European Journal of Behavior Analysis

ISSN: 1502-1149 (Print) 2377-729X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rejo20

Some preliminary notes on utopianism,

postmodernism and behavior analysis

Cesar Antonio Alves da Rocha

To cite this article: Cesar Antonio Alves da Rocha (2015): Some preliminary notes on
utopianism, postmodernism and behavior analysis, European Journal of Behavior Analysis,
DOI: 10.1080/15021149.2015.1092278

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15021149.2015.1092278

Published online: 28 Sep 2015.

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 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS, 2015
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15021149.2015.1092278

Some preliminary notes on utopianism, postmodernism and

behavior analysis
Cesar Antonio Alves da Rocha
Laboratório de Estudos do Comportamento Humano (LECH), Programa de Pós-Graduação em Psicologia,
Universidade Federal de São Carlos, São Carlos, Brazil

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

As a science with its foundation in the twentieth century and its Received 30 December 2014
immediate future in the twenty-first, behavior analysis encom- Accepted 5 September 2015
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passes the common tensions of the history and the philosophy KEYWORDS
of contemporary sciences. Several authors identify a crisis in the Behaviour analysis;
current epistemological field: the decline of the modern science postmodernism; utopianism;
model, and the rise of a postmodern kind of science. As a matter determinism; metanarratives
of fact, the so-called “postmodern discourse” seems to involve a
broader project, with issues that go beyond the purely scientific
field, reaching ethical and political concerns. What is the place of
behavior analysis in this scenario? This article presents a brief
review of arguments on the position of behavior analysis in the
debate between modern and postmodern trends of science, with
special focus on the postmodern ones. Two topics will be specifi-
cally addressed: the abandonment of determinism and the distrust
towards metanarratives. These two features of postmodern dis-
course are crucial for the relations between utopianism and beha-
vior analysis. Two different views on science, modern and
postmodern, can possibly guide behavioral technology and cul-
tural design in different ways. Therefore, some reflections about
the relation between behavior analysis and utopian thinking are
also presented.

As a science with its foundation in the twentieth century, behavior analysis encom-
passes the common tensions of the history and the philosophy of contemporary
sciences. Several authors identify a crisis in the current epistemological field: the decline
of the modern science model, and the rise of a postmodern kind of science (Lyotard,
1979/1984; Rorty, 1990; Santos, 1988/1992). But is behavior analysis a postmodern kind
of science? Despite the provocative nature of this question, it is not my aim to offer an
ultimate answer for it. Instead, I would like to briefly restore and contribute to a trend
once initiated in theoretical studies in the field: I refer to the investigations on aspects of
behavior analysis that coincide with postmodern tendencies.
To talk about postmodernism in behavior analysis is as controversial and difficult as
talking about postmodernism in science in general. According to Lyotard (1979/1984),
postmodernism can be defined as the distrust in modern metanarratives about progress

CONTACT Cesar Antonio Alves da Rocha alvesdarocha@gmail.com

© 2015 Norwegian Association for Behavior Analysis
 2 C. A. A. DA ROCHA

in western societies. These metanarratives purport to tell us not only about how the
world works, but also how humankind should act upon the world in order to make it
better. As Lyotard (1979/1984) puts it,

I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly

a product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it. To the
obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of legitimation corresponds; most notably, the
crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution which in the past relied
on it. The narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero, its great dangers, its great
voyages, its great goal. It is being dispersed in clouds of narrative language. (p. xxiv)

Besides Lyotard (1979/1984), others have described distinctive traits of postmodernism,

