MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY OF VIETNAM

ENGLISH FACULTY
—--------------------

PRAGMATICS
Topic:
PRAGMATICS: POLITENESS AND POLITENESS STRATEGIES

GROUP 3: MEMBERS

FULL NAME STUDENT ID PART IN CHARGE

Vũ Thị Lan Chi NNA48A10591 I. Notion of politeness
Nguyễn Ngọc Phương Chi NNA48A10589 II. Indirectness
- Leaders
Vũ Tiến Đông NNA48A10595 III. Theories of politeness
Phạm Thị Ngọc Diệp NNA48A10593 IV. Brown and Levinson's
politeness strategies
(1,2)
Vũ Thị Hương Giang NNA48A10605 V. Brown and Levinson's
politeness strategies
(3,4)
OUTLINE
I. NOTION OF POLITENESS.................................................................................................
1. Definition of politeness.......................................................................................................
2. Face.....................................................................................................................................
3. Face-threatening acts & face-saving acts............................................................................
4. Negative politeness & positive politeness.........................................................................
II. INDIRECTNESS...................................................................................................................
1. Intentional indirectness.......................................................................................................
2. Cost and risk of indirectness...............................................................................................
3. Factors governing indirectness............................................................................................
III. THEORIES OF POLITENESS..........................................................................................
1. Grice’s principle..................................................................................................................
2. Lakoff’s rules......................................................................................................................
3. Leech’s maxim....................................................................................................................
IV. Brown and Levinson’s politeness strategies.....................................................................
1. Bald-on record strategies....................................................................................................
2. On-record (with redress) strategies.....................................................................................
3. Off-record strategies...........................................................................................................
4. No FTA...............................................................................................................................
I. NOTION OF POLITENESS

1. Definition of politeness
It is possible to treat politeness as a fixed concept, as in the idea of ‘polite
social behavior', or etiquette, within a culture. It is also possible to specify a
number of different general principles for being polite in social interaction
within a particular culture. Some of these might include being tactful, generous,
modest, and sympathetic toward others. (Yule, 1996:60)
However, in an interaction, there is a more narrowly specified type of
politeness at work. Then, politeness can be defined as the means employed to
show awareness of another person's face. So, in order to describe it, we need the
concept of face. (Yule, 1996:60)
2. Face
As a technical term, face means the public self-image of a person. It
refers to that emotional and social sense of self that everyone has and expects
everyone else to recognize. (Yule, 1996:60). Politeness can be accomplished in
situations of social distance or closeness. (Yule, 1996:60)
Showing awareness for another person's face when that other seems
socially distant is often described in terms of respect or deference. Showing the
equivalent awareness when the other is socially close is often described in terms
of friendliness, camaraderie, or solidarity. The first type might be found in a
student's question to his teacher, shown as [ia.], and a second type in the friend's
question to the same individual, as in [ib.].
[i] a. Excuse me, Mr Buckingham, but can I talk to you for a minute?
b. Hey, Bucky, got a minute?
‘Face’ consists in two related aspects:
- A person's negative face is the need to be independent, to have freedom
of action, and not to be imposed on by others. The word 'negative' here
doesn't mean 'bad', it's just the opposite pole from 'positive'. (Yule,
1996:61)
- A person's positive face is the need to be accepted, even liked, by others,
to be treated as a member of the same group, and to know that his or her
wants are shared by others. (Yule, 1996:62)
In simple terms, a negative face is the need to be independent and a positive
face is the need to be connected. (Yule, 1996:62)
3. Face-threatening acts & face-saving acts
If a speaker says something that represents a threat to another individual's
expectations regarding self-image or their face wants, it is described as a face
threatening act. (Yule, 1996:61). Alternatively, given the possibility that some
action might be interpreted as a threat to another's face, the speaker can say
something to lessen the possible threat. This is called a face saving act. (Yule,
1996:61)
Imagine a late night scene, where a young neighbor is playing his music
very loud and an older couple are trying to sleep. One of them, in [2], proposes
a face threatening act and the other suggests a face saving act.
[2] Him: I'm going to tell him to stop that awful noise right now!
Her: Perhaps you could just ask him if he is going to stop soon because
it's getting a bit late and people need to get to sleep.
(Yule, 1996:61)
4. Negative politeness & positive politeness
A face-saving act which is oriented to the person's negative face will tend
to show deference, emphasize the importance of the other's time or concerns,
and even include an apology for the imposition or interruption. This is also
called negative politeness. (Yule, 1996:62). A face-saving act which is
concerned with the person's positive face will tend to show solidarity,
emphasize that both speakers want the same thing, and that they have a common
goal. This is also called positive politeness. (Yule, 1996:62)

II. INDIRECTNESS
1. Intentional indirectness
Not all indirectness is intentional; some is caused by linguistic
inadequacy. We may have to use indirectness because of some performance
error, for example, if you temporarily forget a word or, through fear,
nervousness, excitement, etc., cannot get it out. (Meaning in interaction, Jenny
Thomas. 1995, P.120). People who use indirect speech acts or indirectness
mainly in communication need politeness so the speaker can diminish some
unpleasant message in the order or request to the hearer. By using indirectness,
the speaker will not infringe on the hearer’s feelings.
The use of indirectness in these circumstances may lead the hearer to
infer all sorts of things about you, but you cannot be said to have generated any
implicatures. In pragmatics we are interested only in intentional indirectness
(although it is not always possible to say with certainty whether indirectness is
intended or not). (Meaning in interaction, Jenny Thomas. 1995, P.120)
In simple terms, if a speaker chooses an indirect way of expressing their
intentions, it requires the listener to engage in more inferential processes or
interpretation to grasp the intended meaning.
Example: Here is an example originally due to Searle (1975:61), suppose
somebody says to a friend:
“A: Let’s go to the movies tonight” and the friend answers:
“B: I have to study for an exam”
(Pragmatics an introduction, Jacob L.Mey 2001, P.112)

