Mananquil v. Atty. Villegas, A.M. No.

2430

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. 2430 August 30, 1990

MAURO P. MANANQUIL, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. CRISOSTOMO C. VILLEGAS, respondent.

Geminiano M. Eleccion for complainant.

RESOLUTION

CORTES, J.:

In a verified complaint for disbarment dated July 5, 1982, Mauro P. Mananquil charged respondent Atty. Crisostomo C. Villegas with gross
misconduct or malpractice committed while acting as counsel of record of one Felix Leong in the latter's capacity as administrator of the
Testate Estate of the late Felomina Zerna in Special Proceedings No. 460 before then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. The
complainant was appointed special administrator after Felix Leong died.

In compliance with a resolution of this Court, respondent filed his comment to the complaint on
January 20, 1983. After complainant filed his reply, the Court resolved to refer the case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

In a hearing conducted on May 15, 1985 by the investigating officer assigned to the case, counsel
for the complainant proposed that the case be considered on the basis of position papers and
memoranda to be submitted by the parties. Respondent agreed. Thus, the investigating officer
required the parties to submit their respective position papers and memoranda, with the
understanding that with or without the memoranda, the case will be deemed submitted for resolution
after the expiration of 30 days. In compliance, both parties submitted their respective position
papers; but no memorandum was filed by either party. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted.

In the pleadings submitted before the Court and the Office of the Solicitor General, complainant
alleges that over a period of 20 years, respondent allowed lease contracts to be executed between
his client Felix Leong and a partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, of which respondent is one of
the partners, covering several parcels of land of the estate, i.e. Lots Nos. 1124, 1228, 2221, 2402,
3939, 3942 and 3957 of the Tanjay Cadastre, under iniquitous terms and conditions. Moreover,
complainant charges that these contracts were made without the approval of the probate court and
in violation of Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code.

On the basis of the pleadings submitted by the parties, and other pertinent records of the
investigation, the Solicitor General submitted his report dated February 21, 1990, finding that
respondent committed a breach in the performance of his duties as counsel of administrator Felix
Leong when he allowed the renewal of contracts of lease for properties involved in the testate
proceedings to be undertaken in favor of HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS without notifying and securing
the approval of the probate court. However, the Solicitor General opined that there was no sufficient
evidence to warrant a finding that respondent had allowed the properties to be leased in favor of his
family partnership at a very low rental or in violation of Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code.
Thus, the Solicitor General recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of THREE (3) months with a warning that future misconduct on respondent's part will be
more severely dealt with [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General, pp. 1-10; Rollo, pp.
37-46. Also, Complaint of the Solicitor General, pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp. 47-49].

As gleaned from the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General,
the following facts are uncontroverted:

That as early as March 21, 1961, respondent was retained as counsel of record for
Felix Leong, one of the heirs of the late Felomina Zerna, who was appointed as
administrator of the Testate Estate of the Felomina Zerna in Special No. 460 on May
22, 1961;

That, a lease contract dated August 13, 1963 was executed between Felix Leong
and the "Heirs of Jose Villegas" represented by respondent's brother-in-law Marcelo
Pastrano involving, among others, sugar lands of the estate designated as Lot Nos.
1124, 1228, 2221, 2402, 3939, 3942 and 3957 of the Tanjay Cadastre;

That Felix Leong was designated therein as administrator and "owner, by

testamentary disposition, of 5/6 of all said parcels of land";

That, the lifetime of the lease contract was FOUR (4) sugar crop years, with a yearly
rental of TEN PERCENT (10%) of the value of the sugar produced from the leased
parcels of land;

That, on April 20, 1965, the formal partnership of HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS was
formed amongst the heirs of Jose Villegas, of which respondent was a member;

That, on October 18, 1965, another lease contract was executed between Felix
Leong and the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, containing basically the
same terms and conditions as the first contract, with Marcelo Pastrano signing once
again as representative of the lessee;

That, on March 14, 1968, after the demise of Marcelo Pastrano, respondent was
appointed manager of HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS by the majority of partners;

That, renewals of the lease contract were executed between Felix Leong and HIJOS
DE JOSE VILLEGAS on January 13, 1975 and on December 4, 1978, with
respondent signing therein as representative of the lessee; and,

That, in the later part of 1980, respondent was replaced by his nephew Geronimo H.
Villegas as manager of the family partnership.

Under the above circumstances, the Court finds absolutely no merit to complainant's charge, and the
Solicitor General's finding, that respondent committed acts of misconduct in failing to secure the
approval of the court in Special Proceedings No. 460 to the various lease contracts executed
between Felix Leong and respondent's family partnership.

Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor or administrator
has the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the personal estate of the
deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of
administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of administration without special authority from the
court having jurisdiction of the estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has
the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the estate even without prior
judicial authority and approval [See Ferraris v. Rodas, 65 Phil. 732 (1938); Jocson de Hilado v.
Nava, 69 Phil. 1 (1939); San Diego, Sr. v. Hombre, G.R No. L-19265, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 165].

Thus, considering that administrator Felix Leong was not required under the law and prevailing
jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the probate court in order to validly lease real properties of
the estate, respondent, as counsel of Felix Leong, cannot be taken to task for failing to notify the
probate court of the various lease contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial approval
thereto.

Nevertheless, contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor General, the Court finds sufficient evidence to
hold respondent subject to disciplinary sanction for having, as counsel of record for the administrator
in Special Proceedings No. 460, participated in the execution in 1975 and 1978 of renewals of the
lease agreement involving properties of the estate in favor of the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE
VILLEGAS, of which respondent is a member and in 1968 was appointed managing partner.

By virtue of Article 1646 of the new Civil Code, the persons referred to in Article 1491 are prohibited
from leasing, either in person or through the mediation of another, the properties or things mentioned
in that article, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his
guardianship;

(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to
them, unless the consent of the principal have been given;

(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration

(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision
thereof, or of any government owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the
administration of which has been intrusted to them; this provision shall apply to
judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the
sale;

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the
property or rights in litigation or levied upon on execution before the court within
whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition
includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect
to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may
take part by virtue of their profession.
 (6) Any others specially disqualified by law

xxx xxx xxx

[Article 1491 of the new Civil Code; Emphasis supplied.]

The above disqualification imposed on public and judicial officers and lawyers is grounded on public
policy considerations which disallow the transactions entered into by them, whether directly or
indirectly, in view of the fiduciary relationship involved, or the peculiar control exercised by these
individuals over the properties or rights covered [See Rubias v. Batiller, G.R. No. L-35702, May 29,
1973, 51 SCRA 120; Maharlika Publishing Corporation v. Tagle, G.R. No. 65594, July 9, 1986, 142
SCRA 553; Fornilda v. The Branch 164, RTC Fourth Judicial Region, Pasig, G.R. No. 72306,
October 5, 1988, 166 SCRA 281 and January 24, 1989, 169 SCRA 351].

Thus, even if the parties designated as lessees in the assailed lease contracts were the "Heirs of
Jose Villegas" and the partnership HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS, and respondent signed merely as
an agent of the latter, the Court rules that the lease contracts are covered by the prohibition against
any acquisition or lease by a lawyer of properties involved in litigation in which he takes part. To rule
otherwise would be to lend a stamp of judicial approval on an arrangement which, in effect,
circumvents that which is directly prohibited by law. For, piercing through the legal fiction of separate
juridical personality, the Court cannot ignore the obvious implication that respondent as one of the
heirs of Jose Villegas and partner, later manager of, in HIJOS DE JOSE VILLEGAS stands to benefit
from the contractual relationship created between his client Felix Leong and his family partnership
over properties involved in the ongoing testate proceedings.

In his defense, respondent claims that he was neither aware of, nor participated in, the execution of
the original lease contract entered into between his client and his family partnership, which was then
represented by his brother-in-law Marcelo Pastrano. And although he admits that he participated in
the execution of subsequent renewals of the lease contract as managing partner of HIJOS DE JOSE
VILLEGAS, he argues that he acted in good faith considering that the heirs of Filomena Zerna
consented or acquiesced to the terms and conditions stipulated in the original lease contract. He
further contends that pursuant to the ruling of the Court in Tuason v. Tuason [88 Phil. 428 (1951)]
the renewal contracts do not fall within the prohibition of Articles 1491 and 1646 since he signed the
same as a mere agent of the partnership.

Respondent's contentions do not provide sufficient basis to escape disciplinary action from this
Court.

It taxes this Courts imagination that respondent disclaims any knowledge in the execution of the
original lease contract between his client and his family partnership represented by his brother-in-
law. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that respondent himself had knowledge of and allowed
the subsequent renewals of the lease contract. In fact, he actively participated in the lease contracts
dated January 13, 1975 and December 4, 1978 by signing on behalf of the lessee HIJOS DE JOSE
VILLEGAS.

Moreover, the claim that the heirs of Filomena Zerna have acquiesced and consented to the
assailed lease contracts does not militate against respondent's liability under the rules of
professional ethics. The prohibition referred to in Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code, as
far as lawyers are concerned, is intended to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client
on account of his fiduciary and confidential association [Sotto v. Samson, G.R. No. L-16917, July 31,
1962, 5 SCRA 733]. Thus, the law makes the prohibition absolute and permanent [Rubias v.
Batiller, supra]. And in view of Canon 1 of the new Code of Professional Responsibility and Sections
3 & 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, whereby lawyers are duty-bound to obey and
uphold the laws of the land, participation in the execution of the prohibited contracts such as those
referred to in Articles 1491 and 1646 of the new Civil Code has been held to constitute breach of
professional ethics on the part of the lawyer for which disciplinary action may be brought against him
[See Bautista v. Gonzalez, Adm. Matter No. 1625, February 12, 1990). Accordingly, the Court must
reiterate the rule that the claim of good faith is no defense to a lawyer who has failed to adhere
faithfully to the legal disqualifications imposed upon him, designed to protect the interests of his
client [See In re Ruste, 70 Phil. 243 (1940); Also, Severino v. Severino, 44 Phil. 343 (1923)].

Neither is there merit in respondent's reliance on the case of Tuason v. Tuason [supra.] It cannot be
inferred from the statements made by the Court in that case that contracts of sale or lease where the
vendee or lessee is a partnership, of which a lawyer is a member, over a property involved in a
litigation in which he takes part by virtue of his profession, are not covered by the prohibition under
Articles 1491 and 1646.

However, the Court sustains the Solicitor General's holding that there is no sufficient evidence on
record to warrant a finding that respondent allowed the properties of the estate of Filomena Zerna
involved herein to be leased to his family partnership at very low rental payments. At any rate, it is a
matter for the court presiding over Special Proceedings No. 460 to determine whether or not the
agreed rental payments made by respondent's family partnership is reasonable compensation for
the use and occupancy of the estate properties.

Considering thus the nature of the acts of misconduct committed by respondent, and the facts and
circumstances of the case, the Court finds sufficient grounds to suspend respondent from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months.

WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Atty. Crisostomo C. Villegas committed acts of gross
misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for four (4)
months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that future misconduct
on respondent's part will be more severely dealt with. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to
all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty.
Villegas.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 5108 - ROSA F. MERCADO v. ATTY. JULITO

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. NO. 5108 : May 26, 2005]

ROSA F. MERCADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, Respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D.
Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from the practice of law. The complainant alleged that
respondent maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public document
against her, a former client, based on confidential information gained from their
attorney-client relationship.

Let us first hearken to the facts.

Complainant is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development

Division, Office of Programs and Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive
Director IV of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED).1

Complainant's husband filed Civil Case No. 40537 entitled "Ruben G. Mercado v. Rosa
C. Francisco," for annulment of their marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City. This annulment case had been dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal
became final and executory on July 15, 1992.2

In August 1992, Atty. Anastacio P. de Leon, counsel of complainant, died. On February

7, 1994, respondent entered his appearance before the trial court as collaborating
counsel for complainant.3

On March 16, 1994, respondent filed his Notice of Substitution of Counsel,4 informing
the RTC of Pasig City that he has been appointed as counsel for the complainant, in
substitution of Atty. de Leon.

It also appears that on April 13, 1999, respondent filed a criminal action against
complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City, entitled "Atty. Julito
Vitriolo, et al. v. Rose Dela Cruz F. Mercado," and docketed as I.S. No. PSG 99-9823,
for violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of the Revised
Penal Code.5 Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates
of Live Birth of her children, Angelica and Katelyn Anne. More specifically, complainant
allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain
Ferdinand Fernandez, and that their marriage was solemnized on April 11, 1979, when
in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage took place on
April 11, 1978.
Complainant denied the accusations of respondent against her. She denied using any
other name than "Rosa F. Mercado." She also insisted that she has gotten married only
once, on April 11, 1978, to Ruben G. Mercado.

In addition, complainant Mercado cited other charges against respondent that are
pending before or decided upon by other tribunals - (1) libel suit before the Office of
the City Prosecutor, Pasig City;6 (2) administrative case for dishonesty, grave
misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, pursuit of private
business, vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service rules
and regulations, and violations of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," before the
then Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption;7 (3) complaint for
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
before the Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of misconduct and
meted out the penalty of one month suspension without pay;8 and, (4) the Information
for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, as amended, otherwise known
as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees before
the Sandiganbayan.9

Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public
document (I.S. No. PSG 99-9823) disclosed confidential facts and information relating
to the civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. This
prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She claims
that, in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their
privileged and confidential lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred.

Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss on November 3, 1999 where he

alleged that the complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant
because all the allegations leveled against him are subject of separate fact-finding
bodies. Respondent claimed that the pending cases against him are not grounds for
disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent until proven otherwise.10 He also
states that the decision of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct and
imposing upon him the penalty of suspension for one month without pay is on appeal
with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was found guilty, only of simple misconduct,
which he committed in good faith.11

In addition, respondent maintains that his filing of the criminal complaint for
falsification of public documents against complainant does not violate the rule on
privileged communication between attorney and client because the bases of the
falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are public documents and in no
way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of respondent as
counsel. According to respondent, the complainant confided to him as then counsel only
matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing was said about the alleged
falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters. The birth
certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone. 12

In a Resolution dated February 9, 2000, this Court referred the administrative case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.13
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but complainant failed
to appear in both. Investigating Commissioner Rosalina R. Datiles thus granted
respondent's motion to file his memorandum, and the case was submitted for resolution
based on the pleadings submitted by the parties.14

On June 21, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating
commissioner Datiles, finding the respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client, and recommending his suspension from
the practice of law for one (1) year.

