Bibliographic Essay:

British Airborne Coup de Main Operations during the Second World War.

Would it have been possible to capture the Arnhem Bridges by such an operation?

Abstract

___________________________________________________________________________

This essay examines the available literature and explores what primary sources are available

which cover three key British airborne operations of the Second World War: The Bruneval

Raid, the capture of Pegasus Bridge, and the failure to capture Arnhem Bridge. The primary

focus is to question why a coup de main operation was not launched at Arnhem to capture the

bridge when similar missions had been very successful.

Introduction

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Since the end of the Second World War there has been a great interest in the employment of

airborne forces. During this conflict a new method of deploying military forces would be

used en mass – airborne warfare. Carefully employment of gliders and paratroopers were

used by both Allied and Axis forces to seize key objectives during campaign, secure flanks

for seaborne landings, or used independently during raids - striking fear into the hearts of the

enemy. Parachute and glider operations captured the imagination of the public during and

after the war. Much literature has been published and in recent years there has been a surge in

books published about this subject.

Three British airborne operations during the Second World War are of particular relevance to

the study of this subject. The Bruneval Raid / Operation Biting (Bruneval, France, February

1942); the Capture of the Caen Canal / Orne Bridges / Operation (Benouville, France, June

1944); & the attempt to capture Arnhem bridges / Operation Market Garden (Arnhem,

Netherlands, September 1944). Why should these apparently well-examined and amply

written military operations be re-examined? The failure at Arnhem is often used as an

example of why airborne forces should not be used. Was the failure at Arnhem as clear cut as

people seem to believe it was? A genuine question remains about the failure to capture the

Arnhem bridges in September 1944: Could the bridges at Arnhem have been captured had a

bold coup de main operation have been launched? This question is the primary focus of this

essay. Available literature will be reviewed, both older and more recent, and explored. In

addition other primary sources available will be investigated to see if more light can be shed

on this controversial subject.

The Development of Airborne Warfare

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The concept of delivering soldiers by parachute or other aerial means was not a new one. The

first successful ascent of a hot air balloon was made in Paris in 1783. Within a very short time

people started to view these as a means of deploying soldiers, with the first military use at the

Battle of Fluerus in 1794 where a balloon was used for observation. Shortly after this the first

successful parachute descent was made from a balloon. Despite these early developments

balloons and parachutes remained novelties until the early twentieth century. During the First

World War the concept of delivering parachutists using powered aircraft was theorised and in

1918 American General Billy Mitchell proposed training the US First Infantry Division with
2
parachutes and dropping them behind German lines.1 The end of the war prevented the

implementation of this. During the 1920s and 1930s various experiments with military

parachutists were made, particularly by the Soviet Union. The development of larger

transport aircraft made it much easier to transport large numbers of parachutists. The first

‘mass drop’ was made in 1935 during manoeuvres by the Soviet army when 3,000

paratroopers were dropped. The development of gliders also gained pace during the 1930s but

it was not until 1938 that the world’s first glider-borne unit was formed in Germany. Britain

did not establish glider units until late 1941. Initially most countries (except the Soviet

Union) viewed paratroopers and glider troops as saboteurs / raiders who could attack the

enemy using small units. The first large scale use of parachute / glider-borne airborne forces

in war was by the Germans in April / May 1940 during the invasions of Scandinavia and the

Low Countries. They were dropped / landed in units from platoon to regiment size to capture

bridges and airfields or block roads. The most dramatic operation was the capture of the

Belgian Fort at Eben-Emael near Maastricht. Following these successes by Germany both

Britain and the USA ordered the establishment of airborne forces during the summer of 1940.

Operation Biting, Bruneval, France, 1942

___________________________________________________________________________

The range of books that trace the development of airborne forces is numerous however

relatively few have been written about Operation Biting. This raid at Bruneval on the coast of

Upper Normandy north of Le Havre occurred on the night of 27 / 27 February 1942. The

Bruneval raid, as it is often referred to, was not the first use of airborne forces by Britain but

1 James A. Bassett, ‘Past Airborne Employment’ in Military Affairs, xii, no. 4 (1948) pp. 206-216.
3
it was the first successful and highly publicised operation. The previous year the fledgling

‘paras’ had attacked an aqueduct with very limited success.