In this situation, The speaker (B) wants to decline the invitation but doesn't want
to say “NO” directly so they choose the polite expression and respectful tone.
2. Cost and risk of indirectness
Indirectness is costly and risky. It is ‘costly’ in the sense that an indirect
utterance takes longer for the speaker to produce and longer for the hearer to
process. It is risky in the sense that the hearer may not understand what the
speaker is getting at.
(Meaning in interaction, Jenny Thomas. 1995, P.120)

Example 1: B (a non-native speaker of English) has been staying with A for

several weeks. He has a passion for West Side Story and has just played the
film's soundtrack right through for the second time in one evening:
A : Would you like to listen to something else now?
B: No .
(References: Meaning in interaction, Jenny Thomas. 1995, P.120)

Example 2: The following was related to me by Elite Olshtain and I have

reconstructed the dialogue from memory. An American woman was visiting
Israel; one evening she went to the flat of some friends and her host asked her
what she would like to drink. She replied: 'Well, I've been on whisky all day.'
3. Factors governing indirectness
3.1. The relative power of the S over the H
We tend to use a greater degree of indirectness with people who have
some power or authority over us. These types of power are most apparent in
hierarchical settings, such as courts, the military, and the workplace.

Example: You would probably be more indirect about conveying to your

employer that you are annoyed by the fact that he or she always arrives late,
than in conveying the same to your brother.
3.2. The social distance between the S and the H
It is best seen as a composite of psychologically real factors (status, age,
sex, degree of intimacy, etc.) which 'together determine the overall degree of
respectfulness' within a given speech situation.
In other words, if you feel close to someone, because that person is related to
you, or you know him or her well or are similar in terms o f age, social class,
occupation, sex, ethnicity, etc., you feel less need to employ indirectness in, say,
making a request than you would if you were making the same request of a
complete stranger.

Example: The speaker wanted some change for the coffee machine. She first
approached a colleague whom she knew very well, but, when he could not help,
was forced to approach a complete stranger [a man Pragmatics and indirectness
129 considerably older than she was]:
- Got a change of fifty pence, DB?
- Excuse me, could you change fifty pence for me? I need tens or fives for
the coffee machine.

3.3. The degree to which X is rated an imposition in culture Y:

When we talk about 'size of imposition' we mean how great is the request
you are making.
Example: The speaker was my mother. She made the two following requests to
me within the space of a few minutes:
- Shut the window, Jen.
- Do you think you could find the time to take those invitations to the
printers?

3.4. The relative rights and obligations between the S and the H
A policeman, speaking in his capacity as a police officer, could get you to
move your car simply by saying: 'Move this vehicle.' But the same person,
speaking in a purely private capacity, would have to use a much more indirect
strategy to perform the same speech act.
3.5. Religion: people may be more or less indirect because of their religious
beliefs.
3.6. S/F language acquisition:
Those who acquire more than one language seem affected by values and
norms of the culture/language other than those of their first culture/language in
their choice of indirectness.

3.7. Personal relation:

Speakers may be more or less direct in talk depending on their
interpersonal relations.

3.8. Education:
Those who are well-educated normally act differently in terms of
indirectness.

3.9. Intellectual abilities:

People may be more or less direct in speaking as regards their intellectual
abilities.

III. THEORIES OF POLITENESS

Politeness Theory, developed by Penelope Brown and Stephen C.
Levinson in the 1970s, has always been a valuable framework for understanding
how language is used to navigate social interactions and achieve communicative
goals in a polite and respectful manner. This theory proposes that speakers,
when communicating, consider the social context and the "face" needs of the
addressee (listener) in order to be perceived as polite. Face refers to a person's
sense of self-esteem and their desire to be respected.

1. Grice’s principle
Grice's principle, also known as the “Cooperative Principle”, plays a
foundational role in understanding theories of politeness. Developed by H. P.
Grice, this principle suggests that participants in a conversation generally
cooperate to ensure effective communication. It posits that speakers and
listeners follow certain guidelines, known as “maxims”, to achieve this goal.
These maxims are:
 - Quantity: Be informative, but not more than necessary.
- Quality: Try to be truthful, avoid saying things you believe to be false, or
lack adequate evidence for.
- Relation: Be relevant to the topic at hand.
- Manner: Be clear and unambiguous, avoiding obscurity and disorder.
The connection to politeness lies in how these maxims can be adhered to
or strategically flouted (violated) to achieve politeness goals.
Following the maxims often contributes to a cooperative and clear
communication, which can inherently be perceived as polite. For example,
providing relevant information (quantity maxim) or avoiding ambiguity
(manner maxim) demonstrates respect for the listener's time and effort in
understanding the message.
However, flouting a maxim can also be used strategically to be polite in
specific situations. For instance, understating one's abilities (modesty maxim)
can be a way to avoid appearing boastful, or indirectly requesting something
(quantity maxim) can be more polite than a direct command.
The key lies in using these strategies appropriately while considering the
potential impact on the listener's face needs. Brown and Levinson's “Politeness
Theory” builds upon Grice's principles by emphasizing the importance of
maintaining both the positive face (desire for approval) and negative face
(desire for freedom of action) of the addressee.
Therefore, Grice's Cooperative Principle provides a foundation for
understanding how communication can be achieved effectively, while
politeness theories, like Brown and Levinson's, expand upon this by considering
the social context and the specific strategies speakers use to navigate
interpersonal interactions in a polite and respectful manner.*