and more specifically of what became known as “postmodern science”. Over the last
decades, contemporary sciences experimented several shifts (Santos, 1988/1992).
Pointed out as a key characteristic of postmodern science, the decline of determinism
is recognized by different disciplines, such as physics (Eddington, 1932), chemistry
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(Prigogine, 1997) and biology (Mayr, 2004). Focusing on these points and others,
several behavior analysts had already examined relations between behavior analysis
and postmodernism (Abib, 1999; Cautilli, Rosenwasser, & Hantula, 2003; Czubaroff,
1991; Laurenti, 2012; Moxley, 1999, 2001; Roche & Barnes-Holmes, 2003).
Nevertheless, the way towards a postmodern discourse about science is a steep and
thorny one. Several reactions come almost automatically when someone employs the
expression “postmodern science”. Some say that modernism seems to be an unfinished
project, so it does not make sense to talk about a “postmodern” trend in science. Others
go further to say that postmodernism is nothing but a bunch of pedantic and falsely
intellectual claims, and that the only real goal of postmodernists is the sabotage of
science.
In the late 1990s, a book by professors Sokal and Bricmont (1998) caused an uproar
in the academy. In their Fashionable Nonsense, also known as Intellectual Impostures,
Sokal and Bricmont criticize what they call the “postmodern intellectuals abuse of
science”. Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Giles Deleuze, Bruno Latour, and Felix
Guattarri are some of the thinkers criticized in the book. The book has an interesting
story: In 1996, Sokal wrote an article entitled “Transgressing the boundaries: Towards a
transformative hermeneutics of quantum gravity”. He sent this paper to a famous
academic journal of postmodern cultural studies called Social Text. His article was
accepted and published. However, the article was a hoax and a parody. It was written to
deliberately demonstrate the abuse of some scientific concepts by postmodernists.
The episode became known as the “Sokal affair”, and when his book was published
two years later, many believed that it represented the final blow against postmodernism.
Besides Sokal, many famous thinkers now critically refer to postmodernism as an empty
or useless perspective. For instance, in an article published in New Republic, psychol-
ogist Steven Pinker (2013) stated: “the humanities have yet to recover from the disaster
of postmodernism, with its defiant obscurantism, dogmatic relativism, and suffocating
political correctness” (para. 30).
As can be seen, to advocate for postmodernism is not an easy task. Nevertheless, the
issue is far from being settled, and the so-called “science wars” are far from being over.
Great contemporary philosophers and scientists defend the postmodern view of science
 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 3

in a more reasonable and effective way than do some more devoutly radical postmo-
dernists. In this regard, even Sokal and Bricmont (1998) recognize that not all post-
modern discourses should be abandoned, as they make clear in a passage at the end of
the book:
Let us start by recognizing that many “postmodern” ideas, expressed in a moderate form,
provide a needed correction to naive modernism (belief in indefinite and continuous
progress, scientism, cultural Eurocentrism, etc.). What we are criticizing is the radical
version of postmodernism. (p. 183)

Given this, I would like and dare to suggest that postmodernism is not all about the
useless nonsense some people swear it is. More than that, I believe that behavior
analysts could benefit if they listened to some aspects of postmodern thought, particu-
larly for the discussion on the relation between behavior analysis and utopianism. It is
true that the lack of a monolithic definition of postmodernism represents an additional
problem for its defense. Nevertheless, we can instead focus on distinctive characteristics
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of what has been widely pointed out as “postmodern discourse”. Two of those char-
acteristics are going to be addressed: the abandonment of determinism and the incre-
dulity towards metanarratives. Finally, I discuss the relation between utopianism and
behavior analysis, especially as that relation concerns the ideas of B. F. Skinner and
other behaviour-analytic commentators.

The abandonment of determinism

For decades, there have been theoretical discussions about whether behavior analysis
is a deterministic science, regardless of whether behavior analysts defend determin-
ism (Chiesa, 1994, 2003; Delprato & Midgley, 1992, Dittrich, 2009, Galuska, 2003;
Skinner, 1947/1999, 1953/2005, 1968), propose a taxonomy over the uses of the
expression (Slife, Yanchar, & Williams, 1999), or openly contest the deterministic
interpretation of behavior analysis (Day, 1969; Laurenti, 2008, 2009, 2012; Moxley,
1997, 1998, 1999, 2007; Neuringer, 1991; Rocha, Laurenti, & Liston, 2013; Rockwell,
1994; Vorsteg, 1974).
Moxley (1999) showed it is possible to identify two main trends in Skinner’s work:
one modern and the other postmodern. Moxley’s (1999) remarks focus on some
specific epistemological aspects of behavior analysis, such as the place of “determin-
ism” and “probability” in the behavioral-analytic model of explanation and its unity
of analysis:
With his probabilistically developed three-term contingency, Skinner has implicitly refuted
all claims of necessity: no claim of necessity can be more than probabilistic because all such
claims are verbal behavior analyzable in terms of operant behavior, which is inherently
probabilistic. (p. 120)

Skinner wrote in support of determinism several times (Skinner, 1947/1999, 1953/2005,

1968). Elsewhere (Skinner, 1971a, 1974, 1990), however, Skinner’s remarks allow an
indeterminist interpretation of his system. Determinists and indeterminists seem to
conceive the place of probability in a science of behavior differently. Descriptions in
terms of probability have its advantages, as Skinner (1953/2005) noted:
 4 C. A. A. DA ROCHA

An all-or-none subject matter lends itself only to primitive forms of description. It is a

great advantage to suppose instead that the probability that a response will occur ranges
continuously between these all-or-none extremes. (p. 62)

At issue in such statements is whether probability is an inherent trait of behavior or not.