The four most comprehensive books covering this operation are Colonel Gilbert Renault’s

Bruneval, Opération coup de croc (Paris, 1968); George Millar’s The Bruneval Raid:

Stealing Hitler’s Radar (London, 1974); Major-General John Frost’s A Drop too Many

(London, 1980); Taylor Downing’s Night Raid (London, 2013); Other books of relevance

include Colonel Gilbert Renault’s The Silent Company (London, 1946) and Ken Ford’s The

Bruneval Raid: Operation Biting 1942 (Oxford 2010). Journal articles which mention the

Bruneval raid are not readily available and a search revealed no articles written specifically

about the raid.

The French resistance played an essential role in providing intelligence for the raid at

Bruneval. Colonel Gilbert Renault was a French resistance leader and wrote several books

about his experiences about the war. His book The Silent Company (London, 1946) relates to

his experiences throughout the war and while it does refer to the Bruneval raid it does not go

into much detail about it. At the time it was written most of the primary source documents

would still have been classified. His later work Bruneval, Opération coup de croc (Paris,

1968) provides a much more in depth narrative and analysis of how the resistance penetrated

German security in the region and were able to clandestinely gather information.

Unfortunately this book is not currently available in English.

For many years George Millar’s The Bruneval Raid: Stealing Hitler’s Radar (London, 1974)

was the only significant English language book about the operation. With a foreword by
4
Admiral Louis Mountbatten (chief of Combined Operations during the Second World War),

at two hundred pages this book concisely narrates the story of radar, British preparations for

the raid, the French resistance role and the German reaction. Millar’s work also includes a

very useful series of notes discussing his sources. Millar was in a fortunate position to be able

to interview many of the participants of the raid including the commander of C Company 2

Parachute Battalion, Major General John Frost (Frost had been a Major at the time of the

raid), the German-Jewish interpreter Private Newman and one of the key figures in the

development of radar R.V. Jones. While the book is concise and informative it only gives a

brief overview of the actual conduct of the raid. Missing from Millar’s book is the German

side of the story.

Major General John Frost’s A Drop too Many (London, 1980) recounts his entire service

throughout the Second World War. Frost finished the war in German captivity following the

Battle of Arnhem and was a legend in the British airborne forces making four combat

parachute jumps at Bruneval, Tunisia, Sicily, and Arnhem. Frost’s book was written almost

forty years after the Bruneval raid, however it can be considered as a primary source as it was

based on his diaries and memoirs written during the war. Only one chapter of the book is

dedicated to the raid and it recounts the raid from his personal perspective. It by no means

gives a complete picture of the raid as Frost was located with one of four parties of the

company that attacked the radar installation. He unfortunately did not provide additional

sources of information in the book.

The most recent and most comprehensive book about the Bruneval raid is Taylor Downing’s

Night Raid (London, 2013). This book is based on a wide array of primary and secondary
5
sources and includes an extensive and useful bibliography and notes. Downing’s account,

while being very detailed is easy to read and provides far more information than any other

work discussed hitherto. Significantly it also used German sources, giving a more complete

picture of the raid which has not been covered in detail in any other work. The actual raid

itself, which only lasted under three hours, is covered by eighty pages of text.

The bulk of Primary source material covering Operation Biting is located at the National

Archives in Kew, London. Kew holding fifteen files of documents produced before and after

the operation. These include training photographs (PRO: DEFE 2/103), photographs of

captured radar equipment (PRO: AVIA 26/291), technical reports (PRO: AIR 20/1546, PRO:

AVIA 26/1872), intelligence reports (PRO: AIR 40/3057, PRO: DEFE 40/2), operation

reports (PRO: WO 199/3230), Prime Ministers correspondence / reports (PRO: PREM 3/73).

Another key repository of primary source material is the Airborne Assault section at the

Imperial War Museum, Duxford. This archive includes operations orders, after action

reviews, models, firsthand accounts / reports, interviews of veterans, pre-raid intelligence

documents, aircraft manifests, aerial photographs, maps, memorandums and photographs.2

The Imperial War Museum, Lambeth, London, contains a similarly large amount of material

about the raid but also includes recordings of interviews with veterans.