On August 6, 2003, complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and
recommendation, wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr., a letter of desistance. She
stated that after the passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness for
those who have wronged her.

At the outset, we stress that we shall not inquire into the merits of the various criminal
and administrative cases filed against respondent. It is the duty of the tribunals where
these cases are pending to determine the guilt or innocence of the respondent.

We also emphasize that the Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the complaint or
desistance by the complainant. The letter of complainant to the Chief Justice imparting
forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential in disbarment proceedings.

We now resolve whether respondent violated the rule on privileged communication

between attorney and client when he filed a criminal case for falsification of public
document against his former client.

A brief discussion of the nature of the relationship between attorney and client and the
rule on attorney-client privilege that is designed to protect such relation is in order.

In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of
trust and confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and
fiduciary. The relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is
required by necessity and public interest.15 Only by such confidentiality and protection
will a person be encouraged to repose his confidence in an attorney. The hypothesis is
that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice.16 Thus, the preservation and protection of that relation will
encourage a client to entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of paramount
importance to the administration of justice.17 One rule adopted to serve this purpose is
the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his client's secrets or
confidence and not to abuse them.18 Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's
secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship,19 and
continues even after the client's death.20 It is the glory of the legal profession that its
fidelity to its client can be depended on, and that a man may safely go to a lawyer and
converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any litigation with absolute
assurance that the lawyer's tongue is tied from ever disclosing it.21 With full disclosure
of the facts of the case by the client to his attorney, adequate legal representation will
result in the ascertainment and enforcement of rights or the prosecution or defense of
the client's cause.
Now, we go to the rule on attorney-client privilege. Dean Wigmore cites the factors
essential to establish the existence of the privilege, viz:

(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived. 22

In fine, the factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client

relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
communication.

Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on

privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the
lawyer or the latter declines the employment.23 The reason for this is to make the
prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that
what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be
equally free to obtain information from the prospective client.24

On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some
purpose other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not
privileged. Instructive is the case of Pfleider v. Palanca,25 where the client and his
wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare agricultural land for a period of ten years.
In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified portion of the lease
rentals would be paid to the client-lessors, and the remainder would be delivered by
counsel-lessee to client's listed creditors. The client alleged that the list of creditors
which he had "confidentially" supplied counsel for the purpose of carrying out the terms
of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by counsel, in violation of
their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those of the client.
As the client himself, however, states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid
lease contract between the parties, he furnished counsel with the "confidential" list of
his creditors. We ruled that this indicates that client delivered the list of his creditors to
counsel not because of the professional relation then existing between them, but on
account of the lease agreement. We then held that a violation of the confidence that
accompanied the delivery of that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong
than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a lawyer to his client.

(2) The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
confidentiality.26 The client must intend the communication to be confidential.27

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of

disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the
client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose
for which it was given.28
Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise
agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered
to the opposing party,29 an offer and counter-offer for settlement,30 or a document
given by a client to his counsel not in his professional capacity,31 are not privileged
communications, the element of confidentiality not being present.32

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity. 33

The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his
rights or obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his
attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.34

If the client seeks an accounting service,35 or business or personal assistance,36 and not
legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such
purpose.

Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to
substantiate complainant's allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify
the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were
couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated
the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her
for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts
relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. She did not,
however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her complaint. The
Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the
complainant must prove.

Indeed, complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP. Without any testimony
from the complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by
respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there
was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. Such confidential
information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the
attorney-client privilege.37 The burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed
upon the party asserting the privilege.38

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Tinga, J., out of the country.
A.C. No. 9018 - TERESITA P. FAJARDO, COMPLAINAN

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/61992

TERESITA P. FAJARDO, Complainant, v. ATTY. NICANOR C. ALVAREZ, Respondent. A.C. No. 9018, April 20,
2016 FACTS: Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo,
Nueva Ecija. She hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez) to defend her in criminal and
administrative cases before the Office of the Ombudsman. Teresita alleged that Atty. Alvarez was then
working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health. He asked for P1,400,000.00 as
acceptance fee. However, Atty. Alvarez did not enter his appearance before the Office of the
Ombudsman nor sign any pleadings. Atty. Alvarez assured Teresita that he had friends connected with
the Office of the Ombudsman who could help with dismissing her case for a certain fee. Atty. Alvarez
said that he needed to pay the amount of P500,000.00 to his friends and acquaintances working at the
Office of the Ombudsman to have the cases against Teresita dismissed. However, just two (2) weeks after
Teresita and Atty. Alvarez talked, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution and decision
recommending the filing of a criminal complaint against Teresita, and her dismissal from service,
respectively. Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a portion of the amount she gave.
Atty. Alvarez promised to return the amount to Teresita; however, he failed to fulfill this promise. Teresita
sent a demand letter to Atty. Alvarez, which he failed to heed.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Alvarez violated the Lawyer’s Oath and the CPR.

RULING: YES. We find that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he communicated to or, at the very least, made it appear to complainant that he
knew people from the Office of the Ombudsman who could help them get a favorable decision in
complainant's case. Lawyers are mandated to uphold, at all times, integrity and dignity in the practice of
their profession. Respondent violated the oath he took when he proposed to gain a favorable outcome
for complainant's case by resorting to his influence among staff in the Office where the case was
pending.

Thus, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 1, Rules 1.01, and 1.02 prohibit
lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. Respondent's act of
ensuring that the case will be dismissed because of his personal relationships with officers or employees
in the Office of the Ombudsman is unlawful and dishonest. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requires lawyers to always "uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession." In
relation, Canon 13 mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of his [or her] cause and refrain
from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court."
Floran v. Atty. Ediza, A.C. No. 5325

EN BANC

February 9, 2016

A.C. No. 5325

NEMESIO FLORAN and CARIDAD FLORAN, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ROY PRULE EDIZA, Respondent.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

In a Decision dated 19 October 2011, the Court found respondent Atty. Roy Prule Ediza (Atty. Ediza)
administratively liable for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court upheld the findings of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) and suspended Atty. Ediza from the practice of law for six months.

Atty. Ediza's liability stemmed from a Complaint/Affidavit1 dated 8 September 2000 filed by the
spouses Nemesio and Caridad Floran (complainants). The subject of the complaint was a 3.5525
hectare parcel of unregistered land located in San Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, which was
covered by a tax declaration in the name of Sartiga Epal, a relative, who gave the property to
complainants.

From the records, the Court found that Atty. Ediza deceived complainants when he asked them to
unknowingly sign a deed of sale transferring a portion of their land to him. When the sale of
complainants' land pushed through, Atty. Ediza received half of the amount of the proceeds given by
the buyer and falsely misled complainants into thinking that he would register, using the same
proceeds, the remaining portion of their land. These actions, which deprived complainants of their
property, showed Atty. Ediza's behavior as unbecoming a member of the legal profession.

The Court, in its Decision dated 19 October 2011, (1) suspended Atty. Ediza from the practice of law
for six months, effective upon receipt of the Decision; (2) directed him to return to complainants the
two sets of documents that he misled them and Sartiga Epal into signing; and (3) ordered Atty. Ediza
to pay complainants the amount of P125,463.38, representing the amount he deceived them into
paying him, with legal interest from 8 September 2000 until fully paid. The Court further warned Atty.
Ediza that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Thereafter, Atty. Ediza filed a Motion for Reconsideration 2 dated 18 November 2011 which was
denied by the Court in a Resolution3 dated 8 February 2012 for lack of substantial merit.

Atty. Ediza then filed a Manifestation of Compliance (On the Order of Suspension) 4 dated 29 May
2012 through the Office of the Bar Confidant. He also attached a sworn statement 5 attesting that he
desisted from the practice of law for six months from receipt of the decision on 18 November 2011
until 29 May 2012.

In a Resolution6 dated 3 September 2012, the Court deferred action on the Manifestation of
Compliance and adopted the recommendations of the Office of the Bar Confidant that Atty. Ediza be
required to (1) submit certifications from the IBP Local Chapter where he is a member and the Office
of the Executive Judge where he practices his profession, both stating that he had desisted from the
practice of law from 18 November 2011 to 29 May 2012; and (2) show proof of payment to
complainants of P125,463.38 plus legal interest, and the return of the two sets of documents that
Atty. Ediza misled complainants and Sartiga Epal to sign. The Court also required complainants to
manifest whether Atty. Ediza had already paid the said amount and returned the said documents.

In an undated letter written in the vernacular, complainants wrote the Court that Atty. Ediza had yet
to comply with the Court's Decision and asked the Court's assistance in implementing the same.
Later, in a Verified Compliance with Manifestation executed with the assistance of the Public
Attorney's Office, complainants informed the Court that as of 17 October 2012, Atty. Ediza had not
paid any single centavo and neither had he returned the required documents.
In a Resolution7 dated 25 February 2013, the Court noted the manifestations and further ordered
Atty. Ediza to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or be held in contempt and
to comply with the Decision.

In a Manifestation Showing Cause8 dated 22 April 2013, Atty. Ediza claimed that he had no intention
to defy the Court's authority or challenge its orders and that he had served his suspension, but
asked the Court to consider that the two sets of documents were merely fictional. He also claimed
that he was at a loss as to which 'documents' the Decision was referring to because the same were
supposedly not alleged with particularity and he had been barred by the Rules of Procedure of the
IBP Committee on Bar Discipline from requesting a bill of particulars. Atty. Ediza alleged that due to
the ambiguity about the 'documents,' the judgment was incomplete and unenforceable. Moreover,
Atty. Ediza claimed that the alleged lack of due process in the administrative case rendered the
entire proceedings void; and consequently, even the order to pay the sum should be stricken off.

The Court, in its 15 July 2013 Resolution,9 found this last explanation unsatisfactory and further
required Atty. Ediza to comply with the 19 October 2011 Decision within ten days from notice,
warning him of a more severe penalty in the event of his continued failure to do so.

On 22 November 2013, the Office of the Chief Justice received a handwritten letter, in the
vernacular, from complainants requesting information on the status of the administrative case.
Again, complainants wrote the Court two letters in February 2014, one dated 5 February and another
an undated letter received by the Court on 18 February, requesting for the immediate resolution and
information on the status of the administrative case.

The Court, in its 4 June 2014 Resolution,10 noted this last letter from complainants and required Atty.
Ediza to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or be held in contempt for failure
to comply with the 19 October 2011 Decision, and again ordered him to conform to the same.

Meanwhile, on 13 July 2014, complainants again wrote the Office of the Chief Justice reiterating
Atty. Ediza's failure to comply with the Court's directives, and noted that it had been 17 years since
the dispute with Atty. Ediza began.

Atty. Ediza then filed a Compliance with a Motion to Reopen/Reinvestigate the Case dated 2 August
2014, claiming that he had discovered new evidence which would prove that complainants had been
engaging in fraudulent schemes that resulted in him being victimized. Briefly, Atty. Ediza claimed
that complainants never had ownership over the subject property, and that when they initially sought
his services in preparing the document that would effect the sale and conveyance of the land in their
favor, they employed the aid of a poseur to misrepresent the real Sartiga Epal, the supposed
transferor of the prqperty. Atty. Ediza attached the affidavits of allegedly the surviving spouse and
sons of Sartiga Epal to substantiate said averments.

In its 12 November 2014 Resolution, the Court denied the motion to reopen/reinvestigate the case
for lack of merit and again required Atty. Ediza to comply with the 19 October 2011 Decision within
five days from notice.

On 5 January 2015, the Office of the Chief Justice received another letter from complainants,
requesting the issuance of a writ of execution. In the meantime, Atty. Ediza filed on 7 February 2015
a Manifestation and Motion, asking the Court to stay the execution of the 19 October 2011 Decision
insofar as it required the return of money and documents to complainants, and to note his service of
the suspension and lift the same.
More than four years since the· Court promulgated its Decision dated 19 October 2011, Atty. Ediza
has yet to comply with the Court's directives to (1) submit certifications from the IBP Local Chapter
where he is a member and the Office of the Executive Judge where he practices his profession both
stating that he has desisted from the practice of law from 18 November 2011 to 29 May 2012; (2)
pay complainants the amount of Pl25,463.38 plus legal interest; and (3) return the two sets of
documents that Atty. Ediza misled complainants and Sartiga Epal to sign.

The Court issued numerous Resolutions dated 3 September 2012, 25 February 2013, 15 July 2013,
4 June 2014, and 12 November 2014, requiring Atty. Ediza to comply with the 19 October 2011
Decision and show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or be held in contempt for his
failure to abide by the Court's orders. However, Atty. Ediza repeatedly and blatantly disregarded and
obstinately defied these orders from the Court. Instead, Atty. Ediza responded by (1) claiming
ignorance over the documents stated in the Decision, and worse, adjudged that the documents were
fictional; (2) alleging newly discovered evidence; (3) demanding to stay the execution of the
Decision; and (4) reporting that he has complied with the order of suspension without submitting any
required certifications from the IBP and the Office of the Executive Judge.

The intentional delay and utter refusal to abide with the Court's orders is a great disrespect to the
Court which cannot be tolerated. Atty. Ediza willfully left unheeded all the warnings imposed upon
1âwphi1

him, despite the earlier six-month suspension that was meted out to him for his administrative
liability. In Tugot v. Judge Coliflores,11 the Court held that its resolutions should not be construed as
mere requests from the Court. They should be complied with promptly and completely. The failure of
Atty. Ediza to comply betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in his character, but also disrespect for
the Court's lawful orders and directives.

As a member of the legal profession, Atty. Ediza has the duty to obey the orders and processes of
this Court without delay and resistance. Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
1âwphi1

Responsibility states:

CANON 12

A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE
SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

xxxx

Rule 12. 04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
Court processes.

In the present case, Atty. Ediza had previously been found guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility and was suspended from the practice of law for six months. Despite the
suspension, Atty. Ediza is once again demonstrating to this Court that not only is he unfit to stay in
the legal profession for failing to protect the interests of his clients but is also remiss in following the
dictates of the Court, which has administrative supervision over him. In Martinez v. Zoleta,12 we held
that the Court should not and will not tolerate future indifference to administrative complaints and to
resolutions requiring comment on such administrative complaints. It bears stressing that a disregard
of Court directives constitutes grave or serious misconduct13 and gross or willful
insubordination14 which warrant disciplinary sanction by this Court.15

Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over
members of the Bar. Reinforcing the execution of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule
1awp++i1
138 of the Rules of Court which gives this Court the power to remove or suspend a lawyer from the
practice of law. The provision states:

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member
of the bar -may·be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Ediza, we are aware that the power to disbar is one
to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the
Court.16 However, Atty. Ediza's stubborn attitude and unwillingness to comply with the Court's
directives, which we deem to be an affront to the Court's authority over members of the Bar, warrant
an utmost disciplinary sanction from this Court.