Is probability just a sort of confession about our ignorance of the totality of determining
causes of behavior, which ultimately would be fully and inexorably determined?
Alternatively, is behavior itself conceived as a probabilistic phenomenon, therefore, at
some extent undetermined?
Skinner (1947/1999) once considered determinism as an obligatory assumption for a
science of behavior, and that the lack of a deterministic view would make one less of a
scientist than someone who remain skeptical about determinism. The following remark
makes clear the first impression:
To have a science of psychology at all, we must adopt the fundamental postulate that
human behavior is a lawful datum, that it is undisturbed by the capricious acts of any free
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agent in other words, that it is completely determined. (Skinner, 1947/1999, p. 345)

Once one accepts the assumption that behavior is fully determined, as Skinner pre-
sumed it to be, probabilistic descriptions are justified not because the nature of
behavioral phenomena imposes them, but because there are no sufficient measurement
procedures that could assure complete access to all the determining causes of behavior.
Even though the scientist talks in terms of probability, the talk may not be due to the
nature of behavioral phenomena: it could be due to a limitation of measurement. From
this point of view, chance does not play any kind of active role on behavioral phenom-
ena: it would be only another name for the effect of uncontrolled variables, as noted by
Sidman (1960): “If such variables are in fact controllable, then chance in this sense is
simply an excuse for sloppy experimentation. If the uncontrolled variables are actually
unknown, then chance is, as Boring has pointed out, a synonym for ignorance” (p. 45).
Determinists seem to believe not only that such a limitation can eventually be
overcome, but also that it would allow unequivocally accurate descriptions. As
Skinner (1953/2005) noted, even the orbit of a fly could be precisely described, and if
no one had done it yet, maybe it is because no one was interested in doing so.
On the other hand, indeterminists remain skeptical about the possibilities promised
by determinism. Indeterminists understand that scientific descriptions are made in
terms of probability because of its practical advantages, but they do not assert that it
is due to an epistemological limitation necessarily (i.e., the lack of technology sufficient
to measure all controlling variables). The hypothesis that maybe a probabilistic
approach is imposed by the very nature of behavioral phenomenon should not be
ignored. About the character of behavior as a subject matter in its own right, Skinner
noted that “the illusion that freedom and dignity are respected when control seems
incomplete arises in part from the probabilistic nature of operant behavior” (Skinner,
1971a, p. 96, italics added), and that “Both prediction and control are inherent in
operant conditioning, but the notion is always probabilistic” (Skinner, 1974, p. 249,
italics added).
The determinist hope about the possibility of unbounded scientific achievements can
sometimes encourage the claim that indeterminists are not as committed to scientific
enterprise as determinists are. The existence of so many brilliant indeterminist scientists
 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 5

shows by itself how outrageous such a claim is. But Skinner (1968) doesn’t seemed to
care too much about it, saying that
Determinism is a useful assumption because it encourages the search for causes. A man
who believes that the volume of a gas changes capriciously will not look for the cause of
every change he observes and will be less likely to discover the laws which govern volume.
He is also not likely to learn how to change the volume. (p. 171)

The relation established between determinism and the search for causes was only
mentioned by Skinner, but never really justified. It seems that a belief according to
which all causal explanation should be a determinist one underlies this remark.
Meanwhile, twentieth-century philosophers of science had already pointed out that
determinism and causality are not the same (Popper, 1982), and that not all kinds of
scientific explanation are causal (Bunge, 1963/1959, Nagel, 1961). Therefore, the pre-
servation of determinism, even as an assumption, seems to ignore that determinism is
not a necessary condition for scientific enterprise at all.
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Vorsteg (1974) indicates that maybe its preservation in behavior analysis could be
explained by an incorrect identification of determinism with the idea of lawfulness:
Phenomena accounted for in terms of probabilistic laws are not, or need not be, determi-
nistic. The laws of behavior specified in terms of operant conditioning are probabilistic.
(. . .) Could it be that the persistent and pervasive belief in an ultimately deterministic
psychology has been generated by this mistaken equation of lawfulness with determinism?
(p. 118)