Aftermath of the Bruneval Raid

___________________________________________________________________________

The Bruneval raid could not have come at a better time for British morale. More setbacks had

recently happened to the British. Singapore had fallen, German U-Boats were again sinking

2 Airborne Assault (www.paradata.org) (9 Jan 2014)

6
vast amounts of Allied shipping and the arrival of American forces in Europe was still over

the horizon. Within days, newsreels across Britain relayed pictures of the returning paras

from France and of captured German soldiers. The purpose of the raid at the time, to capture

radar equipment, was kept secret. The formation of British airborne forces had been justified

and their development progressed at a quicker pace. With their new distinctive maroon beret

the paratroopers and glider troops were now an effective way of bringing the fight to the

enemy’s doorstep, even if a full-scale invasion of the continent was a long way off. Other

airborne missions followed including a drop in Tunisia to capture an airfield and landings in

Sicily to capture bridges. The most spectacular mission of the British Airborne forces would

come with the invasion of France in June 1944. The plan was simple: Land six gliders beside

two bridges and capture them intact – at night.

Operation Tonga, Benouville, France, June 1944

___________________________________________________________________________

The action at Benouville, astride the Orne Canal and River Orne, was described as the

greatest feat of flying of the second world war" by Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-

Mallory, the Commander in Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force.3 D Company of the

2nd Battalion, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry under the command of Major

John Howard landed beside their objectives at 0015hrs on D-Day, 6 June 1944. Some gliders

landed as close as forty metres from their objective at what has become known as ‘Pegasus

Bridge’. With less than two hundred men Howard secured the two bridges in fifteen minutes.

The mission which had been planned for months, with some of the most skilled pilots of the

Glider Pilot Regiment flying the Horsa gliders was an outstanding success. Key to this were

3 Stephen Ambrose, Pegasus Bridge (London, 1985), p. 95.

7
the precise and risky rehearsals, landing beside mock-ups of the targets in England. Despite

the bridges being fitted with demolition charges the landing was so quick and with such

surprise that the German sentries did not have time to blow the bridges.

Despite the capture of Orne / Caen Canal bridges being well known due to featuring in films

such as the Longest Day and having a dedicated museum in Benouville, there are surprisingly

only a few books written specifically about the operation. These are Stephen Ambrose’s

Pegasus Bridge, D-Day: The Daring British Airborne Raid (London, 1985); Penny Bates’

The Pegasus Diaries (2006); and Neil Barber’s The Pegasus and Orne Bridges: Their

Capture, Defence and Relief on D-Day (Barnsley, 2009). Another book which covers the

operation is Tim Lynch’s Silent Skies: Gliders at War 1939-1945 (Barnsley, 2008).

Perhaps the most well known book written about the Pegasus Bridge operation is Stephen E.

Ambrose’s Pegasus Bridge, D-Day: The Daring British Airborne Raid (London, 1985).

Ambrose was a popular historian who was best known for his book Band of Brothers. His

narrative about the Pegasus Bridge operation was written following a chance encounter with

Major Howard in 1981. The bulk of his research was done by interviewing veterans of the

operation and cross checking the various versions of events by comparing interviews or using

official documents. At two hundred pages and with a simple layout and narrative Ambrose’s

Pegasus Bridge is easily read. Ambrose notes that following the successful execution of the

coup de main operation D Company were kept ‘in the line’ for a further three months.

