Ortigas co v Velasco

Molina filed a petition for reconstitution of a transfer certificate title. She alleged that the original copy was lost
when the qc register of deeds was gutted on fire and that she has an owners duplicate copy of the title and
that title is not subject of any document or contract creating a lien.

Several days later Molina moved to withdraw her petition that she would go to the us, judge Velasco granted

Molina then again filed a motion ex parte for review- motion was granted

Osg and and Ortigas filed a motion to review on certiorari- tct of Molina was declared null and void and Velasco
had no jurisdiction to decide reconstitution of the title since no notice was given to the owners

Present case- the motion alleges Molina persistently defied the lawful orders of the ocurt and sought to erode
the courts authority and integrity

The court had previously issued a decision in those consolidated cases which became final and executory

Molina filed multiple MR despite the courts denial with finality of her previous motions

Manila bank contends that these motions are merely for delay

 The court emphasizes that a second motion for reconsideration is not allowed except for
extraordinary reasons and with express leave from the court.
 The court clarifies that the denial of a motion for reconsideration signifies that the grounds relied
upon have been found to be without merit and any other grounds not raised are deemed waived.
 The court reiterates that the judgment of a division is as authoritative and final as that of the court en
banc.
 The court finds Molina guilty of contempt of court for willful disregard and disobedience of the court's
resolutions.
 The court imposes a fine on Molina as a penalty for her actions.
 The court warns that any subsequent disregard and disobedience of the court's orders will be dealt
with more severely.
 The court emphasizes that no further pleadings, motions, or papers should be filed in the case, except
for issues directly involved in the motion for reconsideration.
 The court orders the publication of this resolution for the information and guidance of the bench and
bar.
En banc- a resolution of the supreme court in division is not appealable to the court en banc

Mendoza v villas

In 2007 mendoza obtained the highest vote for the position of punong barangay whilw respondent herato
obtained highest number of votes for the position of brgy kagawad. The losing candidate panajel filed with the
mtc a quo warranto. Mtc issued a decision disqualifying Mendoza. Mendoza appealed to the Comelec the
decision of mtc. villas issued Memorandum, directing all department heads of the Municipal Government to
actonly on documents signed or authorized by Herato

Meanwhile, Mendoza sought the advice of the DILG as to who should exercise the powersof Punong Barangay
of Balatasan given the prevailing controversy.
DILG Undersecretary Panadero responded to Mendoza

s inquiry informing Villas that Mendozashould occupy the post of Punong Barangay as there was no Writ of
Execution Pending Appealof the MTC Decision

Nevertheless, the Bulalacao Municipal Administrator issued a letter to the Manager of LBP,requesting that
transactions entered into by Mendoza in behalf of Barangay Bulalacao shouldnot be honored.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages and Prayer for the Writ of PreliminaryMandatory
Injunction pending with the RTC. Petitioners prayed that the LBP be directed torelease the funds
of Barangay Balatasan to them in order to render necessary, basic publicservices to the inhabitants of the
barangay

In an attempt to clarify the issues on the matter, Mendoza again sought the opinion of the DILGregarding the
controversy. Thus, the DILG issued another letter reiterating its stance that theMTC Decision has not yet
become final and executory.

Nevertheless, the RTC issued the assailed dismissing the petition on the strength of theCOMELEC disqualifying
Mendoza from running in the 2007 elections.

From such orders the petitioners went directly to this Court

Issue: w/n the case was rightly filed to the sc

Held: In CREBA v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

a petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 wasdismissed for having been filed directly with the Court, violating
the principle of hierarchy ofcourts, to wit:
Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional TrialCourts have concurrent jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrencedoes not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.In Heirs of Bertuldo
Hinog v. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, this Courtma
de the following pronouncements”

This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by thisCourt with
Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals.
This concurrence of jurisdictionis not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute,unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefore will be directed
.There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals,and also serves
as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for theextraordinary writs.
A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates thatpetitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
first level (inferior) courts should befiled with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court
of Appeals. Adirect invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should beallowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specificallyset out in the petition.
This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to preventinordinate demands upon the Courts time and
attention which are better devoted to thosematters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
over-crowding of the Courtsdocket.

On the other hand, direct recourse to this Court has been allowed for petitions filed under Rule 45 when only
questions of law are raised, as in this case. Thus, the Court ruled in Barcenas v.Tomas:Section 1 of Rule 45
clearly states that the following may be appealed to theSupreme Court through a petition for review by
certiorari: 1) judgments; 2) finalorders; or 3) resolutions of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
theRegional Trial Court or similar courts, whenever authorized by law. The appealmust involve only questions
of law, not of fact.
In Barcenas vs Tomas:
Under the principle of the hierarchy of courts, decisions, final orders orresolutions of an MTC should be
appealed to the RTC exercising territorial jurisdiction over the former. On the other hand, RTC judgments,
final orders orresolutions are appealable to the CA through either of the following: an ordinaryappeal if the
case was originally decided by the RTC; or a petition for reviewunder Rule 42, if the case was decided under
the RTC's appellate jurisdiction.