Maybe one of the main reasons to reignite this debate on determinism is the more-
than-ever current claim that behavior analysis would benefit once it follows the path of
biological sciences (Glenn, 2014; Marr, 2009). According to biologist Ernst Mayr
(2004), “the refutation of strict determinism and of the possibility of absolute prediction
freed the way for the study of variation and of chance phenomena, so important in
biology” (p. 27). By recognizing the legitimacy of chance and variation as constitutive
part of its subject matter, not just data disturbance resulting of a lack of experimental
control, biologists were obliged to develop new research methods to take account of
chance phenomena as a dependent variable in itself.
Additionally, much of evolutionary biology seems to have a lot in common with
humanities, such as the historical sciences, in terms of methodology. Mayr (2004)
indicates that the traditional distinction between what used to be called
WISSENSHAFTEN, German term that stands for natural, deterministic “hard” sciences,
and GEISTESWISSENSCHAFTEN (humanities), becomes blurred when it comes to
contemporary biology: “Considering how similar evolutionary biology is to historical
science and how different it is from physics in conceptualization and methodology, it is
not surprising that drawing a definite line between the natural sciences and the
humanities is so difficult” (p. 13).
Mayr’s remarks against determinism and about the hybrid constitution of biological
science can serve as inspiration for us to think some of Skinner’s proposals. Whether
the abandonment of determinism in behavior analysis would “free it” in the same way is
a question that remains. But the late Skinner—the postmodern one, according to
Moxley’s (1999) analysis—showed scepticism about the determinist hope, admitting
that “Too much of what will happen depends upon unforeseen variations and
 6 C. A. A. DA ROCHA

adventitious contingencies of selection. The future is largely a matter of chance. . .”

(Skinner, 1990, p. 104).
Besides this, in his autobiography, Skinner (1983) noted the following:

I had learned my operationism from Percy Bridgman, but evidently not well enough.
When he saw the manuscript of Science and Human Behavior, he caught me up on two
subtle points. He wrote:
I think it would be better in discussing the principle of indeterminacy to say that
relevant information does not exist than to say we cannot put ourselves in possession of it.
And I would not like to say, as seems implied, that science has to assume that the universe is
lawful and determined, but rather that science proceeds by exploiting those lawfulnesses
that it can discover. Anything smacking of faith I think we can get along without. (p. 60,
italics added)

Despite Skinner’s early assertions in favour of determinism, his later remarks open the
way for an indeterminist interpretation about a science of behavior: “Although Skinner
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never explicitly rejected determinism, he had marginalized it to the point at which it

was irrelevant to his selectionism” (Moxley, 1998, p. 88). Moreover, if it is true that
selection by consequences (Skinner, 1981) can be considered either a canonical model
of explanation in behavior analysis, and a model based on natural selection, it is an
additional motive to remain at least skeptical about determinism, since “natural selec-
tion represents not only the rejection of any finalistic causes that may have a super-
natural origin, but it also rejects any and all determinism in the organic world” (Mayr,
2004, p. 111).
Finally, a last argument that could be stated against determinism: as explained by
Popper (1982), the burden of proof weighs “on the shoulders of determinists”. Because
determinists are those who claim possibilities that demand robust evidences, it is up to
them to demonstrate the feasibility of their claims or hypotheses. Indeterminists, on the
other hand, could handle science without the necessity of a determinist hypothesis, even
as a “working assumption”. Indeterminism, then, could at least represent a more
modest stance in science, a relevant virtue for a science of behavior (Neuringer, 1991).

The distrust towards metanarratives

Besides Moxley, whose analysis focuses on the abandonment of determinism as a
postmodernism trait of Skinner’s behaviorism, Abib (1999) also wrote on the closeness
of behavior analysis and postmodern discourse. Abib’s analysis focuses three topics:

radical behaviorism does not commit to the main theses of modern discourse, such as
foundationalism in epistemology, representationalism in the philosophy of language and
scientific, political, social and cultural metanarratives concerning the progress of western
world. Therefore, radical behaviorism is set as a decisive divergence from modern dis-
course. (p. 244, italics added)

Besides the problem of determinism, the preservation or abandonment of metanarra-

tives can be critical to the usage of scientific knowledge in human affairs, therefore, to
our way of conceiving utopianism. Is there a grand story to be told about the world’s
functioning—not common historiography, but as a great narrative about all local
 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 7

narratives—a narrative that could enlighten men about world’s progress? Does a
philosophy like radical behaviorism offer, or agree with, any narrative like that?
Before facing these questions, it is convenient to specify and adduce the notion of
metanarrative a little more. In the same line traced by Lyotard (1979/1984), pragmatist
philosopher Richard Rorty (1990) focuses on the distrust of metanarratives as a main
feature of postmodernism:

I use “postmodernist” in a sense given to this term by Jean-Francois Lyotard, who says that
the postmodern attitude is that of “distrust of metanarratives,” narratives which describe
or predict the activities of such entities as the noumenal self or the Absolute Spirit or the
Proletariat. (pp. 198–199)

For example, Marxism is often mentioned as a typical modern metanarrative: according

to it, history is driven by the clash between opposing classes, which would result in a
proletarian revolution, when equality could finally be achieved. But the promise that
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contradictions and inconsistencies proper of capitalism would be responsible for taking

down class society is no longer reliable: “incredulity is now such that we no longer
expect salvation to rise from these inconsistencies, as did Marx” (Lyotard, 1979/1984, p.
xxiv).
Furthermore, Enlightenment philosophy is another emblematic example of meta-
narrative, which assumed that reason and its by-products—scientific and technological
progress—would certainly lead humans to happiness, emancipating humankind from
errors and delusions. As explained by Lyotard (1979/1984): “to the extent that science
does not restrict itself to stating useful regularities and seeks the truth, it is obliged to
legitimate the rules of its own game” (p. xxiii): Enlightenment philosophy provides such
legitimation. It encompasses the idea that conflicts and lack of consensus could be
solved by rational minds, which always converge towards consensus: “this is the
Enlightenment narrative, in which the hero of knowledge works toward a good
ethico-political end—universal peace” (p. xxiv).
So what about radical behaviorism and behavior analysis? Does either one provide
(or agree with) any metanarrative? Could Skinner’s utopian novel, Walden II (Skinner,
1948), be considered an example of metanarrative? Does it provide a new kind of
metanarrative, with an orientation to some kind of “behavioral Enlightenment”? For
instance, the priority given to scientific knowledge in the society described by Skinner,
with the political deliberation focused on cultural planners, could suggest that the
scientist is the one who can best guide society: “A constantly experimental attitude
toward everything—that’s all we need. Solutions to problems of every sort follow almost
miraculously” (Skinner, 1948, p. 25). As Moxley (1999) and Laurenti (2012) pointed
out, the kind of society designed in Walden II seems to reflect a clear modern science
perspective. For example, the constitution of Walden II could not be changed by
ordinary people, but only by the votes of planners and administrators. Skinner (1948)
defended the concentration of power on the hands of planners without any
embarrassment.
Likewise, Skinner’s (1971a) explicit claim that scientists are in a better position to
make value judgments seems to reiterate the modern tendency of praising scientific
knowledge as a privileged kind of knowledge:
 8 C. A. A. DA ROCHA

decisions about the uses of science seem to demand a kind of wisdom which, for some
curious reason, scientists are denied. If they are to make value judgments at all, it is only
with the wisdom they share with people in general.
It would be a mistake for the behavioral scientist to agree. (p. 102)

Hence, for Skinner, science has a privileged kind of knowledge when it comes to make
value judgments, and the behavioral scientist would be precisely the one who could
better tell us about this. If behavioral science is in better position to make value
judgments, then it probably detains a privileged kind of knowledge on how to achieve
a better world. The task is to plan contingencies that lead to this world, that lead to
what is good. But a great problem of this point of view starts with the following
remarks: “good things are positive reinforcers” (Skinner, 1971a, p. 103); and “things
are good (positively reinforcing) or bad (negatively reinforcing)” (Skinner, 1971a,
p. 104).
In the first place, Skinner wrote this in 1971a. Just four years later, Michael (1975)
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questioned the distinction between positive and negative reinforcers. Michael explained
that this distinction is not objective, and his arguments were later endorsed by Baron
and Galizio (2005). In short, if science cannot objectively distinguish positive from
negative reinforcers, it cannot tell us objectively and in advance what is good or what
is bad.
Besides this, if it is true that a particular stimulus function (i.e., its definition as a
positive or negative reinforcer) is not due to an inherent property of an event itself, but
rather is acquired, changeable, and reliant on the context, then any effort to establish
universal prescriptions about “good things” and “bad things” is fated to fail. Indeed, the
very notion of contingency opposes universality. It is doubtful whether it would be
possible to derive from a science like behavior analysis any kind of universal and
unconditional prescriptions as guides for transforming the world into a better place
(i.e., a place where the use of aversive control techniques could be completely abol-
ished). Skinner (1948) seemed to believe that an “aversion free” world would be
possible. In his criticism of “the literature of freedom”, he noted: “What is overlooked
is control which does not have aversive consequences at any time” (Skinner, 1971a, p.
45). But it remains the question whether such kind of control would be really possible,
since the idea of control completely free from aversive traits appears to be groundless.
The ubiquity of aversive control is clarified by Perone (2003):

inside and outside the laboratory, aversive control is ubiquitous. Indeed, it seems to be
unavoidable (. . .) decisions about “good” and “bad” methods of control must be decided
quite apart from the questions of whether the methods meet the technical specification of
“positive reinforcement” or “aversive” control. (pp. 11–13)

Those are considerable problems if we intend to state that a science of behavior

could inform mankind on how to make a better world with deterministic accuracy,
and how such a world should be. This seems to be a clear modern perspective, like
modern metanarratives, and it seems to be compatible with at least some Skinnerian
remarks. But what if we agree that even though science is a powerful tool that can
help us solve lots of human problems, science alone by itself cannot tell how a better
world should be? Is it possible that this less modern view finds support in Skinner’s
perspective?
 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 9

I believe the answer is yes. Utopianism and technocracy are not the only possibilities
for behavior analysts engaged on political issues. In a more postmodern remark, talking
about value judgments and the planning of cultural practices, Skinner (1971b) wrote:
There is no absolute truth in value judgments. No one has that kind of truth, or can
answer questions by appealing to it (. . .) It would be a mistake to try to justify [cultural
practices with survival value] in any absolute sense. There is nothing fundamentally right
about the survival of a culture. . .. (pp. 547–550)

So, if, in one hand, Skinner seems to believe that behavior analysis could objectively tell
us about what is good or bad (by pointing out whether things are positive or negative
reinforcers, for example), on the other hand, he seems to remain skeptical about how
science could objectively tell us how to make value judgments and how to design a good
culture, at least in universal, deterministic sense. So Skinner was somewhat aligned with
postmodern criticisms, disagreeing that scientific enterprise could be a boundless or
enlightened plan to dominate and improve natural world. On this issue, he made
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important alerts:
Science helps us in deciding between alternative courses of action by making past con-
sequences effective in determining future conduct. Although no one course of action may be
exclusively dictated by scientific experience, the existence of any scientific parallel, no matter
how sketchy, will make it somewhat more likely that the more profitable of two courses
will be undertaken. To those who are accustomed to evaluating a culture in terms of
absolute principles, this may seem inadequate. But it appears to be the best we can do.
The formalized experience of science, added to the practical experience of the individual in
a complex set of circumstances, offers the best basis for effective action. (Skinner, 1953/
2005, p. 436, italics added)

Behaviour analysis between utopianism and postmodernism

Considering these previously indicated similarities between radical behaviorism and
postmodernism, we shall next consider some possible consequences for the relation
between behavior analysis and utopian thinking. One could argue that radical behavior-
ism never really had intended to provide any kind of prescriptivism about how to turn
the world into a better place. By persisting as “pure science”, behavior analysis would
simply provide a way to analyze world’s functioning, but it does not mean that it
encompasses or offers utopian hopes (nor metanarratives) beforehand.
Nevertheless, Skinner (1969) not only pointed out that “anti-utopianism” was a
“danger signal”, but also that “to most people ‘utopian’ still means ‘impossible,’ but
that usage may have to be changed” (p. 38). At that time, Skinner was defending the
idea that experimental communities could serve as “pilot experiments”, and although
Walden II was commonly labelled as utopia, in the sense of “fantasy”, it was actually
formulated in a serious way: “Some readers may take the book as written with tongue in
cheek, but it was actually a quite serious proposal” (p. 29).
But how does “utopia” relates to those two modern notions previously addressed,
determinism and metanarratives? In the first place, the possibility of complete knowl-
edge that could allow precise predictions and a boundless power to control behavior is
often claimed to achieve utopian hopes. Some famous remarks by Watson (1924/1930),
in his book Behaviorism, express this well enough:
 10 C. A. A. DA ROCHA

Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them
up in and I’ll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of
specialist I might select—doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even beggar-man
and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of
his ancestors. (p. 104)

Obviously, it is not my aim to try to eclipse the deep differences between Watson’s
behaviorism and Skinner’s behaviorism, but the quote is interesting as an illustration of
how the determinist assumption can support exceedingly pretentious views on beha-
vioral engineering. Although some may consider the fulfillment of determinism’s claims
a utopia, along with the technological possibilities it would enable, others may consider
it a form of dystopia.
As Newman (1993) observed, Skinner’s Walden II was considered a dystopia by
literary critics. Newman also noted that “If the environment could not shape the
behavior of the individual, then why would we find ideal individuals within the ideal
societies, or corrupt individuals within the corrupt societies? Utopianism would be
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pointless without determinism” (p. 173, italics added). Given the controversy over
whether or not behavior analysis is a determinist science (Laurenti, 2009; Slife et al.,
1999), it should not be surprising that the relation between behavior analysis and
utopian thinking also remains a controversial affair.
Meanwhile, given that the place of determinism in behavior analysis remains unde-
cided, for many the feasibility of utopian hopes based on behavioral science and its
technological implications remains doubtful. Indeed, Newman (1993) suggested that the
prevailing negative view of Skinner’s Walden II seems to be due to “general negative
reactions to behavioral determinism” (p. 167). If Newman’s analysis is correct, the
problem of determinism is crucial not only for the possibility of deriving utopianism
from behavior analysis and radical behaviorism, but also for the widespread application
of behavioral technologies in the future.
The incredulity or distrust towards metanarratives, another tension raised by post-
modern criticism, is also a decisive affair for utopianism. On the one hand, someone
could allege that metanarratives are indispensable traits of utopias. The successful
accomplishment of the prescriptive aspects of a metanarrative (i.e., to base political
deliberation in pure rationality with priority reserved to technicians and specialists, or
to destroy class society and private property) would amount the achievement of a
utopia. On the other hand, if we consider a broader, maybe simpler, idea of a utopia,
like the hope for the maximization of social justice and welfare without any previous
plan on how to accomplish these things, then maybe we can think about the possibility
of utopianism without metanarratives.
Although not mentioning the concept of metanarrative, it seems to be precisely this
second possibility that made Altus and Morris (2009) classify Walden II as utopia. They
highlighted a distinctive and decisive aspect of the book: its focus on experimentation.
The prevalence of experimentation is probably the main prescription of Walden II
(Skinner, 1948), and all the others specific aspects of the society described in the novel
would simply be aspects derived from an experimental stance. A constant and ongoing
experimental approach interdicts attempts to establish beforehand universal paths or
courses of action as the best ones, or the only right ones. From this point of view, the
practices in Walden II do not characterize some sort of “behaviorist metanarrative”.
 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 11

Rather, they were simply hypotheses about possible experimentally derived practices
that proved to be advantageous. As Altus and Morris (2009) put it,

we found Walden Two situated in the utopian genre that addresses means for maximizing
social justice and human well-being by balancing (a) the community members’ ability to
achieve these ends purposefully, consciously, and freely with (b) the community’s ability to do
the same, so as to ensure its survival. In Walden Two, the community’s practices were those
Skinner conjectured would benefit both interests. They were, though, contingent. They were
contingent on Skinner’s historically situated personal and scientific values and the cultural
context of post World War II America. They were contingent on the community’s evolution
in the context of changes in the American culture (. . .) Skinner’s utopian vision, then, was not
about any of Walden Two’s practices, except one: experimentation. (p. 330)

In short, based on the assumption that the value of any practice should be judge by its
historically located functions (therefore, that they are contingent), Skinner’s proposals in
Walden II would oppose universal plans, like those encompassed by modern metanar-
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ratives. The lack of an available metanarrative imposes a never-ending empirical stance.