Ambrose argued that Howard and his men should have been withdrawn from Normandy due

to their specialised training, and used again in similar operations. ‘It is indeed a mystery why

the War Office squandered D Company. It was an asset of priceless value, a unique company
8
in the whole British Army.’ He went even further writing: ‘...the War Office allowed D

Company to bleed nearly to death in front of the German guns...’4

A more recent, though less well known, version of the events at Benouville is Neil Barber’s

The Pegasus and Orne Bridges: Their Capture, Defence and Relief on D-Day (Barnsley,

2009). Like Ambrose, Barber felt that it was important that more information should be

available about this iconic mission. Where other books focus mostly on Howard and the coup

de main operation, Barber’s gives much greater attention to the events following the capture

of the bridges. It also recounts the actions of the other units which defended the bridges and

recognises the contribution of the French Resistance in gathering crucial information and

intelligence about the area and the defenders. Rather than attempt to specify exact timings

Barber goes to great pains to keep the events in chronological order. Like Ambrose’s work

Barber’s uses interviews as his primary source of information. Barber’s book uses a different

method to Ambrose’s to get across the information. Most of the book is quotes from

interviews with survivors of the operation and it uses many photographs to help bring the

places and people to life. The other difference is Barber’s account only covers the events

leading up to the mission and on D-Day itself. The book also includes some useful

appendices which list all members of D Company, and discusses issues / conflicting versions

of the capture and the holding of the bridges.

Although not written specifically about the coup de main operation at Benouville, Tim

Lynch’s Silent Skies: Gliders at War 1939-1945 (Barnsley, 2008) gives an excellent context

Ambrose, Pegasus Bridge, p. 102.

9
to the operation as it recounts the entire history of glider borne military operations before and

during the Second World War.

Other works covering the operation which were unfortunately unavailable include J. E. H.

Neville’s (ed) The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, War Chronicle Vol IV

1944/1945 (Aldershot, 1954) and Penny Bates’ The Pegasus Diaries (2006).

Similar to the Bruneval operation much primary source material is located at the National

Archives – Kew, the Imperial War Museum – London, and the Airborne Assault section of the

Imperial War Museum – Duxford. Of particular relevance is the Airborne Plan ‘Operation

Tonga’ (PRO: AIR 37553). Other files available include: Requirements and availability of

gliders and pilots (PRO: WO 219/2876); Records of the Cabinet Office covering Report on

operations of 6th Airborne Division in Normandy 1944 June 6-Aug. 27 (PRO: CAB

106/970), and recommendations for awards (PRO: WO 373/48/38).

Operation Market Garden, Arnhem, September 1944

___________________________________________________________________________

The Allied advance into the Netherlands and attempt to cross the Rhine into Germany in

September 1944 is generally viewed as a strategic failure. The plan, called Operation Market

Garden, intended to use an Airborne Corps (Market) consisting of the US 82nd and 101st

Airborne Divisions, the British 1st Airborne Division and the Polish 1st Independent Parachute

Brigade, to capture the bridges over the rivers and canals in the Netherlands in order to allow

a British ground Corps (Garden) to advance. It was hoped that the perceived collapse of the

German Army in Western Europe would allow conditions for XXX Corps to move along a
10
narrow route on a south-north axis of advance through the Dutch cities of Eindhoven,

Nijmegen and Arnhem then turn east towards the German border, outflank the West Wall

(Siegfried Line) and strike for the industrial heartland of the Ruhr, thus ending the war by

Christmas. The plan conceived by British Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery on 10

September was uncharacteristic in its daring for a usually cautious commander. In the

previous months many airborne operations had been planned but not executed for various

reasons, usually due to the changing situation on the ground. In the past six weeks alone

eighteen such operations had been planned (and cancelled) by the newly formed First Allied

Airborne Army. It has been said that this lack of action was the reason why there were few

detractors at senior level when it came to Operation Market Garden.5 Unlike most previous

Allied airborne operations the troops parachuting and landing in gliders during Market

Garden would do so in daylight. The reason for this was that the D-Day for this mission, 17

September, fell on the dark of the moon. The planners felt that at this stage the Luftwaffe did

not pose a significant threat; however the anti-aircraft artillery (flak) did, at least in some

areas, Arnhem in particular. As a result, to avoid this danger, some of the DZ’s were up to

thirteen kilometres from the objectives. The commander of the British 6th Airborne Major

General R. E. Urquhart was not overly concerned by this and preferred to take the option of

landing far away and safely rather than closer and with risk. To make matters more difficult it

would not be possible to drop / land all the troops on the first day due to shortage of transport

aircraft. Furthermore, there was intelligence available which revealed the presence of

stronger than expected German ground forces, including armour, which paratroopers were

5 Piper, A. C, Intelligence Planning for Airborne Operations: A Perspective from Operation Market Garden
(Fort Leavenworth, 1997), p. 21.
11
not effectively equipped to deal with. So, despite these handicaps could the British 6th

Airborne Division have taken the bridges at Arnhem?

