Analyse both the British and German attempts

in 1916 to break the deadlock of the trenches.

Abstract

The year of 1916 was marked by two of the bloodiest battles in history: The First Battle of

the Somme, and the Battle of Verdun. To fully comprehend the First World War one must

understand these two battles, how they formed part of allied and German strategy and their

impact on later strategic planning and tactical development in the First World War. This paper

will examine the conduct of the war up to 1916, examine the strategy of both sides and

investigate whether either side learned lessons from these epic confrontations.

Introduction – War by Timetable

Today when the First World War is mentioned most people think of the horror and deadlock

of static trench warfare. One imagines gas attacks, artillery, men skulking in trenches trying

to evade the grim reapers harvest, which could come at any time, but also the battle against

the elements and disease. By early 1916 most of Europe had been at war for eighteen months.

The majority of the professional soldiers who had gone to war in August 1914 were dead,

wounded, exhausted or captured.

The causes of the war were many and tragic. The series of mobilisations today seems almost

ridiculous but at the time made perfect sense. How could one country allow another to

mobilise without following suit? Why did sense not prevail and peace win through? There
1
were attempts by people such as Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, to maintain

peace. These attempts were, sadly, in vain and Austria demanded satisfaction. Ironically

while Grey sought peace his Austrian counterpart, Count Leopold Berchtold pushed harder to

get Austria to declare war on Serbia. He did not want foreign powers getting involved with

what was, to him, a local conflict.1 To Britain’s Prime Minister H.H. Asquith it seemed that

‘Happily there seems to be no reason why we should be anything more than spectators’.2

Germany also felt, and hoped, that Britain would keep out of it, and that Russia would be

deterred by Germany standing behind Austria. There has perhaps, never been such a

miscalculation. Austria declared war on Serbia on 28 July and so began a sequence of

mobilisations and declarations of war that led to all major powers in Europe being at war by

10 August.

The mobilisation plans of most countries involved were detailed and elaborate. Years of

planning and preparations gave each side confidence that their pre-planned, rehearsed

strategy would be victorious and that they had accounted for any contingency. The overall

German strategy was to avoid a two front war with France in the west and Russia in the east.

The German Army in the west would move according to the timetable of the Schlieffen plan

(as modified by General Helmuth von Moltke) and envelop and destroy the French forces

within six weeks (The time that Schlieffen had estimated it would take Russia to mobilise).

They would then move their forces to the east and along with Austria-Hungary finish the war.

The Russian’s plan was to come to France’s aid and prevent the Germans from focussing the

bulk of their strength in the west by attacking the Germans in East Prussia and the Austro-

1 Hew Strachan, The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War (Oxford, 1998), p. 20.

2 Martin Gilbert, The First World War (London, 1994), p. 22.

2
Hungarians in Galicia. The Russians needed to mobilise weeks in advance in order to bring

her forces to readiness to attack the Central Powers.

German Strategy Before Verdun – A Short War?

A short war was what most sides intended. The Germans hoped it would minimise

mobilisation, produce rewards at a low cost for the elite and limit concessions to the masses.3

The Schlieffen plan was a gamble that they would be successful in the west by destroying the

French Army quickly. If significantly delayed it would render their plan for a short war

unlikely and lead to a war on two fronts. The plan did not really take into account the British

army which due to its small size it felt was unlikely to take a key role in the war it envisaged.

This was a serious underestimation. The British did eventually play an important part in

defeating the German invasion of France, and more significantly during the war of attrition

that would follow. The Germans moved on 2 August and invaded Luxembourg. Neutral

Belgium refused to permit the Germans to pass through their territory and opted to fight. This

caused a delay, allowing the allies time to move their forces up to face the Germans. The

Anglo-French victory at the Marne stalled the attack and with it passed any chance of a

quick, decisive German victory. Reporting to the Kaiser, Moltke is reputed to have said ‘Your

majesty, we have lost the war’.4 Defeat at the Marne would eventually cost the Germans the

war, albeit four years later.

Once the western front had stabilised in the autumn of 1914 the Germans were presented with

a conundrum. In order to defeat the Triple Entente of Britain, France and Russia, they would

3 Strachan, The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War, p. 26.

4 T. Dodson Stamps, Vincent J. Esposito (eds), A Short Military History of World War I (West Point, 1950).
3
have to undermine it and cause its collapse. To bring about its collapse they would, however,

have to defeat it in the field. Undermining it by political means became unlikely when the

Pact of London was signed between the three countries on 5 September. This committed each

of them to not negotiating a separate peace. For the Germans, agreeing a strategy was no easy

task as there was a difference of opinion as to how to deal with Russia. All agreed that some

kind of negotiated settlement was necessary with Russia in order to defeat the western

powers. The new German Chief of Staff General Erich von Falkenhayn and the Kaiser felt

that they could make peace with Russia without further significant military operations. The

bulk of German politicians and generals felt that more military defeats were necessary to

force Russia to the negotiating table. In the meantime the Germans settled in on the western

and eastern fronts, strengthened their positions and hopefully a political settlement with

Russia would allow them to launch decisive action at a later stage in the west.

As part of the strategy to persuade Russia to make peace, the Central Powers sought new

allies. They persuaded Bulgaria to join them in October 1915 which assisted with the defeat

of Serbia in November. Following this Germans again attempted to make a separate peace

with Russia due to Russia’s military defeats, the defeat of Serbia, and the blockade by the

Turks. This came to nothing. There was also an attempt to make a separate peace with France

by exerting pressure on left-wing French politicians and contacts in Italy, Turkey, and Egypt,

in the hope that they could convince France to sue for peace. From December 1915

Falkenhayn pushed for this strategy of a separate peace with France and Russia to isolate

Britain. He decided that France did not necessarily have to be decisively defeated but

sufficiently denuded of her manpower by being forced to defend key points. In spite of

4
Germany losing two million eight hundred thousand men on both fronts in the war so far, this

was seen as the best chance of achieving victory.

Allied Strategy Before the Somme – Lack of Unity and Coordination.

Despite the intensive arms race and formation of alliances prior to the declaration of war, the

Entente did not have a unified strategy on how to fight the Central Powers. This lack of a

combined strategy became apparent following the first few weeks of war.5 Many differences

and disagreements were still in existence between these powers despite the Entente

agreements of 1904 and 1907. Colonial rivalries remained, particularly between Britain and

France. There was mistrust, especially in Britain, of the repressive Tsarist regime and the

common interest in the area around the Indian frontiers. Although France and Russia had

agreed a strategic policy in 1913, there was no such agreement with Britain. Britain was

viewed by many politicians in France and Russia as a weak land ally due to the lack of a

large standing army. To make relations even more strained Britain refused to commit to

unconditional support to Russia or France should go to war against the Central Powers. It was

in this context that the Entente entered into the war in August 1914.

France and Russia decided that the best way to beat the Central Powers was for both

countries to attack simultaneously, forcing Germany into a war on two fronts. Despite some

initial gains on both fronts, neither France nor Russia achieved significant success. In the

5 Strachan, The Oxford Illustrated History of the First World War, p. 54.
5
west the French were soon retreating in almost all areas. In the east an entire Russian army

was destroyed in battles around Tannenberg. Fearing that the French or British might make a

settlement with the Germans, as they approached Paris, the Russians proposed a new

agreement to pledge not to make peace separately with the Germans. The Pact of London

formalised the alliance. While this secured the Entente and prevented a quick end to the war

it did not propose any new strategy in how to defeat the Central Powers.

In August and September 1914, at the political level, there was no coherent strategy, however

events on the battlefields of France were beginning to turn against the Germans. The Battle of

the Marne forced the Germans to retreat and prevented their occupation of Paris. The Marne

was a decisive, strategic and moral victory for France and it was the beginning of the end of

the war of movement in the west. Following the Marne was a series of engagements which

have become known as the ‘race to the sea’, where each side attempted to outflank each

other. The British who had been moved from the centre of the western front to the left flank,

along with Belgian and French troops stubbornly held the town of Ypres against German

attempts to breach the line.

Unlike the Germans who adopted a defensive strategy, the Entente sought to go on the

offensive in 1915. How could such a policy be pursued? In defending France, her army had

lost over half a million casualties. Britain’s small peacetime army had been decimated and

despite significant recruitment, would not be in a position to launch a strategic offensive in

1915. The solution, to Britain, was to support her allies financially, and to launch an

operation somewhere where she could best use her strongest arm, the Royal Navy.

6
In 1915 after one year of war there was still no unified allied campaign. Russia feared Greece

getting involved and wished to be given Constantinople, should it be captured. The ill fated

expedition and landings around Gallipoli cost the allies over a quarter of a million men, the

bulk to which were from Britain and her dominions. Perhaps the most successful foray of the

Entente in 1915 was luring Italy into the alliance, however the front in Italy, facing the

Austro-Hungarians, soon reached stalemate.

The allies suffered many setbacks on the western front during 1915. In Champagne and

Artois, French attacks were repulsed. The weaker British launched limited offensives at

Neuve Chapelle and Aubers Ridge but were driven back. Following these defeats they

resolved to adopt a defensive posture until their new army was ready to attack.

By the end of 1915 the front lines dug a year earlier had hardly changed. France had lost over

two million men since August 1914, Britain over six hundred thousand. Russia had lost

almost four million men. The lack of co-ordination came to a head in December 1915 when

each side of the Entente met at General Joseph Joffre’s (Chief of the French General Staff)

headquarters in Chantilly to produce a plan for the next year. The overall strategy was to

launch a series of attacks on the fronts in France, Italy and Russia. If they co-ordinated the

attacks they could possibly negate the German’s ability to move reserves and reinforcements

to hard pressed parts of the fronts. Perhaps then Germany would seek a peaceful settlement in

1916.

The Battle of Verdun

7
Historian Holger Afflerbach wrote of Verdun that ‘If there ever was a total war on the

battlefield, it was here’6 Falkenhayn knew that it was only a matter of time before Britain’s

new army would begin to arrive en mass in the west. He rejected the idea that a breakthrough

at this stage of the war was possible. This view was based on the many failed Allied

offensives of 1915. He surmised that the best way to defeat the French was to lure them into a

battle in a place that suited him. So, where could Falkenhayn force this battle with the

French? Verdun was close to the Franco-German border which had been established

following the Franco-Prussian War. Since then the French had heavily fortified the

surrounding area with dozens of forts and support bunkers. Despite these strong defences

Falkenhayn decided ‘taking the bull by the horns’7 here was the only way to force a decision.

Falkenhayn’s plan was to launch a limited surprise attack preceded by an immense artillery

bombardment. He hoped to take the hills on the eastern bank of the River Meuse, and from

there dominate the town with artillery. His intention was not to try to breakthrough and

capture Verdun, but to confront the French army and force them to make a decision. He knew

abandoning the town of Verdun would damage French national prestige and morale, and force

them to attempt to re-take the hills to the east. This attempt would cause the French huge

casualties, as the Germans would be in a strong defensive position. It is not exactly clear

what Falkenhayn expected would happen during or after this battle. Holger Afflerbach wrote

that perhaps Falkenhayn thought France would suffer a ‘hysterical mood swing’ and sue for

peace. Perhaps the British would launch a premature attack to take the pressure off the

6Holger Afflerbach, ‘Planning Total War? Falkenhayn and the Battle of Verdun, 1916’ in Roger Chickering,
Stig. Forster (eds), Great War, Total War (Cambridge, 2000), p. 114.

7 Afflerbach, ‘Planning Total War?’ in Chickering, & Forster (eds), Great War, Total War, p. 121.

8
French. Once the concept was born, Falkenhayn tasked the commander of the 5th Army,

Crown Prince Wilhelm, to prepare plans. The Crown Prince’s chief of staff, General

Constantin Schmidt von Knobelsdorf drew up the plans. The plan would use all reserves on

the western front to cut the French supply lines to Verdun and would require an attack on the

east and west banks of the Meuse. Falkenhayn disagreed and only wanted to attack on the

east bank due to a shortage of reserves. This was despite the prospect of his troops being

exposed to flanking fire from the west bank.

The Battle of Verdun began on 21 February 1916. Within a week they advanced 8 km and had

captured Fort Douaumont, which had been left almost completely undefended since 1915. On

the 24th the Germans missed the opportunity to capture Verdun due to a shortage of reserves

to exploit the situation. Could the Germans have captured Verdun that day? It is generally

accepted that the ground forces committed initially were too weak for such a task as they

were unable to exploit successes.8 The Germans did almost attain the objective of capturing

the east bank and dominate the town, however with the arrival of French reinforcements,

movement ground to a halt.

The French were lured into Falkenhayn’s trap and committed their forces to the battle. The

commander of the army tasked with defending the east bank was General Henri-Philippe

Pétain. Although the German attack had captured some of its objectives, its basic principle of

taking and holding the key terrain of the east bank had failed. Without taking this the

Germans could not dominate the town as planned and were not in an ideal position to defend,

being overlooked by the west bank. A decision had to be made – commit more troops and

press on with the attack, or withdraw towards the start line. The decision to keep attacking

8 Afflerbach, ‘Planning Total War?’ in Chickering, & Forster (eds), Great War, Total War, p. 124.
9
was made, despite mounting German losses and the spectre of the battle doing to the

Germans what they intended it to do to the French. Belatedly on 6 March Falkenhayn finally

decided to attack the west bank. Where they could have achieved surprise two weeks earlier,

now the French were ready and waiting.

A serious miscalculation was the Germans overestimation of French losses. They estimated

that their losses were only one third those of the French. In reality the ratio of German to

French losses was 1:1.1.9 It began to dawn on Falkenhayn by the end of March that the

German losses were not as low as expected however he wished to continue as long as the

French suffered more losses. By early April Falkenhayn had convinced himself that the attack

should be halted. He felt that even without achieving their objectives they had inflicted

enough casualties on the French to force a conclusion, if not immediately, certainly later.

Unfortunately for the troops in Verdun this proposal was not followed through due to

Knobelsdorf convincing him otherwise. Pétain, on 9 April, concluded that the French had

won the defensive battle. German morale began to crash. Even the Generals realised that their

soldiers could not take much more. General Max Von Bahrfeld reported that ‘The enormous

demands are too much for human strength’.10 Despite opposition from Crown Prince

Wilhelm, the attack continued at the behest of Falkenhayn and Knobelsdorf.

Joffre, who felt the battle was won for the French, reduced the forces there in early May. This

gave the Germans new opportunity to attack again at the end of the month. In early June Fort

9 Afflerbach, ‘Planning Total War?’ in Chickering, & Forster (eds), Great War, Total War, p. 126.

10Hermann Wendt, Verdun 1916 (Berlin, 1931), p. 126, quoted in Chickering & Forster (eds) Great War, Total
War, p. 127.
10
Vaux fell to the Germans. Talk of massive French losses began again and the true scale of

German losses was concealed. Falkenhayn again became convinced that he could break the

French by the end of the year.

Events elsewhere conspired to scupper Falkenhayn’s plans. The co-ordinated allied

offensives struck in Russia and on the Somme. These attacks forced troops to be diverted to

shore-up the defences. The General Staff pressured Falkenhayn to call off the offensive. Even

Falkenhayn himself was beginning to see the folly of continuing. Despite this shift in German

attitude and the necessity to concentrate elsewhere, one last effort to attack was made to take

Fort Souville in order to at last gain control of the east bank. The attackers, the elite

Alpenkorps, were driven back. This final futile attack finally convinced Falkenhayn once and

for all, to call off the offensive.

The German offensive at Verdun was a failure. Although they had inflicted significant losses

on the French, they themselves had suffered equally appalling casualties. The failure at

Verdun signalled the end of Falkenhayn’s strategy to win the war in 1916 or 1917. Far from

beating the French in the spring and summer of 1916, the Germans themselves appeared to

on the verge of defeat by July. Falkenhayn was dismissed in August, being succeeded by

Field Marshal Paul von Hindenberg. Despite the Germans ending their attacks, the fighting at

Verdun dragged on until November when the French re-captured Forts Vaux and Douaumont.

Verdun proved the willingness of commanders to sacrifice the lives of their men purely to try

and kill more of the enemy. By 1916 soldiers were regarded only as tools of war. Writers like

Afflerbach, contend that this was not a new phenomenon and cite examples such as

11
Napoleon’s disregard for life when he had boasted that he cared nothing for the lives of a

million soldiers.11 Could the British and the French have come up with a better plan in 1916?

The Battle of the Somme

The Chantilly conference of December 1915 had at last decided a common strategy for the

Entente powers. In 1916 co-ordinated offensives would be launched which would restrict the

Germans moving reserves from one front to another. France who had suffered the most was

beginning to reach the end of her available manpower with ninety eight divisions. Britain’s

new armies and resources were reaching peak levels and it was clear that she would have to

be the main offensive force in 1916.

Britain began 1916 with a stronger Army and also a new commander. Field Marshal Sir John

French had been replaced on 18 December 1915 by General Sir Douglas Haig. Soon after

taking over he became embroiled in a quarrel. The French would only commit to one large

offensive in 1916 which would be conducted in July, when the Russian’s planned to attack in

the east. They wanted the British to engage in ‘wearing out fights’, thus supporting their

offensives.12 Eventually in February 1916, Haig convinced Joffre to join with the British in a

joint offensive on the Somme.

The Somme was not necessarily Haig’s first choice as a place to attack. Ypres was also

considered as a place where they might have launched another offensive. Events elsewhere

11 Afflerbach, ‘Planning Total War?’ in Chickering, & Forster (eds), Great War, Total War, p. 131.

12 Richard Holmes, War Walks: From Agincourt to Normandy (London, 1996), p. 123.
12
would change Haig’s plans somewhat. The German offensive at Verdun had begun and the

French were under tremendous pressure. The primary reason for attack on the Somme was

this was where the British and French armies met. Unlike the British, the Germans had

decided to prepare strong defensive positions and in most places they had withdrawn to the

higher ground.

So what were Haig’s intentions? Some say that Haig intended a similar battle of attrition to

the Germans at Verdun. British military historian and theorist, Basil Liddell Hart, challenged

the commonly held view that Haig did not intent to breakthrough, but to fight a battle of

attrition. He maintained in his writing that a breakthrough was Haig’s original intention. He

felt that the perception that Haig had intended a battle of attrition only came about when it

was clear that the offensive was not going well.13 The commander of the British 4th Army,

General Sir Henry Rawlinson, whose army was to launch the Somme offensive, certainly

believed that Haig’s intention was to breakthrough, however Rawlinson was more in favour

of ‘bite and hold’ operations where a massive and prolonged artillery bombardment would

render the German lines indefensible. Haig was less conservative and directed Rawlinson to

amend his plan to advance further.

During the first half of 1916 the British expanded their front facing the Germans. With their

new troops arriving freshly trained from Britain they filled former French positions. To

support the 4th Army’s planned breakthrough on the Somme, a new reserve army was being

formed which would become the 5th Army after the battle had commenced. The new army

which arrived in France in 1916 was entering a war which had no real tactical or strategic

13 Holmes, War Walks: From Agincourt to Normandy, p. 124.

13
doctrine developed with which to fight it. Nonetheless these new troops would be unleashed

on the German’s, prepared or not.

As previously mentioned, Haig and Rawlinson had different expectations for the offensive.

Haig wanted Rawlinson to advance 1 ½ miles (2.4 km) along a 14 mile (23 km) front on the

first day. Gough’s Reserve Army would move through and exploit, seizing Bapaume, then

move north towards Arras. Rawlinson doubted this was how things would play out, however,

was confident that the German front line position could be taken. He felt that they could then

consolidate and move forward again, in the same manner, and eventually take Bapaume.

Some commanders expected that the men should be able to ‘slope arms, light up your pipes

and cigarettes, and march all the way...before meeting any live Germans’.14 This confidence

grew from what would occur in the week leading up to the initial assault - an immense

artillery bombardment where one and a half million shells would be fired. Once the battle had

commenced, a ‘creeping barrage’ would move forward ahead of the infantry. Despite the

volume of artillery fire it soon became apparent that it was inadequate due to faulty fuses

(causing almost a third of shells to remain unexploded on impact), shot out barrels (due to too

few guns) and unavailability of ‘graze’ fuses to destroy barbed wire.

The attack had been planned to commence on 29 June however was postponed until 1 July

due to bad weather. Even before 1 July there were signs that all was not well. Patrols had

found that the enemy wire was uncut. It was also felt that the ‘creeping barrage’ would move

14 Ibid, p. 132.

14
too fast for the slow moving infantry. Rawlinson refused to change the plans and even

threatened those who offered criticism.

The Battle of the Somme began at 7.20 am on 1 July 1916 when the Hawthorn Ridge mine

was blown, followed by eighteen others. What occurred that day has been described as the

bloodiest day in the history of the British Army. They expected destroyed enemy positions

filled with dead Germans. What they encountered instead was effective, interlocking

machinegun fire. Control was difficult in the strict company line formations, and thus the

advance was slow. In some places the British advanced no more than a few yards before

being forced to stop due to lack of troops left to fight. In other sectors some units took their

initial objectives or at least partially, such was the case with the 36th Ulster Division.

Perhaps the most successful attacks on the first day of the Somme were those by the French.

They attacked at 9.30 am using less rigid formations and smaller groups, supporting each

other using fire and movement. These newer tactics had developed as a result of hard learned

lessons from Verdun.

In the following days Haig directed Gough and his Reserve Army to attack northern part of

the sector, which had seen the least success. This was change of the original plan to exploit

the success of Rawlinson’s 4th Army. There followed for the next few months small advances

gained with many casualties. During some attacks it was found that a short sharp artillery

bombardment offered better chances of success due to a greater degree of surprise. The

Germans launched counter-attacks as quickly as possible to re-take ground lost. The conduct

for much of the Battle of the Somme has been described as ‘attack, counter-attack; attack
15
again, counter-attack again’.15 It was recognised early in the war that infantry-artillery

cooperation was essential to achieve success. Despite this there were still commanders who

had a severe mistrust of artillery to the extent that they deliberately made sure that their

troops were as far away as possible from the supporting artillery fire provided.16

By August the battle was wearing on even the most senior commanders. General Sir William

Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, warned Haig of the widespread uneasiness

over the huge losses for such small advances. Haig intended to launch another major attack in

mid-September which would include the first use of the new armoured vehicles – tanks.

While not affecting the outcome of the battle they did show how quick technological

advances were being made by this stage of the war. In the final attacks of the Somme in

November, some of the day one objectives such as Beaumont-Hamel finally fell.

The Battle of the Somme was a strategic failure. It did not achieve its objective of breaking

through the enemy lines, exploiting, and pushing back the Germans. The greatest advance, in

the centre, was 6 miles (10 km). In some places the front line did not change at all. To

achieve this, the Allies lost six hundred thousand men, two thirds of which were British. The

Germans lost a similar figure. By late 1916 both sides had fought each other to a near

standstill. General Erich Ludendorff, who had replaced Falkenhayn, acknowledged that by

the end of the Battle of the Somme the German army was completely exhausted.17

15 John Terraine, ‘The Smoke and the Fire: Myths and Anti-Myths of War 1861-1945’, (London, 1980) quoted
in Holmes, War Walks: From Agincourt to Normandy, p. 141.

16 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front (Yale, 1994), p. 66.

17 Holmes, War Walks: From Agincourt to Normandy, p. 143.

16
Lessons learned in 1916

Verdun destroyed the German army’s hopes of achieving victory in 1916 or 1917. After

Verdun they could not afford to go on the offensive (until 1918) and resolved to adopt a

defensive posture to attempt to recover from the losses of the two battles. They began a

process of re-evaluating their offensive and defensive tactical doctrine beginning in the

summer of 1916. The offensive doctrine was largely based on a document written by French

Captain Andre Laffargue, which had been captured that summer. De-centralisation of

command was introduced. They developed the techniques of using surprise to achieve a deep

penetration using concentrated close artillery fire. Infantry-artillery cooperation would be

essential and during the exploitation phase, moving artillery forward. Speed and depth would

be key. Speed would limit the enemy’s ability to counterattack and depth would allow the

rear, follow up units to isolate and mop up remaining pockets of resistance. Defensive

doctrine was also updated emphasising the use of matériel rather than soldiers, and

advocating a more flexible defence.18

They had ample opportunities in the defensive battles of 1917 to test the new offensive and

defensive new methods. The new offensive doctrine meant that attacking units would keep

going until exhausted. In addition to tactical doctrine the infantry sections and platoons were

re-organised with light machine guns and rifles. Light artillery pieces were also issued to

some infantry units to give organic fire support. Both the use of new doctrine and newly

formed or re-formed units using new techniques, would be used en mass in the spring

18 Strohn, M (ed), World War I Companion (Oxford, 2013), p112.

17
offensives of 1918 and would prove to be tactically successful, although a strategic

breakthrough was not achieved.

The first day of the Somme was not a total failure as is commonly believed. In the southern

sector there had been success, particular in the French zone. Instead of reinforcing this

success, Haig chose to reinforce defeat but deploying the reserve army to the north. A

revisionist view of the Battle of the Somme, by some historians, proposes that the Somme

was in fact a strategic success for the allies. It did provide them, particularly the British, with

a platform from which to learn and also contributed to wearing down the Germans further.

The Somme transformed the BEF from a mass, inexperienced army into an experienced

force. By the end of the battle there was a much greater understanding that close cooperation

between infantry and artillery was necessary to ensure success. Instead of the infantry

following far behind the bombardment, in many cases by the final weeks of the battle, they

followed 50 yards behind. They were, however, still plagued with defective shells. In the

Somme and earlier offensives timings had been rigidly enforced to attempt coordination. In

reality is did not usually work. Solutions such as using aircraft with klaxons, ground marker

panels, flares etc... became more common place. The British also developed small unit

tactics. Close support could now be provided from within the infantry units. New lighter

weapons such as the Lewis gun, rifle-grenades and Stokes mortars were useful to enable

infantry to continue forward even if the artillery support had finished. In late 1916 and early

1917 two important manuals were produced. These covered training divisions, and platoons

18
for offensive action.19 A much bigger emphasis was now given to the planning process before

an operation, instead of the impulsive efforts to continually attack as had been used before.20

Similar to the Germans, the British re-organised their infantry sections and platoon. The new

platoons would be composed of a section each of riflemen, bombers, Lewis Gunners, and

rifle bombers. While they still emphasised moving towards the enemy in lines, they did allow

for sub-units to mount flanking attacks using fire and movement.21 This doctrine was a

departure from the Victorian style tactics which had been used hitherto and with later

refinement would form the basis for the tactics used which proved successful later in the war.

Conclusion

The Battles of Verdun and the Somme have come to be known as examples of the supreme

senselessness of the First World War. Neither side was able to achieve a decisive victory in

1916. Had the allies agreed on a co-ordinated strategy with a unified command perhaps they

would have been able to concentrate their forces and breakthrough in 1916. Conversely, the

Germans could not make a decisive blow and in essence were only prolonging the inevitable

defeat which arguably came about as a result of the failure of the Schlieffen plan in August –

September 1914. Both sides learned lessons from their experiences at the Somme and

Verdun, however it took over a year and a half before the new methods and techniques,

learned through hard fighting and millions of casualties, would bring about movement and

decisive actions once more.

19
Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, 1917, in Stephen Bull (ed), An Officer’s
Manual of the Western Front 1914-1918 (London, 2008), p. 11.

20 Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front, p. 74-76.

21 Stephen Bull (ed), An Officer’s Manual of the Western Front 1914-1918, p. 117-138.
19
Word count: 5,494

20
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