Such a stance can never be substituted for a solely rationalist approach on human
affairs. However, this stance does not exhaust the controversies about a supposedly
modern or postmodern quality of Walden II. One could argue that the prescription of
an incessant experimental attitude, along with privileges ascribed to scientific knowl-
edge, could be by themselves a sort of metanarrative. Yet, the rejection of universalism
and preconceived plans for emancipating humankind would make the utopian ideals of
Walden II very unusual ones when compared to other modern utopias.
Could such exceptionality be due to the modern-postmodern tension within beha-
vior analysis? On the one hand, Moxley (2001) supports that “Skinner’s (1948) Walden
Two, for example, is in the modernist tradition as are typical literary Utopias” (p. 145).
On the other hand, according to Gable (1999), “Walden Two is essentially a postmo-
dernist utopia” (p. 2, italics added), but Gable’s analysis focuses different traits of
postmodernism than the ones addressed here. Whereas some may consider “postmo-
dern utopia” an oxymoronic expression, Gable claims that, along with some versions of
postmodernism (more specifically, with Fredric Jameson’s critiques), Walden II com-
promises with the denying of the idea of “human nature”: “In both Jameson’s post-
modernism and Skinner’s utopia, the primary goal of the reformer is to disintegrate
(human) nature, because nature is inconvenient when it conflicts with the cultural
values one wishes to instill” (p. 2).
If determinism were true, once humankind could get over the epistemological
frontier by knowing every determining cause, individual values could be easily manipu-
lated according to “collective” values, such as the survival of the culture (Skinner
1971a). If it is then assumed that there is no such thing as human nature, maybe this
manipulation could be, in principle, limitless. Of course, as Newman (1993) pointed
out, behavior analysis does not endure unscathed from its commitment to determinism.
And in the words of Gable (1999), Walden II also encompasses dystopic aspects:
“Ultimately the artificial world of Walden Two, with its facade of respectable and
efficient plenty, run by mysterious unknown leaders, is closer to the modern nightmare
of the bureaucratic state” (p. 6).
 12 C. A. A. DA ROCHA

Final remarks
Finally, we may revisit our original question: Is behavior analysis a postmodern kind of
science? The only honest answer I can offer is a typical postmodern answer: It depends.
It seems that both modernism and postmodernism find support in Skinner’s work and
its commentators. As it has been shown so far, the place of behavior analysis in the
contemporary scientific debate is not free from controversies. Its tendency towards
determinism has been questioned for some time, and it seems to be undecided whether
such a science could encompass any kind of metanarrative, such as the traditional
modern metanarratives. Although sometimes classified among the typical modern
utopias, Walden II also is liable to postmodern interpretations, and even considered a
dystopia by some.
The combination of these aspects suggests that the modern–postmodern debate
within behavior analysis has repercussions for the efforts to derive any utopian thinking
from behavior analysis, and from the philosophy upon which it is based. Would it be
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possible, disagreeing with Newman (1993), to abandon determinism and still think of
utopia? Would it be possible to agree with Skinner (1969) that “processes of mutation
and selection do not require, and may not provide, any advance plan of the state toward
which they lead” (p. 41), and yet sustain the possibility of deriving a metanarrative from
behavior analysis or radical behaviorism? Do we, as behavior analysts of the twenty-first
century, still need to preserve Skinnerian utopianism?
These questions are intriguing. I hope that these preliminary notes, although they may
not answer all of them, can at least indicate possible ways to deal with them. Discussions
about the relation between behavior analysis and postmodernism are important. Besides
determinism and metanarratives, other typical postmodern topics could be addressed in
future essays, such as the social construction of knowledge (Roche & Barnes-Holmes,
2003; Guerin, 1992), the anti-representationalism in the philosophy of language (Abib,
1999), and the transdisciplinary character of contemporary sciences (Laurenti, 2012).
As issues that intersect the modern–postmodern debate in science, such topics are
probably also highly relevant to the relation between utopianism, on one hand, and
behavior analysis and radical behaviorism, on the other hand. In short, a dialogue with
postmodernists seems to be an effort that deserves to be made, even if it is to disagree
with a lot of what they say. We can assume that we could learn something worthwhile
from at least some aspects of postmodernism. Then perhaps we could produce dis-
cursive variations on behavior analysis, and let selection act upon them.

Acknowledgments
I thank Julio de Rose, my PhD advisor, for the valuable suggestions. This manuscript benefited
greatly from the observations and recommendations by two anonymous reviewers on an earlier
version of this work.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS 13

Funding
Preparation of this manuscript was supported by the São Paulo State Research Foundation
(FAPESP), through a doctoral fellowship granted to the author [FAPESP, Grant 2014/02981-1].

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