Any study of why Arnhem failed should begin with an examination of the intelligence

available to the planners. SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces)

placed a high value on the activities of the Dutch resistance so it would be logical to include

this in any research covered. A good starting point to research this is a Stewart W. Bentley’s

essay The Dutch Resistance During Operation Market Garden.6 Unfortunately much of the

original documents created in the Netherlands were destroyed due to the Dutch resistance’s

need to maintain security in an occupied country. With the information available today a

comprehensive terrain analysis and estimate of the enemy situation is relatively easy. Aerial

photographs taken shortly before and during the operation show potential suitable drop zones

and landing zones immediately to the south of the bridge.7 At the time these were discounted

due to Dutch resistance intelligence reports which indicated they were unsuitable. Some

information in relation to these reports is available in the National Archives collection

Records of Special Operations Executive (PRO: HS 6/732). Confirmation of this would most

likely be found when in the plans for Operation Market (PRO: WO 219/2887). Comparison

with modern aerial photographs reveals almost no change in these fields in seventy years and

a modern military planner would likely conclude that these fields were suitable for such

operations on 17 September 1944. Examination of the plans for the cancelled Operation

Comet would provide likely provide useful information on a coup de main which was part of

6 Stewart W. Bentley, Dutch Resistance During Operation Market Garden, available at the Pegasus Archive,
(http:// http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/RepDutch.htm) (15 Jan 2014)

7 Airborne Assault Museum, Imperial War Museum, Duxford.

12
that plan. For this coup de main it was planned to land eighteen gliders before dawn to

capture the Arnhem road bridge. This is contained Operational Reports for Operation Comet

(PRO: WO 205/850), RAF No. 38 GROUP (PRO: AIR 37/1216) and Operation order No

524: Operation Comet (PRO: AIR 37/979).

Following the Second World War most countries wrote official histories. One which is readily

available is a monograph published by Dr John C. Warren: Airborne Operations in World

War II, European Theater (Montgomery, Alabama, 1956). This was intended to describe the

planning and execution of airborne operations by the US Army Air Forces in Europe during

the war. Its task was to analyse and evaluate these operations as a basis for information with

regard to the contemporary writing of doctrine for future operational planning. This

document is an excellent source of information about a wide range of aspects of these

operations including details of the airborne operations of Operation Neptune (Normandy

Invasion), Operation Market (The Netherlands) and Operation Varsity (Germany). Although

written more specifically about US Airborne operations it also provides information about

British operations as a means of comparison.8 Of particular interest is where Warren notes

that the British incurred significant glider losses due to collisions on landing.9 He also

highlights that a coup de main operation similar to the one at Pegasus Bridge in Normandy

was proposed for the cancelled Operation Comet.

8 John C. Warren, Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater (Montgomery, Alabama, 1956). p.
78.

9 Ibid, p. 79.
13
Another well written monograph is that by Arnold C. Piper. Intelligence Planning for

Airborne Operations: A Perspective from Operation Market Garden (Fort Leavenworth,

1997). It discusses the complex relationship between intelligence and operational planning

before the operation. One of Pipers key points is that the terrain analysis conducted during

the planning phase of Market Garden was flawed. He contends that this led to poor selection

of the ground avenue of approach and the airborne drop / landing zones. These short comings

were not unknown at the time. In particular to the commander of XXX Corps, Lieutenant

General Brian Horrocks showed that he was well aware of this when he briefed his troops.10

Piper also supports the idea that the intelligence provided by Royal Air Force (RAF)

photographic interpreters and the Dutch resistance in relation to the terrain to the south of the

bridge was poor and inaccurate. One of his primary sources is the intelligence reports of the

First Allied Airborne Army. (PRO: WO 219/4997).