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege clothed with public interest
because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of
the State - the administration of justice - as an officer of the court.17 To enjoy the privileges of
practicing law, lawyers must adhere to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintain the highest
degree of morality, and faithfully comply with the rules of the legal profession. 18 Clearly, Atty. Ediza's
conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roy Prule Ediza, having violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility by committing grave misconduct and willful insubordination, is DISBARRED and his
name ordered STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the records of respondent. Further, let other copies be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 12063 - EVERDINA C. ANGELES, COMPLAINA

EVERDINA C. ANGELES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. WILFREDO B. LINA-AC,
RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
The practice of law is a privilege, and lawyers who fail to meet the strict standards of legal proficiency, morality, and
integrity will have their names stricken out of the Roll of Attomeys. [1]

This resolves the Administrative Complaint [2] filed by Everdina C. Angeles (Angeles) against Atty. Wilfredo B. Lina-ac
(Atty. Lina-ac) for his negligence in performing his duties as legal counsel, and for committing a fraudulent act to
cover up his negligence.

Sometime in February 2010, Angeles engaged the services of Atty. Lina-ac to file a petition for the nullity of her
marriage with her husband. She paid him his professional fee in several tranches, for a total of P50,000.00, which
was paid by May 2010.[3]

Angeles repeatedly followed up with Atty. Lina-ac on the status of her case. In October 2010,[4] he sent her a copy of
a Complaint,[5] which bore the "received" stamp of the Regional Trial Court Branch 11, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. The
complaint was supposedly docketed as Civil Case No. 10-3-

Angeles brought up an error in the Complaint with Atty. Lina-ac, who promised to rectify it. Months passed, yet her
counsel failed to provide her a copy of the corrected Complaint, despite her repeated follow-ups. Fed up with his
excuses, Angeles verbally asked Atty. Lina-ac in the second week of May 2011 to return the P50,000.00 she paid
him.[6]

On May 25, 2011, Angeles went to the Regional Trial Court to inquire about her case status, and was shocked to
discover that there was no pending petition for the nullity of her marriage, and that the stamp used in the Complaint
provided by Atty. Lina-ac was not official.[7] The Regional Trial Court certified[8] that there was no Civil Case No. 10-3-
35 pending in its docket.

Angeles confronted Atty. Lina-ac about this, to which he admitted that he never filed her Complaint. He also promised
to return the money she paid him.[9]

Despite their agreement to sever their attorney-client relationship, Atty. Lina-ac on June 16, 2011 filed a
Complaint[10] before the Regional Trial Court for the nullity of Angeles' marriage. It was docketed as Civil Case No. II-
06-79.

In its June 27, 2011 Order,[11] the Regional Trial Court directed Angeles to file the necessary motion to serve
summons on her husband through publication. [12]

On June 29, 2011, Angeles sent Atty. Lina-ac a Demand Letter[13] for the immediate return of'P110,000.00,
representing all the money she paid him for the two (2) cases he was handling. She expressed her dismay at how he
swindled her and deliberately went against their agreement by filing the second Complaint without her consent. She
then informed him that she would file the appropriate criminal and administrative cases against him. [14]

On July 6, 2011, Atty. Lina-ac sent Angeles a copy of the June 27,2011 Order, and asked her to submit an affidavit
with information on her husband's whereabouts. [15] He then filed a Motion for Extension of Time[16] to file the motion
for service of summons through publication, which the Regional Trial Comi granted in its July 22, 2011 Order.[17]

Angeles did not provide Atty. Lina-ac the requested affidavit; yet, on August 4, 2011, Atty. Lina-ac still filed a Motion
with Leave of Court for Service of Summons through Publication. [18]

In its August 10, 2011 Order,[19] the Regional Trial Court denied the Motion for failure to attach Angeles' affidavit. Atty.
Lina-ac then provided Angeles a copy of it.[20]

In its September 6, 2011 Order,[21] the Regional Trial Court dismissed the second Complaint for Angeles' failure to
comply with the requirements of filing the Motion. Again, Atty. Lina-ac provided Angeles a copy of the Order.[22]

On May 17, 2012, Angeles filed before the Provincial Prosecutor a Complaint [23] for estafa against Atty. Lina-ac, and
forwarded the same Complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Misamis Oriental Chapter. [24]

On May 30, 2012, Angeles sent Atty. Lina-ac another Demand Letter[25] for the return of her money, and threatened
to file a disbarment proceeding against him.

On July 9, 2012, Atty. Lina-ac filed his Comment[26] before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Misamis Oriental
Chapter. He denied defrauding Angeles and claimed that he did not know who placed the fake stamp on the first
Complaint. He further claimed that the first Complaint was just a draft, and that Angeles' sister-in-law requested for
copy of it.[27]

Atty. Lina-ac also pointed out that he filed a petition for the nullity of Angeles' marriage, and that the petition was
dismissed because Angeles failed to provide the necessary affidavit for the summons on her husband to be served
through publication.[28]

On April 26, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner directed both parties to attend a mandatory conference on July 25,
2013 at the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Building in Pasig City. [29] Atty. Lina-ac, who was 72 years old,[30] moved
for the postponement[31] of the mandatory conference because his condition of Type 2 Diabetes made it difficult for
him to travel from Bukidnon to Pasig City.

The Investigating Commissioner canceled[32] the scheduled mandatory conference and reset[33] it to August 29,2013.
Atty. Lina-ac moved[34] to transfer the venue of the mandatory conference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Misamis Oriental/Cagayan De Oro chapter because of his ailment.

The mandatory conference was reset one last time. When both parties still failed to appear, the Investigating
Commissioner terminated the mandatory conference, denied Atty. Lina-ac's motions to transfer venue, and directed
the parties to submit their position papers.[35]

In his Position Paper,[36] Atty. Lina-ac denied that he swindled Angeles and emphasized that he fulfilled his duties as
her counsel. On the other hand, Angeles failed to file her position paper. [37]

On January 29, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner recommended[38] that Atty. Lina-ac be suspended from the
practice of law for one (1) year for his negligence and deceitful conduct.

In its September 27, 2014 Resolution,[39] the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors modified the
Investigating Commissioner's recommendation by increasing the penalty of suspension to two (2) years and ordering
Atty. Lina-ac to return P50,000.00 to Angeles:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution as Annex " A ", and considering that Respondent was remiss of his obligation and even deceived
Complainant in violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Wilfreda B. Linaac is
hereby SUSPENDED from tlte practice of law for two (2) years and Ordered to Return to Complainant tlte
amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.40 (Emphasis in the original)
On April 29 2015, Atty. Lina-ac moved for reconsideration[41] of the Resolution against him.

In its June 17, 2017 Resolution, the Board of Governors partially granted [42] Atty. Lina-ac's Motion and downgraded
the penalty of suspension to reprimand, in recognition of his belated filing of the petition for annulment.

This Court modifies the findings of the Board of Governors.

Upon pursuing his client's cause, respondent Atty. Lina-ac became duty bound to protect complainant Angeles'
interests. The degree of service expected of him as an advocate was his "entire devotion to the interest of the client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability[.]" [43] The
high degree of service required of a lawyer is brought about by the lawyer's fiduciary duty toward the client, with their
relationship marked "with utmost trust and confidence."[44]

The Code of Professional Responsibility likewise imposes an exacting standard and requires lawyers to serve their
clients with competence, fidelity, and diligence:
CANON 17 -A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

CANON 18 -A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

RULE 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

RULE 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client's request for information.
Respondent fell short of the standard required of him as complainant's legal counsel when he failed to serve her with
competence and diligence.

Complainant engaged respondent's services to secure a declaration nullifying her marriage with her husband.
However, despite complainant's considerable efforts at coming up with the cash for respondent's professional fees,
respondent did not reciprocate with similar diligence toward her case. Further, instead of filing an actual petition for
the nullity of complainant's marriage, he attempted to hoodwink complainant by fmnishing her a copy of a Complaint
with a fraudulent received stamp from the Regional Trial Court. As the Investigating Commissioner found:
A painstaking review of the case shows that respondent was negligent enough in his obligation as counsel despite
having received the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000) PESOS from the complainant. He was remised (sic) in
his obligation when he failed to file the petition for annulment of marriage despite the lapse of reasonable period of
time. Worse, he deceived complainant by showing a copy of the petition with a stamp of the court in order to make
her believe that it was already filed when in truth, there was no such case filed by him. His belated filing of the petition
in (sic) June 27, 2011 will not exculpate him from any administrative liability under Rule 18.03 of the CPR which
states: "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.[45] (Emphasis in the original)
Respondent's deceitful conduct violates Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides, "A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral[,] or deceitful conduct."

Worse, even after their attorney-client relationship was severed, respondent filed a second Complaint in a blatant
attempt to cover up his earlier negligence and thwart complainant's efforts to recover the money she paid him.
Respondent's repeated duplicity toward complainant reflects his lack of integrity, and is a clear violation of the oath he
took before becoming a lawyer, as correctly found by the Investigating Commissioner:
Very clearly, respondent violated his oath as he was not forthright and honest in his dealings with the complainant.
He engaged in deceitful conduct by presenting a bogus complaint allegedly bearing the stamp ofthe court.
Consequently, he must bear the consequence of his own wrongdoing. [46]
Del Mundo v. Atty. Capistrano[47] emphasized the exacting standards expected of law practitioners:
To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality, including honesty, integrity[,] and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts[,] and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Falling short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to
discipline an eiTing lawyer by imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in
consideration of the surrounding facts.[48] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This Court expects an officer of the court to strictly adhere to the "rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of
the highest degree of morality[,] and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession[.]" [49] Undoubtedly,
respondent lacks the essential requirements of "probity and moral fiber,"[50] which are needed for his continued
membership in the legal profession.[51]

Nonetheless, this Court takes judicial notice that respondent will be about 78 years old by the time this Resolution is
promulgated. In light of his advanced age, this Court deems it proper to temper justice with mercy and mete out a
penalty of two (2) years of suspension instead of the ultimate penalty of disbarment. Ours is a court oflaw, but it is our
humane compassion that strengthens us as an institution and cloaks us "with a mantle of respect and legitimacy."[52]

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wilfreda B. Lina-ac is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years. He
is ORDERED to return to complainant Everdina C. Angeles the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) with
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of promulgation of this Resolution until fully
paid.[53] He is likewise DIRECTED to submit to this Court proof of payment of the amount within ten (10) days from
payment.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to: (I) the Office of the Court Administrator, to disseminate it to all courts
throughout the country for their information and guidance; (2) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (3) the Office
of the Bar Confidant, to append it to respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5704 - WILLEM KUPERS v. ATTY. JOHNSON B. H ... : May 2009

A.C. No. 5704 May 8, 2009

WILLEM KUPERS, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOHNSON B. HONTANOSAS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:

This administrative case against respondent Atty. Johnson B. Hontanosas was triggered by a letter-
complaint1 dated April 15, 2002 of complainant Willem Kupers to the Court through the Court
Administrator. The Court Administrator referred the letter to the Bar Confidant on April 25, 2002. 2 On
May 7, 2002, the Acting Bar Confidant wrote complainant that for the court to take cognizance of an
administrative case against a lawyer, a verified complaint must be filed in nineteen (19) copies
together with supporting documents.3 Thus, complainant was told to submit an additional thirteen
(13) copies of his complaint. On May 25, 2002, complainant complied and submitted an additional
thirteen (13) copies of his complaint.

Complainant alleged that respondent4 had: (1) prepared and notarized contracts that are both invalid
and illegal as these contracts violated the limitations on aliens leasing private lands; (2) served
conflicting interests since he performed legal services for adverse parties; (3) refused to furnish
copies of the contracts he notarized to the parties thereof; (4) notarized documents without keeping
copies thereof and (5) failed to properly discharge his duty to his client Karl Novak, particularly when
respondent allegedly refused to accept his dismissal as counsel for Novak, failed to turn over
Novak’s documents thereafter, handled legal matters without adequate preparation, betrayed
Novak’s trust and refused to see Novak with a translator of Novak’s choice.

Complainant claimed that as counsel for Hans and Vivian Busse, respondent had prepared a
memorandum of agreement and a contract of lease between the spouses Busse and Hochstrasser,
a Swiss national. Under said agreement, Hochstrasser would lease Vivian Busse’s property in Alcoy,
Cebu for fifty (50) years, renewable for another fifty (50) years.5 Complainant added that respondent
had acted despite conflict of interest on his part since the Spouses Busse and Hochstrasser were
both his clients. Respondent prepared a similar agreement and lease contract between the spouses
Busse and Karl Emberger, a Swiss national, over another parcel of land in Alcoy, Cebu. This time
the lease contract was for a period of forty nine (49) years renewable for another forty nine (49)
years.6 All four (4) documents were notarized by respondent. It was also averred that respondent
drafted two deeds of sale over the leased properties of Spouses Busse to Naomie Melchior, a
Filipina, and Karl Novak, a German National.

The Court required respondent to comment on the charges. 7 He answered that if anyone should be
penalized, it should be respondent for meddling in the affairs of his clients and otherwise making a
mockery of the Philippine legal system by deceitfully passing as material facts opinionated, baseless
and false allegations as well as a falsified document. 8 Respondent also moved that complainant be
made to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt.

Complainant filed a reply on November 6, 2002, in which he stated among other things that
respondent is like Pontius Pilatus [sic].9

On February 10, 2003, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 10

In lieu of hearings, Commissioner Doroteo Aguila required the parties to file their respective
memoranda due to the limited time period given by the Court. The parties did. The Commissioner
found that respondent had prepared and notarized contracts that violated Presidential Decree No.
471 (P.D. No. 471) since leases of private lands by aliens cannot exceed twenty five (25) years,
renewable for another twenty five (25) years. 11 Nonetheless, complainant failed to prove the other
charges he had hurled against respondent as the former was not privy to the agreements between
respondent and the latter’s clients. Moreover, complainant failed to present any concrete proof of the
other charges. The commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for two (2) months.

Upon review, the IBP Board of Governors disregarded the recommendation of the commissioner and
dismissed the complaint on February 27, 2004.12 The Board of Governors ratiocinated that
suspension was not warranted since respondent did not really perform an illegal act. The act was not
illegal per se since the lease agreement was likely made to reflect the agreement among the parties
without considering the legality of the situation. While admittedly respondent may be guilty of
ignorance of the law or plain negligence, the Board dismissed the complaint out of compassion.