Nonetheless, a direct recourse to this Court can be taken for a review of thedecisions, final orders or
resolutions of the RTC, but only on questions of law.Under Section 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution

Procedurally then, petitioners could have appealed the RTC Decision affirmingthe MTC (1) to this Court on
questions of law only
; or (2) if there are factualquestions involved, to the CA

Admittedly, this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and inthe interest of
justice, has the discretion to treat a petition for certiorari as having been filedunder Rule 45, especially if filed
within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review.

Nevertheless, even providing that the petition was not filed prematurely, it must still bedismissed for having
become moot and academic.

With the conduct of the 2010 barangay elections, a supervening event has transpired that hasrendered this
case moot and academic and subject to dismissal. This is because whatever judgmentis reached, the same can
no longer have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, can nolonger be enforced. Mendozas term
of office has expired with the conduct of last years localelections.
WHEREFORE the Petition is DENIED

United claimants v nea

Petitioners are former employee who were terminated with the implementation of PD 269 issued in august
1973 empowering the nea board to organize or reorganize neas staffing structure

On august 2002 nea implemented an early retirement program denominated as the early leavers program
giving incentives to those who availed of it and left nea before the effectivity of the reorganization plan. The
other employees were terminated effective 2003

Petition were filed by former employees of nea who were terminated befre the implementation of the
resolution

Held:This Court Has Jurisdiction over the Case

Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of... choice of court forum.

Evidently, the instant petition should have been filed with the RTC. However, as an exception to this general
rule, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important reasons. Such reason exists
in the instant case involving as it does the employment... of the entire plantilla of NEA, more than 700
employees all told, who were effectively dismissed from employment in one swift stroke. This to the mind of
the Court entails its attention.

Rp v Charlie felix
In his Petition for Correction of Entries[4] dated July 30, 2007, respondent Charlie Mintas a.k.a. Shirley Mintas
Felix essentially alleged that he was born on October 1, 1976 in Itogon, Benguet. his birth was registered with
the Local Civil Registrar (LCR)-Itogin, Benguet where his birth certificate bore the following erroneous entries:
his first name "Shirley" instead of "Charlie," his gender "female" instead of "male," and his father's surname
"Filex" instead of "Felix". but he has another birth certificate carried the correct entries" his first name as
Charlie, his gender as male, and his father's surname as "Felix".

In all his subsequent official transactions, he used the birth certificate registered with LCR-Carrangalan, Nueva
Ecija. But when he subsequently requested for authenticated copy of his birth certificate from the National
Statistics Office (NSO), what it officially released to him was the erroneous birth certificate with LCR-Itogon,
Benguet.[5]

He, thus, prayed for correction of his birth certificate with the LCR-Itogon, Benguet and cancellation of his
second birth certificate with the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.[6]

The Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicior General (OSG), prayed for the dismissal of
the petition on ground that the RTC-La Trinidad, Benguet did not have jurisdiction over the LCR-Carranglan,
nueva Ecija which ought to implement the directive for cancellation of respondent's second birth certificate,
[7]
should be the same be granted by the trial court.

Rtc- granted the petition CA- granted the petition It is settled that jurisdiction over the main case embraces all
incidental matters arising therefrom and connected therewith under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction.

Here, the trial court has jurisdiction over respondent's petition for correction of entries in his first birth
certificate on file with the LCR-Itogon, Benguet. The trial court has jurisdiction, as well, to direct the
cancellation of respondent's second birth certificate with the LCR-Carranglan, Nueva Ecija as an incident or as a
necessary consequence of the action to correct the entries sought by respondent. Indeed, demands, matters,
or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above
principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its
authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide
matters which, as original causes of action, would not he within its cognizance.[18]

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT) v. Citi Appliance M.C. Corp.
G.R. No. 214546, 9 October 2019 (J. Leonen)
FACTS:
Since 1992, Citi Appliance has owned a parcel of land in Cebu City. In 2003, itdecided to construct a 16-storey
commercial building on it. The Cebu City Zoning Board (CCZB) required Citi Appliance to construct a one-level
parking area consisting of 26 parking slots. To comply with this requirement, Citi Appliance had to make a deep
excavation to lay the foundation of the parking lot. In the process, it discovered telephone lines, cables, and
manholes underground, which had been placed there by PLDT sometime in 1983. These encroached on Citi
Appliance's property, preventing it from excavating the land. In April 2003, Citi Appliance applied for
exemption from the parking requirement, which the CCZB eventually denied. On 26 April 2004, Citi Appliance
wrote PLDT, demanding that it remove the underground telephone lines, cables, and manholes, or to
shoulder the parking exemption fee. On 28 May 2004, Citi Appliance made a final demand on PLDT to
comply until 15 June 2004, otherwise, it would file an appropriate action in court. When PLDT still refused to
comply, Citi Appliance filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) a complaint for ejectment against
PLDT. In its Answer, PLDT alleged that its telephone lines, cables, and manholes did not encroach
on Citi
Appliance's property as they were properly positioned alongside and underneath a public sidewalk. It later
filed an Amended Answer, arguing that the case should be dismissed since the action for forcible entry had
prescribed. Moreover, PLDT argued that the area in question was part of public domain, it being a sidewalk.
Assuming that
the property did belong to Citi Appliance, PLDT claimed that it had the right of eminent domain.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the issue of lack of jurisdiction was deemed waived by PLDT;
2.
Whether or not MTCC has jurisdiction over the case; subsumed under
which are the issues of whether: (a) the element of prior physical possession is present;
ad (b) the one-year prescriptive period of an action for forcible entry through stealth
should be reckoned from the time the unlawful entry is discovered or from the last
demand to vacate; and
3.
Whether or not PLDT may assert its right of expropriation over the
encroached portion of the lot in the ejectment proceeding.
HELD:
1.
PLDT is not barred from raising the issue of jurisdiction. In the case of
Amoguis v. Ballado
(G.R. No. 189626, 20 August 2018), the Court pronounced the case of
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
is based on the doctrine of equity, which applies only in cases
“where jurisdiction was raised at the very last minute when the parties have already
gone through years of litigation.” The
Tijam
doctrine will apply only when
circumstances of a case, allowing the belated objection to the jurisdiction of the court
will additionally cause irreparable damages, and therefore, injustice to the other party
that relied on the forum and the implicit waiver.
In this case, PLDT raised the issue of jurisdiction when it filed with the MTCC its
Amended Answer with leave of court. Further, even if the Court disregards PLDT’s
Amended Answer, PLDT is not deemed barred by laches since it immediately
questioned the MTCC’s jurisdiction without allowing trial to stretch into years. The
unique circumstances in Tijam are absent here. As the Court noted in
Amoguis
, raising
the lack of jurisdiction a little under a year, or even after the laps of four (4) years, will
not operate as estoppel against a party. Thus, as PLDT seasonable raised the lack of
jurisdiction, there is neither waiver of the jurisdictional issue nor estoppel against it.
2.
The MTCC has no jurisdiction over the case. For a forcible entry suit to
prosper, the three (3) elements that must be alleged and proved are the following: (a)
that they have prior physical possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of
possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and, (c) that the
action was filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors
learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property.
In this case, two (2) elements of forcible entry are absent: first, Citi Appliance has
no prior physical possession of the property; and second, the action was filed beyond
the one-year prescriptive period.
On lack of physical possession
Possession in ejectment cases means nothing more than physical or material
possession, not legal possession. It is not required that the complainant is the owner of
the property. If the issue of ownership is raised, the court may resolve this question
only to determine the question of possession.
Here, PLDT claims that when it installed the lines and cables beneath the
property, the property was not yet owned by Citi Appliance. Hence, it concludes that
Citi Appliance had no prior physical possession of the property.
A cursory reading of the complaint shows that Citi Appliance failed to allege its
prior physical possession over the property. It merely submitted proof of ownership
over the property, which is not sufficient to prove prior physical possession. Thus, Citi
Appliance is mistaken in claiming that it had prior physical possession by virtue of its
absolute ownership over the land. An allegation of prior physical possession must be
clearly stated in a complaint for forcible entry. It cannot equate possession as an
attribute of ownership to the fact of actual prior physical possession.
Nevertheless, even if this Court were to rule that Citi Appliance's allegation of
prior physical possession is sufficient, the action for forcible entry must still fail for
being filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period.
On prescription
An action for forcible entry must be filed within one (1) year from the date of
actual entry to the land. If the entry was done through stealth, the one-year time bar in
forcible entry cases is reckoned from the date of discovery of the encroachment, not
from the date of the last demand to vacate.
A review of Citi Appliance's own narration of facts reveals that it discovered the
underground cables and lines in April 2003 when it applied for exemption from the
parking slot requirement with the CCZB.
Counting from this date, the one-year prescriptive period to file the forcible entry
suit had already lapsed sometime in April 2004. Thus, by the time the complaint for
forcible entry was filed on 1 October 2004, the period had already prescribed. The
MTCC no longer had jurisdiction to resolve the case.
3.
PLDT’s claim of its right to eminent domain cannot over the encroached
portion of the lot cannot be resolved in a complaint for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer.
Expropriation may be judicially claimed only by filing a complaint for
expropriation. Inverse expropriation is a claim for compensation by the deprived
landowner as a complaint or as a counterclaim. It seeks to recover the value of property
taken, even though there is no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Normally, it is the expropriator — the State — that files the complaint.
An expropriation suit falls under the jurisdiction of the regional trial court
because it is a case incapable of pecuniary estimation. It deals with the government's
exercise of its authority and right to take property for public use.
The right of an expropriator to file a complaint for expropriation is not allowed
in an action such as a forcible entry or unlawful detainer suit. These actions are
summary in nature. Therefore, in this case, this Court cannot award expropriation.
Enerio v lampay and villegas

Petitioner filed a suit with rtc negros occidental for recovery of actual moral and exemplary damages and attys
fees and litigation fees amounting close to 30000 when villegas bump petitioners son

Pre trial was conducted without its jurisdiction having been questioned it dismissed petition on the ground that
without claims for moral and exemplary damages the case will not fall within its jurisdiction and the bloated
and disproportionate claims were placed to shift the jurisdiction of the court but due to the amount involved
the court cannot take cognizance.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari

The supreme court held that the court of first instance had jurisdiction over the case since the amount alleged
was over 10,000 falls within the jurisdiction of cfi as amended by sec 44 of the judiciary act ra 298

The totality of the demand in suits for recovery of sums of money between the parties, the total aggregate
amount in the complaint constitutes the basis of jurisdiction and for determining jurisdictional amount in civil
cases. Here, the claims of petitioners exceeds 10,000 which falls within the jurisdiction of cfi.

There appears no valid justification in the record for respondent court's bare conclusion that petitioners' claim
for damages were "bloated" in order to shift jurisdiction to it since it did not give the petitioners a day in court.

The supreme court held that the basis of the petitioner’s claim for moral and exemplary damages are correctly
applied.

Flores v mallare

Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order of Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City and Benguet Province which dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner did
not attach to his petition a copy of his complaint in the erroneous belief that the entire original record of the
case shall be transmitted to this Court pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 39 of BP129. This provision
applies only to ordinary appeals from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals (Section 20 of the Interim
Rules). Appeals to this Court by petition for review on certiorari are governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
(Section 25 of the Interim Rules)

The order appealed from states the cause of action was against binongcal for non-payment of 11,643 cost of
truck tires which he purchased and the section cause of action was against callion for the non payment of
10,212 cost of truck tires which callion purchased from him.
On the hearing, judge mallare dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the demand was
only 11643, and the rtc shall exercise its jurisdiction when the demand exceeds 20,000. Although another
person is indebted to him his obligation was separate from the other respondent.

At the hearing of said Motion to Dismiss, counsel for respondent Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Counsel for petitioner opposed the Motion to Dismiss. As
above stated, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner maintains that the rtc has jurisdiction due to the novel totality rule in sec 33 of bp 129

The supreme court affirmed the rtc decision

totality rule.-In actions where the jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount involved, the test of
jurisdiction shall be the aggregate sum of all the money demands, exclusive only of interest and costs,
irrespective of whether or not the separate claims are owned by or due to different parties. If any demand is
for damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must be specifically alleged.

Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or more plaintiffs having separate
causes of action against a defendant join in a single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has
separate causes of action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the causes of
action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants should arise out of the
same transaction or series of transactions and there should be a common question of law or fact, as provided
in Section 6 of Rule 3.

In other words, in cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under Section 6
of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state also, if instead of
joining or being joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or against the parties, the amount
demanded in each complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.

In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of
parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a careful
scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims against
respondents Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.

First corpo v sixth division of ca

Facts:

 The case involves First Corporation, a corporation, being ordered to repay a loan with interest and
attorney's fees.
 The corporate officers of First Corporation convinced Eduardo Sacris to invest in their business in
1991.
 The investment was supposed to be converted into shareholding in the corporation, but it was
instead considered as a loan with an interest rate of 1% per month.
 Sacris extended a total loan of P2.2 million to the corporation from 1991 to 1997.
 The corporation failed to convert the loan into equity and instead agreed to pay a monthly interest of
2.5%.
 In 1998, Sacris assigned his collectibles to Cesar Abillar, the former president of the corporation, who
filed a complaint for a sum of money against the corporation.
  The corporation and Abillar later rescinded the assignment.
 Sacris filed a motion for intervention in the case.
 The trial court admitted Sacris' complaint in intervention and dismissed Abillar's complaint.
 The corporation filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.
 The Court of Appeals granted the petition and directed the trial court to dismiss Abillar's complaint
and deny Sacris' motion in intervention.
 Sacris then filed a separate complaint for a sum of money against the corporation.
 The trial court ruled in favor of Sacris.
 The corporation appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the appeal was dismissed.
 The corporation filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
 The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, stating that the issues raised by the corporation were
mainly factual and that certiorari is not the proper remedy to review factual findings.
 The court also noted that the corporation availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal and that the
petition was filed beyond the reglementary period.
 Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts and ordered the corporation
to pay the outstanding loan with interest and attorney's fees.

Issue:

 Whether the corporation should be ordered to repay the loan with interest and attorney's fees.

Ruling:

 The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts and ordered the corporation to pay the
outstanding loan with interest and attorney's fees.

Ratio:

 The Supreme Court dismissed the corporation's petition for certiorari, stating that the issues raised by
the corporation were mainly factual and that certiorari is not the proper remedy to review factual
findings.
 The court noted that the corporation availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal and that the petition
was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied
by certiorari. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which
error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors of the
trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said findings and
its conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of
the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.

Settled is the rule that the proper remedy from an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals is an appeal under
Rule 45 and not a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Hence, petitioner corporation could have raised the
Court of Appeals Decision dated 29 November 2005 and Resolution dated 14 February 2006, affirming the
assailed Decision dated 28 June 2004 of the RTC of Quezon City, to this Court via an ordinary appeal under
Rule 45 of the certiorari will not lie when there are other remedies available to the petitioner. Therefore, in
availing itself of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner corporation resorted to a wrong mode
of appeal.

Santos v bayhon

 Labor dispute between Kamapi and Poly-Plastic Products and/or Anthony Ching
 RTC of manila rendered Decision in favor of Kamapi by Labor Arbiter Ceferina Diosana
 Decision affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
 Kamapi obtained a writ of execution against the properties of Poly-Plastic Products or Anthony Ching
 Priscilla Carrera filed a third-party claim, asserting that Anthony Ching had sold the machinery and
equipment to her
 Public auction sale proceeded despite the claim
 Carrera filed a claim in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
 RTC issued a temporary restraining order to prevent the issuance of a certificate of sale over the
levied properties
 Labor Arbiter Ariel Santos declared the deed of sale presented by Carrera as fictitious, allowing the
execution to proceed
 Santos and the sheriff filed a motion to dismiss the civil case, arguing that the RTC did not have
jurisdiction over the labor case
The court held that rtc manila had jurisdiction over the case.

The general rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of
another court with concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction possessing equal power to grant injunctive relief,
applies only when no third-party claimant is involved (Traders Royal Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 133
SCRA 142). When a third-party, or a stranger to the action, asserts a claim over the property levied upon, the
claimant may vindicate his claim by an independent action in the proper civil court which may stop the
execution of the judgment on property not belonging to the judgment debtor.

When the sheriff, acting beyond the bounds of his authority, seizes a stranger's property, the writ of injunction,
which is issued to stop the auction sale of that property, is not an interference with the writ of execution issued
by another court because the writ of execution was improperly implemented by the sheriff. Under that writ, he
could attach the property of the judgment debtor. He is not authorized to levy upon the property of the third
claimant.
Trb vs IAC

Trb filed a case against Remco alcohol distillery with the RTC pasay for the recovery of 2.3 million obtaining a
writ of preliminary attachment directed against the properties of Remco.

Sheriff then levied 4600 barrels of alcohol found within the property of Remco.

3rd party TOneda filed a 3rd party claim claiming ownership over the seized property. Toneda argued that Remco
has a 3m debt which remained unpaid.

RTC pasay held that the barrels still remained within the property of Remco

La Tondeña then instituted before RTC Bulacan in which it asserted its claim of ownership
over the properties attached and likewise prayed for the issuance of a writ of Preliminary Mandatory and
Prohibitory Injunction.

A motion to dismiss (for the application for P.I.) was filed by petitioner.

La Tondeña filed opposition to the MTD. Subsequently, the questioned order was issued by the respondent
Judge declaring La Tondeña to be the owner of the disputed alcohol and granting the latter’s application for
injunctive relief(Sheriff Evangelista issued the corresponding writ of preliminary injunction.

Pasay Court also issued an order requiring Deputy Sheriff Santiago to enforce the writ of preliminary
attachment previously issued by said court, by preventing respondent sheriff and LA Tondeña from
withdrawing or removing the disputed alcohol from the Remco ageing warehouse at Calumpit and requiring
respondents to explain and show cause why they should not be cited for contempt for withdrawing
or removing said attached alcohol belonging to Remco, from the latter’s ageing warehouse at Calumpit,
Bulacan.

Petitioner filed with the IAC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for writ of preliminary
injunction to annul and set aside the Order of RTC Bulacan to dissolve the writ of p.i.; to dissolve the writ of p.i.
issued pursuant to said order; to prohibit respondent judge from taking cognizance of and
assuming jurisdiction and to compel La Tondeña and Provincial Sheriff of BUlacan to return the disputed
alcohol totheir original location at Remco’s warehouse in Bulacan.

IAC dismissed the petition for lack of legal and factual basis. MFR was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE
WON RTC has the authority to issue, at the instance of a third-party claimant, an injunction enjoining the sale
of property previously levied upon by the sheriff pursuant to a writ of attachment issued by another

RATIO
Generally, the rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the injunctive relief sought by injunction, is
applied in cases where no third party claimant is involved, in order to prevent one court from nullifying
the judgment or process of another court of the same rank or category, a power which devolves upon theprop
er appellate court. The purpose of the rule is to avoid conflict of power between different
courts of coordinate jurisdiction and to bring about a harmonious and smooth functioning of their
proceedings. As held in Manila Herald Publishing co. vs Ramos:“It has been seen that a separate action
by the 3 rd party who claims to be the owner of the property attached is appropriate. If this is
so, it must be admitted that the judge trying such action may render judgment ordering the sheriff
of whoever has in possession the attached property to deliver it to the plaintiff-claimant or desist from seizing
it. It follows further that the court may make an interlocutory order, upon thefiling of such bond as may
be necessary, to release the property pending final adjudication of the title.Jurisdiction over
an action includes jurisdiction over an interlocutory matter incidental to the casue and deemed
necessary to preserve the subject matter of the suit or protect the parties’ interests. This is self-evident.

Tijam v sibonghanoy

An action for collection of a sum of money in the sum of P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest was filed by Serafin
Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio which was originally
instituted in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the
complaint, the RA 296 or otherwise known as Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect which deprives the CFI of
original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs.
44[c.] and 86[b.], R.A. 296.)

Now, the case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding, the
appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals’ adverse decision.

Consequently, considering that the Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which
the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court
along with the records of the case.

Issue:
Whether the appellant’s motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the CFI during the pendency
of the appeal will prosper.

Ruling:
SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost fifteen years
before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. A party
may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak
of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse
decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it couldhave
raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to takecognizance of the
present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the lawthen in force, was within
the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, atseveral stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it
invokedthe jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication
onthe merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finallywoke up
to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would ineffect be
declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced onJuly 19, 1948 and
compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity andunfairness of this is not only
patent but revolting

Laches, generally, is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by
exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it
or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of “stale demands” is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the
peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere
question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted.

Manchester v ca

Present case is an action for torts and damages and specific performance with prayer for temporaryrestraining
order, etc.

petitioner MDC filed a complaint for specific performance against City Land to compel the latter to execute a
Deed of Sale in favor of the former.

Petitioner aalleged that respondent City Land forfeited their tender of payment for a certain transaction
thereby causing damages amounting to P78,750,000.00

Said amount was alleged in the BODY of the complaint but was not reiterated in the PRAYER.

Petitioner paid a docket fee of P410.00 based on the allegation that their action is primarily for specific
performance and is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Court ruled that there is an under-assessment of docket fees, and thus ordered petitioner toamend its
complaint.

With leave of court petitioner complied and lowered the amount of claim for damages to P10M,which was
again not state in the PRAYER (but stated in the BODY).NOTE:

The designation and prayer of the present case clearly show that it is an action for damages and specific
performance. Hence the docket fee should be assessed by considering the amount ofdamages as alleged in the
original complaint.

As setted in the Magaspi case: “a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the
actual date of filing in court.”

The Court held that in the present case, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by thepayment of
P410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint vest jurisdictionupon the Court.

For all legal purposes, there is no original complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.

The order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken bythe trial
court are null and void.

CA was correct in ruling that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount ofdamages
sought in the original complain and not in the amended complaint.

Henceforth, all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount
ofdamages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and saiddamages shall
be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails tocomply with this
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged fromrecord.

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
Anamendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much lessthe
payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.

THECORRECT AND PROPER DOCKET FEE HAS NOT BEEN PAID.

The trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only
₱ 410.00 as docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby
vest jurisdiction upon the Court. The basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages
sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint. All complaints, petitions, answers and
other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any
case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record.
Sun Insurance v. asuncion

Petitioner Sun Insurance (SIOL) filed a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the consignation of fire
insurance policy.

Private Respondent filed a complaint for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In addition, Respondent also claims for
damages, attorney’s fees, litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state the amount of
damages sought although from the body of the complaint it can be inferred to be in amount of P 50million.
Hence, Respondent originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees.

The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for subsequent re-assessments of the
amount of damages sought as well as the corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.

Petitioners alleged that private respondent had paid the amount ofP182,824.90 as docket fee, and considering
that the total amount sought to be recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70
the docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the
same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should
be annulled. In support of their theory, petitioners cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester
Development Corporation vs. CA.
\
It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment
of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of th edocket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings.
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to
defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but
also in the filing of the second amended complaint.
However, in the present case, an interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester,
private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees
as required.
The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence onprivate respondent
who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance
by manifesting. Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient
considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or
his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found
due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same.

It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the
filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment
of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment
of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left fo rdetermination by the court, the additional filing fee therefore shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee

MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA NOEL v REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM
These were two separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for recovery of
possession against three defendants, namely Antonio Noel, Ponciano Panes, and Maximo Tacay.
Pineda was the owner of 790sq. meter land evidence by TCT No. T-56560. The previous owner of such land
allowed the three defendants to use or occupy the same by mere tolerance. Pineda having himself the need to
use the property, demanded the defendants to vacate the premises and pay reasonable rental therefore, but
such demands were refused.
The complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each defendant alleging that it did not specify
the amounts of actual, nominal and exemplary damages, nor the assessed value of the property, that being a
ground to bar the determination of the RTC’s jurisdiction in deciding the case. The Motions to Dismiss were
denied and the claims for damages in the complaint were expunged for failure to specify the amounts. Thus,
the defendants filed a Joint Petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, as well as a temporary
restraining order against the RTC.
WON THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES CLAIMED AND THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY
ARE RELEVANT IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE COURT’S JURISDICTION IN A CASE FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION
OF PROPERTY.
/
the motion was dismissed. Certiorari dismissed, no grave abuse of discretion.

Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the legal fees shall be
assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total amount of related damages
sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by
the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, asof the
time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time. But in the case at bar-the fees prescribed for an
action involving real property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related damages (actual,
moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The Court undeniably
has jurisdiction over the action involving the real property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or
similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that authority by the circumstance
that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages because of lack of
specification thereof. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to which no
amounts are stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the
amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages and accept payment
of the requisite fees therefore within the relevant prescriptive period

the complaints do not state the amounts being claimed as actual, moral and nominal damages. It
is also true, however, that the actions are not basically for the recovery of sums of money. They
are principally for recovery of possession of real property, in the nature of an accion publiciana.
Determinative of the court's jurisdiction in this type of actions is the nature thereof, not the
amount of the damages allegedly arising from or connected with the issue of title or possession,
and regardless of the value of the property. Quite obviously, an action for recovery of possession
of real property (such as an accion plenaria de possesion) or the title thereof, or for partition or
12

condemnation of, or the foreclosure of a mortgage on, said real property - in other words, a real
13

action-may be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying claim for actual, moral,
nominal or exemplary damages; and such an action would fall within the exclusive, original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES vs. SECURITY BANK

A supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to
be paid upon its filing

This case is about the propriety of awarding damages based on claims embodied in the plaintiff’s supplemental
complaint filed without prior payment of the corresponding filing fees.

Dragon Lady Industries took out loans from respondent Security Bank Corporation totaling P92.4 million.
Unable to pay the loans on time, the Lims assigned some of their real properties to the Bank to secure the
same, including a building and the lot on which it stands
In 1998, the Bank offered to lease the property to the Lims through petitioner Do-All Metals Industries, Inc.

DMI and the Bank executed a two-year lease contract from October 1, 1998 to September 30, 2000 but the
Bank retained the right to pre-terminate the lease.
In 1999, before the lease was up, the Bank gave notice to DMI that it was pre-terminating the lease on
December 31,1999. Wanting to exercise its right of first refusal, DMI tried to negotiate with the Bank the terms
of its purchase but the Bank, wanting a higher amount, declined its offers.
While the negotiations were on going, the Lims claimed that they continued to use the property in their
business. But the Bank posted at the place private security guards from Philippine Industrial Security Agency
(PISA). The Lims also claimed that on several occasions they were harassed by the guards and that they were
unable to enter the premises as the bank representatives had the property padlocked. The Lims also alleged
that they were unable to retrieve assorted furniture, equipment, and personal items left at the property.

The Lims filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City for damages with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction against the Bank and officers.
They won in the RTC and the Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning among other things
the RTC’s authority to grant damages considering plaintiffs’ failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental
complaint.
The RTC denied the motion, but on appeal to the CA, the decision was reversed, and the complaint as well
as the counterclaims were dismissed. DMI and the Lims filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied
the same, hence this petition.

Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate plaintiff’s supplemental complaint
against the Bank considering their failure to pay the filing fees on the amounts of damages they claim in it

What the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC acquired
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the moment thhey filed their original complaint accompanied by the pa
yment of the filing fees due on the same.

The plaintiffs’ non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of
the jurisdiction it already had over the case a supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that
the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing. The rules do not require the court to make
special assessments in cases of supplemental complaints.

Ng soon v Alday
Ng Soon a widow is seeking to reconstitute her deceased husband’s savings account and is also claiming
damages and atty’s fees.
Ng soon alleges that her husband’s savings account with the china banking corporation was closed and that his
signature was forged by billie t. gan who conspired with the bank officials to withdraw the funds.
Ng soon claims to have suffered actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and incurred expenses
due to litigation due to defendant’s refusal to heed her demands.
For the above complaint ng soon paid the amount of P3,600 as docket fees with the RTC of QC
Respondent Billie T. Gan moved to expunge the complaint for non payment of the required docket fees due to
the unspecified amount of damages sought.
Respondent Judge granted the motion to expunge
Ng soon moved for its reconsideration but denied, hence a petition for certiorari

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner

The court finds that the petitioner did pay the necessary filing fees and that the amounts claimed in the
complaint were definite enough to enable the computation of the docket fees payable.

While it may be that the body of petitioner's Complaint below was silent as to the exact amount of moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees, the prayer did specify the amount of not less than P50,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages, and not less than P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. These amounts were definite
enough and enabled the Clerk of Court of the lower Court to compute the docket fees payable.

Similarly, the principal amount sought to be recovered as "missing money" was fixed at P900,000.00. The
failure to state the rate of interest demanded was not fatal because it is the Courts which ultimately fix the
same This clearly implies that the specification of the interest rate is not that indispensable.

As to the issue of the Identity of Ng Soon, it is a question of fact, and the court is not a trier of facts and shall
pass upon any question involving the truth or difference of evidence

LU v Lu YM
A complaint was filed by David Lu, Rosa Go, Silvano Ludo and CL Corp against Paterno Lu YM et al and Lu Ym
Develepment Corporation.
David Lu et al are the minority shareholders of LLDC, claimed that Lu YM et al caused the issuance of 600,000
shares of corporation’s stock to themselves for less than their actual value.
David Lu et al sought for the dissolution of corporation and appointment of receivership
Lu Ym et al moved for the dismissal of the complaint for non compliance with certification of non forum
shopping and failure to exert efforts towards a compromise

The trial court denied defendant’s motion and placed David Lu under receivership

Lu Ym et al appealed to the CA but was dismissed for insufficient signatures on verification and certification of
non forum shopping
Lu Ym re filed a petition which was granted by CA

David Lu appealed to the SC seeking the dismissal of the initial complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
due to the insufficient payment of docket fees

The supreme court held that the main purpose of the complaint was the annulment of the issuance of the
600,000 LLDC shares of stocks because they had been allegedly issued for less than their value and since DAVID
paid the docket fees for an action the subject of which was capable of pecuniary estimation the docket fees
should be based on this figure. David Lu acknowledge that the action they filed affected title to or possession
of real property thus, the docket fee would be based on the assessed value of the property, their inaction or
silence implies bad faith. Since David did not pay the correct amount of docket fees the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction

Harvest all investments v alliance select foods

Harvest All, et al are minority stockholders of Alliance Select Foods International,
Inc. (Alliance), with Hedy S.C. Yap Chua acting as a member of Alliance’s Board of
Directors. As per Alliance’s by-laws, its Annual Stockholders’ Meeting (ASM) is
held every June 15.
However, in a Special Board of Directors Meeting the Board of Directors, over
Hedy S.C. Yap Chua’s objections, passed a Board Resolution indefinitely
postponing Alliance’s 2015 ASM pending complete subscription to its Stock
Rights Offering (SRO) consisting of shares with total value of Pl
such postponement was made “to give the stockholders of [Alliance] better
representation in the annual meeting, after taking into consideration their
subscription to the [SRO] of [Alliance].
This prompted Harvest All, et al. to file the instant Complaint (with Application for
the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction) involving an intra-corporate
controversy against Alliance, and its other Board members,

Harvest All, et al., prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Board Resolution
indefinitely postponing the 2015 ASM, as well as the Board Resolution dated
February 17, 2015 approving the SRO.

The Clerk of Court of the RTC assessed Harvest All, et al. with filing fees
amounting to P8,860.00 which they paid accordingly.

For its part, the Alliance Board raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the
ground of Harvest All, et al.‘ s failure to pay the correct filing fees. It argued that
the latter should have paid P20 Million, more or less, in filing fees based on the
SRO which was valued at P1 Billion.

Harvest All, et al. maintained that they paid the correct filing fees, considering
that the subject of their complaint is the holding of the 2015 ASM and not a
claim on the aforesaid value of the SRO. Harvest All, et al. likewise pointed out
that they simply relied on the assessment of the Clerk of Court and had no
intention to defraud the government

The RTC dismissed the instant complaint for lack of jurisdiction due to Harvest
All, et al.‘s failure to pay the correct filing fees. As such, Harvest All, et al. should
have paid filing fees in the amount of more or less P20 Million and not just
P8,860.00.

The CA reversed the RTC’s order of dismissal and, accordingly, reinstated the
case and remanded the same to the court a quo for further proceedings after
payment of the proper legal fees.CA held that the prevailing rule is that all intra-
corporate controversies always involve a property in litigation
SSUE:
Whether or not Harvest All, et al. paid insufficient filing fees for their complaint,
as the same should have been based on the P1 Billion value of the SRO.

HELD:
Harvest All paid the correct filing fees. where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has
considered such actions incapable of pecuniary estimation and are cognizable
exclusively by Courts of First Instance.

Harvest All, et al.’s Complaint reveals that its main purpose is to have Alliance
hold its 2015 ASM on the date set in the corporation’s bylaws, or at the time
when Alliance’s SRO has yet to fully materialize, so that their voting interest with
the corporation would somehow be preserved and the complaint does not
involve the recovery of sum of money. Therefore, Harvest All paid the correct
filing fees.

Court notes that in ruling that the correct filing fees for Harvest All, et al.’s
complaint should be based on the P1 Billion value of the SRO – and, thus,
essentially holding that such complaint was capable of pecuniary estimation –
However, after a careful reading of Lu, it appears that Harvest All, et al. correctly
pointed out that the foregoing statements were in the nature of an obiter
dictum. To recount, in Lu, the Court ruled, inter alia, that the case involving an
intra-corporate controversy instituted therein, i.e.
declaration of nullity of share issuance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation and, thus,
the correct docket fees were paid