An article on the Polish view of the battle was written by Michael A. Peszke. The Polish

Parachute Brigade in World War Two: A Paradigm for the Polish Military in Exile (1984). It

recounts the formation of the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade before the battle and

its conduct during it. Of particular interest is his description of the load plan for the Brigade,

i.e. how they would be deployed to the Arnhem area. The Brigade would be landed by glider

and parachute in three lifts in different areas, separated by the River Rhine and on different

days. Their main Drop Zone (Drop Zone K) was to be a short distance to the south of the

bridge; however it was not planned to drop the Poles here until day three. This would have

likely been an ideal location had the Brigade been dropped there on day one of the battle, and

it would certainly have captured the road Bridge at Arnhem. The plan, however, as Peszke

10 Piper, Intelligence Planning for Airborne Operations: A Perspective from Operation Market Garden, p. 18.
14
wrote, was to drop and march the troops over the Arnhem road bridge, northwards, and

reinforces the area, in Arnhem town, where the British airborne troops would be.11 As it

happened the bulk of the Brigade did not arrive until the fifth day of the battle when the

outcome was virtually decided.

Of the three operations referred to in this text, Market Garden has been examined the most by

historians. It was and still is seen as a lost opportunity to end the war in 1944. There are

dozens of books covering Arnhem alone. While John Frost’s A Drop Too Many does cover his

experiences leading the battalion which captured the northern approaches to Arnhem Bridge

(now named the John Frost Bridge) it does not refer to the lost opportunity of a possible coup

de main operation.

David Bennett’s A Magnificent Disaster: The Failure of Market Garden, The Arnhem

Operation September 1944 (Philadelphia, 2008) clearly outlines his opinion in relation to the

lack of a coup de main operation. While he does criticise the earlier plan for Operation

Comet, he notes that there was no objection from the RAF to using the area immediately to

the southwest of Arnhem Bridge as a landing zone. He does note that the RAF officer in

charge of the transport of troops there, Air Vice-Marshall Leslie Hollinghurst felt that this

land was unsuitable for glider operations. Hollinghurst based this opinion of Dutch resistance

intelligence. Bennett raises the question, why were paratroopers not dropped?12 This

11Michael A Peszke, ‘The Polish Parachute Brigade in World War Two: A Paradigm for the Polish Military in
Exile’ in Military Affairs, xlviii, no. 4 (1984).

12David Bennett, A Magnificent Disaster: The Failure of Market Garden, The Arnhem Operation September
1944 (Philadelphia, 2008), p. 20.
15
question is certainly relevant as it has been since proved by civilian parachute club, that it is

possible to parachute large numbers onto this field.13

Robert J. Kershaw’s It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market Garden and

the Battle of Arnhem, September 1944 (Hersham, 1990) provides a useful context to the

operation from the oft ignored German perspective. He notes that the German estimate of the

situation prior to Market Garden was entirely wrong as they expected an advance northwards

into the Netherlands to be only a secondary effort with airborne forces dropping near the

Ruhr.14 Aerial reconnaissance might have confirmed this at the time as no anti glider defences

or significant defences of any kind were constructed to block this route.

Major General R.E. Urquhart’s Arnhem (London, 1958) gives the division commanders

personal perspective on the operation. Being written just over a decade after the event it

provides an outline of the battle. He glossed over the lack of a coup de main stating that the

RAF concluded that the area to the south of the road bridge was unsuitable for both glider

and parachute operations. He stated that ‘An airborne operation remains the airmen’s

responsibility until such time as the troops are put on the ground’15. This contrasts with most

other accounts of this aspect operation which in general state that he personally favoured

drop zones away from the perceived dangerous bridge area. He further noted that a coup de

main was not possible due to flak around the bridge. Was he attempting to appropriate blame

13 Pathfinder Parachute Group (http://www.pathfindergroupuk.com) (15 Jan 2014).

14Robert J. Kershaw, It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market Garden and the Battle of
Arnhem, September 1944 (Hersham, 1990)

15 R. E. Urquhart, Arnhem (London, 1958), p. 7.

16
for the failure of the operation elsewhere? This question remains to be comprehensively

answered.