We reject the Board’s recommendation. We stress that much is demanded from those who engage
in the practice of law because they have a duty not only to their clients, but also to the court, to the
bar, and to the public.13 The lawyer’s diligence and dedication to his work and profession ideally
should not only promote the interests of his clients. A lawyer has the duty to attain the ends of justice
by maintaining respect for the legal profession. 14

The investigating commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors both found that the majority of the
charges against the respondent lack proof. Our own review of the records confirms that most of the
charges are unsupported by evidence. Such charges are simply the unsubstantiated accusations in
the complaint with nary a whit of concrete proof such as affidavits of the clients whose trust
respondents had allegedly breached.

However, administrative cases against lawyers are sui generes and as such the complainant in the
case need not be the aggrieved party. Thus even if complainant is not a party to the contracts, the
charge of drafting and notarizing contracts in contravention of law holds weight. A plain reading of
these contracts clearly shows that they violate the law limiting lease of private lands to aliens for a
period of twenty five (25) years renewable for another twenty five (25) years.

In his defense, respondent avers that the assailed contracts are valid under Republic Act No. 7652
(R.A. No. 7652), entitled "An Act Allowing The Long-Term Lease of Private Lands by Foreign
Investors." They add that these contracts should not be viewed purely as lease contracts since they
allow the leasor to nominate a Filipino citizen or corporation to purchase the subject property within
the lease period. Respondent’s defenses are frivolous. Assuming that it can be duly established that
his foreign clients are indeed "foreign investors" as contemplated under R.A. No. 7652, 15 said law
allows the lease for the original period of fifty (50) years, renewable for another period of twenty five
(25) years, well below the periods of fifty (50) years renewable for another fifty (50) years, and forty-
nine (49) years renewable for another forty-nine (49) years respectively, stipulated in the two lease
agreements. 1avvphi1

Respondent, by drafting the questioned lease agreements, caused his clients to violate Section 7 of
R.A. No. 7652 which states:

Sec. 7. Penal Provision. — Any contract or agreement made or executed in violation of any of the
following prohibited acts shall be null and void ab initio and both contracting parties shall be
punished by a fine of not less than One Hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) nor more than One
million pesos (₱1,000,000), or imprisonment of six (6) months to (6) years, or both, at the discretion
of the court:

(1) Any provision in the lease agreement stipulating a lease period in excess of that provided
in paragraph (1) of Section 4;
 (2) Use of the leased premises for the purpose contrary to existing laws of the land, public
order, public policy, morals, or good customs;

(3) Any agreement or agreements resulting is the lease of land in excess of the area
approved by the DTI: Provided, That, where the excess of the totality of the area leased is
due to the acts of the lessee, the lessee shall be held solely liable therefor: Provided, further,
That, in the case of corporations, associations, or partnerships, the president, manager,
director, trustee, or officers responsible for the violation hereof shall bear the criminal liability.
(Emphasis ours)

In preparing and notarizing the illegal lease contracts, respondent violated the Attorney’s Oath and
several canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. One of the foremost sworn duties of an
attorney-at-law is to "obey the laws of the Philippines." This duty is enshrined in the Attorney’s
Oath16 and in Canon 1, which provides that "(a) lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." Rule 1.02 under Canon 1 states: "A
lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at decreasing confidence in
the legal systems."

The other canons of professional responsibility which respondent transgressed are the following:

CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

xxx

Rule 15.07- A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
hairness.

CANON 17 – A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

Aside from constituting violation of the lawyer’s oath, the acts of respondents also amount to gross
misconduct under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ― A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. x x x

The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously
affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While we will not hesitate to
remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers, where the evidence calls for it,
we will also not disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.

We cannot accept, however, the plea of leniency expressed by the IBP Board of Governors in behalf
of respondent. We also find that the suspension for two (2) months recommended by the IBP
Investigating Commissioner too light. We find six (6) months suspension to be a sufficient sanction
against respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Johnson B. Hontanosas, is found GUILTY of violating the lawyer’s
oath and gross misconduct. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months with
a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent’s suspension is effective upon notice hereof. Let notice of this Resolution be spread in
respondent’s record as an attorney in this Court, and notice of the same served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts
concerned.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

A.C. NO. 6160 - NESTOR PEREZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. AT ... LA TORRE, RESPONDENT D E C I S I
ON

A.C. No. 6160 March 30, 2006

NESTOR PEREZ , Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE, Respondent.
 DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In a letter-complaint1 dated July 30, 2003 addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
complainant Nestor Perez charged respondent Atty. Danilo de la Torre with misconduct or conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer for representing conflicting interests.

Perez alleged that he is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga, Camarines Sur; that in
December 2001, several suspects for murder and kidnapping for ransom, among them Sonny Boy
Ilo and Diego Avila, were apprehended and jailed by the police authorities; that respondent went to
the municipal building of Calabanga where Ilo and Avila were being detained and made
representations that he could secure their freedom if they sign the prepared extrajudicial
confessions; that unknown to the two accused, respondent was representing the heirs of the murder
victim; that on the strength of the extrajudicial confessions, cases were filed against them, including
herein complainant who was implicated in the extrajudicial confessions as the mastermind in the
criminal activities for which they were being charged.

Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that while being detained at the
Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his assistance in drafting an extrajudicial confession
regarding his involvement in the crimes of kidnapping for ransom, murder and robbery. He advised
Avila to inform his parents about his decision to make an extrajudicial confession, apprised him of
his constitutional rights and of the possibility that he might be utilized as a state-witness.

Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his extrajudicial confession, he
conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents; and only after he was convinced that Ilo was not
under undue compulsion did he assist the accused in executing the extrajudicial confession.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.2 On August 16, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his report with the
following recommendation:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Danilo de la Torre be suspended for one (1)
year from the practice of the legal profession for violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

The Board of Governors of the IBP modified the recommendation by increasing the period of
suspension to two years.

In finding the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests, the Investigating Commissioner
opined that:

In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by substantial evidence,
the allegations in his complaint. The complainant was able to prove by substantial evidence his
charge against Atty. de la Tor[r]e. The respondent admitted that his services as a lawyer were
retained by both Avila and Ilo. Perez was able to show that at the time that Atty. de la Torre was
representing the said two accused, he was also representing the interest of the victim’s family. This
was declared by the victim’s daughter, Vicky de Chavez, who testified before Branch 63 of the
Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur that her family retained the services of Atty. Danilo de la
Torre to prosecute the case against her father’s killers. She even admitted that she was present
when Atty. de la Torre met with and advised Avila and Ilo on one occasion. This is proof that the
respondent consciously offered his services to Avila and Ilo despite the fact that he was already
representing the family of the two accused’s victim. It may not even be improbable that respondent
purposely offered to help the accused in order to further his other clients’ interest. The respondent
failed to deny these facts or offer competent evidence to refute the said facts despite the ample
opportunity given him.

Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Respondent is therefore duty bound to refrain from representing two parties having conflicting
interests in a controversy. By doing precisely the foregoing, and without any proof that he secured
the written consent of both parties after explaining to them the existing conflict of interest,
respondent should be sanctioned.

We agree with the findings of the IBP except for the recommended penalty.

There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue
or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. 3

There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the
attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents
him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection.4

The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of public policy and
good taste. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected
with the client’s case, including the weak and strong points of the case. The nature of that
relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. It behooves lawyers not
only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of impropriety and
double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.5

To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did not offer his legal services to accused
Avila and Ilo but it was the two accused who sought his assistance in executing their extrajudicial
confessions. Nonetheless, he acceded to their request to act as counsel after apprising them of their
constitutional rights and after being convinced that the accused were under no compulsion to give
their confession.

The excuse proferred by the respondent does not exonerate him from the clear violation of Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from representing
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the
facts.

As found by the IBP, at the time respondent was representing Avila and Ilo, two of the accused in
the murder of the victim Resurreccion Barrios, he was representing the family of the murder victim.
Clearly, his representation of opposing clients in the murder case invites suspicion of double-dealing
and infidelity to his clients.
What is unsettling is that respondent assisted in the execution by the two accused of their
confessions whereby they admitted their participation in various serious criminal offenses knowing
fully well that he was retained previously by the heirs of one of the victims. Respondent, who
presumably knows the intricacies of the law, should have exercised his better judgment before
conceding to accused’s choice of counsel. It did not cross his mind to inhibit himself from acting as
their counsel and instead, he even assisted them in executing the extrajudicial confession.

Considering that this is respondent’s first infraction, disbarment as sought by the complaint is
deemed to be too severe. Under the present circumstances, we find that a suspension from the
practice of law for three years is warranted.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo de la Torre is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. He is SUSPENDED for THREE
YEARS from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as
on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Lagua v. CA, G.R. No. 173390

G.R. No. 173390 June 27, 2012

MELCHOR L. LAGUA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION
SERENO, J.:

In dismissing the present Petition filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, we find no valid,
justifiable reason for petitioner’s failure to file his appellant’s brief with the Court of Appeals (CA) that
would warrant a reversal of the CA Resolutions dated 25 November 20051 and 17 May 2006.2 To rule
otherwise would make light of this Court’s extraordinary certiorari jurisdiction, which operates only
upon a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the appellate tribunal.3

On 11 April 2003, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig rendered a Decision in Criminal Case
Nos. 118032-H and 118033-H finding the accused petitioner guilty of homicide and sentencing him
to 8 years of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years of reclusion temporal as maximum in each case.
On 19 May 2003, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
27423. On 18 June 2003, he filed a Very Urgent Petition for Bail Pending Appeal, which the CA
granted without objection from the Office of the Solicitor General.4 On 6 November 2003, an Order of
release upon bond was issued in his favor by the Division Clerk of Court of the CA.5

On 14 October 2003, petitioner received the Order from the CA requiring, within 45 days from receipt
thereof, or until 28 November 2003, the filing of his Appellant’s Brief.6 He filed a Motion for Extension
of another 45 days from 28 November 2003, or until 12 January 2004, within which to file the said
brief. On 8 January 2004, he filed a Second Motion for Extension asking for an additional 45 days,
which the CA granted with a warning that no further extension shall be allowed. 7 Thus, petitioner had
45 days from 12 January 2004 or until 26 February 2004.

Despite the two extensions, petitioner Lagua still failed to file his appellant’s brief. On 5 May 2004,
the CA ordered him through counsel to show cause, within five days from receipt, why the appeal
should not be dismissed pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. He again failed to
submit his brief within the reglementary period and to comply with the Court’s 5 May 2004
Resolution. Thus, on 1 September 2004, the CA issued a Resolution declaring the appeal
abandoned and accordingly dismissed pursuant to the Rules.

On 14 October 2004, petitioner’s counsel of record, Atty. Salvador Quimpo, manifested to the Court
that he had already withdrawn as defense counsel for petitioner, but that he had failed to secure the
latter’s conformity.8 The following day, petitioner himself filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 1
September 2004 Resolution, requesting more time to secure the services of another counsel. On 20
October 2004, the Solicitor General, manifesting that accused-appellant’s abandonment of his
appeal rendered the judgment of conviction final and executory, moved for his immediate arrest and
confinement at the New Bilibid Prison.9

In its Resolution dated 9 February 2005, the CA stated that it had never received a Notice of
Withdrawal from Atty. Quimpo, but nevertheless granted a 30-day period for petitioner and his new
counsel to file a Notice of Appearance. Again, petitioner failed to comply. On 8 July 2005, the CA
issued another Show Cause Order, directing him to explain within 10 days why he had not caused
the appearance of his new counsel, and why the appeal should not be considered abandoned.
Instead of filing a timely compliance, petitioner’s new counsel, Atty. Emerson Barrientos filed a
Notice of Appearance on 8 March 2005 or almost a month after the Show Cause Order.

On 17 August 2005, the CA filed a Resolution stating that in the interest of justice, the Notice of
Appearance was considered sufficient compliance with the Order of 8 July 2005. It granted the
Motion for Reconsideration, set aside the Order of Dismissal issued on 1 September 2004, and gave
petitioner and his new counsel a non-extendible period of 30 days within which to file the appellant’s
brief.
Notwithstanding the new non-extendible period, petitioner again failed to seasonably file his brief,
prompting the CA to issue the first assailed Resolution dated 25 November 2005, which, for the
second time, declared his appeal abandoned and accordingly dismissed. Roused from inaction, he
filed another Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief on 19 December
2005, or 18 days after his counsel received the 25 November 2005 Resolution.

In its second assailed Resolution issued on 17 May 2006, the CA denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and ordered the Appellant’s Brief to be expunged from the records, viz:

Indeed the present appeal has been dismissed twice by the Court because of accused-appellant’s
failure to file his brief. The present motion for reconsideration of the second dismissal of the appeal
was even filed three (3) days beyond the reglementary period. Ineluctably, the dismissal of the
present appeal has become final and accused-appellant has lost his right to appeal.

It bears stressing that accused-appellant cannot simply trifle with the rules of procedure on the
pretext that his life and liberty are at stake. For appeal is a mere statutory privilege to be exercised in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law granting the privilege. 10 x x x.

Petitioner comes to this Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court in
declaring the appeal abandoned, pointing to the negligence and errors of his counsel as the cause of
the two-year delay in coming up with the brief. Petitioner reasons that there would be no prejudice to
the People if his appeal is reinstated, and that he has a good defense that can lead to his acquittal.

We dismiss the Petition.

The certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is rigorously streamlined, such that Rule 65 only
admits cases based on the specific grounds provided therein. The Rule applies if there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The independent
action for certiorari will lie only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proven to exist. Grave
abuse of discretion is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or
personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or a capricious exercise of power that amounts to an
evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law.
For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross.11

In the present case, petitioner would have us strike down the Resolutions of the CA declaring his
appeal as abandoned for purportedly being issued in grave abuse of discretion. Yet, far from
committing the grievous error petitioner presents it to be, the CA merely exercised the authority
expressly granted to it under Rule 124, which we quote below:

Sec. 8. Dismissal of appeal for abandonment or failure to prosecute. – The appellate court may,
upon motion of the appellee or on its own motion and notice to the appellant, dismiss the appeal if
the appellant fails to file his brief within the time prescribed by this rule, except in case the appellant
is represented by a counsel de oficio.