2. Lakoff’s rules
Robin Lakoff's contribution to theories of politeness lies in proposing two
fundamental “rules of pragmatic competence”:
2.1. Be clear: This rule aligns with Grice's Cooperative Principle,
emphasizing clarity and conciseness in communication to avoid
misunderstandings and ensure effective message transmission.
2.2. Be polite: This rule goes beyond Grice's by explicitly focusing on the
social aspect of communication. It acknowledges the importance of considering
the feelings and needs of the listener and tailoring your language accordingly.
 Lakoff argues that achieving both clarity and politeness requires
“pragmatic awareness” – understanding the context, the relationship with the
listener, and the potential impact of your words.
While Lakoff's approach shares similarities with Grice's principles, it
emphasizes “politeness as a distinct goal.” Additionally, unlike the specific
maxims in Grice's theory, Lakoff's “rules are broader and more general”,
leaving room for interpretation and adaptation based on the specific situation.
However, one critique of Lakoff's theory is its *lack of detail* regarding
how politeness is achieved and the strategies involved. She doesn't explicitly
outline different politeness strategies, which later theories like Brown and
Levinson's “Politeness Theory” addressed by providing specific frameworks
like positive and negative face and strategies like positive politeness and
negative politeness.
Overall, “Lakoff's rules” laid the groundwork for understanding
politeness as a crucial aspect of pragmatic competence, paving the way for
further exploration in the field of politeness theories.

3. Leech’s maxim
In the realm of politeness theories, Geoffrey Leech builds upon the
foundation laid by Grice and Lakoff by proposing six specific politeness
maxims:
3.1. Tact: This maxim emphasizes minimizing the expression of beliefs
that could be perceived as negative or critical towards the listener. The goal is to
avoid causing offense or embarrassment.
Example: Instead of saying, "You look terrible in that outfit," one might follow
the tact maxim by saying, "That color might not be the most flattering for you."
3.2. Generosity: This maxim focuses on minimizing the imposition on the
listener's wants and desires. It encourages the speaker to avoid making
demands, requests, or suggestions that could burden the listener.
Example: Instead of asking, "Can you give me a ride?," one might follow the
generosity maxim by saying, "I would be grateful if you could give me a ride,
but only if it's convenient for you."
3.3. Approbation: This maxim encourages the speaker to maximize the
expression of positive regard and approval towards the listener. It suggests
emphasizing complimentary remarks and showing appreciation.
Example: Instead of simply saying "Thank you," one might follow the
approbation maxim by saying, "Thank you so much! I really appreciate your
help."
3.4. Modesty: This maxim encourages the speaker to downplay their own
abilities, achievements, or desires. The goal is to avoid appearing arrogant or
boastful.
Example: Instead of saying, "I'm the best candidate for this job," one might
follow the modesty maxim by saying, "I believe I have the skills and experience
for this role."
3.5. Agreement: This maxim enables the speaker to seek common ground
and avoid expressing disagreement with the listener. It gives a sense of harmony
and cooperation.
Example: Instead of directly stating, "I disagree with your opinion," one might
follow the agreement maxim by saying, "while I have a different perspective, I
appreciate your reasoning."
3.6. Sympathy: This maxim encourages the speaker to show concern and
understanding for the feelings and experiences of the listener. It promotes
empathy and emotional connection.
Example: Instead of simply responding with "Okay," when someone expresses
sadness, one might follow the sympathy maxim by saying, "I'm so sorry to hear
that. I can imagine how difficult this must be for you."

By adhering to these maxims, speakers can navigate social interactions more

effectively and maintain a sense of politeness and respect towards their
listeners. It's important to note that these maxims can be “strategically flouted”
depending on the context and desired outcome, but doing so often requires
*redress* through explanations, apologies, or other mitigating strategies
IV. Brown and Levinson’s politeness strategies

Introduction

The face-management view on politeness by Brown & Levinson (1978

and revised in 1987), is recognized as the most influential and successful theory
of politeness.

In the context of the mutual vulnerability of face, any rational agent will
seek to avoid these face-threatening acts, or will employ certain strategies to
minimize the threat. Below is a series of possible strategies for performing
FTAs, numbering from greater to lesser risk of face losing.

Brown, P., & Levinson, S. C. (1987). Politeness: Some universals in language usage (p.60).

Now I will explain this chart and give definitions to some terms included in it:
The first strategy, on record but without redressive action, baldly. Doing
an act baldly, without redress, involves doing it in the most direct, clear,
unambiguous and concise way possible (for example, for a request, saying ‘Do
X!’).
By redressive action, we mean action that ‘gives face’ to the addressee,
that is, that attempts to counteract the potential face damage of the FTA by
doing it in such a way, or with such modifications or additions, that indicate
clearly that no such face threat is intended or desired, and that S, in general,
recognizes H’s face wants and Himself wants them to be achieved. (Brown and
Levinson 1987: 69)

The second branch, on record with redressive action. Such redressive

action takes one of two forms, depending on which aspect of the face (negative
or positive) is being stressed. In the previous section, we have mentioned
positive and negative face. In simple terms, negative face is the need to be
independent and positive face is the need to be connected.

So, according to which face to care for, we have Negative politeness and
Positive politeness, which have been mentioned earlier.

Positive politeness A face-saving act which is concerned with the

person's positive face will tend to show solidarity,
emphasize that both speakers want the same thing,
and that they have a common goal. (Yule, G.
1996: 62)

Negative politeness is oriented mainly toward

partially satisfying (redressing) H’s negative face,
his basic want to maintain claims of territory and
self-determination. (Brown and Levinson 1987:
70)
Negative A face-saving act which is oriented to the person's
politeness negative face will tend to show deference,
emphasize the importance of the other's time or
concerns, and even include an apology for the
imposition or interruption. (Yule, G. 1996: 62)

Positive politeness is oriented toward the positive

face of H, the positive self-image that he claims
for himself. (Brown and Levinson 1987: 70)

The opposite of on record is the set of strategies number 4, off record,

which are types of statement, are not directly addressed to the other (Yule, p.63)
 The series of strategies adopted and deployed in this study encompasses:
(i) bald-on-record strategies, (ii) on-record (with redress) strategies, (iii) off-
record strategies, and (iv) no FTAs.

1. Bald-on record strategies

For our purposes, we can treat the bald-on-record strategy as speaking in

conformity with Grice’s Maxims (Grice 1975). These Maxims are an intuitive
characterization of conversational principles that would constitute guidelines for
achieving maximally efficient communication.

The prime reason for bald-on-record usage may be stated simply: in

general, whenever S wants to do the FTA with maximum efficiency more than
he wants to satisfy H’s face, even to any degree, he will choose the bald-on-
record strategy. There are, however, different kinds of bald-on-record usage in
different circumstances, because S can have different motives for his want to do
the FTA with maximum efficiency. These fall into two classes: those where the
face threat is not minimized, where face is ignored or irrelevant; and those
where in doing the FTA baldly on record, S minimizes face threats by
implication. Direct imperatives stand out as clear examples of bald-on-record
usage, and we concentrate on them in the examples that follow.

1.1 Cases of non-minimization of the face threat

Where maximum efficiency is very important, and this is mutually known

to both S and H, no face redress is necessary. In cases of great urgency or
desperation, redress would actually decrease the communicated urgency. For
example:
(1) Help! (compare the non-urgent ‘Please help me, if you would be so
kind’)
(2) Watch out!
(3) Your pants are on fire!
 (4) Give me just one more week! (to pay the rent)

Another motivation for bald-on-record (non-redressed) FTAs is found in

cases of channel noise, or where communication difficulties exert pressure to
speak with maximum efficiency. This can be seen, for example, when S is
calling across a distance:
(17) Come home right now!
or talking on the telephone with a bad connection:
(18) I need another £1000.

Another set of cases where non-redress occurs is where S’s want to

satisfy H’s face is small, either because S is powerful and does not fear
retaliation or non-cooperation from H:
(24) Bring me wine, Jeeves.
(25) In future, you must add the soda after the whisky.
or because S wants to be rude, or doesn’t care about maintaining face. A good
example of socially acceptable rudeness comes in teasing or joking.

A third set of cases where non-minimization is likely occurs where doing

the FTA is primarily in H’s interest. Then in doing the FTA, S conveys that he
does care about H (and therefore about H’s positive face), so that no redress is
required. Thus sympathetic advice or warnings may be baldly on record:
(27) Careful! He’s a dangerous man. (warning H against someone who
could threaten him)
(28) Your slip is showing.
(29) Your wig is askew; let me fix it for you.
(30) Your headlights are on!

1.2 Cases of FTA-oriented bald-on-record usage

The above, the standard uses of bald on record, are usages where other
demands (at least metaphorically) override face concerns. But another use of
bald on record is actually oriented to face. For in certain circumstances it is
reasonable for S to assume that H will be especially preoccupied with H’s
potential infringements of S’s preserve. In these circumstances it is polite, in a
broad sense, for S to alleviate H’s anxieties by pre-emptively inviting H to
impinge on S’s preserve.

Three areas where one would expect such pre-emptive invitations to

occur in all languages are these: (i) welcomings (or post-greetings), where S
insists that H may impose on his negative face; (ii)farewells, where S insists that
H may transgress on his positive face by taking his leave; (iii) offers, where S
insists that H may impose on S’s negative face.
The classic example of such invitations is perhaps ‘Come in’, which is a
bald-on-record imperative in many languages:
(39) English: Come in, don’t hesitate, I’m not busy.

Other examples of bald-on-record imperatives include offers, as in English:

(50) (You must) have some more cake.
(51) Don’t bother, I’ll clean it up.
(52) Leave it to me.
Other cases of bald-on-record imperatives seem to be addressed to H’s
reluctance to transgress on S’s positive face (as contrasted with the above,
which are aimed at forestalling H’s reluctance to impinge on S’s negative face).
For example, in:
(56) Don’t worry about me.
(57) Don’t let me keep you.
S communicates essentially ‘Feel free to get on with your business and
don’t worry about offending me.’ And in:
(58) Don’t mind the mess.
S communicates something like, ‘Don’t worry that I will mind you seeing
me (or my preserve) in such a mess; I won’t.’

2. On-record (with redress) strategies

Now we will analyze Brown and Levinson's on-record (with redress)

strategies. However, in the book Politeness - Some Universals in language
usage by these two authors, this section has up to 25 strategies, and due to time
constraints, this study will only focus on analyzing five strategies: Two
strategies in Positive politeness and Three strategies in Negative politeness.
2.1 Positive politeness

Positive politeness is redress directed to the addressee’s positive face, his

perennial desire that his wants (or the actions/acquisitions/values resulting from
them) should be thought of as desirable. Redress consists in partially satisfying
that desire by communicating that one’s own wants (or some of them) are in
some respects similar to the addressee’s wants. (Brown and Levinson 1987:
101)

Positive-politeness utterances are used as a kind of metaphorical

extension of intimacy, to imply common ground or sharing of wants to a limited
extent even between strangers who perceive themselves, for the purposes of the
interaction, as somehow similar. For the same reason, positive-politeness
techniques are usable not only for FTA redress, but in general as a kind of social
accelerator, where S, in using them, indicates that he wants to ‘come closer’ to
H. (Brown and Levinson 1987: 103)

Strategy 1: Notice, attend to H (his interests, wants, needs, goods)

In general, this output suggests that S should take notice of aspects of H’s
condition (noticeable changes, remarkable possessions, anything which looks as
though H would want S to notice and approve of it). Examples used as FTA
redress include:
(1) Goodness, you cut your hair! (...) By the way, I came to borrow some
flour.
Another aspect of the Notice output is that when H makes an FTA against
himself (a breakdown of body control, or any faux pas), S should ‘notice’ it and
indicate that he’s not embarrassed by it. (By contrast, in negative politeness S
should always ignore H’s faux pas.) He can do this by a joke, or teasing H about
his penchant for faux pas:
(7) English: God you’re farty tonight!
or by including S himself as part of the act:
(9) We ate too many beans tonight, didn’t we!
Strategy 4: Use in-group identity markers

By using any of the innumerable ways to convey in-group membership, S

can implicitly claim the common ground with H that is carried by that definition
of the group. These include in-group usages of address forms, of language or
dialect, of jargon or slang, and of ellipsis.

Address forms. In many languages (for reasons discussed below) the

second-person plural pronoun of address doubles as an honorific form to
singular respected or distant alters. Other address forms used to convey such in-
group membership include generic names and terms of address like Mac, mate,
buddy, pal, honey, dear, duckie, luv, babe, Mom, blondie, brother, sister, cutie,
sweetheart, guys, fellas.
Such forms may be used to soften FTAs:
(26) Here mate, I was keeping that seat for a friend of mine…

Use of in-group language or dialect. The phenomenon of code-switching

involves any Switch from one language or dialect to another in communities
where the linguistic repertoire includes two or more such codes. Other cases
simply involve switching from one language to another, in bilingual or
multilingual communities. This is comparable to the switch within English,
from nickname to full name:
(35) First call: Come here, Johnny.
Second call: John Henry Smith, you come here right away.
Another type of code-switching phenomenon is the switch in English into
a spurious dialect, or a dialect not normally used by S or H, to soften an FTA or
turn it into a joke - for example, making a complaint in a fake Cockney accent
or Alfred E. Neumann-style nasal twang.

Use of jargon or slang. Related to the use of an in-group language or

dialect is the use of in-group terminology. By referring to an object with a slang
term, S may evoke all the shared associations and attitudes that he and H both
have toward that object; this then may be used as FTA redress. For example, use
of brand names in a request may stress that S and H share an (in-group) reliance
on the required object:
(36) Got any Winstons?
(37) I came to borrow some Allinsons if you’ve got any.
And just as in British English one uses:
(38) Lend us two quid then, wouldja mate?
and in American English:
(39) Lend us two bucks then, wouldja Mac?

Contraction and ellipsis. Because of the reliance on shared mutual

knowledge to make ellipsis comprehensible, there is an inevitable association
between the use of ellipsis and the existence of in-group knowledge. For
example, in order for the utterance ‘Nails’ to be interpretable, S and H must
share some knowledge about the context that makes the utterance
understandable (for example that S and H are cooperating in building a house
and S has the hammer in his hand). It is perhaps for this reason that the use of
ellipsis and contraction is associated with positive politeness, and therefore the
presence of ellipsis may mark an utterance as being positively polite. Even the
use of conventionally indirect requests? normally a feature of negative
politeness, if marked by ellipsis crosses over into "positive politeness:
(41) Mind if I smoke?
(42) Got any spare cash?
(43) How about a drink?

Note also that, in English at any rate, many nicknames are simply
contracted forms of the full name - for example, Liz, Jenny, Joe, Tom, Sam. It
seems that to contract is to endear, perhaps because of the association with
smallness, perhaps partly because of the contrast with negative politeness where
one tries to increase the metaphorical size of H.

2.2 Negative politeness

Negative politeness is redressive action addressed to the addressee’s

negative face: his want to have his freedom of action unhindered and his
attention unimpeded.

Strategy 1: Be conventionally indirect

In this strategy a speaker is faced with opposing tensions: the desire to

give H an ‘out’ by being indirect, and the desire to go on record. In this case it is
solved by the compromise of conventional indirectness, the use of phrases and
sentences that have contextually unambiguous meanings (by virtue of
conventionalization) which are different from their literal meanings. In this way
the utterance goes on record, and the speaker indicates his desire to have gone
off record (to have conveyed the same thing indirectly). Conventional
indirectness encodes the clash of wants, and so partially achieves them both.
(1) Can you please pass the salt?
which can only be an indirect request (and not conceivably a question about the
addressee’s potential abilities).

Strategy 2: Question, hedge

In the literature, a ‘hedge’ is a particle, word or phrase that modifies the
degree of membership of a predicate or noun phrase in a set; it says of that
membership that it is partial, or true only in certain respects, or that it is more
true and complete than perhaps might be expected (note that this latter sense is
an extension of the colloquial sense of ‘hedge’). For example:
(44) A swing is sort of a toy.
(45) Bill is a regular fish.
(46) John is a true friend.
(47) I rather think it’s hopeless.
(48) I’m pretty sure I’ve read that book before.
(49) You’re quite right.
(50) This paper is not technically social anthropology.

Hedges on illocutionary force. It is performative hedges in particular that

are the most important linguistic means of satisfying the speaker’s want.
For example:
(152) He perhaps might not be home, I suppose.
(153) Perhaps I’ll go too, I say?/ do you think I could?/ shall we say?
(159) We are sort of/a little bit/merely getting drunk.

‘If’ clauses are another very productive source in English.

(186) Close the window,
if you can.
if it closes.
if it isn’t already closed,
if you want.
*if I want you to. (but note that this is OK if S might later ask H to
do it)

Hedges addressed to Grice's Maxims. The speaker’s want to avoid

presuming may be partially satisfied by not assuming that H wantSulQ. operate
 (in Grice’s sense: 1967, ch.3), or by not assuming that S’s assessment of what
would be a contribution to the cooperative enterprise of talking is the same as
H’s.

Hedges Quality hedges Quantity Relevance Manner

hedges hedges
hedges

Meaning Suggests that the speaker is not Gives notice Mark the Can be used
that not as change of the to redress
taking full responsibility for the truth
much or not as topic, and all kinds of
of his utterance precise perhaps FTAs
information is partially
provided as apologize for
might be it
expected
Examples There is some evidence to the effect roughly, more This may not to be
be succinct
that… or less,
relevant/appro in a nutshell
To the best of my recollection… approximately, priate/timely, not to beat
but… about the
I think/believe/assume… give or take a
Now is bush…
With complete honesty I can say… few, or so, I probably the you see
time to say... What I
I absolutely deny/promise/ believe should think, I
I might meant
that… can’t tell you mention at was…
this point… More
As you know . . . any more than
Since (I’ve clearly…
As is well known . . . that it’s…, to been To put it
wondering/ more
As you and I both know . . . some extent,
it’s been on simply…
As I remember it, all in all my mind…) Now, to be
Sorry/Hey/ absolutely
My best recollection would have in short,
Oh, I’ve just clear, I
been…/is … basically, so to thought… want…
By the way… yeah?
. . . you might say . .. speak
Oh I know… got it?
(so) I would say . . . I’ll just say Anyway… OK?
While I you with
As I recall. . . well
remember/ me?
 I can explain a partial answer to that. you know think of it, j ' ' is that
' clear?
.. I mean
Excuse me if I see?
mention this
while I’m
thinking of
it...
All right,
now…

Hedges addressed to politeness strategies. In addition to the hedges on

the Maxims with their FTA uses, there are some which, while they may be
derived from Maxim hedges, function directly as notices of violations of face
wants. Such are, for example, frankly, to be honest, I hate to have to say this,
but... (which preface criticisms or bad news), phrases like if I do say so myself
(which are tagged onto brags), and phrases like I must say (which occur with
both types of FTA). Essentially these seem to signify that what is said on record
might more properly have been said off record, or not at all.

Prosodic and kinesic hedges. Perhaps most of the verbal hedges can be
replaced by (or emphasized by) prosodic or kinesic means of indicating
tentativeness or emphasis. The raised eyebrow, the earnest, frown, the umms
and ahhs and hesitations that indicate the speaker’s attitude toward -what he
saying, are often the most salient clue to the presence of an FTA, even cross-
culturally.

Strategy 6: Apologize
By apologizing for doing an FTA, the speaker can indicate his reluctance
to impinge on H’s negative face and thereby partially redress that impingement.
There are at least four ways to communicate regret or reluctance to do an FTA.

Admit the impingement. S can simply admit that he is impinging on H’s

face, with expressions like:
(295) I’m sure you must be very busy, but…
 (296) I know this is a bore, but…
(297) I’d like to ask you a big favour:
(298) I hope this isn’t going to bother you too much:

Indicate reluctance. Secondly, S can attempt to show that he is reluctant

to impinge on H with the use of hedges (discussed above) or by means of
expressions such as the following:
(301) I normally wouldn’t ask you this, but…
(302) Look, I’ve probably come to the wrong person, but…
(305) I’m terribly embarrassed to have to admit…
(306) I hesitate to trouble you, but…
(307) You’ve never bothered me, I know, but…
(308) I hope you don’t mind me saying this, but…

Give overwhelming reasons. Thirdly, S can claim that he has compelling

reasons for doing the FTA (for example, his own incapacity), thereby implying
that normally he wouldn’t dream of infringing H’s negative face:
(310) I can think of nobody else who could…
(311) I simply can’t manage to…
(312) I’m absolutely lost…
(313) I can’t understand a word of this language; do you know where the
American Express office is?
(314) Can you possibly help me with this,
(because I can’t manage it/because there’s no one else/I could ask.)

Beg forgiveness. Finally, S may beg H’s forgiveness, or at least ask for
‘acquittal’ - that is, that H should cancel the debt implicit in the FTA:
(317) Excuse me, but…
(318) I’m sorry to bother you…

3. Off-record strategies

A communicative act is done off record if it is done in such a way that it

is not possible to attribute only one clear communicative intention to the act. In
other words, the actor leaves himself an “out” by providing himself with a
number of defensible interpretations; he cannot be held to have committed
himself to just one particular interpretation of his act. Thus if a speaker wants to
do an FTA, but wants to avoid the responsibility for doing it, he can do it off
record and leave it up to the addressee to decide how to interpret it.
Such off-record utterances are essentially indirect uses of language:

To construct an off-record utterance one says something that is either

more general (contains less information in the sense that it rules out fewer
possible states of affairs) or actually different from what one means (intends to
be understood). In either case, H must make some inference to recover what
was in fact intended.

The actual processes that lie behind the comprehension (and thus the
production) of indirection in language are not well understood. Essentially,
though, what is involved is a two-stage process:

(i) A trigger serves notice to the addressee that some inference must be made.

(ii) Some mode of inference derives what is meant (intended) from what is
actually said, this last providing a sufficient clue for the inference.

A very plausible candidate for the trigger is some violation of a Gricean Maxim.
(Brown & Levinson 1987: 211)

In conversations off-record strategies are considered on-record ones (Brown &

Levinson 1987: 212): ...[M]any of the classic off-record strategies – metaphor,
irony, understatement, rhetorical questions, etc. – are very often actually on-
record when used. Because the clues to their interpretation (the mutual
knowledge of S and H in the context; the intonational, prosodic and kinesic
clues to speaker’s attitude; the clues derived from conversational sequencing)
add up to only one really viable interpretation in the context.
(Brown & Levinson 1987: 214)

Fig. 6 classifies such off-record strategies, which are grouped first under the
trigger which starts the inference rolling - the particular Gricean Maxim whose
violation serves notice that there is an inference to be made. Then, within each
trigger type, Brown and Levinson classify strategies by the kinds of clues that
are presented by the speaker for the intended inferences to be derived from.

Invite conversational implicatures.

If a speaker wants to do an FTA, and chooses to do it indirectly, he must

give H some hints and hope that H picks up on them and thereby interprets what
S really means (intends) to say. The basic way to do this is to invite
conversational implicatures by violating the Gricean Maxims of efficient
communication. H is left to ask himself “Why did S say that that way?” and to
hit upon an interpretation that makes the violation understandable.

For example, if S says “Hmm, it’s pretty stuffy in here”, he may implicate a
request that H open the window. Such a conveyed intent is likely to be off
record, and H can ignore the request with impunity (while, say, agreeing with
the utterance). (Brown & Levinson 1987: 213)

3.1. Violating Relevance Maxim

Strategy 1: Give hints

If S says something that is not explicitly relevant (irrelevant), he invites H to

search for an interpretation of the possible relevance. The basic mechanism here
is a violation of the Maxim of Relevance (be relevant). Many cases of truly
indirect (off-record) speech acts are accomplished by hints that consist in
“raising the issue of” some desired act A, for instance, by stating motives or
reasons for doing A

(1) It’s cold in here. (c.i. Shut the window)

(2) I need some more nails to finish up this rabbit hutch. (c.i. Buy me some
when you go to town)

(3) This soup’s a bit bland. (c.i. Pass the salt)

Besides, stating motives or reasons for doing A, Hints may also be done by
asserting or questioning the conditions for A (as in indirect requests); for
example:

(6) That window isn’t open.

(7) You didn’t open the window when you came in.

(Brown & Levinson 1987: 215)

Strategy 2: Give association clues

A related kind of implicature triggered by relevance violations is provided by

mentioning associated with the act required of H, either by precedent in S-H’s
experience or by mutual knowledge irrespective of their interactional
experience.

(8) Oh God, I’ve got a headache again. (Brown & Levinson 1987: 215)

may be used to convey a request to borrow H’s swimming suit, if S and H

mutually know that they both have an association between S having a headache
and S wanting to borrow H’s swimsuit in order to swim off his headache.

In a sense association clues for indirect requests are nothing but more remote
hints of practical-reasoning premises. What is special about them is that specific
knowledge extrinsic to H’s desired act is required to decode them.
In Madagascar (E. 0. Keenan 1974a and personal comm.), apparently most
requests are done in this way, with a cumulative summing of associative hints,
such as is indicated in the following glosses:

(9) My house isn’t very far away . . . [intervening material] . .. There’s the path
that leads to my house. (c.i. Please come visit me)

(10) Are you going to market tomorrow? . . . There’s a market tomorrow, I

suppose. (c.i. Give me a ride there)

Such hints leave it up to H to offer, taking the responsibility for the FTA away
from S. (Brown & Levinson 1987: 216)

Euphemisms for taboo topics are also presumably derived from implicatures of
this kind (for example WC, toilet, lavatory, bathroom, cloakroom, restroom,
little girl's room, etc.). As these become conventionalized there is constant
pressure to create new euphemisms for truly taboo subjects. Euphemisms are a
universal feature of language usage.

Strategy 3: Presuppose

An utterance can be almost wholly relevant in context, and yet violate the
Relevance Maxim just, at the level of its presuppositions

For instance, if S says:

(13) I washed the car again today.

He presupposes that he has done it before (e.g. last week) and therefore may
implicate a criticism.

The use of “again” forces H to search for the relevance of the presupposed prior
event; if it is relevant only on the assumption that S and H are counting the
times each does the task, and this in turn is relevant because S and H have
agreed to share the task, then a criticism is implicated.

Another way of presupposing is to use contrastive stress, which in conjunction

with a contextual violation of the Relevance Maxim carries a criticism:

(15) I don’t go around boasting about my achievements.

(16) It wasn’t me that did it. (Brown & Levinson 1987: 217)
Here the contrastive stress presupposes that someone does or did. This
implicature is conveyed even more clearly with the addition of at least:

(17) At least I don’t go around boasting about my achievements.

3.2. Violating Quantity Maxim (“Say as much as and no more than is

required”)

Strategy 4: Understate

By violating the Quantity Maxim (‘Say as much as and no more than is

required’), the speaker is inevitably saying something different than what he
actually intends to convey.

Typical ways of constructing understatements are to choose a point on a scalar

predicate (e.g. tall, good, nice) that is well below the point that actually
describes the state of affairs, or to hedge a higher point which will implicate the
(lower) actual state of affairs.

That is, in the case of criticism, S avoids the lower points of the scale, and in the
case of a compliment, or admission, S avoids the upper points.

Note that the necessity for background knowledge in order to interpret such
informationally inadequate utterances means that, if they are contextually
marked and therefore on record, they are essentially positive politeness devices,
stressing shared knowledge and/or shared values.

“Here are some examples:

(18) A: What do you think of Harry? (Brown & Levinson 1987: 218)

B: Nothing wrong with him. (c.i. I don’t think he’s very good)

(19) That car looks as if it might go! (about a flashy sports car, c.i. compliment)

(23) She’s some kind of idiot. (c.i. She’s an idiot)

Strategy 5: Overstate

If S says more than necessary, thus violating the Quantity Maxim in another
way, he may also convey implicatures. He may do this by exaggerating or
choosing to appoint on a scale which is higher than the actual state of affairs.
The speaker may do this by the inverse of the understatement principle — that
is, by exaggerating or choosing a point on a scale which is higher than the actual
state of affairs. Here, however, the implicatures often lie far beyond what is
said.

For example:

(35) There were a million people in the Co-op tonight!

could convey an excuse for being late

(36) I tried to call a hundred times, but there was never any answer.

could convey an apology for not getting in touch

(38) Why are you always smoking?

could convey the relevant criticisms.

(Brown & Levinson 1987: 220)

Strategy 6: Use tautologies

By uttering a tautology, S encourages H to look for an informative

interpretation of the non-informative utterance.

(40) War is war.

=> It may be an excuse.

(42) Your clothes belong where your clothes belong, my clothes belong where
my clothes belong. Look upstairs! (Brown & Levinson 1987: 220)

=> It may be a criticism.

3.3. Violating Quality Maxim

Strategy 7: Use contradictions

By violating the Quality Maxim (“Speak the truth, be sincere”), S forces H to

find some implicature by using contradictions, as well as the ironies, metaphors,
and rhetorical questions considered in the following three sections.
By stating two things that contradict each other, S makes it appear that he
cannot be telling the truth. He thus encourages H to look for an interpretation
that reconciles the two contradictory propositions. For example:

(49) A: Are you upset about that?

(B): Well, {yes and no/I am and I’m not)

Such contradictions may convey a complaint or a criticism; for instance one

might say of a drunken friend to a telephone caller:

(50) Well, John is here and he isn’t here. (Brown & Levinson 1987: 221)

Strategy 8: Be ironic

By saying the opposite of what he means, again a violation of Quality, S can

indirectly convey his intended meaning, if there are clues that his intended
meaning is being conveyed indirectly. Such clues may be prosodic (e.g.
nasality), kinesic (e.g. a smirk), or simply contextual: (Brown & Levinson 1987:
221, 222)

(51) John’s a real genius, (after John has just done twenty stupid things in a
row)

(52) Lovely neighborhood, eh? (in a slum)

In English ironies they may be marked by similar hedges: real, regular, just,
exactly, for example, or by exaggerated stress

Strategy 9: Use metaphor

Metaphors are a further category of quality violations, for metaphors are

literally false. The use of metaphor is perhaps usually on record, but there is
possibility that exactly which of the connotations of the metaphor S intends may
be off record. For example:

(61) Harry’s a real fish. (Brown & Levinson 1987: 222)

(c.i. He drinks/swims/is cold-blooded like a fish.)

Like irony, metaphors may be marked with hedging particles (real, regular, sort
of, as it were) that make their metaphorical status explicit.
Strategy 10: Use rhetorical questions

To ask a question with no intention of obtaining an answer is to break a

sincerity condition on quests - namely, that S wants H to provide him with the
indicated information. This sincerity condition straightforwardly follows from
the injunction “Be sincere”, i.e. the Quality Maxim.

Questions that leave their answers hanging in the air, implicated, may be used to
do FTAs, for example, excuses:

(64) How was I to know . . . ? (c.i. I wasn’t)

or criticisms:

(65) How many times do I have to tell you . . . ? (c.i. Too many)

(66) What can I say? (c.i. Nothing, it’s so bad) (Brown & Levinson 1987: 223)

Be vague or ambiguous: Violate the Maimer Maxim.

Rather than inviting a particular implicature, S may choose to go off record by

being vague or ambiguous (that is, violating the Manner Maxim) in such a way
that his communicated intent remains ill-defined. (Brown & Levinson 1987:
225)

3.4. Violating Manner Maxim

Manner (be clear and orderly)

Strategy 11: Be ambiguous

Purposeful ambiguity may be achieved through metaphor, since (as mentioned

above) it is not always clear exactly which of the connotations of a metaphor are
intended to be invoked. Thus:

(80) John’s a pretty sharp/smooth cookie (Brown & Levinson 1987: 225)

could be either a compliment or an insult, depending on which of the

connotations of sharp or smooth are latched on to.

Strategy 12: Be vague

S may go off record with an FTA by being vague about who the object of the
FTA is, or what the offense is.

E.g., in criticisms:

(81) Looks like someone may have had too much to drink. (vague
understatement)

(82) Perhaps someone did something naughty.

or in some euphemisms:

(83) I’m going you-know-where/down the road for a bit. (c.i to the local pub/to
hanging out with my friends) (Brown & Levinson 1987: 226)

Strategy 13: Over-generalize

Rule instantiation may leave the object of the FTA vaguely off record:

Ss’ overgeneralization makes Hs decide if the general rule applies to them. H

then has the choice of deciding whether the general rule applies to him, in this
case.

(84) The lawn has got to be mown.

(86) Mature people sometimes help do the dishes.

The use of proverbs can be considered one way of overgeneralization.

(87) People who live in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones. (Brown &
Levinson 1987: 226)

Strategy 14: Displace H

S may pretend to address the FTA to someone whom it wouldn’t threaten, and
hope that the real target will see that the FTA is aimed at him.

ErvinTripp (1972:247) cites an example of this, where one secretary in an office

asks another - but with negative politeness - to pass the stapler, in
circumstances where a professor is much nearer to the stapler than other
secretaries. His face is not threatened, and he can choose to do it himself as a
bonus “free gift”.
Strategy 15: Be incomplete, use ellipsis

By leaving an FTA half undone, S can leave the implicature “hanging in the air”
just as with rhetorical questions:

(91) Well, if one leaves one’s tea on the wobbly table …

(92) Well, I didn’t see you …

4. No FTA

Chart 3-1: Possible strategies for doing FTAs

(Brown & Levinson 1987: 60)

Brown and Levinson's final strategy 'Do not perform FTA' , appears to be self-
explanatory: there are times when something is potentially so face-threatening,
that you don't say it. Brown and Levinson do not discuss this strategy (there's
not a lot to say about saying nothing!),

Tanaka (1993) discusses two sorts of “saying nothing” (which, following

Bonikowska (1988), she terms the “opting out choice” or OOC). There are
times when the speaker decides to say nothing and genuinely wishes to let the
matter drop; there are other occasions when an individual decides to say nothing
(decides not to complain, for example) but still wishes to achieve the effect
which the speech act would have achieved had it been uttered. Tanaka (1993:
50-1) terms these two strategies OOC-genuine and OOC-strategic:

OOC-genuine : S does not perform a speech act, and genuinely intends to let the
matter remain closed.

S/he does not intend to achieve the perlocutionary effect.

OOC-strategic: S does not perform a speech act, but expects A to infer her/his
wish to achieve the perlocutionary effect.

There is a third situation — where there is such a strong expectation that

something will be said, that saying nothing is in itself a massive FTA (for
example, failing to express condolences to someone on the death of a loved
one).