by reference to
the moderately informed observer who knows the actual circumstances of the case.
Applying those tests, he concluded that there was no reasonable apprehension of bias. An
example of a report being rejected for apprehended bias was expressed in the following
terms:
I am satisfied that the Referee, by the fact of the … communications passing between
himself and only one of the parties (irrespective of the content of those communications)
and the opportunity which he gave to only one of the parties to comment upon the draft
Report, has so compromised the integrity of the procedure, and has so contravened the
concept of natural justice, by disregarding the principles of procedural fairness, that he has
given rise to a perception of apprehended bias which, in the interests of natural justice,
requires that the report be rejected.
(See Carbotech-Australia Pty Ltd v Yates [2007] NSWSC 1304 at [33].)

In David v Vamiso Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 326, an application was made to disqualify a
referee because of an alleged friendship with counsel for one party. After considering all
the facts of that relationship, Bergin J dismissed the application.
Extent of cross-examination
[6.10.180] In Beveridge v Dontan Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 13, Rogers J, quoting at length
from Xuereb, among other things, made the following points about the manner in which a
referee should conduct an inquiry: first, that in the light of Pt 72, r 8 (now r 20.20), it is not
correct that a referee should conduct the inquiry as if it were a trial before a judge; second,
that in assessing the opportunity afforded by the referee for cross-examination, the
ultimate test is always whether each party has been given a fair opportunity to put its case
and point of view. Such an assessment should bear in mind the nature of the issues posed
to the referee, the expertise of the referee, the submissions made by the parties, and the
absence or otherwise of a request for an oral hearing and the chance to cross-examine.
[6.10.180] 387
Legal representation
[6.10.190] To what extent does assistance to the referee, and the requirement of fairness,
import the usual expectations of a hearing before a judge? Does it, for example, import a
right to legal representation before the referee? In Triden Properties Ltd v Capita Financial
Group Ltd (1993) 30 NSWLR 403, the New South Wales Court of Appeal held (at 406) that
the powers given by Pt 72 (now Pt 20, Div 3 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005
(NSW)) are ‘beneficial and far reaching … wide enough to authorise an instruction or
direction (by the trial judge) that (the meeting of experts before the referee) be held in the
absence of legal representation’ subject to the following considerations. First (at 408):
[T]here is no principle of law that, in every case where a party may take part in a
proceeding, he may as of right be represented by a lawyer. In the end, a party’s rights in
this regard depend upon the intention of the statute or other document from which the
proceedings originate and the requirements of justice in the circumstances of the case.
Second (at 408), there is:

no reason why, in issues of technicality or expertise, it should not be open to the court to
direct that the report be prepared by an expert, with the assistance of experts and that it
should take the view that representations by lawyers will not assist in the proper
preparation of such a report; it is not accepted that, as a matter of principle, proceedings
directed by the court cannot be directed to be held in the absence of lawyers.
The usual order for reference does not provide for the exclusion of solicitors or counsel for
the parties. However, in Argyle Lane Corp Pty Ltd v Tower Holdings Pty Ltd (1993) 10 BCL
273, the referee misunderstood the reference as being ‘lawyer free’ and ‘being only for
experts’. On that basis, the referee excluded the lawyers for the second defendant. An
examination of the referee’s report and associated documentation revealed that the referee
and the experts were not ad idem on the subject matter of the inquiry or what it was that
the referee was proposing to report upon. His Honour observed (at p 10) that he was ‘left
with a sense of unease about the way in which the hearing proceeded and the way in
which the report is presented’.
The power given to a referee is one which allows the referee to regulate the conduct of
the proceedings: Pt 72, r 8(2)(a) (now r 20.20). However, that freedom does not extend to
excluding what has long been ‘a well recognised right’. His Honour noted (at p 12):
[T]he rules look to a referee having power over the proceedings … rather than in respect
of the rights appertinent [sic] to a hearing, such as the usual right of a party to participate
by a lawyer in adversary proceedings. … Such an approach accord[s] with a policy that a
court determines the right to representation in respect of proceedings commenced in such
court.
Hence, in the absence of a court order excluding legal representation, a reference can only
be ‘lawyer free’ with the express consent of all parties. This is consistent with comments
made by Spigelman CJ and Allsop P in Bellevarde Constructions Pty Ltd v CPC Energy Pty
Ltd [2008] NSWCA 228 at [55]:
It is important … to state how parties should approach the conduct of references. It is for
the parties to make clear what their cases are. In appropriate cases, references are a tool for
the convenient and expeditious conduct and despatch of controversies. Sometimes in
technical matters the referee will not be legally trained. … To effectuate the administration
of justice in accordance with the overriding purpose in s 56 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005,
and to make efficient use of referees, parties are obliged to express with clarity the issues
that they wish to ventilate and upon which the referee will report.
Rules of evidence
[6.10.195] In Xuereb v Viola (1989) 18 NSWLR 453 at [39], Cole J held that referees are able
to conduct proceedings as they see fit and are not bound by the rules of evidence (see too
Super Pty Ltd (formerly known as Leda Constructions Pty Ltd) v SJP Formwork (Aust) Pty Ltd
388 [6.10.190]
Referees | CH 6.10
(1992) 29 NSWLR 549 at 563). Rule 20.20(2)(b) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005
(NSW) explicitly provides that ‘in conducting proceedings under the reference, the referee
is not bound by the rules of evidence but may inform himself or herself in relation to any
matter in such manner as the referee thinks fit’. In addition, r 20.20(3) states that evidence
before the referee may be given orally or in writing, and, if the referee so requires, must be
given on oath or by affidavit.
Task delegation
[6.10.200] The complexity of the issues given to referees is often reflected in the volume of
paperwork to which the referee must refer. The organisation of that supporting
documentation is a task that the referee might well want to delegate. Can this be done? In
Telecomputing PCS Pty Ltd v Bridge Wholesale Acceptance Corp (Aust) Ltd (1991) 24 NSWLR
513, the referee was an accountant. Rogers J found sufficient guidance from earlier
decisions about the extent to which liquidators could delegate tasks associated with their
work. As was said in Ah Toy v Registrar of Companies (1986) 10 FCR 356 at 361–362:
‘Appointees are personally accountable for the conduct of the … liquidation. In their work
they must rely to some extent upon others but it is important that they bring their
personal skills and experience to all significant aspects of the liquidation.’ Referees must
follow the same careful division of labour.
A view
[6.10.210] Referees are entitled to inspect the site, equipment etc which is central to the
dispute. In Hanna v Richmond Properties Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal,
No 40361/90, 15 November 1991), the referee acceded to the invitation of a party to take a
view of a building site. Before taking the view, the referee indicated that upon the view he
would make observations to be included in the transcript and that he would invite the
legal counsel to question him on any observations he made. The court thought that
procedure to be sensible as it assisted clarification and meant that no-one should be taken
by surprise. At the time, however, the parties’ lawyers saw it as an invitation to
cross-examine the referee and, in accordance with the usual custom on a judicial officer
taking a view, declined to say or ask anything. Without expressing a concluded view, the
court noted that the constraints imposed upon judicial officers in conducting a view (see
Scott v Numurkah Corp (1954) 91 CLR 300 at 313–314) do not apply to a referee who is
‘entitled to make such use of a view as he or she considers appropriate provided that
procedural fairness is accorded to the parties’.
Inquiry procedure
[6.10.220] In the conduct of the inquiry, the referee can benefit from the experience of
others and the interest of the legal system to ensure fairness and efficiency. Thus, the
requirements that expert reports be exchanged before hearing have their parallel in the
referee inquiry. And the notion that much can be gained from a round table conference of
the competing experts has been used in both the United States and Australia.
A similar approach has been adopted before referees in New South Wales. Sir Laurence
Street, a former Chief Justice of New South Wales, suggested a standard direction to be
used in arbitrations and references for expert evidence. His purposes are to save time and
to enable the conflicting opinions and the reasons for that conflict to be more fully
understood: see Street (1992). His model direction requires that:
(1) By a given date, the parties exchange the names, fields of expertise, and witness
statements of the experts upon whom they intend to rely.
[6.10.220] 389
(2) The parties thereafter arrange a meeting or meetings of those experts. The object
of the meeting(s) is to identify and report in writing upon where the experts agree
and where they disagree.
(3) To further that object, the parties may be required to furnish more information to
the experts.
(4) The report which is to be provided to the referee shall be accompanied by written
statements from the respective experts which set out each point of disagreement
and the reasons why the expert disagrees with the view propounded by another
expert.
In a manner similar to the usual rules of court, additional expert evidence from someone
who has not participated in these meetings is not permitted. At the hearing before the
referee, each expert, as called, verifies the witness statement, the joint report, and her or
his annexure to that report.
Sir Laurence describes how the arbitrator/referee can chair further discussion among
the experts and how the various parties can have proper opportunity to question the
experts and make submissions. When this procedure is compared with the traditional
ways of a trial, it is obvious that this procedure promotes a much clearer identification and
discussion of the real issues.
The adoption or rejection of the referee’s report by the trial judge
Summary of principles to be applied

[6.10.260] It is not mandatory for a judge to accept the report of a referee. According to
Hansen J in Wallfire Pty Ltd v Andwendrod Services Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 348 at [31]:
It is fundamental that the report of a special referee is a report to the Court, and that it is
for the Court to decide whether to adopt it in whole or in part … If not for the reference,
the question referred is one that a judge would decide in determining the litigation. It is,
therefore, appropriate that the Court retains the power to decide whether the report will
be adopted in whole or in part. The report does not, of itself, operate to determine the
rights of the parties in the proceeding. It has no legal effect as between the parties unless
and until it is adopted and acted on by the Court in the disposition of the proceeding.
In Banabelle Electrical v New South Wales [2005] NSWSC 714, McDougall J, considering the
approach to the court’s adoption or rejection of all or parts of a referee’s report, distilled
the relevant principles from earlier cases as follows (at [9]–[10], emphasis added):
1. An application under Pt 72 r 13 [now r 20.24] is not an appeal either by way of
hearing de novo or by way of rehearing.
2. The discretion to adopt, vary or reject the report is to be exercised in a manner
consistent with both the object and purpose of the rules and the wider setting in
which they take their place. Subject to this, and to what is said in the next two
subparagraphs [3 and 4], it is undesirable to attempt closely to confine the
manner in which the discretion is to be exercised.
3. The purpose of Pt 72 [now Pt 20, Div 3] is to provide, where the interests of
justice so require, a form of partial resolution of disputes alternative to orthodox
litigation, that purpose would be frustrated if the reference were to be treated as
some kind of warm up for the real contest.
4. Insofar as the subject matter of dissatisfaction with a report is a question of law,
or the application of legal standards to established facts, a proper exercise of
discretion requires the judge to consider and determine that matter afresh.
5. Where a report shows a thorough, analytical and scientific approach to the
assessment of the subject matter of the reference, the Court would have a
disposition towards acceptance of the report, for to do otherwise would be to
negate both the purpose and the facility of referring complex technical issues to
independent experts for inquiry and report.
390 [6.10.260]
Referees | CH 6.10
6. If the referee’s report reveals some error of principle, absence or excessive jurisdiction,
patent misapprehension of the evidence or perversity or manifest unreasonableness in fact
finding, that would ordinarily be a reason for rejection. In this context, patent
misapprehension of the evidence refers to a lack of understanding of the evidence
as distinct from the according to particular aspects of it different weight; and
perversity or manifest unreasonableness mean a conclusion that no reasonable
tribunal of fact could have reached. The test denoted by these phrases is more
stringent than ‘unsafe and unsatisfactory’.
7. Generally, the referee’s findings of fact should not be re-agitated in the Court. The
Court will not reconsider disputed questions of fact where there is factual
material sufficient to entitle the referee to reach the conclusions he or she did,
particularly where the disputed questions are in a technical area in which the
referee enjoys an appropriate expertise. Thus, the Court will not ordinarily
interfere with findings of fact by a referee where the referee has based his or her
findings upon a choice between conflicting evidence.
8. The purpose of Pt 72 [now Pt 20, Div 3] would be frustrated if the Court were
required to reconsider disputed questions of fact in circumstances where it is
conceded that there was material on which the conclusions could be based.
9. The Court is entitled to consider the futility and cost of re-litigating an issue
determined by the referee where the parties have had ample opportunity to place
before the referee such evidence and submissions as they desire.
10. Even if it were shown that the Court might have reached a different conclusion in
some respect from that of the referee, it would not be (in the absence of any of the
matters referred to in sub para (6) above) a proper exercise of the discretion
conferred by Pt 72 r 13 [now r 20.24] to allow matters agitated before the referee
to be re-explored so as to lead to qualification or rejection of the report.
11. Referees should give reasons for their opinion so as to enable the parties, the
Court and the disinterested observer to know that the conclusion is not arbitrary,
or influenced by improper considerations; but that it is the result of a process of
logic and the application of a considered mind to the factual circumstances
proved. The reasoning process must be sufficiently disclosed so that the Court
can be satisfied that the conclusions are based upon such an intellectual exercise.
[In Banabelle his Honour concluded (at [113]):

Whilst I accept that the Court does not rehear the matter, and that the adoption
application is not an appeal from the referee, I am nonetheless left in the position that
what I regard as the confusion of concepts evident in the referee’s reasoning on the topic
of ‘delay, disruption and loss of productivity’ is such as to indicate that his analysis does
not possess the degree of logical rigour that is necessary to give me a feeling of comfort
sufficient to warrant adoption. It may be, as Banabelle submitted, that many of the
conclusions in the reasoning process were open to the referee. But what is lacking is an
overall framework of analysis and reasoning sufficient, when coupled with the
appropriate allowance in favour of his findings, and view of the evidence that is dictated
both by his status as referee and his undoubted expertise, to justify adoption.]
12. The right to be heard does not involve the right to be heard twice.
13. A question as to whether there was evidence on which the referee, without
manifest unreasonableness, could have come to the decision to which he or she
did come is not raised ‘by a mere suggestion of factual error such that, if it were
made by a trial judge, an appeal judge would correct it’. The real question is far
more limited: ‘to the situation where it is seriously and reasonably contended that
the referee has reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal of fact could have
reached; that is, a decision that any reasonable referee would have known was
against the evidence and weight of evidence.’
14. Where, although the referee’s reasons on their face appear adequate, the party
challenging the report contends that they are not adequate because there was
very significant evidence against the referee’s findings with which the referee did
[6.10.260] 391
not at all deal, examination of the evidence may be undertaken to show that the
reasons were in fact inadequate because they omitted any reference to significant
evidence.
15. Where the court decides that the reasons are flawed, either on their face or
because they have been shown not to deal with important matters, the court has
a choice. It may decline to adopt the report. Or it may itself look at the detail of
the evidence to decide whether or not the expense of further proceedings before
the referee (which would be the consequence of non adoption) is justified.
His Honour then noted (at [10]) that the 12th point above restates the aphorism of
Mahoney JA in Super Pty Ltd v SJP Formwork (Aust) Pty Ltd [1992] 29 NSWLR 549 at 567.
The 13th, 14th and 15th points are drawn (and include direct quotations) from the
judgment of Hodgson CJ in Eq (with whom Priestley JA agreed and with whom, as to the
relevant principles, Fitzgerald AJ also agreed) in Franks v Berem Constructions Pty Ltd
(unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 2 December 1998). McDougall J regarded what
Hodgson CJ in Eq said as giving content, on the facts of the particular case, to the
operation of relevant principles rather than as stating any new principle.
(McDougall J reiterated the above principles in Chocolate Factory Apartments v Westpoint
Finance [2005] NSWSC 784 at [7]–[8] and in Bestcare Foods v Origin Energy [2012] NSWSC
574.)
In Permanent Trustee Co Ltd v Keogh [1999] NSWSC 967, the plaintiffs won. Thereafter,
the defendants sought indemnity from their insurers. The insurers disputed that they were
liable under the contract of insurance. The issue was referred to a referee, who found
against the insurer. The matter then came back to the court and the insurer successfully
argued that the referee’s report should not be adopted. One of the insurer’s submissions
was that the plaintiffs did not have standing to propose the adoption of the referee’s
report. This flowed from there being no pleadings between the plaintiffs and the insurer
and further because the referee’s report did not deal with any issue between the plaintiffs
and the insurer.
Sully J rejected this submission. His remarks (at [13]) are instructive; however, they are
obiter as it was not clear whether the insurer pressed the submission:
The plaintiffs have an obvious interest in the effective enforcement of their judgment. That
… depends, in significant degree, upon the liability of [the insurer] to indemnify the
[defendants]. The adoption, or the rejection, by this court of the referee’s report has
obvious importance in the resolution of the question whether that liability falls … upon
[the insurer]. Those considerations are sufficient … to dispose of this particular
[submission].
Adequacy of reasons
[6.10.280] The curial system cannot benefit from a reference to a referee unless and until
the expert referee provides the trial judge with a report which comprehensively sets out
the evidence, the analysis and the conclusions in a logical and consistent manner. The
rules require that the referee make a written report to the court and in New South Wales
the referee’s opinion on the matter and reasons for that opinion (Uniform Civil Procedure
Rules 2005 (NSW) r 20.23(1)(a)–(b)). In the absence of such reasons, or faced with a report
which is internally inconsistent, the trial judge will reject the report, as happened in
Xuereb.
The principles justifying adoption of a report are usefully set out in Cape v Maidment
(1991) 98 ACTR 1 at 3–4. Miles CJ, drawing from the earlier decisions of Cole J in Chloride
Batteries Australia Ltd v Glendale Chemical Products Ltd (1989) 17 NSWLR 60 at 67 and in
White Constructions (NT) Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1990) 7 BCL 193, advanced three key
propositions. Each of these is now set out, together with discussion which is drawn from
other decisions which have tested and applied one or more of these propositions.
392 [6.10.280]
Referees | CH 6.10
1. If the report shows a thorough, analytical and scientific approach to the

assessment of the subject matter of the inquiry, the court will have a disposition
towards acceptance of the report, for to do otherwise would negate the purpose of
and the facility of referring complex, technical issues to independent experts for
inquiry and report.
Referees should see themselves as in a similar position to the trial judge, at least to the
extent that the losing party will be looking for sufficient reasons to have the outcome
overturned. A useful guide to the preparation of reasons, just as applicable in a referee’s
report as in a first instance judgment, was provided by Samuels J in Strbak v Newton
(unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 18 July 1989) and quoted by Giles J in Stuart Bros Pty
Ltd v Posei Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, No 55045/91, 9 November 1993) at
p 35. Samuels J said:
[I]t is going too far to suggest that in every case a judge must submit the material before
him or her to the most meticulous analysis and carry into judgment a detailed exposition
of every aspect of the evidence and the arguments. What is necessary … is a basic
explanation of the fundamental reasons which led the judge to his conclusion. There is no
requirement, however, that the reason must incorporate an extended intellectual
dissertation upon the chain of reasoning which authorises the judgment which is given. …
In the present case the reasons are certainly succinct; but that is often to be regarded as a
judicial virtue. Trial judges must always endeavour to balance their duty to explain with
their duty to be brief.
2. A court should not accept a report where it sees any reason to differ from the
referee on any matter of law, or on any questions involving the application of a
legal standard.
This proposition has been confirmed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in
Homebush Abattoir Corp v Bermria Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 605 at 608–609: ‘the court in
deciding what action to take on a referee’s report is both entitled and bound to decide for
itself whether the referee has erred in law and to correct any such error’. The referee in
that case was an ex-judge of the Supreme Court – so the breadth of the Appeal Court’s
finding as an encouragement to relitigate the hearing before any referee, whether technical
expert or experienced in the law and adjudication, should not be underestimated.
For so long as referees were technical experts inquiring into technical issues, it was not
too difficult for trial judges to refuse an application to rehear evidence or, in extreme cases,
to refer part or all of the issue back to the referee or even to another referee. Matters
became more complex as matters of legal construction and interpretation were sent out on
reference to former judges of the court. Issues for these ‘honourable’ referees included
valuations, construction of leases, whether or not there was a binding contract etc. The
parties had the advantage of a quick hearing but there was the sometimes irresistible
temptation for the losing party to oppose the adoption of the report, alleging errors of fact
and/or of law.
Concern about the trend to seek a second hearing within the trial is forthrightly
expressed by Rogers J in Maritime Services Board of NSW v Australian Shipping Commission
(1991) 27 NSWLR 258. The question of the function of the court in relation to referees’
reports impacts crucially on the effective working of the commercial/building and
construction division of the New South Wales Supreme Court (at 272). Indeed, the
development of the use of referees as discussed in this chapter is largely the result of
decisions made by judges sitting in that division. In his Maritime Services Board decision,
Rogers J set out to correct what he clearly viewed as undesirable trends to have the work
of referees, especially the non-technical referees, set at nought by dissatisfied parties
seeking to relitigate part or all of the reference.
The judgment of Rogers J includes some interesting and persuasive historical
background in support of his approach (at 263–266). In particular, his Honour was anxious
[6.10.280] 393
to ensure that the trend of recent case law, as developed in the commercial division of the
court, was not diverted by any further reference to what had been the case under the
Equity Act 1901 (NSW). He refers, inter alia, to the 1972 (sic) decision of Holland J in
Watson v Lazarevic (1991) 22 NSWLR 159 and the judgment of Young J in Hoogerdyk v
Condon (1990) 22 NSWLR 171, in which reference is made to Watson’s case. The latter case
was disapproved by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Super Pty Ltd (formerly
known as Leda Constructions Pty Ltd) v SJP Formwork (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 29 NSWLR 549.
The referee whose report was under attack was not a technical expert but, once again,
a former judge of the court. As in several other disputed referee reports, one or both of the
parties were seeking to draw a distinction between the report of a technical expert referee
and a report by a non-technical referee upon complicated issues of fact and law. The
submission suggested that the latter could be considered afresh by the court. That is, it
would seem that submissions may have acknowledged the court’s now oft-repeated wish
to adopt the reports of technical referees, but argued that the non-technical report was of a
different ilk and demanding of closer attention. It is this suggestion which Rogers J was
anxious to quash. He saw much sense in the remarks of Giles J in Hobartville Stud Pty Ltd
v Union Insurance Co Ltd (1990) 6 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-032 at 76,923 and 76,926: ‘What
is necessary is that the reasons given by a referee for his opinion explain how he arrived at
his conclusion, not only so that the court can properly exercise its function under Part 72
rule 13 [now r 20.24 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)] but also so that the
parties (and any observer) can see that he did so not arbitrarily but by the rational
application of principles to facts.’ When the report was so presented, Rogers J found no
reason for the trial judge to intervene. This approach was consistent with that developed
to respond to attempts to have the court not adopt the report of a technical referee. His
Honour noted (at 272) that ‘it would be unfortunate in the extreme if, what would
effectively be yet another tier in litigation, and what would in all respects be an appellate
review were inserted in the determination of commercial disputes calling for speedy
resolution’.
The ultimate possibilities for attempted ‘relitigation’ inherent in the Court of Appeal’s
Homebush Abattoir formulation were realised in Nine Network Pty Ltd v Kennedy Miller
Television Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, No 40641 of 1993, 8 June 1994). An
issue of the quantification of damages was referred to an ex-judge of the Supreme Court.
In his report, the referee identified the issues which had been isolated by counsel,
canvassed the arguments of fact and law in respect of each issue, made the necessary
findings of fact on the evidence before him, stated his views on the applicable law, and
expressed his conclusion as to the amounts (at p 2).
The referee’s report was adopted by the trial judge. At that time, the appellant declined
to make submissions against adoption of the report but indicated that it would ‘raise its
complaints before the Court of Appeal’. It contended before the Court of Appeal that as
the trial judge had adopted the report, so he had adopted any errors within it and those
could now be explored afresh.
Conclusively rejecting this ploy, the Court of Appeal unanimously held that ‘the proper
course would have been to raise and argue the issues of law before [the trial judge] and
tender any evidence necessary for that purpose’ (at p 10). The Chief Justice noted, ‘if the
[trial] judge’s decision to adopt (or vary or reject) the referee’s report in whole or in part
cannot be shown to be based upon a material error on the part of the judge, then there will
be no ground for attacking the judgment based on that decision’ (at p 11), and ‘[t]he
important point is that it is the judge at first instance who reviews what the referee did;
the Court of Appeal, within the limits of the ordinary rules governing appeals, reviews
what the judge did’ (at p 12). To like effect are the comments of Spigelman CJ and Allsop P
in Bellevarde Constructions Pty Ltd v CPC Energy Pty Ltd [2008] NSWCA 228 to the effect
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that a trial judge, when adopting the recommendations of a referee, is exercising a power
in the nature of a discretion. It is the approach taken by the trial judge and any asserted
error therein that is the subject of the appeal, not the referee’s report itself (at [51]).
Further, because of that discretionary nature, the Court of Appeal ‘is limited to the
correction of error exhibited by the approach of the primary judge constrained by
principles of the kind expressed in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499’ (at [59]). An
application of this approach is the Court of Appeal decision in Illawarra Hotel Company Pty
Ltd v Walton Construction Pty Ltd [2013] NSWCA 6.
3. Where a court is comfortably satisfied that the factual issues have been properly
explored and considered by the referee, the court should adopt the referee’s
findings on fact.
This proposition was confirmed by Giles J, who is quoted by Gleeson CJ in Super Pty Ltd
(formerly known as Leda Constructions Pty Ltd) v SJP Formwork (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 29
NSWLR 549 at 553: ‘As a broad proposition, depending upon the circumstances of each
case, the court will not reconsider disputed questions of fact where there is factual
material sufficient to entitle the referee to reach the conclusions he did, particularly where
the disputed questions are in a technical area where the referee enjoys an appropriate
expertise.’
Gleeson CJ summed up the approach taken by the judges of the commercial division
(at 555):
[They] approached the matter on the basis that he [the trial judge] had a discretionary
decision to make as to whether he adopted the referee’s report in whole or in part, and
that, in making that decision, he, being satisfied that the referee had applied his mind to
the task of fact finding required of him, carefully and in a manner consistent with legal
principle, would not do more than ensure that the referee had addressed the appropriate
questions, and that there was evidence capable of being accepted, which, if accepted,
supported the findings of fact made.
And that approach now has the endorsement of the Court of Appeal (at 563): ‘The
purpose of Pt 72 [now Pt 20, Div 3] is to provide, where the interests of justice so dictate,
a form of partial resolution of disputes alternative to orthodox litigation, and it would
frustrate that purpose to allow the reference to be treated as some kind of warm up for the
real contest.’ As Mahoney J aptly put it in his concurring decision (at 567): ‘The right to be
heard does not involve the right to be heard twice.’
But no matter how clear the principle, there is always another possible line of attack.
For example, there have now been unsuccessful attempts in New South Wales to argue a
federal constitutional issue arising from the trial judge’s adoption of a referee’s report. In
Multicon Engineering Pty Ltd v Federal Airports Corp (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal,
CA 40220/96 CommD 55004/91, 15 October 1997), (extracts are from the judgment of
Mason P) , the appellant, Multicon Engineering Pty Ltd (MCE), contended that the New
South Wales Supreme Court’s power to adopt a referee’s report varies according to
whether or not the court is exercising federal jurisdiction. The respondent Federal Airports
Corporation (FAC) disputed this proposition, as well as the appellant’s right to raise it for
the first time on appeal.
From the start of the proceedings in 1991, the Supreme Court was exercising federal
jurisdiction because of MCE’s claim of breach of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
If the parties were conscious of this, neither they nor the judge saw any need to advert to
it.
At first instance, a judge ruled that the entirety of the proceedings should be referred.
The extent and complexity of the matters in issue caused the proceedings before the
referee to span 205 sitting days. There were 12,500 pages of transcript and 6,590 pages of
[6.10.280] 395
final submissions. Each side was represented by senior and junior counsel. The referee
reported to the court with reasons which covered 267 pages.
The trial judge adopted the report, save for one paragraph. He gave judgment for the
FAC on MCE’s claim and judgment for the FAC in the sum of $1.7 million on its
cross-claim. MCE appealed. Before the Court of Appeal, the relevant grounds of appeal
were:
31. His Honour, exercising federal jurisdiction invested by s 86 of the Trade Practices Act
1974, acted outside power, or erred in law, in failing himself to consider directly the
evidence in the proceedings in relation to disputed factual findings in the report in
accordance with Pt 72 r 13(1)(d) of the Supreme Court Rules [now r 20.24 of the Uniform
Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)] or alternatively, in failing to hear de novo the evidence
relating thereto and in failing to draw his own conclusions from the evidence. This
involves a matter within s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
32. Further or alternatively to para 31, Pt 72 r 13(1)(a) of the Supreme Court Rules [now
r 20.24] is invalid to the extent that it permits the court, when exercising federal
jurisdiction, to adopt a disputed factual finding in a report merely because, in the opinion
of the court, there was material before the referee upon which the finding was open. This
involves a matter within s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
32A. Further to paras 31 and 32, for there to have been a valid exercise of federal
jurisdiction, his Honour should have decided the proceedings for himself on the basis only
of the undisputed factual findings in the report and such further factual findings as his
Honour may have made in the manner referred to in para 31. This involves a matter
within s 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth).
Thus, it was submitted that the judge was obliged to conduct a hearing de novo. His error
was said to be that he approached his role (under r 13) in accordance with the principles
expounded in Super Pty Ltd v SJP Formwork (Aust) Pty Ltd (1992) 29 NSWLR 549.
Specifically, it was contended that the judge erred in considering merely whether it was
open to the referee to make the findings that he did.
The President of the Court of Appeal noted (some references not of present relevance
have been omitted):
Super explains the approach which the court should adopt in addressing an application to
adopt a referee’s report pursuant to Part 72, rule 13 [now r 20.24]. It was held that the
court is at liberty to give substantial deference to the findings and recommendations of the
referee, with power (in the terms of r 13(1)(a)) to adopt the report in whole or in part. That
power must, of course, be exercised fairly, with consciousness of the liberty to reject the
report if the court is not persuaded that the interests of justice require its adoption. The
Court of Appeal expressly rejected the proposition that a party dissatisfied with a referee’s
report is entitled as of right to require the judge acting under rule 13 to reconsider and
determine afresh all issues which that party desires to contest before the judge [see at 562,
566–567]. MCE contends that this liberty is not available in proceedings involving the
exercise of federal jurisdiction, except with the consent of the parties at the time.
To place the constitutional argument in its proper focus, it must be noted that, since the
Supreme Court was exercising federal jurisdiction, Part 72 [now Pt 20, Div 3] did not
apply of its own force. Rather, it applied as ‘surrogate Commonwealth law’, picked up by
s 79 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). It is well established that, when s 79 picks up and
applies State laws in this manner, it does so ‘with their meaning unchanged’.
There being no incompatible federal enactment, the question becomes whether the
Constitution precludes the picking up of Part 72, rule 13(1)(a) [now r 20.24] as expounded
in Super [cf Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 79]. MCE argued that Chapter III of the Constitution
imposes a requirement, which rule 13(1)(a) as expounded in Super contravenes, that the
judicial power of the Commonwealth may not be delegated by a court in which its
exercise is vested unless that court effectively retains the power to determine by hearing
de novo any contested issued of fact or law. Reliance is placed on Harris v Caladine [(1991)
172 CLR 84 at 94–95, 122, 151, 164] and Harrington v Lowe [(1996) 136 ALR 42 at 53].
The respondent, supported by the Attorney General for New South Wales (intervening),
submits that the constitutional argument is misconceived for at least two reasons:
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(1) the principle in Harris does not extend to State courts exercising federal
jurisdiction; and
(2) the powers conferred by rule 13 as construed in Super are compatible with Harris”
non-delegation principle.
For reasons given below, there is powerful support for each of these responses to
MCE’s ‘constitutional argument’, although it is not necessary that this Court rule upon
that argument in this case.
Speaking in Harris about the Constitution’s requirement that a federal court’s
jurisdiction, powers and functions are to be exercised by a court whose members are
judges appointed pursuant to s 72 of the Constitution, Mason CJ and Deane J said (at 94)
that:
the requirement does mean that the judges of the Court do effectively control and
supervise the exercise of its jurisdiction, powers and functions by participating in the
hearing and determination of cases and otherwise by having the capacity to review the
decisions of officers of the Court and other persons to whom jurisdiction, powers and
functions may be delegated.
At issue in Harris was whether the Family Law Rules 2004 retained for the judges of the
Family Court effective control in their function of reviewing any exercise of power
delegated to a Registrar of that Court. The Court’s power when reviewing a Registrar’s
order was stated in the Rules to require the Court to ‘proceed by way of a hearing de novo
[having] regard to the proceedings, including the evidence given … before the …
Registrar, as the case requires’ [Family Law Rules 1984, O 36A, r 7(4)]. The High Court (by
majority) held that this involved no breach of the constitutional prohibition of
non-delegation. The case does not decide the application of the prohibition to State courts,
nor does it establish that nothing short of a right to a hearing de novo is sufficient.
Nevertheless, there is a wealth of differing dicta addressing these issues.
(a) Application of Harris principle in State courts
There are passages in Harris which suggest that the non-delegation principle there
discussed derives from s 72 of the Constitution, which addresses the tenure of judges of
the High Court and of other federal courts created by the Parliament of the
Commonwealth. If s 72 is the critical determinant, then the non-delegation principle
discussed in Harris does not extend to State courts. The Constitution imposes no tenure
requirement for a State court to be a receptacle of invested federal judicial power.
There are indications that some of the justices relied significantly upon s 72 and did
not intend their remarks to apply to State courts [see, eg, at 94 per Mason CJ and Deane J,
at 121 per Dawson J], although only McHugh J seems to have said so expressly [at 157].
On the other hand, there are statements suggesting a contrary view. For example, the
discussion by most of the justices of the catena of cases relating to State courts exercising
federal jurisdiction culminating in The Commonwealth v Hospital Contribution Fund [(1982)
150 CLR 49] was at pains in several places to emphasise the supervision and control of
masters and registrars by the judges of those State courts. It also emerges from a reading
of the judgment of Gaudron J that her Honour does not rest the non-delegation principle
upon s 72, and that she views it as deriving from the broader notion of the judicial power
of the Commonwealth which s 71 vests in various ‘courts’, including State courts.
(b) Extent of effective supervision and control of delegate
While review by way of hearing de novo was sufficient to pass muster for the rule
under challenge in Harris, and while there are statements that mere appellate review was
insufficient, only McHugh J stipulated that the right to a hearing de novo is a necessary
minimum for what Dawson J described as ‘effective supervision and control’. Mason CJ
and Deane J, speaking of the scope of a State court to organise itself in a variety of ways,
saw no difficulty with such a court referring a case or an issue to arbitration or to assessors
for examination and report. [See at 91–92; their remarks at 95 also infer clearly that a
hearing de novo is not essential. See also Brennan J at 111, Gaudron J at 151. See also Kotsis
v Kotsis (1970) 122 CLR 69 at 92–93.] Dawson J appeared to contemplate that the rules
might permissibly limit the evidence admissible in the proceedings on review. [See at 125;
Gaudron J reserved this point (at 153).] Of the majority justices, only McHugh J [at 164]
insisted on a right to a hearing de novo, and he expressly confined it to federal courts [see
at 157].
[6.10.280] 397
The upshot is that, even if Harris applies to State courts, it is doubtful whether the
Super principles would contravene its mandate. It is to be remembered that a referee’s
opinion has no effect unless and until the court chooses to adopt it [Najjar v Haines (1991)
25 NSWLR 224 at 246, 270]. And Super emphasises the breadth of the power of ‘review’
implicit in the power to reject [see Super (1992) 29 NSWLR 549 at 563–564, 567–568]. …
There is much to be said for the view that Part 72 – rule 13 [now r 20.24] in particular –
effectively modifies the common law of judicial evidence, albeit in a manner consistent
with fair procedure and the proper exercise of federal judicial power. It follows that, when
one turns to the application of Super in this particular case, it is far from clear that any
breach of the principles in Harris would be involved even if [the trial judge] had been
sitting as a judge of the Federal Court.
This said, I consider it appropriate that we should follow the practice of avoiding the
determination of constitutional issues unless necessary. The practice has been frequently
stated. [See, eg, Attorney General (NSW) v Brewery Employees’ Union of New South Wales
(1908) 6 CLR 469 at 553–554; Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation (NSW) v WR Moran
Pty Ltd (1939) 61 CLR 735 at 773–774; Lambert v Weichelt (1954) 28 ALJ 282 at 283. See also
Neese v Southern Rwy 350 US 77 at 78 (1955).] Such an approach is judicially economical; it
avoids unnecessary conflict between the judicial and other arms of government, thereby
enhancing the standing of each; and it saves the parties and others from the potentially
irremediable consequences of a determination that is beyond legislative correction. Above
all, the practice reflects the truth that there are times and areas in which judges ‘know too
little to risk the finality of precision’ [Denver Area Educational Telecommunications
Consortium Inc v FCC 135 L Ed 2d 888; 925 (1996) (Souter J)]. These principles apply a
fortiori to an intermediate court of appeal addressing an area of developing High Court
jurisprudence. …
Disputing issues of fact and law

[6.10.290] In Skinner & Edwards (Builders) Pty Ltd v Australian Telecommunications Corp
(1992) 27 NSWLR 567, a dispute arising from a building contract was referred to a referee.
There was a five-day hearing involving seven lawyers and 13 witnesses. The referee wrote
a lengthy report covering the evidence, the credit of witnesses, and the relevant law as to
negligence, contributory negligence, the form of the contract and trade practices. He
recommended a sum that the plaintiff recover from the defendant and apportioned
responsibility among the various parties from which the defendant sought contribution.
All but one of the parties then moved the court to adopt the referee’s report.
The opposition of that one party caused some further 80 pages of submissions and a
half day of hearing in the Supreme Court. Cole J declared himself ‘appalled by this
litigation’ (at 570). After a pithy summation of the legal issues, he continued: ‘Any
application of commercial common sense a year ago … should have produced a
resolution. Instead of such a solution there has been a legal festival comprising a series of
feast days extending over twelve months. I expect that the costs by now exceed the initial
claim.’
Notwithstanding these criticisms of the conduct of the litigation, his Honour then went
on to further define and explain the reasons for which the court might not accept a
referee’s report. Taking up the point of an error of law made by a referee, Cole J noted (at
572F):
[A]n error of law, being the erroneous application, as distinct from mere misstatement, of
incorrect and material legal principle … requires the judge … to intervene. … A finding of
material fact critical to the chain of reasoning … be it factual or legal, when there is absent
any evidence, direct or indirect from which an inference of the found fact may be drawn,
may constitute an error of law requiring judicial intervention.
It has been accepted since the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision in Azzopardi v
Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139 that the question whether there is any
evidence of a particular fact is a question of law. Where there is evidence of the fact then
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the two further questions as to (a) whether and to what extent that evidence should be
accepted; and (b) how far the accepted evidence establishes the fact, are questions of fact:
at 155.
When a court is considering what course to follow regarding a referee’s report, the
court can compare the report with the statements of facts and contentions that each party
to the reference has prepared (see r 8.5). The referee’s reasons for making a particular
finding of fact should appear in the report. If those reasons reasonably lead to the finding
of fact, then the judge may adopt the opinion of the referee without referring to the
evidence. It is not germane that the judge may have reached a different conclusion of fact.
Indeed, the judge may consider primary evidence only when the opinion expressed by a
referee upon the material fact is so much an error as not to be reasonably available and
thus to constitute and result in a miscarriage of justice: at 577A. The parties may put
submissions as to errors of law, including the entire absence of evidence upon a critical
fact – that being a question of law: at 576.
Cole J noted that the effect of Pt 72 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) (now Pt 20,
Div 3 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)) is that the court is invested with a
review, adoptive and supervisory role which is not appellate in nature: at 573F. Any
evidence tendered before the referee is not evidence in the proceedings. So, it is not
evidence before the court when the referee’s report is being considered. ‘It may become
evidence in the action or on the motion for adoption or variation of the referee’s report
only if it is tendered and admitted into evidence by the court’: at 575A.
Severance
[6.10.300] The pragmatic approach to the acceptance or rejection of a referee’s report
extends to an ability to disregard parts of a report while adopting the balance of it. In
Astor Properties Pty Ltd v L’union Des Assurance De Paris (1989) 17 NSWLR 483 at 492, the
trial judge, Cole J, adopted the answers provided by the referees to the referred questions
but specifically declined to adopt referee opinions offered about various witnesses. In
Salama v Pisarek (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Cole J, No 55041/91, 10 September
1992), an objection was taken by one defendant to the adoption of the referee’s report
which followed an inquiry into the causes of defective building. Following argument,
Cole J adopted the report save for one paragraph which specified the proportion of the
liability for which that defendant should be liable. His Honour reserved his consideration
of that part of the report until the question of liability as between the plaintiffs and the
other defendant was resolved.
Further argument and evidence

[6.10.310] What happens when an issue has been overlooked by everyone? In Australian
Development Corp Pty Ltd v White Constructions (ACT) Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Supreme
Court, Giles J, 55041/91, 14 October 1993), the reference, which involved complex issues of
law, was referred to a former judge. There was argument about accepting parts of the
report and one party wished to put points of law and construction which had not been
raised before the referee. Giles J took the view (at p 12) that ‘while no explanation was
given for the failure to put the argument to the referee, there is no reason to think that it
was deliberately withheld; rather, I would infer that the significance to the question on
which the parties were at issue of an aspect of the material before the referee was
overlooked. It seems to me that in the present case, where the report is but a step in the
resolution of the proceedings, the object and purpose of the Rules is best served by taking
the point up’.
In McBeath v Sheldon [1990] ACLD 596, it was argued unsuccessfully that, following the
receipt of a referee’s report, the court should readily give leave to call further evidence
[6.10.310] 399
before it, save in those instances where there is no good reason why such evidence was
not put before the referee. The decision is consistent with the courts’ intentions to ensure
that referral of issues to referees does improve the quality of outcome and the efficiency of
proceedings. Attempts to circumvent the findings of referees, unless very well grounded,
will fail because they are contrary to the fundamental aims of the referee process.
In Italform Pty Ltd v Sangain Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 427, one of the reasons given by the
primary judge for rejecting an argument that the referee’s report should not be adopted
was that the point was not raised with the referee (and it could have been): at [22]. The
Court of Appeal, however, considered that the point was ‘before the referee’: at [48], [50].
However, Macfarlan JA (with whom the other judges agreed) went on to express a
cautionary note:
[T]he circumstances of particular litigation may be such that the absence of a submission
on a point may give rise to an implied admission. In light of the High Court’s emphasis in
Aon Risk Services Ltd v ANU (2009) 239 CLR 175; 83 ALJR 951; [2009] HCA 27 on the
efficient and timely disposal of litigation it may be that courts will be more ready in the
future to make such an implication than they might have been in the past.
In Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v HSH Hotels (Australia) Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1069, a
challenge was made to a referee’s findings on the basis that only one of the experts before
the referee had been cross-examined. The referee found that the cross-examination did not
successfully cross-examine the expert’s views. Thus, the referee had two experts’ opinions
that were in conflict and, although one was cross-examined upon, the ultimate position
was that neither had been effectively challenged. Bergin J held that it was important for
the referee to look at all the evidence and to find the facts. She found no error in the
referee ultimately expressing a preference for one of the experts in such circumstances.
Remittal for further inquiry

[6.10.320] The clear purpose of the referee system is ‘to obtain a report … in the most
efficient, expeditious and least expensive method available’: per Cole J in Xuereb (at 466).
Sometimes that goal requires that a report is referred to the referee, especially when it is
clear that a ‘just result’ cannot be obtained from the process so far. Such a referral back to
the referee occurred in Story v David Sasson & Partner Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Supreme
Court, Rogers J, CommD No 50646/90, 19 June 1991); [1991] ACL Rep 325 NSW 90. His
Honour referred to King v Thomas McKenna Ltd [1991] 1 All ER 653, a decision of the Court
of Appeal on the interpretation of the Arbitration Act 1950 (UK), s 22. The English court
held (at 660–661) that a matter could be remitted to the arbitrator because some aspect of
the dispute which was the subject of the reference had not, due to mishap or
misunderstanding, been considered and adjudicated upon as fully as, or in a manner
which, the parties were entitled to expect.
In Stuart Bros Pty Ltd v Posei Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, No 55045/91,
9 November 1993), a 35-day reference on a building dispute was followed by four days of
argument before Giles J as to which parts of the referee’s report were to be accepted. One
of the issues before the referee was the calculation of the plaintiff builder’s head office
overheads during the project. Following discussion of the evidence led before the referee
and what the referee had to say about this issue in the report, Giles J held: ‘In my opinion
a further report is required in which the referee reveals his reasons more fully and, to the
extent to which he may not have fully appreciated the need to address whether he was
satisfied that there had been actual loss, finds whether or not he is so satisfied’ (at
pp 21–22).
Another disputed issue was the valuation of variations. Giles J observed (at p 26): ‘If
the referee’s reasons in relation to entitlement to head office overheads were economical,
these reasons are positively miserly.’ He continued: ‘The referee’s reasons are not only
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sparse but also internally inconsistent.’ Accordingly (at p 28), ‘remission to the referee will
be necessary for a further report upon the valuation of the variations remaining in issue’.
His Honour saw no difficulty in referring these matters back to the referee for further
inquiry and report. He rejected the submission that the report should be rejected, seeing
no reason for such a course.
Implications of widespread challenge

[6.10.330] The expected benefits from the use of referees include, among other things,
technical expertise and quicker dispute resolution. However, these benefits are illusory if
the referee’s inquiry and report can be relitigated before the trial judge. In the cases
discussed above, it is apparent that judges, especially those who have encouraged the use
of referees, have discouraged attempts to circumvent the findings of a referee, while at the
same time making clear that referees must produce reports which demonstrate an
impartial, comprehensive and skilled approach to the reference topic.
[6.10.330] 401
Chapter 6.12
SINGLE JOINT EXPERTS

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [6.12.01]
Single expert regimes ........................................................................................................... [6.12.40]
The Australian Family Court regime ............................................................................... [6.12.80]
The New South Wales regime ............................................................................................ [6.12.120]
The Queensland regime ....................................................................................................... [6.12.160]
The Victorian regime ............................................................................................................ [6.12.200]
Appointment of further experts ......................................................................................... [6.12.240]
‘To our age anything Delphic is anathema. We want the
definite. As certainly as ours is a time of the expert and
technician, we are living under a dynasty of the intellect, and
the aim of the intellect is not to wonder and love and grow
wise about life, but to control it.’
Harold C Goddard, The Meaning of Shakespeare (1951), Vol 1, p11.
Introduction
[6.12.01] The use of single joint experts appointed by both parties has its origins in
realignments of the processes for the forensic use of expert evidence in civil matters in the
United Kingdom as a result of the Woolf Report. The Woolf single expert model has been
emulated in a number of jurisdictions in subsequent years, including in Hong Kong (see
Seun and Chung (2008); Peace Mark Holdings Pty Ltd (In liq) v Patrick [2017] HKCU 2782;
[2017] HKCFI 1934) and parts of Australia.
This chapter identifies both the core characteristics of single joint expert schemes and
the case law that has applied and interpreted them. It also makes reference to the
controversies that attach to the use of single joint expert regimes, identifying the
fundamental issues for litigant autonomy raised by inhibitions upon how parties are
permitted to conduct their civil litigation under such schemes.
Single expert regimes

[6.12.40] Court rules and regulations in the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and in a number
of Australian jurisdictions, most notably that of the Family Court, have implemented
regimes under which there is a presumption that a singe joint expert will give evidence to
the court and that other experts will generally not be permitted to give evidence in civil
disputes. The genesis arose in Lord Woolf’s final report on Access to Justice in 1996 where
he wrote:
I do not think it would be appropriate to specify particular areas of litigation where a
single expert should or should not be used. There are in all areas some large, complex and
strongly contested cases where the full adversarial system, including oral cross-
examination of opposing experts on particular issues, is the best way of producing a just
result. That will apply particularly to issues on which there are several tenable schools of
thought, or where the boundaries of knowledge are being extended. It does not, however,
apply to all cases. As a general principle, I believe that single experts should be used
wherever the case (or the issue) is concerned with a substantially established area of
knowledge and where it is not necessary fort the court directly to sample a range of
opinions. The expert’s duty to the court will require him to set out in his report his view of
the range of possible opinions. Too often under the present regime the experts are in fact
agreed upon the range of opinion, but their reports only set out the extreme positions.
The outcome of Lord Woolf’s report was the introduction in 1999 of major amendments to
the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) (CPR), enabling the parties to instruct a single joint
expert but with the court having power to impose such an expert, even if such a course
was contrary to the parties’ wishes (CPR, r 35.7(1)). Hodgkinson and James (2015, at p152)
[6.12.40] 403
have properly described the innovation as ‘radical’. When considering whether the court
should give permission to rely on expert evidence and whether it should be from a single
joint expert, the court is obliged to take into account all the circumstances, in particular,
whether:
(a) it is proportionate to have separate experts for each party on a particular issue
with reference to:
(i) the amount in dispute;
(ii) the importance to the parties; and
(iii) the complexity of the issue;
(b) the instruction of a single joint expert is likely to assist the parties and the court to
resolve the issue more speedily and in a more cost-effective way than separately
instructed experts;
(c) expert evidence is to be given on the issue of liability, causation or quantum;
(d) the expert evidence falls within a substantially established area of knowledge
which is unlikely to be in dispute or there is likely to be a range of expert opinion;
(e) a party has already instructed an expert on the issue in question and whether or
not that was done in compliance with any practice direction or relevant pre-action
protocol;
(f) questions put in accordance with rule 35.6 are likely to remove the need for the
other party to instruct an expert if one party has already instructed an expert;
(g) questions put to a single joint expert may not conclusively deal with all issues that
may require testing prior to trial; and
(h) a conference may be required with the legal representatives, experts and other
witnesses which may make instruction of a single joint expert impractical.
Under the English single expert regime permission for a change of expert will only be
granted where a party establishes there is a ‘good reason’ to do so: the mere fact that an
expert has altered their view is not enough: Stallwood v David [2006] EWHC 2600; Guntrip
v Cheney Coaches Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 392. If that is to occur, courts generally require
disclosure of a previous expert’s report as a precondition (see Edwards-Tubb v JD
Wetherspoon [2011] EWCA Civ 136).
The single expert regime solution is controversial (see Downes (2005); Freckelton
(2019a)) in substantial part because inherently it encroaches significantly upon the
autonomy of parties to run their cases as they wish. In the era of increasingly assertive
court management of cases, parties certainly do not have complete autonomy over the
conduct of their cases. There are other, transcendent considerations. However, the removal
from parties of the entitlement to select experts and to call them, even though their reports
and their evidence comply with the exclusionary rules of evidence, is a significant step. It
risks depriving parties of the confidence that they have been able to put their case to the
best of their ability and in accordance with what they understand to be the views of
persons with specialised knowledge who support their position.
In addition, giving to the one expert the status of being the ‘single joint expert’ endows
them with a potent influence on the outcome of proceedings and rests upon the fallacy
that there is one answer to what can be complex questions, upon which reasonable
practitioners properly have different perspectives. It does not necessarily follow from an
expert ultimately being agreed upon as the ‘single joint expert’ that they are representative
of the community of views within their discipline.
In addition, there has been some suggestion that single expert regimes do not wholly
achieve their objectives because at least a percentage of parties employ shadow experts to
check and comment on the single joint expert’s opinions and provide questions which
should be raised with them. It has also been suggested that there is the risk that a matter
404 [6.12.40]
Single joint experts | CH 6.12
can degenerate into a type of ‘arms race in which, faced with unwelcome opinions from a
joint expert parties will seek to appoint a more senior peer to attempt to influence a single
joint expert to agree with their position.’ Finally, there are inhibitions on the entitlements
of parties to have conferences with single joint experts (Horne and Mullen (2013, 4.5.5)).
Finally the single joint expert regime still permits the application for other experts to be
called, leaving open to considerable and fraught disputation whether the interests of
justice or a specific consideration justifies the calling by a party or parties of an
‘adversarial expert’ or a further joint expert.
The Australian Family Court regime

[6.12.80] The current Family Court regime for single expert witnesses has its genesis in the
recommendations advanced in the 2002 discussion paper by the Family Court, The
Changing Face of the Expert Witness. A party before the Family Court of Australia is able
seek permission to tender a report or adduce evidence from an expert witness by filing an
Application in a Case. A party doing so must, at the same time, file an affidavit stating the
facts relied on in support of the orders sought and such an affidavit must state:
(a) whether the party has attempted to agree on the appointment of a single expert
witness with the other party and, if not, why not;
(b) the name of the expert witness;
(c) the issue about which the expert witness’s evidence is to be given;
(d) the reason the expert evidence is necessary in relation to that issue;
(e) the field in which the expert witness is expert;
(f) the expert witness’s training, study or experience that qualifies the expert witness
as having specialised knowledge on the issue; and
(g) whether there is any previous connection between the expert witness and the
party.
When considering whether to permit a party to tender a report or adduce evidence from
an expert witness, the court may take into account:
(a) the purpose of this Part (see rule 15.42);
(b) the impact of the appointment of an expert witness on the costs of the case;
(c) the likelihood of the appointment expediting or delaying the case;
(d) the complexity of the issues in the case;
(e) whether the evidence should be given by a single expert witness rather than an
expert witness appointed by one party only; and
(f) whether the expert witness has specialised knowledge, based on the person’s
training, study or experience:
(i) relevant to the issue on which evidence is to be given; and
(ii) appropriate to the value, complexity and importance of the case.
If the court grants a party permission to tender a report or adduce evidence from an
expert witness, the permission is limited to the expert witness named, and the field of
expertise stated, in the order (Family Law Rules 2004 Rule 15.52(3)).
Where a party wishes to cross-examine a single expert witness at a hearing or a trial,
they must inform the expert of the requirement for them to attend court in writing at least
14 days before (Rule 15.50).
Under Rule 15.51 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) a party is obliged to apply for the
court’s permission to tender a report or adduce at hearing or trial from an expert witness.
However, there is an exception for single expert witnesses. In Royce v Donovan [2012]
FamCA 168 at [82] Kent J observed that:
[6.12.80] 405
In any case where a single expert has been appointed, allowing another party to tender
evidence from another expert on the same issues creates an imbalance. That is, only one
party may have what may be described as an adversarial expert, whilst the other party
has only the evidence of the single expert who has acted within the constraints, in terms of
instructions, as provided for in the Rules.
In Hoffman v Barone [2014] Fam CA 52 at [94]-[100] Faulks DCJ helpfully summarised the
Family Court’s expectations of single expert witnesses:
The task of a single expert witness is never easy. The opportunities for observation and
a single expert witness faces challenges to his or her opinion. It is important therefore that
single expert witnesses follow the pathway prescribed by authority to prepare and present
his or her report.
knowledge.
single expert witness.
The New South Wales regime

[6.12.120] In New South Wales the court has a discretion to order that an expert be
engaged jointly by the parties, and may make directions in respect of the selection and
engagement of the parties’ single expert, the instructions to be given to the expert, and the
remuneration of the expert. A direction must be obtained ‘promptly’ from the court before
expert evidence is adduced, except in professional negligence cases (Uniform Civil
Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 31.19; Supreme Court Practice Note, SC CL 7) and unless the
court otherwise orders, expert evidence cannot be adduced at trial: (a) unless directions
have been sought in accordance with this rule, and (b) if any such directions have been
given by the court, otherwise than in accordance with those directions.
The parties may seek clarification of the single expert’s report, may cross-examine the
expert, but are not entitled to adduce other expert evidence unless the court orders
otherwise (Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 31.37–31.45).
Practice Note Gen 10 (2005) provides that a ‘single expert direction’, when made in
those terms, means that the following directions are to be taken as having been made,
with such variations as may be specified at that time or subsequently:
Any expert evidence is confined to that of a single expert witness in relation to any one
head of damages, including but not limited to the nature, extent and cost of required
nursing care or domestic care (including claims under Griffiths v Kerkmeyer and under
Sullivan v Gordon), physiotherapy, speech therapy, home modification, motor vehicle or
aids and equipment, being evidence of the kind customarily given (by way of example) by
406 [6.12.120]
rehabilitation consultants, occupational therapists, nursing and domestic care providers,

architects, builders, motor vehicle consultants, and by aids and equipment suppliers.
(a) Evidence may be provided by the same single expert in relation to more than one
head of damages provided the expert is appropriately qualified. It is
contemplated, however, that there may be a number of single expert witnesses
retained or appointed in the one proceedings.
(b) In relation to any head of damages as to which any party wishes expert evidence
to be adduced, the parties are to agree on a single expert to be retained and are to
obtain the concurrence of the expert within 14 days from a date specified in the
order as the commencement date of the direction, otherwise within 14 days from
the making of the direction.
(c) Failing agreement and concurrence within that time, the parties are to notify the
court forthwith, and the court will, pursuant to Pt 39, appoint a court expert to be
the single expert.
(d) Within 14 days from the selection or appointment of a single expert witness, the
parties are to brief the expert, in such manner as the parties may agree, with
materials sufficient to enable the expert to prepare a report. If the parties do not
so agree, they are to notify the court forthwith and the court will give directions
as to how the single expert witness is to be briefed.
(e) If the parties agree or the single expert witness so requests, the plaintiff in the
proceedings is to submit to clinical examination by the single expert witness.
(f) Within 21 days from the date on which a single expert witness is so briefed, the
expert is to send his or her report to each of the parties to the proceedings,
through their legal representatives.
(g) A single expert witness may be requested to provide a supplementary report
taking into account any new or omitted factual material. The provisions of this
practice note apply to such a supplementary report mutatis mutandis.
(h) Any party may, within 14 days from receipt of the report, put a maximum of 10
written questions to the expert, but for the purpose only of clarifying matters in
the report unless the court otherwise grants leave. The expert is to answer the
questions within 14 days.
(i) The report of a single expert witness and any question put to the expert and the
expert’s answer thereto may be tendered by any party at the trial subject to all
just exceptions.
(j) A single expert witness may be cross-examined at the trial by any party.
(k) A single expert witness’s fee for preparation of the report and any supplementary
report and for attending court, if required to do so, is to be paid by the parties
equally, subject to other agreement or direction and subject to any later order
concerning the costs of the proceedings. A single expert witness’s fee for
answering questions put by a party is to be paid by the party, subject to the same
qualification.
(l) A single expert witness may apply to the court for directions.
Nothing in this practice note is intended to require the retaining or appointment of a
single expert witness in relation to liability, the nature or extent of injury or disability, or
the causation of injury or disability.
The Queensland regime

[6.12.160] Under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR) have amongst the
purposes of the provisions relating to expert evidence to ‘ensure that, if practicable and
without compromising the interests of justice, expert evidence is given on an issue in a
proceeding bv a single expert agreed to by the parties or appointed by the court’ (UCPR,
r 423(b)). Such an expert may be appointed by the parties if they and the expert agree
(UCPR, r 429H(1)) or, if the parties cannot agree, by the court (UCPR, r 429I) upon
application in writing by a party naming at least three experts who are prepared to be
[6.12.160] 407
appointed (UCPR, r 429I). In deciding whether to appoint an expert in relation to an issue

in a proceeding the court is entitled to consider:
(a) the complexity of the issue; and
(b) the impact of the appointment on the costs of the proceeding; and
(c) the likelihood of the appointment expediting or delaying the trial of the
proceeding; and
(d) the interests of justice; and
(e) any other relevant consideration. (UCPR, r 429K(1)).
When a court appoints an expert, they are to be the only expert in the proceeding on the
issue (UCPR, r 429N(2)) but on application, or on its own initiative, it may appoint
another expert in relation to an issue if, after receiving the report of the expert originally
appointed, it is satisfied there is expert opinion, different from the first expert’s opinion,
that is or may be material to deciding the issue; or the other expert knows of matters, not
known by the first expert, that are or may be material to deciding the issue; or there are
other special circumstances (UCPR, r 429N(3)). There are comparable processes for
appointment of an expert by disputants before a proceeding is started (UCPR, r 429) or on
application by a party by the court (UCPR, r 429S).
The Victorian regime

[6.12.200] In Victoria the option of a single joint expert is but one of the options available
for a court in a civil proceeding. Under s 65L(2) of the Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) (CPA)
a court can make an order for a single joint expert at any stage of a proceeding. In making
such an order it is obliged to consider:
(a) whether the engagement of 2 or more expert witnesses would be disproportionate
to—
(i) the complexity or importance of the issues in dispute; and
(ii) the amount in dispute in the proceeding;
(b) whether the issue falls within a substantially established area of knowledge;
(c) whether it is necessary for the court to have a range of expert opinion;
(d) the likelihood of the engagement expediting or delaying the trial;
(e) any other relevant consideration. (CPA s 65L(3)).
Such an expert is selected by agreement between the parties or, if there is no agreement,
by a direction of the court (CPA s 65L(4)).
Appointment of further experts

[6.12.240] The potential exists in most scenarios for a further expert to be permitted
subsequent to the receipt of a single joint expert report. This is a regular issue of conflict
between parties and of applications to the court. As Lord Chief Justice Woolf commented
in Daniels v Walker [2000] 1 WLR 1382; [2000] EWCA Civ 508 at [28]:
In a substantial case such as this, the correct approach is to regard the instruction of an
expert jointly by the parties is the first step in obtaining expert evidence on a particular
issue. It is to be hoped that in the majority of cases it will not only be the first step but the
last step. If, having obtained a joint expert’s report, a party, for reasons which are not
fanciful, wishes to obtain further information before making a decision as to whether or
not there is a particular party (or indeed the whole) of the expert’s report which he or she
may wish to challenge, then they should, subject to the discretion of the court, be
permitted to obtain that evidence.
However, he made the point (at [29]) that:
408 [6.12.200]
In the majority of cases, the sensible approach will not be to ask the court straight away to
allow the dissatisfied party to call a second expert. In many cases it would be wrong to
make a decision until one is in a position to consider the position in the round. You cannot
make generalisations, but in a case where there is a modest sum involved a court may take
a more rigorous approach. It may be said in a case where there is a modest amount
involved that it would be disproportionate to obtain a second report in any circumstances.
At most what should be allowed is merely to put a question to the expert who has already
prepared a report.
He observed too that the advantage in utilising the joint expert system at the outset is that
‘in the majority of cases it will have the effect of narrowing the issues.’ (at [32]) In Cosgrove
v Pattison [2000] All ER 1387-1388 Neuberger J identified as relevant considerations that in
the majority of cases, the sensible approach will not be to ask the court straight away to
allow the dissatisfied party to call a second expert: ‘In many cases it would be wrong to
make a decision until one is in a position to consider the position in the round. You cannot
make generalisations, but in a case where there is a modest sum involved a court may take
a more rigorous approach. It may be said in a case where there is a modest amount
involved that it would be disproportionate to obtain a second report in any circumstances.
At most what should be allowed is merely to put a question to the expert who has already
prepared a report.’
In Bulic v Harwoods [2012] EWHC 3657 at [15] (QB) Eady J rejected the proposition that
there is a rigid test: ‘No straitjackets were intended. In referring simply to requiring a
“good reason”, [Lord Woolf] was clearly recognising a need for flexibility. What is a “good
reason” in one case may prove quite inadequate in another. None of these judicial
observations, uttered in the context of applying broad principles to very specific factual
circumstances, should detract from the breadth of the court’s discretion or from the
general terms in which the guidance was given in the earlier cases.’ He emphasised the
transcendent importance of the interests of justice and commented (at [39]) that he was:
unable to derive, from Daniels or any of the other cases cited, anything approaching a
general principle to the effect that, in claims of less than a certain monetary value, the
court should decline to allow a litigant to engage his own expert evidence where he has
lost confidence in a single joint expert – especially where the expert evidence is of a
technical nature which is likely to be determinative of the case on liability. Yet the Judge
thought it appropriate to decide specifically whether this was a ‘substantial’ case. Having
decided that it was not, he seems to have treated it as a significant factor in refusing the
application. No doubt it was relevant, but it should not have assumed such importance. In
my judgment, he should have allowed in Dr Stinton’s evidence because it was technical
and far from ‘peripheral’. I believe that this is what the overriding objective required –
whether the Judge assessed the value of the claim as ‘substantial’ or not.
(See too Roadrunner Properties Ltd v Dean [2003] EWCA Civ 1816).
There is Australian law on the issue, largely to a similar effect. The fact that there exist
differences of opinion on an issue is not enough to justify the appointment of another
expert witness when a joint expert witness has been appointed (see eg D v S [2009] QSC
446). As was observed by Biscoe J in Walker Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore
Authority [2008] NSWLEC 282 at [33], ‘Large differences of opinion between valuation
experts are, unfortunately, a common occurrence in this court. The solution does not lie in
permitting the parties to call more valuation experts to join the fray.’
Further, as Beazley JA observed in Owners of Strata Plan 58577 v Banmor Development
Finance Pty Ltd [2006] NSWCA 325 at [2], there needs to be a balance. On the one hand, it
is necessary to consider principles of case management and the need for expeditious
resolution of disputes. On the other hand, it is necessary to ensure, so far as possible, that
disputes are resolved so as to provide justice according to law to the parties to the dispute.
(see too Carpentaria Gold Pty Ltd v Hood [2015] QLC 36).
[6.12.240] 409
In the New South Wales Supreme Court Brereton J in Tomko v Tomko [2007] NSWSC
1486 at [9] observed that where some arguable basis is shown for challenging the report of
a single expert, a court should be disposed to grant leave lest trial by judge be supplanted
by trial by single expert. In the most authoritative analysis of the relevant principles thus
far, Wu v Statewide Developments Pty Ltd [2009] NSWSC 587 at [17], his Honour reviewed
the case law and identified three guidelines relating to the exercise of the discretion
whether to grant leave under r 31.44:
These cases establish, at least as guidelines, the following:
• An order for a single expert is a first step, not necessarily the last word on the topic.
While the magnitude of the case will influence the court’s willingness to permit further
reports, having regard to considerations of proportionality, the process was not
intended to substitute trial by expert for trial by court.
• It will be a significant factor in favour of permitting further expert evidence if the
existence of a competing respective expert opinion can be shown.
• It will be a significant factor in favour of permitting further expert evidence if
otherwise the party affected would have a legitimate sense of grievance that it had not
be permitted to advance its case at trial. (see too Coyne v Calabro [2009] NSWSC 1023 at
[12] per White J; Carpentaria Gold Pty Ltd v Hood [2015] QLC 36)
410 [6.12.240]
Chapter 6.15
CONCLAVES/JOINT CONFERENCES
OF EXPERTS
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [6.15.01]
Purpose of expert conclaves ................................................................................................ [6.15.40]
Role of lawyers ...................................................................................................................... [6.15.80]
Designation of issues for expert conclaves ....................................................................... [6.15.120]
Materials to be provided ...................................................................................................... [6.15.160]
Role of a moderator/facilitator .......................................................................................... [6.15.200]
Role of a scribe ...................................................................................................................... [6.15.240]
Role of experts ....................................................................................................................... [6.15.280]
Confidentiality of discussions ............................................................................................. [6.15.320]
The joint report ...................................................................................................................... [6.15.360]
Immunity for a conclave ...................................................................................................... [6.15.400]
Preparation for a conclave ................................................................................................... [6.15.440]
Pre-trial expert meetings in criminal matters .................................................................. [6.15.480]
Controversies about conclaves ............................................................................................ [6.15.520]
The future ............................................................................................................................... [6.15.560]
‘An expert is somebody who is more than 50 miles from

home, has no responsibility for implementing the advice he
gives, and shows slides.’
Edwin Meese.
Introduction
[6.15.01] The practice of experts convening pre-trial to identify those matters upon which
they agree and those upon which they disagree is described as a ‘conclave of experts’ or a
‘joint conference of experts’. It is a procedure that is being utilised increasingly in many
countries in both civil and criminal matters. In Tinnock v Murrumbidgee Local Health District
[2015] NSWSC 151 at [9], Garling J observed that:
Conclaves of experts are, in my view, an essential element in the just, quick and cheap
disposition of the real issues in cases such as the present. I am acutely conscious that they
are not easy to organise nor are they always cheap. However, the benefit to be obtained
from joint opinions arising from conclaves is, in my view, usually significant.
(See too Cockburn and Madden (2015).)

To similar effect, Meintjes-Van der Walt (2003, p 361) in South Africa has argued
strongly for conclaves and has contended that ‘[p]re-trial meetings between experts could
contribute to consensus-delineation, leaving only disputed issues for trial’. Amendments
to Federal Courts Rules in Canada in 2010 and to the Criminal Procedure Rules (Eng & Wales)
have also enabled such meetings (see Bobker (2011); Arnold and Soriano (2014)).
This chapter reviews the practice of conclaves of experts and concurrent evidence
internationally, concentrating on Australia and New Zealand, and analyses a cross-section
of examples of cases in which such evidence has been given.
Purpose of expert conclaves

[6.15.40] At the heart of the development of conclaves of expert witnesses is an attempt
procedurally to clarify those matters which are authentically in dispute and thereby to
enhance the quality of justice and reduce its costs. In Hudson v Howes [2010] NSWSC 1503
at [2], Garling J described the purposes of a joint conference of experts as to:
(a) minimise the areas of disagreement between the experts about their opinions, and
maximise the areas of agreement;
[6.15.40] 411
(b) enable the production of a joint expert report which records the areas of
agreement and of disagreement, together with a short statement from each expert
as to their respective opinions on the issues which are not agreed; and
(c) … enable the concurrent evidence of the experts to proceed in an orderly and
efficient manner.
Clause 5 of Practice Note SC Gen 11, ‘Joint Conferences of Expert Witnesses’, of the New
South Wales Supreme Court, provides as follows:
Objectives of joint conferences
5. The objectives of such directions for a joint conference of experts include the
following:
• the just, quick and cost effective disposal of the proceedings;
• the identification and narrowing of issues in the proceedings during
preparation for such a conference and by discussion between the experts at the
conference. The joint report may be tendered by consent as evidence of
matters agreed and/or to identify and limit the issues on which contested
expert evidence will be called;
• the consequential shortening of the trial and enhanced prospects of settlement;
• apprising the Court of the issues for determination;
• binding experts to their position on issues, thereby enhancing certainty as to
how the expert evidence will come out at the trial. (The joint report may, if
necessary, be used in cross-examination of a participating expert called at the
trial who seeks to depart from what was agreed); and
• avoiding or reducing the need for experts to attend court to give evidence.
The Guidelines for Expert Evidence in the Land Court of Queensland, issued on 30 April
2018, similarly provide that:
35. The purpose of a meeting of experts is for the expert witnesses to discuss, clarify,
and perhaps find areas of agreement about their evidence on an issue for the
hearing and to prepare a joint expert report that –
a) addresses all the issues they are requested to give evidence about;
b) explains clearly their assumptions, methodologies, and conclusions and
where they differ;
c) considers the consequences of those differences for their opinion; and
d) explains clearly the differences in their conclusions and the reasons for
those differences.
Expert conclaves can serve the purposes of encouraging constructive settlement

negotiations and making the conduct of the trial more efficient if settlement negotiations
fail (Gerber and Serra (2011)). They can also promote a collegiate environment in which
experts can identify their role more clearly as one of assisting the court rather than
advocating for a party’s case (Hughston and Jowett (2014)).
However, there are circumstances in which no useful outcome is likely from a joint
conference of experts and courts have determined that a conclave would constitute an
unhelpful additional expenditure of time and expense. For instance, in Spasovic v Sydney
Adventist Hospital [2002] NSWSC 164 at [32], Studdert J concluded that, having regard to
the fact that there were alternative explanations of what factually had occurred at the
defendant hospital at the relevant time, it was ‘unlikely that opinions expressed on two
different assumed histories will assist in early resolution of this case or the various
questions suggested for consideration. There are, in addition, significant underlying
differences in medical opinion between the experts’. He found that there was no
reasonable expectation that a conference of experts would result in agreement on any of
the issues put forward for consideration and thus declined to order a conclave. (See too
Booth v Di Francesco [2002] NSWSC 154 at [30]–[31].)
412 [6.15.40]
Conclaves/Joint conferences of experts | CH 6.15
A variety of provisions in court rules govern such conferences. For instance, in New
South Wales, rr 31.24 and 31.26 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (NSW) provide that:
31.24 Conference between expert witnesses
(1) The court may direct expert witnesses:
(a) to confer, either generally or in relation to specified matters, and
(b) to endeavour to reach agreement on any matters in issue, and
(c) to prepare a joint report, specifying matters agreed and matters not
agreed and reasons for any disagreement, and
(d) to base any joint report on specified facts or assumptions of fact,
and may do so at any time, whether before or after the expert witnesses have
furnished their experts’ reports.
(2) The court may direct that a conference be held:
(a) with or without the attendance of the parties affected or their legal
representatives, or
(b) with or without the attendance of the parties affected or their legal
representatives, at the option of the parties, or
(c) with or without the attendance of a facilitator (that is, a person who is
independent of the parties and who may or may not be an expert in
relation to the matters in issue).
(3) An expert witness so directed may apply to the court for further directions to
assist the expert witness in the performance of his or her functions in any respect.
(4) Any such application must be made by sending a written request for directions to
the court, specifying the matter in relation to which directions are sought.
(5) An expert witness who makes such an application must send a copy of the
request to the other expert witnesses and to the parties affected.
(6) Unless the parties affected agree, the content of the conference between the expert
witnesses must not be referred to at any hearing.
…
31.26 Joint report arising from conference between expert witnesses
(1) This rule applies if expert witnesses prepare a joint report as referred to in
rule 31.24(1)(c).
(2) The joint report must specify matters agreed and matters not agreed and the
reasons for any disagreement.
(3) The joint report may be tendered at the trial as evidence of any matters agreed.
(4) In relation to any matters not agreed, the joint report may be used or tendered at
the trial only in accordance with the rules of evidence and the practices of the
court.
(5) Except by leave of the court, a party affected may not adduce evidence from any
other expert witness on the issues dealt with in the joint report.
As part of the implementation of the Harmonised Expert Evidence Witness Code, from
1 June 2016 the Victorian Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic) provided:
Conference of Experts
7. Each expert witness shall –
(a) exercise his or her independent judgment in relation to every conference
in which the expert participates pursuant to a direction of the Court and
in relation to each report thereafter provided, and shall not act on any
instruction or request to withhold or avoid agreement; and
(b) endeavour to reach agreement with the other expert witness (or
witnesses) on any issue in dispute between them, or failing agreement,
endeavour to identify and clarify the basis of disagreement on the issues
which are in dispute.
[6.15.40] 413
(See too High Court Rules 2016 (NZ) Sch 4.)
Role of lawyers
[6.15.80] It is standard for the experts in conclaves to be quarantined from lawyers, as well
as other advisers and clients, during the process in order to avoid contamination.
However, if legal representatives fail to cooperate with the conclave process, there is
the potential for consequences to follow. In Ceepee Pty Ltd v Roads and Maritime Services
[2014] NSWCATAD 196 at [96], the defendant was found to have failed in its obligations
as a model litigant in failing to facilitate a conclave of financial advisers.
Designation of issues for expert conclaves

[6.15.120] There are three models for determining what is traversed at expert conclaves:
• leaving the matter to be determined by agreement of the parties;
• leaving the matter to be determined by the experts; and
• judicial direction.
In New South Wales, the default position is that the parties agree on the experts to attend,
the questions to be answered, and the materials to be placed before the experts.
It is common in complex cases for there to be multiple areas for proposed expert
evidence. There is much to be said for separate conclaves on each area. Conclaves should
not become a ‘battle of numbers’: Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 10) [2012] VSC 379
at [8]; Rowe v AusNet Electricity Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 553 at [11]. The delineation of a number
of specific and discrete issues for separate conclaves of experts has the potential to refine
the issues in a focused way, which maximises the potential for clarification of what is and
is not in dispute – smaller conclaves avoid incorporation of experts who previously have
not proffered opinions on a topic but in conclave are tempted to do so. Smaller conclaves
often maximise the prospect of clarification of issues that are in dispute: Rowe v AusNet
Electricity Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 553 at [11].
As Forrest J observed in Matthews v SPI Electricity Pty Ltd (No 10) [2012] VSC 379 at [7]:
by having a conclave devoted to specific issues there can be no question about the
expertise of the particular witnesses who author the joint report. That report will
ultimately form part of the evidence at trial and any issue about the expertise of the
witnesses (which may arise in a mass conclave where witnesses possess differing areas of
expertise) will be avoided.
However, there are occasions, too, when the convening of significant numbers of separate
expert conclaves would consume undue time and resources, and therefore not be
practicable: see, for example, Porter v Le [2014] NSWSC 883 at [19]. In terms of medical
experts and the appropriateness of dividing conclaves into specialisation-specific
conclaves, Harrison J in Porter v Le [2014] NSWSC 883 at [29] expressed the view that there
should not be excessive preoccupation with the differences between medical specialities:
I do not accept that medical experts in particular areas of specialty are the inevitable
captives of their particular disciplines. Just as the legal representatives and judges are
required to master the competing issues and contentions called up for consideration in
cases such as these, so it is with expert witnesses. Any expert conforming to the code of
conduct that binds him or her will be expected confidently to refrain from embarking
upon the expression of opinions beyond the relevant field of study or acquired experience
and expertise. The fact that all experts at a joint conference are neither similarly qualified
nor similarly specialised is a fact of life in all litigation that depends on the assessment of
technical issues. I am not convinced that an epidemiologist will fail to appreciate that he
or she will be of limited value in solving an isolated orthopaedic or neurological question.
I am not convinced, however, that his or her attendance at a conference designed to solve
a problem raising combined and connected issues in all three specialties is problematic.
Indeed, it is the very nature of the problem that people do not often or necessarily get sick
414 [6.15.80]
or fall victim to medical insults in easily divided and neat categories. The same can be said
of the alleged victims of poor medical outcomes.
It has been suggested that the questions to be submitted to a conclave should be designed
as a guide for the experts:
Where possible, the questions should be drafted at a higher, broader level. It is ultimately
for the experts to consider the issues which they consider are relevant. The questions serve
as guidance, not a second chance to put questions to the experts and particularly not to
put loaded questions to the experts which may influence the importance attributed to a
particular issue or topic.
(Rowe v AusNet Electricity Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 553 at [22].)

Notably, the composition of a conclave does not necessarily determine the composition
of concurrent evidence at trial: Rowe v AusNet Electricity Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 553 at [13].
In John v Henderson (No 1) [2013] NSWSC 1435 at [12]–[13], Garling J stated that:
The parties are expected to agree upon the issues to be considered by the experts at a joint
conference prior to the conference commencing. Such issues according to the common
practice, then become, where necessary, the issues covered by the joint expert evidence. In
effect, the list of issues becomes an agenda which is the sequence followed in the
concurrent evidence session. As the UCPR provides, the joint conference is a forum,
without the presence of lawyers for the parties, at which the experts consistently with the
expert Code of Conduct, discuss the issues and attempt to reach agreement on those issues
where possible. If agreement is not possible, then the joint report requires that the fact of
their non-agreement be set out and that it be accompanied by a short expression of the
basis of their non-agreement.
It is ordinarily to be expected that the process of joint conferencing will reduce the
number of issues in dispute between the parties and will have the consequential effect of
reducing the time spent by the experts in court and accordingly, the costs to the parties.
However, given the importance of the content and framing of the questions to be put to a
conclave, there are occasions when the parties are unable to agree on the questions to be
put to a conclave and the involvement of the court is required: see, for example, Porter v Le
[2014] NSWSC 883. A reason for such a difficulty can be an absence of agreement as to the
underlying facts relevant to the dispute.
It is important too that questions be clear (not ambiguous) and neither loaded nor
biased. In Reid v Wright t/as D M Wright & Associates Solicitors [2016] NSWSC 466 at [7]–[8],
Wilson J found fault with a proposal for questions to be put to a conclave, commenting:
… the questions are to a degree loaded, as the defendant complains. They are certainly
closely drafted to an extent that the experts I think would be unduly confined in the way
in which they were able to consider the issues at a conclave and provide a joint report.
However, I also agree that the defendant’s questions perhaps do not go far enough and
may need some supplementation to adequately address the relevant evidence.
As a general statement I think it is desirable not to too closely manage the nature of the
questions asked. It would be unhelpful if the experts were so confined by the framing of
the questions as to be unable to have regard to the evidence overall and to view the
specifics of evidence in its overall context.
A practical suggestion made by Muirhead (1998) is that the questions should be ordered
not just logically but in a sequence in which the early questions may be the subject of
agreement or where controversy is likely to be mild.
Materials to be provided
[6.15.160] Experts participating in a conclave should be provided with all materials that
they require for the task.
Clause 10 of Practice Note SC Gen 11, ‘Joint Conferences of Expert Witnesses’, states
that the materials to be provided to participating experts in a joint conference, aside from
questions to be answered, should include:
[6.15.160] 415
• the Code;
• this Practice Note;
• an agreed chronology, if appropriate;
• relevant witness statements or, preferably, a joint statement of the assumptions to be
made by the experts, including any competing assumptions to be made by them in the
alternative (which should be specified clearly as such);
• copies of all expert opinions already exchanged between the parties and all other expert
opinions and reports upon which a party intends to rely; and
• such records and other documents as may be agreed between the parties or ordered by
the Court.
Role of a moderator/facilitator
[6.15.200] An option for expert conclaves is the involvement of a moderator or facilitator
(see Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 31.24(2)). In a superior court, such a role
can be played by an Associate Justice. In a tribunal, it may be a tribunal member who will
not hear the dispute. Alternatively, a non-involved expert or even an independent lawyer
can perform such a role.
Role of a scribe
[6.15.240] Rather than having the experts in a conclave distracted by needing to generate a
written record of what is discussed and decided, the involvement of a designated,
non-participating scribe can be useful.
Role of experts
[6.15.280] Experts participating in a conclave should exercise their independent
professional judgment in relation to the matters they consider. It is important that they not
abrogate such functions or be intimidated into subscribing to opinions that they do not
actually hold or into making concessions which they do not accept.
The facts of Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] UKSC 13 exemplify the need for an
expert participating in such a conference, including on the telephone, to be suitably
prepared and to be robust in explaining and, as appropriate, asserting the opinions which
they hold, and the reasons for their views. In Jones v Kaney, it emerged subsequent to the
joint conference between the experts that the psychologist had not made the effort to read
the report of the other participant to the conference (a psychiatrist) and had signed a joint
statement which she later said did not reflect what she had agreed to during the
conversation, and which she felt pressure to agree to, and her views were at odds with
what she signed (at [9]). This constituted a fundamental derogation of her forensic
responsibilities.
It follows from the orthodox rules in respect of forensic experts’ work that experts in a
conclave should not act as an advocate for the party by which they have been
commissioned and should use their best endeavours to identify the matters upon which
they agree and disagree. In addition, it is good practice for the experts to accept as fact
(unless they identify a good reason not to do so, in which case they should so explain) the
matters stated in witness statements or assumptions submitted to them: ‘It is not their role
to decide any disputed question of fact or the credibility of any witness. Where there are
competing assumptions to be made in the alternative, alternative answers may have to be
provided to a question or questions, specifying which of the assumptions are adopted for
each answer.’ (Clause 19 of Practice Note SC Gen 11, ‘Joint Conferences of Expert
Witnesses’.)
416 [6.15.200]
Confidentiality of discussions
[6.15.320] It is standard for the content of discussions during a conclave of experts to be
confidential, with a preclusion upon reference to them during subsequent court
proceedings.
The joint report

[6.15.360] The product of a conclave, signed by all participants, is a joint report, which
should be completed at the end of or promptly after the conclave. It should identify the
matters the subject of agreement, as well as those not the subject of agreement, with
reasons being stated for those matters upon which there is disagreement.
The outcome of such a conference may be compromise, with the experts considering
where in substance they agree and disagree: McHugh v Australian Jockey Club Ltd (No 9)
[2011] FCA 1138 at [13].
In practice, a joint report from a conclave binds the parties, as it will be tendered at
trial as to matters that have been agreed. This is not without its difficulties. As Romaniuk,
Smith and Kumar (2016) have pointed out:
This means that a Conclave is effectively a preliminary determination of (many) expert
issues prior to trial, but it is done without knowledge of what evidence will be admitted
or without clarity as to the ultimate factual position, and usually without the presence of
the parties or their lawyers (or a Judge) and in circumstances where your expert can
effectively win or lose your client’s case.
The Guidelines for Expert Evidence in the Land Court of Queensland, issued on 30 April
2018, make the following constructive suggestions to experts about how they should
approach a joint conference of experts:
41. The expert witnesses are required to discuss and attempt to reach agreement
about their evidence in relation to an issue in dispute as it relates to their area of
expertise. That does not mean they must negotiate their opinions in the way
parties may negotiate their positions in a mediation. However, they must explore
the factors that underlie their conclusions and squarely address any differences
between them in how they have arrived at their conclusions.
42. The expert witnesses attending a meeting will decide their agenda. If a CMEE
[Court Managed Expert Evidence] Convenor chairs the meeting, the CMEE
Convenor will assist them to do so.
43. The following checklist may assist the expert witnesses during their discussions
and in preparing their joint expert report –
a) Do you have the same information?
b) If not, does any new information affect your opinion?
c) Do you need any more information or instruction from the parties?
d) Do you need an opinion or instruction on a matter outside your area of
expertise?
e) Are using the same methodology and in the same way?
f) If not, why not?
g) What scenarios are presented in your briefs of instructions or in
preceding expert reports (if any)?
h) How should you address the possible outcomes from those scenarios?
i) What are your points of agreement?
j) For your disagreements, are they about:
i. the existence, relevance, or validity of an asserted or assumed
fact;
ii. the methodology that should be applied to deal with the issue;
iii. how that methodology should be applied;
[6.15.360] 417
iv. the conclusions that arise from applying the methodology to

the facts or assumptions; or
v. something else?
k) How will you draft and finalise the joint expert report and when?
[Footnote omitted.]
Immunity for a conclave

[6.15.400] Witness immunity extends to communications within and documents produced
for and arising from a conclave: see Young v Hones [2014] NSWCA 337.
Preparation for a conclave

[6.15.440] The Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal provides the following
useful advice for participants in a conclave:
• Do you have all the information you need to give an opinion? List further information
you will need.
• What facts or opinions do you think you can agree upon? What facts or opinions are
likely to be matters of disagreement?
• Are there any issues where there is an alternative view that might be acceptable to all
experts?
• Have you articulated the issues clearly and concisely? Will the tribunal member be able
to understand what you are saying?
(See http://www.qcat.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/101205/guide-expert-
conferences.pdf (viewed 1 September 2019).)
Pre-trial expert meetings in criminal matters

[6.15.480] In his 2001 report into the criminal courts of England and Wales, Auld LJ
observed (at 145):
As to pre-trial meetings between experts, this occasionally takes place on an informal basis
with the agreement of both parties, but I believe it to be the exception rather than the rule.
If the views expressed in the Review are representative, the reluctance to arrange such
meetings comes mainly from the defence, not the prosecution or the expert witnesses
themselves, both of whom urge it. Subject to proper safeguards of confidentiality as to
undisclosable information on both sides, I strongly encourage it. It is obviously of great
assistance to the court in the simplification of the expert evidence over-all. And it can give
no improper advantage to either party if they can discuss and identify in advance the
extent of the likely issue between them when the matter goes to court. It is of particular
importance where one side is proposing to use information technology for the
presentation of some of its evidence, since there will need to be discussion of the system to
be used, as well as of content of the evidence.
This led to r 19.6 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 (UK):

Pre-hearing discussion of expert evidence
(1) This rule applies where more than one party wants to introduce expert evidence.
(2) The court may direct the experts to –
(a) discuss the expert issues in the proceedings; and
(b) prepare a statement for the court of the matters on which they agree and
disagree, giving their reasons.
(3) Except for that statement, the content of that discussion must not be referred to
without the court’s permission.
In Victoria, Practice Note SC CR 3, ‘Expert Evidence in Criminal Trials’, makes explicit

provision for pre-trial meetings of experts:
418 [6.15.400]
12.1 This rule applies where more than one party wants to introduce expert evidence
on the same issue or on related issues.
12.2 The Court may direct the experts to –
(a) discuss the expert issues in the proceedings; and
(b) prepare a statement for the Court of the matters on which they agree
and disagree, giving their reasons.
12.3 Except for that statement, the content of that discussion must not be referred to at
the trial of the accused without the Court’s permission.
12.4 The Court may convene a hearing at which –
(a) the Court or any party may seek clarification of any aspect of the expert
evidence; and
(b) the Court may direct the experts to narrow the areas of disagreement.
12.5 A party may not introduce expert evidence without the Court’s leave if the expert
has not complied with a direction under 12.2 or 12.4.
In a 2016 study for the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration (AIJA) (Freckelton,
Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016, 3.26–3.31)), enthusiasm was expressed
from a number of sources for the pre-hearing meetings of experts. A judge recounted
persuading the parties in a criminal trial to have their experts engage in a joint conference
to identify what was in dispute. Ultimately, after the joint conference, the parties decided
none of the expert evidence was of any assistance (Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty,
Horan and McKimmie (2016, 3.31)).
Sommer (2009) has identified that while such meetings have the potential to be
constructive, faced with conflicting expert reports, some judges are tempted to leave the
detail of what is discussed to the experts: ‘The meeting then starts without a clear agenda.
This can sometimes have an unfortunate effect. Inexperienced experts may exceed their
remits.’ He also raised concerns about a problematic amount of the defence case being
revealed at a conclave of experts. A pathologist in the 2016 AIJA study (Freckelton,
Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016, 3.30) identified the phenomenon of
senior colleagues being intimidating and somewhat oppressive in the environment of a
conclave.
Controversies about conclaves

[6.15.520] Not everyone is enthusiastic in their evaluation of conclaves. Edmond (2003), for
instance, is unconvinced that if experts are released from traditional adversarial processes
they will be more likely to reach consensus or narrow the extent of their disagreement:
‘This particular procedure presupposes that legal processes cause or accentuate expert
disagreement, and that parties should be bound on matters where experts agree. There is,
in addition, an untested assumption which implies that where expert witnesses agree the
consensus is both reliable and objective.’
While Edmond’s position is theoretical and fails to take significantly into account the
consistent views of those who participate in litigation as judges, litigation lawyers and
experts, he is correct when he observes that the use of procedures such as expert conclaves
accentuates the importance of expert selection. While selection of the ‘right expert’ has
always been a crucial part of forensic tactics, the use of conclaves and concurrent evidence
introduces additional characteristics into those which litigation lawyers aspire to in
forensic experts – namely steadfastness in their opinions, a capacity not to be intimidated
by colleagues, and an ability to incorporate the views of others into their own analyses.
‘Expert Experts’ conducted a series of qualitative interviews with expert witnesses
about conclaves and joint reports and reported that most expert witnesses:
[6.15.520] 419
• Liked the idea of conclaves. They see real benefit in professional peers being able to
discuss and resolve, or at least clarify and narrow, issues in the absence of pressure
from clients and lawyers.
• Had participated in some successful conclaves, which produced joint reports that
clarified and narrowed the issues in dispute in line with the objectives of the process.
• Had, however, participated in a larger number of ‘failed’ conclaves. Problems included
disorganised conferences; over-bearing personalities; a lack of agreement as to what the
issues or questions posed meant; disagreements as to what the obligation to seek to
resolve issues meant (were they meant to ‘horse trade’ concessions to ‘settle’ the
matter?); lack of basic administrative resources to prepare a joint report at the time;
confusion over what to do when the conclave was clearly degenerating; difficulty
coordinating the preparation of a joint report after the conclave was over; and
numerous other issues. These issues had resulted in poorly drafted and confusing joint
reports that did not assist any party or the court.
• Thought that the main reason conclaves and joint reports went wrong was the failure to
have in place a settled, structured, closely managed and supervised set of procedures to
facilitate the conclave and joint report process. The general guidance to legal
practitioners and experts contained in current Rules and Practice Notes was not
considered sufficient. Further, each firm of solicitors apparently has a unique view of
the ‘usual practice’ that should be followed.
• Thought that the factor most likely to contribute to a conclave and joint report being
successful was the presence of an independent experienced facilitator/chairperson,
either an independent legal practitioner or expert with experience in the process, who
facilitated and coordinated the entire process from start to finish, including dealing
with all administrative issues, impartially assisting the experts to liaise with the parties
and legal representatives to clarify the issues and questions to be addressed, and
assisting the experts in preparing a useful joint report reflecting all experts views in an
appropriate form to assist the court and parties.
(Why Expert Conclaves Go So Wrong, So Badly and So Often (2015).)
The future
[6.15.560] The use of pre-trial meetings or conclaves of experts has become standard in
Australia in civil matters. It is becoming more common also in criminal litigation.
It is apparent, though, that such meetings are most successful when their parameters
are clearly delineated and well formulated by the parties or, if necessary, by the court. It
would be a rare case where there would not be some benefit in the experts meeting and
endeavouring to identify whether there are areas of theoretical or practical agreement in
relation to their expert opinions and the bases for them. Given the generally
acknowledged direct and indirect benefits in expert conclaves, it has become questionable
whether the ‘possible utility test’ of Studdert J as expressed in Booth v Di Francesco [2002]
NSWSC 154 will generally be applied.
420 [6.15.560]
Chapter 6.20
CONCURRENT EXPERT EVIDENCE

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [6.20.01]
Concurrent evidence as an option ..................................................................................... [6.20.20]
The background ..................................................................................................................... [6.20.40]
International uptake .............................................................................................................. [6.20.60]
Procedures for concurrent expert evidence ...................................................................... [6.20.80]
Concurrent evidence in the courts ..................................................................................... [6.20.120]
Concurrent evidence before administrative tribunals .................................................... [6.20.160]
Controversies .......................................................................................................................... [6.20.200]
Directions for concurrent evidence orders ....................................................................... [6.20.240]
Concurrent evidence in criminal litigation ....................................................................... [6.20.260]
The future ............................................................................................................................... [6.20.280]
‘Rub a dub dub,

Three men in a tub,
And who do you think they be?
The butcher, the baker,
The candlestick maker.
Turn them out, knaves all three!’
Traditional.
Introduction
[6.20.01] The practice of more than one expert witness giving evidence at the same time is
known as ‘concurrent evidence’, the preferable term (see Heerey (2004); Stockton (2006)).
It is also known as ‘hot-tubbing’ of experts. Thus far, concurrent evidence has been
confined principally to civil litigation in the courts and hearings before tribunals. It
constitutes an alternative to the traditional adversarial method by which expert evidence
is given serially by experts for one side and then the other, in the course of which the
experts are examined-in-chief and cross-examined by the legal representatives for each
side. Concurrent evidence is becoming significant for many forms of contemporary
litigation and is likely to become more so.
Originally, concurrent evidence was an Australian innovation. However, with its
entrenchment as an increasingly significant form of adducing evidence in Australia
(Hargrave (2010)), it has attracted international interest in the United States (Yarnall
(2009); Wood (2007)), Canada and the United Kingdom (Genn (2012)).
This chapter reviews the practice of concurrent evidence internationally, concentrating
on Australia and New Zealand, and analyses a cross-section of examples of cases in which
such evidence has been given. It reviews the strengths and limitations of concurrent
evidence and scrutinises orders that have provided for the giving of concurrent evidence,
with a view to identifying how the effectiveness of concurrent evidence can be optimised.
Concurrent evidence as an option

[6.20.20] Concurrent evidence is a procedure that has been developed as an alternative to
the traditional mode of experts giving evidence and being individually cross-examined,
often with a considerable time elapsing between the evidence by the parties’ respective
experts. With concurrent evidence, more than one expert testifies at the same time. It
resembles a discussion in which a cooperative endeavour is engaged in to identify the
relevant issues and, where possible, arrive at an agreed resolution of them. To the extent
appropriate, the joint evidence is subject to judicial control, much like the control by a
chair of a meeting, although all necessary formality is observed. (See John v Henderson
(No 1) [2013] NSWSC 1435 at [11] (Garling J); see also Bergin (2011).)
[6.20.20] 421
Justice McClellan, who pioneered the procedure in the New South Wales Land and
Environment Court, has described the procedure as follows:
[A]ll experts in relation to a particular topic are sworn to give evidence at the same time.
What follows is a discussion, which is managed by the judge or commissioner, so that the
topics requiring oral examination are ventilated. The process enables experts to answer
questions from the Court, the advocates and, most importantly, from their professional
colleagues. It allows the experts to express in their own words the view they have on a
particular subject. There have been cases where as many as six experts have been sworn to
give evidence at the same time.
For hearings in my court, the procedure commonly followed involves the experts
being sworn and their written reports tendered together with the document which reflects
their pre-trial discussion of the matters upon which they agree or disagree. I then identify,
with the help of the advocates and in the presence of the witnesses, the topics which
require discussion, in order to resolve outstanding issues. Having identified those matters,
I invite each witness to briefly speak to their position on the first issue followed by a
general discussion of the issue during which they can ask each other questions. I invite the
advocates to join in the discussion by asking questions of their own of any other witness.
Having completed the discussion on one issue we move on until the discussion of all the
issues has been completed.
Experience shows that, provided everyone understands the process at the outset, in
particular that it is to be a structured discussion to inform the judge and not an argument
between the experts and the advocates, there is no difficulty in managing the hearing.
Although I do not encourage it, very often the experts, who will be sitting next to each
other, normally in the jury box in the courtroom, end up referring to each other on
first-name terms. Within a short time of the discussion commencing, you can feel the
release of the tension which normally infects the evidence-gathering process. Those who
might normally be shy or diffident are able to relax and contribute fully to the discussion.
(McClellan (2006); see also McClellan (2005a; 2005b; 2005c); Hughston and Jowett (2014).)
In summary form, the Australian Law Reform Commission (2000, para 6.116) has
described the process of concurrent evidence as follows:
• experts submit written statements to the tribunal, which they may freely modify or
supplement orally at the hearing, after having heard all the other evidence
• all of the experts are sworn in at the same time and each in turn provides an oral
exposition of their expert opinion on the issues arising from the evidence
• each expert then expresses his or her view about the opinions expressed by the other
experts
• counsel cross-examine the experts one after the other and are at liberty to put questions
to all or any of the experts in respect of a particular issue. Re-examination is conducted
on the same basis.
Professor Dame Hazel Genn (2012, p 1) has also provided a useful description:
Under the Court’s direction, the basic approach is for the experts retained by the parties to
prepare written reports in the normal way. The reports are exchanged and the experts are
required to meet without the parties or their representatives to discuss those reports. This
may be done in person or by telephone. The experts prepare a Joint Statement
incorporating a summary of the matters upon which they agree, but also and very
importantly, matters upon which they disagree. Before the trial the parties produce an
agreed agenda for taking concurrent evidence based on the Joint Statement. This contains
a numbered list of the issues where the experts disagree and must be provided in sufficient
time to enable the judge to consider it properly. At trial, the experts are sworn together
and take their place together at the witness table. Using the summary of matters upon
which they disagree, the judge chairs a ‘directed’ discussion of the issues in disagreement.
The process provides an opportunity for each expert to place his or her view on a
particular issue or sub-issue before the court. The experts are encouraged to ask and
answer questions of each other. The advocates also may ask questions during the course of
the discussion to ensure that an expert’s opinion is fully articulated and tested against a
422 [6.20.20]
Concurrent expert evidence | CH 6.20
contrary opinion. At the end of the discussion, the judge will ask a general question to
ensure that all of the experts have had the opportunity to fully explain their positions.
Justice Pepper, also of the Land and Environment Court in New South Wales, has
identified seven separate aspects of concurrent evidence:
(a) first, identification of the issues upon which expert evidence is needed;
(b) second, the preparation of individual expert reports;
(c) third, a conference between the experts, without lawyers, in order to prepare a
joint report that sets out the matters upon which there is agreement and the
matters upon which there is disagreement, including, where possible, short
reasons as to why they disagree;
(d) fourth, the preparation of the joint report;
(e) fifth, the experts are called to give evidence together, at a convenient time in the
proceedings, usually following the tendering of the lay evidence;
(f) sixth, the experts are given the opportunity to explain the issues in dispute in
their own words. Each expert is then allowed to comment on or question the
other expert; and
(g) Seventh, cross-examination of the expert is permitted. During this process, each
party is permitted to rely on their own expert for clarification of an answer.
(Pepper (2013, para 68).)
The background
[6.20.40] The introduction of ‘concurrent evidence’ dates back at least to 1987 (Freckelton
(1987)) and experiments with it date back to at least 1985 in Spika Trading Pty Ltd v Royal
Insurance Australia Ltd (1985) 3 ANZ Ins Cas 60-663, a case involving damage by flood
where the two parties called evidence from five hydrologists: see Freckelton (1987). Each
hydrologist was sworn and, as there was not enough room in the witness box, each sat in
the body of the court. By consent, questions were asked of the witnesses by counsel for
both parties and also by Rogers J. Witnesses were able to comment on and dissent from
one another’s testimony, enabling the issues to be crystallised and explained. The evidence
was given in a relatively informal atmosphere, allowing more natural expression of
thought and joinder of issue than is customary. Rogers J commented that the technical
problems of hydrology were successfully explored by these techniques and counsel agreed
that, as a result, the hearing was substantially shortened.
Rogers J noted that the High Court in R v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte
Hardiman (1980) 144 CLR 13 at 35 had drawn attention to ‘the panel system of
cross-examination’ used by the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal and expressed concern
that it could be ‘a procedure which is calculated to hamper the cross-examiner and make it
difficult to evaluate the worth of an individual witness’. He held that these sentiments
have no application to the procedure employed by him.
Other analyses (see, eg, Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2005)) have contended that
the practice of ‘hot-tubbing’ experts has its origins in procedures employed by Lockhart J
in the Trade Practices Tribunal. An example of his Honour’s technique was that employed
in Re Queensland Independent Wholesalers Ltd (1995) 132 ALR 225 at 231–232:
Four expert witnesses in the field of economics furnished statements and were examined
orally before the tribunal at the hearing. The Tribunal adopted the following procedure
with respect to expert witnesses, for the purpose of obtaining the maximum benefit from
their evidence and removing them from the adversary process as far as possible:
• At the conclusion of all the evidence (other than the evidence of the experts) and before
the commencement of addresses, each expert was sworn immediately after the other
and in turn gave an oral exposition of his or her expert opinion with respect to the
relevant issues arising from the evidence.
[6.20.40] 423
• Each expert then in turn expressed his or her opinion about the opinions expressed by
the other experts.
• Counsel then cross-examined the experts, being at liberty to cross-examine on the basis
(a) that questions could be put to each expert in the customary fashion (ie one after the
other, completing the cross-examination of one before proceeding to the next), or (b)
that questions could be put to all or any of the experts, one after the other, in respect of
a particular subject, then proceeding to the next subject. Re-examination [re-direct] was
conducted on the same basis.
In the result we gained assistance from the evidence of the experts. Their oral
expositions and examinations occupied only three and one-half hours.
Justice McClellan (2005a; 2005b; 2005c) (Pepper (2012)) adapted the process to the New
South Wales Land and Environment Court and has extolled its virtues. Justice Pepper
(2012) noted that by 2012, concurrent evidence in that court had become:
[T]he norm rather than the exception. Unless the judge or commissioner orders otherwise,
the relevant experts on a particular point are sworn-in together and remain together
during the entirety of their evidence, as opposed to the traditional approach where each
expert presents their evidence and is separately made available for cross-examination.
This approach facilitates a discussion between the experts, the advocates and the judge,
and helps to narrow the issues in dispute.
A review of concurrent evidence undertaken by the Civil Justice Council’s Civil Litigation
Review Working Group (2016) differentiated between different forms of adducing expert
evidence in ‘some sort of a “concurrent” fashion’:
• sequential, ‘back-to-back’ evidence;
• hot tubbing (or ‘judge-led joint examination of experts’); and
• hybrid versions of hot-tubbing arising because of:
– variations in the role that counsel has been permitted to play during the
hot-tubbing;
– different judicial attitudes towards the interaction which has been permissible
among expert witnesses while they are in the hot-tub; and
– differences in judicial practice, in that the judge will not always lead the
discussion.
However, while it is helpful to acknowledge that there has been considerable variation in
the roles played by judges, counsel and experts in the concurrent evidence format, it is
questionable whether the Working Group’s first category is properly to be termed
concurrent evidence; it is better described as consecutive evidence (see Ch 6.25).
International uptake
[6.20.60] At the instigation of Lord Justice Jackson’s review of civil litigation costs (2009),
concurrent evidence was trialled in the United Kingdom in the Manchester Technology
and Construction Court and Mercantile Court and in the Manchester Chancery Court
during 2012. Professor Dame Hazel Genn identified from the trial a range of benefits from
concurrent evidence and no significant disadvantages from the point of view of the
judiciary, counsel, solicitors or experts (Genn (2012)).
Part 35 of the Civil Procedure Rules (UK) now allows civil courts a discretion to order
that concurrent expert evidence take place from evidence in like disciplines. Practice
Direction 35 states:
Concurrent expert evidence
11.1 At any stage in the proceedings the court may direct that some or all of the
evidence of experts from like disciplines shall be given concurrently. The procedure set out
in paragraph 11.4 shall apply in respect of any part of the evidence which is to be given
concurrently.
424 [6.20.60]
11.2 To the extent that the expert evidence is not to be given concurrently, the court
may direct the evidence to be given in any appropriate manner. This may include a
direction for the experts from like disciplines to give their evidence and be cross-examined
on an issue-by-issue basis, so that each party calls its expert or experts to give evidence in
relation to a particular issue, followed by the other parties calling their expert or experts to
give evidence in relation to that issue (and so on for each of the expert issues which are to
be addressed in this manner).
11.3 The court may set an agenda for the taking of expert evidence concurrently or on
an issue-by-issue basis, or may direct that the parties agree such an agenda subject to the
approval of the court. In either case, the agenda should be based upon the areas of
disagreement identified in the experts’ joint statements made pursuant to rule 35.12.
11.4 Where expert evidence is to be given concurrently, then (after the relevant experts
have each taken the oath or affirmed) in relation to each issue on the agenda, and subject
to the judge’s discretion to modify the procedure –
(1) the judge will initiate the discussion by asking the experts, in turn, for their views
in relation to the issues on the agenda. Once an expert has expressed a view the
judge may ask questions about it. At one or more appropriate stages when
questioning a particular expert, the judge may invite the other expert to comment
or to ask that expert’s own questions of the first expert;
(2) after the process set out in (1) has been completed for any issue (or all issues), the
judge will invite the parties’ representatives to ask questions of the experts. Such
questioning should be directed towards:
(a) testing the correctness of an expert’s view;
(b) seeking clarification of an expert’s view; or
(c) eliciting evidence on any issue (or on any aspect of an issue) which has
been omitted from consideration during the process set out in (1); and
(3) after the process set out in (2) has been completed in relation to any issue (or all
issues), the judge may summarise the experts’ different positions on the issue and
ask them to confirm or correct that summary.
The procedure is being used increasingly frequently: see, eg, Bluewater Energy Services BV
v Mercon Steel Structures BV [2014] EWHC 2132; Homebase Ltd v Rengasamy [2015] EWHC
68; Glaxo Wellcome UK Ltd (t/a Allen & Hanburys) v Sandoz Ltd [2017] EWHC 3196 (Ch);
Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd (No 2) [2017] EWHC 2988
(Pat). Lord Jackson has become an enthusiastic proponent of it (see Jackson (2016)). It is
also being utilised in Scotland: see, eg, SSE Generation Ltd v Hochtief Solutions AG [2018]
CSIH 26.
In 2011, in Harrison v Shepherd Homes Ltd [2011] EWHC 1811 (TCC) at [26], Ramsey J
commented of the procedure:
After cross-examination of the engineering experts, with the agreement of the parties,
there was a process of concurrent evidence, colloquially known as ‘hot tubbing’, so as to
deal effectively with the ten individual properties. This highlighted the extent of
agreement between the experts and also showed the limited differences in approach on
which I have had to make a decision.
Similarly, in the Family Court, regarding a dispute about the care of a disabled child, in Re
Baby X [2011] EWHC 590 (Fam) at [22]–[23], Ryder J noted that:
The three experts commissioned to analyse the key issues were heard in oral evidence by
the court. Not for the first time, this court was very greatly assisted by hearing their
evidence concurrently. A device unfortunately and colloquially known as ‘hot tubbing’
was used with the agreement of all parties. This process has been tested in America and
Australia, but not in this jurisdiction. Out of the experts’ reports and discussions, the court
derived an agenda of topics which were relevant to the key issues and to which counsel
were asked to contribute. The witnesses were sworn together, and the court asked each
witness the same questions under each topic, taking a topic at a time. The experts were
encouraged to add or explain their own or another’s evidence so that a healthy discussion
[6.20.60] 425
ensued, chaired by the court. Each advocate is permitted to examine or cross examine and
where appropriate re-examine each witness after the court has elicited evidence on a topic.
The resulting coherence of evidence and attention to the key issues rather than adversarial
point scoring is marked. The evidence of experts who might have been expected to fill 2
days of court time was completed within 4 hours.
In Canada, the Federal Courts Rules relating to expert witnesses were amended in 2010 to
provide judges with the necessary tools to ensure that expert evidence is adduced in the
most efficient, least costly, and most fair manner. The new rules allow judges to order
some or all of the expert witnesses in a case to testify as ‘a panel’ (see [5.05.20]). The
experts are expected to provide their views, and may be directed to comment on the views
of other expert panel members as well. On completion of the panel’s testimony, the
experts may, with leave of the court, pose questions to the other panel members, following
which the members of the panel may be cross-examined and re-examined in a sequence
directed by the court. The Rules stipulate that an expert witness who is ordered to confer
with another expert witness must (a) exercise independent, impartial and objective
judgment on the issues addressed; and (b) endeavour to clarify with the other expert
witness the positions on which they agree, and the points on which their views differ.
Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure also include provisions which came into force on
1 January 2010 that allow judges to order pre-trial ‘hot-tub’ meetings between the experts
to identify areas of agreement and disagreement and to prepare a joint statement.
Enthusiasm about concurrent expert evidence has also been expressed in the United
States, by commentators who have drawn attention to the difficulties generated by expert
partisanship (see, eg, Sonnenstein and Fitzpatrick (2013); Yarnall (2009)). For instance,
Mnookin (2008, p 1009) has proclaimed: ‘The future … may belong to Australia. Hot
tubbing … is much more interesting than neutral experts.’
Procedures for concurrent expert evidence

[6.20.80] An example of the usage of the technique is to be found in Walker Corporation Pty
Ltd v Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority (2004) 134 LGERA 195; [2004] NSWLEC 315,
where a major issue in contention was the extent of developmental potential for the land
the subject of the case, and for which residential use was being contemplated. The oral
evidence of the six expert witnesses in relation to town planning issues and developmental
potential was taken concurrently, consuming only two days of hearing time. Other
evidence that was given concurrently related to a planning instrument, contamination,
design modelling and value. The result was that the experts’ oral evidence only occupied
four days of a 13-day hearing.
In BGP Properties Pty Ltd v Lake Macquarie City Council (2004) 138 LGERA 237; [2004]
NSWLEC 399 at [121]–[122], McClellan CJ observed:
The issues which were ultimately defined in the proceedings required resolution of the
different views of experts in relation to a number of significant matters. As will become
commonplace in proceedings in this Court, the oral testimony of the experts was taken by
a process of concurrent evidence. This involved the swearing in of the experts with similar
expertise, who then gave evidence in relation to particular issues at the same time. Before
giving evidence, the experts had completed the joint conferencing process, which enabled
the court to identify the differences which remained and which required resolution
through the oral evidence. Each witness was then given an opportunity to explain their
position on an issue and provided with an opportunity to question the other witness or
witnesses about their position. Questions were also asked by counsel for the parties. In
effect, the evidence was given through a discussion in which all of the experts, the
advocates and the court participated.
Both Commissioner Watts and I found this to be an efficient and effective method to
receive expert evidence. It enabled ready identification of fundamental issues and it
ensured that court time was devoted to understanding those issues and providing the
426 [6.20.80]
court with the material necessary to resolve them. Apart from enhancing the quality of the
court’s decision, it ensured that a number of days of hearing time were saved.
The Judicial Commission of New South Wales and the Australian Institute of Judicial
Administration (2006) have jointly produced a DVD on the giving of concurrent evidence.
Concurrent evidence in the courts

[6.20.120] Concurrent evidence has been given in a great many cases before Australian
courts; in fact, it is the norm in many courts. Its virtues have been extolled in many
decisions. In 2010, for instance, Fullerton J in Huseyin v Qantas Airways [2010] NSWSC 372
at [50] commented:
The conflict between the experts on the question whether restriction in function is a
presenting feature of fibromyalgia exemplifies the advantage of having experts within an
established discipline give their evidence concurrently.
It has either been used or mooted in Air New Zealand v Commerce Commission (No 6) (2004)
11 TCLR 347; [2004] BCL 896; Commerce Commission v NZ Bus Co Ltd HC WN CIV 2006 485
585; and Powerco Ltd v Commerce Commission [2006] NZHC 662.
In Halverson v Dobler [2006] NSWSC 1307, McClellan CJ at CL heard concurrent
evidence from four cardiologists, as well as from a series of general practitioners, in a
medical negligence action. McClellan CJ at CL commented of the process (at [101]):
This process proved both highly productive and efficient and has been of great benefit to
me in resolving this case. The discussion was sustained at a high level of objectivity by all
participants, each of whom displayed a genuine endeavour to assist the court to resolve
the problems. The fact that ultimately they disagreed on critical issues was not due to
anything other than a genuine difference of opinion about the appropriate conclusion to be
drawn from the known facts.
Referring to the approach he adopted in Strong Wise Ltd v Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd
(2010) 185 FCR 149; [2010] FCA 240, Rares J (2010) has described the process he used (at
paras 30–34):
[T]here were eight expert witnesses who gave oral evidence over five separate areas of
specialised knowledge. … Each had prepared at least one principal report, some prepared
a responsive report. In the pre-trial phase, I directed that the experts in each relevant
discipline should confer together, without the parties or their lawyers, and prepare a joint
report that set out the issues on which they agreed and those on which they disagreed,
giving brief reasons for their differences. I also directed that the experts, in each discipline
would give evidence concurrently. Here, the experts and their fields were 3 master
mariners; 2 naval architects; 2 structural engineers; 2 metallurgical engineers; and 2
mechanical engineers. A number of other experts gave written reports that were accepted
without the need for cross-examination.
The joint reports were extremely useful in crystallising the real questions on which the
experts needed to give oral evidence. Experience in using this case management technique
generally demonstrates considerable benefits in practice. First, the experts usually will
readily accept the other’s opinion on the latter’s assumptions. This position is often lost in
long reports that debate, not that opinion, but the assumptions which, in turn, usually
depend on the facts that need to be found. Secondly, the process then usually identified
the critical areas in which the experts disagreed.
When each concurrent evidence session began, I explained that the purpose of the
process was to engage in a structural discussion. Each expert was asked to summarise
what he (all were male) thought were the principal issues between him and his
colleague(s). Each was free to comment on or question his colleague on what he had said
both during the introductory part and throughout the process. After each expert had
outlined the principal issues (usually one did this and the other agreed that it was a fair
summary or added some brief further remarks), counsel identified the issues or topics on
which they wished to cross-examine. I then invited whichever counsel wished to begin
questioning to do so. The experts sat at a table where they had ample room to place their
[6.20.120] 427
reports and materials. They had a single microphone for whomever was speaking, so that
the transcript would record the relevant evidence and they would exercise self-discipline
in responding. Often when one had given an answer, the other would comment, or agree,
thus narrowing the issues and focussing discussion. From time to time counsel could and
would pursue a traditional cross-examination on a particular issue exclusively with one
expert. But, sometimes when one expert gave an answer, counsel, or I, would ask the other
about his opinion on that same question.
The great advantage of this process is that all experts are giving evidence on the same
assumptions, on the same point and can clarify or diffuse immediately any lack of
understanding the judge or counsel may have about a point. The taking of evidence in this
way usually greatly reduces the court time spent on cross-examination because the experts
quickly get to the critical points of disagreement. At the end of his second session of
concurrent evidence, one witness from London said that he had been in court before but
that this had been a very different and positive experience for him.
Another significant benefit of the process is generally a substantial saving of court time
and costs.
As yet, the use of concurrent evidence has not generated significant appellate litigation.
Concurrent evidence before administrative tribunals

[6.20.160] The Administrative Appeals Tribunal also has significant experience in using
concurrent evidence. It is now being followed in this regard, at least in the land and
environment context, by the Western Australian State Administrative Tribunal: see, eg, WR
Carpenter Properties Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2006] WASAT 200;
Uniting Church Homes Inc v City of Stirling [2005] WASAT 191; Dumbleton v Town of
Bassendean [2005] WASAT 145; Gangemi and Shire of Augusta–Margaret River [2005] WASAT
113.
In Penola High School and Geographical Indications Committee [2001] AATA 844, the AAT
elected to use concurrent procedures. The matter involved review of a decision of the
Geographical Indications Committee determining a geographical indication called
‘Coonawarra’, pursuant to s 40Y of the Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation Act 1980
(Cth). The initial estimate of hearing time was six months, due to the number of expert
witnesses who were to give evidence at the hearing. Using concurrent procedures, the
hearing was completed in five weeks. The tribunal said (at [28]):
At the hearing of this matter, the oral evidence of the experts (to supplement their
voluminous written statements) was given and their views tested by way of a panel
session called a ‘hot tub’. Each of the experts was invited to make a presentation
addressing their statements and identifying the important issues. The experts were able to
consult, be challenged and discuss their views with the other experts on the panel. The
Tribunal asked questions of the experts as necessary. Finally, counsel for the parties were
given the opportunity to ask questions of the experts in relation to any matters raised
during the ‘hot tub’ interchange and from the written material (including the T
documents). We found this method of dealing with such a large volume of expert material
very helpful.
Experts who gave evidence in the case were from a wide variety of fields, including
geography and geomorphology, soil science, hydrology, viticulture and mapping. The
experts gave their evidence as panels. The first panel of experts giving concurrent
evidence included experts in the fields of viticulture, horticulture, hydrology and wine
production. The second panel of experts traversed similar subject matter as the first, but
with more emphasis on cartography, soil science and land systems. A third panel of
experts then further elaborated on some points, and two subsequent groups of experts
dealt with the history of the region, the development of the wine industry, and the
marketing of the produce from the region.
428 [6.20.160]
In Keenan and Repatriation Commission [2000] AATA 707, the AAT also adopted the
concurrent evidence method when hearing several Veterans’ Appeals Division applications
involving evidence relating to the level of fat in the diets of veterans who were later
diagnosed with prostate cancer.
Similarly, in Temple and Repatriation Commission [2001] AATA 490, Dwyer SM suggested
the use of concurrent evidence procedures after expressing concern about the difficulty in
choosing between the different opinions of the expert witnesses, both of whom were
eminent respiratory physicians. At the end of the decision, Dwyer SM commented (at [67])
that:
The practice of calling two medical expert witnesses together is still unusual within the
tribunal. I consider it appropriate to record how helpful I found it to be and to express the
tribunal’s appreciation to the doctors for their cooperation, and to the representatives for
their assistance in making the necessary arrangements. I suggest that the approach be
adopted more frequently. There is benefit in a more investigative and less adversarial
approach.
The AAT has undertaken an analysis of the utility of concurrent evidence, with 62 AAT
members responding to a survey, along with 13 expert witnesses: see Administrative
Appeals Tribunal (2005). The percentage of respondents reporting satisfaction with using
concurrent evidence procedures was 94.9%. The study concluded that the concurrent
evidence procedure assisted experts to fulfil their role as independent advisers. The
utilisation of concurrent evidence appeared to have assisted settlement of cases and time
taken to conclude hearings. Significant numbers of members also reported that the usage
of concurrent evidence assisted them in writing up their decisions. The study
recommended the development of guidelines in terms of the methodologies of taking
concurrent evidence to optimise consistency of approach.
Controversies
[6.20.200] Proponents of concurrent evidence have been evangelistic about its benefits: see
McClellan (2004a; 2004b; 2005c; 2006; 2010); Downes (2004); Heerey (2002; 2004); Rares
(2010); Garling (2011); Pepper (2012). In evaluating the early phase of the Manchester
Concurrent Evidence Project, Genn (2012, p 8) found that the evidence of the pilot to date
suggests that there are time and quality benefits to be gained from the use of the
concurrent evidence procedure for expert evidence.
Genn concluded (2012, p 8) that, by the stage of her early evaluation, there was:
no evidence of significant disadvantages from the point of view of the judiciary, counsel,
solicitors or experts themselves. What is needed is a larger evidence base so that the use of
the procedure in different kinds of cases can be evaluated and a wider range of experience
relating to rigour and costs can be analysed. All but one of the respondents has agreed to
be interviewed about their experience and these issues could be explored in more depth
with those respondents. However, there remains a need for a larger database of cases
before firm conclusions about the procedure can be drawn.
She observed (2012, p 8):

In light of the positive evaluations of those involved in this pilot to date, by those both on
winning and losing sides of cases, and in light of the relatively large number of cases in
which parties agreed to adopt the concurrent evidence approach but settled prior to trial,
it would seem entirely appropriate that in the implementation of the Jackson Report
recommendations the use of concurrent evidence should be included in the Part 35
Practice Direction as an optional procedure which can be adopted if the judge so directs.
However, not all evaluations have been so effusive. Edmond (2011, p 70) has argued that
‘[h]aving experts agree pre-trial or in a “hot tub” is less important than demonstrable
evidence that the techniques supporting their opinions are reliable’. Ergas (2006–2007) has
expressed concern about the potential for expert evidence to be ‘dumbed down’ and for
[6.20.200] 429
more assertive experts to dominate the ‘hot tub’. Justice Davies (2004; 2005) has doubted
the likelihood of substantial time and cost being saved by the procedure and has
expressed concern about the potential for concurrent witnesses to be coached, that ‘whilst
the hot tub method has some advantages over the process of calling expert witnesses as
part of each party’s case, it remains, in substance, a partisan procedure which has a high
risk that adversarial bias will distort the result. And it saves little in costs’. (These concerns
were rejected by Rares (2010), Garling (2011) and Pepper (2012).)
Stockton (2006) has suggested that there is an element of trendiness about the new
procedure, while Garling (2011) has noted the difficulties in assessing experts’ credit from
the concurrent evidence setting. Rackemann DCJ of the Queensland Planning and
Environment Court (2012, p 176) has argued that concurrent evidence is ‘too limited in its
application and applies too late in the process to be considered as a viable substitute for
appropriate management at an earlier stage’, warning that:
One of the problems with the enthusiastic promotion of concurrent evidence is that it has
tended to give the impression that it is ‘the’ method for adducing expert evidence and is,
in itself, a sufficient way to address concerns surrounding expert opinion evidence. In
truth, it is neither. It is a tool, the usefulness of which will vary according to the context in
which it is used, and the manner in which it is employed.
Carson et al (2013) advanced the following observations from six accounting experts who
had participated in giving concurrent evidence in a variety of jurisdictions in Queensland,
New South Wales and Victoria:
• It is apparent that whilst a Court or Tribunal may make an order to ‘hear the experts
concurrently’, there is great variety in how the orders are implemented.
• The ‘hot-tub’, and joint expert report do not always go hand in hand.
• Even where joint reports had been prepared prior to the ‘hot-tub’, the experts were not
always examined extensively on those reports but rather on their individually authored
reports. In one case, an expert was examined on his opening statement, and not on any
of the reports that had been prepared.
• It is often the case that the Court or Tribunal was not adequately equipped to
accommodate experts in a ‘hot-tub’ (witness table space, availability of microphones,
ease of shared access to documents), leading to distraction for the Court, experts and
others.
• It was generally the case that prior to being sworn in the experts were given little, if
any, forewarning as to the specific mode of operation of the ‘hot-tub’, for example
whether opening statements were required, how examination would proceed, whether
questions were allowed.
• In a number of cases, experts in the ‘hot-tub’ proceeded without being asked to deliver
anything in the way of an ‘opening statement’, and we experienced no cases where
closing statements were used.
• The judge usually, but not always, asked questions of the experts.
• The ‘hot-tubs’ were generally shorter in duration than we would normally experience
under the traditional method of cross-examination.
• Concurrent evidence will minimise the potential for one expert (or both experts) being
called to give evidence in response to the evidence presented by the other expert.
When Grant Thornton (2015) asked 108 lawyers across Canada about alternative
approaches of adducing expert evidence, concurrent evidence was reported in 2015 as the
least favoured, with concerns being expressed that:
• lawyers from each side are required to agree on how the process will run;
• counsel needs to consider not only the expertise of the expert, but also the expert’s
debating skills and ability to react quickly in a concurrent evidence process;
430 [6.20.200]
• presenting concurrent evidence may unintentionally give the perception that the two
experts are equal in credentials, reputation and experience, when in fact that is not the
case;
• some experts may become advocates in a concurrent evidence setting;
• the personality of the experts can impact the case, such as bullying tactics;
• matters involving opinion evidence are not usually black or white, so it is still up to the
judge to assess the credibility of each expert and make a decision; and
• it is possible that the two experts will not agree on anything, thus defeating the purpose
of finding commonality within the expert evidence.
McDougall JA in Caruana v Darouti [2014] NSWCA 85 at [123], an occupier’s liability case,

commented:
[T]his court has had occasion in the past to comment on the unsatisfactory practice of
tendering reports of experts, whose views are sharply in conflict, without any attempt to
resolve the conflict through processes such as conclave and joint report, concurrent
evidence sessions, or old fashioned cross-examination …
Similar points were made by McClellan CJ at CL in Halverson v Dobler [2006] NSWSC 1307
at [101], observing:
This process [of concurrent evidence] proved both highly productive and efficient and has
been of great benefit to me in resolving this case. The discussion was sustained at a high
level of objectivity by all participants, each of whom displayed a genuine endeavour to
assist the court to resolve the problems. The fact that ultimately they disagreed on critical
issues was not due to anything other than a genuine difference of opinion about the
appropriate conclusion to be drawn from the known facts.
(See too Visy Packaging Pty Ltd v Siegwerk Australia Pty Ltd (2013) 301 ALR 560; [2013] FCA
231 at [53] (Gray J); Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd v AstraZeneca AB (2013) 101 IPR 11; [2013]
FCA 368 at [39] (Middleton J).)
However, unsurprisingly, concurrent evidence has not been successful in all instances:
see Qantas Airways Ltd [2004] ACompT 9.
On balance, though, in spite of some academic commentators having expressed
reservations about concurrent evidence (most notably Edmond (2009)), it is apparent that
the overwhelming majority of judges and tribunal members (see Administrative Appeals
Tribunal (2005); McClellan (2010); Downes (2004); Rares (2010); Pepper (2012)) who have
utilised the concurrent evidence procedure have been positive about its benefits. So strong
an informed view is not lightly to be rejected.
The advantages of concurrent evidence over traditional forms of adducing of expert
evidence have been usefully summarised by Cheeseman (2006/2007, p 57):
• the evidence on one topic is all given at the same time;
• the process refines the issues to those that are essential;
• because the experts are confronting one another, they are much less likely to act
adversarially;
• a narrowing and refining of areas of agreement and disagreement is achieved before
cross-examination; and
• cross-examination takes place in the presence of all the experts so that they can
immediately be asked to comment on the answers of colleagues, potentially even
utilising technology so that experts in different places can nonetheless be ‘present’: see
Re International Fund for Animal Welfare (Australia) Pty Ltd and Minister for Environment
and Heritage (2006) 42 AAR 262; [2006] AATA 94.
The New South Wales Law Reform Commission (2005, para 6.51) has observed that the
procedure employed by the Land and Environment Court has met with:
[6.20.200] 431
overwhelming support from experts and their professional organisations. They find that,
not being confined to answering questions put by the advocates, they are better able to
communicate their opinions to the court. They believe that there is less risk that their
opinions will be distorted by the advocates’ skills. It is also significantly more efficient in
time.
(See also McClellan (2005a; 2005b; 2005c); Rares (2010); Pepper (2012).)
The New South Wales Law Reform Commission (2005, para 6.56) concluded that:
The giving of concurrent evidence has very significant advantages. Especially where there
are more than two relevant experts, the process can save time, minimising the time spent
on preliminaries and allowing the key points to be quickly identified and discussed.
Perhaps more importantly, the process moves somewhat away from lawyers interrogating
experts toward a structured professional discussion between peers in the relevant field.
The experience in the Law and Environment Court indicates that the nature of the
evidence is affected by this feature, and that experts typically make more concessions, and
state matters more frankly and reasonably, than they might have done under the
traditional type of cross-examination. Similarly, it seems that the questions may tend to be
more constructive and helpful than the sort of questions sometimes encountered in
traditional cross-examination.
The Australian Law Reform Commission (2000, para 6.117) noted that:
It has been the judges’ experience that having both parties’ experts present their views at
the same time is very valuable. In contrast to the conventional approach, where an interval
of up to several weeks may separate the experts’ testimony, the panel approach enables
the judge to compare and consider the competing opinions on a fair basis. In addition, the
court has found that experts themselves approve of the procedures and they welcome it as
a better way of informing the Court. There is also symbolic and practical importance in
removing the experts from their position in the camp of the party who called them.
It recommended (Recommendation 67) that:

Procedures to adduce expert evidence in a panel format should be encouraged wherever
appropriate. The Commission recommends that the Family Court and the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal establish rules or practice directions setting down such procedures,
using the Federal Court Rules as a model.
(See also the recommendations of the Victorian Law Reform Commission (2008, p 512).)
Directions for concurrent evidence orders

[6.20.240] Rule 23.15 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and s 65K of the Civil Procedure
Act 2010 (Vic) empower the judge to direct that the evidence of expert witnesses called in
relation to the same or similar questions be given concurrently.
Concurrent evidence orders are increasingly often being used in most civil courts in
Australia, as well as by administrative tribunals. For instance, FM McInnis (2005)
described the following innovative orders from Qantas Airways Ltd [2004] ACompT 9 per
Goldberg J:
1. The parties deliver to the experts later this afternoon or early this evening a
number of questions or issues to which the tribunal wishes to direct the experts’
attention and which it will ask them to address tomorrow.
2. Each of the experts, when he received the list of questions or issues, is not to
discuss those matters with anyone before being sworn in to give evidence
tomorrow.
3. Those questions and issues will be made available to counsel overnight, but the
tribunal does not wish the dissemination of the questions or issues to go any
further at this stage.
4. The tribunal proposes to adopt the following procedure in relation to the giving
of the expert’s evidence tomorrow:
(a) The five experts will be sworn in at the same time;
432 [6.20.240]
(b) Each of them will be invited to make an opening statement of around

15 minutes as to how they see the issues in terms of their evidence and
the core issues in the proceedings at this stage;
(c) Then the experts will be invited to ask questions of any of the other of
the experts;
(d) Then the tribunal will open the floor between the five experts for any
dialogue which they wish to undertake, having regard to what has
preceded that dialogue earlier in the morning;
(e) The experts will then have the opportunity of about 10 minutes to sum
up the position as they see it from their point of view in relation to the
issues in respect of which their evidence and their participation is
relevant;
(f) Then counsel would be given the opportunity to cross-examine. So far as
cross-examination is concerned, or questioning, depending on who asks
the questions, the extent to which the questions might be leading is a
matter of flexibility. Each counsel would cross-examine what I might call
the five witnesses who are called by the opposing parties, but not their
own witnesses. After that range of cross-examination has been
completed, then they will be given a final opportunity for re-examination.
The following is a summary of the directions given by Edwards-Stuart J in Fluor Ltd v

Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industry Co Ltd in the Technology and Construction Court on
15 January 2016:
(a) Expert evidence will be given adopting a hybrid procedure involving both joint
examination and cross-examination.
(b) The Claimant must select three of its experts to be lead experts, one of whom will
deal with issues relating to ultrasonic testing. …
(c) Each party is to select not more than six topics for discussion between the experts
in each of the three disciplines. …
(d) The expert evidence in each discipline is to be completed in 1 1/2 days, but the
parties may agree to lengthen or shorten this period in the case of any particular
discipline, provided that an overall time of 4 1/2 days for expert evidence is not
exceeded.
(e) Whilst the precise procedure will be determined following the openings in the
light of the topics (and it may not be the same for each discipline), in the absence
of any further direction, the default procedure will be as follows:
(i) One expert from each discipline will take part in giving evidence by way
of joint examination [hence, both experts of the same discipline were sworn in
together]
(ii) The process will begin by the Court inviting each expert to give a brief
summary of his opinion on the relevant topic and thereafter, each expert
will be invited to indicate the extent of his agreement with his opposite
number and to identify the areas of dispute and the reasons for them.
This will probably take, on average, about [10] minutes per topic. [hence,
this stage of the joint expert witness examination was judge-led]
(iii) Counsel for each party will then have an opportunity for brief
cross-examination of the opposing party’s expert. Each party may have
[2] hours cross-examination per discipline. Thus, if there are 12 topics
and 1 1/2 days is allowed for each discipline, this will allow counsel
approximately [10] minutes of cross-examination per topic (although it
will be open to counsel to use the time as he thinks fit between the
various topics) [hence, this stage was the cross-examination that PD 35.11
permits to follow the judge-led examination. In this case, that cross-examination
was not limited in nature or extent, but it was limited in time]
[6.20.240] 433
(iv) At the conclusion of cross-examination, the Court will resume the joint
examination by inviting each expert to identify what he considers to be
the real point in dispute and why he disagrees with the other side’s
expert. On the same assumptions, this will probably take [5–7] minutes.
[hence, there was no provision for re-examination; instead, the judge again led
the joint examination, with a view to identifying the ‘real point in dispute’, and
the key reasons as to why the experts disagreed]
(f) Thus, the overall allocation time by activity per discipline will be 2 hours joint
examination, 4 hours cross-examination, and 1 1/2 hours by way of joint
examination in conclusion.
Note: since this is a novel procedure, each party may, if it wishes, make further brief
submissions in writing on the form of this draft direction within 7 days, with even briefer
submissions in reply within 3 days thereafter.
(Civil Justice Council, Civil Litigation Review Working Group (2016, p 33).)
Carson et al (2013) have usefully identified the following considerations to which
attention should be given when experts are called upon to give concurrent evidence:
• The facilities of the Court or Tribunal, including the use of microphones, and
consideration such as ‘who will go first’, and whether each expert will be given equal
opportunity to respond to a question.
• What is the respective standing of experts who will be in the ‘hot-tub’ together? Is it
likely that one may dominate or one defer to another due to seniority?
• The importance of early communication to experts as to the format, including whether
the experts need to prepare opening statements.
• If your expert is to be asked to deliver an opening statement, how long should this be,
will you (and can you) be involved in its preparation, and how will such a statement be
treated as evidence?
• Whether it is likely that your expert will need to pose questions to the other expert(s),
and if so, whether they are prepared for that role.
• If in the course of the ‘hot-tub’, the expert to expert questioning process leads to new
issues or areas of expert opinion emerging, how will this be dealt with?
Concurrent evidence in criminal litigation

[6.20.260] To date, the overwhelming majority of the uptake of concurrent evidence as a
style of providing expert evidence to the courts has been in civil litigation: see particularly
in the medical negligence context Madden, Cockburn and Cockburn (2015). However, in a
modest number of cases in Australian criminal courts, the procedure has been used with
consent of the parties before a judge sitting alone, in voir dire examinations, and before
magistrates in summary criminal proceedings in New South Wales. In addition, it is
regularly used in Queensland’s Mental Health Court.
An example of its usage was in the New South Wales District Court in a judge-alone
trial which dealt with charges of dangerous driving occasioning bodily harm: R v Stanyard
[2012] NSWDC 78 at [30]. The issue in dispute related to whether the driving of the
accused was dangerous to other persons at the time of the impact of the one vehicle on the
other. Both the prosecution and the accused called an expert on how fast the vehicle was
travelling and whether it had become airborne as it travelled over the crest of a dune
immediately after the victims suffered their injuries. Judge Berman described the process
adopted for the trial in his reasons. He noted that the experts had prepared a joint report
that identified where one expert’s opinion had changed, where they had reached
agreement, and where they continued to disagree.
Similarly, concurrent evidence was given in the high profile Western Australian
Supreme Court trial of barrister Lloyd Rayney for the murder of his wife. Scientists from
the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation gave concurrent
434 [6.20.260]
evidence in relation to the comparability of brick dust found on the deceased woman’s bra
and bricks that paved the Rayney home. Ultimately, Mr Rayney was found not guilty.
However, the situation was unusual in that the two scientists who gave concurrent
evidence were joint authors of the same report.
Another high profile criminal case in which concurrent evidence was used was the
murder trial of Jeffrey Gilham, who was charged with killing both of his parents at the
family home. Three forensic pathologists gave evidence in a concurrent format: Gilham v
The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 22; [2012] NSWCCA 131.
In Canada, reflections on the repercussions of problematic evidence that has led to
miscarriages of justice led the Public Prosecution Service to observe:
At present, the concept of ‘hot-tubbing’ is not a staple in criminal trials. As noted by
Jackson LJ in his Final Report, it remains to be seen which types of cases respond well to
the concurrent evidence approach, what costs are saved, and whether the parties involved
perceive the process as enabling each side’s case to be properly considered. There is little
doubt, however, that successfully soliciting the viewpoints of multiple expert witnesses at
the same time by allowing them to discuss complex, difficult issues together can be very
useful for any trier of fact.
(Federal/Provincial/Territorial Heads of Prosecutions, Subcommittee on the Prevention of

Wrongful Convictions (2011, p 140).)
In Victoria, Practice Note No 2 of 2014, Expert Evidence in Criminal Trials, explicitly
contemplates concurrent evidence in criminal trials. It provides that, where two or more
parties have served expert evidence relating to the same issue or relating to two or more
closely related issues, the commissioning parties agree, and the court so orders, ‘evidence
may be given by the experts … concurrently (ie with all of the experts present in court,
sworn or affirmed at the same time)’.
However, tactical considerations have led most who appear to defend persons accused
of serious criminal offences to be leery of giving away the potential tactical advantage of
calling their own expert at a time of their choosing – namely, at a time close to the
conclusion of evidence and the judge’s charges.
This matter was canvassed in the 2016 Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration
(AIJA) study (Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016)). The
tendency was for judges and prosecutors to be enthusiastic about, or at least interested in,
the procedure, but for defence lawyers to express reservations about whether it would be
advantageous to their clients – although some expressed guarded support for it in
appropriate cases. For the most part, experts who had experience of being a witness in
civil matters where concurrent evidence had been taken were positive about the
experience.
One expert suggested that only two people should be in the witness box at the same
time when concurrent evidence is given. However, an advantage identified by an expert
who was interviewed was that:
One can fill in gaps for each other, because the border of one’s knowledge is always a
vague area and it depends very much on a person’s professional experience as to how
clear that border is or how vague or grey the border area is with anybody’s expert
evidence.
To similar effect, a psychiatrist expert expressed concern that a:
danger of having hot-tubbing with two psychiatrists together is that you could easily
mount arguments for and against each other’s reports. And then you could … end up
moulding each other’s report and you could come back to the same position or something
a bit closer to each other.
Another expert commented that:
One of the interesting things that comes out in the hot-tubbing process is that there is
often very broad agreement about the facts which might be there and what actually
[6.20.260] 435
happened and what symptoms the person experienced. … So one of the advantages that I
see of hot-tubbing is that you get everyone to agree. … Hot tubbing at least gets you down
to the base line where you agree on certain basic facts and so you then clarify what the
differences are … that saves a lot of time.
However, the expert observed that:

You can ask the same question to another expert and hear his answer and try and resolve
why there is a difference. Yes, I think that would be very useful for a jury, although, in the
more complicated cases, I wonder how much a jury actually understands.
In a similar vein, an expert recounted an experience in which the experts were sent away
by a trial judge to produce a ‘consensus statement’, but:
the barristers got all flustered and it seemed to me generally … that what was holding up
concurrent evidence was that the barristers don’t want to do it. They either are a bit
anxious around how it will be done or they just don’t want to give up their chance of their
ability to cross-examine an individual witness in court.
Another expert emphasised that he would need to be provided with the proposed
evidence for the defence in advance so that he could consider it before constituting the
expert hot tub.
A number of defence lawyers in the AIJA study differentiated between the role of the
prosecution and the responsibility of the defence to optimise the prospects of their client
being found not guilty. This was a relevant differential, it was said, because experts called
by the prosecution tend to be mainstream, while those called by the defence can be fringe,
iconoclastic or alternative; they may not bear comfortable comparison with the credentials,
experience and reliability of experts called by the prosecution. It was perceived that the
comparison may be more apparent, and damaging for the defence, either if experts gave
evidence one after the other or, more particularly, if they gave evidence at the same time
via concurrent evidence.
Judges were asked if they had had concurrent evidence adduced in trials over which
they had presided, and, if not, what had been the reasons. The view from a number of trial
lawyers and judges was that it may not be possible to use concurrent evidence without
specific authorisation, unless the parties agree or it is in the course of a voir dire. It was
also noted that concurrent evidence had been used occasionally in judge-alone criminal
trials, including where the experts were in agreement. However, a number of counsel, in
particular defence counsel, were not sufficiently familiar with how the option would
function in criminal trials, and entertained misapprehensions about how concurrent
evidence works – for instance, confusing it with pre-trial expert meetings.
When judges were asked why they had not availed themselves of the concurrent
evidence option, a number said that the parties had not asked for it. This was a similar
answer to that given by a high proportion of judges who were asked in the 1999 survey
why they had not used court-appointed experts or assessors.
The future
[6.20.280] The practice of taking ‘concurrent evidence’ from expert witnesses has a
growing number of enthusiastic proponents. Most are judges, but a significant number are
also expert witnesses; some are litigation lawyers (see, eg, Livesey (2017)). The New South
Wales Land and Environment Court adopted ‘hot tubbing’ of experts as its principal
means of eliciting expert opinion evidence where there are multiple experts with different
views (Pepper (2012)); others have followed and the popularity of the practice continues
to grow in many areas of civil and administrative litigation.
The New South Wales Law Reform Commission (2005) observed that effective
utilisation of ‘concurrent evidence’ will depend heavily upon the extent to which judges,
as against litigation parties, are prepared to embrace it as a preferable form in which
436 [6.20.280]
expert evidence can be presented to courts. It requires effective judicial management

(Rares (2010)). As yet, there is significant and at times problematic variation in the
procedures employed by different judicial officers in respect of concurrent evidence
(Young (2010); Civil Justice Council, Civil Litigation Review Working Group (2016)). Mere
swearing in of multiple experts at the one time without clearly articulated procedures and
significant judicial officer involvement is unlikely to achieve the desired objectives and
may even generate unhelpful confusion and unfairness. Among other things, it risks
giving undue prominence and influence to the most assertive (as distinct from the most
informed) experts. There is much to be said for the recommendation of the Civil Justice
Council, Civil Litigation Review Working Group (2016, p 53) that:
When considering the logistics of judge-led joint expert examination, the judge should
have regard to the procedural fairness of the hearing, and in particular, to issues such as:
(1) whether equivalent questions are being addressed to each expert, and/or
whether an equivalent opportunity to address the issues on the pre-set agenda
has been afforded to each expert;
(2) whether counsel should be invited to address any cross-examination to the
opposing expert witness at the conclusion of the judge-led questioning on each
topic, or at the overall conclusion of the judge-led expert examination, or not at
all;
(3) alternating the order in which questions on the agenda are addressed to the
experts, such that each expert has the opportunity to answer the question first, or
second, as the case may be;
(4) the physical layout of the courtroom, to ensure that the experts have equivalent
stature in the courtroom, and an equivalent opportunity to address the judge;
(5) the desirability (if any) of opening statements on the part of each expert witness.
While those who have serious reservations about concurrent evidence, such as Edmond,
Ferguson and Ward (2018) (see too Edmond (2008; 2009)), critique the phenomenon on the
basis of the diversity of approaches to its implementation per se, this fails to give adequate
recognition to the many different scenarios in which there is the potential for alternative
approaches to be taken to the reception of expert evidence in a concurrent evidence
format. It is not a one-size-fits-all scenario and there is ample scope for flexibility and
judicial innovation – it is such innovation which resulted in the procedure in the first
place. However, learning by trial and error what is most effective in terms of the
procedure is a work in progress. What is apparent is that undifferentiated, undirected
placing of experts in a ‘hot tub’ is not useful. In addition, in each case the questions asked
and the way in which they are asked, as well as the specific procedure adopted for the
concurrent evidence, need to be carefully crafted so as to optimise the potential for the
evidence to be coherent, comprehensible and such as to draw out both agreement and
disagreement among the expert witnesses.
For concurrent evidence to assist in fact-finding, experts need to be assertive and
clearly focused, about both those matters upon which they agree and those upon which
they disagree (cf Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] UKSC 13). Active judicial guidance
is needed. It requires the selection of experts who are robust, articulate and prepared and
able to articulate their positions, together with the reasons for their having reached them.
It is important that experts not descend into ‘group think’ or coalesce their views around
a person who is seen to be more assertive and influential than others. Disagreement
among experts remains legitimate; otherwise, the fallacy that there is only one correct
answer can take over. However, active steps need to be taken to ensure that experts do not
become ‘mired in mutual animosity, hostility, or a lack of respect’ (Civil Justice Council,
Civil Litigation Review Working Group (2016, p 41)) or preoccupied with arid, unhelpfully
technical or theoretical disagreements. The concurrent evidence procedure also demands
new and subtle skills of counsel: to resist the temptation to passivity in the face of judicial
[6.20.280] 437
management of the process and to ask informed questions, directed toward highlighting
pertinent aspects of their clients’ cases and toward securing a measure of compromise (or
disagreement) among the expert witnesses.
On balance, it is likely that the apparently escalating disillusionment with the
traditionally adversarial means of placing expert opinions before the courts (see
Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999; 2001); Pepper (2012); Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty,
Horan and McKimmie (2016)) will lead to increasing interest in evidence being taken
concurrently from experts so that they have a less fettered opportunity to explain to courts
and tribunals their views and the reasons for them, as well as to crystallise with greater
precision those areas upon which they agree and disagree with other experts. However,
the utility of the procedure will remain dependent upon the skills and articulateness of
experts, the adoption of focused and fair procedures by trial judges, and the constructive
involvement of well-briefed counsel.
438 [6.20.280]
Chapter 6.25
CONSECUTIVE EXPERT EVIDENCE

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [6.25.01]
Procedure for consecutive expert evidence ...................................................................... [6.25.40]
Order and directions powers .............................................................................................. [6.25.80]
The role of consecutive evidence ....................................................................................... [6.25.120]
‘And I would sooner trust the smallest slip of paper for truth,
than the strongest and most retentive memory, ever bestowed
on mortal man.’
Miller v Cotton, 5 Ga 341, 349 (1848).
Introduction
[6.25.01] An option to improve the capacity of the fact-finder to evaluate expert evidence is
for experts to be called during litigation in a sequence that has them following on directly,
or at least closely, one after another. Such a procedure is described as ‘consecutive expert
evidence’ (see Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016)). Its
principal advantage is one of juxtaposition, enabling details of evidence to be recalled by
the fact-finder – judge or jury – more readily, and assisting the comparison of expert
evidence by witnesses called for the prosecution/plaintiff with evidence called for the
defendant.
This chapter introduces the concept of consecutive expert evidence and refers to
occasions when it has been availed of and the arguments for and against it. However,
importantly, for the present, such an encroachment on the usual order for the calling of
witnesses can only be utilised with the agreement of the parties.
Procedure for consecutive expert evidence

[6.25.40] Generally, the order of witnesses is a matter to be determined by the parties, not
the presiding judge by direction or order. However, the expedient of consecutive expert
evidence, which necessarily interferes with the usual order of witnesses, has been
encouraged by some academic writers (see, eg, Horan (2012, p 135); Henderson and
Seymour (2013, 4.4.2)), as well as some practitioners. Lord Neuberger (2014), for instance,
joined Sir Rupert Jackson in:
wondering whether the present system of consecutive cross-examination of expert
witnesses is always the best way to go about testing the expert evidence. The formal
cross-examination of witness 1, following which he can hardly ever be recalled, followed
by the formal cross-examination of witness 2 is fun for the advocates and can be good
theatre, but the rather gladiatorial and artificial nature of the cross-examination process
may not be the best way of arriving at the truth, although it sometimes can be.
Henderson and Seymour (2013, 4.4.2) have observed that the advantage of consecutive
evidence is that:
it removes the delay between opposing experts’ testimony, thereby reducing the strain on
fact-finders’ memories. The follow-on format may also make it easier for experts to
schedule time to sit in on each other’s evidence rather than finding time to return to court
at a later date.
Consecutive evidence has been utilised in both civil and criminal proceedings by
agreement of the parties. An example was the lengthy Pong Su litigation in Victoria, which
involved four men convicted of importing heroin to Australia on a North Korean freighter:
see on appeal (not dealing with the issue) R v Teng (2009) 22 VR 706; [2009] VSCA 148.
[6.25.40] 439
While latitude exists for directions to facilitate the giving of evidence in civil matters,
there is less scope in criminal proceedings on the basis that it is the right of the defence to
determine at the end of the prosecution case whether to call any evidence and whether to
make a ‘no-case’ submission.
In feedback to the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration’s expert evidence
study, published in 2016, a judge in a criminal trial stated that they were firmly opposed to
consecutive evidence:
It means that a party will be calling their expert out of turn. It interrupts the traditional
flow of an adversarial case. I do think that people have a capacity to retain this complex
evidence for longer than the fifteen minutes between experts and perhaps this should
happen in [some] cases but I think that’s better than calling the witnesses out of order.
(Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016, 3.19).)

However, another judge extolled the advantages of consecutive expert evidence,
observing that while it would rely very much on cooperation between the parties, ‘if the
jury are able to hear one [expert witness] very shortly, if not immediately, following the
other, or others, it would very much aid in comprehension of their evidence to see where
there is common ground, and where there’s not’ (see Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty,
Horan and McKimmie (2016, 3.18)).
A prosecutor particularly familiar with sexual assault trials had a similar view, stating
that expert evidence called consecutively was her preferred approach (see Freckelton,
Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016, 3.16)).
However, the reality is that parties in both civil and criminal litigation, particularly
defendants, will often conclude that it is strategically disadvantageous for them to agree to
juxtaposition of the testimony of experts, on the basis that to clarify points and bases of
disagreement between experts will not assist their case concept which may be generated
by a wish for obfuscation rather than clear delineation of points of expert disagreement.
Order and directions powers

[6.25.80] As to the powers of the courts to order consecutive evidence in the New Zealand
context, Henderson and Seymour (2013, 2.4.2) have argued that:
It is already possible for expert witnesses to give evidence consecutively on the
application of the defence under an explicit provision of the Crimes Act 1961. Further, there
is nothing to prevent a judge from granting the Crown’s application under the courts’
inherent jurisdiction. Neither the Crimes Act 1961 nor the Evidence Act 2006 require
evidence to be called in the conventional order, provided that the parties’ and, most
especially, the accused’s right to see, hear and challenge the evidence is preserved. In the
Family Court the path to alternative processes is even smoother since it operates a
semi-inquisitorial process. [Footnote omitted.]
Similarly, for instance, under r 19(5)(xi) of the Planning and Environment Court Rules 2010
(Qld), the court may order or make directions ‘requiring expert witnesses in the same field
to give evidence consecutively, concurrently or in another way’.
In addition, s 232A of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) provides that:
232A Trial judge may give directions about the giving of concurrent or consecutive
evidence by expert witnesses
(1) This section applies despite sections 226 and 231(2).
(2) The trial judge, with the consent of the prosecution and the accused, may direct
that 2 or more expert witnesses give evidence concurrently or consecutively.
(3) In determining the procedure to be followed for the giving of evidence
concurrently or consecutively, the trial judge may direct that any expert witness –
(a) give evidence at any stage of the trial, including after all factual evidence
has been adduced on behalf of the prosecution and the accused; or
440 [6.25.80]
Consecutive expert evidence | CH 6.25
(b) give an oral exposition of the opinion of the expert witness on any issue;
or
(c) give the opinion of the expert witness of any opinion given by another
expert witness; or
(d) be examined, cross-examined or re-examined in a particular manner or
sequence, including by putting to each expert witness in turn each
question relevant to one matter or issue at a time; or
(e) be permitted to ask questions of any other expert witness who is
concurrently giving evidence.
(4) The trial judge may question any expert witness to identify the real issues in
dispute between 2 or more expert witnesses, including questioning more than
one expert witness at the same time.
(5) Nothing in this section limits any other power the court may have in relation to
case management, evidence or witnesses, including expert witnesses.
On 1 July 2014, a practice note of the County and Supreme Courts of Victoria, entitled
“Expert Evidence in Criminal Trials”, came into force in Victoria. It explicitly contemplates
consecutive (as well as concurrent) expert evidence, by consent:
11.1 Where –
(a) two or more parties have served expert evidence relating to the same issue or
relating to two or more closely related issues;
(b) the commissioning parties agree; and
(c) the Court so orders,
evidence may be given by the experts consecutively (ie one after the other) or
concurrently (ie with all of the experts present in court, sworn or affirmed at the
same time).
11.2 The procedure to be followed for consecutive or concurrent evidence is to be
determined by the Court, with the expectation that the parties will have conferred in
advance and attempted to agree on the procedure.
The role of consecutive evidence

[6.25.120] Consecutive evidence is one of a number of procedural options that has the
potential to assist fact-finders, especially juries, to appreciate the differences between
parties’ expert evidence more accurately, and thus to enhance the quality of decision-
making. It facilitates better recall and is likely to assist in the quality of cross-examination
by juxtaposing one expert’s evidence with that of another.
However, for the present, although there is some latitude in courts’ inherent powers in
civil matters, and there are some court rules which facilitate the capacity of judges to order
that expert evidence by different parties be given consecutively, it is seldom undertaken
save with parties’ consent.
In criminal litigation, while Victoria has taken the initiative of formally recognising the
potential for expert evidence to be given consecutively, this can only be done with the
consent of the parties – a scenario which will only be seen where parties identify a
strategic advantage, or at least no disadvantage, or a major convenience, in such a
procedure. This will be comparatively rare.
[6.25.120] 441
PART 7 – EXPERT EVIDENCE IN
COURT
Chapter 7.0: Preparation & examination of the expert

witness................................................................................... 445
Chapter 7.05: Cross-examination of the expert witness .......... 483
Chapter 7.10: Sentencing evidence by the expert witness....... 517
443
Chapter 7.0
PREPARATION AND EXAMINATION
OF THE EXPERT WITNESS
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [7.0.01]
Advice to expert witnesses before court ........................................................................... [7.0.40]
Advice for expert witnesses not experienced in courts ................................................. [7.0.50]
Exclusion of expert witnesses ............................................................................................. [7.0.90]
Demonstrating appropriate expertise ................................................................................ [7.0.130]
Bias ........................................................................................................................................... [7.0.170]
Receipt of fees ........................................................................................................................ [7.0.180]
Association ............................................................................................................................. [7.0.190]
Unacceptable advocacy ........................................................................................................ [7.0.200]
Language ................................................................................................................................. [7.0.250]
Bases of evidence .................................................................................................................. [7.0.290]
The hypothetical question ................................................................................................... [7.0.330]
Evidence of speculation ....................................................................................................... [7.0.370]
Eliciting of evidence ............................................................................................................. [7.0.410]
Use of diagrams, slides and other forms of demonstrative exhibit ............................ [7.0.450]
Evidence of experiments ...................................................................................................... [7.0.490]
Avoidance of admissibility traps ........................................................................................ [7.0.530]
Re-examination of the expert witness ............................................................................... [7.0.570]
‘The weight to be given to inferences drawn by an expert will

depend upon, inter alia, the certainty of his facts and the
stringency of his principles.’
Chambers v Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1 at 24 per Mahoney JA.
The author acknowledges with gratitude the input on this chapter in earlier editions from Hugh
Selby.
Introduction
[7.0.01] This chapter has two purposes. The first is to assist advocates to improve the
preparation and presentation of an expert for giving evidence before a court or tribunal.
The second is to provide insights and guidance for ‘expert witnesses’ who have had little
litigation experience and are looking for information to enhance their preparation and
presentation.
Issues of ‘how best to approach’ a problem commonly arise in forensic medical,
scientific and accounting work. For example, a crime scene specialist collects some
evidence, such as a firearm. It is of interest to the laboratory-based specialists because of
‘discharge residues’, bloodstains and fingerprints. These are three distinct fields and each
specialist must ensure that his or her contact with and testing of the item does nothing to
disturb or compromise the evidentiary material to be used by the others.
While the work of various experts may complement one another, it is also common to
find that the work of one expert is a prerequisite to the work of another. An example is an
accountant’s opinion of the loss suffered by a business in which the prior expert valuation
of property is required.
These scenarios illustrate why early (and ongoing) consultation between lawyers and
potential expert report writers and witnesses is at the very least worthwhile and often
essential. Moreover, in the quest for efficiency in hearing cases, it is now usual for courts
and tribunals (by their rules and their practice notes) to impose requirements upon the
parties and their witnesses in terms of the form and content of reports in non-criminal
and, in some jurisdictions, even criminal matters.
[7.0.01] 445
Part 7 – Expert evidence in court
Both experts and advocates must refer to and adhere to the relevant rules of court
which set out guidelines or codes of conduct for experts when preparing their reports.
Those guidelines prescribe an expert’s duties in ensuring the reliability of data, the
appropriateness of methodologies, and the declaration of any shortfall in required data, as
well as how to deal with changing circumstances. There are also rules of court which
prescribe pre-trial meetings (sometimes called ‘conclaves’) of experts to delimit the issues,
or require single expert procedures. Legal representatives must ensure that the prescribed
time schedules are met. For a more detailed discussion of these various rules, see Ch 5.05.
A variation on this court-led approach to requiring the experts to delimit the issues is
the ‘reference out’ procedure in civil matters in which the court appoints an expert (called
a referee) to determine an expert issue and report to the trial judge after considering the
view of each party’s expert. This process is described in detail in Ch 6.10.
As crucial as the decision to select the right expert to give evidence is, even more
important is the portrayal of the expert through his or her report and through his or her
in-court performance as a person who should be believed and who is careful, reliable and
authoritative in his or her field. This means that expert witnesses must create and
maintain a positive impression. Accordingly, the early part of examination-in-chief should
be directed toward establishing not only the expertise but the integrity, renown and
professionalism of the expert. In part it is an issue of impression management.
The advocate needs to anticipate before and at the hearing how the other side will
present its case. A plaintiff’s advocate or a prosecutor will use examination-in-chief both to
develop his or her side’s story and to anticipate and rebut the very different facts and
arguments that might be put by the defence. Likewise, when defence witnesses are giving
their evidence-in-chief, their advocate should develop his or her account persuasively and
then convincingly explain and rebut the account already given by the prosecution or
plaintiff witnesses. It follows that although an expert may have prepared a detailed
written report before the hearing, there may be a few or many further questions put to the
expert by his or her advocate, dealing with issues that have arisen after the expert’s report
was received.
How an expert’s evidence is presented depends upon the rules of the court, the quality
of the documents, and the competence of the advocate. Generally, the expert’s written
report is not evidence unless it is formally tendered. Its role at court may simply be as the
primer for the advocate’s questions to the expert whose evidence is given by spoken word
from the witness box. In addition, it will have alerted the judge and the other side to the
essence of the expert’s opinions and the reasons why they are being expressed.
At the other extreme are those courts where the witness who has written a report is
expected to do no more than confirm that the opinions expressed in the report remain his
or her view and that the witness has nothing to add. A good advocate will still want to
ensure that his or her witness is well prepared for the coming cross-examination by
settling the expert with some introductory questions and then seeking to ask questions
that emphasise, supplement or amplify material in the report. Such a process also allows
the building of rapport between the witness and the court; it is vital if the court is to invest
trust in the expert as reliable. Sometimes (where permitted) the advocate may lead the
witness step by step through the report, highlighting those parts most advantageous to the
case. But whether the opportunity to expand on the written material is limited or
generous, it is important for the expert to bear in mind that his or her report must be
written to persuade of its content; this is distinct from the witness acting in any way as an
advocate for a party to the litigation: a role expressly precluded by courts’ rules of court,
codes of conduct and practice directions, as well as by the common law. The expert’s
report is a statement which not only reflects the opinions within it, but also bespeaks the
character of the author.
446 [7.0.01]
Preparation and examination of the expert witness | CH 7.0
Litigation and public inquiries often raise a number of issues: what happened (who,
where, when, how and why); the choice of legal principles to ‘interpret’ what happened;
and what the proper consequences are for the participants. Because the investigation of
what happened is always coloured by memory, hindsight and self-interest, it is inevitable
that its reconstruction can only ever be approximate. Good advocacy by a legal
representative marshals the contributions from each witness to build a construct that is
most favourable to one’s side.
The teamwork which is essential to good case preparation and presentation can be
understood through the following analogy. Imagine a vibrant market scene which is being
re-created by a team of painters on a very large canvas. Each painter has an allocated task
which will illustrate some aspect of market life. There is one painter who has the
responsibility to decide what will immediately capture the viewers’ interest, what is to be
stressed, and what is to be deftly understated. This is the advocate. There may, for
example, be a reason to draw attention away from some activity in the foreground while
emphasising some activity which is happening deep within the market. In this project
collaboration is vital. The other painters are the witnesses.
The advocate also presents the prepared work to an audience and explains its features
– the courtroom ‘showing’. To do this, a competent advocate will set out the overall case
themes, the particular topics for each witness, and the linkages among the witnesses, both
in the opening statement and by the evidence given by each witness.
An expert needs to be assisted to know his or her place within the order of witnesses
and whether the expert’s evidence is pivotal or just supportive, as well as what the case in
general terms is about. The case plan script reflects not only the fact-finding, legal
principles and outcomes to which reference was made above; as well, the advocate should
be considering the presentation characteristics of each witness. This is because all evidence
is evaluated by decision-makers (magistrates, judges, tribunal members and jurors) in
terms of both the content and the messenger.
Advice to expert witnesses before court

[7.0.40] Expert witnesses should be familiar with courtroom procedures before they give
evidence. Etiquette such as standing whenever a judge or magistrate enters or leaves,
referring to the judicial officer appropriately, and avoiding ‘no go’ areas of the court (such
as between the judge or judge’s associate and the table) are important in showing suitable
respect and avoiding the impression of a lack of forensic professionalism (see Hampel,
Brimer and Kune (2008)). So too is becoming silent whenever a judicial officer or tribunal
member speaks.
The following general preparation strategies for lawyers have been found to assist
experts to give their evidence persuasively:
(1) developing a rapport and a comfortable working relationship with expert
witnesses, ensuring that requests which might impair the experts’ independence
are not made;
(2) enlisting their help in finding the clearest and most interesting way to explain
what they have to communicate;
(3) explaining where their evidence fits into the general ‘case theory’; this is an
explanation that needs to be given to the witness at least twice: first, out of court,
and then again when the witness is being examined. An advocate who states what
topics will be covered with a witness, the order in which they will be covered, and
their priority, is reassuring the witness and giving the trier of fact a clear outline of
what is to follow, when and why;
(4) emphasising the importance of their explaining all exhibits comprehensively so
that the exhibits’ significance and relevance can readily be understood;
[7.0.40] 447
(5) practising concise questions and succinct, responsive answer techniques (note:
this is not coaching a witness in what to say, as that is improper); and
(6) explaining how objections are made and how witnesses should deal with them.
Advice for expert witnesses not experienced in courts
[7.0.50] The following suggestions are made for expert witnesses who are not experienced
or who have modest experience in courts.
(1) If you have never given evidence before as an expert witness, go to a court and
familiarise yourself with its ambience, layout and procedures.
Any witness performs better when he or she feels comfortable. Visit the court to observe
and listen to the manner in which the judge or magistrate treats witnesses, and try out the
seat in the witness box, the layout and the acoustics. Make sure you have water to drink
(placed out of the way, so you cannot knock it over) to avoid ‘dry mouth syndrome’.
(2) Close to the time of the hearing, prepare carefully for court by reading through any
notes that you have and ensure that you are familiar with any reports that you have
written and reports by other experts with which you have been supplied.
It can be helpful too if it is some time since you wrote your report, or if the area is
dynamic or controversial, to do a quick check of the relevant professional literature to
ascertain if there have been any significant recent developments in the area.
If you have referred to reviews, studies or scholarly articles in your report, make sure
you are ready to discuss them in your evidence. It can be useful to bring copies to court to
assist yourself in answering questions and, potentially, to enable them to be tendered by
counsel.
It is useful also to have your materials tagged and appropriately ordered so that you
can have ready access to them if you need to do so in court. It is important both to be well
organised and to appear to be so – these are basic attributes of professionalism which can
impact upon your credibility.
(3) Try to ascertain both the factual and the legal issues that have brought about your
involvement as an expert.
This gives you context. It is the lawyer’s task to ensure that their experts are adequately
instructed about the issues in a case: Gray and Williams (2008). What is adequate will vary
from one case to another. Sometimes an expert will be reporting upon an essential, but
non-controversial, factual element. For example, if an expert received a sample on a given
date, tested it according to the standard method, and obtained results which are presented
as evidence, there may well be no cross-examination. There is no reason for the expert to
look beyond the report. At the other extreme, an expert may be expressing an opinion
with which other experts disagree because of challenges to factual assumptions, selection
of methodology, and the stated confidence in the results. This expert needs an
understanding of the factual issues in dispute and the significance of his or her evidence.
Any expert should be familiar with reports that he or she has previously produced in
the matter and any evidence he or she has already given in the case, such as at committal.
Of course, this requires an amount of pre-hearing preparation on the part of the witness.
An expert should seek a lawyer’s advice before including in a formal report
contentious information given by a person who is not a party to the case. There are several
rules of evidence which may apply and a breach of the rules, even if inadvertent, may
cause a jury trial to be aborted, meaning that there must be a fresh trial – which will be
448 [7.0.50]
expensive and time-consuming. Here are two examples where the problem of how to
report information may arise.
Example 1
You are an experienced doctor working in an Emergency Department when called
upon to treat a wound. The patient ‘V’ tells you that:
• she was the victim in a fight that took place outside a nightclub;
• she saw D with a knife;
• she saw D lunge at her with the knife;
• she heard D say to her, ‘Take that, you bitch’; and
• ‘I know I shouldn’t wind D up like that, but it’s such fun to see D barking mad’.
For your treatment of V, it is relevant to know that the wound was caused by a knife.
At D’s trial for assault upon V, the decision-maker will want to know the nature of the
wound, its seriousness, and with what it might have been inflicted. That is expert
evidence which you can give.
For the decision-maker, it is also relevant to know the circumstances which led up to
the stabbing. Evidence of what was done, said and seen can be given by those who
were present. V and D are the key witnesses, but other observers may also be called.
You, however, were not present and therefore you cannot give ‘firsthand’ evidence of
what happened between V and D. It is likely to be highly unfair to D to permit you to
give evidence of what V told you, as most of that conversation incriminates D.
However, suppose that D has a poor memory of the events and, in particular, has no
memory of what caused her to lose control and attack V. Clearly, the admission made
to you by V as to the deliberate winding up of D is relevant to each and all of the
following possible outcomes: a defence to the charge; to persuade the prosecution to
accept a plea of guilty to a lesser charge; and as a mitigating factor during sentencing.
Note that this factual information came to you while you were carrying out your
‘expert’ work, but it is not a matter of your expertise or your opinion. With respect to
this information, your evidence is as to matters of fact.
Your Emergency Department conversation with V should be reported to the police
investigator, whose report will be passed to both the prosecution and the defence. It is
possible that V will deny ‘winding up’ D at trial. It may then follow that the defence
will seek to have you give evidence of that conversation with V. If your expert
evidence is given before V gives evidence, then you may be recalled. If your expert
evidence is given after V, then the defence may cross-examine you on your
conversation with V.
Your expert medical report, however, would normally be limited to your being told
that the wound was inflicted by a knife, that in your experience the presentation of the
wound was consistent with being caused by a knife, how serious or not the wound
was, and that you treated it in a particular way.
[7.0.50] 449
Example 2
You are an accountant who has been retained by the wife in a family law property
dispute. Your task is to prepare a report on the marriage asset pool. She tells you, ‘Just
before I told him that I was leaving, he told me that he’d been amazingly lucky with
off-course betting, a good six figure sum’. Can you take this factor into your
calculations? No, at least not at the report-writing stage. The wife can give evidence in
court about the conversation with her husband because such winnings are relevant to
the size of the asset pool. The husband has not told you about such winnings and
what the wife tells you about that supposed betting luck is not evidence that can be
used against the husband. Hence your report should not refer to the wife’s allegation.
It is quite common for an expert’s task to involve other people in data gathering and
testing. Both in laboratories and within busy accountancy practices, it is usual to
allocate tasks and to rely on the results for the final analysis. Within hospitals, too, it is
expected that a doctor will look at the notes made by the ward nurses. Sometimes the
actions and records of those other people have to be proved; that is, the authors must
come to give the evidence of what they did, and what they noted, out of their own
mouths. For that reason, it is good practice to ensure that such delegated activities are
clearly documented and that those who did the work can be readily identified.
Finally, it is most important that the expert witness is informed about legislation that
may have an impact upon the kinds of recommendations – for example, in a
sentencing context that might be advanced. Sentencing options change. To come to
court and recommend a discontinued option exposes the expert as being inexpert or
out-of-date. Such misconceptions or misunderstandings can usually be dispelled by
the use of draft reports and early conferences.
(4) Dress appropriately for court.

Physical appearance affects the impressions of observers in all settings; the courtroom is
no exception. Courts are formal, conservative settings. The expert is called in order to
convince, not to alienate. Do not compromise that aim by confronting or distracting the
Bench or jury with ‘unusual’ clothes or accessories. Wear reasonably formal business or
office attire in which you feel comfortable, which looks professional, and which is not
distracting for the court.
Dalby (2007) usefully gives the following advice:
‘[D]ress for a funeral and hope it’s not your own.’ Dark business attire (black or navy)
with minimal adornment is best. The courtroom is one of the most conservative venues
our society has. There are flags hanging, official coats of arms, … and gowned judges; even
the lawyers wear robes in federal courts. This is not a place for promoting the new
casual-Friday look. The formal look must be balanced with comfort … While you may ask
for a chair, most experts find that testimony delivered from a standing position carries
more authority. Comfortable shoes are a must for experts.
450 [7.0.50]
(5) Don't be late. Give yourself time.

There is nothing more guaranteed to fluster a witness than irritating the presiding judge,
magistrate or tribunal member by arriving after the appointed hour to give evidence. It is
worth giving yourself some extra time at the courthouse to settle your nerves, speak with
counsel, and gather your composure before going into the witness box (see Gutheil
(2009)). Tom Grisso, a very experienced United States forensic psychiatrist (see Brodsky
(1991, pp 110–111)), has stressed the need for clearing the mind before giving evidence:
I usually arrange to cut myself off from normal business so that I can get my head together
… I take a walk, or stop at a favorite place for breakfast on the way to court. For me it’s
very important that I be alone at those times. I’m not aware of any need to get ‘psyched
up’; it’s more a matter of spending some time tuning out the customary activities of work,
so that I can arrive at court relatively uncluttered and properly focused.
(6) When you give evidence, sit or stand comfortably in the witness box and, for the
most part, face the judge or magistrate if there is no jury, or the jury if there is one,
when answering questions from counsel.
Politeness and common sense dictate that evidence should primarily be directed toward
those to whom the information needs to be supplied. Hence the persuasive expert will be
seen to pay attention to the main decision-maker of fact in the case – be it a judge, jury,
magistrate or tribunal member – and give them the opportunity to assess the witness’s
credibility. Bear in mind that the advocate asking the expert questions should not need eye
contact with the expert, as the advocate should already know most of the answers to his or
her questions.
If you need to do so, manoeuvre your chair so that it is at an appropriate height and
facing in the right direction. It can be useful to place your feet on the floor facing toward
the decision-maker, so as to keep your orientation in that direction, rather than toward the
questioner. Do not hesitate to ask for water shortly after you enter the witness box – not
just when you are having trouble answering questions.
[7.0.50] 451
(7) Make sure your mobile phone or pager is switched off (or onto silent, not vibration
mode) all the time that you are in court.
There is only one thing worse than worrying that an inappropriate noise, distracting and
irritating for the court, might emerge from your pocket, jacket, handbag or briefcase. That
is when it actually happens. It can be difficult to regain respect and equanimity after such
an incident.
(8) Be alert to avoid inappropriate non-verbal communications which may detract from
your credibility.
Body language includes posture, eye contact, facial expressions, gestures, body orientation,
positioning, vocal qualities (loudness, rhythm, tone, pitch, inflection and timbre) and,
arguably, the use of humour (see Smith and Bace (2003, pp 367–368)). All of these have the
potential to detract from, as well as to add to, an expert’s credibility. They are adjuncts to
communication, and in fact are themselves forms of communication. Boccaccini and
Brodsky (2002) reached the unsurprising conclusion that non-verbal behaviour can
influence the way in which one is perceived by others. They identified several such
behaviours that tend to characterise effective communicators, including frequent eye
contact with lawyers and jurors (especially while speaking), illustrator gestures, leaning
forward slightly, relaxed posture, facing one’s head and body toward the jury and counsel,
expressing genuine emotions, and speaking at a moderately fast rate in a loud voice that
varies in pitch. By contrast, Boccaccini and Brodsky (2002, p 193) found that ineffective
communicators tend to ‘avert their gaze (especially when speaking), use self- and
object-adaptors, make frequent posture shifts, have rigid postures, pause before answering
questions, display extreme affect (flat or melodramatic), and speak slowly using a soft and
flat voice’.
(9) Take steps to enhance your credibility.

There are commonly said to be four dimensions to a witness’s credibility: knowledge,
likeability, trustworthiness, and confidence (Brodsky, Griffin and Cramer (2010)). In the
2016 AIJA study (Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016)), six
factors were particularly identified by participants in relation to an expert’s credibility: an
arrogant demeanour, defensiveness, the use of emotive language, evasiveness, their
experience in the courtroom, and the way in which they gave their evidence. The factors
underline the need for experts to refrain from alienating their audience, including by
condescension or haughtiness, the need for them to speak in ways which are accessible
and clear, the need for them to be even-handed and authoritative in their views, and the
need for them to be straightforward in their answering. This combination of attributes is
vital for gaining and maintaining the trust and respect from a fact-finding body in a court
or tribunal.
(10) Be mindful of the impression you are creating. Take care not to appear arrogant,
condescending, flippant, smart, hostile or evasive.
If anyone wishes to have a listener believe what he or she is saying, plausibility and a
perception of trustworthiness are essential. Alienating mannerisms or aspects of
demeanour create an impediment to trusting a person. As trust is partially an intuitive as
well as an intellectual judgment, such barriers need to be avoided: see Stone (1991, p 829).
A whole range of verbal and non-verbal cues can affect the impression of
self-assurance and confidence given by expert witnesses: Gee and Mason (1990, p 112);
Neitzel and Dillehay (1986, p 127); Miller and Burgoon (1982, pp 169ff); Wellborn (1991,
p 1075); Brodsky (1999); Kapardis (2014). Among these are anxiety, voice pitch, ‘odd
behaviour’, uncertainty, and contradictions among verbal cues. Should the expert give
mixed messages or convey a sense of major discomfort while in the witness box, jurors
may conclude that he or she is biased, incompetent or even lying (see Edinger and
Patterson (1983, pp 30ff)), even though that may not be the case: Stone (1991, pp 826ff).
452 [7.0.50]
Evasiveness in answering questions can also detract from the perception of trustworthiness:
Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016, p 177).
Research shows the importance of the exhibition of confidence on the part of the
communicator – although factual accuracy and communicator confidence are unrelated,
impressions of confidence in one study accounted for 50% of the variance in decisions to
accept what was said as true: Neitzel and Dillehay (1986, p 129). The tactful and
perceptive lawyer can give useful feedback to the expert on the impressions that an expert
witness is conveying or is likely to convey.
Most people are anxious about being a witness. Standing or sitting in a small box-like
area facing advocates, jurors and a judge, wondering how you will perform, it is not
surprising that hands sweat, speech races, and tone is different from conversation with
friends. It is important to control that ‘performance anxiety’ as quickly as possible, lest it
diminish credibility. Hence, it is helpful for the witness to settle himself or herself into the
space of the witness box, ensuring that, if he or she is seated, the chair is at a comfortable
height, that he or she is facing the correct way, and that water to relieve a dry mouth is
readily available, but not positioned where it might be spilt.
Part of the advocate’s task is to settle the witness whom the advocate calls. This is often
done by the asking of standard questions about name, occupation and address. You know
the answers, so the questions provide the opportunity to check your voice speed and tone.
Some witnesses tend to camouflage their anxiety behind a cloak of ‘who cares?’ or an
arrogant front. It should never be forgotten, though, how important the proceedings are
for the parties involved and that, although the intellectual issues raised by a case may be
very interesting, or a cross-examining barrister particularly obnoxious, there is an
important human dimension to the drama that takes place within the courtroom. A
witness who does not appear to treat the proceedings with due gravity can singlehandedly
[7.0.50] 453
bring a side in the litigation into disrepute. Similarly, an expert to whom the whole
exercise seems an intellectual game or who talks down to the tribunal or seems pompous
may alienate decision-makers.
(11) Speak only at a moderate pace.

If a witness speaks too quickly, they will look nervous, they will lack gravity, and it will be
impossible to make a note of the important points made during evidence. It is not
coincidental that many of the great orators in history had a slow and measured delivery,
encouraging their audience to dwell upon their words and reflect upon their message.
Judges and magistrates, of course, are well used to taking detailed notes throughout a
trial. Traditionally, jurors were expected to rely upon their memories for what they heard,
even if it was a lengthy trial. Fortunately, the practice of providing jurors with pen and
paper is now widespread. In R v Sandford (1994) 33 NSWLR 172, Smart J noted: ‘Jurors
often make some notes of the evidence and the addresses and very full notes of the critical
directions in a summing up. Juries should be encouraged to make notes of the evidence,
the final addresses and the summing up’: at 185. Hunt CJ at CL commented: ‘[I]f jurors are
not permitted the ordinary courtesy of being able to take their own notes, there is a …
danger that they will lose all track of the evidence and simply “switch off”’: at 182.
Since the expert can thus expect both judge and jurors to be taking notes, it is very
important for the witness to speak or read at a rate which allows those notes to be taken:
elementary, most certainly, but many witnesses and advocates overlook it. An advocate
and a witness should always be able to answer this question: ‘With what hand did the
judge take notes?’ An expert’s delivery rate should be governed by that writing or typing
hand. When it is busy, slow down or stop. When it pauses, continue.
(12) Be accessible and comprehensible in your reasoning

It is important for an expert to be understandable, engaging and memorable in his or her
evidence, as well as to refrain from ‘talking down’ or being condescending. The reason is
that it is disrespectful and likely to antagonise an audience.
It is useful too, so far as possible, to avoid technical language (White, Day and Hackett
(2007); Conroy (1999, p 3); Gutheil (1998)), especially where it is not necessary to employ
abstruse or recondite terminology. Part of good communication is for the expert witness to
explain complex matters comprehensibly – in a manner which relates to practical,
everyday experience. Thus, homely analogies designed to portray, for instance, a chemical
process in a familiar context can be very useful: ‘gas can be deodorised by a chemical
reaction in the same way that kitchens can be deodorised by an aerosol spray’( see
Bridgers (1988, p 238)).
There is no reason why an expert should hesitate to explain in a straightforward way
both his or her expertise (see Fennell (1992, p 163)) and the reasons why he or she adheres
to particular opinions. The articulation of the expert’s process of reasoning in a
transparent way assists in avoiding any impression that the expert has arrived at an
opinion in such a way as to reach a predetermined outcome (cp Phosphate Co-operative Co
of Aus Pty Ltd v Shears [1989] VR 665 at 686 per Brooking P).
(13) Be sensitive to questions and listen carefully to them before answering

responsively.
It is important both to listen carefully to questions and also to respond to the issues
actually raised (Brodsky (1991)), not others. The witness box is not an opportunity to make
speeches or to adopt the politicians’ tactic of side-stepping what has been asked and
answering another question; such a tactic is likely to be interpreted as evasiveness and to
detract from credibility (Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016,
p 177)). It is appropriate, and in fact adds to plausibility, to be prepared to say, ‘I do not
know’ where a fact has departed (or never entered) memory, or where an issue is outside
a witness’s area of expertise.
454 [7.0.50]
It is important too not to speculate or confabulate. To do so is suggestive of bias or a

predetermined position, regardless of the evidence for it, on the part of the expert and will
detract from the expert’s credibility. Alternatively, it suggests that the witness is prepared
to say whatever occurs to them as appropriate on the spur of the moment; this is
unprofessional and not such as to enhance credibility.
If a question is unclear, poorly expressed, or just not heard, then it is appropriate to
request the advocate to repeat it or clarify it.
If a question has more than one part, this can be confusing and apt to lead to an
ambiguous answer. It is appropriate to request that it be broken down into its constituent
parts so that the expert can answer each in turn.
(14) Be as clear, precise and confident in your answers as the strength of your
knowledge and views permits.
Zobel and Rous (1993, p 154) speak of the role of the expert as a ‘witness-teacher’. This is
a useful notion as it emphasises the importance of the forensic expert’s capacity for
making lucid what might otherwise be complex and for subordinating all other
considerations to the end of communicating effectively to the tribunal of fact: see
Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999; 2001). Of course, different people’s styles differ, but a
constant among experienced and well-regarded forensic experts is that they formulate
their views in a comprehensible, yet accurate and interesting way and defend them
forthrightly: Zobel and Rous (1993, p 154).
However, it is important not to lapse into the ‘academic mode’ of giving a lecture, as
the courtroom is rarely the correct forum for this form of delivery. It can irritate and even
imperil the admissibility of the views expressed.
(15) If you cannot answer a question, say so, explain why and, if you can, offer to
redress the situation.
Experienced witnesses will admit to holes in their knowledge when any are found and
will be confident in the sum of their knowledge and experience. They will also offer to
look at notes or records when necessary to refresh their memory or clear up an anomaly.
Giving expert evidence is not a memory competition, so witnesses should not hesitate to
ask to look at relevant material which they have brought to court or which they know is
available at court. Moreover, if further information is required for a satisfactory answer to
be given, it is appropriate for the expert witness to offer to obtain it and bring it to the
court’s attention after an adjournment ordered for that purpose. Such an offer is both
helpful for the tribunal of fact and can defuse irrelevant cross-examination very effectively.
Example
A toxicologist was under intense questioning concerning the amount of heroin which
the deceased would have needed to have ingested in order to have left the quantity
found in body fluids at the time of death. She turned to the coroner and told him that
she could not give a precise answer but could provide the necessary information after
the luncheon break if it was required. That was the end of that line of inquiry by
counsel.
Sometimes there are calculations that need to be done. They need a little time and a
quiet place. Rather than sitting awkwardly in the witness box, it is appropriate to ask to be
allowed to use one of the interview rooms at the next break in proceedings so as to ensure
that the correct answer, along with the right methodology, can be made available to the
court. The court is likely to agree.
(16) Convey your views using whatever aids to communication you believe will best
assist your giving evidence.
Many judges, and especially those who are accustomed to ‘pre-trial’ procedures at which
procedural issues are decided, recognise and encourage the use by experts of a wide range
of visual aids to complement oral and affidavit evidence: see Butera v Director of Public
[7.0.50] 455
Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180. Such means of communication are generally
welcomed by courts and tribunals provided that suitable arrangements are made in
advance. Whatever facilities can reasonably be afforded to assist the expert’s effectiveness
as a communicator should be discussed, prior to witnesses giving evidence, between the
expert and the lawyer calling them. (See the discussion on demonstrative aids below at
[7.0.450].)
While demonstrative aids are useful (see, for example, the PowerPoint presentation of
DNA evidence, used at trial and referred to on appeal in R v Berry (2007) 17 VR 153; [2007]
VSCA 202 at [51]), it is still the written and spoken explanations to which decision-makers
pay closest attention. The ‘aid’ is just that and no more. The expert witness and the
advocate calling them need to do what is in their power to ensure that the decision-maker
hears, notes, understands and considers the content of the questions, the answers and the
submissions.
(17) Be wary of humour.

There are real risks in the use of humour by expert witnesses, especially when they are not
aware of what has taken place prior to their entering the witness box (Blau (2001)).
Dvoskin and Guy (2008, p 206) have warned of the risks of insensitive use of humour by
experts: ‘Humor can be highly inappropriate if doing so expresses disrespect for the
process. In contrast, humor at one’s own expense can ease tension and make the expert
likeable. Sarcasm, however, can make one look small-minded, mean-spirited, disrespectful,
and insecure.’ If humour is to be deployed, it is important to make sure that it is consistent
with the dignity of the court proceedings and your own professionalism. It should not be
cruel or directed toward someone else’s detriment. No-one wants a comedian or Bozo the
Clown on the witness stand: Brodsky (1991, p 101).
(18) Answer all questions in a measured, dignified and considered way as best you can.
Courts look to experts to provide them with an understanding of issues which is beyond
the experience of jurors and judges (see [2.05.30]). Since jurors and judges must rely upon
the expert, it is essential that a decision-maker has confidence in both the message and the
messenger. As soon as it is thought that an expert will tailor his or her evidence to meet
the needs of the client – or, put another way, is prepared to be an advocate for a party –
the decision-maker will not rely upon that expert.
This means that maintenance of the moral high ground in the face of attack or criticism
is important. Such high ground can be held by measured, calm and dignified responses to
questions, even when what is asked is repetitive, insulting or lacking a knowledgeable
base.
(19) Do not become angry or offended. Maintain equilibrium, detachment and the
moral high ground.
However badly or unpleasantly others in the courtroom are conducting themselves, it is
important not to descend into the arena of conflict and become angry, or to take questions
that are posed as a personal affront or an attack on one’s professionalism.
It is helpful to avoid undue emotion in the presentation of facts or opinions; otherwise,
it will be suggested that the expert is not appropriately neutral and non-partisan – that
they have descended into being an advocate. The use of emotive language can either
suggest partisanship or be interpreted as insensitive (see Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty,
Horan and McKimmie (2016, p 177)).
Likewise, avoid the idea that the hearing is about the expert – it is important to stay
detached and avoid self-absorption: see Rogers and Shuman (2005, p 64).
(20) Be really well prepared.
It is offensive and disrespectful of the important role played by courts and tribunals in our
community for an expert not to have taken the time to have relevant facts and reports at
his or her fingertips. This requires re-familiarisation with an expert’s own report and
456 [7.0.50]
potentially reports written by other experts, as well as underlying documents referred to

in the reports. In addition, there is generally work that can usefully be done by solicitors
and sometimes counsel to enable the expert to be ready for giving evidence, including
familiarising the expert with the bench and assisting the expert to be aware of the issues
relevant to his or her evidence that are likely to be contested at trial (see Henry (2016)).
Exclusion of expert witnesses

[7.0.90] The usual rule is that a lay witness remains outside the courtroom or tribunal
until called to give evidence. Expert witnesses are often treated differently. If a party
wishes an expert to hear the evidence of other witnesses who are being called before the
expert, then the advocate should request permission from the trial judge for the expert to
sit in court. If there is no objection from the other parties, then the judge is likely to give
permission. It is important for the expert to take care where he or she chooses to sit as an
expert, preferably taking a position which highlights the witness’s independence.
Although it has been held by an English court that expert witnesses ‘are never
excluded from the court’ (Tomlinson v Tomlinson [1980] 1 All ER 593 at 596), in fact there
have been a number of occasions when an expert has been ordered to remain outside the
hearing of the court at the advocate’s request: see Munday (1981, p 688). In Australia, the
focus has been on whether it can be shown that the expert should be permitted to remain
in court.
In the United States, the practice of excluding witnesses is referred to as ‘sequestering
witnesses’. Its aim has been held by the Supreme Court as twofold: it exercises a restraint
on witnesses ‘tailoring’ their testimony to that of earlier witnesses, and it aids in detecting
testimony that is less than candid: Geders v United States 425 US 80 (1976). The court in
Miller v Universal City Studios 650 F 2d 1365 (5th Cir 1981) put it thus: ‘The purpose of the
sequestration rule is to prevent the shaping of testimony by one witness to match that of
another, and to discourage fabrication and collusion.’ Rule 616 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence provides that sequestration is mandatory at the application of either party, but
an exception exists where it is shown by a party that the presence of a witness is essential
for the presentation of their case. Thus, in United States v Vurgess 691 F 2d 1146 (4th Cir
1982), the court permitted experts for both sides on the defence of post-traumatic stress
disorder to remain in court throughout the proceedings, where written reports from the
experts were delayed to the point where they were forthcoming from the defence only two
days before trial and from the prosecution on the second and last day of the trial. In the
notorious trial of Alger Hiss, who was accused of passing secrets to the Communists
(United States v Hiss 88 F Supp 559 (SDNY 1950)), Dr Carl Binger was permitted to remain
in court. In due course, he testified in part upon his curial observations that Hiss’s accuser
was a ‘psychopath with a tendency toward making false accusations’.
In Australia’s leading case on the subject, R v Tait [1963] VR 520, counsel for the
accused had asked that witnesses be ordered out of court and the trial judge’s order in
that regard was the subject of analysis by the Full Court of the Victorian Supreme Court. It
was held on appeal (at 523) that the matter is simply one of discretion for the trial judge,
and the court affirmed that the discretion ought to be exercised in the way which the judge
deems ‘most conducive to the investigation of truth’ (following R v Basett [1952] VLR 535
at 539):
Convenience is a matter which is conducive to the investigation of truth in a particular
case, as for example, permission for a witness to remain in court who is familiar with the
exhibits when they are many in number and in danger of becoming confused, or
permission for an expert witness to remain in court to instruct counsel on unfamiliar
matters while a rival expert is giving evidence. You could run in and out of court or get
instructions by messenger but convenience relative to the elucidation of the truth
demands otherwise.
[7.0.90] 457
The court held that where an application is made to allow a particular witness to remain
in court who would otherwise be excluded, the decision will often depend upon the
balance between the assistance to be derived in the elucidation of the truth on the one
hand, and the possible prejudice to the other side on the other hand. Similarly, in R v
Bicanin (1976) 15 SASR 20 at 26, the South Australian Supreme Court focused upon the
utility of having the expert in court where there were interrelated documents and
numerous exhibits, and had regard to the specific potential for prejudice flowing from the
expert’s continued presence. In Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313,
the Full Court of the Federal Court, at 345, noted that an expert witness had remained in
court for most of the 55 hearing days until he gave evidence. The court confined its critical
comments to the use of the expert to ‘filter the facts’: at 353.
The Australian cases suggest something of a departure from the English approach. The
expert witness is excluded if a party requests unless there are good practical reasons for
retaining him or her in court. If the expert’s bona fides are seriously in question, it may
well be that the court would not permit the expert to remain in court.
Given the problems that arise from any perception of bias or partisanship, some
advocates prefer to use as their ‘in court’ adviser an expert who will not be called to give
evidence. No permission is needed for that adviser to be in court.
Demonstrating appropriate expertise

[7.0.130] Before an expert may express an opinion, it must be demonstrated that he or she
has the recognised education and experience to voice reliable, authoritative views on the
subject on which those views are proffered. This is much more than an issue of
admissibility of evidence: see also [2.0.20]. It is a vital part of advocacy: Chayko, Gulliver
and MacDougall (1991, p 23); Gross (1991, p 1159). Typically, the expert witness is asked to
list educational qualifications, publications and work history at the beginning of
examination. What is often lost sight of is the need for counsel to persuade the tribunal of
fact, be it judge or jury, that this particular expert is especially suited to express opinions
in the case at hand.
The art of persuasion begins with the very first question asked of the expert (see
generally Hampel, Brimer and Kune (2008)). Hence, when eliciting the credentials that
justify the witness’s special role as an expert allowed to give opinion evidence, there
should be a definite strategy to bring out those qualifications and experiences which are
relevant and also to emphasise those which are particularly impressive in the context of
the particular case. Only so much can be remembered. It is counterproductive to list
activities, study and publications that are not germane. Particularly in the case of jurors, it
is likely not to be academic credentials but rather years of appropriate experience that
stick in the mind, as well as details of relevant and significant projects on which the expert
has engaged. See the research and findings of Champagne, Shuman and Whitaker (1991);
Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999; 2001). Juries are not dominated by academics or even
those with university training – they contain ordinary members of the community whose
primary reading matter is what is online and, to a lesser degree, newspapers. Years of
expertise actually doing the relevant work is impressive and not so alienating to laypeople
as listening to a description of the subject matter of the witness’s PhD thesis and
postdoctoral work if these are not absolutely on point: see Murphy and Bernard (1986,
p 112). Moreover, as Seckinger (1991, p 6) has pointed out, which of us would not prefer to
have a major surgical procedure performed on us by a surgeon with extensive practical
training and experience, rather than by a recently graduated medical student with
excellent educational and academic credentials?
The following is an example of a constructive method of eliciting credentials and
relevant experience:
458 [7.0.130]
Q: You are a member of the Department of Aeronautical Engineering at the University of

Queensland?
A: Yes.
Q: You graduated with a Bachelor of Science and did postgraduate work at the University
of New South Wales, obtaining a master’s degree?
A: Yes.
Q: Following graduation, you were employed for seven years with the Australian Air
Force as a design engineer?
A: Yes.
Q: And while there you did work on the F111?
A: I assisted in developing modifications of the F111 for Australian conditions. Yes.
Q: Then 10 years ago you left the Air Force and joined the University of Queensland?
A: Yes.
Q: Why did you make that job change?
A: As a result of my Air Force experience, I was keen to research metal fatigue.
Q: And over these past 10 years, how have you followed that research interest?
A: In brief, I have conducted research at two universities, spent a sabbatical in the United
States of America, attended conferences both to present papers and to learn from others,
been involved in accident investigations, and taught and supervised students.
Q: And have you been conducting any specialised research?
A: Yes, I have been assessing the problems of metal fatigue on fixed-wing aircraft.
Q: And is it the case that you are the editor of a work about to be published in the United
States entitled Metal Fatigue and the Airline Industry?
A: Yes. That is correct.
Q: And have you also published in excess of 20 articles in learned journals both in
Australia and overseas on this and allied subjects?
Yes. I have.
Another example might be:
Q: Have you conducted investigations into the causes of these fires in outback scrub?
A: Yes, I have.
Q: So that the court can determine your expertise to give this kind of evidence, would you
please recount your experience in investigating cases of suspected arson?
Where there is a jury, it is necessary to elicit the information orally. It may be useful to
tender a written summary of that evidence to ensure a lasting and accurate record of the
expert’s experience and credentials, although this is seldom done as yet in Australasia.
Opposing counsel may offer to accept an expert as qualified to the requisite degree and
may indicate that they will make no objection as to expertise. When there is a jury, the
offer should be declined. Lying behind the apparent generosity of counsel may well be
calculated advocacy. Avoiding the qualifying process may save a few minutes, but it
deprives the party calling the expert of the chance to show the witness as a specialist
whose views should be treated with the utmost care and respect. The qualification phase
is an opportunity to draw a picture of the expert which will affect to a substantial degree
the way in which the views that he or she is going to express will be received. It should be
treated accordingly. Such an offer by opposing counsel can be countered in this way:
Your Honour, it is important that the jurors hear the details of the expert witness’s
background so that they are able to decide how much weight can be given to the views
that this expert expresses.
It is to the client’s advantage if the expert’s particular qualification, be it experiential or
academic, is detailed in the earliest phase of testimony; otherwise, objection may be made
to the admissibility of the expert’s evidence. From a tactical point of view, counsel who
have not established the expert’s relevant qualifications at the outset will face difficulties if
subsequently called upon to defend the expertise of the expert in an admissibility
challenge or, by contrast, to downplay the credentials of an opposing expert.
The results of the following qualification of an expert were the subject of deservedly
contemptuous comment by Maurice J in Lewis v The Queen (1987) 29 A Crim R 267 at 272:
[7.0.130] 459
Q: Doctor, so far as identification of perpetrators of crime from bite marks is concerned,

have you read a number of publications in relation to that?
A: I have.
Q: Have you developed a degree of expertise in relation to that area?
A: I certainly hope so.
Bias
[7.0.170] Bias in the context of experts was defined in United States v Abel 469 US 45 at 52
(1984) as ‘a term used … to describe the relationship between a party and a witness which
might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or
against a party’.
There is always the potential for a suggestion to be advanced that an expert is not
independent and fair-minded by his or her objectivity being impugned. This can be done
in many ways, including by highlighting emotive or overly emphatic language in which
the expert has expressed his or her opinions, the assumptions the expert has made, the
methodologies the expert has employed, the level of contact the expert has had with a
party, the expert’s preparedness to adjust his or her opinions on the basis of input from the
client or the client’s legal representatives, how often the expert has given similar
testimony (see Mamado v Fridson 2016 ONSC 4080 at [28]), prior stances taken by the
expert on comparable issues, and any part of the fee arrangement that is or appears to be
dependent upon a particular outcome in the litigation.
It is a fallacy to expect that an expert will approach his or her forensic task in a wholly
objective way; the adversarial legal system inevitably propels an expert to some degree
into the mindset of the client whose lawyers commission the expert (see Neal (2016);
Freckelton (1987)). As long ago as 1959, Diamond (1959) pointed to what he called the
fallacy of the impartial expert. An analysis of perceptions by experts of their own biases
led Commons, Miller and Gutheil (2004) to conclude that a relative state of denial exists
among many experts about potentially biasing factors – in their study, only experts who
regularly chose one side in litigation were seen as potentially biased.
Gutheil and Simon (2004) divided biases for psychiatrists into those that are internal
and those that are external. Among the internal biases, they identified narcissism,
competitive thinking, transferential bias, a desire to be recognised and admired (the ‘love
me bias’), gender bias, a desire to write-up the case later, personal ideologies, traumatic
experiences, moral or religious biases, and a desire to be an advocate. Among the external
biases, they identified ‘treater bias’, money, entrepreneurialism, pressures from lawyers,
extra-forensic relationships (including personal and romantic relationships), the availability
of limelight, hindsight bias, and confirmatory bias after they have formed an early
impression of a case or of a patient (see too Du (2017)).
The concern about partisanship on the part of expert witnesses was one of the most
prominent themes in the surveys of judges, magistrates and litigation lawyers in Australia
conducted for the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration (see Freckelton, Reddy
and Selby (1999; 2001); Freckelton and Malsch (2005); see also R v Dowding [2000] VSC 222
per Teague J. The issue occurs in many countries. The notion of impartiality, even as a
criterion for admissibility, was emphasised by the Canadian Supreme Court in White
Burgess Langille Inman v Abbott and Haliburton Co [2015] 2 SCR 182 (see Hunt (2016)). For
instance, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal in Jacobs v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail
2015 (1) SA 139 at [15] observed that:
It is well established that an expert is required to assist the court, not the party for whom
he or she testifies. Objectivity is the central prerequisite for his or her opinions. In
assessing an expert’s credibility an appellate court can test his or her underlying reasoning
and is in no worse a position than a trial court in that respect. Diemont JA put it thus
in Stock v Stock 1981 (3) SA 1280:
460 [7.0.170]
An expert … must be made to understand that he is there to assist the court. If he is to

be helpful he must be neutral. The evidence of such a witness is of little value where
he, or she, is partisan and consistently asserts the cause of the party who calls him.
So likely is it that some or all of these issues will be raised in cross-examination that it is
common for advocates to use examination-in-chief to raise and deal with any likely issues
that might otherwise be raised in the following cross-examination.
The impression that the witness conveys will affect his or her credibility in the eyes of
the tribunal of fact. Everything must be planned to create a picture of an impartial,
objective authority who has been brought to the courtroom to assist judge, magistrate or
jury by the provision of his or her pertinent knowledge. Preferably, the expert should be
able to indicate to the court that his or her views are representative of the consensus (or at
least the better part) of expert opinion on the subject: see Lubet (1993, p 18). It should go
without saying that the expert has no financial interest in the outcome of the case (see
Graham (1977)).
Receipt of fees
[7.0.180] If asked, it is best, and in some jurisdictions obligatory, for experts to be frank
about the terms of engagement. Ideally, the witness can explain that those terms are no
different from those which the expert’s peers would charge for similar court work and are
not contingent upon the outcome of the litigation. It is crucial to show that the expert has
no vested interest in the result of the proceedings – that he or she ‘just tells it like it is’.
Hence, an expert cannot appear for a fee which is contingent upon the results of the case
as such an arrangement is incompatible with an independent willingness to put the
interests of the court first and the client second.
Moreover, if experts do not earn all or most of their living from court-related work,
that too can be portrayed as an indicator of their impartiality. It suggests that their
appearance in court on this occasion is just part of an otherwise busy schedule of work as
a doctor, scientist, clinical psychologist etc. Preferably, the witness should come across as a
professional whose credentials are such that he or she is brought to the courtroom as an
expert every now and again, but otherwise is someone who goes about his or her
professional work. Such a characterisation, assuming it to be possible, has the advantage
of cutting off, before it has a chance to begin, the kind of cross-examination that includes:
Doctor, you are a forensic practitioner, a regular in the courts, are you not? In fact, you are
paid week in, week out, by [eg, victims of accidents, insurers, government bodies] to give
evidence?
Association
[7.0.190] The suggestion that a witness has a practice of testifying only for one particular
side implies a stance on the part of the witness which may be hostile to certain kinds of
people, situations or views. As Baltman J commented of a psychiatrist in Mamado v Fridson
2016 ONSC 4080 at [28]: ‘(She has never testified on behalf of a plaintiff, except on one
occasion when the plaintiff also happened to be her patient). Incredibly, she is of the view
that she can be seen as entirely neutral no matter to whom she owes much of her
livelihood.’
If the expert does work for both defence and plaintiff/prosecution, workers and
insurance companies, and government and social security beneficiaries, that even-
handedness can be highlighted. However, such ‘ranging across the field’ is rare. Advocates
are typically preferred by one side; so too are experts. An expert may wish in vain to be
used by ‘the other side’. There is no harm, when asked by an inquisitive advocate, in
expressing a willingness to appear for either side, but noting that it is only one side which
tends to retain the expert.
[7.0.190] 461
Unacceptable advocacy
[7.0.200] The expert may advocate, but only in a limited sense. A witness with expertise in
a particular discipline may advance arguments as to the conclusions that can be drawn,
and perhaps should be drawn, from the facts that the witness is asked to assume (see Pan
Pharmaceuticals Ltd (in liq) v Selim [2008] FCA 416 at [29]). The boundaries are well
summed up by Shaw (1976):
One often hears it said that an expert witness should not appear to be an advocate in the
cause. In one sense this is true. … He must not contend for a verdict or judgment one way
or the other. That is not his business. But he must be an advocate for the opinion he
expresses about a matter which may have a bearing on the ultimate outcome of the trial.
… He must not be a protagonist of the party [by whom he has been called] but he is a
protagonist of the opinion he expresses for he has come to support it and must seek to do
so as long as he believes in it.
Thus an expert can and should explain their opinions and the reasons why they hold
them, as part of the process of educating the court and elucidating their views.
The vices of inappropriate involvement in a case or investment in the outcome of a
case are a feature of both bias and forensic advocacy that is inappropriate for an expert
witness.
A telling but highly illustrative example of an expert ‘allowing himself to act as a
mouthpiece’ for a party is to be seen in Van Oord UK Ltd v Allseas UK Ltd [2015] EWHC
3074 (TCC) where Coulson J made such a criticism (at [93]) and dismissed the
appropriateness and reliability of an expert’s opinion evidence (at [94]), disregarding his
evidence in full on 12 separate, but related, bases:
• Mr Lester repeatedly took the pleaded claims at face value and did not check the
underlying documents that supported or undermined them, utilising the rates which
had been claimed by OSR (the party which commissioned him), not on the basis of any
quantity surveying or expert opinion he might have had as to their applicability, but
because he had been told that those rates had been agreed by the parties in other
contexts, in respect of different Change Order Requests: ‘For many of the disputed line
items, there was often no quantity surveying input from him at all.’ (at [81]);
• Secondly, he prepared his report by only looking at the witness statements prepared on
behalf of OSR. He did not look at the witness statements prepared on behalf of the
other party AUK: ‘In some instances, this process culminated in Mr Lester cutting and
pasting controversial parts of the OSR statements into his report as if they were in some
way a contemporaneous record of events. His report and his evidence were therefore
inevitably biased in favour of OSR.’ (at [82]);
• Thirdly, Mr Lester refused to value these claims on any basis, or on any assumption,
other than the full basis of the OSR claim (which had been prepared by claims
consultants who did not give evidence). This was despite of the judge’s exhortations to
the experts that they were to agree figures based on both their own and the other side’s
case. Thus Mr Lester’s figures were all skewed in favour of OSR, and there was nothing
the other way: ‘This was, of course, a very dangerous stance.’ (at [83])
• Fourthly, not only did Mr Lester base his promotion of the OSR claims on made-up or
calculated rates, but he never once considered, let alone formulated, claims based upon
the actual costs incurred by OSR: this ‘created the overwhelming impression that the
OSR claim (as supported by Mr Lester, at least until he came to be cross-examined) was
potentially a “try-on”, relying as it did on calculated rates and all manner of
assumptions said to have been made in the tender, but not credibly evidenced. Mr
Lester resolutely refused to address the issue as to whether or not OSR had suffered
any actual loss at all as a result of the events now complained of.’ (at [84]);
• Fifthly, throughout his cross-examination, Mr Lester was caught out on numerous
matters, most of which were ... relatively obvious ... Mr Lester originally said that these
were typing errors or examples of poor presentation, but, as his cross-examination wore
462 [7.0.200]
on, he could not escape from the truth that many were much more fundamental than
that, and went to the heart of his wholly uncritical approach to the … claim: ‘By the end
of his cross-examination, he was accepting every criticism or error being put to him; on
occasions, he even conceded points before they had even been suggested. The admitted
errors fatally undermined both his credibility and the credibility of the ... claim as a
whole’ (at [85]);
• Sixthly, the widespread and important elements of the claim, which he admitted he
could no longer support, drove him to say in cross-examination that he was not happy
with any of his reports, not even with the one provided during the last week of the
trial, just before he gave his oral evidence: ‘If an expert disowns his own reports in this
way, the court cannot sensibly have any regard to them.’ (at [86]);
• Seventhly, he repeatedly accepted that parts of his reports were confusing and accepted
on more than one occasion that they were positively misleading: ″‘For example, he
calculated various rates in his report because he said that it was necessary to do so, but
then he did not use the rates that he had calculated, and used instead rates which OSR
said that they had been paid for other work, and which he did not calculate at all.’” (at
[87]);
• Eighthly, he appended documents to his original report which he had either not looked
at all, or had certainly not checked in any detail, making out appear that it had been the
client who had put them together;
• Ninthly, he made repeated assertions in his reports that appeared to be expressions of
his own views: ‘They were certainly not attributed to anybody else. But in
cross-examination it was revealed that these assertions came straight from discussions
he had had with OSR witnesses ... Even more alarmingly, some of these assertions, in
particular those in Mr Lester’s report provided at the start of the last week of the trial,
related to matters on which both men had already been cross-examined and (in many
instances) on which they had had no credible answer to the points being put to them. In
this way, Mr Lester was used to try and plug the gaps in OSR’s evidence which had
been exposed by … cross-examination of OSR’s witnesses of fact, without any input
from Mr Lester himself. That is the complete opposite of what a responsible,
independent expert is obliged to do. This subterfuge (for that is what it was) only
became apparent during Mr Lester’s cross-examination. It reflected very badly on him,
as well as on [those who had been cross-examined]’ (at [89]);
• Tenthly, this process reached its logical conclusion when a schedule was identified by
Mr Lester in the third joint statement (produced just before day 9 of the trial) which
said that he had prepared the schedule: ‘In fact, it turned out that the schedule had
been produced by [members of the client]. Mr Lester, having accepted in cross-
examination that he had not prepared it, continued to maintain that he had checked
and approved it. However, further cross-examination revealed that what he meant by
that was that he had discussed the schedule with Mr M, and had accepted what Mr M
had said about it. In fact the cross-examination revealed that the schedule contained
important errors and must be discounted in its entirety.’ (at [90]);
• Eleventhly, he accepted, as he was bound to do, that instead of checking the claims
himself, he had preferred to recite what others had told him, ″‘even though what he
had been told could be shown to be obviously wrong.’ [at [91]);
• Finally, Mr Lester confirmed to the court that he had never considered valuing these
Line Items by reference to fair and reasonable rates: ‘Remarkably, he seemed almost
proud that he had not embarked on that exercise. In my view, this omission made the
entirety of the valuation exercise he had carried out of no value, because he had not,
even as a cross-check, investigated whether the figures he was so carelessly promoting
were actually fair or reasonable, or instead represented some kind of windfall for OSR.
It became apparent in his cross-examination that many of the rates he had adopted
were far from fair or reasonable.’ (at [92]).
[7.0.200] 463
The conduct of the witness in Van Oord constitutes almost a template for how an expert
should not discharge their forensic role. It highlights the need for an expert witness to
avoid partisanship and advocacy, in particular, by Coulson J’s findings that the witness
had betrayed his obligations of independence, rigour and professionalism and had been
determined to adhere to a methodology leading to a pre-determined outcome, and a set of
unwarranted assertions, in spite of the flaws in the expert’s evidence being inescapably
apparent, and drawn explicitly to his attention.
The issues of inappropriate championing of a party’s interest or of engagement in
advocacy have figured in many judgments as a basis for discounting an expert’s opinions
or giving them little weight. For instance, in the controversial decision of the New South
Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012]
NSWCCA 21 at [758], McClellan CJ at CL observed of a witness who had written a book
about the case:
Associate Professor Cross took upon himself the role of investigator and became an active
participant in attempting to prove that the applicant had committed murder. Rather than
remaining impartial to the outcome and offering his independent expertise to assist the
court he formed the view from speaking with some police and Mr Byrne and from his
own assessment of the circumstances that the applicant was guilty and it was his task to
assist in proving his guilt. In my opinion if the book and the speech had been available to
the defence and the extent of Associate Professor Cross’ partiality made apparent, his
evidence would have been assessed by the jury to be of little if any evidentiary value on
any controversial issue.
As soon as the expert’s advocacy crosses the line into anything resembling advocacy, it can
easily be depicted as partisanship and is likely to be impugned accordingly (see the
assessment of a key witness by Foster J in Cubillo v Commonwealth (unreported, Federal
Court of Australia, 14 December 1995) at p 98; see also Rogers and Mitchell (1991)); or
downgraded in its probative value: see Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999; 2001).
The following are three examples of an expert’s involvement in a case going too far.
The first arose in Forrester v Harris Farm Pty Ltd (1996) 129 FLR 431. An ergonomist gave
evidence in a case involving long-term back injury. The report of the expert was described
by Miles CJ as ‘of little or no assistance’, for a number of reasons. The expert’s description
of himself as ‘providing analytical product and legal liability evaluation’ clearly concerned
the court, savouring as it did of preparedness to overstep its bounds: ‘“legal liability
evaluation” is not a field of expertise which entitles the expert to give opinion evidence
about his or her view on the strength or otherwise of a legal claim’.
Of even more concern to the court, though, was the breadth of the expert’s report – it
‘ranges so far and wide that at worst it reads as if he were an advocate for the plaintiff and
at best an arbitrator called upon to decide the case on liability’. Part of the problem lay in
the ‘selective self-corroboration’ found in the referencing, part in the comprehensibility of
the material: it was accounted ‘embarrassing to a court charged with the duty of finding
the facts because it is impossible to know how far the court is expected to evaluate and
analyse them or to master them or to discuss them in any reasons for decision in respect of
which they may be relevant’. In addition to the fact that the expert expressed views on the
basis of information that was never proved to the court, Miles CJ found fault with his
evidence on the basis that he concluded his report ‘in the manner of a judgment, finding
for the plaintiff on the three issues of causation, foreseeability and preventability’.
The second example involves the views of an expert child psychiatrist in a family law
case in which allegations of sexual abuse were prominent: Re W and W (2001) 164 FLR 18;
[2001] Fam CA 216. The judgment of two of the three Full Court judges includes these
damning passages (at [167]–[180]):
Our conclusion, however, is that this case is a classic example of the misuse of expert
evidence … [W]e think that the trial Judge should have harboured significant reservations
464 [7.0.200]
about the evidence and opinions of Dr W because Dr W was more than prepared to
express views favourable to the husband and contrary to the position of the wife about her
suitability as a residential parent without the opportunity to properly assess the issues.
The extent to which Dr W was prepared to express opinions about people with whom
he had never been associated can be measured by the fact that he said: ‘It is clear that T
was a troubled, very insecure girl from toddlerhood, although of superior intelligence’;
and his conclusion that: ‘It is probably that Mrs W is a highly susceptible but persuasive
person, but T is a very insecure girl who is desperate for attention and has felt that way
since early childhood’.
He went further and said:
The materials which I have seen strongly suggest that once the mother became
convinced of her paranormal beliefs and philosophies she inappropriately shared them
with her daughter who, being extremely needy of attention, produced for her mother
based on suggestive questioning, a range of paranormal experiences which confirmed
in the mother’s mind that her daughter had special powers.
In cross-examination, Dr W said:
We’re talking about a highly dysfunctional set of fantasies which have – transported
this child off the planet a couple of years ago and – and at least within the sexual
domain, in my view, have transported her off the planet now, and that – its – it’s part
of the same process. I mean what you’re trying to do is separate the two where it is
absolutely wrong to do that.
We are very troubled about an expert expressing such views about people that he had
never dealt with. This is even more marked when it is remembered that Dr W was the
only expert to see a link between the wife’s spiritual beliefs and T’s allegations of sexual
abuse.
It is clear from [a passage of quoted cross-examination] that Dr W was prepared to go
well beyond the position of an expert commenting on facts that were common ground or
the opinion of other experts and was stepping into the ring himself. Perhaps the
realisation came at a late stage in the above passage when he made a partial retreat from
his position.
We believe that a careful reading of Dr W’s evidence reveals him to have been
extremely partisan to the point where we find it difficult to accept his professional
objectivity.
In the third case, experts were called to provide valuations of a company in Foody v
Horewood (No 2) [2004] VSC 222. Hansen J commented (at [16]–[20]) :
It may not be unduly cynical to observe that the evidence of the experts followed the
pattern, so often experienced, of favouring the party on behalf of whom the expert was
engaged. The differences between them were not based upon a difference as to a relevant
principle of valuation. The differences were due to their individual opinions as to the
appropriate approach or calculation in the circumstances of the present case.
Borsky’s evidence suffered from a tendency to be argumentative, not content to simply
and responsively answer the question and say no more, but to argue the matter, and at
times to provide commentary. I do not consider that he … or McCann and Phillips for that
matter, were not honest witnesses, but Borsky clearly saw his role as being to argue a case
for Foody. In my view he took every point he considered possible in order to achieve the
best result for [the client]. …
…
[By contrast, Phillips] impressed me as an independent and reliable witness, neutral to
the interest of the parties, who sought to aid the Court with his best professional view.
In Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313, the Full Court of the Federal
Court, at 352, made particular mention of the expert’s role ‘as an advocate’. The court
adopted the following comments of Sir Richard Eggleston (1983, p 154):
[T]he expert has a legitimate role of advocacy in that, having expounded to the tribunal
the rules applicable to the case (these may not even be in dispute), his evidence may then
consist of argument as to the conclusions that should be drawn from the facts, interpreted
[7.0.200] 465
in the light of those rules. The difficulty arises because the expert often finds it difficult to
distinguish between arguments on the assumption that the ‘facts’ put forward by his side
are the correct ones, and telling the judge or jury which facts they should accept as true. If
he makes his assumptions clear, there is no objection to his arguing what the consequences
of accepting those assumptions should be; but he is not to do the jury’s fact-finding for it,
where this depends on accepting one or the other set of contradictory witnesses.
(See also Pan Pharmaceuticals Ltd (in liq) v Selim [2008] FCA 416 at [29].)
It is helpful for experts to be conscious of factors that might be said to bias their
ultimate opinions so that they can deal with such biases.
Language
[7.0.250] Expert witnesses receive very little training to qualify them for being forensic
experts (ie, practitioners who appear in the courts, 1 as against specialists recognised as
such in their own areas). The inexperienced, in particular, tend to use jargon. The reasons
for this are partly that, when they enter the witness box, they are in an unfamiliar
environment, away from their peers, and experience the temptation to retreat into the
world in which they are more comfortable: see Emmerson (1994, p 875). In addition, they
are frequently more used to discussion with colleagues, who share their knowledge, than
they are to explaining the intricacies of their discipline to the ignorant.
Kemelfield (1983, p 45) has noted that an ‘expert’s evidence will be worth little if he
takes the view that it is his right to perplex or mislead the court or tribunal’. (See also
Brodsky and Robey (1972); Furst (2002, p 17); Gutheil (2009, p 79); Preber (2014, p 217).)
Just as the advocate needs to learn the language of the expert, so the expert’s explanations
must be readily intelligible. While it is the advocate’s task to persuade and the expert’s
task to supply information to the court and express considered opinions, there is nothing
improper in the legal team encouraging the expert to express opinions which lay people –
meaning the judge and jurors – can readily understand.
Complexity is an issue separate from comprehensibility. Difficult concepts should be
able to be explained in English that is familiar to the ordinary person without detracting
from their complexity. As Ian Kennedy (1980) wrote in one of his Reith Lectures:
There is no issue which is too complicated to be discussed before an interested and alert
audience. To argue otherwise is to surrender the power to decide to those who would
claim the appropriate expertise.
Skill in communicating complexity in an understandable and memorable way is part of

the skill of the good forensic expert. It is a major consideration in the decision that is made
about who should be selected to testify in a particular case.
Establishing the expertise of the witness and demonstrating that he or she can assist
the trier of fact go hand in hand. To offer real assistance, the expert has to explain so that
the trier of fact understands. One way to do that is to have the expert explain general
principles before giving evidence about the specific case. Such an explanation allows the
trier of fact both to appreciate the expertise of the witness and to feel that he or she is
being assisted in this understanding. As an example, suppose that expert evidence is
brought about the performance of particular machinery. The expert can begin by clearly
explaining how the machinery works, or should work. This background is useful to later
understanding of alleged problems with the machinery, as to both the nature of those
problems and possibly the causes of those problems.
1 The word ″forensic″ is used consistently throughout this work in its increasingly rare,
etymologically correct sense – that is, pertaining to, connected with, or used in courts of
law (from the Latin forensis, meaning pertaining to the forum): see Howard (1991, p 99);
Meintjes-van der Walt (2006, p 152).
466 [7.0.250]
Another good technique can be to describe a condition and then give the technical
term, rather than the other way round. For example: ‘When a bullet is fired the rifling in
the barrel from which it was fired causes negative impressions on the surface of the bullet.
These impressions are called “land and groove” impressions.’ By first hearing a
description of the condition, the lay audience is being taught. It can then apply the
technical term. But done in reverse, the use of the unknown technical term affronts the
audience with their ignorance. That is not persuasive.
Clear communication is expected from the statement of qualifications right through to
the statement of conclusions. As Lubet (1993, p 20) points out, experts should be
encouraged to avoid qualifying expressions which have little meaning, such as ‘to the best
of my knowledge’, ‘according to present indications’, ‘as far as I am presently advised’, or
‘as far as we can tell’:
Although this language is meant to convey open-mindedness as opposed to uncertainty, it
can be fatal to a witness’s testimony. To prevent this, experts should testify in
straightforward unequivocal terms. They should be cautioned to avoid language that
unintentionally qualifies or hedges their results. Instead, they should use words that
emphasise their accuracy and certainty.
Bases of evidence
[7.0.290] An expert witness must identify the facts assumed as the basis of an opinion (see
Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21). This requirement has a long
pedigree and was recognised as long ago as in the trial of Earl Ferrers for murder. His
counsel sought to prove that the Earl was a lunatic at the time of the shooting. He
accepted that the accused peer could not ask ‘the doctor’s opinion upon the result of the
evidence’ but must identify each particular fact said to be established by the evidence and
ask whether it was a symptom of the lunacy: R v Ferrers (1760) 19 How St Tr 885 at 943; see
also R v Haidley [1984] VR 229 at 234–235. As Brooking J noted in R v J (1994) 75 A Crim R
522 at 531–532:
I should have thought that, after a voir dire to determine whether an expert can give
admissible opinion evidence, it will usually if not always be desirable, if not essential, to
place before the jury much if not all of the evidence that was led on the voir dire to
establish the admissibility of the expert evidence, so that the jury may consider the
expertise of the witness and understand the basis of the opinion and determine whether to
accept it.
An expert’s opinion may rely upon facts elicited from other witnesses. The expert witness
either may sit in court and hear that evidence or, not having been present in court, may
later read the transcript of the evidence. In R v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 at 524, Brooking J
stated:
[I]n either case, the witness should be asked to identify what evidence he has heard or
read, as by saying that he has heard or read the whole of the evidence of a given witness,
and also asked to identify the particular facts which he assumes to be established, or the
particular pieces of evidence which he assumes to be correct, for the purposes of his
opinion.
Alternatively, a witness who has neither heard the evidence nor read the transcript of it
may have recounted to him or her by counsel what has been said, or may be asked to
assume certain facts; ‘[w]hatever method is adopted, the important thing is to make it
clear precisely what evidence, assumed to be correct, or precisely what supposed facts,
assumed to be established, are being placed before the witness for the purpose of his
expressing an opinion’: R v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 at 524. (See also Whitbread v The Queen
(1995) 78 A Crim R 452.)
In R v Decha-Iamsakun [1993] 1 NZLR 141, Cooke P of the New Zealand Court of
Appeal declined to find a trial judge to have erred in excluding expert evidence from a
[7.0.290] 467
linguist as to the accused’s facility with the English language. He did so not in response to
the argument that the trial judge had wrongly applied the common knowledge rule, but
because the evidential foundation for the expert’s views had not been established by other
defence evidence or cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. The decision represents
an important warning to legal practitioners of how carefully a case strategy needs to be
formulated to ensure that the foundations of key expert testimony are laid.
Experts generally have regard to a wide range of material which enables them to arrive
at their opinions: English Exporters (London) Ltd v Eldonwall Ltd [1973] 1 Ch 415 at 420;
Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 at 161 per Blackburn J. There is no harm in
an expert revealing this where it is a legitimate use of standard texts and research
materials.
In the case of a psychologist who has performed tests upon an individual to determine
his or her capacity to perform a certain act, the bottom line may be that a view is reached
that the person was unable to appreciate the significance of what he or she was doing at
the relevant time. But it is important that the expert witness explain the tests conducted
and the impressions gained during the course of interview which in due course
contributed to the view. For example, why did the psychologist use certain tests and not
others? Are these particular tests standard ones, recognised by the Australian Psychological
Society? Did the psychologist administer them in the usual way? Was there anything
special about the process of the psychologist’s interpretation of the raw data from the
tests? What margin for error is there in the tests? Were they suitably normed for the
population of which the person tested is part? What alternative interpretations of the
results could be advanced? Does current professional literature agree with this method of
interpretation? If there are alternatives, why are these rejected? How confident is the
psychologist of his or her findings in this instance? If impressions were formed of the
person in the course of the interview, on what were they founded? What did the person
do or say that was unusual? How subjective is this interpretation and on what is it based?
Are the impressions consistent with the harder data of the test results?
However, it is not appropriate for an expert to act as a mere conduit for the research
findings, the opinions or the perceptions of others. If the expert’s views depend upon such
other sources of information, then arrangements should be made to ensure that those
other persons are also available to give evidence of the data provided to the expert. An
example is where a forensic accountant uses financial data collected by others. The
soundness of such data must be proved.
A related example is the need to show ‘continuity’ (also called ‘chain of custody’) in
test samples used in criminal forensic testing (see Meintjes-van der Walt (2003)). If more
than one person is handling material which is intended to become an exhibit, there need
to be stringent procedures to account for the custody of the material until it arrives in the
courtroom. The suggestion of possible substitution or contamination of material collected
at the crime scene can undermine a prosecution.
The possibility that samples might have been contaminated can be highly problematic
for prosecutors and a boon for defence counsel. For a checklist of procedural issues that
should be checked carefully before submitting a report about DNA analysis, see Ch 12.20
at [12.20.330]. See, too, the recommendations of the English Court of Appeal in Doheny and
Adams v The Queen [1997] 1 Cr App R 369, which are set out and discussed at [12.25.70].
The hypothetical question

[7.0.330] Frequently, the expert witness is asked to express an opinion on the basis of a set
of facts and circumstances which he or she is asked to assume (see Papenbrock (1962)). For
the opinion to have any significance, these matters must already have been proved by
admissible evidence or must subsequently be proved: see Commissioner for Government
468 [7.0.330]
Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292 at 298 per Taylor J; Paric v John Holland
(Constructions) Pty Ltd (1985) 59 ALJR 844; Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642; Glass
(1987, pp 46ff). The practice of setting out a complex set of circumstances to the expert
witness has been the subject of considerable controversy. For instance, Wigmore (1979,
Vol 2, para 686) warned:
The hypothetical question, misused by the clumsy and abused by the clever, has in
practice led to intolerable obstruction of truth. In the first place, it has artificially clamped
the mouth of the expert witness, so that his answer to a complex question may be so built
up and contrived by counsel as to represent only a partisan conclusion. In the second
place, it has tended to mislead the jury as to the purport of actual expert opinion. This is
due to the same reason. In the third place, it has tended to confuse the jury, so that its
employment becomes a mere waste of time and a futile obstruction.
If a complex hypothetical question is to be asked of a witness in examination-in-chief, he

or she should have had an opportunity to consider its intricacies in detail (Rossi (1991,
p 241)). The witness should be supplied with a written version of the question prior to
conference with counsel. That allows the expert to suggest amendments to the question
that will permit the expert to give a response with which he or she will feel comfortable.
In addition, the hypothetical question needs to be intelligible to the triers of fact.
Glass (1987, pp 46–47) put a model hypothetical question, which he suggested could
not be impeached:
I ask you to assume that you have a frame consisting of three members, the two uprights
having a certain height and thickness and the cross bar a certain thickness and length, the
total frame having a certain weight. Assume further that the frame has previously been
supported as part of a system of scaffolding, that all the supporting members have now
been withdrawn and that the frame is being maintained in an upright position solely by
means of a batten of certain size and thickness nailed to it at a certain height above the
ground. On those assumptions is that frame in your opinion being adequately supported
and prevented from falling?
A more common question in the workers compensation jurisdiction might be:

Doctor, you have expressed your expert opinion as to the incapacity suffered by the
plaintiff. Let me put a hypothetical proposition to you: ‘Assume that a plaintiff has
described injury, sites of pain and degrees of pain as follows (these are then described and
suggest severe incapacity in the lumbar and sacral regions). Now, doctor, supposing that
you were told that this same person was seen to run with a fully loaded supermarket
trolley a distance of some 200 metres in and out of parked cars and then to lift from that
trolley onto a car roof rack three 15 kilogram bags of chicken manure fertiliser, apparently
suffering no distress or discomfort whatever, what would be your opinion about the
accuracy of the symptoms previously reported to you?’
For evidentiary purposes, it is of the utmost importance that the facts upon which the
opinion is to be expressed are clearly stated (so that they can be proved) and that the
expert’s opinion be confined to opinions expressed upon the basis of those stated facts: R
v Fowler (1985) 39 SASR 440 at 442–443 per King CJ; Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243
CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21.
Evidence of speculation
[7.0.370] There are significant limitations upon the extent to which an expert witness can
give evidence in the form of speculation. The policy reason for this is that such evidence,
if its bases are not proved, is not susceptible of proper evaluation by the tribunal of fact.
Thus, in Straker v The Queen (1977) 15 ALR 103 at 114, the High Court held that a medical
practitioner should not have been allowed to speculate on the possibility that a deceased
person may have been the subject of anal intercourse shortly before or after his death.
Jacobs J conceded that:
[7.0.370] 469
in many circumstances an expert witness is entitled to explain the steps by which he

reaches his expert opinion. But he is not entitled to speculate on a possibility directly
relevant to the issue or to a fact in issue when the speculation is adverse to the accused
person and when there is no evidence which would support a conclusion that the fact was
established.
(See also R v Telford (1996) 86 A Crim R 427 per Southwell AJA; R v Tran (1990) 50 A Crim
R 233 at 242.)
It has been held that ss 79 and 80 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and the Evidence Act
1995 (NSW) have not abolished this ‘cautionary principle’: see Lipovac v Hamilton Holdings
Pty Ltd (unreported, ACT Supreme Court, 13 September 1996) at p 100 per Higgins J.
In HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999] HCA 2 at [44], Gleeson CJ analysed
evidence by a psychologist that he found to be speculative and not to comply with the
requirement of s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) that opinion evidence be wholly or
substantially based on specialised knowledge. He observed:
Experts who venture ‘opinions’ (sometimes merely their own inference of fact), outside
their field of specialised knowledge may invest those opinions with a spurious appearance
of authority, and legitimate processes of fact-finding may be subverted.
An expert's change of opinion

[7.0.400] It is legitimate in principle for an expert to change their opinion. A number of
factors may impel such a course entirely legitimately. In Orrong Strategies Pty Ltd v Village
Roadshow Ltd (2007) 207 FLR 245; [2007] VSC 1 at [985], Habersberger J observed that
‘experts should be entitled to think through the issues and change their mind without
being castigated for giving into pressure from the client or lawyers’. However, it depends
upon the reasons for such a change of opinion whether criticism may be made, such as an
abandonment of independence. In the circumstances of Seeley International Pty Ltd v Jeffrey
[2013] VSCA 288, for instance, one expert was found to have a sound basis for each of his
changes of opinion, while the other did not.
Eliciting of evidence
[7.0.410] Evidence should be elicited from an expert in a way which makes it accessible
and memorable for the tribunal of fact. Experts are often allowed to narrate their evidence
at large. This is counter-productive because it often lacks the focus which is relevant from
a forensic point of view. As anyone who has ever sat through lengthy lectures is aware, it
is not easy to maintain concentration for an extended period of time. When the subject
matter of the information being provided is technical and intricate, the problem is all the
more significant. Allowing an expert to testify in an unbroken stretch is a prescription for
‘fact finder inattention’ and also for evidence that strays from the relevant. The following
example provides an instance of controlled interchange which focuses upon the most
pertinent aspects of the information the expert is able to provide:
Q: We turn now to the topic of ‘location’ and its relationship to profit. To begin, what is the
significance of location in projecting profits for a chain of drive-in restaurants?
A: Location is probably the single most important factor when it comes to profitability in
any retail business, especially restaurants. Even if there is an upward overall trend in an
industry, a poorly located business is unlikely to benefit.
Q: Please explain why a poorly located business will not benefit.
A: The restaurant business is intensely local in nature. Very few restaurants attract people
from great distances. Most people eat near their homes, their places of work, or their
shopping destinations. So a restaurant in an undesirable neighbourhood or in a declining
business district simply will not draw customers.
Q: Why is that?
A: Many restaurants depend heavily on the lunch trade. People on their lunch break
usually do not have more than an hour, so a restaurant cannot draw this business unless it
470 [7.0.400]
is located near a fairly large number of workers. No matter how well the economy is
doing, a restaurant will not do well at lunchtime if it is located in an area that has
experienced a downturn.
(Adapted from Lubet (1993, p 16).) Notably, the questioner in this instance introduced the
topic with a statement, thereby telling everybody what is coming. How the questions and
answers flow is also significant.
Similarly, the use of carefully devised examples and analogies can be advantageous in
demonstrating the practical application of what might otherwise appear to be an
alienating or abstruse concept:
Q: I’d like to explore the impact of location with you a little more, so please give an
example of how a drive-in restaurant chain might do poorly, even in a State with an
expanding population?
A: Certainly. Population growth in many urban areas is basically limited to the suburbs. A
restaurant chain concentrated in the central city would show almost no increased
profitability as a result of that growth. Its profits might well decline due to the population
shift. That is why location is so important.
Q: To make this clearer, please explain the importance of location using the example we
discussed in my office.
A: Well, perhaps it would help to think about it this way. Imagine a football team in the
national competition with 17 teams. If the top two or three premiership contenders are all
located in Melbourne and Perth, they are likely to attract large numbers of people to their
home games. On the other hand, a last-place team, in say Launceston, would probably
play to very small crowds indeed. Even if the competition’s overall attendance went up,
that would not help to fill the seats at the ground for the last-placed team. A restaurant’s
poor location is a lot like a team being stuck in last place. Average attendance for
restaurants might be high, but that won’t create profits for the losers.
(Adapted from Lubet (1993, p 18).)

Eliciting summaries of key points from witnesses can also emphasise those aspects of
evidence which counsel would like the tribunal of fact to recall. Encouraging a witness to
itemise aspects of disagreement with other witnesses and the employment of numbered
lists of points generally can also be very helpful – the introduction of each point serves to
re-initiate primacy, encourages comparison and cross-referencing on the part of the
listener, and thus heightens the tribunal of fact’s attention.
Use of diagrams, slides and other forms of demonstrative exhibit

[7.0.450] Demonstrative evidence is defined by the purpose for which it is introduced
(Hinshaw (1954); Ladd (1956); Spangenberg (1960); Cady (1967); Lipson (2018)). That
purpose is to explain or illustrate other previously, or contemporaneously, admitted
evidence (spoken, written or ‘real’) so that it assists an understanding of the admitted
evidence. It is essential that it fairly and accurately reflects the admitted evidence: see
Brain and Broderick (1994).
In Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180, members of the
Australian High Court encouraged the use of appropriate graphics, illustrative of
evidence previously determined admissible. In a joint judgment, Mason CJ, Brennan and
Deane JJ said (at 190):
The use of such charts and other time-saving devices in complicated trials of this kind is a
usual and desirable procedure and is encouraged by the courts.
Later, Gaudron J commented (at 208):

The laws of evidence allow that evidence may sometimes be given other than in oral form.
Thus photographs, charts, maps, diagrams and the like are admissible as a documentary
representation of the relevant knowledge of a witness as to physical characteristics of an
object or person.
[7.0.450] 471
(See also R v Menzies [1982] 1 NZLR 40; [1982] NZCA 19 at 49.)

A useful warning, however, was sounded in the Canadian case of R v Creemar [1968] 1
CCC 14 at 22, where it was pointed out that the admissibility of photographs (and like
aids) depends upon:
(1) their accuracy in truly representing the facts;
(2) their fairness and absence of any propensity to mislead; and
(3) their verification on oath by a person capable of doing so.
Photographs, charts, overhead transparencies, videos etc must always be vouched for as
true and correct by those seeking to introduce them into evidence or to offer views on
their significance. In addition, care must be taken to ensure that the evidence is relevant,
probative and not of an unduly prejudicial nature, such as might be involved in the use of
particularly distressing or unpleasant visual aids: R v Baker [1989] 3 NZLR 635 at 638; R v
Quinn [1961] 3 All ER 88; R v O’Donnell (1936) 65 CCC 299; R v Wray (1970) 11 DLR (3d)
673; Goldstein (1991).
Computer-animated re-enactments are an example of demonstrative evidence. In the
United States Federal Court, the admission of such evidence involves two steps. First, an
adequate foundation must be laid to establish authenticity and relevance. Second, the
court must be persuaded that this demonstrative aid will be more probative than
prejudicial.
Laying an adequate foundation has been held to involve three steps:
(1) showing that the underlying data are accurate;
(2) showing that the process by which the data were fed into the computer provides
reasonable assurance that error was avoided; and
(3) demonstrating that tests were used to maintain the accuracy and reliability of the
hardware and software: see Brain and Broderick (1994, pp 80–83).
The fundamental principle in the art of persuasion is that the person providing the
information must be induced to remember what it is that one would have one’s listeners
believe. Many impediments lie in the way of this accomplishment, not least of which is
that attention spans are short, perhaps as limited as 15 to 20 minutes: Turley (1989, p 62).
People from modern Western societies have a moderately well-developed visual memory,
but their auditory facilities are nowhere near as developed as they were when storytelling
was a highly prized art and a form of entertainment. 2 Our courtroom processes remain
substantially dependent on the oral. However, indicative of the evolution in the courts’
focus on the oral presentation of evidence are the words of Brennan J in Butera v Director of
Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 190, where he canvassed the appropriateness
of alternative arrangements so long as the rights of the accused are suitably safeguarded:
The practice of requiring witnesses to give their evidence orally should not be waived
lightly, especially if there be a risk that writing will give undue weight to that evidence to
the disadvantage of an accused person. But the practice is not immutable. If a witness
writes out a proof of his evidence and swears to its truth or if a written transcript of part
of the witness’ oral evidence is produced, and if the task of the jury can be facilitated by
admitting the document in evidence, there is no absolute bar against doing so. For
example, a written document may prove more convenient than oral evidence as a
foundation for cross-examination upon its contents or it may be a valuable aide-mémoire
for the jury in a case where precise recollection of words is important.
(See Read (1992, p 93).)
2 Corboy and Clifford (1988) quote Parker (1960) in support of the contention that only 10%
of knowledge is attained through the sense of hearing, with 85% coming from sight and
the remaining 5% from the other senses combined.
472 [7.0.450]
Juries, and judges for that matter, must be kept interested during examination-in-chief
and cross-examination of experts, as well as during addresses. Diagrams, charts and the
various forms of demonstrative evidence have the significant advantage of breaking up
the flow of oral presentation of evidence. It goes without saying that the production of the
actual barrel in which the victim was burned, an assembly of sequential photographs of a
propane explosion displayed on a five-feet-wide panel producing a wide-screen Cinerama
effect, or a simulated burning of a house conducted by experts who have investigated an
alleged arson can be extremely powerful forms of evidence. Earl Rogers in the United
States once defended a client in a murder trial by calling a professional acrobat as a
defence witness to show that it would have been physically impossible for the defendant
to have done what the prosecution was contending: Rumsey (1988, p 103). Such evidence
must have been telling. In a complex commercial fraud prosecution, an accusation of
insider trading, or a breach of directors’ duties involving many companies and a
convoluted money trail, it is unrealistic for the prosecution to attempt to rely upon the
vagaries of jurors’ memories or the uncertainties of jury members’ note-taking. Clear
diagrams summarising the connections between company directors and interlocking
corporate structures have the capacity to make manageable large amounts of data that can
otherwise become lost in an information overload.
It is important to use pre-trial procedures to ensure that such diagrams and other aids
will be allowed at trial. An advocate may wish to use them in opening address. However,
a trial judge, ever mindful of the costs of trials which are aborted because juries see and
hear evidence that is ‘inadmissible’, is unlikely to countenance such ‘pre-proof’ use of aids
unless it has been shown at pre-trial hearing that there is admissible evidence, which will
be called, to back up every assertion within the visual aids. The more persuasive the
visual aid, the more likely that an opponent will fight to keep it out, or at least to delay its
introduction as long as possible.
Whenever it is proposed to use a photograph, a plan or a diagram in court, the value of
that demonstrative aid will be greatly enhanced if each member of the tribunal of fact,
Bench and/or jury is provided with a copy of that plan, photograph or diagram at the
very time when the expert is referring to it. This enables the judge or juror to make
changes to the object, to put notes around it, and, in essence, to become actively involved
in the process of understanding what is sought to be explained.
Similarly, the message that comes from the decisions in R v Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R
233, R v Lucas [1992] 2 VR 109; (1992) 55 A Crim R 361, and R v Juric (2002) 4 VR 411; [2002]
VSCA 77 is that superior courts are concerned about the capacity of jurors to evaluate
complex conflicting scientific evidence, particularly in the DNA profiling area: see Ch 80 of
the subscription service on DNA profiling in criminal investigations. Again, the potential
exists for the issues in dispute to be reduced to proportions that are no longer so
intimidating by the use of suitable visual materials similar to those employed in a
presentation by scientists to their peers.
The variety of available visual aids includes poster-size enlargements, chronology
charts, video material, computer simulations, models, slides, overhead transparencies,
PowerPoint presentations, and even demonstrations. Enlargements are low in cost and
offer easy recall during a hearing. They are already regularly employed in fingerprinting
and document analysis contexts, and should be used when evidence of shoe impressions,
palm prints or footprints is offered to a jury. (See United States v Roustio 455 F 2d 366
(1972); Radney v State 342 So 2d 942 (1977); State v Kuhl 175 P 190 (Wa 1918); State v
Weygandt 581 P 2d 1376 (1978).) Overhead transparencies of crime scenes can prove very
helpful in providing perspective for juries.
Video reproductions of incidents or processes have the advantage of replicating the
primary way in which most people obtain information today, so are likely to have a
[7.0.450] 473
particular impact. The use of visual material in courts where the rules of evidence are not
strictly applied can also bring with it surprising advantages. Videotaped reconstruction of
a fan catching alight and then immolating material in its vicinity proved devastating
evidence in a notorious coronial inquiry: Johnstone (1992). A further example might be a
case where it is critical for a parent to demonstrate his or her understanding of the
protective behaviours the parent will need to follow if a paedophile spouse is to return to
the matrimonial home. A videoed interview with a forensic psychologist where such
issues are canvassed in controlled surroundings might persuade the court that adequate
steps have been and will be taken to protect the child. Finally, a video of a factory process
line’s workings in operation at the point where an industrial accident took place (before its
health and safety flaws were corrected pre-trial) can be a very useful aid, by which means
an expert can explain the then existing design and structural problems that endangered
workers.
Models are three-dimensional and have the advantage of being particularly realistic.
Moreover, they provide an opportunity for the legal team to fashion evidence for the
courtroom that is controlled. So long as the visual exhibit is thoroughly relevant to matters
before the court and cannot be said to mislead, and so long as it is authenticated by the
expert witness, it should be admissible.
When it is sought to lead evidence of reconstructions or experiments, it will be
necessary to establish the relevance of such material. Thus, the proponent of such
evidence will need to show that the test, for example, has the requisite similarity to the
conditions or occurrences in dispute for it to have probative value: see Lawson v
Schumacher & Blum Chevrolet 687 SW 2d 947 (1985); 64 ALR 4th 109 (1985). So long as this
is accomplished, simulation such as a policewoman demonstrating the possibility of being
strangled with a blouse will be permissible: R v Truscott (1967) 62 DLR (2d) 545. However,
counsel seeking to lead demonstrative reconstruction evidence must lay the appropriate
foundation to establish its authenticity and relevance and in criminal trials must ensure
that it is not more prejudicial than probative if led by the prosecution: see Simmons and
Lounsberry (1994, p 78).
Jurors cannot be invited to experiment themselves on a demonstrative evidence
exhibit, although ‘a degree of testing and experimentation’ is permissible to enable jurors
the better to understand expert evidence: see Jones v Multiple Sclerosis Society [1996] 1 VR
499 at 505. Gibbs CJ in Kozul v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 221; [1981] HCA 19 at 227 held:
‘When the experiments conducted by the jury go beyond a mere examination and testing
of the evidence, and become a means of supplying new evidence, they become
impermissible.’ To the same effect, Mason J in the same case (at 235–236) held that what is
precluded is an:
inexpert jury substituting its views for the evidence of an expert …
Juries must be free to use in their deliberations the qualities of judgment and of
common sense which they bring into the juryroom. They must not substitute what they
may suppose to be their own special knowledge in place of the expert evidence given in
Court; they must not substitute mere speculation in place of the evidence they have heard
and the inferences which may properly be drawn from it.
(See also Hodge v Williams (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 489; Scott v Numurkah Corp (1954) 91 CLR
300.)
Thus, it can be proper for a jury members to pull the trigger of a revolver, both when
cocked and when not cocked, so that they can judge for themselves how much pressure
was necessary to cause it to discharge: ‘In experimenting in this way the jury are doing no
more than using their own senses to assess the weight and value of the evidence’: Kozul v
The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 221; [1981] HCA 19 at 226. Moreover, if the question is whether
a knife is sharp or a club is heavy, or whether one object resembles another, a jury is
entitled to prefer its observation of an exhibit to the evidence of expert or other witnesses:
474 [7.0.450]
Kozul v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 221; [1981] HCA 19 at 227; Hodge v Williams (1947) 47 SR
(NSW) 489 at 493. What a jury is not permitted to do is to attempt a task with an exhibit
which requires expert skills: R v O’Sullivan [1969] 1 WLR 497; see also R v Hamitov (1979)
21 SASR 596 at 598.
Evidence of experiments
[7.0.490] Courts have been reserved in admitting the results of experiments conducted
outside the court out of a concern that such evidence may be difficult for jurors to evaluate
and that it may depart in important respects from the facts which they are called upon to
evaluate. Generally, experiment evidence is designed to establish not so much a fact as a
probability of the existence of a fact: R v Harbour [1995] 1 NZLR 440 at 446. A key issue
impacting upon the fairness of adducing such evidence, especially where it is adduced by
the prosecution, is the degree of similarity of the experimental conditions to those that are
the subject of the facts in dispute: see R v Harbour [1995] 1 NZLR 440; see also R v Baker
[1989] 3 NZLR 635 at 638.
In relation to the conduct of experiments whose results are reported to the court,
Zuber JA in R v Laverty (No 2) (1979) 47 CCC (2d) 60 at 62 has stated the law and practice
as they are generally applied:
Testing the truth of hypotheses by the use of controlled experiments is one of the key
techniques of modern scientific method. The courts in their task of investigating facts
make extensive use of this technique, but under conditions which prevent them from
exploiting the process to the full limits of its usefulness. The legal doctrines relating to
experimental evidence are simple and the principal task of the lawyer is to recognize the
opportunities for their use, to seize these opportunities boldly, and when experiments are
employed to plan them inventively and correctly, so that the results derived will be
convincing to judge and jury. We are dealing here with experiments carried out before trial
and presented at the trial through descriptions given by witnesses of the experiments and
its results. …
The opportunities are of limitless variety. Some of the types of experiments most
frequently encountered are these: tests of the composition and properties of substances;
testing firearms to show the patterns of powder and shot made upon the object at different
distances; experiments by human beings in the holding of firearms to determine whether a
given gunshot wound could have been self-inflicted; tests of the visibility of objects or
persons at a given distance; tests of audibility; and tests of the speed of locomotives and
motor vehicles and of the effectiveness of their brakes and headlights.
His Honour admitted expert evidence relating to experiments conducted by fire

investigators who ignited flammable fluids in a bathtub to compare heat blisters with
those found at the scene of the alleged arson: see also R v Campbell (1977) 38 CCC (2d) 6.
It is prudent for counsel to provide other parties (and the court) with copies of
photographs, charts etc that they intend to use before the hearing. Some rules of court
make such pre-inspection a necessity.
In R v Ireland (No 2) [1971] SASR 6, upon the trial of the appellant for murder, the
prosecution tendered evidence of tests conducted by a police officer which involved the
rolling of a body over the floor of a room, and the walking of a specified distance to
ascertain the time taken in the walk. The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South
Australia held that evidence of the results of the tests was admissible. Bray CJ, Hogarth
and Wells JJ said (at 14–15):
In practice, evidence of experiments, more often than not, is offered by experts and its
purpose is frequently to confirm the opinions of those experts arrived at by an
examination of real evidence that has been found and collected at the scene of the trial.
But, of course, the use of experiments for the purpose of enlightening a jury is not limited
to those so conducted. It seems to us that, given conditions for the experiment sufficiently
similar to the conditions in which the act or event under consideration must have been
done or occurred, an experiment carefully performed and conscientiously recorded and
[7.0.490] 475
reported may frequently be of great assistance to the jury in its deliberations. Some
experiments can be carried out only by experts, occasionally by experts with high
qualifications and advanced skills, but others can be carried out by ordinary laymen by
the application of common sense and the employment of such tools, materials and devices
that are readily at hand. As with opinion evidence, much will depend on the degree of
knowledge and skill required, and the degree of precision claimed for the results of the
experiment. If a layman witness is seen by a trial judge to have blundered into arcane
fields of science or learning with inadequate training, or to be claiming that his experiment
produced results whose accuracy is plainly exaggerated, he will, no doubt, either
recommend to the jury that they disregard the evidence or, in his discretion, exclude it. But
there is a wide range of experiments whose purposes and execution are so easy to follow
and to assess, and whose results are so plainly useful, that a jury can legitimately make
reference to them to assist in ascertaining the truth, even though they are conscious that
their results are only approximate.
They approved the following statement in the judgment of Edwards J in Shepherd v State
51 Okl Cr 209; 300 Pac 421 (1931):
The general rule as to the admissibility of the result of experiments is, if the evidence
would tend to enlighten the jury and to enable them to more intelligently consider the
issues presented and arrive at the truth, it is admissible. The experiment should be under
circumstances similar to those prevailing at the time of the occurrence involved in the
controversy. They need not be identical, but a reasonable or substantial similarity is
sufficient. Several Courts have held that the lack of identity of circumstances affects only
the weight and not the competency of the evidence provided there is a degree of similarity
which will assist the jury.
The Ireland (No 2) decision was followed in Thompson v The Queen (1986) 13 FCR 165,
where the appellant had been convicted of murdering two sisters whose remains had been
found in a burnt-out motor vehicle that had crashed against a tree and caught fire. The
prosecution’s case was that the appellant had murdered the sisters and feigned an
accident resulting in the fire. The appellant gave an explanation to the police to the effect
that he was driving when he was dazzled by the lights of an oncoming vehicle. He said he
drove his vehicle from the highway, without braking, and collided with the tree at a speed
of 40–45 miles per hour, resulting in his car bursting into flames, the fire beginning in the
engine compartment and spreading to the inside of the vehicle. According to the
appellant, the flames engulfed the vehicle so rapidly that although he was able to extricate
himself, it was impossible for him to assist the two sisters, who were his passengers. The
police conducted experiments to test the appellant’s account of the events in question. The
Full Court of the Federal Court held that the trial judge had been correct to admit
evidence of the experiments, and that the divergences between the circumstances of the
experiments, on the one hand, and the circumstances of the appellant’s version of the
facts, on the other, went to weight rather than to admissibility. Forster, Everett and Miles JJ
said (at 173), relevantly, in relation to the crash experiment:
It seems to us that the difference in the loads carried by the two vehicles must have
worked in the appellant’s favour so that we may safely ignore that difference whatever it
may have been.
In the event it seems to us that the circumstances of the two collisions were sufficiently
similar to make the evidence of the test results relevant. The weight to be put on that
evidence was, of course, a matter for the jury.
(See also R v Baker [1989] 3 NZLR 635, especially in relation to the distinction between an
experiment and a reconstruction.)
In R v Neilan [1992] 1 VR 57, the applicant was charged with the murder of his wife.
His defence was that unknown intruders had broken into the family home, assaulted him,
placed him in the boot of a motor vehicle, and shot his wife. During the trial, evidence
was received of tests conducted by the police to determine whether the applicant could
476 [7.0.490]
have seen the intruders approaching his home, as he claimed. The applicant was
convicted. The Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal considered the principles governing
the admissibility of evidence of experiments and tests. Young CJ, Brooking and Marks JJ
approved (at 74–75) the following observations in 29 American Jurisprudence 2d, s 824:
One desiring to make an experiment or test in court or to introduce evidence of an
experiment or test made out of court should first show that the experiment or test is to be
made or was made, as the case may be, under conditions and circumstances similar to
those prevailing at the time of the occurrence involved in the controversy; otherwise, the
courts will not, as a general rule, permit the making of the experiments or tests or the
introduction of evidence thereof. It is clear, however, that the conditions need not be
identical with those existing at the time of the occurrence, but it is sufficient if there is a
substantial similarity of conditions. Minor variations in the essential conditions go to the
weight, rather than to the admissibility of the evidence.
There is no precise test or gauge to determine when the requirement of substantial
similarity has been satisfied. This depends largely upon the purpose for which such
evidence is to be introduced. Speaking generally, however, the measure of permissible
variation of the conditions of the experiment or test from those of the occurrence is
measured by whether such variation is liable to confuse or mislead the jury. When the
conditions are so dissimilar from those of the occurrence in question as to tend to confuse
or mislead the jury, the evidence of an experiment or test should be rejected. The question
of similarity is one that lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, to be decided in
the light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances.
Their Honours held (at 75) that in the case before them it had not been shown that there
was such a similarity of relevant conditions on the night in question and at the time of the
tests to render evidence of those tests admissible:
The evidence of the tests was wrongly admitted. But after careful consideration we are
satisfied that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred in consequence of the
reception of this inadmissible evidence. It should at the outset be noted that the case is not
one of the erroneous reception in evidence of material that is intrinsically highly
prejudicial, such as evidence of bad character or evidence of the kind considered in Maric
v R (1978) 52 ALJR 631. The evidence in question was no more than evidence of tests
conducted with a view to ascertaining what could be seen in and from the house having
regard to the state of the lighting, although it is true, as Mr Winneke submitted, that the
evidence was led for the purpose of helping to persuade the jury that the accounts which
the accused had given about the killing were not to be believed. The evidence was not
given by experts of experiments carried out by them in a field within their expertise: it
was evidence of lay persons about what they could see in or from a dark room and
looking from the doorway of a dark house. The evidence had about it none of the possibly
deceptive persuasiveness which might be thought to attach to the use of scientific
instruments under conditions which did not reproduce those of the night in question.
Moreover, because the admissibility of evidence of this kind is governed by a principle
based on common sense as opposed to depending upon some rule of law that a jury might
have difficulty in understanding, and because, similarity being a matter of degree, there is
no hard and fast line between dissimilarity which merely affects (and may affect very
seriously) weight, and on the other hand dissimilarity which leads to irrelevancy, the jury
were in a position themselves to perceive the weakness of the tests. This weakness was
well and truly exposed in cross-examination of the Crown witnesses concerned and was
made much of by counsel for the defence in his final address. The Crown, without
formally abandoning reliance on the tests, appeared in its final address to set no store by
them. The unsatisfactory nature of the tests being an obvious matter which had been
thoroughly exposed to the jury, we do not think that the jury would have placed any
weight on them. Moreover, the Crown case against the applicant was a very strong one.
By contrast, in Birks v Western Australia (2007) 33 WAR 291; [2007] WASCA 29 at [53], the
Western Australian Court of Appeal held that the circumstances of the demonstration
burn were sufficiently similar to those of the fire the subject of the case to make the
demonstration burn relevant to and probative of the facts which the respondent sought to
prove by its tender.
[7.0.490] 477
A similar issue was canvassed by the Queensland Court of Appeal in R v Dyke (2009)
197 A Crim R 558; [2009] QCA 339, where the court reviewed the authorities in the context
of determining whether to admit video recordings of fire tests. The court noted that in
Birks there had not been contrary opinion evidence and that the evidence was not affected
by deficiencies of significance, such as characterised the evidence before it. It concluded (at
[36]) that the differences between the experiment and the scenario at the time ‘were at least
of sufficient importance to require analysis, but Mr Smith did not explain the basis of his
expressed belief that the differences would not significantly bear upon the results’. It was
found that the generality of his evidence, including the absence of any description of the
reported tests in which no fire resulted and of the reported cases in which a fire did result,
rendered the evidence of problematically limited probative value.
In Wood v The Queen (2012) 84 NSWLR 581; [2012] NSWCCA 21 at [275]–[276],
McClellan CJ at CL highlighted the risks of experiments where there is not adequate
comparability of circumstances (what is sometimes called ‘ecological validity’):
To my mind all of this experimental analysis must be approached with considerable
reservation. The tests carried out by A/Prof Cross were all conducted in daylight and in
conditions where none of the participants had reason to fear for their safety. The run up
was secure and the persons who were thrown were of course cooperative. One test was
done where the female volunteer was asked to remain limp. However, even in this
experiment she cooperated and facilitated her safe entry into the water.
The circumstances on the night of Ms Byrne’s death were quite different. It was a ‘pitch
black’ night, cold (it was the middle of winter) and, having regard to the evidence of
Sgt Powderly, the surface areas were likely to have been moist from sea spray or mist.
Avoidance of admissibility traps

[7.0.530] It is not permissible at common law for expert witnesses to express opinions that
‘answer the ultimate issue’. The meaning and significance of this technical rule of expert
evidence existing under the common law is canvassed in Ch 2.25. In this context, it is
sufficient to point out that, even outside the common law jurisdictions, the expert should
be cautioned before writing a report or giving evidence that he or she should not express
opinions in ‘legal-sounding language’ or in a way which could be portrayed as usurping
the province of the fact-finding tribunal, the judge or jury. Such a posture can be alienating
for decision-makers.
Thus, an expert should not say that a person is suffering from diminished
responsibility, is insane/mentally impaired, has been negligent, or lacked testamentary
capacity; that a covenant was in restraint of trade; that a directors’ report was false and
misleading; that a company engaged in insider trading; that a publication is obscene; or
that a trade mark is likely to deceive. The same message can be conveyed in a way that
will avoid the objections that will be brought should such language be employed.
Experts can stray into being regarded as usurping the role of the trier of fact
inadvertently. Cases in which there has been expert evidence about syndromes such as
rape trauma, battered woman, and repressed memory syndromes provide graphic
instances of the problems faced by courts in deciding whether to allow or reject such
evidence.
The nature of the evidence that might be given about syndromes ranges from neutral
explanation of typical conduct through to noting the consistency of a victim’s conduct
with that described by the syndrome, and ultimately to asserting that the victim is telling
the truth because of the match between the victim’s conduct and that prescribed for the
syndrome. This range can be usefully classified in five levels, which are set out and
discussed in [10.30.670]. The decided cases illustrate that the courts will sometimes admit
evidence in the lower levels but not at the upper end. It is the ‘entry level’ neutral
explanatory evidence which is often termed ‘counterintuitive’ – that is, it provides a
478 [7.0.530]
proper basis for the trier of fact to interpret other evidence. Without such counterintuitive
expert help, the lay trier of fact is likely to misunderstand the other evidence. The
‘upper-end’ evidence, by contrast, replaces a decision by the trier of fact with one by the
expert. Hence it is not allowed.
Re-examination of the expert witness

[7.0.570] The purpose of re-examination is to adduce evidence to explain or qualify
matters that have emerged during cross-examination and which may cause adverse
inferences to be drawn regarding the witness’s credit or the examining party’s case: see,
generally, Kosciusko Thredbo Pty Ltd v Milson Projects Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW Supreme
Court, McLelland J, 9 August 1990); Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 at
409; R v Clune (No 1) [1975] VR 723 at 734; Okudzeto v Commissioner of Police [1964] GLR
588; Henry (2013). There is a related principle that when a witness has been
cross-examined as to part of a written or oral statement made by him or her, counsel may
prove in re-examination such other parts of the statement as are necessary to explain or
qualify it: see Young (1991, p 282); Meredith v Innes (1931) 31 SR (NSW) 104 at 112;
Wentworth v Rogers (No 10) (1987) 8 NSWLR 398 at 409. Where a document has been
shown to an expert witness who is only asked whether he or she adheres to the earlier
statement and no part of the document is specifically put to the expert, it is probable that
the right to re-examine on the document does not arise: Malcolm (1986, p 276). See, too,
s 39 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the Evidence Act 2001
(Tas), the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence Act
(Uniform National Legislation) Act (NT), s 39.
Where an ambiguous answer is given during cross-examination, it will clearly provide
a ground for re-examination. However, re-examination is permitted for broader purposes
than this (R v Lavery (No 2) (1979) 20 SASR 430 at 451 per Wells J):
It is to be permitted … whenever an answer or answers given by a witness in
cross-examination would, unless supplemented or explained in the manner proposed by
the re-examiner, leave the Court with an impression of the facts, derived from the witness,
that is capable of being construed unfavourably to the side responsible for calling the
witness, and that represents a distortion, or an incomplete account, of the truth as the
witness is able to present it.
(See also Wells (1988, p 196).)

Re-examination is a particularly important tool in the context of expert witnesses
because it provides the opportunity for the examiner to allow the witness who may have
been limited to ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers to convey the complexities and the shades of grey in
his or her opinion. Experienced forensic experts will give the advocate calling them a cue
during cross-examination to indicate matters on which they wish to say more. This is best
done by saying to the cross-examiner: ‘I can say more about that.’
In addition, as Brereton J (2006) has observed:
Particularly with experts, re-examination provides a very valuable opportunity to
re-enforce your expert testimony by eliciting the rationale for answers given in
cross-examination. Where, in cross-examination, your expert is asked to agree to
propositions but is confined to ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answers, in re-examination you can – and
usually should – ask ‘why?’. In this way, bare assertion becomes supported by reason and
all the more compelling and acceptable to a Judge.
Wells (1988, p 199) gives the pertinent example of a doctor cross-examined about a written
report, prepared some six months before the trial, in which the doctor expressed views
and a prognosis of the plaintiff’s condition which proved to be at variance with his
evidence:
[7.0.570] 479
It would be proper, by re-examination, to show that he later learnt facts about the
plaintiff’s history which were unknown to him at the time of writing the report, and which
were taken into account by him in reaching, and which greatly modified, the opinion and
prognosis he gave in evidence.
Another classic example of an appropriate occasion for re-examination is when a

concession has been wrung from the expert that there is a possibility of an error in a
certain technique or that an alternative explanation is plausible. If counsel is confident that
the likelihood of either is extremely low, there is no reason why the expert should not be
given the opportunity to ‘set the record aright’ by explaining just that to the tribunal of
fact.
Before re-examination, there may be an opportunity for counsel to confer with the
expert witness but this must be done with discernment. There is very little written on this
point. As a matter of practice, it is common for cross-examining advocates to continue
their cross-examination until just after a break (mid-morning, lunch or overnight) because
the ‘calling’ advocate can then be required to re-examine without any chance of a
conference with their witness. If the cross-examiner chooses to finish questions before a
break, then it is common practice for the witness and the advocate to take the opportunity
to confer before the re-examination begins.
However, elsewhere there are different attitudes. In Canada, the fact that the Crown
prosecutor discussed his evidence with an expert witness who later, and apparently in
response to the discussions, changed his evidence between cross-examination and
re-examination was the subject of scathing comment in R v Peruta (1992) 78 CCC (3d) 350
at 362, 372.
Young (1991, p 283) noted that if an advocate:
does not know enough about the subject matter that has received some devastating
cross-examination, to be able to re-examine, then it is usually accepted that no questions
should be asked without first conferring with the witness.
The practice in New South Wales is that counsel says to the judge:
Your Honour, the witness has been asked questions about subject matters which did not
seem to me to be relevant and upon which I have not taken instructions. I would seek
leave to confer with the witness further before re-examination.
(See also Sheppard (1987, p 39).)

An excellent example of where such a short conference could have had dramatic effect
is provided by the following oft-repeated sample of advocacy. Du Cann quotes (in
Reynolds and King (1988, p 117)) this famous cross-examination interchange between
Norman Birkett KC and an expert:
Q: What is the co-efficient of expansion of brass?
A: I am afraid I cannot answer that out of hand.
Q: If you do not know, say so. What do I mean by the term?
A: You want to know what is the expansion of the metal under heat.
Q: I asked you what is the co-efficient of the expansion of brass. Do you know what it
means?
A: Put that way I probably do not.
Q: You are an engineer?
A: I dare say I am.
Q: Well you are not a doctor or a crime investigator or an amateur detective are you?
A: No.
Q: Are you an engineer?
A: Yes.
Q: What is the co-efficient of the expansion of brass? Do you know?
A: No, not put that way.
The expert, Arthur Isaacs, was then re-examined by his counsel Finnemore as follows:
480 [7.0.570]
Q: Do you know, from a metallurgical point of view, why a nut which is subject to intense
heat, afterwards, when it cools, is in fact loose? Do you know of the metallurgical
explanation or not?
A: No, I cannot say that I do.
Q: But you say, from your experience, that it happens?
A: Yes in every case that I have had.
Q: You do not profess to be a metallurgist?
A: No, not at all.
This re-examination was not successful. It did nothing to re-establish the credibility of the
expert engineer; rather, it reinforces his lack of knowledge about co-efficients of expansion.
Whether or not that topic was relevant is not to the point: the engineer Isaacs appeared
inexpert. The re-examination should have focused upon the expert being an excellent
engineer and demonstrated that the cross-examiner’s question was a red herring, perhaps
even suggesting that the cross-examiner did not know that his question was pointless.
The technique for re-examination questions is similar to that of examination-in-chief.
Hence the expert should expect the questions to be ‘open’ in style, calling for explanation.
The advocate should also use headings so that the topic is clear, as in:
Q: Now do you recall that during the cross-examination you were asked about a
co-efficient of expansion for brass?
A: Yes.
Q: And you responded, ‘You want to know what is the expansion of the metal under
heat?’
A: Yes.
Q: Please tell us what – if anything – this topic has to do with your opinions today within
your field of expertise as an engineer?
A: It has nothing to do with my opinions today, nothing at all.
A common error by counsel is to attempt to use re-examination as an opportunity to elicit

expert evidence belatedly that was overlooked during examination-in-chief. This is not
permissible. An astute opponent will quickly and successfully object. Re-examination is
limited to matters which arise from the cross-examination (Robinson (undated)). If the
advocate or witness realises that some topic has been forgotten or overlooked, then the
advocate must persuade the judge to give leave for this additional evidence to be given. If
that leave is given, then the opponent has a right to cross-examine on it.
[7.0.570] 481
Chapter 7.05
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE
EXPERT WITNESS
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [7.05.01]
Strategic cross-examination ................................................................................................. [7.05.10]
Approach of competent cross-examiners .......................................................................... [7.05.20]
Conferences by counsel with expert witnesses ............................................................... [7.05.60]
Challenging the expert’s qualifications ............................................................................. [7.05.100]
Arguing with the witness or the advocate ....................................................................... [7.05.140]
Tried and tested cross-examination techniques ............................................................... [7.05.180]
Scrutinising the basis of the opinions ............................................................................... [7.05.190]
Exposure of flawed logic by experts .................................................................................
Post hoc ergo propter hoc ................................................................................................... [7.05.210]
Affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent ................................................. [7.05.220]
Naive inductivism ................................................................................................................. [7.05.230]
Focusing on other possibilities ........................................................................................... [7.05.250]
The contemporaneity attack ................................................................................................ [7.05.260]
Securing of advantageous concessions .............................................................................. [7.05.280]
Exposure of bias .................................................................................................................... [7.05.290]
Unmasking the ubiquitous expert ...................................................................................... [7.05.310]
Showing up the template expert ........................................................................................ [7.05.320]
Cross-examination by reference to court rules and guidelines .................................... [7.05.360]
Impeachment by reference to a code of ethics, accepted protocols
or industry guidelines .......................................................................... [7.05.370]
Exploiting the expert’s personality .................................................................................... [7.05.380]
Impeachment by prior inconsistent statements ............................................................... [7.05.390]
Impeachment by reference to prior ethical indiscretions .............................................. [7.05.395]
Just answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ ....................................................................................................... [7.05.400]
(Dis)continuity and contamination in exhibits ................................................................ [7.05.440]
Dealing with hypothetical questions ................................................................................. [7.05.480]
Examination of the expert’s notes ...................................................................................... [7.05.520]
Utilisation of draft reports ................................................................................................... [7.05.540]
‘Cross-examination demands tempering boldness with

discrimination, courage with caution, and passion with
judgment.’
Weitz (1992, p 58).
‘Counsel: Do you know the symptoms of concussion of the

brain?
Witness: I do.
Counsel: Well, suppose my learned friend and myself were to
bang together, would we get concussion of the brain?
Witness: Your learned friend might.’
Roth (1989, p 113).
The author acknowledges with gratitude the input on this chapter in earlier editions from Hugh
Selby.
Introduction
[7.05.01] This chapter outlines strategies for and techniques of cross-examination of expert
witnesses. It does so by reference to general principles that are fundamental to effective
advocacy and, where appropriate, refers to learned texts on advocacy and testimony. It is
written in such a way as to endeavour to provide assistance to both advocates and
experts. It should be read in conjunction with Ch 7.0 (Preparation and examination.of the
expert witness) and Ch 5.0 (Forensic reports).
[7.05.01] 483
Strategic cross-examination
[7.05.10] Cross-examination of an expert witness should make him or her accountable for
views expressed during examination-in-chief and in any forensic reports which the expert
has written. In addition, cross-examination will often highlight evidence from others
which assists the cross-examiner. It is followed by the opportunity for re-examination: see
Ch 7.05.
Cross-examination should be dignified and respectful (Pembroke (2013)), at least at
first, acknowledging the knowledge and specialised knowledge of an expert witness. As
Sir David Napley (1983, p 142) observed:
Expert witnesses are a much maligned body of men. It is true that some of them may be
charlatans, but for the most part they are men who are concerned to give help to the court
upon the basis of a life-time’s experience and training, and moreover, training within a
particular field. Nothing is to be gained by endeavouring to bully them (or, for that matter,
any other witness). Although your object may often be to show that the extent of their
knowledge and experience is less than the expert whom you propose to call, this needs to
be done with a degree of tact and judgment. You occupy a powerful position in court in
relation to an expert. To make him look silly (if you are able); to cause him to be the centre
of your ridicule (if you are competent to do so) are not only unkind and unnecessary
pursuits. but may damage him in the pursuit of his own profession by destroying his
reputation. Experts for the most part are dealing with matters which can be the subject of
differing opinions.
It should not be haphazard. It should be purposeful, organised and planned (see Henry
(2013)); it should be a product and an integral component of the cross-examiner’s case
plan (see Hampel, Brimer and Kune (2008)). That means that the cross-examiner should be
well aware of what he or she wants from the first question to the last. The advocate may
focus upon the content of the expert’s evidence (the opinions and their basis), or upon the
credit of the expert (this person has flaws which adversely affect our assessment of his or
her opinions), or upon both content and credit. This requires considerable preparation on
the part of the cross-examiner.
An expert also needs to be prepared for cross-examination. This entails being
absolutely familiar with the facts underlying his or her opinions (see Freckelton, Reddy
and Selby (1999, p 48); Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (2001, p 40)), thereby enabling what
respondents to surveys of the Australian judiciary and magistracy categorised as the most
desirable characteristic of oral testimony: clarity. It also involves the expert reviewing
relevant materials, such as reports by other experts that may have been written
subsequent to the expert’s own report. Such familiarity is part of inducing an impression
of trustworthiness on the part of an expert (see Dvoskin (2008)), which is an integral part
of encouraging triers of fact to respect and rely upon the expert’s opinions.
It is generally helpful for experts to keep their evidence practical and to avoid its
seeming too theoretical in orientation. For example, research suggests that jurors prefer
mental health testimony from experts who appear more clinically oriented and have
practical experience, rather than experts from the ‘ivory tower’ of academia: see, for
example, Boccaccini and Brodsky (2002). The surveys of judges and magistrates suggest
that this may well be particularly the case in Australia.
Experts need, too, to be familiar with other viewpoints, whether in the professional
literature or expressed or likely to be expressed by other experts. Ideally, they will have
discussed any qualifications or weaknesses in their report with the advocate calling them,
and ensured that their notes and other relevant documentation are readily available. In the
witness box, they should have settled so that they are comfortable and can easily give
their answers to the trier of fact, be it a judge, jury, magistrate or tribunal member. An
expert witness should try to resist being rushed, should consider the questions posed, and
should always remember that his or her overriding duty is to assist the court.
484 [7.05.10]
Cross-examination of the expert witness | CH 7.05
Sometimes, but not often, the opinions of an expert witness, the facts upon which the
expert relied, and even the expert’s authority are successfully impugned during
cross-examination. In real life, as opposed to the scripts of television dramas, effective
cross-examination of an expert is more likely to be a methodical process of probing and
testing the bases of the expert’s views, eliciting concessions, and exploring the possibility
for alternative inferences to be drawn legitimately from the data available. The aim
generally is not the discrediting of the witness as inexpert, unacceptably partisan or a
charlatan, but cumulatively to reduce the impact of the witness’s evidence-in-chief and to
cast doubt upon the expert’s assumptions and opinions: see Brigden (2018); Chayko,
Gulliver and MacDougall (1991, p 33). The objective may even be as humble as to commit
the witness to specifics which an equally or better qualified expert will later refute: see
Mulligan (1987, p 13).
Where, as is regularly the case, there are competing expert views, given by reputable,
competent and reasonably even-handed people, the notion of ‘destructive cross-
examination’ has no place. Rather, counsel may well seek to induce the other side’s expert
to agree with their side’s position as much as can be orchestrated, or to concede that
another interpretation of the facts is ‘possible’ or ‘feasible’, even though it happens not to
be the expert’s preferred approach. Thereby the groundwork has been laid for counsel’s
summing up, well after the experts have left the court, to argue that, on balance, the views
of the expert or experts appearing for their side are the more convincing – pointing
perhaps to more ambivalence or equivocation on the part of the other opposing expert or
to the importance of the concessions that were elicited during cross-examination.
Another option to which counsel may aspire is to create some doubt about the
accuracy, representativeness or completeness of the facts upon which the other side’s
expert relied, or the strengths of the techniques or theories that had been chosen. A
cross-examination may establish such matters without in any way attacking the
credentials, the honesty or the impartiality of the expert.
For example, cross-examination which leads the expert to qualify an opinion because
he or she is presented with additional facts, or to concede that less weight might be put on
facts he or she previously relied upon, is powerful. Suppose the expert has offered an
opinion based upon 10 facts. Of these 10, some two or three may be contentious. The
cross-examination strategy may be to have the expert admit that with the removal of each
one of those contentious facts, the opinion becomes less compelling – perhaps even
insupportable. Alternatively, further facts may be put to the expert to suggest that his or
her opinion was prematurely reached and, in light of the availability of further
information, should at least be qualified.
None of this is to suggest that cross-examination is a friendly, unstressful experience
for the expert. It is the job of counsel to persuade, and within their armoury, they are quite
entitled by any fair means 1 (the judge or magistrate being the arbiter) to lure the expert
into overstatement, confusion or error and to play upon any foible which may detract
from the witness’s credibility or enhance that of their side.
Cross-examination is the ‘accountability’ mechanism within our adversarial litigation
system. One party advances facts and, through its experts, opinions which will assist the
trier of fact to understand those facts. The opposing party can test those opinions, as to
both content and the status of the expert, through cross-examination. As outlined above,
that testing can be pleasant or unpleasant for the witness (see Smith and Bace (2003, ch 2)).
However, it is not ‘all one way’. Experts who are called by the prosecution or plaintiff can
expect that the cross-examiner will raise with them those issues where their expert has
written, or will be saying, something which is different from that of the expert being
1 See the fascinating discussion of orators’ ethics in this regard in Quintilian (1920, Vol 2, No
xvii, pp 19ff).
[7.05.10] 485
cross-examined (see Allied Pastoral Holdings Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) [1983]
1 NSWLR 1 at 16; MWJ v The Queen (2005) 80 ALJR 329; [2005] HCA 74).
This is an opportunity for the expert to be quite clear about his or her views and why
they should be preferred. This is regarded as a rule of fairness and its breach has drastic
consequences. Should expert witness A for the plaintiff assert proposition X and the
defendant’s expert witness B opine (in his or her written report or when giving spoken
evidence) that proposition X is inapplicable, and further that only proposition Y can apply,
the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL) requires that counsel for the defendant put to
witness A during cross-examination questions that relate to the inapplicability of
proposition X and the appropriateness of proposition Y. Should expert witness A not be
cross-examined about the alleged error of applying proposition X, and in the course of the
defence’s case expert witness B claims that proposition X does not apply, the judge or
magistrate is entitled to take into account that the rule has been broken and to find that
expert witness A’s evidence should be preferred. All that counsel for the defendant can do
at that stage is to ask for leave to recall expert witness A for further cross-examination, a
request which at the best is highly embarrassing and at the worst will be refused.
Likewise, if counsel for the defendant remembers to raise with expert witness A the
inapplicability of proposition X but neglects to mention proposition Y to witness A, the
plaintiff is entitled to seek leave to reopen the case to deal with this ‘surprise’. It is
common for parties to seek leave to have their experts sit in court to hear the evidence of
the opposing experts and, on occasion, the evidence of lay witnesses: see also Munday
(1981, p 688). Combining this practice in civil matters with the requirement of pre-hearing
exchange of expert reports entails that the courts can be uncompromising in applying
rules such as the rule in Browne v Dunn – after all, everyone can to a significant degree be
on notice of what the other side’s experts will say. However, a degree of harshness in the
rule is now alleviated by the more flexible approach in the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) the Evidence (National Uniform
Legislation) Act (NT), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic).
Approach of competent cross-examiners

[7.05.20] Fennell (1992, p 164) has contended that there are three basic options for
cross-examination of an expert witness:
(1) putting questions which place a different interpretation on the facts than the
expert has already expressed;
(2) challenging the opinion by confronting the expert with authoritative works, or
even his or her own writings, which cast doubt on the correctness of the opinions;
and
(3) establishing that the expert formed his or her opinion without taking into account
facts already established, or which will be established.
Each of these techniques requires careful preparation and planning before execution.
A common set of principles followed by many competent cross-examiners includes the
following:
1. Ensuring that each question is part of an overall strategy with a clear focus as to points
and issues.
In a properly planned case, the advocate has clear aims for any cross-examination. Thus,
for one witness it may be important to gain a concession; with another, it may be
necessary to demonstrate through the witness’s evasiveness that the witness and his or
her evidence are unreliable; while with a third the best approach may be ‘damage
minimisation’ by no cross-examination at all (assuming that there are no Browne v Dunn
(1893) 6 R 67 (HL) requirements).
486 [7.05.20]
The importance of an overall case strategy, in which the cross-examination of the other
side’s witnesses is a significant factor, can be seen in the following example. The plaintiff
in a civil action or the victim in a criminal prosecution alleges sexual abuse by the
defendant. The alleged incidents occurred many years before and were ‘rediscovered’
during therapy. In his or her evidence-in-chief, the plaintiff or victim will be recounting his
or her version of events. The plaintiff or victim may also call an expert to dispel common
misunderstandings about his or her conduct as a victim of the defendant (eg, the failure to
complain at the time of the alleged abuse). The expert may be allowed to give this
‘counterintuitive evidence’. For a detailed discussion of the admissibility limitations and
problems with such evidence, see [10.30.240] and [10.30.670].
Part of the defence strategy, whether or not the plaintiff or prosecution is successful in
calling an expert, is to create a situation which will persuade the trial judge to allow the
defence to call experts whose evidence will diminish or neutralise the credibility of the
victim. Properly prepared by his or her own experts, the defence advocate will
cross-examine the victim so as to obtain answers which will create the foundation for
arguing that the trier of fact (whether judge or jury) must have the help of an expert in
order to evaluate the evidence of the victim.
2. Asking closed questions, which suggest their answer.

In cross-examination, the advocate should control the witness and the information given
by the witness. That control can be used to elicit concessions and admissions from the
witness which are consistent with the story and the argument that the advocate’s client is
promoting. The control is achieved by the physical positions of the witness and the
advocate, the level of facility with the area on the part of the questioner, the form of the
questions, and the extent to which the advocate can induce the witness to submit to the
advocate’s tone and inflection.
To achieve control with the form of question, the easiest method is to use a question
which suggests one of the answers ‘yes’, ‘no’ or ‘don’t know’, and no more. No
opportunity for any explanation is given or invited. Thus, ‘You never finished your PhD
dissertation, did you?’ is a typical closed question which might be asked in cross-
examination. This can be contrasted to the open question put in examination-in-chief,
‘You’ve told us that you started a PhD but never finished. What happened?’
3. Making the argument through the questions.

The content and tone of the advocate’s questions followed by the witness’s answers create
an impression about ‘what really happened’ or ‘this is how we should interpret these
results’. Those impressions are creative in the sense that the advocate is deliberately
working toward a specific interpretation of past events.
4. Using simple language and including only one fact in each question.
The language employed by a cross-examiner should be unambiguous and straightforward,
not adorned by terminology that is ambiguous or difficult to understand. Questions
should be simple, not containing multiple components which could confuse the witness.
5. Exploring possible options with ‘open’ style questions only when the ‘worst possible’
answer will leave the questioner no worse off.
Reference was made above to the usual reliance upon ‘closed’ questions (eg, ‘yes’ or ‘no’)
during cross-examination. Sometimes the cross-examiner’s strategy calls for raising
possibilities with the witness and allowing the witness to explain. Because such
explanation by the witness is inconsistent with the exercise of control by the advocate, it is
only likely to be allowed by a good advocate who has decided that the most damaging
explanation from the expert will leave the advocate’s case no worse than it was before the
question was asked.
[7.05.20] 487
6. Confining the witness within options that the advocate wishes to highlight to the trier of
fact: a funnelling technique is common in cross-examination.
At the start, there are a number of possible outcomes. As the cross-examination proceeds,
the advocate ‘closes’ those outcomes through the answers given by the witness so that the
witness and the trier of fact are directed toward a particular outcome. As an example,
suppose that there are three tests that have been used, with varying results. The advocate
wishes test ‘B’ to be adopted:
Advocate: You agree that three tests may be used in this situation?
Expert: Yes.
Advocate: Those are commonly known as ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’?
Expert: Yes.
Advocate: Your preference is to use ‘A’, isn’t it?
Expert: Yes.
Advocate: However, if ‘X’ is not available, then you’d turn to another test, wouldn’t you?
Expert: Yes.
Advocate: I’d like you to assume that ‘X’ was not available. In that scenario, you’d prefer
to use ‘B’ rather than ‘C’, wouldn’t you?
Expert: Yes.
Advocate: And that’s because ‘B’ is known to be more reliable than ‘C’, isn’t that so?
Expert: Yes.
7. Identify all dates relevant to the expert witness and the expert evidence.
Anomalies within chronologies can expose inconsistencies, inappropriate assumptions
and the commission of errors (Uppal (2016)).
Conferences by counsel with expert witnesses

[7.05.60] Wherever possible, in preparation for trial an advocate and his or her expert
should discuss likely cross-examination topics. The impact of cross-examination on such
topics can be minimised, if not neutralised, by being raised during examination-in-chief.
This has the potential for educating counsel and also for enhancing the alertness and
readiness of the experts for the questions likely to be asked of them. There is no substitute
for such preparation for both the legal representatives and expert witnesses (see Eliasberg
(1946); Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016)).
An advocate can also seek to talk to the experts for opponents. There is no property in
a witness: see Harmony Shipping Co SA v Davis [1979] 1 WLR 1380; [1979] 3 All ER 177;
Ward v The Queen (1981) 3 A Crim R 171. This means that advocates are not generally
precluded from speaking with expert witnesses before trial.
In civil matters, it is now standard for copies of expert reports on which a party intends
to rely to be made available to the other side before trial: see above, [5.0.50]. This is so in
a number of jurisdictions (see, eg, Crimes (Criminal Trials) Act 1999 (Vic), s 9) also in respect
of criminal matters. There is no reason why opposing experts should not be approached
before trial by a party’s solicitors seeking comment and/or a conference. 2 This can reduce
the number of issues in dispute and reveal reservations and hesitations held by the expert
but not expressed in a formal report. It can therefore be most worthwhile for revealing
matters toward which fruitful cross-examination can be directed. However, an expert (just
like any other witness) can quite properly decline such overtures, preferring the witness
box exchange. 3
In the criminal arena, Miller (1987, p 628) has observed that:
2 They can always refuse to discuss matters if they are so minded, although in my
experience such an attitude is rare.
3 Refusal by experts to communicate with each other was one of the points of criticism by
Commissioner Morling in his report into the convictions of Michael and Lindy
Chamberlain (1987).
488 [7.05.60]
Whatever convention there may be which calls upon defence counsel to alert the Crown
prosecutor of an intention on the part of defence counsel to speak with a Crown witness,
that convention does not apply in the case of expert forensic 4 witnesses.
It is generally regarded as inappropriate for counsel to interview witnesses in each other’s

presence on contentious matters: see the various Bar rules. However, this prohibition does
not apply in respect of expert witnesses, although there are many circumstances in which
prudence would suggest compliance with it. 5
Once cross-examination has begun, the general practice in Australia is that counsel will
not speak with their own witnesses ‘without the leave of the court or [their] opponent, or
query, without informing the court or [their] opponent’: Sheppard (1987, p 36) and see
various Bar rules. At the very least, extreme caution is needed in such circumstances, lest
there be any suggestion that the advocate is seeking to influence his or her witness’s
evidence. Experts should take care that they do not discuss their evidence with others
during breaks in their cross-examination. Usually, this will mean over morning tea and
lunch, but it extends to overnight breaks also. From time to time, there is the following
cross-examination:
Advocate: Expert, did you enjoy your lunch?
Expert: Yes, thank you.
Advocate: Lunch has made you better prepared for my questions, hasn’t it?
Expert: Well, I’m not hungry, if that’s what you mean.
Advocate: Your lunch partner is very talented, isn’t she?
Expert: Yes.
Advocate: Indeed, she did quite a lot of the work that forms the basis of your opinions?
Expert: Yes.
Advocate: Before lunch, you were hungry for food.
Expert: Of course.
Advocate: And, of course, you were also hungry for some expert help to get over those
problems in your evidence?
Expert: Not really.
Advocate: You’ve given evidence in court before, haven’t you?
Expert: Yes.
Advocate: And you know that you shouldn’t discuss your evidence while you’re being
cross-examined?
Expert: Yes.
Was that why you went several blocks to that coffee shop – so you wouldn’t be seen?
Expert: No.
Challenging the expert's expertise

[7.05.100] The criteria that enable experts to assume their privileged position in the
courtroom are in principle quite strict: see above, Ch 2.05. The limits to the right accorded
to expert witnesses to give evidence in the form of opinions are enunciated in Wigmore on
Evidence (1979, Vol 2, p 750), in a passage adopted by Brennan J in Murphy v The Queen
(1989) 167 CLR 94 at 120:
4 By this expression, it is to be assumed that the author was referring to witnesses who, it
was intended, would give evidence in relation to scientific matters.
5 Case conferences are sometimes convened by community services departments in relation
to wardship or care and protection applications. Prosecuting and even defence legal
representatives may be invited to attend in company with more than one person, who is
likely to testify in subsequent proceedings as an expert. Such conferences are replete with
possibilities for discussion and changes of view by experts. Counsel should not participate
in any form of conference which could lead them to become a witness, and should
generally not be present at such meetings.
[7.05.100] 489
person.
(See also above, [2.15.160].)

It is important that courts can be confident that claimed qualifications, credentials and
affiliations of experts are all that they appear to be. At the extreme, on occasion claimed
qualifications prove to be spurious (see Freckelton (2018)).
Eichel (2002) related the disturbing tale of obtaining a flurry of credentials for his cat,
Zoe, in the areas of psychotherapy and hypnotherapy. Zoe ended up being certified by
three major hypnotherapy associations, having met their ‘strict training requirements’ and
having had her background ‘thoroughly reviewed’. Zoe held a diplomate in psychotherapy
from an association that claimed to promote the highest standards among psychotherapists.
The story is very amusing, but also a salutary reminder of how specious many apparent
associations and qualifications in fact are; they can be well worth scrutinising during
cross-examination.
In addition, it is important to look carefully at claimed publications as the phenomena
of vanity publishing and subsidy publishing mean that persons seeking to create the
appearance of a publication history can readily do so through publishing articles in open
access, non-peer-reviewed journals in which authors pay to be published.
Something of a myth has grown up in the Australasian and, to a lesser degree, English
jurisdictions that it is not appropriate to press an objection as to the sufficiency or
relevance of experts’ qualifications to give evidence: see Glissan (1985, p 123). This is in
contrast to the United States and Canadian practice, which is much more stringent in its
examination of the qualifications of alleged expert witnesses to testify. As Miller (1987,
p 625) has pointed out:
Too often judges are inclined to discourage attacks by counsel on the qualifications and
standing of expert witnesses. In medical cases judges will often state that the professional
qualifications of a particular witness are ‘well known’ and need not be the subject of
evidence. This is a dangerous development, which has occurred all too frequently in
jurisdictions in which courts have the exclusive jurisdiction to try personal injury cases,
and where the judges become familiar with the procession of medical witnesses who are
called as witnesses.
In Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94, Brennan J held that neither the expert’s report
nor his statement of qualifications revealed any expertise which would have qualified him
to offer a view about the accused’s understanding of particular questions or his use of
particular words or phrases: see above, Ch 2.15. He found that the crucial link in the chain
of proof of the witness’s qualifications to give the expert evidence was missing – it had not
been shown that the general expertise of well-qualified psychologists enables them to say
whether a subject understands particular words and phrases or enables them to assert the
unlikelihood of the subject’s use of such words or phrases.
Dawson J took a similar approach and expressed the view that the psychologist’s
qualifications, as presented to the trial judge, would equip him to do no more than express
the view that the accused was poorly educated and of limited intellectual capacity. There
was no material before the court which would indicate that the witness was qualified to
express an expert opinion about whether the use of phrases and sentence structures in the
record of interview was uncharacteristic of the accused.
490 [7.05.100]
Finally, even if an expert survives an attack on his or her qualifications during a voire
dire, that does not mean that those qualifications are not still vulnerable and properly
subject to further scrutiny: Wells (1988, p 188). Many experts proclaim that they are
members of a professional association when stating their qualifications. Often such
memberships are procured by payment of a fee, and exposure of this fact ‘can demonstrate
that the witness has puffed up the important résumé to appear more credible’: Chayko,
Gulliver and MacDougall (1991, p 33); Myers (1989).
Cross-examination on such a matter might proceed as follows:
Q: Doctor, you said in stating your experience and your qualifications that you are a
member of the Australian and New Zealand Forensic Veterinary Science Society?
A: Yes. That is right.
Q: That means that you pay just a small subscription each year to be a member?
A: Yes, that is so.
Q: No formal qualifications are necessary for membership of the Society, save an interest
in the area of forensic veterinary science?
A: I suppose that is so.
Q: In fact, someone as ignorant as I of forensic veterinary science could join, if I paid my
subscription?
A: Yes. Some barristers are members.
Q: So nothing about this membership indicates any qualifications, does it?
A: No.
Q: And it’s not an assessment of experience either, is it?
A: No.
Q: And yet you deemed it appropriate to list your membership of this Society in the
context of your qualifications?
Lack of experience may entail that the court gives less weight to the ‘expert’ opinion.
Thus, a social worker employed in a protective services division may have graduated only
recently and done no more than an induction course into the practices of his or her
department. That may be enough to designate such a person an expert in the behaviour of
children after they have been sexually assaulted. However, it may be more worthwhile for
the cross-examiner to draw out that this is the first time that the social worker has received
a ‘disclosure’ from a child and that the stock of experience against which he or she can
compare the encounter in question is lacking.
Arguing with the witness or the advocate

[7.05.140] Neither the advocate nor the expert witness should argue with the other during
cross-examination. Davis (1989, p 65) puts it somewhat unflatteringly:
You never get into a wrestling match with a hog because you both come up covered with
manure, and the hog kind of likes it.
[7.05.140] 491
Thus, instead of confronting an expert with ‘Dr X, you hardly saw the defendant before
concluding she was fit to plead’, something along the following lines might more
constructively (and subtly) be attempted:
Q: Dr X, as a professional, you prefer to have as many facts and opportunities for
observation as possible before drawing a conclusion, don’t you?
A: Of course.
Q: And yet you were able to meet only once with the defendant before concluding her fit
to plead. Is that right?
A: Yes.
Q: And that meeting was for a little less than one hour?
A: Yes.
Q: And you are now aware that the defence psychiatrist, who has a different view to your
view, met with the defendant on three separate occasions for a total of seven hours?
A: Yes.
Q: You’ve seen the notes taken during those three meetings, haven’t you?
A: Yes.
Q: Thorough, aren’t they?
A: Yes.
Maintenance of unflustered composure by both advocates and experts is more consistent
with professionalism (see Chappelle and Rosengren (2000)).
On the other hand, the ill-prepared advocate or witness deserves to be exposed. A
courtroom performer, whether at the Bar table or in the witness box, can be lured more
easily into loss of control and overt display of emotion when he or she is not sufficiently
prepared. For example, when the expert is well prepared and the cross-examiner is not,
the advocate may start to feel discouraged, then flustered, and finally angry at the obvious
failure of the cross-examination. Likewise, when the advocate is well prepared but the
expert’s report and evidence-in-chief have been superficial, then that expert under
cross-examination will become more and more unhappy as each and all of the
shortcomings in the expert’s experience, preparation and report are exposed. People who
are upset, be they advocates or witnesses, make mistakes – the kind of mistakes that can
tip court cases one way or the other.
Tried and tested cross-examination techniques

[7.05.180] A number of strategies are customarily employed by cross-examiners seeking to
draw into question the value of evidence given by expert witnesses during examination-
in-chief. These include:
• subjecting the bases of expert opinion, and the assumptions and reasoning lying behind
them, to rigorous scrutiny;
• suggesting that the views expressed are the result of partiality and a lack of objectivity;
492 [7.05.180]
• impeaching the quality of the work conducted by the expert witness;

• confining the witness’s testimony narrowly within acceptable limits; and
• eliciting important concessions from the expert to reduce the harmful impact of the
examination-in-chief.
The following are well-trodden routes to these ends.
Scrutinising the basis of the opinions
[7.05.190] Any expert opinion will be based upon data, facts, tests, observations,
assumptions or truths generally accepted within the expert’s milieu. Abadee J in R v
Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554 at 577 observed: ‘An expert opinion is only as persuasive as
the facts upon which it is based.’ A legitimate and worthwhile course for the
cross-examining counsel is to determine whether those data are themselves valid: see Von
Doussa (1987, pp 617ff); Miller (1987, p 625). Have the tests been carried out in accordance
with established protocols? Could the observations have been corrupted through
contamination, poor memory, inadequate notation etc? Is there, in fact, disagreement
within the expert’s profession about the validity of the testing procedure or the means of
reading the results? 6
For instance, there was a dispute about the accuracy of the early DNA profiling
procedures: see Thompson and Ford (1988; 1989). People v Castro 144 Misc 2d 956 (1989) in
the United States highlighted the existence of alternative approaches to DNA profiling and
saw prominent scientists calling into question the Lifecodes procedures for calculating
probabilities of matching DNA. (See, eg, Lander (1989).) In both Chamberlain v R (No 2)
[1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521 and Castro, errors were made in note-taking by the
major scientists involved. This meant that the procedures in the tests came under a
questioning spotlight, to which neither the foetal blood tests in the former case nor the
DNA profiling in the latter stood up well: see Morling (1987). The primary data, upon
which opinions were later expressed, were shown to be fundamentally flawed by
methodological sloppiness, including in Castro the employment of contaminated probes,
inadequate recording of procedures, and dubious assertions of statistical likelihood of
false matchings.
For a checklist of procedural issues that can be usefully raised in cross-examination of
DNA evidence, see Ch 12.20, [12.20.330].
The following is an example of effective cross-examination of the expert which focuses
upon the validity of the testing procedure. A psychologist had used the Rorschach test and
arrived at various conclusions based on the answers provided by the test subject. The
cross-examining barrister asked these simple questions:
Q: It is usual to ask ‘x’ questions in application of the Rorschach test, isn’t it?
A: Yes.
Q: But you only asked some of those questions?
A: Yes.
Q: And could not this have had an impact on the conclusions which you later formed on
the basis of the answers you received?
A: Yes. It could have done.
(See also Bartholomew (1992) on selective administration of IQ tests.)

Similarly, the circumstances in which tests are administered are crucial. A well-known
form of cross-examination of psychologists proceeds as follows:
Q: You performed various tests on the defendant whilst he was on remand at Boggo Road
Prison?
6 Such a consideration lies beyond the confines of the Frye test because it relates to the
mechanics of application of a theory which may be generally accepted within the scientific
community: see Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923); see also Daubert v Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993).
[7.05.190] 493
A: I did.
Q: And the defendant is well aware that the charges he is facing are most serious?
A: Yes. He understands that.
Q: In fact, he is most conscious of the danger of his going to jail for a long time, if he is
convicted?
A: Yes. We discussed that.
Q: His anxiety could have biased the effect of the tests that you administered, couldn’t it?
A: Yes, possibly.
Ziskin and Faust (1994, Vol III, p 193) suggest the following questions in regard to a
similar aspect of testing:
• Doctor, how long after the date of the crime did you examine the defendant for the first
time?
• How many times did you see him altogether?
• What was the duration of these interviews?
• Where were the interviews conducted?
• Where in the jail (if there was psychological testing)?
• Was the physical setting comfortable?
• Free from distractions?
• Aren’t these conditions important to proper administration and interpretation of tests?
• Did you perform a mental status examination?
• As part of the examination, did you observe the behaviour of the defendant?In that
examination, isn’t it important to observe his mood, affect, manner of verbalising and
thought processes?
• Could the fact that he was in jail accused of this serious crime have any influence on
the kind of material that would be produced in such an interview?
• Could that make him depressed?
• Could that make him anxious?
• Can anxiety have an effect on a person’s concentration and attention?
• Could it make his thinking a little less clear than it would be if he was not anxious?
• Could his attention and thought processes be affected by a preoccupation with the
situation that he is in?
• Would it be pathological for him to be preoccupied with his situation?
• Had you examined him under a different set of circumstances, could his behaviour,
mood and affect have been quite different?
• Could his mood, affect, verbalisation, thought processes have been different a couple of
hours before the time of the crime?
• If you observed a different mood and affect and quality of verbalisation and thought
processes, would your diagnostic conclusions be any different?
• You did not observe the defendant prior to the crime, did you?
• Then these behaviours which you observed in the clinical examination could have been
quite different at the time of the crime for all you know, isn’t that correct?
• Doesn’t the literature show that people react differently to different types of
psychiatrists?
• Did you base your conclusions to some degree on the affect or emotional response that
he displayed in his interviews with you?
• That is just the way he reacted with you under the particular set of circumstances, isn’t
that correct?
• Who first contacted you regarding this case?
• What did he tell you on that occasion? …
494 [7.05.190]
• Did that information suggest anything to you about the defendant’s psychological
state? …
• Isn’t there research showing that suggestions of this kind do establish a certain amount
of preconception in the clinician? …
• Did you have in your possession any information which might suggest a conclusion
contrary to the one that you reached?
• What information was that?
Mahoney JA in X and Y (by her Tutor X) v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR 26 at 31 went so far as to
maintain:
Expert evidence is … to be approached with reserve or scepticism because of the nature of
it. …
The reason why a court ordinarily should approach expert evidence in the way that it
does is, I think, because of the imprecision of the facts and/or uncertainty of principles in
the particular case.
(See also Chambers v Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1 at 24.)
On one view, if the court does not know or is in no position to evaluate the strength of
the bases of an expert’s opinion, it must not adopt it: Von Doussa (1987, p 619). In Samuels
v Flavel [1970] SASR 256, Bray CJ adopted as a correct statement of the law the following
passage from Fullagar J in R v Jenkins; Ex parte Morrison (No 2) [1949] Argus LR 468 at
475–476 with reference to blood tests in the proof of parentage:
The only comment to which I think it [the evidence] is open is one which affects the
lawyers and not the scientists, and it is that counsel did not ask any expert witness to
explain the basis of theory or experience upon which rest the scientific conclusions. …
Dixon J observed, in an address delivered to the Medical-Legal Society of Victoria in 1933,
and reported in the Proceedings of the Society, Vol 11, p 1 (at p 11) that ‘courts cannot be
expected to act upon opinions the basis of which is unexplained’.
Punctilious examination of the bases of an expert’s opinions often yields surprising results
– gaps in scientific method, short cuts, inappropriate assumptions and sometimes even
errors. The advocate’s duty and probably the advocate’s most powerful weapon is
[7.05.190] 495
preparedness to subject the process of the progression from data to expert opinion to
rigorous scrutiny. An opinion is only as valid as the material upon which it is based.
Exposure of flawed logic by experts
[7.05.200] It is not unknown for opinions to fail to proceed logically from the data from
which they should emerge – that is, for the process of drawing inferences to miscarry. It is
crucial that the logical and practical propriety of the progression from data to opinion be
scrutinised critically. There may be syllogisms; there may be non sequiturs. The expert’s
logic in proceeding from data to inference may be fundamentally wrong. Cross-examining
counsel should seek to confine the expert to the material already put before the judge and
jury. Then questioning may focus upon the arbitrariness and decisiveness of the opinions
as contrasted with the equivocal nature of the data. Perhaps the data are inadequate. This
will surely lower the confidence of the expert in promulgating a view based on it. It may
even be that the prerequisites for the expert’s opinions have not been placed before the
court at all.
Thus, in Chambers v Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1, a case in which the issue was whether
the plaintiff had been the driver or passenger of a car, the process of expert inference was
essentially as follows: the body was on the one side of the car; it was thrown about inside
the car by the accident; the laws of physics are such and such; and because of these, it
should be inferred that the body could not have been in the seat alleged before the
accident. The problem was that the way in which the body had been thrown about in the
car was quite unclear, so the application of the laws of physics was extremely
problematical; the result was that it was not possible to determine which seat the body
had occupied.
Similarly, an incorrect assumption or appreciation of the facts upon which an expert’s
reasoning is based may lead an expert to an incorrect conclusion, notwithstanding that his
or her principles may be impeccable: see X and Y (by her Tutor X) v Pal (1991) 23 NSWLR
26 at 31 per Mahoney JA. Thus, if there is expert evidence that the condition of a child
after birth is B, and where condition B occurs, experience shows that the mother (at the
relevant time before birth) had condition A, the conclusion that condition B was therefore
caused by condition A is by no means absolute. The inference that condition B followed
condition A can only be drawn in limited circumstances and its weight depends upon
there being no acceptable alternative cause available. And the strength of the inference is
affected by the number of times that condition B has been seen to follow condition A in
similar circumstances, as well as the number of times condition B has been seen not to
follow condition A in comparable circumstances: see X and Y (by her Tutor X) v Pal (1991)
23 NSWLR 26 at 31 per Mahoney JA.
Post hoc ergo propter hoc

[7.05.210] Post hoc ergo propter hoc (‘after which, therefore because of which’) logic can be
particularly beguiling when expressed eloquently by an expert. Its distinguishing feature
is that it is based solely upon the temporal sequence of events. For example, if a baby was
administered a triple-antigen vaccination and died shortly thereafter of respiratory failure,
post hoc reasoning would suggest that the vaccination caused the death. And it might
have, but many other possibilities exist that are unrelated to the vaccination. Counsel for
the midwife/doctor/vaccination manufacturer would need to be alert to the inappropriate
jump in logic that could wittingly or unwittingly form part of the plaintiff’s case for
negligence. 7
7 Judge Weinstein, explaining his rejection of post hoc physician testimony in the Agent
Orange litigation, put the matter pithily: ‘Temporal sequence is not, of course, the
equivalent of causation’: Re ‘Agent Orange’ Prod Liability Litigation 611 F Supp 1223 at 1248
(EDNY 1985).
496 [7.05.200]
Affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent

[7.05.220] Gee and Mason (1990, p 91) usefully drew attention to two notorious errors in
logic which can easily seep into evidence: ‘affirming the consequent’ and ‘denying the
antecedent’. They cite the following as an example of the former:
If the heart is weak then the pulse is feeble. The pulse is feeble. Therefore the heart is
weak.
At first sight, such a proposition is most attractive, but in fact the feebleness of the pulse
may be due to reasons other than the weakness of the heart. They also cited the following
passage from the Sherlock Holmes story The Boscombe Valley Mystery:
It was about ten minutes before we regained our cab … Holmes still carrying with him the
stone which he had picked up in the wood.
‘This may interest you, Lestrade,’ he remarked, holding it out. ‘The murder was done
with it.’
‘I see no marks.’
‘There are none.’
‘How do you know, then?’
‘The grass was growing under it. It had only lain there a few days. There was no sign
of a place whence it had been taken. It corresponds with the injuries.’
Again, the conclusion is only one of a number of possibilities, not a logical result of the
propositions preceding it.
There is also the beguiling form of argument known as ‘denying the antecedent’:
If schizophrenia is hereditary, lineal descendants will inherit it. Schizophrenia is not
hereditary. Therefore, lineal descendants will not develop it.
Given the first proposition, negativing its existence does not carry with it the necessary
consequence that descendants will not develop schizophrenia because it may have all
manner of other causes.
Naive inductivism
[7.05.230] A technique employed by some advocates is to query the validity of proceeding
from a finite number of specific findings to a general assertion and thence to an
explanation of a further specific instance.
The question is whether the following model is valid:
Inductive reasoning is wholly dependent upon the quality of its premises. It functions
as follows:
[7.05.230] 497
(1) If a large number of the hymens of young girls who have been vaginally
penetrated have been observed under a wide variety of circumstances, and
(2) if all those hymens have been observed to have a certain quality,
(3) then all hymens of young girls who have been vaginally penetrated have that
certain quality.
The sophisticated inductivist would amend (3) to an assertion that will have a
probabilistic flavour:
(3) then all hymens of young girls who have been vaginally penetrated probably
have that certain quality.
Deductive reasoning will then proceed:

(1) If all hymens of young girls who have been vaginally penetrated have (or
probably have) a certain quality, and
(2) if Sally is a young girl who has been vaginally penetrated,
(3) then Sally’s hymen will have (or will probably have) that certain quality.
The ultimate deduction will be dependent for its accuracy upon the quality of the
observations of the hymens of young girls who have been vaginally penetrated in the first
place.
Many philosophers of science have pointed out that observations are regularly made in
the context of the existence of a theory – that is, are theory-dependent and so are
potentially subjective and flawed. Were the pool of observations to have been made on the
assumption that all those young girls presenting as having been vaginally penetrated in
fact had been, the whole chain of reasoning would be open to attack. Similarly, it might be
argued that the expectation that a certain quality was to be found in all the subjects may
have influenced the observations made: see Popper (1968; 1972); Feyerabend (1975);
Kordig (1971); Chalmers (1976).
Chalmers (1976, p 28) encapsulated the issue well by a simple example:
Consider the statement, ‘Here is a piece of chalk’, uttered by a teacher as he indicates a
cylindrical white stick held in front of the blackboard. Even this most basic of observation
statements involves theory, and is fallible. Some very low-level generalization, such as
‘White sticks found in classrooms near blackboards are pieces of chalk’, is assumed. And,
of course, this generalization need not be true. The teacher in our example may be wrong.
The white cylinder in question may not be a piece of chalk but a carefully contrived fake
placed there by a scheming pupil in search of amusement. The teacher, or anyone else
present, could take steps to test the truth of the statement, ‘Here is a piece of chalk’, but it
is significant that the more stringent the test the more theory is called upon, and further,
absolute certainty is never attained. For instance, on being challenged, the teacher might
draw the white cylinder across the board, point to the resulting white trace and declare,
‘There you are, it is a piece of chalk’. This involves the assumption, ‘Chalk leaves white
traces when drawn across a blackboard’. The teacher’s demonstration might be countered
by the retort that other things besides chalk leave white traces on a blackboard. Perhaps,
after other moves by the teacher, such as crumbling the chalk, being countered in a similar
way, the determined teacher might resort to chemical analysis. Chemically, chalk is largely
calcium carbonate, he argues, and so should yield carbon dioxide if immersed in an acid.
He performs the test and demonstrates that the evolving gas is carbon dioxide by showing
that it turns lime water milky. Each stage in this series of attempts to consolidate the
validity of the observation statement, ‘Here is a piece of chalk’, involves an appeal not
only to further observation statements but also to more theoretical generalizations.
Should an expert witness make unqualified generalisations, appropriately probing
questions are likely to elicit a substantial number of theories and assumptions upon which
the opinion is dependent for its validity. By plumbing those, it is often possible for counsel
to gain a concession that the generalisation is only one of (potentially modest) probability.
498 [7.05.230]
That may be all that counsel is seeking to establish. Or it may be that further attention can
usefully be focused on the circumstances in which the observations have been made that
ground the inductive reasoning that in turn leads to the making of a generalised
statement.
Focusing on other possibilities
[7.05.250] Every assertion of opinion by an expert witness involves the dismissal of an
alternative view or approach. Every expert has an affiliation within his or her discipline to
a school of thought. Unanimity of approach in any area of knowledge is a rare
phenomenon. Thus, there should normally be scope for exploring the grounds upon
which an alternative interpretation of the data was rejected. This can be done by putting
authoritatively to the witness that there is, in fact, another way of looking at the problem
in hand and that prominent representatives of his or her discipline embrace such an
approach. Alternatively, it may be that a respected colleague has a different view or
perspective on the issue. Thus, the way is opened up for suggesting that this witness’s
opinions are honestly put, but either are not representative of the general approach within
the expert community of which he or she is part, or are the subject of legitimate
disagreement within the profession, and so should be afforded little or no weight.
Effective cross-examination of an expert witness in terms of compatible research will
also generally focus upon both methodological problems with consistent research and,
potentially, alternative explanations for the author’s outcomes. Applying Salter (1991,
p 53), the following is a useful checklist:
(1) What study (or studies) backs your opinion?
(2) Be specific. What is the name of the study?
(3) Who is the author?
(4) Do you have it with you?
(5) Can you produce it?
(6) What sample size did this study have?
(7) What measures did this study employ?
(8) Who were the subjects in this study?
(9) Was this study of ‘x’ specifically?
(10) If not, how are the conditions in this study similar to ‘x’?
(11) How are they different from ‘x’?
(12) Was this the major finding of the study?
(13) If not, what was?
(14) Does this study have any findings which you have omitted which are contrary to
your opinion?
(15) Do the authors express any opinions that are contrary to yours?
(16) Does this study have any caveats qualifying the conclusions you have cited?
(17) Has this author produced later works which change the conclusions he or she
wrote at that time?
(18) Are there any studies before or after this study which contradict what this study is
saying? What are they?
contemporaneity attack
[7.05.260] The well-prepared advocate can make considerable headway by confronting an
expert with authoritative and up-to-date books and articles that have been written by
other equally or even more respected hands (see Willens (1950); Poythress (1980)). In the
United States, this is known as the ‘learned treatise attack’ (see Imwinkelried (2011)). At
the least, this method of drawing the expert’s attention to other learned opinions opens up
the possibility of eliciting from him or her the concession that there are alternative ways of
[7.05.260] 499
approaching the problem, or that other views on the subject can legitimately be expressed:
see Horsley (1988); R v Anderson (1914) 16 DLR 203; 22 CCC 455 at 206, 207, 220.
In an unreported South Australian case, prior to putting the alternative point of view,
counsel asked the expert witness whether he accepted the following well-known
comments of Sir Roger Ormrod (1968, p 246):
It should be a rigorous obligation on all experts to give the court, as clearly as they can,
the limits of accuracy of their evidence, whether it is experimental or theoretical, and to
disclose, if it be the fact, that other views exist in their profession. It should also be their
duty to the court, to indicate what inferences cannot properly be drawn from their
evidence.
(See also Ormrod (1972, p 18); Preece v HM Advocate (1981) CLR 783.)
It would be a rare expert who was not prepared to acquiesce in these demonstrably
reasonable sentiments. Alternatively, the process of putting relevant articles and standard
works to an expert can have the effect of throwing into doubt the adequacy of a witness’s
continuing expertise:
Q: Doctor, you are on the staff of [name] Hospital?
Q: Your office is one block away from the hospital library?
Q: Doctor, the hospital has a library on the fourth floor, does it not?
Q: And that library has an entire section devoted to orthopaedic surgery?
Q: According to the return of the subpoena, the current textbooks on orthopaedic surgery
at the hospital library are [give examples]?
Q: Doctor, you keep abreast of developments in orthopaedic surgery?
Q: One of the ways to do that is by going to the latest editions of these texts?
Q: Text books must be revised to keep abreast of new knowledge, mustn’t they?
Q: And even busy surgeons must put aside time for reading to stay up to date also?
Q: Doctor, you say that you teach orthopaedics at [name] Medical School?
Q: Your students in orthopaedic surgery are directed to use the medical school library?
Q: That library has Medline access?
Q: Medline lists authoritative, up-to-date works on orthopaedic disorders?
Q: Medline directs you to leading medical journals?
Q: Some of these leading journals are [give examples]?
Q: You expect your students to be up to date?
Q: And so you need to be up to date also?
Q: Doctor, are you familiar with the article entitled [title] by Dr [name] in the [title]
journal?
Q: Doctor, are you familiar with the article entitled [title] by Dr [name] in the [title]
journal?
(Adapted from Herman (1991, pp 58–59).)
500 [7.05.260]
As the tactic of putting possible alternative explanations of data to the expert witness is
sometimes described as falling into the ‘party tricks’ category, it must be executed with the
utmost care. It should not be attempted without consulting an expert or experts who can
advise about the pre-eminence of the works to be cited (see Rule 803(18) of the United
States Federal Rules of Evidence), the particular alternative expression of opinion to be put,
and whether the expert in the box will be or should be acquainted with it. It can also be
used in conjunction with, and perhaps as a precursor or follow-up to, the alternative
expression of opinion by the advocate’s own expert in accordance with the rule in Browne
v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 (HL). However, the experienced expert has been known to handle
this tactic with aplomb and to distinguish more than adequately the material put before
him or her: for example, by noting that the recent work is still experimental, that the
authors are rather junior, that the journal is not peer reviewed, that the approach outlined
in the article is not accepted by peers, and so on.
The status of learned material put to an expert in the process of cross-examination is
not such that it automatically itself becomes evidence. The Supreme Court of Canada in R
v Marquard [1993] 4 SCR 223; (1993) 85 CCC (3d) 193 held that the proper procedure in
putting to an expert alternative published opinions is to ask the witness whether he or she
knows the relevant work. If the witness’s answer is in the negative or if the witness denies
the work’s authority, the contents of the work cannot properly be put to him or her.
However, if the witness does acknowledge the work’s authority, then the majority of the
Supreme Court held that parts of the work may be read to the witness. To the extent to
which the witness confirms the parts, they become evidence themselves. The defect in
Marquard was that the device had been adopted by cross-examining counsel of reading
large portions of alternative opinions to the expert without the witness adopting the
passages as emanating from reputable authority. The fact that the trial judge had allowed
this to take place was regarded as one of a number of grounds for a new trial.
Securing of advantageous concessions
[7.05.280] The obtaining of concessions which compromise unequivocal, unqualified
opinions expressed in a report or in examination-in-chief is a crucial objective of
cross-examination. While such cross-examination is not of the ‘glamorous’ kind, it may be
tellingly effective. In R v Donald (1983) 11 A Crim R 47 at 54, a classic instance of such
cross-examination directed toward obtaining a humble, but important, concession from an
expert witness is provided. A forensic biologist was asked a series of questions about the
survival time of seminal acid phosphatase. The witness indicated that the maximum time
of survival was in the order of 30 hours. The witness was asked about tests that had been
[7.05.280] 501
done with consenting couples in order to obtain such results and then was asked whether
he had encountered cases in which baby oil had been used prior to intercourse. He said
that he had encountered such cases and that no unusual results had been found when
baby oil had been used as a lubricant. However, he conceded that he knew of no studies
on the subject.
He was asked the following question:
So you wouldn’t say that your experience so far has been sufficient to say that baby oil
could have no effect?
The witness answered:

Oh no, certainly not, I mean we have very limited experience with that, I couldn’t rule it
out entirely.
The cross-examiner’s objective was achieved. The cross-examination was low-key, but
achieved the vital qualification upon the unequivocality of the expert’s opinions.
Cross-examination of an expert can also provide the opportunity for discrediting other
experts previously called by the other side. Often an expert witness will not have been
present for expert evidence that has previously been given. This renders possible the
sowing of discord among experts called for the same side, using a judicious selection of
questions aimed at demonstrating to the tribunal of fact that many interpretations of the
question at issue are feasible:
Doctor, you have suggested that pesticides might well have caused this man’s
schizophrenia. What would you say to the suggestion [evidence from a previous expert]
that even research on animals would not provide better than reason for speculation on this
issue?
Alternatively, cross-examination can be used to bolster the credentials and authority of

experts who have already been called for the cross-examiner’s side:
Q: You worked with Dr X for some years?
A: Yes. I did.
Q: In fact, he was your superior at the CSIRO for some five years, wasn’t he?
A: Yes. He was.
Q: He is an extremely highly qualified scientist in this area?
A: Yes. He is.
Q: Highly regarded scientists may reasonably differ on such matters, may they not?
A: Yes.
Experts may be asked for their opinion upon the evidence already given by another expert
witness. However, it has been held that loose questioning of the kind, ‘Do you see any
value in the opinion expressed by’ another expert should be disallowed: ‘It is important
that questions directed toward expert witnesses asking them to comment on the evidence
of others be appropriately framed’ in terms of specificity: R v Reed (unreported,
Queensland Court of Appeal, 23 May 1996) per Fitzgerald P, McPherson JA and
Williams J.
Another technique that is used in cross-examination of an expert witness where it is
known that his or her superior will not be called is directed at casting doubt upon the
witness selection process:
Q: Mr R, you hold a bachelor’s degree in pharmacy, is that correct?
A: Yes, and I am presently completing the requirements for my master’s degree.
Q: Your supervisor, Dr X, holds a doctorate, doesn’t he?
A: Yes. That is so.
Q: You have worked as a research scientist for four years?
A: Yes.
Q: But, Dr X has worked as a senior researcher for over 20 years?
A: Yes. I believe so.
Q: Dr X is responsible for supervising your work?
502 [7.05.280]
A: Yes. He is.
Q: And he supervised your testing in this case?
A: Yes, he checked all my results and supervised my methodology.
Q: And yet it is you and not he who has been selected to give evidence to the jury?
A: Yes.
Care must be taken with this technique lest there be any possibility that the other side can
actually call the missing expert.
As a general principle, however, the securing of advantageous concessions (see Zobel
and Rous (1993)) by judicious and non-threatening exploration of the parameters of
experts’ views constitutes one of the cross-examiner’s most effective strategies in relation
to expert testimony.
Exposure of bias
[7.05.290] The concern that expert witnesses are not impartial has functioned as an
unarticulated and sometimes semi-articulated basis for many decisions in relation to the
admissibility of expert evidence in the courts: see Bromley v Housing Commission (NSW)
(1988) 30 Valuer 49; Mitchell (1991, p 74). It has played a very significant role in the
evolution of the rules of expert evidence and it continues to be a major issue of concern for
judges: see Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999; 2001); Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty,
Horan and McKimmie (2016); see also R v Dowding (2000) 159 FLR 204; [2000] VSC 274 per
Teague J. Inevitably, therefore, cross-examination is regularly directed toward suggesting
that a particular witness lacks impartiality, has a philosophical or pecuniary affiliation that
should affect the weight ascribed to his or her opinions, or is more concerned to defend his
or her own interests and reputation than to fulfil his or her obligations as an expert to the
court.
Occasionally, the concern that some expert witnesses are biased is expressed openly
and without equivocation: see, eg, Miller Steamship Co Pty Ltd v Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd
[1963] NSWR 737 at 753 and the remarks of Windeyer J in Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486
at 509–510. 8 In a case that was decided by the Australian High Court, the issue was
whether the trial judge’s comments signalled bias or appearance of bias to those who
might have heard his comments: Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568. The trial judge had
referred to three medical practitioners as ‘“that unholy trinity”, the [Government
Insurance Office’s] “usual panel of doctors who think you can do a full week’s work
without any arms or legs”; whose “views are almost inevitably slanted in favour of the
[Government Insurance Office] by whom they have been retained, consciously or
unconsciously”’: at 572. In his judgment, the trial judge referred to the evidence of one of
the doctors, commenting that it did not impress him and that it was ‘“as negative as it
always seems to be – and based as usual upon his non-acceptance of the genuineness of
any plaintiff’s complaints of pain”’: at 573.
The significant issue in the case, though, is not that a trial judge would harbour such
attitudes, nor even that he might voice them. It is the character of the response of the
different members of the High Court. Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ held (at 570):
It is inevitable that a judge who sits regularly to hear claims for damages for personal
injury will form views about the reliability and impartiality of some medical experts who
are frequent witnesses in his or her court. In some cases and notwithstanding the
professional detachment of an experienced judge, it will be all but impossible to put such
preconceived views entirely to one side in weighing the evidence of a particular medical
8 Windeyer J in Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 509–510 commented that the ‘acrid
remarks in Taylor on Evidence (1931) concerning expert witnesses do not lose significance
when the expertise is spurious: “These witnesses are usually required to speak, not to
facts, but to opinions; and when this is the case, it is often quite surprising to see with
what facility, and to what an extent, their views can be made to correspond with the
wishes or the interests of the parties who call them”.’
[7.05.290] 503
expert. That does not, however, mean that the judge is disqualified from hearing the
particular action or any other action involving that medical expert as a witness. The
requirement of the reality and the appearance of impartial justice in the administration of
the law by the courts is one which must be observed in the real world of actual litigation.
That requirement will not be infringed merely because a judge carries with him or her the
knowledge that some medical witnesses, who are regularly called to give evidence on
behalf of particular classes of plaintiffs (eg, members of a particular trade union), are likely
to be less sceptical of a plaintiff’s claims and less optimistic in their prognosis of the extent
of future recovery than are other medical witnesses who are regularly called to give
evidence on behalf of particular classes of defendants (eg, those whose liability is covered
by a particular insurer). If it were so infringed, the administration of justice in personal
injuries cases would be all but impossible.
(See also R v Dowding (2000) 159 FLR 204; [2000] VSC 274 at [18].)
This decision underlines the mistrust that can attach to certain expert witnesses who
give evidence in a predictable way because they are regularly called by a particular
category of litigant: see Joseph Crosfield & Sons Ltd v Techno-Chemical Laboratories Ltd (1913)
29 TLR 378 at 379 per Neville J. 9 Not only do they tend to lose credibility after a time, but
open expression of cynicism toward their views may be ventilated by a judge.
Lord Wilberforce in Whitehouse v Jordan [1981] 1 WLR 246 at 256–257 noted that the role
of lawyers in the preparation of experts’ statements may not always be salutary, especially
if it is taken to extremes:
[is] necessary that expert evidence presented to the court should be, and should be seen to
exigencies of the litigation.
Lord Denning in the English Court of Appeal had been less charitable about the
partisanship that excessive involvement by experts in the legal process had brought about:
[T]heir joint report suffers to my mind from the way it was prepared. It was the result of
long conferences between the two professors and counsel in London and it was actually
‘settled’ by counsel. In short, it wears the colour of special pleading rather than an
impartial report. Whenever counsel ‘settle’ a document, we know how it goes. ‘We had
better put this in’, ‘We had better leave this out’ and so forth. A striking instance is the
way in which Professor Tizard’s report was ‘doctored’. The lawyers blocked out a couple
of lines in which he agreed with Professor Strang that there was no negligence.
In Permanent Trustee Aust Ltd v Boulton (1994) 33 NSWLR 735 at 739, Young J commented,
apparently with relief, that an expert ‘showed a refreshing attitude for an expert witness
in that he refused to put his evidence any higher than a careful expert should and that was
to tell the Court what he would have done in the circumstances or to criticise a particular
thing that Hunt & Hunt allegedly did or did not do’. Once again, this underlines the
frustration often enunciated by the judiciary about a perceived propensity by experts to
give evidence outside the proper parameters of their role and their expertise. In 1903,
Francis Wellman stated as a fact in his landmark book, The Art of Cross-Examination (1936,
pp 125, 126):
The professional witness is always partisan, ready and eager to serve the party calling him
(See also Friedman (1910, p 247); Foster (1897, p 169); Coady (1992, p 280).)
Wellman argued that this phenomenon should always be present in the mind of the
cross-examiner and that during cross-examination efforts should be directed at encouraging
9 ‘Whereas the expert witnesses called for the plaintiff almost invariably take a strong view
in his favour on each and all of the issues in the action, the expert witnesses for the
defendants are equally confident the other way. It is rare to find any substantial difference
of opinion between eminent experts upon matters of science whenever it is possible to
dissociate the question from immediate connection with the issues in the case.’
504 [7.05.290]
the witness to betray any signs of affiliation to the party that has called him or her. The
quality of this advice cannot be denied a century later.
On rare occasions, outright bias and deception have been uncovered by courts. A
notorious example of this occurred in a 1993 judgment of the English Court of Appeal in
which a series of damning findings of partisanship was made of forensic scientists
involved in an IRA bombing investigation and subsequent trial:
Three senior RARDE scientists took the law into their own hands, and concealed from the
prosecution, the defence and the court, matters which might have changed the course of
the trial. The catalogue of lamentable omissions included failures to reveal actual test
results, the failure to reveal discrepant Rf values, the suppression of the boot polish
experimental data, the misrepresentation of the first firing cell test results, the concealment
of subsequent positive firing cell test results, economical witness statements calculated to
obstruct enquiry by the defence, and, most important of all, oral evidence at the trial in the
course of which senior RARDE scientists knowingly placed a false and distorted picture
before the jury.
It is in our judgment also a necessary inference that the three senior RARDE forensic
scientists acted in concert in withholding material evidence.
(See Ward v The Queen (1993) 96 Cr App R 1 at 51.)

The court later commented (at 51) on the process which had brought about these
results:
Forensic scientists may become partisan. The very fact that the police seek their assistance
may create a relationship between the police and the forensic scientists. And the
adversarial character of the proceedings tend to promote this process. Forensic scientists
employed by the government may come to see their function as helping the police. They
may lose their objectivity. That is what must have happened in this case.
The concern that expert witnesses are biased has played a very significant role in the
evolution of the rules of expert evidence. For example, Best noted (1849, p 389):
There can be no doubt that much evidence is daily received in our courts as ‘scientific’
testimony to which it is almost profanation to apply the term; as being revolting to
commonsense, and inconsistent with the commonest honesty on the part of those by
whom it is given. The truth is that witnesses of this kind are apt to presume largely on the
ignorance of their hearers with respect to the peculiar subject of examination, and little
dread prosecution for perjury, an offence of which it is extremely difficult at any time to
convict a person who only swears to his belief, and when the belief relates to a scientific
subject, may be pronounced almost impossible.
The indicia of bias can be many and varied, including:

(1) over-enthusiastic participation in the trial process;
(2) refusal to acknowledge alternative possibilities and schools of thought;
(3) overstatement and exaggeration in a report or in the course of giving evidence:
see Permanent Trustee Aust Ltd v Boulton (1994) 33 NSWLR 735 at 739;
(4) evasive and aggressive demeanour as a witness;
(5) prior employment associated with the case or with one party;
(6) prior or current financial interests; or simply
(7) an adherence to a particular view inimical to one party’s case.
(See Imwinkelried (1992, pp 240ff).)

Unmasking the ubiquitous expert
[7.05.310] If cross-examination can expose an expert as having strayed beyond the limits of
the witness’s expertise, this is a most significant ground upon which the cross-examiner
can impugn both the reliability of the expert and the evidence that he or she has given in
examination-in-chief. Such a preparedness to exceed proper parameters suggests bias, an
[7.05.310] 505
inability to recognise the limits of expertise, and a willingness to speculate, which in turn
brings into question the utility of the opinions proffered. It may go to forensic competence.
In Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; [2002] HCA 4 at [161]–[164], Gummow and
Callinan JJ dealt specifically with a scenario on appeal where expert pathologists were said
to have gone beyond the field of their expertise, including by relying upon phenomena
which required no expertise for their assessment. One pathologist, for instance, referred as
part of his opinion to the ‘incongruity of scene tranquillity’ and said that at a scene where
it was said that a triple murder had taken place, he had a ‘feeling’ that ‘the scene might
have been cleaned up’ and referred to ‘commonsense on how the child is held against a
shoulder and what parts are exposed’. Their Honours accepted that such evidence went
beyond the witnesses’ expertise: ‘Instead of just stating what they had observed and using
only those parts of ordinary knowledge and experience which it was necessary for them to
use in reaching their expert opinions, they gave weight, and attached significance to other
matters’: at [164]. However, they noted that this provided ‘a platform for an attack on the
experts’ opinions …: to that extent those opinions would have been diminished in
importance and cogency’: at [163].
The cross-examining advocate can encourage the witness to express many opinions
across a range of topics and to speculate – all in aid of the telling argument in closing that
the witness was only too happy to venture at large, with no ability to turn to the judge
and say, ‘Your Honour, I can’t answer that question. It is outside my expert field.’
As Gleeson CJ held in the important High Court decision of HG v The Queen (1999) 197
CLR 414; [1999] HCA 2 at [44], the stakes can be high enough to elicit a decision that such
opinions are inadmissible as not emanating wholly or substantially from the realm of the
expert’s field of expertise and thus to breach the requirements of s 79 of the Evidence Act
1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), the Evidence Act 2011
(ACT) and the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT), and s 79A of the Evidence
Act 2001 (Tas):
Experts who venture ‘opinions’ (sometimes merely their own inference of fact), outside
their field of specialised knowledge may invest those opinions with a spurious appearance
of authority, and legitimate processes of fact-finding may be subverted.
Showing up the ‘template’ expert
[7.05.320] As emphasised in the following section, ‘an expert witness has an overriding
duty to assist the court on matters relevant to the expert’s area of expertise’. However,
there is the occasional ‘expert’ who yields to the temptation to produce pro forma reports
that differ only in names, specific details and minor respects from other reports that he or
she has written for courts and tribunals. This phenomenon has particularly occurred in the
victims of crime compensation context. Such reports are possible when the reports cover a
standard battery of tests or an expert is repeatedly reporting upon one condition.
However, their authors are practising a deception. Solicitors, advocates, magistrates and
judges who become familiar with the work of frequently employed experts notice it and,
once exposed, the expert’s career as an expert witness is imperilled: see, for example, J v
The Queen (1994) 75 A Crim R 522; Re W and W (2001) 164 FLR 18; [2001] FamCA 216; R v
Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1; [2001] SASC 64. That exposure can be achieved by a
cross-examination which is based upon the use of a number of reports prepared by the
expert. That collection of reports is often generated by the solicitors from several firms
pooling their filed resources to give the advocate the necessary ammunition. The expert is
forced to defend the indefensible as the witness and the court are confronted with
identical phrasing, summaries and test results in a number of reports. As well, the witness
will be questioned about the time he or she spent with the subjects of the reports, whether
the data (such as tests) were actually collected, when the data were analysed, and when
the reports were prepared. There may be a demand that the expert produce his or her
work diaries. Thereafter, the cross-examiner will use those diaries to illustrate that the
506 [7.05.320]
necessary work could not be done and thus expose the ‘fabricated’ nature of the report.
This can even have disciplinary repercussions.
Cross-examination by reference to court rules and guidelines
[7.05.360] Since 1998, all superior courts in Australia have issued guidelines, codes or
directions for expert report-writers. Failure to adhere to these will expose an expert to
damaging cross-examination. The sections of the guidelines which are most useful to
cross-examiners are as follows:
General duty to the court
• An expert witness has an overriding duty to assist the Court on matters relevant to the
expert’s area of expertise.
• An expert witness is not an advocate for a party.
• An expert witness’s paramount duty is to the Court and not to the person retaining the
expert.
The form of the expert evidence

• All assumptions made by the expert should be clearly and fully stated.
• The report should identify who carried out any tests or experiments upon which the
expert relied in compiling the report, and give details of the qualifications of the person
who carried out any such test or experiment.
• Where several opinions are provided in the report, the expert should summarise them.
The expert should give reasons for each opinion.
• At the end of the report the expert should declare that ‘[the expert] has made all the
inquiries which [the expert] believes are desirable and appropriate and that no matters of
significance which [the expert] regards as relevant have to [the expert’s] knowledge, been
withheld from the Court’.
• If, after exchange of reports or at any other stage, an expert witness changes his or her
view on a material matter, having read another expert’s report or for any other reason,
the change of view should be communicated in writing (through legal representatives)
without delay to each party to whom the expert witness’s report has been provided
and, when appropriate, to the Court.
• If an expert’s opinion is not fully researched because the expert considers that
insufficient data is available, or for any other reason, this must be stated with an
indication that the opinion is no more than a provisional one.
• Where an expert witness who has prepared a report believes that it may be incomplete
or inaccurate without some qualification, that qualification must be stated in the report.
• The expert should make it clear when a particular question or issue falls outside his or
her field of expertise.
Suppose that an expert thought that there were insufficient data but failed to disclose that
inadequacy in the report. Once that inadequacy was revealed during either examination-
in-chief or cross-examination, then the cross-examiner could further impeach credibility of
the expert by drawing attention to the above guidelines. It is a contest that only the
advocate will win:
Q: As a forensic expert you are, of course, aware of this court’s guidelines for experts?
A: Yes/No [it doesn’t worry the advocate which response comes].
Q: You know you have an overriding duty to assist the court?
A: Yes/No [same comment as before].
Q: [If ‘yes’, then] You placed the required declaration at the end of your report?
Q: [If ‘yes’, then] Of course, being a forensic expert, you thought about that declaration
before you signed off on the report?
Q: You’ve conceded that your opinion is based on insufficient data to be reliable?
Q: You knew that we laypeople would be relying on your opinion?
Q: Your report should have set out the limitations of the data and your opinions?
[7.05.360] 507
Q: It didn’t, did it?

Q: You’ve short-changed us, haven’t you?
Impeachment by reference to a code of ethics, accepted protocols or industry
guidelines
[7.05.370] If an expert witness can be shown to have departed significantly from a code of
ethics to which he or she is subject, or court protocols (such as Practice Directions etc) to
which compliance is expected, this will significantly detract from the credibility of the
opinions that that witness has espoused. As pointed out in Ch 5.20, few expert witnesses
are subject to a code of ethics that is forensic in orientation. A major exception is forensic
scientists, many of whom are members of and therefore governed by the provisions of the
Code of Ethics of the Australian and New Zealand Forensic Science Society.
Failure to comply with a code of ethics can be portrayed as indifference to ethical
proprieties, a lack of commitment to accepted protocols and procedures, and a
preparedness to flout standards that have been formulated, and are adhered to, by peers.
Thus, cross-examination may proceed as follows:
Q: Doctor, you are a member of the Australian and New Zealand Forensic Science Society?
A: Yes. I am.
Q: And does it follow that you are bound by the Society’s Code of Ethics?
A: Yes, it does.
Q: As a professional forensic scientist, you would take the obligation to comply with
proper ethical procedures very seriously?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: No doubt then, you are familiar with the Code’s provisions?
A: In general terms, yes.
Q: No doubt, you are also scrupulous in ensuring that you comply with them?
A: Yes, I endeavour to.
Q: I want to be fair to you. Here is a copy of the Code. Please silently read Provisions 1 to
5 to yourself. … Have you done that?
A: Yes.
Q: Would you agree that Provision 2 of the section on ‘reporting’ prescribes that your
opinions must be expressed in simple and unambiguous terms?
A: Yes.
Q: And that failure to comply with that provision would be an ethical indiscretion?
A: Yes.
Q: And you say that you have complied with that ethical obligation, do you?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: Would you agree that Provision 5 provides that reference should be made in any report
produced to every item examined or tested?
A: Yes.
Q: Now, have a look at this ‘lab book’ which is being handed to you. Go to page X, check
the date, and note those test entries. … Have you done that?
A: Yes.
Q: Now if you would refer to your report please (that is, exhibit Y) and go to page Z. Some
of those test entries in the lab book are not mentioned in your report, are they?
A: No.
Q: Those are the tests which yielded inconclusive results, aren’t they?
A: Some of them are, yes.
Q: And would you concede that there are items which you tested, and when those tests
yielded inconclusive results, you took it on yourself not to mention them in your report?
A: Yes.
Q: This procedure would not then be in strict compliance with the Code of Ethics to which
you are subject?
A: No, not in strict compliance.
Q: Is it also the case that you failed to use a control probe to ensure the absence of
contamination of one of your DNA probes?
A: Yes. I have agreed with that already.
Q: And would you also agree that Provision 4 of the section of your Code of Ethics on
‘scientific method’ prescribes that you should use experimental controls?
508 [7.05.370]
A: Yes. But …
Q: Thank you, doctor. No further questions, your Honour.
On a more banal level, it is common for experts to determine in particular instances to

conduct their work in a way which is not strictly in accord with a protocol or procedure to
which they are theoretically subject. This is not necessarily sinister, but it does need to be
justified. Careful cross-examination which focuses on the decision to depart from
generally accepted standards or from industry guidelines (see Uppal (2016)) can be very
effective.
Exploiting the expert's personality
[7.05.380] Even experts who are well prepared to explain and defend their opinions may
be successfully undermined by a cross-examination which exposes and then exploits
personality trait weaknesses. The following are some examples, none of them unusual.
The ‘self-important’ witness will be quick to confirm that they are always busy and likely
to claim that they are always in demand. It is not difficult to make the telling suggestion
that their frantic pace entails a consequential lack of attention to detail which is illustrated
by this and that shortcoming in their report and their ‘in court’ explanations.The expert
who markets his or her expertise by the frequent use of jargon, cant and arcane language
can be upset in a number of ways. The easiest is to entice the expert into ever more
employment of that incomprehensible language so that the audience’s attention withers
and dies. Where the witness cannot be understood, the audience, be it judge or jury, is
likely to ignore the evidence, or at least give it little weight. Another cross-examination
technique is to ri dicule the witness repeatedly, but politely, as they use one, then another,
and yet another unnecessarily difficult word or phrase.
Witness: In my opinion, that is so clearly an example of ‘X’.
Advocate: I see, or rather I don’t see. Just what does ‘X’ mean?
Witness: Well, as everyone in my area knows, ‘X’ is the way in which we all talk about ‘Y’.
Advocate: Oh, you mean what we laypeople call ‘Z’.
Witness: Yes.
The cross-examination continues with more examples of these ‘clarifying’ exchanges,

until:
Advocate: I’d just like to summarise where we have reached, please. During my
questioning, you have agreed that in layman’s terms your opinions can be summarised as
‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’.
Witness: Yes.
Advocate: And that’s quite straightforward, isn’t it?
Witness: Yes.
Advocate: And I’m not doing you or your opinions any disservice in putting it that way,
am I?
Witness: No.
Advocate: However, your way of expressing ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ was by reference to – I’m
sorry, I’ll need to look at my notes as I attempt to get this right – Ah yes, ‘X’ and ‘V’ and
‘U’?
Witness: Yes.
Advocate: My goodness, how quickly the simple can be made unintelligible.
Other Advocate: Objection – argumentative.
Advocate: I don’t press it.
The irritated witness is a welcome target for the cross-examiner. Irritation means that the
witness is losing detachment and becoming emotionally involved in the exchange
between witness and advocate. That involvement is likely to mean that the witness
becomes ever more intent on defending or asserting himself or herself. This is
incompatible with being the objective presenter of sound opinions. It is not a partisanship
in opinion: rather, it is a partisanship for self.
[7.05.380] 509
The skilled advocate will either bait the witness into this irritation or pick up the cues
that the witness is irritated. Those cues are the same as we recognise outside of
courtrooms, in others as well as in ourselves. There will be changes to voice tone and
speed. Body language in terms of seating posture, hand movement and eye contact will
change. A highly desirable response from the cross-examiner’s viewpoint is when the
witness gives replies along the lines of ‘And that’s another silly question’, ‘Can’t you even
understand this simple answer?’, or ‘Being here is such a waste of my valuable time’.
Once uttered, the witness is now vulnerable as the advocate moves with quiet, polite
questioning while the witness has barked once and may continue to bark responses.
After such witness irritation has been exposed, it can then be exploited. For example:
Advocate: So you now concede that test ‘X’ was not the best test to use?
Witness: No, no wait. It wasn’t the best test, but it was OK.
Advocate: Yet another grudging admission from you?
Witness: It’s not an admission and it’s not grudging.
Advocate: Is that so? Well, give us the benefit of your opinion then. What would be the
best test?
Witness: As I told you before, test ‘Y’ would be the best test.
Advocate: And as you told us before, you preferred to use test ‘X’?
Witness: Yes.
Advocate: ‘X’ isn’t as good as ‘Y’, is it?
Witness: No.
Advocate: Would you now like to concede that ‘X’ was not the best test to use?
Witness: No, I don’t want to concede that.
Advocate: Yes, I think we all understand – thank you so much.
Impeachment by prior inconsistent statements
[7.05.390] The potential for impeachment of the reliability of an expert by a prior
inconsistent statement is highlighted by the decision of the High Court in Rodi v Western
Australia (2018) 92 ALJR 960; [2018] HCA 44. The successful ground of appeal was that
there had been a miscarriage of justice by reason of the fact that it had been identified after
the appellant’s trial on a charge of possession of cannabis that an important prosecution
witness had given a quite different calculation of the typical yield of a mature naturally
grown female cannabis plant than he had given in the appellant’s trial. This made the new
evidence as to the prior expression of view by the expert witness credible and cogent and
thereby such as to impugn the verdict at trial.
However, the attack on the person, the ‘argumentum ad hominem’, should always be
the last resort of the competent advocate, but, on occasion, it is a necessary and powerful
weapon if it has come to an advocate’s notice that an expert is ill-regarded because of the
‘flexibility’ of the opinions that he or she has expressed in the courtroom setting. When
previously expressed, inconsistent views are to be put to the expert to discredit him or her,
this must be executed with extreme care. The tactic can backfire embarrassingly!
First, ideally, the previous opinion should be reasonably recent. 10 Second, it must be
truly comparable – that is to say, it should not be able to be distinguished readily on the
facts of the particular case. Thus, if counsel intends to put such material to a witness, they
must be thoroughly conversant with the earlier case and in a position to deal with an
attempt by the expert to distinguish its facts and circumstances. Third, it must be
pointedly contrary to the view expressed in the instant case: see Carroll v The Queen (1985)
19 A Crim R 410, discussed below, [7.05.520].
Impeachment by reference to prior ethical indiscretions
[7.05.395] On occasions, parties call witnesses who have previously been subject to
censure by their disciplinary body for breaches of their ethical obligations: see, for
10 Although in Carroll v The Queen (1985) 19 A Crim R 410, it was not and the
cross-examination was extremely successful.
510 [7.05.390]
example, Chiropractic Board of Australia v Hooper [2013] VCAT 878. This has the potential
not just to detract from the credibility of the expert, but to reflect ill on the party calling
them – a form of guilt by association.
Just answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’
[7.05.400] It is always open to counsel to press an expert witness to answer a question
directly, avoiding all evasion. The classic way to accomplish this – an issue often
complained about and criticised by experts – is when the expert is confined to ‘yes’ or ‘no’
answers (see Dillon (1990, p 21); Gee (1987, p 308); Freckelton (1987, p 134); Jones (1994,
p 144)) and by the careful framing of questions so that they are always closed – that is,
suggesting both the desired answer and that no explanation should be given by the
witness. It is tempting for the witness to provide such answers, while it is difficult and
stressful to assert repeatedly that so simple an answer cannot properly be advanced.
It is not the right of an advocate to insist upon a yes/no answer (that is the preserve of
the judge or magistrate) (see Stern (1997, p 100); Preber (2014, p 277)).
Experienced expert witnesses know to avoid the yes/no dichotomy where an answer
in such a form would distort their views. This is accomplished either by giving a fuller but
responsive answer, or by turning to the magistrate or judge and explaining that a yes/no
answer would risk misleading the court. 11 Such a response may elicit permission from the
Bench for them to give a fuller and more adequate answer, allowing them to explain the
shades of grey that they wish to employ to qualify a bald assertion. Another useful
response is to add to the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ a cue to counsel to take up the issue again in
re-examination. This is done by saying: ‘Yes/No, but I have more to say about that.’
(Dis)continuity and contamination in exhibits
[7.05.440] For an expert’s evidence to be admissible, it must be relevant to a fact in issue –
that is to say, it must ‘afford a reasonable inference as to the principal matter in dispute’
(Hollingham v Head (1858) 27 LJCP 241; 140 ER 1135) or be capable of increasing or
diminishing ‘the probability of the existence of a fact in issue’: Director of Public
Prosecutions v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 757. If an expert gives opinion evidence which is
based upon the assumption that the exhibit tested was the same exhibit as the one seized
or found at a particular place, that evidence ceases to hold any or any significant probative
value if it is shown that the assumption is invalid. In such circumstances, it can be argued
that the evidence is inadmissible on the ground that it does not impact upon the facts in
issue or the principal matter in issue by allowing the drawing of any inferences – its status
remains permanently incapable of evaluation. In addition, should the evidence be led by
the prosecution, the argument becomes open that the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value. Imwinkelried (1992, pp 63ff) set out
devastatingly a range of circumstances in which the chain of custody can be shown to be
broken or to be flawed. An instance was where a blood sample was taken from a body at
a mortuary but because of the number of samples and their similar appearance, it was
held that there was a distinct possibility of confusion and substitution: see Nichols v McCoy
235 P 2d 412 (1951). Similarly, the longer that an exhibit is left unattended, and the further
it is moved, the more possible becomes the inference of mishandling by those with
responsibility for the exhibit. In Jines v Greyhound Corp 210 NE 2d 562 (1965), an expert
mechanic’s evidence was declared inadmissible on the basis that, before he inspected it,
the subject car had been moved a number of miles to a storage lot, then to the owner’s
home, and finally to the mechanic’s garage over a period of several months. It was not
11 Clause 6 of the ‘conduct in court’ section of the Code of Ethics of the Australian and New
Zealand Forensic Science Society mandates such a response where an inappropriate
perspective is being given on the witness’s evidence.
[7.05.440] 511
possible to prove that there had been adequate safekeeping over the car, and so it could
not be proved that the brake drum when examined by the expert was in the same
condition as it was prior to the accident.
Even if expert evidence is declared admissible, when a cloud hangs over proof of
continuity of custody over an exhibit, the weight to be accorded to such evidence can be
reduced by attacks upon the integrity of the chain of custody or by demonstration of the
potential for contamination of the exhibit. In looking to the possibility of mishandling,
misrecording (see United States v Ladd 885 F 2d 954 at 957 (1989)) or confusion,
Imwinkelried (1992, pp 220–221) advocated cross-examination that first focuses upon the
potential for confusion, then multiple persons’ access, and then may use a quirk of
location:
Q: After placing the sample in the test tube, where do you put it?
A: In the refrigerator in the examination room.
Q: All the test tubes go into the same refrigerator?
A: Yes.
Q: Isn’t it true that on the day in question … there were a grand total of 42 test tubes
containing blood samples in that refrigerator?
A: Yes.
Q: Forty-two test tubes from the same manufacturer that all looked alike?
A: Yes.
Q: When you left the room, did you place the sample in a safe?
A: No.
Q: Did you put it in a locked cabinet?
A: No.
Q: Did you lock the door to the room?
A: No.
Q: Did you even close the door?
A: No.
Q: During the day shift, isn’t it true that over 200 people work in the laboratory?
A: That’s about right.
Q: Would they even need a key to get into the hallway where this room is located?
A: No.
Q: Do you need an identification badge to get into the building?
A: No.
Q: Once you were in the building, would you have to have a key to get into this room?
A: No.
Q: On an average workday, can you tell us how many people who are not employees have
access to your building?
A: I’m afraid I have no idea. I’d be guessing.
Q: You returned 15 minutes later?
A: Yes.
Q: Was the sample where you left it?
A: No.
Q: Isn’t it true that when you returned, you found the sample on the examination table?
A: Yes.
Q: Not on your desk?
A: Yes.
Q: In fact, at least five feet from where you left it?
A: Yes.
Q: Was the cover still over the sample?
A: No.
Q: Was there any cover over the sample?
A: No.
Q: And, isn’t it true that of your personal knowledge, you don’t know who touched the
sample?
A: Yes.
Q: And you don’t know who removed the cover?
A: No.
512 [7.05.440]
Q: And, of your own personal knowledge, you don’t know what else they did with the
sample while you were gone. Do you?
A: No.
Similarly, cross-examining a forensic biologist at a government laboratory, the following

interchange might take place:
Q: Your laboratory is extremely busy and not as well resourced as the workload demands.
A: That is so.
Q: Not all laboratory assistants at the relevant time were experienced in the job.
A: No, they were not.
Q: It is possible that in the confusion of the early part of the day, a laboratory assistant in
error substituted another urine sample?
A: Well, it’s possible.
Q: Some samples tested in your area test positive for amphetamines, some for
benzodiazepines, some for opioids, and some test negative?
A: That’s right.
Q: If there had been a substitution, the actual sample of urine from the accused may have
been negative, by contrast with the one which you tested?
A: That may be so.
It will be recalled that in Chamberlain v R (No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521 (see
Morling (1987, p 66); Freckelton (1992a, p 11)), the conditions within the car of the accused
while it was in the Central Australian sun were at times so hot as to hold the possibility of
denaturing and degrading a substance such as blood within it. In terms of cross-
examination, this carried with it the possibility for counsel, particularly at the Royal
Commission, to impugn the value of the scientists’ hypotheses by eliciting from them the
concession that the environmental circumstances were such as to pose the potential for
profound contamination of the exhibits. Similar considerations arise in terms of
cross-examination aimed at establishing the existence or potential for contamination, as in
relation to a break in the chain of custody.
Dealing with hypothetical questions

[7.05.480] As pointed out in relation to examination-in-chief (see above [7.05.360]), the use
of hypothetical questions is a practice that has been much criticised by lawyers and
academics. However, they are a fact of life throughout the common law world, and
although their most prominent flowering has been in the United States, they are regularly
employed elsewhere.
Some hypothetical questions, particularly those that are most criticised, contain a large
number of facts whose correctness the expert witness is asked to assume. It is always open
to a cross-examining advocate to explode the artificiality of the mechanism of posing the
hypothetical question. Few experts in the stress of the witness box can recall with the
necessary accuracy the detail of a complex hypothetical question. The failure to do so, on
request from the advocate, has two aspects. It can demonstrate lack of certainty of the
bases on which the expert is responding to the hypothetical question, thereby devaluing
the examination-in-chief with its complex questions and simple answers. It can also
highlight the connection between the witness and the advocate conducting the
examination-in-chief, giving the suggestion that the expert is responding in a prearranged
manner that fits in with the intent of the questions asked by the examiner-in-chief.
Examination of the expert's notes

[7.05.520] Most expert witnesses bring with them a range of notes, documents or records
that they have generated or relied upon in the process of conducting their tests, techniques
and experiments or in interviewing subjects en route to forming their professional
opinions. Generally, they will seek the court’s leave to refer to such notes or records.
[7.05.520] 513
Counsel are often somewhat more lenient in querying expert witnesses’ rights to refer to
such material than they are with police or lay witnesses. However, in general terms,
witnesses are only permitted to refer to material for the purposes of refreshing their
memory when their memory has been exhausted and the materials have been created
contemporaneously with the interviews or tests that they are discussing: Phillips (1989,
p 113); Emmett (1987, p 99). Thus, a report later created by an expert or a transcript of
evidence previously given by the expert on the same issues does not constitute material to
which an expert may properly refer to refresh his or her memory.
It has been suggested that it ‘is undesirable for a witness to merely read out the
document from which the witness is refreshing memory’: Arnold (1991), citing R v Jones
(Harvey) (1979) 5 P Sess Rev 2059. However, such substantial recourse to report is
common. Once memory is refreshed by the use of a document, opposing counsel may
require that the document be produced for inspection: R v Kingston [1986] 2 Qd R 114 at
127. Where counsel calls for a document discussed by a witness but not used to refresh
memory, counsel may be compelled, upon the application of counsel for the other side, to
tender the document during cross-examination (Walker v Walker (1937) 57 CLR 630; see
contra R v Skalij (1972) 2 P Sess Rev) or possibly later. Likewise, if counsel inspects a
‘refresher’ document and cross-examines on material in that document which was not
used by the witness to refresh memory, tender of the document can be compelled.
Cross-examining counsel can avoid a demand for tender only by (a) inspecting a
‘refresher’ document, and (b) limiting cross-examination to that part of the document used
to refresh memory. See, however, s 35 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995
(NSW), the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the Evidence (Uniform National Legislation Act) (NT), the
Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), and s 25 of the Evidence Act 2006
(NZ), which abolish the common law rule.
Competent cross-examining counsel will inspect such documentation. Experts’ records
frequently unearth a treasure-trove of information that provides a new perspective on the
tests employed and those not employed, the interviews conducted, and the general
methodology and attitudes of the expert. It is by no means unknown for such material to
expose information discarded by the expert at the time as irrelevant but which may open
up substantial avenues for cross-examination. This might include cross-examination
directed at demonstrating the existence of valid alternative approaches that might have
been pursued by the expert, or the existence of bias in the witness.
A classic example of the usefulness of examining notes emerges from the odontology
case of Carroll v The Queen (1985) 19 A Crim R 410, where examination of the initial work
done by a forensic dentist revealed that in the expert’s early work 12 years before, he and
a panel of 10 dentists to which he had submitted his materials had formed the
diametrically opposing view to the one he now offered in court. He never succeeded in
re-establishing his credibility. Kneipp J commented (at 416):
In my view, he did not account satisfactorily for the change. He spoke of ongoing research
and study in this field, but none of the matters which he mentioned specifically appeared
to me to be relevant to his change of opinion. He asserted that he was already an expert in
this field in 1973.
(See also Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] UKSC 13, where a psychologist resiled in a
joint report from views she had previously expressed in forensic reports.)
Similarly, production to counsel for the opposing party of the notes of an expert has the
potential to reveal embarrassing accounts of conversations between the expert and the
instructing solicitor.
514 [7.05.520]
Utilisation of draft reports

[7.05.540] It is common for experts to generate draft reports which are scrutinised by
solicitors and sometimes counsel prior to the report being finalised by the expert. Any
change from a draft report to a final report has the potential to raise issues of the extent to
which lawyers have had inappropriate input into the substance of the report, raising the
potential that the expert has been prepared to permit such involvement, thereby
abrogating their independence. If there is not proper documentation of communications
between lawyers and the expert during the period between a draft and a final report, this
too may give rise to suspicion that proprieties have not been adhered to, and, more
importantly, that improper influence has been brought to bear or the expert has been
problematically prepared to incorporate the perspective of commissioning lawyers into his
or her report and therefore is functioning as an advocate (see, for example, Certain Children
v Minister for Families and Children (No 2) [2017] VSC 304).
The difficulties in which an expert is placed by different versions of their report
becoming the subject of cross-examination are exemplified by an exchange recounted by
the English forensic pathologist, Dr Richard Shepherd (2018, pp 259–260). He records the
following cross-examination to which he was subject after those cross-examining him
obtained an earlier draft of his report and a variety of insinuations were made which were
not easily the subject of a satisfactory reply:
QC: Let us look at page 36 … why did you revise the word ‘severe’ to ‘moderate’, Dr
Shepherd? For that was certainly a dramatic revision.
RS: It seemed on reflection a more appropriate description.
QC: But why was it more appropriate?
RS: Well, I considered all the facts again very carefully and revised my opinion.
QC: Are you sure that revision wasn’t based on the receipt of further information?
RS: It was based entirely on my analysis of the case.
QC: But why would you make so extreme a change if you had no new information?
RS: I felt it was more correct.
QC: So … are you saying you … changed your mind?
RS: Indeed, I changed my mind.
QC: You simply changed your Mind! Changed it on a, on a, on a mere whim?
[7.05.540] 515
Chapter 7.10
SENTENCING EVIDENCE BY EXPERT
WITNESSES
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [7.10.10]
The role of the expert ........................................................................................................... [7.10.20]
Expert evidence in mitigation ............................................................................................. [7.10.50]
Existence of remorse ............................................................................................................. [7.10.60]
Circumstances of offender ................................................................................................... [7.10.70]
Cultural factors ...................................................................................................................... [7.10.80]
Drug and alcohol addiction of offender ........................................................................... [7.10.90]
Illness of offender .................................................................................................................. [7.10.100]
Stress ........................................................................................................................................ [7.10.110]
Prospects of rehabilitation ................................................................................................... [7.10.120]
Harsh consequences of imprisonment .............................................................................. [7.10.170]
Mentally ill offenders ..........................................................................................................
Longstanding law .................................................................................................................. [7.10.190]
Limits to the relevance of symptomatology to moral culpability ................................ [7.10.200]
The Verdins restatement ....................................................................................................... [7.10.210]
The law after Verdins ............................................................................................................ [7.10.220]
Mental conditions potentially relevant to sentencing .................................................... [7.10.230]
Intellectually disabled offenders ......................................................................................... [7.10.250]
Foetal alcohol spectrum disorder ....................................................................................... [7.10.260]
Dementia ................................................................................................................................. [7.10.265]
Unusual impact of imprisonment ...................................................................................... [7.10.270]
Availability of rehabilitative services ................................................................................. [7.10.290]
Impact of executive policy ................................................................................................... [7.10.310]
Welfare of children ................................................................................................................ [7.10.330]
Expert evidence for the prosecution ..................................................................................
Victim impact ......................................................................................................................... [7.10.370]
Prediction of dangerousness ............................................................................................... [7.10.410]
Proving bases of testing ....................................................................................................... [7.10.430]
Expert evidence as to the nature of the offence .............................................................. [7.10.470]
‘When the king has accurately ascertained the motive and the
time and place, and has considered the strength (of the
criminal to endure punishment) and the offence itself, he
should have punishment brought down upon those who
should be punished. Unjust punishment injures the reputation
and destroys the fame (of the king) in this world, and keeps
him from heaven in the next world, therefore he should avoid
it entirely.’
The Laws of Manu, Vol 8, pp 126–127 (Penguin, 1991).
Introduction
[7.10.10] This chapter addresses the role of the expert witness and report-writer for the
sentencing process. It reviews aspects of the evidence that can be given by mental health
practitioners, in particular, to assist courts in making decisions as to the dispositions to be
given to persons found guilty of criminal offences. In doing so, it makes particular
reference to conditions such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, as well as autism
spectrum disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), foetal alcohol
spectrum disorder, intellectual disability, Alzheimer’s disease/dementia and Huntington’s
disease.
The role of the expert

[7.10.20] The sentencing hearing should inform the sentencing judge or magistrate of the
different considerations that are pertinent when deciding the type and seriousness of the
[7.10.20] 517
sentence appropriate to the offences found to have been committed. The sentencer will
have regard to the need for condign punishment (retribution) and for deterring the
individual and others from committing similar offences, the appropriateness of denouncing
the type of conduct the offender has been found guilty of, the potential for her or his
rehabilitation, and the need to protect the community from the offender: see generally Fox
and Freiberg (2014); Judicial College of Victoria; Australian Law Reform Commission
(1988).
Expert witnesses are regularly called by the defence to provide mitigating material
during the sentencing process in relation to these considerations. In addition, experts are
increasingly called by the prosecution in serious assault cases to provide up-to-date data
on the physical or mental state of the victim subsequent to the offence. The impact of the
offence upon the victim is not recognised at common law as a sentencing factor: see R v
Penn (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 9 May 1994). However, legislative
recognition of the needs of victims and the relevance of their situation to sentencing is
standard by way of victim impact statements. On occasion, information is sought by the
Bench in order to determine what impact an assault, for instance, is likely to have had on
a particular victim or class of victim. Thus, in Rogers v The Queen (1989) 44 A Crim R 301 at
316, Brinsden J, faced with sentencing an offender who had sexually assaulted a young
girl, commented:
Courts are asked to sentence offenders in respect of offences against children of tender
years, that is to say 12 years or under, on the assumption that the commission of the
offence would inevitably have very serious impact on the child’s emotional well-being.
For myself, until instructed by persons having expertise in this field, I am not prepared to
assume that the impact of such an offence as this would necessarily be worse if committed
on a child of tender years than say a girl of 14 years. … If there is documentary material
which may assist a judge in appreciating the likely impact of this type of offence upon a
child of tender years, I for one would appreciate having my attention drawn to it. And if
there is some individual or individuals capable of expressing an expert opinion, I for one,
would be prepared to listen to that person.
Technically, the rules of expert evidence do not apply to expert and other evidence given
during the sentencing process: see R v Clayton [1989] 2 Qd R 439; R v Ford (1994) 75 A Crim
R 398. However, many a judge will enforce at least those rules which render expert
opinions capable of being effectively evaluated. Courts are concerned to avoid expert
witnesses functioning as the conduit for the assertions of the defendant without at least
the application of critical judgment by the expert.
It is poor advocacy for counsel to seek to elicit expert evidence where, for instance, the
expert’s expertise is open to doubt (see the discussion on expertise rule in Ch 2.05) or the
bases of her or his evidence have not been proved to the court: see the discussion on the
basis rule in Ch 2.20. Apart from anything else, it opens up the possibility that the other
side, be it prosecution or defence, will call expert evidence in reply.
It is inappropriate to analyse the roles of the prosecution and the defence in the
sentencing process in terms of onus and standard of proof. However, the Australian High
Court has held that a sentencing judge may not take facts into account in a way that is
adverse to the interests of the accused unless those facts have been established beyond
reasonable doubt. This is so whether the facts are primary matters, such as the role the
accused played in an offence, or constitute the bases of an expert’s opinion. On the other
hand, if there are circumstances which the sentencer proposes to take into account in
favour of the accused, they must still be proved, but they need only be proved on the
balance of probabilities: R v Olbrich (1999) 108 A Crim R 464 at 471, 479–480; see also R v
Storey [1998] 1 VR 359 at 369.
518 [7.10.20]
Sentencing evidence by expert witnesses | CH 7.10
Thus, in Paparone v The Queen (2000) 112 A Crim R 190, the Western Australian Court of
Criminal Appeal held that it is necessary, where the accused seeks to rely in mitigation
upon a psychological or psychiatric condition, to prove both the condition and also its
nexus to the accused’s offending.
The styles of expert witnesses, of course, vary greatly, as do the wishes of individual
sentencers about the evidence adduced before them. Some sentencing judges and
magistrates are content with witnesses being extremely straightforward and commenting
upon the feasibility or advisability of specific sentencing options. Others are not so
comfortable with what might be perceived as an encroachment on the role of the sentencer
and regard it as inappropriate for witnesses to advocate for certain sentencing dispositions
without being asked by the Bench to embark upon such a course. An example of the
former approach is the leeway extended to the evidence of a Victorian forensic
psychiatrist, Dr Walton, in R v Man (1990) 50 A Crim R 79 at 82:
Incarceration will serve no useful rehabilitative effect. He would certainly not be a suitable
vehicle for the expression of general deterrence and given his ongoing mental illness,
incarceration will serve relatively little useful specific deterrent. Mr Man was primarily a
resident of New South Wales and a sensible ultimate disposition would be for this man to
be returned to psychiatric care in that State.
Such testimony would be halted quickly by many judges or magistrates as a usurpation of

the sentencer’s function in terms comparable to the preclusion traditionally imposed by
the ultimate issue rule. As Lord Ross in the Scottish case of Rolland v Lothian Health Board
(unreported, 27 August 1981) (cited by Gee and Mason (1990, p 119)) commented: ‘Most
judges, I imagine, dislike being lectured to in their own courts and I count myself one
among the majority.’
Where the sentencer is considering whether an offender’s future conduct could be
affected by such dispositions as a suspended sentence, an intensive correction order, a
community-based order or an attendance order, the views of an experienced expert about
the efficacy or suitability of such dispositions may be sought and may be very helpful.
This is particularly so where the expert has had an extended opportunity both to review
the offender’s history and to assess the offender. The modern tendency is for courts to
allow and to welcome such evidence, provided that its bases are clearly enunciated and
the expert’s reasoning is set out.
Expert evidence in mitigation

[7.10.50] After a person has been found guilty of criminal offences, it is common for
forensic psychologists and psychiatrists, social workers, youth workers, parole officers,
community corrections officers and other like professionals to be called to give their
assessment of the mental state of the offender at the time of committing the offences, any
change in that state, the existence of remorse, suitability for community service options,
her or his psychological background, and any other mitigating considerations which
might bear upon the passing of sentence in accordance with the sentencing principles
outlined above at [7.10.20]. In addition, occasionally expert evidence is given as to the
seriousness or otherwise of the offence in order to assist the sentencer to rank the actual
offence appropriately among others in the sentencing hierarchy: see R v Crocker (1992) 58
A Crim R 359.
Sometimes expert reports at sentencing are tendered but, in the higher courts, expert
witnesses generally appear in person to enable them to be cross-examined and to answer
any further questions which the sentencer may wish to pose. Not infrequently, reports are
also tendered in the course of oral expert evidence. This has the advantage of enabling the
sentencer to have a clear record of both the history taken by the expert and the expert’s
[7.10.50] 519
carefully framed views. It disengages the sentencer from the laborious process of
punctilious note-taking, allowing her or him to concentrate on what is being advanced on
behalf of the offender.
Not uncommonly, sentencing is deferred pending receipt by the sentencer of a
pre-sentence report prepared by a forensic psychiatrist or psychologist, an expert in
intellectual disability, a probation officer or a person who has superintended or may
superintend a community-based option as an alternative to imprisonment. A number of
factors may properly weigh upon the sentencer’s mind in determining whether or not a
pre-sentence report ought to be ordered by the court. Carruthers J of the New South Wales
Court of Criminal Appeal expressed a cautionary admonition in R v Majors (1991) 54 A
Crim R 334 at 337 in this regard:
One factor which may be relevant is that, in many cases, the pre-sentence report, the
preparation of which invariably involves an interview with the offender, consists
substantially of self-serving statements made by the offender often involving
unsubstantiated allegations. The Crown is obliged to tender the report, which obviates the
need for the offender to give evidence before the sentencing judge and thereby deprives
the Crown prosecutor of the opportunity to cross-examine the offender. It also deprives
the judge of the opportunity of hearing the offender give evidence of subjective matters.
The sentencing judge is often then left in doubt as to how much weight may be given to
all or any part of the report, particularly conclusions, suggestions and recommendations
by the interviewing officer.
His Honour went on to maintain (at 337):
Experience indicates that much of the information gathering undertaken by officers who
prepare pre-sentence reports involves work which should have been done by the legal
representatives of the accused, prior to the conclusion of the trial. It is essential for the
proper administration of the criminal justice system that those representing an accused
person be in a position to adduce all relevant evidence for the purposes of a plea in
mitigation of sentence at the conclusion of the trial. I refer here to such matters as the
preparation of a family, work and medical history of the offender and the like.
Carruthers J acknowledged that there are certain matters in respect of which probation
officers may be of special assistance – for example, details of previous behaviour by the
offender while on parole. However, his Honour maintained (at 337) that, save in rare
cases, the legal representatives for the offender should be in a position to adduce all
relevant evidence on her or his behalf at the conclusion of the trial:
Adjournment of the sentencing process to enable the preparation of a pre-sentence report
should be confined to those cases where it is apparent to the judge that there is a clear and
legitimate advantage to be obtained by this course.
From the point of view of advocacy, more can be said. It is generally preferable, finances
and other considerations permitting, for the lawyers advising an offender to organise their
own expert for compiling the pre-sentence report, rather than leaving the choice to the
vagaries of the courts’ selection processes. So long as the offender’s representatives choose
the expert, they are able to veto the report should it prove prejudicial and to organise for
evidence to be given of the bases upon which the expert’s views are founded, should such
a course be appropriate. This is likely to result in the provision of material that is both
more consonant with what the offender wishes to have placed before the court and more
persuasive.
A judge or magistrate is not entitled to take into account against an offender any facts
stated in a victim impact report or in a pre-sentence report unless they are admitted by her
or him or are proved formally. ‘Such reports [ie, police and pre-sentencing reports] contain
many matters of hearsay which are not to be taken into account against a prisoner except
on his admission of their truth’: R v Lucky (1974) 12 SASR 136 at 142. The question may be
resolved by the calling of evidence, normally from the expert who wrote the report: R v
Bryant [1980] 1 NZLR 264 at 271. Bray CJ in R v Lucky (1974) 12 SASR 136 at 139 held:
520 [7.10.50]
[O]pinion evidence from experts should not be used against a convicted person if he
objects to it without the expert being called: and opinion evidence based on hearsay
information obtained in his absence is not evidence against him except by consent: R v
Reiner (1974) 8 SASR 102 at 109–110; Sych and Sych v Hunter (1974) 8 SASR 118.
(Compare the ‘Newton hearing’ in England and Wales: Newton; Gandy (1984) 11 Cr App R
564.)
Existence of remorse
[7.10.60] Murphy J held in Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305 at 315 that ‘[c]ontrition,
repentance and remorse after the offence are mitigating factors, leading in a proper case to
some, perhaps considerable, reduction of the normal sentence’ (citing Harris v The Queen
[1967] SASR 316; R v Tiddy [1969] SASR 575; Darwin v Samuels (1971) 1 SASR 411 at 423;
Datson v The Queen (unreported, WA Supreme Court, 1972)). He suggested that such
considerations were generally given insufficient weight in sentencing in Australia. In
Phillips v The Queen [2012] VSCA 140 at [101], Harper JA observed: ‘If there is evidence of
remorse, and if that remorse is genuine, it is a very important element in the exercise of
the sentencing discretion. Remorse of this kind indicates realistic prospects of rehabilitation
and a reduced need for specific deterrence. An offender who pleads guilty because he or
she has an accurate appreciation of the wrongfulness of his or her offending, and of its
impact upon its victim or victims, and who desires to do what reasonably can be done to
repair the damage and to clear his or her conscience, is someone to whom mercy – in the
form of a very substantial reduction in what would otherwise be an appropriate sentence
– is very likely due.’ In CD v The Queen [2013] VSCA 95 at [36], Harper JA further
observed: ‘“Remorse” is a word frequently employed during plea hearings. Yet it is not
putting it too starkly to say that there is very often no substantive justification for its use.
Although they too often masquerade as remorse, self pity or regret at being caught do not,
or at least should not, qualify. Nor is a plea of guilty, without more, necessarily evidence
of remorse. But when convincing evidence of genuine contrition is placed before a
sentencing court it should in my opinion be given great weight.’
It is preferable for concrete evidence to be placed before the court of such an attitude to
the crime – pious expressions of regret are rarely given significant weight by experienced
sentencers: see R v Rowe (1982) 7 A Crim R 39 at 41. Thus, expert evidence about an
offender’s genuine attitude toward what he or she has done, insight into the effects of the
crime on the victim, and, for example, real attempts at restitution or reparation (see R v
Mickelberg (1984) 13 A Crim R 365 at 370) or preparedness to assist the investigating
authorities are all genuinely mitigating factors to which a forensic psychologist or
psychiatrist, for instance, may be able to testify.
An example of actual steps taken by a convicted person was in R v Hurd (1988) 38 A
Crim R 454 at 459, where Dr R was able to say that a brain-damaged alcoholic offender
was ‘horrified at the magnitude of his actions and the possible harm that may have
occurred’ and that, as a consequence, he had commenced attending Alcoholics
Anonymous and had made ‘remarkable progress’. This was regarded as evidencing real
remorse.
Circumstances of offender
[7.10.70] The personal circumstances of the offender in a broad sense are relevant to the
sentencer whose task it is to balance the need to protect the community by deterring
criminal conduct and punishing criminal offences, against the need to rehabilitate the
offender. The age of an offender, for instance, is a most relevant factor in determining
severity of disposition. In sentencing a young offender, ‘the consideration of general
deterrence has been held not to be “as important as it would be in the case of sentencing
[7.10.70] 521
an adult and considerations of rehabilitation should always be regarded as very important

indeed”’: C, S and T (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, Gleeson CJ, 12 October
1989); see also R v C (1991) 55 A Crim R 478 at 480. However, there is a point at which the
seriousness of a crime committed by a young person is so great that the principle that
youth is a mitigating factor gives way: R v Nichols (1991) 57 A Crim R 391 at 395; Pham v
The Queen (1991) 55 A Crim R 128 at 135.
Similarly, a person’s good character, as evidenced by the absence of prior convictions, a
steady work record, a history of contributions to the community (uncoerced), the
performance of charitable deeds and so on can have a significantly mitigating effect upon
the disposition to be imposed: R v Markus [1974] 3 WLR 645; W v M (1983) 12 A Crim R 90
at 95. Typically, such information will be provided in serious cases partially by counsel
from the Bar table (as to the continuing legitimacy of such, see R v Storey [1998] 1 VR 359
at 371) and partially by a forensic psychiatrist or psychologist, or potentially by persons
such as youth workers, social workers, parole officers, employees of offices of intellectual
disability or community services and so on.
Although an offender’s unfortunate childhood, abuse by parents or guardians, poor
medical history, or early introduction to drugs and alcohol may not provide an excuse for
her or his criminal offences, such matters may assist to paint a sympathetic picture of the
real person with whom the court is dealing. They also explain the overall context within
which the offences were committed. The extensive history generally taken by forensic
mental health professionals can be provided either directly via the witness’s responses
when examined-in-chief, via the expert’s report when tendered, or as background material
to be incorporated in a plea.
Cultural factors
[7.10.80] Matters of cultural background that have particular impact upon the lifestyle or
attitudes of an offender may also be the subject of expert evidence from suitably qualified
professionals. For sentencing purposes, ‘courts are bound to take into account … all
material facts including those facts which exist only by reason of the offender’s
membership of an ethnic or other group’: Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305 at 326 per
Brennan J. It is not unusual for leaders of community groups, religious figures and even
interpreters to be called to give such evidence.
Thus, an interpreter was called in R v Yildiz (1983) 11 A Crim R 115 (although, in this
instance, in the trial proper) to give evidence of the Turkish attitude toward homosexuality,
in particular to the active and passive participants in anal intercourse. This was relevant to
the kind of provocation that might be constituted by the use of derogatory reference in
Turkish to such a person (see Ch 11.20).
In Lancaster v The Queen (1991) 58 A Crim R 290 at 293, evidence was placed before the
court that initiation rites had long been tolerated by the Australian Regular Army. This
information was viewed by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal as a
mitigating factor for the purposes of sentencing two soldiers charged with indecent
assault.
While the background, education and ‘cultural outlook’ of offenders may be the subject
of relevant expert evidence, consideration of racial background per se has been held not to
be a mitigating factor in the sentencing process: Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305 at
326 per Brennan J; R v Woodley (1994) 76 A Crim R 302 at 306; Rogers v The Queen (1989) 44
A Crim R 301 at 307, 314; R v Gibuma (1991) 54 A Crim R 347 at 349; Juli v The Queen (1990)
50 A Crim R 31 at 37; R v Bulmer (1987) 25 A Crim R 155 at 158–159; see, though, Neal v The
Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305 at 318 per Murphy J; at 326 per Brennan J. However, it has been
held that the consequences of Aboriginality, such as poor self-image, stressors leading to
alcohol abuse, and a culture of violence may properly be taken into account in assessing
522 [7.10.80]
an offender’s moral turpitude: Yougie v The Queen (1986) 33 A Crim R 301 at 304; Rogers v
The Queen (1989) 44 A Crim R 301. This is so, in relation both to Aborigines living tribally
and on reserves (see Friday v The Queen (1984) 14 A Crim R 471; Houghagen v Charra (1989)
50 SASR 419 at 422; Harradine v The Queen (1992) 61 A Crim R 201 at 210) and to
Aborigines living in an urban environment (Harradine v The Queen (1992) 61 A Crim R 201
at 210). Such factors are properly the subject of expert evidence from psychologists, social
workers and, to a lesser degree, anthropologists and sociologists.
The general health of an Aboriginal person, taking into account their personal
circumstances, may also be accounted relevant. In Russell v The Queen (1995) 84 A Crim R
386, for instance, Kirby P was prepared to take account of the ‘particular correlation
between hearing loss, Aboriginality and the criminal justice system which is increasingly
being brought to light by research’ (at 392). In order to adduce evidence of such a matter,
pertinent expert reports are essential.
The Aboriginality of an offender, coupled with the nature of the offence charged, has
been held to have the potential to be relevant to the form of penalty properly to be
exacted. This may vary from a determination of the appropriateness of imprisonment to a
decision on quantum of fine to the propriety of imposition of any penalty at all: Walden v
Hensler (1987) 29 A Crim R 85. The fact that an offender is a full-blood Aboriginal person
living in a remote community may well be relevant to culpability, given the person’s likely
lack of acquaintance with white laws and cultural norms: Leech v Peters (1988) 40 A Crim R
350 at 353.
A number of courts have also employed the option of a period of suspended
imprisonment or a short period of incarceration to take into account the likely customary
punishment to be inflicted upon the offender: see Jadurin v The Queen (1982) 7 A Crim R
182 at 186; Mamarika v The Queen (1982) 5 A Crim R 354; R v Minor (1992) 59 A Crim R 227
at 240; R v Jungarai (1981) 9 NTR 30 at 31–32; R v Colley (unreported, WA Supreme Court,
Brinsden J, 14 April 1978). In addition, some sentences have taken into account the fact
that the accused may have perceived himself or herself to have been under a duty
pursuant to tribal customs and traditions to have inflicted an injury upon the victim: R v
Davey (unreported, Federal Court of Aust, Bowen CJ, Muirhead and Evatt JJ, 13 November
1980); R v Colley (unreported, WA Supreme Court, Brinsden J, 14 April 1978).
The fact that an Aboriginal person has genuine fears of traditional, customary
retribution from ‘kadaitcha men’ may well be relevant to the punishment to be accorded
him or her: Shannon v The Queen (1991) 56 A Crim R 56 at 61–62; see also Australian Law
Reform Commission (1986, p 352ff). However, expert evidence, in all probability from
anthropologists, is necessary to establish the nature and contemporaneity of such beliefs
and practices within a particular indigenous community; credible evidence is necessary,
not merely assertions from the Bar table: R v Jungarai (1981) 9 NTR 30 at 31–32. Thus, in
Mamarika v The Queen (1982) 5 A Crim R 354 at 357, the Federal Court held:
It is of course a fact, and one that cannot and should not be disregarded, that the appellant
did suffer serious injuries at the hands of other members of the community. If it is to be
asserted that conduct of this sort should be seen as a reflection of the customary law of an
Aboriginal community or tribal group, we are of the opinion that there should be evidence
before the court to show that this was indeed the case …
and that the exercise of traditional punishment was not simply the angry reaction of
friends of the deceased or the result of intoxicated retaliation. Courts have on many
occasions recognised as a mitigating factor the fact that retribution may be exacted on
the offender by his own community both by way of the culture of shame and by way
of physical ‘pay-back’: see, eg, Jadurin v The Queen (1982) 7 A Crim R 182 at 187.
Expert evidence in relation to particular dispositional options applying to Aboriginal or
Torres Strait Islander offenders is also relevant and has been welcomed by the courts. For
[7.10.80] 523
instance, within some Aboriginal communities, the community itself has facilities where
rehabilitation can take place: see R v Woodley (1994) 76 A Crim R 302 at 308; R v
Miyatatawuy (1996) 135 FLR 173.
In the important decision of R v Fernando (1992) 76 A Crim R 58 at 62–63, Wood J
applied the following principles to the sentencing of Aboriginal offenders:
(A) The same sentencing principles are to be applied in every case irrespective of the
identity of a particular offender or his membership of an ethnic or other group
but that does not mean that the sentencing court should ignore those facts which
exist only by reason of the offender’s membership of such a group.
(B) The relevance of the Aboriginality of an offender is not necessarily to mitigate
punishment but rather to explain or throw light on the particular offence and the
circumstances of the offender.
(C) It is proper for the court to recognise that the problems of alcohol abuse and
violence which to a very significant degree go hand in hand within Aboriginal
communities are very real ones and their cure requires more subtle remedies than
the criminal law can provide by way of imprisonment.
(D) Notwithstanding the absence of any real body of evidence demonstrating that the
imposition of significant terms of imprisonment provides any effective deterrent
in either discouraging the abuse of alcohol by members of the Aboriginal society
or their resort to violence when heavily affected by it, the courts must be very
careful in the pursuit of their sentencing policies to not thereby deprive
Aboriginals of the protection which it is assumed punishment provides. In short,
a belief cannot be allowed to go about that serious violence by drunken persons
within their society are treated by the law as occurrences of little moment.
(E) While drunkenness is not normally an excuse or mitigating factor, where the
abuse of alcohol by the person standing for sentence reflects the socio-economic
circumstances and environment in which the offender has grown up, that can and
should be taken into account as a mitigating factor. This involves the realistic
recognition by the court of the endemic presence of alcohol within Aboriginal
communities, and the grave social difficulties faced by those communities where
poor self-image, absence of education and work opportunity and other
demoralising factors have placed heavy stresses on them, reinforcing their resort
to alcohol and compounding its worst effects.
(F) That in sentencing persons of Aboriginal descent the court must avoid any hint of
racism, paternalism or collective guilt yet must nevertheless assess realistically
the objective seriousness of the crime within its local setting and by reference to
the particular subjective circumstances of the offender.
(G) That in sentencing an Aborigine who has come from a deprived background or is
otherwise disadvantaged by reason of social or economic factors or has little
experience of European ways, a lengthy term of imprisonment may be
particularly, even unduly, harsh when served in an environment which is foreign
to him and which is dominated by inmates and prison officers of European
background with little understanding of his culture and society or his own
personality.
(H) That in every sentencing exercise, while it is important to ensure that the
punishment fits the crime and not to lose sight of the objective seriousness of the
offence in the midst of what might otherwise be attractive subjective
circumstances, full weight must be given to the competing public interest to
rehabilitation of the offender and the avoidance of recidivism on his part.
The Fernando judgment was applied in R v Stone (1995) 84 A Crim R 218 at 224. See also R
v Hickey (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 27 September 1994) per Simpson J.
Clearly enough, advantage can only be taken of the many opportunities in this
formulation of principles by the adducing of comprehensive evidence about the personal
circumstances and background of the Aboriginal offender. It may also be that many of the
524 [7.10.80]
sentiments expressed may be able to be translated to offenders of other particularly

vulnerable and disadvantaged ethnic and socio-cultural backgrounds.
As ‘battered woman syndrome’ has been ruled admissible evidence on the issue of
duress in determining guilt (R v Runjanjic (1991) 53 A Crim R 362), expert evidence
relating to it and other syndromes, such as rape trauma syndrome and possibly even in
extreme cases premenstrual syndrome (see Ch 10.30), may be relevant for the sentencing
process, in the same way as are drug and alcohol addiction, in order to cast offenders’
actions in a less reprehensible light.
In United States v Whitetail 956 F2d 857 (8th Cir 1992), for example, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals remanded a woman for resentencing after she had failed in her plea of
self-defence and, at initial sentence, the court had not taken account of the fact that she
had been suffering from battered woman syndrome. It held that the fact that she was a
victim of the syndrome was germane to the severity of the punishment to be imposed on
her: see also United States v Johnson No 90-30344 (9th Cir, 11 February 1992); United States v
Cheape 889 F 2d 477 (3rd Cir 1989).
Drug and alcohol addiction of offender

[7.10.90] As a matter of general principle, a number of authorities have held that
intoxication, alcoholism, drug abuse and drug addiction (as well as gambling addiction;
see Freckelton (2013c)) neither excuse nor mitigate criminal activity: see R v Bradley (1980)
2 Cr App R 12 at 13; Lawrence v The Queen (1980) 2 Cr App R 463 at 464; Blake v The Queen
(unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, Lush J, 9 August 1983); R v De Jesus
(1986) 20 A Crim R 402 at 405; R v Redenbach (1991) 52 A Crim R 95 at 99; Gibson v The
Queen (unreported, WA Court of Criminal Appeal, Pidgeon, Ipp and Scott JJ, 15 November
1995); R v Walker (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, Hayne JA, Southwell and
Smith AJJA, 31 May 1996). However, where a court is satisfied that there is something that
wholly or partly excuses the taking of drink or drugs, it will treat that circumstance as
going to mitigation: R v Redenbach (1991) 52 A Crim R 95 at 99. What this highlights is the
need for the evidence of the offender’s intoxication and/or alcoholism to emanate from a
suitably qualified and fully briefed expert so that the full context of the offender’s
circumstances at the relevant time can be placed before the court. Provided it can be
accommodated within the relevant sentencing principles, however, it has been held to be
in the community’s interest to facilitate the genuine efforts of those who are addicted to
drugs or alcohol to overcome their addiction: Gundry v The Queen (1989) 39 A Crim R 227.
This can only feasibly be done by detailed evidence from a person, preferably a
professional – a doctor, a counsellor or a supervisor in a relevant organisation – in relation
to the motivation and success of the offender in weaning herself or himself from the
substances to which an addiction has been formed.
Where the intake of alcohol or illicit drugs has acted as a disinhibitant, expert evidence
about the effect of such substances by a professional, such as a psychopharmacologist (see
subscription service, Chs 70 and 71), will be significant in relation to establishing
mitigating circumstances for the offences. This is particularly so where the offender is of
otherwise blameless character: R v Sewell (1981) 5 A Crim R 204 at 207.
As it is no longer permissible in Australia to take into account any curative effects
imprisonment may have on alcoholism or drug addiction (Ngulkurr v O’Brien (1989) 64
NTR 36 per Pincus J), such evidence is unlikely to be led by the prosecution.
Illness of offender
[7.10.100] Expert evidence relating to the offender’s ill health will be a factor tending to
mitigate punishment only when the imprisonment would be a greater burden on the
offender because of her or his state of health, or when there is ‘a serious risk of
[7.10.100] 525
imprisonment having a gravely adverse effect on the offender’s health’ (R v Smith (1987)
44 SASR 587; Bailey v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 62 ALJR 319; R v McDonald
(1988) 38 A Crim R 470 at 475; R v Eliasen (1991) 53 A Crim R 391 at 396; R v Jones (1993) 70
A Crim R 449; Arrowsmith v The Queen (1994) 55 FCR 130; R v Williams (unreported,
Victorian Court of Appeal, 18 September 1995); R v Morgan (1996) 87 A Crim R 104; R v
DHM [1998] VSCA 11), but compare Zehir v The Queen (1998) 104 A Crim R 109 at 114
(where it was prison administration that was held responsible for the endangerment of the
prisoner’s health) or in some circumstances when the imposition of a substantial period of
imprisonment, taking into account the offender’s ill health, would amount to being
‘crushing’: R v Burnett (1994) 70 A Crim R 469 at 473–474. ‘Crushing’ has been held to
connote ‘the destruction of any reasonable expectation of useful life after release’: Yates v
The Queen [1985] VR 41 at 48. It has been suggested, by way of explanation for reducing a
sentence when by reason of cancer the prisoner’s serving a sentence of imprisonment
would be more burdensome than would otherwise have been the case, that ‘[s]pecific
deterrence becomes irrelevant to the sentence to be imposed … by reason of these factors.
He is … entitled therefore to be treated with greater leniency than would otherwise be the
case’, even though the sentence to be imposed may not enable the prisoner to leave prison
before his or her death: R v Williams (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, 18 September
1995) per Charles JA.
In cases where the hardship and deprivation of incarceration would be particularly
aggravated by the offender’s illness (R v Vachalec [1981] 1 NSWLR 351 at 353; see also R v
Perez-Vargas (1986) 8 NSWLR 559; Bailey v Director of Public Prosecutions (1988) 62 ALJR 319
at 321) or when factors such as stress might advance the illness (Bailey v Director of Public
Prosecutions (1988) 62 ALJR 319 at 321 (AIDS)), expert evidence as to the relationship
between the illness and imprisonment, particularly the medical facilities which could be
afforded the offender, is critical.
On the basis of the evidence before him, Roden J in R v McDonald (1988) 38 A Crim R
470 at 475 observed:
1. The very nature of the confinement in the assessment unit [for AIDS] imposes
hardships, including the lack of opportunity that would exist in other sections of
the prison for the appellant to determine who his associates would be. He is
necessarily confined with other AIDS sufferers. There is a problem arising in this
situation in the case of a person requiring protection, and that, I understand,
applies to this appellant. …
2. While so confined, the appellant will have reduced opportunities for courses of
education.
3. A further consequence of confinement in the assessment unit is the loss of
opportunity for remissions.
In these circumstances, he found compelling reasons for regarding the appellant’s ill
health resulting from AIDS, and its effect upon the nature of his confinement, as a
considerable mitigating factor so far as his sentence was concerned.
This approach is consistent with that adopted in relation to blind offenders. On the
basis of expert evidence in R v Todd [1976] Qd R 21, for instance, the Queensland Court of
Criminal Appeal reduced a sentence of six years’ imprisonment by two-thirds on the
ground of the hardship that it was convinced the blind offender would suffer during his
period of incarceration. It noted that the offender would be unable to take part in work
and recreational activities, would become agitated and depressed, and would require
constant supervision: see also R v Vachalec [1981] 1 NSWLR 351 at 353; Hannan v The Queen
(1982) 653; Hansford v The Queen (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, 5 October 1973).
526 [7.10.100]
Stress
[7.10.110] ‘Emotional stress which accounts for criminal conduct is always material to the
consideration of an appropriate sentence, though its mitigating effect can be outweighed
by a countervailing factor’: Neal v The Queen (1982) 149 CLR 305 at 324. Evidence of such
matters is regularly led through mental health professionals: see, eg, Harradine v The Queen
(1992) 61 A Crim R 201 at 204. It is frequently asserted, for instance, that significant stress
leads some offenders to shoplift and others to participate in inappropriate sexual contact
with members of their family: see further subscription service, Ch 53. The experience of
premenstrual tension or, more particularly, premenstrual syndrome (see Ch 10.30) may
also be put as a mitigating factor through appropriate expert evidence: see Easteal (1991);
Scutt (1982).
Prospects of rehabilitation
[7.10.120] As Fox and Freiberg (2014, p 258) phrased it:
There is a persistent judicial line of thought in Victoria, based on the judgment of Starke J
in R v Williscroft [[1975] VR 292 at 303–304], that contends that rehabilitation is entitled to
be given greater weight in the scheme of things and must not be regarded as subsidiary to
the aim of deterrence because, somehow, sanctions whose aims are rehabilitative are more
‘lenient’.
But similar sentiments have been expressed in other jurisdictions. For instance, in South
Australia, King CJ in Vartozkas v Zanker (1989) 44 A Crim R 243 at 245 held:
Rehabilitation as an object of sentencing is aimed at the renunciation by the offender of his
wrongdoing and his establishment as an honourable law-abiding citizen. It is not confined
to those who fall into wrongdoing by reason of physical or mental infirmity or a
disadvantaged background. It applies equally to those who, while not suffering such
disadvantages, nevertheless lapse into wrongdoing. The object of the courts is to fashion
sentencing measures designed to reclaim such individuals wherever such measures are
consistent with the primary object of the criminal law which is the protection of the
community. Very often a person who is not disadvantaged and whose character has been
formed by a good upbringing, but who has lapsed into criminal behaviour, will be a good
subject for rehabilitative measures precisely because he possesses the physical and mental
qualities and, by reason of his upbringing, the potential moral fibre to provide a sound
basis for rehabilitation.
Similarly, Wood J in the New South Wales context noted that ‘sentencing judges should be
astute in detecting those cases where, after a poor record, a turning point appears in the
life of a repetitive offender’: Micallef v The Queen (1990) 50 A Crim R 465 at 467, citing Cardi
v The Queen (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 3 December 1987). By and large,
expert evidence as to the realistic prospects for an offender’s rehabilitation is essential –
the sentencer must be persuaded that there is a ‘real glimmer of hope’: Micallef v The
Queen (1990) 50 A Crim R 465 at 467.
A case in which a number of expert strands came together to convince the New South
Wales Court of Criminal Appeal that an offender was worth the risk of a significant
reduction in sentence on appeal was R v Wright (1989) 45 A Crim R 423. Evidence was
given (at 429) by the principal of a religious order of nuns, who had been the chaplain of
a women’s prison and was a Commissioner of the Department of Corrective Services in
Queensland, that the offender had ‘remarkable prospects of rehabilitation’. In addition, a
senior psychologist expressed the view (at 428) that the offender’s prospects of
rehabilitation were good, describing her as intelligent, well adjusted, and well equipped to
readjust to life in the community and to establish for herself and her daughter ‘a stable
and pro-social lifestyle’. Finally, a welfare officer for the Department of Prisons gave
evidence (at 428) that while the offender’s former attitudes had been anti-social and
criminal, ‘her attitudes now in the present are socially and personally responsible’.
[7.10.120] 527
If an expert witness is in a position to give sworn evidence that the offender has
already made substantial progress in rehabilitation, courts will be loath to interrupt the
process unless the crime in respect of which the offender is being sentenced is so serious
as to demand incarceration: Duncan v The Queen (1983) 47 ALR 746 at 749.
In a number of historical cases, paedophilic sex offenders were released on
non-custodial orders with a condition that they submit to such treatment and undertake
such therapy as a named doctor may require. A classic case was R v McCracken (1988) 38 A
Crim R 92, in which Dr Myers recommended to the court that a person with a number of
convictions for sexual assault receive a further community-based order on condition that
he submit to regular injections of anti-androgen medication to counteract his symptoms of
paedophilia. Research material and literature placed before the court persuaded the trial
judge, and later the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, that despite the offender’s
‘illness’, there was a likelihood that ‘the respondent could be controlled by non-custodial
techniques to render him immune from recidivism’: at 97. Crockett J commented (at 97):
‘So much the better it is that the respondent should be gainfully employed and lead a
normal life, rather than spending his years wasting away in prison.’
In a contrasting case before the same judge, expert evidence also played a vital role. In
Flynn v The Queen (1993) 68 A Crim R 294 at 296, Crockett J, on behalf of the Victorian
Court of Criminal Appeal, placed reliance upon a psychologist’s evidence which dealt
both with the nature of the offender’s lawbreaking and his susceptibility to rehabilitation.
The expert had reached the conclusion, based on some 32 visits voluntarily attended by
the offender, that the sexual assaults upon children for which he was responsible did not
have paedophilic tendencies: ‘The better interpretation of the events, as I understand the
witness’s evidence, is that what the applicant did amounted to sexual experimentation or
sexual exploration.’ This evidence permitted the court to form the view that the offender
was sexually immature and that the offences constituted no more than aberrations from
his normal sexual development. This, accompanied by his proven preparedness to take
steps toward his own reclamation, caused the court to reduce his sentence to one of three
year’s imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.
Harsh consequences of imprisonment

[7.10.170] It is appropriate for sentencers (and persons making decisions on bail) to have
regard to the probable effects that a period of imprisonment will have upon dependants or
family members of the offender: see R v Boyd [1984] WAR 236; R v Van Roosmalen (1989) 43
A Crim R 358; H v The Queen (1995) 81 A Crim R 88 at 105. This is now specifically
provided for by s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). However, the courts are
cognisant that ‘incarceration of almost anybody causes adverse effect, often financial, on
dependants. Certainly it does for every married man, every father, who is sent to prison’:
R v Adami (1989) 42 A Crim R 88 at 91. Generally speaking, it will only be where the
consequences to such persons are dire that evidence will convince the court to take them
into account (R v Adami (1989) 42 A Crim R 88 at 92):
Distress, reduced financial circumstances and deprivation of emotional support and
comfort are the usual consequences of the imprisonment of a spouse but, unless the
circumstances are truly exceptional, sentencers are to ignore them as a sentencing factor.
(See also Wayne v Baldiston (1993) 85 NTR 8 at 16; R v Adami (1989) 42 A Crim R 88 at 92;
R v Mitchell [1974] VR 629 at 631; R v Hakopian (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal
Appeal, 11 December 1991); R v Lane (2007) 176 A Crim R 471; [2007] VSCA 222.)
Expert evidence from a social worker or appropriately trained welfare worker may be
advisable if it is sought to argue that spouses, parents or children will be deprived of
adequate care (see R v Vaughan (1982) 4 Cr App R 83) or that overwhelming hardship will
ensue as a result of the offender being imprisoned: R v Haleth (1982) 4 Cr App R 178. The
528 [7.10.170]
court may well wish to hear whether services existing in the community, available from
the extended family, or provided by the state could suffice during the period of
incarceration. In Scarce v Tampalini (unreported, WA Supreme Court, Kennedy J, 21 March
1990), for instance, the court noted pointedly that the child’s grandmother was available to
take care of him during the period of imprisonment that it imposed.
In Walsh v Department of Social Security (1996) 89 A Crim R 65, Perry J heard an appeal
from the imposition of sentences of imprisonment on two parents for social security fraud.
He permitted a report from a medical practitioner which stated that the incarceration of
the parents would ‘particularly punish’ their children who, he said, would suffer
psychological damage that had the potential to be profound and long-lasting. As well,
they would be jeopardised in terms of their physical health because of their suffering from
asthma. Perry J noted that various of the international instruments signed by Australia
emphasise the protection to be given by society to the family as the fundamental group
unit of society and to the preservation of the rights of children. He held that, where
possible, provisions such as s 16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) should be construed
and applied consistently with them, applying Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v
Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273 at 286 per Mason CJ and Deane J; Jumbunna Coalmine NL v
Victorian Coal Miners Association (1908) 6 CLR 309 at 363; Polites v Commonwealth (1945) 70
CLR 60 at 80–81; Ahmad v Inner London Education Authority [1978] 1 QB 36 at 41, 48.
Accordingly, he released the children’s mother on a three-year recognisance to be of good
behaviour.
In R v Amuso (1987) 32 A Crim R 308 at 310, evidence was given by the appellant’s
family doctor regarding the incapacitating arthritis that afflicted the appellant’s wife, her
distress after his conviction, her inability to attend to household duties, and the fact that
she had had to be admitted to hospital for psychiatric reasons in relation to the appellant’s
incarceration by the judge at first instance. However, the response of the South Australian
Court of Criminal Appeal (at 314) was unreceptive: ‘The short answer is that, if, indeed
the family of the appellant is more than usually dependent upon him, his dominant role
makes it all the more important that he keep within the law.’
For the most part, although sentencing statistics do not appear to bear out this
assertion, the gender of an offender is said by sentencers not to be relevant for sentencing
purposes: see, however, Friday v The Queen (1984) 14 A Crim R 471 at 473 per Connolly J.
However, it has frequently been pointed out that:
[D]istress, hardship and deprivation of support and comfort are inevitable consequences
of imprisoning a mother of young children; but other than in exceptional cases, those
factors must be disregarded or, at best, given limited weight, when the offences are
serious.
(See Scarce v Tampalini (unreported, WA Supreme Court, Kennedy J, 21 March 1990); see
also Wirth v The Queen (1976) 14 SASR 291 at 293; R v Sinclair (1990) 51 A Crim R 418 at
431.)
However, if young children will effectively be deprived of parental care, this will be
looked upon with some benevolence as a mitigating factor by courts, particularly if the
offences of which the offender has been found guilty are not ‘grave’.
The Court of Criminal Appeal in Western Australia determined in R v Stewart (1994) 72
A Crim R 17 at 21 that an offender’s pregnancy and the potential hardship imposed by the
imprisonment of an offender may be taken into account by the sentencer ‘when the degree
of hardship that imprisonment will involve is exceptional or when the offender is the
mother of young children, or where imprisonment will result in the children being
deprived of parental care’. Wallwork J in R v Stewart (1994) 72 A Crim R 17 quoted from
academic studies about the importance of bonding and affiliation between mothers and
small children in evaluating the impact that imprisonment would have upon the
[7.10.170] 529
prisoner’s children. It may well be that professional evidence in this regard would be of
significant probative value in establishing the ‘exceptional’ nature of a case.
Again, expert evidence from a social worker or welfare worker is advisable if seeking
to argue such mitigating factors.
If an offender suffers from claustrophobia, expert assessment may lead the court, as in
R v De Vroome (1988) 38 A Crim R 146 at 147, to reduce the sentence of imprisonment that
might otherwise have been imposed. However, the courts ‘are necessarily limited in the
extent of such adjustment by the necessity of maintaining proper standards of
punishment’: at 147. If the illness is sufficiently serious and would result in ‘psychological
consequences of an unbearable character’ (at 147), it may even lead to the imposition of
another disposition: see above, [7.10.100].
The same principle was expressed slightly differently by the South Australian Court of
Criminal Appeal in Broad v The Queen (unreported, SA Court of Criminal Appeal, 24 June
1994), where King CJ held that the appellant’s mental condition constituted an ‘important
consideration in assessing sentence’, as it was ‘such that he is likely to upset other
prisoners, and perhaps those in authority, and that will make his life in prison very
difficult’.
Similarly, if an offender is particularly aged, imprisonment will carry with it harsh
consequences that would not be shared by other sentenced persons. This is a function,
generally, both of their reduced expectation of life upon release and the impact of illness
and lack of mobility upon their prison experience. These factors have been held broadly
relevant as matters going to mitigation: see, for instance, Austin v The Queen (1996) 87 A
Crim R 570; R v Smith (unreported, WA Court of Criminal Appeal, 2 June 1994).
Mentally ill offenders
Longstanding law
[7.10.190] Sheldon et al (2006), p 250) observed that ‘[t]he relationship between criminal
behavior and mental illness is likely complex and nuanced’. One of the earlier Australian
analyses of the relevance of mental disorders was that of Young CJ in R v Mooney
(unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, 21 June 1978) (and applied in R v Anderson [1981]
VR 155 at 160). The focus of the decision was upon the relevance of general deterrence
when an offender is mentally unwell:
In sentencing generally it is necessary to balance personal and general deterrence on the
one hand with rehabilitation on the other. But in the case of an offender suffering from a
mental disorder or abnormality general deterrence is a factor which should often be given
very little weight. … General deterrence should often be given very little weight in the
case of an offender suffering from a mental disorder or abnormality because such an
offender is not an appropriate medium for making an example to others.
Justice Lush explained the court’s reasoning in this regard by reference to fundamental
considerations of fairness:
A sentence imposed with deterrence in view will not be acceptable if its retributive effect
on the offender is felt to be inappropriate to his situation and to the needs of the
community.
In R v Tsiaras [1996] 1 VR 398, the Victorian Court of Appeal usefully summed up the
conventional ways in which ‘serious psychiatric illness not amounting to insanity’ has
been held relevant to sentencing:
First, it may reduce the moral culpability of the offence, as distinct from the prisoner’s
legal responsibility. Where that is so, it affects the punishment that is just in all the
circumstances and denunciation of the type of conduct in which the offender engaged in
less likely to be a relevant sentencing objective. Secondly, the prisoner’s illness may have a
bearing on the kind of sentence that is imposed and the conditions in which it should be
530 [7.10.190]
served. Thirdly, a prisoner suffering from serious psychiatric illness is not an appropriate
vehicle for general deterrence, whether or not the illness played a role in the commission
of the offence. The illness may have supervened since that time. Fourthly, specific
deterrence may be more difficult to achieve and is often not worth pursuing as such.
Finally, psychiatric illness may mean that a given sentence will weigh more heavily on the
prisoner than it would on a person in normal health.
(See also R v Scott (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, Tadgell, Charles and
Southwell JJ, 19 February 1996).)
In New South Wales, Sperling J in R v Hemsley [2004] NSWCCA 228 observed that
mental illness can be relevant to sentencing in four ways:
(1) where mental illness contributes to the commission of the offence in a material
way, the offender’s moral culpability may be reduced; there may not then be the
same call for denunciation and the punishment warranted may accordingly be
reduced: see too R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346; [1999] NSWCCA 111 at [254]; R
v Jiminez [1999] NSWCCA 7 at [23]; R v Tsiaras [1996] 1 VR 398 at 400; R v Lauritsen
(2000) 114 A Crim R 333 at [51]; R v Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255 at [23]; R v Pearson
[2004] NSWCCA 129 at [43];
(2) mental illness may render the offender an inappropriate vehicle for general
deterrence and moderate that consideration: R v Pearce (unreported, NSW Court
of Criminal Appeal, 1 November 1996); Engert v The Queen (1995) 84 A Crim R 67
at 71 per Gleeson CJ; R v Letteri (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal,
18 March 1992); R v Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255 at [22]; R v Pearson [2004]
NSWCCA 129 at [42];
(3) a custodial sentence may weigh more heavily on a mentally ill person: Tsiaras at
400; R v Jiminez [1999] NSWCCA 7 at [25]; R v Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255 at [26];
and
(4) the level of danger which the offender presents to the community may sound in
special deterrence; R v Israil [2002] NSWCCA 255 at [24].
In South Australia, Martin J in R v Wiskich (2000) 207 LSJS 431 at 457–458 (see also R v
Gommers [2005] SASC 493 at [34], [58]) has observed:
The existence of a mental disorder is always a relevant factor in the sentencing process,
but its impact upon that process and the various issues that arise in sentencing will vary
considerably according to the circumstances of the individual case. An assessment of the
severity of the disorder is required. A sentencing court must determine the impact of the
disorder upon both the offender’s thought processes and the capacity of the offender to
appreciate the gravity and significance of the criminal conduct. In this respect I agree with
the approach taken in the Victorian and New South Wales authorities that, as a general
proposition, if an offender acts with knowledge of what is being done and with
knowledge of the gravity of the criminal conduct, the importance of the element of general
deterrence otherwise appropriate in the particular circumstances is not greatly affected.
The gravity of the criminal conduct is also an important consideration. It is not difficult to
understand that the element of general deterrence can readily be given considerably less
weight in the case of an offender suffering from a significant mental disorder who commits
a minor crime, particularly if a causal relationship exists between the mental disorder and
the commission of such an offence. In some circumstances, however, the mental disorder
may not be serious or causally related to the commission of the crime, and the
circumstances of the crime so grave, that very little weight in mitigation can be given to
the existence of the mental disorder and full weight must be afforded to the element of
general deterrence. In between those extremes, an infinite variety of circumstances will
arise in which competing considerations must be balanced.
Although the court must proceed on the basis that the offender has accepted legal
responsibility for offences in respect of which he or she has been found guilty, either as the
result of a plea or verdict:
[7.10.190] 531
[H]is mental condition, and in particular the possibility that his mental condition in the
future may be different from that existing at the time of the offence, remain significant in
the determination of what is an appropriate course to be adopted in relation to him as an
individual and to the protection of the community from him and from those who might be
disposed to imitate him.
(See R v Anderson [1981] VR 155 at 161 per Young CJ and Jenkinson J.)
Limits to the relevance of symptomatology to moral culpability

[7.10.200] However, there are situations in which, although an offender may either exhibit
symptoms of mental illness or may have a significant disorder within the meaning of the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (the
DSM) or the World Health Organisation’s International Classification of Diseases (the ICD),
such pathology only exercised a minimal or modest impact upon the offender’s moral
culpability and thus their suitability for punishment or specific deterrence or for being
used as a vehicle for general deterrence. As the New South Wales Court of Criminal
Appeal put it in R v Wright (1997) 93 A Crim R 48 at 50–51: ‘The significance of the
offender’s mental incapacity is to be weighed and evaluated in the light of the particular
facts and circumstances of the individual case.’ A vital question is whether and to what
extent the ‘condition’ can be said to have affected the offender’s mental capacity at the
time of offending or at the time of sentence: see R v Sebalj [2006] VSCA 106 at [21]; see too
R v Wiskich (2000) 207 LSJS 431 at 457–458.
For instance, a person with schizophrenia may have relatively encapsulated delusions
which do not bear in any significant way upon behaviour in which they engage which is
unrelated to the subject matter of their delusions. In R v Gommers [2005] SASC 493 at [34],
[58], Martin J observed that:
In some circumstances, however, the mental disorder may not be serious or causally
related to the commission of the crime, and the circumstances of the crime so grave, that
very little weight in mitigation can be given to the existence of the mental disorder and
full weight must be afforded to the element of general deterrence. In between those
extremes, an infinite variety of circumstances will arise in which competing considerations
must be balanced.
The Verdins restatement

[7.10.210] Because the R v Tsiaras [1996] 1 VR 398 decision was framed in terms of ‘serious
psychiatric illness’, the appellant in that case having schizophrenia, there was uncertainty
for a number of years, particularly in Victoria, as to what conditions made the mitigating
impact of the Tsiaras principles operative. The Victorian Court of Appeal in R v Verdins
(2007) 16 VR 269; [2007] VSCA 102 at [26] (see Freckelton (2007); Walvisch (2010; 2018))
endeavoured to resolve this uncertainty by adopting different terminology to that
previously employed in the decisions, preferring to frame its analysis of the law in terms
of ‘impaired mental functioning’. It observed (at [13]) that the important consideration is
not the diagnosis or ‘diagnostic label’:
Where a diagnostic label is applied to an offender, as usually occurs in reports from
psychiatrists and psychologists, this should be treated as the beginning, not the end, of the
enquiry. As we have sought to emphasise, the sentencing court needs to direct its attention
to how the particular condition (is likely to have) affected the mental functioning of the
particular offender in the particular circumstances – that is, at the time of the offending or
in the lead-up to it – or is likely to affect him/her in the future.
(The court was applying R v Skura [2004] VSCA 53 at [8]; R v Sebalj [2006] VSCA 106 at [21]
per Maxwell P, holding that ‘[w]hat matters in any given case is not the label to be applied
532 [7.10.200]
to the psychiatric condition but whether and to what extent the condition can be shown to
have affected the offender’s mental capacity at the time of the offence and/or at the time of
sentence’.)
Thus, the focus is now upon the nexus between symptomatology and offending or its
ongoing impact, for instance on experience of incarceration.
The court held (at [26]) that such functioning at the time of offending may reduce the
offender’s moral culpability if it had the effect of:
(a) impairing the offender’s ability to exercise appropriate judgment;
(b) impairing the offender’s ability to make calm and rational choices, or to think
clearly;
(c) making the offender disinhibited;
(d) impairing the offender’s ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct;
(e) obscuring the intent to commit the offence; or
(f) contributing (causally) to the commission of the offence.
The court observed, too, that an offender’s psychiatric illness may be mitigating in that a
sentence of imprisonment may weigh more heavily upon a psychiatrically ill offender than
upon ‘ordinary offenders’ and may be likely to lead to deterioration in the offender’s
mental health (at [26]–[28]).
The court reframed the Tsiaras principles as follows (at [32]):
Impaired mental functioning, whether temporary or permanent (‘the condition’), is
relevant to sentencing in at least the following six ways:
1. The condition may reduce the moral culpability of the offending conduct, as
distinct from the offender’s legal responsibility. Where that is so, the condition
affects the punishment that is just in all the circumstances; and denunciation is
less likely to be a relevant sentencing objective.
2. The condition may have a bearing on the kind of sentence that is imposed and
the conditions in which it should be served.
3. Whether general deterrence should be moderated or eliminated as a sentencing
consideration depends upon the nature and severity of the symptoms exhibited
by the offender, and the effect of the condition on the mental capacity of the
offender, whether at the time of the offending or at the date of sentence or both.
4. Whether specific deterrence should be moderated or eliminated as a sentencing
consideration likewise depends upon the nature and severity of the symptoms of
the condition as exhibited by the offender, and the effect of the condition on the
mental capacity of the offender, whether at the time of the offending or at the date
of the sentence or both.
5. The existence of the condition at the date of sentencing (or its foreseeable
recurrence) may mean that a given sentence will weigh more heavily on the
offender than it would on a person in normal health.
6. Where there is a serious risk of imprisonment having a significant adverse effect
on the offender’s mental health, this will be a factor tending to mitigate
punishment.
A similar approach has been followed by the Western Australian Court of Appeal in
Krijestorac v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 35.
It is clear that the Verdins restatement of the law is not intended, nor likely to be
interpreted, as a licence for persons with psychiatric pathology to receive automatic
sentencing discounts. Notably, in the decisions themselves, all three appellants were
unsuccessful. As Cavanough J put it in R v Oznek [2007] VSC 192 at [22]:
[T]here is [a need for] identification in the evidence of the type of mental impairment from
which [it is asserted that the offender was] suffering at the time; and secondly (and more
importantly), there is no clear identification in the evidence of the type of mental
[7.10.210] 533
impairment from which you may have been suffering at the time; and secondly (and more
importantly), there is no clear evidence that any such condition had any of the effects
which tend to reduce moral culpability.
The law after Verdins

[7.10.220] The Victorian Court of Appeal decision in R v Verdins is Australia’s most
sophisticated and subtle analysis of the relevance of psychiatric symptomatology to
sentencing. It confirms the relevance as extending to a variety of considerations germane
to sentencing – punishment, specific deterrence, general deterrence and denunciation. It
does so by principal reference to its impact upon the moral culpability of the offender, but
also by reference to the impact of symptomatology to the experience of imprisonment.
The terminology employed by the Court of Appeal is important. It is deliberately
broad, eschewing either the expression ‘serious mental illness’ or the label ‘mental illness’.
The concept of ‘impaired mental functioning’ is to be distinguished both from ‘mental
impairment’, the Victorian term for insanity under the Crimes (Mental Impairment and
Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic), and any expression which denotes a ‘mental disorder’
diagnosed by reference to the DSM or the ICD. It encompasses symptomatology which
impacts deleteriously upon the capacity to exercise appropriate judgment, to make calm
or rational choices, to think clearly, to disinhibit the offender, or to appreciate the
wrongfulness of conduct, or which obscures the intent to commit the offence. This broader
view of the potential relevance of psychiatric symptomatology to the sentencing process is
likely to facilitate the provision to sentencers of more mental health background through
expert reports and witnesses by reference to impaired mental functioning constituting
‘psychiatric symptomatology’ but falling short of fully fledged ‘mental disorders’ or
‘mental illnesses’. It is also likely to ease the path for suitably qualified and experienced
psychologists to provide more evidence than previously about offenders’ mental states,
whether or not such states amount to or fall short of pathology defined by reference to the
DSM or the ICD.
A significant aspect of the court’s decision is its identification of symptoms of disorders
such as bipolar disorders as potentially relevant to offending by reason of their potential to
disinhibit offenders or to impair their capacity to make calm and rational choices and
thereby to create circumstances in which offending might take place during an offender’s
manic phase when otherwise it would not have taken place. (See further Freckelton
(2005b); R v Nilsson [2000] NZCA 144; R v Bridger [2002] NZCA 298; R v EJ (unreported,
NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 1 April 1997); R v Fosse [2003] NSWCCA 347; Sherman v
Medical Practitioners Board of Victoria [2005] VCAT 644; Thompson v The Queen (2005) 157 A
Crim R 385; [2005] WASCA 223 at [74].) This is to be welcomed because overmuch
emphasis in the criminal law has historically been given to disorders such as
schizophrenia, by contrast to the bipolar disorders which can also create psychotic
contexts for offending – albeit contexts that are more subtle than the florid delusions and
hallucinations that often characterise schizophrenia.
An important issue in relation to expert evidence in mental illness pleas was raised in
R v Miller (1995) 81 A Crim R 278 at [33] by King J, who noted the frequency with which
such arguments are relied upon, requiring judges:
to consider reports from psychiatrists, but more usually psychologists, who have often
had only very brief interaction with that offender, who have accepted as reliable and
truthful the word of that offender as to their state of mind, thought processes or abilities,
and relied upon the statements by the offenders, as though it was sworn evidence, to then
ascribe to the offender, at least one of the six limbs in Verdins. I have found over time that
I am less and less satisfied with reports prepared by forensic psychologists who have often
spent an hour or less, with the offender before producing a lengthy report that purports to
address quite particularly, and directly, the various limbs of Verdins, usually relating to
either the moral culpability or the sentence weighing more heavily upon the offender.
534 [7.10.220]
The Verdins decision was revisited and reconsidered by the Victorian Court of Appeal in
Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v O’Neill (2015) 47 VR 395; [2015] VSCA 325, where it
was argued that the offender was suffering from a dependent personality disorder with
prominent features of narcissistic personality disorder, the combination of which was
argued to have enlivened the principles in Verdins. The court emphasised that before
Verdins, the principles relating to the relationship between an offender’s mental illness and
the concept of general deterrence were articulated in cases in which the offender suffered
from a serious psychiatric or intellectual disability: ‘In such cases, the disability had
played an important role in diminishing the offender’s capacity to form a rational
judgment in relation to the offending. Sometimes considerations of humanity precluded
the offender who was afflicted with such a condition from being considered to be a
suitable medium for the full application of the principles of general deterrence, although
the impairment did not contribute to the offending. Nothing said in Verdins modifies or
alters those principles, so far as they relate to the question of general deterrence in
sentencing, save that it recognises that the “nature and severity” of an offender’s
impairment falling short of a serious psychiatric illness may require some moderation of
general deterrence’ (at [54]–[55]). The Court of Appeal emphasised that ‘there must be
proper, and informed, consideration of how that impairment might have either materially
diminished the capacity of the offender to reason appropriately at the time of the offence
concerning the wrongfulness of his or her offending, or of how the offender’s condition
might make the full application of the principles of general deterrence repugnant to the
underlying sense of humanity which guides proper sentencing’ (at [59]).
The Court of Appeal observed that the prosecution has an important role to play (at
[81]):
in identifying any inadequacy in the opinion of the expert or the circumstances in which it
was formed. The prosecutor should provide full assistance to the judge in the performance
of his or her task. The expert evidence should be scrutinised with care and, where
appropriate, a challenge made to the adequacy of the material. Where the judge concludes
that the material is inadequate to support the opinion expressed, either because of its
content or because of the circumstances in which it came into existence, the sentencing
judge will ordinarily be obliged to state the reasons for rejecting the opinion or for finding
that the material is inadequate. But it is a matter for the sentencing judge to determine the
manner in which such issues are resolved.
The court concluded (at [85]–[86]) that the personality disorders diagnosed in relation to
O’Neill did not enliven the Verdins principles – the expert had not opined that O’Neill:
was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or exercise appropriate
judgment or make a rational choice, or, alternatively, how the respondent’s personality
disorder might have obscured his intention to commit the offence of murder. The
respondent did not establish on the balance of probabilities that he suffered from a mental
impairment. As we have said, it is well settled that Verdins principles are confined to
impairment of mental functioning. The principles in Verdins do not extend to personality
disorders such as those relied upon and which are set out in Section II of DSM–V.
Accordingly, the respondent’s condition could not provide a basis for a moderation of
the principles of general deterrence. That condition did not play any relevant role in
diminishing the respondent’s capacity to understand the nature and gravity of his
offending. It was not an impairment which required some moderation of general
deterrence on the grounds that the respondent’s condition at the time of the offence or
sentence rendered him unsuitable to be a vehicle for general deterrence.
The challenge remains for forensic assessors after the fact to provide the insight required
by the courts into the impact of ‘impaired mental functioning’ or, put another way, into
the effect of psychiatric symptomatology upon offenders’ moral culpability. While the
Verdins decision provides latitude in relation to the need for a diagnosis of mental illness,
the imperative remains that for expert evidence in relation to impaired mental functioning
to be mitigating it must establish that the symptoms of mental unwellness exercised a
[7.10.220] 535
material impact upon the capacity for calm, rational and aware decision-making by the
offender. Inevitably, such an assessment by a mental health professional will include
significant elements of subjectivity in particular cases and will be an evaluation upon
which reasonable clinicians may differ.
Mental conditions potentially relevant to sentencing

[7.10.230] There are many conditions which have the potential to affect the offending
behaviour of a person. An example is the neurological disorder, high-functioning autism
spectrum disorder, formerly known as Asperger’s disorder, which has the potential to
impair ability to appreciate the consequences of conduct, to reason calmly (in part because
of commonly occurring comorbidities, such as anxiety and depression), to generate
impulsivity, and to reduce the ability of an offender to read cues by others which might
otherwise inhibit antisocial behaviour: see, eg, R v Jensen [2007] VSC 199; R v Petroulias
(No 36) [2008] NSWSC 626; Sultan v The Queen [2008] EWCA Crim 6; R v Porritt [2008]
ACTSC 33; Hopper v The Queen [2003] WASCA 153; Parish v Director of Public Prosecutions
(2007) 17 VR 412; [2007] VSC 494; R v Kagan (2007) 261 NSR (2d) 285; Freckelton (2009;
2011; 2013b). Expert evidence about the disorder also has the potential to assist in
understanding an accused person’s demeanour, communication and evidence: see R v
MCO [2018] QCA 140 at [12], [68]; McGraddie v McGraddie [2009] ScotCS CSOH 142.
Another example is attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (see Freckelton (2019);
Foreman (2006)). In Paparone v The Queen (2000) 112 A Crim R 190, a psychologist
expressed an opinion on a plea in relation to manufacturing amphetamines with which
ADHD sufferers self-medicate, as well as with a variety of other substances, in a bid to
function normally in society. It has been asserted that around 25% of English prisoners
meet the diagnostic criteria for ADHD (see Young at al (2018)). ADHS occurs in 3-5% of
school-aged children and 2-4% of adults, presenting as pervasive and impairing levels of
over-activity inattention and impulsivity, often manifesting too in deficits in executive
functioning, such as planning, organisation, self-control, affects-regulation and working
memory (see Quigley and Gavin (2018)). A consequence is a multi-faceted over-
representation of persons with ADHD amongst those charged, sentenced and imprisoned
by the criminal justice system (see Fletcher and Wolfe (2009); Freckelton (2019)). However,
the court affirmed that for such matters to have any significance for sentencing, they must
be proved to the requisite degree. The majority held (at 199) that the presence in an
offender of a psychiatric illness or an intellectual disability will be relevant to the
sentencing process in a number of ways and for different reasons when there is a causal
connection or link of a relevant kind established between the condition of the offender and
the commission of the crimes for which he or she is to be sentenced:
Generally speaking, where that is the case, the effect of the condition or the disorder will
be mitigatory, but that will not always be the case and indeed in some circumstances the
effect may be one of aggravation, eg, where an intractable condition related to the
offending behaviour leads to the conclusion that the offender will represent in the future a
continuing danger to the community by reason of the commission of further offences.
Such a condition may have an impact upon the type of disposition chosen and its severity.
In a series of decisions by the English Court of Appeal (R v Friend [2004] EWCA 2661; R v
Osborne [2010] EWCA Crim 547; Ibrahim v The Queen [2014] EWCA Crim 121), the potential
relevance of ADHD to criminal proceedings was accepted, although there was variation in
terms of whether in the factual circumstances the condition was regarded as significant in
terms of reducing culpability or affording any kind of a defence.
However, the existence of a personality disorder in the offender is unlikely to be
viewed as an extenuating factor for the sentencing process (Burchielli v The Queen
(unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 10 June 1977); see further R v Leach
536 [7.10.230]
(2004) 14 NTLR 44; [2004] NTSC 60) unless it ‘is of such gross severity’ that it renders the
person inappropriate to be considered a suitable vehicle for general deterrence:
Harland-White v The Queen (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, 10 May 1994). Should
expert evidence of sociopathic behaviour or lifestyle on the part of the offender
demonstrate that he or she has been ‘no stranger to the ministrations of social workers,
psychologists and psychiatrists’ (R v Steels (1987) 24 A Crim R 201 at 204), it may work to
the detriment of the offender during the sentencing process in that it tends to suggest that
the person’s susceptibility to rehabilitation is low. The reason lies in the view adopted in a
number of judgments (see, eg, Hatherley v The Queen (unreported, Victorian Court of
Criminal Appeal, 6 May 1986)) that psychopathy, sociopathy and a range of personality
disorders do not necessarily deprive offenders of control over their actions or of a capacity
to understand the nature and consequences of their criminality.
Further, where there is a history of ‘rehabilitative failure’, then the imperative toward
community protection entails that deprivation of liberty will be the principal focus of the
sentencer. A danger arises that ‘sentencing frustration’ (arising from failure on the part of
the offender to profit from previous lenient sentences) will class the recidivist
substance-abusing offender among the ‘habitual offender’ category with the result that
periods of extensive imprisonment will be imposed. As Brennan J held in Channon v The
Queen (1978) 33 FLR 433 at 436–437:
[An] abnormality may reduce the moral culpability of the offender and the deliberation
which attended his criminal conduct; yet it may mark him as a more intractable subject for
reform than one who is not so affected, or even as one who is so likely to offend again that
he should be removed from society for a lengthy or indeterminate period.
(See also Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 476–477.)
After R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269; [2007] VSCA 102, the scope of mental impairments
that are relevant for the purposes of sentencing still remains to be resolved. DSM-5, the
diagnostic manual most frequently used in Australian psychiatric diagnoses (see O’Brien
(at [50.120]); Mendelson (at [51.120]); see also Shea (1993); Pathé and Mullen (1993, p 47);
Freckelton (1994)), does not employ the term ‘mental illness’ but classifies in terms of
‘mental disorders’, each of which is conceptualised as (American Psychiatric Association
(2013, p 20)):
A syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an individual’s
cognition, emotion regulation, or behavior that reflects in dysfunction in the psychological,
biological, or developmental processes underlying mental functioning. Mental disorders
are usually associated with significant distress or disability in social, occupational, or other
important activities. An expectable or culturally approved response to a common stressor
or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant
behavior (eg, political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are primarily between the
individual and society are not mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict results from
a dysfunction in the person, as described above.
The result is that side by side with ‘schizophrenia’, ‘delusional disorders’ and ‘mood
disorders’ are found ‘disruptive behaviour disorders’, ‘adjustment disorders’, ‘personality
disorders’, ‘pathological gambling’ and ‘psychoactive substance abuse disorders’: see
Freckelton (1994). It is readily apparent that the second series of disorders falls into a
category that is distinguishable from the first, which comprises a number of the
traditionally recognised mental illnesses.
After R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269; [2007] VSCA 102, the real issue for the sentencer is
the extent to which the experience of a psychiatric impairment impacts upon the moral
culpability of the offender and the capacity of that person to understand and control the
behaviour in which ultimately they indulge, as well as upon their potential experience of
imprisonment.
[7.10.230] 537
Difficult issues arise in respect of mental disorders such as pathological gambling, or,
as it is now termed under DSM-5 (p 585), ‘gambling disorder’, which is classified as an
‘Addictive Disorder’ because of their capacity to some degree (and in some circumstances)
to impact upon an offender’s volition and their capacity to exercise reasoned judgment. As
long ago as 1993, Vincent J in Novak v The Queen (1993) 69 A Crim R 145 at 149
commented:
[T]here is no shortage of evidence, which has been accumulating over the years, that
persons do become addicted to gambling to the extent that their whole lives are affected
by it. The commission of crimes in order to secure the necessary funds to satisfy
temporarily their compulsion or obsession is a well-recognised phenomenon. It can, in my
view and [does] in some circumstances, constitute an important factor to be taken into
account by a sentencing judge when assessing the degree of an offender’s moral
culpability and the extent to which the sentence should incorporate an element of general
deterrence.
(See also R v Telford [2004] SASC 248; Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd [2013] HCA 25;
Freckelton (2013); R v Yi Yi Wang [2009] VSCA 67; R v Cusack [2009] VSCA 207; R v Baxter
[2012] QCA 12; R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346; [1999] NSWCCA 111 per Spigelman CJ at
[203]; Assi v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 257 per Howie J at [27]; R v Do [2007] VSCA 308.)
In Ourdi v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 46, Kirby J (with Grove and Blanch JJA agreeing)
affirmed that an addiction to gambling will rarely be a matter for mitigation at sentencing.
Exceptions in this regard were identified in R v Henry (1999) 46 NSWLR 346; [1999]
NSWCCA 111 as arising from:
(i) the impulsivity of the offence and the extent of any planning for it: cf R v Bouchard
(1996) 84 A Crim R 499 at 501–502 and R v Nolan (unreported, Victorian Supreme
Court, Court of Appeal, 2 December 1998);
(ii) the existence or non-existence of any alternative reason that may have operated in
aggravation of the offence, for example, that it was motivated to fund some other
serious criminal venture or to support a campaign of terrorism;
(iii) the state of mind or capacity of the offender to exercise judgment, for example, if
he or she was in the grips of an extreme state of withdrawal of the kind that may
have led to a frank disorder of thought processes or to the act being other than a
willed act.
Inherent in such an approach is the provision by the accused of credible expert evidence
enabling an inference of pathology in his or her behaviour and the impact of that
pathology upon the accused’s moral culpability, including upon the person’s capacity to
control or moderate his or her impulsivity or addictive behaviours.
The impact of a person’s depression subsequent to a finding of guilt, making them a
significant suicide risk, has been raised on a number of occasions via expert evidence to
suggest an alternative sentencing disposition. In R v Leigh (1996) 86 A Crim R 261, this risk
was described as a ‘not uncommon response’ for many sex offenders sentenced to
imprisonment. It appears that such a potential is not generally regarded as significantly
mitigating, particularly in the context of offences which generally will command a
sentence of imprisonment to be served. Focused, accused-specific evidence from a suitably
qualified expert, preferably the treater, will be necessary to make this argument viable.
Intellectually disabled offenders

[7.10.250] See, generally, Samuels (1978); Potas (1981); Hayes and Hayes (1982, p 406);
Papaleo (1985); Fox (1986); Bright (1989); Hayes and Craddock (1992); Brookbanks and
Freckelton (2018); see also subscription service, Ch 63A (Intellectual disability).
538 [7.10.250]
Increasingly, the criteria for intellectual disability set out in the 5th edition of the
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-5) (2013, p 33) are used in the courts:
Intellectual disability (intellectual developmental disorder) is a disorder with onset during
the developmental period that includes both intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits
in conceptual, social, and practical domains. The following three criteria must be met:
A. Deficits in intellectual functions, such as reasoning, problem solving, planning,
abstract thinking, judgment, academic learning, and learning from experience,
confirmed by both clinical assessment and individualized, standardized
intelligence testing.
B. Deficits in adaptive functioning that result in failure to meet developmental and
socio-cultural standards for person independence and social responsibility.
Without ongoing support, the adaptive deficits limit functioning in one or more
activities of daily life, such as communication, social participation, and
independent living, across multiple environments, such as home, school, work,
and community.
C. Onset of intellectual and adaptive deficits during the developmental period.
One of the notable changes between the 1994 DSM-IV and the 2013 DSM-5 was the change
in nomenclature from ‘mental retardation’ to ‘intellectual disability’. However, it took
until 2010 for the United States to replace the term ‘mental retardation’ with ‘intellectual
disability’ under what is commonly known as ‘Rosa’s Law’ (124 Stat 2643). The United
States Supreme Court followed suit in Hall v Florida 134 S Ct 1986 (2014), a case dealing
with the imposition of the death penalty on persons with intellectual disabilities. It was
influenced by the terminology employed in the DSM-5.
However, as became apparent in Hall v Florida, extremely important consequences can
attach to whether a person’s disability is technically such as to qualify as ‘intellectuall
disability’. Hall was diagnosed as having an IQ of 71 and therefore was eligible for the
death penalty for participation in the murder of a pregnant newlywed. The relevant
Florida statute defined intellectual disability as ‘significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested during the period from conception to age 18’ (Fla Stat §921.137(1) (2013)). It
further defined ‘significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning’ as ‘performance
that is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized
intelligence test’. Evidence was adduced at trial that the mean IQ test score is 100 and, as
the standard deviation on an IQ test is approximately 15 points, a person with an IQ of
under 70 fell within the definition. However, the plurality noted that the use of such an
arbitrary numerical cut-off had unfair consequences – it meant that sentencing courts were
precluded from considering ‘even substantial and weighty evidence of intellectual
disability as measured and made manifest by the defendant’s failure or inability to adapt
to his social and cultural environment, including medical histories, behavioral records,
school tests and reports, and testimony regarding past behavior and family circumstances.
This is so even though the medical community accepts that all of this evidence can be
probative of intellectual disability, including for individuals who have an IQ test score
above 70’ (p 9). It found that such an approach was inconsistent with contemporary expert
approaches and meant that Florida’s law disregarded established medical practice in two
interrelated ways: ‘It takes an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a defendant’s
intellectual capacity, when experts in the field would consider other evidence. It also relies
on a purportedly scientific measurement of the defendant’s abilities, his IQ score, while
refusing to recognize that the score is, on its own terms, imprecise’ (at p 10).
The plurality accepted that the professionals who design, administer and interpret IQ
tests had agreed for many years that IQ test scores should be read not as a single fixed
number but as a range. In part, this is because an individual’s IQ test score may fluctuate
[7.10.250] 539
for a variety of reasons, including the test-taker’s health, practice from earlier tests, the
environment of location of the test, the examiner’s demeanour, the subjective judgment
involved in scoring certain questions, and even simple lucky guesswork. This has meant
that it has become orthodox to refer to an IQ test’s ‘standard error of measurement’ (SEM).
Thus, an IQ score of 71, such as that of Hall, is generally considered to reflect a range
between 66 and 76 with a 95% confidence limit and a range of 68.5 and 73.5 with a 68%
confidence limit. The plurality found that an IQ’s test’s SDEM ‘is a statistical fact, a
reflection of the inherent imprecision of the test itself’ (at p 19). This rendered highly
problematic the fact that Florida law used the test score as a fixed number, thus barring
further consideration of other evidence bearing on the question of intellectual disability.
The plurality went so far as to hold that by failing to take into account the SEM and
setting a strict cut-off at 70, Florida went against the ‘unanimous professional consensus’
and emphasised that intellectual disability ‘is a condition not a number’. This led it to
emphasise that courts must accord with the medical community in recognising that ‘the
IQ test is imprecise’ (at p 21). It held that this does not render IQ testing as unhelpful, but
simply that courts should utilise the ‘same studied skepticism that those who design and
use the tests do, and understand that an IQ test score represents a range rather than a
fixed score’. This meant that in a case such as that involving Hall – a man whose familial,
educational and social background strongly suggest serious intellectual deficits – the
defendant should be enabled to present additional evidence of intellectual disability,
including testimony about adaptive deficits (at p 21).
The approach of the United States Supreme Court is consistent with case law in
England and Wales, as well as the legislative approach in many jurisdictions. For instance,
in the United Kingdom, s 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (England and
Wales) permits a trial judge in criminal proceedings to exclude confession evidence if the
prosecution cannot prove (beyond reasonable doubt) that it was not obtained by
oppression or in consequence of anything done or said which may have rendered it
unreliable. Section 78 allows a trial judge to exclude evidence where the defence proves on
the balance of probabilities that its admission would be unfair. In R v Silcot, Braithwaite and
Raghip, the Court of Appeal (unreported, The Times, 9 December 1991) stated that it was
not ‘attracted to the concept that the judicial approach to submissions under section 76(2)(b)
should be governed by which side of an arbitrary line, whether at 69/70 or elsewhere, the
IQ fell’.
In New Zealand, a different but related approach is used with a person being classified
under s 7(1) of the Intellectual Disability (Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003 (NZ)
as having an intellectual disability as a person with a permanent impairment that:
(a) results in significantly sub-average general intelligence; and
(b) results in significant deficits in adaptive functioning, as measured by tests
generally used by clinicians, in at least 2 of the skills listed in subsection (4); and
(c) became apparent during the developmental period of the person.
(These skills referred to in s 7(1)(b) are designated by s 7(4) to be (a) communication; (b)
self-care; (c) home-living; (d) social skills; (e) use of community services; (f) self-direction;
(g) health and safety; (h) reading, writing and arithmetic; and (i) leisure and work.)
Section 7(2) provides that, wherever practicable, ‘a person’s general intelligence must
be assessed by applying standard psychometric tests generally used by clinicians’.
Section 7(3) provides that for the purposes of s 7(1)(a), an assessment of a person’s general
intelligence is indicative of significantly sub-average intelligence if it results in an
intelligence quotient ‘that is expressed (a) as 70 or less; and (b) with a confidence level of
not less than 95%’.
540 [7.10.250]
Section 3 of the Disability Act 2006 (Vic) defines intellectual disability in a flexible way
as ‘the concurrent existence of (a) significant sub-average general intellectual functioning;
and (b) significant deficits in adaptive behaviour – each of which became manifest before
the age of 18 years’.
Intellectual disability in itself does not necessarily reduce culpability. As the Irish Court
of Appeal observed in Director of Pblic Prosecution v Clarke [2014] IECA 27 at [22]:
The trial judge also considered the culpability of the appellant and his personal
circumstances. He came to the view that the appellant had no major mental illness and
that while he had a border line IQ with symptoms of frontal lobe dementia and
intellectual impairment, his mental condition was not such that he was not able to take
control of himself. He knew that he was doing wrong. He had deliberately selected his
first victim because she was on her own. He knew she was only fifteen and that she was
frightened.
However, expert evidence in relation to intellectual disability can result in its being
equated with mental illness for sentencing purposes: R v Roadley (1990) 51 A Crim R 336 at
343; R v Ulla (2004) 148 A Crim R 356; [2004] VSCA 130; R v Bux (2002) 132 A Crim R 395;
[2002] VSCA 126; R v Champion (1992) 64 A Crim R 244 at 255; R v Letteri (unreported,
NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 18 March 1992). In relation to considerations of both
rehabilitation and deterrence, it is quite clear that such evidence may be taken into
account. Less weight than would otherwise be the case should be given by the sentencer
to considerations of general deterrence (R v Ulla (2004) 148 A Crim R 356; [2004] VSCA
130; R v Bux (2002) 132 A Crim R 395; [2002] VSCA 126; R v Champion (1992) 64 A Crim R
244 at 255; R v Anderson [1981] VR 155; R v Kilmartin (1989) 41 A Crim R 22; R v Roadley
(1990) 51 A Crim R 336 at 343; see also Kiltie v The Queen (1974) 9 SASR 452; Masolatti v The
Queen (1976) 14 SASR 124; R v Scognamiglio (1991) 56 A Crim R 81). The key issue is the
extent of the offender’s ability to appreciate the consequences of her or his behaviour and
to exercise control over impulses (see R v Roadley (1990) 51 A Crim R 336 at 343; R v Ulla
(2004) 148 A Crim R 356; [2004] VSCA 130; R v Bux (2002) 132 A Crim R 395; [2002] VSCA
126). If, as in R v Roadley (1990) 51 A Crim R 336, the offender has the mental age of a five-
or six-year-old child and limited (possibly non-existent) impulse control, little weight will
be given to general deterrence.
The weight that should be given to specific deterrence will depend upon the
intellectually disabled offender’s level of understanding of, and control over, her or his
actions, and thus her or his moral culpability for the offending behaviour: see R v Musicka
(unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 11 April 1995); R v Champion (1992) 64 A
Crim R 244 at 254–255 per Kirby P; R v Elchami (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal
Appeal, 15 December 1995); R v Williams [2000] VSCA 174.
The pre-Verdins approach of the courts was articulated by the New South Wales Court
of Criminal Appeal in R v Champion (1992) 64 A Crim R 244 at 254–255 per Kirby P:
It is imputed to the general community that it will understand that a person with the
intellectual capacities of a child will need to be deterred but may need special attention in
order that the deterrence will be effective. Moreover, the full understanding of the
authority and requirements of the law, which may be attributed to the ordinary individual
of adult intellectual capacities, cannot be expected of a person who, although adult in
bodily form, retains the intellectual capacities of a child. Because the constraints which
may be demanded of a person with ordinary adult intellectual capacities may not operate,
or operate as effectively, in the case of a person with significant mental handicaps, the
community (reflected by the judges) applies to such people the principles of general
deterrence in a way that is sensibly moderated to the particular circumstances of their
case: see Roadley (1990) 51 A Crim R 336 (at 343). It is in place for the protection of the
community and the victims of offences which the community rightly takes most seriously.
But as that principle falls …, it is necessarily a consideration to which less weight can, and
therefore should, be given.
[7.10.250] 541
In R v Gommers [2005] SASC 493 at [59]–[63], though, Layton J equated intellectual

disability to mental illness in relevance to sentencing in the following ways:
• the existence of either a mental disorder or intellectual disability are always relevant
factors in sentencing;
• the sentencing court must ‘determine the impact of the disorder upon the offender’s
thought processes and the capacity of the offender to appreciate the gravity and
significance of the criminal conduct’;
• the court should also consider whether there is any causal relationship between the
mental disorder or the intellectual disability and the commission of the offence;
• the court is to have regard to the seriousness of the offence as well as the aspect of
general deterrence; and
• if there is either a causal connection between the mental disorder or intellectual
disability and the commission of the offence, or if by reason of the mental disorder or
intellectual disability the person does not appreciate the gravity of the criminal
conduct, then these circumstances may reduce the importance of general deterrence in a
given case but increase the importance of specific deterrence.
In R v Norris [2007] VSCA 241, the ‘Verdins restatement’ was explicitly held to apply to the
sentencing of an intellectually disabled offender.
For the assessment of the impact which deterrence is capable of having upon an
intellectually disabled offender, courts tend to rely on experienced persons who have a
professional acquaintance with the offender, such as workers in the offender’s sheltered
workshop, hostel or institution or, if necessary, on evidence from suitably qualified
employees of the state instrumentality that deals with the intellectually disabled or from
psychologists or psychiatrists who have specialised in working with such persons. On
occasions, courts require expert witnesses, such as intellectually disabled persons’ case
workers, to assist their determinations on disposition: see R v Musicka (unreported,
Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 11 April 1995).
In Hansen v The Queen (unreported, SA Court of Criminal Appeal, King CJ, Matheson
and Millhouse JJ, 22 February 1995), for instance, it was held that the extent to which a
court will mitigate a sentence which would otherwise be appropriate, by reason of
diminished responsibility arising from intellectual retardation, will depend upon the
circumstances of the case: see also R v Clausen (1981) 95 LSJS 194; Mason-Stuart v The Queen
(1993) 61 SASR 204. In Hansen v The Queen (unreported, SA Court of Criminal Appeal,
King CJ, Matheson and Millhouse JJ, 22 February 1995), expert evidence from a
psychologist showed that the accused understood that the victim was too young for his
sexual attentions and that he understood that what he did to her was criminal. However,
it also showed that his sexual knowledge was limited and that his level of understanding
with respect to the wrongness of his actions was impaired. The court determined that the
aspect of general deterrence in such a case ought not to be completely ignored but ‘should
play a smaller part than it would in the case of a man of normal intelligence’. The court
also noted that an intellectually retarded person of the appellant’s type, particularly one
also afflicted with epilepsy, would suffer more from imprisonment than a person ‘free of
those detriments’.
The variability of the relevance of intellectual disability was further emphasised in the
important decision of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Russell v The
Queen (unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, Kirby ACJ, Allen and Dowd JJ,
15 December 1995). Kirby ACJ cautioned that ‘[i]t is important not to fall into the trap of
excusing inexcusable behaviour’:
Mental incapacity might diminish responsibility in certain situations, for example
someone with a mental illness might be affected in such a way that more complex
intellectual notions of ownership, property rights or the dangers of fire are
542 [7.10.250]
incomprehensible. But a court must be wary of elevating an accused person’s diminished

mental capacity into an excuse or exculpation in the case of sexual assault.
In Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39, the High Court accepted the
in principle relevance of intellectual disability to criminal offending, but sounded (at
[54]–[55]) an important and pointed caution:
A question will often arise as to the causal relation, if any, between an offender’s mental
illness and the commission of the offence. Such a question is less likely to arise in
sentencing a mentally retarded offender because the lack of capacity to reason, as an
ordinary person might, as to the wrongfulness of the conduct will, in most cases,
substantially lessen the offender’s moral culpability for the offence. The retributive effect
and denunciatory aspect of a sentence that is appropriate to a person of ordinary capacity
will often be inappropriate to the situation of a mentally retarded offender and to the
needs of the community.
In this case, there was unchallenged evidence of the causal relation between the
appellant’s retardation and his offending in the reports of Dr Muir and Ms Daniels. The
fact that the appellant possessed the superficial understanding of a mentally retarded
adult that it was wrong to engage in sexual contact with a child and that he told childish
lies in the hope of shifting the blame from himself were not reasons to assess his
criminality as significant, much less to use him as a medium by which to deter others from
offending.
Foetal alcohol spectrum disorder
[7.10.260] Foetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD) has latterly become recognised by the
courts as highly relevant to a range of issue in the criminal justice system, including
sentencing. FASD is an umbrella term for a condition that results from alcohol exposure of
a foetus during the mother’s pregnancy. It causes brain damage and growth problems that
are irreversible and can manifest in physical, cognitive, memory, behavioural and learning
difficulties with lifelong implications (see Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder Ontario
Network of Expertise).
Physical defects may include:
• distinctive facial features, including small eyes, an exceptionally thin upper lip, a short,
upturned nose, and a smooth skin surface between the nose and upper lip;
• deformities of joints, limbs and fingers;
• slow physical growth before and after birth;
• vision difficulties or hearing problems;
• small head circumference and brain size; and
• heart defects and problems with kidneys and bones.
Damage to the brain and central nervous system may include:
• poor coordination or balance;
• intellectual disability, learning disorders and delayed development;
• poor memory;
• trouble with attention and with processing information;
• difficulty with reasoning and problem-solving;
• difficulty identifying consequences of choices;
• poor judgment skills;
• jitteriness or hyperactivity; and
• rapidly changing moods.
The diagnostic criteria are summarised in Table 1.
As yet, there is no unanimity about the diagnostic criteria for FASD. It does not have a
place in the DSM-5. However, Bower and Elliott, in a report (2016, pp 4–5) to the
Australian Government Department of Health, suggested that:
[7.10.260] 543
A diagnosis of FASD can be divided into one of two sub-categories:

FASD with three sentinel facial features.
FASD with less than three sentinel facial features.
FASD with three sentinel facial features replaces the diagnosis of Fetal Alcohol
Syndrome, but without a requirement for growth impairment. FASD with less than three
sentinel facial features encompasses the previous categories of Partial Fetal Alcohol
Syndrome and Deurodevelopmental Disorder-Alcohol exposed.
The aetiological role of alcohol is most clearly established in the presence of all three
characteristic facial abnormalities. In this situation, a diagnosis of FASD with three sentinel
facial features can be made even when prenatal alcohol exposure is unknown, provided
there is also severe neurodevelopmental impairment.
Diagnostic criteria and categories for Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder

Fetal alcohol spectrum disorder
Diagnostic criteria Diagnostic categories
FASD with 3 Sentinel Facial FASD with < 3 Sentinel Facial
Features Features
Prenatal alcohol
Confirmed or unknown Confirmed
exposure
Neurodevelopmental Severe impairment in at least Severe impairment in at least 3
domains: 3 neurodevelopmental neurodevelopmental domains
• Brain domains
structure/Neurology
• Motor skills
• Cognition
• Language
• Academic
Achievement
• Memory
• Attention
• Executive
function,
including
impulse control
and
hyperactivity
• Affect
Regulation
• Adaptive
Behaviour,
Social Skills or
Social
Communication
Sentinel facial Presence of 3 sentinel facial Presence of 0, 1 or 2 sentinel facial

features features features
• Short Palpebral
Fissure
• Smooth
Philtrum
• Thin Upper Lip
544 [7.10.260]
Key components of the FASD diagnostic assessment include documentation

of:
• History – presenting concerns, obstetric, developmental, medical, mental health, behavioural, social;
• Birth defects – dysmorphic facial features, other major and minor birth defects;
• Adverse prenatal and postnatal exposures, including alcohol;
• Known medical conditions – including genetic syndromes and other disorders;
• Growth
Infants and young children under six years of age and older adolescents and adults
warrant special consideration during the FASD diagnostic assessment process.
In LCM v Western Australia (2016) 262 A Crim R 1; [2016] WASCA 164 at [84], the expert
witness gave the following answer when asked what FASD is:
So Foetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders, so foetal really gives you the timing of when the
disease occurs, so it occurs prenatally; alcohol because alcohol is attributed as the toxic
agent that causes brain damage during foetal life; spectrum because there are ranges of
impairments; and disorders because disorders can mean impairment as well, so people
drink different quantities at different frequencies and different timings across a pregnancy,
different things happen across a pregnancy, and in the first trimester is when the primary
organ development happens, and then, really, for the second and third trimester, those
organs grow, the body grows, but throughout pregnancy, the brain grows, so timing of
alcohol exposure in the first trimester may be manifest in external organs that we can see
like the face or the eyes or the lips, but for the remainder of the pregnancy, the damage
that alcohol does to the brain you cannot necessarily see, and if the brain is severely
damaged, then the size of the skull is smaller, so you will have microcephaly – micro,
small; cephaly, head; but if perhaps the alcohol intake occurred in the later stages of the
pregnancy, at that point the external structures of the baby have grown and so the insult to
the brain is hidden behind a normal sized skull, and then that damage to the brain will be
manifest as the child grows, and there may be behaviours, even as an infant, that you
might be able to attribute to that prenatal alcohol exposure, and then later on that prenatal
alcohol exposure will corrupt the child’s ability to optimise good things that happen to
them and also corrupt the child’s ability to manage when noxious things happen to them.
A substantial body of case law has evolved on the relevance of FASD for sentencing
purposes (see Douglas (2010); Freckelton (2013c; 2016a; 2016b; 2017); Brookbanks and
Freckelton (2018)). It can also be highly pertinent in relation to suspects’ fitness for
interview (see Pora v The Queen [2015] UKPC 9; Freckelton (2016c)).
In Churnside v Western Australia [2016] WASCA 146, the sentencing judge received a
number of reports – from a psychologist, a neuropsychologist, a paediatrician and a
pre-sentence report writer – in relation to the circumstances a male offender who had been
found to have committed burglaries. They established that he suffered from a
neurocognitive disorder as a result of exposure to alcohol and possibly other substances
during his mother’s pregnancy. The Court of Appeal concluded that ‘[t]he combined effect
of the appellant’s development disorder and his childhood experience has a profound and
continuing impact on every aspect of his day-to-day functioning, including his thought
processes, his social interactions and his behaviour’ (at [75]). This led the court to find that
as there was an ‘obvious connection between the appellant’s disabilities and his offending
behaviour’, his moral culpability was diminished (at [79]). It found that it was incumbent
on the court below to ‘use every means at its disposal to arrive at a disposition which
would offer some degree of protection to the community by reducing the risk of the
appellant reoffending and at the same time provide some measure of justice to the
appellant who would otherwise be destined to an indefinite and perhaps escalating cycle
of offending and imprisonment as a result of his pre-birth and childhood experiences’ (at
[82]).
[7.10.260] 545
LCM v Western Australia (2016) 262 A Crim R 1; [2016] WASCA 164 is Australia’s most
significant decision in relation to the sentencing of offenders with FASD. Martin CJ held
that: ‘A diagnosis that an offender suffers from one of the conditions within the spectrum
of disorders caused by foetal exposure to alcohol can be of great significance to the
sentencing process … In this case, the appellant’s diagnosis was of great significance … As
Dr Mutch observed in her evidence, the organic brain injury which LCM suffered before
he was born compounded the consequences of his traumatic childhood, which included
exposure to domestic violence, neglect, abandonment, relationships which were disruptive,
and parental substance misuse. The combined effect of the organic deficit and childhood
trauma, both of which were suffered through no fault on the part of LCM, produced the
deficits identified in the evidence of Dr Mutch which were relevant to the sentencing
process’ (at [2]).
Martin CJ drew attention to the concern he had previously raised in AH v Western
Australia (2014) 247 A Crim R 34; [2014] WASCA 228 about deficits in FASD assessment
and forensic reporting. He lamented that neither the experienced counsel who represented
LCM at first instance, the author of the psychiatric report, the author of the pre-sentence
report, the author of the psychological report, or the court had identified the prospect that
LCM might be affected by FASD and should be comprehensively assessed. He found that,
as a result, the opportunity for early detection and appropriate management of LCM had
been lost and the sentencing process had miscarried (at [6]). He commented (at [8]): ‘What
is clear, however, is that the current arrangements for the assessment and management of
offenders with that condition are quite inadequate. Unless those arrangements are
improved, not only will injustice be suffered by those who commit crime at least in part
because of a condition which they suffer through no fault of their own, but also the
opportunity to reduce the risk to the community by appropriately managing such
offenders will be lost.’
Martin CJ made the point that foetal exposure to alcohol can produce a variety of
different disorders within a spectrum, and that the particular disorder caused may be
suffered to an extent which varies from minor to profound deficit or disability: ‘It follows
that the relevance of a diagnosis of FASD in any particular case will depend critically
upon the precise nature of the diagnosis, and upon the nature and extent of the disorder
suffered as a consequence of foetal alcohol exposure’ (at [8]). He quoted (at [10]) from
Douglas (2010):
The cognitive, social and behavioural problems associated with FASD often bring sufferers
to the attention of the criminal justice system. It has been estimated that approximately
60% of adolescents with FASD have been in trouble with the law. Impulsive behaviour
may lead to stealing things for immediate consumption or use, unplanned offending and
offending behaviour precipitated by fright or noise. As a result of their suggestibility,
FASD sufferers may engage in secondary participation with more sophisticated offenders.
Lack of memory or in not understanding cause and effect may lead to breach of court
orders, further enmeshing FASD sufferers in the justice system. Impaired adaptive
behaviour that results from brain damage is translated into practical problems such as
trouble handling money and difficulties with day to day living skills. It may be difficult for
FASD sufferers to understand or perceive social cues and to tolerate frustration.
Inappropriate sexual behaviour is also common amongst FASD sufferers; in one study,
about 50% of FASD sufferers had displayed inappropriate sexual behaviours. Canadian
research has found that FASD is over-represented in prison populations of sex offenders.
… Pre-natal alcohol exposure increases up to threefold the likelihood of alcohol abuse
in adolescence. Researchers have noted that about 30% of FASD sufferers develop
substance abuse problems. Such problems also increase the likelihood of involvement with
criminal justice interventions, especially in Indigenous communities in Australia where
alcohol use is often prohibited.
He noted that in R v Ramsay [2012] ABCA 257 at [24]–[25], the court identified that:
546 [7.10.260]
Crafting a fit sentence for an offender with the cognitive deficits associated with FASD
presents at least two identifiable challenges: accurately assessing the moral
blameworthiness of the offender in light of the adverse cognitive effects of FASD; and
balancing protection of the public against the feasibility of reintegrating the offender into
the community through a structured program under adequate supervision. Medical
reports assessing the prospect of the offender’s rehabilitation and reintegration into the
community are essential to the task and must be carefully analyzed.
He also observed that in R v FD [2016] ABPC 40 at [7]–[8], it was observed that:

Research into FASD indicates that out of youth court cases reported, including Aboriginal
young persons, 89% of aboriginal young persons were suffering from FASD. Further,
studies indicate compelling evidence that a young accused person who is suffering from
FASD is likely to have diminished capacity to foresee consequences, make reasoned
choices or to learn from their mistakes. People with FASD are primarily compromised in
the following areas: intellectual functioning, reasoning and judgment, verbal learning and
memory, impulse control and inhibition and perceiving social cues. Young accused
persons with FASD lack the normal ability to process information and therefore their
ability to plan, perceive and appreciate situations is distorted. Persons suffering from
FASD do not have normal capacity to learn from experience and to retain learning. This
includes an inability to appreciate consequences and to choose right from wrong. FASD
accused have difficulty understanding how their behavior causes a certain outcome such
as how they can get burned by a hot stove or how they may be sent to jail for committing
a crime; therefore, they are unable to learn from their mistakes or to control their
impulsive behavior. They are also unlikely to show true remorse or to take responsibility
for their actions. These actions of FASD young persons are likely to clash with
assumptions that judges have about human behavior at almost every stage of the justice
system. The neurodevelopmental deficits associated with FASD challenge the basic
principles of sentencing, which assumes that the offenders are capable of making choices,
understanding the consequences of their actions, and learning from their mistakes so as
not to repeat. General deterrence – meaning that the punishment given to one person for
breaking the law will operate to deter other persons, presupposes the ability of an FASD
sufferer to process and translate information as well as to remember it … [T]here is no
pharmaceutical solution, no successful talk therapy, no amount of jail time, and no
probation order that will regrow brain cells of an FASD accused. In light of this, one could
conclude that treating FASD offenders as other accused sets them up for failure because
they will be required to act beyond their level of ability and will most likely fail to comply.
In summary, the traditional principles of sentencing such as deterrence, denunciation
and separation are not effective because the organic nature of FASD impedes the
individual’s ability to adapt their behavior. Having said that, studies seem to indicate that
with proper treatment and care such behavioral characteristics can be managed quite
effectively. Deterrence and denunciation are problematic in that many FASD young
persons are simply incapable of engaging in risk and consequence analysis …
He concluded (at [25]) that:

This case illustrates the significance which a diagnosis of FASD may have upon the
application of established principles of sentencing. It also illustrates that levels of
awareness with respect to the possibility that an offender might be suffering FASD, and
the arrangements which pertain to an assessment of that prospect and for the
management of an offender found to be suffering that condition are inadequate, especially
when compared to the awareness of and attention given to this issue in another
comparable jurisdiction – namely Canada.
The court in LCM (at [86]) accepted evidence ‘that the best way of diagnosing FASD is by
way of a multidisciplinary team that comprises a medical practitioner, usually a physician
or a paediatrician, but someone with advanced specialist training, a psychologist,
preferably a neuropsychologist, a speech and language pathologist and an occupational
therapist’. LCM was assessed over eight domains:
• cognition;
• attention and activity levels and sensory processing;
[7.10.260] 547
• executive functions;
• memory and learning;
• language;
• adaptive functioning, social communication and social skills;
• academic functioning; and
• motor skills.
He was found (at [94]) to have the following areas of difficulty:
• Executive functioning difficulties (abstract thinking, making connections, understanding
relationships, looking at the bigger picture and mentally manipulating information)
• Reading and other academic functioning (sentence comprehension, spelling, math
computation)
• Remembering visual information with context (eg picture)
• When information becomes more complex or had extra components that he had to
process at the same time he had difficulty inhibiting or remembering (eg picture) and
therefore any tasks with an extra cognitive load results in a decrease in his ability
• [The appellant’s] fine motor coordination skills are impaired, and proprioception
difficulties are present
• Remembering information
• Understanding information
• [The appellant] has a limited vocabulary so his language use is basic and not age
appropriate
• [The appellant] can remember some key detail from a short story however not all key
elements.
• [The appellant] will have difficulties with literacy (errors in sentence grammar such as
using conjunctions and more complex sentences)
• Manipulating information in his mind in order to figure out a task (sequences, spatial
information and comparative information)
• Stories lack key information and have limited grammatical structure. This makes his
stories sound confusing. This will have an impact on explaining events correctly,
including the setting, planning of events, attempting actions and outcomes of events.
• Providing enough information to the listener so they can understand which character
he is talking about (character reference)
• [The appellant] does show some abstract thought and ability to make some inferences
however this is limited and his story contains mostly a series of events.
Mazza JA and Beech J held that FASD is a mental impairment and that it involves a
spectrum of disorders: ‘The particular disorder of an individual with FASD may be severe,
it may be minor. FASD may lead to a varying number of deficits of varying intensity. Thus
blanket propositions about how a diagnosis of FASD bears on the sentencing process
should be avoided. Rather, attention must be directed to the details of the particular
diagnosis of FASD, including the nature and extent of the specific disabilities and deficits,
and how they bear upon the considerations relevant to sentence’ (at [123]). They found (at
[128]) that the FASD suffered by LCM was a significant (although not the sole) cause of his
offending and that his FASD impacted in the following areas in light of his impulsive and
unexpected offending:
(1) it diminished his moral culpability for the offence;
(2) it moderated the weight to be given to personal and general deterrence;
(3) it diminished the adverse impact of the primary judge’s findings that the
appellant acted ‘deliberately’ and ‘violently’;
(4) it bore on whether and to what extent the appellant was to be seen as lacking
remorse, and the weight to be given to that;
548 [7.10.260]
(5) it bore on the significance of the appellant’s failure to call for treatment
immediately after the offence, a matter on which the primary judge made an
adverse finding; and
(6) the appellant’s impaired language skills may well explain the appellant’s
persistent adherence to the position that his actions were an ‘accident’, a position
which the primary judge regarded negatively.
This meant that his FASD was a significant mitigating factor that had not properly been
taken into account. Thus, it was an appealable error.
The LCM decision constitutes an influential template for how FASD assessments
should be undertaken and how the results of such assessments should be integrated into
the sentencing process in Australia.
Dementia
[7.10.265] A range of neurodegenerative conditions can cause dysfunction of neural
structures involved in the exercise of judgment, and executive function, emotional
processing, sexual behaviour, violence and self-awareness (see Liljegren et al (2015);
Ekstrom et al (2017)). An outcome can be impulsive and disinhibited behaviours for
which, at the least, the offender’s culpability is reduced. This consideration has particular
application for persons with DSM-5 major neurocognitive disorder (more commonly
termed dementia) or Alzheimer’s disease, but also persons with conditions such as
Huntington’s disease (see R v Norman [2008] EWCA Crim 1810; R v Larmour [2004] NICC
4; R v Miller (1995) 81 A Crim R 278; Freckelton (2010)). One aspect of the relevance of such
conditions is that they impact upon the life expectancy of the person with them: see eg
Woodward v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 44 at [32]. In addition, there is the potential for
imprisonment to be more burdensome for the sentenced person than it otherwise would
be. Further, though, such conditions may render a person inappropriate or at least less
appropriate for punishment, specific deterrence and general deterrence: see Fedele v The
Queen [2017] VSCA 363; R v Lepore [2013] SASCFC 13. The Verdins principles have been
held to apply: see eg Kavanagh v The Queen [2011] VSCA 234 at [7].
Thus, in R v Gabriel [2010] NSWSC 13, Price J accepted that the defendant had early
fronto-temporal dementia and was suffering depression at the time of committing
manslaughter of his wife. In addition to increasing the defendant’s negative perceptions
and level of hurt, Price J found that the defendant’s medical conditions ‘to a limited
degree reduced his capacity for self-control when the deceased attacked him with a knife.
The offender’s moral culpability for his offending is diminished by reason of his dementia
and depression and the objective seriousness of the offence is mitigated by the presence of
these conditions’ (at [67]).
In Fedele v The Queen [2017] VSCA 363, on the basis of a fresh report by a clinical
neuropsychologist, and information that, by reason of fast-progressing early-onset
dementia, the appellant did not even appreciate that he was in prison, the Victorian Court
of Appeal resentenced him, permitting immediate release without a non-parole period (at
[26]):
The purposes of sentencing include the punishment of, and specific deterrence of, an
offender. The applicant does not know that he is being punished, so that the aim of
specific deterrence is rendered nugatory. Sentencing also aims to protect the community
from an offender, and to establish conditions to facilitate rehabilitation. Given the
applicant’s present condition, the community needs no protection from him; and,
self-evidently, he is beyond any meaningful rehabilitation. Moreover, the concept of
general deterrence has little work to do in the case of a person labouring under the
applicant’s mental incapacity. Indeed, as we have already observed, the respondent (very
fairly) did not seek to resist the proposition that the evidence we have referred to is fresh
evidence, the admission of which re-opens the sentencing discretion. In sentencing the
applicant, Whelan J referred to the need for specific deterrence and the importance of
general deterrence. As the respondent conceded, however, specific deterrence is of no
[7.10.265] 549
relevance in sentencing the applicant today and, having regard to the applicant’s present
state, general deterrence does not assume the significance it assumed when the applicant
was originally sentenced.
In the particular circumstances of the case, however, in Wright v The Queen [2016]
NSWCCA 122, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal declined to reduce a
sentence because of fresh evidence that the appellant was suffering from dementia and
thus that imprisonment would be experienced as particularly burdensome by him – ill
health and advanced age had already been taken substantially into account at first
instance in his sentencing (see too De Faria v Western Australia [2013] WASCA 116).
In short, therefore, the crucial consideration is the extent to which the offender’s
particular symptomatology affects an evaluation of his or her moral culpability and
suitability for punishment or deterrence.
Unusual impact of imprisonment

[7.10.270] The courts recognise that imposition of a prison term is a ‘potentially
devastating and corrupting experience’ (R v McCormack [1981] VR 104 at 110) – especially
for persons of previously good character. However, more than a blameless past needs to
be demonstrated to the court if the offence is very serious and alternative sentencing
dispositions cannot realistically be said to be open.
Notwithstanding this, particular offenders may be unusually adversely affected by
incarceration, and this may be taken into account by the sentencer in determining whether
to choose the disposition of imprisonment. Thus, in R v Lucas (1982) 9 A Crim R 268, a
psychologist employed by the South Australian Department of Corrections was called to
give evidence that a Vietnam veteran had become unusually preoccupied with his
physical and emotional condition in gaol and that he had major problems dealing with
confinement, with the result that he was dwelling on his experiences in Vietnam in an
increasingly depressive and suicidal manner. The expert also gave evidence as to the
offender’s weight loss and the steps that could and could not be taken to alleviate the
stress that the offender would suffer were he to be sentenced to a lengthy period of
imprisonment. Similarly, the impact of imprisonment upon career and subsequent pension
entitlements may be taken into account by the sentencer: Lancaster v The Queen (1991) 58 A
Crim R 290 at 293.
Availability of rehabilitative services

[7.10.290] As part of a plea in support of the contention that imprisonment is not the
appropriate disposition for an individual, expert evidence is occasionally given as to the
presence or absence of facilities to treat or adequately accommodate certain categories of
offenders. Thus, evidence relating to the services available for an intellectually disabled
paedophile was tendered at length in Roadley v The Queen (1990) 51 A Crim R 336. The
Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal held that the appropriate response of the sentencing
judge, in the face of expert evidence that there were no appropriate social services outside
the corrections system to cater for the applicant’s needs, was not to supplement the
inadequacy of such services by sentencing him to imprisonment but on this occasion to
release the offender on a three-year common law bond. It was held (at 343) that it was
inappropriate for a sentence of preventive detention to be imposed because of the absence
of other suitable alternatives: see also R v Clarke (1975) 61 Cr App R 320 at 323; Veen v The
Queen (No 1) (1979) 143 CLR 458.
Impact of executive policy

[7.10.310] It is inappropriate for a sentencer to take into account expert or other evidence
which forecasts the effect of the executive policy on the serving of a term of imprisonment.
550 [7.10.270]
Thus, the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal held that it was inappropriate for a
sentencing judge to decline to set a minimum term for a West German national, taking
into account any form of evidence that he may be deported on completion of his head
sentence. (See also Bensegger v The Queen [1979] WAR 65; Zaharoudis and Salihos (1986) 22 A
Crim R 233.) Similarly, it was held in R v Yates [1985] VR 41 that evidence in relation to the
remission likely to be earned by prisoners should be ignored in the sentencing process,
unless legislation directs otherwise.
Welfare of children
[7.10.330] In general circumstances, even if child abuse has taken place, courts are of the
view that it is worthwhile for a family not to be completely dislocated: see Ch 63
(subscription service) on child sexual abuse. Evidence of the impact upon children of the
long-term removal of an abusing parent may affect final disposition (R v Accused [1991] 2
NZLR 277 at 279), particularly if the parent has commenced rehabilitative therapy.
Expert evidence for the prosecution
Victim impact
[7.10.370] Evidence regarding the effect of a crime on a victim has traditionally been
regarded as relevant to the sentencing process (R v Webb [1971] VR 147 at 150–151 (FC)):
It is always open to a judge to have regard to the fact that no evil effect resulted from the
crime to a victim. That is a common occurrence and a fact properly taken into account. But
conversely, a learned judge is equally entitled in our view, to have regard to any
detrimental, prejudicial or deleterious effect that may have been produced on the victim
by the commission of the crime.
(See also R v Mallinder (1986) 23 A Crim R 179 at 184–185; R v Dixon-Jenkins (1991) 55 A

Crim R 308 at 316; Brannon v The Queen (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court,
McInerney J, 3 February 1982).)
In R v Penn (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 9 May 1994), however, it
was held that it is wrong under the common law for the sentencing judge ‘to receive and
act upon evidence called to show the extent of the sorrow and misery to a particular
victim’s family’. It appears that the fact that a victim has proved particularly resilient or
has made a good recovery from injuries is not properly to be regarded as a mitigating
factor in sentencing: see R v Woodley (1994) 76 A Crim R 302 at 318.
However, the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Miller (1995) 81 A Crim R 278,
construing s 5(2) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), which obliged a sentencer to have
regard, inter alia, to ‘the personal circumstances of any victim of the offence’ and ‘any
injury, loss or damage resulting directly from the offence’, determined that the
amendments which had wrought these changes to the Sentencing Act 1991 had altered the
position prevailing at the time of the decision of Penn. The court held that evidence of
sorrow and misery to a victim’s family would now be admissible, presumably directly
through such person’s own victim impact statement, or through one prepared by a
psychiatrist, psychologist or counsellor. The court, however, stressed that ‘it is still good
law that a sentencing judge should not “be required to impose a harsher penalty upon an
offender who causes the death of a person who is widely loved than upon one who causes
the death of an unloved victim”’.
By statute in some jurisdictions, courts are entitled to have regard to statements
containing particulars of injuries suffered by victims: see, eg, Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act
1988 (SA), s 7; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 447C; Victims of Offences Act 1987 (NZ), s 8;
Sentencing (Victim Impact Statement) Act 1994 (Vic). In other jurisdictions, it is becoming
[7.10.370] 551
more common for ‘victim impact statements’ to be tendered by the prosecution in cases
involving offences against the person: see, eg, Stanbrook v The Queen (1993) 65 A Crim R
107 at 110.
Thus, a sentencing judge is entitled to take into account the attitude, belief or fear of
the victim and her spouse that a child that she has conceived might possibly be the
product of the offender’s actions: R v Webb [1971] VR 147 at 151. Similarly, in some
circumstances expert evidence from a sociologist or urban anthropologist might be led as
to the particular impact that a crime has on a victim because of cultural reasons – eg, the
rape of a member of a community where loss of virginity would have disastrous
consequences for the victim’s prospects of marriage and acceptance within the
community: see, eg, Akkus v The Queen (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal,
4 September 1975).
In certain circumstances, evidence might also be led about an assailant’s particular
knowledge or expectations regarding the likely effects that a crime might have upon a
particular victim. However, the relevance, for sentencing purposes (either as an
aggravating or mitigating factor), of the victim of a violent crime being a prostitute, for
example, became a matter of controversy after the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal
decision in R v Hakopian (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 11 December
1991) (see, eg, Carter and Wilson (1992)) and remains to be finally articulated.
Under the former s 442B(3) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), for example, a series of 10
considerations were listed to which the sentencer was required to have regard in
determining whether to reduce a sentence on the basis of assistance which the offender
had given or had undertaken to give to the authorities. Numbered among these
considerations was:
(a) the effect of the offence for which the offender is being sentenced on the victim or
victims of the offence and the family or families of the victim or victims.
For the prosecution or defence to make submissions in this regard, expert evidence is
likely to be most important.
It is generally regarded as the duty of the prosecution to make information about the
ongoing effects of a crime upon a victim available to the court so that sentencing can be
conducted in an informed manner, taking into account the personal circumstances of the
victim, as well as those of the offender. Evidence from the Bar table is not sufficient;
appropriate expert evidence should be called: R v Richards (unreported, Victorian Supreme
Court, 6 August 1981). Thus, an account of the character and background of the victim is
often provided to the court by way of a report from a forensic psychologist or psychiatrist
specialising in trauma assessment and treatment. Similarly, an up-to-date report on a
victim’s physical recovery, or failure to recover from serious injuries, is generally procured
from a suitably qualified medical practitioner, and is made available to the sentencing
judge after having been shown to the offender’s legal representatives. In principle, expert
evidence could be called to rebut the assertions in such reports. (For instance, information
such as that made available by Professor Oates (1992, p 189ff) could be used in this way.)
However, in practice, this is almost unheard of – no doubt for fear that such a challenge
may suggest a lack of recognition of the nature and consequences of the offence or an
absence of contrition on the part of the assailant.
In 1992, the Full Court of the Federal Court, in R v P (1992) 39 FCR 276, was called
upon to evaluate a variety of victim impact material proffered by the Australian Capital
Territory prosecution in relation to the effects of sexual assaults by an assailant upon his
stepdaughter. The court held that it was in the public interest for ‘reliable information’ to
be presented about the effect of the crime upon the victim, ‘since a proper sentence should
not be based on a misconception or ignorance of salient facts’ (at 279). However, it found
(at 279–281):
552 [7.10.370]
[T]here are objections to the prosecution taking too active a role in the matter of injury to
the victim … We do not see any impropriety in the Director of Public Prosecutions …
ensuring that the court has before it sufficient material of a proper kind to enable it to
proceed to sentence upon a realistic assessment of the injury to or loss suffered by a
victim. It is essential, however, that the material not be presented in such a way that the
prosecuting authority will not only be seen to be promoting the interests of the victim at
the expense of the interests of justice, but also the reality will be quite otherwise.
In practice, given the Full Court’s concern which echoed that expressed by the sentencing
judge about the victim impact evidence which had been tendered at first instance, the
following can be concluded:
(1) victim impact evidence should emanate from experienced experts in the field,
perhaps from persons preparing a pre-sentence report, as in South Australia (at
281);
(2) the evidence should not consist of emotive restatement of the words of the victim
but should be professional and evaluative;
(3) the tone of the evidence should be measured and the author should not
misconstrue his or her role as acting as an advocate for the victim; and
(4) the author should generally be made available as a witness so as to facilitate
effective evaluation of the conclusions advanced.
Prediction of dangerousness
[7.10.410] As indicated above [7.10.250], one of the considerations that comes into play in
the sentencing process is the ‘protection of the community’. This involves the formation of
a view by the sentencer, almost invariably on the basis of expert evidence, generally called
by the prosecution, that an offender remains dangerous and may commit further serious
offences. It was held in 1987 that ‘psychiatric evidence is clearly relevant to the issue
whether a person is likely to behave in a certain way and, indeed, is probably relatively
superior in this regard to the evidence of other clinicians and laypersons’: R v Lyons (1987)
37 CCC (3d) 1 at 48 per La Forest J. However, a great deal of literature suggests that
mental health professionals are poor predictors of dangerousness, and many prominent
forensic psychiatrists and psychologists have pronounced themselves disinclined to
engage in the process. Hedigan J in Attorney-General v David [1992] 2 VR 46 at 61 noted
that when prison life has been the recent milieu of an offender, there is a vast body of
literature on the difficulty of predicting dangerousness, not to mention the difficulties in
defining it. The fallibility of such crystal-ball gazing was recognised in Veen v The Queen
(No 1) (1979) 143 CLR 458 at 464–465 by Stephen J, who nonetheless accepted that in some
cases it may be necessary and appropriate:
Predictions as to future violence, even when based upon extensive clinical investigation by
teams of experienced psychiatrists, have recently been condemned as prone to very
significant degrees of error when matched against actuality. … However, if such, perhaps
uncertain, predictions are nevertheless to be employed as aids in sentencing, they should
at least be the result of thorough psychiatric investigation and assessment by experts
possessing undoubted qualifications for the task.
(See also R v Addabbo (1990) 47 A Crim R 329 at 346–347.)

Since that time, it has been the subject of castigation from Carson (1994); Steadman et
al (1993); Bluglass and Bowden (1992); Monahan (1992); Ziskin and Faust (1994) and many
others (see Steadman and Cocozza (1976; 1980); Roth (1987); Bartholomew (1986); Slobogin
(1984); Monahan (1981)). It has been pointed out by many commentators that the criteria
that clinicians say they use to predict dangerousness appear not to be the ones that they
apply in practice. It has also been asserted that the accuracy of clinical predictions by
mental health professionals is poor and that the tendency is toward overprediction of
dangerousness. Nonetheless, it is a daily exercise for a sentencer to ask a forensic expert
[7.10.410] 553
what her or his assessment is of an offender’s prospects of rehabilitation. Answers are

generally given which take into account the apparent motivation of the offender to address
the problems that brought about the commission of the offences; the offender’s
demonstrated bona fides for rehabilitation (eg, the time that the offender has spent doing
an anger management course, attending Odyssey House, or abstaining from alcohol); the
insight that the offender has gained into the reasons for offending; contrition for the effects
of the offences; the offender’s history in offending after having been dealt with in like
circumstances by the court; the offender’s age and family circumstances (eg, the presence of
a supportive spouse or parents, the responsibility of children or dependants to care for);
and the availability of regular employment. In addition, certain kinds of offences are well
known for the degree of recidivism that occurs among offenders unless significant
intervention takes place – for example, sex offences on children, some kinds of shop theft,
and certain categories of driving offences. (See Prins (1990; 1991) for a useful treatment of
the literature on predictions and considerations that may scientifically be taken into
account.)
Continuing research is being conducted upon the capacity of psychiatrists and
psychologists to predict dangerousness accurately. This has been given a fillip in many
jurisdictions by the passage of indefinite detention legislation, which is frequently
predicated upon an assessment of the risk of an offender continuing to commit criminal
acts. Teplin et al (1993, p 98) have confirmed earlier research (see Monahan and Steadman
(1983)) that the best predictor of future violence is past violence but have found that while
most mentally ill prison detainees do not become violent, a few may become repeatedly
violent. In their study, alcohol and drug use disorders did not predict violence, leading
them to suggest that an interpretation of this finding may be that intoxication rather than
alcoholism per se may be a better predictor of violence. A new paradigm which has
emerged in the area is that of ‘risk assessment’. In this regard, an authoritative team
headed by Steadman, Appelbaum and Monahan proposed (Steadman et al, (1993), p 42)
that five factors are particularly relevant, though not yet adequately tested, as markers of
increased risk of violence among the mentally disordered (and possibly other groups as
well):
• the amount and type of social support available to the person;
• the person’s level of impulsivity;
• the person’s reactions to provocation – that is, his or her resort to anger;
• the person’s ability to empathise with others (this linking to the criteria for
psychopathy); and
• the nature of the delusions and hallucinations to which the person is subject.
They argued that the concept of dangerousness must be disaggregated into its three
constituent parts: the variables used to predict violence (‘risk factors’); the amount and
type of violence being predicted (‘harm’); and the likelihood that harm will occur (‘risk’):
see Steadman et al (1994). They pointed out that harm must be treated as a probability
estimate that establishes a relationship between risk factors and harm: see Steadman et al
(1994); Monahan (1996); Monahan and Steadman (1994).
The MacArthur study highlighted the significance of the role of substance dependence:
see Steadman et al (1998); see also Wallace et al (1998). However, the research highlighted
an even greater level of complexity of prediction of dangerousness than had previously
been appreciated. Steadman et al (1998) concluded that even discharged mental patients
do not form a homogeneous group in relation to violence in the community. The
prevalence of community violence by people discharged from acute psychiatric facilities
was found in the MacArthur study to vary considerably according to diagnosis, and
particularly co-occurring substance abuse diagnosis or symptoms.
554 [7.10.410]
In a large Victorian study, Wallace et al (1998) found that the increased offending by
those with schizophrenia and affective illnesses was modest and may often be mediated
by coexisting substance misuse. They argued that ‘[t]he risk of a serious crime being
committed by someone with a major mental illness is small and does not justify subjecting
them, as a group, to either increased institutional containment or greater coercion’.
Proving bases of testing

[7.10.430] A forum for argument about prediction of dangerousness is increasingly likely
to be in the context of applications by the state for continuing detention or supervision
(see Ch 10.40). In Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Mangolamara (2007) 169 A Crim R
379; [2007] WASC 71, Hasluck J heard extensive evidence from experts in terms of their
interpretation of the Static-99, and Structured Professional Judgments (SPJs) based upon
the SVR-20 (Sexual Violence Risk – 20) and the RSVP (Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol).
In the course of cross-examination, it emerged that the manuals, and the data upon which
the manuals were based, did not form part of an expert’s reports. Moreover, the forms or
sheets of paper completed by the expert in the course of equating the subject’s perceived
traits to certain defined categories in the manuals had not been adduced in evidence. This
prompted a submission that the court must be satisfied that the facts on which the opinion
is based are proved by admissible evidence, or at least that evidence placed before a court
must be sufficient for the court to understand how the opinion contended for was arrived
at. Hasluck J (at [165]–[166]) partially accepted the submission and held that in the
circumstances he accorded little weight to the results of the tests:
[T]he evidence in question does not conform to long-established rules concerning expert
evidence. The research data and methods underlying the assessment tools are assumed to
be correct but this has not been established by the evidence. It has not been made clear to
me whether the context for which the categories of assessment reflected in the relevant
texts or manuals were devised is that of treatment and intervention or that of sentencing.
Dr P acknowledged under cross-examination that the assessment tools are directed not to
the commission of serious sexual offences but to sexual re-offending of any kind (t/s 60).
She acknowledged also that the database used for the mathematical model upon which
Static-99 was based related to untreated English and Canadian sex offenders released back
into the community on an unsupervised basis (t/s 68). Moreover, having regard to the
admissions made under cross-examination that the tools were not devised for and do not
necessarily take account of the social circumstances of indigenous Australians in remote
communities, I harbour grave reservations as to whether a person of the respondent’s
background can be easily fitted within the categories of appraisal presently allowed for by
the assessment tools.
Dangerousness research continues, and further research results will continue to emerge. In
the meantime, great care needs to be taken in scrutinising the empirical base and the
assumptions on which predictions of dangerousness are made.
Expert evidence as to the nature of the offence

[7.10.470] On comparatively rare occasions, expert evidence is given as to the nature of the
offence of which the offender has been found guilty. An example has been held to be the
fixing of an appropriate level of sentencing for the trafficking of MDMA (Ecstasy), when
such an offence is contrasted with trafficking in other illicit drugs such as amphetamines,
heroin and LSD. In both Robertson v The Queen (1989) 44 A Crim R 224 and R v Crocker
(1992) 58 A Crim R 359, expert witnesses, in the former a pharmacologist and in the latter
a research psychologist, gave evidence about the proper classification to be given to
MDMA so as to assist the trial judge in the sentencing process.
In Robertson v The Queen (1989) 44 A Crim R 224, the evidence led the sentencer to
conclude (at 230):
[7.10.470] 555
MDMA (Ecstasy) should be treated as in the middle range of drugs which attract the
maximum sentence of 25 years imprisonment, being more serious than cannabis resin
derivatives, but less serious than LSD, cocaine or heroin.
However, in R v Crocker (1992) 58 A Crim R 359, the expert evidence was at significant
variance with that led in Robertson v The Queen (1989) 44 A Crim R 224. The research
psychologist found that MDMA countermanded violent behaviour; it was harmful in
overdose; it was less harmful than alcohol, nicotine and cannabis; a long-term user would
not have any ongoing withdrawal symptoms upon cessation of usage; and it is rarely seen
associated with any clinical presentations. She suggested that the drug was banned
because of uncertainty as to its long-term effects.
On the basis of the evidence before him, Higgins J found (at 364):
There is … no justification on the evidence before me for treating MDMA as being more
harmful than cannabis. The wide range of penalties, up to $100,000 fine or 25 years
imprisonment (or both) indicates that the court must make up its mind where, on the scale
of seriousness or harmfulness, the offence before it falls. That depends, save in the case of
notorious drugs so well-known as to be judicially noticed for their effects, on the evidence.
Similar procedures were followed in New Zealand in drug cases involving then new
drugs. In R v Richardson [1981] BCL 697, the Crown was permitted to introduce an affidavit
from a DSIR scientist as to the nature and effects of MDMA, while in R v Latta [1985] 2
NZLR 504 affidavits were allowed from a similar person and from the coordinator of the
National Drug Intelligence Bureau, which drew attention to and provided background
information about the emergence and incidence of a new form of manufacture in New
Zealand: ‘homebake’ methods of creating morphine and heroin. In R v McFarlane [1992] 3
NZLR 424, the Court of Appeal accepted affidavits, by consent, from experts concerning
‘crack’: see also R v Aramah (1982) 76 Cr App R 190; R v Martinez (1984) 6 Cr App R (S) 364.
It is likely that in a number of future MDMA and designer drug cases, expert evidence
will be led about the nature of the substance in order to assist the sentencer to locate
where trafficking, possession and use of such substances should be placed in the
proscription hierarchy for the purposes of imposition of penalty. Complex issues arise in
relation to cultural aspects of Khat usage: Douglas and Hersi (2010); Douglas and Pedder
(2010). If they are to be relied upon, they need to be the subject of expert evidence.
556 [7.10.470]
PART 8 – LIABILITY OF EXPERTS
Chapter 8.0: Criminal and civil liability of expert witnesses. 559

Chapter 8.05: Regulatory liability of expert witnesses............. 585
557
Chapter 8.0
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY OF
EXPERT WITNESSES
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [8.0.01]
Civil liability for expert witnesses: the immunity rule .................................................. [8.0.40]
Immunity applying to reports and affidavits ................................................................... [8.0.80]
Rationales for the witness immunity rule ........................................................................ [8.0.120]
Limitations to the immunity rule ....................................................................................... [8.0.160]
Preparatory work .................................................................................................................. [8.0.200]
Traditional English authority
Palmer v Durnford Ford ......................................................................................................... [8.0.210]
Stanton v Callaghan ................................................................................................................ [8.0.220]
Reforming English authority
Jones v Kaney ........................................................................................................................... [8.0.230]
The reasoning of the Supreme Court ................................................................................ [8.0.235]
The judgment of Lord Phillips ........................................................................................... [8.0.240]
Other judgments of the majority ........................................................................................ [8.0.245]
The dissenting judgments of Lord Hope and Lady Hale ............................................. [8.0.250]
Repercussions of the decision ............................................................................................. [8.0.255]
Scottish authority .................................................................................................................. [8.0.260]
Extension to vicarious liability ........................................................................................... [8.0.430]
Criminal liability for experts ............................................................................................... [8.0.460]
‘An Expert: “A paranoid, noisy, obsessively compulsive

long-shot gambler who simply does not know when to leave
well alone.”’
NS Kline, “You Can’t Get It from Here” (1959) 1 Indian Journal of Psychiatry 18.
Introduction
[8.0.01] This chapter outlines the liability of expert witnesses and authors of forensic
reports under the criminal and civil law.
The traditional position has been that witnesses are immune from civil action (and, to
most intents and purposes, from criminal prosecution) for their evidence in court. The
extension of that rule to reports prepared for court by experts constitutes a fundamental
component of the role of expert witnesses in the contemporary court system. It is one of
the major contributors to judicial anxiety about the provision of written and oral evidence
by experts.
The general liability of experts in negligence, contract and equity is a subject beyond
the scope of this chapter. However, it is apparent that the degree of experts’ exposure to
liability has risen significantly since 1980. This is particularly so in respect of healthcare
practitioners who, in Australia (see Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479; Rosenberg v
Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434; [2001] HCA 18) and in the United Kingdom (Montgomery v
Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] 1 AC 14; [2015] UKSC 11; Freckelton (2017a)) and Canada
(Reibl v Hughes [1980] 2 SCR 880; see also Hopp v Lepp [1980] 2 SCR 192 at 21; Arndt v Smith
(1997) CanLII 360), have been required to meet significantly increased obligations in terms
of their provision of information to patients about treatment options and risks, while the
general law of negligence has been interpreted in such a way as to impose an increased
duty of care upon health practitioners in the provision of treatment.
[8.0.01] 559
Part 8 – Liability of experts
The incidence of corporate collapses and the heightened scrutiny of auditors,

accountants and other professionals with the responsibility to report or monitor duties in
relation to public companies has resulted in escalating litigation also in relation to a
variety of professionals: see, eg, Duke Group (in liq) v Arthur Young (1990) 54 SASR 498;
Shears v Chisholm [1994] 2 VR 535; Carr Boyd Minerals Ltd v Queen Margaret Gold Mines NL;
Hill Minerals NL v Spargos Exploration NL (1989) 7 ACLC 1,029; Tonville Pty Ltd v Stokes
(A/asia) Ltd (1985) 10 ACLR 449; Reiffel v ACN 075839226 Ltd (2003) 21 ACLC 469; BT
Australia Ltd v Raine & Horne Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 221; see, too, Humphris (1991);
Godsell (1991); Austin and Ramsay (2009); McDonald et al (2003).
There is the potential for the growing expectations about professionals’ responsibilities
to spill over into the liability of persons who author reports for courts and tribunals and
who give evidence as expert witnesses. In light of the protection for barristers being
attenuated in a number of jurisdictions (see, eg, the United Kingdom and New Zealand;
see Mills (2019)), a question that has arisen for some time (see Richmond (1993); Jensen
(1993–94); Hanson (1996)) and that will recur is what protection needs to be accorded to
report writers and expert witnesses. It is likely that the limits of ‘witness immunity’ will
continue to be challenged in the aftermath of the decision of Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398;
[2011] UKSC 13.
Aside from the operation of cross-examination as a check on error, misstatement and
impropriety, the accountability under law for experts’ work in a forensic context arises in:
• civil law contexts;
• criminal law contexts; and
• regulatory law contexts.
This chapter addresses liability issues in the civil and criminal law context, while Ch 8.05
deals with experts’ liability in relation to disciplinary proceedings brought in the
regulatory context.
Civil liability for expert witnesses: the immunity rule

[8.0.40] Witnesses (both expert and lay) in civil and criminal proceedings have
traditionally been held in many jurisdictions to enjoy broad immunity from any form of
civil action in respect of evidence given during those proceedings:
• United Kingdom: Willers v Joyce [2016] UKSC 43 at [158]; Darker v Chief Constable of the
West Midlands Police [2001] 1 AC 435; Stanton v Callaghan [2000] QB 75; Roy v Prior [1971]
AC 470 at 480; Hargreaves v Bretherton [1959] 1 QB 45; Revis v Smith (1856) 18 CB 126 at
140, 141; 139 ER 1314 at 1319, 1320; R v Skinner (1772) Lofft 54; 98 ER 529;
• Australia: D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; [2005] HCA 12 at [39];
Commonwealth v Griffiths [2007] NSWCA 370; Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130;
• New Zealand: Gibson v Cotter HC AK Civ 2005-404-6935 [2006] NZHC 592;
• United States: David v Wallace 565 SE 2d 386 (W Va 2002); Pollock v Panjabi 781 A 2d 518
(Conn Super 2000); LLMD of Michigan, Inc v Jackson-Cross Co 740 A 2d 186 (Pa 1999);
Panitz v Behrend 632 A 2d 562 (1983); Briscoe v LaHue 460 US 325 (1983); Mitchell v
Forsyth 472 US 511 (1985);
• Canada: Samuel Manu-Tech Inc v Redipac Recycling Corp (1999) 38 CPC (4th) 297 (Ont
CA); Reynolds v Kingston (Police Services Board) [2007] ONCA 166;
• Ireland: McMullen v Clancy [1999] IEHC 252; and
• Scotland: Karling v Purdue [2004] Scots SC 221.
The longstanding and often repeated stance articulated by the common law is that no
action will lie against a witness for words spoken in the course of giving evidence:
Dawkins v Lord Rokeby (1873) LR 8 QB 255; Watson v McEwan [1905] AC 480 at 486; Darker
v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2001] 1 AC 435 at 464B. This has been held to
560 [8.0.40]
Criminal and civil liability of expert witnesses | CH 8.0
be so even if the evidence given is false, malicious (Dawkins v Lord Rokeby (1873) LR 8 QB
255 at 264; Darker v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2001] 1 AC 435; Silcott v
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1996] EWCA Civ 1311; (1996) 8 Admin LR 633) or
negligent (see, eg, Evans v London Hospital Medical College (University of London) [1981] 1
WLR 184 at 190; Darker v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2001] 1 AC 435 at
471G–472B) or defamatory (Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR 130 at 140; Docker v West Midlands
Police [1998] EWCA Civ 522; Commonwealth v Griffiths [2007] NSWCA 370 at [44]). The
protection commenced with immunity against action for libel or slander brought by
disgruntled litigants (Dawkins v Lord Rokeby (1873) LR 8 QB 255 at 263 per Kelly CB) and
was extended to other forms of action in tort (see Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398; [2011]
UKSC 13 at [12]).
Chief Baron Kelly in Dawkins v Lord Rokeby (1873) LR 8 QB 255 at 263–265 concluded
that it was ‘settled law’ that no action lay against a witness upon evidence given before
any court or tribunal constituted according to law (see also Watson v McEwan [1905] AC
480 at 486; Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 234; Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 528; Evans v
London Hospital Medical College (University of London) [1981] 1 WLR 184 at 191). The
immunity of a witness from suit in respect of evidence given in court was described by
Simon Brown LJ in Silcott v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1996] EWCA Civ 1311;
(1996) 8 Admin LR 633 at 636 as ‘a fundamental rule of law’. It remains so today, save in
the United Kingdom by reason of the important 2011 decision of the Supreme Court in
Jones v Kaney [2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] UKSC 13.
Immunity applying to reports and affidavits

[8.0.80] While at first the compass of the witness immunity rule was confined to evidence
given orally in court, evolving procedures have required consideration to be given in a
number of jurisdictions to its application to reports, affidavits and other statements given
as a preliminary to experts actually or potentially giving evidence in court. In a series of
decisions, the rule has been declared to apply also to protect reports and affidavits
prepared for the purposes of litigation (see, eg, D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005)
223 CLR 1; [2005] HCA 12; Ollis v New South Wales Crime Commission [2007] NSWCA 311;
Commonwealth v Griffiths [2007] NSWCA 370). Thus, in Meadow v General Medical Council
[2006] EWHC 146 (Admin) at [9], Collins J held that the immunity ‘extends to any civil
proceedings brought against a defendant which are based on the evidence which he gives
to a court. It extends to any statement which the witness makes for the purpose of giving
evidence’. The following passage from Gatley on Libel & Slander (10th ed) at paras 13.11
and 13.12 was cited with approval and then applied in Tufano v Vincenti [2006] EWHC
1496 at [13]:
The privilege which protects a witness from an action for defamation in respect of his
evidence in a judicial proceeding applies not only to evidence given viva voce, but also to
statements contained in an affidavit, a witness statement, or in a document handed in by a
witness at the close of his examination. However, privilege extends a good way beyond
what is said or done in court. It has long been the case that if the person making the
statement was called or proposed to be called as a witness then the protection of absolute
privilege would extend to what he said while a proof of his evidence was being taken and
the same was so in respect of interviews with the object of possibly calling him at the trial.
In Stanton v Callaghan [2000] QB 75 at 100C, Chadwick LJ set forth the following three
propositions:
(i) an expert witness who gives evidence at a trial is immune from suit in respect of
anything which he says in court, and that immunity will extend to the contents of the
report which he adopts as, or incorporates in, his evidence; (ii) where an expert witness
gives evidence at a trial the immunity which he would enjoy in respect of that evidence is
not to be circumvented by a suit based on the report itself; and (iii) the immunity does not
[8.0.80] 561
extend to protect an expert who has been retained to advise as to the merits of a party’s
claim in litigation from a suit by the party by whom he has been retained in respect of that
advice, notwithstanding that it was in contemplation at the time when the advice was
given that the expert would be a witness at the trial if that litigation were to proceed.
Lord Hope of Craighead in Darker v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2001] 1 AC
435 held that:
As the Earl of Halsbury LC said in Watson v McEwan [1905] AC 480 at 487, the public
policy which renders the protection of witnesses necessary for the administration of justice
must as a necessary consequence extend to the preliminary examination of witnesses to
find out what they can prove. In Evans v London Hospital Medical College (University of
London) [1981] 1 WLR 184 it was held that the immunity was available to potential
witnesses in criminal proceedings at a time when such proceedings were merely in
contemplation but had not yet commenced. The same view was taken in the case of an
expert’s report prepared in the knowledge that, if there was evidence to bring proceedings
for child abuse, proceedings would be brought and the report would form part of the
evidence in those proceedings: X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633,
per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 755G. In Taylor v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [1999] 2
AC 177 it was held that the immunity extended also to statements made out of court
which could fairly be said to be part of the process of investigating a crime or a possible
crime with a view to prosecution. In the course of my speech at 218G I referred in this
connection to investigators and the prosecuting officials with whom they are required to
communicate. The protection of the immunity is available even if the trial does not take
place: Stanton v Callaghan [2000] 1 QB 75.
He affirmed the proposition that: ‘The purpose of the immunity rule is to protect the
witness in respect of statements made or things done when giving or preparing to give
evidence.’ The corollary was that acts of the witness in collecting material on which he or
she may later be called to give evidence are not protected by the immunity: ‘The
immunity extends only to the content of the evidence which the witness gives or is
preparing to give based on that material.’ He applied the analysis of Sir Richard Scott VC in
Bennett v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1997) 10 Admin LR 245 at 252D–E that the
immunity extends to statements made or agreed to be made out of court ‘if these were
clearly and directly made in relation to the proceedings in court, for example, witnesses’
proofs of evidence’.
In Looney v Bank of Ireland [1996] 1 IR 157, O’Flaherty J observed:
However, there is at issue a far more fundamental point which is the need to give
witnesses (and also indeed, the judge) in court, a privilege in respect of oral testimony and
also with regard to affidavits and documents produced in the course of a hearing. Such
persons, either witnesses or those swearing affidavits, are given an immunity from suit.
Otherwise, no judge could go out on the Bench and feel that he or she could render a
judgment or say anything without risk of suit. Similarly, witnesses would be inhibited in
the way they could give evidence. The price that has to be paid is that civil actions cannot
be brought against witnesses even in a very blatant case … but even in a case of perjury –
which would be such a case – the law says that an action cannot lie.
(See, too, O’Keefe v Kilcullen [2001] IESC 84.)

After an extensive consideration of the issues, Reid J in Karling v Purdue [2004] Scots SC
221 at [65] summarised the law as follows:
1. When a witness comes to court to give evidence he has the benefit of an absolute
immunity in respect of the evidence which he gives in the witness box in a court
of justice. He is immune from any civil action that may be brought against him on
the ground that the things said or done by them in the ordinary course of the
proceedings were said or done (i) falsely and maliciously without reasonable and
probable cause, or (ii) negligently (Watson at 110; Burns at 252G; McKie at [15];
Darker per Lord Hope of Craighead at 445H–446B); the privilege does not extend
to statements made by a person who, in relation to criminal proceedings is an
informer or instigator of the inquiry process if that person acts with malice and
562 [8.0.80]
without probable cause – malicious prosecution (Burns at 253C–D; McKie at

[18]–[23]; Taylor per Lord Hope of Craighead at 291).
2. The underlying rationale of the immunity is that witnesses should speak freely
(Hall per Lord Hoffman at 697C, G–H), and the desirability of avoiding repeated
litigation on the same issue (Darker per Lord Clyde at 461B and 461D); without
the rule witnesses would be reluctant to assist the court (Hall per Lord Hoffman
at 698C); originally it was to protect a witness who had given evidence in good
faith from being harassed and vexed by an action of defamation based on what
he said in court (Darker per Lord Hutton at 464C–D; 469E).
3. The immunity would be worthless if confined to the actual giving of evidence in
court (Darker per Lord Clyde at 458D). Accordingly, the immunity covers a
statement of the evidence which the witness might give if called to give evidence.
The immunity thus applies to a potential or prospective witness (Burns at 252G–I)
who may not, in the event, be called to give evidence (Darker per Lord Clyde at
458E); and where proceedings are merely in contemplation but have not yet
commenced (Darker per Lord Hope at 447E).
4. Moreover, immunity applies to the early stages of litigation where evidence is
being collected with a view to court proceedings (Darker per Lord Clyde at 458G;
Lord Hope at 448B). In particular, the immunity applies to the compilation of
expert and technical reports in the course of an investigation with a view to
giving evidence (Darker at 448B; McKie at [15]). Whether evidence is provided
with a view to court proceedings is a question of fact (at 458G).
5. Negligent conduct, such as examination or removal of organs in a post-mortem
examination, for the purposes of making a report with a view to giving evidence
will be protected on the ground that the conduct forms part of the preparation by
a potential witness (Evans at 190; Darker per Lord Hutton at 471G–472B). This is
because the conduct relates directly to what requires to be done to enable the
witness to give evidence; and is part of the normal function of an expert witness
or potential expert witness (Darker at 448C per Lord Hope).
6. Absolute immunity exists where the statement or conduct is such that it can fairly
be said to be part of the process of investigating a crime or possible crime with a
view to a prosecution or a possible prosecution in respect of the matter being
investigated (Evans at 192; Taylor per Lord Hoffmann at 214–215 Lord Hoffman at
221; Darker per Lord Hope at 448B, Lord Mackay of Clashfern at 450D,
Lord Clyde at 458G).
7. Where investigations have an immediate link with possible proceedings
immunity applies (X Minors v Bedfordshire County Council [1995] 2 AC 633 at 755
per Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
8. When an expert is engaged in the context of an existing litigation or a prospective
litigation, he may perform a dual role. The first is advisory and the second is in
his capacity as expert witness with all the responsibilities to the court as which
that entails (see Davie v Magistrates of Edinburgh [1953] SC 34 at 40 and 42;
National Justice Compania SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (1993) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68
at 81–82; Stanton at 108). In one sense, all communications by an expert to his
client constitute advice in one shape or form. He may advise him of his factual
findings following on investigation; he may advise him of his conclusions based
on those findings and/or other established or assumed facts. He may suggest a
particular strategy or tactic. Part or all of this may be included in a report to be
lodged as a production to which he may in due course speak. All of the foregoing
may be intimately or closely connected with proceedings, actual, contemplated or
possible. The difficulty of identifying whether the work of an expert or part of it
falls within or without the protective circle of immunity is greater in the context
of civil proceedings than criminal proceedings. The period between engagement
and the giving of evidence or the settlement of the case may be several years.
Initial engagement may occur where litigation is not in contemplation. In
criminal proceedings a defence expert is unlikely (although it is possible) to be
engaged before criminal proceedings are ‘on-going’.
[8.0.80] 563
9. As with advocates prior to Hall, the acts of an expert which are ‘intimately
connected’ with the conduct of the litigation and those which are not is a
distinction which is very difficult to apply with any degree of consistency (Hall
per Lord Hoffman at 707E, Lord Hope at 724F–G; Lord Hutton at 728H–729H)
and may not truly represent the touchstone of immunity.
Rationales for the witness immunity rule

[8.0.120] The underlying rationale for the immunity from civil suit has traditionally been
to promote two objectives:
• ensuring that witnesses give evidence ‘freely and fearlessly’ (D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria
Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; [2005] HCA 12 at [37]–[42]; Commonwealth v Griffiths [2007]
NSWCA 370 at [43]; Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462; [2006] EWCA Civ
1390 at [14]; Darker v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2001] 1 AC 435 at 456;
Evans v London Hospital Medical College (University of London) [1981] 1 WLR 184 at 191;
Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 234 at 237; Watson v McEwan [1905] AC 480; Watson v
Jones [1905] AC 480; Taylor v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [1999] 2 AC 177; Briscoe v
LaHue 460 US 325 (1983); Seaman v Netherclift (1876) 2 CPD 53 at 62; Goffin v Donnelly
(1881) LR 6 QBD 307 at 308; Samuel Manu-Tech Inc v Redipac Recycling Corp (1999) 38
CPC (4th) 297 (Ont CA); Reynolds v Kingston (Police Services Board) [2007] ONCA 166; Re
Haughey [1971] IR 217; O’Keefe v Kilcullen [2001] IESC 84), ‘in an atmosphere free from
threats of suit from disappointed clients’ (Stanton v Callaghan [2000] QB 75 at 108F),
with the corollary that ‘persons who may be witnesses in other cases in the future will
not be deterred from giving evidence for fear of being sued for what they say in court’;
and
• ‘to avoid multiplicity of actions in which the value or truth of their evidence would be
tried over again’ (‘ut sit finis litium’: Roy v Prior [1971] AC 470 at 480; Meadow v General
Medical Council [2007] QB 462; [2006] EWCA Civ 1390 at [14]; Mitchell v Forsyth 472 US
511 (1985); Commonwealth v Griffiths [2007] NSWCA 370 at [43]; Sovereign Motor Inns v
Howarth Asia Pacific [2003] NSW SC 1120 at [34]). Devlin LJ in Lincoln v Daniels [1962] 1
QB 237 at 263 held that the witness immunity rule should extend ‘only so far as is
strictly necessary … in order to protect those who are to participate in the proceedings
from a flank attack’. It has been observed that ‘the trial process contains in itself, in the
subjection to cross-examination and confrontation with other evidence, some safeguard
against careless, malicious and untruthful evidence’: Roy v Prior [1971] AC 470 at 480.
Auld LJ pointed out in Docker v West Midlands Police [1998] EWCA Civ 522 at [10]:
The whole point of the first public policy reason for the immunity is to encourage honest
and well-meaning persons to assist justice even if dishonest and malicious persons may on
occasion benefit from the immunity.
As Lord Hoffmann put it in Taylor v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [1999] 2 AC 177 at
208E, the absolute immunity rule:
is designed to encourage freedom of speech and communication in judicial proceedings by
relieving persons who take part in the judicial process from the fear of being sued for
something they say.
In Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 234 at 237, which was subsequently upheld by the Court
of Appeal in Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 528, Salmon J stated that:
The administration of justice would be greatly impeded if witnesses were to be in fear that
any disgruntled or possibly impecunious persons against whom they gave evidence might
subsequently involve them in costly litigation.
He observed that there is good reason to prevent disgruntled, convicted prisoners from
seeking to have their cases retried (see also Carnahan v Coates (1990) 71 DLR (4th) 464).
In Munster v Lamb (1883) LR 11 QBD 588 at 607, Fry LJ described the purpose of the
rule as ‘to protect persons acting bona fide, who under a different rule would be liable, not
564 [8.0.120]
perhaps to verdicts and judgments against them, but to the vexation of defending actions’.
In Docker v West Midlands Police [1998] EWCA Civ 522, Auld LJ summarised his view in
the Court of Appeal in a passage approved by Lord Hope in Darker v Chief Constable of the
West Midlands Police [2001] 1 AC 435 (at 447B):
The whole point of the first public policy reason for the immunity is to encourage honest
and well-meaning persons to assist justice even if dishonest and malicious persons may on
occasion benefit from the immunity.
Finally, in Stanton v Callaghan [2000] QB 75 at 107A, it was held that the immunity:
is not granted primarily for the benefit of the individuals who seek it. They themselves are
beneficiaries of the overarching public interest, which can be expressed as the need to
ensure that the administration of justice is not impeded. This is the consideration which
should be paramount.
Limitations to the immunity rule

[8.0.160] ‘Witness immunity’ has often been described as ‘absolute’. However, questions
have arisen in a variety of contexts about where its parameters lie and whether it should
be modified (see below in relation to the United States) or even extended. The general
principle was articulated in Rees v Sinclair [1974] 1 NZLR 180 at 187, where McCarthy P
observed: ‘The protection should not be given any wider application than is absolutely
necessary in the interests of the administration of justice.’ Devlin LJ in Lincoln v Daniels
[1962] 1 QB 237 at 263 made a similar point, holding that the witness immunity rule
should extend only so far as is strictly necessary to achieve its policy objectives, including
protecting witnesses from collateral, retributory actions.
The idea of a universal immunity attaching to a person in the performance of a
particular function in relation to the courts should be entertained with some caution. As
Lord Wilberforce observed in Roy v Prior [1971] AC 470 at 480: ‘Immunities conferred by
the law in respect of legal proceedings need always to be checked against a broad view of
the public interest.’
It is important to recognise that the principle of witness immunity is itself an exception
to the operation of a fundamental feature of the legal system that breach of the law should
be remediable through the courts: see Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462;
[2006] EWCA Civ 1390 at [108]. Illustrative of this tension is the decision of the Court of
Appeal in Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462; [2006] EWCA Civ 1390, where
consideration was given to whether ‘witness immunity’ should be extended to provide
protection against regulatory proceedings taken against health care practitioners (see
generally Ch 8.05). The Court of Appeal decided unanimously that there should not be
such an extension. Auld LJ observed that the reasons for the principle of witness
immunity were ones of conflicting public policy, incorporating the fact that there should
be remedies for forensic misconduct but also that witnesses should not be deterred from
the utmost candour in discharge of their forensic functions. He concluded (at [110]–[112])
that:
[T]he exception should extend no further than necessary to ensure that justice may be
sought and administered without constraint in the courts. To that end, the immunity
should apply and extend only insofar as it is necessary to achieve that purpose. Hence the
few, but well-established, exceptions to the immunity of suits for malicious prosecution,
prosecutions for perjury and proceedings for contempt of court, a common feature of
which, if well-based, is to prevent abuse of the process of the courts for unlawful ends. …
The fact that a witness – expert or otherwise – may be deterred from making himself
available to give evidence in civil, criminal or other judicial proceedings for fear of
disciplinary proceedings by his professional body arising out of serious professional
misconduct by him in the witness box is no basis for extending the immunity to such
proceedings.
[8.0.160] 565
The position in respect of the immunity available for statements or reports made in the
course of a criminal investigation was considered in Taylor v Director of the Serious Fraud
Office [1999] 2 AC 177, where the court was concerned with whether absolute immunity
was available in respect of court statements, which could fairly be said to be part of the
procedure of investigating a crime or a possible crime with a view to prosecution. In the
course of the speeches, it was made clear that the absolute immunity available in such
cases was subject to the exception that it would not cover actions based on malicious
prosecution. Lord Hoffmann stated (at 215):
As the policy of the immunity is to encourage freedom of expression, it is limited to
actions in which the alleged statement constitutes the cause of action. In Marrinan v Vibart
[1963] 1 QB 528 the Court of Appeal held that the immunity in respect of statements made
in court or with a view to a prosecution, could not be circumvented by alleging that it
formed part of a conspiracy with other witnesses to give false evidence. That seems to me
to be right. On the other hand, the immunity does not apply to actions of malicious
prosecution where the cause of action consists in abusing legal process by maliciously and
without reasonable cause setting the law in motion against the plaintiff …
Actions for defamation and for conspiracy to give false evidence plainly fall within the
policy of the immunity and actions for the malicious prosecution fall outside it.
Lord Hope of Craighead said (at 291):

Just as proceedings for perjury are available to deal with a witness who would otherwise
be protected against statements made in the witness box, so also the public interest
requires that a remedy for malicious prosecution should remain available against those
who would be entitled to the benefit of the absolute privilege but who have acted
maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause during the investigation process.
That is quite a separate matter as it is the malicious abuse of process, not the making of a
statement, which provides the cause of action. The public policy argument for extending
the absolute privilege, consistently with established principles, seems to me to be
unanswerable.
The matter was further examined in Darker v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police
[2001] 1 AC 435, where, following a police undercover operation involving an informer,
four of five plaintiffs were indicted on charges of conspiracy to import cannabis resin and
a further conspiracy to forge travellers’ cheques. In the course of the trial, it was ruled that
the police had been significantly at fault in respect of matters of disclosure and the charges
against the plaintiffs were dismissed on the ground of abuse of process. The plaintiffs then
brought an action against the police for damages for conspiracy to injure and misfeasance
in public office claiming, among other things, that the police officers had fabricated the
evidence against them. Although at first instance and in the Court of Appeal it was
decided that the acts of alleged fabrication of evidence were covered by absolute privilege
or immunity, it was held in the House of Lords that public policy requires in principle that
those who have suffered a wrong should have a right to a remedy; and that, although the
absolute immunity from suit given in the interests of the administration of justice to a
party or witness, including a police witness, in respect of what he said or did in court
extended to statements made for the purpose of court proceedings, public policy did not
require this protection to be extended to things done by the police during the investigative
process which could not fairly be said to form part of their participation in the judicial
process as witnesses; that, in particular, the immunity did not extend to cover the
fabrication of false evidence; and that, accordingly, the plaintiff’s statement of claim
should not have been struck out and the action should be allowed to proceed to trial.
Lord Hope of Craighead, in considering the conflict that might exist between the
absolute immunity enjoyed by the police and the principle that a wrong ought not to be
without a remedy, held (at 448):
But there is a crucial difference between statements made by police officers prior to giving
evidence and things said or done in the ordinary course of preparing reports for use in
566 [8.0.160]
evidence, where the functions that they are performing can be said to be those of
witnesses or potential witnesses as they are related directly to what requires to be done to
enable them to give evidence, and their conduct at earlier stages in the case when they are
performing their functions as enforcers of the law or as investigators. The actions which
the police take as law enforcers or as investigators may, of course, become the subject of
evidence. It may then be necessary for the police officers concerned to assume the
functions of witnesses at the trial to describe what they did or what they heard or what
they saw. But there is no good reason on grounds of public policy to extend the immunity
which attaches to things said or done by them when they are describing these matters to
things done by them which cannot fairly be said to form part of their participation in the
judicial process as witnesses. The purpose of the immunity is to protect witnesses against
claims made against them for something said or done in the course of giving or preparing
to give evidence. It is not to be used to shield the police from action for things done while
they are acting as law enforcers or investigators. The rule of law requires that the police
must act within the law when they are enforcing the law or are investigating allegations of
criminal conduct.
Lord Hope explained the underlying reasons for his conclusions (at 499):
This distinction rests upon the fact that acts which are calculated to create or procure false
evidence or to destroy evidence have an independent existence from, and are extraneous
to, the evidence that may be given as to the consequences of those acts. It is unlikely that
those who have fabricated or destroyed evidence would wish to enter the witness box for
the purpose of admitting to their acts of fabrication or destruction. Their acts were done
with a view to the giving of evidence not about the acts themselves but about their
consequences. The position is different where the allegation related to the content of the
evidence or the content of statements made with a view to giving evidence, and not to the
doing of an act such as the creation of the fabrication of evidence.
In agreeing with Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Clyde said (at 459):
It is then not enough that there be an investigation; investigation must also be with a view
to an action or to a prosecution which is already under consideration. Before that stage is
reached it would be very difficult to justify the grant of an immunity. Even after that stage,
if proceedings are commenced, it does not necessarily follow that all that is said or done in
connection with the proceedings will be immune.
Further, Lord Hutton said (at 469):

The underlying rationale of the immunity given to a witness is to ensure that persons who
may be witnesses in other cases in the future will not be deterred from giving evidence by
fear of being sued for what they say in court. This immunity has been extended, as I have
described, to proofs of evidence and to prevent witnesses being sued for conspiracy to
give false evidence. But the immunity in essence relates to the giving of evidence. There is,
in my opinion, a distinction in principle between what a witness says in court (or what
proof of evidence a prospective witness states he will say in court) and the fabrication of
evidence such as the forging of a suspect’s signature to a confession or a police officer
writing down in his notebook words which a suspect did not say, or a police officer
planting a brick or drugs on a suspect. In practice, the distinction may appear to be a fine
one, as, for example, between the police officer who does not claim to have made a note,
but falsely says in the witness box that the suspect made a verbal confession to him (for
which statement the police officer has immunity), and a police officer who, to support the
evidence he will give in court, fabricates a note containing an admission which the suspect
never made. But I consider that this distinction is a real one and that the first example
comes within the proper ambit of immunity and the other does not.
In Looney v Bank of Ireland [1996] 1 IR 157, O’Flaherty J contemplated the boundaries of

witness immunity, stating:
I would concur with setting that boundary to the immunity. If someone for a malicious
purpose, or in order to abuse what he might have thought was a situation of immunity
that he enjoyed in court simply used that situation to make defamatory or malicious
statements against others, in a manner that had nothing to do with the particular
[8.0.160] 567
proceedings in which he was engaged, then it might well be that he would have no
answer in an action for defamation or malicious falsehood, or whatever.
In O’Keefe v Kilcullen [2001] IESC 84 at [16], Murphy J put it as follows:

if a witness … so departed from the duties which he or she was purporting to perform as
to abuse his position that he would forfeit the immunity which he was abusing.
In general, experts are liable to their clients for advice given in breach of their contractual
duty of care, and it was held in Palmer v Durnford Ford [1992] QB 483 at 488 by Tuckey QC,
sitting as a Deputy High Court judge, that the immunity extended to them for protection
from negligence actions was based on public policy grounds and so should only be
‘conferred where it is absolutely necessary to do so’. He further held (at 488):
[P]rima facie the immunity should only be given where to deny it would mean that expert
witnesses would be inhibited from giving truthful and fair evidence in court. Generally I
do not think that liability for failure to give careful advice to his client should inhibit an
expert from giving truthful and fair evidence in court. … I can see no good reason why an
expert should not be liable for the advice which he gives to his client as to the merits of
the claim, particularly if proceedings have not been started, and a fortiori as to whether he
is qualified to advise at all.
He regarded the expert’s immunity as being comparable to that of the advocate (at 488):
Thus, the immunity would only extend to what could fairly be said to be preliminary to
his giving evidence in court judged perhaps by the principal purpose for which the work
was done. So the production or approval of a report for the purposes of disclosure to the
other side would be immune but work done for the principal purpose of advising the
client would not.
Preparatory work
[8.0.200] In England, the immunity protecting witnesses within the courtroom has also
been held to apply to the preparation of the evidence to be given in court. Thus, in
Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 528 at 535, where the plaintiff sought to sue police officers
who had prepared a report for the Director of Public Prosecutions and who had appeared
against him at his trial on criminal charges, the court held that the immunity ‘protects
witnesses in their evidence before the court and in the preparation of the evidence which
is to be so given’.
Similarly, in Evans v London Hospital Medical College (University of London) [1981] 1 WLR
184, the plaintiff sued doctors and their employer for negligently investigating the
circumstances in which her baby had died and which had resulted in her being prosecuted
for murder. Drake J held that immunity from suit extended to cover the collection and
analysis of material relevant to the offence or possible offence under investigation and was
not confined to the preparation of the witnesses’ formal statement or proof of evidence (at
191–192):
I think it essential that the immunity given to a witness should also extend to cover
statements he makes prior to the issue of a writ or commencement of a prosecution,
provided that the statement is made for the purpose of a possible action or prosecution
and at a time when a possible action or prosecution is being considered. In a large number
of criminal cases the police have collected statements from witnesses before anyone is
charged with an offence; indeed, sometimes before it is known whether or not any offence
has been committed. If immunity did not extend to such statements it would mean that
the immunity attaching to the giving of evidence in court or the formal statements made
in preparation for the court hearing could easily be outflanked and rendered of little use.
For the same reason I think that immunity must extend also to the acts of the witness in
collecting or considering material on which he may later be called to give evidence. If it
does not so extend then a convicted person could, eg sue the police officers for the
allegedly negligent manner in which they had investigated the crime, by complaining that
568 [8.0.200]
they had wrongly assessed the evidential value of certain matters or had failed to
interview possible witnesses whose evidence was thought by the accused to be favourable
to him.
In each case, it will be a question of fact whether or not the negligent act or omission arose
during the course of preparation of the evidence: Evans v London Hospital Medical College
(University of London) [1981] 1 WLR 184 at 190; Landall v Dennis Faulkner [1994] 5 Med LR
268; M (A Minor) v Newham London Borough Council [1995] 2 AC 633 at 661.
Clarke MR in Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462; [2006] EWCA Civ 1390
summarised the coverage of the immunity rule as extending to:
• the preliminary examination of witnesses: Watson v McEwan; Watson v Jones [1905] AC
480;
• evidence from potential witnesses in criminal proceedings at a time when proceedings
are in contemplation but have not yet been commenced: Evans v London Hospital Medical
College (University of London) [1981] 1 WLR 184;
• an expert’s report prepared in circumstances where, if there were to be proceedings for
child abuse, the report would be relied upon: X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council
[1995] 2 AC 633 at 755G per Lord Browne-Wilkinson; and
• statements made out of court that could fairly be said to be part of the process of
investigating crime with a view to prosecution: Taylor v Director of the Serious Fraud
Office [1999] 2 AC 177.
Traditional English authority
Palmer v Durnford Ford

[8.0.210] The English case of Palmer v Durnford Ford [1992] QB 483 is one of two leading
United Kingdom authorities on the issue. The plaintiffs were haulage contractors who
bought a new tractor that subsequently broke down and had to have its engine repaired
on two occasions. They sought legal advice as to whether they could sue the vendors and
the repairers. The plaintiffs’ solicitors retained an engineer to prepare a report on the
breakdown of the engine. He advised that claims against both potential defendants were
justified and, based on this report and counsel’s advice, legal action was instigated.
As the expert was to be called to give evidence, his report was disclosed to both
defendants, who in turn disclosed their expert reports. Having seen them, the expert
reconsidered his position and advised that he now would have difficulty supporting the
claim against the vendor but that the claim against the repairer was justified. After the first
plaintiff and the expert had given evidence, the plaintiffs abandoned their claims and, by
consent, judgment was given for the defendants with costs.
The plaintiffs then sued the expert and their solicitors for breach of their contractual
duty of care. They maintained that the solicitors should not have instructed the expert and
that the expert should not have accepted the retainer because he lacked the necessary
qualifications and experience. They argued that the expert should have advised from the
outset that no claim against the vendor was justified and that he persisted in an obviously
wrong view that the repairer had unnecessarily replaced parts. In this way it was
contended that the expert had so damaged his credibility before trial that the partly
meritorious claim against the repairer had to be abandoned, as well as the claim against
the vendor.
Tuckey QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court judge, overturned a previous decision to
strike out the plaintiffs’ claim in respect of the expert’s expertise and the alleged
negligence in the expert’s report. The question ultimately to be decided in such cases is
whether the expert’s work can properly be described as principally in the nature of advice
or as the preliminary to giving evidence in court. The decision in Palmer v Durnford Ford
[1992] QB 483 makes clear that work done by forensic experts which is not intimately
[8.0.210] 569
connected with litigation may be the subject of negligence actions in the same way that
barristers and solicitors are now recognised as liable for out-of-court legal advice.
Stanton v Callaghan
[8.0.220] The English Court of Appeal decision in Stanton v Callaghan [2000] QB 75 at 92
constitutes the most substantial analysis of the issues: see McSweeny (2002). The question
to be determined by the court was whether claims for negligence and breach of retainer
can be brought by a party to pending proceedings against an expert whose evidence the
party proposes to call in those proceedings where the claims are said to arise out of the
expert’s conduct in preparing, in conjunction with the expert instructed by the other party
to those proceedings, a joint statement indicating what parts of the evidence which
respectively they were proposing to give at trial were or were not in issue.
The plaintiffs owned a dwelling house which they suspected had suffered subsidence
damage. The defendant was engaged to make a report. The defendant advised that the
partial underpinning that had been carried out was an inappropriate solution and that
what needed to be done was total underpinning of the building. On the basis of the report,
the plaintiffs made a claim against their insurers for total underpinning. The insurers
rejected the claim and the plaintiffs commenced proceedings against the insurers, with the
defendant retained to provide expert evidence in relation to the claim. The District
Registrar gave directions, including that expert evidence be agreed if possible. The
defendant provided a draft report and he and an expert commissioned by the insurers
signed a joint statement that the partial underpinning had entailed a considerable risk of
future damage and that such damage had to some extent ensued. They also stated that a
specific solution existed to address the problem. This fell well short of the total
underpinning previously contemplated by the defendant. He amended his draft report
accordingly. The plaintiff accordingly accepted moneys paid into court by the insurers but
used the proceeds to sue the expert, alleging that the alternative solution proposed by the
defendant in his amended draft report and in the co-signed expert statement was not
feasible and therefore was negligent and that the defendant ought to have notified the
plaintiff before co-signing the statement which departed from his previous views. The
defendant sought to have the action struck out on the basis that it disclosed no cause of
action and was frivolous and vexatious, each assertion being grounded in claims of
witness immunity.
Chadwick LJ examined the authorities and held that if the objects of witness immunity
are to be achieved, it is essential that the immunity be given to statements made by a
witness prior to the issue of a writ or commencement of a prosecution provided that the
statement is made for the purposes of a possible action or prosecution and at a time when
a possible action or prosecution is being considered: see, too, X (Minors) v Bedfordshire
County Council [1995] 2 AC 633.
He observed that what had not been decided by any binding authority was whether an
expert is immune from suit by the party who has retained her or him in respect of the
contents of a report which she or he prepares for the purpose of exchange prior to trial,
such as to comply with directions to meet with other experts and provide an indication of
where the experts agree and disagree – in circumstances where the witness does not, in
the event, give evidence at the trial, either because the trial does not take place or because
she or he is not called as a witness. He held that if there is to be immunity in such
circumstances, it must be founded on some identifiable ground of public policy and,
further, that it must be recognised that the report prepared for the purposes of exchange
prior to trial is likely to contain, or reflect, the initial advice as to the merits of the claim –
advice which, as Sir Thomas Bingham MR pointed out in M (A Minor) v Newham London
Borough Council [1995] 2 AC 633 at 661, did not itself attract immunity. He concluded that
the only ground of public policy that could be relied upon as a foundation for immunity
in respect of the contents of an expert’s report, in circumstances where no trial takes place
570 [8.0.220]
and the expert does not give evidence, is that identified by Morris LJ in Rondel v Worsley
[1969] 1 AC 191 at 251 and referred to by Diplock LJ in Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell & Co
[1980] AC 198 at 222: namely, that it has always been the policy of the law to ensure that
trials are conducted without avoidable strains and tensions of alarm and fear.
Chadwick LJ stated that he was not (emphasis in original):
persuaded that experts who, as part of their professional practice and for reward, offer
their services as potential witnesses on matters within their expertise are prone to ‘strains
and tensions of alarm and fear’ at the stage at which they are preparing reports for exchange.
I would not, myself, subscribe to the view that experts’ reports would be any more or less
helpfully drawn than they now are if the authors were or were not immune from suit by
those who retain them in respect of the contents of those reports. But there does come a
point at which the expert begins to take part in the management and conduct of the trial in
advance of proceedings in court.
He held that the public interest in facilitating full and frank discussion between experts
before trial requires that each expert should be free to make proper concessions without
fear that any departure from advice previously given to the party who has retained her or
him will be seen as evidence of negligence:
That, as it seems to me, is an area in which public policy justifies immunity. The immunity
is needed in order to avoid the tension between a desire to assist the court and fear of the
consequences of a departure from previous advice.
This led him to conclude that the defendant should be regarded as immune from suit.
Otton and Nourse LJJ agreed, Otton LJ concluding that the expert’s duty to the court must
override the fear of suit arising from a departure from a previously held position: ‘The
expert must be able to resile fearlessly and with dignity.’ (See also Darker v Chief Constable
of the West Midlands Police [2001] 1 AC 435 and note, in Australia, Sovereign Motor Inns Pty
Ltd v Howarth Asia Pacific Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1120.)
It appears therefore that a significant concomitant of new court procedures mandating
experts to meet and produce joint statements where possible will be that immunity will
extend to such activities and the products of them.
Reforming English authority
Jones v Kaney
[8.0.230] In 2011, the important United Kingdom Supreme Court decision of Jones v Kaney
[2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] UKSC 13 rendered experts liable in negligence in certain
circumstances to the party that commissioned them (see Hughes (2011); Freckelton (2012);
Mendelson (2012)). In Australia, the decision is unlikely to be followed in the short to
medium term, although, in New Zealand, the decision may well prove highly persuasive
because in both the United Kingdom and New Zealand the immunity of barristers has
been statutorily abolished.
A road traffic accident occurred in Liverpool in 2001. Jones was stationary on his
motorcycle, waiting to turn at a road junction. He was knocked down by a car driven by a
man who was intoxicated, uninsured and driving while disqualified. Jones claimed to
have suffered significant physical injuries, but also mental harm in the form of
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, an adjustment disorder, and associated
illness behaviour which manifested itself in chronic pain syndrome.
Mr Jones instructed solicitors to act for him in personal injury proceedings against the
driver of the motor vehicle and his insurer. His solicitors consulted an orthopaedic
surgeon who recommended that an opinion should be obtained from a clinical
psychologist. The solicitors commissioned the psychologist, Ms Kaney, to examine
Mr Jones and to prepare a report for the purposes of litigation. She did so and expressed
the view, amongst other things, that the appellant was at that time suffering from PTSD.
[8.0.230] 571
Mr Jones then issued proceedings against the driver and his insurer. Liability was
promptly admitted, leaving the quantum of damages as the only issue in dispute.
The passage of time required a further examination of Mr Jones by Ms Kaney and a
second report. On this occasion (about 18 months after the first report), she expressed the
view that by this time Mr Jones did not have all the symptoms to warrant a diagnosis of
PTSD, but was still suffering from depression and some of the symptoms of PTSD.
Those representing the driver and his insurer commissioned a psychiatrist, Dr El-
Assra, also to examine Mr Jones and to provide a report. Dr El-Assra expressed the view
that Mr Jones was exaggerating his physical symptoms.
In light of the manifest differences between the experts’ views, the trial judge ordered
the two experts to hold discussions and to prepare a joint statement. The discussion took
place on the telephone. Dr El-Assra prepared a draft joint statement, which Ms Kaney
signed without amendment or comment. This was somewhat surprising in that the
statement recorded agreement that Mr Jones’ psychological reaction to the accident was no
more than an adjustment reaction that did not reach the level of a depressive disorder or
PTSD. It further stated that Ms Kaney had found Mr Jones to be deceptive and deceitful in
his reporting, and that both experts agreed that Mr Jones’ behaviour was suggestive of
‘conscious mechanisms’ that raised doubts as to whether his subjective reporting was
genuine.
When Mr Jones’ solicitors confronted Ms Kaney with the discrepancy between the joint
report that she had signed and her earlier assessments, Ms Kaney stated that:
• she had not seen the reports of the opposing expert at the time of the telephone
conference;
• the joint statement, as drafted by Dr El-Assra, did not reflect what she had agreed in the
telephone conversation, but she had felt under some pressure in agreeing to it;
• Ms Kaney’s true view was that Mr Jones had been evasive rather than deceptive;
• it was her view that Mr Jones did suffer PTSD which had resolved; and
• she was happy for the joint statement to be amended accordingly.
Dissatisfied with the performance of Ms Kaney, those representing Mr Jones sought

permission to change their expert but were not permitted by the trial judge to do so. In
light of that situation, the action by Mr Jones was then settled for what he asserted was
significantly less than the sum of damages that he would have obtained had not Ms Kaney
signed the joint statement in the terms in which she did. Thereafter, Mr Jones sued
Ms Kaney for the difference between the two sums, alleging that she had been negligent in
the discharge of her forensic duties.
Mr Jones lost his action at first instance before Blake J (Jones v Kaney [2010] EWHC 610),
Ms Kaney contending that the principle of witness immunity precluded her from being
sued for the discharge of her forensic duties. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court
of the United Kingdom on the question of whether Ms Kaney’s act of preparing a joint
witness certificate was one in respect of which she, as an expert witness, enjoyed
immunity from an action in negligence. The action raised the fundamental question of the
contemporary ambit of the witness immunity rule in the United Kingdom. The Supreme
Court held that it was open for a party to sue their own witness in negligence for their
forensic work. The reasoning employed by the members of the Supreme Court is
important for analysing whether the decision is likely to be applied in due course outside
the United Kingdom, including in Australia and New Zealand, and whether it is likely to
prove the start of further encroachment on the rule in the United Kingdom itself.
The reasoning of the Supreme Court
[8.0.235] The decision of the Supreme Court was the subject of seven separate judgments.
Lord Phillips, Lord Brown, Lord Collins, Lord Kerr and Lord Dyson determined that the
572 [8.0.235]
action could be brought by Mr Jones against Ms Kaney, thereby reducing the ambit of the
protection afforded by the witness immunity rule. Lord Hope and Lady Hale dissented,
holding that so important an encroachment upon the common law should only be the
subject of a decision by Parliament.
The judgment of Lord Phillips
[8.0.240] Lord Phillips, the President of the Supreme Court, gave the court’s most
extensive judgment. He noted that while the witness immunity rule is longstanding, it
dated back to an era long before it became common for forensic experts to offer their
services under contracts for reward. He regarded the immunity as having its origin in a
reaction to an actual or perceived tendency on the part of disgruntled litigants in civil
proceedings or defendants in criminal proceedings to bring actions for libel or slander
against those who had given evidence against them (at [11]). He observed that in the
United Kingdom a similar protection was afforded to barristers, both in respect of
defamation actions (Medcalf v Mardell [2003] 1 AC 120 at 142) and, until it was successfully
challenged (in Hall v Simons [2002] 1 AC 615), in relation to failure to exercise reasonable
care and skill in the conduct of litigation on behalf of a client.
Lord Phillips noted the concerns expressed by Thorpe J in Meadow v General Medical
Council [2007] QB 462; [2006] EWCA Civ 1390 at [225]–[249] that, in relation to family
justice, the demand for experts exceeded supply and that this was a field which was very
sensitive to increasing or newly emerging disincentives. He regarded as the most pressing
policy consideration the risk that experts would be reluctant to undertake forensic work if
they were aware that their clients could sue them.
He observed (at [44]) that the previously existing immunity had been eroded by the
decision of the Court of Appeal in relation to Professor Meadow and also in relation to
‘wasted costs orders’ (see Phillips v Symes (No 2) [2005] 1 WLR 2043; [2004] EWHC 2330
(Ch)), but did not regard either of these facts as weakening the case for experts to continue
to be immune from civil actions: ‘The principal argument advanced for immunity from
civil suit is that the risk of being sued will deter the expert witness from giving full and
frank evidence in accordance with his duty to the court when this conflicts with the
interests of his client’ (at [44]).
Lord Phillips noted important similarities in the responsibilities of expert witnesses
and members of counsel, in particular, expert witnesses’ duty to help the court with
matters within their expertise and that this duty overrides any obligation owed to the
person from whom they receive their instructions or are paid. He observed (at [50]) that:
The expert witness has this in common with the advocate. Each undertakes a duty to
provide services to the client. In each case those services include a paramount duty to the
court and the public, which may require the advocate or the witness to act in a way which
does not advance the client’s case. The advocate must disclose to the court authorities that
are unfavourable to his client. The expert witness must give his evidence honestly, even if
this involves concessions that are contrary to his client’s interests. The expert witness has
far more in common with the advocate than he does with the witness of fact.
Since the immunity rule impacts upon the rights of parties to take action against a
tortfeasor and to call relevant evidence (see Darker v Chief Constable of the West Midlands
Police [2001] 1 AC 435 at 456–457 per Lord Clyde), Lord Phillips started his analysis by
asking whether the abolition of the rule would be attended by such disadvantage that its
retention was clearly justifiable in the public interest. He was not persuaded that
witnesses would be discouraged from providing their services if they became liable to be
sued. He asked the rhetorical question (at [54]): ‘Why should the risk of being sued in
relation to forensic services constitute a greater disincentive to the provision of such
services than does the risk of being sued in relation to any other form of professional
service?’ (at [54]).
[8.0.240] 573
The court was alerted to a survey carried out at the Bond Solon Annual Expert Witness
Conference in November 2010 (the 16th of such conferences), where 106 experts were
asked whether they would continue to act as expert witnesses if expert witness immunity
were substantially reduced. Ninety-two answered in the affirmative and 14 in the
negative. Lord Phillips did not attribute ‘much weight’ to the survey, but observed that it
did not suggest that immunity was essential to the supply of expert witnesses. He found
the argument that immunity is necessary to prevent a chilling effect on the supply of
expert witnesses not to be made out.
In terms of the proposition advanced on behalf of Ms Kaney that the absence of
immunity could result in expert witnesses not doing their duty to the court, Lord Phillips
observed that there was no empirical evidence. He accepted that there is a temptation for
a witness to give an initial opinion which is consonant with what a client wants to hear
and, if they are reticent in terms of integrity of discharge of their duty to the court, they
will not express a candid view at any stage to the court. Ironically, though, he found that
such unethical conduct would not result in their client suing them on the basis that the
client would be happy with their (biased) opinion. He commented (at [56]): ‘It is
paradoxical to postulate that in order to persuade an expert to perform the duty that he
had undertaken to his client it is necessary to give him immunity from liability for breach
of that duty.’
Lord Phillips had regard to the ‘position of barristers’, observing that the removal of
their immunity in the United Kingdom had not resulted in any diminution in advocates’
readiness to perform their duty. He found that it would be ‘quite wrong’ to perpetuate
expert witness immunity out of conjecture that without it they would be reluctant to
perform their duty to the court.
Lord Phillips found that the rational expert witness who has performed his or her duty
is unlikely to fear being sued by a rational client but accepted a genuine concern about
clients who are irrational (at [59]). However, he doubted whether fears in this regard were
realistic and noted that in the particular case before the court there was nothing vexatious
in the action being brought. He doubted the likelihood of a proliferation of vexatious
claims and noted that this phenomenon had not assailed barristers. It followed for him
that justification had not been established for retention of expert witness immunity other
than in respect of claims for defamation.
Other judgments of the majority
[8.0.245] Lord Brown agreed with Lord Phillips and was persuaded that the gains to be
derived from denying experts immunity for breach of their duty of reasonable care and
skill to their clients ‘substantially exceed whatever loss might be thought likely to result
from this’ (at [67]). He identified a likelihood from removal of such protection that there
would be a sharpened awareness in the forensic expert community of the risks of pitching
their initial views of the merits of a case too high or too inflexibly lest these views come to
expose and embarrass them later. He also highlighted an advantage in permitting parties
adversely affected by the negligence of an expert witness to have redress. He commented
that, in his view, litigation against experts by their own clients would be likely to be
‘highly exceptional’ and urged courts ‘to be alert to protect expert witnesses against
specious claims by disappointed litigants – not to mention to stamp vigorously upon any
sort of attempt to pressurize experts to adopt or alter opinions other than those genuinely
held’ (at [68]).
Lord Collins concurred in the outcome proposed by Lord Phillips but emphasised that
the appeal related only to the liability of the ‘friendly’ expert to their client. He observed
that ‘there are wider considerations of policy which ought to prevent adverse experts from
being the target of disappointed litigants, even if the scope of duty in tort were to be
extended in the future’ (at [73]). He noted too that the potential effects of disciplinary
sanctions ‘are more serious than the effects of civil proceedings by a dissatisfied client’
574 [8.0.245]
where usually the expert will be insured. He concluded that there were no longer ‘any
policy reasons for retaining immunity from suit for professional negligence by expert
witnesses’ (at [85]). He summarised his position by stating (at [85]) that:
• the danger of undesirable multiplicity of proceedings has been belied by the practical
experience of removal of the immunity from barristers;
• a conscientious expert would not be deterred by the danger of civil action by a
disappointed client; and
• the main effect of the removal of immunity would be to cause a greater degree of care
in preparation of the initial report or joint report.
Lord Kerr agreed with Lord Phillips. He stressed the fact that an expert witness owes a
duty to a client who retains him or her, breach of which should enable redress. He found
no evidence to support the assumption that experts would behave discreditably in
modifying their opinions if the immunity were removed (at [93]). He found that the
claimed chilling factors were unlikely to materialise and that the longevity of the
protection for experts was not an adequate justification for maintaining ‘an immunity
whose effect is to deny deserving claimants of an otherwise due remedy’ (at [94]).
Lord Dyson also concurred with Lord Phillips. He found the duty of the expert witness
to his or her client to be to perform the function as an expert with the reasonable skill and
care of an expert drawn from the relevant discipline: ‘This includes a duty to perform the
overriding duty of assisting the court. Thus the discharge of the duty to the court cannot
be a breach of duty to the client’ (at [99]). He found the analogy of the abolition of
barristers’ immunity to be significant in respect of the position with experts. He
considered the boundaries of the traditional immunity to be conceptually unclear and
thereby problematic. Otherwise, he noted that it was principally relevant to the early
phase of advice, a time relatively unlikely to generate the aggrievement which might lead
the dissatisfied to litigate vindictively. He expressed reservations about the claimed
antiquity of the immunity rule insofar as it applies to experts but, regardless, found that
contemporary circumstances no longer provided a ‘sufficient reason for blessing it with
eternal life’ (at [112]). He emphasised the nostrum that where there is a wrong there
should be a remedy and found that to deny a victim a remedy should only be done in
exceptional circumstances.
Similar to the other members of the plurality, he gave short shrift to the proposition
that the abolition would result in experts failing in their duties to the court (at [120]):
There is no reason to doubt that most experts are honest conscientious people who need
no other incentive to comply with their duty and the rules and ethics of their profession.
There may be a few experts (as there may be a few advocates) who behave dishonourably.
But that is no more compelling a reason for retaining the immunity for experts than it was
for retaining it for advocates.
Lord Dyson emphasised that the longstanding privilege enjoyed by other witnesses in
respect of litigation should be retained. He also commented that he could not identify any
reason for treating witnesses engaged in criminal and family litigation any differently
from those involved in civil litigation (at [124]).
The dissenting judgments of Lord Hope and Lady Hale
[8.0.250] Lord Hope (the Deputy President of the Supreme Court) and Lady Hale in
powerful dissents preferred to leave the witness immunity rule undisturbed by the courts
and to permit Parliament to decide on its legitimacy based upon a report from the Law
Commission (at [173], [190]). Lord Hope emphasised that the privilege ‘exists for the
protection of all witnesses, not just the few against whom successful action might
otherwise be brought for an award of damages’ (at [135]). He expressed doubts about
whether different considerations should apply to claims for breach of duty as against
claims for defamation: ‘If the claim is well founded, a wrong was done in either case
[8.0.250] 575
which ought to be remedied’ (at [160]). He was concerned about the longevity of the
immunity and not convinced that a sufficient analogy exists between the duties of
advocates and the those of expert witnesses. He observed that (at [165]):
it is one thing to be liable to a wasted costs order at the instance of the court itself or to
proceedings by a professional body for professional misconduct. It is quite another to be at
risk of worthless but possibly embarrassing and time-consuming proceedings by a
disgruntled and disaffected litigant in person. Insurance cover, if available, is not a
universal remedy.
Lord Hope did not attach major significance to the risk of experts being deterred from
giving evidence if their immunity was abolished but was concerned that there may be
some kinds of case and client where persons may be deterred from becoming involved: ‘If
that were to happen it would raise questions as to whether access to justice for the
disadvantaged was being inhibited’ (at [168]). Lord Hope and Lady Hale joined in
expressing concern about the parameters of the removal of immunity (at [169]–[170],
[182]–[185]), querying the situation with respect to criminal and family law proceedings,
as well as proceedings involving the protection of children. Lady Hale expressed
particular concern about the effect of abolition upon disappointed litigants’ ability to
blame expert witnesses for their lack of success in court.
Repercussions of the decision
[8.0.255] For the United Kingdom, the decision of the Supreme Court in Jones v Kaney
[2011] 2 AC 398; [2011] UKSC 13 allows parties to sue their own experts (‘friendly experts’)
if they are in default of their duties of care to the party paying them in their forensic work.
It does not allow actions against ‘adverse experts’ by the other party in litigation. It does
not impact at all upon the immunity rule’s preclusion of actions for defamation against
witnesses for what they say in court or in documentation prepared for court. It is unclear
whether the decision impacts upon other than civil proceedings and, if so, how.
The decision of the Supreme Court is controversial (see Mendelson (2012)). It was
significantly influenced by the policy approach that wrongs should have remedies, but it
has been pointed out (Mendelson (2012), p 253) that this does not always obtain. In
addition, the Rt Hon Professor Sir Robin Jacob, the former Chief Justice of the Court of
Appeal (2011, p 2) (see, too, Re X (Children) (Morgan and Others Intervening) [2012] 1 WLR
182 at [63]), has suggested that the decision ‘may make some Judges phrase adverse
comments on an out of order expert with a possible view to making it easier for the client
to sue’.
The decision in Jones v Kaney was taken in the absence of empirical information and
without reliable data about the likely impact of this judicially made law reform. The
analysis of policy considerations was done without the provision of hard data as to, for
instance, what had occurred in terms of litigation against barristers after their immunity
was removed in the United Kingdom. Similarly, while many assertions and assumptions
were made in the various judgments about how removal of the immunity would be
received in practice by the expert community, there was no solid information to support
the various positions at which the plurality, or the minority, arrived. What can be said
with confidence is that the changes brought about by Jones v Kaney will have significant
repercussions within the United Kingdom expert witness community (whether rightly or
wrongly). However, at this point, it is premature to forecast what they will be, save that
insurance premiums will rise to some degree and a small percentage of persons will now
have a form of remedy which previously had been denied to them.
A key aspect in the decision by the plurality was a factor which is shared in New
Zealand but not by Australia – the fact that in the United Kingdom immunity for
barristers was abolished in 2002. The rules protecting barristers and expert witnesses share
many (but not all) features in common. What can be said in respect of the United
Kingdom and also New Zealand is that the absence of immunity once again has not
576 [8.0.255]
resulted in a proliferation of successful (or unsuccessful) civil actions against members of

counsel. The likelihood is that the partial abolition of the witness immunity rule will not
generate significant levels of litigation against experts in the United Kingdom either.
However, analysis of litigation patterns over a sufficient period of time – say, five years –
will be necessary to evaluate this phenomenon in an evidence-based way. For Australia, it
is unlikely that the United Kingdom experiment will be emulated in the short or medium
term, as the High Court in D’Orta Ekanaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1; [2005]
HCA 12 reaffirmed its decision 17 years previously on barristers’ immunity in Giannarelli v
Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543 (see Gerber (2005)). Without reform of the immunity of
barristers, reform of the witness immunity rule, as it applies to expert witnesses, is
unlikely. In due course, it is highly likely that the continued protection of both barristers
and expert witnesses will prove socially and politically unacceptable, as well as difficult to
justify in terms of public policy.
Scottish authority
[8.0.260] In Scotland, witness immunity has been extended to matters prior to court. In
Watson v McEwan [1905] AC 480, it was held that the immunity generally available to a
witness in giving evidence extends to statements made ‘on precognition’ by that witness
with a view to giving evidence. In B v Burns 1994 SLT 250, this protection was extended to
apply to statements less formal than a precognition. In that case, the pursuer, who said
that she had been raped, brought an action for damages against the alleged offender and
five others, claiming that they had each given false information to the police. This
information, it was said, provided the accused with a false alibi, as a result of which the
alleged offender was not prosecuted and the complainer was arrested, strip searched and
prosecuted for wasting police time and rendering the alleged offender liable to suspicion
and arrest. The complainer was subsequently acquitted. One of the defenders in the
complainer’s action for damages sought dismissal, arguing that she had not volunteered
information to the police but only responded to their inquiries. Accordingly, it was
submitted, her statements were absolutely privileged because they had been made in the
course of a legal process; and, further, her statements could not be said to have caused the
complainer’s prosecution, which had proceeded from decisions reached by the prosecuting
authorities. It was held that, given the paramount objective of encouraging witnesses to
give their evidence freely in court, the rule conferring absolute privilege applied equally to
precognitions and to less formal statements given at the earlier stages of an investigation,
and that the statements made by the defender to the police in these circumstances
accordingly enjoyed complete protection. In giving the opinion of the court, Lord Caplan
held (at 252):
Given that the paramount objective in conferring privilege is to encourage witnesses to
give their evidence freely in court then it seems to us to matter little whether the
investigation of a person as a prospective witness is done by way of precognition or at
some earlier stage of the proceedings by way of a less formal interview. Particularly in
relation to criminal proceedings those charged with investigating cases must be able to
explore the testimony likely to be available and the privilege which on any view would be
available to the witness in the witness box will be of no benefit to the witness if he or she
knows that any information given to those concerned with preparing the case at some
earlier stage could expose the witness to the risk of civil action.
This led the court in McKie v Strathclyde Joint Police Board [2003] Scot CS 353 at [13] to hold:
It therefore appears to be plain from these authorities that the absolute immunity from
prosecution which has always attached to witnesses giving evidence in court is extended
not only to what is said in the course of precognition, but also to the making of less formal
statements of all kinds, at all times within the course of an investigation, made with a
[8.0.260] 577
view to criminal proceedings being taken, and that the reason for the provision of this
immunity lies in the administration and interests of justice.

[8.0.300] Appelbaum (2001, p 885) has asserted that United States forensic experts ‘can
count on absolute witness immunity to insulate them from liability to their examinees for
the reports they write or the testimony they provide, even if they are negligent in
performing these functions’. However, not all courts have upheld this proposition and it is
apparent that experts in the United States are under increasing scrutiny for their forensic
work: see Meyer (2006) (see too Turner (2006)).
The United States Supreme Court confirmed the importance of witness immunity twice
during the 1980s. In Briscoe v LaHue 460 US 325 (1983), a convicted man sued two police
officers who gave perjured evidence against him. The majority opinion held that there
were important policy considerations favouring an absolute immunity (at 332–333):
The immunity of parties and witnesses from subsequent damages liability for their
testimony in judicial proceedings was well established in English common law. Some
American decisions required a showing that the witness’ allegedly defamatory statements
were relevant to the judicial proceeding, but once this threshold showing had been made,
the witness had an absolute privilege. The plaintiff could not recover even if the witness
knew the statements were false and made them with malice.
In the words of one 19th-century Court, in damages suits against witnesses, ‘the claims
of the individual must yield to the dictates of public policy, which requires that the paths
which lead to the ascertainment of truth should be left as free and unobstructed as
possible.’ A witness’ apprehension of subsequent damages liability might induce two
forms of self-censorship. First, witnesses might be reluctant to come forward to testify.
And once a witness is on the stand, his testimony might be distorted by the fear of
subsequent liability. Even within the constraints of the witness’ oath there may be various
ways to give an account or to state an opinion. These alternatives may be more or less
detailed and may differ in emphasis and certainty. A witness who knows that he might be
forced to defend a subsequent lawsuit, and perhaps to pay damages, might be inclined to
shade his testimony in favor of the potential plaintiff, to magnify uncertainties, and thus to
deprive the finder of fact of candid, objective, and undistorted evidence. But the
truthfinding process is better served if the witness’ testimony is submitted to ‘the crucible
of the judicial process so that the factfinder may consider it, after cross-examination,
together with the other evidence in the case to determine where the truth lies.’
See, too, Bruce v Byrne-Stevens & Assoc Engineers Inc 776 P 2d 666 at 667 (Wash 1999);
Martinez v Lewis 969 P 2d 213 (Colo 1998). In Mitchell v Forsyth 472 US 511 (1985), the court
reaffirmed the principle highlighting the risk of disappointed litigants wanting to sue
witnesses who had played a significant role in the successful case against them.
However, a number of decisions are suggestive of an emerging tendency toward
moderating the absolutism of the witness immunity rule and holding experts answerable
for negligence in execution of their forensic role: see Binder (2004); Jones v Kaney [2011] 2
AC 398; [2011] UKSC 13 at [77]–[81] per Lord Collins. Thus, in Levine v Wiss & Co 478 A 2d
397 (NJ 1984) at 399 (NJ, 1984), a New Jersey court allowed a civil action to be brought
against a court-appointed accountant for substandard performance, holding that he had a
duty to ‘exercise reasonable care in preparing reports, verifying underlying data, and
examining the methods employed in arriving at financial statements’. Similarly, in Mattco
Forge Inc v Arthur Young & Co 6 Cal Rptr 2d 781 (Cal Ct App 1992), the California Court of
Appeals allowed a claim of negligence against an accounting firm that had undertaken
expert witness services in spite of the claim of witness immunity.
In Murphy v AA Matthews 841 SW 2d 671 (Mo 1992), the Missouri Supreme Court held
that the witness immunity rule did not bar civil actions against expert witnesses for
negligence in reaching their opinions. It held that the rule should be limited in scope and
limited to defamation actions and retaliatory cases against adverse witnesses. It identified
578 [8.0.300]
utility in adjusting the rule by reason of the encouragement that would thereby be given
to experts to be careful and accurate in their forensic work. It rejected the proposition that
experts would abandon the area of forensic practice if made amenable to being sued.
In Mattco Forge Inc v Arthur Young & Co 6 Cal Rptr 2d 781 at 784 (Cal Ct App 1992), the
California Court of Appeals held that a forensic accountant who engaged in document
fabrication could be held liable for professional malpractice, and established the following
criteria for expert malpractice cases: ‘1) the professional was negligent in the handling of
the prior lawsuit; 2) the professional’s negligence was a substantial factor in the plaintiff’s
loss of the prior lawsuit; and 3) the proper handling of the prior lawsuit by the
professional would have resulted in a collectible judgment in plaintiff’s favor.’
In Dalton v Miller 984 P 2d 666 (Col 1999), the Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that a
psychiatrist could be sued for alleged misconduct of a forensic examination, the plaintiff
identifying discrepancies between his written report for an insurer and his videotaped
deposition testimony. The court distinguished between the psychiatrist’s actual conduct of
the examination, in respect of which it held he could be sued, and the documentation and
testimony which ensued, which it held were covered by the witness immunity rule: see
Appelbaum (2001)
In Pollock v Panjabi 781 A 2d 518 (Conn Super 2000), in a personal injury action against
a police officer for using excessive force which rendered the plaintiff a quadriplegic, a
spinal biomechanics expert was retained to prove that the officer caused the plaintiff’s
injuries. The Connecticut Superior Court found that the expert was liable for his
negligence in incorrectly performing experiments that were deemed inadmissible at trial.
In LLMD of Michigan, Inc v Jackson-Cross Co 740 A 2d 186 (Pa 1999), the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania held that the plaintiff’s expert witness who been retained to calculate
damages arising from a failed business deal was liable for his professional malpractice.
The witness made a mathematical error that resulted in a drastic miscalculation of lost
profits and caused the plaintiff to settle for a substantially smaller sum. It observed that (at
189):
It is imperative that an expert witness not be subjected to litigation because the party who
retained the expert is dissatisfied with the substance of the opinion rendered by the expert.
An expert witness must be able to articulate the basis for his or her opinion without fear
that a verdict unfavorable to the client will result in litigation, even where the party who
has retained the expert contends that the expert’s opinion was not fully explained prior to
trial. …
We are unpersuaded, however, that those policy concerns are furthered by extending
the witness immunity doctrine to professional negligence actions which are brought
against an expert witness when the allegations of negligence are not premised on the
substance of the expert’s opinion. … The goal of ensuring that the path to truth is
unobstructed and the judicial process is protected, by fostering an atmosphere where the
expert witness will be forthright and candid in stating his or her opinion, is not advanced
by immunizing an expert witness from his or her negligence in formulating that opinion.
The judicial process will be enhanced only by requiring that an expert witness render
services to the degree of care, skill and proficiency commonly exercised by the ordinarily
skillful, careful and prudent members of their profession.
Whether an adverse expert witness can be sued remains unresolved. Only West Virginia
and New Jersey have dealt squarely with the issue. In Davis v Wallace 565 SE 2d 386 (W Va
2002), a convicted woman brought a lawsuit against the State’s experts for negligently
performing their duties and failing to meet the requisite standard of care. The experts’
motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions were granted, but the Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning the woman
and cited case law that established that expert witnesses are not entitled to absolute
immunity.
[8.0.300] 579
By contrast, in Reilly, Supple & Wishchusen, LLP v Malcolm Blum v Michael Ambrosio (NJ
App Div, March 9, 2011), an unpublished appellate opinion, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that an attorney did not have the right to sue the opposing side’s expert and
that the witness did not owe any duty to the attorney.
The potential liability of court-appointed or neutral experts is likewise unclear,
although there are some suggestions that there may be liability: see Levine v Wiss & Co 478
A 2d 397 (NJ 1984); Politi v Tyler 751 A 2d 788 (Vt 2000).
Canadian authority
[8.0.340] In Canada, an expert witness is immune from civil action by any person with
whom his or her only relationship derives from a judicial proceeding: Carnahan v Coates
(1990) 71 DLR (4th) 464; Fabian v Mergulies (1986) 53 OR (2d) 380; Varghese v Landau (2004)
CanLII 5084 (On SC). The protection extends to the actions of an expert witness in
collecting and considering material upon which the expert may later be called to give
evidence: Carnahan v Coates (1990) 71 DLR (4th) 464 at 474, applying Evans v London
Hospital Medical College (University of London) [1981] 1 WLR 184; Fabian v Mergulies (1986)
53 OR (2d) 380; Varghese v Landau (2004) CanLII 5084 at [48]. It appears that the immunity
applies even where an expert does not testify but is a potential expert witness: Varghese v
Landau (2004) CanLII 5084 at [49]; Johnson v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co
[1998] OJ No 3139.

[8.0.380] In Gibson v Cotter HC AK Civ 2005-404-6935 [2006] NZHC 592, Faire AJ observed
that although he could find no complete statement of the law in New Zealand in relation
to witness immunity, he derived assistance from the following passage in Halsbury’s Laws
of England 17(1) (4 ed) 4 [963]:
A witness is protected from civil proceedings in respect of the evidence which he gives in
judicial proceedings and in respect of things said or done in the course of preparing
evidence for such proceedings although not in respect of advice given as to the merits of
the claim before proceedings are commenced. The protection is against civil proceedings
of any sort and is not limited to claims for libel and slander. The underlying rationale of
immunity is to ensure that persons who may be witnesses in future cases will not be
deterred from giving evidence by fear of being sued for what they say in court. Where,
however, an arrest has been secured as a result of some malicious proceeding for which
there was no reasonable cause, the protection given to the witness will not necessarily
exclude a claim for malicious arrest. A person giving evidence in support of a bench
warrant has no privilege. The immunity of witnesses from civil proceedings does not
extend to immunity in respect of the deliberate fabrication of evidence which is to be
referred to in a statement of evidence.
[8.0.420] The law as to witness immunity was summarised as follows by Gleeson CJ,
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ in D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1;
[2005] HCA 12 at [39]:
From as early as the 16th century, a disappointed litigant could not sue those who had
given evidence in the case. That is, the disappointed litigant could not seek to demonstrate
that witnesses had given, or parties had suborned, perjured evidence or that witnesses or
parties had conspired together to injure that litigant. Nor could the disappointed litigant
seek to demonstrate that what was said by the witnesses had defamed that litigant. All
such actions were precluded or answered by an absolute privilege. It mattered not how
the action was framed. And it mattered not whether the disappointed litigant alleged that
the witness had acted deliberately or maliciously. No action lay, or now lies, against a
witness for what is said or done in court. It does not matter whether what is done is
alleged to have been done negligently or even done deliberately and maliciously with the
580 [8.0.340]
intention that it harm the person who would complain of it. The witness is immune from
suit and the immunity extends to preparatory steps.
(See, too, Attwells v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd (2016) 259 CLR 1; [2016] HCA 16 in
relation to advocates; Cockburn and Madden (2017)).
The purpose of the principle was identified by Starke J in Cabassi v Vila (1940) 64 CLR
130:
But it does not matter whether the action is framed as an action for defamation or as an
action analogous to an action for malicious prosecution or for deceit or, as in this instance,
for combining or conspiring together for the purpose of injuring another; the rule of law is
that no action lies against witnesses in respect of evidence prepared, given, adduced or
procured by them in the course of legal proceedings. The law protects witnesses and
others, not for their benefit, but for a higher interest, namely, the advancement of public
justice. The remedy against a witness who has given or procured false evidence is by
means of the criminal law or by the punitive process of contempt of court.
(See also Commonwealth v Griffiths [2007] NSWCA 370 at [47].)

In R v Beydoun (1990) 22 NSWLR 256 at 259, the New South Wales Court of Appeal
affirmed that statements made orally and in writing by witnesses, parties, judicial officers
and advocates preclude civil liability provided the statements were made in the course of
and with reference to judicial proceedings, and even if they were made maliciously, were
without justification or excuse, or were irrelevant to every issue in the proceedings in the
course of which they were made (see, too, Mann v O’Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204).
In Jovanovic v Woods [2001] TASSC 96, Master Holt of the Tasmanian Supreme Court
was called upon to consider whether the immunity extended to the preparation of expert
reports. He stated (at [7]):
The immunity of witnesses is not confined to evidence actually given in court. It applies
even in the early stages where evidence is being prepared or collected for proceedings in
contemplation.
In Sovereign Motor Inns Pty Ltd v Howarth Asia Pacific Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 1120,
Harrison M was required to rule on a strike out application in respect of an action brought
against an expert as a result of a report that he had written for previous litigation. During
the earlier court case the expert was criticised by the presiding judge. Harrison M
reviewed the relevant authorities and noted that in Mann v O’Neill (1997) 191 CLR 204,
McHugh J (at 221) had warned of the temptation to recognise the availability of the
immunity in new circumstances because they are closely analogous to an existing category
without examining the case for recognition in light of the underlying rationale for the
immunity. He noted that in Darker v Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police [2001] 1 AC
435, the House of Lords excluded conspiracy to injure and misfeasance in public office
from the core immunity.
Applying the McHugh J approach, Harrison M examined the factual circumstances
before him in light of the underlying rationale for the witness immunity principle. He
found that the public policy reasons for the immunity are (at [34]):
[F]irst, so as to encourage honest and well-meaning persons to assist the higher interest of
the advancement of public justice even if a dishonest and malicious person may on
occasions benefit from the immunity; second, the rule is designed to encourage freedom of
speech and communication in judicial proceedings by protecting persons who take part
from being sued for something they say; third, to ensure that there is finality to litigation,
so there is no opportunity for relitigating the same issues by means of subsequent
litigation.
Harrison M found that the witness whom the plaintiff wished to sue had not been found
in the previous proceedings to have misled the court or to have committed any offence.
The report had been prepared in contemplation of the possibility of being relied upon in
court proceedings to wind up a company. He noted that the criticisms directed toward the
[8.0.420] 581
report had been in terms of the court’s task having been made easier had the expert
evidence been more rigorous and helpful, but the court had been able to proceed with its
function and assess damages. Parts of the oral and written evidence by the witness
survived, although parts were rejected. Harrison M commented that if an expert is to
adhere to the new obligations applying as a result of changes to court rules (at [39]):
[I]t can be expected that when confronted with that of another expert in the same field’s
opinion, he or she may make concessions and even change their view. In these
circumstances the expert should be able to give his evidence freely and not be in fear of
being sued. The rationales of not relitigating the same issues and the higher interest of the
advancement of public justice are all applicable.
Harrison M ruled that the expert was not liable.
It is likely that the reasoning in Palmer v Durnford Ford [1992] QB 483 at 487–488 will be
followed in due course to achieve uniformity of approach between the immunity extended
to advocates pursuant to the principles articulated by the Australian High Court in
Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 CLR 543 and D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223
CLR 1; [2005] HCA 12 and that extended to expert witnesses (see Commonwealth v Griffiths
[2007] NSWCA 370 at [47]). Already, this has been the position taken by the New South
Wales Court of Appeal in Young v Hones [2014] NSWCA 337 at [35].
In all probability, the protection for out-of-court statements will extend only where the
work is so intimately connected with the conduct of the case in court that it can fairly be
said to be a preliminary decision affecting the way the case will be conducted when it
comes to hearing: see Rees v Sinclair [1974] 1 NZLR 180 at 187; Giannarelli v Wraith (1988)
165 CLR 543 at 559 per Mason CJ; Saif Ali v Sydney Mitchell & Co [1980] AC 198 at 215, 224,
232, 236.
Extension to vicarious liability
[8.0.430] In Commonwealth v Griffiths [2007] NSWCA 370, the forensic work done by a
scientist for a government laboratory was the subject of a civil action. The Commonwealth
asserted that as it would not have been possible to sue the individual scientist because of
witness immunity, it should not be possible to sue his employer. The New South Wales
Court of Appeal agreed, applying the reasoning in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council
[1995] 2 AC 633 at 755, and holding that an employer of a person with immunity from
being sued for their tortious behaviour is likewise protected (at [115]).
Criminal liability for experts

[8.0.460] There is controversy over whether an expert witness who deliberately misleads a
court can be charged with the criminal offence of perjury. However, the charge of perjury
against an expert witness is almost unknown (see Freckelton (2016)).
Auld LJ in Silcott v Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis [1996] EWCA Civ 1311 has
held that:
(1) the assumed miscreant is himself open to criminal prosecution whether for
perjury or for perverting the course of public justice …
(2) if the miscreant is himself responsible for [an unjustified] prosecution being
brought, whether or not himself technically the prosecutor (see on this point
Martin v Watson [1995] 3 WLR 318) he or she is vulnerable to a claim for
malicious prosecution.
What is generally agreed is that proving the elements of the offences of perjury or
perverting the course of justice would be exceptionally difficult. This reality was
recognised as long ago as 1873, when Sir George Jessel MR in Lord Abinger v Ashton (1873)
17 LR Eq 358 at 374 nominated experts’ immunity from perjury prosecutions as one of the
reasons to be wary of the evidence of expert witnesses:
In matters of opinion I very much distrust expert evidence, for several reasons. In the first
place, although the evidence is given upon oath, in point of fact the person knows that he
582 [8.0.430]
cannot be indicted for perjury, because it is only evidence as to a matter of opinion. So that
you have not the authority of legal sanction. A dishonest man, knowing he could not be
punished, might be inclined to indulge in extravagant assertions on an occasion that
required it.
(See also Adams v Canon (1621) 1 Dyer 53b; 73 ER 117; Best (1849, p 389).)
The Illinois Supreme Court has observed that ‘it is virtually impossible to prosecute an
expert witness for perjury … The opinion … is the result of reasoning, and no one can be
prosecuted for defective mental processes’: Sears v Rutishauser 466 NE 2d 210 at 212 (Ill
1984). Similarly, the Wyoming Supreme Court has observed that ‘[a] witness is not guilty
of perjury simply because his testimony is inconsistent’. It reasoned that ‘internal
inconsistencies in testimony or an insufficient foundation for the basis of an expert’s
opinion … may provide sufficient contradiction to allow the jury to disregard the opinion
rendered’, but does not provide a basis for perjury: Little v Kobos 877 P 2d 752 (Wyo 1994).
However, in obiter comments it was said in Folkes v Chadd (1782) 3 Doug KB 157 at 159; 99
ER 589 at 590 that ‘handwriting is proved every day by opinion; and for false evidence on
such questions a man may be indicted for perjury’ (emphasis added); see also R v Pedley
(1784) 1 Leach 325; 168 ER 265. The reasoning in the two cases can be reconciled. As
Hodgkinson (1990, p 215) pointed out, comparison of handwriting may be undertaken by
lay witnesses, so that the case is distinguishable from the clear views expressed in
Lord Abinger v Ashton (1873) 17 LR Eq 358. However, he noted: ‘More recent authority
suggests that opinion may indeed be the subject of perjury proceedings, if an opinion is
not genuinely held.’ (See R v Schlesinger (1847) 10 QB 670; 116 ER 255; Ockley & Whitlesbye’s
case (1622) Palm 294; 81 ER 1089; R v Mawbey (1796) 6 Term Rep 619 at 637; 101 ER 736 at
745.) This is suggestive of genuineness or sincerity being the touchstone for whether a
forensic expert can be liable for views expressed in a report or in the witness box. It opens
up the possibility that a witness who can be shown as a matter of fact not to hold the
views he or she has expressed (for instance, by reference to having expressed
fundamentally different views on another occasion) may be able to be sued or even
charged in respect of such views.
On a public policy level, it is likely that the justifications adduced in support of
witnesses’ immunity from negligence suits would not avail in a case where deliberate
dishonesty was perpetrated by an expert in the form of a report tendered to the court or in
the form of viva voce evidence: see, eg, Kline v State 444 So 2d 1102 (Fla App 1984); see also
NSW Crime Commission v Ollis [2006] NSWSC 316. Courts are unlikely to be receptive to
the argument that expert witnesses should be exempted from criminal liability should
there be evidence that they have deliberately attempted to mislead by offering false
information or views that they do not hold.
It is probable that the immunity of expert witnesses cannot be circumvented by the
prosecution merely alleging a conspiracy between witnesses to make false statements: Roy
v Prior [1971] AC 470 at 480; Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 528. Gross (1991, p 1176); cf
Saldirim (2018). Their infrequency is attested to by the absence of modern authority on the
subject, but cases can be postulated in which the problems of proof of the requisite mala
fides might be overcome. A successful prosecution would need to negative the likely
defences of confusion or inadvertent mistake under the pressures of court proceedings: see
R v Millward [1985] 1 WLR 532. Inculpating documentation or clear proof of a conflict of
interest could enable such a finding.
[8.0.460] 583
Chapter 8.05
REGULATORY LIABILITY OF EXPERT
WITNESSES
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [8.05.01]
Misleading a court ................................................................................................................ [8.05.60]
The Meadow decisions: a resolution to the witness immunity argument ................... [8.05.80]
The Fitness to Practise Panel decision ............................................................................... [8.05.80]
The decision of Collins J ...................................................................................................... [8.05.90]
The Court of Appeal decision ............................................................................................. [8.05.100]
The Southall decision ............................................................................................................ [8.05.110]
United States authorities ...................................................................................................... [8.05.140]
Australian authorities ........................................................................................................... [8.05.180]
The decision in Mustac v Medical Board (WA) .................................................................. [8.05.200]
The decision in James v Medical Board (SA) ...................................................................... [8.05.220]
The decision in James v Keogh ............................................................................................. [8.05.240]
Disciplinary tribunal decisions ........................................................................................... [8.05.260]
The role of regulatory bodies .............................................................................................. [8.05.280]
Timing of investigations by regulators ............................................................................. [8.05.300]
‘… all power is a trust; … we are accountable for its exercise.’

Benjamin Disraeli, Vivian Grey, 1826.
Introduction
[8.05.01] This chapter addresses the disciplinary regulation of experts, focusing upon
health practitioners. It should be read in conjunction with Ch 8.0, which deals with the
civil and criminal liability of experts. It identifies sources of error that have the potential to
prompt disciplinary investigations and sanctions as a result of unprofessional discharge of
the forensic role.
There is a trend toward increasing regulation of professionals by the state. This is most
pronounced in relation to health practitioners: see Moran (2003); Glynn (2005); Donaldson
(2006); Freckelton (2008d; 2008g). Thus, for instance, in Australia, registration bodies and
the potential for disciplinary proceedings have been constituted by Parliament in respect
of:
• medical practitioners;
• nurses;
• dental practitioners (dentists, dental hygienists, dental therapists and dental
prosthetists);
• psychologists;
• pharmacists;
• physiotherapists;
• traditional Chinese medicine practitioners (acupuncturists, Chinese herbal medicine
practitioners and Chinese herbal dispensers);
• chiropractors;
• osteopaths;
• podiatrists;
• optometrists;
• occupational therapists;
• Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health workers;
[8.05.01] 585
• medical radiation technologists (medical imaging technologists, radiation therapy

technologists and nuclear medicine technologists); and
• paramedics.
In many jurisdictions, architects and builders are similarly regulated by registration
bodies. However, this leaves professionals such as accountants, auditors, engineers,
psychotherapists (see, though, Freckelton (2008g)) and social workers regulated only by
reference to membership of their professional associations. At the time of writing, the
Victorian Parliament was still considering the Professional Engineers Registration Bill 2019
(Vic).
The potential for professionals to be regulated by registration bodies and for hearings
to take place before decision-making entities that are part of regulators or at arm’s-length
from regulators has important ramifications for experts who exercise forensic functions
(see Freckelton (2016)). Until decisions in Australia and the United Kingdom in 2006, there
had been a view that experts were not accountable to their regulatory bodies for forensic
work because of the ‘witness immunity rule’. This has now been repudiated by the South
Australian Supreme Court in James v Medical Board (SA) (2006) 95 SASR 445; [2006] SASC
267 and the Court of Appeal in Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462; [2006]
EWCA Civ 1390.
In Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462; [2006] EWCA Civ 1390, Thorpe LJ
made a series of observations about the importance of accountability for experts in the
discharge of their role as report-writers for courts and tribunals and in giving evidence.
He commented (at [226]) that:
In criminal and civil justice there are many fields of expertise beyond the medical from
which dependable witness must be available to the courts. There are a corresponding
number of professional men whose livelihood in part, and sometimes in large part, is
gained from court work. In a marketplace where supply exceeds demand there is a
particular need for ensuring dependability both in the field of the witnesses’ expertise and
also in the observation of the forensic standards set by the courts.

[8.05.40] A series of decisions in the United Kingdom in relation to medical practitioners
has made it clear, for good policy reasons, that contemporary health practitioners are
answerable to their regulatory bodies in respect of the discharge of not only their clinical
and administrative responsibilities but also of their forensic role.
Misleading a court
[8.05.60] In Re Paterson (unreported, Professional Conduct Committee, General Medical
Council, 3 April 2004), for instance, a medical practitioner was suspended on the basis of
two court reports that he had written, one of them for the Family Division of the High
Court of Justice.
The High Court report had been commissioned on behalf of parents who were accused
of causing non-accidental injuries to their children: see Freckelton (2004a). Dr Paterson
authored a report in which he concluded that it was more likely than not that the fractures
sustained by one of the children had been caused by bone disease, probably ‘temporary
brittle bone disease’ (TBBD).
The Professional Conduct Committee (the Committee) held that it is a medical
practitioner’s responsibility to ensure that an expert report is properly researched and to
substantiate any departure from his or her published research. It acknowledged that it is
permissible to modify a published view but ‘this must be made explicit in any report and
any modifications must be fully explained and justified in language that is clear,
comprehensive and non-ambiguous to the reader’.
The Committee found that Dr Paterson’s report was misleading and/or inadequately
researched in that it omitted consideration and discussion of a chest bruise observed on
586 [8.05.40]
Regulatory liability of expert witnesses | CH 8.05
the child and swelling observed and bruising visible on the child’s ankle. The nub of the
flaw in this regard was that Dr Paterson failed to state that such signs were
contra-indications to TBBD. It found that the relationship of the calf swelling and ankle
bruising to the fracture in the child’s ankle ‘should have been fully discussed’ in the report
and that Dr Paterson’s failure to do so was ‘a failure of the duties of an expert witness’.
The Committee found that Dr Paterson failed to explain why, when the child had none
of the predisposing or identifying features of TBBD, as set out in his published research,
the child was not outside the criteria for TBBD and thus that a diagnosis of TBBD should
be treated with caution. It found that Dr Paterson had overlooked or discounted clinical
aspects of the child’s presentation that were at variance with his published views about
the preconditions for diagnosis of TBBD and thus that he failed to fulfil his duties as an
expert witness. By doing so, he misled or risked misleading the court and not acting in the
best interests of the child.
In respect of the proposed expert evidence that Dr Paterson gave in Arizona, again for
parents charged with causing serious injuries to their daughter, the Committee found that
Dr Paterson should have been aware of the need for his opinions to be properly
researched and not such as to mislead, yet he gave evidence without having seen all the
relevant records and without factoring into his consideration relevant information
inconsistent with the diagnosis of TBBD. Again, it found that in arriving at a diagnosis of
TBBD, he overlooked or discounted clinical aspects of the case that were at variance with
his published views, or he covertly added new aspects to his diagnostic criteria for the
condition in arriving at his diagnosis. It emphasised the ‘heavy responsibility: of those
providing expert evidence to the courts and the need for the courts to rely on the evidence
of expert witnesses’. It found that in both cases, Dr Paterson had acted as an advocate for
the clients who had commissioned him, to the point of ignoring his own published
diagnostic criteria for TBBD. This meant that he had risked misleading the court and
undermining the confidence which ‘the judiciary is entitled to place in expert medical
witnesses’.
The Committee held that it is necessary and advantageous for experts on occasion to
challenge conventional views. However, it stated that when an expert expresses what is a
minority view, it is incumbent on him or her to ‘put forward a fully reasoned logical basis
why an alternative diagnosis is valid in the particular circumstance’. It stated that to do so
it is necessary to demonstrate that the alternative view has been considered and to put
forward a reasoned, cogent argument as to why the orthodox diagnosis is not valid.
The Committee found that Dr Paterson had failed to comply with his obligation to
work within the limits of his professional competence. In light of the persistence in which
he had engaged in his misconduct and his lack of insight into the seriousness of his
conduct and its consequences, it took the step of erasing his name from the Medical
Register.
The Meadow decisions: a resolution to the witness immunity argument
The Fitness to Practise Panel decision

[8.05.80] The United Kingdom Fitness to Practise Panel of the General Medical Council
was called upon in 2005 (Fitness to Practise Panel, General Medical Council, 15 July 2005)
to evaluate the professional conduct of a prominent paediatrician who had written reports
and given expert evidence in ways which it was alleged were misleading. The allegations
arose from involvement as an expert by Professor Roy Meadow in criminal proceedings
against solicitor Sally Clark for the murder of her two children. Her conviction was later
quashed on other grounds by the Court of Appeal: R v Clark (Sally) (Appeal against
conviction) (No 2) [2003] EWCA Crim 1020.
[8.05.80] 587
The Panel found that Professor Meadow had been engaged as a consultant
paediatrician by the Cheshire Constabulary of Police to assist their investigation. He was
ready, willing and considered himself able to give expert evidence as to child abuse and
unnatural infant deaths, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), the probability of
occurrence and recurrence of SIDS deaths within a family, and the statistical consideration
of data on such matters. It found that he owed a duty to familiarise himself with all
relevant data and published (or to be published) work, sufficient to provide competent,
impartial, balanced and fair expert evidence of scientific validity. It found that he had
failed in this duty and had not discharged his obligation to refrain from giving expert
evidence on matters beyond his competence.
The Panel found that Professor Meadow’s evidence was misleading and erroneous,
although that had not been his intention, his error lying in squaring odds of matters which
may have been associated and thus not amenable to the ‘multiplication factor’, as well as
failing to have regard to dependent variables which would have substantially changed the
statistics which he was citing. It found that his errors had been ‘grave’ and that his
conduct had had serious implications and repercussions for many people, not least those
working in the field of child protection. It concluded that his errors were so serious that, in
spite of his contributions to medicine and his international reputation, it had no option but
to strike his name from the medical register.
The decision of Collins J

[8.05.90] However, the Panel’s decision was appealed to the Queen’s Bench Division of
the High Court. Justice Collins, in the course of argument between the parties to the
appeal, raised a threshold issue concerning the immunity from suit of a witness in respect
of evidence given in a court of law. Such immunity has been held to apply as much to an
expert as it does to evidence by any other witness (see X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County
Council [1995] 2 AC 633, approving Evans v London Hospital Medical College (University of
London) [1981] 1 WLR 184) and to extend to any civil proceedings brought against a
defendant which are based on the evidence given by the witness to a court, as well as to
any statement which the witness makes for the purpose of giving evidence.
Until the decision of Collins J, the immunity had never been extended to prevent the
bringing of disciplinary proceedings. However, he held that it should do so. Justice Collins
(at [10]) drew a distinction between oral evidence and steps along the way to the giving of
such evidence:
It is clear that to produce a report or to give information which is sufficiently flawed as
properly to be regarded as serious professional misconduct will not attract immunity even
though it is used as the basis for evidence given subsequently. The report must have been
prepared with a view to its being used or in the knowledge that it will probably be used in
evidence in court.
He observed (at [13]) that immunity from civil action extends to the honest as well as the
dishonest witness, being based on public policy ‘which requires that witnesses should not
be deterred from giving evidence by the fear of litigation at the suit of those who may feel
that the evidence had damaged them unjustifiably’. Justice Collins drew a distinction
between oral evidence and steps along the way to the giving of such evidence. He noted
(at [13]) that the Court of Appeal had previously held in respect of an engineer’s report
that the immunity is not granted primarily for the benefit of the individuals who seek it –
they are the beneficiaries of the overarching public interest which seeks to protect the
administration of justice. The rationale for this position derives from the obligation owed
by expert witnesses to the court which overrides their duties to their clients. In Stanton v
Callaghan [2000] 1 QB 75 at 109, Nourse LJ emphasised the importance of witnesses being
free to give ‘frank and fearless evidence’ and the need to avoid a ‘multiplicity of actions’.
588 [8.05.90]
Collins J accepted that the immunity doctrine is not untrammelled and that it does not
preclude an expert being prosecuted for the criminal offence of perjury ‘if sufficient
evidence exists’. He commented (at [13]):
The public policy states that the need to protect the honest witness may result in
immunity for the dishonest, but the balance between the right of an individual to make a
claim and the need in the interest of the administration of justice to ensure that witnesses
give evidence in the knowledge that they cannot be subjected to action which may later
seek to penalise them is struck by giving priority to the latter.
Collins J made it clear (at [17]) that the reason for his view that the principle of witness
immunity extends to disciplinary actions brought by regulatory bodies was ‘evidence
before me, and common sense points in the same direction, that the possibility of
disciplinary proceedings based on a complaint by someone affected by the evidence given
has a serious deterrent effect’. He accepted previous statements that the immunity should
not be ‘given any wider application than is absolutely necessary in the interests of the
administration of justice’: see Rees v Sinclair [1974] 1 NZLR 180 at 187; Roy v Prior [1971]
AC 470 at 480. However, based upon his perception that the administration of justice had
been ‘seriously damaged’ by the decision of the Fitness to Practise Panel and that the
damage would continue unless the decision was overturned, he felt obliged to make it
clear that experts should not fear disciplinary proceedings for performance of forensic
work. He accepted that there is also a public interest that practitioners should be regulated
and that their standards of practice be of a high level, but he observed (at [21]) that ‘any
expert witness will know that he has a duty to the court and must bear in mind his
obligations in that regard’. He reiterated in full the duties of experts articulated by
Cresswell J in National Justice Compania Naviera SA v Prudential Assurance Co Ltd (The
Ikarian Reefer) [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 68 at 81–82. However, he held that the immunity has to
cover proceedings based on a complaint (whether or not it alleges bad faith or dishonesty)
made by a party or any other person who may have been upset by the evidence given.
He identified (at [11]) no reason why the judge before whom an expert gave evidence
(or the Court of Appeal) should not refer the witness’s evidence to the relevant
disciplinary body – but only if satisfied that ‘the conduct of the expert witness had fallen
so far below what is expected of the witness as to merit some disciplinary action’. He
noted (at [23]) that such a referral would not be justified unless the witness’s shortcomings
‘were sufficiently serious for the judge to believe that he might need to be removed from
practice or at least to be subjected to conditions regulating his practice such as a
prohibition on acting as an expert witness. Normally evidence given honestly and in good
faith would not merit a referral’. Thus, he held that the courts are the sole pathway to
regulation in respect of forensic conduct by practitioners, rather than the ordinary
processes of the professional regulatory bodies. He noted (at [24]) that ‘it is unlikely that a
single case involving a poor report or evidence would on its own show that the
practitioner was unfit to practise and so a danger to the public’. His Honour drew comfort
(at [24]) from the proposition that the expert’s report would become known ‘and he would
not be invited to give evidence in the future. Further, if he was so poor, he would be likely
to show his defects in a subsequent case’. He considered that the ‘precise boundaries’ of
witness immunity would need to be established on a case-by-case basis.
The Court of Appeal decision

[8.05.100] However, the General Medical Council successfully appealed the decision of
Collins J. In Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462; [2006] EWCA Civ 1390 (see
Groves (2007); Freckelton (2007)), the Court of Appeal overturned the decision of Collins J
which had extended the principle of witness immunity. The court unanimously found
Professor Meadow to have engaged in misconduct. However, it was only Clarke MR who
[8.05.100] 589
expressed the view that Professor Meadow had engaged in ‘serious professional
misconduct’ (as defined in Preiss v General Dental Council [2001] 1 WLR 1926). He observed
(at [71]–[72]) that:
It is in my opinion of the utmost importance that an expert should only give evidence of
opinion which is within his particular expertise and that, where a statement, whether
made in writing or orally, is outside his expertise, he should expressly say so. If, for
example, it depends upon work done or opinions expressed by others, that work or those
opinions should be identified in the statement, so that their validity can be ascertained by
the parties to the proceedings or by the court. All reasonable attempts should be made to
check the validity of an opinion which is not within the expert’s expertise. These are
simple precautions which should be taken by experts because of the risk that the opinion
might be wrong, with what may be very serious consequences. This seems to me to be of
particular importance in a serious criminal matter such as the trial of a defendant for
murder. It was the failure of Professor Meadow to adopt these principles and to adopt
these precautions which, in my opinion, amounted to serious professional misconduct.
Clarke MR found that Professor Meadow was not a statistician and had no relevant
expertise which entitled him to use the statistics in the way he did. He accepted that
Professor Meadow made a mistake in good faith which other non-statisticians had made
but held that that should not exonerate him. He observed (at [83]) that Professor Meadow
had given his expert evidence ‘in a colourful way which might well have been attractive
to the jury without expressly disclaiming any expertise in the field on an issue the only
possible relevance of which can have been … to support the prosecution’s case’.
Auld and Thorpe LJJ were somewhat more understanding. Auld LJ held that
Professor Meadow’s use of statistics was clearly wrong but accepted it to have been honest
and concluded that it was explicable by the wider circumstances of the case. He accepted
(at [201]) that it:
may also be professional misconduct where, as here, a medical practitioner, purporting to
act or speak in such expert capacity, goes outside his expertise. Whether it can properly be
regarded as ‘serious’ professional misconduct, however, must depend on the circumstances,
including with what intention and/or knowledge and understanding he strayed from his
expertise, how he came to do so, to what possible, foreseeable effect, and what, if any,
indication or warning he gave to those concerned at the time that he was doing so.
He noted (at [205]) that where the conduct of an expert alleged to amount to a professional
offence under scrutiny by his or her professional disciplinary body arises out of evidence
given to a court or tribunal, it is:
important that that body should fully understand, and assess his conduct in the forensic
context in which it arose. Of great importance are the circumstances in which he came to
give the evidence, the way in which he gave it, and the potential effect, if any, it had on the
proceedings and their outcome. If the disciplinary body lacks information to enable it
properly to assess the expert’s conduct in that forensic context, or fails properly to take it
into account, a court reviewing its determination, is likely to bring important insights of
its own to the matter. Not least among those should be an appreciation of the isolation of
an expert witness, however seasoned in that role, in the alien confines of the witness box
in an adversarial contest over which the judge and the lawyers hold sway.
Auld LJ noted (at [207]) that:

All of this is not to absolve the expert of responsibility from professional or forensic
impropriety in the presentation and form of his evidence. As a medical expert, he should
know his limits. In most instances, his knowledge and instincts in his particular field
should alert him to confining his evidence to those limits and the true issues identified for
the court by the legal representatives of the parties. However, the forensic process, in
preparation and in action at trial, is not always as ordered and considered as it should be.
The issues may not always be sufficiently carefully defined, or the evidence, lay and
expert, adequately prepared and tailored in advance, to deal with them. The trial process
itself can be unpredictable in direction. From time to time the questioners and the
590 [8.05.100]
questioned can lose sight of the essential issues in exploring or ‘trying out for size’ areas of
evidence that, on careful examination, have no bearing on the case. The line and pace of
the questioning may leave little time for calm analysis by an expert witness called to deal
with a variety of issues on one or more of which he is required to express an opinion that
is, or he knows is, to be, challenged. The same may be said for those questioning him and,
indeed for the judge who is trying to keep up with the evidence as it is given. In that,
sometimes, fevered process, mistakes can be made, ill-considered assertions volunteered
or analogies drawn by the most seasoned court performers, whatever their role.
In part because of such considerations, but also because certain other material was not
before the Fitness to Practise Committee, Auld LJ concluded that it had overstated the
heinousness and adverse impact of Professor Meadow’s evidence.
Thorpe LJ took a similar approach. He held (at [270]) that the incorrect statistical
evidence could not be solely attributed to Professor Meadow because the use of ‘squaring’
was common ground between the prosecution and the defence at Sally Clark’s trial. It
followed from his perspective that Professor Meadow’s misconduct was significantly less
reprehensible than it had been regarded by the Fitness to Practise Committee.
Nonetheless, Thorpe LJ had no reservation in concluding (at [251]) that:
there can be no doubt that Professor Sir Roy Meadow fell short of the required standards.
He advanced a probability theory that can only be applied in the calculation of the odds
against the happening of two truly independent events. He was not expert in the
calculation of probability.
All judges accepted that Professor Meadow should not have been dealt with more harshly
by reason of his eminence and that this was an error on the part of Collins J (see at [72] per
Clarke MR; at [275] per Thorpe LJ). However, Auld LJ qualified the absolutism of this
position, noting that he would not wish:
to be taken as dismissing eminence as a possibly relevant consideration in other types of
cases, for example, where some moral turpitude or bad faith is involved, or perhaps when
it is shown that a leader of a profession has deliberately or recklessly cast aside the norms
of his professional obligations in the confident expectation that his authority will carry the
day.
On the issue of the applicability of the ‘witness immunity rule’ to preclude disciplinary
action, Clarke MR held (at [34]) that:
although the need for fearlessness and the avoidance of a multiplicity of actions has been
held to outweigh the private interest in civil redress, hence the immunity from civil suit,
those public policy benefits do not and cannot (or at least should not) override the public
interest in the protection of the public’s health and safety enshrined in the GMC’s
statutory duty to bring FTP proceedings where a registered medical practitioner’s fitness
to practise is impaired. A similar point can be made in the case of other professions and
occupations, with more or less force depending upon the particular circumstances.
Auld and Thorpe LJJ agreed with him on the point.
Clarke MR (at [46]) accepted the Attorney-General’s submission that:
in general the threat of FTP proceedings is in the public interest because it helps to deter
those who might be tempted to give partisan evidence and not to discharge their
obligation to assist the court by giving conscientious and objective evidence. It helps to
preserve the integrity of the trial process and public confidence both in the trial process
and in the standards of the professions from which expert witnesses come.
Auld LJ commented (at [113]):
Put in another way, why should an expert witness be entitled to go into the witness box
secure in the knowledge that what he says will have immunity not only from civil suit, say
in negligence or other civil wrong, but also disciplinary proceedings for conduct so bad
that, if established, would bring his profession into disrepute and, if unchecked, be
potentially harmful to the public?
Clarke MR concluded (at [55]) that:
[8.05.100] 591
[T]here is no principled basis upon which trial judges should be charged with the
responsibility for deciding whose conduct should be referred to an FPP and whose
conduct should not. The judge presiding over a criminal trial has many duties, some of
which are very onerous. So too does a trial judge in a civil action of any complexity.
Although trial judges have been free in the past (and will no doubt be free in the future) to
refer the conduct of an expert to his professional body, it has never been part of a trial
judge’s duty to consider whether or not to do so. To impose such a duty on all trial judges
in both civil and criminal cases seems to me to be inappropriate.
He accepted (at [66]) that risks exist for expert witnesses in being amenable to complaints
by aggrieved and disappointed litigants but rejected this as a reason to extend immunity
from disciplinary investigations and hearings:
[I]t does seem to me that it should be possible to devise a scheme which reduces to an
absolute minimum the risk of expert witnesses being vexed by unmeritorious complaints
to regulatory bodies like the GMC.
In short, therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeal emphatically repudiated the
proposition that experts are not subject to disciplinary proceedings for misconduct arising
out of the discharge of forensic obligations. While the members of the court disagreed
about the culpability of Professor Meadow, they were at one in relation to the fact that his
conduct was deserving of censure and in breach of the standards of behaviour expected by
the courts of expert report writers and witnesses.
The Southall decision

[8.05.110] In Council for the Regulation of Healthcare Professionals v General Medical Council
[2005] EWHC 579 (Admin), Collins J heard an appeal against sanctions imposed by the
General Medical Council upon a prominent paediatrician, Professor Southall. It occurred
in the context of the controversies surrounding the conviction of Sally Clark, in whose trial
Professor Meadow gave evidence (see above).
Sally Clark’s husband was convinced that his wife was not guilty of the offences of
which she had been convicted. He was looking after a third child, A, while she was in
prison pending her appeal. In April 2000, Channel 4 television devoted a program to the
case of Sally Clark. It contained a lengthy interview with her husband. Professor Southall
had an interest in the case and watched the program. In the course of it, Mr Clark
described how one of his sons who had died nine days later had suffered a nosebleed
while he was looking after him at a hotel in London. The description of this event
triggered in Professor Southall, who at that time knew nothing of the case beyond what he
saw in the course of the program, a firm view that there had been an attempt to suffocate
the child and that Mr Clark had not only been responsible for that attempt but had
ultimately been responsible for the child’s death.
Professor Southall immediately communicated his concerns to the police and to the
Child Protection Unit at Staffordshire. He attended a meeting with Cheshire Social
Services and the remaining child’s guardian ad litem, having spoken to one of the
pathologists who had appeared for the Crown at Sally Clark’s trial and Professor Meadow
(see above). However, he did not disclose to Social Services that he had spoken to the two
experts because he was concerned that he ‘might get the two into trouble if he did’ (at [3]).
He maintained his conclusions that Mr Clark had attempted to suffocate his son at the
hotel and that it was he and not his wife who had killed his children. Despite the
emergence of evidence that demonstrated that Mr Clark could not have been responsible
for his sons’ deaths, he did not resile from his views.
Professor Southall penned a report of his views, urging a review of the evidence with
an eye to assessing the potential for Mr Clark to have been the perpetrator of the crimes.
592 [8.05.110]
When challenged by an expert in shaken baby syndrome about the opinions in his report,
and thereby given an opportunity to qualify them, Professor Southall assertively declined
to do so.
The conduct of Professor Southall was the subject of a complaint to the General
Medical Council which required him to appear before the Professional Conduct
Committee. After a hearing of nine days, the Committee found him guilty of serious
professional misconduct and directed that for three years he must not engage in any
aspect of child protection work either within the National Health Service or outside it. In
particular, it found that his actions were precipitate, irresponsible and an abuse of his
professional position. It observed that at the time he expressed his views, he had not
interviewed Sally Clark or her husband. It noted too that his report expressed extremely
serious views about criminal culpability and yet it purported to be underpinned by
research he had conducted. In fact, it contained ‘matters of truth’ which he could not have
known and did not know (ie, it was pervaded by speculation and assumptions).
Moreover, it contained no caveat in terms of its being based on very limited information.
An appeal was made pursuant to s 25 of the National Health Service Reform and Health
Care Professions Act 2002 (UK) by the Council for Health Care Regulatory Excellence
against the leniency of the penalty imposed on Professor Southall. The Council argued
before Collins J that no result short of erasure from the Register would have been
appropriate. His Honour was explicit about the purpose of disciplinary proceedings,
namely ‘to protect the public and the reputation of the profession in question, not to
punish’. He observed that in Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 at 518, Sir Thomas
Bingham said:
The second purpose is the most fundamental of all: to maintain the reputation of the
solicitors’ profession as one in which every member, of whatever standing, may be trusted
to the ends of the earth. To maintain this reputation and sustain public confidence in the
integrity of the profession it is often necessary that those guilty of serious lapses are not
only expelled but denied re-admission. If a member of the public sells his house, very
often his largest asset, and entrusts the proceeds to his solicitor, pending re-investment in
another house, he is ordinarily entitled to expect that the solicitor will be a person whose
trustworthiness is not, and never has been, seriously in question. Otherwise, the whole
profession, and the public as a whole, is injured. A profession’s most valuable asset is its
collective reputation and the confidence which that inspires.
United States authorities

[8.05.140] The availability of disciplinary sanctions against licensed practitioners has not
been finally resolved in the United States. In In Re Lustgarten 629 SE 2d 886 (NC Ct App
2006), the fact that a neurosurgeon’s flawed court testimony was given in good faith was
one of the factors that protected him against liability.
In 2001, the United States 7th Circuit of Appeals, however, held that a professional
society could discipline a member for improper testimony: Austin v American Association of
Neurological Surgeons 253 F3d 967 (7th Cir 2001). The case involved a neurosurgeon who
was suspended by the American Association of Neurological Surgeons after testifying
problematically for a plaintiff as an expert witness in a medical malpractice action. The
appellate court upheld the suspension, determining that the testimony was ‘irresponsible’
and violated the ethical code of the association to ‘provide the court with accurate and
documentable opinions on the matters in hand’.
Similarly, in 1997, the Washington State Supreme Court ruled that disciplinary
proceedings by the State Board of Psychology were not precluded by the witness
immunity rule in relation to testimony given by a psychologist in child custody cases:
Deatherage v State of Washington Examining Board of Psychology 948 P 2d 828 (Wash 1997);
see further Binder (2004).
[8.05.140] 593
Australian authorities
[8.05.180] In Australia, there have been a number of decisions on the amenability of
forensic experts to regulatory sanctions. They have confirmed the emerging practice of
regulatory bodies to discipline professionals for unacceptable discharge of the forensic
role.
The decision in Mustac v Medical Board (WA)
[8.05.200] In Mustac v Medical Board (WA) [2004] WASCA 156, the Western Australian
Court of Appeal heard an appeal against a suspension for six months by that State’s
Medical Board of a psychiatrist on the basis that he had engaged in ‘improper conduct in
a professional respect’ by reason of his authorship of two forensic reports: see further
Freckelton (2004a). Dr Mustac was found to have applied a psychometric test, the TOMM,
impermissibly, using both the wrong methodology and failing to comply with the
instructions for its administration and interpretation.
The Board commented (as cited at [129]):
[T]he need to maintain the high standards and good reputation of the profession generally
in the eyes of the community is a matter of priority. The trust which the general public
does place in the professionalism of doctors is a vital component in the overall delivery of
health care services to the community. When a person consults with or attends on a
registered medical practitioner the reasonable assumption that is made is that the
practitioner is conducting himself or herself in all respects in a professional manner and
that he or she will continue to do so in their dealings with that person.
The Board maintained (as cited at [129]) that comparable levels of professionalism apply
in clinical and forensic contexts:
When that consultation takes place in a forensic context with a view to the independent
assessment by the doctor of the entitlement to financial redress for alleged personal injury
the requirement that professional standards and reputation be maintained is all the more
important. That the integrity of the medical profession be preserved in such circumstances
is imperative. … the Board is concerned in this inquiry with former patients who had no
choice but to attend on the practitioner – they did not attend on him voluntarily. The
relevant insurers required that they subject themselves to his assessment of their
psychiatric health and, it follows, their entitlement to financial aid for alleged personal
injury. The former patients were entitled to expect that the practitioner would comply
with professional standards in the fair and responsible discharge of this important
function. The relationship of trust and confidence between doctor and patient was
founded on the assumption that he would do so. Doctors who do not conduct themselves
in this manner are unable to discharge the obligations assumed by members of the
profession. Forensic psychiatrists who behave as the practitioner did in this case
undermine significantly the confidence and respect the general public should be entitled
to repose in the medical profession generally and psychiatrists specifically.
On the basis of his application of the TOMM to two workers whom he was assessing for
compensation purposes, Dr Mustac concluded that each intended to deceive him. The
Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the Medical Board that the conclusions of false or
exaggerated claims on the part of the workers by Dr Mustac arose from an improper use
of the TOMM. It found that the conduct of Dr Mustac fell well short of being in
accordance with a body of respectable, if minority, opinion. Accordingly, it upheld the
decision of the Medical Board to suspend the practitioner for the misconduct in which he
had engaged in framing his opinions as he had in his forensic reports.
The decision in James v Medical Board (SA)
[8.05.220] In James v Medical Board (SA) (2006) 95 SASR 445; [2006] SASC 267, the Full
Court of the South Australian Supreme Court heard an application to prevent that State’s
Medical Board further conducting a hearing in relation to the conduct of a forensic
pathologist, Dr James. The complaint related to the interpretation of bruises on the leg of a
594 [8.05.180]
deceased person and was made by the person charged with the murder of the deceased.
Mr James had written a report at the request of the prosecution and then gave evidence at
trial.
On behalf of Dr James, it was argued, among other things, that the principle of witness
immunity (see Freckelton (2007)) meant that he could not be taken before a regulatory
tribunal, such as the Medical Board, for evidence he had given in court. Reliance was
placed upon the decision of Collins J in Meadow v General Medical Council [2006] 1 WLR
1452; [2006] EWHC 146. However, the court held (at [84]) that:
public interest requires that someone who has given evidence, albeit that they are immune
from suit insofar as the evidence given cannot be challenged in another process, should
nevertheless be accountable to his or her professional peers when a member of the public
makes a complaint of unprofessional conduct.
The decision in James v Keogh
[8.05.240] In James v Keogh [2008] SASC 156, Debelle J heard an appeal against a decision
of the South Australian Medical Board which made findings against a pathologist in
relation to his forensic work. Debelle J held (at [67]) that the duties of an expert witness
are the same in criminal and in civil trials: ‘The question whether the expert witness has
discharged those duties will be determined by reference to the context of the forensic
issues at the trial as well as by reference to the obligation of the expert to disclose all
relevant material.’
He held (at [72]) that an expert witness:
must give evidence honestly and in good faith and must not deliberately mislead the
court. An expert giving evidence to the court has an obligation to the court to assist it by
giving evidence objectively. That obligation includes making full disclosure of all relevant
material no matter whether it assists or is detrimental to the cause of the client of the
expert. That is because the obligation of the expert to the court overrides the obligation of
the expert to the client.
Following the Court of Appeal decision in Meadow v General Medical Council [2006] 1 WLR
1452; [2006] EWHC 146, Debelle J held that when a professional disciplinary body
considers whether an expert has properly discharged his or her duties as an expert, regard
should be had to the forensic context in which the expert provided his report or gave his
evidence, as well as to the adversarial nature of the trial and the overall forensic context:
‘However, while the expert’s conduct is to be judged in the context of the particular
circumstances in which he is placed, that context does not absolve the expert from
professional or forensic impropriety in the presentation and form of his evidence’ (at [73]).
Debelle J held that while it is necessary to have regard to the potential effect of the
problematic evidence of the expert on the outcome of the case in which he or she testified
or provided an expert report, the actual outcome is not a relevant fact: ‘Plainly, if a
medical practitioner gives expert evidence incompetently or dishonestly but, in the result,
the evidence does not affect the outcome, he will not necessarily be absolved from a
charge of unprofessional conduct’ (at [73]).
Disciplinary tribunal decisions
[8.05.260] In Re Watson-Munro [2000] PRBD (Vic) 4, a formal hearing panel of the
Psychologists Registration Board of Victoria dealt with a forensic psychologist who had
become addicted to cocaine, for a period of time purchasing his drug of dependence from
a solicitor who commissioned him to undertake forensic work in the form of writing
reports for sentencing courts and also giving expert evidence. The Board’s task was to
determine whether Mr Watson-Munro should be re-registered. It determined not to
re-register the psychologist not because of the psychologist’s previous drug addiction, or
wholly because of his lack of insight into holding himself out as a forensic expert in
relation to drug matters when he had an undisclosed substance dependence. It was
[8.05.260] 595
particularly influenced by the especial responsibilities of persons who fulfil a forensic

function upon whose integrity courts and tribunals should be able to depend:
It is not appropriate for a direct parallel to be drawn between the expectations had of
members of counsel and those entertained of psychologists. However, the qualities
required by Dixon CJ of a member of counsel are pertinent to some degree: ‘he should be
able to command the confidence and respect of the court, of his fellow counsel and of his
professional and lay clients.’ Just as there is a delicate relationship between members of
the Bar and the Bench, so there is a special relationship between the writer of forensic
reports and the expert witness and the court. The role of the forensic expert carries the
privilege, not extended to lay witnesses, entitling the expression of opinions. However,
along with the privilege go especial obligations in relation to integrity, professionalism
and the exercise of responsible judgment.
In Re Noble [2002] PRBD (Vic) 6, a formal hearing panel of the Psychologists Registration
Board of Victoria heard allegations that a psychologist had engaged in professional
misconduct by writing an ill-informed and potentially harmful report for the Family Court
about the risks posed by a contact father frequenting gay beats. The psychologist had no
experience in writing reports for the courts. Research was done for him by persons
associated with a party to the litigation and he was presented with a draft report to which
he only made minor alterations before he signed it and later adopted it as his views in the
Family Court. He did not independently research the subject-matter of the report and
succumbed to the pressures imposed by the solicitors representing the mother to adopt the
draft with which he had been provided. Evidence before the Family Court and then before
the Board by a psychologist expert in the relevant area exposed Mr Noble’s views as
prejudiced and uninformed.
The panel emphasised the importance of the role of a psychologist when preparing
reports for courts and tribunals (at [70]):
For a psychologist to hold him or herself out as a forensic expert, namely to supply
information and opinions upon which courts and tribunals might rely, is an onerous
responsibility. It should not be lightly assumed. A psychologist is responsible for
everything that goes under his or her hand in an affidavit and everything that is said
under oath or affirmation in a court or tribunal. Words should be chosen judiciously and
opinions only expressed when they are informed by reflective understanding of a
psychological assessment or testing. When a diagnosis is made, utilising words resonant
of pathology, it should only be done on the basis of scientific application of the precepts of
psychology.
The panel concluded that the even-handedness, scientific rigour and fairmindedness
which should constitute the hallmarks of an expert’s opinion evidence had been absent. It
found him to have failed to accept his professional responsibilities.
The role of regulatory bodies

[8.05.280] It is now apparent that a form of accountability outside the courts and
collegiate censure exists in respect of professional regulation. The decisions of the South
Australian Supreme Court in James v Medical Board (SA) (2006) 95 SASR 445; [2006] SASC
267 and James v Keogh [2008] SASC 156, as well as of the Court of Appeal in Meadow v
General Medical Council [2007] QB 462; [2006] EWCA Civ 1390, have laid to rest the
proposition that the witness immunity rule protects experts against disciplinary hearings
in the way that it affords partial protection against civil actions.
Regulatory bodies will be expected by the courts to exercise restraint in relation to the
circumstances in which they place forensic conduct before disciplinary tribunals. What
Auld LJ has called the ‘alien confines of the witness box’ and the exigencies of giving
evidence mean that hypercritical scrutiny of evidence-in-chief and cross-examination by
experts should not provide a forum for precious or unreasonable criticism of witnesses or
a forum for attempts at relitigation by aggrieved litigants. However, when experts’
596 [8.05.280]
performance is egregiously lacking in professionalism and constitutes a departure from

the fundamental attributes expected of those who assist the courts and tribunals by
provision of specialised knowledge, disciplinary proceedings will be able to determine
experts to have engaged in unprofessional conduct. Such professional infractions may
even be held to amount to serious professional misconduct.
Decided cases make it apparent that a wide variety of forms of conduct by experts in
their reports or their evidence may be regarded as constituting unprofessional conduct
within the regulatory environment. They include, but are not limited to:
• a failure to adhere to the obligations of neutrality, non-partisanship and evenhandness
in the forensic role: Mustac v Medical Board (WA) [2004] WASCA 156;
• adoption of an advocacy role: Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462; [2006]
EWCA Civ 1390; Council for the Regulation of Healthcare Professionals v General Medical
Council [2005] EWHC 579;
• dishonesty: Hussein v William Hill Group [2004] EWHC 208; James v Keogh [2008] SASC
156;
• detracting from the reputation of the profession: Re Watson-Munro [2000] PRBD (Vic) 4;
• exceeding the parameters of expertise: Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462;
[2006] EWCA Civ 1390;
• utilising unscientific methodologies: Meadow v General Medical Council [2007] QB 462;
[2006] EWCA Civ 1390;
• failing to make proper disclosure of all relevant material: James v Keogh [2008] SASC
156;
• breaching client confidentiality without justification: Re Noble [2002] PRBD (Vic) 6;
• grossly incompetent analysis, diagnosis or prognosis: Re Noble [2002] PRBD (Vic) 6;
• misusing tests to achieve a particular result: Mustac v Medical Board (WA) [2004]
WASCA 156;
• misleading a court or tribunal: Re Noble [2002] PRBD (Vic) 6;
• adoption of unwarrantedly inflammatory language: Meadow v General Medical Council
[2007] QB 462; [2006] EWCA Civ 1390;
• failing to provide a court with accurate and documentable information: Austin v
American Association of Neurological Surgeons 253 F 3d 967 (7th Cir 2001);
• engaging in unjustified conjecture: Council for the Regulation of Healthcare Professionals v
General Medical Council [2005] EWHC 579;
• assumption of minority or heterodox views, without disclosing their status: Re Paterson
(unreported, Professional Conduct Committee, General Medical Council, 3 April 2004);
and
• departing from their own published views without justification and explication: Re
Paterson (unreported, Professional Conduct Committee, General Medical Council,
3 April 2004).
Timing of investigations by regulators

[8.05.300] A significant number of notifications against psychologists and psychiatrists in
respect of their forensic work in Family Court and Children’s Court proceedings is
received by both the Psychology Board of Australia and the Medical Board of Australia.
Very few of these translate into extensive investigations and even fewer into hearings.
However, an issue of sensitivity arises in respect of the use which can be made by the
regulatory boards of expert reports and clinical files subpoenaed to court. It is likely that
the collateral use of such materials is improper except for the court for which the reports
were prepared, or that the materials which were subpoenaed give permission for such use
(see [8.05.280] and Psychology Board of Australia v Vicary [2013] FCWA 7.
[8.05.300] 597
A further difficulty arises as to whether a disciplinary hearing can be, or should be,
scheduled before the conclusion of the primary proceeding – that is, for which the report
was prepared or the documentation proceeded. There is a danger that if such matters are
traversed later, an adverse outcome against the health practitioner may raise issues about
the result of the primary proceedings. In addition, the delay may be experienced as
intimidating by the practitioner and may lead her or him to be loath to continue an expert
role, thereby possibly achieving the motive in lodging the notification. If the notification is
investigated immediately, before the resolution of the primary proceedings, this may
involve a problematic canvassing of matters which are before a court and are likely to be
the subject of cross-examination.
Essentially, for logistical reasons arising from the time which investigations of such
matters take, the problem will generally not arise.
598 [8.05.300]
PART 9 – MEDICAL, DENTAL AND
NURSING EVIDENCE
Chapter 9.0: Medical evidence .............................................................. 601

Chapter 9.05: Dental evidence............................................................... 623
Chapter 9.10: Nursing evidence........................................................... 629
599
Chapter 9.0
MEDICAL EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [9.0.01]
Causation ................................................................................................................................ [9.0.40]
Fibromyalgia and chronic pain syndrome ........................................................................ [9.0.120]
Unorthodox treatments ........................................................................................................ [9.0.160]
Aetiology of cancer ............................................................................................................... [9.0.200]
Aetiology of HIV/AIDS ....................................................................................................... [9.0.240]
Pathologists’ evidence on injury causation ...................................................................... [9.0.280]
Pathologists’ evidence in SIDS cases ................................................................................. [9.0.320]
Clark v The Queen ................................................................................................................... [9.0.330]
R v Cannings ........................................................................................................................... [9.0.340]
R v Kai-Whitewind .................................................................................................................. [9.0.350]
R v Folbigg ............................................................................................................................... [9.0.360]
R v Matthey ............................................................................................................................. [9.0.370]
The law after Clark, Cannings, Kai-Whitewind, Folbigg and Matthey ............................. [9.0.380]
‘Doctors are men who prescribe medicines of which they

know little, to cure diseases of which they know less in
human beings of whom they know nothing.’
Voltaire (1694–1778).
Introduction
[9.0.01] Evidence by medical practitioners is the most common of expert evidence given in
courts and tribunals and has a long pedigree in criminal, civil and family law: see Jones
(1994, ch 5). For instance, in his 1792 preface to his collection of lectures delivered at the
University of Edinburgh, Andrew Duncan observed:
Many questions come before the courts of justice where the opinion of medical
practitioners is necessary either for the exculpation of innocence or the detection of guilt
…
There is no branch of medical education, from which the practitioner may not derive
useful information on some points, necessary for enabling him to deliver before the courts
of law, an opinion consistent with truth and with justice.
(See Duncan (1795).)

In earlier times, other means of resolving medical matters had been adopted by the
courts. For instance, when it was alleged in 1220 that a young man had become a leper, the
court did not hear evidence from a medical practitioner, but turned instead to a panel of
barons of the exchequer for an expert opinion: see Flower (1944, p 309).
However, although forensic medicine is often dated as having its modern origins in the
Anglo-American tradition in 1783, when William Hunter published his paper ‘On the
Uncertainty of the Signs of Murder, in the Case of Bastard Children’ (see Forbes (1985)),
somewhat surprisingly, medical evidence has generated only a modest number of
controversies in terms of admissibility and a finite number of major debates in terms of
dilemmas of evaluation (see, eg, Storer (1851), cited in Hand (1901)). Some notable debates
relate to the role of particular categories of medical evidence, such as that by
epidemiologists and by forensic pathologists; others have related to the intersection
between physical and psychiatric/psychological causes of symptomatology. The history of
the latter controversies dates back to the role of Edward Jorden in 1602. Jorden is
somewhat questionably classified by Thomas Forbes (1985, pp 168–169) as the first
forensic psychiatrist. The issue in a witchcraft trial was whether the accused suffered from
a physical ailment or whether her affliction was due to some cause beyond the natural.
Jorden testified that the causes of the accused woman’s distress were attributable to
[9.0.01] 601
Part 9 – Medical, dental and nursing evidence
organic problems arising from ‘the mother’, namely her uterus. In the modern era, though,
forensic disputation in relation to the mind/body divide has focused on the nature of
‘chronic pain syndrome’ and conditions such as ‘fibromyalgia’.
The experience of being an expert witness is often far from welcome and can be
traumatic for medical practitioners (Rous (2016)), especially as treating (as against
independently assessing) practitioners (see Rich (2006); Australian Medical Association
(2016)), in part because of the disruption that it causes to practice and in part because of
the different culture into which doctors are required to intrude where they often feel
neither welcomed nor valued (see Jaques (2011); Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty, Horan
and McKimmie (2016)). For this reason, bodies such as the Australian Medical Association
(2016) and the American College of Physicians (1990) have published guidelines to assist
doctors with the discharge of their forensic role. In addition, calls are regularly made for
additional training for medical practitioners to give expert evidence (see eg Dyer (2019)).
More than any other aspect of medical practitioners’ reports and testimony, it is the
subject of consternation about ‘experts for hire’, ‘whores of the court’ (Hagen (1997)) and
bias and partiality among forensic experts that has aroused concern among judicial officers
and been productive of adverse commentary. In the surveys of the Australian judiciary
and magistracy in relation to expert evidence (Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999; 2001)),
medical evidence generated more caustic feedback from respondents than any other
profession appearing regularly in the courts.
However, the ventilating of such concerns, even expressed in emotive language, is not
a new phenomenon: see Mendelson (2002). For instance, in December 1867, commenting
on railway injury cases, The Lancet observed that:
[n]othing has a greater tendency in the public mind to weaken the confidence in Medicine
as an exact science than the medical evidence given at trials for compensation for railway
injuries.
(See Anonymous (1867).)

The commentator was particularly critical of contradictory testimony adduced on the
part of plaintiffs and defendants by medical experts of equal standing and eminence in the
profession:
The witnesses on the side of the plaintiff invariably regarded the injuries sustained as of a
very serious character; whilst the witnesses for the defendant as invariably appeared to
regard them as far less important, and less permanent in their effects.
(See Anonymous (1867).)

Medical witnesses in the 19th century provided expert opinions with some regularity
arising from what were asserted to be ‘dying declarations’. They were allowed to express
a view on whether the patient was dying and whether he or she knew it. This had
repercussions for clinical practice, leading Elwell (1860, p 318) to observe: ‘The medical
man should therefore note well the last words of the dying man, and the circumstances,
and also his signs, for such signs, if intelligible, are also evidence’.
For the purpose of illustrating the functioning of medical practitioners in the writing of
forensic reports and the giving of oral testimony, a small number of subjects which have
proved controversial in the modern era is canvassed in this chapter:
• causation;
• epidemiology;
• chronic pain syndrome;
• fibromyalgia;
• unorthodox cancer treatments
• causation of HIV/AIDS;
602 [9.0.01]
Medical evidence | CH 9.0
• self-infliction of injuries; and

• SIDS deaths.
A number of issues arise in relation to health practitioner evidence that occur in respect of
all areas of expert opinion evidence. To be admissible their evidence must be the product
of specialised knowledge pertinent to the issues in dispute in litigation. Rulings declaring
expert evidence inadmissible were made by Harrison J in Morocz v Marshman [2015]
NSWSC 149, and upheld by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Morocz v Marshman
[2016] NSWCA 202, a case in which a plaintiff claimed that a surgeon had failed to advise
or warn about the risks of adverse consequences from a thoracic operation. Harrison J’s
refusal to admit expert reports incorporated multiple bases upon which expert reports
may be held inadmissible in the context ultimately of irrelevance:
• the report of a neurologist who had not examined the plaintiff was the report of a
practitioner who was not a surgeon and professed no expertise in relation to the
relevant condition (at [15]);
• the report of a physician and medical researcher was the report of a practitioner who
had no expertise in the conduct of the relevant surgery and its risks, not being based in
a background which permitted informed opinions about the issues before the court (at
[28]);
• the report of an endocrinologist was the report of a practitioner who professed no
study, experience, training or specialised knowledge in the the relevant surgical field -
the performance of a bilateral, endoscopic thoracic sympathectomy (at [38]);
• the report of a research neuroscientist and professor of biomedical engineering,
psychiatry and neuroscience was the report of a practitioner who was not medically
qualified, had not examined the plaintiff and had not performed the relevant procedure
(at [42]); and
• the report of a pharmacologist was by a practitioner who did not have medical
qualifications and who had no history of study, experience, training or specialised
knowledge regarding management of patients with hyperhidrosis or those who have
undergone a bilateral endoscopic thoracic sympathectomy (at [46]).
Causation
[9.0.40] Causation of injury is a core issue that medical practitioners are required to
address to assist courts and tribunals. Often it is far from straightforward where multiple
causes are mooted and also when previous or subsequent events confuse the course of
disease or injury. Many have remarked upon the distinctions between the concept of
causation in medicine, science, psychology and philosophy, on the one hand, and in law,
on the other (see, eg, Greenberg (2002); Stapleton (2002); Lloyd-Bostock (1979)). As
Windeyer J pointed out in National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Espagne (1961) 105
CLR 569 at 591, ‘questions of cause and consequence are not the same for law as for
philosophy and science’.
Rimmer (1989, p 17) identified the clinician’s approach, observing that:
In endeavouring to establish medical causation the lawyer must distinguish in her own
mind, if necessary make clear to her own doctors, the distinction between causation in a
legal sense and a medical sense. The treating doctor is concerned with the aetiology of the
disease, which is the study or theory of the causation of any disease. Since the condition is
present when he sees the patient he is not so much concerned with the trauma factors,
except in so far as that information assists the diagnosis or treatment. Therefore, he is
reluctant to spend much time in studying causal relationships between the accident and
the injury.
In Australia, the orthodox analysis of causation from the legal perspective, by contrast, is
as stated by the High Court in March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506. The
test is not merely the ‘but for’ test but ultimately a question of common sense
[9.0.40] 603
determination of fact: for a critique of this, see Freckelton and Mendelson (2002)). This
remains so even after the tort reforms at the start of the 21st century which prescribe that
negligent is to be accounted as having caused harm by reference to whether the negligence
was a necessary precondition of the harm (factual causation) and whether it is appropriate
for the scope of the negligent party’s liability to extend to the harm so caused (scope of
liability): see, eg, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5D; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 11;
Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 34; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 13; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic),
s 51; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5C.
Spigelman CJ in Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; [2000] NSWCA 29
at [142]–[143] emphasised the contrast between such an approach and that adopted by
other professionals:
When assessing expert evidence on causation, the legal concept of causation requires the
court to approach the matter in a distinctively different manner from that which may be
appropriate in either philosophy or science, including the science of epidemiology.
The commonsense approach to causation at common law is quite different from a
scientist’s approach to causation. (see National Insurance Co of New Zealand Ltd v Espagne
(1961) 105 CLR 569 at 591; March v E & M H Stramare Pty Ltd (1990–91) 171 CLR 506 at 509,
522, 530–531; Chappel v Hart (1998) 195 CLR 232 esp at [6]–[7], [23], [62]–[64], [93], [111],
[122]. An inference of causation for purposes of the tort of negligence may well be drawn
when a scientist, including an epidemiologist, would not draw such an inference.
Frequently, the major question for the courts is how the medical evidence in principle
enabling such an inference should be evaluated.
In Medlin v State Government Insurance Commission (1995) 182 CLR 1 at 6–7, Deane,
Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ articulated the contemporary legal position in Australia
in their joint judgment:
For the purposes of the law of negligence, the question whether the requisite causal
connection exists between a particular breach of duty and particular loss or damage is
essentially one of fact to be resolved, on the probabilities, as a matter of commonsense and
experience. And that remains so in a case such as the present where the question of the
existence of the requisite causal connection is complicated by the intervention of some act
or decision of the plaintiff or a third party which constitutes a more immediate cause of
the loss or damage. In such a case, the ‘but for’ test, while retaining an important role as a
negative criterion which will commonly (but not always) exclude causation if not satisfied,
is inadequate as a comprehensive positive test. If, in such a case, it can be seen that the
necessary causal connection would exist if the intervening act or decision be disregarded,
the question of causation may often be conveniently expressed in terms of whether the
intrusion of that act or decision has had the effect of breaking the chain of causation which
would otherwise have existed between the breach of duty and the particular loss or
damage. The ultimate question must, however, always be whether, notwithstanding the
intervention of the subsequent decision, the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is, as
between the plaintiff and the defendant and as a matter of commonsense and experience,
properly to be seen as having caused the relevant loss or damage.
This issue poses particular difficulties for expert witnesses and for the evaluation of expert
evidence where causation is multi-factorial.
Priestley JA in Department of Agriculture (NSW) v Allen [2000] NSWCA 141 at [2]–[3]
observed:
The decision at first instance is a paradigm example of a feature of fact finding often found
in cases involving medical issues. That feature is the major cleavage between proof of a
fact in non-criminal court cases to the satisfaction of the fact finding tribunal on the
balance of probabilities and proof of a fact for scientific purposes to the satisfaction of
those expert in the particular field of science. The latter kind of proof is much more
rigorous and demanding than the former.
The two kinds of proof are quite different in their objects and methods, but are
frequently the cause of confusion when medical issues are concerned. In many such cases,
experts in the field of the relevant medical science give evidence of their expert opinion
604 [9.0.40]
concerning the medical issue. Trained in the scientific method of proof, some such experts
find difficulty in adjusting themselves, when giving evidence in court, to the lesser
requirements of legal proof, which, looked at from their scientific standpoint, they regard
as inferior and unreliable. An expert who gave evidence for a party in litigation where
there has been an adverse result reached by application of the legal standard of proof is
quite likely to advise the party that the result is an unscientific and unsound one.
In turn, this prompted Giles JA in Dobler v Halverson (2007) 70 NSWLR 151; [2007] NSWCA
335 at [117] to observe:
Assistance from expert scientific opinion does not negate the use of common sense in
coming to a conclusion as to causation in law, including in the application of the scientific
criteria to the facts. It should of course be borne in mind that common sense may not
accord with what science can establish, and a layman must guard against substituting an
untrained opinion for expert guidance, but that does not mean that common sense has no
part to play in judge’s fact finding.
Fibromyalgia and chronic pain syndrome

[9.0.120] Atypical pain experience, not demonstrably referable to injury by radiology or
other medical techniques, causes dilemmas for court evaluation. Both ‘fibromyalgia’ and
‘chronic pain syndrome’ have been prominent in this regard.
Fibromyalgia is a disorder of unknown etiology causing a set of symptoms including
muscle pain, joint pain, impaired concentration and memory, sleep disturbance, fatigue
and, to a varying extent, anxiety and depression, irritable bowel symptomatology,
paraesthesia, visual disturbance and other somatic complaints (see Huseyin v Qantas
Airways [2010] NSWSC 372 at [41]ff). It is thought by some to be a psycho-physical
disorder resulting in pain amplification in certain people predisposed to developing this
type of condition (see, eg, evidence in Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd (2005) 222 CLR 44;
[2005] HCA 15 at [13], [45]). Put another way, it has been described as ‘a common pain
syndrome due to psychological distress whereby the pain system becomes overly active
and painful musculo-skeletal symptoms supervene’ (Forder v Hutchinson [2005] VSCA 281
at [21]). Others have classified it as a symptom of an anxiety disorder (see, eg, evidence in
Cerebos (Australia) Ltd v Koehler [2003] WASCA 322 at [30]). It is sometimes also described
as a ‘chronic pain syndrome’ (see, eg, evidence in Koutroumanis v TAC [2003] VCAT 439 at
[43]; Williams v Baz [1997] ACTSC 65) and it is linked with ‘chronic fatigue syndrome’ (see,
eg, evidence in Rose v Central Queensland University [2002] QSC 304 at [8]).
Chronic pain syndrome often arises where there is disseminated pain of unclear origin.
It is generally regarded as a psychiatric diagnosis – one of the somatoform disorders (see
Wikner v Commissioner of Police [2006] NSWCA 217; Jones v Eagle Ford Pty Ltd [2000]
NSWSC 1084; Dew v Richardson [1999] QSC 192).
In Veljanovska v Socobell OEM Pty Ltd [2005] VSCA 227, for instance, the plaintiff
claimed to have suffered, by reason of repetitive work, an injury which affected her hands,
arms, shoulders and neck. Consequential upon the injury, she contended that she had
developed a chronic pain syndrome affecting the areas which had been the sites of
organically determined pain; and further, consequential upon that injury, she said that she
had developed psychiatric injury. This was found to be a serious injury by the Victorian
Court of Appeal.
The controversial nature of the condition is exemplified by the evidence of a
neurologist in Branagan v Robinson [2006] ACTSC 66 at [83]: he had never made a
diagnosis of chronic pain syndrome. His belief was that pain must have a cause and that
his task as a neurologist was to find the cause. His impression was that the diagnosis of
chronic pain syndrome had been developed as a fallback position where a clinician was
unable to find a cause for pain, and that it was not in itself an acceptable explanation. He
had seen the diagnosis made often by pain specialists but not by neurologists or
[9.0.120] 605
neurosurgeons. He regarded the diagnosis as unfortunate because it gave the impression

that there was no longer any need to look for the cause of the pain and to treat the cause.
Ultimately (at [240]), the court at the same time accepted the opinion of the neurologist
and those specialists who asserted that the label of chronic pain syndrome applied to the
plaintiff:
It is consistent with the proposition that the plaintiff has a degree of genuine pain and that
medical science is at present unable to identify the cause of it. I can also accept that Dr S
correctly detected a measure of exaggeration and embellishment in the plaintiff’s
presentation. The difference is one of degree. I am satisfied that the plaintiff genuinely
suffers from pain in the low back which is at times moderately disabling. I am satisfied
that at other times she is much less disabled than she pretends to be.
(See too Schwartz v Resi Corp (2003) 85 SASR 357; [2003] SASC 118.)
On a number of occasions, courts have heard argument about the uncertain status of
both chronic pain syndrome and fibromyalgia and accepted that plaintiffs suffer the
conditions. For instance, in Sprowles v Makita [1999] NSWSC 1239 at [220], James J found
that although fibromyalgia can occur without any clear precipitant, it can develop
following physical trauma, such as a fall. It would be unusual for there to be a single cause
of fibromyalgia, but in the case before him James J found that the fall at work was a
significant contributing factor. Similarly, in Caldipp Pty Ltd t/as Slaven Motors v Delov [2002]
FCAFC 352 at [51]–[52], Higgins and Madgwick JJ held that:
The fibromyalgia is pre-existing, and the manifestations of it were both pain and fatigue.
That effect was work-related. It was itself deemed to be a work-related disease and, hence,
an ‘injury’. The evidence suggested that the effects subsided with rest but returned, with
increasing virulence, until Mr Delov was unable to perform his usual duties. It could,
therefore, be concluded that the liability to pain at a disabling level has continued and
appears permanent (or at least of indefinite duration).
(See too Workcover Corporation of South Australia v Trask [2007] SASC 339.)
The current state of the law is that both fibromyalgia and chronic pain syndrome in
principle are accepted with some regularity as compensable conditions (see, in particular,
the significant decision of Fullerton in Huseyin v Qantas Airways [2010] NSWSC 372, in
spite of the fact that debate within medicine continues about their legitimacy, their
symptomatology and their aetiology.
Unorthodox treatments
[9.0.160] From time to time, spurious ‘cancer treatments’ are pedalled by the misguided or
the exploitative. When action is taken against such persons, expert evidence can be
fundamental in establishing what constitutes mainstream and scientifically accepted forms
of treatment (see, eg, Chiropractic Board of Australia v Hooper [2013] VCAT 878) in respect of
which patients can be enabled to give informed consent, if provided with balanced
information.
An example in this regard was the action taken against Paul Rana in Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission v Nuera Health Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 695, which led
Ryan J to characterise the conduct of the promoters of various spurious medications as:
a consistently cynical and heartless exploitation of cancer victims and their relatives when
they were at their most vulnerable. This conduct was not like that which is sometimes
encountered in this context of a well-meaning but misguided administration of a single
cure or treatment which the promoter genuinely believes, in the face of a body of
opposing scientific opinion, to offer a prospect of arresting or delaying the progression of
the disease … By contrast with the naïve or credulous proponent of a single cure or
treatment to whom I referred a moment ago, Paul Rana has indiscriminately thrown
together, under the aegis of the Rana System, a package of discredited or entirely
unproven theories, procedures and nostrums which he has gleaned from populist
literature and a range of other sources of widely varying scientific or medical credibility.
606 [9.0.160]
He has then cynically made, to various victims of the respondents, one or more of the
various representations which have been described in the statement of claim and collected
in the categories of the ‘cure cancer representations’, the ‘cancer cure future
representations’, the ‘prolong life representations’, and the ‘scientific support
representations’.
On other occasions, medical practitioners have prescribed ‘unorthodox treatments’ and
insurers, such as Comcare, have declined to fund them (see, eg, Farrugia and Comcare
[2006] AATA 438). In respect of such treatments, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal held
in Kentish and Telstra Corporation Ltd [1999] AATA 661 that the considerations for funding
are whether the treatments are of benefit to the patient and also whether provision of
them, by prescription or otherwise, is supported by a minority of the medical profession.
Aetiology of cancer
[9.0.200] Medical evidence about the causation of conditions such as cancer can be pivotal
in personal injury and other forms of litigation.
In Commissioner for Government Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292, the High Court
of Australia was called upon to consider how extraordinary evidence from a medical
practitioner, who had expressed the view that leukaemia could be caused by emotional
disturbance, should be evaluated. The question was not the admissibility of the evidence
but whether there was medical evidence upon which a jury could have found a causal
nexus between negligence, for which in part each of the appellants had been responsible,
and the death of the respondent’s husband. The deceased had received injuries in a tram
accident – a fracture (without displacement) of his acetabulum and abrasions and
lacerations to his scalp. He was in hospital for a little less than a fortnight and was
described as having been in happy spirits at the time of his discharge. However, within a
few days of his discharge, swellings were observed in his throat, armpit and groin,
whereupon he was diagnosed with lymphatic leukaemia from which he died a few
months later.
The physician called for Mr Adamcik conceded that he had only ever treated one case
of acute lymphatic leukaemia (at 296). He had published a work entitled Autonomic
Dyspraxia in England some years before and propounded the theory that emotional stress
could give rise to a wide variety of diseases (not referring specifically to acute lymphatic
leukaemia) on the basis that a major emotional disturbance may halt or disorganise the
activity of the hypothalamus. He accepted that he was the first person to argue in favour
of such a theory in relation to the aetiology of lymphatic leukaemia (at 298).
The views of the majority in the High Court emphasised the primacy then given to a
jury decision, so much so that other considerations, which would have been important in
an appeal against a judge-alone decision, were secondary, except in the dissenting opinion.
Menzies J noted that the physician, upon whose evidence Mr Adamcik relied, was a
specialist practitioner and thereby warranted his expression of opinion on the subject. He
held that it would have been open to an appellate court to find the jury’s verdict to be
against the weight of the evidence – although this was not the ground of the appeal – but
otherwise he regarded the issue of the physician’s views as one for the jury to evaluate.
Windeyer J (with whom Kitto J agreed) drew attention to the improbable nature of the
physician’s assertions but stated (at 360):
[H]owever far-fetched some of his statements may seem, however much his theory may
be criticized as unproven, however much it is out of line with orthodox opinion, it would
be a bold court that could say that he was not qualified to express an opinion on medical
matters and that the jury should have been told that, as a matter of law, they must
disregard his opinion. The learned trial judge did in effect advise them to treat it with
scepticism. … The case is not one in which a witness, posing as an expert, made assertions
that are contrary to proved scientific facts or to the known phenomena of nature, thus
exposing his ignorance of the learning he professed. To liken the doctor’s statements, as
[9.0.200] 607
counsel did, to the assertion of an eccentric person that the earth is flat is, even for
argumentative purposes, mistaken. If there were any value at all in such a comparison–and
there really is not–Doctor Haines would, no doubt, answer that he should be likened
rather to those who first denied that the earth was flat.
He observed that the competence of the witness as a physician had not been contested.
Thus, it was open to a jury to conclude his views to have been honestly held and it was up
to them to consider whether the witness was a ‘charlatan’, as alleged by the appellants –
‘they might think so or they might regard him as an earnest but misguided proponent of
an incorrect theory or as a discoverer and prophet or in some other way’ (at 308).
Thus, the majority (Kitto, Menzies and Windeyer JJ) held that, unsatisfactory as the
evidence of the physician called on behalf of Mr Adamcik was, nonetheless it was such as
to enable the jury to make its decision on the basis of it.
Taylor J disagreed. He commented (at 298) that the acceptance of the physician’s
evidence was ‘a body singularly unfitted to pronounce on matters involving consideration
of medical or scientific theories. But as long as some members of the medical profession
can be found to advance mistaken or erroneous medical theories in cases such as the
present there will always be the danger that jurors will accept their testimony’. He held
that there had to be found in the expert evidence a sufficient foundation for its application.
In his dissent, he concluded that as there was no evidence in respect of the deceased
suffering a severe emotional disturbance, the opinion of the medical practitioner was
based upon an assumed set of facts for which no proof was offered. This meant that there
was no evidence which supported the verdict of the jury.
Aetiology of HIV/AIDS
[9.0.240] In an extraordinary case in South Australia, Sulan J in R v Parenzee (2007) 248
LSJS 99; [2007] SASC 143 and then the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Parenzee (2007)
SASR 456; [2007] SASC 316 were urged to give permission to appeal to Mr Parenzee, who
had been convicted on three counts of conduct endangering life contrary to s 29(1) of the
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) by engaging in ‘unprotected sexual intercourse’
with three different women, ‘knowing that he had the HIV/AIDS virus’, and knowing that
acts of unprotected sexual intercourse were likely to endanger the lives of the women in
question. It had been found that Mr Parenzee had been recklessly indifferent as to whether
the women’s lives were endangered. The prosecution case included evidence that before
the acts of intercourse Mr Parenzee had been diagnosed as HIV-positive, and that he had
been told by medical practitioners that the virus could be transmitted by sexual
intercourse.
Mr Parenzee applied for permission to appeal against the conviction on the ground
that there had been a miscarriage of justice. At trial he had not disputed that at the
relevant times he was infected with the HIV virus, that by engaging in unprotected sexual
intercourse he could transmit the virus, or that if the women became infected the virus
might cause them to suffer from AIDS and so endanger their lives. The application for
leave to appeal was based on an argument not advanced at trial.
It was contended by Mr Parenzee that prior to the trial, the defence was not informed
of the existence of reputable scientific opinion demonstrating the following facts ((2007)
248 LSJS 99; [2007] SASC 143 at [2]):
(1) At present there are cogent scientific arguments that the set of laboratory
procedures known as HIV isolation are non specific and thus the existence of HIV
has not been proven.
(2) There is no scientific evidence that AIDS is caused by a unique infectious agent.
(3) Cross-reactions between HIV-I antigens and antibodies formed against other
antigens, may lead to false positive reactions.
608 [9.0.240]
(4) Testing procedures used to diagnose HIV (ELISA and WB) are manifestly
unreliable.
(5) Viral load tests do not measure the number of viral particles and no HIV
researcher has been able to correlate the ‘viral load’ with the number of viral
particles in plasma.
(6) There is no proof that CD4 cells are killed by HIV.
(7) There is no proof that HIV, if it exists, is sexually transmitted.
(8) If HIV does exist, the risk of it being sexually transmitted is extremely low.
It was further contended that ((2007) 248 LSJS 99; [2007] SASC 143 at [2]):
2. The fact that this information was not before the jury (irrespective of any contrary
opinions) means that the accused unfairly lost the opportunity for an acquittal.
3. If the new information is cogent, the jury would have had to acquit.
4. The defence was not advised of the existence of the material by the prosecuting
authority, if it was aware of it or by any of the prosecution experts, if they were
aware of it, or by any of the experts consulted by the defence, if they were aware
of it.
In short, Mr Parenzee wished to challenge the factual basis upon which it was said that by
engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse he had endangered the life of the women in
question.
At first instance, Sulan J found that (at [35]–[43]):
HIV is an acronym for human immunodeficiency virus (HTLV-III).
According to mainstream scientific opinion, HIV is a retrovirus. In the most general
terms, a virus is a particle (minute infectious agent) characterised by the ability to replicate
only within living host cells. The general principle of viral replication is that the virus
binds to its target cell, either killing the cell, causing disease inside the cell or taking over
the cell machinery to produce the virus that leaves that cell to infect other cells. …
…
Viruses are able to reproduce with genetic continuity and the possibility of mutation.
The particle, or virion, consists of nucleic acid (the nucleoid), DNA or RNA (but not both)
and a protein shell containing the nucleic acid, which may be multi-layered.
For many years scientific researchers held the view that human cells contain DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid) which can form RNA (ribonucleic acid). That is, genetic
information flowed from DNA to RNA.
…
According to mainstream scientific opinion, acquired immuno deficiency syndrome
(AIDS) is a condition which is caused by HIV. Those persons who have been diagnosed as
being infected with HIV, if untreated, will eventually develop certain conditions which are
considered as AIDS-defining diseases from which they will eventually, if untreated, die.
The effect of HIV, according to mainstream medical scientists throughout the world,
including those who were called by the respondent, is that a person who is infected with
the virus HIV will eventually contract one or other of these AIDS-defining diseases as a
consequence of their immune system becoming depleted to the point that they have
inadequate resistance to fight the disease.
HIV is said to attack the body’s immune system, with the result that the patient
contracts diseases which, in non-HIV patients, would not normally occur. If such diseases
do occur in non-HIV patients, the immune system in most instances is able to resist the
development of the condition, such that it would not usually be fatal.
He applied the decision of King CJ in R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45; 15 A Crim R 364 at
46:
[W]hen it is established that the witness is an expert in the relevant field of knowledge, he
will be permitted to express his opinion, however unconvincing it might appear to be,
subject always, of course, in a criminal trial to the discretion to exclude evidence whose
prejudicial effect is disproportionate to its probative value. The weight to be attached to
his opinion is a question for the jury.
[9.0.240] 609
He noted the questions posed by King CJ (at 46–47):

Before admitting the opinion of a witness into evidence as expert testimony, the judge
must consider and decide two questions. The first is whether the subject matter of the
opinion falls within the class of subjects upon which expert testimony is permissible. This
first question may be divided into two parts: (a) whether the subject matter of the opinion
is such that a person without instruction or experience in the area of knowledge or human
experience would be able to form a sound judgment on the matter without the assistance
of witnesses possessing special knowledge or experience in the area, and (b) whether the
subject matter of the opinion forms part of a body of knowledge or experience which is
sufficiently organized or recognized to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or
experience, a special acquaintance with which by the witness would render his opinion of
assistance to the court. The second question is whether the witness has acquired by study
or experience sufficient knowledge of the subject to render his opinion of value in
resolving the issues before the court.
Sulan J also referred to the taxonomy of the exclusionary rules of expert evidence
advanced in an earlier version of this work and concluded without difficulty that the
evidence sought to be adduced for the applicant fell into the category of expert opinion
evidence and classified it as ‘of assistance’ to the court. He noted that King CJ in Bonython
had required that expert evidence be ‘sufficiently organized or recognized to be accepted
as a reliable body of knowledge or experience’ and that this requirement bore significant
similarities to the test contained in Frye v United States 293 F 1013at 1014 (DC Cir 1923).
Sulan J had particular regard to the dissident nature of the expert before him and
observed that in Commissioner for Government Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106 CLR 292 the
High Court had been called upon to consider evidence from a doctor who expressed the
view that leukaemia could be caused by emotional disturbance.
Sulan J found the decision in Adamcik not to be ‘perfectly analogous’ to the case before
him on the basis that the evidence before him was that HIV is ‘an extremely well
understood virus and that the issues raised by the applicant’s witnesses were not the
subjects of legitimate scientific controversy’ (at [73]). By contrast, the understanding of
leukaemia at the time of Adamcik was limited and the witness was proposing a theory
which, while it was not accepted, was not contrary to a well-developed body of
knowledge. Further, whereas the medical practitioner in Adamcik was proposing a new
theory, the witnesses for Mr Parenzee before Sulan J was seeking to discredit a
well-established theory.
However, ultimately, Sulan J concluded that the reasoning by the High Court in
Adamcik meant that the level of acceptance of a witness’s evidence should not be
determinative of the question whether the witness is qualified to give the evidence – even,
as in Adamcik, where the evidence is far-fetched or implausible, although such
considerations are highly relevant to assessment of the probative value of the evidence,
and also to the court’s assessment of the likely effect of such evidence, had it been led
before a jury.
Two witnesses were called on behalf of the applicant before Sulan J and eight on behalf
of the respondent.
The first of the witnesses for Mr Parenzee was Ms Papadopoulos-Eleopoulos, who
gained a degree in 1960 in nuclear physics from the University of Bucharest in Rumania
(at [77]). She emigrated to Australia and worked as a laboratory attendant in the
Department of Public Health in Western Australia and then as a physicist in the
Department of Medical Physics, where persons with cancer and other diseases were
treated. Sulan J observed that she had no formal qualifications in medicine, biology,
virology, immunology, epidemiology or other medical disciplines (at [84]). She had never
treated nor been directly involved in clinical trials relating to any disease (at [84]). Her
duties at the Royal Perth Hospital were to test people for sensitivity to ultraviolet
radiation. She claimed to have expertise in relation to HIV and AIDS for 25 years, to have
610 [9.0.240]
published learned papers on the subject, and to have conducted research in the area in the
sense of reading and critiquing the work of others in the area, during her spare time.
Sulan J found that ‘her qualifications do not provide her with the academic study required
to give opinions on medical and scientific matters unrelated to nuclear physics’ (at [86])
and that ‘she has not read or she has chosen to ignore an enormous volume of recently
published material on the diagnosis and treatment of HIV/AIDS’ (at [88]). He concluded
that she had been ‘selective in the material upon which she relies’ (at [88]). He scrutinised
the publications which Ms Papadopoulos-Eleopoulos had authored and observed that a
significant number had been rejected by reputable scientific journals (at [89]). He rejected
her explanation that the reason for the rejections lay in the requirement of editors to reject
them because ‘those who peer review articles are members of mainstream scientific
community who support the mainstream view that HIV is a virus which is the cause of
AIDS’ (at [89]). Sulan J commented (at [89]):
Reputable journals will only publish material which has been peer reviewed and from
which it can be demonstrated that recognised scientific techniques have been followed.
Opinions which question scientific conclusions, if adequately researched and peer
reviewed, will be accepted for publication.
Sulan J observed (at [83]) that Ms Papadopoulos-Eleopoulos did not subscribe to HIV
being a cause of AIDS, questioning whether it has been proved that HIV exists as a unique
virus:
She questions the view that the HIV genome originates in a unique exogenously acquired
infectious retroviral particle. Her view is that it has not been proved that HIV is infectious,
either in blood, blood products or by sexual intercourse. Her opinion is that mother to
child transmission of the HIV virus has not been established. She questions whether
antiretroviral drugs have any effect in controlling or suppressing the progression of AIDS.
Her belief was that the HIV virus has not yet been isolated and that those who are
diagnosed with it have not been proved to suffer from a virus. Her view was that the
diseases from which HIV-positive patients are commonly found to suffer are not
causatively linked with the virus.
Sulan J made a variety of criticisms of the way in which Ms Papadopoulos-Eleopoulos
gave her evidence, finding her to be often non-responsive, failing to address the questions
posed of her (at [92]), lacking balance (at [102], [120], [137]), misusing and misrepresenting
others’ work (at [121]), and misunderstanding matters which she should have understood
(at [122]). He accepted that ‘there may be circumstances in which a person can become
expert in a particular area of expertise simply by reading and self-teaching’ (at [130]).
However, he concluded that the areas in which Ms Papadopoulos-Eleopoulos gave
evidence were not such areas: ‘it is virtually impossible to develop an expertise in medical
science, sufficient upon which others can rely, simply by reading textbooks and research
papers’ (at [130]). Sulan J emphasised the importance of ‘practical experience’ (at [131]):
If a person has work experience and has developed their knowledge from learning from
others and being taught, that may be sufficient to qualify the person as an expert. In many
disciplines, practical experience is essential. For example, an expert in winemaking may
gain their expertise by working and being taught by an experienced winemaker. Simply
reading about the subject may not be sufficient.
Sulan J concluded that Ms Papadopoulos-Eleopoulos demonstrated a ‘superficial

understanding of a number of areas’, which he classified as a ‘textbook understanding’,
her knowledge being limited to her reading (at [134]) and lacking any depth of knowledge
or understanding. Accordingly, he found her not to have expertise in the various
disciplines in which expertise was required and thus not to be qualified to express expert
opinions on the existence of HIV, whether it has been established that it causes AIDS,
whether HIV is transmissible, or about the tests developed to diagnose the virus (at [135]).
[9.0.240] 611
He commented too that even had he reached a different conclusion about the expertise
of Ms Papadopoulos-Eleopoulos, he considered her opinions to be so ‘out of line with the
prevailing opinions and prevailing evidence’ that no jury could rely upon her evidence (at
[136]). He found her to lack independence, to be an advocate for a cause, to lack
objectivity, and to refuse to acknowledge or to be inclined to dismiss any evidence
unsupportive of her views. Accordingly, he ruled that her opinions ‘lacked any credibility’
and thus no miscarriage of justice had been demonstrated by reference to her evidence (at
[140]).
Another witness called on behalf of the applicant was Dr Turner, who held orthodox
medical qualifications and was an experienced emergency physician and Fellow of the
Royal Australasian College of Surgery and of the Royal Australasian College for
Emergency Medicine. However, Sulan J concluded that his knowledge of the relevant
subject-matter too was ‘limited to reading’ (at [142]). He found him to lack practical
experience in the treatment of viral diseases or in the disciplines of virology, immunology
or epidemiology: ‘His opinions are based on reading scientific literature, studying of
scientific literature, and spending a considerable amount of time thinking’ (at [143]). Sulan
J took into account that Dr Turner had not published any papers or conducted any
research of significance in the relevant areas. He concluded that Dr Turner too was not
qualified to provide expert opinions about matters such as virus isolation, antibody tests,
viral load tests or sexual transmission of the HIV virus. He found his knowledge to be
limited to reading and reliance on his interpretation of various studies in the specialised
areas, unassisted by practical experience or research.
By contrast, the Director of Public Prosecutions called a number of witnesses with
qualifications in medicine and science who had studied the relevant areas in considerable
depth.
Sulan J observed that ‘[e]ach of the witnesses had extensive practical experience in the
subject matter. Each taught their subject at a high level’ (at [155]). Their evidence
supported the proposition that Ms Papadopoulos-Eleopoulos and Dr Turner lacked the
requisite expertise. Specifically, he concluded that:
• the evidence establishing that the virus HIV exists and is identifiable is compelling and
there is no genuine scientific dispute about the proposition (at [250]);
• there is overwhelming evidence that electron micrographs of HIV have been taken (at
[258]);
• the genetic testing of the HIV genome that has been developed and is accurate for the
identification of HIV (at [266]);
• endogenous retroviral sequences are distinguishable from HIV; there are relatively few
endogenous retroviruses which can be cultured and most are incomplete and will not
replicate (at [274]);
• the method for testing for HIV is extremely rigorous and highly specific and sensitive
(at [293]);
• the HIV virus has been identified and the ELISA test is both specific and sensitive (at
[304]);
• epidemiological research in studies can prove causation (at [321]) and there is
overwhelming evidence that HIC can be and is transmitted by sexual intercourse,
including heterosexual contact, as well as by blood transfusions (at [323]–[324]); and
• HIV causes AIDS (at [337]).
Sulan J found that both the witnesses called on behalf of Mr Parenzee were not adequately
qualified to express their opinions and so their evidence was inadmissible. Even were it to
be admissible, he was satisfied that no jury would conclude that there was any doubt that
HIV is the cause of AIDS or that it is sexually transmissible. To the extent that the evidence
had any probative evidence, it lacked cogency (at [373]).
612 [9.0.240]
The Court of Criminal Appeal observed that the longstanding practice of the court was
to grant leave to appeal against conviction if the proposed ground of appeal was
reasonably arguable. Alternatively, leave is refused if the ground is not reasonably
arguable, lacks any substance or has no reasonable prospect for success (at [22]). This
required in the particular context an analysis of the proposed grounds of appeal to
determine whether it was reasonably arguable that there had been a miscarriage of justice
at trial. The court found that the issue before it was reduced to whether the proposed
witnesses on appeal were qualified to express the opinions that they were asked to express
and whether it was appropriate for the court to consider the questions in respect of the
qualification of the witnesses directly. It found that it was appropriate for the single judge
who had heard the matter to consider whether it was arguable that if the witnesses had
the requisite qualifications, their evidence had the cogency and plausibility required for
the evidence to be left to the jury as the basis for an acquittal.
On appeal, counsel for the applicant did not seek to overturn the decision of Sulan J in
relation to the qualifications of Ms Papadopoulos-Eleopoulos or Dr Turner. However, he
did advance submissions supporting some of the criticisms made by Ms Papadopoulos-
Eleopoulos of scientific papers the subject of debate before Sulan J. This was of little avail,
with the Court of Criminal Appeal observing that the papers in respect of which criticism
was advanced by counsel for the applicant ‘lay not in their intrinsic merit, but in the use
made of them in cross-examination of Ms Papadopoulos-Eleopoulos to expose flaws in her
understanding and approach’ (at [42]). The court affirmed the decision of Sulan J in respect
of the lack of qualifications on the part of both witnesses to express opinions.
The Court of Criminal Appeal found (at [49]) that the evidence called before Sulan J by
the Director of Public Prosecutions also demonstrated that the evidence relied upon by the
applicant lacked cogency and probative force on the basis that the witnesses’ views:
are not based on sound principle. They hold to a point of view rejected by a substantial
body of experts with appropriate qualifications. It is not just that they hold a different
point of view on a matter that is accepted to be contentious or open to debate. Their views,
on the evidence before the Court, are regarded as untenable by experts with appropriate
qualifications and experience.
The court emphasised that it did not regard it as reasonably arguable that the evidence
relied upon by Mr Parenzee had the quality or cogency or plausibility that would lead to
a conclusion that if it had been given at trial the jury might reasonably have arrived at a
different verdict (at [50]). It rejected the proposition that the evidence from the experts
called for the prosecution disclosed a ‘genuine scientific controversy on the three key
matters’ – the existence of the HIV virus, its transmission, and its role as a cause of AIDS.
Pathologists' evidence on injury causation

[9.0.280] In a number of cases, the evidence of pathologists in relation to the aetiology of
injuries, in particular whether they were inflicted by the victim or by someone else, has
proved controversial. For instance, in 2000 the Victorian Court of Appeal was asked to
consider the admissibility of Crown evidence by medical practitioners that wounds found
on the accused man had been self-inflicted: R v Anderson (2000) 1 VR 1; [2000] VSCA 16.
Evidence on the subject was admitted from a surgeon and a general practitioner, both of
whom treated the accused, and from a forensic pathologist and a forensic physician. The
controversy related to the admissibility of the evidence given by the treaters.
Winneke P, with reservations, accepted the concession made before the Court of
Appeal that there was an organised body of knowledge and experience, based on the
observation of wounds alone, which would entitle a person, skilled in the knowledge, to
express an expert opinion on the question of whether particular wounds observed are
self-inflicted (cf R v Mason (1911) 7 Cr App R 67 at 69).
He found (at [55]), though, that the body of knowledge:
[9.0.280] 613
does not derive from recognised principles of medical science, but rather from the study of
characteristics and patterns of wounds from which one may infer, by comparison with
recognised standards, that the wounds being studied are themselves self-inflicted.
Winneke P found that such an expertise would not necessarily be limited to medical
practitioners, although by reason of their experience they would be the more likely
possessors of it. He found that the field of expertise would necessarily be ‘an imprecise
one simply by reason of the infinite variety of circumstances in which wounds are
produced and can be suffered’ (at [55]).
The court held that neither of the treaters should have been permitted to give opinion
evidence as to whether the accused’s wounds were self-inflicted. Winneke P found that
neither witness had shown himself to be qualified to express an opinion in the field of
expertise claimed and neither had demonstrated any factual or scientific foundation for
the opinion expressed. He also commented that ‘at the very least’ the trial judge should
have directed the jury to disregard the opinions of the two doctors because by the end of
their evidence it was clear that they lacked the relevant expertise. (Compare R v Mason
(1911) 7 Cr App R 67, where a surgeon was permitted to give evidence that a fatal stab
wound was not self-inflicted.)
Winneke P stressed (at [59]) that it is incumbent upon the party seeking to elicit expert
opinion evidence to provide a factual or scientific foundation for the opinion expressed:
Although it is, of course, true that it is for the trial judge to decide whether an expert’s
opinion is admissible, and for the jury to decide whether the opinion is credible and what
weight it should be given, it is also true that an opinion is only as good as the factual or
scientific basis upon which it is expressed; and if no such basis is given then the opinion
will be worthless: R v Turner [1975] QB 834 at 840 per Lawton LJ. In that sense the
existence of such a foundation, or proper foundation, for the expression of opinion is a
matter relevant to be taken into account on the question of admissibility: R v Bonython
(1984) 38 SASR 45; 15 A Crim R 364 per King CJ; R v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 at 531–532 per
Brooking J.
The Anderson decision can be contrasted with the decision of the Western Australian Court
of Criminal Appeal in Middleton v The Queen (2000) 114 A Crim R 258; [2000] WASCA 213,
where the Crown sought to assert that the wounds apparent upon the chest of the accused
were self-inflicted after he had attacked the deceased. The prosecution called a
Dr Margolius, a highly qualified forensic pathologist, who testified that the wounds
displayed the ‘classical signs of self-inflicted wounds’. The Court of Appeal held (at [21])
that the matter upon which Dr Margolius expressed opinions were:
matters the full significance of which might not be appreciated by a layman unaided by
evidence from a person skilled in interpreting wounds. Although the untrained layman is
able to see wounds and observe their severity and the pattern of them and where they are
on the body and so on, the question as to what features are significant and the inferences
to be drawn from them are questions of judgment, assessment and opinion.
The court found that the qualifications of the expert were primarily a question of fact for
the trial judge and that an appellant court should be slow to reverse the decision to admit
expert evidence.
In Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; [2002] HCA 4, conflicting evidence from
pathologists figured prominently in evidence before a jury as to whether the prosecution
had proved beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Velevski had murdered his wife and
children. The question agitated on appeal was whether instead there was a reasonable
possibility that Mrs Velevska had killed her children and then herself. Opinions from
pathologists differed significantly.
The appellant submitted that, because the differences of opinion between experts could
not be properly evaluated by the jury, the trial judge should have directed the jury that it
would be dangerous to accept the body of expert evidence adverse to the appellant by
614 [9.0.280]
reasoning from general scientific knowledge. The majority disagreed, Gleeson CJ and
Hayne J finding (at [37]) that ‘[t]he critical differences between the experts did not depend
upon matters that required difficult or sophisticated scientific analysis’.
Gummow and Callinan JJ (at [160]), agreeing, found in relation to the expert evidence
that:
Medical doctors, and pathologists in particular, are well capable therefore of processing
specialised knowledge enabling them to offer informed opinions as to the infliction, self or
otherwise, of injuries. Their experiential knowledge of the pathology of blood, tissue,
bone, and additionally, of the way in which vulnerable parts of the body may be reached
with weapons would, on that basis as well, qualify them to express an opinion on this
matter.
They declined the appeal, observing (at [182]) that:

Juries are frequently called upon to resolve conflicts between experts. They have done so
from the inception of jury trials. Expert evidence does not, as a matter of law, fall into two
categories: difficult and sophisticated expert evidence giving rise to conflicts which a jury
may not and should not be allowed to resolve; and simple and unsophisticated expert
evidence which they can. Nor is it the law, that simply because there is a conflict in respect
of difficult and sophisticated expert evidence, even with respect to an important, indeed
critical matter, its resolution should for that reason alone be regarded by an appellate court
as having been beyond the capacity of the jury to resolve.
However, Gaudron J dissented, observing (at [84]–[85]) that:

[e]xpert evidence is evidence with respect to matters outside ordinary experience or
knowledge. Where conflicting evidence is given with respect to such matters, the conflict
will ordinarily be capable of resolution by a jury only if the evidence is based on matters
of common knowledge or experience or on assumptions with respect to matters about
which the jury can reach its own conclusions.
If the conflicting evidence of experts is not based on matters or assumptions with
respect to matters upon which the jury can reach its own conclusions but, instead, is
evidence of ‘opinion on matters of science within disciplines of which each [is] a master,
and at a level of difficulty and sophistication above that at which a juror … might by
reasoning from general scientific knowledge subject the opinions to wholly effective
critical evaluation’, a jury cannot, by reference solely to that evidence, resolve that conflict
in a manner ‘which would eliminate reasonable doubt’ (Chamberlain v The Queen (1983) 72
FLR 1 at 82; 46 ALR 493 at 574, cited with approval in Chamberlain v The Queen [No 2]
(1984) 153 CLR 521 at 558 per Gibbs CJ and Mason J).
This led her to conclude (at [89]) that, in association with other matters:
the inability of the jury to resolve the conflict with respect to the purely scientific matters,
it must be concluded that the jury could not have excluded Snezana’s suicide as a
reasonable possibility unless satisfied either that the bed was moved after her death but
before the bodies were found or that her body, or the bodies of one or more of her children
were moved after her death.
The important legacy of the case is the unresolved exploration of circumstances when, in
the face of complex disagreement by experts about matters beyond the ordinary ken of
jurors, that aspect of the evidence should either be removed from them or a reasonable
doubt found.
Pathologists' evidence in SIDS cases

[9.0.320] In a series of decisions, courts have grappled with the complex scenario of
widely divergent views expressed by pathologists (and others) about the legitimacy of
classifying multiple deaths of young children from the same family as sudden infant death
syndrome (SIDS) deaths. The difficulty arises from the fact that the diagnosis is one of
exclusion and, inevitably, for a pathologist to arrive at a confident decision about a
[9.0.320] 615
negative, in the context of evolving medical knowledge about unexpected child deaths is
problematic, as often is the identification of when infants’ deaths are brought about by
deliberately unlawful means.
The sequence of important decisions for these purposes is:
• Clark v The Queen [2000] All ER (D) 1219; [2000] EWCA Crim 54;
• R v Cannings [2004] 1 All ER 725; [2004] EWCA Crim 1;
• R v Kai-Whitewind [2005] 2 Cr App R 31; [2005] EWCA 1092;
• R v Folbigg (2005) 152 A Crim R 35; [2005] NSWCCA 23;
• R v Matthey (2007) 177 A Crim R 470; [2007] VSC 398.
Clark v The Queen
[9.0.330] The appellant, Sally Clark, unsuccessfully appealed from convictions for the
murder of her children, Christopher and Harry, when aged 11 weeks and 8 weeks
respectively: Clark v The Queen [2000] All ER (D) 1219; [2000] EWCA Crim 54. Pathology
evidence had been given at the trial of the presence of old and new blood in Christopher’s
lungs and a variety of evidence was given that the condition of Christopher was consistent
with his having been smothered. Problematic evidence was given by Professor Sir Roy
Meadow (see Ch 8.05). This formed part of the basis for the appeal. Pathologists called for
the defence expressed the view that the cause of the children’s death could not be
ascertained.
The Court of Appeal expressed strong views that persons should not be tried on the
basis of statistics but, in spite of Professor Meadow’s evidence, declined to quash Sally
Clark’s conviction, holding (at [144]) that:
Professor Meadow did not overstep the line between the expert’s role and the task of the
jury when he gave it as his opinion that Christopher and Harry did not die natural deaths.
… In our judgment … Professor Meadow’s opinion was based on his expert assessment of
the medical and circumstantial evidence, not on the statistical material. Most of his
examination in chief was concerned with the medical issues.
The court held (at [166]) that the trial judge should have told the jury that it was the
prosecution’s case that to have one unexplained infant’s death with no suspicious
circumstances in the family was rare, and for there to be two such in the same family
would be rarer still. It found that Professor Meadow’s use of statistics and then that of the
trial judge were inappropriate but declined to overturn the convictions in the particular
circumstances of the case. It concluded (at [256]) that there was an:
overwhelming case against the appellant at trial. If there had been no error in relation to
statistics at the trial, we are satisfied that the jury would still have convicted on each
count. In the context of the trial as a whole, the point on statistics was of minimal
significance and there is no possibility of the jury having been misled so as to reach
verdicts that they might not otherwise have reached. Had the trial been free from legal
error, the only reasonable and proper verdict would have been one of guilty.
R v Cannings
[9.0.340] The appellant, Angela Cannings, successfully appealed against her convictions
for murdering two of her three children, who died during infancy: Jason, aged 6 weeks,
and Matthew, aged 17 weeks: R v Cannings [2004] 1 All ER 725; [2004] EWCA Crim 1. The
Crown’s case was that the appellant had smothered both Jason and Matthew, intending to
kill or do them really serious bodily harm by obstructing their upper airways. To support
that allegation, it was suggested that another child’s death, and each of the ALTEs (acute
life-threatening events), were also consequent on smothering by the appellant, and that
the deaths of Jason and Matthew formed part of an overall ‘pattern’. The court summed
up the problem which it faced as follows (at [3]):
The convenient acronym SIDS requires a little amplification, particularly in relation to the
last ‘S’, which stands for syndrome. Treating the problem as a syndrome tends to obscure
616 [9.0.330]
the fact that sudden unexplained infant deaths occur in different circumstances, and some
may be multi-factorial, the result of a coincidence of processes which, taken in isolation,
would not necessarily cause death. No underlying condition for every death categorised
as SIDS has been identified. The critical point of each such death is that it is indeed
unexplained, and that its cause or causes, although natural, is or are as yet unknown. SIDS
does not apply to deaths, or if already attributed to SIDS, ceases to apply to deaths which
are clinically explicable or consequent on demonstrable trauma. In each SIDS case the
mechanism of death is the same, apnoea, loss of breath or cessation of breathing. In the
true SIDS case we do not know why the particular infant’s breathing stopped. All we
know is that for some unexplained reason it did. One obvious reason for loss of breath is
smothering or some deliberate interference with the infant’s normal breathing process.
However the same process, with the same result, also occurs naturally.
The court identified two different reasoning approaches that could be employed. The first
was to examine each death to see whether it is possible to identify one or other of the
known natural causes of infant death (at [10]–[11]):
If this cannot be done, the rarity of such incidents in the same family is thought to raise a
very powerful inference that the deaths must have resulted from deliberate harm. The
alternative approach is to start with the same fact, that three unexplained deaths in the
same family are indeed rare, but thereafter to proceed on the basis that if there is nothing
to explain them, in our current state of knowledge at any rate, they remain unexplained,
and still, despite the known fact that some parents do smother their infant children,
possible natural deaths. It will immediately be apparent that much depends on the
starting point which is adopted. The first approach is, putting it colloquially, that lightning
does not strike three times in the same place. If so, the route to a finding of guilt is wide
open. Almost any other piece of evidence can reasonably be interpreted to fit this
conclusion.
The court concluded that the correct approach is the second (at [13]):
Whether there are one, two or even three deaths, the exclusion of currently known natural
causes of infant death does not establish that the death or deaths resulted from the
deliberate infliction of harm. That represents not only the legal principle, which must be
applied in any event, but, in addition, as we shall see, at the very least, it appears to us to
coincide with the views of a reputable body of expert medical opinion.
Again, substantial amounts of conflicting evidence were called for the prosecution and the
defence. An issue that became important was the potential for an organic, but not sinister,
reason for the children’s deaths to emerge. The court held (at [177]–[179]):
[T]he fact that such deaths have occurred does not identify, let alone prescribe, the
deliberate infliction of harm as the cause of death. Throughout the process great care must
be taken not to allow the rarity of these sad events, standing on their own, to be subsumed
into an assumption or virtual assumption that the dead infants were deliberately killed, or
consciously or unconsciously to regard the inability of the defendant to produce some
convincing explanation for these deaths as providing a measure of support for the
Prosecution’s case. If on examination of all the evidence every possible known cause has
been excluded, the cause remains unknown.
The trial, and this appeal, have proceeded in a most unusual context. Experts in many
fields will acknowledge the possibility that later research may undermine the accepted
wisdom of today. ‘Never say never’ is a phrase which we have heard in many different
contexts from expert witnesses. That does not normally provide a basis for rejecting the
expert evidence, or indeed for conjuring up fanciful doubts about the possible impact of
later research. With unexplained infant deaths, however, as this judgment has
demonstrated, in many important respects we are still at the frontiers of knowledge.
Necessarily, further research is needed, and fortunately, thanks to the dedication of the
medical profession, it is continuing. All this suggests that, for the time being, where a full
investigation into two or more sudden unexplained infant deaths in the same family is
followed by a serious disagreement between reputable experts about the cause of death,
and a body of such expert opinion concludes that natural causes, whether explained or
unexplained, cannot be excluded as a reasonable (and not a fanciful) possibility, the
prosecution of a parent or parents for murder should not be started, or continued, unless
[9.0.340] 617
there is additional cogent evidence, extraneous to the expert evidence, … which tends to
support the conclusion that the infant, or where there is more than one death, one of the
infants, was deliberately harmed. In cases like the present, if the outcome of the trial
depends exclusively or almost exclusively on a serious disagreement between
distinguished and reputable experts, it will often be unwise, and therefore unsafe, to
proceed.
In expressing ourselves in this way we recognise that justice may not be done in a
small number of cases where in truth a mother has deliberately killed her baby without
leaving any identifiable evidence of the crime. That is an undesirable result, which
however avoids a worse one.
Subsequently, this passage has been relied upon by a number of appellants.

R v Kai-Whitewind
[9.0.350] The appellant, Chaha’oh Niyol Kai-Whitewind, appealed unsuccessfully against
her conviction for murdering the youngest of her three children, Bidziil, aged 11 weeks: R
v Kai-Whitewind [2005] 2 Cr App R 31; [2005] EWCA 1092. The father of the child was not
the appellant’s husband, the appellant had been depressed after the birth, and there was
evidence before the trial court of a clear previous ALTE. Again, there was significant
disagreement among the expert witnesses about the possibility that the death of the child
had been a SIDS death. The appellant relied upon the judgment in Cannings.
The court observed that in Cannings, the Crown’s approach was to be contrasted with
the reputable alternative view, that although three unexplained deaths in the same family
are rare, if there was nothing to explain them, they remained unexplained and still,
despite the known fact that some parents do smother their infant children, possible
natural deaths. It pointed out (at [80]) that ‘there was effectively nothing in Cannings to
establish unnatural as opposed to natural death, and the basis of the case against [the
accused] depended on inferences by one group of experts which were refuted by another
reasonable body of medical opinion’. It found (at [83]) that:
Although there were disputes between reputable experts about the significance of some of
the findings made at post mortem, paragraph 178 of Cannings has no direct application to
the present appeal. The allegation against the appellant arose from a single death. No-one
could have suggested, and no-one did, that any inference should be drawn against the
appellant from any previous incident involving any of her other children, or that there
was a pattern of ALTEs from which adverse inferences could be drawn.
The court observed (at [85]) that ‘[i]n Cannings there was essentially no evidence beyond
the inferences based on coincidence which the experts for the Crown were prepared to
draw’. Other reputable experts in the same specialist field took a different view about the
inferences, if any, which could or should be drawn. Hence the need for additional cogent
evidence. With additional evidence, the jury would have been in a position to evaluate the
respective arguments and counter-arguments: without it, in cases like Cannings, they
would not.
The court dismissed the appeal, distinguishing the reasoning in Cannings and holding
(at [89]) that:
In the context of disputed expert evidence, on analysis, what was required in this case was
no different to that which obtains, for example, when pathologists disagree about the
cause of death in a case of alleged strangulation. An argument whether the hyoid bone
was fractured before death (supporting the conclusion of strangulation) or whether it
occurred post mortem, perhaps during the course of the autopsy itself (which would
discount strangulation), is commonplace. More important, it does not alter the fact that the
hyoid bone was fractured. And even if the experts disagree about whether it was indeed
fractured, that is a question for the jury. R v Cannings [2004] 1 All ER 725; [2004] EWCA
Crim 1 does not produce the result that it follows from an argument between experts that the
issue whether the fracture occurred before or after death, or whether there is a fracture at all,
is not appropriate for the jury’s consideration. Evidence of this kind must be dealt with in
618 [9.0.350]
accordance with the usual principle that it is for the jury to decide between the experts, by
reference to all the available evidence, and that it is open to the jury to accept or reject the
evidence of the experts on either side.
R v Folbigg
[9.0.360] The appellant, Kathleen Folbigg, unsuccessfully appealed against her conviction
of the murder of her four children, Caleb, Patrick, Sarah and Laura, aged, respectively,
3 weeks, 8 months, 10 1/2 months and 18 1/2 months: R v Folbigg (2005) 152 A Crim R 35;
[2005] NSWCCA 23.
The prosecution case was that she had smothered all four children and that there was
corroborative evidence from her own diaries. Again, the pathology evidence conflicted.
The prosecution case was essentially circumstantial, positing the circumstances (at
[80]):
• that it was not a reasonable possibility that Caleb’s death had been caused by his
defective larynx;
• that it was not a reasonable possibility that Patrick’s ALTE had resulted from either
encephalitis or a spontaneous epileptic episode;
• that it was not a reasonable possibility that Patrick’s death had been caused by an
epileptic episode causing him to stop breathing suddenly and for long enough to die;
• that it was not a reasonable possibility that Sarah’s death had been caused by a
displaced uvula;
• that it was not a reasonable possibility that Laura’s death had been caused by
myocarditis;
• that it was not a reasonable possibility that there was, in any individual case, some
other natural cause of death;
• that, absent a natural cause of death in any one of four successive infant deaths in a
single family, the only inference rationally available was that the deaths had been
caused in some unnatural way;
• that the only rational inference as to the nature of the unnatural cause was that each of
the children had been suffocated by somebody; and
• that the only person to whom the evidence pointed in that connection was, in each case,
the appellant.
At trial, the following general direction was given (at [99]):
When you come to consider whether the accused smothered any child, you are entitled to
take into account far more than the doctors were in coming to their opinions. You are
entitled to take into account, as they were not, the unexpected deaths of the other three
children, and Patrick’s ALTE, and all the circumstances surrounding those deaths and that
ALTE. You are also entitled to take into account all the other evidence in the case,
particularly the entries made by the accused in her diaries from time to time, and any
meaning that you attribute to those entries.
It was found to be appropriate on appeal.
The court discussed the ramifications of Cannings and concluded (at [138]–[143]):
First, one of the principal Crown experts had given evidence in another trial, and it had
been demonstrated, but only after the conclusion of that other trial, that his evidence had
been seriously flawed. The Court of Appeal thought that it ‘must reflect on the likely impact
on the verdict in the present case if … (defence counsel) …. had been able to cross-examine … (the
particular witness) … and undermine the weight the jury would invariably attach to his evidence
by exposing that, notwithstanding his pre-eminence, at least part of his evidence in … (the other
trial) … was flawed in an important respect’. There is no such situation present in the expert
evidence given for the Crown at the appellant’s trial.
Secondly, the Court of Appeal in R v Cannings [2004] 1 All ER 725; [2004] EWCA Crim
1 received at the hearing of the appeal a body of fresh scientific evidence. This fresh evidence
is described in paragraph 138 as ‘a substantial body of research, not before the jury, and received by
us in evidence…’. There is no such fresh post-trial evidence before this Court.
[9.0.360] 619
Thirdly, the Court of Appeal discusses at paragraphs 31–35 inclusive, what it describes as
‘The Family Context’. In that connection the Court of Appeal considers both trial evidence, and
post-trial fresh evidence, about the immediate and extended family tree of Mrs. Cannings. The
Court concludes that: ‘That there may well be a genetic cause, as yet unidentified, for the deaths of
the Cannings children, manifesting itself in some, but not all of the extended family, through autosomal
dominant inheritance with variable penetrance. That would mean that the child in question needed only
to inherit the gene from one parent to be liable to develop whatever the genetic mechanism may be’.
There is no comparable situation in the present case.
Fourthly, the Court of Appeal emphasises, (paragraph 160), that in the case of
Mrs Cannings: ‘there is no suggestion of ill-temper, inappropriate behaviour, ill treatment let alone
violence, at any time, with any one of the four children’. In the appellant’s case, there is a body of
such evidence, and it was not shown to be inherently incredible. That evidence was, rather,
bolstered by the diary entries, for which there was no parallel in the Cannings case.
The differences between the appellant’s case and that of Mrs Cannings entail that it does
not follow that the reasoning which led to the quashing of Mrs Cannings’ convictions must
lead more or less as a matter of course to the quashing of the appellant’s convictions.
In the present case there was, in my opinion, ample evidence at trial to justify these
findings, reached beyond reasonable doubt:
(1) None of the four deaths, or Patrick’s ALTE, was caused by an identified natural
cause.
(2) It was possible that each of the five events had been caused by an unidentified
natural cause, but only in the sense of a debating point possibility and not in the
sense of a reasonable possibility. The evidence of the appellant’s episodes of temper
and ill-treatment, coupled with the very powerful evidence provided by the diary
entries, was overwhelmingly to the contrary of any reasonable possibility of
unidentified natural causes. So were the striking similarities of the four deaths.
(3) There remained reasonably open, therefore, only the conclusion that somebody had
killed the children, and that smothering was the obvious method.
(4) In that event, the evidence pointed to nobody other than the appellant as being the
person who had killed the children; and who, by reasonable parity of reasoning, had
caused Patrick’s ALTE by the same method.
Betts and Goodman-Delahunty (2007) have commented of the decision:

The case lays bare the inherent uncertainty and fallibility of medical opinion about the
cause of an infant’s sudden and unexpected death. Medical opinion is based to some
degree on clinical judgment and, like any decision-making task, the subject of bias and
error. The case illustrates how developing a legal argument that the accused has
committed the crimes can transform circumstantial evidence, which may have been
unrelated or innocent, into markers or ‘proof’ of guilt. Numerous inferences were drawn
to fit circumstantial evidence into a compelling argument to find the accused guilty.
Inferences are as prone to error as professional judgment. Whether existing legal
procedures can effectively minimise these errors is a separate issue …
When an infant dies suddenly, autopsy examinations can provide a probable cause of
death based on the available medical knowledge about likely mechanisms in other
instances of infant death. However, autopsy examinations are unable to distinguish
between SIDS and inflicted suffocation. The deaths of the Folbigg children were initially
viewed as unrelated based on varying and uncertain causes reported following each
autopsy. However, when a number of children die in one family without a physiological
explanation (such as genetic or metabolic abnormalities), suspicion falls on those present
at the death scene, typically one or both parents. This suspicion may not be justified if
external signs of trauma are absent. Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) is a term
applied when an infant is found unexpectedly dead after sleeping with no cause of death
ascertained. The syndrome is contentious, and there is limited agreement as to its
symptoms, other than that it is unlikely to represent a single disease with a unique cause.
Instead, SIDS may be a complex amalgam of predisposing factors, external stresses, and
underlying vulnerability. Different factors may have different effects on different
individuals. Primarily, SIDS is a phenomenon of early infancy (under 12 months) and
unexpected deaths after one year of age are regarded as unusual. This definition is
important, as it recognises that attributing a death to SIDS requires more than a thorough
620 [9.0.360]
pathological evaluation. Many subtle natural diseases in infancy result in unexpected

death, and infants may be seriously ill with few signs and symptoms. Similarly, the
findings at autopsy in infants after accidental or inflicted asphyxia are often minimal … ‘as
SIDS is diagnosed through a process of exclusion, the term SIDS should not be used if
there is’ possible accidental asphyxia, inflicted injuries, or significant organic diseases.
They noted that:
Notwithstanding the increasing body of science on which medicine is based, clinical
judgment represents a substantial portion of medical decision-making. Research on
decision-making has shown that clinical judgment and decision-making are often
unreliable. However, the law appears to accept medical evidence as factual and objective
on the basis that it is physical and measurable. The evidence of more than eight medical
experts who testified in Folbigg [2005] NSWCCA 23, each espousing different views on a
variety of medical issues, challenged the notion that there is one ‘correct’ answer
regarding the cause of the infant deaths. …
The legal system assumes that evidence management (adversarial process, cross-
examination, rules for admission of evidence, judicial warnings, deliberation) corrects for
biases or errors involved in reasoning in the context of evidence proffered by medical
experts. However, as medical opinion on causation is probabilistic and involves clinical
judgment, it cannot be assumed that it is possible to arrive at an error-free ‘correct’ view
about the cause of death(s), either legally or medically. Clinical decision-makers use
heuristics or cognitive short cuts in a similar manner to lay decision-makers, which in turn
contribute to errors in clinical judgment.
In August 2018, the New South Wales government announced an inquiry into the
conviction of Ms Folbigg to be conducted by the former Chief Judge of the District Court,
Reginald Blanch.
R v Matthey
[9.0.370] The accused, Carol Matthey, was presented for trial for the murder of four of her
children, Jacob, Chloe, Joshua and Shania, aged 7 months, 10 weeks, 13 weeks and
41 months, respectively: R v Matthey (2007) 177 A Crim R 470; [2007] VSC 398. In each
instance, the prosecution alleged that death was the result of deliberate suffocation. Expert
medical evidence, mostly from pathologists, was sought to be adduced that the
post-mortem findings were consistent with suffocation. Additionally, the Crown sought to
advance evidence of a circumstantial nature, much of it addressed to the accused’s
relationship with her partner and children. This material was said to demonstrate acts by
the accused (including the murders) which were motivated by a desire on her part to
sustain her relationship with her partner.
Coldrey J heard extensive pre-trial arguments, made rulings and then the prosecution
withdrew its case against Ms Matthey. He observed (at [147]) that the major area of
contention in the case involved the ambit of the expert medical evidence. This included
defence submissions that the expert evidence (mostly from pathologists) trespassed upon
the province of the jury in their determination of the ultimate question of whether the
Crown had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused deliberately suffocated each
of her children.
The defendant denied harming any of her children. It was her case that the deaths
were natural, if unexplained, incidents to be classified as SIDS. The expert medical
witnesses called by the prosecution and on behalf of the defendant disagreed about
whether multiple infant deaths and further ALTEs in the same family led to the inevitable
conclusion that the deaths were not natural.
The prosecution indicated to Coldrey J that it did not propose to lead any statistical
evidence about the unlikelihood of four SIDS deaths in the one family or any evidence
about the profiles of mothers who intentionally suffocate their infants. Justice Coldrey
held (at [183]–[184]) that:
[i]n cases such as the instant one, the medical expert can go no further than to express the
opinion that induced asphyxia was a possible and consistent cause of death and ALTE. …
[9.0.370] 621
[t]he determination of the actual cause of death is a matter for the jury and the medical
evidence must be limited to opinions of the diagnostic possibility of, or consistency with,
an asphyxial episode.
He held that while it is legitimate for experts to point to the rarity of four unexpected and
unexplained deaths in the one family on the basis of their experience and knowledge of
the literature, to utilise that factor in allocating a cause of death in an individual case is to
indulge in impermissible ‘coincidence reasoning’ of the type apparently disapproved of by
Barr J in Folbigg: ‘Put another way, such an approach simply begs the question’ (at [188]).
Coldrey J held that insofar as there was medical evidence of the lack of any genetic or
metabolic causes which may account for the deaths, these were factors which could be
considered in relation to each child. In the same way, the lack of any signs of physical
injury or trauma to a particular child was a relevant medical fact to be taken into account
in considering possible causes of death. He applied Cannings and held (at [191]) that ‘the
rarity of the phenomenon of four unexpected and seemingly unexplained deaths in one
family cannot, of itself, provide a cause of death’. Importantly, he drew a distinction
(applying the approach of Barr J at first instance in Folbigg) between the embargo upon
medical witnesses relying upon coincidence reasoning as a basis for assigning a cause of
death and the approach which may be taken by the jury (at [192]):
The latter are entitled to take into account, as a piece of circumstantial evidence, the rarity
of four infants in one family dying from unknown natural causes and to utilise it, along
with other pieces of circumstantial evidence, in determining whether the Crown has
succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that the deaths were unnatural and that
the accused was responsible for them.
In July 2019 Blanch concluded that there was no reasonable doubt as to any matter that
may have affected Ms Folbigg’s convictions or sentence and observed that it was not
helpful to attempt to ascribe a statistical value to the possibility of recurrence of SIDS and
that the trial judge’s treatment of the issue had not given rise to a miscarriage of justice
(Blanch (2019, p 165)).
The law after Clark, Cannings, Kai-Whitewind, Folbigg and Matthey
[9.0.380] The law has, to a significant degree, resolved the parameters of medical evidence
and permitted reasoning where it is alleged that a mother has murdered her child or
children and the alternative hypothesis is SIDS. The unusualness of, especially, multiple
deaths attributable to SIDS does not itself provide a cause of death and great care needs to
be exercised in relation to coincidence reasoning. In general, it is inappropriate that such
reasoning be reduced to statistics. The fact that there are major disagreements among
experts (save perhaps with the scenario identified by Gaudron J in Velevski) does not mean
that a jury verdict which evidently prefers one set of experts to another is unsafe.
However, where the disagreement among the experts about the cause of the infants’
deaths is substantial and, in the absence of other information that corroborates the
prosecution, a body of such expert opinion concludes that natural causes, whether
explained or unexplained, cannot be excluded as a reasonable (and not a fanciful)
possibility, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal.
622 [9.0.380]
Chapter 9.05
DENTAL EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [9.05.01]
Dental evidence in the Chamberlain case ........................................................................... [9.05.40]
Bitemark evidence ................................................................................................................. [9.05.80]
‘If economists could manage to get themselves thought of as

humble, competent people on a level with dentists, that
would be splendid.’
John Maynard Keynes, ‘The Future’, Ch 5, Essays in Persuasion (1931).
Introduction
[9.05.01] Dental evidence or odontology evidence has proved important in three major
contexts in the criminal law – to establish the identity of a deceased person (see, eg, R v
Narayan [1996] EWCA Crim 1623), to age a person (alive or dead) (see, eg, R on the
application of A v Liverpool City Council [2007] EWHC 1477 (Admin)) and to identify an
offender by reference to bitemarks (see, eg, R v Carroll (1985) 19 A Crim R 410; Lewis v The
Queen (1987) 29 A Crim R 267; R v Stillman [1997] 1 SCR 607; and R v Smith 2005 BCSC
1624 (CanLII)). Each of these areas has its controversies (see Senn and Weems (2013)). The
experience of being an expert witness is often experienced as difficult and traumatic by
dentists (see Meckler (1982)) but it is increasingly a part of the landscape of professional
practice. It has been the subject of a number of attempts to provide constructive guidance
in the dental literature (see, eg, Dunphy (2012); Abdel-Fattah (1994); Meckler (1982); see
too Fan (2006)) and from professional associations (see, eg, Australian Dental Association
(2012/2016)).
This brief chapter reviews the major roles of dental evidence in contemporary legal
proceedings. It does so against the background of Australia’s most notorious case in which
dental evidence was adduced: Chamberlain v The Queen (1983) 72 FLR 1 and Chamberlain v
R (No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521.
Dental evidence in the Chamberlain case

[9.05.40] In Chamberlain v The Queen (1983) 72 FLR 1 and Chamberlain v R (No 2) [1984]
HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521, the evidence was pivotal to the ultimate result at trial. The
Chamberlains were charged with the murder of their daughter, Azaria. The Crown
adduced evidence by an expert in textile physics and technology, Professor Chaikin, of his
opinion that the severance of the fabric of the child’s jumpsuit had been effected by
cutting, probably with scissors, and not by the teeth of a dingo. In respect of that latter
opinion, his evidence was supported by the opinion of other odontologists. However,
another odontological expert swore that in his opinion the severance of the fabric could
have been caused by canine teeth.
The Federal Court, on appeal, found that the jury would have been justified in finding
beyond reasonable doubt that cuts had been made in the neck of Azaria’s jumpsuit by a
human being with a cutting instrument, probably scissors, notwithstanding the
odontologists’ evidence which tended against that finding – those opinions were directed
to the question whether the teeth of a dingo might have been applied by a living dingo to
the fabric in such a way as to cause the severance of fabric. The court observed that the
odontologists, however, professed neither expertise in the physics or the technology of the
fabric or its components, nor any particular experience of the behaviour of a dingo or a
[9.05.40] 623
dog when eating or attacking prey. Professor Chaikin conceded his ignorance of the
behaviour of the dingo in attack on a clothed body and his ignorance of the appearance of
fabric bitten by a dingo. There was very little evidence of observation of the action, or the
effect of the action, of canine teeth on fabric.
A consequence was that the jury was held to have been able to subject to effective
critical evaluation the expert evidence as to the dentition and the behaviour of the dingo
and as to what scientific examination of the fabric of the jumpsuit revealed.
Another ground of appeal to the Federal Court related to the admission by the trial
judge of evidence from Mr Bernard Sims, a senior lecturer in forensic odontology at the
University of London. He had written extensively on his subject and had participated in
the investigation of about two dozen cases in which biting by domesticated dogs had
occurred or was suspected. He had prepared himself to give evidence by examining the
skulls and the teeth of dead and living dingos and had on one occasion observed the
response of captive dingos to the introduction into their pen of meat.
Mr Sims expressed in evidence the opinion that such anatomical differences as there
were between the skull, including the teeth, of the domesticated dog and the skull of a
dingo were slight. The opinion was not challenged. Mr Sims’ qualification to express the
opinion was not questioned at trial or on appeal, and no suggestion was made that any
anatomical difference might be of significance. It was argued in the Federal Court for the
Chamberlains that Mr Sims’ evidence included opinions for the forming of which a
knowledge of the behaviour, particularly the predatory behaviour, of the dingo was
required and that Mr Sims lacked that knowledge.
It was held that the opinions given by Mr Sims did not go outside the field of his
expertise. He was asked to assume that Azaria had died from a wound to the throat
inflicted by a dingo and gave evidence that, in the course of any such wounding, any
clothing at the throat would be damaged by the dingo’s teeth. He was asked questions
about the extent to which a dingo might open its jaws: that was evidence relevant to the
question whether a seizure of the child’s head by a dingo’s jaws was within the animal’s
anatomical capacity, and was held to be evidence within the expertise of the witness. He
was asked to comment on the hypothesis that, in the course of such a seizure, the
penetrating teeth might so occlude the wounds as to prevent immediate shedding of
blood. The answer was held to be within Mr Sims’ field of expertise:
[I]t would stop copious bleeding to a certain extent, but there would be capillary oozing
and other blood coming around the margins of the wound, coming to the outside, and
there would still, I believe, be a build up of blood which could be dropped. Drops of blood
would come from that.
Then followed this passage:
MR BARKER: Having regard to what you said about twisting and biting – what is the
likelihood of a dog’s teeth actually occluding the wound? – If the dog had seized the
throat, it would have enough power in its jaws to go right through the soft tissues of the
throat.
And the head? – Not so much the head, because of the underlying bone, but it would
certainly – scalp wounds do bleed copiously.
To carry a child, would the dog have to have a firm purchase? – It would have to have
a firm purchase on something secure; the back of the neck certainly where there’s a good
bone structure which it could grip.
Would you expect the victim to be inert? – I would expect in the first instance that
there – there might be a – beginnings of a struggle but –
MR PHILLIPS: Your Honour, we submit this is going right into the realm of
speculation. This witness is a forensic dentist. He is being asked a series of leading
questions and we submit we have now gone beyond the area of his expertise and getting
into an area of speculation, and we submit there ought to be a limit to it.
HIS HONOUR: Yes, Mr. Barker, the witness’s experience with the dingo situation
selecting its food and everything may be one thing, but I think it is limited.
624 [9.05.40]
Dental evidence | CH 9.05
MR BARKER: Yes, I am simply asking him to draw upon his experience of dog attacks,
Your Honour, that is all.
HIS HONOUR: Can I just ask you this, you are assuming in your evidence, are you,
Mr. Sims, that a dingo in consuming something will necessarily bite and tear? – Yes.
Or in an aggressive situation will bite and tear such as when it bites me or something
like that? – Yes.
What about a dingo who is more or less selecting its meal, be it a lump or meat or a
buffalo bone, to carry to another place? You would not necessarily get the tearing of the
canine teeth in that situation, would you? – Not in that situation, no, not – the dingo I
witnessed taking a buffalo bone away, with finesse gripped the – the meat at the end of the
bone with its front teeth and dragged it off.
Counsel for the Crown had previously elicited from the witness, without objection,
evidence of the catching and twisting action of the teeth of a domesticated dog in attack
and the witness had then commented that it is stated that the dingo will catch and twist,
but he had not professed any personal knowledge of the dingo’s behaviour, except that
which he had derived from observing the feeding of the captive dingos. A witness who
had systematically studied dingo behaviour – including predatory behaviour in relation to
small mammals – gave evidence for the Chamberlains, without objection or serious
challenge in cross-examination by the Crown, that in attack the dingo commonly seizes
the cranium of such prey in a crushing grip, without twisting or tearing, and shakes the
prey while it is in that grip and then runs away to safety with the prey held thus. The
contrast was drawn by the witness between the efficient and swift killing and removal of
prey to safety by a mammal dependent for survival on its own food gathering and the
behaviour in attack of a domesticated dog which is fed by its owner. It was held that all
this had been anticipated by the trial judge in his questioning of the witness. It was held
too that Mr Sims’ ignorance of the predatory behaviour of the dingo was carefully
emphasised by the trial judge in his charge to the jury. Thus, the objections to Mr Sims’
evidence having been admitted were rejected.
Bitemark evidence
[9.05.80] The controversial area of bitemark evidence has been the subject of testimony in
a number of major cases in Australia (R v Carroll (1985) 19 A Crim R 410; Lewis v The Queen
(1987) 29 A Crim R 267) and Canada (see, eg, R v Stillman [1997] 1 SCR 607; R v Smith 2005
BCSC 1624 (CanLII)). A consequence of these decisions is that the probative value of such
evidence remains highly suspect.
In 2019 Justice Maxwell, the President of the Victorian Court of Appeal, observed
extra-judicially that: ‘The benefit of better DNA testing has shown that very many people
convicted on the basis of “crook science”, for example, bite mark analysis, were innocent.
This seems to me a matter of profound concern.’ (see Mannix (2019)).
[9.05.90] In R v Carroll (1985) 19 A Crim R 410, the appellant had been convicted of the
murder of a young girl on whose left thigh were bruises left by human dentition.
Odontology evidence had been called in an effort to show that the marks had been caused
by the appellant’s teeth. Kneipp J held (at 413) that ‘the study of the characteristics of
human bite marks and consequent identification of persons responsible for such marks fall
within a field of expertise’ (author’s emphasis) and that the witnesses called were experts in
that field.
The experts gave evidence that each person’s dentition is unique so that comparison of
dentition with bite marks allows a conclusion as to whether the person’s teeth produced
those marks. However, the reliability of such a conclusion will depend upon factors which
include the quality of the marks against which the dentition is to be compared. In Carroll
there were no indentations or lacerations, merely bruising.
Kneipp J observed (at 414) that each of the odontologists:
[9.05.90] 625
maintained the validity of identification by reference only to bruise marks, but from their
evidence it is clear that experts in this field are a long way from unanimity on this point.
There is a body of eminent opinion which holds that valid identifications cannot be made
by reference only to bruise marks or that they should be referred to only for the purpose of
excluding suspects and not for the purpose of positive identification.
In addition, one of the witnesses acknowledged a number of problems with the

comparison process. These included the difficulties in accurate reproduction of the
bruising, 1 the reproduction of the dentition marks on an acetate which involved a change
from three dimensions to two, the marking of the tracing which was not a mechanical
process but a matter of judgment, and the identification of what number of teeth actually
caused the bruising. The latter issue proved particularly problematic, with two witnesses
seeing bruising related to all four upper incisors but the other witness relating that
bruising to only three teeth. In short, the witnesses were significantly at variance about
how the teeth in question could have caused the bruising on the deceased. 2
Ironically, too, one of the experts, 12 years earlier (in relation to the deceased), had
expressed the view after consultation with a panel of 10 eminent dentists that ‘it would be
impossible to establish, with any degree of certainty, as to who would be responsible for
this bite mark to the dead child’: at 416. Although in the intervening period he had done
considerable further research and study, Kneipp J held (at 416) that ‘none of the matters
which he mentioned specifically appeared to me to be relevant to his change of opinion.
He asserted that he was already an expert in this field in 1973’.
The appeal point was not that the odontology evidence should not have been admitted
but that the judge did not give adequate directions to the jury concerning the weakness,
insufficiency, unreliability and conflicts in the expert evidence. The ground was upheld,
with Kneipp J holding (at 417) that the case was not one where the jury ‘could be selective
in deciding which of the evidence of any particular witness or witnesses they would
accept and act on or reject or refuse to act on. I think that the state of the evidence is such
as not to assist them in such a process’ (see also at 435 per Shepherdson J). Given the
employment of Frye terminology in Kneipp J’s decision in the context of assessing the
need for judicial directions, it is unclear what fate would have befallen the evidence had
the appeal point been the admissibility of the evidence in the first place.
In Lewis v The Queen (1987) 29 A Crim R 267, the Crown relied heavily at trial upon
odontology evidence in a sexual assault charge. The admission of such evidence was the
main ground of the convicted man’s appeal. Maurice J noted the decision in R v Carroll
(1985) 19 A Crim R 410 and reflected that in the field of forensic dentistry, there was not
general acceptance of the reliability of comparison of bruising with dental impressions. He
1 ‘A photograph of part of a human body results in reproduction in two dimensions of a

three-dimensional object, with possible distortion. The bruise marks in question were on a
curved surface, and this might also cause distortion. The shapes of bruise marks can alter
if the body is placed in a different position from that in which it was placed when the
marks were made. The marks here were near the knee, and their shapes might be affected
by changes in tensions of the skin caused by extension or flexion of the knee joint’: at 415.
2 ‘In addition, however, Mr Sims related the left central incisor to a mark which
Dr Romaniuk and Mr Brown related to the left lateral incisor. It would follow, one would
think, that Mr Sims would relate bruising to the right central and right lateral incisor
which Dr Romaniuk and Mr Brown would relate to the left and right central incisors. But,
finally, all three related a certain mark to the right lateral incisor. So far as the lower teeth
were concerned, Dr Romaniuk saw bruising which he would relate to all four teeth.
Mr Sims saw bruising which related to three. He saw nothing relating to the left lateral
incisor. So far as Mr Brown is concerned, he spoke of a scraping mechanism, causing
diffuse bruising, and I think it is fair to infer that he would not relate any particular
bruising to any particular teeth’: at 416.
626 [9.05.90]
Dental evidence | CH 9.05
asserted that at the least, the Frye test functions as a useful guideline in determining
whether novel scientific evidence should go before a jury.
He held (at 270) that it was incumbent on the Crown to prove the scientific reliability of
the exercise it carried out. He suggested that it was appropriate that courts issue judicial
guidelines for the reception of scientific evidence, noting the concerns expressed in
Chamberlain v R (No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 588 (Gibbs CJ and Mason J
agreeing with Jenkinson J in the Federal Court) about jurors’ capacity to evaluate certain
kinds of expert evidence effectively:
But the evidence of Professor Boettcher and of Professor Nairn claimed the consideration
of the jury upon grounds which could not rationally be shaken substantially by those
things which the eyes and ears of a jury receive, but which a transcript does not reveal.
Each of them was giving his opinion on matters of science within disciplines of which
each was a master, and at a level of difficulty and sophistication above that at which a
juror, or a judge, might by reasoning from general scientific knowledge subject the opinion
to wholly effective critical evaluation. … But in my opinion no juror could reasonably have
failed to acknowledge that, reason as he might, he was not in a position to assure himself
of the correctness of a conclusion against the opinions of the two professors to the degree
which would eliminate reasonable doubt as to that conclusion.
Maurice J expressed the view in Lewis (at 271):

[W]henever the Crown wishes to rely upon forensic [sic] evidence the prosecutor has a
clear duty, not just to his client, the Crown, but to the trial judge and the jury to acquaint
them, in ordinary language, through the evidence he leads, with those aspects of the
expert’s discipline and methods necessary to put them in a position to make some sort of
evaluation of the opinions he expresses. Where the evidence is of a comparatively novel
kind, the duty resting on the Crown is even higher: it should demonstrate its scientific
reliability. It is not an answer to considerations that dictate these things be done to say the
defence may draw it out in cross-examination; that is an abdication of the Crown’s
primary function in a criminal prosecution.
In the end, his Honour, having focused upon a significant number of utterly unsatisfactory
elements of the expert evidence led by the Crown, held that the jury ‘should not have been
allowed to place any reliance on the dentists’ opinions’. He declined to say whether the
evidence had been inadmissible or whether it should not have been admitted because its
prejudicial effect far outweighed its probative value.
In the main, Muirhead AJ (with whom Asche J agreed) was at one with the judgment
of Maurice J. He commented (at 287) that the science of forensic odontology was
developing still, but that ‘this branch of forensic science has not advanced to the stage of
say fingerprints or ballistics. The result is a matter of judgment, not easily, or at least
accurately demonstrable to a jury’. Quoting from the problems with such evidence
highlighted in Carroll, Muirhead AJ held (at 288): ‘It may be that this type of forensic [sic]
evidence is becoming important in the forensic field but as I understand the evidence
there is no established universal view as to its reliability in identifying, as opposed to
excluding the suspect.’ His Honour did not address the question of admissibility; nor did
he explicitly adopt the language or reasoning of the Frye test. Rather, he decided the
appeal on the question of the weakness of the Crown case.
Canadian authority
[9.05.100] In a notorious British Columbia case, R v Smith 2005 BCSC 1624 (CanLII), the
accused was charged with killing the deceased by stomping on his head with his cowboy
boots. The prosecution called a forensic odontologist, Dr Sweet, who had studied the
comparison of marks made by certain classes of objects, generally bite marks and other
injuries on skin. However, he testified that his practice was to examine a questioned
object; in this case, the object was a new cowboy boot. He compared marks that were
made in clay by the boot and was asked about the force used. Modelling clay was used to
get the impression of the boot. Dr Sweet said he began by trying to exclude the object and
[9.05.100] 627
then looked for characteristics. He was able to give evidence with regard to objects, but
not the boot itself. He could not be more specific. The British Columbia Court of Appeal
held (at [79]) that although Dr Sweet:
is unquestionably an expert in the field of forensic odontology, his evidence was of limited
use in this case. No conclusion can be drawn except maybe a certain object caused one
type of injury. At most, any object with a corner like that of a new boot could have made
one or more of the injuries to the head of Mr Alcock. An object with the same shape could
have caused a similar injury or injuries.
[9.05.110] In R on the application of A v Liverpool City Council [2007] EWHC 1477 (Admin),
Walker J heard complex evidence about the age of an Afghani applicant for asylum. The
key evidence was dental evidence. Walker J on appeal did not find fault with the
admission of the evidence but observed (at [46]) that:
Plainly a person with dental expertise – whether that be specialist dental expertise in the
case of Mr Ritchie or more limited dental expertise in the case of Dr Michie – can express
a view as to the dental age of a particular individual. Only a person with wider expertise,
however, can offer a view as to the strength of particular non-dental factors in reaching a
conclusion as to age. Second, those who are experts in a particular field should normally
confine themselves to setting out opinions on a relevant topic.
628 [9.05.110]
Chapter 9.10
NURSING EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [9.10.01]
Nurses as experts .................................................................................................................. [9.10.40]
Forensic nurses as experts ................................................................................................... [9.10.80]
‘I came to realise there should be a discipline of forensic

nursing that involved the sexual assault nurse, the death
investigator, the legal nurse consultant, the clinical forensic
nurse and the emergency department, the psychiatric nurse
and nursing attorneys. They were all practising in unique
areas and they didn’t have a label. What I did was bring them
together under an umbrella.’
V Lynch, Forensic Nursing (2005).
Introduction
[9.10.01] Nurses are asked comparatively rarely to function as expert witnesses or to write
reports for courts and tribunals providing their professional opinions about matters in
contest. However, they are often called to outline (as a matter of fact) what occurred on a
particular occasion and to explain the documentation in a clinical record (see, eg, Sherry v
Australasian Conference Association (t/as Sydney Adventist Hospital) [2006] NSWSC 75). A
prominent exception in this regard is coronial inquests and, to a lesser degree, negligence
actions where nurses occasionally are sued (see, eg, Ferguson v Steel [2007] ABQB 596) but
more commonly have a perspective to offer about what has taken place in a context which
has given rise to negligence allegations against medical practitioners or against a hospital.
However, this is likely to change with the growing role of nurse practitioners and the
trend towards team provision of healthcare. Another important development is the
emergence of the discipline of forensic nursing (see Lynch (2005); Pyrek (2006); Hammer,
Moynihan and Pagliaro (2008)). This chapter provides a brief review of the evolving role
of nursing evidence.
Nurses as experts
[9.10.40] Forrester (1998, p 324) accurately asserted that ‘[t]raditionally nurses have not
been perceived as competent to appear as experts even where the issues raised by the
allegations involve an assessment of what would be considered, by nurses, as part of their
practice’ (see too Phillips (2013)). An example of this attitude is to be found in the decision
of Wells J in Maloney v Wake Hospital Systems 262 SE 2d 680 (1980), where the issue before
the court related to drug burns suffered by a patient. They had been caused by an
undiluted bolus of potassium chloride administered into the tissue. An attempt was made
by counsel for the plaintiff to qualify a nurse as an expert in the field of intravenous
therapy. However, in spite of the nurse having impressive credentials and extensive
relevant practice and teaching experience, Wells J refused to admit expert evidence from
the nurse on the basis that intravenous therapy was a medical matter upon which the
nurse was not qualified to testify.
An aspect of the impediment to a nurse giving expert opinion evidence is the contrast
in qualifications and anticipated knowledge between nurses and doctors (see, eg, Avert v
McCormick 271 SE 2d 832 (1980) per Birdsong J). However, there are occasions when it can
legitimately be said that a nurse has specialised knowledge that has a genuine potential to
assist the trier of fact (see Murphy (1986); Perry (1992)) and there have been many
examples internationally where nurses have been accepted as experts in court proceedings.
On occasions, this has even extended to nurses offering expert opinions on issues of
causation (see Staples (2011)). To this extent, it is not to the point that others may have
[9.10.40] 629
more extensive tertiary qualifications – the issue is the potential for assistance to be
provided for decision-making; after that, it is a question of the probative value of the
evidence.
In Ferguson v Steel [2007] ABQB 596, the question before the Alberta Court of Queen’s
Bench was whether a patient’s stroke was caused by the negligent conduct of two medical
practitioners and two nurses. Hughes J received expert evidence from two highly
credentialled and experienced nurses, ultimately (at [332]) concluding that:
Both nursing experts have relevant clinical experience and knowledge and are committed
to educating nurses and to improving standards. However, as Ms N is specialized in the
particular field of neuroscience nursing I find that she holds the nurses to an unreasonably
high standard. Where their evidence conflicts, I prefer the evidence of Ms C-S.
Forensic nurses as experts

[9.10.80] In some jurisdictions by statute, nurses are given various forensic tasks. An
example is in New South Wales under s 50 of the Crimes (Forensic Procedures) Act 2000
(NSW), which provides that nurses can conduct various examinations, including:
• external examination of the genital or anal area of the buttocks or the breasts of a
female or a transgender person who identifies as female;
• the taking of a sample of blood;
• the taking of a sample of saliva, or a sample by a buccal swab;
• the taking of a sample of pubic hair;
• the taking of a sample by a swab or washing from the external genital or anal area of
the buttocks or breasts of a female or a transgender person who identifies as a female;
• the taking of a sample by a vacuum suction, scraping or lifting by tape from the
external genital or anal area or the buttocks or the breasts of a female or a transgender
person who identifies as a female;
• external examination of a part of the body other than the genital or anal area or the
buttocks or the breasts of a female or a transgender person who identifies as a female
that requires touching of the body or removal of clothing;
• the taking of a sample of hair other than pubic hair;
• the taking of a sample from a nail or from under a nail;
• the taking of a sample by swab or washing from an external part of the body other than
the genital or anal area or the buttocks or the breasts of a female or a transgender
person who identifies as a female; and
• the taking of a sample by vacuum suction, scraping or lifting by tape from any external
part of the body other than the genital or anal area or the buttocks or the breasts of a
female of a transgender person who identifies as a female.
In other jurisdictions, such as Victoria, forensic nurse examiners provide clinical forensic
services for sexual assault victims and forensic evidence collection. Evidence about the
observations that they make in the course of forensic examinations is increasingly being
given in criminal trials (see, eg, R v Sollitt [2019] QCA 44; R v KAL [2013] QCA 317; Benson
v The Queen (2014) 46 VR 563; [2014] VSCA 51; Bell v The Queen [2017] NSWCCA 207),
generally without objection.
It has accurately been identified (Lynch (2011)) that in light of the fact that nurses
comprise the largest group of healthcare providers worldwide, forensic nurse examiners
represent a previously unrecognised resource in healthcare and the potential to make a
substantial contribution to forensic assessments.
In a variety of cases, principally coronial in Australia, nurses have been allowed to give
opinion evidence as experts. Forensic nursing was recognised as a specialty by the
American Nurses Association in 1995. There are training courses in ‘forensic nursing’ at
630 [9.10.80]
Nursing evidence | CH 9.10
Flinders, Monash and Notre Dame Universities in Australia. There is an Australian

Association of Forensic Nurses (AAFN), but it exists at this stage in an inchoate form to
‘introduce, promote and develop the science of forensic nursing throughout Australia’.
Membership criteria are not stringent. Since 1992, there has been an International
Association of Forensic Nurses: see http://www.iafn.org (viewed 26 October 2018). It
conducts meetings and has established a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE) Standard
of Practice, which incorporates goals for SANEs. It administers a scheme for accreditation
of forensic nurses. Vanderbilt University has had a significant history of running forensic
nursing programs: see https://www.nursing.vanderbilt.edu (viewed 1 September 2019).
Forensic nursing has been recognised by the American Nurses Association since 1995:
http://www.forensicnurses.org (viewed 1 September 2019). Multiple textbooks have been
published on the subject: see, eg, Stevens (2004); Lynch (2005); Hammer (2005); Pyrek
(2006); Hammer, Moynihan and Pagliaro (2008); Scannell (2018). The Victorian Institute of
Forensic Medicine, which is part of Monash University, established a Graduate Certificate
of Nursing (Forensic). There is also a Journal of Forensic Nursing.
These matters are all indicative of forensic nursing constituting a legitimate and
respectable field of scholarly endeavour that is increasingly likely to be regarded as an
area of expertise by courts, provided that forensic nurses giving evidence and writing
forensic reports are circumspect in terms of the parameters of the expertise that they assert
that they possess.
It has been suggested in the United States that there are the following areas of
specialisation within forensic nursing:
• correctional nurse specialist;
• legal nurse consultant;
• nurse coroner or death investigator;
• forensic nurse investigator;
• forensic psychiatric nurse; and
• sexual assault nurse examiner.
(‘What Is a Forensic Nurse?’ (2017).)
The SANE system has been the subject of a number of challenges in terms of expert
evidence admissibility. In Velasquez v Virginia 557 SE 2d 213 (2002), for instance, a forensic
nurse was held by the Supreme Court of Virginia to be able to testify as an expert on
medical causation within limited parameters. This was because she possessed sufficient
knowledge, skill or experience to assist the court. The contention that she was not able to
do so because she did not hold qualifications as a medical practitioner was explicitly
rejected by the court.
A similar matter went before the Court of Appeals in Virginia in Mohajer v Virginia
(unreported, Virginia Court of Appeals, 15 April 2003). The SANE nurse was called to give
evidence about, among other things, the causation of an alleged abrasion on the
complainant’s vaginal area. It was conceded that the SANE nurse was qualified to testify
concerning matters of medical evidence-gathering in sexual assault cases but contended
by the accused/appellant that Virginia law prevented her from providing testimony in
sexual assault cases, as this would constitute the practice of medicine. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial judge’s decision to allow the evidence and applied the Velasquez
decision: ‘a SANE nurse need not be licensed to practise medicine to express an expert
opinion on the causation of the injuries in the context of an alleged sexual assault’. It
found that she did not offer a diagnosis of the complainant’s injuries and was not acting
outside the duties of a registered nurse.
In addition, in Gonzales v Texas 1991 WL 67061 (Tex App Hous (14 Dist) 1991), a sexual
assault nurse examiner was permitted to testify at trial that her examination of the
[9.10.80] 631
complainant in a sexual assault case was consistent with her being the victim of sexual
assault, rather than having engaged in consensual sexual activity. The Texas Court of
Appeals found that the nurse’s testimony constituted expert testimony on the basis of her
training and extensive experience in dealing with sexual assault victims. It was also found
that she did not directly testify on the believability of the complainant, so she did not go
too far in giving evidence about the complainant’s credibility.
A case that provides a salutary warning about the limits of forensic nursing evidence is
the 2006 decision of R v Thomas (2006) 207 CCC (3d) 86. Ducharme J of the Ontario Court
of Justice was called upon to rule on the evidence of a nurse sexual assault examiner in a
case involving allegations of sexual assault. Ducharme J found that the nurse had worked
in her examiner role for seven years and was completing a PhD. Her qualification to
become an examiner had consisted of a short certification course. Ducharme J found that
she had not assessed the results of her examinations in any systematic way and was
unable to relate her results to any professional literature in the area. He found that the
nurse had not undertaken any research or academic writing in a relevant area and,
although she had testified in a number of cases, had not previously been qualified to give
opinion evidence of any type. Ducharme J found the nurse not to be acquainted with the
literature involving injuries for sexual assault and determined that she was not qualified
to testify as to whether the injuries sustained by the complainant were more consistent
with non-consensual sex than with consensual sex. On a number of occasions, Ducharme J
contrasted her evidence with that of a medical practitioner who had given evidence in
comparable matters: see R v Quashia (2005) 198 CCC (3d) 337; R v Liu (2004) 190 CCC (3d)
233.
Much of the evidence from sexual assault nurses is in the form of evidence of fact
arising from their observations and record-keeping. The importance of such evidence
should not be under-estimated (see, eg, R v Dahlman (2007) BCSC 1912 at [8]).
The usual rules in relation to expert opinion evidence apply in the context of the
sufficiency of the ‘specialised knowledge’ held by forensic nurses on a given subject (see
Thom (2010)). It is likely that courts will carefully scrutinise the evidence of forensic
nurses as in R v Thomas (2006) 207 CCC (3d) 86 to ensure that the parameters of their
expertise are not breached. A consequence is that it would be prudent practice (at least in
the early phase of expert opinion evidence from forensic nurses) for complex matters of
interpretation, such as the age of injuries or the likely aetiology of injuries, to be the
subject of evidence (if at all) from forensic physicians, rather than from forensic nurses.
It is important, too, for suitable concessions to be made by sexual assault nurses. An
example where this was done is R v Siddiqui (2004) BCSC 1717, where the evidence of an
examiner was summarised by Bennett J as follows:
Ms H is a sexual assault nurse examiner. She examined MS at […] Memorial Hospital
around 3:00 am on March 2, 2002. MS had her pants on backwards and was not wearing
any undergarments. Ms Hildebrand observed a number of bruises to MS, the most serious
being deep bruising to her knees. She noted tenderness and swelling in her genital area.
Ms Hildebrand testified that the general injuries and the injuries to the vaginal area
were consistent with nonconsensual sexual activity. However, she also agreed that the
literature has reported studies that show these type of injuries to the vaginal area are also
consistent with consensual intercourse.
The extent to which forensic nurses can offer evidence in the form of opinions will change
as training and expertise develop.
632 [9.10.80]
PART 10 – MENTAL HEALTH
EVIDENCE
Chapter 10.0: Psychiatrists’ and psychologists’ evidence....... 635

Chapter 10.05: Fitness for interview evidence .............................. 681
Chapter 10.10: Fitness to stand trial evidence.............................. 693
Chapter 10.15: Identification evidence ............................................... 715
Chapter 10.20: Memory evidence......................................................... 743
Chapter 10.25: Mental state evidence................................................ 769
Chapter 10.30: Syndrome evidence .................................................... 789
Chapter 10.35: Profiling evidence ........................................................ 875
Chapter 10.40: Prediction of risk evidence..................................... 895
Chapter 10.45: Post-traumatic stress disorder evidence .......... 935
Chapter 10.50: Critical incident stress intervention evidence. 977
633
Chapter 10.0
PSYCHIATRISTS’ AND
PSYCHOLOGISTS’ EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [10.0.01]
The parameters of mental health professionals’ expertise ............................................ [10.0.40]
Diagnostic expertise of psychologists ................................................................................ [10.0.80]
Bases of mental health expert testimony .......................................................................... [10.0.120]
Expert evidence on intellectual impairment .................................................................... [10.0.160]
Mental health expert evidence about ‘normal’ persons ................................................. [10.0.200]
The repercussions of Murphy v The Queen ....................................................................... [10.0.240]
Mental health expert evidence about intention ............................................................... [10.0.260]
Mental health expert evidence about children ................................................................ [10.0.280]
Mental health expert evidence about child development
and child behaviour .............................................................................. [10.0.300]
Mental health expert evidence as to character, credit and credibility ......................... [10.0.320]
Definitions of ‘character’, ‘credit’ and ‘credibility’ ......................................................... [10.0.330]
Mental health expert evidence about character ............................................................... [10.0.340]
Mental health expert evidence as to credit and credibility ........................................... [10.0.360]
Expert evidence about conditions impacting upon credibility ..................................... [10.0.380]
Expert evidence about truthfulness and lying ................................................................. [10.0.420]
Truth drug administration ................................................................................................... [10.0.430]
Polygraph administration .................................................................................................... [10.0.440]
Admissibility of polygraph evidence in the
United Kingdom and North America ................................................ [10.0.450]
Inadmissibility of polygraph evidence in Australia ....................................................... [10.0.460]
Other credibility evaluation techniques ............................................................................ [10.0.470]
Statement validity analysis .................................................................................................. [10.0.480]
Reality monitoring ................................................................................................................ [10.0.490]
Brain fingerprinting .............................................................................................................. [10.0.500]
Voice stress analysis .............................................................................................................. [10.0.510]
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) ............................................................. [10.0.520]
Expert evidence about admissions and confessions ....................................................... [10.0.590]
Mental health expert evidence about behaviour
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy (factitious disorder) ................................................. [10.0.600]
‘I would guess that, today, nine-tenths of the psychiatrists in
this country [the United States] would probably unhesitatingly
agree to the desirability of removing psychiatric experts from
the legal adversary system.’
Bernard Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert (1959).
Introduction
[10.0.01] Mental health professionals play a fundamental role in many forms of litigation
in contemporary courts. In the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration surveys
(Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999, p 40); Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (2001, p 33);
Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016)), psychiatry and
psychology figured prominently as areas of particular difficulty for trial judges and
magistrates.
A number of parameters exist in relation to the evidence which traditionally has been
permitted from psychiatrists and psychologists. In particular, there are controversies about
the areas in which they are regarded as having specialised knowledge and therefore
expertise to be able to assist the courts. In addition, inhibitions have traditionally been
expressed about the subject matter upon which opinions from psychiatrists and
psychologists are permitted – normality, children, and credit and credibility. This chapter
[10.0.01] 635
Part 10 – Mental health evidence
reviews the controversies and attempts to give guidance about the parameters of
permitted testimony from psychiatrists and psychologists.
The parameters of mental health professionals' expertise

[10.0.40] All expert witnesses must be sufficiently qualified in respect of the subject upon
which they propose to express opinions in order to be permitted to do so (Ch 2.05). It is
not just a matter of possessing relevant credentials. Expertise is a function of possessing
specialised knowledge, of reasonable contemporaneity, howsoever obtained.
This is the case with mental health professionals, as well with all other experts. In the
leading case of J v The Queen (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 at 532, for instance, Brooking J noted
that in respect of the evidence that a highly experienced forensic psychiatrist,
Dr Bartholomew, gave in relation to battered woman syndrome, he ‘did not sufficiently
make it appear … that he was qualified to speak about it’. The psychiatrist had practised
in the forensic domain for a long while but the question related to his ability to express
informed opinions about the responses of young females to the trauma of sexual abuse
either based on the relevant literature or on his own clinical experience (see Freckelton
(1997f)).
There was a further problem. Brooking J noted that although the expert maintained
that he was ‘reasonably au fait with’ the syndrome, his familiarity with the relevant
literature was not all that it seemed to be. He had not read any of a series of 14 articles to
which he had made reference, had read a book on the subject written some 10 years
previously, and ‘had read other material but could not recall exactly what he had read or
when he had read it’ (at 527). The essence of this aspect of the decision by the Victorian
Court of Criminal Appeal is that the substance of the expert’s claimed expertise was
fundamentally deficient.
Similarly, in F v The Queen (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 at 507, the New South Wales Court
of Criminal Appeal was troubled (and disallowed) evidence from an experienced
paediatrician who had a substantial amount of experience in dealing with children who
had been subjected to sexual abuse: ‘She is not a psychiatrist or a psychologist. However,
the evidence she was permitted to give included evidence concerning her reading of
literature in the area of psychiatry or psychology and she gave evidence in the capacity of
an expert’ (see Freckelton (1997f)).
The issue for psychiatrists and psychologists is reasonably straightforward. For them to
hold themselves out in a report or to give oral evidence in the witness box about an area,
they must be in a position to demonstrate convincingly that they have specialised
knowledge about it that is up to date and of real substance. The more sub-specialised the
area and the more it is controversial, in a practical sense the more onerous will be the
burden.
Diagnostic expertise of psychologists

[10.0.80] There are important and not fully resolved issues about the parameters of mental
health experts’ expertise. Partly it is a question of industrial delineation of competence
between psychiatry and psychology; partly it is a question of evidentiary admissibility.
This is particularly so in relation to psychologists who may be regarded by the courts as
‘straying’ inappropriately into the area as experts of pathology, utilising manuals of
diagnosis prepared by psychiatrists (albeit with assistance on committees from
psychologists) for psychiatrists.
In the controversial decision of R v MacKenney (1983) 76 Cr App R 271 at 275, for
instance, Ackner LJ affirmed the decision of a trial judge to refuse to hear evidence from a
psychologist on the existence of mental illness:
636 [10.0.40]
Psychiatrists’ and psychologists’ evidence | CH 10.0
Mr M submitted to us that Mr I was qualified to diagnose mental illness. His training, he

submitted, as a psychologist enabled him so to do. We do not agree. No doubt his training
as a psychologist gave him some insight into the medical science of psychiatry. However,
not being a medical man, he had of course no experience of direct personal diagnosis. He
was thus not qualified to act as a psychiatrist. Mr I’s evidence was not medical evidence,
and was not admissible.
It may well be that if a court were given a clear understanding of the skills, training and
experience of a particular psychologist, a different result would ensue. However, the
MacKenney decision is not without support. Wood J, in the case of R v Peisley (1990) 54 A
Crim R 42 at 52 in the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, made a similar point:
I consider it necessary to observe once again that it is important that clinical psychologists
do not cross the barrier of their expertise. It is appropriate for persons trained in the field
of clinical psychology to give evidence of the results of psychometric and other
psychological testing, and to explain the relevance of those results, and their significance
so far as they reveal or support the existence of brain damage or other recognised mental
states or disorders. It is not, however, appropriate for them to enter into the field of
psychiatry.
(See also R v Petroulias (No 36) [2008] NSWSC 626 at [164].)

A similar view was expressed in Klimoski v Water Authority (WA) (1989) 5 SR (WA) 148
at 150 by Keall J, who differentiated between the expertise of a psychologist to perform
and interpret tests (see R v Forde (1986) 19 A Crim R 1) and to make diagnoses such as that
a person suffers from ‘post-concussion syndrome’. The Western Australian Court of
Appeal was asked in Ta v Lucky Import and Export Co Pty Ltd [2002] WASCA 65 to overrule
Klimoski but did not find it necessary to decide whether to do so.
In Allanson v Toncich [2002] WASCA 216 at [12], Murray J, faced with arguments about
the propriety of psychologists providing diagnoses, commented: ‘Of course a psychologist
is not medically qualified, but if the diagnosis is received as a description of the fact that
some traumatic event has caused an excessive degree of stress and anxiety in the patient,
then I see no difficulty with it.’ Similarly, in Trudgett v Commonwealth [2006] NSWSC 575 at
[42]–[43], the objection was taken to a psychologist’s having made a diagnosis but the
court did not find it necessary to rule on the issue as a matter of principle.
In the tribunal context, Judge Strong of the Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunal
in two 1994 judgments was highly critical of experts who, in his judgment, went beyond
the scope of their expertise in offering views in relation to crimes compensation appellants
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. In Hood v Crimes Compensation Tribunal
(unreported, Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 24 March 1994), after reviewing
the nature of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM) and its treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder, his Honour
commented (at p 5):
[T]he diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders is, principally, the province of
psychiatrists. I do not doubt that suitably qualified and experienced health professionals
of other disciplines can competently identify mental disorders of the kind described in
DSM-III-R. But my recent experience at this Tribunal has, frankly, left me with some
concern that the growth of the Crimes Compensation jurisdiction has encouraged
psychologists in particular – some of them seemingly unsuited for the task – to arm
themselves with DSM-III-R and enter the fray.
Five days later, his Honour broached the subject once more in Williams v Crimes
Compensation Tribunal (unreported, Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunal, 29 March
1994), where he took exception to excessively liberal use of the diagnosis of post-traumatic
stress disorder by persons not medically qualified (at p 3):
T [a clinical psychologist] correctly notes, and emphasises ‘… that definitive diagnosis of
this condition must be made by a registered medical practitioner’. Most psychologists
appear not to appreciate or acknowledge this requirement.
[10.0.80] 637
A more liberal approach was taken by Hampel J in R v Whitbread (1995) 78 A Crim R 452
(see further Freckelton (1997e)), where the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal was called
upon to examine the distinctions between evidence properly to be given by psychologists
and psychiatrists. It had been sought by the defence to lead somewhat dubious evidence
from a psychologist about a ‘conversion disorder’ in the context of the need to evaluate
whether apparent lies told by a suspect in a baby-shaking case were indicative of
consciousness of guilt. The opinion from the psychologist was as follows:
Often the conversion disorder is accompanied by some form of dissociative disorder both
being related forms of hysterical neurosis. One type of a dissociative disorder is
psychogenic amnesia. It is characterised by a temporary disturbance in the ability to recall
important personal information without underlying organic brain disease. This may occur
in a situation in which a person has been overwhelmed by grief and anxiety leaving the
painful memories totally repressed. Hysteria is not a planned deliberate response to panic
or stress but an altered state of consciousness, in which painful psychological stimuli are
blocked out in order to help the victim cope. It is a fairly common response to stress,
especially in individuals whose internal resources are limited. It is my opinion that
Mr Whitbread’s description of his experiences during the events that occurred with Daniel
are consistent with a diagnosis of hysteria.
The Crown contended in part that the psychologist was not qualified to give such
evidence as he was not a psychiatrist. Hampel J (at 460) rejected this submission as
‘misconceived’ and noted that standard and medical dictionaries define ‘psychology’ as a
‘branch of science which deals with the mind and mental processes’ – ‘the science of the
nature, functioning and development of the human mind and the study of the behaviour
of the mind’. So much was unexceptionable. However, he then stated (at 460):
The definition in the Glossary of Psychiatric Terminology refers to a psychologist as ‘A
person, usually with an advanced degree, who specialises in the study of mental processes
and the treatment of mental disorders’.
Ironically, this demonstrates that the document to which Hampel J was having recourse to
determine the entitlements of Australian psychologists was not only North American
(because of its reference to psychologists normally having an ‘advanced degree’, which
they do not in Australia – the greater percentage being registered with a four-year degree
and two years’ supervision) but, it appears, a psychiatric document, although he did not
cite it in such a way as to allow identification of its authorship or its full title.
His Honour went further. He provided from the same source a definition of
‘psychiatry’, by contrast, as ‘the medical treatment of mental illness, emotional
disturbance and abnormal behaviour’ (at 460).
His Honour held (at 460) that nothing in the definitions or the literature about the
functions of psychiatrists and psychologists ‘differentiates them on the basis that one has
more or less understanding and knowledge of the nature and functioning of the mind in
its normal or abnormal state’. Given the extent of tertiary study required as a baseline for
psychologists and psychiatrists (accepting that a percentage of psychologists have
postgraduate qualifications), this was a surprising contention.
He held (at 460) that, once the question of medical treatment of mental illness was put
to one side, ‘there is no reason why a psychologist may not be just as qualified or better
qualified than a psychiatrist to express opinions about mental states and processes’.
Ironically, too, the definition proffered by the psychologist in Whitbread was dated in
terms of the DSM (see, eg, DSM-III-R (1987) at p 257; cf DSM-IV-TR (2000) at p 498) by its
reference to ‘hysteria’, a term generally utilised by followers of Freud, not practitioners
applying modern taxonomies of diagnosis such as the DSM.
Australia’s second decision offering a window of opportunity to psychologists to
undertake diagnoses was that of Martin CJ in Nepi v Northern Territory [1997] NTSC 153
(see further Freckelton (1998)). Martin CJ upheld an appeal against a determination by a
638 [10.0.80]
magistrate in a crimes compensation matter on the basis that a psychologist’s evidence

about post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) had been wrongly determined to be
inadmissible. In the course of a voire dire, the psychologist had maintained that ‘[t]here
are many blurred boundaries and the distinction between psychiatric and psychological is
becoming less and less meaningful’ (at p 4).
It is significant that no evidence about PTSD other than that from the psychologist
whose evidence was objected to was called by either side in Nepi, meaning that there was
no evidence to contradict the evidence of the psychologist or to assert that he was not
competent to give his opinions. This was expressly noted by Martin CJ in his judgment.
Martin CJ observed that the magistrate had not adverted to the psychologist’s evidence
as to his academic qualifications and experience, nor to his evidence regarding whether
PTSD was a psychological or psychiatric disorder. The Chief Justice also observed that the
magistrate had not rejected what the witness had said because of some advantage he had
arising from his having seen and heard him in the witness box. This meant that the
rejection of the psychologist’s opinion had not been upon the basis of the evidence before
him: ‘Rather, he made the ruling by adopting observations made in a couple of reported
cases in other jurisdictions at other times going to other mental disorders’ (at p 5).
By contrast, Martin CJ observed that there was no question in Nepi that there had been
any lack of testing or that the history given by the victim had been incomplete. His
Honour also noted that the opinions of clinical psychologists as to PTSD ‘had been
frequently received and acted upon by the courts’. He commented that, in a series of
unreported cases, such evidence had been given by psychologists (referring to Enright v
Windley (unreported, ACT Supreme Court, 1 June 1995); W & W v R & G (unreported,
Family Court of Australia, 21 April 1994); Caldwell v Caldwell (unreported, NSW Court of
Appeal, 30 August 1996); and Milner v Australian Capital Territory (unreported, ACT
Supreme Court, 15 December 1994)).
His Honour accepted that the most prominent case to deal with ‘the difficulties which
can sometimes arise as between psychology and psychiatry’ was the decision of Hampel J
in R v Whitbread (1995) 78 A Crim R 452. He found that the magistrate had erred in making
a finding that the psychologist had crossed the barrier of his expertise when there was no
evidence to support such a conclusion. The Chief Justice proffered a second reason – that
the magistrate had wrongly taken into account irrelevant material, namely, the
observations in the cases to which he had made reference, namely Klimoski and Peisley.
The Chief Justice’s reasoning was no more extensive than this.
The decision as to whether a witness is qualified to give evidence as an expert is a
decision of fact. The legal question for the Northern Territory Supreme Court was
whether, on the evidence before the magistrate, it had been open to him to find that the
psychologist could not diagnose PTSD because he had ‘crossed the barrier of his expertise’
or ‘because he had taken into account irrelevant material’ (at p 6). The only evidence in the
case was the assertion from the psychologist that he had made the diagnosis previously,
that the disorder was not exclusively a psychiatric condition, and that the boundaries
between psychiatry and psychology were becoming less clearly delineated. In the
circumstances, the magistrate had little probative evidence before him and in principle
was probably entitled to make a finding that the psychologist in providing a diagnosis
using a medical manual, namely a manual of the American Psychiatric Association
designed primarily for psychiatrists by psychiatrists, was going beyond his expertise.
Therefore, there are real limits upon the extent to which Nepi can be elevated to the status
of being a significant authority upon the question of psychologists’ capacity to diagnose.
Evidence was not led on this vexed issue in the course of a contested hearing on the
subject in which experts from opposed viewpoints were called. Neither the Australian
[10.0.80] 639
Psychological Society nor the Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists sought
leave to intervene as an interested party to present its position on the subject.
In addition, it is questionable, with respect, whether Martin CJ was correct in finding
fault with the magistrate for having taken into account irrelevant material, when it is seen
that the material in question consisted of other decisions whose reasoning he chose to
adopt. It was open to Martin CJ to hold that the magistrate had erred in applying
decisions which the Northern Territory was prepared to distinguish or to reject as
authoritative pronouncements, but this is a question quite separate from whether an error
of law had been made by the magistrate taking into account material which, properly
described, was irrelevant to the questions of fact before him.
The issue arose afresh in R v Kucma (2005) 11 VR 472; [2005] VSCA 58, an appeal to the
Victorian Court of Appeal on the ground of fresh evidence as to the appellant’s mental
state at the time of his commission of offences.
Under s 20 of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic):
(1) The defence of mental impairment is established for a person charged with an offence
if, at the time of engaging in conduct constituting the offence, the person was suffering
from a mental impairment that had the effect that –
(a) he or she did not know the nature and quality of the conduct; or
(b) he or she did not know that the conduct was wrong (that is, he or she could not
reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure about whether the
conduct, as perceived by reasonable people, was wrong).
(2) If the defence of mental impairment is established, the person must be found not
guilty because of mental impairment.
Batt JA permitted the evidence of two psychiatrists but in respect of the evidence of a
psychologist declined to allow it, stating (at [26]):
I do not, however, consider that the reports of Dr Kennedy are otherwise admissible. In
my opinion, the field of expertise responsive to the matters raised by s 20 of the 1997 Act
is psychiatry, the discipline concerned with mental health, and does not include
psychology. The experience of counsel for the respondent that it has always been
psychiatrists who give evidence in cases of insanity or mental impairment tends to
support this opinion.
Eames JA acceded (at [56]–[57]) to the approach of Batt JA:
Whether the Court should receive in evidence the opinion of Dr Kennedy, as a clinical and
forensic psychologist, was not the subject of detailed argument before us. Counsel for the
respondent contended that it was not usual for a psychologist to give such an opinion. …
Batt, J.A. expresses the opinion that Dr Kennedy’s qualifications do not permit him to
diagnose mental illness, that being the exclusive province of psychiatry. I do not need to
express a concluded view as to that question, which if there is a re-trial may fall for
argument before the new trial judge. As presently advised, however, I do not consider the
issue to be beyond argument. Since it is unnecessary to resolve this question, and having
regard to the fact that we heard no argument on the issue, it is appropriate that I endorse
the course proposed by Batt, J.A. that we not formally receive the report of Dr Kennedy as
fresh evidence on the appeal.
Warren CJ agreed with the reasons and orders proposed by Batt and Eames JJA.
It appears then that the propriety of psychologists providing diagnoses of pathology
remains unresolved and thus so does the admissibility of such evidence – at common law
and under the uniform evidence scheme. The approach of the Victorian Court of Appeal in
R v Kucma (2005) 11 VR 472; [2005] VSCA 58 brings into question the authority of the
approach of Hampel J in R v Whitbread (1995) 78 A Crim R 452 and Martin CJ in Nepi v
Northern Territory [1997] NTSC 153. It has underlined the importance of resolution of the
issue.
There is much to be said for an individualised, case-by-case assessment of
psychologists’ levels of specialised knowledge entitling a diagnostic opinion about the
640 [10.0.80]
presence or absence of a particular disorder, or its symptomatology. There are some

psychologists who, by reason of their postgraduate training and/or their experience, have
ample knowledge to be able to assist courts with their opinions. Others do not fall into
that category because of the modest nature of their training or the particular
characteristics of their experience, which may not have facilitated the acquisition of
specialised knowledge about the diagnostic criteria for particular disorders.

[10.0.85] The issue, however, has been relatively settled since the 1960s in the United
States, where psychologists for the most part hold doctoral qualifications and where in
some states they can also prescribe medications. In Jenkins v United States 307 F 2d 637
(1962), in a trial for housebreaking, assault and intent to rape, a defendant presented the
testimony of three clinical psychologists in support of an insanity defence. All three
psychologists testified, based on their personal contact with the defendant, review of his
case history, and standard psychological tests, that on the date the alleged crimes were
committed, the defendant had been suffering from the mental disorder of schizophrenia.
One of the three testified that he could give no opinion concerning the relationship
between the illness and the crimes, but the other two expressed the view that the
schizophrenia and the criminal conduct were related and that the crimes were the product
of the illness.
At the conclusion of the trial, the judge instructed the jury to disregard the opinions of
the psychologists on the basis that they were not qualified to give expert testimony on the
issue of mental disease. On appeal, the District Court Circuit reversed the decision and
remitted the case for a further trial, holding that the psychologists were qualified as expert
witnesses on the question of mental disease. The American Psychological Association
submitted an amicus brief, arguing that: (1) psychology is an established science; (2) the
practice of psychology is a learned profession; (3) a clinical psychologist is competent to
express professional opinions concerning the existence or non-existence of mental disease
or defect and their causal relationship to overt behaviour; and (4) experience is the
essential legal ingredient of competence to give an expert opinion. On the issue of the
psychologists’ expert evidence, the District Court stated that some psychologists are
qualified to render expert testimony on mental disorders. It held that the determination of
a psychologist’s competence to give an expert opinion based on his or her findings as to
the presence or absence of mental disease or defect depends upon the nature and extent of
the psychologist’s knowledge and not simply on the claim to the title ‘psychologist’.
Bases of mental health expert testimony

[10.0.120] It is incumbent upon psychiatrists and psychologists, like other experts (see eg
Dasreef v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011] HCA 21), to identify the facts on the basis of
which they advance opinions.
In J v The Queen (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 at 524, Brooking J held that this can be done by
the expert sitting in court and hearing the evidence or later reading the transcript, or in
evidence-in-chief having particular parts of the evidence identified to him or her:
Whatever method is adopted, the important thing is to make it clear precisely what
evidence, assumed to be correct, or precisely what supposed facts, assumed to be
established, are being placed before the witness for the purpose of his expressing an
opinion. An expert witness must identify the facts assumed as the basis of the opinion.
(See Earl Ferrers Case (1760) 19 How St Tr 885 at 943; Turney [1975] 1 QB 834 at 840; Fowler
(1985) 39 SASR 440 at 442–443; Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313
at 347–340.)
[10.0.120] 641
Expert evidence on intellectual impairment

[10.0.160] A question exists about whether psychiatrists and psychologists possess
specialised knowledge about persons suffering neither a mental illness nor an intellectual
disability. Traditionally, the common law common knowledge rule precluded such
testimony. Under the uniform evidence scheme, the question is whether the cognition and
functioning of ‘normal people’ is a subject about which there is specialised knowledge.
Expert evidence about a person being of borderline intellectual disability (eg, between
IQ 69 and 78) having the capacity to form the necessary intent to commit a crime has been
permitted on a number of occasions (see, eg, R v Schultz (1981) 5 A Crim R 234; see also
Falconer v The Queen (1989) 46 A Crim R 83 at 94). Similarly, expert evidence has been
permitted on the question of reliability of a confession by a person with an intellectual
disability (see, eg, R v Barry [1984] 1 Qd R 74). These cases couched their language in
terms of the normality versus abnormality test and had the effect of extending the R v
Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 preclusion of expert evidence on people not
suffering from mental illnesses to those assessed as being intellectually impaired.
In R v Schultz (1981) 5 A Crim R 234, the crucial issue was whether the accused had
formed the necessary intent. His counsel sought to adduce evidence from a psychologist
and a psychiatrist that he was of borderline mentally defective intelligence, having an IQ
between 69 and 78. Burt CJ held (at 237–238) that:
Once it be acknowledged that there is no legal presumption that a man intends the
probable consequences of his acts and that in every case the finding to be made is
specifically and exclusively as to the intention of a particular person at a particular
moment in time, then, … all facts personal to [him] which have bearing or which in the
judgment of reasonable men have a bearing on the operation of his mind are relevant to
that finding. … Such facts as do distinguish the person concerned from his fellow in a
way, which could … weaken an inference as to intent otherwise based upon the facts
found [are] relevant … and if those facts cannot without the aid of expert opinion
evidence be made known to the jury then such evidence directed toward their proof is
relevant.
The jury unaided may safely be left to pass judgment upon the ordinary man,
notwithstanding the fact, which they can safely be assumed to know, that the ‘ordinary’
man comes in many shapes and sizes. But … they could not … be expected to know by
merely seeing and hearing the appellant in the witness box, that his intellectual
functioning was impaired to the extent to be spoken of by the [proposed] witnesses. That
evidence if accepted would … take the appellant outside the range of the ordinary and
would alert the jury to the fact that [he] was not ‘an ordinary man’ and that he was in a
class apart.
A slightly different approach was adopted by the English Court of Appeal in R v Masih
(unreported, English Court of Appeal, 27 January 1986); [1986] Crim LR 395, where the
defendant, who had an IQ of 72, was extremely immature and had a limited
understanding of the ways of the world, had been charged with rape. Expert evidence was
sought to be adduced to the effect that he would have been unable to comprehend
adequately the nuances of the sexual interplay that had taken place in his presence and
might have misconstrued the complainant’s willingness or unwillingness to engage in
sexual intercourse. Lord Lane expressed the view that the decision in R v Schultz (1981) 5
A Crim R 234 went too far and held that:
(1) In cases where the IQ level is 69 or below and therefore the defendant is formally
classified as ‘mentally defective’ then subject always to its relevance in the
particular case, generally speaking the psychiatric evidence would be admissible.
That would enlighten the jury on a matter of abnormality which would ex
hypothesi be outside their own experience.
(2) Where the defendant is within the scale of normality, albeit (as Masih was) at the
lower end of that scale, expert evidence will not as a rule be necessary and
should be excluded.
642 [10.0.160]
(See Beaumont (1988, p 292)). His Honour added the following qualification:
It is not necessary, for the purposes of this particular decision, to determine when, if ever,
a defendant whose intelligence quotient is above that of a mental defective will be
permitted to adduce evidence of mental capacity.
(See Beaumont (1988, p 293); see also the New Zealand Court of Appeal decision in R v
Moore [1982] 1 NZLR 242. However, IQ estimation is not such an exact science as appears
to have been contemplated in R v Masih (unreported, English Court of Appeal, 27 January
1986); [1986] Crim LR 395).
His Honour’s decision was soon the subject of further interpretation in R v Silcott (see
Beaumont (1987, p 807)), in which psychological and psychiatric evidence was offered to
the court on behalf of a juvenile to challenge the reliability of a confession that he had
allegedly made. This comprised evidence that the juvenile, although aged 15, had a
mental age of seven and an IQ of 70 to 80, rendering him educationally subnormal. The
first part was not challenged but the second was challenged on the basis that it was
hypothetical opinion evidence as to the reliability of a confession made by someone
possessing the characteristics of the young man in question.
Hodgson J interpreted Lord Lane’s ruling in this way:
The court said that in considering a person’s intellect, no IQ above 69 should be
considered abnormal, and therefore, expert evidence aimed at showing that a defendant
was in the category of educationally subnormal, 70 or over, was inadmissible on the mens
rea issue. 69 is apparently taken as the point at which mental defectiveness changes to
educational subnormality. The Lord Chief Justice did, however, admit the possibility of: ‘A
defendant whose IQ is above that of a mental defective’, being able, ‘To adduce evidence of
mental capacity’. To draw a strict line at 69/70 does seem somewhat artificial.
It is likely that Hodgson J’s commonsense view of the arbitrariness of classification of
intellectual disability will be consolidated in cases which henceforth examine the issue.
His Honour held that when an adult jury has to consider the mens rea of a juvenile
with the age of a young child, it should be permitted the assistance of expert evidence.
The case broke new ground as an application of the rules of expert evidence to the
admissibility of expert evidence in relation to a juvenile’s confession. His Honour found
further justification for his approach in the words of Lord Parker CJ in Director of Public
Prosecutions v A & BC Chewing Gum Ltd [1968] 1 QB 159 at 164, a case that required a
decision about whether bubble-gum battle cards read by children were obscene:
When considering the effect of something on an adult an adult jury may be able to judge
just as well as an adult witness called on the point. Indeed, there is nothing more that a
jury or justices need to know. But certainly when you are dealing here with children of
different age groups and children from five upwards, any jury and any justices need all
the help they can get, information which they may not have, as to the effect on different
children.
(See Epperson v Dampney (1976) 10 ALR 227 at 233–234, but note, however, R v Anderson
[1972] 1 QB 304 at 312; R v Calder [1969] 1 QB 151; R v Stamford [1972] 2 QB 391.) In R v
Henry [2006] 1 Cr App R 6, the Court of Appeal considered the admissibility of mental
health expert evidence in relation to an accused person with an IQ of 75. It reaffirmed the
approach taken in R v Masih (unreported, English Court of Appeal, 27 January 1986);
[1986] Crim LR 395 and declined the evidence.
As to the role of evidence about an offender’s intellectual disability for the purposes of
sentencing, see [10.0.200].
Mental health expert evidence about ‘normal’ persons

[10.0.200] The leading Australian common law case on the operation of the common
knowledge rule is the 1989 decision of the High Court in Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167
CLR 94. It involved considerable discussion by members of the High Court about the
[10.0.200] 643
circumstances in which mental health professionals can give admissible opinion evidence
about the reliability of confessional evidence.
The case related to one of Australia’s most notorious murders – that of Anita Cobby
(Sheppard (1991)). A ground of appeal to the High Court was that the trial judge had erred
in ruling inadmissible certain expert evidence proposed to be called on behalf of one of the
accused men. The evidence was that of Ricki Sharpe, a consultant psychologist, whose
evidence would have been that one of the accused was of limited intellectual capacity and
that the confessional material adduced through the police record of interview with him
was thereby rendered inadmissible or at any rate dangerously unreliable.
The trial judge had rejected the proposed expert evidence on the basis that Mr Sharpe’s
report had excluded brain damage and mental retardation. In those circumstances, he was
of the view that the evidence related to matters of human nature and behaviour within the
limits of ‘normality’ – it was therefore an issue on which the members of the jury were
competent to form their own views. The relevant parts of the expert’s report are as follows
(at 108–109):
Leslie Murphy is functioning intellectually at the level of a ten year old person. He shows
adequate adaptive functioning and could not be considered to be mentally retarded. His
poor educational performance would seem to be almost entirely due to a disturbed
childhood and inadequate educational opportunities and not due to any biological or
anatomical reasons.
Leslie Murphy shows great impairment in most of the basic educational skills. The
greatest deficits are in his reading and comprehension skills. Spelling, vocabulary,
arithmetic, reading and comprehension (silent and auditory) are in the nine to ten year old
range.
In my opinion, Leslie Murphy would have had great difficulty in reading and fully
comprehending the record of interview. It would have taken him five to ten minutes to
read each page with 50 per cent comprehension. If the record was read to him at normal
speech rate, he would have had approximately 25 per cent comprehension. His auditory
comprehension is very much dependent on the speed with which things are read or
spoken, whether or not he is able to make interruptions so as to mark his own copy to
‘jog’ his memory at the conclusion of the reading. I strongly doubt that he could fully
comprehend the medical authorisations he signed, whether he read them himself or they
were read out to him. I believe that the words mentioned in the medical authorisations
would not have been within his vocabulary.
Mason CJ and Toohey J began their analysis of the case law in the area by accepting the
statement of Lawton LJ in R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 at 841 that: ‘An
expert’s opinion is admissible to furnish the court with scientific information which is
likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury.’ However, they
cavilled at the assertion (at 841) that:
suffering from any mental illness are likely to react to the stresses and strains of life.
Their Honours pointed out that such a statement assumes that terms such as ‘ordinary’
and ‘normal’ have a clearly understood meaning and that the distinction between ‘normal’
and ‘abnormal’ is well recognised. They continued (at 111):
Further, it assumes that the commonsense of jurors is an adequate guide to the conduct of
people who are ‘normal’ even though they may suffer from some other relevant disability.
And it assumes that the expertise of psychiatrists (or, in the present case, psychologists)
extends only to those who are ‘abnormal’.
Their Honours focused instead on whether the expertise that the witness could bring to
bear was ‘outside the experience and knowledge of the judge and jury’ (at 111) (emphasis
added). They accepted that the distinction between normality and abnormality could be of
644 [10.0.200]
value in some cases, in spite of its ‘inherent difficulties’, but held that ‘it tends to obscure
the fact that in a particular case evidence may be offered to which the distinction has no
relevance’. They held the instant case to be an example of the inutility of such a dichotomy
as the issue was not the accused’s normality or abnormality but the standard of his
vocabulary and literacy, and so of his comprehension. They held that the expert had been
called to give evidence on a matter calling for his expertise and should have been
permitted to give his evidence.
In broad terms, Deane J agreed with the Chief Justice and Toohey J. He expressed the
view (at 125–126) that the evidence sought to be given by the expert was properly the
subject of the expert evidence of a qualified psychologist if the accused’s ‘extraordinarily
low levels of intellectual function, silent and auditory comprehension and linguistic ability
were themselves relevant to a question to be decided by the jury’. He held that the
witness’s evidence was at least relevant to, and may have been of great assistance in,
determining the question of the reliability of the accused’s allegedly voluntary
confessional statements. The evidence would have been by a qualified expert, on a subject
susceptible of expert evidence, it would have been useful and it would not have been
precluded by the objection that it was on the very question that the jury had to decide.
Most importantly, Deane J rejected the view that psychological evidence should not be
admitted in those situations where there is no evidence of ‘abnormality’. He held (at 127)
that:
Expert psychological evidence of identified and significant difficulty in intellectual
functioning or in comprehension and expression could well be admissible on the question
of the reliability of a confessional statement notwithstanding that the identified difficulty
did not take the case out of the lower range of what would be classified as normal.
However, his Honour decided the case on the basis that the relevant evidence relating to
the level of the accused’s functioning was evidence of abnormality (at 127). His Honour
completed his judgment with these words (at 127):
It appears to me to be irrelevant that those abnormally low levels of intellectual function,
comprehension and linguistic ability were the result of environmental factors rather than
innate mental defect.
However, Brennan and Dawson JJ took a different approach and denied that an error had
been made by the trial judge in refusing to allow Mr Sharpe to give expert evidence. They
pointed out that the evidence was being proffered to contradict the police evidence that
the accused had given the incriminating answers that they alleged he had given in
response to the questions they had asked him. Brennan J quoted a passage (at 120) from
the leading United States textbook, Wigmore on Evidence (1979, Vol 2, p 750):
person.
His Honour held that neither the expert’s report nor his statement of qualifications
revealed any expertise which would have permitted him to form a view about the
accused’s understanding of particular questions or his use of particular words or phrases.
He found that the crucial link in the chain of proof of the witness’s qualifications to give
the expert evidence was missing – it had not been shown that the general expertise of
words and phrases or to assert the unlikelihood of the subject’s use of such words or
phrases: see above [2.05.310]–[2.05.490].
[10.0.200] 645
Brennan J disputed that the proper approach in this case was to ask whether a
psychologist’s evidence should be admissible to prove the state of mind of a ‘normal’
accused. Rather, his view was that the expertise of the witness to give the evidence had
not been sufficiently proved. Thus, Brennan J’s approach is not necessarily inconsistent
with that of Mason CJ, Toohey or Deane JJ; rather, he resolved the issue before him by
reference to the expertise rule, rather than application of the common knowledge rule.
Dawson J adopted a slightly different approach but agreed with the result of Brennan J.
His Honour was of the view that the psychologist’s qualifications, as presented to the trial
judge, would equip him to do no more than to express the view that the accused was
poorly educated and of limited intellectual capacity. There was no material before the
court which would indicate that the witness was qualified to express an expert opinion
about whether the use in the record of interview of phrases and sentence structures was
uncharacteristic of the accused.
As the expert’s potential evidence was significantly circumscribed in Dawson J’s view,
the issue arose in his approach of whether, in effect, it was helpful to the jury (see Thayer
(1898, p 525)) to hear such evidence from the mouth of an expert. He decided that in fact
the jury was sufficiently equipped by their ‘ordinary, everyday experience adequately to
assess the applicant’s capabilities’.
At the same time, his Honour acknowledged (at 130) that difficulties could exist in
relation to the traditional formulation of the common knowledge rule:
One such rule is that which says that expert evidence is not admissible to prove the
behavioural characteristics of normal people. Normal behaviour, it is said, is within the
range and experience of the ordinary human being and hence the ordinary juror. See R v
Chard (1971) 56 Cr App R 268 at 271; R v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 441 at 444.
While the difference between normal and abnormal behaviour, where it is apparent,
may offer considerable guidance, the true principle does not rest upon the drawing of a
line which must often be difficult, if not impossible. The principle is simply that evidence
which is put forward to tell the jury something that is within their own knowledge or
experience is not helpful and not admissible for that reason. … But the distinction between
helpful and unhelpful expert evidence cannot of its nature be very precise.
His Honour inclined to the approach that as there are real dangers in receiving evidence
from experts, it is incumbent on the courts to be stringent in their decisions to admit it
(see, eg, R v Massey (1994) 62 SASR 481 at 487). In the particular case, he found that
opinion evidence concerning the accused’s behavioural characteristics was not admissible
unless the significance of those characteristics could not be understood without the aid of
that evidence: see R v Schultz (1981) 5 A Crim R 234 at 237 per Burt CJ.
The repercussions of Murphy v The Queen

[10.0.240] No clear approach has emerged from the Australian High Court about the
application of the common knowledge rule at common law or the appropriate scope of
mental health expert evidence under the uniform evidence regime with the abolition of
the common knowledge rule under s 80.
It appears to be agreed by the judges of the High Court that at common law evidence
that is within the ordinary understanding and experience of the jury will be inadmissible
if provided by an expert witness. It may also be that such material is also not a matter of
specialised knowledge for the purposes of the uniform evidence scheme.
However, doubt remains about how such areas are to be recognised. Mason CJ and
Toohey J perceived ‘inherent difficulties’ with the normal versus abnormal dichotomy but
remained convinced that it nonetheless ‘could be of value’. In this they were joined by
Dawson J, who said that the difference between ‘normal and abnormal behaviour’
(emphasis added) may offer considerable guidance but focused upon the criterion of
646 [10.0.240]
helpfulness to the judge and jury. It is unclear whether his Honour meant something
different by this expression to the words ‘normality’ and ‘abnormality’ as employed by the
Chief Justice and Toohey J.
Deane J decided that evidence could be given by psychologists even when there is no
evidence that the accused should be designated abnormal, but then found the problem a
non-issue in the case because the accused was abnormal. Brennan J simply did not employ
the dichotomy but neither accepted nor rejected its validity or utility.
It can therefore be said with some confidence that the majority of the High Court has
exhibited unease with employing the dichotomy as a determinative factor for deciding
whether expert evidence relates to matters of common knowledge. At least two, and
probably three, of the judges were of the view that the distinction between normality and
abnormality could nonetheless be useful for admissibility decision-making. However,
further than this the High Court has not gone. The situation in fact has been confused by
the decision in Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94, because the status of the distinction
between the normal and abnormal person is now utterly unclear. A person’s normality is a
relevant factor in deciding whether expert evidence about intellectual capacity should be
admissible in relation to a question in issue. However, it is not at this time possible to say
how significant a factor it is.
Furthermore, the High Court has foresworn any attempt to define ‘normality’. This
means that the presence or absence of a mental illness has significance but, once more, it is
not possible to say how much significance (see Liyanage v Western Australia (2017) 51 WAR
359; [2017] WASCA 112 at [112]). The situation is further confused by the preparedness of
Deane J to take a very wide view of abnormality so that it encompasses abnormally low
levels of intellectual function, comprehension and linguistic ability, whether they are the
result of environmental factors or innate mental defect.
A significant decision subsequent to Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 is R v
Whitbread (1995) 78 A Crim R 452. It was sought by the accused at his trial to lead evidence
from a psychologist to establish that untruths told by the accused, and relied upon by the
Crown as consciousness of guilt, could have been the result of a psychological state
resulting from stress. Hampel J held that the evidence in principle should have been
admitted:
It would have been tempting for the jury to treat the matter as one of credibility based on
the proposition that the failure to remember the incriminating events was all too
convenient in the circumstances. The jury may well have taken the view that whilst a
person may forget some acts during a traumatic incident it was unlikely that he would
forget only those facts which were ultimately incriminating. In my view it was therefore
essential from the point of view of the defence that the jury understood the precise
psychological condition and mechanism which is capable of producing the result for
which the defence was contending.
Both Hampel and Teague JJ (purporting to apply the reasoning in Murphy v The Queen
(1989) 167 CLR 94) held that the trial judge was in error in excluding the evidence on the
basis that it fell within the realm of normal human experience as it amounted to normal
behaviour in abnormal circumstances.
A decision to similar effect is that of the Queensland Court of Appeal in R v Yeo
(unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, Fitzgerald P, McPherson JA and Helman J,
22 August 1995), where the trial judge was held to have wrongly excluded the evidence of
a clinical psychologist that an intellectually disabled complainant may have dreamed of,
rather than experienced, an assault. Helman J referred to the decision of Murphy v The
Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 and held that:
The dreaming and other processes of children and adults who are not disabled would no
doubt have been within the experience and knowledge of the jury and so would not have
called for any assistance from an expert. The mental processes of one who, like the
[10.0.240] 647
complainant, was disabled would however not have been, it is reasonable to conclude,
within their experience and knowledge. It follows that this was a case in which the
evidence of an expert could have helped the jury in its task of deciding the case.
The decision of the High Court in Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 must also be
reconciled with the same court’s pronouncement in the earlier case of Jackson v The Queen
(1962) 108 CLR 591, in which a trial judge’s rejection of evidence from a psychiatrist about
an accused’s state of mind at the time of an alleged confession was held to be incorrect.
The court pointed out (at 596) that where the mental condition of a person who makes a
confession is relevant to determining the person’s guilt of a particular offence, ‘no
authority is needed for the proposition that all the circumstances surrounding the making
of it which tend to show either that it can safely be relied upon or that it would be unwise
to do so are admissible’. In Jackson, the view of the psychiatrist was that the accused
person made a confessional statement at a time when he was mentally abnormal and
suffering from acute fear based upon an irrational belief that he was in danger of death,
and believed that he might secure his removal from danger by making a false confession.
This, of course, brings the accused person into the category of ‘abnormal’ a category
which expert psychiatric evidence would relate to matters that were traditionally outside
common knowledge.
It appears that expert evidence may be led about those special characteristics of the
victim, accused or other witness which place the assessment of the person’s credit and
possibly the credibility of the person’s evidence beyond the unassisted capacity of the
ordinary juror. Such evidence may be directed toward removal of misconceptions, such as
why a victim of domestic violence would not leave her situation or report abuses
promptly to the police.
On the issue of whether an admission has been made voluntarily, considerable leeway
is customarily extended in relation to the admissibility of expert evidence. Such evidence
may cover the gamut from character through credit and even to credibility. No doubt this
is because of the absence of a jury during the voire dire and so the absence of a concern
that their fact-finding role will be usurped by the expert evidence.
It appears to be permissible for expert witnesses to give evidence about the likelihood
of a person’s intellectual disabilities (even should they fall short of ‘official’ retardation),
brain injuries or extreme youth to affect the weight that should be attached to admissions
that have been declared voluntary by the trial judge. However, it would seem prudent for
such evidence to stop well short of an assertion that the accused could not have
understood, would not have comprehended, or did not make such admissions. So long as
such evidence relates to the limitations of the accused person in contrast to the ordinary
person, and gives examples of the practical effects of such limitations upon his or her
functioning in circumstances analogous to the making of the record of interview, the
evidence is likely to be admitted. This allows the final step to be taken by the jury –
relating the problems of the accused to the circumstances in which he or she is said to
have made inculpatory statements and then to the weight that should be attached to such
utterances.
It appears also to be the case that the expertise of witnesses called to give such
evidence will be strictly construed and that skills in psycholinguistics, the behaviour and
speech of children and the effects of brain damage will on occasions be required, in
addition to standard psychological or psychiatric qualifications.
Mental health expert evidence about intention

[10.0.260] Expert evidence is generally not permitted about the intention of an accused
person (R v AI [2013] ACTCA 16 at [14]). However, should an accused person have a
mental or physical condition which bears upon his or her capacity to form a specific
648 [10.0.260]
intent, evidence to this effect may be permitted (see, for an analogy, Farrell v The Queen
(1998) 194 CLR 286; [1998] HCA 50: see Freckleton and Henning (1998)).
Mental health expert evidence about children

[10.0.280] It has been argued, on a number of occasions, that there should be a constraint
upon admissibility of expert evidence by mental health professionals precluding them
from expressing views about the condition of children who are healthy as against mentally
ill.
However, evidence as to the condition of children, whether mentally ill, psychologically
damaged or healthy, was permitted on a routine basis in Family Court and Children’s
Court proceedings prior to the passage of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), as well as in matters
heard in Supreme Courts involving the welfare of children. In an instance of the latter,
Wootten J summed up the prevailing view clearly in Sullivan v Read-Bloomfield [1983] 1
NSWLR 649 at 652:
It is unreal to think that children can be divided into two categories – those suffering from
mental ill-health and normal, happy children. There is a continuum of strain and risk. Any
child, no matter how normal and healthy it may have been to date, may be put at risk in
its psychological development by a custody decision which does not give proper weight to
its needs, the strength of the bonds it has formed, its capacity to adjust and so forth.
(See also Epperson v Dampney (1976) 10 ALR 227.)

Wootten J further noted (at 652–653):
In such cases the judge’s main hope of getting a real insight into the child’s view of the
world, the foundations of its security and its psychological needs, is through the evidence
by an expert.
By virtue of s 9A of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld), expert evidence may be given in relation
to children under the age of 12 as to the ‘level of intelligence of the child including his
powers of perception, memory and expression or relating to any other matter relevant to
his ability to give reliable evidence’.
In the English decision of G v Director of Public Prosecutions [1997] 2 All ER 755 at 759, it
was held to be ‘misconceived, inappropriate and a complete waste’ of money for expert
evidence to be adduced on the question of whether a child is capable of giving ‘intelligible
evidence’: ‘[It] does not require any input from an expert. It is a simple test well within the
capacity of a judge or magistrate.’
Mental health expert evidence about child development and child behaviour
[10.0.300] Because of admissibility uncertainty, special provision has been made in two
Australian jurisdictions to enable expert opinion evidence about child development and
child behaviour.
Under s 79A of the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas):
A person who has specialised knowledge of child behaviour based on the person’s
training, study or experience (including specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual
abuse on children and their behaviour during and following the abuse) may, where
relevant, give evidence in proceedings against a person charged with a sexual offence
against a child who, at the time of the alleged offence, had not attained the age of 17 years,
in relation to one or more of the following matters:
(a) child development and behaviour generally;
(b) child development and behaviour if the child has had a sexual offence, or any
offence similar in nature to a sexual offence, committed against him or her.
To a similar effect, s 79(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the
Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (National Uniform
Legislation) Act (NT) provides:
[10.0.300] 649
To avoid doubt, and without limiting subsection (1) –

(a) a reference in that subsection to specialised knowledge includes a reference to
specialised knowledge of child development and child behaviour (including
specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their
development and behaviour during and following the abuse); and
(b) a reference in that subsection to an opinion of a person includes, if the person has
specialised knowledge of the kind referred to in paragraph (a), a reference to an
opinion relating to either or both of the following –
(i) the development and behaviour of children generally;
(ii) the development and behaviour of children who have been victims of
sexual offences, or offences similar to sexual offences.
Mental health expert evidence as to character, credit and credibility

[10.0.320] The veracity of defendants has traditionally been viewed as an archetypal issue
upon which the untrained layperson is qualified to make insightful determinations after
having been exposed to all the evidence in a case. It has repeatedly been held that it is the
proper function of the juror to apply his or her daily experience to assess the truthfulness
of witnesses and the credibility of their evidence. ‘It is the jurors’ own “expertise” in
conducting their personal and business affairs which our judicial system has long
regarded as making them specially qualified’ to make such determinations: Abbell (1977,
p 55); followed in R v Beland [1987] 2 SCR 398; (1987) 43 DLR (4th) 641; 36 CCC (3d) 481 at
654.
The corollary of this assumption has been that expert evidence about such matters has
for the most part been excluded as inadmissible. The New South Wales Court of Criminal
Appeal restated this proposition in 2001, holding that, while a psychologist’s evidence
about whether an accused told lies may have been relevant, the jury was capable of
assessing the issue without assistance from the psychologist – in fact, the evidence by the
psychologist in this regard did not emanate from specialised knowledge based on her
training, study or experience: R v Quesada (2001) 122 A Crim R 218; [2001] NSWCCA 216 at
[49]. However, the decision of the High Court in Farrell v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 286;
[1998] HCA 50 (see Freckelton and Henning (1998)) signalled an important exception to
the range of permissible expert evidence on a witness’s credibility.
Definitions of ‘character’, ‘credit’ and ‘credibility’

[10.0.330] For the purposes of this and the succeeding sections, the following definitions,
which are adapted from McWilliams (1988, p 1078), are adopted:
(1) ‘Character’ concerns the disposition of a witness to act in a certain way.
(2) ‘Credit’ refers to the estimation of the truthfulness of a witness.
(3) ‘Credibility’ is the result of the assessment or weighing of the evidence to
determine whether a particular witness should be believed in relation to particular
statements. (Under s 101A of the uniform evidence legislation, credibility evidence
is evidence relevant to the credibility of a person.)
(See also Stone (1991, p 821). See further Melbourne v The Queen (1999) 198 CLR 1; [1991]
HCA 32; Ryan v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 267; [2001] HCA 21 in relation to ‘good
character’.)
Thus, an expert witness giving evidence about a person’s credibility would express
views about whether a particular version of events by a witness should be accepted. An
expert giving evidence as to credit would testify about whether a person is generally a
witness of truth and so can be believed (Magner (1989, p 226); R v Gunewardene [1951] 2
KB 600), or whether a person’s reputation or character traits are such that he or she can be
believed. Not surprisingly, there are few expert evidence cases on this aspect of veracity as
650 [10.0.320]
examining psychiatrists and psychologists are not often in a position to be able to proffer
an informed view of the defendant’s customary treatment of the truth.
However, it is acknowledged that these distinctions have an element of arbitrariness
about them, sometimes blurring during the progression from reputation of a person for
truthfulness and history of truthfulness (credit), to propensity to tell untruths or fantasise
or ex post facto rationalise (character), to the likelihood of the person being truthful on a
particular occasion (credibility). Moreover, expert evidence which addresses the likelihood
of a record of interview being truthful, that is to say being the untutored, uncoerced
expression of a defendant, fits somewhat uncomfortably into the credibility division.
One of the confusions is that the terms ‘credit’ and ‘credibility’ are, on occasions, used
interchangeably, when in fact they refer to different notions. Clearly, too, credibility is a
subset of credit in that it focuses upon whether a particular person, who may not
generally be a truthful person (ie who lacks credit), is likely to have told the truth on a
particular occasion. While assessment of a person’s credit always remains the task of the
trier of fact, that assessment in principle may be aided by expert evidence as to character.
Mental health expert evidence about character

[10.0.340] The decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Lowery v The
Queen [1974] AC 85 illustrates the complexity of the courts’ varying decisions in allowing
expert evidence about character and what might be described as offender profiling (see
also s 110 of the uniform evidence legislation). The co-accused, Lowery and King, had
been convicted in Victoria of the murder of a 15-year-old girl. Each had assigned
responsibility to the other. One of the witnesses called by King was a psychologist who
had interviewed both co-accused and had subjected them to various psychological tests.
He gave evidence that King was an immature youth who was likely to be led and
dominated by more aggressive and dominant men and that he might behave aggressively
in response to the demands of such people. The psychologist also testified that the tests he
had employed showed that Lowery was strongly aggressive and lacked impulse control.
Lowery appealed on the ground that the psychologist’s evidence had been wrongly
admitted as it tended merely to show disposition. The Privy Council dismissed the appeal,
holding that the psychologist’s evidence was relevant to King’s case in order to show that
King’s version of events was more probable than Lowery’s, and the whole substance of
Lowery’s case placed its admissibility beyond doubt as necessary to negate Lowery’s
evidence. The decision, therefore, relates both to assessment of Lowery’s telling the truth
on this occasion and to his general disposition and character.
Arguably, the leading English case on the common law admissibility of expert
character evidence is that of R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80, in which the
Court of Appeal held that on a charge of murder, evidence from a psychiatrist that the
defendant was not suffering from a mental illness and was not violent by nature, but that
his personality was such that he could have been provoked and was likely to be telling the
truth, was inadmissible. The court distinguished Lowery v The Queen [1974] AC 85, saying
that its issues were ‘unusual’ and confining it to its particular facts:
We do not consider that it is an authority for the proposition that in all cases psychologists
and psychiatrists can be called to prove the probability of the accused’s veracity. If any
such rule was applied in our courts, trial by psychiatrists would be likely to take the place
of trial by jury and magistrates. We do not find that prospect attractive and the law does
not at present provide for it.
However, it could plausibly be argued that R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R
80 is primarily a case dealing with expert evidence on the issue of credit.
Previously, the House of Lords in Toohey v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1965] AC
595 had held that evidence that the victim of an assault would be more prone to hysteria
[10.0.340] 651
than the average person was admissible on a charge of assault on the ground that such
evidence might have created a real doubt as to whether the episode created the hysteria or
vice versa and thus whether the assault took place at all. McMullin J in R v B [1987] 1
NZLR 362 at 368 points out that ‘Toohey’s case is an authority for the proposition that
evidence which makes the event in issue more probable than not or vice versa is
admissible in the same way as evidence of physical factors directed toward that end’.
In R v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 441, the defence was not permitted to adduce the
evidence of a psychologist who had studied records of interview made by the police and
formed views about the content of certain answers allegedly made by the accused to the
police. Gowans J conceded the relevance of the evidence but excluded it (at 444) on the
express basis that the accused person was ‘normal’:
The content and nature of an ordinary written record cannot be made the subject of expert
opinion; that is for the jury. Neither can the behaviour of ordinary persons.
This was not to deny that an area of expertise existed which might otherwise have
provided useful information to the jury, but to assert that because of the proscription on
expert evidence on an area within the ken of the jury, such evidence was not admissible.
However, the Queensland Supreme Court five years later appeared to take a more
liberal view in R v McEndoo (1981) 5 A Crim R 52 at 54, when it admitted a psychiatrist’s
evidence that an accused person was weak-willed, vacillating, a poor judge of others,
obsequious, submissive and dependent, and so more likely than the usual person to make
a false confession in the sense of agreeing with whatever was put to him in a record of
interview. However, the person did not suffer from any mental illness, was not insane nor
mentally retarded. ‘The highest it could be put was that his personality showed an
exaggerated form of a number of personality traits that it was said all people possess to
some degree’ (at 54).
The majority decision of Connolly and Andrews JJ permitted the evidence as to
personality but refused to permit the expert witness’s views as to the likelihood or
otherwise of the accused having acquiesced in the production of a false confession. This
approach has the advantage that it permits the expert to assist the court to understand the
mental characteristics of the accused and the court, so equipped, to proceed to determine
the issues. It avoids any usurpation of the jury role, which could be asserted if the expert
were to offer opinions specifically upon the accused person’s capacity to do a certain act or
perform a certain task.
The decision can be compared with that of R v Haynes (1997) 121 CCC (3d) 1, where it
was held that a judge correctly excluded the evidence of a psychologist that an accused
suffered a dependent personality disorder and was psychologically dominated by his
accomplice girlfriend. It was held that in such a situation the evidence added nothing and
the jury was able to form its own conclusions without expert evidence.
Mental health expert evidence about credit and credibility

[10.0.360] The general approach of Australian, New Zealand, Scottish, Canadian and
English courts has been to hold that psychiatrists and psychologists may not be called to
prove the probability of the accused’s veracity, the likelihood of an admission having been
made truthfully, or the credibility of a witness’s account. The assessment of the credibility
of persons appearing before the court is ‘first and foremost a jury function’ (R v B [1987] 1
NZLR 362 at 367; Thomas v The Queen [1972] NZLR 34 at 39; R v Ashcroft [1965] 1 Qd R 81
at 85; Maguire (1993); Hodgkinson and James (2015)) and an expression of opinion on the
subject has often been described as risking usurpation of the role of the jury: see, eg, R v
Barry [1984] 1 Qd R 74 at 90; see too R v Mackenney (1981) 76 r App R 271; R v Strudwick
(1994) 99 Cr App R 326. Put another way, it is impermissibly oath-helping (R v Turner
[1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80).
652 [10.0.360]
The exceptions that have been permitted have been where the accused is of ‘borderline
mentally defective intelligence’ or is suffering from a ‘mental illness’ or a physical or
mental defect which reduces their capacity to give reliable evidence: R v Toohey [1965] AC
595; R v B [1987] 1 NZLR 362 at 369–370; Farrell v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 286; [1998]
HCA 50 at 300. Even in this instance, though, it has been held that determining whether a
mentally retarded person has told the truth is ‘not a matter which is substantially one of
science or skill [but] it is a matter for the “commonsense of the jury” and entirely for
them’: R v Helpard (1979) 49 CCC (2d) 35 at 50.
The leading Australian decision is that of Farrell v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 286; [1998]
HCA 50 at [29]. Kirby J accepted that while expert evidence on the ultimate credibility of
a witness is not admissible, expert evidence on psychological and physical conditions,
which may lead to certain behaviour relevant to credibility, is admissible. However, such
evidence must be given by an expert within an established field of knowledge relevant to
the witness’s expertise; the testimony must go beyond the ordinary experience of the trier
of fact; and the trier of fact, if a jury, must be provided with a firm warning that the expert
cannot determine matters of credibility, this being the role of the jury.
In R v Gunewardene [1951] 2 KB 600, an attempt was made to call a doctor to discredit
a witness for the prosecution. The doctor would have given evidence that he had
examined the witness and formed the view that he was suffering from a disease of the
mind and so was not credible. It was held that, like any other witness, the doctor could be
called to say that he would not believe the witness on his oath, but he could not give the
reasons for that belief in examination-in-chief. This is the extreme end of the prohibition
on expert evidence as to credit. More recently, in Re S and B (Minors) (Child abuse: evidence)
[1990] 2 FLR 489, a psychiatric social worker was allowed to offer a view on a person’s
credit as part of her opinion on that person’s psychiatric state, but she was not permitted
to express a view as to whether the witness was telling the truth about a particular fact.
However, the courts have recognised that the personal circumstances of the accused
that were prevailing at the time of making a confession may render it wholly or partly
unreliable and therefore either inadmissible or of dubious weight: Jackson v The Queen
(1962) 108 CLR 591; Driscoll v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 517. For the purpose of assisting
the jury to evaluate admissions contained in a confession, evidence of both a lay and
expert nature, whether medical, psychological or linguistic, is admissible. The effect of
intoxication, whether by alcohol or drugs, upon the reliability of a confession is a prime
example: R v Buchanan [1966] VR 9 at 15. Another is the effect of head injuries (R v
Buchanan [1966] VR 9 at 14; R v Barry [1984] 1 Qd R 74 at 88) or ‘clouded consciousness’
resulting from a condition brought on by attempted suicide: R v Starecki [1960] VR 141 at
150; Sinclair v The King (1946) 73 CLR 316. ‘Infancy’ may present another example (see R v
C (an infant) [1976] Qd R 341; R v M [1976] Qd R 344), and ‘it is difficult to see why any
cogent evidence bearing upon the mental or physical well-being of the accused, and
capable of detracting from the full value or weight of the confession, should not be
admissible for this purpose’: R v Barry [1984] 1 Qd R 74 at 89. Evidence that fails to
persuade a judge that a confession was not voluntary may nevertheless be relevant to its
weight and, if so, may be led a second time as being relevant for that purpose before a
jury: Sinclair v The King (1946) 73 CLR 316 at 326.
An expert witness attempting to testify on matters of credibility is likely to focus on
‘the witness’ capacity for observation or the operation of the witness’ memory or the
witness’ ability to relate the story’: Magner (1989, pp 226–227). The fullest analysis of the
admissibility of evidence based upon psychological tests employed to assess such matters
is to be found in R v B [1987] 1 NZLR 362, where the accused had been committed for trial
on various indecent assault charges relating to a girl who, at the time of the trial, was
12 years old and mentally retarded. The Crown sought to adduce evidence from a
[10.0.360] 653
psychologist relating to tests carried out by her which had led her to the view that the
complainant was credible. (The tests were the Family Relations Test, the Rotter Incomplete
Sentences Blank, the Dreams test and tests involving friends, as well as the complainant’s
inability to tell anyone else of her experiences, her relationship to her father and her level
of sexual knowledge (at 365).) The court held that such evidence was designed to enhance
the complainant as a witness of truth by the use of tests, which necessarily involved a
disclosure of what the complainant had told the psychologist. Thus, it was hearsay
evidence as well as expert evidence relating to the complainant’s credibility, ‘which is a
matter on which the jury alone can express a view’ (at 369) and inadmissible as such.
Somers J commented (at 370):
If the science of child psychologists continues to advance it may be that the stage will be
reached when expert evidence will be able to indicate, with a sufficient degree of
compulsion, features which establish that the evidence of the complainant is indeed
truthful. I am of opinion however that it has not been demonstrated in the instant case
that such a stage has been reached.
The Crown’s difficulties would probably have been alleviated had they simply sought to
use the expert evidence to assist the court to understand how in general the credit of an
intellectually disabled person may be assessed. That would have left the application of
such generalisations to the specific victim as a matter for the jury.
Thus, in R v MacKenney (1983) 76 Cr App R 271 at 276, the Court of Appeal accepted
that ‘in a proper case’ psychiatric evidence could properly be given that a person is
incapable of giving reliable evidence if suffering from a ‘psychiatric disability’. However,
this is subject to the additional qualification that although the mental illness need not be
such as to make the witness ‘totally incapable of giving accurate evidence’, it must
‘substantially affect the witness’s capacity to give reliable evidence’. However, the court
stressed (at 276) that:
this is very different from calling psychiatric evidence with a view to warning a jury about
a witness who is capable of giving reliable evidence, but who may well choose not to do
so. If the witness is mentally capable of giving reliable evidence, it is for the jury … to
decide whether or not that witness is giving reliable evidence.
(See also R v B [1987] 1 NZLR 362 at 372; R v Kyselka (1962) 133 CCC 103; R v Kostuck
(1969) 29 CCC 190.)
The same message was given in R v Ward [1993] 2 All ER 577 at 641 by Glidewell LJ,
who extended the boundaries of potential ‘abnormality’ for the purposes of the giving of
psychiatric or psychological evidence:
We conclude on the authorities as they now stand that the expert evidence of a
psychiatrist or a psychologist may properly be admitted if it is to the effect that a
defendant is suffering from a condition not properly described as mental illness, but from
a personality disorder so severe as properly to be categorised as mental disorder … In our
view, such evidence is admissible on the issue whether what a defendant has said in a
confession or admission was reliable and therefore likely to have been true. We emphasise
that the occasions on which such evidence would properly be admissible would probably
be rare. This decision is not to be construed as an open invitation to every defendant who
repents of having confessed and seeks to challenge the truth of his confession to seek the
aid of a psychiatrist.
It is likely, however, for it to be very rare indeed for a personality disorder, for instance, to
be determined as sufficiently severe for these purposes to legitimise psychiatric or
psychological evidence in relation to the reliability of alleged admissions.
Subsequent to these cases is the important decision of R v Robinson (1994) 98 Cr App R
370, where the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had erred in allowing the Crown
to call evidence from an educational psychologist about an intellectually disabled
15-year-old complainant in a rape case not being unduly suggestible. The court held that
654 [10.0.360]
in a proper case evidence from a psychiatrist or psychologist to show that a witness is

unreliable may be admissible. It accepted, however, that there has been no case which
authorised psychiatric or psychological evidence to ‘boost, bolster or enhance the evidence
of a witness for the Crown or indeed of any witness’ (at 374). The court accepted that if the
defence called an expert to say that a witness of fact for the Crown should be regarded as
unreliable due to some mental abnormality outside the jury’s experience, then it may be
open to the Crown to call an expert in rebuttal, or even in anticipation. It also held that it
may even be open to the Crown to rebut by expert evidence a case put only in
cross-examination that a prosecution witness is unreliable in a particular respect arising
from mental abnormality. Lord Taylor CJ commented, however (at 375):
Much may depend upon the nature of the abnormality and of the cross-examination. If
such evidence is admitted, great care would need to be taken to restrict the expert opinion
to meeting the specific challenge and not to allow it to extend to ‘oath-helping’.
In R v Robinson (1994) 98 Cr App R 370, as no expert evidence was proposed to be called

by the defence and as no specific case had been put in cross-examination that the
complainant was peculiarly suggestible or given to fantasise as a result of her mental
impairment, it was held that the Crown should not have been permitted to call the
educational psychologist to give evidence about the complainant not being suggestible. Its
effect would have been in essence to prop up the credit of its own witness.
In an earlier Queensland case (R v Barry [1984] 1 Qd R 74), the suggestion was made by
Thomas J that a distinction should be maintained between evidence relating to statements
and conduct out of court and evidence relating to statements and conduct in court.
(Compare the approach in relation to surveys undertaken for purposes other than
litigation articulated by Burchett J in Shoshana Pty Ltd v 10th Cantanae Pty Ltd (1987) 79
ALR 279: see below [11.0.390].) He held (at 102) that where the expert evidence was
relevant to the reliability of out-of-court behaviour the test for admissibility was a broad
one, but that when the evidence was relevant to the evaluation of in-court statements or
conduct, a close control should properly be exercised by judges to safeguard the function
and primacy of the jury or the court as a fact-finding tribunal:
There is a fundamental difference between offering aids to a jury in relation to the
evidence of a witness whose performance they can see for themselves, and offering
evidence as to the circumstances and nature of a confession which was made out of court
by a person who may never be called as a witness.
Magner (1989, p 238) suggested in discussing his Honour’s ruling that ‘it may be that there
is a rule that testimony based upon observations made in court should be excluded’.
However, she acknowledged that the ‘rule’ is never enunciated in these terms. Nor has it
been clearly articulated in other reported decisions. Such an approach would not be useful
and would misconceive the functions traditionally assigned to the common knowledge
rule. In addition, it fails to take account of the fact that the factors which may impact upon
the unreliability of the accused’s evidence may not be obvious to lay jurors or susceptible
of adequate evaluation by them.
Even in the Canadian case of R v Beland [1987] 2 SCR 398; (1987) 43 DLR (4th) 641; 36
CCC (3d) 481, it was accepted that it is a basic tenet of the legal system that judges and
juries are capable of assessing credibility and credit. However, Canadian decisions have
shown a preparedness not to focus quite so strictly as English and Australian decisions on
the need for demonstration of mental illness and have been more liberal in the scope
extended to the admissibility of evidence of mental health professionals: R v Rosik [1971] 2
OR 47; 2 CCC (3d) 351; R v Holland (1981) 6 WCB 177. In a significant case the accused did
not suffer from any form of mental illness but a psychiatrist was held to have been
correctly permitted to give evidence that the accused person’s condition after the crime
was consistent with his being in a state of emotional shock: R v Scopelliti [1981] 34 OR (2d)
[10.0.360] 655
524 at 531. Similarly, in R v Clark (1983) 1 DLR (4d) 46, the Ontario Court of Appeal held
that at the accused’s trial for murder, the trial judge had wrongly disallowed psychiatric
evidence that after the crime the accused had suffered from hysterical amnesia and for that
reason was unable to recall relevant events. Both these cases illustrate the admission of
evidence that was highly relevant to the credit of the defendants.
The Canadian position is enunciated most clearly in the Supreme Court decision of R v
Marquard [1993] 4 SCR 223; (1993) 85 CCC (3d) 193, where the majority held (at 228):
It is a fundamental axiom of our trial process that the ultimate conclusion as to the
credibility or truthfulness of a particular witness is for the trier of fact, and is not the
proper subject of expert opinion … A judge or jury who simply accepts an expert’s
opinion on the credibility of a witness would be abandoning its duty to itself determine
the credibility of a witness.
The majority held that ‘credibility’ is the product of the judge or jury’s view of the ‘diverse
ingredients it has perceived at trial, combined with experience, logic and an intuitive sense
of the matter’ (at 228). It determined, therefore, that credibility is a matter within the
competence of lay people who draw conclusions about people’s truthfulness on a daily
basis. The reasons advanced by the majority for this stance are important. First, it
maintained that an expert who testified on the issue of credibility was not sworn to the
same ‘heavy duty’ as a judge or a juror. Second, it noted that the expert’s opinion may be
founded upon evidence which does not come properly before the jury. Third, the majority
held that ‘the expert’s opinion may be too readily accepted by a frustrated jury as a
convenient basis upon which to resolve its difficulties’ (at 228).
However, the court conceded that aspects of a witness’s evidence may go beyond the
ability of a lay person to understand and hence may justify expert evidence. The majority
judges held that this was particularly the case in relation to children’s evidence. They
instanced (at 228) that:
[T]he ordinary experience from failure to complain promptly after a sexual assault might
be that the story is a fabricated afterthought, born of malice or some other calculated
stratagem. Expert evidence has been properly led to explain the reasons why young
victims of sexual abuse often do not complain immediately. Such evidence is helpful;
indeed it may be essential to a just verdict.
Thus, the court held that while generally expert evidence about credibility is inadmissible,
evidence on human conduct and the psychological and physical factors which may lead to
certain behaviour relevant to credibility is admissible, provided the testimony goes
beyond the ordinary experience of the trier of fact (at 229). What is now unclear is the
extent to which the 2000 decision in R v DD 2000 SCC 43 reduces the significance of the
observations in R v Marquard [1993] 4 SCR 223; (1993) 85 CCC (3d) 193, the court in R v
DD 2000 SCC 43 refusing to allow expert evidence about the reasons why children often
delay in complaining on the basis that such evidence had not been shown to be
‘necessary’. (See also R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402 and R v J-LJ [2000]
2 SCR 600; 2000 SCC 51.)
Expert evidence about conditions impacting upon credibility

[10.0.380] The most important Australian authority on the propriety of a mental health
professional expressing expert opinions about the reliability of a witness is the 1998 High
Court decision of Farrell v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 286; [1998] HCA 50: see Freckelton
and Henning (1998). Determining the correctness of a trial judge’s comments subsequent
to allowing a psychiatrist to give evidence about the impact of a personality disorder upon
the credibility of a complainant in a sexual assault case, the court unanimously held that
expert evidence as to a condition which may affect a witness’s ability to give reliable
evidence is admissible, provided that the expert evidence extends beyond the experience
of ordinary persons.
656 [10.0.380]
The trial judge had permitted a psychiatrist called on behalf of the accused to testify
that the complainant was suffering from a mental disorder which he described as ‘alcohol
dependence and polysubstance abuse’, as well as a ‘personality disorder’ (at [3]). He had
not examined the complainant but based his views on hospital and medical records
relating to the complainant. The witness described a personality disorder as ‘perhaps more
like a disability than an illness … where an individual has a characteristic way of
behaving, of responding to situations, of doing things that is mal-adaptive and causes
distress or dysfunction either to themselves and/or others’ (at 664). He made reference to
the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
and said that in his view the complainant suffered from anti-social personality disorder
and probably from borderline personality disorder. He said that a borderline personality
disorder would not have any effect upon memory or reporting but that an anti-social
personality disorder, while not actually affecting the structure of a person’s memory, may
have an impact on what he or she reports. The most important aspect of his evidence was
that he expressed the opinion to the jury that persons suffering from an anti-social
personality disorder ‘are inherently less truthful than the average person’ (at [5]).
The witness also testified that the ingestion of large amounts of benzodiazepines could
affect memory and that ‘a very common side effect of benzodiazepine use and abuse
would be periods of amnesia during the time when the levels are at the peak levels in the
person’s body’ (at [48]). He made reference to the propensity of benzodiazepine addicts to
lie to their doctors in order to obtain supplies on prescription. He also opined that persons
with a history of alcohol abuse could have impaired memories.
The trial judge directed the jury to scrutinise the complainant’s evidence with extra
care because there was ‘a real risk that his evidence might be unreliable and [they] must
be careful to take into account that risk, extra in his case, over and above ordinary
witnesses, when … considering his evidence’ (at [14]). However, in charging the jury, the
trial judge stressed that the jury should be careful in assessing the complainant’s
reliability, but not because of the evidence of the psychiatrist, and commented that the
witness’s ‘opinion really does not count for anything because he did not get to the stage of
diagnosing an actual medical condition which would be on [sic, beyond] your experience
and mine’ (at [30]).
The appellant’s main argument before the High Court was that the trial judge’s
direction effectively removed the psychiatrist’s evidence from the jury and that in doing so
the trial judge wrongly denied to the appellant the benefit of the weight which the
psychiatrist’s diagnosis of the complainant and opinions about his credibility gave to the
appellant’s contention that the complainant should not be believed.
The High Court by a majority of three (Gaudron, Kirby and Callinan JJ) to two
(McHugh and Hayne JJ) held that the appellant had been wrongly deprived of the chance
of an acquittal that was fairly open to him because the case against him depended on the
jury’s acceptance of the complainant’s evidence. McHugh and Hayne JJ (in dissent) held
that, in spite of the flaws in what the trial judge said to the jury about the psychiatrist’s
evidence, his direction did not disadvantage the appellant because the trial judge’s
warning brought the dangers of acting on the complainant’s evidence home to the jury
authoritatively and vividly. This meant that he was not deprived of a fair chance of
acquittal.
Kirby J held that, while expert evidence on the ultimate credibility of a witness is not
admissible, expert evidence of psychological and physical conditions which may lead to
certain behaviour relevant to credibility, is admissible. However, this is only so if:
(1) the evidence is given by an expert within an established field of knowledge
relevant to the witness’s expertise;
(2) the testimony goes beyond the ordinary experience of the trier of fact; and
[10.0.380] 657
(3) the trier of fact, if a jury, is provided with a firm warning that the expert cannot
determine matters of credibility and that such matters are the ultimate obligation
of the jury to determine (at [29]).
Kirby J’s judgment on the subject is the most substantial. He found that the trial judge had
been right to approach with caution any attempt to adduce evidence which could have the
effect of usurping the role of the jury in assessing the complainant’s credibility. He
confirmed this function to be pre-eminently that of the jury, and held that the function
could not be assumed by expert witnesses ‘offering their opinion on the accuracy,
consistency and believability’ of a witness’s testimony (at [27]). However, he acknowledged
the study of human behaviour, including psychology, to be ‘an accepted scientific
discipline’ and confirmed it to be appropriate for expert evidence to be admitted ‘where
established patterns of human behaviour have been studied, analysed and scientifically
described’. As an example of such information, his Honour cited battered woman
syndrome. He held that such evidence was admissible, not to usurp the role of the
fact-finder, and noted that principle and a recognition of the imperfections of science deny
such a consequence, apparently referring to the existence of exceptions to such patterns as
can be discerned by social science research about matters such as credibility.
Kirby J held that in the case before the court ‘it would have been quite wrong to cast a
person such as the complainant into a limbo of unbelievable witnesses simply because, in
the past, he had manifested psychological conditions which are often, or sometimes,
associated with mendacity’ (at [28]). However, he held that if a psychiatrist could provide
evidence that the complainant was manifesting symptoms of an established psychological
condition, it would be wrong to deprive jurors of evidence about what such a condition
entailed (at [28]):
Such testimony goes beyond the ordinary experience of the trier of fact. It is not mere
analysis of statistical probability. It is not tendered to suggest that a witness, capable of
telling the truth, would choose not to do so. It does not involve an invitation to the
decision-maker to abandon its duty itself to determine the credibility of the witness. It is
rather the provision by an expert witness of an opinion resting upon established research
within that expert’s scientific discipline.
Callinan J reached the same ultimate conclusion as Kirby J. He noted a statement by

Brennan J in Bromley v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 315 at 325 that ‘if the nature, severity and
significance of [a complainant’s] mental disorder is deposed to by persons qualified to do
so, that may bring home to the jury more vividly and more authoritatively than a judicial
warning on the danger of acting upon the witness evidence without corroboration’.
However, he found it to have limited application as precedent, in part because it was
made in the context of disposing of an application for special leave to appeal to the High
Court. He found assistance in the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in R v
Marquard [1993] 4 SCR 223; (1993) 85 CCC (3d) 193 at 228–229, where McLachlin J (with
whom Iacobucci and Major JJ agreed) acknowledged that there were circumstances in
which expert evidence in relation to the witness’s credibility is appropriate – in particular,
where the evidence is about psychological and physical factors which may lead to certain
behaviour relevant to credibility, and where it goes beyond the ordinary experience of the
trier of fact. Callinan J found that the psychiatrist had, in fact, given evidence of the
consequences of actual disorders or disabilities arising from drug and alcohol abuse and
personality disorders. This evidence was relevant to the complainant’s capacity to give
reliable evidence and should have resulted in the trial judge appropriately summing up its
relevance to the jury. Here, though, he found that the trial judge had wrongly negated its
impact by the way in which he had portrayed it to the jury.
Gaudron J found that the psychiatrist’s evidence fell somewhat short of evidence of the
complainant’s impaired capacity to give accurate evidence. Rather, she found that it
658 [10.0.380]
simply raised the possibility of his being impaired on account of alcohol and substance
abuse, and it ‘raised the probability of greater unreliability of the complainant’s evidence
on account of his anti-social personality disorder than in the case of persons who do not
suffer from that disorder’ (at [9]). She found no reason to exclude expert evidence,
although it does not disclose an impaired capacity in a witness, if it discloses the existence
of a disability the likely consequences of which bear on the reliability of the witness’s
evidence and extend beyond the experience of ordinary persons. She distinguished
between the psychiatrist’s evidence about the possible effects of alcohol and substance
abuse, which she found not to be beyond the experience of ordinary persons, and his
evidence about the complainant’s personality disorder, ‘a distinct disability, one feature of
which was that persons with that disability are inherently less truthful that the average
person. That is not, in my view, a matter within the experience of ordinary persons and,
thus, Dr Sales’ evidence was, to that extent, relevant and admissible’ (at [12]).
In England notably, though, the decisions in R v Reynolds [1989] Crim LR 220 and
Weightman v The Queen [1991] Crim LR 204 have suggested that not only must there be
abnormality in the accused person’s mental state but there has to be a degree of
abnormality sufficient to take his or her condition ‘beyond the experience of non-medical
people’. In Weightman v The Queen [1991] Crim LR 204, discussed in Mackay and Colman
(1991, p 803), the Court of Appeal upheld a trial judge’s refusal to admit psychiatric
evidence, not about mental illness or impairment per se, but about the existence in the
accused man of a personality disorder known as ‘la belle indifference’, characterised by
emotional superficiality, impulsive behaviour when under stress, and a reduced capacity
to develop enduring relationships with others.
The decision of the High Court in Farrell v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 286; [1998] HCA
50 is consistent with a number of decisions in England and Australia which have
permitted expert opinion evidence from mental health professionals about witnesses’
credibility when such witnesses are said to be suffering from a mental condition that
affects their capacity to tell the truth or to recount a version of events with accuracy or
reliability. Where the mental impairment is an organic brain injury or where a person
suffers a schizophrenic disorder, the reasons for the trier of fact needing expert guidance
are clear enough. However, the situation is considerably less clear where the disorder
concerned is a substance abuse disorder or a personality disorder. The admissibility of
expert evidence about a witness’s credibility when the witness is a substance abuser
remains unclear in the wake of Farrell. Gaudron and Callinan JJ found that the possibility
of impaired memory due to alcohol and drug abuse is within the experience of ordinary
persons, so expert evidence on the subject is not admissible. Hayne J, with whom
McHugh J agreed, did not distinguish between the personality and substance abuse
disorders suffered by the complainant. Nor did Kirby J. This leaves the admissibility of
expert evidence about the deleterious impact of significant substance abuse upon a
witness’s reliability unsatisfactorily unclear. It is not unusual for a key witness in a
prosecution to be alcoholic or to have a history of substantial use of opiates,
amphetamines or benzodiazepines. However, the impact of that dependency upon a
witness’s memories and cognition varies dramatically between those whose mental state is
relatively unaffected to those whose mental state has been profoundly damaged: see,
generally, Vrij (2008); Memon, Vrij and Bull (1998). Expert evidence on the subject has the
potential to enable informed evaluation of the reliance that can be placed upon such
witnesses’ evidence. The decision of the High Court is likely to facilitate the admissibility
of such evidence, although the status of such mental health opinions still is uncertain. (See
further Freckelton and Henning (1998).)
[10.0.380] 659
Expert evidence about truthfulness and lying

[10.0.420] ‘A fundamental premise of … [the] criminal justice system is that the jury is the
lie detector’: United States v Barnard 490 F 2d 907 at 912 (1973). However, evidence from
mental health professionals and others as to the accused person’s capacity to form the
requisite intent at the time of the commission of the offence, or the impact of mental illness
upon her or his responsibility for the actions, in principle could take into account the
results of narcoanalysis, hypnosis, the administration of polygraph tests, and a series of
new technologies which purport to assist the process of evaluating truth-telling. Many
studies (see, generally, Vrij (2008)) have shown that professionals perform only just above
the level of chance when they attempt to detect truths and lies in people they do not know
on the basis of non-verbal and verbal behaviour. In spite of the rhetoric, their ability to
distinguish truth from lies is much the same as that of the lay person. Vrij (2008, p 184)
contends that there are three main reasons for this:
• Perhaps many professionals are not practised enough in detecting truths and lies via
observing someone’s nonverbal and verbal behaviour and perhaps, like laypersons,
they mostly detect truths and lies by comparing statements with available evidence.
• Perhaps professionals lack proper feedback in the decisions they make – observers need
to be informed immediately and after every interaction with a person whether that
person was lying or not in order to build up their expertise.
• Perhaps professional ‘lie catchers lack training or receive inadequate training in lie
detection’.
This has led Vrij (at p 184) to comment:
First, professionals are inclined to express confidence in their ability to detect truths and
lies and are typically more confident than laypersons. Being confident but not particularly
skilled in a task is worrisome, amongst other reasons because high confidence often results
in making quick decisions on the basis of limited information. Lie detection is a complex
task, and therefore quick and shallow decision-making processes do not bode well.
Second, at least in some countries professional lie catchers typically exert a lie-bias and
tend to disbelieve senders.
From the point of view of admissibility, the area of greater difficulty is if expert evidence is
led as to the credit of an accused person or the credibility of utterances by the accused
after taking truth drugs such as sodium pentothal or sodium amytal, the results of
lie-detector tests, or statements made under hypnosis.
Truth drug administration
[10.0.430] Late in the 19th century in Germany, Professor Schmidt isolated a drug which
he called scopolamine, one of whose side-effects was hypnosis or narcosis. Work was
subsequently done in both the United States and Germany in the early part of the 20th
century to use the drug as an aid to interrogation. In due course, sodium amytal and
sodium pentothal replaced scopolamine as ‘truth drugs’.
Hodgkinson and James (2015, p 432) reported that the English courts had not generally
received evidence from psychiatrists about the credibility of statements made by witnesses
under the influence of sodium pentothal or similar drugs, ‘although there are isolated, and
somewhat haphazardly reported, examples of its admission’. This remains the case. They
commented (2015, p 432) that there are:
no dicta of authority from the higher courts capable of establishing a principle in relation
to the admission of such evidence.
In Scotland, the High Court refused to arrange for an accused man to be examined under
a truth drug because ‘the medical men would take the place of the jury as a judge of
credibility’ in respect of any resulting statement: Meehan v HM Advocate [1970] JC 11.
Similarly, the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that two psychiatrists were not entitled
to express an opinion that answers given by a defendant after he had been administered a
660 [10.0.420]
truth drug were likely to be true because it could usher in trial by psychiatrist: R v McKay
[1967] NZLR 139 at 144. Turner J commented (at 144):
I am quite alive to the fact that the court must pay due regard to the advances of science,
and if the time ever does come when it is established beyond doubt that answers given by
an accused person under the influence of drugs are always true, then it may be that a
change in the law of evidence may be called for, but such a revolutionary change would
need to be introduced by an Act of Parliament, which I am sure would not be passed until
after a close investigation into the scientific and moral aspects of the proposal and with
proper safeguards to ensure that the tests were carried out in the presence of the Crown.
There is no superior court authority on the admissibility of such evidence in England or

Australasia, but in the early Ontario case of R v Allen (No 2) (1979) 46 CCC (2d) 477
Goodman J allowed a witness to give evidence of her newfound memory, even though her
recollection had been non-existent prior to the injection of sodium amytal. Psychiatric
testimony as to the circumstances of her examination when under the influence of the
drug was presented and allowed on the point that her recollection because of the drug
arose from repressed memory rather than from suggestion during her time under the
influence of the drug. However, Goodman J pointed out (at 480) that there was no
suggestion in the evidence:
that the administration of sodium amytal gives any assurance that the statements elicited
from a patient under the influence thereof are likely to be true by reason of that fact. The
evidence is clear that the administration of the drug for that purpose is not recognised as
a valid procedure in the field of forensic psychiatry. It is not recognised scientifically as
being an assured method of obtaining truthful statements from a person. In fact, Dr C said
that a person to whom the drug is administered may wilfully make false statements even
though under the influence of the drug.
(See also Chayko, Gulliver and MacDougall (1991, p 544).)

He noted in conclusion that the fact that evidence has been retrieved through
administration of the drug is a factor that it is proper for a jury to consider in assessing the
credibility of what a witness says. The dearth of authority on the area, the scientific doubts
pervading use of truth drugs, and the ‘self-serving’ nature of statements made under the
influence of substances such as sodium amytal should alert counsel to the dangers of
memory ‘retrieved’ as a result of the administration of such drugs. Expert evidence in
relation to their use is unlikely to be readily received by Australasian courts.
Polygraph administration
[10.0.440] Polygraphy was developed late in the 19th century, the Italian criminologist
Lombroso postulating first that changes in blood pressure and pulse accompany lying: see
Palmiotto (1983). Chayko, Gulliver and MacDougall (1991, pp 523–524) described its
multiple measuring systems thus:
Respiration is routinely measured by using hollow, convoluted tubes placed over the
thorax and abdomen. Although these sensors give a fairly true picture of respiratory
functioning, there is a growing faction of practitioners who are using lighter and more
comfortable mercury strain gauges. The mercury gauges are more sensitive and therefore
yield a more exact reproduction of chest activity. Both devices yield a measure of the rate
and extent of breathing.
Cardiovascular functioning is generally measured using two different devices and
body locations. The first device is designed to measure relative blood pressure using a
standard occlusion cuff over the brachial artery and inflating it to a pressure slightly under
the average diastolic pressure (70 mm Hg). This device yields an oscillation wave
reflecting both blood pressure and heart rate. The second means of measuring heart
activity is by using a photoplethysmograph or infra-red blood flow monitor. This device is
attached to a peripheral body location, usually a finger, and yields a measure of small
vessel blood flow and heart rate.
The remaining measure taken is electrodermal activity or the galvanic skin response
(GSR). This measure records palmar or skin surface resistance changes to an imperceptible
[10.0.440] 661
level of constant current. The resistance changes are a function of arousal and sweat gland
activity. The galvanic skin response is considered by many to be one of the most sensitive
indices of arousal. Many polygraphists are changing over to measuring skin conductance,
which is considered superior to resistance. Both measures yield useful displays of
autonomic arousal. All three measures are displayed through a series of preamp power
amplifiers connected to a moving ink-writing system. This results in a real time permanent
record of the bodily functions.
(See also Elliott (1982, pp 104ff); Raskin (1986); Honts and Perry (1992, p 357); Clarke
(2000); National Research Council (2003); McMahon (2003); Freckelton (2004); Edelman
(2005).)
For its effectiveness, it has been suggested that polygraphy depends on implanting into
the subject a belief in the infallibility of the machine and on the design of effective control
questions. ‘The whole fragrant stew of imposition, trickery and downright lying (by the
examiner, not the subject) is reminiscent of a certain type of hard police interrogation of
subjects whom the interrogators “know” to be guilty’: Elliott (1982, pp 104, 108).
The use of the polygraph is based upon the presumption that deception and
truthfulness reliably elicit different psychological states across examinees and that
physiological reactions differ reliably across examinees as a function of those psychological
states: National Research Council (2003, p 71). The risk that was isolated early in the
development of the polygraph was that innocent but anxious people could be labelled as
a liar and so as guilty: see Raskin (1989, p 252). The means adopted by researchers to
address this risk was the ‘control question test’, designed to settle the person being tested
and to enable the operator to gauge when the person is telling the truth and when he or
she is lying. Supporters of the polygraph assert laboratory studies reporting accuracy of
polygraph examination of between 93 and 97%: see, eg, Raskin (1989). However, as
Kapardis (2003) noted, a number of the apparently supportive studies suggest that at best
a polygraph examination risks labelling 20% of suspects as liars who are later found to be
innocent. In a disturbing study, Parrick and Iacono (1989) offered prison inmates, half of
them psychopaths, US$20 to beat the polygraph. The psychopaths did little better than the
non-psychopaths but the significant finding was that, using the control question
technique, the polygraph examiners wrongly classified 45% of the innocent subjects as
guilty of crimes. In a later experiment, conducted with the polygraph division of the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police (Parrick and Iacono (1991)), the experimenters found further
evidence to support the contention that the control question technique misidentifies nearly
half of innocent suspects as liars. This has led supporters of the polygraph to develop a
further technique called the ‘directed lie test’: see Honts and Raskin (1988); see also Raskin
(1989). The polygraph’s reliability remains controversial, with passionate opponents of its
reliability (see the discussion in Kapardis (1997, pp 216–223)) remaining probably in the
ascendancy in relation to its forensic, as against its investigative, use.
Many different techniques can be used during the polygraph examination. The original
technique developed by Marston (1917) and elaborated upon by Reid and Inbau (1977)
depended upon alternating relevant and irrelevant questions together with monitoring.
The control questioning technique referred to above is the most common technique.
However, the main problem is the elicitation of false positives, namely people telling the
truth who are classified as having lied: see Fiedler, Schmid and Stahl (2002); Kapardis
(2003); McMahon (2003). The guilty knowledge/peak of tension test has been introduced
to improve the validity of testing for deception. It investigates subjects’ knowledge of a
relevant crime, rather than examining their reactions to determine whether they are lying,
and alternates irrelevant questions with ‘guilty knowledge’ items that present subjects
with multiple choice response categories for each item. McMahon (2003, p 38) has argued
that ‘[t]he GKT is the most scientifically promising of the “lie detector” techniques. It has
a sound theoretical basis (it is derived from theory and research on the orienting reflex),
and relatively high reported validity’.
The National Research Council (2003, p 148) concluded:
[T]heoretical considerations and data suggest that any single-value estimate of polygraph
accuracy would likely be misleading. A major reason is that accuracy varies markedly
662 [10.0.440]
across studies. This variability is due in part to sampling factors (small sample sizes and
different methods of sampling); however, undetermined systematic differences between
the studies undoubtedly also contribute to variability.
It confined itself to stating (2003, p 149) that the empirical data indicate that for several
populations of naïve examinees not trained in countermeasures:
polygraph tests for event-specific investigation detect deception rates at well above those
expected from random guessing. Test performance is far below perfection and highly
variable across situations … Existing polygraph field studies have used research designs
highly vulnerable to biases, most of which exaggerate polygraph accuracy.
Admissibility of polygraph evidence in the United Kingdom and North America
[10.0.450] The use of the polygraph is not the subject of any reported decision from a
superior court in England and Wales (see Hodgkinson and James (2015)). However, the
Privy Council on appeal from Jamaica held a trial judge had been correct to exclude
polygraph evidence – one of the accused men had sought to adduce polygraph evidence
to bolster the credibility of his claim that he did not know that the crates of pineapple juice
which he was transporting from Jamaica to the United States in fact contained 43 kg of
cannabis: see Bernal v The Queen [1997] UKPC 18.
In the United States, the preponderance of authority is against the admission of
polygraph evidence: see, eg, Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923); People v Lippert
466 NE 2d 276 (5th Dist 1984 ); State v Kersting 623 P 2d 1095 (1981); Castillo v State 739 SW
2d 280; cert den and app dism’d 487 US 1228 (Tex 1987); Lee v Loudes Martinez (unreported,
New Mexico, No CS2003-00026, Supreme Court No 27,915, 25 August 2003). See, though,
Kapardis (2003, pp 242ff). A variety of grounds have been asserted by United States courts
for refusing polygraphists’ evidence, including that:
(1) their evidence intrudes on the ultimate issue;
(2) they are unable to fulfil the criteria of the Frye test (Frye v United States 293 F 1013
(DC Cir 1923));
(3) their evidence is hearsay;
(4) their evidence relates to the credit of witnesses not suffering psychiatric illnesses,
a matter not proper for expert evidence;
(5) their eliciting of responses is unfair because of the trickery and deceit necessary to
obtain responses; and
(6) their testimony is self-serving for the defendant.
Hodgkinson and James (2015, p 433) have argued that the use of polygraph equipment is
unlikely to illuminate the subject’s mental state at the relevant time, so is unlikely to be
admissible ‘on general principles’:
Furthermore in practice such machines are frequently operated by persons who, although
no doubt expert in their use, have no psychiatric or other medical expertise, thus arguably
placing their evidence outside the existing authorities on the admission of evidence of
state of mind.
(See Phillion v The Queen (1977) 74 DLR (3d) 136 at 140.)

Two decades ago, the editors of Phipson on Evidence (2000, para 37.13) expressed the
view that ‘this question is pre-eminently one for the jury rather than an expert witness or
a machine programmed by an expert’, but noted that Canadian decisions have taken
conflicting views.
However, this contention appears to be advanced because of a single-judge decision of
the British Columbia Supreme Court in a murder trial: R v Wong (1977) 1 WWR 1. This
was an aberration. The Canadian Supreme Court in Phillion v The Queen (1977) 74 DLR
(3d) 136 and in R v Beland [1987] 2 SCR 398; (1987) 43 DLR (4th) 641; 36 CCC (3d) 481 has
taken a clear stance against the admissibility of polygraph evidence. In Phillion, Ritchie J
[10.0.450] 663
(at 149), speaking for the majority, found that the polygraph operator ‘had neither the
qualifications nor the opportunity to form a mature opinion of the propensity of the man
he was subjecting to the test either as to truthfulness or otherwise’. He noted that if the
subject’s statements had been made to the operator alone, ‘they would have been
inadmissible as self-serving, second hand evidence tendered in proof of its truth on behalf
of an accused who did not see fit to testify and I am not prepared to hold on the evidence
of this case that the presence of the polygraph machine or the expertise of the operator
made them admissible’.
In R v Beland [1987] 2 SCR 398; (1987) 43 DLR (4th) 641; 36 CCC (3d) 481 at 655, the
majority of the court found the admission of polygraph testimony to run counter to
well-established rules of evidence and that its admission would serve no purpose which
was not already served:
It will disrupt proceedings, cause delays, and lead to numerous complications which will
result in no greater degree of certainty in the process than that which already exists.
(See Elliott (1982); Magner (1987–88, p 413); Edelman (2005).)

The orthodox United States position is set out in the judgment of District Court
Judge Knowles of the Second Judicial District Court Bernalillo County, New Mexico, in Lee
v Loudes Martinez (unreported, New Mexico, No CS2003-00026, Supreme Court No 27,915,
25 August 2003). Twenty-seven States and the District of Columbia apply a per se rule of
exclusion of polygraph evidence for all purposes. Seventeen States admit polygraph
evidence at trial only when its admission is agreed to in advance by all parties. Appellate
decisions in such cases do not claim that the evidence is probative or becomes reliable due
to the stipulation. Two States admit stipulated results but in limited circumstances. Two
other States allow the admission of polygraph evidence without stipulation, but only in
post-trial proceedings. One State generally bars admission of polygraph decisions but the
decision is left to the discretion of the trial judge (see too United States v Crumbie 895 F
Supp 1354 (1995)). Knowles DCJ concluded (at pp 24–25):
1 Polygraph test results and the conclusions derived from them are not based upon
an overarching theory. To the extent it is merely argued that there is a hypothesis
that the test reliably detects deception, that hypothesis has not been subjected to
field research. The existing laboratory research, given the problems described
above, is woefully inadequate to support admissibility in court in real life
contexts.
2 There is no theory, as stated above. The technique has been subjected to limited
peer review publication. The conclusions of the relevant publications do not
enhance confidence in the test result, particularly considering the effectiveness of
counter-measures.
3 The potential rate of error is vague and unreliable. Given the effect of ignoring
base rates as endorsed by proponents, the reliability of test results as reflected in
an actual percentage misrepresents the confidence level in the test.
4 There are no set standards other than those set out in Rule 11-707 NMRA 2003.
Those standards are insufficient for the reasons set out above.
5 Control question polygraph tests are not accepted in the relevant scientific
community at a significant level, particularly considering the age of the technique.
6 The technique is not based upon well-recognised scientific principles and is not
capable of supporting opinions based upon reasonable probability rather than
conjecture.
7 If the risk of counter-measures is ignored, there is an argument that all of the studies
taken together support a conclusion that a successful polygraph result makes a fact
in issue more or less probable. However, given the state of the art of polygraphy, the
limited probative value of polygraph test results is substantially outweighed by the
danger of confusion of the issues, undue delay, and waste of time and therefore
polygraph evidence becomes inadmissible under Rule 11-403 NMRA 2003.
664 [10.0.450]
8 At least one court has found that testimony that someone has passed a polygraph
examination is extrinsic evidence of a specific instance of conduct (passing the
polygraph) that supports a witness’s credibility, and is therefore inadmissible under
Rule 11-608B. United States v Piccinonna 729 F Supp 1336; 1338 (SD Fla 1990), affd by
United States v Piccinonna 925 F 2d 1474 (11th Cir 1991).
9 Because of the inherently subjective nature of the test procedure, the polygraph
examination cannot be repeated. Successful repetition of a test is the cornerstone of
the scientific method. It lacks test-retest reliability.
10 The results of polygraph testing are not sufficiently reliable for admissibility in courts
in New Mexico.
In United States v Scheffer 523 US 303 (1998), the United States Supreme Court also dealt
with the admissibility question, albeit in a confined context. The appellant was subjected
to a polygraph examination as a condition precedent to his employment in the Air Force
Office of Special Investigations. The purpose of the investigation was to ascertain if he had
been taking drugs. He passed but later faced a court martial on the basis of consumption
of drugs. His defence was one of innocent ingestion and he proposed to rely on his
polygraph examination results. However, Military Rule 707 precluded admission into
evidence of the results of polygraph tests. The United States Supreme Court held the rule
to be constitutional but expressed the view that in some circumstances the results of
polygraph examinations would be admissible.
Inadmissibility of polygraph evidence in Australia
[10.0.460] A comparable approach to that in North America was adopted by the New
South Wales District Court in R v Murray (1982) 7 A Crim R 48 (see Clarke (2000)), where
Sinclair DCJ rejected polygraph evidence sought to be led on behalf of an accused person
for the following reasons:
(1) The sole purpose of the evidence is to bolster the credit of the accused as a
witness. However, the veracity of the accused and the weight to be given to his
evidence, and other witnesses called in the trial, is a matter for the jury to assess
and on general principle such evidence … is excluded.
(2) The witness seeks to express an opinion as to ultimate facts in issue, which is
peculiarly the province of the jury to determine on facts presented to them by
witnesses who perceived them by the exercise of their physical senses.
(3) It purports to be expert evidence but the witness is not qualified as an expert, he
is merely an operator and assessor of a polygraph. Furthermore, the scientific
premise upon which his assessment is based has not been proved in this court or
in any other court in Australia.
(4) Devoid of any proved or accepted scientific basis, the evidence … is simply
hearsay, which is inadmissible and of no probative value.
Notably, though, in New South Wales s 5(2) of the Lie Detectors Act 1983 (NSW) provides:
A person is guilty of an offence against this Act if, for any prohibited purpose, the person
requests or requires another person to undergo an examination based on the use of an
instrument or apparatus to monitor:
(a) physiological reactions of the body of that other person, or
(b) elements of stress, tonal variation or vibration in the voice of that other person.
Section 4 defines a ‘prohibited purpose’ as

any purpose connected with –
(a) matters relating to employment …
(b) consideration of the acceptance of risk under a proposal for a contract of, or
policy of, insurance;
(c) consideration of a claim under a policy of insurance;
[10.0.460] 665
(d) payment of compensation for loss or damage, whether under a policy of

insurance or otherwise;
(e) an application for any form of financial accommodation; or
(f) establishing whether or not a person is guilty of an act or omission that is
punishable by a fine imprisonment.
In interpreting the provision, Lee J in R v David (1986) 6 NSWLR 278 at 280–281 had regard
to the Second Reading Speech of the Minister moving the Bill:
There are two principal ways in which lie detectors function: By measuring the
physiological reactions of the body, or by measuring the level of stress or vibration in the
voice. A polygraph is attached to a subject by wires or sensors. Any changes in the
subject’s respiration, pulse, blood pressure or muscular activity are recorded as a
physiological reaction while a person is being questioned. From the machine’s records of
these reactions an examiner purports to evaluate the truth or otherwise of the subject’s
replies. The psychological stress evaluator is a device that measures the element of stress
in a person’s voice. This may be done with respect to a tape recording, so it can very
readily be used without a person’s knowledge.
However, Australia’s major decision on the admissibility of polygraph tests is that of the
Court of Criminal Appeal of the Western Australian Supreme Court in Mallard v The Queen
(2003) 28 WAR 1; [2003] WASCA 296. The decision is likely to result in polygraphy
evidence being rejected in Australian courts for the foreseeable future. It constituted an
extensive and thorough testing of the scientific credentials of polygraphy evidence, some
of the most experienced polygraphy experts in North America testifying in the course of
the trial.
One of what were only two polygraph examiners in Australia administered the
polygraph to the appellant, who at the time was a prisoner, having been convicted of a
murder from which he appealed.
The court considered at length whether it should admit evidence of the results of the
polygraph testing administered by Mr Van Aperen, who had been a police officer in
Victoria and South Australia. It was informed that he held a Bachelor’s Degree in Criminal
Justice Administration from RMIT University and a Diploma in Security Management. In
1996 he had attended Western Oregon State University in the United States to train in the
science of forensic psychophysiology under Dr Stan Abrams, a clinical psychologist. He
graduated from the course during 1996, his training reaching the standards for forensic
polygraph examiners set by the American Polygraph Association. A month later, he
received certification by Axcuiton Systems, manufacturers of computerised polygraph
instrumentation in Houston, Texas. This certification related to training on the calibration
and operation of computerised polygraph instrumentation when conducting polygraph
testing. He then became a member of the American Polygraph Association and of the
American Association of Police Polygraphists. Since 1996, he had conducted 338
polygraph tests.
Mr Van Aperen swore that when a person lies, changes in the person’s physiology,
controlled by the autonomic nervous system, include increased skin conductivity (palms
sweating), increased blood pressure and decreased respiratory activity. Such changes
could be measured with polygraph instruments. He told the court that the most
commonly employed testing format was the comparison question test or control question
technique (CQT), where there are three categories of questions:
• questions relating to the matter in question (the relevant questions);
• the control of comparison questions, deliberately designed to produce a lying response;
and
• filler questions.
The court noted (at [217]):
666 [10.0.460]
Interpretation of the test outcome is made by systematically comparing the strength of

reactions to the relevant questions against the comparison or control questions. Negative
scores (indicative of deception) are assigned when reactions to relevant questions are
stronger than reactions to control or comparison questions. Positive scores are assigned
when the reactions to control or comparison questions are stronger than reactions to
relevant questions. The scores are subsequently tallied for the entire test. All relevant
questions combined, a total numerical score of minus six (or a greater negative number)
indicates overall deception to the relevant questions. A total of plus six or greater indicates
overall truthfulness to the relevant questions. A total score between minus six and plus six
is deemed to be inconclusive.
Mr Van Aperen described the utility of the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT), administered by
the Known Peak of Tension Test and the Searching Peak of Tension (SPOT) test, the latter
used to determine if the examinee has knowledge of a particular case fact in respect of the
crime that is known only to the perpetrator and the police.
He explained that he conducted a carefully structured pre-test interview with the
appellant. He then conducted a GKT or SPOT test to determine whether the appellant had
knowledge of what type of instrument was used in the murder. No strong autonomic
reactions were shown by the appellant. He analysed the results using the Polyscore
algorithmic software developed by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics
Laboratory in the United States, which, he said, was designed to evaluate polygraph
recordings to render an independent opinion from the examiner regarding the probability
of truthfulness or deception. This led Mr Van Aperen to conclude that, if any of the
specified items was the murder weapon, then the appellant did not know that. This
enabled the appellant to submit that he could not be the murderer.
A second series of CQT tests was administered which suggested that the probability of
deception on the part of the appellant was less than .01%.
Finally, Mr Van Aperen attempted to ascertain whether the appellant was being
truthful in his responses that he had never told the police that it was he rather than
someone else who struck the deceased. Again, Mr Van Aperen concluded that the
appellant was being truthful. The Polyscore analysis returned the same analysis as that for
the CQT tests.
The issue for the Western Australian Court of Criminal Appeal was whether it should
permit the evidence. It was contended for the appellant that ordinary persons cannot form
a sound judgment about whether a witness is telling the truth and that accordingly
polygraph evidence would enable the jury to form a sound judgment. It was asserted that
Kirby J’s statement in State Rail Authority (NSW) v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq)
(1999) 73 ALJR 306; [1999] HCA 3 at [88], where he approved as ‘entirely accurate’
Lord Devlin’s comment that ‘I doubt my own ability … to discern from a witness’
demeanour, or the tone of his voice, whether he is telling the truth’, was supportive of the
need to allow the admissibility of polygraph evidence.
However, the Crown argued that the evidence of Mr Van Aperen was self-serving
hearsay, made nine years after the relevant events took place, and that it was not a proper
subject for expert opinion. It was also contended that the evidence impermissibly related
to the credibility of a witness.
The court affirmed that the proper starting point for assessment of the admissibility of
expert evidence was the decision of the High Court in Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 and
of the South Australian Supreme Court in R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45; 15 A Crim R
364. It accepted that expert opinion evidence should not be rejected merely because the
technique, instrument or methodology has not been used before (applying R v McHardie
[1983] 2 NSWLR 733 at 763). The court held that technology can also change, requiring a
reassessment of admissibility. It reviewed the application of the Frye test in various
Australian jurisdictions (see Ch 2.10) and applied the decision in Kluck v Borland 413 NW
[10.0.460] 667
2d 90 at 91 (1984) that the party offering novel scientific evidence has the burden of
demonstrating that it has been accepted as reliable among impartial and disinterested
experts within the scientific community.
The court disagreed with Phipson on Evidence (2000 at [37-13]) and held that the learned
authors misapprehended the nature of the polygraph, noting that witnesses are not
permitted to proffer opinions upon whether other witnesses are lying or telling the truth.
It observed that the Supreme Court of Canada in Phillion v The Queen (1977) 74 DLR (3d)
136 and in R v Beland [1987] 2 SCR 398; (1987) 43 DLR (4th) 641; 36 CCC (3d) 481 had
rejected the admissibility of polygraph evidence and noted the decision of Knowles DCJ in
Lee v Loudes Martinez (unreported, New Mexico, No CS2003-00026, Supreme Court
No 27,915, 25 August 2003).
The court also heard evidence from Professor Honts, Professor of Psychology at Boise
State University, Idaho, in the United States, who asserted that polygraph tests had gained
general acceptance in the scientific fields of psychology and psychophysiology ‘and in the
areas of those disciplines devoted to credibility assessment’. He conceded that there was
no overarching theory to describe all aspects of why the polygraph works, but said that
polygraphy holds this lack of comprehensive theory in common with many areas of
applied psychology and argued that it did not pose a practical problem. He referred to the
National Research Council (2003) report which estimated that the polygraph in forensic
settings was 89% accurate. He expressed the general view that polygraph CQT tests
conducted in respect of a person’s credibility on a specific question can be highly accurate,
but he said they have to be properly administered.
Professor Iacono, a Professor of Psychology, Psychiatry, Law and Neuroscience and an
Adjunct Professor of Child Development at the University of Minnesota in the United
States, was also called. He maintained that there is no such thing as a ‘lie detector test’,
arguing that there is no pattern of physiological activity that is uniquely associated with
lying or any human emotion: all that can be determined when a polygraph procedure is
administered is whether a person responds more strongly to one type of question than
another. This means that a polygraph cannot be used to determine why a person responds
differentially to certain questions. He stated that the CQT is not a test, but is rather a type
of interview that is assisted by a physiological recording. He asserted (at [317]–[319]) that
it is neither objective nor standardised:
Instead, each examiner formulates questions based on his or her understanding of the
facts of the case and how the ‘pre-test’ interview with the suspect proceeds. Two
examiners giving a CQT to the same suspect are thus likely to use different questions …
He points out that the scoring of the CQT is also subjective and is itself influenced by the
examiner’s impressions of the suspect’s truthfulness … He emphasises the importance of
noting that the control question in a CQT is not a control in the scientific sense. If it were
it would be identical to the relevant question in all respects but one, namely whether the
answer was truthful or a lie.
Professor Iacono posited that in the particular case there was no true ‘control’ question
that had been administered. He testified that scientists generally at arm’s length from the
polygraph profession, who have expressed opinions regarding the scientific basis of
polygraph testing, had repeatedly found the test to have little scientific support. He
maintained that this had been shown in surveys of scientists, in psychology textbooks
dealing with the validity of polygraph tests, and in independent scientific reviews. He also
raised the possibility that the appellant might have ‘habituated’ to relevant questions
because the Van Aperen test was the second such test which he had undergone. He
contended that rehearsal and repeated questioning gave the subject an opportunity to
become emotionally prepared for questions about the crime and to reduce the likelihood
that strong physiological reactions would continue to be elicited by such queries (at [325]):
668 [10.0.460]
In psychological terms, the subject may have habituated to the stimuli represented by the
relevant questions. The control questions, by contrast, involve new matters not previously
raised and are thus more likely to elicit a strong physiological reaction.
The court noted Professor Iacono’s testimony that the United States Department of Justice
had consistently opposed the use of polygraph evidence in criminal trials. The court also
heard evidence from Professor Furedy, Professor of Psychology at the University of
Toronto, Canada. He, too, opposed the use of the polygraph for evidentiary purposes,
contending that the CQT is not a test at all in the sense that an IQ test is a test. He argued
that the so-called control questions of the CQT are constructed by the examiner as a result
of a discussion with the examinee and asserted (at [338]) that the examination is not a
standardised test:
[B]ecause the relevant control comparison does not involve the difference between
deception and no deception, a ‘deceptive’ result may occur simply because the examinee,
although not deceptive, is more concerned or anxious about the relevant questions than
issues related to the control questions.
He pointed out that psychophysiology’s only universal law is that the greater the
psychological impact or significance of a stimulus, the greater the autonomic response to
it.
It was the view of Professor Furedy that the polygraph procedure is completely
unstandardised and has no scientific rationale. Further, as the CQT polygraph is not a
standardised test, it is not possible to state in general terms what its accuracy is, because it
will vary with each polygraph examination. He was supported in his views by evidence
from Dr Richardson, a synthetic organic chemist who had worked for the United States
Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The court found the evidence of Professors Iacono and Furedy and of Dr Richardson
‘most persuasive’ (at [352]). It accepted their criticisms of many of the published studies
relied upon by Professor Honts and Mr Van Aperen as cogent. It was not satisfied (at
[355]–[358]) that polygraphic examination, specifically the CQT, has been accepted to:
any appreciable extent as scientifically valid and reliable, by members of the psychological
and psychophysiological community (which we consider to be the relevant scientific
community: see R v Jarrett (1994) 73 A Crim R 160) as to constitute part of a body of
knowledge or experience which is sufficiently recognised to be accepted as a reliable body
of knowledge or experience. Nor has it been shown to have a sufficient scientific basis to
render results arrived at by the application of polygraphic technique part of a field of
knowledge which is a proper subject of expert evidence … Most of the publications of
those arguing for the acceptance of polygraphic evidence appear in ‘peer’ publications,
but the ‘peer group’ is that of other polygraph examiners who would appear to have a
vested interest in the outcome … The petitioner has failed to demonstrate a degree of
publication in prestigious academic or scientific journals, or any other indicia, which
might reveal a sufficient degree of recognition and acceptance of the technique,
notwithstanding that it is controversial.
The court noted that it was common ground between all the experts called that there is no
overarching theory which can explain the CQT test. It rejected (at [358]) Professor Honts’
evidence that the lack of such a theory is problematic only for planning future research or
for expanding the technique to areas beyond the research database:
[T]he absence of an underlying theory or rationale must strike directly at the claims that
the technique is properly to be described as the product of scientific study and that it has
a significantly higher degree of accuracy than chance. Furthermore, as a consequence, the
CQT test is not specific and nor is it capable of being verified by repetition or replication in
any scientific sense.
The court noted that it is a fundamental assumption of the test that the autonomous
responses measured by the polygraph machine are attributable to (and only to) an
[10.0.460] 669
awareness by the examinee that he or she is lying. It found, however, that the assumption
was ‘patently unsound’, commenting (at [360]):
[T]he subjective nature of the CQT test process is manifest in the conduct of the pre-test
interview and the formulation of the control questions, as well as the conduct of the ‘test’
itself and the subsequent scoring of it. The subjective aspect at each of these stages must
necessarily have a compounding effect which cannot lead to any confidence that CQT tests
are capable of producing reliable, repeatable results.
It found the situation to be exacerbated by the fact that the appellant had been the subject
of a previous polygraph before that of Mr Van Aperen.
The court also accepted Professor Iacono’s evidence that the result of the Polyscore
software scoring of Mr Van Aperen’s CQT tests, that the ‘probability of deception is less
than 0.01%’, was indefensible. It noted that the National Academy of Science report found
the software methodology to be ‘unscientific and flawed’ and, as Professor Iacono
explained (at [364]):
[I]t is not possible to diagnose or predict human behaviour with accuracy to four [sic]
decimal places. Secondly, as he says, this probability statement means in effect, that for
every 10,000 people tested under circumstances just like those under which the petitioner
was tested, only one with a score like his would actually come from a deceptive person.
There is no database to support such a conclusion. In fact, he says, if one took all the
subjects studied in all the scientific research ever published on the accuracy of polygraph
tests, one could not identify 10,000 confirmed innocent study subjects.
Observing that the evidence from the polygraph operator is essentially that the examinee
is ‘not lying’, the court commented (at [367]):
[T]he opinion is formed on the basis of the assumption that every person will provide an
autonomous response when telling a lie, the examiner’s formulation of the control and
relevant questions, the readings actually recorded on the machine, a comparison of the
responses to relevant and control questions and an entirely subjective assessment by the
examiner of the significance of differences between the results.
The court found that the evidence showed that the examinations conducted by Mr Van
Aperen did not represent any improvement in the technique available 10 or 20 years
previously, except in the area of the computerised statistical analysis conducted by the
Polyscore software program, which it was satisfied had been shown to be ‘entirely
unscientific and worthless’. To that extent, the polygraph evidence was found not to be
‘fresh evidence’.
In summary, the court found that the polygraph technique was not a reliable method
for determining truth or untruth; nor (at [369]):
is there the degree of acceptance within the relevant scientific community which would
indicate that it is seen as being so. That being the case the evidence of the polygraph
examination would not have assisted the trier of fact [the jury].
The court found that there was insufficient basis to regard Mr Van Aperen’s opinions as
any more than expressions of subjective belief or speculation about the credibility of the
petitioner with respect to self-serving statements made by him out of court. It found that
such evidence purported to present an opinion directly on whether the appellant was
truthful in his denial of the offence. It emphasised that that was a task exclusively for the
jury ‘given the lack of scientific support for the polygraph technique, they would not
properly be assisted by the evidence of opinion based on that’ (at [372]). Thus, it found
that the evidence was not admissible.
As indicated above, the emphatic nature of the decision, its orthodoxy in terms of legal
principle, and the fact that such extensive expert evidence was heard are likely to result in
polygraphy evidence not being admitted in the foreseeable future in Australian courts.
(See the views of Kirby (1984) and McConkey and Jupp (1985) in relation to those
conducting the hypnotism of victims.)
670 [10.0.460]
In R v Beland [1987] 2 SCR 398; (1987) 43 DLR (4th) 641; 36 CCC (3d) 481, the majority
found that the admission of polygraph evidence would violate four evidentiary rules:
(1) the rule against oath-helping – the polygraphic evidence was being tendered to
bolster the accused men’s credibility (at 646–649);
(2) the rule against consistent past or out-of-court statements (at 649–651);
(3) the rule against character evidence being led by the prosecution unless the
accused puts his or her character in issue (at 651–653); and
(4) the ‘rule relating to expert evidence’ (what is described in this work as the
common knowledge rule) – the polygraphist was not to be allowed to give
evidence relating to the accused’s credibility (at 653–654).
It is likely that Australasian courts will continue to follow the sound reasoning of the
majority in the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision in R v Beland [1987] 2 SCR 398; (1987)
43 DLR (4th) 641; 36 CCC (3d) 481 as to the admissibility of the fruits of polygraphy and of
expert evidence based on polygraphy. For the present, the reasoning in Mallard v The
Queen (2003) 28 WAR 1; [2003] WASCA 296 suggests it is likely that expert evidence
interpreting polygraph results would fail the Frye test (Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC
Cir 1923)) or be refused on the basis that it constitutes expert evidence that is oath-helping
and relates principally to credibility (see further Elliott (1982); Freckelton (2004); Edelman
(2005)). Finally, such evidence may be withdrawn from the jury on the ground that jurors
would not be able adequately to evaluate it; see below, Ch 2.35. Too many public policy
reasons exist to exclude polygraph evidence for its reception to be seriously contemplated
without major technical innovations to the technique. See also subscription service Ch 67.
Other credibility evaluation techniques

[10.0.470] A variety of other techniques have been developed to evaluate the truthfulness
or otherwise of persons’ accounts. What follows is an identification of a series of the major
techniques that have been asserted to assist in discerning between truth and falsehood in
subjects. It does not purport to be exhaustive.
Statement validity analysis
[10.0.480] An important technique for evaluating truthfulness is the Swedish/German
technique of ‘statement validity assessment’ (SVA), which is the most commonly used
verbal veracity assessment tool (see Trankell (1972); Undeutsch (1989), Kapardis (2013)).
SVA assessments have been accepted in some United States courts (see Ruby and Brigham
(1997)) and in some Western European countries (see, eg, Kohnken (2004)). It consists of
four stages:
• a case file analysis to gain insight into the case;
• a semi-structured interview to obtain a statement from the interviewee;
• a criteria-based content analysis (CBCA) that systematically analyses the quality of a
statement; and
• an evaluation of the criteria-based content analysis outcome.
SVA remains controversial, leading Vrij (2008, p 254) to express the view that evaluations
of the technique do not meet the Daubert indicia for admission of scientific evidence on the
basis that:
• there are doubts about whether the scientific hypothesis underlying the method is
actually testable in real life, given the difficulties in establishing the ground truth in
field studies;
• limited field research has been carried out, particularly with regard to the technique’s
‘validity checklist’ and the known error rate in the available criteria-based content
analysis studies;
[10.0.480] 671
• the criteria-based content analysis has a significant error rate (arguably up to 30%); and
• it is unknown to what extent the method is accepted in the appropriate scientific
community.
Reality monitoring
[10.0.490] Reality monitoring is a technique developed by Johnson and Raye (1981) that
differentiates between memory characteristics of actually experienced events and
imagined events. At its heart is the notion that memories based on real experiences differ
in quality from memories based on fiction. This theory is the same as that used in
justification of the criteria-based content analysis (CBCA) portion of statement validity
analysis (SVA).
It is thought that memories of real events are more vivid and have greater clarity than
imagined ones (Sporer (2004); Johnson and Raye (1981)). As genuine memories are a
product of perceptual processes in response to real-life stimuli, they will often include
perceptual or sensory information (touch, taste, smell, sight and sound), contextual
(spatial and temporal) information (where and when), and affective information (feelings),
whereas internally generated fictional memories are frequently typified by cognitive
processes such as thoughts and reasoning.
Reality monitoring is premised on these distinguishing features of memories and
affords a mechanism for analysing an individual’s statements about a particular incident
to ascertain whether they are a product of recollection about an actual event or a
fabricated account.
There are no standardised criteria used in undertaking reality monitoring assessments.
However, Sporer (2004) has generated an eight-item list that has been relied upon by
others (see, eg, Vrij (2007)). The list comprises:
1. Clarity
2. Perceptual information
3. Spatial information
4. Temporal information
5. Affect
6. Reconstructability of the story
7. Realism
8. Cognitive operations.
Reality monitoring has been utilised as a lie detection technique: see, eg, Masip et al
(2005); Sporer (2004); Vrij (2008). These authors all found the accuracy of lie detection to be
considerably higher than chance levels when applying reality monitoring. As a result, a
number advocate the use of reality monitoring as a credibility assessment tool at the
investigative stage, and possibly even at the decision-making stage (Granhag and
Strömwall (2004)), particularly in the case of adult subjects being examined shortly after
the relevant event (Kapardis (2003)) and when used in conjunction with CBCA: Vrij (2008).
Reality monitoring, however, has limitations. Masip et al (2005), while accepting that
reality monitoring as a lie detection strategy overall distinguishes lies from truths at above
the rate of chance, have questioned whether individual reality monitoring criteria may be
as successful: see, for further discussion, Granhag and Strömwall (2004). It is thus
important to differentiate between the application of specific criteria and the holistic
technique when reviewing claims made in the literature. Granhag, Strömwall and
Landström (2006) found that reality monitoring reliably distinguished between true and
false statements made by children after repeated recall. Others have found that accuracy
rates are problematic with children. This may merely be indicative of a common truth bias
672 [10.0.490]
toward children. In addition, it is clear that accuracy rates of reality monitoring as a lie
detection device are affected by time delay between the event and the interview.
Brain fingerprinting
[10.0.500] Brain fingerprinting was developed by Dr Larry Farwell (Farwell (2012)), who
has stated that it ‘is based on the principle that the brain is central to all human activities:
it plans, executes and records information’ (Burke (1999, p 28)). The technique employs
computer technology to retrieve relevant details from the brain of the examinee. Farwell
has received considerable acclaim and media attention as a result of his project, in
addition to considerable funding from the CIA , but independent researchers in the
scientific community generally regard the technology with scepticism.
Like certain polygraphy approaches, brain fingerprinting is founded upon the
concealed or guilty knowledge test concept. In short, brain fingerprinting proceeds on the
assumption that an examinee’s guilt (or innocence) will be revealed by his or her brain
wave responses to stimuli pertaining to a particular crime to which he or she is exposed
during examination (Farwell and Smith (2001)).
The human brain is a dynamic electrical information centre that constantly receives,
processes and reacts to the various day-to-day sensory stimuli encountered, each of which
triggers neural responses of electrical impulses deep within the brain (Gazzaniga, Ivry and
Mangun (1998)). The specific brain patterns generated in response to the carefully
compiled stimuli are mapped and form the basis of the ‘brain fingerprint’ assessed in this
lie detection technique (Farwell (2012)).
In practical terms, the examinee’s head is fitted with a device that measures his or her
electroencephalograms (EEGs) . The examinee is then shown a series of images and
words. These are of three kinds: irrelevant – those unrelated to the crime or examinee;
targets – those that should be recognised by the examinee; and probes – those specifically
and narrowly related to the crime (Farwell and Richardson (2003)). These stimuli flash
momentarily on a computer screen before the examinee, who is instructed to press one of
two buttons in response to signal that he or she does or does not recognise the particular
stimulus. If the examinee is familiar with a certain stimulus, a Memory and Encoding
Related Multifaceted Electroencephalographic Response (MERMER) will be observed. The
MERMER is a construct observed and labelled, but poorly defined by Farwell. Essentially,
it is a recorded brain wave associated with the P300, NEG, and other identified Event
Related Potentials (ERPs) routinely observed during EEG examinations. At the conclusion
of the examination, a computer analyses the responses – MERMERs and otherwise – to
conclude whether the examinee holds pertinent details of the crime. The simplified theory
is that MERMERs will only occur in those with intimate knowledge of the crime, with
innocent persons lacking requisite ‘guilty knowledge’ and therefore failing to record
MERMERs.
As with the polygraph, brain fingerprinting does not provide a means of distinguishing
truth from lies in the examinee. Rather, it merely records whether or not particular stimuli
are recognised by the examinee , from which guilt or innocence may be inferred based
upon the nature of the stimuli eliciting responses. One advantage brain fingerprinting has
over the polygraph is that it relies on brain neurophysiology rather than the emotionally
derived somatic and autonomic physiology upon which polygraphy is predicated. It is for
this reason that Farwell argues that, unlike the polygraph, brain fingerprinting is resistant
to duping efforts by the examinee (Farwell (2012)) and more reliable than the polygraph in
general. He stresses the potential of his creation to revolutionise lie detection efforts in
criminal investigations and prosecutions of the future (Farwell and Smith (2001)). As for
the reliability of this technique, it has been asserted that testing by various United States
federal government agencies has demonstrated 100% accuracy rates (Burke (1999)).
Similar claims have been made by Farwell and Donchin (1991)). There is no independent
data in support of these dubious assertions. At least one comprehensive review of
[10.0.500] 673
Farwell’s ‘brain fingerprinting paradigm’, carried out by Rosenfeld (2005), has

substantively cast doubt on the veracity of Farwell’s claims and the technique and its
underlying methodology. Further, independent analysis disproves Farwell’s assertion that
the test is resistant to cheating attempts, at least insofar as the exercise of countermeasures
is concerned (Rosenfeld (2005)).
To determine these issues conclusively, independent testing of brain fingerprinting is
imperative. As Dickson and McMahon (2005) cautioned, there is otherwise the risk that an
undiscovered ‘Rosenthal Effect’ may have unwittingly tainted Farwell’s research. This
phenomenon relates to situations whereby researchers heavily invested in a project or
theory, financially or otherwise, are susceptible to unconsciously designing their
experiments to obtain favourable results (see also Lee v Loudes Martinez NMSC 27 (2004);
96 P3d 291; 2004 NM LEXIS 378 (2003).
In addition to the questionable claims made about brain fingerprinting generally as a
reliable and accurate lie detection technique, a number of criticisms and concerns can be
made in terms of the fundamental logic underpinning this method. First, while the final
EEG evaluation may be carried out by a computer, there is human interference at all prior
stages that might sway the ultimate results – principally, the choice of images and words
to be displayed: which ones, how many, for how long, and what each is intended to
represent. It is from these stimuli that a conclusion of guilt or innocence is drawn and this
stage is therefore of pivotal importance. Individual difference and perception could
obviously have significant unintended consequences. On the other hand, outcomes could
be intentionally ‘stacked’ by supplying easily recognisable targets and probes and wildly
unrecognisable irrelevants to create a skewed MERMER fingerprint indicative of guilt. The
concern over this potential misuse is exacerbated by Farwell’s assertion that the most
promising application of brain fingerprinting is in cases where police ‘know’ they have the
perpetrator but are otherwise unable to present sufficient evidence to assure a conviction
(Farwell (12012)). This is precisely the type of scenario that one would expect to produce a
wrongful conviction. Determination of guilt has been made on unsubstantiated hunches,
with evidence thereafter gathered to support the foredrawn conclusion, rather than the
proper, reverse sequence of events.
Errors can also occur by accident as a result of failing to acknowledge individual
features of certain examinees. For example, an innocent person suspected of committing a
murder by way of a rifle shooting might record false positives in being shown pictures of
the rifle and associated paraphernalia, as a result of strong affiliated memories arising out
of years of sport hunting. There is a screening phase that precedes the testing designed to
eliminate this risk, in which the examinee is asked to indicate whether any of the stimuli is
familiar to him or her for reasons unrelated to the crime (Farwell (2012)), but that measure
might fail to address the potential problem adequately. For instance, the examinee may
not know on a conscious level that something has been previously encountered and might
therefore elicit a response. Alternatively, the examinee might not have seen a rifle per se
and therefore fail to state familiarity with such an image, but may have come into contact
with a range of other guns and thus score a false positive MERMER. Similar erroneous
results might arise as a result of media-induced recognition of specific events, or memories
formed via film or literature. Even for incredibly novel stimuli, there is no firm way of
screening examinees to ascertain whether they might have been exposed to it in a prior,
benign setting. This pre-test ‘screening’ is comparable to the ‘control question’ phase of the
polygraph, which suffers from like defects.
Another criticised aspect of the role of brain fingerprinting in determining guilt or
innocence is that, as indicated above, it does not test for truth or lie, guilt or innocence; it
merely demonstrates whether the examinee holds information specifically relevant to the
crime. It is then for the investigators and legal decision-makers to weigh up the
674 [10.0.500]
significance of those findings. What then of an accomplice after the fact, or a person to
whom the perpetrator has detailed his or her exploits? What of the victim or independent
witness? These persons might be shown to have ‘guilty’ knowledge and such a finding
might put them at risk of a wrongful conviction should their ‘innocent’ explanations be
disbelieved. Finally, it remains uncertain what impact false or repressed memories, head
trauma, alcohol and/or drugs, and other such factors might have on the reliability and
validity of brain fingerprinting as a lie detection device (Burke (1999)).
Independent of these outstanding theoretical queries, there are also a number of
practical limitations to the reliance upon brain fingerprinting in investigative and
evidentiary situations. These include the inapplicability of the technique in cases where
there are, or the investigators know of, insufficient unique factual details to compose an
ample range of words and pictures for recognition testing, or, conversely, where all such
information has been revealed via media and/or investigative discourse (Farwell (2012)).
Indeed, Iacono (2008) has concluded that real-life applicability of such guilty knowledge
tests might be as low as 15% of all criminal cases. In economic terms, the expense of the
brain fingerprinting equipment, software, and experts trained in their use might alone be
too prohibitive to justify the adoption of brain fingerprinting as either an investigative tool
or evidentiary device.
Though there is a body of research that supports the theoretical basis of brain
fingerprinting, the precise nature and function of Farwell’s MERMER is yet to be
adequately explained, and further work in general is required to demonstrate the
reliability and validity of brain fingerprinting for use in an investigative or evidentiary
context. As with all scientific advances, general acceptance and implementation of brain
fingerprinting as a means of lie detection in criminal trials will be a slow process,
requiring, at the very least, sufficient peer review and support (Rosenfeld (2005)) and a
carefully scrutinised and tempered introduction into the evidentiary pool. Ironically,
Farwell may have stalled the widespread acceptance and utilisation of his technique
through his considerable self-promotion. His restrictive sole patents (, self-proclaimed
media attention, and comprehensive website coverage of his revolutionary ‘paradigm’,
referred to as ‘Internet marketing material’ by Rosenfeld (2005), coupled with the palpable
lack of any convincing, peer-reviewed studies in reputable scientific journals highlight the
need for caution in relation to any forensic application (Rosenfeld (2005); see too Littlefield
(2011)).
Voice stress analysis
[10.0.510] Voice stress analysis is akin to polygraphy and brain fingerprinting. The
Computer Voice Stress Analyser (CVSA) is a device fitted to the examinee during targeted
questioning, which measures micro-tremors in the examinee’s voice. These voice
alterations are assumed to be indicative of deception (Annon (1988); Bartol and Bartol
(1994)). However, empirical work has cast grave doubt on the reliability of the technique,
a 2008 analysis for instance suggesting that voice stress analysis may only identify about
15% of lies told (see Damphouse (2008)). As with the polygraph, the reliability and
validity of the CVSA is questionable (see, eg, R v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935; US v Baller
519 F 2d 463 (1975)).
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)
[10.0.520] Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has been utilised as another
neuroscientific means of lie detection, like the use of EEG in brain fingerprinting. With this
device, the examinee is placed within an fMRI machine while questioned. The machine
measures and records magnetic resonance emitted by the examinee’s brain, which varies
according to the degree of oxygenation. The results are then analysed, with particular
attention paid to areas of increased oxidative metabolism, particularly within three key
brain centres that are activated when lying takes place. Heightened activity in these
centres is believed to indicate deceitful behaviour.
[10.0.520] 675
An issue that arises with fMRI is that the subject is given instructions as a precursor
about how and when to lie. This has raised a number of issues in terms of reliability and
methodology. Hakun et al (2008) conducted an experiment that concluded that brain
activation took place whenever the target of ‘lie’ stimulus was presented. This was
independent of whether the subjects were actually lying at the time, thereby calling into
question a number of prior studies and raising the possibility that brain activity that had
been measured was not the product of deception. As with other aided lie detection
techniques, reports concerning the accuracy of the fMRI vary, but overall do show promise
(for an overview, see Langleben and Moriarty (2012)). In addition, an experiment by Kozel
et al (2005) raised questions about the accuracy of whether what was being detected was
deception as against faulty memory. Finally, a study by Uncapher et al (2015)
demonstrated that study subjects could successfully conceal or feign memories (for faces),
again raising the potential that retrieval mechanisms could impact upon outcomes.
It is apparent that, as yet, fMRI as a lie detector device has significant limitations that
require further experimental work before its results could safely be adduced in court (see
Farah et al (2014)). The warning given by Spence (2008) that ‘basic issues of reliability
need to be addressed before functional neuroimaging is applied to cases that matter in the
“real world”’ remains valid.
Expert evidence about admissions and confessions

[10.0.590] In principle, expert evidence is admissible about the likelihood of a police
interview having produced admissions that are involuntary in the sense of not having
been made through freedom of choice.
Australia’s most authoritative decision is in this regard is that of Murphy v The Queen
(1989) 167 CLR 94, in which the High Court held that a psychologist’s evidence about the
unlikelihood of a record of interview should have been admitted.
Internationally, one of the most authoritative decisions on the subject is that of the
Scottish High Court of Justiciary, Wilson v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Scottish Criminal Cases
Review Commission Referral) [2009] ScotHC HCJAC 58, in which Wilson and Murray
appealed against convictions for the murder of a young woman. The convictions were
based upon admissions made by each of the men, who later claimed that they had only
been made under pressure and were not truthful. Professor Gudjonsson produced reports
in respect of both men, taking into account the results of a Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test
(yielding a result of 74 for Wilson), the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS1) and the
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale (GCS-D), which measures the extent to which an individual
is motivated to please others and to avoid conflict and confrontation. He also applied the
Gudjonsson Confession Questionnaire – revised (GCQ-R), which contains 52 questions
measuring the reasons offenders have given for having confessed to crimes they have
committed and which, according to Professor Gudjonsson, can also be used to measure
why suspects confess falsely to criminal conduct. He expressed grave concern about
whether the confession was reliable and concluded that the ‘case has the hallmarks of a
coerced-compliant type of a false confession’. He undertook a similar process in respect of
Murray and, although Murray’s IQ was in the normal range, he reached the same
conclusion about his confession.
However, the prosecution called two forensic psychologists who disputed the views of
Professor Gudjonsson. Dr Macpherson expressed the view that the Gudjonsson
Compliance Scale Test was a highly transparent and easily fakeable measure that should
not be relied on, and that its usefulness was undermined by the fact that all of the
information on which the test was based came from the subject. Professor Cooke offered a
detailed statistical analysis of both the Gudjonsson Susceptibility Scale and the
Gudjonsson Compliance Scale scores, which suggested that the results obtained by these
676 [10.0.590]
tests might lack precision, and that it was therefore difficult to determine accurately in any
one case whether an individual could be regarded as falling outside the normal range, and
could be described, for example, as abnormally suggestible or compliant. Even when the
test is used, Professor Cooke gave testimony that the court found convincing that it is
necessary to obtain as much confirmation from independent and reliable collateral sources
as possible (for example, directly from family, friends and workmates) in order to make an
effective assessment of the subject’s compliance. This was not done in the case before the
court.
Ultimately, the court was not satisfied that Professor Gudjonsson’s evidence would
have had any material effect on the jury’s verdict. In an evaluation that is likely to be
important in subsequent decisions, it expressed important reservations about aspects of
his reasoning (at [76]):
[T]here is a significant limitation in this case to the value of the Gudjonsson Compliance
Scales 1 and 2. It is plain that the purpose of the tests will be entirely transparent to the
subject, and the results can therefore be easily faked. The tests essentially depend for their
completion on self-reporting by the subject. In a forensic setting, such as in the present
appeals, it would be unrealistic to expect the subjects to answer the questions in these tests
in a fashion which was not designed to serve the purposes of the appeal. For the test to
have any value, it would require to be supported by extensive, significant and direct
access to contemporary sources (such as family, friends and workmates) to confirm the
results. In this respect we accept the evidence of Professor Cooke. This sort of
corroboration was not in any substantive or meaningful sense available in the present
case. We also think that it is particularly unhelpful and artificial to ask a subject, in the
context of a criminal appeal, to undertake to answer the test as he would have done more
than fifteen years earlier. No scientific basis justifying such an exercise was provided. This
is particularly so in the case of Brian Wilson, who was at the time of the murder reported
to be of borderline intelligence. The Gudjonsson Compliance Scale therefore appears to us
to be considerably less sophisticated and useful in a forensic situation than, for example,
the Gudjonsson Susceptibility Scale tests.
The court also took into account that various of Professor Gudjonsson’s conclusions by
reference to ‘measurement devices’ were based on the premise that the appellants were
credible and reliable, although he had made no attempt to test with any objectivity their
veracity. This led the court to approach his view that they were credible ‘with some
caution’ (at [77]).
Further, the court identified that Professor Gudjonsson’s conclusions depended upon a
series of important assumptions, not all of which were established. The court also
expressed concern for the absence of a convincing explanation for the failure of the expert
to acknowledge certain parts of the evidence which did not coincide with his conclusions;
in other words, it was troubled by his preparedness to descend into advocacy. The
decision of the court constitutes an important warning that a psychologist who forms the
view that admissions or confessions have been elicited in circumstances which render
them unreliable must be circumspect in the expression of views to such an effect and must
employ methodology which is even-handed in its approach and such as to avoid the
reality and appearance of advocacy.
Mental health expert evidence about behaviour
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy (factitious disorder)

[10.0.600] In general, expert evidence is not permitted about behaviour falling short of
conduct induced by pathology. In R v LM [2004] QCA 192, the Queensland Court of
Appeal emphasised the risks of permitting such evidence. The appellant was charged with
a number of counts of torture, unlawful wounding, and causing a noxious thing to be
taken with intent to annoy. The appellant had reported to doctors a series of medical
symptoms that were not explained by medical testing. The prosecution contended that the
[10.0.600] 677
appellant deliberately did things to cause her children to display pathological

symptomatology and that she reported false symptoms in her children so that the children
were subjected to unnecessary medical procedures. The appellant was convicted on a
number of counts at trial and appealed on a number of grounds, including that the trial
judge had erred in allowing the prosecution to adduce medical evidence of factitious
disorder (Munchausen Syndrome) by proxy. See Parnell and Day (1998); Freckelton (2005);
Langer (2009).
Dr Reddan, a psychiatrist, gave general evidence about the disorder. Dr Reddan did
not examine the appellant but noted that the behaviour of persons with the disorder can
be very wide-ranging in its presentation. According to Dr Reddan (at [7]–[11]):
It may be due to multiple motivations but it involves a conscious deception of others
when, by proxy, the care-giver deliberately induces illness in someone under his or her
care, usually a child but sometimes the elderly, disabled or even a pet. Factitious disorder
is not a recognised psychiatric disorder or mental illness; it is not categorised as such in
the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
…
Psychiatrists do not know how prevalent the behaviour is although it is thought to be
uncommon. Those who behave in this way will often initially appear to be people who are
willing to allow the child under their care to have quite painful investigations, but that is
not a diagnostic behaviour. They will often appear curiously unconcerned about the
child’s failure to improve, but again not in every case. Most psychiatrists have very
limited personal experience in this area. The behaviour is more often recognised by
paediatricians and paediatric nurses when the child victim does not recover as he or she
should and, for example, continues to get unusual, unexplained infections. It is difficult
behaviour to detect. The nature of the behaviour means it is almost invariably concealed
and nurses and doctors are reluctant to consider it because it seems unnatural. An
indication of the behaviour is when the victim is removed from the person who is thought
to be inducing the illness and then recovers. Some literature suggests that if a parent
induces illnesses in a child, they may have previously induced illnesses in themselves,
although this is not necessarily the case. The inducement of symptoms in one child may,
but will not invariably, result in the carer inducing symptoms in other siblings. A person
with factitious disorder, whether or not by proxy, knows what they are doing when they
deceive to achieve a goal, such as the deliberate inducement of suffering in a child.
Despite the multitude of potential motives and indicia of factitious disorder by proxy,
it is a medically recognised form of behaviour because it involves the provision of medical
services and can be very serious in its outcome. The literature suggests that it is most
likely to be perpetrated by a mother upon a child, although perpetrators may include
fathers who cause harm to children or those who cause harm to pets and the elderly. It is
difficult to predict whether factitious disorder by proxy will occur in a particular case.
In cross-examination, Dr Reddan said she had seen about eight examples of factitious
disorders and about five factitious disorders by proxy. She repeated that the behaviour is
not a disorder. The expression ‘factitious disorder’ is a catchall phrase which has evolved
historically because of the potential seriousness of the behaviour and its impact on the
medical profession. There is no unique type of person within this category of behaviour.
All that can be said is that those within the category are willing to use a vulnerable person
for some need of their own and the behaviour involves a failure of empathy towards that
person. That is not to say that a person exhibiting the behaviour may not on some
occasions be empathic to the victim or to others, but the behaviour itself implies a lack of
empathy because the dependant victim is used for the perpetrator’s gratification,
regardless of the victim’s wellbeing.
The Queensland Court of Appeal noted that the term ‘Munchausen’s Syndrome’ had been
coined in 1951 by Dr Asher writing in The Lancet. It accepted that a more liberal approach
is taken in respect of expert evidence called by the defence in criminal matters.
President McMurdo for the court noted that the issues for the jury at trial were whether
the prosecution established that the appellant had committed acts causing symptoms in
678 [10.0.600]
and, or alternatively, falsely reported or fabricated symptoms in her children with the
intention that medical professionals would perform otherwise unnecessary procedures on
them. He commented (at [65]):
An ordinary person is likely to be puzzled by the concept that an apparently loving
mother would lie and perform acts to deceive the treating doctors so that her children
were placed in painful, even potentially life-threatening, situations. The appellant made
that claim in her explanation to police and in her evidence in court. Ordinary people will,
however, often be puzzled at the extent of human depravity revealed in the criminal
courts. … If evidence could be given in this case that sometimes mothers exhibit
behaviour identified by medical practitioners by the term factitious disorder
(Munchausen’s Syndrome) by proxy, why would not general evidence be given … that
some fathers rape their daughters, some school teachers sexually abuse their pupils and
some wealthy women steal items although they have no need for them?
He held that the effect of allowing such a category of evidence to be given would be to
lead as expert evidence the propensity, not of the accused but of other people, to engage in
similar unlawful behaviour (at [66]):
The fact other people have done similar things in the past in unknown places and
circumstances is not ordinarily the subject of admissible expert evidence. It has no or very
limited relevance to the determination of whether this appellant has done acts or given
false reports to intentionally harm her children.
He held (at [67]) that examination of the expert medical evidence as to the medical term,
‘factitious disorder (Munchausen Syndrome) by proxy’, used to describe people exhibiting
behaviour like that alleged by the prosecution to have been exhibited by the appellant,
demonstrated that:
it does not relate to matters outside the sound judgment of a reasonable juror without any
particular special knowledge or experience. Ordinary people are capable of understanding
that some mothers may harm their children through deceitfully manipulating unnecessary
medical treatment. As the term factitious disorder (Munchausen’s Syndrome) by proxy is
merely descriptive of a behaviour, not a psychiatrically identifiable illness or condition, it
does not relate to an organised or recognised reliable body of knowledge or experience.
This meant that the expert evidence was inadmissible, but even if it were regarded as
technically admissible, it should have been excluded in the exercise of the judicial
discretion (at [68]); see also [2.35.120].
Thus, the Queensland Court of Appeal emphasised that, although a jury might be
surprised by behaviour asserted to have been engaged in ‘against nature’ by a mother in
respect of her children, it did not necessarily follow that counterintuitive evidence on the
phenomenon was admissible. It reasoned that when expert evidence is ‘merely descriptive
of behaviour’ as against diagnostic of a medical condition, it is not admissible. This
constitutes a robust contemporary assertion at common law of the rule precluding expert
evidence when it does not go beyond what is common knowledge.
[10.0.600] 679
Chapter 10.05
FITNESS FOR INTERVIEW EVIDENCE

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [10.05.01]
The concept of fitness for interview .................................................................................. [10.05.40]
The significance of fitness for interview ........................................................................... [10.05.50]
Legal framework in Australia ............................................................................................. [10.05.90]
Legal framework in the United Kingdom ........................................................................ [10.05.110]
Expert assessments
Limited options ...................................................................................................................... [10.05.150]
The process ............................................................................................................................. [10.05.160]
Assessment criteria ............................................................................................................... [10.05.170]
Consequences of fitness determinations ........................................................................... [10.05.180]
Limitations .............................................................................................................................. [10.05.190]
‘The statistics on sanity are that one out of every four

Americans is suffering from some form of mental illness.
Think of your three best friends. If they’re okay, then it’s you.’
Rita Mae Brown.

Introduction
[10.05.01] A threshold question of fitness can arise at the pre-trial investigation phase
when police or other investigating officials propose to interview a suspect. 1 Knowledge
has grown about the various sources of psychological vulnerability of suspects which
have the potential to distort their responses to police interviews and their conduct while in
police custody (see Gudjonsson (2010)). Gudjonsson (2006, p 68) has defined ‘psychological
vulnerabilities’ in this context as ‘psychological characteristics or mental state which
render a witness prone, in certain circumstances, to providing information which is
inaccurate, unreliable or misleading’. In this context, psychological vulnerabilities can best
be seen as representing potential risk factors rather than definitive markers of unreliability
(see Australian Institute of Criminology (2011)).
When concerns are harboured about a potential interviewee’s mental and/or physical
ability to participate in such an interview, the suspect may be referred for an expert
assessment to review their fitness for interview. Often such an assessment is conducted by
a mental health professional, but on occasions it is also undertaken by a clinical forensic
physician (see Gall and Freckelton (1999)), a general practitioner (see, eg, R v Curtis [2006]
VSC 377), or a nurse (Peel (2017)).
Evaluations of fitness for interview are significant in ensuring that any pertinent
information obtained during an official investigation can properly be relied upon at trial. If
any admissions or confessions are made by a person who is unfit at the time, the state of
the person might impact upon the voluntariness of what has been said and thereby its
admissibility. However, despite the importance of a suspect being mentally and physically
capable of participating in an interview, there is no standardised mechanism for the
assessment of fitness for interview (see Gudjonsson (2008)). On occasions, resort is had to
the all-purpose and limited mini-mental state test (see, eg, R v Cumberbatch [2002] VSC 235
at [26]). This has major limitations in terms of considerations that are subtle or nuanced.
However, when the assessment is wholly clinical and unstructured, there is a risk that
evaluations will be highly subjective.
1 Although the terms ‘interview’ and ‘interrogate’ are technically distinct from each other in
the context of police investigative practice, for the purposes of this chapter they will be
used interchangeably.
[10.05.01] 681
There is only a modest amount of literature addressing the concept of fitness for
interview and means for its determination, with the topic greatly neglected until recently.
Further, the majority of what has been written in this area has been prepared in the United
Kingdom in response to the implementation of its Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984
(UK) and its associated Codes of Practice. This limited attention seems at odds with the
possible ramifications for the trial process in terms of evidentiary considerations,
particularly in light of mounting research regarding the problem of unsafe, false and
coerced confessions and admissions.
The concept of fitness for interview

[10.05.40] Fitness for interview is a more discrete and narrow concept than fitness to stand
trial. Principally, it relates to the mental and physical state of a suspect during the period
of the interview, whereas fitness to stand trial (see Ch 10.10) encompasses the entire trial
period after the police investigation has concluded and proceedings have commenced.
Neither fitness to stand trial nor fitness for interview directly concern the person’s
condition at the time of the alleged offence (see generally R v Dennison (unreported, NSW
Court of Criminal Appeal, 3 March 1998)). Indeed, to be found fit to be interviewed and to
stand trial, the person need not even remember the crime alleged (R v Drummond
(unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 27 May 1994); R v Podola (1960) 43 Cr App R
220). Thus, a defendant may be deemed fit for interview and fit to stand trial, but be
acquitted of the crime on the grounds of insanity/mental impairment.
There is currently no cohesive or exhaustive definition of ‘fitness for interview’ in
Australia. Many conditions can impact upon such fitness. Some may intersect adversely
one with another.
However, aspects of interviewee competency have been identified. Norfolk (1997b) has
provided perhaps the most comprehensive definition in this area by concluding that
‘unfitness’ for interview exists when there is a ‘substantial risk’ that any statement made
by the accused may be unreliable. Factors that Norfolk (1997b) has listed as amounting to
such ‘substantial risk’ include:
• drug and alcohol intoxication;
• severe drug withdrawal;
• severe exhaustion;
• severe physical illness or physical pain;
• dementia;
• hypomania;
• schizophrenia and related conditions;
• depressive illnesses;
• mental handicap/intellectual disability;
• an inability to cope with interrogative pressure on psychiatric grounds;
• significant anxiety; and
• certain phobias (see also Norfolk (1997a)).
In general, a person without any of these features during the interview period can be, and
is regarded as, fit for the purposes of interview.
Gudjonsson (1993; 2008) has suggested that mentally disordered persons are ‘at risk’ or
‘vulnerable’, in accordance with the terminology in the United Kingdom, in the custodial
interrogation setting on the basis of their inability to properly comprehend the significance
of the interview questions being asked of them and the consequences of their answers in
that context. Additionally, such persons may be highly suggestible and easily swayed by
immediate gains, such as any measure that will bring the interrogation to an end or
682 [10.05.40]
Fitness for interview evidence | CH 10.05
provide other short-term gratification: see also Gudjonsson et al (2000); Keilty and
Connelly (2001). A related issue is that police may not always recognise such
vulnerabilities and take suitable steps to have the person suitably assessed and supported
(see Jacobson (2008)).
The significance of fitness for interview

[10.05.50] As with other legal safeguards concerning issues of competency, requiring a
defendant to be fit during the course of police questioning reflects well-established notions
of fairness, morality and equality to be afforded all legal proceedings: see, for general
discussion, McSherry (1999); Melton et al (1997); Freckelton (1996). However, the notion of
fitness for interview encompasses problems particularly associated with police
investigative procedures and the interrogative dynamics.
Police officers (and others) have relatively wide-reaching powers they may exercise in
the course of criminal investigations. In many jurisdictions, they may detain a suspect
without charge for the purposes of interrogation, typically for up to 24–48 hours – though
with the possibility of far greater periods of detention (Samuels, O’Driscoll and Allnutt
(2007)), such as made possible under recent ‘anti-terror’ laws. The custodial interview
involves various interpersonal interactions, questioning, periods of isolation, and
statement-taking often employing audio or visual recording devices. The process can be
directed toward testing the suspect and exploring the potential for eliciting a confession or
admissions: Underwager and Wakefield (1992). Whether the interrogation lasts an hour, a
day, or much longer, there is potential for it to be adversarial (Kassin and Gudjonsson
(2004); Yant (1991)) and ‘inherently coercive’ (Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966)), as well
as for it to include some measure of deception and psychological pressure: Kassin and
Gudjonsson (2004); Wood (1995); Underwager and Wakefield (1992); Leo (1992); Simon
(1991). As a result, police interrogation can be confusing, confrontational and intimidating,
particularly for those with a psychiatric disorder or some other form of vulnerability.
Kassin and Gudjonsson have concluded that, despite a trend away from physically
coercive interrogative practices (Streatfield (2006)), current methods are ‘still powerful
enough to elicit confessions, sometimes from innocent people’ (p 41). False confessions are
not uncommon (Drizin and Leo (2004); Kassin and Gudjonsson (2004); Conti (1999);
Gudjonsson (1995a); Karim (1997); Groves (1991)) and highly publicised cases, such as that
involving the Guildford Four and the seminal United States decision of Brown v State of
Mississippi 297 US 278 (1936), in which confessions elicited by torture provided the basis
for wrongful convictions, demonstrate the possible miscarriages of justice that may stem
from unsafe, false and coerced confessions and admissions occurring during police
interviews. Innocent people on occasions do confess to crimes that they did not commit.
Those individuals most susceptible to falsely confessing while being interviewed by police
are persons suffering from psychiatric disorders or other intellectual impairment. It has
been observed that people with such conditions are highly suggestible and compliant,
making them vulnerable to making untrue admissions of guilt: Gudjonsson (1997);
Norfolk (1997b). Further, some people with particular psychiatric disorders experience an
unconscious compulsion to confess and a need for punishment that again may produce
unreliable and inaccurate information during the interview phase: Schafer (1968); Reik
(1959).
Confession evidence can be extremely persuasive (Kassin and Neumann (1997)),
potentially having a greater impact than most other forms of evidence (Drizin and Leo
(2004); Kassin and Gudjonsson (2004); Leo and Ofshe (1998); Wrightsman and Kassin
(1993); Underwager and Wakefield (1992)), and risks playing a major role in leading to
convictions: Wrightsman, Nietzel and Fortune (1994); Kassin and Wrightsman (1985);
Driver (1968); Schafer (1968). This has led McCormick to remark that ‘the introduction of a
[10.05.50] 683
confession makes the other aspects of a trial in court superfluous, and the real trial, for all
practical purposes, occurs when the confession is obtained’ (1972, p 316). As a result, it is
extremely important that the competency of the interviewee be assured, preferably prior
to interview, by an assessment that involves standardised and reliable criteria for defining
and evaluating the subject’s fitness for interview.
Legal framework in Australia

[10.05.90] In Australia, the common law does not define or specifically regulate when a
person is legally ‘fit for interview’. However, it does exert indirect control in respect of
fitness to be interviewed by excluding from evidence any confession or admission made in
the course of a police interview by a person later found to have been unfit to be
interviewed at the time the confession or admission was made. The legal reasoning behind
the exclusion of evidence in such circumstances is that statements made by an unfit person
may not have been made in the free exercise of choice as to whether or not to answer the
questions being put during interview – to this extent, such statements are regarded as
being involuntary. In Australia, for a confession to be voluntary it must be ‘made in the
exercise of a free choice to speak or be silent’ (McDermott v The King (1948) 76 CLR 501 at
512 per Dixon J). Where the absence of fitness makes genuine free choice in this respect
unlikely, the person’s statements during police interview are deemed ‘involuntary’ and
thereby inadmissible. The burden of proving voluntariness in this context rests with the
prosecution on the balance of probabilities (R v Lee (1950) 82 CLR 133). However, ‘if there
is nothing to suggest that the confession was involuntary, the presumption is that it was
voluntary and the onus is discharged’ (MacPherson v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 512 at 519
(per Gibbs CJ and Wilson J), citing Hough v Ah Sam (1912) 15 CLR 452 at 457;
Attorney-General v Martin (1909) 9 CLR 713 at 731–732).
The decision of R v Buchanan [1966] VR 9 addressed the question of admissibility of
confessional evidence by a person with impaired decision-making capabilities. It dealt, in
part, with the issue of whether or not admissions made by an accused who had suffered a
head injury in a motor vehicle accident were admissible. In considering this question,
Sholl J rejected the proposition that admissions should be regarded as involuntary solely
on the basis that an accused person’s capacity to determine whether or not to answer
questions during police interview was lower than in the accused’s usual state. He stated
(at 15):
I would not be prepared to exclude … a statement as involuntary [where judgment was
reduced by head injury or alcohol intoxication] unless the evidence showed that on the
balance of probabilities the accused was incapable of appreciating that he had a choice to
remain silent, or incapable of expressing sufficient volition to give effect to what he knew
was such a right of choice.
However, Sholl J qualified this by accepting that ‘[t]here may be cases where, as a result of
a head injury, evidence would show that the patient was not in a position to exercise such
a judgment at all. No doubt in such a case the statement would be held not to be a
voluntary statement’.
In Australia, the question of voluntariness also encompasses the concept of ‘fairness’.
There exists an overarching discretion to exclude any admission, including a confession, in
proceedings where, having regard to the circumstances in which the admission was made,
it would be unfair to the defendant to allow the admission into evidence (Pollard v The
Queen (1992) 176 CLR 177; Australian Law Reform Commission (1985, [761]); Australian
Law Reform Commission (2005, [761]); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 90). By way of example,
statements made by an accused person during a police interview may be provided in
circumstances that significantly impair the reliability of either the content of the
statements or the manner in which they were given. As a result, the inferences that may be
drawn by the jury will be affected, which could make unfair the admission of the
684 [10.05.90]
accused’s evidence (see McDermott v The King (1948) 76 CLR 501 at 506; R v Lee (1950) 82
CLR 133). Should the defence object to the admissibility of the accused’s statements in this
situation, the trial judge may exercise his or her discretion to exclude this evidence on the
ground of fairness. This discretion even extends to circumstances in which the accused’s
statement might be held voluntary, but best ruled inadmissible in view of the facts (see,
eg, R v Buchanan [1966] VR 9 at 15 per Sholl J).
It is important to note the relevant period of time for analysis in decisions about
whether or not to exercise the fairness discretion. The pivotal question is whether the
circumstances in their entirety at the time of the police interview are such to render unfair
the admission of statements made by the accused. In B (a child) v Potts (1992) 59 A Crim R
136, the Western Australian Court of Criminal Appeal was required to consider the
admissibility of admissions made by a mildly intellectually disabled person during the
course of police interview. Having reviewed each of the questions put to the accused, the
answers provided in response and the manner in which the interview proceeded, the
court held that the accused had been able to reasonably understand the questions being
asked and was capable of answering. In its reasons (at 142), the court noted that
unfairness may arise ‘where an accused, because of intellectual disablement, fatigue, or
some other reason is not in a fit condition to understand or answer the questions asked of
him’, but found that not to be the case in view of the facts.
There is a lack of clear criteria enunciating the circumstances in which shock or mental
illness will render confessions or other incriminating statements involuntary: Gall and
Freckelton (1999). The seminal case of Sinclair v The King (1946) 73 CLR 316 addressed this
issue, with members of the High Court undertaking different analyses of the issue.
Latham CJ concluded that admissibility would not be questioned on the grounds of
‘mental aberration’ alone (at 323). Starke J conversely suggested that when confessions or
admissions were made as a ‘result of a disordered mental condition’, they would be
inadmissible (at 328). McTiernan J framed the question slightly differently, by asking
whether ‘at the time the accused made each confession he was not rational enough to
make a true confession’ (at 340). Dixon J, on the other hand, stated that ‘a confession is not
necessarily inadmissible as evidence upon a criminal trial because it appears that the
prisoner making it was at the time of unsound mind and, by reason of his mental
condition, exposed to the liability of confusing the products of his disordered imagination
or fancy with fact’ (at 332) (see also Collins v The Queen (1980) 31 ALR 257 at 307–308; Basto
v The Queen (1954) 91 CLR 628 at 638–639).
It may be that the question of the admissibility or otherwise of confessions and
admissions made by mentally impaired accused persons is primarily addressed by the
fairness discretion (R v Collie (1991) 56 SASR 302). However, various Commonwealth and
state decisions have complicated the issue by employing a range of additional tests for
admissibility in these circumstances. These include the following:
• ‘incapable of appreciating the full extent and purpose of his words, or of doing justice
to himself in his answers to questions put to him’: R v Jeffries (1946) 47 SR (NSW) 284 at
311;
• ‘incapable of appreciating that he had a choice to remain silent, or incapable of
exercising sufficient volition to give effect to what he knew was such a right of choice’:
R v Buchanan [1966] VR 9 at 15;
• ‘in such a condition that the utterances were completely unreliable’: R v Isequilla [1975]
1 All ER 77 at 83;
• ‘not rational enough to make a true confession’: Sinclair v The King (1946) 73 CLR 316 at
340; Klemenko v Huffa (1978) 17 SASR 549 at 555;
• in a state of ‘complete emotional disintegration’: R v Horvath (1979) 93 DLR (3d) 1; and
[10.05.90] 685
• ‘so plainly unaware of his surroundings, of the identity of the interrogator, and of the
drift of the questions put, that he is incapable of choosing whether to speak or not and
is just gabbling’: R v Ostojic (1978) 18 SASR 188 at 197.
(See Gall and Freckelton (1999, p 217).)

There are also legislative provisions in operation in Australia that regulate the
admissibility of confessions and other incriminating statements in criminal proceedings.
Section 85(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the Evidence Act
2001 (Tas), the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT)
and the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) provides that such evidence is not admissible ‘unless the
circumstances in which the admission was made were such as to make it unlikely that the
truth of the admission was adversely affected’. In deciding this issue, the court is expressly
directed to consider ‘any relevant condition or characteristic of the person who made the
admission, including age, personality and education and any mental, intellectual or
physical disability to which the person is or appears to be subject’ (s 85(3)(a)). Section 90 of
the Acts contains a statutory form of the fairness test. It provides that:
In a criminal proceeding, the court may refuse to admit evidence of an admission, or
refuse to admit the evidence to prove a particular fact, if:
(a) the evidence is adduced by the prosecution; and
(b) having regard to the circumstances in which the admission was made, it would
be unfair to a defendant to use the evidence.
Part 3.11 contains additional exclusionary discretions that are applicable to evidence of
admissions.
On occasion, a person may be determined to be fit to be interviewed in the presence of
an independent third person (see, eg, R v Munday (Ruling No 1) [2016] VSC 26).
Legal framework in the United Kingdom

[10.05.110] As in Australia, the common law in the United Kingdom does not directly
define the term or address the question as to when an accused can be considered ‘fit for
interview’, but does so obliquely via exerting control over the admissibility of pertinent
evidence, primarily confessions and admissions, obtained during police interrogation
from ‘unfit’ individuals: Gregory (2004); Gudjonsson et al (2000).
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (UK) (PACE) and the associated Codes of
Practice (Home Office (1991; 1995)) provide guidance for the rules of evidence and police
procedure broadly, and specifically in relation to police interviewing and confessions.
PACE was revised and came into force on 1 April 2003. Its most significant new provisions
concern the audio and visual recording of police interviews and inclusion of an
‘appropriate adult’ during interviews in which the accused is considered to be ‘at risk’ as
defined by PACE.
Although one of the prime objectives of PACE is to help ensure that an accused is
physically and mentally capable of participating in a police interview (McKenzie (1994)),
neither PACE nor the relevant Codes of Practice define ‘fitness for interview’. However,
there is a provision in Code C (Home Office (1995, para 12.3)) that effectively renders
persons intoxicated by alcohol or other illicit substances temporarily unfit to participate in
police questioning about any alleged offences while in the compromised state and thereby
prevented from so doing. The justification for this prohibition is the acknowledgement
that persons affected by alcohol or other drugs are unable to fully appreciate the questions
being asked of them and of the consequence of their own answers. Annexure C provides a
very narrow exception to this rule that allows for police interviewing of temporarily unfit
persons by reason of intoxication when information is required urgently and is of such a
kind that it is likely to lead to interference with, or the prevention of imminent harm to,
686 [10.05.110]
other people. In these circumstances, interviews can only proceed with the express
authority of an officer with the rank of Police Superintendent or above.
Notably, both PACE and the Codes of Practice fail to extend this protection to mentally
disordered or impaired individuals. If, by reason of psychological vulnerability and absent
any intoxication, an accused is unable to comprehend the importance of the interview
process, they are not deemed unfit, temporarily or otherwise. Instead, psychologically
disordered persons and others susceptible on the grounds of age, intellectual impairment,
communication deficiencies and the like are considered fit so long as they are afforded the
assistance of an appropriate adult. That person’s function is to facilitate communication,
provide advice and assistance generally, and be present during the course of the police
interview to help ensure its fairness and propriety. Only in limited cases, where these
safeguards are considered to be unlikely protection in terms of the reliability of the
accused person’s information, does the issue of unfitness for interview arise in respect of
vulnerable, but not intoxicated, persons. This is despite the acknowledgement in Code C
(Home Office (1991 p 79)) that mentally disordered individuals may ‘without knowing or
wishing to do so, be particularly prone in certain circumstances to provide information
which is unreliable, misleading or self-incriminating’. However, there is a ‘catch-all’
contained in s 76(2) of PACE, which provides that the court must exclude confession
evidence if ‘in consequence of anything said or done which was likely, in the
circumstances existing at the time, to render unreliable any confession which might be
made by the suspect in consequence thereof’. This extends to inappropriate interrogation
practices resulting in admissions or confessions (see, eg, R v Trussler [1988] Crim LR 446).
Expert assessments
Limited options
[10.05.150] Until recently, quite limited information had been published in relation to the
assessment of fitness for interview. However, as the clinical demand for formal fitness
assessment increases, so too does the body of literature in this area. While still relatively
rare, growing numbers of expert assessments to ascertain a person’s fitness to be
interviewed by police are being requested: Norfolk (1997a; 1997b); Protheroe and Roney
(1996); Robinson (1996a). These evaluations are carried out by medical practitioners,
forensic medical examiners, psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Common reasons for such referrals are concerns over the person’s competency as a
result of alcohol or other substance abuse and withdrawal (Robertson (1992); Robertson,
Pearson and Gibb (1995)), psychiatric conditions and mental impairment (Gudjonsson
(1993); Robertson, Pearson and Gibb (1995)). The primary purpose of fitness for interview
assessments is to assess the suspect’s physical and mental wellbeing as it exists at the time
of police interview in order to eliminate or reduce the risk of unsafe or false confessions,
admissions and other factual information being obtained during interview and then
introduced at the trial stage: Gall and Freckelton (1999).
The process
[10.05.160] The majority of requests for assessment for fitness to be interviewed involve
psychiatric, psychological (Robertson, Pearson and Gibb (1995); Gudjonsson (1993)) and
drug-related features (Robertson (1992); Robertson, Pearson and Gibb (1995)), with
physical impairments fairly infrequent: Gudjonsson (1993); Gudjonsson et al (2000); Gall
and Freckelton (1999). As a result, a physical evaluation may be useful, particularly in
relation to individuals experiencing drug or alcohol intoxication or withdrawal, or
physical symptoms of some other nature, but the examination can be relatively cursory.
On the other hand, a comprehensive psychological assessment is crucial: Gudjonsson et al
(2000). While a combined physical and mental state evaluation is often recommended
[10.05.160] 687
(Gudjonsson et al (2000); Rogers (1995)), the nature and degree of investigation in both
regards will vary according to the circumstances of the given case.
Gall and Freckelton (1999) made the following recommendations for assessors in
respect of the clinical evaluation of fitness for interview:
1. Prior to any interview or examination of the accused, thorough background facts
should be obtained from the suspect, relevant police officers, treating practitioners,
and accompanying persons. This should include details of the crime alleged, the
manner of apprehension, and the time spent and behaviour observed while in
custody. It may also involve direct observation of the suspect by way of video or
other equipment in the custodial setting. A detailed medical history should also be
taken. The clinician must receive the suspect’s informed consent prior to seeking
this information.
2. Suitable demeanour should be exhibited by the assessor during the interview by,
for example, maintaining eye contact and a relaxed posture, avoiding being
judgmental, and asking direct questions about the alleged crime.
3. Typically, the physical examination should be confined to a review of the general
appearance of the suspect, including his or her clothing, degree of hygiene, signs
of alcohol or drug intoxication, addiction or withdrawal or self-harm, apparent
injuries, and degree of consciousness and coherence. In cases involving suspected
impairment by reason of drugs or alcohol, the administration of an alcometer
(Rogers, Stark and Howitt (1995)) and/or a blood test may be useful. In only a
limited number of situations, primarily those in which a physical illness is
affecting the suspect, should the physical examination proceed beyond this level.
Again, it is important that the clinician receive the suspect’s informed consent
before carrying out any such examination.
4. The assessor should ensure that the suspect is properly medicated, where
required, provided with sufficient food and water, and allowed adequate rest.
Depending upon the requirements of the particular assessment, the entire clinical
interview and examination process should be completed in 15–20 minutes (Norfolk
(1997a)) in straightforward cases, and within up to an hour in cases involving a
psychiatric disorder or intellectual impairment: Gall and Freckelton (1999).
Due to the depth and complexity of factors to be evaluated in each fitness assessment,
and the pressing time constraints of many practitioners, the use of proformas may be a
potentially useful tool to facilitate determinations of fitness for interview. The Victorian
Institute of Forensic Medicine has developed one such proforma. It encompasses patient
details, information regarding the examination, background facts provided by police,
personal history, observations about the accused, and concluding remarks. The benefit of
the proforma is that it ensures that the clinician addresses certain relevant factors and
records pertinent findings in an adequate manner. While a comprehensive range of
assessment criteria are included in the proforma, this is merely a guide for the medical
examiner; they are charged with the responsibility of deciding which sections to complete
or exclude and must be prepared to justify these choices if tested. The use of proformas of
this kind has been criticised on the basis that legal practitioners will be able to identify
sections omitted from review by the clinician, and thereby challenge the findings made.
However, it would appear that the use of proformas has been successful, especially as
aides for less experienced medical practitioners: Gall and Freckelton (1999).
Rarely is the question of fitness for interview raised or assessed prior to the police
interview for which competency is in issue. Rather, whether a suspect was or was not
capable of adequately participating in the question and answer process is typically not
evaluated until after the event, with concerns over fitness emerging during the formal
interview. Such retrospective assessments are clearly less than ideal. Mental competence is
variable and responsive to stimuli such as interrogative pressure and complex intellectual
688 [10.05.160]
demands. Further, the effects of drug and alcohol intoxication and withdrawal vary
markedly from person to person due to their metabolic processing of the intoxicants,
history of use, pre-existing psychiatric and medical conditions, time and quantity of
consumption, and the like: see generally Norfolk (1996); Clarke (1991). It may be that a
person is heavily impaired by an illicit substance during the course of interview, thus
adversely impacting their performance (Pearse et al (1998)), but has rapidly metabolised it
and appears completely coherent at the time of fitness assessment. Conversely, some
heavy drinkers may show a high blood alcohol concentration hours after the interview,
but have such advanced alcohol tolerance that they were capable of proceeding
unimpaired during the police questioning: Rogers, Stark and Howitt (1995). Similarly,
those experiencing drug or alcohol intoxication may experience no more than confusion
during interview (Sigurdsson and Gudjonsson (1994)), although the type of drug has a
bearing in this respect (Jones (1997)).
While it may be possible to conduct a thorough evaluation of the suspect and to read a
transcript of the interview, to view or listen to it, and to receive accounts from the
interviewing officers and sometimes third parties, such information may be inadequate to
properly determine the underlying affect, mental state, and so on of the suspect during the
time of the interview. This problem is compounded when the suspect cannot later be
assessed for reasons such as subsequent death (Odell (2003)), or is not subjected to
appropriate psychological testing (Gudjonsson (1993)). In this regard, Odell (2003, p 108)
has concluded that ‘[o]pinions regarding fitness to be interviewed are always problematic
when made after the event’.
Ideally, a clinical assessment of fitness should be undertaken prior to a formal police
interview. Obviously, many suspects are unquestionably competent to attend an interview
and so testing them would involve unnecessary labour and expense. However, in some
blanket scenarios, a compulsory pre-interview assessment would be well advised. These
situations might include all persons appearing intoxicated and/or testing positive for
drug or alcohol inebriation, persons undergoing medical treatment, including psychiatric,
for acute and chronic illnesses, and persons who have reservations about speaking with
police: Robinson (1996a).
Assessment criteria
[10.05.170] Standardised medical and legal criteria to determine fitness for interview have
yet to be agreed upon. However, many attempts have been made to construct reliable
conceptual frameworks and assessment approaches for medico-legal practitioners in this
area.
In 1990, McLay proposed fitness for interview assessments be undertaken by way of
physical examination, paying particular attention to the central nervous system, in
conjunction with a few key interview questions. The Victoria Police’s Forensic Medical
Officer’s Manual (1993) advocated a clinical examination confined to two questions:
1. Is the accused mentally alert and oriented to answer questions?
2. Is the accused physically well enough to answer questions?
If both answers were in the affirmative, the detainee was deemed fit for interview. The
deficiencies of such approaches have since been acknowledged, namely a high degree of
subjectivity and failure to consider any medical contra-indications and/or psychiatric and
physical impairment: Gregory (2004); Norfolk (1997b); Robinson (1996a). Shortly after,
similar guidelines were proposed by the British Medical Association and the Association
of Police Surgeons (1994) and the Department of Health (1994). However, these were still
lacking in important respects: Gregory (2004). It was not until 1996, when the Home Office
[10.05.170] 689
Working Party published recommendations about fitness for interview, that a reasonable
set of guidelines began to emerge. The Working Party defined a person as being unfit to be
interviewed when:
(a) Conducting an interview could worsen any existing physical or mental illness to a
significant degree.
(b) Anything said or done by the detained person at the time of detention may be
considered unreliable in subsequent court proceedings, because of the physical or
mental state of the detainee.
Norfolk (1997b) expanded this definition by citing six factors he considered to be linked
with an increased risk of interrogative suggestibility (see too Keilty and Connelly (2001))
and thereby questionable fitness for interview:
• mental illness;
• intellectual impairment;
• youth;
• alcohol or drug effects sufficient to affect memory or the decision-making processes;
• factors likely to cause the belief that the perceived immediate gain outweighs the
potential long-term consequences; and
• physical discomfort, pain or exhaustion.
While this does not provide a comprehensive assessment format, it does highlight features
tending to predispose an accused to behave in an ‘unfit’ manner during interview. There
are a range of other clinical factors that the assessor should contemplate in making an
overall evaluation of a detainee’s health. These include:
• medications and their possible impact on demeanour and state of mind;
• the existence of any and which phobias;
• observable signs of anxiety, nervousness, exhaustion, intoxication or pain;
• memory problems;
• unassertiveness;
• low self-esteem;
• intellectual impairment or disability;
• lack of comprehension of what is taking place, including the ramifications of particular
decisions; and
• notable aspects of medical history, particularly in relation to substance abuse and
psychiatric disorders.
Specific assessment may also be required in relation to particular classes of detainee. These
include persons with an intellectual impairment (see Keilty and Connelly (2001);
Brookbanks and Freckelton (2018)), those affected by alcohol or other drugs, persons who
have an existing medical illness or injury, and ‘silent detainees’: Gall and Freckelton
(1999). Individuals with intellectual disability may be hard to identify and often require
extensive assessment to discern the full extent of their impairment. Despite this, such
persons tend to be in a stable state and, unless accompanied by some other medical or
psychiatric feature, are generally fit for interview on the prerequisite that a suitable person
– an accompanying adult or lawyer – be present. While intellectually impaired persons are
typically fit, special police treatment is recommended and it should be accepted that the
benefits to be gained from any interview are limited. Intoxication and withdrawal
symptoms associated with illicit substances cause a range of problems for medical
examiners and therefore an extensive physical, psychological and medical history and
evaluation should be carried out as appropriate. Of particular difficulty is the prevalent
690 [10.05.170]
co-relationship between substance abuse and psychiatric and psychological disorders.

Further, due to the high degree of drug- and alcohol-related referrals, it is important that
practitioners charged with carrying out these assessments have expertise in both general
psychiatric and substance abuse contexts and in the interplay between the two. Existing
medical illnesses and injuries should not overly complicate issues of fitness, but do require
special consideration. Whether the condition is stable or unstable, so long as it is not
life-threatening or likely to affect the individual’s performance during any interview, the
detainee can be deemed fit to proceed. However, if the person requires medical care or
significant treatment, is in undue pain or distress, or is otherwise unable to properly
engage in the interview process, he or she should receive appropriate attention before
being assessed for fitness again, then progressing to formal police interview once
medically capable. The silent detainee is perhaps the most difficult to assess. As informed
consent is required before any medical interview or examination, and silence cannot
amount to express or implied consent in this regard, the clinician will be forced to base his
or her decision on directly observable features of the accused in conjunction with
information obtained from relevant third parties. As discussed above, this approach has
significant limitations.
Consequences of fitness determinations

[10.05.180] After having completed a physical and/or psychological assessment of a
suspect, the clinician will form a conclusion as to whether or not the suspect is fit for
interview. While that may appear to be a straightforward flow-on from the assessment
itself, it is somewhat more complicated. This is because there are varying forms of fitness
or, more correctly, unfitness.
Norfolk (1996) has provided a dual lack of fitness categorisation: those associated with
temporary conditions, such as drug and alcohol intoxication or withdrawal and treatable
medical conditions; and those that are likely to be permanent, including severe
neurological and intellectual impairment. Thus, a practitioner may deem the suspect to be
fit for interview, unfit for interview for a specified or indefinite period, or, in rare
circumstances, permanently unfit and therefore never capable of undergoing police
interview. In reviewing fitness assessments in Victoria, Gall and Freckelton (1999) found
that of the 150 cases analysed by them in 1997, 47% of those evaluated were considered to
be fit for interview, but in 14% of those cases an independent third person was
recommended. In total, 35% were deemed unfit for interview, with 58.6% of these referred
for further assessment.
Once a determination as to fitness has been made, the appropriate treatment of the
suspect must then be formulated by way of discussion between the clinician and police.
Legal considerations – such as whether or not the suspect may be charged, released or
detained – obviously impact upon such course of action. However, the medical concerns
are still of importance. Should the person be considered temporarily unfit, the clinician
may be able to provide assistance with means of expediting and facilitating their return to
fitness. The clinician should then have an opportunity to reassess the accused at the point
fitness is considered to have returned to ensure that this is the case. Finally, the medical
examiner may advise that the suspect is unfit unless, or is fit only if, an appropriate adult
and/or lawyer attend the interview. Unlike the situation in the United Kingdom, where
categories of ‘vulnerable’ or ‘at risk’ persons are listed in the relevant legislation and codes
as discussed above, most other jurisdictions permit clinicians to decide whether the given
circumstances warrant the presence of a support person during police interview. Whatever
decisions are made, a suitable recording of facts and conclusions should be made in the
police and clinical files.
[10.05.180] 691
Limitations
[10.05.190] Robertson (1992) found that the evaluations of detainees’ mental capacity
account for under 10% of medical examiners’ consultation periods. Gudjonsson (1995a)
has cautioned that the assessment of fitness for interview of mentally disordered offenders
should not be underestimated. As noted above, persons unfit for interrogation are
susceptible to giving misleading information and unsafe or false confessions and
admissions. This can have serious consequences at the trial stage and may lead to
abandonment of proceedings. Further, failure to assess or to adequately assess a person’s
fitness prior to interview can have a number of adverse ramifications for the individual. It
can exacerbate existing psychiatric or other medical disorders, it can impinge upon
treatment efforts, and it may provoke self-harm: see, eg, Odell (2003). Despite the
importance of assessing fitness to be interviewed, the existing policies and procedures
have some limitations.
There is currently no cohesive definition of fitness for interview, nor are there
standardised criteria or guidelines for its assessment. Protheroe and Roney (1996) have
observed that of the many psychiatrists conducting fitness evaluations at the behest of
police, most had received little or no training in this regard and thus showed marked
divergence of approach. This consequently results in a high degree of variability in clinical
opinions, potentially in relation to the same individual. A study by Norfolk (1995) lends
support for this view. He demonstrated a divergence in attitudes held by police medical
examiners about what exactly constitutes fitness for interview. Additionally, 26% of
participants questioned the necessity of assessing fitness to be interviewed in all cases.
However, Gregory (2004) has argued that ‘in the interests of justice, such examinations
should be routine’ (at 261), and others have supported this in respect of at least particular
classes of detainee: see, eg, Gall and Freckelton (1999). Gudjonsson et al (2000) have found
in this regard that some examiners employ too broad a construct of unfitness and thus
improperly find competent detainees unfit for police interview, a finding which has
obvious ramifications for the police investigation and criminal prosecution. Due to the
high degree of referrals concerning drug- and alcohol-related issues, medical examiners
should possess sufficient expertise in relation these matters and their relationship with
psychiatric conditions, but this is not a requirement and it is not commonplace in practice.
Janofsky (2006) has also cautioned against expert clinicians inadvertently assuming a
collusive role, rather than performing a necessarily detached and impartial consultative
function.
Practical limitations with existing fitness analysis approaches include difficulties with
assessing silent detainees or others who refuse consent to assessment or treatment.
Gudjonsson (1993) has also noted that psychological vulnerabilities, and especially mild
intellectual impairment, are unlikely to be detected by common, brief mental state
examinations typically employed. As noted previously, most assessments are undertaken
retrospectively, but this results in a greatly reduced accuracy and reliability of
determination. Finally, it is important for examining clinicians to take adequate
contemporaneous notes. Failure to do so can leave their opinions unable to be evaluated
effectively.
692 [10.05.190]
Chapter 10.10
FITNESS TO STAND TRIAL
EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [10.10.01]
Fitness to stand trial: the concept ...................................................................................... [10.10.40]
Legal framework
England
Criteria for fitness ................................................................................................................. [10.10.80]
Australia
Statutory provisions .............................................................................................................. [10.10.130]
Jurisdictions ............................................................................................................................
Commonwealth ..................................................................................................................... [10.10.180]
New South Wales .................................................................................................................. [10.10.190]
Queensland ............................................................................................................................. [10.10.200]
South Australia ...................................................................................................................... [10.10.210]
Victoria .................................................................................................................................... [10.10.220]
Tasmania ................................................................................................................................. [10.10.230]
Western Australia .................................................................................................................. [10.10.240]
Australian Capital Territory ................................................................................................ [10.10.250]
Northern Territory ................................................................................................................. [10.10.260]
New Zealand
Canada
United States
International criminal law ................................................................................................... [10.10.340]
Expert assessments
The process
How the issue arises ............................................................................................................. [10.10.360]
Unaided clinical evaluation ................................................................................................. [10.10.370]
Standardised assessment instruments – psychometric testing
The background ..................................................................................................................... [10.10.410]
Competency Screening Test ................................................................................................. [10.10.420]
Competency to Stand Trial Assessment Instrument ....................................................... [10.10.430]
Georgia Court Competency Test ........................................................................................ [10.10.440]
Interdisciplinary Fitness Interview .................................................................................... [10.10.450]
Fitness Interview Test (revised edition) ............................................................................ [10.10.460]
Macarthur Structured Assessment of the Competencies of Criminal Defendants .... [10.10.470]
Macarthur Competence Assessment Tool – Criminal Adjudication ............................ [10.10.480]
Assessment tools for specialised populations .................................................................. [10.10.490]
The benefits and limitations of standardised assessments ............................................ [10.10.510]
Consequences of fitness determinations ........................................................................... [10.10.530]
‘No matter what we have come through, or how many perils

we have safely passed, or how many imperfect and jagged –
in some places perhaps irreparably – our life has been, we
cannot in our heart of hearts imagine how it could have been
different. As we look back on it, it slips in behind us in
orderly array, and, with all its mistakes, acquires a sort of
eternal fitness, and even, at times, of poetic glamour.’
Randolph Silliman Bourne.
693
Introduction
[10.10.01] Expert evidence on the subject of fitness to stand trial has traditionally been
liberally admitted and objections have not been taken that assessments provided to courts
fall within areas of common knowledge. Of its nature, the evidence on the subject
concerns the impact of mental or physical illness or of intellectual impairment on the
capacity of the accused person to function effectively within the criminal trial system.
Thus, it generally relates to matters which could be construed as lying beyond the general
ken of a tribunal of fact, although its essence concerns capacity to understand and
communicate. The ultimate issue rule (see Ch 2.25) in relation to such evidence has not
stood in the way of admissibility of such evidence.
The criteria for determining fitness to stand trial vary to some degree from country to
country (see Mackay and Brookbanks (2018)), especially in terms of the extent to which
capacities for the exercise of rational evaluation and communication, generally based upon
psychiatric or psychological evidence, are regarded as criteria for unfitness. The criteria
provide the parameters within which the expert evidence is relevant to the tribunal of fact.
This chapter analyses the criteria for unfitness to stand trial and scrutinises the tests
employed to evaluate unfitness.
Fitness to stand trial
The concept
[10.10.40] The concept of fitness to stand trial is variously referred to as ‘fitness to plead’
and ‘fitness to be tried’, with the notion of ‘fitness’ replaced by ‘adjudicative competency’
or, more commonly, simply ‘competency for trial’ or ‘competency for adjudication’ in the
United States setting (see Morse (2018); Bonnie (2018)). Whatever terminology is utilised,
the fundamental requirement that a defendant be mentally and physically ‘fit’ to stand
trial (R v Enright [1990] 1 Qd R 563 at 573 per Lee J; R v Beynon (1957) 2 QB 111) commands
general and largely unquestioned support: see generally Norfolk (1997); Freckelton (1996);
Gudjonsson (1995); Legal Research Foundation (1995); Blackstone (1783); Perlin et al
(2008); Frost and Bonnie (2001); Mackay and Brookbanks (2018).
It is important that the question of fitness to stand trial is not confused with issues of
insanity, psychosis, automatism or similar. Matters of intellectual and psychiatric
impairment may be relevant considerations in determining fitness, but they are not
prerequisites for that status: see generally Roesch et al (2004); Roesch and Golding (1980).
The rule that a defendant must be fit to be tried for a criminal offence can be traced
back to at least the start of the 1400s (Mackay (2018); McSherry (1999)) and was first
consolidated in British common law in the mid-18th century (Blackstone (1783); Frith’s
Case 22 How St Tr 307 (1790); Fingarette and Fingarette (1979); Silten and Tullis (1977); see
generally Melton et al (1997)). It is founded upon notions of fairness and moral dignity
and represents an effort to ensure that legal proceedings are non-discriminatory, accurate,
and transparent and comprehensible to those being tried, thus avoiding an otherwise
immoral and inhumane trial process that denies individual autonomy, making it
comparable to a trial in absentia (Freckelton (1996); Verdun-Jones (1982)), and unduly
punitive (Scott (2007); Melton et al (1997); Grisso (1988)).
While there is obvious merit in this principle, its application as a practical safeguard
within the criminal justice system is less than straightforward, both domestically and
under international criminal law. In part, this is a result of the varying legal definitions
and requirements afforded the concept across jurisdictions.
694 [10.10.01]
Fitness to stand trial evidence | CH 10.10
Legal framework
Different legal frameworks for the reception of expert evidence on the fitness of accused
persons to stand trial exist in different jurisdictions. Because of the extent of the differences
in both form and substance, they are dealt with separately hereunder.
England
Criteria for fitness

[10.10.80] The English common law criteria for fitness to stand trial were formulated by
Baron Alderson in R v Pritchard (1836) 7 C & P 103; 173 ER 135 (emphasis added):
There are three points to be inquired into: first whether the prisoner is mute of malice or
not, secondly whether he can plead to the indictment or not, and thirdly whether he is of sufficient
intellect to comprehend the course of proceedings on the trial so as to make a proper defence to know
that he might challenge any of you to whom he may object and to comprehend the details of the
evidence.
See also R v Governor of Stafford Prison [1909] 2 KB 81; R v Robertson (1968) 62 Cr App R 690;
R v Berry (1977) 66 Cr App R 156. See also Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to
Plead) Act 1991 (UK).
The word ‘comprehend’ has been held to mean no more than ‘understand’: R v Podola
[1960] 1 QB 325 at 354; Ngatayi v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 1 at 7. The emphasis, therefore,
is upon understanding of the proceedings, while the scope of the requirement that the
accused be able to ‘plead to the indictment’ remains somewhat unclear. There is little focus
upon capacity for communication or decision-making, and no distinction has been drawn
between intellectually disabled, physically ill, and mentally ill accused persons (see
Mackay (2018)).
There has been little by way of judicial analysis of the forms of mental illness which
may be accounted sufficient to render an accused unfit to plead, although the decision of
Devlin J (as he then was) in R v Roberts [1954] 2 QB 329 at 331 accepted that ‘defects of the
senses’, whether or not combined with a ‘defect of the mind’, may render a person unfit to
plead: see also R v Berry (1977) 66 Cr App R 156.
Australia

[10.10.120] In Australia, the common law remains as set out in 1958 in R v Presser [1958] VR
45, where Smith J held that the test to be applied was one of ‘common sense’: ‘whether the
accused, because of mental defect, fails to come up to certain minimum standards which
he needs to equal before he can be tried without unfairness or injustice to him’ (at 48).
Smith J gave what is one of the most substantial lists of indicia that exists in reported case
law (at 48, emphasis added):
He needs, I think, to be able to understand what it is that he is charged with. He needs to be able
to plead to the charge and to exercise his right of challenge. He needs to understand generally the
nature of the proceeding, namely, that it is an inquiry as to whether he did what he is
charged with. He needs to be able to follow the course of proceedings so as to understand
what is going on in court in a general sense, though he need not, of course, understand the
purpose of all the various court formalities. He needs to be able to understand, I think, the
substantial effect of any evidence that may be given against him; and he needs to be able to
make his defence or answer to the charge. Where he has counsel he needs to be able to do this by
giving any necessary instructions and by letting his counsel know what his version of the facts is
and, if necessary, telling the court what it is. He need not, of course, be conversant with court
procedure and he need not have the mental capacity to make an able defence; but he must,
I think, have sufficient capacity to be able to decide what defence he will rely upon and to make his
defence and his version of the facts known to the court and to his counsel, if any.
[10.10.120] 695
See also R v Allen, Kesavarajah and Moses (1993) 66 A Crim R 376 at 396ff; R v NCT (2009) 26
VR 247; [2009] VSCA 240.
The High Court has made it plain that the Presser rules are the ‘minimum standards
with which an accused person must comply before he or she can be tried without
unfairness or injustice’: Kesavarajah v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 230 at 245; Ngatayi v The
Queen (1980) 147 CLR 1 at 8. The requirements centre upon capacity for understanding
and ability to make forensic decisions, as well as to communicate both to the court and to
his or her legal representatives. It is not necessary that a represented accused understands
the law ‘if that lack of capacity does not render him unable to make a proper defence’:
Ngatayi v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 1 at 9. Nor is a requirement of rationality articulated,
but it would be open to argument that such a requirement is inherent in Smith J’s
formulation. However, the High Court has held that ‘in some cases, complete
understanding [of proceedings] may require intelligence of quite a high order. But it does
not mean that the accused is required to have sufficient capacity to make an able defence’:
Kesavarajah v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 230 at 245; Ngatayi v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 1 at
8. The reference to ‘complete understanding’ is potentially significant, but cryptic within
the context of the judgment. The express link between powers of rationality and fitness to
stand trial has not been drawn in Australia.
Statutory provisions
[10.10.130] Each Australian jurisdiction has enacted legislation to define fitness (to plead,
stand trial, or be tried) and/or the relevant review processes and orders available (Crimes
Act 1914 (Cth), Pt IB Div 6; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), Pt XIA; Mental Health (Treatment and
Care) Act 1994 (ACT), ss 68–70; Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW), Pt 2;
Criminal Code Act (NT), Pt 2 Div 3; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), s 613; Mental Health Act
1974 (Qld), ss 33–34; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), Pt 8A Div 3; Criminal Justice
(Mental Impairment) Act 1999 (Tas), Pt 2; Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried)
Act 1997 (Vic), Pt 2; Criminal Code (WA), s 619; Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act
1996 (WA), Pt 3 Div 1). While the central tenets of the States’ and Territories’ statutory
provisions are substantially similar, there are differing definitions and approaches.
Commonwealth
[10.10.180] The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) does not define unfitness (or fitness) to be tried, save
to state that the concept includes unfitness to plead (s 16). The Act otherwise provides a
detailed overview of procedural issues related to questions of fitness.
New South Wales

[10.10.190] The Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW) contains the relevant
provisions addressing questions of fitness to stand trial in New South Wales. It represents
a deliberate attempt at fairer application following the removal in 1990 of legislative
provisions that could result in the indefinite detention of unfit criminal offenders.
The Act provides stringent guidelines as to its assessment and corresponding
disposition options available. If the court finds that the accused is unfit, the matter must
be referred to the Mental Health Review Tribunal (s 14), which assesses whether the
person will become fit to be tried within the next 12 months (s 16(1)). If recovery within
12 months is likely, the court may grant bail, and the accused may be detained in hospital
or elsewhere for a period not exceeding 12 months (s 17). If recovery within 12 months is
not likely, the Attorney General must decide whether to hold a special hearing or to drop
the charges (s 18). Should a special hearing take place, it must do so in a manner as near as
possible to criminal proceedings (s 21). At the outset of a special hearing, the trial judge
must explain to the jury the fact that the accused is unfit to be tried in accordance with
696 [10.10.130]
normal procedures, the meaning of unfitness to be tried, the purpose of the special
hearing, the verdicts which are available, and the legal and practical consequences of
those verdicts (s 21), despite the fact that the Act does not define ‘unfitness to be tried’.
Pursuant to s 22, the special hearing may result in a finding of:
• not guilty;
• not guilty on the ground of mental illness; or
• that on the limited evidence available, the accused person:
– committed the offence charged; or
– committed an offence available as an alternative to the offence charged.
Queensland
[10.10.200] The relevant legislative instruments in Queensland are the Criminal Code Act
1899 (Qld) and the Mental Health Act 1974 (Qld). The Mental Health Act 1974, which came
into effect in 2002, represents the most modern mental health legislation in Australia (Scott
(2007)). Strangely, the Act fails to provide a comprehensive definition of ‘fitness to stand
trial’ and the Code offers no definition whatsoever. The relevant definition contained in
Sch 2 of the Act provides that ‘fit for trial, for a person, means fit to plead at the person’s
trial and to instruct counsel and endure the person’s trial, with serious adverse
consequences to the person’s mental condition unlikely’. However, there is no explanation
or guidance given as to the nature of ‘plead’ and ‘instruct’ integral to the status of fitness
referred to therein (see R v M [2002] QCA 464 for a judicial interpretation of the statutory
definition).
The equivalent provision in the Code, s 613, is phrased in terms of ‘want of
understanding’. It provides that if there is uncertainty over whether the accused is able to
understand the trial proceedings, such that he or she is capable of making a ‘proper
defence’, a jury must be empanelled to determine the issue. Should the jury decide that
the accused is incapable of such understanding, they must state whether they have so
concluded on the basis that the accused is of unsound mind or for some other reason, and
the court may order the accused to be discharged, or may order the accused to be kept in
custody in such place and in such manner as the court thinks fit, until the accused can be
dealt with according to law. There is yet to be judicial interpretation of the term ‘proper
defence’ (Scott (2007)), fundamental to the Code’s definition.
South Australia
[10.10.210] Section 269H of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1996 (SA) sets out the South
Australian definition with respect to fitness to stand trial. Section 269H states that:
A person is mentally unfit to stand trial on a charge of an offence if the person’s mental
processes are so disordered or impaired that the person is –
(a) unable to understand, or to respond rationally to, the charge or the allegations on
which the charge is based; or
(b) unable to exercise (or to give rational instructions about the exercise of)
procedural rights (such as, for example, the right to challenge jurors); or
(c) unable to understand the nature of the proceedings, or to follow the evidence or
the course of the proceedings.
Victoria
[10.10.220] In Victoria, s 6(1) of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act
1997 (Vic) defines a person to be unfit to stand trial for an offence if:
because the person’s mental processes are disordered or impaired, the person is or, at
some time during the trial, will be –
[10.10.220] 697
(a) unable to understand the nature of the charge; or

(b) unable to enter a plea to the charge and to exercise the right to challenge jurors or
the jury; or
(c) unable to understand the nature of the trial (namely that it is an inquiry as to
whether the person committed the offence); or
(d) unable to follow the course of the trial; or
(e) unable to understand the substantial effect of any evidence that may be given in
support of the prosecution; or
(f) unable to give instructions to his or her legal practitioner.
Section 6(2) prescribes that a person is not unfit to stand trial only because he or she is
suffering from memory loss.
The provisions largely replicate the Presser criteria (see R v NCT (2009) 26 VR 247;
[2009] VSCA 240). Their most difficult aspect lies in the requirement, unqualified, that the
accused person be able to follow the course of a trial, which is a cryptic requirement,
heavily dependent upon assessment of the person’s powers of concentration, stress levels,
intelligence, and levels of delusional or other illness. Its overlap with the requirement that
the person be able to understand the substantial effect of evidence given by the
prosecution but, apparently, not necessarily evidence given by a co-accused, or their own
witnesses, is unclear. Similarly, what is meant by the requirement that they need to be able
to provide instructions will need to be qualified because of the potential, for instance, that
such instructions may be internally inconsistent, generated by mistrust or paranoia about
their lawyer or other participants in the trial process, self-harming, or contrary to their
best forensic interests.
Tasmania
[10.10.230] Tasmania is the most recent Australian jurisdiction to enact a legislative
definition of ‘fitness’ (Scott (2007)). The relevant provision is s 8 of the Criminal Justice
(Mental Impairment) Act 1999 (Tas), which provides:
A person is unfit to stand trial for an offence if, because the person’s mental processes are
disordered or impaired or for any other reason, the person is:
(a) unable to understand the nature of the charge; or
(b) unable to plead to the charge or to exercise the right of challenge; or
(c) unable to understand the nature of the proceedings; or
(d) unable to follow the course of the proceedings; or
(e) unable to make a defence or answer the charge.
Section 8(2) prescribes that a person is not unfit to stand trial only because he or she is
suffering from memory loss.
Western Australia
[10.10.240] In Western Australia, the Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996
(WA) governs assessments of fitness to stand trial. Section 9 of the Act provides that a
defendant lacks mental fitness to stand trial if that defendant, because of mental
impairment, is:
(a) unable to understand the nature of the charge;
(b) unable to understand the requirement to plead to the charge or the effect of the
plea;
(c) unable to understand the purpose of the trial;
(d) unable to understand or to exercise the right to challenge jurors;
(e) unable to follow the course of the trial;
698 [10.10.230]
(f) unable to understand the substantial effect of evidence presented by the

prosecution in the trial; or
(g) unable to properly defend the charge.
Section 8 defines ‘mental impairment’ as intellectual disability, mental illness, brain

damage or senility, and ‘mental illness’ as ‘an underlying pathological infirmity of the
mind, whether of short or of long duration and whether permanent or temporary, but
does not include a condition which results from the reaction of a healthy mind to
extraordinary stimuli’ (cf Mental Health Act 1996 (WA)).
The question of mental impairment is to be decided by the presiding judicial officer on
the balance of probabilities drawn from all relevant matters that he or she sees fit to
consider, which typically includes some form of expert report (s 12). The criminal
proceedings may be adjourned until the question of fitness is answered. If the judicial
officer determines that the accused is unfit to stand trial, the proceedings may be
adjourned for up to six months (ss 14, 18, 19), but if the judicial officer considers that the
accused is unfit and likely to remain that way for longer than six months, the indictment is
quashed and the accused is discharged or remanded into custody at the ‘Governor’s
pleasure’ – that is, until released by order of the Governor (ss 16–19, 24, 25, 35).
Australian Capital Territory

[10.10.250] The relevant legislation relating to fitness to plead in the Australian Capital
Territory is the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) and the Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994
(ACT). Section 311 of the Crimes Act 1900 provides:
(1) A person is unfit to plead to a charge if the person’s mental processes are
disordered or impaired to the extent that the person cannot –
(a) understand the nature of the charge; or
(b) enter a plea to the charge and exercise the right to challenge jurors or the
jury; or
(c) understand that the proceeding is an inquiry about whether the person
committed the offence; or
(d) follow the course of the proceeding; or
(e) understand the substantial effect of any evidence that may be given in
support of the prosecution; or
(f) give instructions to the person’s lawyer.
(2) A person is not unfit to plead only because the person is suffering from memory
loss.
Sections 68 and 70 of the Mental Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994 (ACT) then mandate
acceptable review processes and the making of appropriate orders for the management of
those deemed unfit in the Supreme Court or the Magistrates Court under the Crimes Act
1900 (ACT).
Northern Territory
[10.10.260] The Northern Territory Criminal Code was significantly amended by the
Criminal Code Amendment (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 2002 (NT). It
introduced several provisions addressing the issue of fitness to stand trial, among other
‘mental impairment provisions’. Section 43 of the amended Code provides:
(1) A person charged with an offence is unfit to stand trial if the person is –
(a) unable to understand the nature of the charge against him or her;
(b) unable to plead to the charge and to exercise the right of challenge;
(c) unable to understand the nature of the trial (that is that a trial is an
inquiry as to whether the person committed the offence);
[10.10.260] 699
(d) unable to follow the course of the proceedings;

(e) unable to understand the substantial effect of any evidence that may be
given in support of the prosecution; or
(f) unable to give instructions to his or her legal counsel.
(2) A person is not unfit to stand trial only because he or she suffers from memory
loss.
There is a presumption of fitness to stand trial (s 43 of the Criminal Code Act (NT)); see
Heffernan v The Queen (2005) 194 FLR 370; [2005] NTCCA 14.
New Zealand

[10.10.280] The key fitness-to-plead provision in New Zealand is s 108 of the Criminal
Justice Act 1985 (NZ), where it is prescribed that a person is ‘under a disability’ if ‘because
of the extent to which a person is mentally disordered, they are unable (a) to plead; (b) to
understand the nature or purpose of the proceedings; or (c) to communicate adequately with
counsel for the purpose of conducting a defence’ (emphasis added). To this extent,
therefore, the concentration is upon the unclear notion of ability to plead, presumably to
express a wish to plead guilty or not guilty, to understand what the trial is about in
principle, and to communicate ‘adequately’ with their legal representative (see Brookbanks
(2018)). Again, much lies within the word ‘adequately’. Heron J in R v Carrel [1992] 1
NZLR 760 at 762 has accepted that the notion of ‘adequacy’ requires consideration of the
quality of the accused person’s communication, as well as the physical possibility of
communication. This decision builds upon the earlier decision of Wilson J in R v Owen
(No 2) [1964] NZLR 828 at 831, where his Honour inquired into whether the accused was
able to ‘reach a proper decision whether to plead guilty or not guilty’ and did so explicitly
in terms of assessing whether he was ‘able to reach a rational judgment’ on the issue.
No definition of ‘mentally disordered’ is found in the Act, so recourse has been had to
the definition in the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (NZ)
where ‘mental disorder’ is defined as:
an abnormal state of mind (whether of a continuous or intermittent nature) characterised
by delusions, or by disorders of mood or perception or volition or cognition, of such a
degree that it
(a) Poses a serious danger to the health or safety of that person or others; or
(b) Seriously diminishes the capacity of that person to take care of himself or herself.
In relation to an intellectually disabled person, this focuses the court’s inquiry upon the
person’s disorders of cognition, or potentially on the person’s disorders of mood,
perception or volition. This is appropriate if the quest is for assessment of the person’s
ability to understand proceedings and to participate meaningfully in them through
counsel. The problem comes in the qualifying aspects of the definition – namely, whether
the person poses a serious danger to his or her own or others’ health or safety, or whether
the impairment seriously diminishes the person’s capacity to take care of himself or
herself. One way of resolving this problem is by a determination that an accused person’s
disorder of cognition seriously diminishes his or her capacity to exercise adequate
self-care: see also Brookbanks (1996).
Canada

[10.10.300] Section 2 of the Criminal Code (Can) provides that a person is ‘unfit to stand
trial’ if they are (emphasis added):
700 [10.10.280]
unable on account of mental disorder to conduct a defence at any stage of the proceedings
before a verdict is rendered or to instruct counsel to do so, and, in particular, unable on
account of mental disorder to
(a) understand the nature or object of the proceedings;
(b) understand the possible consequences of the proceedings; or
(c) communicate with counsel.
See also Ferguson (2018).

The focus of the section, therefore, is upon understanding and capacity for
communication. There is a requirement of a ‘mental disorder’, but no criterion of
rationality or any comparable concept. The adequacy of understanding or capacity for
communication is not adverted to: see further Freckelton (1996); R v Taylor (1992) 11 OR
(3d) 323.
United States

[10.10.320] In the United States, two cases are authoritative on the nature of unfitness to
stand trial: Dusky v United States 362 US 402; 80 S Ct 788 (1960) and Drope v Missouri 420
US 162; 95 S Ct 896 (1975). In the vital but cryptically short decision of Dusky, the Supreme
Court agreed with the submission from the Solicitor-General that it is ‘not enough for the
district court judge to find that the defendant [is] oriented to time and place and [has]
some recollection of events’. The court held at 825 (emphasis added):
The test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding – and whether he has a rational as well as a factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.
Thus, the inquiry of the court is not upon whether the accused is mentally ill per se, or
intellectually disabled, but rather upon whether his or her experience of hallucinations,
delusions or other abnormalities will adversely impact upon his or her functioning in
court. The key concept in the decision is capacity for rational understanding.
In Drope v Missouri 420 US 162; 95 S Ct 896 (1975), the Supreme Court was more
expansive, noting that it had long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is
such ‘that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings
against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be
subjected to trial’ (Drope v Missouri 420 US 162; 95 S Ct 896 (1975) (emphasis added)). They
court noted too that ‘even when a defendant is competent at the commencement of his
trial, a trial court must always be alert to circumstances suggesting a change that would
render the accused unable to meet the standards or competence to stand trial’ (Drope v
Missouri 420 US 162; 95 S Ct 896 (1975) at 119; see also Godinez v Moran 125 L Ed 2d 321;
113 S Ct 2680 (1993)). Drope is often regarded as a gloss upon Dusky, but does not exhibit
the same concern with the need for rational understanding in the competent defendant. It
probably takes the law no further.
In Medina v California 120 L Ed 2d 353 at 366 (1992), in the context of determining the
constitutionality of a State law that placed the burden upon the accused to establish
incompetence, the Supreme Court noted that although an impaired defendant might be
limited in his or her ability to assist counsel in demonstrating incompetence, the
defendant’s inability to assist counsel could itself constitute probative evidence of
incompetence – ‘defense counsel will often have the best informed view of the defendant’s
ability to participate in his defence’. The majority accepted that case law had established
that the ‘“subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually
beyond reach in most situations” because “[p]sychiatric diagnosis … is to a large extent
[10.10.320] 701
based on medical ‘impressions’ drawn from subjective analysis and filtered through the
experience of the diagnostician”’: Addington v Texas 441 US 418 at 430 (1979).
United States law on competency therefore demands a rational capacity for
understanding proceedings and an ability to communicate meaningfully with legal
representatives (see Morse (2018); Bonnie (2018)). It is probable that inherent in both is the
absence of an impairment that substantially interferes with the rational operation of the
powers of cognition.
International criminal law

[10.10.340] While there have been a number of decisions under international criminal law
(see Freckelton and Karagiannakis ((2014a;2014b))) in relation to defendants’ fitness to
stand trial, the major authority is the Appeals Chamber decision of the International
Criminal Chamber for the Former State of Yugoslavia in Prosecutor v Strugar, IT-01-42-A,
Appeals Chamber, Judgment, 17 July 2008. The Appeals Chamber recognised that the
issue of fitness is one which has the potential to affect the fair and expeditious conduct of
the trial. After examining national and international authorities, it accepted that the issue
of fitness is not confined to the question of whether a particular medical condition is
present but is better approached by determining whether the defendant is able to exercise
his or her criminal trial rights effectively. The Appeals Chamber found that a
non-exhaustive list of the capacities to be evaluated when assessing an accused person’s
fitness to stand trial includes the capacity to plead, to understand the nature of the
charges, to understand the course of the proceedings, to understand the details of the
evidence, to instruct counsel, to understand the consequences of the proceedings, and to
testify. It held (at [55]) that ‘the applicable standard is that of meaningful participation
which allows the accused to exercise his fair trial rights to such a degree that he is able to
participate effectively in his trial, and has an understanding of the essentials of the
proceedings’. It held that the ability of the accused to participate in his or her trial should
be assessed by looking at whether the person’s capacities are, viewed overall and in a
reasonable and common-sense manner, at such a level that it is possible for him or her to
participate in the proceedings and sufficiently exercise his or her rights. It also found (at
[56]) that when an accused person maintains that he or she is unfit to stand trial, it is
incumbent upon him or her to prove the contention on the balance of probabilities.
The Appeals Chamber did not adopt the United States approach to require that the
accused be able to make rational evaluations and to provide rational, reasonable or lucid
instructions and accounts to his or her legal representatives and the court. It rejected the
proposition that the test should require the accused person ‘to fully comprehend the
course of the proceedings in the trial, so as to make a proper defense’. Instead, it required
a lower level of capacity to participate meaningfully in the trial (at [60]), without setting
out clear reference points for when this will be satisfied (see Freckelton and Karagiannakis
(2018)).
Expert assessments
The process
How the issue arises

[10.10.360] There is comparatively little empirical knowledge about the process of expert
assessment of fitness to stand trial in Australia. However, it has become apparent that the
context in which an accused is referred for a fitness to plead assessment is important. It
may be at the instigation of the accused, the Crown or the judge (see Kesavarajah v The
Queen (1994) 181 CLR 230 at 245) and it may occur before or during a trial (Crimes Act 1914
(Cth), Pt IB Div 6; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), Pt XIA; Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act
702 [10.10.340]
1990 (NSW), s 7; Criminal Code Act (NT), s 357(1); Mental Health Act 1974 (Qld), ss 33–34;
Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), s 645; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), Pt 8A Div 3;
Criminal Justice (Mental Impairment) Act 1999 (Tas), Pt 2; Crimes (Mental Impairment and
Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic), Pt 2; Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996
(WA), Pt 3 Div 1; Criminal Code (WA), ss 652, 653; R v Enright [1990] 1 Qd R 563
(Queensland CCA)).
It may be that the defendant’s demeanour and appearance are such that concerns over
his or her fitness to stand trial are raised before or even after a plea has been entered. In
circumstances where the defendant fails to enter a plea, the court must decide whether he
or she is unable rather than merely unwilling to plead (Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 396;
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 396; Criminal Code Act (NT), s 345; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld),
ss 601, 613; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), s 284(2); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 392;
R v Bradley (1986) 40 NTR 6). The United States Supreme Court has held that there are ‘no
fixed or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to
determine fitness to proceed’ and has conceded that the question is often a difficult one ‘in
which a wide range of manifestations and subtle nuances are implicated’: Drope v Missouri
420 US 162; 95 S Ct 896 (1975). Studies by Aubrey in 1987 and 1988 have indicated that
certain characteristics are particularly prominent among those who are actually assessed
for fitness to plead – namely, that 55% had a history of inpatient treatment, while 48% had
a previous conviction for a serious offence. He also found that such assessments are more
common where violence of some kind has been displayed in the offence with which they
are currently charged: Aubrey (1987; 1988).
When the question of fitness to stand trial arises, the issue may be reserved for
investigation by the court in which the defendant is charged (Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), Pt IB
Div 6; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), Pt XIA; Mental Health (Criminal Procedure) Act 1990 (NSW),
Pt 2; Mental Health Act 1974 (Qld), Pt 4; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA), Pt 8A;
Criminal Justice (Mental Impairment) Act 1999 (Tas), Pt 2; Crimes (Mental Impairment and
Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic), Pt 2; Criminal Code (WA), ss 609A, 619; Justices Act 1902
(WA), s 138A; Criminal Law (Mentally Impaired Accused) Act 1996 (WA), ss 11–13). Typically,
when fitness is in issue, the court receives expert psychiatric opinion to assist in its
decision-making. Traditionally, this entailed psychiatric evidence presented to the court
following a forensic inpatient assessment. However, concerns over time and expense have
resulted in alternative avenues, such as assessments conducted in outpatient and prison
settings by mental health worker teams and by sole private clinicians: Jager (2000); Warren
et al (1997).
Relatively recent research into means of assessing fitness to stand trial has revealed
that the evaluation process is from time to time ‘misabused’, in the sense that it is often
invoked for reasons other than genuine concerns over the accused person’s capacity to be
fairly tried. Fitness issues may instead be raised as a way of ensuring that accused persons
considered in need of mental health care be remanded in psychiatric institutions rather
than jail, to deny bail, to delay the trial, or as a foundation for reducing the charges against
the accused or the sentence which he or she might ultimately receive: Golding (1992);
Roesch and Golding (1985); Teplin (1984); Dickey (1980). As a result, the vast majority of
those assessed are deemed fit: see generally Roesch et al (1997); Brookbanks (1996); New
South Wales Law Reform Commission (1994); Law Reform Commission of Western
Australia (1991); Golding, Roesch and Schreiber (1984). Regardless of these findings, the
question of fitness to plead, let alone resulting decisions of unfitness, is raised very rarely
(Birgden and Thomson (1999)), albeit significantly more frequently than the insanity/
mental impairment defence: Roesch et al (2004); see also Hoge et al (1997); Golding (1993);
Bonnie (1992); Hoge et al (1992); Steadman and Harstone (1983).
[10.10.360] 703
Unaided clinical evaluation

[10.10.370] While the legislation and applicable case law set out above provide guidance as
to the meaning of ‘fitness to stand trial’, in practice the concept is variable and highly
contextualised. As a result, the standard that mental health assessors tend to apply is
‘open-textured’, depending upon the seriousness and complexity of the charges, the
challenges facing the particular accused, the relationship between the accused and his or
her lawyers, those lawyers’ communication skills, and a number of other criteria.
The task of assessing fitness to stand trial is one that is unusual for many mental health
professionals as their primary orientation is generally toward assessment and treatment of
psychiatric impairment, rather than assessment of a patient’s competency to function
within a legal environment.
Rogers and Mitchell (1991, p 96) in the Canadian context have identified ‘a notable
absence of specific guidelines for assessing fitness to stand trial’ and that, no doubt for this
reason, ‘forensic psychiatrists and psychologists often adopt rather idiosyncratic
interpretations of fitness to stand trial’. The inadequacy of guidance for assessments is
exacerbated where a request from either the court or a legal representative is in terms that
do not enable the expert to be clear about the purpose of the report, or where the report is
apparently commissioned for more than one purpose.
Larkin and Collins (1989) found in assessing 77 pre-trial psychiatric reports that in 27%
the criteria for assessment of fitness to plead were not explicitly mentioned by the authors,
leading them (p 31) to agree with the proposition advanced earlier by Chiswick (1978) that
‘some psychiatrists … seem uncertain of the criteria for fitness to plead and confused the
issue with responsibility’. Given the mixed messages sent by the legislature and the courts
in many jurisdictions, such confusion is hardly surprising. Winick (1995, p 621) sums up
the difficult situation:
The discretion vested in clinical evaluations is made more troubling by the fact that
appellate courts rarely review, and almost never reverse, trial court competency
determinations, and the fact that trial judges almost always defer to clinical evaluations.
Thus, decision-making in this area is effectively delegated to clinical evaluators making
low visibility and essentially unreviewed decisions pursuant to a vague open-textured
standard. This arrangement allows for an obscuring of the distinction between the clinical
and legal components of incompetency.
Nevertheless, expert evidence on the subject, in spite of its many limitations, is routinely
allowed. Its probative value is a matter for the tribunal of fact.
Most assessments in Australia, New Zealand (Freckelton (1996); Chantler and
Heseltine (2007)) and Canada (Davis (1994); McDonald, Nussbaum and Bagby (1991))
remain non-standardised and, in the case of persons potentially disabled by intellectual
disability, are clinical in orientation but supported, albeit rarely (Warren et al (2006);
Winick (1995)) by some amount of psychometric testing (see below). Assessment based
upon clinical experience and clinical exposure (often brief) to the accused person is the
norm. Jones (1990) in Australia acknowledged that when called upon to assess the fitness
to plead of an intellectually disabled person, a variety of options are open – interviewing
(structured or semi-structured), a general intelligence approach, a specific test of fitness to
plead, and an experimental approach. He noted that, from a psychologist’s point of view,
there was no standard set of procedures and that, for the most part, a combination of
methods tended to be employed. He advocated the development of a specific screening
test and argued that it could be developed in conjunction with lawyers and validated
against actual court outcomes and the opinions of relevant people.
704 [10.10.370]
Standardised assessment instruments – psychometric testing
The background
[10.10.410] A variety of attempts has been made to develop standardised fitness to stand
trial assessments, dating back to the 1960s. A number of these are unpublished and used
by institutions in an ‘in-house’ fashion only (Jager (2000)). A further range of assessment
measures, numbering at least 12, are available in the literature (see also Hoge et al (1997)).
Robey (1965) designed the first of these instruments, a psycho-legal checklist that
examines understanding of court and legal processes to ascertain fitness (see also
Nicholson et al (1988)). This was followed shortly afterwards by a checklist and guided
interview approach designed by Bukatman, Foy and DeGrazia (1971). These early efforts
at standardised testing were rarely used (Schreiber (1978)). However, the work carried out
by McGarry and his associates at the Harvard Medical School’s Laboratory of Community
Psychiatry during this period was instrumental in efforts to standardise fitness to stand
trial assessments, culminating in one screening tool: the Competency Screening Test
(Lipsitt et al (1971)) and one semi-structured interview tool: the Competency to Stand Trial
Assessment Instrument (Roesch, Webster and Eaves (1984)), which paved the way for
numerous measures developed thereafter, including:
• Another two screening tests – the Georgia Court Competency Test: an unpublished
manuscript by Wildman et al (1978); see Rogers and Mitchell (1991, p 104); see also
Bagby et al (1992, pp 492ff) and Grisso (1986), which has since been variously revised
(Bagby et al (1992); Wildman, White and Brandenburg (1990); Nicholson, Briggs and
Robertson (1988); Johnson and Mullet (1987)); and the Computer Assisted Competence
Assessment (Barnard et al (1991)).
• Another three semi-structured interviews – the Interdisciplinary Fitness Interview
(Golding, Roesch and Schreiber (1984)); the untitled instrument developed by
Oosthuizen et al (1995); and the Fitness Interview Test (Roesch, Webster and Eaves
(1984)), since produced in a revised edition (Zapf and Roesch (2001)).
• Two structured cognitive assessment devices – the MacArthur Structured Assessment
of the Competencies of Criminal Defendants and the MacArthur Competence
Assessment Tool – Criminal Adjudication.
• A measure for assessing mentally retarded defendants – the Competence for Standing
Trial for Defendants with Mental Retardation (Everington (1990)) – and research into
instruments specifically designed to assess fitness in adolescent populations: McKee
(1998); Cooper (1995); Cowden and McKee (1995).
A number of these instruments will now be detailed in a summary way.
Competency Screening Test

[10.10.420] The Competency Screening Test (CST) (Lipsitt et al (1971)), as its name
suggests, was designed to function as a screening tool for the early identification of
obviously fit defendants, thereby eliminating the time and expense required for otherwise
unnecessary clinical evaluations. These and other screening instruments have arisen in
response to the research indicating that most defendants assessed for fitness are found to
be fit, as noted above.
Various studies into the validity of the CST have demonstrated it to possess high levels
of inter-rater reliability when scoring the incomplete sentence format: Randolph, Hicks
and Mason (1981).
Despite the legitimacy of its purpose and other noted attributes, the CST has only been
infrequently used in practice and has been met with considerable criticism. Nicholson et al
[10.10.420] 705
(1988) have noted a key deficit in the construct of this measure, 1 being the evaluation of
functional performance rather than a true assessment of functional capacity, the latter
properly demonstrating fitness as defined (for similar critique regarding these and other
psychometric devices, see Poythress et al (2002)). Similarly, Roesch and Golding (1980) and
Brakel (1974) have questioned the validity of the scoring methodology. They have noted
that, due to the allegedly unrealistic and overly favourable conceptualisation of the
criminal justice system, a defendant’s responses may be attributable to prior litigation
experiences and may indicate frustration in that context, rather than lack of comprehension.
The most concerning aspect cited in relation to the CST is that studies into its validity,
while supporting the sound inter-rater reliability, have also revealed a high false positive
rate (Randolph, Hicks and Mason (1981); Nottingham and Mattson (1981); Shatin (1979);
Lipsitt et al (1971)) and generally poor validity overall (Schreiber, Roesch and Golding
(1987)). The high false positives in particular, in addition to other criticisms that have been
levelled against the CST, put into serious doubt its usefulness, if any, as a screening tool
for which it was intended.
Competency to Stand Trial Assessment Instrument

[10.10.430] The Competency to Stand Trial Assessment Instrument (CAI) was developed
by the Laboratory of Community Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School. Its developers
intended the device to be used as a two-part screening process in conjunction with the
CST ‘to cover all possible grounds for a finding of incompetency’ (Laboratory of
Community Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School (1973, p 99)). The CAI comprises a
13-item scale and sample interview questions addressing legally relevant issues, such as
ability to relate to one’s lawyer, appraise available defences, and disclose relevant
information. The CAI manual proposes a scoring system whereby each of the 13 items
receives a score of between one (the minimum, demonstrating ‘total incapacity’) and five
(the maximum, demonstrating ‘no incapacity’), and provides clinical examples of the
ranging degrees of incapacity as a guide.
The CAI has been subject to very few studies examining the reliability and validity of
its construct (Melton et al (1997)). However, those published to date suggest high levels of
inter-rater reliability in relation to trained inter-examiner and examiner outcome
agreements: see, eg, Nicholson and Kugler (1991); Roesch and Golding (1980). Despite the
dearth of replicative studies, the CAI has been applied in a number of jurisdictions,
though mostly as a stand-alone semi-structured interview instrument, rather than a
secondary phase screening tool to the CST for which it was designed: Schreiber (1978);
Laben et al (1977).
While the CAI provides a seemingly viable assessment avenue, further research must
be undertaken in respect of reliability and validity and its identified limitations
acknowledged. Compared to other fitness evaluation instruments, such as the
Interdisciplinary Fitness Interview and the Fitness Interview Test (described below), the
parameters of the psycho-legal abilities are too narrow and a correlation between
psycho-legal impairment and psychopathology lacking. In short, it has come under
scrutiny over its asserted, though currently unsubstantiated, depth: Brakel (1974).
Georgia Court Competency Test

[10.10.440] The Georgia Court Competency Test (GCCT) was originally developed, though
not published, by Wildman et al (1978) and comprised a 17-item scale. Subsequent
revisions (Bagby et al (1992); Wildman, White and Brandenburg (1990); Nicholson, Briggs
1 They have made the same observation in relation to the Competency to Stand Trial
Assessment Instrument.
706 [10.10.430]
and Robertson (1988); Johnson and Mullet (1987)) resulted in the Mississippi State
Hospital Revision (GCCT-MSH) version, which consists of 21 items. The first seven of
these items concern the defendant’s ability to locate certain legally relevant members
within the courtroom, while the remaining items address the defendant’s knowledge and
comprehension in relation to the function of legally relevant members in the courtroom
and the nature and extent of the charges made against him or her, in addition to an
assessment of the defendant’s communication and general interaction with his or her
lawyer.
The GCCT-MSH has scored highly in studies assessing its reliability and validity
(Nicholson et al (1988)). However, it has come under scrutiny for its undue focus on
foundational competencies rather than the relevant decisional competencies. As with the
CAI, the GCCT-MSH has therefore been deemed inferior to the Interdisciplinary Fitness
Interview and the Fitness Interview Test (described below): Bonnie (1992). It is perhaps
due to this construct shortcoming that Nicholson et al (1988, p 320) concluded that neither
the GCT nor the CST ‘should serve as the sole basis for a competency decision’ but they
should instead provide valuable assistance as part of a broader fitness assessment scheme.
Interdisciplinary Fitness Interview

[10.10.450] As alluded to above, a distinguishing feature and key strength of the
Interdisciplinary Fitness Interview (IFI), in both its original (Golding, Roesch and
Schreiber (1984)) and revised versions (Golding (1993)), is its ability to examine both the
psycho-legal and the psychopathological aspects of a defendant’s fitness to stand trial.
This is a product of the IFI’s assessment construct. It was specifically designed to ensure
that examiners using it would be required to address psycho-legal and psychological
issues in conjunction with each other, rather than in isolation.
The original IFI was categorised into three key areas:
1. Legal issues – five items.
2. Psychopathological issues – 11 items.
3. Overall evaluation – 4 items.
The IFI training manual sets out recommended sample questions and follow-up probes for
each of the items assessed and provides clinical guidance to assist with common
problems.
The IFI interview and scoring rules demand that the examiner always considers the
defendant’s responses, and thereby fitness, in the context of the legal scenario. In practical
terms, for all items, the examiner must rate the degree of the defendant’s incapacity in
addition to assessing what effect, if any, such incapacity might have on the defendant’s
overall fitness in the circumstances:
Thus, a defendant may receive a score indicating the presence of hallucinations (item 10)
but receive a low weight score because the evaluator has determined that the presence of
hallucinations would not have much effect on the conduct of the legal case. Another
defendant with the same symptom may receive a high weight score because the
hallucinations are considered to be more of a potential problem during the legal
proceedings.
(Roesch et al (2004, pp 10–11).)

A study into the validity and reliability of the IFI carried out by Golding, Roesch and
Schreiber (1984) demonstrated high levels (97%) of inter-rater agreement. In that study, the
structured interviews were carried out by pairs consisting of a lawyer and a mental health
worker, with each scoring independently of the other. The significant degree of agreement
between the legal and psychological opinions has led Roesch et al (2004) to conclude that
both lawyers and mental health workers can make reliable determinations regarding
[10.10.450] 707
fitness by applying the IFI. However, it is questionable whether standardised fitness

assessments performed by legal practitioners would ever be considered acceptable court
practice for litigious purposes.
In 1993, Golding revised the IFI in response to changes in United States constitutional
law and the introduction of ‘articulated competency standards’ by numerous states.
Specifically, the Interdisciplinary Fitness Interview-Revised (IFI-R) was deliberately
modelled to reflect the new standard of competency law as it applied in Utah (Utah Code
Annotated §77-15-1 et seq (1994)). The IFI-R drew heavily from the original instrument but
refined it with the benefit of nearly a decade of practical application within legal and
mental healthcare settings and associated commentary (see, eg, Riggins v Nevada 112 S Ct
1810 (1992); Godinez v Moran 125 L Ed 2d 321; 113 S Ct 2680 (1993)). In its new format, the
IFI-R has a broader composition than the IFI, consisting of 31 assessable psycho-legal
capacity items across 11 key areas. A revised training manual to complement the
instrument has also been prepared by Golding (1993) to provide clinical guidance in the
use of the IFI-R.
Fitness Interview Test (revised edition)

[10.10.460] The Fitness Interview Test (FIT) was originally developed by Roesch, Webster
and Eaves (1984) to offer an instrument expressly tailored to assess fitness to stand trial in
Canada according to its legislative definition. The 1984 version was subject to extensive
revision (Zapf and Roesch (2001); Roesch, Webster and Eaves (1994)) commencing in 1992
in response to Canada’s amendment of its Criminal Code (Criminal Code, RSC 1992, C-46)
and specifically its fitness provisions (s 2, Criminal Code, RSC 1992, C-46), and resulted in
the current version – the Fitness Interview Test-Revised (FIT-R) (Grisso (2003)).
The FIT-R is in the form of a brief semi-structured interview. It takes about half an hour
to complete. As with the IFI-R, the FIT-R’s key strength compared to other fitness
assessment instruments is its focus on the psycho-legal and psychopathological capacities
of the defendant. The three key areas examined by the FIT-R, derived directly from s 2 of
the Canadian Criminal Code, are:
1. The ability to understand the nature and object of the proceedings, or possess
adequate factual knowledge of the criminal procedure.
2. The ability to understand the possible consequences of the proceedings, or a
comprehension of the requisite personal involvement in and the significance of
the proceedings.
3. The ability to communicate with one’s legal representatives, or to sufficiently
participate in his or her defence.
Each of these three major areas is divided into various targeted questions that provide a
comprehensive overall evaluation of the aspects necessary to determine fitness to stand
trial.
The scoring system for the FIT-R employs a three-point scale ranging from 0 to 2. A
score of 0 indicates total or severe incapacity. A score of 1 indicates possible or moderate
incapacity. A score of 2 indicates negligible or nil incapacity.
Research suggests that the FIT-R exhibits high inter-rater reliability (Viljoen, Roesch
and Zapf (2002)), sound psychometric properties (Grisso (2003)), and high inter-examiner
agreement across assessment instruments (Zapf and Roesch (2005); Zapf and Roesch
(1997)). It has been specifically advocated for use as a screening tool (Zapf and Roesch
(1997)). However, Grisso (2003) has recommended that further research be undertaken in
relation to FIT-R’s construct validity.
708 [10.10.460]
Macarthur Structured Assessment of the Competencies of Criminal Defendants

[10.10.470] The MacArthur Structured Assessment of the Competencies of Criminal
Defendants (MacSAC-CD) (Hoge et al (1997); see also Poythress et al (2002)) was
designed, and is being offered, as a psycho-legal tool to be used solely for the purpose of
furthering empirical research efforts into adjudicative competence, rather than as a
forensic evaluation instrument per se. Its developers believe that the MacSAC-CD will
allow researchers to perform systematic studies sufficient to provide the requisite scientific
justification for pre-trial fitness assessments (Hoge et al (1997)).
The MacSAC-CD is the product of extensive research and is founded upon a
comprehensive legal theory of competence encompassing four key structural and content
areas:
First, the measures would be face valid and relate in an obvious way to aspects of
adjudicative competence implicated by Dusky. Second, separate measures would be
constructed to assess various competence-related abilities within each of the legal domains
described in Bonnie’s reanalysis. Third, all measures would involve standardized
administration and criterion-based scoring. Finally, with respect to assessing the ‘factual
understanding’ criterion articulated in Dusky, the relevant measures would evaluate a
defendant’s capacity to comprehend relevant legal information, not merely his or her
current knowledge.
See Poythress et al (2002, p 57).

Consistently with this construct, the assessable items focus upon the defendant’s
capacity in various areas as related to his or her competence in assisting counsel and in
decision-making.
• Component 1: Competence to assist counsel – the minimum conditions legally required
to reasonably participate in one’s own defence:
1. The capacity to understand the charges, the nature and the purpose of criminal
prosecution, and the basic elements of the adversary system.
2. The capacity to convey relevant information to one’s own counsel concerning
the facts of the case.
3. The capacity to appreciate one’s situation as a defendant in a criminal
prosecution (see Bonnie (1993)).
• Component 2: Decisional competence – the capacity to make important decisions and
comprehend legal issues that may arise during a criminal trial, such as:
1. The capacity to understand information relevant to the specific decision in
issue.
2. The capacity to weigh and consider information to reach a decision.
3. The capacity to appreciate one’s situation as a defendant confronted with a
specific legal decision.
4. The capacity to choose and to express a choice among alternatives (see
Appelbaum and Grisso (1988)).
Macarthur Competence Assessment Tool – Criminal Adjudication

[10.10.480] The MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool – Criminal Adjudication
(MacCAT-CA) was developed by Bonnie et al (1996) as part of the MacArthur Network on
Mental Health and the Law project (see also Hoge et al (1999); Otto et al (1998); Hoge et al
(1997)). The MacCAT-CA is a condensed version of the MacSAC-CD, with aspects derived
from various research instruments. It was generated via psychometric item reduction,
with a conscious focus on duration of testing and necessary legal face and content validity
(Hoge et al (1997)) to address problems in these areas identified in the original scale
(Melton et al (1997)). Like the MacSAC-CD, the MacCAT-CA is currently only intended
[10.10.480] 709
and available for use as a research device. It has shown promising results in assessing
impairments in capacity of persons with schizophrenia (see Wang et al (2017)).
The MacCAT-CA consists of 22 items designed to evaluate three key functional fitness
related capacities: understanding, reasoning and appreciation. The foundation for the
assessment is a hypothetical scenario in which two men are involved in a fight, one of
whom is later charged with a criminal offence as a result. Specific questioning about this
situation then gauges the defendant’s legal competence. The first eight items evaluate the
defendant’s understanding of the legal system generally. The next eight items address the
defendant’s reasoning skills by requiring the defendant to decide which of two disclosed
facts would be most relevant to the case. The final six items analyse the defendant’s
understanding and appreciation of his or her own circumstances. The instrument takes
approximately 30 to 45 minutes to administer and does not require extensive legal
knowledge or an inpatient setting to administer: Schreiber et al (1987); Grisso (1986).
It would seem that the developers’ hopes have been realised insofar as the revised
MacArthur instrument appears to have remedied deficiencies in the original scale (Otto et
al (1998)). Grisso (2003) has commented favourably on the MacCAT-CA’s psychometric
properties, degree of administration standardisation, and inter-rater reliability. In a study
assessing the use of competency evaluation devices by Forensics Diplomates in the United
States, Lally (2003) found that of the 83% of participants who used fitness instruments, the
MacCAT-CA was the only specific fitness test recommended, with 56% of the participants
stating that the MacCAT-CA was their ‘test of choice’:
It is anticipated that the MacCAT-CA will provide legally relevant normative data that will
complement the more individualized data that forensic clinicians commonly gather
through social history inquiries, mental status examinations, and clinical interviews that
focus on case-specific details relevant to competence determinations.
(Hoge et al (1997, p 177).)
Assessment tools for specialised populations

[10.10.490] There have been increasing efforts to construct standardised assessment
instruments for application in specialised defendant populations, specifically among those
who are intellectually disabled and young – for example, the Competence Assessment for
Standing Trial for Defendants with Mental Retardation (CAST-MR) (Everington and
Luckasson (1992); Everington (1990)), which was obviously designed to assess the trial
competence of mentally retarded defendants. Preliminary research (Everington and Dunn
(1995)) suggested that the CAST-MR provided sound reliability and validity. Researchers
working in the field of adolescent fitness evaluations (McKee (1998); Cooper (1995);
Cowden and McKee (1995)) noted a negative correlation between offender age and degree
of fitness to stand trial (see also McGaha et al (2001); Grisso and Schwartz (2000);
Heilbrun, Hawk and Tate (1996); Sickmund (1994)).
The benefits and limitations of standardised assessments

[10.10.510] There is much debate in the clinical literature regarding the use of psychometric
testing in assessing fitness to stand trial – specifically, whether it should be used at all, in
preference to, or in conjunction with clinical evaluation, and associated discussion
concerning the advantages and limitations of these assessment measures. The following
observations do not provide a comprehensive picture of these issues, but are intended to
offer a snapshot of the main areas of interest and contention.
Some commentators are firmly of the view that psychometric testing in relation to
questions of fitness to stand trial should become the norm (see, eg, Chantler and Heseltine
(2007)). A common criticism made of unaided clinical evaluation of fitness without the
support of standardised measures relates to the absence of an adequate legal focus.
710 [10.10.490]
Frequently, psychiatrists, or other mental health assessors, will improperly equate a

clinical diagnosis of psychosis, for example, with a conclusion of unfitness and vice versa
(Robbins, Waters and Herbert (1997); Melton et al (1997); Nicholson, Briggs and Robertson
(1988); see generally Roesch and Golding (1980); Chiswick (1978); cf Heilbrun and Collins
(1995)), or simply assess traditionally psychiatric status issues without factoring the more
significant functional capacity aspects (Chantler and Heseltine (2007); Roesch et al (2004)).
Alternatively, they will mistake the elements of another legal concept, such as insanity,
with fitness to be tried. Finally, they may record their clinical diagnosis as to the
defendant’s psychiatric status, but fail to make any observations about how that condition
may impair fitness, if at all (Robbins, Waters and Herbert (1997); Larkin and Collins
(1989)).
It would appear that there is, at minimum, strong support for the use of psychometric
tools for the discrete and limited purpose of a preliminary screening measure. In one
study, Zapf and Roesch (1997) have asserted that 82% of those referred for fitness
evaluations could have been efficiently and accurately screened out in advance of a more
costly and time-consuming comprehensive fitness evaluation as they were obviously fit to
stand trial. However, the preponderance of criticisms surrounding standardised testing
measures developed to date indicate that the implementation of psychometric assessments
as the norm may be a long time coming, if at all.
At the outset, there has been extensive debate as to whether or not so-called
psychometric tools can truly be considered ‘standardised’ measures. The question arises
because these devices typically employ a generalised abstract concept of fitness to stand
trial, rather than assessing fitness in a context-specific manner. Empirical research
consistently demonstrates that an individual’s competencies in one area of functioning are
generally not equally comparable in other areas of their functioning (Grisso et al (1995);
Bonnie (1992); Golding and Roesch (1988)). As a result, a defendant may meet the fitness
criteria for certain aspects of a trial, but not others (Grisso (1988; 1986); Bennett and
Sullwold (1984)). Therefore, some argue (see, eg, Roesch et al (2004); Birgden and
Thomson (1999); Melton et al (1997); Freckelton (1996); Godinez v Moran 125 L Ed 2d 321;
113 S Ct 2680 (1993) per Blackmun J; Bukatman, Foy and DeGrazia (1971)) that fitness
evaluations must be properly considered in view of the actual demands of functional
capacity placed upon the defendant in the particular circumstances of the case; the
pertinent facts, the nature of the litigation, the witnesses to be called, the decisions to be
made by the defendant, the participation required of the defendant, and so on, which
features psychometric instruments generally do not capture. On the other hand, some see
no need for this contextualised approach, and indeed, as Hoge et al (1997, p 148) have
noted, in the United States context at least, ‘the legal system’s expectations regarding
competence are … not tied to the unique features of the defendant’s case’ (see also R v
Whittle [1994] 2 SCR 914; Godinez v Moran 125 L Ed 2d 321; 113 S Ct 2680 (1993); cf
Blackmun J’s dissent in Godinez and Perlin (1996)). Whichever approach is advocated, the
open-textured, contextualised nature of fitness clearly makes the creation of a valid
standardised assessment instrument extremely complicated and perhaps impossible
(Birgden and Thomson (1999)).
It is also questionable whether psychometric tools developed for and normed in one
jurisdiction might be suitably used in other jurisdictions, and particularly within
Australia, given the cultural discrepancies (Scott (2007)) and different legal definitions
underpinning the devices (Scott (2007); Birgden and Thomson (1999)). However, Chantler
and Heseltine (2007, p 5) have suggested that:
While there are some differences between the United States, Canadian and South
Australian legal definitions of fitness [for example], the underlying assumption of these
three jurisdictions is that the defendant must understand the nature of the proceedings,
and be able to instruct counsel. It would then follow that assessments of fitness, including
[10.10.510] 711
psychometric assessments, may be potentially employed across jurisdictions without

significant compromises to reliability and validity.
Other criticisms made in respect of standardised instruments for assessing fitness to stand
trial include general concerns over inadequate validity and reliability data, the lack of
sufficient systematic research, the occurrence of high rates of false positives, inadequate
guidance for scoring, allegations of legalistic idealism and paternalism, and the use of
small sample sizes in preparing the instruments (Birgden and Thomson (1999)). Many of
these issues are a direct result of the practical limitations imposed on researchers in
attempting to study fitness evaluation practices in that it is difficult to secure an
adequately large sample population because the majority of defendants are fit (Golding,
Roesch and Schreiber (1984)).
Finally, ‘[b]ecause the court has a requirement to weigh the evidence, it is likely that an
instrument will never be acceptable to the court to replace clinically-acquired expert
evidence’ (Jager (2000, p 229)). It is in view of this information that Hoge et al (1997, p 175)
have conceded that ‘a purely objective test for competence determination is neither
possible nor desirable’.
In addition to debate over the most appropriate means of conducting fitness
evaluations for legal purposes and a general desire for as much consistency in this regard
as possible, it is essential that there be clear and cohesive guidelines employed regarding
expert reports tendered on this issue. Jager (2000, p 228) has summarised the function of
such reporting when he stated that ‘[i]t is important to note that the concept of fitness to
stand trial is a legal construct … Reports of any kind are merely opinions that the judge
takes into consideration and the court is entrusted with the ultimate decision’ (emphasis
added). In this light, Melton et al (1997, p 129) have recommended that ‘[c]linicians should
avoid offering conclusions about [fitness], or if the court orders otherwise, should couch
their conclusions in cautious terms’ (see also Birgden and Thomson (1999); Bonnie (1993);
Morse (1978)). Clearly enunciated guidelines such as these would help address the
problems associated with ‘unstandardised reports’ and clearly enunciate acceptable
practice concerning clinicians drawing conclusions on the ultimate issue (of fitness) being
tried, which occurs frequently and is of questionable propriety (Robbins et al (1997)).
In conclusion, it may be that the ‘gold standard’ for fitness assessments should have
the following characteristics:
• Upon a question of fitness being raised, the defendant would be referred for a
preliminary evaluation in which a psychometric instrument would be used as a
baseline screening tool.
• Any defendant flagged as potentially unfit during this phase would be referred to an
appropriately qualified and experienced mental health practitioner or team of
practitioners to undergo a comprehensive forensic assessment of competence in view of
the stringent legislative definition and drawing from the knowledge and expertise of
the defendant’s lawyers 2 where necessary.
• The findings of the evaluation would be encapsulated in a standardised report to be
tendered to the court and supported by expert testimony as required, both of which
would stop short of any direct opinion about the ultimate issue to be tried: the question
of fitness.
• The court would weigh up all relevant evidence and make a determination of fitness
and disposition according to legislative guidelines.
2 Interestingly, Winick (1995; 1985) and Bonnie (1993; 1992) have gone so far as to suggest
that legal practitioners are in fact better equipped than mental health professionals to
accurately assess whether a defendant has the capacity to sufficiently participate in his or
her defence, given the facts of the particular case.
712 [10.10.510]
Consequences of fitness determinations

[10.10.530] Having received expert opinion on the issue of fitness, the court must
determine whether the defendant is legally fit to stand trial and, if not, what alternative
course should be taken. While this is the judiciary’s prerogative alone (see Miller and
Germain (1986); Freckelton (1996)), research demonstrates that the court almost invariably
accepts expert opinion on the question of fitness (Robertson et al (1997); Reich and Wells
(1985); see also Zapf et al (2004); cf Grisso (1986)) and recommended treatment and
disposition options (Wettstein and Mulvey (1988); Menzies, Jackson and Glasberg (1982);
Webster, Menzies and Jackson (1982)) and finds accordingly. While this may cause concern
over the apparent usurping of the judiciary’s role by psychiatric experts in relation to
determinations of fitness to stand trial (Winick (1995, p 620)), Jager (2000) suggests that
this is not so. Rather, he argues that the expert opinion is truly accurate and sustainable
and thereby consistent with the judge’s decision on the ultimate issue. Whichever
perspective may be correct, this issue certainly warrants attention in the fitness context,
particularly in light of the extremely deleterious consequences that may stem from a
determination of unfitness.
The requirement that a defendant must be fit to stand trial is in theory a protective
measure intended to promote fairness. However, it has in practice led to extreme and
often inequitable outcomes: Howitt (2002). The most common consequence of a
determination that the defendant is unfit to stand trial is indefinite incarceration in jail or
a secure hospital facility (R v Forrester (1982) 31 SASR 312 at 313 per Mitchell J), as it is
often erroneously assumed that mentally ill offenders pose a greater risk to society than
their non-impaired counterparts: Andrews and Bonta (2003):
Quarantined from the checks and balances of mental health legislation, patients
committed for fitness assessments were not uncommonly found to languish in hospital,
unable to be released because they remained unfit to stand trial. In many cases, these
accused persons stayed in hospital much longer than they would have remained in
custody had they been convicted on the original charge (Jager, 2000: 228; see also Miller
(2003)) and possibly indefinitely (Commonwealth of Australia (2006)) as a product of the
various civil and criminal commitment laws used to confine mentally disordered offenders.
On occasions, it may often be preferable for a defendant to proceed to trial while unfit,
rather than face the potential adverse risks inherent in raising the issue of fitness (Eastman
v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 1; [2000] HCA 29 per Gleeson CJ; Kesavarajah v The Queen
(1994) 181 CLR 230 per Deane and Dawson JJ). However, the ethical issues for lawyers
representing unfit defendants are highly problematic. Birgden and Thomson (1999, p 208)
have remarked of this conundrum that:
Although it is unjust for defendants with mental impairment to stand trial, the converse is
that the issue of fitness may not be raised for fear of indefinite sentence. This serves to
understate the presence of a mental impairment in a defendant resulting in the greater
likelihood that such a defendant will not be given a fair trial.
Concerns over these issues sparked much debate during the 1970s and 1980s (see, eg,
Roesch et al (1981)) and led to calls for clarification concerning:
• the purpose of conducting fitness assessments;
• the criteria for determining fitness; and
• ways of standardising fitness assessments (see too Jager (2000, p 228)).
However, progress in this regard has been slow.
While there have been improvements in Australia’s fitness legislation since 1996 (eg, in
South Australia, an unfit defendant cannot be detained and the trial adjourned for longer
than one year (s 269K(2) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1996 (SA)), significant
problems remain – not least of which being the increase in fitness issues being raised and
the corresponding shortfall in treatment options available to meet the growing demand:
[10.10.530] 713
Commonwealth of Australia (2006); see generally Chantler and Heseltine (2007). In

addition, issues in relation to discriminatory effects of fitness to stand trial legislation in
Western Australia have been the subject of international condemnation (see Freckelton and
Keyzer (2017)).
In conclusion, while there is obvious merit in the legal prerequisite that all defendants
be mentally and physically fit to participate in their own trial, it is apparent that the
consequences that may flow from raising questions of fitness may be severe not only for
the relevant defendant, but also for the broader community. This underscores the
significance of striving to ensure that expert assessments of fitness to stand trial and the
relevant court procedures and legislative mandates generally are consistent and accurate
and true to the objectives of the rule in principle and in practice.
714 [10.10.530]
Chapter 10.15
IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [10.15.01]
Eyewitness identification evidence
Eyewitness identification: general principles ................................................................... [10.15.40]
Expert evidence about the fallibilities of identification evidence ................................ [10.15.50]
Expert evidence: digiboard evidence ................................................................................. [10.15.55]
Expert evidence: United Kingdom authority ................................................................... [10.15.60]
Expert evidence: Australian authority ............................................................................... [10.15.70]
Expert evidence: Canadian authority ................................................................................ [10.15.80]
Expert evidence: United States authority ......................................................................... [10.15.90]
Evolution in the law ............................................................................................................. [10.15.100]
Voice identification: general principles ............................................................................. [10.15.130]
Expert evidence: Australian authority ............................................................................... [10.15.140]
Expert evidence: United Kingdom authority ................................................................... [10.15.150]
The uniform evidence provisions ....................................................................................... [10.15.160]
The future in Australia ......................................................................................................... [10.15.170]
‘We succeed only as we identify in life, or in war, or in

anything else, a single overriding objective, and make all
other considerations bend to that one objective.’
Dwight D Eisenhower, Speech (2 April 1957).
Introduction
[10.15.01] Courts in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States of
America have acknowledged that particular risks of error attach to the identification
process, whether it is in the form of eyewitness identification or voice identification. In the
1967 decision of United States v Wade 388 US 218 at 228 (1967), for instance, the United
States Supreme Court observed: ‘The vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-
known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.’ To a
similar effect, Brennan J in Watkins v Sowders 449 US 341 at 352 (1981) noted: ‘There is
almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points a
finger at the defendant, and says “That’s the one!”.’ As the Supreme Court of the United
States observed in Perry v New Hampshire 132 S Ct 716 at 728 (2012), ‘We do not doubt
either the importance or the fallibility of eyewitness identification.’ This has led to the
evolution of complex jurisprudence, as to both the processes which must be adhered to in
police-assisted identification of suspects and expert evidence as to the risks and fallibilities
of identification.
Empirical evidence has demonstrated a high incidence of mistaken eyewitness
identification (see Kapardis (2014); Brewer, Weber and Semmler (2005)), leading the
Innocence Project to assert:
Eyewitness misidentification is the greatest contributing factor to wrongful convictions
proven by DNA testing, playing a role in more than 70% of convictions overturned
through DNA testing nationwide.
…
Research illustrates that the human mind is not like a tape recorder; we neither record
events exactly as we see them, nor recall them like a tape that has been rewound. In
eyewitness identifications, witness memory is impacted by a variety of factors that occur
from the time of the crime onwards, and their memories can be easily contaminated.
(See Innocence Project: https://www.innocenceproject.org/in-focus-eyewitness-

misidentification/ (viewed 1 September 2019).)
[10.15.01] 715
In Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [10], the court
asked:
What, then, are ‘the dangers of convicting on [identification] evidence’? The basal
proposition is that there have been significant miscarriages of justice where an honest and
confident identification witness has given evidence which is not accurate, and that the
potential for such a miscarriage is a risk in most or many identification cases. Neither the
witness’ honesty nor the witness’ confidence guarantees the reliability of the evidence.
It has been held that aural identification evidence is even more risky than visual
identification evidence (see R v Chenia [2003] 2 Cr App R 6; [2002] EWCA Crim 2345 at
[100] per Clarke J).
However, in Australia and the United Kingdom, for the most part, although the
principles on the basis of which eyewitness identification should be excluded have been
influenced by the work of experimental psychologists, expert evidence from such
professionals about the risks of identification in particular circumstances before courts has
generally not been permitted or encouraged. In the United States, a number of decisions
since United States v Downing 753 F 2d 1224 (3rd Cir 1985) have permitted such evidence,
provided it is reliable within the terms of Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US
579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993) and is a good ‘fit’ with the facts in question. However, it is still
comparatively rare for such evidence to be admitted.
In Australia and the United Kingdom, expert evidence has been permitted on a
number of occasions in respect of voice identification. However, the status of such
evidence as a field of expertise remains somewhat uncertain, rendering the evidence
vulnerable to being excluded as more prejudicial than probative.
This chapter reviews the case law relevant to the admissibility of expert evidence in
relation to both visual and aural identification.
Eyewitness identification evidence
Eyewitness identification: general principles

[10.15.40] Courts have long accepted that there is a tendency for jurors to accept
eyewitness identification ‘too readily’ and that there is a risk of prejudice arising from the
difficulty of assessing identification evidence (R v Theos [1996] VSC 48 at [91] per Smith J;
see too Barry (1938)). Smith J has observed that ‘identification is a complex mental process
and conventional courtroom testing methods do not work satisfactorily’ (R v Theos [1996]
VSC 48 at [91]; see too Devlin (1976, para 4.25); Australian Law Reform Commission (1986,
Vol 1, para 426)). As the Devlin Committee Report pointed out (at paras 1.24 and 4.25),
cross-examination has been found to be a tool of limited usefulness in testing a witness’s
ability to recognise faces, and demeanour is not a useful guide to accuracy in such a case.
A danger is that evidence which is inaccurate may be apparently convincing and that it
will be difficult to test whether it is as accurate as it seems. Thus, there needs to be a
warning that an honest witness may be mistaken, and that an honest but mistaken witness
may be convincing: Kelleher v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 534 at 550–551 per Gibbs CJ; R v
Turnbull [1977] QB 224; Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; [2001] HCA 72 at [166] per
Kirby J, at [218] per Hayne J; Longman v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 79 at 108 per McHugh J
(dealing with honest but mistaken recollection generally). In addition, there is the related
danger, which should also often be the subject of warning, that identification evidence is
highly vulnerable to suggestion: Davies v The King (1937) 57 CLR 170 at 181–182; Festa at
[22] and [26] per Gleeson CJ, at [78] and [81] per McHugh J. This vulnerability takes a
number of forms, including the possibility that a witness will pick out someone from
photographs, or from a group of persons selected by the police, because he or she expects
the group to contain the offender, and the possibility that a person may substitute in the
person’s memory an image of someone seen elsewhere (possibly in photographs selected
716 [10.15.40]
Identification evidence | CH 10.15
or a parade organised by the police) for a hazy recollection of an offender: Winmar v

Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [13]. Further, a person’s ability
to observe another person or event may be very limited in the circumstances of a
particular offence, requiring a warning on occasions that there is a danger that a witness
may not have had (or did not have) an adequate opportunity to make observations
sufficient to enable them to identify anyone.
For the most part, visual identification evidence is adduced in trials without expert
commentary or assistance, reliance being placed upon cross-examination of eyewitnesses,
addresses by counsel, and judicial warnings about the risks attaching to the evidence.
However, in recognition of the many fallibilities of such evidence, substantial amounts of
case law have evolved to guide courts in their use of such evidence.
The proper method of procuring evidence of eyewitness identification has been held to
be by a properly conducted ‘identification parade’ (see R v Hallam (1985) 42 SASR 126 at
130 per King CJ; Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; [2001] HCA 72 at [163] per Kirby J).
The High Court of Australia in Davies v The King (1937) 57 CLR 170 at 182 held that:
[I]f a witness whose previous knowledge of the accused man has not made him familiar
with his appearance has been shown the accused alone as a suspect and has on that
occasion first identified him, the liability to mistake is so increased as to make it unsafe to
convict the accused unless his identity is further proved by other evidence direct or
circumstantial.
(See too R v Simmonds (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 29 October 1992);
R v Ormsby [1985] 1 NZLR 3; R v Theos [1996] VSC 48 at [69].)
Of all forms of identification evidence, one of the most dangerous is the ‘court
identification’ or ‘dock identification’ because it tends to be performed in circumstances
that strongly suggest the answer that is ultimately given. It was held by Mason J in
Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395 at 426–427 that such identification is ‘of little
probative value’.
Gibbs CJ at 402–403 in the same case held that:
The authorities support the conclusion that … as a matter of law, evidence of an
identification made out of court by the use of photographs produced by the police is
admissible. However, a trial judge has a discretion to exclude any evidence if the strict
rules of admissibility operate unfairly against the accused. It would be right to exercise
that discretion in any case in which the judge was of the opinion that the evidence had
little weight but was likely to be gravely prejudicial to the accused.
Gleeson CJ observed in Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; [2001] HCA 72 at [22] that
the relevant risks in identification from photographs arise from ‘the inherent risk of error
associated with suggestibility, and what is sometimes also called the displacement effect’.
He also noted the ‘rogues’ gallery effect’ which comes about because of the impression
that the suspect has a criminal history (see also Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395
at 412 per Stephen J).
In Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007] WASCA 244 at [12], a five
judge Court of Criminal Appeal in Western Australia acknowledged that:
The danger … is that evidence which is inaccurate may be apparently convincing and that
it will be difficult to test whether it is as accurate as it seems. The danger which must be
warned against in every case, therefore, is the danger that an honest witness may be
mistaken, and that an honest but mistaken witness may be convincing …
The court observed (at [13]) that there is a ‘related danger which authority suggests
should be the subject of a general warning about the potential unreliability of
identification evidence, at least in any case where there is any factual basis for concern
that the danger may be present. It is the vulnerability of identification evidence to
suggestion’. The court noted that this can take a number of forms, ‘including a possibility
[10.15.40] 717
that a witness will pick out someone from photographs, or from a group of persons
selected by the police, because he or she expects the group to contain the offender, and the
possibility that a person may substitute in the person’s memory an image of someone seen
elsewhere (possibly in photographs selected or a parade organised by the police) for a
hazy recollection of an offender’ (at [13]). Finally, it found (at [14]) that ‘a person’s ability
to observe an offender may be very limited in the circumstances of a particular offence,
and the dangers of which a jury must be warned include, where appropriate, the danger
that the witness will simply have not had an adequate opportunity to observe, so as to be
able to identify anyone’.
Taking into account that the facts in Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555, which
the court notes (at [7] is the leading authority in Australia concerning identification
evidence, are unlikely to recur, the court held (at 17]) that ‘[i]t is necessary therefore for
trial judges to be able to identify those matters which may reasonably be regarded as
undermining the reliability of identification evidence and about which a warning may be
required. It is obviously impossible to lay down a rule applicable to every case, as
circumstances are likely to vary’. It found (at [26]) that it can be appropriate to refer to
‘scientific works’ to determine the content of a warning.
The decision of the High Court in Alexander v The Queen (1981) 145 CLR 395 specifically
acknowledged risks in eyewitness identification arising from the ‘absence effect’, where
the accused is absent from the identification process (Gibbs CJ at 400, Stephen J at 409,
Mason J at 430 (Aickin J agreeing), Murphy J at 436); the ‘rogues’ gallery effect’, where by
reason of expression, circumstances or even information on what is worn by the
participants, an assumption that the perpetrator is present in the identification process is
likely to be drawn (Gibbs CJ at 400–401, Stephen J at 409, Mason J at 426 (Aickin J
agreeing), Murphy J at 436) and the ‘displacement effect’, where a person is identified in
an identification parade, having been seen on a photograph or photoboard (Stephen J at
409, Mason J at 426, Murphy J at 436). A risk exists in this regard when a witness is shown
only a photograph of the suspect, or only the suspect in person (see Davies v The King
(1937) 57 CLR 170).
Particular risks exist in relation to recognition evidence (see, eg, Spigelman CJ (Hulme
and Latham JJ agreeing) in Trudgett v The Queen (2008) 70 NSWLR 696; [2008] NSWCCA
62; Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555 at 561; R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224 at 228).
Recognition may be more reliable than identification of a stranger, but even when the
witness is purporting to recognise someone whom he or she knows, the jury should be
reminded that mistakes in recognition of close relatives and friends are sometimes made.
In Carr v The Queen (2000) 117 A Crim R 272; [2000] TASSC 183, Blow J, after reviewing R
v Boardman [1969] VR 151 and R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224, noted at [61]:
As Boardman and Turnbull illustrate, ‘recognition’ cases will often involve just as much
danger of mistaken identification as cases involving persons first seen at the times of their
alleged crimes. It would therefore be illogical to hold that a warning as to the dangers of
mistaken identification of the sort discussed in Domican need never be given in a
recognition case. Obviously, such a warning would be inappropriate when the witness is
familiar with the appearance of the accused and the circumstances of the recognition leave
little scope for any chance of a mistake. Whether such a warning is necessary in a
recognition case must depend on all the relevant circumstances, including the degree of
familiarity of the witness with the accused, the circumstances in which the accused was
previously seen by the witness or known to the witness, and the circumstances in which
the accused is alleged to have been seen by the witness at or about the time of the crime.
Similarly, in R v Cox (No 12) [2006] VSC 233 at [23], Kaye J considered the authorities on
the circumstances in which a warning will be required in relation to identification
evidence, and then made observations as to the potential for error in the case of
recognition evidence:
718 [10.15.40]
It is clear that similar errors may also occur where the witness is already acquainted with
the accused. The authorities on this question make it clear that, in a case such as this,
much depends upon the particular circumstances of the case, and upon the precise issues
which have been raised in the course of evidence. Notwithstanding that the witness
making the identification previously knew or had met the accused, a specific warning may
nevertheless need to be given to the jury if, on the issues raised in the case, there is a real
question as to the accuracy or reliability of the witness’s powers of observation,
recognition, or recall.
See R v Spero (2006) 13 VR 225; [2006] VSCA 58 at [28] per Redlich AJA; R v Turnbull [1977]
QB 224 at 228; see also Mills v Western Australia (2008) 189 A Crim R 411; [2008] WASCA
219.
Especial dangers are attendant upon dock identifications: Alexander v The Queen (1981)
145 CLR 395 at 399 per Gibbs J, 426–427 per Mason J; Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593;
[2001] HCA 72 at [18] per Gleeson CJ, [78] per McHugh J; Mills v Western Australia (2008)
189 A Crim R 411; [2008] WASCA 219 at [102]. Much depends on the particular
circumstances, but generally a warning of a jury is required: R v Saxon [1998] 1 VR 503 at
512–513; R v Evan (2006) 175 A Crim R 1; [2006] QCA 527 at [61].
Kirby J has noted too that one of the perils of identification evidence ‘is that it can often
reflect unconscious projection by the witness of what he or she wants or expects to see,
hear or otherwise perceive’ (Festa v The Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; [2001] HCA 72 at [160]).
He observed that this phenomenon is clearly established in relation to visual recognition
and may also apply to voice recognition (see also Bulejcik v The Queen (1996) 185 CLR 375
at 381–382).
Warnings are commonly given to juries in visual identification cases, the strength of
such warnings being contingent upon the importance of the identification evidence for the
prosecution case and the limitations to the identification evidence. Thus, it was held by the
High Court in Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555 at 565 that the adequacy of the
warning given to a jury by a trial judge is to be determined by reference to:
• the nature of the relationship between the witness and the person identified;
• the opportunity that the witness has to observe the person subsequently identified;
• the length of time between the incident and the identification; and
• the nature and circumstances of the first identification.
It has been held on a number of occasions in Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada and,
in particular, the United States that evidence may not be given by experimental
psychologists about the dangers of eyewitness identification and similar processes. In
particular, decided cases have been firm for the most part on the principle that expert
witnesses may not express opinions upon whether a particular witness is likely to have
correctly identified another person.
Expert evidence about the fallibilities of identification evidence

[10.15.50] Although for two decades substantial amounts of empirical research have been
conducted concerning the risks and limitations of identification evidence, in most
countries other than the United States, expert evidence is generally not admitted on the
issue. However, increasingly the research informs the content of judicial warnings and
sometimes admissibility decisions about identification itself.
The controversies surrounding the risks of eyewitness identification have arisen as a
result of a long series of studies: see, for instance, Yarmey and Kent (1980); Yarmey and
Jones (1983); Deffenbacher and Loftus (1982); Thomson (1982); Re (1983); Brigham and
Bothwell (1983); Lloyd-Bostock and Clifford (1983); Wells (1988); Doris (1990); Brewer,
Weber and Semmler (2005). It is clear that the fallibilities of identification processes are apt
not to be accurately appreciated by the ordinary person if unassisted, and that
[10.15.50] 719
non-psychologists consistently overestimate the extent to which research findings in

relation to eyewitness identification merely reinforce common knowledge (Yarmey and
Jones (1983)) – hence the wish to supply to jurors information which may enable them to
evaluate eyewitness testimony more effectively.
In his landmark work The Reliability of Evidence, Trankell (1972) provided a pointed
example of how easily identification can go awry. A lawyer caught a taxi during the peak
period to reach an appointment. Without warning, the car in front of his taxi stopped and
a door swung open. The lawyer saw an old man pushed out, or fall out, and lie in the
roadway. Only later did he discover to his surprise that his observations had been entirely
wrong. The old man was a pedestrian who had been run down – the lawyer had seen an
open door and a man in the roadway. His perceptual processes had completed the task
and made order out of the sequence of events. Such a rationalising process frequently
occurs where fragments of information are put through the senses.
In the early 1980s, Deffenbacher and Loftus administered a questionnaire to
Washington DC residents and students, about half of whom had served on juries. On the
basis of the answers to the questionnaire, the authors of the study suggested that ‘jurors’
intuitions might stand further edification regarding the vagaries of eyewitness behavior’
(1982, p 24) and argued that admission of expert evidence to educate jurors about the
perils of identification would be salutary. Brigham and Bothwell’s 1983 study was also
significant because of its finding that prospective jurors greatly overestimated the accuracy
of experimental witnesses. They concluded that the likelihood of finding 12 jurors who
were adequately informed about the reliability of eyewitness testimony was extremely
slim. Thomson (1982, pp 150ff) similarly argued that expert evidence could usefully serve
to remove misconceptions and make jurors aware of factors that influence the eyewitness:
see also Greene, Schooler and Loftus (1985, pp 219ff).
Brewer, Weber and Semmler (2005) usefully identified difficulties in identification
arising from:
• changed appearance of suspects;
• problems occurring by the absence of a significant component of appearance (eg, the
use of some component of disguise);
• age of witnesses;
• personality characteristics of witnesses;
• exposure duration;
• viewing conditions;
• delay between event and identification – the retention interval;
• the effects of the crime;
• the effects of intervening experiences (including verbal overshadowing, memory
transference, repeated retrieval, context reinstatement, and effluxion of time); and
• distorting effects of the circumstances of some forms of identification (eg, poorly
constructed line-ups).
Expert evidence: digiboard evidence

[10.15.55] A form of eyewitness identification evidence is digiboard evidence, in which a
series of (usually 12) photographs that include an image of the suspect or accused person,
together with a number of ‘fillers’, is shown to a witness. This form of evidence is the
successor to photoboard evidence: Winmar v Western Australia (2007) 35 WAR 159; [2007]
WASCA 244.
720 [10.15.55]
Expert evidence: United Kingdom authority

[10.15.60] In the United Kingdom, the law is clear that expert evidence on eyewitness
identification is not admissible.
In Gage v Her Majesty’s Advocate [2011] HCJAC 40 (which was the subject of appeal on
other issues), Clerk LJ and Reed and Brodie LJJ ruled unequivocally that such evidence is
inadmissible on the basis that ‘questions of credibility and reliability are pre-eminently
matters for the tribunal of fact’ (at [21]): such evidence is not admitted ‘merely’ because it
might be useful to the jury; it must be ‘necessary for the proper resolution of the dispute’
(at [22], [25], applying R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80). They held that the
objections to such evidence are straightforward and, although eyewitness identification is
a source of identified risk of miscarriages of justice, the protections of cross-examination
and judges’ instructions are sufficient. They endorsed a concern of the Louisiana courts,
commenting too (at [32]):
Moreover, we are opposed to the admission of such evidence on other, more practical,
grounds. If evidence of this kind were to be admissible, it is a matter of certainty that the
defence would lead psychological evidence in most trials in which identification was an
issue, if only for fear that a failure to do so would lead to an Anderson appeal. Inevitably,
the Crown would lead psychological evidence in rebuttal. In the result, trials would be
considerably prolonged (cf R v Smith, 2000 116 A Crim R 1, Smart AJ at para 69 (New
South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal)). The focus of the trial would shift as the jury had
to adjudicate on the conflicting expert views and on the cogency of the research evidence
on which they were based. Expert evidence of that kind would of course be centred on the
weaknesses of identification evidence rather than on the factors that enhance its cogency
in any individual case. In our opinion, it would create a climate of disbelief … There
would be a serious risk that a juror who was impressed by an expert would be diverted
from his own duty to make a proper appraisal of the identification in question.
Expert evidence: Australian authority

[10.15.70] Australian law is consistent with that in the United Kingdom, but a little more
liberal. The most authoritative decision on the subject is that of Vincent J in R v Smith
[1987] VR 907. At trial, the accused sought to call a research psychologist (and lawyer),
Professor Don Thomson, to give evidence ‘as to the processes which are involved in
[eyewitness] identification and also as to research findings concerning the possible
problems which can arise in that imperfect process’ (at 907). Importantly, no attempt was
made to call expert evidence about the particular identification evidence in the case.
Vincent J considered a number of the United States authorities where, for the most part, at
the time appellate decisions had upheld trial decisions to exclude such evidence. He noted
(at 911) the concern that ‘by refined analysis of the processes involved in the reception,
retention, and repetition of information, substantial complexity will be introduced into the
conduct of a criminal trial without significantly increasing the reliability of fact finding by
juries’. He applied R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 and noted the
apprehension that juries could be confused by jargon and rendered less capable of
employing the common sense with which the law accepts they are endowed, if such
expert evidence were admitted.
He commented (at 911) that:
There are many persons in the community who possess acute powers of observation and
considerable ability to recall precisely what was observed, and accordingly whose
evidence may be very reliable, whilst there are clearly many others of whom this
statement could not be made.
It is doubtful in the extreme that expert evidence concerned with eyewitness
identification generally will assist a jury in determining whether or not it would be safe to
act upon the evidence of any particular eyewitness to any substantially greater extent than
that which could be achieved by a full and accurate instruction by a trial judge.
[10.15.70] 721
Vincent J concluded (at 911) that even if it were accepted that the fact-finding ability of a
jury could be enhanced by increased knowledge of the precise mechanisms which are
involved in the processes of information reception, retention and recall:
unless a sensible measure of control can be exercised to avoid what may become
unnecessary complexity, the very carefully constructed balance which has been established
in a criminal trial, and which rests upon the ability of members of the community at large
sitting as jurors to answer the question as to whether the Crown has established the guilt
of an accused person beyond reasonable doubt, could be significantly impaired.
He noted that it had not been possible for a lengthy period to adduce specialist evidence
about matters in respect of which the fact-finder otherwise was not able to come to a
proper determination of the issues. This incorporated, he held (at 912), ‘the manner in
which occurrences are perceived by ordinary persons or as to the way in which
information is processed or recalled by ordinary persons’.
An application for special leave to appeal to the High Court resulted in Deane,
Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ declining leave and observing (Smith v The
Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 588 at 588) that:
It has long been accepted in this country that evidence of the kind which the applicant
desired to lead is inadmissible. It is basic to the operation of the jury system that general
questions as to the credit and reliability of the evidence of witnesses, including the
reliability of identification evidence are, subject to special exceptions, matters which are
within the range of human experience which must be determined by the assessment of the
jury.
(See too Holdenson (1988).)

The issue was revisited in relation to the admissibility of such evidence under the
national evidence legislation in R v Smith (2000) 116 A Crim R 1; [2000] NSWCCA 388,
where an attempt was again made to adduce evidence from Professor Thomson as to the
potential inaccuracy of eyewitness evidence by way of fresh evidence on appeal. Smart AJ
for the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal observed (at [59]) that a factor to be
borne in mind, albeit not a factor that was decisive, was that:
the routine admission of expert evidence in cases where identification was the main issue
would lengthen the hearing of these cases and to some extent change the way in which
they are conducted. They would become more costly. It would not be a matter of simply
giving evidence of conclusions but the basis of those conclusions would require
examination.
Smart AJ also identified the difficulty in applying general considerations in respect of the
risks of expert evidence to the particular case. He concluded that the report of
Professor Thomson ‘does not capture the strength of the complainant’s evidence and his
purported application of stated general research conclusions to her and her evidence goes
further than is permissible’ (at [61]). He found that Professor Thomson, however, would
be able ‘to state the results of his research and the general state of learning and answer
questions based on assumptions’ (at [61]). However, Smart AJ emphasised that while
general considerations and research have their value, ‘they do not supplant the particular
inquiry and assessment that has to be made in each case’ (at [63]). The outcome in the case
before the Court of Criminal Appeal was a decision that the evidence of Professor Thomson,
if tendered at trial, would have needed to be excluded under s 135(c) of the Evidence Act
1995 (NSW) as its probative value would have been outweighed by the danger of the
evidence causing or resulting in an undue waste of time (at [69]):
The leading of such evidence by the appellant and the response to it by the Crown might
take a considerable time. The research would have to be investigated and evaluated and
tests may have to be conducted. Then attention would again have to be directed to the
critical question of the reliability of the identification in issue.
722 [10.15.70]
In 2012, the issue arose again before the Victorian Court of Appeal in Dupas v The Queen
(2012) 40 VR 182; [2012] VSCA 328 in the context of exclusion by a trial judge of expert
evidence by a psychologist, Dr Kemp. The defence had sought to adduce evidence from
the expert that the memories of eyewitnesses had been contaminated or otherwise
adversely affected by post-event information and as to the weaknesses of identification
evidence, the displacement effect, and the media misinformation effect insofar as each
affected the eyewitnesses’ reliability. The trial judge in R v Dupas (2011) 211 A Crim R 81;
[2011] VSC 180 had permitted Dr Kemp to give general evidence about exposure to
post-event information and its effect on memory, but had declined to permit him to give
specific evidence as to whether the circumstances of each witness were examples of the
dangers discussed in his general evidence. This generated a ground of appeal. The Court
of Appeal noted (at [281]–[282]) that:
The judge excluded Dr Kemp’s specific evidence because he could not express an opinion
as to the reliability of the individual identifications. He had not been provided with all of
the detail of how those identifications occurred, nor had he interviewed or observed any
of the witnesses. As he acknowledged in the case of each witness, he could not express an
opinion about the reliability of that witness’s identification, nor could he assess the
likelihood of the identification being unreliable.
The judge therefore concluded – correctly, in our view – that for Dr Kemp to have
commented upon the precise circumstances pertaining to each identification, or to have
expressed a view as to whether those circumstances gave rise to the risk of unreliability,
would have been tantamount to him expressing the opinion that the individual
identifications were unreliable. As we have said, the necessary foundation did not exist for
him to extrapolate from the research to the circumstances of each identification (about
which he was not fully informed) or to the individual witnesses (about whom he knew
very little).
It is apparent that the situation in Australia has evolved to some degree since the Victorian
decision in R v Smith [1987] VR 907. Expert evidence about general matters in respect of
the risks of eyewitness identification may be admissible. It will depend upon the
circumstances of the particular case and, for instance, the extent to which such evidence
would consume time and the extent to which such evidence is necessary or at least would
assist the tribunal of fact by reducing potential sources of error. However, it remains the
law in Australia that expert evidence about the particular risks of error in a particular
eyewitness identification will generally not be admissible.
Expert evidence: Canadian authority

[10.15.80] Canadian authority is generally consistent with the decision in R v Smith [1987]
VR 907 and Smith v The Queen (1990) 64 ALJR 588. Limited scope has been given to expert
evidence about eyewitness testimony, with a number of decisions declining to admit such
opinions. The issue has been controversial for over three decades, with the Law Reform
Commission of Canada in its 1983 study paper on Pretrial Eyewitness Identification
Procedures identifying that:
psychologists have shown that much of what one thinks one saw is really perpetual
filling-in. Contrary to the belief of most laymen, and indeed some judges, the signals
received by the sense organs and transmitted to the brain do not constitute photographic
representations of reality. The work of psychologists has shown that the process whereby
sensory stimuli are converted into conscious experience is prone to error, because it is
impossible for the brain to receive a total picture of any event. Since perception and
memory are selective processes, viewers are inclined to fill in perceived events with other
details, a process which enables them to create a logical sequence. The details people add
to their actual perception of an event are largely governed by past experience and
personal expectations. Thus the final recreation of the event in the observer’s mind may be
quite different from reality.
[10.15.80] 723
Witnesses are often completely unaware of the interpretive process whereby they fill in
the necessary but missing data. They will relate their testimony in good faith, and as
honestly as possible, without realizing the extent to which it has been distorted by their
cognitive interpretive processes. Thus, although most eyewitnesses are not dishonest, they
may nevertheless be grossly mistaken in their identification.
(Referred to in R v Miaponoose (1996) 30 OR (3d) 419.)

In R v Audy (No 2) (1977) 34 CCC (2d) 231, for instance, the defence sought to call a
psychologist to give evidence about the processes of perception and eyewitness
identification. It was argued that the expert evidence would be of assistance to jurors in
resolving what was conflicting eyewitness evidence. The Ontario Court of Appeal,
however, upheld the trial judge’s ruling that the jury would not be assisted by the
evidence as the psychologist, if permitted, would have offered views on the dangers of
identification evidence, an issue which was within the jury’s common knowledge and
basic to their task of assessing the evidence.
In R v Sophonow [1986] 2 WWR 481 at [50] (Man CA), too, Twaddle JA held that an
appeal should not be allowed on the basis of the wrongful exclusion of eyewitness
evidence by a psychologist and agreed that insofar as it would have related to the
credibility of Crown witnesses it was irrelevant, but accepted that the psychologist’s
evidence as to ‘unconscious transference’ may have been of utility in avoiding a risk of
error by the jury. O’Sullivan JA in the same case agreed (at [108]) that the credit of a
witnesses cannot be impeached or supported in general by expert evidence and that
evidence about memory becoming hazier with the passage of time should not be
admitted. However, he too (at [109]) concluded that in the particular circumstances of the
case ‘an expert might have been able to help the jury not to impeach the credibility of the
individual witnesses who saw the criminal but to impeach the trustworthiness of the
sketches and composite sketch drawn by the police officer’. Thus, the door was slightly
opened to expert evidence on the subject.
In R v McIntosh (1997) 35 OR (3d) 97; 117 CCC (3d) 385, the Ontario Court of Appeal
dealt with expert evidence about factors at the time of a robbery that might have impaired
the witnesses’ ability to make an accurate identification – the problem of cross-racial
identification, the quality of memory recall for perceived events over different time spans,
the influence of post-event information on memory, the validity of the photographic
line-up, the misconceptions of jurors with respect to photographic line-ups, the difficulties
with in-dock identifications, and police procedures relating to the identification of the two
accused persons. Without fully scrutinising the issue, Finlayson JA (for the court)
commented (at [14]):
[T]he courts are overly eager to abdicate their fact finding responsibilities to ‘experts’ in
the field of the behavioral sciences. We are too quick to say that a particular witness
possesses special knowledge and experience going beyond that of the trier of fact without
engaging in an analysis of the subject matter of that expertise. I do not want to be taken as
denigrating the integrity of Dr. Yarmey’s research or of his expertise in the field of
psychology, clearly one of the learned sciences, but simply because a person has lectured
and written extensively on a subject that is of interest to him or her does not constitute
him or her an expert for the purposes of testifying in a court of law on the subject of that
specialty. It seems to me that before we even get to the point of examining the witness’s
expertise, we must ask ourselves if the subject matter of his testimony admits of expert
testimony. Where is the evidence in this case that there is a recognized body of scientific
knowledge that defines rules of human behaviour affecting memory patterns such that
any expert in that field can evaluate the reliability of the identification made by a
particular witness in a given case?
In terms of the evidence which it was proposed that the expert give, he observed that it
principally related to warning the jury about ‘normal experience’ (at [20]) and commented
that to admit his evidence ‘may foster apprehension in the timorous juror and give him or
724 [10.15.80]
her an excuse for not discharging that juror’s duty to the community that he or she has
sworn to serve’. He preferred that the issues, such as they were with the identification
evidence, be addressed by the judge’s instructions to the jury. This approach was explicitly
endorsed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R v Frimpong 2013 ONCA 243 at [23]–[28] in
determining that an error had not been made by a trial judge in declining expert evidence
about ‘change blindness’ and ‘unconscious transference’ (see also R v Bagerow 2010 ONSC
937 in relation to expert evidence about voice identification evidence; R v Smith 1994
CanLII 2146 (BC CA)).
In R v Sheppard 2002 MBQB 99, Oliphant ACJ accepted a witness to be a properly
qualified expert on eyewitness identification and that there was no exclusionary rule per
se that precluded his evidence being admitted. However, he commented that it was the
requirement under R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402 that expert evidence
be ‘necessary’ that stood in the way in that case of such evidence being admitted, although
he conceded: ‘I want to make it clear that in my mind, at least, the issue as to the
admissibility of this type of evidence remains open where the trial of the accused is before
a judge and jury’ (at [46]). Mackenzie J of the Ontario Supreme Court took a similar
approach in R v Myrie (2003) 57 WCB (2d) 72, as did Glass J of the same court in R v
Maragh (2003) 59 WCB (2d) 126 at [9].
In R v Henderson [2009] 7 WWR 489, Sinclair J acknowledged that in Canada no
criminal court to that point had allowed expert evidence on eyewitness identification, but
observed (at [52]):
The great concern courts should have when it comes to eyewitness identification evidence
is in knowing when and how to place limits on what lay people believe and think they
know. It is interesting that we as judges feel we can give judicial direction to juries without
input from experts in the field. The view of Dr Loftus and others is that there are so many
mythological assumptions about the inherent reliability and strength of eyewitness
testimony that people tend to forget just how frail such evidence can be.
He found (at [53]–[54]) that the psychologists whose evidence was before him had the
appropriate credentials to give expert evidence on eyewitness identification and that on
some of the issues on which evidence was offered:
laypersons and therefore members of a jury would not just benefit from, but actually
require assistance. I speak of issues relating to commonly held myths, as well as such
things as the concept of unconscious transference, the effect of darkness on one’s ability to
distinguish detail such as facial characteristics and color, how alcohol impairment actually
affects eye muscle control, how stress specifically affects perception, how to detect and
understand possible bias in line-up procedures, particularly the concept of unconscious
cuing, the importance and impact of prior knowledge of, or contact with, the accused, on
eyewitnesses, and the nature and potential effect on eyewitnesses of specific types of
post-event information. Eyewitness identification is inherently frail, yet it can have an
overwhelming impact on jurors.
He broke new ground in Canada by permitting, albeit circumscribing, the proposed

evidence by the eyewitness identification expert (at [55]):
1. He will not be allowed to comment on the correctness or reliability of any
particular witness’ evidence.
2. He will not be allowed to speak to any of the factors at play on the night of the
offence other than through general comments in his proposed ‘mini-lectures’ and
through hypothetical questions.
3. Any hypothetical questions to be formulated must be in written form setting out
particular facts or factors and ending with a question such as this:
What assistance can you provide to the jury as to what considerations should
go into evaluating those factors?
[10.15.80] 725
4. I do not at this point see the need for him to have to sit through the testimony of any
of the witnesses. Because his evidence will be general in nature or hypothetical, this
is not necessary.
5. He will not be allowed to express an opinion on the validity or reliability or bias of
the actual photo pack line-up in this case, as that is an issue on which the jury will
receive specific instruction which should be sufficient. He will however be permitted
to testify about the issues that need to be assessed in weighing photo pack line-up
identifications generally.
In R v Lavallee (2011) SKQB 299, Gerein J noted the approach of Sinclair J in R v Henderson
but declined to apply it (at [18]–[20]):
[T]here is no need for the suggested witnesses. They would not be permitted to comment
on the credibility of the impugned witnesses or the accuracy of their testimony. Were they
to do so, they would be usurping the role of the jury.
The accused will be well able to pursue their defence. Cross-examination will expose
any frailties of the eyewitness identification and the weakness of memory and recall. The
jury members will bring their life experience and common sense to bear in assessing the
credibility and reliability of the impugned witnesses. That is the very role of a jury.
They will be assisted in their task by the submissions of counsel and the instructions of
the trial judge. Both will speak of the frailties of eyewitness identification and memory.
Both will speak of the need for caution. The result will be a full and meaningful answer
and defence. That being so, there is no need for the proposed expert witnesses.
For the present, therefore, the law in Canada, with the exception of the single judge
decision of Sinclair J in R v Henderson [2009] 7 WWR 489, is straightforward. There is little
scope for expert evidence as to eyewitness identification to be admitted.
Expert evidence: United States authority

[10.15.90] In the United States, the admissibility of expert evidence about eyewitness
identification has been disuniform although in a number of states a similar approach has
been adopted to that in the United Kingdom and Canada. An example is Pennsylvania,
where in Commonwealth v Simmons 541 Pa 211; 662 A 2d 621 (1995) and Commonwealth v
Bormack 827 A 2d 503 (Pa Super 2003), it was held that expert testimony concerning
eyewitness identification was inadmissible, concerns being expressed that an expert giving
evidence on such matters would have an unwarranted appearance of authority in respect
of the eyewitness’s credibility, and that a defendant is not prejudiced by a preclusion on
expert evidence as the defendant remains free to attack an eyewitness’s credibility during
cross-examination and during closing arguments.
However, such an adverse stance has become an increasingly minority position in the
United States and pressures have built from many quarters in favour of more liberal
admission of expert evidence about the limitations and risks of eyewitness identification,
although doubts continue to be expressed by some about the advisability of ready
admission of expert evidence on the issue (see Preussel (2006)).
A number of decisions (see 46 ALR 4th 1047 (1986)) ruled that experimental findings
regarding eyewitness identification are not admissible on the basis that such evidence is
within the juror’s general sphere of competence: see, for example, Dyas v United States 376
A 2d 827 (1977); Nelson v State 362 So 2d 1017 (Fla 1978). In United States v Amaral 488 F 2d
1148 at 1153 (1973), for instance, the court held that expert evidence on the unreliability of
eyewitness identification in stressful situations is inadmissible because ‘counsel through
effective cross-examination would be able to present to the jury any inconsistencies or
deficiencies in the eyewitness testimony’. It found that the jury was ‘superbly equipped’ to
evaluate the impact of stress on the perception of the identification witness. The same
point was made slightly differently in the older case of United States v Rosenberg 108 F
Supp 798 (1952); aff’d 200 F 2d 666 (1952), where it was stated that it was ‘hornbook law’
that the credibility of a witness and the weight to be given to the witness’s testimony
726 [10.15.90]
rested exclusively with the jury. It was held that opinion evidence offered by a witness
who had neither observed the eyewitness while he testified nor ever seen him was
inadmissible. Such testimony has regularly been held to invade the jury’s province: see 46
ALR 4th 1055 (1988).
Similarly, in Hood v United States 73 L Ed 2d 1370; 102 Sup Ct 3489 (1982), it was held
on appeal that a trial judge had not been in error when he excluded testimony by an
expert which would have dealt generally with the problems of eyewitness identification. It
was said that to admit such evidence would ‘open the door’ to a barrage of marginally
relevant psychological evidence. Similarly, in United States v Langan 263 F 3d 613 at 621
(6th Cir, 2001) , it was observed that:
The use of expert testimony in regard to eyewitness identification is a recurring and
controversial subject. Trial courts have traditionally hesitated to admit expert testimony
purporting to identify flaws in eyewitness identification. Among the reasons given to
exclude such testimony are that the jury can decide the credibility issues itself, … that
experts in this area are not much help and largely offer rather obvious generalities, … that
trials would be prolonged by a battle of experts, … and that such testimony creates undue
opportunity for confusing and misleading the jury …
A way into limited expert evidence by experimental psychologists in the area was
suggested by Johnson v State 393 So 2d 1069 at 1071–1072 (Fla 1980):
The State asserts that the facts affecting the reliability of an eyewitness identification are
within the ordinary experience of jurors, that the conclusions to be drawn from the facts
affecting the reliability of an eyewitness should be left to the jury, and that expert opinion
should be excluded where the facts testified to are of a nature as not to require any special
knowledge or experience to form a conclusion.
This prompted Blau (1984, p 265) to the view that some role may still remain for
psychologists in the eyewitness area. This was the approach taken in State v Chapple 660 P
2d 1208 (Ariz 1983), where an appellate court held that expert eyewitness identification
evidence should not have been excluded in part because of the particular relevance of the
expert’s evidence about confidence and its relationship to accuracy and the evidence given
by the eyewitnesses. A year later, the court in People v McDonald 690 P 2d 709; 46 ALR 4th
1011 (1984) (cf, however, United States v Downing 753 F 2d 1224 (3rd Cir 1985))
concentrated on the utility of expert evidence about the perils of identification evidence in
disabusing jurors of misconceptions which they were likely to have harboured about the
processes: see also Scott v Sears 789 F 2d 1052 (4th Cir 1986). This decision is consistent
with the approach adopted by a number of courts in relation to the admissibility of
battered woman syndrome evidence and rape trauma syndrome evidence: see Ch 10.30.
By 1987, McCord in a leading article (1987, p 61) argued that the pendulum was
swinging in favour of admission:
Researchers have developed three insights specific to eyewitness identification testimony.
First, there appears to be no correlation between the accuracy of identification and the
confidence of the eyewitness in that identification. Second, while moderate stress on the
observer may sharpen perception, a sustained high level of stress causes a dramatic
decline in accuracy. Third, as a general rule persons are much less able to make accurate
identifications of members of other races than they are of members of their own race. …
Courts favoring such testimony believe that the testimony can help the jurors on
important issues where they may either be ignorant or hold affirmative misconceptions. 1
The objection that the testimony does not meet the jurisdiction’s special test for scientific
evidence has been overcome by a holding that the testimony is not ‘scientific’ or that the
testimony is sufficiently reliable, so that any objections concerning it go to its weight, not
its admissibility.
1 State v Chapple 660 P 2d 1208 at 1220–1232 (Ariz 1983); People v McDonald 690 P 2d 709 at
726; 46 ALR 4th 1011 (1984); People v Brooks 128 Misc 2d 608 at 618–620 (NY 1985).
[10.15.90] 727
(See People v McDonald 690 P 2d 709 at 724; 46 ALR 4th 1011 (1984).)
This proved to be prescient (see Conley and Moriarty (2011)), with many decisions
from United States v Downing 753 F 2d 1224 (3rd Cir 1985) permitting expert evidence
provided the indicia set out in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S
Ct 2786 (1993) were complied with and the evidence constitutes a good ‘fit’ with the
particular facts of the case. There remains the discretionary option for the trial judge to
exclude such evidence if it would be likely to overwhelm or mislead the jury. The court
permitted expert evidence on:
• the accuracy of cross-racial identifications by contrast to same-race identifications;
• the effect of ‘weapon focus’ on identifications;
• the effect of stress on identifications;
• the ‘forgetting curve’, namely the impact of time on the accuracy of memory;
• the ‘relation back’ phenomenon, whereby an initial identification may influence later
identifications and perceived memories of an event;
• the lack of correlation between the confidence a witness expresses in making an
identification and its accuracy;
• the suggestiveness in the circumstances of the way in which the ‘photo array’ was
conducted; and
• exposure duration.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Walker: A sign of the direction of United States law on

the subject is found in the influential decision of the Pennsylvania Court of Appeal in
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Walker 92 A 3d 766 (2014) (see Freckelton (2014c)).
The majority reviewed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s rejection of expert evidence
on eyewitness identification, observing that a key reason had been that expert opinions
had not been allowed to intrude upon the jury’s function of deciding credibility: ‘our cases
from the mid-1990s make clear that an unwarranted appearance of authority invading the
province of the jury’s credibility determination, and the existence of alternative means of
challenging the reliability of eyewitness testimony, serve as the basis for the current per se
ban on expert testimony in this area’ (at 781).
The majority took particularly into account that, since earlier key decisions, ‘20 years of
advances in scientific study have strongly suggested that eyewitnesses are apt to
erroneously identify a person as the perpetrator of a crime when certain factors are
present’ (at 781).
The majority accepted that expert testimony concerning the limitations and weaknesses
of eyewitness identification is firmly rooted in experimental foundation ‘derived from
decades of psychological research on human perception and memory’ (at 782). It
concluded that scientific research in relation to the area had advanced significantly since
the imposition of a ban on such testimony in Pennsylvania 20 years earlier. It found there
to be a clear trend nationally in relation to the admission of such testimony and noted that,
beginning with the Supreme Court of Arizona’s decision in State v Chapple 660 P 2d 1208
(Ariz 1983), courts in 44 states and the District of Columbia had permitted such testimony
at the discretion of the trial judge, and all federal circuits (with the possible exception of
the 11th Circuit) had embraced this approach.
The majority found (at 784) that expert testimony on psychological factors which may
impact upon eyewitness identification does not directly speak to whether a particular
witness is trustworthy or unreliable, as the expert is not rendering an opinion on whether
the specific witness is accurate in his or her identification:
Rather, such testimony teaches – it provides jurors with education by which they assess
for themselves the witness’s credibility. In light of demonstrated misconceptions that
jurors and other lay persons may possess regarding the infallibility of eyewitness
728 [10.15.90]
identification, and ideas contrary to ‘common sense’, such as the correlation between
certainty and accuracy, use of expert testimony in appropriate cases will permit jurors to
engage in the process of making credibility determinations with full awareness of
limitations that eyewitness testimony may present.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the view of the Supreme Court of Utah in State
v Clopten 223 P 3d 1103 at 1109 (2009) that:
expert testimony does not unfairly favor the defendant by making the jury skeptical of all
eyewitnesses. In fact, when a witness sees the perpetrator under favorable conditions,
expert testimony actually makes jurors more likely to convict. When expert testimony is
used correctly, the end result is a jury that is better able to reach a just decision.
The court accepted that a role for experts is to provide information which jurors can apply
to the facts, or, put another way, to ‘provide a background against which the jury could
assess various factors concerning eyewitness identification in the case. Consequently,
rather than inviting the jury to abdicate its responsibility, as asserted by the
Commonwealth, such expert testimony would merely assist the jury in understanding the
factors impacting eyewitness identification testimony’ (at 785). Thus, the majority
supported the approach in other United States courts in rejecting as a rationale for
precluding expert evidence that it would constitute an impermissible invasion of the jury’s
role in assessing credibility.
The majority accepted that cross-examination and advocacy in closing argument are
common methods to unearth falsehoods and challenge the veracity of a witness, but it
concluded that ‘it is less effective in educating the jury with respect to the fallibility of
eyewitness identification … especially … when cross-examining a neutral, credible and
confident witness before a jury, which may overestimate the veracity and reliability of
eyewitness identification’ (at 786). It classified such evidence as not going to credibility but
to educating the jury, ‘and if such factors are possibly not known or understood, or even
misunderstood by jurors, then the more effective way of educating the jury is not through
the eyewitness him or herself, but through the presentation of such testimony by an expert
when appropriate’ (at 786). It commented that in its view it was not legitimate to maintain
a preclusive rule based on equating common knowledge among jurors with a developed
understanding of the factors which potentially impact upon eyewitness identification.
The majority envisioned that expert testimony would be limited to ‘certain cases’. It
observed that such evidence needed to be relevant and also beyond the knowledge
possessed by the average layperson. It expressed the view that the impact of removing the
ban on expert testimony on eyewitness identification would be limited, and at the
discretion of the trial judge. It noted that the collective experience of other courts ‘appears
to be that the ability to proffer such testimony has not placed an undue burden on the
court system, either at trial, or on collateral review’ (at 788). It emphasised that its decision
to remove the ban was limited to ‘this one unique area of law, where … the case law from
other jurisdictions and the research is compelling’ (at 788).
The majority observed that factors concerning weapons focus; the reduced reliability of
identification in cross-racial identification cases; decreased accuracy in eyewitness
identifications in high stress/traumatic situations; the risk of mistaken identification when
police investigators do not warn a witness, prior to viewing a photo array or line up, that
the perpetrator may or may not be in the display; and the lack of correlation between
witness statements of confidence and witness accuracy – all constituted topics about
which the average juror may know little. This led it to conclude that ‘in light of
misconceptions ordinary individuals may possess regarding eyewitness testimony, and its
presumption of reliability, … as a general proposition, the particular area of expert
testimony at issue in this appeal may be beyond the ken of the average juror, and thus, as
a threshold matter, possibly subject to expert testimony’ (at 789). It found that such
testimony, when appropriate, can provide salutary educational value to the jurors in their
[10.15.90] 729
credibility-determining function. It found that expert evidence on the issue satisfied the
test in Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923) in that it was established that the
methodology of witnesses on eyewitness identification was generally accepted. In the
specific instance, it remitted the decision as to the particular testimony for determination
by the trial court.
The majority concluded that the expert evidence on eyewitness identification could be
highly relevant. It found no reason to conclude that the evidence would confuse jurors
and noted that it was the responsibility of the trial judge to control and limit the expert
evidence. It questioned that expert evidence in the case before it would be only nominally
valuable, as contended by the Commonwealth, as it was of the view that the expert
opinions could be probative and beneficial to the jury. However, it emphasised that it
would be up to trial judges to weigh admissibility on a case-by-case basis, first deciding
whether it satisfied the preponderance of opinion test in Frye and then evaluating whether
the evidence is properly tailored to the particular characteristics of the identification at
issue. It required that defendants establish explicitly the presence of factors, such as stress
or differences in race, as between the eyewitness and the defendant, which may be shown
to impair the accuracy of eyewitness identification in aspects which are (or to a degree
which is) beyond the common understanding of laypersons.
Castille CJ, though, filed an emphatic dissent, proclaiming that the majority opinion
accepted ‘dubious external literature and sources as settled “science”’, failed meaningfully
to justify its preference for institutionalising a requirement for costly and generic expert
testimony, and failed to provide adequate guidance to trial courts. His language was
strong (at 794):
Make no mistake about it, the effect of the no-record ‘scientific’ conclusion here will be to
ensure that some of the most brazen of criminals – perpetrators of stranger-upon-stranger
violent crime – will walk away scot-free, all because of the generic opinions of some
on-call social-scientific ‘expert’ on a matter that can be explored by ordinary trial means
(effective cross-examination and specific jury instruction) and decided by ordinary jurors
…
Evolution in the law

[10.15.100] A significant gap has opened between the law as to the admissibility of expert
evidence about eyewitness identification between the United States, exemplified by the
liberal 2014 decision by the majority in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision of
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Walker, and the position in the United Kingdom and
Canada. Australia straddles the two admissibility extremes with some measure of
preparedness to permit such evidence on the general issue, subject to how valuable the
evidence is in the particular case and the extent to which such evidence will consume
valuable trial time.
The contrast between the majority and dissenting positions in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court illustrates the extent to which the issue continues to divide judges,
jurisdictions and scholars (see, eg, Preussel (2006) for a useful summary of such views; see
also Cutler and Kovera (2011)) in respect of the role of expert evidence in eyewitness cases.
Generally, courts, save in the United States, will be very hesitant to permit experts to
commentate upon the likelihood that a particular eyewitness is mistaken in their
testimony or to express the view that their evidence is unreliable because such opinions
essentially constitute evidence as to credibility. There is a traditional inclination on the
part of courts to preclude this form of commentary upon whether other witnesses should
be believed.
Expert evidence that goes beyond general statements of risk and danger, based upon
knowledge derived from experiments, is of uncertain value. In principle, expert
perspectives on the risks of certain matters – such as weapons focus; the reduced
730 [10.15.100]
reliability of identification in cross-racial identification cases; decreased accuracy in

eyewitness identifications in high stress/traumatic situations; the risk of mistaken
identification when police investigators do not warn a witness, prior to viewing a photo
array or line up, that the perpetrator may or may not be in the display; and the lack of
correlation between witness statements of confidence and witness accuracy – have the
potential to be counterintuitive, to disabuse of myths and misconceptions and thereby to
enhance the quality of fact-finding. However, the concern in this regard is that such
opinions may generate a multiplicity of expert opinions without sufficient by way of better
reasoning processes on the part of triers of fact – they may introduce subtlety and greater
complexity into the evaluation process without sufficient enhancement of outcomes. In
fact, the issue is even more difficult – how jurors can and will integrate such information
into their decision-making, and whether it may induce them to be overly timorous and
therefore to decide too readily in favour of the accused, is not known. Further applied
research on this topic is required so as to assist judicial officers to determine when the
utility of such evidence is such as to outweigh its detriments or, put another way, when
they should exercise their discretion to admit such evidence.
Voice identification: general principles

[10.15.130] Recognition of a speaker by the sound of the speaker’s voice is a commonplace
human experience (see Bulejcik v The Queen (1996) 185 CLR 375 at 381 per Brennan CJ).
However, ‘[i]t is self evidently not a commonplace human experience to recognise a
speaker’s voice in a language other than that which one is otherwise familiar, and familiar
in the language in which the person is articulating’: Korgbara v The Queen (2007) 170 A
Crim R 568; [2007] NSWCCA 84 at [118] per Grove J.
In Korgbara v The Queen (2007) 170 A Crim R 568; [2007] NSWCCA 84, McColl JA and
James J observed that what is often described as ‘voice identification’ evidence from a
person familiar with the speaker’s voice is more properly described as ‘voice recognition’
evidence: see Ormerod (2001).
The problem of identification by voice recognition has principally arisen for the courts
by reference to the admissibility of evidence identifying a voice heard out of court. The
admissibility of such evidence has been held to depend not only on the witness’s
familiarity with the speaker’s voice or the distinctiveness of the speaker’s voice (see R v
Smith (1986) 7 NSWLR 444; R v Brownlowe (1986) 7 NSWLR 461 on the position at common
law; but R v Adler (2000) 52 NSWLR 451; [2000] NSWCCA 357 at [13]–[14]; Miller v The
Queen (2015) 252 A Crim R 486; [2015] NSWCCA 206 at [55] finding the requirement did
not survive the enactment of uniform evidence legislation), or the witness’s expertise, but
on factors such as the clarity with which the witness has been able to hear the speaker’s
voice and the time elapsing between the previous occasion on which the voice was heard
and the material occasion (see Bulejcik v The Queen (1996) 185 CLR 375 at 382–383).
In Australia’s first major decision on the subject, R v Smith [1984] 1 NSWLR 462 at 477,
O’Brien CJ of Cr D held that:
evidence of the voice of a person present at a crime as being the same as the voice of the
accused can only amount to positive identification where the witness is very familiar with
the voice before hearing it at the crime, or that the voice heard at the crime was very
distinctive, which means that the witness need not have heard the voice before the crime
but heard it as the voice of the accused for the first time after the crime and then noted it
to have the same very distinctive features as had the voice at the crime.
However, he distinguished visual features from verbal (at 478):

[I]t is necessary to realise, it seems to me, that whilst many of the features of a person
which are visually noticeable, such as age, height, size, colour of hair and eyes and the
[10.15.130] 731
numerous other physical characteristics of a particular human being are fairly readily
capable of description so as to give a reasonable reproduction in everyday vocabulary, the
features of a voice are not by any means as readily capable of verbal description. It may be
fairly said that the features of a voice beyond some very general characteristics do not at
all lend themselves to a verbal description any more than the features of a musical
cadence lend themselves to a verbal description. A person will readily recognize the voice
of a political figure heard regularly on the electronic media but he will be quite unable to
convey by words the impression of that voice to one who has not heard it, in the same
way as he would be unable to convey by words the impression of a melody to one who
has not heard that melody.
Beyond broad generalization, such as that the voice was male, Australian, not juvenile,
quite coarse, uneducated because the language used was ungrammatical, rather
high-pitched and so on, a witness would have in effect to resort to mimicry, if he
happened to be a competent mimic, in order to give any realistic impression of a voice. It
cannot, therefore, be expected of a witness who speaks of recognizing a voice that he will
normally be able to give any useful description of the voice.
He observed too (at 479) that:

Voices vary considerably according to the circumstances in which they are used and the
purposes for which they are used. The voice of a man speaking affectionately to a child
necessarily varies markedly from his voice if abusing a fellow motorist in an argument
between drivers on the road. Similarly, the voice of a man speaking in conversational
tones necessarily varies from his voice when used loudly and heatedly. So also there must
be a difference in the voice of a man as used in the course of a crime, especially a violent
crime, from his voice when normally used in a natural manner. This would be especially
so if he be a suspect asked to repeat words used in a violent crime and repeats them in a
constrained or even simulated manner.
These considerations led O’Brien CJ of Cr D to conclude that identification parades for

voice recognition have only ‘limited utility’ (at 479).
He held that for identification of a voice with which a person is not previously familiar
to be reliable, the law requires that:
the voice unlike the appearance of a person – must be found to have very distinctive
characteristics, … firstly because of the intrinsic qualities of the voice and secondly
because of the circumstances in which it was used so that the totality of the qualities of the
voice, both its intrinsic qualities and those brought out by its use in those circumstances,
make it readily recognisable to a witness who is not previously familiar with that voice.
(See R v Smith (1986) 7 NSWLR 444 at 450.)

In Bulejcik v The Queen (1996) 185 CLR 375 at 394–395, Toohey and Gaudron JJ
identified a range of considerations relevant to whether a proper comparison exercise is
feasible in the circumstances of a case:
Where a witness identifies a voice on the basis of having heard it before, the witness needs
to have heard a sufficient amount of the accused’s speech to be familiar with it because, in
saying that the voice at the crime scene is that of the accused, the witness is relying on his
or her memory of the accused’s voice. Where a witness identifies a voice on the basis of
having heard it subsequently, there should be something about the voice at the crime
scene to sufficiently embed it in the witness’s memory so as to enable him or her to say
that it is the same as a voice which he or she heard subsequently. The greater the distance
in time between when the two voices compared were heard, the greater the desirable
degree of familiarity or distinctiveness.
Where two voices are being heard side-by-side, as occurred in the present case, the
concern is not with familiarity or distinctiveness but with whether the quality and
quantity of the material is sufficient to enable a useful comparison to be made. …
As to the quality and quantity of the material being compared, clearly the greater the
amount of material, the greater the similarity in the circumstances in which the voices
were spoken or recorded and the greater the number of similar words used, the more
useful the comparison.
732 [10.15.130]
McHugh and Gummow JJ concluded that it was arguable that Smith had been wrongly
decided insofar as it held that evidence of voice identification is only admissible when the
witness is very familiar with the accused’s voice or when the voice is very distinctive.
They observed that visual identification evidence does not need to reach so high a
standard.
Brennan CJ, ultimately dissenting, held that evidence of identification by voice
recognition is ‘not a distinct category of evidence, though its probative value may
oftentimes be dubious and will vary according to the circumstances of each case’ (at 382).
He held that the test of admissibility must be one of degree and that the prescription of
particular conditions of admissibility was not supported by principle.
In R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287, Simpson J (with whom
Spigelman CJ and Sperling J relevantly agreed) held that an interpreter’s evidence about
different voices was admissible under s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) as the
interpreter fell into the category of being an ‘ad hoc expert’: see too R v Menzies [1982] 1
NZLR 40; [1982] NZCA 19 at 49; Carracher (1993). Simpson J also said that: ‘Voice
comparison is not necessarily a question for expert evidence, although it may be.’
Anderson and Steytler JJ in Nguyen v The Queen (2002) 26 WAR 59; [2002] WASCA 181 held
that voice recognition is not of itself an expert process. Anderson J referred (at [138]) to the
observation of Brennan CJ in Bulejcik (at 381) that: ‘Recognition of a speaker by the sound
of the speaker’s voice is a commonplace of human experience.’ A similar approach was
taken in R v Solomon (2005) 92 SASR 331; [2005] SASC 265 at [66], where Doyle CJ (with
Duggan and Sulan JJ agreeing) held that the jury in a voice comparison case did not
require expert evidence to assist it; it was a decision the jury was entitled to make
unaided, provided sufficient suitable material was available.
The law can be summarised as follows:
• Juries have been permitted to engage in voice comparison in relation to an accused man
who spoke accented English (Bulejcik v The Queen (1996) 185 CLR 375).
• Juries have been permitted to engage in voice comparison in relation to Vietnamese
calls admitted to be in the voice of the accused with other Vietnamese calls (Nguyen v
The Queen (2002) 26 WAR 59; [2002] WASCA 181).
• Jurors may be asked to compare voices of a different nationality or dialect speaking the
same language (Bulejcik per Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
• A jury has been allowed to undertake its comparison of Vietnamese calls without the
assistance of an expert (Nguyen per Anderson J).
• An interpreter has been allowed to compare a person’s voice in English with voices
speaking in Chinese (R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287).
• A police officer who has become familiar with the voice of a suspect during an
investigation has been permitted to give voice identification evidence (Tran v The Queen
[2016] VSCA 79; Kheir v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 308; [2014] VSCA 200).
• A police officer who had some familiarity with Arabic was found not to have the
necessary specialised knowledge to give evidence about whether a voice on tape was
that of a suspect but only whether it was the voice of an Australian speaking English
with a Lebanese accent, which is probably not an issue for expert opinion evidence
(Nasrallah v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA 188 at [46]).
Expert evidence: Australian authority

[10.15.140] Considerable controversy attends the admissibility of expert evidence about
voice analysis and voice identification evidence (see Carracher (1993); Ormerod (2001);
Ormerod (2002); Edmond, Martire and San Roque (2011)). A distinction has been drawn
between auditory phonetic analysis, which provides information principally about the
dialect or accent of the speaker, and quantitative acoustics analysis, which enables
[10.15.140] 733
examination of the difference in the acoustic properties in speech, depending on the

individual’s vocal tract, mouth and throat: see R v O’Doherty [2003] 1 Cr App R 5 at [16].
It is possible to discern five different approaches by which opinions upon voice
identification/recognition has been permitted:
• an orthodox expert opinion evidence approach;
• the ad hoc expert opinion evidence approach;
• the lay opinion evidence approach;
• expert evidence by a person who has made a scientific study of the area; and
• expert evidence regarding the reliability of comparisons made by other persons (see
Hodgson (2007)).
The expert opinion evidence approach: In R v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935, the test in
Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923) was applied in determining the admissibility
of voice identification evidence, with Street CJ (with whom Lee and Ash JJ agreed)
determining (at 941) that voice analysis had:
developed to the point where, although by no means one hundred per cent accurate, it can
properly and responsibly be used as an aid in the resolution of contests of identity … It is
clear that the question will always remain one of fact for a jury properly instructed and
duly warned about the dangers that may be inherent in the evidence, and in the scientific
processes involved in the particular case in hand. … This study has developed, in my
view, to the point where it can, and indeed should in appropriate cases, be made available
to tribunals of fact who are concerned with questions of identity of voices.
The Gilmore decision was followed in R v McHardie [1983] 2 NSWLR 733 at 753–763, where
Begg, Lee and Cantor JJ considered the admissibility of evidence of voice identification
from the same witness whose expertise had been the subject of the Gilmore decision. In
McHardie, the witness had used three methods of analysis of tape recordings – aural
identification, a Kay sonograph, and mathematical analysis of some features of the sound
spectograms – with a view to accurate conclusions as to their significance. After a detailed
consideration of the mathematical technique, the court held (at 763) that the expert
evidence was admissible.
In R v Harris (No 3) [1990] VR 310 (at 318), Ormiston J held that the practice relating to
visual identification should be applied to voice identification (see also R v Brownlowe
(1986) 7 NSWLR 461) with appropriate modifications, in particular trial judges being
recognised as having the discretion to exclude such evidence if it is prejudicial or unfair.
He observed that there are at least as many reasons to take precautions in relation to aural
identification evidence as in relation to visual identification evidence, noting too that there
are relatively few means of distinguishing voices (referring to evidence: intonation,
accentuation, the quality and duration of segmented sounds, speed, expressed or apparent
emotions, and dialect and socialect (pronunciation)). He noted (at 317–318) that the choice
of words or syntax may be another means of identifying a person, but that strictly they do
not relate to the characterisation of a voice.
Ormiston J held that voice recognition should not be regarded as a field of expertise
about which only experts could give evidence. He emphasised that it is the potential for a
jury to be irrationally impressed by identification evidence that should in appropriate
circumstances lead to the exclusion of voice recognition evidence (at 319).
Ormiston J concluded that United States courts had been less strict in their admission
of aural and visual identification evidence than had English and Australian courts, and
that there was no general rule in the United States that a witness must be shown to be
‘very familiar’ with the voice of the accused or that the voice must have been very
distinctive. Thus, he declined to follow Smith (at 319).
734 [10.15.140]
In determining ultimately to exclude the evidence of the expert, Ormiston J (at

321–322) had regard to the facts that:
• the expert in providing an identification in evidence would simply be reiterating her
earlier identification out-of-court;
• the expert’s familiarity with the relevant voices was limited, with some of it separated
in time by many months;
• the expert had not been supplied with unidentified unmarked tapes of a variety of
voices from which she could have sought to identify the voices of the accused men;
• the expert was well aware of the investigators’ suspicions as to the identities of the
voices;
• the expert did not listen to the tapes on her own, but rather in the company of police
investigators; and
• there was a real risk that after the expert had listened to the accused’s voice, her
impressions would be overlaid by what she had previously heard.
In Korgbara v The Queen (2007) 170 A Crim R 568; [2007] NSWCCA 84 at [74]–[76], McColl
and James JJA held that there is no prescriptive rule that voice comparison evidence
should only be admitted where supported by expert testimony, such a rule being
inconsistent with the statutory uniform evidence law scheme and also with common law
authority. In light of the divergence of views concerning the reliability of methods of
expert voice analysis, they affirmed (at [79]) that the test to be applied by a trial judge in
determining whether to admit expert evidence about voice comparison is whether the
quality and quantity of the material is sufficient to enable a useful comparison to be made.
The ad hoc expert evidence approach: On a significant number of occasions, evidence
has been called from police officers by way of ‘ad hoc expert evidence’ in the aftermath of
the decision of R v Menzies [1982] 1 NZLR 40; [1982] NZCA 19, where a police officer who
had listened to tapes ‘over and over again’ was accepted to have acquired a ‘special
expertise in their interpretation’. The view of Edmond, Martire and San Roque (2011) that
ad hoc evidence is not admissible under the uniform evidence legislation was rejected by
the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in Nasrallah v The Queen [2015] NSWCCA
188 at [21], applying R v Leung (1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287 at [40] and
Irani v The Queen (2008) 188 A Crim R 125; [2008] NSWCCA 217 at [14]. However, it is
apparent that such evidence will not be permitted in some scenarios. If there is a need for
a jury, for instance, to compare not just voices but also language and speech patterns, the
involvement of an ad hoc expert is likely to be more acceptable to a court determining
admissibility.
If a police officer’s view about the similarity between recordings and the speech of a
suspect or, alternatively, voice identification evidence is founded on material no different
from what is available to the court, it may well not be received for the reasons set out by
the High Court:
Because the witness’s assertion of identity was founded on material no different from the
material available to the jury from its own observation, the witness’s assertion that he
recognised the appellant is not evidence that could rationally affect the assessment by the
jury of the question we have identified. The fact that someone else has reached a
conclusion about the identity of the accused and the person in the picture does not
provide any logical basis for affecting the jury’s assessment of the probability of the
existence of that fact when the conclusion is based only on material that is not different in
any substantial way from what is available to the jury. The process of reasoning from one
fact (the depiction of a man in the security photographs) taken with another fact (the
observed appearance of the accused) to the conclusion (that one is the depiction of the
other) is neither assisted, nor hindered, by knowing that some other person has, or has
not, arrived at that conclusion. Indeed, if the assessment of probability is affected by that
[10.15.140] 735
knowledge, it is not by any process of reasoning, but by the decision-maker permitting

substitution of the view of another, for the decision-maker’s own conclusion.
(Smith v The Queen (2001) 206 CLR 650; [2001] HCA 50 at [11]; see also Nasrallah v The
Queen [2015] NSWCCA 188 at [42].)
The lay opinion approach: A third way in which voice recognition evidence (generally
from a police officer) has been allowed before courts (in Victoria and Tasmania) has been
by way of a lay opinion pursuant to s 78 of the uniform evidence legislation – not as
expert evidence. Although there is some controversy about it (see Lithgow City Council v
Jackson (2011) 244 CLR 352; [2011] HCA 36; Tasmania v Farhat [2017] TASSC 66 at [33]), s 78
substantially replicates the common law, providing that:
The opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion expressed by a person if:
(a) the opinion is based on what the person saw, heard or otherwise perceived about
a matter or event; and
(b) evidence of the opinion is necessary to obtain an adequate account or
understanding of the person’s perception of the matter or event.
In Kheir v The Queen (2014) 43 VR 308; [2014] VSCA 200 (Maxwell P, Redlich and
Beach JJA), the police informant at trial was permitted to give evidence as to his
identification of the accused man from various intercepted telephone conversations. He
gave evidence that he had listened to approximately 1,000 telephone calls ‘over and over
again’ and was able to attribute the various voices in the intercepts to the respective
accused. The Victorian Court of Appeal viewed the evidence as neither expert opinion
evidence nor ad hoc expert evidence, expressing reservations (at [68]) about R v Leung
(1999) 47 NSWLR 405; [1999] NSWCCA 287, but approached the issue by way of its being
lay evidence of the kind described by the High Court in Lithgow City Council v Jackson
(2011) 244 CLR 352; [2011] HCA 36 (at [45], [48]):
The common law permitted the reception of non-expert evidence where it was very
difficult for witnesses to convey what they had perceived about an event or condition
without using rolled-up summaries of lay opinion – impressions or inferences – either in
lieu of or in addition to whatever evidence of specific matters of primary fact they could
give about that event or condition. The usual examples are age, sobriety, speed, time,
distance, weather, handwriting, identity, bodily health and emotional state … [I]n many
cases, to endeavour to describe the primary facts underlying the inference may be
ineffective or misleading without stating the inference. The reason why it is very difficult
for the observer is that it is almost impossible to separate the inferences from the primary
facts on which they are based, and often very difficult to identify and recollect the primary
facts themselves.
…
The function of the law in relation to that category [s 78(b)] is to permit reception of an
opinion where the primary facts on which it is based are too evanescent to remember or
too complicated to be separately narrated … For that reason, s 78 permits the conclusion
to be stated: without it the evidence does not convey an adequate account or generate an
adequate understanding of the witness’s perception of the sobriety, age or emotional state
being observed.
The court observed (at [66]) that the case before it was not one in which an expert was
asked to give an opinion on facts provided for that purpose:
It is difficult to see how a scenario such as this one can be meaningfully distinguished
from one of long-held personal familiarity with an individual’s voice, such as might arise
out of a friendship or a long-term neighbourly acquaintance. It is not, we think, correct to
say that repeated exposure to the voice of a friend or neighbour makes a person an
‘expert’ in that voice.
The court admitted the evidence.
A differently constituted Court of Appeal took a similar approach in Tran v The Queen
[2016] VSCA 79 (Weinberg, Santamaria and McLeish JJA), permitting the evidence by an
736 [10.15.140]
interpreter with a master’s degree in applied linguistics, to give evidence about the
consistency of voices in transcripts to which she had listened. Ultimately, the court
accepted that the evidence of an interpreter was not led as expert evidence but as lay
opinion pursuant to s 78, and it concluded that there was no proper basis for the trial
judge to exclude the evidence pursuant to s 137.
In Tasmania v Farhat [2017] TASSC 66, Pearce J presided over a drug trafficking trial in
which a detective who had monitored and reviewed telephone transcripts asserted that he
was able to identify the voices of the accused men. Pearce J reviewed the different
Australian approaches on the issues and followed the Victorian approach, finding (as [34])
that:
Although Sgt Bishop referred to some specific matters which he said went to his
identification of the voices, ordinary human experience suggests that his opinion was
based on the perception of many matters which may be difficult or even impossible for
him to adequately convey, including for example tone, pitch and speed of speech, accent,
modulation, resonance, inflection, phrasing and the like.
He found no proper reason to exclude the evidence pursuant to s 137.
Expert evidence about voice identification: In principle, there is no impediment to
expert evidence critiquing or identifying limitations to the quality of voice identification
evidence, although it is significant that in R v Smith [1987] VR 907 Vincent J expressed
reservations about permitting the courts to become a forum for academic disputation
about the quality of eyewitness identification evidence. The same issue may well arise in
the context of voice identification evidence.
Expert evidence: United Kingdom authority

[10.15.150] It has been suggested in the United Kingdom that the risks of voice
identification evidence are more significant than in relation to visual identification
evidence, so warnings should be even more stringent (see R v Chenia [2003] 2 Cr App R 6;
[2002] EWCA Crim 2345 at [100] per Clarke J). Thus, it has been held on the facts of R v
Chenia [2003] 2 Cr App R 6; [2002] EWCA Crim 2345 at [107] that the jury should have
been warned that they should not compare one voice with another by comparing the
characteristics of each because of the dangers of doing so, in particular the similarity of
two brothers’ voices.
It is standard in the United Kingdom for a jury to be played the tape-recording of
speech the subject of voice analysis evidence: see, eg, R v Bentum (1989) 153 JP 538; R v
Chenia [2003] 2 Cr App R 6; [2002] EWCA Crim 2345 at [106]. Much reliance tends to be
placed upon judicial warnings.
In the important but problematic decision of R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161, the
Court of Appeal was required to consider the admissibility of expert evidence identifying
the voice on certain incriminating tapes as that of the defendant. Significantly, although he
made no reference to the test in Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923) or to
Australian or United States decisions on the subject generally, Bingham LJ recorded (at
165) that it was common ground that ‘voice identification is an expert field, ie, a field in
which evidence of opinion may be given by an appropriately qualified witness (ie, a
skilled witness who has carried out certain tests)’.
Oddly, the existence of such a field of expertise was not pressed by the defendant, in
spite of the fact that significant concessions were gained from the phonetician that a unit
in Germany under a respected director rejected his view that identification based on
auditory techniques alone could be reliable and that other Western European countries did
not receive such evidence. The phonetician agreed that there were only a handful of other
such experts, and they were in England, who shared his approach to voice identification.
He had published no material which would allow his methods to be tested or his results
checked. He had conducted no experiments or tests on the accuracy of his conclusions but,
[10.15.150] 737
despite all this, his view (at 165) was that ‘acoustic analysis itself called for interpretation’.
He agreed that voice identification was not an exact science and, while accepting that he
could be wrong, he believed that his conclusions were reliable and that acoustic analysis
was not an essential supplement to auditory identification techniques. In spite of all these
concessions, clearly to some degree influenced by the parties’ concessions, the appeal
proceeded on the basis that the phonetician’s field of endeavour was an expert area.
An important protection for cases in which voice identification evidence has been
adduced is the use of a ‘special warning to the jury’. This has become standard in England
and Wales: see R v Hersey [1998] Crim LR 281; R v Gummerson [1999] Crim LR 680; R v
Roberts [2000] Crim LR 183; note also R v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31; [2004] EWCA Crim
R 1344 at [43].
However, it has been held that while there ‘will undoubtedly be cases calling for the
assistance of an expert’, in others the issues will be within the competence of the jury (R v
Hersey [1998] Crim LR 281; [1997] EWCA Crim 3106).
In R v O’Doherty [2003] 1 Cr App R 5, the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal had reason
to reconsider the approach of the English Court of Appeal in R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R
161 (see also R v Medvedew (1978) 43 CCC (3d) 434), where such evidence was
controversially permitted. It held that no prosecution should be brought in Northern
Ireland based on voice identification given by an expert when the evidence was solely
confined to auditory analysis. It held that there should also be expert evidence of acoustic
analysis, including format analysis. However, it allowed for three exceptions to the
general rule:
• where the voices of a known group were being listened to and the issue was which
voice had spoken which words;
• where there were rare characteristics which rendered the speaker identifiable; and
• where the issue related to the accent or dialect of the speaker.
The court held (at [65]) that where a prosecution relied upon voice recognition, the jury
should be allowed to listen to the tape-recording on which the voice recognition was
based, assuming they had heard the accused person giving evidence, and a specific
warning should be given to the jury of the dangers of relying on their own untrained ears
when they did not have the training or equipment of an auditory or acoustic phonetician.
See also subscription service Ch 99.
The uniform evidence provisions

[10.15.160] The common law, at least in relation to visual identification evidence, has been
overtaken in most Australian jurisdictions by Pt 3.9 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), the
Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT). Both
visual and aural identification are forms of ‘identification evidence’.
‘Identification evidence’ is defined as evidence that is:
(a) an assertion by a person to the effect that a defendant was, or resembles (visually,
aurally or otherwise) a person who was, present at or near a place where:
(i) the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted was committed;
or
(ii) an act connected to that offence was done;
at or about the time at which the offence was committed or the act was done,
being an assertion that is based wholly or partly on what the person making the
assertion saw or heard at that place and time; or
(b) a report (whether oral or in writing) of such an assertion.
Under s 116(1), where a judge admits ‘identification evidence’, he or she is obliged to
inform the jury:
738 [10.15.160]
(a) that there is a special need for caution before accepting identification evidence;
and
(b) of the reasons for that need for caution, both generally and in the circumstances
of the case.
A s 165 warning about unreliable evidence is necessary where a party makes such a
request (see Korgbara v The Queen (2007) 170 A Crim R 568; [2007] NSWCCA 84 at [59]).
There are particular provisions where the evidence sought to be adduced is ‘visual
identification evidence’, which is defined by s 114(1) as:
identification evidence relating to an identification based wholly or partly on what a
person saw but does not include picture identification evidence.
The requirements are stipulated by s 114:
(2) Visual identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible unless:
(a) an identification parade that included the defendant was held before the
identification was made; or
(b) it would not have been reasonable to have held such a parade; or
(c) the defendant refused to take part in such a parade;
and the identification was made without the person who made it having been
intentionally influenced to identify the defendant.
(3) Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account by the court
determining whether it was reasonable to hold an identification parade, it is to take into
account:
(a) the kind of offence, and the gravity of the offence, concerned; and
(b) the importance of the evidence; and
(c) the practicality of holding an identification parade having regard, among other
things:
(i) if the defendant failed to cooperate in the conduct of the parade – to the
manner and extent of, and the reason (if any) for, the failure; and
(ii) in any case – to whether the identification was made at or about the time
of the commission of the offence; and
(d) the appropriateness of holding an identification parade having regard, among
other things, to the relationship (if any) between the defendant and the person
who made the identification.
There are special provisions which apply to ‘picture identification evidence’, which is
defined by s 115 as:
identification evidence relating to an identification made wholly or partly by the person
who made the identification examining pictures kept for the use of police officers.
(2) Picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible if the
pictures examined suggest that they are pictures of persons in police custody.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor
is not admissible if:
(a) when the pictures were examined, the defendant was in the custody of a police
officer of the police force investigating the commission of the offence with which
the defendant has been charged; and
(b) the picture of the defendant that was examined was made before the defendant
was taken into that police custody.
(4) Subsection (3) does not apply if:
(a) the defendant’s appearance had changed significantly between the time when the
offence was committed and the time when the defendant was taken into that
custody; or
(b) it was not reasonably practicable to make a picture of the defendant after the
defendant was taken into that custody.
[10.15.160] 739
(5) Picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is not admissible if, when
the pictures were examined, the defendant was in the custody of a police officer of the
police force investigating the commission of the offence with which the defendant has
been charged, unless:
(a) the defendant refused to take part in an identification parade; or
(b) the defendant’s appearance had changed significantly between the time when the
offence was committed and the time when the defendant was taken into that
custody; or
(c) it would not have been reasonable to have held an identification parade that
included the defendant.
(6) Subsections 114(3), (4), (5) and (6) apply in determining, for the purposes of
subsection (5)(c) of this section, whether it would have been reasonable to have held an
identification parade.
(7) If picture identification evidence adduced by the prosecutor is admitted into
evidence, the judge must, on the request of the defendant:
(a) if the picture of the defendant was made after the defendant was taken into that
custody – inform the jury that the picture was made after the defendant was
taken into that custody; or
(b) otherwise – warn the jury that they must not assume that the defendant has a
criminal record or has previously been charged with an offence.
Significant case law has evolved in relation to the admissibility of expert evidence by both
police and interpreters. Significant latitude has been extended under each of the three
approaches identified above for the reception of evidence as to identification. In all
scenarios, there needs to be a real ability on the part of the identifier – over and above that
of, for instance, a jury – to undertake the identification exercise, either because of the
extent of exposure to the relevant voices or by reason of particular issues of complexity
which distinguish the case from one in which the trier of fact could undertake the exercise
unassisted.
In some instances, the techniques employed by the identifier carry the indicia of
technological complexity which render the exercise clearly expert. In others, the expertise
is such that it has been obtained by a police officer or interpreter listening extensively to
the relevant voices. In such scenarios, real assistance may be provided and the question is
whether the witness by reason of their ‘ad hoc expertise’ has gained the specialised
knowledge.
In other instances, the question is whether the opinions expressed by a person such as
a police officer or an interpreter are such as to be able to, at least, facilitate the fact-finding
process. They must not appear to be, or be able to be, confused with being expert
opinions.
The courts have been hesitant to exclude evidence as to identification utilising s 137.
Importantly, Blow J in W v The Queen (2006) 16 Tas R 1; [2006] TASSC 52 at [43], which was
applied in the voice identification decision of Tasmania v Farhat [2017] TASSC 66 at
[42]–[44], summarised the law:
By risk of unfair prejudice is meant the danger that the fact-finder may use the evidence to
make a decision on an improper, perhaps emotional, basis, ie on a basis logically
unconnected with the issues in the case. Thus evidence that appeals to the fact-finder’s
sympathies, arouses a sense of horror, provokes an instinct to punish, or triggers other
mainsprings of human action may cause the fact-finder to base his decision on something
other than the established propositions in the case. Similarly, on hearing the evidence the
fact-finder may be satisfied with a lower degree of probability than would otherwise be
required.
In R v Riscuta [2003] NSWCCA 6, an interpreter’s recognition of a voice speaking

Romanian 18 months after having heard the allegedly same person speaking English was
740 [10.15.160]
also admitted. In R v Madigan [2005] NSWCCA 170, police evidence about recognition of a
voice after 50 hours of listening to audio surveillance recordings was permitted.
Similarly, in Irani v The Queen (2008) 188 A Crim R 125; [2008] NSWCCA 217, the New
South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal declined to overturn a trial judge’s decision not to
exclude (under s 137 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW)) a police officer’s evidence about
recognition of the voice of a suspect on tapes from listening devices after a person had
been arrested and brought to the police station. In addition, it found that the prosecution
concession that the police officer was an ad hoc expert was significant, as he had acquired
substantial expertise in identifying individual voices he heard on the listening device
recordings.
In addition, in Tasmania v Farhat [2017] TASSC 66, submissions that evidence from an
interpreter who had heard the voice on the accused on telephone intercepts should be
excluded under s 137 was not accepted.
The future in Australia

[10.15.170] Many similar considerations apply to visual and aural identification evidence.
Well-documented risks attach to each. However, at this stage, Australian and United
Kingdom courts have been more receptive to aural identification expert evidence than to
visual identification expert evidence, in spite of the fact that substantial divisions of
approach exist in relation to the reliability of the various techniques of voice identification
evidence. In general, for the present, it will generally be regarded as no more than a
question of weight when a police officer or an interpreter offers evidence that he or she
recognises a voice otherwise heard by them in the course of their professional work. A
liberal approach is likely to be taken to their having acquired ‘ad hoc expertise’ for such a
purpose.
A similar concern to that evinced in the United States case law lies at the heart of the
Australian courts’ disinclination to permit evidence at large about the perils of eyewitness
identification, well established as they have been by research. It may be that experimental
psychological evidence assembled by psychologists advising a defendant would be
admissible if it related to particular difficulties about identification evidence in the case at
hand. The Court of Appeal decision in Dupas v The Queen (2012) 40 VR 182; [2012] VSCA
328 does not completely rule this out. The limitations on such evidence may take the
‘human situation’ into the special category or make it so outside the experience of jurors
that methodical studies by psychologists may become admissible to assist in the
fact-finding process: see R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114 at 120.
In addition, the argument that expert evidence in certain cases may serve the
counterintuitive purposes of removing misconceptions about the accuracy of eyewitness
identification may find some favour. So long as the courts are not being manipulated into
providing a forum for the resolution of academic debate, they may be able to be
persuaded to receive relevant expert evidence of this kind where the expert is suitably
informed about the particular circumstances of the particular identification. The
fundamental hurdle that will need to be overcome before such expert evidence is
admitted, however, will be persuading a court that, even with skilful cross-examination of
an eyewitness by experienced counsel, a jury may make an error in its assessment of the
evidence without the expert evidence that can be given by an experimental psychologist.
[10.15.170] 741
Chapter 10.20
MEMORY EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [10.20.01]
Expert evidence on the operation of memory ................................................................. [10.20.60]
A misinformation effect exception ..................................................................................... [10.20.102]
A recovered memory exception .......................................................................................... [10.20.103]
R v BDX .................................................................................................................................. [10.20.105]
R v JH; R v TG (deceased) ...................................................................................................... [10.20.112]
R v Snell ................................................................................................................................... [10.20.114]
R v Bowman ............................................................................................................................. [10.20.115]
R v May: dissociative amnesia ............................................................................................ [10.20.117]
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. [10.20.119]
The parameters of likely admission ................................................................................... [10.20.130]
Hypnotically enhanced or refreshed evidence ................................................................ [10.20.180]
The Californian approach .................................................................................................... [10.20.190]
Australian and New Zealand authority ............................................................................ [10.20.200]
The rule against self-serving evidence .............................................................................. [10.20.210]
EMDR-refreshed evidence ................................................................................................... [10.20.220]
Repressed/False memory syndrome evidence ................................................................ [10.20.230]
Drug-impaired memory ....................................................................................................... [10.20.260]
‘And suddenly the memory revealed itself. The taste was that
of the little piece of Madeleine which on Sunday mornings at
Combray … my aunt Leonie used to give me, dipping it first
in her own cup of tea or tisane.’
Marcel Proust, Swann’s Way (1913, col 1, p 61).
‘Every street lamp that I pass

Beats like a fatalistic drum,
And through the spaces of the dark
Midnight shakes the memory
As a madman shakes a dead geranium.’
TS Eliot, Rhapsody on a Windy Night (1917).
Introduction
[10.20.01] This chapter deals with expert evidence by psychiatrists, psychologists and
other professionals on the operation of memory, as well as the associated issues arising
from the use of hypnosis, eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing (EMDR), truth
drugs and polygraph evidence. It addresses admissibility and evaluation issues in respect
of such evidence. It should be read in conjunction with Ch 10.0 (Psychiatrists’ and
psychologists’ evidence).
Expert evidence on the operation of memory

[10.20.60] As long ago as 1978, Saks and Hastie (1978, pp 170ff) argued that the gap
between the average person’s knowledge and the psychologist’s understanding of
memory, based on scientific research, was extensive. The subject is thoroughly reviewed in
subscription service Ch 65; see also Brewer, Weber and Semmler (2005); Pansky, Koriat
and Goldsmith (2005); Nadel and Sinnott-Armstrong (2012).
Melinder and Magnussen (2014) surveyed 858 psychologists and 78 psychiatrists about
their understanding of memory and tested it through the participants’ agreement or
disagreement with 12 statements about memory function. They were particularly
[10.20.60] 743
interested in whether the psychologists and psychiatrists in their sample who acted as
expert witnesses in court would perform better on the survey than those who did not. The
participants who did not act as expert witnesses scored an average of 6.49 on the survey;
the expert witnesses in the sample did no better, scoring an average of 6.68. However, the
expert witnesses performed marginally better on those survey items that pertained to
clinical practice; they were more likely to recognise the relative unreliability of children’s
recall compared with that of adults; that the age of earliest first memories is typically from
three years and up; that traumatic memories from childhood cannot be completely
forgotten only to be recovered later in therapy; that memories for dramatic events
typically lead to better memories; and that perpetrators who say they have repressed
memory of their crimes are unlikely to be telling the truth. Overall, however, Melinder
and Magnussen concluded that the expert witnesses’ performance on the survey was ‘not
very impressive’.
It is generally thought that there are three stages of memory: acquisition, retention and
retrieval. Each phase is subject to conditions which may warp accuracy. Blau (1998,
pp 335ff) usefully summarised some of the elements of memory that have been studied by
research psychologists.
The acquisition phase:
(1) the effects of exposure time (the longer the better);
(2) the effects of observation conditions (the complexity of observations increases
error potential);
(3) the violence of the event (shock and fear may interfere);
(4) stress (likely to have an adverse effect);
(5) distorted perceptions (overload or fragmentation may warp);
(6) the depth of processing (the deeper, the better the recall);
(7) social expectations (expectations affect observations);
(8) personal needs, biases and emotions (wants and needs to remember); and
(9) ‘weapon focus phenomena’ (observers’ tendency to be obsessed by the weapon
they have observed).
The retention phase:

(1) the motivational or emotional state of the witness;
(2) the kinds of questions asked as they affect recall (especially leading questions,
suggesting their answers);
(3) decay over time (the longer between acquisition and retrieval, the poorer the
memory);
(4) filling gaps (the tendency to add details to eliminate inconsistencies);
(5) post-event information (potential confusion with later events); and
(6) peripheral activity (the tendency to concentrate on a central focus to the detriment
of the periphery, resulting in poorer peripheral retention).
The retrieval phase:

(1) individual differences of a personal and social kind;
(2) age deterioration from 40 years onwards;
(3) the introduction of false items;
(4) conformity with expectations;
(5) the need to reduce uncertainty;
(6) the nature of questioning (particularly its specificity);
(7) the absence of a relationship of confidence to accuracy; and
744 [10.20.60]
Memory evidence | CH 10.20
(8) the frequency of errors.
In 2008, a report from the Research Board of the British Psychological Society generated
recommendations which formed the basis for ‘Guidelines on Memory and the Law’. They
constitute a useful, empirically based starting point for analysing the reliability of
memory:
(i) Memories are records of people’s experiences of events and are not a record of the
events themselves. In this respect, they are unlike other recorded media such as
videos or audio recordings, to which they should not be compared.
(ii) Memory is not only of experienced events but also of the knowledge of a person’s
life such as schools, occupations, holidays, friends, homes, achievements and
failures. As a general rule, memory is more likely to be accurate when it is of the
knowledge of a person’s life than when it is of specific experienced events.
(iii) Remembering is a constructive process. Memories are mental constructions that
bring together different types of knowledge in an act of remembering. As a
consequence, memory is prone to error and is easily influenced by the recall
environment, including police interviews and cross-examination in court.
(iv) Memories for experienced events are always incomplete. Memories are time-
compressed fragmentary records of experience. Any account of a memory will
feature forgotten details and gaps, and this must not be taken as any sort of
indicator of accuracy. Accounts of memories that do not feature forgetting and
gaps are highly unusual.
(v) Memories typically contain only a few highly specific details. Detailed recollection
of the specific time and date of experiences is normally poor, as is highly specific
information such as the precise recall of spoken conversations. As a general rule, a
high degree of very specific detail in a long-term memory is unusual.
(vi) Recall of a single or several highly specific details does not guarantee that a
memory is accurate or even that it actually occurred. In general, the only way to
establish the truth of a memory is with independent corroborating evidence.
(vii) The content of memories arises from an individual’s comprehension of an
experience, both conscious and non-conscious. This content can be further
modified and changed by subsequent recall.
(viii) People can remember events that they have not in reality experienced. This does
not necessarily entail deliberate deception. For example, an event that was
imagined was a blend of a number of different events, or an imagined event that
makes personal sense for some other reason can come to be genuinely
experienced as a memory (these are often referred to as ‘confabulations’).
(ix) Memories for traumatic experiences, childhood events, interview and identification
practices, and memory in younger children and older adults and other vulnerable
groups, all have special features. These are features that are unlikely to be
commonly known by a non-expert, but about which an appropriate memory
expert will be able to advise a court.
(x) A memory expert is a person who is recognised by the memory research
community to be a memory researcher. It is recommended that, in addition to
current requirements, those acting as memory expert witnesses be required to
submit their full curriculum vitae to the court as evidence of their expertise
(Madill (2010)).
Notwithstanding the voluminous literature generated by research psychologists (see

subscription service Ch 65), such information about the vagaries, fallibilities and
idiosyncrasies of the operation of the human memory has rarely been admitted into
evidence and controversies about the utility of such evidence persist (see, eg, Howe and
Knott (2015)).
[10.20.60] 745
[10.20.100] Australian courts have tended to be resistant to expert evidence about both the
operation of memory processes and the risks of distortion of memories.
An early and influential precedent is the decision of the Queensland Court of Criminal
Appeal in R v Fong [1981] Qd R 90, where evidence of research conducted by
psychologists in relation to the functioning of human memory was held to be inadmissible
as expert evidence. A medical practitioner charged with fraud in relation to bulk-billing
practices had been found guilty of overstating the amount of time he had spent with
patients, who testified in relation to the consultations that they had had with their doctor
after a period of some four years had elapsed. The following view of the trial judge was
quoted with evident approval by the Queensland Court of Appeal (at 95):
I take the view that in this case the jury has been empanelled to decide everyday matters.
I assume I believe with some justification that juries do what they are empanelled to do
and that they perform their functions properly. What a person remembers and how they
are likely to remember and the manner in which the human memory works by
reconstruction or suggestion or otherwise are everyday matters well within the field of
knowledge of juries.
In R v Smith [1987] VR 907 at 910–911, a case dealing primarily with the admissibility of
expert evidence relating to the fallibilities of eyewitness identification, Vincent J reiterated
the Fong approach:
Processes of human perception have been the subject of considerable analysis in a number
of other disciplines over recent years. The assumptions generally made in relation to them
and upon which trials have been conducted for generations have been queried and on
occasions possibly thrown into doubt by researches conducted in those disciplines.
Nevertheless, in general terms, the conduct of criminal trials still depends upon the
acceptance of a number of premises. Among these are assumptions that human beings are
capable of observing events, of recalling that which has been observed and subsequently,
verbally for the most part, repeating that which has been heard and describing that which
has been seen.
However, some attenuation of the rigour of the Fong approach can be identified in respect
of expert evidence about matters such as the potential for a misinformation effect and
about the possibility of unreliable ‘recovered memories’.
A misinformation effect exception
[10.20.102] In R v Dupas (2011) 211 A Crim R 81; [2011] VSC 180, Hollingworth J permitted
evidence by a psychologist in relation to the impact of post-event information upon the
processes of memory and the risks of misidentification by reason of a ‘misinformation
effect’. In a report, he stated that a large number of factors can influence how any given
individual may respond to post-event information. These factors include the person’s age
and the delay between the original event and encountering the aspects of eyewitness
identification and specific evidence, so that there was a significant risk that a named
witness had misidentified the accused. He also stated that the duration of the witness’s
observation of the subject is not as important as the circumstances of the observation.
Hollingworth J accepted (at [14]) that jurors may have a general awareness of a matter,
such as the fact that memory is not static and may be unreliable or that it may be affected
by subsequent events, but ‘they may not be aware of the extent of the phenomenon, for
example, how easy it is to make someone “remember” an entire incident which simply did
not occur, or the types of factors which might affect the reliability of a memory’. She
permitted the psychologist to give general evidence about exposure to post-event
information and its effect on memory but emphasised that, in doing so, she had had
regard to the specific and rather unusual facts of the case before her, including the
extensive pre-trial publicity in relation to the accused: ‘in allowing such evidence to be led
in this case, I did not mean to suggest that it will always be appropriate for expert
746 [10.20.100]
evidence to be led as to the misinformation or displacement effect; indeed, in many cases,

it will not be appropriate to do so’ (see also R v Smith (2000) 116 A Crim R 1; [2000]
NSWCCA 388 at [69]–[70]). However, she declined to allow counsel calling the
psychologist to ask him whether this was an example of the sort of situation where there
might be memory contamination as she classified this as a ‘back-door’ way of asking him
to express an opinion on the reliability of particular witnesses’ evidence or the likelihood
that their memory had been affected by post-incident information. (See, too, Dupas v The
Queen (2012) 218 A Crim R 507; [2012] VSCA 328 at [282].)
It remains to be seen how far this form of counterintuitive evidence will open the door
to evidence being given by psychologists about the operation of memory. What can be
said for the present is that Hollingworth J was at pains to limit the ambit of her ruling.
A recovered memory exception
[10.20.103] There are some signs of change in relation to this position, at least in Victoria.
In R v Bartlett [1996] 2 VR 687, for instance, the Victorian Court of Appeal held that an
accused person at trial should have been permitted to adduce expert evidence from a
forensic psychologist about the risks attaching to ‘recovered memories’. This was in
answer to memories said to have been ‘recovered’ by the complainant about the conduct
of a man with whom she had had contact many years before.
R v BDX
[10.20.105] In Australia’s most significant decision thus far on the expert evidence about
memory, R v BDX (2009) 24 VR 288; [2009] VSCA 28, a five-member Victorian Court of
Appeal decided that evidence by a neuropsychologist about memory was admissible.
The appellant had been convicted of an act of digital penetration between 1 January
1997 and 31 December 1998 (when the complainant was about seven or eight years of age)
and an act of sexual intercourse between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2002 (when the
complainant was about 10 or 11 years of age). By the time of the trial, the complainant was
aged 17. The complainant also maintained that she recalled being the victim of indecent
assault when she was three years of age. The expert evidence by Dr Gibbs, a
neuropsychologist, for the appellant, which was held by the Court of Appeal to have been
wrongly rejected at trial, was as follows (at [56]):
The opinion that Dr Gibbs expressed regarding the statement was in the following terms:
1. Infantile amnesia would not make possible such detailed memories claimed for
Queensland (Nerang) at age three years where these are highly detailed by the
time of the police statement. A scientific explanation for this period is that the
brain and verbal skills are not sufficiently developed to allow encoding of such
‘memories’. Infantile amnesia occurs up to four years of age. The nature of the
complainant’s ‘memory’ changes from being ‘vague’ in her handwritten
statements to being extremely detailed in the police statement.
2. This Queensland event revolves around discussions of ‘first impressions’ between
the complainant and friend. It appears that first ‘disclosure’ to friend revolves
around claims that relate to a period of infantile amnesia at age three years.
Interestingly, at committal friend retracts knowing of prior events to Philip Island
(1997) – and in particular being informed of an indecent touch in Queensland
during such period. (She states in her police statement that the complainant had a
bad first impression of the defendant because of something he did. Italics added.
Complainant states in police statement she told friend she was touched, and at
committal p 8/9 states she told the complainant she was touched in Qld as well
as events claimed at Phillip Island and Bonnie Doon.) This raises concern about
the first statements to [the friend] that include initially vague ‘memories’ given
these occur at age three years, well in the period known as infantile amnesia
where such detailed recollection would not be possible. I note these initially
vague ‘memories’ are elaborated into great detail by the time of the complainant’s
eventual police statement.
[10.20.105] 747
3. By the time of police statements, the complainant has a highly detailed account of
claims relating to Queensland and coincide with period of infantile amnesia.
These change from being a ‘vague’ memory in her handwritten statements to
being highly detailed accounts of an indecent touch on the vagina at a time when
the complainant was no older than three years and three months if the family
moved from the location (Nerang) in November 1993. This raises some questions
as to the process through which such ‘recollections’ occurred. Such processes
include exposure to post-hoc information (ie discussion or material) that becomes
incorporated into one’s narrative, exposure to direct suggestion, or use of specific
techniques (eg: exploration of symptoms, ‘journaling/writing’ exercises, imagery
or hypnosis like methods, dream analysis …) to encourage such recollection
where these might impact on the reliability and validity of such recall.
4. By the time of the police statements, there is reference to matters of a spatial
nature including the positioning of the complainant in relation to the defendant
on left or right, as well as whether the left or right hand of the complainant or
defendant occurred. At age three or four years, children are not able to reliably
know left from right, and the ability to know the spatial or ‘crossed perspective’
of the other is more advanced and only reliable to later in childhood. With respect
to memory, such detail does not necessarily imply the historical accuracy of the
event in the absence of independent reliable corroboration.
Vincent and Weinberg JJA applied R v H(JR) (Childhood Amnesia) [2006] 1 Cr App R 195;
[2005] EWCA Crim 1828 (see [10.20.112]), observing (at [85]) that:
The whole point of Dr Gibbs’ evidence would have been to establish that the complainant
in the present case had given a description of early events which contained an unrealistic
amount of detail. That meets the note of caution sounded by the Court of Appeal, and
renders this evidence both relevant and admissible. On that basis, it ought to have been
received.
They rejected the argument advanced by the Crown that Dr Gibbs’ evidence with regard
to infantile amnesia went no further than stating what any jury would regard as obvious,
holding (at [94]–[95]) that:
It is true that most people can readily appreciate the difficulties that others have in
remembering events that occurred long ago. However, in our opinion, it is not within the
ordinary scope of knowledge that childhood amnesia exists as a recognised scientific
phenomenon. Based on his training and experience, Dr Gibbs was able to say that the
complainant’s detailed account of the events of 1993 could not possibly be accurate. The
plain implication of that evidence was that she had not been truthful to the police, and
that she bore malice towards the appellant. That went to the issue of bias. The appellant
was entitled to have that evidence put before the jury as part of his overall defence to the
charges brought against him.
Nettle and Redlich JJA (at [193]) reached the same conclusion, holding that: ‘Such evidence
will ordinarily be admitted to show a lack of capacity or opportunity by the witness to
perceive an event which is in issue.’

[10.20.110] There is some authority from the United Kingdom Court of Appeal which
suggests a small chink of liberality in terms of the admissibility of psychological evidence
about the operation of memory (see Freckelton (2008b)). However, in general, the law
remains as it traditionally has been: such evidence is not admissible (see, eg, R v Wagstaff
[1983] Crim LR 1652 at 1657; Hodgkinson and James (2015, p 431)).
R v JH; R v TG (deceased)
[10.20.112] In R v H(JR) (Childhood Amnesia) [2006] 1 Cr App R 195; [2005] EWCA Crim
1828, an application was made to introduce psychological evidence as fresh evidence on
appeal. The cases were referred to the Court of Appeal by the Criminal Cases Review
Commission and were heard together. In the first, JH was convicted at trial of two counts
748 [10.20.110]
of indecent assault and four counts of rape. The appellant was the biological father of the
complainant who claimed to have memories going back to before she was three years of
age. At the time of trial, the complainant was 21 years of age. Various counts related to
assaults that commenced when she was aged four or five and then extended throughout
her childhood. A year later, TG, ‘a peripatetic music teacher’, was convicted on five counts
of indecent assault and three counts of rape of the same complainant when she was aged
10 and 11.
Professor Conway said that he had never encountered a person who had been able to
provide a detailed narrative account of an event that had taken place at the age of four or
five. A child of four might well remember something that had happened when the child
was three, but by the time the child was seven or eight that would have been forgotten
and it would not be recaptured. It was possible that, if a child was regularly reminded
about an event which occurred when the child was very young, the child might retain the
memory of it. Professor Conway said that if the child had a traumatic experience, one
would expect that, as an adult, he or she might recall a few – usually three or four –
intrusive and disjointed features of the event. However, where the childhood event was
merely unpleasant, such as a painful medical procedure or an accident, such as falling off
a bicycle, the adult might well remember the salient or central feature of the event but
would not remember the surrounding or extraneous details. He or she would not be able
to give an accurate and reliable narrative account.
Professor Conway’s explanation for this state of affairs was that, during the first five
years of life, the frontal lobes of the brain are in a very rapid state of change and
development and material is not retained in the memory. He said that, so far as he knew,
‘all psychologists working in the field of memory formation agreed with what he had said
about the effect of childhood amnesia, although not all agreed with his view about why it
occurred’ (at [31]).
It was Professor Conway’s opinion that, if evidence of an event said to have occurred
at an early age was very detailed and contained a number of extraneous facts, it might
well be unreliable. It may be that the central feature of the event had indeed occurred,
although research showed that, when seeking to remember life events from childhood, it
was quite common for people genuinely to believe that they could remember events
which were known not to have taken place. In an adult account of a childhood event,
some surrounding detail might well be accurate if it was derived from conceptual
knowledge – namely, things that the adult knows from his or her childhood, such as the
school attended, where he or she lived, or the layout of his or her home: ‘However, details
which do not come from conceptual knowledge may well be false or unreliable. In effect
they may well have been added on to the true memory at some later time’ (at [33]).
Professor Conway considered that a narrative account of an event which was said to
have taken place during the years of childhood amnesia should be treated with caution,
especially if it contained a number of details that were extraneous to the central feature of
the event (at [34]). He also expressed the view that the effect of giving an account which
contained details was to enhance its credibility to the ears of the listener. Research showed
that listeners responded differently to two accounts of essentially the same event. If the
account included detail, the listener was more likely to believe and accept it than if that
detail were omitted. The detail might not make any difference to the information being
conveyed; it might be quite without value, but its effect would be to enhance the listener’s
perception. What this came down to in effect was a risk that if a witness gives an account
of a childhood event which contains detail about which he or she feels confident but may
well be unreliable because of childhood amnesia, jurors might find the account more
convincing than they safely should (at [35]).
[10.20.112] 749
The court came to the conclusion that Professor Conway’s evidence was ‘true expert
evidence’, suitable for admission at a criminal trial, in that it provided information likely
to be outside the knowledge and experience of the jury. The court also considered that, in
the exceptional circumstances of the case, where the complainant had provided
remarkably detailed accounts of events which she claimed had taken place at the ages of
three, four and five, his evidence was relevant and was capable of affording a ground for
allowing the appeal, in that it might affect a jury’s view of the complainant’s reliability as
a witness. Thus, the court admitted the expert evidence, quashed the convictions in
relation to JH, and ordered a retrial.
In respect of the appeal of TG, the court held that Professor Conway’s evidence was
not irrelevant but was ‘of less direct relevance than to JH’s case’. TG had died in the
interim, so the appeal was posthumous. The court decided to adjourn its decision pending
the outcome of the retrial of JH. The court sounded a note of caution about evidence of the
kind given by Professor Conway before it (at [47]):
It will only be in the most unusual of circumstances that such evidence will be relevant
and admissible at the trial of allegations of child abuse. The evidence would be relevant
only in those rare cases in which the complainant provides a description of very early
events which appears to contain an unrealistic amount of detail. That, in the experience of
this court does not happen often.
The court emphasised that (at [48]):

The principles set out in R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 should be kept
firmly in mind. Expert evidence is only admissible when it is likely to assist the jury on a topic
which falls outside its ordinary experience. A witness’s ability to remember events will, absent
the special considerations arising from the period of early childhood amnesia, ordinarily be
well within the experience of jurors.
R v Snell
[10.20.114] The extent of the exception identified in R v H(JR) (Childhood Amnesia) [2006] 1
Cr App R 195; [2005] EWCA Crim 1828 fell to be determined before much further time
passed.
In R v Snell [2007] 2 All ER 974; [2006] EWCA Crim 1404, the Court of Appeal heard an
appeal in relation to convictions at trial of the appellant of one count of attempted
buggery, five counts of indecent assault, and one count of inciting a child to commit an act
of gross indecency. He was the biological father of the complainant. The sexual
interference with the complainant was alleged to have commenced when he was aged
between six and eight. When the trial took place, the complainant was 20 years of age.
Relying upon the court’s approach in R v JH; R v TG (deceased) [2005] EWCA Crim 1828,
the appellant sought to introduce as fresh evidence the views of Professor Conway. The
court observed, though, that the evidence admitted in R v JH was very limited in its scope,
being confined to cases in which an adult claimed very detailed memory of events said to
have taken place when the adult was very young. It noted (at [14]) that the application
now before it sought to widen the ambit of R v JH. It commented that where
Professor Conway expressed the view that a complainant’s evidence was ‘unreliable’, such
an opinion was inadmissible because ‘it usurped the responsibilities of the jury’ (at [14]).
The court observed that the essence of the views of Professor Conway was that all
memory is inherently unreliable and malleable. It attributed significance to a telling
concession made by him that memory research at the time he was testifying was ‘too state
of the art’ for it to ‘feed into “the very practical issues that the courts are concerned with”’
(at [17]). The court held that this concession as to ‘the current limitations of this “very
difficult science” needs emphasis, and, as we have borne it, should be clearly in mind
whenever it is sought to adduce evidence relating to childhood amnesia’ (at [17]).
750 [10.20.114]
The court noted that Professor Conway suggested that the memories of adults, going
back to their childhood, could often be wrong. It classified this statement as
‘unremarkable’ (at [18]):
The memories of adults about relatively recent events can similarly be wrong. That, too, is
unremarkable. If witnesses were dealing with a ‘trauma memory’ arising from what was
described as ‘an awareness of mental defeat’, then the memory might combine to produce
some three to five ‘hot spots’, that is, very vivid images of moments during the trauma,
either related to the trauma itself, or to the inner feelings of the person undergoing the
trauma, which would be very difficult to handle. However the question whether there was
indeed any such traumatic event depended on the perception of the victim at the time
when it was suffered. As we understood it, that would mean that although an adult might
perceive a particular event as traumatic to any child, the child, at the time, might not be of
an age or understanding to see it, and therefore remember it, in the same way. Again, this
is unremarkable.
It was noted by the court that while Professor Conway expressed grave reservations about
claims of detailed memories about events taking place when the person was aged three or
less, and to a degree when a child is between five and seven, ‘so far as events occurring at
six to eight years (again emphasising the dangers of over-generalisation) an adult’s recall
of such childhood events is much more like that of an adult recalling events which
occurred in adulthood’ (at [19]). This led him to conclude that these memories would not
be quite the same in their qualities as adult memories of adult experiences, but he had ‘no
problem’ with the view that adults could recall specific events that happened when they
were seven and eight years old.
Professor Conway’s view was that the account of the complainant in the Snell case
looked ‘unusual in my perspective as a memory researcher’ but that did not rule out any
of the possibilities of fantasy, lies or truth (at [20]).
Professor Conway identified risks attaching to the provision of polished, detailed,
‘rolling accounts’ by adults of what they purported to recall as to what happened to them
during childhood. He identified risks of ‘scene setting’ by police officers when
interviewing a complainant and the potential for an effort to be ‘joint’ between police
officers and complainants.
The court emphasised ‘the danger inherent in general deployment of evidence’ in
relation to the fallibilities of memory. It identified (at [26]) a risk that, in essence, the views
of witnesses such as Professor Conway will constitute an assessment by psychologists as
to the accuracy or truthfulness of allegations made by complainants. It held (at [26]) that:
Carefully reflecting on a claimed memory of distant childhood events, the jury must
decide whether any witness, and in particular the complainant, is truthful and accurate.
Unless the jury believes that the witness is accurately describing an actual experience, the
defendant is to be acquitted. Where an adult is speaking of events which occurred in his
or her childhood, for the time being, it is indeed correct that this area of expertise does not
address ‘the very practical issues’ which concern the court, and, save where there is
evidence of mental disability or learning difficulties, attempts to persuade the court to
admit such evidence should be scrutinised with very great care. That is why the court in R
v JH emphasised, as we repeat and endorse, the current strict limits of admissible expert
evidence based on memory research.
This led the court to find that, in the case before it, Professor Conway’s evidence did not
fall ‘anywhere near’ the area of expertise regarded as permissible in R v JH. It declined to
admit it.
R v Bowman
[10.20.115] In R v Bowman [2006] EWCA Crim 417, the appellant appealed against a count
of murdering his wife and three counts of indecent assault on his daughter, one count of
raping her and two counts of buggering his son. The trial took place when the daughter
was 29 years of age and the son 32 years of age. The daughter alleged that the appellant’s
[10.20.115] 751
sexual abuse of her commenced when she was five, at which time the death of her mother,
of which the appellant was convicted, also took place.
The appellant sought leave to adduce evidence from Professor Conway, who provided
generally expressed views about the unreliability of memories of children of five years of
age at a distance of 20 years or more from events. Professor Conway stated (at [161]) that:
The memories from below about 7 years in age were formed during the period in which
the brain, the self, memory, comprehension, language, and the emotions were all
undergoing rapid and intense development. Memories from this time are likely to contain
errors and in some cases will be entirely wrong. This is the case for everyone, there is
nothing unusual about it and it simply reflects the fact that, in humans more so than in
any other animal, cognition develops after birth. It means, however, that memories from
this period, when the individual was aged 5 to 7 years or less should be treated with
caution. As a memory researcher I would not rely on the accuracy of such memories
unless there was additional, independent, corroborating evidence.
In oral evidence, Professor Conway conceded that it was not impossible for a child aged
five-and-a-half to remember her mother being murdered and added that most people
remember three to four ‘hot spots’ in their early life. However, he said that research shows
that the memory of early events is recalled out of order and with inaccuracies as to the
detail of the event or events. It was his opinion that it is not possible for an adult to relate
accurately conversations heard under the age of seven (at [162]). He was sceptical about
the notion of false memory syndrome, but when asked during cross-examination whether
much of what he was saying was ‘simply common sense’, he said he did not really know.
The court held (at [169]) that his evidence was ‘on the very borderline of admissibility’
and rejected its admission appeal:
Essentially the professor’s evidence of the results of research into memories goes little
further than is commonsense and well within normal human experience. He accepted that
a traumatic event occurring when a person is under the age of seven can be recalled by
that person in adulthood.
R v May: dissociative amnesia
[10.20.117] On a related subject, in R v May [1997] EWCA Crim 467, the Court of Appeal
heard a murder appeal and permitted fresh evidence about loss of memory in the context
of the potential for the appellant to have forgotten that she touched the body of her aunt,
which she contended she found after her aunt had been murdered by someone else.
Expert witnesses were permitted to give evidence about the likelihood of the appellant’s
loss of memory being attributable to dissociative amnesia. Dr J gave evidence that
amnesia is usually centred on a traumatic event, and yet the appellant remembered the
discovery of her aunt’s body. To that, Dr B replied that the traumatic event would be
touching the body and thereby discovering that she was dead. Other features of the
evidence on this topic were that:
• the person suffering from dissociative amnesia tends to be aware that they cannot
remember everything;
• it can be simulated and cannot be proved;
• one cannot accept everything from a person who is associated with persistent lying and
deception; and
• Mrs May had a history of lying, not only to the police but also in obtaining and
attempting to obtain money from an insurance company (Dr B).
It was put to the Court of Appeal that dissociative amnesia takes the form of a sudden loss
of memory, which may after a period of time be gradually restored. However, the
sequence claimed was the wrong way around: there was no clear amnesic gap at any
stage; Mrs May merely suffered from normal gaps in memory (Dr J). Evidence was also
given by Dr O, a clinical psychologist and senior lecturer who had hypnotised Mrs May,
that her account was consistent with an amnesic loss or gap from the time of standing by
752 [10.20.117]
the bed to being on the driveway; there was a very clear account at first, and then a patchy
account or a simple gap. In his opinion, her account was genuine, and more consistent
with an amnesic gap than simulation. In spite of the liberality of the admission of the
evidence that was called on behalf of the appellant, it did not persuade the court.
Conclusion
[10.20.119] At first blush, the Court of Appeal’s decision in R v H(JR) (Childhood Amnesia)
[2006] 1 Cr App R 195; [2005] EWCA Crim 1828, and applied in R v BDX (2009) 24 VR 288;
[2009] VSCA 28, appeared to have provided significant liberalisation in relation to the
admissibility of expert psychological evidence about the operation of memory. However,
the decisions impose tight constraints around the ‘liberalisation’ – namely, that such expert
evidence must fall outside a jury’s ordinary experience, a principle which R v H(JR)
(Childhood Amnesia) [2006] 1 Cr App R 195; [2005] EWCA Crim 1828 applied to mean that
it would only be admissible where a complainant provides a description of very early
events (around the age of three, four or perhaps five) which contains ‘an unrealistic
amount of detail’ (at [48]). The later decisions of the court in R v Snell [2007] 2 All ER 974;
[2006] EWCA Crim 1404 and R v Bowman [2006] EWCA Crim 417 have reiterated the
limitations of the exception and declined evidence from the same psychologist in relation
to events said to have occurred when the complainants were somewhat older, even
though the events occurred many years before. The approach of the Victorian Court of
Appeal in R v BDX (2009) 24 VR 288; [2009] VSCA 28 is consistent with this approach.
Canadian authority
[10.20.120] As in a number of areas, Canadian law has tended to admit counterintuitive
expert opinion evidence in relation to the operation of memory so as to dispel
misunderstandings and to enhance informed evaluation of evidence. The British
Columbia Court of Appeal in R v M(W) (1997) 115 CCC (3d) 233 upheld the refusal by a
trial judge to allow evidence from a psychologist about the factors which might distort a
child’s memory. It determined that the trial judge had correctly exercised his discretion in
excluding the evidence on the basis that it would confuse or confound the jury and on the
basis that the task of assessing the accuracy of the child complainant’s memory was a task
that the jury could undertake without expert evidence.
In R v Perlett (2006) 212 CCC (3d) 11, the Ontario Court of Appeal took a similar
approach to evidence refused at trial in a patricide/matricide conviction from forensic
psychologist Dr Elizabeth Loftus. The defence sought to adduce the evidence to establish
that a significant minority of the population mistakenly believe that people are better able
to remember details of traumatic events, and to establish that a witness to a traumatic
event may have false memories of that event. By tendering Dr Loftus’ opinion evidence,
the defence sought to counter the prosecution argument that the accused’s son’s false
statements and inconsistent accounts of what occurred showed that he had fabricated his
intruder story. The trial judge referred to the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in R v
McIntosh (1997) 35 OR (3d) 97; 117 CCC (3d) 385 at 394–395, where Finlayson JA observed
that most people were aware that memories of brief and stressful incidents may be faulty.
He concluded that all that was needed was to caution the jury not to ‘draw too hasty a
conclusion from any inconsistencies they may perceive’ in the accused’s statements. He
rejected the evidence as not being necessary as prescribed in R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9;
(1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402. The Court of Appeal upheld his ruling.
By contrast, Hetherington JA in the Canadian case of R v Wald (1989) 47 CCC (3d) 319
at 352 held that an expert in a sexual assault trial, where the complainant had gaps in her
memory, possessed special knowledge and experience with respect to memory loss which
the jury did not possess, and so might have assisted the jury in their deliberations – her
evidence should have been admitted.
[10.20.120] 753
The parameters of likely admission

[10.20.130] In general, then, in Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada, expert
evidence about the processes of memory has been rejected as inadmissible. However, there
are two qualifications to this stance. Where it is established that the memories the
proposed subject of expert evidence are particularly problematic in terms of reliability,
such as when they relate to a child of three years or younger, expert evidence may be
admitted. As in eyewitness identification evidence, the fundamental question in relation to
the admissibility of evidence about the operation of memory, especially at common law, is
whether it can be demonstrated to the court that an expert can provide information
outside the ken of the average juror which would be of real assistance to their
determinations of fact. Applying the reasoning of R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114 at 120,
the question is whether the situation is so special and so outside the experience of jurors
that evidence should be admitted. As pointed out in Runjanjic and R v Lavallee (1990) 55
CCC (3d) 97, a factor that comes into play in this regard is the need to dispel popular
myths (such as those regarding domestic violence). Thus, popular misunderstanding
about why a rape victim might forget critical parts of his or her ordeal might in principle
properly be the subject of expert evidence from an expert in rape trauma or the operation
of memory. However, at this stage, the courts are not for the most part benevolently
disposed toward evidence that is in generalised form and that may do no more than
advert to broad risks of unreliability which might be the subject of address by counsel or
warning by the presiding judge.
At this stage, memory scholarship for the most part does not permit expert opinions
about comparable fallibilities in relation to memories about events occurring when
children are four or older, meaning that such evidence will not be admitted. Similarly,
where absence of memory is potentially attributable to dissociative amnesia, expert
evidence may well be admitted on the issue. Further, where what is asserted by a
defendant is that memories of a complainant are the product of false memories implanted
by phenomena such as suggestive counselling, such evidence may well be admitted.
Hypnotically enhanced or refreshed evidence

[10.20.180] There is considerable controversy within the scientific community with respect
to the value of hypnosis as a technique for improving memory (see Chayko, Gulliver and
MacDougall (1991, p 171); Odgers (1988, p 22)) and about the distorting effects potentially
exercised upon the reliability of memories as a result of hypnosis. The following concerns
have been aired by researchers and a number of them have been reflected in court rulings:
(1) False ‘recollections’ are reported during hypnosis: Sheehan and McConkey (1992);
McConkey (1991; 1988b); People of California v Guerra 37 Cal 3d 385 (1984); R v H
(1989) 51 SASR 489; cf evidence from R v Haywood (1994) 73 A Crim R 41.
(2) Hypnosis may lead to an increase in the amount of inaccurate material reported
as memory: Dywan and Bowers (1983); Chayko, Gulliver and MacDougall (1991,
p 172).
(3) Hypnosis rarely enhances accurate recall: Orne (1984).
(4) There is an increased suggestibility to any form of leading question on the part of
the subject: Haward and Ashworth (1980, p 476); Gibson (1982); Orne (1984,
p 176); Lloyd-Bostock (1988, p 20); Register and Kihlstrom (1988); R v Geesing
(1984) 39 SASR 111; Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534; R v H (1989)
51 SASR 489 at 491–492; R v Jenkyns (1993) 32 NSWLR 712; R v Jamal (1993) 69 A
Crim R 544; R v Haywood (1994) 73 A Crim R 41, especially among the highly
hypnotisable: McConkey (1991).
(5) Subjects are prepared to say things about which they are uncertain without
qualifying their answers as they would when not under hypnotism: Orne (1984,
p 176).
754 [10.20.130]
(6) There is a propensity for subjects to confabulate – to fill in the gaps in their
memory: see Arnolds et al (1984, p 441); Chayko, Gulliver and MacDougall (1991,
p 172); Odgers (1988, pp 29–30); R v McFelin [1985] 2 NZLR 750 at 755; R v Jenkyns
(1993) 32 NSWLR 712; R v Haywood (1994) 73 A Crim R 41.
(7) The presence of police investigators and others in the room during hypnosis may
affect the subjects’ answers: Orne (1984); McConkey (1988a, p 79).
(8) Persons who have been hypnotised are often unable to distinguish between what
was elicited from them during hypnotism and what they recall independently of
their hypnotism: Orne (1984); Odgers (1988, p 29); R v McFelin [1985] 2 NZLR 750
at 755.
(9) Subjects can simulate being hypnotised and provide a convincing display of
‘recovering lost memories’: Orne (1984); see also Sheehan and McConkey (1988;
1992); Sheehan (1988).
(10) False memories created during hypnosis may persist: McConkey and Jupp (1985,
p 288); McConkey (1991).
(11) There is a tendency for subjects of hypnotism to be more confident of their
recollections after hypnotism: McConkey (1988b); McConkey and Kinoshita
(1988); R v McFelin [1985] 2 NZLR 750 at 755; R v Jenkyns (1993) 32 NSWLR 712.
(12) Myths abound as to the effectiveness of hypnosis for the enhancement of memory:
Haward and Ashworth (1980, p 484); McConkey and Jupp (1985, p 286);
McConkey, Roche and Sheehan (1989, p 265).
(13) Adequate ethical guidelines have not as yet been formulated for professional
practice – especially in relation to investigative hypnosis: Sheehan and McConkey
(1992).
The controversy is so thoroughgoing regarding the bases of the technique of hypnotism in

the memory-enhancing context that it is unlikely that expert evidence on the area would
fulfil the criteria of the Frye test (Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923)): see Ch 2.10.
The Californian approach
[10.20.190] In People of California v Guerra 37 Cal 3d 385 (1984), the California Supreme
Court held that the use of hypnosis to restore or improve memory is so potentially
unreliable that the testimony of a witness is inadmissible as to all matters which have been
the subject of a hypnotic session.
The Californian legislature intervened to temper the effect of the ruling. However,
s 795(a)(3)(D) of the Californian Evidence Code requires a series of safeguards:
(a) The testimony of a witness is not inadmissible in a criminal proceeding by reason
of the fact that the witness has previously undergone hypnosis for the purpose of
recalling events which are the subject of the witness’s testimony, if all of the
following conditions are met:
(1) The testimony is limited to those matters which the witness recalled and
related prior to the hypnosis;
(2) The substance of the prehypnotic memory was preserved in written,
audiotape, or videotape form prior to the hypnosis;
(3) The hypnosis was conducted in accordance with all of the following
procedures:
(A) A written record was made prior to hypnosis documenting the
subject’s description of the event, and information which was
provided to the hypnotist concerning the subject matter of the
hypnosis.
(B) The subject gave informed consent to the hypnosis.
(C) The hypnosis session, including the pre- and post-hypnosis
interviews, was videotape recorded for subsequent review.
[10.20.190] 755
(D) The hypnosis was performed by a licensed medical doctor or

psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis and
independent of and not in the presence of law enforcement, the
prosecution, or the defence.
(E) Prior to the admission of the testimony, the court holds a
hearing pursuant to s 402 of the Evidence Code at which the
proponent of the evidence proves by clear and convincing
evidence that the hypnosis did not so affect the witness as to
render the witness’ prehypnosis recollection unreliable or to
substantially impair the ability to cross-examine the witness
concerning the witness’ prehypnosis recollection. At the hearing,
each side shall have the right to present expert testimony and to
cross-examine witnesses.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the ability of a party to attack
the credibility of a witness who has undergone hypnosis, or limit other legal
grounds to admit or exclude the testimony of that witness.
Australian and New Zealand authority
[10.20.200] The earliest Australasian case to canvass the use to which hypnotically assisted
recollection could be put was the civil case of Van Vliet v Griffiths (1978) 19 SASR 195, in
which the plaintiff sued the nominal defendant for damages for injuries received in a
motor vehicle accident. Walters J admitted evidence that the plaintiff’s memory, which had
been lost because of functional amnesia, returned some five years after the accident as a
result of hypnotherapeutic treatment. He was satisfied that the memory was genuine.
However, the decision does not stand as significant authority for the admissibility of
post-hypnosis evidence, being a civil case and so a matter in which the trial judge could
not exercise the fairness or prejudice/probative discretions and a case in which
admissibility had not been called into issue: see R v Jamal (1993) 69 A Crim R 544 per
Mathews J.
In R v Geesing (1984) 39 SASR 111 at 113, Cox J accepted that the effect of hypnosis on
the memory is not a matter of ‘common experience or common knowledge’ and held that
‘it would be wrong for a jury to attempt without expert assistance to interpret and
evaluate evidence of this kind for themselves’. He expressly disclaimed the need to decide
‘whether evidence from a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist could provide adequate
support for the introduction’ of recollections produced by hypnosis. He noted the growing
literature on the subject, in particular that relating to the danger of post-hypnotic
suggestion, and commented that the preponderance of United States authority favoured
rejection of hypnotically induced evidence.
In 1985, the New Zealand Court of Criminal Appeal in R v McFelin [1985] 2 NZLR 750
at 753, 755 echoed Cox J’s concerns, specifically drawing attention to the need to warn
jurors of the dangers of hypnotically assisted evidence (at 752):
Under hypnosis a person may unconsciously respond to intended and unintended cues.
There may be an eagerness to please the hypnotist, or those who have promoted the
experiment, by producing answers. The subject’s capacity to judge the reality of his
apparent memories may be impaired. Without knowing that he is doing so, he may
confabulate, recounting what he firmly believes to be a memory although in truth he has
only imagined it. He may also acquire a stronger and artificial confidence in pre-hypnotic
memories. Hence the saying that the defence no longer has the same witness to
cross-examine.
756 [10.20.200]
The court held that such evidence should not be admitted (particularly when led by the
Crown) unless the trial judge is satisfied ‘that to do so is safe in the particular
circumstances’. 1 It determined that in all cases where the Crown proposed to call
posthypnotic evidence (at 755):
(1) The fact that the witness was hypnotised should be disclosed to the defence, and
all relevant transcripts and information provided on request.
(2) If objected to, the evidence should be excluded unless the judge is satisfied that it
is safe to admit it in the particular circumstances.
(3) The judge should have regard to whether the hypnotism was carried out by a
qualified person independent of the police and prosecution, and with sufficient
safeguards against the influencing of the subject by suggestions or otherwise.
(4) Pending the establishment of New Zealand guidelines, in deciding whether
safeguards are sufficient, reference may be made to overseas guidelines such as
the Californian … They are not mandatory in New Zealand but indicate
standards to be aimed at as far as reasonably possible.
(5) The judge should also have had regard to the strength of any confirmatory or
supporting evidence to be called by the Crown. This applies in all cases but is
especially important in relation to any recollection or purported recollection
which is not proved by the Crown to have existed before hypnotism.
(6) If he admits the evidence, the judge should warn the jury of the special need for
caution before relying on post-hypnotic evidence. The warning need not be in
any particular terms but should adequately alert the jury to the dangers referred
to in this judgment.
In 1989, Cox J in R v H (1989) 51 SASR 489 was persuaded to exclude hypnotically induced
evidence. H had been charged with two counts of sexual interference with a girl aged
nine. The defence submitted that the complainant should not be called on the basis that
her evidence was unreliable, both on the basis of multiple interviews and on the basis that
an extended course of hypnotherapy which the child underwent in connection with
anxiety symptoms subsequent to the alleged assaults had so contaminated her memory
that her evidence should be excluded. His Honour found (at 492):
It is generally acknowledged among the experts that multiple questioning of young
children about allegations of sexual abuse is inadvisable. There will be a tendency for each
interrogator, however careful, to influence the child’s beliefs and answers by the way he
frames his questions, by the verbal or other indications of his approval or disapproval,
even by the mere circumstances of the interrogation taking place.
However, Cox J stressed the need to be pragmatic about the exposure of children to
multiple questioners (at 493):
No doubt it would be best if a child who makes allegations of sexual abuse were seen by
a skilled interviewer straight away, before there can be any contaminating influence from
family and friends and untrained interrogators. That did not happen here and, in the
nature of things, it would be practically impossible to ensure that it always did happen. It
is also possible to be too critical about the discussions within the family and pre-trial
therapy in this case. Child witnesses have to live and there may be a long delay between
allegation and trial.
He formulated the question to be asked, not as to whether a child complainant has been
seen by too many people but as to whether the multiple questioning that has taken place
1 In 1967, the British Columbia Supreme Court refused an accused person’s application to
give evidence while under hypnosis but allowed her to refresh her memory through
hypnotic induction. It held that ‘to the medical profession hypnosis is regarded as a useful
and efficacious means of enabling a person who has functional amnesia to bring back to
conscious recollection those events which have been forgotten’ (R v Pitt (1968) 3 CCC 342
at 345) and it was suggested (at 345–346) that to deny to an accused person the right to
have assistance from such a procedure would be improper.
[10.20.200] 757
is so likely to have contaminated her recollection and her ability to give an accurate
account of what, if anything, happened to her that to permit the evidence would be to
deny the accused a fair trial.
Cox J also found that it was generally agreed within the relevant community that
patients are more prone to suggestion under hypnosis (at 492–493):
The cues that may influence the patient’s mind under hypnosis as an aid to the
investigation of crime are now well recognised and the courts in many places have laid
down rules for the conduct of such interviews and the giving of evidence by a witness
who has been hypnotised in the course of police investigations.
He found that ‘memory can be changed – and that includes falsified – under hypnosis’ (at
493). The circumstances of the case led him to exclude the complainant’s evidence on the
basis of the hypnotherapy in which she had engaged.
The leading Australian judgment in the area is that of R v Jenkyns (1993) 32 NSWLR 712
per Hunt CJ at CL. His Honour referred to the article of Kirby P (Kirby (1984)) and to the
brief discussion of the dangers of hypnotically enhanced evidence by Kirby P in
Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534. His Honour followed the view of the New
Zealand Court of Appeal in R v McFelin [1985] 2 NZLR 750 at 753 that, unlike the position
in some United States jurisdictions and in France, there is no rule in Australia that
hypnotically induced testimony is per se inadmissible: see also the approach taken by
Mathews J in R v Jamal (1993) 69 A Crim R 544; see below, [10.20.220].
Hunt CJ found that New South Wales courts, until otherwise directed, should follow
the guidelines put forward in R v McFelin [1985] 2 NZLR 750 at 753, which were adopted
and, to some extent, adapted from the requirements of the Californian Evidence Code. Thus,
the onus lies upon the party seeking to introduce hypnotically induced evidence to
establish that it is safe to admit the evidence in the particular case, not upon the accused to
have it excluded pursuant to the trial judge’s general discretion to ensure that the accused
enjoys a fair trial. His Honour set out with approval (at 751) the requirements found in the
Californian Evidence Code and found them to be designed:
(1) to avoid the generally accepted dangers of hypnosis that, in the heightened level
of susceptibility to suggestion which is characteristic of a person in an hypnotic
state, the witness may subconsciously be influenced by suggestions or cues
planted intentionally or otherwise during the hypnosis; and
(2) to assist the trial judge in determining whether there is any likelihood that:
(i) the witness has merely confabulated (that is, has subconsciously filled in
gaps in his or her memory by guessing or by fantasising); or
(ii) the witness has acquired a stronger and artificial confidence in his or her
original recollection; or
(iii) the ability of the accused to cross-examine the witness concerning that
original recollection has been impaired.
Hunt CJ noted that while the New Zealand guidelines do not require compliance with
every one of the safeguards, but leave the matter in the discretion of the trial judge, the
Californian safeguards are to be complied with as far as reasonably possible. He declined
to determine whether and, if so, the extent to which the obligations upon an accused
seeking to introduce hypnotically induced evidence should be any less than those
imposed by the McFelin guidelines upon the Crown (at 716).
In a subsequent case heard in the Tasmanian Supreme Court before Wright J (R v
Haywood (1994) 73 A Crim R 41; see Harsel (1996)), all previous authorities were once
again canvassed. His Honour found the case before him distinguishable on the facts
because the complainant’s recollection had been gradually improving prior to the
hypnosis session. His Honour noted (at 50) that the essential difference between the
Californian and McFelin guidelines:
758 [10.20.200]
appears to be that before admitting post-hypnotic evidence the trial judge should pay
particular regard to the strength or presence of any confirmatory or supporting evidence
to be called by the Crown and, secondly, if such evidence is admitted, the trial judge
should warn the jury of the special need for caution before relying on such evidence.
Following R v McFelin [1985] 2 NZLR 750 and R v Jenkyns (1993) 32 NSWLR 712, Wright J
concluded that the Crown had the obligation to satisfy him that it was safe to admit the
challenged post-hypnotic evidence in the particular circumstances of the case. In this case,
it had not done so.
Wright J, in a comment made ‘for the benefit of police and sexual assault workers and
others engaged in the investigation of crime and the rehabilitation of victims’, noted (at
53–54):
There is a very considerable danger in embarking upon hypnosis of a complainant or
other witness prior to a criminal trial. These dangers are discussed in detail in McFelin
[1985] 2 NZLR 750 … and are amply demonstrated by the facts of the present case and I
would strongly recommend that CIB officers and sexual assault workers in Tasmania
should read at least from 750 to 755 of the judgment in McFelin [1985] 2 NZLR 750. It
would be highly regrettable if in future a victim of crime were to be rendered incompetent
to testify by reason of an ill-advised attempt to enhance his or her recollection by
hypnosis. I recognise that in some cases an investigation will be unable to proceed to
prosecution unless hypnosis is employed in the investigative process and that, in other
cases, proper treatment considerations will suggest that hypnosis is imperative for the
future mental health of the victim. However in circumstances other than these I
recommend great caution and the need to obtain proper legal advice before proceeding in
this way.
On appeal, the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal did not interfere with the findings of
Wright J or find error of law in his approach: Roughley v The Queen (1995) 5 Tas R 8.
Zeeman J declined to follow McFelin on the basis that it ‘may have taken an unduly
pragmatic approach without sufficient regard for principle’ (at 28): see Sparkes v The Queen
(1998) 8 Tas R 21 per Wright J. He held that the ‘fairness discretion’ (see R v Sang [1980]
AC 402 at 434) ought to be the vehicle whereby unreliable post-hypnotic evidence may be
excluded. However, it appears that reliability of such evidence is not a condition
precedent to its admissibility (see Sparkes v The Queen (1998) 8 Tas R 21) or ‘even a
touchstone for its exclusion in the exercise of discretion, but rather the potential difficulty
which may exist in exposing such unreliability by cross-examination or otherwise, thus
rendering the trial unfair’ (Sparkes v The Queen (1998) 8 Tas R 21 at 37). Similarly, the
Victorian Court of Appeal in the important decision of Rozenes v Beljajev [1995] 1 VR 533
(see Ch 2.35) held that, provided that the circumstances of possible unreliability of
evidence are exposed to the jury for their scrutiny, there is no discretion, save in the most
exceptional cases, to exclude evidence based wholly or primarily on the trial judge’s
conclusion that it is unreliable.
In R v Sparkes (1996) 6 Tas R 178 at 189, Underwood J found that the essential difference
between the decisions in R v Tillott (1995) 38 NSWLR 1 and Roughley v The Queen (1995) 5
Tas R 8 lay at the point where the guidelines are considered and where the onus of proof
lay with respect to compliance with the guidelines: see also Sparkes v The Queen (1998) 8
Tas R 21. He found that Roughley left open whether a failure to comply with the McFelin
guidelines should lead to the exclusion of evidence and, if so, whether the rationale for
such exclusion is unreliability. He found (at 190) that unreliable evidence is frequently
admitted with the use of judicial warnings (see Bromley v The Queen (1986) 161 CLR 315;
Domican v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 555) and that exceptional circumstances needed to be
shown to justify the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence, the onus lying upon the
accused (Pfennig v The Queen (1995) 182 CLR 461 at 516):
Discretionary exclusion must depend on the facts of each case, rather than on the
application of guidelines developed in another case although, of course, reference to
[10.20.200] 759
decided cases and past experience is always of valuable assistance. Thus it may be that a
failure to keep a proper record of a hypnosis session will deprive the defence of a proper
opportunity to test the reliability of post-hypnotic memory and for that reason, admission
of post-hypnotic memory into evidence would be unfair to the accused. Similarly, it
appears to me that absence of any pre-hypnotic record of the memory will deprive the
defence of an opportunity to demonstrate that the evidence has been seriously
contaminated and for that reason, either alone or in combination with other reasons, may
make it unfair to admit the evidence. The same observations might be made with respect
to the other R v McFelin [1985] 2 NZLR 750 guidelines. However, in this State, unlike New
South Wales, these matters fall for consideration in the exercise of the discretion and not as
a condition precedent to admission.
It is likely that evidence that is hypnotically induced will from time to time be excluded as
more prejudicial than probative when led by the prosecution because of the problems
outlined above, which are now more clearly recognised than they were even at the time of
the Geesing and McFelin judgments. 2 It is probable that the Californian guidelines will
operate as de facto indicia for the circumstances when post-hypnosis evidence should be
excluded in the exercise of the criminal judge’s discretion to exclude evidence that is
unfair to the accused or that is more prejudicial than probative. However, the question is
not whether the evidence is per se unreliable but whether a jury is in a position to
evaluate it.
As expert evidence to support the credibility of a witness in general is not admissible
(R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 at 842; see also R v Haywood (1994) 73 A
Crim R 41 per Wright J), it is unlikely that evidence of what a psychiatrist or other
professional heard from a victim under hypnosis or evidence as to the conduct of
hypnosis would be admissible when led by the prosecution. It would probably be
regarded as ‘oath-helping’. However, Odgers (1988, p 35) suggested that if the subject’s
evidence were admitted and his or her credibility were attacked, supporting expert
evidence may be permitted.
A strong case could be argued for the admissibility of expert evidence (in rebuttal) if
hypnotically induced testimony from, for instance, a victim is admitted. Such expert
evidence would function to disabuse jurors of wrong impressions that researchers have
shown exist about the reliability of hypnotically enhanced testimony: McConkey and Jupp
(1985, p 286); McConkey, Roche and Sheehan (1989, p 265). However, such evidence may
well not be permitted to deal with the particular circumstances of the case but rather
might function as counterintuitive, myth-dispelling evidence (see R v Lavallee (1990) 55
CCC (3d) 97 at 112; R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114 at 125), being confined to general
learning on the fallibilities of such techniques and leaving it to the triers of fact to apply
the learning to the facts. 3
The rule against self-serving evidence
[10.20.210] It is likely that the rule against self-serving evidence (or ‘oath-helping’: see R v
Huckerby [2004] EWCA Crim 3251 at [97]) will prevent an accused person from adducing
evidence of what he or she said to a mental health professional when under the influence
of a truth drug, when hypnotised, when under the influence of EMDR, or potentially
when having repressed memories ‘retrieved’ or when taking a polygraph or other form of
2 R v Pitt (1968) 3 CCC 342, Aikins J, however, allowed a defendant to be hypnotised in

court. He held that nothing said under hypnosis was to be evidence but allowed her
evidence immediately after the hypnosis as refreshed memory. Given what has since been
learned about hypnosis, such a procedure may not now be permitted, although difficulties
are posed by refusing a defendant such an opportunity to ‘clear her name’.
3 The approach in R v Smith [1987] VR 907 in relation to the admissibility of expert evidence
on the fallibilities of identification may be able to be distinguished on the basis of the
degree of danger posed by post-hypnotically induced evidence, although it would have to
be conceded that the issue is fundamentally the same.
760 [10.20.210]
lie-detector test. Self-serving evidence in the form of exculpatory statements uttered by the
accused is inadmissible unless the statements contain elements of inculpation or form part
of a relevant act so that they can be said to form part of the res gestae: R v Petecherini
(1855) 7 Cox CC 7; Corke v Corke [1958] P 93; R v Graham (1972) 7 CCC (2d) 93 at 97; see
contra R v Beland [1987] 2 SCR 398; (1987) 43 DLR (4th) 641; 36 CCC (3d) 481 per Wilson
and Lamer JJ, eloquently dissenting.
Canadian authority has emphasised the importance of the operation of the rule against
self-serving evidence in the context of statements made by an accused person to his or her
psychiatrist – particularly if the accused does not give evidence in relation to making such
statements and the expert evidence would in effect permit evidence from the accused to be
tendered without the possibility of cross-examination: see, eg, R v Moase (1989) 51 CCC
(3d) 77 at 83. Thus, in R v Kyselka (1962) 133 CCC 103, Porter CJ rejected evidence from a
psychiatrist that a retarded 16-year-old lacked sufficient imagination to concoct a story
because of her low mental age, commenting that ‘there is no warrant for such
oath-helping’.
The same approach was taken by the English Court of Appeal in the important
decision of R v Robinson (1994) 98 Cr App R 370 at 375, where sufficient justification could
not be adduced in the handling of the defence case to establish that the purpose of calling
expert evidence was other than to bolster the Crown witness’s credit.
The rule against ‘oath-helping’ has been held to prevent expert evidence adduced
solely for the purpose of proving that a witness is truthful: see R v Marquard [1993] 4 SCR
223; (1993) 85 CCC (3d) 193; R v Burns (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 193 at 202. The rule, however,
goes to evidence that would tend to prove the truthfulness of the witness, rather than to
the truth of the witness’s statement: R v B (1993) 79 CCC (3d) 112 at 135. Thus, in R v Burns
(1994) 89 CCC (3d) 193, a psychiatrist’s evidence about the symptoms often displayed in
the behaviour of sexually abused children was held not to infringe the rule against
oath-helping.
The major Australian case law on the subject emanates from Tasmania. In particular,
the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal in Ingles v The Queen (unreported, Tasmanian
Court of Criminal Appeal, 4 May 1993) followed the decision of R v Turner [1975] QB 834;
(1974) 60 Cr App R 80 and accepted that when the purpose of expert evidence is solely to
bolster the credibility of a witness, such evidence will be inadmissible. This proposition
was subsequently affirmed by Wright J in the hypnosis case of R v Haywood (1994) 73 A
Crim R 41 and by Zeeman J in Coombe v Bessell (1994) 4 Tas R 149.
EMDR-refreshed evidence
[10.20.220] EMDR (eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing) is a technique
serendipitously discovered in 1987 by a Californian psychologist, Dr Francine Shapiro,
who:
happened to be moving her eyes rapidly from side to side while she was thinking of a
traumatic event in her past. Afterwards she felt unaccountably better. Accordingly she
embarked on a series of clinical tests which confirmed that the process of moving one’s
eyes from side to side whilst focusing on a traumatic event, had the effect of isolating the
memory of the event from the distressing emotions which had previously accompanied it.
(See R v Jamal (1993) 69 A Crim R 544 at 548 per Mathews J.)

In Jamal (at 548), Mathews J found there to be ‘no theoretical explanation for the
effectiveness of EMDR but, despite this, and despite its beguiling simplicity, which to
some smacks of quackery, it appears to be very effective indeed in many cases of
post-traumatic stress disorder’. She found (at 549) that the technique is not intended to be
‘a memory retriever. If anything it is the reverse. It is intended as a therapeutic tool not a
forensic one’.
[10.20.220] 761
Mathews J found that no study has been conducted, ‘certainly in Australia, and
probably elsewhere, as to the effect of EMDR upon a person’s memory’ (at 550–551). Her
Honour found, in the circumstances of Jamal, that it was probable that EMDR was of little
if any importance in the improvement in the relevant witness’s memory. However, she
also examined the issue of the impact of EMDR upon memory and the potential for
distortion. She noted that Dr Shapiro emphasised that there is no guarantee that a memory
which emerges through EMDR would be accurate, but did not find this to be a sufficient
reason for rejecting a witness’s evidence based upon EMDR-revived memory.
Mathews J (at 560) found it to be:
essential that the therapist be entirely reactive and not provide any factual information
which the subject might then adopt as part of his or her memory. For, until we know more
about EMDR and its effect upon memory, we must accept the risk that, as with hypnosis,
the subject might be sufficiently suggestible to unwittingly adopt information received
from the therapist as part of his or her own memory.
She found it to be advisable in order to avoid the possibility of confabulation that the
subject not be told that a revival of memory is likely. In the particular circumstances of
Jamal, Mathews J found that no external cues were given to the subject which he could
have adopted as a part of the content of his memory. Her Honour found (at 654) that there
was:
much to be said for the proposition that any therapeutic process which serves to entrench
a prospective witness’s memory is so inherently dangerous that the rejection of
post-therapy evidence should not be dependent upon proof that the memory was a
distorted one. The risk factor should be assumed, at least on a prima facie basis.
Mathews J found (at 564–565) that the relationship between EMDR and hypnosis was
significant for a number of reasons:
One of the possible explanations for the effectiveness of EMDR is that it induces a
hypnotic-type trance. And whilst even the experts cannot fully explain the phenomenon of
hypnosis, it has been with us for long enough to have produced a great deal of debate
about its efficacy as a memory retriever. In addition, there have been a number of legal
rulings as to the admissibility of post-hypnosis evidence. These give some insight into the
way the courts have dealt with the problem of memory which is retrieved through
unorthodox and potentially distorting processes. Finally, there is the real question, arising
from the particular circumstances of this case, as to whether Mr Thompson himself might
have been in a hypnotic trance during his EMDR session.
However, her Honour found (at 566) that the weight of the evidence before her suggested
that the state of consciousness induced by EMDR is quite different from a hypnotic trance:
‘It is likely that the subject is less suggestible, and almost certainly has more control over
his or her situation than does a hypnotised subject.’ Mathews J found in the circumstances
that it was unlikely that the subject had gone into a hypnotic trance during the EMDR
session, in spite of his inability later to remember detail of what occurred during it. She
determined (at 571) that ‘it must be concluded’ that EMDR is capable of having the effect
of retrieving memory ‘particularly if the treatment is incomplete’.
Mathews J found that in the case before her the return of the subject’s memory was not
to a significant degree attributable to EMDR. However, in obiter, she held (at 571):
Had it been the case that the improvement in Mr Thompson’s memory as demonstrated in
his May 1993 statement, had been wholly or substantially attributable to his EMDR
session, then I would have been seriously concerned as to its reliability. For although the
balance of opinion tends to favour the proposition that EMDR and hypnosis are entirely
different, and that the former does not involve the patient going into a hypnotic trance
with all its inherent dangers of suggestibility, I would nevertheless have had serious
concerns as to the possible unreliability of memory revived through this novel and thus
far unexplained procedure.
762 [10.20.220]
Her Honour strongly recommended (at 571) that the type of safeguards employed in the
Californian legislation regulating the admissibility of post-hypnotic evidence, and
approved by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in McFelin, be adopted in relation to the
use of EMDR.
On appeal, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal went slightly further. It
found that the problems and dangers associated with hypnosis ‘are in many respects the
same or very similar dangers’ to those associated with EMDR and determined:
Each [technique] may be used for therapeutic purposes or for psychotherapy. Each may
apparently be used for investigative or forensic purposes. Both techniques may make a
witness more certain of a false memory. … Both procedures can retrieve, revive or enhance
memory, and the memories revived are not necessarily true.
See R v Tillott (1995) 38 NSWLR 1 at 38 per Abadee J.

The court (at 38 per Abadee J) determined that the same guidelines or procedural
safeguards as apply in the case of hypnosis, that is to say those ‘considered in McFelin
(adopting the Californian Evidence Code) and Jenkyns’ should apply to EMDR and that once
it is found that EMDR has been applied to a prospective witness, then the onus lies upon
the proponent of the evidence to prove that it is safe to admit the evidence: R v Tillott
(1995) 38 NSWLR 1 at 39–40 per Abadee J.
The issue was revisited in JAT v The Queen (1998) 103 A Crim R 345 by Parker J of the
Western Australian Supreme Court. Ultimately, Parker J held that, although the McFelin
guidelines had not been fully complied with, the prosecution had satisfied the court that
in the circumstances of the case it was safe to admit the evidence of the complainant in
spite of her having undergone EMDR for the purpose of resolving or processing her
traumatic memories. He summarised the evidence about the EMDR administration as
follows (at 348):
[T]he technique [as applied in this case] involved the patient focusing on a particular
memory that is representative of a past trauma, this is known as the ‘target memory’.
Once the target memory is identified, the patient then undergoes a process known as
‘negative cognition’ and ‘positive cognition’ with respect to the target memory. When the
patient focuses on the memory negative beliefs … may be evoked and this may arouse
strong emotions. The patient is then asked to identify a positive belief in relation to the
belief … At this stage the patient may be asked to think of the ‘target memory’ and the
negative belief again so that the memory and the associated emotions are reactivated. A
‘desensitisation’ phase then follows. The patient is asked to follow the therapist’s hand
with their eyes. The hand is rapidly moved from side to side. This rapid eye movement
proceeds on each occasion for about 30 seconds and is repeated while the patient reports
her thoughts and emotions to the therapist. When the level of distress associated with the
memory has reduced the patient is then asked to focus on the positive belief identified in
relation to the target memory. The rapid eye movement is repeated until the patient
reports the positive belief feels completely true. This is known as the ‘integration’ phase of
EMDR. Finally, there is a debriefing stage where the patient is invited to recall the target
memory and reflect on the positive thoughts they now have. At the conclusion of the
treatment … the patient is also told that over the next 48 hours or so, she may experience
other memories, dreams or thoughts related to the traumatic events. The patient is asked
to keep a written log of any such memories or thoughts which is discussed with the
therapist during the next visit. Usually … this treatment is repeated over a number of
subsequent sessions.
Parker J found that the evidence before him was that the technique, when used in the way
described, was not designed to, nor used for the purpose of, reviving or altering memory.
The patient does not lose consciousness at any stage. Rather, the objective of the treatment
is to alter the patient’s emotional response to the past trauma so that he or she can live
with the memory without experiencing an undesirable degree of emotional and other
[10.20.220] 763
reaction to it. He found that ‘[f]rom a scientific point of view there is not yet any generally
accepted understanding of how and why EMDR has’ its level of success in achieving its
objectives: at 348–349.
In JAT v The Queen (1998) 103 A Crim R 345, the evidence disclosed that the
psychologist administering the EMDR made only brief written notes of the one session but
the patient’s log, created shortly afterwards, was available for scrutiny. The evidence
disclosed that the psychologist had been careful throughout the short EMDR session to
limit the degree to which the patient’s emotions were aroused and that the psychologist
‘was careful to avoid any form of suggestion to her or any selective reinforcement of any
particular thoughts she expressed’ (at 351). Parker J found that the target memory was
volunteered at the commencement of the session and that the psychologist did not
identify any distortion or change in the detail of the target memory either during or after
the session ‘and was certainly unaware of any form of revival of any suppressed
recollection or of any new recollection concerning the target memory’ (at 351). This was
corroborated by the complainant herself. In addition, psychiatric evidence in the case
suggested that merely one session of EMDR was unlikely to affect the memory of events
other than the target memory.
Parker J noted the different approaches in Roughley v The Queen (1995) 5 Tas R 8, as
against R v Tillott (1995) 38 NSWLR 1 and R v McFelin [1985] 2 NZLR 750, indicating
something of a preference for the Roughley approach (at 356), but focused upon whether
the post-EMDR evidence could be safely admitted. He found that the psychologist, who
had been trained by Dr Shapiro, was competent and experienced in the use of EMDR at
the time that he treated the complainant. He found that a variety of evidence permitted an
assessment of the complainant’s pre-EMDR memory. He also found the psychologist’s
record of what occurred during the EMDR to be satisfactory. Although the EMDR session
was not videotaped or audiotaped, he was satisfied by the psychologist’s notes and
memory that there was an adequate record of what took place. He found that the McFelin
guidelines are only guidelines, not mandatory requirements, simply constituting standards
to be aimed at as far as is reasonably possible, the aim of which is to ensure verifiable
independence of the use of hypnotic (or EMDR) procedures. He found that, while all the
guidelines had not been complied with, the deficiencies in relation to them were
ameliorated by the circumstances of the case. He was persuaded that it was safe to admit
the evidence. In relation to the exercise of the prejudice/probative discretion, he found
that the defence was, in fact, disadvantaged by reason of the EMDR. He found: ‘There is
every reason to expect that, should the course of the trial commend the need for this to the
trial judge, some special warning and advice should be sufficient to ensure that in this
respect the trial is not unfair to the accused’ (at 360). In PA v The Queen [2012] VSCA 294 at
[33], the Victorian Court of Appeal emphasised that the guidelines were procedural
safeguards but not more:
They do not establish requirements to be met before evidence is admissible. The trial judge
retains a discretion as to whether the evidence should be admitted despite any failure to
comply with them.
There are other techniques which have features in common with EMDR and which may
pose similar difficulties in respect of their effects on memory: BJS v The Queen [2013]
NSWCCA 123 at [129].
In the light of the Australian decisions thus far, it is likely that the Californian
guidelines will operate as a de facto series of indicia for the circumstances when trial
judges should exercise their discretion to exclude EMDR evidence that is unfair to the
accused or more prejudicial than probative. It is clear that the focus will be upon whether,
in the particular circumstances, the administration of the EMDR was likely to have
resulted in confabulated or unreliable memories on the part of the witness.
764 [10.20.220]
Repressed/False memory syndrome evidence

[10.20.230] There is considerable controversy about whether early childhood memories of
sexual abuse can be ‘recovered’ with the assistance of psychotherapists, or whether such
‘recoveries’ are confabulations brought about by the witting or unwitting intervention of
such practitioners, (see Ch 10.30 (Syndrome evidence); see also Loftus and Rosenwald
(1993); Byrd (1994); Gleaves (1994); Olio (1994); Gold (1994); Loftus (1993); Perry and Gold
(1995); Lindsay and Read (1995); Freckelton (1996b); Van Koppen and Crombag (1999);
Epstein and Bottoms (2002).
‘Recovered memories’ of sexual abuse gained increased acceptance among
psychotherapists in the early 1980s, providing a means of explaining a variety of
disorders, such as anorexia nervosa, low self-esteem and sexual dysfunction. It was
asserted that the trauma of childhood abuse could cause children, and even adults, to
repress all memories of the painful assaults until they were ‘unlocked’ in the course of
therapy, enabling, in due course, healing of the memories which, while submerged, had
been psychologically destructive.
The theory of repressed memories has never been verified experimentally (see Loftus
and Rosenwald (1993, p 71)) and is likely to encounter major problems under the
falsifiability criterion enunciated in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579;
113 S Ct 2786 (1993); Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 43 F 3d 1311 (9th Cir 1995)
(on remand).
Considerable amounts of litigation have been generated in the United States against
therapists who have ‘recovered’ memories of sexual abuse for their patients. Joyce-Courch v
De Silva 602 NE 2d 286 (Ohio 1991) is an example of an appeals court decision to have
upheld a jury malpractice award to a patient whose therapist was found to have
mishandled recovered-memory therapy. In Montoya v Bebensee 761 P 2d 285 (1988), the
Colorado Court of Appeals reinstituted a father’s negligence and outrageous conduct
claims against his daughter’s therapist, holding that the therapist owed a duty of care to
the father because the damage suffered by him from claims of sexual abuse facilitated by
the therapist was foreseeable.
On some occasions, drugs such as sodium amytal, or other forms of barbiturates, are
used by therapists to assist recovery of memory. Loftus and Rosenwald (1993, p 73) made
the pertinent point that the use of such drugs carries with it well-documented dangers of
suggestibility and expert evidence on the subject or post-therapy evidence should be
treated in a way comparable with evidence that is subsequent to hypnosis. They noted
that in a Seattle suit a therapist helped a woman to ‘recover’ her memories of sexual abuse
with methods such as age repression, bioenergetics, psychodrama, trance work,
visualisation and guided imaging: Mateu v Hagen (King County Superior Court,
91-2-08053-4).
The admissibility of ‘repressed memory syndrome’ evidence is controversial also in
Australia (see [10.30.600]; Gelb (1994); Thomson (1994); Freckelton (1996a; 1997)) but not
as yet the subject of authoritative superior court decisions (see, though, the evidence of
Professor Mullen in Papazoglou v The Queen (2014) 45 VR 457; [2014] VSCA 194). However,
in Canada, in an important case, the Ontario Court of Appeal in 1993 expressed grave
concerns about the dangers posed by evidence from complainants in sexual abuse matters
where ‘memories’ are retrieved by a therapeutically oriented memory retrieval process: R
v Norman (1993) 87 CCC (3d) 153 at 168–169. The danger is that the process may not elicit
‘real memories of what actually occurred. In either case the patient is convinced of the
truth of what he or she is recalling. Honesty of recall is not a factor; the concern instead is
the reliability of the recall’. An error may be made in such circumstances by placing too
much weight on the appearance of honesty and integrity on the part of a witness who has
engaged in a psychotherapeutically oriented memory retrieval process (at 172).
[10.20.230] 765
In Norman, the Court of Appeal placed particular weight on the evidence of a Dr Carr,
who had stressed that a memory may arise through a process of suggestion from a
therapist (at 168–169):
A patient may be told that she has a memory, that she must recall it and that it is
important for her well-being that she recall it. In such instances, the patient may begin to
develop memories, the process of suggestion having instilled in him or her a desire, or a
perceived need, to do so.
On the other side of the coin, Dr Carr testified that the therapist who is encouraging
this memory recall process is not disposed to be critical of the memory. He or she does not
wish to inhibit this process, for to do so might mean losing the trust and confidence of the
patient. The accuracy of the memory is not significant to the therapeutic process. The
therapist must work with whatever memory the patient has. While it is difficult to
determine whether a memory is accurate, according to Dr Carr, these traumatic memories
are usually recalled very vividly, very clearly, a memory engraved in indelible detail. It
does not, in his view, have the fumbling qualities of other memories.
Norman was decided on the basis that the ‘trial judge did not come to grips with the expert
evidence’ (at 169). The court found that expert evidence is of considerable value in
‘historical sexual assault cases’, the trier of fact being unlikely to be familiar with
phenomena such as the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome: see R v Marquard
[1993] 4 SCR 223; (1993) 85 CCC (3d) 193; R v Mohan (1992) 71 CCC (3d) 321 at 327. It
noted that without such assistance the failure of the complainant to report a rape to the
authorities might be incomprehensible: see R v R (1994) 11 CRNZ 402. However, it held
that the fact that a psychiatric condition could be responsible for lack of memory does not
relieve the triers of fact from the need to satisfy themselves of whether the Crown has
made out its case beyond reasonable doubt.
It appears that where a recovered memory claim is made by a complainant or plaintiff,
expert evidence to suggest that such memories are unreliable will be admissible: R v
Bartlett [1996] 2 VR 687.
Drug-impaired memory
[10.20.260] In Audsley v The Queen [2014] VSCA 321, the operation of s 108C of the Evidence
Act 2008 (Vic), which enables expert evidence to be led for the purposes of assisting in the
assessment of the credibility of a witness, fell for consideration. At trial, evidence from a
neuropsychologist as to the effects of drugs, alcohol and sleep deprivation on the
reliability of the evidence of a prosecution witness (a co-accused) about a photoboard
identification was disallowed (cp the evidence about the effects of PTSD on memory
permitted in R v Williams [2016] SASC 67). The trial judge was satisfied that the
neuropsychologist had the appropriate specialised training, knowledge and experience to
give evidence of poly-substance abuse and its effects on the reliability of memory, such
evidence going beyond matters of common knowledge. She also accepted that the
evidence could substantially affect the assessment of the reliability of the witness and that
without it the jury might not understand how substance abuse could affect a person’s
capacity to lay down a memory in context, and thus why it was that a person’s memory
might be unreliable. However, she declined leave to admit the evidence.
On appeal, the trial judge’s decision to decline the evidence was accepted to be in error.
The Court of Appeal held (at [53]–[54]) that s 108C:
creates its own criterion by which the importance of the evidence is to be assessed. That is,
the evidence will not be admissible unless it ‘could substantially affect the assessment of
the credibility’ of a witness. That is a test of some stringency. Its satisfaction will ordinarily
establish the importance of the evidence without more.
It is, of course, possible to imagine circumstances in which the expert evidence
proposed to be led concerns the credibility of a peripheral witness and where, for some
particular reasons, the leading of the evidence would result in substantial disruption of
766 [10.20.260]
the trial, or substantial prejudice to the other party, or both. Only then might it become
relevant to make a judgment about ‘the importance’ of the evidence, as weighed against
the demonstrated disadvantages of its being led.
It commented (at [69]) that, although a jury might have ‘some inkling, based on general
knowledge and experience’ that sleep deprivation might have an effect on memory,
‘without the benefit of expert evidence it is unlikely that a jury would be cognisant of the
extent of the possible impairment’.
[10.20.260] 767
Chapter 10.25
MENTAL STATE EVIDENCE

Introduction .......................................................................................................................... [10.25.01]
Expert evidence on intent .................................................................................................... [10.25.40]
Expert evidence about insanity/mental impairment ..................................................... [10.25.80]
Expert evidence about diminished responsibility ........................................................... [10.25.120]
Expert evidence about automatism/involuntariness ..................................................... [10.25.160]
Expert evidence about provocation ................................................................................... [10.25.180]
Expert evidence about testamentary capacity ................................................................. [10.25.200]
The author acknowledges with gratitude suggestions on this topic from Professor
Ronnie Mackay.
‘With wisdom some man

Spoke the famous saying
That evil eventually seems good
To the man whose mind
God drives to madness’
Socrates, Antigone, c 441 BC, 620–625.
‘Deborah pulled her arm away from the doctor’s hand

because of some obscure fear of touching. She was right, for
the place where the hand had paused on her arm began to
smoke and the flesh under the sweater sleeve seared and
bubbled with the burning.
“I’m sorry,” said the doctor, seeing Deborah’s face go pale. “I
didn’t mean to touch you before you were ready.”
“Lightning rods,” Deborah answered, looking through the
sweater to the charred flesh, and seeing how terrible it must
be when one was the grounding path for such power.’
Hannah Green, I Never Promised You a Rose Garden, 1964.
Introduction
[10.25.01] This chapter briefly reviews the admissibility of evidence about mental states in
the context of the criminal law and probate law.
For the most part, it is apparent that considerable latitude has been extended by the
courts to the admissibility of genuinely expert opinion evidence, as the very essence of
evaluating whether insanity/mental impairment, diminished responsibility, automatism
and testamentary capacity exist is frequently dependent upon the insights of psychiatrists
and, to some degree, psychologists. However, commonsense lay evaluation also has its
place and is informed not only by expert opinions but also by the objective and
commonsense assessment of a person’s conduct, their contemporaneous words, and their
subsequent behaviour. Thus, the courts have been clear that experts have their role in such
matters, but the determinative role always lies with the jury, drawing upon expert
opinions, but not being bound by them.
Expert evidence on intent

[10.25.40] When an accused person is argued to be suffering from a psychiatric disorder or
intellectual disability, expert evidence as to whether the person was able to form a
criminal intent is admissible. However, when the person’s condition falls short of such a
mark, expert evidence is likely not to be permitted in most scenarios. In Australia, the
leading authority is Hawkins v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500 at 517, a case that involved a
charge of murder brought against a young man who had shot his father dead. The defence
case was that the accused intended to commit suicide in the father’s presence and that, at
the last moment, in a disturbed state of mind, he turned the rifle towards his father and
[10.25.40] 769
pulled the trigger without having the specific intention necessary to establish the crime.
The defence of insanity was not raised by the accused. The High Court held that the judge
had been wrong in rejecting medical evidence which cast doubt on whether the accused
was able to form a specific intent to either kill or cause bodily harm to his father. The
rejected medical evidence included an opinion that the accused’s plan to kill himself was
a product of a mental disease, and that that mental illness raised a doubt about whether
the accused had the intention to kill his father. The joint judgment of Mason CJ, Brennan,
Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ observed (at 515):
To say that evidence of mental disease is admissible on the issue of intent is one thing; the
strength of the evidence is another. If the evidence of mental disease does not establish
that the accused was incapable of knowing that the act was ‘one which he ought not to do’
(s 16(1)(a)(ii)) or, under the common law, was incapable of knowing the nature and quality
of his act, that evidence may not greatly affect the strength of any adverse inference of
intent drawn from the objective circumstances. But there is no necessary inconsistency
between mental abnormality and the existence of a specific intent.
Their Honours said (at 517):

In principle, the question of insanity falls for determination before the issue of intent. The
basic questions in a criminal trial must be: what did the accused do and is he criminally
responsible for doing it? Those questions must be resolved … before there is any issue of
the specific intent with which the act is done. It is only when those basic questions are
answered adversely to an accused that the issue of intent is to be addressed. That issue can
arise only on the hypothesis that the accused’s mental condition at the time when the
incriminated act was done fell short of insanity under s 16.
It follows that, if there be evidence that the accused was suffering from a mental
disease when the incriminated act was done and the evidence is capable of supporting a
finding of insanity, the trial judge must give the jury a direction on that issue. Evidence of
mental disease that is incapable of supporting a finding of insanity or that does not satisfy the jury
that the accused was insane when the incriminated act was done, is inadmissible on, and must
be taken to be irrelevant to, the issue whether the act was ‘voluntary and intentional’
within the meaning of those terms in s 13 of the Code. But such evidence of mental disease
is relevant to and admissible on the issue of the formation of a specific intent … [emphasis
added]
(See also Cvetkovic v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 329.)

Until the Hawkins decision, the dominant line of Australian authority was that expert
evidence on whether a person can form an intention to do an act or a specific intention
that is a constituent part of a crime was not admissible. It was said not to be a question of
medical science or a question upon which a psychiatrist or any other professionally
qualified person had any greater claim to express an opinion than an unqualified person:
see R v Carn (1982) 5 A Crim R 466 at 469 per Young CJ; Cameron v The Queen (1990) 2
WAR 1 at 29 per Ipp J; R v Darrington [1980] VR 353 at 363 per Anderson J; Wilbraham v The
Queen (unreported, WA Court of Criminal Appeal, 21 December 1979); Cameron v The
Queen (1990) 2 WAR 1 at 7.
Thus, the issues to be determined in a case where there is evidence of mental illness
are: (1) Was it the act of the accused which, in this case, caused the injury/death? (2) Was
the accused criminally responsible for doing that act? (3) Was that act done with the
specific intention required? The second question is resolved by a finding that mental
illness had been established. The third question arises only if the second question is
answered adversely to the accused and, in those circumstances, the evidence of mental
illness (even though insufficient to make out the defence) is relevant to the issue of specific
intent. That evidence is not, however, relevant to the issue as to whether the act of the
accused was a deliberate one (see R v Minnani (2005) 63 NSWLR 490; [2009] NSWCCA 226
at [32]; R v Lieu (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 486).
770 [10.25.40]
Mental state evidence | CH 10.25
In Teague (A Pseudonym) v The Queen [2018] VSCA 77, Weinberg, Beach and
Hargrave JJA heard an appeal from a special hearing in relation to a man with an
intellectual disability (an IQ of 55) who was found to have committed various assaults,
including rape, of a sex worker. The Court of Appeal affirmed that it was open to the
accused to call evidence from a psychologist, Ms Lofthouse, who expressed the view that
‘Due to intellectual impairment [the applicant] is likely to have been somewhat confused
during the alleged offence and it is possible that he did not fully understand the situation
in light of [the complainant] feigning consent to engage in sexual intercourse. It is likely
that [the applicant] understands the nature of rape but at the time of the incident it is
possible that the complexity of the social situation impinged on his ability to fully
understand the nature and quality of his conduct in the moment’ (at [24]). The Court of
Appeal found that the expert opinions of Ms Lofthouse were relevant and admissible to
the question of whether, by reason of his intellectual disability, the accused man was not
aware that the complainant was not consenting, or might not be consenting, to sexual
intercourse with him (at [41]).
The law is similar in the United Kingdom. Thus, in R v Chard (1971) 56 Cr App R 268 at
271, the court rejected evidence from an experienced prison doctor that ‘in the light of this
man’s personality … there was no intent or mens rea on his part to commit murder at any
time that evening’. The doctor’s evidence was ruled inadmissible on the basis that:
One purpose of jury trials is to bring into the jury box a body of men and women who are
able to judge ordinary day-to-day questions by their own standards, the standards in the
eyes of the law of theoretically ordinary men and women. That is something which they
are well able by their ordinary experience to judge for themselves. Where the matters in
issue go outside that experience and they are invited to deal with someone supposedly
abnormal, eg, supposedly suffering from insanity or diminished responsibility, then
plainly in such a case they are entitled to the benefit of expert evidence. But where … they
are dealing with someone who by concession was on the medical evidence entirely
normal, it seems to this court abundantly plain, on the first principles of the admissibility
of expert evidence, that it is not permissible to call a witness, whatever his personal
experience, merely to tell the jury how he thinks the accused man’s mind – assumedly a
normal mind – operated at the time of the alleged crime with reference to the crucial
question of what the man’s intention was.
The difficulty raised by this decision is the arbitrariness of the distinction between normal
and abnormal, ordinary and exceptional. It has its origin in the influential remarks of
Lawton LJ in R v Turner [1975] QB 834; (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 at 841:
likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury. If on the proven facts
a judge or jury can form their own conclusions without help, then the opinion of an expert
is unnecessary. In such a case if it is given dressed up in scientific jargon it may make
judgment more difficult. The fact that an expert witness has impressive scientific
qualifications does not by that fact alone make his opinion on matters of human nature
and behaviour within the limits of normality any more helpful than that of the jurors
themselves; but there is a danger that they may think that it does … jurors do not need
psychiatrists to tell them how ordinary folk who are not suffering any mental illness are
likely to react to the stresses and strains of life.
The rigidity of this binary postulation has been criticised for a lengthy period (see, eg,
Freckelton (1987)), and it is has been suggested that ‘it would be a mistake to treat Lawton
LJ’s dictum as laying down an immutable rule that expert evidence is admissible only
when it deals with matters of human nature and behaviour beyond the “limits of
normality”, not least because many psychiatrists and psychologists might well disagree
about whether there is a neat dividing line between the normal and the abnormal’
(Hodgkinson and James (2015, para 15-002)).
There are some signs, however, that the preclusion is breaking down to some degree,
and that there may be some flexibility arising from the fundamental purpose of expert
[10.25.40] 771
evidence to assist the fact-finder’s decision-making processes. For instance, in R v

Strudwick (1994) 99 Cr App R 326, the Court of Appeal indicated that it would have been
prepared to permit mental health expert evidence to show why, on a charge of
manslaughter, a mother had not reacted in a way that a ‘normal mother’ would have done
to protect her child, due to serious psychological damage she had sustained as a result of
herself having been abused. Farquharson LJ observed (at 332):
It is not suggested here that the appellant is suffering from a mental illness, but that is not
in itself conclusive against the admission of this evidence. The law is in a state of
development in this area. There may well be other mental conditions about which a jury
might require expert assistance in order to understand and evaluate their effect on the
issues in a case.
(See also R v Loughran [1999] Crim LR 404; R v Huckerby [2004] EWCA Crim 3251 at [101].)
There are limits to the evidence that can be given by experts in relation to an accused
person’s intent to commit a crime (see R v AI [2013] ACTCA 16 at [14]). The request to a
mental health practitioner that they provide their view by the use of ‘in your expert
opinion’ does not legitimise a request by solicitors that a psychiatrist express an opinion to
a question such as: ‘Whether, in your expert opinion it is reasonably possible that [AI]
planned the murder of [CMR] and co-opted his friends and associates to participate in the
plan but never held or formulated any actual intention of carrying out that murder or
allowing it to occur.’ (See R v AI [2013] ACTCA 16 at [14].)
Thus, for expert evidence on intent to be admissible, it appears still to be necessary to
established that a person is ‘abnormal’ or, alternatively expressed, with a mental disorder
within the meaning of DSM-5 or an intellectual disability. There have been many decisions
that otherwise such evidence is not admissible. For instance, in the Ontario case of R v
Robertson (1975) 21 CCC (2d) 385, evidence that a young man charged with a particularly
vicious murder ‘did not show any violent or aggressive tendencies’ was ruled
inadmissible because it was not suggested that he was suffering from any mental illness
rendering him ‘abnormal’. Similarly, the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Moore [1982]
1 NZLR 242 at 245 affirmed a trial judge’s decision to disallow evidence from an expert to
the effect that an accused was particularly suggestible on the basis that it ‘is a matter of
everyday experience’.
By contrast, in R v Stephenson [1979] 1 QB 695, the defence successfully relied on
medical evidence that a person suffering from schizophrenia, who had lit a fire in a
haystack, may not have had the same ability to foresee the risks of his conduct as a
‘normal’ person. Similarly, expert evidence has been allowed in relation to a person with a
psychopathic personality with brain damage (R v McMillan (1975) 29 CRNS 191) and in
relation to an accused likely to react like an 11-year-old child: Helpard v The Queen (1979)
10 CR (3d) 76.
However, the development of the law in this respect has not always been conceptually
coherent or consistent (see generally Yannoulidis (2012)). For instance, in R v Honner [1977]
Tas SR 1, the accused unsuccessfully sought to call a doctor to prove that because of worry,
alcohol and the ingestion of Valium, he lacked the necessary mens rea for the charge of
arson. Chambers J held that when intent is in issue, the accused may call expert evidence
to establish any ‘abnormal’ characteristic which he or she may have had at the relevant
time which may have affected the mind’s operation, and to establish, in general terms,
what the effect of that abnormality would have been. However, such a characteristic must
not be observable by, and be likely to be understood by, a jury without instruction.
Unfortunately, his Honour’s explication of ‘abnormality’ did not go further.
In R v Carn (1981) 5 A Crim R 234, the Western Australian Court of Criminal Appeal
explicitly adopted the reasoning in Honner and held that the trial judge should not have
ruled inadmissible evidence of a psychologist that the accused was of borderline mentally
772 [10.25.40]
defective intelligence and might have a brain impairment. It confirmed, though, that it is
not possible for the expert to go further and give an opinion as to whether the effect in the
particular case was or was not such as to negative a finding of intent.
A number of Canadian decisions have followed similar lines. It appears that a ‘normal’
defendant may call expert evidence that only an ‘abnormal’ defendant could have
committed a crime, and that perhaps an ‘abnormal’ defendant may call expert evidence
that a person with his or her kind of sexual ‘abnormality’ would be unlikely to have
committed a crime: R v Lupien [1970] SCR 263; R v McMillan (1975) 29 CRNS 191.
For Australia, the impact of the High Court decision in Hawkins v The Queen (1994) 179
CLR 500 has been significant in terms of the focus of defences when an accused person is
regarded as suffering from a mental illness. The High Court has made it clear that the trial
judge is obliged to place the issue of insanity before the jury where evidence is capable of
supporting such a finding. However, where there is evidence falling short of such a
finding, expert opinion is admissible to shed light upon whether the accused was capable
at the time of forming the relevant specific intent. The ruling allows evidence from
psychiatrists, psychologists and psychopharmacologists about the actual effect upon the
reasoning processes of the accused of a variety of mental illnesses, as well as the dual
impact of mental illnesses and substance abuse.
When an expert is called to express an opinion as to the likely or possible state of mind
of an accused at a given time, it is proper for that opinion to be given upon an assumed
state of facts postulated for the benefit of the witness: R v Fowler (1985) 39 SASR 440 at
442–443.
Expert evidence about insanity/mental impairment

[10.25.80] The modern law in relation to the defence of insanity dates back to 1724, when
Tracey J gave the following instructions to the jury in relation to the man charged with
shooting Lord Onslow (Trial of Edward Arnold (1724) 16 St Tr 695 at 764–765):
[The question is] … whether this man hath the use of his reason and sense? If he was
under the visitation of God, and could not distinguish between good and evil, and did not
know what he did though he committed the greatest offence, yet he could not be guilty of
any offence against the law whatsoever … If a man be deprived of his reasons, and
consequently of his intention, he cannot be guilty; and if that be the case … he is exempted
from punishment …
… It is not every kind of frantic humour or something unaccountable in a man’s
actions, that points him out to be such a madman as is exempted from punishment: it
must be a man that is totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and doth not
know what he is doing, not more than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast …
In 1800, James Hadfield, an ex-sergeant in the British army, shot at George III in the Drury
Lane Theatre in London. At trial, Dr Alexander Chrichton, a psychiatrist, expressed views
as to the effects on his mental state of various penetrating head injuries which, amongst
other things, had resulted in his previously making threats toward his own child. In what
later became formulated as the defence of ‘irresistible impulse’, Lord Kenyon CJ directed
the jury to acquit (R v Hadfield (1800) 27 St Tr 1282 at 1355–1356):
I must convince you, not only that the unhappy prisoner was a lunatic, within my own
definition of lunacy, but that the act in question was the immediate unqualified offspring
of the disease …
The prisoner for his own sake, and for the sake of society at large, must not be
discharged; for this is a case which concerns every man of every station, from King upon
the throne to the beggar at the gate; people of both sexes and of all ages may, in an
unfortunate frantic hour, fall a sacrifice to this man, who is not under the guidance of
sound reason; and therefore it is absolutely necessary for the safety of society, that he
should be properly disposed of, all mercy and humanity being shown to this most
unfortunate creature. But for the sake of the community, undoubtedly he must somehow
or other be taken care of, with all the attention and all the relief that can be afforded him.
[10.25.80] 773
After Hadfield’s case, the Criminal Lunatics Act 1800 (UK) made provision for a special
verdict of ‘not guilty by reason of insanity’ and, upon such a verdict, required detention of
the accused ‘to strict custody in such place and in such manner as the court shall deem fit,
until His Majesty’s pleasure is known’.
In R v Oxford (1840) 4 St Tr (NS) 498, the accused shot at Queen Victoria. Evidence was
adduced of the accused man’s disordered behaviour and a familial history of mental
instability. Expert evidence of his mental illness was given by four doctors, including one
of the best-known psychiatrists of the time, Dr John Connolly of Hanwell Asylum. He was
found not guilty by reason of insanity.
However, it is the case of R v M’Naghten (1843) 10 Cl & F 200 at 210; 8 ER 718 at 722
that has provided the best-known formulation of the insanity defence. The accused man
was a wood-turner from Glasgow. He shot Edmond Drummond, the private secretary to
Prime Minister Peel, on 20 January 1843. The majority of the House of Lords concluded
that:
[T]he jurors ought to be told in all cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and
to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary
be proved to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it
must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong.
(See, too, Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland (1963) AC 386 at 413; Bronitt and
McSherry (2017); Brookbanks and Simpson (2007); West and Walk (1977); Forshaw (2008);
Mackay and Brookbanks (2020).)
Thereafter, M’Naghten was found not guilty of murder and consigned to Bethlehem
Asylum.
The law is not entirely consistent in Australia’s different jurisdictions, although its core
is still to be found in the M’Naghten formulation (see Loughnan (2012)). The onus of proof
of insanity rests with the accused person (Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions
[1935] AC 362) and accused persons are presumed to be of sound mind until the contrary
is proved (R v Oxford (1840) 9 Car & P 525; 173 ER 941; Taylor v The Queen (1978) 22 ALR
599 at 613; R v S [1979] 2 NSWLR 1 at 61). It appears that there is no comparable
presumption as to a witness in proceedings, although if there is an issue as to the capacity
of a witness to give evidence, in that context the witness will be presumed sane: Anderson
v The Queen (1991) 53 A Crim R 421.
In New South Wales, s 38 of the Mental Health (Forensic Provisions) Act 1990 (NSW)
provides:
(1) If, in an indictment or information, an act or omission is charged against a person
as an offence and it is given in evidence on the trial of the person for the offence
that the person was mentally ill, so as not to be responsible, according to law, for
his or her action at the time when the act was done or omission made, then, if it
appears to the jury before which the person is tried that the person did the act or
made the omission charged, but was mentally ill at the time when the person did
or made the same, the jury must return a special verdict that the accused person
is not guilty by reason of mental illness.
In Victoria, there is a different formulation under s 20 of the Crimes (Mental Impairment and
Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic):
(1) The defence of mental impairment is established for a person charged with an
offence if, at the time of engaging in conduct constituting the offence, the person
was suffering from a mental impairment that had the effect that –
(a) he or she did not know the nature and quality of the conduct; or
774 [10.25.80]
(b) he or she did not know that the conduct was wrong (that is, he or she
could not reason with a moderate degree of sense and composure about
whether the conduct, as perceived by reasonable people, was wrong).
(2) If the defence of mental impairment is established, the person must be found not
guilty because of mental impairment.
In Western Australia, s 27 of the Criminal Code (WA) provides that:

(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission on account of
unsoundness of mind if at the time of doing the act or making the omission he is
in such a state of mental impairment as to deprive him of capacity to understand
what he is doing, or of capacity to control his actions, or of capacity to know that
he ought not to do the act or make the omission.
(2) A person whose mind, at the time of his doing or omitting to do an act, is affected
by delusions on some specific matter or matters, but who is not otherwise
entitled to the benefit of the foregoing provisions of this section, is criminally
responsible for the act or omission to the same extent as if the real state of things
had been such as he was induced by the delusions to believe to exist.
(See also Criminal Code (Cth), s 7.3; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 320; Criminal Code (ACT), s 28;
Criminal Code (NT), s 43C; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA); Criminal Code (Tas),
s 16.)
In Queensland, s 27 of the Criminal Code provides that:
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission if at the time of
doing the act or making the omission the person is in such a state of mental
disease or natural mental infirmity as to deprive the person of capacity to
understand what the person is doing, or of capacity to control the person’s
actions, or of capacity to know that the person ought not to do the act or make
the omission.
(2) A person whose mind, at the time of the person’s doing or omitting to do an act,
is affected by delusions on some specific matter or matters, but who is not
otherwise entitled to the benefit of subsection (1), is criminally responsible for the
act or omission to the same extent as if the real state of things had been such as
the person was induced by the delusions to believe to exist.
The High Court in Hawkins v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 500 at 517 in a joint judgment said:
In principle, the question of insanity falls for determination before the issue of intent. The
basic questions in a criminal trial must be: what did the accused do and is he criminally
responsible for doing it? Those questions must be resolved (the latter by reference either to
s 13 or to s 16) before there is any issue of the specific intent with which the act is done. It
is only when those basic questions are answered adversely to an accused that the issue of
intent is to be addressed. That issue can arise only on the hypothesis that the accused’s
mental condition at the time when the incriminated act was done fell short of insanity
under s 16.
It follows that, if there be evidence that the accused was suffering from a mental
disease when the incriminated act was done and the evidence is capable of supporting a
finding of insanity, the trial judge must give the jury a direction on that issue. Evidence of
mental disease that is incapable of supporting a finding of insanity or that does not satisfy
the jury that the accused was insane when the incriminated act was done, is inadmissible
on, and must be taken to be irrelevant to, the issue whether the act was ‘voluntary’ and
‘intentional’ within the meaning of those terms in s 13 of the Code. But such evidence of
mental disease is relevant to and admissible on the issue of the formation of a specific
intent – relevantly, the intents prescribed by pars (a) and (b) of s 157(1) of the Code.
The authorities on insanity/mental impairment prominently discuss the role of expert

opinions, with many of the major authorities containing evaluation of conflicting expert
evidence.
In Taylor v The Queen (1978) 22 ALR 599 at 616–617, for example, Connor and Franki JJ
held that a jury could not reject unanimous medical evidence where there was no other
[10.25.80] 775
evidence casting doubt on it. Smithers J, in a separate judgment, held (at 608–609) that the
direction given in that case might have induced an impression in the jury that the
distinction it drew between evidence of fact and opinion meant they could decide the
question of insanity on facts other than the opinion stated by the expert witnesses, thus
calling on the latter evidence only if they felt the need to be assisted by it in reaching their
conclusions. Were they to have approached the case in that way, then the jury, his Honour
held, would not have properly understood the evidentiary basis of the case for the
accused where ‘the only real evidentiary basis of that case was that constituted by the
medical opinions considered as evidence of the critical facts’.
In Taylor, Smithers J observed (at 609–610) that in a case where insanity was an issue it
might well be, for practical purposes, that the only evidence on the critical facts bearing on
the question of insanity was to be found in the opinion of the expert witnesses. His
Honour observed (at 611):
Where the fact in issue was the state and capacity of mind and the only evidence thereof is
expert opinion, the jury should understand that where the competence and honesty of the
expert are accepted his skill in the area should be respected and should only be rejected
for good reason. But if the jury are under the impression that on the relevant issue they
must look at the ‘facts’ given in evidence other than by the experts as the source or
primary source of proof of insanity, and that they are not bound by the opinions and are
free to make up their own mind contrary to those opinions, then it is hard to think that
they would be performing their task according to law. And it appears to me that there was
great danger that the impression of the jury would have been that referred to above. If so,
that would explain the verdict which it is reasonable to think was quite unexpected.
However, the standard position is that evaluating the differences between experts on the
question of insanity is a question with which juries are well capable of dealing (see R v
Gemmill (2004) 8 VR 242; [2004] VSCA 72). The fact that such evidence trespasses upon the
‘ultimate issue rule’, in principle a proscribed area of common law (see Ch 2.25), has never
inhibited its admissibility.
The term ‘disease of the mind’ has been accepted by the High Court as being
synonymous with the term ‘mental illness’: R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30 at 53,
approving a passage from R v Radford (1985) 20 A Crim R 388; 42 SASR 266 at 274–275,
where King CJ expressly accepted that the term ‘disease of the mind’ had the same
meaning as ‘mental illness’. Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ approved the following
passage in Rabey v The Queen (1977) 79 DLR (3d) 414 at 430:
In general, the distinction to be drawn is between a malfunctioning of the mind arising
from some cause that is primarily internal to the accused, having its source in his
psychological or emotional make-up, or in some organic pathology, as opposed to a
malfunctioning of the mind which is the transient effect produced by some specific
external factor such as, for example, concussion. Any malfunctioning of the mind, or
mental disorder having its source primarily in some subjective condition or weakness
internal to the accused (whether fully understood or not), may be a ‘disease of the mind’ if
it prevents the accused from knowing what he is doing, but transient disturbances of
consciousness due to certain specific external factors do not fall within the concept of
disease of the mind.
Their Honours held that a temporary mental disorder must not be prone to recur if it is to
avoid classification as a disease of the mind because a malfunction of the mind which is
prone to recur reveals an underlying pathological infirmity (at [24]). This has meant that
conditions such as intoxication (from alcohol or drugs) are excluded from the concept of
‘disease of the mind’ (R v Carter [1959] VR 105 at 110; R v Meddings [1966] VR 306).
A personality disorder has been held not to constitute a ‘disease of the mind’ (R v
Hodge (1985) 19 A Crim R 129). However, it is possible that further research will challenge
this position.
776 [10.25.80]
The concept of ‘knowledge of wrongness’ is difficult. Australia’s major authority on the

issue is that of R v Porter (1933) 55 CLR 182 at 190:
We are not dealing with right or wrong in the abstract. The question is whether he was
able to appreciate the wrongness of the particular act he was doing at the particular time
… If through the disordered condition of the mind he could not reason about the matter
with a moderate degree of sense and composure it may be said that he could not know
that what he was doing was wrong. What is meant by ‘wrong’? What is meant by wrong
is wrong having regard to the everyday standards of reasonable people. If you think that
at the time when he administered the poison to the child he had such a mental disorder or
disturbance or derangement that he was incapable of reasoning about the right or
wrongness, according to ordinary standards, of the thing which he was doing, not that he
reasoned wrongly, or that being a responsible person he had queer or unsound ideas, but
that he was quite incapable of taking into account the considerations which go to make
right or wrong, then you should find him not guilty upon the ground that he was insane
at the time he committed the acts charged. In considering these matters from the point of
view of fact you must be guided by his outward actions to a very large extent. The only
other matter which can help you really is the medical opinion. I think the evidence may be
described as his outward conduct and the medical opinion. It is upon this you must act.
The medical opinion included explanations of the course of mental conditions in human
beings generally.
In conclusion I go back to what I consider the main question of the case and it is
whether you are of the opinion that at the stage of administering the poison to the child
the man whom you are trying had such a mental disorder or diseased intelligence at that
moment that he was disabled from knowing that it was a wrong act to commit in the
sense that ordinary reasonable men understand right and wrong and that he was disabled
from considering with some degree of composure and reason what he was doing and its
wrongness. If you answer that question in his favour you will find him not guilty on the
ground of insanity at the time of the commission of the offence charged.
The same approach was taken by Bongiorno J in R v Martin (No 1) (2005) 159 A Crim R
314; [2005] VSC 518 at [21] (see too Director of Public Prosecutions v Taleski [2007] VSC 183)
in holding that the Crimes (Mental Impairment and Unfitness to be Tried) Act 1997 (Vic) had
not, so far as the defence of mental impairment was concerned, altered the common law
and that the term ‘mental impairment’ is synonymous with the term ‘disease of the mind’.
This led him to conclude on the evidence before him that the condition of cannabis-
induced psychosis was not a disease of the mind which would be such as to entitle the
accused to an acquittal on the ground of mental impairment.
In R v Sebalj [2003] VSC 181, Smith J held that mental impairment means no more and
no less than ‘disease of the mind’ as that concept was used in the common law M’Naghten
defence of insanity.
The term ‘defect of reason’ under R v M’Naghten was viewed in R v Porter (1933) 55
CLR 182 at 185 as involving the accused person’s faculties being ‘disordered’. There needs
to be ‘some diminution or malfunction of the normal capacity for rational thought’
(Howard and Westmore (2005); Bronitt and McSherry (2017) Yennoulidis (2012); Loughnan
(2012)).
While it is orthodox for accused persons seeking to plead insanity or mental
impairment to adduce expert evidence from mental health professionals (usually from
psychiatrists because of the need for a ‘disease of the mind’ to be established), on
occasions the plea has been made in the absence of expert evidence. It is not often
successful. For example, in Lucas v The Queen (1970) 120 CLR 171, it was claimed on behalf
of the accused that, first, due to an excessive consumption of methylated spirits he was in
a state of delirium tremens at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the
offences and, second, some statements attributed to him indicated a lack of comprehension
of events that were taking place. No medical evidence was called as to the existence of any
mental disease or disorder. The court held (at [5]) that:
[10.25.80] 777
Whilst medical evidence may not always be indispensable to the establishment of a

defence of insanity, its absence in this case meant, in our opinion, that the material before
the jury was insufficient to found such a defence. Whilst the jury could have concluded
that the applicant was at relevant times very intoxicated, there was, in our opinion,
nothing on which it could have been concluded that any mental disease or disorder had
supervened so that by reason of that disease or disorder he was unable to know what he
was doing or to appreciate its quality. However, the trial judge left the defence of insanity
to the jury. As we have said, the facts in the case were few and at the time of the summing
up had been but recently evidenced and canvassed before the jury. In our opinion, the trial
judge did not fail adequately in the circumstances of the case to place the defence before
the jury and to instruct them in its legal elements. In so far as leave to appeal may be
necessary, we would refuse it.
In general, there is little forensic advantage in expert evidence being adduced about a
self-induced intoxication which affected an accused person’s mental state, including
whether they were psychotic at the relevant time. When acts are carried out under the
influence of a drug such as ice, the moral culpability of the offender will not be regarded
as lessened (see, eg, Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Gargasoulas [2019] VSC 87 at [150])
and indeed will not afford much ground for elimination or even moderation of general or
specific deterrence (see, eg, Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Gargasoulas [2019] VSC 87
at [151]). The exception in this regard is if it can be contended on behalf of an offender that
the issue of ongoing self-intoxicating conduct has been addressed (eg by their addiction
having been dealt with) and therefore also the threat to the person’s mental state which
generates the risk of dangerousness.
Expert evidence about diminished responsibility

[10.25.120] Diminished responsibility provides a partial defence to murder, reducing it to
manslaughter (see Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501). It exists in different statutory
forms.
In New South Wales, s 23A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) provides that:
(1) A person who would otherwise be guilty of murder is not to be convicted of
murder if:
(a) at the time of the acts or omissions causing the death concerned, the
person’s capacity to understand events, or to judge whether the person’s
actions were right or wrong, or to control himself or herself, was
substantially impaired by an abnormality of mind arising from an
underlying condition, and
(b) the impairment was so substantial as to warrant liability for murder
being reduced to manslaughter.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), evidence of an opinion that an impairment
was so substantial as to warrant liability for murder being reduced to
manslaughter is not admissible.
(3) If a person was intoxicated at the time of the acts or omissions causing the death
concerned, and the intoxication was self-induced intoxication (within the
meaning of section 428A), the effects of that self-induced intoxication are to be
disregarded for the purpose of determining whether the person is not liable to be
convicted of murder by virtue of this section.
(4) The onus is on the person accused to prove that he or she is not liable to be
convicted of murder by virtue of this section.
(5) A person who but for this section would be liable, whether as principal or
accessory, to be convicted of murder is to be convicted of manslaughter instead.
(6) The fact that a person is not liable to be convicted of murder in respect of a death
by virtue of this section does not affect the question of whether any other person
is liable to be convicted of murder in respect of that death.
(7) If, on the trial of a person for murder, the person contends:
778 [10.25.120]
(a) that the person is entitled to be acquitted on the ground that the person
was mentally ill at the time of the acts or omissions causing the death
concerned, or
(b) that the person is not liable to be convicted of murder by virtue of this
section, evidence may be offered by the prosecution tending to prove the
other of those contentions, and the Court may give directions as to the
stage of the proceedings at which that evidence may be offered.
(8) In this section:
underlying condition means a pre-existing mental or physiological condition, other
than a condition of a transitory kind.
By contrast, s 304A of the Queensland Criminal Code 1899 provides that:

(1) When a person who unlawfully kills another under circumstances which, but for
the provisions of this section, would constitute murder, is at the time of doing the
act or making the omission which causes death in such a state of abnormality of
mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of
mind or inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially to
impair the person’s capacity to understand what the person is doing, or the
person’s capacity to control the person’s actions, or the person’s capacity to know
that the person ought not to do the act or make the omission, the person is guilty
of manslaughter only.
(2) On a charge of murder, it shall be for the defence to prove that the person
charged is by virtue of this section liable to be convicted of manslaughter only.
(See also Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 14; Criminal Code (NT), s 37; Bronitt and McSherry
(2017).)
In R v Cheatham [2002] NSWCCA 360 at [112], Smart AJ observed that ‘[j]uries often
find it difficult to understand and deal with the question of diminished responsibility.
They have to wrestle with the psychiatric evidence. It is difficult when experienced
psychiatrists disagree’.
The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, though, has held that medical
evidence is not necessarily required in order to enable the tribunal of fact to determine
whether mental responsibility for the relevant acts has been substantially impaired: R v
Purdy [1982] 2 NSWLR 964 and R v Tumanako (1992) 64 A Crim R 149.
In R v Purdy [1982] 2 NSWLR 964, Glass JA held that it was not necessary that expert
evidence standing alone should be capable of establishing all three ingredients of the
defence (of diminished responsibility). His reasoning, however, clearly treats expert
evidence as normally necessary to establish the ingredient of an abnormality of mind at
the critical time, and the second element of the defence, namely whether that abnormality
was due to one of the specified causes. But his Honour continued (at 966):
If the first and second ingredients of the defence are supported by evidence but not the
third, I consider that the judge could leave to the jury with proper instruction the question
whether his responsibility was substantially impaired for the reason that impairment of
responsibility to a substantial extent is a legal and not medical concept.
Maxwell J agreed with Glass JA; Roden J, in a separate judgment, focused on the issue of
the aetiology of the abnormality of mind. The judgment of Glass JA in R v Purdy was
quoted with approval by Badgery-Parker J in R v Tumanako (1992) 64 A Crim R 149 at 160,
where his Honour held that:
The first two elements in the defence must be established by evidence; but where there is
evidence fit to go to the jury that the accused was suffering an abnormality of mind, and
that that abnormality of mind resulted from one of the specified causes, the question
whether his mental responsibility was thereby substantially impaired may be left to the
jury although there is no evidence directly bearing on that issue [citing Purdy per Glass JA
at 966].
His Honour later added (at 160):
[10.25.120] 779
Because the existence of the first and third elements are matters for determination by the
jury being matters of degree not capable of scientific measurement, and the jury is entitled
to approach them in a broad commonsense way and not necessarily in accordance with
the medical evidence, on neither issue is the jury bound to accept the medical evidence if
there is other material before it which in the judgment of the jury, conflicts with it and
outweighs it.
Badgery-Parker J expressed the view that in respect of the second element of the defence,
the aetiology of the abnormality of mind, that was a matter which must be determined by
expert evidence. Clark JA agreed with the reasons and orders of Badgery-Parker J in
Tumanako, and Gleeson CJ, in a shorter concurring judgment, did not disagree with those
observations.
The third element in the defence of diminished responsibility was considered by
Hunt CJ at CL in R v Trotter (1993) 35 NSWLR 428 at 431:
[T]he tribunal of fact is not bound to accept the medical evidence where there is other
material before it which, in its judgment, conflicts with it and outweighs it [R v Byrne
[1960] 2 QB 396 at 403]. Such material includes the nature of the killing, the conduct of the
accused before, at the time and after the killing and any history of mental abnormality:
Walton [1978] AC 788 at 793. The tribunal is in any event entitled to consider the quality
and the weight of the expert medical evidence (at 793).
(See too R v Majdalawi (2000) 113 A Crim R 241; [2000] NSWCCA 240.)
This led his Honour to observe (at 431):
Those criteria demonstrate why expert medical evidence is not really of great assistance in
determining this crucial question of whether the impairment is substantial. The doctors
are obviously qualified to say whether the extent of the particular impairment to the
accused’s perceptions, judgment and self-control is slight, moderate or extensive, or
somewhere in between, but whether that impairment to the accused’s mental responsibility
for his actions may ‘properly’ be called substantial (in the sense of being such as to
warrant the reduction of the crime from murder to manslaughter) is not a matter within
the expertise of the medical profession. That is a task for the tribunal of fact, which must
approach that task in a broad commonsense way: Byrne (at 404); Walton (at 793). It
involves a value judgment by the jury representing the community (or by a judge where
there is no jury), not a finding of medical fact.
(See too R v Ryan (1995) 90 A Crim R 191 at 195–196; R v Majdalawi (2000) 113 A Crim R
241; [2000] NSWCCA 240 at [10].)
Not surprisingly, then, for the most part courts have been generous in extending
permission to expert witnesses to testify when the defence advanced by the accused
person is that of diminished responsibility: see Mackay and Colman (1991, p 801); Griew
(1988, pp 79–80). As the claim of insanity necessarily relates under the M’Naghten rule to a
‘disease of the mind’, expert evidence is customarily permitted about the accused’s mental
health.
Given that the notion of diminished responsibility relates to the effect of ‘abnormality
of mind’ (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of the
mind or any inherent cause or induced by disease or injury) upon the person’s mental
responsibility for homicide, it is also not surprising that expert evidence is liberally
admitted when the defence is bona fide raised.
There has been considerable case law upon the definition of ‘abnormality of mind’ in
the context of diminished responsibility, and in general an expansive interpretation has
been accorded the expression. An oft-quoted description was given by Lord Parker CJ in R
v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396 at 403:
‘Abnormality of mind’ … means a state of mind so different from that of ordinary human
beings that the reasonable man would term it abnormal. It appears to us to be wide
enough to cover the mind’s activities in all its aspects, not only the perception of physical
780 [10.25.120]
acts and matters, and the ability to form a rational judgment as to whether an act is right
or wrong, but also the ability to exercise will power to control physical acts in accordance
with that rational judgment.
There are also the observations of the court in Galbraith v HM Advocate 2002 JC 1 at 19, to
the following effect:
[A]n individual’s mind may work differently from the mind of a normal person in more
than one way and for more than one reason. The abnormality may mean, for example, that
the individual perceives physical acts and matters differently from a normal person. In
some cases he may suffer from delusions. Or else it may affect his ability to form a rational
judgment as to whether a particular act is right or wrong or to decide whether to perform
it. In a given case any or all of these effects may be operating and may impair the
accused’s ability to determine and control his acts and omissions. The cases of diminished
responsibility recognised by the law in the past do indeed involve abnormality of mind of
this kind and, therefore, fall within this general description. The law responds in this way,
however, because it recognises that the individual is to be pitied since, at the relevant time,
he was not as normal people are. There was unfortunately something far wrong with him,
which affected the way he acted. By contrast, the law makes no such allowance for failings
and emotions, such as anger and jealousy, to which any normal person may be subject
from time to time. They do not call for the law’s compassion. Rather, we must master them
or else face the consequences …
[I]t will not suffice in law for the purpose of this defence of diminished responsibility
merely to show that an accused person has a very short temper, or is unusually excitable
and lacking in self-control. The world would be a very convenient place for criminals and
a very dangerous place for other people, if that were the law.
The general position was stated by Thomas J in R v Whitworth [1989] 1 Qd R 437 at

445–447 in these terms:
There are certain mental qualities and states of mind that for reasons of policy (mainly law
and order) as much as of logic the law will not allow to be put into the balance for the
purpose of this exercise in legal accountability. It now seems reasonably well established
that the law will not recognise the following qualities or states of mind as valid
contributing causes to an abnormal state of mind relied on by an accused –
• Intoxication (temporary effects thereof as distinct from enduring damage occasioned
thereby).
• Normal propensities or emotions such as prejudice, anger, temper, jealousy, or in
general, base natural emotions.
• Particular attitudes or prejudices derived from religious, political or partisan influences.
(See McDermott v Director of Mental Health; Ex parte A-G (Qld) (2007) 175 A Crim R 461;
[2007] QCA 51.)
In New South Wales (see also R v Cheatham [2002] NSWCCA 360) in R v Ryan (1995) 90
A Crim R 191 at 195, Hunt CJ at CL, with the concurrence of the other members of the
court, said:
The particular aspects of mind to which attention is usually paid in relation to this defence
are the accused’s perception of events, his ability to form a rational (or sensible) judgment
as to whether his actions were right or wrong, and his capacity to exercise willpower to
control his physical actions in accordance with rational (or sensible) judgment. Such
perception, ability and capacity vary widely in normal people. An abnormality of mind
exists where there is a deviation from the range over which they may vary in normal
people. A person’s mental responsibility for his actions concerns the extent to which his
mind is answerable for his physical acts, and it too involves the extent of that person’s
ability to exercise willpower to control his physical actions. That mental responsibility is
impaired if it is diminished by reason of that abnormality of mind.
However, it has been said that the inherent cause must be one of ‘some continuance in
contrast to a mere temporary origination’: R v McGarvie (1986) 5 NSWLR 270 at 272. It
probably includes the impact of a wide variety of psychosocial factors upon the accused’s
[10.25.120] 781
state of mind: see R v Whitworth [1989] 1 Qd R 437; Rose v The Queen [1961] AC 496 at 507;
R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396 at 403. The nub of the issue is that psychological and
psychosocial factors, which will properly be permitted to be the subject of expert evidence
in the diminished responsibility context, must be of a kind that exceed the experience and
phenomena that fall within the wide range of normal persons’ experience.
In R v GMB (2002) 130 A Crim R 187, Chesterman J, sitting as the Mental Health
Tribunal of Queensland, held that a personality disorder did not constitute an abnormality
of mind for the purposes of s 304A of the Criminal Code 1899 (Qld). However, in R v
Dietschmann [2003] UKHL 10, the House of Lords assumed or accepted that an adjustment
disorder could constitute an abnormality of mind.
An important illustration of the extent to which expert evidence on the issue of
diminished responsibility will be permitted is found in R v Trotter (1993) 35 NSWLR 428
(see also R v Ryan (1995) 90 A Crim R 191 per Hunt CJ at CL). The accused, whose
intelligence was assessed as falling in the bottom 1% of the population, was charged with
the rape and murder of a two-and-a-half-year-old boy. On a number of occasions, he made
telling admissions to police. However, he pleaded diminished responsibility at his trial
(before judge alone) and both defence and prosecution sought to call expert evidence
about the capacity of the accused to control his actions in light of his suffering from
schizophrenia and being borderline intellectually disabled.
Hunt CJ determined (at 430) that he had three issues to decide:
(1) Was the accused at the relevant time suffering from an abnormality of mind of the
type described in s 23A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW)?
(2) Did that abnormality of mind impair his mental responsibility for his act?
(3) Was that impairment substantial?
His Honour noted (at 430) that the particular aspects of mind to which attention is usually
paid in this context are ‘the accused’s perception of events, his ability to form a rational (or
sensible) judgment as to whether his actions were right or wrong, and his capacity to
exercise the willpower to control his physical actions in accordance with rational (or
sensible) judgment’. He found an ‘abnormality of mind’ to exist where there is a deviation
from the range over which perception, ability and capacity vary in normal people. He held
that a person’s mental responsibility for his actions concerns ‘the extent to which his mind
is answerable for his physical acts, and it too involves the extent of that person’s ability to
exercise willpower to control his physical actions’ (see R v Byrne [1960] 2 QB 396 at 403).
He found that such mental responsibility is impaired if it is diminished by reason of that
abnormality of mind.
This approach left the scope for expert evidence quite wide. Hunt CJ held that
although the word ‘responsibility’ in the expression ‘mental responsibility’ ‘appears to
introduce a non-medical value judgment’, an expert witness would in any view be able to
give evidence that, for example, the accused’s perception of his capacity to exercise
willpower to control his physical actions was impaired (at 431).
It is clear that the impairment, to be substantial, may be less than total, but it must be
more than trivial or minimal (R v Ryan (1995) 90 A Crim R 191 per Hunt CJ at CL). It has
been held that a temporary state of alcoholic or narcotic intoxication does not fall within
the relevant categories permitted by statute: R v Jones (1986) 22 A Crim R 42 at 44.
However, it may be that a craving by an accused for alcohol may be such as to amount to
an abnormality of mind either (a) where the alcoholism has reached a level at which the
accused’s brain has been damaged so that there is gross impairment of judgment and
emotional responses even when sober; or (b) where the craving is such as to render the
use of alcohol (and its consequential impairment of judgment and emotional response)
involuntary, so that the accused is no longer able to resist the impulse to consume alcohol:
see R v Tandy [1989] 1 WLR 350 at 356.
782 [10.25.120]
Abnormality of mind is a complex and compendious concept. As a mind cannot be

examined under a microscope, the decision about whether there is an abnormality of mind
will ordinarily be made by observing how the relevant person acts and by inferring from
that whether he or she has an abnormality of mind and that it is of a particular kind. A
jury is at liberty to reject expert evidence suggesting abnormality of mind manifesting in
impulsiveness constituting diminished responsibility: R v Gieselmann (unreported, NSW
Court of Criminal Appeal, 12 November 1996). Extremes of emotion, such as anger or
jealousy, are not abnormalities of mind: see R v Whitworth [1989] 1 Qd R 437 at 446. It
probably does not include a personality disorder (see R v GMB (2002) 130 A Crim R 187 at
198), although it is possible that a severe personality disorder (such as an antisocial
personality disorder verging on or equating to psychopathy) could so qualify.
Expert evidence about automatism/involuntariness

[10.25.160] Automatism is a complete defence, entitling an accused person to a finding of
not guilty – it goes to the voluntariness of the acts of the accused: see Ryan v The Queen
(1969) 121 CLR 205 at 213, 216–217 per Barwick CJ. There is a distinction between an
‘unwilled act’ and ‘a willed act the product of a diseased mind which knows not the
nature or quality of the willed act’ (Ryan v The Queen (1969) 121 CLR 205 at 215). (See,
further, Bronitt and McSherry (2017); Yannoulidis (2012).) Under the traditional common
law, a distinction was made between sane and insane automatism based upon whether the
accused had a ‘disease of the mind’. The tests to determine whether there is such a disease
are:
• the recurrent/continuing danger test – if a condition is prone to recur, it should be
regarded as a disease of the mind (see, eg, R v Kemp [1957] 1 QB 399 at 407; R v Stone
[1999] 2 SCR 290; see also McSherry (1993));
• the internal/external test – if the mental state is internal to the accused, as against
arising from an external cause, it should be regarded as a disease of the mind (see, eg,
Rabey v The Queen (1981) 54 CCC 1; but see R v Quick [1973] QV 910; R v Hennessy [1989]
1 WLR 287); and
• the sound/unsound mind test – if a mind is unsound, such as by reason of dissociation,
it should be regarded as subject to a disease of the mind (see, eg, R v Radford (1985) 20
A Crim R 388; 42 SASR 266; R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30 at 55).
In Bratty v Attorney-General for Northern Ireland [1963] AC 386 at 402, Viscount Kilmuir
described automatism as ‘action without any knowledge of acting, or action with no
consciousness of doing what was being done’. Examples of cases in which such a
disjunction between mind and body has been found include acts done in the course of:
• an involuntary reflex action or spasm: Ryan v The Queen (1969) 121 CLR 205 at 215;
• an epileptic fit: R v Sullivan [1984] 1 AC 156; R v Youssef (1990) 50 A Crim R 1;
• sleep: R v Burgess [1991] 2 WLR 1206; Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 1992) [1993] 4
All ER 683; R v Parks (1992) 75 CCC (3d) 287;
• a state of concussion: Re Wakefield (1958) 75 WN (NSW) 66; R v Wogandt (1988) 33 A
Crim R 31;
• hypoglaecemia from too much insulin: R v Quick [1973] 1 QB 91; cf the hyperglaecemia
cases: see, eg, R v Hennessy [1989] 1 WLR 287; and
• dissociation arising from a psychological blow: see, eg, R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30.
Thus, in R v Haywood [1971] VR 755, psychiatric evidence was permitted about the
capacity of a 15-year-old boy to act voluntarily after consumption of whisky and Valium.
Similarly, in R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30, the Australian High Court found to be
admissible evidence from psychiatrists that the conduct of the accused man was consistent
with non-insane automatism and that psychological stress and conflict had produced a
[10.25.160] 783
state of dissociation: see also Rabey v The Queen [1980] 2 SCR 513 at 552. Deane, Dawson,
Toohey and Gaudron JJ expressed the view that the defence of sane automatism exists
only when the actions of the accused are involuntary because of the operation of events
upon a sound mind. The minority, however (Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ),
propounded a special test in relation to automatism when it was claimed to be the result
of a malfunction of the mind, requiring the accused to prove (inevitably by expert
evidence) (1) that the malfunction was transient; (2) that is was caused by physical or
psychological trauma, which the mind of an ordinary person would be likely not to have
withstood; and (3) that is was unlikely to recur.
The court held that the personality and the state of mind of the accused, before being
subjected to physical or psychological trauma causing the alleged malfunction, was
relevant to the question whether the proscribed act was in fact accompanied by an exercise
of the will.
Expert evidence about provocation

[10.25.180] Other than in Victoria, provocation operates as a partial defence to murder,
reducing the charge to manslaughter. It exists at common law in South Australia and
under statute in the Australian Capital Territory (Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 13); New South
Wales (Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 23); the Northern Territory (Criminal Code (NT), s 158);
and Queensland (Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 304). The defence has been abolished in
Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia, although in Western Australia it is retained in
relation to assault offences (see Bronitt and McSherry (2017), paras 5.10–5.75).
Where the test does exist, in general, there must be:
• provocative conduct;
• loss of self-control as a result of the provocation; and
• provocation such that it was capable of causing an ordinary person to lose self-control
and to act in the way that the accused did.
(See R v Muy Ky Chhay (1994) 72 A Crim R 1 at 13; Parker v The Queen (1964) 111 CLR 665
at 679; Moffa v The Queen (1977) 138 CLR 601 at 620–621; Green v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR
334; Stingel v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 312 at 334; Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183
CLR 58 at 66.)
There is limited scope for expert evidence – both as to the likelihood of loss of
self-control on the part of the individual, and to the third objective limb of the test.
Expert evidence about testamentary capacity

[10.25.200] A person has capacity to make a will (testamentary capacity) if, at the relevant
time, the person had capacity:
• to comprehend the nature of what he or she was doing and its effects;
• to comprehend the extent and character of the property with which he or she was
dealing; and
• to comprehend and weigh the claims to which he or she ought to give effect. (See
Brokenshire v Equity Trustees Executors & Agency Company Ltd (1998) 8 VR 659; [1998]
VSC 183 at [8].)
For a deceased person to have acted with testamentary capacity, he or she must have acted
with sound mind, memory and understanding with reference to the particular will: Kantor
v Vosahlo [2004] VSCA 235 at [49]. Where the evidence as a whole is sufficient to throw a
doubt upon the testator’s competency, then the court must decide against the validity of
the will unless it is satisfied affirmatively that the testator was of sound mind, memory
784 [10.25.180]
and understanding when he or she executed it: Bull v Fulton (1942) 66 CLR 295 at 343; see
too Worth v Clasohm (1952) 86 CLR 439 at 453; Seeley v Back – Estate of John Michael Pegus
Seeley [2005] NSWSC 68 at [19].
Longstanding law establishes that it is relevant for a court to consider whether there
was a disorder of the mind which may have poisoned the ‘affections’ of the testator,
perverted his or her ‘sense of right’, or prevented the exercise of his or her ‘natural
faculties’, which may have led to a disposal of his or her property which would not have
been made if the person’s ‘mind had been sound’ (Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549 at
565; see also Bailey v Bailey (1924) 34 CLR 558 at 570–572; Bull v Fulton (1942) 66 CLR 295 at
339, 343; In the Will of Wilson (1897) 23 VLR 197 at 199; Timbury v Coffee (1941) 66 CLR 277).
It is not enough that a delusion existed. The important issue is whether it had the
proscribed influence on the dispositions made (Banks v Goodfellow at 571). The inquiry
identified by Williams J in Timbury v Coffee (1941) 66 CLR 277 at 280 is whether ‘the
delusion overmastered the judgment at the time of executing the will to such an extent as
to render him incapable of making a reasonable and proper disposition of his property or
of taking a rational view of the matters to be considered in making a will’ (see also Seeley
v Back – Estate of John Michael Pegus Seeley [2005] NSWSC 68 at [19]).
Santow J, in Easter v Griffith (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 17 June 1994), after a
review of authority and relevant literature, concluded that ‘the concept of “insane
delusion”’ today means:
incorrigibility of a belief whose falseness is not amenable to appeals of reasons … [T]he
delusion must be tested by objective evidence as to it being fixed, false and incorrigible
such that the testator could not be reasoned out of it. Such delusions or disorders of the
mind thus go beyond mere eccentricity, or vindictiveness or irrationality, though these
may be evidence pointing with other material, to lack of testamentary capacity.
(See too Scattini v Matters [2004] QSC 459 at [93].)

The test prescribed by the law sets the minimum standard to be satisfied for
testamentary capacity. As was said by Powell J in Re Estate of Hodges; Shorter v Hodges
(1988) 14 NSWLR 698 at 705:
[T]he locus classicus for the test of whether or not a person has testamentary capacity is
the judgment of Cockburn CJ in Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549) in which case his
Lordship said (at 565): ‘… It is essential to the exercise of such a power’ (scil, testamentary
power) ‘that a testator shall understand the nature of the act and its effects; shall
understand the extent of the property of which he is disposing; shall be able to
comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect; and with a view to
the latter object, that no disorder of the mind shall poison his affections, pervert his sense
of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties – that no insane delusion shall
influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about it a disposal of it which, if
the mind had been sound, would not have been made’.
(See too Shorten v Shorten [2001] NSWSC 100.)

Further, in Bull v Fulton (1942) 66 CLR 295, Williams J said (at 341ff): ‘A sound and
disposing mind is one which is able to reflect upon the claims of the several persons who,
by nature, or through other circumstances, may be supposed to have claims on the
testator’s bounty and the power of considering the several claims and determining in
what proportions the property shall be divided between the Claimants.’
In Banks v Goodfellow (1870) LR 5 QB 549 at 566, Cockburn CJ (giving the judgment of
the court) dealt with unsoundness of mind arising from ‘the decay of advancing age, as
distinguished from mental derangement’ and commented (at 566) that:
in these cases it is admitted on all hands that though the mental power may be reduced
below the ordinary standard, yet if there be sufficient intelligence to understand and
appreciate the testamentary capacity in its different bearings, the power to make a will
[10.25.200] 785
remain. It is enough if, to use the words of Sir Edward Williams, in his work on executors,
‘the mental facilities retain sufficient strength fully to comprehend the testamentary act
about to be done’.
The court then went on to refer to United States authorities. The first was the case of
Harridan v Rowan 3 Washington at 585, where the court, after referring to the usual three
aspects, said:
It is not necessary that he should view his will with the eye of a lawyer, and comprehend
its provisions in legal form. It is sufficient if he has such a mind and memory as will
enable him to understand the elements of which it is composed, and the disposition of his
property in its simple forms. In deciding upon the capacity of the testator to make his will,
it is the soundness of the mind and not the particular state of the bodily health, that is to
be attended to; the latter may be in a state of extreme imbecility and yet he may possess
sufficient understanding to direct how his property shall be disposed of; his capacity may
be perfect to dispose of his property by will, and yet very inadequate to the management
of other business, as, for instance, to make contracts for the purchase or sale of property.
For, most men, at different periods of their lives have meditated upon the subject of the
disposition of their property by will, and when called upon to have their intentions
committed to writing, they find much less difficulty in declaring their intentions than they
could in comprehending business in some measure new.
The issue was taken up in Den v Vancleve 5 NJL at 660 (1819), where it was stated:
By the terms ‘a sound and disposing mind and memory’, it has not been understood that
a testator must possess these qualities of the mind in the highest degree; otherwise, very
few could make testaments at all; neither has it been understood that he must possess
them in as great a degree as he may have formerly done; for even this would disable most
men in the decline of life; the mind may have been in some degree debilitated, the
memory may have become in some degree enfeebled; and yet there may be enough left
clearly to discern and discreetly to judge, of all those things and all those circumstances
which enter into nature of a rational, fair and just testament.
As to memory, it was said in the next case referred to, Stevens v Vancleve 4 Wash CC 262 at
267 (1822):
He must have memory; the man in whom the facility is totally extinguished cannot be said
to possess understanding to any degree whatever, or for any purpose. But his memory
may be very imperfect; it may be greatly impaired by age or disease; he may not able at all
times to recollect the names, the persons, or the families of those with whom he has been
intimately acquainted; may at times ask idle questions, and repeat those which had before
been asked and answered, and yet his understanding may be sufficiently sound for many
of the ordinary transactions of life. He may not have sufficient strength or memory and
vigour of intellect to make and to digest all parts of the contract, and yet be competent to
direct the distribution of his property by will. This is a subject which he may possibly have
often thought of and there is probably no person who has not arranged such a disposition
in his mind before he committed it to writing … To sum up the whole in the most simple
and intelligible form, were his mind and memory sufficiently sound to enable him to
know and to understand the business in which he was engaged at the time he executed
his will?
(See also Bailey v Bailey (1924) 34 CLR 558 at 566.)

Whether the testamentary decision is caused by delusion or harsh judgment will be a
matter of degree in all the circumstances (Walsh v Legge (unreported, NSW Supreme Court,
Cohen J, 12 March 1997)).
A modern restatement of the test in Banks v Goodfellow is found in Read v Carmody
(unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 23 July 1998) per Powell JA, which is set out in
Grynberg v Muller [2001] NSWSC 532 at [18] and Conroy v Unsworth-Smith [2004] QSC 81 at
[83]:
It is clear from the first of the passages in Brownie J’s Judgment which I have set out above
that his Honour was aware of the various matters which he was required to consider in
786 [10.25.200]
determining whether or not at the relevant time the deceased had testamentary capacity.
Those matters have, over the years, been expressed in varying forms and in differing
language, but all formulations seem agreed that ‘testamentary capacity’ encompasses the
following concepts:
1 that the testator – or testatrix – is aware, and appreciates the significance, of the
act in the law which he – or she – is about to embark upon;
2 that the testator – or testatrix – is aware, at least in general terms, of the nature,
and extent, and value, of the estate over which he – or she – has a disposing
power;
3 that the testator – or testatrix – is aware of those or (sic) may reasonably be
thought to have a claim upon his – or her – testamentary bounty, and the basis
for, and nature of, the claims of such persons;
4 that the testator – or testatrix – has the ability to evaluate, and to discriminate
between, the respective strengths of the claims of such persons.
Expert evidence on the issue of testamentary capacity is given by a variety of experts:

• psychiatrists;
• psycho-geriatricians;
• geriatricians;
• neurologists;
• palliative care physicians;
• neuropsychologists;
• psychologists; and
• general practitioners.
There is no hierarchy of authority in terms of the different categories of experts. The
different perspectives of such professionals can be influenced by a wide variety of factors
(see Champine (2006)). The authority of any given expert depends on the circumstances of
the case and the particular knowledge of the expert in terms of their capacity to assist the
court to determine the question of the testator’s capacity. In Brokenshire v Equity Trustees
Executors & Agency Company Ltd (1998) 8 VR 659; [1998] VSC 183 at [125], for instance,
Smith J made the following findings:
1. A person can have dementia and paranoid ideation and still have testamentary
capacity. The presence of the former does not necessarily negate testamentary
capacity.
2. There can be catastrophic and sudden deterioration in the condition of the
dementia.
3. Paranoid ideation can be discreet. It tends to relate to specific and discreet areas.
Thus the fact that the testatrix may have shown a degree of paranoid ideation in
relation to neighbours did not mean that she had any such paranoid ideation in
relation to family members.
4. Paranoid ideation is often a suspiciousness, a doubt, which is amenable to reason
or to challenge. A delusional belief is a fixed illogical belief which is not
challenged or questioned by the patient.
5. A patient may have delusional beliefs, may have hallucinations, may have a
psychotic disorder but still be quite capable of identifying what they own and
who might have a claim on their bounty. The presence of psychotic ideation and
delusional beliefs do not preclude the person having reason in other areas.
6. With short term memory deficiencies it is possible to remember current events
and plans if they are linked in some way to long term memory items and
particularly when they are seen by the person to be important.
In Bailey v Bailey (1924) 34 CLR 558 at 572, Isaacs J expressed the view that ‘[t]he opinion of
witnesses as to the testamentary capacity of the alleged testator is usually for various
[10.25.200] 787
reasons of little weight on the direct issue’ and also that while the opinions of the attesting
witnesses that the testator was competent are ‘not without some weight, the court must
judge from the facts they state and not from their opinions’.
In Re Estate of Griffith; Easter v Griffith (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 7 June 1995),
Kirby P said:
In judging the will propounded, and the challenge to it, the Court must consider all of the
facts proved which are relevant to the testamentary capacity of the testator. It must not be
deflected into a consideration of medical evidence, still less of jargon, as to whether
particular conditions, such as a ‘delusion’ or ‘paranoia’ have been established. Such
evidence is only relevant as it throws light on the Court’s responsibility to decide whether
the testator has appreciated the extent of the property to be disposed of; realised the
various calls for disposition to which consideration should be given; and was able to
evaluate those calls to give effect to the resulting dispositions by the provisions of the will
… There is nothing excessively technical in any of these considerations. What the Court is
asked to do is to determine, on all the evidence, whether for the purpose for which the law
provides and protects testamentary freedom, the testator had the capacity to give effect to
the legal privilege.
On occasion, there is the difficult situation of experts proffering views in the absence of
having seen the testator at the relevant time, but having examined contemporaneous
hospital records and considered the palliatory drug regime which the testator was on at
the time he or she executed the disputed documentation: see, eg, Theophanous v Gillespie
[2001] QSC 177 at [23].
In R v Palmer [1981] 1 NSWLR 209 at 214, Glass JA held that the ‘true’ ultimate issue
rule ‘is that no evidence can be received upon any question, the answer to which involves
the application of a legal standard. It is not possible, for example, to tender evidence that
a defendant was negligent, that a deceased lacked testamentary capacity or that the
accused was provoked. These are questions, the answers to which can only be given by
the jury after the judge has instructed them upon a rule of law which they must apply’.
However, while it may be good practice for experts to refrain from giving answers on the
ultimate matters which the trier of fact has to decide, the passage of s 80 of the uniform
evidence legislation and modern practice mean that such evidence is generally permitted
(see Ch 2.25).
788 [10.25.200]
Chapter 10.30
SYNDROME EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [10.30.01]
Psychological syndromes ..................................................................................................... [10.30.50]
Battered woman syndrome evidence ................................................................................ [10.30.100]
Self-defence ............................................................................................................................. [10.30.110]
Provocation ............................................................................................................................. [10.30.120]
Duress ...................................................................................................................................... [10.30.130]
Sentencing ............................................................................................................................... [10.30.140]
The Walker model of battered woman syndrome .......................................................... [10.30.150]
Battered person syndrome? ................................................................................................. [10.30.160]
Controversies about the syndrome .................................................................................... [10.30.170]
Criminal law .......................................................................................................................... [10.30.220]
Administrative law ............................................................................................................... [10.30.230]
Likely developments ............................................................................................................. [10.30.240]
Rape trauma syndrome evidence: The genesis of the term .......................................... [10.30.300]
Development of the thesis ................................................................................................... [10.30.310]
Likely Australasian developments ..................................................................................... [10.30.330]
Battered child/Shaken baby syndrome evidence
Battered child/Shaken baby syndrome evidence ........................................................... [10.30.400]
Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) evidence
Controversies .......................................................................................................................... [10.30.450]
United States authorities ...................................................................................................... [10.30.460]
New Zealand authorities ..................................................................................................... [10.30.470]
Canadian authorities ............................................................................................................. [10.30.480]
Australian authorities ........................................................................................................... [10.30.490]
Tasmanian authority ............................................................................................................. [10.30.500]
New South Wales authority ................................................................................................ [10.30.510]
South Australian authority .................................................................................................. [10.30.520]
Victorian authority ................................................................................................................ [10.30.530]
Queensland authority ........................................................................................................... [10.30.540]
Australian statutory reform ................................................................................................. [10.30.550]
Likely Australasian developments ..................................................................................... [10.30.560]
Repressed memory syndrome and false memory syndrome evidence
Repressed memory syndrome ............................................................................................ [10.30.600]
False memory syndrome ...................................................................................................... [10.30.610]
Repression ............................................................................................................................... [10.30.620]
The critique of repressed memory ..................................................................................... [10.30.630]
American Psychiatric Association Statement ................................................................... [10.30.640]
Australian Psychological Society guidelines .................................................................... [10.30.650]
Steps toward consensus ....................................................................................................... [10.30.660]
Legal issues ............................................................................................................................ [10.30.670]
Canadian authority: R v Norman ........................................................................................ [10.30.680]
New Zealand authority: R v R ........................................................................................... [10.30.690]
Common law evidentiary hurdles to admissibility ........................................................ [10.30.710]
The common knowledge rule ............................................................................................. [10.30.720]
The area of expertise rule .................................................................................................... [10.30.730]
Statutory evidentiary hurdles to admissibility ................................................................ [10.30.760]
789
Premenstrual syndrome evidence

Premenstrual syndrome evidence ...................................................................................... [10.30.800]
Parental alienation syndrome evidence
Parental alienation syndrome evidence ............................................................................ [10.30.850]
Criticisms of parental alienation syndrome ..................................................................... [10.30.860]
Forensic application of parental alienation syndrome ................................................... [10.30.870]
English authority ................................................................................................................... [10.30.880]
European Association for Psychotherapy ......................................................................... [10.30.895]
The future ............................................................................................................................... [10.30.900]
‘[Syndrome evidence] is aimed at an area where the purported

common knowledge of the jury may be very much mistaken,
an area where jurors’ logic, drawn from their own experience,
may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion, an area where
expert knowledge would enable the jurors to disregard their
prior conclusions as being common myths rather than
common knowledge.
State v Kelly 478 A 2d 364 at 378 (1984).
Introduction
[10.30.01] In the course of the 1980s and 1990s, a series of “novel” forms of psychological
evidence was introduced into the courts. Most prominent among these were battered
woman syndrome evidence, rape trauma syndrome evidence, battered child/shaken baby
syndrome evidence, child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome evidence, repressed
memory syndrome evidence, false memory syndrome evidence, parental alienation
syndrome evidence, premenstrual syndrome evidence, and parental alienation syndrome
evidence. This chapter analyses the empirical bases for the adducing of such information,
the case law that developed and its legacy for the admissibility of such evidence.
Psychological syndromes
[10.30.50] A substantial sequence of decisions in the United States, Canada, the United
Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand required the courts to determine the admissibility
of what has become known as “novel psychological evidence” or “syndrome evidence”.
These terms refer to expert evidence, given by forensic psychologists and, less often,
forensic psychiatrists (and occasionally by counsellors, psychiatric nurses and even
criminologists) about certain forms of behaviour which are said to be indicative of
stressors suffered by particular classes of victims (battered women, molested children,
victims of rape, survivors of conflicts etc).
Sometimes such evidence is offered by the defence in a criminal trial to support claims
of self-defence, provocation and duress. Sometimes the evidence is led by the prosecution
as circumstantial evidence that a complainant has been the victim of sexual assault,
molestation or physical abuse. Occasionally, expert evidence about the absence of such
symptoms is led by the defence to suggest, for instance, that an alleged victim has
consented to sexual intercourse.
Syndrome evidence can directly or indirectly impact upon the alleged victim’s credit
and the credibility of his or her claims. Sometimes the expert evidence is led as to the
nature of post-traumatic behaviour generally, and the jury is left to relate the expert
evidence to the particular complainant or accused person. It can also be led on the ground
that it will educate the jury about the behaviour that can be expected of persons who
become the victims of particular forms of stress and to disabuse them of common
misconceptions about battered or molested children or adults.
Many controversies attend the admissibility of syndrome evidence. These relate to
whether the evidence is necessary or helpful; whether it is reliable in the sense of being
scientifically sound; whether it is, in fact, evidence about credibility; whether it is
oath-helping; and whether it trespasses unduly on the ultimate issues to be decided by the
790 [10.30.01]
Syndrome evidence | CH 10.30
trier of fact. Much depends upon the extent to which the syndrome evidence is provided
as “social framework evidence” (see Bradfield (2002)) or “counterintuitive evidence” or
“myth-dispelling evidence”, as against evidence about whether a particular complainant’s
claims should be accepted. However, insofar as it is proffered as evidence aimed to assist
the task of the trier of fact by factoring out potential sources of fact-finding error and
enhancing understanding about phenomena such as responses of victims to abuse, much
depends upon the scientific basis of the evidence, as well as the extent to which the
evidence actually operates to provide information needed to overcome community
misunderstandings: see, eg, Reddy et al (1997). Courts have differed as to the existence of
levels of societal awareness about a range of phenomena whose characteristics the
syndromes have sought to address: cf, for instance, R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114; C v
The Queen (1993) 60 SASR 467; S v The Queen (2001) 125 A Crim R 526; [2001] QCA 501.
The main kinds of expert evidence fitting into the category of psychological syndrome
are:
• rape trauma syndrome;
• battered woman syndrome (also known as “battered wife syndrome” or “battered
spouse syndrome”); see also “the psychological impact of prolonged exposure to
domestic violence” (Liyanage v Western Australia (2017) 51 WAR 359; [2017] WASCA 112
at [82]); “intimate partner violence” (R v Tarrant [2018] NSWSC 774 at [45]);
• battered child syndrome;
• battering child syndrome: see McCord (1987, p 52);
• child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome: see McCormack (1993); Meyers (1989);
Summit (1983); Gardner (1992);
• parental alienation syndrome: see below, [10.30.850];
• premenstrual syndrome: see Easteal (1991); Spitzer et al (1989); McArthur (1989); Boorse
(1987); Luckhaus (1985); Mulligan (1983); Dalton (1983); Carney and Williams (1983);
Press (1983); Horney (1978);
• repressed memory syndrome;
• false memory syndrome;
• XYY chromosome syndrome: see McCord (1987, p 67); Melton et al (1997, pp 224–225);
• post-traumatic stress syndrome: see American Psychiatric Association (2000);
• pathological gamblers’ syndrome: see McCord (1987, p 66);
• Vietnam Veterans’ syndrome: see McCord (1987, p 64); and
• cult-indoctrinee syndrome: see Delgado (1977); for an analysis, see Freckelton (1998);
Corrado, Dempster and Roesch (2013).
This chapter profiles the nine syndromes (battered woman syndrome, rape trauma
syndrome, battered child/shaken baby syndrome, child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome, repressed memory syndrome, false memory syndrome, parental alienation
syndrome, premenstrual syndrome and parental alienation syndrome) that have thus far
have been the most significant of the forensic syndromes. Six of the syndromes may be
divided into syndromes that are primarily “prosecution” and “defence” syndromes, as
shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Syndrome evidence in criminal cases *

Prosecution case Defence case
Accused not suffering battered woman Accused suffering battered woman
syndrome syndrome
[10.30.50] 791
Prosecution case Defence case

Victim suffering battered woman Victim not suffering battered woman
syndrome syndrome
Complainant suffering rape trauma Victim not suffering rape trauma
syndrome syndrome
Accused not suffering rape trauma Accused suffering rape trauma syndrome
syndrome
Complainant suffering battered child Complainant not suffering battered child
syndrome/child sexual abuse accommoda- syndrome/child sexual abuse accommoda-
tion syndrome tion syndrome
Complainant suffering repressed memory Complainant suffering false memory
syndrome syndrome
Accused not suffering premenstrual Accused suffering premenstrual
syndrome syndrome
Accused not suffering cult indoctrinee Accused suffering cult indoctrinee
syndrome syndrome
*
Major use of syndrome evidence is in bold type.
The syndrome phenomenon is often viewed in isolation. This is not helpful, as many of
the syndromes are interrelated and came from a similar wellspring in terms of ideological
and cultural changes occurring generally within the community and, in turn, having
expression in the legal framework: see generally Freckelton (2001).
Battered woman syndrome evidence

[10.30.100] Battered woman syndrome evidence is expert evidence that purports to give
an insight into the effects of long-term, repeated domestic violence upon a victim’s
reactions to threats, provocation and physical or mental cruelty from her assailant. The
question whether the woman had been battered is not the issue; the question is whether a
defence such as provocation or self-defence is made out: Osland v The Queen (1998) 197
CLR 316; [1998] HCA 75 at [59] per Gaudron and Gummow JJ, at [165] per Kirby J; Malott
v The Queen (1998) 155 DLR (4th) 513 at 527; Ruka v The Queen [1997] 1 NZLR 154 at
173–174; R v Thornton (No 2) [1996] 2 All ER 1023 at 1030. It is used to assist in the defences
of self-defence, provocation and duress to explain why a victim of domestic violence
would react in a way that another person from a more “normal” domestic environment
would not – why she might perceive danger or threats where others might not; why she
might perceive them as being more imminent or threatening than others might; or why
she might succumb to pressure when others might stand firm: see Lavallee v The Queen
[1990] 1 SCR 852; (1990) 55 CCC (3d) 97; R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114; R v Lorenz
(unreported, ACT Supreme Court, 18 August 1998); see further Bradfield (1998); Crocker
(1985); Edmond (2003). In Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; [1998] HCA 75 at [169],
Kirby J held that the battered woman syndrome evidence can be offered as relevant to
questions such as:
(1) why a person subjected to prolonged and repeated abuse would remain in such a
relationship; (2) the nature and extent of the violence that may exist in such a relationship
before producing a response; (3) the accused’s ability, in such a relationship, to perceive
danger from the abuser; and (4) whether, in the evidence, the particular accused believed
on reasonable grounds that there was no other way to preserve herself or himself from
death or serious bodily harm than by resorting to the conduct giving rise to the charge.
Kirby J found (at [167]) that the “greatest relevance” of battered woman syndrome (BWS)
evidence:
792 [10.30.100]
will usually concern the process of “traumatic bonding” which may occur in abusive
relationships. This phenomenon has been observed in the circumstances to which
evidence of BWS may relate. But it has also been described as between battered children
and their parents, hostages and their captors and prisoners in a concentration camp and
their guards.
(See also Lavallee v The Queen [1990] 1 SCR 852; (1990) 55 CCC (3d) 97.)
The syndrome has also been regarded as a mitigating factor able to be summoned to
aid in the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings: see R v Woolsey (unreported, NSW
Supreme Court, 19 August 1993); R v Taylor (unreported, SA Supreme Court, 3 February
1994); R v Suluape [2002] NZCA 6; R v Scott [2003] NSWSC 627; R v O’Brien [2003]
NSWCCA 121. The related notion of “intimate partner violence” has regularly been taken
into account at sentencing: see, eg, R v Tarrant [2018] NSWSC 774 at [214]; R v TP [2018]
NSWSC 369; Director of Public Prosecutions v Williams [2014] VSC 304 at [20]–[26]. Thus, the
primary function of the evidence is to be counterintuitive – to remove potential sources of
error, born of misunderstanding, from the fact-finding process.
In the administrative and civil law contexts, battered woman syndrome has a potential
relevance in criminal injuries compensation applications and actions for damages to
establish why a victim might have perceived an incident in a more threatening way
because of her intimate knowledge of her partner’s pattern of domestic violence than
might a stranger to the situation. It may also have a relevance in terms of establishing that
a woman’s failure to remove herself from the traumatic context should not be regarded as
indicative of her not having been gravely traumatised by a previous act of violence for
which she is seeking compensation or damages.
The fact that many women have killed or assaulted the violent partner in their
domestic relationships after a lull in violence is often explicable in terms of the power
dynamics of the situation, including disparities in strength, perceived absence of
alternatives, and expectation of the imminence of danger based on women’s intimate
understanding of their assailants (see Craven (2003)). Until the decision of the High Court
of Australia in Zecevic v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 645 at 661, such a lull, however, was
generally regarded as disentitling a woman to the defences of self-defence and often
provocation. An important aspect of the syndrome is that it gives some insight into both
why a woman may be slow to respond to threat or provocation and why she might
respond in a way which might otherwise be considered incommensurate. In other words,
the syndrome is not itself a defence, but it has the potential to assist decision-makers
better to understand the circumstances preceding a woman’s eruption into lethal violence,
it may remove sources of misunderstanding that might make decision-makers
inappropriately suspicious of a woman’s account of her relationship, and it may give
some insight into what was happening in the woman’s thought processes when she had
resort to lethal force.
Most commonly, battered woman syndrome is summoned in aid in the context of the
defence of self-defence: see Bronitt and McSherry (2017).
Self-defence
[10.30.110] The defence of self-defence relates to offences of violence and leads to a
complete acquittal. A crucial question for the question of self-defence is the perception of
the killer at the time of the act: see further Bronitt and McSherry (2017, ch 6); Terrance,
Plumm and Rhyner (2012); Bradfield (2002); Seuffert (1997). The woman must be able to
show that she believed “on reasonable grounds” that it was “necessary” for her to do
what she did in order to defend herself or others (such as children) in response to a threat
which called for her response: see Zecevic v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 645 at 661; for
others, see R v Duffy [1967] 1 QB 63 at 67. Thus, the law focuses upon the reasonableness
of her perception of necessity for her actions. The gap between an assault upon her and
her reaction will be relevant to such an estimation, but there are indications that the
[10.30.110] 793
“imminence” of the threat to her is now being viewed somewhat more liberally by the
courts: see, eg, Zanker v Vartokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 11. In Osland v The Queen (1998) 197
CLR 316; [1998] HCA 75 at [172], Kirby J framed the issue in this way:
[BWS] evidence may assist a jury to understand, as self-defensive, conduct which on one
view occurred where there was no actual attack on the accused under way but rather a
genuinely apprehended threat of immediate danger sufficient to warrant conduct in the
nature of a pre-emptive strike. Clearly, it is still necessary to discriminate between a
self-defensive response to a grave danger which can only be understood in the light of a
history of abusive conduct and a response “that simply involves a deliberate decision to
exact revenge for past and potential – but unthreatened – future conduct” [Secretary v The
Queen (1996) 86 A Crim R 119 at 122]. The former will attract considerations of
self-defence. The latter will not.
The trier of fact is entitled to take into account all the facts within the knowledge of the
woman at the time (see R v Wills [1983] 2 VR 201 at 210); the prior conduct of the victim
(see R v Muratovic [1967] Qd R 15 at 30); the relationships between the parties involved
(see R v Hector [1953] VLR 543); and any excitement, affront or distress experienced by the
woman: see R v Wills [1983] 2 VR 201 at 211; R v Dziduch (1990) 47 A Crim R 378 at 380; R
v Johnson [1964] Qd R 1 at 13–14; see generally Bronitt and McSherry (2017). Excessive
self-defence can result in the charge of murder being made out. The use of excessive force
in the belief that it was necessary in self-defence does not automatically result in a verdict
of manslaughter: Zecevic v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 645 at 654. The issue is significantly
one of proportionality of force, but this is not itself a separate requirement – there is no
rule of law that the use of excessive force necessarily establishes that the accused did not
act in self-defence: see Zecevic v The Queen (1987) 162 CLR 645 at 653; R v Lean (1993) 66 A
Crim R 296; but see R v Howe (1958) 100 CLR 448 at 477.
In New Zealand, s 48 of the Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) makes clear the role of the personal
perception of the person acting in self-defence: “Everyone is justified in using, in the
defence of himself or another, such force as, in the circumstances as he believes them to be,
it is reasonable to use.”
However, there is important Western Australian authority that when expert evidence
relates to an accused person’s engagement in behaviours consistent with the possible
threat of harm or death to them, this is essentially a question for the jury – it may be
regarded as within the ordinary experience of jurors. In Western Australia v Liyanage [2016]
WASC 12, a case in which a female doctor of Sri Lankan background killed her husband,
who was also a doctor of Sri Lankan background, by hitting him with a hammer while he
slept (see Butler (2016)), Hall J declined to permit evidence by a social worker with
expertise in family violence. The social worker utilised two actuarial tools for assessing the
risk of domestic violence, the Danger Assessment Scale and the Abusive Behaviour
Inventory. She also used a number of clinical guides, including the Power and Control
Wheel and the Cycle of Violence and Abuse (Walker (1979)) to conclude that the accused
was at high risk of serious harm at the time she killed her husband.
Hall J reviewed the authorities and concluded that he should pose the following
questions about the proposed evidence (at [54]):
(1) Is the subject matter outside ordinary experience? That is, can jurors form a
sound judgment on the subject without the assistance of witnesses with specialist
knowledge?
(2) Is the subject matter part of an organised, accepted and reliable body of
knowledge?
(3) Has the witness acquired sufficient knowledge or experience to be qualified to
give an expert opinion? and
(4) Are the methods used established as having a sufficient scientific basis, that is
that they are reliable?
794 [10.30.110]
He noted that it was also necessary for experts to identify the basis upon which they had
arrived at their conclusions, including all information relied on and any assumptions
made. The course of the reasoning used by experts should be apparent, in accordance with
the views expressed by Heydon J in Dasreef Pty Ltd v Hawchar (2011) 243 CLR 588; [2011]
HCA 21. He took into account that there had been no other cases in which the risk
assessment tools applied by the social worker had been used in the manner in which she
had used them (at [58]): “That is, there have been no cases where a risk assessment tool
has been used retrospectively to determine whether an accused person was at risk of harm
from the deceased in order to support a claim of self-defence.”
The social worker evidence was as to (1) the risk of harm to the accused; (2) the
behaviour of domestic violence victims; and (3) the state of mind of the accused.
Hall J observed that the evidence by the social worker as the risk of harm to the
accused was based on three components:
• the accused woman’s own assessment of the risk;
• the social worker’s own judgment as to that risk, based on what she had been told by
the accused; and
• the results from the two actuarial risk assessment tools.
Hall J held that the accused woman’s own assessment of the risk posed to her by her
husband was an issue about which she could give evidence – the repetition of such
evidence by the social worker was hearsay and had no evidential value.
In terms of the social worker’s judgment of the risk, she relied on what the accused had
told her and Hall J observed that while she “has extensive experience dealing with victims
of domestic violence, she is not an expert as to whether people are telling the truth and
her views in that regard do not qualify as expert evidence” (at [74]).
Hall J accepted that the subject matter of risk assessment “may be a matter outside
ordinary experience” and that the social worker had the qualifications and experience
necessary to use and give evidence regarding the relevant tools. The issue for him was
whether the risk assessment undertaken by the social worker was part of an organised,
accepted and reliable body of knowledge and whether the tools that she had used had
been shown to be scientifically valid.
In this regard, he observed that the evidence was that the Danger Assessment Scale in
its revised form had been validated by one study reported in a journal article but that the
article stated the science in the area was “young and that further testing is required” (at
[76]). However, he found that there was a more fundamental problem with the scale
because it had not been developed for use in determining risk retrospectively (at
[77]–[78]):
The obvious difficulty in obtaining reliable answers is that the accused is facing a murder
charge. She has an interest in giving answers that support the existence of a risk because
that would assist a claim of self-defence. The possibility that this interest would affect the
answers given was accepted by Ms Cooke. This problem is compounded by the fact that
the Scale depends entirely on the truth and accuracy of the answers given by the person
being tested. In this it is unlike some other risk assessment tools that incorporate objective
factors. A conclusion drawn from the answers could be viewed as simply a presentation in
a different form of the accused’s own evidence. By ascribing numerical values and a score
to the answers the Scale gives the appearance of being an objective outcome independent
of the person tested, but it is not that at all.
The Scale has not been validated for use in this way. … The Scale was developed, and
has been used, to determine the present risk of alleged victims of domestic violence. This
is to enable victims to obtain a better understanding of their own risk and crisis workers to
determine appropriate action and allocation of resources to prevent further recurrence of
violence to the victim. None of those considerations arise here. There is no evidence that
use of the Scale in this way was ever contemplated by those who developed it or has ever
been considered in any study or academic journal.
[10.30.110] 795
Hall J concluded that the situation with the Abusive Behaviour Inventory was worse – no
evidence of its validation was provided, and there was no evidence that it had been used
in circumstances comparable to those before the court. He found that the evidence had not
established that either the Scale or the Inventory had been established as scientifically
reliable to use in determining a historical risk in circumstances such as those before the
murder trial for the court. As the results from the tests were an integral part of the social
worker’s risk assessment opinion, Hall J held her opinion not to be admissible.
The social worker gave an opinion that the accused was a victim of family and
domestic violence and that the perpetrator was the deceased, the pattern of abuse being
highly controlling, coercive and violent. She also opined that there was strong evidence of
learned helpless behaviour on the part of the accused and confused decision-making
consistent with battered woman syndrome. Before Hall J, it was accepted that the social
worker was not qualified to give evidence about the syndrome. He commented that such
evidence must be given by an expert who is (at [85]):
appropriately qualified. The appropriate qualifications are in psychology or psychiatry,
not social work. Social workers do not, in my view, have the qualifications to give
evidence as to “learned helplessness” or “traumatic bonding”; these are concepts
developed by psychologists to describe the behaviour of individuals in highly stressful
and traumatic circumstances. Where such evidence has been given in the past it has
invariably been by psychologists.
He found that the evidence that she gave about domestic violence was not outside the
ordinary experience of jurors and that to the extent that she was giving evidence about
battered woman syndrome, she lacked the qualifications to do so.
He also observed that insofar as the social worker expressed views about the accused
firmly believing what she said about her experiences of abuse, this was not properly a
subject of expert evidence: “It is the province of the jury to determine whether the
evidence of a witness is truthful and should be accepted. The views of the people in this
regard are irrelevant” (at [91]).
On appeal, the Western Australian Court of Appeal preferred avoidance of the
terminology of syndrome (Liyanage v Western Australia (2017) 51 WAR 359; [2017] WASCA
112 at [82]):
What is implied by the term is a disease or disorder to which women in general, or
perhaps an accused in particular, is vulnerable. However, as we understand the evidence,
what is being described is the common reaction of an ordinary person, who is not
necessarily female, to an extraordinary situation of prolonged, repeated and cyclical
violence, and threats of violence. Reference to a “syndrome” might carry unwarranted
implications about the unusual nature of the “battered woman’s” response. That could be
detrimental to an accused when the jury comes to consider the objective elements of
whether there were reasonable grounds for her belief or whether her response was
reasonable in the relevant circumstances.
Provocation
[10.30.120] Provocation constitutes a partial defence to murder. It is derived from the
common law and has statutory expression in Australia in all jurisdictions apart from
Victoria, Tasmania and Western Australia (where it has been abolished) and South
Australia. It may not be available in relation to charges of attempted murder: R v Farrar
[1992] 1 VR 207 at 208–209.
The leading Australian decision on provocation is Stingel v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR
312, which was applied in Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58 at 66. The test for
provocation consists of both objective and subjective elements. There must be some
evidence that the accused was in fact acting under provocation, but the extent of the
provocative conduct is assessed from the viewpoint of the particular accused person. In
addition, though, there is the requirement that the provocation be of such a nature that
796 [10.30.120]
could or might have moved an ordinary person to act as the accused did. Bronitt and
McSherry (2017, 5.14) usefully isolate the three fundamental requirements of the defence:
• there must be provocative conduct;
• the accused must have lost self-control as a result of the provocation; and
• the provocation must be such that it was capable of causing an ordinary person to lose
self-control and to act in the way the accused did.
For the defence of provocation to be made out, “the acts or words of the dead man have
caused the accused a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering him so subject
to passion as to make him for the moment not the master of his own mind”: R v McGregor
[1962] NZLR 1069 at 1078. When considering whether the accused actually lost
self-control, the trier of fact must consider the relevant characteristics of the accused
(Stingel v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 312 at 326) and the totality of the conduct of the
deceased (Stingel v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 312 at 326; Moffa v The Queen (1977) 138 CLR
601 at 666). The decision-maker is entitled to take into account the significance in any gap
in time between the trigger and the response, but there is no separate requirement that the
accused person lose control suddenly or immediately after the provocative conduct: Moffa
v The Queen (1977) 138 CLR 601; see too Parker v The Queen (1963) 111 CLR 610 at 655. That
is simply an issue that can be relevant.
The “ordinary person test” has two factors (see Bronitt and McSherry (2017, 5.45)):
(1) given that the accused actually lost self-control, was the provocation of such a nature as
to be capable of causing an ordinary person to lose self-control? This is usually referred to
as assessing the gravity of the provocation; and (2) given that the ordinary person would
have lost self-control, was the provocation such as could cause an ordinary person to act
in the way in which the accused did?
(See generally Stingel v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 312 at 325–327; Masciantonio v The Queen
(1995) 183 CLR 58 at 66.)
In assessing the gravity of the provocation, any relevant characteristic of the accused
may be attributed to the ordinary person: Stingel v The Queen (1990) 171 CLR 312 at
325–327; Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 58 at 67; Verhoeven v The Queen (1998)
101 A Crim R 24 at 29.
In assessing whether or not the ordinary person could or might have lost self-control as
the accused claims to have done, factors such as the exceptional pugnacity of the
defendant, sensitivity about sexual impotence, self-induced intoxication, pregnancy,
delusion, or particular sensitivity to allegations have been held in Australia not to be
characteristics of the “reasonable man” or the “ordinary man” for the purposes of the
provocation defence. Furthermore, the Australian High Court decisions of Stingel v The
Queen (1990) 171 CLR 312 at 326–327, 330–331; and Masciantonio v The Queen (1995) 183
CLR 58 at 67 make it clear that the test in relation to provocation is “objective” and does
not take account of factors personal to the accused, save age – not even gender.
The liberal approach is to be seen in England, where the Court of Appeal in R v
Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889 (see also R v Thornton (No 2) [1996] 2 All ER 1023) held that
the judge is obliged to explain to a jury that a reasonable man is a person having the
power of self-control of a person of the sex and age of the accused, but in other respects
showing such of the accused’s characteristics as they think would affect the gravity of the
provocation to him. This means that not every trait or disposition of the accused can be
invoked, but such factors will be limited to those which are “definite” and of sufficient
significance to make the accused a “different person from the ordinary run of mankind
and also possess a sufficient degree of permanence to warrant their being regarded as
something constituting part of the accused’s character or personality” (at 897; affirming R
v Newell (1980) 71 Cr App R 331; adopting R v McGregor [1962] NZLR 1069). Thus,
applying this approach in New Zealand, psychiatric evidence that an appellant suffered
[10.30.120] 797
from a pathological condition making him an “obsessively compulsive personality” has

been admitted (R v Taaka [1982] 2 NZLR 198), as has psychiatric evidence that an appellant
suffered from chronic post-traumatic stress disorder (R v Leilua [1986] NZ Recent Law 118).
The problem is currently less confronting in New Zealand, where s 169(2) of the Crimes
Act 1961 (NZ) (now repealed) provided that culpable homicide that would otherwise be
murder may be reduced to manslaughter if the person who caused the death did so under
provocation. Anything said or done may constitute provocation if (emphasis added):
(a) In the circumstances of the case it was sufficient to deprive a person having the
power of self-control of an ordinary person, but otherwise having the characteristics
of the offender, of the power of self-control; and
(b) It did in fact deprive the offender of the power of self-control and thereby
induced him to commit the act of homicide.
(See R v Rongonui [2000] NZCA 273; R v Campbell [1997] 1 NZLR 16 at 25.)

In Campbell, it was held that the characteristics of the accused can be taken into
account only in relationship to the offender’s sensitivity or susceptibility to the
provocation, and not to the offender’s power of self-control. The Court of Appeal in R v
Rongonui [2000] NZCA 273 and in R v Campbell [1997] 1 NZLR 16 sought to align New
Zealand law with Australian and English law (see R v Morhall [1995] 3 All ER 659 at 666;
see also Luc Liet Thuan v The Queen [1996] 2 All ER 1033; but see R v Smith [1998] 4 All ER
387) on the issue of the entitlement of the trier of fact to take into account mental
characteristics of the offender if impacting upon their loss of self-control, rather than
susceptibility to provocation. In R v Rongonui (at [120] per Elias CJ), the court held that
s 169(2) invests the ordinary man with the characteristics of the accused, which in turn can
be taken into account in assessing whether the words and conduct of the victim were
sufficient to cause the accused to lose control:
Such characteristics must extend beyond the ill-temper, irascibility, impulsiveness,
violence, or intoxication an ordinary man may experience and which he is expected to
keep under control. That is the self-control of the ordinary man. But if the characteristics
are such as to deprive the accused of the power of this ordinary self-control, they are made
relevant to the question of sufficiency of the provocation under s 169(2)(a). Immaturity
through youth or mental impairment, cognitive impairment through brain damage or
senility, and heightened sensitivity through a recognised syndrome induced by abuse are
all examples of characteristics which may be considered.
Duress
[10.30.130] Finally, battered woman syndrome can be relevant to the defence of duress, a
complete defence to a criminal charge, requiring in Australia:
(1) a threat that death or grievous bodily harm would be inflicted unlawfully upon a
person if the accused failed to do the act;
(2) the circumstances were such that a person of ordinary firmness of mind would
have been likely to yield to the threat in the way that the accused did;
(3) the threat was present, continuing, imminent and impending;
(4) the accused reasonably apprehended that the threat would be carried out;
(5) the accused was induced to commit the crime because of the threat;
(6) the crime was not murder, nor any other crime so heinous as to be excepted from
the doctrine;
(7) the accused did not expose himself or herself to the threat; and
(8) the accused had no means of preventing the execution of the threat.
(See R v Hurley and Murray [1967] VR 526 at 537 per Smith J; see also R v Emery (1985) 18
A Crim R 49; R v Graham [1982] 1 WLR 294 at 300; see generally Bronitt and McSherry
(2017); for Canada, see R v Ryan (2013) 353 DLR (4th) 387.)
798 [10.30.130]
The syndrome was used to support a defence of duress in the landmark Australian
decision of R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114. It was also invoked in R v O’Brien [2003]
NSWCCA 121.
Sentencing
[10.30.140] Battered woman syndrome also has the potential to be of relevance in the
context of sentencing because it serves to contextualise the assailant’s behaviour, to reduce
moral culpability, and potentially to provide reassurance about the ongoing threat to the
community posed by the offender. The latter consideration particularly arises from the fact
that the offender’s battered woman syndrome is generally related to the conduct of the
male whom she has killed; there is no evidence that it is indicative of impulsivity or
retributiveness generally.
Battered woman syndrome has been accepted on a significant number of occasions as a
reason for reducing a sentence below the severity that it would otherwise have: see, eg, R
v Woolsey (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 19 August 1993); R v Taylor (unreported, SA
Supreme Court, 3 February 1994); R v Suluape [2002] NZCA 6; R v Scott [2003] NSWSC 627;
R v O’Brien [2003] NSWCCA 121; R v Tarrant [2018] NSWSC 774; see though R v Whiu
[2007] NZCA 591. See generally Tolmie (1997). Put another way, the developed
understanding of “intimate partner violence” is to be taken into account on sentence: R v
TP [2018] NSWSC 369 at [6]–[7]; Director of Public Prosecutions v Williams [2014] VSC 304 at
[20]–[26]; R v Tarrant [2018] NSWSC 774 at [214].
The Walker model of battered woman syndrome
[10.30.150] Dr Lenore Walker is the first author credited with describing the cycle of
violence frequently met in the relationships of battered women with their battering
spouses. She did so in her 1979 book The Battered Woman. In her 1984 follow-up, The
Battered Woman Syndrome, she reported the results of a study involving approximately 400
battered women, her research being designed to test empirically the theories expounded
in her earlier work: see also Walker (1989). In her 1979 work (Walker (1979, pp 55–69)) she
summarised the cycle of violence thus:
Phase One – The Tension-Building Phase
During this time, minor battering incidents occur. The woman may handle these
incidents in a variety of ways. She usually attempts to calm the batterer through the use of
techniques that have proved previously successful. She may become nurturing, compliant,
and may anticipate his every whim; or she may stay out of his way. … She resorts to a
very common psychological defense – called, of course, denial by psychologists. She
denies to herself that she is angry at being unjustly hurt psychologically or physically. She
rationalizes that perhaps she did deserve the abuse. … Women who have been battered
over a period of time know that these minor battering incidents will only escalate.
However, using the same psychological defense, they deny this knowledge to help
themselves cope. They also deny their terror of the inevitable second phase by making
themselves believe they have some control over the batterer’s behaviour. … As the batterer
and the battered woman sense the escalating tension during the first phase, it becomes
more difficult for their coping techniques to work. Each becomes more frantic. …
Exhausted from the constant stress, she usually withdraws more from the batterer, fearing
she will inadvertently set off an explosion. He begins to move more oppressively towards
her as he observes her withdrawal. … Every move she makes is subject to misinterpretation.
He hovers around her, barely giving her room to breathe on her own. Tension between the
two becomes unbearable.
Phase Two – The Acute Battering Incident
There is a point toward the end of the tension-building phase where the process ceases
to respond to any controls. Once the point of inevitability is reached, the next phase, the
acute battering incident, will take place. Phase two is characterized by the uncontrollable
discharge of the tensions that have built up during phase one. This lack of control and its
major destructiveness distinguish the acute battering incident from the minor battering
incidents in phase one. … During phase two, the batterer fully accepts the fact that his
rage is out of control, as does the battered woman. … The trigger for moving into phase
[10.30.150] 799
two is rarely the battered woman’s behaviour; rather, it is usually an external event or the
internal state of the man. The battered woman occasionally does provoke a phase-two
incident. When this occurs, the couple usually has been involved in battering behaviour
for a long period of time. The woman often senses that the period of inevitability is very
close, and she cannot tolerate her terror, her anger, or anxiety any longer. She also knows
from experience that the third phase of calm will follow the acute battering incident. She
would prefer to get the second phase over with rather than to continue in fear of it, so she
provokes the batterer into an explosion. She then has control over when and why the
incident occurs, rather than being at his total mercy. The battered woman often does not
realize she is provoking the incident, although a few do. The second phase of the cycle is
briefer than the first and third phases. Usually, it lasts from two to twenty-four hours,
although some women have reported a steady reign of terror for a week or more.
Anticipation of what might occur causes severe psychological stress for the battered
woman: she becomes anxious, depressed, and complains of other psychophysiological
symptoms. … When the acute attack is over, it is usually followed by initial shock, denial,
and disbelief that it has really happened. Both the batterers and their victims find ways of
rationalizing the seriousness of such attacks. If there has been physical violence, the
battered woman will often minimize her injuries. … Most battered women do not seek
help during this period immediately following the attack unless they are so badly injured
that immediate medical attention is called for. …
Phase Three: Kindness and Contrite Loving Behaviour
The ending of phase two and movement into the third phase of the battering cycle is
welcomed by both parties. Just as brutality is associated with phase two, the third phase is
characterized by extremely loving, kind, and contrite behaviour by the batterer. He knows
he has gone too far, and he tries to make it up to her. It is during this phase that the
battered woman’s victimization becomes complete.
The third phase follows immediately on the second and brings with it an unusual
period of calm. The tension built up in phase one and released in phase two is gone. In
this phase, the batterer constantly behaves in a charming and loving manner. He is usually
sorry for his actions in the previous phases, and he conveys his contriteness to the battered
woman. He begs her forgiveness and promises her that he will never do it again. … The
batterer truly believes that he will never again hurt the woman he loves; he believes that
he can control himself from now on. He also believes that he has taught her such a lesson
that she will never again behave in such a manner, and so he will not be tempted to beat
her. …
It is at the beginning of this phase, immediately following the acute battering incident,
that … [battered women] are most likely to flee. …
The battered woman wants to believe that she will no longer have to suffer abuse. The
batterer’s reasonableness supports her belief that he can really change, as does his loving
behaviour during this phase. She convinces herself that he can do what he says he wants
to do. It is during this phase that the woman gets a glimpse of her original dream of how
wonderful love is. His behaviour is her reinforcement for staying in the relationship. …
The couple who live in such a violent relationship become a symbiotic pair – each so
dependent on the other that when one attempts to leave, both lives become drastically
affected. It is during phase three, when the loving-kindness is most intense, that this
symbiotic bonding really takes hold. Both fool each other and themselves into believing
that together they can battle the world. … Some women have become very adroit at
keeping this loving phase going for a long period of time.
Walker comments that when the third phase is followed by an intense period of phase-one
behaviour, “these women often lose control of their suppressed rage and seriously injure
their men”: Walker (1979, p 69). (See also Kinports (1988); Easteal (1992a; 1992b); Faigman
(1986).)
Dr Walker defines a “battered woman” as a woman who has gone through the
battering cycle at least twice.
Battered person syndrome?
[10.30.160] A threshold question is whether the syndrome can properly be regarded as
applying to males as well as to females: whether there can legitimately be said to be a
battered person defence, or whether the defence is intrinsically “gendered”. The issue is
800 [10.30.160]
controversial and has particularly arisen in discussion of the so-called “homosexual

advances defence” and the raising of provocation by gay men: see generally Tomsen
(1993); Kiley (1994); Tomsen (1994); George (1995); Johnston (1996); George (1997); Howe
(1997); Hodge (1998); Tomsen (1998); Howe (1998); Howe (1999); De Pasquale (2002);
Russell, Raqatz and Kraus (2012). In Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; [1998] HCA
75 at [159], Kirby J noted:
Some commentators have resisted a proposition that BWS should be expressed in terms
which are neutral as to the sex of the alleged victim. They argue that BWS is one of those
social facts which, like conception and child bearing, is peculiarly specific to women and
therefore properly described in such terms.
He acknowledged that the scientific and empirical research presents an issue which is
overwhelmingly one affecting women but found that “there is no inherent reason why a
battering relationship should be confined to women as victims. Instances exist where the
reverse is the case, including in some same-sex relationships of analogous dependence
and prolonged abuse”: at [159]. He found that “[w]hat is at stake in reflecting the reality
which may accompany long-term abusive relationships of dependence is not ‘gender
loyalty or sympathy’ but ethical and legal principle”: at [159]. He went on (at [160]) to
criticise the terminology in terms of its referring to wives, noting that frequently sufferers
are not spouses:
Although in an individual case a relationship of marriage might reinforce an abuser’s
notions of dominance, control and justification, the problem described in the literature
extends beyond married couples … What is relevant is not the sex or marital status of the
victim of long-term abuse. Nor whether that abuse has been physical (battering) or
otherwise. It is whether admissible evidence establishes that such a victim is suffering
from symptoms or characteristics relevant in the particular case to the legal rules
applicable to that case.
It is significant that evidence of the syndrome, framed in gender-neutral terms, is
permitted by legislation in many United States jurisdictions.
In Australia, the major authorities are the decision by Hall J in Western Australia v
Carlino (No 2) [2014] WASC 404 and the appellate decision of Liyanage v Western Australia
(2017) 51 WAR 359; [2017] WASCA 112 at [81]–[84].
In Carlino, the accused man was charged with murdering another male with whom he
had been in a non-sexual relationship. The accused described himself as a “lackey” and as
being in involuntary servitude to the deceased. He asserted that the deceased was
possessive and would periodically go into a rage, threatening him with violence and being
controlling of his movements, communications and finances. The evidence of an
experienced forensic psychologist, Jeffrey Cummins, was that the accused was subjected to
(at [10]):
the same psychological influences and developed similar symptoms to those reported in
the well documented “battered wife syndrome; which is characterised by the wife or
female partner developing and displaying the behaviour described as learned
helplessness”. Learned helplessness essentially reflects self-destructive and
counterproductive behaviour which ultimately only serves to reinforce the abuse within
an already abusive relationship. Simultaneously, the recipient or victim of the abuse
characteristically forms the view they are powerless in relation to the perpetrator of the
abuse. In my opinion [the accused] reached the point where he felt powerless in relation to
[the deceased].
The evidence by the forensic psychologist was that the syndrome was not confined to
females or to sexual relationships; rather, the crucial ingredients for the syndrome were (1)
a dependent relationship; (2) progressive assertion of control; and (3) abuse of the person
in the inferior position. Hall J reviewed the analyses provided by the High Court in Osland
v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; [1998] HCA 75 and commented (at [24]): “the possibility
that the syndrome may extend to relationships other than that of husband and wife does
[10.30.160] 801
not obviate a need for proof that this possibility has been widely accepted by experts in
the field.” He took into account the fact that under cross-examination, the psychologist
said that he was unable to identify any research or published papers confirming that
battered wife syndrome could extend to situations like that of the accused.
However, Hall J was faced by a highly atypical battered “person” syndrome scenario,
including that there was no extensive history of battering cycles (at [25]–[26]):
I have no evidence that application of this theory to a factual scenario like this is widely
accepted by psychologists working in this field. When I look to what it is that has been
accepted by the courts as being an area of specialised knowledge this case differs from it in
many ways. It was not, as many of those cases were, a long term marriage type
relationship. It was not characterised by recognisable cycles of tension, violence and
reconciliation. Although Mr Cummins said that there were cycles, he referred only to one
instance of a violent assault. The other instances of cycles he referred to involved the
taking of a mobile telephone and the refusal to give it back and the directing of the
accused not to return a hire car. It is difficult to see that those two instances involve cycles
of tension, violence and reconciliation in the way that it has been recognised in other
cases. There are, on the other hand, some similarities: assertion of increasing control,
emotional volatility and increasing feelings of helplessness, bear similarities to some of the
previous cases.
It is not, however, sufficient to label this case as one involving battered wife syndrome
and for an opinion about it to be therefore admissible. The difference here between the
factual circumstances of the accused and other cases where battered wife syndrome has
been accepted are sufficient to require that there be evidence to prove that the application
of the syndrome to a situation like this is accepted by the majority of experts in the field of
psychology. Without that evidence I cannot be satisfied that the evidence is admissible as
expert evidence.
Thus the psychological evidence was not admitted. However, the reasoning of Hall J does
not preclude expert evidence about “battered person syndrome” where the factual
circumstances are more closely analogous to the archetypal battered woman syndrome in
terms of cycles of violence, cohabitation, dependence and physical abuse.
In Liyanage v Western Australia [2017] WASCA 112 at [104], the Western Australian
Court of Appeal (on appeal from a decision of Hall J in Western Australia v Liyanage [2016]
WASC 12) made important observations about terminology (see above), but also about the
use to be made of what was described as “counter-intuitive evidence”:
expert evidence about the psychological impact of prolonged exposure to domestic
violence may be admissible if its relevance can be demonstrated, on [the] basis that it is
necessary for the jury to form sound judgments about the accused’s beliefs and conduct.
The necessity arises not just because the jurors are unlikely to have experienced the
relevant abuse, but because they are likely to misapprehend the psychological impact of
prolonged exposure to domestic violence without expert assistance.
Insofar as the evidence was to be characterised as risk assessment evidence, the Court of
Appeal held (at [122]) that four questions need to be asked:
1. Is the opinion relevant; ie could the evidence rationally affect, directly or
indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue in
the proceedings?
2. Is a person of ordinary experience unable to form a sound judgment on the
subject matter without the assistance of an “expert” witness with special
knowledge or experience in the area?
3. Is the subject matter part of a body of knowledge or experience that is sufficiently
organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or
experience?
4. Has the witness acquired, by study or experience, sufficient knowledge of the
subject to render her opinion of value in resolving the issues before the court?
802 [10.30.160]
The court did not dismiss the proposition that “social context evidence” may be
admissible from an expert as relevant. It observed that (at [162]):
An example of relevant contextual evidence, which was admitted at the trial, was the
history of the relationship between the appellant and the deceased. The evidence of that
long history of cyclical abuse was capable of informing the jury’s assessment as to whether
she held, and a reasonable woman in her position would hold, a belief that her actions
were necessary for defence. The ongoing nature of the threat, and the history of the
relationship, was capable of informing an assessment of the reasonableness of the
appellant’s response, in all of the circumstances as she believed, on reasonable grounds, to
exist. The appellant could reasonably contend that the incidents of violence were not to be
considered as if they occurred in isolation.
However, it concluded that a social worker was not required or admissible – the appellant
was able to give evidence herself about the history of the relationship and “the jury were
capable of understanding that evidence and assessing its veracity” (at [163]) without the
social worker’s evidence. The court held that while evidence of the psychological impact
of prolonged exposure to domestic violence was relevant (at [163]):
Ordinarily, such evidence would be given by an appropriately qualified and experienced
psychiatrist (as it was in this case) or psychologist, rather than a social worker when that
person does not have formal training in psychology or psychiatry. A large amount of
Ms Cooke’s evidence, which in effect concerned the psychological impact of prolonged
exposure to domestic violence, did not concern a subject matter on which she was
qualified to give opinion evidence in court. Nor did it add substantively to the evidence
given by the psychiatrists on this subject.
The court summarised its findings in relation to the social worker’s “social context
evidence” (at [183]):
The jury did not require the evidence of Ms Cooke to understand the appellant’s account
of the history of the relationship between her and the deceased. Ms Cooke’s evidence
would not materially assist the jury in assessing whether the conduct of the deceased
described by the appellant gave reasonable grounds for a belief that his violence would
escalate if she left or made a report to police. Nor did the jury require the evidence of
Ms Cooke to understand or evaluate the appellant’s evidence about the coercive,
controlling and socially isolating character of the deceased’s abusive behaviour towards
the appellant. Ms Cooke was not qualified to give evidence about the psychological
impact of prolonged exposure to domestic violence.
Judge Masousaridis of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia in SZUVE v Minister for
Immigration [2016] FCCA 1942 noted pointedly the failure of an applicant to adduce
evidence about the nature of battered person syndrome or about how it might have
applied to the specific facts of the case. On that basis, no error was made by the AAT
ignoring matters that could only be established by expert evidence that had not been
adduced.
Controversies about the syndrome
[10.30.170] In the aftermath of the Carlino and Liyanage decisions, the appropriateness of
“battered woman syndrome” terminology is doubtful. For forensic purposes, the
definition of the syndrome, howsoever termed, is important and potentially problematic.
It allows both inclusion and exclusion, in principle, of those complying with its
preconditional criteria. However, Walker’s definition has proved difficult for courts to
apply with consistency. In addition, her classifications and research methodology have
been the subject of significant criticism: see, eg, Faigman (1986); Coughlin (1994); Faigman
and Wright (1997); McMahon (1999). In particular, Walker’s use of the theory of “learned
helplessness” to explain the woman’s sense of “psychological paralysis”, and thus her
failure to leave the batterer, has been objected to on the basis of research data: see, eg,
McDonald (1989); Gelles and Straus (1988); Schuller and Vidmar (1992). Moreover, her
definition of the timeframe for the three stages is extremely flexible, having the potential
[10.30.170] 803
to extend from a few minutes to years: see Walker (1979, p 58). Dutton and Painter (1993)
have also called into question whether Walker’s empirical research justifies her division of
stages into three.
Schuller and Vidmar (1992) have maintained both that “[a]side from general problems
of inaccuracy of diagnosis, the diagnosis of battered woman syndrome could be
exacerbated by methodological problems similar to those that plague the diagnosis of
child sexual abuse” and that “the reliability of diagnosis of battered woman syndrome for
forensic use urgently needs both legal and scientific attention”. The original data upon
which Walker based her work arose from sources that may have skewed her results. The
women were selected from a non-random sample of what were described as “more than
120” battered women and caseworkers: Walker (1984). Later, 435 women from the Rocky
Basin area were interviewed from referrals from a range of sources that could be expected
to come into contact with battered women. Advertising also yielded referrals: Walker
(1984). Walker defined a “battered woman” as a woman of 18 or older “who is or has been
in an intimate relationship with a man who repeatedly subjects or subjected her to forceful
physical and/or psychological abuse”: Walker (1984, p 203). It appears that from a point of
frequency, all that was necessary was that battery occurred more than once. Walker did
not use control groups, leaving many uncertainties about the significance and
characteristics of those women who kill their partners as against those with “learned
helplessness” who do not: see Morse (1990).
A range of criticisms may be made of the conduct of the interviews by Walker’s
researchers, including the fact that interviewers were aware of the hypotheses being
tested, this having the potential to have an impact upon both the recording and the
interpretation of answers: see Faigman (1986); Faigman and Wright (1997). In addition, a
variety of findings are conflated without apparent justification and without statistical tests
of significance being applied: Faigman (1986).
Doubts have been expressed about whether the syndrome should be so described: see
McMahon (1999); Goodyear-Smith (1998); Grant (1991); McDonald (1997); Stubbs and
Tolmie (1995); Freckelton (1994); Stubbs (2002). In Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316;
[1998] HCA 75 at [161], Kirby J observed the syndrome to be an “advocacy driven
construct”, designed to:
“medicalise” the evidence in a particular case in order to avoid the difficulties which
might arise in the context of a criminal trial from a conclusion that the accused’s
motivations are complex and individual: arising from personal pathology and social
conditions rather than a universal or typical pattern of conduct sustained by scientific
data. As a construct, BWS may misrepresent many women’s experiences of violence. It is
based largely on the experiences of caucasian women of a particular social background.
Their “passive” responses may be different from those of women with different economic
or ethnic backgrounds.
(See also Beri (1997).)

Coughlin (1994, pp 82ff) has also deconstructed the analysis of the disempowering
aspects of the battered woman’s relationship with her battering partner. The “learned
helplessness” paradigm upon which Walker places so much emphasis derives from
Seligman’s work with dogs. She points out that the success of Walker’s analogy between
women who are helpless to leave their violent partners and Seligman’s dogs “appears to
rest on the similarity between the constraints imposed by an abusive relationship and the
bars of a cage”. Coughlin argues that Walker’s summary of Seligman’s work with dogs
omits key features of his experiments.
In fact, Seligman’s work involved two groups of dogs. The first included dogs which,
prior to being placed in cages, were exposed to shocks that were physically inescapable
and not susceptible of any form of control by the dog. The second group of dogs consisted
of dogs that were classified as “experimentally naive” – dogs that had not been given
804 [10.30.170]
uncontrollable shock before being placed in the cages. The cages which confined the
animals contained a mechanism through which they could readily escape the shocks
administered by Seligman’s researchers. The experimentally naive dogs did not develop
learned helplessness but learned to avoid the shocks altogether. Walker does not mention
this. The dogs that manifested the inability to extricate themselves from the cages were
those that had previously been given shocks from which they had no escape and in
respect of which they could exercise no control. The dogs had come to expect from prior
experience that nothing they could do could ameliorate their circumstances.
Moreover, in Seligman’s 1975 work, Helplessness: On Depression, Development and Death,
upon which Walker relies, Seligman cautioned against extrapolating “without evidence”
from one species to another. By 1978, Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978, pp 49–50)
cautioned that they had become “increasingly disenchanted” with the hypothesis derived
from animal studies on the basis that it was inadequate to understand learned
helplessness in human beings. They went so far as to criticise and reformulate their earlier
hypothesis. Walker does not refer to this.
A significant question exists about whether women who remain in domestically violent
relationships can routinely be characterised as suffering from learned helplessness or as
helpless. Walker’s data, in fact, demonstrate that around 20% of the women would leave
their home immediately after a battering incident, about 25% left the batterer frequently,
and about 49% immediately sought “outside help” after being assaulted: Walker (1984,
p 170, Table 11). A total of 39% reported taking out a restraining order against their
husband at some point: Walker (1984, p 179, Table 17); see further McMahon (1999).
Moreover, it has already been argued in North American and Australian courts that
particular victims of domestic violence could not properly avail themselves of expert
evidence on battered woman syndrome because they had not been sufficiently beaten, or
beaten for long enough, to have developed the syndrome. The inference sought then to be
drawn (usually on behalf of the prosecution) is that the woman’s actions are in fact
premeditated, malicious and calculated – not the result of the injurious effects of long-term
violence. This was the tack of what was ultimately the successful prosecution argument at
trial in Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; [1998] HCA 75. The point at which a
woman “qualifies” for the indulgences potentially to be extended by the categorisation as
a “battered woman” is not an easy one to pinpoint and is likely to be the subject of
considerable forensic argument.
Walker (1991; 1994; 1995), however, has also argued that the psychiatric diagnosis of
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD – see American Psychiatric Association (2000))
“comes closest to describing battered woman syndrome, the group of psychological
symptoms often observed after a woman has repeatedly experienced physical, sexual
and/or serious psychological abuse”. She has maintained that, as with other syndromes,
such as rape trauma syndrome and combat war syndrome, there are core symptom
patterns observable in addition to ones which are syndrome-specific (1995, p 32). For what
she describes as “both political and clinical reasons”, Walker continues to support the use
of the diagnostic category of PTSD for those suffering battered woman syndrome,
although she acknowledges that “the generic criteria may not be specifically tailored to
measure the entire collection of psychological symptoms that constitutes battered woman
syndrome”: Walker (1991, p 27).
In 1994, Walker was most explicit about the battered woman syndrome/post-traumatic
stress disorder overlap. She argued (Walker (1994, p 70)) that the cognitive disturbances
occurring in the syndrome are much like those seen in “other PTSDs”:
[T]he woman re-experiences the traumatic event or fragments of traumatic events
spontaneously or in association with a familiar stimulus. Time sequences may be
distorted. Abusive events may merge, telescope, or become confused. Fear or anticipation
of battering may prompt flashbacks of past abuse. Nightmares may contain elements of
the trauma, often reflective of the woman’s fear that she will do something to set off the
man’s anger and precipitate a violent reaction.
[10.30.170] 805
She has argued, too, that chronic, repeated abuse brings about a pessimistic cognitive style
often associated with depression. She has aligned this in turn with Seligman’s “learned
helplessness”, further building a bridge for admissibility on the basis of the pathology
“suffered” by the woman.
In response to a proposal by Dutton and Goodman (1994, p 215) that the term
“battered woman syndrome” needed to be standardised so that psychologists, lawyers
and judges can be clear on what is meant by it, Dr Walker has argued (Walker (1995, p 33))
that such a step would be premature: “The definition is still evolving, though, so it may be
too soon to codify one.”
A further issue is the extent to which there already exists sufficiently sophisticated
societal understanding of the phenomena and dynamics of domestic violence to mean that
battered woman syndrome is not needed to disabuse jurors of myths or misconceptions to
which they might otherwise by subject. A study by Reddy et al (1997) found a
sophisticated level of understanding of the nature and consequences of domestic violence
for women in Australia and questioned whether this might mean that battered woman
syndrome evidence was no longer “needed” by the courts. Similarly, in 2000, the
Australian Office of the Status of Women commissioned research to investigate attitudes to
domestic and family violence within the diverse Australian community. This qualitative
research found that “participants across the research appeared to have a sound level of
understanding of domestic violence”: Partnerships Against Domestic Violence (2000, p 2).
However, Bradfield (2002) has argued that caution needs to be exercised in interpreting
the results of the study by Reddy et al (1997) on the basis of the stereotyped images of the
persons involved in its vignettes, the fact that it did not address race and ethnicity, and
attitudes toward the “bad woman”. She has argued that while community attitudes and
values show signs of changing, there remains a failure on the part of the community to
recognise the positioning of violence within the overall context of a relationship of power
imbalance – in short, the power dynamics of domestic violence.
The leading Australasian case to consider explicitly the criteria for reception of
evidence relating to battered woman syndrome is the South Australian Court of Criminal
Appeal decision of R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114. The case took place against a
background of increasing preparedness in the United States and Canada to admit
evidence of battered woman syndrome to assist in claims of self-defence in relation to
situations where a woman feared imminent and perhaps mortal danger when ordinary
persons, especially men, might not have held such fears. However, the decision now needs
to be read in light of the High Court decision of Osland: see too R v Peters [2002] NSWSC
1234 at [72]; Liyanage v Western Australia (2017) 51 WAR 359; [2017] WASCA 112. As a
result of the suboptimal evidence given before the Western Australian Supreme Court in
Western Australia v Carlino (No 2) [2014] WASC 404 and before the Federal Circuit Court in
SZUVE v Minister for Immigration [2016] FCCA 1942, a major question exists about whether
Australian courts will recognise “battered person syndrome” in relation to other
categories of victim based on the questionable analogy of their circumstances with those
of battered women. What is clear is that the evidence will need to be better than was
adduced in both cases and that the question of analogy between different contexts of
disempowerment and cycles of violence will need to be addressed effectively by those
seeking to rely on “battered person syndrome”.
[10.30.180] The Court of Appeal decision of R v Thornton (No 2) [1996] 2 All ER 1023 has
given a clear indication of the approach likely to be followed in United Kingdom courts in
respect of battered woman syndrome. The appellant was convicted at trial of murdering
her husband: see R v Thornton (No 1) [1992] 1 All ER 305 on appeal. The trial judge
summed up to the jury in terms of her suffering a personality disorder and, although she
relied on diminished responsibility arising from the disorder, elected to sum up also in
terms of her having been provoked by a man who had been repeatedly violent to her.
806 [10.30.180]
In 1995, the Home Secretary referred Thornton’s case to the Court of Appeal on the basis
of further medical evidence about her personality disorder and also about the impact
upon her of her husband’s abuse. The Court of Appeal held that Thornton’s suffering
battered woman syndrome was a relevant characteristic which could be considered by a
jury, although a defendant cannot succeed in relying on provocation unless she persuades
a jury that she had suffered, or might have suffered, a sudden and temporary loss of
self-control at the time of the killing. The court held that if the trial judge had had the
evidence about, among other things, battered woman syndrome, he should and would
have given the jury directions accordingly, with the potential of another result to the
prosecution. Lord Taylor CJ held (at 1038) that battered woman syndrome has relevance to
legal proceedings in two ways:
First, it may form an important background to whatever triggered the actus reus. A jury
may more readily find there was a sudden loss of control triggered by even a minor
incident, if the defendant has endured abuse over a period, on the last straw basis.
Secondly, depending on the medical evidence, the syndrome may have affected the
defendant’s personality so as to constitute a significant characteristic relevant … to the
second question the jury has to consider in regard to provocation.
(See also R v Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889; Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23; Law
Commission (2003).)
[10.30.190] The early cases in the United States rejected battered woman syndrome
evidence on a number of bases, including that it was more prejudicial than probative
(Ibn-Tamas v United States 407 A 2d 626 (1979)); that its original proponent, Dr Lenore
Walker, was not sufficiently qualified (Hawthorne v State 470 So 2d 770 (1985)); that the
existence of the syndrome was not sufficiently accepted within the relevant scientific
community (Hill v United States 507 So 2d 554 at 555 (1987); Mullis v State 282 SE 2d 334
(1981); State v Martin 666 SW 2d 895 (Mo Ct App 1984); People v Powell 102 Misc 2d 775;
424 NYS 2d 626 (1980); State v Thomas 423 NE 2d 137 (1981)); and that it intruded upon the
ultimate issue which was the jury’s domain: Commonwealth v Rose 725 SW 2d 588 (Ky
1987).
However, by 1990, Brown (1990, p 678) opined in relation to the United States context:
The clear trend is towards admissibility whether under the general acceptance standard or
under the relevancy approach. There will likely be less controversy regarding the
reliability of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome in the future. Research has
been ongoing enough to amass considerable scientific and legal literature and a large pool
of experts. As a result controversy regarding the reliability of expert testimony on battered
woman syndrome will become an increasingly infertile ground for those wishing to deny
the self-defence claim to the battered woman.
(See further Bechtel v State 840 P 2d 1 at 7 (Oklahoma 1992); Duncan (1996).)

Canadian authority
[10.30.200] The leading Canadian authority on the subject is the decision of the Canadian
Supreme Court in Lavallee v The Queen [1990] 1 SCR 852; (1990) 55 CCC (3d) 97, in which it
was sought to use the syndrome to assist in the defence’s case of self-defence. A
psychiatrist was called by the defence to testify that the accused felt that unless she
defended herself and reacted in a violent way, she would be killed. In addressing the
admissibility of the expert evidence offered on the psychological effect of battering on
wives, Wilson J held such evidence to be both relevant and necessary in the context of the
case before her (at 112):
How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The average member
of the public (or of the jury) can be forgiven for asking: Why would a woman put up with
this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could she
love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalisation? We would expect the
woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose
[10.30.200] 807
and make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted
with the so-called “battered-woman syndrome”. We need help to understand it and help
is available from trained professionals.
She noted (at 113) the commendation of the value of such testimony by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in State v Kelly 478 A 2d 364 at 378 (1984), where it had been said that such
evidence:
is aimed at an area where the purported common knowledge of the jury may be very
much mistaken, an area where jurors’ logic, drawn from their own experience, may lead to
a wholly incorrect conclusion, an area where expert knowledge would enable the jurors to
disregard their prior conclusions as being common myths rather than common
knowledge.
Wilson J found that where evidence exists that an accused is in a relationship involving
battering, expert testimony can assist the jury in determining whether the accused had a
“reasonable” apprehension of death when she acted, by explaining the heightened
sensitivity of a battered woman to her partner’s acts. Without such testimony, she held
that there was a danger that the average fact-finder might well fail to appreciate why the
woman’s subjective fear may have been reasonable in the context of the relationship.
“After all, the hypothetical ‘reasonable man’ observing only the final incident may have
been unlikely to recognise the batterer’s threat as potentially lethal” (at 120).
Wilson J summarised as follows the principles upon which she regarded expert
testimony is to be admitted in such cases (at 125):
1. Expert testimony is admissible to assist the fact-finder in drawing inferences in
areas where the expert has relevant knowledge or experience beyond that of the
layperson.
2. It is difficult for the layperson to comprehend the battered wife syndrome. It is
commonly thought that battered women are not really beaten as badly as they
claim; otherwise they would have left that relationship. Alternatively, some
believe that women enjoy being beaten, that they have a masochistic strain in
them. Each of these stereotypes may adversely affect consideration of a battered
woman’s claim to have acted in self-defence in killing her mate.
3. Expert evidence can assist the jury in dispelling these myths.
4. Expert testimony relating to the ability of an accused to perceive danger from her
mate may go to the issue of whether she “reasonably apprehended” death or
grievous bodily harm on a particular occasion.
5. Expert testimony pertaining to why an accused remained in the battering
relationship may be relevant in assessing the nature and extent of the alleged
abuse.
6. By providing an explanation as to why an accused did not flee when she
perceived her life to be in danger, expert testimony may also assist the jury in
assessing the reasonableness of her belief that killing her batterer was the only
way to save her own life.
(See Martinson et al (1991); see also Shaffer (1997).)

The issue was revisited in 1998 in Malott v The Queen (1998) 155 DLR (4th) 513, where
Major J for the majority affirmed that the jury should be informed of how battered woman
syndrome evidence may be used to understand:
• why an abused woman might remain in an abusive relationship;
• the nature and extent of the violence that may exist in a battering relationship;
• the accused’s ability to perceive danger from her abuser; and
• whether the accused believed on reasonable grounds that she could not otherwise
preserve herself from death or grievous bodily harm.
L’Heureux-Dube and McLachlin JJ stressed the need to look at the whole context of a
woman’s experience to inform the analysis of events when a battered woman is charged
808 [10.30.200]
with a serious offence. They maintained that there should not be a “too rigid and
restrictive approach to the admissibility and legal value of evidence of a battered woman’s
experiences” (at 528). They noted that it is possible that there are women who are unable
to fit themselves within the stereotype of a victimised, passive, helpless, dependent,
battered woman and that because of that they will not have their claims fairly decided.
They argued that courts need to combat what they described as the “syndromisation of
battered women” (at 529). They held that a judge and jury should be told that a battered
woman’s experiences are generally outside the common understanding of the average
judge and juror and that they should seek to understand the evidence being presented to
them in order to overcome the myths and stereotypes that “we all share” (at 530). They
acknowledged that men also live in abusive relationships, but stated that to assume that
they are affected in the same way as battered women without the benefit of the research
and expert evidence that has informed the courts of the existence and details of battered
woman syndrome would be “imprudent” (at 530) (see Ono (2017)).
[10.30.210] The phenomenon of battered woman syndrome has also been called in aid in
New Zealand cases (Robertson (1998)). In R v Zhou (unreported, High Court, Auckland, 8
October 1993, T.7/93), for instance, the defendant was charged with attempted murder,
having tricked the victim into taking a sleeping tablet, tied him up while asleep, tried to
put a chloroform-soaked towel in his mouth, and, when this failed, “chopped” him at least
eight times to the scalp with a meat cleaver. Battered woman syndrome evidence was
adduced in part as to what Anderson J described (summing up, pp 7–8) as “a sociological
phenomenon that sees women … in particular in relationships with dominant men who
physically abuse them and then stay in the relationship whereas one would often think
that people who are in an abused situation would leave the relationship. … [C]haracteristic
of the phenomenon is the fact that [the relationship] continues when logic should say that
it be terminated”. The accused was found not guilty, but it is not possible to determine the
ground upon which the jury arrived at its finding.
The issue also arose in R v Wang [1990] 2 NZLR 529, where the defendant had stabbed
her husband while he was asleep after he threatened to kill her and members of her
family. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s finding that there was no immediacy
to the victim’s threats and that the defendant had been free to seek protection in other
ways, such as leaving the house and going to the police. The court agreed with the trial
judge that to allow self-defence in Wang’s case would be “close to a return to the law of the
jungle” (at 535).
In Ruka v Department of Social Welfare (1996) 14 CRNZ 196 (see Hughes (1999)), an
appellant who had received social welfare payments to which she was not entitled while
cohabiting appealed on the basis that battered woman syndrome should have been taken
into account to establish whether the relationship in which she had been involved at the
relevant time was in the nature of marriage. Her appeal was allowed by majority. It was
held that there had been error by the trial judge in failing to accept that certain
characteristics exhibited by the appellant as a result of her partner’s violence negated the
basic elements of a relationship in the nature of marriage. In obiter dicta, Richardson and
Blanchard JJ found that the existence of battered woman syndrome does not itself provide
a defence but is a factor available to be taken into account in the determination of whether
a relationship in the nature of marriage existed. Thomas J, though, found that it was the
effects of the violence on the battered woman’s mind and will, as those effects bear on the
particular case, which are pertinent. He found, therefore, that it “is not a matter of
ascertaining whether a woman is suffering from battered woman syndrome and, if so,
treating that as an exculpating factor. What is important is that the evidence establish that
the battered woman is suffering from symptoms or characteristics which are relevant” (at
[10.30.210] 809
220). The case is a further example of recent cases in which judges have expressed
reservations of the extent to which battered woman syndrome evidence can be used to
exculpate an accused.
In R v Suluape [2002] NZCA 6, the New Zealand Court of Appeal was called upon to
consider the seven-and-a-half year sentence imposed upon a Samoan woman for
murdering her husband with an axe. Baragwanath J for the court expressed the view that
a focus on “battered woman syndrome” has deflected attention from a related but, in the
circumstances of the case before the court, much more pertinent consideration of the
provocative nature of chronic domestic abuse and humiliation (at [13]–[18]):
There is considerable modern literature concerning the effect of sustained abuse, much of
it dealing with women who having been physically abused appear as defendants to
prosecutions. The Law Commission’s Report 73 Some Criminal Defences with Particular
Reference to Battered Defendants referred to by the judge, is a recent authority which
examines the issue. It identifies a human behaviour of submission, for a complex of
reasons, to chronic abuse and humiliation. One of many reasons may be cultural
impediment to obtaining protection or support from outside the domestic environment.
The Commission does not support use of the term “battered women’s syndrome” to
describe such behaviour.
But the explicability of the submission is not the real point in this case. The crucial
matter, identifiable without requiring recourse to psychological literature, is the
cumulative impact on a person of the repeated expression of abuse.
The Law Commission’s discussion makes the point, which we accept, that the absence
of brutality on the part of the batterer during the period immediately prior to the victim’s
attack does not of itself neutralise the effects of long term abuse or necessarily deprive the
victim of an argument for substantial mitigation. Both the history of abuse and the cultural
factors are highly germane to an assessment of the appellant’s criminality.
Furthermore, while the defence evidence in this case was founded on the so-called
“battered women’s syndrome”, its expert witness did not address the vital element that
the appellant was a woman of a traditional culture, to whom much of the analysis in R v
Fate (1998) 16 CRNZ 88 is relevant. That was an unsuccessful Solicitor-General’s appeal
against the sentence of 2 years imposed for the provoked manslaughter of her husband on
a woman who had come to New Zealand from the small island of Nanumea, which is part
of the Tuvalu Islands. The facts of that case were much stronger for the defence than those
of the present case. Mrs Fate spoke no English and was isolated within a small close-knit
Wellington community of 12 or so families.
But there is a reasonably close analogy in the culturally influenced acquiescence in
shameful treatment, ultimately erupting in fatal violence.
What is relevant here is
• the exemplary past behaviour of the appellant
• the sustained pattern of abusive and insulting conduct of the deceased and their
progressive cumulation
• the gross humiliation of the appellant and her family by the deceased’s conduct in
Samoa
• the appellant’s perception, from what seemed to her a position of subordination within
her home and her culture, of a lack of realistic options available to her to do anything
effective to relieve herself of what had progressively become an intolerable burden.
The court substituted a sentence of five years’ imprisonment (cf R v Whiu [2007] NZCA
591).
Criminal law
[10.30.220] In R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114 (see Guigni (1992)), the appellants had
formed a subservient ménage-à-trois relationship with a man for whom both worked as
prostitutes. He beat another woman seriously and was to a degree assisted in the process
810 [10.30.220]
by the appellants. At the trial, their counsel sought to call an experienced psychologist to
give evidence that the appellants suffered from “the battered woman syndrome” in order
to advance the defence of duress in respect of their participation in the assault. It was
argued (at 371) on the appellants’ behalf that the evidence would assist the jury to
evaluate the effect that the violence perpetrated upon them had on their actions in respect
of the victim in the case, and would “eliminate the risk of the appellants being condemned
‘by popular mythology about domestic violence’”. Without hearing from the psychologist,
the trial judge ruled the evidence inadmissible.
The South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal was referred to a substantial volume of
North American literature on the subject, including Cipparone (1987); Lipsman (1985);
Schneider (1980); Creach (1982); Diamond (1987); Dahl (1985); McKinnie (1981); Baumann
(1983); Kaas (1982); Waltrip (1986); Thar (1982); Brodsky (1987); Walker, Thyfault and
Browne (1982). King CJ held (at 366) that the syndrome:
now appears to be a recognised facet of clinical psychology in the United States and
Canada. It emerges from the literature that methodical studies by trained psychologists of
situations of domestic violence have revealed typical patterns of behaviour on the part of
the male batterer and the female victim, and typical responses on the part of the female
victim. It has been revealed, so it appears, that women who have suffered habitual
domestic violence are typically affected psychologically to the extent that their reactions
and responses differ from those which might be expected by persons who lack the
advantage of an acquaintance with the result of those studies.
In addressing the appropriateness of admitting such evidence, King CJ looked to the Frye
criterion of general acceptance of the theory within the relevant scientific community: see
above, [2.10.60]. Curiously, he did not refer to the Frye test (Frye v United States 293 F 1013
(DC Cir 1923) at 1014 (1923)) by name, although the language employed is unmistakeably
that of Frye (at 366):
An essential prerequisite to the admission of expert evidence as to the battered woman
syndrome is that it be accepted by experts competent in the field of psychology or
psychiatry as a scientifically established facet of psychology. This must be established by
appropriate evidence.
King CJ then cited the following passage from People (New York) v Torres 488 NYS 2d 358 at
363 (1985) in support of his approach (at 367):
Upon careful reflection and analysis, however, it is the opinion of this court that the theory
underlying the battered woman’s syndrome has indeed passed beyond the experimental
stage and gained a substantial enough scientific acceptance to warrant admissibility.
According to Dr B, numerous articles and books have been published about the battered
woman’s syndrome; and recent findings of researchers in the field have confirmed its
presence and thereby indicated that the scientific community accepts its underlying
premises.
He also cited the following passage from the Court of Appeals of New Mexico in State
(New Mexico) v Gallegos 719 P 2d 1268 at 1274 (1986), which followed People (New York) v
Torres 488 NYS 2d 358 (1985):
In our case, the trial court apparently found the psychologist qualified to testify in her area
of expertise. The court evidently also determined that the “battered wife syndrome” had
gained general recognition and acceptance in the field of psychology.
(See also Lavallee v The Queen [1990] 1 SCR 852; (1990) 55 CCC (3d) 97.)
His Honour held that as the defence of duress had been raised by the defence, issues
before the court included (a) whether the will of the two women had actually been
overborne; and (b) whether a person of reasonable firmness in the two women’s situation
would have been so overborne. The expert evidence relating to battered woman syndrome
proffered by the psychologist was “designed to assist the court in assessing whether
[10.30.220] 811
women of reasonable firmness would succumb to the pressure to participate in the

offences”. Thus, it was relevant to the issues to be decided. Similarly, as it also served to
explain why even a woman of reasonable firmness would participate in criminal activity
rather than escape the situation, it was also relevant.
Bollen J in the same case took a different approach while arriving at the same result. He
found the battered woman syndrome to be “an organised branch of knowledge in which”
a person may qualify as an expert (Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 at 491, 501–502) and
purported to follow a decision of the DC Circuit Court of Appeals in Dyas v United States
376 A 2d 827 at 832 (1977) (see also Ibn-Tamas v United States 407 A 2d 626 at 638 (1979) ),
where the court stated:
1. The subject matter “must be so distinctly related to some science, profession,
business or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the average layman …”;
2. The witness must have sufficient skill, knowledge or experience in that field or
calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the
trier in his search for the truth …; and
3. Expert testimony is inadmissible if “the state of the pertinent art or scientific
knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted even by an
expert”.
His Honour expressed the view (at 372) that “this text, sometimes expressed in different
words with the same meaning seems to command agreement amongst writers in
America” and held that, subject to the Clark v Ryan (1960) 103 CLR 486 requirement (see
above), it was “apposite for South Australia”.
Bollen J also canvassed the possibility that the expert evidence might be excluded on
the basis that its value might be outweighed by its prejudice. His Honour expressed the
view that battered woman syndrome evidence, when led for the defence, may result in a
focus on the batterer, but was sanguine about the employment of appropriate trial
safeguards. In addition, he held (at 373, quoting Baumann (1983, p 434)) that the right of
the accused to put his or her defence “is so fundamental that it must tip the scales in
favour of the probative value of the proffered testimony over its potentially prejudicial
impact”.
Ironically, the second Australian case to accept expert evidence relating to battered
woman syndrome involved one of the women to benefit from its admission in the first
case – Erika Kontinnen (R v Kontinnen (unreported, SA Supreme Court, 30 March 1992)).
She had killed in his sleep the male with whom she had been living in a ménage-à-trois
after he had threatened to kill her, another woman and a child. On the basis of expert
evidence about her suffering from battered woman syndrome, her defence of self-defence
was upheld and she was acquitted.
The third Australian case to admit expert evidence of battered woman syndrome was
that of R v Hickey (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 14 April 1992) per Slattery AJ, noted
(1992) 16 Criminal Law Journal 271), in which Cynthia Hickey was acquitted of the murder
of her former de facto husband. No objection was taken by the Crown to the admission of
expert evidence about the syndrome in the context of her having stabbed the deceased
after he had assaulted and attempted to strangle her. However, the evidence given by the
forensic psychologist was of very short compass, it was scarcely cross-examined, and it
was directed almost exclusively toward explaining the victim’s dependency and “why she
would continue to live with such a person” (transcript, p 124). The case is almost valueless
in terms of precedent.
The fourth Australian case where battered woman syndrome was explicitly raised by
the defence in an effort to secure the acquittal of a woman charged with murder was R v
Raby (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, 31 October 1994), where evidence was given
by a psychiatrist and a psychologist about the dependency induced by repeated domestic
assaults and rapes perpetrated by a woman’s husband. Expert evidence on battered
812 [10.30.220]
woman syndrome was admitted, including evidence as to whether Margaret Raby was
suffering from the syndrome. Mrs Raby was ultimately acquitted by a jury of murder, but
convicted of manslaughter – presumably on the basis that she had been provoked into her
reprisal in which she had fatally stabbed her husband. Again, the case does not strictly
mark any significant kind of a precedent.
Another key case in which an attempt was made to invoke the syndrome was that of R
v Taylor (unreported, SA Supreme Court, 3 February 1994), where Olsson J described
battered woman syndrome as “really a type of post-traumatic stress condition caused by
enduring long term high stress environments”:
The literature suggests that the syndrome has a significant impact on a woman’s
perception of the immediacy and degree of danger and can often give rise to the
commission of a homicide when the person killed is in fact asleep and certainly not, at the
time of the retaliation, objectively, actually about to inflict further acts of brutality. … In
relation to self-defence it bears, in an important fashion, on both the perception of
immediacy and nature of further danger and what response is necessary to meet it,
however much that perception, in objective terms, is difficult for the ordinary person to
appreciate. In short, such a condition has a fundamental effect on the normal reasoning
processes of the sufferer.
A key decision which has adopted a less sympathetic approach to the admissibility of
battered woman syndrome evidence is Director of Public Prosecutions v Secretary
(unreported, NT Supreme Court, 12 December 1995) per Kearney J. The accused stood
trial for murder and pleaded self-defence, alleging a long history of domestic abuse. The
accused conceded that after an argument, the deceased went to sleep. She walked outside
to a utility, grabbed a gun and a bullet, re-entered the house, walked past her children,
aimed the gun, and shot the deceased. She maintained that she feared for her life and was
concerned about what he was going to do if she did not kill him while he slept. The
Crown did not object to the accused leading expert evidence from a psychiatrist in relation
to battered woman syndrome. Kearney J commented (at p 50):
Despite the various cases in which expert evidence of “battered woman syndrome” has
been admitted, it is not clear to me that this novel scientific evidence can properly be said
to be a recognised area of expertise for forensic purposes, as opposed to its use for
therapeutic purposes. Those purposes are not the same. The need for caution in the
admission of such evidence, referred to by King CJ in R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114; 53
A Crim R 362 at p 44 is very real.
His Honour further noted that the Frye criterion (Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir
1923)) for admitting novel scientific evidence “adopted in Australia to allow in evidence of
this syndrome, no longer obtains in the United States” as a result of the Daubert decision
(Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993)). However, as
there had been no contest before him as to admissibility, Kearney J treated the expert
evidence as properly before the jury and found that the deceased at the time of death
posed no imminent danger (at p 51). He concluded that “it would be impossible for a
reasonable jury to hold on the view of the evidence most favourable to the accused that at
the time she shot the sleeping man … she could reasonably have apprehended that she
would suffer death or grievous harm when he awoke”.
In 1998, the High Court had occasion in Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; [1998]
HCA 75 to comment upon battered woman syndrome in the context of an appeal by a
woman convicted of murdering her abusive husband. The prosecution case, which was
successful at trial, and upheld on appeal to the Victorian Court of Appeal and then the
Australian High Court, was that Osland and her son together planned to murder Osland’s
husband. It was contended by the Crown that on a particular day they dug a grave for
him; that evening, Osland mixed sedatives in with the husband’s dinner in sufficient
quantity to induce sleep; and the son, after the husband went to bed, at the instance of his
[10.30.220] 813
mother, fatally hit him over the head with a pipe until he was dead. Both Osland and her
son admitted that they had killed the husband, but they pleaded self-defence and
provocation, explaining a background of sustained tyrannical and violent behaviour
toward them by the deceased over many years. At the trial, Osland’s counsel adduced
evidence that she had suffered battered woman syndrome for many years. However, she
was convicted of murder.
The High Court was primarily called upon to rule on the legal question of whether a
woman could be found guilty of murdering her husband when the son who struck the
actual blows was not convicted and subsequently was acquitted on retrial. The court
rejected all the arguments on behalf of the appellant and found that the trial judge did not
err in his direction to the jury as to the use to which the evidence of battered woman
syndrome could be put. Kirby J aired a variety of important concerns about the misuses to
which the syndrome could be put: see [10.30.240].
Administrative law
[10.30.230] In a 1994 case before the Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunal (LM v
Crimes Compensation Tribunal (unreported, coram Ms A Coghlan, 2 September 1994); see
also LM v Crimes Compensation Tribunal (No 2) (unreported, coram M Macnamara, 10 May
1995)), it was argued by the applicant that a mother who had been awarded only $1,500
before the Crimes Compensation Tribunal was entitled to considerably more because of
the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) which ensued after an episode with her
husband. He had returned to her house after a separation arising from repeated episodes
of domestic violence, refused to leave, deliberately kept her awake all night, and then
calmly and eerily assembled their two children beside him together with an axe, a knife
and a baseball bat. He had made a variety of threats. His wife swore that she had been
convinced from her knowledge of his past patterns of behaviour that he was going to kill
her and probably the children.
Subsequently, she displayed a wide variety of PTSD symptoms, according to a forensic
psychologist who gave evidence. However, some time later, she had briefly resumed
cohabitation with her husband and the argument was put by counsel appearing for the
Crimes Compensation Tribunal that, although the incident was an unpleasant one, no
physical injuries had been caused, the incident was similar in its violence to many others
in the relationship, and she had resumed living with the man, suggesting that she had not
been excessively traumatised by the incident.
The forensic psychologist was permitted to give evidence that the mother had been a
long-time sufferer of battered woman syndrome and that this enabled her to have a
particularly acute and insightful perspective upon the violence likely to be perpetrated
upon her and her children. He maintained that this took the incident out of the pattern of
violence to which she had been exposed and made it especially traumatic. He also testified
that her resumption of cohabitation with the assailant did not necessarily indicate that she
was not traumatised by the prior incident, but that her decision was explicable in terms of
the learned helplessness symptomatic of battered woman syndrome which had become
her coping mechanism during her years of suffering his assaults.
Likely developments
[10.30.240] The R v Runjanjic decision immediately proved controversial in Australia (see
Stubbs (1991; 1992); Scutt (1992); Easteal (1992b); Sheehy, Stubbs and Tolmie (1992);
Freckelton (1994); Leader-Elliott (1993)) in the same way that its precursor, Lavallee v The
Queen [1990] 1 SCR 852; (1990) 55 CCC (3d) 97, had been (see Martinson et al (1991)). It
was followed by many more cases in which attempts were made to introduce battered
woman syndrome evidence to support pleas of self-defence, provocation and duress by
814 [10.30.230]
those alleged to be suffering from it. However, where the evidence sought to be led goes
no further than to buttress the defendant’s argument by offering the inference that she
might well have been provoked or have acted under duress as a result of a long period of
having been subject to domestic violence, it may be excluded as “raising the very
non-expert matters the jury has to decide”: R v Singleton (1994) 72 A Crim R 117 at 124; see
too Western Australia v Carlino (No 2) [2014] WASC 404.
It may be that the categories of persons permitted to give evidence in relation to
battered woman syndrome will become quite broad. A criminologist in a Magistrates
Court in Canberra was allowed to give evidence with respect to the offence of imposition
on the Commonwealth contrary to s 29B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth): Easteal (1993). She
was allowed to give evidence as to the syndrome’s characteristics, while a psychologist
testified that the woman in question “exhibited the indicia of battered woman syndrome”:
Easteal (1993, p 140). This may be a forerunner of a more flexible approach by courts as to
the possessors of expertise about the effects of domestic violence: see, too, R v Gadd
(unreported, Queensland Supreme Court, 27 March 1995), where a social worker was
permitted to give evidence. However, the views of Hall J in Western Australia v Liyanage
[2016] WASC 12 and then of the Court of Appeal in Liyanage v Western Australia (2017) 51
WAR 359; [2017] WASCA 112 are to the effect that a witness in relation to the syndrome
needs to be a mental health professional. It may well be that they are not followed by
other courts in this regard. However, it is apparent that a person purporting to give
evidence on the syndrome will need to establish his or her expertise to do so.
Kirby J in Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; [1998] HCA 75 at [165] signalled the
need for “caution in the reception of testimony concerning BWS”. In this he has been
supported also by the approach of the English Court of Appeal in R v Thornton (No 2)
[1996] 2 All ER 1023 and by the Supreme Court of Canada in Malott v The Queen (1998) 155
DLR (4th) 513. He noted (at [165]) that the syndrome is not a:
universally accepted and empirically established scientific phenomenon. Least of all does
the mere raising of it, in evidence or argument, cast a protective cloak over an accused,
charged with homicide, who alleges subjection to a long-term battering or other abusive
relationship. No civilised society removes its protection to human life simply because of
the existence of a history of long-term physical or psychological abuse. If it were so, it
would expose to unsanctioned homicide a large number of persons who, in the nature of
things, would not be able to give their version of the facts. The law expects a greater
measure of self-control in unwanted situations where human life is at stake. It reserves
cases of provocation and self-defence to truly exceptional circumstances. While these
circumstances may be affected by contemporary conditions and attitudes, there is no legal
carte blanche, including for people in abusive relationships, to engage in premeditated
homicide.
(See also Green v The Queen (1997) 191 CLR 334 at 407.)
Kirby J has pointed out that while battered woman syndrome does not enjoy universal
support, “there is considerable agreement that expert testimony about the general
dynamics of abusive relationships is admissible if relevant to the issues in the trial and
proved by a qualified expert”: Osland v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 316; [1998] HCA 75 at
[167]. The qualifications of persons seeking to give evidence in this area are likely to be
carefully scrutinised – at least in superior courts and tribunals – in light of the decision in
R v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522. Not every psychologist or psychiatrist or sexual assault
centre worker could properly claim to have the requisite expertise to offer informed views
on battered woman syndrome. Important questions yet to be finally determined include:
(1) whether the evidence that will be permitted will extend simply to description of
the indicia of the syndrome, without particular reference to the accused woman;
(2) whether expert witnesses will be permitted to offer the view that the woman
actually suffers from the syndrome;
[10.30.240] 815
(3) whether expert witnesses will be permitted to express views on the impact that
suffering the syndrome has upon the woman’s perceptions of the threats to which
she was subjected;
(4) whether the concept of “learned helplessness” has proper application in the
battered woman context;
(5) whether the Walker (1984) definition of a “battered woman” as a woman who has
gone through the battering cycle at least twice will be applied in Australasian
courts and whether it will prove workable;
(6) whether myth-dispelling evidence is necessary in the context of the reactions of
women the subject of domestic violence: see Dodge and Greene (1991); Schuller
and Vidmar (1992);
(7) why it is that only a small cross-section of battered women kill or seriously injure
their assailants;
(8) whether, notwithstanding being battered, in the majority of situations a battered
woman can reasonably be expected to do other than kill or seriously injure her
assailant; and
(9) whether battered woman syndrome is properly to be regarded as a subset of
post-traumatic stress disorder.
Because of the definitional vagueness that characterises battered woman syndrome, as

acknowledged by Walker in 1995, doubts must exist as to whether it is an expert field of
endeavour that can properly be translated from the therapeutic context to the forensic: see
Freckelton (1994). The multiple methodological problems and interpretive uncertainties
that beset Walker’s interpretation of her data compound this. In light of the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113
S Ct 2786 (1993) (see above, [2.10.550]), courts are likely increasingly to focus upon the
reliability and validity of techniques and theories placing “syndrome evidence” in an “at
risk” category. Questions going to the scientific validity of battered woman syndrome
include:
(1) whether the edges of the syndrome are too “fuzzy” to allow it to be regarded as
scientifically or adequately empirically based;
(2) what overlap exists between the syndrome and post-traumatic stress disorder and
other psychiatric illnesses – for instance, Rosewater (1987) has warned that the
“symptoms” presented by the battered woman have been confused with, and
resulted in misdiagnosis of, schizophrenia or borderline personality disorder;
(3) whether sufficient controls and other safeguards have been used in the empirical
research propounding the existence of the syndrome;
(4) whether Walker’s results are reproducible in any accurate way and whether her
methodology and interpretation can stand up to rigorous scrutiny;
(5) whether the syndrome can come into being when persons are not regularly
cohabiting, when the violence is predominantly emotional, or when there are long
gaps between different phases of the Walker cycle; and
(6) whether its fundamental dynamic of abuse of power within a relationship means
that it should be conceptualised as “battered person syndrome”.
It is likely that the years ahead will see more rigorous analysis of the forensic legitimacy of
battered woman syndrome. The decision of the Western Australia Court of Appeal in
Liyanage v Western Australia (2017) 51 WAR 359; [2017] WASCA 112 makes this very clear.
When expert evidence about battered woman syndrome is admitted, its scope may well be
tightly construed along the lines of Canadian authority on rape trauma syndrome: see
[10.30.300]. Thus, evidence may be able to be given in relation to behaviour patterns of
victims of domestic violence, but the drawing of inferences relevant to the accused will be
816 [10.30.240]
left to the tribunal of fact unassisted by expert evidence which would essentially function
to bolster or detract from the accused’s credibility. However, an unresolved forensic
tension continues to exist between the uncertainties of general myth-dispelling evidence
about a social phenomenon such as battered woman syndrome and the courts’ need for
information about whether a particular person suffered from the characteristics of a
condition such as battered woman syndrome which might enable enhanced appreciation
of how the person perceived events prior to taking assaultive action against his or her
assailant.
Rape trauma syndrome evidence
The genesis of the term

[10.30.300] In 1974, Ann Burgess and Lynda Holmstrom coined the term “rape trauma
syndrome” to describe the emotional, behavioural and psychological reactions typically
exhibited by female victims of sexual assault: Commonwealth v Gallagher 547 A 2d 355 (Pa
1988). It is a form of post-traumatic stress disorder: American Psychiatric Association’s
(2013, p 279); Kiev (1988, p 62); and see subscription service Ch 51. The thesis of Burgess
and Holmstrom was based on the analysis of the symptoms exhibited by 92 female
victims of rape, selected from 146 patients admitted during a one-year period between
1972 and 1973 to the emergency ward of Boston City Hospital. They described a syndrome
with two phases. 1 During the initial stage, the victim experiences disorganisation in
lifestyle, with emotional reactions ranging from fear, humiliation and embarrassment to
anger and a desire for revenge (see Dwyer (1988, p 1064)):
Although fear of physical violence and death dominates the victim’s feelings, self-blame is
also very prominent. During this phase, when the victim feels the impact of the rape most
severely, she may exhibit one of two widely divergent emotional styles. In the expressed
style, feelings of fear, anger, and anxiety are manifested through crying, sobbing, smiling,
restlessness, and tenseness. In the controlled style, feelings are masked by a calm,
composed, or subdued demeanour.
The second phase involves a long-term process of physical and emotional
reorganisation. This phase begins two to three weeks after the attack. Symptoms may
include change in residence, travel to sources of support in other cities, nightmares, and
various phobic reactions. 2 Although all victims do not experience the same symptoms in
the same sequence, victims consistently experience the disorganisation phase. Many
victims thereafter experience mild to moderate symptoms in the reorganisation process.
Few victims report no symptoms.
Development of the thesis

[10.30.310] Early follow-up studies were critical of the methodology of the work of
Burgess and Holmstrom and others: see Kilpatrick, Veronen and Resick (1979, p 658);
McCombie (1976, p 137); Notman and Nadelson (1976, p 408); Katz and Mazur (1979);
Frazier and Borgida (1985); Haynes, Richard and Kubany (1995); Biggers and Yim (2003),
but in general terms supported the early researchers’ conclusions, while refining the
characterisation of the nature of the victims’ tensions and anxieties during the longer-term
post-sexual assault period. 3 However, the conclusions were identified as drawn from an
unrepresentative and inadequate sample (Frazier and Borgida (1985)), random sampling
was not employed (Frazier and Borgida (1985); Haynes, Richard and Kubany (1995)), and
1 Sutherland and Scherl (1970, p 503) divided victims’ reactions into three phases, but in
general terms agreed with Burgess and Holmstrom.
2 Including fear of sexual relations, fear of being alone, fear of people, and fear of the
indoors or fear of the outdoors (depending on where they were attacked): Burgess and
Holmstrom (1974, p 983).
3 Lauderdale (1984, pp 1371ff) usefully collects the literature on the studies as at 1984.
[10.30.310] 817
control groups were not used (Frazier and Borgida (1985)). No distinction was made
between different categories of victims in the initial screening – incest victims, sexual
assault victims involving non-penetrative assault, rape victims, child victims, adolescent
victims and adult victims (Katz and Mazur (1979)). Concern has also been expressed about
the fact that while Burgess and Holmstrom originally referred to rape trauma syndrome as
the “acute phase and the long-term reorganizational process that occurs as a result of
forcible rape or attempted forcible rape”, in the next sentence they stated: “This syndrome
of behavioral, somatic, and physiological reactions is an acute stress reaction to a life
threatening situation” (1974, p 981). This makes the temporal aspect of rape trauma
syndrome significantly unclear (see O’Donohue et al (2014, p 861)). Likewise, Burgess and
Holmstrom are unclear in their assumptions about pre-rape status, how it applies across
victims’ ages, and whether it is fully applicable across categories such as intra-familial
rape and stranger rape.
Fisher (1989, pp 705–706) notes:
Subsequent research refined the symptoms associated with these short- and long-term
reactions to a rape and estimated the prevalence of those symptoms in the general
population of victims. There are numerous empirical studies of victims of rape completed
to date [1989] which demonstrate that victims’ reactions affect four areas: anxiety or fears,
depression, social adjustment and social functioning. 4 Most rape victims have strong
rape-related fears, both immediately after the rape and long term. Other researchers have
found that depressive symptoms are frequently part of the long-term reaction to rape.
Victims often have problems in carrying out their major social roles, including work and
social relationships. Many victims also report that rape disrupts their sexual functioning
for a substantial period …
The psychological studies also document the severity of the trauma caused by rape.
Six months after the rape, the majority of rape victims still experience a distinct “core of
distress”. More than 40 per cent of victims at 15 to 30 months after the rape suffer from
sexual dysfunction, restricted social interaction, suspicion, fears, and depression. A variety
of psychological symptoms are present in rape victims three years after the rape, leading
researchers to conclude that victims may never achieve complete recovery from the rape.
Additionally, the results of these studies indicate that knowing the assailant does not
improve the rape victim’s recovery process, and may even present additional problems for
the victim.
(Compare Watson (1988, pp 1014ff).)

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) (American Psychiatric
Association (2013)) recognises sexual assault as one of the stressors that can cause
post-traumatic stress disorder (2013, p 274), which numbers among its symptoms the
presence of intrusion symptoms associated with the event, persistent avoidance of stimuli
associated with the traumatic event, negative alterations in cognitions and mood
associated with the traumatic event, and marked alterations in arousal and reactivity
associated with the traumatic event beginning or worsening after the event (pp 271–272).
(See Ch 10.45.)
However, this does not assist with the most important issue from a forensic point of
view – whether the presence or absence of rape trauma syndrome discriminates between
women who are truthfully (as against falsely) asserting that they have been the victims of
sexual assault. As it has been put by O’Donohue et al (2014, p 858): “there is no scientific
evidence regarding rape trauma syndrome that demonstrates that the extent to which a
particular woman seems to meet some of the symptoms involved in rape trauma
syndrome has any bearing on whether her claims are true or false.”
4 It would be appropriate for any professional conducting an interview on the impact of a

sexual assault on a particular victim to address each of these areas.
818 [10.30.310]

[10.30.320] Evidence about the responses of victims to having been sexually assaulted will
generally be led by the prosecution to corroborate the sexual assault complainant’s
assertion that she (or he, although there have been few studies on the male response to
sexual assault) has been the victim of rape (Block (1990); Lauderdale (1984); Trowbridge
(2003); Keogh (2007)). However, there have been occasions in the United States where the
defence has sought to lead expert evidence of rape trauma syndrome to highlight the fact
that the complainant’s actions have been inconsistent with the symptoms of rape trauma
syndrome and so to suggest that intercourse either never took place or was consensual:
see State v Marks 647 P 2d 1292 (1982); Henson v State 535 NE 2d 1189 (Ind 1989);
Economou (1991, p 1152). The existence and severity of experience of the syndrome are
also relevant, insofar as they pertain to the particular victim, when assessing the impact of
a sexual assault for sentencing purposes. As well, rape trauma syndrome evidence has
been introduced by plaintiffs in civil actions for assault to assist jurors in assessing the
measure of damages: Division of Corrections v Wynn 436 So 2d 446 (Fla Dist Ct App 1983);
White v Violent Crimes Compensation Board 76 NJ 368; 388 A 2d 206 (1978). The syndrome
may also be relevant for crime compensation applications.
United States courts have been split on the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome
evidence, 5 with three holding it inadmissible (Minnesota: State v Saldana 324 NW 2d 227
(Minn 1982); State v McGee 324 NW 2d 232 (Minn 1982); Washington: State v Black 109
Wash 2d 336; 745 P 2d 12 (1987); Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v Gallagher 547 A 2d 355 (Pa
1988)) and at least 10 holding it admissible for at least a limited purpose (Arizona: State v
Radjenovich 674 P 2d 333 (1983); State v Huey 145 Ariz 59; 699 P 2d (1985) (en banc);
California: People v Bledsoe 36 Cal 3d 236; 681 P 2d 291 (1984) (en banc); Colorado: People v
Hampton 746 P 2d 947 (Colo 1987) (en banc); Indiana: Simmons v State 504 NE 2d 575 (Ind
1987); Henson v State 535 NE 2d 1189 at 1191 (Ind 1989); Iowa: State v Gettier 438 NW 2d 1
(Iowa 1989); Kansas: State v Marks 647 P 2d 1292 (1982); State v McQuillen 236 Kan 161; 689
P 2d 822 (1984); aff’d 239 Kan 590; 721 P 2d 740 (1986); Maryland: State v Allewalt 308 Md
89; 517 A 2d 741 (1986); 6 Missouri: State v Taylor 663 SW 2d 235 (Mo 1984); Montana: State
v Liddell 685 P 2d 918: 42 ALR 4th 865 (1988); Wisconsin: State v Robinson 146 Wis 2d 315;
431 NW 2d 165 (1988)). 7 Four State Supreme Courts have admitted such evidence when
the victim is a child, and not committed themselves on the issue of its admissibility in
respect of adult victims (Delaware: Wheat v State 527 A 2d 269 (Del 1987); Hawaii: State v
Kim 64 Haw 598; 645 P 2d 1330 (1982); 8 Oregon: State v Middleton 294 Or 427; 657 P 2d
1215 (1982); Vermont: State v Catsam 148 Vt 366; 534 A 2d 184 (1987)).
Most United States commentators (see, eg, Fischer (1989, p 693); Donohue (1988, p 35);
Massaro (1985, p 439)) have concluded that rape trauma syndrome satisfies the Frye
criteria for admissibility: Frye v United States 293 F 1013 at 1014(DC Cir 1923) . 9 However,
Watson (1988, p 1024; see also Schnee (1986, p 192)) argued that to focus on the validity
5 See 42 ALR 4th 879 for a useful analysis of United States case law.
6 The expert in this case employed the term ″post-traumatic stress disorder″ in place of rape
trauma syndrome.
7 The New Mexico Supreme Court could be said to have implied acceptance of rape trauma
syndrome testimony in State v Jackson 641 P 2d 498 (1982).
8 The Supreme Court permitted the testimony of a child psychiatrist on the specific
characteristics shared by children sexually abused by family members. Based upon
interviews with the alleged victim, the expert testified not only that the victim exhibited
such characteristics, but also that the victim’s story was true. The court accepted that
expertise in post-traumatic reactions can assist a jury in assessing a witness’s credibility.
9 The Colorado Supreme Court in People v Hampton 746 P 2d 947 (Colo 1987) at 952 (en banc)
held that the Frye test (Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923)) should apply to
‘novel scientific devices and processes’, but not to rape trauma syndrome.
[10.30.320] 819
and consistency aspects of the syndrome casts doubt upon whether the symptoms of the
syndrome accurately demonstrate that rape was their cause and raised the issue of
whether many other factors might not cause the same symptoms. She joined others in
querying whether the syndrome can validly be translated from a treatment to a diagnostic
tool and the appropriateness of reliance being placed upon it in the forensic arena.
In the leading case of People v Bledsoe 36 Cal 3d 236; 681 P 2d 291 (1984), a live issue
was whether the syndrome was generally recognised as having validity within the
scientific community that uses it (primarily sexual assault counsellors). 10 The court in
Bledsoe drew an analogy from expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome to hypnotically
induced testimony (see above, [10.30.300]; 92 ALR 3d 442 (1979)) and testimony on the
results of polygraph tests (see above, Ch 10.0; Elliott (1982)), and held that the scientific
evaluation of rape trauma syndrome had not reached a level of reliability that surpassed
the quality of common-sense evaluation that could be undertaken by lay jurors. The court
noted that the symptoms characteristic of the syndrome may follow any psychologically
traumatic event. It pointed out that the syndrome only describes symptoms that occur
with some frequency, but it makes no pretence of covering the field of all sexual assaults.
The task of determining whether the alleged victim really was a victim in the sense
alleged by the prosecution remains that of the body best equipped to undertake it – the
jury.
For the most part, expert evidence relating to the experience of rape trauma syndrome
has been regarded as complying with r 702 of the United States Federal Rules of Evidence
1975, which prescribes that testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact; this is generally
interpreted to mean that it must be beyond the ken of the average layperson. In particular,
the existence of “rape myths” is regularly cited to justify evidence being given on matters
that might otherwise be regarded as within the province of the average juror to appreciate:
cf [10.30.300].
There has been an evolution in the scope of rape trauma syndrome and the purposes
for which it has been admitted in United States courts, with an emerging focus, when
determining admissibility, on the purpose for which the testimony is tendered. Generally,
testimony offered to explain elements of the complainant’s behaviour that might be
considered harmful to the prosecution case has been held admissible. These elements
include delay in reporting, failure to make an early complaint, emotional flatness after the
incident, memory lapses, inability to provide a clear description of the assailant, and a
hostile attitude towards police investigators.
Much of the controversy in the 1980s surrounded the issue of whether the expert
should be permitted to proceed to the next step 11 and, as in State v McQuillen 236 Kan 161;
689 P 2d 822 at 829 (1984); aff’d 239 Kan 590; 721 P 2d 740 (1986), express the view that the
complainant suffered from the syndrome.
Although it was suggested in Commonwealth v Gallagher 547 A 2d 355 (Pa 1988) that
such evidence in fact was about the witness’s credibility and so invaded the province of
the jury, most courts have regarded it as helpful to “rebut common misconceptions about
the presumed behavior of sexual assault victims”: State v Robinson 146 Wis 2d 315; 431 NW
2d 165 at 169 (1988). It may be that such evidence, where it is designed to be
counterintuitive or to combat “unconscious assumptions and prejudices” (State v Black 109
Wash 2d 336 at 352; 745 P 2d 12 at 21 (1987); see Watson (1988)), only becomes possible
10 It has also been suggested that the relevant community is the psychiatric community (State
v Marks 647 P 2d 1292 at 1299 (1982)), while Buchele and Buchele (1985, p 31) maintained
that it should be psychiatrists and psychologists. In State v Liddell 685 P 2d 918: 42 ALR 4th
865 (1988), a psychiatric nurse was permitted to give rape trauma syndrome evidence.
11 Compare the issues to be determined in relation to battered woman syndrome, as listed
above, [10.30.240].
820 [10.30.320]
where the defence has “opened the door” by arguing that the behaviour of the
complainant after the alleged assault is inconsistent with that of a “real victim”. Often,
however, the expression “rape trauma syndrome” is not employed by the expert or the
court and the evidence is simply about general clinical symptoms of victims in similar
circumstances: see Fisher (1989, p 714). Expert testimony has generally not been permitted
to evaluate or comment on the complainant’s credibility: see Watson (1988, p 1034);
Commonwealth v Gallagher 547 A 2d 355 (Pa 1988).
Fisher (1989, pp 717ff) usefully divided the approaches of United States courts into the
following categories:
(1) expert testimony limited to explaining the general theory behind the syndrome
and listing the constellation of symptoms and behaviour that constitute its
diagnosis in an individual (the approach favoured by Watson (1988));
(2) expert testimony listing the victim’s behaviour and symptoms but not giving an
opinion about the meaning of those symptoms;
(3) expert testimony that the victim’s symptoms are consistent with either rape
trauma syndrome or post-traumatic stress disorder;
(4) expert testimony that the victim suffers from rape trauma syndrome or
post-traumatic stress disorder; and
(5) expert testimony to the effect that a victim suffers from rape trauma syndrome or
post-traumatic stress disorder, is telling the truth, and/or was raped.
The categories are in ascending order of magnitude of incursion into the province of the
jury – that is, determining whether by reason of the victim suffering rape trauma
syndrome, the victim’s account of her experience is likely to be true and that she was
therefore forced into non-consensual sexual intercourse.
There have been occasions where rape trauma syndrome evidence has been rejected on
the basis that its prejudicial value outweighed its probative qualities. In State v Saldana 324
NW 2d 227 (Minn 1982), for example, an appellate court upheld the exclusion of expert
evidence on typical familial sexual abuse symptoms and behaviour. It characterised a
counsellor’s proposed evidence as of no help to the jury and as bearing with it an extreme
danger of unfair prejudice. Permitting a person in the role of an expert to suggest that,
because the complainant exhibited some of the symptoms of the rape trauma syndrome,
she had therefore been raped, was declared by the court to unfairly prejudice the
defendant by creating an aura of special reliability and trustworthiness. Since jurors of
ordinary abilities are competent to consider the evidence and to determine whether the
incident occurred as alleged by the prosecution, the danger of unfair prejudice
outweighed any probative value that such evidence would have.
In Henson v State 535 NE 2d 1189 at 1191 (Ind 1989), the Indiana Supreme Court held
that a judge had erred at first instance in excluding expert opinion evidence led by the
defence that the behaviour of the complainant, in drinking and dancing at the same bar at
which she claimed she had been raped earlier the same evening, was inconsistent with the
behaviour of rape victims and did not match the profile of a person suffering from rape
trauma syndrome.
Concern that such evidence might be advanced had been flagged in 1987 in State v
Black 109 Wash 2d 336; 745 P 2d 12 at 21 (1987) :
The defense could seize upon [the victim’s] apparently incongruous lack of hysteria to
allege that no attack occurred, or that the woman consented. The intuitive response of the
average juror may well be to assume that a woman could not possibly respond calmly to
such an assault. In such a case, the evidence presented to the jury by both parties
concerning the victim’s mental state and behavior is counterintuitive, and may appeal to
the unconscious assumptions and prejudices of the average juror – or judge.
[10.30.320] 821
However, the court in Henson found the evidence probative on the issue whether a
traumatic rape occurred and held that it would be “fundamentally unfair” (at 1193) to
preclude the defence’s use of rape trauma syndrome evidence if such evidence were
permissible to the prosecution: Simmons v State 504 NE 2d 575 at 577ff (Ind 1987) . In her
criticism of the Henson decision, Economou (1991, p 1157) argued that it was significant
that in Simmons the rape trauma syndrome evidence was called by the prosecution in
rebuttal, to controvert the defence suggestion that the complainant forgot or lied about the
facts because the rape never occurred. However, there appears little justification in
principle or decided cases for her contention that rape trauma syndrome evidence should
be admissible for the prosecution but denied to the defence (p 1165).
Likely Australasian developments

[10.30.330] It would be unhelpful and inappropriate for the prosecution or the defence to
lead expert evidence relating to the presence or absence of rape trauma syndrome in an
Australasian sexual assault trial (for a report in relation to it, see R v Glynn [1998] SASC
6923). Courts are likely to be unreceptive to such evidence, given the controversies and the
divergence of approach that have characterised its reception in the United States.
Although it has generally been the experience in the United States that the syndrome’s
status as an area of expertise has not been successfully impugned, it is likely that this
would be a focus of close scrutiny in Australia and New Zealand. Given the stringent
criteria applied to “acceptable” survey compilation, and the increasing awareness of the
importance of reliability as a discriminant in the use to be made of expert evidence, it is
probable that social science evidence will be examined particularly closely for some time
by the courts. It is likely that the approach adopted in People v Bledsoe 36 Cal 3d 236; 681 P
2d 291 (1984) will be influential and that defence lawyers will point to the uncertainty
surrounding whether the syndrome can properly be used as a tool for determining
whether a rape, as opposed to some other traumatic event, took place. The issue comes
down to determining whether rape trauma syndrome is a definable, predictable
sub-species of the well-recognised post-traumatic stress disorder.
The argument that the traumatic experience of sexual assault and the common
behaviour of rape victims are outside the range of normal experience, particularly for
male jurors, may encourage some judges to consider admitting expert evidence to describe
the constellation of symptoms frequently suffered, without the symptoms being related to
the particular complainant (see Long, Pang and Kee (2002)); such a function can accurately
be described as “myth-dispelling”, educative or counterintuitive (see Buchele and Buchele
(1985, p 31)) or, alternatively, as a form of social framework evidence (see Giannelli (1997)).
However, it is noteworthy that such an approach has not found favour in spite of the
availability of psychological testimony in relation to the well-known dangers of
eyewitness identification and the vagaries of the operation of memory.
It may be that the prejudicial effect of such evidence, as weighed against its
questionable probative value, will be the criterion that would be particularly potent in the
decision to exclude expert evidence relating to a victim’s alleged experience of rape
trauma syndrome.

[10.30.400] A number of researchers have isolated symptoms said to be indicative of the
non-accidental causation of physical injuries in young children: see, for instance, Kempe et
al (1962). In Commonwealth v Rodgers 364 Pa Super 477; 528 A 2d 610 at 614 (1987), appeal
denied 542 A 2d 1368 (1988), it was described thus:
822 [10.30.330]
The diagnosis of battered child syndrome is used in connection with young children and
is based upon a finding of multiple injuries in various stages of healing, primarily
multiple fractures, soft tissue swelling or skin bruising. Also pertinent to the diagnosis is
evidence that the child is generally undernourished, with poor hygiene, and that the
severity and type of injury is inconsistent with the story concerning the occurrence of the
injuries offered by the parents or those who were caring for the child.
(See also Commonwealth v Paquette 301 A 2d 837 at 840 (1973); Commonwealth v Dunkle 529
Pa 168; 602 A 2d 830 (1992) at 834–835.)
In Tasmania v Lowe (2004) 13 Tas R 120; [2004] TASSC 62 at [13]–[14], Slicer J made the
following observations about “battered baby syndrome”:
The term first entered the medico/legal lexicon in the 1960s (Kempe CH, “The Battered
Baby Syndrome” (1962) Journal of the American Medical Association 181:17) and the first
reference to the term was made in Australian literature in 1964 (Storey, “The Battered Child”,
Medical Journal of Australia II:789). Specialist agencies have attempted to develop general
strategies to deal with what, in human experience, is an historic problem, but one only
recently analysed through scientific method. Traditional application of the criminal law
through doctrines of assault, physical harm to the person, parental rights of discipline and the
like were not well suited to the complexity. Specialist agencies attempted to deal with
strategies designed to identify the characteristics of perpetrators’ identification and forms of
intervention and treatment (see generally Longshaw, “The Battered Child” (1970) Australian
Journal of Forensic Sciences Vol 3, at 60; Katz, “The Battered Child Syndrome – Psychiatric
Aspects” (1970) Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences Vol 3, at 71). In the former work
Longshaw concludes (at 69):
Management of cases of the battered child begins with a correct diagnosis and will
often need to be followed by a separation of the child from the battering parent on a
temporary or permanent basis. Along with any necessary treatment of the child must
also go treatment of the parent and action to prevent or reduce the likelihood of
further episodes. Another reason for the reporting of cases to a central authority even
where injury may have been accidental is to check whether there has been any
previous history of trauma. Such knowledge will provide valuable clues for a new
approach to the parent while centralised reporting may also overcome the problem of
hospital jumping, reported from time to time in the literature.
And in the latter, Katz states (at 75):

The actual assault on the child may be precipitated by a crisis which puts and [sic]
extra strain on the already inadequate individual. This may be some criticism, rejection
or desertion, which results in an overwhelming hostility to the world in general and to
the baby in particular. On the one hand, the unfortunate child cannot meet the intense
need of the moment and, on the other, it may represent the undesirable aspects of the
parent, which she resents in herself; punishing baby in effect means punishing her
“bad self”.
A child’s “badness” in the form of persistent soiling, wetting or crying may also
precipitate an attack, as may other crises of a financial or social sort.
As Australian statistics began to be compiled, certain characteristics of the perpetrator

and factors causing violence were identified, which included models of causation defined
as social learning, family structure, environmental stress and mental illness. (Smith SM,
“An Overview of the Battered Baby Syndrome” (1980) Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences
Vol 12, at 91.) Some of those characteristics and factors are here present. Management was
focused on the treatment of the child by removal or placement into the care of another and a
team or holistic approach directed to the modification of future conduct. As Professor Smith
stated (at 102–103):
Most parents, if skilfully handled, gain confidence and understanding of the
specialized medical team’s approach. When this stage is reached, the parents will relax
sufficiently to allow for a detailed explanation of their family, marital and other
problems. The psychiatrist, assisted by an experienced social worker, should arrive at a
diagnosis with an understanding of the family dynamics, in a space of two or three
weeks. Coupled with background information obtained from a variety of sources,
[10.30.400] 823
immediate long-term management of the child and his family can then be planned. In
approximately one-third of cases, a detailed psycho-diagnostic evaluation will
establish that the likelihood of parents responding to treatment will be remote. In such
cases, strong consideration must be given to permanent removal of the child from his
parents’ care. The paediatrician or psychiatrist, as leaders of the medical team, should
notify the statutory agency of his opinion and be prepared to provide written or oral
evidence to substantiate his opinion. He should not shirk this important duty.
Separating an abused child from his family is usually considered a last resort that is
harmful to the “therapeutic situation”. The converse is, however, often the case.
Removal from a battering situation is usually beneficial, provided substitute foster care
that provides adequately for the child’s needs, can be obtained. Attempts should not
be made to rehabilitate the parents at the expense of the safety of the child. This
unfortunately frequently occurs. Supervision by social workers, whether it is voluntary
or by Court Order, does not overcome the inherent difficulty in managing the
hard-core group of cases – namely, that no supervisor can be with a child or his family
for more than a fraction of the time. One needs to overcome a reluctance by medical
and social welfare agencies to inform legal agencies that in their opinion the child
should be removed. Such reluctance, which is often coupled with unilateral
decision-making by a particular agency, deprives a child of his legal rights of
protection.
Child-abusers share a striking similarity with other behavioural deviants. If this is
accepted, a great deal of disappointment and wasted effort in treating the phenomenon
might be saved. Among child-abusers there is a small nucleus of individuals who will
be difficult or impossible to help. These are overlapped by a larger group, shading into
the community as a whole, in which simple methods of treatment and support will be
eminently satisfactory. Because there is no universal type of abusing parent, there is, of
course, no one common cause or factor that needs to be eradicated. In many cases
(approximately two-thirds), and with skilled help, child-abusers can be managed by
identifying and modifying those factors that cause and release their anger. Apart from
the usual professional services – supportive individual or group psychotherapy, social
case work and custodial treatments that have been reviewed elsewhere (Smith, 1975), a
number of community organizations have been established to help abusing parents. These
include Mothers Anonymous, Homemaker Services, 24-Hour Life-Line Services and
Parents’ Aid. Such self-help groups, if provided with professional leadership and utilizing
carefully selected and trained volunteers, will provide an effective means of improving the
relationship between the parents and their children, and of parents with each other. Many
abusive parents can benefit from therapy, in terms of their own personality, their
self-esteem, their capability to adapt to stress, and their ability to utilize people and
agencies for their own needs. With support also, the parents’ attitudes and behaviour
towards their children can be substantially modified.
This subject, which relates to a physical syndrome, is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) evidence
Controversies
[10.30.450] At around the same time that Walker and others were studying the reactions of
adult victims of sexual assault, researchers began to attempt to determine whether
children who are sexually abused also exhibit predictable behavioural characteristics that
can accurately be profiled. Summit (1983), for instance, identified a “sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome” experienced by children who had been sexually molested by a
member of their family. He identified the following characteristics:
(1) secrecy;
(2) helplessness;
(3) entrapment and accommodation;
(4) delayed, conflicted and unconvincing disclosure; and
(5) retraction of disclosures: see also Meyers (1989); Gardner (1992).
824 [10.30.450]
Category 1, “secrecy”, describes the secrecy which Summit maintains is inherent in the
abusive adult–child relationship in the course of which the abuser makes it clear to the
child that adverse consequences will follow the child’s disclosure of what has been
happening to him or her. Category 2, helplessness, describes the absence of power that a
child has in an abusive relationship with a parent or trusted adult, making disclosure
exceptionally difficult because of the exploitation of an authoritarian relationship which is
subsisting.
Categories 3 to 5 are said by Summit to occur as a result of the abuse. By
“accommodation”, Summit (1983, p 184) has described a phenomenon in the course of
which abused children:
learn to accept the situation and survive. There is no way out, no place to run. The healthy,
normally emotionally resilient child will learn to accommodate to the reality of continuing
sexual abuse. There is the challenge of accommodating not only to escalating sexual
demands, but to increasing consciousness of betrayal and objectification by someone who
is ordinarily idealised as a protective, altruistic, loving parental figure.
To facilitate the acceptance of the situation, the child may develop accommodation
mechanisms, including “domestic martyrdom”, “splitting of reality”, “altered states of
consciousness”, self-mutilation, promiscuity, projection of rage, substance abuse, and a
range of other destructive behaviours.
Stage 4 involves disclosure of abuse, which may be long delayed and whose delay may
be misconstrued. Stage 5 describes the propensity of children to retract their allegations
because of a newfound awareness of the consequences of their disclosures, pressures
brought upon them by family members, and a sense of guilt for betraying the abusing
family member.
Notably, the syndrome is not argued by Summit to extend as far as “denial” by a child
of having been sexually molested. Nor does Summit suggest that the syndrome has
application for very young victims in spite of its having been used in a number of highly
publicised kindergarten molestation cases in the United States. Summit put the ambit and
limitations clearly by 1992 in arguing that the “abstract presentation of the CSAAS” by an
expert who has not seen the child and who may even know virtually nothing about the
case provides the jury with useful information: Summit (1992a, p 148). He explained that
from his point of view, the CSAAS originated not as a “laboratory hypothesis or as a
designated study of a defined population. It emerged as a summary of diverse clinical
consulting experience, defined at the interface with paradoxical forensic reaction. It should
be understood without apology that the CSAAS is a clinical opinion, not a scientific
instrument”: Summit (1992b, p 155). The importance of these statements cannot be
overemphasised for the forensic context. They have a profound significance for the kind of
evidence that should be able to be given by expert witnesses in respect of the reactions of
children to sexual abuse and the kinds of inferences that can legitimately be drawn from
the presence or absence of such characteristics in a child suspected of being or claiming to
have been sexually abused: see further Freckelton (1997a).
Summit at the same time bewailed the fact that “lawyers and a few clinical expert
witnesses have tended to seize on the CSAAS as a major weapon” and maintained that
some of the adversarial alarm and distortion that he claimed by 1992 had attended the
reception of CSAAS evidence had stemmed from a misunderstanding of the term
“syndrome”. Summit (1992b) employed the term to mean a “list, or pattern of otherwise
unrelated factors which can alert the physician to the possibility of disorder” (p 157) and
acknowledged that such a pattern is not diagnostic: “the cause-and-effect relationship
among the factors themselves and with the possible problem is generally obscure” (p 157).
He contended that, in the forensic context, “syndrome seems to mean a diagnosis which an
expert contrives to prove an injury. Syndrome evidence has become a generic term for
diagnostic medical or psychological testimony which must be closely scrutinised for
[10.30.450] 825
scientific reliability, lest the intrinsic authority of the expert witness improperly prejudice a
jury through contrived or eccentric opinion”: p 157. He made the telling comment that had
he known the legal consequences of the term “syndrome”, he would have eschewed it and
might have chosen a name like “Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Pattern”: p 157. This
is one of the weaker points of an otherwise candid apology for the syndrome advanced by
Summit. The fact is that by cloaking the entity in the language of medical diagnosis, which
is the inevitable connotation of the word “syndrome”, Summit originally invested it with
a resonance of legitimacy (and no doubt did so advisedly) which it would not otherwise
have commanded. The difficulty is that the description is inappropriate from at least two
points of view – it is not an entity susceptible of classification in terms of being a
constellation of signs or symptoms whose medical aetiology may be unknown; nor is it a
pathological condition of any demonstrated kind.
Summit at least conceded that the behavioural patterns that he identifies are not
pathological – rather, they are descriptive of normal children making normal adjustments
to an abnormal environment. He acknowledged (Summit (1992b, p 160)) (emphasis in
original):
There has been some tendency to use the CSAAS as an offer of proof that a child has been
abused. A child may be said to be suffering from or displaying the CSAAS as if it is a malady
that proves the alleged abuse. Or a child’s conspicuous helplessness or silence might be
said to be consistent with the CSAAS, as if not complaining proves the complaint. Some
have contended that a child who retracts is a more believable victim than one who has
maintained a consistent complaint. Such absurd distortions fuel the fire against the
CSAAS.
Summit’s stance therefore was that an instrument with utility within the therapeutic
environment has been highjacked by prosecutors and applied for purposes for which it
was never designed when he coined it. Given that both battered woman syndrome and
rape trauma syndrome were controversial within the mental health areas and commencing
to be used in the forensic context by 1983, however, in all probability the associations of
the term “syndrome” must have been apparent to Summit in 1983 and in the succeeding
years.
McCord (1987, p 41) has maintained that researchers have been unsuccessful in relation
to children who have been the victims of sexual abuse:
In fact, research has indicated that children react in incredibly diverse ways to sexual
abuse. Nevertheless, there are expert witnesses who will testify that they can diagnose a
child as having been sexually abused.
Gardner (1992, p 297), too, expressed significant hesitation about the status of Summit’s
syndrome, noting that it was identified in 1983 and the phenomena described by Summit
relate to observations made a significant time before that. He argues that it presupposes
“an incredulous mother and a disbelieving community, especially police and child
protective services”. Gardner (1992, pp 297–298) also points out that Summit described a
series of reactions in children who have been sexually molested by an assailant from
within their family:
Accordingly, the syndrome’s application to other situations, such as nursery schools,
molestation by a stranger, molestation by a babysitter, and molestation by a teacher, is
inappropriate. In all of these situations the child is not living with the molester and is not
as likely therefore to develop the kinds of reactions seen at those levels in which there is a
sense of entrapment.
However, many psychiatrists and psychologists working in the sexual abuse area accept
that “typical reactions” of child sexual abuse victims can be isolated. For instance, Oates
(1992, p 189), citing a variety of studies conducted in both Australia and the United States
(Lusk and Waterman (1986); Adams-Tucker (1982); Brassard, Tyler and Kehle (1983);
Blumber (1981); Yates (1982); Boatman, Borkan and Schetky (1981); Sgroi (1982)) listed
826 [10.30.450]
general reactions, including anxiety, phobias, nightmares, separation anxiety, depression,

stomach-aches, headaches, hypochondriasis, faecal soiling, bed-wetting and excessive
blinking as reactions of children to sexual abuse: see also Beitchman et al (1992);
Kendell-Tackett et al (1993); Silverman et al (1996); Bagley et al (1995); Beitchman et al
(1991). However, a major issue that pervades discussions on the validity of the syndrome’s
existence is whether these and other symptoms, or a cross-section of them, can properly be
described as characteristic of a child who has been abused, or whether they can have other
aetiologies.
There are limits to the inferences that can be drawn from many of the studies on the
impact of sexual abuse upon children. Beitchman et al in a 1991 review of the literature
noted that as the majority of studies examining the short-term effects of child sexual abuse
were based on samples drawn from child protective services or psychiatric facilities, there
was a possibility that they overstated the prevalence and symptomatology associated with
child sexual abuse in the general population: Beitchman et al (1991, p 546). Beitchman et al
(1991, p 546) concluded that with the exception of sexualised behaviour, most of the
symptoms found in child and adolescent victims of sexual abuse:
were characteristic of clinical samples in general. Specifically, children from disadvantaged
or disturbed families often displayed behaviour problems, difficulties at school, and low
self-esteem. Internalizing behaviours such as sleep disturbance, somatic complaints,
fearfulness and withdrawal were also common symptoms in child psychiatric populations
and so cannot be automatically conceptualized as sequelae specific to sexual abuse.
They maintained that the research literature at that time did not yield sufficient evidence
“to postulate the existence of a unique ‘sexual abuse syndrome’ with a specific course or
outcome”: p 546; for a review of the critiques, see Freckelton (1997a). In addition, it may
well be that parameters of sexual abuse, such as age of onset, frequency, duration,
invasiveness, overt brutality, type of sexual intercourse, identity of assailant, and general
circumstances within the family, are significant factors, among others (see Beitchman et al
(1991; 1992); Mannarino and Cohen (1996)), in the impact of domestic sexual assaults upon
child victims, and thus the extent to which behaviour patterns can be said to be generally
indicative of the occurrence of sexual abuse.
The extent to which physical battering can properly be distinguished from sexual
abuse from a point of view of the symptoms or behaviour said to be customarily exhibited
by child victims remains unclear.
As with other of the syndromes discussed in this chapter, a key question for the courts
is whether the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome or pattern can legitimately be
taken from the therapeutic context in which it commands at least some degree of
confidence into the milieu of the courts. While it may be that the syndrome is a useful
diagnostic device, it assumes the presence of abuse and explains the child’s reactions to it.
It cannot so readily be used to prove that a particular child has been abused because he or
she exhibits indicia of the syndrome: see Askowitz and Graham (1994). O’Donohue and
Benuto (2012) went to the point of describing CSAAS evidence as “an exemplar of junk
science and should not be used in any way in any context, particularly in legal settings,
where impactful decisions are being made”.
United States authorities

[10.30.460] United States courts have been called upon to determine the admissibility of
psychological evidence concerning the consistency or otherwise of a child’s behaviour
with that of “genuine” victims of sexual abuse. A critical issue has been the propriety of
expert evidence about a child witness’s credibility. Some decisions have focused upon the
need for jurors to receive assistance about the reactions of child victims of sexual abuse
and so have been lenient in the leeway that they have extended to such testimony (see, eg,
Pennsylvania v Baldwin 502 A 2d 253 (1985); People v Payan 220 Cal Rptr 126 (1985); State v
[10.30.460] 827
Myers 359 NW 2d 604 (Minn 1984); State v Kim 64 Haw 598; 645 P 2d 1330 (1982); State v
Batangan 799 P 2d 48 (Haw 1990); State v Carlson 360 NW 2d 442 (Minn 1985); State v Davis
422 NW 2d 296 (1988); Robins v State 798 P 2d 558 (1990)), while others have enforced the
rule that experts are not permitted to proffer opinions upon other witnesses’ credibility:
see, eg, State v Lash 699 P 2d 49 (Kan 1985); State v Haseltine 352 NW 2d 673 (Wis 1984);
State v Castore 435 A 2d 321 (RI 1981).
A leading case is the decision of the California Supreme Court in People v McAlpin 812
P 2d 563 at 569 (1991), where it was held that expert evidence on the common reactions of
child molestation victims is not admissible to prove that the complaining witness has in
fact been sexually abused. However, it was held (at 569) admissible:
to rehabilitate such witness’s credibility when the defendant suggests that the child’s
conduct after the incident – eg, a delay in reporting – is inconsistent with his or her
testimony claiming molestation. … Such expert testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of
commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse and to explain the emotional
antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior.
The decision of People v Leon 263 Cal Rptr 77 (1989) appears to represent the majority
stance of United States courts. A leading expert in the area, Dr Summit, was permitted to
testify generally as to the characteristics of child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome
(CSAAS), as well as to the myths surrounding the reactions of children to such assaults.
However, it was held that as CSAAS had not been generally accepted within the relevant
professional community as more than a therapeutic tool, expert evidence in relation to its
existence in a particular complainant could not be tendered in support of the fact that a
particular molestation had been committed.
One of the most significant modern decisions on the subject is that of Commonwealth v
Dunkle 529 Pa 168; 602 A 2d 830 (1992), an appeal against a conviction for indecent assault
and other sexual offences against a child, where the appeal point related to the admission
of expert testimony about “child abuse syndrome”. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court by
majority decided that expert testimony concerning typical behaviour patterns by sexually
abused children should not have been regarded as admissible by the trial judge. It also
held that it was an error for the trial judge to have permitted expert evidence to explain
why sexually abused children may not recall certain details of an assault, why they may
not give complete details, and why they may delay reporting the incident.
In the trial, the expert evidence came from an experienced child protection worker, but
it did not relate specifically to the child in question who had made the complaints of abuse
the subject of the trial. The majority found the “child abuse syndrome”, which was
recognised as that described by Roland Summit, to be “an attempt to construct a
diagnostic or behavioral profile about sexually abused children” (at 832). However, it
found that the “existence of such a syndrome as either a generally accepted diagnostic tool
or as relevant evidence is not supportable” – principally because it is not specific enough
to sexually abused children to be “accurate”: at 832.
The court surveyed the literature and concluded:
[T]here is no one classical or typical personality profile for abused children. The difficulty
with identifying a set of behaviors exhibited by abused children is that abused children
react in a myriad of ways that may not be dissimilar from other sexually abused children,
but may be the very same behaviors as children exhibit who are not abused. 12
The majority found that the testimony about the uniformity of behaviour exhibited by
sexually abused children was not sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs and in fact constituted impermissible
evidence that the child was exhibiting symptoms of sexual abuse. The court found that
12 The court noted the studies referred to in Cohen (1985, pp 440–441); McCord (1986).
828 [10.30.460]
“[i]t is virtually impossible to clinically describe the elements of the ‘child abuse
syndrome’ with any realistic degree of specificity”: at 834.
The court also examined whether the testimony was probative and concluded (at
834–835):
Clearly, drug and alcohol abuse, eating disorders, low self-esteem and not doing school
work are common phenomena not solely related to child abuse. To permit the jury to
speculate that they might be, however, violates every notion of what constitutes probative
and relevant evidence. It is neither scientifically supportable nor legally supportable. Such
a laundry list of possible behaviors does no more than invite speculation and will not be
condoned.
The majority noted that Walker (1988) had included a compilation of a study showing
what percentage of sexually abused children exhibited what behaviours. The study
analysed the effects of sexual abuse on 369 children: see Table 2.
Table 2: Proportion of abused sample exhibiting checklist symptoms

Symptoms % Present
Panic/Anxiety attacks 5.7
Behavioural regression 3.8
Runs away/Takes off 2.7
Excessive autonomic arousal 4.6
Depression 18.7
Withdrawal from usual activity or relations 15.2
Sexually victimises others 3.0
Generalised fear 11.7
Suicidal attempts 1.9
Body image problems 7.9
Repressed anger/hostility 19.2
Daydreaming 13.8
Major problems with police 0.3
Eating disorders 0.8
Psychotic episode –
Overly compliant/Too anxious to please 13.8
Drug/Alcohol abuse 2.2
Age-inappropriate sexual behaviour 7.9
Hurts self physically 1.4
Minor problems with police 3.3
Fearful of abuse stimuli 30.1
Suicidal thoughts or actions 5.7
Psychosomatic complaints 10.0
Ritualistic behaviour 1.1
Indiscriminate affection-giving or receiving 6.5
Low self-esteem 32.8
Places self in dangerous situations 4.9
Violent fantasies 2.4
Emotional upset 22.8
Prostitution 0.8
[10.30.460] 829
Symptoms % Present
Obsessional, repetitive/recurrent thoughts 5.4
Shoplifting/Stealing 2.2
Non-academic school behaviour problems 9.2
Nightmares/Sleep disorders 20.1
Inability to form/maintain relationships 8.7
Academic problems 15.4
Aggressive behaviour 14.4
Inappropriate/Destructive peer relationships 7.0
The court found the table to demonstrate that:

[S]exually abused children (1) cannot be fitted into any specific behaviour patterns; (2) for
every symptom that was exhibited by any percentage, an even larger number do not
exhibit that symptom; and (3) not one single symptom was exhibited by a majority of
sexually abused children.
It concluded: “Clearly, these types of percentages cannot constitute probative evidence.”

The court contrasted the probative value of the evidence with “battered child
syndrome”, a diagnostic tool used by medical practitioners to determine whether a child
has been the subject of intentional abuse or accidental injury:
The diagnosis of battered child syndrome is used in connection with young children and
is based upon a finding of multiple injuries in various stages of healing, primarily
multiple fractures, soft tissue swelling or skin bruising. Also pertinent to the diagnosis is
evidence that the child is generally undernourished, with poor hygiene, and that the
severity and type of injury is inconsistent with the story concerning the occurrence of the
injuries offered by the parents or those who were caring for the child.
(See also Commonwealth v Rodgers 364 Pa Super 477; 528 A 2d 610 at 614 (1987), appeal
denied 542 A 2d 1368 (1988); Commonwealth v Paquette 301 A 2d 837 at 840 (1973).)
The court found that, “[p]ermitting an expert to testify about a behavioral profile and
then to introduce testimony to show that the witness acted in conformance with such a
profile is an erroneous method of obtaining a conviction”.
The majority repudiated the need for counterintuitive evidence about the reasons for
dilatoriness in complaint and poor-quality recounting of details of abuse on the basis that
there was no need for such evidence and that it would infringe upon the jury’s right to
determine credibility. The court was convinced that there may be a range of both
reasonable and unreasonable explanations for delay, but that such matters were “well
within the range of common experience; reasons that are understood by the jury”: at 837.
It accepted that sexually abused children may sometimes omit details of an incident for
the same reasons that they do not always promptly report the abuse – fear, embarrassment
or coercion by the abuser. It also accepted that the child may not understand either what
has occurred or the need for a complete description of what has happened. However, it
did not accept “that there is any clear need for an expert to explain this to a jury. This
understanding is well within the common knowledge of jurors. Additionally, the
prosecutor is able to elicit such information from the child during testimony”: at 838. The
majority also rejected the need to have expert testimony upon the reasons why a child
may fail to remember specific dates or times on the basis that this was an issue for the jury
upon which it did not require expert evidence. In dissent, McDermott J found that the
position of the majority “trivializes an entire field of child psychology by implying that
everybody already knows these facts as surely as they know that apples fall down”: at
840. Larsen J also recorded (at 840) an emphatic dissent, declaiming that the ruling by the
majority:
830 [10.30.460]
completely rules out the use of expert testimony to aid a jury in understanding a subject
which is shrouded in myth and shame and about which the average citizen/juror knows
little or nothing. To add insult to injury, the majority supports its holding atop a fragile
house of cards consisting of the writings of various “authorities” whose studies and
opinions carry only as much weight as any other untested authority who can be found to
espouse opinions that are in direct opposition to the “authorities” cited.
See also Commonwealth v Rodgers 364 Pa Super 477; 528 A 2d 610 at 614 (1987), appeal
denied 542 A 2d 1368 (1988); Commonwealth v Paquette 301 A 2d 837 at 840 (1973).
In State v Batangan 799 P 2d 48 (Haw 1990), by contrast, it was held that although
expert testimony explaining “seemingly bizarre” behaviour of a child sexual abuse victim
was helpful and should be admitted, conclusory opinions that the abuse did occur and
that the child victim’s report of abuse is truthful and believable is of no assistance to the
jury and should not be admitted.
New Zealand authorities

[10.30.470] In 1987 in R v B [1987] 1 NZLR 362 at 368, the New Zealand Court of Appeal
foreshadowed the admission of syndrome evidence in the sexual assault context:
As child psychology grows as a science it may be possible for experts in that field to
demonstrate as matters of expert observation that persons subjected to sexual abuse
demonstrate certain characteristics or act in peculiar ways which are so clear and
unmistakable that they can be said to be the concomitants of sexual abuse. When that is so
the courts may admit evidence as evidence of direct observation.
(See further Freckelton (1997a).)

In 1989, the Court of Appeal was asked to go further in R v Accused [1989] 1 NZLR 714
and to hold that “child abuse syndrome evidence” was admissible. In a very strong
judgment, it refused to do so. The Crown sought to call as a witness a psychologist, who
was also a school guidance counsellor, to counter the suggestion arising from
cross-examination that the complainant had fabricated her allegations. The psychologist
gave evidence that the complainant had exhibited behavioural characteristics consistent
with the characteristics of sexually abused children.
The court held (at 720–721) that it had not been properly established that children
subject to sexual abuse demonstrate:
certain characteristics or act in peculiar ways which are so unmistakable that they can be
said to be concomitants of sexual abuse; or that expert evidence in this field was able to
indicate with a sufficient degree of compulsion, features which establish that the evidence
of the complainant was indeed truthful; nor did the psychologist describe the tests she
undertook and the reactions of other children from her own experience, or have recourse
to the specialist literature to confirm her opinion.
(See also subscription service Ch 63.)

The court drew attention to a problem that has been remarked upon in the context of
battered woman syndrome (Freckelton (1994)), that many characteristics of a victim said
to be consistent with a syndrome may have other explanations (at 721):
While the characteristics mentioned by the psychologist were said to be consistent with
those the witness had come to know as the characteristics of sexually abused children,
some at least of those characteristics, eg pen tattoos on hands and arms, cigarette burns
and cuts and lack of eye contact, may very well occur in children who have problems
other than sexual abuse.
The decision in R v Accused [1989] 1 NZLR 714 received support in R v CS (1993) 11 CRNZ
45 (see also R v Schmit (1992) 8 CRNZ 376), where Williamson J found that the problem in
allowing expert opinion testimony in relation to human behaviour is that it may in reality
[10.30.470] 831
be little more than a well-packaged endorsement of the complainant’s truthfulness, or it

may be perceived by the jury as such an endorsement.
Canadian authorities
[10.30.480] The leading non-American cases on the admissibility of child abuse syndrome
evidence are Canadian: R v Millar (1989) 49 CCC (3d) 193; R v C (1990) 57 CCC (3d) 522; R
v J (1990) 74 CR (3d) 269; R v R (1992) 73 CCC (3d) 225; R v D (1992) 74 CCC (3d) 481; KM
v HM (1992) 96 DLR (4th) 291; R v C(G) (1995) 110 CCC (3d) 233; DR, HR and DW v The
Queen (1996) 107 CCC (3d) 289; R v DD 2000 SCC 43. While the Canadian approach to the
admission of counterintuitive evidence has been liberal, the Supreme Court decision in R v
DD 2000 SCC 43 appears to have signalled reservations by the court in relation to the need
for such evidence.
In R v Millar (1989) 49 CCC (3d) 193, a wide variety of evidence relating to the
circumstances of injuries suffered by the infant victim was given. The Ontario Court of
Appeal noted that expert opinion evidence on the existence of child abuse or the “battered
child syndrome” is “generally admissible in American courts” (at 219), and pointed out
that in State v Mulder 29 Wash App 513; 629 P 2d 462 at 463 (Wash Ct App 1981) the
following was said in relation to the syndrome:
The diagnosis is dependent on inferences, not a matter of common knowledge, but within
the area of expertise of physicians whose familiarity with numerous instances of injuries
accidentally caused qualifies them to express with reasonable probability that a particular
injury or group of injuries to a child is not accidental or is not consistent with the
explanation offered therefore but is instead the result of physical abuse by a person of
mature strength.
It also noted that in State v Tanner 675 P 2d 539 at 543 (Utah SC 1983), the following had
been held:
Battered child syndrome evidence is most frequently cited as admissible to show absence
of accident. It is relevant to claims of accidents by the child, eg, “She was clumsy and fell
a lot” as well as accidents by the adult, “I tripped while I was carrying him”. Expert
testimony as to types of injuries, their size, location and severity, together with evidence of
their varying age and progress in healing, allows the lifeless or preverbal victim to testify
in the one way possible. We are satisfied that the concept of the battered child syndrome is
grounded in scientific research and is widely accepted in the medical community. Our
research shows that all courts which have addressed the question have affirmed the
admission of expert medical testimony regarding the presence of the battered child
syndrome.
The Ontario Court of Appeal held (at 220) that such evidence could not be objected to on
the ground alone that it contained an opinion on the ultimate issue for the court. However,
it acknowledged (at 221) that evidence to the effect that “this was in my opinion a case of
child abuse” carries with it the risk that a jury will forgo independent analysis of the facts
and defer to the expert: “[E]vidence given in this form requires a very careful direction
from the trial judge with respect to its analysis and potential application in the case as a
whole.”
In R v C (1990) 57 CCC (3d) 522, the British Columbia Court of Criminal Appeal
permitted extensive expert evidence relating to the phenomenon of sexual abuse and to
the credibility of child complainants. The court permitted such testimony, maintaining (at
530):
Where credibility is in issue, the evidence of an expert may be helpful to the jury in the
sense that, but for the expert evidence, the jury might well draw an adverse inference
against the complainants in failing to disclose the alleged sexual abuse when it took place
and in delaying disclosure until the year 1987. The jury might well wonder why no
complaints were made to the mother of the complainants. The jury would not understand
how it could possibly be that the memory of the complainants had improved between the
832 [10.30.480]
date of the preliminary hearing and the trial. The jury might also have wondered why the
complainants continued to associate with the appellant after being sexually abused.
The “sexual abuse therapist” provided a range of evidence relevant to the credibility of the
complainant, which tended to show that inferences that might well be drawn on the basis
of common sense and common experience should not be drawn as a matter of course in
cases of sexual abuse. Thus, it was found to be admissible.
Similarly, Galligan J in R v J (1990) 74 CR (3d) 269 at 276 permitted a psychologist to be
called by the Crown after the complainant had been cross-examined about having
recanted her allegation of sexual abuse:
I would think that it is probably not generally known that children who have been
sexually abused and have reported commonly recant their allegations. Thus, in order for
the trial judge in this case to decide whether this child’s testimony should have been
disbelieved … he was entitled to know that recantations are common.
In R v R (1992) 73 CCC (3d) 225 at 230, however, the emphasis of the decision was upon
the impropriety of admitting expert evidence in order to “bolster the credibility of
witnesses”. The court reviewed the authorities and accepted that expert evidence about
the general behavioural and psychological characteristics of child victims of sexual abuse
was admissible but held that such evidence must be restricted within tight parameters to
prevent its becoming primarily directed towards enhancing the credibility of the accused.
(See also R v D (1992) 74 CCC (3d) 481.)
The Canadian Supreme Court in the leading decision of KM v HM (1992) 96 DLR (4th)
291, dealing with limitation periods for civil actions arising out of sexual assaults, gave
further endorsement to the approach of Summit. La Forest J, speaking for the court, found:
It is clear from the evidence and the scientific literature that a misapplied sense of
responsibility is instrumental in conditioning the child victim to submit silently to the
abuse. … Dr. Summit (1983) put it succinctly in this article at p 183: “Without a consistent
therapeutic affirmation of innocence, the victim tends to become filled with self-condemnation
and self-hate for somehow inviting and allowing the sexual assaults.”
In R v C (G) (1995) 110 CCC (3d) 233 9Nfld CA, the Newfoundland Court of Appeal
endorsed the use of behavioural science evidence in respect of patterns of behaviour by
children the subject of sexual abuse. It accepted that an experienced social worker (cf R v
Gadd (unreported, Queensland Supreme Court, 27 March 1995), a social worker also
giving evidence) and child protection worker was sufficiently qualified to give evidence to
explain the phenomenon of delayed disclosure and continued association by survivors of
sexual assaults, “provided the groundwork is laid”. It found that the reception of such
evidence is justifiable to assist an assessment of the complainant’s credibility – not as the
determinant of ultimate truthfulness, but to explain factors bearing on a witness’s
believability provided that the subject matter of the testimony transcends ordinary
experience. It applied the ruling in R v J (FE) (1989) 53 CCC (3d) 64 at 71 per Galligan JA
“that properly qualified expert opinion about the general behavioural and psychological
characteristics of child victims of sexual abuse is admissible for certain purposes” and
declined to follow the view of Charron J in R v Olscamp (1994) 95 CCC (3d) 466 that such
evidence is not sufficiently reliable to be useful. It also noted the decision of R v P(H)
(1992) 15 CR (4th) 121, which refused evidence about child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome, while accepting its general admissibility, on the basis that it was unnecessary
as the complainant was of mature years and quite capable of explaining lucidly why it
was that she had not complained for 14 years. The court found (at 267) that “[i]n effect the
law has created a presumption premised on recognition that the general knowledge of
triers of fact concerning patterns of reaction of child abuse victims … needs to be assisted
by specialized expert opinions”. (See also R v C (LT) (1994) 35 CR (4th) 337 in relation to
the phenomenon of children recanting their allegations.)
[10.30.480] 833
One of the most significant Canadian decisions in relation to the admissibility of expert
testimony about child development and the characteristics of sexually abused children is
the Supreme Court decision of DR, HR and DW v The Queen (1996) 107 CCC (3d) 289.
Three accused had been charged with multiple counts of sexual and physical abuse of
children over a six-year period, when the children ranged in age from one to 10 years. The
children claimed that while in the care of their birth parents, they had been victims of a
variety of forms of sexual abuse, as well as witness or party to the killing and eating of
babies and the eating and drinking of faeces, blood and urine. They began treatment with
a child therapist and medical examinations revealed evidence of injuries consistent with
the types of physical and sexual abuse alleged by the children.
At trial, the Crown called the therapist as an expert in the characteristics of abused
children and the defence called an expert in the area of child development and
characteristics of child abuse. The former testified that children have two kinds of
memories: visual memory, which is based on experience, and verbal memory, which is
learned. He testified that the children’s memories of their parents and of what happened
when they lived with their parents were verbal memory. The trial judge prevented the
expert from testifying about his conclusions on the reliability of the children’s memories of
specific events on the basis that to do so would usurp the function of the court in making
findings of credibility.
The majority held that expert testimony is admissible even if it relates directly to the
ultimate question which the trier of fact must answer (at 304) and applied the decision in
R v Marquard [1993] 4 SCR 223; (1993) 85 CCC (3d) 193, where McLachlin J held, for the
majority (at 229 CCC), that expert evidence on human conduct and the factors that may
lead to behaviour relevant to conduct is admissible provided that the testimony goes
beyond the “ordinary experience” of the trier of fact. They found that the defence expert’s
testimony was relevant to the question of the reliability of the children’s memories of their
birth parents, which he suggested had been learned and which could not be recalled
independently. They found that the credibility of the children was central to the
disposition of the case and, considering the nature of the children’s evidence, any
explanation of their otherwise incredible behaviour could only aid the trier of fact in
accurately assessing their credibility. They found that the expert’s testimony should have
been admitted as an evidentiary basis upon which the children’s credibility could have
been judged. In addition, they found that the accused ought to have been permitted to
cross-examine the therapist using transcripts of the interviews. The credibility of the
children was at the heart of the case against the accused and, as the accused would have
been entitled to lead evidence on the effect of the interview techniques on the memories of
the children, the issue was not collateral. Any evidence which might have cast doubt on
the children’s credibility, or that might show that the children had been subjected to
coaching and manipulation, would have been crucial to the accused’s case. They found
that, given the importance of the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the fact that the
issue of the children’s credibility was central to the allegations against the accused, the
trial judge had erred in restricting the cross-examination of the therapist.
The Supreme Court’s decision appears to open the way to significant amounts of
counter-intuitive evidence concerning the behaviour of sexually abused children,
notwithstanding that it trespasses upon the ultimate issue to be decided by the court, and
notwithstanding that it has the effect of bolstering or impugning the credibility of the child
complainant.
However, a subsequent decision of the Canadian Supreme Court caused this position
to be qualified. In R v DD 2000 SCC 43, the court was asked to determine the admissibility
of evidence by a child psychologist in a child sexual assault case. The witness was called
by the Crown merely to explain that a child’s delay in alleging sexual abuse does not
834 [10.30.480]
necessarily support an inference of falsehood. The psychologist testified that the fact of
delay in complaining is irrelevant to whether the sexual assault complained of actually
occurred and maintained that the length of time before a child discloses assault is
non-diagnostic. The court reached its decision by a bare four-to-three majority,
determining that the evidence was not necessary – it was not unique or scientifically
puzzling, but was regarded as the proper subject for a simple jury instruction.
The minority found all of the four criteria in R v Mohan (1994) 2 SCR 9; [1994] 89 CCC
(3d) 402 to be made out. The evidence was relevant and, although the effect of the
evidence was to bear upon the complainant’s credibility (at [19]):
there is a growing consensus that while expert evidence on the ultimate credibility of a
witness is not admissible, expert evidence on human conduct and the psychological and
physical factors which may lead to certain behaviour relevant to credibility, is admissible,
provided the testimony goes beyond the ordinary experience of the trier of fact.
On the issue of “necessity”, the point that separated the majority from the minority, the
dissenting judgments noted that the evidence needed to be more than merely “helpful”
but that necessity need not be judged “by too strict a standard”. The minority found that
there was ample justification for the trial judge to find that the psychologist’s evidence
went beyond the ordinary knowledge and expertise of the jury, enabling him to present
insights to the jury about sexual abuse which might not be within the knowledge of the
ordinary juror. The psychologist’s testimony (at [25]) in essence was that:
contrary to what the ordinary juror might assume, there is no “normal” child response.
Some abused children complain immediately, others wait for a period of time, and some
never disclose the abuse. … He also outlined the factors that may lead to delay in
disclosure, such as fear of reprisal, lack of understanding, fear of disrupting the family, the
nature of the child’s relationship with the abuser, and the nature of the abuse. Some of
these explanations might have occurred to ordinary jurors as a matter of experience and
common sense, but some might not have been apparent to them without expert assistance.
The minority rejected the contention that expert evidence is confined to evidence about
“abnormal behaviour”, rejecting, as the Australian High Court did in Murphy v The Queen
(1989) 167 CLR 94, the normal/abnormal dichotomy.
The minority found that no other exclusionary rule was breached by admission of the
psychologist’s evidence, in particular because his evidence was not directly on the
complainant’s credibility – it was subsidiary to it. The minority considered the
prejudice/probative discretion, finding that probative value is determined by considering
the reliability, materiality and cogency of expert testimony: see R v K(A) (1999) 45 OR (3d)
641 at [114] per Charron JA. It found the psychologist’s evidence to have considerable
probative value and a low potential for the jury to be misled or confused by the evidence
which did not verge on advocacy, neither explicitly nor implicitly commenting on the
complainant’s credibility.
The decision of the Supreme Court by a four-to-three majority in R v DD 2000 SCC 43
has the potential to turn around what had been a preparedness in Canada to admit
significant levels of expert mental health testimony directed toward disabusing jurors of
misapprehension under which they otherwise have laboured or toward filling in deficit of
understanding by triers of fact. It signals a new rigour in the application of the “necessity”
requirement of R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402 and, if continued, may
result in a heavy burden for those seeking to adduce counterintuitive evidence to establish
clearly that without such evidence, the reasoning of the trier of fact will be contaminated
by misunderstanding or prejudice.
[10.30.490] The major Australian decisions to have focused upon the admissibility of
expert evidence in relation to the behaviour of children who have been battered or
[10.30.490] 835
sexually assaulted are of the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal in Ingles v The Queen
(unreported, Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal, 4 May 1993); the New South Wales
Court of Appeal in F v The Queen (1995) 83 A Crim R 502; the South Australian Court of
Appeal in C v The Queen (1993) 60 SASR 467; the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal in R
v J (1994) 75 A Crim R 522 (see further Freckelton (1997a)); and the Queensland Court of
Appeal decision in S v The Queen (2001) 125 A Crim R 526; [2001] QCA 501. The important
decision of Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 170 A Crim R 1; [2006] TASSC 111 has interpreted
the reforming provision, s 79(2) of the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas).
Tasmanian authority
[10.30.500] In Ingles v The Queen (unreported, Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal, 4 May
1993), the appellant and the complainant, aged 82 and 17 at the time of the trial, had been
neighbours. The appellant was charged with a variety of sexual assaults upon the same
complainant when she ranged between the ages of 10 and 16.
The Crown called evidence from a psychiatrist, Dr Sale, and it was on the basis of the
admission of his evidence that the appellant appealed. Dr Sale had never seen the
complainant, but his evidence related to the inferences that he said could be drawn from
the behaviour of victims of childhood sexual abuse. Dr Sale maintained that a feature of
“childhood sexual abuse accommodation syndrome” is (per Zeeman J):
a feeling of entrapment in that if a child is unable to disclose what has occurred after the
first or second episode of abuse, the child becomes enmeshed in a guilty secret with the
perpetrator, starts to feel culpable for what is happening and starts feeling more as a
participant than as a victim. As a result the child suffers a sense of guilt which prevents
disclosure. He said that usually a child in this situation is overborne in the relationship
and becomes helpless to resist.
The psychiatrist’s qualifications were not questioned; nor was it disputed that the subject
matter of his evidence was properly the subject of expert evidence. However, the appellant
submitted (successfully) that the psychiatrist’s evidence served only to bolster the
credibility of the complainant’s evidence and so was inadmissible.
The Court of Criminal Appeal rejected the argument that the psychiatrist’s evidence
was relevant as going to the issue of consent on the basis that absence of complaint in
sexual cases is not probative of consent (see Kilby v The Queen (1973) 129 CLR 460 at 472).
Zeeman J pointed out that as “evidence of a recent complaint does no more than act as a
buttress to the credibility of a complainant, an explanation for an absence of such a
complaint does no more than relate to credibility”. The court left open the possibility of
expert evidence to explain delay in making complaint when evidence of recent complaint
is actually introduced which, in Ingles v The Queen (unreported, Tasmanian Court of
Criminal Appeal, 4 May 1993), it was not.
The respondent had also argued that Dr Sale’s evidence was relevant as being
probative of the complainant having been the victim of sexual abuse. The court held that
the evidence in fact did no more than support the complainant’s credibility. In this regard,
it is significant that the foundations for the psychiatrist’s opinions had been very thinly
laid. Not only had he not seen the complainant or conducted any tests upon her, but the
psychological circumstances of the complainant between the time of the early assaults and
her much later disclosure had not been elicited in any detail from her in examination-in-
chief. Zeeman J pointed out that in R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114, the expert evidence
had been relevant to whether the will of the accused had actually been overborne, and in
Lavallee v The Queen [1990] 1 SCR 852; (1990) 55 CCC (3d) 97, the evidence had related to
the state of mind of the accused, which was relevant to the defence of self-defence. He
contrasted the case before him, in which the evidence was only logically relevant to
whether or not the child was telling the truth.
Crawford and Zeeman JJ made reference to the New Zealand decisions of R v B [1987]
1 NZLR 362 and, in particular, R v Accused [1989] 1 NZLR 714, where, as noted above,
836 [10.30.500]
child sexual abuse accommodation evidence was regarded as admissible in principle if it

was established that “a particular child has exhibited traits displayed by sexually abused
children generally” and if the evidence demonstrates “in an unmistakable and compelling
way and by reference to scientific material that the relevant characteristics are signs of
sexual abuse” (at 720). Their Honours noted that the requirements enunciated in R v
Accused [1989] 1 NZLR 714 had not been fulfilled (per Zeeman J):
There was no evidence of characteristics or actions clearly and unmistakably the
concomitants of sexual abuse. The evidence of Dr Sale indicated that the conduct of the
complainant was consistent with that to be expected from a child the subject of sexual
abuse, but in circumstances where that conduct was equally consistent with no real sexual
abuse having occurred.
Both judges expressed reservations about the correctness of the analysis in R v Accused
[1989] 1 NZLR 714, with Zeeman J, for instance, suggesting that “it might be said to go
further than sound principle justifies”.
The most significant aspect of the decision of the Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal
in Ingles v The Queen (unreported, Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal, 4 May 1993) is the
court’s view that the expert evidence which had been elicited from the psychiatrist in the
circumstances did nothing other than bolster the complainant’s credibility, a function long
precluded (see, for instance, R v Turner [1975] 1 QB 834 at 842; R v Beland [1987] 2 SCR 398;
(1987) 43 DLR (4th) 641; 36 CCC (3d) 481 at 646–649). It appears that recent relevant
Canadian authorities were not cited to the court and it is also noteworthy that the basis for
the expert evidence was not adequately laid in the course of the complainant’s evidence.
However, the court’s disinclination to admit counterintuitive evidence, expert evidence
directed toward disabusing jurors of myths and misimpressions, and its preparedness to
take the analysis to the next step to determine what relevance the expert’s opinions would
have to the jury function, is most important. If this line of reasoning is more generally
adopted, syndrome evidence will be admitted comparatively rarely – and very rarely in
the case of “child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome”.
New South Wales authority
[10.30.510] In F v The Queen (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 (see further Freckelton (1997a)), the
Crown in a criminal case sought to call a specialist paediatrician, Dr Packer, to whom the
complainant had been taken for a physical examination after allegations of sexual assault
had been made. Dr Packer took a history of sexual abuse from the complainant. At trial,
the prosecutor was allowed to ask questions of the paediatrician in relation to literature
about the effects of sexual abuse and about whether children delay in making complaints.
Dr Packer gave evidence of what she termed “Accommodation Syndrome”, referring to
the writings of Dr Summit. She did not say that in her opinion the complainant was
affected by the syndrome about which she had read in the literature, or that the behaviour
of the complainant was consistent with such a syndrome. Gleeson CJ, Grove and
Abadee JJ found (at 507) that much of what:
Dr Packer was talking about, whilst it might apply to victims of sexual abuse, could apply
to all manner of people in a wide variety of circumstances. It is not only abused children
who feel helpless or powerless, or who delay in making complaints of conduct which
victimises them, or who disclose information piece by piece for the purpose of testing the
water. Many victims of crime delay in reporting it because it occurred in circumstances
subjecting them to fear or shame. Sometimes the reporting of crime may disclose conduct
on the part of a person doing the reporting which such person may prefer to conceal.
Sometimes people judge, and perhaps rightly judge, that the consequences of reporting a
crime might be more detrimental than the consequences of the crime itself.
The court found (at 507) that, although Dr Packer was a specialist paediatrician, and had a
substantial amount of experience in dealing with children who had been subjected to
sexual abuse, she was not a psychiatrist or a psychologist. However, the evidence that she
[10.30.510] 837
had been allowed to give at trial “included evidence concerning her reading in literature
in the area of psychiatry or psychology and she gave that evidence in the capacity of an
expert”.
The court also expressed concern (at 507) about the use to which a jury might put
counterintuitive evidence of the kind given by the witness:
Presumably the corollary of the proposition that some children delay in complaining of
sexual abuse is that other children do not delay, presumably the corollary of the
proposition that some children, for good and sufficient reason, make complaints which are
inconsistent, is that other children make complaints which are consistent. From one point
of view, the evidence, if taken at face value, might be regarded by a jury as destroying the
utility of seeking to test the evidence of a complainant by examining the circumstances
and the content of complaints.
The court expressed its dissatisfaction about the parameters of what Dr Packer’s
counterintuitive was conveying to the jury. It queried (at 508) whether the evidence was
intended to suggest that inconsistency in stories told by a complainant can never reflect
adversely on the reliability of a complainant and, if not, in what circumstances would such
inconsistency be a useful guide to a complainant’s reliability.
The court also expressed reservations about the employment of the term “syndrome”
(see also Freckelton (1994, p 31)), noting (at 508) that it “is one that is not always
associated with scientifically rigorous analysis”. The court commented that “[i]t is not easy
to understand why one would need any such term to describe the phenomenon whereby
victims of crime, whether of a sexual or any other nature, who feel helpless or powerless,
delaying in making complaints, or deciding to let the truth out piece by piece”. The court
expressed the view (at 508) that if the term were to be used, then the label should be
accompanied by some explanation of how cases where delay or inconsistency are to be
attributed to the syndrome should be distinguished from those where delay or
inconsistency indicate unreliability on the part of the complainant. “So far as appears from
the evidence of Dr Packer, the ‘syndrome’ is non-diagnostic. It is not possible to tell when
delay or inconsistency in complaint is a manifestation of the syndrome, as distinct from an
indication of unreliability.”
The court found that the problems posed by the evidence were exacerbated by the trial
judge’s failure to explain to the jury what use they could legitimately make of the
evidence. However, the court (at 508) noted that this was “hardly surprising” when the
conclusion to Dr Packer’s evidence appeared to be that “some children conceal abuse
when they feel threatened; some children conceal abuse when they feel safe; some
children disclose abuse when they feel threatened; some children disclose abuse when
they feel safe”.
The court determined Dr Packer’s evidence to be inadmissible, but noted (at 509) that
“it is not possible to say, categorically, that evidence about such a syndrome could never
be admissible”. It held that while evidence may be led to restore the credibility of a
witness, this is subject to the conditions that the subject matter be a fit subject for expert
opinion and that the evidence be given in a proper form and by a properly qualified
person. None of the conditions had been fulfilled. The court (at 509) held that the
syndrome had not been shown to be a “fit subject for expert opinion”.
South Australian authority
[10.30.520] In August 1993, the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal in C v The
Queen (1993) 60 SASR 467 ruled upon the admissibility of expert evidence to explain the
behaviour of child victims of sexual abuse. The evidence admitted at trial, but excluded on
appeal, related to the reasons why the child victim was not medically examined and why
she did not make an earlier complaint. The leading judgment was that of King CJ. It was
delivered overtly in the shadow of R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114. His Honour, with
whom Mohr J agreed, held that expert evidence to rehabilitate the credibility of a witness
838 [10.30.520]
may be led provided that the evidence “is a fit subject of expert opinion”. He held (at 473)
that “if the typical responses of sexually abused children is a fit subject of expert evidence,
there is no reason why it should not be admitted for the purpose of rehabilitating the
credit of an alleged victim”. His Honour noted that such evidence was admitted in
California (see People v McAlpin 812 P 2d 563 (1991)) to disabuse jurors of commonly held
misconceptions about child sexual abuse (see Meyers (1989, p 89)) and reviewed recent
Canadian authority (see R v J (1990) 74 CR (3d) 269; R v R (1992) 73 CCC (3d) 225; R v RAC
(1990) 57 CCC 3d 522) on the subject.
King CJ assumed for the purpose of “discussing the topic” that “it is proved that there
is a scientifically accepted body of knowledge concerning the behaviour of child sexual
abuse victims”, although this had not been proved in the child psychiatrist’s evidence,
which was the subject of the appeal in C v The Queen (1993) 60 SASR 467. He held that the
vital question for the purpose of determining admissibility was whether the subject matter
of the proposed evidence “is so special and so outside ordinary experience that the
knowledge of experts should be made available to courts and juries”. As he had stressed
in R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114 at 121, King CJ held that courts “must exercise great
caution in expanding the area of expert evidence”. He distinguished the esotericism of
understanding about “learned helplessness” in the battered woman syndrome context
from jurors’ “experience of the behaviour and reactions of children in the family
situation”. He acknowledged that child psychology might be able “to contribute insights”
into the dynamics within a family in which a child is being abused and the “beguiling
influence of the shared secret”, but held that he was “far from convinced” that “those
insights are necessary in order to enable a jury to reach a just decision or that their value
would outweigh the impairment of the trial process which would result from introducing
expert opinion, and probably conflicting expert opinion, into child sexual abuse cases”.
For these reasons, he declared the evidence inadmissible, focusing not upon the potential
utility of the evidence but upon the lack of “necessity” for it and the dangers which it
could pose.
Arriving at the same decision, Duggan J followed the New Zealand decisions of R v B
[1987] 1 NZLR 362 and R v Accused [1989] 1 NZLR 714 and held that the evidence before
the court had not arrived at the point of establishing that the witness was skilled in a field
of study or experience such that the opinions that she sought to offer could be admitted.
He held that it had not been shown that the field of child psychology was as yet
sufficiently developed to allow experts to state that children subject to sexual abuse
demonstrate certain characteristics or act in certain ways that can be said with confidence
to be the concomitants of sexual abuse.
The authority that will be commanded by C v The Queen (1993) 60 SASR 467 remains to
be determined. Its application of the “necessity” standard rather than the “helpfulness”
standard appears to leave King CJ’s decision inconsistent with the interpretation of the
common knowledge rule articulated by the High Court in Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167
CLR 94. In acknowledging that some assistance might be gained by the jury from expert
evidence on the behaviour of child victims of assault, King CJ failed to acknowledge the
existence of myths and misconceptions about the behaviour of children who are the
victims of assault. At the least, his ruling leaves it theoretically open for evidence about
such phenomena to be led before a trial judge to persuade him or her that such evidence
is “necessary” or that it would at least be “very useful” to assist jurors to understand
better the effects of assault trauma upon the behaviour of child victims and to “explain the
emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching behaviour”:
Meyers (1989, p 89); see also McCormack (1993).
Victorian authority
[10.30.530] The decision of the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal in R v J (see further
Freckelton (1997a)) has also dealt with the area. It was sought by the Crown to establish by
[10.30.530] 839
expert evidence the typical behaviour and responses of victims of sexual abuse, not by
way of aiding in the proof of the fact of abuse, but by way of “rehabilitating” the credit of
the complainant. It had been suggested by the defence that the complainant’s failure to
leave home and her sending of greeting cards to her father were not the behaviour to be
expected of a person who had been subjected to numerous acts of sexual abuse over a
long period. The Crown wished to show by expert evidence that, having regard to the
general behavioural and psychological characteristics of children and young persons
sexually abused over long periods by persons in a position of trust, the complainant’s
behaviour was not surprising and was indeed to be expected. The court followed the
decision in C v The Queen (1993) 60 SASR 467, finding that in principle expert evidence to
rehabilitate a witness’s credit may be led. The court rejected the application of the Frye test
(Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923)) and expressly disagreed with the approach
of King CJ in C, holding (at 535) that:
Provided that the judge is satisfied that there is a field of expert knowledge to which
recourse may be had, it is no objection to the reception of the evidence of an expert within
that field that the views which he puts forward do not command general acceptance by
other experts in the field: cf Commissioner for Government Transport v Adamcik (1961) 106
CLR 292.
The Victorian court also noted King CJ’s view that juries were not ignorant of the
behaviour of children or of the effect of family relationships on such behaviour and
responses. It commented (at 536):
[O]ne could say that jurors were not ignorant of the behaviour and reactions of wives, or
de facto wives, or of the effect of family relationships on such behaviour and (as King J
said with regard to children) that most jurors will have experienced, and all will have
observed, relationships between man and wife and man and de facto wife.
The court rejected the distinction drawn by King CJ in relation to the battering of women
and the sexual abuse of children. The court (at 537) found that the “rehabilitating
evidence” could have been led, provided that:
(1) the opinions to be expressed were on questions that were “the subject of a field of
expert knowledge”;
(2) the witness was a qualified expert in that field; and
(3) the matters to which the expert would speak were outside the knowledge and
experience of the jury.
Queensland authority
[10.30.540] In S v The Queen (2001) 125 A Crim R 526; [2001] QCA 501, the Queensland
Court of Appeal heard an appeal that dealt, among other things, with evidence from a
Family Services officer with 17 years of experience in working with families where there
had been sexual abuse. The trial judge permitted the officer to give expert evidence about
the writing of letters by the child complainant in a sexual abuse case to the person who
had allegedly abused her. The trial judge held that the witness was qualified to give
general evidence about the behaviour of abused children toward their abusers. He also
held that it was within the officer’s expertise to comment on the parenting skills of the
complainant’s mother. Her evidence was to the effect that it is quite common for children
to want abuse to stop, that they love the alleged offender, and that the greatest fear of
many children is to be removed from the family situation.
She also testified that 85% of women with bipolar affective disorder have been sexually
abused as children.
Thomas JA for the court held (at [51]) that the evidence ought not to have been
permitted:
840 [10.30.540]
It was not shown that the propensity of abused children to manifest affection for the
abusive parent is a recognized body of learning, or that it was beyond the knowledge and
experience of jury members.
He held that it was not a subject where an expert can usefully be brought to court to assist
a jury and compared the case before him with that of F v The Queen (1995) 83 A Crim R 502
at 508–509.
In respect of the evidence about the correlation between bipolar affective disorder and
sexual abuse, Thomas JA held that the evidence should not have been permitted and
commented (at [51]):
The gratuitous evidence that 85 per cent of female manic depressives have been sexually
abused as children was probably not particularly damaging, but it was excrescence in a
criminal trial. The evidence seems to have been led to engender sympathy for the
complainants and to encourage conviction upon statistical data concerning general
societal problems.
Australian statutory reform

[10.30.550] Section 79A of the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) (now merged into s 79) provided
that:
A person who has specialised knowledge of child behaviour based on the person’s
training, study or experience (including specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual
abuse on children and their behaviour during and following the abuse) may, where
relevant, give evidence in proceedings against a person charged with a sexual offence
against a child who, at the time of the alleged offence, had not attained the age of 17 years,
in relation to one or more of the following matters:
(a) child development and behaviour generally;
(b) child development and behaviour if the child has had a sexual offence, or any
offence similar in nature to a sexual offence, committed against him or her.
This enabled the adducing of evidence about the reasons why a child might delay in
reporting having been sexually assaulted: Bellemore v Tasmania (2006) 170 A Crim R 1;
[2006] TASSC 111 (see [3.0.100]).
In Victoria, s 37E of the Evidence Act 1958 (Vic) came into force in December 2006:
Despite any rule of law to the contrary, in any legal proceeding that relates (wholly or
partly) to a charge for a sexual offence, the court may receive evidence of a person’s
opinion that is based on that person’s specialised knowledge (acquired through training,
study or experience) of –
(a) the nature of sexual offences; and
(b) the social, psychological and cultural factors that may affect the behaviour of a
person who has been the victim, or who alleges that he or she has been the
victim, of a sexual offence, including the reasons that may contribute to a delay
on the part of the victim to report the offence.
The provision is intended to ease the admission of expert evidence about matters such as
delay in reporting. However, the probative value of the evidence will remain to be
evaluated by the trier of fact.
Section 79(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the Evidence
Act 2008 (Vic), the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation)
Act (NT) is in similar terms to s 79(2) in Tasmania. (See Ch 2.35.)
Likely Australasian developments

[10.30.560] As in the case of rape trauma syndrome and battered woman syndrome, it is
clear that Australasian courts will continue to look with some stringency at whether
experts purporting to provide informed views on “child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome”, or a term similar to it, should be permitted to give such counterintuitive
[10.30.560] 841
evidence. First, such witnesses must be suitably qualified to give such evidence. Second,
their evidence must be framed in such a way as to do more than just bolster the credibility
of the complainant, or it may well be found inadmissible.
A threshold issue is whether the courts are placed in a position to form the view that
the collection of symptoms exhibited by children who have been sexually abused is of
such a kind that it can be related with confidence exclusively to sexual abuse, as against
other forms of stress and trauma. If that becomes so, then evidence about a syndrome, and
about whether a particular complainant exhibits its symptoms, may well be admissible.
However, as yet medical science does not permit of such evidence. Thus, syndrome
evidence framed in terms of a medical condition, and of whether a particular complainant
conforms to the stereotype of its symptoms, is unlikely for the foreseeable future to be
found admissible.
Five levels of evidence which, in principle, expert witnesses might give can be
identified:
• First level: The expert may explain the phenomena of children’s difficulty in reporting,
complaining, and being precise and consistent in accounts of their sexual abuse by the
expert reporting upon psycho/sociological studies and knowledge (or perhaps the
existence of a “syndrome” or pattern).
• Second level: The expert may also list the complainant’s behaviour and “symptoms”,
but offer no opinion as to the consistency of the results of the studies and the behaviour
and “symptoms” exhibited by the complainant.
• Third level: The expert may also suggest that the behaviour and “symptoms” of the
particular complainant are consistent with the behaviour and “symptoms” or pattern of
behaviour of many others who have been the victims of sexual abuse.
• Fourth level: The expert may classify the complainant as exhibiting behaviour and
“symptoms” consistent with a “syndrome” or pattern such as child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome (or pattern).
• Fifth level: The expert may suggest that because the particular complainant’s
behaviour and “symptoms” are consistent with the behaviour and “symptoms” of a
“syndrome” such as child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, it is likely that when
the complainant says that she or he was sexually assaulted, the complainant is telling
the truth.
(For further analysis of these categories, see Freckelton (1997a).)
This division into levels contemplates that each level builds upon the previous. The
first level involves the provisions of generalised evidence about the phenomenon of many
children’s reactions to sexual abuse. To an extent it is stereotypical, but what it purports to
do is to describe in almost an epidemiological way what is known about the behaviour of
a certain category of victims. Evidence of this kind is admissible.
The second level incorporates a profile of the complainant and the circumstances in
which she or he behaved subsequent to the alleged assault. It does not include the
drawing of any inferences about the complainant. Second-level evidence is consistent with
the approach propounded in 1992 by Summit.
The third level goes to another plateau in that it involves the proffering of a view that
the behaviour and symptoms of the complainant are consistent with the behaviour and
symptoms of others who have been sexually abused. Of the essence of third-level evidence
is the drawing of inferences about the credibility of the complainant, although this is not
always immediately apparent. While the evidence led may be responsive to questions
posed of the complainant by the cross-examiner about his or her behaviour, his or her
honesty, and the accuracy of their account, the sole purpose of such evidence is to
re-establish the complainant as a witness whose allegations should be believed. It is really
evidence about credibility. Another aspect of third-level evidence is that it is fundamentally
842 [10.30.560]
dependent upon a correlation being made between the propensity of many victims to
behave in certain ways and the behaviour of the victim. In other words, the invitation is
for the triers of fact to conclude that because many victims behave in a certain way, and
the complainant has behaved in that same way, it is more likely than might previously
have been appreciated that he or she is telling the truth and is a victim of the accused as
alleged. It is likely that this level of evidence will not for the present be permitted in
Australasian courts.
The fourth level actually incorporates a “diagnosis” or classification in respect of the
particular complainant. Such evidence will not, for the present, be admissible.
The fifth level overtly adds an analysis of the impact of the syndrome or pattern upon
the evaluation of the complainant’s truthfulness. It will not, for the present, be admissible.
It is likely that counterintuitive evidence as to the diverse responses of children to
sexual abuse will increasingly be permitted to dispel misunderstandings about why
children do not immediately complain, why children continue to have close relationships
with their assailant, why children might appear to cooperate or connive in the process,
why they are not always able to be specific about details, why they may recant their
allegations, and so on: see R v C (1990) 57 CCC (3d) 522 at 530; R v J (1989) 53 CCC (3d) 64;
GB v The Queen (1990) 56 CCC (3d) 201; cf, though, R v DD 2000 SCC 43; see also Ch 2.15
above. However, even for such limited evidence to be admitted, a number of hurdles will
need to be overcome. The admissibility of such evidence will be more problematic in the
remaining common law states and in New Zealand than in New South Wales, Victoria,
Tasmania and the Northern Territory and at the Commonwealth level.
The New South Wales Court of Appeal decision in R v F (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 makes
it clear that counterintuitive evidence will need to be focused, scientifically rigorous, and
the subject of clear summing up by the trial judge: see Freckelton (1997c). It seems that
even the term “syndrome” cannot be too readily employed and that the courts will
question whether the application of scientific rigour to evidence in the area would yield
counterintuitive information of real use or relevance to a jury. It may well be that it will be
necessary henceforth for the myth which it is sought to dispel to be clearly enunciated.
Then it will be necessary to show that it is in fact a myth (see Shiu (2009)), and that it is
harboured by a significant cross-section of the community. Next, it will be necessary to
show that the evidence will be likely to have the effect of assisting the fact-finding process
by factoring out the potential source of error represented by the myth. The decision in R v
F by the New South Wales Court of Appeal has created a major barrier in the way of the
giving of counterintuitive evidence about the responses of children to the trauma of sexual
abuse, such that the future of such evidence by experts remains quite uncertain.
Repressed memory syndrome and false memory syndrome evidence
Repressed memory syndrome

[10.30.600] Repressed memory syndrome is defined as the propensity of some victims of
major trauma, such as sexual assault, to experience complete absence of awareness or
memory of a traumatic event from the time of its occurrence until a period of years
thereafter: see Christophers v The Queen [2003] WASCA 214 at [103]; State of New Hampshire
v Hungerford and Morahan (unreported, State of New Hampshire, Hillsborough County,
Superior Court, Groff J, 23 May 1995). Thus, the syndrome does not come into play when
a memory of abuse has long existed for the victim but has been to some extent suppressed
because of its traumatic associations. Proponents of repressed memory syndrome maintain
that persons “forget” or repress recollections of major traumata until their memories are
triggered by associations or unlocked in the course of psychotherapeutic intervention.
They maintain that there are forms of memory not yet well understood empirically which
[10.30.600] 843
enable the body itself to remember and repress memory of traumata: see Gerrie, Garry
and Loftus (2005). They call these “somatic”, “somatosensory” or body memories: see Terr
(1994); Rothschild (2000).
Others, among them many prominent experimental psychologists, argue that memories
do not wax and wane in this way and that psychotherapeutic intervention is resulting in
instances of unintentional confabulation: see, eg, Simon (1996); Loftus and Ketcham (1994);
Wakefield and Underwager (1994); Ofshe and Watters (1994); Pendergast (1995); Thomson
(1995); Gleaves (1994, p 440); Gold, Hughes and Hohnecker (1994, p 441); Olio (1994,
p 442). When this problem is translated into the forensic context, it has the potential to
result in wrongful convictions.
An interesting aspect of repressed memory syndrome debates is that there can be a
significant disjunction between clinicians’ and researchers’ attitudes toward repression of
memory. Patihis et al (2014), for instance, found that between 60% and 80% of clinicians,
psychoanalysts and therapists whom they surveyed agreed to some extent that traumatic
memories are often repressed and can be retrieved in therapy. These figures contrast to
less than 30% of research-oriented psychologists.
Repressed memory syndrome expert evidence has the potential to act as
counterintuitive information provided on behalf of the prosecution to explain why a
victim of sexual assault has failed to report; namely, that she or he has not recalled the
assaultive conduct until triggered by therapeutic or extra-therapeutic cues. It endeavours
to explain how it could be that a person could “forget” assaults and indignities
perpetrated upon them. It does so variously in terms of dissociation, denial, post-
traumatic amnesia and Freudian repression. Sperling J in E v The Queen (1997) 96 A Crim
R 489 at 500 commented:
Common experience does not enable one to say that the memory of a painful event, absent
for a long time and later experienced, is more likely to be a revived, true memory than an
honestly experienced, false memory. I do not accept as common knowledge that, in the
case of children, memory of abuse is frequently lost and later reliably recovered.
False memory syndrome

[10.30.610] Opponents of the legitimacy of repressed memory syndrome have coined the
term “false memory syndrome” to describe the phenomenon whereby persons who have
not been assaulted come to hold the belief that they have been assaulted as a result of
poor-quality treatment by counsellors, psychiatrists and psychologists (see the evidence of
Professor Mullen in Papazoglou v The Queen (2014) 45 VR 457; [2014] VSCA 194). It has
become orthodox to acknowledge that there is the potential for hypnosis or “suggestive
influences” to generate illusory memories or “false memories” (see, eg, R v Ibrahim [2001]
VSC 210 at [7]; Wade v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 85 at [78]–[80], summarising the
evidence of Dr Thomson, a forensic psychologist).
Thus, the syndrome is an antithesis to repressed memory syndrome. Proponents of
false memory syndrome argue too that repressed memory syndrome is conceptually
flawed. Armstrong (1995, p 21) cites an adviser to the False Memory Foundation,
Dr Kihlstrom, as defining the syndrome as:
a condition in which a person’s identity and interpersonal relationships are centred
around a memory of traumatic experience which is objectively false but in which the
person strongly believes. … The syndrome may be diagnosed when the memory is so
deeply ingrained that it orients the individual’s whole personality and lifestyle, in turn
disrupting all sorts of other adaptive behaviors.
Shobe and Schooler (2001), utilising information from persons who have retracted their
allegations, have identified a variety of conditions occurring during therapy which
appeared at least to have laid the groundwork for the encoding of memories of abuse that
never occurred: therapist suggestion; suggestion from authority figures; uncertainty on the
844 [10.30.610]
part of the client/patient; reinterpretation of past events; and the role of influences such as
books and the media. In addition, they have argued that there are factors that encourage
the growth of memory during the retention interval. In this regard, Lief and Fetkewicz
(1995), in a study of retractors, found that 78% of the sample experienced deep relaxation;
75% age regression; 73% guided imagery; 70% dream interpretation; and 68% hypnosis
techniques in therapy. Shobe and Schooler (2001) have identified a risk of confabulation of
false memories as a result of hypnosis, medication, repetition, visualisation and dream
interpretation, while they have contended that reinforcement in a variety of forms during
the retrieval phase may consolidate false memories.
Repression
[10.30.620] The term “repression” figured most prominently in the writings of Sigmund
Freud: see further Freckelton (1996, p 7). While the term had been used before, Freud
maintained that the theory of repression came to him independently of any other source.
In 1915, Freud (1915, p 147) described the essence of repression as lying “simply in turning
something away, and keeping at a distance, from the conscious”. He advocated
psychoanalysis of the patient with repression, during the course of which “the patient can
go on spinning a thread of … associations, till he is brought up against some thought, the
relation of which to what is repressed becomes so obvious that he is compelled to repeat
his attempt at repression”: Freud (1915, p 149). Integral to the notion is “avoidance” – for
instance, of a phobia. An object of psychoanalysis can be the re-establishment of the
repressed idea. Freud (1901, p 339), in discussing the process of forgetting, maintained that
“the motive for forgetting is invariably an unwillingness to remember something which
can evoke distress”. His stance on the subject was that, in relation to “repressed
memories”, 13 it could be demonstrated that they undergo “no alteration even in the
course of the longest period of time”. 14
Fraulein Elizabeth von R, one of Freud’s best-known patients, is often described as an
archetypal example of a client engaging in repression. Fraulein Elizabeth was in love with
her brother-in-law. She described to Freud her experience of intense pain when she
approached her sister’s deathbed and thought, “Now he is free and can marry me”. She
instantly forgot the scene and, according to Freud, the process of regression, which led to
her “hysterical pains”, was set in motion. Freud described the process of “excavating” a
buried city, layer by layer, in pursuit of the repressed memories of Fraulein Elizabeth and
others of his patients: see Freud (1895, p 226; 1924, p 222).
Erdelyi argues that Freud’s original conception of conscious repression has been
converted by current theorists into a mechanism that works unconsciously: see Erdelyi
(1990); see also Loftus and Ketcham (1994, pp 50ff); Brewin and Andrews (2014).
Repression figured little in professional literature, other than that which was
distinctively Freudian, but became resurgent in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Blume’s
description of the sexually abused woman’s experience is a significant example of the
resurfacing theories of repressed memories (Blume (1990)):
The incest survivor develops a repertoire of behaviors designed to preserve the secret …
these behaviors are not calculated or even conscious. They become automatic and, over
the years, almost part of her personality. She denies that she was abused by repressing the
memory of her trauma. This is the primary manifestation of “the secret”: incest becomes
the secret she keeps even from herself. Repression in some form is virtually universal
among survivors.
13 In a footnote added in 1907.

14 He further stated (1901, p 339n): ‘The unconscious is quite timeless. The most important as
well as the strangest characteristic of psychical fixation is that all impressions are
preserved, not only in the same form in which they were first received, but also in the
forms which they have adopted in their later developments’.
[10.30.620] 845
The critique of repressed memory

[10.30.630] Much of the refutation that is offered of repressed memory syndrome
concentrates upon what has been experimentally learned about the operation of memory,
both during childhood years and later, and upon methodological dangers identified in the
processes of retrieval of “repressed memories” which have the potential to lead to
confabulation of false memories or pseudomemories (see, eg, the evidence of Professor
Mullen in Papazoglou v The Queen (2014) 45 VR 457; [2014] VSCA 194). Authors such as
Loftus and Ketcham (1994) have deconstructed the retrieval process and highlighted a
variety of dynamics and techniques which they argue have the potential to bias the
retrieval process in the same way that poor use of hypnosis can erode the reliability of
what is recovered through its use: see Freckelton (1996); above, Ch 10.20; subscription
service Ch 67.
Modern experimental psychologists have classified memory as falling into four stages:
the encoding or input or perceptual stage; the storage or retention stage; the retrieval
stage; and the recounting stage. It is said that what we remember is affected by everything
within our own experience since, and sometimes even before, the encoding of the
perceptions: see Loftus and Ketcham (1991). Forgetting may be explicable in terms of any
of the stages. Thus, perceptual errors may arise from the circumstances in which a person
perceives an event; their state of mind at the time; their perception of themselves; whether
they were under the influence of drugs, stress or exhaustion; and whether they had
particular expectations. The Ebinghaus curve of forgetting entails that recollection, at least
in terms of specificity, deteriorates quickly, and may be adversely affected by intervening
events that are similar, conflicting, traumatic or confusing. The greater the passage of time,
in general terms, the poorer will be the memory. In addition, the circumstances of retrieval
have the potential to impact upon the quality of the memory.
Pseudomemories have been implanted in subjects in clinical experiments to
demonstrate the susceptibility of people’s minds to errors when conditions conducive to
them are created: see Lindsay and Read (1994); Wakefield and Underwager (1994,
pp 167ff); Ofshe and Watters (1994, pp 139ff); Pendergast (1995).
Thomson argued that “inappropriate retrieval cues may … inhibit our capacity to
recognise or recall a particular event” (1995, p 98), while the perspective of childhood may
itself warp memory (Thomson (1995, p 98)):
Childhood memories may be inaccessible simply because the way the person as an adult
construes the world is different from the way that same person construes the world as a
child; thus, the cues available to the adult simply do not provide access to the childhood
memories.
Factors such as stress or suggestion can also impact upon the retrieval and recounting
stages.
It has been suggested that certain kinds of therapy can result in patients being
especially susceptible to suggestion and confabulation. A particular concern that has been
expressed relates to the over-representation of recovered memories among clients of
particular therapists (Van Koppen and Crombag (1999)), as well as the over-representation
of recovered memories of childhood sexual assault among psychiatric patients: Orr (1999).
Memory can be divided into automatic (or somatosensory or body) and intentional
processes. Automatic memory functions at a chronologically early stage and does not
require deliberate attention by the observer when the item or events are experienced, or
retrieval strategies when the experience is remembered. Intentional memory, by contrast,
is dependent upon the reaching of serial development stages of maturity by the brain. It
“includes temporal and contextual information about the to-be-remembered experience; it
is facilitated by strategies at the perception stage and the retrieval stage. Intentional
memory is characterised by ready forgetting and vulnerability from other experiences”:
846 [10.30.630]
Thomson (1995, p 98). By the age of 11 to 13 years, the accuracy and completeness of a
child’s memory approaches that of an adult. By contrast, young children’s memories can
disappear, and are not neurologically susceptible to retrieval. “Infant amnesia” is a
phenomenon that recognises that children do not usually recall incidents from their lives
before the age of three to four (see Usher and Neisser (1993, p 155); Loftus, Gary, Brown
and Rader (1994, p 176)), although occasionally there may be exceptions stretching back to
the age of two. These, however, may be explicable in terms of reconstructions, educated
guesses, and scripts which are created for repeat events. The younger the person, the
greater the impact of delay upon their capacity to recall: see, eg, Flin, Boon, Knox and Bull
(1992, p 323). The younger they are, the more likely it is that recall will be influenced by
subsequent events and information (Poole and White (1993, p 844)), and the longer the
delay the more operative will be the contamination effect.
Loftus and Ketcham have argued that the notion of memory advanced by Terr as
analogous to film shot with a higher than usual intensity light, not deteriorating with the
usual half-life of memory, and characterised by better than normal implantation of detail
(Terr (1990, p 170)) does not accord with laboratory-derived understanding of the
operation of memory. They repudiated the suggestion that such experimental knowledge
has little to do with the traumatic circumstances of implantation of memory in frightening
circumstances and maintain that stress has been proved repeatedly to reduce the quality of
recollections in terms of their accuracy and their validity: Loftus and Ketcham (1994, p 58).
They argued (pp 67–68) that the concept of recovered memories characterised by accuracy
and specificity is beguilingly attractive because it appeals to our need to believe that
people’s vivid apparent recollections are true:
We want to believe – in fact we need to believe – … because the belief in … memory
affirms that our own minds work in an orderly efficient way, taking in information, sorting
it, filing it, and calling it back later in full and vivid detail. In a chaotic world, where so
much is out of control, we need to believe that our minds, at least, are under our
command. We need to believe that our memories, inherently trustworthy and reliable, can
reach back into the past and make sense of our lives. … The idea that our minds can play
tricks on us, leading us to believe in a distorted reality, even in fantasy and confabulation,
is deeply disturbing.
They argued (p 75) that while it is soothing to believe memory to be a predictable and
reliable operation, the truth is not so reassuring:
When the wild cacophony of dreams, wishes and desires intrudes, the elegant, linear
metaphors begin to sway and topple. … Recent research featuring high-tech brain
mapping procedures indicates that memory is not a broad, generalized capability drawing
on a centrally located storehouse of images and experiences, but a network of numerous
separate activities, each carried out in a separate part of the brain.
…
Thus we can imagine the brain as filled with hundreds of thousands of tiny
overlapping “nets” of information … Nets get tangled, knots develop, frays and holes
begin to rip apart the intricately knotted fabric.
Although the mind struggles valiantly to mend the imperfections, it is not always an
effective seamstress. Thus, the opponents of repressed memory syndrome maintain, the
processes by which memories are perceived, stored, retrieved and recounted – in
particular, retrieved and recounted – may lead to the memories being confused and
misleading. If psychotherapeutic processes are employed using techniques comparable in
their characteristics to hypnosis, the fallibilities always attendant upon the processes of
remembering may result in confabulation in response to perceived suggestions and the
reporting of pseudomemories not readily distinguishable from real memories: see
subscription service Ch 67.
Critics surveying studies which assert that repression occurs have argued that the
studies are pervaded by methodological flaws: see Herman and Schatzow (1987, p 1);
[10.30.630] 847
Briere and Conte (1993, p 21); Loftus, Polonsky and Fullilove (1994, p 67); Williams (1994,
p 1167); Lindsay and Read (1995). Pope and Hudson (1995), for instance, maintain that
laboratory studies have entirely failed to demonstrate that individuals can repress
memories. They argue that clinical studies which extrapolate from the laboratory to the
study of real-life traumas must therefore start with the null hypothesis that repression
does not occur. To reject that hypothesis, they assert that two criteria need to be met:
“First, one must confirm that traumatic abuse actually occurred. Secondly, one must
demonstrate that individuals actually developed amnesia, of non-biological origin (and
after the age of five), for this abuse” (p 125).
Pope and Hudson have identified four substantial studies that have attempted to
document repression of memories of childhood sexual abuse. They argue that when each
one of these studies is subjected to the two criteria described above, none present data that
satisfy the requirements. They described this result as “surprising” in light of so many
writers having suggested “that there is a high prevalence of repression in the population”
(p 126). The critique of these studies was reiterated by Groff J in a key United States
decision on the subject in May 1995 (State of New Hampshire v Hungerford and Morahan
(unreported, State of New Hampshire, Hillsborough County, Superior Court, Groff J,
23 May 1995)), where it was held that many of the studies failed adequately to account for
childhood amnesia. His Honour also determined that the studies failed “to confirm that
any memory repression itself, actually occurred”, finding that in many of the studies, the
survey questions were so ambiguous as to preclude ascertaining whether the failure to
remember the experience was memory repression, normal forgetting, or disinclination to
make disclosures.
A number of writers have documented false memories, including those where persons
have complained of abduction by aliens (see, eg, Mack (1994)) and ritualistic abuse by
satanic cults: see Noblitt and Perskin (2000); Scott (2001). 15 In their famous “Sam Stone
study”, Leichtman and Ceci (1995) tested the effects of stereotype induction plus repeated
suggestive questioning of children’s eyewitness testimony. Preschoolers were told
anecdotally about the clumsiness of a stranger named Sam Stone. Then he made a brief,
uneventful visit to their day-care centre. After that, they were asked questions about him
after suggestions that Stone had got a teddy bear dirty and ripped a book. A total of 46%
of the children spontaneously mentioned that he had committed both or one of the
misdeeds and 72% and 35% respectively made such reports when asked whether anything
had happened concerning a teddy bear or a book.
Bruck et al (1995; 1997) also elicited false reports from young children as a result of
repeated misleading interviews and the use of leading questions and guided imagery.
Nelson and Simpson (1994) have found an association between retractors’ memories of
sexual abuse and the perception of pressure to remember, while Lief and Fetkewicz (1996)
have associated various forms of suggestive therapy with false memories of abuse. Ost et
al (2002), in a study of 20 retractors, likewise reported that retractors felt that they had
experienced more pressure to remember in the first place than to retract, and that they
experienced the recovered memories as “different” from memories that they had always
had. Some noted that the memories were abnormally clear and vivid, becoming more so
with time, contrary to their usual experience, while others reported them as vague and
dreamlike.
A further issue is the significance and frequency with which victims experience partial
or complete loss of memories of sexual assaults. Herman and Schatzow (1987) reported
that nearly two-thirds of 53 adults in a treatment program for victims of child sexual
abuse claimed to have experienced partial or complete amnesia, with nearly three-quarters
15 The only case of a convicted, self-confessed satanic sexual abuser has been claimed to be a
case of false memory: Wright (1994).
848 [10.30.630]
of the amnesic sample reporting corroborative evidence of the abuse. Feldman-Summers

and Pope (1994) found that 40.5% of 79 adults who had been sexually or physically
abused as children experienced periods of amnesia. They found that “the rates of
corroboration for abuse memories are unrelated to whether there had ever been a period
of forgetting”: Cossins (1997, p 11). However, there were real limitations in terms of both
the sampling and the potential bias of their victims. Loftus, Polonsky and Fullilove (1994)
conducted a clinical, retrospective study of 52 patients who reported abuse. However, the
sample consisted of persons who attended an outpatient clinic for substance abuse. The
findings were that 19% of victims claimed to have experienced complete amnesia for the
event, while 12% reported partial amnesia. However, because of the potentially
confounding nature of using a sample of substance abusers, there were other possible
causes of the victims’ claimed loss of memory. In the retrospective clinical study
conducted by Briere and Conte (1993) of 450 adult survivors of child sexual abuse in
therapy, 59.3% claimed to have experienced periods during which they had forgotten the
abuse. By contrast, Epstein and Bottoms (2002) found that when patients were asked an
unambiguously worded question, less than 1% reported complete amnesia in relation to
abuse.
American Psychiatric Association Statement
[10.30.640] On 12 December 1993, the American Psychiatric Association adopted a
Statement on “Memories of Sexual Abuse”. The Statement is important in a variety of
respects, not least of which because it articulates a model for the process of memory
(American Psychiatric Association (1993, p 2)):
Memory can be divided into four stages: input (encoding), storage, retrieval, and
recounting. All of these processes can be influenced by a variety of factors, including
developmental stage, expectations and knowledge base prior to an event; stress and
bodily sensations experienced during an event; post-event questioning; and the experience
and context of the recounting of the event. In addition, the retrieval and recounting of a
memory can modify the form of the memory, which may influence the content and the
conviction about the veracity of the memory in the future. Scientific knowledge is not yet
precise enough to predict how a certain experience or factor will influence a memory in a
given person.
The Association classified memory in terms of being “explicit” or “declarative”, referring

to the ability consciously to recall facts or events, and “implicit” or “procedural”, referring
to behavioural knowledge of an experience without conscious recall. It asserted that the
distinction between the two forms of memory is fundamental because “they have been
shown to be supported by different brain systems”.
The Statement stressed that some individuals who have experienced documented
traumatic events may nevertheless include some false or inconsistent elements in their
reports, be hesitant in their reporting, and even recant. It also accepted that memories “can
be significantly influenced by questioning, especially in young children or by a trusted
person” (p 3).
Psychiatrists are exhorted by the Statement to “maintain an empathic, non-judgmental,
neutral stance toward reported memories of sexual abuse” (p 3). They are instructed that:
Clinicians who have not had the training necessary to evaluate and treat patients with a
broad range of psychiatric disorders are at risk of causing harm by providing inadequate
care for the patient’s psychiatric problems and by increasing the patient’s resistance to
obtaining and responding to appropriate treatment in the future. In addition, special
knowledge and experience are necessary to properly evaluate and/or treat patients who
report the emergence of memories during the use of specialized interview techniques (for
example, the use of hypnosis or amytal), or during the course of litigation.
Australian Psychological Society guidelines
[10.30.650] The Australian Psychological Society adopted “Guidelines Relating to
Recovered Memories” in May 2000:
[10.30.650] 849
The Australian Psychological Society has developed the following Ethical Guidelines in
relation to an issue which has involved public controversy, therapeutic uncertainty,
scientific conflict and debate, and on occasions, litigation. While the Guidelines are
primarily directed towards psychologists working with clients who report memories of
abuse, it is recognised that a range of people may be involved in or affected by such
reports. The Guidelines are intended to safeguard all clients, and to assist in dealing with
reports of recovered memories in therapeutic, forensic and scientific contexts. The aim is to
produce a balanced document offering some clarity without compounding the distress
and confusion of those most affected by the issue.
Complete or partial memory loss is a frequently reported consequence of trauma,
particularly childhood trauma, and most commonly, child sexual abuse. Recovered
memory, also known as repressed traumatic memory, refers to the full or partial recovery
of such memories after a gap of some years. Amid the controversy surrounding the
validity of treatment designed to recover traumatic memories, there is general agreement
about the following points:
• Childhood trauma involving physical, sexual and/or emotional abuse is not uncommon.
• Children who are subjected to such experiences are likely to be adversely affected, and
evidence exists that varying degrees of psychological damage can be attributed to a
child’s experience of such abuse.
• Child sexual abuse should not be retrospectively assumed solely on the basis of
presenting symptoms.
• Memories of such experiences may be incessant, intrusive, complete, selective,
fragmented, distorted or absent, depending on the context and nature of the abuse and
the survival strategies available to the individual as a child or later in life.
• All memories are susceptible to revision and influence from the time of encoding up to
and including the time and context of retrieval, as well as in the disclosure and
reporting process.
• The percentage of child sexual abuse experiences which (a) are recalled for the first
time during therapy and (b) are the subject of litigation is very small in comparison to
those which are remembered but unreported, and whose effects may or may not
require treatment. [See also Psychotherapy and Counselling Federation of Australia
(2017).]
Given that this is a controversial area, and that no source of truth can be taken as absolute,
it is essential that psychologists continually examine their own values and take account of the
wider contexts in which debates may arise. Such debates may involve divisions between
scientist, clinician and consumer perspectives, or between advocates of false memory and
recovered memory theories, research on cognitive memory, body memory and traumatic
memory processes, conflicting forensic and therapeutic concerns, and issues related to gender,
power and the repercussions of the widespread exposure given to childhood trauma in recent
years. Questions are raised around the empirical basis for particular trends in psychological
treatment, and the different contexts in which retrieval for research, litigation and therapeutic
purposes can take place.
I Scientific Issues
Psychologists should recognise that reports of abuse long after the alleged events are
difficult to prove or disprove in the majority of cases. Independent corroboration of the
statements of those who make or deny such allegations can be difficult. Accordingly,
psychologists should exercise special care in dealing with clients, their family members, and
the wider community when allegations of past abuse are made.
Memory is a constructive and reconstructive process. What is remembered about an event
is shaped by how that event was experienced, by conditions prevailing during attempts to
remember, and by events occurring between the experience and the attempted remembering.
Memories can be altered, deleted and created by events that occur during and after the time
of encoding, during the period of storage, and during any attempts at retrieval.
While there is a great deal of evidence for inaccurate memory in the context of eye-witness
and other non-clinical research, there is currently less evidence for the creation of false
memories in clinical contexts. Research about memory in non-traumatised people may not
necessarily apply to the experiences of people who have been abused or traumatised. As there
is evidence of selective memory, particularly autobiographical memory, in the context of
mood disturbance, there is a need to consider what is cause and effect in dealing with
recovered memories.
850 [10.30.650]
Memory is integral to many approaches to therapy. Repression and dissociation processes

are also central to some theoretical and therapeutic approaches which propose that memories
of traumatic events may be blocked out, such that a person has no recall of the events,
although they may become accessible at some later time. Although clinical observations offer
some support for the possibility of repressed memories, experimental research on memory is
inconclusive. Moreover, the question of whether traumatic memory is processed, stored and
recalled differently from normal memory is unresolved. Current scientific evidence does not
allow predictive statements to be made with great certainty about any relationship between
trauma and memory.
Memories that are reported either spontaneously or following the use of special
procedures in therapy may be accurate, inaccurate, selective, fabricated, or a mixture of these.
The level of belief in memory or the emotion associated with the memory does not predict the
accuracy of the memory. The scientific and clinical evidence currently available does not allow
accurate, inaccurate, and fabricated memories to be distinguished from one another in the
absence of independent corroboration.
II Clinical Issues
Psychologists should seek to meet the needs of clients who report memories of abuse; this
responsibility exists quite apart from the truth or falsity of those reports. Psychologists should
always recognise that the needs and well-being of individual clients are paramount, and
should design their therapeutic interventions accordingly.
Psychologists should always evaluate critically their assumptions or biases about attempts
to recover memories of trauma-related events. Equally, psychologists should facilitate
exploration of clients’ own assumptions about repressed or recovered memories. Assumptions
that adult problems may or may not be associated with repressed memories from childhood
are difficult to sustain on the basis of available scientific evidence.
Psychologists in caring, assessment and therapeutic roles need to be open to the
emergence of memories of trauma which may or may not have been previously available to
the client’s consciousness. Recovered memories are only one way in which experiences of
abuse may surface or be disclosed within and beyond the therapeutic context. Disclosure is
typically an emerging process rather than a one-off event, and delays in reporting may reflect
the difficulties of this process rather than being attributable to a recovered memory
phenomenon. The establishment of trust within the therapeutic relationship is central to the
client’s choices regarding disclosure.
Psychologists should be alert to the ways that they can influence the reporting or
non-reporting of memories by clients through the expectations they convey, the comments
they make, the questions they ask or do not ask, and the responses they give to clients.
Psychologists should be aware that clients may be susceptible to subtle suggestions and
reinforcements, whether those communications are intended or unintended. Equally,
psychologists should be alert not to dismiss memories that may be based in fact, and should
provide a context in which it is safe to disclose material about abuse.
Psychologists should recognise that the context of therapy is as important as the content.
At all times, psychologists should be empathic and supportive towards clients, while also
ensuring that clients do not form premature conclusions about the truth or falsity of their
recollections of the past. They should also ensure that alternative causes of any reported
problems are explored.
Psychologists should not avoid asking clients about the possibility of sexual or other
abusive occurrences in their past, if such a question is relevant to the problem being treated.
However, psychologists should always be sensitive in the way that they ask such questions,
and cautious in interpreting any response that is given. Psychologists should not assume that
a report of no abuse is necessarily indicative of either repressed or dissociated memory or
denial of known events. They should neither assume that a report of abuse indicates
necessarily that the client was abused; nor assume that a report of no abuse is indicative that
no abuse occurred.
Psychologists should not initiate a search for memories of abuse, as abused (and
non-abused) clients may be further traumatised or overwhelmed by material that has not
arisen spontaneously. On the other hand, whilst taking care about the implications of active
investigation and suggestion, psychologists should not seek to manage these risks simply by
refusing to deal with past events and “working in the present” where this actively denies the
client’s experience or wishes. The decision to deal with, or not deal with, past events should
always be made in the interests of the client’s welfare.
Psychologists should understand the distinction frequently made in the literature between
narrative truth and verifiable truth, and the relevance of this distinction within the therapy
context and outside that context. Psychologists need to tolerate, and help their clients tolerate,
uncertainty and ambiguity regarding the client’s early experiences, as eventually it may have
to be accepted that the truth cannot be verified, and that helping clients to make sense of their
lives may not be the same as discovering objective facts. However, to be accepted for legal
purposes, reports must be shown to be substantially accurate.
[10.30.650] 851
Finally, psychologists should note that there is no standard procedure for verifying
recovered memories in individual cases, and that clients may want to draw their own
conclusions about whether or not they were previously traumatised, and about the specific
details of such events, insofar as they wish to recall or reconstruct them.
III Ethical Issues
Psychologists treating clients who report recovered memories of abuse are expected to
observe the Principles set out in the Code of Ethics of the Australian Psychological Society,
and in the Code of Professional Conduct of the Psychologists Registration Board in the
State(s) and/or Territory(ies) in which they are registered as psychologists. Psychologists
should be mindful of General Principle I of the Code of Ethics, which relates to the personal
responsibility they hold for the foreseeable consequences of their actions.
At the beginning of therapy psychologists should provide opportunities for clarification
and discussion, and obtain informed consent in relation to the details of the therapeutic
process and its possible consequences. Where hypnosis is to be used, informed consent
should include information about its likely effect on litigation cases, whereby information
gathered under hypnosis may not be accepted as evidence. (See also the APS Ethical
Guidelines on the Teaching and Use of Hypnosis.)
Psychologists should be prepared to discuss with any client who recovers a memory of
abuse the nature of that memory: that it may be true or false, partly true, distorted, selective,
thematically true, metaphorically true, or a blend of accurate, distorted and symbolic material.
Psychologists should explore with the client the meaning and implications of the memory for
the client, rather than focus solely on the content of the reported memory. Psychologists
should explore with the client ways of determining the accuracy of the memory, if
appropriate. Discovering that some aspects of a memory are displaced, metaphorical or
inaccurate should not lead psychologists to immediately discount all of the memory. Given
the acknowledged difficulties in distinguishing “false” from “true” memories, an open mind
is essential.
Psychologists should be particularly alert to the need to maintain appropriate skills and
learning in this area, and should keep abreast of relevant scientific evidence and clinical
standards of practice. Psychologists should guard against accepting approaches to abuse and
therapy that are not based on scientific evidence and appropriate clinical standards. Nor is it
the role of psychologists to instruct or pressure clients to take a particular course of action
with accused offenders and/or family members during the course of therapy for childhood
abuse.
IV Legal Issues
Psychologists should in no way tolerate, or be seen to tolerate, childhood or adult sexual
abuse, or abuse of any kind. They should ensure that their psychological services are used
appropriately in this regard, and should be alert to problems of deciding whether allegations
of abuse are true or false. They should be alert especially to the different demands and
processes of the therapeutic and legal contexts in dealing with such allegations, including
laws relating to the reporting of child abuse.
Psychologists should be aware that some approaches and writings concerning abuse and
recovered memories urge clients to engage in legal action against the alleged abuser and any
others who may question the accuracy of any recovered memories. Given that the accuracy of
memories, which is the focus of the courts, cannot be determined without corroboration,
psychologists should exercise caution when responding to questions from clients about legal
action. Psychologists may explore the implications of taking legal action in terms of the
potential impact on the client’s well-being, including the possibility of their being further
traumatised by the legal process. Psychologists working in a therapeutic context should
recognise that their responsibilities are to the needs of their clients, and not to issues of legal
or punitive action. Nevertheless, the therapeutic need of clients might include support
through a litigation process.
Psychologists should be aware that their knowledge, skills, and practices may come under
close scrutiny by various public and private agencies if they are treating clients who recover
memories of abuse. Psychologists should always ensure that accurate records are maintained
about their sessions with clients recovering memories of abuse. Psychologists should consider
the implications of any records they keep, should they be the subject of a subpoena, and
familiarise themselves with laws relating to confidentiality in various legal jurisdictions in
their State. Where the role of psychologists is to assist in obtaining evidence that is reliable in
forensic terms, they should restrict themselves to procedures that enhance reliability (such as
the cognitive interview), and avoid techniques that are known to reduce reliability (such as
hypnosis or leading questions). When negotiating informed consent in such circumstances,
the psychologist should be aware that the techniques they use might be called into question,
and therefore might discuss the option of documenting sessions by audio or videotape.
Reports for forensic purposes may include comment on the availability of any corroborative
or contradictory evidence.
852 [10.30.650]
While there are currently no standard protocols for the determination of the validity of
individual reports of recovered memories, the scientific and clinical knowledge available can
provide consensual and balanced information which can be utilised in forensic contexts.
V Research Issues
Psychologists should be aware that further research is needed to understand more about
trauma-related memory, techniques to enhance memory, and techniques to deal effectively
with childhood sexual abuse. Psychologists should support and contribute to research on
these and related issues whenever possible. Clinicians need to recognise the limitations of
anecdotal reports or data collected solely from clinical populations; memory researchers need
to examine and acknowledge the limitations of laboratory-based data and non-traumatised
samples.
Revised
May 2000
These guidelines were based upon the recommendations of Professor Kevin McConkey:
see subscription service Ch 67. They were designed to encourage a critical approach by
psychologists to revelations of past trauma by clients. They were amended in 2008 to
reflect the revised Australian Psychological Society Code of Ethics.
Steps toward consensus
[10.30.660] The recovered memory debate has proved highly divisive within the mental
health professions and has prompted considerable community and legal anxiety.
However, there have been moves toward consensus. There is general agreement that some
people who experienced sexual abuse in post-infancy childhood sometimes do not
remember the abuse and that memories of the abuse can return during adulthood (see
Holdsworth (1998)). Similarly, there is a high level of agreement that suggestive influences
can sometimes lead to confabulated pseudo-memories which are genuinely held by
people, in particular those who have received psychotherapy. This has led to a move
toward the adoption of significant care around the elicitation or receipt by therapists of
apparent memories of abuse. Lindsay and Read (2001, p 87) have suggested that it is
possible crudely to estimate the accuracy of recovered memory reports by weighing a
constellation of factors, including:
(a) the presence/absence of converging evidence; (b) how the memories came about (the
less evidence of suggestive memory recovery work the greater the confidence); (c) the
nature and clarity of the memories (with more credence given to detailed, integrated
recollections than to vague feelings); (d) the likelihood of the alleged events being
forgotten if they had actually occurred (eg when and how often the abuse is said to have
occurred; probability that the person would have encountered reminders, overall
memorability of the alleged events, etc); (e) the plausibility of having memories to recover
(eg less credence given to reports of events said to have occurred before two years of age);
and (f) the base rate of the alleged type of abuse.
(See too Schooler, Bendiksen and Ambadar (1997).)
Legal issues
[10.30.670] Repressed memory syndrome goes further than child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome (CSAAS), however, in that it seeks to explain delay in reporting
not simply in terms of tendencies for children not to disclose abuse, but on the basis that
they repress the memory entirely and have nothing which they can report.
A number of United States and Canadian cases have made a related distinction,
dividing failure to report child sexual abuse into “Type 1” and “Type 2” categories: (1)
where the complainant concedes that he or she has always known and remembered the
sexual assaults, but says that he or she was unaware that other physical or psychological
problems were caused by the abuse; and (2) where the plaintiff claims that because of the
trauma of the experience, he or she for a long while had no recollection of the abuse (see
Johnson v Johnson 701 F Supp 1363 at 1367 (ND Ill 1988); Mary D v John D 264 Cal Rptr 633
at 636–637 (Cal App 6 Dist 1989); Des Rosiers (1992, pp 51ff); KM v HM (1992) 96 DLR
(4th) 291 at 307ff).
[10.30.670] 853
Expert evidence in relation to repressed memories has the potential to take different
forms:
• First level: It may explain the phenomenon of repressed memory syndrome by
explicating the workings of memory so far as psychological and psychiatric knowledge
is able to provide an insight into the failure by some victims of sexual and other
traumata to recall what has been done to them.
• Second level: It may list the survivor’s behaviour and symptoms, as well as explain the
circumstances in which the memories were triggered, but not ascribe a meaning to
those symptoms.
• Third level: It may also suggest that the symptoms of the particular complainant are
consistent with the symptoms of repressed memory syndrome.
• Fourth level: It may diagnose the complainant as suffering from repressed memory
syndrome.
• Fifth level: It may suggest that because the particular complainant suffers from the
symptoms of repressed memory syndrome, it is likely that when the complainant says
that he or she was not until a certain time able to recall the details of having been
sexually assaulted, he or she is telling the truth.
This division into levels contemplates that each level builds upon the previous level. The
first involves the provision of generalised evidence about the phenomenon of repression
of memory by survivors of abuse. The second incorporates a profile of the complainant
and the circumstances in which he or she “recovered” his or her memories. The third
involves the proffering of a view that the symptoms are consistent with experience of the
syndrome. The fourth actually incorporates a diagnosis in respect of the particular
complainant. The fifth adds an analysis of the impact of the syndrome upon the
evaluation of the complainant’s truthfulness when the complainant says that he or she
was in no position to complain or report because shortly after the incident he or she
“forgot”.
Little case law as yet exists in Australia and New Zealand in relation to the
admissibility of expert evidence about the processes of recall by adults or children of
assaults, sexual or otherwise, perpetrated upon them. Expert evidence has been admitted
in Canada, however, about a range of matters in respect of which jurors may labour under
misconceptions: see above, [10.30.480]. This enables the evidence potentially to pass
through the doors of the common knowledge rule for those jurisdictions where it still
exists. Repressed memory syndrome falls into the same kind of counterintuitive category
in that it seeks to explain delay in reporting by pitching it not just in terms of human
dynamics but as a psychological phenomenon in which the memory of the trauma is
repressed.
The admissibility of expert evidence about repressed memory syndrome or false
memory syndrome remains to be authoritatively determined throughout common law
jurisdictions. It is useful therefore to examine those few cases on the subject which have
reached appellate level and to separate out the different strands of evidence law which
may impact upon the admissibility of expert evidence in relation to both repressed
memory syndrome and false memory syndrome.
Canadian authority: R v Norman

[10.30.680] The admissibility of expert evidence about repressed memory syndrome or
false memory syndrome remains to be finally determined. In the important case of R v
Norman (1993) 87 CCC (3d) 153 at 168–169, the Ontario Court of Appeal gave what may be
an indication of the direction in which the law will head. It expressed grave concerns
about the dangers posed by evidence from complainants in sexual abuse matters where
“memories” are retrieved by a therapeutically oriented memory retrieval process. The
854 [10.30.680]
danger identified was that the process may not elicit “real memories of what actually
occurred. In either case the patient is convinced of the truth of what he or she is recalling.
Honesty of recall is not a factor; the concern instead is the reliability of the recall.” The
court held that an error may be made in such circumstances by placing too much weight
on the appearance of honesty and integrity on the part of a witness who has engaged in a
psychotherapeutically oriented memory retrieval process: at 172.
In Norman, the Court of Appeal placed particular weight on the evidence of a Dr Carr,
who had stressed that a memory may arise through a process of suggestion from a
therapist (at 168–169):
A patient may be told that she has a memory, that she must recall it and that it is
important for her well-being that she recall it. In such instances, the patient may begin to
develop memories, the process of suggestion having instilled in her a desire, or a
perceived need, to do so.
On the other side of the coin, Dr Carr testified that the therapist who is encouraging
this memory recall process is not disposed to be critical of the memory. He or she does not
wish to inhibit this process, for to do so might mean losing the trust and confidence of the
patient. The accuracy of the memory is not significant to the therapeutic process. The
therapist must work with whatever memory the patient has. While it is difficult to
determine whether a memory is accurate, according to Dr Carr, these traumatic memories
are usually recalled very vividly, very clearly, a memory engraved in indelible detail. It
does not, in his view, have the fumbling qualities of other memories.
Norman was decided on the basis that the “trial judge did not come to grips with the
expert evidence” (at 169). The court found that expert evidence is of considerable value in
“historical sexual assault cases”, the trier of fact being unlikely to be familiar with
phenomena such as the child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome: see R v Marquard
[1993] 4 SCR 223; (1993) 85 CCC (3d) 193; R v Mohan (1992) 71 CCC (3d) 321 at 327. It
noted that without such assistance, the failure of the complainant to report a rape to the
authorities might be incomprehensible. However, the court held that the fact that a
psychiatric condition could be responsible for lack of memory does not relieve the triers of
fact from the need to satisfy themselves of whether the Crown has made out its case
beyond reasonable doubt. The case, therefore, did not rule authoritatively in any sense on
the admissibility of expert evidence about “repressed memory syndrome”, although its
approach bears some similarities to that of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v
Accused [1989] 1 NZLR 714 at 720 in relation to “child abuse syndrome evidence”.
In the subsequent case of R v Russell (1994) 95 CCC (3d) 190, it was held that it was not
necessary for an expert (in this case Dr Yarmey) on repressed memory of sexual assault
victims to have clinical experience in relation to such victims or to have written on the
subject of sexual abuse. However, the case did not rule expressly on the admissibility of
such evidence.
New Zealand authority: R v R

[10.30.690] In the New Zealand case of R v R (1994) 11 CRNZ 402, a single judge of the
New Zealand High Court was called upon to rule on the admissibility of expert evidence
relating to repressed memory syndrome. The accused had been charged with sexual
offences said to have been committed on his two daughters between 1983 and 1990. The
elder daughter, aged 21 at the time of the trial, had no recollection of the abuse alleged
prior to July 1990. It was said that during the course of a counselling program, her
memory of the alleged abuse started to come out. The younger daughter, aged 18 at the
time of the trial, had her first memory of the alleged abuse in July or August 1991.
The Crown sought to call a Dr Zelas, an experienced Christchurch psychiatrist with
training in child psychiatry, to give evidence about the process by which human memories
are formed. If permitted, she was going to describe how memories are retrieved and to
[10.30.690] 855
explain that retrieval occurs either as a deliberate cognitive process or as a response to

associations or triggers. She was going to say that memories are not retrieved in their
entirety, but tend to be recovered piecemeal or “reconstructed” from stored material. Thus
it is, she was going to say, that memories can be influenced by other information held by
the brain in storage.
Dr Zelas proposed to describe “declarative” or “semantic” memory and to distinguish
them from “somatosensory” memory. She proposed to give evidence that declarative
memory relates to the storage and retrieval of material such as formal educational data,
while somatosensory memory is the memory of the perception or experience of an event.
It is not retrieved in words but as a repetition of the original experience, such as the
feeling of a bodily sensation. It is likely to be triggered by the occurrence of an event
which reminds the person of, or has characteristics in common with, the event which is
remembered.
Dr Zelas proposed also to describe how the mind constructs psychological defences
against trauma, these defences being classified as dissociation and denial (at 403):
Dissociation involves shutting one’s self off from the traumatic experience. Denial involves
not acknowledging or allowing one’s self to “know” the event or its significance. Dr Zelas
says that because of these mechanisms there may be partial or complete amnesia of
traumatic events for at least periods of most victims’ lives. This applies particularly when
the events occur early in life. The experience is commoner with events registered by
somatosensory memory as opposed to declarative/semantic memory.
The Crown proposed that Dr Zelas give evidence that the term “repressed” is misleading
and unhelpful because the repression involved is not repression in any active sense but is
a result of dissociation and denial. Dr Zelas was to describe the circumstances that can
provide a trigger for the retrieval of a memory that has been the subject of dissociation or
denial.
Counsel for the accused objected that the evidence was not relevant and that it should
be excluded as more prejudicial than probative because of the danger of its being viewed
by the jury as a prop to the credibility of the complainant.
Tipping J found that the evidence was relevant. His Honour held that credibility has
two aspects: first, truthfulness, and second, reliability. In R v R (1994) 11 CRNZ 402, his
Honour found (at 404) that the reliability of the complainant was critical to the
prosecution case:
In any ordinary situation, a jury might consider that if a complainant has no recollection of
an event for a number of years and then starts to recall it there could be a doubt about the
reliability of the ultimate recall. The Crown wishes to put before the jury Dr Zelas’s
evidence to demonstrate that what, on its face, might appear strange is in medical or
psychiatric terms quite possible.
Thus, the purpose which was found to be acceptable in leading the evidence was its
counterintuitive aspect. Tipping J confirmed a distinction, which his Honour had earlier
adumbrated in Police v Sinclair [1991] 3 NZLR 569 at 575, between matters of ordinary
human experience upon which expert evidence is neither necessary nor admissible and
“matters likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a Judge or jury” upon
which expert evidence is both necessary and admissible (R v R (1994) 11 CRNZ 402 at 404).
His Honour found the evidence in the particular case to be necessary.
Tipping J found it significant that the proposed expert evidence was carefully
structured so as not to trespass into the specifics of the case. Instead, it was designed
simply to give the jury a means of scientific appraisal of how human memory works and
of the capacity for the memory to be affected by dissociation and denial. The jury was
being supplied with information outside its experience of a kind as to enable jurors to
come to the ultimate decision as to whether the complainants were truthful and reliable
witnesses. Tipping J found that the jury would be able to understand that the witness was
856 [10.30.690]
neither directly nor indirectly intending to endorse the reliability of the particular
complainants. Thus, his Honour found that the evidence did not improperly trespass
upon the ultimate issue to be decided by the jury and was not unduly prejudicial.
The decision of Tipping J may well become a model for the myth-dispelling kind of
repressed memory syndrome evidence which the Crown will often wish to lead to explain
long delay in reporting by complainants whose recollection of sexual assault has only
crystallised in the years long subsequent to the commission of sexual assault.
A later decision of Fisher J emphasised the difficulties lying in the way of the reception
of expert evidence concerning the repression of memory. In R v D (1995) 13 CRNZ 306, the
accused was committed for trial for sex offences alleged to have been committed between
1971 and 1979. The complainant had two periods of treatment by a psychologist during
the 1990s, during the second of which Eye Movement Desensitisation and Reprocessing
was used. She also said that she experienced a series of flashbacks of her abuse, stimulated
first by her seeing a film about sexual abuse that made her “sad and angry”. Fisher J noted
literature about recovered memory syndrome, including Hampton (1995), Goodyear-
Smith (1995) and State of New Hampshire v Hungerford and Morahan (unreported, State of
New Hampshire, Hillsborough County, Superior Court, Groff J, 23 May 1995). He held
that the case against the accused was already marginal due to the magnitude of the delay
and the prejudice that that would cause: “To that one must then add as a fresh factor the
controversy surrounding evidence of the repressed memory type to be given by the
complainant” (at 314). He held that that was sufficient to tip the scales against allowing the
trial to continue. Thus, the ruling was not in terms of admissibility but in terms of abuse of
process.
[10.30.700] The major Australian authority on repressed memory is the Victorian Court of
Appeal decision in R v Bartlett [1996] 2 VR 687. In that case, the accused was convicted of
indecent assault and false imprisonment of a girl then nine years of age. The events the
subject of the counts in the presentment were alleged to have occurred some 13 years
before the trial. The complainant had made no early complaint or report and gave
evidence during the trial that her memory had revived during counselling sessions. At the
trial, the accused sought to lead expert evidence from a psychologist, Dr Ken Byrne,
concerning problems relating to the repression of memory, but the trial judge rejected it on
the basis that the subject matter toward which the testimony was directed was one on
which persons without instruction or experience in the area of knowledge or human
experience would be able to form a sound judgment without expert assistance: see also R
v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45; 15 A Crim R 364 at 46–47.
Dr Byrne indicated on the voire dire that he would give evidence that people over the
age of seven or eight do not as a rule suppress or forget traumatic events, and that if it is
suggested that such a person has retrieved a recall of events which had been obliterated
for many years from the mind, then such material was likely to be unreliable. He said that
the fundamental issue was whether a “repressed memory” was really representing a
memory or whether it was a “memory created by suggestion” (at 694). Dr Byrne further
expressed the view that the reliability of the late recall could be further compromised if
the person claiming to have the memory had been the subject of other abuses early in
childhood. He claimed that it was a known phenomenon that a person retrieving a recall
of physical abuse could incorporate in such recall aspects of other physical abuses. He said
that this was known as the phenomenon of “unconscious transference”. The trial judge
made no formal ruling but said (at 695):
It is not demonstrated that there is a scientifically accepted body of knowledge concerning
memory. There is obviously a good deal of research going on but there is nothing before
me to indicate that the researchers are by any means unanimous. Secondly the result of the
[10.30.700] 857
research that has been put to me … seems to me to indicate no more than what is common
human experience as in fact verified by research. There is nothing … that this witness
could say to a jury that a jury might not already well know, and accordingly I do not
propose to allow the evidence to be led.
The court found this ruling to be in error. Winneke P, giving the court’s judgment, found
(at 695):
In determining whether there is, or is not, a field of knowledge which requires expert
assistance, the judge is to a large extent involved in an exercise of personal judgment, for
which authority provides little help: see Blackburn J in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971)
17 FLR 141 at 160. It seems to me, however, that questions of whether there is such a
phenomenon as “suppressed memory” and, if so, whether it is likely to provide accurate
recall; or whether recall of events suppressed for many years are likely to be affected or
displaced by other similar events, are questions which must surely be outside the ken of
the lay person.
His Honour held that merely because there exists a division of opinion among experts –
that they do not speak with one voice – cannot assist in determining the admissibility of
expert opinion evidence. As the evidence of Dr Byrne was capable of persuading the jury
that the events described by the complainant were the product of a false, rather than real,
memory, the Court of Appeal determined that the convictions of the accused should be
quashed (see also R v E (1997) 96 A Crim R 489; R v Forsti [2010] ACTSC 85).
Common law evidentiary hurdles to admissibility

[10.30.710] Only R v Bartlett [1996] 2 VR 687 has dealt squarely with the issue of the
admissibility of expert evidence about the repression of memories. In addition, the
decision in Bartlett relates in essence to the admissibility of false memory evidence.
The common knowledge rule
[10.30.720] A key question in terms of admissibility at common law is whether the expert
evidence to be adduced canvasses a matter of common knowledge. If so, it is inadmissible.
The most applicable case law on the subject may have been superseded by Murphy v The
Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94. In the 1981 Queensland case of R v Fong [1981] Qd R 90,
evidence of research conducted by psychologists in relation to the functioning of human
memory was held by the Court of Criminal Appeal to be inadmissible as expert evidence.
A medical practitioner charged with fraud in relation to bulk-billing practices had been
found guilty of overstating the amount of time he had spent with patients who testified in
relation to the consultations that they had had with their doctor after a period of some
four years. The following view of the trial judge was quoted with evident approval by the
Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal (per Lucas ACJ (Matthews and Kelly JJ concurring)
at 95):
I take the view that in this case the jury has been empanelled to decide everyday matters.
I assume I believe with some justification that juries do what they are empanelled to do
and that they perform their functions properly. What a person remembers and how they
are likely to remember and the manner in which the human memory works by
reconstruction or suggestion or otherwise are everyday matters well within the field of
knowledge of juries.
R v Fong [1981] Qd R 90 was an application of the common knowledge rule to exclude

information determined to be within the ken of the tribunal of fact. The impact of the
High Court decision in Murphy on the formulation to be given to the common knowledge
rule is that expert evidence about a matter involving the operation of memory subsequent
to the experience of severe trauma may be admissible if it will assist the tribunal of fact to
better understand the issues.
If the evidence is couched in terms of dissociative amnesia – that is to say, suggesting
that the person who has repressed memories of sexual abuse suffered from a psychiatric
858 [10.30.710]
disorder – expert evidence of this kind would probably be admissible. However, if it takes
the form of conventional expert evidence on repressed memory – which seeks to explain
how it is that a cross-section of victims of abuse, who are not considered to be suffering
from a psychiatric disorder, deny and dissociate to the extent that they cease to remember
what has been done to them for long periods and so are in no position to complain or
report – then problems exist. Can it seriously be accounted as evidence that will “assist”
the tribunal of fact? For the moment, profound controversy still exists about the dangers
posed by evidence that is psychotherapeutically retrieved, the definitional parameters of
the syndrome are uncertain, and there is a major division of opinion within the ranks of
both psychiatrists and psychologists about the theoretical underpinnings of repressed
memory syndrome. In short, such evidence may not be “myth dispelling” at all. It is to be
contrasted with the counterintuitive function of battered woman syndrome evidence
enunciated by Wilson J in Lavallee v The Queen [1990] 1 SCR 852; (1990) 55 CCC (3d) 97 at
112:
How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The average member
of the public (or of the jury) can be forgiven for asking: Why would a woman put up with
this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could she
love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the
woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose
and make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average person confronted
with the so-called “battered-woman syndrome”. We need help to understand it and help
is available from trained professionals.
The myths sought to be dispelled by battered woman syndrome evidence (at the general
level) are generally accepted within the psychiatric, psychological, sociological and sexual
assault counselling communities as myths. By contrast, the alleged myth that people do
not forget their abuse remains the subject of profound contention within the relevant
professional communities.
It should be noted, however, that evidence in relation to the operation of memory
might potentially be led to disabuse of a variety of myths. For instance, Ashley J in R v
Thorne (unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, 9 June 1995) noted (pp 28–30):
It may be the case that, as a particular topic is concentrated upon, recollections pertinent
to the matter may multiply. It may be the case that the most disagreeable memories are
those that are hardest to retrieve. … It might be said that memories of grave incidents
would be most deeply buried. … [I]t is not easy to understand why events of lesser
gravity occurring further in the past should be the subject of later recollection.
These may or may not be myths and could potentially be the subject of expert evidence in
relation to the working of memory based upon the research work of psychologists such as
Loftus, Thomson, McConkey and Orne. However, the central issue in relation to repressed
memory syndrome evidence is the propensity of victims of major trauma to cease to
remember what they have suffered.
Traditionally, expert evidence that is simply “oath-helping”, or that is adduced merely
to support the credit of a witness, is inadmissible, as assessment of credibility is regarded
as pre-eminently a task for the tribunal of fact and expert evidence about the credibility of
a witness trespasses into an area of common knowledge. In all probability, the first, second
and third levelss of expert evidence in relation to repression of memories would not be
regarded as oath-helping, although the fourth level may be and the fifth level probably
would be. Where, however, the primary purpose of the evidence is, for instance, to
disabuse misconceptions current in the community, the oath-helping preclusion will not
render the evidence inadmissible. Generally expressed evidence in relation to repressed
memory has the benefit for the prosecution of bolstering the witness’s claim that he or she
forgot the assault of which he or she is now complaining. However, it can legitimately be
[10.30.720] 859
argued that the primary purpose of the evidence is to dispel the myth that such matters
are not forgotten rather than to support the witness’s credit.
the area of expertise rule
[10.30.730] Repressed memory syndrome does not qualify as reliable under the Daubert
test of falsifiability (Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786
(1993)), the test that governs the admissibility of scientific evidence generally under the
Federal Rules of Evidence 1975 (US). Should this test be applied to the syndrome, it should
be excluded as inadmissible. Useful guidance on this approach is to be found in the
persuasive judgment of Groff J in State of New Hampshire v Hungerford and Morahan
(unreported, State of New Hampshire, Hillsborough County, Superior Court, Groff J,
23 May 1995). Groff J focused upon the equivocal stance of the American Psychiatric
Association (referred to above) and noted the position taken by the Australian
Psychological Society (also previously referred to). He also made extensive reference to the
interim report of the American Psychological Association’s Working Group on
Investigation of Memories of Childhood Abuse (1994), which found:
[M]ost people who were sexually abused as children remember all or part of what
happened to them. … However, it is possible for memories of abuse that have been
forgotten for a long time to be remembered. The mechanism(s) by which such delayed
recall occur(s) is/are not currently well understood.
Groff J noted that even the members of the committee who prepared the report “seem to
disagree as to the meaning of the conclusions”. In addition, Groff J noted that the
American Medical Association’s Report of the Council on Scientific Affairs issued in 1994
concluded:
[F]ew cases in which adults make accusations of childhood sexual abuse based on
recovered memories can be proved or disproved and it is not yet known how to
distinguish true memories from imagined events in these cases. … The American Medical
Association considers recovered memories of childhood sexual abuse to be of uncertain
authenticity, which should be subject to external verification. The use of recovered
memories is fraught with problems of potential misapplication.
Groff J summarised the position by observing that “a raging or robust debate exists in the
field of psychology” as to whether the phenomenon of repressed memory exists. To this he
might have added that the debate rages in other interested professions as well. Groff J
found that the reliability of the phenomenon had not been established and commented
that he suffered from a “loss of confidence in the validity of the technique” (emphasis
added) as a result of the continuing scientific dialogue. He found that the theory lying
behind repressed memories could not be “rationally and scientifically exhibited”. So far as
the falsifiability of the phenomenon of repressed memory was concerned, Groff J observed
that all experts who had appeared before him had conceded that “there is absolutely no
ability, absent independent corroboration or confirmation, to determine whether a
particular repressed memory is false or true” – in other words, repression of memory is
unfalsifiable in terms of the Daubert test. Groff J also found that the theory behind
repressed memory does not command general acceptance within the relevant intellectual
marketplace pursuant to the requirements of the Frye test (Frye v United States 293 F 1013
at 1014 (DC Cir 1923)), given the profound disagreement about its legitimacy among
psychologists and others.
The Daubert test has not yet been adopted by Australian or New Zealand courts.
However, a range of decisions have employed language consistent with the Frye test
(which remains one of the four indicia of reliability under Daubert) focusing upon whether
the theory or technique has gained general acceptance within the relevant scientific
community: see above, Ch 2.10. If this criterion is employed, a determination of
inadmissibility would have to follow.
860 [10.30.730]
Statutory evidentiary hurdles to admissibility

[10.30.760] While in principle it might be argued that s 79(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth),
the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic) , the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and
the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT), and s 79A of the Evidence Act 2001
(Tas), might ease the admissibility of repressed memory evidence, this is probably unlikely
given the questionable status of such opinions. The prejudice/probative discretion
remains a major hurdle to the admissibility of such evidence and it remains to be
determined whether it will constitute evidence arising from “specialised knowledge”.

[10.30.800] It has been suggested that the experience of premenstrual syndrome (PMS) by
women who commit violent acts may function, in some circumstances, to distort their
sense of reality in a way comparable to the experience of repeated cycles of domestic
violence. It may thus be relevant to the defences of self-defence, provocation, duress,
diminished responsibility, automatism and even insanity: see Singh et al (2004); Slovenko
(1995); Lewis (1990); Easteal (1991); Press (1983); Horney (1978); Abplanalp (1985);
Luckhaus (1985); Mulligan (1983); Dalton (1983); Carney and Williams (1983); Apodaca
and Fink (1984); McArthur (1989); McSherry (1993; 1994); Dershowitz (1994); Perr (1958);
Oleck (1953); Wallach and Rubin (1971).
Definition of the syndrome has once again proved problematic (see Boorse (1987) but is
vital to its forensic use. McSherry (1993, p 296) has pointed out that over 150 symptoms
have been posited as varying with the menstrual cycle and that while the most popular
theory is that PMS is caused by an imbalance or deficiency in the hormone progesterone,
no biochemical test yet exists to determine such an imbalance or deficiency. Spitzer et al
(1989) have made the point that from a psychiatric point of view, premenstrual syndrome
“has no precise definition” but has come to refer to a collection of disturbances of mood
and physical symptoms that occur regularly and repetitively before menses and remit
once menses begins. They maintained that as of 1989, there was still no accepted definition
of “premenstrual syndrome”. Rodin (1992, p 52) has also argued:
The findings from correlational data (which show that women can become totally
incapacitated because of PMS) and from PMS research in general (where the conclusion
that hormonal changes influence behaviour is maintained despite methodological
inconsistencies) are more indicative of unstated assumptions about women and the
menstrual cycle than they are of actual causal relationships or the direct hormonal control
of emotions.
McSherry (1993, p 297) argued in 1993 that it was “still too early to assess whether
premenstrual syndrome is in fact a pathological syndrome”.
The issue was a live one for those preparing the revision of DSM-III and thereafter the
1994 edition of DSM-IV – less so the DSM-5. They identified a need to distinguish between
those women for whom the physical aspects preponderate and those for whom
disturbance of mood is more prominent. They recommended the term “Late Luteal Phase
Dysphoric Disorder” (LLPDD) in DSM-III-R and then “Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder”
in DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association (2000, p 771)). It was included in
DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric Association (1987, p 367)) and DSM-IV as a mental
disorder, but in an appendix “to facilitate further systematic clinical study and research”.
The editors of DSM-III-R maintained (p 367):
The diagnosis is given only if the symptoms are sufficiently severe to cause marked
impairment in social or occupational functioning and have occurred during a majority of
menstrual cycles in the past year.
They commented that for some women, self-monitoring of the symptoms has been found
to have a therapeutic effect and they add the following warning (p 367):
[10.30.800] 861
The diagnosis of Late Luteal Phase Dysphoric Disorder should be made only provisionally
on the basis of retrospective reports; daily self-ratings for at least two symptomatic cycles
are required to confirm the diagnosis.
In 1994, the editors of DSM-IV confirmed the DSM-III-R criteria for Late Luteal Phase
Dysphoric Disorder, but renamed it as Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder:
A. In most menstrual cycles during the past year, five (or more) of the following
symptoms were present for most of the time during the last week of the luteal
phase, began to remit within a few days after the onset of the follicular phase,
and were absent in the week postmenses, with at least one of the symptoms
being either (1), (2), (3) or (4):
(1) markedly depressed mood, feelings of hopelessness, or self-deprecating
thoughts
(2) marked anxiety, tension, feelings of being “keyed up”, or “on edge”
(3) marked affective lability (eg, feeling suddenly sad or tearful or increased
sensitivity to rejection)
(4) persistent and marked anger or irritability or increased interpersonal
conflicts
(5) decreased interest in usual activities (eg, work, school, friends, hobbies)
(6) subjective sense of difficulty in concentrating
(7) lethargy, easy fatigability, or marked lack of energy
(8) marked change in appetite, overeating, or specific food cravings
(9) hypersomnia or insomnia
(10) a subjective sense of being overwhelmed or out of control
(11) other physical symptoms, such as breast tenderness or swelling,
headaches, joint or muscle pain, a sensation of “bloating”, weight gain.
In menstruating females, the luteal phase corresponds to the period between
ovulation and the onset of menses, and the follicular phase begins with menses.
In nonmenstruating females (eg, those who have had a hysterectomy), the timing
of luteal and follicular phases may require measurement of circulating
reproductive hormones.
B. The disturbance markedly interferes with work or school or with usual social
activities and relationships with others (eg, avoidance of social activities,
decreased productivity and efficiency at work or school).
C. The disturbance is not merely an exacerbation of the symptoms of another
disorder, such as Major Depressive Disorder, Panic Disorder, Dysthymic Disorder,
or a Personality Disorder (although it may be superimposed on any of these
disorders).
D. Criteria A, B, and C must be confirmed by prospective daily ratings during at
least two consecutive symptomatic cycles. (The diagnosis may be made
provisionally prior to this confirmation.)
(Reprinted with permission from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
Copyright 2000, American Psychiatric Association.) (See, too, DSM-IV-TR (American
Psychiatric Association (2000, p 771)).)
In 2013, DSM-5 maintained “Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder” as a recognised mental
disorder, but adjusted its criteria:
A. In the majority of menstrual cycles, at least five symptoms must be present in the
final week before the onset of menses, start to improve within a few days after
the onset of menses, and become minimal or absent in the week post menses.
B. One (or more) of the following symptoms must be present:
(1) marked affective lability (eg, mood swings, feeling suddenly sad or
tearful, or increased sensitivity to rejection)
(2) marked irritability or anger or increased interpersonal conflicts
862 [10.30.800]
(3) markedly depressed mood, feelings of hopelessness, or self-deprecating

thoughts
(4) marked anxiety, tension, and/or feelings of being “keyed up”, or “on
edge”.
C. One (or more) of the following symptoms must additionally be present, to reach
a total of five symptoms, when combined with symptoms from Criterion B above.
(1) decreased interest in usual activities (eg, work, school, friends, hobbies)
(2) subjective difficulty in concentration
(3) lethargy, easy fatigability, or marked lack of energy
(4) marked changes in appetite, overeating, or specific food cravings
(5) hypersomnia or insomnia
(6) a sense of being overwhelmed or out of control
(7) physical symptoms, such as breast tenderness or swelling, headaches,
joint or muscle pain, a sensation of “bloating” or weight gain.
The symptoms in Criteria A–C must have been met for most menstrual cycles
that occurred in the preceding year.
D. The symptoms are associated with clinically significant distress or interference
with work, school, usual social activities, or relationships with others (eg,
evidence of social activities, decreased productivity and efficiency at work,
school, or home).
E. The disturbance is not merely an exacerbation of the symptoms of another
disorder (such as major depressive disorder, panic disorder, persistent depressive
disorder (dysthymia) or a personality disorder (although it may co-occur with
any of these disorders)).
F. Criterion A should be confirmed by prospective daily ratings during at least two
symptomatic cycles (note: the diagnosis may be made provisionally prior to this
confirmation).
G. The symptoms are not attributable to the physiological effects of a substance (eg,
a drug of abuse, a medication, other treatment) or another medical condition (eg,
hyperthyroidism).
Although she acknowledges the existence of a study that a high percentage of female
prisoners had committed their crimes during the premenstruum (Lever (1979); see also
Dalton (1984, p 236)), McSherry (1993, p 299; 1994, p 4) has persuasively argued that the
belief that premenstrual syndrome causes aggressive behaviour “appears to be based in
fantasy, not fact”. A vital issue too is whether experience of the syndrome is such as to
deprive a person of control over their actions or understanding about their nature and
consequences. As yet there is no clear evidence that the impact of the syndrome is of this
order.
Easteal (1991, pp 5–6) has drawn attention to a number of unreported English cases
and Easteal, Kaye and Reed (2009) to some United States cases in which premenstrual
syndrome was used in the 1970s and 1980s by defence lawyers. McSherry (1993,
pp 308–309) has summarised the major unreported English cases:
In 1980, Sandie Craddock was tried for stabbing to death a fellow barmaid (R v Craddock
unreported, London Central Criminal Court, January 1981, (1981) CLY 476). She had
previously been convicted of a number of minor criminal offences and had attempted
suicide on several occasions between 1970 and 1979.
Doctor Katharina Dalton gave evidence that Craddock suffered from premenstrual
syndrome. This diagnosis was based on the cyclical pattern of Craddock’s criminal
behaviour and suicide attempts as well as a series of tests which revealed a severe
progesterone deficiency. The jury found Craddock guilty of manslaughter, presumably
because of the well-documented evidence of premenstrual syndrome presented by Dalton.
Sentencing was delayed for three months in order to see whether progesterone treatments
would affect Craddock’s behaviour. At sentencing, Dalton gave evidence that massive
[10.30.800] 863
doses of progesterone had stabilised Craddock’s behaviour and the court released
Craddock on probation, provided that she continue to receive progesterone treatment
under Dalton’s influence. Premenstrual syndrome was also considered in a
contemporaneous proceeding: R v English (unreported, Norwich Crown Court,
10 November 1981). In December 1980, Christine English deliberately drove her car at her
lover, pinning him against a utility pole. He died two weeks later. English had been living
with her lover for three years, but a short time before the incident, he had announced his
intention of seeing another woman. On the day of the killing, he had quarrelled with
English outside a pub and there was some evidence that he had punched and slapped her.
English said in a statement to police: “he turned and made a V-sign at me. I just wanted to
bump him and hurt him.” … English pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the ground of
diminished responsibility.
Doctor Dalton testified that English suffered from premenstrual syndrome which
caused her to become aggressive and irritable and to lose self-control. Purchas J accepted
premenstrual syndrome as a mitigating factor in sentencing and granted English a
twelve-month conditional discharge and banned her from driving for one year.
In a curious twist of fate, reminiscent of R v Kontinnen (unreported, SA Supreme Court,

30 March 1992) (see above, [10.30.220]), Craddock was later charged under the name of
Smith with threatening to kill a police officer and with carrying an offensive weapon in
public without authority or excuse. Her counsel argued that because of the reduced
dosage of progesterone, her syndrome had recurred and had either reduced her to an
automatic state or had led to an irresistible impulse to kill the police officer. On appeal
from her conviction, the Court of Appeal was urged to recognise a special defence based
on premenstrual syndrome. The court declined to do so, rejecting the defence of
automatism and finding no authority for a defence of irresistible impulse based on a
temporary medical condition: R v Smith Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), 27 April
1982); [1982] Crim LR 531. However, it determined that premenstrual syndrome could
properly be regarded as a mitigating factor in sentencing and it upheld the trial judge’s
order for Smith to undergo three years’ probation. Appellate authority on the admissibility
and value of premenstrual syndrome evidence is as yet minimal in almost all jurisdictions.
However, it is clear that women’s experience of the disorder forms part of plea material
from time to time in many countries.
It is doubtful whether the syndrome is sufficiently precise in its characteristics for it to
be capable of furnishing the basis for defences based upon duress, self-defence,
provocation, automatism, diminished responsibility or insanity (cf Carney and Williams
(1983, p 253); Apodaca and Fink (1984, p 54)). Persuasive arguments have been
constructed that the syndrome has been constructed for forensic purposes instrumentally
to provide a defence or excuse, where objectively neither exists on the facts (see, eg, De
Luca (2017)).
Little as yet exists by way of controlled empirical studies of sufferers of the
syndrome/disorder and its status under DSM is still evolving. As Spitzer et al (1989,
p 895) have pointed out, “[c]are is needed in defining the boundary between normality
and pathology given that all women experience premenstrual changes”, but at this stage
the greatest forensic unknown is the degree of disabling impact experienced by sufferers.
Further research and academic discourse are necessary before this syndrome is used other
than in the sentencing phase of proceedings, where it retains some potential relevance as a
mitigating factor (see Grose (1998); Langer (2012)).

[10.30.850] An important syndrome that has been asserted in the context of family law
proceedings where there is wholesale noncompliance with custody/access, residence/
contact orders is “parental alienation syndrome”.
864 [10.30.850]
In 1985, Gardner (1985), a United States psychiatrist, introduced the term “parental
alienation syndrome” in order to explain the “programming” or “brainwashing” of a child
by a parent to denigrate the other parent and the self-created contributions by the child in
support of the alienating parent’s campaign of denigration against the alienated parent:
see also Gardner (1987); Lowenstein (2007). When Gardner did so, he employed
terminology that drew upon the legacy of at least rape trauma syndrome, cult indoctrinee
syndrome, battered woman syndrome, and child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome
– all of which were syndromes that had preceded parental alienation syndrome.
In the second edition of his book on parental alienation syndrome, Gardner (1998, p xx)
defined parental alienation syndrome as:
A disorder that arises primarily in the context of child-custody disputes. Its primary
manifestation is the child’s campaign of denigration against a parent, a campaign that has
no justification. It results from the combination of a programming (brainwashing) parent’s
indoctrinations and the child’s own contributions to the vilification of the target parent.
When true parental abuse and/or neglect is present the child’s animosity may be justified,
and so the parental alienation syndrome explanation for the child’s hostility is not
applicable.
Since the first edition, Gardner has argued (1998, p 73) that the syndrome includes not
only conscious but also subconscious and unconscious factors within the alienating parent
that contribute to the child’s alienation from the target parent, as well as factors in the
child, independent of the parental contribution, that play a role in the development of the
syndrome.
Gardner has emphasised (1998, p xxi) that a parent who inculcates such a syndrome in
their child is perpetrating a form of emotional abuse:
in that such programming may not only produce lifelong alienation from a loving parent,
but lifelong psychiatric disturbance in the child. A parent who systematically programs a
child into a state of ongoing denigration and rejection of a loving and devoted parent is
exhibiting complete disregard of the alienated parent’s role in the child’s upbringing.
He argued (1998, p xxv) that the syndrome is characterised by a cluster of symptoms that
usually appear together in the child, especially in the “moderate” and “severe” types of
the syndrome (as distinguished from the “mild” type), including:
1. A campaign of denigration.
2. Weak, absurd, or frivolous rationalisations for the deprecation.
3. Lack of ambivalence.
4. The “independent thinker” phenomenon.
5. Reflexive support of the alienating parent in the parental conflict.
6. Absence of guilt over cruelty to and/or exploitation of the alienated parent.
7. The presence of borrowed scenarios.
8. Spread of the animosity to the friends and/or extended family of the alienated
parent.
He has maintained (1998, p xxv) that children “suffering with” parental alienation
syndrome (PAS) will exhibit most, if not all, of the “symptoms”:
This consistency results in PAS children resembling one another. It is because of these
considerations that the PAS is a relatively “pure” diagnosis that can easily be made by
those who are not somehow blocked from seeing what is in front of them.
As of 1998, he maintained (1998, p xxv), in spite of what he termed a campaign of

politically correct attacks, that:
in the vast majority of families it is the mother who is likely to be the primary
programmer and the father the victim of the children’s campaign of denigration. My own
observations since the early 1980s, when I first began to see this disorder, have been that in
[10.30.850] 865
85–90 per cent of all cases in which I have been involved, the mother has been the
alienating parent and the father has been the alienated parent.
However, in a remarkable turn-around, in the 2000 “addendum” to the book (p 442), he

said that around 1998 he began to notice a shift in the gender ratio of men and women
inducing the syndrome in their children: “in the last few years I have seen a shift that has
brought the ratio now to 50/50”.
Gardner argued for two decades that “when a sex-abuse accusation emerges in the
context of a parental alienation syndrome – especially after the failure of a series of
exclusionary manoeuvres – the accusation is far more likely to be false than true”: Gardner
(1998, p xxvii). Where cases of the syndrome are “moderate” or “severe”, Gardner
advocated a series of sanctions against the alienating parent. He contended (1998,
pp 378–379) that consideration for transfer of custodial responsibility should be given
where “the mother’s campaign of denigration has been so relentless that there is the risk
that the children will move along the track to the moderate and even severe form of PAS”.
He instanced cases where therapeutic interventions in relation to the alienating parent
have been completely unsuccessful. He was supported in his approach by English
psychologist Dr Lowenstein (2007).
Criticisms of parental alienation syndrome
[10.30.860] Increasing numbers of critics of Gardner’s syndrome have emerged with the
passage of the better part of two decades: see Johnston (2003); Warshak (2003); Williams
(2001); Kelly and Johnston (2001); Bruch (2001); Faller (1998); Niggemyer (1998); Smith and
Coukos (1997); Wood (1994); Dunne and Hedrick (1994); Palmer (1988). They have pointed
out that the syndrome continues to be confusing and unclear in its criteria, its purpose and
its dimensions (see, eg, Bone and Walsh (1999); Walsh and Bone (1997)) and that it focuses
almost exclusively on the alienating parent as the aetiological agent of the child’s
alienation (Kelly and Johnston (2001, p 249)):
This is not supported by considerable clinical research that shows that in high-conflict
divorce, many parents engage in indoctrinating behaviors, but only a small proportion of
children become alienated. … Hence, alienating behavior by a parent is neither a sufficient
nor a necessary condition for a child to become alienated.
It has also been observed that Gardner’s formulation is unfalsifiable because it is only true
by reference to its own definition: Kelly and Johnston (2001, p 249); Johnston (2003). The
syndrome is controversial within psychology and psychiatry, in particular because of a
relative absence of empirical or research support for the reliable identification of its
symptom clusters: see, eg, Etemad (1999). Most of Gardner’s writings about it have been
self-published and not submitted to peer review: Faller (1998). In addition, Gardner has
been evangelical in relation to the syndrome, leading to a number of doubts about his
objectivity and investment in its promotion.
The syndrome has not been included in the DSM or ICD systems of psychiatric
classification (see Lane & Arthurs [2006] FamCA 87 at [27]), having no commonly
recognised or empirically verified pathogenesis, course, familial pattern or treatment
selection. At most, it is a non-diagnostic syndrome with little light to shed on cause,
prognosis or treatment of the allegedly pathological behaviours. Many of the criteria for
determining whether a child has the syndrome are derivative from and borrowed from
Gardner’s “earlier and now widely discredited objective test for determining whether
children were fabricating allegations of sexual abuse, the Sex Abuse Legitimacy Scale
(SAL)”: Williams (2001, p 269); see especially Berliner and Conte (1993). In this regard, a
problem identified by critics is Gardner’s published view that the “vast majority” of
sexual abuse allegations made during custody argumentation are false – the difficulty is
that there is a serious potential for erroneous identification of the syndrome when in fact
children’s hostility toward a parent may have another and factually legitimate
866 [10.30.860]
explanation: see, eg, Niggemyer (1998). Wood (1994, p 1373) has also criticised Gardner for
suggesting that the projection of a mother’s own needs or fantasies onto children is a
contributor to false allegations of sexual abuse. The extent to which the syndrome, like
Divorce-related Malicious Mother Syndrome (Turkat (1994; 1995)), is gender-neutral (or, as
Niggemyer (1998) puts it, “blatantly anti-mother”) has also been questioned, as has its
sophistication in terms of typically multiple aetiology: see, eg, Wood (1994).
Moreover, variants on Gardner’s version of the syndrome have emerged, resulting in
the potential for significant disuniformity of conceptualisation of the syndrome. Darnell
(1999), a United States psychologist, for instance, has distinguished between parental
alienation and Gardner’s parental alienation syndrome, defining “parental alienation” as
“any constellation of behaviours, whether conscious or unconscious, that could evoke a
disturbance in the relationship between a child and the targeted parent”, classifying
alienating parents into “naive”, “active” and “obsessed” categories: Darnell (1999). Others,
such as Cartwright (1993), have sought to expand the parameters of the syndrome,
arguing that others than biological parents can be responsible for persistent attempts to
alienate children: see further Williams (2001). Kelly and Johnston (2001) also advanced a
“family systems focus” upon the problem of the alienated child, categorising a complex
set of factors in both the child and the alienating parent which have the potential to
conduce toward alienation. Sullivan and Kelly (2001) have stressed the need for courts to
engage in humane, flexible, prompt and non-confrontational management of cases
involving suspected alienation of children.
Kopetski (1998), on behalf of the Family and Children’s Evaluation Team in Colorado,
developed Gardner’s approach, identifying particular familial and personality
characteristics on the part of “alienating parents”:
1. A narcissistic or paranoid orientation to interactions and relationships with
others, usually as the result of a personality disorder. Both narcissistic and
paranoid relationships are maintained by identification, rather than by mutual
appreciation and enjoyment of differences as well as similarities. Perfectionism
and intolerance of personal flaws in self or others have deleterious effects on
relationships. When others disagree, narcissistic and paranoid people feel
abandoned, betrayed and often rageful.
2. Reliance on defenses against psychological pain that result in externalizing
unwanted or unacceptable feelings, ideas, attitudes, and responsibility for
misfortunes so that more painful internal conflict is transformed into less painful
interpersonal conflict …
3. Evidence of an abnormal grieving process such that there is a preponderance of
anger and an absence of sadness in reaction to the loss of a marital partner.
4. A family history in which there is an absence of awareness of normal
ambivalence and conflict about parents, enmeshment, or failure to differentiate
and emancipate from parents; or a family culture in which “splitting” or
externalizing is a prominent feature. Some alienating parents were raised in
families in which there is unresolved or unacknowledged grief as the result of
traumatic losses or of severe but unacknowledged emotional deprivation, usually
in the form of absence of empathy. More frequently, alienating parents were
favorite children or were overly indulged or idealized as children.
Serious questions in relation to the flawed concepts of “programming” and “brainwashing”

have been raised in the context of the conduct of cults and new religious movements. For
a review of the literature, see Freckelton (1998).
Perhaps most seriously, a series of commentators has criticised the “punitive” aspect of
Gardner’s proposed solution in relation to serious cases of the syndrome – that of shifting
custody and access arrangements. Johnston, Walters and Friedlander (2001), for instance,
have argued in favour of an integrated and persistent therapeutic approach with both the
[10.30.860] 867
alienated child and the aligned parent made the target of intervention, introducing the
possibility of complexity and nuance and working toward reality-testing of entrenched
perceptions and values.
Forensic application of parental alienation syndrome
[10.30.870] In many cases, Gardner’s parental alienation syndrome has been applied by
courts (see People v Loomis 658 NYS 2d 787 (NY Co Ct 1997) for a list of cases in the United
States admitting parental alienation syndrome evidence) on a number of occasions
controversially: see, eg, Karen B v Clyde M 574 NYS 2d 267 (Fam Ct 1991, aff’d sub nom
Karen “PP” v Clyde “QQ” 602 NYS 2d 709 (App Div 1993)), discussed in Wood (1994) and
Zirogiannis (2001); see also Hanson v Joseph 685 NE 2d 71 (1987); Schutz v Schutz 581 So 2d
1290 (Fla 1991); Coursey v Superior Court 194 Cal App 3d 147 at 150 (1987); Re TMW 553 So
2d 260 (Fla Dist Ct App 1989). Its status has been questioned on some occasions, while on
other occasions courts have apparently uncritically applied Gardner’s theories. The
Florida District Court of Appeals, for instance, identified that there has been no claim of
general professional acceptance of parental alienation syndrome as a tool for diagnostic
evaluation.
English authority
[10.30.880] In England and Wales, the most prominent decision in relation to the
syndrome is that of the Court of Appeal in L, V, M and H (Children) [2000] EWCA Civ 194,
where a circuit court’s denials of access to a father in the context of allegations of domestic
violence were scrutinised. In one of the four cases heard by the court, a report had been
rejected by the trial judge from a forensic psychiatrist, Dr Lowenstein: see Lowenstein
(1998a; 1998b; 2007). The Court of Appeal received a report on the subject generally by
Dr Sturge and Dr Glaser, who had been commissioned by the Official Solicitor acting as
amicus to the court. They drew the court’s attention to the fact that the syndrome was not
recognised in either the DSM or ICD systems of classification, or generally in psychiatric
or allied child mental health specialities. Dame Butler-Sloss observed:
It would be fair to say that Dr Lowenstein is at one end of a broad spectrum of mental
health practitioners and that the existence of the syndrome is not universally accepted.
There is, of course, no doubt that some parents, particularly mothers, are responsible for
alienating their children from their fathers without good reason and thereby creating this
sometimes insoluble problem. That unhappy state of affairs, well known in the family
courts, is a long way from a recognised syndrome requiring mental health professionals to
play an expert role. I am aware of the difficulties experienced in some areas in getting the
appropriate medical or allied mental health expert to provide a report within a reasonable
time. It was, however, unfortunate that the parents’ lawyers not only did not get the
medical expert ordered by the judge, that is to say, a child psychiatrist (although in many
cases a psychologist would be appropriate), but, more serious, were unable to find an
expert in the main stream of mental health expertise.
For the most part, British courts have been unreceptive to the concept of parental
alienation syndrome. For instance, Wall J in Re O (A Child) [2003] EWHC 3031 (Fam) at
[91]–[92] and Munby J in F v M [2004] EWHC 727 (Fam) at [12] stated that they preferred
the concept of “implacable hostility” used by Sturge and Glaser (2000).
[10.30.890] In Australia, contemporary approaches toward parental alienation syndrome
must start with s 60CC(2)(a) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), which prescribes that in
determining what is in the child’s best interests, the court must consider, among other
things, the primary consideration of “the benefit to the child of having a meaningful
relationship with both of the child’s parents”.
The tide has turned emphatically against the reception of, or at least the giving of
significant weight to, parental alienation syndrome evidence. However, it is important to
868 [10.30.870]
distinguish between decisions that have acknowledged the reality of alienation and
decisions which have dealt with the reception of expert evidence of parental alienation
syndrome.
The principal pro-syndrome authority: The procedural decision of the Full Court of
the Family Court in Johnson v Johnson (unreported, Full Court of the Family Court of
Australia, 7 July 1997) is important. The case dealt with whether a husband should have
been permitted part way through trial to raise issues and call evidence about the
syndrome. The Full Court, reviewing how the issue arose, noted a 1989 article by the
psychologist Kenneth Byrne, who applied the writings of Gardner (see too Byrne (1999))
indicating that the symptoms of the syndrome are (Byrne (1989)):
1. The child shows a complete lack of ambivalence – one parent is described almost
entirely negatively, the other almost entirely positively;
2. The reasons given for the dislike of one parent may appear to be justified, but
investigation shows them to be flimsy and exaggerated; with younger children
the reasoning is even more transparent;
3. The child proffers the opinion of wanting less contact with one parent in a way
which requires little or no prompting. The complaints have a quality of being
rehearsed or practised;
4. The child seems to show little or no concern for the feelings of the parent being
complained about;
5. The alienating parent, while seemingly acting in the best interests of the children,
is actually working to destroy the relationship between them and the other
parent. It is not uncommon for this to be further fuelled by new spouses or de
factos;
6. Most importantly, while the children will verbally denigrate one parent, they
retain an unspoken closeness and affection for that parent. However, if the
syndrome is allowed to develop unchecked, this can be all but erased by the
alienating parent.
Again purporting to give voice to the views of Gardner, Byrne expressed the opinion that
such symptoms are seen “exclusively” in children where parents are engaged in custody
or access litigation. He argued that the syndrome represents an extreme form of
brainwashing by parents whose goal is “to get revenge” (Byrne (1989, p 5)), but contended
that the syndrome has clear signs and “with appropriate procedures can be diagnosed and
treated”.
Another witness, a psychiatrist, Dr Craig, gave evidence that the diagnostic symptoms
of the syndrome are:
1. The child makes negative non-ambivalent statements about the non-custodial
parent;
2. The child makes entirely positive statements about the custodial parent and
entirely negative statements about the non-custodial parent;
3. The reasons given for the dislike of one parent may appear to be justified but
investigation shows them to be flimsy and exaggerated;
4. The child offers the opinion of wanting less contact with one parent in a way
which requires little or no prompting and these complaints have a quality of
being rehearsed or practised;
5. The child shows little or no concern for the feelings of the parent being
complained about;
6. The alienating parent, while seemingly acting in the best interests of the child is
actually working to destroy the relationship between the child and the other
parent;
7. While the child will verbally denigrate one parent they retain an unspoken
closeness and affection for that parent.
[10.30.890] 869
The Full Court observed that in a case where there had been obvious contact difficulties
between the parties, the possibility that the child had either been brainwashed or
indoctrinated by one of the parents “must be a relevant consideration”. It found (at [96])
that Dr Byrne’s article left it “in no doubt that ‘Parental Alienation Syndrome’ is a very
real psychological phenomenon which the husband, in our opinion, was entitled to
investigate and put to the relevant experts called in the course of the trial”. The decision is
limited in terms of its significance as a precedent in relation to the syndrome. However, it
is an example of a superior court not being assisted to take a critical perspective on a
difficult area of expert evidence, resulting in an ambiguous message being broadcast as to
the legitimacy of the evidence.
The anti-syndrome authorities: However, by 2006–2007, a different approach had
become evident within the Family Court. In Lane & Arthurs [2006] FamCA 87, Moore J was
urged to apply the syndrome. He observed (at [30]) that:
It is … well known that Gardner’s writings created some controversy in mental health and
legal circles and there are many countervailing opinions about it. The contrary body of
opinion would have it that while it has been useful in drawing attention to a type of high
conflict divorce, the studies on which Gardner’s writings are based are flawed by the lack
of empirical support; the term “syndrome” is a medical term referring to symptoms that
cluster together and is a descriptor, therefore, unsuited to discussion of complex dynamics
involving at least three people; the term or “syndrome” is not recognised by the American
classification of mental disorders (DSMIV) or the international classification (ICD10) and
nor is it generally recognised in allied child mental health specialties; overreliance could
lead to stereotyping and poorly conceived intervention rather than case by case analysis
and individual decision-making; and the Gardner-proposed intervention for “severe”
cases is potentially risky and has not been evaluated with controlled cases together with
standardised testing of mental health outcome for the child.
Moore J said that he was more inclined to the view of the opponents of the syndrome and
noted that the preference of Johnston (see Kelly and Johnston (2001); Johnston (2001;
2003)), with which he concurred, is to reformulate the discourse to focus on the “alienated
child” rather than the “alienating parent”, there being many reasons for children resisting
contact with a parent – not all of which would qualify as “alienation” (at [32]):
[T]hese reasons include resistance that is rooted in normal developmental processes (eg,
normal separation anxieties in a very young child); in high conflict marriage and divorce
(eg, fear or inability to cope with the high conflict transition); in response to a parent’s
parenting style (eg, rigidity, anger, or insensitivity to the child); arising from the child’s
concern about an emotionally fragile residence parent (eg, fear of leaving this parent
alone); and arising from the remarriage of a parent (eg, behaviours of the parent or
step-parent which alter willingness to visit).
Moore J noted (at [31]) that Johnston has located a child’s relationship to each parent after
separation along a continuum of positive to negative, where the most positive is a healthy
and valued relationship with both parents and the most negative is “alienation” from one
parent:
Along this continuum she identifies and distinguishes alienated children from others who
resist or refuse contact with a parent for what may be a variety of normal, realistic or
developmentally explicable reasons. The first to be found at the positive and healthy end
of the continuum is the child who has an “affinity” with one parent [by reason of
temperament, gender, age, shared interests, sibling preferences of parents and parenting
practices] but desires continuity and contact with both parents. There is then the child
who is “allied” with one parent and who demonstrates or expresses a consistent
preference for a parent, often wants limited contact with the non-preferred parent after
separation, but unlike the alienated child may not completely reject the other parent or
seek to terminate contact entirely. The “alliance” may arise by reason of intense marital
conflict and flawed marital dynamics [where children were encouraged to take sides or
carry hostile messages] which may intensify after separation when the older child may be
involved in making moral assessments about which parent caused the separation, who is
870 [10.30.890]
the most hurt and vulnerable, and who needs or deserves the child’s allegiance and
support. Strong alliances may be temporary or they may consolidate into more hardened
alignments or even alienation. The key factor, Dr Johnston maintains, distinguishing these
children from those who are alienated is that most “aligned” children are able to
acknowledge (sometimes begrudgingly) they love the other parent but do not like being
with them or want much contact at this point in time and nor do they engage in the fierce,
brittle remonstrations and cruel behaviours towards the rejected parent so common to
alienated children. “Estranged” children are those realistically estranged from their other
parent for reasons related to that parent’s history of violence, abuse or neglect and, unlike
alienated children, they do not harbour unreasonable anger and/or fear towards that
parent. Finally, there is the truly “alienated” child who stridently rejects a parent without
apparent guilt or ambivalence and strongly resists or completely refuses any contact with
that parent despite the presence of “good enough” or better parenting and the absence of
any physical or emotional abuse of the child. While there may be a “kernel of truth” to the
child’s complaints and allegations, the grossly negative views and feelings are significantly
distorted and exaggerated reactions, beyond alliance or estrangement in the intensity,
breadth and ferocity of their behaviours. It is a response to complex dynamics within the
separation process itself, to an array of parental behaviours, and to children’s own
vulnerabilities which make them susceptible to becoming alienated.
Moore J noted Dr Johnston’s preference for a “systems framework” assessing the multiple
and interrelated factors influencing the alienated child’s response. These include
background factors that directly or indirectly impact on the child (such as a history of
intense marital conflict, humiliating separation, litigation fuelled by professionals and
relatives, personality dispositions of each parent, and age, cognitive capacity and
temperament of the child), as well as a number of intervening variables that can either
moderate or intensify the child’s response to critical background factors (such as parenting
beliefs and behaviours, sibling relationships, and the child’s own vulnerabilities within the
family dynamics). He noted that Dr Johnston has identified factors that may indicate risk
of alienation developing, though recognising that individual cases may have a mix of
these factors (child triangulation in intense marital conflict; high conflict divorce and
litigation; and separation experienced as deeply humiliating). He observed that
Dr Johnston has also described a range of behaviours and organising beliefs on the part of
the “aligned” parent that contribute to a child becoming alienated, the ways in which
“rejected” parents contribute to the alienation, and the influence brought to bear by the
child’s own psychological, cognitive and developmental strengths and vulnerabilities. He
endorsed (at [32]) the proposition that a full understanding is necessary of the
pathological development in the parent–child relationship, most often separation-
engendered, that can then lead to an effective plan and structure for legal, judicial, and
therapeutic intervention directed at resolving the profound alienation of the child from the
parent.
It is likely that the approach of Moore J will be applied more broadly. Notably, CJ
Bryant (2007), speaking extra-judicially, observed:
[T]here are almost no experts who give evidence in the Family Court who subscribe to the
view that there is a parental alienation syndrome. And the decisions of the court do not
accept that there is a parental alienation syndrome. … So it isn’t something that the Family
Court accepts. All of the internal counsellors that are in the court subscribe to the view
that there is no valid condition as parental alienation syndrome.
(See C & C [2004] FamCA 708; Irish & Michelle [2009] FamCA 66 at [78]; Udall & Oaks [2010]
FMCAfam 1482.)
By 2016, in Helbig and Rowe [2016] FamCAFC 117, Ainslie-Wallace, Ryan and
Aldridge JJ summed up the contemporary Australian position by being unreceptive to
submissions in relation to the syndrome.
[10.30.890] 871
European Association for Psychotherapy
[10.30.895] In February 2018, the European Association for Psychotherapy issued a

statement that:
the terms and concepts of Parental Alienation Syndrome and Parental Alienation are
unsuitable for use in any psychotherapeutic practice:
The EAP recognizes that there is a high risk and potential of PAS/PA concepts to be
used in a manner allowing for violence against children and their mothers to remain
undetected, and/or contested, since it ignores essential aspects of child welfare and the
gender-based nature of domestic violence.
In cases of allegations of child abuse in a divorce or custody situation, one of the basic
assumptions of PAS/PA is that the allegations made by the child or parent are untrue. This
concept alone can allow for – and/or – cause further victimization, and a pathologization
of children and other victims of domestic violence. In addition, neither PAS nor PA are
included in any international classifications of mental disorders (DSM and ICD) and
psychotherapists should therefore not use these terms as diagnostic categories.
The EAP believes that all European psychotherapists must also take, very seriously
any report of domestic violence in divorce and child custody cases. Psychotherapists need
to distinguish between a contentious divorce/separation and a divorce/separation in
which there is domestic violence in order to be able to adjust psychotherapeutic
interventions accordingly. This requires a case-by-case determination and a mutual
understanding and cooperation between all psycho-social and legal professions, in
accordance with universal standards relating to domestic and international legal
documents concerning the protection of the best interests of the child and the protection of
victims of domestic violence.
The future
[10.30.900] A number of legal difficulties surround the reception of parental alienation
syndrome evidence, given the apparently increasing levels of criticism of the concepts that
underlie it and the controversies that relate to its standing within the psychological and
psychiatric communities. By 2000, Faulks DCJ in Rudman v Rudman [2010] FamCA 961 at
[24] stated that “this syndrome has been significantly discredited in the literature”.
Borris (1997, p 10) has argued that until such time as the parental alienation syndrome
is independently and empirically validated:
attorneys should attack or defend alleged abusers without discussing PAS. … Otherwise
experts who allege that PAS has occurred in a particular case will face a stiff
cross-examination on the very existence of the syndrome, and the court’s focus will be
shifted from the child’s best interests to the existence of PAS.
Similarly, Judge Williams (2001, p 278) has urged the inadmissibility of evidence about the
syndrome (see, too, Wood (1994)), arguing that the legal system should not be distracted
by the fledgling efforts of mental health professionals:
Not all negative or inappropriate behavior has to be a named pathology. The limits of, and
plethora of, conceptualisations concerning AS and PA create real problems when the
medical or social science concepts enter the legal phase.
Wood (1994, p 1415) has passionately argued that until such time as the syndrome passes
muster in terms of meaningful peer review, publication and empirical testing, it should be
consigned to the waste bin of untested speculations.
The criticisms that have legitimately been mounted of parental alienation syndrome as
propounded by advocates such as Gardner, Lowenstein and Byrne cannot properly be
interpreted as a denial of the reality of children’s estrangement from a parent for reasons
other than abuse: see Bone and Walsh (1999); Rand (1997a; 1997b); Sturge and Glaser
(2000); Johnston (2003). However, the causes and means of addressing such toxic
alienation lie within a complex evaluation of the dynamics of what has given rise to the
alienation within the family unit at the earliest possible opportunity: see, eg, Lee and
872 [10.30.895]
Olesen (2001). If a tool for identifying such alienation is to be accepted by the courts, it
needs to have as a core element of its criteria means of discerning between:
(1) families where estrangements are normal or characterised by developmentally
normal preferences, alignments and attachments;
(2) families where estrangement has been generated by phenomena such as abuse;
and
(3) families where rigid and non-ambivalent estrangement has been generated by
pathology either existing as a result of the attitudes of the child or encouraged by
an aligned parent.
The misleading pseudo-scientific patina of objectivity and reliability provided by the word
“syndrome” is particularly problematic in relation to parental alienation syndrome: see
Zirogiannis (2001). This is not to argue that all components of scientific rigour need to be
applied to the evidence by psychologists (see Richardson et al (1995)) as a condition of
admissibility. However, the scientific deficits of parental alienation syndrome should be
regarded as such as to make expert evidence in relation to it unhelpful and, at least in
most circumstances, counterproductive.
It is clear that literature on the subject cannot per se be adduced; it must be tendered
through an expert: Maurer & Van Laren [2012] FamCA 8 at [10].
[10.30.900] 873
Chapter 10.35
PROFILING EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [10.35.10]
The psychological autopsy/equivocal death analysis .................................................... [10.35.50]
The impediments to admissibility ...................................................................................... [10.35.90]
The Mohan decision .............................................................................................................. [10.35.210]
The SCB decision ................................................................................................................... [10.35.220]
The Dowd decision ................................................................................................................ [10.35.230]
The J-LJ decision .................................................................................................................... [10.35.240]
Criminal profiling/Crime scene analysis evidence ........................................................ [10.35.280]
The Ranger decision .............................................................................................................. [10.35.290]
The Clark decision ................................................................................................................. [10.35.300]
The Klymchuk decision .......................................................................................................... [10.35.320]
A limited future for profiling evidence ............................................................................. [10.35.340]
‘The personality of the violent offender is a result of a special

combination of factors, including biological inheritance,
culture, environment, and common and unique experiences.
Because of this unique combination, the violent personal
offender will commit crimes as an outgrowth of existing
pathological conditions.’
RM Holmes and ST Holmes, Profiling Violent Crimes: An Investigative Tool (2nd
ed, Sage Publications, 1996, p 45).
Introduction
[10.35.10] Many different forms of criminal profiling are documented in what is a diverse
and contradictory scholarly literature on the subject. They include:
• offender profiling (by which a profile of the likely characteristics of an offender is
constructed from a crime scene analysis of the crime scene);
• crime scene analysis (examination of the crime scene evidence to draw inferences other
than as to offender characteristics, and reconstruct how the crime took place);
• analysis (examination of the modus operandi and/or ‘signature’ of two or more crimes,
so as to determine whether they were likely to have been part of a pattern and
committed by the same offender(s): see, eg, State of Washington v Russell 125 Wn 2d 24
(1994); Pennell v State 602 A 2d 48 (Del Sup 1991); State of California v Prince 40 Cal 4th
1179 (2007); cf State of New Jersey v Fortin 318 NJ Super 577 (1999);
• motivational analysis (examination of the crime scene with a view to ascertaining the
likely criminal motive);
• counterintuitive expert evidence about the risks of drawing inference about the
likelihood of a person committing evidence without expert evidence: see eg R v
Kavanagh [2002] EWCA Crim 904; and
• psychological autopsy or equivocal death analysis (reviewing the victim’s characteristics
in order to ascertain the likely mode of death).
Profilers come from a variety of professional backgrounds: often current or former police
officers; some are clinical psychologists; and some are academic researchers, criminologists
or even forensic scientists (see Ebisike (2008)). Their level of training and technical
expertise varies considerably. There is no consistent approach, including in the United
States, as to the expertise that is required for profilers’ background, training or credentials,
although, in some cases, in the United States in particular, the sufficiency of police officers’
expertise has been doubted: see, eg, Brunson v State 349 Ark 300; 79 SW 3d 304 (2002); State
[10.35.10] 875
of Ohio v Lowe 75 Ohio App 3d 404 at 408 (1991); cf Simmons v State 504 NE 2d 575 (Ind
1987). Not surprisingly, there can be a close nexus between courts’ views about evidence
and witnesses’ expertise: see, in relation to Professor Canter, R v Gilfoyle [2001] 2 Cr App R
57 at [25].
There are also many different schools of thought within criminal profiling, including
within the FBI’s National Centre for the Analysis of Violent Crime; Canter and Young’s
Investigative Psychology (IP) and Turvey’s Behavioural Evidence Analysis (BEA) (see, too,
Petherick (2009)). This has the potential to make courts’ decisions about admissibility,
particularly by reference to issues of reliability and probative value, very difficult.
However, notably, the profiling scholars Kocsis and Palermo (2016) have expressed
optimism about the potential for crime behavioural analysis by experts to be admitted in
the courts on the basis of what they identify as its reliability (see, too, the study by
Pinizzotto and Finkel (1990)). Resorting to databases to justify the drawing of inferences as
to the likelihood of linkages between crimes has been undertaken in the United States, but
with mixed results in terms of admissibility: State of Washington v Russell 125 Wn 2d 24
(1994); cf State of California v Hernandez 55 Cal App 4th 225 (1997).
Attempts have been made in a number of jurisdictions to adduce evidence that,
because of the characteristics of the accused, it is either more or less likely that he or she
committed an offence (see, eg, R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402).
Alternatively, it has been put that because of certain characteristics of the crime scene,
inferences can be made about either the crime or the offender (see Freckelton (2008b); see,
eg, R v Ranger (2003) 178 CCC (3d) 375; R v Clark (2004) 182 CCC (3d) 1; R v Klymchuk
(2005) 203 CCC (3d) 341; R v Klymchuk 2008 CanLII 23495 (ON SC)). Profiling is best
known for its application to criminal and other investigations: see, generally, Canter (1989;
1994; 2003); Douglas, Burgess, Ressler and Ressler (1993); Ressler, Burgess and Douglas
(1988); Holmes and Holmes (1996); Douglas and Olshaker (1996); Ormerod (1996); Kocsis
and Irwin (1997); Jackson and Bekerian (1997); Canter and Alison (1999; 2000a; 2000b);
Douglas and Olshaker (2000); Ainsworth (2000); Turvey (2001); McMahon (2002); Davis
(2005); Alison (2005); Kocsis (2006); Young (2009); Turvey (2011); Kocsis and Palermo
(2016). A controversial instance in this regard was where it was contended by a forensic
psychologist that the state of the crime scene where a complainant maintained that sexual
intercourse took place was consistent with its having been violent and non-consensual:
State of Ohio v Roquemore 85 Ohio App 3d 448 (1993).
It has also been argued that because of the profile of the deceased, garnered by a
psychological autopsy, it is unlikely that the death was attributable to suicide, and
therefore that no crime was committed (see, eg, R v Gilfoyle [2001] 2 Cr App R 57). The
contention has been advanced, too, that because a certain kind of conduct was foreseeable
on the part of an offender, established by profiling evidence, particular efforts should have
been made to prevent the conduct and the predictable harm that ensued. It has further
been asserted that because of certain characteristics of the crime scene, inferences can be
made about the crime, the offender or the victim (see, eg, Godfrey v New South Wales (No 1)
[2003] NSWSC 160). These attempts coincide with the increasing use of criminal profiling
by law investigation agencies, and the enthusiasm by some to draw profiling from the
realm of criminal investigations and to introduce its fruits to the courts.
Six major admissibility issues have arisen:
• the status of profiling as an area of expertise, defined by such features as reliability,
distinguishing between investigative and forensic applications (see, eg, State of Idaho v
Parkinson 128 Idaho 29 (1996); cf United States v Meeks 35 MJ 64 at 66 (1992); State of
Tennessee v Stevens 78 SW 3d 817 (2002));
• the use that can be made of ‘propensity’, ‘tendency’, ‘coincidence’ and ‘character’
evidence, as they intersect with profiling evidence;
876 [10.35.10]
Profiling evidence | CH 10.35
• whether the probative value of profiling evidence exceeds its prejudicial effect (see, eg,
R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402 at 21);
• whether profiling evidence is to be classified as precluding evidence of speculation;
• whether profiling evidence is ‘oath-helping’ or impermissibly self-serving (see R v
Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402); and
• whether profiling evidence unacceptably trespasses on the ultimate issue rule, an issue
that is problematic in some jurisdictions (State of Idaho v Parkinson 128 Idaho 29 (1996);
State of New Jersey v Fortin 178 NJ 540; 843 A 2d 974 (2004)).
Thus far, court decisions (including, to a lesser degree, in the United States) have exhibited
a disinclination to admit most forms of profiling evidence (see Kocsis and Palermo (2016)),
whether the attempts to adduce it be by the prosecution or the defence in criminal trials.
As the Court of Appeals of Ohio put it, offender profiling evidence might lead jurors to
make decisions based on stereotypes, rather than the actual evidence adduced in the case:
State of Ohio v Roquemore 85 Ohio App 3d 448 at 454–456 (1993). In addition, real questions
have been identified on many occasions about the reliability of the evidence and the risk
that in a particular instance it will be significantly more prejudicial than probative. One of
the most emphatic expressions of concern in this regard is the following expostulation in
Re Hillier [2003] ACTSC 50 at [21]:
The suggestion that a person who is not qualified as a psychiatrist or psychologist may
express an expert opinion as to the personality, character and likely future behaviour of a
man he has never met was one which I had not previously encountered in a court of law.
I accept that a person of [behavioural consultant] Mr Longford’s qualifications and
experience may be able to make visual observations of a crime scene and identify signs of
pre-meditation and planning, deduce that the crime was the produce of an outburst of
rage and even draw tentative conclusions as to the type of person likely to have
committed it. Opinions of this kind may enable the police to identify the most likely range
of suspects and to sharpen the focus of their enquiries accordingly. However, the fact that
profiling may sometimes prove to be a valid investigative tool does not justify a
conclusion that its exponents may leap majestically over the limitations of modern
psychology and psychiatry and give expert evidence as to the personality and conduct of
a particular person.
The decision of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, in State of New Jersey
v Fortin 178 NJ 540; 843 A 2d 974 (2004) remains authoritative. The defendant was charged
with first degree felony murder and the State sought to admit expert opinion evidence
from Roy Hazelwood, a former FBI agent with a long-term affiliation with the National
Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, and the author of more than 30 articles on the
modus operandi of criminal conduct and ritualistic behaviour, on the issue of identity in
relation to the defendant’s attack on another female. This was permitted at trial but
overturned on appeal. Mr Hazelwood purported to find some 15 similarities between the
crimes: (1) high-risk crimes; (2) crimes committed impulsively; (3) victims are female; (4)
age of victims generally the same; (5) victims crossed the path of the offender; (6) victims
were alone; (7) assaults occurred at confrontation point; (8) adjacent to or on well-travelled
highway; (9) occurred during darkness; (10) no weapons involved in assaults; (11)
blunt-force injuries inflicted with fists, with nose of victims broken; (12) trauma primarily
to upper face, no teeth damaged; (13) lower garments totally removed, with panties found
inside the shorts or pants of the victims; (14) shirt left on victims and breasts free; and (15)
no seminal fluid found in/on victims. He regarded the crimes to exhibit a signature of the
criminal and to continue distinctively ritualistic elements. He concluded that the crimes
were both anger-motivated and that the offender demonstrated anger by ritualistic or
signature behaviour in the crimes, including by biting the victim’s lower chin and left
[10.35.10] 877
breast, anally penetrating her, brutally beating her facial area and frontally strangulating
her. The bottom line of his opinion was his opinion that it was highly improbable that the
offenders were different in identity.
Mr Hazelwood characterised his ‘linkage analysis’ not as a science but as based on
training, research, education and experience. On appeal, essentially dealing with the
admissibility of similar fact or coincidence evidence, the appellate court held that for the
admission of ‘other-crime evidence’, it was necessary for the State to satisfy a four part
test: (1) the evidence of the other crime must be admissible as relevant to a material issue;
(2) it must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; (3) the
evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing; and (4) the probative value of
the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice (applying State v Cofield
127 NJ 328 at 338; 605 A 2d 230 (1992)). It noted that when the issue in question was
identity, other-crime evidence must find that the prior criminal activity was ‘so nearly
identical in method as to earmark the crime as defendant’s handiwork’.
The appellate court accepted that Hazelwood’s linkage analysis evidence was found on
behaviour science but observed that his views essentially constituted evidence on the
ultimate issue in the trial, this being the exclusive province of the jury. It distinguished the
reception of such evidence in Pennell v State 602 A 2d 48 (Del Sup 1991) on the basis that in
that case the quantity of the signature was ‘overwhelming’ and ‘far more distinctively
similar’ than in the case before it, where there were as many differences as similarities
between the crimes. It commented that it had no doubt that the linkage analysis methods
had great value in the sphere of criminal investigation, but concluded that they were not
sufficiently reliable for admission in the case before it and stated that it was not satisfied
that the State had discharged its burden to prove that the field was at a state of the art that
an expert’s testimony in relation to it was ‘sufficiently reliable’.
For the most part, attempts have not been made to utilise profiling evidence in civil
litigation. However, there is Australian authority on the question of admissibility in this
context that is liberal: Godfrey v New South Wales (No 1) [2003] NSWSC 160. The greatest
uptake of profiling evidence in the courts has been in coroners’ hearings, where the need
has emerged to understand the state of mind of the deceased before her or his death in
order to evaluate whether the death was likely to have been because of a deliberate act of
the deceased or some other reason: see Freckelton and Ranson (2006).
This chapter reviews the history of attempts to introduce profiling evidence into the
courts and analyses the rationales advanced for its exclusion. It scrutinises case law on the
subject in the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States and Canada. It particularly
draws attention to the limited use made latterly of profiling evidence relating to inferences
that can be drawn from crime scene analysis or reconstruction.
The psychological autopsy/equivocal death analysis

[10.35.50] A particular form of profiling – the psychological autopsy – is admitted
frequently in coroners’ courts in an attempt to facilitate understanding of the causes and
circumstances of otherwise equivocal deaths (Freckelton and Ranson (2006)). Attempts
have also been made to adduce such evidence in criminal proceedings (see R v Gilfoyle
[2001] 2 Cr App R 57, discussed below at [10.35.120]).
Schneidman and Faberow (1961a) defined the ‘psychological autopsy’ as:
a retrospective reconstruction of an individual’s life that focuses on lethality, that is those
features of his life that illuminate his intentions in relation to his own death, clues as to the
type of death it was, the degree (if any) of his participation in his own death, and why the
death occurred at that time.
Schneidman and Faberow coined the term while at the Suicide Prevention Center in Los
Angeles in 1958 to improve the accuracy of coroners’ verdicts.
878 [10.35.50]
Non-physical, psychological autopsies are an as-yet-controversial form of post-mortem

investigation, which relies on interviewing key informants, such as spouses, close family
members, work colleagues, treating medical practitioners and relevant others, and
analysing pertinent documents, such as suicide notes, diaries and other writings, to
determine the mental state of the deceased before her or his death. Other information
about the lifestyle and circumstances of the deceased, including behaviours and events
preceding death, are also utilised to reconstruct the mental state of the deceased: see
Ogloff and Otto (1993); Schneidman (1994); Selkin (1994); Hawton et al (1998); LaFon
(1999); Cavanagh, Owens and Johnstone (1999); Cavanagh, Carson, Sharpe and Lawrie
(2003); Schneidman and Faberow (1961b); Davis (2005). McMahon (2002) has observed
that, since the original work of Schneidman and his colleagues, research on the
psychological autopsy generally has developed in two distinct directions:
• a retrospective form of research into the causes of suicide – most of the research on the
psychological autopsy has been of this type; and
• a technique for distinguishing four modes of death: natural causes, accident, suicide
and homicide.
McMahon has asserted that ‘this application of the psychological autopsy has been much
less thoroughly researched, although expert testimony on the psychological autopsy for
the purpose of establishing manner of death (murder or suicide) has been admitted in
criminal trials since the 1970s’.
As LaFon (1999) has put it:
Although in use since 1958, the term ‘psychological autopsy’ and its constituent elements
have yet to achieve either consensual validation or operational standardization. This calls
into question issues of content validity and reliability when psychological autopsies are
used in the field.
(See, too, Bendheim (1979); Ammon (1995).)

Different approaches have become pronounced in relation to the conduct of
psychological autopsies. For instance, as part of its criminal profiling work, the FBI
developed an approach to the psychological autopsy that has been designated ‘equivocal
death analysis’: see Poythress, Otto, Darkes and Starr (1993). In the investigation of
ambiguous deaths, the FBI uses a semi-structured investigative strategy to determine
whether a death occurred by reason of natural causes, accident, homicide or suicide,
utilising five factors:
(1) victimology: characteristics of the deceased relevant to suicide, probability of
being a victim of crime, etc;
(2) stressors: variable environmental and personal factors that adversely affect the
deceased;
(3) medical autopsy information and other information from the death scene,
including detailed information on weapons, the type and number of injuries, etc;
(4) scientific examination: general crime scene analysis, including location and
position of body of deceased, etc; and
(5) death scene analysis.
This is significantly at odds with the approach of Professor Canter and colleagues in
England: Canter and Alison (1999; 2000a; 2000b). McMahon (2002) has argued that, as yet,
psychological autopsies do not rest upon:
a solid and substantial research base. Hence claims that they are scientific must at best be
regarded as premature. The problems that continue to bedevil these approaches can be
classified into three main categories:
• difficulties inherent in the task;
• an inadequate research base; and
[10.35.50] 879
• utilisation in the adversarial setting of the criminal trial.
Several criticisms of psychological profiling have been advanced in the aftermath of its
usage in the USS Iowa incident in 1989: see Poythress, Otto, Darkes and Starr (1993); Otto,
Poythress, Starr and Darkes (1993). An explosion took place aboard a United States naval
ship, killing 47 sailors. A Naval Investigative Service inquiry ruled out the possibility of an
accidental explosion having caused the deaths. It focused on two sailors – one who had
died in the explosion and another who was the beneficiary of the first man’s life insurance
policy. The inquiry asked behavioural scientists at the FBI to provide an opinion about the
likelihood of mass-murder by the surviving sailor; a suicide attempt by the dead sailor to
get revenge on the surviving sailor for marrying; and suicide by the dead sailor as a result
of a variety of triggers. The FBI analysts favoured the third option, but their views, and
the way in which they reached them, proved controversial. A peer review panel of 14
psychologists and two psychiatrists was particularly critical. While the panel agreed with
many of the inferences drawn by the FBI analysts, they disagreed as to the three options,
with the FBI analysts being criticised for adopting negative and stronger conclusions than
the members of the panel. The panel recommended that the users of what they termed
‘equivocal death analysis’ should not assert ‘categorical conclusions about the precise
mental state or actions of the deceased’ (see Poythress, Otto, Darkes and Starr (1993, p 12))
and argued that appropriate qualifying statements for any opinions should be expressed.
Notably, there are no formal academic qualifications that are universally regarded as
necessary for conducting psychological autopsies or equivocal death analyses. There is a
risk, too, that data-gathering will not be as thorough as it might be (see Ogloff and Otto
(1993)), or that it will be biased in favour of a particular hypothesis that is being explored.
Interviewee biases, too (see Davis (2005)), have the potential to contaminate the process as
surviving relatives and friends may have their own reasons for adopting certain
perspectives on the causes of the death or the behaviour of the deceased in the period
before her or his death.
The impediments to admissibility

[10.35.90] A major impediment to admissibility is whether profiling evidence is sufficiently
reliable to be considered an area of expertise either within the terms of the Frye rule (Frye
v United States 293 F 2d 1013 (1923)) or under the indicia of Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993), or to constitute information that can
safely be taken into account by courts (see State of New Jersey v Fortin 178 NJ 540; 843 A 2d
974 (2004)). Even though the Frye and Daubert tests are not ubiquitously applied outside
the United States (see Ch 2.10), they do provide helpful yardsticks for the exercise of
exclusion of evidence under the prejudice/probative discretion, including as to the
reception of coincidence or tendency evidence. They do so by focusing both upon the
reputation of theories and techniques within the relevant scientific community (the Frye
test) and the reliability of theories and techniques by reference to factors such as
falsifiability, peer review, existence of controls, published literature and views held within
the relevant intellectual community (the Daubert test). An associated issue is the probative
value of such evidence, the potential existing that if the probative value is outweighed by
its prejudicial effect, it will be excluded. Other issues are whether such evidence emerges
from an organised body of knowledge or whether, properly construed, it constitutes
impermissible speculation.
A large part of the difficulty is the extent to which the field of profiling is profoundly
divided, the approaches of the FBI and of Canter and colleagues being illustrative of the
differences that pervade approaches. In this context, as recently as 2001, Turvey (2001,
p 346) has argued that it cannot yet be said that criminal profiling is ‘a science’. He has
880 [10.35.90]
noted that profiling, as practised by the FBI, has been widely criticised for its failure to test
hypotheses and to pass the usual peer review processes.
Generally, it is impermissible for the prosecution to adduce evidence that because a
person is of a general character, has a particular propensity, or has a particular
psychological make-up, this makes it possible or probable that he or she was the
perpetrator of a criminal offence. However, it is permissible for the prosecution to adduce
evidence of a person having an unnatural passion that makes it more likely that they
would sexually assault a person or category of persons. Evidence about particular
characteristics that make it more likely than would be the case with random members of
the community that they would commit a particular kind of offence can be adduced
provided that it is not significantly more prejudicial than it is probative, but this is subject
to the legitimacy of the evidence which is sought to be adduced from the expert. Similarly,
if a person has engaged in the past in strikingly similar activity to that charged, such
evidence may be admissible as a similar fact or as showing a propensity to commit such
offences.
A significant difficulty in evaluating the admissibility of profiling evidence lies in
identifying with clarity what use a party to litigation proposes to make of profiling
evidence. Circumstantial evidence, sometimes of modest probative value, is admitted in
criminal trials, provided that it is not more prejudicial than probative. An important
question for trial judges is the kind of reasoning that the party proffering the profiling
evidence wishes the trier of fact to engage in. If it is that persons who commit a certain
kind of crime or come from a certain vicinity, and the accused is that kind of person or
comes from that locality, then such evidence has only modest probative value but runs the
risk of being wrongly estimated in terms of its value – it tends to be excluded because of
the imbalance between its probative value and its prejudicial effect.
Ormerod (1996, pp 865–866) has commented, too, that definitional difficulties stem
from the fact that there is considerable theoretical disagreement about approaches to
criminal profiling, describing the process as follows:
The profiler begins by reconstructing how the crime occurred, on which is based an
inference as to why the crime happened, and culminates in an educated guess about the
characteristics of the offender. This WHAT to WHY to WHO is seen as the nucleus of the
criminal profile. Profiles incorporate many factors, including: evaluations of the crime
scene and neighbourhood, post-mortem reports, information as to the victim’s movements
prior to the crime, the suspect’s interaction with the victim, etc. Ideally, the resulting
profile should include information as to the age, race, occupational level, marital status,
intelligence, educational level, arrest history, military history, family background, social
interests, socioeconomic level, residence in relation to the crime and with whom residing,
personality characteristics (rigid, passive, manipulative, aggressive), colour, age and
description of vehicle, [and] suggested interview techniques for the offender [Footnotes
omitted.]
This approach has led the Ontario Court of Appeal to draw a distinction between ‘crime
scene analysis’ or ‘crime scene reconstruction’ evidence on the one hand, and ‘criminal
profiling evidence’ on the other: R v Ranger (2003) 178 CCC (3d) 375; R v Clark (2004) 182
CCC (3d) 1; R v Klymchuk (2005) 203 CCC (3d) 341.
For the present, a series of legal difficulties confronts the adducing of profiling
evidence – in particular, whether the field of profiling is accepted within psychology as an
area of scientific expertise; whether it is reliable; and, most particularly, whether its fruits
from a legal point of view are more prejudicial than probative. Another issue that is not
entirely clear is whether it makes a difference in terms of admissibility if it is the accused
who seeks to adduce profiling evidence. Profiling evidence on occasions has been
‘dismissed’ as evidence of informed guesswork. Theories and conjectures may be allowed
as part of final addresses by legal advocates, but courts have been loath to have them
legitimised by being advanced by expert mental health witnesses. In addition, when
[10.35.90] 881
reduced to its essentials, profiling evidence in some circumstances can be portrayed as

‘oath helping’ – evidence adduced by the accused in support of her or his protestations of
not having engaged in the alleged criminal behaviour. Finally, in jurisdictions such as the
United Kingdom, and some parts of Australia, anxieties persist amongst some judges that
profiling evidence unduly trespasses into the domain of the fact-finder by breaching the
preclusion upon expert evidence concerning ultimate issues.

[10.35.120] The decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Lowery v The
Queen [1974] AC 85 illustrates the complexity of the courts’ varying decisions in allowing
expert evidence about character and what might be described as offender profiling. The
co-accused, Mr Lowery and Mr King, had been convicted in Victoria, Australia, of the
murder of a 15-year-old girl. Each had attributed responsibility to the other. One of the
witnesses called by Mr King was a psychologist who had interviewed both co-accused
and had subjected them to various psychological tests. He gave evidence that Mr King
was an immature youth who was likely to have been led and dominated by more
aggressive and dominant men and that he might behave aggressively in response to the
demands of such people. The psychologist also testified that the tests he had employed
showed that Mr Lowery was strongly aggressive and lacked impulse control.
Mr Lowery appealed on the ground that the psychologist’s evidence had been wrongly
admitted as it tended merely to show disposition. The Privy Council dismissed the appeal,
holding that the psychologist’s evidence was relevant to Mr King’s case in order to show
that his version of events was more probable than Mr Lowery’s, and the whole substance of
Mr Lowery’s case placed its admissibility beyond doubt as necessary to negate
Mr Lowery’s evidence. The decision, therefore, relates both to the assessment of
Mr Lowery’s telling the truth on this occasion and to his general disposition and character.
The evidence did not relate to particular kinds of offenders but did resort to the
psychological profiles of the two accused men in order to evaluate which was the more
likely to have been the aggressor and thus which was the more likely to be telling the
truth in his accounts of the homicide. While today the psychologist’s evidence might well
be classified as ‘profiling evidence’, the term was not employed in 1974.
The first major English case which dealt with the admissibility of profiling evidence
was that of Ognall J in R v Stagg (unreported, Central Criminal Court, 14 September 1994):
see Ormerod and Sturman (2005). This occurred in the context of an attempt to introduce
profiling evidence against a person (Mr Stagg) accused of murder. The profiler, Mr Britton,
a psychologist, had guided the criminal investigation from its early stages. He had drafted
an initial profile of the killer based upon examination of the crime scene and the
characteristics of the victim, her habits, her movements, and whether or not she had
enemies. He then advised on the characteristics of the undercover operative introduced as
a confidante to the suspect, Mr Stagg, as well as in relation to correspondence to and from
the suspect. The trial of Mr Stagg did not have to determine the admissibility of Mr
Britton’s opinions, but Ognall J commented that the prosecution would have faced
‘formidable difficulties’ in persuading him that such evidence should be allowed. He
observed that he had been provided with no authority that expert evidence about
profiling had ever been admitted in proof of identity and suggested that such evidence
was no more than evidence of propensity. Ormerod and Sturman (2005, p 185) have
commented:
[P]rofiling rests on the assumptions that behavioural traits or imprints are displayed or
reflected in crime scenes, that such imprints are identifiable, that they are unique to the
offender, that they remain constant … Profile evidence is potentially very prejudicial when
882 [10.35.120]
it is being used to draw links between the offender and the accused. Evidence of
discreditable traits of the offender will be transposed in the minds of the jury to the
accused.
In words resonant of the Frye test, Ognall J stated that it was ‘doubtful’ that psychological
profile evidence was sufficiently well established or ‘generally accepted’ as a scientific
method to be received as expert evidence. He observed that such a novel technique must
satisfy tests such as the Frye or Daubert tests. He noted, too, a real risk of unfairness in the
investigative process – the suspect was a lonely, sexually inexperienced and socially
isolated man who could have been predicted to be vulnerable to the attentions paid to him
by the operative orchestrated by the profiler. It may well be that, had Stagg made a
confession as a result of the interaction with the operative, it would have been classified as
involuntary and thereby inadmissible: Ormerod and Sturman (2005, p 174). The Stagg case
has led to the suggestion that stringent standards for monitoring and review of individual
profilers should be introduced, as well as formal accreditation of profilers by the Home
Office: Ormerod and Sturman (2005, pp 175–176); see, too, Alison and Canter (2005); Cox
(1996).
The most substantial English analysis of the admissibility of psychological profiling
took place in R v Gilfoyle [2001] 2 Cr App R 57. It dealt with the admissibility of profiling
evidence by Professor Canter, which took the form of a psychological autopsy. The Court
of Appeal declined the evidence, accepting Professor Canter as an expert but finding that
he had never embarked on evaluating the suicidality of a deceased person previously and
on the basis that ‘his reports identify no criteria by reference to which the court could test
the quality of his opinions: there is no database comparing real and questionable suicides
and there is no substantial body of academic writing approving his methodology’: at 67. It
found, too, that Professor Canter’s views were based on ‘one-sided information’ provided
by the defendant. It was also doubted that the signs of unhappiness and argument about
suicide rates were outside the experience of the jury. It noted that there had been 17
occasions in the United States when criminal trial judges had admitted evidence of
psychological profiling, on each occasion the decision having been overturned on appeal.
The court found (at 68) that there was no conceptual distinction between expert
evidence about the profile of a deceased person and about the profile of a defendant:
In our judgment, the roads of inquiry thus opened up would be unending and of little or
no help to a jury. The use of psychological profiling as an aid to police investigation is one
thing, but its use as a means of proof in court is another. Psychiatric evidence as to the
state of mind of a defendant, witness or deceased falling short of mental illness may, of
course, as we have said, be admissible in some cases when based, for example, on medical
records and/or recognised criteria … But the academic status of psychological autopsies is
not, in our judgment, such as to permit them to be admitted as a basis for expert opinion
before a jury.
In R v Kavanagh [2002] EWCA Crim 904 the Court of Appeal was asked to admit fresh
evidence from Professor Canter, that people may commit suicide for a variety of reasons; it
is difficult, if not impossible, to predict if or when a person might commit suicide; lay
opinions on the likelihood of suicide can be very misleading; and even clinicians may find
it difficult or impossible to predict whether someone might or might not commit suicide. It
was contended that for a jury, a decision as to suicide ‘would be even more difficult
without the assistance of professional guidance’ such as that available from Professor
Canter (at [55]). It was argued that this did not strictly constitute a psychological autopsy
evidence. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal declined the evidence, applying the test of
Lawton LJ in R v Turner (1974) 60 Cr App R 80 at 83-84, on the basis that this was not a
matter on which the court required export assistance. The Court commented that: ‘When
the issue is homicide or suicide and the factual evidence is such that there is scope and
need for a jury to consider the likelihood or otherwise of the victim having been suicidal,
[10.35.120] 883
judges should draw juries’ attention to the unpredictability of human nature in such cases.
Outwardly happy and contented people may commit suicide without warning. Those
who are deeply unhappy or depressed or mercurial in temperament may have more
resilience than their behaviour suggests. In the end, all a jury can do is look at the signs
each way and keep in mind, along with evidence as a whole and the burden of proof, that,
from such signs on their own, “you never can tell”.’ (at [57])
[10.35.160] In the New South Wales civil decision of Godfrey v New South Wales (No 1)
[2003] NSWSC 160, the issue of criminal profiling arose in a somewhat unusual context:
damages actions for psychiatric and physical injury. The plaintiff sought to have the
Supreme Court admit evidence from a retired police officer, a Mr Wicks, concerning the
likely behaviour of an escaped convict who had held up a newsagency, thereby causing
the proprietor to go into premature labour and give birth to a brain-damaged baby. The
evidence proposed (at [6]) was to the effect that:
• escapees will try to go where they know and will seek out relatives and associates for
financial assistance and support;
• almost every escapee commits further crimes while at large;
• if the offender is addicted to heroin, then offences such as armed robbery will be
‘virtually certain’ to be committed by the escapee to obtain money to fund the
addiction;
• responsible law enforcement and prison officials would, if they had turned their minds
to the question, have been aware that it was probable and foreseeable that the escapee
would proceed to the area in which he had grown up and would probably commit
offences in that region to obtain money to satisfy his heroin addiction; and
• it was more probable than not that the escapee would commit more serious offences
than housebreaking, and would engage in armed robbery, under the influence of his
elder brother’s career in that form of activity.
Shaw J held (at [21]):

Behavioural profiling of criminal suspects by law enforcement officials is, in my opinion,
an organized body of knowledge upon which they legitimately draw in the course of their
duties. This is not to raise the predictions of Mr Wicks to a science. Rather, the knowledge
of the habits, probable location and likelihood of re-offending of persons who have
escaped from gaol is a corpus of knowledge the community would expect a competent
law enforcement agency or officer to have and to utilize in the manner suggested by
Mr Wicks, that is, the ability to track or otherwise locate an escaped prisoner.
It is unlikely that the decision will be applied in criminal cases, with Shaw J noting (at
[24]) that, ‘in civil cases, every consideration should favour the court having relevant
material rather than rejecting it on technical grounds, providing of course that the parties
are afforded procedural fairness’.
Issues relating to the psychological condition of the deceased were raised in the
complex Australian criminal case best known for its conflicting evidence from forensic
pathologists: Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; [2002] HCA 4; see also R v Velevski
[1999] NSWCCA 96. The fundamental issue disputed at appellate levels was whether twin
babies of three months, their six-year-old sister and their mother, Snezana Velevski, were
murdered by their father or whether the deaths were brought about in the course of a
murder-suicide in which the mother killed herself. At trial, a psychiatrist was permitted to
give expert testimony on behalf of the defence in relation to the mental state of
Mrs Velevski prior to her death. The admissibility of this evidence was not challenged.
The psychiatrist had not seen the deceased but relied upon her medical records, as well as
interviews with the accused and his parents. He formed the view that she may have been
884 [10.35.160]
under stress in the months prior to her death and developed a depressive illness. He
concluded that she might have been becoming psychotic with symptoms of confusion,
perplexity and lability of mood emerging in the post-partum period following the births
of her twins. He referred to Mrs Velevski appearing to be confused and disoriented on the
morning of the killings and to her depression concerning the poor state of her marriage.
He also noted that her brother experienced a severe depressive illness a few years
previously, perhaps indicative of a family propensity to mental illness. The suggestion was
made that she killed herself and her children in the course of a psychotically depressive
episode.
The testimony of this psychiatrist was not formally described during the course of the
trial as a psychological autopsy, although, as a reconstruction of the mental state of a
person prior to her death, it clearly was based on a traditional, clinical version of the
psychological autopsy. In a dissenting judgment in the New South Wales Court of Appeal,
David Kirby J raised a number of matters which he regarded as inconsistent with the
proposition that the deceased woman may have been psychiatrically disturbed and
inclined to take her own life: see R v Velevski [1999] NSWCCA 96 at [207]–[227]. In the
High Court, Gummow and Callinan JJ, who reflected on this aspect of David Kirby J’s
dissent, found that his Honour’s concerns were more properly described as speculation
than as a ground for finding a miscarriage of justice to have taken place. The decision
highlights the need for expert evidence to be adduced from a suitably qualified
psychological profiler and to be grounded in data and published analyses if what is being
canvassed is in relation to a psychological autopsy.
Canadian authority
[10.35.200] A series of cases has addressed the admissibility of psychological profiling
evidence in Canada. They constitute the most important analysis of the admissibility of
profiling evidence thus far. Their reasoning is likely to be applied in other jurisdictions.
The Mohan decision
[10.35.210] The most significant of the decisions is the Supreme Court decision of R v
Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402. The accused was a paediatrician who was
charged with a series of counts of sexual assault upon female patients aged between 13
and 16. The accused sought unsuccessfully at trial to call evidence from a psychiatrist that
the perpetrator of the offences alleged to have been committed would be part of a limited
and unusual group of individuals and that the accused did not fall within the class
because he did not possess the characteristics belonging to the group.
In the course of the voire dire into the admissibility of the psychiatrist’s evidence, the
expert explained that there are three general personality groups that have unusual
personality traits in terms of their psychosexual profile. The first, he said, encompasses the
person who suffers from major mental illness, such as schizophrenia, and engages in
inappropriate sexual behaviour occasionally. He maintained that the second and largest
group contains the sexual deviation types, persons who show distinct abnormalities in
terms of the choice of individuals with whom they report sexual excitement and with
whom they would like to engage in some type of sexual activity. The third group, he said,
is made up of sexual psychopaths, individuals with a callous disregard for people around
them, including a disregard for the consequences of their sexual behaviour toward other
individuals.
The expert identified paedophiles and sexual psychopaths as examples of members of
unusual and limited classes of persons. In response to questions hypothetically
encompassing the allegations of the four complainants in respect of whom the accused
was charged, the expert stated that the psychological profile of the perpetrator of the first
three complaints would be likely to be that of a paedophile, while the profile of the
[10.35.210] 885
perpetrator of the fourth would be likely to be that of a sexual psychopath. He said that if
the one person was responsible for the offences involving all four of the complainants, he
would be likely to be a sexual psychopath, such an individual belonging to a very small,
behaviourally distinct category of persons. He said that if the perpetrator was a physician,
this would bring him into an even more limited class. It was contemplated that the
psychiatrist would go on to testify that the accused did not have the characteristics
attributable to any of the three groups into which most sex offenders fall.
The court held that the admission of expert evidence depends on the criteria of:
• relevance;
• necessity in assisting the trier of fact;
• the absence of any exclusionary rule; and
• a properly qualified expert.
It noted a previous decision of the court in R v Morin (1988) 44 CCC (3d) 193; [1988] 2 SCR
345 (see Kaufman (1998)), where it had been held unanimously that the Crown cannot
lead evidence about the character of the accused person unless it is relevant to an issue
and is not being used merely as evidence of disposition. It held that different
considerations apply when the evidence is adduced by the accused, who is permitted to
call such evidence as to disposition both in her or his own evidence or via evidence: ‘The
general rule is that evidence as to character is limited to evidence of the accused’s
reputation in the community with respect to the relevant trait or traits. The accused may
rely on specific acts of good conduct’: at 415. They noted that evidence from an expert that
the accused, by reason of her or his mental make-up or condition of the mind, would be
incapable of committing the crime, or would be disposed to commit the crime, does not fit
either of these categories. Referring to the English decisions of R v Chard (1971) 56 Cr App
R 268; Lowery v The Queen [1974] AC 85; and R v Turner [1975] 1 QB 834, the court noted
the English approach of proscribing expert opinion evidence, with the exception of
evidence on non-insane automatism, to show the accused’s state of mind unless it is
contended that the accused is abnormal in the sense of suffering from insanity or
diminished responsibility. (See Ch 10.25.) The court had regard to the Canadian decision
of R v Lupien [1970] SCR 263, which permitted psychiatric evidence for an accused man to
show lack of intent that he reacted violently to any form of homosexual activity. Similarly,
in McMillan v The Queen (1975) 23 CCC (2d) 160; 7 OR (2d) 750 (Ont CA), the Supreme
Court affirmed the admissibility of evidence from a psychiatrist that a third party, the
accused’s wife, was more likely to have committed a murder of their infant child because
she had a psychopathic personality disorder with brain damage.
The Supreme Court in R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402 held (at 423)
that, before an expert’s opinion is admitted as evidence, the trial judge must be satisfied,
as a matter of law, that either the perpetrator of the crime or the accused has:
distinctive behavioural characteristics such that a comparison of one with the other will be
of material assistance in determining innocence or guilt … The trial judge should consider
the opinion of the expert and whether the expert is merely expressing a personal opinion
of whether the behavioural profile which the expert is putting forward is in common use
as a reliable indicator of membership in a distinctive group.
Putting the test another way, the court asked (at 423) whether the scientific community
had developed:
a standard profile for the offender who commits this type of crime? An affirmative finding
on this basis will satisfy the criteria of relevance and necessity. Not only will expert
evidence tend to prove a fact in issue but it will also provide the trier of fact with
assistance that is needed. Such evidence will have passed the threshold test of reliability
which will generally ensure that the trier of fact does not give it more weight than it
886 [10.35.210]
deserves. The evidence will qualify as an exception to the exclusionary rule in relation to
character evidence provided, of course, that the trial judge is within the field of expertise
of the expert witness.
Applying the criteria to the facts of the case, the court in Mohan adopted the findings of
the trial judge that a person who commits sexual assaults on young women cannot be said
to belong to a group possessing behavioural characteristics sufficiently distinctive to be of
assistance in identifying the perpetrator of the offences charged. In addition, the court
accepted that the fact that the alleged perpetrator was a physician did not advance the
analysis because there had not been shown to exist an acceptable body of evidence that
doctors who commit sexual assaults fall into a distinctive class with identifiable
characteristics. The court also accepted the trial judge’s finding that there was no evidence
to support the theory that the characteristics of the offending against the fourth
complainant identified the perpetrator as a sexual psychopath. It also observed that there
was no material on the record to support a finding that the profile of a paedophile or
psychopath ‘has been standardized to the extent that it could be said that it matched the
supposed profile of the offender depicted in the charges’: at 423. The court did not see fit
to disturb the trial judge’s finding that the expert’s group profiles were not sufficiently
reliable to be considered ‘reliable’: at 424. The Supreme Court’s decision was that, in the
absence of these indicia of reliability, ‘it cannot be said that the evidence would be
necessary in the sense of usefully clarifying a matter otherwise inaccessible, or that any
value it may have had would not be outweighed by its potential for misleading or
diverting the jury’: at 424. Thus, the court’s decision was that the admissibility of the
profiling evidence had been correctly rejected.
The SCB decision
[10.35.220] The issue was revisited in R v SCB (1997) 119 CCC (3d) 530, where it was
affirmed that psychiatric evidence that an accused person, because of her or his mental
make-up, is unlikely to have committed the crime alleged is generally inadmissible.
Again, the problem identified at appellate level was that the mental health expert evidence
did no more than indicate that some features of the hypothetical scenario presented to him
were consistent with the acts of a sexual sadist or a person with an anti-social personality
disorder. The expert did not suggest that others who did not fall within either of these
categories could be excluded as possible perpetrators. The evidence was held inadmissible
on the basis that it did not address the question of whether the scientific community had
developed a standard profile for the offender committing the particular kind of crime.
The Dowd decision
[10.35.230] A similar approach was taken by the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in R v
Dowd (1998) 120 CCC (4th) 360, where it had been argued on behalf of a dentist charged
with a series of 18 indecent assaults that he should have been allowed to call psychiatric
evidence that he did not exhibit the characteristics of the person who would have
committed the offences.
The J-LJ decision
[10.35.240] In 2000, the Canadian Supreme Court was called upon to revisit the
admissibility of profiling evidence adduced by the defence. In R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600;
2000 SCC 51, the court was asked to determine whether a person accused of molesting
two children should have been permitted to adduce psychiatric evidence that in all
probability a serious sexual deviant with a highly distinctive personality disorder had
inflicted the abuse upon the two children and that the defendant did not display such
personality traits in various tests, including penile plethysmography. The court applied its
reasoning in Mohan and held that the trial judge had correctly excluded the evidence. The
psychiatrist had testified on voire dire that it is not possible to establish a standard profile
of individuals with a disposition to sodomise young children but maintained that such
[10.35.240] 887
people ‘frequently’ or ‘habitually’ exhibited distinctive characteristics which can be

identified. He said that by application of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory
Test Version Two (the MMPI2), administered with the monitoring of electromyography
(EMG) to measure anxiety, along with the plethysmograph, the accused could be said not
to have such characteristics and not to have a serious sexual disorder.
The accused had been exposed to a range of sexual images and his penis measured by
the plethysmograph to evaluate attraction by measuring any tumescence. The psychiatrist
found the accused to have a ‘clearly normal profile’ with a preference for adult women
and a slight attraction for adolescents, but no deviation in respect of boys in general or
prepubescent boys, the category of victim in the case before the court.
The court acknowledged the ‘essential role’ of expert witnesses in criminal cases and
noted the comment of Sopinka J in Mohan:
Dressed up in scientific language which the jury does not easily understand and
Binnie J commented (at [25]):

[T]here is also a concern inherent in the application of this criterion that experts not be
permitted to usurp the functions of the trier of fact. Too liberal an approach could result in
a trial’s becoming nothing more than a contest of experts with the trier of fact acting as a
referee in deciding which expert to accept.
He emphasised that, while courts should be extremely cautious in restricting the power of
an accused person to call evidence in their defence, such evidence must be excluded if it
may ‘distort the fact-finding process’: at [29].
The court found that the psychiatrist’s evidence satisfied the first Mohan requirement
that the subject matter be such that ordinary people are unlikely to form a correct
judgment about it, unassisted by persons with specialised knowledge. It noted that what
is necessary for evidence of disposition to be admissible is that the particular disposition
or tendency be characteristics of a distinctive group: ‘[T]he term “distinctive” more aptly
defines the behavioural characteristics which are a pre-condition to the admission of this
kind of evidence.’ It applied the Mohan determination that ‘novel science’ should be
subject to ‘special scrutiny’ to determine whether it meets a basic threshold of reliability
and whether it is essential in the sense that the trier of fact will be unable to come to a
satisfactory conclusion without the assistance of the expert.
The court acknowledged that the penile plethysmograph is generally recognised by the
scientific community and is used by well-regarded psychiatric facilities to monitor the
result of treatment for sexual pathologies. However, it noted that this was not the situation
of the accused and commented (at [35]):
Dr Beltrami is a pioneer in Canada in trying to use this therapeutic tool as a forensic tool
where the problems are firstly to determine whether the offence could only be committed
by a perpetrator who possesses distinctive and identifiable psychological traits, secondly
to determine whether a ‘standard profile’ of those traits has been developed, and thirdly
to match the accused against the profile.
This meant that his evidence was subject to ‘special scrutiny’, in particular because of the
closeness of his opinion to the ultimate issue. It held that ‘the closer the evidence
approaches an opinion on an ultimate issue, the stricter the application of this principle’.
In looking at the ‘distinctiveness’ criterion, the court held that the offence concerned
must be shown only to be committed by members of a distinctive group and then that ‘the
personality profile of the perpetrator group must be sufficiently complete to identify
distinctive psychological elements that were in all probability present and operating in the
perpetrator at the time of the offence. Lack of distinctiveness robs the exception of its
raison d’etre’: at [40]; see also R v B(SC) (1997) 119 CCC (3d) 530 at 537 (Ont CA); R v KB
888 [10.35.240]
(1999) 176 NSR (2d) 283 (CA). Binnie J for the court accepted that the level of detail
required in the ‘standard profile’ may vary with the conclusiveness of individual elements
(see, eg, necrophilia: R v Malboeuf [1997] OJ No 1398 (QL) (CA)). However, he held that
‘more common personality disorders’ are less distinctive and likely to serve as ‘badges’ to
distinguish the perpetrator class from the rest of the population, to the point potentially of
being of little assistance: see, eg, R v Perlett [1999] OJ No 1695 (QL) (SCJ). Binnie J stated
(at [44]):
Between these two extremes, the range and distinctiveness of personality traits attributed
to perpetrators of different offences will vary greatly. The requirement of the ‘standard
profile’ is to ensure that the profile of distinctive features is not put together on an ad hoc
basis for the purpose of a particular case. Beyond that, the issue is whether the ‘profile’ is
sufficient for the purpose to be served, whether the expert can identify and describe with
workable precision what exactly distinguishes the distinctive or deviant perpetrator from
other people. If the demarcation is clear and compelling, the fact that the personality
portrait cannot be filled in with elements that do not serve to distinguish the perpetrator is
not fatal to acceptance of the evidence.
The court reaffirmed that the criteria for reception of expert evidence are relevance
‘(determined by reference to whether evidence has some tendency as a matter of logic and
human experience to make the proposition for which it is advanced more likely than that
proposition would appear to be in the absence of that evidence), reliability and necessity
measured against the counterweights of consumption of time, prejudice and confusion’. It
accepted that the psychiatrist was an expert but found that his definition of a ‘distinctive’
group of individuals to commit the ‘distinctive crimes’ before the court was ‘vague’. The
court noted that the reliability of the scientific foundations of the theory that certain acts
will almost always be done by people having certain distinctive characteristics requires
evidence; it cannot simply be assumed: at [49]. It found that the Mohan requirement of a
standard profile should not be taken to require an exhaustive inventory of personality
traits – the profile must confine the class to useful proportions. The court instanced (at
[49]) a spectrum of personality disorders stretching from alcoholics to sexual psychopaths
as too broad to be useful:
If a man with more or less ordinary sexual predilections is capable while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs to have committed these offences, the class of potential
perpetrators is insufficiently ‘distinctive’ in the Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d)
402 sense for the expert evidence to be useful. Dr Beltrami considered biological factors
related to sexual interests to be the most important indicator but did not rule out the
possibility that the offence was prompted by behavioural rather than biological factors.
The court interpreted this to mean that the onus upon the defence was to satisfy the trial
court that the underlying principles and methodology of the tests were reliable and,
importantly, applicable. However, it did not succeed in this regard, the MMPI2 not being
designed for the detection of sexual disorders and not containing any specific probe for
unusual sexual preferences. No evidence was called from those who conducted the
interviews or administered the plethysmograph test. Nor were test protocols introduced.
Nor was there confirmation that standard procedures for its administration had been
followed. Significantly, too, the psychiatrist noted that the plethysmograph would detect a
sexual deviant only 47.5% of the time. In addition, the judge took account of the fact that
the psychiatrist did not explain how, if the basis of the plethysmographic test was the
stimulation of remembrance of past pleasures, the results would vary according to the
degree of deviance from some norm. He also took into account that a false negative could
be caused by the fact that the visual and auditive scenarios presented to the subject lacked
specific elements of stimulation, such as humiliation of the victim. The Supreme Court
found (at [55]) that the trial judge had had good reason to be sceptical about the value of
the testimony of the psychiatrist:
[10.35.240] 889
[E]ven giving a loose interpretation to the need for a ‘standard profile’, and passing over
the doubts that only a pedophile would be capable of the offence, the evidence of the test
error rate in the ‘match’ of the [accused] with or his ‘exclusion’ from the ‘distinctive class’
was problematic. The possibility that such evidence – ‘cloaked under the mystique of
science’ (R v Beland [1987] 2 SCR 398; (1987) 36 CCC (3d) 481; 43 DLR (4th) 641 at p 434) –
would distort the fact-finding process, was very real. Moreover, defence evidence of this
type can be expected to call forth expert evidence from the Crown in response, with the
consequent danger that the trial could be derailed into a controversy on disposition or
propensity, with the trial becoming ‘nothing more than a contest of experts with the trier
of fact acting as referee in deciding which expert to accept’ (R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9;
(1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402, at p 24).
(See, too, R v F(DS) (1999) 132 CCC (3d) 97 at 111; R v Klymchuk (2005) 203 CCC (3d) 341 at
[44].)
The court also had regard to the Mohan necessity requirement, commenting (at [56])
that:
[the] purpose of expert evidence is thus to assist the trier of fact by providing special
knowledge that the ordinary person would not know. Its purpose is not to substitute the
expert for the trier of fact. What is asked of the trier of fact is an act of informed judgment,
not an act of faith.
The court observed that the psychiatrist had not meaningfully explained the facts upon
which his opinion had been based. The bottom line was that a conclusory opinion was
offered that on cross-examination turned out to be short on demonstrated scientific
support.
Moreover, the psychiatrist’s evidence was regarded as in effect being that the denial of
the accused should be believed because he was not the sort of person to offend in such a
way. The court noted that this was close to ‘oath-helping’ in circumstances that did not fit
within any legitimate exception. It found, too, that, on the basis of a ‘cost-benefit’ analysis
of the necessity requirement, it would have been open to the trial judge to have rejected
the psychiatrist’s opinion as well.
Criminal profiling/Crime scene analysis evidence

[10.35.280] A series of Ontario Court of Appeal decisions has scrutinised evidence lying on
the junction between criminal profiling evidence and evidence analysing a crime scene: R
v Ranger (2003) 178 CCC (3d) 375; R v Clark (2004) 182 CCC (3d) 1; and R v Klymchuk (2005)
203 CCC (3d) 341. It is likely that their approach will be followed in other jurisdictions.
The Ranger decision
[10.35.290] In R v Ranger (2003) 178 CCC (3d) 375, two sisters were stabbed to death in
their home. The accused and his cousin were charged. The prosecution theory was that the
accused decided that if he could not have one of the sisters, his former lover, then no-one
else would. It called Detective Inspector Lines, the Manager of the Behavioural Sciences
Section of the Ontario Police Investigative Support Bureau, as an expert in crime scene
reconstruction and profiling. She expressed the view that the break-in to the house had
been staged and that the person most likely to have been responsible was someone with
an association or relationship with the victim and who had no interest in the possessions
of the deceased. It was put that Detective Inspector Lines had conducted criminal profiling
in over 1,000 cases, some 500 of which had been homicide investigations. It was also said
that about 25 of the cases previously investigated by Detective Inspector Lines had
included crime scene staging. Charron JA, writing the leading judgment, noted that the
fact that a crime scene may have been staged to look as if the house had been burgled is a
piece of circumstantial evidence that may provide some insight into the perpetrator’s
motivation and, in turn, her or his identity. He accepted that criminal profiling may be a
useful, albeit potentially dangerous, aid to police investigations, but regarded its use as a
890 [10.35.280]
means of proof in the courtroom as quite another matter. To this extent, his approach was
entirely in conformity with that of R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402 and
R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600; 2000 SCC 51.
Charron JA contrasted profiling evidence with crime scene analysis, which quite
regularly meets the legal requirements for admissibility (at [71]; see Ormerod (1996)):
A few examples readily come to mind: an expert’s opinion in an arson case that a fire was
not accidental but, rather, deliberately set; opinion evidence explaining the significance of
blood splatters; a pathologist’s opinion about the likely cause of death or of injuries
observed on a deceased victim; an expert’s opinion on how a motor vehicle accident
happened. There are many more examples. This kind of evidence assists the trier of fact in
understanding WHAT the crime scene shows. The admissibility of that kind of evidence
will usually turn on questions of relevance or the witness’s particular expertise.
He contrasted (at [72]; see Ormerod (1996)) such evidence with attempts to adduce expert
opinion evidence about ‘WHY an offence was committed in a particular manner and, more
particularly, about WHO is more likely to have committed the offence’, which previously
had been found in Canada not to be admissible.
Charron JA for the court found ([at 82]) that Detective Inspector Lines’ opinions about
the perpetrator’s likely motivation for staging the crime scene and his characteristics as a
person associated with the victims and having a particular interest in one of the sisters
constituted evidence of criminal profiling:
Criminal profiling is a novel field of scientific evidence, the reliability of which was not
demonstrated at trial. To the contrary, it would appear from her limited testimony about
the available verification of opinions in her field of work that her opinions amounted to no
more than educated guesses. As such, her criminal profiling evidence was inadmissible.
The criminal profiling evidence also approached the ultimate issue in this case and, hence,
was highly prejudicial.
(See, too, New York v McDonald 231 AD 2d 647 (1996); California v Singh 37 Cal App 4th
1343 (1995); United States v Yost 24 F 3d 99 (1994).)
The Clark decision
[10.35.300] The Ontario Court of Appeal had occasion to consider cognate issues one year
later in R v Clark (2004) 182 CCC (3d) 1. An accused man was convicted of two counts of
first degree murder. The victims were found stabbed to death in bed with no sign of a
struggle. The accused was shown to have been using the credit card of one of the
deceased. The prosecution theory was that the accused had killed the victims in order to
silence them.
Once again, Detective Inspector Lines was called. Moldaver JA for the court applied
the reasoning of Charron JA in R v Ranger but took his analysis further. He found that a
properly qualified expert in crime scene analysis can offer opinion evidence about what
occurred at the crime scene and about how the crime was committed. He classified such
evidence as crime scene reconstruction evidence. He found (at [76]) that, assuming a
properly qualified witness, the following three areas will generally require close attention:
• whether the evidence is necessary in the sense that it is likely to fall outside the
knowledge or normal experience of the average juror;
• whether the opinion is reliable in the sense that it is anchored in the evidence and not
the product of guesswork or speculation; and
• whether there is a real danger that the jury will be overwhelmed by the evidence and
give it more weight than it deserves.
Moldaver JA regarded the question of whether a crime scene is ‘staged’ as a subset of

crime scene reconstruction evidence. He found that Detective Inspector Lines’
impermissible criminal profiling evidence took two forms. First, in light of her opinion
that the crime scene had been staged and her further opinion that people stage crime
[10.35.300] 891
scenes to divert suspicion from themselves, she had interpreted this to mean that the
person responsible for the deaths of the victims would have some knowledge or
relationship with them. Applying the approach of the court in Ranger, he found that
evidence to be impermissible because it spoke to the motivation and characteristics of the
likely perpetrator (see Ranger at [82]). He found, too, that the Inspector was not entitled to
testify about the characteristics of the likely offender – characteristics which, in the instant
case, fitted comfortably with the accused man. This was again because it constituted
criminal profiling evidence. He held (at [90]), though, that evidence from the Inspector
that the crime scene had been staged to make it appear as though a burglary had occurred
had been properly admitted at trial on the basis that it was crime scene reconstruction
evidence and on the basis that the witness was qualified to express an opinion about
staging; that the evidence given by her fell outside the knowledge and experience of the
average juror; that her opinion was reliable in the sense that it was anchored in the
evidence and not the product of guesswork or speculation; and that the evidence of
staging was not so complex or technical that the jury was likely to be overwhelmed by it
and give it more weight than it deserved.
The Klymchuk decision
[10.35.320] In R v Klymchuk (2005) 203 CCC (3d) 341, the Court of Appeal for Ontario
allowed an appeal against a husband’s conviction for first degree murder of his wife in a
drive shed near the family home. She was struck on the neck and the back of the head
several times, causing death. There were signs that pressure had also been applied to her
neck before she died, but she was not sexually assaulted nor the victim of robbery. The
prosecution case against the appellant husband was principally on the basis of
opportunity and motive, the wife recently having informed him that she wanted to end
their relationship. The prosecution also relied on evidence permitted at trial from a special
agent from the FBI that the crime scene had been staged to make it appear that someone
had broken into the drive shed. The evidence had five components:
(1) the drive shed was a high-risk target for break-in and therefore relatively unlikely
to be selected by a burglar;
(2) the deceased was at very low risk to be a victim of crime;
(3) the area where the deceased lived was at low risk of break and enters, and when
they did happen the offender tended not to inflict violence on the victim;
(4) the violence inflicted on the deceased, the absence of sexual assault or theft, and
the indication that the offender had quickly gained control over the deceased in a
confined area were contra-indicative of homicide by an unknown intruder; and
(5) the apparent point of entry, a window on the side of the shed, was unlikely to
have been a real point of entry and had been left open.
The Court of Appeal (at [37]) found evidence by the witness, insofar as it related to the
killer’s motive and prior association with the victim, to fall into the same category as the
precluded evidence in R v Ranger (2003) 178 CCC (3d) 375 and R v Clark (2004) 182 CCC
(3d) 1:
Agent Brantley’s experience and review of the other sources led him to conclude that
those who staged break-ins as part of a homicide probably had a personal motive for the
homicide and probably had a prior association with the victim. Even if those opinions
accurately reflect the statistical probabilities that a killer who stages a break-in as part of a
homicide has a personal motive for the homicide and a prior relationship with the victim,
conclusions based on statistical probabilities can offer no insight as to what happened in a
specific case.
Thus, the court found an error in the trial judge having permitted evidence as to the
killer’s prior relationship with the deceased and the possible motives for the killing. It
found only the fourth and fifth factors to be able to be categorised as crime reconstruction
892 [10.35.320]
evidence upon which an expert could base the opinion that a crime scene was staged. The
first two categories were held (at [41]) to constitute impermissible forms of profiling
evidence. The court commented that ‘[t]he mere identification of factors that can make a
person more susceptible to crime does not amount to an admissible profile of victims of
crime’ (at [44]). The court also commented that the profiles were also drawn on inferences
that could be drawn by any reasonably intelligent layperson. The third category ‘offered
no basis for the opinion that this crime scene was staged’ (at [46]). The court allowed the
appeal and observed for the benefit of the subsequent re-trial that if at the re-trial the
Special Agent or other witness ‘is offered to give evidence that the crime scene was staged
to make it appear as though there had been a break-in, that opinion must be based on
observations of the crime scene and information gathered at the crime scene’ (at [58]). The
court observed that the admissibility of the evidence ‘[m]ay well come down to the trial
judge’s determination of whether that evidence is necessary’ (at [59]; see also State of Ohio
v Roquemore 85 Ohio App 3d 448 at 455 (1993) in relation to the danger of stereotyping;
Haakanson v State of Alaska 760 P2d 1030 at 1037 (1988) in relation to the risk of prejudicing
a jury into illegitimate reasoning processes.
At the subsequent re-trial, Speyer J excluded the evidence (R v Klymchuk [2006] OJ No
4166 (SC)), but a further attempt was made at the third trial before Dawson J (R v
Klymchuk 2008 CanLII 23495 (ON SC)). The crime scene investigator again was found to
rely upon reasoning going beyond the evaluation of information from the crime scene:
‘His opinion was originally formed, in part, by relying on criminal profiling’, including
considerations related to motivation, the ‘Why Question’ (at [11]–[14]). Dawson J also took
into account the fact that when the witness was asked whether his discipline was based on
any rules that would give a consistent result, he provided a lengthy answer that Dawson
J concluded was to the effect that factors at the crime scene are evaluated subjectively on
the basis of personal experience in order to come to an opinion as to whether the crime
scene was staged (at [18]). The evidence was not allowed on the basis of the ‘necessity’
criterion and also on the basis that its probative evidence was outweighed by its
prejudicial effect.
A limited future for profiling evidence

[10.35.340] In a number of countries, courts, other than coroners’ courts, have exhibited a
disinclination to permit evidence that the psychological make-up of a person makes it
either more or less likely that it is they who have committed a criminal offence. In
principle, the Canadian Supreme Court decisions of R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89
CCC (3d) 402 and R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600; 2000 SCC 51 have opened the door to the
reception of criminal profiling evidence. However, the Supreme Court has not made the
reception of such evidence straightforward; considerable advances in profiling research
will be necessary as a precondition to admissibility.
The challenge lies ahead for witnesses who claim to be able to profile particular kinds
of offenders, or even victims, such as those who have died (see R v Gilfoyle [2001] 2 Cr App
R 57), to show empirically that certain kinds of crimes are only, or even predominantly,
committed by persons of a particular psychological make-up or that the crimes were so
distinctively similar in methodology (crime signature) that it is overwhelmingly likely (on
the basis of crime linkage analysis) that they were committed by the same person. Until
that point is reached, it will be very rare for evidence of psychological profiling to be
permitted on behalf of those accused of criminal conduct and even rarer for it to be able to
be adduced on behalf of the prosecution in criminal cases (see the reasoning in State of
New Jersey v Fortin 178 NJ 540; 843 A 2d 974 (2004)). The potential in the aftermath of the
decisions of R v Ranger (2003) 178 CCC (3d) 375 and R v Clark (2004) 182 CCC (3d) 1 is that
evidence may be able to be given from persons interpreting the crime scene provided that
[10.35.340] 893
they confine themselves to assisting juries to understand what the crime scene shows,
rather than why an offender behaved in a certain way and what characteristics are likely to
have been possessed by the offender. However, even this is not entirely straightforward as
it will be incumbent upon the prosecution to establish that interpretation of the crime
scene, such as comparative crime scene analysis, is reliable. It appears that the mere
identification of factors that can make a person more susceptible to crime does not amount
to an admissible profile of victims of crime evidence: R v Klymchuk (2005) 203 CCC (3d)
341 at [44]. Generally, it will not be open to the prosecution in a criminal case to adduce
expert evidence that a crime scene was ‘staged’ on the basis of criminal profiling: R v
Klymchuk 2008 CanLII 23495 at [3], or that it commanded a sufficient ‘signature’ for an
expert to be able to assert that the perpetrator was the same in the crime charged and the
previous crime of which he or she was found guilty. What may be possible is expert
evidence that a crime scene has been staged if the opinion is based on observations of the
crime scene and information gathered at the crime scene.
894 [10.35.340]
Chapter 10.40
PREDICTION OF RISK EVIDENCE

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [10.40.01]
Risk prediction under Australian legislation ................................................................... [10.40.10]
The predictive instruments .................................................................................................. [10.40.20]
Legislative mandates ............................................................................................................ [10.40.30]
The role of actuarial tests .................................................................................................... [10.40.40]
The nature of the risk occurring ........................................................................................ [10.40.50]
The degree of the risk occurring ........................................................................................ [10.40.60]
An overview of commonly used actuarial instruments
The Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offence Recidivism (RRASOR) .................... [10.40.80]
The Static-99 ........................................................................................................................... [10.40.90]
The Static-2002 ....................................................................................................................... [10.40.100]
The Hare Psychopathy Checklists (PCLs) ........................................................................ [10.40.110]
The Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG) ................................................................... [10.40.120]
The Sexual Offender Risk Appraisal Guide (SORAG) ................................................... [10.40.130]
The Historical, Clinical and Risk Management 20 Item (HCR-20) .............................. [10.40.140]
The Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) ............................................................. [10.40.150]
Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol 2003 (RSVP) ............................................................... [10.40.160]
Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ [10.40.200]
Appendix: Brief overview of actuarial prediction instruments
analysed in Ch 10.40 ............................................................................. [10.40.500]
‘There are risks and costs to a program of action. But they are
far less than the long-range risks and costs of comfortable
inaction.’
John F Kennedy (1917–1963).
Introduction
[10.40.01] Prediction of the risk of offender recidivism is fundamental in many areas of
the criminal law and inevitably depends upon expert evaluations which contain elements
of the objective and the subjective. For instance, sentencing generally (see, eg, R v MSK
[2004] NSWSC 319 at [68]) and also Parole Board decision-making (see, eg, Oakes v Chief
Executive, Department of Corrective Services (Qld) (2004) 144 A Crim R 334; [2004] QSC 11 at
[10]–[11]) require prediction of risk. So too does the application of the good character test
in immigration, citizenship and passport decision-making (see, eg, Cousens and Minister for
Immigration and Citizenship [2007] AATA 1426; Re Thompson and Minister for Foreign Affairs
and Trade (2007) 45 AAR 149; [2007] AATA 1244; Tuitaalili v Minister for Immigration and
Citizenship (2011) 124 ALD 405; [2011] FCA 1224).
A development commencing in about early 2000 in Australia was the adoption of sex
offender registration legislation (Crimes (Child Sex Offenders) Act 2005 (ACT); Child
Protection (Offenders Registration) Act 2000 (NSW); Child Protection (Offender Reporting and
Registration) Act 2004 (NT); Child Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2004 (Qld); Child Sex
Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA); Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2005
(Tas); Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic); Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2004
(WA)). These pieces of legislation predominantly impose reporting obligations on
convicted offenders who are released back into the community. Their operation is
dependent upon expert evidence of ongoing risk posed by the sex offender. Some
jurisdictions have also adopted legislative schemes enabling continuing detention of
persons on the basis of the risk that they pose of reoffending, as well as enabling ongoing,
and, in some instances, intrusive monitoring and supervision of offenders (see Crimes
(High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW); Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 (WA); Serious Sex
Offenders (Detention and Supervision) Act 2009 (Vic); Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders)
[10.40.01] 895
Act 2003 (Qld)). The legislation has proved to be controversial and challenging to
implement (see, eg, Vess et al (2011); McSherry and Keyzer (2009); Freckelton and Keyzer
(2010)). A further extension of the legislation which is dependent upon expert evidence
about risk prediction is legislation directed toward serious offenders generally, namely
those who have serially offended other than sexually and are postulated to pose an
‘unacceptable risk’ by further offending: see, eg, Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic).
Expert evidence is a key aspect of the implementation of the legislative provisions and
judicial responsibilities concerning prediction of risk. As Monahan (2006) observed more
than a decade ago, for some time actuarial risk prediction instruments have constituted
one of the bases for a variety of judicial decision-making. This chapter reviews the
evolving case law on the role of expert evidence in assisting courts to make evaluations of
potential risk and recidivism during sentencing and parole determinations and the
making of supervision and detention orders. It also summarises the principal instruments
being used in forensic contexts.
Risk prediction under Australian legislation

[10.40.10] The validity of the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) allowing
for continuing preventive detention was challenged before the High Court of Australia,
but the court held that the legislation was constitutionally valid (Fardon v Attorney-General
(Qld) (2004) 223 CLR 575; [2004] HCA 46, Kirby J dissenting). Following the High Court’s
decision, two detainees complained to the United Nations Human Rights Committee
against their continuing detention pursuant to the legislation in Queensland and New
South Wales (Tillman v Australia, United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC),
CCPR/C/98/D/1635/2007, 10 May 2010; Fardon v Australia, United Nations Human
Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR/C/98/D/1629/2007, 10 May 2010). The Human Rights
Committee concluded that their detention was arbitrary and violated their human rights
as protected by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – namely, their right
to liberty, including the right to be free from arbitrary detention (Art 9.1); their right to
equal treatment before courts and tribunals, including the right to a fair trial (Art 14.1);
and their freedom from retroactive effects of criminal law (Art 15.1). The Human Rights
Committee asserted that the detention was, de facto, renewed post-sentence imprisonment
for the same offence (double jeopardy) and based on civil proceedings which do not meet
the due process guarantees required for penal sentencing. Two of the 13 Human Rights
Committee members disagreed with this conclusion and considered that the continuing
detention order is a disciplinary measure based on legislation which aims to achieve the
compelling and legitimate purpose of protecting the community from serious danger.
They noted that the legislation limits continued detention orders to apply only when
reasonable or necessary in the individual circumstances and proportionate to achieve its
purpose and that it mandates periodic review by an independent judicial body.
The findings of the Human Rights Committee do not invalidate domestic law (see, eg,
Keyzer (2009, p 32)). However, the Legislative Assembly of the Northern Territory passed
the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Bill 2011 (NT) on 23 November 2011 and the
controversial nature of the serious sex offender legislation influences its application.
Freckelton and Keyzer have suggested that in consequence of the recommendations of the
Human Rights Committee, judicial decision-makers in those jurisdictions which allow for
preventive detention orders against sex offenders should, for instance, make supervision
orders in preference to detention orders (Freckelton and Keyzer (2010, p 352)). Treatment
and management plans should be developed, as well as community support for offenders,
including substance abuse relapse programs (Keyzer (2009, pp 33ff).
896 [10.40.10]
Prediction of risk evidence | CH 10.40
The predictive instruments

[10.40.20] Risk prediction on the basis of unstructured, unguided clinical judgment (see
Hart (1998); Ireland and Craig (2011); Rettenberger and Hucker (2011)) by psychiatrists
and psychologists has been recognised as characterised by problematically high
false-positive rates, as well as unacceptable high rates of false-negative findings. As long
ago as 1976, Cocozza and Steadman concluded that there was no ‘clear and convincing
evidence’ of mental health professionals’ ability to forecast violence accurately. This led to
many calls (see, eg, Monahan (1981); Steadman (2000)) for mental health professionals to
refrain from the exercise. In 1981, Monahan (1981, p 63) argued that there should be an
increased emphasis on using statistical techniques of clinical prediction and a heightened
sensitivity to both environmental and contextual variables.
The ‘second generation’ of dangerousness assessment (see Davis and Ogloff (2008b))
focused upon the identification of appropriate variables for the prediction of violence and
culminated in the development of actuarial risk assessment tools, utilising a ‘formal,
algorithmic, objective procedure (eg equation) to reach the decision’ (Grove and Meehl
(1996, pp 293–294)). There are ample reasons to conclude that actuarial approaches to
violence risk assessment are more accurate than unstructured clinical judgment: see, eg,
Quinsey et al (2006); Ogloff and Davis (2005); Rettenberger and Hucker (2011); Doyle,
Ogloff and Thomas (2011). Their advantages are that:
• they promote predictive validity and reliability; and
• important risk factors are focused upon with a reduced potential for illusory
correlations.
However, they can be:

• rigid; and
• dominated by assessment by static risk factors that are principally historical and give
limited importance to dynamic risk factors such as accommodation, employment,
education and antisocial attitudes.
Davis and Ogloff (2008a) argued that the third generation of risk assessment has seen a
conceptual transition from the notion of predicting dangerousness to assessing and
managing risk, utilising structured professional judgment informed and augmented by
various of the actuarial risk prediction instruments. Third generation assessment tools
require psychiatric experts to take into account historical information about the offender
and the environment or context in which the offender lives (see, eg, Ireland and Craig
(2011, pp 23, 27); Ware (2011)).
A consequence of the evolution in approaches is that increasingly courts are being
urged to have regard to a proliferating array of instruments of risk prediction, which are
utilised in disuniform ways, depending upon whether the assessment is principally a
second or third generation evaluation. Baxter J in Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v
Moolarvie [2008] WASC 37 at [41] has observed that:
various instruments or tools have been developed over the past 10 years in response to
concerns that subjective clinical assessments as to the risk of sexual reoffending might be
unreliable. It is also clear from a number of published articles in reputable international
journals … that these tools are at an early stage of development and involve an area of
behavioural science which is the subject of some controversy.
These instruments include:

• the Automated Sexual Recidivism Scale (ASRS): see Skelton et al (2006); R v Peta [2007]
NZCA 28; [2007] 2 NZLR 627;
• the Classification of Violence Risk (COVR) (an actuarial risk assessment software
produced as a result of the VRAS (MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study)): see
Monahan et al (2000); see also Monahan et al (2005; 2006); Davis and Ogloff (2008a);
[10.40.20] 897
• the Dangerous Behaviour Rating Scale (DBRS): see Menzies, Webster and Sepejak
(1985); Menzies et al (1994);
• the Short-Term Assessment of Risk and Treatability (START): see Webster et al (2006);
• the Hare Psychopathy Checklist (PCL); the Hare Psychopathy Checklist Revised
(PCL-R) (Hare (1991; 2003)); the Hare Psychopathy Checklist Revised Screening Version
(PCL:SV) (Hart, Cox and Hare (1995)); and the Hare Psychopathy Checklist Revised
Youth Version (PCL:YV) (Forth, Kossen and Hare (2003)): see, eg, Hare and Craig
(2009); R v Armfield (2005) 155 A Crim R 299; [2005] SASC 108; Attorney-General (Qld) v
Robinson [2006] QSC 328; Attorney-General (Qld) v Fisher [2007] QSC 212; Radford v Parole
Board [2002] NSWCCA 70; Secretary, Department of Justice (Vic) v Fletcher [2010] VSC 170;
Attorney-General (Qld) v Lawrence [2012] QSC 386; Western Australia v West [2013] WASC
14; Attorney-General (Qld) v Spoehr [2015] QSC 362; Attorney-General (Qld) v Penningson
[2016] QSC 146; Attorney-General (Qld) v Nallajar [2016] QSC 317; Attorney-General (Qld)
v Barlow [2018] QSC 91;
• the Historical, Clinical, and Risk Management 20 item (HCR-20): see, eg, Webster et al
(1997); Attorney-General (Qld) v Robinson [2006] QSC 328; Attorney-General (Qld) v
Lawrence [2012] QSC 386; Western Australia v West [2013] WASC 14; R v Haigh [2009]
VSC 185; New South Wales v Richardson (No 2) (2011) 210 A Crim R 220; [2011] NSWSC
276; Attorney-General (Qld) v Penningson [2016] QSC 146; Attorney-General v Barlow
[2018] QSC 91; New South Wales v O’Donnell [2018] NSWSC 563;
• the Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) and the Level of Service Inventory-
Revised Screening Version (LSI-R:SV): see, eg, Andrews and Bonta (1995; 2001); Agafili
and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] AATA 91; Radford v Parole
Board [2002] NSWCCA 70; Pollock v The Queen [2007] NSWSC 148; ASP v The Queen
[2007] NSWSC 339; Sutton v NSW State Parole Authority [2011] NSWSC 935; New South
Wales v TT (Preliminary) [2017] NSWSC 1797;
• the Lifestyle Criminality Screening Form-Revised (LCSF-R): see Walters, Revella and
Baltrusaitis (1990); Walters (2011);
• the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised (MnSOST-R) and the MnSOST-3:
see Epperson, Kaul and Hesselton (2003); Duwe and Freske (2012);
• the Ontario Domestic Assault Risk Assessment (ODARA): see Hilton et al (2004); R v
Pieszkor 2005 BCPC 640;
• the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sex Offender Recidivism (RRASOR): see, eg, Hanson
(1998); DG v Commission for Children and Young People [2003] NSWADT 162; New South
Wales v Mitchell [2009] NSWSC 283; Agafili and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural
Affairs [2001] AATA 91; Director of Public Prosecutions v GTR [2009] WASC 318;
• the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol (RSVP): see, eg, Hart et al (2003); Director of Public
Prosecutions (WA) v Mangolamara (2007) 169 A Crim R 379; [2007] WASC 71; Director of
Public Prosecutions (WA) v Moolarvie [2008] WASC 37; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
v GTR (2008) 198 A Crim R 149; [2007] WASCA 318; Woods v Director of Public
Prosecutions (WA) (2008) 38 WAR 217; [2008] WASCA 188; Western Australia v West
[2013] WASC 14; New South Wales v Kas [2012] NSWSC 1139; Attorney-General (Qld) v
Lawrence [2012] QSC 386; Attorney-General (Qld) v Spoehr [2015] QSC 362; Attorney-
General (Qld) v Penningson [2016] QSC 146; Attorney-General v Barlow [2018] QSC 91; New
South Wales v O’Donnell [2018] NSWSC 563;
• the Risk Matrix 2000 Sexual/Violence (RMS, RMV): see, eg, Thornton et al (2003); Re
Thompson and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade (2007) 45 AAR 149; [2007] AATA 1244;
Commissioner of Police v ABC [2010] WADC 161;
• the Risk of Conviction Times Risk of Imprisonment (RoC*RoI): see Bakker, Riley and
O’Malley (1998); Belcher v Department of Corrections [2006] NZCA 262;
• the Sex Offender Need Assessment Rating (SONAR): see, eg, Hanson and Harris (2001);
Lee v State Parole Authority of New South Wales [2006] NSWSC 1225; Belcher v Department
of Corrections [2006] NZCA 262; TSL v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2006) 14 VR
898 [10.40.20]
109; [2006] VSCA 199; Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections v C HC WN CRI
2006-485-51 [2006] NZHC 790; Attorney-General (NSW) v Tillman [2007] NSWSC 605;
Salter v West Moreton Community Corrections Board [2007] QSC 29; Secretary, Department
of Justice (Vic) v Fletcher [2010] VSC 170;
• the Sex Offender Risk Appraisal Guide (SORAG): see, eg, Quinsey et al (1998, pp 147ff;
2006, pp 175ff); Attorney-General (Qld) v HTR [2007] QSC 19; Agafili and Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] AATA 91; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
v GTR [2007] WASC 318; Attorney-General (NSW) v Quinn [2007] NSWSC 873;
Attorney-General (Qld) v Lawrence [2012] QSC 386; Attorney-General (Qld) v Tilbrook [2012]
QSC 128; Attorney-General (Qld) v Penningson [2016] QSC 146; Attorney-General v Nallajar
[2016] QSC 317; Attorney-General v Barlow [2018] QSC 91; Thompson v Attorney-General
[2018] QCA 172;
• the Sexual Violence Risk 20 (SVR-20): see, eg, Boer et al (1997); R v Armfield (2005) 155 A
Crim R 299; [2005] SASC 108; Attorney-General (Qld) v HTR [2007] QSC 19; Director of
Public Prosecutions (WA) v Mangolamara (2007) 169 A Crim R 379; [2007] WASC 71;
Attorney-General v Fardon [2003] QSC 379; Department of Corrections v P HC HAM CRI
2006-419-51 [2008] NZHC 1040; New South Wales v Wilde [2008] NSWSC 1148;
Attorney-General (Qld) v Tilbrook [2012] QSC 128; Attorney-General (Qld) v Lawrence [2012]
QSC 386; Attorney-General (Qld) v Spoehr [2015] QSC 362; Attorney-General v Nallajar
[2016] QSC 31;
• the Stable-2000/Acute-2000, Stable-2000R/Acute-2000R and the Stable-2007/Acute-
2007: see, eg, Hanson et al (2007); Attorney-General (Qld) v LSS [2007] QSC 202;
Attorney-General (Qld) v HTR [2007] QSC 19; Gough v Southern Queensland Regional Parole
Board [2008] QSC 222; Attorney-General (Qld) v Tilbrook [2012] QSC 128; Attorney-General
(Qld) v Lawrence [2012] QSC 386; Attorney-General (Qld) v Spoehr [2015] QSC 362;
Attorney-General v Nallajar [2016] QSC 317; New South Wales v O’Donnell [2018] NSWSC
563;
• the Spousal Assault Risk Assessment Guide (SARA): see Kropp et al (1994); Kropp and
Hart (2000); R v Pieszkor 2005 BCPC 640;
• the Static-99/Static 99R: see, eg, Hanson and Thornton (1999; 2000); Harris et al (2003);
Green v The Queen [2004] NTSC 65; Oakes v Department of Corrective Services (2004) 144 A
Crim R 334; [2004] QSC 011; R v Armfield (2005) 155 A Crim R 299; [2005] SASC 108;
Director of Public Prosecutions v Papworth [2005] VSCA 88; TSL v Secretary to the
Department of Justice (2006) 14 VR 109; [2006] VSCA 199; Belcher v Department of
Corrections [2006] NZCA 262; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Allen [2006] WASC
160; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Moolarvie [2008] WASC 37; Tirtabudi v Minister
for Immigration and Citizenship [2008] FCA 414; Gough v Southern Queensland Regional
Parole Board [2008] QSC 222; Woods v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2008) 38 WAR
217; [2008] WASCA 188; Mirik and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] AATA
835; Attorney-General (Qld) v Lawrence [2012] QSC 386; Western Australia v West [2013]
WASC 14; Attorney-General (Qld) v Spoehr [2015] QSC 362; Attorney-General v Nallajar
[2016] QSC 317; Attorney-General v Barlow [2018] QSC 91; Thompson v Attorney-General
[2018] QCA 172; New South Wales v O’Donnell [2018] NSWSC 563;
• the Static-AS: see Belcher v Department of Corrections [2006] NZCA 262; Barr v Chief
Executive of the Department of Corrections [2006] NZCA 313;
• the Static-2002: see, eg, Hanson and Thornton (2003); New South Wales v Richardson
(No 2) (2011) 210 A Crim R 220; [2011] NSWSC 276; New South Wales v Conway [2011]
NSWSC 976; Attorney-General (Qld) v Willis [2012] QSC 052; Attorney-General (Qld) v
Currie [2012] QSC 300;
• the Structured Anchored Clinical Judgement – Minimum (SACJ-Min): see Grubin
(1998);
[10.40.20] 899
• the Structured Professional Judgment (SPJ): see, eg, Hart and Boer (2009); Director of
Public Prosecutions (WA) v Mangolamara (2007) 169 A Crim R 379; [2007] WASC 71; New
South Wales v KAS [2012] NSWSC 1139; Attorney-General (Qld) v Gilchrist [2012] QSC
287; Western Australia v West [2013] WASC 14;
• the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG): see, eg, Quinsey et al (2006, pp 162ff);
Monahan (2008); Director of Public Prosecutions v Zullo [2004] VSCA 153; Attorney-General
(Qld) v Robinson [2006] QSC 328; Attorney-General (Qld) v HTR [2007] QSC 19; R v Main
[2008] NSWSC 692; Attorney-General (Qld) v Perkins [2009] QSC 053; Attorney-General
(Qld) v Hocking [2011] QSC 251; Lucas and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2002]
AATA 423; Attorney-General v Nallajar [2016] QSC 317;
• the 3–Predictor Model: see, eg, Allan, Dawson and Allan (2006); Director of Public
Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2007] WASC 318 at [79]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v
Moolarvie [2008] WASC 37; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Brown [2010] WASC
405; Western Australia v West [2013] WASC 14;
• the Violence Risk Scale (VRS) and the Violence Risk Scale Second Edition (VRS-2): see
Wong and Gordon (2006);
• the Violence Screening Checklist (VSC): see McNiel, Binder and Greenfield (1988);
• the Violent Offender Risk Assessment Scale (VORAS): see Howells et al (1997);
• the Assessment of Risk Manageability for Individuals with Developments and
Intellectual Limitations Who Offend – Sexually (ARMIDILO-S): see Boer, Tough and
Haaven (2004); and
• the Juvenile Sex Offender Assessment Protocol-II (J-SOAP-II) (see Prentky and
Righthand (2003)) and the Sexual Offense Recidivism Risk Assessment Tool-II
(JSORRAT-II) (see Epperson et al (2006)).
Such tests locate an offender within a broad population of offenders and evaluate
statistically the likelihood of their reoffending, based upon identified aspects of past
behaviour, childhood and adolescent development, life events, current attitude, and
personality traits. The conceptual framework for each assessment scheme is generally
derived from an empirical study analysing a sample class of offenders to determine which
variables show the strongest correlation with recidivism risks. From the results of such
studies, the predominant risk factors are isolated, coded and weighted, then reproduced
as an actuarial risk prediction instrument composed of these items.
The actuarial scale may comprise items that are static, dynamic, or a mixture of both.
Existing instruments consist of around 10 to 20 variables, though there are some with
fewer (eg, the RRASOR has four) and some with many more (eg, the LSI-R has 54). A
scoring system is then constructed and applied to each scale item. This may be a
straightforward yes/no or present/absent approach with a nil or one-point score awarded
according to the relevant facts, or it may be a more complicated, graded system with, say,
up to three points possible for a given item depending upon how strongly its features are
present. A minimum and maximum achievable total score limit will be set, and ranges of
scores therein designated predictive significance. In other words, an instrument may
specify a total score range of 0–20, with 0–5 points denoting low risk; 6–10 points:
medium-low risk; 11–15 points: medium-high risk; 16–20 points: high risk. Based on the
results obtained, the clinician, correctional facility, and/or court is invited to make
determinations about treatment and supervision options for the offender based upon his
or her likelihood of reoffending.
900 [10.40.20]
There can be significant inter-rater variability in assessments. An example is to be

found in reports provided to the Queensland Supreme Court in Attorney-General (Qld) v
McLean [2006] QSC 137, where the assessments were as follows:
Nurcombe James Lawrence

VRAG 15 3 8
SORAG 12 1 8
PCL 26 10 28
Despite criticism of the actuarial approach (see, eg, Boer and Hart (2009); Cooke and
Michie (2011); Quinsey et al (2006, pp 197ff)), to date, actuarial risk prediction instruments
have been used in a variety of settings to assess and manage risk. Often mental health
professionals will administer two or more tests for a given individual. Research suggests
that the combination of particular instruments can increase the predictive validity and
provide further clarity in the evaluation. As a result, some risk assessment tools that now
exist as stand-alone instruments are actually an amalgamation of two or more actuarial
models or parts thereof, or a combination of actuarial and non-actuarial risk assessment
methods (see, eg, Douglas, Ogloff and Hart (2003); Boer and Hart (2009); Rettenberger and
Hucker (2011)). For example, the Structured Professional Judgment (SPJ) is or a
combination of scientific, professional and legal literature which considers current best
practice assessment tools, such as the SVR-20, the RSVP or the ARMIDILO-S (see, eg,
Craig, Browne and Beech (2008); Hart and Boer (2009); Doyle, Ogloff and Thomas (2011);
Rettenberger and Hucker (2011, p 88)). Courts have been asked to consider expert
evidence concerning these actuarial risk prediction assessments in making decisions
pertaining to sentencing, parole, and supervision and detention orders. As a preliminary
caution in this regard, Smallbone and Ransley (2005, p 305) have observed that ‘[a]ctuarial
risk prediction scales may contribute important information to psychological and
psychiatric risk assessments, but their limitations must be better understood by courts,
and more openly acknowledged’. Douglas et al (2017) have called for the development of
further data to prevent excessive reliance on risk assessment scores, allow matching of
different risk assessment tools to different context of application, protect against
problematic forms of discrimination and stigmatisation, and ensure that contentious
demographic variables are not prematurely removed from risk assessment tools.
Legislative mandates
[10.40.30] All jurisdictions which have sex offender legislation in place that allows for
continuing detention or extended supervision orders require courts to be ‘satisfied to a
high degree of probability’ that there is ‘an unacceptable risk’ of reoffending (Crimes
(Serious Sex Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW); s 17(3), (3A), as amended by the Crimes (High Risk
Offenders) Amendment Act 2017 (NSW); Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003
(Qld), s 13(1)–(3); Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic), ss 35(1), (4), 36(4); Dangerous Sexual
Offenders Act 2006 (WA), s 7(1), (2). Three of the four jurisdictions require courts to base
their decision on ‘acceptable and cogent evidence’ (Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders)
Act 2003 (Qld), s 13(3)(a); Serious Sex Offenders (Detention and Supervision) Act 2009 (Vic),
s 36(4)(a); Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 (WA), s 7(2)(a)). The legislation in New
South Wales does not use that terminology, but the wording on the requirements for
continuing detention orders is generally so similar to the provisions in the other
jurisdictions that it follows a similar approach.
In all of these jurisdictions, judges are obliged to have regard to expert opinions
derived from psychiatric examinations and the resulting psychiatric reports. For example,
s 17(4) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) provides:
[10.40.30] 901
In determining whether or not to make a continuing detention order or extended

supervision order, the Supreme Court must have regard to the following matters in
addition to any other matter it considers relevant:
…
(b) the reports received from the psychiatrists appointed under section 15(4) to
conduct psychiatric examinations of the offender, and the level of the offender’s
participation in any such examination,
(c) the results of any other assessment prepared by a qualified psychiatrist,
registered psychologist or registered medical practitioner as to the likelihood of
the offender committing a further serious sex offence, the willingness of the
offender to participate in any such assessment, and the level of the offender’s
participation in any such assessment,
(d) the results of any statistical or other assessment as to the likelihood of persons
with histories and characteristics similar to those of the offender committing a
further serious sex offence.
…
Similarly, under s 7(3) of the Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 (WA) the court must have
regard to:
(a) any report that a psychiatrist prepares as required by section 37 for the hearing of
the application and the extent to which the person cooperated when the psychiatrist
examined the person; and
(b) any other medical, psychiatric, psychological, or other assessment relating to the
person; and
(c) information indicating whether or not the person has a propensity to commit serious
sexual offences in the future; and
(d) whether or not there is any pattern of offending behaviour on the part of the person;
and
(e) any efforts by the person to address the cause or causes of the person’s offending
behaviour, including whether the person has participated in any rehabilitation
program; and
(f) whether or not the person’s participation in any rehabilitation program has had a
positive effect on the person; and
(g) the person’s antecedents and criminal record; and
(h) the risk that, if the person were not subject to a continuing detention order or a
supervision order, the person would commit a serious sexual offence; and
(i) the need to protect members of the community from that risk; and
(j) any other relevant matter.
(See also Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld); Parole Act 2002 (NZ),
s 107E.)
The legislation in Victoria and Queensland incorporates similar provisions: see
Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), s 13(4); Serious Sex Offenders
(Detention and Supervision) Act 2009 (Vic), s 35(2).
The legislation in Victoria and Queensland incorporates provisions that bear some
similarity: Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), s 13(4);Serious Offenders Act
2018 (Vic), s 105.
In such a context, ‘[a] court will, ordinarily, place significant weight on the assessment
of a psychiatrist’ because of the expertise held by the psychiatrist: Director of Public
Prosecutions (WA) v GTR (2008) 38 WAR 307; [2008] WASCA 187 at [57]. However, the
decision-making by courts occurs against a backdrop of awareness of the fallibility of
expert evidence in this regard. For instance, Kirby J in Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld)
(2004) 223 CLR 575; [2004] HCA 46 at [125], in reference to s 13 of the Dangerous Prisoners
(Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), observed that:
902 [10.40.30]
Judges of this Court have referred to such unreliability. Even with the procedures and
criteria adopted, the Act ultimately deprives people such as the appellant of personal
liberty, a most fundamental human right, on a prediction of dangerousness, based largely
on the opinions of psychiatrists which can only be, at best, an educated or informed
‘guess’.
In addition, those jurisdictions with serious offender legislation (as against serious sex
offender legislation) contain comparable provisions.
It is for this reason that courts and clinicians alike have embraced the emerging role of
actuarial risk assessment instruments. These tests aspire to provide a more consistent,
quantifiable means of accurately gauging an offender’s potential for recidivism and future
harm to the community and, preferably, assist decision-makers in thereby determining the
most suitable course of treatment, supervision or detention.
The role of actuarial tests
[10.40.40] Although actuarial instruments may be beneficial in predicting the risk of
reoffending, they have limitations (see, eg, Quinsey et al (2006, pp 197ff); Wollert and
Cramer (2012)) and the criteria for determining whether risks, as defined by the relevant
legislation, are established are complex. Following are some observations that have been
made when courts have decided whether or not there is ‘acceptable and cogent evidence’
for the risk of reoffending.
It has been emphasised by the courts that the results obtained from actuarial tests are
not necessarily decisive For example, in TSL v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2006) 14
VR 109; [2006] VSCA 199, Callaway J observed (at [41]–[42]) that:
As well as having difficulties with accuracy, predictions of risk may be seen as providing a
veil of science over what is essentially a social and moral decision about the kind of
offender who creates the greatest fear within the community. Asking mental health
professionals to assess the risk of future harm shifts the burden of deciding what to do
with such offenders from the community to clinicians whose primary role lies within the
medical model of treatment, rather than within the criminal justice model of punishment
and community protection …
[Quoting Professor McSherry on behalf of the Sentencing Advisory Council]
…
It is for those reasons that Parliament has conferred the responsibility for deciding
whether or not to make an extended supervision order on judges experienced in
sentencing, assisted but not constrained by assessment reports and medical evidence.
In Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR (2008) 38 WAR 307; [2008] WASCA 187,
Steytler P and Buss JA stated (at [62]) that: ‘[T]he reports are only a part of the materials
that must be considered and the weight to be accorded to them will depend upon their
cogency and reliability, when considered in the light of the whole of the evidence. The
responsibility for deciding whether or not the offender is a serious danger to the
community as defined and, if so, what order should be made is that of the judge alone.’
Similarly, in Barr v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2006] NZCA 313 at
[24], the New Zealand Court of Appeal has emphasised that:
in the end it is for the Judge to make up his or her own mind after hearing all the evidence
and considering all the statistical, historical and current circumstances to decide whether
the pre-condition for making the order exists. The Court has to ask whether it is satisfied,
having considered the matters addressed in the health assessor’s report, and any other
evidence, whether the offender is likely to commit any of the relevant offences. It requires
a measured independent judgment on the part of the Judge, weighing up all the relevant
circumstances.
In short, judges are the ultimate triers of fact; the role of experts is to assist the courts, not
to usurp their fact-finding role. Within this framework, it has been argued that:
careful consideration must be given to the procedural question of how judges are to
incorporate actuarial tools into their assessments of future criminal behavior. … [A]
[10.40.40] 903
reasonable way for judges to approach the use of actuarial tools is to routinely obtain the
actuarial prediction but to weight it according to the individual circumstances of each case
(ie, more heavily under normal circumstances and less heavily under circumstances in
which countervailing information is present or the target sample is substantially different
from the sample on which the tool was constructed).
(See Silver and Chow-Martin (2002, pp 563, 565).)

In Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Mangolamara (2007) 169 A Crim R 379; [2007]
WASC 71 at [165]–[166], Hasluck J expressed important reservations about the application
of assessment tools:
In the end, bearing in mind that the rules of evidence reflect a form of wisdom based on
logic and experience, I am of the view … that little weight should be given to those parts
of the reports concerning the assessment tools. In my view, the evidence in question does
not conform to long-established rules concerning expert evidence. The research data and
methods underlying the assessment tools are assumed to be correct but this has not been
established by the evidence. It has not been made clear to me whether the context for
which the categories of assessment reflected in the relevant texts or manuals were devised
is that of treatment and intervention or that of sentencing. Dr Pascu acknowledged under
cross-examination that the assessment tools are directed not to the commission of serious
sexual offences but to sexual re-offending of any kind … She acknowledged also that the
database used for the mathematical model upon which Static-99 was based related to
untreated English and Canadian sex offenders released back into the community on an
unsupervised basis … Moreover, having regard to the admissions made under
cross-examination that the tools were not devised for and do not necessarily take account
of the social circumstances of indigenous Australians in remote communities, I harbour
grave reservations as to whether a person of the respondent’s background can be easily
fitted within the categories of appraisal presently allowed for by the assessment tools.
In Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2007] WASC 318, McKechnie J found that
similar issues arose in the case before him. He emphasised (at [112]) the ‘intense scrutiny’
required for the application of the Dangerous Sex Offenders Act 2006 (WA) and the
difference between the roles of a judge and a reporting psychiatrist (at [113]), a judge being
required to consider a range of factors beyond what may be the subject of psychiatric and
psychological reports. He considered that the psychiatric expert opinion was ‘helpful in
determining a counselling regime or a management strategy for the offender’ (at [111]),
but he attributed ‘little weight’ (at [112]) to the results of the assessment tools in predicting
the offender’s risk of reoffending that were presented to him at that time. He stated (at
[112]) that:
[The Dangerous Sex Offenders Act 2006] requires acceptable and cogent evidence to a high
degree of probability. While opinions based on the present predictive models may be
suitable for management purposes, they lack cogency for the purposes of the DSO Act that
little weight can be attributed to the results of assessments that rely on them. Accepting
the view expressed that clinical interview alone is a poor predictor, it remains the case in
Western Australia that as yet the tools that are being developed to increase the accuracy of
predictive outcome of dangerous sexual offenders have not developed to such a stage that
the evidence can be described as ‘acceptable and cogent’.
In Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Comeagain [2008] WASC 235 at [20], McKechnie J
remained highly critical of using actuarial scales and stated that:
it would be an error to attribute a degree of scientific certainty to the tools simply because
they deliver an arithmetical outcome. They remain unvalidated. Years will have to pass
before a retrospective survey can determine whether and, to what extent, the predictive
tools are reliable.
However, on appeal regarding GTR, Murray AJA stated in Director of Public Prosecutions
(WA) v GTR (2008) 38 WAR 307; [2008] WASCA 187 at [162] that:
904 [10.40.40]
His Honour did not need to globally discard the predictive models insofar as they might
be applied to any case, but in relation to this case, having regard to the limitations
inherent in those predictive models, as noted by McKechnie J, it seems to me that it was
well open to him, in view of the lack of clinical support for the assessment made, to have
reservations about the cogency of the psychiatric evidence.
He emphasised (at [57]) that:

the psychiatrist has expertise which the court lacks and the Parliament considers to be
important. However, if the psychiatrist’s reasons for the assessment … do not withstand
scrutiny, even allowing for the psychiatrist’s expertise, or if the assessment is based on
mistaken factual assumptions, the court is, of course, free to give little weight to it.
This has resulted in complex decisions such as Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Pindan
(No 3) [2017] WASC 107 in an orthodox analysis of the offender’s insight, attitudes and
responsiveness to treatment without a major reliance upon actuarial test results.
Doyle, Ogloff and Thomas (2011) examined risk assessment practices of forensic
clinicians on sexual offender recidivism in Australia. They observed the use of unreliable
methods of risk assessment and insufficient precaution in communicating risk assessment
results to others who are not in clinical practice (p 553). However, their study also
observed that the consistent use of structured risk assessment tools has resulted in regular
consensus between experts and they suggest that the consistent use of structured risk
assessment can translate hard science into practice when applied with clinical modesty
and professional rigour (p 553). Their study suggests that the actuarial and Structured
Professional Judgement (SPJ) methods deliver valid, evidence-based risk information
when clinicians combine both methods based on contemporary best knowledge (p 551)
and communicate the results with clinical modesty and professional rigour (p 552). This
includes stating the limitations of the state of knowledge in the field and using the
language of the tools – not the judgment whether the risk is ‘unacceptable’, ‘significant’ or
‘likely’, as this is for the decision-maker to determine (p 552). Similarly, Ireland and Craig
(2011) suggest that a combination of actuarial assessment tools and dynamic factors has
shown greater reliability and consistency in predicting recidivism of sex offenders.
In a number of judgments, this approach has been followed with courts basing their
decision on evidence provided by several experts who presented results of a combination
of risk assessment tools or a combination of actuarial assessment tools and dynamic
factors (see, eg, R v Armfield (2005) 155 A Crim R 299; [2005] SASC 108; Secretary of
Department of Justice v Fletcher [2010] VSC 170; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Unwin
[2011] WASC 11; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v TJD [2011] WASC 83; Attorney-
General (Qld) v Tilbrook [2012] QSC 128; New South Wales v KAS [2012] NSWSC 1139;
Attorney-General (Qld) v Gilchrist [2012] QSC 287; Attorney-General for Queensland v
Lawrence [2012] QSC 386; Western Australia v West [2013] WASC 14).
In Western Australia, the ‘3-Predictor Model’ has been employed in a number of cases
in addition to other risk assessment tools. It takes into account whether or not there are
unrealistic long-term goals, unfeasible release plans and poor coping skills prior to release:
Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Allen [2009] WASC 360 at [125]; see also Western
Australia v Woods [2007] WASC 320 at [81]; Woods v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)
(2008) 38 WAR 217; [2008] WASCA 188 at [21]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v
Moolarvie [2008] WASC 37 at [59]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2008] WASC
187 at [152]; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Brown [2010] WASC 405 at [36], [63];
Western Australia v West [2013] WASC 14. The 3-Predictor Model has been developed for
indigenous populations and allows for identifying factors beyond the control of the
offender, such as social factors, racism or remote residency (Western Australia v West [2013]
WASC 14 at [31]). It is subject to criticism, but, in deciding whether or not a convicted sex
[10.40.40] 905
offender was a serious danger to the community, Corboy J in West took into account the
criticism of the 3-Predictor Model ([at 51]) rather than disregarding the clinical assessment
because such criticism exists.
The nature of the risk occurring
[10.40.50] Another difficulty judges have faced in deciding on the convicted person’s risk
of reoffending lies in determining the nature and degree of the risk occurring. All
jurisdictions which allow for continuing, post-sentence detention orders require that the
convicted person poses ‘an unacceptable risk’ of committing a serious sex offence: Crimes
(High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), s 17(3); Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act
2003 (Qld), s 13(2); Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic), s 35(1), Sch 1; Dangerous Sexual
Offenders Act 2006 (WA), s 7(1).
In Western Australia, a court may find that a convicted offender is a serious danger to
the community if the court is satisfied that there is an unacceptable risk that the person
would commit a serious sexual offence. (The wording in Queensland is similar.) With
respect to the legislation in Western Australia, Martin CJ concluded in Director of Public
Prosecutions (WA) v Williams (2007) 35 WAR 297; [2007] WASCA 206 at [11] that:
By using two different expressions; namely, ‘serious danger to the community’ and
‘unacceptable risk’ and specifying that a finding of the latter is a prerequisite to a finding
of the former, the legislature appears to be connoting that the two expressions have a
different ambit. This in turn tends to the conclusion that it is at least theoretically possible
that somebody could pose ‘an unacceptable risk’ but not be ‘a serious danger to the
community’. One theoretical possibility is that the legislature intended the reference to
‘the community’ to connote a danger to a broad class or group, thus excluding cases in
which the unacceptable risk was posed only to an identifiable individual.
In Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR (2008) 38 WAR 307; [2008] WASC 187 at [25],
Steytler P and Buss JA observed that the ‘interaction between the expressions is, to some
extent, obscure’, but they confirmed the majority opinion in Director of Public Prosecutions
(WA) v Williams (2007) 35 WAR 297; [2007] WASCA 206 per Wheeler JA, with whom
LeMiere AJA agreed. In Wheeler JA’s view, the finding that there is an unacceptable risk of
the convicted person committing a serious sexual offence automatically results in finding
that there is a ‘serious danger to the community’ (at [66]). She further stated (at [66]) that:
Normally, where Parliament uses two different expressions, one would expect two
different meanings to be intended. However, if, as in my view it does, s 7(1) in referring to
an ‘unacceptable risk’ is referring to a risk which is unacceptable having regard to the
serious consequences of making such a finding, then it is difficult to imagine what further
matters the court would need to consider in determining whether the person was a
serious danger to the community. In the context of this Act, it seems to me more likely that
in using the different, and even less precise, expression ‘serious danger to the community’,
Parliament was merely intending to emphasise the very serious nature of the finding with
which the court was concerned. In my view, once the court has found an unacceptable risk
in the sense that I have described, the finding of serious danger to the community
inevitably follows.
Concerning the question of what constitutes ‘an unacceptable risk’, Steytler P and Buss JA
also confirmed (at [26]) Wheeler J’s observation in Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v
Williams (2007) 35 WAR 297; [2007] WASCA 206 at [63] that:
In my view, an ‘unacceptable risk’ in the context of s 7(1) is a risk which is unacceptable
having regard to a variety of considerations which may include the likelihood of the
person offending, the type of sexual offence which the person is likely to commit (if that
can be predicted) and the consequences of making a finding that an unacceptable risk
exists. That is, the judge is required to consider whether, having regard to the likelihood of
the person offending and the offence likely to be committed, the risk of that offending is so
unacceptable that, notwithstanding that the person has already been punished for
whatever offence they may have actually committed, it is necessary in the interests of the
community to ensure that the person is subject to further control or detention.
906 [10.40.50]
Their Honours amended this observation in Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR
(2008) 38 WAR 307; [2008] WASCA 187 (at [27], [34]) by stating that:
The word ‘unacceptable’ necessarily connotes a balancing exercise, requiring the court to
have regard, amongst other things, for the nature of the risk (the commission of a serious
sexual offence, with serious consequences for the victim) and the likelihood of the risk
coming to fruition, on the one hand, and the serious consequences for the offender, on the
other, if an order is made (either detention, without having committed an unpunished
offence, or being required to undergo what might be an onerous supervision order).
The court must therefore identify what it is (if anything) that constitutes the risk and
makes the risk unacceptable, and then consider whether or not that factor has, or those
factors have, been proved to a high degree of probability by acceptable and cogent
evidence.
In Western Australia v West [2013] WASC 14 at [52], Corboy J confirmed these positions.
The degree of the risk occurring
[10.40.60] All jurisdictions that have serious sex offender legislation in place also require
that the court has to be satisfied ‘to a high degree of probability’ that the convicted sex
offender will reoffend: see Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), s 17(3); Dangerous
Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld), s 13(1), (3)(b); Serious Sex Offenders (Detention
and Supervision) Act 2009 (Vic), s 35(1), (4)(b); Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 (WA),
s 7(1), (2)(b).
In respect to the phrase ‘high degree of probability’, it has been established that the
standard of proof is higher than the civil standard of proof on ‘a balance of probabilities’,
but lower than the criminal standard of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’: see, eg, Tillman v
Attorney-General (2007) 70 NSWLR 448; [2007] NSWCA 327 per Mason P at [15]; Director of
Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR (2008) 38 WAR 307; [2008] WASC 187 at [29], [34] per
Steytler P and Buss JA; New South Wales v Darrego [2011] NSWSC 1449 at [15] per
Fullerton J.
Prior to legislative change in New South Wales and Victoria, the consideration whether
the convicted sex offender was ‘likely to commit a relevant offence’ was subject to
controversy. It was discussed whether ‘likely’ means ‘more probably than not’: see, eg,
Tillman v Attorney-General (2007) 70 NSWLR 448; [2007] NSWCA 327; Cornwall v
Attorney-General [2007] NSWCA 374; TSL v Secretary to Department of Justice (2006) 14 VR
109; [2006] VSCA 199; Secretary Department of Justice (Vic) v Fletcher [2010] VSC 170.
However, the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW), s 17(3A) and the Serious Sex
Offenders (Detention and Supervision) Act 2009 (Vic), s 35(4) now state that a person poses an
‘unacceptable risk’ of committing a serious sex offence even if it is less likely than not that
the person will commit another offence.
An overview of commonly used actuarial instruments
The Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offence Recidivism (RRASOR)

[10.40.80] The Rapid Risk Assessment for Sexual Offence Recidivism (RRASOR) (Hanson
(1997)) was developed by Dr RK Hanson, Solicitor General of Canada, in 1997, to be used
as a simple device to determine the likelihood of sexual recidivism among adult males
known to have committed at least one sexual offence. It is not intended to provide a
comprehensive evaluation of recidivism risk, but instead to provide a basic screening tool
by which to broadly categorise offenders into relative risk levels.
Unlike some actuarial risk prediction tests, the RRASOR is extremely concise and easy
to use. It relies upon only four items, the information for all of which can be readily
obtained from official records such as psychiatric patient and correctional files. This makes
it very convenient in circumstances requiring routine assessments of sexual offender risk
status. It is commonly used for this purpose.
[10.40.80] 907
The RRASOR variables were derived from a pool of factors that were shown to
correlate closely with the risk of reoffence in a meta-analysis carried out by Hanson and
Bussière in 1996. As a result of further research by Hanson, these variables were
condensed down to the four now making up the RRASOR. The resulting four items are as
follows:
1. Having prior sex offences.
2. Being between the ages of 18 and 24.99 years old at the time of release (ie the
current age).
3. Having an unrelated victim.
4. Having a male victim.
The scoring process is straightforward. The final two items (the presence of unrelated
and/or male victims) are treated as yes/no factors. A positive response receives a score of
1. A negative response receives a 0 score. So, for example, an offender who has sexually
assaulted only females, all of whom were unrelated, would receive a score of 1 (a 0 score
for male victims; a 1 score for unrelated victims). There need be only one victim to score in
relation to these variables. Thus, if an offender has had 10 victims, nine of whom were
female and 1 of whom was male, then the offender will still score 1 for item 4. The second
item (offender’s current age) is also a two-choice option. An age of 25 or more receives a 0
score. An age of 24.99 or less receives a 1. The only slightly more complicated, multi-score
variable is item 1, which concerns the offender’s previous sexual offences. For this item, an
offender can receive a score of between 0 and 3. Nil previous offences equates to a 0 score.
One conviction or one to two charges receive a score of 1. Two to three convictions or three
to five charges receive a score of 2. Four or more convictions or six or more charges receive
a score of 3. As a result, total scores can range from 0 (lowest) to 6 (highest) to indicate the
sexual recidivism risk.
There have been various replication studies carried out in relation to the RRASOR,
which demonstrate its moderate level of predictive accuracy. Some studies suggest that
the RRASOR is at least as accurate as, if not more accurate than, more elaborate actuarial
tests, such as the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG) and the Minnesota Sex Offender
Screening Tool-Revised (MnSOST-R). However, due to the brevity of the RRASOR, a
number of important variables are absent that have been shown to have a high correlation
with the risk of reoffending, such as deviant sexual preferences (consistently found to be
one of the strongest recidivism predictors), antisocial orientation, lack of cooperation with
or failure to complete treatment and/or community supervision, and other dynamic
personality and psychiatric traits. Due to these shortcomings, even the developer of the
RRASOR, Dr Hanson, has conceded (1997, p 19):
There is … sufficient recidivism research to suggest that applied risk assessments should
consider more than the four basic factors covered in the RRASOR.
The Static-99
[10.40.90] The Static-99 (Hanson and Thornton (1999; 2000)) is the most used of the
actuarial risk prediction instruments in Australia and has attracted a measure of judicial
analysis. As with the RRASOR, the Static-99 was designed to estimate the probability of
sexual (and violent) reoffending by adult males who have been charged with, or convicted
of, at least one sexual offence against a child or a non-consenting adult. The instrument
utilises what it describes as static or unchangeable factors that correlate with sexual
recidivism in adult males. These factors are intentionally easily identifiable from common
records.
Although the test can be completed mostly from a review of official files and generally
a brief interview, the developers of the instrument strongly recommend training in the use
908 [10.40.90]
of the Static-99 before attempts at risk assessments. They have observed that researchers,
parole and probation officers, psychologists, sex offender treatment providers, and police
personnel involved in threat and risk assessment activities typically use it. The estimates
of sexual and violent recidivism produced by the Static-99 are described as ‘a baseline of
risk’ for recidivism (Harris et al (2003)). On the basis of such assessment, treatment and
supervision strategies can be constructed to reduce the risk of recidivism.
The Static-99 was developed by Dr Hanson and Dr D Thornton of Her Majesty’s Prison
Service, England. It was created by amalgamating two risk assessment instruments: the
Rapid Risk Assessment for Sex Offender Recidivism (RRASOR) (discussed above) and
Thornton’s Structured Anchored Clinical Judgement – Minimum (SAJ-C/SACJ-Min). The
SAJ-Min is an independently created risk assessment instrument written by Dr Thornton
which consists of the following nine items:
1. Having a current sex offence.
2. Prior sex offences.
3. A current conviction for non-sexual violence.
4. A prior conviction for non-sexual violence.
5. Having four or more previous sentencing dates on the criminal record.
6. Being single.
7. Having non-contact sexual offences.
8. Having stranger victims.
9. Having male victims.
The Static-99 combines all four items of the RRASOR (previous sexual offences; offender
age; male victim; unrelated victim) with the six non-redundant items of the SACJ-Min,
producing a relatively static scale. The coding rules for the Static-99 require the assessor to
allocate one point (or not), as the case may be, for each of the following nine risk factors:
1. Youth (defined as 18 to 24.99 years).
2. Never lived with a lover for two years.
3. Index non-sexual violence convictions.
4. Prior non-sexual violence convictions.
5. Prior sentencing dates (four or more separate sentencing dates prior to the index
offence).
6. Convictions for non-contact sex offences (exhibitionism, possession of obscene
material, obscene telephone calls, voyeurism, exposure, illicit use of the internet,
sexual harassment).
7. Any unrelated victims.
8. Any stranger victims (a person whom the offender did not know 24 hours before
the offence).
9. Any male victims.
The final risk factor, prior sex offences, is scored in a more graded fashion. Nil charges or
convictions receive 0 points. One to two charges or one conviction scores 1 point. Three to
five charges or two to three convictions score 2 points. Six or more charges or four or more
convictions score 3 points. In relation to items 8 and 9, the Static-99 instrument awards a
score of 1 point for an offence against a victim who is unrelated to the offender and for an
offence in which the victim is a stranger. The offender scores 2 points for the same offence
committed against a stranger to whom he was not related.
Once all variables have been addressed and scored accordingly, all points are tallied to
produce a total score of between 0 and 12, which is then allocated to one of four
[10.40.90] 909
recidivism risk categories. Scores of 0 or 1 are considered to indicate a low risk. Scores of
2 or 3 are medium-low risk. Scores of 4 or 5 are medium-high risk. A score of 6 and above
places the subject into the high-risk category. In statistical terms, persons with a score of 6
or above are designated to have a 39% rate of sexual recidivism within five years; a 44.9%
rate of sexual recidivism within 10 years; and a 52.1% rate of sexual recidivism within
15 years. A sample of 100 sex offenders with a score of 6 or above would be expected to
include 39 who were convicted of a further sexual offence within five years, while 61
would not reoffend within this period.
Significantly, a score of 8, for example, does not necessarily mean that an offender has
a greater level of risk than an offender with a score of 6. Rather, there is said to be
increased confidence that an offender who scores above 6 is a member of the high-risk
group (Attorney General (NSW) v Tillman [2007] NSWSC 605 at [66]). In the actuarial
sample group upon which the Static-99 was constructed, the higher the Static-99 score, the
higher the percentage of individuals who eventually recidivated. Approximately 50% of
individuals with a Static-99 score of 6 and above did not recidivate within a 15-year
follow-up period; however, the other 50% or so did. Given the fact that not all persons
within that so-called ‘high risk’ group are at equal risk, the Static-99 can take us no further
than identifying specifically which individuals with a score of 6 or greater are actually
more or less likely to recidivate. When it comes to determining specifically which persons
with a score of 6 or higher are more or less likely (whether likely means 50% or 40%) to
commit a further act of ‘sexual violence’, the Static-99 cannot do much better than a coin
flip. What the Static-99 has demonstrated is that many persons, including those with
multiple prior offences, who might have been expected to recidivate, did not do so. For
this reason, the conceptual framework of the Static-99 has encountered criticism.
Professor Greenberg has observed that the sample size of the population in the
Static-99 study was not large, and that the instrument has a ‘moderate accuracy’. He noted
predictive validity rates of about 70%, which is clearly better than chance, but not so
convincing as to make clinical judgment redundant. As a result, Professor Greenberg
recommended that the Static-99 be used in conjunction with a clinically guided risk
assessment (Attorney General (NSW) v Tillman [2007] NSWSC 605 at [73]). He commented
that the major limitation with actuarial scales, such as the Static-99, lies in the fact that
they inform about a risk group of sex offenders relative to other sex offenders in the same
category and do not identify which offender will reoffend and which offender will not
reoffend within the same category. Accordingly (at [73]):
All that can be deduced from the scales is that in a group of sex offenders with similar
scores a percentage will reoffend within a 15 year or longer period while the remaining
group will not reoffend based on re-arrest rates.
Professor Greenberg also noted that the scales of the Static-99 have not been fully
validated on an Australian population. He has conducted a validation study involving a
Western Australian sex offender population and found the Static-99 to have an acceptable
level of validity.
As the instrument is of its nature a predictive instrument that has limited application
to individuals, it has been treated with reservations by a number of courts. Thus, for
instance, while a defendant was measured as in the high-risk category of offenders in the
Static-99 scale in Attorney General (NSW) v Tillman [2007] NSWSC 605 at [76], Bell J
observed that:
This does not establish to [a] high standard … that he is likely to commit a further serious
sex offence. It has been shown to be a predictive tool of moderate value and I have regard
to the defendant’s high score on it in conjunction with the assessment made of him by the
various health professionals based upon a consideration of factors that are specific to him.
910 [10.40.90]
In Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Mangolamara (2007) 169 A Crim R 379; [2007]
WASC 71, objection was initially taken to the admissibility of reports based upon the
Static-99 and other actuarial risk prediction instruments (the Structured Professional
Judgment (SPJ) and the Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol (RSVP)). However, the objection
was not pressed and arguments were ultimately directed toward the weight that should
be given to the reports. It was argued that the opinions in the reports that there was a high
risk of reoffending were based upon or significantly influenced by assessment tools which
had not been proven. Thus, the argument was not that the experts were drawing upon
specialised knowledge or non-specific hearsay as the foundation for an opinion, but that
they were drawing upon assumed facts as to patterns of behaviour in sexual offenders
which had not been established by evidence. Hasluck J (in Director of Public Prosecutions
(WA) v Mangolamara (2007) 169 A Crim R 379; [2007] WASC 71 at [162]) held that the
objections raised against what he termed the ‘so-called assessment tools’ were ‘persuasive’
on the basis that ‘the assumed facts upon which the operation of the tools depend’ had not
been established by independent evidence and in one instance ‘the reasoning or method of
computation’ had not been adduced in evidence.
Hasluck J further observed that there was what he termed a ‘basic objection’ in relation
to the reports before him, namely, that the facts and assumptions underlying the
assessment tools and related manuals had not been proved. He acknowledged that he was
required by statute to take account of psychiatric reports in relation to the matters which
he was called upon to decide but held (at [164]) that:
… it is apparent from the decided cases that, in a context where the effect of the orders
applied for may be to deprive a person of his liberty, the Court is obliged to proceed with
circumspection in determining what weight, if any, is to be given to the reports. The
reports must be subjected to careful scrutiny, having regard to the prescribed onus upon
the DPP as applicant to make out its case to a high degree of probability.
Hasluck J concluded (at [165]) that little weight should be given to those parts of the
psychiatrists’ reports concerning the assessment tools on the basis that the research data
and methods underlying the assessment tools assumed to be correct had not been
established by the evidence:
It has not been made clear to me whether the context for which the categories of
assessment reflected in the relevant texts or manuals were devised is that of treatment and
intervention or that of sentencing.
He noted that the tools had been conceded by one of the witnesses to be directed not to
the commission of serious sexual offences but to sexual reoffending of any kind and that
the database used for the mathematical model upon which the Static-99 was based related
to untreated English and Canadian sex offenders released back into the community on an
unsupervised basis. He particularly took into account that the tools were not devised for
and did not necessarily take account of the social circumstances of indigenous Australians
in remote communities.
In conclusion, Hasluck J held that, as the psychiatrists before him had characterised the
assessment tools as screening devices or aids which were used essentially to check the
validity of their clinical assessments, he considered that it was open to him to take account
of and give weight to those parts of their reports in which it appeared that their opinions
were formed on the basis of their clinical assessments of the patient.
Bell and Hasluck JJ, in different ways, seemed to echo to some extent the view
expressed by Professor McSherry on behalf of the Sentencing Advisory Council, which
was quoted by Callaway JA in TSL v Secretary to the Department of Justice (2006) 14 VR 109;
[2006] VSCA 199 at [41], as stating that there is a potential for risk assessments to be
misunderstood and assigned greater accuracy by the courts than is warranted, and that
the assessments tend to be taken out of their primary context, which is one of treatment
and intervention.
[10.40.90] 911
Blaxell J in Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Moolarvie [2008] WASC 37 at [43] found
that:
The literature shows that the ‘Static-99’ has only ‘moderate predictive accuracy’ at best. Its
great shortcoming is that it does not take account of dynamic or changing factors which
might increase or reduce the risk, and which would differentiate an individual offender
from the group. A further drawback of the ‘Static-99’ (in the context of the present
application) is that it purports to assess the risk of recidivism for sexual offending
generally rather than for ‘serious sexual offending’ as defined by the Act.
Ultimately, he concluded (at [59]) that ‘I agree that an expert opinion based upon the
results of the “Static-99” alone would have very little weight. However an opinion based
upon those results combined with the clinical assessments required by the “3-Predictor
model” may well have a sounder footing’.
In Western Australia v West [2013] WASC 14, two psychiatric experts assessed the
offender’s risk of reoffending based on the use of Static-99, PCL-R, RSVP and the
3-Predictor Model. This ‘multi-factorial approach to risk assessment’ provided
Justice Corby (at [54]) with information for identifying the factors which make a risk
unacceptable and then for considering whether or not one or several of these factors are
acceptable and cogent evidence to prove a high degree of the probability of the convicted
offender’s risk of reoffending (at [52]).
In Attorney-General v Barlow [2018] QSC 91 at [13], [62], the concession was made by the
assessor, and noted by Lyons SJA, that the risk assessment instruments (including the
STATIC 99R) had not been standardised for Australian populations and, in particular, for
indigenous populations, and thus would need to be interpreted with caution.
There have also been specific concerns expressed about the reliability of utilising the
Static-99, among other actuarial instruments, across diverse racial populations. Hasluck J
in Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Williams [2007] WASC 95 at [35] found there was
‘considerable validity’ in criticism ventilated before him that the Static-99 had been found
to be less accurate with ethnic groups, other than white Canadians, and performed
particularly poorly with European offenders of African or Asian ethnicity. In part, this led
him to conclude (at [36]) that:
the use of Static-99 is a sufficient predictor of the propensity to commit serious sexual
offences in the future so as to discharge the onus under the Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act
[2006 (WA)] s 72.
He adopted a similar position in Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Mangolamara (2007)

169 A Crim R 379; [2007] WASC 71 at [32], a case concerning an application by the Director
of Public Prosecutions for continuing detention or a supervision order pursuant to the
Dangerous Sexual Offenders Act 2006 (WA) in relation to an Aboriginal male from remote
north-western Australia. One of the two psychiatrists charged with assessing the
respondent, Dr Adam Brett, a consulting forensic psychiatrist, conceded that the Static-99
had not ‘been validated within the Indigenous Australian population’, but proceeded to
say that ‘clinically [it made] the most sense to be used’ (at [116]). Hasluck J was not
satisfied with the evidence presented by the two psychiatric experts, both of whom
asserted that the respondent was ‘at a high risk of re-offending’, and therefore refused the
order sought (see also Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Moolarvie [2008] WASC 37 at
[44] per Blaxell J).
As stated above, the Static-99 is intended to be a measure of long-term risk potential.
However, further concerns have been expressed in relation to its abilities in this regard. In
Re Thompson and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade (2007) 45 AAR 149; [2007] AATA 1244
at [47]–[48], Hack DP commented that he could not identify how it could logically be said
that in 2005 or 2006 the probability of a person reoffending remained at four in 10 when he
had committed no offences in the previous 10 years:
912 [10.40.90]
The flaw, as it seems to me, in the logic of this method is that it does not take into account
periods of compliance with the law. That is to say, once a subject’s criminal history is of a
range and volume to warrant a score of 6 or more points Static-99 seems to suggest that
the offender continues indefinitely to have a 4 in 10 chance of re-offending even as that
prediction is falsified by the passage of time.
This highlights a key deficit of the Static-99: its lack of dynamic factors within the actuarial
paradigm. Unlike other risk assessment instruments, such as the HCR-20 and LSI-R
(discussed below), the Static-99 comprises predominantly stable items. Therefore, it is
unable to measure, cater for, and positively reflect positive change exhibited by the
offender over time. Additionally, it is of only limited assistance in constructing appropriate
treatment and supervision programs. Nor can it evaluate whether offenders have
benefited from such treatment and supervision. Nor can it predict when and under what
circumstances offenders are likely to recidivate. Finally, it is not recommended for
individuals under 18 years of age at the time of release, female offenders, or offenders who
have only been convicted of minor sexual offences.
Despite the criticism and judicial scepticism with which the Static-99 has been met, it
continues to play a significant role in the assessment of recidivism risk in civil, forensic
and correctional settings, and is therefore often brought before the courts for analysis. The
prevalent use of the Static-99 is due in part to the relatively consistent moderate predictive
accuracy it demonstrates across various settings. A summary of the strengths of the
Static-99 are described by its creators to be:
that it uses risk factors that have been empirically shown to be associated with sexual
recidivism and the Static-99 gives explicit rules for combining these factors into a total risk
score. This instrument provides explicit probability estimates of sexual reconviction, is
easily scored, and has been shown to be robustly predictive across several settings using a
variety of samples. The weaknesses of the Static-99 are that it demonstrates only moderate
predictive accuracy (ROC = .71) and that it does not include all the factors that might be
included in a wide-ranging risk assessment (Doren, 2002). While potentially useful, an
interview with the offender is not necessary to score the Static-99.
(See Harris et al (2003, p 3). ‘ROC’ is a statistical abbreviation meaning ‘Receiver

Operating Characteristic’ (Metz (1978)), which is used to empirically compare the
diagnostic performance of two or more quantifiable tests (Griner et al (1981).)
In 2011, Doyle, Ogloff and Thomas asserted that the use of the Static-99 was to that
point the most reliable and validated risk assessment tool (p 551).
The Static-2002
[10.40.100] A relatively new actuarial risk assessment scale is the Static-2002 (Hanson and
Thornton (2003)). It is a revised version of the Static-99 that was generated by the same
developers (Drs Hanson and Thornton). Like the Static-99 (and the RRASOR and the
SAC-J/SACJ-Min), the Static-2002 is intended to be a widely applicable predictive
measure of sexual and violent recidivism among adult males known to have committed at
least one sexual offence, which can be scored using readily available, objective file
information, such as criminal history, victim profiles, and age.
Although the Static-99 has been used widely and demonstrated to have sound
predictive accuracy, Drs Hanson and Thornton considered revision to be necessary for a
number of reasons, including the advantages in improving its coherence, conceptual
clarity, consistency of the coding rules or scoring criteria, rater reliability, ease of training,
and overall predictive accuracy, as well as to reduce or eliminate counterintuitive scorings
experienced (rarely) in applications of the Static-99 (Hanson and Thornton (2003)).
In constructing the scale to be used with the Static-2002, the focus was on the
prediction of sexual recidivism. As such, data sets with factors distinguishing violent
recidivism from sexual recidivism were developed and analysed, with only the composite
[10.40.100] 913
variable sexual recidivism scale retained. The selection of items for the Static-2002 was
guided by previous sexual offence recidivism research, with variables taken from sources
including the Hanson and Bussière (1998) meta-analysis; actuarial risk prediction schemes,
such as the Sex Offender Risk Appraisal Guide (SORAG) and the Minnesota Sex Offender
Screening Tool-Revised (MnSOST-R); and a number of exploratory variables. As with the
Static-99, a key objective was to ensure ease of application of the Static-2002, and therefore
included items were only those about which information was readily accessible from
common file records.
In preliminary trials, all of the Static-99 risk factors were retained, except for ‘never
lived with a lover for two years’, as this was often poorly documented and hard to
confirm, and a number of new items were added. This produced a 22-item test, which was
grouped into five key content areas. Further research refined the final Static-2002 to an
overall 13-variable, five-content areas assessment device. The coding system involved is
more complex than that of the Static-99, though still relatively easy to understand and
apply. In simple terms, the Static-2002 consists of the following recidivism risk prediction
variables:
1. Age at Release (four coding options):
1.1 18 to 24.9.
1.2 25 to 34.9.
1.3 35 to 49.9.
1.4 50 or older.
2. Persistence of Sexual Offending:
2.1 Prior sentencing occasions for sexual offences (four coding options).
2.2 Arrest for sexual offences as juvenile and conviction separate sexual
offence as adult (two coding options: yes or no).
2.3 Rate of sexual offending (two coding options: high or low).
3. Deviant Sexual Interests:
3.1 Any conviction for non-contact sexual offences (same as Static-99 – two
coding options: yes or no).
3.2 Any male victims (same as Static-99 – two coding options: yes or no).
3.3 Convictions for sexual offences against two or more victims under the age
of 12, one of which is unrelated (two coding options: yes or no).
4. Relationship to Victims of Sexual Offences:
4.1 Any unrelated victims (same as Static-99 – two coding options: yes or no).
4.2 Any stranger victims (same as Static-99 – two coding options: yes or no).
5. General Criminality:
5.1 Prior arrest/sentencing occasions for anything (four coding options).
5.2 Any breach of conditional release (two coding options: yes or no).
5.3 Years free prior to committing the sexual offence for which the offender
was convicted (two coding options).
5.4 Any prior convictions for non-sexual violence (two coding options: yes or
no).
Scores are tallied across these 13 variables, resulting in total scores ranging from 0 (lowest)
to 14 (highest) as predictive indicators of recidivism risk.
Drs Hanson and Thornton expressed the hope that the addition of new variables and
the refinement of definitions for the existing variables would increase the predictive
accuracy demonstrated by the Static-99 with respect to institutional and community
samples of rapists, child molesters and exhibitionists. They have noted that, in the
914 [10.40.100]
alternative, even in the absence of significant improvement in predictive accuracy, the

Static-2002 would still be an improvement over the Static-99 if it produced the same
accuracy levels while affording a simpler and easier scoring methodology.
Preliminary research suggests that the Static-2002 shows similar levels of predictive
accuracy to the Static-99 for the prediction of sexual recidivism. Despite this, the
Static-2002 may have some practical advantages over the Static-99, such as offering better
predictive accuracy for predicting violent recidivism; exhibiting less variation across
settings; and increased conceptual clarity, which is important for evaluators desiring to
adjust the suggested risk level according to external, additional factors. However, further
independent, peer-reviewed, replicative studies are required before any firm conclusions
can be drawn.
As with the Static-99, the Static-2002 is not intended to be a comprehensive recidivism
risk assessment tool. It is designed to categorise offenders into broad levels of reoffending
likelihood. It needs to be used in conjunction with other relevant factors to achieve greater
specificity and confidence in relation to recidivism risk. Similarly, the Static-2002 is only
for use in select circumstances, namely to assess recidivism risk in offenders known to
have committed at least one prior sexual offence, who have the opportunity to reoffend as
a result of having received a community sentence or having been released from
incarceration. The offenders to be evaluated must be males, aged 18 years or older, who
have committed a sexual offence against an identifiable victim.
The Hare Psychopathy Checklists (PCLs)

[10.40.110] Psychopathy is a controversial diagnosis (see Cooke (2008); Blaauw and
Sheridan (2002); Doren (1996); Millon et al (1998); Simon (1996)). It is to be distinguished
from Antisocial Personality Disorder as defined by the DSM-V (2013). The diagnostic
criteria of Antisocial Personality Disorder are:
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others
occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following:
(1) Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as
indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest.
(2) Deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning
others for personal profit or pleasure.
(3) Impulsivity or failure to plan ahead.
(4) Irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or
assaults.
(5) Reckless disregard for safety of self or others.
(6) Consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain
consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations.
(7) Lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing
having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another.
B. The individual is at least age 18 years.
C. There is evidence of Conduct Disorder with onset before age 15 years.
D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of
Schizophrenia or a Manic Episode.
The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), now in its second edition (Hare (1991;
2003)), is a diagnostic tool used to rate a person’s psychopathic or antisocial tendencies.
The PCL-R arose out of research into identifiable psychopathic traits conducted by
Professor Robert Hare in the 1960s and 1970s, which culminated in the Psychopathy
Checklist (PCL) (Hare (2003)). The PCL consisted of a 22-variable scale intended to be
[10.40.110] 915
used to assist in assessing an individual for the possible diagnosis of psychopathy. The
PCL was revised by Professor Hare in 1985 and published as a diagnostic manual in 1991
(the PCL-R: Hare (1991)).
Psychopathy, as described by Professor Hare, is an extreme-end antisocial personality
disorder. The Hare PCL-R contains two parts: a semi-structured interview and a review of
the subject’s file records and history. During the evaluation, the clinician scores 20 items
that measure central elements of the psychopathic character. The items cover the nature of
the subject’s interpersonal relationships; affective or emotional involvement; responses to
other people and to situations; evidence of social deviance; and lifestyle. The material thus
covers two key aspects that help define the psychopath: selfish and unfeeling victimisation
of other people, and an unstable and antisocial lifestyle.
The 20 traits assessed by the PCL-R scale are:
• glib and superficial charm;
• grandiose (exaggeratedly high) estimation of self;
• need for stimulation;
• pathological lying;
• cunning and manipulativeness;
• lack of remorse or guilt;
• shallow affect (superficial emotional responsiveness);
• callousness and lack of empathy;
• parasitic lifestyle;
• poor behavioural controls;
• sexual promiscuity;
• early behaviour problems;
• lack of realistic long-term goals;
• impulsivity;
• irresponsibility;
• failure to accept responsibility for own actions;
• many short-term marital relationships;
• juvenile delinquency;
• revocation of conditional release; and
• criminal versatility.
As noted above, the original PCL-R broadly categorises these 20 assessable variables into
two key groups via factor analysis:
Factor 1: The selfish, callous and remorseless use of others.
Factor 2: A chronically unstable, antisocial and socially deviant lifestyle.

Factor 1 concerns the ‘core personality traits of psychopathy’, which typically relate to the
benign and possibly even beneficial personality traits. Factor 2 addresses the negative and
criminalistic features.
The current (second) edition of the PCL-R comprises a further level of classification:
Factor 1, facet 1a: Interpersonal.
Factor 1, facet 1b: Affective.
Factor 2, facet 2a: Impulsive Lifestyle.
916 [10.40.110]
Factor 2, facet 2b: Antisocial Behaviour.
The PCL-R facets 1a and 1b are strongly correlated with narcissistic personality disorder
and histrionic personality disorder. The relevant variables are associated with extroversion
and positive affect. Facets 2a and 2b relate to behaviours including reactive anger, criminal
conduct, and impulsive violence, which strongly correlate to antisocial personality
disorder and criminality generally. Particularly high scores in any given factor and facets
provide further depth and specificity to the clinical diagnosis.
The test proceeds on the basis that people who are psychopathic prey on others using
charm, deceit, violence or other methods that allow them to get what they want. The
symptoms of psychopathy, as defined by Hare (1993), include lack of a conscience or sense
of guilt, lack of empathy, egocentricity, grandiosity, deceitfulness, shallowness,
manipulativeness, and repeated violations of social norms.
The PCL-R was originally designed to assess people accused or convicted of crimes. Its
20-item symptom rating scale allows comparison of a subject’s degree of psychopathy
with that of a prototypical psychopath. Definitions of each item are provided and
evaluators rate the lifetime presence of each item on a 3-point scale on the basis of an
interview with the participant and a review of case history information. A score of 0
denotes a contradiction between the item and the available information. A score of 1
indicates that the available information slightly suggests the item is present or mildly
present. A score of 2 strongly demonstrates the presence of the item on the basis of the
available information. The PCL-R is used to diagnose members of the original population
for which it was developed – adult males in prisons, in criminal psychiatric hospitals, and
awaiting psychiatric evaluations or trial in other correctional and detention facilities. The
PCL-R has also been used to diagnose sex offenders. The PCL-R was originally developed
to identify the degree of a person’s psychopathic tendencies. However, because
psychopaths are heavily over-represented in the recidivist offender population, especially
offenders who repeatedly commit sexual assaults or other violent crimes, the PCL-R is
increasingly being used as an indicator of the potential risk posed by subjects or prisoners.
Obviously, diagnosing someone as a psychopath is a very serious step. It has important
implications for a person and for his or her associates in family, clinical and forensic
settings. Therefore, the test must be administered by professionals who have been
specifically trained in its use and who have a wide-ranging and up-to-date familiarity
with studies of psychopathy. The PCL-R Manual, currently in its second edition (Hare
(2003)), advises that professionals who administer the diagnostic examination should have
advanced degrees in a medical, behavioural or social science field and be registered with a
reputable organisation that oversees psychiatric or psychological testing and diagnostic
procedures. Other recommendations include experience working with convicted or
accused criminals or several years of some other related on-the-job training. Because the
results are used so often in a legal context, it is advised that those who administer it
should be qualified to serve as expert witnesses in the courtroom. It is recommended that,
where possible, two experts test a subject independently with the PCL-R. The final rating
is then to be determined by averaging their scores.
The interview portion of the evaluation covers the subject’s background, including
such items as work and educational history; marital and family status; and criminal
background. Because psychopaths lie frequently and easily, the information they provide
must be confirmed by a review of the documents in the subject’s case history.
When properly completed by a qualified professional, the PCL-R provides a total score
that indicates how closely the test subject matches the ‘perfect’ score that a classic or
prototypical psychopath would rate. Each of the 20 items is given a score of 0, 1 or 2 based
on how well it applies to the subject being tested. A prototypical psychopath would
[10.40.110] 917
receive a maximum score of 40, while someone with absolutely no psychopathic traits or
tendencies would receive a score of 0. A score of 30 or above qualifies a person for a
diagnosis of psychopathy. People with no criminal backgrounds normally score around 5.
Many non-psychopathic criminal offenders score around 22.
Although, as noted above, the Hare PCL and its revision, the PCL-R, were not
originally designed as a risk assessment instruments, the PCL-R and its derivatives (the
PCL-R:2nd ed, PCL-SV, PCL-R:YV) have over time become extremely common means of
determining the likelihood of future recidivism. Indeed, the PCL-R and PCL-SV (screening
version) are considered to be two of the most accurate schemes for assessing the
personality constructs that correlate to violent recidivism and are therefore seen to be very
reliable for the purpose of risk assessments of violence (Hart (1998)). Professor Hare even
claims on his website that ‘[r]ecent surveys of the literature have determined that the
PCL-R is the single best predictor of violent behaviour currently available’ (http://
www.hare.org/scales/pclr.html (accessed 1 September 2019)). Although the PCL-R has its
critics who are more sceptical about its value – including some questioning its suitability
for assessment in older offenders, female offenders, minority populations and cross-
culturally (Cunningham and Reidy (1998); Salekin, Rogers and Sewell (1996); Thornquist
and Zuckerman (1995); Kosson, Smith and Newman (1990); see also Wong (1984)), some
cautioning its use in sentencing (Cunningham and Reidy (1998); Walters (2012)), and
others asserting high rates of false positive and false negative results in replicative studies
(Freedman (2001); Buffington-Vollum et al (2002)) – with the caveat of full and proper use
of the instrument, the PCL-R is asserted to perform at a high standard in assessing
psychopathy and predicting violent behaviour (Hare (1998)).
In addition to the second edition of the PCL-R, Professor Hare has developed the
following derivative assessment instruments:
• the Psychopathy Checklist Revised Screening Version (PCL:SV) (Hart, Cox and Hare
(1995));
• the Psychopathy Checklist Revised Youth Version (PCL:YV) (Forth, Kossen and Hare
(2003));
• the Hare P-Scan Research Version (P-Scan) (Hare and Hervé (1999)); and
• the Antisocial Process Screening Device (APSD) (Frick and Hare (2001)).
The Hare PCL:SV is an abridged version of the PCL-R, developed to provide a concise
screening instrument with sufficiently high validity and reliability consistent with the
PCL-R. It is intended not to supersede the PCL-R, but instead to complement it by
providing an efficient and cost-effective preliminary means of testing for the possibility of
psychopathy, before making a definitive assessment. Should the individual being
evaluated receive a score indicative of potential psychopathy, which cut-off is provided by
the PCL:SV manual, then the PCL-R can be implemented for a complete diagnosis. The
PCL:SV comprises a 12-item scale derived from the PCL-R variables. Scoring proceeds in
the same fashion as with the PCL-R. Total scores range from 0 to 24, with 18 and above
indicating the possibility of psychopathy. The assessment takes approximately one and a
half hours, whereas the full PCL-R requires about three hours to complete. It is
recommended for use in the same forums as the PCL-R, and is commonly used for that
purpose, in addition to personnel selection and community studies.
A number of the questions are heavily value-laden and straightforward:
1. Do you lie a lot?
2. Do you think people are easy to ‘con’ or ‘manipulate’?
3. Do people tell you have a bad temper?
4. How many close friends do you have?
5. Have you ever been deeply in love?
918 [10.40.110]
6. How many different sexual partners have you had?

7. Have you ever been unfaithful to any of your partners?
8. Do you have any long term goals?
9. What was your home life like?
10. Are you a reliable employee?
11. Have you ever been unemployed?
12. How did you get on with other kids at school?
The Psychopathy Checklist Revised Youth Version (PCL:YV) comprises a 20-item scale
comparable to the PCL-R, but the PCL:YV has been specifically designed for the
assessment of psychopathic tendencies in male and female offenders aged between 12 and
18. Recent research suggests that the PCL:YV is useful in assessing psychopathic traits in
adolescent female offenders and for providing meaningful information regarding their
criminal behaviour patterns and personality traits (Bauer, Whitman and Kosson (2011)).
The Hare P-Scan Research Version (P-Scan) is a non-clinical tool designed to provide
an extremely preliminary screen for psychopathic traits. It is intended to be utilised by law
enforcement, probation, parole and correctional officials in civil and forensic facilities, and
in other areas in which such psychiatric information might be of assistance in addressing
‘persons of interest’. Its purpose is to provide a means of initial evaluation of such
persons, to assist in managing their risk for antisocial, criminal and violent behaviour.
The Antisocial Process Screening Device (APSD) is similar to and based upon the
PCL-R. However, rather than detecting psychopathic traits alone, the APSD is designed to
screen for antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy. The APSD is intended to be
used in young populations for the early detection of interpersonal, affective and
behavioural characteristics of an antisocial or psychopathic nature, so that preventative
measures can be employed to avoid violent, criminal and destructive behaviour in the
future.
The Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG)

[10.40.120] Among the earliest, most accurate, and most replicated actuarial risk
assessment schemes is the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG) (Harris, Rice and
Quinsey (1993); Quinsey et al (1998; 2006)). Based upon the results of a series of studies
investigating correlations between specific variables and violent recidivism, Harris et al
selected a range of the most predominantly linked variables to develop a statistical risk
prediction device, originally termed the ‘Risk Assessment Guide’. This later became
known as the VRAG (Rice and Harris (1995)) highlighting its focus on the risk of violent
recidivism. The VRAG was constructed from an ongoing seven-year follow-up study of a
sample of 618 exclusively male offenders with mental disorders, who were convicted,
treated and/or assessed in the Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre, a maximum-
security psychiatric hospital in Ontario, Canada, on the basis of the commission of serious
criminal offences.
The VRAG was developed for, and now is widely applied as a means of, predicting the
risk of violent recidivism, including sexual offences involving some physical contact with
the victim, among mentally disordered offenders who have committed serious violent or
sexual criminal offences. The VRAG is unusual in that it predicts the risk of violent
reoffending within a specific timeframe after release from incarceration.
The VRAG is a purely actuarial instrument comprising a 12-item scale. The included
variables are as follows:
1. Lived with both biological parents to age 16 (except for death of parent).
2. Elementary school maladjustment.
[10.40.120] 919
3. History of alcohol problems.

4. Marital status (at the time of or prior to serious violent or sexual criminal offence).
5. Criminal history for non-violent offences prior to the serious violent or sexual
criminal offence.
6. Failure on prior conditional release.
7. Age at time of serious violent or sexual criminal offence.
8. Severity of victim injury.
9. Any female victim for serious violent or sexual criminal offence.
10. Meets DSM criteria (DSM-III, American Psychiatric Association (1980)) for any
personality disorder (must be made by an appropriately licensed or certified
professional).
11. Meets DSM criteria (DSM-III, American Psychiatric Association (1980)) for
schizophrenia (must be made by an appropriately licensed or certified
professional).
12. Psychopathy Checklist score (if available, otherwise CATS score).
Scoring is relatively straightforward and relies heavily upon the offender’s clinical record,
particularly the psychosocial history, rather than an interview or questionnaire format. As
noted above, one of the 12 variables assessed is the offender’s Hare PCL-R score. The total
VRAG score can range from –26 to 38, from which offenders are categorised into one of
nine risk levels, ranging from a 1 (lowest) to 9 (highest) risk of recidivism.
The VRAG has received considerable attention and acceptance. This is, in part, due to
its range of notable attributes distinguishing it from other actuarial recidivism risk
prediction instruments. It demonstrates marked generality across different populations,
measures of violent outcome, and a wide range of follow-up times. It has been used to
predict serious criminal violent reoffending over follow-up periods in the order of
15 months to 10 years, and in samples with base rates of violent recidivism ranging from
22% to 57%. The VRAG has also accurately predicted the period of time before the first
violent reoffence and the severity of such offence. Although the VRAG was developed to
assist in predicting violent recidivism, it has also demonstrated predictive accuracy in
relation to general criminal recidivism, institutional misconduct, institutional violence and
sexual recidivism (see Harris, Rice and Camilleri (2004)).
The accuracy of the VRAG in predicting violent recidivism among criminal offenders
with mental disorders has been independently tested frequently and replicated in over 25
studies carried out in at least five different countries. The results obtained suggest that the
VRAG may be among the most accurate actuarial risk assessment instruments in
predicting violent and sexual reoffending reported in peer-reviewed scientific literature to
date. The VRAG is most reliable in situations in which there is little or no variance in the
follow-up time, the scoring reliability is high, and none of the 12 scale items have been
omitted or approximated. Under these optimal conditions, the predictive accuracy of the
VRAG can exceed an ROC area of 0.85.
The VRAG has received so much acclaim and support within the scientific community
that the Ontario government awarded its developers the Amethyst Award for Outstanding
Achievement in the Ontario Public Service. Expert evidence concerning predictions of
offender risk utilising the VRAG has been accepted in many criminal courts across
Canada, the United States, Britain and Australia.
Professor John Monahan of the University of Virginia, an internationally recognised
authority in relation to violence prediction, has said (Monahan (1995, p 447)) of the VRAG
that:
for use with male patients with histories of serious violence, the [VRAG] is so far superior
to anything previously available that not to seriously consider its use, at least on an
920 [10.40.120]
experimental basis … would be a difficult choice to justify. The [underlying VRAG

research] constitutes an extraordinary accomplishment – the programmatic gathering and
interpretation of complex information in a manner that is both scientifically rigorous and
clinically meaningful.
Similarly, Dr Kirk Heilbrun of the MCP-Hahnemann University and the Villanova School
of Law, Philadelphia, has stated (Heilbrun (2000, p 396)) that:
anyone familiar with the violence risk literature over the past decade will be aware that
the VRAG is clearly the tool of choice when the purpose is predicting violent behavior
over a relatively long period (a mean outcome period of 88 months for the derivation
sample) with mentally disordered offenders.
However, there have been criticisms of the VRAG. The device does not offer guidance as
to the likely nature, severity, frequency or occurrence timeframe for predicted violent
reoffending (Cooke (2000)) or how to address such risk (Cooke et al (2001)). The VRAG
has been condemned for being over simplistic (Hart (1999)) and lacking ancillary clinical
and dynamic variables demonstrated to correlate with violent recidivism (Cooke (2000);
Hart (1999)). Concerns have been expressed that forensic populations diverge greatly from
one another, thus rendering VRAG predictions inaccurate and unreliable (Loza et al
(2002); see also: Monahan (1981)). A counter-argument to this is that, although population
nature and composition might vary, the variables that predict violent recidivism remain
stable (Harris, Rice and Camilleri (2004); Quinsey et al (1998)) – a position that has
considerable empirical support. A further concern is that, as the VRAG was developed
exclusively on a sample of male offenders, it may be inapplicable for use as a predictor of
violent recidivism among female populations. Although only limited studies have been
carried out in this regard, there is supporting evidence for the successful utilisation of the
VRAG with women. Finally, a practical concern over the legitimacy of using the VRAG
has also been raised. The instrument requires access to adequate offender information, the
release of some of which may be refused (however, note that the VRAG is often still
effective, though typically less so, in circumstances where some of the variables are
unknown); patient cooperation; and around two and a half days of a suitably qualified
clinician’s time to compile the requisite psychosocial history and obtain the PCL-R score
and make DSM assessments. It has been argued (Summers and Loza (2004); Barbaree et al
(2001); see also Buffington-Vollum et al (2002); Kroner and Mills (2001)) that such skill and
time and associated expense may be prohibitive in at least some circumstances.
Alternatively, failure to retain a properly qualified clinician for these components invites
inaccurate results and possible breaches of ethical, and perhaps legal, standards.
The Sexual Offender Risk Appraisal Guide (SORAG)

[10.40.130] The Sexual Offender Risk Appraisal Guide (SORAG) (Quinsey et al (1998;
2006)) is a modification of the VRAG. This actuarial prediction instrument was also
developed at the Penetanguishene Mental Health Centre, Ontario, Canada, using similar
methodology to that employed in the construction of the VRAG. The SORAG was
specifically designed to predict violent recidivism, including sexual offences involving
some physical contact with the victim, among male sex offenders. As with the VRAG, the
SORAG aims to assess risk within a specific period from the date of release from
incarceration. Variables were identified and weighed in the same manner as the VRAG.
The resulting 14-item scale includes 10 of the 12 VRAG variables, in addition to four new,
non-redundant variables. The complete item list is as follows:
Items in common with the VRAG:
1. Lived with both biological parents to age 16 (except for death of parent).
2. Elementary school maladjustment.
3. History of alcohol problems.
[10.40.130] 921
4. Marital status (at the time of or prior to serious violent or sexual criminal offence).
5. Criminal history for non-violent offences prior to the serious violent or sexual
criminal offence.
6. Failure on prior conditional release.
7. Age at time of serious violent or sexual criminal offence.
8. Meets DSM criteria (DSM-III, American Psychiatric Association, 1980) for any
personality disorder (must be made by an appropriately licensed or certified
professional).
9. Meets DSM criteria (DSM-III, American Psychiatric Association, 1980) for
schizophrenia (must be made by an appropriately licensed or certified
professional).
10. Psychopathy Checklist score (if available, otherwise CATS score).
Novel SORAG items:

11. Criminal history for violent offences prior to the serious violent or sexual criminal
offence.
12. Number of previous convictions for sexual offences (pertains to convictions
known from all available documentation to be sexual offences prior to the serious
violent or sexual criminal offence). Any offence known to be sexual, including, eg,
incest, is counted.
13. History of sex offences only against girls under 14 (including serious violent or
sexual criminal offences). (This item also addresses the age of the victims.)
14. Phallometrically measured deviant sexual interests.
As with the VRAG, scoring the SORAG is fairly straightforward and involves the use of
clinical records for the sourcing of relevant information. Again, a PCL-R score is
incorporated as one of the variables. The total SORAG scores can range from –27 to 51. As
with the VRAG, offenders are assigned to one of nine risk levels, ranging from a 1 (lowest)
to 9 (highest) risk of violent recidivism.
A number of criticisms have been made in relation to the SORAG, many of which are
also applicable to the VRAG. As with the VRAG, a key component of the SORAG scoring
is the inclusion of the PCL-R score and DSM diagnoses, in addition to a phallometric
diagnosis. These psychometric assessments demand specialised training, qualifications,
certification, and a lengthy file review and interview. Such requirements are expensive and
time-consuming. Additionally, very few psychologists are trained in the use of
phallometric assessment tools. This complicates and compromises the consistent
application of the SORAG. For these reasons, alternative actuarial tools, such as the
RRASOR, the Static-99 and the Static-2002, which do not include PCL-R, DSM, or
phallometric variables, may be preferable predictive instruments, at least in circumstances
where the requisite information is not already contained within the offender’s clinical file
or where a psychological history is not required for other purposes.
It has also been argued that there is little, if any, empirical support for at least five of
SORAG’s actuarial scale items, namely: a history of alcohol problems; marital status at
time of or prior to the commission of the relevant offence; a history of non-violent
offences; and meeting the DSM-III criteria for a personality disorder and/or schizophrenia
(Hanson and Bussière (1998)). All of these variables are also included in the (shorter)
VRAG actuarial scale.
Another complaint is the considerable degree of subjective opinion required and the
corresponding impact on inter rater reliability (Campbell (2000)). The items highlighting
this problem are assessments in relation to elementary school maladjustment and the
offender’s history of alcohol problems. As a result of the considerable subjectivity involved
922 [10.40.130]
in scoring these items, it is questionable whether two or more psychologists might be

capable of using these actuarial risk prediction tools reliably when evaluating the same
offender.
The SORAG has also received criticism independent of and beyond that directed at the
VRAG. Notably, the research reporting by Quinsey et al (1998) failed to adequately
elucidate the specific details of the sample characteristics of their offender population,
including the size; the mean age; the mean number of prior violent and sexual offences;
and the number of child molesters in proportion to the number of adult victim offenders.
Without this information being made available, it is difficult for those intending to use the
instrument to be confident about whether or not it is suitable for the offenders they are
evaluating. It has also been argued that the SORAG is somewhat unclear in defining
precisely which type of recidivism it is designed to predict (Campbell (2000)).
In replicative studies, there have been some promising results regarding the SORAG’s
predictive accuracy. Results have been comparable to that of the VRAG, with a high
correlation between the two instruments. The SORAG has been shown to perform as well
as the VRAG in predicting violent recidivism among sex offenders, with both significantly
capable of predicting violent and sexual recidivism. Although the SORAG has proven
successful in predicting general and serious violent and sexual recidivism, preliminary
findings indicate that there are no significant differences between the VRAG and SORAG
in the prediction of recidivism outcome in sex offenders and, as discussed above, a range
of criticisms have been made in relation to the nature and application of both. These issues
raise the obvious question as to what additional insights the SORAG contributes in terms
of actuarial risk predictive instruments.
The Historical, Clinical and Risk Management 20 Item (HCR-20)

[10.40.140] The Historical, Clinical and Risk Management 20 item (HCR-20) is a broadly
conceived violence risk assessment instrument. The HCR-20 is intended to predict the risk
of future violent behaviour by scaling a range of violence risk markers. These markers
were chosen for their correlative strength with violent offending during the course of
concerted analysis of the relevant empirical literature and from first-hand clinical input
contributed by experienced forensic practitioners. The HCR-20 was designed to be utilised
in various populations, particularly those of a psychiatric and correctional nature, in
which there exists a ‘high proportion of persons with histories of violence, and a strong
suggestion of mental illness or personality disorder’ (Webster et al (1997, p 5)). However,
its reliable application across these settings requires further investigation. Another, more
ambitious, goal concerning the HCR-20 is the attempt by its creators to use it as a
benchmark for developing consistent professional standards relating to the nature and
application of risk assessments.
There are two versions of the HCR-20, both published and available as manuals
(version 1: Webster et al (1995); version 2: Webster et al (1997)). (Additionally, the Sexual
Violence Risk 20 item (SVR-20) is comparable to the HCR-20, but was instead developed
to provide a means of specifically assessing the risk of sexual reoffending: see Boer et al
(1997).) The content of the items for both versions is largely the same. As indicated by its
name, the HCR-20 scheme comprises 20 items. These are distributed across three scales
(Historical, Clinical, and Risk Management) in the following manner:
1. Historical – made up of 10 predominantly static items that are assumed to remain
relatively stable over time. The items are:
1.1 Incidences of previous violence.
1.2 First violent incident committed at a young age.
1.3 Relationship instability.
1.4 Employment problems.
[10.40.140] 923
1.5 Substance use.

1.6 Major mental illness.
1.7 Psychopathy.
1.8 Early maladjustment.
1.9 Personality disorder.
1.10 Prior failure of supervision.
2. Clinical – made up of five items subject to fluctuation and change that address the
current mental, emotional and psychiatric condition. The items are:
2.1 Absence of insight.
2.2 Negative attitudes.
2.3 Active symptoms of a major mental illness or illnesses.
2.4 Impulsivity.
2.5 Unresponsiveness to treatment.
3. Risk Management – made up of five items that are designed to predict an
individual’s future social and living conditions, and treatment needs, in addition
to their likely response to these. These items are:
3.1 Plans lack feasibility.
3.2 Destabilisers are present.
3.3 Lack of personal support.
3.4 Non-compliance with remediation attempts.
3.5 Stress is present.
All items have been intentionally clearly defined so that information regarding these
variables can, theoretically, be easily collected and coded retrospectively primarily from
medical, psychological, psychiatric, and legal records, other clinical assessments, social
workers’ notes and reports, presentencing and pre-release parole reports, and other
accessible official files. This has the benefit of allowing a suitably trained assistant to
compile the requisite information, rather than consume the time and expense of a
qualified mental healthcare professional for this purpose. While this is considered a
reasonable exercise in relation to the historical and risk management variables, the clinical
component of the assessment should properly be carried out by a fully trained clinician by
way of interviews and file reviews as deemed appropriate in the circumstances. Adding to
the ease of utilisation of the HCR-20, the historical and clinical components of the
evaluation can be completed at any time. The risk management scale, on the other hand,
‘pertain[s] to existing circumstances in the community or to future situations that the
individual may encounter upon release from institutionalization’ (Webster et al (1995,
p 60)), and thus is typically completed close to the time of release from incarceration.
The scoring system used across the three scales and 20 items is the same as that
employed by the PCL-R: a 0, 1, or 2 point score for each item, according to whether it
applies to the offender and, if so, how strongly. As a result, the highest achievable score is
40, which would strongly tend to suggest a likelihood of violent reoffending. A minimum
score of 0 would conversely indicate a nil or low probability of violent recidivism. In their
comprehensive review as to the predictive accuracy of the HCR-20, Douglas et al (1999)
concluded that a score above the HCR-20 median equated to a 6–13 times greater chance
of violent behaviour than a score below the median (p 917).
As can be seen, the HCR-20 is uncomplicated, easy to comprehend and administer, and
relatively straightforward to score. Douglas, Guy, Reeves and Weir (2008) have aptly
summarised this by stating (p 4):
924 [10.40.140]
Very complicated schemes may not be put to their intended use in the daily practice of
risk assessment. Professionals who make risk assessments cannot afford the time to
calculate complex weighting co-efficients and discriminant function equations. As such,
the HCR-20 is an attempt to merge science and practice by offering an instrument that can
be integrated into clinical practice but also is empirically based and testable.
Further, according to Belfrage et al (2000, p 950):

The promise of this instrument lies in its foundation on a conceptual model or scheme for
assessing dangerousness and risk; its basis in the empirical literature; its operationally
defined coding system allowing for increased reliability; and its practical use, as evidenced
in its brevity and allowance for time-consuming data collection to be done by trained
assistants.
As with the VRAG and SORAG, it could be argued that the degree of subjectivity in some
of the risk items (eg early maladjustment, substance use, employment problems,
relationship instability) and, particularly, all variables contained in the clinical scale, might
lead to a lack of consistency generally and specifically when two or more clinicians are
evaluating the same individual or population.
The Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R)

[10.40.150] The Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) was specifically designed to
provide a modern, dynamic risk/needs analysis instrument. The LSI-R was developed by
Drs Don Andrews and James Bonta in a forensic setting. Development of the device began
in Canada in the late 1970s, producing the original version – the Level of Service
Inventory (LSI) (Andrews (1982)). The LSI was revised in the mid-1980s, which resulted in
the LSI-R version used today (Andrews and Bonta (1995)). The LSI-R is unique in that it is
the only third-generation risk/needs analysis device that was wholly theoretically
derived.
The developers of the LSI-R have described it as ‘a way of systematically bringing
together risk and needs information important to offender treatment planning and for
assigning levels of freedom and supervision’ (Andrews and Bonta (2001, p 1)). True to its
aims, the LSI-R has been used extensively in Canadian, United States and Australian
correctional institutions in undertaking risk/needs analyses of incarcerated offenders to
produce suitable treatment and supervision programs that are intended to eliminate or
reduce reoffending upon release into the community.
The LSI-R comprises a 54-item scale that is categorised into 10 separate substantive
subcomponents that are considered to be correlated with the likelihood of future criminal
conduct. Broadly, the LSI-R is structured as follows:
1. Criminal History (10 items).
2. Education and Employment (10 items).
3. Financial (2 items).
4. Family and Marital (4 items).
5. Accommodations (3 items).
6. Leisure and Recreation (2 items).
7. Companions (5 items).
8. Alcohol and Drugs (9 items).
9. Emotional and Personal (5 items).
10. Attitude and Orientation (4 items).
The 54 item LSI-R is primarily administered via a semi-structured interview. Although the
scoring and assessment occur during the interview phase, a pre-interview review of all
relevant information concerning the subject is strongly recommended (Andrews and
[10.40.150] 925
Bonta (1995)). During the interview, the offender responds in a yes/no fashion to some
items, resulting in a nil or set positive score, and provides further information in response
to particular variables, which corresponds to a graded score of 0 to 3 for those items.
Based upon the offender’s responses, the evaluator notes the correct scores for each item,
then tallies them together, manually or using the specifically designed software, to
produce a total score. This figure may then be converted to a statistically significant sum.
Typically, the institution utilising the LSI-R sets its own criteria for the risk categories
assigned to the numerical results obtained during the LSI-R interview. Generally,
composite scores of 0–20 are deemed ‘low risk’, composite scores of 21–30 are considered
‘medium risk’, and composite scores of 31 and above define the ‘high risk’ classifications.
Significantly, as with the HCR-20, some of the included LSI-R items are stable, but the
vast majority are considered to be dynamic variables. The application of a quantifiable,
dynamic criminogenic risk/need analysis instrument, such as the LSI-R, confers many
benefits. Importantly, this device enables evaluators to empirically track change (ideally
progress) in an offender’s development over time and amend treatment and supervision
regimes accordingly. Additionally, the LSI-R facilitates the development of adequate
control groups for the purposes of comparing the effects of various treatment methods
across differing risk categories of offenders.
The LSI-R has been heralded as the most heavily researched risk/needs assessment
instrument (Lowenkamp, Holsinger and Latessa (2001)). From the time the first validation
study into the LSI took place in 1982 (Andrews (1982)), the LSI and LSI-R have
demonstrated reliable predictive accuracy for a number of correctional outcomes
(Andrews and Bonta (1998)). This body of research and an evaluation of the requirements
of correctional services have tended to support the preferential use of the LSI-R in the
classification of adult offenders above other risk assessment devices. This is not to say that
the LSI-R has been exempt from negative commentary.
The LSI-R has received challenges based upon the validity of the instrument and its
assessment process (Lowenkamp et al (2001)). Specific criticisms of the LSI-R include its
absence of incorporated physical and sexual abuse factors as scored risk items, and the
general failure to adjust the LSI-R to provide a uniquely tailored instrument for the
assessment of female offenders (Lowenkamp et al (2001); Funk (1999); Mazerolle (1998);
Chesney-Lind (1989; 1997)). This latter concern is one routinely raised in relation to
actuarial assessment schemes. Notably, at least one comprehensive study into the
reliability of the LSI-R, which concerned incarcerated females, demonstrated levels of
predictive accuracy as high for the females as those for the corresponding male population
(Coulson et al (1996)).
For a brief overview of the actuarial prediction instruments analysed in this chapter,
see the Appendix to this chapter.
Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol 2003 (RSVP)

[10.40.160] The Risk for Sexual Violence Protocol (RSVP) (Hart et al (2003)) was developed
in 2003. It provides a set of professional guidelines for use in assessing the risk of sexual
violence and, more significantly, generating comprehensive risk management plans that
respond to each area of risk identified. The RSVP is premised upon the assumption that
risk must be defined in the context in which it occurs. It approaches the risk assessment
exercise as preventative, rather than just diagnostic. Unlike some actuarial instruments,
the RSVP cannot be used to determine whether an individual has committed a sexually
violent act in the past, to assess an individual’s risk of non-sexual violence, or to estimate
the likelihood of recidivism, but it does afford specific guidelines for risk formulation and
risk management strategies.
926 [10.40.160]
The RSVP is not truly a revision of the Sexual Violence Risk-20 (SVR-20) (Boer et al
(1997)), which is an earlier sexual violence risk assessment tool prepared by some of the
same authors of the RSVP. However, it is an example of the structured professional
judgement method of risk assessment and can be seen as an improvement upon the
SVR-20 in that capacity, thereby arguably (Rettenberger, Boer and Eher (2011)) rendering
the SVR-20 redundant. Principally, the RSVP supersedes the SVR-20 because it:
• incorporates scenario-based risk assessment methods;
• details means of obtaining necessary assessment information, such as incidences of
previous sexual violence, to facilitate analysis of prior clinical history;
• offers comprehensive consideration of factors addressing risk management; and
• separately codes the presence and the relevance of risk factors.
The RSVP and the SVR-20 are actuarially derived, but clinically interpreted, instruments
developed to estimate the likelihood of actual, attempted or threatened sexual contact
with a person who is non-consenting or unable to give consent. Both tools incorporate
static and dynamic risk factors derived from literature reviews and consultations with
clinicians and academics, but the RSVP, while including the key areas categorised by the
SVR-20 – sexual offences, psychosocial adjustment, future plans, and other considerations
– also addresses relevant areas absent from the SVR-20.
The RSVP comprises 22 individual risk items:
1. Chronicity of sexual violence.
2. Diversity of sexual violence.
3. Escalation of sexual violence.
4. Physical coercion in sexual violence.
5. Psychological coercion in sexual violence.
6. Extreme minimisation or denial of sexual offence.
7. Attitudes that support or condone sexual violence.
8. Problems with self-awareness.
9. Problems with stress or coping.
10. Problems resulting from child abuse.
11. Sexual deviance.
12. Psychopathic personality disorder.
13. Major mental illness.
14. Problems with substance abuse.
15. Violent or suicidal ideation.
16. Problems with intimate relationships.
17. Problems with non-intimate relationships.
18. Problems with employment.
19. Non-sexual criminality.
20. Problems with planning.
21. Problems with treatment.
22. Problems with supervision.
These items can be broadly categorised among five domains:

1. History of sexual violence – five items.
2. Psychological adjustment: related to decisions to engage in sexual violence – five
items.
3. Mental disorder – five items.
[10.40.160] 927
4. Social adjustment: related to interpersonal relationships and fulfilment of social

roles – four items.
5. Manageability: related to views about future planning, treatment, and supervision
– three items.
Items are scored as ‘yes’ (the item is present and has clear or substantial relevance);
‘possible’ (the item is present but is of unclear or limited relevance); or ‘no’ (the item is not
present and not relevant). In addition to the 22 scored risk items, there is a further
category of other/idiosyncratic considerations also available. The RSVP does not have a
coding guide or translation matrix for a summary score to be created based on particular
numbers or patterns of risk factors. This may be because it aims to extend beyond a mere
assessment of risk. Instead, the RSVP’s emphasis is upon incorporating guidelines for risk
formulation, thereby enhancing the implementation of targeted risk management
strategies that might lessen the actual likelihood of violent sexual reoffending in respect of
the individuals being assessed.
In conducting RSVP evaluations, the assessor is required to undertake a detailed
review of case information and clinical history to ascertain which, if any, risk factors exist
and to consider their relevance in respect of particular periods of time. The instrument
offers two relevant timeframes: the past (greater than one year ago) and the present
(within the past year). This enables some dynamic representation of risk by requiring
comment about the future relevance of each risk factor for risk management planning
purposes. However, often an offender is being assessed at a point following a period of
lengthy incarceration, which can render the available timeframe of little or no value (see,
eg, the evidence of Dr Tanney in Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Morato [2008] WASC
25 at [91]). Various risk scenarios are then analysed in terms of the nature, severity,
imminence, frequency, duration and likelihood of future sexual offending. From this
background assessment, a risk management plan is developed to address outstanding
risks by way of control and supervision orders and other monitoring methods, treatment
regimes, victim safety planning, and other factors deemed necessary to balance the rights
of the offender against those of his or her victim(s) and the community at large.
The RSVP was designed to be used in respect of males over the age of 18 with a known
or suspected history of sexual violence. It can be applied in populations of older male
adolescents and with women, but the research concerning these groups is restrictive. The
instrument is not intended to be used in relation to children or young adolescents under
the age of 15. Under these provisions, the RSVP has been recommended and used on a
significant number of occasions in Australian courts (see, eg, Director of Public Prosecutions
(WA) v Morato [2008] WASC 25; Attorney General (NSW) v Quinn [2007] NSWSC 873;
Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2007] WASC 318; Director of Public Prosecutions
(WA) v Mangolamara (2007) 169 A Crim R 379; [2007] WASC 71; Western Australia v Woods
[2007] WASC 320; Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Moolarvie [2008] WASC 37). In
Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Moolarvie [2008] WASC 37 at [59], Blaxell J said of the
RSVP that:
[it] is a relatively sophisticated instrument which is carefully structured and seems to
address all conceivable risk factors that may be relevant to the assessment required by
s 38. I also consider that the requirement for the RSVP to develop a comprehensive risk
management plan must necessarily aid a clinical assessment of the overall risk.
Accordingly, I have come to the view that a clinical assessment which is partially based
upon the correct application of the RSVP will have added weight.
The instrument may be applied independently by appropriate mental health professionals

with knowledge of sexual deviance and violence, or by others in a ‘supervised’ context,
such as within multidisciplinary teams.
928 [10.40.160]
A key benefit of the RSVP is its ability to do more than just act as a risk prediction
instrument by providing a means of developing a comprehensive risk management plan
on an individually tailored basis. This feature was minimally addressed by the SVR-20,
and absent from other risk assessment devices concerning physical, sexual and domestic
violence, such as the Historical, Clinical, and Risk Management 20 item (HCR-20) and the
Spousal Assault Risk Assessment Guide (SARA). Although this feature is a predominant
attribute of the RSVP, its inclusion significantly increases the average time to complete the
assessment in comparison to other such instruments. As a result, the RSVP is likely to be
used more extensively within forensic mental health contexts, rather than in custodial or
probationary situations.
In Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v GTR [2007] WASC 318 at [58]–[60], McKechnie J
commented of the instrument:
[O]ne weakness of the RSVP in prediction of risks is the weakness identified in the
cross-examination of Dr Tanney:
[W]hen you read the coding manual … for the RSVP, one of the things it includes is he
may have appropriate plans – he may have plans that are feasible, but can they be put
forward because of other restrictions that he perhaps might have no control over; like
geography or other controls. That’s where you have to still give it as a ‘yes’, as a
possible risk issue. (ts 57)
And further:
Each of those last three items in that cluster are the RSVP: 20, 21, and 22 have a coding
requirement that the plans or the supervision or the treatment may have – he may
have cooperated with it all, but if there is a possibility that it might not be able to be
provided wherever he’s going to be, one still has to put it as a potential risk factor but
it doesn’t speak at all to him; it speaks to the system in which he operates.
…
They all get a ‘yes’ or a ‘possible’, simply because they might not be available. Even
though what he is prepared to do and what he would propose to do would be
acceptable, if it’s not possible to happen, the requirement of the RSVP protocol is that
you indicate that it is something to be considered as a risk management issue.
This lends force to the view that RSVP may have a valid use for risk management but
may be an imperfect tool for risk assessment.
It would appear premature to make any conclusive statements at this stage as to the
suitability of the RSVP as a combined risk assessment instrument and risk management
tool for the application for which it was designed and in relation to comparable devices.
As Mercado and Ogloff (2007) have concluded, its worth is yet to be analysed and proven
empirically: ‘While promising, at the time of writing, there has been no published data
validating the RSVP’ (p 54).
Conclusions
[10.40.200] The use of risk assessment instruments, supported by clinical assessments, as
one of the bases for evaluation of dangerousness and risk of recidivism has become part of
the contemporary framework for courts’ decision-making. Issues relating to the scientific
validity of some tests (see Krauss and Scurich (2013)) remain important, as does the
applicability of general results to the circumstances of a particular individual’s
dangerousness. In addition, issues relating to the generalisability of some tests to
particular populations, including indigenous populations, remain to be resolved finally.
This means that considerable scope remains for clinical assessments, but that the courts
have become accustomed to having these buttressed by the scores from risk assessment
instruments.
[10.40.500] 929
Appendix: Brief overview of actuarial prediction instruments analysed in Ch 10.40
Actuarial risk Year developed Developer Intended risks No of Common applica- Advantages Criticisms/
predictor predicted items tions limitations
RRASOR 1997 Hanson Sexual recidivism 4 Forensic Efficient, inexpen- A broad screening
among adult males sive and easy to device only; it
930 [10.40.500]
known to have use; does not cannot be used as a
committed at least require PCL-R score comprehensive
one sexual offence recidivism risk
assessment tool in
isolation
Static-99 1999 Hanson and Sexual and violent 10 Forensic; civil; Can be completed Cannot be used to
Thornton recidivism among psychiatric; and easily scored on predict likely period
adult males known correctional information readily of recidivism; not
to have committed obtainable from recommended for

at least one sexual official records; does those under
offence not require PCL-R 18 years of age,
score; beneficial for female offenders,
constructing offenders only
appropriate convicted of
treatment/ prostitution,
supervision regimes solicitation,
consensual sex in
public locations, or
possession of
indecent materials;
demonstrates only
moderate predictive
accuracy; does not
allow consideration
of relevant factors
addressed in more
comprehensive
assessments
Static-2002 2003 Hanson and Sexual and violent 13 Forensic Can be completed See Static-99
Thornton recidivism among and scored on
adult males known information readily
to have committed obtainable from
at least one sexual official records; does
offence not require PCL-R
score; offers greater
conceptual clarity
than the Static-99,
and might confer
other advantages,
such as increased
predictive accuracy
PCL-R 1991 Hare Psychopathic 20 Forensic; correc- High predictive Requires clinical
personality traits tional accuracy particu- expertise to
larly in relation to administer; may not
assessing risk of be suitable for US
violent behaviour (and possibly other)
minority popula-
tions; possibility for
high false positive
error rates; not
designed to assess
risk per se
HCR-20 Version 1: 1995 Webster, Eaves, Violence and 20 Theoretically broad Very popular for Requires profession-
Douglas and dangerousness risk population inpatient evalua- ally trained
Wintrup assessment applicability, tions to monitor interviewers for at
including: civil; and tailor treatment least the clinical
forensic; psychiatric; and supervision scale; possible lack
correctional regimes over time of generality with
different popula-
tions and variability
within high-risk
Prediction of risk evidence
male populations
and generally
Version 2: 1997 Webster, Douglas,
Eaves and Hart
[10.40.500] 931
| CH 10.40
VRAG 1993 Harris, Rice and Violent recidivism 12 Forensic; correc- It is the ‘tool of Requires the PCL-R
Quinsey among mentally tional; psychiatric choice’ for assessing score in its risk
disordered violent behaviour calculations; not
932 [10.40.500]
offenders among mentally available as a
disordered stand-alone
offenders over a commercially
relatively long available scheme;
period of time requires clinical
expertise to
administer; may not
be suitable for
female offenders
SORAG 1998 Quinsey, Harris, Violent recidivism 14 Forensic Reasonable Lack of clarity in
Rice and Cormier among adult sexual predictive accuracy the nature and
offenders for general, sexual application of the
and violent instrument; may not
recidivism risks; add anything
provides time based beyond the VRAG
assessments over ’s capabilities;
relatively long requires the PCL-R
period of time score in its risk
calculations; not
available as a
stand-alone
commercially
available scheme;
requires clinical
expertise to
administer; may not
be suitable for
female offenders
LSI-R 1995 Andrews and Bonta Violent recidivism 54 Correctional; Comprehensive Failure to include
in correctional forensic risk/needs analysis general and sexual
setting particularly suited abuse risk items
to correctional and to adequately
offender treatment distinguish
planning; a variables to suit
preferred instru- female offenders
ment in the may reduce its
classification of generality and
adult offenders predictive accuracy
across different
populations
Prediction of risk evidence
[10.40.500] 933
| CH 10.40
Chapter 10.45
POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS
DISORDER EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [10.45.01]
Development of PTSD criteria ............................................................................................ [10.45.40]
Early accounts of the impact of trauma ............................................................................ [10.45.50]
Criteria controversial and in flux ....................................................................................... [10.45.60]
DSM and ICD PTSD criteria
Criteria under DSM-IV-TR .................................................................................................. [10.45.100]
Criteria under ICD-10 ........................................................................................................... [10.45.120]
Changes to the criteria ......................................................................................................... [10.45.140]
Difficulties with DSM-IV-TR criteria for PTSD ................................................................ [10.45.160]
DSM-5 criteria ........................................................................................................................ [10.45.165]
Reliability and validity of diagnoses ................................................................................. [10.45.170]
Challenges in diagnosis ....................................................................................................... [10.45.180]
Psychometric tests ................................................................................................................. [10.45.190]
Prevalence of PTSD ............................................................................................................... [10.45.200]
Overlap with other disorders .............................................................................................. [10.45.210]
Physiological aspects of PTSD ............................................................................................ [10.45.220]
Practical consequences ......................................................................................................... [10.45.230]
Difficult relationship with assessment instruments ........................................................ [10.45.300]
Compensability of psychiatric injuries in Australia
Common law .......................................................................................................................... [10.45.340]
Statutory changes .................................................................................................................. [10.45.360]
Current status of PTSD in the law ..................................................................................... [10.45.400]
McLean v Commonwealth ....................................................................................................... [10.45.430]
Russell v Commonwealth ........................................................................................................ [10.45.440]
Hill v Commonwealth .............................................................................................................. [10.45.450]
Stankowski v Commonwealth .................................................................................................. [10.45.460]
Cavenett v Commonwealth ...................................................................................................... [10.45.470]
Burk v Commonwealth ............................................................................................................ [10.45.480]
The stressor criterion ............................................................................................................ [10.45.490]
Expert witness bias ............................................................................................................... [10.45.510]
Late-onset PTSD: An explanation for delayed claims .................................................... [10.45.520]
Vernon v Bosley ....................................................................................................................... [10.45.550]
Frost v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police ........................................................... [10.45.560]
Diagnostic Issues ................................................................................................................... [10.45.600]
PTSD and criminal law ........................................................................................................ [10.45.640]
Self-defence and provocation .............................................................................................. [10.45.660]
Insanity and automatism ..................................................................................................... [10.45.680]
Duress ...................................................................................................................................... [10.45.700]
Diminished responsibility .................................................................................................... [10.45.720]
Assessment of complainant ................................................................................................. [10.45.740]
Sentencing ............................................................................................................................... [10.45.760]
PTSD and its challenges for the law ................................................................................. [10.45.800]
‘It is as though some old part of yourself wakes up in you,

terrified, useless in the life you have, its skills and habits
destructive but intact, and what is left of the present you, the
person you have become, wilts and shrivels in sadness or
despair: the person you have become is only a thin shell over
this other, more electric and endangered self. The strongest,
the least digested parts of your experience can rise up and put
you back where you were when they occurred; all the rest of
935
you stands back and weeps.’

Peter Straub, The Throat, (2010).
Introduction
[10.45.01] Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is probably the most important but at the
same time the most problematic psychiatric diagnosis, so far as the legal system is
concerned (see Stone (1993); Mezey (2006); Kelly (2008)). PTSD evidence is vital:
• for the civil law of damages, where the claim is for psychiatric injury: Tame v New South
Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; [2002] HCA 35 (under most crime compensation schemes,
compensation can be awarded for pain and suffering: see Freckelton (2001a)); Gifford v
Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269; [2003] HCA 33;
• for crimes and accident compensation law: see, eg, H, B & E v Crimes Compensation
Tribunal [1997] 1 VR 608; Powley v Crimes Compensation Tribunal (1997) 11 VAR 146;
Martin v Crimes Compensation Tribunal (1994) 8 VAR 39;
• potentially, for evaluating the reliability of a witness’s evidence (but only if the witness
has PTSD as a result of relevant events): R v Williams [2017] SASCFC 65;
• potentially, for determining whether a person has been the victim of a crime – that is to
say, whether he or she is suffering from symptoms of rape trauma syndrome: see
[10.30.300]ff;
• arguably, for determining whether a person was legally insane, suffered from
diminished responsibility, was an automaton, or was subject to distorted perceptions of
threats posed to him or her by reason of battered woman syndrome: see [10.30.680]ff;
• from time to time, for assessing the degree of an offender’s culpability for his or her
criminal actions; and
• for the formulation of public health responses to the incidence of trauma-induced harm:
see Freckelton (1998a).
However, it remains controversial (see Pai, Suris and North (2017); North, Suris, Smith
and King (2016)).
As recently as 1999, the Commonwealth of Australia, through a well-known
psychiatrist, argued that PTSD as an entity had not been established and that it was
‘self-serving and tautological and with spurious validation’: Russell v Commonwealth [1999]
VSC 437 at [30]–[31]. The diagnosis remains the most controversial and divisive diagnosis
in contemporary psychiatric injury litigation.
An aspect of the controversies was disclosed in the January 1997 issue of the Medical
Journal of Australia, where Dr John Ellard observed that he had encountered ‘claimants
able to recite the phenomena of post-traumatic stress disorder like a litany, attributing
them severally to falling over in a bus, seeing something disagreeable and hearing a loud
noise’: Ellard (1997, p 84). Similarly, in 1993 Pitman and Orr maintained that because
many of the symptoms of PTSD are subjective and can be exaggerated or faked, cases in
which PTSD is asserted can end up with the disorder itself being put on trial: Pitman and
Orr (1993); see also Sparr and Boehnlein (1990); Law Commission (1998); Slovenko (1999);
Morgan v Tame (2000) 49 NSWLR 21 at [100].
Like repetitive strain injury (see Lucire (2003)), repressed memory syndrome (see
[10.30.600]) and chronic fatigue syndrome, PTSD has polarised practitioners in psychiatry
and psychology for a variety of reasons which are important to the legal system. There are
passionate proponents of the legitimacy of most claims of PTSD and increasing numbers
of cynics, within both the mental health and legal professions, who are expressing
concerns about misdiagnosis and overdiagnosis: see Neal (1994, p 119); Perconte and
Goreczny (1990, p 158); Keane, Caddell and Taylor (1988, p 85).
However, the importance of PTSD to the law should not be underestimated. In 1993
Alan Stone, the Touroff-Glueck Professor of Law and Psychiatry at Harvard University,
proclaimed (1993, pp 23–24):
936 [10.45.01]
Post-traumatic stress disorder evidence | CH 10.45
No diagnosis in the history of American psychiatry has had a more dramatic and
pervasive impact on law and social justice than post-traumatic stress disorder … [T]he
PTSD diagnostic conception offers the law a scientific rationale to support the
socio-political ideology of victimisation and to justify the growing recognition of victims’
rights.
He pointed out (p 29) that the disorder gives diagnostic credence to the concept of psychic
harm and, in so doing, ‘has become the lightning rod for a wide variety of claims of
stress-related psychopathology’.
One of the distinctive features of the disorder, which leaves it in contrast to the criteria
for almost all other psychiatric disorders, is that it posits a straightforward causal nexus
between a triggering event and a variety of symptoms which characterise it: see Weiss and
Ozer (2006); Young, Kane and Nicholson (2007). The consequence is that, while victims are
prone to develop a range of anxiety and depressive disorders after trauma (see Young and
Yehuda (2006); Briere (2004)), litigators have increasingly tended to frame psychiatric
damage claims in terms of PTSD because of the advantage that diagnosis of the disorder
provides in terms of proof of the elements of a tortious claim. In turn, this has generated
assertions that there has been a lawyer-caused epidemic of the disorder.
Stone (1993, pp 24, 35) sounded a warning in these challenging terms:
PTSD’s greatest importance is that it seems to make matters scientific and objective that
the court once considered too subjective for legal resolution. [It] has demonstrated an
almost awesome capacity to rework the psychological narratives of life experience. From
the Holocaust survivor to the incest survivor, PTSD offers a new frontier of explanation. It
seems at first to provide a world of Manichaean moral certainty where evil people
traumatise innocent victims, but of course it is not that simple, indeed the victimisers
claim to have been victims – the abuser was abused.
(See also Hagen (1997, p 107).)

Antagonists continue to express a view that PTSD is at least in part nomogenic, that it
is a disorder that has been created for legal and other social needs (see, eg, Rosen (1996)),
rather than having its own independent clinical existence: see also Dr Bell in Russell v
Commonwealth [1999] VSC 437. Lees-Haley and Dunn perhaps appear at the extreme end
of such cynicism, commenting in 1986 that ‘if mental disorders were listed on the New
York Exchange, PTSD would be a growth stock worth watching’. In 1994 (Lees-Haley and
Dunn (1994); see also Ziskin (1995); Carlson (2006)), they criticised the usage of self-report
questionnaires in the PTSD context, finding that 98.9% of patients responding to such
questionnaires in their survey satisfied the B criterion, 89.2% the C criterion and 95.7% the
D criterion.
PTSD evidence plays a highly influential role in a wide variety of legal proceedings.
The combination of the controversies current within the mental health professions about
PTSD and its importance to legal outcomes means that PTSD evidence needs to be
carefully led and rigorously scrutinised: see McFarlane (1997, p 98).
The significance of the existence or non-existence of PTSD makes the assessment of
whether a person’s symptomatology fulfils the formal criteria for a PTSD diagnosis vital
for the civil law of damages; for crimes and accident compensation law; on occasions, for
determining whether a person has been the victim of a crime, as he or she claims (see
[10.30.320]); and for assessing the degree of an offender’s culpability for their criminal
actions.
The fact that a person was under stress at the time of committing a crime or had at
some stage been traumatised does not serve to exculpate them to any significant extent in
the eyes of the criminal law. What is necessary for any mitigatory effect of their condition
is proof of a formal psychiatric diagnosis such as PTSD or acute stress disorder (ASD).
Such a disorder can have relevance to the defences of insanity, sane automatism, duress,
[10.45.01] 937
diminished responsibility, self-defence and provocation, as well as being pertinent for

sentencing purposes if the accused is found guilty of a criminal offence.
In the late 1980s and during the 1990s, the civil law system in England and Australia
focused with increasing rigour upon the nature of the criteria for PTSD prescribed in the
American Psychiatric Association third (revised) and fourth (DSM-IV) editions of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and the 10th edition (ICD-10) of the
World Health Organization International Classification of Diseases. However, this process has
not been easy, as neither instrument is formally recognised by the law; contrary to many
assumptions, they do not command any special status: AOTC Ltd v McAuslan (1993) 47
FCR 492. Judges cannot take ‘judicial notice’ of what is in DSM-IV or ICD-10. Evidence
needs to be given in every case not only in respect of the instrument employed by a
mental health professional in arriving at a diagnosis, but also as to how the instrument
was applied by the professional. Not only this, but key cases have begun in recent years to
grapple with the subtleties of the criteria for PTSD (see especially McLean v Commonwealth
(unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 28 February 1997); see [10.45.430]) and to construe the
words of especially the DSM-IV very carefully in order to make the important decision as
to whether given individuals actually suffer from PTSD or from lesser or other
symptomatology.
A number of difficult issues have arisen. Are mental health professionals other than
psychiatrists entitled to provide such a diagnosis? In this regard, no definitive position has
yet emerged. What should be made by the courts of the fact that the DSM and ICD criteria
are at variance, leading to the potential for real divergence of professional opinion? What
kind of a triggering event is sufficient, for psychiatric and legal purposes, to cause PTSD?
What of the fact that it is apparent that there remain many controversies within the mental
health professions about the diagnosis and prognosis for PTSD? Finally, what significance
should be given to the fact that the criteria for PTSD are not fixed (see Ziskin (1995,
p 1232)), significant changes even having occurred in 2013 with the introduction of
DSM-5? These issues have been evolving in major ways over the past two decades. Such
fluidity of diagnostic criteria has prompted anxiety in curial and tribunal psyches, because
it makes it apparent that authoritative theoretical opinion on the subject is not static. It
confounds the wish of the law for a definitive, evidence-based analysis, comparable to the
hard data and the ‘either/or assessment’ said to characterise the fruits of scientific
techniques such as DNA profiling.
This chapter examines the way in which PTSD has figured in recent appeals from
judge and jury verdicts in civil assessments of psychiatric damage, principally those in
Australia and the United Kingdom. It addresses issues arising for the legal system from
the reliance of clinicians upon self-report in respect of symptoms of PTSD, problems of
expertise in those who diagnose PTSD, differences in experts’ approach to interpretation
of the criteria for PTSD, and the impact that psychophysiological research may have upon
the role of PTSD in the legal system: see Freckelton (2008c).
Development of PTSD criteria

[10.45.40] The diagnostic instruments under which diagnoses of PTSD are arrived at are of
significance both to the legal system and to those whose task it is to ensure that expert
opinions about the existence of PTSD in any particular case are valid. It is therefore
pertinent that the term ‘PTSD’ is of relatively recent provenance. It only began to be used
under the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders in its third edition (DSM-III) in 1980: Summerfield (2001). While the DSM is the
system of diagnostic classification currently most commonly used by psychiatrists and
psychologists in Australia and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand, the practice is not
uniform: see Chaplow and Peters (1996, p 181). The proceedings in AOTC Ltd v McAuslan
(1993) 47 FCR 492 at 506 were not unusual in relation to their approach to the DSM,
Miles CJ of the Australian Capital Territory Supreme Court commenting:
938 [10.45.40]
It was common ground in the appeal that DSM-III-R is a standard reference work
published by the American Psychiatric Association, commonly accepted as such by
psychiatrists in Australia, and often used in forensic evidence of a psychiatric nature.
However, there was no agreement and no evidence that it is the only standard work of its
type and it was not submitted on behalf of the respondent that judicial notice may be
taken of its contents.
Problems may be encountered if the diagnostic instrument is not properly tendered in

evidence so that the criteria for the diagnosis actually made are not clearly articulated:
AOTC Ltd v McAuslan (1993) 47 FCR 492 at 506.
The DSM, in particular, has its detractors – especially in respect of its forensic
applications: see Kirk and Kutchins (1992); and generally Ziskin (1995). For instance, it
was denied in 1993 that both the DSM classificatory system and its main rival (ICD-10) ‘as
they currently stand are satisfactory for use in legal settings’: Pathé and Mullen (1993,
p 51); cf Schuman (1989). The cautionary statements that have preceded the diagnostic
criteria in the various editions of the DSM have changed significantly, the most recent in
DSM-5 (2013): see In the Review of HL (1997) 2 MHRBD (Vic) 485.
Early accounts of the impact of trauma
[10.45.50] Neither DSM-I, published in 1952, nor DSM-II, published in 1968, contained a
diagnostic category comparable to the present entity of PTSD. Both manuals required that
neurotic illnesses consequent upon traumata were to be classified according to the
presenting symptoms or as ‘transient situational disturbance of adult life’: see Metcalfe v
Commonwealth [2006] VSC 105; Wright v Commonwealth [2005] VSC 200. PTSD was not
included in the World Health Organization International Classification of Diseases (the
standard psychiatric manual of classification and diagnosis used in the United Kingdom
and many other parts of the world) until its 10th edition in 1992 (ICD-10).
However, the realisation that distressing incidents can cause long-term psychiatric
harm is not new. The mental health sequelae of traumatic incidents had long been
acknowledged by psychologists and psychiatrists alike before the law recognised their
importance: see, eg, Mendelson (1997; 1995); Slovenko (1994; 1995); Parry-Jones and
Parry-Jones (1994); Merskey (1991); Freckelton (1995; 2001b). The concept of traumatic
neurosis had been accepted by the psychiatric profession well prior to 1980. In the 19th
century, railway accidents and people’s reactions upon witnessing the horror of dead and
dying passengers prompted considerable medical debate about the emotional
consequences of exposure to such traumata. On the basis that one of the primary
symptoms of stress neurosis was fast beating of the heart, it was labelled ‘Irritable Heart
Syndrome’ in the 19th century and then ‘Soldier’s Heart’: see Thomson (1991, p 280).
Subsequently, a large number of studies were conducted upon victims of ‘shell shock’,
‘battle fatigue’ and ‘war neurosis’ and other incidents of battle during the Boer War and,
more particularly, World War I.
In literature, too, interesting accounts exist of the impact of trauma, including traumas
expressed in The Iliad and in Shakespeare: see Mendelson (1997). Samuel Pepys’
description of his symptoms after witnessing the Great Fire of London in 1666 (Daly
(1983)) and Charles Dickens’ description of his problems in readjustment after witnessing
a train accident in which 10 people lost their lives and 49 were injured have since been
interpreted as indicative of PTSD: Mendelson (1988, p 126). See also the description by
Robert Boyle of a mother who saw her child drowned in the 17th century, excerpted in
Hunter and Macalpine (1982).
Criteria controversial and in flux
[10.45.60] Many problems of diagnosis and interpretation of PTSD still exist as the criteria
under DSM-5 and ICD-10 remain controversial and in flux. For instance, to identify just a
few:
[10.45.60] 939
• there are interpretative problems in relation to a range of the criteria under both DSM-5
(2013) and ICD-10 (1992);
• there is the potential for over-diagnosis because of the necessary reliance of clinicians
upon ex post facto self-report by the assessee: Melton et al (1997, p 376); Turnball (1999);
• clinicians’ usage of self-report questionnaires: Ziskin (1995, p 347); Lees-Haley and
Dunn (1994); Peterson v Commonwealth [2008] VSC 166 at [231];
• the symptoms of PTSD are in the public domain and are not difficult to exaggerate or
even fabricate: Rosen (1996); Crewdson (1996);
• there are difficulties of subjectivity of diagnosis and lack of symptom specificity: Joseph,
Williams and Yule (1997);
• there are problems of diagnosis and status of the repeatedly victimised/abused victim:
Young and Yehuda (2006);
• there are important overlaps between PTSD diagnosis and diagnosis of other disorders:
Young and Yehuda (2006); Melton et al (1997);
• some victims of sexual assaults, and perhaps other traumata, may display only clusters
of symptoms: see Kilpatrick et al (1989);
• reference of an instance of trauma to the current state of the victim can be problematic:
see Raifman (1983);
• the attribution of causation of current psychiatric state for the particularly vulnerable
victim can be difficult and result in inter rates variability: McFarlane (1995); and
• diagnostic difficulties are posed by assessment of the victim exposed to drawn-out
trauma that may not technically qualify as the trigger for PTSD.
To make matters more complex, two different diagnostic regimes currently exist, and they
continue to be significantly at variance. A threshold question for the law is the use that
should be made of the DSM-5 and ICD-10 manuals. A cautionary statement in the 1987
version of the DSM warned that diagnostic classifications emanating from the DSM ‘may
not be relevant to considerations in which DSM-III-R is used outside clinical or research
settings, eg, in legal determinations’ (p xxvi). However, DSM-5 incorporates a much more
extended qualification to the uses to which its system of classification, so far as it is
concerned, can legitimately be put. It addresses the ‘tick-a-box’ phenomenon that has
proliferated from earlier versions of the DSM and which is said by many to have been
encouraged by the legal system. It stresses that ‘[i]t is important that DSM-IV not be
applied mechanically by untrained individuals’. It also warns the user that when DSM-5
categories, criteria and textual descriptions are employed for forensic purposes, ‘there are
significant risks that diagnostic information will be misused or misunderstood. These
dangers arise because of the imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate concern to the
law and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis’ (p xxiii). However, the courts
and tribunals have no option other than to measure the symptoms exhibited by a litigant
against accepted criteria for the disorder, such as those listed in DSM-5 and ICD-10.
In New South Wales v Seedsman (2000) 217 ALR 583; [2000] NSWCA 119 at [119],
Spigelman J noted that the ‘DSM-IV is not a statutory formulation which a court must
construe and decide whether the requirements are satisfied. It is, as its title suggests, a
“diagnostic manual” for clinical use’.
DSM and ICD PTSD criteria
Criteria under DSM-IV-TR

[10.45.100] There were six key groups of criteria (A–F) under DSM-IV for the diagnosis of
PTSD:
A. The person must have been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the
following were present:
940 [10.45.100]
(1) the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or

events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a
threat to the physical integrity of self or others.
(2) the person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror. 1
B. The traumatic event must be persistently re-experienced in one (or more) of the
following ways:
(1) recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event, including
images, thought, or perceptions. 2
(2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event. 3
(3) acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a
sense of reliving the experience, illusions, hallucinations, and dissociative
flashback episodes, including those that occur on awakening or when
intoxicated). 4
(4) intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues
that symbolise or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
(5) physiological reactivity or exposure to internal or external cues that
symbolise or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event.
C. There must be persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and
numbing of general responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated
by three (or more) of the following:
(1) efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the
trauma;
(2) efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of
the trauma;
(3) inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma;
(4) markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities;
(5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others;
(6) restricted range of affect (for example, unable to have loving feelings);
(7) sense of a foreshortened future (for example, does not expect to have a
career, marriage, children, or a normal life span).
D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma) must be
present, as indicated by two (or more) of the following:
(1) difficulty falling or staying asleep;
(2) irritability or outbursts of anger;
(3) difficulty concentrating;
(4) hypervigilance;
(5) exaggerated startle response.
E. The duration of the disturbance, namely, the symptoms in Criteria B, C and D,
must be greater than one month.
F. The disturbance must cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
Practitioners were encouraged to categorise the severity of experience of PTSD as ‘acute’,

if the duration of symptoms was less than three months; or ‘chronic’ if the duration of
1 It is noted that in children this may be expressed instead by disorganised or agitated

behaviour.
2 It is noted that in young children, repetitive play may occur in which themes or aspects of
trauma are expressed.
3 It is noted that in children there may be frightening dreams without recognisable content.
4 It is noted that in young children trauma-specific re-enactment may occur.
[10.45.100] 941
symptoms was three months or more. In addition, practitioners are instructed to specify if
the PTSD is ‘with delayed onset’, namely if the onset of symptoms was at least six months
after the stressor.
DSM-IV also introduced a new disorder termed ‘acute stress disorder’ (ASD), which
shares many of the features of PTSD but whose essential feature is the development of
characteristic anxiety, dissociative and other symptoms within a month of exposure to an
extreme traumatic stressor (as in PTSD) and lasting for a minimum of two days and a
maximum of four weeks.
The diagnostic criteria for ASD under DSM-IV were:
A. The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following
were present:
(1) the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or
events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a
threat to the physical integrity of self or others;
(2) the person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror;
B. Either while experiencing or after experiencing the distressing event, the
individual has three (or more) of the following dissociative symptoms:
(1) a subjective sense of numbing, detachment, or absence of emotional
responsiveness;
(2) a reduction in awareness of his or her surroundings (eg, ‘being in a
daze’);
(3) derealization;
(4) depersonalization;
(5) dissociative amnesia (ie inability to recall an important aspect of the
trauma).
C. The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in at least one of the following
ways: recurrent images, thoughts, dreams, illusions, flashback episodes, or a
sense of reliving the experience; or distress on exposure to reminders of the
traumatic event.
D. Marked avoidance of stimuli that arouse recollections of the trauma (eg,
thoughts, feelings, conversations, activities, places, people).
E. Marked symptoms of anxiety or increased arousal (eg, difficulty sleeping,
irritability, poor concentration, hypervigilance, exaggerated startle response,
motor restlessness).
F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning or impairs the individual’s
ability to pursue some necessary task, such as obtaining necessary assistance or
mobilizing personal resources by telling family members about the traumatic
experience.
G. The disturbance lasts for a minimum of 2 days and a maximum of 4 weeks and
occurs within 4 weeks of the traumatic event.
H. The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (eg, a
drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition, is not better
accounted for by Brief Psychotic Disorder, and is not merely an exacerbation of a
preexisting Axis I or Axis II disorder.
Criteria under ICD-10

[10.45.120] PTSD did not appear under ICD-9, the closest entity being ‘acute reaction to
stress’. By ICD-10 in 1992, however, PTSD was defined as a ‘delayed and/or protracted
response to a stressful event or situation (either short or long-lasting) of an exceptionally
threatening or catastrophic nature, which is likely to cause pervasive distress in almost
anyone’: ICD-10 (1992, p 147). ICD-10 provides that the disorder should not generally be
diagnosed unless there is evidence that it arose within six months of a traumatic event of
942 [10.45.120]
exceptional severity. In addition to evidence of trauma, there must be a repetitive,

intrusive recollection or re-enactment of the event in memories, daytime imagery, or
dreams. Conspicuous emotional detachment, numbing of feeling, and avoidance of stimuli
that might arouse recollection of the trauma are said often to be present in those with the
disorder but are not classified as essential for the diagnosis – the autonomic disturbances,
mood disorder and behavioural abnormalities are all said to contribute to the diagnosis
but not to be of prime importance. ICD-10 notes that there is usually a state of autonomic
hyperarousal with hypervigilance, an enhanced startle reaction, and insomnia. Anxiety
and depression are stated to be commonly associated with its symptoms and signs, and
suicidal ideation is stated not to be infrequent: ICD-10 (1992, p 148).
Under ICD-10, a related disorder is also found: acute stress reaction (ASR). It is defined
as a ‘transient disorder of significant severity which develops in an individual without any
other apparent mental disorder in response to exceptional physical and/or mental stress
and which usually subsides within hours or days’: ICD-10 (1992, p 146). The stressor may
be an overwhelming traumatic experience involving serious threat to security or physical
integrity of the person or of a loved person. It may also be an unusually sudden and
threatening change in the social position and/or network of the individual, such as a
multiple bereavement or a domestic fire. ICD-10 (1992, p 146) notes that the risk of the
disorder developing is heightened if physical exhaustion or organic factors are also
present. The ICD-10 diagnostic guidelines prescribe that there must be an immediate and
clear temporal connection between the impact of an exceptional stressor and the onset of
symptoms. In addition, under ICD-10 (1992, p 147), the symptoms:
(a) show a mixed and usually changing picture; in addition to the initial state of
‘daze’, depression, anxiety, anger, despair, overactivity, and withdrawal may all
be seen, but no one type of symptom predominates for long; (b) resolve rapidly
(within a few hours at most) in those cases where removal from the stressful
environment is possible; in cases where the stress continues or cannot by its
nature be reversed, the symptoms usually begin to diminish after 24–48 hours
and are usually minimal after about 3 days.
Changes to the criteria

[10.45.140] Significant changes took place between DSM-III-R and DSM-IV-TR. Fifteen
changes altogether in respect of the criteria for PTSD were made. Three were particularly
important:
(1) the ‘stressor description’ was made more specific;
(2) the requirement was added that the person’s response involve intense fear,
helplessness or horror; and
(3) the physiological reactivity added to the D-group in DSM-III-R was moved to the
B-group in DSM-IV-TR, increasing the B-group criteria to six and reducing the
D-group criteria to five.
Between DSM-III-R and DSM-IV, the A criterion shifted from a conceptualisation under
DSM-III that PTSD was a very likely response to extreme traumatic stressors to identifying
it under DSM-IV as a variable response to stressors. Davidson and Foa (1991) observed:
‘The definition of Criterion A, the traumatic event, is of considerable importance because
it serves as the gatekeeper to PTSD. If a person does not meet the required definition of a
stressful event, it matters little whether all the other criteria are met because the person
cannot be diagnosed with PTSD.’ In general, this has been the approach of court decisions
(see, eg, Cleary v Congregation of the Sisters of the Holy Family of Nazareth (unreported, NSW
Supreme Court, 23 December 1996); Hussein v William Hill Group [2004] EWHC 208). The
version of PTSD under DSM-IV, with its cryptic reference to an event that ‘involved actual
or threatened death or serious injury’ and then its focus upon individualised response to
[10.45.140] 943
the stressor, led to the potential for more symptomatology to be classified as PTSD – what
McNally (2003) has termed ‘bracket creep’. Ironically, this phenomenon limited the
reasoning back potential of PTSD – the presence of PTSD in a plaintiff does not make a
statement about the objective characteristics of the trigger; it simply represents an
amalgamation of the stressor characteristics and subjective responses to them: Young and
Yehuda (2006, p 60).
Significantly, under DSM-IV-TR, there was a requirement that ‘the response’ of the
victim of PTSD and ASD to the stressor be one of ‘intense fear, helplessness, or horror’. It
is unclear whether the response (as distinct from the experience of the PTSD) had to be
immediate or whether it could be delayed, as envisaged by ICD-10 for PTSD. This is a
most important ambiguity because should the requirement be one of immediate response,
the criterion would eliminate persons who deal with their trauma in the short term by
dissociation or other temporary coping mechanisms. The formulation of the criteria for
ASD and ASR suggests that this disorder was intended to deal with immediate responses,
although the situation was confused by the similar criteria that were prescribed for the
disorder in response to the impact of the stressor.
Another important difference between PTSD under DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10 was in the
nature of the triggering trauma, which must be of personal threat (in the sense of injury or
death) under DSM-IV-TR but can be of a generally ‘catastrophic nature’ (that is not
necessarily personally endangering) under ICD-10. It seems not to be necessary under
either diagnostic manual that the victim have been harmed physically or threatened
personally. Those who are in some direct way privy to an exceptionally stressful event can
be said in DSM-IV-TR terms to have ‘witnessed’ or been ‘confronted’ by the event or in
ICD-10 terms to have ‘witnessed’ it: see Gelder et al (1996, p 142). This issue of the
significance of the triggering event has long been controversial. Scrignar (1988) argued
that the danger to the person need not in an objective sense be of a high order for a patient
legitimately to contract PTSD. He argued that it needed to be assessed subjectively at the
time of the incident to be horrific and beyond the capacity of the person to deal with
adequately – it had to deprive them of a significant measure of control. He reported two
cases of enduring PTSD which were stimulated, he said, by very minor incidents. One
involved a computer operator who bent down to pick up groceries at a supermarket and
was hit on the head twice by four-pound bags of carrots sliding off the vegetable counter:
Scrignar (1988, pp 19–20). She was severely shaken, returned home and developed an
intense anxiety response, including dissociative reactions, which lasted for over
12 months. In the other case, a 31-year-old secretary ordered a sandwich for lunch from
her local milk bar and consumed part of it before noticing the presence of a large
cockroach amidst the filling. She became very distressed, started vomiting and ultimately
developed pathological anxieties, nightmares, inability to sleep for a sustained period, and
an intense phobia of a variety of forms of insect life: Scrignar (1988, p 21). Pilowsky (1985)
has since coined the term ‘cryptotrauma’ to describe situations in which a stressor that
appears innocuous to an observer may be perceived by a victim as highly dangerous: see
also Pitman and Orr (1993).
Difficulties with DSM-IV-TR criteria for PTSD

[10.45.160] Under DSM-IV-TR, there was a requirement that a numbing of general
responsiveness ensue in the aftermath of the stressor. This left uncertain the status of those
who are already suffering numbing or the like arising from another cause and is
inadequate for sufferers who experience chronic traumata, such as those living in
circumstances of long-term domestic violence.
Under DSM-IV-TR, a question arose of whether the experience of witnessing or
confronting an event or events ‘that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury’
944 [10.45.160]
needs to be assessed subjectively or objectively. There are many circumstances which at a

subjective level may be perceived as extremely dangerous, while at an objective level may
be quite harmless or at least not sufficiently dangerous to satisfy the DSM-IV-TR criteria:
the cryptotrauma conundrum: see Cleary v Congregation of the Sisters of the Holy Family of
Nazareth (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 23 December 1996); Hussein v William Hill
Group [2004] EWHC 208. Persons who are already paranoid or unusually fearful could
more readily qualify for PTSD criteria if the subjective interpretation were adopted. Under
DSM-III-R, the criteria were that the person ‘experienced an event that is outside the range
of usual human experience and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone’:
DSM-III-R (1987). Those formulating DSM-IV-TR were conscious that a range of persons
who had not suffered DSM-III-R experiences developed behavioural and emotional
symptoms unequivocally within the compass of PTSD. Joseph, Williams and Yule (1997,
p 15) usefully summarised the dynamics of the definitional debate:
It was argued that what was important was how the person perceived the event and thus
that criterion A should include reference to subjective factors. Clearly, what is traumatic to
one person may not be so to another. But others argued that by broadening the definition
to include subjective factors, criterion A would become all but abolished so that trauma
was defined in terms of its effects. In response, it was argued that previous definitions,
despite attempting to define the event objectively, implied subjective perception as well as
objective environmental factors, anyway.
A further difficulty in relation to the qualifying criteria for DSM-IV-TR PTSD was in
respect of the ‘F criterion’ and what constituted ‘clinically significant distress or
impairment’: see Cavenett v Commonwealth [2005] VSC 333; Burk v Commonwealth [2006]
VSC 25. ‘Significant’ may mean more than ‘minimal’ and less than ‘substantial’ for
lawyers, but what effect on the evaluation process does the adverb ‘clinically’ have?
DSM-5 criteria
[10.45.165] The following is a summary of the significantly revised DSM-5 criteria for
PTSD.
Criterion A: stressor (one required)
The person was exposed to: death, threatened death, actual or threatened serious
injury, or actual or threatened sexual violence, in the following way(s):
• Direct exposure
• Witnessing the trauma
• Learning that a relative or close friend was exposed to a trauma
• Indirect exposure to aversive details of the trauma, usually in the course of professional
duties (eg, first responders, medics)
Criterion B: intrusion symptoms (one required)

The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in the following way(s):
• Unwanted upsetting memories
• Nightmares
• Flashbacks
• Emotional distress after exposure to traumatic reminders
• Physical reactivity after exposure to traumatic reminders
Criterion C: avoidance (one required)

Avoidance of trauma-related stimuli after the trauma, in the following way(s):
• Trauma-related thoughts or feelings
• Trauma-related external reminders
Criterion D: negative alterations in cognitions and mood (two required)
[10.45.165] 945
Negative thoughts or feelings that began or worsened after the trauma, in the
following way(s):
• Inability to recall key features of the trauma
• Overly negative thoughts and assumptions about oneself or the world
• Exaggerated blame of self or others for causing the trauma
• Negative affect
• Decreased interest in activities
• Feeling isolated
• Difficulty experiencing positive affect
Criterion E: alterations in arousal and reactivity

Trauma-related arousal and reactivity that began or worsened after the trauma, in the
following way(s):
• Irritability or aggression
• Risky or destructive behavior
• Hypervigilance
• Heightened startle reaction
• Difficulty concentrating
• Difficulty sleeping
Criterion F: duration (required)

Symptoms last for more than 1 month.
Criterion G: functional significance (required)
Symptoms create distress or functional impairment (eg, social, occupational).
Criterion H: exclusion (required)
Symptoms are not due to medication, substance use, or other illness.
Two specifications:
• Dissociative Specification. In addition to meeting criteria for diagnosis, an individual
experiences high levels of either of the following in reaction to trauma-related stimuli:
– Depersonalization. Experience of being an outside observer of or detached from
oneself (eg, feeling as if ‘this is not happening to me’ or one were in a dream).
– Derealization. Experience of unreality, distance, or distortion (eg, ‘things are not
real’).
• Delayed Specification. Full diagnostic criteria are not met until at least six months after
the trauma(s), although onset of symptoms may occur immediately.
Importantly, PTSD has been moved out of the anxiety disorders into a new class of
‘trauma and stressor related disorders’ (see Pai, Suris and North (2017)). The definition of
what constitutes a traumatic experience has been revised and extended, which is
significant for medico-legal purposes. Three new symptoms have been added, while
existing ones have been modified and a new four-cluster organisation and diagnostic
algorithm has been introduced. There is also a new dissociative subtype (see Miller, Wolf
and Keane (2014); O’Donnell et al (2014)) and a developmental subtype for children aged
six or younger is incorporated (see Tedeschi and Billick (2017)). Specific provision for
‘complex PTSD’ has not been made in DSM-5.
Reliability and validity of diagnoses

[10.45.170] There are many controversies in relation to the reliability and validity of
diagnoses of PTSD under the DSM system. A new aspect to these is the extent to which
the DSM-5 criteria may be more restrictive than those in DSM-IV-TR.
Kolb, in a memorable letter to the American Journal of Psychiatry in 1989, maintained
that PTSD was to psychiatry what syphilis was to medicine, such is its heterogeneity: ‘At
one time or another [this disorder] may appear to mimic every personality disorder’: Kolb
(1989, p 811). Considerable amounts of research have been conducted over the past two
946 [10.45.170]
decades in an effort to formulate objective diagnostic indicators for PTSD. However,

comparatively few studies have focused upon the pathophysiology of PTSD, while most
studies on the physical stress manifestations have been conducted as yet upon animals.
The search for such objective measures is made the more important by the claim-
friendliness of the disorder and the growing public awareness of it. As Neal (1994, p 119)
has commented: ‘rarely before have claimants presented themselves to psychiatric
examiners having read printed symptom lists describing the diagnostic features of the
disorder for which they are seeking compensation’: see also Atkinson et al (1982). He
might have added that rarely before have significant numbers of examiners provided
checklists of symptoms for patients seeking compensation to check-off in order to
‘facilitate’ the assessment process.
Much depends in terms of accuracy of diagnosis upon the reliability of patient
self-report: Turnball (1999). If this is flawed, any diagnosis consequent upon it will be
flawed – for instance, see Alagic v Callvar [1999] NTSC 90. Ashley J in Wright v
Commonwealth [2005] VSC 200 at [59] has commented that while there are psychological
tests with the potential to assist a conclusion whether circumstances recounted by a
patient satisfy the criteria for a diagnosis of a psychiatric illness, the diagnosis of PTSD
depends ‘at least very considerably upon the reliability of symptoms recounted by a
patient’, although the skilled professional ‘will be alert to consider whether the patient’s
history fits together’. He observed too that:
there is a particular problem when a patient presents long after an event which would
prima facie satisfy the requirements of criterion A of DSM-IV, that patient providing a
history of symptoms compatible with the presence of PTSD in the intervening period.
Memory is fallible. There is a risk of innocent but false attribution of symptoms to that
criterion A event. On the other hand, in some cases … persons who suffer from PTSD do
not discern that their symptoms represent illness, or reject the idea that they are
psychologically unwell. So it is that a prolonged period may pass whilst symptoms of
PTSD remain present but medically unexplored. So also … in some cases the presence of
symptoms may be recognised, but attributed to a cause other than the critical traumatic
event.
In Peterson v Commonwealth [2008] VSC 166 at [231], Kaye J, for good reason, was
extremely critical of the usage of a self-reporting questionnaire in the context of forensic
assessment of PTSD:
The limitations and disadvantages involved in that method, in the context of a
medico-legal claim, are self-evident, and substantial. Such a technique might be
appropriate where a practitioner is examining a patient for the purposes of diagnosis and
treatment. However, in the context of a medico-legal claim, such a methodology carries
with it the obvious risk of suggestibility. In this case, that risk was compounded by the fact
that before the plaintiff was referred to Professor Horne, he had spoken to Mr Forster, the
solicitor, who had ‘diagnosed’ him as suffering PTSD caused by his experiences of the
Voyager collision, and aggravated by his experiences of the Vietnam War.
PTSD is a disorder of a prevalence arguably comparable to that of panic disorders, bipolar
disorders or schizophrenia, namely in the order of 1% by way of lifetime prevalence in the
community: Helzer (1987) – at least in the United States context: see Helzer (1987, p 317).
Notably, DSM-IV speaks in terms of a prevalence ranging from 1 to 14%. Pitman and Orr
(1993, p 39), though, review a number of studies and comment: ‘Estimates of the
occurrence of PTSD have shown substantial variation. The incidence of the disorder has
been set at between 1% and 9% in the general population, between 34% and 78% in assault
victims and between 15% and 31% in Vietnam veterans. Much of this variation is due to
differences in clinical diagnostic techniques.’ See also Gelder et al (1996, pp 191–192).
However, it has been asserted that pharmacologic treatments have not been carefully
investigated in controlled studies and that relative to other anxiety and affective disorders,
treatment of PTSD is still ‘at an early stage’: Kosten (1990, p 187); Davidson (1990, p 205).
[10.45.170] 947
Lack of symptom specificity has also been identified as clinically problematic, with
other aetiologies being potentially responsible for symptoms of anxiety. Joseph, Williams
and Yule (1997, p 19) note that sleep disturbances have been ‘characterised as a hallmark
of PTSD’, but point out that there can be many causes of sleep disturbance – Lasagna
(1981), for instance, found that up to one-third of the population is dissatisfied with their
sleep. Van Kampen and colleagues (1986) have argued that a feeling of detachment from
others is not a valid criterion but have suggested that anxiety, mistrust and depression
should be regarded as further indicators of PTSD. McFarlane has argued similarly for
‘survivor-guilt’: McLean v Commonwealth (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 28 February
1997) per Studdert J. See McFarlane (1999).
Challenges in diagnosis
[10.45.180] It is generally regarded that the re-experiencing of the traumatic event ‘is a
central clinical feature of PTSD’ (see Mendelson, subscription service at [51.370]); Joseph,
Williams and Yule (1997, p 19)) or at least a primary characteristic of the disorder:
McFarlane (1995, p 28). Another key aspect of the disorder is persistent avoidance of
stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing or general unresponsiveness as a result
of the trauma. These are matters of personal psychic experience, not readily susceptible of
independent clinical verification or corroboration. They are such as to leave scope for
significant inter-rater variability: McFarlane (1995, p 28); Pitman and Orr (1993, p 39). For
this reason, Slovenko (1984) and Resnick (1984) have both highlighted the problem posed
by the need for reliance by clinicians on patients’ self-reports in the context of PTSD. It is
certainly the case that the criteria for PTSD are particularly dependent upon, first, the
communication of symptoms to mental health professionals and then those professionals’
ability to evaluate clinically the genuineness of the self-reports: see Hagen (1997, p 256).
The need for reliance by the psychologist or psychiatrist upon what the patient says
creates a potential for erroneous diagnosis by dint of unrecognised fabrication or
exaggeration of symptoms: Crewdson (1996, p 98); Platt and Husband (1986, p 34); Breslau
and Davis (1987, p 255). In 1996 Dr Gerald Rosen, writing in the Bulletin of the American
Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, observed that the defining characteristics of PTSD were
particularly prone to exaggeration or fabrication because of their being subjective,
publicised in the popular media, and easy to simulate:
Recent findings demonstrate that attorneys can play an active role in furthering the
presentation of false PTSD claims. Rosen (1995) reported on 20 survivors of a major
marine disaster who all filed personal injury claims and presented with the hallmark
symptoms of post traumatic stress disorder. The resulting and extraordinarily high incidence
rate for diagnosed PTSD among these litigating survivors was explained, in part, by reports of
attorney coaching and symptom sharing. Thus, several survivors disclosed that counsel had
advised them that they didn’t need to work and it might be worth their while to see a doctor
every week. Two other survivors reported after settling their cases that attorneys had
explained to crew members how people with PTSD had sleep problems, nightmares and
fears. This information was allegedly shared with others in the group.
Commenting on the potential of PTSD for forensic abuse, Lees-Haley and Dunn (1986,
p 17) earlier had maintained that, ‘[i]f mental disorders were listed on the New York Stock
Exchange, PTSD would be a growth stock worth watching’: see further Hagen (1997); cf
Mezey (2001).
PTSD presents unique challenges in terms of proof of symptoms sufficient to amount to
the diagnosis. Ashley J in Wright v Commonwealth [2005] VSC 200 at [59] has commented
that while there are psychological tests with the potential to assist a conclusion whether
circumstances recounted by a patient satisfy the criteria for a diagnosis of a psychiatric
illness, the diagnosis of PTSD depends ‘at least very considerably upon the reliability of
948 [10.45.180]
symptoms recounted by a patient’, although the skilled professional ‘will be alert to

consider whether the patient’s history fits together’. He observed too that:
there is a particular problem when a patient presents long after an event which would
prima facie satisfy the requirements of criterion A of DSM-IV, that patient providing a
history of symptoms compatible with the presence of PTSD in the intervening period.
Memory is fallible. There is a risk of innocent but false attribution of symptoms to that
criterion A event. On the other hand, in some cases … persons who suffer from PTSD do
not discern that their symptoms represent illness, or reject the idea that they are
psychologically unwell. So it is that a prolonged period may pass whilst symptoms of
PTSD remain present but medically unexplored. So also … in some cases the presence of
symptoms may be recognised, but attributed to a cause other than the critical traumatic
event.
Many of the re-experiencing criteria are not easily objectively measured. When does a
person have difficulty concentrating, suffer from hypervigilance or an exaggerated startle
response? Issues such as restricted range of affect and feelings of detachment or
estrangement from others are also highly subjective experiences and assessments, making
comparison between assessors’ assessments exceptionally difficult. McFarlane (1995, p 31)
has conceded that standard clinical examination alone in relation to PTSD is a ‘relatively
insensitive and idiosyncratic instrument’ and criticised the paradoxical situation whereby:
the same rigour of diagnostic assessment is not demanded in the legal settings as [is]
required in the research setting. This would systematically challenge the often biased
assessment and report writing used by both the insurance company and the plaintiff
expert.
This creates a need for more objective measures of PTSD. One option is psychometric
testing.
Psychometric tests
[10.45.190] The accuracy of psychometric testing for PTSD is controversial. Structured
clinical interviews are the gold standard for PTSD assessment: Taylor (2006, p 106).
Self-report questionnaires and inventories have serious limitations. It has been asserted
that even psychometric tests such as the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder Scale-1-Revised
‘are no guarantee that symptoms of PTSD are actually present and previous studies have
shown that such measures are relatively easy to fake’: Neal and Rose (1995, p 353), citing
Dalton, Tom and Rosenblum (1989); Lees-Haley (1990). However, the many tests all have
their proponents. For instance, it has been maintained that the PTSD Inventory (Solomon
et al (1993)), which consists of 17 statements corresponding to the 17 PTSD symptoms
listed in DSM-III-R, has satisfactory internal reliability. But there is no shortage of
competitors to the PTSD Inventory:
• the PTSD Interview: see Watson et al (1991);
• the Clinician-Administered Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Scale: see Blake et al (1990);
• the Mississippi Scale for Combat Related PTSD: see Keane, Caddell and Taylor (1988);
• the Penn Inventory: see Hammarberg (1992);
• the MMPI: see Silver and Salamone-Genovese (1991);
• the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale: Foa (1995);
• the Davidson Trauma Scale: Davidson (1996);
• the PTSD Checklist: Weathers et al (1994);
• the Trauma Symptom Inventory: Briere (1995); and
• the MMPI-2 with a new PTSD scale, the PS-MMPI-2.
The fact that there is frequently a secondary advantage in the existence of symptoms
carries with it the potential both for unconscious distortion of symptoms by patients and
[10.45.190] 949
for bias on the part of psychologists and psychiatrists in interpreting what is reported to
them. McFarlane (1986, p 12), for instance, has commented:
It is difficult to divorce oneself from the immediacy of many of these people’s experiences
… this … can interfere with people’s scientific objectivity and may help to explain the
weak theoretical underpinnings of much disaster research. Thus the range of opinions
about the psychological consequences of disaster may, in part, represent the differing
responses of researchers to their own experience of disasters rather than the unbiased
interpretations of the available data.
(See also Stewart and Hodgkinson (1994, p 69).)

It is also the case that mental health assessors are frequently asked to express an
opinion as to the duration of PTSD symptomatology when they have not been the
professional whom the person has seen regularly for treatment. Often it is only after
sustained symptomatology that a person sees a psychologist or psychiatrist: see, eg,
McLean v Commonwealth (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 28 February 1997) at p 20: see
Freckelton (1997e). A problem can arise if only a general clinical history is taken by the
assessor without careful questioning about how the person was, and which symptoms he
or she was experiencing, at a series of particular times. Although such questions are
admittedly difficult for many patients/clients to answer, the responses can provide very
important diagnostic information. The tendency toward retrospective reconstruction, if
not carefully evaluated, has the potential to induce a patient to convey an erroneous or
misleading interpretation of PTSD symptomatology experienced over a lengthy period to
an uncritical examiner. Moreover, research has demonstrated a significant tendency
toward inflated assessments of PTSD pathology when such assessments are retrospective,
as against prospective assessments or assessments using non-disaster control groups: see
Melton et al (1997, p 377).
Prevalence of PTSD
[10.45.200] Not surprisingly, the prevalence of PTSD depends upon the prevalence of
traumatic events to which a population is exposed. In North America, the lifetime
prevalence of DSM-IV-TR PTSD was stated to be 8%, although it is higher in certain
subgroups, such as emergency service workers, police, armed servicemen and sex
workers. For instance, the lifetime prevalence of PTSD among combat veterans is between
22% and 31%: see Kulka et al (1990); Prigerson, Maciejewski and Rosenheck (2002).
Women have a higher lifetime prevalence of PTSD than men (10% as against 5%): Kessler
et al (1995), even after controlling for frequency of exposure to traumatic events. A variety
of explanations have been proffered: see Taylor (2006, p 8). In a systematic review, it has
been argued that caution should be exercised in the interpretation of prevalence rates of
PTSD as many studies are susceptible to bias and low response rates, meaning that
statements on both prevalence and trajectories are not warranted (see Ophuis, Olij,
Polinder and Haagsma (2018)).
Overlap with other disorders

[10.45.210] A further uncertainty is the extent of overlap between PTSD and other
psychiatric disorders such as depression (see Southwick (1993)), personality disorders,
pathological grief disorder (see Vernon v Bosley (No 1) [1997] 1 All ER 577), thyrotoxicosis
(Simpson v Buckney (unreported, Tasmanian Supreme Court, 28 April 1995)), substance
abuse disorders, and even cognitive impairment: see Joseph, Williams and Yule (1997,
p 20); Beary (1995, p 735); Melton et al (1997, p 377); Behar (1987, p 461). For instance,
Breslau et al (1991) found that 83% of people with PTSD also had at least one other
disorder, most commonly substance abuse or dependence (43%), major depression (37%)
or agoraphobia (22%).
950 [10.45.200]
McFarlane and Papay (1992) discovered in a survey of 70 firefighters who had

contracted PTSD after the Ash Wednesday bushfires in 1983 that 77% attracted a further
diagnosis. However, other commentators have argued that the concept of PTSD is
fundamentally flawed by its inadequacy, Herman maintaining that it has failed ‘to capture
either the protean symptomatic manifestations of prolonged, repeated trauma or the
profound deformations of personality that occur in captivity’: Herman (1992, p 119). She
argued (1992, p 121) in favour of a new entity proposed to the working group of the ICD,
‘complex post-traumatic stress disorder’, broad enough to deal with:
a history of subjection to totalitarian control over a prolonged period (months to years).
Examples include hostages, prisoners of war, concentration-camp survivors, and survivors
of some religious cults. Examples also include those subjected to totalitarian systems in
sexual and domestic life, including survivors of domestic battering, childhood physical or
sexual abuse, and organized sexual exploitation.
The childhood victim of sexual abuse was argued in R v McNeill (unreported, Victorian
Court of Appeal, 8 October 1996) to suffer from symptoms consistent with complex
post-traumatic stress disorder.
Physiological aspects of PTSD

[10.45.220] A number of researchers have argued that chronic PTSD can be described as a
‘physioneurosis’ with distinctly physiological components. Taylor (2006, p 64) has
summarised the research as follows:
Neuroimaging research has implicated dysregulations in at least three important brain
regions in PTSD: the amygdale, medical prefrontal cortex, and hippocampus. In PTSD the
amygdale appears to be hyperreactive to trauma-related stimuli. Although the amygdale
functions differently in PTSD, compared to controls, it is unclear whether the source of the
problem is with the amygdale or whether it lies elsewhere. Nevertheless, increased
activity of the amygdale seems to play a role in PTSD symptoms such as hyperarousal (eg
exaggerated startle response) and trauma-related fear and avoidance.
In normal individuals, the suppression of declarative memories is associated with
heightened activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and decreased activity of the
hippocampus. This raises the possibility that dysregulations in the frontal or hippocampal
systems may be associated with intrusive recollections (reexperiencing symptoms) in
PTSD. Consistent with this, neuroimaging studies show that PTSD is associated with
lower than normal activation of the medial prefrontal cortex upon exposure to threatening
stimuli, which occurs when the amygdale is hyperactivated.
Given the amygdale inhibition by the prefrontal cortex plays a role in fear extinction …
it has been suggested that the neuroimaging findings indicate that PTSD is associated with
insufficient amygdale inhibition by the medical prefrontal cortex. This could account for
the persistence of trauma-related fear and avoidance that characterises PTSD. Insufficient
inhibition may also play a role in re-experiencing symptoms such as flashbacks. This could
occur if heightened activity of the amygdale leads to the repeated simulation of fear
memories.
Practical consequences
[10.45.230] A number of researchers have noted hippocampal damage in PTSD sufferers:
see Gurvits et al (1996); see also Bremner (1999); Bremner et al (1995); Carlson (2002).
Van derKolk et al (1985) have argued that the negative symptoms in humans parallel
the catecholamine mediated behaviour sequences in animals that have been subjected to
shock. It has been argued by them that long-term augmentation of the locus ceruleus
pathways following trauma underlies the repetitive, intrusive recollections and nightmares
that afflict many persons with PTSD. McCulloch, Jones and Bailey (1995, p 289) note that
‘more recent work emphasises the increasingly biological view that is now taken of PTSD’,
including the possibility that PTSD involves an enduring imbalance between the release of
two classes of transmitters (noradrenaline and opioids) in the locus ceruleus, caused by
the psychological effects of acute stress. McFarlane (1995, p 27) has expressed the view
[10.45.230] 951
that ‘a demonstrable disorder of the circadian modulation of cortisol is apparent’ in

sufferers of PTSD. Van der Kolk (1996, Table 10.1) summarised as follows the
psychobiological abnormalities prompted by PTSD:
I. Psychophysiological effects
A. Extreme autonomic responses to stimuli reminiscent of the trauma
B. Hyperarousal to intense but neutral stimuli (loss of stimulus
discrimination)
1. Nonhabituation of the acoustic startle response
2. Response below threshold to sound intensities
3. Reduced electrical pattern in cortical event-related potentials
II. Neurohormonal effects
A. Norepinephrine (NE), other catecholamines
1. Elevated urinary catecholamines
2. Increased plasma NE metabolite response to yohimbine
3. Down-regulation of adrenergic receptors
B. Glucocorticoids
1. Decreased resting glucocorticoid levels
2. Decreased glucocorticoid response to stress
3. Down-regulation of glucocorticoid receptors
4. Hyperresponsiveness to low-dose dexamethasone
C. Serotonin
1. Decreased serotonin activity in traumatised animals
2. Best pharmacological responses to serotonin uptake inhibitors
D. Endogenous opioids
1. Increased opioid response to stimuli reminiscent of trauma
2. Conditionability of stress-induced analgesia
E. Various hormones: Memory effects
1. NE, vasopressin: Consolidation of traumatic memories
2. Oxytocin, endogenous opioids: Amnesias
III. Neuroanatomical effects
A. Decreased hippocampal volume
B. Activation of amygdala and connected structures during flashbacks
C. Activation of sensory areas during flashbacks
D. Decreased activation of Broca’s area during flashbacks
E. Marked right-hemispheric lateralisation
IV. Immunological effects
A. Increased CD45 RO/RA ratio.
The potential for PTSD to be regarded as a physical injury in the sense of being a bodily
injury caused at least in part by injuries to the brain (at least for the purposes of the
Montreal Convention) was accepted by Schmidt J in Casey v Pel-Air Aviation Pty Ltd (2015)
89 NSWLR 707; [2015] NSWSC 566 at [144] (see Freckelton (2015)). This appeared to open
the door for similar claims on an orthodox personal injury basis, potentially circumventing
the additional criteria in personal injury claims for ‘pure mental harm’ litigation.
However, in Pel-Air Aviation Pty Ltd v Casey (2017) 93 NSWLR 438; [2017] NSWCA 32, the
New South Wales Court of Appeal held that the expression ‘bodily injury’ connotes
damage to a person’s body, including damage to a person’s brain. It concluded that if the
evidence in a particular case demonstrates that there has been physical damage to part or
952 [10.45.230]
parts of the brain, ‘bodily injury’ will have been proved. However, it held that in the
particular case, while the expert evidence justified a conclusion that the plaintiff’s brain
was malfunctioning as a result of biochemical changes, there was no evidence that her
brain had physically changed. This led it to hold that the changes to the plaintiff’s brain
resulting from PTSD did not amount to ‘bodily injuries’ as that term is used in the
Montreal Convention.
However, Ziskin (1995, p 1261) maintained that the diagnostic category of PTSD still
remained:
highly experimental and unstable. Second, the practices and criteria used to identify PTSD
vary considerably, and any such diagnosis may be largely determined by selection of the
clinician who conducts an evaluation as opposed to the characteristics of the examinee.
Third, overall, research to date on PTSD has been quite limited, often applicable only to
Vietnam veterans, and in any event not generalisable to DSM-IV PTSD because of the
changes in criteria. Fourth, in cases in which the diagnosis is rendered, a series of factors
complicates the determination of causal factors. A number of authors indicate that at least
in some cases, symptoms following purportedly ‘traumatic’ events can be accounted for
partially, or sometimes fully, by iatrogenic factors, involvement in litigation, exaggeration
or falsification, or a tendency to externalise blame onto the accident for pre-existing
difficulties. Fifth, although there is limited evidence in this regard, a few reports suggest
that in contrast to claims that treatment of PTSD requires years of intensive work, even
brief treatment may produce a positive outcome.
For Australia, Mullany and Handford (1993, p 38) summed up tellingly but tactfully the
problems of causation that flow for the legal system from this complexity: ‘The etiological
facts of PTSD have not yet been fully determined.’ Much the same might be said of many
other aspects of the disorder. The practical consequences for the conduct of litigation of
the as yet developing understanding of PTSD by mental health professionals are
profound.
Difficult relationship with assessment instruments

[10.45.300] A difficult issue arises in relation to the extent to which a diagnosis of PTSD is
to be translated into an impairment rating under tables of impairment such as those
produced by the American Medical Association. The disorder becomes the more attractive
to plaintiffs with the preclusion in a number of jurisdictions upon psychiatric symptoms
arising as a consequence of, or secondary to, a physical injury being taken into account for
the purposes of evaluating impairment: see Mendelson (2004).
Compensability of psychiatric injuries in Australia
Common law
[10.45.340] In the landmark case of Victorian Railways Commission v Coultas (1888) 13 App
Cas 222 at 225, the Privy Council held, in the context of a level-crossing incident causing
‘severe nervous shock’ to the occupant of a buggy, that psychiatric injury without more
was not a form of harm for which damages for negligence could be recovered. Before the
outbreak of World War II, though, the situation had changed in Australia at least, where
‘neurasthenic breakdown amounting to an illness’ was held to be a form of damage which
without more had the potential to be compensable in damages actions: Bunyan v Jordan
(1937) 57 CLR 1 at 16. The categories of recovery were further broadened in Mount Isa
Mines Ltd v Pusey (1971) 125 CLR 383 at 395 (see further McSherry (1997); Mullany and
Handford (1993); Mullany (1997); Mendelson (1997); Handford (2006)), where Windeyer J
repudiated the notion that ‘psychogenic illness’ is any less an injury than physical injury
and Walsh J spoke in terms of recovery for ‘all forms of mental or psychological disorder
which are capable of resulting from shock’ (at 414). It is from this time that PTSD, as it
came to be formally described in the DSM-III of 1980, could plausibly be claimed as a head
[10.45.340] 953
of tortious damage. However, a distinction was drawn by the High Court between
‘“shock”, however grievous, which was no more than an immediate emotional response to
a distressing experience sudden, severe and saddening’ and a ‘severe emotional distress
[which] can be the starting point of a lasting disorder of mind or body, some form of
psychoneurosis or a psychosomatic illness’, for which damages could be awarded (at 394).
By 1983, it was held by the House of Lords in McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] 1 AC 410
that a plaintiff could recover for ‘nervous shock’ from a defendant whose negligent
driving had caused a road accident resulting in death and injury to members of her family
when she was some distance away and did not even learn of the accident for some two
hours after its occurrence.
The important Australian case on the subject, Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549,
involved a situation where the psychiatric injury resulted at still further remove from the
actual accident. The plaintiff’s injury consisted not in the plaintiff witnessing a car accident
but in seeing her husband subsequent to it at hospital in severe pain. He did not die, but
she was described subsequent to seeing her husband in hospital by Brennan J as suffering
‘severe anxiety and depression’ – her psychiatric condition was accepted as having caused
gynaecological problems and a hysterectomy was later performed on the plaintiff.
The High Court held that the test was whether a defendant could reasonably have
foreseen that a person later perceiving the physical consequences of the defendant’s
breach of a duty of care to a third person might suffer a ‘mental or psychological disorder’
induced by shock. Thus, the propinquity requirement which had arguably previously
existed was removed, as well as the qualified requirement that at least the plaintiff be close
enough to the accident to enable him or her to observe the immediate consequences of the
defendant’s wrongful conduct: see further Mullany and Handford (1993); Handford
(1995); McSherry (1997); Mendelson (1998); Freckelton (2001b; 2005c); Handford (2006).
By and large, phenomena such as sorrow, grief, stress, anxiety, pain and trauma, of
themselves, are not compensable under Australian or English law: see Lynch v Knight
(1861) 9 HL Cas 577; 11 ER 854 at 855; Benson v Lee [1972] VR 879 at 880; Alcock v Chief
Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310 at 401; [1991] 4 All ER 907; T v South
Australia (1992) 60 A Crim R 273 at 273; Horne v Wilson (unreported, Tasmanian Supreme
Court, 19 March 1998); Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; [2002] HCA 35 (under
most crimes compensation schemes, compensation can be awarded for pain and suffering:
see Freckelton (2001a)); Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269;
[2003] HCA 33; O’Leary v Oolong Aboriginal Corp Inc [2004] Aust Torts Reports 81-747;
[2004] NSWCA 7. Such matters have been described as ‘psychological injuries’ (see
Aldersea v Public Transport Corp [2001] 3 VR 499; [2001] VSC 169; Freckelton (2002c)).
However, damages are recoverable ‘for any recognisable psychiatric illness caused by the
breach of duty by the defendant’: Hinz v Berry [1970] 2 QB 40 at 42–43. PTSD, for legal
purposes, is such an illness. As noted above, because of its nexus between symptomatology
and the triggering event, it has proved particularly attractive to plaintiff lawyers.
As a result of Australia’s leading judgment on the subject (Tame v New South Wales
(2002) 211 CLR 317; [2002] HCA 35), it is now clear that the principal common law
criterion for evaluating whether a defendant has breached a duty of care not to cause a
psychiatric injury to a plaintiff is whether the defendant knew or ought to have known
that, by its action or omission, it was reasonably foreseeable that it would cause
psychiatric injury to the plaintiff. At common law, the ‘nervous shock’, ‘ordinary
robustness’ and ‘direct perception’ rules (see Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549) ceased to
constitute prerequisites for recovery but remain factors to be evaluated in determining
whether psychiatric injury was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant: see also Gifford v
Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269; [2003] HCA 33; Freckelton (2005c;
2002a; 2002b). See, further, Freckelton (2001b); Mendelson (1998); Handford (2006).
954 [10.45.340]
Statutory changes
[10.45.360] Statutory changes have intervened in most parts of Australia: see Freckelton
(2005c); Handford (2006). Under s 5S of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 33 of the Civil
Liability Act 1936 (SA), and s 34 of the Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), it is provided
that a defendant does not owe a plaintiff a duty of care not to cause the plaintiff ‘mental
harm’ unless the defendant ought to have foreseen ‘that a person of normal fortitude
might, in the circumstances of the case, suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable
care were not taken’. In short, then, there is a presumption against an action being able to
be brought unless the preconditions are satisfied by plaintiffs. The ‘circumstances of the
case’ are stipulated to include:
(a) whether or not the mental harm was suffered as the result of a sudden shock;
(b) whether the plaintiff witnessed, at the scene, a person being killed, injured or put
in peril;
(c) the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and any person killed, injured
or put in peril; and
(d) whether or not there was a pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant.
The court can still have regard to what the defendant knew, or ought to have known,
about the fortitude of the plaintiff.
Under s 53 of the Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), damages may only be awarded for
mental harm if the injured person was physically injured in the accident or was present at
the scene of the accident when the accident occurred, or if the injured person is a parent,
spouse or child of a person killed, injured or endangered in the accident. In addition, it is
provided that damages may only be awarded for pure mental harm if the harm consists of
a recognised psychiatric illness.
The Tasmanian provision (s 34 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas)) is in very similar
terms save that the two indicia to which the court is obliged to have regard are:
(a) whether or not the mental harm was suffered as the result of a sudden shock; and
(b) whether or not there was a pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant.
Section 72 of the Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) and s 30 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) are
along similar lines to the Western Australian, South Australian and Tasmanian legislation.
However, they contain some additional provisions. Both provisions state that they do not
affect the duty of care of a defendant if the defendant knows, or ought to know, that the
plaintiff is a person of less than normal fortitude. This does not change the common law.
Importantly, though, s 73 of the Victorian Act and s 30 of the New South Wales Act
provide that a plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages for pure mental harm arising
wholly or partly from mental or nervous shock in connection with another person being
killed, injured or put in danger by the act or omission of the defendant unless:
• the plaintiff witnessed, at the scene, the victim being killed, injured or put in danger; or
• the plaintiff is or was in a close relationship with the victim (Victoria) or is a close
member of the family of the victim (New South Wales).
Under the New South Wales legislation, a ‘close member of the family’ of a victim is
defined to be:
• a parent of the victim or other person with parental responsibility for the victim;
• the spouse or partner of the victim;
• a child or stepchild of the victim or any other person for whom the victim has parental
responsibility; or
[10.45.360] 955
• a brother, sister, half-brother or half-sister, or stepbrother or stepsister of the victim.
A ‘spouse or partner’ is defined to mean a husband or wife, or the other party to a de facto
relationship within the meaning of the Property (Relationships) Act 1984 (NSW). Where
more than one person would so qualify as a spouse or partner, only the last person so
qualifies.
Section 31 of the New South Wales Act prescribes (for the sake of clarity) that there is
no liability for a defendant to pay damages for pure mental harm resulting from
negligence unless the harm consists of a recognised psychiatric illness. This is not defined.
This requirement has been removed in Canada (see Saadati v Moorhead [2017] 1 SCR 543;
see also Freckelton and Popa (2018)).
The most significant development under the statutory changes is the partial
re-emergence of the ‘ordinary fortitude’ test. It is no longer simply one of the indicia of
reasonable foreseeability; there must have been foresight or the capacity to foresee that a
person of normal fortitude might suffer a recognised psychiatric illness. It is likely that,
under the new common law provisions, Mrs Tame would still have failed in her action
and that Mr and Mrs Annetts would have succeeded. Plaintiffs such as the Giffords
(Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring Pty Ltd (2003) 214 CLR 269; [2003] HCA 33), the
Cubbons (Cubbon v Roads and Traffic Authority (NSW) (2004) 42 MVR 153; [2004] NSWCA
326) or Mr Napier (New South Wales v Napier [2002] NSWCA 402) would still succeed, as
would Mr Maddalena (Maddalena v CSR Ltd [2004] WASCA 231). Probably, the bar is
slightly raised against that small category of plaintiffs whose psychiatric decompensation
is prompted by a surprisingly minor event or is far in excess of what could reasonably
have been anticipated by the tortfeasor (eg, Mrs Tame). However, under the common law,
the unpredictable nature of the plaintiff’s reaction remained an indicium of reasonable
foreseeability and therefore constituted a mechanism for denying compensability.
Much now depends on what is established as ‘reasonably foreseeable’. A difficulty for
plaintiffs can occur where the position adopted on behalf of the defendant is that stress
and distress, both psychological injuries falling short of compensable psychiatric injuries,
were foreseeable but pathology of the kind exhibited by the plaintiff could not have been
predicted. In Van Soest v Residual Health Management Unit [2000] 1 NZLR 179 at 197, the
majority saw it as significant that psychiatry distinguished between mere mental distress
and psychiatric illness, albeit that the distinction was one of degree rather than kind and
might change with advances in medical knowledge. Gummow and Kirby JJ in Tame v New
South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317; [2002] HCA 35 at [202] noted that in McLoughlin v O’Brian
[1983] 1 AC 410 at 432, Lord Bridge of Harwich made the point that, in cases of psychiatric
injury, a question of reasonable foreseeability ‘depends on what knowledge is to be
attributed to the hypothetical reasonable man [sic] of the operation of cause and effect in
psychiatric medicine’, while in his judgment, Hayne J raised a number of questions about
breach of duty and causation, asking what knowledge of psychiatry is to be imputed to
the reasonable person (at [262]) and ‘[h]ow is the distinction to be made between
compensable injury and non-compensable “ordinary” or “normal” emotional
consequences?’ (at [265]). His Honour observed (at [292]) that little explicit attention had
been given to identifying the basis upon which the distinction is to be made ‘beyond
noting that it is only the former which is to be compensable. So far, the courts appear to
have been content to defer to the way in which psychiatrists distinguish between the two.’
This leaves uncertain how plaintiffs can prove what constitutes a reasonable
expectation on the part of defendants – in particular, whether psychiatrists can play a
legitimate role in expressing opinions about what the reasonable person would anticipate
in terms of a breach of duty with the potential to lead to a recognised mental illness,
namely a compensable psychiatric injury, as against a psychological injury. Probably the
question is one that does not call for expert opinion, as the question that requires an
956 [10.45.360]
answer is what the reasonable person, presumably untutored by expert psychiatric

opinions, would conclude about risk. A secondary question is the steps that a reasonably
prudent and careful defendant would undertake to ascertain whether a consequence of
her or his conduct could be psychiatric as against psychological injuries. This might be a
matter for expert evidence.
Current status of PTSD in the law

[10.45.400] Decisions from the civil courts in Australia have employed a wide diversity of
terms in relation to trauma alleged to be compensable. Terms such as the following have
all been employed in judgments – often in response to the terminology employed in
expert evidence:
• ‘post-traumatic neurosis’: Huysse v Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Authority [1975] 1
NSWLR 401 at 402;
• ‘post-traumatic anxiety depressive state’: Smith v Robinson (unreported, NSW Supreme
Court, 23 March 1995);
• ‘chronic stress syndrome’: In the Matter of s 663B of the Criminal Code (unreported,
Queensland Supreme Court, 24 February 1995);
• ‘post-traumatic amnesia’: Chambers v Jobling (1986) 7 NSWLR 1;
• ‘post-traumatic stress reaction’: Dillon v Baltic Shipping Co (1989) 21 NSWLR 614 at 666;
• ‘nervous shock’: Dillon v Baltic Shipping Co (1989) 21 NSWLR 614 at 616; McLean v
Commonwealth (1996) 41 NSWLR 389 (part of this judgment is reported in NSWLR but
references in this chapter are to unreported parts of the decision);
• ‘mental trauma’: Page v Smith [1994] 4 All ER 522 at 549; see also Mullany (1995);
• ‘post traumatic stress syndrome’: R v Walsh (1991) 60 A Crim R 419; and
• ‘complex post-traumatic stress disorder’: R v McNeill (unreported, Victorian Court of
Appeal, 8 October 1996); Nolan v The Queen (unreported, WA Court of Criminal Appeal,
22 May 1997).
PTSD, however, is now generally recognised as the appropriate term to be employed

when the diagnostic criteria of the DSM-5or ICD-10 are made out.
Ultimately, though, so far as the law is concerned, the various terms, the latest of which
is PTSD, are all means of expressing via labels a form of psychiatric injury which it is
prepared to recognise. This may change in due course with the development of
neuroscience (see Bottalico and Bruni (2012)).
There have been a number of particularly important cases in Australia and in England
which will be influential in charting the future for PTSD through the difficult waters of
forensic acceptance.
[10.45.420] For two decades, litigation involving post-traumatic stress disorder has been a
staple of personal injury actions in Australia. There are too many judgments in which
mental harm in the form of the disorder has been found for them to be enumerated
individually. The actions vary from persons who have been involved in transport
accidents and workplace accidents, to persons who have been confronted with frightening
situations in a criminal or personal context.
In Doherty v New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 450, one of a cohort of cases brought by
emergency services personnel, Price J (at [288]) made a not unusual finding:
It was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff might suffer serious psychological injury as
a result of his work. The reticence of the plaintiff to disclose his symptoms was also
reasonably foreseeable. Furthermore, it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff was
continuing to perform his duties as a crime scene officer with undisclosed symptoms of
[10.45.420] 957
PTSD and depression. The defendant’s negligence was a necessary condition of the
occurrence of the plaintiff’s injury. As the plaintiff’s injury was a foreseeable consequence
of its negligence, the defendant is liable for all of the injury caused, notwithstanding the
existence of prior symptoms.
A continuing challenge in such cases is the methodology that should be used by trial
judges to resolve conflict among mental health experts about whether a plaintiff has PTSD
and, if so, what has been responsible for it. In this regard, the litigation involving the
collision between the HMAS Melbourne and the HMAS Voyager on 10 February 1964 was
significant. It yielded a series of judgments that have influenced and generated important
aspects of the modern approach of Australia’s courts to PTSD evidence. For these
purposes, the relevant set of cases is those brought by sailors on board the Melbourne,
which scythed through the Voyager, causing the death of 82 sailors on the smaller vessel.
The defendant, the Commonwealth of Australia, admitted that negligence caused the
collision: see Freckelton (2004b).
The crucial questions in the litigation were whether it has been possible to determine if
the plaintiffs have suffered from a psychiatric injury, such as PTSD or an adjustment
disorder, and, if so, whether and to what extent their psychiatric disorders were
attributable to the collision. The fact-finding in the cases was the more complex by reason
of having been brought between 30 and 40 years subsequent to the collision.
Some sailors on the Melbourne were involved in rescue efforts but none, objectively
speaking, could be said to have been at any significant risk of death or serious injury (save
perhaps to a modest degree during the rescue efforts). However, some subjectively have
maintained that they had a different perception at the time. A number of those involved in
the rescue efforts contended that they were confronted by death and serious injury. In the
succeeding paragraphs, a number of the decisions – McLean v Commonwealth (unreported,
NSW Supreme Court, 28 February 1997), Russell v Commonwealth [1999] VSC 437, Hill v
Commonwealth [2003] NSWSC 1025, Stankowski v Commonwealth [2004] NSWSC 198,
Cavenett v Commonwealth [2005] VSC 333, and Burk v Commonwealth [2006] VSC 25 – are
analysed in terms of their significance for PTSD litigation.
McLean v Commonwealth
[10.45.430] In a controversial 1996 decision, the New South Wales Court of Appeal heard
an appeal on a large number of grounds involving a jury decision granting damages to the
plaintiff as part of ‘the Voyager litigation’ (controversial, high-profile and politically
sensitive litigation in Australia spanning decades as a result of a collision between two
ships): McLean v Commonwealth (1996) 41 NSWLR 389. Among other things, the Court of
Appeal held by majority that the trial judge had wrongly withdrawn from the jury part of
the defendant’s case in relation to the validity of PTSD: see Freckelton (1997e).
The dispute at trial (McLean v Commonwealth (unreported, NSW Supreme Court,
28 June 1996)) revolved in part around whether the plaintiff suffered from PTSD, as well as
alleged sequelae, including laryngeal carcinoma as a result of excessive cigarette smoking
arising out of the traumatic events of the sinking of the Voyager. In evaluating the use to be
made of the DSM, Santow JA on appeal gave particular emphasis to the ‘Cautionary
Statement’ in DSM-IV (1994, p xxvii):
The specified diagnostic criteria for each mental disorder are offered as guidelines for
making diagnoses because it has been demonstrated that the use of such criteria enhances
agreement amongst clinicians and investigators. The proper use of these criteria requires
specialised clinical training that provides both a body of knowledge and clinical skills.
He also observed that DSM-IV stated (1994, p xxiii) that ‘the criteria do not necessarily
embody all conditions for which people may be treated’ and:
[t]he specific diagnostic criteria included in DSM-IV are meant to serve as guidelines to be
informed by clinical judgment and are not meant to be used in a cook book fashion. For
example, the exercise of clinical judgment may justify giving a certain diagnosis to an
958 [10.45.430]
individual, even though the clinical presentation falls just short of meeting the full criteria
for the diagnosis, so long as the symptoms that are present, are persistent and severe.
(See too Budworth v Repatriation Commission (2001) 33 AAR 48; [2001] FCA 317.)
Santow JA noted: ‘What is meant by a clinical presentation falling “just short” of
meeting the full criteria for diagnosis is not explained in the document. The authors of the
text do acknowledge, however, by that statement, that there must be some flexibility in the
application of the criteria for particular illnesses.’ Within the evidence reviewed by the
appellate court, there was a difference of opinion about the status of DSM-IV, with one
doctor relying exclusively on the DSM-IV criteria and two others purporting to give
evidence independent of DSM-IV. The Court of Appeal’s decision liberates diagnosis
somewhat from the straitjacket of the ‘tick-a-box’ criteria of DSM-IV and ICD-10, and
evinces reservation about the extent to which the courts will regard themselves as bound
by the strict terms of the two main international manuals of psychiatric diagnosis.
The case returned to Studdert J for redetermination in 1997: McLean v Commonwealth
(unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 28 February 1997) (see further Freckelton (1997b)). The
key question before Studdert J was whether it had been proven on the balance of
probabilities that the plaintiff had suffered PTSD and that it was induced by the shock of
his experience at the time of the collision between the Voyager and the Melbourne. The way
in which Studdert J went about the exercise of evaluating the expert evidence may well
form a template for future Australian cases on PTSD.
His Honour noted that the plaintiff had been on board the Melbourne and had heard a
‘mixture of scraping metal, steam and screams of help, horrific screams’ (p 5). The plaintiff
at trial described his memories of the scenes of chaos and distress that had ensued after
the collision but had not sustained any physical injuries, in fact continuing to serve on the
Melbourne, including during Vietnam service in 1966. However, the plaintiff had testified
that after the collision he had become nervous and jumpy, felt bitter and angry about the
collision, suffered flashbacks to the collision, and had increased his use of alcohol and
cigarettes. In 1968 he had been admitted to a naval hospital in a tremulous, agitated state,
his doctor concluding that what was by then compulsive gambling had been a reaction to
stress. Again, by 1986 he was admitted to a clinic and described as ‘a tremulous, anxious
man with an alcohol problem’ (p 16). At the trial of the matter, the plaintiff called three
psychiatrists and the defendant called two psychiatrists and a psychologist.
One of the issues in dispute between the parties was whether there was a causal nexus
between the collision of the ships and any psychiatric condition that the plaintiff
subsequently suffered. It was submitted on behalf of the Commonwealth that if the
plaintiff had been suffering from symptoms referable to the disaster since 1974, and in
particular had been suffering flashbacks, he would have linked those problems in his own
mind to the collision and would have told the various doctors whom he consulted not
only about the symptoms but also about the necessary attribution of his symptoms. It was
asserted by experts for the Commonwealth that if someone has a re-experiencing
symptom, of the kind in Criterion B in the DSM criteria for PTSD, then the person knows
the cause and that, if the real cause of the plaintiff’s anxiety was the collision, he would
have made the link between his flashbacks and the anxiety.
According to the plaintiff, by contrast, in 1993 an ex-serviceman raised with him the
possibility of taking legal action in respect of the impact of the collision upon his life and
it was only then that he identified his illness as being an anxiety state deriving from the
Voyager collision. Studdert J accepted a range of expert opinions from the main mental
health expert, Professor McFarlane, called on behalf of the plaintiff:
• a PTSD sufferer is often reluctant to discuss symptoms;
• such a sufferer frequently minimises or ignores past trauma through shame or survivor
guilt, this being a powerful indicator of PTSD;
[10.45.430] 959
• such a sufferer frequently presents primarily with physical complaints rather than
non-physical complaints;
• a person with PTSD has a tendency to misattribute the cause of his or her symptoms
(often to the most proximate event), a tendency which is typical of the disorder, as well
as unreliable for defining a cause for the person’s symptoms;
• it is quite possible for a person to have a profound recurring memory, such as a
flashback, and yet not be aware of the event to which it is linked because the memory is
not linked with a verbal narrative; and
• a development of the narrative is required for an understanding of the flashbacks
(pp 20–21).
Studdert J also noted that the condition of PTSD was not so defined before 1980. The
significance of this was that the importance of intrusive memories and nightmares would
not have been understood prior to DSM-III, meaning that the absence of a formal medical
record of the plaintiff’s experiencing such phenomena was more a reflection of the medical
practitioners’ state of knowledge than of what was being reported by the plaintiff to his
doctors.
Studdert J accepted the diagnostic criteria for PTSD as being those in DSM-IV, there
apparently being no argument on the point, and examined the criteria in turn in response
to the submission from the defendant that the evidence failed to establish the disorder in
the plaintiff. Thus, the DSM criteria formed the battleground on which the case was
contested and the key legal question came to be whether the plaintiff satisfied the DSM
criteria.
Studdert J accepted that whether or not the plaintiff had suffered PTSD at any stage
from 1964 was ‘a medical question involving clinical judgment’ but ‘reflected upon’ the
various criteria ‘with a view to assessing whether such assumptions as the doctors are
required to make for the purposes of their diagnoses are based upon what I regard to be
the facts in this case’ (p 61).
One of the defence psychiatrists maintained that the plaintiff satisfied the DSM criteria
for amnestic disorder due to alcohol abuse, specific phobia (heights) and substance abuse
(nicotine), but not for PTSD. Studdert J, though, found that the plaintiff’s symptoms
satisfied the requirements for a person suffering from PTSD.
He found that the experience to which the plaintiff had been subject on the night of the
naval collision was a traumatic one in terms of Criterion A for PTSD. He found the
flashbacks described by the plaintiff to be ‘adequate to meet the requirements of criterion
B’ (p 57), only one symptom being necessary within Criterion B, and also noted the
evidence that had been given about the plaintiff’s disturbances at night, declining to find a
clear distinction between ‘night terrors’ and ‘nightmares’.
Studdert J found that for a considerable period after the collision the plaintiff
attempted to pursue his career and was even able to cope with a simulated emergency
test, to continue to serve on the same ship, and to sleep in the same area as he had at the
time of the collision. However, he found that these factors did not rule out a diagnosis of
PTSD. It was asserted on behalf of the Commonwealth that the plaintiff’s ability to
complete a trade qualification as a carpenter was a contra-indication to his suffering PTSD.
However, Studdert J found that the plaintiff’s success in passing his tests only on the third
attempt was an indication of an inability to concentrate, one of the symptoms under
Criterion D, and so was quite consistent with his suffering PTSD. His Honour took
account of the plaintiff’s disinclination to talk about the trauma to either his wife or
friends as being relevant to Criterion C(1), his withdrawal from the company of others as
relevant to Criterion C(2), (4) and (5), and his inability to form a normal relationship with
his children as relevant to Criterion C(5). Moreover, he found that the plaintiff had an
960 [10.45.430]
incomplete sequential recall of what happened on the night of the collision, this
constituting an inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma (Criterion C(3)).
Studdert J found that the plaintiff had experienced persistent problems in going to
sleep (Criterion D(1)) and difficulties in concentrating (Criterion D(3)), and that his nerves
had long been on edge and that he had been anxious (Criterion D(4)), these constituting
three symptoms within Criterion D when only two were formally necessary. He found
that the changes in the plaintiff had been lengthy in their impact, this satisfying the
requirement in Criterion E. Studdert J omitted any specific reference to the important
Criterion F, which demands an assessment of whether the disturbance found by the
clinician ‘causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or
other important areas of functioning’. No definition of what is clinically significant is
found in DSM-IV and Studdert J provided no assistance for the interpretation of this
difficult concept. However, he found that the existence of the chronic PTSD was ‘severe’
(p 87) and ‘has had a marked impact upon the plaintiff’s lifestyle’ (p 67), disturbing his
relationships with his wife and children in a significant way and having a significant
impact upon his ability to earn. He declined, though, to find that the plaintiff’s gambling
habits were compensable and made similar findings in respect of his development of
phobias, his alcoholism, and his nicotine addiction and subsequent contraction of cancer.
An important issue that arose in the course of McLean v Commonwealth (unreported,
NSW Supreme Court, 28 February 1997) was in respect of the role of survivor guilt as a
diagnostic indicator of PTSD. On the basis of the evidence before him, Studdert J
determined that, while DSM-IV does not express survivor guilt as one of the criteria for
PSTD, he was prepared to take it into account.
The Commonwealth maintained that a motor vehicle accident in which the plaintiff
had been involved in 1967 could have been responsible for the plaintiff’s symptomatology.
Studdert J determined on the basis of the mental health expert evidence that the relevant
event for the PTSD was the naval disaster, as opposed to the motor vehicle collision, but
accepted that the role of the latter was to cause a ‘flare-up in the plaintiff’s condition, a
happening which is characteristic of PTSD’ (p 64).
The methodology adopted by Studdert J in his decision in McLean v Commonwealth
(unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 28 February 1997) is likely to be the most significant
legacy of his detailed evaluation of the expert evidence. The fact that he accepted the
criteria of DSM-IV and then proceeded on a painstaking analysis of whether the expert
evidence satisfied him that each of the DSM PTSD criteria had been satisfied is likely to
form a template for how many other courts will go about the process of evaluating expert
evidence about PTSD.
Russell v Commonwealth
[10.45.440] A Victorian example of the same litigation came before Cummins J in 1999:
Russell v Commonwealth [1999] VSC 437. Again the plaintiff’s claim was PTSD. Cummins J
found (at [20]) that the reason the plaintiff again reported no trauma arising from the
collision was:
because he had buried it deep within him. It was his guilt and his shame. Far from the
plaintiff’s recalcitrance about the naval disaster being evidence that he was not
traumatised, I consider it evidence that he was. The expression by the plaintiff of his
trauma was not verbal; it was behavioural – rigidity, closure, alcohol, sleep disturbance –
and affective.
According to the plaintiff, it was seeing the Commonwealth Attorney-General speaking

about outstanding claims at a news conference that stimulated the plaintiff into action. He
then saw his lawyers and attended a seminar on PTSD. Professor McFarlane and Associate
Professor Horne gave evidence for the plaintiff, finding him to have chronic mild to
moderate PTSD some 35 years after the collision.
[10.45.440] 961
On this occasion, the Commonwealth called a well-known doubter about PTSD, a

Sydney psychiatrist, Dr David Bell. Dr Bell is the editor of the Australian Journal of Forensic
Sciences and well known for his conviction that PTSD is questionable in terms of its
diagnostic validity. Cummins J dealt with Dr Bell’s evidence with little ado (at [32]):
Part of the defendant’s case was that PTSD as an entity has not been established. It has.
There is a substantial body of qualified and reputable medical opinion in support of its
existence and integrity. The fact that the criteria in DSM-IV were finalised after lobbying
by the American Vietnam Veterans Association is inconsequential if the entity and its
incidents are shown to be valid. The entity and its incidents, like most in psychiatry, are
subject to debate and to change. Else we would never advance.
Dr Bell had testified that the plaintiff did not suffer from PTSD and never had; that the
naval collision could not cause his excessive use of alcohol; and that there was no residual
psychiatric disability in the plaintiff deriving from the collision. He had stated: ‘The
collision could cause PTSD, but only to people who have been subjected to life-threatening
circumstances or great personal suffering. Mr Russell did not have that experience’: at [30].
Cummins J considered this latter factual statement to be wholly inadequate (at [30]):
It does not objectively comprehend what the plaintiff has experienced. Further, Dr Bell
exhibited a narrow and judgmental view of PTSD. He regarded PTSD as self-serving and
tautological and with spurious validation. I regret to say that, while Dr Bell was
experienced, intelligent and charming in full measure, I did not find his evidence
objective.
Cummins J awarded the plaintiff $150,000 in pain and suffering, together with expenses
for 70 psychiatric consultations at $155 per hour and $385,668 for pecuniary loss.
Hill v Commonwealth
[10.45.450] An example of post-traumatic stress disorder evidence being subjected to a
level of critical scrutiny that resulted in its rejection occurred in a further case in the course
of the Melbourne–Voyager litigation: Hill v Commonwealth [2003] NSWSC 1025. The plaintiff
was a naval rating on board the HMAS Melbourne. He alleged that by reason of the
negligence of the Commonwealth, he suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder, and/or
alcohol abuse disorder and dependency, and/or adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety
and depressed mood, and/or general anxiety disorder. As a result, he contended that he
had had to leave the Navy in 1964 and thereafter had been adversely affected in health
and career. The Commonwealth argued that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he
suffered from any psychiatric illness, arguing that his accounts were unreliable.
The plaintiff argued that he had been unaware of suffering from any form of
psychiatric disorder as a result of the collision until the 1990s – although he knew that he
suffered from insomnia, claustrophobia, nightmares and flashbacks, he stated that he was
unaware that these symptoms were attributable to the collision. Rather, he had gone into
denial and had self-medicated with alcohol for many years. Cripps AJ rejected the
proposition that alcoholism constitutes a psychiatric condition of the same kind as PTSD.
Evidence disclosed that the plaintiff had suffered pre-accident claustrophobia and anxiety.
Cripps AJ was unconvinced as to the plaintiff’s reliability. He commented (at [43]) that it
was beyond credulity that the plaintiff would not have discussed his psychiatric
symptoms with his general practitioner:
after he had been to see his solicitor from whom he had received, I infer, a possible
diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (albeit by a lawyer) which would have
accounted for symptoms he claimed he had suffered for more than thirty years.
He accepted a submission on behalf of the Commonwealth that the plaintiff was unable to
distinguish between nightmares and flashbacks.
Cripps AJ stated that he was not assisted by evidence from Professor McFarlane about
the plaintiff having suffered from PTSD. He rejected the evidence as speculation, in
962 [10.45.450]
particular, expressing doubt about whether there had been the necessary A criterion
triggering event for the plaintiff. He accepted (at [77]) that an assessing psychiatrist such
as Professor McFarlane:
is bound to accept history given to him for the purpose of diagnosis. But for the plaintiff to
successively [sic] sheet home liability to the defendant he must establish on the balance of
probabilities a cause and effect connection between his condition post 1964 and the
collision event of 1964. That is to say the court must have confidence in the correctness of
the history where, as in the present case, the history was put in issue.
He reached the position (at [85]–[87]) in part because of a view that Professor McFarlane
appeared:
to assume the plaintiff suffered from the condition of post-traumatic stress disorder as a
result of the collision and he then sought to explain inaccuracies or inconsistencies in the
history the plaintiff gave to the court as not being consistent with the plaintiff’s assumed
condition. That is not, in my opinion, an approach the court can take or adopt … If ever
there is a case where it is important to have a reliable history it must be where a claim is
being made for a condition such as post-traumatic stress disorder (or, for that matter, any
other psychiatric injury) that depends for acceptance on the reliability of the history of
subjective symptoms.
Stankowski v Commonwealth
[10.45.460] By contrast with Mr Hill, Mr Stankowski did not see the collision, at the time
being below decks: see Stankowski v Commonwealth [2004] NSWSC 198; Freckelton (2004b).
However, he went above decks and saw the back half of the Voyager with its light on and
steam coming out of it. He saw men jumping into the water and boats milling around
picking up survivors. He made observations of the survivors when they were brought on
board the Melbourne, was conscious that ‘we might be next’, and was especially concerned
about one of his friends.
O’Keefe J found Mr Stankowski to be a credible witness, in terms of both his memories
of the night and the effects that the collision had upon him. Extensive psychiatric evidence
was called. He rejected evidence from psychiatrists called by the Commonwealth that
Mr Stankowski had engaged in a distorted and self-serving report of his history and
symptoms. He concluded that Mr Stankowski suffered from severe, chronic PTSD caused
by his exposure to and involvement in the events surrounding the collision. This resulted
in a change in attitude toward life, depression, excessive consumption of alcohol, and
difficulties with marital, family and other relationships, as well as nightmares.
While the decision of O’Keefe J does not stand for any new propositions of law, it does
highlight the significance of whether the account of a plaintiff alleging PTSD
symptomatology referable to a traumatic stressor is accepted as credible. If it is, the
opinions of mental health professionals are relatively likely to be regarded as highly
probative.
Cavenett v Commonwealth
[10.45.470] In Cavenett v Commonwealth [2005] VSC 333, a sailor on the HMAS Melbourne,
who had been a 22-year-old sick bay attendant and who had helped to pull sailors from
the HMAS Voyager out of the water in the course of the rescue efforts, sued the
Commonwealth for PTSD. The Commonwealth admitted negligence but contested both
his injuries and their causes.
Gillard J observed (at [61]) that ‘[i]t is trite to observe that it is very easy to allege
symptoms of PTSD and difficult to disprove the disorder’. He found that the principal
question before him was whether the plaintiff satisfied the DSM-IV criteria. He held (at
[62]) that:
The exercise [of determining whether a patient meets the DSM-IV criteria] depends to a
large extent on the truthfulness and accuracy of the patient in stating his or her symptoms
and problems.
[10.45.470] 963
He accepted (at [63]) that ‘[t]here are some tests that psychologists administer which
provide some basis to test the genuineness of a patient’s complaints’ but lamented (at [63])
the unfalsifiability of some aspects of PTSD symptomatology:
The difficulty that one experiences in resolving conflicts in this area arises because the
objective facts which one may rely upon suggesting that the plaintiff is not suffering from
PTSD are explained as being examples of symptoms experienced with PTSD.
His Honour stressed the importance of Category F in the DSM-IV criteria: that patients’
symptoms must cause ‘clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational
or other important areas of functioning’.
Gillard J bewailed the polarisation in the expert evidence in the case before him and
expressed concern in essence about a culture of partiality, noting (at [80]) that the
psychiatrists and psychologists who gave evidence fell into either the category of
accepting that PTSD can and does occur or a category of approaching ‘each claimant with
a degree of disbelief and cynicism’. He found the court to enjoy an advantage not shared
by the experts in that it could carefully analyse the extensive evidence given by the
plaintiff. Ultimately, he evaluated the plaintiff (at [87]) to ‘be a witness who at times did
not tell the truth, was well aware of the criteria of DSM-IV and falls into the category of a
witness who is inaccurate, prone to guess and exaggerate’. This led him to reject key parts
of the plaintiff’s evidence and to find that he had had substantial respites from his
symptoms. He awarded him only $20,000 in general damages.
On appeal, the Victorian Court of Appeal (Cavenett v Commonwealth [2007] VSCA 88 at
[83]) rejected the argument that the trial judge had impermissibly functioned as a clinician,
substituting his views for those of the experts, Chernov JA concluding:
A fair reading of his Honour’s reasons makes it apparent that he decided the critical issue
on the evidence, as informed by it and the criteria in DSM-IV and not, as is alleged, by
applying his own ‘opinion’ to the issue. As I have explained, once his Honour discounted
the evidence of the medical experts, he turned to consider the question whether the
evidence established that the appellant suffered PTSD as a result of the collision and in
doing so adopted the general approach taken by the experts, namely, by applying DSM-IV
‘in a step-by-step consideration, as have most of the experts called in this case’. The judge
then proceeded to analyse the evidence by reference to these criteria. It is true that his
Honour’s conclusion differed from that of a number of the medical witnesses but, by itself,
it does not follow that the conclusion was a ‘purported opinion’ or was otherwise wrong.
Burk v Commonwealth
[10.45.480] In Burk v Commonwealth [2006] VSC 25, the plaintiff, who had been below deck
in the HMAS Melbourne at the time of the collision, fared even worse in his PTSD claim.
Again, the contest was in relation to whether the plaintiff suffered from a recognised
psychiatric illness, namely PTSD, attributable to the collision. Harper J observed (at [32])
that:
There are difficulties in the diagnosis of the condition. When the symptoms are as vague
as, for example, ‘irritability’, issues of degree and of individual judgment – about which
opinions might reasonably differ – come into play. Moreover, many of the indicia of PTSD
as listed in DSM-IV are non-specific.
His Honour observed (at [34]) that the assessor’s role is very different from that of the
court:
A clinician, while exercising common sense and judgment and being vigilant for
inconsistencies, does not cross-examine his or her patient as if in a court of law.
Harper J made the following findings in respect of the DSM-IV PTSD criteria:
• Criterion A1 was made out;
• on balance, Criterion A2 was made out;
• recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections had not been established;
964 [10.45.480]
• those dreams experienced by the plaintiff had not been established to be caused by the
collision;
• the plaintiff’s claimed flashbacks were not established;
• the plaintiff’s psychological distress or physiological reactivity were not sufficient;
• the plaintiff made some, but not sufficient, efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings or
conversations associated with the trauma (C1);
• the plaintiff made insufficient efforts to avoid matters arousing recollections of the
trauma (C2);
• the plaintiff did not suffer from psychogenic amnesia (C3);
• although the plaintiff had exhibited some involvement in sport and greyhounds after
the collision, generally his life was characterised by diminished interest and
participation in activities (C4);
• the plaintiff remained capable of forming close and intense relationships; this meant
that the criterion relating to feelings of detachment was not made out (C5);
• the plaintiff did not suffer a restricted range of affect (C6);
• the plaintiff did not experience a sense of foreshortened future (C7);
• the plaintiff’s sleep disturbance was not caused by the collision (D1);
• the plaintiff’s irritability was caused by factors other than PTSD (D2);
• the plaintiff had a reasonable ability to concentrate (D3);
• the plaintiff did not suffer from hypervigilance (D4);
• the plaintiff did not have an exaggerated startle response (D5);
• ‘E criterion’ was partly established; and
• the ‘F criterion’ not made out in light of the plaintiff’s work history.
The appellate decision of Burk v Commonwealth [2008] VSCA 29 did not address the
methodology used by Harper J, a new trial being ordered on other grounds. The absence
of appellate interference in either case has lent further legitimacy to the painstaking
indicium-by-indicium approach of the trial judges in each case.
The stressor criterion

[10.45.490] A difficult issue in PTSD litigation is whether there needs to have been a
stressor which, objectively speaking, posed a threat to life and limb, or whether it is
sufficient for the plaintiff (wrongly) to have perceived it so.
The decision of Lee J in Cleary v Congregation of the Sisters of the Holy Family of Nazareth
(unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 23 December 1996) provides further useful guidance
on the way in which PTSD is likely to be interpreted by the courts (see also to a similar
effect Hussein v William Hill Group [2004] EWHC 208). An important issue in the case
emerged in the context of the ‘cryptotrauma conundrum’: could a relatively minor
physical incident that an assistant nurse was called upon to deal with in a nursing home
found a civil claim by her for damages for negligence by reason of its having caused
PTSD? It was also asserted, ultimately successfully, that by reason of the incident, the
assistant nurse sustained a serious depressive illness.
An 81-year-old patient, deceased by the time of the case, was central to events. He was
small, placid and frail, suffering from dementia, of which the most prominent
characteristic was his continual singing. He was 8.5 stone in weight, partially blind, and
required assistance to walk. He used a stick. On the day of the incident which prompted
the plaintiff’s claim, he fell from his bed and was trapped, crouching on the floor, for a
short period, with a chair leaning back against his chest, effectively hemming him in.
When the plaintiff nurse came to the old man’s assistance, he grabbed her by the arm
and pulled on her, forcing her, according to her evidence, to ‘do the splits’. She said that
[10.45.490] 965
she remembered little of the incident from that time onwards, save her fear. She helped the
man back to bed and reported the pain in her arm to the authorities in the hospital. She
obtained assistance from doctors and physiotherapists and then suffered significant
psychiatric problems. She had a pre-existing history of serious psychiatric illness.
By the time the claim reached court, the plaintiff maintained that since the incident she
had suffered flashbacks, fearful memories associated with the incident, paranoia and
suicidal fantasies. She said in evidence that, at the time of helping the old man, she was in
fear for her life because she thought her head was going to strike the washbasin. Evidence
was also given that she had suffered flashbacks in which she feared that she was going to
be sexually assaulted by the old man. Since the incident, she had undergone a course of
EMDR (eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing: see R v Tillott (1995) 38 NSWLR
1), during which she allegedly re-experienced feelings of helplessness, a perception that
she was about to die, and a fear of being raped by the patient.
Two doctors gave evidence for the plaintiff. Dr S defined PTSD as an anxiety-based
disorder, which results from people being traumatised, in which they experience a
significant shock, ‘either threatened or real threat, which results in them sustaining a range
of symptomatology, predominantly of an anxiety type with high levels of arousal, and
re-experiencing the phenomenon in terms of nightmares and recurrent images of the
actual trauma’. He stated that for PTSD to occur, it was necessary merely for the plaintiff
to subjectively experience trauma associated with the event. Lee J formed the view that
later in his evidence, though, Dr S ‘effectively conceded … that a genuine traumatic (actual
or threatened) incident is required to cause PTSD’.
Dr D for the plaintiff also maintained that a merely subjective reaction to a perceived
traumatic event could be enough to trigger PTSD, from which ailment he also believed the
plaintiff to be suffering. Both doctors regarded the later experience by the plaintiff of
symptoms as consistent with their diagnosis. Both doctors were aware that the plaintiff
had suffered from significant pre-existing psychiatric illness, as a result of which she had
previously suffered auditory and visual hallucinations and became depressed, suicidal
and paranoid. However, they expressed the view that the incident with the old man had
caused the plaintiff’s PTSD.
Dr R, called for the defendants, stated that a patient’s perception of a traumatic event
was a necessary second limb to establish PTSD, but contended that the first limb required
a real, objective traumatic event, such as experienced by victims of warfare or serious
crime. He gave evidence of the diagnostic method of Criterion A of DSM-IV. He expressed
the opinion that the plaintiff was not suffering from PTSD because she had not
encountered any real trauma (actual or threatened). He said that, as a clinical psychiatrist,
he regarded this element as ‘extremely important’:
It was not enough, in Dr R’s opinion, that the plaintiff may have suffered what to her mind
was a traumatic incident (if that was her true perception), but which to any other person
would not cause the slightest alarm.
Thus, the question of the substance necessary for a trigger to PTSD required determination
by the court. Lee J held that it was ‘indisputable that some sort of objective trauma is
required in order for a diagnosis of PTSD to be made, ie actual trauma or an actual threat
of trauma even if the person the subject of the threat reasonably mistook its nature, eg, if
someone, such as a bank teller is threatened with a replica pistol which looked real’. He
preferred the evidence of Dr R, and found that he could not accept the proposition that
what had occurred to the plaintiff was in any way objectively traumatic, but to the
contrary:
I find it difficult to imagine that such a frail individual who obviously needed assistance to
regain his feet after he had fallen with the chair on top of him, could have objectively
traumatised a 37 year old assistant nurse, who was well versed in dealing with such
patients and, indeed, had doubtless treated him over the past two weeks. There is nothing
966 [10.45.490]
unusual for a frail elderly patient, when on the floor and being helped up by a nurse, to
clutch or grab hold of her arm in an attempt to help himself to his feet.
Indeed, Lee J noted that, ultimately, Dr S agreed that if the incident occurred in this
fashion, it would not satisfy Criterion A for the diagnosis of PTSD under DSM-IV.
Lee J found that what had occurred in the case was an example of retrospective
reconstruction:
To conclude, as Dr D and Dr S seem to have done, that the plaintiff must have suffered an
objectively traumatic experience because in their opinions she subsequently displayed
psychiatric symptoms consistent with PTSD is to put the cart before the horse.
His Honour identified as a major problem the reliance that needed to be placed by the
clinician upon the reported feelings and perceptions of the patient. He found that the
psychiatrists called for the plaintiff had felt constrained to accept uncritically what their
patient had told them, based principally upon her alleged flashbacks. He did not criticise
the doctors for this but declined to accept that such an approach was legitimate for the
court:
Indeed, there seem to be any number of other hypotheses open, such as fantasy or
fabrication, which more readily conform to the evidence … [T]he plaintiff had knowledge
of and well knew of the diagnostic criteria of PTSD. One could be excused for suspecting
that the alleged condition, PTSD, was advanced in order to deflect consideration from the
likelihood that the plaintiff was otherwise very susceptible to a psychiatric breakdown
which was likely to re-emerge at any stage in her life.
Lee J concluded that it had not been proved on the balance of probabilities that the
plaintiff was suffering from PTSD as a result of the incident in question, not having proved
any relevant traumatic event. In the event that he was wrong on this point, Lee J examined
the question of whether the incident had caused PTSD. He expressed grave doubts as to
whether an incident that objectively was not traumatic could have caused the PTSD. He
determined that he was unable to conclude that the PTSD symptoms from which the
plaintiff may be suffering were, applying the commonsense test, caused by the incident.
The court made other findings in relation to a depressive illness, which it found had
ensued from the incident, and ultimately awarded a total of $357,330 to the plaintiff.
Similar issues were traversed in Morgan v Tame (2000) 49 NSWLR 21, where the
plaintiff contended she had developed PTSD after learning of a bureaucratic error by
police in the recording of a blood alcohol analysis. The New South Wales Court of Appeal
found that for PTSD to be developed it was necessary for a person to be exposed to a type
and intensity of stressor more significant than that found by the plaintiff: at [109].
Cleary v Congregation of the Sisters of the Holy Family of Nazareth (unreported, NSW
Supreme Court, 23 December 1996) is a potentially significant decision from a range of
points of view. However, it has to be assessed in the light of its being a single-judge
decision which arose in the context of confused and changing expert evidence led on
behalf of the plaintiff. Nonetheless, the reasoning of the New South Wales Court of Appeal
in Morgan v Tame (2000) 49 NSWLR 21 appears consistent with Lee J’s reasoning. Lee J
rejected the uncritical, subjective test for the threat posed to a victim. This determination,
if followed elsewhere, would have the potential to impose a significant fetter on the range
of precipitating events which the courts will hold to be potential triggers for psychiatric
damage of the PTSD variety. In addition, Lee J gave explicit recognition to the difficulty
faced by evaluating mental health professionals when they had little choice but to be
heavily dependent upon the self-report of a patient with a forensic incentive to claim
symptoms consistent with PTSD. It is notable that the psychiatrists in the case gave no
indication of having utilised any of the psychometric tests for PTSD to which reference has
been made above. Another approach to the facts of the case, though, would have left the
foreseeability test to act as the constraint upon liability.
[10.45.490] 967
Expert witness bias

[10.45.510] Concern has been expressed on a number of occasions about the bias of expert
witnesses giving evidence about the presence or absence of PTSD in a litigant. A
disturbing example of this occurred in Hussein v William Hill Group [2004] EWHC 208. The
plaintiff claimed damages for an assault in a betting shop by an employee with a
cardboard tube containing posters. The assault failed to disarrange the plaintiff’s glasses.
Nor did it cause either a red mark or a bruise. The plaintiff was assessed by a psychiatrist,
Dr Hussain, who reported for the court that the plaintiff had contracted PTSD as a result
of the assault. He maintained that the plaintiff had:
witnessed an event in which he sustained serious injury and there was a threat to his
physical integrity. His response was intense fear, helplessness and horror. Since then he
has a recurrent, intrusive and distressing recollection of events, including the images. He
gets distressing dreams about the events and feels that this traumatic event has upset him
very much … Immediately after the attack he had difficulty in falling or staying asleep,
irritability with occasional outbursts of anger, difficulty in concentrating and exaggerated
start and response. He feels and I agree with him that there is an impairment to his
hobbies, social and occupational functioning.
Hallett J rejected the proposition that the plaintiff experienced any of these symptoms,
save possibly distress and anger at being assaulted. He noted that the plaintiff did not
describe any of such symptoms to another psychiatrist, Dr Fry, who examined him for
forensic purposes, but, instead, complained about an effect on his memory, a fear of
crowds, difficulty in sustaining an erection, and an occasional feeling of being in danger.
He did not complain of flashbacks or avoidance behaviour or instances of hyper-arousal.
He said he slept well. Hallett J observed that:
If Dr Hussain is to be believed, there was a very substantial difference between what he
was told by the claimant on the two occasions he saw him and what the claimant told
Dr Fry. Yet he does not seem to have questioned his diagnosis of Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder, following an assault with a cardboard tube.
Hallett J rejected outright the argument that the plaintiff suffered from PTSD and
repudiated Dr Hussain’s evidence (at [31]) as ‘totally unconvincing and very troubling. He
… seemed to be prepared to say whatever would advance’ the plaintiff’s case.
Late-onset PTSD: An explanation for delayed claims

[10.45.520] The existence of post-traumatic stress disorder can go some distance toward
explaining the reasons for delay in instituting legal action.
An important example is the Tasmanian Full Court decision of Wilson v Horne (1999) 8
Tas R 363; [1999] Tas SC 33. The plaintiff had sought damages against a man who she said
had subjected her to sexual abuse when she was aged between five and 12 (between 1973
and 1980). The plaintiff maintained that she had given no thought to her abuse until a
conversation with her sister in 1994, when her sister told her that she, too, had been
sexually abused by the defendant. The plaintiff swore that she then sought counselling
and remembered more and more of what had happened to her during the years of abuse,
in due course filing a statement of claim against the defendant in 1996, claiming damages
for negligence. She maintained that, at the time of the assaults, she did not appreciate the
wrongfulness of her uncle’s conduct, which the appellant discouraged her from revealing
to others on the pretext that it was a ‘special secret’ between them. She said that her
memories were ‘revived’ in her consciousness by the revelation made to her by one of her
sisters that she, too, had been molested by the same uncle. The respondent then sought
counselling and, as further memories came to light, developed symptoms of chronic
PTSD. There was evidence that until then she did not suffer any psychiatric illness. The
abuse itself had not involved penetration, nor had it been accompanied by the infliction of
any physical injury.
968 [10.45.510]
The expert evidence at trial was that she was still suffering from sex avoidance,
frequent nightmares, tension headaches and general irritability. Evidence was given by a
psychiatrist that she sustained post-traumatic stress disorder of delayed onset at the time
when she confronted what had happened to her many years before in the course of her
conversation with her sister in 1994. The psychiatrist was cross-examined about the onset
of injury and, in particular, in relation to the plaintiff’s sexual precocity during
adolescence, the suggestion being advanced on behalf of the defendant that that was the
time of onset of injury and so she was statute-barred. He expressed the view that the
plaintiff’s behaviour was indicative of a child who had been sexually assaulted but not of
her having a psychiatric disorder at that stage.
In analysing the legitimacy of a PTSD action being brought out of time in such
circumstances, Cox CJ noted the ‘interesting alternative basis for upholding’ judgment of
the trial judge, namely that the appellant uncle’s conduct induced a state of affairs which
effectively prevented the respondent from instituting proceedings until her memories
were revived in 1994. He specifically noted the comments of Deane J in Hawkins v Clayton
(1988) 164 CLR 539 at 590:
If a wrongful action or breach of duty by one person not only causes unlawful injury to
another but, while its effect remains, effectively precludes that other from bringing
proceedings to recover the damage to which he is entitled, that other person is doubly
injured. There can be no acceptable or even sensible justification of a law which provides
that to sustain the second injury will preclude recovery of damages for the first … It is
arguable that the notion of unconscionable reliance upon the provisions of a Statute of
Limitations which provides the foundation of the long-established equitable jurisdiction to
grant relief in a case of a concealment of a cause of action until after the limitation period
has expired … should, by analogy, be extended to cover cases such as these where the
wrongful act at the one time inflicts the injury and, while its effect remains, precludes the
bringing of an action for damages. It seems to me, however, that the preferable approach
is to recognise that it could not have been the legislative intent that the effect of provisions
such as s 14(1) of the Limitation Act 1969 should be that a cause of action for a wrongful act
should be barred by lapse of time during a period in which the wrongful act itself
effectively precluded the bringing of proceedings. On that approach, the reference in
s 14(1) of the Act to the cause of action first accruing should be construed as excluding any
period during which the wrongful act itself effectively precluded the institution of
proceedings.
The Chief Justice noted (at [16]) that in the case before him there was evidence that the
appellant persuaded the respondent not to reveal his assaults upon her and that her
natural defence mechanism to his wrongful behaviour involved repression and suppression
of her memories of it:
In these circumstances it was submitted that his own wrongful conduct effectively
precluded the respondent from commencing any action against him. In consequence, both
causes of action, namely trespass and negligence, only accrued when disclosure was made
and the repressed memories were released. There is, with respect, much to be said for this
contention …
However, as it was not necessary for him to rule upon it, he did not do so.
Evans J made the point, however, that even had the respondent’s developmental
disorder constituted a recognised psychiatric illness, it would have been necessary to
determine whether her cause of action accrued at the time she suffered from the condition,
or at the time when she first discovered it or could reasonably have discovered it.
Distinguishing English authority Cartledge v E Jopling & Sons Ltd [1963] AC 758, he applied
the reasoning in the New Zealand decision of S v G [1995] 3 NZLR 681 and the Canadian
Supreme Court decision of KM v HM (1992) 96 DLR (4th) 291 and held that, where a
victim of sexual abuse suffers psychological and emotional harm resulting from that
abuse, the cause of action against the abuser accrues only when the victim discovers the
link between the abuse and the harm: at [56]. Without actually deciding it, because it was
[10.45.520] 969
unnecessary, he stated that the special circumstances of the respondent may have
warranted a finding that when she suffered personal injury for the purposes of
determining when her cause of action accrued was when she first knew, or could
reasonably have known, that she was suffering from a psychiatric illness. The decision of
the court emphasises the propensity of PTSD to ‘flower’ only some considerable time after
an initial triggering incident and for the prodromal phase of the disorder itself to militate
against insight in respect of the nexus between the sufferer’s mental state and what caused
it.
A similar issue was traversed in Smith v Advanced Electrics Pty Ltd [2005] 1 Qd R 65;
[2003] QCA 432, where the Queensland Court of Appeal dealt with a claim for
compensation from an electrician who had been sent by his employer to perform work on
a switchboard at a customer’s premises. It was in a dangerous condition and exploded.
However, he was dilatory in bringing his action and the question before the court was
whether he should be allowed to bring his case out of time. Expert evidence suggested
that, as a result of post-traumatic stress disorder, the electrician had a history of
‘self-defeating, self-harming, and avoidant behaviour accompanied by a severe rise in his
level of anxiety and panic attacks when he had to face thoughts or memories of his
accident (such as solicitor’s letters etc)’. The court found that he was suffering from an
unsoundness of mind arising from post-traumatic stress disorder, which meant that at the
relevant time he was under a disability from the time of the accident onwards, thereby
excusing his dilatoriness.
Vernon v Bosley
[10.45.550] In the English appellate decision of Vernon v Bosley (No 1) [1997] 1 All ER 577,
the defendant appealed from a judgment in respect of psychiatric damages awarded to the
plaintiff arising from a car accident. The plaintiff’s two young children were passengers in
a car driven by their nanny, the defendant. The car crashed off the road and into a river.
The plaintiff did not witness the accident but was called to the scene shortly afterwards
and witnessed attempts to salvage the car when it was thought that his children may still
be alive. The rescue attempt was unsuccessful and the children drowned.
The plaintiff sued the defendant after the failure of his business and his marriage,
alleging that she had caused him psychiatric injury by reason of his having been an
eyewitness to the unsuccessful rescue attempt. One of the injuries that he claimed was
PTSD.
The English Court of Appeal held that a plaintiff in the position of a secondary victim
(see North Glamorgan NHS Trust v Walters [2002] EWCA Civ 1792 for an example of how
broadly ‘secondary victims’ are viewed) could recover damages for PTSD, namely, the
nervous shock of witnessing an accident or its immediate aftermath, or pathological grief
disorder (PGD), that is, a grief which became so severe as to be regarded as abnormal and
giving rise to psychiatric illness (that is, nervous shock). The legal test was held to be
whether the plaintiff had suffered mental injury caused by the negligence of the defendant
and not whether he had suffered PTSD rather than PGD. Thus, the plaintiff father was
recognised as being entitled to recover damages for mental illness caused or contributed
to by the actionable negligence of the defendant, notwithstanding that the illness could
also be regarded as a pathological consequence of the bereavement that the plaintiff had
inevitably suffered.
The case provided the most significant occasion thus far for the English Court of
Appeal to define the current status of PTSD under the law. The court held emphatically
that while the DSM may provide the medical profession with a useful diagnostic tool,
PTSD and the DSM should not be adopted in personal injury litigation as ‘the yardstick’
970 [10.45.550]
by which the plaintiff’s success or failure is to be measured. For this proposition,

Thorpe LJ advanced four reasons. All of them resonate with an anxiety about the potential
for variability of psychiatric diagnosis and a perception that confining diagnosis within
the terms of a particular diagnostic instrument existing at a particular point in time may
be unsatisfactorily confining. To this extent, the decision is entirely consistent with the
decision of Lee J in Cleary v Congregation of the Sisters of the Holy Family of Nazareth
(unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 23 December 1996).
First, Thorpe LJ said that PTSD ‘is not a bespoke measure for the purpose of nervous
shock litigation’ (at 610). He noted (at 610) that it was:
produced for other purposes and is itself of a much wider range; for instance a victim of
sexual abuse may subsequently develop PTSD. Furthermore it is but one of many relevant
psychiatric diagnoses. The fact that it is a diagnosis that necessarily involves a shock is not
a reason for elevating it to the exclusion of other psychiatric illnesses that may be shock
induced. Although in personal injury litigation it is sometimes said that the plaintiff must
show shock to the nervous system or shock to the mind what ultimately is in issue is
psychiatric illness whether it be the product of shock to the mind, the nervous system or
to the psyche.
Second, Thorpe LJ noted that medical science in the area of PTSD is ‘continuously
expanding and evolving’. Presumably, by this he sought to imply that only limited
reliance at any particular stage could be placed upon the criteria applied to any particular
diagnosis. Ironically, the judgment related to PTSD criteria under DSM-III-R, the case not
being completed until DSM-IV had superseded its predecessor for over two years. This
underscores his point that the criteria for the diagnosis remain in a state of ongoing
development.
Third, he commented that ‘developmental disorders of personality as opposed to
mental illness seem to me to be unusually difficult to classify and define in the concrete
terms with which physical illness can usually be defined’ (at 611). Interestingly, PTSD
could not legitimately be said to fall into such a category. It is not a developmental
disorder within Axis 2 of DSM-IV. In addition, the term ‘developmental disorder of
personality’, while not being applicable, on any view, to PTSD, is not one found in
DSM-IV.
Fourth, he observed that there was a wide divergence of stance and terminology
between the psychiatrist who treats psychiatric illness largely chemically and the
psychiatrist who favours a psychodynamic approach that emphasises the importance of
the patient’s unconscious (at 611). Again, the point apparently being made by his Lordship
was that reasonable psychiatrists could differ about a diagnosis because of the different
schools of thought within their discipline.
Finally, Thorpe LJ noted that the DSM was not the only diagnostic manual, the World
Health Organization in the ICD system having defined PTSD in ‘similar but nonetheless
different terms’ (at 611).
In adopting the judgment of Thorpe LJ, Evans LJ raised a further point in favour of
rejecting too confined a construction of the criteria for PTSD. He stressed the existence in
the DSM of a number of cautions as to its use – in particular, as to the prescriptiveness of
its definitions – in arriving at the same conclusion that the category of PTSD is not
universally recognised in terms of the DSM definition. The majority rejected outright the
contention that PTSD as defined by the DSM was the essential yardstick, Thorpe LJ
holding that ‘psychiatric illness is too complex and insufficiently concrete to be subjected
to such a rigid analysis’ (at 611).
Thus, the case represents a further example of decisions which have determined that
the law ought not to be constrained by the tyranny of psychiatric instruments such as the
DSM or the ICD. Where it leaves PTSD as a diagnosis recognised by the law is less clear.
Presumably, the court was not seeking to encourage the provision of diagnoses by mental
[10.45.550] 971
health professionals which were outside generally accepted psychiatric structures, but at
the same time it was unprepared to adopt the prescriptions articulated by one, albeit
powerful, arm of the profession.
Frost v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police

[10.45.560] In Frost v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [1997] 1 All ER 540, the
English Court of Appeal was required to determine when an employee could recover
damages for psychiatric injury sustained as a result of tending a victim of an employer’s
negligence. The case arose out of the circumstances of the Hillsborough Stadium collapse
and consisted of claims by police officers for damages for psychiatric injury brought
against the Chief Constable for negligence, including the negligence of senior police
officers in crowd control, which caused 96 spectators to be crushed to death and about 730
injured. Henry LJ found (at 556) no difficulty in identifying the tragedy as a post-traumatic
stressor, ‘namely a psychologically distressing external event quite outside the range of
normal human or police experience, capable of causing “marked or pervasive distress to
almost anyone” (see the Law Commission Liability for Psychiatric Illnesses (Consultation
Paper No 137, para 3.5)’. He also found that the length of the exposure and the
circumstances of the exposure were the trauma that caused the PTSD, rather than any
immediate ‘shock’. He held this not to conflict with Lord Ackner’s requirement in Alcock v
Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310; [1991] 4 All ER 907 for an
actionable shock to involve the sudden appreciation of a horrifying event, but rather to
constitute an example of what Lord Ackner referred to as an expansion of ‘the liability for
shock induced psychiatric illness … due to a better understanding of mental illness and its
relationship to shock’ (at 401, 399 (AC); 918, 916 (ER)). He equated ‘trauma’ and ‘shock’
and emphasised that ‘what matters is not the label on the trigger for psychiatric damage,
but the fact and foreseeability of psychiatric damage, by whatever process’ (at 556; see also
Buljabasic v Ah Lam (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, Priestley JA, 3 September 1997)).
He commented (at 556): ‘Clearly the law should accept post-traumatic stress disorder
rather than exclude it whether it is caused by sudden shock (properly defined) or not.’
In addressing the issue of foreseeability, Henry LJ held that Chief Constables should be
regarded as being aware of the risk of PTSD and psychiatric damage generally where
police are exposed to potent stressors (at 556–557). He acknowledged the risk of
fraudulent claims succeeding but said that this was ‘greatly reduced by objective
psychological tests’, referring to the Law Commission Consultation Paper but otherwise
saying nothing about the effectiveness of such tests in distinguishing between false or
exaggerated claims on the one hand and genuine claims on the other. Overall, he assessed
the risk of such claims ‘as being no greater than in, say, cases involving back injuries
where there is often a wide gap between observable symptoms and complaints – yet the
courts manage satisfactorily, or so I believe’ (at 565).
The key component of the Court of Appeal decision in Frost was the English court’s
preparedness to extend the categories of compensability to include those engaged in
rescue efforts: see Handford (2006). However, the relaxed attitude of the court in equating
back injury claims with PTSD claims suggests an emerging confidence in England at least
that PTSD actions can be adequately evaluated in the forensic environment provided that
the expert evidence placed before the tribunal of fact is of high quality, and, presumably,
well tested by cross-examination.
Diagnostic issues
[10.45.600] Particular sensitivity has been exhibited in a number of decisions of courts and
tribunals about the expertise of persons other than psychiatrists to provide diagnoses in
respect of PTSD. This is canvassed in Ch 10.0.
972 [10.45.560]
PTSD and criminal law

[10.45.640] PTSD is potentially relevant to the criminal law in a variety of ways and has
been extremely influential and controversial in the United States: see Stone (1993, pp 26ff);
Melton et al (1997, pp 223ff); Berger, McNiel and Binder (2012). It has been raised in
defences of insanity, diminished responsibility, automatism, self-defence and provocation,
as well as duress; sought in aid in prosecutions for sexual assault; prayed in aid for the
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses; and also asserted to be germane in the
sentencing process.
The impact of stresses and trauma, whether or not formally constituting PTSD, has
been the direct and indirect source of defences in notorious and important criminal cases
also in Australia. For instance, in R v Radford (1985) 20 A Crim R 388; 42 SASR 266 and in
Falconer v The Queen (1989) 46 A Crim R 83 and R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30, the accused
maintained at trial that, as a result of their exposure to traumatic stresses, they were in a
state of dissociation or derealisation at the time they shot the victims. With Radford, the
stresses were said to be related to the Vietnam War. With Falconer, the stresses were said
to be associated with her discovery of the existence of an incestuous relationship between
her husband and her daughters.
It has been suggested too that the changes to the diagnostic criteria of PTSD and the
growing awareness of PTSD should lead forensic practitioners to be familiar with the use
of PTSD as a legitimate and proper defence in criminal cases (Yohanna and Rovner
(2013)). While this assertion was made in relation to the United States criminal justice
system, it has some application in other jurisdictions also.
The following recommendations have been advanced for forensic clinicians arriving at
PTSD diagnoses:
First, accurately diagnosing PTSD is fundamental for the acceptance of expert testimony
as reliable by courts. Second, forensic experts should specifically determine whether and
how specific PTSD phenomena played a role in the criminal act in question. Particular
attention should be directed to whether PTSD phenomena that have been recognized by
courts as relevant to criminal defenses were present. The forensic expert should elucidate
as clearly as possible how the PTSD phenomena that were present contributed to the act.
In doing so, the forensic expert should keep in mind the relevant criminal defenses
involved, including insanity, self-defense, and diminished capacity. In numerous cases
reviewed in this article, expert testimony has been excluded or deemed irrelevant because
of a failure to identify a clear and direct connection between the defendant’s PTSD
symptoms and the criminal act.
(Berger, McNiel and Binder (2012, p 520).)

Self-defence and provocation
[10.45.660] The role of battered woman syndrome (BWS), said by some to be a subset of
PTSD, is discussed at [10.30.100]. It has the potential to explain why it is that an accused
person responded to a threat, physical or verbal, in a way which might otherwise be
viewed as disproportionate to the immediate danger posed.
Insanity and automatism
[10.45.680] PTSD has the potential in principle to ground, or at least contribute to, a plea
of insanity or mental impairment, but only in extreme circumstances: see R v Lange [2007]
SASC 243; see also Western Australia v Brown [No 3] [2013] WASC 349. It can also provide
grounds for a defence of automatism: see Pard v United States 589 F Supp 518 (1984); Sparr
and Atkinson (1986); Thomson (1991, pp 300–301); see also Pitman et al (1996, p 387). In
Australia, it will furnish a defence of insane automatism (as distinct from sane
automatism) unless the accused can show that the cause of the automatism was transient;
caused by trauma to the mind which an ordinary person would be likely not to have
withstood; and not prone to recur: Falconer v The Queen (1989) 46 A Crim R 83; see, further,
Thomson (1991); McSherry (1993).
[10.45.680] 973
The forensic problems associated with assertions of flashbacks leading to violent

behaviour by war veterans led Sparr (1987, p 152) to propose the following criteria for
assessments:
• the ‘flashback’ behaviour needs to have been sudden and unpremeditated;
• the ‘flashback’ behaviour must be uncharacteristic of the person in normal
circumstances;
• there needs to be a retrievable history of one or more traumatic combat events that are
reasonably re-enacted by the ‘flashback’ behaviour;
• the defendant must be amnesic for all or part of the episode;
• there must be a lack of current motivation for the ‘flashback’ behaviour;
• there need to be identifiable stimuli in the current environment which are representative
of the person’s war experiences;
• the victim may be fortuitous or accidental; and
• the patient must have, or have had, other PTSD symptomatology.
Duress
[10.45.700] PTSD evidence has been led to explain why a person would have been
particularly compliant in the face of pressures to engage in illegal behaviour. This was the
essence of the way in which the battered woman syndrome evidence was adduced in R v
Runjanjic (1991) 53 A Crim R 362, where the two accused women maintained that they had
assaulted the intruder onto their pimp’s property as a result of his insistence, having
succumbed to a state of learned helplessness as a result of cycles of battering at his hands:
see also [10.30.220].
Similarly, in United States v Winters 729 F 2d 602 (9th Cir 1984), the defendant asserted
that the victims had not been kidnapped but had voluntarily accompanied him and
committed acts of prostitution of their own free will. In reply, the prosecution adduced
evidence to explain that the victims had acquired PTSD as a result of the way they had
been treated by the defendant. It was put that an aspect of their condition was a sense of
helplessness, which rendered it less likely that they would try to escape their plight.
Diminished responsibility
[10.45.720] PTSD has the potential to be a cause of ‘diminished responsibility’ in the sense
of its being an abnormality of mind such as to substantially impair capacity. For instance,
in R v Nielsen (1990) 47 A Crim R 268, it was asserted by a psychiatrist in a murder case in
Queensland that the accused’s Korean War experiences had left him with PTSD and
depression, which in turn had caused him to abuse a variety of substances. The
psychiatrist gave evidence that the accused ‘de-humanised’ his victim, the psychiatric
disorders impairing his capacity to control his actions and his awareness that he should
not attack his victim. The jury was found on appeal to have been entitled to reject the
expert evidence.
PTSD, in principle, can also be enough to deprive a person of ordinary awareness of
his or her actions. Thus, in R v Walsh (1991) 60 A Crim R 419, the accused argued to the
Supreme Court of Tasmania on appeal from his conviction for murder that he had suffered
at the key time a deluded belief in the course of a flashback episode that he was in Korea
defending himself from an enemy soldier. Such an argument could also in principle found
an insanity, or possibly an automatism, defence.
Assessment of complainant
[10.45.740] It has been contended in some cases, particularly in the United States, that if a
person is a genuine victim of sexual assault it is more likely than not that she or he will
exhibit symptoms consistent with rape trauma syndrome (see [10.30.300]), a subset of
PTSD. For the prosecution, this has been put in terms of its being indicative of sexual
intercourse being non-consensual if in its immediate aftermath the complainant
974 [10.45.700]
commenced to exhibit signs of PTSD which she had not previously displayed: see, eg,
Allewalt v State 487 A 2d 664 (Md Ct Spec App 1985); cf, though, People v Bledsoe 36 Cal 3d
236; 681 P 2d 291 (1984) (see also Block (1990)). However, it has also been argued that the
absence of PTSD symptoms in the complainant is suggestive of the fact that if sexual
intercourse did take place, it was consensual: see, eg, Henson.
Sentencing
[10.45.760] At the sentencing stage of the criminal trial process, the judge is entitled to
have regard to the impact of the crime upon the victim. The existence of PTSD in a victim
or family member can constitute an aggravating factor to which a sentencing judge may
properly have regard through the means of a suitably tendered victim impact statement: R
v Keating (1993) 65 A Crim R 315; R v Yaldiz (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal,
4 December 1996); R v Zammit (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, 21 February 1996);
R v McNeill (unreported, Victorian Court of Appeal, 8 October 1996); R v Palmieri (1997) 91
A Crim R 120; see also Slovenko (1995, p 91).
If the offender has suffered symptoms of PTSD subsequent to his or her offending, this
may in some circumstances contribute to the perception by the sentencing court that his or
her claim to contrition is bona fide and may act as a mitigating factor: R v Stone (1994) 71
A Crim R 417; R v Snewin (1997) 190 LSJS 487. However, even in cases such as culpable
driving, this factor will often have little impact upon sentence. Thus, in R v Stone (1994) 71
A Crim R 417, Matheson J of the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal held that
although the offender suffered from PTSD as a result of the fatal road accident for which
he had been responsible, this should not have any significant influence on whether or not
his sentence of imprisonment should be suspended.
A person suffering from battered woman syndrome, arguably a form of PTSD, or
suffering from rape trauma syndrome, may also be entitled to a sentencing discount to
take account of the impairment of the person’s capacity for reasoned evaluation of options
open to her or him, or of the imminence of the threat posed to her or him by the person
who was often their assailant: see R v Simon (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Vince
Bruce J, 21 July 1995). In the United States, a series of attempts have been made by
prosecutors to use expert testimony concerning PTSD to explain the rape victim’s
suffering and to counteract the defence contention that the victim consented to the sexual
intercourse. In the important decision of State v Strickland 96 NC App 642; 387 SE 2d 62,
disc rev denied, 326 NC 486; 392 SE 2d 100 (1990), for instance, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals ruled expert evidence about PTSD relevant and admissible to disprove consent
in a rape trial: see [10.30.320]. However, it is unclear how far such testimony will be
allowed to go and in precisely what circumstances such evidence will be admissible: see
Trosch (1991); see also Lioti and Skelos (1989).
PTSD and its challenges for the law
[10.45.800] PTSD is a diagnosis still in psychiatric flux. It displays most of the
characteristics of early adolescent confusion. Its characterisation in the latest version of the
American Psychiatric Association’s DSM (the DSM-5) is significantly at variance in key
particulars from that of its own predecessor and from its equivalent under the latest
version of the World Health Organization’s ICD. In addition, PTSD under DSM-5, which
is used much more regularly by psychiatrists and psychologists alike in Australia than its
competitor, has not been drafted in the form of a legal document – for good reasons. It
contains uncertainties and ambiguities. These will be the subject of forensic disputation
over succeeding years.
There are some signs that there is a backlash against PTSD claims. Tort reforms have
made PTSD claims more difficult and decisions such as those of Gillard J in McKenzie v
Lichter [2005] VSC 61, of Harper J in Burk v Commonwealth [2006] VSC 25, and of Gillard J
in Cavenett v Commonwealth [2005] VSC 333 suggest that the task for plaintiffs remains
demanding.
[10.45.800] 975
Current indications are unclear as to how the courts in Australia and England will
address the difficulties in assessing whether a given plaintiff or applicant suffers from
PTSD. The decisions in Vernon v Bosley (No 1) [1997] 1 All ER 577, Cleary v Congregation of
the Sisters of the Holy Family of Nazareth (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 23 December
1996) and Hussein v William Hill Group [2004] EWHC 208 suggest that there will be
flexibility in terms of the use to be made of the criteria in the diagnostic manuals. Notably,
though, Studdert J in McLean v Commonwealth (unreported, NSW Supreme Court,
28 February 1997) was disinclined to import in relation to PTSD a symptom outside the
strict terms of the DSM which was required for diagnosis – survivor guilt.
However, the decisions of Studdert J in McLean v Commonwealth (unreported, NSW
Supreme Court, 28 February 1997) and, more particularly, of Gillard J in Cavenett v
Commonwealth [2005] VSC 333 and of Harper J in Burk v Commonwealth [2006] VSC 25,
undisturbed in this regard on appeal, suggest that the likely approach by the courts in
PTSD claims in Australia has shifted toward painstaking examination of the extent to
which each one of the DSM-IV-TR criteria is met. The appeals in these matters will
determine the extent to which this methodology constitutes an illegitimate usurpation of
the clinical role by judges.
Thus far, therefore, the messages to decision-makers are very mixed as to the use to be
made of the diagnostic manuals and the inferences to be drawn if there is less than
complete satisfaction by a plaintiff or applicant of the manuals’ PTSD criteria. This leaves
decision-makers, whose task it is to determine whether or not a given litigant has PTSD, in
a difficult and unsatisfactory position. They need criteria on the basis of which to make
their decision and, if the courts are going to permit ‘creative’ or ‘imprecise’ use of the DSM
and ICD instruments, this makes consistency and predictability of decisions in respect of
PTSD unlikely to be attained.
Until such time as objective criteria for PTSD can be identified, either by the use of
psychometric instruments, generally agreed upon as valid by psychiatrists and
psychologists, or by the use of physiological tests that are agreed to be falsifiable and
valid, clinical judgment on the part of mental health professionals will remain the primary
determinant, unsatisfactory though that be from a legal point of view, for whether
patients/clients do or do not suffer from PTSD.
In such circumstances, the scrutiny of the law will continue to focus upon the degree to
which the clinical judgments of psychiatrists and psychologists are vulnerable in terms of
their reliance upon questionable accounts from the plaintiff, upon problematic self-
reporting of symptoms by the plaintiff in the shadow of litigation (see, eg, Peterson v
Commonwealth [2008] VSC 166 at [231]; Hill v Commonwealth [2003] NSWSC 1025), upon
assessor bias, and upon uncertainty of criteria.
976 [10.45.800]
Chapter 10.50
CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS
INTERVENTION EVIDENCE
Employers’ and occupiers’ duties for exposure to traumatic incidents ..................... [10.50.01]
Acute stress disorder ............................................................................................................ [10.50.20]
Critical incident stress intervention: debriefing
Psychological debriefing (PD) ............................................................................................. [10.50.50]
Critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) ......................................................................... [10.50.60]
Critical incident stress management (CISM) .................................................................... [10.50.70]
The role of critical incident stress intervention ............................................................... [10.50.80]
Medico-legal considerations for employers ...................................................................... [10.50.90]
Critical incident stress intervention: the controversy
Terminology ........................................................................................................................... [10.50.150]
Proponents .............................................................................................................................. [10.50.160]
Critics ....................................................................................................................................... [10.50.170]
Risks ......................................................................................................................................... [10.50.180]
Civil actions for inadequate response to psychogenic trauma ..................................... [10.50.240]
Howell v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (No 1): the Abadee J approach ...... [10.50.250]
Howell v State Rail Authority of New South Wales: the Court of Appeal ...................... [10.50.260]
Howell v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (No 2): the Newman J approach .... [10.50.270]
The Hind decision .................................................................................................................. [10.50.280]
The Pioneer Construction decision ....................................................................................... [10.50.290]
The Koehler v Cerebos decision ............................................................................................. [10.50.300]
The evolving law ................................................................................................................... [10.50.340]
‘O, my good lord, why are you thus alone?
For what offence have I this fortnight been
A banish’d woman from my Harry’s bed?
Tell me, sweet lord, what is’t that takes from thee
Thy stomach, pleasure, and thy golden sleep?
Why dost thou bend thine eyes upon the earth,
And start so often when thou sitt’st alone?
Why hast thou lost the fresh blood in thy cheeks;
And given my treasures and my rights of thee
To thick-eyed musing and cursed melancholy?
In thy faint slumbers I by thee have watch’d,
And heard thee murmur tales of iron wars;
Speak terms of manage to thy bounding steed;
Cry “Courage! to the field!” And thou hast talk’d
Of sallies and retires, of trenches, tents,
Palisadoes, frontiers, parapets,
Of basilisks, of cannon, culverin,
Of prisoners’ ransom, and of soldiers slain,
And all the currents of a heady fight.
Thy spirit within thee hath been so at war
And thus hath so bestirr’d thee in thy sleep,
That beads of sweat have stood upon thy brow,
Like bubblers in a late-disturbed stream.’
Shakespeare, Henry IV, Part 1, Act 2, Scene 3, lines 42–64.
Employers' and occupiers' duties for exposure to traumatic incidents
[10.50.01] In a variety of circumstances, it is necessary for reasonable steps to be taken to
reduce the foreseeable potential for persons to experience pathological sequelae to
traumatic incidents. An example is employers who will be exposed to civil liability if they
do not take reasonable action if they are on notice by words or conduct that a particular
employee has been adversely affected by a traumatogenic incident in the workplace or is
likely to be so in the future (see, eg, Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd (2005) 222 CLR 44;
[10.50.01] 977
[2005] HCA 15; Hegarty v Queensland Ambulance Service [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-919;
[2007] QCA 366; Freckelton (2008e)). This issue can arise also in the context of workplace
bullying (see, eg, Naidu v Group 4 Securitas Pty Ltd (2005) 57 AILR 200-181; [2005] NSWSC
618; Green v DB Group Services (UK) Ltd [2006] EWHC 1898; Freckelton (2008g)).
However, what constitutes a reasonable response is far from clear. Referral to a mental
health professional will generally be required but a number of different modalities of
response on the part of mental health professionals exist in face of the exposure of a
person to a stressor which has the potential to cause pathology, such as post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD).
To satisfy the perceived need to assist persons at risk of long-term psychiatric
morbidity arising as a consequence of exposure to a trauma, some mental health
professionals have advocated the routine provision of acute psychological interventions to
such individuals. These critical stress intervention proponents recommend this approach
on the assumption that the sooner the post-trauma response, the less likely adverse
psychiatric disorder is to develop: Deahl (2000).
One clinical response is that of cognitive-behavioural intervention, supported by
medicinal treatment where necessary: see, for instance, the approach propounded by
Professor McFarlane in Howell v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (unreported, NSW
Supreme Court, Newman J, 7 May 1998).
Another approach is that of critical incident stress debriefing (CISD), said to be an
element of critical incident stress management (CISM), which is designed to mitigate the
acute psychological distress associated with psychological crises that may arise from
circumstances of extreme stress: see Everly and Mitchell (1997; 2000); Robinson and
Mitchell (1995).
Despite the obvious appeal of the concept of critical incident stress intervention as a
means to ward off serious debilitating psychiatric phenomena, such as PTSD, whether or
not these interventions are actually successful in fulfilling this aim in practice is a subject
attracting much controversy.
This chapter reviews recent controversies ventilated in the courts in relation to expert
evidence about critical incident stress management and employers’ responsibilities to
employees after their exposure to workplace stressors.
Acute stress disorder

[10.50.20] In the short-term aftermath of experience of a traumatic incident, a person may
experience acute stress disorder (ASD). Criteria for its diagnosis under DSM-5 (2013) are:
DSM-5 Diagnostic Criteria for ASD

A. Exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violation.
B. Presence of nine (or more) of the following symptoms from any of the five
categories of intrusion, negative mood, dissociation, avoidance, and arousal,
beginning or worsening after the traumatic event(s) occurred:
Intrusion Symptoms
1. Recurrent, involuntary, and intrusive distressing memories of the
traumatic event(s).
2. Recurrent distressing dreams in which the content and/or affect of the
dream are related to the event(s).
3. Dissociative reactions (eg, flashbacks) in which the individual feels or
acts as if the traumatic event(s) were recurring.
4. Intense or prolonged psychological distress or marked physiological
reactions in response to internal or external cues that symbolize or
resemble an aspect of the traumatic event(s).
978 [10.50.20]
Critical incident stress intervention evidence | CH 10.50
Negative Mood
5. Persistent inability to experience positive emotions.
Dissociative Symptoms
6. An altered sense of the reality of one’s surroundings or oneself.
7. Inability to remember an important aspect of the traumatic event(s).
Avoidance Symptoms
8. Efforts to avoid distressing memories, thoughts, or feelings about or
closely associated with the traumatic event(s).
9. Efforts to avoid external reminders that arouse distressing memories,
thoughts, or feelings about or closely associated with the traumatic
event(s).
Arousal Symptoms
10. Sleep disturbance.
11. Irritable behaviour and angry outbursts (with little or no
provocation), typically expressed as verbal or physical aggression
toward people or objects.
12. Hypervigilance.
13. Problems with concentration.
14. Exaggerated startle response.
C. Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in Criterion B) is 3 days to 1 month
after trauma exposure.
D. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
E. The disturbance is not attributable to the physiological effects of a substance
(eg, medication or alcohol) or another medical condition (eg, mild traumatic
brain injury) and is not better explained by brief psychotic disorder.
Research has indicated that the ASD diagnosis has reasonably good positive predictive
power in terms of the development of other symptomatology, with 50–75% of individuals
who meet ASD diagnostic criteria eventually developing PTSD. However, it has poor
sensitivity, with fewer than 50% of individuals who meet PTSD diagnostic criteria having
previously met criteria for ASD. Thus, the ASD diagnosis fails to identify the majority of
people who will go on to develop PTSD after a traumatic event. However, treatments are
available although it has been argued that drug treatments should not normally replace
trauma-focused psychological therapy as a first-line treatment for adults with PTSD
(Forbes et al (2007)). It has been asserted too that exposure-based therapy for ASD leads to
greater reduction in subsequent PTSD symptoms in persons with ASD when compared
with cognitive restructuring, especially if used early (Bryant et al (2008)).
Critical incident stress intervention: debriefing
Psychological debriefing (PD)

[10.50.50] During World War II, SLA Marshall, a military historian, experimented with
structured group debriefings that he referred to as ‘historical event reconstruction
debriefings’ to obtain details of military conflict from the soldiers involved and to describe
their reactions: see Fitzgerald et al (1993, p 159). As a result of Marshall’s work, mental
health professionals hypothesised that similar group debriefings, founded upon
psychological principles and procedures, might alleviate extreme stress reactions capable
of manifesting in psychiatric illnesses and prevent post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
in respect of persons in occupations in which exposure to trauma is prevalent: see Everly
(1995, p 279). This led to the implementation of various psychological debriefing (PD)
methods, first introduced by Mitchell (1983) and named PD by Dyregrov and Mitchell
(1988) shortly afterwards.
[10.50.50] 979
Although PD was originally utilised as a means of group intervention for emergency

services workers, PD and critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) have since been
implemented in various situations to offer assistance to both primary and secondary
trauma victims. At one end of the spectrum, PDs have been generated that are
predominantly educational and employed by peers or management in organisations in
which emotional displays are discouraged and mental health professionals and external
persons generally are disfavoured, such as the armed forces: see Jones and Roberts (1998);
Harris, Baloğlu and Stacks (2002). Programs placing a greater significance upon
psychodynamics and group dynamics have also been embraced, most typically in
situations concerning civilian victims: see Hobbs et al (1996); Dyregrov (1997); see, further,
Deahl (2000).
While the PD models differ in many respects, Busuttil and Busuttil (1997) suggested
that all emphasis should be placed on three pivotal factors:
1. Cognitive – the detailed disclosure of pertinent facts, in addition to an
individual’s expectations, thoughts, emotional reactions, and sensory impressions
of the event or incident.
2. Coping – the provision of education about traumatic stress responses,
normalisation and anticipatory guidance, and future planning.
3. Group support/debriefing – the provision of a supportive environment and a
trustworthy group leader.
Critical incident stress debriefing (CISD)

[10.50.60] Critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) is a specific form of PD. The first CISD,
a seven-step group crisis intervention tool confusingly referred to solely as ‘Formal CISD’,
was published and standardised by Mitchell in 1983. Mitchell stated (1983, p 37) that
‘[t]here are many methods to deal with a stress response syndrome’ and proceeded to list
(at pp 37–38) various such techniques to comprise an overall systematic and multi-
component program:
• … strenuous physical exercise …
• … special relaxation programs …
• … individual or group meetings …
• … assessment by the facilitator of the intensity of the stress response in the workers …
• … support and reassurance from the facilitator …
• … information is provided …
• … a plan of further action may be designed …
• … referrals, if necessary, are made …
• … The initial defusing …
• … The Formal CISD …
• … Follow-up …
Mitchell’s model remains arguably the best-known model of CISD (see, further, Freckelton
(1998)), pursuant to which debriefings are based upon the military principles of
immediacy (of treatment), proximity (to the battlefield) and expectancy (of return to duty):
see Mitchell (1983); Mitchell and Bray (1990); see also Deahl (2000). As is apparent from
the listed components of the proposed comprehensive CISD program, the seven-step
Formal CISD was not intended as a stand-alone intervention (Mitchell (2004, p 25)).
Initially, Mitchell insisted that CISD must take place within the first 24 to 72 hours after
exposure to a stressor, follow a specific format, and be limited to a specific intervention:
see also Rank (1997); Armfield (1994). However, he has more recently broadened the
intervention approach to encompass follow-up debriefings and ongoing counselling, as
980 [10.50.60]
well as recognising that individual counselling can be therapeutic (see Mitchell and
Dyregrov (1993)) and accepting that timeframes for the provision of initial assistance can
be more flexible. Further, appropriate timing for different components of the overall CISD
program varies according to the circumstances. For example, Mitchell (2004) has stressed
that debriefings are not recommended for several weeks or longer after a disaster: see
Mitchell (2004). Other PD/CISD programs have undergone similar transformation over
time. Deahl (2000) has commented (p 932) that:
Even within a well-defined intervention … the ‘goalposts’ have shifted and the
recommended number, frequency and timing of the intervention have varied with time, as
has the recommended use of adjunctive therapy including simple counselling, practical
support and the use of formal cognitive behavioural techniques.
Since the inception of Mitchell’s CISD in the 1980s, CISDs have grown in number,
popularity, and applicability. They exist in individual and group models, and are referred
to variously as debriefing, PD, critical incident debriefing, traumatic event debriefing, and
post-trauma intervention (see Rank (1997)), in addition to a range of ‘branded’ methods,
such as the Assaulted Staff Action Program (ASAP) (see Flannery (1998; 1999)).
Critical incident stress management (CISM)

[10.50.70] With the proliferation of various CISD techniques, confusion emerged, and
arguably remains, in relation to distinguishing CISD as a concept and Mitchell’s 1983
Formal CISD as a standardised model. In 1990, in response to the problems associated
with the dual use of the term, Life Net, the official publication of the International Critical
Incident Stress Foundation, began referring to ‘Critical Incident Stress Management
(CISM) teams’ and, in this and subsequent issues of Life Net, advocated the adoption of
this terminology: Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) for the field and CISD,
previously referred to as the Formal CISD, for the specific group process. Subsequent
online publications and training workbooks of the International Critical Incident Stress
Foundation continued attempts to clarify the situation by explaining that the use of the
term CISD as the label for the cumulative strategic crisis intervention program had been
abandoned and replaced by the term CISM: see Everly and Mitchell (1997).
Despite the changed nomenclature, CISM, like the CISD concept, embodies a
comprehensive, systematic and multi-component program. Mitchell (2004, p 24) has
argued that (emphasis added):
The CISM program includes many tactics and techniques, but it is not limited to:
• crisis assessment services and strategic planning programs
• family support services
• individual, peer-provided crisis intervention services
• pre-crisis education programs
• large group crisis interventions
• the provision of food and fluids to work crews
• rotation and resting of work crews
• advice to command staff and supervisors
• small group crisis interventions
• follow-up services and referral services
• post-crisis education
• and many other services.
Mitchell has come under criticism for his inability to distinguish CISM clearly from CISD
and for failing to provide an operational definition of CISM: see Shave (2010); Devilly and
Cotton (2004); and further below.
[10.50.70] 981
The role of critical incident stress intervention

[10.50.80] The prevalence of PTSD and other significant post-traumatic psychiatric
illnesses is a major public health concern. Kessler et al (1995) have observed that at least
2–3% of the population exhibit clinically significant PTSD. Further, Green (1994) has noted
that over two-thirds of the population experience trauma of such magnitude that it meets
the ‘stressor’ criterion used in PTSD diagnosis. While there is ongoing debate over what
constitutes a PTSD ‘stressor’ (Bryant (1996); Dobson and Marshall (1998)), common
traumatic scenarios in which PTSD manifests include employment with inherent
confronting experience, such as the emergency services and the armed forces; disasters;
interpersonal violence; motor vehicle accidents; miscarriage; rape; torture; terrorism; and
war: see Duckworth (1986); Curran (1988); Mezey and Taylor (1988); Dyregrov (1989);
Everly (1995); Kessler et al (1995); Hobbs, Mayou, Harrison and Worlock (1996); Lee, Slade
and Lygo (1996); Rank (1997).
Often when people are exposed to an extreme trauma they experience severe physical
injuries requiring emergency medical attention. In this setting, little or no effort is
expended to offer accompanying psychological or psychiatric care. Critical incident stress
intervention is purported to fill that void by offering a form of ‘psychological first aid’: see
Mitchell (2004, p 24). It is intended to provide a support service in which victims of
trauma may be assessed and, where appropriate, referred to specialist care. Crisis
intervention is not the same as psychological treatment; the two are complementary: see
Mitchell and Everly (1995).
Medico-legal considerations for employers

[10.50.90] The possible benefits of critical incident stress interventions for those who have
endured a traumatic event have become increasingly important to employers. Specific
occupations are associated with a higher risk and prevalence of serious post-traumatic
illnesses such as PTSD. For example, the percentage of military personnel veterans
experiencing chronic PTSD has been reported as greater than 31%: see Kulka et al (1990).
Similarly, approximately 30% of those involved in disasters, conflict and serious accidents
develop PTSD: see Cobb and Lindemann (1943); Duckworth (1986); McFarlane (1988). This
extends to ‘front-line’ rescuers and their families; to support staff such as switchboard and
control room operators, volunteers, and administrators (see McFarlane (1988)); and to
witnesses, including the media: see Deahl (2000).
Critical incident stress intervention: the controversy
Terminology
[10.50.150] The confusion arising out of Mitchell’s use of the terms ‘CISD’, ‘formal CISD’
and ‘CISM’ has not abated since the 1980s. Further, authors often use these descriptors,
along with briefings, PD, and even other ‘branded’ models such as Flannery’s ASAP
intervention (1998; 1999) interchangeably. Additionally, the role and content of intervention
strategies that may be categorised under any number of these titles frequently change and
differ from each other. This significantly complicates the process of gathering empirical
data: ‘Redefining the role or content of an intervention keeps the technique one step ahead
of the researcher and makes efficacy difficult to refute and comparisons between studies
difficult to draw’ (see Deahl (2000, p 932)).
Another controversial aspect of the critical incident stress intervention literature is the
lack of agreement over what actually amounts to a ‘critical’ or ‘traumatic’ event: see
Bryant (1996); Dobson and Marshall (1998). Mitchell (1983) has offered a fairly expansive
definition of a critical incident as (at p 36): ‘any unplanned, unexpected or unpleasant
situation faced by emergency services personnel that causes them to experience unusually
strong emotional reactions and which have the potential to interfere with their ability to
982 [10.50.80]
function either at the scene or later’. In an attempt to provide research consistency, Green
(1990) generated eight generic stressor dimensions to categorise traumatic events. Morris
(2000) has adopted a somewhat unique approach, distinguishing ‘critical incidents’ from
‘traumatic stress’ and excluding ‘normal’ daily trauma. Morris’ classification system places
the work of emergency services personnel and the military in the ‘critical incident’ group;
unforeseen disasters, such as natural catastrophes and terrorism, as examples of ‘traumatic
stress’; and miscarriage, death, and other confronting personal experiences that are
everyday occurrences as neither. This last aspect, what constitutes a trauma as opposed to
a normal aspect of life, remains hotly contested: see Davis (1999); Summerfield (2001).
Proponents
[10.50.160] The proponents of critical incident stress intervention, not surprisingly,
maintain that the results of their work have been positive – in diminishing psychological
and somatic problems, difficulties functioning in the workplace, and impairment of social
and other relationships. Robinson and Mitchell (1993), in an evaluation of the effectiveness
of critical incident stress interventions on emergency personnel, reported that 60% of
participants in critical incident stress intervention reported reduced symptoms after
critical incident stress intervention and that they attributed this to the debriefing. It was
reported as helpful by another 34% of participants because it facilitated communication
with others about the incident, encouraged talking about the incident, improved their
understanding of themselves, and assisted in inter-agency cohesion. However, these were
the perceptions of the participants themselves.
The advocates of critical incident stress interventions list a number of benefits to be
had by employees and employers in organisations that possess such schemes. Broadly,
they claim that psychological interventions can:
(1) prevent post-traumatic sequelae and long-term illnesses such as PTSD, and
thereby avoid litigation that might otherwise ensue as a consequence of the
employer failing to satisfy its obligations under relevant occupational health and
safety legislation;
(2) alleviate stress symptoms and other negative emotional states and possibly
harmful physical symptoms;
(3) offer therapeutic benefits to employees, regardless of whether or not post-
traumatic symptoms are relieved in the process: see Robinson and Mitchell (1993);
Deahl et al (1994);
(4) demonstrate a meaningful gesture of concern and compassion on the part of the
employer; and
(5) increase workplace productivity by reducing the potential impact of long-term
psychologically impaired employees.
Critics
[10.50.170] While there exist numerous anecdotal suggestions that early interventions
involving psychological debriefings for all persons involved in traumatic events minimise
the likelihood of their developing post-traumatic sequelae (see Mitchell (1983); Armstrong,
O’Callahan and Marmar (1991)), critics have pointed to the fact that relatively few data
exist to establish on an objective basis that any of the critical incident stress interventions
accomplish what they seek to achieve: see Deahl and Bisson (1995); Gist, Lubin and
Redburn (1998); Raphael, Meldrum and McFarlane (1996).
Raphael et al (1996, p 471) have acknowledged that the positive effects of short-term
critical incident stress interventions ‘may be very helpful, and this is reinforced by the
emphasis on disclosure in most focal and crisis therapy models’ but have noted the
existence of circumstances ‘where opportunities for disclosure have resulted in no
[10.50.170] 983
demonstrable benefit’. Weisaeth (1989) similarly reported that no clear advantage had
been achieved by such intervention in the aftermath of a factory fire/explosion. Perhaps
more significantly, Kenardy et al (1996) reported on a detailed study of the follow-up of
helpers and volunteers who received debriefing after the Newcastle earthquake. The
numbers of persons assessed were significant – 173 in all. Approximately one-third were
debriefed and the condition of those assessed was evaluated. The researchers concluded
that there was no evidence of enhanced rate or extent of recovery in those who were
debriefed, when compared to those who had not been. (See also Brom, Kleber and
Hofman (1993); Hyton and Hasle (1993); Deahl et al (1994); Hobbs and Adshead (1996);
Lee, Slade and Lygo (1996); Bisson et al (1997).)
There has so far been a dearth of randomised controlled trials to evaluate the
distinctions between subjects’ belief that critical incident stress intervention has been
helpful to them, whether or not their belief is well-founded and whether they would
probably have emerged from the precipitating trauma relatively unscathed in the absence
of the intervention. (See Shalev (1994); Rose (1997); Raphael, Meldrum and McFarlane
(1995); Kenardy and Carr (1996); Raphael and Wilson (2000).) There is a notable absence of
pre-intervention data on subjects and a reliance on questionnaire results as opposed to
validated interview data: see Deahl (2000). No two traumatic events are the same. Despite
this, standard measures of the nature and degree of the critical incidents are infrequently
recorded; comparisons between disparate traumatic incidents are made; and single event
traumas are compared with ongoing and repetitive ones: see Green et al (1983). Further,
limited studies have compared intervention by way of debriefing with other forms of
trauma support, despite acknowledgment of the deficiencies of current non-intervention
controls that fail to control the effects of the ‘sympathetic ear’ phenomenon: see Bordow
and Porritt (1979); Deahl (2000).
The conclusion of Raphael et al (1996, pp 473–474) is:
[A]lthough debriefing in one form or another is widely used, strongly supported, and
generally valued as a helpful preventive intervention, there is no evidence to date of its
effectiveness as a preventive intervention in terms of posttraumatic morbidity. In fact,
some findings raise questions about the negative effects of these interventions.
Similarly, Wessely, Rose and Bisson (1997), in a systematic review of debriefing

interventions, conclude:
At present the routine use of individual debriefing in the aftermath of individual trauma
cannot be recommended in either military or civilian life. The practice of compulsory
debriefing should cease pending further evidence. … There is no information on the
response of those with pre-existing psychiatric disorder to psychological debriefing, since
all studies used known psychological disorder as an exclusion. … [T]here remains a
pressing need for more randomised studies.
(See also Wessely, Rose and Bisson (1999); Raphael and Wilson (2000); Bisson and Deahl
(1993); Kenardy and Carr (1996).)
Demonstrating the most sceptical approach to the debate, some critics of critical
incident stress intervention debriefing have claimed that it exists only to satisfy the needs
of mental health professionals, rather than those of trauma victims: see Raphael et al
(1996); Gist et al (1998). Raphael, Meldrum and McFarlane (1995) have referred to this
approach’s increasing popularity as ‘social movement’, ‘believed in as an ideology’.
Further, Deahl (2000) has pointed to the highly political nature of this controversy,
referring to the conflict of interest many intervening debriefers have in collating
supporting empirical evidence and promoting critical incident preventative schemes.
984 [10.50.170]
Risks
[10.50.180] Significant in terms of legal liability also is the fact that critical incident stress
interventions, particularly psychological debriefings and other early psychological
measures, may have adverse, counter-therapeutic effects (see, eg, Barboza (2005)). This is
particularly true for those who are depressive or likely to be subject to negative
ruminations: see Solomon, Neria and Witztum (2000). Gist, Lubin and Redburn (1998)
have suggested that iatrogenic consequences may result for those who participate in
psychological debriefing based upon slight, but significant, negative post-adjustment in
comparison to those who do not undergo such intervention. Moreover, the personality of
the person affected by a stressor may be relevant. According to Raphael and Wilson (2000,
p 9):
personality facets and coping styles may be influential in adaptation, and debriefing may
interact positively or negatively with these – for instance, emphasizing emotional
reactions, for those for whom this is, either at this time or generally, not helpful.
It may be that particular considerations apply in this regard to children: see Wessely, Rose
and Bisson (1999); Wraith (2000). Resentment, anger and passive participation may also
arise when psychological interventions are made compulsory and without reflection on
what other interests of the victim might best be served: see Rahe et al (1990); Flannery et al
(1991). Another risk of relying too heavily upon preventative measures is that they may
delay the diagnosis and treatment of those individuals who do develop post-traumatic
psychological morbidity: see McFarlane (1984; 1989). It is for this reason that Deahl (2000)
has stressed the importance of offering mandatory follow-ups when early interventions
have been employed. There is also a concern that the provision of critical incident stress
interventions may expose the interveners to the trauma such that they experience it
vicariously. It is thought that the stress of this might be so severe as to result in the
interveners becoming ‘secondary’ victims of the trauma as a product of their involvement:
see Berah, Jones and Valent (1984); Raphael (1986); Talbot (1990).
Civil actions for inadequate response to psychogenic trauma

[10.50.240] The potential exists for employees injured by stressors to be able to bring civil
actions against their employers if they have not received satisfactory psychological
intervention, be it by way of cognitive-behavioural therapy or by way of CISD or
adequate CISD. The ethical and legal question for employers has become what they
should do to provide a safe workplace for employees who are exposed to traumata that
foreseeably have the potential to cause psychiatric injuries such as post-traumatic stress
disorders (PTSDs), anxiety disorders, depressive disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorders
and adjustment disorders. An important question is whether the failure to provide such
intervention deprived the plaintiff of a reasonable chance to avoid a reasonably
foreseeable psychiatric disorder (see Hegarty v Queensland Ambulance Service [2007] Aust
Torts Reports 81-919; [2007] QCA 366; Freckelton (2008e)).
Employers are subject to legal liability not because their employees have suffered PTSD
per se, but rather due to negligence in failing to introduce measures to minimise, detect
and treat PTSD and other disorders associated with exposure to trauma: see Deahl (1998).
The area remains controversial both clinically and legally: see Devilly and Cotton (2004);
see too Benic v New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 1039; Freckelton (2011a).
As Gleeson CJ observed in New South Wales v Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; [2007] HCA 20
at [4] in relation to police officers:
The duties of police officers commonly expose them to danger, sometimes from people
who deliberately seek to cause them harm. Individual responses to stressful situations
vary greatly, and police officers are sometimes called upon to deal with situations that
many ordinary citizens would find unbearably stressful. Police service is not unique in
[10.50.240] 985
this respect. Many callings expose people to forms of stress with which outsiders would
be unable to cope. Furthermore, an individual’s capacity to cope with stress may be
affected by unpredictable personal circumstances.
The general principles relevant to foreseeability were set out by the High Court in Wyong
Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 at 47–48:
[T]he tribunal of fact must first ask itself whether a reasonable man in the defendant’s
position would have foreseen that his conduct involved a risk of injury to the plaintiff or
to a class of persons including the plaintiff. If the answer be in the affirmative, it is then for
the tribunal of fact to determine what a reasonable man would do by way of response to
the risk. The perception of the reasonable man’s response calls for a consideration of the
magnitude of the risk and the degree of the probability of its occurrence, along with the
expense, difficulty and inconvenience of taking alleviating action and any other conflicting
responsibilities which the defendant may have. It is only when these matters are balanced
out that the tribunal of fact can confidently assert what is the standard of response to be
ascribed to the reasonable man placed in the defendant’s position.
The considerations to which I have referred indicate that a risk of injury which is
remote in the sense that it is extremely unlikely to occur may nevertheless constitute a
foreseeable risk. A risk which is not far-fetched or fanciful is real and therefore foreseeable.
These principles continue to apply with respect to psychiatric injuries: New South Wales v
Fahy (2007) 232 CLR 486; [2007] HCA 20 at [78] per Gleeson CJ.
In Fahy, Kirby J at [103] was explicit that prescribing a safe system is not enough to
discharge the obligation that is owed to employees:
The system must be enforced. This must be done even against employee resistance.
Although an employer may not always have to take active steps to acquaint itself with
special or unique weaknesses or predispositions to injury and damage on the part of
particular employees, where the employer becomes aware that there is such a
susceptibility, or should be so aware in the ordinary course of reasonable conduct, special
precautions need to be taken by it, to fulfil the duty of care that is inherent in the
employment relationship.
(See also Benic v New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 1039.)

Decisions of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (see, eg, Howell v State Rail
Authority of New South Wales (No 1) [1996] NSWSC 179 per Abadee J; Howell v State Rail
Authority of New South Wales (No 2) (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Newman J, 7 May
1998)) have also made it clear that it is incumbent upon employers to intervene in an
active way where they are on particular notice of risk, whether by way of persistent offers
of critical incident stress debriefing or cognitive behavioural therapy, and that it is their
responsibility not to be readily fobbed off by distressed or insightless employees. But
Court of Appeal decisions, also in New South Wales (see, eg, State Rail Authority v Howell
(unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 19 December 1996); Pioneer Construction Material Pty
Ltd v Millsom [2002] NSWCA 258), have also emphasised the need for plaintiffs to prove
that the absence of appropriate intervention made a material difference to their psychiatric
health – namely, that it demonstrably reduced the chances of their having succumbed to a
psychiatric disorder such as PTSD. This means that plaintiffs need to adduce evidence
from a mental health professional that, had a certain kind of therapy or intervention been
provided, there would have been a significant prospect of the plaintiff avoiding suffering
the disorder, which in due course constituted the injury for which he or she sued.
It has become orthodox for litigation to be brought by plaintiffs in this area, not on the
basis of an event having caused psychiatric sequelae, but on the basis of an employer’s
failure to intervene, such as by providing suitable debriefing, thus having removed from
the plaintiff the chance of a better outcome (see, eg, New South Wales v Burton [2006] Aust
Torts Reports 81-826; [2006] NSWCA 12 at [25]; Hegarty v Queensland Ambulance Service
[2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-919; [2007] QCA 366). In such circumstances, the plaintiff
bears the onus of establishing the extent of the loss of the chance (see, eg, Sellars v Adelaide
986 [10.50.240]
Petroleum NL (1994) 179 CLR 332 at 355; Olympic Holdings Pty Ltd v Lochel [2004] WASC 61
at [122]–[123]; Rufo v Hosking (2004) 61 NSWLR 678; [2004] NSWCA 391 at [9]). A major
focus of such litigation is upon whether or not, and the extent to which, the plaintiff’s
subsequent psychiatric condition would or could have been improved had earlier
intervention/counselling been provided (see, eg, New South Wales v Burton [2006] Aust
Torts Reports 81-826; [2006] NSWCA 12 at [25]).
A continuing flow of litigation has ensued and will continue to agitate the issue of
whether particular employers in particular factual circumstances have exercised their
obligation to avoid causing reasonably foreseeable psychiatric injury or to provide a safe
workplace for employees, especially those who work in workplaces that are high risk for
psychiatric injuries.
Howell v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (No 1): the Abadee J approach
[10.50.250] In 1992, a woman committed suicide by throwing herself in front of a train in
rural New South Wales: Howell v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (No 1) [1996]
NSWSC 179. The plaintiff was the assistant station-master at the nearest railway station. It
was stipulated by the defendant (at p 2) that part of the plaintiff’s duties was that:
[a]s soon as possible after an incident has occurred in which an employee or member of
the public is injured or fatally injured an employee must be placed in charge of the scene
of the incident. This employee must supervise the transfer of any injured persons or
removal of the body and if necessary must protect the site.
The plaintiff promptly attended the scene, was confronted by the remains of the deceased,
and undertook a number of traumatic duties. Abadee J found in the process that he was
‘confronted with an horrendous situation, a situation of some horror, and the sort of
situation that fortunately most human beings as they go through life would not be
exposed to’ (at p 3). He found him to have been exposed to a scene ‘in circumstances
where it appears on the evidence that there was the potential or risk for a human being
who had been so exposed, to thereafter suffer from a condition known as Post-traumatic
Stress Disorder’ (at p 3).
The plaintiff returned home in the early hours of the morning and had a few drinks of
alcohol to calm himself. A short time later, he received a telephone call from a psychologist
contracted by the State Rail Authority Rehabilitation Service. The purpose of the call,
which was at about 3.30 am, was said to be to establish contact and communication in
order to provide the plaintiff with debriefing and counselling after a traumatic experience
of the type that had occurred. The conversation was short and did not result in the
plaintiff and the psychologist actually meeting.
Evidence adduced before the court included documentation about CISD. A key
document in the proceedings was generated by the defendant and entitled ‘Trauma Group
Debriefing’ (at p 3). It dealt with the management and procedures of trauma counselling
and, more significantly, the process of trauma and the necessity for ‘critical incident
debriefing’. It referred to the need for trauma debriefing sessions to be conducted by
trained and experienced health professionals and to take place as soon as possible after the
incident, preferably within 48 hours. While the Mitchell model of CISD is not mentioned
in the course of the decision, it appears that the defendant’s CISM was broadly consistent
with the Mitchell approach. The document was found by Abadee J at (p 4) to suggest:
in terms of foreseeability, that the defendant itself acknowledged or recognised that
accidents of the type that occurred in the instant case were the type of accidents that might
give rise to persons such as the plaintiff attending in the course of their employment and
pursuant to instructions inter alia of the type [to which the plaintiff was subject] … a risk
of suffering from trauma in consequence of the performance of their duties.
Abadee J found that the standard of care exercised by the psychologist in going about the
performance of his duties fell short of the standard required in the circumstances both
[10.50.250] 987
initially and in the days following. He was satisfied on the evidence before him that ‘it is
critical to debrief as soon as possible on a face-to-face basis’ (at p 4). It was clear that a
failure by the psychologist would be the responsibility of the defendant (see Kondis v State
Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672) – the principle of non-delegable duties made the
defendant liable for any act or omission by the psychologist that materially contributed in
a causative way to the plaintiff’s injury. In this instance, the relevant injury was a serious
case of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
A substantial part of Abadee J’s decision sets out the way in which the psychologist
transgressed in terms of his exercise of his duties toward the plaintiff. When he first spoke
with the plaintiff, the plaintiff was under the influence of alcohol and had not been to bed.
It was in the aftermath of a gruesome and profoundly distressing experience. This contact
was held not to constitute a proper debriefing. The psychologist made contact with the
plaintiff on two further occasions on the next day, again, though, only on the telephone.
Abadee J found that by then the psychologist was in a position to know, or at least ought
to have known, that the plaintiff was showing signs of PTSD. The psychologist never met
with the plaintiff face-to-face. He was found in this regard to have failed to take
appropriate steps to implement immediately the kind of counselling needed by a person
in the plaintiff’s position. In so doing, he fell short of the standard set forth in the
defendant’s own instructions and of the standard postulated to apply in such
circumstances by expert evidence before the court. Abadee J found (at pp 4–5):
Commonsense would suggest that wherever that debriefing was to take place, it should be
on a face-to-face basis. It is treatment by at least a trained clinical psychologist that is
required and one would expect that, if possible, not only should the trained psychologist
be speaking to the person being debriefed but also that the trained psychologist should be
able to observe the behaviour of the person being debriefed and bring it into account in
his/her clinical assessment of the situation.
The plaintiff alleged also that he should have received some form of pre-trauma
counselling to enable him better to deal with the situation with which he ultimately was
faced. However, Abadee J found that the need for such pre-trauma training or counselling
was not established (at p 7). Even if it had been provided, Abadee J found that he was not
persuaded that such training or counselling would have prevented the plaintiff from
sustaining a severe case of PTSD. His approach in this regard is in stark contrast to his
assumption that post-trauma counselling, if conducted expeditiously and in contiguity
between the counsellor and the victim, would have been efficacious.
The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant had been negligent also in exposing the
plaintiff to the horrific sight that he witnessed, given that the risk of injury from such an
experience was foreseeable. This argument had little merit, effectively constituting that an
employee whose terms of employment contemplated that he might, at some stage, have to
deal with the results of death on the railways did not consent to this aspect of
employment. Abadee J gave the argument short shrift, holding that the defendant had not
been negligent in failing to lay down procedures for employees that would have
prevented persons such as the plaintiff from coming into contact with bloodied body
parts. It had been argued that such procedures should have dictated that a person in the
plaintiff’s position should only have played a role in securing the death scene, but at a
distance, leaving the assessment of death or serious injury to ambulance officers or others
with specialised training, and the assessment of the situation with the railway carriage
until after the body parts had been removed. Abadee J declared such a proposition as not
‘reasonably practical or reasonably required’: at p 7. Any other finding would have
exposed all employers of emergency service personnel and of workers who may come into
contact with injury and death liable for the very nature of the employment in which such
workers voluntarily participate in the knowledge of what they may encounter.
988 [10.50.250]
The key element of the decision is therefore that the employer was found to be
negligent in failing in its non-delegable duty to ensure that its employee received
adequate debriefing from the person it had subcontracted to provide it. The decision
establishes that inadequate provision of CISD in circumstances where it is foreseeable that
this would lead to psychiatric injury is itself actionable. However, it is not the CISD that
causes the injury. It is the exposure to the trauma. Underlying the decision is an
assumption of the effectiveness of CISD in negativing or addressing the primary injury. It
is assumed that, if proper CISD had been administered, the plaintiff’s PTSD either would
not have existed or would have been much less severe. It appears that this aspect of the
case was not the subject of evidence, argument or submission. However, had there been
evidence about the controversies surrounding the effectiveness of CISD, it might well have
been that the assumption upon which Abadee J acted would have been contradicted and a
different result arrived at.
Howell v State Rail Authority of New South Wales: Court of Appeal
[10.50.260] This aspect of the decision was the subject of successful appeal to the New
South Wales Court of Appeal in State Rail Authority v Howell (unreported, NSW Court of
Appeal, 19 December 1996). The court found that it had not been open to Abadee J to
conclude that negligence caused the plaintiff’s PTSD and to assess damages on that basis.
Clarke JA, with whose judgment Cole JA and Cohen AJA agreed, found that neither
pre-trauma training nor post-trauma counselling and debriefing would have prevented
the onset of PTSD. Thus, it was not open to the trial judge to conclude that the negligence
in the debriefing process caused the plaintiff’s condition. The case was remitted for retrial.
Howell v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (No 2): the Newman J approach
[10.50.270] In the retrial (Howell v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (No 2)
(unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Newman J, 7 May 1998)), Newman J heard argument
from the State Rail Authority to the effect that early and proper psychological intervention
would not have assisted the plaintiff, either at all or to a very limited extent indeed,
because of the severity of his ultimate condition. Newman J accepted that the actions of
the psychologist had been negligent. He also received a report from the South Australian
psychiatrist Professor McFarlane and heard extensive oral evidence from him. Newman J
described Professor McFarlane as ‘a world standing expert on the condition of post
traumatic stress disorder’ and ‘unreservedly’ accepted his views (at p 7).
Professor McFarlane expressed the opinion that the plaintiff suffered from chronic PTSD,
alcohol abuse and a major depressive disorder, all arising from the incident.
Professor McFarlane described not CISD, but a cognitive-behavioural program, which
he said should have been extended to the plaintiff, involving about 12 sessions over a
six-week period. He expressed the view that such therapy carried with it at least a 70%
chance of success, if not more, in terms of rendering the plaintiff ‘relatively symptom-free’,
thus being able to continue his work. Professor McFarlane stressed (at p 14) the need for
early, effective intervention to ward off what he termed:
Progressive social decline. Progressive social alienation. Progressive irritability. … The
sooner you prevent that process commencing, the sooner you prevent the secondary
morbidities. That is one of the principles of prevention. It is actually to stop the emergence
of that secondary morbidity.
Newman J accepted that had the plaintiff received cognitive-behavioural intervention of

the kind described by Professor McFarlane, ‘on the balance of probabilities he would have
made a recovery which would have enabled him to not only continue working but also to
live a reasonably normal social life’: at p 15. He found the ‘vast bulk of this man’s misery
may be ascribed to the failure to properly treat’ and thus allowed him as damages for
non-economic loss A$127,650, all told awarding him as damages against the State Rail
Authority A$613,293.90 after appropriate deductions.
[10.50.270] 989
The Hind decision

[10.50.280] In Hind v Attorney-General (Tas) (unreported, Tasmanian Supreme Court, Cox J,
29 September 1995), a former policeman applied for leave to sue outside the limitation
period pursuant to the Tasmanian limitation provisions. The main action on behalf of the
ex-policeman was for damages in respect of what was asserted to be the contractual
and/or tortious failure of the defendant to provide him with a safe place of work. One
element of this claim was the failure to provide him with any or adequate CISD.
The plaintiff joined the Tasmanian Police Force in 1975 and had had an outstanding
record of service prior to leaving. During his time as a policeman, he had attended scenes
of car and industrial accidents. He had removed corpses from their place of death, at times
when they were in advanced states of decomposition. His case was that by the late 1980s,
he had developed a pervasive feeling of repugnance toward dead bodies and to incidents
involving the loss of blood. He was acutely aware of the risk of contracting diseases such
as AIDS and hepatitis.
The plaintiff asserted that in 1989 he was exposed to two further traumatic stressors –
firearm incidents that traumatised him in what had become a state made vulnerable by his
previous experience with incidents involving death. He asserted that he did not receive
any debriefing or stress debriefing or even advice from psychologists or experienced
counsellors. By 1990, he resigned from the Tasmanian Police Force after attending the
scene of a shooting suicide. Various diagnoses were offered of his subsequent condition,
including obsessive compulsive disorder and PTSD.
Cox J found the plaintiff to have a prima facie case that, in the course of his police
career, he was subjected to a great many deeply stressful incidents which were capable of
affecting him psychologically. He found that the incidents involved a risk that was
foreseeable to his employers and that there was a need, which should have been readily
apparent to them, to minimise the effect of such traumatic incidents. He found that ‘it
would, in my view, be unreasonable not to draw the inference at this stage that an absence
of counselling or other treatment contributed to the exacerbation of [his] condition and
thereby caused [him] some damage’.
The decision in Hind is only in relation to whether a case existed sufficient to allow the
plaintiff to proceed out-of-time. Accordingly, its importance as precedent needs to be
discounted. However, the decision of Cox J may be seen as consistent with that of Abadee
and Newman JJ in the Howell decisions. A difference is that Cox J referred to the absence of
therapeutic intervention as constituting simply a ‘contribution’ to the plaintiff’s condition,
but he shared with Abadee and Newman JJ the view that its absence caused psychiatric
damage.
The Pioneer Construction decision
[10.50.290] In 2002 the issue was confronted by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in
the decision of Pioneer Construction Material Pty Ltd v Millsom [2002] NSWCA 258. The
respondent had sued the appellant, alleging that it had breached its duty of care to him by
exposing him in the course of his employment to the foreseeable risk of psychological
harm and by not taking steps to obviate or significantly reduce that risk. Mr Millsom was
employed as a truck driver and then as a driver trainer, his responsibilities entailing that
he investigate and report on accidents in which the company’s vehicles and drivers were
involved. Between 1994 and 1998, he investigated some 60 such accidents, five of them
involving fatalities and 20 involving near-fatalities. Many of the scenes at the accidents
were horrifying.
He claimed that he suffered from PTSD or an adjustment disorder with anxiety and
depressive features as a result of his exposure to the distressing circumstances of the
accidents. He also alleged that, had there been proper response from his employer in
accordance with the employer’s duty of care toward him, his condition would have been
otherwise. It was common ground that he received no counselling or debriefing, rather
990 [10.50.280]
being told that exposure to stressors was part and parcel of the job. However, the
respondent did not call evidence to suggest that debriefing or counselling would have
been of assistance to him in either avoiding the onset or diminishing the symptoms of his
psychological injury. However, the appellant did tender a report from a consultant
psychiatrist, Dr Lovell, who stated that, in the genesis of a PTSD, debriefing has not been
found to be helpful and has little if any impact on outcome. He referred to Deahl (2000),
who maintained that ‘at present there is little other than anecdotal evidence to
demonstrate the effectiveness of debriefing and the vast majority of published data suffers
from various methodological difficulties’.
At trial, the District Court judge hearing the case accepted that the plaintiff had
suffered psychological injuries and that their cause was his workplace exposure to
stressors. On appeal, it was contended that there was no evidence on which the trial judge
could find, or was entitled to find, that a failure to provide counselling or debriefing more
likely than not caused the injuries.
The decision of the Court of Appeal was split. The majority (Handley JA and
McClellan J) held that there was no evidence on which the trial judge was entitled to base
his finding that a causal relationship existed between the employer’s failure to provide
counselling and the worker’s psychological injury.
However, Foster AJA, in dissent, held that it was open to the trial judge to consider
that a large organisation such as the appellant would not put in place a counselling service
unless it provided a useful function: ‘he could clearly infer, because the evidence indicated
that it was available for drivers, that it was used to ameliorate the effects upon them of
involvement in accidents’ (at [37]). He noted also that the respondent had complained of
the absence of such services for staff, as against drivers. He held, too, that it had been
legitimate for the trial judge to be satisfied that the counselling service was efficacious in
relation to drivers and would have been in relation to someone in the position of the
respondent. His Honour found that as long-term consultations with a psychiatrist or
psychologist were said to be advisable to assist the respondent in dealing with his
psychiatric symptoms, an inference could be made that had such assistance been made
available to the respondent at a time close to the traumatic events, ‘then it also would have
been efficacious if, indeed, not more efficacious’ (at [39]). He accepted that the expert
evidence on the likely effect of counselling could have been ‘a great deal stronger’;
nonetheless, the deficiencies in the evidence were not so serious that it could be said that
there was no evidence supporting the trial judge’s decision. He found, too, that no clear
case had been advanced at trial that counselling would have had no utility for the
respondent.
The Koehler v Cerebos decision
[10.50.300] The legacy of the early decisions was a significant level of uncertainty about
the extent and nature of responsiveness mandated by the law from employers. To some
extent, this was redressed by the High Court in the controversial decision of Koehler v
Cerebos (Australia) Ltd (2005) 222 CLR 44; [2005] HCA 15. In that case, the plaintiff worked
part-time as a marketing representative, could not perform her duties to her satisfaction,
and complained on many occasions to her employer, maintaining that the duties expected
of her needed to be changed. In the Western Australian District Court, she was successful
and established that she had not been provided with a safe system of work because of the
excessive demands made of her and the unresponsiveness of her employer. However, she
was unsuccessful before the Full Court and then the High Court, where McHugh,
Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ emphasised (at [21]) that:
The content of the duty which an employer owes an employee to take reasonable care to
avoid psychiatric injury cannot be considered without taking account of the obligations
which the parties owe one another under the contract of employment, the obligations
arising from that relationship which equity would enforce and, of course, any applicable
[10.50.300] 991
statutory provisions. (This last class may require particular reference not only to industrial
instruments but also to statutes of general application such as anti-discrimination
legislation.) Consideration of those obligations will reveal a number of questions that bear
upon whether, as was the appellant’s case here, an employer’s duty of care to take
reasonable care to avoid psychiatric injury requires the employer to modify the work to be
performed by an employee.
They found that the Full Court had been right to hold against the plaintiff because she had
agreed to perform the duties which were a cause of her injury and because the defendant
employer in the particular circumstances had no reason to suspect that the appellant was
at risk of psychiatric injury. Importantly, they held (at [36]) that:
the employer engaging an employee to perform stated duties is entitled to assume, in the
absence of evident signs warning of the possibility of psychiatric injury, that the employee
considers that he or she is able to do the job. Implying some qualification upon what
otherwise is expressly stipulated by the contract would contradict basic principle.
Secondly, seeking to qualify the operation of the contract as a result of information the
employer later acquires about the vulnerability of the employee to psychiatric harm
would be no less contradictory of basic principle. The obligations of the parties are fixed at
the time of the contract unless and until they are varied.
Ultimately, the decision of the High Court was based upon the fact that the plaintiff never
exhibited any unequivocal signs of injury or vulnerability to psychiatric injury. Much of
what took place in terms of her expression of grievances could properly have been
construed as an industrial relations issue or an employment dispute.
The Koehler decision has been vehemently criticised: see, eg, Geraghty, Hocking and
Muthu (2007); see also Handford (2004). However, ultimately, it gave relatively little
guidance to employers as to their obligations save that they would not be expected to
interpret what was ambiguous in terms of either injury or potential to incur injury. In its
aftermath, decisions such as that of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Hegarty v
Queensland Ambulance Service [2007] Aust Torts Reports 81-919; [2007] QCA 366 have
emphasised that employers do not have an absolute and unremitting duty of solicitude for
employees’ mental health but must look at what a reasonable employer in the particular
circumstances would have done, in light of signs of potential dysfunction in an employee,
to reduce the potential for mental harm, in the employee (see Freckelton (2008e)).
The evolving law

[10.50.340] The decisions in Howell v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (unreported,
NSW Supreme Court, Newman J, 7 May 1998) and Hind v Attorney-General (Tas)
(unreported, Tasmanian Supreme Court, Cox J, 29 September 1995) suggest that a failure
on the part of employers to provide their employees exposed to significant trauma with
adequate measures to alleviate potentially pathological symptomatology may leave them
liable in negligence (see, too, New South Wales v Seedsman (2000) 217 ALR 583; [2000]
NSWCA 119). This arises also in the context of workplace bullying (Freckelton (2008f)).
However, the decision in Pioneer Construction Material Pty Ltd v Millsom [2002] NSWCA
258 shows that this ground for civil actions may encounter significant problems when
informedly opposed by defendants on the basis that proof of the efficacy of the
intervention may not be straightforward (see, eg, the evidence given in Corporation of the
Synod of the Diocese of Brisbane v Greenway [2018] 1 Qd R 344; [2017] QCA 103 by Dr Chalk).
Ironically, it may be that some plaintiffs can sue because they have been coerced into a
modality of treatment or management which for them is counter-therapeutic.
It seems clear that employers have a legal obligation to take reasonable steps to
minimise the effects of trauma encountered by employees in the course of their
employment and to be properly alert for the development of such symptoms (see Benic v
New South Wales [2010] NSWSC 1039). What constitutes such steps remains to be clarified.
992 [10.50.340]
An unresolved question is whether, in due course, courts will prefer the cognitive-
behavioural approach argued for by Professor McFarlane in Howell v State Rail Authority
(No 2) or the evolving critical stress debriefing/management model. Calculation of
damages in due course may need to factor into consideration the degree of likelihood that
a person exposed to trauma would have contracted PTSD in spite of any efforts to the
contrary by those providing post-event counselling.
Whichever approach is taken by an employer, it is clear that the prophylactic action
will require a level of persistence in endeavouring to engage the employee above and
beyond the laconic attempts of the psychologist in Howell. However, courts are alert to the
need to avoid the imposition of unreasonable expectations upon employers in the form of
reviews of employer responsiveness to employees’ reactions to trauma through hindsight
knowledge or an unproven assumption that responsiveness would necessarily have made
a material difference to the development of the injury (see Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd
(2005) 222 CLR 44; [2005] HCA 15; Hegarty v Queensland Ambulance Service [2007] Aust
Torts Reports 81-919; [2007] QCA 366 at [95]; S v New South Wales [2008] NSWSC 933).
[10.50.340] 993
PART 11 – SOCIAL SCIENTISTS’
EVIDENCE
Chapter 11.0: Survey evidence.............................................................. 997

Chapter 11.05: Historians’ evidence.................................................. 1037
Chapter 11.10: Anthropologists’ evidence ..................................... 1045
Chapter 11.15: Cultural experts’ evidence..................................... 1057
Chapter 11.20: Linguists’ evidence .................................................... 1061
995
Chapter 11.0
SURVEY EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [11.0.01]
Admissibility of survey evidence
The issues ............................................................................................................................... [11.0.40]
Flexibility of approach .......................................................................................................... [11.0.50]
The Canadian approach ....................................................................................................... [11.0.60]
The New Zealand approach ................................................................................................ [11.0.70]
The United States approach ................................................................................................ [11.0.80]
Early Australian civil authorities on survey evidence ................................................... [11.0.120]
The use of survey evidence in criminal cases
Canada .................................................................................................................................... [11.0.160]
Australia .................................................................................................................................. [11.0.180]
Jurors ....................................................................................................................................... [11.0.200]
Assumptions or evidence? ................................................................................................... [11.0.220]
The court’s power to give directions about a proposed survey .................................. [11.0.240]
Permanent stay applications ............................................................................................... [11.0.260]
Survey evidence as a defence
The Sydney Morning Herald case ......................................................................................... [11.0.290]
Evidentiary issues in the use of surveys .......................................................................... [11.0.310]
Survey questions ................................................................................................................... [11.0.330]
Practical steps ......................................................................................................................... [11.0.350]
Later Australian civil authority permitting survey evidence
The new trend ........................................................................................................................ [11.0.390]
Further departure from the older authorities .................................................................. [11.0.410]
Continuing evolution ............................................................................................................ [11.0.430]
The leading Australian authority ....................................................................................... [11.0.450]
The pragmatic and perhaps even generous approach ................................................... [11.0.470]
A third phase ruling ............................................................................................................. [11.0.480]
Further guidance on survey methodology ....................................................................... [11.0.490]
Federal Court Practice Note ................................................................................................ [11.0.510]
The impact of the uniform Evidence Acts ........................................................................ [11.0.530]
An English note of caution .................................................................................................. [11.0.570]
Principles arising from the case law
Methodology required .......................................................................................................... [11.0.630]
‘But thought’s the slave of life, and life, time’s fool,

And time, that takes survey of all the world,
Must have a stop.’
Shakespeare, King Henry IV, Part I, Act 5, Scene 4, lines 80–82.
The author acknowledges assistance from Hugh Selby on early versions of this chapter.
Introduction
[11.0.01] This chapter addresses admissibility and methodology issues relevant to the
probative value to be accorded to expert evidence in relation to surveys.
Survey evidence is potentially relevant to a variety of forms of litigation, including:
• trade mark or passing-off infringement actions: see Lego System Aktieselskab v Lego M
Lemelstrich Ltd [1983] FSR 155; Customglass Boats Ltd v Salthouse Bros Ltd [1976] 1 NZLR
36; Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd v Harvest Bakeries Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 129; Johnson &
Johnson Australia Pty Ltd v Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (1991) 101 ALR 700; Interlego
AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1991) 102 ALR 379; Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd
(1992) 111 ALR 577;
[11.0.01] 997
Part 11 – Social scientists’ evidence
• actions for deceptive and misleading conduct (especially advertising), such as under
the former Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and its State equivalents: see TV-AM plc v
Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [1988] ATPR 40-891; Shoshana Pty Ltd v 10th
Cantanae Pty Ltd (1987) 79 ALR 279; State Government Insurance Corporation v Government
Insurance Office (NSW) (1991) 28 FCR 511; Kettle Chip Co v Apand (1993) 119 ALR 156;
• criminal offences such as offensive behaviour or obscenity, where contemporary
standards are in issue: see R v Prairie Schooner News Ltd (1970) 75 WWR 585; (1971) 1
CCC (2d) 251 at 265–267; R v Pipeline News Ltd (1971) 5 CCC (2d) 71; R v Times Square
Cinema Ltd (1971) 4 CCC (2d) 229;
• criminal actions where it is claimed that a fair trial cannot be had because of adverse
publicity: see Glennon v Director of Public Prosecutions (unreported, Victorian Supreme
Court, Crockett J, 25 July 1990); R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592 at 623; Bush v The Queen
(1993) ALR 654 at 662;
• change of venue applications in criminal trials: see, eg, United States v Eagle 586 F 2d
1193 (8th Cir 1978); R v Brunner, discussed in Vidmar and Judson (1981); see also
Corbin, Gill and Jolliffe (2000, pp 123–125);
• criminal actions for sub judice contempt where it is claimed that publicity has the real
and substantial tendency to affect the fair trial of an accused person: see Attorney
General (NSW) v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 318;
• breach of contract actions where the measure of damages is affected by public attitudes,
such as where likely public patronage of an uncompleted facility designed for public
use is in issue: Bevan Investments Ltd v Blackhall & Struthers (No 2) [1978] 2 NZLR 97;
• defamation or scandalising the court actions: see, however, R v Murphy (1969) 4 DLR
(3d) 289;
• actions to establish restrictive trade practices, such as under the former Trade Practices
Act 1974 (Cth): see Miller (2001); Farmer (1984); and
• appeals based on the contention that no reasonable tribunal could have made a certain
decision: see ULV Pty Ltd v Scott (1990) 19 NSWLR 190, where this approach might have
been tried.
Survey evidence has generated a number of admissibility, methodology and evaluation
issues. This chapter reviews those issues and identifies ways of optimising both the likely
admissibility and the probative value of such evidence.
Admissibility of survey evidence
The issues
[11.0.40] The most troubled application of the debate concerning the existence or
non-existence of a basis rule (see Ch 2.20) has been in the context of the admissibility of
expert opinion evidence in relation to surveys and market research: see Fair and
O’Laughlin (2017); Farmer (1984); Freckelton (1987); Gillies (1991); Shafron (1989);
Shanahan (1990); Freckelton (1999); Corbin, Gill and Jolliffe (2000); Tourangeau, Rips and
Rasinski (2000). Expert interpretation of surveys provides opinion evidence based upon
the assemblage of data elicited standardly from the answers to questions posed by
interviewers to members of the public or some specialist subgroup thereof.
Survey evidence is frequently used in North America in many forms of litigation: see
Fair and O’Laughlin (2017); Wetter (1998); Corbin, Gill and Jolliffe (2000). In Sun Life
Assurance Co of Canada v Sunlife Juice Ltd (1988) 22 SPR (3d) 244 at 249, MacFarland J
observed: ‘To attempt to make such a determination [about confusion in the public mind]
without regard to evidence of what others may think or have said would to my mind be
nothing more than an exercise in pure judicial fantasy and of not much assistance at all.’
In a series of cases in the United States, the absence of survey evidence has been the
subject of adverse judicial comment: see, eg, Mushroom Makers Inc v RG Barry Corp 441 F
998 [11.0.40]
Survey evidence | CH 11.0
Supp 1220 at 1231 (1977); Information Clearing House Inc v Find Magazine 492 F Supp 147 at
160 (1980); Bonny Products v Robinson Knife Manufacturing Co 14 USPQ 2d 1666 at 1667
(SDNY 1989); Brunswick Corp v Spinit Reel Co 832 F 2d 513 at 523 (10th Cir 1987); Processed
Plastic Co v Warner Bros Inc 218 USPQ 86 at 89 (ND Ill 1982); Warren Corp v Goldwert Textile
Sales Inc 581 F Supp 897 at 902 (SDNY 1984). United States litigation has highlighted that
the risk of surveys arises from how they are designed and implemented – namely, bias. As
Judge Posner of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated in Kraft Foods Group
Brands LLC v Cracker Barrel Old Country Store Inc 735 F 3d 735 (7th Cir Ill 2013): ‘Consumer
surveys conducted by party-hired witnesses are prone to bias. There is such a wide choice
of survey designs, none foolproof, involving such issues as sample selection and size,
presentation of the allegedly confusing products to the consumers involved in the survey,
and phrasing of questions in a way that is intended to elicit the surveyor’s desired
response – confusion or lack thereof – from the survey respondents.’
Comparable concerns have led to the expression of significant reservations in Australia
about the utility of market research evidence. In Cat Media Pty Ltd v Opti-Healthcare Pty Ltd
[2003] ATPR 41-933; [2003] FCA 133 at [55], Branson J said:
It seems to me that evidence of opinions based on market research and expert appreciation
of consumer behaviour will rarely be of assistance in litigation where the court’s primary
concern is with the behaviour to be expected of, and the judgments likely to be made by,
ordinary (even if it might be thought, somewhat credulous) members of the community
intent on making a relatively modest purchase in a conventional way. I endorse the
comment of Beaumont J in Pacific Publications Pty Ltd v IPC Media Pty Ltd (2003) 57 IPR 28
at [92] that where a claim is essentially a matter for the court’s impression, expert views
which are merely ‘impressionistic’ can be given no more than nominal weight.
Similarly, in Domain Names Australia Pty Ltd v .au Domain Administration Pty Ltd (2004) 139
FCR 215; [2004] FCAFC 247 at [21], the Full Court of the Federal Court observed that
‘market research evidence has not been received with enthusiasm in this Court in recent
years’: see, too, Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2007) 159
FCR 397; [2007] FCAFC 70.
Fundamental therefore to both admissibility decisions and how weight is accorded to
survey evidence is whether there has been a lack of evenhandedness in the construction of
surveys and in how their results have been interpreted, ultimately by experts. A number
of biases can intrude:
• selection biases relating to the population studied (ie did the expert seek out and ask
the right people, using statistically valid sampling techniques?);
• information-related biases relating to which questions are asked, how the questions
are asked, and what answers are offered; and
• analytical biases relating to how the data are analysed, such as the interpretation of
open-ended responses (see Fair and O’Laughlin (2014)).
Flexibility of approach
[11.0.50] The debate over the admissibility and use of survey and market research
evidence and expert opinion evidence on the basis of surveys took a practical turn in
actions making their way into the Federal Court of Australia as it has in both the United
States and Canada: see Corbin, Gill and Jolliffe (2000); Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski
(2000). The tendency has been to overturn early authority which denied the admissibility
of expert evidence about survey results because of the hearsay nature of surveys. A series
of decisions in each country has identified the relevance of well-conducted survey
material. At the federal level in Australia, the discretion existing under what was O 33, r 3
of the Federal Court Rules was consistently used to permit the evidence to be adduced:
The court may at any stage of the proceedings –
[11.0.50] 999
(a) dispense with compliance with the rules of evidence for proving any matter
which is not bona fide in dispute; or
(b) dispense with compliance with the rules of evidence where such compliance
might occasion or involve unnecessary or unreasonable expense or delay,
including, but without limiting the generality of this power, compliance with the
rules relating to proof of handwriting or of documents and the proof of the
identity of parties or of authority.
One of the most extensive justifications for this practice is that articulated by the Full
Court of the Federal Court in Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at
360ff per Lockhart, Wilcox and Gummow:
To call the persons who responded to the survey will almost always result in appreciable
expense and delay. Given the existence of a discretion, it seems more sensible to
concentrate attention upon the necessity for, and reliability of, the survey evidence, rather
than to worry about its compliance with rules regarding hearsay evidence which were
developed before this type of problem arose.
The court specifically excepted criminal cases from its decision without explanation (at
360–361):
But in a civil case in which a market survey may cast light on relevant issues, it is
desirable in principle to admit into evidence a report of a professionally conducted survey,
upon proof that it has been satisfactorily conducted using relevant and unambiguous
questions, and without requiring evidence from each of the participants.
There are two reasons for our view. In the first place, market survey techniques have
now been refined to the point where, if undertaken by experienced, professional people,
they are capable of providing answers which are highly likely to be accurate, subject only
to a small sampling error. It is commonplace for polls to predict the results of elections
within a couple of percentage points. Political parties and commercial organisations
constantly use market research to ascertain public reactions upon a wide range of matters;
and there is no reason to doubt that, by and large, they find the results reliable. As Hill J
observed in Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Johnson and Johnson Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 96
ALR 277, ‘… statistical analysis can confirm that to a specified degree of probability and
subject to a specified error rate, the result can be projected to the whole or a defined sector
of the population’.
(See also Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Johnson & Johnson Pty Ltd (1990) 96 ALR 277 at
293 per Hill J.)
Presumably, the exception of criminal cases arises from the consideration that
particular care with admission of evidence needs to be taken when jury members are
present, as they may not be able to dismiss from their minds as effectively as a judge or
magistrate expert opinions which do not proceed from bases that are adequately proved
by evidence.
The second reason enunciated by the Full Court was that the alternative methods of
proving consumers’ habits and attitudes were unacceptable. The court dismissed the
option of calling those of the survey’s interviewees who were contactable, recognising the
disadvantage that it would provide a ‘fairly selected group of witnesses’, but noting that it
would add ‘enormously’ to the cost and duration of the trial. The court noted the
alternative pursued in Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158, where
the plaintiff called 152 members of the public, as it turned out, in a most partisan manner.
(Unfortunately, in that case it appeared that those asked to give evidence tended to be
those who had given answers favourable to the plaintiff’s case. The result of this was that
the evidence was regarded as of negligible value. As McLelland J noted (at 215), there was
‘no ground in the evidence for any extrapolation on a statistical basis, or on the basis of
any mathematical or logical probability, of the views of the “public” witnesses (or any
selection from them) as representing the views of the relevant class of the Australian
public or a significant section of that class’.)
1000 [11.0.50]
A final possibility canvassed and dismissed by the court was the option of receiving no
evidence about such matters: ‘But information is preferable to intuition’: at 362. (Compare
Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada v Sunlife Juice Ltd (1988) 22 SPR (3d) 244 at 249.)
However, this leaves unanswered the threshold evidentiary question of whether expert
opinions interpreting the results of interviews conducted by interviewers other than the
expert witness are admissible evidence.
The Canadian approach

[11.0.60] Leading Canadian cases have found the survey material either not to constitute
hearsay or to fall within an exception to the hearsay rule: R v Prairie Schooner News Ltd
(1970) 75 WWR 585; (1971) 1 CCC (2d) 251; R v Pipeline News (1972) 1 WWR 241; Canadian
Schenley Distillers Ltd v Canada’s Manitoba Ltd (1975) 25 CPR (2d) 1; Aluminium Goods Ltd v
Registrar of Trademarks (1954) 19 CPR 93; St John, City of v Irving Oil Co Ltd [1966] SCR 581;
58 DLR (2d) 404; National Hockey League v Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd (1992) 92 DLR (4th) 349,
overturning the approach best expressed in Building Products Ltd v BP Canada Ltd (1961) 36
CPR 121. The Canadian law is accurately summarised in Labatt Brewing Co v Molson
Breweries (1996) 73 CPR (3d) 544 at 550: ‘Survey evidence or public opinion polling … is
admissible when approved statistical methods, social research techniques and interview
procedures are employed.’
The New Zealand approach

[11.0.70] In New Zealand as long ago as 1976, Mahon J rejected the contention that survey
evidence was hearsay and accepted that it constituted ‘proof of the fact that opinions
reflected by the survey do exist, this being something quite different from the issue or
otherwise of the opinions which were offered’: Customglass Boats Ltd v Salthouse Bros Ltd
[1976] 1 NZLR 36 at 39; see also ARA v Mutual Rental Cars [1987] 2 NZLR 647; Penfolds
Wines (NZ) Ltd v Pacific Vineyards Ltd (unreported, New Zealand Supreme Court, Barker J,
3 August 1979); Bevan Investments Ltd v Blackhall & Struthers (No 2) [1978] 2 NZLR 97 at
124; Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries Ltd v Harvest Bakeries Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 129 at 133.
The United States approach

[11.0.80] The problems experienced in Australian, New Zealand and Canadian courts in
relation to survey evidence were also encountered in the United States, where the early
approach of the courts in response to survey material adduced in passing-off and trade
mark cases was to disallow it on the ground that it was hearsay: see, eg, Elgin National
Watch Co v Elgin Clock Co 26 F 2d 376 at 377 (1928). However, by the 1950s, a number of
cases had reversed the trend. In the leading decision of United States v 88 Cases, More or
Less 187 F 2d 967 (1951) (the Orange Beverage Case), the United States Government sought
to introduce survey evidence assembled from 3,539 interviewees, who were asked their
opinions about what was contained in a brand of orange juice. The court acknowledged
(at 974):
Many objections were made to the manner in which the surveys were taken. The principal
contention however, was that the surveys were hearsay and therefore inadmissible. The
hearsay objection is unfounded. For the statements of the persons interviewed were not
offered for the truthfulness of their assertions as to the composition of the beverage. …
They were offered solely to show as a fact the reaction of ordinary householders and
others of the public generally when shown a bottle of Brieley’s Orange Beverage. Only the
credibility of those who took the statements was involved, and they were before the court.
(Survey evidence had been admitted on the reasoning of the Orange Beverage Case in
Standard Oil Co v Standard Oil Co 252 F 2d 65 at 75 (1958); Household Finance Corp v Federal
[11.0.80] 1001
Finance Corp F Supp 164 at 166 (DC D Ariz 1952). See also Girl Scouts (USA) v Hollingsworth
188 F Supp 707 (DC ED NY 1910); Arrow Metal Products Corp v Federal Trade Commission 249
F 2d 83 at 84 (1957).)
Survey evidence came to be admitted either on the basis that the testimony of the
researcher contained no hearsay (United States v 88 Cases, More or Less 187 F 2d 967 (1951))
or on the basis that the testimony fell within the hearsay exception for utterances of a third
person which showed his or her state of mind: Marcalus Manufacturing Co v Watson 156 F
Supp 161 at 164 (1957). By 1963, the admissibility of survey evidence was unequivocal in
principle: the weight of case authority, the consensus of legal writers, and reasoned policy
considerations all indicate that the hearsay rule should bar the admission of properly
conducted public surveys. Although courts were at first reluctant to accept survey
evidence or to give it weight, the more recent trend is clearly contrary: Zippo
Manufacturing Co v Rogers Imports Inc 216 F Supp 670 at 682 (1963 D Ct SDNY).
The major practical difficulty encountered in the employment of survey evidence
material and opinion evidence for interpreting primary data was obtaining survey
evidence of a sufficiently high value: see Keller (1992). Thus, in Commonwealth v Trainor 374
Mass 796; 374 NE 2d 1216 (1978), survey evidence in an obscenity case was held
admissible in principle ‘if it tends to show relevant standards’, but the trial judge was
entitled to exclude the evidence if the selection process for interviewees could not be
shown to be free of bias.
The Federal Rules of Evidence 1975 (US) largely codified the pre-existing situation, with
r 703 amended to provide:
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made
aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on
those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be
admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be
inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their
probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect.
Potentially, therefore, the results of survey evidence can be incorporated in an expert’s

opinion evidence if the results are of a type reasonably relied upon by an expert in his or
her particular field – such as interpretation of market research data. In order for opinion
evidence to be admitted, the expert must merely show that the techniques employed lead
to reliable results upon which an expert would fairly be entitled to rely. The survey itself
can be admitted under a hearsay exception (r 803(3)) relating to ‘a statement of the
declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation or physical condition’ (such as
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain and bodily health, but not including a
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to
the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of a testator’s will). The result has been
that survey evidence has been admitted in motions for change of venue (United States v
Eagle 586 F 2d 1193 (8th Cir 1978)); to show consumer perceptions in trade mark and
misleading advertising cases (American Footwear Corp v General Footwear Co 609 F 2d 655 at
663 (2d Cir 1979); Squirt Co v Seven-Up Co 628 F 2d 1086 (8th Cir 1980); Anti-Monopoly v
General Mills Fun Group 684 F 2d 1316 (9th Cir 1982)); as evidence of community standards
in obscenity cases (People v Nelson 410 NE 2d 476 (1980); Carlock v State 609 SW 2d 787
(1981)); and for a variety of other purposes: McCormick on Evidence (1984, p 642, n 9).
By 1990, according to Sugarman and Small (1990, p 54, citing Evans and Gunn (1989,
pp 1, 2 and n 5)):
[A] scientifically conducted consumer survey is the most probative evidence available on
the issue of the likelihood of confusion [in trade mark cases; see Universal City Studios Inc
v Nintendo 746 F 2d 357 (2d Cir 1984); Mattell Inc v Azrak-Hamway International Inc 724 F 2d
357 (2d Cir 1983)]. Indeed, after a period in which judges expressed great scepticism about
1002 [11.0.80]
the reliability of survey evidence, surveys have become such an accepted part of major
trademark infringement litigations that courts have occasionally penalized a well-financed
party for failing to present survey evidence.
(See, generally, Federal Judicial Center (1985).)

However, in determining admissibility or whether an exclusionary discretion should
be exercised, United States courts look carefully at ‘whether the conclusions of the survey
researchers rest on sample data collected in such a way as to permit fair inferences about
the relevant factual questions’: McCormick (1984, p 643). (In this regard, McCormick (1984,
pp 644–645) usefully notes the difference between ‘probability sampling’ and ‘convenience
and quota sampling’, and comments that in many recent cases courts have employed
sophisticated statistical reasoning to evaluate the quantitative evidence before them: p 648,
citing Moultrie v Martin 690 F 2d 1078 at 1082–1083 (4th Cir 1982).)
Early Australian civil authorities on survey evidence

[11.0.120] In the early Australian cases (Hoban’s Glynde Pty Ltd v Firle Hotel Pty Ltd (1973) 4
SASR 503; McDonald’s System (Aust) Pty Ltd v McWilliam’s Wines Pty Ltd (No 2) (1979) 41
FLR 436; Mobil Oil Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks [1984] VR 25), the preponderant
view was that no exception to the hearsay rule existed to render responses of persons
interviewed in the course of a public survey admissible as evidence of their current state
of mind.
Hoban's Glynde Pty Ltd v Firle Hotel Pty Ltd

In Hoban’s Glynde Pty Ltd v Firle Hotel Pty Ltd (1973) 4 SASR 503, Bray CJ found survey
evidence not only to be hearsay, but doubly, perhaps even triply, hearsay, and thus
inadmissible. Two witnesses who had conducted extensive surveys were called. The first,
the governing director of a survey company, had carried out two surveys by ‘random
sampling’. He had defined an area on the map, and ‘so-called starting addresses’ were
fixed by taking the address of every 700th person on the electoral roll for the area. Three
interviewers were engaged. On the first survey, some 400 interviews were conducted, with
each interviewer speaking to 20 persons living in dwellings contiguous to each starting
point. Two hundred and sixty-eight men and 132 women were interviewed.
The second survey was conducted on the same principles and, again, 400 interviews
were conducted. On each occasion, the following questions were asked after certain
introductory statements were made explaining the locality of the proposed site for a hotel:
• Are you in favour of the hotel there?
• Would you go to the hotel?
• Would you go to it: (a) for meals? (b) for bottle supplies? (c) for social drinking?
The other interviewer called as a witness was a public relations consultant. He conducted
a survey at the local Kmart shopping centre, engaging eight interviewers who asked a
series of questions of persons entering the shopping centre:
• Do you regularly shop at this shopping centre?
• Would you use a hotel on the site indicated?
• If so, would you go to the hotel for: (a) social drinking? (b) drive-in bottle supplies? (c)
browsing in the bottle department? (d) meals?
• Has anyone spoken to you opposing the hotel?
Bray CJ commented (at 509) that surveys, petitions and the like were not the only way ‘or
even the most natural way of proving need’. He suggested that this could be proved in
many ways, including the calling of evidence from people in the relevant area and the lack
of other suitable facilities in the vicinity.
[11.0.120] 1003
McDonald's System (Aust) Pty Ltd v McWilliam's Wines Pty Ltd (No 2)
In McDonald’s System (Aust) Pty Ltd v McWilliam’s Wines Pty Ltd (No 2) (1979) 41 FLR 436,
at an interlocutory hearing, McDonald’s adduced evidence of a survey conducted by a
market research consultant. However, the ‘survey’ consisted only of two questions:
• What does a McWilliam’s Big Mac mean to you?
• Where would you expect to buy a McWilliam’s Big Mac?
Forty-seven completed questionnaires were tendered but they failed to impress Franki J
(at 455):
Looking at the documents tendered before me I think they are an analysis of pieces of
hearsay evidence and that there is no existing exception to the rule against hearsay under
which they could be admitted. In addition I do not think I have the power, nor that I
ought, to attempt to extend the exceptions to the hearsay rule in this case.
His Honour (at 455) specifically addressed his mind to the argument that statements of
contemporaneous opinion made by persons not called as witnesses can be admitted on the
basis that they are not hearsay, as contended by the learned editors of Phipson on Evidence
(1976, para 215):
I have some considerable doubt whether this statement of the law, if it be a correct
statement of the law, is applicable to the case where it is sought to collect opinions from a
number of persons by interviewers asking questions of those people. However, even
assuming that such statements are admissible, I am not asked to admit them but in
substance to admit the conclusions of interviewers about what was said by interviewees,
and the precise document under consideration is one purporting to set out an analysis of
the conclusions of the interviewers.
His Honour refused to permit the survey to be admitted into evidence under the
discretion accorded him under the Federal Court Rules, O 33, r 3, but qualified his ruling (at
457):
This ruling is not intended to be taken as one necessarily applicable to all types of what
might broadly be called market surveys, and it may very well be that in an appropriate
case in the future some form of market survey could be worked out at a directions
hearing, or shortly thereafter, which would permit some improvement on the traditional
way cases are conducted in Australia where the type of fact now sought to be proved is
involved.
Mobil Oil Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks
In Mobil Oil Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks [1984] VR 25, King J had placed before
him an affidavit relating to a survey of the impressions of members of the public about the
word ‘Mobil’. It had been conducted by the Morgan Research Centre and comprised a
range of questions administered to members of the public. The interviewer asked each
interviewee a sheet of questions and recorded each answer as it was given. The
interviewees were chosen so as to furnish a fair cross-section of public opinion and the
interviewers were trained and carefully briefed beforehand. The records of answers were
analysed by computer to ascertain the percentages of the interviewees’ responses.
Immediately after the survey, at least 20% of the people interviewed in each one of the
1,760 zones into which Australia was divided for the purposes of the survey were
contacted to confirm the accuracy of the survey results. However, the interviewees were
not made available to the court.
Reliance was placed by counsel seeking admission of the survey material on the
decision of Mahon J in Customglass Boats Ltd v Salthouse Bros Ltd [1976] 1 NZLR 36, in
which his Honour had decided there was no error in the admission of expert market
survey evidence, either as proving a public state of mind on a specific question, which in
his view was an acknowledged exception to the hearsay rule, or as proving an external
fact, namely that a designated opinion was held by the public or a class of the public, this
in his view not being a matter of hearsay.
1004 [11.0.120]
King J refused to follow the decision of Mahon J, holding that all that such evidence
could prove was that certain opinions were expressed by the person interviewed, not that
the opinions were genuinely held or how they were arrived at. Without the interviewees
being made available for cross-examination, King J indicated that he would not accept the
kind of survey results that came before Mahon J. His Honour approached the issues in
Mobil Oil Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks [1984] VR 25 at 28–29 in this way:
The technique of confronting [the interviewees] with a bare word and asking them to
describe their immediate reaction may be thought to make this case analogous with those
where a person engaged in trade describes the spontaneous or unconsidered statements of
customers. I think that any such comparison is illusory. … The answers … are not
spontaneous responses by members of the public to actual real life situations, but are in
essence expressions of opinion, to which relevant meaning cannot be given unless the
interviewees are cross-examined about them.
His Honour noted the view of Mahon J that survey evidence is not now in practice treated
as hearsay in trade mark cases in the United States, but declined to accept it.
The use of survey evidence in criminal cases
Canada
[11.0.160] A number of Canadian criminal cases in the 1970s hesitantly permitted survey
evidence in principle. In R v Prairie Schooner News Ltd (1970) 75 WWR 585; (1971) 1 CCC
(2d) 251 at 265–267, for example, the approach of the Australian High Court in Transport
Publishing Co Pty Ltd v Literature Board of Review (1956) 99 CLR 111 at 119 in rejecting
evidence of community standards (see above, [2.15.400]) was expressly rejected:
[I]t would seem to me that when it becomes necessary to determine the true nature of
community opinion and to find a single normative standard, the court should not be
denied the benefit of evidence, scientifically obtained in accordance with accepted
sampling procedure, by those who are expert in the field of opinion research. Such
evidence can properly be accorded the status of expert testimony. The state of mind or
attitude of a community is as much a fact as the state of one’s health; it would seem
therefore as proper to admit the opinion of experts on the one subject as on the other. A
word of warning. The findings of a poll can be deceptively simple and frequently
misleading.
It was further commented that if a survey is intended simply as a non-scientific amalgam

of the views of a small number of unidentified people, it will fall foul of the rule against
hearsay. The court held that expert evidence describing the standards of a community is
not only admissible, but desirable.
A similar approach was adopted in R v Times Square Cinema Ltd (1971) 4 CCC (2d) 229
and R v Pipeline News Ltd (1971) 5 CCC (2d) 71, but problems with survey methodology
were stressed and an attempt was made to circumscribe the admissibility of survey
evidence by linking it to appropriate standards in survey procedure.
Australia
[11.0.180] Well-structured and well-conducted surveys of potential jurors may assist
criminal trial courts to ensure a fair trial in those exceptional cases where the offence
and/or the accused are notoriously well known to the community. The issue is likely to
arise when a temporary or permanent stay of proceedings is sought on the basis that
previous publicity entails that a fair trial cannot be held.
As a related issue, the media have already attempted to use surveys to demonstrate
that their publicity has not created prejudice to a fair trial and that they have not
committed a contempt of court: see, eg, Attorney General (NSW) v John Fairfax Publications
Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 318.
[11.0.180] 1005
‘The central prescript of the criminal law’ is that no person shall be convicted
otherwise than after a fair trial: R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592 at 623. In criminal trials,
this entails a clearly recognised general and overriding duty on the part of the trial judge
to ensure a fair trial to the accused: see Jago v District Court of NSW (1989) 168 CLR 23. The
amount, the nature and the content of pre-trial attention to a matter may lead to a
fundamental defect so that a hearing could be an abuse of process: Glennon at 623. In the
Glennon case, the High Court found, despite the adverse publicity, that a fair trial could be
held. However, in related proceedings, in which a well-known radio and television
presenter was dealt with for his contempt of court in publicising both background and
allegations about the accused Glennon, Murphy J of the Victorian Supreme Court had
commented: ‘The poisonous effect of the [broadcast] message would be very likely to
remain ready to be re-livened or re-awakened when evidence at his trial is led. Only one
juror would need to recall some part of the detail of his [Glennon’s] prior offences, or
alleged offences, for his fair trial to be likely to be prejudiced’ (cited by Crockett J in
Glennon v Director of Public Prosecutions (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, Crockett J,
25 July 1990)). A solution to the very real possibility identified by Murphy J is to use
properly designed surveys: first, to identify those members of the jury panel whose
prejudgment militates against a dispassionate approach to the evidence; second, to assist
the trial judge to fashion tailored instructions for those who take the juror’s oath.
Such an approach recognises that the courts must and will balance the interests of an
accused against public interests whenever an application for a stay, be it temporary or
permanent, is sought. In Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75 at 111, Wilson J put the test
in simple terms: ‘to justify a permanent stay … there must be a fundamental defect which
goes to the root of the trial of such a nature that nothing that a trial judge can do in the
conduct of the trial can relieve against its unfair consequences’. Just what the trial judge
can do was addressed by Brennan J in Jago v District Court of NSW (1989) 168 CLR 23 at 47:
‘[T]he responsibility is discharged by controlling the procedures of the trial by
adjournments or other interlocutory orders, by rulings on evidence and, especially, by
directions to the jury designed to counteract any prejudice which the accused might
otherwise suffer.’
All recent Australian publicised attempts to use surveys before a jury is empanelled
sought to achieve either a permanent or short-term stay of proceedings. The applications
by the accused Bush in the Australian Capital Territory (R v Bush (unreported, ACT
Supreme Court, No SCC of 1992)), Connell in Western Australia (R v Connell (No 3) (1993)
8 WAR 542), and Glennon in Victoria (Glennon v Director of Public Prosecutions (unreported,
Victorian Supreme Court, Crockett J, 25 July 1990)) were unsuccessful. We now refer to the
detailed reasons given in the decisions to refuse those applications for a stay, especially
noting the shortcomings in the surveys, the ambit of the argument within which the
surveys played a part, and the manner in which the various trial judges intended to deal
with any perception of jury prejudgment of the case.
Bush was charged with the murder of his estranged second wife’s lover and with the
attempted murder of his second wife. This was not the first occasion when he had been
accused of murder. Some years earlier, he was charged with the murder of his first wife
and was convicted of manslaughter. The events of the first killing and the trial had
received extensive publicity at that time. The defence team was naturally concerned that,
since all the events had occurred in the same community, there was a likelihood that one
or more jurors would have recollections of the first killing. Such recollections could act to
convince the jurors, regardless of the present evidence, that the first event indicated a clear
propensity to do it again. There being no provisions for change of venue, the defence
sought a stay. Their application was unsuccessful. Bush was convicted at the trial and his
appeal was dismissed: Bush v The Queen (1993) 115 ALR 654.
1006 [11.0.180]
Connell and others were charged, amongst other things, with conspiring to defraud the
public by deceitfully concealing and falsely portraying the true financial position of
Rothwells Ltd so as to induce persons to have business dealings with Rothwells Ltd. There
were related charges alleging the publishing of financial statements known to be incorrect.
The rise and fall of Rothwells Ltd, a merchant bank, and its directors was a steady source
for media stories, comment and analysis not only in Connell’s town and State, but also
across the nation. His counsel applied for a permanent stay, and in the alternative for a
temporary stay. These applications were unsuccessful.
Glennon was charged, amongst other things, with various counts of indecent assault
upon adolescent males, including one count of buggery. His counsel sought a permanent
stay because of the inordinate delay between the alleged commission of the offences and
the trial and because of the prejudice flowing from certain media comment upon the case.
That media comment drew attention to Glennon’s earlier conviction for the same kind of
offence. The application for a stay failed. Glennon was convicted.
It would be unfortunate if the reasoning in these cases discouraged any further
pre-trial applications to make proper use of surveys. Following the High Court’s decision
in R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592, the focus of an application to conduct a survey should
usually shift from seeking a stay. Instead, the focus should be upon settling the procedure
to be followed by the court in ascertaining perceptions among potential jurors and in the
procedure followed by the trial judge to question juror panels and give directions about
the functions and duties of jurors.
Jurors
[11.0.200] Are 12 jurors subjected to pre-trial publicity capable of giving effect to the
presumption of innocence? Doubts about that capacity are sometimes the reason for
changing the venue of a trial; however, in these days of instant telecommunications across
the length and breadth of countries, mere distance does nothing to establish that there is a
jury of 12 open minds.
Traditionally, trial judges have been content to rely upon the good sense of jurors, the
passage of time since the crime occurred, and the assumed regard that each and all of the
jurors will have to the instructions given to them by the trial judge as to the jury’s task and
how it is to be performed. This reliance is grounded in bare assertions of the efficacy of
institutions, as we have no data in this country based upon what jurors have actually done
or why they have done it: see Freckelton (1994).
The legal history of the Glennon case as it made its way up to the High Court illustrates
the difficulties facing our legal system when well-established notions of fairness are
assaulted by the pervasiveness, the intrusion and the alleged opinion-forming capacity of
our mass communications. Did the judgments of the High Court in R v Glennon (1992) 173
CLR 592 go far enough in assisting trial judges to know what steps in notorious cases
would be sufficient to ensure a fair trial? Is there any sense in which the High Court was
too uncritical of the assumed integrity of trial by jury and the effect on the jury of the
instructions given by the trial judge?
Ultimately, both Mason CJ and Toohey J observed in R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592 at
603:
The possibility that a juror may acquire irrelevant and prejudicial information is inherent
in a criminal trial. The law acknowledges the existence of that possibility but proceeds on
the footing that the jury, acting in conformity with the instructions given to them by the
trial judge, will render a true verdict in accordance with the evidence … [I]n the past too
little weight may have been given to the capacity of jurors to assess critically what they
see and hear and their ability to reach their decisions by reference to the evidence before
them.
[11.0.200] 1007
Their Honours then quoted from their own earlier judgment in Murphy v The Queen (1989)
167 CLR 94 at 99 that ‘[p]rior information about a case, and even the holding of a tentative
opinion about it, does not make partial a juror sworn to render a true verdict’ (at 603).
Whether or not those ‘tentative opinions’ are checked by the combined force of taking
an oath and hearing the trial judge’s carefully worded instructions is a matter that lawyers
cannot determine unassisted by psychological data. Likewise, it is a brave step to be
confident that after some finite passage of time there is sufficient fading of public memory
to feel confident that the 12 jurors are indeed free of strong opinions one way or the other.
Nevertheless, in Glennon v Director of Public Prosecutions (unreported, Victorian Supreme
Court, Crockett J, 25 July 1990), Crockett J thought that the passing of some three years in
that case was ‘a very substantial time’. His Honour noted that the references in the media
during the three years were quite negligible and that without more he should conclude
that the matter had in the community consciousness died a natural death. Nevertheless,
he noted the possibility that among potential jurors there might be some who continued to
retain a clear recollection of some broadcast material.
Those judicial opinions are normative sentiments. To ensure a fair trial and full force
and effect for the presumption of innocence, it may be necessary to survey the nature and
strength of those tentative opinions. The findings of the survey could be used to disqualify
some potential jurors and to assist the trial judge in the formulation of instructions to the
jury which are carefully crafted to neutralise those ‘tentative’ opinions. After all, in recent
years, the law as to bias has become much clearer: see, eg, Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR
568 and Laws v ABT (1990) 64 ALJR 412. Where judicial officers or members of tribunals
have participated in prior related proceedings, made comments about parties or witnesses,
or acted so as to rely upon matters which are not formally before them, then an informed
bystander may have a reasonable apprehension of bias sufficient to require that the
decision-maker stand aside. If we demand such impartiality from our judges, then how
could the test be any less for our jurors? What may be reasonably apprehended as a bias
on the part of a judicial officer or members of a tribunal must equally be capable of such
apprehension if it exists among one or more of the prospective lay triers of fact. The
difference, in the absence of a survey, is that neither the parties nor the trial judge know
what prejudgment as to facts or issues exists among the potential jurors.
By comparison, there are many United States analyses of jury selection and
performance. A most illuminating example is Steven Brill, Trial by Jury (1989), a collection
of investigative legal reporting of a number of famous or infamous American trials of
recent years. See, for example, his analysis of United States v DeLorean: Brill (1989,
pp 201–265). Following the trial, at which DeLorean was acquitted, Brill interviewed 11 of
the 12 jurors (and three of the four alternates), most more than once. He also conducted a
three-hour group interview with eight of this group. All those interviewed, reports Brill,
knew about the case before the trial. Twelve of the 14 interviewed said that before the trial
they assumed DeLorean was guilty: Brill (1989, p 231).
Brill drew some interesting conclusions. First, the jurors agreed on the not guilty
verdict but not on the reasons for it. Second, the generally accepted speculation that
pre-trial publicity spoils things for the accused got no support in this case. Third, nearly
everyone on this jury said that he or she came out of it thinking much less of the media:
Brill (1989, p 262).
Assumptions or evidence?
[11.0.220] In the absence of a survey, the capacities of the prosecution, the defence, and the
court to elicit highly relevant information about potential jurors are very limited. The
various Jury Acts in each State and Territory allow for peremptory challenges (no reason
need be given) and for challenges for cause. It is usual for each party to be able to make a
1008 [11.0.220]
set number of peremptory challenges, with a higher number allowed where the charge is
murder. Challenge for cause requires that some definite reason for the challenge is given.
Such a challenge may be to individual jurors or to the panel as a body. There is no limit to
the number of such challenges; however, the law is clear that the person issuing the
challenge must lay a foundation of fact to support the challenge before any right to
cross-examine arises: R v Chandler (1964) 48 Cr App R 143 at 154.
As it was put some centuries ago, ‘the prisoner must prove it by witnesses, not out of
the mouth of the juryman’: see, for the history, R v Manson [1974] Qd R 191 at 198–200. In
R v Stuart [1974] Qd R 297, an unsuccessful attempt was made to use newspaper articles
as the basis of a foundation upon which prospective jurors could be challenged for cause.
As usually nothing is known about the jury panel by the parties, it can be mere luck, such
as overhearing a chance remark by a juror outside the court, that leads to knowledge
which may found a successful challenge for cause. (For a ‘wholly exceptional’ departure
from this rule, see R v Kray (1969) 53 Crim App R 412.)
In Murdoch v The Queen (1987) 37 A Crim R 118, it was argued on appeal that the trial
judge had erred by refusing to permit counsel to challenge for cause. Counsel had made
the application at the trial on the basis that the proposed juror would not be impartial. The
New South Wales Court of Appeal observed (at 126):
It is not appropriate for this jurisdiction to adopt the practice followed in some other
countries of permitting in effect a fishing expedition with each prospective juror. There
must be a sound basis made out on a prima facie footing to anticipate the probability or
[sic] prejudice on the part of an individual juror
See also the High Court decision in Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94 at 102–104, in
which the actions of the trial judge and the Court of Criminal Appeal in Murdoch were
generally endorsed.
At common law, the only ground for allowing a challenge to the entire panel is the
indifference or default of the officer responsible for summoning the jury: O’Connell v The
Queen (1844) 1 Cox CC 413 at 478–479. See also R v Grant and Lovett [1972] VR 423. This
common law ground is repeated in some Jury Acts.
Quite apart from challenges by the prosecution or defence, the trial judge has power of
his or her own motion to direct the removal from the panel of a juror who for any reason
is considered unlikely to be impartial. R v Rawcliffe [1977] 1 NSWLR 219 (at 221–223 per
Street CJ, at 227–228 per Taylor J and at 246–247 per Lee J) was an appeal which, among
other grounds, raised the correctness of the trial judge’s direction to two jurors to stand
aside because, though ‘respectably dressed with long sleeved shirts and ties, [they were]
without coats’ (at 221). The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal politely indicated
that, even in 1977, the trial judge had overstepped the mark. The power is confirmed in
earlier decisions, such as that of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Greening [1957]
NZLR 906 at 914–917 and the Full Court of the Victorian Supreme Court in R v Cullen
[1951] VR 335. It is this power which is critical to the proper development of the use of
survey evidence before criminal trials.
A properly designed and administered survey has the potential to assist the trial judge
in making the following important determinations:
(1) Is the strength of prejudice and prejudgment about a case such that a trial can or
cannot be held in the immediate future? If it seems that it cannot, there should be
the ability to conduct another comparable survey several months later so as to
measure any changed responses.
(2) If it is apparent that a trial can be held soon, or should not be delayed any longer,
then in the light of the survey results what specific questions should be put by the
trial judge to those called for jury duty so as to weed out those whose prejudices
or prejudgment entail that the presumption of innocence has no life? In a few
[11.0.220] 1009
cases, it will not be sufficient for a trial judge merely to ask prospective jurors if
any of them know reason why they should not serve. Rather, the judge must be
prepared to put specific questions to them. The argument for this being necessary
is made stronger by the inherent inability of counsel in our system to make
effective use of the right to challenge for cause.
(3) Both in opening remarks and in the charge to the jury, the trial judge can make
comments which reflect the knowledge gained from the survey. Hence what is
said is not mere generality but focused upon the task of ensuring a fair trial in
uncommon circumstances.
The court's power to give directions about a proposed survey

[11.0.240] Where it is proposed by either or both parties that there be a survey of the
potential juror population, it will be a useful and efficient use of time and funds for the
trial judge to be involved from the start. For example, in R v Connell (No 3) (1993) 8 WAR
542, the written material exhibited to the various affidavits filled 48 volumes, the radio
material was contained in 120 audiotapes, and the television material in 150 videotapes (at
545). Presumably, it took the trial judge a lot of time to study all that material. Was it really
necessary? Could much of that time and expense have been avoided?
Arguably, both the party seeking a survey and the court will be better off if that party
first approaches the court for directions on the commissioning of a pilot survey sufficient
to demonstrate that the content and extent of preconceived views among potential jurors
is significant enough to warrant the court’s endorsement of a broader survey.
In proposing that a trial judge oversee a survey proposed by one or both parties and
then make use of survey evidence to ensure a fair trial, there is no fundamental attack
upon the jury system, but rather an invitation to make use of longstanding principles. A
number of early cases suggest that the English courts were once of the opinion that they
had a special power to appoint their own expert witnesses. (See the discussion by
Freckelton (1987, pp 206ff) and see especially footnotes 21–24 at p 208. See also this work,
Ch 6.0, especially [6.0.120].)
A proposed use of a pilot or final survey may lead a trial judge to want to call an
independent witness or to ask many questions of a witness called by either party. For
example, a judge may agree that extra precautions, such as a survey, are necessary in the
interests of justice. But the same trial judge may have misgivings about the structure of the
proposed survey, its administration, and who is to analyse it. Usually, it might be claimed
that the adversarial process entails that the other party will test any proffered evidence –
but this is not always so. Indeed, the three case examples in this discussion illustrate the
lack of appropriate expertise in survey design and administration. Faced with doubts
about the efficacy of a proposed survey, a judge may choose to exclude any survey when
the better course would be to call an expert and ensure that any survey is done properly.
In New South Wales, the decision of Street CJ in R v Damic [1982] 2 NSWLR 750 at
754–763 is of significance. A judge presiding at a criminal trial has power of his or her own
motion (ex moro motu) and regardless of the attitude of the parties to call a witness where
the interests of justice make that course necessary. Further, the judge may either elicit
evidence-in-chief himself or herself or invite (but not require) one or other of the parties to
assist by eliciting the evidence-in-chief. Both parties should be afforded the unrestricted
right of cross-examination subject to an exception which is not relevant here. Subsequently,
the High Court in R v Apostilides (1984) 53 ALR 445 at 455 endorsed the possibility of a
trial judge calling a person to give evidence, but only where ‘the most exceptional
circumstances’ warranted such a course.
Where a survey is proposed, it is appropriate for the trial judge to take an active part in
ensuring that a survey really will appropriately test perceptions and provide useful
information to the court about juror attitudes. That intervention may be limited to more
1010 [11.0.240]
than usual judicial questioning of a witness, or it may extend to the court calling an expert
to assist it. Such intervention reflects that appropriate surveys will better equip the court
for jury selection and jury instructions and so enhance the pursuit of demonstrable
fairness.
Permanent stay applications

[11.0.260] In February 1993, Seaman J of the Western Australian Supreme Court ruled
upon an application by Lawrence Robert Connell and others for a permanent stay of
indictment on the basis of adverse media publicity, extensive both in duration and
amount: R v Connell (No 3) (1993) 8 WAR 542. His Honour’s analysis of the material and
the issues arising is very helpful to any further debate about and development of the use
of surveys before a trial. (Note: A detailed analysis was prepared and annexed to the
reasons for the decision. However, publication was prohibited except by leave of the
judge. The following points are drawn from the public summary of reasons.)
The relevant period began with the appointment of provisional liquidators in early
November 1988 to Rothwells Ltd, a public company, of which Connell was a director. His
Honour was asked to consider events from then until November 1992, a span of four
years. For presentation and analysis, this was broken up into 42 periods, identified not by
duration but by relevant events.
Over the period, there were ‘considerable fluctuations in the volume and nature of
prejudicial material published’ about Connell. Over the space of 13 months, there was
‘fairly constant publicity pointing in part to [Connell’s] general bad character and
dishonesty, and in part to his participation in a conspiracy to defraud the public’. Then
there was dramatic publicity given to his arrest. Headlines accused him of deceit and the
final 11 months were ‘a time of intermittent but extremely dramatic prejudicial publicity’.
‘Images of Connell were freely used and cartoons have been particularly prejudicial to
him’: at 547–549.
His Honour accepted Connell’s written submission (at 549) that the publicity had
shown him as:
(a) a person who dishonestly obtained enormous financial benefits from Rothwells;
(b) a person who has committed criminal offences and is obtaining such benefits;
(c) a person who has caused or contributed to the present depressed economic
circumstances of the State [of Western Australia] by reason of his involvement in
‘WA Inc’ and his ‘dealings’ with the State Government and by reason of the
assertion that the State and people of Western Australia lost vast sums of money
because of that involvement and those details;
(d) a person who has maintained an extravagant personal lifestyle notwithstanding
the financial harm he has caused; and
(e) a dishonest person who should not be believed.
His Honour also accepted an analysis by Professor Durkin, a social psychologist, that the
media material depicted Connell during the four years as ‘rich, corrupt, manipulative,
greedy, deceptive, conspiratorial, indifferent to the suffering he has caused others and
carefully protecting his own interests while all around him collapses’ (at 549).
Having reached those conclusions, Seaman J then went on to consider what issues
arose as a result. He found that ‘at the moment most potential jurors will know Connell
and his connection with Rothwells and have a broad impression, without detailed
recollection of the media sources by which it has been generated, that his dishonesty
caused its failure and that he is a crook anyway’ (at 557). He continued: ‘The question is
whether such a present disposition against Connell as to his guilt on these charges and as
[11.0.260] 1011
to his credibility is likely to persist after inquiries at empanelment and directions in the
trial, and after the jury have been exposed to admissible evidence over a long period’ (at
557).
We do not know the answers to those questions posed by Seaman J. In the absence of
substantial studies of juries, such as have never been permitted in Australia, we cannot
know. Meanwhile, the best course is to tailor the inquiries and directions to potential
jurors so as to counteract any preconceived beliefs and attitudes.
An assumption that such inquiries and directions may be sufficient is supported by a
result of the survey in support of the Glennon application for a permanent stay, namely,
‘the lack of passion – indeed, lack of interest – displayed by so many of those questioned’:
Glennon v Director of Public Prosecutions (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, Crockett J,
25 July 1990) per Crockett J.
The Bush case is interesting for the limits of the questions that could be put to the
survey expert. Saulwick, who had earlier designed and carried out the Glennon survey,
was retained by the defence. The Crown had no objection to the tendering of the survey;
however, it objected successfully to the question ‘What is the significance in your view of
the finding that 12.6% of the 150 [respondents] may, in fact, entertain a prejudice based on
what I may loosely describe as propensity?’ The Crown properly submitted that the
witness was not qualified to express a view as to how a jury might behave. This is a classic
example of an objection that goes to the field of expertise of an expert.
Survey evidence as a defence
The Sydney Morning Herald case

[11.0.290] In Attorney General (NSW) v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [1999] NSWSC 318,
the use to which survey evidence could be put to defend a prosecution for contempt was
explored. Barr J was called upon to determine whether a newspaper publisher was guilty
of a sub judice contempt which involved the publication of both photographs and
prejudicial information about a person whose trial was pending: see, further, Freckelton
(1999); Freckelton and McMahon (2002); and see, generally, Studebaker and Penrod (2005).
In Australia, the test for whether a publication is in contempt of current court proceedings
is whether it has a real and practical tendency to interfere with the administration of
justice (Attorney-General v 2UE (unreported, NSW Court of Appeal, 16 October 1997)) or
whether it has created a substantial risk of serious interference with the pending
proceedings: Hinch v Attorney-General (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 15.
The key witness for the defendant newspaper publisher was the United States jury
scholar and social psychologist Professor Neil Vidmar. He relied substantially for his
opinions upon the results of a survey which sought to test the ability of members of the
public to remember the details of the publication that was the subject of the contempt
prosecution (at [51]):
A number of readers of the Sydney Morning Herald newspaper were asked to attend at the
offices of a Sydney marketing research organisation. They were divided randomly into
four groups. The members of group A were given a complete black and white photocopy
edition of the Sydney Morning Herald newspaper of 27 October 1997 [the issue the subject
of the charge]. The members of group B were provided with copies of the editions of 27, 28
and 29 October 1997. The members of group C were given a copy of the edition of
3 November 1997 and those of group D were given copies of 3, 4 and 5 November 1997.
The 28 November edition returned to normal format and contained coverage under the
heading ‘A Herald Investigation’ about the ‘carve-up’ of the drug trade in Sydney. Various
well-known identities, not including the person whose trial was pending, Duong Van Ia,
were named. The 29 November edition contained the third article in the series, principally
dealing with money laundering. The foreshadowed article about cannabis, highlighted the
1012 [11.0.290]
day before, did not appear. The 3 November edition contained articles about the intention
of the Federal Government to spend sums of money to reduce the supply of drugs into
Australia, to rehabilitate drug users and to fund medical research and education about
drug abuse.
The 4 November edition carried various general articles about drugs and criticised the
attitude of the Prime Minister toward drug reform. The 5 November edition did not carry
any relevant articles about drugs. The participants were asked to read the newspaper or
newspapers as they would ordinarily have read them, something of an artificial exercise in
the circumstances, but one which, if anything, could be expected to have sensitised the
participants and to have improved the quality of their concentration and therefore of their
recall for what otherwise they may have read casually. Then they were asked to complete
a written questionnaire, were paid a sum of money, and were told that the researcher
might telephone them to ask additional questions at a later date. About 14 days later, the
researchers telephoned each participant and asked a series of questions designed to
evaluate the extent to which each participant recalled the names Duong Van Ia and Uncle
Six, a nickname ascribed in the articles prompting the prosecution to Duong Van Ia, as
well as any connection between the names and other names which had appeared in the
articles they had been asked to read.
Of the participants who responded to the follow-up request for information, 79 were in
group A, 30 were in group B, 19 were in group C, and 18 were in group D. Participants
were asked a number of introductory questions about topics that had been dealt with in
the newspaper editions they had been asked to read. There followed a key series of
questions, which formed the basis of much of what Professor Vidmar opined to the court.
Participants were asked whether they could recall reading or hearing any news stories
during the past two years that involved the illegal drug trade, such as heroin or cocaine in
Australia. Not surprisingly, 97% of participants answered in the affirmative. There were no
significant differences across the four groups. Participants were then asked whether they
could provide the names of persons associated with the stories and explain how they were
associated with the stories.
Eighteen per cent of participants in group A said that they could do so, compared with
40%, 32% and 28% respectively in groups B, C and D. None of the participants mentioned
the name of Duong Van Ia, but two mentioned the name Uncle Six and one mentioned
Duncan Lam, the other alleged drug boss featured in the photographs on page 1 of the
27 October edition and the articles on page 1. Other persons who were mentioned by
participants included persons mentioned in the course of the articles on 27 October.
Participants were asked whether they could give the names of any persons identified
as ‘drug bosses’. Those who said that they could comprised 22%, 30%, 11% and 6%
respectively of the four groups. One participant said ‘Uncle something’, another said
‘someone Lam’, and several referred to ‘Asian names’ that they could not remember. A
number of participants were able, however, to refer to the names of well-known Sydney
crime identities.
Participants were then asked to listen to a list of 20 names which were read in random
sequence. Some were well known. Two, namely Lan Tran Cao and Philip Tran, were
invented by Professor Vidmar in order to try, he said, to identify prejudice which might
exist among the participants toward anyone with a name that sounded Vietnamese.
Fifteen per cent of group A participants claimed to recognise the name Duong Van Ia. Of
the other groups, 10%, 5% and 6% respectively recognised the name. However, the reasons
for their doing so were disuniform, some thinking he was concerned with a murder but
most recognising the name as connected with the drug trade. Thirty-seven per cent of
[11.0.290] 1013
participants in group A recognised the name Uncle Six, compared with 20%, 11% and 6%
respectively in the other groups, most identifying him as being involved in drug
trafficking.
The participants who recognised the name Duncan Lam comprised 24%, 10%, 11% and
17% respectively in the four groups, most saying he was a drug boss or involved in the
illegal drug trade. Similarly, 19%, 20%, 21% and 6% respectively said that they recognised
the name of Lan Tran Cao, most connecting the name with drug trafficking. The other
fictitious name, Philip Tran, was ‘recognised’ by 33%, 20%, 26% and 17% of the groups.
The rate of identification of the names of people about whom media coverage had been
intense or prolonged was much higher than for the other names, including those of the
accused. Barr J commented that this phenomenon ‘demonstrates the correctness of
Dr Vidmar’s opinion that repeated rehearsal of a fact is likely to produce a longer or more
reliable memory of it’ (at [69]).
The participants were then asked whether during the past two years they had read or
heard anything about a Vietnamese immigrant called Lan Tran Cao, a Vietnamese
immigrant called Duong Van Ia, or someone named Uncle Six. They were asked whether
there was any connection between Lan Tran Cao or Duong Van Ia or Uncle Six and any
other person. They were also asked the real name of the man called Uncle Six. There was
no significant increase in the rate of recognition of the three names over the rate that
resulted from the earlier question about recognition of the names, only the one person
identifying Duong Van Ia as Uncle Six.
The findings from the survey led Professor Vidmar to express the opinion that public
recall and recognition of the accused was very low at what he called an absolute level and
by comparison with names which had appeared more extensively in the news media.
Moreover, he contended that this result was comparable with other research he had
conducted in other jurisdictions. His findings, if accepted, would have led to an acquittal
of the defendant newspaper publisher.
Barr J, though, identified what he said was a significant flaw in the inferences drawn
by Professor Vidmar in relation to the fictitious names. First, the sequencing of the
opinions about the names ‘must have led the minds of the participants to an expectation
that they would be asked about a Vietnamese person who had some connection with the
illegal trade’ (at [75]). Second, the question asked in respect of Lan Tran Cao would have
been true of the accused, meaning, so Barr J held, that the false identification should be
given little weight. Finally, and most importantly, the names chosen as a control contained
the name Tran, very common in Vietnamese, and the name of a number of persons who
had been the subject of significant publicity in respect of violent and drug-related crime.
Barr J stated that he did not accept that the survey results demonstrated the existence in
the community of any general assumption that Vietnamese persons are involved in drug
or other crimes (at [81]):
I therefore reject the conclusion of Professor Vidmar that the survey results show that the
drug bosses and Uncle Six articles resulted in relatively little recognition and recall
memories of Mr Duong as a drug boss that could be separated from general assumptions
about persons with Vietnamese names being involved in drugs and other crimes.
Barr J acknowledged that only one-third of potential jurors read the relevant newspaper,
and that therefore recognition rates needed to be significantly discounted in the
assessment of the likelihood of the publicity causing a significant prejudice to the fair trial
of Duong Van Ia. Moreover, the survey had been carried out only two weeks after the
participants read the newspaper that they were given, whereas the trial of the accused was
not due to take place until five months after the publicity the subject of the charge against
the Sydney Morning Herald. Professor Vidmar’s interpretation of this fact was that memory
of other activities would occur during the interim, meaning that the memory of the articles
would fade more and more. Barr J accepted the validity of this analysis but commented
1014 [11.0.290]
that ‘it is difficult to know how great it is in view of the evidence … that memory of the
detail of an event rapidly diminishes unless there exist any of the features which may
combine to produce long term memory’ (at [84]). He concluded (at [84]) that unless an
event:
is of such interest or importance or of such a striking nature as to produce long term
memory, little if any of it will remain in the memory after two weeks. On the other …
whilst it seems reasonable to suppose that that memory will fade over a long time, it is
difficult to say whether there will be any significant loss of memory between a time two
weeks after the event and a time five months after the event.
He accepted that the concentration of the questions on drugs and drug bosses would be
likely to prompt guesses consistent with the anticipated purposes of the study, this being
another of the factors tending to make the results of the survey conservative.
Of importance for subsequent attempts to employ survey evidence as a defence, Barr J
identified a series of factors distinguishing the survey conditions from those that would
prevail at a trial of the accused. He found these to stand in the way of giving weight to the
survey results. (See further Freckelton (1999); Freckelton and McMahon (2002).) First, he
noted that the survey was carried out without warning, save the indication two weeks
previously that participants might be contacted, meaning that there was little possibility
for stimulation of memories. This, he held, contrasted markedly with the trial process.
Second, he was troubled by the fact that in the survey, by contrast with the trial, the only
possible means of memory stimulation for participants was the questions that they were
asked. Third, the telephone survey was short, the questions only being asked once, this
again contrasting with the trial of the accused that could reasonably be expected to last (as
it did in fact) for several days. Fourth, the photographs of the accused published on three
occasions in the edition complained about were a striking and important feature of the
article, but the participants in the survey were only shown reduced-size, black-and-white
versions of them. However, in a trial, jurors would see the accused every day and
although identification or replication of a live person from a photograph may be less
reliable than from a face, Barr J held that jurors having some memory of the article and the
photographs would have a significantly greater chance of memory stimulation by seeing
Mr Duong and remembering the photographs than would participants in the survey. Fifth,
the name of the accused and the subject of drugs were never brought together in the
survey in the way that they would be at trial. This combination of factors led Barr J to
reflect that it was impossible to replicate trial conditions in a survey and to comment on
the ‘consequent difficulty about accepting survey results as a reliable indicator of what
might happen at a trial’ (at [95]).
A further matter concerned Barr J. He noted that there is no way of assessing the
degree of commitment of survey participants and whether they are prepared to make a
genuine effort to answer fully and honestly. He held that account needed to be taken of the
fact that those asking the questions over the telephone had little control or knowledge of
how people were answering the questions and of the fact that, since the participants were
telephoned without warning, it was likely that they were being distracted by other things
on their mind and going on around them. Moreover, of the 188 persons followed up, 42
could not be contacted or declined to participate – ‘this demonstrates that not every
participant was wholeheartedly committed to the success of the survey. [By contrast] there
are well established methods of ensuring that the attention of jurors at trial is not
distracted’ (at [96]–[97]).
Barr J found that a range of characteristics which had been described by the newspaper
articles could be raised at trial, giving the jurors a further means of recognising the
accused as the man the subject of the Sydney Morning Herald article. His Honour also
noted that the article, when read by the participants in the survey, was not current news,
meaning that it was less likely to be memorable to the survey participants than it would
[11.0.290] 1015
have been to potential jurors when reading it at the time of publication. In addition, the
article as published at the time was part of a series and so potentially retained by readers
and even reread between the date of publication and the date of the trial, especially within
the first few days after publication.
Barr J concluded that the limitations of the survey were so great and the differences
between the conditions of the survey and those which would apply at a trial were so
marked that ‘the survey results cannot form the basis for any reasonable conclusion that
there was a small likelihood as a matter of practical reality that the material complained of
had significant adverse effects at the trial of Mr Duong on the beliefs and attitudes of
persons exposed to them’ (at [102]). In addition, he found that Professor Vidmar had not
demonstrated any basis independent of his survey results that reasonably supported his
opinion about the unlikelihood of the adverse impact of the Sydney Morning Herald
publicity about the accused.
Barr J went even further, finding that a number of the survey results showed the
opposite of the position contended for by John Fairfax Publications. He noted that 11
members of group A recognised the name Duong Van Ia, seven of them in connection with
drugs, and 25 members recognised the nickname Uncle Six, 22 of them in connection with
drugs. He accepted submissions from the Attorney-General that it followed from the
results that 27 of the 79 members of group A identified either Duong or Uncle Six as a
person connected with drugs. He classified this as a ‘high rate of recognition’.
The legacy of Barr J’s decision in Attorney General (NSW) v John Fairfax Publications Pty
Ltd [1999] NSWSC 318 will be a disincentive to use survey evidence because of the
logistical difficulties in replicating participant performance and juror experience. Any
future survey will need to build in a significant number of factors which will equate
participant performance to the conditions in which jurors customarily undertake their
tasks in order for the expert interpretation of the survey results to be accorded any
substantial probative value in assisting the contention that the publicity prompting the
charges either was or was not likely to have the relevant tendency to interfere with the
administration of justice.
Evidentiary issues in the use of surveys

[11.0.310] Factors which affect the admissibility of survey evidence in civil cases are
discussed earlier in this chapter. For criminal cases, does it matter that a survey of public
opinion cannot comply with the rules of evidence? For so long as the use of a survey is
seen as an attempt to demonstrate that there cannot be a fair trial, then perhaps there is
some point in referring to the usual requirements of admissibility. However, if the survey
is conducted primarily to ensure a fair trial, then it is the quality of the survey and its
utility to the court, rather than its compliance with strict evidentiary rules, which is most
important. That is not to say that the rules of evidence should be ignored, but rather that
attention shifts from admissibility to weight.
In the applications made by the accused Connell, Glennon and Bush (see [11.0.160]),
the Crown chose to make no objection to the admissibility of the survey evidence. That is
unlikely to remain the position. After all, survey evidence and the inferences sought to be
drawn from it can be attacked on several grounds. The survey instrument can be criticised
for the content of the questions, the range of the questions as too narrow or too broad,
whether the questions are sufficiently or overly focused, whether the language used is
appropriate or misleading, and so on.
Likewise, the conduct of the survey may be questioned. Have the interviewers been
properly briefed? Do the interviewers know more than they should know? Has the target
population been properly defined? Thus, in the R v Connell (No 3) (1993) 8 WAR 542, the
1016 [11.0.310]
first telephone survey was not confined to eligible jurors so a second telephone survey
was conducted (at 551). What is the appropriate medium for the survey: face-to-face,
telephone, prepaid mail response etc?
And what of the inferences that either side, or the trial judge, might wish to draw from
the survey? Can a layperson (albeit legally trained), unassisted by experts in survey
design, conduct and assessment, adequately judge the utility of a survey and the
conclusions to be derived from it?
As soon as those questions are acknowledged, then the rules for the reception of expert
evidence come into play. The trial judge must decide whether he or she can be assisted in
any way by survey evidence and its interpretation. If so, then the trial judge will be
concerned that the survey process is managed by persons who are recognised as
competent to do so. And thereafter there will be the further issue of relevant and sufficient
expertise being available to assist in understanding the results of the survey.
An excellent example of the importance of the application of the rules relating to expert
evidence is seen in Seaman J’s approach to the evidence sought to be led from
Professor Durkin, social psychologist, in the Connell case. The professor’s opinion was that
attitudes created by media publicity will be remembered long after the details upon which
they are based have begun to fade and will affect the manner in which jurors will process
the material put before them at trial (p 22). If accepted, that view would significantly
influence a trial judge’s response to an application for a stay. Further, that view would also
influence the content and number of inquiries that a trial judge might put to the panel of
prospective jurors to determine whether any of them should be excused from service.
But the professor’s opinions went beyond what the court saw as the limits of his
expertise. He had no personal experience of the work of juries and his research involved
the reading of mainly United States literature. He had no publication on the
interrelationship between prejudicial media publicity and guilt or innocence (p 553). Even
literature upon which the professor was forced to rely was, noted his Honour, based on a
number of experiments and many of the researchers say that their results should be
treated with caution and that fuller research is required (at 554). Then there is material
which is inconsistent with the professor’s opinions. His Honour noted that a study by
Friendly and Goldfarb in 1967 concluded that publicity does not wreak its civil effects
upon juries ‘to the degree commonly believed and that the study supports the conviction
that the jury is … an effective trier of the facts laid before it in the courtroom and that trial
procedures do indeed operate as they are supposed to’ (at 555).
Survey questions
[11.0.330] With such a small number of surveys conducted, there is much to be gained
from more experience. For example, in an assessment of survey questions, to what extent
should lawyers’ views about objectionable questions have weight? In the Bush case, the
Irving Saulwick survey began with a multipart question. This was not objected to pre-trial,
but on the appeal Drummond J usefully commented upon the inherent ambiguity and
uncertainty of meaning which flows from a single answer to a multipart question: see
Bush v The Queen (1993) 115 ALR 654.
The much earlier telephone survey conducted by Irving Saulwick in support of the
permanent stay application by Glennon reached 301 persons aged 18 and above. Just over
one-third answered ‘yes’ to the question: ‘Have you ever heard of Father Michael
Glennon, a Roman Catholic priest who has been accused of indecently assaulting young
children?’
This smaller field was then asked: ‘What can you tell me about this case?’ So long as
they could continue to proffer information, they were further questioned.
[11.0.330] 1017
The ‘running sheets’ upon which the interviewer recorded the actual responses by each
interviewee were tendered through Mr Saulwick.
Similarly, the first telephone survey in the Connell matter asked 400 respondents if
they had heard of Connell. A respondent who had heard of him was then questioned to
discover what the respondent knew about Connell. Included among the questions related
to any knowledge of criminal allegations was a question which probed knowledge of the
charges laid against Connell by listing a number of offences, some of which Connell had
been charged with and some of which he had not.
Thereafter, each respondent was asked: ‘Do you think he is guilty of any of those
offences or any others?’ A positive response entailed more probing questions to discover
upon which offence or offences guilt was presumed.
Further questions included: ‘If you were a jury member of any trial of Laurie Connell
would he have to prove his innocence?’, and ‘If you were a jury member at any trial of
Laurie Connell, would you accept any evidence which he gave of his innocence?’
Bearing in mind that this survey was conducted as part of an application to seek a stay
of proceedings, some important issues still arise if such questions and the answers given
are used as a basis of ensuring effective oversight of the jury by the trial judge. Seaman J
felt that the question as to Connell proving his innocence ‘predisposes the respondents
against Connell and unintentionally but significantly misleads them as to the task of a
person sitting in criminal judgment’ (at 551). His Honour went further and found that ‘the
overall effect of the interview form is to predispose respondents against Connell’ (at 551).
In the context of seeking to ensure a fair trial, it can be argued that useful questions
need to be prefaced by remarks such as: ‘It is a juror’s duty to consider only the evidence
given at the trial. Do you have any information or beliefs which would influence the way
you would assess anything you heard or saw at a trial of Connell?’ A positive response
would then be followed by questions which probed for those beliefs and information.
In the absence of some prefatory remarks, questions which use terms such as ‘guilt’ or
‘innocence’ are not helpful. The tasks are to assess the degree to which potential jurors can
bring an independent mind to the evidence at trial and to discern those matters upon
which the trial judge should comment.
A second survey was conducted for the Connell stay application. Relevantly, this
survey tested whether the respondents thought Connell was guilty. Again, no context was
given for the questions and no opportunity was given for the respondents to explain their
answers. His Honour found that ‘the survey records statements made spontaneously in
answer to questions asked by a stranger over the telephone without the opportunity for
any worthwhile consideration as to whether or not Connell is guilty of those offences’ (at
553). Such a survey is hardly useful to the parties or the court.
In the Bush application for a temporary stay of proceedings in the Australian Capital
Territory, the purpose of the telephone survey of 150 respondents was to explore the
extent to which potential jurors would be influenced by knowledge of the accused’s
criminal history. The survey was funnelled in that asking the next question was
conditional upon a ‘yes’ answer to the current question. The result of the survey was that
between 8% and 19% of eligible jurors would ‘tend to think that [Bush] was guilty of [the
later] offence’ because of a previous conviction on a similar charge. It will be recalled that
in separate proceedings arising from the media events that led to the application to stay
the Glennon trial, a Victorian Supreme Court judge observed: ‘Only one juror would need
to recall some part of the detail of his prior offences, or alleged offences, for his fair trial to
be likely to be prejudiced.’
The results of the Bush survey suggest that if the evidence of the earlier offence was to
be inadmissible for any purpose (and we may assume that the accused would not put his
character in issue), then a trial judge may wish to examine the potential jurors so as to
1018 [11.0.330]
discharge the near 20% who had formed a view because of their knowledge of past events.
It can be argued that up to 20% of the panel can be discharged without any hazard to the
rest of the jury selection process.
Alternatively, the trial judge might take the view that it would be more pragmatic to
instruct the jury from the outset that anything they heard about the accused’s history was
irrelevant to their task unless and until it became part of the evidence before them.
Practical steps
[11.0.350] With statutory changes such as s 611A of the Criminal Code Act (WA) (a provision
enacted in 1991) and the passage of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) to ensure that
courts may give directions before an accused is arraigned or, in the absence of such
provision, then after arraignment and before the jury is sworn, there is the opportunity for
a judge appointed to preside at a forthcoming trial to give directions that will ensure
fairness at the hearing. In the Glennon case, the accused sought a permanent stay before
the arraignment. When the accused Glennon did face trial in the County Court of Victoria,
the trial judge, Neesham J, took the following steps:
(1) he divided the jury panel into two groups and then proceeded with each group;
(2) he outlined the charges, said that the accused had been a priest at the time of the
alleged offences but had now resigned, and said that the accused was at the time
the governing director of a youth organisation; and
(3) he mentioned the places of the alleged offences and gave the names of the alleged
victims and of other witnesses.
His Honour then said: ‘If anybody among you knows any of the persons that I have
named or believe that you may know anything about the circumstances of this case or
have heard anything about the circumstances of this case, would you kindly hold your
hand up?’ (quoted by Brennan J in R v Glennon (1992) 173 CLR 592 at 609).
In Western Australia, Seaman J proposed to take the following steps to avoid prejudice
to the accused Connell (at 560):
(1) A panel of about 500 persons was to be brought to the court in groups over a
number of days. The summoning officer would instruct them (Juries Act 1957
(WA), ss 32FA and 34B, and Sch 4) to disclose any reasons why there may be bias
or likelihood of bias.
(2) His Honour would question the panel to discover whether any of them should be
excused on the ground of bias or likelihood of bias.
(3) His Honour would explain the nature of the juror’s oath and the obligations of
jurors at trial.
(4) His Honour would give the panel information as to the identity of witnesses, and
other persons and entities involved in the Crown case.
(5) After the jury is sworn and before it selects its foreman, his Honour would direct
it ‘in terms which [he] thinks appropriate to judge the case upon the evidence
admitted in court and that there is no place for bias or prejudice’.
(6) During the course of the trial, his Honour would give directions to the same effect
whenever appropriate.
The surveys used in both the Glennon and Connell matters did not assist the trial judges
to put particular questions to the jury. Thus, Neesham J proposed to ask a general ‘do you
know’ question, while Seaman J proposed to question so as to identify possible bias. In the
Bush matter, Gallop J addressed the jury panel before the empanelling. His Honour said,
inter alia, in R v Bush (unreported, ACT Supreme Court, No SCC of 1992) (at p 20):
You must be able to put out of your mind anything which could affect your ability to give
a true verdict according to the evidence … Impartiality, making decisions based upon
[11.0.350] 1019
what is ventilated in this courtroom is the only way we can operate in the criminal area …
I … invite anybody who has heard what I have said and who wishes to make any sort of
application, based upon an inability to give a true verdict according to the evidence in this
courtroom to come and make an application to be excused.
It would appear that no attempt was made to probe the panel to identify those who had
any knowledge of Bush’s history.
If surveys are to be used, then a person expert in the design, carrying out and
interpretation of the data collected by a survey could be commissioned by either or both
the parties, well before the likely trial date, to survey the appropriate population and
report to the court. The content of the survey and its target population should be the
subject of agreement between the parties. For example, the survey might open by
establishing that the respondents could be eligible jurors. So, the opening questions would
weed out those whose age, occupation, or personal circumstances entailed that they
would not be jurors. Then the questions would turn as necessary to the accused and
certain characteristics of the accused and also to views about the alleged crime.
In survey design, reference should be made to the principles developed by the Federal
Court for the use of surveys in civil matters. There can also be argument before the court
as to the results of the survey and the opinions to be drawn from it. Being pre-trial, there
are some interesting questions as to whether the argument and materials should be public
knowledge or whether in the interests of justice such pre-trial steps should be subject to
non-publication orders.
Seaman J ordered that his detailed analysis of the pre-trial publicity in Connell could be
published to the Crown, the accused and their respective legal advisers, but to no-one else
without his leave (at 547). In Victoria, Crockett J prohibited the publication of a report of
the whole of the proceeding in Glennon or of any information derived from the
proceeding: see Glennon v Director of Public Prosecutions (unreported, Victorian Supreme
Court, Crockett J, 25 July 1990). In the Australian Capital Territory, the evidence led in
support of the Bush application for a stay was, similarly, not published.
Later Australian civil authority permitting survey evidence
The new trend

[11.0.390] In 1987, Burchett J in Shoshana Pty Ltd v 10th Cantanae Pty Ltd (1987) 79 ALR 279
(see also Shafron (1989, pp 218ff); Johnson & Johnson Australia Pty Ltd v Sterling
Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (1991) 101 ALR 700 at 720) departed expressly from the earlier
Australian approach and held that the response of a person interviewed for a market
survey is a statement indicating state of mind and is admissible as such, though not to
prove the truth of the opinion expressed. In a new development, he made a distinction
between the use of survey evidence obtained specifically for a case, where the risk of
introducing biased questions and methods is greater, and the use of survey evidence
obtained for purposes extrinsic to the immediate dispute between the parties – that is,
obtained in pursuance of the normal activities of the business specialising in the regular
conduct of such surveys for commercial purposes.
In Shoshana, the passing-off dispute centred on an advertisement which used the same
name as that of a well-known television personality to promote its product. The plaintiff
tendered expert evidence on the basis of surveys used to determine audience reaction to
particular television personalities. Neither the interviewers nor the interviewees were
called. Burchett J held that if evidence from interviewers had been admissible, the records
of the surveying organisation reproducing the interviewees’ answers in statistical tables,
or derived from those answers by statistical procedures, were admissible under s 7B of the
Evidence Act 1905 (Cth), as they would be statements in documents forming part of a
business record.
1020 [11.0.390]
On the issue of the classification of extra-curial statements of existing intention, his

Honour noted the decisions of Dobson v Morris (1975) 4 NSWLR 681; Process Church of the
Final Judgment v Rupert Hart Davis Ltd, referred to in Phipson on Evidence (1982, pp 94–95);
Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Plumbers & Gasfitters Employees’ Union (Aust) (1987) 72 ALR
415, and held (at 293) that ‘it is now authoritatively established that such evidence is not
hearsay; but primary evidence of the person’s condition etc’. His Honour reviewed recent
English and New Zealand authority (in particular, Lego System Aktieselskab v Lego M
Lemelstrich Ltd [1983] FSR 155 and Noel Leeming Television Ltd v Noel’s Appliance Centre Ltd
(1985) 5 IPR 249 per Holland J) and noted the apparently increasing reliance on survey
evidence in those countries.
Burchett J also noted the opinion expressed in Cross on Evidence (1986, p 725):
An expert may base his opinion upon material (ie opinion survey material) compiled over
a field which is wider than the issue before the court. Where he gathers raw data
specifically for the court hearing, this must be authenticated like any other evidence.
His Honour held (at 294) that on this view the expert’s opinion, being based on data
gathered over many years for reasons unrelated to the litigation, was admissible, ‘but if he
had conducted a survey specifically for the purposes of the applicant’s case, his evidence
would not have been admissible’.
In Shoshana Pty Ltd v 10th Cantanae Pty Ltd (1987) 79 ALR 279, an attempt was made to
prove not that opinions held about the television celebrity were true but merely that they
were held, rather similarly to the 1951 United States case of United States v 88 Cases, More
or Less 187 F 2d 967 (1951). Thus, Burchett J held (at 296) that ‘even if the objection were
correct (as I do not think it is) that evidence of an expression of an opinion is not evidence
that that opinion is actually held, it would not matter for present purposes’. He found that
what the opinion survey evidence established about the name employed by the
advertisers had been independently established by other evidence that he accepted.
Further departure from the older authorities

[11.0.410] In 1988, McLelland J, in Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR
158 at 177, reviewed the increasing list of authorities on the admissibility of survey
evidence and noted the view of Feinberg J in the leading United States case of Zippo
Manufacturing Co v Rogers Imports Inc 216 F Supp 670 at 683 (1963):
Regardless of whether the surveys in this case could be admitted under the non-hearsay
approach, they are admissible because the answers of respondents are expressions of
presently existing state of mind, attitude, or belief. There is a recognised exception to the
hearsay rule for such statements, and under it the statements are admissible to prove the
truth of the matter contained therein.
(See also Customglass Boats Ltd v Salthouse Bros Ltd [1976] 1 NZLR 36 at 41–42 per Mahon J;
ARA v Mutual Rental Cars [1987] 2 NZLR 647.)
In Ritz, the plaintiff called as witnesses 152 members of the public who had been
interviewed by representatives of the plaintiff’s solicitors, but the defendants contended
that in the absence of evidence of the full responses to the plaintiff’s survey, it could not be
inferred that views expressed by members of the public who were called were likely to be
held by anyone except themselves or, in particular, that they were likely to be held by a
significant section of the Australian public. They sought to adduce evidence from an
expert in statistics, market research and survey design, implementation and interpretation
as to the characteristics of a statistically significant public survey. The plaintiff objected on
the basis that it had not conducted a survey and, further, that survey evidence is not
admissible in trade mark proceedings in Australia.
McClelland J held (at 178):
[11.0.410] 1021
There is a substantial preponderance of authority in support of the proposition that survey

evidence, and expert evidence in relation thereto, are admissible to prove the state of mind
of the public or a section of the public on some particular matter, when that is an issue.
However, he noted (at 178) that two distinct bases emerged from the cases in justification
of the admissibility of such evidence:
The first is that although out-of-court statements by persons interviewed in the course of a
survey as to their impressions or opinions are of a hearsay nature, the admission of such
statements as evidence of the existence of those impressions or opinions falls within a
recognised exception to the hearsay rule. On this approach, the primary evidence is that of
the individual responses of those interviewed, interpretative evidence being subsidiary.
The second basis is that such statements are to be treated not as hearsay, but as original
data providing a foundation for expert evidence as to the state of public opinion on the
matter in question. On this approach, the primary evidence is that of the expert, and
evidence of the individual responses is subsidiary.
In relation to the first basis, his Honour noted the distinction between the statement that
may not be hearsay at all but original circumstantial evidence from which a state of mind
may be inferred, and the statement that may simply assert the existence of the state of
mind, in which case it will be hearsay ‘but is nevertheless admissible by virtue of an
established exception to the hearsay rule’. (See Wigmore on Evidence, Vol 6 (1976, [1714],
[1715]); see also Cross on Evidence (1986, p 991).) The existence of such an exception to the
hearsay rule has been affirmed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Steele v Mirror
Newspapers Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 348 at 369–370 per Hutley JA and at 381 per Samuels JA;
applied in World Hosts Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1978] 1 NSWLR 189 at 207 per
Hutley JA (with whom on this point Moffitt P and Glass JA agreed).)
McClelland J found that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff from its interviewees
was ‘of a similar character to evidence of responses given by persons interviewed in the
course of a public survey’ – it was hearsay evidence but admissible by virtue of an
exception to the hearsay rule. As to the evidence of the expert called to impugn the quality
and representativeness of the ‘quasi-survey’ evidence, McClelland J found his opinions to
infringe the common knowledge rule: see [2.15.10].
Continuing evolution
[11.0.430] Hill J was called upon to grapple with the issue once more in Sterling
Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Johnson & Johnson Pty Ltd (1990) 96 ALR 277. He recognised that
the ‘development of sophisticated methods of collecting and analysing survey data has
brought with it a challenge to the law to reconcile the admissibility’ of survey evidence
with the constraints of the hearsay rule. His Honour reviewed the Australian authorities
and summed up what now appears to be the preferred view (at 293):
The present state of the law would confine the admissibility of survey evidence to surveys
which show a contemporaneous state of mind or feeling, subject, of course, to the
relevance of that state of mind or feeling to a matter in issue in the case.
The leading Australian authority

[11.0.450] By the end of 1990, the Full Court of the Federal Court had also entered the
debate in Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313. The court accepted
that in Hoban’s Glynde Pty Ltd v Firle Hotel Pty Ltd (1973) 4 SASR 503 and McDonald’s
System (Aust) Pty Ltd v McWilliam’s Wines Pty Ltd (No 2) (1979) 41 FLR 436, the
characterisation of the evidence objected to as hearsay was correct, but doubted (360)
whether that was the case in Mobil Oil Corporation v Registrar of Trade Marks [1984] VR 25:
The survey in that case related to public perception of the significance of a word, as
bearing upon the question whether a particular mark would deceive or confuse. We
1022 [11.0.430]
would have thought that as in [Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR
158], the survey was direct evidence of an issue in the case, namely the state of public
perception.
This was the view taken in Shoshana Pty Ltd v 10th Cantanae Pty Ltd (1987) 79 ALR 279 at
290–294 and Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Johnson & Johnson Pty Ltd (1990) 96 ALR 277.
The Full Court commented that it did not find it ‘very profitable – at least in this court’ –
to spend time on determining whether a particular survey is hearsay evidence, as even if
it were so categorised, the court possessed a discretion under O 33, r 3 of the Federal Court
Rules to permit the evidence to be adduced: see above, [11.0.40].
The difficulty in this regard is that the determination as to whether survey evidence is
hearsay is important – at least for other contexts. It is difficult to impugn King J’s decision
in Mobil from the point of view of its correctness in principle. Rather than relying upon the
O 33 discretion, it would be preferable to articulate specifically that an exception to the
hearsay rule exists in relation to proving a state of mind.
The pragmatic and perhaps even generous approach

[11.0.470] In State Government Insurance Corporation v Government Insurance Office (NSW)
(1991) 28 FCR 511, French J dismissed an application for injunctions by the State
Government Insurance Corporation (SGIC) preventing the use of logos in Western
Australia by the Government Insurance Office (GIO) of New South Wales, which had
commenced competitive business in Western Australia with a similar logo to that used by
the SGIC. The SGIC had sought to rely upon survey evidence. The reports and associated
testimony of interviewers, coders, data entry and data analysis contractors associated with
the survey were objected to by the respondents, who argued that the material was of a
hearsay character, being founded upon the responses of persons interviewed, and that in
any event the material was beset with methodological deficiencies which militated against
its reception into evidence.
French J applied the principles decided in Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission
(1990) 24 FCR 313 and held (at 543):
Given the existence of the discretion [O 33, r 3], it is more sensible to concentrate upon the
necessity for and reliability of survey evidence than worry about compliance with rules
regarding hearsay evidence which were developed before this kind of problem arose.
His Honour was urged to adopt the passage from the Handbook of Recommended Procedures
for Trial of Protracted Cases followed in the United States and viewed with evident approval
by the Full Court in Arnotts:
The offeror has the burden of establishing that a proffered poll was conducted in
accordance with accepted principles of survey research, ie that the proper universe was
examined, that a representative sample was drawn from that universe, and that the mode
of questioning the interviewees was correct. He should be required to show that the
persons conducting the survey were recognised experts; the data gathered was accurately
reported; the sample design, the questionnaire and the interviewing were in accordance
with generally accepted standards of objective procedure and statistics in the field of such
surveys; the sample design and the interviews were conducted independently of the
attorneys; and the interviewers, trained in this field, had no knowledge of the litigation or
the purposes for which the survey was to be used. Normally this showing will be made
through the testimony of the persons responsible for the various parts of the survey.
French J indicated that he did not regard the above passage ‘as prescribing a standard of
statistical purity in the conduct of surveys that would be appropriate to a carefully
controlled study undertaken for purposes of scientific research’ (emphasis added). By inference
then, this is the test that he would prescribe for the admission of such material. He
commented further (at 543):
[11.0.470] 1023
Surveys of the kind now under consideration are obviously to be undertaken in a real
world of cost limitations and the possibility of error in their design and execution.
Provided that they comply with the standards prescribed by their own designers and
those acceptable to market researchers generally, they may be useful and relied upon in
judicial proceedings if only for broad conclusions that some proportion of the general
population will react in one way or another to particular stimuli or questions put to them.
Close numerical analyses may suggest a level of quantitative precision that is neither
necessary nor meaningful in the light of the kinds of judgments a court is called on to
make.
French J’s words were shortly thereafter echoed by Lockhart J in Johnson & Johnson
Australia Pty Ltd v Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd (1991) 101 ALR 700 at 713 in accepting
the utility of the survey evidence there in question ‘for the purpose of indicating, not with
mathematical accuracy the small number of persons … who had come across the use of
the word “caplets”’.
The collocation by French J of what has elsewhere been termed the ‘intentionalist
fallacy’ (the linkage of significance to what was intended rather than what actually
transpired) with compliance with standards acceptable to experts in the area generally is
curious and probably adds little. Presumably, the reference to ‘judicial proceedings’ is
made to differentiate ‘judge alone’ proceedings from those involving a jury, although this
also is not entirely clear.
His Honour’s preparedness to take the results of appropriately conducted surveys into
account for obtaining a rough impression of the community’s reaction to certain stimuli is
significant, as is his pragmatism in being disinclined to scrutinise the methodology of
surveys to the extent of ensuring that the information being presented to the court is
absolutely quantitatively precise. On occasions, of course, the distinction between the
imperfect but acceptable and the unacceptably flawed will not be easy.
In this case, though, even allowing for what his Honour acknowledged as a ‘pragmatic
and perhaps even generous approach’, he was not prepared to regard part of the survey
evidence as data from which he could draw ‘any positive conclusions’ (State Government
Insurance Corporation v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1991) 28 FCR 511 at 543) about
the behaviour of the people surveyed or the likely behaviour of the general population or
of any segment of it on the basis of:
(1) the existence of leading questions in the survey;
(2) the inexperience of a significant proportion of the interviewers;
(3) the departure by a number of the interviewers from prescribed procedures;
(4) the tight time constraints under which the survey and subsequent analyses were
undertaken;
(5) the disclosure to at least some of the interviewees that the interviews were being
conducted on behalf of the SGIC; and
(6) the implicit disclosure to interviewers in the briefing notes that the survey was to
be undertaken in connection with proposed litigation (at 544).
In spite of all of these concerns, however, French J indicated (at 544) that although he
would not rely on the September survey ‘as an independent source of any inferences’, he
would use the survey, to the extent that it might be relevant, ‘as a check upon my own
findings’.
State Government Insurance Corporation v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1991) 28
FCR 511 marked the most sophisticated challenge yet mounted using expert evidence
from highly qualified witnesses to what on its face appeared to be a professionally
conducted survey.
1024 [11.0.470]
A third phase ruling

[11.0.480] To a similar effect, Yates J in Frucor Beverages Ltd v The Coca-Cola Company [2017]
FCA 298 rejected an interlocutory application to exclude two affidavits filed in an appeal
from a decision of the Trade Marks Office which had upheld opposition to the registration
of the appellant’s colour mark in relation to energy drinks. The affidavits in question were
challenged in terms of relevance and on the ground that their probative value was
outweighed by the danger that the evidence given by them might cause or result in an
undue waste of time or be unfairly prejudicial.
The relevance challenge was based on three arguments:
(1) that the surveys were conducted two and half years and three and a half years
after the mark’s priority date and therefore could not be probative of the question
of actual distinctiveness at the relevant date. The respondent relied on the court’s
doubting of the probative value of late survey evidence in Optical 88 Ltd v Optical
88 Pty Ltd (No 2) (2010) 275 ALR 526; [2010] FCA 1380 at [396] and [410]–[415] and
Apple Inc v Registrar of Trade Marks (2014) 227 FCR 511; [2014] FCA 1304 at [223];
(2) that the statistics produced by the surveys were ‘unremarkable’ and the level of
identification was overstated by the charts and tables in the report; and
(3) that the surveys failed to show use of the mark ‘as a trade mark’ – mere
association is insufficient – it must be association in a trade mark sense. The
respondent relied on the comments of the Full Federal Court in Woolworths Ltd v
BP plc (No 2) (2006) 154 FCR 97; [2006] FCAFC 132.
Justice Yates noted that in Optical 88, Apple and Woolworths, despite the criticisms of it, the
survey evidence was not excluded. Further, in the case before him, the deponent had
sought to tie the results of the surveys to the relevant date. This was a feature that was
absent in Optical 88 and Apple. His Honour was not persuaded that that the affidavits
‘should be rejected at the outset as lacking relevance on the basis that, as CCC contends,
the surveys should be given no weight at all’ (at [27]). He was of the view that the
criticisms did not reach such a point as to justify an inadmissibility determination on the
basis of a lack of relevance.
After noting that there will be other evidence before him at the substantive hearing, his
Honour said: ‘The point of present significance is that I should proceed cautiously before
concluding that, in advance of the hearing, when all of Frucor’s evidence will be before
the Court, some part of that evidence should be rejected now as lacking relevance’ (at
[28]). Similarly, he did not accept that any of the grounds justifying his rejection of the
evidence on discretionary grounds were made out and so the discretion was not
enlivened.
Further guidance on survey methodology

[11.0.490] In Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1991) 102 ALR 379 at 410, Sheppard J
had occasion to consider in detail the methodology employed in surveys conducted in a
passing-off case. His comments are useful for the purpose of determining a methodology
which is likely to be acceptable in future Federal Court cases. His Honour indicated that
the words of Whitford J in Imperial Group plc v Philip Morris Ltd [1984] RPC 293 at 302–303
gave important guidance to the way in which survey material should be assessed:
If a survey is to have any validity at all, the way in which the interviewees are selected
must be established as being done by a method such that a relevant cross-section of the
public is interviewed. … Any survey must of course be of a size which is sufficient to
produce some relevant result viewed on a statistical basis. It must be conducted fairly.
If survey evidence is to have any weight at all it can only be of weight if in any case
where, as here, a number of surveys have been carried out the plaintiffs give – and they
must give this to the defendants before even the action comes on – the fullest possible
[11.0.490] 1025
disclosure of exactly how many surveys they have carried out, exactly how those surveys
were conducted and the totality of the number of persons involved, because otherwise it is
impossible to draw any reliable inference that answers given by one or two of three people
in one survey might conceivably be said to indicate that similar answers would be given if
a survey covering the entire smoking population or the entirety of retail tobacconists were
carried out.
It is also important that the totality of all answers given to all surveys should be
disclosed and made available to the defendants.
Great importance inevitably attaches to the way in which the questions are cast. It is
very difficult in connection with an exercise such as this to think of questions which, even
if they are free from the objection of being leading, are not in fact going to direct the
person answering the question into a field of speculation upon which that person would
never have embarked had the question not been put. It must necessarily be the case that
the exact answers given and not some sort of abbreviation or digest of the exact answer
should be recorded. For the purpose of analysis, coding is in general carried out … and it
is of vital importance that any such coding should be carried out. Of course, one has to
know exactly what instructions were given to persons carrying out the interviews upon
which answers to questionnaires are secured.
His Honour also referred with approval (at 412) to the 1985 Manual for Complex Litigation
published by the Federal Judicial Center of the United States:
Whether estimates obtained by sampling are reliable – a prerequisite to their use in
litigation – will depend upon the procedures employed in selecting the sample and in
obtaining information from or about the sample. The proponent of such evidence has the
burden of establishing conformity with generally recognised statistical standards, a task
that will ordinarily involve expert testimony. This showing, including disclosure of all
underlying data and documentation, should be made well in advance of trial.
Polls and surveys – a species of sampling that involves interrogation of individuals
about such matters as their observations, actions, attitudes, beliefs, or motivations –
require special attention. The parties should be required before conducting any poll, to
provide other parties with an outline of the proposed form and methodology, including
the particular questions that will be asked, the introductory statements or instructions that
will be given, and other controls to be used in the interrogation process. The parties
should attempt to resolve any disagreements concerning the manner in which the poll is
to be conducted, and a meeting between the experts engaged by the litigants may produce
a mutually acceptable plan. Of course, the results and any opinions based on the poll
should be disclosed promptly after it has been taken.
Sheppard J declined to follow either approach slavishly and to lay down a rule for dealing
with survey evidence, but suggested (at 413) that a practice note ‘which will usually apply
in relation to survey evidence’ might be appropriate. In Interlego, his Honour declined to
place ‘great weight’ upon the survey evidence because the hypothetical situation that was
created by the questions posed to interviewees was so artificial as to make it a dangerous
guide to what the reactions of actual shoppers purchasing products from the shelves of a
supermarket might have been. In this he was fully supported by the Full Court on appeal
in Interlego v Croner Trading (1992) 111 ALR 577, which held (at 620):
[I]n the absence of a specialised market, evidence of consumers or retailers as to their
likely reaction should not be admitted on the issue of whether conduct has been, or is
likely to be, misleading or deceptive.
Federal Court Practice Note

[11.0.510] On 25 October 2016, a new Practice Note (GPN-SURV) specifically applicable to
survey evidence was issued by the Federal Court:
1. Introduction
1.1 This practice note applies to any proceeding in which a party may seek to adduce
evidence based upon out-of-court statements or responses of respondents to a
survey (‘survey evidence’). This practice note should be read together with:
1026 [11.0.510]
(a) the Central Practice Note (CPN-1), which sets out the fundamental
principles concerning the National Court Framework (‘NCF’) of the
Federal Court and key principles of case management procedure;
(b) the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), including ss 37M and 37N
(overarching purpose), and Part 23 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth);
(c) the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Evidence Act’), including Parts 3.1, 3.3 and
3.11; and
(d) the Expert Evidence Practice Note (GPN-EXPT).
1.2 This practice note takes effect from the date it is issued and, to the extent
practicable, applies to proceedings whether filed before, or after, the date of
issuing.
1.3 Survey evidence may be adduced in a variety of practice areas. However, given
that it is most often sought to be relied upon in the Commercial and Corporations
and Intellectual Property National Practice Areas (‘NPAs’), parties should also be
familiar with the contents of the Commercial and Corporations NPA Practice
Note (C&C-1) and Intellectual Property NPA Practice Note (IP-1).
2. Survey Evidence Generally
2.1 Survey evidence can give rise to a number of problems which may result in it not
being admitted into evidence or being given little or no weight. The party
adducing the survey evidence is seldom in a position where it can remedy
problems arising out of poor design or execution of a survey during the course of
the trial. Even if a party is in a position to remedy such problems, allowing a
party to do so at a late stage of the proceeding may be unfairly prejudicial to the
other party and/or unduly disrupt the proceeding. It is therefore important that,
at an early stage in the proceeding (and before any survey is conducted), a party
proposing to adduce such evidence give close attention to the survey design and
the steps that will be taken to ensure that the survey evidence is both relevant
and reliable.
2.2 Experience shows that a great deal of time can be spent at the trial on evidence
and submissions concerning the admissibility and/or reliability of survey
evidence which, if the evidence is excluded, or given no weight, can result in a
significant waste of time and costs. Any party seeking to adduce such evidence
has a responsibility to take appropriate steps to ensure that the survey that is
proposed to be conducted will be properly designed and executed and that the
data obtained will be properly recorded and analysed. A party that fails to satisfy
the Court that it has done these things may find not only that the survey evidence
is excluded or given little or no weight but that it is also required to pay the other
party’s costs of responding to the survey evidence, even if it is otherwise
successful in the proceeding.
2.3 One purpose of this practice note is to establish a procedure for the giving of
notice of a party’s intention to adduce survey evidence in order to ensure that the
other party is given a meaningful opportunity to respond by raising any issues it
may have in relation to the proposed survey design or methodology and/or the
relevance of any results that may be obtained to matters in issue in the
proceeding before the survey is conducted.
2.4 Another purpose of this practice note is to provide a party wishing to rely upon
survey evidence with some guidance in relation to matters that may bear on the
admissibility of such evidence or the weight that it might be given if admitted
into evidence.
2.5 Needless to say, it will always be a matter for the judge hearing a matter either
during or prior to the trial to rule upon the admissibility of survey evidence.
Among other things, it may be open to a judge in a particular case to exclude
survey evidence pursuant to s 135 of the Evidence Act. Further, a judge may
either dispense with or modify the application of this practice note in any
particular case as the judge considers fit including, without limitation, the
requirements of this practice note with respect to the giving of written notices.
3. Case Management
[11.0.510] 1027
3.1 A party that proposes to conduct a survey which is to be the subject of survey
evidence (‘initiating party’) should raise the matter with the other party
(‘responding party’) prior to undertaking the survey. It may be that the matter to
which the proposed survey is directed is not in issue or may be the subject of an
admission that is acceptable to both parties thereby avoiding any need for the
initiating party to adduce survey evidence.
3.2 Before the survey is undertaken, the initiating party must file and serve written
notice of its intention to conduct the survey (‘Survey Notice’) which should
include the following information:
(a) a precise statement of the issue or issues to which the survey will be
directed including, in particular, any fact or facts in issue that the survey
evidence will be relied upon to prove;
(b) details of the survey design including:
(i) the name and qualifications of the person or persons responsible
for the survey design;
(ii) the nature of the survey (eg. telephone, on-line, face-to-face);
(iii) a precise description of the population to be investigated
(‘target population’);
(iv) details of the sample frame from which the sample will be
drawn, the sampling procedure and the sample size that will be
used;
(v) a copy of any proposed survey questionnaire or instrument
(‘survey instrument’) and any information or instructions to be
given to survey participants or to any person who will
administer the survey instrument;
(vi) the name and qualifications of any person responsible for
coding, processing and analysing the data;
(c) details of any pilot survey that the initiating party or any researcher
acting on its behalf has conducted or proposes to conduct for the
purpose of designing or testing the survey instrument.
3.3 Within 21 days of receiving the Survey Notice the responding party should file
and serve a written notice (‘Responding Notice’) which indicates with specificity
what issues (if any) it has with the initiating party’s proposed survey design and
what design changes it proposes in order to address any such issues. In an
appropriate case, a judge may determine that a responding party may not be
permitted to rely upon any submission or evidence that raises an issue relating to
the survey design not adequately identified or explained in the Responding
Notice.
3.4 Parties are encouraged to engage in constructive discussions about any disputed
features of the proposed survey design. Each party and its expert should reflect
on the points raised by the other side and, where appropriate, modify their
position with a view to reducing the scope of any dispute in relation to the design
of the proposed survey.
4. Guidance
4.1 The admissibility of a survey, or the weight given to it, will be determined by a
judge in light of all the relevant evidence. The purpose of this section of the
practice note is to highlight some of the problems that have been found to
diminish the quality and reliability of survey evidence so that the initiating party
may avoid making some of the mistakes that have been made by parties
adducing such evidence in previous cases.
4.2 Some potential problems that should be considered and, if possible, avoided by
the initiating party include:
(a) failure to adequately identify what it is that the survey is designed to
measure;
1028 [11.0.510]
(b) use of biased or leading questions, preambles and/or excessive use of

probing;
(c) use of questions open to different interpretations and/or poorly defined
or ambiguous terms or concepts;
(d) use of a survey instrument that is excessive in length and/or complexity;
(e) inadequate testing of the survey instrument;
(f) use of a sample frame not sufficiently representative of the target
population;
(g) use of an inadequate sample size;
(h) inappropriate or poor quality recording and/or coding of responses;
(i) excessive non-response and/or non-completion rates;
(j) inappropriate or poor quality data analysis;
(k) use of researchers for interviewing and/or coding of responses with
insufficient training or experience;
(l) lack of adequate quality controls (eg. failure to review data for evidence
of problems with participants’ understanding of questions and/or the
reliability of recording / coding of responses).
4.3 As to the design of the survey instrument, it is important to note that what may
be acceptable in one case may not be acceptable in another. For example, in some
circumstances it may be preferable to use open-ended questions rather than
closed questions. Similarly, probing for additional and/or more specific responses
may be acceptable in one case but unacceptable in another.
4.4 Whether or not a survey instrument is excessive in length or complexity is a
matter that will usually be assessed having regard to the complexity of the
subject matter of the survey, the sophistication of the target population, the
survey methods used (eg. telephone, on-line or face-to-face) and the qualifications
and experience of the persons administering the survey instrument. Except in
cases involving a very straightforward design, it is expected that the proposed
survey instrument will have been properly tested before it is deployed in the
field.
4.5 As to the involvement of lawyers in the survey process, lawyers should only be
involved with survey design to the extent needed to ensure that relevant
questions are directed to the relevant population. Similarly, lawyers should,
wherever practicable, not participate in the survey administration or the data
analysis. Those conducting the interviews should be independent and objective
and not affiliated with the initiating party.
5. Survey Reports
5.1 When presented, survey reports should provide an appropriate level of detail
about the survey, including:
(a) the purpose of the survey;
(b) a definition of the target population;
(c) a description of the sampled population;
(d) a description of the sample design;
(e) a copy of the survey instrument;
(f) calculations and estimates of sampling error;
(g) clearly labelled statistical tables;
(h) a copy of the interviewer instructions;
(i) coding and related instructions;
(j) quality control measures; and
(k) details of any unforeseen problems encountered in the course of the
survey work that might reasonably be expected to have an impact upon
the quality or reliability of the data or results.
[11.0.510] 1029
5.2 Any expert preparing such a report should also have regard to the requirements
set out in the Expert Evidence Practice Note (GPN-EXPT).
…
Compliance with the Practice Note is not a precondition of admissibility. Further, failure to
comply with the Practice Note will not itself generally be taken into account on the issue
of whether evidence of a survey should be excluded in the exercise of a court’s discretion
under s 135 or s 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea
Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006] ATPR 42-113; [2006] FCA 364 at [11]. However, the
considerations set out in para 4.2 of the Practice Note appear relevant to discretionary
decision-making.
The impact of the uniform Evidence Acts

[11.0.530] In Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (No 2) [2006]
ATPR 42-113; [2006] FCA 364, part of the evidence before Heerey J in a passing-off case
included evidence about a ‘chocolate sensory study’ based upon responses given by
survey participants who were shown chocolates of undisclosed origin, in fact made by
Cadbury, in different forms. Questions were asked of the participants in relation to their
reactions. It was objected that the evidence was hearsay. However, Heerey J held that the
participants’ answers fell within s 72 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) as representations
made by such persons that were contemporaneous representations about their feelings,
sensations, knowledge or state of mind.
It was also objected that the only source of evidence was one person, whereas a
number of persons would have participated in administering the survey. Heerey J held
that this objection is answered by s 190(3), which provides:
In a civil proceeding a court may order that any one or more of the provisions mentioned
in subsection (1) [one of those is Pt 3.2 dealing with hearsay] do not apply in relation to
evidence if:
(a) the matter to which the evidence relates is not genuinely in dispute; or
(b) the application of those provisions would cause or involve unnecessary expense
or delay.
He found that both the criteria applied in the case before him. He observed that what was
in dispute before him was the significance of the survey for the purpose of the resolution
of whether, in marketing its chocolates, Darrell Lea had contravened ss 52 and 53(c) and
(d) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and committed the tort of passing off by use of the
colour purple. He found (at [6]) that the survey involved a:
typical routine commercial operation. There is no suggestion of bad faith or some major
disruption. While it is always possible to imagine some fault, for example, some incorrect
recording of a participant’s answer or some gratuitous comment by a participant on a
written response, that remains essentially speculative. Moreover, I think to search for all
the supervisors who took part in this exercise and take affidavits from them would involve
unnecessary expense or delay.
He was urged to exclude the survey results by reference to s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995
(Cth) but again declined to do so (at [8]) on the basis that:
the report does have prima facie probative value in that one of the issues in this case is the
likely reaction of chocolate consumers to different colours and the strength of association
with various colours, in particular purple or shades of purple.
He accepted that the study could be subject to comment and criticism but, as it appeared
to have been carried out in a rational and professional way, he was not prepared to
exclude it as a matter of principle. He noted that there was not any specific prejudice to
Darrell Lea, the report having been available to its solicitors for some time and the
evidence being neither misleading nor confusing.
1030 [11.0.530]
In a subsequent decision in Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea Chocolate Shops Pty
Ltd (No 3) (2006) 229 ALR 179; [2006] FCA 386, Heerey J held that what various persons
who cooperated in market research analysis for Cadbury said to researchers was
inadmissible as being second-hand hearsay. Further, he found that, to the extent that the
documents expressed opinions of the authors about consumer behaviour, he regarded
them also as inadmissible, or alternatively that they should be rejected under s 135, for the
reasons given in his ruling on expert evidence (Cadbury Schweppes Pty Ltd v Darrell Lea
Chocolate Shops Pty Ltd (2006) 228 ALR 719; [2006] FCA 363) that if the expert’s direct
opinion evidence was not admissible, hearsay opinions of the same kind were even less
admissible. He also indicated that he would have been prepared if necessary to limit the
use of the documents by s 136 had he not otherwise held them inadmissible. He was
particularly influenced by the absence of the authors, which reduced the probative value
of the evidence. He observed that the absence of the authors also was prejudicial to Darrell
Lea and their admission for all purposes would add length and confusion to the trial: see
Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371 at 378, 382.
An English note of caution

[11.0.570] In the English case Mothercare UK Ltd v Penguin Books Ltd [1988] RPC 113, which
involved issues of passing off and infringement of trade marks in relation to a book
entitled Mother Care/Other Care, the Court of Appeal was provided with a primitive survey
carried out by a marketing research company. A small number of women, either expectant
mothers or mothers of young children, had been shown the book and asked ‘If you
wanted further information about this book who would you approach?’ and then ‘Why?’
A number of the interviewees had responded ‘Mothercare’ to the first question and, in
answer to the second question, said that they thought the organisation called ‘Mothercare’
had something to do with the book.
Dillon LJ noted (at 117) that none of the interviewees had studied the contents of the
book and that those answering were responding to ‘an unnatural question in an unnatural
surrounding’. He held that the women’s answers fell a long way short of providing any
basis for asserting that the title of the book involved a misrepresentation as to the source
of the book or as to the existence of an association between the organisation, Mothercare,
and the book. He commented (at 117):
It has become rather a fashion latterly for large companies involved in passing off actions
to have surveys carried out, with the results put in evidence, to show public reaction to
the defendant’s product, when, as here, the question of misrepresentation or likelihood of
deception is a question for the court. I do not for my part find such surveys helpful.
Principles arising from the case law
General principles
[11.0.610] Pragmatism is important in relation to the level of subjectivity that inevitably
attaches to expert evidence about survey results. As Anderson J in King-Seeley Thermos Co
v Aladdin Industries Inc 321 F 2d 577 at 579 (CA 2d Cir 1963) observed: ‘Any conclusion in
this area cannot be reduced to a figure of unimpeachable accuracy but must, at best, be an
approximation.’ Corbin, Gill and Jolliffe (2000, p 13) caution:
The proper approach is to view survey evidence with appreciation of the many sources of
variability in conducting a survey. Technical defects, assuming they are not fatal to the
credibility of the survey as a whole, may be used to diminish the overall weight to be
given as evidence, rather than to reject the results out-of-hand.
In the Australian Federal Court, the currently preferred approach is for the court to avail
itself of the evidentiary discretions existing under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) to admit
survey evidence, even if it is classified as hearsay evidence, specifically s 135: see Telstra
[11.0.610] 1031
Corporation Ltd v Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd (2014) 316 ALR 590; [2014] FCA 568.
This approach is expressly adopted for pragmatic reasons on the basis of the time and
expense that would be incurred in having all survey interviewees called as witnesses. It
also has the advantage of redirecting the court’s attention toward the statistical integrity
and reliability of the actual survey’s methodology. However, there are still threshold
issues, as noted in Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 360–361
per the Full Federal Court:
[I]n a civil case in which a market survey may cast light on relevant issues, it is desirable
in principle to admit into evidence a report of a professionally conducted survey, upon
proof that it has been satisfactorily conducted using relevant and unambiguous questions,
and without requiring evidence from each of the participants.
Thus, both in determining the admissibility of survey material and in deciding the weight
that should be accorded to it and, in particular, to expert evidence on the basis of the
admitted basis material, principles of statistical interpretation and methodology are
looked to. These are discussed below, at [11.0.630].
The critical issue remains whether survey material is to be classified as hearsay and
then whether an exception to the hearsay rule to cover evidence of state of mind should be
permitted, and whether the evidence ultimately has probative value. Early Australian
cases liberally classified answers to interviewers’ questions as hearsay, but an alternative
view that has more recently emerged claims a distinction between material tendered in
proof of interviewees’ answers and survey evidence, which is ‘direct evidence of an issue
in the case’, such as the state of public perception.
In addition, Burchett J in Shoshana Pty Ltd v 10th Cantanae Pty Ltd (1987) 79 ALR 279
expressed the view that survey evidence that is generated for the purposes of litigation
ought not to be admitted.
Methodology required
[11.0.630] Modern authority has emphasised the potential probative utility of survey
evidence and stressed the need for methodological soundness: see, eg, Tourangeau, Rips
and Rasinski (2000). Corbin, Gill and Jolliffe (2000, p 16) argue that there are a number of
universal standards against which admissibility and weight should be judged, including
the following:
• the survey sample should be representative of the relevant universe, or as it is
sometimes known, the pertinent population;
• the time period for the survey should not be biased by seasonality or changing markets;
• while the real-life context of the consumers’ experience need not be reproduced exactly,
elements of that context critical to the legal analysis should not be omitted;
• if the survey is designed to test a causal proposition, the survey should include an
appropriate control group or question;
• the survey sample should be sufficiently large to draw reasonable conclusions;
• questions should be free from bias;
• responses should allow interviewees freedom of expression, not unduly restrict their
answers;
• coding of open-ended questions should be thorough and not overly restrictive;
• interviewer instructions and all respondents’ answers must be disclosed;
• interviewers should be well-trained, but should have no knowledge of the litigation or
purpose of the survey;
• the data should be analysed in accordance with accepted statistical principles and
accurately reported; and
• the objectivity of the entire process should be assured.
1032 [11.0.630]
The need to maintain objectivity and scientific soundness of methodology in the surveying
process has been stressed by many decisions. The risk of alienating a decision-maker
through the absence of such measures was caustically highlighted by the decision in
American Home Products Corp v Johnson & Johnson 654 F Supp 568 at 583 (SDNY 1987):
The difference in bias between the two surveys is dramatically shown by the fact that only
2% of the respondents in the AHP survey chose the [no product similarity option in the
advertisement in question], while in the M survey 52% of the respondents did so. It is
difficult to believe that it was a mere coincidence that when each party retained a
supposedly independent and objective survey organisation, it ended up with survey
questions which were virtually certain to produce the particular results it sought. This
strongly suggests that those who drafted the survey questions were more likely knaves
than fools. If they were indeed the former, they must have assumed that judges are the
latter.
A survey instrument should be both reliable and valid. The distinction between these two
concepts is important generally throughout the sciences but particularly in the context of
survey research. Reliability relates to the likelihood of obtaining the same results if the
same measurements were applied to another sample on the same day, using the same
instrument, and utilising the same methodology. Therefore, if the questionnaire is tested
on a sample of people who are distinctly unrepresentative of the population, its reliability
should be called into question. If there is lack of consistency in interviewer style, or
inconsistent interviewer training, then reliability is also threatened. If coding is not done
with strict rules, or if there is any lack of objectivity in the survey process, reliability is not
assured. On the other hand, if such conditions are reasonably well controlled, then the
reliability of the survey sample is adequately described by the margin of error. Reliability
standards are almost always under the control of the survey researcher, insofar as making
design decisions and overseeing the quality controls of the interviewing process: Corbin,
Gill and Jolliffe (2000, pp 33–39). By contrast, the validity of a survey is the extent to which
a test, survey instrument or questionnaire meets its intended purpose: is the concept
which requires measurement being accurately captured by the test question? If not, what
is being measured? And is it an acceptable surrogate for the necessary evidence? (See
Corbin, Gill and Jolliffe (2000, p 38).)
International case law has addressed these issues and suggests that the following
principles may be distilled from the multiplying decisions on the subject:
(1) A representative cross-section of the public must be interviewed: Ritz Hotel Ltd v
Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15 NSWLR 158; Imperial Group plc v Philip Morris Ltd
[1984] RPC 293; Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1991) 102 ALR 379; ARA v
Mutual Rental Cars [1987] 2 NZLR 647; Levi Strauss & Co v Kimbyr Investments Ltd
[1994] 1 NZLR 332; Phoenix Trade Mark [1985] RPC 122; R v Times Square Cinema
Ltd (1971) 4 CCC (2d) 229; R v Pipeline News Ltd (1971) 5 CCC (2d) 71; R v Prairie
Schooner News Ltd (1970) 75 WWR 585; (1971) 1 CCC (2d) 251 at 259.
(2) Where a subpopulation is surveyed, it must still be properly representative: Joseph
E Seagram & Sons Ltd v Seagram Real Estate Ltd (1990) 33 CPR (3d) 454 at 473.
(3) The time period of a survey must not be biased by reference to factors such as
seasonality or market evolution: R v Hammer Ltd [1987] 1 CTC 199.
(4) Surveys must be large enough to be of relevance: Imperial Group plc v Philip Morris
Ltd [1984] RPC 293; Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1991) 102 ALR 379;
Phoenix Trade Mark [1985] RPC 122; Corbin, Gill and Jolliffe (2000); Tourangeau,
Rips and Rasinski (2000); see, however, Sorenson and Sorenson (1953, p 1248).
(5) Full disclosure of how many surveys are carried out, how they were conducted,
and how many people were involved must be made: Imperial Group plc v Philip
Morris Ltd [1984] RPC 293; Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1991) 102 ALR
379.
[11.0.630] 1033
(6) Leading questions must not be posed: State Government Insurance Corporation v
Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1991) 28 FCR 511; Payton & Co Ltd v Snelling,
Lampard & Co Ltd (1900) 17 RPC 628 at 635; Mothercare UK Ltd v Penguin Books Ltd
[1988] RPC 113 at 117; Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1991) 102 ALR 379.
(7) There should generally be a combination of open-ended and closed questions, as
well as opt-out answers (such as ‘I don’t know’) in order to avoid the inherent
suggestiveness of many closed-end and multiple-choice questions: Upjohn Co v
American Home Products Corp 598 F Supp 550 at 557 (SDNY 1984); Coors Brewing Co
v Anheuser Busch Companies 802 F Supp 965 at 972 (SDNY 1992); Corbin, Gill and
Jolliffe (2000, pp 29–32).
(8) The full answers given by all interviewees must be recorded: Imperial Group plc v
Philip Morris Ltd [1984] RPC 293; Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1991) 102
ALR 379.
(9) The full instructions given to interviewers must be made known: Imperial Group
plc v Philip Morris Ltd [1984] RPC 293; ARA v Mutual Rental Cars [1987] 2 NZLR
647; Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1991) 102 ALR 379; Levi Strauss & Co v
Kimbyr Investments Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 332.
(10) Questions posed by interviewers must be fair and free from suggestio falsi:
Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v Beauty Box [1987] 2 SALR 600 at 618.
(11) Answers as to what people felt and thought or answers of a subjective type may
be objectionable in the criminal context: R v Times Square Cinema Ltd (1971) 4 CCC
(2d) 229.
(12) Wherever possible, surveys should avoid hypothetical circumstances remote from
the actual consumer environment or the course of trade: Hoechst Pharmaceuticals v
Beauty Box [1987] 2 SALR 600; Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (1988) 15
NSWLR 158.
(13) Surveys should take into account relevant real-life factors: G Heileman Brewing Co
v Anheuser-Busch Inc 873 F 2d 985 at 995 (1989); Joseph E Seagram & Sons Ltd v
Seagram Real Estate Ltd (1990) 33 CPR (3d) 454 at 473; see also Vidmar and
Melnitzer (1988, p 492).
(14) Evidence of interviewees’ spontaneous or initial responses before any conditioning
process can operate are particularly valuable: Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd
(1988) 15 NSWLR 158; Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] 1 WLR 491
at 509 quaere by inference.
(15) The results of a survey commissioned for non-litigious purposes may be accorded
especial weight: Shoshana Pty Ltd v 10th Cantanae Pty Ltd (1987) 79 ALR 279; Kettle
Chip Co v Apand (1993) 119 ALR 156.
(16) Interviewers should be experienced: State Government Insurance Corporation v
Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1991) 28 FCR 511.
(17) Interviewers should not depart from prescribed procedures: State Government
Insurance Corporation v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1991) 28 FCR 511.
(18) Wherever possible, control conditions should be incorporated in the survey: Labatt
Brewing Co v Molson Breweries (1996) 73 CPR (3d) 544; Mennen Co v Gillette Co 565
F Supp 648 at 652 (SDNY 1983).
(19) The time constraints under which a survey and its subsequent analyses are
conducted should not be oppressive: State Government Insurance Corporation v
Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1991) 28 FCR 511.
(20) Disclosure of the company commissioning the survey should not be made to
interviewees: State Government Insurance Corporation v Government Insurance Office
(NSW) (1991) 28 FCR 511.
1034 [11.0.630]
(21) Disclosure, either explicit or implicit, should not be made to interviewers that the
survey is being undertaken in connection with proposed litigation: State
Government Insurance Corporation v Government Insurance Office (NSW) (1991) 28
FCR 511; Sugarman and Small (1990, p 55).
(22) Surveys should not be directed to the hypothetical, eg whether consumers would
be deceived: Interlego v Croner Trading (1992) 111 ALR 577 at 619.
(23) The survey should be genuinely relevant in its formulation of questions to assist
the court: Phoenix Trade Mark [1985] RPC 122; Mothercare UK Ltd v Penguin Books
Ltd [1988] RPC 113.
In addition, a United States court has sounded a warning about lawyers’ involvement in
the design of surveys: Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH v Pharmadyne Laboratories 532 F Supp
1040 (DNJ 1980). It is advisable for solicitors and barristers to stay at arm’s length from the
design of surveys and leave the process to the professionals.
Taken in combination, these principles indicate that considerable scrutiny will be
applied to the mechanics of the compilation of the data upon which an expert may express
an opinion about, for example, the likelihood of a member of the public mistaking one
product for another because of its name or logo. There is nothing startling about the
principles – they are those advocated in the creation of any sound market research and
ought not theoretically to present a significant problem to the party wishing to adduce
survey evidence. The fundamental message is that short-cuts cannot be adopted with
impunity.
Once a survey is held to be admissible, the value of the answers and the weight to be
accorded to them depends on the structural integrity and fairness of the survey
questionnaire and the individual questions incorporated in it: Klissers Farmhouse Bakeries
Ltd v Harvest Bakeries Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 129 at 133; Levi Strauss & Co v Kimbyr Investments
Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 332 at 364. In the normal course of events, if a survey is said to be
profoundly deficient and if that is the approach which is taken in cross-examination, it
would be standard practice to call expert evidence to that effect: Levi Strauss & Co v Kimbyr
Investments Ltd [1994] 1 NZLR 332 at 366.
Ironically, a procedure adopted by Lockhart J as long ago as 1979 (Greynor Investments
Pty Ltd v Hunter Douglas Ltd (unreported, Federal Court of Australia, 12 September 1979))
may re-emerge in the future via a Federal Court Practice Note. In this case, directions were
given by consent that an intended survey should not be rendered inadmissible by reason
only of the hearsay rule, provided that the following conditions were observed:
(a) The respondent establishes that the survey was designed and conducted in
accordance with accepted principles of survey research producing a result which
is trustworthy, including (without limiting the generality of the foregoing):
(i) That the proper universe was examined.
(ii) That a representative sample was drawn from that universe.
(iii) That the persons conducting the survey were recognised experts.
(iv) That the data gathered was accurately recorded.
(v) That the questionnaire, sample design and interviewing were in
accordance with generally accepted standards of objective procedure
and statistics in the field of such surveys.
(b) A complete record of:
(i) The methods by which the universe and sample were selected, and of
the techniques employed for selecting and instructing the interviewers,
and the experience of those interviewers.
(ii) Any data underlying the survey, methods of interpretation and
conclusions reached.
[11.0.630] 1035
(iii) The responses to the survey with names and addresses of those
interviewed deleted.
(iv) Any tests applied and the results of any tests applied to determine the
extent to which the survey or results of the survey can be trusted.
(v) The nature of and results of any audit applied in connection with the
survey.
(vi) The method employed in assigning the answers to open-ended
questions to categories is supplied to the applicant in reasonable time in
advance of the hearing.
(c) Such persons as were involved in the conduct of the survey are, if required by the
applicant, called by the respondent as witnesses in the proceedings.
The approach adopted by Lockhart J is similar to that taken by the trial judge in People v
Castro 144 Misc 2d 956; 545 NYS 2d 985 (NY 1989), in which an attempt was made to
formulate procedures that would enable parties to scrutinise the reliability of the evidence
put before the court in a meaningful way: see below, [12.20.650].
A similar approach was adopted in 1984 in Imperial Group plc v Philip Morris Ltd [1984]
RPC 293 at 293–294 by Whitford J, who set out the following requirements for the validity
of survey evidence:
(a) The interviewees must be selected so as to represent a relevant cross-section of
the public;
(b) The size of the survey must be statistically significant;
(c) The survey must be conducted fairly;
(d) All the surveys carried out must be disclosed including the number carried out,
how they were conducted, and the totality of the persons involved;
(e) The totality of the answers given must be disclosed and made available to the
defendant;
(f) The questions must not be leading nor should they lead the person answering
into a field of speculation he would never have embarked upon had the
questions not been put;
(g) The exact answers and not some abbreviated form must be recorded;
(h) The instructions to the interviewers as to how to carry out the survey must be
disclosed; and
(i) Where the answers are coded for computer input, the coding instructions must be
disclosed.
1036 [11.0.630]
Chapter 11.05
HISTORIANS’ EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [11.05.01]
Diverse examples of historians’ evidence in the courts ................................................. [11.05.40]
Factual history and social history ...................................................................................... [11.05.80]
Nature of history ................................................................................................................... [11.05.120]
Qualifications as an historian .............................................................................................. [11.05.160]
Objectivity ............................................................................................................................... [11.05.200]
Bases of evidence .................................................................................................................. [11.05.220]
Native title cases .................................................................................................................... [11.05.240]
Planning cases ........................................................................................................................ [11.05.280]
Veterans’ pension entitlement cases .................................................................................. [11.05.320]
Tobacco litigation ................................................................................................................... [11.05.330]
Damages calculation ............................................................................................................. [11.05.340]
Statutory provisions .............................................................................................................. [11.05.360]
‘In my soul and conscience, I believe that historians cannot be
“witnesses” and that a role as “expert witness” rather poorly
suits the rules and objectives of a court trial. It is one thing to
try to understand history in the context of a research project
or course lesson, with the intellectual freedom that such
activities presuppose; it is quite another to try to do so under
oath when an individual’s fate hangs in the balance.’
Rousso, letter to the Chief Justice of the Court of Assizes, Palais de Justice,
Bordeaux, 1997.
Introduction
[11.05.01] Evidence from historians makes its way relatively seldom into the courts (see
Durie (1994)), but on a number of occasions has played an important role. In native title
claims, historians’ evidence is assuming an increasing significance (Ginzberg (1994); Ritter
(1999); Choo and Hollbach (1999); Reilly (2000); Dreyfus (2003); Carter (2008); Luker
(2016)). Similarly, in New Zealand historians have regularly given evidence before the
Waitangi Tribunal, whose investigations are explicit inquiries into history. In a number of
Nazi war crime trials, expert evidence by historians has been adduced (see Evans (2002);
Haberer (2005); Petrovic (2009); Turner (2011)). This chapter identifies some instances of
such evidence becoming contentious and analyses relevant principles.
Diverse examples of historians' evidence in the courts

[11.05.40] In Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1 at 196, Dixon J
referred to the use that can be made by the courts of ‘the general facts of history, as
ascertained or ascertainable from the accepted writings of serious historians’ and of ‘the
common knowledge of educated men’ referring for verification to ‘standard works of
literature and the like’. His Honour’s comments were consistent with a line of authority
(and especially ecclesiastical authority) in the course of which Lord Halsbury LC stated, in
Read v Bishop of Lincoln [1892] AC 644 at 653: ‘Where it is important to ascertain ancient
facts of a public nature, the law does permit historical works to be referred to.’ This was a
case dealing with whether the mixing of communion wine with water, and various other
practices, were contrary to the laws of the Church of England.
McLelland J in Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz (Nos 15 and 16) (1987) 14 NSWLR 107
at 112 commented that ‘the circumstances that a particular fact or event receives publicity
is not sufficient to constitute it as a fact “of a public nature” of the kind referred to by
Lord Halsbury’. In the context of a case dealing with a ‘sympathetic memoir of Cesar
Ritz’, he concluded that it was among neither accepted writings of serious historians nor
standard works and commented (at 112–113) that he did not consider:
[11.05.40] 1037
that the circumstances that the book has been treated as a source in subsequent works
dealing with the history of hotel keeping or of particular hotels or any other subject (even
if those subsequent works were themselves properly to be regarded as ‘accepted writings
of serious historians’) would materially alter the status of the book itself.
(See also Islamic Council of Victoria v Catch the Fire Ministries Inc [2004] VCAT 2510 at [108].)
In Cubillo v Commonwealth (No 2) (2000) 103 FCR 1; [2000] FCA 1084, a personal injuries
case in which indigenous plaintiffs sought damages as members of the ‘stolen generation’,
the Commonwealth called an educational historian to give expert evidence about the
development and availability of educational facilities for Aboriginal and part-Aboriginal
children in the Northern Territory. For the plaintiffs, an historian gave evidence on the
contemporary attitudes to the policy and practice of removal of part-Aboriginal children
in the Northern Territory between 1947 and 1963.
In the controversial decision of the United Kingdom Court of Appeal involving
writings by the revisionist historian David Irving, there was argument about the
admissibility of evidence by other historians: Irving v Penguin Books Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ
1197. One was Professor van Pelt, a professor of the history of architecture at a Canadian
university. It emerged that he was not a qualified architect but described himself as a
‘cultural historian’. He proposed to give evidence about the buildings at Auschwitz. It was
submitted that, even if qualified to give evidence about the design of buildings, he should
not have been permitted, when questions arose as to the chemistry involved in gassing, to
give evidence about such a subject. The court saw no merit in the submissions, holding
that Professor van Pelt plainly had considerable knowledge and expertise in the design of
buildings and the uses to which they could be put. The absence of a professional
qualification in architecture did not preclude him from giving evidence on architectural
matters when the issues were those in the particular case. The court commented that a
person does not have to be a qualified lawyer to express views on legal history. It
acknowledged (at [29]):
There must of course be a limit to the extent to which someone whose profession is that of
historian can express views of his own on highly technical matters. The witness is
however entitled to consult, refer to and rely on source material in support of an opinion.
Military historians frequently express opinions about the effectiveness of weapons and the
effect of their use in battle and can do so without their being experts, for example, in
ballistics or metallurgy.
In R v Vinayagamoorthy (2008) 238 FLR 117; (2008) 200 A Crim R 186; [2008] VSC 599 at [25],
Coghlan J commented that although witnesses could be called to give eyewitness evidence
of atrocities committed by individuals or in the presence of individuals, this would not
preclude the calling of ‘expert historical evidence that there was an ongoing policy of the
German regime towards genocide. Such evidence might be necessary to prove that the act
involving an individual was part of a more general policy so that it might qualify as a
“war crime” and a crime against humanity’.
The role of historians as expert witnesses is unresolved and continuing to evolve. The
view of Curthoys, Genovese and Reilly (2008, pp 100–101) is that courts may acknowledge
that historians have particular skills in identifying relevant evidentiary sources in archival
sources, but they have generally been resistant to the proposition that they bring
specialised knowledge in the form of interpretative skills to litigation.
1038 [11.05.40]
Historians’ evidence | CH 11.05
Factual history and social history

[11.05.80] In Bellevue Crescent Pty Ltd v Marland Holdings Pty Ltd (1998) 43 NSWLR 364,
Young J was called upon in the context of s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) to consider
evidence by historians. He did so in relation to a dispute about land in inner-city Sydney.
He noted (at 371) that there is a distinction on the authorities between the facts of history
and what might be called ‘social history’:
Whilst courts may obtain the basal facts such as when a particular war broke out or other
matters of record from reputable histories, analyses as to why certain things happened
and generally how people behaved is not a matter which can be proved by the evidence of
people who were not there but have ascertained the historical facts and then have
analysed them to work out a conclusion.
Young J rejected most of the evidence from historians that was placed before him, finding
that their knowledge was not s 79 knowledge, but rather was based on hearsay material of
the past and was not even wholly or substantially based on such knowledge, but rather
was an analysis. A similar approach was followed by Hely J in Jones v Scully (2002) 120
FCR 243; [2002] FCA 1080.
Dr Bosworth, a senior lecturer at the University of Sydney specialising in European
history, was permitted to give evidence, in the face of objection to the admissibility of such
evidence, about the geographical and political history of the state of Yugoslavia up to 1945
on the basis that it was ‘relevant and admissible on the issue of motive’: R v Bebic
(unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Maxwell J, 23 September 1980). Cole and Acland (1994,
p 106) similarly refer to the case of R v Booth in which an historian gave evidence about
the significance of an inverted cross from the point of view of black magic, and a writer
‘describing herself as a ceremonial magician’ gave evidence about the difference between
white and black magic.
Nature of history
[11.05.120] In Daniel v Western Australia [2003] FCA 666 at [149], Nicholson J said that it
must always be borne in mind that any historical record about Aboriginal people is
incomplete. There are ‘silences’ in the historical record. His Honour said:
The nature of these ‘silences’ and the manner in which they should be addressed is the
subject not merely of academic interest, but one that bears directly upon the approach the
Court must take in order to interpret the expert and witness evidence, and to derive the
inferences that of necessity must be made, in order to decide upon the issues in
contention.
Nicholson J said that this was particularly so in Daniel, where the records of ‘police and
pastoralists’ were ‘ethnocentric’ and where there was a ‘lack of continuity of
anthropological observation of the customs, practices and lifestyles of Aboriginal people,
and Europeans generally, including police, pastoralists and Native Welfare officers, did not
identify people by tribe or language’.
Qualifications as an historian
[11.05.160] In YCO v Firearm Appeals Committee (Occupational and Business Regulation) [2008]
VCAT 966 at [48], Walker SM found that a witness who claimed to be an historian was not:
‘I do not find on the evidence that he has expertise in the history and built form of
Melbourne. He has worked with others in this area but he has no formal qualifications or
other proven expertise.’ Similarly, in Victoria v Tymbook Pty Ltd (Retail Tenancies) [2008]
VCAT 965 at [45], Walker SM distinguished between the witness’s expertise as an art
curator, museum manager and librarian and that of an historian: see too Re Maccallum of
Havelock North Broadcaster Television New Zealand Ltd [2001] NZBSA 71.
[11.05.160] 1039
By contrast, Bryson J in Sydney City Council v Griffin Corp Pty Ltd (2003) 11 BPR 20,675;
[2003] NSWSC 26 at [2]–[3] said of a witness (emphasis added):
She has had a career of over 30 years as a professional historian and is a Doctor of
Philosophy of Macquarie University. She has had a distinguished career, with several
academic and other positions and many publications, and the history of the City has been
a central part of her work. In her evidence she produced and explained the historical
material which refers to the lane, and to Arthur Little in relation to his owning the land of
which the lane is part.
Doctor Fitzgerald is, in my opinion, well qualified by academic qualifications, and also
in terms of practical experience as a historian, especially in practical experience in relation
to the use and occupation of land in the City of Sydney, and I have confidence in her
evidence and opinions.
Objectivity
[11.05.200] Although history can encompass a considerable degree of subjectivity, the
importance of historians as expert witnesses being impartial has been emphasised by
courts and commentators alike. Choo and Hollbach (1999, p 6) have acknowledged that
historians who do forensic work in the native title context:
face a major problem in reconciling the contradiction between these kind of
historiographical perspectives and the imperatives of a judicial discourse where rhetorical
and narratological dimensions of historical practice are not generally acknowledged.
Mainstream legal discourse revolves around the notion that objective truth can be
discovered through a rigorous analysis of the facts. This rhetoric of objectivity obscures
senses in which both the analytical process and the facts it interrogates reflect power
relations associated with gender, culture, class etc. As recent cases illustrate, the native title
era is forcing courts of law to confront these issues. But most historians of Aboriginal-
European relations continue to be acutely aware of the problems associated with applying
European rules of evidence and concepts of historical truth to the analysis of indigenous
culture and experience.
In Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404 at [135], Mansfield J observed that ‘[a]n
historical source document is only as objective as its author. Therefore, it is reasonable that
an expert historian would adopt a methodology requiring a critical reading of source
documents’. He complained of an historian that (at [132]–[133]):
She was not a dispassionate witness. She clearly firmly believed in the reliability of the
views she had expressed, and was anxious to persuade as to their accuracy. There is often
a fine line between objectivity of presentation and intellectual persuasiveness in
communication. An expert is not expected to abandon or qualify opinions truly held
because there is a different view, or to accept a different view as equally arguable if that is
not the expert’s opinion. On the other hand, there are occasions when an expert’s opinion,
having been reached, has [led] that person to such a degree of persuasion – for whatever
reason – that countervailing considerations apparent to others are discussed or
rationalised in a way that others do not find convincing.
In my judgment, Dr Wells did fall into the category of expert witnesses whose views
are so firmly held that I have regard to her evidence with some circumspection. That is not
because I regard her as less than fully honest with the Court. I have no doubt about that.
(Cf Trinity Western University v Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society 2014 NSSC 395 at [40].)
Bases of evidence
[11.05.220] There is frequently contention in relation to the documentation or other sources
utilised by historians and anthropologists. In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v Fast (2003) 240 FTR 161 at [36], Pelletier J observed that:
… the use of particular documents by the historians may be weaker evidence of reliability
than would be the case if the historians had selected the documents themselves. But it
remains some evidence that the historians thought the documents trustworthy. One
1040 [11.05.200]
cannot assume that professional historians, whose reputations are at risk, would rely upon
documents which they knew to be unreliable. So, as a general rule, it is my view that proof
of the reliability of the documents is supplied by the fact that professional historians have
relied upon them in coming to the conclusions which they have put before the Court. This
does not preclude a challenge to particular documents, or classes of documents.
Furthermore, the question of weight is always an issue. Consequently, I am prepared to
receive archival documents in evidence in proof of their contents where the reliability of
the documents for that purpose is asserted, implicitly or explicitly, by a professional
historian or other witness whose familiarity with the documents permits them to make
such an assertion.
It has been held in Canada that:

If an historical treatise is admissible to prove an historical fact of general public interest, …
it should logically follow, if the conditions for this exception to the hearsay rule are met,
that an expert historian may testify as to the existence of an historical event relying upon
material to which any careful and competent historian would resort. The testimony of an
expert historian is, in our view, superior to the admission of an historical treatise, because
the expert can be cross-examined.
(R v Zundel (1987) 35 DLR (4th) 338; 31 CCC (3d) 97 at 135; cf Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration) v Odynsky 1999 CanLII 18486.)
The expertise of historians can also provide the necessary threshold for admission of
official documents as business records (see, eg, Canada (Minister for Citizenship and
Immigration) v Oberlander [1999] 1 FC 88).
It is common for evidence from historians to be necessary for there to be informed
understanding of historical documents (see, eg, Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia 2004
BCSC 1237; Ahousaht Indian Band v Canada 2008 BCSC 768; [2009] 2 WWR 159).
Native title cases

[11.05.240] The use of historians in native title claims, aboriginal rights and treaty cases has
become common in Australia, Canada (see, eg, R v Badger [1996] 1 SCR 771; Delgamuukw v
The Queen (1987) 40 DLR (4th) 685; R v Côté [1996] 3 SCR 139) and New Zealand. For
example, in Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483, the applicants called Dr Choo
and Dr Shaw; the State of Western Australia called Dr Green, and the Northern Territory
called Dr Clement. In Daniel v Western Australia [2003] FCA 666, the first applicant called
two historians, Dr Choo and Mr Gara, and the first respondents called historian Dr Green.
In De Rose v South Australia [2002] FCA 1342, Dr Foster gave expert evidence as an
historian on behalf of the applicants on a variety of historical documents that he had been
asked to examine and also wrote two reports. In Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] FCA
1402, Dr Skyring, an historian employed by the Kimberley Land Council, provided three
written reports and gave oral evidence for the applicants and Dr Green prepared a report
for the State.
Ritter (1999) has observed:
It would seem axiomatic that, as history is the foundation of native title, historians should
be well-represented amongst those who are busy constructing the edifice of the native title
claim process. This statement is not to imply that historians are more important experts or
witnesses than Aboriginal people themselves. The courts have recognised (and I believe
strongly) that the most important evidence in native title proceedings comes from the
hearts and minds of Aboriginal people themselves. However, there is no doubt that the
evidence of Aboriginal people themselves can be buttressed by the contributions of
non-indigenous experts, including historians.
Choo and Hollbach (1999, p 4) have noted:

Historians may be called upon to gather together ‘facts’ from available secondary and
archival sources, organise material for presentation in court, and provide expert opinion in
relation to issues such as continuity of indigenous occupation, traditional culture and land
[11.05.240] 1041
use and the impact of European occupation. In relation to continuity of occupation, the
historian may be required to map individuals and indigenous groups to places within the
boundaries of the claim and to trace movements in and around the claim area across given
time periods.
An important reservation was raised by Lindgren J in Harrington-Smith v Western Australia

(No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at [40] in applying the notion of ‘opinion’ to
reports by historians in a land claim. He noted that the word ‘opinion’ is not defined in
the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) but is generally understood as an inference drawn from facts:
see Allstate Life Insurance Co v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (No 5) (1996) 64
FCR 73 at 75; Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371 at 373. Another definition is ‘a
conclusion, usually judgmental or debatable, reasoned from facts’: RW Miller & Co Pty Ltd
v Krupp (Australia) Pty Ltd (1991) 34 NSWLR 129 at 130 per Giles J; and see R v Perry (No 4)
(1981) 28 SASR 119 at 123–126 per Cox J. Lindgren J noted in respect of evidence by
historians in reports before him:
As is to be expected, the historians’ reports assemble and report voluminous data
scattered throughout contemporary sources, and offer interpretative conclusions. The
distinction between the analysis, synthesis and summary of factual and material on the
one hand, and the drawing of inferences on the other, can be difficult, as the historians’
reports show.
In particular, he was troubled by the fact that, in some instances, ‘an interpretation is
offered of the terms of a single letter’. He concluded that, generally speaking, an historian
was not qualified in terms of s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) to give expert opinion of
that kind. As no party was objecting in principle to the admissibility of the historians’
reports, he admitted them but noted specifically that there was a question as to how much
of them was admissible as evidence of expert opinion as distinct from submission as to the
interpretation he should place on historical data (see too Jango v Northern Territory (No 4)
(2004) 214 ALR 608; [2004] FCA 1539 at [27]–[31] per Sackville J; Gumana v Northern
Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457; [2005] FCA 50 at [156] per Selway J).
Historical evidence focusing on reconstruction of a chronology of past events has been
given in a number of Australian native title hearings: see Ritter (1999); Reilly (2000); Ward
v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483 at 501; Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria
[1998] FCA 1606 at [3].
Planning cases
[11.05.280] Historians’ evidence has also been called in relation to the status of land as a
public road vested in a council (Sydney City Council v Griffin Corp Pty Ltd (2003) 11 BPR
20,675; [2003] NSWSC 26) and the historical status of buildings and the need for their
conservation or classification on a heritage register (see, eg, Reelaw v Queensland Heritage
Council [2004] QPEC 79; Lenehan v Town of East Fremantle [2004] WATPAT 145; Wrap
Properties Pty Ltd v Yarra CC [2002] VCAT 1499; Cramar v Manningham CC (1997/90125)
[1998] VICCAT 502; Sisters of Mercy Property Ass v Melbourne CC [2002] VCAT 198; Ficarra
v City Moonee Valley [2000] VCAT 2571).
Veterans' pension entitlement cases

[11.05.320] War historians have also been called on a number of occasions as expert
witnesses in pension entitlement cases (see, eg, Repatriation Commission v Robertson [2004]
FCA 173; Bolton and Repatriation Commission [2001] AATA 584; La Roche and Repatriation
Commission [2003] AATA 151; Peace and Repatriation Commission [2003] AATA 1013; Dencher
and Repatriation Commission [2007] AATA 1530).
1042 [11.05.280]
Tobacco litigation
[11.05.330] Historians have been used extensively as expert witnesses in tobacco litigation
in the United States. (See Delafontaine (2015).)
Damages calculation
[11.05.340] Another role potentially to be played by historians is in the calculation of
certain forms of damage after destruction. Thus, in Furlong Estate v Newfoundland Light &
Power Co 2000 CanLII 28332 (NL SCTD), where the question was the damages caused by a
fire to the residence of Furlong CJ which contained rare books, manuscripts, maps,
paintings, antiques and other valuable material, the testimony of historians, librarians and
appraisers was central.
Statutory provisions
[11.05.360] In South Australia (Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 64) and Western Australia
(Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 72), courts are permitted expressly to refer to such published
books, maps or charts as the court considers to be of authority on the subjects to which
they respectively relate ‘in matters of public history, literature, science or art’.
[11.05.360] 1043
Chapter 11.10
ANTHROPOLOGISTS’ EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [11.10.01]
Expertise .................................................................................................................................. [11.10.40]
The bases of anthropologists’ evidence ............................................................................ [11.10.80]
Avoidance of advocacy ........................................................................................................ [11.10.120]
Distinction between facts and opinions ............................................................................ [11.10.160]
Role of lawyers ...................................................................................................................... [11.10.240]
Self-referential reports .......................................................................................................... [11.10.260]
Gender restriction issues ...................................................................................................... [11.10.280]
Compliance with ethical codes ........................................................................................... [11.10.320]
Physical anthropology evidence ......................................................................................... [11.10.360]
‘Contemplate all this work of Time,
The giant labouring in his youth;
Nor dream of human love and truth,
As dying Nature’s earth and lime;
But trust that those we call the dead
Are breathers of an ampler day
For ever nobler ends.
’
Alfred Lord Tennyson, In Memoriam AHH, CXVIII.
Introduction
[11.10.01] The specialised knowledge of an anthropologist derives from the function to be
performed by the anthropologist for which he or she is trained and in relation to which
study has been undertaken and experience gained. ‘Anthropology’ is ‘the science that
treats of the origin, development (physical, intellectual, moral, etc), and varieties, and
sometimes especially the cultural development, customs, beliefs, etc of mankind’:
Macquarie Dictionary (2nd ed, 1991). Cultural or social anthropology is the science of
human social and cultural behaviour and its development. Socio-cultural anthropology is
traditionally divided into ethnography and ethnology. The former is the primary,
data-gathering part of socio-cultural anthropology – that is, field work in a given society.
This involves the study of everyday behaviour, normal social life, economic activities,
relationships with relatives and in-laws, relationship to any wider nation-state, rituals and
ceremonial behaviour. and notions of appropriate social behaviour: Kottak (1982, p 12).
Anthropologists’ evidence can provide a framework for understanding the primary
evidence of indigenous witnesses in relation to matters such as the acknowledgment and
observance of traditional laws and practices:
Not only may anthropological evidence observe and record matters relevant to informing
the court as to the social organisation of an applicant claim group, and as to the nature
and content of their traditional laws and traditional customs, but by reference to other
material including historical literature and anthropological material, the anthropologists
may compare that social organisation with the nature and content of the traditional laws
and traditional customs of their ancestors and to interpret the similarities or differences.
And there may also be circumstances in which an anthropological expert may give
evidence about the meaning and significance of what Aboriginal witnesses say and do, so
as to explain or render coherent matters which, on their face, may be incomplete or
unclear.
See Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group v Northern Territory
(2004) 207 ALR 539; [2004] FCA 472 at [89]; see also Roe v Western Australia (No 2) [2011]
FCA 102; Murray on behalf of the Yilka Native Title Claimants v Western Australia (No 5) [2016]
FCA 752 at [167].
[11.10.01] 1045
Anthropologists also fill the valuable function of pulling together the accounts of the
society and the laws and customs of the claimant community. They may also prove
relevant facts by providing an account of things that they have seen, heard or observed; or
prove relevant facts about reputation concerning the existence, nature or extent of
traditional laws and customs, family history, and family relationships and marriage:
Murray on behalf of the Yilka Native Title Claimants v Western Australia (No 5) [2016] FCA 752
at [168].
The evidence of anthropologists tends to focus on relationships at a given time and
extrapolate to more general observations about communities’ social organisation. By
contrast, it has been observed that historians’l evidence (see Ch 11.05) focuses on
reconstructing a chronology of past events – for instance, on a claim area and on how
events impacted on communities: see Ritter (1999); Reilly (2000); Mabo v Queensland (No 2)
(1992) 175 CLR 1 at 58; Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483; [1998] FCA 1478 at
501; Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [1998] FCA 1606 at [3].
However, anthropologists’ evidence has been adduced in a wide range of cases (see
Ubelaker (2018)). An example is H v H (2003) 198 ALR 383; [2003] FMCAfam 31, where an
anthropologist was called to give evidence about the social and cultural impact of
proposals relating to the religious upbringing and education of children from the
Lebanese–Australian community and whether the proposals were likely to impact upon
the welfare of the children. Similarly, the role of an anthropologist has been recognised in
respect of indigenous practices and values: see Re P (1997) 137 FLR 367; Donnell v Dovey
(2010) 237 FLR 53; [2010] FamCAFC 15.
Physical anthropology often overlaps with forensic osteology and forensic pathology:
see, eg, Joyce and Stover (1991); Jackson and Fellenbaum (1996); Manhein (1999); Rhine
(2001); Stanojevich (2012). In North America, it is regarded as a significant part of various
categories of death investigations: see, further, Freckelton and Ranson (2006); R v
Likiardopoulos [2009] VSC 217 at [11]; R v Holden [2009] VSCA 254 at [12]; R v Aydin [2008]
VSC 388 at [9]; see too Roberts v Western Australia (2007) 34 WAR 1; [2007] WASCA 48;
Western Australia v Rayney (No 3) [2012] WASC 404 at [761]; Pickering and Bachman (2009);
Klepinger (2006). Some anthropologists have also claimed expertise in the facial mapping
context (XR): see, eg, SHJB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs
[2003] FCA 502 at [10].
Many areas of anthropology have been recognised as having a forensic relevance and
the field is continuing to diversify and evolve (see Ubelaker (2018)), with a variety of
biomolecular applications becoming grounded in empirical research (see, eg, Baker
(2016)). For instance, anthropology has been utilised in a refugee review hearing in
relation to ‘honour killings’ in Jordan: see 071594635 [2007] RRTA 229.
However, in Australia, anthropology figures most prominently in native title hearings
where it has become a mainstay: see, eg, Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 (the
Gove case) at 161; Yarmirr v Northern Territory (1998) 82 FCR 533; Members of the Yorta Yorta
Aboriginal Community v Victoria [1998] FCA 1606 at [3]; Underwood v Gayfer [1999] WASCA
56; Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 4) (2001) 123 FCR 62; [2001] FCA 1106; Ward v Western
Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483; [1998] FCA 1478; Daniels v Western Australia (2000) 178 ALR
542; [2000] FCA 858; Lardil v Queensland [2000] FCA 1548; De Rose v South Australia [2002]
FCA 1342; Neowarra v Western Australia (2003) 205 ALR 145; [2003] FCA 1399; Jango v
Northern Territory (No 2) [2004] FCA 1004; Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 8)
(2004) 207 ALR 483; [2004] FCA 338; Alyawarr, Kaytetye, Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title
Claim Group v Northern Territory (2004) 207 ALR 539; [2004] FCA 472; Bennell v Western
Australia (2006) 153 FCR 120; [2006] FCA 1243; Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404;
Griffiths v Northern Territory (2007) 165 FCR 391; [2007] FCAFC 178; Moses v Western
Australia (2007) 160 FCR 148; [2007] FCAFC 78; Western Australia v Sebastian [2008] FCAFC
1046 [11.10.01]
Anthropologists’ evidence | CH 11.10
65; Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84; [2008] FCAFC 63; Roe v Western Australia (No 2)
[2011] FCA 102; Banjima People v Western Australia (No 2) (2013) 305 ALR 1; [2013] FCA 868;
CG (Deceased) on behalf of the Badimia People v Western Australia [2015] FCA 204; Murray on
behalf of the Yilka Native Title Claimants v Western Australia (No 5) [2016] FCA 752; Narrier v
Western Australia [2016] FCA 1519; Manado (on behalf of the Bindunbur Native Title Claim
Group) v Western Australia [2017] FCA 1367; Starkey on behalf of the Kokatha People v South
Australia (2018) 261 FCR 183; [2018] FCAFC 36.
The Federal Court has found that expert anthropological evidence of traditional laws
and customs and connection to country based on field work, which accords with the
member of the native title claim group’s evidence, is probative: Neowarra v Western
Australia [2003] FCA 1402 at [388]; Rubibi Community v Western Australia (No 5) [2005] FCA
1025 at [263]; Jango v Northern Territory (2006) 152 FCR 150; [2006] FCA 318 at [291]–[292].
As the Full Court of the Federal Court has noted, an anthropologist may observe and
record matters relevant to both the social organisation of a native title claim group and the
nature and content of their traditional laws and customs. There may also be circumstances
in which an anthropologist may give evidence about the meaning and significance of what
Aboriginal witnesses say and do so as to explain or render coherent matters which, on
their face, may be incomplete or unclear: Northern Territory v Alyawarr, Kaytetye,
Warumungu, Wakaya Native Title Claim Group (2005) 145 FCR 442; [2005] FCAFC 135 at [89];
Wilma Freddie on behalf of the Wiluna Native Title Claimants/Western Australia/Kingx Pty Ltd
[2011] NNTTA 170 at [29].
In relation to genealogies, Lee J in Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483; [1998]
FCA 1478 at 532 said that their preparation:
involved distilling information from a broad context of ethnographic material and it
involved the application of skill and expertise of anthropologists. … The charts as received
in evidence were not restricted to the expression of opinion by anthropologists but were
also evidence as to the truth of the statements contained therein. Genealogies duly
prepared by anthropologists employing their specialised skill and understanding of the
structure and culture of a society represent not only an appropriate field of expert
evidence but also a record of statements made to the anthropologists, the record of which
is likely to be reliable, the statements made being appropriate to be admitted in a case of
this nature.
This chapter reviews judicial decisions concerning the admissibility and probative value of
anthropologists’ evidence, concentrating upon the evidence of social anthropologists, and
focusing upon Australian land claim hearings. It should be read in conjunction with
subscription service Ch 36.
Expertise
[11.10.40] For the most part, the expertise of anthropologists has not been questioned by
the courts, although it has been noted that ‘Anthropology is not a precise science’ (Roe v
Western Australia (No 2) [2011] FCA 102 at [101]). However, with increasing specialisation
within anthropology, it is likely that expertise on the part of some anthropologists will not
be contextually sufficient on some occasions to reach the formal status of expertise for
courts. A warning in this regard was the critique of Professor Sutton’s evidence on the
basis of his lack of familiarity with the Western Desert people, which he sought to
supplement by extensive research and study: see Jango v Northern Territory of Australia
[2006] FCA 318 at [316]–[338] discussed by Burke (2011). By and large, the extent of
anthropologists’ academic qualifications will influence the weight given to their opinions,
rather than the admissibility of their evidence: Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR
141 at 159–161.
[11.10.40] 1047
In Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [1998] FCA 1606 at [55],
Olney J stated of an anthropologist that, while his evidence was not inadmissible, it
suffered:
from a combination of factors, notably that she had no prior anthropological experience in
the area under consideration, she had not read the ethnographic literature of the region
and had relied upon the written witness statements, not all of which were in evidence and
some of which were shown to be inaccurate.
By contrast, in Yarmirr v Northern Territory (1998) 82 FCR 533 at 562–563, Olney J found
that anthropologists had extensive qualifications and experience in the anthropology of
land tenure in the region, had carried out extensive fieldwork, and had conducted
considerable amounts of relevant genealogical mapping (see, too, Ward v Western Australia
(1998) 159 ALR 483; [1998] FCA 1478 at 531). Such considerations are relevant principally
to the probative value accorded to anthropologists’ opinions.
Often the opinions of anthropologists who have not carried out field work and whose
work is ‘just’ academic will carry less weight than those of anthropologists who have
immersed themselves in the day-to-day life of their subjects: Neowarra v Western Australia
[2003] FCA 1402 at [120].
The relevance of the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals 509 US 579 (1993) to forensic anthropology remains unresolved and
controversial (Grivas and Komar (2008)).
The bases of anthropologists' evidence

[11.10.80] As Reeves J observed in Starkey on behalf of the Kokatha People v South Australia
(2018) 261 FCR 183; [2018] FCAFC 36 at [190]: ‘The premises upon which expert opinion
evidence is based are fundamental, as expert evidence “is only as helpful as the evidence
and assumptions on which it is based”: Anikin v Sierra (2004) 79 ALJR 452 at [28].’
A defining characteristic of anthropologists’ evidence, and one that it shares to some
degree with evidence by historians, is that their opinions are heavily dependent upon
information provided by others. This raises the admissibility of their evidence in terms of
proof of the bases of the opinions: see Ch 2.20.
The seminal Australian case on the subject is that of Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971)
17 FLR 141 (the Gove case), where Blackburn J held (at 161) that it was not correct to apply
the hearsay rule so as to exclude evidence from an anthropologist in the form of a
proposition of anthropology – a conclusion which has significance in that field of
discourse. He said it could not be contended – and was not – that the anthropologists
could be allowed to give evidence in the form: ‘Munggurrawuy told me that this was
Gumatj land.’ He continued:
But in my opinion it is permissible for an anthropologist to give evidence in the form: ‘I
have studied the social organization of these Aboriginals. This study includes observing
their behaviour; talking to them; reading the published work of other experts; applying
principles of analysis and verification which are accepted as valid in the general field of
anthropology. I express the opinion as an expert that proposition X is true of their social
organization.’ In my opinion such evidence is not rendered inadmissible by the fact that it
is based partly on statements made to the expert by the Aboriginals.
Blackburn J was considering the admissibility of expert evidence purporting to give an

account of the social organisation or ‘laws’ of Aboriginals. The opinion evidence was
partly based on what the experts had been told by the Aboriginals. Of that fact,
Blackburn J said (at 161):
The process of investigation in the field of anthropology manifestly includes
communicating with human beings and considering what they say. The anthropologist
should be able to give his opinion, based on his investigation by processes normal to his
field of study, just as any other expert does. To rule out any conclusion based to any extent
1048 [11.10.80]
upon hearsay – the statements of other persons – would be to make a distinction, for the
purposes of the law of evidence, between a field of knowledge not involving the
behaviour of human beings (say chemistry) and a field of knowledge directly concerned
with the behaviour of human beings, such as anthropology. A chemist can give an account
of the behaviour of inanimate substances in reaction, but an anthropologist must limit his
evidence to that based upon what he has seen the Aboriginals doing, and not upon what
they have said to him.
In Yarmirr v Northern Territory (1998) 82 FCR 533 at 560–563, Olney J also considered
objections to admission by way of anthropologists’ report of statements by available living
persons who have not been the subject of primary evidence. One of the main complaints
about the report was that it recorded statements attributed to a person within the claimant
group who was available to give evidence but was not called. Olney J provided (at
562–563) the following summary in relation to the use to be made of anthropologists’
evidence (albeit in a context in which the rules of evidence did not strictly apply):
(i) to the extent that it sets out the basis upon which the applicants’ claim to native
title is formulated, it is in the nature of a pleading;
(ii) it contains, to some extent, expert opinion evidence of persons qualified in the
relevant field of learning;
(iii) to the extent that it contains assertions of fact in the nature of hearsay, based
upon information supplied by informants who later gave evidence, regard must
be had to the evidence of the informants rather than to the contents of the report;
(iv) inconsistencies between facts asserted in the report and the evidence of the
witnesses may reflect upon the credit of the witnesses, but this would not
necessarily be so if the weight of evidence suggests that the report is inaccurate;
(v) the weight to be accorded to assertions of fact not in the nature of expert opinion
which are not supported by the evidence of witnesses will depend upon the
particular circumstances including whether or not the respondents have had a
real opportunity to test the accuracy of the matters asserted in the report.
He continued (at 563):

In the present case the anthropologists’ report serves the very useful purpose of providing
the contextual background against which the oral testimony of the applicants’ witnesses
can be better understood. Whether or not a particular statement in the report is to be
classified as mere pleading, as expert opinion or as hearsay is not always readily apparent
but to a very large extent the report can be accepted as both reliable and informative. It
contains some speculation but not much, and to the extent that it does, I have not found it
necessary to refer to it.
In Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483; [1998] FCA 1478, Lee J admitted into
evidence genealogical charts prepared by anthropologists on the basis that they were not
restricted to the expression of opinion by them but were also evidence of the truth of the
statements contained therein. He said (at 532):
Genealogies duly prepared by anthropologists employing their specialised skill and
understanding of the structure and culture of a society represent not only an appropriate
field of expert evidence but also a record of statements made to the anthropologists, the
record of which is likely to be reliable, the statements made being appropriate to be
admitted in a case of this nature.
Similarly, evidence was permitted in Daniels v Western Australia (2000) 178 ALR 542; [2000]
FCA 858 from an anthropologist, though based on hearsay representations made by
Aboriginal people. Nicholson J formulated the following principles for reception of
evidence under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (at [30]):
1. The opinion will only be admissible if it can satisfy the requirements of s 79.
[11.10.80] 1049
2. Section 79 does not require that for an expert testimony to be admitted it can only
be founded on admitted evidence. However, as will appear, that does not mean
that regard must not be had to the factual basis of the opinion.
3. For admissibility to follow from the section it is necessary for the court to find
that the opinion is wholly or substantially based on knowledge based on the
expert witnesses’ training, study or experience.
4. As the expression of the opinion in oral testimony will precede findings
concerning the matters on which it is based, the opinion could not be admitted
into evidence until the court has made a finding that it is based wholly or
substantially on knowledge of the type made requisite by s 79. For the court to
make the findings it will be necessary for examination and cross-examination to
make apparent the extent to which the opinion is the product of an inference of
the requisite type. That will undoubtedly take the court to the passages in the
expert’s written report to which objection is made.
5. The focus for the court will be on the view, estimation or judgment inherent in
the inference drawn by the expert from the factual basis. Having in mind the
observations of Emmett J in Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd (1998) 87 FCR 371; 157 ALR
615, that does not preclude reference to the factual basis of the opinion in order
for a finding to be made whether the specialised knowledge itself is the base of
the opinion. To the extent the evidence considered by the expert, hearsay or
otherwise, is able to be considered by the court without reference to the
specialised knowledge of an expert, the opinion of the expert will not be an
inference in the exercise of the specialised knowledge.
6. To the extent to which the opinion is akin to the form found permissible by
Blackburn J in Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 (the Gove case), it
would seem that it would be likely to fall within the description of knowledge
derivative from the expert’s training, study or experience.
7. Hearsay evidence from which the opinion is inferred, will (subject to the
application of s 135 and s 136) qualify for admission pursuant to s 56 as relevant
to the purpose of the basis upon which the expert holds the opinion so that its
weight can be assessed. It could then be used for a hearsay purpose as a
consequence of the application of s 60.
8. Admission of hearsay evidence with that consequence under s 60 leads inevitably
to the need for the court to consider whether that admission should be limited
under s 136 to the stated purpose of testing the knowledge on which the opinion
is based.
9. Admission with the consequences flowing from s 60 would not occur if the court
considered admission should be precluded in exercise of its discretion under
s 135. It would seem that hearsay evidence comprising a statement as to the
existence of native title made to the expert by a party not called (and being on an
issue central to the case) would qualify for exclusion or admission limited to
testing the opinion in the manner required by s 78.
10. If as a result of the court’s consideration of the foundations of the opinion, it is
found not to be wholly or substantially based on the type of knowledge specified
in s 79, the opinion will not qualify for admission.
(See too Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404.)