Petitioner was represented by private counsel (and not counsel de oficio) to whom the CA had
granted multiple extensions: two for Atty. Quimpo; and two for Atty. Barrientos, whose Notice of
Appearance was submitted a month after the Show Cause Order of 8 July 2005. As for Atty.
Quimpo, he filed his Manifestation more than a month after the CA had first issued the dismissal. It
was only because of the plea for compassion in petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration that the CA
granted him another 30 days in order to secure the services of another lawyer. Again, petitioner
failed to comply. Both he and the new counsel, Atty. Barrientos, also failed to comply with the
second Show Cause Order.

Yet again, the CA allowed Atty. Barrientos’ Notice of Appearance and considered it substantial
compliance with the second Show Cause Order. Out of the CA’s liberality, petitioner was given
another 30 days to come up with the Appellant’s Brief. This he failed to submit, prompting the CA, for
the second and final time, to declare his appeal as abandoned. Even then, his Motion for
Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief was filed 18 days after his counsel received
the CA Resolution.

In his Petition, Lagua bewails the negligence and mishandling by his two previous counsels as the
reason for the delay, which has lasted for more than two years. However, it is clear from the facts
that despite the liberality and consideration afforded to him by the CA, he is by no means blameless.
More importantly, his excuse cannot serve as a substitute for the jurisdictional requirements under
Rule 65. It does not amount to any grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
discretion that may be attributable to the appellate court. Under the circumstances, the CA was well
within the authority granted to it under the cited rule.

Nothing is more settled than the rule that the negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding on the
client.12 Otherwise, there would never be an end to a suit, so long as counsel could allege its own
fault or negligence to support the client’s case and obtain remedies and reliefs already lost by the
operation of law.

The rationale for this rule is reiterated in the recent case Bejarasco v. People:

The general rule is that a client is bound by the counsel’s acts, including even mistakes in the realm
of procedural technique. The rationale for the rule is that a counsel, once retained, holds the
implied authority to do all acts necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and
management of the suit in behalf of his client, such that any act or omission by counsel
within the scope of the authority is regarded, in the eyes of the law, as the act or omission of
the client himself.

It is the client’s duty to be in contact with his lawyer from time to time in order to be informed
of the progress and developments of his case; hence, to merely rely on the bare reassurances of
his lawyer that everything is being taken care of is not enough. 13 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Tan v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:

As clients, petitioners should have maintained contact with their counsel from time to time, and
informed themselves of the progress of their case, thereby exercising that standard of care "which
an ordinarily prudent man bestows upon his business."

Even in the absence of the petitioner’s negligence, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a party is bound
by the mistakes of his counsel. In the earlier case of Tesoro v. Court of Appeals, we emphasized –

It has been repeatedly enunciated that "a client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct
of a case and cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had he
proceeded differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were to be
admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new
counsel could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently
diligent or experienced or learned."
Thus, with the ordinary remedy of appeal lost through the petitioner’s own fault, we affirm that no
reversible error was committed in the dismissal of the petition by the appellate court. 14

Petitioner was granted bail, and he had all the time to contact his counsel or follow up on the appeal
himself. He is similarly responsible for procuring the services of new counsel after having been told
1âwphi1

of Atty. Quimpo’s withdrawal. Yet he offered no explanation why it took him so long to apprise Atty.
Barrientos of the case, or why they had repeatedly failed to comply with the CA’s Orders after
several extensions. As he has lost the ordinary remedy of appeal because of his own laxity, we
cannot allow him to haphazardly take advantage of the remedy of certiorari.

The Court cannot tolerate habitual failure to follow the procedural rules, which are indispensable for
the orderly and speedy disposition of justice. Otherwise these rules would be rendered useless.15 In
Polintan v. People, the Court of Appeals gave the petitioner therein a total of 75 days to submit his
Appellant’s Brief, but he failed to do so. In that case, the accused Polintan filed a "Very Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion to Admit Appellant’s Brief." This Court affirmed the CA Resolution declaring his appeal
abandoned, after finding his excuses too flimsy to warrant reversal.

In the present case, accused Lagua was given more time, not only to file his Appellant’s Brief, but
also to secure new counsel to adequately prepare the appeal. The CA issued two Show Cause
Orders and two Resolutions declaring the appeal as abandoned. Despite these issuances, his
second Motion for Reconsideration was filed 18 days after his receipt of the second and final CA
Resolution. To our mind, this delay is indicative of sheer laxity and indifference on his part, for which
he has lost the statutory right of appeal. Even during the intervening period after counsel has
withdrawn, litigants are expected to be vigilant and conscious of the status of their cases, viz:

The appellate court committed no error therefore in dismissing the appeal. Petitioners-appellants
have shown no valid and justifiable reason for their inexplicable failure to file their brief and have
only themselves to blame for their counsel’s utter inaction and gross indifference and neglect in not
having filed their brief for a year since receipt of due notice to file the same. They could not even
claim ignorance of the appellate court’s notice to file brief since it had required withdrawing counsel
Valente to secure their written conformity before granting his withdrawal as counsel, and certainly
they must have ascertained from him as well as new counsel the status of their appeal — which
accounts for Atty. Valente’s repeated prayers in his two motions for withdrawal for the granting of
sufficient time for new counsel to file the brief. They had almost a year thereafter to make sure that
their new counsel did attend to their appeal and did file the brief.16

In Estate of Felomina G. Macadangdang v. Gaviola,17 the Court made a clear finding of negligence on
the part of the lawyer handling the petitioner’s case, but nevertheless affirmed the denial of the
appeal. It confirmed that the petitioner was bound by his counsel’s negligence. It ruled that "the right
to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but is merely a statutory privilege that may
be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the law."

Neither can we deem petitioner Lagua’s Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Admit Appellant’s
Brief as substantial compliance with the procedural requirement. In Cariño v. Espinoza, 18 the
appellate court rightly disallowed the submission of the Appellant’s Brief after a delay of seven
months. In this case, it took petitioner almost two years from 26 February 2004 (after the CA gave
him a second non-extendible period of 45 days) to finally submit his Appellant’s Brief on 19
December 2005.

Lastly, it is erroneous for petitioner to declare that there would be no prejudice to the People if his
appeal is reinstated.19 The judgment of conviction having attained finality, respondent is now entitled
to execution as a matter of right. This Court has recently declared:
Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes
immutable and unalterable. The enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or evaded,
for the immediate enforcement of the parties’ rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a major
component of the ideal administration of justice. This is the reason why we abhor any delay in the
full execution of final and executory decisions. Thus, a remedy intended to frustrate, suspend, or
enjoin the enforcement of a final judgment must be granted with caution and upon a strict
observance of the requirements under existing laws and jurisprudence.20 x x x.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions issued by the Court of Appeals
on 25 November 2005 and 17 May 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 27423 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Adelfa Properties v. Atty. Restituto Mendoza

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 8608 [Formerly CBD Case No. 11-2907], October 16, 2019

ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC. (NOW FINE PROPERTIES, INC.), COMPLAINANT, v.

ATTY. RESTITUTO S. MENDOZA, RESPONDENT.
 RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Complaint for Disbarment1 filed by Adelfa Properties, Inc. (now Fine Properties,
Inc.), as represented by Ma. Nalen Rosero-Galang, against respondent Atty. Restituto
Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), for allegedly violating the Lawyer's Oath and Canons 15, 17, 18, 21,
and Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The facts are as follows:

Adelfa Properties, Inc. (complainant) is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws
of the Republic of the Philippines, the majority stockholders of which are then Senator Manuel
B. Villar, Jr. and his wife Senator Cynthia Villar. The corporation is primarily engaged in real
estate development. Imperative to its business operation, Adelfa maintains a pool of lawyers,
each of which is assigned as in-house counsel to its affiliate companies. As in-house counsel,
they provide legal advice and opinion not only to the company they are assigned to but also to
other affiliate companies of Adelfa as deed arises. They also represent the companies in court
litigations and administrative proceedings, and handle legal issues confronting the companies.

In 2004, Brittany Corporation, an affiliate company of Adelfa, hired Atty. Mendoza as one of its
in-house counsel. As in-house counsel, Atty. Mendoza, who practically holds an executive
position, thus, apart from his legal expertise, must be able to blend well with company offices
and other executives. However, much to the dismay and disappointment of Adelfa and its
affiliates, Atty. Mendoza failed to blend effectively and efficiently with his co-in house counsels,
officers and other executives. Complainant added that Atty. Mendoza's performance evaluation,
particularly his ability to adapt to his work environment had been consistently low that he had to
be transferred from one com any to another, from one supervisor to another, in order to find him
a suitable place in the company.

Thus, on February 1, 2007, Atty. Mendoza was transferred to Casa Regalia, Inc. However, due to
his failure to work well again with his peers and superiors, he was again transferred and placed
under the supervision of Atty. Edgardo Mendoza, and was tasked to handle non-core business or
non-housing business collection and criminal cases.

Nevertheless, complainant averred that Atty. Mendoza's performance continued to disappoint the
company, thus, in May 2009, Cynthia J. Javarez, Senior Officer of MB Villar Group of
Companies, spoke with Atty. Mendoza about his poor annual performance evaluation. In her
Affidavit2 dated September 30, 2909, Javarez stated that after she informed Atty. Mendoza of the
unfavorable assessment made by the senior officers, he threatened them and retorted, "I will
bring down the Company with me," and even brazenly claimed that he has information and
documents against the company boss.

Complainant also alleged that on May 15, 2009, Atty. Mendoza approached another lawyer of
one of the affiliated companies of Adelfa and showed him an affidavit which the former
supposedly executed, containing an account of the alleged irregular and illegal acts and corrupt
practices of the complainant and its affiliated companies. Atty. Mendoza allegedly told said
lawyer that he would give said Affidavit to Senator Panfilo Lacson, unless Jerry M.
Navarrete (Navarrete), one of the senior officers of one of Adelfa's affiliated companies,
immediately meets with him to discuss his concerns.

In an Affidavit3 executed by Navarrete, dated June 2, 2009, Navarrete stated that on May 20,
2009, he met Atty. Mendoza at Starbucks, 6750 Building, Ayala Center, Makati City. He averred
that during the meeting, Atty. Mendoza told him that he took part in the preparation of
documents in one of the illegal and irregular transactions of Adelfa and/or its affiliates, and that
he had information and documents that are damaging to the political career of Senator Villar.
Despite being reminded that Atty. Mendoza is bound by the attorney-client confidentiality rules,
Atty. Mendoza continued to demand that he be paid P25,000,000.00, otherwise, he would
surrender all the documents he had against Senator Villar to Senator Lacson.

Because complainant did not accede Atty. Mendoza's demands, the latter allegedly made a phone
call to Engr. Momar Santos (Engr. Santos), one of Adelfa's officers. In his Affidavit4 dated June
2, 2009, Engr. Santos stated that Atty. Mendoza threatened that he will go all out against Senator
Villar, and that he knew where he and his family resides should he release certain indecent
photos of him.

Thus, due to breach of trust and confidence, complainant sent a notice of termination5 dated May
22, 2009 to Atty. Mendoza. In the said termination letter, complainant manifested they found
substantial evidence that Atty. Mendoza has violated the company's core values and the pertinent
provisions of the Labor Code. Complainant averred that Atty. Mendoza's threats against Engr.
Santos and his family, his attempts to extort money, and his threats to expose incriminating
information against Senator Villar constitute serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of
duties, and willful breach of trust and confidence.

Complainant pointed out that in the illegal dismissal complaint which Atty. Mendoza filed
against them, it is apparent that its filing was tainted by malice and caprice. In the said labor
case, complainant averred that Atty. Mendoza asked for: (1) P73,433.54 per month as full
backwages, (2) recovery of all salary increases due him, (3) performance bonuses given every six
months of the year, (4) moral damages of P30,000,000.00, (5) exemplary damages of
P30,000,000.00, and (6) attorney's fees equivalent to 15% of the total award. 6

To aggravate the situation, complainant lamented that on April 20, 2010, Atty. Mendoza even
had himself interviewed by ABS-CBN TV Patrol where he maliciously claimed that he was
dismissed from employment because he does not want to participate in the corrupt practices of
the company. He also said therein that Senator Villar uses his influence and power to obtain
favorable decisions in land disputes, when in truth, he had neither worked with Senator Villar
nor the latter asked him to do work for him.

On April 22, 2010, in a press conference, Atty. Mendoza publicly declared that he will testify
against Senator Villar on the alleged land grabbing issue committed by complainant and its
affiliates.
Thus, complainant filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Mendoza for violation of Canons
15, 17, 18 and 21, Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the lawyer's oath.
Complainant also added that Atty. Mendoza also violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canons 8 and 11,
Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for imputing that judges, justices and other
public officers allow themselves to be bribed.

In a Resolution7 dated June 23, 2010, the Court resolved to require Atty. Mendoza to file his
comment on the charges against him.

In his Comment8 dated September 22, 2010, Atty. Mendoza argued that contrary to the
allegations against him, he actually upheld the lawyer's oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility by refusing to engage in immoral, dishonest, unlawful and
deceitful conduct. He claimed that his employment was terminated because he stood up for his
principles to which he was branded as abrasive and not a team player.

Atty. Mendoza averred that he filed the labor complaint in order to seek justice for his illegal
termination, and that he never wanted the media attention he got from filing his labor complaint
against complainant. He, however, asserted the truth of his allegations of bribery of judges,
justices and other government officials, as he claimed that he was privy to said incidents having
worked as in-house counsel for complainant.

On November 15, 2010, the Court resolved to refer the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.9

In its Report and Recommendation dated March 26, 2013, Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr.,
IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), found Atty. Mendoza to have violated Canon 17 and
Rule 21.02 of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended that he be
suspended for one (1) year from the practice of law.

In Resolution No. XX-2013-613 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP-Board of Governors resolved to
adopt and approve with modification the report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. Instead, it recommended that Atty. Mendoza be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months.

RULING

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and
confidence. Their relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary. The
relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and
public interest.10 Only by such confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to
repose his confidence in an attorney. The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal advice
in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the administration of justice.11� Thus, the
preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a client to entrust his legal problems
to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to the administration of justice. 12 One rule
adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his
client's secrets or confidence and not to abuse them. Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his
client's secrets and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship, and
continues even after the client's death.13

In sum, the Court elucidated on the factors essential to establish the existence of the said
privilege, to wit:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and

it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication.

Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged
communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter
declines the employment. The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss
whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or
used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the
prospective client.

xxxx

(2) The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The
client must intend the communication to be confidential.

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure

between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware,
discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.

Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement
prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party,
an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his
professional capacity, are not privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not
being present.

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.