Conclusion

___________________________________________________________________________

As has been discussed in this essay, the sources for studying airborne operations are wide

ranging and varying in accuracy and opinion. The highly successful operations at Bruneval

and Pegasus Bridge demonstrated that coup de main style operations could work for the

British, even if the landing zone was restricted. There is no doubt that by the time Market

Garden was planned there was a more risk-adverse decision making process creeping in. For

airborne forces to be used effectively surprise is essential. This could never have been

achieved with the Market Garden plan.

Following a review of the available literature, a gap in research appears to remain in relation

to the reasons for cancelling the coup de main at Arnhem. It is easy to attribute this decision

to intelligence provided by the RAF or the Dutch resistance, however a more thorough

examination of primary sources would be necessary in relation to this. Strict comparison

would be necessary to attempt to gain a true a picture as possible. The researcher must

approach this with a caveat: Following the failure at Arnhem there were produced or edited

many primary source documents. Were the people who wrote and compiled these records

concerned about either how their contemporary superiors or future historians would judge

their role in this debacle?

17
18
 Annotated Bibliography

It should be noted that the subject of coup de main operations conducted by British airborne

forces, specifically the Arnhem operation, has received relatively little attention. While there

are many general publications about the strategic and operational events very little exists with

regards to Bruneval, and the cancellation of a coup de main at Arnhem. Very few journal

articles were found specifically about the tactical level of these operations. The primary

sources referred to in the article are all housed in archives in the United Kingdom and were

not accessible at the time of writing this bibliographic essay. The National Archives records

referred to below are identified with the letters PRO and their excellent website provides a

good basis for research as it provides an excellent search engine and directory.

Primary Sources Unpublished

Operation Biting

Training photographs (PRO: DEFE 2/103)

Photographs of captured radar equipment (PRO: AVIA 26/291)

Technical reports (PRO: AIR 20/1546, PRO: AVIA 26/1872)

Intelligence reports (PRO: AIR 40/3057, PRO: DEFE 40/2)

Operation reports (PRO: WO 199/3230)

Prime Ministers correspondence / reports (PRO: PREM 3/73).

Operation Tonga (Pegasus Bridge)

Airborne Plan ‘Operation Tonga’ (PRO: AIR 37553)

Requirements and availability of gliders and pilots (PRO: WO 219/2876)

19
Records of the Cabinet Office on operations of 6th Airborne Division in Normandy 1944.

(PRO: CAB 106/970)

Recommendations for awards (PRO: WO 373/48/38)

Operation Market Garden

Records of Special Operations Executive (PRO: HS 6/732)

Operation plans for Operation Market (PRO: WO 219/2887)

Operational Reports for Operation Comet (PRO: WO 205/850)

RAF No. 38 Group Operation Report – Operation Market Garden (PRO: AIR 37/1216)

RAF No. 38 Group Operation Report - Operation Comet (PRO: AIR 37/979).

Intelligence reports of the First Allied Airborne Army. (PRO: WO 219/4997).

Primary Published Sources

Frost, J, A Drop too Many (London, 1980).

This book recounts his entire service throughout the Second World War. It can be

considered as a primary source as it was based on his diaries and memoirs written during the

war. One chapter of the book each covers the Bruneval Raid and Market Garden. He

unfortunately did not provide additional sources of information in the book.

Renault, G, The Silent Company (London, 1946).

This book recounts the experiences of a French resistance leader throughout the war

and while it does refer to the Bruneval raid it does not go into much detail about it.

20
Urquhart, R. E, Arnhem (London, 1958).

This book gives the division commanders personal perspective on the operation.

Being written just over a decade after the event it provides an outline of the battle. It

is selective in dealing with the controversial decisions made prior to the battle and

contradicts other sources in relation to some matters.

Secondary Sources (Books)

Ambrose, S. E, Pegasus Bridge, D-Day: The Daring British Airborne Raid (London, 1985).

Ambrose’s narrative about the Pegasus Bridge operation is a concise account based

primarily on interviews with veterans. He provides a good overview of the events of the

battle and the months following it. He questions why D Coy, 2 Bn, Ox & Bucks were not

withdrawn, retrained and used again.

Bennett, D, A Magnificent Disaster: The Failure of Market Garden, The Arnhem Operation

September 1944 (Philadelphia, 2008).

This book gives an overall picture of the operation at Arnhem. It clearly outlines the

author’s opinion in relation to the lack of a coup de main operation. There is much

discussion of the perceived failure of the intelligence planning.

Barber, N, The Pegasus and Orne Bridges: Their Capture, Defence and Relief on D-Day

(Barnsley, 2009).

Barber wrote this book to address the lack of information available about this mission.

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 Its main focus is on the events following the coup de main, however it gives an

effective narrative of the operation to capture the bridges. A useful appendix is

provided which is of use to researchers.

Downing, T, Night Raid: The True Story of the First Victorious British Para Raid of WWII

(London, 2013).

The most recent and comprehensive book about the Bruneval raid. This book is based

on a wide array of primary and secondary sources and includes an extensive and

useful bibliography and notes. A very detailed book it provides far more information

about the Bruneval raid than any other work discussed hitherto.

Ford, K, The Bruneval Raid: Operation Biting 1942 (Oxford 2010).

A short book which uses many photographs, diagrams and maps to portray the battle.

Of particular interest is its use of the original air photo with the ‘drop run’ (aircraft

heading) for the planned drop. It provides some useful sources in its notes section.

Kershaw, R. J, It Never Snows in September: The German View of Market Garden and the

Battle of Arnhem, September 1944 (Hersham, 1990).

This book provides a useful context to the operation from the oft ignored German

perspective. It debunks some myths that the Germans were prepared for the operation

and provides some useful information on the German estimate of the situation prior to

the battle.

Lynch, T, Silent Skies: Gliders at War 1939-1945 (Barnsley, 2008).

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 Lynch’s book recounts the entire history of glider borne military operations before

and during the Second World War. It is more useful for general reading and provides a

list of sources he used.

Millar, G, The Bruneval Raid: Stealing Hitler’s Radar (London, 1974).

The only significant book about the Bruneval raid until recently, this book concisely

narrates the story of radar, British preparations for the raid, the French resistance role and

the German reaction. Millar’s work also includes a very comprehensive series of notes

discussing his sources. Much of his research was based on interviews with survivors.

While the book is concise and informative it only gives a brief overview of the actual

conduct of the raid. Missing from Millar’s book is the German side of the story.

Secondary Sources (Journal Articles / Essays / Monographs)

Bassett, J, ‘Past Airborne Employment’ in Military Affairs, xii, no. 4 (1948).

This journal article gives a general overview of airborne operations up to the end of

the Second World War. It does not provide great detail but provides useful context as

it was written shortly after the events, offering a contemporary point of view on their

conduct.

Bentley, S. W, Dutch Resistance During Operation Market Garden, available at the Pegasus

Archive, (http:// http://www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/RepDutch.htm) (15 Jan 2014)

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 This essay, published online, introduced the reader to the role of the Dutch resistance

with respect to the Arnhem operation. It provides an extensive list of footnotes and

sources used which would be of use to people interested in studying this subject.

Peszke, M. A, ‘The Polish Parachute Brigade in World War Two: A Paradigm for the Polish

Military in Exile’ in Military Affairs, xlviii, no. 4 (1984).

This journal article describes the formation of the Polish 1st Independent Parachute

Brigade before the battle and its conduct during it. Peszke was critical of the Market

plan and provides some useful information in relation to the load plan for the Brigade.

Piper, A. C, Intelligence Planning for Airborne Operations: A Perspective from Operation

Market Garden (Fort Leavenworth, 1997).

This monograph discusses the complex relationship between intelligence and

operational planning before the operation. One of Pipers key points is that the terrain

analysis conducted during the planning phase of Market Garden was flawed. His list

of sources would be useful when researching the operation.

Warren, J. C, Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater (Montgomery,

Alabama, 1956).

This monograph was intended to describe the planning and execution of airborne

operations by the US Army Air Forces in Europe during the war. This document is an

excellent source of information about a wide range of aspects of these operations

including details of three large airborne operations including Operation Tonga and

Market Garden.
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