Nicholson J also gave consideration to the procedures for declaring such evidence
inadmissible by application of the discretion to do so. He held (at [31]) that the probative
value of hearsay evidence is that it goes to establishing the foundations of the knowledge
of the expert in the preparation of his report and the formation of his opinion, but held (at
[32]–[33]):
If that evidence were admitted without limitation it could be unfairly prejudicial to a party
where that party has not previously had the opportunity to cross-examine that witness on
the issue. Use of it generally could be confusing because it would require to be weighed
against the evidence of claimants who have given evidence and been cross-examined but
without any proper forensic basis for undertaking that task in relation to the unexamined
1050 [11.10.80]
evidence. There could arguably be as a consequence an undue waste of time. However, the
probative value of the evidence is high in relation to whether or not the expert’s opinion
qualifies for admission pursuant to s 79. It is necessary the court resolve that issue.
His Honour held (at [34]) that the hearsay evidence should first be considered for limited
admission under s 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): ‘When it has been utilised for the
purpose of the court finding whether the opinion of the expert has or has not qualified
under s 79, it would then be necessary for the court to determine whether each particular
piece of hearsay evidence should be excluded under s 135.’ He considered it more helpful
in the circumstances of the case to approach that with the benefit of the examination and
cross-examination in relation to the particular items of hearsay evidence (for the specific
rulings, see Daniel v Western Australia [2000] FCA 1334; Daniel v Western Australia [2000]
FCA 1356).
In Lardil v Queensland [2000] FCA 1548, Cooper J declined to make an order under s 136
of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) limiting the use to be made of an anthropologist’s evidence
of representations made to him. The report contained references to published academic
writings, the work of other anthropologists in relation to the islands in the South Wellesley
group, his own observations and researches concerning the Kaiadilt people, and
statements made to him over time by a number of named Kaiadilt people as to their
culture, laws, practices and beliefs and their social structures and relationships. In
summary, his reasons for declining to do so were that:
• if the applicants wished to rely on evidence of the facts alleged in the representations,
they would have to recall the makers of the representations (a development which no
party in the present proceeding would embrace) or give a notice or notices under s 67
of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) and seek to have the hearsay evidence admitted under
s 64 of that Act;
• s 60 made the hearsay evidence only some evidence of the asserted facts, and gave no
added weight to that evidence; and
• it would remain open to the respondents to contend that the evidence should be given
little or no weight.
The approach of Nicholson J was applied by Sundberg J in Neowarra v Western Australia
[2003] FCA 1402 at [42], deciding that, in light of evidence from three anthropologists as to
the way in which they prepared their parts of the genealogies, their expert evidence was
admissible. He was satisfied that they had specialised knowledge based on their training,
study and experience, and that the genealogies and the report accompanying them were
substantially based on that knowledge. However, it may be that where genealogical charts
are prepared by anthropologists but are not ‘authenticated’ by reference to explanation
about how the charts have been prepared, they will not be regarded as admissible: Jango v
Northern Territory (No 2) [2004] FCA 1004 at [65].
It has been held that ordinarily an anthropologist’s evidence of statements made to her
or him about practices of members of that society will be relevant for the purpose of
exposing the factual basis of the anthropological opinions expressed: Harrington-Smith v
Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893. An anthropologist is entitled
in a report to identify hearsay material that goes to establish the foundations of the
knowledge applied in preparing the report and in forming the particular opinions
expressed in the report: see Daniels v Western Australia (2000) 178 ALR 542; [2000] FCA 858
at [30]; Neowarra v Western Australia (2003) 205 ALR 145; [2003] FCA 1399 at [38]; Jango v
Northern Territory (No 2) [2004] FCA 1004 at [79]. However, Lindgren J in Harrington-Smith
v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003] FCA 893 at [79], while following the
approach of Nicholson J in Daniel, commented:
I will follow the views expressed by RD Nicholson J and Cooper J [in Lardil v Queensland
[2000] FCA 1548], which I do not think are clearly wrong, that ordinarily an
[11.10.80] 1051
anthropologist’s evidence of statements made to him or her about practices of the society
being examined by members of that society will be relevant for the purpose of exposing
the factual basis of the anthropological opinions expressed. It is, however, odd that the
tendering party should be in a better position because the anthropologist’s report is in the
form, ‘Informant A told me facts X, Y and Z’, rather than (in my opinion, the orthodox and
preferable model) ‘I assume, as the basis of my opinion, facts X, Y and Z’. It is perhaps
arguable that the choice of the former in preference to the latter suggests two purposes:
the purpose of exposing the expert’s factual assumptions and the purpose of proving the
asserted facts by hearsay evidence. I am not satisfied in the present case that the hearsay
form was chosen for the latter purpose. If I were, I would make an order under s 136 of
the Evidence Act 1995 limiting the use to be made of the evidence to the proof of the
anthropologist’s factual assumptions.
In Bodney v Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84; [2008] FCAFC 63, Finn, Sundberg and Mansfield JJ
observed (at [92]–[93]):
Before the Evidence Act it was well established that experts are entitled to rely upon
reputable articles, publications and material produced by others in the area in which they
have expertise, as a basis for their opinions. In Borowski v Quayle [1966] VR 382 at 386
(Borowski) Gowans J, quoting Wigmore on Evidence 3rd ed, vol 2 at 784–785, said that to
reject expert opinion because some facts to which the witness testifies are known only
upon the authority of others, ‘would be to ignore the accepted methods of professional
work and to insist on finical and impossible standards’. Experts may not only base their
opinions on such sources, but may give evidence of fact which is based on them. They
may do this although the data on which they base their opinion or evidence of fact will
usually be hearsay information, in the sense they rely for such data not on their own
knowledge but on the knowledge of someone else. The weight to be accorded to such
evidence is a matter for the court. See generally Borowski at 385–387, PQ v Australian Red
Cross Society [1992] 1 VR 19 at 34–35, H v Schering Chemicals [1983] 1 WLR 143 at 148–149,
Millirrpum v Nabalco Pty Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141 at 161–163 and Jango v Northern Territory
(No 4) 214 ALR 608 at [8]. There is nothing in the Evidence Act that displaces this body of
law.
Dangers exist in treating ethnographic studies and other historical records, whether
prepared by anthropologists or by other professionals, as infallible sources of reference:
see Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2000) 101 FCR 171; [1999] FCA 1668 at [342]–[353]; Shaw v
Wolf (1998) 83 FCR 113 at 130–131; Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v
Victoria [1998] FCA 1606; Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd (No 4) (2001) 123 FCR 62; [2001] FCA
1106 at [365]; Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1997) 153 DLR (4th) 193 at 231–236.
Lindgren J, in Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424; [2003]
FCA 893 at [26], has identified ‘great practical differences’ between anthropologists’
reports and reports from experts in other disciplines:
Admittedly, there are great practical differences in the present respect between, for
example, Makita, an appeal concerned with a report of expert opinion given by a ‘physicist
who specialised in the investigation of slipping accidents’ … in relation to the slipperiness
of a stair, and a case such as the present one, concerned with reports of opinions given by
historians and anthropologists in relation to the more complex question whether there are
communal, group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples in relation to
land or waters, where the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws
acknowledged, and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples, and they,
by those laws and customs, have a connection with the land or waters.
On the same subject, Mansfield J, in Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404 at [468]–[470],
contended that inherent in such a dichotomy is the notion that science and mathematics
are exact disciplines, whereas the disciplines of anthropology, humanity, much of
economics, and history are not:
In most if not all disciplines, opinion is formed by reasoning drawn from a group of
‘facts’. The facts may be drawn from a scientific experiment, historical documents or a
series of conversations held with members of a native title claimant group. However,
1052 [11.10.80]
‘facts’ themselves have varying degrees of primacy or subjectiveness. Some facts are now,
in reality (and despite the deconstructionists) incontrovertible. Our communication
systems make them so: the use of numbers in measurement is a clear example. Some are
obviously more subjectively perceived: estimates, descriptions of persons or events, and
the like … Some are complex and themselves involve judgment. In the realm of expert
evidence, the primary data upon which an opinion is based may comprise a mixture of
primary and more complex facts. The opinion may then be further based upon an
interpretation (sometimes requiring expertise) of those facts and that stage may require an
exercise of judgment, sometimes fine judgment, by the person concerned. The important
thing in any expert’s report, in my view, is that the intellectual processes of the expert can
be readily exposed. That involves identifying in a transparent way what are the primary
facts assumed or understood. It also involves making the process of reasoning transparent,
and where there are premises upon which the reasoning depends, identifying them. An
understanding of the nature of the judicial process in addressing expert evidence would
readily recognise the need for the expert’s report to communicate those matters to the
court. The premises, whether based on primary facts or on other material, then need to be
established. Their ready identification ensures that the means of satisfaction – whether by
proof of primary facts or in some other way – can be addressed by the party relying upon
that expert opinion, generally by the legal representations.
Avoidance of advocacy
[11.10.120] As in all areas, when an anthropologist commences to be partisan, her or his
credibility is diminished. Thus, in De Rose v South Australia [2002] FCA 1342 at [352],
O’Loughlin J criticised an anthropologist for becoming:
too close to the claimants and their cause; he failed to exhibit the objectivity and neutrality
that is required of a [sic] expert who is giving evidence before the court. Rather he seemed
– too often – to be an advocate for the applicants.
(See, too, Daniel v Western Australia [2003] FCA 666 at [233]; Chapman v Luminis Pty Ltd
(No 4) (2001) 123 FCR 62; [2001] FCA 1106 at [360], [373]; Shaw (2001); Rangiah (2016).)
However, the fact that an anthropologist has become close to her or his subjects does
not necessarily mean that the expert has lost independence; it may even endow the
evidence with particular value: Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402 at
[112]–[119].
It remains important that anthropologists’ reports not be subject to the observation
made by Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ in Commonwealth v Yarmirr (2001)
208 CLR 1; [2001] HCA 56 at [84] that an anthropological report had been received in
evidence in that case and without objection ‘despite it being a document which was in
part intended as evidence of historical and other facts, in part intended as evidence of
expert opinions the authors held on certain subjects, and in part a document advocating
the claimants’ case’.
In particular, there is a risk with anthropologists’ reports that stray into an advocacy
function that opinions expressed will not be based on the specialist knowledge explicitly
required under s 74 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), the
Evidence Act 2001 (Tas) and the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic).
Distinction between facts and opinions

[11.10.160] There is a particular need in anthropological reports for the authors to
distinguish between the facts upon which opinions are based and the actual opinions:
Jango v Northern Territory (No 2) [2004] FCA 1004 at [11].
A component of evidence from anthropologists is not, strictly speaking, opinion
evidence as it is evidence of the anthropologist’s own observations. As Selway J pointed
out in Gumana v Northern Territory (2005) 141 FCR 457; [2005] FCA 50 at [156], such
evidence is not necessarily opinion evidence and subject to the strictures of opinion
admissibility: ‘In the case of anthropologists, it will often be direct evidence of the
[11.10.160] 1053
anthropologist’s observations and thus admissible in the ordinary course’ (Bodney v

Bennell (2008) 167 FCR 84; [2008] FCAFC 63 at [94]).
When an anthropologist advances an assertion that indigenous persons with ties to a
country usually include persons whose claims on the same areas rest on something
individual to themselves, the assertion may be rejected as inadmissible if it does not
identify the facts or observations which form the basis of the opinion as it may be
impossible to determine whether the opinion is wholly or substantially based on the
author’s specialised knowledge: Jango v Northern Territory (No 2) [2004] FCA 1004 at [54].
[11.10.200] In some circumstances, the absence of the capacity to cross-examine those
supplying information to anthropologists could result in the anthropologists’ opinions
being held inadmissible as an exercise of judicial discretion. Often, though, such an issue
will go to the weight given to the anthropologists’ evidence: see, eg, Harrington-Smith v
Western Australia (No 8) (2004) 207 ALR 483; [2004] FCA 338 at [79].
In addition, on occasion a court has exercised its discretion to disallow an
anthropologist’s report after the conclusion of tranches of evidence on the basis that its
submission would delay the trial and cause unfair prejudice to the other parties: see, eg,
Larrakia People v Northern Territory [2003] FCA 1175; cf Banjima People v Western Australia
(No 2) (2013) 305 ALR 1; [2013] FCA 868 at [45].
Role of lawyers
[11.10.240] Lindgren J, in Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 7) (2003) 130 FCR 424;
[2003] FCA 893 at [19], has emphasised in the context of anthropologists’ reports
(emphasis in original):
Lawyers should be involved in the writing of reports by experts: not, of course, in relation
to the substance of the reports (in particular, in arriving at the opinions to be expressed);
but in relation to their form, in order to ensure that the legal tests of admissibility are
addressed. In the same vein, it is not the law that admissibility is attracted by nothing
more than the writing of a report in accordance with the conventions of an expert’s
particular field of scholarship. So long as the Court, in hearing and determining
applications such as the present one, is bound by the rules of evidence, as the Parliament
has stipulated in s 82(1) of the NT Act, the requirements of s 79 (and of s 56 as to
relevance) of the Evidence Act are determinative in relation to the admissibility of expert
opinion evidence.
Lindgren J’s observations were strongly supported by Sackville J in Jango v Northern

Territory (No 2) [2004] FCA 1004 at [10].
Self-referential reports
[11.10.260] Reports that deal in a theoretical way with how anthropologists, or some
anthropologists, use words or concepts which themselves arise from certain High Court
decisions are likely to be of limited utility: Larrakia People v Northern Territory [2003] FCA
1175 at [30].
Gender restriction issues

[11.10.280] Anthropologists can be under a professional duty, because of the circumstances
in which they have been made privy to information, to take those steps reasonably open
to them to respect gender and cultural restrictions in respect of access to that information.
This can present ethical dilemmas for anthropologists and challenges for courts. As
McIntyre and Bagshaw (2002, p 11) have noted:
The litigation process of the Federal Court, in the tradition of the legal system upon which
it is based, has as one of its precepts a faith in the process of exposure of information to
1054 [11.10.200]
challenge by the public and adversaries, to test the efficacy of asserted fact. Aboriginal
culture, on the other hand, has a tradition of sparing and incremental dissemination of the
information, which it regards as most crucial to its existence, and then only to those who
have demonstrated that they are worthy of receiving the knowledge and will treat it with
the respect which it must be accorded to maintain its significance. An obvious tension
exists between those two cultural views when they come together in the context of a
native title claim.
(See also Rose (1996).)

For the most part, courts, on advice from anthropologists, have adjusted their
procedures in order to do what is possible within the context of significantly contested
proceedings to limit access to such information and knowledge, while enabling such
material to be tested effectively and evaluated: see McIntyre and Bagshaw (2002).
Compliance with ethical codes

[11.10.320] Many difficult ethical questions beset anthropologists’ methodologies and
opinions within the context of land claim hearings. Neate (1995, p 532) has pointed out
that these include the obligations of anthropologists to preserve confidentiality and the
legitimacy of certain forms of making information they have obtained public or
semi-public. Failure on the part of an anthropologist to comply with the Code of Ethics of
the Australian Anthropological Society, or that of the American Anthropological
Association, or that of the Association of Social Anthropologists, can provide scope for
criticism of the quality of anthropological field work and forensic opinions (see Galloway
(2016); see also, in respect of ethical issues, Aboriginal Sacred Sites Protection Authority v
Maurice (1986) 10 FCR 104; Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475).
Physical anthropology evidence

[11.10.360] There is a forensic need for a variety of human remains to be examined,
including those which are fresh, decomposed, burned and skeletonised (see Galloway,
Birkby, Kahana and Fulginiti (1990)). The work of the physical anthropologist can be
complementary to that of the forensic pathologist (see Cuha and Cattaneo (2006)) and the
forensic entomologist in participating in such examinations and drawing inferences from
them. The physical forensic anthropologist has the potential to provide insights into
matters such as the gender, race, age and stature of the deceased person, and their
experience of trauma (see Lundy (1998)).
New techniques, including forensic taphonomy (dealing with the decay and
fossilisation of remains), are emerging (see, eg, Dirkmaat, Cabo, Ousley and Symes (2008))
and are only in the early stages of development. In respect of all of the work, examination
of the scene and preservation of evidence are fundamental obligations (see Galloway,
Birkby, Kahana and Fulginiti (1990)). Scrutiny of adherence to proper procedures in this
regard is often forensically important.
Bayesian analysis to estimate matters such as stature have been embraced by some
practitioners (see, eg, Konigsberg, Ross and Jungers (2006)).
[11.10.360] 1055
Chapter 11.15
CULTURAL EXPERTS’ EVIDENCE

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [11.15.01]
Criminal law .......................................................................................................................... [11.15.40]
Family law matters ............................................................................................................... [11.15.80]
Native title claims ................................................................................................................. [11.15.120]
‘Culture shock is what happens when a traveler suddenly
finds himself in a place where yes may mean no, where a
“fixed price” is negotiable, where to be kept waiting in an
outer office is no cause for insult, where laughter may signify
anger.’
Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (1970), Ch 1.
Introduction
[11.15.01] In a variety of circumstances, evidence from experts about practices and mores
related to an ethnic culture can be relevant to issues to be decided by the courts. In
particular, it can provide context to enhance understanding of other evidence in
proceedings and to factor out potential sources of misunderstanding and misinterpretation
of other evidence. Examples of such proceedings are:
• criminal law matters where the cultural practices may afford either a defence or
mitigation to the charges: R v Yildiz (1983) 11 A Crim R 115; R v Thomas (2006) 207 CCC
(3d) 86; R v George 2002 BCPC 207; R v Bernard 2003 NBCA 55;
• family law matters involving indigenous people (see, eg, Davis & Spring (2007) 38 Fam
LR 671; [2007] FamCA 1149; Moses v Barton [2008] FamCA 590 at [30], where no such
expert was found) or ethnic minority children;
• actions against employers for lack of cultural sensitivity causing psychiatric harm: see
Good Health Wanganui v Burberry (unreported, Employment Court, Wellington, NZ,
Shaw J, 10 December 2002); Magallanes (2003);
• immigration and refugee applications: see, eg, Muoi Ly Principal: Chee Yoon Lai [1993]
MRTA 1981; cf Ho, Van Duoc [2003] MRTA 7636;
• native title claims: see, eg, Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404 at [109]ff;
• claims in relation to cultural practices in payment of honoraria: British Columbia
(Minister of Forests) v Adams Lake Band [2006] 3 CNLR 1;
• planning matters requiring consideration to be given to the cultural impact of a
development: see, eg, PGH Environmental Planning v Wollongong City Council [2009]
NSWLEC 138;
• when conduct has been non-compliant with government regulation in relation to the
naming of children: Prus-Czarnecka v Alberta [2003] ABQB 698;
• evidence as to political roles in North Korean society: R v Wong [2005] VSC 66; cp R v
Choi [2005] VSC 335;
• evidence as to the structure and activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam: R v
Vinayagamoorthy (2008) 238 FLR 117; (2008) 200 A Crim R 186; [2008] VSC 599; and
• cultural assessment to gauge needs under guardianship: CM [2011] QCAT 693.
Criminal law
[11.15.40] The study of cultural mores within particular communities or community groups
is a well-recognised field of study within a range of professions, including sociology,
criminology and anthropology. In R v Abbey (2009) 246 CCC (3d) 301 at [121], it was held
that a trial judge had erred in excluding evidence from a Dr Totten about the inscription of
a teardrop tattoo on the face of a young male gang member and his view that the tattoo
[11.15.40] 1057
carried one of three possible meanings within the urban gang culture. Expert opinion
evidence about cultural mores may be relevant to, and thus admissible on, a variety of
issues, including to provide context for, and to facilitate appreciation of, other evidence: R
v Boswell (2011) 277 CCC (3d) 156 at [26]. The evidence may also be admissible to support
a defence of provocation and to establish that a murder was planned and deliberate: R v
Sadiqi 2013 ONCA 250 (CanLII) at [16].
In R v Shafia (2016) 341 CCC (3d) 354, it was held on appeal by the Court of Appeal of
Ontario that expert cultural evidence adduced by the prosecution about honour and
honour killings was correctly admitted at trial. The prosecution relied on the expert
evidence to provide cultural information which the jury could use to understand and
assess other evidence adduced at trial: ‘The concepts of honour, family and gender
dynamics within Middle Eastern and East Asian communities involved knowledge that
was found at trial to be outside the scope of a typical Canadian jury’ and that its probative
value outweighed any prejudicial effect.
In R v Yildiz (1983) 11 A Crim R 115, the Victorian Court of Appeal upheld a trial
judge’s decision to allow an interpreter to give opinion evidence about the meaning of
certain words in Turkish and of the attitude of the Turkish community in Melbourne, both
in relation to homosexuality and in relation to the differing roles of male participants in
homosexual activity. The evidence was relevant to explain the conduct of the wife of the
deceased in leaving and later rejoining the deceased and to show an additional motive for
the applicant to shoot the deceased.
Similarly, Ducharme J in R v Thomas (2006) 207 CCC (3d) 86 allowed evidence to be
given by an expert in Chinese culture about the presence of a cloth with Chinese
characters written in blood and reading ‘Loyalty’ and ‘Righteousness and Justice’. The
accused had maintained that the cloth was a loving declaration of his desire to end
quarrels between himself and his wife. However, the expert said that the cloth was a
strong emotion of protest and evidence of a wish to seek justice. Ducharme J held the
expert’s evidence admissible because otherwise the jury could not give meaning to the
words written on the cloth.
In R v Wong [2005] VSC 66 at [31], Kellam J held that knowledge as to the internal
workings of North Korean society, such as the field of political science, constituted a field
of specialised knowledge, not being within the realm of knowledge of the ordinary
member of the community (cf R v Choi [2005] VSC 335).
Similarly, in R v Vinayagamoorthy (2008) 238 FLR 117; (2008) 200 A Crim R 186; [2008]
VSC 599, Coghlan J found that two witnesses whom the prosecution sought to call in a
terrorist trial had made studies of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). He found
that the study of the LTTE was a field of specialised knowledge, that it was outside
ordinary knowledge so that a jury might be uninformed by an expert, and that their
evidence as to the structure of the LTTE equated to evidence of opinion. However, as the
evidence of one of the witnesses relied upon a number of either confidential or
undisclosed sources, he concluded that ‘it is difficult to see what the factual foundation for
his opinion is sufficient for it to be properly and adequately tested in a criminal trial’ (at
[47]). Thus, he concluded that as neither the basis for his opinions nor the application of
his specialised knowledge could be made out, his evidence was inadmissible. However, by
contrast, the other expert could be cross-examined about his evidence ‘in a proper and
meaningful way’ (at [58]), so he was prepared to admit it provisionally.
Family law matters

[11.15.80] In Davis v Davis (2007) 38 Fam LR 671; [2007] FamCA 1149, the Family Court was
faced with the complex task of balancing two cultures and two peoples to the benefit of a
child who was both part-Aboriginal and part-Anglo-Australian in blood and appearance.
1058 [11.15.80]
Cultural experts’ evidence | CH 11.15
Young J (at [281]) observed that there is an established legal principle that the court should
refrain from making ‘value judgments as to the merits of differing cultural, religious or
ethnic heritage issues ([In the Marriage of Goudge]) (1984) 54 ALR 514 per Everitt CJ where
her Honour, in affirming an earlier principle expanded upon in Sanders [(1976) 26 FLR
474;] [1976] FLC 90-078 and N and N (1981) 7 Fam LR 889; FLC 91-111 stated that: “Insofar
as there are significant differences between the cultural, heritage and identity of each of
their parents, it is not for the court to prefer one over the other on that ground”.’
Ms A provided evidence to the Australian Family Court as a ‘cultural consultant’
engaged by the Independent Children’s Lawyer to undertake an anthropological
assessment of the Aboriginal culture issues relating to a child. Her qualifications to give
such evidence as an expert were not contested. Ms A’s approach was to have regard to
social, cultural and other factors. As background she had court documents filed up to the
date of her report and her own archival material and published literature as is identified
in the bibliography annexed to the report. Young J (at [298]) classified Ms A’s evidence as
‘careful, well researched and helpful and her background history and evidence of culture
and kinship were important guidance to me in my decision’.
Ms A included in her report the cultural background of the mother as a Western
Arrernte woman from the west of Alice Springs. Her evidence led Young J to accept (at
[277]) that the culture of the Arrernte people is ‘a holistic one incorporating the
importance of art, song, dance and oral history together with stories of the dreamtime,
hunting and gathering and kinship’ and that ‘kinship underlies every aspect of social
behaviour and structure and is a major constitutive element of identity’. On the basis of
Ms A’s evidence, and relevant to the application of s 61G of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth),
Young J accepted that the Arrernte people place great importance on family and social
relationships and that there are traditionally many family areas within the vast country
that is the Arrernte region, each with their own dialect which strongly connects with
family membership and a relationship to the land and the dreamtime.
Ms A’s report explained that the role of grandparents within communities is of extreme
importance as they are the nurturers and teachers of their grandchildren and are
responsible for moral, cultural and spiritual guidance. Grandmothers have a special
cultural role to play and therefore a special status, often seen as more important than a
child’s mother in educating children in Aboriginal tradition and social mores and passing
down knowledge of the dreamtime.
Ms A counter-intuitively explained (at [284]–[285]) the absence of the mother during
much of the child’s life to be ‘not only a normal response to circumstances in Arrernte
culture, it is something that is actively encouraged for the benefit of the child’s cultural
and emotional development … Further, children who are raised periodically by other
elders receive a broader cultural education, a strategy employed to preserve and maintain
indigenous culture against erosion by western forces’.
Young J observed that the child the subject of the dispute was not an integral part of
the local Koori community. Rather, she was a half-blooded Western Arrernte Aboriginal.
He accepted the evidence from the cultural expert that, as the child grew older, she would
be likely to find it extremely difficult to claim a Koori identity and live within a very
different cultural background. Ms A considered the social rules that are embodied within
the Western Arrernte community and what is accepted as appropriate social and personal
conduct, particularly in the context of the child being able to learn, experience and grow
into this culture and environment, and argued (at [290]) that:
As with all Australian Aboriginal cultures, the rules that are embodied in the social system
of Western Arrernte culture impact upon all aspects of contemporary social life in some
way. These cultural systems operate to determine the accepted social behaviour and
conduct of individuals who are part of this culture. In order for [the child] to move
[11.15.80] 1059
comfortably within the culture and life-style of her extended Arrernte family therefore it is
essential that she learns these social rules as a natural part of her development.
Such social rules are most effectively learnt in a person’s everyday interaction with
their family, as it is in this context that they become a part of their normal behaviour.
Furthermore, from my experience working with Aboriginal children and families from a
variety of Aboriginal cultural backgrounds it is very apparent that the longer an
Aboriginal person remains separated from their culture the harder it is for them to fit back
in as they grow older. Indeed for some Aboriginal people who have returned to their
culture as young adults after either being removed from their families by authorities or
living with their non-Aboriginal relatives, the journey to learn and accept a very different
cultural life-style can be extremely difficult. … In my opinion, it is therefore essential for
[the child] to maintain meaningful contact with her Aboriginal family in Ernabella and
Alice Springs as she grows up in order for her to learn about and become a part of the
specific cultural mores of the Western Arrernte culture of her maternal family.
The essence of Ms A’s views was that (at [292]): ‘Without the nurturing of her extended
Aboriginal family, should she decide to embrace her culture further in later life, [the child]
will almost certainly suffer confusion and adjustment difficulties.’ Young J stated that
‘from an anthropological and sociological perspective [the cultural expert’s] views and
opinions remain untouched. They were of real assistance in determining the best interests
of the child which is a matter of balance and all aspects of this case, family, cultural,
lifestyle, educational and practical – past, present and future – have all been evaluated to
arrive at a very difficult decision’.
Native title claims

[11.15.120] A fundamental component of native title claims is proof of the cultural
connection on the part of the claimants with an area of land. On occasion, ethnographic,
ethno-archaeological and cultural evidence are called to establish the behaviours, cultural
practices and ceremonial relationships of indigenous people with the land. For instance, in
Risk v Northern Territory [2006] FCA 404 at [109]ff, Mansfield J received such evidence,
concluding (at [117]–[119]) that the expert’s evidence has:
facilitated and assisted me in better understanding the significance of some of the oral
evidence. As my consideration of the whole of the evidence relating to this period reveals,
the indigenous community in this period 1825–1900 carried out types of economic activity
consistent with those carried out in current times by the Larrakia people, of course
adapted to current society. … Those accounts reveal systems for the inter-generational
transmission of ecological information and resource procurement, a system of alliance and
mutual sharing, ceremonies and song cycles of both practical and spiritual significance,
often related to particular geographical features or locations, body ornamentation, hunting
weapons and cooking and carrying implements.
1060 [11.15.120]
Chapter 11.20
LINGUISTS’ EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [11.20.01]
Assistance for the trier of fact ............................................................................................. [11.20.20]
Meaning of words ................................................................................................................. [11.20.40]
Voice recognition ................................................................................................................... [11.20.60]
Creation of transcripts .......................................................................................................... [11.20.65]
Voluntariness of confessions or admissions ..................................................................... [11.20.80]
Distinctiveness of expression .............................................................................................. [11.20.100]
Trade mark cases ................................................................................................................... [11.20.120]
Immigration and refugee claims ........................................................................................ [11.20.160]
Native title claims ................................................................................................................. [11.20.200]
Family law cases .................................................................................................................... [11.20.240]
Voice recognition ................................................................................................................... [11.20.280]
‘The linguistic philosophy, which cares only about language,
and not about the world, is like the boy who preferred the
clock without the pendulum because, although it no longer
told the time, it went more easily than before and at a more
exhilarating pace.’
Bertrand Russell, Foreword to Ernest Geller, Words and Things (1959).
Introduction
[11.20.01] In a significant number of scenarios, expert evidence from linguists has been
received and utilised by the courts to explain the meaning of words and phrases, as well
as their likely background and significance (see, eg, Tiersma and Solan (2002)). Forensic
linguistics has emerged as its own discipline (see, eg, Gibbons (2003); Olsson (2004)).
There is an International Association of Forensic Linguists (http://www.iafl.org (viewed
11 February 2019)), as well as an International Journal of Speech, Language and the Law.
This short chapter reviews important decisions on the admissibility and evaluation of
linguists’ evidence across a variety of areas of law.
Assistance for the trier of fact

[11.20.20] A theme amongst the decided cases is that linguists’ evidence should only be
admitted where it is the product of specialised knowledge – that is, it has to add to the
understanding of the trier of fact, not just summarise and reframe an understanding in the
trier of fact that would be reached without the expert evidence. Thus, in Arshad v Her
Majesty’s Advocate [2006] ScotHC HCJAC 28, the Appeal Court of the Scottish High Court
of Judiciary upheld criticism advanced by the High Court at Edinburgh disallowing
evidence by a forensic linguist on the basis that the linguist was not ‘in any better position
to make these criticisms than counsel was or that there arose any technicality or speciality
of the study of linguistics upon which the jury would require instruction if they were to
understand any criticism that counsel sought to make’.
In addition forensic linguistics evidence needs to be distinguished from evidence of
voice attribution: see, eg, Tran v The Queen [2016] VSCA 79.
Meaning of words
[11.20.40] In some limited circumstances, there is the potential for linguistic evidence to be
adduced in relation to the meaning of words. For instance, in Nelson Barbados Group Ltd v
Cox 2008 CanLII 4265 (ON SC), Shaughnessy J permitted linguistic evidence in a civil
matter in which the question of whether threats had been made needed to be determined.
The evidence was from a psycholinguist who was a member of the FBI and had been an
instructor in the Behavioral Unit of the FBI Academy, where her duties included analysing
[11.20.40] 1061
cases involving threats, detection of deception, authorship identification, rapes, child

molestation and homicides. Her view, based upon analysis of transcripts of conversations
and other exhibits, was that no threat had been made.
However, it is debatable whether the analysis of the psycholinguist in this instance
materially added to the inferences which might otherwise have been drawn by the trier of
fact. In many cases in which linguistic or psycholinguistic evidence of this kind is offered
to a court, it is likely that the court will be hesitant to receive expert evidence on matters
which it might conclude it is sufficiently able to interpret without expert evidence. The
issue is whether the evidence concerned is actually the product of specialised knowledge.
Where plain English words are in question (see [2.15.480]), expert evidence about their
meaning will not be permitted (see, though, Toronto Police Association v Board of
Commissioners [1975] 1 SCR 630). However, where the issue is how a particular group in
the community is likely to understand words, linguistic evidence may well be admissible:
Drew v Newfoundland and Labrador (Minister of Government Services and Lands) 2006 NLCA
53 (CanLII); [2007] 1 CNLR 34; Queen v Drew 2003 NLSCTD 105 (CanLII).
It is possible too that the intention of a testator could be the subject of linguistic
evidence, but only if in particular circumstances the words employed needed specialist
analysis.
On a number of occasions, linguists have been permitted to give evidence about the
meaning or connotations of words in languages other than English or in dialects. For
instance, in State v Tinno 497 P 2d 1386 (Idaho 1972), a linguist was permitted to express
opinions about how the Shoshone might have understood the word ‘hunt’ in a treaty.
Similarly, in Martin Luther King Junior Elementary School Children v Ann Arbor School District
Board 473 F Supp 1371 (ED Mich 1979), experts were permitted to give evidence about the
characteristics of Black English Vernacular, or Ebonics.
On occasion, linguists have been permitted to give evidence about whether words
employed in other languages contain covert references to illegal drugs: see, eg, Director of
Public Prosecutions v Maeda [2015] VCC 620.
Voice recognition
[11.20.60] On occasion, linguists have been permitted to give morphophonology evidence,
based on acoustic analysis, of whether a voice identified in a control sample matches
another voice. A range of techniques can be employed in this regard, including auditory,
acoustic and text analysis, linguistic profiling, disguised voice analysis, and voice line-ups.
In particular, spectrograms of the speaker can be used to scrutinise the vocal tract of the
speaker. This is an area in the process of early forensic acceptance: see Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission v SensaSlim Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 5) [2014]
FCA 340.
Creation of transcripts
[11.20.65] Since Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180, a transcript
setting out words that can be heard when a tape of speech is played has been admitted
‘not to provide independent evidence of the conversation but so as to aid [the jury] in
understanding what conversation is recorded on the tape’ (at 188).
However, tape recording has a range of frailties which can make it difficult for the
tribunal of fact to utilise it. This has led to juries being provided with transcripts not as
evidence of the words on the tape recording or other sounds recorded, but as a means of
assisting in the perception of understanding of the evidence tendered by the playing of the
tape. A jury should be instructed that the purpose of admitting a transcript ‘is not to
provide independent evidence of the conversation but so as to aid them in understanding
what conversation is recorded on the tape if they are not satisfied that the transcript
1062 [11.20.60]
Linguists’ evidence | CH 11.20
correctly sets out what they heard on the tape’ (Butera v Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic)
(1987) 164 CLR 180 at 188). Thus ‘a transcript is merely an aid to the jury’s understanding
of the evidence derived from playing over the tape in court’ (Butera v Director of Public
Prosecutions (Vic) (1987) 164 CLR 180 at 188).
Difficulties can arise as a result of police investigators generating a transcript from a
tape, with whose voices they are familiar. Fraser has argued that the difficulties can arise
from translation of material in languages other than English, transcription of indistinct
English material, speaker attribution and identification, and enhancing of indistinct audio
(see Fraser (2018a, p 129)). In addition, issues can arise from suggestibility and the making
of assumptions by police transcribers (see Ridley, Gabbert and La Rooy (2013)). French
and Fraser (2018, p 300) have noted that contextual expectations by police transcribers can
lead to errors which are not deliberate. They term this ‘priming’: ‘in the vast majority of
cases, listeners’ contextual expectations are reasonable, and priming helps them hear
speech efficiently and accurately. The problem is that, while priming with reliable
contextual expectations can be extremely helpful, priming with unreliable contextual
expectations can be powerfully misleading. Worse, there is nothing in listeners’ experience
to alert them as to which condition applies in any given case’ (French and Fraser (2018,
p 300)). There are notorious instances of mistranscriptions. Coulthard, Johnson and Wright
(2017), for instance, note the examples of ‘he died after wank off’ in a police transcript
being exposed by expert analysis to be ‘he died after one cough’, while ‘shot a man to kill’
was exposed to be ‘showed the man the ticket’.
This fallibility raises the risk of miscarriages of justice (Fraser (2017)) and has led to the
proposal that linguists should play a role in the generation of such transcripts: ‘problems
of priming by an unreliable transcript are not resolved by admitting indistinct covert
recordings without a transcript. This retains the likelihood of priming by suggestions
arising from contextual information a jury might absorb (by intention or otherwise)
during the trial, or by verbal suggestions offered by prosecution or defence counsel as to
what words or phrases might or might not be heard. Nor is it advisable to have covert
recordings evaluated by the judge. While this can be effective, at the cost of considerable
judicial time, it is not guaranteed to provide a reliable outcome’ (Fraser (2018b, pp 55–56)).
It is likely and constructive that there will be greater use of linguists in the preparation of
the transcripts of tapes to reduce the risks which research has identified.
Voluntariness of confessions or admissions

[11.20.80] Expert opinion evidence from linguists has been admitted in relation to the
likelihood of whether admissions or confessions attributed to a suspect are likely to have
been made by the suspect (see, eg, R v Nedrick [1997] EWCA Crim 190; R v Blackburn [2005]
EWCA Crim 1349; R v Bentley (Dec’d) [1998] EWCA Crim 2516; see also, for similar
evidence, albeit from a psychologist, Murphy v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 94; and see
further People v Smith, 37 Cal Rptr 2d 524 (Cal Ct App 1995), where a foreign language
expert was permitted to give evidence on the likelihood that a suspect understood a
Miranda warning). In addition, a linguist may have the ability to express an informed
opinion on whether the content of admissions was adversely affected by the English
proficiency of the interviewee. Put another way, there can be a distinction between
apparent proficiency with English and the reality of ability to understand and
communicate. This was pointed out by Professor Eades (2015) in a paper quoted by
Blokland J of the Northern Territory Supreme Court in R v BL [2015] NTSC 85 at [53]:
When we think about Aboriginal people speaking any English in their dealings with the
law, one of the most important issues in remote Australia is how much English people
speak, or as linguists put it, their English proficiency. It can be misleading to assume that
just because an Aboriginal person is speaking some English, that they have the proficiency
required to participate in a police interview, or a lawyer interview, or to answer questions
[11.20.80] 1063
in court. It is common for people to have the ability to speak about some topics in some
contexts in a second or additional language, while lacking sufficient proficiency to
communicate in this language on more complex issues: the term ‘partial speakers of
English’ refers to people whose main language is a traditional Indigenous language or
Kriol, but whose English proficiency is not the same as, or similar to, that of a native
speaker. (The term Aboriginal Learner’s English is sometimes given to their use of English,
see Cooke 2002).
Many Aboriginal partial speakers of English have what the expert’s term ‘basic
transactional proficiency’. This is the level of language proficiency at which people can use
English for basic transactions (this is using English to get things done), for example in familiar
shops, or in very basic social interactions. People at this level are: ‘able to understand enough
to participate in very simple face-to-face conversations with a sympathetic or experienced
member of the public. Such conversations are usually directly related to the person’s basic
transactional needs or on very familiar topics’. Others have a higher level of English
proficiency: ‘Social proficiency’. This means they are ‘Able to satisfy basic social needs, and
the requirements of routine situations pertinent to their own everyday commerce and
recreation and to linguistically undemanding “vocational” fields[’]. This is the entry level for
some TAFE courses. But a higher level of proficiency in English would be required to
understand abstract concepts such as in the full right to silence caution.
This is an issue in relation to which linguists have the potential to be able to make
forensically helpful contributions. Professor Eades’ evidence on this issue was utilised in
Western Australia v Gibson (2014) 243 A Crim R 68; [2014] WASC 240, where she gave
evidence on whether the accused’s language indicated that he understood his rights;
whether the language used by the police was likely to have been understood by the
accused, who was a Pintupi man from a remote Western Desert community in Western
Australia; and the extent to which the assistance from an independent person may or may
not have helped the accused in understanding his rights. Ultimately, the accused man’s
participation in an interview was found not to be voluntary (see [180]).
However, it is necessary for the evidence from the expert linguist to be the product of
specialised knowledge. Otherwise, the consequence can be the kind of adverse ruling
made in Arshad v Her Majesty’s Advocate [2006] ScotHC HCJAC 28 at [5]:
Such criticisms as he makes of the recordings of the conversations and the transcripts
appeared to be ones that were all capable of being made by the defence in cross
examination and I was at a loss to understand how and why a linguistics expert would be
required to enable them to be articulated. I could not see from the report that a professor
of linguistics was in any better position to make these criticisms than counsel was or that
there arose any technicality or speciality of the study of linguistics upon which the jury
would require instruction if they were to understand any criticism that counsel sought to
make.
It is also necessary that any evidence from a linguistics expert remain within the province
of linguistics and not commentate on other matters: Arshad v Her Majesty’s Advocate [2006]
ScotHC HCJAC 28 at [14].
Distinctiveness of expression
[11.20.100] On occasion, the distinctiveness of language used or errors made by a person
may be indicative of their identity, or at least of their ethnic origin. In Kozomara v Hollows
[2013] WASC 68, for instance, Corboy J held on appeal reviewed linguists’ evidence about
the distinctiveness of ‘errors’ and their significance in terms of whether they indicated a
Serbian, Croatian or Bosnian background.
Trade mark cases

[11.20.120] In Companhia Souza Cruz Industria E Comercio v Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia)
Ltd (1998) 41 IPR 497; [1998] FCA 689, Wilcox J heard an appeal against a decision of a
delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks, Michael Homann, refusing to register a trade
1064 [11.20.100]
mark, ‘FREE’, in respect of the category of goods (Class 34) described in the Trade Marks
Register as ‘tobacco, cigarettes and smokers articles in general’. Each party filed an
affidavit made by a linguistic expert as to the similarities and dissimilarities between the
words FREE and FREEDOM. Wilcox J did not find the evidence of use, commenting:
Without any disrespect to these experts, their evidence was unnecessary. It does no more
than spell out the detail of what any reasonably well-informed non-expert already knows.
I think judges may be allowed (and expected) to know the meaning of ordinary English
words and their methods of pronunciation. It would be unfortunate if the notion got about
that it was necessary for parties to go to the trouble and expense of retaining a linguistic
expert in order to present an argument that a particular mark is, or is not, deceptively
similar to another mark. The courts have proved well able to reach conclusions about that
question without the assistance of linguists.
However, in A & W Food Services of Canada Inc v McDonald’s Restaurants of Canada Ltd
(2005) 253 DLR (4th) 736, O’Reilly J heard a claim by A & W which sold a grilled chicken
sandwich called a ‘Chicken Grill’. It registered a trade mark for that name and product in
1988. Commencing in 2001, McDonald’s sold a grilled chicken sandwich which it called
‘Chicken McGrill’. A & W alleged that McDonald’s had infringed its trade mark, used a
confusingly similar mark, and preyed upon its goodwill in the marketplace. In turn,
McDonald’s claimed that A & W’s trade mark was invalid because it lacked the essential
element of distinctiveness.
O’Reilly J heard extensive linguistics evidence. For the plaintiff, a linguistics expert
testified that consumers would likely confuse the names ‘Chicken Grill’ and ‘Chicken
McGrill’. In her view, the sound, appearance and meaning of the two phrases were so
similar that they would be conflated in consumers’ memories. She believed the ‘Mc’ prefix
was likely to be mumbled or dropped entirely in conversation. Further, ‘Mc’ did not
change the meaning of the phrase ‘Chicken Grill’. She characterised ‘Chicken Grill’ as a
‘noun-noun’ phrase, a form of phrase which is more complex and difficult to comprehend
than adjective-noun compounds. She expressed the view that ‘Chicken Grill’ could refer to
a restaurant, a cooking implement, a culinary event or a menu item. It was not clear. She
argued that A & W’s use of the phrase as a name for a sandwich did not follow the usual
pattern of noun-noun phrases in which the left word tells the reader something about the
right word. A ‘Chicken Grill’ in an A & W restaurant was not a kind of ‘grill’ at all; it was
a grilled chicken sandwich. As such, the name ‘Chicken Grill’ did not describe the
product, it merely suggested some of its qualities. She discounted the effect that the ‘Mc’
prefix might have in helping consumers distinguish between the ‘Chicken Grill’ and the
‘Chicken McGrill’. She characterised ‘Mc’ as an ‘inflectional morpheme’ – a unit of speech
that does not change the meaning of the root word to which it is attached or change its
grammatical category. She compared it to adding an ‘s’ to a word to make it plural or an
‘ed’ to change its tense. It would not affect the meaning of the phrase in which it appears
(ie ‘Chicken McGrill’), especially when it appears in the middle. Further, it would not
cause consumers to store that phrase, or retrieve it from memory, distinctly from a similar
phrase that lacks the ‘Mc’ prefix (ie ‘Chicken Grill’).
By contrast, the defendant’s linguistic expert expressed the view that the phrase
‘Chicken Grill’ followed a fairly standard pattern in the naming of food items. He argued
that it is common for dishes to be identified by a noun-noun phrase, with one of the nouns
being the main ingredient and the other being the method of preparation. In these kinds of
phrases, it is not unusual for the left noun to be the ingredient and the right noun the
method of preparation. He concluded from his analysis that ‘Chicken Grill’ had ‘a
common and ordinary meaning in the English language being a meal which includes
chicken that has been cooked on a grill’. If the name ‘Chicken Grill’ were used in or by a
restaurant selling sandwiches, consumers would understand that it referred to a sandwich
made with grilled chicken. In his view, ‘Chicken Grill’ could have no other relevant
[11.20.120] 1065
meaning in that context. He testified that the ‘Mc’ prefix has a clear, well-known and
specific meaning: it means ‘from McDonald’s’. As such, he disagreed with the plaintiff
linguist that ‘Mc’ added virtually nothing when inserted in the phrase ‘Chicken Grill’.
Further, given its distinct meaning, the prefix ‘Mc’ was unlikely to be dropped by
consumers in ordinary speech. Finally, in his view, the ‘Mc’ prefix clearly distinguished the
‘Chicken McGrill’ from the ‘Chicken Grill’, making it unlikely that consumers would
confuse them.
Justice O’Reilly gave short reasons, holding that the ‘Mc’ prefix was meaningful and, in
the circumstances of this case, significantly reduced the likelihood of confusion about the
source of each party’s product. He was persuaded that the defence linguist’s opinion
‘better describes how an average consumer would react to the names of the parties’
sandwiches’ (at [68]).
Immigration and refugee claims

[11.20.160] Linguistic evidence has also played an important role in the assessment of
claims for refugee status. For instance, in Jan v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural
Affairs [2002] FCA 100, linguistic evidence is recorded as having addressed at first instance
the nature of the applicant’s recorded spoken language. He claimed to be Sunni Muslim of
Pashtu ethnicity, speaking Pashtu, having lived in Afghanistan all his life. His claim to
refugee status depended upon his assertion that he had left Afghanistan because of
persecution by the Taliban and fear that if he returned he would again suffer persecution
and, indeed, would be killed. (See too Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v
SBAA [2002] FCAFC 195; see also Secretary of State for Home Department v MN and KY
(Scotland) [2014] UKSC 30; RM (Sierra Leone) v Secretary of State for the Home Department
[2015] EWCA Civ 541.)
In WAHN v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FMCA
336, the applicant for a protection visa was found not to be Algerian as claimed by him,
but most reasonably – based on the linguistic evidence – to be from Morocco. This
precluded any consideration of his claim as to a well-founded fear of persecution for
convention reasons in another country.
It is important that the role provided to a linguist and the bases of her or his opinions
be clear: Joam v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 107.
In some situations, it may even be that an adverse inference is drawn if no linguistic
evidence is called by an applicant: see, eg, HH (Mogadishu: armed conflict: risk) Somalia CG
[2008] UKAIT 00022 at [356]. Alternatively, it may be incumbent upon an inquisitorial
tribunal to procure such evidence, with the cooperation of the applicant.
Native title claims

[11.20.200] In a number of native title cases, evidence from linguists has played an
important role. There is the potential, for instance, for applicants to claim to be a
linguistically or dialectically distinct group. On a number of occasions, the linguists are
self-described as ‘anthropological linguists’: see, eg, Narrier v Western Australia [2016] FCA
1519 at [273].
An example of relevant evidence in this respect was that given by Dr Walsh in
Anderson on behalf of the Wulli Wulli People v Queensland (No 3) [2015] FCA 821 at [47],
where his report addressed:
(a) What evidence was there that shows certain languages were spoken by
Aboriginal people in each claim area, or parts thereof, prior to and after 1788?
(b) What languages were they and how closely related are they?
(c) What evidence is there that shows that those languages have continued to be
spoken?
1066 [11.20.160]
(d) To what extent have those languages experienced change and adaptation since
1788?
(e) Who has continued to speak them and to what extent?
In Daniel v Western Australia [2003] FCA 666 at [206]–[207], Nicholson J explained the role
of language in the native title claim context as follows:
The link of language to land is direct, unmediated by speakers, and is regarded as a result
of Dreamtime placement of languages at particular places. People are themselves
associated with the languages because they are associated with those places. (A Rumsey,
“Language Groups in Australian Aboriginal Land Claims”, Anthropological Forum, vol VI(1),
1989 69, p 75). From the Dreamtime on ‘the relation between language and territory is a
necessary rather than a contingent one … The links between peoples and languages are
secondary links, established through the grounding of both in the landscape’ (A Rumsey,
“Language and Territoriality in Aboriginal Australia” in Language and Culture in Aboriginal
Australia (ed M Walsh and C Yallop) Aboriginal Studies Press, Canberra, 1993, p 191 at 204).
It follows that the ability to speak a language is not the link to group identity, since a
person may speak the language but not be in the group and vice versa (Rumsey, 1989, p 75).
A person [may] be regarded as Ngarluma but not necessarily speak Ngarluma or perhaps
have command of only a set of key Ngarluma words or expression sufficient to be identified
as Ngarluma but yet not possessed of communicative linguistic competence.
The evidence of the linguistic experts addressed the use of languages as a means of
connecting Aboriginal people to country in the context of the claim. Ultimately, Lindgren J
concluded (at [228]) that:
While the linguistic evidence relevant to connection is therefore of little weight in relation
to the first applicants specifically, nevertheless it is evidence of connection by Aboriginal
peoples generally to the claim areas. Subject to the issue of weight, it is evidence from
which it can be inferred that such peoples had the general connection described in the
evidence.
In Neowarra v Western Australia [2003] FCA 1402 at [121], Sundberg J commented that
although the applicants had not mounted ‘a language area claim … an understanding of
the languages spoken in the claim region now and in the past, and of the language
countries, is essential to an understanding of the level at which any native title should be
recognised’. (See also Mathias v Canada 2001 FCT 480 (CanLII); Delgamuukw v British
Columbia (1991) 79 DLR (4th) 185; [1991] 5 CNLR 5.)
In Ward v Western Australia (1998) 159 ALR 483; [1998] FCA 1478, Lee J, on the basis of
the linguistic evidence before him, commented (at 523):
The evidence dealt with the history and use of a language and indicated that before
colonization an identifiable group had relied upon use of the language as an element of
identification of the group. The languages studied by Ms Kofod have taken centuries to
evolve. It follows that the languages in use today would have been in use at the time of
sovereignty and likely to have been given a similar role in defining the identity of a group
at the time the Crown claimed sovereignty over land occupied by Aboriginal people.
In De Rose v South Australia (No 2) (2005) 145 FCR 290; [2005] FCAFC 110 and
Harrington-Smith v Western Australia (No 9) (2007) 238 ALR 1; [2007] FCA 31, too, linguistic
evidence played an important role in the resolution of the proceedings.
In Harrington-Smith (at [1025]–[1028]), Lindgren J stated that:
I have not found matters relating to Aboriginal language of particular assistance in
resolving the issues before the Court.
The picture that emerges is that across the Western Desert, there was a ‘chain’ or
‘spread’ of dialects; that the dialects were mutually intelligible; and that the mutual
intelligibility was greater or less according to the geographical distance between speakers.
The mutual intelligibility was therefore least as between people at opposite extremities of
the Western Desert. In his report, Dr Clendon referred to ‘mutually intelligible varieties of
a larger linguistic taxonomic category referred to as the Western Desert language’. …
[11.20.200] 1067
While there is necessarily some relationship between language and territory, the
evidence does not support language groups as the holders of rights and interests. People
who find it necessary or desirable to communicate with each other will find a means of
doing so, and those living within a certain proximity to each other will find this necessary
or desirable.
In Sampi v Western Australia [2005] FCA 777, linguistic evidence was received in relation to
the Bardi and Jawi peoples in the Kimberleys. It dealt with vocabulary used from the time
of Dampier, the agglutinative characteristics of the languages, and the vocabulary relating
to time, flora and the sea. It enabled French J to conclude (at [781]–[782]) that:
the Bardi and Jawi language groups are closely related and that the Jawi language may be
regarded as a dialect with respect to Bardi. This may be regarded as consistent with the
proposition that Bardi and Jawi could be regarded as one society for the purposes of a
native title determination. It is not however, as will emerge later in these reasons,
conclusive of that proposition.
Certainly the evidence brings out the long-standing connection to country reflected in
the detailed references in the languages to aspects of the environment. That detail is
indicative of the accumulation of knowledge over a lengthy period of time. That aspect of
the linguistic evidence supports, in my opinion, continuous connection of both Bardi and
Jawi people with the country of the claim area since before 1829. It also supports the
inference that the immediate offshore marine environment was an important element of
their country.
Family law cases

[11.20.240] On occasion, a parent’s oral communicative proficiency can be relevant to
parenting arrangements and also to the viability of relocation to another country/culture.
For instance, in Spengler & Thomas [2017] FamCa 747, expert evidence was permitted from
a linguist who assessed a wife’s capacity to listen and speak in a foreign language. He
assessed that she had basic proficiency such as to enable her to satisfy basic social needs
and to engage in linguistically undemanding interactions – she could serve at a cash
register or behind a counter selling a limited range of goods, but did not have the
proficiency required of a sales consultant (at [129]–[133]).
1068 [11.20.240]
PART 12 – SCIENTISTS’ EVIDENCE
Chapter 12.0: Scientific evidence......................................................... 1071

Chapter 12.05: Novel scientific evidence ....................................... 1087
Chapter 12.10: Fingerprinting, footprint and footwear
evidence .............................................................................. 1109
Chapter 12.15: Document analysis evidence................................. 1125
Chapter 12.20: DNA evidence................................................................ 1131
Chapter 12.25: Statistical and probability evidence .................. 1187
1069
Chapter 12.0
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [12.0.01]
Definition of scientific evidence ......................................................................................... [12.0.02]
Admissibility .......................................................................................................................... [12.0.10]
Controversies .......................................................................................................................... [12.0.60]
The status of scientific evidence ......................................................................................... [12.0.100]
Scientific evidence as circumstantial evidence ................................................................. [12.0.140]
Drawing inferences as to guilt ............................................................................................ [12.0.150]
Sufficiency of evidence ......................................................................................................... [12.0.160]
Epidemiology and evidence of possibility in civil cases ............................................... [12.0.200]
Relative risk ratio evidence ................................................................................................. [12.0.210]
Evaluation of scientific evidence ........................................................................................ [12.0.260]
Continuity of evidence ......................................................................................................... [12.0.300]
Computer simulations .......................................................................................................... [12.0.340]
Destruction of exhibits ......................................................................................................... [12.0.380]
Scientific instruments: the presumption of accuracy ...................................................... [12.0.420]
The National Measurement Act 1960 (Cth) ......................................................................... [12.0.460]
Facilitation of proof ............................................................................................................... [12.0.500]
‘The contrasts between law and science are often described in
binary terms: science seeks truth, while the law does justice;
science is descriptive, but law is prescriptive; science
emphasises progress, whereas the law emphasises process …
[C]omparisons between science and the law often celebrate
science’s unique commitment to systematic testing of
observations and its willingness to submit its conclusions to
critical probing and falsification.’
Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar (1995, p 7).
Introduction
[12.0.01] Scientific evidence has become a mainstay of criminal trials and figures
prominently too in much other litigation. However, science continues to develop and
evolve, resulting in challenges for the courts in determining when a stage has been
reached where it is appropriate and safe for such evidence to be admitted. There have
been many instances where scientific evidence has enjoyed a period of acceptance within
the expert community, or at least the community of forensic scientists, and later has been
identified as lacking validity or reliability. Such considerations prompted the President of
the Victorian Court of Appeal, Justice Maxwell, to observe in 2019 that ‘there was little
proof that forensic techniques including gunshot analysis, footprint analysis, hair
comparison and bite mark comparison could reliably identify criminals’ and to call for law
reform so that trial judges be required to consider the reliability of scientific evidence
before admitting it before juries (see Mannix (2019)). Thus, the threshold decision of
determining at a given point in time whether scientific evidence should be admitted in
litigation, especially before jurors, has proved fraught and controversial.
Another aspect of scientific evidence is the challenge for the courts in evaluating how it
should be deployed in the reasoning process to determine whether there is causation
between an act and an outcome and whether it is safe to draw inferences from scientific
testing or simulation.
This chapter reviews how the law deals with scientific evidence, focusing upon the role
of scientific evidence as circumstantial evidence, how science can be utilised when it
provides additional means of concluding association between an event and an outcome,
the inferences that can be drawn from simulations, how the law proceeds in the
unsatisfactory position of where original samples no longer exist for re-testing, and other
issues of proof arising from the adducing of scientific evidence.
[12.0.01] 1071
Part 12 – Scientists’ evidence
Definition of scientific evidence

[12.0.02] The use of the term ‘scientific evidence’ itself is important because of the
connotations of ‘science’ and the expectations that may be raised when evidence is
characterised as ‘scientific’.
‘Scientific evidence’ is a generalised term that has traditionally been used to refer to
evidence concerning matters such as ballistics, fingerprinting and blood analysis. For
reasons that lack conceptual justification, it has not often been thought to apply to
evidence from environmental scientists. That is not a correct approach. The pages of this
work have shown the extent to which the ‘forensic sciences’ have proliferated and evolved
and have become specialised and professionalised. The most obvious example is DNA
profiling (subscription service Chs 80 and 80A). Others, though, are glass and paint
analysis (subscription service Chs 89 and 90), gold analysis (subscription service Ch 88A),
forensic botany (subscription service Ch 91), entomology evidence (subscription service
Ch 91A) and even podiatry evidence (subscription service Ch 85A). Food analysis
evidence (subscription service Ch 116), too, is a form of scientific assessment that has an
obvious forensic application.
A key characteristic of ‘scientific evidence’ is valid measurement, assessment and
statistically based evaluation. Much of forensic science investigates the likelihood that a
sample found at the scene of a crime emanates from the same source as is associated with
a suspect. This involves analysis of statistically calculated probabilities, the drawing of
inferences on the basis of the matches found against the likelihood of such matches
occurring. Frequently, conclusions are based upon databases that have been compiled
within scientific laboratories.
For the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scientific evidence’ is construed broadly so
as to enable analysis from a legal perspective of important underlying concepts of
evidence that are adduced under the rubric of ‘science’, with a particular focus upon the
relevance, and the modes for evaluation, of such evidence.
Admissibility
[12.0.10] ‘Scientific evidence’ is not in a special category so far as admissibility is
concerned in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa or England. However, the
designation ‘scientific’ has a particular significance in the United States, where the
Supreme Court held in the influential decision of Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc
509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993) that a series of indicia is relevant to whether ‘scientific
evidence’ would assist the trier of fact, and therefore be admissible. The same court in
Kumho Tire Co Ltd v Carmichael 526 US 137; 119 S Ct 1167 (1999) rejected a distinction
between ‘scientific’ knowledge and evidence based on technical and other specialised
knowledge. The practical result is that the questions posed in the United States of
scientific and comparable evidence are:
• whether it can be or has been tested;
• whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication as a
means of increasing the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be
detected;
• the known or potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique’s operation; and
• whether a technique has gained general acceptance within the scientific community: see
[2.10.550].
The answers to these questions are relevant, too, for New Zealand, where the Daubert test
has been applied (see [2.10.720]); for Canada (see [2.10.770]), where a version of the
Daubert test is applied; and in other common law jurisdictions where the prejudice/
probative discretion needs to be informed by reliability criteria.
1072 [12.0.02]
Scientific evidence | CH 12.0
This chapter reviews a variety of issues pertinent to the admissibility and evaluation of
‘scientific evidence’. Topics such as the status of scientific evidence; scientific evidence as
circumstantial evidence; evidence of possibility in civil cases; evaluation of scientific
evidence; continuity of evidence; computer simulations; destruction of exhibits; scientific
instruments; the National Measurement Act 1960 (Cth); and the facilitation of scientific proof
are covered.
This chapter is intended to be read particularly in conjunction with subscription
service Ch 28 (Interpreting scientific evidence). Reference can also usefully be made to
subscription service Ch 26 (Quality management in the forensic sciences), as well as the
specific legal chapters relating to novel scientific evidence (Ch 12.05), fingerprinting
evidence (Ch 12.10), document analysis evidence (Ch 12.15), and DNA evidence
(Ch 12.20).
Controversies
[12.0.60] ‘Scientific evidence’ is adduced in all forms of cases in the courts but it is in the
criminal area and in toxic tort litigation that it tends to assume the highest profile, and also
to prompt the most significant concerns (see, eg, Pyrek (2007)). Key among these is the
issue of whether judges, magistrates and, most of all, juries are adequately equipped to
evaluate scientific evidence. Australian judges (see Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (1999))
and magistrates (see Freckelton, Reddy and Selby (2001)) were asked in an extensive
survey whether they had encountered evidence that they had not been able to evaluate
adequately because of its complexity. Approximately half said that they had (judges:
52.28%, n=103; magistrates: 46.81%, n=110). Of those answering the question, 17.02%
(n=32) of judges said that the evidence had been scientific and 13.87% (n=33) of
magistrates said that also had been their experience. Scientific evidence ranked third,
behind psychiatry and psychology, in terms of difficulty of comprehension among judges
primarily sitting in the criminal area.
The difficulties posed by scientific evidence to the fact-finding processes of the courts
have prompted considerable discussion: see, eg, Huber (1991); Jones (1994); Jasanoff
(1995); Foster and Huber (1997); Robertson and Vignaux (1995); Freckelton (2000a); Golan
(2004); Pyrek (2007). Undoubtedly, such difficulties will be the subject of ongoing debate.
By and large, they are outside the scope of this chapter, save insofar as they impact upon
the admissibility of scientific evidence or the weight likely to be accorded to admitted
scientific evidence.
The status of scientific evidence

[12.0.100] In Australia, scientific evidence is not regarded as forming a distinctive category
of evidence. As Dixon J held in Hocking v Bell (1945) 71 CLR 430 at 440:
Scientific evidence, even when composed in part of textbooks, is no less a matter of fact
within the province of the jury than is other evidence, and it is the jury’s function to
estimate the reliance to be placed on scientific evidence, however eminent.
(See also Jarrett v The Queen (1994) 73 A Crim R 160 at 169 per Mullighan J.) Certainty of
result or unanimity of scientific opinion is not required for admissibility: Gilmore v The
Queen [1977] 2 NSWLR 935 at 939, citing United States v Baller 519 F (2d) 463 (1975).
However, it is accepted that scientific evidence, especially if it goes to an important
issue which inculpates an accused person in the commission of an offence, may have a
prejudicial effect which, in the minds of a jury, may outweigh its probative value: see Lewis
v The Queen (1987) 29 A Crim R 267 at 271; see also Ch 2.35. The risk has been
acknowledged to be that ‘the jury, being without scientific training’ (Lewis v The Queen
[12.0.100] 1073
(1987) 29 A Crim R 267 at 271), may be overwhelmed by the scientist’s qualifications,

appointments, experience and confidence of articulation. As the majority put it in R v DD
2000 SCC 43 at [53]:
Dressed up in scientific language which the jury does not easily understand and
(See, too, R v Beland [1987] 2 SCR 398; (1987) 43 DLR (4th) 641; 36 CCC (3d) 481 at 403.)
In extreme cases, this has been held to legitimise the exclusion of scientific evidence on
the basis that a jury is inadequately positioned to evaluate it and might misconstrue it:
Lewis v The Queen (1987) 29 A Crim R 267 at 271; R v Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233; R v
Elliott (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, Hunt J, 6 April 1990); Lucas v The Queen [1992] 2
VR 109. However, this response to the complexity of evidence is very much the exception
and the standard approach of criminal courts has been to admit such evidence and ease
the path of jurors to the greatest extent possible by judicial questioning, summing up and
direction: see, in particular, Jarrett v The Queen (1994) 73 A Crim R 160; R v Duke (1979) 22
SASR 46; 1 A Crim R 39.
Scientific evidence as circumstantial evidence

[12.0.140] Scientific evidence is rarely the only evidence adduced by the prosecution in
criminal trials: see, eg, Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; [2002] HCA 4. It generally
forms part of the matrix of facts which the prosecution seeks to suggest properly leads to
a finding beyond reasonable doubt that the accused person committed the crime.
Frequently, scientific evidence reduces down to statistical evidence which, when adduced
by the prosecution, raises the likelihood that the accused person is the offender. This raises
the difficult issue of the use to which the trier of fact, be it a judge, a magistrate or a jury,
can legitimately put scientific evidence.
In a series of DNA profiling cases, courts have held that scientists ought not to be
asked questions whose answers the jury might misconstrue, such as the likelihood that it
was the defendant who left the crime stain: Doheny v The Queen [1997] 1 Cr App R 369;
Latcha v The Queen (1998) 104 A Crim R 390 at 397. However, it is standard for the jury to
be provided with the random occurrence ratio – the frequency with which the matching
DNA characteristics are likely to be found in the population at large. This provides it with
a tool by which to evaluate the significance of the match between the crime scene DNA
and that of the accused. These figures vary dramatically, sometimes being very low by
reason of only one probe, for instance, being able to be used, and other times being high.
In general, the prosecution is allowed to adduce such scientific evidence in the same way
that it was previously entitled to adduce ABO blood typing evidence, even though the
statistics yielded from such testing often only modestly advance the prosecution case.
Drawing inferences as to guilt
[12.0.150] The issue for a decision-maker in a criminal trial, when such evidence is
equivocal, or of modest dimensions of assistance to the prosecution, is to determine what
use can be made of the evidence. It has been held that a jury is obliged to consider ‘the
weight which is to be given to the united force of all the circumstances put together’:
Belhaven and Stenton Peerage (1875) 1 App Cas 278 at 279. This means that a jury should
decide whether it accepts the evidence of a particular fact not by considering the evidence
directly relating to the fact in isolation, but in the light of all of the evidence. It is entitled
to draw an inference of guilt from a combination of facts, none of which viewed alone
would support that inference: Chamberlain v R (No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521 at
536 per Gibbs CJ and Mason J. An inference of guilt in a criminal trial can be drawn if it is
based upon primary facts which are found beyond reasonable doubt and if it is the only
inference which is reasonably open upon the whole body of primary facts: Chamberlain v R
1074 [12.0.140]
(No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521 at 598 per Brennan J; at 536 per Gibbs CJ and
Mason J; see also Moss v Baines [1974] WAR 7 at 11. An inference of guilt may properly be
drawn, although any particular primary fact, or any concatenation of primary facts falling
short of the whole, would be insufficient to exclude other inferences.
The High Court’s decision in Chamberlain v R (No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521
provides a good example of such a difficulty. The prosecution relied on a number of
different groups of evidence:
(1) evidence of foetal haemoglobin in the car of the accused and in their camera case;
(2) evidence of likely bleeding if a dingo had seized the baby’s head and of the
absence of large quantities of blood in the tent in which the deceased had been at
the time; and
(3) evidence of the condition of the deceased’s jumpsuit and singlet and the
arrangement of the deceased’s clothes when they were found.
One of the issues for the High Court was whether the fact that the foetal haemoglobin
evidence was flawed meant that the jury verdict should be quashed.
Gibbs CJ and Mason J drew a distinction between crucial (or primary) facts and
secondary facts, both of which have the potential to be proved by scientific evidence (at
536):
[T]he jury cannot view a fact as a basis for an inference of guilt unless at the end of the
day they are satisfied of the existence of the fact beyond reasonable doubt. When the
evidence is circumstantial, the jury, whether in a civil or in a criminal case, are required to
draw an inference from the circumstances of the case; in a civil case the circumstances
must raise a more probable inference in favour of what is alleged, and in a criminal case
the circumstances must exclude any reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.
It is not possible for a decision-maker in a criminal case to be satisfied beyond reasonable

doubt of an inference drawn from facts about the existence of which he or she is in doubt.
Deane J in Chamberlain took a somewhat different approach, finding that it is not the
law that a juror is precluded in all circumstances from drawing an inference from a
primary fact unless it is proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, if a primary fact
constitutes an essential element of a crime charged, a juror must be persuaded that that
fact has been proved beyond reasonable doubt before properly joining in a verdict of
guilty. He found that those bodies of evidence were cumulative (at 627):
The jury was entitled to pay regard to all of them, even if unpersuaded that any or all of
them was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus a conclusion that the evidence directed
to showing the presence of foetal haemoglobin in the car was persuasive only to the extent
of balance of probability does not mean that the conclusion and the evidence should be
rejected as irrelevant. Even though the evidence, viewed discretely, does no more than
establish the presence of foetal haemoglobin on the balance of probabilities, it remains part
of the totality of the admissible and relevant evidence in the context of which the ultimate
question whether Mrs Chamberlain’s guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt fell
and falls to be determined.
Thus, in Chamberlain v R (No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984) 153 CLR 521, the High Court found
that although scientific evidence that blood under the dashboard and in the car of the
accused parents was foetal blood and the evidence of a pathologist that he saw on the
jumpsuit of the deceased the imprint of a hand in blood were unsafe to form the basis of
an inference of guilt, the jury’s finding of guilt should not be disturbed because of the
existence of other legitimate bases for its decision.
In R v Anderson [2000] 1 VR 1 at 26, the Victorian Court of Appeal applied the same
principle to insist that a jury should have been instructed that it could only accept the
opinions expressed by two treating doctors that wounds on the accused had been
self-inflicted, to the exclusion of opinions on the same subject expressed by a forensic
[12.0.150] 1075
physician and a forensic pathologist, if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the former
opinions were correct: see also R v Sodo (1975) 61 Cr App R 131 at 134.
Sufficiency of evidence
[12.0.160] As a further example of the principles, in R v Van Beelen (1973) 4 SASR 353, it
was decided by the South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal that it had been
illegitimate for a jury to find an accused man guilty of murder when it could only have
done so on the basis of scientific evidence that was equivocal. In Van Beelen, the direct
evidence in respect of the murder charge was insufficient for a finding of guilt without
scientific evidence. The scientific evidence, though, only went as far as to establish that
certain trace materials (fibres, foraminifera, paint chips and hairs) found on or about the
deceased were similar to other trace materials found on or about the accused man. For
instance, fibres found on the deceased girl’s singlet were said to be similar to those from
the pullover of the accused man.
The court held that there had been sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of
guilt. It had been legitimate for the jury to infer, from the fact that in a number of instances
the trace materials on the deceased and on the accused could have originated from the
same source, that they did so originate. This was so notwithstanding that the individual
identity of any one set of trace materials, considered in isolation, was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt. However, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had erred in
directing the jury that it could in effect draw an inference of guilt from primary evidence
the existence of which was in doubt. It held (at 374):
[T]he jury is not, in our view, required to split up the various stages in the process of
reasoning leading to the conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt and to apply some
particular standard of proof to each of those steps … That, of course, does not mean that
they ought to be encouraged or permitted to draw inferences of guilt from doubtful facts.
As a matter of common sense it is impossible to infer guilt beyond reasonable doubt from
facts which are in doubt. There is a clear distinction between drawing an inference of guilt
from a combination of several proved facts, none of which by itself would support the
inference, and drawing an inference of guilt from several facts whose existence is in doubt.
In the first place the combination does what each fact taken in isolation could not do; in
the second case the combination counts for nothing.
In 2002, the High Court of Australia revisited the issue in the context of conflicting
evidence about whether a mother could have cut her children’s throats and then
committed suicide in the same way: see Velevski v The Queen (2002) 76 ALJR 402; [2002]
HCA 4. Gaudron J focused upon the limitations of a jury to arrive at a correct evaluation
(at [85]):
If the conflicting evidence of experts is not based on matters or assumptions with respect
to matters upon which the jury can reach its own conclusions but, instead, is evidence of
‘opinion on matters of science within disciplines of which each [is] a master, and at a level
of difficulty and sophistication above that at which a juror … might by reasoning from
general scientific knowledge subject the opinions to wholly effective critical evaluation’, a
jury cannot, by reference solely to that evidence, resolve that conflict in a manner ‘which
would eliminate reasonable doubt’.
Epidemiology and evidence of possibility in civil cases

[12.0.200] Evidence of ‘possibility’ arises in the context of a variety of forms of scientific
evidence, particularly in the context of epidemiology evidence which establishes the
potential for a nexus between, for instance, a teratogen or a carcinogen and a plaintiff’s
medical condition. Spigelman CJ in Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262;
[2000] NSWCA 29 at [59]–[62] usefully summarised the status of epidemiology evidence:
1076 [12.0.160]
Epidemiology is the study of the distribution and determinants of disease in human

populations. It is based on the assumption that a disease is not distributed randomly in a
group of individuals. Accordingly, subgroups may be identified which are at increased
risk of contracting particular diseases.
Epidemiological evidence identifies associations between specific forms of exposure
and the risk of disease in groups of individuals. Epidemiologists do make judgments
about whether a statistical association represents a cause-effect relationship. However,
those judgments focus on what is sometimes called in the epidemiological literature
‘general causation’: Whether or not the particular factor is capable of causing the disease.
Epidemiologists are not concerned with ‘specific causation’: Did the particular factor cause
the disease in an individual case? …
Epidemiology provides two types of material: first, the statistical measurement of an
association between exposure and disease and, secondly, interpretation of the data to
determine general causation. The second function may be performed by an epidemiologist
who had no association with the study or studies which provide the raw data.
Relative risk ratio evidence
[12.0.210] As Lord Nimmo Smith put it in McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2005] ScotCS
CSOH 69 at [6.158]:
If an association between an exposure and a condition is judged to be statistically
significant, after taking account of the foregoing considerations, that in itself does not
constitute a judgment that there is a causal connection between the exposure and the
condition. The distinction between association and causation is not always recognised,
and clearly gives rise to confusion in the minds of those who are insufficiently instructed
in epidemiology. The finding of an association between an exposure and a condition or
disease, even if judged to be statistically significant, does not of itself connote that a causal
connection between the two is established. This is a matter for a further exercise of
judgment, taking account of such criteria as the consistency, the strength, the specificity,
the temporal relationship and the coherence of the association …
Epidemiological studies generally identify the strength of an association by a measure
described as ‘relative risk’, which is the ratio of the incidence of the disease in exposed
people compared to the incidence in those who are not exposed: see further Freckelton
(2000b); Danne (2006). If the relative risk equals 1.0, the risk is the same in exposed as in
non-exposed people. By contrast, if it is higher than 1.0, inference of causation may be able
to be drawn. A relative risk of 2.0 means that, for instance, a disease occurs among the
population subject to the event under investigation twice as frequently as the disease
occurs among the population not subject to the event under investigation, as expressed in
Manko v United States 636 F Supp 1419 at 1433–1434 (1986):
Phrased another way, a relative risk of ‘two’ means that, on the average, there is a fifty per
cent likelihood that a particular case of the disease was caused by the event under
investigation and a fifty per cent likelihood that the disease was caused by chance alone. A
relative risk greater than ‘two’ means that the disease more likely than not was caused by
the event.
Key decisions in the United States have demanded a relative risk ratio of greater than 2.0
to establish causation on the balance of probabilities: see, eg, Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc 43 F 3d 1311 (9th Cir 1995); Re Joint Eastern and Southern District
Asbestos Litigation 758 F Supp 199 at 202–203 (1991). However, this has not been required
in Australia: Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; [2000] NSWCA 29 at
[59]–[62], [137].
In Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; [2000] NSWCA 29, Australia’s
most important decision on the use that can legitimately be made of ‘possibility evidence’,
the evidence was that studies of quality had demonstrated an increased risk of between
1.5 and 2.0 fold for succumbing to renal cell carcinoma upon exposure to asbestos. A series
of witnesses testified that there was a possible, but not a definite, link between such cancer
and exposure to the potential carcinogen. Proof of damage was necessary on the balance
of probabilities.
[12.0.210] 1077
The decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal took place in the context of
previous determinations that the common law test of balance of probabilities is not
satisfied by evidence which does no more than establish a possibility of nexus: see, eg,
St George Club Ltd v Hines (1962) 35 ALJR 106 at 107; Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw
[1956] AC 613.
Spigelman CJ held that the fact that epidemiology evidence only establishes possibility
of causation does not preclude admissibility of such evidence. However, he held that
when evidence only goes so far, it must be weighed in the balance with other factors in
determining whether or not on the balance of probabilities an inference of causation in a
particular case could or should be drawn: at [79]. Not surprisingly, he held that where the
whole of the evidence, incorporating the epidemiology evidence, does not rise above the
level of possibility, either alone or cumulatively, an inference of causation cannot be
drawn: at [79].
The Chief Justice found that the test for the particular case in respect of causation was
whether on the basis of primary facts it was reasonable to draw the inference that the
nexus existed on the balance of probabilities. He held that evidence of possibility,
including epidemiological studies, should be regarded as circumstantial evidence which
has the potential, alone or in combination with other evidence, to establish causation in
the particular case. He held that causation, like any other fact, can be established by a
process of inference which combines primary facts like ‘strands in a cable’ rather than
‘links in a chain’. He held that in the case before him the primary facts consisted in large
measure of the epidemiological studies which established that nexus could possibly exist.
This, he found, was not necessarily a bar to the respondent’s success as epidemiological
studies and expert opinions based on such studies are able to form strands in a cable of a
circumstantial case: at [98]. The question was whether the studies showed the connection
between the inhalation of asbestos and renal cell carcinoma to be ‘sufficiently close’ to
warrant a reasonable mind to conclude that the possible was the actual cause.
In investigating this question, Spigelman CJ held that the issue before the court was
whether an increased risk did cause or materially contribute to the injury actually
suffered. He held that the test of actual persuasion in respect of causation does not require
epidemiological studies to reach the level of a relative risk of 2.0, even when that is the
only evidence available to a court. However, he noted (at [137]):
[T]he closer the ratio approaches 2.0, the greater the significance that can be attached to
the studies for the purposes of drawing an inference of causation in an individual case.
The ‘strands in the cable’ must be capable of bearing the weight of the ultimate inference.
(See also XYZ v Schering Health Care Ltd (2002) 70 BMLR 88; [2002] EWHC 1420 at [40];
Judd v Amaca Pty Ltd [2003] NSWDDT 12; Ellis v South Australia [2006] WASC 270.)
Evaluation of scientific evidence

[12.0.260] There is no specific yardstick by which the probative value of scientific evidence
can be measured. The general acceptance test of Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC Cir
1923) (see Ch 2.10) is one tool. The test in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US
579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993) (see [2.10.550]) is another. What is becoming increasingly clear is
that the bases of scientific evidence and the reasoning which leads to an expert drawing
inferences from the available data are being subjected to rigorous scrutiny by the courts.
For instance, if scientific method is abandoned and guesswork or speculation is employed
by a witness under cover of expert evidence, this will not legitimise it: HG v The Queen
(1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999] HCA 2. Those criteria employed within a profession afford an
obvious and appropriate mechanism for the evaluation process. Thus, in Seltsam Pty Ltd v
1078 [12.0.260]
McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; [2000] NSWCA 29 at [139], Spigelman CJ applied

principles for the interpretation of epidemiological evidence recognised within the
profession itself:
1. Strength of the Association. In general the higher the risk estimate, the less likely
the finding is a result of confounding or bias …
2. Dose Response Effect. If the risk of the disease rises with increasing exposure, a
causal interpretation of the association is more plausible …
3. Time Sequence. The exposure or risk factor must precede the disease …
4. Consistency. Results from other epidemiological studies of the exposure-disease
association should be similar. If similar results are found in different populations
using various study designs, the plausibility of a causal interpretation is
increased. An alternative explanation of bias or confounding would have to apply
to each of the different studies, a highly implausible explanation.
5. Biological Coherence. Does the exposure-disease association make biological sense
given what is known of the natural history of the disease? Do animal experiments
support the association? Do other types of collateral evidence support the
association, such as secular trends of the exposure factor in the disease?
Unfortunately, for many diseases little is known about their aetiologies, so the
informational background by which to judge biological coherence is often
limited. Thus, failure of this broad principle does not necessarily weaken the
plausibility of a causal interpretation.
The first three principles can be applied to an individual study and used to assist the
findings. The last two principles referred to results outside their particular study and
relate more to external issues of coherence or consistency. All of the criteria or principles
should be viewed as guidelines. Except, perhaps, for time sequence, none is required for a
causal interpretation.
(See, too, Thomson (1992); McLaughlin and Brookmeyer (1994), utilising the criteria of Hill
(1965); see also Parascandola (1998); Ginzburg (1986).)
Parker (1998) has similarly identified four major questions that should be considered
when interpreting an epidemiological study:
• Was the study well designed?
• Could the observed results be the result of chance?
• Are the data generalisable?
• Does the association represent a cause and effect relationship?
In Valentine v PPG Industries Inc 158 Ohio App 3d 615 at 633 (2004), the Ohio Court of
Appeals warned too about the extrapolations that can be made from epidemiological
evidence, including:
extrapolating (1) from a structure analysis for similar compounds, (2) that a substance that
causes one type of harm also causes a different type of harm, (3) upon the basis of
methodology that is transposed from one area of inquiry to a completely different one, (4)
from epidemiological studies with different exposures, and (5) when data regarding the
plaintiff’s exposure is [sic] unknown.
(See further Danne (2006).)

In McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2005] ScotCS CSOH 69, Lord Nimmo Smith classified
scientific literature into primary, secondary and tertiary. He stated (at [6.160]) that primary
epidemiological literature should ‘explain the study design, the measures taken to control
for bias and confounding, the statistical techniques used to determine whether or not an
association has been found … and the process of reasoning which leads to any conclusions
about the significance of the association and any judgment which is formed about a causal
connection’.
Lord Nimmo Smith highlighted the expectation of transparency in primary literature
for the purpose of peer review processes. He regarded secondary and tertiary literature as
[12.0.260] 1079
meta-analysis and overview literature. In the case before him, he regarded the claimant’s
failure to adduce adequate quality primary literature, instead relying upon secondary and
tertiary literature, as a ‘fundamental defect’ in her attempt to prove general causation (at
[6.163]).
In relation to epidemiological evidence, it is apparent that it ‘cannot be used to make
statements about individual causation’: McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [2005] Scot CS SCOH
69 at [6.180]. As Danne (2006, p 475) has stated:
The most that can be drawn from epidemiological evidence … is recognition of a statistical
association between determinants and disease which, despite the incongruity of scientific
and legal standards generally [see Barnes (2001)] … will always be inferior to evidence
which actually explains the mechanistic or pathological nature of a disease’s etiology.
Continuity of evidence
[12.0.300] For a scientist’s evidence to be admissible, it must be relevant to a fact in issue –
that is, it must ‘afford a reasonable inference as to the principal matter in dispute’
(Hollingham v Head (1858) 27 LJCP 241; 140 ER 1135) or be capable of increasing or
diminishing ‘the probability of the existence of a fact in issue’ (Director of Public
Prosecutions v Kilbourne [1973] AC 729 at 757; see also Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 55; Evidence
Act 1995 (NSW), s 55; Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), s 55; Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), s 55; Evidence
Act 2011 (ACT), s 55Q). If a scientist gives opinion evidence which is based upon the
assumption that the exhibit tested was the same exhibit as the one seized or found at a
particular place, that evidence ceases to hold any, or any significant, probative value if it is
shown that the assumption is invalid. In such circumstances, it can be argued that the
evidence is inadmissible on the ground that it does not impact upon the facts in issue or
the principal matter in issue by allowing the drawing of any inferences – its status remains
permanently incapable of evaluation. In addition, should the evidence be led by the
prosecution, or possibly even by the defence, the argument becomes open that the
probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial value: see
Ch 2.35; see also Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), ss 135, 137; Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ss 135, 137;
Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), ss 135, 137; Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), ss 135, 137; Evidence Act 2011
(ACT), ss 135, 137.
There are many circumstances in which the chain of custody can be shown to be
broken or to be flawed and therefore the opinions of the scientist are of limited utility: see
Imwinkelried (1997). A United States example is where a blood sample was taken from a
body at a mortuary but, because of the number of samples and their similar appearance, it
was held that there was a distinct possibility of confusion and substitution: see Nichols v
McCoy 235 P 2d 412 (1951). Similarly, the longer that an exhibit is left unattended, and the
further that it is moved, the more possible becomes the inference of mishandling by those
with responsibility for the exhibit. In Jines v Greyhound Corp 210 NE 2d 562 (1965), an
expert mechanic’s evidence was declared inadmissible on the basis that before he
inspected the subject car, it had been moved a number of miles to a storage lot, then to the
owner’s home, and finally to the mechanic’s garage over a period of several months. It
was not possible to prove that there had been adequate safekeeping over the car and so it
could not be proved that the brake drum, when examined by the expert, was in the same
condition as it was prior to the accident.
Even if scientific evidence is declared admissible when a cloud hangs over proof of
continuity of custody over an exhibit, the weight to be accorded to such evidence can be
affected by attacks upon the integrity of the chain of custody or by demonstration of the
potential for contamination of the exhibit. In looking to the possibility of mishandling,
mis-recording (see United States v Ladd 885 F 2d 954 at 957 (1989)) or confusion,
Imwinkelried (1997) advocates cross-examination that focuses first upon the potential for
confusion, then upon multiple persons’ access, then ideally upon a quirk of location.
1080 [12.0.300]
Few appeals have been brought on the basis of breaches in continuity or chain of
custody in the United Kingdom and Australia. Those that have been brought have
generally not been successful. By and large, the issue has been regarded as capable of
being determined by a jury where questions have arisen about whether samples have
‘surprisingly’ been transferred from one container to another (R v McNair (unreported,
Victorian Court of Appeal, 8 May 1997)) and where anomalies have been established in
respect of the labelling of exhibits: Director of Public Prosecutions v Spencer [1999] VSC 301.
If it is to be suggested that malign behaviour was engaged in by a police officer as a result
of a break in the chain of custody, it needs to be squarely raised, rather than being asserted
for the first time on appeal: R v Contin [2004] VSCA 210.
Computer simulations
[12.0.340] The incidence of the use of computer simulations and reconstructions in the
courts is increasing, as technology makes such measures increasingly viable. It can be very
powerful: see, eg, Nominal Defendant v Dowedeit (2016) 78 MVR 472; [2016] NSWCA 332.
However, such evidence does not necessarily hold probative value. See subscription
service Chs 140 and 141.
Young J of the New South Wales Supreme Court had occasion to consider such
evidence in Lawrence v Kempsey Shire Council (1995) 87 LGERA 49 in the context of an
application for an injunction and damages in respect of an alleged nuisance in allowing
sewage effluent to enter a creek, flow out of the creek, and adversely affect the applicant’s
grazing land. He also sued for infringement of his riparian rights. Young J reserved the
evidentiary question as to the admissibility of a scientist’s computer model of how the
creek would behave under certain conditions, by adopting the course of provisionally
admitting the evidence subject to relevance. An expert had given evidence that it was
difficult to observe flood patterns because floods occur uncommonly and, when they do,
each flood is unique. Furthermore, the applicant had said that even the longest-term
resident had only been able to observe a small number of the floods that had happened on
a particular site during history. Thus, he had contended that it was necessary to operate
from models in order to predict flood patterns. Young J noted that since the 1970s,
physical models had been used less and less and had been displaced by ‘numeric models’,
or computer models. In rejecting the computer evidence adduced before him, he
commented (at 76–77):
One must be very careful with computer predictions. Usually they are the result of
someone making assumptions and assessments of various vital factors and feeding these
factors into the computer. Unless those assumptions and assessments are proved by
evidence (or are conceded to be valid) the mere fact that a computer produced a
prediction is of no evidentiary value whatever.
It is clear law that an expert witness’ evidence on matters of fact is in the same position
as the factual evidence of any other witness: English Exporters (London) Ltd v Eldonwall Ltd
[1973] 1 Ch 415 at 421; Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 16 ACSR 227 at 231.
That problem cannot be overcome merely by feeding unproved factual material into a
computer and treating as evidence what the machine produces.
Young J summarised his reasoning by holding (at 77) that ‘[u]nless there is some factual
evidence or satisfactory expert opinion evidence to support that sort of assumption, the
result obtained from the computer has no evidentiary value’. Thus, he rejected the
computer-modelled evidence adduced before him of the prediction of floods and the
extent of flooding.
However, in R v Farquharson (2009) 26 VR 410; [2009] VSCA 307, no error was found in
relation to the use of simulation evidence utilising a program by the name of PC Crash.
(See also Pesa v The Queen [2011] VSCA 31.)
[12.0.340] 1081
Destruction of exhibits
[12.0.380] It is poor practice for a forensic scientist to destroy an exhibit if this is not a
necessary part of testing. When significant damage to, or destruction of, an exhibit is a
foreseeable possibility, sound scientific practice would suggest that measures be taken to
record for later evaluation those procedures which have been undertaken and their
results. In the United States, it has been held that the ‘government is flirting with the
danger of reversal any time evidence is lost or inadvertently destroyed. When evidence is
seized, the government should take every reasonable precaution to preserve it’: United
States v Heiden 508 F 2d 898 at 903 (1974). In Chamberlain v R (No 2) [1984] HCA 7; (1984)
153 CLR 521 at 574, Murphy J held:
Destruction of such materials reduces the value of any evidence based on them, because of
the inability to test the material and cross-check the results, to such an extent as to render
it non-scientific and therefore non-expert.
(See also [2.35.360].)

In such circumstances, it is arguable that opinions expressed are inadmissible because
they are not expert opinions (cf HG v The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414; [1999] HCA 2), or that
the evidence should be excluded as more prejudicial than probative.
Scientific instruments: the presumption of accuracy

[12.0.420] Various scientific instruments have been held to fall into a class which by
general experience are known to be trustworthy, so that there is a rebuttable presumption
of fact (in the absence of evidence to the contrary) that readings taken from such
instruments are correct, and hence it is not necessary to show that at the relevant time the
instrument had been tested and found to be working correctly. Examples in this regard
include watches, clocks, thermometers and speedometers: see Porter v Kolodzeij [1962] VR
75 at 78. The presumption has also been held to apply to scientific or technical processes
and scientific tests such as to detect bloodstains (Crawley v Laidlaw [1930] VLR 370 at 374),
recordings of radar echoes showing movements of ships (Owners of Motor Ship Sapporo
Maru v Owners of Steam Tanker Statute of Liberty [1968] 1 WLR 739), and printouts of
computerised data (Mehesz v Redman (No 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244; R v Weatherall (1981) 27
SASR 238).
However, the acceptance of a particular instrument without proof of its function,
operation and accuracy ‘depends upon the extent to which it is commonly used within the
community’: Zappia v Webb [1974] WAR 15 at 17; see also Holt v Auckland City Council
[1980] 2 NZLR 124 at 127. Thus, a mechanical or scientific device recently invented will
usually require expert evidence to establish what it can measure or accomplish and
whether it can be relied upon. Later, as the device becomes known, ‘a stage may be
reached where the courts will be sufficiently familiar with it not to require proof of what it
is and what it does, but may still require evidence of its accuracy at the relevant time’:
Zappia v Webb [1974] WAR 15 at 17; see also Holt v Auckland City Council [1980] 2 NZLR 124
at 127.
Proof need not come from the manufacturer. It is sufficient that the expert who uses the
instrument can say that it is an instrument which is accepted and used by competent
persons as a reliable aid in the carrying out of the scientific procedure in question, and
that he or she so regards it (Mehesz v Redman (No 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244 at 247).
The courts have tended to be cautious in extending the presumption to newly
developed scientific devices. Four examples illustrate this caution. As late as 1938, it was
held in England that the accuracy of a speedometer must be established (Melhuish v Morris
[1938] 4 All ER 98); in 1930, it was held in Victoria that there was no presumption of the
accuracy of a loadometer (Crawley v Laidlaw [1930] VLR 370); and in 1962, it was held,
again in Victoria, that breathalysers did not fall within the class of notorious scientific
1082 [12.0.380]
instruments, the accuracy of which is presumed at common law: Porter v Kolodzeij [1962]
VR 75. However, in 1995, vernier callipers and stainless steel scallops gauges were
determined to be of the kind which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, courts will
presume to have been in order at the material time, since they are not complex or
vulnerable to failure: Crosthwaite v Loader (1995) 77 A Crim R 348 at 358. In 2010, in Bevan
v Western Australia (2010) 202 A Crim R 27; [2010] WASCA 101 at [37], the Western
Australian Court of Appeal was not prepared to countenance the process employed by a
police officer to download data from a mobile phone to a laptop computer without
evidence that it was a process generally accepted by experts as being accurate.
The New Zealand Court of Appeal has commented in Holt v Auckland City Council
[1980] 2 NZLR 124 at 128:
The presumption serves the important purpose of saving the time and expense of proving
the obvious. At the same time, until it can be considered that the functioning and
trustworthiness of a newly developed device is a matter of common knowledge, those
who rely on the equipment must carry the responsibility of establishing its accuracy.
In that case, the instrument in question was a head space gas chromatograph which in
1980 had been in use in the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR)
laboratories for only some three years. The court found that it was not referred to in
common parlance and that its use had not been discussed in any reported decisions in
New Zealand. It found that it came within the category of ‘recently invented devices’, as
set out in Zappia v Webb [1974] WAR 15 at 17, and that it could not at that stage be said
that data analysers of that kind had reached such a degree of usage and acceptability in
New Zealand that the instrument should have been presumed to have been functioning
accurately. Moreover, the court pointed out (at 128):
[T]he apparatus differs in one important respect from many instruments which have been
judicially noticed. It is not simply a calculator. It has to be programmed. The results
obtained depend on the manner in which it is programmed. And there is no basis on
which the court could take judicial notice of the manner in which this equipment was
programmed and maintained.
In R v Ciantar (2006) 16 VR 26; [2006] VSCA 263, the Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal
was asked to hold that evidence from a preliminary breath testing device should have
been excluded at trial. On behalf of the applicant for leave to appeal, it was submitted that
a preliminary breath testing device is not within that class of notorious scientific
instruments of which the accuracy is presumed at common law and, consequently, that in
order for evidence of the preliminary breath test results to be admissible at common law, it
was necessary for the prosecution to establish the scientific character and operation of the
preliminary breath testing device. It was contended that it had failed to do so. The court
held against the applicant, maintaining that if Porter v Kolodzeij [1962] VR 75 is still good
law, a court may still admit the results of a test conducted with a scientific instrument on
the basis of evidence from a witness expert in its use. The court held (at [9]) that it is
sufficient if it is established that it is a scientifically accepted instrument for its avowed
purpose and that the particular instrument was handled properly and read accurately (see
Philpott v Boon [1968] Tas SR 97 at 99–100). It applied the pronouncement of White J in
Mehesz v Redman (No 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244 at 252:
If the instrument is not a notorious scientific instrument, its accuracy can be established by
evidence: (a) that the instrument is within a class of instrument generally accepted by
experts as accurate for its particular purpose; (b) that the instrument, if handled properly,
does produce accurate results: ((a) and (b) must be established by expert testimony, that is,
by experts with sufficient knowledge of that kind of instrument; and upon proof of (a) and
(b), a latent presumption of accuracy arises which allows the court to infer accuracy on the
particular occasion if it is proved) – (c) that the particular instrument was handled
properly and read accurately by the operator on the particular occasion; ((c) can be
[12.0.420] 1083
established by a trained and competent person familiar with the operation of the
instrument, not necessarily the type of expert who proves (a) and (b)).
… Where the actual accuracy of the measurement can be inferred from all of the
proved circumstances, it is not necessary to rely upon the presumption arising from (a)
and (b), proof of which is superfluous.
The court held that the evidence from the experts was such as to be capable of satisfying a
jury of the preliminary breath testing device being generally accepted by experts as
accurate for its purpose and of producing accurate results, if handled properly.
In Bevan v Western Australia (2010) 202 A Crim R 27; [2010] WASCA 101 at [33], the
Western Australian Court of Appeal added:
[A] court will not be satisfied that an instrument was ‘handled properly’ on a particular
occasion, if it does not understand what was required of the operator for this to be so.
Detailed evidence as to the workings of the instrument need not be given (Fa v Morris
(1987) 27 A Crim R 342 at 350–351). However, it is necessary that there be sufficient
evidence for the court to apprehend what it was that the operator had to do in order to
ensure an accurate result.
Similarly, in a 1991 Canadian case, the Wigmore criteria for reception of evidence based
upon scientific instruments were explicitly applied to exclude evidence produced by a
speed-detection device whose reliability was not adequately proved: R v Chow (1991) 65
CCC (3d) 162. The case involved the use of a Multanova speed camera. The questions
posed were whether the photograph produced by the camera was proof of speed and
whether it could be admitted by simply establishing that the particular instrument was in
proper working order and that it was operated by a qualified person. It was held that it
was necessary for it to comply with the general rules relating to testimony based on
instruments:
The foundation for such testimony is the trustworthiness of the process. That can be
satisfied by
(a) technical evidence of the trustworthiness of the process in general; and
(b) evidence of the correctness of the particular instrument as one of the trustworthy
type.
(Applying Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn rev 1970, pp 243–244.))

As the Crown had failed to adduce technical evidence of the general trustworthiness of
the process of speed detection by means of the camera, and as judicial notice could not be
taken of that fact, the evidence was held inadmissible. The case stands as a warning that
the fruits of technology cannot be employed without appropriate supporting evidence
from a suitably qualified expert who can attest to the reliability of the technology in
general and as to workings of the particular machine. 1 It is consistent with the decision of
Herring CJ in Porter v Kolodzeij [1962] VR 75 at 78, where his Honour held that the
presumption of the working accuracy of scientific instruments applies to watches, clocks,
thermometers, pedometers, aneroids, anemometers and a ‘variety of other ingenious
contrivances for detecting different matters’ (quoting Taylor (1931, para 183, p 167)). It has
also been held to apply to the readings of speedometers: see, eg, Thompson v Kovacs [1959]
VR 229; Peterson v Homes [1927] SASR 419; Nicholas v Penny [1950] 2 KB 466. In the context
of breath analysis instruments, Herring CJ in Porter v Kolodzeij [1962] VR 75 at 79 held:
If it can be shown that the instrument in question is accurate there is no necessity to rely
upon any presumption. However, where the presumption is called in aid as in the present
case, the evidence to establish what is necessary may well, I should think, be given by a
senior constable, without any professional qualification, though it would depend, of
1 This problem is often solved by legislation which deems the evidence not only admissible
of the readings that it produces, but conclusive unless certain conditions are fulfilled.
1084 [12.0.420]
course, upon his knowledge, training and experience in the handling of the instrument,
the source of his knowledge and also the qualification of his instructors.
In Jarrett v The Queen (1994) 73 A Crim R 160 at 188, Mullighan J was called upon to rule
on the admissibility of evidence relating to paint from a microspectrophotometer, a
scanning electron microscope (SEM) and a database of analyses. He held that the
instruments did not fall within the category of notorious scientific instruments of which
the court will take judicial notice of their capacity for accuracy. However, he did find them
to fall into a class of instruments which are generally accepted by experts as accurate for
their particular purpose (at 188): ‘It must be shown that if they are used properly they
produce accurate results: see Mehesz v Redman (No 2) (1980) 26 SASR 244 at 252.’
The National Measurement Act 1960 (Cth)

[12.0.460] Many jurisdictions have formal measures to institute systems of measurement.
Their precise terms can be very important. For instance, s 10 of the National Measurement
Act 1960 (Cth) prescribes:
When for any legal purpose, it is necessary to ascertain whether a measurement of a
physical quantity for which there are Australian legal units of measurement has been
made or is being made in terms of those units, that fact shall be ascertained by means of,
by reference to, by comparison with or by derivation from:
(a) an appropriate Australian primary standard of measurement;
(b) an appropriate Australian secondary standard of measurement;
(c) an appropriate State primary standard of measurement;
(d) an appropriate recognised-value standard of measurement;
(e) an appropriate reference standard of measurement;
(f) two or more standards of measurement, each of which is a standard of
measurement referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e);
(g) a certified reference material;
(h) a certified measuring instrument;
(i) one or more standards of measurement, each of which is a standard of
measurement referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e) and a certified
reference material; or
(j) one or more standards of measurement, each of which is a standard of
measurement referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e) and a certified
measuring instrument; or
(k) one or more standards of measurement, each of which is a standard of
measurement referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d) or (e), a certified reference
material and a certified measuring instrument;
and not in any other manner.
The section has been held to be ‘designed to establish a uniform national procedure for
obtaining measurements required for legal purposes … [T]he section requires the
instruments to be derived directly from one of the specified standards or a combination of
those standards’: Breedon v Kongras (1996) 85 A Crim R 472 at 476 (emphasis added). In
Mitchell v WS Kimpton & Sons Pty Ltd [1971] VR 583, the decision of Newton J in Bryan v
Brambles Holdings Pty Ltd (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, 14 October 1968) was
applied to determine that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, compliance with s 10
is presumed. In a case concerning the measurement of undersized lobsters, it was argued
that the common law presumption as to the accuracy of scientific instruments applies
notwithstanding the operation of the Act. In addition, it was argued that the effect of
Mitchell and Bryan is to convert the common law presumption into a presumption that the
measurement in question complies with s 10. Owen J in Breedon v Kongras (1996) 16 WAR
66 at 74 held:
[12.0.460] 1085
Even if there is room for the application of the common law presumption in the fact of the
Act, it would not operate to save a measurement done by the sheridan gauge [which was
not a certified instrument]. That instrument is not one to which the presumption applies. If
a measurement by the sheridan gauge is to be relied upon then either the gauge itself
must be a certified instrument or the gauge must be certified as accurate by reference to a
standard which is within the terms of s 10. This might be another certified instrument or it
might be another standard in s 10. It seems to me that this process of checking or
certification is sufficiently proximate to qualify as direct derivation from an appropriate
standard.
It would not be sufficient to check the accuracy of the instrument against another
instrument or standard which, while not within s 10, was subject to the common law
presumption. In my opinion, to permit certification or checking in this way would allow
ascertainment of the fact of the measurement ‘in any other manner’, something which is
prohibited by s 10.
Facilitation of proof
[12.0.500] Provisions exist in a number of jurisdictions to facilitate proof of the product of
scientific instruments. Under s 146(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), the Evidence Act 1995
(NSW), the Evidence Act 2001 (Tas), the Evidence (National Uniform Legislation) Act (NT), the
Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) and the Evidence Act 2008 (Vic), for instance, if it is reasonably
open to find that the device or process is one that, or is of a kind that, if properly used,
ordinarily produces that outcome, it is presumed (unless evidence sufficient to raise doubt
about the presumption is adduced) that, in producing the document or thing on the
occasion in question, the device or process produced that outcome. The provision applies
to a document or thing that is produced wholly or partly by a device or process, and that
is tendered by a party who asserts that, in producing the document or thing, the device or
process has produced a particular outcome: s 146(1).
1086 [12.0.500]
Chapter 12.05
NOVEL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [12.05.01]
The obligation of the party adducing novel scientific evidence at common law ..... [12.05.10]
Reliability of evidence .......................................................................................................... [12.05.30]
Photographic and X-ray evidence ...................................................................................... [12.05.60]
Fingerprinting evidence ....................................................................................................... [12.05.100]
Polygraph evidence .............................................................................................................. [12.05.140]
Voice identification evidence ............................................................................................... [12.05.180]
Downloading of data from mobile phones ...................................................................... [12.05.190]
DNA profiling evidence ....................................................................................................... [12.05.220]
Psychological autopsy evidence ......................................................................................... [12.05.260]
Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome evidence .............................................. [12.05.300]
Facial mapping/Body mapping evidence ........................................................................ [12.05.340]
Re BLM .................................................................................................................................... [12.05.420]
The Murdoch decisions ......................................................................................................... [12.05.430]
The Tang decision .................................................................................................................. [12.05.440]
The Morgan decision ............................................................................................................. [12.05.442]
The Honeysett decision .......................................................................................................... [12.05.445]
The current state of the law ................................................................................................ [12.05.450]
Walking gait analysis evidence ........................................................................................... [12.05.460]
Lip-reading evidence ............................................................................................................ [12.05.490]
Ear print comparison evidence ........................................................................................... [12.05.540]
‘[Soon] there will be no jury, no hordes of detectives and
witnesses, no charges and countercharges, and no attorney for
the defense. These impedimenta of our courts will be
unnecessary. The State will merely submit all suspects in a
case to the tests of scientific instruments, and as these
instruments cannot be made to make mistakes nor tell lies,
their evidence would be conclusive of guilt or innocence.’
“Electrical Machines to Tell Guilt of Criminals”, The New York Times (1911).
Introduction
[12.05.01] New developments in forensic science can be tracked through different phases
from the perspective of the courts, at first being classified as ‘novel’ and later either falling
into disrepute (see, eg, the ‘paraffin wars’: Golan (2004, pp 89ff); polygraph evidence:
Mallard v The Queen (2003) 28 WAR 1; [2003] WASCA 296 at [355]; arguably, facial
mapping), achieving intermediate status requiring jury warnings (see, eg, lip-reading
evidence) or acquiring mainstream or orthodoxy status (see, eg, fingerprinting, X-ray and
DNA profiling evidence). From time to time arguments are advanced in relation to the
utility of new forms of scientific evidence; thus in 2019 ‘co-produced informatIon’ was
championed in Canada (see Isaac (2019)), while in the 1990s there was controversy about
the legitimacy of evaluation of intoxication from acoustic-phonetic analyses of a suspect’s
voice (see eg Tanford, Pisoni and Johnson (1991)). The initial approach of the courts has
typically been somewhat mistrustful (see, eg, voice analysis evidence at [10.15.130]),
demanding reassurance that the development has achieved a status of confidence from the
relevant intellectual marketplace or that it bears the hallmarks of reliability.
In Australia, the law has recognised the fluid nature of evolving scientific knowledge.
It is as stated by the Western Australian Court of Appeal in Mallard v The Queen (2003) 28
WAR 1; [2003] WASCA 296 at [270]:
[E]xpert opinion evidence should not be rejected merely because the technique, instrument
or methodology has not been used in court before (R v McHardie [1983] 2 NSWLR 733 at
[12.05.01] 1087
763). Likewise, even where such evidence has been rejected as not satisfying the requirements
for admissibility at one time, that may change. Subsequent theoretical or practical scientific
developments may later lead to a conclusion that in light of the more developed state of the
particular field of expertise it may meet the requirements for admissibility.
Thus, for instance, faced with an argument that there was ‘a real possibility that there
were involuntary physical causes for the applicant’s aberrant behaviour, of a genetic or
neuropsychological nature’ in R v Serra (1997) 92 A Crim R 511 at 529, the Northern
Territory Court of Criminal Appeal commented:
[A]s far as we are aware, scientific knowledge in Australia has not reached the point
where expert evidence of genetic evaluation is accepted as per se relevant to sentencing
for crime. It has not been shown that genetic evaluation and its consequences for criminal
behaviour are as yet generally accepted in the relevant scientific community in Australia
as a reliable body of scientific knowledge such that a special acquaintance with it could
render the opinion of an expert of assistance to a sentencing judge, nor has it been shown
that it is treated as reliable and relevant; cf the differing tests for the admission of novel
scientific evidence in the courts in Frye and Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509
US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993).
There is a very real mistrust on the part of the courts of what may ultimately be classified
as unreliable or even spurious scientific evidence.
This chapter reviews a variety of areas of scientific endeavour that have been, or are
currently, classified as ‘novel scientific evidence’.
The obligation of the party adducing novel scientific evidence at common law
[12.05.10] The term ‘novel scientific evidence’ has been employed routinely since the 1980s
by United States courts (see eg Giannelli (1980); Van Domelen (1985); Moenssens, Inbau
and Starrs (1986); Osborne (1990)) to refer to new and emerging scientific techniques with
a forensic application. In Mallard v The Queen (2003) 28 WAR 1; [2003] WASCA 296 at [288],
the status of ‘novel scientific evidence’ was explicitly recognised by the Western
Australian Court of Appeal, after reviewing United States authorities, and it was held that:
the party offering the novel scientific evidence has the burden of demonstrating that it has
been accepted as reliable among impartial and disinterested experts within the scientific
community.
In addition, in Hillstead v The Queen [2005] WASCA 116 at [48]–[49], Roberts-Smith JA

observed:
In criminal cases the prosecutor has a clear duty to acquaint the Judge and jury in
ordinary language, through the evidence which is led, with those aspects of the expert’s
discipline and methods necessary to put the court in a position to make some sort of
evaluation of the opinion that the expert expresses. Where the evidence is of a
comparatively novel kind, the duty resting on the prosecutor is even higher. Then the
evidence should demonstrate the scientific reliability of the opinion expressed: Lewis v The
Queen [1987] NTCCA 3; (1987) 88 FLR 104 at 123–124 per Maurice J; Makita (Australia) Pty
Ltd v Sprowles (supra) at [73]. It is the role of the prosecutor to strip forensic evidence of its
mystery so far as is possible. The ‘bare ipse dixit’ of a scientist upon an issue in controversy
should carry little weight: Davie v Magistrates of Edinburgh (1953).
Whether other courts will hold that the Australian common law has developed to this
point remains to be seen.
One approach to novel scientific evidence is to classify it as a particular category of
potentially unreliable evidence in respect of which cautious approaches need to be
adopted. Another is to identify within any given category of scientific evidence parallels to
other evidence which has previously been received in the courts: see R v I, R & T [2012]
EWCA Crim 1288 at [29] in relation to the counter-immuno electrophopresis test.
1088 [12.05.10]
Novel scientific evidence | CH 12.05
In Canada, the Supreme Court has taken a significant step toward aligning Canadian
law in relation to the test for reception of expert evidence with that of the United States, as
set out in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993).
In R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402 at 21, Sopinka J observed that
‘[d]ressed up in scientific language which the jury does not easily understand and
by the jury as being virtually infallible and as having more weight than it deserves’. That
led him to conclude (at 25) that ‘expert evidence which advances a novel scientific theory
or technique is subjected to special scrutiny to determine whether it meets a basic
threshold of reliability and whether it is essential in the sense that the trier of fact will be
unable to come to a satisfactory conclusion without the assistance of the expert’. (See too
White Burgess Langille Inman v Abbott and Haliburton Co [2015] 2 SCR 182 at [17].)
In R v J-LJ [2000] 2 SCR 600; 2000 SCC 51 at [33], Binnie J regarded the court in Mohan
as having rejected the Frye general acceptance test, having moved ‘in parallel with its
replacement, the “reliable foundation” test’. In grappling further with the issue, Weiler
and Gillese JJA in R v Dimitrov (2003) 68 OR (3d) 641; 181 CCC (3d) 554 at [37] held:
Novel scientific theories or techniques are subject to ‘special scrutiny’; so too, is the novel
application of established or recognised scientific techniques. The threshold question that
arises in relation to the admissibility of either is well-established: the court must be
satisfied that the evidence proffered is capable of being the subject of expert evidence. That
is, the court must be satisfied, as a threshold matter, that the proposed evidence is, indeed,
‘science’. The burden is on the party putting forth the expert, in this case the Crown, to
establish its reliability on a balance of probabilities.
(See also R v Terceira (1998) 123 CCC (3d) 1 at 21, aff’d (1999) 142 CCC (3d) 95; see also R
v Violette (2008) BCSC 920 (CanLII); R v Alcantara 2012 ABQB 225 (CanLII).)
It appears that in the United Kingdom, the courts are also inching their way toward a
reliability test, with the Court of Appeal, for instance, observing in R v I, R & T [2012]
EWCA Crim 1288 at [29]:
once the judge concluded, as he did, that ‘the CIE test is a well-recognised and reliable test
for establishing whether or not animal protein is or is not present in blood’, the CIE test
results were admissible … The fact that the test was used for a new purpose, or in a new
context, did not of itself render the test unproven.
(See too R v Reed [2010] 1 Cr App R 23; [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 at [111]–[112].)
However, the situation is nuanced, with the same court in R v Dlugosz [2013] EWCA
Crim 2 at [9] emphasising that the reliability test for admissibility does not require a
reliable statistical basis per se:
As is clear from the judgments in Atkins and Atkins [[2010] 1 Cr App R 8; [2009] EWCA
Crim 1876 at [23]] and T (Footwear Mark Evidence) [2010] EWCA Crim 2439 [at [92]] the fact
that there is no reliable statistical basis does not mean that a court cannot admit an
evaluative opinion, provided there is some other sufficiently reliable basis for its
admission. As is clear from Reed and Reed and R v Weller [2010] EWCA Crim 1085,
evaluative opinions were given in relation to the ways in which DNA could be transferred
without there being any statistical database. We see no reason for concluding that
evaluative evidence as to whether the profile can be attributed to a defendant or other
person should be placed in a special category and should necessarily be excluded.
Reliability of evidence
[12.05.30] For the present, the decisions of the Victorian Court of Appeal in Tuite v The
Queen (2015) 49 VR 196; [2015] VSCA 148, the New South Wales Court of Appeal in R v
Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; [2006] NSWCCA 167 at [137], and the High Court in IMM v
The Queen (2016) 257 CLR 300; [2016] HCA 14 (cf Liyanage v Western Australia (2017) 51
[12.05.30] 1089
WAR 359; [2017] WASCA 112) mean that reliability is a criterion neither for admissibility
of expert evidence nor for assessment of probative value in the context of s 137 exclusion
of expert evidence.
This contrasts with:
• the law of the United States, as set out in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509
US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993);
• the law of Canada, as set out in R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402 at 21
and R v Trochym [2000] 1 SCR 239;
• the law of New Zealand: Lundy v The Queen [2018] NZCA 410; [2013] UKPC 28; [2014] 2
NZLR 273;
• the law of England and Wales, implementing R v Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2 by
virtue of Pt 19 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 and Criminal Practice Directions
2015, 19A.5; and
• the law of India: see Chaudhary v CBI (unreported, High Court of Delhi, 15 May 2009).
This leaves Australia significantly out of step with cognate parts of the common law world
in failing to exclude evidence which lacks key hallmarks of reliability (see Freckelton,
Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016)). In particular, it is notable that the
changes to procedure in England and Wales, following an extensive process of reflection
and consultation facilitated by the Law Commission (see Law Commission of England
and Wales (2011); Stockdale (2016)).
In England and Wales, the following helpful set of factors is set out by Criminal
Practice Directions 2015, 19A.5:
Therefore factors which the court may take into account in determining the reliability of
expert opinion, and especially of expert scientific opinion, include:
(a) the extent and quality of the data on which the expert’s opinion is based, and the
validity of the methods by which they were obtained;
(b) if the expert’s opinion relies on an inference from any findings, whether the
opinion properly explains how safe or unsafe the inference is (whether by
reference to statistical significance or in other appropriate terms);
(c) if the expert’s opinion relies on the results of the use of any method (for instance,
a test, measurement or survey), whether the opinion takes proper account of
matters, such as the degree of precision or margin of uncertainty, affecting the
accuracy or reliability of those results;
(d) the extent to which any material upon which the expert’s opinion is based has
been reviewed by others with relevant expertise (for instance, in peer-reviewed
publications), and the views of those others on that material;
(e) the extent to which the expert’s opinion is based on material falling outside the
expert’s own field of expertise;
(f) the completeness of the information which was available to the expert, and
whether the expert took account of all relevant information in arriving at the
opinion (including information as to the context of any facts to which the opinion
relates);
(g) if there is a range of expert opinion on the matter in question, where in the range
the expert’s own opinion lies and whether the expert’s preference has been
properly explained; and
(h) whether the expert’s methods followed established practice in the field and, if
they did not, whether the reason for the divergence has been properly explained.
Practice Direction 19A.6 provides that:

In addition, in considering reliability, and especially the reliability of expert scientific
opinion, the court should be astute to identify potential flaws in such opinion which
detract from its reliability, such as:
1090 [12.05.30]
(a) being based on a hypothesis which has not been subjected to sufficient scrutiny
(including, where appropriate, experimental or other testing), or which has failed
to stand up to scrutiny;
(b) being based on an unjustifiable assumption;
(c) being based on flawed data;
(d) relying on an examination, technique, method or process which was not properly
carried out or applied, or was not appropriate for use in the particular case; or
(e) relying on an inference or conclusion which has not been properly reached.
For Australia, this constitutes a useful set of considerations which can guide submissions
as to the probative value of evidence asserted to be unreliable.
Photographic and X-ray evidence

[12.05.60] The latter approach characterised the initial receipt of photographic evidence,
the opinion of Folger CJ in Cowley v People 83 NYR 478 (1881) equating photographs with
man-made pictures:
Photographic pictures do not differ in kind of proof from pictures of a painter. They are
the product of natural law and a scientific process. It is true that in the hands of a bungler,
who is not apt in the use of the process, the result may not be satisfactory. Somewhat
depends for exact likeness upon the nice adjustment of machinery, upon atmospheric
conditions, upon the position of the subject, the intensity of the light, the length of the
sitting. It is the skill of the operator that takes care of these, as it is the skill of the artist
that makes correct drawing of features and nice mingling of tints for the portrait.
He went on to observe (at 478) that:
Most of evidence is but the signs of things … A witness who speaks of personal
appearance or identity, tells in more or less detail the minutiae thereof as taken in by his
eye. What he says is a description thereof, by one mode of signs, by words orally uttered.
If his testimony be written instead of spoke, and is offered as a deposition, it is a
description in another mode of signs, by words written, and the value of that mode, the
deposition, depends upon the accuracy with which his words uttered are put into words
written. Now if he had before him a portrait or a photograph of the person, and it shows
to him a correct copy of that person, if it produces to his view a correct description, which
he testifies is a likeness, why may not that be given to the jury, as a description of the
person by the witness in another mode of signs? The portrait and the photograph may err,
and so may the witness. That is an infirmity to which all human testimony is lamentably
liable.
A similar approach was at first taken in relation to X-ray or roentographic evidence (see
Golan (2004)) in Smith v Grant 29 Chicago Legal News 145 (1896):
[W]e have been presented with a photograph taken by means of a new scientific discovery,
the same being acknowledged in the arts and in the science. It knocks for admission at the
temple of learning and what shall we do or say? Close fast the doors or open wide the
portals? These photographs are offered in evidence to show the present condition of the
head and neck of the femur bone which is entirely hidden from the eye of the surgeon.
Nature has surrounded it with tissues for its protection and there it lies hidden; it cannot,
by any possibility, be removed or exposed that it may be compared with its shadow as
developed by this new scientific process. In addition to these exhibits in evidence, we have
nothing to do or say as to what they purport to represent; that will, without doubt, be
explained by eminent surgeons. These exhibits are only pictures or maps, to be used in
explanation of a present condition, and therefore are secondary evidence and not primary.
They may be shown to a jury as illustrating or making clear the testimony of experts.
(See too Bruce v Beall 41 SW 445 (1897).)
Fingerprinting evidence
[12.05.100] It is common for courts to take a cautious approach in admitting evidence of
new scientific approaches, especially when the theory or technique underlying such
[12.05.100] 1091
approaches is still emerging from the experimental (see Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (DC
Cir 1923)). An example in this regard was fingerprinting evidence (see Ch 12.10). In R v
Parker [1912] VLR 152 at 154, Madden CJ, for instance, expressed reservations about the
admissibility of dactylography evidence. He particularly factored into his decision-making
process what he termed ‘the extreme danger’ of receiving such evidence which may be
determinative of a prosecution:
We are asked to accept the theory that correspondence between two sets of finger-prints is
conclusive evidence of the identity of the person who made those prints as an established
scientific fact. Standing on the same basis as the propositions of Euclid or other matters
vouched for by science and universally accepted as proved. If this finger-print theory were
generally recognized by scientific men as standing on this basis, there would be no more
to be said. … ‘My difficulty arises from the fact that the subject of finger-prints has not
been sufficiently studied to enable these propositions to be laid down as scientific facts.
Finger-prints have been studied by Monsieur Bertillon in France from an anthropometrical
point of view, and by Sir Francis Galton and a few others, doubtless highly intelligent
persons, from the standpoint of mere observers. But the matter has not been investigated
by scientists generally so that we can say that the propositions relied upon by the Crown
are scientific facts.’
(Compare Hodges J at 158 and Cussen J at 160.)
Polygraph evidence
[12.05.140] A series of controversies envelops polygraph evidence. For the present, though,
the authoritative exposition of the law in relation to its admissibility in court is as set out
by the Western Australian Court of Appeal in Mallard v The Queen (2003) 28 WAR 1; [2003]
WASCA 296 at [355]:
[W]e are not satisfied on the evidence that polygraphic examination (specifically CQT) has
been accepted to any appreciable extent as scientifically valid and reliable, by members of
the psychological and psychophysiological community, (which we consider to be the
relevant scientific community: see R v Jarrett (1994) 62 SASR 443; 73 A Crim R 160) as to
constitute part of a body of knowledge or experience which is sufficiently recognised to be
accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience. Nor has it been shown to have a
sufficient scientific basis to render results arrived at by the application of polygraphic
technique part of a field of knowledge which is a proper subject of expert evidence.

[12.05.180] Considerable controversy attends the admissibility of expert evidence about
voice analysis and voice identification evidence (see [10.15.130]). While the most common
form of identification evidence is visual identification evidence, identification by sound,
aural resemblance, is also identification evidence: Bulejcik v The Queen (1996) 185 CLR 375;
[1996] HCA 50; Tasmania v Farhat [2017] TASSC 66 at [25]; Nguyen v The Queen (2017) 264 A
Crim R 405; [2017] NSWCCA 4 at [27], although it is also on occasion termed ‘voice
recognition evidence’.
A distinction has been drawn between auditory phonetic analysis, which provides
information principally about the dialect or accent of the speaker, and quantitative
acoustics analysis, which enables examination of the difference in the acoustic properties
in speech which depend on the individual’s vocal tract, mouth and throat: see R v
O’Doherty [2003] 1 Cr App R 5 at [16].
In R v Gilmore [1977] 2 NSWLR 935 at 941, the Frye test was applied in determining the
admissibility of voice identification evidence, with Street CJ (with whom Lee and Ash JJ
agreed) determining that the science of voice analysis had:
developed to a point where, although by no means one hundred percent accurate, it can
properly and responsibly be used as an aid in the resolution of contests of identity. … It is
clear that the question will always remain one of fact for a jury properly instructed and
duly warned about the dangers that may be inherent in the evidence, and in the scientific
1092 [12.05.140]
processes involved in the particular case in hand. … This study has developed, in my
view, to the point where it can, and indeed should in appropriate cases, be made available
to tribunals of fact who are concerned with questions of identity of voices.
(See also R v McHardie [1983] 2 NSWLR 733 at 753–763.)

In R v Harris [1990] VR 310, Ormiston J held that the practice relating to visual
identification should be applied to voice identification (see too R v Brownlowe (1986) 7
NSWLR 461) with appropriate modifications, in particular trial judges being recognised as
having the discretion to exclude such evidence if it is prejudicial or unfair. Ormiston J held
that voice recognition should not be regarded as a field of expertise about which only
experts could give evidence. He emphasised that it is the concept of a jury being
irrationally impressed by identification evidence that should in appropriate circumstances
lead to the exclusion of voice recognition evidence.
Ormiston J concluded that United States courts had been less strict in their admission
of aural and visual identification evidence than had English and Australian courts, and
that there was no general rule in the United States that a witness must be shown to be
‘very familiar’ with the voice of the accused or that the voice must have been very
distinctive. Thus, he declined to follow R v EJ Smith [1984] 1 NSWLR 462.
In R v Tilley [1985] VR 505 at 509, Beach J accepted that the stylistic analysis of
documents was a science such that, ‘in appropriate cases’, expert opinion based on such
analysis might be received in evidence. In the particular case, though, he found that the
expert witness, whose credentials in relation to the authenticity of documents were not
questioned, was not entitled to express his opinions. However, he refused to accept the
proposition that an individual’s manner or style of speech is the same as his manner or
style of writing, and rejected the expert’s assertion to that effect and so disallowed the
evidence.
In Korgbara v The Queen (2007) 170 A Crim R 568; [2007] NSWCCA 84, McColl and
James JJA held (at [74]–[76]) that there is no prescriptive rule that voice comparison
evidence should only be admitted where supported by expert testimony, such a rule being
inconsistent with the statutory uniform evidence law scheme and also with common law
authority. In light of the divergence of views concerning the reliability of methods of
expert voice analysis, they affirmed (at [79]) that the test to be applied by a trial judge in
determining whether to admit expert evidence about voice comparison is whether the
quality and quantity of the material is sufficient to enable a useful comparison to be made
(see also Nguyen v The Queen (2017) 264 A Crim R 405; [2017] NSWCCA 4).
Downloading of data from mobile phones

[12.05.190] In Bevan v Western Australia (2010) 202 A Crim R 27; [2010] WASCA 101, the
Western Australian Court of Appeal was urged to overturn a conviction on the basis that
it had not been proved at trial that the downloading of data from a mobile phone to a
laptop computer was a process generally accepted by experts as accurate. As a subsidiary
matter, it was also argued that the particular download had been properly performed by a
police officer. Blaxell J (with whom Owen and Buss JJA agreed) held that the downloading
of data from a mobile phone to a laptop computer is a process which was not yet
generally known to be accurate (at [35]). This meant that data obtained in this way would
only be admissible if there was evidence from a suitably qualified person to prove that the
process produces accurate results, as well as evidence to show that the downloading was
properly carried out on the occasion in question. There were deficits in these regards at
trial.
[12.05.190] 1093
DNA profiling evidence

[12.05.220] While the early phase of DNA profiling evidence was characterised by
tentativeness by the courts and a preparedness on a number of occasions to exclude it as
more prejudicial than probative (see, eg, R v Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233; R v Lucas [1992]
2 VR 109; (1992) 55 A Crim R 361), the orthodox position of the courts is now to admit
expert opinions about the incidence of matching between samples (see, eg, R v Karger
(2001) 83 SASR 1; [2001] SASC 64; R v McIntyre [2001] NSWSC 311; R v Jarrett (1994) 62
SASR 443; 73 A Crim R 160), provided that appropriate guidelines are adhered to, such as
avoidance of the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’ (see, eg, Latcha v The Queen (1998) 104 A Crim R 390
at 396–397; Doheny and Adams v The Queen [1997] 1 Cr App R 369) and the jury is
ultimately in a position to intelligently interpret the testing results (cf R v Juric (2002) 4 VR
411; [2002] VSCA 77 at [20]). As Hunt CJ and Hidden J expressed it in R v Pantoja (1996) 88
A Crim R 554 at 558:
DNA testing has been accepted by the courts for some years as an acceptable scientific
technique for the identification of the source of bodily tissues, in accordance with the
approach to scientific evidence generally adopted by this Court in R v Gilmore [1977] 2
NSWLR 935 at 939–941.
However, this position has taken time to emerge (see Ch 12.20), with a range of issues at
times impeding admissibility of DNA profiling evidence – including the expertise of
witnesses to interpret results statistically (see, eg, R v Sing (2002) 54 NSWLR 31; [2002]
NSWCCA 20; R v Ryan [2002] VSCA 176), the validity of databases, and the absence of
data in relation to population subgroups (see, eg, R v Pantoja (1996) 88 A Crim R 554). With
the passage of time and the resolution of many of the scientific controversies, the legal
focus has shifted toward issues such as the potential for secondary transfer of DNA (see,
eg, R v Joyce (2002) 173 FLR 322; [2002] NTSC 70) and the risk that DNA has been ‘planted’
malignly.
Psychological autopsy evidence

[12.05.260] The status of psychological autopsy evidence (see Freckelton and Ranson
(2006)) is currently highly problematic. The most authoritative decision in terms of the
admissibility of such evidence is R v Gilfoyle [2001] 2 Cr App R 5; [2000] EWCA Crim 81 at
[25], where it was observed that English law will not consider expert evidence properly
admissible if it is ‘based on a developing new brand of science or medicine … until it is
accepted by the scientific community as being able to provide accurate and reliable
opinion’.
The court identified methodological flaws in the approach from the expert who had
provided psychological profiling evidence as to the likelihood of the death of the deceased
having been brought about by murder as against suicide, and concluded (at [25]) that the
‘roads on inquiry’ that would be opened up by such evidence:
would be unending and of little or no help to a jury. The use of psychological profiling
evidence as an aid to police investigation is one thing, but its use as a means of proof in
court in another.
(See also R v Mohan [1994] 2 SCR 9; (1994) 89 CCC (3d) 402.)
Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome evidence

[12.05.300] Attempts have been made by the prosecution in criminal cases to adduce child
sexual abuse accommodation evidence in order to provide an explanation for the
phenomenon of children not properly reporting or complaining about abusive experiences
to which they have been subject. However, the approach of New Zealand (see, eg, R v B
[1987] 1 NZLR 362 at 368; R v Accused [1989] 1 NZLR 714 at 720–721) and Australian
courts (see, eg, Ingles v The Queen (unreported, Tasmanian Court of Criminal Appeal,
1094 [12.05.220]
4 May 1993); F v The Queen (1995) 83 A Crim R 502; C v The Queen (1993) 60 SASR 467; J v
The Queen (1994) 75 A Crim R 522; S v The Queen (2001) 125 A Crim R 526; [2001] QCA 501)
has been to hold the reception of such evidence premature in light of the state of
knowledge about child psychology.
It was summed up in R v B [1987] 1 NZLR 362 at 368 by the New Zealand Court of
Appeal:
As child psychology grows as a science it may be possible for experts in that field to
demonstrate as matters of expert observation that persons subjected to sexual abuse
demonstrate certain characteristics or act in peculiar ways which are so clear and
unmistakable that they can be said to be the concomitants of sexual abuse. When that is
so, the courts may admit evidence as evidence of direct observation.
Until that point (see also R v Accused [1989] 1 NZLR 714), without statutory intervention,
such expert evidence will generally not be admissible, in spite of its potential to function
counterintuitively and thereby to aid juror decision-making.
Facial mapping/Body mapping evidence

[12.05.340] ‘Facial mapping’ and ‘body mapping’ are relatively new areas of scientific
inquiry that have generated a body of caselaw in Australian and United Kingdom courts,
as well as scientific controversy: see Wilkinson (2004); Henneberg (2007); Clement and
Marks (2005). The potential exists for them to be admitted (generally for the prosecution in
criminal cases) for purposes such as to assist a jury as to whether the defendant’s face
appeared on video films taken during two separate incidents, a robbery and an attempted
robbery (see, eg, R v Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260) or comparison between
photographs taken at the scene of the robbery and photographs of a suspect: see R v Clarke
[1995] 2 Cr App R 425.
Facial and body mapping employ three techniques:
• photo-anthropometry;
• morphological analysis; and
• photographic superimposition.
Morphology analysis (also known as visual biometric analysis) involves the comparison of
two images – one from the crime scene and one from a suspect. It involves subdividing
the face, head and body into components to obtain a thorough qualitative analysis and to
determine visual similarities or differences.
Photographic superimposition involves overlaying two comparably enlarged images to
provide a visual display through the use of video or computer technology of the definitive
similarities or dissimilarities between the offender and the suspect. This can be achieved
by utilising Adobe Photoshop software: see Bromby (2003).
Photo-anthropometry is a technique that attempts to metrically compare the
proportional relationships of one photograph rather than to determine visual similarities,
as is done in morphological comparisons. It involves the analysis of anthropometric
landmarks, dimensions and angles to quantify facial characteristics and proportions from
photographs: see Wilkinson (2004); Clement and Marks (2005); Henneberg (2007).
[12.05.380] In R v Stockwell (1993) 97 Cr App R 260, expert evidence was permitted about
the consistency between the defendant’s face and the face appearing on video films taken
during two separate incidents, a robbery and an attempted robbery. In R v Clarke [1995] 2
Cr App R 425, a video superimposition of a photograph of the defendant was permitted to
enable comparison with photographs taken at the scene of a robbery. Steyn LJ (at 429)
stated:
It is essential that our criminal justice system should take into account modern methods of
crime detection … There are no closed categories where such evidence may be placed
[12.05.380] 1095
before a jury. It would be entirely wrong to deny to the law of evidence the advantages to
be gained from new techniques and new advances in science.
In R v Hookway [1999] Crim LR 750, the Court of Appeal upheld a conviction based solely
upon expert evidence of facial mapping. Stockwell, Clarke and Hookway were all applied by
the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 2002) [2003] 1 Cr App R 321.
The court (at 327) held that:
a suitably qualified expert with facial mapping skills can give opinion evidence of
identification based on a comparison between images from the scene, (whether expertly
enhanced or not) and a reasonably contemporary photograph of the defendant, provided
the images and the photograph are available for the jury …
The court held (at [19]) that there are at least four circumstances in which, subject to the
judicial discretion to exclude, evidence is admissible to show and, subject to appropriate
directions in the summing up, a jury can be invited to conclude, that the defendant
committed the offence on the basis of a photographic image from the scene of the crime
(cited authorities omitted):
(1) where the photographic image is sufficiently clear, the jury can compare it with
the defendant sitting in the dock;
(2) where a witness knows the defendant sufficiently well to recognise him as the
offender depicted in the photographic image, he can give evidence of this; and
this may be so even if the photographic image is no longer available for the jury;
(3) where a witness who does not know the defendant spends substantial time
viewing and analysing photographic images from the scene, thereby acquiring
special knowledge which the jury does not have, he can give evidence of
identification based on a comparison between those images and a reasonable
contemporary photograph of the defendant, provided that the images and the
photograph are available to the jury;
(4) a suitably qualified expert with facial mapping skills can give opinion evidence of
identification based on a comparison between images from the scene (whether
expertly enhanced or not) and a reasonably contemporary photograph of the
defendant, provided the images and the photograph are available to the jury.
(See too R v Gardner [2004] EWCA Crim 1639.)

However, in R v Gray [2003] EWCA Crim 1001 at [16], the Court of Appeal concluded
that the key witness, a Mr Harrow, had been significantly discredited. One of the
difficulties in his evidence was that he framed it in terms of the comparison of facial
characteristics providing ‘strong support for the identification of the robber as the
appellant’. However, no evidence was adduced as to the number of occasions on which
any of the six facial characteristics identified by him as ‘the more unusual and thus
individual’ were present in the general population, nor as to the frequency of the
occurrence in the general population of combinations of these or other facial characteristics.
The witness did not suggest that there was any national database of facial characteristics
or any accepted mathematical formula, as with fingerprints, from which conclusions as to
the probability or occurrence of particular facial characteristics, or combinations of them,
could safely be drawn. This led the Court of Appeal to rule against the admission of the
evidence (at [16]):
In their absence any estimate of probabilities and any expression of the degree of support
provided by particular facial characteristics or combinations of facial characteristics must
be only the subjective opinion of the facial imaging or mapping witness. There is no
means of determining objectively whether or not such an opinion is justified.
Consequently, unless and until a national database or agreed formula or some other such
objective measure is established, this Court doubts whether such opinions should ever be
expressed by facial imaging or mapping witnesses. The evidence of such witnesses,
including opinion evidence, is of course both admissible and frequently of value to
demonstrate to a jury with, if necessary, enhancement techniques afforded by specialist
1096 [12.05.380]
equipment, particular facial characteristics or combinations of such characteristics so as to

permit the jury to reach its own conclusion – see Attorney-General’s Reference (No 2 of 2002)
[2003] 1 Cr App R 321; but on the state of the evidence in this case, and if this Court’s
understanding of the current position is correct in other cases too, such evidence should
stop there.
In Atkins v The Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 (see Molloy (2010)), a witness called by the
prosecution gave evidence about similarities between the face of the offender caught on
indistinct CCTV footage and the face of the accused. It was contended on appeal that it
was impermissible for the expert to say that in his view the similarities between the two
faces lent something between support and strong support to the allegation that the man in
the camera shot was the accused. The Court of Appeal reviewed previous authority,
including Australian, observing that in Gray the court had dealt with an expert ‘who had
overstepped the mark and whose reliability had subsequently appeared seriously
questionable’ (at [16]). The court declined to overturn the admission of the evidence at
trial, although it agreed (at [27]) that:
there can be proper anxiety about new areas of expertise. Courts need to be scrupulous to
ensure that evidence proffered as expert, for any party, is indeed based upon specialised
experience, knowledge or study. Mere self-certification without demonstration of study,
method and expertise, is by itself not sufficient.
The court did not canvass a discretion to exclude in any detail (by contrast with Australian
authorities), but held (at [27]) that the remedy for courts’ anxieties:
is not to prevent all experts, good and bad, from expressing any informed opinion at all as
to the import of their findings. The three principal remedies are (i) to have such evidence
examined and, if appropriate, criticised by an expert of equal experience and skill, (ii) to
subject the evidence to rigorous testing in the witness box and (iii) to ensure careful
judicial exposition to the jury of the difference between factual examination/comparison
or arithmetical measure on the one hand and on the other a subjective, but informed,
judgment of the significance of the findings.
The court accepted ‘the caution with which any expression of conclusion in relation to
evidence of this kind (and others) needs to be approached’ (at [23]). It agreed (at [23]) that
the fact that a conclusion is not based upon a statistical database recording the features
compared as they appear in the population at large:
needs to be made crystal clear to the jury. But we do not agree that the absence of such a
database means that no opinion can be expressed by the witness behind rehearsing his
examination of the photographs. An expert who spends years studying this kind of
comparison can properly form a judgment as to the significance of what he has found in
any particular case. It is a judgment based on experience. A jury is entitled to be informed
of his assessment.
The court concluded (at [29]) that the absence of a statistical database is:
something which will undoubtedly be exposed in cross-examination. The witness may
expect to be asked to explain how, if no-one know [sic] how often ears or noses of the
shape relied upon appear in the population at large, it is possible to say anything at all
about the significance of the match; his answers may be satisfactory or unsatisfactory but
will be there to be evaluated by the jury, which will have been reminded by the judge that
any expert’s expression of opinion is that and no more and does not mean that he is
necessarily right. Similarly, the expert may be expected to be tested upon the extent to
which he has not only looked for similarities, but has actively sought out dissimilarities.
Those are but the simplest of the questions which plainly need to be asked of anyone
offering evidence of this kind. Cross examination will also be informed by the fullest
disclosure of his method, generally, and of his working notes in the particular case being
tried.
It found that in the case before it, the trial judge’s treatment of the facial mapping
evidence in summing up to the jury was:
[12.05.380] 1097
meticulous and entirely fair if the disputed expression of opinion was admissible. As well
as setting out in detail the extent and limitations of the evidence of [the witness], he made
it wholly clear that it (i) was incapable of constituting positive identification, whilst it
could positively exclude, (ii) involved no unique identifying feature in this case, (iii) was
not based upon any database which could give any statistical foundation for his
expression of opinion and (iv) was therefore, as to opinion of significance, informed by
experience but entirely subjective. He also told the jury plainly that the decision whether
to accept expert evidence was for it and it alone.
The Court of Appeal commented (at [30]):

Without attempting to ordain a form of summing up which can fit every case, we observe
that in some instances it may help the jury for the judge to explain that the forms of
expression are labels applied by the witness to his opinion of the significance of his
findings and different experts may not attach the same label to the same degree of
comparability.
The Court of Appeal decided (at [31]) that:

[W]here a photographic comparison expert gives evidence, properly based upon study
and experience, of similarities and/or dissimilarities between a questioned photograph
and a known person (including a defendant) the expert is not disabled either by authority
or principle from expressing his conclusion as to the significance of his findings, and that
he may do so by use of conventional expressions, arranged in a hierarchy … We think it
preferable that the expressions should not be allocated numbers, as they were in the boxes
used in the written report in this case, lest that run any small risk of leading the jury to
think that they represent an established numerical, that is to say measurable, scale. The
expressions ought to remain simply what they are, namely forms of words used. They
need to be in an ascending order if they are to mean anything at all, and if a relatively firm
opinion is to be contrasted with one which is not so firm. They are, however, expressions
of subjective opinion, and this must be made crystal clear to the jury charged with
evaluating them.
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Atkins is representative of the significant difference of

approach between the United Kingdom decisions on novel scientific evidence and, for
instance, those in Australia.
Re BLM
[12.05.420] The evidence of a person put forward by the prosecution as a facial mapping
expert, Dr Sutisno, was considered by Blanch J of the New South Wales District Court in
Re BLM (unreported, NSW District Court, 14 September 2005). Dr Sutisno gave evidence
that she had developed a previously established area of forensic anatomy into a ‘new area’
and that she regarded this as innovation. She inspected a surveillance video, blew up still
photographs from it, and then compared them with pictures of the accused. She identified
a habitual gesture of side bending or lateral flexion of the neck and also similarities in the
nose and upper lip. The result was a table prepared by Dr Sutisno of significant
similarities which led her to conclude that they were the same person. However,
Dr Sutisno was not prepared to discuss precisely what she had developed or her
protocols. This led Blanch J to conclude that:
The failure in this case to identify what novel approach she had adopted makes it very
difficult to make any assessment about whether it is a proper field for expert evidence or
not. What is known about it of course is that she is the only person who does it and who
knows about it. That might tend to suggest that it is not an established field of expertise.
1098 [12.05.420]
The Murdoch decisions

[12.05.430] In the Northern Territory judgment of Martin CJ in R v Murdoch (No 4) (2005)
195 FLR 421; [2005] NTSC 78 at [108]–[110], endorsement was given to both facial and
body mapping as a suitable body of knowledge:
When regard is had to the nature and detail of the characteristics and the methodology
employed by Dr Sutisno, it is readily apparent that her knowledge and expertise in the
area of anatomy give Dr Sutisno a significant advantage in the assessment of the
significance of the features of comparison both individually and in their combination.
Dr Sutisno possesses scientific knowledge, expertise and experience outside the ordinary
knowledge, expertise and experience of the jury. This is not a case in which the jury,
having been informed of the relevant features, would not be assisted by the expert
evidence of Dr Sutisno as to her opinion of the significance of the features individually
and in their combination.
In my view, applying the language of King CJ in R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45; 15 A
Crim R 364, facial mapping ‘forms part of a body of knowledge or experience which is
sufficiently organised or recognised to be acceptable as a reliable body of knowledge or
experience’. Further, by study and experience, Dr Sutisno possesses a sufficient knowledge of
the subject matter to render her opinion of value in resolving the issues before the court.
Body mapping has received limited attention within the scientific community. For that
reason it may be regarded as a new technique, but as Dr Sutisno explained it is merely an
extension of the well recognised and accepted principles of facial mapping to the remainder
of the body. I am satisfied that the technique has ‘a sufficient scientific basis to render results
arrived at by that means part of a field of knowledge which is a proper subject of expert
evidence’.
The decision of Martin CJ was appealed to the Northern Territory Court of Criminal
Appeal, which reached a different conclusion in Murdoch v The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R
329; [2007] NTCCA 1. The court held (at [297]) that it was not established that body
mapping or ‘face and body mapping’ is a technique that has a ‘sufficient scientific basis to
render results arrived at by that means a proper subject of expert evidence’. It found that
Dr Sutisno was able to give evidence of points of similarity regarding the facial features of
the persons shown in the images on the basis that she had training and expertise that
permitted her to do so. It also determined that she could give evidence of similarities of
body and movement based upon her detailed study of the images. The court found that
the technique employed by Dr Sutisno did not have a sufficient scientific basis to render
the results arrived at by that means part of a field of knowledge which is a proper subject
of expert evidence. However, it concluded (at [298]) that the evidence given by Dr Sutisno
was capable of assisting the jury in terms of similarities between the person depicted in
the truck stop footage and the appellant, as it was evidence that related to, and was
admissible as, demonstrating similarities. However, it was not admissible as to positive
identity: ‘Dr Sutisno was not qualified to give evidence, as she did, based on “face and
body mapping” as to whether the two men were, indeed, the same man.’ To this extent,
the court held that her evidence in this regard should not have been admitted.
The Tang decision

[12.05.440] Between the first instance and appellate decisions in Murdoch (R v Murdoch
(No 4) (2005) 195 FLR 421; [2005] NTSC 78; Murdoch v The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329;
[2007] NTCCA 1), the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal addressed the issue in
the decision of R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; [2006] NSWCCA 167. The court was
informed that Dr Sutisno had utilised photo-anthropometry and morphological analysis in
respect of three conclusions: that two bodies of photographs depicted the same person;
that on a six point scale, the similarities between the two persons lent support to the
conclusion that the offender and the appellant were one and the same person; and that
certain matters were ‘unique identifiers’. Ultimately, the court held that the evidence
should have been rejected. Spigelman CJ (for the court) accepted that there is a body of
[12.05.440] 1099
expertise based on facial identification but, in respect of ‘body mapping’ in relation to

matters regarding posture, nothing had been presented to the court which indicated that
body mapping has a comparable level of background and support. He noted that
specialist knowledge of posture can exist (see Li v The Queen (2003) 139 A Crim R 281;
[2003] NSWCCA 290 at [106]), but emphasised that the foundation for admissibility must
be laid out – it had not been in the case before the court. In particular, the so-called
‘unique identifier’ of posture was an essential element of the expert’s evidence.
Spigelman CJ held that ‘knowledge’ within the meaning of s 79 of the Evidence Act 1995
(NSW) requires ‘more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation’. He applied the
majority judgment in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786
(1993) in this regard, finding instructive that the term was held by the United States
Supreme Court to apply ‘to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from
such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds’.
Spigelman CJ observed that the only links in key parts of Dr Sutisno’s evidence to any
form of training, study or experience was her study of anatomy and experience, which
was not specified in terms of quality or extent, in comparing photographs for the purpose
of comparing posture. The result was that her evidence did not disclose and did not
permit a finding that her evidence was based on the study of anatomy (at [140]):
That evidence barely, if at all, rose above a subjective belief and it did not, in my opinion,
manifest anything of a ‘specialised’ character. It was not, in my opinion, shown to be
‘specialised knowledge’ within the meaning of s 79.
Contrasting evidence as to fingerprinting, Spigelman CJ emphasised the importance of the
step from evidence of similarity to a conclusion about the identity of the suspect and the
offender. He found that facial mapping, let alone body mapping, had not been shown on
the evidence at trial to constitute ‘specialised knowledge’ of a character which could
support opinion of identity.
He classified the evidence of Dr Sutisno as failing to go beyond a ‘bare ipse dixit’ (at
[154]):
Dr Sutisno did not identify the terms of the ‘strict protocol’ that she purported to have
applied, nor did she set out the basis on which the protocol was developed. Indeed, she
said that this information was confidential, because of what she described as a ‘process of
patenting my innovation’. Accordingly, she had not published any of these ‘innovations’.
The critical matter is that she did not identify her ‘protocol’ or explain its basis.
Spigelman CJ quoted from and expressly referred to the reasons of the Court of Appeal in
R v Gray [2003] EWCA Crim 1001 for rejecting similar evidence.
The Morgan decision

[12.05.442] In Morgan v The Queen (2011) 215 A Crim R 33; [2011] NSWCCA 257, the New
South Wales Court of Appeal heard an appeal from a conviction for robbery in company
and various associated charges. The Court of Appeal’s decision was unanimous in relation
to the admission of expert evidence. An important part of the prosecution evidence that
was admitted at trial over objection was expert evidence by Professor Henneberg, who
was a biological anthropologist and anatomist occupying the Wood Jones Chair of
Anthropological and Comparative Anatomy in the School of Medical Sciences at the
University of Adelaide. He compared the images of the person of interest, the offender,
and the person who was charged as follows (at [74]–[75]):
Person of interest is an adult male of heavy body build. His shoulders and hips are wide.
He has a prominent abdomen but his upper and lower limbs, especially in their distal
segments, are not thick. This suggests centripetal pattern of body fat distribution. This
pattern consists of the deposition of most body fat on the trunk while limbs remain
relatively thin. His head and face were covered by a garment well adhering to the surface
of the skin. This enabled me to make observations of the head shape, nose and face profile.
1100 [12.05.442]
His head is dolichocephalic (elongated) in the horizontal plane (viewed from above). His
nose is wide and rather prominent while his face has straight profile (orthognathic). He is
right-handed in his actions and carries himself straight.
…
Mr MORGAN is an adult male of darkish colour skin. He is heavily build (sic), but the
bulk of his body fat is concentrated on the trunk while his distal limbs are not fat (see
especially lower legs). His shoulders and hips are wide. He has straight posture. His face
is orthognatous (straight profile, without protruding jaws). His nose is wide and rather
prominent. Since during the forensic procedure no photographs showing his head from
above were taken the assessment of his head shape is uncertain. Judging from head width
shown on posterior (taken from behind) photographs and head length on profile
photographs, his head seems to be dolichocephalic (elongated oval rather than a shape
approximating a circle).
This led him to express the following opinion (at [76]):

Based wholly or substantially on the above knowledge, I am of the opinion that there is a
high level of anatomical similarity between the Offender and the Suspect (Mr MORGAN).
My opinion is strengthened by the fact that I could not observe on the Suspect any
anatomical detail different from those I could discern from the CCTV images of the
Offender.
He explained that his methodology was one of anatomical comparison, utilising what he
described as the observable biological characteristics of particular individuals ‘in their
unique combination’ (at [78]).
A forensic psychologist, Dr Kemp, and a forensic scientist, Glenn Porter, called for the
defence, expressed reservations about Professor Henneberg’s methodology. Dr Kemp
noted that Professor Henneberg’s approached relied exclusively on a morphological
approach to anatomical examination and that he did not take any measurements from
photographic images or draw on any published data regarding the frequency of particular
anatomical features to estimate the probability that two sets of images showed the same
person. He noted the absence of evidence from Professor Henneberg to discern face and
head shape through a covering of clothing and contended that there was no scientific basis
for the claim by Professor Henneberg that he could discern aspects of the anatomy
obscured by unknown items of clothing.
Mr Kemp, who had wide experience in forensic photography as a result of his work
with the Australian Federal Police, emphasised that the CCTV footage utilised by
Professor Henneberg was not of good quality and expressed concern that image artefacts
could affect the reproduction of shape, including human forms. He described the
distortion, both curvilinear and rectilinear, as significant such as to lead to magnification
of the offender’s upper body, resulting in a ‘keystoning effect’.
Further evidence for the defence was given by the forensic anatomist, Dr Sutisno, who
also concluded that Professor Henneberg’s evidence was defective in terms of its
methodology and scientific protocol.
In his leading judgment, Hidden J (with whom Beazley JA and Harrison J agreed on
this issue) noted that the court had not been referred to any appellate authority in which
body mapping was subjected to critical analysis. He was troubled by the ‘lack of research
into the validity, reliability and error rate of the process’ (at [138]), as well as the fact that
Professor Henneberg’s assessment methodology involved observation of two sets of
images and a comparison without measurements and without the aid of technology such
as the computerised enhancement of the images and photographic superimposition, as
was utilised by Dr Sutisno in Tang (at [138]).
Hidden J noted that the claim of Professor Henneberg was that he was able to detect
not just a measure of similarity, but a high level of such anatomical similarity between the
persons, in spite of the images being of poor quality and the persons being clothed: ‘How
he was able to do that when no part of the body of the offender in the CCTV images was
[12.05.442] 1101
exposed was, in my view, never satisfactorily explained’ (at [140]). Hidden J concluded
that the evidence failed to convey that Professor Henneberg’s experience extended to the
observation of anatomical features of the head and face of a person whose head was
entirely covered by a garment such as a balaclava (at [143]). He found that
Professor Henneberg’s observations about the shape of the offender’s head and face,
which were vital to his conclusion of a high degree of similarity between the person and
the suspect, were based on his specialised knowledge of anatomy. He also was not
persuaded that the comparative exercise was not one which the jury could have
undertaken unassisted.
The outcome was that the court concluded that the evidence of Professor Henneberg
‘tended to cloak evidence of similarity in a mantle of expertise’, described by counsel for
the appellant as a ‘white coat effect’ which it did not deserve. The court found on this
ground that the evidence of Professor Henneberg should not have been admitted, that the
verdict should be quashed, and that a new trial should take place.
The Honeysett decision

[12.05.445] Australia’s most authoritative decision in relation to identification by anatomists
from CCTV images is that of the High Court in Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122;
[2014] HCA 29. Evidence was given at trial by an anatomist, Professor Henneberg, of his
views as to the images taken on CCTV of the persons responsible for a robbery compared
with the images from other sources. Again, Dr Sutisno was a witness. No doubt taking
into account previous decisions by the courts, the prosecution at trial did not apply to
adduce Professor Henneberg’s views as to the ‘high degree of anatomical similarity’
between the offender and the suspect. Rather, his evidence was as to (1) the physical
characteristics of the offender; (2) the physical characteristics of the accused man; and (3)
the absence of observable anatomical dissimilarity between the two. Thus, the evidence
was that the accused could not be excluded as the offender and Professor Henneberg’s
evidence constituted circumstantial identification evidence.
He asserted that ‘forensic identification’ (which he also described as anatomical
identification) was within his specialised knowledge and that he had practised it since
1976 and published the results of his forensic research in peer-reviewed international
journals and books. The analyses provided by Professor Henneberg of the offender seen
on CCTV and of the suspect were important in the language that they employed.
Of the offender, Professor Henneberg said (at [15]):
He is an adult male of ectomorphic (thin, ‘skinny’) body build. His shoulders are
approximately the same width as his hips. His body height is medium compared to other
persons, and to familiar objects (eg doorways) visible in the images from the [offence]. He
carries himself very straight, so that his hips are standing forward while his back has a
very clearly visible lumbar lordosis (the small of his back is bent forward) overhung by
the shoulder area. Although the offender covers his head and face with a cloth (what looks
like a T-shirt) … the knitted fabric is elastic and adheres closely to the vault of his skull (=
braincase). This shows that his hair is short and does not distort the layout of the fabric.
The shape of the head is clearly dolichocephalic (= long head, elongated oval when
viewed from the top) as opposed to brachycephalic (= short head, nearly spherical). The
offender is right-handed in his actions. … Although most of the body of the offender is
covered by clothing, head wrap and gloves, an area of naked skin above his wrist
(between the glove and the sleeve) in images … is visible and can be compared to the skin
colour of a female hotel employee on the same images.
Of the suspect, he expressed the view that (at [16]):

[The appellant] is an adult male of ectomorphic (= slim) body buil[d]. His hips and
shoulders are of approximately the same width. His stance is very straight with well
marked lumbar lordosis and pelvis shifted forward. His skull vault is dolichocephalic
when viewed from the top. Comparison of lateral (side) and front views of his head also
1102 [12.05.445]
indicates the head … is long but narrow. His skin is dark, darker than that of persons of
European extraction, but not ‘black’. … He is right-handed – uses his right hand to sign
documents.
Comparison of the two images led him to conclude that ‘[t]here is [a] high degree of
anatomical similarity between [Offender One] and [the appellant]’ (at [17]). His opinion
was strengthened by the fact that he was unable to discern any anatomical dissimilarity
between the two individuals. Professor Henneberg’s methodology of forensic identification
consisted of looking at the image of a person and forming an opinion of their physical
characteristics, not drawing upon anthropometric measurement or statistical analysis. He
accepted that his examination of images was not different from that of a lay observer, save
that he was an experienced anatomist with a good understanding of the shape and
proportions of details of the human body (at [18]).
Criticism was levelled by Dr Sutisno and another witness at Professor Henneberg’s
failure to explain how artefacts produced by lens distortion had been taken into account in
the identification of the physical characteristics of one of the offenders. Dr Sutisno
disputed Professor Henneberg’s capacity to make an assessment of the offender’s height,
gender, maturity and hair length. She asserted that such assessments were speculative and
highly subjective. The court accepted a number of the criticisms and concluded (at [45])
that Professor Henneberg’s evidence gave the ‘unwarranted appearance of science to the
prosecution case’ that the offender and the accused man shared a number of physical
characteristics: ‘Among other things, the use of technical terms to describe those
characteristics – Offender One and the appellant are both ectomorphic – was apt to
suggest the existence of more telling similarity than to observe that each appeared to be
skinny’ (at [45]). It held that his opinion was not based wholly or substantially on his
specialised knowledge and it had been an error of law at first instance to admit it.
The current state of the law
[12.05.450] The consequence of the decisions of the New South Wales Court of Criminal
Appeal in R v Tang (2006) 65 NSWLR 681; [2006] NSWCCA 167, the Northern Territory
Court of Appeal in Murdoch v The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329; [2007] NTCCA 1, the
New South Wales Court of Appeal in Morgan v The Queen (2011) 215 A Crim R 33; [2011]
NSWCCA 257, the High Court in Honeysett v The Queen (2014) 253 CLR 122; [2014] HCA 29
and the United Kingdom Court of Appeal in R v Gray [2003] EWCA Crim 1001 and Atkins
v the Queen [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 is that evidence about facial mapping and body
mapping is unlikely to be admitted until such time as it comes from a sound scientific
methodology and is based upon a sound statistical basis. In addition, the reasoning
processes which lead to conclusions of identification or non-identification will need to be
clearly revealed and articulated so that they can be evaluated meaningfully.
Walking gait analysis evidence
[12.05.460] In Otway v The Queen [2011] EWCA Crim 3, the discipline of walking gait
analysis was adduced by the prosecution from CCTV images which depicted 20 seconds
of an offender walking. The witness who gave the evidence was a Mr Blake, who
described himself as a ‘podiatrist and specialist in lower limb gait, pathomechanics and
biomechanics’ (at [10]). He said that he routinely used video camera equipment to analyse
gait clinically to assess and diagnose anatomical and skeletal conditions. He described the
practice of gait analysis (at [10]) as follows:
Gait analysis is the examination of walking or running. The gait, or walking cycle, skeletal
movement in general can have recognised anatomical movements or reference points
during a walking cycle. Biomechanics is the examination and analysis of body movement.
Specifically in this case to humans the skeleton can at times give an anatomical signature
that if not unique, can be a relatively rare anatomical position or movement to a few
individuals. A person’s walking cycle or his skeletal anatomy is difficult to hide as it is
part of their body’s anatomy. The science of gait analysis was introduced into the UK and
[12.05.460] 1103
the profession of podiatry in the early 1970s. The gait cycle can be broken down into
factors such as the position of feet and other parts of the lower limb. Thus features of gait
can be identified and sometimes quantified. Podiatrists use gait analysis virtually every
day in their practice. Recently that science has been applied forensically. The Council for
the Registration of Forensic Practitioners recognises gait analysis and footprint
identification as important components in identification of individuals. A podiatric section
has recently been set up … some clinicians may suggest that certain key elements of gait
cycle or biomechanical (body) position and movement can leave a unique signature
confirming that an individual in comparison is one of the same …
At trial it was argued for the defence that the analysis offered by Mr Blake could be
undertaken by the jurors themselves unassisted by expert evidence (at [11]) and that there
was no statistical database against which the jury could judge the significance of his
evidence. In addition, it was contended that there was no scientific basis, and no
measurement, to support Mr Blake’s methodology. The trial judge ruled that Mr Blake
should be permitted to give evidence in which he identified the similarities between the
walking gait of the appellant and the walking gait of the suspect. It would be for the jury
to assess that evidence having viewed the recorded material for themselves. Mr Blake
would not, however, be permitted to give evidence relating to the facial features of the
appellant or the suspect, and would not be permitted to evaluate his comparison of
walking gait by reference to the chance that the driver of the Honda motorcar at the petrol
filling station was someone other than the appellant.
The Court of Appeal received evidence from a professor who was an expert in biology
and genetics and who argued that there was an absence of evidence about whether the
technique employed by Mr Blake had been tested in field conditions, subjected to peer
review and publication or known rate of error, or subjected to verifiable standards. The
Court of Appeal observed that the professor was not a podiatrist and not in a position to
express an opinion as to whether Mr Blake had the expertise which he purported to
employ in his analysis. It observed too that in Re T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439 at [92]–[96],
Thomas LJ, giving the judgment of the court, made reference to several cases in which, by
reason of the subject matter of the expert evidence, the expert was unable to evaluate their
findings by reference to a database of random selection (at [19]):
Nevertheless the evidence of evaluation, founded upon and explained to be the
consequence of personal experience, was properly admitted. The proposition that
evidence of a comparison cannot be admitted if its evaluation is expressed in terms
subjective experience is simply wrong in law.
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that the evidence of Mr Blake, in
the absence of contradiction, was sufficient to establish the existence of (1) the science or
expertise; (2) the witness’s proficiency in it; and (3) the foundation for the witness’s
opinion. It accepted (at [22]) the argument that:
in a comparison exercise based upon facial mapping or walking gait, it is a necessary
condition of admissibility that the witness is able to demonstrate to the court the features
of comparison upon which his opinion is formed. Since the comparison is visual, an
inability by the witness to explain and demonstrate the features upon which his opinion is
formed not only places in doubt the existence of the science or technique claimed; it
undermines the foundation of reliability required. We have read a transcript of Mr Blake’s
evidence and we have viewed the recorded material from which he demonstrated the
foundation for his opinion. We entertain no doubt that the jury was in a position to follow
and assess the value of his evidence. There is no danger here that the jury was being
invited simply to take Mr Blake’s comparison on trust. We agree with Maddison J,
however, that Mr Blake’s ability safely to express his ultimate conclusion in terms of
probability of a match, even probability based on Mr Blake’s clinical experience, was
insufficiently established. It is important that juries are not misled to an over-valuation of
comparison evidence.
1104 [12.05.460]
While the court declined leave to appeal, it was circumspect in its reasoning and
concerned not to be seen to be accepting of this novel form of evidence (at [23]):
We do not wish it to be thought that we are endorsing the use of podiatric evidence in
general. Upon the evidence before him and the argument addressed to this court, we
conclude that Maddison J was right to rule the evidence admissible. However, each such
application must be considered on its own merits. It may well be, as in the present case,
that the trial judge will need to be astute when such evidence is admitted that it is strictly
confined within the expertise established and that the proper limits of evaluation are
identified from the outset. We endorse, with respect, the views of the court in T
(paras 97–99) as to the necessity for the parties to have issues of disclosure and
admissibility well in mind during preparation for the case management hearing so that,
when the appropriate time comes, the trial judge is presented with all the material needed
to make an assessment of admissibility, and the permissible scope of the evidence if
admitted.
Lip-reading evidence
[12.05.490] Attempts have latterly been made by the prosecution in criminal cases to
adduce ‘lip-reading’ evidence from CCTV cameras and other sources. It is highly
problematic evidence from a scientific point of view.
The most important of the modern line of decisions is the Court of Appeal decision in
R v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31; [2004] EWCA Crim R 1344, where the prosecution of the
accused depended substantially upon video evidence of two persons speaking with one
another. The Crown adduced evidence from a Jessica Rees, who had been deaf since the
age of four but had obtained a degree from Oxford University. She was presented as a
skilled lip-reader, relying on lip-reading in her daily life and not using sign language. She
had been lip-reading semi-professionally for 10 to 12 years and professionally for five to
six years. She had been tested for accuracy in 1993 and 2000. In her 2000 test, she conceded
that she got 452 out of 890 words right and introduced 224 unspoken words. However, she
contended that, since then, new methods had been introduced so that such mistakes did
not happen. She agreed that lip-reading for legal purposes was in its infancy. She felt she
should be tested again on the basis of new criteria. She emphasised that her services had
been sought in Europe, Canada and the United States. She had given evidence in court on
many occasions.
However, the reliability of her evidence was queried by Professor Summerfield, a
Professor of the Medical Research Council’s Institute of Hearing. Ms Rees had been his
patient and it was he who had tested her. He pointed out that, in respect of her 2000 test,
she had failed to convey the meaning properly in respect of all the instances when she had
introduced words which, in fact, had not been uttered. He gave evidence that Ms Rees
made three types of errors: relatively minor changes; phrases introduced as a result of
having been told the broad context of the conversation; and where an unusual word was
used. He was not able to comment upon whether she had got the words right in the
particular case before the court.
Professor Campbell, a Professor of Communication Disorders in adults and children,
also gave evidence questioning the reliability of Ms Rees’s capacity to lip-read.
Professor Campbell had written two reports on the admissibility of lip-reading evidence.
Her view was that the intrinsic unreliability of it was so strong that it should never be
used evidentially (at [16]):
[W]hat was seen by lip readers was always less than what was said. Even a very good lip
reader could not overcome that limitation. There was an art in the ability to lip read but
the understanding of speech was a science and the science community was able to assess
the validity of claims made about lip reading. There was room for error.
[12.05.490] 1105
Professor Campbell noted that the Association of Teachers of Lip Reading for Adults
strongly recommended that members should not undertake forensic work because
lip-reading was unreliable.
On appeal, Professor Moore, Professor of Auditory Perception at Cambridge
University, gave further evidence. He said that in relation to the accuracy of speech
reading, the information from visible sources is incomplete – important sources of
information are lacking to even the best speech readers so speech reading inevitably
involves inference from incomplete information. He identified a variety of sources of
potential error for lip-reading. He did not doubt that Ms Rees was one of the best
lip-readers available, but had serious doubts about the reliability of lip-reading.
The Court of Appeal accepted Professor Moore’s evidence that the information
provided for speech reading from visible sources is incomplete and that care must be
taken not to prompt a transcriber by prior information. However, it concluded that it did
not follow that speech reading evidence is so unreliable that it should not be admissible in
court. It found that there was ample evidence to demonstrate that, depending on various
factors, such as the quality of the video and the visibility of the lip, jaw and other facial
movements of the speaker, speech reading may be free from error.
The court accepted that lip-reading evidence as to the contents of a videotaped
conversation is capable of passing the ordinary tests of relevance and reliability and
therefore is potentially admissible in evidence. It found that lip-reading is a well-
recognised skill and that lip-reading from video footage is no more than an application of
that skill: ‘it may increase the difficulty of the task, as may the speaker’s facial features and
the angle of the observation, but the nature of the skill remains the same’ (at [38]). The
court noted that this does not mean that in every case where lip-reading evidence is
tendered it will be admissible: ‘the decision in every case is likely to be highly fact
sensitive’ (at [38]). The court provided examples. In particular, a video may be of such
poor quality or the view of the speaker’s face so poor that ‘no reliable interpretation is
possible’. There may also be cases where the interpreting person is not sufficiently skilled.
The consequence is that a judge may properly take into account (at [38]):
whether consistency with extrinsic facts confirms or inconsistency casts doubt on the
reliability of an interpretation; whether information provided to the lip-reader might have
coloured the reading; and whether the probative effect of the evidence depends on the
interpretation of a single word or phrase or on the whole thrust of the conversation. In the
light of such considerations (which are not intended to be exhaustive) a judge may well
rule on the voire dire that any lip-reading evidence proffered should not be admitted
before the jury.
The court explicitly adopted the interpretation of King CJ in R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR
45; 15 A Crim R 364 at 46 that the question:
may be divided into two parts: (a) whether the subject matter of the opinion is such that a
person without instruction or experience in the area of knowledge or human experience
would be able to form a sound judgment on the matter without the assistance of witnesses
possessing special knowledge or experience in the area, and (b) whether the subject matter
of an opinion forms part of a body of knowledge or experience which is sufficiently
organised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience, a special
acquaintance with which by the witness would render his opinion of assistance to the
court.
In short, if the conditions are met, the question becomes one of weight (at [33]); see also R
v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161 at 165; R v Dallagher [2003] 1 Cr App R 12; [2002] EWCA
Crim 1903 at [23].
The court rejected the proposition that reliability constitutes a criterion for admissibility
(at [34]):
1106 [12.05.490]
In established fields of science, the court may take the view that expert evidence would
fall beyond the recognised limits of the field or that methods are too unconventional to be
regarded as subject to the scientific discipline. But a skill or expertise can be recognized
and respected, and thus satisfy the conditions for admissible expert evidence, although the
discipline is not susceptible to this sort of scientific discipline.
The court accepted that in some cases the reliability of the evidence might be relevant to
the conditions of admissibility. It noted that, in the psychological autopsy decision of the
court in R v Gilfoyle [2001] 2 Cr App R 57 at [25], it was observed that English law will not
consider expert evidence properly admissible if it is ‘based on a developing new brand of
science or medicine … until it is accepted by the scientific community as being able to
provide accurate and reliable opinion’. Similarly, in R v Robb (1991) 93 Cr App R 161, a
case dealing with the admissibility of voice identification, which was acknowledged to be
an ‘expert field’, the court focused upon whether the particular witness’s techniques were
sufficiently recognised within his profession for him to be properly qualified to give expert
evidence. In addition, it was held in R v Clarke [1995] 2 Cr App R 425 at 432 that evidence
may be so lacking in ‘prima facie reliability’ that it has no probative force or its probative
force is too slight to influence a decision.
However, the court held that while reliability of evidence can be relevant to whether
conditions of admissibility are met, in itself reliability goes to weight.
The court held that lip-reading evidence from a video, like facial mapping, is a species
of real evidence. It observed (at [37]) that while in earlier times a more conservative
approach was adopted, the policy of the English courts in more recent times ‘has been to
be flexible in admitting expert evidence and to enjoy “the advantages to be gained from
new techniques and new advances in science”’ (see R v Clarke [1995] 2 Cr App R 425 at
430). The court held that the better approach, so long as an expert field is sufficiently well
established to pass the ordinary tests of relevance and reliability, is for no enhanced test of
admissibility to be applied. However, the weight of the evidence should be established by
the same adversarial techniques applicable generally (at [37]).
The result in terms of the decision in R v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 31; [2004] EWCA
Crim R 1344 was that lip-reading evidence was permitted in spite of its fallibilities.
However, the court found (at [42]) that lip-reading evidence fell into the category of cases
where a ‘special warning’ is necessary:
if experience, research or common sense has indicated that there is a difficulty with a
certain type of evidence that requires giving the jury a warning of its dangers and the
need for caution, tailored to meet the needs of the case.
The court observed that the trial judge should spell out to the jury the risk of mistakes as
to the words that the lip-reader believes were spoken; the reasons why the witness may be
mistaken; and the way in which a convincing, authoritative and truthful witness may yet
be a mistaken witness. In addition, the court ruled that the trial judge should deal with the
particular strengths and weaknesses of the material in the particular case, carefully setting
out the evidence, together with the criticisms that can properly be made of it because of
other evidence (at [44]):
The jury should be reminded that the quality of the evidence will be affected by such
matters as the lighting at the scene, the angle of the view in relation to those speaking, the
distances involved, whether anything interfered with the observation, familiarity on the
part of the lip-reader with the language spoken, the extent of the use of single syllable
words, any awareness on the part of the expert witness of the context of the speech and
whether the probative value of the evidence depends on isolated words or phrases or the
general impact of long passages of conversation.
[12.05.490] 1107
Ear print comparison evidence

[12.05.540] In R v Dallagher [2003] 1 Cr App R 12; [2002] EWCA Crim 1903, evidence of ear
print comparison from a Dutch police officer, without formal qualifications, was
permitted, in a case where ear prints were found on the glass of a window of the house
where a woman had been murdered; so, too, was evidence from a Professor Vanezis, the
Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine and Science in the University of Glasgow. The
Dutch police officer testified that he had become interested in ear print identification and
read what was available on the topic. Evidence was called questioning the scientific
credentials of ear print comparison. The English Court of Appeal (at [34]) noted that the
experts called for the accused accepted that they were working on the assumption that
any questioned ear print of adequate quality can only be ascribed to one ear and that each
ear and ear print is discernibly different, an assumption supported by relatively limited
information. However, it was prepared to regard ear print evidence in principle as
admissible. Again, the Frye test was not utilised to determine admissibility.
1108 [12.05.540]
Chapter 12.10
FINGERPRINTING, FOOTPRINT AND
FOOTWEAR EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [12.10.01]
Settled law relating to fingerprinting ................................................................................ [12.10.40]
Experts as convenient helpers? ........................................................................................... [12.10.80]
Comparison points ................................................................................................................ [12.10.120]
Subjectivity ............................................................................................................................. [12.10.160]
Other authorities ................................................................................................................... [12.10.165]
Fabrication/Transposition of fingerprints ........................................................................ [12.10.240]
United States case authority ................................................................................................ [12.10.280]
Sufficiency of expert fingerprinting evidence .................................................................. [12.10.290]
Footprint evidence ................................................................................................................ [12.10.320]
Barefoot impression evidence ............................................................................................. [12.10.360]
Shoeprint impression evidence ........................................................................................... [12.10.380]
Resemblance evidence .......................................................................................................... [12.10.387]
Shoe evidence ......................................................................................................................... [12.10.390]
Biometric identification evidence ....................................................................................... [12.10.400]
Assessing fingerprint and associated evidence ............................................................... [12.10.440]
‘He seals up the hand of every man, that all men may know
his work.’
Job: Ch 37 v 7.
‘Evidently not well off – probably a charwoman. I caught a

look at her gloves as she loosened her bonnet-strings, and the
finger-tips were like a split bud of a black fuchsia just about to
bloom.’
Sir Ernest Swinton, The Great Tab Dope.
‘It will be long before a British jury will consent to convict a

man upon the evidence of his finger prints; and however
perfect in theory the identification may be, it will not be easy
to submit it in a form which will amount to legal evidence.’
From an 1892 review in The Athenaeum of Fingerprints by Sir Francis Galton.
Introduction
[12.10.01] This chapter reviews leading decisions that have dealt with the admissibility of
and weight given to fingerprinting, footprint and footwear evidence and highlights
controversies in the area. It functions as a companion piece to subscription service Ch 96.
See also Meintjes-van der Walt (2006); Leo (2018).
Settled law relating to fingerprinting

[12.10.40] By 1911, fingerprinting as a scientifically sound means of establishing identity
achieved forensic acceptance, the Illinois Supreme Court holding in People v Jennings 252
Ill 534; 96 NE 1077 at 1082 (1911):
[T]he classification of finger print impressions and their method of identification is a
science requiring study. While some of the reasons which guide an expert to his
conclusions are such as may be weighed by any intelligent person with good eyesight
from such exhibits as we have here in the record, after being pointed out to him by one
versed in the study of finger prints, the evidence in question does not come within the
common experience of all men of common education in the ordinary walks of life, and
therefore the court and jury were properly aided by witnesses of peculiar and special
experience on this subject.
[12.10.40] 1109
Two years later, in New Zealand, it was said in R v Krausch (1913) 15 GLR 664 at 655,
disagreeing with R v Parker [1912] VLR 152, that:
The leading facts respecting finger markings such as have been proved in this case may be
regarded as established biological facts. The first of these facts is that finger markings
remain absolutely unaltered from birth to death, however long a human being may live,
unless, of course, destroyed by scars. The second is that there is no rule whatever of race
or heredity which determines on what part of the fingerprint certain marks will be found
which for convenience I will call ‘junctions’ and ‘free ends’.
Chapman J, in R v Krausch (1913) 15 GLR 664 at 655, queried whether fingerprinting was
‘anything absolutely new or strange’ at that time:
It has long been known that every hair in a man’s head has its own place, and if you could
make an accurate map of a few square inches of a man’s scalp, fixing the place of each hair
by means of fine lines of latitude and longitude, and you were then to try and find another
man presenting exactly the same features in this respect, you would, I have no doubt, find
it extremely difficult, if not impossible. Such a fact, when established, has no value as a
means of identification, because it is not practicable to use it, but it may be, and probably
is, as firmly established biological fact as those relating to fingerprints.
His Honour provided a down-to-earth analogy, which has since been used by prosecuting
counsel in explaining the significance of fingerprints (at 655):
I take from my pocket this bunch of keys. You see that they are of various sorts and sizes,
made to fit a considerable variety of locks. Suppose you were now to arrest every man in
New Zealand who possessed a bunch of keys, can you suppose for a moment that you
would find another man whose keys correspond in type and detail of (say) one quarter of
their number? You might occasionally find one or two which correspond, but would you
expect to find more? The proposed illustration may at first sight appear to go too far, but
if the accepted scientific facts respecting finger marks are true facts that illustration
presents a fairly close analogy.
Since that time, fingerprinting has become an orthodox and rarely questioned form of
identification. It has been accepted as a legitimate basis for convictions: see Moreshead v
Police [1999] SASC 162; R v SMR [2002] NSWCCA 258 at [96]. However, considerable
evolution has taken place in how fingerprint evidence is presented for the prosecution and
challenged y those representing defendants (see Leo (2018)).
In the United Kingdom, a numerical standard evolved and it became accepted that
once 12 ridge characteristics could be identified, a match was proven. In 1924, however,
the New Scotland Yard altered the standard to require 16 characteristics, on the basis of a
paper published by the French dactylographer Alphonse Bertillon. This criterion was
confirmed in 1953, when a meeting took place between the Deputy Director of Public
Prosecutions, officials from the Home Office, and officers from several police forces with a
view to agreeing on a common approach. However, ‘[i]t is apparent that the committee
were not seeking to identify the minimum number of ridge characteristics which would
lead to a conclusive match, but what they were seeking to do was to set a standard which
was so high that no one would seek to challenge the evidence and thereby, to raise
fingerprint evidence to a point of unique reliability’: R v Buckley [1999] EWCA Crim 1191.
At the same time, a National Conference of Fingerprint Experts was established to
monitor the application of the standard. It amended the standard to provide that where at
any scene there was one set of marks from which 16 ridge characteristics could be
identified, any other mark at the same scene could be matched if 10 ridge characteristics
were identified. By 1983, though, a conference of United Kingdom fingerprinting experts
agreed that a fingerprint identification could be ‘certain’ with fewer than the standard 16
points of agreement.
In 1988, the Home Office and the Association of Chief Police Officers commissioned a
study by Drs Evett and Williams into fingerprinting standards. This recommended that
‘there was no scientific, logical or statistical basis for the retention of any numerical
1110 [12.10.40]
Fingerprinting, footprint and footwear evidence | CH 12.10
standard, let alone one that required as many as 16 points of similarity’: R v Buckley [1999]
EWCA Crim 1191. A Fingerprint Evidence Project Board was established to evaluate the
feasibility of moving nationally to a non-numerical system. In 1998, it recommended in
favour of moving toward such a system by 2000.
Ultimately, the non-numerical system for fingerprint identification was introduced
from 11 June 2001, Lord Rooker stating to the House of Lords on 25 February 2002 and
11 March 2002 (Hansard, pp 2700, 3041):
Although there is no set numerical standard to be satisfied before experts make a decision
that a mark or impression left at a crime scene and a fingerprint were made by the same
person, there are objective criteria which must be satisfied and must be capable of
demonstration, eg in a court, before any decision is made. There are also prescribed
verification procedures which must be adhered to at all times before that decision is
communicated to an investigating police officer and eventually to the courts …
To determine whether or not a crime scene mark and a fingerprint impression have
been made by the same person, the fingerprint examiner must carry out a process of
analysis, comparison and evaluation by determining whether in each impression friction
ridge features are of a compatible type; they are in the same relative positions to each
other in the ridge structure; they are in the same sequence; there is sufficient quantitative
and qualitative detail in each in agreement; and there are any areas of apparent or real
discrepancy. The examiner must address all these issues before declaring that both mark
and impression have been made by the same person.
The next stage is verification. The examiner’s conclusion must be verified independently
by two other officers who must both be fingerprint experts. Any mark/impression
identification notified to investigating officers and presented in court will have, and must
have, been subject to the above procedures.
The science of fingerprint assessment has developed to the stage where properly trained
and experienced technicians can recognise points of similarity which would not be at all
clear to an uninstructed layperson: see R v Buisson [1990] 2 NZLR 542 at 549. In R v Lawless
[1974] VR 398 at 423, the court held:
It is a matter for expertise not possessed by the ordinary run of mankind to identify
characteristics of fingerprints and their patterns in each of two prints and make a
comparison and form a conclusion as to whether they are identical or not and the jury
could not be invited or allowed to act as experts.
(See also R v O’Callaghan [1976] VR 676 at 678.)

However, in spite of increasing digitalisation of the technique, it may be that subjective
interpretation still plays something of a role: Robertson and Vignaux (1994, p 7). It is not
infallible and remains subject to the potential for human error (see Gutowski (2006); Pyrek
(2007)). An inquiry initiated by the English Home Office and the Association of Chief
Police Officers in England and Wales (Evett and Williams (1989)) involved the sending of
pairs of fingerprints from the same source to a number of fingerprint examiners
throughout England. They were asked to compare them, determine whether they were
from the same source, and indicate the number of points of uniformity. One pair had been
doctored. No examiners made any identification errors but, when examining and
identifying genuine pairs of prints, examiners varied significantly in the numbers of
points of uniformity that they found. In the case of one print, this varied from 11 to 40.
In 2011, Ulery et al reported on a large-scale study of the accuracy and reliability of
latent print examiners’ decisions. Each of 169 latent print examiners compared
approximately 100 pairs of latent and exemplar fingerprints from a pool of 644 pairs. The
fingerprints were selected to include a range of attributes and quality encountered in
forensic casework and to be comparable to searches of an automated fingerprint
identification system containing more than 58 million subjects. Five examiners made at
least one false positive error – the overall false positive rate was 7.5%. Eighty-five percent
of examiners made at least one false negative error. Independent examination of the same
[12.10.40] 1111
comparisons by different examiners (a process comparable to blind verification) was

found to detect all false positive errors and the majority of false negative errors.
In 2017, Thompson et al, in their important report on Latent Fingerprint Examination,
concluded that (p 5):
The scientific literature does not, however, provide an adequate basis for assessing the
rarity of any particular feature, or set of features, that might be found in a fingerprint.
Examiners may well be able to exclude the preponderance of the human population as
possible sources of a latent print, but there is no scientific basis for estimating the number
of people who could not be excluded and there are no scientific criteria for determining
when the pool of possible sources is limited to a single person.
They found too that (p 6):
There is a body of research that addresses the question of how much variation is possible
in prints from the same finger under different circumstances. But there is also evidence
that latent print examiners sometimes misjudge the degree of intra-finger variability that
may occur, creating a risk of false exclusions. It is unclear whether this problem occurs
because examiners fail to appreciate the implications of existing research on intra-finger
variability, or because existing research is incomplete.
They summarised that (p 7):
Studies have shown that latent print examiners (like all human beings) are vulnerable to
contextual bias. Their evaluations of the features of latent prints can be influenced
inappropriately by premature exposure to reference prints; their conclusions can also be
influenced inappropriately by information about the underlying criminal investigation.
Contextual bias of this type is unlikely to change examiners’ opinions in clear-cut cases,
but may have stronger effects in ambiguous cases where the prints are more difficult to
evaluate.
Contextual bias can happen without an examiner’s conscious awareness, and,
therefore, cannot be reliably suppressed or corrected by the individual.
Contextual bias can be mitigated through the use of context management procedures
that avoid exposing examiners to contextual information that is unnecessary for a
scientific assessment of the prints and delay exposing examiners to information that, while
necessary, may create bias if presented prematurely.
They argued that context management procedures should be adopted by all forensic
laboratories in order to reduce the potential for contextual bias in latent print examination.
They also urged examiners to take care to avoid making statements in reports or oral
evidence that exaggerate the certainty of their conclusions (p 11):
They can indicate that the differences between a known and latent print are such that the
donor of the known print can be excluded as the source of the latent print. They can also
indicate that the similarity between a latent and a known print are such that the donor of
the known print cannot be excluded as the source of the latent print. But they should
avoid statements that claim or imply that the pool of possible sources is limited to a single
person. Terms like ‘match,’ ‘identification,’ ‘individualization’ and their synonyms, imply
more that the science can sustain.
Because fingerprint impressions are known to be highly variable, examiners who
observe a high degree of correspondence between a latent print and known print may be
justified in making statements about the rarity of the shared features.
Experts as convenient helpers

[12.10.80] In the early case of R v Parker [1912] VLR 152 at 160, Cussen J referred as follows
to the role of fingerprint experts:
So far as they attempt to point out similarities, they are not, in one sense, speaking as
experts at all, but are merely pointing out to the jury matters which the jury could not
determine for themselves – they are simply convenient helpers of the court.
However, in R v Lawless [1974] VR 398 at 423, it was held that jurors are not to be
permitted to conduct an examination of fingerprints to form their own opinion as to
1112 [12.10.80]
whether they can pick out identifying features in order to be able to conclude whether the
fingerprints have the same provenance: see also S v Nala (1965) 4 SA 360 at 362. The jurors
cannot be invited themselves to act as experts. But jurors may examine the fingerprint
exhibits for the purpose of determining for themselves whether they are satisfied to the
necessary degree by the evidence of the experts: ‘the determination was for them, but the
provision of evidence was for the experts’: R v Lawless [1974] VR 398 at 423; see also R v
O’Callaghan [1976] VR 676 at 678; R v Tilley [1961] 1 WLR 1309; R v Harden [1963] 1 QB 8;
R v Weise [1969] VR 953 at 972; R v Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233 at 241; cf People v Jennings
96 NE 1077 at 1082–1083 (1911); see also [12.25.640]–[12.25.830] and [16.80].
Gibbs CJ, in Kozul v The Queen (1981) 147 CLR 221; [1981] HCA 19 at 227, held in the
comparable context of experiments with a revolver that: ‘When the experiments
conducted by a jury go beyond a mere examination and testing of the evidence, and
become a means of supplying new evidence, they become impermissible.’ To the same
effect, Mason J, in the same case (at 235–236), held that what is precluded is an:
inexpert jury substituting its views for the evidence of an expert … Juries must be free to
use in their deliberations the qualities of judgment and of common sense which they bring
into the jury room. They must not substitute what they may suppose to be their own
special knowledge in place of the expert evidence given in court; they must not substitute
mere speculation in place of the evidence they have heard and the inferences which may
be properly drawn from it.
(See also Hodge v Williams (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 489; Scott v Numurkah Corporation (1954) 91
CLR 300.)
Comparison points
[12.10.120] One of the leading modern cases on fingerprinting is that of R v Buisson [1990] 2
NZLR 542. A fingerprint found on a block of hashish was vital evidence for the Crown,
which called a fingerprint technician who explained how he was able to obtain one
photograph of the fingerprint before it started to melt under the heat of the lights that he
used. He explained that he found 12 characteristics or points identical with those of the
fingerprint impression taken from the defendant upon arrest. He said that in fact he could
see two or three more identical points, and he referred to a prominent scar on the finger
which appeared to be identical in both the photograph of the fingerprint on the hashish
block and the impression on the defendant’s fingerprint form.
Another witness gave evidence that there was no hard and fast rule about the number
of points or characteristics necessary to enable an expert to make a positive identification.
He maintained that it could be done with as few as seven or eight, or even fewer in special
circumstances. He said that 12 points had become accepted as a matter of practice in the
New Zealand Police Department’s Fingerprint Section as the minimum number to be put
forward.
The defence called two retired police officers. The first said that he could only see eight
discernible points of identity, but qualified this by indicating that he was picking out only
those that could be clearly demonstrated to laypersons. He said that trained fingerprint
experts had a considerable advantage in being able to see characteristics that were not
clearly defined. He also thought that the Crown expert’s view that the loop in the
photograph could be due to movement of the finger was not proven, and he regarded it as
conjecture.
He accepted that there was no ‘magic number’ of points required to form an opinion
about identity and that it was possible to reach a conclusion on fewer than 12 points, but
that an opinion should not be offered if there were fewer than six. He agreed that this
lower figure was an acceptable standard in some jurisdictions, and that the standard
varied from place to place. He accepted that the scar would have to be taken into account.
The other defence expert found seven points of identity and accepted as tenable the
explanation that the loop shown in the photograph could be due to a double impression
[12.10.120] 1113
or finger movement. He was adamant that anything fewer than 12 points of identity was
not acceptable as evidence for a court, but conceded that he had made many
identifications on eight or nine points to other police officers.
The court (consisting of Cooke P, Richardson, Somers, Casey and Bisson JJ) noted (at
546):
In the experience of most – if not all – judges, it is the practice for police experts to put
forward at least 12 points in common, and if a witness endeavoured to support identity on
less he or she might well be asked for an explanation. However, there is no rule that an
opinion based on a lesser number is inadmissible. No doubt a judge would reject such
evidence if the similarities on which it was based were so few or so unremarkable that
they could have no probative value in determining identity.
The court also noted the following views expressed by Campbell (1985, p 199):
An expert, faced with a scene of crime mark which corresponds in every one of the
required sequence of characteristics [16 in England 1] will say, without hesitation, that the
mark was made by the person who supplied the known sample. Where there are less than
the standard number, the expert will still hold a firm and reasonable belief that the marks
are of common authorship until there comes a point where the identification becomes
truly suspect. However, the only value such an incomplete identification can have is as a
pointer to those concerned with investigating the crime. The danger in treating incomplete
identifications as evidence is that certainty of fingerprint identification may be subject to
wholly unjustified attack. What number of points in agreement justify a ‘probable’ and
how many are required to suggest ‘highly probable’? What magic raises high probability
to certainty?
The Court of Appeal declined to stipulate that the jury should have been directed that
they could find identity to have been established only if they were satisfied that there were
12 points of identity or similarity. It referred with approval to the Manitoba case of R v
Nielsen (1984) 16 CCC (3d) 39 at 70, a footprint case, which permitted evidence to be
placed before the jury that it was ‘highly probable’ that the prints discovered at the scene
were identical to those of the defendant on the basis that ‘it no doubt added to the already
cogent body of evidence pointing to’ the defendant’s guilt.
Subjectivity
[12.10.160] The issue of the subjectivity in the interpretation of friction ridge analyses is
controversial. A risk is that the miners can too easily explain a ‘difference’ as an
‘acceptable distortion’ in order to justify an identification. The National Research Council
authors (2009, pp 137–138) observed that:
Many factors affect the quality and quantity of detail in the latent print and also introduce
variability in the resulting impression. The examiner must consider the following:
(1) Condition of the skin – natural ridge structure (robustness of the ridge structure),
consequences of aging, superficial damage to the skin, permanent scars, skin
diseases, and masking attempts.
(2) Type of residue – natural residue (sweat residue, oily residue, combinations of
sweat and oil); other types of residue (blood, paint, etc.); amount of residue
(heavy, medium, or light); and where the residue accumulates (top of the ridge,
both edges of the ridge, one edge of the ridge, or in the furrows).
(3) Mechanics of touch – underlying structures of the hands and feet (bone creates
areas of high pressure on the surface of the skin); flexibility of the ridges, furrows,
and creases; the distance adjacent ridges can be pushed together or pulled apart
1 Chayko, Gulliver and MacDougall (1991, p 456) commented that ‘it has been accepted by
the courts that ten or 12 points of comparison establish identity beyond all chance of
error’.
1114 [12.10.160]
during lateral movement; the distance the length of a ridge might be compressed
or stretched; the rotation of ridge systems during torsion; and the effect of ridge
flow on these factors.
(4) Nature of the surface touched – texture (rough or smooth), flexibility (rigid or
pliable), shape (flat or curved), condition (clean or dirty), and background colors
and patterns.
(5) Development technique – chemical signature of the technique and consistency of
the chemical signature across the impression.
(6) Capture technique – photograph (digital or film) or lifting material (e.g., tape or
gelatin lifter).
(7) Size of the latent print or the percentage of the surface that is available for
comparison.
The examiner also must perform an analysis of the known prints (taken from a suspect
or retrieved from a database of fingerprints), because many of the same factors that affect
the quality of the latent print can also affect the known prints.
This led them to contend:

The determination of an exclusion can be straightforward if the examiner finds detail in
the latent print that does not match the corresponding part of the known print, although
distortions or poor image quality can complicate this determination. But the criteria for
identification are much harder to define, because they depend on an examiner’s ability to
discern patterns (possibly complex) among myriad features and on the examiner’s
experience judging the discriminatory value in those patterns. The clarity of the prints
being compared is a major underlying factor. …
Errors can occur with any judgment-based method, especially when the factors that
lead to the ultimate judgment are not documented. Some in the latent print community
argue that the method itself, if followed correctly (i.e., by well-trained examiners properly
using the method), has a zero error rate. Clearly, this assertion is unrealistic, and,
moreover, it does not lead to a process of method improvement. The method, and the
performance of those who use it, are inextricably linked, and both involve multiple
sources of error (e.g., errors in executing the process steps, as well as errors in human
judgment).
(National Research Council (2009, pp 140, 143.)
Other authorities
[12.10.165] There have also been controversies about both the potential for the planting of
fingerprints and the potential for mistaken identifications. For instance, Scottish Police
Officer Shirley McKie was charged with perjury for giving testimony that a fingerprint
lifted from a door frame at a murder scene was not hers. Four fingerprint experts testified
that the print was hers, but two United States experts gave contrary testimony and she
was found not guilty: see United States v Plaza 188 F Supp 2d 549 at 558 (2002) at 558.
In R v Darren Walsh (unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, 29 March 1993), evidence
was given by a fingerprinting expert that certain identification could be made from the
latent print on the basis of eight characteristics that it shared with the accused man’s
finger. The evidence was admitted after a review of standards adopted in other Australian
jurisdictions, as well as in Canada and the United States, with the question being held to
be one of fact for the jury to determine whether such a contention was correct. O’Bryan J
added a caution that when a fingerprint expert is required to form his or her opinion on a
minimum of eight characteristics, it may be an appropriate safeguard to request the
prosecution to call an additional expert witness.
In Ghebrat v The Queen (2011) 214 A Crim R 140; [2011] VSCA 299, the trial judge’s
summing up of defence counsel’s submissions in respect of defects in the evidence given
by a police fingerprint expert about the process known as ACE-V (Analysis, Comparison,
Evaluation and Verification) was challenged. The Victorian Court of Appeal found fault
[12.10.165] 1115
with the trial judge’s summary, which suggested that a sufficient number of points of
similarity made it possible to say ‘with certainty’ that fingerprints came from the same
person.

[12.10.200] In R v Buckley [1999] EWCA Crim 1191, the Court of Appeal was required to
determine whether fingerprinting evidence had been correctly admitted by a trial judge. It
did so in the knowledge of a series of conflicting decisions. In R v Holt (unreported, High
Court, 5 November 1996), for instance, Mitchell J declined to permit evidence of 10 similar
ridge characteristics. In other cases, by contrast, evidence had been admitted where 12
similar characteristics had been identified. The court noted developments to that date in
fingerprinting science in the United Kingdom and noted that when the prosecution seeks
to rely on fingerprinting evidence, it will usually be necessary to consider two distinct
questions:
(1) a question of fact, namely, whether the control point from the accused has ridge
characteristics – and, if so, how many – similar to those of the print on the item
relied upon; and
(2) a question of expert opinion, namely, whether the print on the item relied on was
made by the accused.
The Court of Appeal held that according to the then state of knowledge of and expertise in
relation to fingerprints, if there are fewer than eight similar ridge characteristics, it was
highly unlikely that a judge would exercise his or her discretion to admit such evidence
and, save in wholly exceptional circumstances, the prosecution should not seek to adduce
such evidence. However, if there are eight or more similar ridge characteristics, a judge
may or may not exercise his or her discretion in favour of admitting the evidence. The
court stated that how the discretion is exercised should depend on all the circumstances of
the case, including in particular:
(1) the experience and expertise of the witness;
(2) the number of similar ridge characteristics;
(3) whether there are dissimilar characteristics;
(4) the size of the print relied on, in that the same number of similar ridge
characteristics may be more compelling in a fragment of the print than in an entire
print; and
(5) the quality and clarity of the print on the item relied on, which may involve, for
example, consideration of possible injury to the person who left the print, as well
as factors such as smearing or contamination.
The court emphasised that in every case where fingerprint evidence is admitted, it will
generally be necessary, as in relation to all expert evidence, for the judge to warn the jury
that it is evidence of opinion only, that the expert’s opinion is not conclusive, and that it is
for the jury to determine whether guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt in the light of
all the evidence.
Fabrication/Transposition of fingerprints
[12.10.240] In a 1976 article, the then supervisor of the Latent Fingerprint Section of the
FBI, Bonebreak (1976, p 4), maintained that ‘there has never been a known instance of a
person committing a crime and “planting” the fingerprints of an innocent party’.
However, he acknowledged that it is technically possible to fabricate a fingerprint using
liquid silicone, having commissioned one of his technicians to do exactly that. His
conclusion was that (1976, p 4):
1116 [12.10.200]
To make a latent fingerprint that would be susceptible to normal development, and of a

quality that would escape detection by a competent technician, would require very careful
work on the part of someone knowledgeable on fingerprint matters.
In relation to the possibility of transfer, he commented (1976, p 4):
By transfer we can mean several different things: eg, you can hand a common water glass
to an individual. And if he has a sufficient amount of perspiration or oil on the ridges of
his fingers that could be deposited on the drinking glass, then you can hold it up to a light
and easily see this deposit, this latent print on the drinking glass. It is possible, of course,
to take ordinary transparent lifting tape to lift this oil or perspiration from the glass and
take it to another object – your actual piece of evidence, a rear-view mirror, glass desk top,
or something like that, and carefully redeposit that oil or perspiration on that evidence.
The tape can then be taken off and the remaining oil or perspiration can be developed
using normal fingerprint powders, and you have what appears to be a legitimate latent
print on the actual piece of evidence. The latent print is usually somewhat faint and is not
a sharp clear print, but that is, as we all know, more characteristic of latent prints than the
sharp, well-defined prints that we see occasionally.
He continued (1976, p 5):
Another thing which we could mean by the ‘transfer of a latent print’ would be again by
giving a drinking glass to a person who would handle it, the latent print could be
developed on this glass with fingerprint powders, lifted with normal transparent lifting
tape, and then transferred to a piece of evidence. The whole tape and powdered latent
could be put on a piece of evidence, photographed on that piece of evidence, lifted and
marked as having come from the actual piece of evidence …
The third thing that could be meant by ‘transfer of latent prints’ is to merely develop
your latent print, again on the glass which the suspect may have handled, powder it, lift it
and place it on a suitable backing and merely label it as having come from the actual piece
of evidence. As long as the evidence is of the same nature as the water glass, eg, and it is
done skilfully by someone knowledgeable in fingerprint work, it is very unlikely that it
could be detected by any means now known to us.
(See R v Carr [1972] 1 NSWLR 608 at 611–612 for the issue of the legality of police covertly
obtaining fingerprints from a suspect.)
Australasia’s most notorious fingerprinting case is undoubtedly that of Mickelberg v The
Queen (1989) 167 CLR: see Lovell (1990); see also Mickelberg v The Queen (2004) 29 WAR 13;
[2004] WASCA 145. The majority of the High Court held that further evidence tendered
before the Western Australian Court of Criminal Appeal about the theoretically possible
fabrication of the alleged fingerprint would not have affected the outcome if it had been
placed before the jury in the trial. The fabrication alleged related to the application of a
latex or rubber mould moistened by human sweat onto a surface. The potential for
fabrication in fingerprinting cases remains controversial and will undoubtedly be the
subject of further decisions.
Clark (1994, p 54), however, related a case in the Victorian County Court in which
extensive evidence was given by both a prosecution expert and a defence expert about the
potential for fingerprints to be fabricated. In the course of the evidence, the prosecution
expert explained that there were three methods of forging fingerprints (Clark (1994, p 55)):
There can be a transferred fingerprint which is transferred from the actual exhibit or from
another means and placed on an exhibit by the means of, say, a piece of sticky tape. There
is stamped prints, by the making of a stamp or mould to transfer a fingerprint. And there
is moulded fingerprints.
Clark recounted that the expert gave evidence that there were two methods of transferring
fingerprints, one with the use of powder and the other simply by lifting a fingerprint in its
latent form and placing it somewhere else. However, the prosecution expert said that by
either method the transferred print tends to be extremely faint and that the use of an
adhesive medium deposited on the secondary surface in an unnatural sequence tends to
leave telltale residue and thus be easily detectable: R v Hilton, Transcript, 13 October 1994
[12.10.240] 1117
at p 212. Further evidence suggested that it is a simple matter to take an inked impression
of a fingerprint on a plain sheet of paper to a commercial stamp maker and to have a
rubber stamp made. However, once again there is a significant possibility for the
representation of ridge detail and sweat pores to be deficient.
The prosecution expert, a sergeant with 10 years’ experience in the Fingerprint Bureau
of the Victoria Police, gave evidence that a latex mould using actual fingerprints ‘is
usually exceptionally good in that they possess all the sweat pores and every detail that
you can find off a fingerprint and would, in my opinion, be very, very difficult to, to
actually say that that wasn’t a forgery’ (at p 211).
The defence expert, a former officer-in-charge of the Victorian Fingerprint Bureau, by
contrast maintained that a mould could be made without the need for access to the
suspect’s fingers: Transcript, 20 October 1994 at p 699. In this the prosecution expert had
agreed, saying that access to a copy of the person’s fingerprints would be sufficient:
Transcript, 13 October 1994, at p 214.
The defence expert gave evidence that the use of Vienna Foil, a substance made from
gelatine, could transfer prints without the presence of telltale signs such as are to be found
when cellotape has been used (at p 699). The defence expert also gave evidence that some
kinds of stamps could create sweat pore marks (at p 703).
Clark’s article falls into the category of the anecdotal, but the transcript of R v Hilton
raises a number of important issues which undoubtedly will be explored in future cases.
The evidence from the defence expert was inconsistent in significant respects with that of
the prosecution expert in relation to the ability of fingerprint experts to determine whether
a fingerprint has been forged. The case raises the spectre of transfers using Vienna Foil, the
use of stamps that may create sweat pore marks, and thus appear plausible, and the
creation of a mould of a print without the use of the person’s actual finger. All of these
constitute potential means of fabrication of fingerprints and, while requiring some
measure of sophistication, appear not to require the application of advanced technology.
United States case authority

[12.10.280] In the United States, it has been held that, in some instances, a scientific
technique’s validity and reliability may have attained such broad acceptance in the
scientific community that a court may take judicial notice of that acceptance. Examples
given were fingerprint identification, ballistics tests and certain blood tests: State v Kersting
623 P 2d 1095 (1981).
As in other jurisdictions, opinion evidence as to the correspondence of fingerprints so
as to prove a person’s identity is admissible: see 31 Am Jur 2d (para 279); Gianelli and
Imwinkelried (1993, p 479ff). Palm prints are also subject to comparison by experts for
identification purposes: United States v Moore 936 F 2d 1508 (7th Cr, 1991); State v Kuhl 175
P 190 (Wa 1918), as are footprints: United States v Ferri 778 F 2d 985 (3rd Cr, 1985). There is,
however, controversy over whether a person can be identified on the basis of wear
patterns in shoes (see Thiel v State 762 P 2d 478 (Alaska App 1988); State v Hasan 534 A 2d
877 (1987) (in favour); People v Ferguson 526 NE 2d 525 (1988) (against)); toe prints (see
Moenssens, Inbau and Starrs (1986, para 7.10)); or fingernail impressions (Commonwealth v
Graves 456 A 2d 561 (1983); State v Shaw 369 NW 2d 772 ). An expert opinion as to the time
that fingerprints were placed on a surface is generally inadmissible unless the witness has
conducted a control test to determine how long prints would remain on such a surface or
where it is shown that the expert is qualified in dating prints: Commonwealth v Crawford
364 A 2d 660 (Penn 1976). An exception is suggested where the question is phrased in
hypothetical terms: State v Cass 356 So 2d 396 (La 1978).
The FBI switched from relying on a mandatory minimum number of ‘Galton points’
(characteristics on the fingerprint ridges) in common before they can declare a match to no
1118 [12.10.280]
minimum in the late 1940s: see United States v Havvard 117 F Supp 2d 848 (2000), aff’d 260
F 3d 597 (2001). However, the FBI does employ a 12-point quality assurance process:
United States v Plaza 179 F Supp 2d 492 (2002).
While the admissibility of expert evidence on fingerprint identification is, as in
Australasia, largely unquestioned, there is some controversy as to the form in which such
opinions should be stated. It is standard for the witness to testify as to a belief or opinion
that the fingerprints or palm prints were or were not made by the same person, but there
is also some authority that a fingerprint expert may not categorically assert that the prints
or impressions were made by the same person: see, eg, State v Miller 440 P 2d 792 (1968).
Fingerprint experts have been permitted to express views on how prints have been
made on a certain surface: see, eg, on a window in People v Gordon 419 NE 2d 66 (1981).
For example, in Commonwealth v Medina 364 NE 2d 203 (1977), a fingerprint expert was
held, on appeal, to have been allowed properly to give his view that the direction and
position of fingerprints on a rifle were not consistent with its having been fired from an
inverted position, as contended by the defendant charged with his wife’s murder, as part
of his assertion that she had died by her own hand.
Similarly, fingerprinting experts have been permitted to express the view that an
absence of smudges and smears on a door was proper (People v Barber 452 NE 2d 725
(1983)) and that prints were impressed simultaneously or in one motion on bathroom
fixtures: State v Murphy 575 P 2d 448 (1978).
Gianelli and Imwinkelried (1993, p 518) argue that there are only two situations in
which there could be a serious challenge to the validity of fingerprinting technique in the
United States:
One situation would be a case in which a novel means of identification such as lip or
fingernail impressions is offered. The other case would be a situation in which a
computerized identification of a finger, palm or bare footprints is offered.
However, reliability evidence in respect of fingerprinting came under new scrutiny in the
United States in 2002 with conflicting decisions by Pollak J in what have become known as
Plaza I and Plaza II (United States v Plaza 179 F Supp 2d 492 (2002); United States v Pollak 188
F Supp 2d 549 (2002)). (See too Pyrek (2007).)
In Plaza I, objection was taken to the admissibility of fingerprinting evidence on the
basis of the indicia in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786
(1993) and reaffirmed in Kumho Tire Co Ltd v Carmichael 526 US 137; 119 S Ct 1167 (1999).
Pollak J defined the questions to be answered as:
(1) whether each individual has a unique set of fingerprints and, if so, whether these
unique fingerprints are permanent; and
(2) whether latent prints – fragments of fingerprints lifted from a surface touched by
an unidentified person – can accurately be matched to rolled prints – complete
fingerprints that are obtained from an identified person through established
fingerprinting procedures.
The United States Government asked the court to take judicial notice of the uniqueness
and permanence of friction ridges and friction ridge skin arrangements under r 201(b) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence 1975 (US).
Pollak J noted evidence that latent prints are often incomplete and distorted, the
procedure for comparison between rolled and latent prints utilising ‘ridgeology’ or
‘ACE-V’, an acronym for ‘analysis’, ‘comparison’, ‘evaluation’ and ‘verification’. He
applied the Daubert indicia and reached a number of troubled conclusions. He rejected the
proposition that a century of utilisation of fingerprinting meant that it was falsifiable and
found that fingerprint identification techniques had not been tested in a manner that could
properly be characterised as ‘scientific’, rather bearing many features of a subjective
[12.10.280] 1119
interpretation. He found that even those standing at the top of the fingerprint-
identification field tended to be skilled professionals who have learned their craft on the
job and without any concomitant advanced academic training. He thus repudiated the
proposition that they could be termed a ‘scientific community’ in the Daubert sense and
rejected the proposition that fingerprint identification is controlled by a clearly describable
set of standards to which most examiners subscribed. He found that the failure of
fingerprint identification fully to satisfy the first three Daubert factors militated against
heavy reliance upon the ‘general acceptance’ factor.
The result of Pollak J’s analysis was that ACE-V fingerprint identification did not
adequately meet the Daubert indicia on the basis that it did not satisfy the ‘scientific’
criterion of testing, the ‘scientific’ criterion of peer review, or the scientific rate of error, or
operate under uniformly accepted scientific standards. However, he declined to determine
the evidence to be inadmissible, instead taking judicial notice of the uniqueness and
permanence of fingerprints and permitting testimony for the prosecution by examiners to:
(1) describe how the rolled and latent fingerprints at issue were obtained;
(2) identify and place before the jury the fingerprints and such magnifications as
were required to show minute details; and
(3) point out observed similarities and differences between the prints.
This precluded the examiners from presenting evaluation testimony as to their opinion
that a particular latent print was in fact the print of a particular person. A similar
approach had been taken in respect of handwriting in United States v Hines 55 F Supp 2d
62 (1999); see also [12.15.320].
United States v Plaza 188 F Supp 2d 549 (2002) (Plaza II) revisited the issue upon
application by the government that Pollak J reconsider his ruling on the ground of
prosecution effectiveness. On this occasion, he received additional information about the
qualification of FBI fingerprint examiners – namely, that they must have a bachelor’s
degree, preferably as a science major, and then successfully complete a two-year in-house
training program culminating in a three-day certifying examination. He reaffirmed his
view that fingerprinting does not constitute a science in terms of being connected with
propositions that can be tested or verified by observation or experiment. He noted that
this meant that the forensic journals in which practitioners published could not therefore
be said to be ‘scientific journals’ in the Daubert sense, but rejected the proposition that
because they were not scientists, instead being possessed of technical or specialised
knowledge, their evidence should be discounted.
He reaffirmed his earlier decision that the Daubert testing criterion was not met. On the
issue of error rates, he concluded that the proficiency tests undertaken by FBI examiners
were ‘less demanding than they should be. To the extent that this is the case, it would
appear that the tests can be of little assistance in providing the test makers with a
discriminating measure of the relative competence of the test takers.’ However, he
concluded that there was no evidence before him that the error rate of certified FBI
fingerprint examiners was unacceptably high. He reviewed developments in the United
Kingdom in terms of the move to non-numerical identification and concluded, contrary to
his opinion in Plaza I, that the standards which control the opining of a competent
fingerprint examiner are sufficiently widely agreed upon to satisfy the requirements of
Daubert.
Having reviewed the applicability of the Daubert factors through the prism of the
Supreme Court decision in Kumho Tire Co Ltd v Carmichael 526 US 137; 119 S Ct 1167 (1999),
he concluded that the one factor which was both pertinent and unsatisfied was the first –
testing. He posed to himself the question whether in the absence of this indicium a court
should conclude that the ACE-V fingerprint identification system, as practised by certified
1120 [12.10.280]
FBI examiners, had too great a likelihood of producing erroneous results to be admissible.
He declined to determine that such evidence should be inadmissible pending research to
remedy the deficits on the basis that to do so would be to make the best the enemy of the
good. Although noting that unlike the United Kingdom system, which requires
verification by two examiners, the FBI system mandates only one verification, he
concluded that the FBI system of fingerprint analysis should be regarded as sufficiently
complying with the reliability requirements of Daubert and Kumho.
At first instance, a trial judge determined fingerprint evidence to be inadmissible
because of the failure to take bench notes. However, on appeal in State of New Hampshire v
Langill 157 NH 77, 945 A 2d 1 (NH 2008), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
overturned the decision, finding that while bench notes might have demonstrated that the
witness correctly applied the technology or refreshed her memory on the stand, they were
not necessary to determining whether she had applied the methodology correctly to the
facts of the case. In terms of the absence also of blind verification, it observed that the
fingerprint community is currently debating whether blind verification actually leads to
more accurate results and that while blind verification may ensure, with a higher level of
certainty, that an identification is correct, there was no proof that non-blind verification is
unreliable. It found the absence of such verification not to constitute a legitimate ground
for exclusion of evidence.
Sufficiency of expert fingerprinting evidence

[12.10.290] On some occasions, fingerprinting evidence constitutes the prosecution’s only
or most important evidence against the accused. It stands to common sense that if the
prosecution is unable to exclude the hypothesis that the accused may have had legitimate
access to a place where his or her print is found, that evidence will be of minimal
circumstantial value. The well-known decision of Borum v United States 380 F 2d 595 (DC
Cir 1967) illustrates the issue. In Borum, the accused’s fingerprints were discovered on a jar
that had contained a coin collection which had been the subject of a burglary and theft.
Evidence was given that fingerprints could stay on objects such as a jar indefinitely. On
appeal, the majority found that the accused ought not to have been convicted because the
prosecution had failed to show that the accused had had no access to the jar.
Similarly, if other unidentified fingerprints are found near the defendant’s and the
surrounding circumstances suggest a lone perpetrator of the criminal act, the fingerprint
evidence has been held in the United States to be insufficient to form the basis of a finding
of guilt against the accused: see Anthony v State 68 SE 2d 150 (1951).
Footprint evidence
[12.10.320] Footprint evidence has been admitted on a number of occasions by Canadian
courts: see, eg, R v Ferguson (2000) 142 CCC (3d) 353. On occasions, footprint evidence has
also been adduced in Australian courts. For instance, in R v Fernando [1999] NSWCCA 66,
the prosecution relied upon footprint evidence found in the hospital where the deceased
had been abducted, and prints near to the scene of a car, as well as footprints leading to
the site where the deceased had been attacked. Evidence was adduced that the size of an
impression taken was similar in length to the size of the shoes which the appellant
claimed he was wearing. The cast was taken from a barred shoe impression near the rugby
oval, and that impression was similar to impressions seen both inside and outside the
hospital building where the deceased had been working (at [12]–[14]). It was held, on
appeal, that the evidence of similarity was properly admitted.
[12.10.320] 1121
Barefoot impression evidence

[12.10.360] Controversies exist in relation to the reliability of barefoot impression evidence.
In R v Legere (1994) 95 CCC (3d) 139 (cf State v Jones 541 SE 2d 813 (2001)), such evidence
was admitted, but in R v Dimitrov (2003) 68 OR (3d) 641; 181 CCC (3d) 554 at [46], it was
held that such evidence must be carefully evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine
admissibility. It was held that it may be admissible where there are distinctive features of
the barefoot impression that can connect the footwear to the accused person’s feet, as in
Legere. It was suggested, too, that such evidence may be admissible to show that an
accused person has not worn a particular pair of shoes or to eliminate persons as regular
wearers of shoes. The fact, however, that an accused person’s footprint is similar to the
barefoot impression was held generally to be inadmissible as positive identification on the
basis that research had not yet reached a point to enable such reasoning to be regarded as
reliable. Such evidence is most likely for the present to be disallowed as more prejudicial
than probative (see, though, State v Bullard 322 Se 2d 370 (NC, 1984)).
Shoeprint impression evidence

[12.10.380] It is essential that any expert in relation to shoe impression evidence, or
footprint evidence, be an expert and refrain from speculation: R v Berry (2007) 17 VR 153;
[2007] VSCA 202 at [69]; R v Smart (2008) 182 A Crim R 490; [2008] VSC 79 at [28].
In Perish v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 90, a pair of boots which the suspect was
wearing was seized as part of a criminal investigation. A podiatrist concluded that they
had a tread pattern that was ‘very very similar’ to the boot print left in the premises that
had been robbed. His evidence was that there were no other wear marks of any other
wearer on the inner sole. A police forensic officer gave evidence that the boot print from
the appellant’s boots ‘shared the same class characteristics as to the size, shape, style and
pattern, although he accepted that it could not be excluded that the boot print could have
been made by another pair of boots of the same size and displaying the same class
characteristics’. The court observed at [33] that ‘the evidence about the similarity of the
boot prints was therefore important circumstantial evidence to be taken into account by
the jury’ (see too R v Cannell [2012] SADC 80).
Resemblance evidence
[12.10.387] There is an important distinction between evidence of resemblance and
evidence of identification: Murphy v The Queen (1994) 625 ASR 121 at 123–124; Festa v The
Queen (2001) 208 CLR 593; [2001] HCA 72 at [10]–[21]; Pitkin v The Queen (1995) 80 A Crim
R 302 at 304–305; R v Smith (No 5) (2011) 217 A Crim R 297; [2011] NSWSC 1459 at
[21]–[36]. Evidence relating to shoe and shoe impression evidence by podiatrists will
generally fall into this category, which is simply a form of circumstantial evidence.
Shoe evidence
[12.10.390] On occasions, evidence from podiatrists has been permitted arising from the
state of shoes. For instance, in R v Rose (1993) 69 A Crim R 1, the South Australian Court of
Criminal Appeal included evidence from two podiatrists about casts they had made of the
suspect’s feet. The podiatrists determined that the feet had some distinctively unusual
features. They also examined shoes worn by the suspect and two pairs of shoes that had
been found at the crime scene, concluding that the shoes at the crime scene could have
been worn by the suspect. The Court of Criminal Appeal observed (at 10) : ‘Podiatry is
something in the nature of a science which requires a course of study in order to obtain
knowledge of it.’
The trial judge gave the following instructions to the jury (at 10–11):
It is important to remember what the podiatrists purported to say. The Crown sought to
adduce Crown evidence from podiatrists, not on the subject matter of whether by
1122 [12.10.360]
reference to a comparison of the accused’s feet and wear marks in the shoes allegedly
found apparently dumped in a drain near the scene of these crimes, these were shoes that
had been worn by the accused, but on the limited subject matter of whether, by reference
to such a comparison, those shoes could have been worn by the accused.
The subject matter of the opinion evidence in question is not to be viewed as
identification evidence, or anything akin to fingerprint identification, but rather as
evidence of the characteristics and points of comparison said to be seen on both the feet
and shoes from which circumstantial evidence and inferences may ultimately be sought to
be drawn that there was a connection or a correspondence.
Bollen J (with whom the other members of the Court of Criminal Appeal agreed) observed
of the direction (at 11):
This is certainly in no way an overstatement. I think that the learned trial judge could
have left it to the jury as evidence much more strongly than he suggested. I think it was
some evidence connecting the accused with the crime. But it was left as a factor or one
point in the mass of circumstantial evidence capable of implicating the appellant.
In Parish v Western Australia [2008] WASCA 90, a podiatrist was permitted to give evidence
that the foot impression left in the boots matched the foot impression taken from the
suspect.
In Mainwaring v The Queen [2009] NSWCCA 207, two podiatrists gave evidence that
they had compared the wear patterns on shoes seized from the appellant, and another pair
of shoes, relevant to the charge he was facing. The effect of the evidence was that the
possibility that the appellant had been the wearer of those other shoes could not be
excluded. There was no challenge to the admissibility of that evidence.
In R v N, GF and N, SG (No 2) [2010] SASC 8, two pairs of shoes which were said to
have been discarded by the two accused (who were charged with murder) were subjected
to forensic examination by a podiatry expert. The podiatrist concluded that one pair of
shoes could not be excluded as having been worn by one of the accused, while the other
pair of shoes could not be excluded as having been worn by the other accused. The trial
judge, over objection, admitted the evidence. N, GF was convicted, while N, SG was
acquitted. N, GF’s appeal against conviction was dismissed: R v Newman [2011] SASCFC
36.
In R v Smith (No 5) (2011) 217 A Crim R 297; [2011] NSWSC 1459, Buddin J reviewed
the authorities in the context of a challenge to evidence proposed to be adduced by the
prosecution from a podiatrist who examined footwear belonging to the accused which had
been seized from him after his arrest. The podiatrist had compared the footwear with
shoes located a short distance from where the murdered deceased was found. The
evidence was said by the prosecutor not to be leading, as identification evidence or akin to
fingerprint identification evidence, but as evidence of the characteristics and points of
comparison between the crime scene shoes and those seized from the accused. Objection
to the evidence was taken under ss 135 and 137 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). Buddin J
accepted that the podiatrist’s evidence was ‘open to challenge. Indeed, it may very well be
that the jury would be disposed … not to accept it. However, as the authorities make clear,
that determination remains the province of the tribunal of fact even if, as counsel for the
accused contended, it has “only minimal probative value”.’ He rejected the objections
made to the admissibility of the evidence.
Biometric identification evidence

[12.10.400] A variety of forms of biometric identification evidence has been available for
some time: see Olsen v Identix Australia Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 157; Davies (1995);
Crompton (2002). However, authority on its admissibility in the courts has yet to be
generated.
[12.10.400] 1123
Assessing fingerprint and associated evidence

[12.10.440] The reliability of prosecution evidence as to fingerprinting, footprint and foot
impression evidence can be very difficult for the defence to evaluate. Copies of the actual
prints are often not readily made available until at least a committal, leaving only
fingerprint examiner statements. It is essential for the defence to obtain, via subpoena or
otherwise, documentation of the prints which have been examined from the crime scene
and those taken from the accused person (see de Villiers (2014)). If feasible, these should
then be submitted to an independent fingerprint examiner. In many jurisdictions, there are
limited options in this regard and most such experts are former police officers who have
worked in the relevant section of the relevant police force. In addition, there are relatively
few forensic podiatrists.
However, the assistance of experts is indispensable to effective cross-examination of
prosecution witnesses called in relation to fingerprint and associated forms of identification
or correlation (see National Research Council (2009); President’s Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology (2016); Thompson et al (2017)).
The principal focuses of cross-examination of experts on fingerprints and associated
areas should be:
• the potential for the crime scene prints to have been left at a time other than when the
crime was committed, either before or after;
• the possibility that the crime scene prints are not in a good enough condition to enable
definitive identification with those of the accused;
• the potential for there to be doubt about whether there are sufficient points of
identification between the crime scene prints and those of the accused;
• the potential for there to be a point or points of dissimilarity between the crime scene
prints and those of the accused;
• whether the null hypothesis has been applied in the fingerprint examiner’s
methodology;
• whether there has been proper adherence to standard protocols by crime scene
examiners;
• whether the training of the fingerprint examiner is sufficient to enable the examiner to
be accounted an expert in respect of the particular testing or examination that he or she
undertook;
• the scope for subjective evaluation to have intruded into the identification or exclusion;
• whether there has been blind verification of results;
• whether there has been sufficient and orthodox documentation of results; and
• whether there is a possibility that the crime scene prints could have been ‘planted’ or
‘transposed’.
1124 [12.10.440]
Chapter 12.15
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS EVIDENCE

Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [12.15.01]
Area of expertise ................................................................................................................... [12.15.40]
Presentation of evidence ...................................................................................................... [12.15.80]
Disputed evidence ................................................................................................................. [12.15.120]
The control document .......................................................................................................... [12.15.160]
Basis of evidence ................................................................................................................... [12.15.200]
Availability of disputed document for jury ..................................................................... [12.15.240]
Judicial warnings ................................................................................................................... [12.15.280]
United States post-Daubert developments ........................................................................ [12.15.320]
‘There is something in common between these hands. They
belong to men who are blood relatives. It may be most
obvious to you in the Greek e’s, but to me there are many
small points which indicate the same thing. I have no doubt
at all that a family mannerism can be traced in these two
specimens of writing. I am only, of course, giving you the
leading results of my examination of the papers. There were
twenty-three other deductions which would be of more
interest to experts than to you.’
Sherlock Holmes speaking to Mr Acton in “The Reigate Squires”, The Memoirs
of Sherlock Holmes, 1892.
Introduction
[12.15.01] The technical aspects of document examination are discussed in Ch 95 of the
subscription service. A small body of case law exists in relation to the admissibility and
weight properly to be extended to expert evidence concerning handwriting and the
identification of the authorship of documents. The purpose of this chapter is to draw
attention to some pertinent legal decisions.
Area of expertise
[12.15.40] Document analysis evidence is a long-recognised form of expert opinion
evidence (see Allen (2015); Lewis (2014); Koppenhaver (2007)). It is significantly broader
than handwriting identification (see Harralson and Miller (2017)) but an area of scientific
evidence that needs to be the subject of close attention from cross-examiners (Hilton
(1954); Moore (1958)).
In R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45; 15 A Crim R 364 at 48, King CJ was emphatic about
the status of handwriting evidence:
There could be no question in the present case as to whether the subject matter was proper
for expert testimony. Comparison of handwriting and identification of signatures is a
well-established field for expert testimony. Although there is no course of formal study in
the subject, the qualifications of the witness acquired by informal study, practical
instruction and experience are considerable.
The practical existence of experience in handwriting analysis is generally the focus of

query when a document examiner’s expertise is the subject of challenge.
However, in R v Meads [1996] Crim L Rev 519, objection was made to tests conducted
by experts purporting to show the speed at which the handwritten notes of disputed
interviews had been made and suggesting that they could not have been made in the time
claimed by the officers. The prosecution submitted that the evidence should not be
permitted on the basis that there was no sufficiently organised body of knowledge or
experience, relatively few tests having been undertaken. The English Court of Appeal
disagreed, holding that the evidence was admissible, provided that it was confined to
evidence of tests undertaken by the two experts and the results derived from them. The
[12.15.40] 1125
court applied R v Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45; 15 A Crim R 364. It held that the evidence
was not opinion evidence any more than the evidence of a police officer who gave
evidence of the timing of a journey in order to test an alibi.
Presentation of evidence
[12.15.80] The evidence of handwriting experts/document analysts generally is supported
by enlargements of the disputed writing, enabling analysis of the formation of particular
letters in a disputed document against similar letters in an undisputed control document:
see, eg, R v Devenish [1969] VR 737. Such facilitation of comparison, standard among the
forensic identification areas of expertise, is rarely challenged.
Disputed evidence
[12.15.120] However, there have been a few occasions where not only has the evidence been
challenged but diametrically opposed views have been given by the experts called by the
two sides. In Gawne v Gawne [1979] 2 NSWLR 449 at 455, for example, Glass JA
commented that ‘the confidence of the defendant’s expert that the signatures are forged is
equalled by the conviction of the plaintiff’s expert that they are genuine’.
It is significant that the documentation in such cases is tabled before the jury, where
there is one, for its members to make up their own minds (see R v Smit (1952) 3 SA 447),
and the common sense usually shown in this area of expertise was exhibited in Gawne’s
case with Glass JA being prepared to comment on the similarity of the writings from his
own analysis. In fact, evidence has been received from a person not qualified in any way
as a handwriting expert that certain handwriting is the writing of a named person: R v
Wright [1980] VR 593 at 596–597; Lewis v Sapio (1827) Mood & M 39; 173 ER 1073;
Harrington v Fry (1824) 1 C & P 289; 171 ER 1199; Doe d Mudd v Suckermore (1837) 5 Ad &
El 703; 111 ER 1331.
The control document

[12.15.160] The reception in evidence of a control document written by the accused person,
to cast doubt on whether he or she wrote another document, was not permissible at
common law: Doe d Perry v Newton (1836) 5 Ad & E 514; 111 ER 260; Hughes v Rogers (1841)
8 M & W 123; 151 ER 975; Doe d Devine v Wilson (1855) 10 Moo PCC 502 at 530; 14 ER 581
at 592; Doe d Mudd v Suckermore (1837) 5 Ad & El 703; 111 ER 1331 per Coleridge and
Patterson JJ, contra Lord Denman CJ and Williams J; R v Adami (1959) 108 CLR 605 at 616.
This was changed by s 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (UK), which provided:
Comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the Judge
to be genuine shall be permitted to be made by witnesses and such writings the evidence
of the witnesses respecting the same, may be submitted to the Court and the jury as
evidence of the genuineness or otherwise of the writing in dispute.
Similar provisions were enacted in the Australian jurisdictions: see, eg, Evidence Act 1958
(Vic), s 148; Evidence Act 1929 (SA), s 30.
In R v Adami (1959) 108 CLR 605 at 616, the High Court, in a joint judgment, held that
under s 30 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA), writing not otherwise relevant to any issue could
be received in evidence in criminal proceedings in order to constitute a standard against
which a document in dispute could be compared. It was held (at 616–617) to be necessary
that ‘the writing to be used as a standard shall be properly proved to the satisfaction of the
judge to be the handwriting of the party concerned’.
In R v Browne-Kerr [1990] VR 78, the documents in question were those alleged to have
been forged by the appellant and were the subject of the 57 counts against him. An expert
witness was called to express his views on the authorship of the documents in respect of
which the appellant was charged, as against those in an exhibit which were claimed to
1126 [12.15.80]
Document analysis evidence | CH 12.15
have been written by the appellant. On appeal it was held necessary that the trial judge be
satisfied that the control exhibit was genuine – that it was in the handwriting of the
defendant: see, too, R v Hannes (2000) 158 FLR 359; [2000] NSWCCA 503; R v Knight (2001)
160 FLR 465; [2001] NSWCCA 114.
However, most of the submissions by counsel focused on the standard of satisfaction
that had to be reached by the trial judge. The issue was one of conflicting authority, as the
Court of Appeal in R v Ewing [1983] QB 1039 had refused to follow an earlier decision of
the same court in R v Angeli [1979] 1 WLR 26, which had held that the appropriate
standard was proof on the balance of probabilities. In the 1983 decision of R v Ewing, the
court had decided that in civil cases the standard should be the balance of probabilities
and in criminal cases the standard should be beyond reasonable doubt.
Following the High Court decision in Wendo v The Queen (1963) 109 CLR 559, the
Victorian Full Supreme Court in R v Browne-Kerr [1990] VR 78 pointed to the distinction
between the admissibility of evidence and the probative value necessary to be considered
by the jury when determining the ultimate issue of fact in the case. The court held (at 85):
It was necessary before that document could be admitted in evidence, and before the
expert witness could rely on it as a standard against which to compare the document in
dispute, for the trial judge to be satisfied that it was in the writing of the applicant.
Furthermore … the standard of satisfaction was … on the balance of probabilities. On the
judge’s being so satisfied, but not until he was, the document was able to be admitted in
evidence and relied upon as a standard. It was then that the standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt had to be applied by the jury.
It is open to the side disputing the authorship of the questioned document to contest in a
voire dire the authorship of the control document. The accused person may be called by
the prosecution to give sworn evidence about the circumstances of the making of the
document. The decision of the applicant about whether he or she stands mute or gives
sworn or unsworn evidence at this juncture does not affect subsequent rights in relation to
the kind of evidence to be given or not given later in proceedings on behalf of the defence:
R v Browne-Kerr [1990] VR 78 at 86–87. The decision as to the genuineness of the document
is that of the judge alone, and if the proof of its authorship is by witnesses, ‘he must
decide on their credibility. If counter-evidence is offered, he must receive it before he
decides; he has no right to ask the opinion of the jury on the fact as a condition precedent’.
(See Doe v Davies (1847) 10 QB 314; 116 ER 122.)
Basis of evidence
[12.15.200] An important expression of judicial views on the need for availability of the
bases of an expert’s opinion was advanced by McClelland J in the handwriting case of Bell
v FS & U Industrial Benefit Society Ltd (unreported, NSW Supreme Court, 9 September
1987):
As a general rule it is highly desirable when opinion evidence is relied upon that there
should be put before the court, so far as is practicable, evidence of the facts upon which
the opinion has been formed, including where observations of physical phenomena are
relied on, evidence of what in fact was observed. The absence of evidence of such facts
deprives the court of an important opportunity of testing the validity of the process by
which the opinion was formed, and substantially reduces the value and cogency of the
opinion evidence. In the particular case of document examination where reliance is placed
on particular physical features of handwriting or typing, or of a comparison of such
features as between two or more different documents, it is of basic importance, first, that
the relevant specific features relied upon be identified, and second, that evidence be
provided of the actual observation or existence of those specific features. In this latter
regard it is often feasible and convenient to adduce in evidence enlarged photographs of
the specific features relied upon.
[12.15.200] 1127
Availability of disputed document for jury

[12.15.240] It is unclear whether the disputed document must always be available to be
submitted to the jury for purposes of comparison with the genuine writing: see R v
Devenish [1969] VR 737 at 740 per Winneke CJ, Gowans and Gillard JJ; see also R v Adami
(1959) 108 CLR 605 at 616. The comparison may be undertaken even without the
assistance of expert evidence: Adami v The Queen (1959) 108 CLR 605; Grayden v The Queen
[1989] WAR 208; R v Knight (2001) 120 A Crim R 381; [2001] NSWCCA 114; Jeans v Cleary
[2006] NSWSC 647; R v Burns (2001) 123 A Crim R 226; [2001] SASC 263; R v Doney (2001)
126 A Crim R 271; [2001] NSWCCA 463.
Procedural fairness is the key factor. In R v Devenish [1969] VR 737, the defendant had
been charged with dishonesty offences and the Crown at committal had alleged that the
defendant had raised a false receipt signed in the name of a fictitious person. This receipt,
together with an important letter written by the defendant to his wife, were mislaid by the
Crown before presentment. During the trial, the Crown gave notice to the defendant and
later sought to adduce as additional evidence secondary evidence (being photo
enlargements of the contents of the alleged false receipt) and then expert opinion evidence
from a police handwriting expert who had compared both documents.
The Full Supreme Court on appeal held, first, that reasonable notice of intention to
adduce additional evidence against an accused person had to be given (see also R v Brown
(1869) WW & A’B (L) 239; 1 AJR (NC) 59) and, second, that the absence of the false receipt
made it impossible for the defendant to procure contrary evidence and thus deprived the
jury of an opportunity of examining the document itself. It was held (at 741–742) that the
probative value of the evidence, therefore, was far outweighed by its prejudicial effect and
so had been wrongly admitted: see Ch 4.0.
For a clear example of the Canadian courts’ view of the legitimacy of juries’
comparison of handwriting, even without expert assistance, see R v Abdi (1997) 116 CCC
(3d) 385.
Judicial warnings
[12.15.280] In Medina v The Queen (1990) 3 WAR 21, the Western Australian Court of Appeal
held that although a trial judge can give a warning to the jury in respect of the process of
comparing handwriting, in the absence of expert testimony, a warning is not mandatory.
Thus, handwriting evidence was not regarded as falling into the particularly dangerous
forms of evidence, such as eyewitness identification evidence or uncorroborated evidence,
that always require a judicial warning.
As noted above, common sense has traditionally attached to the role of the expert in
the handwriting area. A conclusion regarding the similarity of one document to another
can be essayed by the uninitiated as well as the expert. It goes without saying that there
are real dangers in the inexpert forming their own unaided views about the similarity in
authorship of two documents. However, it remains the responsibility of the triers of fact to
form their own conclusions about the authorship of documents when that is a matter in
dispute. It remains their responsibility whether or not expert evidence is given. Moreover,
it is not proper for them to defer unquestioningly to the conclusions expressed by the
expert. For this reason, it is usual for judges to issue a warning to jurors. Somewhat
surprisingly, in a 1984 New South Wales case (R v Leroy [1984] 2 NSWLR 441), the
suggestion from the trial judge that ‘whilst it is a matter for you, I caution you to be
guided by the handwriting expert’ was held to be acceptable.
1128 [12.15.240]
Document analysis evidence | CH 12.15
United States post-Daubert developments

[12.15.320] A result of the United States Supreme Court decision in Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc 509 US 579; 113 S Ct 2786 (1993) has been an increased preoccupation
with scientific methodology in relation to matters such as handwriting analysis (see Pyrek
(2007); Zlotnick and Lin (2001)).
In United States v Hines 55 F Supp 2d 62 (1999), Gertner J was called upon to evaluate
the status of handwriting evidence in the aftermath of Daubert. He divided the evidence
from an FBI document examiner into two kinds: testimony with respect to similarities
between the known handwriting of the accused and a robbery note, and testimony with
respect to the author of the note, namely that the author of the note was the accused. He
classified the evidence of the expert as essentially that of an observational expert, a
taxonomist. He concluded that the expert could testify to the ways in which she had
found his writing similar to, or dissimilar from, the handwriting of the robbery note but
declined to permit the second category of her evidence. He found that there were no data
suggesting that handwriting analysts could say that a person definitively was the author
of a document (compare DNA profiling). He found that there were no ‘meaningful and
accepted validity studies in the field’, nor was there an academic field known as
‘handwriting analysis’. Rather, he found that it was a field with little efficacy outside the
courtroom:
[T]here are no peer reviews of it. Nor can one compare the opinion reached by an
examiner with a standard protocol subject to validity testing, since there are no recognised
standards. There is no agreement as to how many similarities it takes to declare a match,
or how many differences it takes to rule it out.
This resulted in his permitting evidence as to similarities and dissimilarities but not as to
the ultimate conclusion about the identity of the author (cf United States v Plaza 179 F Supp
2d 492 (2002) in relation to fingerprinting).
[12.15.320] 1129
Chapter 12.20
DNA EVIDENCE
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [12.20.01]
DNA technology .................................................................................................................... [12.20.20]
Applications of DNA profiling ........................................................................................... [12.20.40]
Presentation of DNA evidence ........................................................................................... [12.20.80]
The prosecutor’s fallacy ....................................................................................................... [12.20.90]
Limitations of DNA profiling
No panacea ............................................................................................................................. [12.20.120]
Transfer risks .......................................................................................................................... [12.20.125]
Proof of DNA matching ....................................................................................................... [12.20.130]
Jury directions ........................................................................................................................ [12.20.140]
Age and state of samples ..................................................................................................... [12.20.160]
Potential for error .................................................................................................................. [12.20.180]
Contamination and degradation ........................................................................................ [12.20.200]
Sources of potential error .................................................................................................... [12.20.213]
‘Pull up’ ................................................................................................................................... [12.20.213A]
‘Stutter’ .................................................................................................................................... [12.20.213B]
‘Drop out’ ............................................................................................................................... [12.20.213C]
‘Stochastic effect’ .................................................................................................................... [12.20.213D]
Illegality/Impropriety of procurement ............................................................................. [12.20.215]
Statistical interpretation ....................................................................................................... [12.20.220]
Mitochondrial DNA evidence ............................................................................................. [12.20.230]
Low template DNA .............................................................................................................. [12.20.240]
Mixed-profile DNA evidence .............................................................................................. [12.20.248]
Paternity index evidence: R v GK and R v JCG
R v GK ..................................................................................................................................... [12.20.275]
R v JCG .................................................................................................................................... [12.20.280]
Appropriate witnesses in DNA cases ................................................................................ [12.20.290]
The future for the admissibility of DNA profiling evidence ........................................ [12.20.300]
Guidance for DNA cross-examiners .................................................................................. [12.20.330]
Summary of methodology problems highlighted by decisions ................................... [12.20.370]
Key historical cases from Australia and Britain
Admissibility, weight, databases and useful protocols
R v Karger ................................................................................................................................ [12.20.460]
R v McIntyre ........................................................................................................................... [12.20.470]
R v Pantoja .............................................................................................................................. [12.20.480]
R v Milat .................................................................................................................................. [12.20.490]
R v Guingab ............................................................................................................................. [12.20.495]
Important historical case law internationally .................................................................. [12.20.550]
United States case law
General admission of evidence ........................................................................................... [12.20.580]
An early setback .................................................................................................................... [12.20.590]
Discrepancies between forensic report and laboratory findings .................................. [12.20.600]
Deficient laboratory records ................................................................................................ [12.20.610]
The use of controls ................................................................................................................ [12.20.620]
Identification and matching of bands ............................................................................... [12.20.630]
The impact of degradation of DNA samples ................................................................... [12.20.640]
The impact of probe contamination ................................................................................... [12.20.650]
Calculation of matching probabilities ............................................................................... [12.20.660]
Post-Castro case law in the United States ......................................................................... [12.20.670]
Canadian case law ................................................................................................................ [12.20.690]
English case law
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ [12.20.720]
R v Gordon ............................................................................................................................... [12.20.730]
1131
New Zealand case law ......................................................................................................... [12.20.780]

Australian case law ............................................................................................................... [12.20.800]
The early setbacks: Tran, Lucas and Green
R v Tran ................................................................................................................................... [12.20.820]
R v Lucas ................................................................................................................................. [12.20.830]
R v Green ................................................................................................................................. [12.20.840]
The second phase: Jarrett, Pantoja, Milat and Humphrey ................................................ [12.20.850]
R v Jarrett ................................................................................................................................ [12.20.860]
R v Humphrey ......................................................................................................................... [12.20.870]
The third phase: from Karger and McIntyre to Juric and Joyce ...................................... [12.20.880]
R v Juric and R v Joyce .......................................................................................................... [12.20.890]
‘Prosecutors and defence counsel should not oversell DNA

evidence. Presentations that suggest to a judge or jury that
DNA typing is infallible are rarely justified and should be
avoided.’
National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, DNA
Technology in Forensic Science (National Academy Press, 1992).
Introduction
[12.20.01] The aim of this chapter is to link scientific information about DNA evidence to
the appropriate exercise of the lawyer’s duty to probe scientific developments so that an
informed decision can be made as to whether to challenge admissibility or to question the
probative value of particular results of testing. It discusses the grounds upon which
challenges have been made to the admissibility and weight of DNA evidence, refers to
legal literature that has expressed concerns about the reliability of DNA evidence, and
comments upon the likely fate of future opinion evidence utilising DNA technology. Key
court decisions that are pertinent to current practice are followed by a review of historical
decisions by the courts in relation to DNA testing, which commenced in the mid-1980s.
A checklist is provided of areas upon which cross-examination might usefully focus:
see [12.20.330] below. Such a task can only be performed with up-to-date information. The
laboratory and statistical processes of DNA analysis are explained at length in
subscription service Ch 80 and Ch 80A. Inevitably, therefore, there is reliance upon
secondary sources. Those using this chapter to prepare cross-examination would be well
advised to discuss strategies with up-to-date practising forensic scientists in the DNA
field.
DNA technology
[12.20.20] This chapter does not purport to summarise the state of the art in DNA testing
technology. However, the following brief observations are made as to the various forms of
analysis and tools that are employed by forensic laboratories.
It is important to note that forensic DNA technology has undergone serial generational
change since the 1980s. DNA profiling was proposed by Sir Alec Jeffreys in 1984 as a
means of differentiating between suspects, determining whether a serial offender is
responsible for multiple crimes and evaluating the similarity between a crime scene
sample and a suspect’s DNA. However, multiple different techniques and refinements
have taken place since the results of DNA testing were first introduced into the courts a
few years later (see Arnaud (2017)).
DNA is composed of four chemical constituents (labelled A, T, C and G) known as
bases. There are two strands in DNA which run in opposite directions forming a twisted
ladder, the A pairing with the T and the G with the C. When strands separate, each can act
as a template to reproduce the other and the linear sequence of bases can act as a code,
governing biological functions. Each cell in the human body contains 6,500,000,000 pairs
of bases, the full complement known as the genome that is packaged into 23 different pairs
of chromosomes, half of a child’s DNA coming from the father and half from the mother.
1132 [12.20.01]
DNA evidence | CH 12.20
Forensic DNA testing utilises sections of the DNA that are variable from one individual
to another, with the part of the DNA examined known as the locus. This is a unique site
along the DNA of a chromosome characterised by a particular sequence of bases (see
Royal Society and Royal Society of Edinburgh (2017); National Institute of Justice (2019)).
An important development was the discovery by Dr Kary Mullis in 1985 of a capacity
to copy DNA (see Templeton (1992)). The copying process, known as polymerase chain
reaction (PCR), employs an enzyme polymerase to replicate DNA regions in a test tube. It
enables a very small number of DNA molecules to replicate up to billions of times within
a short time frame. This liberates DNA testing from the requirement of restriction
fragment length polymorphism (RFLP) testing (which scrutinises the presence of
fragments of different lengths after digestion of the DNA samples in question with specific
restriction endonucleases) that there be a substantial quantum of visible DNA material
and also allows testing on degraded DNA material. However, initially especially, it raised
risks in relation to contamination and required great care in identifying, collecting and
preserving DNA evidence.
Currently, there are three main forms of DNA testing.
The first is short tandem repeat (STR) analysis, which evaluates specific regions (loci)
found on nuclear DNA (see Royal Society and Royal Society of Edinburgh (2017); R v
Karger (2001) 83 SASR 1; [2001] SASC 64). The variable (polymorphic) nature of the STR
regions analysed for forensic testing enables a high level of discrimination, with usage of
multiple loci testing having the potential to reduce the likelihood of the same DNA profile
coming from two individuals being in the order of 1 million to one.
The second is Y-chromosome analysis, which targets only the male fraction of a
biological sample (see Royal Society and Royal Society of Edinburgh (2017, 2.2)). This can
be of particular forensic application if there are multiple male contributors to a sample:
‘Because the Y chromosome is transmitted directly from a father to all of his sons, it can
also be used to trace family relationships among males. Advancements in Y-chromosome
testing may eventually eliminate the need for laboratories to extract and separate semen
and vaginal cells (for example, from a vaginal swab of a rape kit) prior to analysis’
(National Institute of Justice (2019)).
The third is mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) analysis, which allows DNA profiles to be
developed from samples that may not be suitable for RFLP or STR analysis. mtDNA
technology analyses DNA found not in the nuclear part of the cell but in the
mitochondrion, a membrane-bound organelle found in the cytoplasm of eukaryotic cells.
Old remains and samples lacking nucleated cells – such as hair shafts, bones and teeth –
may not be able to be tested by STR and RFLP techniques, but mtDNA analysis may yield
results. For this reason, mtDNA testing can be valuable for the investigation of older cases
and ones where the sample has been damaged or degraded (see Melton, Holland and
Holland (2012)).
A further and developing aspect of DNA technology, which is likely to present
admissibility issues in the short term, is rapid DNA technology (see, eg, Buscaino et al
(2018)), which as of early 2019 is commencing to be used for criminal investigative
purposes in parts of the United States (Glowicki (2019)). However, whether it is ready to
be used in court is doubtful as yet.
Applications of DNA analysis

[12.20.40] DNA contains the chemically encoded genetic information that determines each
individual’s physical characteristics. There are a number of features of the DNA molecule
that are ideally suited to forensic work (Kiely (2006); Chayko, Gulliver and MacDougall
(1991, pp 304–305); Evett and Foreman (2000)):
(a) with the exception of monozygotic (identical) twins, the DNA of each individual
is unique;
(b) for a given individual, the DNA of each cell is identical and, in the absence of
rearrangement or mutation, remains constant over the individual’s lifespan;
[12.20.40] 1133
(c) DNA is found in a variety of biological specimens, including blood, semen, saliva,
hair follicles, skin and virtually any bodily tissue, fluid or secretion which
contains nucleated cells (ie, not mature red blood cells);
(d) DNA is a very stable molecule which can remain virtually unaltered for many
years, despite environmental insult; and
(e) DNA analysis can be conducted on very small biological specimens, containing in
the order of several thousand cells or less.
DNA is a relatively stable substance. It exists for many years. Every human sheds DNA (at
various rates). It can be deposited or transferred by primary means, such as by a person to
a person or object, and secondary means, such as by a person to a person or object, and
then to another person or object: Director of Public Prosecutions v Paulino (2017) 54 VR 109;
[2017] VSCA 38 at [55] per Priest JA.
Whenever an assailant is injured or leaves any form of body sample at the scene of a
crime (such as hairs, torn nails, saliva etc), the DNA profile has the potential to identify
the person from her or his own deposit of biological evidence. Similarly, traces of the
victim on the assailant’s clothing may provide extremely probative evidence. Scientists
also have the potential to identify victims of anonymous crimes, such as hit-and-run
accidents. They may even have some chance of matching the victim’s DNA with DNA
recovered from blood or tissue found on a suspect’s car. DNA profiling is useful in
providing investigators with evidence of whether the same assailant is responsible for a
series of crimes. This is particularly so in the case of serial rapes where it is suspected that
there is a single offender: see Gill and Werrett (1987, p 145).
As DNA frequently maintains a useful degree of integrity in dried specimens for
extended periods, the DNA profile can be used to re-evaluate old evidence that has not
yielded determinative or even useful evidence using other techniques.
Government agencies in the United States estimate that up to 1.5 million people are
reported missing each year, a significant percentage of these for extended periods. In
addition, many unidentified dead children are buried each year. Dental (see subscription
service Ch 34) and X-ray (see subscription service Ch 35) records may not yield sufficient
information to ascertain identity. The DNA profile allows scientists to compare DNA
patterns of unidentified people with those of their parents and to determine their identity
more definitively. This process has also assisted in identifying the remains of soldiers
missing in action in arenas of conflict (eg, corpses in the Gulf War: see Eisenberg and
Chimera (1991, p 183)), as well as following natural disasters such as the Asian Tsunami of
2005: see Freckelton and Ranson (2006).
In a number of contexts, paternity is an issue of legal concern: see Ellison v Karnchanit
(2012) 48 Fam LR 33; [2012] FamCA 602; Farnell v Penhalluriack (No 2) [2008] VSC 214;
subscription service Ch 82; see also Simons (1990); National Research Council (1992, Ch 3).
These contexts range from the payment of social security benefits to issues of inheritance.
DNA technology is capable of resolving the uncertainty about a child’s paternity
prenatally. It has been used in Argentina to reunite families with children abducted during
the military dictatorship of the 1970s. It is also of major significance to sexual assault
victims, women with multiple sexual partners, and men concerned about their children’s
paternity. DNA profiling has been included as a parentage test that can be ordered by the
Australian Family Court under s 69W of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth); see, eg, Re H v A
(Children) (Paternity: Blood Tests) [2002] 1 FLR 1145; TNL and CYT (2005) 33 Fam LR 167;
[2005] FamCA 77; OP v HM (2002) 168 FLR 465; [2002] FamCA 454; see subscription
service at [82.80].
DNA testing has been employed for many years to screen immigrants requesting rights
of residence on the basis of their familial relationship to a current British citizen: see
Jeffreys, Brookfield and Semeonoff (1986, p 290).
1134 [12.20.40]
Presentation of DNA evidence

[12.20.80] One of the greatest challenges facing both the prosecution and defence in DNA
cases is to elicit evidence and to conduct cross-examination in such a way that the
information is comprehensible to judge and jury, but also presented in such a way as not
to distort unfairly the reasoning of the tribunal of fact. With DNA profiling evidence this is
no easy task, as the figures which can constitute the essence of DNA profiling have the
potential to overwhelm juries by the persuasive power of their probabilistic formulations
(see Aytugrul v The Queen (2010) 205 A Crim R 157; [2010] NSWCCA 272 at [89]; Urbas
(2012); Freckelton, Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016); R v Xie (No 18)
[2015] NSWSC 2129 at [27]; Koehler, Chia and Lindsey (1995); Koehler (1996; 2001);
Thompson (1989); Findlay and Grix (2003); Young (2018)). People tend to think
heuristically, rather than probabilistically (see Ch 12.25), with the result that when
presented with information in a quantitative form, as Koehler has stated (2001,
pp 1299–1230):
[W]e do not perform algebraic computations and arrive at solutions by using tenets of
logic and probability theory. Instead, we evaluate quantitative evidence via mental
shortcuts and other rules of thumb. In the case of DNA evidence, the ease with which we
can imagine scenarios or examples of a match other than the suspect may be the heuristic
of choice.
The so-called ‘CSI effect’ is at its most potent in relation to DNA evidence (see Director of
Public Prosecutions v Wise [2016] VSCA 173 at [70]; Wise (2010); but see Freckelton,
Goodman-Delahunty, Horan and McKimmie (2016)), raising the risk that either the
evidence or its absence may be the subject of inappropriate expectation or overly
deferential interpretation by jurors. This can be an issue which needs to be addressed by
counsel in cases where DNA figures or is absent.
If a statistic is targeted toward the suspect, there is the risk that it will be more
compelling than one which is focused upon the general population (Koehler (2001)). In
addition, McClellan CJ at CL, in Aytugrul v The Queen (2010) 205 A Crim R 157; [2010]
NSWCCA 272 at [93], took into account Koehler’s observation (2001, p 1284) that the way
in which a statistic is framed is also important. For instance, if it suggests formulations
which contain frequencies (eg, 1 in X people), this invites jurors to adopt a broad, ‘outside’
view in which other coincidental matches are brought to mind, whereas if it contains
probabilities in reference to the general population (eg, 99.9% of people in Perth), this
encourages a narrower outlook and discourages consideration of the potential for
coincidental matchings.
There is usually little question as to the relevance of DNA evidence: see, eg, Mukevski v
State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 138. It is a question of logic (see Director of Public
Prosecutions v Wise [2016] VSCA 173).
However, it is necessary for the prosecution to establish a rational basis upon which,
without engaging in conjecture, the DNA in question was connected with the crime
(Director of Public Prosecutions v Paulino (2017) 54 VR 109; [2017] VSCA 38 at [54]). If there
is ‘virtually no probative value’ in the DNA evidence, it may be irrelevant (see Director of
Public Prosecutions v Paulino (2017) 54 VR 109; [2017] VSCA 38 at [24]).
It is common for probabilities to be expressed in the form of a likelihood ratio (cf the
terminology of ‘random match ratios’, for instance as used in Thomason v Western Australia
[2007] WASCA 153; Mukevski v State of Western Australia [2010] WASCA 138). As
Simmonds J stated in Western Australia v Muller [2015] WASC 199 at [7]:
Again, a mixed DNA profile consistent with having come from at least three individuals
was recovered and, again, the appellant could not be excluded as a contributor to the
profile. The chance of a randomly chosen individual having a DNA profile that would not
exclude that individual as a possible contributor is less than 1 in 34 (first side) or 1 in 217
(second side).
[12.20.80] 1135
Experts’ reports about DNA profiling should be clear and open as to any problems
encountered in the procedures employed in the case in question. In particular, the
statement of the significance of the results of testing should be comprehensibly expressed
with an eye to the likely readers of the reports, but in terms which enable
contextualisation and the potential for coincidental matchings. Ambiguity in this aspect of
the reporting or the presence of any dissimulation is an invitation to a concerned judge to
withdraw the evidence from the jury.
In R v Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2 at [29], the Court of Appeal observed that:
We would hope that, unless there are unusual circumstances, such written material will be
provided. We were told, however, that no standardised version is available. We see great
advantage in there being such standardised material. We hope that the Forensic Science
Regulator in conjunction with the Royal Society and the Royal Statistical Society can assist
in providing such material in a format understandable by a jury and in [a] way that is not
open to debate.
It is standard for prosecutors to advise their experts of the possible need for them to
provide accessible and comprehensible information to judges and juries on molecular
biology, genetics and laboratory protocols. If they are to do this, a variety of visual aids
can facilitate understanding. These are increasingly commonly used.
The defence, on the other hand, has no option but to rely upon painstaking scrutiny of
the scientific reliability and validity of the theories lying behind DNA profiling, as well as
on the stringency of the protocols and procedures applied generally by the forensic
laboratory and employed specifically in the case at hand and in the context of the
particular profiling system employed. There is no substitute for such careful and detailed
analysis, which may yield anything from inadequate care of exhibits to deficiencies in a
laboratory’s analytical procedures or protocols, or in hygiene processes and interpretative
procedures: see Balding and Donnelly (1994, p 285); Goodman-Delahunty and Hewson
(2010); Tait (2007).
In the context of DNA evidence, courts have emphasised that reliance on a
mathematical expression of probability must not be substituted for proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt: see, eg, R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317; [2001] NSWCCA 413 at [26]–[27]
per Mason P; R v Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135; [2002] SASC 294 at [11] per Doyle CJ; Gibson
v The Queen [2001] TASSC 59. A court is required to consider the statistical DNA evidence
in combination with all the other evidence in the case in arriving at a decision whether or
not the guilt of the accused has been established beyond reasonable doubt: see Riley v
Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 525; [2005] WASCA 190 at [30]. As the Court of Appeal
observed in R v Bates [2006] EWCA Crim 1395 at [30] in relation to partial DNA evidence,
the jury must be:
made aware of its inherent limitations and are given a sufficient explanation to enable
them to evaluate it. There may be cases where the match probability in relation to all the
samples tested is so great that the judge would consider its probative value to be minimal
and decide to exclude the evidence in the exercise of his discretion, but this gives rise to
no new question of principle and can be left for decision on a case by case basis. However,
the fact that there exists in the case of all partial profile evidence the possibility that a
‘missing’ allele might exculpate the accused altogether does not provide sufficient grounds
for rejecting such evidence. In many cases there is a possibility (at least in theory) that
evidence exists which would assist the accused and perhaps even exculpate him
altogether, but that does not provide grounds for excluding relevant evidence that is
available and otherwise admissible, though it does make it important to ensure that the
jury are given sufficient information to enable them to evaluate that evidence properly.
Moreover, as the court observed in Doheny and Adams at page 373D, the significance of
DNA evidence depends to a large extent upon the other evidence in the case. By itself
such evidence, particularly if based on a partial profile, may not take the matter far, but in
conjunction with other evidence it may be of considerable significance.
1136 [12.20.80]
Evidence in terms of likelihood ratio is fundamental to the presentation of DNA profiling

evidence. The likelihood ratio is an approach that has been accepted in many courts: see,
eg, R v Whyms [2012] ACTSC 7 at [55]; Forbes v The Queen (2009) 167 ACTR 1; [2009]
ACTCA 10 at [40].
The likelihood ratio was described by Doyle CJ, with whom Prior J agreed, in R v
Karger (2002) 83 SASR 135; [2002] SASC 294 at [15]–[16] as follows:
For the purposes of expressing the likelihood ratio, two factual hypotheses are compared.
One is the prosecution hypothesis that the appellant was the source of the bloodstain and
of the incriminating DNA. The other hypothesis is the defence hypothesis that an
unrelated person is the source of the bloodstain and of the incriminating DNA. The
statistical evidence calculates the probability of the occurrence, in either case, of the match
found between the incriminating DNA and that of the appellant, and expresses the
competing probabilities as a ratio.
The statistical evidence interpreting the significance of the DNA match is not evidence
of the probability that the appellant was the source of the incriminating DNA. To so
regard it would be to make an error. However, the statistical evidence interpreting the
DNA match is expert evidence that the jury could use in deciding whether it was satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the source of the incriminating DNA. The
statistical evidence is undeniably strong evidence pointing to a conclusion that the
accused was the source of the incriminating DNA, but is not direct evidence of that fact.
And, as is obvious, the statistical evidence must be considered in the light of other
evidence in the case.
The likelihood ratio has been accepted as a proper calculation to assist the jury in the
interpretation and evaluation of the evidence from DNA analysis: see, eg, R v Whyms
[2012] ACTSC 7 at [55]; R v Carroll [2010] SASC 156 at [28]; R v Berry (2007) 17 VR 153;
[2007] VSCA 202 at [30]; Ligertwood (2003). However, it is not a substitute for proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt and must be considered along with all the other evidence:
R v Whyms [2012] ACTSC 7 at [55]; Riley v Western Australia (2005) 30 WAR 525; [2005]
WASCA 190 at [33] per Steytler P.
The prosecutor's fallacy

[12.20.90] A dangerous way in which there is the potential for jurors to be confused or
misled is by the intemperately expressed resort to statistics (See also [12.25.70]–[12.25.80]).
The ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’ figures prominently in this regard (Australian Law Reform
Commission (2003, vol 2, [44.29]); Balding and Donnelly (1994)). It is a failure in statistical
reasoning that invites a jury to assume that a DNA statistic provides a statistical likelihood
that incriminating DNA belongs to a suspect, and therefore that the suspect is guilty of the
crime charged: ‘the mathematical basis for the fallacy lies in incorrectly disregarding the
fact that the suspect’s DNA was selected for analysis because of other (non-DNA)
evidence said to link him or her to the crime’ (see Doheny and Adams v The Queen [1997] 1
Cr App R 369; Latcha v The Queen (1998) 104 A Crim R 390 at 396–397; R v Keir (2002) 127
A Crim R 198; [2002] NSWCCA 30; R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317; [2001] NSWCCA 413; R
v Carroll [2010] SASC 156 at [38]; R v JCG (2001) NSWCCA 504; Aytugrul v The Queen (2010)
205 A Crim R 157; [2010] NSWCCA 272).
The non-sequitur which underlies the fallacy was explained as follows by Phillips LJ
(as he then was) in Doheny and Adams v The Queen [1997] 1 Cr App R 369 at 372–373:
It is easy, if one eschews rigorous analysis, to draw the following conclusion:
(1) Only one person in a million will have a DNA profile which matches that of the
crime stain.
(2) The defendant has a DNA profile which matches the crime stain.
(3) Ergo there is a million to one probability that the defendant left the crime stain
and is guilty of the crime.
…
Taking our example, the prosecutor’s fallacy can be simply demonstrated. If one
person in a million has a DNA profile which matches that obtained from the crime stain,
[12.20.90] 1137
then the suspect will be 1 of perhaps 26 men in the United Kingdom who share that
characteristic. If no fact is known about the defendant, other than that he was in the
United Kingdom at the time of the crime the DNA evidence tell us no more than that there
is a statistical probability that he was the criminal of 1 in 26.
(See, too, R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317; [2001] NSWCCA 413 at [48].)

Another example comes from R v Keir (2002) 127 A Crim R 198; [2002] NSWCCA 30. In
evidence the DAL analyst said (at [14]): ‘It is approximately 660,000 times more likely to
obtain this particular DNA profile found in the bones if it comes from a child of CS and
GB than from a child of a random mating in the Australian population.’ The error arose
from the fact that the Crown, and later the trial judge, transposed this statement and
directed the jury (at [16]) that ‘there is a 660,000 to one chance that those are the bones of
JK (the daughter of CS and GB) as distinct from any other person’.
For this reason, it is the practice to provide to a jury the random occurrence ratio – the
frequency with which the matching DNA characteristics are likely to be found in the
population at large, generally indicating how many persons in the population generally, or
in a relevant subgroup, would have the matching characteristics: Doheny and Adams v The
Queen [1997] 1 Cr App R 369; Latcha v The Queen (1998) 104 A Crim R 390 at 396–397.
In addition, there is a risk of misimpression if the relevant facts, such as the probability
or the possibility of siblings of the accused having a matching profile, are not properly
placed before a jury, thereby leading to the potential for confusion: People (Director of Public
Prosecutions) v Allen [2003] 4 IR 295. It is fundamental that jurors be given suitable
assistance to understand the probabilistic nature of DNA profiling evidence (see Dartnall
and Goodman-Delahunty (2006); Findlay (2008)).
When an attempt was made to adduce Paternity Index results of 220,000:1 and
147,005:1, and their corresponding Relative Chance of Paternity results of 99.9995% and
99.9993%, Sully J in R v GK (2001) 53 NSWLR 317; [2001] NSWCCA 413 at [99] found that
the figures were ‘so extraordinarily close to 100%’ that there was at least a real risk that
jurors would discount the small possibility that someone other than the accused was the
father: ‘it is scientifically uncontroversial that the one thing that DNA testing cannot do is
to exclude absolutely any possibility, however statistically trifling, to the contrary’ (at
[99]). He said that he would have excluded the raw percentage figures on the basis of s 137
or s 135 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), ‘not because of a fundamental dissatisfaction with
the statistical sufficiency of the relevant data bases, but because of the combined effect of
the following considerations’ (at [100]):
(1) that the residual risk of unfairness deriving from the subliminal impact of the
raw percentage figures would have been, to me, both real and unacceptable; and
(2) that the admission of the Paternity Index figures would have given the Crown
every fair opportunity of persuading the jury to accept the Crown contention that
there was no real possibility that GK was not the father.
Mason P, who agreed with Sully J, expressed similar concerns (at [60]):
[P]art of the difficulty would be removed if 99.9993 per cent was transposed to a statement
that there was a 0.0007 per cent probability or chance of C’s father being anyone other
than GK. Even such adjustment would leave me of the view that the evidence is unduly
prejudicial in its impact.
In R v Galli (2001) 127 A Crim R 493; [2001] NSWCCA 504, a similar issue was canvassed.
The appellant was convicted of having sexual intercourse with a 26-year-old with an
intellectual disability. Five persons had had contact with the victim – three carers and two
other residents. The two residents were eliminated as suspects and two of the carers were
eliminated by DNA testing, leaving the accused under suspicion – he had a Combined
Paternity Index of 2,400,000:1, a Relative Chance of Paternity of greater than 99.99999%
and a Relative Chance of Non-Paternity of less than 0.00001%. The 99.9999% figure was
1138 [12.20.90]
not put to the jury, but the figure was mentioned in passing. The Court of Criminal Appeal
intervened, applying its GK decision. Spigelman CJ observed at [72] (in obiter):
if a figure of 98 percent was put to a jury, it is likely that many jurors would regard that as
very significant evidence pointing to the accused, even though the Paternity Index ratio
was very low, so that numerous persons in the general community could share the DNA
profile.
Similarly, in Aytugrul v The Queen (2010) 205 A Crim R 157; [2010] NSWCCA 272, where a
man was convicted of murdering a woman with whom he was upset when she formed a
new relationship after refusing his request to marry, an important issue arose in relation to
the way in which DNA evidence about a hair found on the thumbnail of the deceased
when blood on her nail was drying was expressed to the jury. The evidence was expressed
in the form of random occurrence ratios and exclusion percentages. The exclusion
percentages were 99.9% and 98% of the Turkish population. The defence position was that
the DNA evidence in such a form should have been excluded because, when expressed as
percentages close to 100, it was unduly prejudicial and so should have been rejected
pursuant to ss 135 and 137 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).
The appeal was dismissed by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, with
Simpson J holding that provided the various means of expressing the DNA conclusions
correspond accurately with one another, there is no reason to prefer one over another. In
this instance, the DNA evidence, whether expressed as a frequency ratio or an exclusion
percentage, was the same (at [175]); she was not inclined to find that it should have been
excluded by reason of its prejudice (at [198]). McClellan CJ at CL, however, dissented,
finding that the exclusion percentages had the potential to overwhelm the jury.
On appeal, French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ declined to adopt a general rule that
expressing the results of DNA analysis as an exclusion percentage should be precluded:
Aytugrul v The Queen (2010) 205 A Crim R 157; [2010] NSWCCA 272 at [22]. They found at
[24] that the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial to the accused:
[T]he exclusion percentage given was high – 99.9 per cent – but relevant content was given
to that figure by the frequency ratios that were stated in evidence. As the trial judge
pointed out to the jury, the evidence that was given did not, and was not said to, establish
that the mitochondrial DNA profile found in the hair definitely came from the appellant.
Significantly, they went further, though, stating that ‘[t]here was no risk of rounding the
figure of 99.9 per cent to the certainty of 100 per cent’ (at [24]). This appears to constitute
a repudiation of the reasoning of Koehler.
French CJ, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ declined to decide whether evidence about
frequency ratios and exclusion percentages was different and distinct and should be
approached separately (at [27]).
Their Honours rejected the argument that the percentages were so high that they
risked a subliminal impact whereby the jury might round the figures up to 100%,
observing that the frequency ratio and the manner in which the exclusion percentage had
been derived from the frequency ratio had been explained to the jury, thereby eliminating
the risk of unfair prejudice (at [33]–[34]):
It may very well be right to observe that a frequency ratio of one in 1,000 can, even may
often, convey a different message to the hearer than does an exclusion percentage of 99.9
per cent, because the denominator of the frequency ratio directs the hearer’s attention to
the population that must be considered when seeking to apply the ratio. (Of course, a
percentage, too, is a ratio but may direct less attention to the denominator.) Not only that,
it is important to recognise that evidence of DNA analysis tendered by the prosecution is
tendered in proof of a case that the accused is guilty of the offence charged. It is not
usually tendered only to exclude the possibility that there may be others who committed
the offence (unless the possible class of offenders is limited). It is usually tendered to show
that there is at most a small pool of persons, including the accused, who could have left a
[12.20.90] 1139
trace at the scene of the crime. But demonstrating that there are many persons in Australia
who did not commit the crime charged against the accused may be thought, if that
information is considered in isolation, to tend to distract attention from whether the
accused is the one out of the remaining number of possible perpetrators who did commit
the crime.
In this case, where both the frequency ratio and the exclusion percentage were given,
and the relationship of one to the other was explained, there was neither a wrong decision
of any question of law nor on any other ground a miscarriage of justice.
Limitations of DNA profiling
No panacea
[12.20.120] DNA profiling has much to offer but its contribution to the criminal and civil
justice systems should not be overstated. It must not be seen as having a ‘mystical
infallibility’ (Vincent (2010, p 11)). Frequently, it is best characterised as ‘only one factor in
the circumstantial matrix of proof’ (Howson v The Queen (2007) 210 FLR 288; [2007]
WASCA 83 at [69]). It provides an opportunity for innocent people wrongly suspected to
prove their innocence. Predominantly, though, it furnishes an enormously useful
investigative tool to police investigators, who with its assistance are able to resolve certain
critical issues in criminal investigations. It can thereafter translate to important evidence
for the prosecution.
In a rape trial, for instance, the existence of sexual intercourse is only one of the issues.
Frequen

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EXPERT EVIDENCE

Law, Practice, Procedure and Advocacy

INTERNATIONAL AGENTS & DISTRIBUTORS

NORTH AMERICA ASIA PACIFIC

LATIN AMERICA EUROPE

THOMSON REUTERS 2019

First edition .......................................................................................................................................... 1999

Editors: Zehra Bharucha, Michelle Nichols

Publisher: Virginia Barton

Printed by Ligare Pty Ltd, Riverwood, NSW

neglected. With this subject, that is no mean feat and Dr Freckelton is to be

Part 1 – Introduction ........................................................................................ 1

Part 2 – Common law evidentiary rules..................................................... 17

Chapter 2.05: The expertise rule................................................................... 31

Chapter 2.10: The area of expertise rule..................................................... 55

United States case law interpreting the Frye test ............................................................ 65

Chapter 2.15: The common knowledge rule ............................................. 83

Chapter 2.20: The basis rule ......................................................................... 115

Chapter 2.25: The ultimate issue rule ....................................................... 139

Chapter 2.30: Judicial notice ....................................................................... 153

Chapter 2.35: Discretionary exclusion of expert evidence ..................... 161

Part 3 – Statutory evidentiary rules..........................................................179

Chapter 3.05: Statutory law in New Zealand ......................................... 209

Chapter 3.10: Statutory law in the United States .................................... 221

Chapter 3.15: Law reform proposals ......................................................... 225

Part 4 – Appeals ............................................................................................ 235

Part 5 – Procedure ........................................................................................ 265

Failure to serve expert material .......................................................................................... 285

Chapter 5.5: Court rules............................................................................... 291

Chapter 5.10: Client legal privilege and confidentiality .......................... 303

Chapter 5.15: Wasted costs orders.............................................................. 325

Chapter 5.20: Remuneration of experts .................................................... 345

Part 6 – Expert witnesses and decision-making...................................... 355

Chapter 6.05: Assessors ............................................................................... 367

Chapter 6.10: Referees.................................................................................. 377

Chapter 6.12: Single joint experts ............................................................. 403

The Australian Family Court regime ................................................................................. 405

Chapter 6.15: Conclaves/Joint conferences of experts............................. 411

Chapter 6.20: Concurrent expert evidence................................................ 421

Chapter 6.25: Consecutive expert evidence ............................................. 439

Part 7 – Expert evidence in court .............................................................. 443

Chapter 7.05: Cross-examination of the expert witness ........................ 483

Chapter 7.10: Sentencing evidence by expert witnesses......................... 517

Part 8 – Liability of experts ........................................................................ 557

Chapter 8.05: Regulatory liability of expert witnesses.......................... 585

Australian authorities ........................................................................................................... 594

Part 9 – Medical, dental and nursing evidence....................................... 599

Chapter 9.05: Dental evidence ................................................................... 623

Chapter 9.10: Nursing evidence ................................................................ 629

Part 10 – Mental health evidence ................................................... .......... 633

Chapter 10.05: Fitness for interview evidence ........................................ 681

Chapter 10.10: Fitness to stand trial evidence ........................................ 693

Expert assessments ................................................................................................................ 702

Chapter 10.15: Identification evidence......................................................... 715

Chapter 10.20: Memory evidence............................................................... 743

Chapter 10.25: Mental state evidence........................................................ 769

Chapter 10.30: Syndrome evidence............................................................ 789

Chapter 10.35: Profiling evidence ................................................................ 875

Chapter 10.40: Prediction of risk evidence.............................................. 895

Chapter 10.45: Post-traumatic stress disorder evidence......................... 935

Late-onset PTSD: An explanation for delayed claims .................................................... 969

Chapter 10.50: Critical incident stress intervention evidence................. 977

Part 11 – Social scientists’ evidence ......................................................... 995