The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information,
but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The
communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking
legal advice.14

Applying all these rules in the instant case, we find that the evidence on record fails to
substantiate complainant's allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the alleged
communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. Complainant merely claimed that the
privilege was broken without averring any categorical and concrete allegations and evidence to
support their claim.

The filing of the illegal dismissal case against complainant, and the disclosure of information in
support thereof is not per se a violation of the rule on privileged communication because it was
necessary in order to establish his cause of action against complainant. In sum, mere allegation,
without any evidence as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by Atty.
Mendoza, is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule on
privileged communication. Such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a
breach of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to
merely assert the attorney-client privilege. The burden of proving that the privilege applies is
placed upon the party asserting the privilege.

Further, our jurisprudence is replete with cases reiterating that in disbarment proceedings, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant.15 In the recent case of Reyes v. Atty. Nieva,16 this
Court had the occasion to clarify that the proper evidentiary threshold in disbarment cases is
substantial evidence.

In the instant case, a careful scrutiny of the evidence presented would reveal that the degree of
proof indispensable in a disbarment case was not met. Complainant claims that Atty. Mendoza
has been threatening and blackmailing them. However, the Court finds that the complaint, as
well as the submitted affidavits, failed to discharge the necessary burden of proof as no other
evidence was presented to substantiate their claims of extortion. The affidavits merely provided
general statements and lacked evidence in support of their allegation of extortion.

However, the Court, nonetheless, does not find Atty. Mendoza totally absolved of fault. While
We find the allegations of violation of rule on privileged communication and extortion to be
unsubstantiated, the Court finds Atty. Mendoza's act of causing himself to be interviewed by the
media, i.e., ABS-CBN, thereby divulging information he has gathered in the course of his
employment with complainant in the media to be violative of Rules 13.02, 21.01 and 21.02 of the
CPR, which state:

Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.

CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS

CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-�CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.

Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except;
(a)When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
(b)When required by law;
(c)When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by
judicial action.
Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the
course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.
Here, Atty. Mendoza's actuation of allowing himself to be interviewed by the media, thus,
utilizing that forum to accuse his former employer of committing several illegal activities and
divulging information which he secured in the course of his employment while he was the
complainant's in-house counsel, no matter how general the allegations are, is an act which is
tantamount to a clear breach of the trust and confidence of his employer.

Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which Atty. Mendoza should have done
was instead lodge a proper complaint against complainant if he finds it necessary and allowed
the judicial system to take its course. He should have exercised prudence and refrained from
holding press conferences, issuing press statements, or giving interviews to the media on any
matter or incident related to the issues subject of the controversy. The fact that he brought his
issues to the arena of public opinion was reckless and punctuates his indiscretion.

This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste and, more importantly,
upon necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts
connected with the client's case, including its weak and strong points. Such knowledge must be
considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given to him to take advantage
of his client; for if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof. It
behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double�-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice. It is for
these reasons that we have described the attorney-client relationship as one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree.17

PENALTY

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an
attorney, for violating the lawyer's oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the CPR, for the practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the
performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral
character. The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts.18

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other
gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer
may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

While the Court finds no violation of the rule on non-disclosure of privileged communication,
the acts of Atty. Mendoza, in allowing himself to be interviewed by the media constitute gross
misconduct in his office as attorney, for which a suspension from the practice of law is
warranted.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Restituto S. Mendoza GUILTY of violation of Rules
13.02, Canon 21, 21.01 and 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt
of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar offense
in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into the records of Atty. Restituto S. Mendoza and
furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their information and guidance.

Atty. Mendoza is DIRECTED to INFORM the Court of the date of his receipt of this
Resolution so that the Court can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take
effect.

SO ORDERED.

A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and Inting, JJ., concur.

Leonen, J., on wellness leave.

Periquet v. NLRC, G.R. No. 91298

G.R. No. 91298 June 22, 1990

CORAZON PERIQUET, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and THE PHIL. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION (Formerly Construction Development Corp. of the Phils.), respondents.

Tabaquero, Albano & Associates for petitioner.

The Government Corporate Counsel for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

It is said that a woman has the privilege of changing her mind but this is usually allowed only in affairs of the heart where the rules are
permissibly inconstant. In the case before us, Corazon Periquet, the herein petitioner, exercised this privilege in connection with her work,
where the rules are not as fickle.

The petitioner was dismissed as toll collector by the Construction Development Corporation of the
Philippines, private respondent herein, for willful breach of trust and unauthorized possession of
accountable toll tickets allegedly found in her purse during a surprise inspection. Claiming she had
been "framed," she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and was sustained by the labor arbiter, who
ordered her reinstatement within ten days "without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and
with fun back wages to be computed from the date of her actual dismissal up to date of her actual
reinstatement." 1 On appeal, this order was affirmed in toto by public respondent NLRC on August
29, 1980. 2

On March 11, 1989, almost nine years later, the petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution of the decision. The motion was granted by the executive labor arbiter in an order dated
June 26, 1989, which required payment to the petitioner of the sum of P205,207.42 "by way of
implementing the balance of the judgment amount" due from the private respondent. 3 Pursuant
thereto, the said amount was garnished by the NLRC sheriff on July 12, 1989. 4 On September 11,
1989, however, the NLRC sustained the appeal of the CDCP and set aside the order dated June 20,
1989, the corresponding writ of execution of June 26, 1989, and the notice of garnishment. 5

In its decision, the public respondent held that the motion for execution was time-barred, having
been filed beyond the five-year period prescribed by both the Rules of Court and the Labor Code. It
also rejected the petitioner's claim that she had not been reinstated on time and ruled as valid the
two quitclaims she had signed waiving her right to reinstatement and acknowledging settlement in
full of her back wages and other benefits. The petitioner contends that this decision is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion and asks for its reversal. We shall affirm instead.

Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A judgment may be

executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it
becomes final and executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by
the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.

A similar provision is found in Art. 224 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, viz.

ART. 224. Execution of decision, orders, awards. — (a) The Secretary of Labor and
Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter or Med-
Arbiter, or the Voluntary Arbitrator may, motu propio, or on motion of any interested
party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it
becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute
or enforce a final decision, order or award. ...

The petitioner argues that the above rules are not absolute and cites the exception snowed
in Lancita v. Magbanua, 6 where the Court held:
 Where judgments are for money only and wholly unpaid, and execution has been
previously withheld in the interest of the judgment debtor, which is in financial
difficulties, the court has no discretion to deny motions for leave to issue execution
more than five years after the judgments are entered. (Application of Molnar,
Belinsky, et al. v. Long Is. Amusement Corp., I N.Y.S, 2d 866)

In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although there is authority
to the contrary, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when
execution is stayed, either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by
injunction, by the taking of an appeal or writ of error so as to operate as a
supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any interruption or delay
occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be issued
without scire facias.

xxx xxx xxx

There has been no indication that respondents herein had ever slept on their rights to
have the judgment executed by mere motions, within the reglementary period. The
statute of limitation has not been devised against those who wish to act but cannot
do so, for causes beyond their central.

Periquet insists it was the private respondent that delayed and prevented the execution of the
judgment in her favor, but that is not the way we see it. The record shows it was she who dilly-
dallied.

The original decision called for her reinstatement within ten days from receipt thereof following its
affirmance by the NLRC on August 29, 1980, but there is no evidence that she demanded her
reinstatement or that she complained when her demand was rejected. What appears is that she
entered into a compromise agreement with CDCP where she waived her right to reinstatement and
received from the CDCP the sum of P14,000.00 representing her back wages from the date of her
dismissal to the date of the agreement. 7

Dismissing the compromise agreement, the petitioner now claims she was actually reinstated only
on March 16, 1987, and so should be granted back pay for the period beginning November 28,
1978, date of her dismissal, until the date of her reinstatement. She conveniently omits to mention
several significant developments that transpired during and after this period that seriously cast doubt
on her candor and bona fides.

After accepting the sum of P14,000.00 from the private respondent and waiving her right to
reinstatement in the compromise agreement, the petitioner secured employment as kitchen
dispatcher at the Tito Rey Restaurant, where she worked from October 1982 to March 1987.
According to the certification issued by that business, 8 she received a monthly compensation of
P1,904.00, which was higher than her salary in the CDCP.

For reasons not disclosed by the record, she applied for re-employment with the CDCP and was on
March 16,1987, given the position of xerox machine operator with a basic salary of P1,030.00 plus
P461.33 in allowances, for a total of P1,491.33 monthly. 9

On June 27, 1988; she wrote the new management of the CDCP and asked that the rights granted
her by the decision dated August 29, 1980, be recognized because the waiver she had signed was
invalid. 10
On September 19, 1988, the Corporate Legal Counsel of the private respondent (now Philippine
National Construction Corporation) recommended the payment to the petitioner of the sum of
P9,544.00, representing the balance of her back pay for three years at P654. 00 per month (minus
the P14,000.00 earlier paid). 11

On November 10, 1988, the petitioner accepted this additional amount and signed another Quitclaim
and Release reading as follows:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

THAT, I CORAZON PERIQUET, of legal age, married and resident of No. 87 Annapolis St., Quezon
City, hereby acknowledged receipt of the sum of PESOS: NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
FORTY FOUR PESOS ONLY (P9,544.00) Philippine currency, representing the unpaid balance of
the back wages due me under the judgment award in NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79 entitled
"Corazon Periquet vs. PNCC- TOLLWAYS" and I further manifest that this payment is in full
satisfaction of all my claims/demands in the aforesaid case. Likewise, I hereby manifest that I had
voluntarily waived reinstatement to my former position as TOLL TELLER and in lieu thereof, I sought
and am satisfied with my present position as XEROX MACHINE OPERATOR in the Central Office.

Finally, I hereby certify that delay in my reinstatement, after finality of the Decision dated 10 May
1979 was due to my own fault and that PNCC is not liable thereto.

I hereby RELEASE AND DISCHARGE the said corporation and its officers from money and all
claims by way of unpaid wages, separation pay, differential pay, company, statutory and other
benefits or otherwise as may be due me in connection with the above-entitled case. I hereby state
further that I have no more claims or right of action of whatever nature, whether past, present, future
or contingent against said corporation and its officers, relative to NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 10th day of November 1988 at
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. (Emphasis supplied.) 12

The petitioner was apparently satisfied with the settlement, for in the memorandum she sent the
PNCC Corporate Legal Counsel on November 24, 1988, 13 she said in part:

Sir, this is indeed my chance to express my gratitude to you and all others who have
helped me and my family enjoy the fruits of my years of stay with PNCC by way of
granting an additional amount of P9,544.00 among others ...

As per your recommendation contained therein in said memo, I am now occupying

the position of xerox machine operator and is (sic) presently receiving a monthly
salary of P2,014.00.

Reacting to her inquiry about her entitlement to longevity pay, yearly company increases and other
statutory benefits, the private respondent adjusted her monthly salary from P2,014.00 to P3,588.00
monthly.

Then the lull. Then the bombshell.

On March 11, 1989, she filed the motion for execution that is now the subject of this petition.
It is difficult to understand the attitude of the petitioner, who has blown hot and cold, as if she does
not know her own mind. First she signed a waiver and then she rejected it; then she signed another
waiver which she also rejected, again on the ground that she had been deceived. In her first waiver,
she acknowledged full settlement of the judgment in her favor, and then in the second waiver, after
accepting additional payment, she again acknowledged fun settlement of the same judgment. But
now she is singing a different tune.

In her petition she is now disowning both acknowledgments and claiming that the earlier payments
both of which she had accepted as sufficient, are insufficient. They were valid before but they are not
valid now. She also claimed she was harassed and cheated by the past management of the CDCP
and sought the help of the new management of the PNCC under its "dynamic leadership." But now
she is denouncing the new management-for also tricking her into signing the second quitclaim.

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily
entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be
disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver
was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable
on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that
the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and
the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as
a valid and binding undertaking. As in this case.

The question may be asked: Why did the petitioner sign the compromise agreement of September
16, 1980, and waive all her rights under the judgment in consideration of the cash settlement she
received? It must be remembered that on that date the decision could still have been elevated
on certiorari before this Court and there was still the possibility of its reversal. The petitioner
obviously decided that a bird in hand was worth two on the wing and so opted for the compromise
agreement. The amount she was then waiving, it is worth noting, had not yet come up to the
exorbitant sum of P205,207.42 that she was later to demand after the lapse of eight years.

The back pay due the petitioner need not detain us. We have held in countless cases that this
should be limited to three years from the date of the illegal dismissal, during which period (but not
beyond) the dismissed employee is deemed unemployed without the necessity of proof. 14 Hence,
the petitioner's contention that she should be paid from 1978 to 1987 must be rejected, and even
without regard to the fact (that would otherwise have been counted against her) that she was
actually employed during most of that period.

Finally, the petitioner's invocation of Article 223 of the Labor Code to question the failure of the
private respondent to file a supersedeas bond is not well-taken. As the Solicitor General correctly
points out, the bond is required only when there is an appeal from the decision with a monetary
award, not an order enforcing the decision, as in the case at bar.

As officers of the court, counsel are under obligation to advise their clients against making untenable
and inconsistent claims like the ones raised in this petition that have only needlessly taken up the
valuable time of this Court, the Solicitor General, the Government Corporate Counsel, and the
respondents. Lawyers are not merely hired employees who must unquestioningly do the bidding of
the client, however unreasonable this may be when tested by their own expert appreciation of the
pertinent facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. Counsel must counsel.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 12018 - ZENAIDA MARTIN-ORTEGA, COMPLAI ... NGELYN A. TADENA, RESPONDENT

January 29, 2020

A.C. No. 12018

ZENAIDA MARTIN-ORTEGA, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. ANGELYN A. TADENA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERALTA, C.J.:
Before the Court is a Complaint1 for disbarment, dated July 12, 2012, filed by complainant Zenaida
Martin-Ortega against respondent Atty. Angelyn A. Tadena for her alleged gross misconduct in the
representation of her client and husband of Zenaida, Leonardo G. Ortega, Jr., with respect to the
legal battle of the spouses.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In her complaint, Zenaida narrated that she was married to Leonardo but has been separated from
him since January 2011. From then on, she lived in a condominium unit located at 202A Centro
Plaza, Scout Torillo, South Triangle, Quezon City, while Leonardo lived at 15-B Palawan Tower, Bay
Gardens, Macapagal Avenue, Pasay City. Around 2:00p.m. on December 7, 2011, and while in
Davao City, she received a frantic phone call from Mr. Michael Fral, the building administrator of
Centro Plaza, informing her that her estranged husband, Leonardo, was at the lobby intimidating him
and the building's security guards to gain entry to her unit. She immediately called her personal
bodyguard, Mr. Allan A. Afable, to prevent Leonardo from entering said unit. Upon seeing Afable,
Leonardo angrily scolded him and asked, "Ikaw ba yung bodyguard ng asawa ko? Gusto ko
pumasok sa unit kasi maliligo ako. Asan na ang susi?" Afable apologized and said that he was
specifically instructed by Zenaida not to allow him to enter. Then, about five (5) to seven (7) armed
men came and asked him, "Ano bang problema dito pare? Bakit ayaw mong papasukin ang Bro
namin? Sya naman ang may-ari ng unit. Asan pala ang amo mo? Gusto mo bang masaktan?" The
men, however, left him alone as soon as responding policemen arrived.2

Not long after, Atty. Tadena arrived and introduced herself as Leonardo's counsel. She talked to the
policemen and when they left, she scolded Afable saying, "Walanghiya naman! Bakit ayaw mong
papasukin ang may-ari? Asan na ang susi? Idedemanda kita kapag di mo ibinigay ang susi!" But
Afable stood his ground. Atty. Tadena then called a locksmith to open the unit. When Afable tried to
stop them, she angrily shouted at him, "Sige, pipigilan mo kami? Gusto mo talagang mademanda?"
Feeling intimidated, Afable had no choice but to follow them to the unit as they forcibly opened its
door. He, however, took photographs of the incident. Upon gaining entry of the unit, Leonardo and
Atty. Tadena took pictures of the same, rummaged through Zenaida's personal belongings, and,
thereafter, padlocked the door. Zenaida then instructed Afable to report the incident at the nearest
police station. Subsequently, when Zenaida arrived at the unit from Davao City, she was surprised to
discover that missing therefrom were her laptop computer and twelve (12) assorted ladies' luxury
bags. She immediately summoned the security guard on duty who said that he saw Leonardo
carrying some items when the latter left the building. This incident prompted Zenaida to file a robbery
case against Leonardo and Atty. Tadena, as well as the instant administrative complaint against
Atty. Tadena.3

In her Answer,4 Atty. Tadena vehemently denied the accusations against her. She challenged the
pieces of evidence presented by Zenaida and insisted that she never threatened Afable. Neither did
she forcefully break into the subject condominium unit. Atty. Tadena argued that contrary to the
claims of Zenaida, Leonardo owned the unit and had previous access to it. That is why he felt
violated, embarrassed, and publicly humiliated when he waited at the lobby for more than seven (7)
hours just to gain entry to his own property. The acts of Zenaida, through Afable, as well as the
building administrator, in intimidating and preventing him from entering his own unit were clear
violations of his civil and constitutional rights. Thus, she merely fulfilled her duty to defend
Leonardo's rights. She also pointed out that Zenaida's accusation of robbery against her and
Leonardo was a mere fabrication so she can use it as one of her defenses in the adultery case they
filed against her. There, she relied on the argument that Leonardo's evidence, consisting of video
recordings, is inadmissible because it was illegally obtained during the robbery. Moreover, Atty.
Tadena refuted the insinuation that the Louis Vuitton bag she was seen holding in her Facebook
account was stolen from Zenaida, stating that she purchased the same in a secondhand store. As to
the alleged missing Louis Vuitton bag of Zenaida, Leonardo countered that he cannot be charged of
any unlawful taking because he is the owner of the missing bag.5

In a Report and Recommendation6 dated November 8, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that Atty.
Tadena be admonished, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or equivalent acts shall be
dealt with more severely in the future.

In addition, on the basis of the new allegation of collusion made by Zenaida in her Supplemental
Affidavit7 and Rejoinder8 against Atty. Tadena, Atty. Eric Reginaldo, and Atty. Neil P. Cariaga, the
Investigating Commissioner further recommended that the Board of Governors (BOG) of the IBP
motu proprio initiate administrative proceedings against said parties by requiring them to explain why
they should not be held administratively liable for violation of the Lawyer's Oath and Code of
Professional Responsibility for an apparent collusion in the filing of the petition for annulment of
marriage of spouses Zenaida and Leonardo and/or for bribery.9

In her Rejoinder,10 Zenaida charged Atty. Tadena for colluding with Atty. Reginaldo and Atty.
Cariaga, then counsels of Zenaida, in the filing of the petition for annulment. She alleged that in a
meeting where said counsels, as well as Leonardo and herself, were present, the counsels were
discussing their plan of action on the petition. In support of her allegation, Zenaida presented Atty.
Tadena's e-mail message addressed to Atty. Cariaga, sent on November 16, 2011, which goes as
follows:

Dear Niel;

Yes, we will furnish you a copy of our draft petition within this week. Regarding the fees, our client
will shoulder the half of Php300,000 as agreed upon. As to the decision, just like we said, the
process will go through the regular procedure, but, certainly[,] it will not take a year or so. Rest
assured, same as Zeny, our client wants this to be settled soonest, too.

Thank you and keep in touch.

A. A. Tadena

Senior Legal Officer11

In a Resolution12 dated January 31, 2015, the BOG of the IBP approved, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner suspending Atty. Tadena from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months. The BOG further issued a Show Cause Order
against Attys. Tadena, Reginaldo and Cariaga to explain why they should not be held
administratively liable for violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
for an apparent collusion among them.

On October 26, 2015, Atty. Tadena filed a Motion for Reconsideration13 praying that the BOG
reconsider its resolution to suspend her for three (3) months. First, she reiterated that she merely
fulfilled her duty as counsel of Leonardo in defending his rights and the same does not constitute
gross misconduct amounting to her suspension. This is due to the fact that there was no legal (such
as a restraining order) nor even reasonable ground why Leonardo was being prevented from gaining
entry into the conjugal property he co-owned. Second, she argued that the challenged rulings were
anchored on hearsay allegations because Zenaida was not present during the December 7, 2011
incident, her basis being merely derived from phone calls with the building administrator and from
her bodyguard who executed an affidavit. But said bodyguard was never presented in any of the
other proceedings against Leonardo, such as an application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order/permanent protection order. Third, Atty. Tadena invited attention to the propensity
of Zenaida and her new lawyer, Atty. Ulysses Gallego, to file unfounded and frivolous suits against
her and her client Leonardo, such as: (1) a robbery case that was dismissed for lack of merit by the
Quezon City prosecutor; (2) a complaint for marital rape against Leonardo that was dismissed for
lack of merit by the Pasay City prosecutor; and (3) an administrative complaint against Judge
Tingaraan U. Guiling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City who granted support pendente
lite in favor of Leonardo in the main annulment case of the spouses. On appeal, the Court sustained
the ruling of Judge Guiling and held that the support was valid. Fourth, Atty. Tadena further invited
attention to the fact that on the contrary, the following cases she and Leonardo filed against Zenaida
were all meritorious and sustained: (1) an adultery case against Zenaida, supported by video clips of
Zenaida and her paramour kissing, as well as an affidavit of their helper who saw them having
sexual intercourse which was found to have probable cause by the Quezon City prosecutor who
subsequently filed an information and is now undergoing trial; (2) a libel case against Zenaida which
was found to have probable cause by the Pasay City prosecutor who subsequently filed an
information and is now undergoing trial; and (3) the annulment of marriage case where the video
clips were presented and which had already attained finality.

As for the allegation of collusion, Atty. Tadena argued that the same was merely an attempt of
Zenaida and her new counsel to save their plight. She countered that the prohibition of collusion
essentially pertains to the agreement on any of the legal grounds for annulment. But the agreement
in the instant case as to who will file the petition and as to sharing in the legal expenses is not a
ground for annulment and, hence, collusion cannot be inferred therefrom. In fact, legal expenses for
annulment are necessary expenses that may be taken from the conjugal asset. In effect, there is
actually sharing in expenses by the spouses in any annulment case.14

Subsequently, in another Resolution15 dated May 27, 2017, the BOG granted Atty. Tadena's Motion
for Reconsideration and restored the earlier recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to
impose on Atty. Tadena the penalty of admonition with stem warning, including the show cause
order against Attys. Tadena, Reginaldo, and Cariaga.

The Court's Ruling

After a judicious review of the instant case, we affirm the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and admonish Atty. Tadena, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or
equivalent acts shall be dealt with more severely in the future.

Prefatorily, it must be noted that the complaint against Atty. Tadena is essentially predicated on the
allegation that she violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when she gravely intimidated
and hurled expletives at Zenaida's bodyguard, Afable, and, subsequently, led the forceful opening of
Zenaida's condominium unit. In support of said contention, Zenaida presented an affidavit executed
by Afable, as well as Police Reports dated December 7, 201116 and December 21,
2011,17 certifying that Afable personally appeared at the Kamuning Police Station to report the
incident. The Police Reports provide as follows:

At this time and date[,] repartee one ALLAN AFABLE y ANACTA, 37 years old, security guard
(Dasia Davao Security and Investigation Agency) native of Samar and residing at No. 38[,] Amparo
Subd.[,] Baco St.[,] Novaliches, Quezon City, personally appeared before this Station and requested
an incident be put on record. That on or about 2:00PM, December 7, 2011[,] he arrived at Centro
Plaza located at Scout Madrinian St. comer Scout Torillo St.[,] Brgy. South Triangle, Quezon City
and saw Dr. Leo Ortega[,] the husband of his VIP Dra. Zenaida D. Martin; that on or about 4:00pm of
same date[,] three policemen arrived (SPO2 San Jose, SPO1 Ticobay and PO2 Balisi) and
approached Dr. Leo Ortega and the latter introduced that he is the husband of Dra. Zenaida Martin[,]
the BPSO also arrived[,] however[,] Dr. Leo Ortega instructed his man to destroy the padlock
(doorlock) and entered the house.

When inside[,] reportee followed and took pictures of the appliances and other valuable items and
Dr. Leo Ortega also took pictures and left the unit and padlocked it with another key door lock.

xxxx

At this time and date, one Allan Afable y Anacta, 37 years old, married[,] close-in security[,]
personally appeared before this Station and reported that at about 3:00PM[,] December 21, 2011[,]
his employer Dra. Zenaida D. Martin discovered that her twelve (12) pcs. of assorted handbags in
different brands composed of Louis Vitton, Prada, Coach and Michael [Kors], worth One (1) Million
Pesos were discovered missing[,] allegedly taken by her Ex-Husband Dr. Leo Ortega sometime on
December 7, 2011.

Noteworthy to mention that Teddy and Sally Ortega[,] with a certain Maribel[,] entered x x x Unit 201-
B JJB Centro Plaza without the consent and permission from Dra. Zenaida Martin. Hence this
report.18 (Emphases supplied)

As can be gleaned from the above excerpts, however, and as duly pointed out by Atty. Tadena,
Afable made no declaration as to the alleged intimidation and participation of Atty. Tadena in the
forceful opening of the condominium unit. In fact, nowhere in the aforequoted police reports, made
on two (2) separate days, was Atty. Tadena's name even stated. In both accounts, Afable merely
identified Dr. Leo Ortega as the perpetrator of the break-in, with the help of his man." He even
mentioned the names of Teddy, Sally Ortega, and Maribel, as those who accompanied Dr. Leo
Ortega inside the subject premises. But again, he made no statement as to the participation, if any,
of Atty. Tadena therein. As such, the Court finds it rather difficult to reasonably admit as true Afable's
allegations in his affidavit on Atty. Tadena's alleged indiscretions of threats and breaking into private
property. If, indeed, Atty. Tadena scolded Afable and forcefully opened Zenaida's unit, he should
have, at least, mentioned her name in the police reports he made on two separate days - on the day
of the alleged incident on December 7, 2011 and on the day Zenaida arrived from Davao City on
December 21, 2011 - and not merely on the Affidavit19 he executed on January 25, 2012, almost
two (2) months after the event.

Thus, while we have, in the past, suspended lawyers who wrongfully asserted their clients' rights
outside the bounds of the law,20 we cannot do so if the allegations against them are not
satisfactorily proven by the complainants. Time and again, the Court has ruled that in administrative
proceedings, complainants bear the burden of proving the allegations in their complaints by
substantial evidence21 or that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.22 In the present case, it cannot be denied that complainant
Zenaida failed to discharge that burden. As previously discussed, her bodyguard and witness
curiously failed to declare Atty. Tadena's alleged misconduct in his police reports. Neither did he
explain the reason for his omission. Apart from this, what cast more doubt on Zenaida's claims are
the photographs she presented, supposedly showing Atty. Tadena in the act of breaking into her
condominium unit.23 But these photographs are, at best, mere abstract illustrations that are
extremely blurred. There is, therefore, an undeniable uncertainty surrounding the issues of whether
Atty. Tadena, indeed, threatened Zenaida's bodyguard and whether she actually participated in the
forceful opening of the subject condominium unit.

The Court is, however, one with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that Atty. Tadena
must, nonetheless, be admonished with warning that a repetition of the same acts will be dealt with
more severely. What have been established by the records are the facts that Leonardo has been
living separately from Zenaida since January 2011 and that he has, in fact, filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage in November 2011. These show that the parties have already
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court where the petition was pending. Verily, said court had
jurisdiction to consider and rule upon the property relations of the spouses which necessarily include
the subject condominium unit. All questions, therefore, pertaining to the administration, possession,
and ownership thereof had to be addressed before said court by way of filing a pleading and/or
arguing before the judge and certainly not before the building administrator, police officer, or
personal bodyguard in a condominium lobby. Accordingly, while it cannot be ruled with certainty that
Atty. Tadena truly engaged in threats, intimidation, and the forcible entry into the subject property,
the Court agrees with the Investigating Commissioner when he held that at the very least, Atty.
Tadena could have advised her client to file and make the proper representation before the court,
instead of surreptitiously entering the premises.24

Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the expense of truth
and the administration of justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer has the
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly
delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. While lawyers
owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client's right,
they should not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every
effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Their office does not permit
violation of the law or any manner of fraud or chicanery. A lawyer's responsibility to protect and
advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and
malicious intentions against the other party. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession,
they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. They advance the honor of their profession and
the best interests of their clients when they render service or give advice that meets the strictest
principles of moral law.25

In response to the Show Cause Resolution,26 dated March 25, 2019, against Attys. Tadena,
Reginaldo and Cariaga requiring them to explain why they should not be held administratively liable
for an apparent collusion, Atty. Tadena reiterated that the charge of collusion, that is prohibited by
law, must relate to the grounds of annulment that the parties agree to use in the petition for nullity of
marriage. But the subject e-mail communication between her and the counsels involved cannot
constitute collusion because it was merely about a split of legal expenses duly allowed under the
law. Atty. Tadena went on to add that the annulment case they filed, which has now attained finality,
was duly approved by the Public Prosecutor to have no collusion and had, subsequently, gone
through the rigorous trial in the RTC of Pasay City. Hence, she insists that she cannot be held
administratively liable for collusion.27 The same arguments were interposed by Atty. Reginaldo in
his response,28 while Atty. Cariaga has yet to comply with the Show Cause Resolution.

WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated May 27, 2017. Thus, Atty. Angelyn A. Tadena is hereby
ADMONISHED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or equivalent acts shall be
dealt with more severely in the future.

Further, the Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to INITIATE administrative proceedings
against Atty. Angelyn A. Tadena, Atty. Eric Reginaldo and Atty. Neil F. Cariaga for their apparent
collusion in the filing of the petition for annulment of marriage of spouses Leonardo Ortega, Jr. and
Zenaida Martin-Ortega.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this
Decision to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr., Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 8243 - Rolando B. Pacana, Jr. v. Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez

A.C. No. 8243 July 24, 2009

ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:
This case stems from an administrative complaint 1 filed by Rolando Pacana, Jr. against Atty. Maricel
Pascual-Lopez charging the latter with flagrant violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.2 Complainant alleges that respondent committed acts constituting conflict of interest,
dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure to render an accounting of all the money and properties
received by her from complainant.

On January 2, 2002, complainant was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications
Corporation (MCC). MCC is an affiliate company of Multitel International Holdings Corporation
(Multitel). Sometime in July 2002, MCC changed its name to Precedent Communications
Corporation (Precedent).3

According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel was besieged by demand letters from its members
and investors because of the failure of its investment schemes. He alleges that he earned the ire of
Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and
after being appointed as trustee of a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (₱30,000,000.00)
deposited at Real Bank.

Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent who also happened to be a member of the
Couples for Christ, a religious organization where complainant and his wife were also active
members. From then on, complainant and respondent constantly communicated, with the former
disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedent’s relation with Multitel.
Respondent gave legal advice to complainant and even helped him prepare standard quitclaims for
creditors. In sum, complainant avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established between him
and respondent although no formal document was executed by them at that time. A Retainer
Agreement4 dated January 15, 2003 was proposed by respondent. Complainant, however, did not
sign the said agreement because respondent verbally asked for One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱100,000.00) as acceptance fee and a 15% contingency fee upon collection of the overpayment
made by Multitel to Benefon,5 a telecommunications company based in Finland. Complainant found
the proposed fees to be prohibitive and not within his means.6 Hence, the retainer agreement
remained unsigned.7

After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter from respondent 8 asking
for the return and immediate settlement of the funds invested by respondent’s clients in Multitel.
When complainant confronted respondent about the demand letter, the latter explained that she had
to send it so that her clients – defrauded investors of Multitel – would know that she was doing
something for them and assured complainant that there was nothing to worry about. 9

Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the persistent demands
made by Multitel investors against complainant. On these occasions, respondent impressed upon
complainant that she can closely work with officials of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC),
the Department of Justice (DOJ), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportations (BID),10 and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)11 to
resolve complainant’s problems. Respondent also convinced complainant that in order to be
absolved from any liability with respect to the investment scam, he must be able to show to the DOJ
that he was willing to divest any and all of his interests in Precedent including the funds assigned to
him by Multitel.12

Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for safekeeping to be used only for his
case whenever necessary. Complainant agreed and gave her an initial amount of ₱900,000.00
which was received by respondent herself.13 Sometime thereafter, complainant again gave
respondent ₱1,000,000.00.14 Said amounts were all part of Precedent’s collections and sales
proceeds which complainant held as assignee of the company’s properties. 15
When complainant went to the United States (US), he received several messages from respondent
sent through electronic mail (e-mail) and short messaging system (SMS, or text messages) warning
him not to return to the Philippines because Rosario Baladjay, president of Multitel, was arrested and
that complainant may later on be implicated in Multitel’s failed investment system. Respondent even
said that ten (10) arrest warrants and a hold departure order had been issued against him.
Complainant, thereafter, received several e-mail messages from respondent updating him of the
status of the case against Multitel and promised that she will settle the matter discreetly with
government officials she can closely work with in order to clear complainant’s name. 16 In two
separate e-mail messages,17 respondent again asked money from complainant, ₱200,000 of which
was handed by complainant’s wife while respondent was confined in Saint Luke’s Hospital after
giving birth,18 and another ₱700,000 allegedly to be given to the NBI. 19

Through respondent’s persistent promises to settle all complainant’s legal problems, respondent was
able to convince complainant who was still in the US to execute a deed of assignment in favor of
respondent allowing the latter to retrieve 178 boxes containing cellular phones and accessories
stored in complainant’s house and inside a warehouse. 20 He also signed a blank deed of sale
authorizing respondent to sell his 2002 Isuzu Trooper. 21

Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may not be able to handle his legal problems,
complainant was advised by his family to hire another lawyer. When respondent knew about this,
she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as follows:

Dear Butchie,

Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your friend and lawyer.
The charges are all non-bailable but all the same as the SEC report I told you before. The findings
are the same, i.e. your company was the front for the fraud of Multitel and that funds were provided
you.

I anticipated this, that is why I really pushed for a quitclaim. Rolly is willing to return the Crosswind,
laptap (sic) and [P]alm [P]ilot. Manny Cancio really helped. Anthony na lang. Then, I will need the
accounting of all the funds you received from the sale of the phones, every employees and
directors[’] quitclaim (including yours), the funds transmitted to the clients through me, the funds you
utilized, and whatelse (sic) is still unremitted, every centavo must be accounted for as DOJ and NBI
can have the account opened.

I will also need the P30 M proof of deposit with Real [B]ank and the trust given [to] you. So we can
inform them [that] it was not touched by you.

I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I know him very well
as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you hire him but I will be hands off. I work
differently kasi. In this cases (sic), you cannot be highprofile (sic) because it is the clients who will be
sacrificed at the expense of the fame of the lawyer. I have to work quietly and discreetly. No funfare.
Just like what I did for your guys in the SEC. I have to work with people I am comfortable with. Efren
Santos will sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work. He can help with all his connections.
Val’s friend in the NBI is the one is (sic) charge of organized crime who is the entity (sic) who has
your warrant. My law partner was the state prosecutor for financial fraud. Basically we have it
covered in all aspects and all departments. I am just trying to liquidate the phones I have allotted for
you s ana (sic) for your trooper kasi whether we like it or not, we have to give this agencies (sic) to
make our work easier according to Val. The funds with Mickey are already accounted in the quit
claims (sic) as attorneys (sic) fees. I hope he will be able to send it so we have funds to work with.
As for your kids, legally they can stay here but recently, it is the children who (sic) the irate clients
and government officials harass and kidnap to make the individuals they want to come out from
hiding (sic). I do not want that to happen. Things will be really easier on my side.

Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire Coco, I will give him
the free hand to work with your case. Please trust me. I have never let you down, have I? I told you
this will happen but we are ready and prepared. The clients who received the phones will stand by
you and make you the hero in this scandal. I will stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST
me! That is all. You have an angel on your side. Always pray though to the best legal mind up there.
You will be ok!

Candy22

On July 4, 2003, contrary to respondent’s advice, complainant returned to the country. On the eve of
his departure from the United States, respondent called up complainant and conveniently informed
him that he has been cleared by the NBI and the BID. 23

About a month thereafter, respondent personally met with complainant and his wife and told them
that she has already accumulated ₱12,500,000.00 as attorney’s fees and was willing to give
₱2,000,000.00 to complainant in appreciation for his help. Respondent allegedly told complainant
that without his help, she would not have earned such amount. Overwhelmed and relieved,
complainant accepted respondent’s offer but respondent, later on, changed her mind and told
complainant that she would instead invest the ₱2,000,000.00 on his behalf in a business venture.
Complainant declined and explained to respondent that he and his family needed the money instead
to cover their daily expenses as he was no longer employed. Respondent allegedly agreed, but she
failed to fulfill her promise.24

Respondent even publicly announced in their religious organization that she was able to help settle
the ten (10) warrants of arrest and hold departure order issued against complainant and narrated
how she was able to defend complainant in the said cases.25

By April 2004, however, complainant noticed that respondent was evading him. Respondent would
either refuse to return complainant’s call or would abruptly terminate their telephone conversation,
citing several reasons. This went on for several months. 26 In one instance, when complainant asked
respondent for an update on the collection of Benefon’s obligation to Precedent which respondent
had previously taken charge of, respondent arrogantly answered that she was very busy and that
she would read Benefon’s letter only when she found time to do so.

On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed with respondent’s arrogance and evasiveness,
complainant wrote respondent a letter formally asking for a full accounting of all the money,
documents and properties given to the latter. 27 Respondent rendered an accounting through a letter
dated December 20, 2004.28 When complainant found respondent’s explanation to be inadequate,
he wrote a latter expressing his confusion about the accounting. 29 Complainant repeated his request
for an audited financial report of all the properties turned over to her; otherwise, he will be
constrained to file the appropriate case against respondent. 30 Respondent replied,31 explaining that
all the properties and cash turned over to her by complainant had been returned to her clients who
had money claims against Multitel. In exchange for this, she said that she was able to secure
quitclaim documents clearing complainant from any liability.32 Still unsatisfied, complainant decided
to file an affidavit-complaint33 against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of respondent.
In her Answer-Affidavit,34 respondent vehemently denied being the lawyer for Precedent. She
maintained that no formal engagement was executed between her and complainant. She claimed
that she merely helped complainant by providing him with legal advice and assistance because she
personally knew him, since they both belonged to the same religious organization. 35 lavvph!1

Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel and that she merely
mediated in the settlement of the claims her clients had against the complainant. She also averred
that the results of the settlement between both parties were fully documented and accounted
for.36 Respondent believes that her act in helping complainant resolve his legal problem did not
violate any ethical standard and was, in fact, in accord with Rule 2.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.37

To bolster her claim that the complaint was without basis, respondent noted that a complaint for
estafa was also filed against her by complainant before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon
City citing the same grounds. The complaint was, however, dismissed by Assistant City Prosecutor
Josephus Joannes H. Asis for insufficiency of evidence. 38 Respondent argued that on this basis
alone, the administrative case must also be dismissed.

In her Position Paper,39 respondent also questioned the admissibility of the electronic evidence
submitted by complainant to the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline. Respondent maintained that
the e-mail and the text messages allegedly sent by respondent to complainant were of doubtful
authenticity and should be excluded as evidence for failure to conform to the Rules on Electronic
Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC).

After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued a Report and
Recommendation40 finding that a lawyer-client relationship was established between respondent and
complainant despite the absence of a written contract. The Investigating Commissioner also
declared that respondent violated her duty to be candid, fair and loyal to her client when she allowed
herself to represent conflicting interests and failed to render a full accounting of all the cash and
properties entrusted to her. Based on these grounds, the Investigating Commissioner recommended
her disbarment.

Respondent moved for reconsideration,41 but the IBP Board of Governors issued a
Recommendation42 denying the motion and adopting the findings of the Investigating Commissioner.

The case now comes before this Court for final action.

We affirm the findings of the IBP.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides:

Rule 15.03 – A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.

This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste43 and, more importantly, upon
necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with
the client’s case, including its weak and strong points. Such knowledge must be considered sacred
and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given to him to take advantage of his client; for if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof. 44 It behooves lawyers not only to
keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double ─
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is
paramount in the administration of justice.45 It is for these reasons that we have described the
attorney-client relationship as one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. 46

Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating with
complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually
led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot shield herself from the
inevitable consequences of her actions by simply saying that the assistance she rendered to
complainant was only in the form of "friendly accommodations,"47 precisely because at the time she
was giving assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing parties
who had been referred to her by the SEC.48

Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that no written
contract for the engagement of her services was ever forged between her and complainant. 49 This
argument all the more reveals respondent’s patent ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts and
of basic ethical standards expected from an advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it said:

The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional
relationship between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is
sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter
pertinent to his profession.50 (Emphasis supplied.) 1awphi1

Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should have done was
either to advise complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already
representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and
stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to
double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.

In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,51 we explained the concept of conflict of interest, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue
or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only
cases in which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of
the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client
in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation
to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.52

Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainant’s hapless situation, initially, by giving him
legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, respondent
impressed upon complainant that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the
properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was
also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she
was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel. Respondent herself admitted
to complainant that without the latter’s help, she would not have been able to earn as much and that,
as a token of her appreciation, she was willing to share some of her earnings with
complainant.53 Clearly, respondent’s act is shocking, as it not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility,54 but also toyed with decency and good taste.

Respondent even had the temerity to boast that no Multitel client had ever complained of
respondent’s unethical behavior.55 This remark indubitably displays respondent’s gross ignorance of
disciplinary procedure in the Bar. As a member of the Bar, she is expected to know that proceedings
for disciplinary actions against any lawyer may be initiated and prosecuted by the IBP Board of
Governors, motu proprio or upon referral by this Court or by the Board of Officers of an IBP
Chapter56 even if no private individual files any administrative complaint.

Upon review, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, on the admissibility of the
electronic evidence submitted by complainant. We, accordingly, adopt the same in toto.

Finally, respondent argues that the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar her on
the grounds of deceit, malpractice and other gross misconduct, aside from violation of the Lawyer’s
Oath, has been rendered moot and academic by voluntary termination of her IBP membership,
allegedly after she had been placed under the Department of Justice’s Witness Protection
Program.57 Convenient as it may be for respondent to sever her membership in the integrated bar,
this Court cannot allow her to do so without resolving first this administrative case against her.

The resolution of the administrative case filed against respondent is necessary in order to determine
the degree of her culpability and liability to complainant. The case may not be dismissed or rendered
moot and academic by respondent’s act of voluntarily terminating her membership in the Bar
regardless of the reason for doing so. This is because membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions.58 The conduct of a lawyer may make him or her civilly, if not criminally, liable to his
client or to third parties, and such liability may be conveniently avoided if this Court were to allow
voluntary termination of membership. Hence, to terminate one’s membership in the Bar voluntarily, it
is imperative that the lawyer first prove that the voluntary withdrawal of membership is not a ploy to
further prejudice the public or to evade liability. No such proof exists in the present case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez is hereby DISBARRED for representing

conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her
Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent’s record as a member of the Bar, and notice
of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice