ST ANTONY'S SERIES

General Editor: Alex Pmvda, Fellow of SI AIIIOIIY'S College, Oxjord

Recellllities illclude:
Mark D. Alleyne
INTERNATIONAL POWER AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION
Daniei A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya and David Martin Jones
TOWARDS ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN PACIFIC ASIA
Judith M. Brown and Rosemary Foot (editors)
MIGRATION: The Asian Experience
Sir Alec Cairncross
MANAGING THE BRITISH ECONOMY IN THE 1960s: A Treasury Perspeetive
Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson (edilor)
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICT
Anne Deighlon (editor)
BUILDING POSTWAR EUROPE: National Decision-Makers and European Institutions,
1948-63
Richard Drifte
JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1990s: From Economic Superpower to What Power?
Simon Duke
THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY DISORDER
Jane Ellis
THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, 1985-94
Yhakan Erdem
SLA VERY IN THE OTIOMAN EMPIRE AND ITS DEMISE, 1800-1909
Joäo Carlo Espada
SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS: A Critique ofF. A. Hayck and Raymond Plant
Christoph GassenschmidI
JEWISH LIBERAL POLlTlCS IN TSARIST RUSSIA, 1900-14: The Modernizalion of
Russian Jewry
Amitzur lIan
THE ORIGIN OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS RACE: Arms, Embargo, Military Power
and Decision in the 1948 Palestine War
Hiroshi Ishida
SOCIAL MOBILITY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN
Austen Ivereigh
CATHOLICISM AND POLITICS IN ARGENTINA, 1910-60
Leroy Jin
MONETARY POLICY AND THE DESIGN OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN
CHINA,1978-90
Mallhew JOlles
BRITAIN, THE UNITED STA TES AND THE MEDITERRANEAN WAR, 1942-44
Anthony Kirk-Grcene and Daniei Bach (editors)
STATE AND SOCIETY IN FRANCOPHONE AFRICA SINCE INDEPENDENCE
Jon Lunn
CAPITAL AND LABOUR ON THE RHODESIAN RAILW AY SYSTEM, 1888-1947
Iftikhar H. Malik
STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN PAKISTAN: Politics of Authority, Ideology und
Ethnicity
Javier Martfnez Lara
BUILDING DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL: The Politics ofConstitutional Change, 1985-95
Leslie McLoughlin
IBN SAUD: Founder of a Kingdom
Rosalind Marsh
HISTORY AND LITERATURE IN CONTEMPORARY RUSSIA
David Nicholls
THE PLURALIST STATE: Thc Politicalldeas of J. N. Figgis and his Contemporaries
J. L. Porket
UNEMPLOYMENT IN CAPITALlST, COMMUNIST AND POST-COMMUNIST
ECONOMIES
Charles Powell
JUAN CARLOS OF SPAIN: Self-Made Monarch
Neil Renwick
JAPAN'S ALLIANCE POLITICS AND DEFENCE PRODUCTION
Aran Shai
THE FA TE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH FIRMS IN CHINA, 1949-54: Imperialism
hnprisoned
H. Gordon Skilling
T. G. MASARYK: Against the Cuerent. 1882-1914
William J. Tompson
KHRUSHCHEV: A Political Life
Christopher Trcmewan
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIAL CONTROL IN SINGAPORE
Stephen Welch
THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL CULTURE
Jennifer M. Welsh
EDMUND BURKE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: The Commonwealth of
Europe and the Crusade against the Frcnch Revolution
Czechoslovakia, 1918-92

A Laboratory for Social Change

Jaroslav Krejcf
Professor Emeritus, Lonsdale College
Lancaster University

and

Pavel Machonin
Research-Team Leader
Institute of Sociology
Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic

in association with
Palgrave Macmillan
© Jaroslav Krejci and Pavel Machonin 1996
Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover 1st edition 1996978-0-333-60475-5
All rights reservcd. No rcproduction, copy or transmission of
ihis publicalion may be made without written permission.
No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or
Iransmitted save with written permission or in accordance with
the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988,
or under the terms of any licence pemlitting Iimited copying
issued by the Copyright Licensing Agcncy, 90 Tottenham Courl
Road, London W IP 9HE.
Any person who docs any unauthoriscd act in relation 10 this
publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil
claims fOT damages.

First published 1996 by

MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS
and London
Companics and representatives
throughout the world

ISBN 978-1-349-39183-7 ISBN 978-0-230-37721-9 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/9780230377219

A catalogue Tecord for this book is available

from the British Library.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2
05 04 03 02 01 00 99 98

Published in the United States 01' America 1996 by

ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC.,
Scholarly and Reference Division
175 Fiflh Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
Contents
List ofTables viii
Preface xii
Ackllowledgemems xv
List of Abbreviations xvi
Maps ofCzechoslovakia: 1918-38 and 1945-92 xvii

PART I ETUNOPOLITICS
Jaroslav Krejc{

1 The Wider Context 3

2 Composite Nation, Multiethnic State and

Parliamentary Democracy 8
The Czech-Slovak partnership 8
Coping with the (argest minority (2

3 Dismemberment and Restitution: Various Kinds of

Authoritarian Rule 19
The Czech-German issue 19
Thc Czech-Slovak issue 25

4 The Balance Sheet of Ethnic Changes 31

Germans. Magyars. Jews and Poles 31
The casc of Ruthenia 37

5 Nationalism and Communism in Interplay 41

A three cornered contest 41
Thc fuH circlc of Czech-Slovak haggling over power-sharing 45

Appendix to Part I 54

PART 11 TUE ECONOMIC CONTEXT

V
Jaroslav Krejc {

6 The First Republic 57

Preliminary rcmark 57
v
vi Contents
Recovery and growlh 58
Triumph and crisis 62
Appendix: Some structural aspects 69
7 Time of Disruption 71

8 The Rise and Fall of a Socialist Experiment 78

Immediate post-war measures 78
The start of economic planning 81
Economic policy under state socialism 85
Economic performance of state socialism 90
The role of economy in Slovakia's nation-building 100

9 A New Start as Two Nations lOS

PART 111 SOCIAL METAMORPHOSES

Pavel MacllOnin

10 An Overview of the Basic Social Changes 113

The subject and method of study 113
Changes in c1ass structure 115
Changes in the branch structure of the economically
active population 118
Changes in levels of education 122
Social aspects of urbanisation 125
Shifts in earnings distribution 126
Preliminary conc1usions 130

11 Tbe First Attempt at a Common Social Emancipation 132

The birth of the Czech-Slovak social and political system 132
The 1920s: a social success 134
The 1930s: the road to collapse 136

12 Social Developments during the Second World War 140

Social devastation in the Czech Lands 140
Social shifts in the 'sovereign' Siovak state 146

13 The Second Attempt at a Democratic Common Life 150

The post-war social situation ISO
The decisive conftict 156
 Contents vii
14 The Installation of a Totalitarian and Egalitarian
Social System 159
The Communist offensive and the first signs of a
crisis (1948-52) 159
The crisis, retreat and first attempts to renew social
balance (1953-6) 165

15 Reform Attempts 168

The main events of the period 1956-69 168
The sociological survey on social stratilkation in
1967: the main social changes, in 1955-67 170
Czech-Slovak comparison 184
The Praguc Spring 1968 as an attcmpt at social
transformation of the state socialist society 185

16 The 'Normalisation': AReturn to Abnormality 192

Socially significant events of the period 1969-89 and
a general characteristic of the ruling system 192
The sociological survey of c1ass and social structure
in 1984 199
Czech-Slovak comparison 206
Reasons for the collapse of the state socialist system 209

17 The Post-Communist Social Transformation 212

Thc iegacy 01' communism 212
Democratic changcs and the exchange of political e\ites 215
Major social changes in federal Czechoslovakia during
the first period of social transformation: the
Sociological Survey on Social Stratification, 1993 221
The Czcch-Slovak dissociation 232
Social and political prospects 240

Notes 245
Bibliograph)' 249
Index 259
List of Tables
2.1 Ethnic structure of Czechoslovakia in 1930
(census data) 12
3.1 Chronology of the dismembennent of Czechoslovakia
1938-9 21
3.2 Election results for the Constituent Assembly,
26 May 1946 29
4.1 The lack of electoral support for unitary Czechoslovakia
in 1935 32
5.1 Czech and Siovak demographie development 51
5.2 The development of ethnie structure: the Czech Lands 51
5.3 The development of ethnie structure: Slovakia 52
A.l Demographie indicators: the Czeeh Lands 54
A.2 Demographie indicators: Slovakia 54
6.1 Population structure by economic sector in the
conslituent parts of Czechoslovakia in 1921 58
6.2 Economic cycle 1929-37: physical indicators 62
6.3 Eeonomie cycle 1929-37: trade volumes 63
6.4 Eeonomic eycle 1929-37: Gross National Produel by
type of expenditure 64
6.5 Eeonomie eycle 1929-37: domestic and national income 65
6.6 Real wages and salaries 66
6.7 Dwelling-house sector: ratio of rent to construetion eosts 67
6.8 Manufaeturing industry: strueture by employment 68
6.9 National income by industrial origin in 1930 69
6.10 Value added per person engaged in 1930 69
6.11 National reproducible wealth in 1930, and its ratio to GNP 70
6.12 Consolidated balance of international payments 70
7.1 Bohemia and Moravia as a whole: employment in
manufaeturing industry in 1944 71
7.2 Performance of industry in 1943 72
7.3 Alternative series for real national income in
Bohemia-Moravia 1939-43 75
7.4 Expendilure of GNP in Bohemia-Moravia 1940-4 75
7.5 Gennany's absorption of GNP generated in
Bohemia-Moravia 1940-4 76
7.6 Purchasing power, consumption and savings in
Bohemia-Mora via 77

VIII
 List 0/ Tables ix
8.1 Real income indices in 1946 80
8.2 Employment in industry by form of ownership as
percenlage of total industrial employment 84
8.3 Economic growth: annual averages 92
8.4 Consumption and investment: official series 93
8.5 Provision with productive assets and their efficiency 94
8.6 The main shirts in the structure of industrial production 95
8.7 GNP by distributive shares and by final use 96
8.8 GDP by final use, as percentage 98
8.9 Equalisation ratios: Siovakia as percentage of the level
in the Czech Lands 102
8.10 Fixed assets and industrialisation: Siovakia compared
with the Czech Lands 102
8.11 Transfers of net material product from Czech Lands
to SJovakia 103
8.12 Government finance in the final years of federation 104
9.1 Gross Domestic Product by final type of use: annual
changes as percentage 108
9.2 GOP: Czechoslovakia and the Republics 108
10.1 Changes in c\ass structurc in thc Czech Lands,
1921-91, as percentages of economically active 116
10.2 Changes in c\ass structure in Siovakia, 1921-91, as
percentages of economically active 117
10.3 Changes in branch structures in the Czech Lands,
1921-93, as percentages of economically active 119
10.4 Changes in the branch structures in Siovakia, 1921-93,
as percentages of economically active 120
10.5 Attained levels of education in the Czech Lands, 1950-91,
as percentages of the population over 15 years 123
10.6 Attained levels of education in Slovakia, 1950-91,
as percentages of the population over 15 years 124
10.7 Percentages of secondary- and tertiary-educated in
age cohort 30-34, 1991 124
10.8 Inhabitants according to the size of localities in the
Czech Lands and Siovakia, 1910-91, as percentages
of population 126
10.9 Earnings distribution in Czech and Siovak industry,
1937-91 128
10.10 Average monthly wages of population occupied in
the socialist sector of the national economy in the
Czech Lands and Siovakia, 1948-92, in CSK 129
x List ofTables
11.1 Results of the 1920 parliamentary elections for the
House of Representatives in the Czech Lands and
Siovakia, as percentages of valid votes 133
11.2 Results of the 1925 and 1929 parliamentary
elections for the House of Representatives in the
Czech Lands and Siovakia. as percentages of valid votes 135
11.3 Results of the 1935 parliamentary elections for the
House of Representatives in the Czech Lands and
Siovakia, as percentages of valid votes 139
13.1 Results of the 1946 parliamentary elections for the
National Assembly in thc Czech Lands and Slovakia
as percentages of valid votes 154
15.1 Fulfilment of educational requiremcnts in the socialist
sector of the national economy in the Czech Lands,
1970-83, as percentages of attaincd required minimum
level or above 175
15.2 Fulfilment of educational requirements in the socialist
sec tor of the national economy in Siovakia, 1970-83, as
percentages of allained required minimum level or ahove 175
15.3 Monthly earnings in selected occupations in
Czechoslovakia in 1965 182
16.1 Basic social status characteristics of the economically
active in the Czech and Siovak Republics, 1984 and 1993,
as percentages 201
16.2 Class differentiation of the economically active in thc
Czech and Slovak Republics. 1984, as percentages 203
16.3 Class differentiation of the economically active in thc
Czech and Slovak Republics, 1993, as percentages 203
16.4 Spearman's rank correlations' matrices for
status-forming variables in thc Czech and Siovak
Republics, 1983 204
16.5 Spearman's rank correlations' matrices for
status-forming variables in the Czech and Slovak
Republics, 1993 204
16.6 Multiple regressions of individual earnings in the
Czech and Siovak Republics in 1984 (values ofbeta
coefficients) 206
16.7 Multiple regressions of individual earnings in the
Czech and Siovak Republics in 1993 (values of beta
coefficients) 206
 List ofTables XI

16.8 Evaluation of the development in the past five years of

thc Czcch and Slovak populations, as perccntages 208
17.1 Results of the 1990 parliamentary elections for the
Housc of Peoplc in the Czech and Slovak Republics,
as percentages of valid votes 216
17.2 Results of the 1992 elections for the parliaments of the
Czcch and Slovak Republies, as percentages of valid votes 218
17.3 Results of the 1994 parliamentary elections in the
Slovak Republic, as percentages of valid votes 220
17.4 Preference for political parties in the Czech Republic in
December 1994, as percentages of adult population
(exc\uding the undecided) 220
17.5 Participation of former and present Communist Party
members in the social status categories of economically
activc in the Czech and Siovak Republics, 1993 231
17.6 Indicators of the development of self-employed in the
Czech and Slovak Republics in Autumn 1993, as
perccntages of economically active 235
17.7 Positive answers to the question 'Did (do) you have
enough money in thc family budget for ... ?' in the
Czech and Siovak Republics 1988 (retrospectively) and
1993, as percentagcs of population 237
17.8 Positive evaluations of the transformation and of its
future prospects in the Czech and Siovak Republics in
1991 and 1993, as percentages of economically active 237
Preface
ABOUT THE BOOK

The aim of lhis book is 10 provide the Anglophone reader with a succinct
account of a unique experiment in nalion-building: an attempl 10 huild up
a composite ethnic (Czechoslovak) nation and provide il with an adequatc
political framework.
The book is divided into three parts. The tirst, written hy Jaroslav
KrejCf, is calledElhnopolitics; it explains the rationale of the experiment,
and reviews ils obstaeles, successes and failures, due hoth to internal and
extern al causes.
The second part, written hy the same author, contains an outline of the
economic contcxt of ethnic as weil as social aspects of the deyelopment.
As far as possihle, the economic structure and performance of lhe Czech
and Siovak parts of the state are given separate attention.
The third part, wrilten by Pavel Machonin, and called Social Meta-
ll1orphoses, covers structural changes in lhe Czech and Siovak societies.
Changes in c\ass structures, stratification, mobility and living slandanJs
constitute the main items for consideration. Wherevcr there is relevant
material available, popular opinion on particular issucs and elcctoral
results are scrutinised.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Jaroslav Krejci, born in 1916, studied law and economics at Charles

University in Prague. During the German occupation he took part in the
resistanee movement, and after the war held a responsihle joh in the State
Planning Office. He also laught national accounting at the Graduate
School of Social and Political Studies in Prague. Step by step banned from
these engagements for political reasons, he became involved. in coopera-
tion with others, in independent research sponsored hy the Hluvka
Economic Institute in Prague. In 1954, this institute was e10sed down and
its main co-workers, including Krejcf, were sentenced to imprisonment for
high treason (KrejCf for ten years). Released on amnesty in 1960. he was
allowed to return to his profession only in 1968. Employed in mcnial johs
in the interim, he turned his interest to a wider field of social scicnce and

xii
 Preface xiii

history. As the Soviet anned intervention put an abrupt end to the Praguc
Spring, he, together with his wife (at that time lecturer in Psychology at
Charles Univcrsity) left lor exile. After a short sojourn in Vienna. they
seltled in England where they could both resume their academie careers.
As Lecturer and then Professor at Lancaster University he taught mainly
in lhe departments of European Studies and Religious Studies. His ex-
pertise in various mcthods of national accounting was utilised for research
work at St Antony's College in Oxford. His writings cover a widc runge (Ir
subjeets such as national income and social structurc in Central European
countries, ethnic problems in Europe, comparative study 01' revolutions
with the outline of a theory, and comparative study of civilisations. inclUlt··
ing the quest for the underlying pallern or their transtormations.
Krejc('s present position:
• in England, Emeritus Professor at Lancaster University
• in Prague, Director (honorary) of the Ccntrc tor Rcsearch into Sucio-
Cultural Pluralism at thc Philosophical Institute of the AcadclllY uf
Sciences. Honorary Chairman of the restored Hhivka Economic
Institute, and mcmbcr uf thc Czcch Lcarncd Socicty.

}lavel Machonin. born in 1927, was 18 when the war ended and he WllS
ahle to relurn from a yc.lr's mandatory work as a lahourer and completc
his grammar school studies. Likc many young pcoplc at that time hc was
fascinated by the prospects of the specifically Czechoslovak road to social-
ism advoeated then by the Communists and joined their party. He linished
his sludies at Ihe Graduate ScllOOI of Social and Political Studies in Prague
in 1949. Disappointed wilh thc course 01' cvcnts wh ich actually followed
in socia/ and po/i/ical lire of the country in the I950s. hc idcntitied himse/f
with the reformist current already emerging in the mid-1950s within thc
Parly. In I960s, he look part in the rcnasccncc of sociology as a /egilimatc
diseipline and led u team 01' young soci%gists who had emancipalcd
thclllselves from thc officia/ doctrinu/ stalinist stance. On thc eve of the
Praguc Spring he completed with thcm a thoroughgoing empirica/
r.:search on social strati/kation and mobility in Czechoslovakia which was
the first study of this kind in the state socia/ist countries. In 1967, he was
uppointcd to the post 01' Director of the Institute of Social and Political
Scienccs <11 CharIes Uni\'ersity. In 1968 Machonin took an active part in
the reformists' bid for power und as a rcsult of this and of his research
activitics, he was banned from his professional work in which he could
eonsequently continue only privatcly und anonymously. For fourtcen
years. he workcd in the computer station of the Czech poultry industry. At
xiv Preface
that time, the most important support for him was provided by his wife
Olga who worked as lecturer in the field of culturology at Charles
University. Only after 1989 was he able to return to research work first at
the University and then in the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of
Sciences. In recognition of his pioneering research work on stratification
in Cenlral and Eastern Europe, he was elected in 199\ Honorary President
01' the Research Committee on Social Stratification and MobiJity at the
International Sociological Association. At present, he is leading a research
team dealing with the ongoing social transformation in the Czech and
Slovak Republics. He has been elected external member of the Academic
Assembly of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic.

THE GENESIS OF THE BOOK

In the relaxed atmosphere in Czechoslovakia of 1967, Pavel Machonin

was in a position to organise a broadly based piece of research on the state
of Czechoslovak society. In 1969 the results were published in SJovakia
where repression of the reform movement was less severe than in Prague.
Although the book was withdrawn from circulation in Czechoslovakia,
shortly afterwards, KrejCf, already in England, obtained a copy and, in his
first hook in English (published by Macmillan in 1972) could make ample
refcrence 10 the findings of Machonin's team in support of his own con-
clusions. After 1989, Machonin as a member of the Governmental
Commission for the evaluation of the events in 1968, used Krejc('s data in
support of his interpretations. When in 1990 the two authors, for the first
time in their life, met in Prague it seemed to both that their earlier work
nccded 10 be brought up to date and to become available in English.
It is up to the reader to judge to what extent the authors, each writing
from his specific angle his own part of the study, based on his own par-
ticular professional background and life experience, contributcd to an
understanding of the often dramatic quest of two kindred peoples for
full nationhood, democracy and, if possible, an equitable social system.
Acknow ledgements
For Jaroslav Krejcf the most valuable contribution to this work was fhe
advice and unstinted editorial work of his wife. Anna. The emerital status
at Lancaster University together with the support of the Departmcnt 01'
German Studies in the School of Modern Languages provided him with
the facilities without which it would not have been possible to continue
research after retirement. The typing of the text by the secretary of the
Centre for Research in Socio-Cultural Pluralism in Prague. Mrs Dana
Schautova, and by Mrs Kveta Kasparova, has been much appreciatcd.
Both authors have to express their gratitude to the Institute of Sociology
in Prague, particularly to Lumfr Gatnar and Zdena Janii, for the tcchnical
work on the completion of the book, and to the British Academy for its
contribution towards the indexing or the book.
The third part of the book is based on empirical data. Besides publishcd
statisties, sociological and historieal literature, some historiographical
working studies not accessible at the book market and unpublished socio-
logical data were used. The author, Pavel Machonin, expresses in this way
his thanks to the historians L. Kalinova, V. Priicha and K. Kaplan who
wrote the mentioned studies and organised the teams who prcpared them:
it is due to their work that the author gained access to the historiographical
knowledge in a comprehensive form. Thanks also to M. Tucek and
L. Gatnar who elaborated data from Czechoslovak sociological surveys or
1984 and 1993 for this study. Both researchers and the author worked on
this topic within the framework of the grant No 828105 of the Grant
Agency of the Academy or Sciences, Czech Republic, supported further
by a grant from the Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. In the
last two chapters, the author uses data from the international comparative
survey 'Social Stratification and Circulation of Elites in Eastern Europe
after 1989' (1993) coordinated by the UCLA and sponsored by the
US National Science Foundation and NWO (Netherlands' Science
Foundation). The Czech data were collected and prepared by a team led by
P. Matejii, the Slovak by a team led by J. Buncak. The author thanks those
institutions that gave their support as weil as those researchers who were
engaged in the research project in question. Last but not least, the author
cordially thanks Stephanie Howard for her assistance in the translation of
his 'Czenglish' to English.

xv
List of Abbreviations
Co i. f. cOSl, insurance, freighl
CMEA Council for Mutual Economic Assistancc
CSK Czcchoslovak Koruna
CSSR Czcchoslovak Socialist Republic
C:S-Y Czech Statistical Yearbook
f.o.h. free on board
UDP gross domcstic product
GDR German Dcmocratic Repuhlic (East Germany)
GFR German Federal Republic (West Germany)
GNP gross national product
IISY Historical Statistical Yearbook
NMP nct material product
SM Statistical Manual
SNA standard national accounting
S)' Czechoslovak Statistical Yearbook
SS)' Slovak Statistical Yearbook
ueLA The Univcrsity of California. Los Angclcs
UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

xvi
 Q

...j
~ ~
~I.?
e,.
~
b \
~
:j
t
I
'1'1
U

i
~
>-
z :s::11 ~

< L\.I

~
Ci)
::c:
0
c:Q

~~
~"r
o~

xvii
 )

~4.
~
~
~ ~
i b
N
l'3.. ~
...
'-'

.s~
~~
!
U rfl

~ :;j
~
~
~

xviii
 Part I
Ethnopolitics
Jaroslav Krejc{
1 The Wider Context
Nation-building, in the modern sense of the term, is a complex and long-
term process. It embraces four aspects or dimensions of its fulfilment: geo-
graphical, cultural, political and psychological. Not all of these dimensions
develop at an equal pace. Sometimes it is a kind of statehood, a concen-
trated power structure over a kindred people in a defined area, that pro-
vides the main integrative impetus; sometimes it is the Janguage,
slandardised in written form, that represents the decisive step in
the identification of particular people as aseparate 'ethnic' nation.
Occasionally, it is a particular religious affiliation that constitutes the bond
of cuhural identity, similar to that of an ethnic nation.
Common country, common language or religion, and common state, all
these are the objective marks of national identity. But there is one addi-
tional mark of ethnic belonging, Le. a common awareness shared by all the
people concerned. lt is a subjective feeling, astate of mind, but its expres-
sion in social hehaviour may hecome an objectively assessable factor. The
different intcnsity levels of national consciousness, different with respect
to social strata or geographical areas, are a matter of particular importance
in political history.
As modern history has ahundantly shown, the bond of national con-
sciousncss has proved to he the most enduring bond of social cohesion.
Only religion in particular circumstances provided such a strong link.
Religious affiliation has also stretched its unifying bond over several
nations, so on the contrary, has divided a nation, idenlified by one
common language, into smaller self-contained 'ethno-religious'
communities.
The different starting-points can be illustrated by the following exam-
pIes. Thc French and thc English began their nation-building proccss from
the political sidc. Their states provided frameworks for the Iinguistic
unitication of their suhjects. In contrast, the Germans and thc Italians
started their nation-huilding from the cuhural plane where the common
literary language was the key factor. Inspired by the ex am pie of Prance,
where during the process of revolution the nation-building made a great
Icap forward. German and Italian nationalists managed 10 turn their
mosaics of dynastie states into nationwide monarchies. The divergence
between ethnic and political (state's) borders was regarded as a dysfunc-
lional relationship in the social structure of European countries.

3
4 Ethnopolitics
In the second decade of the twentieth century, as a result of the two
Balkan wars and, in particular of the First World War, further stateless
nations progressed towards different levels of political status. Some
hecame one-nation states in their own right, others created composite
states with their next of kin. As the borders were dictated by those who
had won the wars, large swathes of ethnic nations whose state had lost
the war became ethnic minorities in the newly created or restituted
states.
Although the process of adaptation of political to ethnic borders and
vice versa made great strides, new problems surfaced when borders were
redrawn. As already stated, new ethnic minorities emerged and not all
stateless nations were satisfied with the poIitical status they had won. The
Finns, Poles, Czechs, Serbs, Romanians, as weil as the Balts, were the
definite winners. The French, Italians and Danes could also reunite some
of their members with their mother country. Also the Croats, Slovenes and
Slovaks could be regarded as winners - they improved their poIitical
status in becoming members of the composite states; but, fol' various
reasons, they could not playa leading role there. Somewhat latcr' also the
Irish won their sovereign state. However not all those who saw themselves
Irish were united in the newly created Irish Republic.
Finally, there were merely nominal winners. As the Russian Empire was
transformed into the Union of the Soviet SociaIist Republics (USSR)
almost all its various ethnic nations were gradually granted some political
status graded according to the eomparative importance ascribed to them
within the union. Territories of some ethnic groups became federated
republics, some became autonomous republies and others merely
aulonomous regions or districts. In astate where all leading positions were
held by the highly centralised Communist Party, which was Russian-dom-
inated, a federal constitution had litde practical meaning; it nevertheless
provided individual ethnic groups with a token status which became mean-
ingful when the power of the Communist Party collapsed.
In absolute terms, the main losers were the German-speakers, irrespect-
ive whether they were Reichsdeutsche (from Germany proper) or
Volksdeutsche (from other countries, in particular from the former Austro-
Hungarian Empire). When the size of the whole nation is taken into
aceount the main losers were the Hungarians (Magyars)} Their kingdom,
in which they constituted less than a half of the total population, had to
give up so much territory that about a third of the Magyars (Hungarian
cthnic nation) remained outside a Hungary reduced in size by the Treaty of
Trianon. The Bulgarians were also losers as weil the Ukrainians and
Belorussians whose western regions were incorporated into the PoIish
 The Wider Context 5
republic as the result of the Polish-Soviet war in 1920. The seeds of a new
series of troubles were sown.
The two composite states created as a result of the First World War,
namely the Czechoslovak Republic and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes (from 1929 called Yugoslavia), were based on ethnic
kinship. Albeit to a different extent, both also encompassed peoples of a
different ethnic complexion. In this respect Czechoslovakia's situation
appeared to be less advantageous than that of Yugoslavia. Whereas the
Czechs and Slovaks constituted less than two thirds of Czechoslovakia's
population, the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes between them made almost
90 per cent of the Kingdom's population (Macedonians and Serbocroat-
speaking Muslims were then not yet considered as separate nations). Yet
neither of these two states lived much longer than seventy years. The three
score years and ten seem to have been the upper times limit wh ich the jux-
taposition of the lwo main driving forces in history - the spirit of the times
and the genius loci - allowed to the experiment in composite nation-
building.
Despite the same time limit, the issues of ethnic coexistence triggered
different courses of events and evenlually also different types of out-
comes. In what later became Yugoslavia the three official partners, the
Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes were significantly divided by language
only as far as the Siovenes were concerned. The c10seness of the Serbian
and Croatian languages (the main difference being the script), however,
was offset by the division of the Serbocroat-speakers into three cultural
orbits: Grcek Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Islamic. Taking into account
the difference in political development and strong communalloyalties, this
c1eavage assumed a dimension of three different socio-cultural entitics,
each belonging to a different civilisation.
Between the Czechs and Slovaks there was no diversity of that kind.
The ancestors of both of them, speaking several related dialects, passed
the threshold of history simultaneously. Right al the start they experi-
enced, on their own territory , the first serious confrontation between
Roman and Byzantine Christianity and eventually opted for the former.
Although divided politically, both the Czechs in the Bohemian Lands and
the Slovaks under the Hungarian Crown, wholeheartedly embraced
Catholicism. In a further development they allowed themselves to be
inftuenced by the renaissance, became involved in Reformation and
Counter-Reformation. In the latte'r two epochs the Czech-Slovak contacts
were particularly frequent. Under the impact of Enlightenment and of its
antidote - Romanticism - both Czechs and Slovaks began to develop their
own secular cultures orientated towards the reaffirmation of their national
6 Ethnopolitics
indentity. The only significant difference was in the rhythm and intensity
of Ihis development. The Enlightenment with its pragmatic implications -
the most conspicuous results being the industrial revolution - was less
effcctive in the Hungarian Kingdom to which the Slovaks belonged, than
in the Lands of the Bohemian Crown.
Thus, when the time came to bring the two nations together, Slovak
society was considerably less urbanised, industrialised and secularised.
The educated strata were less numerous and there was much less political
involvement and national consciousness and self-confidence. Although
ethnically the Czechs and Slovaks were very elose (the language is similar
to such an extent that no translation is needed) these societies differed
considerably.
In terms of modern nation-building, the Czechs had several advantages
over the Slovaks. Their national consciousness drew its strength from a
cultural und political tradition going back to the tenth century; literary
Czech erystallised by the end of the thirteenth century and in the fifteenth
century, was widely used across Central Europe. After the hiatus caused by
the Counter-Reformation and the loss of political sovereignty in the seven-
tccnth eentury the Czeeh language and eulture reeovered to a remarkable
exlent during the nineleenth eentury. Education was given high priority.
There was a private foundation for the promotion of education in the
Czech language which effectively counteracted the support provided by
the authorities for education in German.
According to the census of 1910 in the Austrian part of the Habsburg
Empire ilIiteracy among persons over 10 years old was lowest amongst
Czcch-speakers - 2.4 per cent; amongst German-speakers it was
3.1 per cent and the average for all nationalities was 16.5 per cent. In the
Hungarian part of the Empire the average ilIiteracy rate reached almost
50 per cent; thc breakdown by nationality was not given. 2 However, as in
Ihe second half of the nineteenth century, there was mounting pressure by
Ihe Hungarian authorities to replace education in minority languages by
education in Magyar, there was less scope for becoming literate in Slovak
than in Magyar. By 1914 there were no secondary schools teaching in
Slovak and whilst one Magyar elementary school catered on average for
"bout 26 pupils the ratio of one Slovak elementary school to the total
numher 0(' Slovak pupils was over 700. The only three Slovak private
(religious) gymnasia were closed in 1874. A year later, the Hungarian
govcrnment dissolved the Slovak 'Matica', a private foundation for pro-
moting education in Slovak language and confiscated all its assets. 3
On the political plane Czech confidence was bolstered by the historieal
reminisccnce of virtually independent and inftuential kingdom within the
 The Wider Colltext 7
Roman Empire, covering the per iod from 1212 to 1620. The three 'Lands'
of the Bohemian Kingdom - Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia - (though the
last one with a considerably reduced size) preserved their identity within
the Habsburg Empire.
In contrast to the Czechs, the Slovaks had to go a thousand years back
in history in order to find astate, styled as Great Moravia in the Byzantine
chronicles, in which their ancestors, together with those of the Moravian
Czechs could be considered as a nucleus of a political nation in modern
terms. From then until 1918 the Slovaks were one of the nations in the
multiethnic Hungarian Kingdom in which the Magyars were the dominant
nation. The counties in Hungary, inhabited by Siovaks, were known as the
Upper Land (in Magyar jelvidek in Slovak Hortldky).
Only in the second quarter of the nineteenth century did one of the
Siovak dialects begin to be used as a literary language, but the very low
level of Iiteracy, reflecting the situation in the multiethnic Hungarian
Kingdon of which the Slovaks were an underprivileged part, was not
favourable for its unifying effect on thc nation.
2 Composite Nation,
Multiethnic State and
Parliamentary Democracy
THE CZECH-SLOV AK PARTNERSHIP

There were good reasons, both on the Czech and on the Siovak sides, to
create a common state. The more advanced Czechs were supposed to help
the Siovaks to catch up; they also had to give them support against the
attempts of their former Magyar masters to regain lost territory. As a quid
pro quo the 2 million Siovaks, endowed with a much higher birthrate than
the Czechs, were supposed to strenghten the 7 million Czechs against the
3 million Germans in the Bohemian Lands. The Czechs needed to reduce
the proportion of this German minority if they wanted to build the new
state as their nation state. The Siovaks, as the next of kin, were to
strengthen them in this respect.
The historical Bohemian state was not exclusively Czech; it was both de
facto and de iure bilingual. The Bohemians, Moravians and Silesians 'of
the German tongue' were quite happy with the arrangements under the
Habsburg Empire. Due to defeat in the First World War, however, this
multiethnic empire was divided partly according to the ethnic, partly
according to historical criteria. After the previous seventy years of
haggling about their national prerogatives in the Bohemian Lands
(1848-1918) the Czechs were not willing to reconstitute their historieal
state as a two-nation state any Ion ger. Tbe social climate in Europe, the
spirit of the times, was quite different from that of the seventeenth century
when the united Czech and German Protestant nobility lost their war
against the Catholic monarch. The quest for ethnic (linguistic) homogene-
ity was substituted for the principle Cuius regio, eius religio. Thus, as will
be shown further on, the establishment of nation state was bound to create
problems in abilingual country.
The vengeful spirit of the Peace Treaties after the First World War
allowed the Czechs to attain two goals which, in principle were incompat-
ible: the creation of astate on the principle of ethnic kinship but with
borders drawn according to quite different criteria: historieal borders of the
bilingual Bohemian Crown Lands in the West and strategie considerations

8
 Composite Nation, Multiethnic State alld Parliamentary Democracy 9
in the formerly Hungarian East. The treaties not only did not allow the
Sudeten Gehnans to secede from the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, now
dominated by the Czechs, but they also drew the southern borders of
Siovakia so generously that according to the 1921 census over 700 000
Magyars, i.e. over 20 per cent of Siovakia's population - became citizens of
the new composite state. On top of that, by special agreement with the repre-
sentatives of the Ruthenian population in north-eastern Hungary, a piece of
land named Subcarpathian Russia was, after some hesitation, transferred to
Czechoslovak administration with the prospect of autonomy in due course.
Taking the Siovaks into the partnership with the Czechs was not a
straightforward maUer. AIthough the idea of a common state was indis-
putable, its centralised form and the concept of one Czechoslovak nation
was embraced wholeheartedly by the Czechs rather than the Slovaks. As
the weaker partners, many Siovaks feit that, under the Czech umbreIla,
they were forfeiting much of their identity. Perhaps a hundred years
earlier, when Siovak ethnic awareness was not yet properly articulated and
Siovaks lacked the unifying factor of their own literary language, the
venture might have had better prospects.
In 1918 Siovak awareness of national identity was still in the making
and it was up to their leaders to decide in which direction it would
develop: either closer to the Czech paradigm of one Czechoslovak nation
or towards their own pattern of two nations in elose cooperation. The rep-
resentatives of the Protestant minority (about 18 per cent of Slovak popu-
lation) as weIl as those of more secular orientation and/or democratic
convictions favoured the Czech option. The representatives of the Catholic
majority who were not fond of the liberal secularism widespread amongst
the Czechs, preferred to uphold and possibly further the development of
Siovak distinctiveness.
The unifkation of the Czechs and Siovaks into one state was negotiated
between their respective leaders, partly in their horne countries, partly
abroad. During the First World War the negotiation abroad had a particu-
lar significance. In support of their political aspirations both the Czechs
and the Slovaks could lean on a numerous, comparatively wealthy and cul-
turally vocal, diaspora abroad, in particular in the USA. Their negotiations
culminated in the agreement between the Czech and Slovak emigre organ-
isations coneluded on 30 May 1918 in Piusburgh.
The basic idea of the PiUsburgh Agreement was 'the union of the
Czechs and Slovaks in an independent State composed of the Czech Lands
and Slovakia'. This state was envisaged as a republic with a democratic
constitution. In it 'Slovakia shall have her own administrative system, her
own Diet and her own courts. The Slovak language shall be the official
10 Ethnopolitics
language in the schools, in the public offices and in public affairs gen er-
ally.' The last paragraph added: 'Detailed provisions relating to the organ-
isation or the Czechoslovak state shaJl be left to the liberated Czeehs and
Slovaks and Iheir duly accrediled representatives.' I
Obviously. the representatives of emigre organisations who signed the
document had no mandate from their horne countries; but the fact thaI the
meeting took place in the presenee of T. G. Masaryk, the leader or
the Czeeh and Siovak resistence abroad (later to become the first President
of the Czechoslovak Republic), who pUl his signalure under Ihe agreed
text, made the Pittsburgh Agreement into a morally binding document.
The representatives of the Siovak politieal parties in the horne country
assembled on 30 October 1918 in Turciansky sväty Martin went further.
They declared themselves 'the National Council of the Siovak branch of the
United Czeeho-Slovak Nation', and demanded 'an unlimited right of
self-determination' concluding: 'On the basis of this principle we express
our consent with the new condition of international law accepted on
28 Oetober by the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs.' This
cryptic formulation Illeant that the Siovak National Council accepted the
foundation or the Czechoslovak Republic which had been declared in Prague
two days earlier and approved by the authorities of the collapsing empire.
The Slovak declaration of 30 October 1918 contained no provision for
the future shape of the Czechoslovak state. Everything was relegated to
further negotiations in which, on the Siovak side, two schools of thought
began to compete for ascendancy. Those who were concerned with the
fact that not all Siovak-speakers shared the Siovak national consciousness
(they were still under the impact of Hungarian domination) and that the
relationship with Hungary was tense, preferred a tighter link with the
Czech part or the state. Others looked for a looser kind of coexistence and
partnership with the Czechs.
The Siovak political class became divided between wh at may be
described as Czechoslovaks on the one hand and Czecho-Slovaks on the
olher. The hyphen became the symbol of the division. The Czechoslovaks
stood for the concept not only of one Czechoslovak state but also of one
Czechoslovak nation albeit with two separate languages; Czech being
official in the historical Lands of the Bohemian Crown and Slovak in the
newly created Siovakia. The Czechoslovaks were represented mainly by
the political parties operating throughout the whole state, such as the
Czechoslovak Agrarian and Social Democralic Parties. The Czecho-
Siovaks were represented by the Siovak (Catholie) People's Party that.
under the leadership of the courageous and popular priest Andrej Hlinka,
accepted the common state as a union of two fully-tledged nations; conse-
 COlllposite Natioll. Mllltiethllic State alld Parliamentary Democracy 11
qucntly this party requircd for Siovakia the implementation of the princi-
pie stated in the Piusburgh Agreement.
The comparative numet'ical strength of the two Siovak blocks fluctu-
ated according to the political situation but in most elections the electorate
gave the Czechoslovak parties a decisive edge. Of the four parliamentary
elections which took place (in 1920. 1925. 1929 and 1935) between the
two world wars, it was only in 1925 that the Siovak autonomists came
close to parity with the unionists. They polled 34.3 per cent agains!
36.4 pcr cent of those who stood for the centraliscd state. The Hungarian
and German minorities together scored 16.1. The remaining 13.2 per cent
belongcd to the ethnically undifferentiated Communist Party 01'
Czechoslovakia whose stance towards the Czechoslovak state followcd the
policy of the Communist International. Its Fifth Congress (of June 1924)
declared the right to self-determination. possibly even secession. for all
nationalities living in Czechoslovakia.
The proportion 01' the Siovak votes accepting the unitary state was of
crucial importance for the Prague government. In order to get a majority in
the parliamcnt the governmcnt could not rcIy on the Czech vote only.
According to thc 1921 ccnsus. the Czechs constituted just 50 per cent 01'
thc statc's population. The support of the Siovaks. who made up
15 pcr ccnt of the state's population. was badly needed. A furthcr recruit-
ing ground for thc Czechoslovak parties wcre the Ruthenians living partly
in Siovakia but mainly in the province called Subcarpathian Russia who
formed 3.5 per cent of the state's inhabitants. Although their sense öl"
national identity vacillated (some of them saw themselves as Russians.
somc as Ukrainians and others as aseparate Slavic nation. the
Ruthenians). they cast their vote for the regional branches of the
Czechoslovak parties in great numbers. however almost 33 per cent of the
votcrs in the Subcarpathian Russia voted the communists.
The comfortable Slavic majority however. did not necessarily mean a
commensurate majority tor the government of the day. There were always
some Czech political parties in opposition and the Czech vote cast for the
communists was always a loss (their proportion in the whole state was
10-14 per cent). On the other hand. the Siovak autonomists were ready to
join the government in order to obtain some concessions. The most
important of them was in 1927. the change of the administrative division
of the state. According to the constitution of 1920 the whole state was
divided into nineteen counties. of which six were in Siovakia. Siovakia as
a whole was administered by a special government ministry. (An even
tighter control applied to Ruthenia.) The change consisted in the abolition
of this ministry as weil as of the counties whose functions. with somewhat
12 Ethnopolit;cs
Table 2.1 Ethnic struclure of Czechoslovakia in 1930 (census dala)

euch Landsx Siovakia Rwhenia The whole slale

Population in lhousand 10 674" 3331 725 14730

Of which, as pcrccntagcs:
Czcchs 68.4" 3.7"" (3.8) 51.1"
Siovaks 0.4" 67.6"" (1.0) 15.8"
RlIthcnians 0.2 2.9 63.0 3.8
Germans 29.5 4.6 1.9 22.3
Magyars 0.1 17.8 15.4 4.8
Poles 0.9 0.2 0.6
Jcws by nationality 0.3 2.0 12.9 1.3
Othcrs 0.2 1.2 2.0 0.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
of which lews by religion 1.1 4.1 14.1 J.3

XBohcmia and Moravia-Silesia (7109 and 3565 thousand respectively)

"Thc pre-war censuses lumped the Czechs and Siovaks together as
Czcchoslovaks. Their separate retrospectivc calculations was lIndertakcn in 1968
(V. Srh in Demografie 1968, p. 302). Figures in brackcts are estimated.

reduced powers, were transferred to the four 'Lands' (a traditional term

dcsignaling political status, usually half-way bctween the state and the
province); these were Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, Siovakia and Ruthenia
(officially called the Subcarpathian Russia). The population of these Lands
as weil as their ethnic structure is shown in Table 2.1.
Yet, in October 1929 the sentencing of a prominent autonomist to
inprisonment because of high treason and spying for Hungary induced the
Siovak autonomists to withdraw from the government for good.
Meanwhile, the first generation of graduates from Siovak secondary
schools and university established with Czcch help since the war, began to
compete for jobs in thc labour market, which at that time, because of an
acute cconomic crisis, offered fewer opportunities. Also, the more liberal
style that accompanied the Czech cultural influence, was not always com-
patible with the more tradition-minded social environment in Siovakia.

COPING WITH THE LARGEST MINORITY

In the 1921 census Germans constituted 23.4 per cent of Czechos10vakia' s

population, dropping to 22.3 per cent in 1930. In the Lands of the
 Composite Natio", Multiethllic State and Parliamemary Democracy 13
Bohemian Crown the Germans made up about 30 per cent, while in
Siovakia they constituted only 4.5 per cent.
At the time of the founding of the Czechoslovak Republic, the Sudeten
Germans c1aimcd the right of self-determination and attemptcd to cstab-
lish their own independent areas in the borderland. There were ahogether
four separate areas, predominanlly settled by Germans, lwo bordcring
wilh Germany, one with Austria, and one bordering with both Gcnmmy
and Austria. The victorios powers, however, appreciated the contribution
of the Czechoslovak Legions of volunteers on their side during the war,
and preferred a strong, strategically and economically viablc.
Czechoslovakia and veloed any secession from the newly crcatcd
Czechoslovak state. The French regarded Czechoslovakia's role in Ihe
prospective 'cordOll sanitaire' , a continuous zone of countries bctween
Germany and Russia to be of particular importance. For that rcason
Siovakia and Ruthenia (Suhcarpathian Russia) were also gran ted favour-
able bordcrs, taking altogether 800 000 ethnic Hungarians (Magyars) inlo
the Czechoslovak state.
Although among the Sudeten Germans Ihere were so me calls for armed
resistance, there were not enough volunteers on either side; eventually thc
Czechs managed to send some troops and this decided the issue. Only in
one place did real skirmishes occur. Austria and Germany declincd to
intervene in thc situation. Hungary, however, did not accept ils new
hordcrs without a strugglc. Surprisingly, it was its short-Iived comm-
munist government led by Bela Kun (March 1919-January 1920) that, in
support of the self-proclaimed Soviet republic in eastern Slovakia,
attempted, hy military means, to recreate Hungary as a multiethnic state
on thc model of Soviet Russia.
Thc Germans in the Lands of the Bohemian Crown started their post-
war political existence with passive rcsistance to the Czechoslovak
regime. Their leaders rcjected thc offcr to join the Prague National
Committee which soon adopted a provisional constitution and crcatcd a
provisional (Revolutionary) National Assembly. The first public act in
which the Germans in Czechoslovakia took part were the municipal elec-
tions in June 1919, held in the 'historica!' Lands (BohelUia, Moravia and
Silesia) according to the principle of proportional representation.
Parliamentary elections according to the same principle followed suit in
1920; over 25 per cent of the vote was cast for the German political
parties.
There were good pragmatic reasons for a gradual softening of the nega-
tive attitude on the part of the German-speakers. who entered the new state
much hetter equipped, culturally and cconomically, than the Czechs. It
14 Eth1lopolitics
was slill Ihe Czechs who, especially wilh respecl to Ihe establishments of
higher education had to catch up with the Germans. In fact, the Gennan
Illinority in the Czechoslovak Republic was provided more generously
wilh elementary education facilities than the Germans in Gennany itself.
As J. W. ßruegel (a Moravian Gennan) pointed out, towards the end of the
1930s the average number of pupils per elementary sehool form in
Gcrmany was 40.3, whilst in the Gennan schools in Czechoslovakia 34.3.
The average for Czech/Slovak schools was 37.0. The ratios wcre similar
with respect to the number of pupils per teacher. As far as the secondary
~lI1d Icrtiary education in Czechoslovakia were concerned the German
Illinorily upheld its slight advantage over the Czcch and Siovak schools
ulltil the dissolution of the Republic in 1939. 2
Czechoslovakia not only honoured its commitments laid down in the
Peace Treaties but interpreted the spirit of the latter more generously.
According to the Czechoslovak constitution of 1920 and its amendments
later the use of minority languages was guaranteed not only in conlacts
with tribunals, as the Peace Treaty of St Germain stipulated, bur with all
government bodies in communes and distriets which had at least
20 per cent of the minority members. 3
Under these circumstances there was Iittle scope for eomplaints from
the German minority save for the fact Ihat Czechoslovakia was built up as
a composite one-nation state in wh ich the Germans were not considered as
partners but only as a minority, albeit a fully respected one. Nevertheless.
as long as the country as a whole prospered and ahove all, no serious
repercussions took place in the neighbouring countries to which the
Gennan minority might look as to a helpful ally, the spirit of trust and
cooperation could provide a framework for the Czech-German
rchltionship.
In 1922, the club of German MPs split into two parts with symptomatic
labels: Combat Community (with 17 members) versus Working
Community (with about 40 members).4 In 1926, the German Agrarian
Party and thc Socia! Christi an Party, representing a!most half of the
German vote in 1925, entered the government. As the German Social
Democrats followed suit in 1929, the share of the so-eaIled aetivists in the
Gerlllun electorate increased to 75 per cent. (The share of the German vote
which went to the ethnically undifferentiated Communist Party is not
taken into account.) The willingness of the three German political parties
to take part in the government of the Czechoslovak state provided the
Czech politicians with a wider choice of partners in the ruling coalitions.
When only the less-numerous Siovak votes were avaiIable for the parlia-
mentary game the choice was more limitcd.
 Composite Nation, Multiethnic State and Parliamemary Democracy 15
In the late 1920s the general soeio-economic and political climate in
Europe developed favourably. The victorious powers in the First World
War began to treat the Weimar Republic with more consideration. The
burden of reparations was eased and between mid-September 1929 and
Ihe end of lune 1930 Ihe Rhineland was cleared of the armies of occupa-
tion. Also, within Czechoslovakia, the German minority began to feel
more at horne. With its cultural and economic activities in the ascendant
and with its representatives in the government, their main unfullfilled
aspiration was a kind of cultural autonomy which would provide the
whole ethnic group with an institution, legitimising its collective status.
However, the Czech political class was not keen on such an arrange-
ment. Only the Czechoslovak Social Democrats incorporated the demand
for the cultural autonomy of ethnic minorities into their party programme
of 1930. But before anything suhstantial could come of this initiative, the
soeial climate in the German-speaking neighbourhoods (in Germany as
weil in Auslria) underwent a thoroughgoing change. The agreement of
February 1937, concluded between the Czechoslovak government and the
three German activist parties concerning an adequate share for Germans in
public works and services and some minor concessions in linguistic
maUers, was 100 liule 100 late.
The world around Czechoslovakia, almost all her neighbours, turned
Iheir back on democracy or rather on that farade of parliamentarianism
which still allowed them some claim to be considered pluralistic. German
nationalism in the new populist and raeist form became more virulent than
ever. The great powers of the West, whose goodwill had been essential for
the creation of Czechoslovakia with borders suggested by her leaders,
began to lose their grip on the international situation; their vigour was on
the wane. On 30 lanuary 1933, Hitler became Chancellor of the German
Republic. A year later, a fascist-type regime was established in Austria.
Soon Czechoslovakia became arefuge for those persecuted by the new
regimes in the two neighbouring states. In the early years of her existence
it was the anti-bolshevik Russians and Ukrainians; in the 1930s it was the
anti-fascist Germans and Austrians, and lews in particular.
In such a situation the German minority in Czechoslovakia began to be
more than ever torn apart between those who preferred democracy and
those who preferred national unification in an authoritarian state. In
OClober/November 1933 the Czechoslovak governmcnt disbandcd thc
German National Soeialist Workers' Party (its much more "important coun-
terpart in Germany was styled the 'National Socialist German Workers'
Party) and the German National Party (which, too, had its mightier coun-
terpart in Germany). But before that happened, a leading representative of
16 EtJl1Iopolilics
the Union of the German gymnastic associations (TlIrIIVereille) in
Czechoslovakia founded a new German nationalist organisation called
SIldeteIldeutsche Heimats/rom (Sudeten German Fatherland Front).
Althouth its original support basis and political orientation were tradition-
alist rather than a Nazi type of nationalist, the Heimats/rom gradually
developed into an instrument of Hitler's expansive policy. In 1935, in
order to conform with electoral laws, the Heimals/ront was renamed the
Sudeten German Party (in Slovakia and Ruthenia 'Carpathian German
Party') and in the subsequent parliamentary election of that year won
66 per cent of the German vote in Czechoslovakia. The 'activists' parties,
wh ich in the 1929 election were supported by 75 per cent of the German
electorate, became minorities in that ethnic camp.
Meanwhile the Czechoslovak centralist camp was, on the one hand,
shattered by internal dissent, on the other hand, strengthened from an
unexpected quarter - the communists.
At the presidential elections in May 1934, in wh ich Masaryk was re-
elected as usua! with a large majority, his only opponent was the commu-
nist candidate. 'Not Masaryk but Lenin' was the communist slogan.
Before the parliamentary elections in May 1935, the Czech National
Democrats merged with two smaller right-wing parties in the Party of
National Unity which was to become a fierce nationalistic antidote to
advancing German nationalism. The electorate, however, was unimpressed
with the tour de force manifested in fascist-type symbols (blue shirts
uniform, fascist salute, etc.) and a noisy election campaign. The National
Fascist Community (they stood for election for the first time) also 1'ailed to
make any impact, gaining only 2 per cent of the total vote.
A more serious rift in the Czechoslovak camp occurred when in
November 1935 Masaryk, because 01' illness, offercd his resignation and
recommended Benes as his successor. The latter, however, was not
favoured by the Czech part of the Agrarian Party and confrontation
between the right and left seemed inevitable. As neither side could count
on a majority, the casting vote could have remained, undesirably, with the
Sudeten German Party. Combat voting was averted by the timely inter-
vention of the Vatican wh ich recommended the Slovak People's Party to
vote for Bene;;, Scenting de1'eat, the right withdrew its candidate. In
December 1935 Eduard BeneS was elected President by an cvcn higher
majority than Masaryk. The communists also cast their vote for hirn.
The reason for the change of communist policy has to be sought in
international developments. On 2 May 1935 France and the USSR signed
a treaty of mutual assistance. On 16 May Czechoslovakia concluded a
similar treaty with the USSR. Soviet help to Czcchoslovakia, however,
 COl1lposite Nation. Multiethllic State alld Parlial1lelltary Del1locracy 17

was conditional on French assistance. Stalin did not want to become

involved without another, stronger, capitalist a11y. In those days thc
Czechoslovak government did not know that Stalin would have preferred
an agreement with Hitler; only when Hitler ignored Stalin's overture did
Stalin decide. reluctantly, to play the French and Czech card instead. The
Communist International, at its congress in August 1935, followed the
shirt in Soviet policy. The struggle against fascism was declared its
primary aim, with the united front of all anti-fascist forces as the main
weapon.
The demands of the Sudeten German Party, fully supported by Hitler,
were based on the principle of self-determination for the German minority,
an argument wh ich even people we11-disposed towards Czechoslovakia
found difficult to refute; among some French and British politicians there
was even an uneasy feeling that the inclusion of a sizeable German minor-
ity in the Czechoslovak slate according to the terms of the peace treaty
(which their governments had imposed upon Germany) had not been
justified.
In aseries of negotiations, BeneS and his government tried hard to
satisfy the Sudeten German Party with far-reaching concessions, but
whenever something was conceded the demands were increased.
Meanwhilc, the Sudeten German Party unleashed a campaign of terror
against democratic Germans and against the Czech officials in the border-
Iand. Frightened Agrarian and Christian Social parties disbanded (as did
one sm aller party also) and joined the Sudeten German Party. Only thc
German Social Democrats withstood the pressure but even they had at
leasl to leave the government in order to facilitate negotiations between
the Czechoslovak authorities and the Sudeten German representatives. In
1938 municipal election the Sudeten German Party and its counterpart in
Slovakia, the Carpatho-German Party, scored between them 88 per cent of
Gcrman vote in the Czechoslovak state.
The declared aim of the Sudeten German Party was the enrolment of a11
members of the German minority in Czechoslovakia inlo a corporate body
which was 10 direct all aspects of its members' lives and which should be
authorised to found compulsory social, economic and cultural groupS. 5
Later, reparations were required to be paid by the Czechoslovak state for
damages caused by a11eged injustices perpetrated against the Sudeten
Germans since 1918 and Czechoslovakia was asked to grant the Sudeten
Germans complete freedom of choice in malters of al1egiance to the
German nation and to its WeltallschauuIIg. 6
Although the acceptance of these demands meant a complete renunci-
alion of Czechoslovak sovereignty over a particular part of her population
18 Ethllopolitics
and the creation of an organisation both territorially and personally total-
itarian within her territory - in fact, of astate within the State - the
Czechoslovak government eventually, under pressure from the Western
powers, was ready to make this almost suicidal sacrifice.
Yet Hitler did not actually want to bring the negotiations to a sucessful
end. He would have preferred to resolve the situation by a war in which he
could destroy Czecholovakia at one stroke and show the world the
efficiency of his military might. Only fears of war on the part of the
British and French governments and also of Hitler's ally, Mussolini (who
was apparently not yet prepared for his fateful venture), persuaded Hitlcr
to pursue and achieve his aims piecemeal and without war.
On 29 September 1938 in Munich, the dictators of Germany and Italy
and the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and France signed the
agreement according to which Czechoslovakia was to cede to Germany
its German-inhabited borderlands. The Czechs were neither invited nor
consulted. The verdict was presented to them as an ultimatum. The new
fron tiers of sm aller Czechoslovakia werc supposed to be guaranteed by
the four powers, but an agreement on this matter did not matcrialise.
3 Dismemberment and
Restitution: Various Kinds
of Authoritarian Rule
THE CZECH-GERMAN ISSUE

As a result of the Munich ultimatum of 29 Sept 1938, Germany annexed

38 per cent of the Bohemian Lands with about 34 per cent of their popula-
tion; almost 20 per cent of whom were ethnic Czechs. The Hungarian ter-
ritorial claims were resolved by German-Italian arbitration in Vienna;
Hungary obtained a southern strip of Slovakia and Ruthenia with over
25 per cent of their total population, only slightly more than 50 per cent or
whom declared themselves to be Magyars (ethnic Hungarians) in 1930.
At the same time Czechoslovakia was forced to cede to Poland the eastern,
and economically most valuable, part of what still remained 01" Silesia
wh ich belonged to the Bohemian Lands.
The rest of Czechoslovakia was transformed into Czecho-Slovakia in
which Slovaks were recognised as aseparate self-governing nation; a
similar autononlOUS status was granted to Ruthenia.
Everywhere political pluralism was substantially reduced. However,
Hitler allowed no time for the viability of this tripartite arrangement, the
so-called Second Republic, to be tested. In the night of 14/15 March 1939,
under the menace or a devastating assault on a defenceless country (guar-
an tees of its territorial integrity envisaged by the four powers in Munich
had been rcjected by GClmany), the Czecho-Slovak government surren-
dered, and accepted for the remaining parts of Bohemia and Moravia the
status of a Protectorate of the German Reich. A day earlier, Slovak leaders
made a deal with Hitler, and Slovakia was constituted as an independent
state under German protection. The Ruthenians wanted to save themselves
by a similar arrangement, but Hitler was no longer interested in that area
and agreed thc incorporation of Ruthenia into Hungary. For details of this
chronology see Table 3.1.
When, at the beginning of September 1939, Germany attacked Poland,
and France together with the United Kingdom declared war on Germany,
the Czechs found themselves in a situation similar to that of 1914. Their
country was under a foreign power; their free political representatives

19
20 Ethnopolitics
were abroad and their only effective military participation in the conflict
was in organizing army and air-force units for the states which were at
war with those of their homeland. Yet there were also some signifieant
differences. The Czechs had at least a vestige of aseparate polity - the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Its head was officially styled
'Staatspräsident'. But the Bohemian Lands were divided. according to the
wishes of radieal German nationalists before the First World War, into
two parts. One of these, the so-called Sudetenland, and some other minor
lerritories were directly ineorporated into the Reich; despite a sizeable
Czech minority, German was the exc\usive language. The other part was
the Protectorate, with only about 3.5 per cent of ethnic Germans, and was
supposed to be bilingual - German and Czech (in that order) were its
official languages.
The general belief in the country was that the Protectorate was a tempor-
ary arrangement which had to be survived at minimum cost and loss of
face. The justification for this attitude can be summarised as folIows: the
Czechs were betrayed by their allies and forced to extradite their arma-
ments and fortifieations and dis band their armed forces. Thus they were
pushed against their own will into a situation in which only a few of them
could escape and join the Allied armies. At horne the resistance forces had
10 wait until a propitious moment to strike presented itself. A German
obscrver gave the following poignant summary of the situation:
As long as the war lasted, neither side had reason to want an open
con/lict: relative quiet served the interests of both. WhiJe the German
administration was interested in exploiting the working capacity of the
Czcch population to the utmost, and for this reason in keeping it rela-
lively content materially, it wanted to lull or kill off its political and
intcllcctual Iife as completely as possible. Thc Czcch leaders, for their
part, saw that their interest lay in keeping the politieal awareness of
their people as alert as possible, holding collaboration to amimimum,
'throwing sand into the cogwheels' and resisting all efforts and induce-
menls at Germanization ...
This also explains the motives of most members of the Protectorate
government and of numerous Czech ci vii servants, who remained at
Iheir posts not out of opportunism or selfishncss but to serve the
national cause and then, perforce, slipped into collaboration. The great
majorily of them believed that they could serve the future of the Czech
nation best by remaining in their places. However, they often found
themselves facing the painful dilemma of deciding at what point collab-
oration with the Germans ceased to serve the national cause and became
 Dismembermelll afld Restitution 21

treasonable. Like other peoples under German occupation, they nevcr

found a satisfactory solution to the dilemma. I

The Nazi and Fascist ideologies pushed the preference for ethnic hOlTlo-
gencity to the extreme. The bordcrs were drawn according to the wishes 01'
the victors and ethnic uniformity within these bordcrs was to be achic\'l'd
by a kind of final solution. There were basically four alternatives on otTer;
all 01' them were tried in the course of the Second World War.
The alternatives can he classified as folIows: eviction, Iinguocidc.
cthnocide and genocide.
Eviction may be from the ethnic point of view the least destructivc; in
human tcnns, however, it constitutes a trcmendous hardship at least lor thc
generation affected. Furthcnnore, this solution need not be necessarily
final. If circumstances changed for the better the expellees could COIllC
back and the whole exercise would be nullificd. Prevention of such a
reversal rcquircs continuous vigilance and effort on the part of those who
have perpetrated the eviction.

Table 3.1 Chronology of the dismembermenl of Czechoslovakia 1938-9

Oetober 1938 Ineorporalion 01' the Sudelen areas (population 3.6 m. (11'
which almost 20 per cent Czechs) into Germany.
A further adjustmenl in November 1938 added further small
areas to Gcrmany.
Incorporation 01' the Tesfn district in Eastem Silesia
(population 0.25 m of wh ich almost 66 per cent C7.echs)
into Poland.

November 1938 As result or Vienna award, incorporation or Southem

Slovakia and Southern Ruthenia (popu lation 1.0 m of which
over 40 per cent Slovaks and Ruthenians) into Hungary.

March 1939 The rest of Bohemian Lands (population 7.5 m) incorporated

into the German Reich as the Protectorate Bohemia-Moravia.
The rest of Slovakia (population 2.6 m) set up as an
independent state under the protection of the German Reich.
The rest ofRuthenia (population 0.7 m. almost all
Ruthenians) annexed by Hungary.

SOlirce: Data from Theodor Prochazka. 'The Second Republic, 1938-1939' in

Mamatey and Luza (eds) A HislOry of fhe CzecilOslovak RelJllblic 1918-1948,
pp. 235--70 ..
22 Ethllopolitics
Safer and less painful in physical terms is depriving the heterogeneous
cthnic group of its language. This may take a long time and requires a
constant pressure wh ich usually lasts for several generations if it is to
bring about an irreversible result. The English achieved this with most of
their Celtic neighbours and the French with ethnic groups in all corners of
their hexagon. If such a linguocide is not thoroughly carried out, only
a superficial assimilation affecting mainly the upper strata takes place, a
revival of the suppressed language may be brought about by nationalist
agitation. This was the case with the Czech and other languages in the
Habsburg Empire in the early nineteenth century.
Extermination of language, however, does not mean the full annihila-
tion of ethnic identity. The sense of identity may be preserved on a
regional (country) basis, as is the case with the anglicised Welsh or franeo
ßretons or Alsatians; a still more conspicuous example are the Spanish-
spcaking Basques. Furthermore, the ethnic consciousness of people who
give up their language and exchange it for another may take the form of a
particular religion as a mark of identity that differentiates Ihem from those
who imposcd their own language on them. In Europe, this is thc case with
the lrish.
A higher degree of homogeneity may be achieved if not merely the lan-
guage bccomes extinct but the whole ethnic consciousncss disappears.
This may he described as ethnocide. This solution is usually combined
with the mass immigration of those people with whom the affccted ethnic
group is to assimilate. Such an ethnocide was the case with the Polabian
Slavs and Balts in wh at later became Prussia. A similar ethnocide of het-
erogeneous ethnic groups was attempted by the Magyars after they had
hegan to turn their multiethnic Hungarian Kingdom into a Magyar nation
state; but there was insufficient time for such a project. As has been hinted
with rcference to the existence of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, 70
years are too short a time span for ambitious ethnopolitical velltures.
Italians, between the First and the Second World Wars, had stilliess time
to assimilate their ethnic minorities.
In this context, it has to be pointed out that the Austrian Habsburgs had
cvcn less time for their Iinguocidal attempt. It happened in the epoch of
Enlighlened absolutism; the policy was not a matter of a nationalistic
fervour hut of cold rationality aiming at the simplification of the Iinguistic
map of the Empire. The homogeneity preference had no emotional under-
tones. The most-spoken language was to become the linguafrallca.
From 1848 until 1918 the Habsburgs in the Western (Austrian) part of
the Empire pursued a merely moderate discriminatory policy towards the
minority languages. Most adversely affected were the Siovenes in
 Dismemberment and Restitution 23
Carinthia and the Czechs in Silesia - a Bohemian Land where Czech
national consciousness was at its lowest ebb. Otherwise, it was the private
initiative of German politicians, industrialists and private cultural bodies
in the Bohemian Lands which promoted the use of German in funding
German schools in the Czech-speaking areas. But the Czechs fought back
and the result was a struggle between the German and the Czech educa-
tional institutions in the mixed areas to attract pupils. After the First World
War, the Czechs, having won a sovereign state, attempted some retali-
ation, but eventually the situation calmed down and both sides maintained
their established positions.
With Hitler's coming to power the situation changed dramatically.
German Nazism considered assimilation by linguocide or ethnocide as a
privilege for the racially acceptable non-Germans. Others, regarded as
racially inferior but still worthy of survival, were to be evicted; finally
those considered racially unacceptable in particular, the Jews, were to be
annihilated (an absolutely final solution).
The Czechs, as long as they were not of Jewish origin or unless they
became a target of a collective retaliatory action for some individual acts
of violence, were scheduled for either eviction or assimilation. As they
were not supposed to give up their regional consciousness (they would be
seen as Bohemian and Moravian Germans), their kind of assimilation
may be described as a linguocide. An opportunity for the first step in this
direction came when mass demostrations broke out on the occasion of
the twenty-first anniversary of the Czechoslovak Republic (28 October
1939) and then during the burial of a student shot at that demonstration
by German police. Apart from arrests and imprisonments, all Czeeh
establishments of higher education were c\osed down, allegedly for three
years, but they were not reopened when the time elapsed. This was the
first step in the poliey that Hitler himself deseribed as folIows: 'by firmly
leading the Protectorate, it ought be possible to push the Czech language
in about twenty years back to the level of a dialect'2; this means, back to
the situation before the Czeeh national revival a hundred years ago. A
further thrust in that direction occured in two waves of terror unleashed
against the Czech educated strata; the first, under the aeting
Reichsprotektor, Heydrich (from 27 September ]941) and the second
after his assassination (on 27 May 1942 by the Czechoslovak paratroop-
ers sent from England).3
Hitler, however, overplayed his hand, and having waged a devastating
war on all sides of his empire in the making, lost everything and left his
Germany in ruins. As a result of war, its Lebensraum was not increased
but significantly reduced. Those destined for assimilation (by linguoeide
24 Ethnopolitics
or ethnocide), expulsion or annihilation (genocide) were in a position to
strike back.
Experience of various kinds of ethnic cleansing during the war was
crucial. The genocide of the Jews was pursued with utmost thoroughness.
But many gipsies (Romi) were also exterminated. A selective genocide
was pursued against the revolting Poles and other nations who opposed the
Gennan domination with anns. The map of a great part of Europe was
redrawn and within the new borders the ethnic homogeneity was to
become the target of state policy. German minorities in the countries
which either were German allies, such as Italy, or with whom Hitler made
a temporary agreement, such as the USSR between 30 September 1939
and 22 June 1941, were to be moved from their hornes and resettled in
areas under the German control; from these the non-German, mainly
Slavic population, was to be evicted. Most Germans from the Baltic states
and some from the Balkans were already settled in this way during the
war. Transfers of population on a much larger scale were planned for the
time after the war.
When the war ended, such transfers really did happen, but the other way
round from what Hitler had envisaged. It was the Germans who were
expelled from their homelands. Although the Nazis were eliminated from
the game, the principle of ethnic homogeneity which they had pushed to
the forefront of their policy continued to be applied. Whether within the
old borders, such as in Czechoslovakia's case, or within the new ones,
such as with Poland, elimination of ethnic, in particular German minor-
ities, became a widely approved target.
As in 1945 Czechoslovakia was reconstituted within its pre-war borders
(only Ruthenia had to be ceded to the Soviet Union for ethnic reasons). the
problem now was how to handle the ethnic minorities, in particular the
Sudeten Germans. The resumption of the trend that came to an abrupt end
in the mid-1930s might have been the ideal solution. It indicated the possi-
bility of cooperation under more equal conditions. Yet the social cJimate,
the socio-psychological disposition of the peoples concerned, made it
impossible to resurne that policy. Neither the Czechs nor the Germans
were prepared to participatc in a peaceful discussion on the future devel-
opment of their relationship. Furthermore the influcnce of the Soviet
Union was not conducive to such an atlempt. Both the Czech and the
Russian leadership, Benes and Stalin, preferred to use this unique opportu-
nity for a clean sweep.
Let us consider the other alternatives in this context. The implementa-
tion of the idea tentatively put forward by Masaryk during the First World
War and again by Benes during the Second World War, namely that
 Dismemberment and Restitution 25
Czeehoslovakia would eede to Germany some strategieally expendable
border areas, was out of question; victors are not supposed to give up their
territory. Moreover this solution eould only have redueed the size of the
German minority and would not have resolved the whole problem.
Assimilation of the German minority, whether in the way of linguocide or
ethnocide, was not feasible either; the Sudeten Germans were too numer-
ous and their national eonseiousness highly developed. Thus evietion
remained the only possibility if ethnie homogeneity had to be achieved.
Evietion was aeeeptable to all those who either stood for ethnic
homogenisation as a matter of prineiple or who merely were afraid of a
possible repetition of the Sudeten German bid for seeession in the future.
As has been said earlier, evietion, in order not to be a merely temporary
measure, requires eonstant vigilanee and effort to prevent a later return of
the expellees. The Czeehs eould not rely on their strength for this purpose.
Although at the eonferenee of Potsdam in the late Summer of 1945, the
USSR, USA and UK, gave their consent to the eviction of Germans from
Czeehoslovakia and other liberated eentral European eountries, at that
time only the Soviet Union appeared to be a dedieated supporter of that
type of ethnie c1eansing. Soviet leaders knew weil that this was their
strongest leverage on the Czech and Polish 'bourgeois' politicians whose
eooperation they needed - at least on a temporary basis. They eould also
presume that, as determined guarantors of the new status quo, their image
as good Slavie brothers, even for those Czeehs and Poles who otherwise
abhorred their policies, would be upheld.

THE CZECH-SLOV AK ISSUE

The Czeehs, who had hoped that the partnership with the Slovaks would
strengthen their international position, were disappointed. Purely in demo-
graphie terms, this partnership provided the Czeehs with a eomfortable
majority in the multiethnie state. Furthermore, sinee the birthrate of the
Slovaks was mueh higher than that of the Czechs and, more signifieantly
than that of the most important minorities - the Germans and the Magyars,
this boded weil for the future. From 1921 to 1937 (the period for whieh
the relevant data are available) the number of the Czeehs increased by
14 per cent, the Slovaks by 23 per cent and that of Ruthenians by
24 per cent; on the other hand the ethnic Germans increased by barely
5 per cent and the Magyar minority declined by 3 per cent. 4 The reason for
the decline of the Magyars was not only a lower natural increase in that
ethnic group but also the fact that bilingual people (Magyar and Slovak-
26 Ethnopolitics
speakers) tended to declare their nationality aceording to the political
situation.
Unfortunately, the demographie advantage was too small in order to
bring the Czechs any significant advantage when the existence of the state
became seriously menaced. Moreover the Siovaks regarded themselves as
only partly Czechoslovaks. For those Siovaks who did not share the sense
of Czechoslovak identity (and the border between them and the others was
fluid) the destruction of Czechoslovakia was seen as an opportunity rather
than a disaster.
The so-called Second (Czecho-Slovak) Republic that emerged from the
Munich agreement provided the Siovaks with a broadly based autonomy.
It may be assumed that its scope was acceptable to most Slovak autonom-
ists, at least as a starting position for further development. Yet there was a
determined group of Slovak separatists who wanted to exploit the new
constellation in order to gain complete separation from the Czech part of
the state. They played into Hitlcr's hand - since the liquidation of the
Czechoslovak state was his primary object at that time.
The sequence of events that followed deserves to be reeorded. Seeking
to stern the agitation of the Slovak separatists, the authorities in Prague
dismissed the Slovak Government and appointed a new Prime minister for
Siovakia. Security measures were taken in the Siovak capital. Hitler, with
whom the separatists were in touch, responded quickly. He invited Ihe
deposed Prime minister, Msgr Josef Tiso, and put to hirn an ultimatum: if
Siovakia wished to become independent he would support her. If she hesi-
tated or refused to be separated from Prague, he would abandon her 10 her
fate. (It was no seeret that Hungary, not satisfied with her gain from Ihe
Vienna award, was poised to take ovcr the wholc of Slovakia.) As Hitler
put il, the desision had 10 be a matter not of days bul of hours. 5 Thus on
14 March, one day be fore the German army marched into the Czech part
of the state, the Siovak Diel, summoned by Tiso from Berlin, unanimously
declared Slovak independenee. As a compensation to Ihe Hungarians who
thus lost an easy prey, Hitler refrained from making a similar arrangement
with Ruthenia and allowed Hungary to annex at least that counlry.
This brief account of the dramatic events of 13-15 March 1939 may
help to explain the particular nature of the Slovak independence from
193910 1945. First, it was not areal independence. Germany's proleetion
required submission to her political goals. Second, it did not come to the
Slovaks as the culmination of a long, eoncerted effort such as was the case
wilh the Czech or Polish independence afler Ihe First World War. It was a
gift of circumstances, apremature bonus which gradually beeame devalu-
ated in the course of further events. It is difficult to assess the extent of the
 Dismembermetlt and Restitutioll 27
popular consent to that particular outcome. It may be surmised that at Ihc
slart the idea was quite weil received; furlhermore, the conviction that
Ihere was no other option made Ihis situation acceptable even to those who
did not particularly Iike it. Only when the war broke out and Slovakia
eventually had to take an active part in it on the German side, did many
begin to look for the opportunity for another solution.
The Slovak Constilution of luly 1939 reflected the ideology of a corpor-
ate state and authoritarian government as weil as some of the ideas of the
papal social encyclicals. This was probably popu1ar within the Catholic
majority. There were elements among the political c1ass, however, who
favoured the adoption of the German national socialist model. Tension
bctween these two orientations stirred Slovakia's political c1imate
throughout most of her 'independence' .
The core of the radicals was organised along Fascist and Nazi lines in
the so-called Hlinka People's Guards. They were also keen to pursue poli-
eies aimed at exterminating the lews. Yet the more moderate (conserva-
tive) leadership of the Hlinka People's Party (now the only political party
in the state) with Msgr Tiso at the helm was not completely helpless
against these zealots. First, the conservatives could exploit German
momentaneous interests, in particular their need to present Slovakia as a
show piece tor those states in the south-eastern Europe wh ich were ready
to becomc German allies. Later. as the war dragged on and required more
strenuous eftort Tiso's popular appeal was a welcomed asset in the smooth
running of Siovakia's not ncgligible contribution to the German war
economnY. Only the anti-lewish policy was firmly pushed through. Other
mcasures that would bind Slovakia c10ser to the German Reich were to be
postponed unlil the war was won.
The shifts in the relative strength of the conservatives and radicals can
bc shown by reference to the treatment of the lews. The original idea of
the conservatives was to limit lewish participation in commerce, industry,
administration and the liberal professions to their percentage in the popu-
lation at large. i.e. 4.1 per cent. As lews were strongly overrepresented in
all these professions. most lews were affected by Ihese measures. Unlike
the situation in Germany the criterion for lewishness was religious
affiliation. not racial origin. In September 1941 the radicals gained the
upper hand and German style anti-lewish legislation was introduced in
Slovakia. Not merely discrimination hut eviction and extermination were
the final goals. The bulk of the Iransportalion to German concentration
camps in Poland look place between March and August 1942. Then, as
a result of intervention by the Vatican (supported by the Catholic episco-
pate) at leasl the deportations were halted and lews continued to be
28 Ethnopolitics
interned in domestic camps. However, in September 1944, when the
German army in Slovakia met with armed resistance and occupied the
whole country, many lews were killed by the SS units.
The summer of 1944 was a turning-point in Slovak history . The
prospect of German defeat forced many Slovaks to rethink their stance
and the 'Czechoslovaks' had the chance to strike back. In December 1943
the democrats and the communists had created the clandestine Slovak
National Council which, in agreement with the Czechoslovak government
in exile, was to prepare an uprising against the pro-German regime. Owing
to the advancing Soviet armies and the prematurely intensified activity of
the partisans, the German army began to occupy the whole of Slovakia.
Two Slovak divisions near the eastern front were encircled and disarmed
before they could take any action. All this precipitated the uprising which
started on 29 August 1944 and in which nevertheless a substantial part of
the Siovak army participated. Despite its defeat within two months, this
uprising had an enormous political effect. In the perception of the Allies,
East and West, the Slovaks rehabilitated their reputation. They could re-
enter the world stage on the side of the eventual victors.
The Czechoslovak government in exile (which meanwhile had become
reshaped according to the Soviet wishes) entered Siovakia from the east.
Following the Czechoslovak army corps operating with the Soviet army, it
came to the country both as a conqueror and a Iiberator. Understandably,
restitution of a pre-Munich unitary Czechos10vakia was out of the ques-
tion. The short-lived Second Czecho-Slovak Republic (October 1938 to
March 1939) appeared to be a more suitable paradigm. Slovakia was to
enjoy a kind of autonomy and, more significantly, Slovaks were recog-
nised as a nation in their own right. Although Czechoslovakia was still to
be styled in one word, without a hyphen, the official programme of
15 April 1945 (the so-called Kosice programme) declared it to be astate
of two separate nations (Czech and Slovak), each master in its own
country. In addition to the Czechoslovak governrnent in Prague in which
Siovaks were strongly represented, a Siovak Council of Commissioners
was appointed in Bratislava. Furthermore, both the Czech part of the state
and Slovakia were reconstituted in their previous border. Only Ruthenia,
as will be shown later, was ceded to the Soviet Union and lost for good.
The new Czech-Slovak arrangement had not much time to be properly
implemented. As the short-Iived Second Republic so also the Third
Republic (May 1945 to February 1948) lived under the shadow of a
mighty neighbour. Neither of these republics could unfold the fuH range of
its political spectrum. In the Czech part of the Second Republic the
number of political parties was reduced to two: National Unity Party and
 Dismembermem and Restitution 29
National Labour Party. In Slovakia, with the exception of the subsequcntly
banned social demoerats and the communists, all the political parties,
merged with the autonomist People's Party (after the death of its eharis-
matie leader ealled Hlinka People's Party) and aeeepted its programme.
The German and Magyar minorities were represented by their own ethnic
parties.
In the Third Republic only four politieal parties were permitted in each
part of the state. In the Czech part there were, from the politiealleft to thc
right, the communists, the sodal democrats, the national socialists and the
people's party. Although operating only in the Czech Lands, the last three
were offieially called Czechoslovak, whilst the communist party was
styled 'of Czechoslovakia'. In Slovakia, originally only two parties wcrc
permitted: the Communist Party of Siovakia and the Democratic Party.
Later, in order to dilute the non-communist vote, the social demoerats who
had been foreed to merge with the communists atthe time of Slovak upris-
ing, were allowed to re-emerge under the name of the Labour Party; U11
additional party, the Freedom Party. was founded as a votecateher for the
'bourgeois' elements. All other political parties of the right, of which the
most important had been the Agrarian Party, were banned.
Furthermore, in order not to upset the powerful neighbour, a kind of
self-censorship was practised in both the aforementioned republics. The
social climate, however, was signifieantly different. For the Czeehs, the
perspeetive of the Seeond Republie was grim. Even the Siovaks who had
won their autonomny, but, like the Czeehs, had to give up apart of their
land, were worried about their future. The Third Republic started in a
climate ol' great expeetations. For the Czeehs, there was no longer a
danger of linguocide or ethnocide. There was even a hope that the new

Table 3.2 E1ection results for the constituent assembly of 26 May 1946
(parties are arranged from the left to the right)

Czeclr Lallds Percefltage Slol'akia Percefltage

Communists 40.17 Communist 30.37

Social democrats 15.58 Labour Party 3.11
National socialists 23.66 Freedom Party 3.73
People' s Party 20.24 Democratic Party 62.00
Blank vote 0.35 Blank vote 0.79

Sout'ce: DejiflY CeskoslovetlSka v dateclr (Praha. 1968) p. 408.

30 Ethnopolitics
powerful neighbour might change its spots and give up its repugnant fea-
tures. The Slovaks, however, were more cautious. They had more direct
experience with the Big Brother and their conservative instincts made
them more apprehensive.
Election results for the Constituent Assembly in 1946 (Table 3.2) may
iIIustrate this difference. Although the right-wing parties were banned and
so me voters were disqualified because of alleged collaboration with the
Germans or Hungarians, the elections were fair and free and reflected the
mood in the country.
Thc fact that in Slovakia the party most to the right won an absolute
majority of vote was, for the communists, areminder that Slovaks could
not be trusted, and that it would be advisable if their autonomy would be
reduced.
4 The Balance Sheet of
Ethnic Changes
GERMANS, MAGY ARS, lEWS AND POLES

The extent to which individual nationalities supported or opposed the

unitary statehood of the First Czechoslovak Republic is illustrated in Table
4.1. The percentages of the vote cast for the autonomist or separatist polit-
ical parties of individual ethnic groups indicate the degree of loyalty of
these groups towards the Czechoslovak Republic as a unitary state. The
juxtaposition of these percentages with the relative numerical strength of
these ethnic groups in the state as a whole shows to what extent the First
Republic could rely on its citizens when its very existence was threatened.
The election data refer to the 1935 elections to the National Assembly
(Lower House of the Parliament); these were the last parliamentary elec-
tions before Hitter launched his campaign against the Czechoslovak state
and within three years succeeded in destabiIising it.
As has been stated in Chapter 3, the German minority was affected most
drastically by retribution. Almost all the ethnic Germans were evicted. The
development in quantitative terms may be summarised as folIows: In mid-
1937 the· official retrospective estimate of the ethnic Germans in
Czechoslovakia was put at 3 344000 of whom 150000 lived in Slovakia.
(Ruthenia with approximately 15 000 Germans is not included in this
figure.) The census of 1 March 1950 counted 165000 Germans in
Czechoslovakia. The course of this reduction can be divided into five
stages:
I. the losses of the Sudeten and Karpathen Germans on the front and in
the fight against the partisans;
2. their ßight with the retreating German army;
3. their forcible expulsion by the over-zealous Czech groups such as the
Revolutionary Guards or partisans (the so-called wild transfer), where
there were also some killings reported;
4. the organised transfer which had been approved by the Potsdam
agreement of the Great powers (USA, UK and USSR) in Summer
1945; this transfer was carried out during the year 1946;
5. the additional organised emigration of ethnic Germans, wh ich con-
tinued trickling for many years after.

31
32 Ethnopolitics
Table 4.1 The lack of electoral support for unitary Czechoslovakia in 1935

Vote Jor autonomist or separatist parties

as per cent oJ the respective as per ceflt oJ the
natiollality total vote

Czechs
Slovaks 38.0 6.0
Ruthenians' 15.8 0.6
Germans 68.2 15.2
Magyars 72.9 3.5
Poles 50.0 0.3
Jews
All nationalities 25.6

Xlrrespective of whether they declared themselves Russians or Ukrainians.

Compiled from Czechoslovak Statistical Yearbooks.
Note: The election data represent the percentage of valid votes for the National
Assembly (Chamber of Deputies) gained by following parties: The
Autonomist Bloc, composed mainly of the Slovak People's (Catholic) Party
and three other minor parties; Slovak Nationalist Party, Autonomist
Agrarian Union (Ruthenian) and Polish United Party (in East Silesia);
Sudeto-German and Carpatho-German Parties; Hungarian Christian
Socialist and Nationalist Parties.

It is difficuIt to obtain precise information as to how many Germans left

Czechoslovakia at each of the several stages of this migration. There is a
difference between the figures given by the Allied Control Commission in
Berlin and by the administration of the American Zone, on the one hand,
and the data of the official sources in Prague on the other. Nevertheless it
may be assumed that of the difference between the numbers of Germans in
1937 and 1950 respectively, about 75 per cent were subject to organised
transfer of one kind or another, and that weil over two million were moved
in 1946. 1
Paradoxically, geuing rid of the Hungarian minority from Slovakia was
a more difficult task than the eviction of the German minority from the
Czech part of the state. Hungary as a whole fell into the Soviet sphere of
interest and was occupied by Soviet armed forces. As such she was des-
tined to adopt the communist socio-economic and political system and
become a member of Soviet bloc. A pro-Soviet Hungarian government
had been proclaimed on its territory in December 1944. Furthermore, there
 The Balance Sheet 0/ Ethnic Changes 33
was no agreement by the Allies similar to that concluded in Potsdam con-
cerning the ethnic Germans. Thus the transfer of ethnic Hungarians
(Magyars) to Hungary could not be achieved without the latter's consent
and cooperation; moreover the confiscation of the expellees' property
could not occur without compensation. Attempts of the Czechoslovak side
to proceed against the Magyars in a similar way to their treatment of the
Germans (Le. depriving them of civil rights. confiscation of property and
eviction) had to be stopped.
As there were also ethnic Slovaks Iiving within Hungary's post-war
borders. exchanging them with the ethnic Hungarians in Siovakia seemed
to be the best solution. After difficult negotiations agreement with the
Hungarian government was reached to this effecl. However. the exchange
of population between these two countries was only partly successful.
Hungarian official statistics from 1941 counted 76 000 Slovaks within the
post-war Hungarian borders; according to Siovak claims, however. this
figure was considerably underestimated. During the exchange negotiations
95 000 persons on each side were listed for resettlement; however, only
73 000 ethnic Siovaks actually returned to Siovakia. The number of ethnic
Hungarians who left Siovakia was approximately the same.
Apart from the exchange of population with Hungary. two further
. measures were devised:
I. the re-Slovakisation of those Magyar-speakers who were supposed to
be of Siovak origin;
2. transfer of true Magyars (ethnic Hungarians) who did not intend to
leave for Hungary. to the Czech borderland formerly settled by
Germans.
In the first programme 327 000 persons were declared to be Slovaks. In
the second measure about 44 000 were settled in the Czech borderland.
most of them forcibly. Thus. in 1948. when the communists took over
exclusive power in Czechoslovakia. the number of ethnic Hungarians in
Siovakia was supposed to be reduced to 190000. In June 1948 the
exchange of population with Hungary was stopped. After 1 May 1948
ethnic Hungarians who had been forcibly settled in the Czech borderlands
were allowed to return horne. The re-Slovakisation became obsolete and
everybody was allowed to decide his or her nationality for hirnself. Thus it
happened that the number of the declared Magyars (ethnic Hungarians) in
Czechoslovak censuses rose to 368 000 in 1950. increasing to 534 000 in
1961.2
The relative number of Slovaks and Magyars might also have depended
on the decision of the gipsies who could. in principle. opt for any national-
34 Ethnopolitics
ity. As about 80 per cent of them Iived in Slovakia, they usually dcclared
themselves according to the circumstances either as Slovaks or Magyars.
Gipses (although speaking their own language) were officially looked
upon as a socio-economic anomaly rather than an ethnic group right up
to the 1991 census. They were not counted by censuses, but registered
by local authorities (in 1947 there were 10 I 000, of whom 84 000 were
in Slovakia; in 1966, 222000, of whom 165000 were in Slovakia).
However, these figures do not include about 50 000 gipsies who were sup-
posed to be adequately integrated with the local population. Some of them
have attained higher education and a good standard of Iiving. It was this
group of gipsies that first made the claim to be acknowledged as aseparate
nationality, named Romis or Romany. 3
In this context a few words have to be said about the predicament of the
lewish community in Czechoslovakia, that according to the census in
1930 counted 365 000 people. During the hundred years or so that had
elapsed since loseph II had begun to allow them to leave the ghettos, the
lews had succeeded more or less in integrating themselves into their
rcspective ethnic environment. This at least was the case with Bohemia
and Moravia (and also with the Alpine Austrian lands), where the lews
found their environment more congenial for socio-cultural assimilation
than in other parts of the Habsburg Empire. This difference was later
demonstrated by the population censuses. Whereas in Bohemia and
Moravia most lews declared their nationality as either Czech or German,
in Slovakia, where the lews constituted a highcr percentagc of the popula-
tion (4.1 per cent in Slovakia against 1.1 per cent in the Czech Lands)
almost half dec1ared themselves as lews not only by religion but also by
nationality. In Ruthenia almost all lews made that decision.
Assimilation enabled the lews to take an activc part in the public life of
the country in which they lived. From the mid-nineteenth century until the
Second World War the lews not only played an important role in the econ-
omic development of Bohemia and Moravia but also significantly con-
tributed to the cultural performance of that nationality with which they
assimilated. Exceptionally, such as with the Prague lewish writer, Pranz
Kafka (1883-1924), their work has been considered a contribution to both
national cultures.
The assimilation did not mean, however, that the lews were everywhere
accepted as genuine Czechs or Germans. Medieval prejudices only slowly
gave way to more enlightened views and attitudes. To a large extent it was
jealousy of the successes achieved by a number of lews in economic and
professional walks of life that made old habits die hard. The atmosphere of
inter-ethnic rivalry was a further impediment. The inclination of the lews
 The Balallce Sheet 0/ Ethllic Challges 35
to be rather cosmopolitan in ethnic out look and also their greater upward
social mobility made them more Iikely to adopt the language and culture
of the upper, ruling strata in society. This was, more often than not,
German, but in Siovakia it could also be Magyar. Under the circumstances
anti-Semitism tended to taint the patriotic fervour of those ethnic Czcchs
who were economically less favourably placed. However, this began to
change when the Czechs become masters in the state. Significantly, it was
Masaryk, the first President of the Czechoslovak Republic, who by his
previous record of intercession on behalf of the Jews when they became
victims of outbursts of hatred became the symbol of enlightened attitude
towards the Jews.
Gradually, a sensible approach and tolerance prevailed in both ethnic
camps. Jewish participation in the social democratic movement and in
various ethnic cultural activities was not a negligible factor in this devel-
opment. Only the emergence of German Nazism in the 1930s brought a
disastrous reversal of this trend.
The story of the Nazis' anti-Jewish barbarism is too well-known to be
retold in this context. All that need be remembered here is the impact of
Hitler's extermination policy on Czechoslovak Jewry. Despite the unrc-
straincd anti-Semitic propaganda of a small Czech fascist group, the
Czech authorities in the Protectorate implemented only with the utmost
reluctance the anti-Semitic measures imposed upon them by their German
masters.This, however, could not prevent the Germans from pursuing their
anti- Jewish policy in the Protectorate. In Siovakia, which was in a beUer
position' to withstand German pressure, there were (as was shown earlier)
enough willing collaborators in the establishment ready to perpetrate anti-
Semitic atrocities.
As a result, the Jewish religious community, which, according to the
census of 1930 amounted in the territory of post-war Czechoslovakia
(Le., not incJuding Ruthenia with her 102000 Jews) to 254 000, was virtu-
ally wiped out between 1940 and 1945. The Nazi extermination, however,
was directed not only against those who were Jewish by religion but also
against those who were Jewish by descent, irrespective of whether they
had converted to another religion or remained without any religious
affiliation. This would increase the number of victims of the holocaust by
a few further thousands.
The 44 000 or so Jews who reappeared in Czechoslovakia between
1945 and 1947 were mainly those who survived either by hiding or by
emigration, or even in some concentration camps. Most of these remaining
Jews joined the two waves of general exodus from Czechoslovakia (each
comprising about 140 000), which took pi ace as a result of events in 1948
36 Elhnopolilics
and 1968. In 1980 only 9000 Jews were believed to be living in
Czechoslovakia. The census of 1991 reported merely 2204 Jews by
religion.
Reviving the ethnic problems of Czechoslovakia we must not forget the
70 or 80 000 Poles in the north-eastern corner of the Bohemian Crown
Lands, namely in that part of the formerly East Silesian Duehy of Tesln
which was assigned to Czechoslovakia by the Peaee Treaty of Paris in
January 1919. This decision was taken only after a bitter conflict. The
Poles insisted on ethnie borders, the Czeehs stressed the eeonomie and
strategie importance of the region (the main railway link with eastern
Siovakia ran through this country). Arguments of history eould be used by
both sides, the Duchy had been attaehed to the Polish Kingdom until the
fourteenth century, when it switched allegianee to Bohemia. The Peace
conference in Paris accepted basically the ethnie division of the Duchy
but a strip of land in the middle, along the strategie railway, was alloeated
to Czechoslovakia. By way of compensation, in May 1920 'a special
Ambassadors' conferenee dealing with border issues in the area assigned
to Poland several sm all rural areas in northern Siovakia (amounting to
about 25 000 people altogether) on the ground that their local dialect
appeared more Polish than Slovak.
However, before the Peace conference brought both sides into negotia-
ti on agenda, the Czechs exploited Poland's military engagement on other
more vital borders and took the part of Tesfn city oceupied by the Poles by
force. This left bitter resentment on the Polish side. Nineteen years later,
when the four European powers met in Munich (29 September 1938) in
order to draw new borders for Czechoslovakia, the Polish government
reopened its claim to the contested area in Eastern Silesia. At that time it
was Czechoslovakia that eould not defend herself beeause other mueh
more important issues were at stake. Thus her government yielded and
Poland was ceded an area with 227 000 people of whom only 35 per cent
declared themselves Polish in the 1930 census. It was, however, a short-
Iived success for the Poles. Overrun by the German army one year later,
the Polish state ceased to exist only half a year later after the demise of
Czechoslovakia. Germany took everything.
When Germany eventually lost the war it was her turn not only to give
up her spoils but also to cede a considerable part of her territory to Poland.
The Poles seemed to be more than satisfied with those gains and raised no
immediate claim against Czeehoslovakia. Yet suddenly, in June 1945, a
Polish military unit moved towards the city of Tesfn. But the Soviet
Union, the new dominant power in the area, was not interested in the
reopening of the Tesln question. 4 The disputed Siovak-Polish borders
 The Balance Sheet 0/ Ethnic Changes 37
became stabilised on the line decided by the Peace conference after the
First World War.

THE CASE OF RUTHENIA

Ruthenia was a special case. It became apart of Czechoslovakia becausc

this was the only option acceptable both to the Ruthenian representatives
and to the victorious powers in the First World War.
The Ruthenians Iiving on the southern slopes of the Carpathian moun-
tains in the north-eastern corner of the Hungarian Kingdom were the least-
developed people of the Habsburg monarchy. Their Iiving standard was
very low and their national consciousness was often on the tri baI level of
awareness. Their vernacular was not constituted as a literary language.
Under these circumstances, after the Austro-Hungarian agreement of
1867, the Hungarian government could successfully proceed with its pro-
gramme of Magyarisation. This policy can be illustrated by the following
data. On the territory of what was to become Ruthenia there were 353
primary schools in 1870 in wh ich teaching was in the Ruthenian verna-
culer; by 1904 there were only 18.
The extreme poverty of the country led to mass emigration. As a result,
the Ruthenian diaspora in North America became the most successful and
sophisticated branch of the Ruthenian people. It was therefore from
America that the call tor emancipation was launched when they feit time
was ripe. On 23 July 1918 the represcntatives of the Ruthenian emigres in
America gathered in Homestead (Pennsylvania) to launch a programme of
unifkation of all Ruthenians in the Habsburg Empire (i.e. those Iiving in
the Kingdom of Hungary and in the Austrian lands of Galicia ami
Bukovina). Anticipating that this might be too much for international
acceptance by the Peace Conference, tbey envisaged, as a second option,
autonomy for the Hungarian Ruthenians without further specification of
the state within wh ich this autonomy should be guaranteed. Only in the
second conference, which took place in Scranton (Pennsylvania) on
12 November 1918, did the Ruthenian representatives propose the auton-
omy of the Hungarian Ruthenians within the Czechoslovak Republic
which had been proclaimed two weeks earlier. In the interim they had
made contact with Masaryk, the Chairman of the Czechoslovak National
Council (abroad).
At horne, a Czechoslovak option was also envisaged, but some pre-
ferred the link with Ukraine and some might have been satisfied with the
autonomy within Hungary. The government of Hungary extended this
38 Ethnopolitics
offer to the Ruthenians in December 1918. Eventually, at ajoint meeting
of the representatives of all three alternatives, Ruthenian representatives
agrecd on the Czechoslovak option. The Peace Conference in Paris,
looking at the issue from the point of view of political stability in that
area, gave this decision its blessing. As this solution extended
CzechosJovakia so far to the east that it now had a common border with
Romania (into which a smaller area inhabited by Ruthenians was incor-
porated), this link could serve as a baITier against a possible surprise from
the cast. At that time the common Polish-Romanian border was not yet
established and the idea of the cordon sanitaire could have been
endangered.
As Ruthenians were the most underdeveloped of all the ethnic groups in
that part of central Europe, the Czechoslovak government did not rush to
establish autonomy for that region - officially called Subcarpathian Russia
- as had been stipulated by its representatives. Only the demise of the First
Czechoslovak Republic in 1938 gave Ruthenians what they had been
promised. The Ruthenians themselves could not make up their mind
whether they shou1d adopt Russian or Ukrainian as their officia1 (literary)
1anguage. The Czechoslovak political c1ass, too, was divided on this point.
The right favoured Russian, the left, Ukrainian. As there were not enough
Ruthcnian teachers and the number of schools and pupils was steadily
increasing, Russian and Ukrainian refugees were employed in that capac-
ity . Czech language schools, founded originally for children of the
Czechoslovak personnel in the region, also became popular, in particular
among the 14 per cent strong Jewish minority. In addition there was an
increasing number of multilingual schools where teaching was conducted
in two, three, or even four languages (Russian or Ukrainian, Czech,
Magyar and German).
In political telms, the Ruthenians were divided in a similar way to the
Slovaks; there were determined Ruthenian autonomists on the one hand
and local branches of the Czechoslovak parties on the other. But the
autonomists were substantially weaker than in Slovakia. Their best resuIt,
in 1929, was only 18 per cent of the vote. In 1935 they won barely
16 per cent against the 47 per cent cast for the local branches of the
Czechoslovak parties. The 15 per cent strong Magyar minority was repre-
sen ted by their own political parties. Apart from that there was the ethnic-
ally undifferentiatcd Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; in the
parliamentary elections in 1925 and 1935 it scored the highest vote in the
country (31 and 25 per cent respectively). In 1929 it was the local branch
of the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party that topped the list (29 per cent of the
vote).
 The Balance Sheet 0/ Ethnic Changes 39
The tluctuation of the relative strength of the communists and the agrar-
ians was mainly due to the economic situation. In the early 1920s
Ruthenia had difficulties in adapting its economic structure to the new
state borders; in thc late 1920s it shared the worldwide boom; and in the
mid-1930s it was the worldwide economic crisis that caused the depl'ess-
ing impact of the voters' preferences.
The subsequent political crisis of the late 1930s had fatal consequences
for Ruthenian nationhood (at that time consisting of over 550000 people,
of whom over 90 000 were in Slovakia). As was said earlier, the short-
Jived Ruthenian autonomy under the Second (Czeeho-Slovak) Republic
(Oetober 1938-March 1939) ended with the Hungarian oeeupation. In two
separate actions, the whole of Ruthenia was annexed and in addition, a
part of norlh-eastern Siovakia inhabited by Ruthenians was taken into the
bargain. It must be pointed out that the change of the Siovak-Ruthenian
bord er in favour of Ruthenia within the Czechoslovak Republic had been
one of the requirements of the Ruthenian nationalists for many years.
Because of the transitional nature of dialects in that area, there was ample
opportunity for claims and counterclaims, as far as national identity was
concerned. 5
After the Second World War, aJl pre-war state borders were restituted
with only one important exception: Ruthenia was to swap her masters. The
sequence of events was as folIows. As soon as Ruthenia was taken by the
Soviet army, the Czechoslovak government in exile attempted to establish
its authority there. But the previous consent of President Benes to
negotiate' Ruthenia's future with Stalin weakened the resolve of the
Czechoslovak government. Its delegate, dispatched to Ruthenia, was pre-
vented from fulfilling his mission, and the Soviet authorities in occupied
Ruthenia launched a propaganda campaign in favour of joining the USSR.
The Czechoslovak government that meanwhile established itself in Prague
had to give up. Anyhow, the strong position of the communists in
that government would not allow it to consider another option. On
26 September 1945 the respective agreement was signed. Ruthenia
was incorporated into 'the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as its
Transcarpathian region. Thus only the few Ruthenians living in eastern
Siovakia remained Czechoslovak citizens.
After 1945 Ruthenians constiluled only a small minority in Siovakia.
Their dwindling numbers did not reflect a declining birth-rate but a piece-
meal Slovakisation. As stated earlier, the transitory dialects between
Siovak and RUlhenian enabled people to take either option. There was also
the question of religion. Like the Ukrainians in east Galicia. most
RUlhenians professed the Greek version of Catholicism. They adhered 10
40 Ethnopolitics
the Uniate Church which had been founded by the agreement, known as
Union of Brest. between the Polish and apart of the Greek Orthodox epis-
copate in 1594. The Uniates preserved Greek rites but acknowledged the
supremacy of the Roman Pope.
In 1946, wanting to abolish the main difference between the West
Ukrainians (Greek CathoIic) on the one hand and the East Ukrainians
(Greek Orthodox) on the other, Statin assumed supreme ecclesiastical
authority, cancelled the Union of Brest and forced all Uniate clergy to
accept the jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox Church. After the commu-
nist takeover in Czechoslovakia, this poticy was also pursued on her terri-
tory. Some Ruthenians saw in this stance aprelude 10 annexa1ion by the
USSR. As a protective move at the next census many preferred to declare
themselves Slovaks instead of Ukrainians which was the only other
option. Thus, despile a continuous rise in population, the number of
counted Ruthenians declined from 95 to 48000 between the 1930 and
1950 censuses. Understandably, there was also natural assimilation by
the more numerous Slovaks. In subsequen1 censuses, the number of
Ukrainians in Slovakia oscillated between 35 and 42 thousand. The first
census after the fall of the communist regime (the census of 1991) counted
17 000 Ruthenians and 14 000 Ukrainians. The dual perception of their
own national identity did not disappear.
5 Nationalism and
Communism in Interplay
A THREE-CORNERED CONTEST

After the disruption in 1938-9 it was out of the question to reconstitute

Czechoslovakia without a substantial shift in the conditions of the Czech-
Slovak partnership. Although President Benes, supported by a consider-
able part of Czech political opinion, held to the concept of a Czechoslovak
nation (this was his 'scicntific' conviction) it was beyond his capacity to
enforce this stance in practice. To seeure the existenee of post-war
Czechoslovakia the goodwill of the USSR was supposed to be crucial;
thus its views, as refleeted in the policy of the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia, were to he respected. The electoral strength of this party,
as evideneed in the parliamentary eleetions of 1946, gave a popular sane-
tion to its poliey. Furthermore, the eooperation of the demoerats with the
eommunists in the Siovak national uprising in September-Oetober 1944
ereated a new institution al basis for Slovak national identity: the Slovak
National Couneil as a legislative body and the Council of Commissioners
as its executive organ.
It was an axiom of eommunist international poliey to reeognise a
national identity of any ethnic group interested in sueh an aeknowledge-
ment. Although this reeognition might have been merely nominal or, if
real, without a eorresponding politieal status, it nevertheless ereated a pre-
condition for fuller ethnie self-determination in the future.
Thus, onec the Czeehoslovak government in exile had conc\uded a
treaty with the USSR and started to negotiate with Czechoslovak eommu-
nist exiles in Moseow whose participation in the post-war Czeehoslovak
governmcnt was anticipated, reeognition of aseparate Slovak nationhood
in ethnic terms could not be swept under the earpet. The political and insti-
tut ion al implcmentation of that Slovak nationhood, however, became con-
lingent on thc momentaneous needs and interests of the Communist Party.
As the Czech Lands were the main communist stronghold (election in
1946 confirmed this beyond any doubt) the case for keeping the power of
thc state centralised and in Czech hands appeared obvious. The Slovak
eommunists, pro ud of their revolutionary reeord in 1944 and sharing
enthusiasm for Slovak national emancipation with their democratic rivals,

41
42 Ethnopolitics
had to accept a role subordinate to that of the traditional Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia within which Slovak aspirations would be more easily
contained. The fact that the Siovak Communist Party had no counterpart in
a Czech Communist Party was an anomaly wh ich, however, proved con-
venient for the centralising tendency of the Czech communists.
The contest for a political solution of the Siovak question was a game in
which spontaneous forces could operate more or less freely for only three
years. At that time three basic bargaining positions emerged: federation,
autonomy and a unitary state. In the Czech Lands, the resistance move-
ment created aNational Council that ultimately led the Prague uprising of
the 5-9 May, 1945. Some assumed that the Czech and Siovak National
Councils could become the nuclei of a federal arrangement for post-war
Czechoslovakia. The Czech National Council, however, was neither in the
position nor possessed the willpower to become a party to such a venture.
After the arrival of the Czechoslovak government from exile to Prague,
the Czech National Council was dissolved.
Nevertheless the Slovak National Council wh ich had nieanwhile
enlrenched its position in Bratislava, came up with a proposal to reconsti-
tute Czechoslovakia as a dual federation. The draft for such a 'symmetri-
ea\' solution was agreed by both communist and democratic leaders.
However, before the Prague government could start discussing that pro-
posal, the leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party invited the
leaders of the Siovak Communist Party (between wh ich two parties the
relationship was asymmetrical) for eonsultations in the course of which
the Siovaks eventually submitted to the unified leadership and withdrew
their eonsent to the proposal. The Siovak democrats were isolated. On
I lune, 1945, the eommunists brokered a compromise, the so-called First
Prague Agreement, according to which Siovakia was merely to be granted
autonomy, which provided the Siovak National Council and the Board 01"
Commissioners with a more limited range of jurisdiction.
In Siovakia as in the Czech Lands the eleetoral contest between the
eommunists and the democrats was focused on those volers who in condi-
tions of an unrestricted pluralism would have voted for the then-banned
right-wing parties. Apart from some smaller parties, these consisted
mainly of the Agrarian Party, which operated in the whole state, and the
H1inka People's Party, in Slovakia. In this contest the task was easier for
the Czech communists. They took a Czechoslovak nationalist stance and
made capital out of the Soviet promise to help in case of any international
conflagration. The leading position of the communists in administering the
resettlement of the areas from which the Germans had been evicted gave
the communists the opportunity to pose as donors and distributors of
 Nationalism and Communism in Interplay 43
property, a powerful argument for al1those interested in acquiring any. In
Slovakia, where the German minority had been much smaller, there was
less opportunity for such a spree and, furthermore, nationalism there was
Slovak rather Ihan Czechoslovak. On top of that, its ideological and insti-
tutional prop was the Catholic church.
In the struggle for votes the communists attempted to argue that the
leaders of the Democratic Party, being mainly of Protestant religious
affiliation, could not properly defend Catholic interests. The response
of the Protestants was swift. On 30 March 1946, the Chairman of the
Democralic Party concIuded an agreement with the Catholic leaders under
which the Catholics were promised representation in al1 organs of the
Democratic Party in a ratio of 7:3 in their favour. This agreement not only
infuriated the communists but also became a matter of concern for the
leaders of the Czech democratic parties who feared that, as a result 01" this
agreement, the democrats might abandon the Czechoslovak platform. The
hasty constitution of an additional political party in Slovakia (the Freedom
Party) and the earlier resurgence of independent Social Democratic Party
in Slovakia under the name of the Labour Party,l could hardly be a match
tor the combined Catholic/Protestant aIliance. As a protective measure
against the possible influence of separatists in the Slovak autonomous
organs, the Slovak representatives, at that time involved in aseries or
negotiations in Prague, had to accept that all personal appointements hy
the Slovak National Council were to be subject to the approval or thc
Prague government (the so-called Second Prague Agreement).
The eleclion of 26 May 1946 fulfil1ed the expectations of the Slovak
Democratic Party. They won 62 per cent of the vote, the communists only
30 per cent. After this rebuff Ihe communist leadership in Prague decided
to undertake a combined assault on the Slovak Democratic Party. For a
further limitation of Slovak autonomy they could count upon the support
of the Czech democratic parties. According to the Third Prague
Agreement (27 June) the legislative acts of the Slovak National Council
became subject to prior approval by the Prague government. Furthermore,
individual members of the government in Prague were entitled to exercise
Iheir jurisdiction in Slovakia directly through their own organs and indi-
vidual commissioners in Bratislava became responsible to the correspond-
ing ministers in Prague.
As a more aggressive measure the communists started a political cam-
paign against the democrats cIaiming that the latter harboured supporters
of the previous cIero-fascist regime in their leadership. Under the pretext
of anti-state activities staunch anticommunists were selected for elimina-
tion from their eh~cted posts. Those leading personalities of the Slovak
44 Ethnopolit;cs
state who did not escape abroad, or who, having escaped, were extradited,
were tried and sentenced to imprisonment. The person considered most
rcsponsible for collaboration with the Germans, the former president of
the Siovak republic, Msgr Tiso, was sentenced to death and, dispite many
interventions, was indeed executed. President Benes's refusal of a reprieve
damaged the Czeeh-Slovak relationship irreparably.
In Autumn 1947, following the pattern in other 'Peoplc's Democracies'
(thc string being pulled by Moscow), the Czechoslovak police, who werc
firmly in communist hands, began to uncover reactionary plots in
Siovakia. Althought some elements in the country were favourably dis-
poscd towards such separatist activities, the bulk of the conscrvatives
expccted more from the democratic process and tried to establish them-
seI ves within the official structures. The democrats were also reproached
for having turned a blind eye to the attempts of the anti-communist
Ukrainian partisans to use Slovakia as an escape route to the West. As the
Czech non-communist parties did not want to look anti-Soviet they left
themselves be persuaded by these accusations, the incriminated democrat
ministers in the Siovak autonomous government having to resign, and thc
Democratic Party being purged; furthermore the communist share in the
Siovak administration was extended far beyond what had been their elec-
toral strength.
These changes in Siovakia were aprelude to the crucial events which
were soon to take place in Prague; there, on 25 February 1948, the com-
munists staged a well-prepared coup d'etat and took over all power in the
state. This event, which made a turning-point in Czechoslovak history, has
heen amply discussed in monographs and more general accounts; thus ref-
ercnce will be made only to the most important writings. 2 In this context,
it is the impact of that coup d'etat on the Czech-Slovak relationship wh ich
is 10 be discussed.
Aflcl' Fcbruary 1948 nothing restraincd the communists from reducing
Siovakia's autonomy to areas of limited political importance such as ele-
IIIcnlary and secondary cducation, cultural affairs, public health, building
operations etc. However even here the sphere of 'uniform and economic'
planning was excluded from the competence of the Siovak organs.
Instead of autonomy the Slovaks were to receive industrialisation and a
Iiving standard commensurate with that of the Czechs. As will be shown in
more detail in the economic section of this book, a continuous ftow of
capital transfers from the Czech Lands to Slovakia was the price that the
Czechs had to pay for keeping the state together in such a form as their
leaders of the day required. Grandiose industrialisation was to givc rise to a
stronger working class wh ich would then be more favourably disposed
 Nationalism and Communism in lmerplay 45
lowards communist ideology than were the more traditionally minded pcas-
ants. Class-consciousness would then become a stronger bond that any
narrow national loyalties. The development and outcome of this strategy
will be discussed later. Here only the general outlines will be touched UpOII.

THE FULL CIRCLE OF CZECH-SLOV AK HAGGLING OVER

POWER SHARING

The communist victory in February 1948 meant defeat not only for the
Czech and Siovak democrats but also tor Siovak nationalists of evcry
political complexion, communist and c\ero-fascist alike.
From 1945 to 1954 the Czechoslovak political stage was dominated by
political c1eansing. Purges and trials eliminated all those who in one way
or another had shown their opposition to the communist takeover and to its
subsequent policy. In this context there were several hundreds of death
sentences passed and carried out. The total number of victims sentenced
by various types of courts or sent to labour camps by the administrative
decisions of local authorities has been estimated to be weIl over 100 000;1
much more than under 'retribution' in 1945, if the expulsion of Germans
is considered separately. A similar number of persons escaped into exile.
In contrast to the situation after the defeat of the uprising of the Bohemian
estates against the Habsburgs in 1618, no one was officially allowed to
Jeave. Often it was merely a putative opposition that was the reason for the
purges arid tabricated trials as was, for example, the case of people who
had fought Nazi Germany on the side of the Western allies in particular
with the British armed forces. Even quite a few memhers of the commu-
nist party did not excape a similar treatment.
Special measures were taken against the Catholic church. All its reli-
gious orders were dissolved. In order to weaken the resolve of Catholic
c\ergy, its rank-and-fiIe members were pressurised into joining govern-
ment controlled association. All churches were put under government
supervision. The anti-religious campain had also its ethnic connotation. It
was more disturbing in Slovakia where, in contrast to the Czech Lands, a
vast majority were practising Christi ans (Krejcf, 1990, pp. 183-6).
By the end of the 1950s the communist leadership reached the conclu-
sion that the transformation of the economico-political system had been
completed. Industry, construction. financial institutions and all kinds of
services were completely socialised, Le. became either state-owned or
organised as cooperatives; 88 per cent of agricultural land was collec-
tivised. Thus Czechoslovakia could be considered a socialist state and this
46 Ethnopolitics
characteristic ought to be reflected in its official title. A new constitution
adoptcd in July 1960 described the state as the Czechoslovak Socialist
Rcpublic.
Enthused with the triumph of socialism the Czechoslovak communists
found this a good opoportunity for geuing rid of the last vestiges of Siovak
autonomy. The Board of Commissioners was abolished and the Siovak
National Council was turned into the local branch of the state National
Asscmbly. It also lost control over the regional Councils. The three
regional Councils in Siovakia (those for Western, Central and Eastern
Siovakia) became more important than the central administration in
Bratislava. Although all these different bodies were manned by people
who were either members of the Communist Party or were screened by it
no chances were to be left for any possible dissent along ethnic lines.
However with the early 1960s the wave of de-Stalinisation reached
Czechoslovakia. In 1960 the communists, feeling secure in their hold of
power, granted an amnesty for political prisoners (the first since the com-
munist takeover in 1948) releasing about 11 000 persons from prison and
labour camps. Gradually the political atmosphere was becoming more
relaxed. The obvious deficiencies of the system established in the 1950s
hegan to he openly discussed in academic circles. Economic reform, more
freedom for artistic expression and also for those who wanted to practise
their religion openly, were the main topics to arouse people's imagination.
A movement which has been appositely described as the revolt of the
intellectuals began to crystallise (Golan, 1971).
In such an atmosphere the Slovak issue, played down by the socialist con-
stitution of 1960, could not be neglected. In 1963 the Slovak communists,
who in 1954 had been sentenced to imprisonment for their 'nationalist devi-
ation', were rehabilitated. In 1964 the twentieth anniversary of the Slovak
national uprising was celebrated wjth great pomp. A year later the 150th
anniversary of the birth of Ludovit Stur, the architect of literary Slovak and
thc opponent of the Hungarian uprising against the Habsburgs in 1848 (for
which he had been angrily censored by Karl Marx) provided the opportunity
for a rcbuke of the standpoint of the Marxist fundamentalists.
In contrast to the Iiberalisation in the Czech Lands where the call for
change was voiced mainly by the intellectuals, in Siovakia the call for
change became a popular matter. Also in contrast to the Czechs the main
point for the Slovaks was national self-assertion. Eventually, a common
front of the Czech reformers and Slovak patriots produced a mighty chal-
lenge to communist officialdom. Not only the c1imate but also some insti-
tutions began to change. From January 1966 an economic reform
introduced elements of the market into the system of the command
 Nationalism and Communism in Interplay 47
economy. Pari passu with preparation for economic reform, the Slovak
National Council began to reassert itself as a meaningful political institu-
tion. With the reconstruction of the Czcchoslovak government in January
1967 the Board of Commissioners reappeared on the stage.
The real breakthrough had to wait until the reformists in Prague
managed to toppIe the incumbent leader of the Communist Party (Antonfn
Novotny) who had from 1957 been the president of the republic. As
Slovak support for this act was substantial, the leader of the Slovak com-
munists (Alexander DubCek) became, from 1 January 1968, First Secretary
(Le. the supremo) of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The former
Chief Commander of the Czechoslovak army in the Soviet Union du ring
the war (Ludvfk Svoboda) was elected president of the republic. In what
has later been labelIed the Prague Spring a long discussion about the best
constitutional solution of the Czech-Slovak relationship reached its con-
clusion. In principle it corresponded with wh at the Slovak National
Council had proposed in May 1945. Czechoslovakia was to become a dual
federation. On the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the
Czechoslovak republic the National Assembly adopted a federal constitu-
tion. In a symmetrical way both Slovakia and the Czech part of the state
received their own legislative and executive organs. In a bicameral parlia-
ment the second chamber was made up of equal numbers of Czechs and
Slovaks. Although the federal government retained quite an extensive
jurisdiction, nevertheless the acceptance of the principle of a federal union
was an uncontestable Slovak victory. The common state was further styled
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic but its constitucnt parts were the
Czech Socialist and the Slovak Socialist Republics.
Significantly, this was the only innovation of the DubCek era that sur-
vived the backlash following the invasion by the Soviet and allied armies
on 21 August 1968. The Czechoslovak attempt to reform communism
came to an abrupt end. In that defeat the Czechs and Slovaks again parted
company. The primary aim of the Czech reform communists was the over-
hauling of thc whole system. For the Slovak communists the achievement
of federal status was enough; the other aims of the reform could be thrown
overboard.
Thus the tripartite relationship bctween Czechs, Slovaks and orthodox
communists was changed fundamentally. In contrast 10 the previous epoch
now the Soviets, as guardians of orthodoxy, could trust their Slovak more
than their Czech comradcs. The latter had to undergo a "thorough purge
and be kept under stricter control. The Slovaks could afford a more
relaxed attitude and thus derive more satisfaction from the course of
cvenls. Another Slovak, Gustav Husak, who in 1954 had been among
48 Ethllopolitics
those jailed for nationalist deviation but after the Soviet invasion turned
into a dedicated internationalist, became the First Secretary of the
Communist Party and from 1975 also the president of the republic. Many
Czechs in 1969, as in 1939, feit the abandonment of a common goal by the
Slovaks as a betrayal.
It took more than a year before the pro-Soviet communists established
their firm grip on the Czechoslovak state and sociely. The following epoch
characterised by immobility in many aspects of social life, kept the
Czech-Slovak relationship in a kind of cold storage. When, in the late
1980s, the new wind began to blow this was due to the changes in the
Soviet Union. GlasIlost and perestroika were thc order of the day. But the
Czechoslovak communists leaders were by no means interestcd in taking
lhem seriously. Believing lhat all this might prove to be a passing phase,
they did thcir best to keep the emerging dissident rnovement isolated from
the general public and to bribe the working population by turning a blind
eye to their declining respect for socialist property and to the relaxation 01'
labour relations. Although the decline of economic efficiency became for
thern a matter of concern, there was no desire on their part to undertake
any real reform.
The changes emerging in the late 1980s, unlike those of the late I960s,
were to be initiated from abroad. But in contrast to the beginnings of thc
Prague Spring those of the Prague Novcmber of 1989 were much more the
concern on the people as a whole. Mass demonstrations in thc squares and
slreets of the capital and other cities, as weH as stoppages of work, wcre
the propelling forcc of the 'accelerated pulse of history' .4 The develop-
ment in neighbouring East Germany renowned for thc firm stance of its
communist leadership, thc mass exodus of its citizens to the West and thc
collapse of the Berlin wall, hclped to undermine the resolve 01' the
Czechoslovak communists in attempting to stcm thc tide.
The general outline of the story is well-known. Hs detailed analysis
deserves aseparate monograph which somebody has yet to write. In this
context, only its impact on the Czech-Slovak relationship will be here
brietly reported.
The negotiating process leading to the transfer 01' power began on
26 November, 1989, when the communist representatives met the leading
dissidents for discussions as equal partners. It culminated on 29 December,
whcn the communist-dominated parliament unanimously clected the dissi-
dents' leader Vac1av Havel as president of the republic. Its final outcome
was seen in June 1990 when the Havel-Ied Civic Forum won a resounding
victory in the parliamentary elections, the first free elections since 1946. and
the first free elections since 1935 when no political parties wel'e banned.
 Natiollalism alld Comnllmism i1l /1IIerplay 49

At the first glance a good Czech-5lovak relationship seemed to be guaran-

teed. In the absence of the all-powerful Cornrnunist Party, pulIing the strings
behind the scenes, the full range of powers bestowed on the Czech and
Slovak Republics (no more styled socialist) by the 1968 federal constitution
could now be put into practice. However, to the great surprise of rnany
Czechs, this was not enough for many of the Slovak politica1 c1ass. Not all
Siovaks had forgotten the six years of their country's statehood; furthennore,
having caught up the Czechs in their socio-cconornic developrnent, and over-
taken their demographie growth by far (from 1921 to 1991 Czechs increased
by 44 per cent, Slovaks by 145 per cent), many Slovaks considered it right to
elevate Siovakia's federated status into a higner level of sovereignty. The
Czechs were ready to make concessions 10 avoid separation but the mood in
Slovakia radicalised. A widespread call for a referendum was frustrated by a
combination of semantic confusion about the meaning of sovereignty and
by Ihe cunning manoeuvring of Ihose who wanled 10 oblain a beller deal by
negotiating under political pressure. On the Czech side, patience was running
out because of the shifting of the grounds for Slovak grievances and because
of wh at was perceived as their incessant claims for subsidies.
With the elections of June 1992, the relative strength of individual posi-
tions became clear. On the Czech side, all significant politieal parties
stood for upholding the federation. On the Slovak side, positions ranged
from the status quo to full indepencence. In Slovakia also, because of the
overcapacity of annament and heavy industries buHt in the communist era,
a higher level of unemployment led to misgivings over ecollomic refonn
and to a preference for governrnent intervention.
In the voting for the Siovak National Council (Slovakia's parliament)
only five political parties cleared the 5 per cent hurdle. These parties
polled 76 per cent of the vote between thern, and were as folIows:

• the two 'independence immediately' parties scored 45 per cent;

• the 'indepencence with some delay' party scored 9 per cent of the vote;
• the Party of Ihe Democratic Left (former communisls) with almost 15
per cent of the vote, was at first ambivalent but later gave its support
to the majority.
• Only Ihe Hungarian (Magyar) minority party, with over 7 per cent
stood for the status quo. The Slovak nationalists showed them beyond
any doubts that under their rule the scope for tolerance and respect for
Magyar linguistic rights would be much less than coidd be expected
from the Czechoslovak state.
• Other pro-federation parties were so fragmented that they failed to
achieve representation.
50 Ethllopolit;cs
Thus, with eommunist support, the Slovak parliament could now
approve the new eonstitution whieh, by a qualified majority, proclaimed
Slovakia's sovereignty. However, seeing economic difficulties ahead, the
new Slovak government, led by Vlado Meciar, was prepared to modify
temporarily their eountry's claim to sovereignty in exchange for further
economic help. Yet the new Czeeh government, led by the arehitect of the
economic reform, Vaclav Klaus, took the view that the division of the
state was inevitable and that protracted bargaining could endanger eeon-
omic recovery in the Czech Lands. Despite the opposition of the political
left, the Czech government opted for the dissolution of the federation
without delay. On 15 November 1992, after some more haggling, the
federal parliament declared its own dissolution by three votes over the
required majority of three-fifths and announced the end of the federation
by 31 December 1992.
This has been abrief account of the last three years of Czechoslovakia
as a eomposite, two-nation, state. In the struggle for a new constitutional
relationship of the Czech Lands with Slovakia the only new idea to erop
up was that of confederation, i.e. the loosest possible link between the two.
The hybrid title, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic adopted in 1990,
was a nominal pointer to such a solution. Yet the spirit of the times
favoured a still more radieal step.
Let us reeolleet the previous turning-points. After the First World War it
was the time for creating ethnically comprehensive or eomposite nation
states. Changes of borders were the main means for achieving this. In the
aftermath of the Seeond World War it was mainly ethnie c1eansing that
gave the spirit of the times its particular flavour. As far as the movement
of horders is concerned it was only Poland that experienced an extraordi-
nary transformation. The end of the Cold War gave oceasion to yet
another change of direction. In essence it was the reversal 01' the syneretie
spirit prevailing after the First World War: composite states were broken
into their eonstituent parts and regional loyalties began to be more
assertive. Economic issues could do little to alter these shifts in the way
people viewed the basic problem at stake - ethnic homogeneity versus
multiethnie society.
By way of conc\usion, two tables may iIIustrate the ethnographie and
demographie aspeets of Czeehoslovakia's seventy four years of existenee.
Table 5.1 shows the comparative demographie growth of the two nations,
Czechs and Slovaks. Table 5.2 compares the development of the ethnic
strueture of the Czeeh Lands (formerly the Lands of the Bohemian Crown)
with that of Slovakia. Both tables are self-explanatory. The extraordinary
abrupt ehanges in Table 5.2 were explained in the text.
 Natio"alism a"d Commullisl1l ill Inrerplay 51

The appearance of Moravians and Silesians in the ethnic structurc of

the Czech Republic in the 1991 census is yet another mark of the changing
spirit of the times. Traditionally. being Moravian or Silesian was a malter
of regional allegiance. As far as they were Slavs. the common Czech lall-
guage. at least in its written form. overrode any other consideration about
nationality; dialects did not matter. Only in Eastern Silesia where the

Table 5.1 Czech and Siovak demographie development (based on the

declaration of ethnic nationality at the respective censuses)

Illdices 1921 = 100 Ratio

CzecJrs Slol'aks Slovaks per 100 CzecJrs

1910 93.5 85.7 26

1921 100.0 100.0 29
1930 108.7 116.5 31
1950 122.7 164.7 39
1970 136.4 213.4 45
1991 143.9 244.9 49

Notes: Territorial coverage:

In 1910 thc area of the Bohemian Lands and of that part of Hungary which aftcr
1918 becarnc Siovakia. Olherwise Czechoslovakia within the borders of the ycar in
question; in 1921 and 1930 Ruthenia is exc1uded.
In 199 I the number of the Czechs includes also those who declared themselves
Moravians or Silesians but whose mother-tongue was given as Czech.

Table 5.2 The development of elhnic structure (census data - percentages):

Ihe Czcch Lands

/910 /930 /96/ /99/

Czcchs 63.4 68.4 94.3 94.8'

Germans 35.0 29.5 1.4 0.5
Poles 1.6 0.9 0.7 0.6
Siovaks 0.4 2.9 3.1
Others 0.8 0.7 1.0

'Including those who declared themselves Moravians or Silesians but whose

mother-tongue was given as Czech. Altogether they made up 13.6 per cent of the
population.
52 Elhnopolilics

Table 5.3 The development of ethnic structurc: Siovakia

/9/0' /930 /96/ /99/

Siovaks 57.7 67.7 85.3 85.7

Magyars 30.3 17.6 12.4 10.8
Germans 6.8 4.7 0.1 0.1
Ruthenians 3.4 2.9 0.9 0.6
Czechs 3.7 1.1 1.1
Romany 1.4"
Othcrs 1.8 3,4 0.2 0.3

'Uungarian territory which after 1918 became Siovakia.

"The first census allowing them to deciare themselves aseparate cthnic group.

spoken dialect was between literary Czech and literary Polish was there a
choiee to be made between these two languages and consequently nation-
alities. For those whose mother-tongue (Muttersprache) was German or
who, because of the circumstances, adopted German as their language of
everyday communication (Umgangssprache) it was also the language that
decided the issue of nationality. As long as there were ethnic borderlands
where two or three languages competed, via school education, for chil-
dren's national consciousness, those who opted for Czech tended to hold
together and not to over-emphasise loyalty towards their Land (province).
After the Germans had been evicted and the ftuctuating borderline in
Eastern Silesia between Czech and Polish had been stabilised, the need
for caution subsided. Furthermore, the demise of the highly centralised
und authoritarian regime unleashed a1l centrifugal propensities.
Declaration of Moravian or Silesian nationality at the 1991 census, at the
same time as a declaration of Czech as one's mother-tongue, could be
undcrstood as a protest against the centralising tendency of the Prague
govcrnment. For many it also meant support for the proposal of a tripartite
constitutional arrangement for Czechoslovakia, i.e. a federal state to
he composed of three Lands: Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, Slovakia. This
idea was not quite new. It cropped up whenever federalisation of
Czechoslovakia was considered but never achieved full political backing.
Nevertheless, 35 per cent of the Czech-speaking residents in the two
regions (according to the arrangeolent of 1960), which correspond to the
historieal Lands of Moravia and Silesia, declared themselves Moravians or
Silesians in 1991. (The latter made up only l.l per cent of the total.) 11
remains to be seen whether the tendency to declare Moravian or Silesian
 Nationalism and Communism in Interplay 53
nationality will become a permanent subtlety of Czech ethnic consious-
ness, or whether it will subside within the new configuration of nations in
the European Union.
Appendix to Part I
TlIble A I Demographie indicators: Czeeh part of the state (per thousand)

Fil'e-year average Live births Deaths Natural illerease Illfallt lIIortality

1920-24 24.1 15.6 8.5 154.3

1925-29 20.3 14.4 6.0 132.8
1930-34 17.5 13.2 4.4 114.1

1945-49 21.3 13.5 7.8 86.7

1950-54 19.6 1 \.0 8.6 46.8
1955-59 15.9 10.0 5.9 25.1
1960-64 14.4 10.3 4.2 19.8
1965-69 14.4 11.3 3.1 ·22.1
1970-74 17.0 12.5 4.6 19.7
1975-79 17.9 12.4 5.5 18.1
1980-84 13.8 12.9 \.0 15.2
19H5--89 12.8 12.4 0.4 I\.6

SOlln:e: Data from es Statistical Yearbook /991 and /992.

Table A2 Demographie indieators: Siovakia (per thousand)

';il'e-year average Live births Deaths Natural illerease Illfallllllortality

1920-24 35.4 19.5 15.9 173.0

1925-29 31.1 18.0 13.1 173.4
1930-34 26.7 15.4 11.3 158.6

1945-49 25.3 14.0 I\.4 130.2

1950-54 28.0 10.5 17.5 78.7
1955-59 24.9 8.7 16.1 40.5
1960-64 20.6 7.8 12.9 26.8
1965-69 18.0 8.4 9.6 26.0
1970-74 19.2 9.3 9.9 24.6
1975-79 20.6 9.6 10.9 22.5
1980-84 18.4 10.1 8.3 18.6
1985-89 16.4 10.1 5.3 14.5

SOllrce: Data from es Statistical Yearbook, /991 and /992.

54
 Part 11
Economic Context
Jaroslav Krejci
6 The First Republic
PRELIMINARY REMARK

By way of introduction a brief statement on the very different levels of

economic development in the three constituent parts of Czechoslovakia at
the time of her birth may be appropriate.
It will be possible to touch only occasionally upon this issue in the
course of our report on the economic development in Czechoslovakia
between the two world wars. We shall, however, pay further attention to
the different levels of economic development in the Czeeh and Siovak
parts of the state in the last part of Chapter 8. This remark is made as a
reminder that the issue of struetural differences by region will not simply
be glossed over.
In the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (Bohemia, Moravia and SiJesia)
there were already in 1910 more people earning their livelihood from
industry than from agriculture; on the other hand, in those parts of
Hungary which after 1918 became Slovakia and Ruthenia, about
66 per cent of the population still belonged to the primary sector of the
economy; industrialisation there was still in its beginnings. The first
Czechoslovak census (in 1921) registered the structure of population by
economic sector as shown in Table 6.1.
The staggering contrast noted above was accentuated by the different
orientation of the market. The Bohemian Lands were the most industri-
alised area of the Austrian part of the Habsburg monarehy, and aceounted
for a high percentage of its foreign trade. According to the Austrian
Institute for Economic Research, between 1911 and 1913 the per capita
income of the Bohemian Lands surpassed the average of other Austrian
Lands by 21 per cent. I In 1913 59 per cent of the pig-iron output from the
Austro-Hungarian Empire was produced in the Bohemian Lands;2 their
share of the population was merely 21 per cent.
Siovakia's territory was also in some respect more industrialised than
the other parts ofHungary. This was in partieular the ease with mining and
metallurgy. In 1913 70 per cent of Hungarian iron ore was extracted on the
territory of tatet Slovakia. however. only about 24 per cent of the output of
pig-iron was produced there. 3 Population of that territory represented
about 17 per cent of the total population of the Hungarial1 Kingdom. Yet,
Slovakia's ftedgeling industry was dependent on subdsidies and in

57
58 Economic Context
Table 6.1 Population structure by economic sector in the constituent parts of
Czechoslovakia in 1921 (Census data - percentages)

Sectors Bohemia Slovakia Ruthenia

Moravia
Silesia

Primary
(agriculture, forestry & fishing) 31.6 60.6 67.7
Secondary
(mining, manufacturing
and construction) 39.6 17.7 10.4
Tertiary, of which
(a) banking, trade & transport 11.7 7.7 7.1
(b) ci vii service, armed forces &
liberal professions 6.1 5.0 4.4
(c) other 11.0 9.0 10.4
100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Statistical Yearbook olthe Czechoslovak Republic, 1925.

Czechoslovakia this practice of the Hungarian government was discon-

tinued. The development of the iron industry in particular suffered a
setback. Only in the late 1930s did it experience a new growth.

RECOVERY AND GROWTH

As Czechoslovakia was born of the war, regulated war economy was its
first type of economic regime. Reconstruction - return to normality - was
the first task for its economic poliey. Tbe Austro-Hungarian government
had expected a short war and failed to make adequate preparations for its
long duration. Due to the extensive military call-up and the fall-off in
foreign trade, production of consumer goods considerably declined and
prices rose sharply. Between 1913 and 1918 the circulation of notes
increased fourteen times and prices much more than that. The wages and
salaries, however, were left behind; the average daily wage merely
doubled (Matis in Brusatti, 1973, pp. 60 ff.).
 The First Republic 59
In these circumstances the war-time rationing of staple consumer goods
had to be continued for a further three years. But even after the increasing
supply of goods and services had allowed almost all consumer goods to be
freed from rationing and price control (the main exception being rent in
dwelling houses) it took yet another year to get the price and wage levels to
their pre-war parity. in nominal terms at a multiple of ten. on average. Also
by the end of 1922 foreign exchange controls were abolished although in
1924 they had to be reimposed and remained in operation until 1928.
Drastic monetary and fiscal measures were taken. first in order to avoid
the continuation of hyperinflation, such as ravaged a11 the neighbouring
countries, then to keep the value of the crown (koruna) at the desircd
level. 4 The initial deflationary measures such as the suppression of
50 per cent of the notes in circulation. and the imposition of a property tax
focused on the war-time increase in property. however, were only partly
successful. More effective Was the later revaluation of the crown (koruna),
for which the proceeds of a foreign loan and foreign exchange reserves
were used. (From the end of 1923 the exchange rate was stabilised at
around 3 US cents per crown.) As a result exports were hard hit and the
down ward pressure on prices and wages made the social unrest still worse.
The unprecedented wave of strikes that started in 1919 continued until
1923. It peaked in 1920. when the number of workers on strike was ten
times higher than had been the average in the last two years before the
war. At the same time political agitation was becoming increasingly
hectic. ~migration from Slovakia stood at a very high rate.
At the first parliamentary elections in Czechoslovakia which took place
in 1920. socialists of all shades and nationalities gained 47.6 per cent of the
total vote. Divided into radicals (later communists) and moderates (social
democrats and national socialists) on the one hand, and by ethnicity, on the
other. they did not represent a uni ted force. Nevertheless they managed to
push through some measures, such as the constitution ofWorkers' Councils
in enterprises with more than thirty employees, and in coal-mines with
more than twenty workers. In the mining industry were established District
Councils wh ich by special law obtained access to documents on the
financial situation of enterprises and became entitled to 10 per cent of the
profits to be devoted to social purposes (Krejcf, 1978. pp. 71-3).
There was much talk of the socialisation of private property. But whilst
the communists placed their bet on a bolshevik-type revolution, the social
democrats and national socialists considered the increase of production to
be the more important first task. They were also aware of the fact that they
had not enough of their own expertise in this field. Last but not least the
general experience with state interference in the economy during the war
60 Economic Context
was not encouraging. Nevertheless the general social atmosphere favoured
socialist attitudes to such an extent that even the main bourgeois political
party, the national democrats, saw it appropriate to include in its pro-
gramme a few words sympathetic to measures advocated by the socialists,
such as tax progression and public ownership. Its representatives in the
government (as finance ministers) did their best to put the principle of pro-
gressive taxation into effect.
But as the reconstruction of the econorny gathered momentum the
general socialising mood petered out. The social democrats and national
socialists becarne satisfied with the progress of social legislation. Starting
in 1922 the Parliament gradually passed laws introducing mandatory
insurance schemes which provided heaIth services, sickness benefits and
old age pensions for various types of ernployees, so that by 1929 the
whole of the hired labour force was covered by these facilities.
Significantly for the situation after the First World War, the only inter-
ference with property rights in Czechoslovakia concerned land ownership.
Although there was much haggling between the political parties about the
scope and method of land reform, the relevant law was al ready adopted in
April 1919. But its implementation was so slow that it was still not fully
completed by 1938 when Czechoslovakia was disrupted. Nevertheless, as
the principle consisted in redistribution and not in socialisation, whilst the
expertise of the beneficiaries was taken for gran ted, this land reform sur-
vived the critical shift in social climate that negatively affccted the reform
policy in the industrial sector.
According to the 1919 law, the government was empowered to ex pro-
priate the ownership of over 150 hectares (370 acres) of arable land and
over 250 hectares (618 acres) of lands in general. Where the land served
the agricultural industry the original owner was allowed to retain up to
500 hectares. A special law fixed compensation at the average price level
between 1913 an 1915. For property over 1000 hectares this price was
reduced progressively by 5 to 40 per cent. The compensation was to be
paid in small instalrnents (at least half a per cent of the price per year plus
4 per cent of interest). Credit facilities for the new owners were provided
by the government. The execution of the reform was entrusted to a special
board, the Land Office, which then became a key power position of the
Agrarian Party.
According to the law, 28 per cent of land ownership (16 per cent fields
and meadows and 12 per cent forests) was scheduled for redistribution. By
the end of 1930 this target was met to the extent of 63 per cent as far as
agricultural land was concerned. Of this percentage the former owners
 The First Republic 61
were allowed to retain 29 per cent; 49 per cent were allocated to 583 080
small farmers; 2 per cent were sold to 1353 middle size farmers;
13 per cent, as the so-called 'residual estates', were sold under advanta-
geous conditions to 1762 new big landlords, thus providing the new agrar-
ian elite with appropriate economic backing. The rest, around 7 per cent,
remained unallocated. S To some extent, in particular in southern Siovakia,
land reform was used to strengthen the Siovak ethnic element in the pre-
dominantly Magyar-inhabited areas.
As has already been hinted, economic reconstruction, as weil as politi-
eal stability, was hampered by disorder and aggressive attitudes in various
kinds of eonftict. In Summer 1921 the Czechoslovak Parliament found it
neeessary to pass a special law enabling the administration to take strong
measures against terrorism and intimidation at public meetings and on
similar oceasions. There were three main causes of disturbances: bully-
ing, to whieh the weaker partner (usually the moderates) in the struggle for
allegiance between the communists and their moderate opponents in the
trade unions were exposed: tension between Czechs and Germans in the
ethnica\1y mixed areas; and, last but not least, as a result of the foundation
of anational (Czechoslovak) chureh by dissident Catholic c1ergy, heated
disputes over ecclesiastical property.
By the end of 1923 the eeonomic recovery could be considered to be
complete. According to arecent estimate the GDP attained approximately
its pre-war level, possibly even surpassing it slightly. From then until 1929
Czechoslovakia shared the general economic upsurge with the rest of the
Western world. From 1923 to 1929 the gross domestic product (GDP)
increased, according to the aforementioned estimate, by 45 per cent and
industrial production by 80 per cent. 6 According to the official data thc
volume of exports increased by 56 per cent and the volume of imports by
79 per cent. The export surplus of the early 1920s continued, however, on
a diminished seale, throughout the whole period. The share of finished
manufactured goods increased from 63 per cent (average of 1920-24) to
74 per cent (average of 1928-30). Czechoslovak foreign trade began to
have a more worldwide orientation. From 1924 to 1929 the share of
foreign trade directed towards non-European countries increased from 10
to 15 per cent.1
If Czechoslovakia experienced anything near to a free market economy
it was towards the end of that period. Starting with 1929 the remaining big
item of war-time rationing, rent control, was to be cautiously phased out.
In 1928 foreign exchange control was Iifted and in t 929 the crown was
based on the gold standard.
62 Economic Context
TRIUMPH AND CRISIS

By the end of the 1920s Czechoslovakia could indeed be proud of her

cconomic recovery and upsurge. However, her fate was not in her own
hands. A fortnight before her currency became convertible to gold, 'Black
Friday' on the New York Stock Exchange gave the signal for a worldwide
economic crisis of unprecedented severity. From then until her disruption
in 1938 Czechoslovakia was to experience only one year, 1937, when her
overall economic achievement was comparable with the last two years of
the 1920s. The scope and duration of the crisis, as weil as its structural
implications, will be illustrated from several angles of observation.
As in the First Republic there were no official series of aggregate produc-
tion, two private estimates of GDP in Table 6.2 are used, and compared
with the workers' and employees' health insurance data. Both GDP esti-
mates are based on selective physical output series in individual sectors of
the economy, weighted by the value added in 1929 or 1930 respectively.
All threc series provide a similar picture. The dccline started slowly.
There was some resilience on thc part of the firms and individuals who
hoped for some improvement, sooner rat her than tater. But after the

Table 6.2 Economie eycle 1929-37: physiea1 indieators

Gross domestie produet by industrial Employment blue and

origin (estimates) while collar workers

KrejC('1 Pryor et al. b (health insurance data C)

1929 100.0 100.0 100.0

1930 95.0 96.7 98.9
1931 93.4 93.4 94.9
1932 86.6 89.7 87.0
1933 82.9 85.9 80.4
1934 82.7 82.6 79.3
1935 80.5 81.8 80.4
1936 87.2 88.5 85.4
1937 99.1 98.4 92.5

aJ. KrejCf (1968) Intertemporal Comparability ofNational Income in Czechoslovakia.

p.254.
~F. I. Pryor, Z. P. Pryor, M. Stlidnl"k and G. J. StaUer (1971), p. 36.
cY. Heimrich (1948), p. 50.
 The First Republic 63
depression turned into a deep crisis the recovery was slow and tedious. In
the first few years employment dropped less than production. The former
reached the bottom in 1934, whilst production touched bottom only in
1935, but then picked up faster than employment.
Unlike production, foreign trade (Table 6.3) bottomed as early as 1933
but emerged from the crisis much reduced. In 1937 its volume was
30 per cent less than in 1929. The share of exports of goods and services
in GNP at current prices (Table 6.4) was 25 per cent in 1929, whilst in
1937 it dropped (0 16 per cent only. The share of imports of goods and
services in both these years was only slightly lower. In 1933, the worst
year for foreign trade, the value of the imports of goods and services was
slightly higher than that of exports.
The retreat from free trade on the world scale did considerable damage
10 all countries. The two subsequent devaluations of the crown, the first in
February 1934, the second in October 1934, had a Iimited impact.
Although in their final effect these devaluations reduced the gold content
of the crown (koruna) by 30 per cent, other major trading partners de-
valued their currencies as weil, and most of them earlier. In relation to
dollar and the pound sterling the Czechoslovak crown remained over-
valued. Nevertheless, despite a significant worsening of the terms of trade,
Czechoslovakia was able, with the exception of two years, 1931 and 1932,
to uphold its export surplus. The continuous export surplus enabled her not
only to honour regular servicing of the Czechoslovak share in the inherited

Table 6.3 Economic cycle 1929-1937: trade volumes (1929 = 100)

Foreigll tltJde (goods ollly) Domestie trade

Exports Imports COllsumer eooperatives Grocers' shops

1930 96.0 88.5 94.8 96.9

1931 79.6 73.2 90.1 92.5
1932 48.4 54.9 84.9 87.0
1933 40.1 42.5 77.5 83.5
1934 50.1 43.2 76.8 82.5
1935 48.1 43.7 80.6 83.9
1936 50.7 51.2 88.5 85.6
1937 71.3 67.0 92.9 89.2

SOl/ree: HSV (\985). pp. 852 and 857.

64 Economic Context
Table 6.4 Economic cycle 1929-37: Gross National Product by type of
expenditure (eurrent prices - pereentages)

/929 /933 /937

1 Private consumplion 68.8 76.9 66.8

2 Government consumption 9.7 11.1 10.7
3 Military expendilure 1.5 1.7 5.2
4 Gross investment 19.7 10.6 16.8
5 Exports (incI. services)" 25.0 9.5 15.9
6 Imports (incI. services)" -24.7 -9.8 -15.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

"i.e. ineluding paymenls 10 lhe faelors of produclion

Source: J. Krejc{ in Politickd ekollornie, no 11, 1968, p. 1046; military expenditure
in 1937 adapted according to M. Hauner (1986), p. 57.

Austro-Hungarian debt but also to undertake some investment abroad. For

a consolidated balance of international payments from 1925 to 1937 see
Table 6.12 in the Appendix to this chapter.
As could be expected, domestic trade was affected by the crisis less
severely. The two series in Table 6.3, covering the main branches of retail
trade, are based On representative sampIes; they show a similar course of
development to that of production but indieate a much-Iess-pronouced
recovery. When the crisis was at its worst, industrial firms began to es tab-
lish their own sales branches and thus took over a significant part of the
domestic market. According to a special research on domeslic Irade as a
whole, the volume of retail sales remained almost stable and the number
of persons employed even increased during the 1929 to 1937 cycle. 8
Losses in exports to European countries were at least partially offset by
thc continued increase in exports to non-Europcan countrics, particularly
those in Asia and Afriea. Exports to the USA declined much less than
exports as a whole. From 1929 to 1937 the share of non-European coun-
tries in total export value increased from 15 to 26 per cent. 9 For the econ-
omic upsurge in the late 1930s it was government spending on armament
and fortification of the borders that played a particularly important role.
Total expenditure on defence in total government expenses increased from
slightly over 17 per cent in 1929 to 30 per cent in 1936, and in 1938,
wh ich was the year when all this tremendous cost came 10 naught, to
44.5 per cent. IO In gross national expenditure (Table 6.4) the share of
 The First Republic 65
Table 6.5 Economic cycle 1929-37: domestic and national income
(factor cost, current prices before tax, percentages)

1929 1933 /937

I. Wages 23.5 19.9 21.2

2. Salaries 21.2 25.5 24.2
3. Employers' contributions to social insurance 4.8 6.4 6.4
4. Income of self-employed from agriculture 21.3 16.9 14.4
& forestry
5. Other income of self-employed 13.8 14.7 12.9
6. Corporate profits' 5.0 0.3 4.4
7. Profits of state interprises 2.6 0.7 2.3
8. Interests~ 5.1 6.9 5.1
9. Renls' 2.7 8.7 9.1
10. DOMESTIC INCOME 100.0 100.0 100.0

". Net income from abroad

12. NATIONAL INCOME
-0.5
99.5
-0.5
99.5
-0.7
99.3

"Distributed and undistributed.

~Interest payments on credit for productive purposes, net of operating cost of
financial intermediaries.
CNet of costs of operation, including the rental value of owner-occupied dwellings
and farm houses.
Source: J. Krejc( (1968) in Politickd ekonomie, no 11. 1968, pp. 1046 and 1049.

defence spending increased from 1.7 per cent in 1933 to 5.2 per cent in
1937.
The structure of the net product at factor cost (domestic and national
income - Table 6.5) reveals several significant shifts; they occurred either
as a result of changes in the composition of the labour force, or as a result
of the changes in price relations.
The contrast between the decline in the share of wages, on the one hand,
and thc incrcase in salaries on the other, was due to the changes in the
structure of cmployment as weil as to a difference in the development of
payments to blue- and white-collar workers respectively. In 1934, when
cmployment was at its lowest, the number of blue-collar workers
cmployed was 25 per cent lowcr than in 1929, whereas the number of
white-collar workers declined only by 5 per cent. In 1937 the employment
of the blue-collar workcrs attained 90 per cent of its 1929 level whereas
thc cmployment of the white-collar workers surpassed it by about
66 Economic Context
Table 6.6 Real wages and salaries (1929 = 100)

Wages Salaries

1930 99.9
1931 101.9 102.0
1932 98.7 101.4
1933 94.1 98.3
1934 92.8 98.2
1935 88.2 98.8
1936 88.8 97.5
1937 92.0

Source: V. Klimecky (1946) pp. 376-7.

3 per cent. As far as the rewards of work are concerned, thc white-collar
workers also fared better than thcir blue-collar counterparts (Table 6.6).
This development was the cumulative result of a twofold process: a long-
tcrm tendency towards mechanisation and to service induslries on the one
hand and, on Ihe other, the short-term impact of Ihc strugglc for Ihe markel
Ihat resulted in more people being employed in commercial activities. 11
In the sec tor of the self-employed, farmers wcre hit by thc crisis more
than the self-employed in the other branches of the economy. A sharp
decline in the share of income from agriculture may be only partly
explained by the declining proportion of the farming population in the
total labour force. Other causes have to be sought for in the changing
price-cost relationship and in Ihe structure of produclion.
A study by the Institute of Agricultural Accountancy and Management
in Prague, based on a representative sampie of farms in Bohemia, revealed
that in comparison with 1929 the prices of agricultural goods in 1937 were
about 26 per cent Jower, whereas the cost of agricultural productiOl'
declined by only 16 per cent. Furthermore, the regulation, introduced in
1934, of the production of, and Irade in, cereals and cereal products, put a
partial brake on the dec\ine of corn prices, while animal production and
sales were unprotected. In the harvest year 1936-7 the volume of crop
production was at 90 per cent, and prices at 82 per cenl of their 1928-9
level; the volume of animaJ production was al 108 per cent and prices at
67 per cent in the same period. 12
The most surprising item in the slruclure of domestic income was Ihe
increase in rents and in rental vaJue of owner-occupied dwellings; their
10lal rose from 2.7 per cent in 1929109.1 per cenl in 1937. These changes
 The First Repub/ic 67

Table 6.7 Dwelling house sector: ratio of rent to construction costs

Year Renl" Constmction costs Ratio

J 2 Column J : 2

1914 24.4 10.0 2.44

1926 72.7 90.6 0.80
1927 74.4 92.7 0.80
1928 82.7 103.6 0.80
1929 100.0 100.0 1.00
1930 115.1 95.4 1.21
1931 138.0 88.2 1.56
1932 151.5 86.4 1.75
1933 161.2 83.1 1.94
1934 167.8 76.0 2.21
1935 179.0 76.1 2.35
1936 177.1 77.7 2.28
1937 179.8 84.0 2.14

"The weighted average of the free market and state-regulated rent of a worker's
family nat.
Source: Jaroslav KrejcI (/986) in Rel'il'1V 0/ J1Icome ami Wealtl!, p. 620.

were due mainly to the fact that the ratio of rent to construction cosls
movcd steadily on from 1929 to 1935 in favour of home-owners (for detail
see Table 6.7). Here it has to be borne in mind that the ratio of rent to con-
struction costs was strongly intluenced in favour of tenants by the legisla-
tion of the early 1920s. Taking as a base that last period of 'normal'
conditions (in the sense of free market economy) which was July 1914, we
can see how the gradual abolition of rent control during the early 1930s
made it possible for rent to catch up with construction costs in 1935. Only
the big increase in average rent, out of proportion to the costs of construc-
tion and to the general price development, however, combined with the
18 per cent increase in the stock of tlats, can explain the big increasc in the
proportion of rents and rental value of owner-occupied dweIlings in
domcstic income.
At the time when rent control was progressively phased out, new con-
trols began to be imposed on various cconomic transactions. Custom
tariffs on imports of agricuItural products were raised with effect from
1930. A Cartel Act of 1933 required cartels to register and authorised
compulsory cartelisation; such cartels were created for example in the
wood, glass, milling, textile and brewing industries, the state being repre-
68 Ecoflom;c Context

Table 6.8 Manufacturing industry: structure by employment (percentages)

/926 /935

Metallurgy and engineering 21.8 27.9

Chemieals 3.1 5.1
Woodworking 6.5 6.4
ßllilding materials. glass
and ceramics 15.3 13.5
Pood processing 14.6 5.5
Textiles and c10thing 30.8 34.1
Lcathcr and fur 3.1 1.1
Papermaking and printing 4.8 6.4

Source: A. Teichov4 (1985).

scnled in their management. With respect to some branches of the

cconomy the government introduced a Iicensing system for new plants.
und rcstricted the resumption of production in the factories wh ich had
heen closed. Also in 1933, a compulsory syndicate of meat and callle
exportcrs was created, followed, in 1934, by the Czechoslovak Corn
Corporation, the cereal trade monopoly. In the mid-1930s further legisla-
live measures were taken for the protection of the state. These, in the final
rcsult, howcver, proved to be the least effective of all the legislation of
Ihat epoch.
By way of conclusion, a few additional data on the structural aspects of
the Czechoslovak economy during the First Republic may be useful.
During the 19208 the main change in the structure of the population by
cconomic sector was the decline of the population depending on agricul-
ture - in the state as a whole from 40 per cent in 1921 to 35 per cent in
J930. Thc share of the secondary sector (mining, manufacturing, construc-
tion) increased from 33 to 35 per cent and the share of the services sector
from 27 to 30 per cent. This tendency continued also in the J930s.
Howevcr there was no census at that thne which might have asscssed its
m:tgnitude.
Mure pronounced were changes within the secondary sector. According
tn special censuscs taken in 1926 and 1935, the structure of employmcnt
in manufacturing industry changed as indicated in TabJe 6.8. The long-
term advllnce of heavy industry, that had already started under the Austro-
Hungarian monarchy, contioued atthe time of the First Republic, and with
the growing defence expenditure after 1935, gathered momentum.
 The First Republic 69
APPENDIX: SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECTS
Table 6.9 National income by industrial origin in 1930

TllOlIsalld //Ii/lioll Percell/age

o/korunas

Agriculture and forestry 16.7 22.2

Mining and manufacturing 28.4 37.9
Building and construction 4.6 6.1
Subtotal:
Primary and secondary production 49.7 66.2
Transportation and communication 4.8 6.4
Wholesale and retailtrade 4.6 6.1
Restaurants. hotels and personal services 2.1 2.8
Banking and insurance 1.8 2.4
Professions 1.5 2.1
Paid household services 0.5 0.7
Dwellings (owned and rented) 3.2 4.3
Government (state and local) 6.8 9.0
Subtotal: Terliary production 25.3 33.8
Total 75.0 100.0

SOllrce: Jaroslav Krejcr (1968) in Review 0/ '" cOllie mld Weat"I. 3. p. 251.

Table 6. \0 Value added per person engaged in 1930

Sec/or PerSOfIS eflgaged" Verlue erddeci" Prodllclivity

Nllmber ill TllOlIsalld KOr/mas Rela'ive

,hollsallds millioll 0/ I,erperson "allle
korullas ellgaged

Primary 2675 16.7 6240 0.58

Secondary 2524 33.0 13010 1.22
Terliary 1484 22.1 14892 1.39
Total or average 6683 71.8 10 745 1.00

·Workers. employees. working owners and family members.

hNalional income by industrial origin less the value of dwellings.
SOllrce: Jaroslav Krejcr (1968) in Rel'jew o/Income alld Wea/tll. 3. p. 252.
70 Economic Context
Table 6.11 National reproducible wealth in 1930 and its ratio to GNP
(estimate, thousand million korunas)

(I) Agriculture 45.3

(2) Mining, manufacturing and construction a 62.3
(3) Transport and communication h 21.5
Of which: (a) State enterprisesc 17.3
(b) Private enterpri1;es 4.2
(4) Trade 5.0
(5) Other commercial services and professions 5.0
(6) Banking and insurance 1.5
(7) Dwellings 94.0
(8) State government propertyd 5.7
(9) Local government propertyC 9.7
(10) Total reproducible capital 250.0
(11) Gross national produd 89.3
(12) Capital-product ratio 2.8
(Row 10: Row 11)

alnclusive of state-owned enterprises

hExclusive of local government-owned enterprises
"Railway and post
dWithout state-owned enterprises
Clnclusive of local government-owned enterprised but exclusive of dwellings
fGross national income at factor cost plus indireet taxes net of subsidies
SOl/ree: J. KrejCf (1968) in Review of Ineome and Wealth, 3, p. 262.

Table 6.12 Consolidated balance of international payments

(in million US dollars)

1925-28 1929-33 /934-37

Capital balance -174.6 9.2 -31.1

Capital movements
long-term -10.1 -4.5 -21.9
short-terOl -71.5 13.7 -9.2
Current balance 187.2 79.6 8.5
Goods 136.4 105.1 62.5
Services 41.4 49.0 2.0
Interests and dividends -83.5 -56.3 -43.8
Gold -7.1 -18.2 -12.2
Errors and omissions 12.6 88.8 -22.6

SOl/ree: R. Nötel (1986), p. 278.

7 Time of Disruption
In October 1938, Czechoslovakia had to cede about one third of her terri·
tory to the neighbouring states; in March, 1939, the Czechoslovak
Republic disappeared from the map of Europe. Until May 1945 the econ-
omic development on its territory must be followed separately for each of
the main parts into which it was dismembered: the Protectorate Bohemia
and Moravia (7.5 million), the Sudetenland (3.2 million) and the Slovak
Republic (2.7 million). These three geographical areas made up
85 per cent of Czechoslovakia's population and over 90 per cent of her
economy. The remainder included the territories acquired by Hungary
(1.7 million) and Poland (0.25 million) as weil as regions incorporated
into other German provinces than Sudetenland (0.4 million).
From 1940 until the beginning of 1945 not only the territories annexed
by Germany, but also the Protectorate and the Slovak Republic were sup-
posed to support the German effort. Abrief comparison of their respective
achievements in this respect may be usefu!. As far as the Sudetenland is
concerned, suffice it here to compare the development of its employment
in industry with that in the Protectorate during the years of 'total war'
(Table 7.1)
As this Table shows, the mobilisation of the labour force for the war
industry was more succcssful in the Sudetenland than in the Protectorate.

Table 7.1 Bohemia and Moravia as a whole: employment in manufacturing

industry in 1944 (1941 = 100)

Protectorate Sudetenlalld

Melallurgy and metal fabricating 163 309

Chemieals 137 223
Wood, sawmills, paper 105 186
Textiles, leathcr and c10thing 90 147
Pottery, ceramies, glass 73 138
Othcr industrics and building 90 114
Total employmcnt 122' 189

'Except mining and public utilities which are inc1uded in the source.
Source: E. A. Radice (1986), pp. 421 and 423.

71
72 Economic Context
The shift towards metallurgy, metal fabricating and chemicals was much
more impressive. Even if apart of the increase in industrial employment in
the Sudetenland can be attributed 10 the Czech workers recruited from the
Protectorate, the numbers of the latter could hardly offset the extensive
military call-up to which all German citizens were subject.
Turning to the comparison of Siovakia with the Protectorate, we find a
signiicant difference between them as far as the growth of industry was
concerned (Table 7.2).
Apparently, the work morale of the Czechs was lower than that of the
Slovaks. The Czechs also seem to have been required to dispatch fe wer
people than the Siovaks to work in Germany. If the retrospective estimates
are correct there were altogether 600000 Czech workers in Germany
during the war, I whereas Slovakia sent 440 000. 2 In proportion to the
population it was 8 per cent on the Czech side and 16 per cent on the
Slovak side. Furthermore, 50000 Siovak soldiers were sent to take part in
the war against the USSR. 3
Not being trusted, the Czechs were not required 10 fightbut were
obliged to assist Germany economically. Taking into account all kinds of
payments (direct war contribution, balance on the clearing account, trea-
sury bills purchased by the Protectorate banks, credit accounts against the
Reichsmark notes used by German civilians for purchases in the
Protectorate), we co me to the sum of 15 billion Reichsmark, i.e. about
6 billion US$, or roughly $ 800 per head of the Protectorate's population. 4

Tabte 7.2 Performance of industry in 1943 (1939 = 100)

Slovakia Bohemia alld Moravia

A. Industry as a whole:
Employment 143 125
Production 156 117
Producti vi ty 109 94
B. Metallurgy and metal fabrlcating:
Employment 174 207
Production 176 173
Productivity 101 84

Sourees: Siovakla ·A·: V. Pavlenda (1968); Siovakia ·ß·: R. Olsovsky et al.

(1961); Bohemla and Moravia: J. Krejcf (1986).
 Time 0/ Disruption 73
In view of her own military expenditure on the war against the USSR,
Siovakia was not caHed upon to pay any war contribution to Germany.
She was to pay a sm alt occupation cost that was debited to her clearing
account against Germany, as welt as an amount in respect of various
means of payment in Reichsmark used by German soldiers or civilians in
Slovakia. Altogether about RM 500 million was the claim on Germany
accumulated by Siovakia during the war. This would make up US$ 75
per head of population. s
There was, of course, also a wide-ranging acquisition of property by the
Germans, mainly in the Protectorate but partly also in Siovakia. However,
these acquisitions did not outlive the war. Thus they have only a limited
effect on the long-term development of the Czechoslovak economy.
As was said at the beginning of this chapter, the Protectorate of Bohemia
and Moravia accounted for about one half of Czechoslovakia's population
and represented more than a half of her economic strength. The territory of
the Protectorate was Icss dircctly affected by war activities than the other
regions of Czechoslovakia. Last but not least, the fact that the economy of
the Protectorate was regulated enabled the Statistical Office in Prague to
follow the economic development in the country thoroughly.
On the strength of these data (during the war largely kept secret) the
present author was later in a position to work out a detailed analysis of the
economic structure and development in what had been the Protectorate, and
eventually to publish it, under the title Bohemian-Moravian War Ecollomy,
in the already quoted Economic History 0/ Eastern Europe 1919-1975
(ed. by M:C. Kaser and E.A. Radice, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986) in
vol. 11, pp. 452-92. The following pages contain an abstract of this work.
The years when Czechoslovakia was first dismembered and then sup-
pressed, 1938 and 1939, were not particularly good for her economy.
However, the year 1940 was clearly a turning-point; it was then that the
Bohemian-Moravian economy started to operate at a fuH employment, with
the fast-increasing share of industry in the employment structure. The drain
on the labour force on behalf of Germany was another saHent feature of the
development. However, the balance of migration also included population
movements other than labour force recruitments. In 1939, the stream of
Czech refugees from the frontier areas annexed in autumn 1938 by Germany
continued and in 1943-4 there was another influx, that of German settlers
(Volksdeutsche), coming mainly from south-east Europe. On the other hand
workers were sent to Germany under civil recruiting (Arbeitseinsatz). After
1942, however, the air war forced the German govemment to exploit Czech
productive resources further, in their comparatively sheltered homelands.
This change of policy is reflected in the decline of the labour force recruited
74 Ecollomic COlltext
for Germany. Unfortunately there are no data on a worker's average sojourn
in Germany, so that the number of Czech workers in Germany in individual
years can be estimated only roughly. This has been done retrospectively by
the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, which assessed the total of those
sent to work in Germany at 600 000 altogether. As most of them did not
work for the whole of the war, the average number of Czechs working in
Germany at large was lower - according to the same source, 265 000. The
number from within the Czech Lands, who were sent to concentration
camps and did not return was estimated at 200 000.
In the Protectorate itself, the proportion of working people in the total
population, both employed and self-employed, increased from about
49 per cent in 1939 to around 52 per cent in 1942. Surprisingly, the pro-
portion of agriculture in the labour force increased more considerably,
owing not so much to the growing need of labour as to the fact that agri-
cuIture until then provided a channel of escape from recruitment to
Germany. Self-employment. declining from 1939 in absolute terms. was
also in relative decline from 1942, but wage and salary employment con-
tinued to rise in both absolute and relative terms.
The growth of employment was concentrated in industry. In 1939 indus-
try, i.c. mining, manufacturing, and construction, accountcd for almost
38 per cent of the population employed as wage and salary earners; by 1944
this share had increased 10 over 42 per cent. Wilhin industry ilself the share
of iron. steel. and meta I fabricating increased more conspicuously - from
about 33 per cent to more than 50 per cent of industrial employment. In
terms of manpower Czech industry was more than half devoted to the metals
sector by the end of the war. The salience of this development is still greater
if changes in working hours are allowed for, but constitutes a surprising
feature of war-time development. Despite a considerable prolongation of
working hours, the available data on working time per worker reveal that it
either remained constant or decreased. That it failed to increase may be
explained by the combined effects of scarcity of raw materials and an
increased rate of absenteeism. voluntary or because of accident or iIIness.
The national product generated on the Bohemian-Moravian territory
experienced no particular upsurge during the German occupation and the
Second World War (Table 7.3). Despite considerably increased labour
input. overall production was below the 1939 level in 194~2; only in
1943 and 1944 was there a slight increase above that level. There was, on
the other hand, a considerable change in the structure of all the three
aggregate aspects (product, income, and expenditure). In the production
aspect, both secondary and tertiary production continued to increase their
respective shares in the national product at the expense of agriculture.
 Time 0/ Disruptioll 75
Table 7.3 Alternative se ries for real national income in Bohemia-Moravia
1939-43 (1939 = 100)

/940 /94/ /942 /943

I. Material product 94.7 93.7 96.9 102.5

2. National income 94.9 95.0 98.3 101.0
3. Gross national expenditurc 97.3 98.9 99.5 \03.3

In distributive shares, there was a relative increase of income from

cmployment and a decline of income from capital. The fuH employment
from late 1940 and the rationing of basic food and some other consumers'
goods from late 1939, which favoured heavy manual workers, caused
so me levelling of real incomes. In 1941, just over one million workers.
Le. 52 per cent of persons employed. received some kind of additional
food ration.
On the expenditure side (Table 7.4), private consumption declined from
70 per cent to 55 per cent in the period 1939-43: gross domestic fixed
capital formation declined from about 15 per cent to about IO per cent of
the GNP. On the other hand, what national accounts would formaHy
record as 'net foreign investment' - mainly unrequited deliveries to
Gcrmany - increased from a slightly negative value to more than
30 per cent of GNP.
During the five years 1940-44, the balance with Germany accounts
for 80 per cent of thc foreign investment. The remaining 20 per cent

Table 7.4 Expenditurc on GNP in Bohemia-Moravia 1939-43

(percentagcs of GNP)

/939 /940 /94/ /942 /943

I. Private consumption 70.2 66.8 60.9 58.2 55.5

2. Govcrnment consumption 14.0 13.2 13.9 14.3 14.6
3. Gross domestic fixed capital
formation 15.4 13.4 12.9 11.8 9.8
4. Net forcign investment -0.7 3.7 14.4 15.5 31.6
5. Additions to stocks 1.1 2.9 -2.1 0.2 -11.5
76 Economic Context
represents the active trade balances with other countries, especially
German sateIlites and alIies. Thus, the German share of the national
product of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia constituted the percent-
ages as given in Table 7.5.
ft is hardly possible to make even a rough estimate of the GNP for the
first months of 1945, when the major part of Bohemia-Moravia was still
in German occupation. Trade and payment data suggest, however, that the
rate of exploitation may have increased in that period to about half of GNP
or even more. This drain may have affected not only current production
but increasingly also assets (fixed and stocks).
In general it has to be stressed that Table 7.5 entirely exc\udes the vaue
of confiscations. As far as these were comprised of immovables and were
not subsequently destroyed, they were not lost and need not be mentioned
in this context. The value of confiscated chattels, however, and of
dcstroyed property has to be considered separately. In the absence of any
data on the basis of which an independent estimate could be made, the
official evaluation of war damages and losses presented to the Nuremberg
Tribunal has to be used: materiallosses as compiled by the Allied
Commission amounted, after exc\usion of savings deposits, currency, and
scientific works, to 125309 million korunas. Some items may figure in the
absorption discussed above and should not simply be added thereto.
In contrast to the economy under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the war
economy under the German Reich was subject to a more rigorous contro\.
Any pent-up demand on the part of the German subjects rcsulting from thc
material shortages was to be accommodated out of the spoils of war, in
particular by realising property confiscated in the Slavic east.
Nevertheless, even strict German rationing of goods and control of
markets left a certain margin for illegal production and sales, difficult
though it is to evaluate them. They were most frequent in agriculture, from

Table 7.5 Germany's absorption ofGNP generated in Bohemia-Moravia

1940-44 (percentages)

1940 194/ 1942 1943 1944

Tolal share 4.6 8.8 11.1 28.7 35.5

ofwhich:
Prolectorate contribution 4.5 6.6 10.0 12.2 14.0
Increase of nominal assets 0.1 2.2 1.1 16.5 21.5
 Time 0/ Disruption 77
Table 7.6 Purchasing power, consumption and savings in Bohemia-Moravia
(1939 =100)

1940 1941 1942 1943 1944

I. Real weekly earnings in industry 99.2 102.2 104.4 114.2 120.0

2. Real per capita personal income 95.9 96.3 99.2 107.3
3. Real per capita personal
consumption 91.7 83.7 79.0 78.8
4. Savings deposits outstanding
at the elose of the year 106.3 114.4 140.3 173.4 235.8

Note: Rows I to 3 from national accounts deHated by cost-of-Iiving index.

which additional food supplies outside regular official channels of distribu-

tion were obtainable. The amount of these transactions may have been more
impressive in monetary than in real terms, but even the monetary cffect
should not be exaggerated, as most of these transactions were on a barter
basis; food was exchanged for industrial goods, mostly second-hand, such as
c1othing, footwear, and household utensits. Thus it may be assumed that the
omission of illegal transactions does not greatly distort the overall picture.
Until 1941 inßationary pressure found its out let in a steady rise in
prices, but from 1942 until the end of the occupation in AprillMay 1945
the officially supervised price level kept fairly stable. There was no con-
siderable divergence in the trends of wholesale and retait prices in general.
The differences, however, were remarkable within the structure of each
price category. In wholesale prices the increase affected agricultural rather
lhan industrial prices. Within the cost-of-Iiving index the basic discrep-
ancy was amongst the prices of goods and services. In particular, rents
kept fairly stable throughout the whole war and occupation period, despite
the considerable increase in construction costs. Both hourly wage rates
and earnings increased faster than the eost of living. This left a fair amount
of income available for purehases on the black market, or for savings. The
relationship between the purchasing power of wages in industry and of
personal incomes generally on the one side, and actual consumption (both
at official cost and/or prices) and the rate of deposit of savings on the other
in Table 7.6, may give an approximate idea of the extent of the repressed
demand as weil as of the contained inflation.
8 The Rise and Fall of a
Socialist Experiment
THE IMMEDIATE POST-WAR MEASURES

When in 1945, Czechoslovakia re-emerged from the ashes of the Second

World War, her economic problems were similar to those with which she
was confronted at the time ofher foundation in 1918. Whereas during the
First Wor1d War, however, the fighting never reached the territory which
then became Czechoslovakia, it did so during the second one: in particular
eastern and central Slovakia was affected. On the other hand, the rcgu-
latcd economy that the German authorities imposed on the Czech heart-
lands (the Protectorate) proved useful for economic reconstructi.on. Some
of these measures were also extended to Slovakia, the economic regime of
which had been more relaxed during the Second World War.
Also, as after the First World War, there was a call for socialisation. In
contrast to 1919-21, however, in 1945 the Communist Party, which was
the main promoter of socialisation, was a formidable force. For the com-
munists, and also for many social democrats, the regulated economy inher-
ited from the time of war was not to be a transient arrangement but the
basis for a more sophisticated kind of regulation - the planned economy.
Decision on its extent and mcthod became a hot political issue between the
political parties. Until February 1948 there was scope for genuine discus-
sion on this topic.
Physical reconstruction proceeded quite quickly. As far as the damaged
infrastructure was concerned, there was considerable help from the Allied
Armies, whilst the Uni ted Nations Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
Administration (UNRRA) contributed to the supply of scarce goods,
.-anging from foodstuffs to capital equipment and petroleum products. In
the peak years of deliveries (1946) the value of UNRRA goods amounted
to 4 per cent of the Czechoslovak GNP.'
On I November 1945, a comprehensive monetary, price and wage
reform was inaugurated; its aims were:
• to check the inftationary pressure from the wartime accumulated
savings;
• to alleviate the burden of indebtedness;
• to remodelthe price and wage structure.

78
 The Rise alld Fall 0/ a Socialist Experiment 79
The main features of the monetary reform of 1945 were as follows. The
holdings of the population were exchanged for cash only up to
500 korunas (10 US$ at the official exchange rate introduced by the
reform) per head and the rest had to be deposited in blocked accounts, the
freeing of which was allowed only for specific, mainly social, reasons.
Also deposit savings, life insurance, securities and bonds were blocked.
Enterprises rcceived exchange money for operation al needs for one month.
This meant that the amount of money in circulation was reduced from
120 billion to less than 20 billion korunas. On average the price and
income level was about three times that of the beginning of 1939. This
was about 30 to 40 per cent higher than at the end of the war. However
rent (as after the First World War) and some services such as public trans-
port wcre kept at the 'stop' level at the beginning of the war. (Thus the
price-cost rclationship in the construction of houses was upse.t for the
second time; at the time of writing, this issue has not yet been adequately
tackled.) Wages and salaries werc restructured more - on the whole, in
favour of low-income recipients.
Taking all thc combined measurcs of this reform into considcration, they
had most pcnetrating income-Ievelling effects in the post-war period. At
thc beginning of 1946, men's real wages (blue-collar workers) were on
average about 20 per cent higher, and women's by almost 30 per cent
higher than in 1939. On the other hand men's real salaries (white-collar
workcrs) were lower by about 30 per cent, women's real salaries by almost
20 per cent. For more detail see Table 8.1. Tbe income levelling of the self-
employed was furthercd by the two subsequent waves of nationalisation. 2
As a further immediate measure, the property of 'traitors' and 'coIlabor-
ators' was confiscated and put under the administration of 'national
trustees'. In order to extend nationalisation as far as possible, there was on
the side of thc communists a strong tendency to define 'collaboration' with
respect to thc propertied c\asses, as broadly as possible.
The first wave of nationalisation was implemented by law on
24 Octobcr 1945 and proc\aimed on the anniversary of the foundation of
the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918, on 28 October 1945. It affected all
mines and enterprises of the so-called key industries, big firms, joint stock
banks and private insurancc companies. As a result of this measure more
than half of the industrial employees worked in the nationalised sector.
Unlike those whose property was confiscated, the former owners of
nationaliscd firms were to receive compensation. As subsequent develop-
ments havc shown, howcver, the possibility of compensation remained a
real issue only in the casc of foreign (allied or neutral) property.
According to the caIculations of Alice Teichova, of the total basic nominal
80 Ecollom;c Context
Table 8.1 Real income indices in 1946

ezeeh Lands Slovakia

(1937 = 100) =
(1938 JOD)

Wages: men 121

women 110
129

Salaries: men 67
78
women 82

Pensions: workers 185

employees 55

Source: Pnlbeh plnen{ clvollieteho hos/JodaiskellO pMnu (Two Year Plan Report),
Prague, 1949, pp. 330, 331 and 338.

capital of joint stock and limited companies (12 802 million korunas)
48 per cent belonged to the companies with foreign participation; the share
of foreign capital in the latter amounted to 53 per cent and in the capital of
all companies 25 per cent. Out of the total foreign investment in
Czechoslovakia 23 per cent belonged to countries which, whether volun-
tarily or not, took part against Czechoslovakia during the Second World
War 11 (Germany, Austria, Italy, Hungary). This leaves 77 per cent,
i.e. 2454 million korunas as capital of nation als in allied or neutral
countries. 3
The principles according to which an indemnity was to bc paid were
regulated by agreement with the governments of nationals affected by
nationalisation. The actual payment of indemnities according to these
agreements was dependent on the value of forcign trade with the respect-
ive countries. The indemnities paid to foreign nationals according to these
agreements amounted to 370 million korunas (7.4 million US$) in 1948.
Figures for 1949 were not releascd.
As the nationalised industries were to a large extent joint stock and othcr
companies, the owners of which were not directly involved in the manage-
ment, there was a strong tendency to take over the existing management;
the leading managers joined in most cases either the Communist Party or
Social Democratic Party. This tendency also appeared, although 10 a lesser
extent, in the case of nationalised banks and insurance companies, wh ich
continued to operate, after some mergers, as separate enterprises.
 The Rise and Falt 0/ a Socialist Experiment 81
The position of workers in nationalised enterprises was regulated by a
special decree passed in the wake of the decree on nationalisation.
According to this there was established in every factory, institute or office
with more than fifty employees, a factory or employee counci\. It was to
be composed of the elected representatives of workers and employees with
the task of 'guaranteeing the smooth operation of the enterprise'. The
factory council had to ensure that the enterprise was operating in accord-
ance with the public interests and with the social and cuItural interests of
the employees. The councils were, in particular, entitled to take part in
decision-making on wages and salaries and to cooperate in the hiring and
firing of employees. Management was obliged to contribute 10 per cent of
net profits to the council's special fund. Up to I March 1947, the number
of employees in the nationalised sector attained 61.2 per cent of the total
employment in industry.
Ouring 1946, the process of socio-economic change was complicated by
the expulsion of the German ethnic minority. This affected 22 per cent of
the labour force in industry. Furthermore, 23 per cent of the acreage in the
whole state was confiscated and redistributed amongst the Czech and
Slovak settlers. As both agricultural land and most of the industrial plants
remained intact, and the effective demand was kept high by significant
unfreezing of the blocked savings, the main problem was the scarcity of
labour rather lhan unemployment. 4

THE START OF ECONOMIC PLANNING

The economic reconstruction and the existence of nalionalised industries

provided a climate favourable to economic planning. Ouring 1945,
however, there was a certain hesitation both among experts and politicians
on this issue. Communist leaders, while considering political problems as
priorities, left the initiative to the social democrats and Trade Union repre-
sentatives. The political parties of the centre (the restoration of right-wing
parties was not permiUed), namely the Czech People's Party and Slovak
Oemocratic Party, favoured an interim and less-binding approach.
In spite of these vacillations, two apparats had already been built up:
one for coordination and short-term economic policy - the General
Secretariat of the Economic Council (the lauer was the collective body of
all economic ministers); the other for the preparation onong-term plan-
ning - the State Planning Office.
Oddly enough, the original concept of the first plan - the Two Year
PlanS - was launched by neither of the planning or coordinating apparats,
82 Ecol/omic Colltext
but by the Communist Party; this happened in the spring of 1946. The
communists had among their members a good number of managers in the
nationalised industries who were invited to submit the first drafts of indi-
vidual production targets, which then were elaborated in more detail by
the commiUee eoordinating administrative and planning apparats.
Although the eommunist draft was not quite in line with the preparatory
work undertaken meanwhile by the State Planning Office (here the stress
was more on overall planning orientated towards consumption rather than
production goals), it had the advantage of simplieity and consequently the
air of viabiIity. It was also not difficult for the communists to obtain
approval from other political parties for a plan which did not commit them
to give up anything ol' their political prerogatives. If there was any opposi-
tion it was ralher from individual government boards, who were loalh to
surrender apart of their 'decision-making sovereignty' in favour of a co-
ordinating apparat. The old bureaueracy, however, had to yield to a new
one, gradually emerging from the planning apparat, management of
nationalised enterprises and the apparats of the Communist and for a short
while also Social democratic parties.
The Two Year Plan, passed as a law by the National Assembly on
25 Oetober 1946, was eonceived as a sum of production plans wh ich gave
both general and specific targets for individual branches of economy.
Specific targets (altogether 142) were given in physical units for what
were considered the bottlenecks or prerequisites of reconstruction.
The domestic fixed investment amounted to the value of 70 billion
korunas in 1946 prices. The 1946 GNP was hiter evaluated at about
190 billion korunas. Whatever growth might have been expected in the
subsequent two years, gross domestic fixed investment would have been
weil below 20 per cent of the GNP. Yet these considerations have not
played any substantial role in the days of the Two Year Plan. Slovakia
with 28 per cent of the population was to obtain 32 per cent of the total
investment. The distribution of investment by sectors was: 36.3 per cem
industry; 7.5 per cent agriculture; 21.6 per cent transport; 20 per cent
dwellings, and 14.6 per cent public works. 6
AIthough the Two Year Plan made no specific provision for foreign
trade, it supposed that the respective ministry would operate in such a
way as to ensure the fulfilment of the plan. Czechoslovakia's position on
the foreign market was particularly good. Her industrial capacity in com-
pared with all neighbouring countries was thc least affected by the war.
Also her terms of trade were the most favourable. In comparison with
1937 the unit value of export (f.o.b.) was in 194672 per cent higher than
the unil value ol' import (c.iJ.).7 Although this ratio deteriorated consider-
 The Rise alld Fall 0/ a Socialist Experiment 83
ably in the following years, it nevertheless remained above the prewur
level unti! 1949.8
Already during the first year of the Two Year Plan the question of thc
further orientation of the Czechoslovak economy emerged. As
Czechoslovakia was still ruled by a coalition of political parties the issue
was to be decided between them. Apart from the communists who clllne
with an ambitious plan of economic restructuring, only social dcmocmts
put forward a detailed alternative for the first Five Year Plan. The main
issues at stake were the extent of planning and the amount and structure of
investment. According to the social democrats, who wanted to give the
market more leeway, the amount of gross fixed investment should not
cxceed 25 per cent of the GNP and, with respeet to the physical output, the
investment should not exceed the produetive capacity and the energy
supply. For the communists who preferred to restrict the market as far as
possible, this was too timid. They planned a much faster rate of growth
and their stress was on a rapid extension of the iron industry - in fact,
more than three times as mueh as the social democrats proposed.
Aeeording to the stratagem devised by Stalin all plans should always
anticipate hidden reserves which should be 'mobilised ' by inereased
efforts.
In terms of the planning method, the communist plan was virtually 11
eontinuation of the Two Year Plan. It was centred on bolstering produc-
tion, for wh ich it gave individual and global targets. Production plans wcre
considered 1IS the kcy factor to which all other considerations had to be
adapted. Problems of financing the rapid growth especially were consid-
ered as less important. On the other hand, in the social democratic plan,
produetion. distribution and consumption aspects had to be balaneed by
national budgeting which as rar as possible should be linked with aceount-
ing in enterprises. The prices and wages policy. which in the Two Year
Plan remained outside the framework of the planning, should be har-
monised with the considerations of the plan.
The orientation of further development. however. was not decided by
negotiation. The communists, shielded by the formidable might of the
Soviet Union, outmanoeuvred their opponents, and, having their men in
eommand of the armed forces and police, in February 1948 staged a suc-
eessful coup d'etat after whieh they took over absolute power in the
eountry. Their coneept of economie development won the day. To satisfy
the requirements of the USSR, they pushed the reconstruction of
Czechoslovak eeonomy still furt her. Czechoslovakia was to provide the
whole Soviet-dominated bl oe with steel and heavy machinery, and 10
adapt its strueture of ownership to the Soviet paUern.
84 Economic Context
After February 1948, the main immediate institutional change was the
second wave of nationalisation. In accordance with the series of laws
passed in the spring of 1948 all enterprises with more than fifty employees
(whenever this number was attained since January 1946) were nation-
alised. Wholesale foreign trade and forwarding business were nationalised
without exception. In reality, however, nationalisation went further than
the legal provision. Towards the end of 1948 there was virtually no private
enterprise left with more than twenty employees. There was strong pres-
sure on individual owners who, either for real or aIIeged tax evasion or
offences against economic regulations, were expropriated. The so-called
Action Committces which were in charge of political purges, used this
opportunity to extend the socialist sec tor as far as possib1e. In communist
terms it was aperiod of 'intensified cJass war' mainly in urban areas.
Thc extent of the socialisation beyond the provisions of the law can be
seen from the trend in industrial employment by form of ownership in
Table 8.2. The percentage of employed in confiscated (not directly nation-
alised or re-sold) firms more than doubled during the spring of 1948. By
the end of that year, firms within this category became nationalised
enterprises.
Nationalisation of the banking system happened in two stages: the first
in January 1948 (pre-February compromise) and the second in March of
that year (integral solution). In quantitative terms, the process of concen-
tration of banks was as folIows: in 1937 there were in the Czech Lands
twenty-three joint stock banks with 380 branches. In Slovakia and
Ruthenia there were fifty-five banks with 208 branches. The concentration

Table 8.2 Employment in industry by form of ownership

(as percentage of total industrial employment)

Legal position 0/ the firm J Feh. 1948 1 May 1948 1 Jall. 1949

National 63.0 64.4 89.4

Confiscated 12.8 27.8 3.8
Government' 1.3 1.3 1.3
Communal 0.4 0.5 0.5
Cooperative 2.1 0.9 1.4
Private 20.4 5.1 3.6

'Traditional state enterprises such as railways, post office, tobacco, etc.

Source: Statistical Bulletin 1949, p. 185.
 The Rise alld Fall 0/ a Socialist Experiment 85
process had alrcady started during the German occupation ; after national-
isation in 1945 only sixteen banks remained. In January 1948 the numher
of hanks declined to tlve; in March 1948 they were merged into two banks
only, one in the Czech Lands with 104 branches and one in Siovakia with
79 branches.
Activity of these two banks was limited to current husiness. For invest-
ment purposes a special bank, 'Investment Bank', was foundcd in July
1948. At the same time small-scalc savings banks in the countryside werc
remodelIed according to a unified system. The five contractual insurance
companies into which, after nationalisation, the former fifty-three cOlllpa-
nies were merged, were also united into one national enterprise. 9
Of more relevance to the social conditions of the population was the
unification of the obligatory social insurance. Plans for this had already
been proposed and the relevant law was passed in April 1948.
Another law of Spring 1948 remodelIed the agrarian reform. This law
allected I 027 000 hectares of land of which 290 000 hectares were agri-
cultural land. Of this land 61 000 hectares altogether were left to the
present owners, small farmers received about 100000 hectares and agri-
cultural cooperatives took over 71 000 hectares. The rest became state
property. Agricultural bllildings, livestock and mechanical equipment
were divided among the state farms and among the state tractor stations
and machinery cooperativcs. Forests became mainly state-owned. This
division of expropriated land and eqllipment foreshadowed meaSllres
wh ich were to co me in the 1950s, namely the collectivisation 01'
agriculturc.
Although in political terms, the commllnist takeover in 1948 can best he
described as a COUI' d'etat, as far as the structure of society was concerncd,
its consequences have to be classified as areal social revolution. Social
change inallgurated in so me sec tors of economy in 1945 was carried much
flIrther, and within a further ten years, the last bastion of private owner-
ship, agriculture, surrendered to the unrelentless political pressure.

ECONOMIC POLICY UNDER ST ATE SOCIALISM

The first two years of the first Five Year Plan (1949-53) brought about
drastic shifts not only in the economic but also in the social structure of
the nation. The expropriation was partly based on law, partlyon various
kinds or punitive measures because or more or less fabricated offences.
Consequently, there was a large transfer of labollr force to the preferred
branches of industry. Thc newly introduced tllrnover tax fell almost ex-
86 Ecollomic COlltexl

c1usively on consumer goods. The rationing of a wide range of consumer

goods which was near abolition in 1947 again had to be extended. As
almost all relevant economic data were kept secret the magnitude of the
rcsulting disequilibrium could be only suspected. 1o
By 1953 the inflationary pressure mounted so high that a drastic mon-
ctary reform had to be undertaken. Unlike the monetary reform of 1945,
wh ich had only blocked the pent-up demand and allowed for the freeing of
limited amounts of assets when the social conditions of individual owners
justified it, the monetary reform of 1953 combined the exchange of notes
and coins with further redistribution and, above all, confiscation of wealth.
It established a double, highly discriminatory rate of conversion: one for
claims by 'society' (government, socialised enterprises, etc.) and the other
tor those by the population.
The basic conversion rate of 5 old korunas to I new koruna was intro-
duced for all wage payments, pensions, and other social benefits, for all
obligations towards government and socialist enterprises, and for cash bal-
ances up to 300 korunas in the new currency. For all other private cash bal-
allces and all other individual dealings with the government and socialised
enterprises the conversion rate was fixed at 50: I, which meant a 90 per cent
cOllfiscatioll. The blocked deposits in pre-1945 currency were completely
annihilated. Saving deposits in post-1945 currency were converted at the
basic rate of 5: I for deposits up to 5000 korunas and above that level at a
progressively depreciating rate. Rationing was abolished, and unified
priccs, somewhat higher than former rationed prices but lower than former
frec (legal) market prices, were deflated at the rate of 5: I. This raised the
cost-of-living index for families buying only rationed goods by about
10 per cent. (Only lower wages and salaries and also wages of some cate-
gories of workers such as those in mines and heavy industry were increased
hy a few percentage points.) By this act of economic craftsmanship (it was
the Soviet experts who masterminded this reform) all uncontrolled sources
of income were abolished and the collectivisation drive, which meanwhile
had been started in thc countryside, could be intensified.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to assess the impact of the above-
menlioned confiscations on the different groups of population. However,
as only the deposits in saving banks werc treated more leniently, judging
from the reaction of the population in different parts of the country, wc
may reasonably infer that this reform hit not only the former capitalists but
also thc workers who, especially in the privileged branches of industry
such as mining, metallurgy and heavy engineering had accumulated large
savings. The workers' demonstrations in several cilies. espccially in Pizen,
bear witness to this fact.
 The Rise and Fall 0/ a Socialist Experimelll 87
A particular aspect of the 1953 monetary reform was the 39 per cent
revaluation of the koruna (official exchange rate) in terms of the
US dollar. From then on, vital exports had often to be subsidised, even if
exports were not, as a maUer of principle, taxed by the turnover tax. On
the other hand, the advantages of cheaper imports were to a considerable
extent invalidated by several factors such as dependence on low-grade iron
ore from Soviet Russia, the embargo on some badly needed materials from
the West, and the inducement by the plan's indicators (gross output) to
use raw material lavishly, wh ich for industrial use had mostly to be
imported. 1I
After the socialisation of private businesses, great and smalI, in
1949-51, after the confiscation of most savings in 1953, came the farmers'
turn. Whilst in 1955, 56 per cent of cultivated land was still privately
owned, by 1960 this share dropped to mere 9 per cent representing mainly
holdings below 5 acres in infertile hill areas. Meanwhile the private
owners of apartment houses had been ruined by the maintenance of rents
at the 1939 level.
Thus, as all potentially profitable means of production were socialised,
Czechoslovakia could be proclaimed, in the new constitution promu1gated
in 1960, a socialist republic. The communists considered this occasion as
their triumph.
Meanwhile, however, the economists began to realise that the immense
economic inputs were not generating corresponding outputs and that
something had to be done. The first 'reform move' was directed towards
reducing tbe number of indicators (about 15 000 in physical units at that
time) and decentralising decision-making. In the biUer-sweet atmosphere
which spread throughout the Czechoslovak power elite after the Twentieth
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (where Khrushchov disclosed
and criticised Stalin's blunders) the reform ideas were incorporated
into the resolution of the general Communist Party conference on
15 June 1956. Not much, however, happened in reality. The administrative
machinery put into operation five to eight years earlier had become so
strongly established and the people in top positions so well-accommodated
that they had no interest in a change.
Another attempt to shift the decision-making from the top to lower organs
and to rationalise the system of indicators, especially to lay much more
stress on qualitative aspects of production, was undertaken two years later.
Beginning in 1959, enterprises were allowed to accumulate funds from par-
ticipation in increased profits and in depreciation allowances, and some half-
hearted steps were taken to give greater material incentives to employees for
increased contribution to production. All this modest reform, however,
88 Economic COlltext
served only to put additional strains on the already-strained relationship
between the monetary and the real processes within the economy. Retained
profits in enterpriscs bolstered the amount of investment, and continuous
increases in wages stimulated effective consumer demand. This, in juxtapo-
sition with thc exhaustion of the labour reserve, which occurred at about
that time, led inevitably to a new inftationary pressure, to a slowdown in
investment and, eventually, to a reduction in production. In about three years
the 'reform' had to be withdrawn. Only greatcr stress on agricultural pro-
duction brought some good results. Higher purehase prices, higher invest-
ment and a bctter supply of fertilisers bolstered both agricuItural production
and the Iiving standard of cooperative farmers. 12
In 1962 however, thc economic growth expressed in official indicators
dropped to a mere 1.4 per cent, in 1963 turned to a 2.2 per cent decIine,
and in 1964 stagnated with a merely 0.6 per cent increase. This gave
impetus to fresh thought and the authorities became more inclined to listen
10 lhe economists who were becoming increasingly aware of the
illsufficiency of the established methods of planning and management.
Already aresolution of the Twelfth Congress of the Communist Party
of December 1960 had postulated the following changes:
• the gradual introduction of continuous planning (Le., abolition of the
uncertainty be fore the end of the planning period);
• the reintroduction of balances with provision for reserves (Le., aboli-
tion of the Stalinist system of mobilisation which sct targets beyond
the resources available);
• the improvement of the system of indicators (especially abolition 01'
the use of gross production for computation of productivity);
• the more effective usc of material and semi-products.
Stress was not on decentralisation but on higher efficiency, without
however the explicit statement of adequate means to this end. This was in
a way an advantage because it opened the door wider to specialist discus-
sion in wh ich the following points were particularly stressed.
First, the national economy is a Iiving organism the management of
wh ich is possible only on the basis of a thoroughgoing knowledge of its
functioning. Therefore, it is not possible to determine individual targets
arbitrarily. To pul it in Kalecki's terms, a central planning authority after
having decided the general rate of growth had aJready by this fact decided
on the structure of economy. The income elasticity of demand and the
technical inter-industrial (input/output) relationships are factors wh ich
determine primarily the development of the economic structure within a
given rate of growth.
 The Rise and Fall 0/ a Socialist Experimem 89
Second, even if the central planning authority were willing to respect
the functioning of the economic organism and adapt their indicators
'scientifically' according to its intrinsic laws, it had not the technical
means to do so. The available econometric models were neither suffi-
ciently comprehensive nor elastic to cover the wide range of decisions
which are necessary in a complex economy. Therefore the only practical
way was to leave these adaptations of individual magnitudes to the sponta-
neous activity of economic subjects (consumers and managers of individ-
ual production units), i.e. to the market.
The rcvitalisation of the market, however was not understood in the
sense of a free market economy. The market ought not to become the deci-
sive or regulating factor of economic growth, but rather a lubricant for its
more efficient development. 13 A socialist market economy had to be intro-
duced stage by stage, using administrative methods for the transitional
period. Of all good intentions, however,14 only one survived the subse-
quent scrapping of the reform. It was the restructuring of prices with effect
from 1 January 1967.
The restructuring of prices resulted from the quest for 'a rational price
formula'. Several alternatives were elaborated, taking into account various
combinations of labour and capital COSt.1 5 The result was a compromise
between divergent interests; although it did not abolish all political deter-
mination of prices (price subsidies provided at various levels of production
were reduced by about a half only),16 it significantly reduced the gap
between wholesale and retail prices, a gap which from the early 1950s had
a strongly discriminatory effect against consumer. On the whole, retail
prices remained almost unchanged (there was an increase of merely
1 per cent) whereas the wholesale prices were put up by almost
30 per cent.
The invasion of Soviet and other Warsaw Pact armies in August 1968
did not bring an instantaneous end to the new economic policy. The
reformers' rule continued for more than a year until thc pro-Soviet ele-
ments were restored to full control. The Communist Party was purged of
about a third of its membership, the traditional method of central planning
and management became the substantial feature of 'normalisation', the
catchword for the return to the pre-reform practices in all walks of social
life.
From 1970 until 1989 no attempt was made to alter substantially the
type and method of political and economic command: The economic
policy, however, had to cope with various challenges, partly external and
partly internal. The most shattering external challenge came with the steep
rise in oil prices in 1973 which strongly affected the structure of
90 Ecol/omic Context
Czechoslovak foreign trade. Internally, the most worrying was the acceler-
ated decline of efficiency of fixed assets, the continuous wastage of raw
materials, and the increasing damage to the natural environment.
Only in 1987, under the impact of development in the USSR, did the
Czechoslovak Communist Party feel constrained to embark on areform
course. With respect to the experience of 1968, however, the communist
leadership preferred to proceed cautiously. They produced several docu-
ments concerning the principles and execution of what was presented as a
far-reaching reform to be implemented between 1988 and 1990.

ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF ST ATE SOCIALISM

After the rich crop of economic statistics in 1940s, Ihe 1950s brought into
this field a comp1ete blackout.
The Statistical Yearbook 0/ 1948 was wilhdrawn from circu1ation
shortly after publication, the next yearbook was not published until 1957,
and then with a considerably reduced range and poJitically biased con-
tents. It was only after 1960 that the breadth of continuously published
information started to expand and seemed convincing at first glance. A
closer scrutiny, however, revealed that this information was not plausible.
Official statistics helped to create 'a false consciousness' about the state
and the development of the economy.
There were several causes for this bias. At the enterprise level it was the
shift from a transparent and interconnected system of double-entry book-
keeping to the Soviet khozraschot with its immense amount of uncon-
nected data. Everything had to be recorded in figures from which it was
almost impossible to abstract a general overview.
This change had the predictable result that enterprise accounting ceased
to provide statistical material for the national accounts; but no political
regime, obsessed with the need for secrecy would consider this to be a
disadvantage. The calculation of national accounts according to the
method recommended by the UN statistical office, later known as
Standard National Accounting (SNA system), had to be discontinued.
Thus, for ideological reasons for aperiod of several years, there was a
vacuum which was only graduaJly filled when national income began to be
calculated according to the Soviet practice. Without a fully developed
system of national accounts the so-ca lied balance of national income (net
material product) was found to be an inadequate tool for economic analy-
sis and management. The exclusion of consumer services from the calcu-
lation, and inclusion of services for the enterprise sec tor and in part for the
 The Rise and Fall of a Socialist Experiment 91
Government in lhe receiving branches of produclion not only distorted the
image of real economic I'elationships but also made it difficult to relate
the financial aggregates with the balances of labour force, raw materials
and energy. The concept of the '(gross) social product' also contributed 10
the distorlion of lhe real state of lhe economy.
However, the worst distortion, which impeded the transparency at all
levels, was the administrative fixing of prices. In economic terms, the irra-
tionalilY of such a procedure could not be justified by any rheloric about
the application of the 'Iaw of value'.
It was only in the mid-1960s when many economists discovered ecoll-
ometrics to be a safer basis for lheir calculations and consequently were
able to envisage a more rational price structure. Understandably the start-
ing-point could not be a free market but merely its simulation with the
help of econometric models. A decisive step in this direclion was under-
taken by the already-mentioned price reform of I January 1967.
The year 1967 was remarkable in the development of the Czechoslovak
economy for several reasons. Although the new pricing system did not
abolish all irrationalities, the disparity between the wholesale and the retail
prices was, nevertheless, significantly reduced.
Thc amount of published information aboullhe nalional aggregates was
subslanlially eXlended. Although most of these aggregates were not inter-
connectcd, an ob server acquainted with both the Soviel and SNA methods
of calculation could recalculate the Czechoslovak national accounts
according to the SNA melhod which, meanwhile, in the West, had becomc
the basis for all comparative and long-term analyses.
The main interest of foreign obscrvers, and also of those at horne who
wanted to know the truth, was an assessment of the real rates of growth. As
the series of physical indicators of production were discontinued, statistical
deflation became the most important matter. The down ward bias of the
ofticial price indices used for this purpose was obvious. But only from the
mid-1960s did the analysts find sufficient ground, in the available data, for
attempts at the rectification of this bias. Naturally, the domestic researchers,
as far as they had access to undisclosed data, were in a better position.
However, the issue was not only statistical deflation but also the need
for comprehensive national aggregates. As is well-known, the main
official indicator of growth, national income produced (net material
product in the SNA parlance), did not include non-material consumer ser-
vices, but on the other hand, included the total value of producer services
in the figures for material branches of the economy. This has to be taken
into consideration when domestic rectifications of the net material product
(NMP) are compared with the estimates of the gross domestic product cal-
92 Economic Context

clllated abroad. TabJe 8.3 contains a juxtaposition of two NMP series

(official and rectified) and three GDP series, as estimated by researchers at
horne and abroad.
In contrast to the drastic rectitication of the NMP series, the GDP esti-
mates show a smaller difference vis-a-vis the official data. On average, the
annual increases in the GDP estimates in Table 8.3 are 33-50 per cent
lower than the NMP data. Another estimate, however, that undertaken by
P. Havlik and F. Levcik of the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic
StIldies covering the period from 1970 to 1980, suggests a lower rate of
annual growth for GDP: 1.9 per cent in the said decade (Ahon suggests
2.75 and Summers-Heston 2.45 per cent)}'
There was only one period, 1961-65, when the data of a private esti-
mate surpassed the official figures. This is quite understandable. Unlike

Table 8.3 Economic growth (annual averages)

Periods Net Material Prodllct Gross Domestic Prodllct

Official Nachtigal's Alton et al. Summers, NachtigaL
series rectification Hestoll

1951-55 8.2 3.4 2.4

1956-60 6.9 6.4 5.4
1961-65 2.0 0.4 2.4 1.6 1.6
1966-70 6.8 4.5 3.4 3.2 4.4
1971-75 5.7 4.8 3.4 2.7 4.9
1976-80 3.7 1.0 2.1 2.0 1.9
1981-85 1.8 -0.9 1.2 1.1 0.2
1986-88 2.3 0.6 0.9 1.1
Avcrages
1951-85 5.0 3.2 2.6
1961-88 3.8 1.8 2.3 2.4

SOllrces:
NMP Official series: from the es
Statistical Yearbooks. Nachtigal's rectification
in Nachtigal (1991) p. 41.
GDP T. P. Alton (1987) and Alton et al., Occasional Papers nos. 115-119 of thc
Research Project on Natlonallncome in East Central Europe (New York,
199\). R. Summers and A. Heston (1988); R. Summers and A. Heston
(1984), p. 261.
Nachtigal in the same source as above.
 The Rise alld Fall 0/ a Socialist Experimellt 93
the officially used net material product, the GDP includes also non-mater-
ial services which in the early 1960s experienced a significant recovery.
The planners, however, did not look at this development as a beneficial
shift within the distorted pattern of the economy but saw in the stagnation,
or lower increase, of material production a sign of crisis; this, eventually,
brought them to consider economic reform more seriously (KrejCf, 1972,
p. 130).
A link with the pre-war situation can be established in two ways.
According to a retrospective official calculation the NMP in 1948 attained
96.8 per cent of the comparable aggregate for 1937. My own calculation
(KrejCf, Vienna, 1960, p. 17), based on the Two Year Plan Report (Prague,
1949), assessed the gross national product in 1948 as being 1.7 per cent
higher than in 1937. Due to the decrease in population, the per capita GNP
estimate was 7 per cent higher. The two calculations are compatible; the
reason for the difference is the incIusion or non-inclusion or non-material
services.
The rate 01' growth in itselr, measured in terms or a comprehensive
national aggregate does not yet indicate a commensurate growth in
welfare. For that purpose it is necessary to look into the structure of the
development. Let us start with the official figures, which indicate the
growth of personal consumption and or gross fixcd investment (Table 8.4).
Throughout the forty years. 1948-88. the increase in reproducible national
wealth was, for the planners. more important than consumer satisfaction.

Tab/e 8.4 Consumplion and investment (official scries, 1984 =100)

2 3
Persollal eOllsumptioll Grossfixed illvestmelll Ratio (2:1)

1953 119 236 1.98

1958 174 343 1.97
1963 215 424 1.97
1968 280 616 2.20
1973 350 896 2.56
1978 418 1,216 2.91
1983 421 1,177 2.80
1988 482 1,310 2.72

SOl/ree: Yearbook 0/ Historieal Statistics eSSR, p. 91 and 169, and es Statistical

Yearbook 1990.
94 Economic Context
Table 8.5 Provision with productive assets and their efficiency:
average growth rates per annum (as percentages at constant prices)

Productive assets Net material product

per person employed per ,mit 0/ assets

1949-1953 2.9 6.4

1954-1955 2.2 6.3
1956-1960 4.6 3.2
1961-1965 4.6 -1.3
1966--1970 3.0 2.4
1971-1975 5.3 0.1
1976-1980 5.5 -2.4
1981-1985 4.9 -3.3
1986-1989 3.2 -2.1

Sources: Statistical Yearbooks, 1975, p. 24; 1982, p. 150; 1986, pp. 13i and 184;
/990, pp. 243 and 246.

and within that national wealth it was mainly the increase in industrial
capacity that mattered. Although the pace was uneven and occasionally
investment did not grow faster, the final result may be suspected. Its
official presentation is summarised in Table 8.5.
As has been said already, the drive for industrialisation had two object-
ivcs: first, to provide the Soviet bloc with the products of heavy industry,
in particular for military purposes, second, to industrialise Slovakia. Thc
shift towards metallurgy, metal fabricating and chemicals startcd under
thc first five-year plan and continued throughout most of the subsequent
forly years. During that time-span Slovakia's industrial production
increased, according to the official figures, almost four times more than in
the Czech part of the state.
In the state as a whole the shift from light to heavy industry was of an
extraordinary magnitude. The ratios of differentiation with respect to the
main branches concerned (machinery and metal fabricating, chemicals,
foodstuffs and textiles), are shown in Table 8.6.
At this point the reader might like to know what were the rates of
growlh underlying the aforementioned coefficients of differentiation.
Unfortunately, there is no simple ans wer to this question. Official sources
give for industrial production in general three different rates of growth.
The most-often-used source is the index or industrial production in the
 The Rise and Fall 0/ a Socialist Experiment 95
Table 8.6 The main shirts in the structure of industrial production
=
based on official indices (1948 for all ilems 1.00)

1953 1960 1970 1980 1989

Machinery and meta 1 fabricating 1.52 1.78 2.12 2.52 2.92

Chemicals 1.19 1.52 2.30 2.76 2.74
All branches 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Telttiles 0.72 0.64 0.52 0.48 0.46
Foodstuffs 0.94 0.71 0.52 0.46 0.42

SOllrce: eurrent Statistical Yearbooks.

'Industry' section of Statistical Yearbooks; the coefficients in Table 8.6

are calculated from that index, divided by branches. The other information
is contained in the 'National Accounts' section, where the industrial pro-
duction is calculated both gross and net, each showing anothcr rate of
growth.
Thus, within the forty years (1948-88) the industrial production
increased either more than fourteen times (index in the 'Industry' section),
or nine times, or eight times (gross and net values in the 'National
Accounts' section). Value-added index calculated by foreign researchers
(Lazarcik,Alton el al., 1987 and 1991) suggest a mere five times increase
(for more detail see Krejef, 1993, p. 180). Taking into account that other
foreign (and also domestic) calculations of economic growth at large
(Table 8.3) indieate still lower rates than those given by Lazarcik, Alton
et al., (1987 und 1991) we may accept as the most plausible estimate a five
fold increase in Czechoslovak industrial production for the given period.
One of the specific features of the economic statistics under the commu-
nist regimes was a greater reliability of data concerning the change of
structure rather than the pace of development. As far as Czechoslovakia is
concerned, adequate data for such an exercise began to be available from
the mid-1960s. Starting from 1966, the present author was in a position to
calculate the GNP at current prices according to the SNA method (stand-
ard national accounting), both by distributive shares (or cost) and by final
use (or expenditure). This twofold count, each using different sections of
official statistics, provided a useful check on data consistency. For the
period 1967-78 the statistical discrepancy between the GNP by distribu-
tive shares and GNP by final type of use was on average 0.3 per cent (for
96 Economic Context
more detail see Krejci, 1982, pp. 18 and 90). From the already mentioned
price reform of I January 1967 the results of these calculations also appear
to be more meaningful than would be any aUempt at a similar calculation
for the earlier period. After the political change in 1989 the Czechoslovak
Statistical Office began to provide its own recalculation of national aggre-
gates in terms of the SNA method, backwards from 1980.
The abbreviated juxtaposition of the GNP by distributive shares and the
GNP by final use in 1967 (year of the first serious refonn attempts), 1971
and 1975 (beginning and peak of 'normalisation') is shown in Tablc 8.7. Its
figures reveal a moderate but nevertheless significant decline in the 'share of
population' in both GNP structures (as personal income and as private con-
sumption). On the strength of various data scattered throughout different
sources it may be assumed that in the mid-1950s this share was at its lowest.
For the I 980s there are already available official calculations focused on
the gross domestic product. But as the accounting system of enterprises
and institutions had not yet been brought into line with the SNA system,
thc Statistical Office had to use the transformation matrix agreed at the
international conferences of the European statisticians. This is not a
straightforward matter and a Iink-up with the figures given in Table 8.7 for

Table 8.7 Gross National Product by distributive shares and by final use
(as percentage of the GNP at current prices)

1967 1971 /975

A Distributive shares (the cost structure

oftheGNP)
Net personal income (in money and kind) 43.6 41.1 39.2
Amortisation 7.1 7.2 8.4
Net income of government and
socialised enterprises 49.3 51.7 52.4
B Final use (expenditure on the GNP)
Private consumption 50.9 48.8 47.8
Government consumption 18.2 19.2 20.5
Gross fixed investment 23.8 24.9 27.5
Increase in stock 4.0 3.6 4.2
Foreign balance 1.8 2.0 -1.1
Reported losses 1.3 1.5 1.1

Source: 1. Krejcf (1982), p. 19 and 23.

 The Rise and Fall 0/ a Socialist Experiment 97
the earlier period is possible only with respect to the GDP by final use.
Official figures are reproduced in Table 8.8.
In order to link up data for the J980s with those for earlier years
(Table 8.7) I have recalculated all items in Table 8.8 in the same way as I
had done with respect to the earlier period. There was only one significant
difference between the official and my own calculations; I did not know
the value of investment for military purposes and the value of amortisation
of public fixed assets. The equivalent of these items had been inc\uded in
the earlier official data in public (i.e. government) consumption and I
treated them accordingly. The magnitude of the shift from the government
consumption to the gross fixed investment is 2 to 3 per cent of the GNP. In
the official count apart of losses is also inc\uded in fixed investment. The
share of private consumption in both calculations is almost identical.
Wilh these qualifications in mind we may summarise Tables 8.7, and
8.8 as folIows: The share of private consumption wh ich in the economic
cycle of pre-war economy tluctuated between 66 and 75 per cent of the
GNP (cf. Table 6.4) was in the post-war, planned economy reduced to half
of that total. The government consumption which at the end of 1920s
made up only lI per cent of the GNP considerably increased towards the
end of 1930s. In 1937 the expenditure on armament and fortification
brought it to 16 per cent of GNP. At the time of the communist takeover it
was slightly higher (though the military requirements at that time were
very modest in comparison with 1937). But then the share of Government
consumption increased to around 20 per cent of GNP. In the 1980s there
was a tendency to a further growth. The share of fixed investment which
had proved to be extremely sensitive to the economic cyc\e of the 1930s

Table 8.8 GDP by final use (as percentage at current prices)

1980 1985 1989

Private consumption 47.7 47.9 48.5

Public consumption 19.2 20.3 21.6
Gross fixed investment' 26.9 26.7 26.5
Increase in stock 6.1 2.1 1.2
Foreign balance" 0.1 3.0 2.2

'Write-off of los ses included.

"Exports minus imports.
Source: Statistical Yearbook 1991, p. 147 and 148.
98 Eco1lomic Cofltext

kept above the 25 per cent mark during the whole period of the centrally
planned and managed economy.
Comparing the post-war development with that before the war, we have
to bear in mind, and this not only with respect to the state socialist but also
to the free market countries, that part of government consumption which
directly benefits lhe private consumer was higher afler the Second World
War than earlier. Taking into account all government expenditure (eurrent
and capital) on education, culture, health service and social care and also
all investment in dwelling houses and adding these items to the private
consumption, we arrive at a fairer comparison of what may be described
as the full share of consumers in the final use of the GNP. But even with
this adjustment which would amount to 7 or 8 per cent of the GNP (KrejCl,
1982, p. 106) the share of the consumer in socialisl Czechoslovakia
remained substantially below the level of the earlier period.
An item of particular relevance for the state socialist economies was the
investment in stocks. Judging from the repeated official criticism of the
high level of stock increases, their magnitude in the structure of the GNP
apparently reveals a failure in Ihe efficiency of planning. Togelher with the
fixed investment which was not completed on schedule, the increases in
stocks were officially considered as the main flaws on the output side of
the economy. On the side of inputs it was mainly the uneconomic use of
raw material and energy, as weil as the low efficiency of fixed assets
(cf. Table 8.5) that were of grave concern for the planners. The reported
losses were a special item of the Czechoslovak statistics (from 1948).
They may be considered as a balancing item reflecting mainly the depreci-
ation of stocks and production rejects.
As far as foreign trade is concerned, Tables 8.7 and 8.8 refer only to its
balance. The total value of foreign trade was currently revealed only in the
so-called exchange korunas; only the input/output tables, published for
selected years, gave the value of exports and imports in domestic prices.
Thus it was possib1e to establish that, between 1962 and 1982, one
exchange koruna equalled two to three and a half domestic korunas, the
ratio being higher with respect 10 exports 1han 10 imports (Krejcf, 1993,
p. 182). Consequently the value of exports and imports could be caJculated
as a percentage of GNP at current prices for at least a few years between
1962 and 1982. In that time span the value of exports increased from 15.5
to 32.0 per cent and the value of imports from 13.7 to 29.7 per cent of
GNP. (In 1937 the ratios were: exports 16.2 and imports 15.7 per cent).
With respect to the commodity structure there was a great increase in
exports of machinery (from 20 per cent in 1948 to 54 per cent in 1985)
and a significant drop in fuel and raw materials (from 44 to 25 per cent)
 The Rise a1ld Fall 0/ a Socialist Experiment 99
and in consumer goods except food (from 3 t to t 5 per cent of total
exports). Also in imports the share of machinery increased (from 7 to
34 per cent), on the other hand the share of fuel and raw materials
remained almost stable (57 and 54 per cent respectively) and the share of
food (processed and raw material) declined conspicuously (from 33 to
6 per cent).
For the development of the terms of trade relevant data were published
from 1960, but a full account was revealed only from 1970. During the
1960s the terms of trade were more or less stable, with a slight improve-
ment towards the end of decade. The latter tendency continued until 1973
when the increase in the price of oil and also of other imported raw mater-
ials reversed the trend. By 1984 the terms of trade dropped below
67 per cent of the parity in 1967. But then again an upturn brought the
ratio of export/import prices to 76 per cent of the aforementioned parity.
Oddly enough, the up-and-down movement of the terms of trade was more
pronounced with respect to the socialist countries than with respect to the
other part of the world (Statistical Yearbooks 1990 and 199/).
The most significant changes however occurred with the structure of
foreign trade by country groups designated as socialist, capitalist and
developing country group respcctively. According to the multiple
exchange rates applicable until the end of 1988, 'socialist' countries (irre-
spective of whether they later became members of the CMEA or not) com-
prised in 1948 about 40 per cent of the total imports and exports
respectively. In 1950 this share increased to weil above 50 per cent and
500n reached the 70 per cent mark. In 1985 it was over 80 per cent in
imports and 77 per cent in exports. However, in terms of uniform
exchange rates introduced in 1989, the share of the socialist countries in
Czechoslovakia's foreign trade was 15 to 17 points lower than in the count
of multiple exchange rates.
During the whole communist" era Czechoslovakia's foreign Irade was
continuously, with one single exception (1951). in credit with the develop-
ing countries. Czechoslovakia tended to be also in credit with the socialist
East, whilst with the capitalist West she was quite often in debit; from the
mid-1950s until 1983 however. this debit became the rule, whereas with
the socialist countries the tendency to be in credit prevailed. This appar-
ently was Czechoslovakia's contrihution towards the redistributive process
that the communist camp tried to pursue on the international scale by
mcans of the foreign trade. Howcver, from 1973, when the cartel of the
main oil-producing countries increased the price of oit to an unprece-
dented hcight, Czechoslovakia could not maintain the export surplus to
her ideological partners any longer.
100 Ecoflomic Cofltext

As far as the overall trade balance is concerned, during the 40 years of

communist rule Czechoslovakia was more often in credit than in debit. In
1989 the total foreign debt, whether from trade or from other transactions,
amounted to 8691 million US$, of which 7915 million was in convertible
currencies; in the domestic currency this was 124 billion korunas
(Statistical Yearbook /99/, p. 487). This sum represented about
16 per cent of the GDP in 1989.

THE ROLE OF THE ECONOMY IN SLOVAKIA'S NATION-

BUILDING

The main, durable, achievement of the communist regime in

Czechoslovakia was the industrialisation of Siovakia. Its precondition was
a marriage of Czech national interests with the communist strategy for
bringing the two parts of the state eloser together. For the Slovaks the
communist era represented the third act in their drive for a fuU-fledged
nationhood.
The First Czechoslovak Republic (1918-38), democratic and capitalist
as it was, delivered the Slovaks from a progressive absorption into the
ethnic conglomeration of magyarised Hungary and helped them to develop
further their distinctive culture based on their own literary language. This
twenty years of education in the Slovak language at all levels of the school
structure was the main asset which Slovakia derived from cohabitation
with the Czechs in the common state. Economically, however, there was
no particular gain for the Slovaks from that close coexistence. Neither the
market forces nor economic regulation, aimed at protecting the domestic
market or at a better competitive edge in the foreign trade, could have any
specific regard for the weaker partner within one and the same economie
area. Only the armament factories buHt in Slovakia in the late 1930s
brought her industrial employment to an unprecedented level.
The Slovak state under German protection (1939-45) was a historieal
phenomenon of ambiguous value. But within the context of defeat and
humiliation of their Czech partners and the still worse fate of their Polish
neighbours, the Slovaks could, for a couple of years, enjoy a taste of their
own statehood, however dependent it was on the foreign power and on
acceptancc of a reduced territory. Also the fact that until the war spilled
over the border into the horne country Slovakia's economy was compara-
tively prosperous helped to bol ster the self-confidence of her people.
The Slovak experience of having their own state could not be wiped out
with the defeat of their powerful protector. The communists understood
 The Rise alld Fall 0/ a Socialist Experimem 101
Ihis situation better than the Czech nationalists who at that time comprised
almost all the Czech nation. During the short interregnum of the Third
Republic (1945-48), the Slovaks were recognised as a nation in their own
right and the political status of Slovakia within the reconstitutcd
Czechoslovakia was elevated to a kind of autonomy. For the communists
however, it was not so much Slovakia's political status but the economic
equalisation of Slovakia with the Czech Lands that mattercd. Thc belief
that abolition of economic differences would eventually eliminate cthnie
rivalry was also shared by many non-communists, especially those 01'
liberal conviction.
The abolition of Slovakia's economic backwardness within a compara-
tively short time span required substantial Czech help; significant capital
transfers from the Czech Lands to Slovakia became a permanent faetor or
the communist era. The Czechs were made to understand that this was the
price for preserving and securing the common state; the Slovaks receivcd
the boost as a compensation for renouncing the status of a sovereign
nation. However, as has been shown in Chapter 5. the more the Slovaks
were approaching the economic level of the Czechs the more keen they
became to match their improved economic status with a greater political
sei f-assertion.
As an economic venture the communist policy was an outstanding
success, in its political implication, however, this policy was a complete
failure. Once the communist authoritarian regime had gone, the Slovaks
could freely wcigh up their chances for their future.
The level of equalisation betwcen Slovakia and the Czech lands can bc
amply illuslraled with statistical data. A few key items are given in Tablc
8.9. Except the average monthly wage all the other indicators show a con-
siderablc lag that Slovakia was able to overcome after forty years or inten-
sive effort. Some more will be said on this point in Part 1Il or this book.
As far as wages are conccrned it has to be stressed that it was the increase
in the number of wage earners in the labour force (from 40 per cent in
1948 to almost 90 per cent in 1989) rather than the increase in the average
wage that made a positive impact on Slovakia's economy.
Changes in the structure of fixed capital assets are shown in Table 8.10.
The first two columns indicate to what extent Slovakia's share in the fixed
capital assets 01' the whole state grew faster than her share in the popula-
tion. Thc other two columns show that it was mainly industry which par-
ticipated in that catching up for most of this period.
Unfortunately for Slovakia, in the fast-growing industrial assets there
was also an increasing share of capacity for production of arms and pro-
duction dependent on export to the Soviet bloc in general. With the demise
102 Economic Context
Table 8.9 Equalisation ratios: Siovakia as percentage of the level
in the Czech Lands

1948 1968 1989

1 Industrialisation a 54.5 82.0 92.6

2 Mcchanisation b 58.0 86.5 97.1
3 Per capita NMP" 61.2 79.9 87.8
4 Average monthly wage 91.5 98.7 98.8
5 Population per medieal doclOr 76.0 90.4 93.8

"Employment in the secondary sector in per cent of the civillabour force.

hproductivc assets per person employed in material branches of economy.
<National income produced.
SoU/·ce: Ratios calculated from thc data in current Slalislical Yearbooks.

TlIble 8.10 Fixed assets and industrialisation: Siovakia compared with the
Czech Lands (as percentage of fixed capital assets at constant prices)

Share 0/ Slovakia ill Share 0/ induslry

Czechoslovakia 's in Ihe fixed capilat asseIs
populalion fixed capilal Czech Lands Siovakia

1948 27.3 18.0 29.5 24.8

1968 31.2 24.4 34.5 33.8
1983 33.0 29.6 35.6 35.4
1989 33.7 30.4 31.8 30.9

Note: Constant prices: until 1975 prices of 1967, from 1975 to 1983 of 1977, from
then prices of 1984.
Sourees: Yearbook 0/ Hislorical Slalislics 1985, pp. 161-2, 475 and 676;
Slalislicll/ Yearbook CSFR 1991, pp. 226-27.

of the communist regime and with the end of the Cold War the sales of
these product suffered a considerable ~etback.
According to a study by Ales Capek, the production of arms in
Czechoslovakia culminated in 1987. Its approximately 100000 employees
represented about 3 per cent of the total industriallabour force. Slovakia's
share of that capacity was estimated as at least 60 per cent. Thus whereas
 The Rise and Fall 0/ a Socialist Experimellt 103
Table 8. 11 Transfers of net material product from Czech Lands to Slovakia
(annual averages as percentage of NMP)

In lire slIpporling country In Ilre receiving country

1950-9 4.5 15.2

1960-9 4.9 13.8
1970-9 4.6 10.6
1980-9 3.2 7.0

Source: J. Kroväk and E. Zamrazilovli (1992/2), p. 146.

in the Czech Republic the share of arms production represented less than
2 vper cent of total industrial output, in Siovakia it was 5 to 6 per cent
(Capek, 1992/2, p. 155).
The cost of Siovakia's catching up with the Czech industrial capacity
was a matter of conjecture but rarely a subject of serious argument.
Nevertheless, a solid attempt at a quantification of capital transfers from
the Czech Lands to Slovakia was undertaken on the basis of national
income produced (net material product) and national income used (expen-
diture on net national product). Tbe authors, J. Kfov4k and E. Zamrazilov4
of the Economic Institute in Prague, calculated this transfer for the period
of 39 years and compared its magnitude with the net material product in
the Czech and Slovak parts of the state respectively. The abbreviated
results of these calculations are reproduced in Table 8.11.
Whereas on the Czech side the transfers remained for the most of the
time at the same proportion of the net material product, on the Slovak side,
due 10 a faster rate of growth, they were bringing diminishing returns.
Nevertheless, their amount continued to be of particular significance for
Siovakia's economy.
Slovak politicians apparently remained accustomed to these transfers
and found it strange when the post-communist federal government,
seeking a quick return to a market economy, was less keen to carry on
such a policy. Due to the less marketable assortment of Slovakia's indus-
trial output, her representatives feit that they needed the subsidy more than
before. As at the same time they also wanted to be more independent and
to have a slower pace of economic transformation in the Slovak Republic,
the agreement aboul the further common policy became extremely
difficult.
104 Ecollomic Cotlfext

Table 8.12 Government finance in the final years 01' federation

(billion korunas and percentagcs)

/989 /990 199/ /992

Total government (state and loeal)

revenues in billion korunas 408.5 463.1 500.3 557.1
expenditure in billion korunas 414.9 455.9 510.7 565.0
01' which as percentage
Federation budget 16.9 19.3 23.0 22.4
Czech Republic budget 51.1 52.3 50.8 52.4
Slovak Republic budget 30.0 28.4 26.2 25.2
Balance as percentage of revenues
Federation budget -1.1 +4.4 +5.2 -5.9
Czech Republic budget -0.7 +1.3 -3.3 +2.0
Slovak Republic budget -3.5 -0.1 -6.7 -5.1

Source: Statistical Yearbooks /991, p. 151, and 1993, p. 119.

The differences in the financial strength and also disciplinc 01' the Czech
and Siovak Republics in the last four years of federal Czechoslovakia can
be seen from the structure of the federal and separate republics' budgets
which is reprodueed in Table 8.12.
Whereas in the budgets of the federation and of the Czcch Republic
years ending with surplus and deficit varicd, thc budget of the Siovak
Republie tended to be continuously in deficit. 0" the other hand, the share
of the Siovak budget within the total was declining. This points to a pro-
gressive weakening of the Siovak economic position within thc federa-
tion. Also other official series, such as on national income produced and
on average monthly earnings, indicate that in that time-span Siovakia's
position vis-a-vis thc Czceh part of the state deterioratcd slightly.
Onee on the Czeeh side the pragmatists won thc day, the Siovaks lost
their bargaining chips. They could not trade off theil' willingness to stay in
the federation for a continued economic support. Only emotionally dedi-
cated Czechoslovaks could preserve the federation. But they failed - and
this happened not only on the Siovak but also on the Czech side of the
border - to organise themselves into a sufficiently strong political force.
9 A New Start as Two
Nations
The demise of the communist regime opened the door for a fundamental
social change. Hs extent and depth is often conceived of in tenns of a
change in civilisation: Czechoslovakia, as weil as other Central European
countries, emancipated themselves from the civilisation which had been
imposcd upon them by thc military power of the USSR after the Second
Wor/d War and returned to the fold of civilisation to which they had
belonged for previous thousand years. This scenario is widely accepted in
that part of Europe which is in the process of post-communist transforma-
tion. A change of civilisation involves not only the change of political
regime, economic control and mechanism of management, but also the
change of values affecting human relations. The reader will find further
discussion on this topic in Part III of this book.
Of all these changes, the change of political regime has been the least
complicated. The communist regime, pretending to be a higher type of
democracy, preserved most of the democratic institutions of the Third
Czechoslovak Republic, lIsing them as pluralistic window-dressing for
Iheir one-party system. The 'velvet revolution' hadjust to tm these institu-
tions withgenuine contents; for this not too much legislative adaptation
was necessary. Practice had changed already before a new constitution
was promulgated.
Once Ihis happcned, the old c1eavages and rivalries opened. The most
acute of them, the Czech-Slovak relationship, has already bcen dealt with
several times in this text. It took only three years before this issue was
resolved, fortunately by mutual consent.
Economic transfonnation has been much more difficult, the more as the
Czechs and Slovaks disagreed on both its extent and speed. At the time of
writing, the process in the Czech Republic has hot yet been fuHy com-
plcted, although it is considerably more advanced than in Slovakia.
The shift from the command to the market economy, however is not the
only problem of economic transformation in the Czech and Siovak
Republics. A new element - unheeded in the previous epoch of market
economy - has appeared: namely, concern for the natural environment.
This sidc-effect of industrial modernisation became particularly hannful in
those countries where singleminded industrialisation was combined with

105
 106 Ecollomic Context
negligence or ignorance of ecological consequences. Improvement and
continuous care for natural environment has created an additional burden
for the post-communist transformation.
Thc basic prerequisites of the economic transformation of a command
economy into a market economy. deregulation and privatisation. werc
. started simultaneously. From 1 January 1991 most prices were freed and
the scope of legislature dealing with restitution and transfer of property
multiplied.
Apart from conventional ways of privatisation. such as restitution of
property rights to original owners or their heirs. and sales to domestic or
foreign investors. there was envisaged a free transfer of socialised
property to municipalities and social funds. and - which is a specific
feature of the Czechoslovak privatisation - the sale of property by means
of vouchers.
By a law of 1991 each citizen over 18 received the opportunity to pur-
chase investment vouchers - 1000 points of investment money - for 1000
korunas. These vouchers entitled the holders to order shares of any
company approved for the voucher privatisation or of any authorised
investment fund. Property to be privatised in this way was passed over to a
special fund. There were altogether three of them: the Federal National
Property Fund. the National Property Fund of the Czech Republic. and the
National Property Fund of the Slovak Rcpublic.
In the first wave of privatisation by voucher. wh ich was complete by the
end of 1992. shares to the total value of almost 300 billion korunas from
1491 joint stock companies were sold - 68.9 per cent through the Czech
Fund. 30.1 per cent through the Slovak Fund and the remaining I per cent
through the Federal Fund (Statistical Yearbook 0/ the Cuch Republic.
1993, p. 288).
In the Czech Republic there were almost 6 million citizens (over two-
thirds of adult population) who took part in this method of privatisation.
By the end of 1992 the total value of property approved for privatisation
by any of the aforementioned methods and passed over to the Czech
National Property Fund amounted to 470 734 million korunas. of which
almost 90 per cent concerned the joint stock companies. These data do not
include privatisation in agriculture or of sm all businesses.
The deregulation was not all-embracing; rent (a perennial problem of
price-cost relations in Czechoslovakia), most utility prices, and partly also
wages remained to be controlIed. Nevertheless the general price level
increased considerably.
The prices of industrial producers increased in 1991 by 75 per cent and
in 1992 by a further 17 percentage points above the 1989 level. The
 A New Start as Two Natiol/s 107
increase of construction costs was significantly sm aller. Producers prices
in agriculture. however. remained remarkably stable; in 1992 they werc
merely 1I per cent higher than in 1989. This comparative stability did not
particularly benefit the cost of Iiving. Its index was already in 1990
10 per cent. in 1991 68 per cent and in 1992 87 per cent above the 1989
level.
Nominal wages increased only moderately. A special tax imposed Oll
the amount of wages which enterprises had to pay kept them down. Thc
index of real average monthly wages. including those in agriculture. was
in 1991 28 per cent below the 1989 level. in 1992 this gap was reduced to
21 per cent. This has been the seamy side of the social aspect of economic
transformation. Its positive side was the low level of unemployment. At
the end of 1992 the unemployment rate was 5.04 per cent in the whole of
Czechoslova~ia. 2.57 in the Czech Republic and 10.4 per cent in the
Siovak Republic (Jamlcek et al .• 1993. p. 102). Also a cautious approach
of the goverr'lment towards the planned abolition of all kinds of subsidies
and towards the implementation of the law on bankruptcies helped to keep
unemployment low.
The adaptation of the price structure to market conditions had been
hampered by the fact that communist economic policy built up a high
barrier between foreign and domestic markets. The official exchange rate
was unrealistic and also the commercial rate used in foreign trade did not
correspond with the purchasing power of the koruna within the country.
The devaluation of the commercial rate in 1991 made the gap hctwecn
foreign and domestic purchasing power of the koruna still wider. Although
in terms of US dollars the Czechoslovak koruna had in 1992 the same
exchange rate as in 1937 (28.7 CSK per US$). its real value on the domcs-
tic market still corresponded more with the exchange rate in the late 1980s
(about 15 CSK per US$). However lhe lower exchange rate. adopted on
the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund. helped to reori-
enlate foreign trade. The share of the developed market economies (in the
former nomenclature capitalist countries) in tOlal trade turnover increased
from 37 per cent in 1989 to 64 per cent in 1992.
The discrepancy between the foreign and domestic value of the national
currency. however. created highly differentiated price levels within the
country. Shops. and in particular restaurants and hotels. catering for for-
eigners. tended to charge prices corresponding with prices abroad.
whereas in many places internal prices were a half to two thirds lower.
The macroeconomic position of Czechoslovakia in the last three years
of her existence is iIIustrated here by two tables. Table 9.1 indicates the
annual rates of development of gross domestic product by final use at con-
108 Eco"omic COllfext
Table 9.1 Gross Domestic Product by final type of use
(annual changes, as percenlages)

1990 1991 1992

Private consumption 2.9 -24.0 8.6

Govcrnment consumption --1.2 -17.2 -1.6
Gross fixcd investment 2.6 -31.8 5.1
Increase in stock 242.1 -2.1 -438.2
Total domestic demand 3.5 -24.2 -7.9
Exports -8.4 -4.8 9.0
Imports 5.2 -31.8 16.0
Gross domestic product -1.2 -14.9 -8.7

SOllrce: V. Nachtigal's calculation in M. Hajek el al. (1993/3), p. 334.

Table 9.2 Gross Domestic Product - Czechoslovakia and the Republics

(in billion korunas at current prices)

1990 1991 1992

Gross domestic product

Federation 812.6 996.4 1027.8
Czech Republic 567.3 712.3 738.8
Slovak Republic 245.3 284.1 289.0
Net export
Federation -15.1 25.5 17.5
Czech Republic 5.3 27.8 -7.7
Slovak Republic -20.4 -2.3 25.2
Net internal transfer
Czech Republic 3.3 7.7 16.0
Slovak Republic -3.3 -7.7 -16.0
nomestic use of GDP
FederatiOll 827.7 970.9 1010.3
Czech Republic 558.7 676.8 730.5
Siovak Republic 269.0 294.1 279.8

So"rce: V. Nachtigal's estimate in M. Hlijek el al. (1992), vol. 3, p. 336.

 A New Start as Two Nations 109
stant prices. Table 9.2 shows the nominal values with particular reference
to transfers between the Czech and Slovak Republics.
In interpreting statistical data of the communist era we had to bc ware 01'
an intrinsic lIpward bias in their indices of growth. In the transformation
period we may rather assume a downward bias; it is due to the existencc ur
a highcr proportion of the 'grey economy' (which evades statistical evi-
dence) lhan in lhe communisl era. Also lhe decline of wastage und in-
tentionally reduced output of arms after 1989 should be taken into
considcration.
In this contexl, the impact of lhis policy on lhe military expenditure
should also be mentioned. Whilst thc total cxpenditurc 01' the statc budget
increascd by 78 per cent from 1989 to 1992, military expenditure declincd
by 23 per cent. In proportion to the GDP this was a dectine from 4.7 lo
2.7 per cent (absolute data from the Statislical Yearbooks and Table 9.2).
Dcspite a probable downward bias the indices in Table 9.1 are cncollr-
aging. After a general and considerable setback in 1991, in 1992 the
increase 01' private consumption and gross investment in contrast to the
declinc of governmcnt consumption and, abovc all, 10 the clearing of
stocks signalIed an upturn.
Table 9.2 contains the data l'or the concluding years 01' Czech-Slovak
coexislence within one - from 1968, fcderal - state. Apart from the role 01'
the foreign trade these data represent a follow up to the analysis 01' such
transfers during the preceding forty years (cf Table 6.2). According to
these figures Slovakia's exports achieved in 1992 a remarkable upturn.
This might have encouraged her leaders in their drive at independencc.
 Part 111
Social Metamorphoses
Pavel Machonin
10 An Overview of the Basic
Social Changes
THE SUBJECT AND METHOD OF STUDY

The Czechoslovak state emerged from the ruins of the Austro-Hungarian

Monarchy following the defeat in the First World War of that dysfunc-
tiona) state formation. Its birth was a result of the clearly expressed politi-
cal will of the Czech nation and of the representatives of the Slovak
nation, on the one hand, and of the governments of the victorious powers
Oll the other. Under the leadership of a group of enlightened and experi-
enced politicians, the road to successfut democratic devetopment seemed
cIear ahead. Indeed, once the democratic government had steered clear of
joining the Soviet-type revolution and the post-war recession had been
overcome, the Czechoslovakia of the second half of the 1920s became an
economically and cuIturally flourishing democratic European country
enjoying international respect. Nobody at that time could have imagined
how complicated its destiny was to be.
From that time on, however, aseries of catastrophes and corresponding
significant and abrupt shifts in the economic, social and political struc-
tu res began: the great recession in the first third of the 1930s; the enforced
preparation for the defence against Hitler, the Munich betrayal and the
German annexation of the Czech borderland in 1938, the final fall of pre-
war Czechoslovakia in 1939 and the harsh times of the Second World War
under German occupation. After a short intermezzo following the libera-
tion in 1945, the Communist victory in 1948 opened the way for a tota-
Iitarian regime with the repressions characterising the 1950s. The reform
attempts of the 1960s, with their peak in the Prague Spring of 1968, led
only to a new suppression following the Warsaw Pact intervention in
August of the same year and to the harshness of the 'normalisation' under
the Soviet occupation. The 'Velvet Revolution' in 1989 brought new
hopes and some success in the creation of a democratic state. However,
the far-from-idyllic continuation of the post-communist transformation
had an unexpected outcome in the dissociation of Czechoslovakia into two
separate states shortly before the 75th year of its existence.
As a sociologist who, since the late 1950s, has been engaged in the sys-
tematic examination of some crucial historical stages of social structure

113
114 Social Metamorphoses
dcvelopment, the present author is profoundly convinced that most of
these events ean find at least a partial explanation in the proeesses of
social change within the country and in the activities of various social
groups and their representatives. Although external influenees obviously
direetly or indireetly eaused many of the fateful upheavals in
Czechoslovak history , the role of the domestic, soeial and political rela-
tionships and actors must not be forgotten, if only to use the accumulated
experienee to solve serious problems awaiting us in the future. At the
same time, it is quite possible that the seemingly unique Czechoslovak
experience of surviving in a geopolitieal environment exposed to heavy
external pressures and frequent international conflicts eould also be of
interest to other nations or perhaps provide the ineentive for some broader
generalisations.
As the ethnopolitical, eeonomic as weil as some of the demographie
aspects of soeial changes in this country have already been discussed at
earlier stages in this book, Part III will foeus mainly on the question of
vertical social differentiation - that is, class structure and/or stra~ification,
and other soeial factors influencing or altending the changes in vertical
structures in the Czech and Slovak societies. The social struetures of these
two ethnically differing societies that Iived for three-quarters of a century
within a common state, interacting and influencing one another, will be
systematieally eompared and analysed in terms of social change's impaet
on the relationship between the two nations. Such a formulation of the
topic is unprecedented in Czech and Slovak sociology. There are some
historical works dealing with similar themes on the basis of eeonomic and
social statistics and archive materials. Some of them (Kalinova and Pnicha
1969; Prueha 1970 a and b; Kalinova 1993 a and b) were elaborated as a
historiographical contribution to such sociologieal analysis as is presented
in this part of the book. We will use them systematically as one of our data
sourees. They will be equally as other historieal literature rcferred in the
text.
The subject of our analysis requires, as far as is possible, representative
macrosociological surveys as an empirical basis. Unfortunately, we only
have aseries of such surveys from 1967 at our disposal. As a result of this
and the extreme importance of the 'Iegacy' of the state socialist era for the
present and future developments in both countries, we will foeus primarily
on the well-doeumented social structures and changes between the years
1967 and 1993. Our main sourees will be the Czechoslovak surveys on
'Vertical Social Differentiation and Mobility' (Machonin, 1967), 'Class
and Social Structure' (Unhart, 1984), 'Social Stratification and the
Circulation of Elites' (Matejü, Buncak, 1993) and 'Beliefs and Behaviour'
 An Overview ojthe Basic Social Changes 115

(Machonin and Rosko, 1993). For the preceding historieal periods we are
obliged 10 use social statislics and historiographieal sources: before 1967,
Czech and Siovak sociology produced no representative macrostruclural
surveys enabling comparison.
We will begin with agiobai statistical overview concerning long
periods in Czechoslovakia's existence, briefly analysing the five crucial
long-term social metamorphoses:
• class structure changes,
• changes in Ihe labour force's branch (sec tor) appurtenance,
• shifts in aUained education levels,
• the urbanisation process and corresponding changes in settlement
structures,
• shifts in earnings distribution.

CHANGES IN CLASS STRUCTURE

Let us hegin with the developmenls in basic dass position indieators as

shown in Tables 10.1 and 10.2. These indicators are central to our study,
although the classifications used in the statistics are insufficiently detailed
when compared with the results of sociological surveys.
Although the data originate in different sources (under various
c1assifications) and therefore may contain cerlain minor inexactitudes,
taken as a whole they present a realistic picture of the dramatic changes in
social structures that occurred from the beginnings of the world recession
in the 1930s until the present. They show the rise and the final phase of the
tlourishing democratic industrial capitalist society in lhe Czech Lands of
the 1920s with its numerous self-employed, some of whom were indeed
fich, with its numerous and sufficiently skilled working class and less-
numerous peasantry, with its not-overly numerous bureaucracy and man-
agerial staff. Siovakia was meanwhile a rural country with a large
peasanlry and numerous agricultural workers and underdeveloped propor-
tions of urhan self-employed and non-manual workers (intelligentsia). The
dala furlher reveal a rat her similar situation in the last phase of the
society's recovery following the economic recession in 1937, that is on
the eve of the Second World War.
Data from 1946/7 and 1950 demonstrate above all the effects of the
world war, lhe German occupation, the transfer of the German population
on the basis of the victorious powers' decision, the resettlement of the bor-
derland, temporarily annexed hy Germany and Hungary, by lhe Czech and
116 Social Metamorphoses
Table 10.1 Changes in class structures in the Czech Lands, 1921-91, as
percentages of economically active

Class calegory 1921 1930 1937 1947 1950 1961 1970 1980 1991

Large- and middle-scale entrepreneurs

Outside agriculture 3.5 4.7 4.9
In agriculture 2.2 3.0 3.0
Total 5.7 7.7 7.9 3.1 2.4
Other self-employed
Outside agriculture 11.1 5.4 5.8 7.2 3.8 1.9
In agriculture 16.8 18.2 18.2 23.5 24.6 1.3 0.3
Total 27.9 23.6 24.0 30.7 28.4 1.3 0.3 1.9
Non-manual employees
Officials 7.6 7.6 7.5
Assistants X 7.7 7.7
TotalX xx 7.6 15.3 15.2 23.3 27.1 30.6 30.6 34.1 35.4
Members of cooperatives
Outside agriculture 1.6 2.5 1.4 1.5
In agriculture - 13.2 8.5 6.8 6.2
Total - 14.8 11.0 8.2 7.7
Manual workers XX 58.8 53.4 52.9 42.9 42.1 53.3 58.1 57.7 55.0
Total (economically active)
Thousand 4561 5278 5060 4027 3937 4695 4984 5364 5421
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0100.0100.0
% of population 45.6 49.4 46.5 46.0 44.5 49.1 50.8 52.1 52.6

x, xx as for Table 10.2.

Siovak population and by some repatriates, and eventually, the new post-
1948 phase of agrarian reform. More bureaucracy and managers, more
small proprietors, fewer large-scale and middle-scale entrepreneurs and
fewer industrial workers than before the war - such a structure charac-
terised the post-war situation. In spite of such regression, the Czech Lands
maintained at that time the shape of an industrial society comparable to
so me Western European countries. At the same time, Slovakia, after
having survived the far more destructive influence of the war on its terri-
tory, was rather a rural country with a none-too-numerous working cIass.
 An Overview ofthe Basic Social Challges 117
Table 10.2 Changes in class structures in Slovakia. 1921-91, as percentages of
economicallyactive

Class category /92/ /930 /937 /947 /950 /96/ /970 1980 /99/

Large- and middle-scale entrepreneurs

Outside agriculture 2.1 2.8 2.8
In agriculture 4.5 6.0 6.3
Total 6.6 8.8 9.1 1.2 1.5
Other self-employed
Outside agriculture 10.1 4.2 3.6 5.3 2.6 1.2
In agriculture 34.3 37.6 37.0 53.3 50.8 6.1 2.1
Total 44.4 41.8 40.6 58.6 53.4 6.1 2.1 1.2
Non-manual employees
Officials 4.6 4.6 4.7
Assistants' 5.0 5.1
Total' .. 4.6 9.6 9.8 16.5 15.5 25.3 28.8 31.6 33.6
Members of cooperatives
Outside agriculture 1.1 1.7 0.7 1.1
In agriculture - 18.0 11.2 8.4 7.4
Total - 19.1 12.9 9.1 8.5
Manual workers" 44.4 39.8 40.5 23.7 29.6 49.5 56.2 59.3 56.7
Total (economically active)
Thous3nd 1234 1437 1420 1652 1708 1775 2008 2485 2618
% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
% of population 41.1 43.2 39.9 49.6 49.6 42.5 44.2 49.8 49.6

x'Assistants' formed a group of occupations on the boundary of non-manual and manual

workers such as supervisors, shop assistants, lower employees, etc. In 1921, apart of this
group was subsumed under the category of manual workers.
"In 1980 Census, the State Statistical Office applied parallel to the old, used in the previous
censuses, also a new c1assification of occupations by whieh most of the so-called 'opera-
tional workers' - i.e. occupations on the boundary of non-manual and manual workers (Iike
shop assistants, workers in services, ete.) - were subsumed under the category of non-manual
employees. Using this classification, uncomparable with the previous data, the percentages
for non-manual and workers would be 34.1 and 46.7 in the Czech, 42.7 and 48.2 in the
Slovak Republics. The author made an analogous estimate for the 1991 census data, which
otiginally were 46.4 per cent, 44.0 per cent and 44.8 per cent, 45.5 per cent. This estimate is
comparable with the former classifications. •
Stlllrce.f: 1921-1961 (Srb, 1994); 1970--1980 (HSY 1985: 433,634); 1991 (CSY 1993: 415).
V. Srb recalculated the census data by including assisting family members in the correspond-
ing c1ass categoties and divided self-employed into the entrepreneurs and other (smalI) self-
employed categories using an estimate.
118 Social Metamorphoses
The series of figures ilIustrating the stages of further developments
(1961 - 1970 - 1980) tell a dramatic story of the total disappearance of the
sm all proprietor class (with no exact analogous occurrence in any other
Central Eastern European country, in all of which some small business-
men had been allowed to continue their work); of the progressive bureau-
cratisation of the economy and society without an accompanying and
sufficient intellectualisation; of the creation of a category of cooperative
workers (above all in agriculture) as a resull of the mostly compulsory
collectivisation; of the rapid decrease in the percentage of agricultural
workers and the enorrnous increase in manual workers - a class category
wh ich encompassed people who were transferred from their professions to
manual work, or earlier were just housewives. These shifts exceeded all
rational limits.
In this period, there were significant differences between the Czech Lands
and Slovakia, not concerning the global development tendency, but the
amount and pace of the changes. While in the Czech Lands of the early
1960s, the 'repeated' industrialisation of an already industrialised country
merely led to a renewal in the pre-war share of workers, Slovakia of the
same period doubled its post-war percentage, exceeding the pre-war per-
centage by 25 per cent. The rash 'socialisation' process of the self-employed
involved nearly 60 per cent of the economically active people in Siovakia,
hut only 33 per cent of the Czech population. The later extreme growth of
the working class was still much steeper in Slovakia and continued until the
1980s, while having already stopped in the Czech Lands. In any case, the
final structures in the 1980s were almost identical in both republics. In this
sense, the Czech and Siovak social structures, so substantially different
immediately after the war, equalised towards the end of the communist era.
The final columns of our tables show how after 1989 a gradual revival
01' standard European social structures commenced in hoth countries.
Since the last census data were only collected in 1991, the further develop-
ment will be explained at the end of this part of the hook (Chapter 17).

CHANGES IN THE BRANCH STRUCTURE OF THE

ECONOMICALL Y ACTIVE POPULATION

Class structure changes were attended by parallel, profound changes in the

achieved level of civilisation and culture. The best global indicators of
such developments are the changes in the branch (sector) structure of the
cconomy (see Tables 10.3 and 10.4) which obviously constitute one of the
factors strongly influencing the vertical social differentiation processes.
 An Overview ofthe Basic Social Changes 119
Table 10.3 Changes in branch structures in the Czech Lands, 1921-93, as
percentages of economically active

Year Agricullure, joreslry Induslry' Servicer

1921 36.6 46.2 17.2

1930 30.4 47.6 22.0
1948 34.7 44.0 2\.3
1950 32.4 45.7 2\.9
1955 27.8 49.7 22.5
1961 20.5 55.0 24.5
1965 18.3 54.6 27.1
1970 15.9 55.0 29.1
1975 14.2 55.2 30.6
1980 12.6 54.6 32.8
1983 1 \.2 55.3 33.5
1985 I \.8 5\.4 36.8
1989 1 \.0 5\.2 37.8
1991 9.9 5\.2 38.9
1992 8.6 49.1 42.3
1993 6.8 47.0 46.2

.. xx as for Table 10.4.

The Czech part of the pre-war republic was an industrial country with a
gradually diminishing agrarian sector, in which an industrial development
with many elements of modernisation continued, among them a more
rapid increase in services than in industry itself. Slovakia represented an
agrarian region with slow industry growth and a somewhat more rapid
increase in the not overly developed tertiary sector. The fact that the pre-
vailingly agrarian character of the Slovak economy (with its correspond-
ing high poverty level) had not changed too much in the first phase of the
common state's history was one of the main causes of the Slovak popula-
tion 's frustration, contributing strongly to the first dissociation of
Czecho.slovakia in 1939.
The war brought some final regression in the degree of industrialisation
and modernisation in the Czech Lands, but a limited progress in industria1
development under the 'sovereign' Slovak state strongly influenced by
Germany during the Second World War and during the immediate post-
war reconstruction. This did not extend to the destroyed service sector.
120 Social Metamorphoses

Table 10.4 Changes in branch structures in Slovakia, 1921-93, as percentages

of economically active X

Year Agricullure, joreslry /nduslry' Services'

1921 65.0 20.9 14.1

1930 60.6 20.7 18.7
1948 62.2 25.2 12.6
1950 56.3 29.3 14.4
1955 51.3 30.8 17.9
1961 35.0 42.7 22.3
1965 30.1 44.5 25.4
1970 25.7 46.9 27.4
1975 20.4 49.5 30.1
1980 17.9 49.9 32.2
1983 17.2 49.8 33.0
1985 16.0 47.7 36.3
1989 14.5 47.6 37.9
1991 12.9 47.0 40.1
1992 12.1 44.0 43.9

x Statistics of occupations for 1948-85 were c1assified by the author as folIows:

Industry = branches of material production - (agriculture + forestry) - (internal +
external trade).
xx Services= non-productive branches + (internal + external trade).
In order to maintain this definition, for the years 1985-93 some partial estimates
dividing transport and communication between industry and services had to be
made by the author. For statistics from the years 1921 and 1930 the classification
used was analogous to the so-called 'classes of occupations' wh ich are roughly
comparable with the 'branches' used in the years 1948-93.
Sources: SM 1925: 408-410; SY 1937: 20; HSY 1985: 460, 664; SY 1992: 195;
CSY 1993: 177; CSY 1994: 181 and SSY 1993: 141.
In this and other references: SM = Stalislical Manual; SY = Slatistical Yearbook;
=
HSY = Hislorical Slatislical Yearbook; CSY Czech Sialislical Yearbook; SSY =
Slovak Stalistical Yearbook.

After 1948, we can observe a steady decline in the population active in

agriculture in both parts of Czechoslovakia, such a decline being typical of
extensive industrialisation processes. In the Czech Lands, it was a rather
gradual change, somewhat accelerated by the collectivisation of the 1950s.
In Siovakia, the analogous process took the form of an abrupt global fall to
 An Overview 0/ the Basic Social Changes 121
less than 30 per cent of the original share of people working in agriculture
in the economically active population in the mid-1970s.
Thc rise in the percentage of people occupied in material production of
an industrial character was also rather gradual, although evidently exagger-
ated in the Czech Lands. We have already mentioned the fact that it meant
a repeated (second) extensive industrialisation for the Czech Lands, which
had already undergone this developmental phase in Austro-Hungary and
continued industrialisation and modernisation during the pre-war period.
The main motivation for choosing this curious path of development was
the military requirement generated by the Cold War. Continuing in the
endeavour of the Czeehoslovak state in the second half of the 1930s, com-
pelled as it had been to strengthen its defence potential, and the arms pro-
duction enforced during the Second World War by the Germans hoth in
occupied Bohemia and Moravia and in the 'sovereign' Siovakia, the state
socialist Czechoslovakia of the 1950s realised (under massive external
pressure) the so-called 'iron concept' of rebuilding the national eeonomy
to meet the needs of the Soviet bloc. By the end of the 1950s, an incredibly
large percentage of the labour force in the Czech Lands was occupied in
industry. For the same reasons, Slovakia was hastily rebuilt from a rather
agrarian into an extensively industrialised country, more than doubling the
pre-war percentage of people working in industry. The industrialisation of
the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia had some positive economic and cul-
tural impact on the population and led to significant progress in the mod-
ernisation process. However, an inseparable component of the general
economic concept for hoth parts of the state was the rapid development of
heavy industry (inc1uding energetics), machinery (espeeially arms produc-
tion) and, subsequently, the preservation of the already-attained technolog-
ical structures and levels. Given the natural conditions of the region (the
lack of sufficient raw materials) the results of this endeavour were cata-
strophic for the environment, the economy and the population. In the
1960s, 1970s and 1980s, when the Western industrial societies began and
successfully continued their post-industrial development, characterised by
a systematic deeline in the relative amount of industrial production and
manuallabour, the Czech Lands formed a stagnating, extensively industri-
alised society which was unable to develop a further wide-ranging mod-
ernisation process. In the same period Siovakia tried as quickly as possible
to attain Czech standards. The linkage of this phenomenon with the
already-explained developments in the class structure, particularly with the
enormous amount of industrial manuallabourers, is evident.
A direct consequence of this exaggerated industrialisation was a very
slow rise in the service seetor. Until the mid-1980s, a stagnation on a very
122 Social Metamorphoses
low level characteristic of the post-war period occurred. Some acceleration
was noticeable only in the second half of the 1950s and in the 1960s, obvi-
ously connected with contemporary reform attempts. In the subsequent
period of 'normalisation', the service sector returned to its 'normal' (for a
state socialist society), or slow developmental pace, the labour-force
balance being wholly saturated by the decline in the agricultural popula-
tion rather than by a decJine in the number of people working in industry.
This hampered the development of both the traditional material services
(the tertiary sector incJuding infrastructure) and the modern quarternary
sector: information systems, science, research and development, educa-
tion, culture and health care services. The contribution of the services to
the growth of the non-manual and, particularly, the highly qualified intel-
lectual labour-force. was limited. The first steps towards the accelerated
development of the service sector appeared in the second half of the
1980s. thus lagging twenty years behind Europe and the Czech Lands'
own national history .
The last rows of Tables 10.3 and 10.4 demonstrate the first changes
characteristic of the post-communist transformation. The agricuItural
sector has continued to decline, perhaps even to critically low levels if one
considers the quality of nourishment and the social needs of the country. A
new wave in the decline of the share of industriallabour-force has begun.
The relative number of those working in the service sector has begun to
grow more rapidly. However, the mainstream rise in this sector encom-
passes the traditional services (inc\uding travel, accommodation, foreign
trade, etc.) and only some of the modern services (e. g. banking. financial
consultancy, insurance, informatics and popular entertainment). while
science, research and development. education, health-care and culture are
in a somewhat problematic position. The door to modernisation thus far
has been only half-opened.

CHANGES IN LEVELS OF EDUCATION

Changes in dass and branch structures required corresponding changes in

the levels of attained education. The official statistics enable us to present
aseries of education indicators from censuses from 1950 onward (see
Tables 10.5, 10.6 and 10.7).
AIthough partially influenced by the extraordinary changcs in the edu-
cation system during the war, in the post-war situation and after February
1948, the 1950 data are first and foremost the achievement of the schools
in pre-war Czechoslovakia, thanks to which thc population was literate.
 All Overview ofthe Basic Social Changes 123
Table 10.5 Attained levels of education in the Czech Lands, 1950--91, as
percentages of population over 15 years

1950 1961 1970 1980 1991

Males
Without education 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3
Primary' 80.4 78.2 39.5 34.0 24.9
Vocational' 10.4 7.4 40.3 41.4 43.6
Secondary general 2.9 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.4
Secondary professional 4.4 7.1 11.6 14.3 18.3
Tertiary 1.6 3.7 5.1 7.0 9.5
Females
Without education 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4
Primary' 86.8 82.9 66.3 54.8 41.2
Vocational' 9.3 8.0 19.0 24.7 28.6
Secondary general 1.4 2.5 3.5 3.9 5.1
Secondary professional 1.8 5.3 9.0 13.1 19.5
Tertiary 0.3 0.9 1.9 3.2 5.2

xx as Table 10.6.
SOllrces: as Table 10.6.

However, the secondary and tertiary education was not extremely devel-
oped even in the Czech Lands and among men, not to speak of the lower
level of these degrees of education in Slovakia and among women. In
principle, the attained education corresponded to the standards of an
extensively industrialised country in the case of the Czech Lands and of a
rather agrarian country in the case of Slovakia. (It should be noted here
that the education system, including the e1ementary schools, was of a rela-
tively high standard as a result of the traditions of both the Austro-
Hungarian and Czechoslovak pre-war schools. This is also true of the
vocational schooling and apprenticeship system where, particularly in the
Czech Lands, a long, proven tradition of industrial education existed.)
It is clear from the data that in both parts of Czechoslovakia the level of
education of males as weil of fe males systematically grew throughout the
state socialist era. This growth was more rapid in Slovakia than in the
Czech Lands and among women than among men. Towards the end of
this historical period, the educational levels of the groups of population
specified by nation and gender were very close, particularly among people
124 Social Metamorphoses
Table 10.6 Attained levels of education in Slovakia, 1950-91, as percentages of
population over 15 years

1950 1961 1970 1980 1991

Males
Without education 1.4 1.2 0.7 0.6 0.6
Primary' 88.7 84.4 49.9 43.8 30.8
Vocational' 4.3 3.8 31.8 32.0 37.0
Secondary general 2.0 3.0 3.4 3.5 3.4
Secondary professional 2.6 4.9 9.8 13.5 18.7
Tcrtiary 1.0 2.7 4.4 6.6 9.5
Females
Without education 1.9 1.9 1.1 0.9 0.8
Primary' 92.8 87.9 73.5 60.3 45.7
Vocational' 3.2 3.6 10.8 15.6 20.3
Secondary general 0.7 2.3 4.3 4.8 5.2
Secondary professional 1.3 3.7 8.5 14.5 21.7
Tertiary 0.1 0.6 1.8 3.9 6.3

'1950, 1961 primary education including apprentices; 1970-91 vocational schools

including apprentices.
S014rces: Census data HSY 1985: 430, 631; Census 1992

Table 10.7 Percentages of secondary- and tertiary-educated in age cohort

30-34 years, 1991

Secondary Tertiary

Males Females Males Females

Czech Lands 21.3 33.2 14.3 11.0

Slovakia 23.3 37.9 13.9 12.8

Source: CSY, 1993: p.411.

 An Overview ofthe Basic Social Changes 125

in the productive age and, above all, among younger cohorts. On the other
hand, the high percentage of people with vocational education (both for
manual and non-manual workers) and with specialised secondary cduca-
tion for the posts of lower professionals corresponded to the extensive
nature of industrial development, whereas the relatively low percentage of
people with completed tertiary education was insufficient to introduce
further horizons of modernisation. In addition, the ideological, organisa-
tional and personal manipulation of the school system within the state
socialist system threatened to a certain extent the quality of education
when compared with open and more advanced societies, the only excep-
tion in this respect being the years of reform attempts before and during
the course of the Prague Spring. Although recent developments in the edu-
cational system have reduced its rigidity somewhat, the lack of financial
resources is obviously hampering the necessary quantitative and qualita-
tive progress.

SOCIAL ASPECTS OF URBANISA TION

The fourth basic indicator providing insight into the long-term social
dynamics in Czechoslovakia is the level of urbanisation (see Table 10.8).
Table 10.8 clearly demonstrates the gradual and stable increase in the
level of urbanisation in the Czech Lands, comparable with industrial
European country standards. Pre-war Siovakia recorded only limited
progress in urbanisation, thus pointing to the simultaneous conservation of
the more tradition al rurallife-style. It was only in the 1960s that a substan-
tial acceleration in urbanisation occurred. Although some elements of the
post-war urbanisation processes may have been artificially accelerated by
administrative measures (as weil as, on thc other hand, a temporary ham-
pering of this process in the first phase of the post-communist transforma-
tion by politically motivated dissociations of some larger communities), it
seems clear that the industrialisation of the country and its specific extens-
ive character requiring the construction of large plants in heavy industry
and machincry also caused a concentration of inhabitants in towns and
cities with adequate occupational (cl ass) structures, education, and income
levels. This process was attended by some changes in Iife-style. The urban-
isation was naturally more rapid in Slovakia, where it started much later
and from a much lower level, typical of a more rural region. The distance
in the achieved levels of urbanisation in the two parts of Czechoslovakia
stepwise somewhat diminished. However, whereas the level of urbanisation
in the Czech Republic, particularly in some of its important regions, has
126 Social Metamorphoses
Table 10.8 Inhabitants according to the size of localities in the Czech Lands and
Slovakia, 1910-1991, as percentages of population

Year Czech Lands Siovakia

Number 0/ illhabitallts Number 0/ inhabitams

< 2000 2000-20000 20000 + < 2000 2000-20000 20000 +

1910 57.9 29.5 12.6 62.8 32.8 4.4

1921 55.1 29.0 15.9 62.8 32.3 4.9
1930 50.9 23.6 19.5 58.2 32.7 9.1
1950 46.0 26.3 27.2 55.9 32.6 11.5
1961 40.1 29.5 30.4 47.9 38.5 13.6
1970 35.3 29.3 35.4 42.6 23.1 21.3
1980 24.5 31.5 44.0 33.2 34.9 31.9
1991 24.8 28.7 46.5 30.7 28.5 40.8

SOllrces: 1910: Sveton 1958: p. 191; 1991: Census 1992; olher years HSY 1985:
pp. 429, 630, 869.

already reached a peak seriously endangering the environment and the

population's health and quality of Iife, in the Slovak Republic this has not
happened. In spite of the high standard of industrialisation, it has main-
tained the character of a country urbanised on an intermediate level: many
people continue to live in the village or small town family houses which
were newly constructed or rebuilt after the war or concurrent with the
erection of new industrial plants. From this point of view, the way of Iife in
Slovakia is far more acceptable than in the Czech Lands.

SHIFTS IN EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION

The most suitable series of data providing a really long-term overview of

one of the crucial aspects of social change in Czechoslovakia - namely the
changes in social equality/inequality - are the statistics on earnings distrib-
ution in Czech and Slovak industry. Since people working in industry rep-
resented a substantial part of the economically active population, and since
the situation for people in other branches of material production (e.g. in
construclion) resembled that in industry, and since from the end of the
19508 onwards, earnings in agriculture gradually rose, approaching those
 An Overview ofthe Basic Sodal Changes 127
in industry; and sinee income for specialists, manual workers and adminis-
trative workers in the service sec tor gradually came to resemble ineome
for the same categories in industry, we assurne that this information can
help to clarify earnings distribution in the economy as a whole.
In the state socialist era, earnings became a more important income
source than ever before. The reason for this was that after the 1953 cu\'-
rency reform and the eeonomic and soeial liquidation of self-employed
during the 1950s, accumulated wealth (fortunes) ceased to function as a
substantial additional income souree for most of the population. Ouring
the time of the redistributive economy, howewr, earnings were supple-
mented by many kinds of social security subsidies which, as a rule, oper-
ated as an additional ineome equalisation instrument. Hidden material
privileges for the 'nomenklatura' (people approved for important posts by
the Communist Party) and unofficial ineomes generated by household eco-
nomie aetivities or the so-ealled 'grey' eeonomy are not covered by our
data. And, of course, the offieial eategorisation of people working in
industry which we are obliged to use is a far from adequate indicator of
the vertieal differentiation in oeeupational positions, hiding, as it does, the
inner differences within the basic categories. Table 10.9 shows the earn-
ings distributions from 1937-1991.
The eomparison of an average Czeehoslovak worker's earnings level in
1937 with the same indicator in both parts of the country in 1948 (along
with additional data demonstrating earnings distribution in pre-war society
whieh will be presented in the next ehapter) prove elearly that the relative
earnings standard of manual workers (in eomparison with other categories
of employed) substantially improved as a eonsequenee of the numerous
egalitarian measures taken during the war, and espeeially in the first post-
war years. (Pre-war workers' earnings in Slovakia must have been much
lower than the average figure for Czechoslovakia presented in the table
for 1937.) However, the main egalitarianism offensive only came after
February 1948. The new Communist politieal elite used its power and
eeonomie monopoly to fulfil at least some of the promises made to their
mainly working class social supporters. The egalitarian distribution of
earnings peaked clearly in 1954. (In the year 1953, the eurreney reform
praetieally liquidated the entire medium seale and large-seale financial
sources of all social categories, thus contributing to the further equalisa-
tion of income sourees.)
Towards the end of the 1.950s, an attempted moderate de-equalisation was
observable, interrupted in 1961 and 1962 by economie and politieal
difficulties. This reform attempt continued through 1968 (the year of the
Prague Spring) until 1969, but was stopped shortly after the Soviet invasion
128 Social Metamorphoses
Table 10.9 Earnings distribution in ezech and Siovak industry. 1937-\99\
(average monthly earnings of a person engaged in industrial activities = 100)

rear Cr,ecil Lands Siovakia

Teclmicians Workers Otllers Teclmicians Workers Otllers

and ecollomi.fts and ecollomists

1937" 87.2 87.2

1948 95.4 91.2
1953 110.5 99.2 79.8 115.6 98.4 96.4
1954 108.0 100.0 76.9 111.6 99.5 91.9
1959 115.5 97.7 75.9 116.8 97.5 85.0
1960 114.5 97.8 75.0 116.8 97.1 84.7
1963 111.1 98.5 77.1 114.1 97.5 87.7
1964 113.8 . 98.1 76.0 116.4 97.2 86.8
1965 116.9 97.2 74.9 120.2 96.5 . 85.0
1967 121.0 95.6 76.4 125.9 95.0 81.9
1968 120.4 95.6 77.0 124.7 95.2 82.2
\969 119.7 95.8 81.0 124.1 95.2 85.5
1973 116.0 96.8 82.3 \20.6 95.9 83.8
1979 112.9 97.8 76.4 115.6 96.8 83.9
1983 114.1 97.8 76.0 117.4 96.8 84.6
1984 112.8 97.2 76.9 1\6.8 96.3 83.6
1987 110.9 97.9 76.3 114.1 97.0 83.6
1988 111.0 97.8 17.0 113.9 97.0 84.1
1989 112.1 97.6 76.6 114.6 96.8 84.0
1990 112.7 97.5 76.2 114.2 97.0 82.7
1991 96.2 95.2

"1937 - data for Czechos1ovakia as a whole.

Sources: HSY 1985: 524. 725; SY 1991: 344 and SY 1992: 363. Data of those
years in wh ich important changes are visible were selected.

by the normalisation regime in 1970. In spite of some faint tendencies to

moderate de-equalisation in the 1970s and 1990s. in principle earnings distri-
bution in state socialist Czechoslovakia remained possibly the most egalitar-
ian in Europe. It was only at the end of 1991 that a new earnings and incomes
distribution began to develop. caused this time by a systemic economic
reform aimed at the gradual introduction of liberal changes to economic Iife.
 All Overview ofthe Basic Sodal Challges 129
Thc devclopments in earnings distribution in the Czech and Slovak
parIs of slate socialist Czechoslovakia were quite similar, apart from a
slight tendency to differentiate in favourable historie al situations even
more distinctly in Slovakia than in the Czech Lands. It is commonly
known that there was a stable annual redistribution of the national income
in favour of Slovakia from the state budget. And it is obvious that these
financial means were employed primarily for earnings and income equal-.
isation throughout the two territories, be it with some slight advantage for
local Siovak distributors (all this in sharp contrast to the extraordinary
pre-war income and wealth inequality in the Czech Lands' favour)
(see Table 10.10).
The post-1989 increase in earnings and, particularly, income differentia-
tion (encompassing Iimited subsidies for the unemployed) had far more
scrious social consequences for Slovakia with its higher unemployment

Table 10.10 Average monthly wages of population occupied in the socialist

sector of the national economy in the Czech Lands and Siovakia,
1948-1992. in CSK

CzechLands Slovakia

Yem' Without In Total Without In Total

agricultural agricullural agricultural agricultural
cooperatives cooperatives cooperatives cooperatives

1948 834 764

1950 970 852
1955 1214 1148
1960 1375 1330
1965 1502 1465
1970 1946 1643 1910 1582
1975 2317 2272 2271 2090
1980 2650 2728 2656 2606 2513 2594
1985 2920 3147 2920 2843 3018 2864
1989 3138 3560 3170 3090 3550 3142
1990 3247 3759 3286 3217 3819 3281
1991 3790 3822 3792 3748 3943 3766
1992 4644 4519

Sourees: HSY 1985: 467, 668; CSY 1993: 184 and SSY 1993: 147.
130 Sodal Metamorphoses
rate, substantial gypsy minority and lower per capita income which
resulted from its demographie specificities.

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

We have Ihus identified those basic processes wh ich formed the shape of
Czechoslovakia's social structure during the country's seventy-four-year-
long historical existence. The first steps of modernisation in an already
industrialised region (interrupted by a harsh recession in the first half of
the 1930s) lasting until the end of the 1930s and the gradual second extens-
ive industrialisation and prolonged stagnation at this level characterised
the situation in the Czech Lands. The development of Czech occupational,
dass, educational and income structures in pre-war times roughly corre-
sponded to the standards of European industrial countries. Following the
Communist upheaval, a total liquidation of the self-employed. a bureau-
cratisation and a state-regulated proletarianisation characterisedthe period
until the end of the 1980s. interrupted only by a Iimited period of refonn
attempts in the late 1950s and in the 1960s. Areturn to modernisation was
begun partially in the mid-1980s. reintroduced with increased intensity
and combined with the return to standard dass relationships after the polit-
kaI changes of 1989. All the mentioned changes were naturally attended
by a stable progress of urbanisation endangering the quality of life in some
parts of the Czech Republic.
In pre-war times. Slovakia was an agrarian. only partly industrialised
region. After the damagcs caused by the war. the agrarian and rural charac-
ter of this part of Czechoslovkia became even more pronounccd. Hcnce. the
extensive industrialisation, bureaucratisation and proletarianisation of the
labour-force occurred so abruptly, attended. in addition. by a wave of egal i-
tarianism. In any case, they were responsible for al least an equalisation of
social structures in both republies and somc Iimited progress in both educa-
tional levels and in the modernisation of the economy. culture and daily
way of life in Slovakia. That is perhaps one of the main reasons why both
during 1968 and following 1989. Slovak represenatives focused on solving
national democratic problems instead of the more general issues of changes
in the social and political structures. This different approach was also one
of the factors contributing to the final dissociatiön of the federation. The
urbanisation of the Slovak settlement structure has been less rash and
ensured some important Iife-quality advantages for this country.
This summary of the basic long-term global tendendes reftected in the
data enables us to progress to more detailed analyses of the social changes in
 A,l Overv;ew o/the Basic Social Charlges 131
the main periods of Czechoslovakia's history and, particularly, of their
reasons and consequences. Only after that can we discuss the most important
question concerning the mutual relationships between Czechs and Siovaks
and the historieal fates or their social cooperation in a common state.
11 The First Attempt at
a Common Social
Emancipation
THE BIRTH OF THE CZECH-SLOV AK SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
SYSTEM

From the social and political perspectives, the establishment of a new

democratic Slavonic state in a sphere strongly influenced by Germans and
Hungarians for hundreds of years was no easy task. First it was necessary
to decide if the new state would be based on the principles of the proletar-
ian revolution, expanding then from Soviet Russia, or on the prineiples of
standard European democracy. A natural pattern for this second possibility
was the system established in France, and eventually in the USA, both of
which were seen to be the main victors in the First World War and princi-
pal ac tors in the liberation of Czech and Siovaks. The necessary decision
was not simple. The extreme pauperisation of the population during the
war, the extraordinarily steep differentiation in fortunes (cf. Kalinova,
1993a: p. 16) and incomes, the radical moods of the soldiers returning
from the trenches, the rapid increase in the influence of the traditionally
strong Social Democracy and especially of its proto-Communist wing, the
direct invasion of the Hungarian Red Army - all these made a radical
solution more possible. The first parliamentary elections (Table 11.1)
clearly showed the increasing influence of the left.
Finally, towards the end of the year 1920, a coalition consisting of
Czech and Siovak nationally oriented political forces and the moderate
democratic left won the social and political conflict and decided, in accord-
ance with the prevailing cultural tradition, in favour of the Western, capi-
talist type of democratic system. However, this victory meant that besides
the already discussed problems with the nationalist groups among Siovaks,
Germans and Hungarians, the new republic faced a relatively strong oppo-
sition from the radical Communist left (supported by the lower c1asses),
which did not identify itself with the basic social and political character of
the Czechoslovak state.
In the first two years following the war, however, the pressure of the
working movement led to the introduction of numerous social reforms that

132
 Common Social Emancipatioll 133
Table 11.1 Results of the 1920 parliamemary elections ror the House or
Rcpresentatives in the Czech Lands and Siovakia, as percentagcs of valid votcs

Political party Czech ulI/ds Siovakia

Social Democracy 20.2 38.1

German Social Democracy 21.9
CzS National Socialist Party 9.9 2.2
CzS People's Party (Christian) 8.7 17.5
SmaH Business Party 2.3
Republican Agrarian Party 11.3
CzS National Democracy 7.3
Siovak National Party 18.0
Hungarian Christian Social Party 20.8
Other Parties 18.4 8.0

Sourees: Volby, 1990; Broklovii, 1992: 86.

- with some later limitations - opera ted during the entire existence of thc
First Republic. The eight-hour working day, the right to strike, state subsi-
dies ror the unemployed, the extension of health insurance and services,
protcction of tenants, were all legalised. Later, old-age and invalidity
insurance for workers were added to this system. In the process of assert-
ing such reforms aimed at the maintenance of social peace, ideas devel-
opcd by Professor T. G. Masaryk (the first president of the Czechoslovak
Republic) in his famous work 'Social Question' were applied. Thc
significanl intluence of the moderate democratic left, together with thc
civic parties in the coalitions governing the new state remained untouched,
except in the second half of the 1920s, whieh saw a purely conservative
government in power.
The radieal moods typieal of the post-war situation also helped to intro-
duce an anti-feudal, agrarian reform that ushered in a subsequent period of
development (1921-30) with some strengthening of the medium-seale
farmers and large-scale capitalist entrepreneurs in agriculture, to the detri-
ment of the (mostly German and Hungarian) feudal large estate owners
(Kali nova, 1993a, pp. 28,49). Concurrently, a state-supported emancipa-
tion from the confessional monopoly of the Catholie chureh, discredited
for its elose cooperation with the Habsburg monarchy, began. This
cnjoyed some sueeess in Bohcmia, less sueeess in Moravia, and only
Iimited int1uenee in religious Slovakia.
134 Sodal Metamorphoses
THE 1920s: A SOCIAL SUCCESS

After the prineipal social and politieal eharaeter of the Czeehoslovak state
had becn affirmed, the first atlempt at emancipating the Czeeh and Siovak
nations from the German and Hungarian inftuence began, an effort with
only reluetant support from the other ethnic groups. The more or less suc-
cessful outcome of the economie, social and cultural development in the
industrially advaneed Czeeh Lands, on the one hand, and in the agrarian
Slovakia, on the other, was in fact of greater importance. (At this point we
will not go into the developments of the small Subcarpathian Ruthenia,
whieh was also apart of Czechoslovakia in the period between the two
World Wars.)
In this connection wc should distinguish between two historieal periods:
the 1920s and the 1930s. In the first half of the 1920s, the Czechoslovak
state gradually overcame the post-war recession, including the relatively
high unemployment of the years 1919, 1922 and 1923 and the soeial and
political confticts in the phase of a Europe-wide increase of the revolution-
ary movement (1919-23). As stated, the second half of the 1920s was
something of a golden age of economic and cultural development, particu-
larly in the Czeeh Lands. It was also a time of a relative international
succcss for the new democraey within the gradually recovering Europe.
This does not mean that thc social relationships among the dasses in the
1920s were idyllie. Significant dass inequalities existed, creating a social
pyramid with the corresponding tensions characteristie of al1 industrial
eountries of that time. At thc top of this pyramid was a sm all group con-
sisting of large-scale financial and industrial capital owners and managers
of German, Jewish and, increasingly. Czech birth. On the bottom were
numerous groups of unskilled and agricultural workers. Particularly in the
Czech part of the republic. however. the traditional middle strata (middle-
seale and large-scale peasantry. craftsmen and businessmen and bureau-
cracy) wcre substantially supplemented during the 1920s by a modern
middle strata consisting of economic and technical personei, tertiary- or
seeondary-educated professionals working in industry and, above all, the
growing service sector. As a rule, these groups identified themselves with
the spirit of the modern democratic capitalist sytem, although a not
negligible part of the intelligentsia was left-oriented.
We already know from the overview of statistical data that as a whole,
Ihis prevailingly positive evaluation of the societal changes in the
Czechoslovakia of the 1920s can hardly be applied to the situation
in Siovakia. Various reasons - from the famous ideology of
Czechoslovakism (as a hidden form of Czech nationalist underestimation
 Commol/ Social Emancipariol/ 135

of the Slovak cultural potential), through the bureaucratic nature of state

administration in Slovakia, to the unwillingness of Czech, German and
Jewish capital to engage itself on Slovak territory (cf. Liptak, 1968,
pp. 95-137) resulted, towards the end ofthe 1920s, in Slovakia's inability
to overcome its inherited rural character and relative poverty.
In his original analysis ofthe income tax statistics from 1928 (presented
in Kalinova, 1993 a, p. 43) Prucha proved that a distinct income differenti-
ation of capitalist character did exist in the Czech Lands and, at the same
time, that Slovakia was merely a poor sister. Of the 327 people who
declared an annual income of over 1 million crowns, only nineteen Iived
in Slovakia, while of the 15 924 individuals who declared an income of
over ) 00 crowns, ) 924 were from Siovakia.
The other side of the coin picture is iIIustrated by the migration data. In
the decade 1920-29, the number of emigrants from Slovakia was 165 000,
whereas from the population of the Czech Lands - more than three times
larger - there were only 136 000. Migration from Slovakia to the Czech
Lands was a frequent phenomenon (Sveton, 1958, p. 169, 179).

Table 11.2 Results of the 1925 and 1929 parliamentary elections for the House
of Representatives in the Czech Lands and Siovakia, as percentages of valid votes

Political party /925 /929

Czecll Lands Slovakia Cucll Lands Slovakia

Communist Party 12.1 13.9 9.8 10.7

Social Democracy 10.2 4.3 14.1 9.5
German Social Democracy 7.5 0.4 8.8 0.3
CzS National Socialist Party 10.2 2.6 12.5 3.1
CzS People's Party (Christi an) 12.2 1.3 10.2 2.6
SmalJ Business Party 5.0 0.8 4.5 2.1
Republican Agrarian Party 12.7 17.3 13.2 19.5
Alliance of German Farmers 10.1
CzS National Democracy 4.7 1.8 4.5 3.8
Hlinka's Slovak People's Party
(Christian Autonomists) 0.5 37.3 0.4 28.3
Hungarian Christian Social Party 6.9 15.9
Allied German Parties 6.8
Other parties 14.8 13.4 15.2 4.2

Sources: Volby (1990); Broklovli (1992) 86.

136 Social Metamorphoses
The economic prosperity of Czechoslovakia as a whole allowed the new
state to maintain an acceptable level of social security, not only in the
Czech Lands but also in Siovakia. At the same time, Czechs helped the
Siovak emancipation from the remnants of Hungarian economic and cul-
tural dominance. The democratisation of the political sphere and the
progress of education and culture contributed significantly to Siovak
development. All this meant that the attitudes of the population in the
Czech Lands developed in favour of the pro-regime political parties. In
Siovakia, the Czechoslovakist parties rather lost their positions while the
influence of Siovak c1erical autonomists extremely rose in comparison
with the post-war situation.
The economic growth and ensuing boom lent stability to the
Czechoslovak social and political system. The achieved relative balance
of social, national and political forces continued. (See Table 11.2.)
Towards the end of the 1920s, the prospects seemed quite satisfactory.
Under one of President Masaryk's mottos 'To create astate, that is to
make and keep order', the editorial to a representative publication, Tell
Years 0/ the Czechoslovak Republic, presented the key ideas of the book
as folIows:
We have now established our republic properly and completely ... A
period of regular and healthy state development in colloquial forms of
democracy is coming (Deset let, 1928).

THE 1930s: THE ROAD TO COLLAPSE

In spite of this official optimism, the situation soon changed, abruptly and
radically. At the end of 1929, the global economic recession hit, with cata-
strophic consequences for Czechoslovak society. The second decade of
Czechoslovakia's existence was therefore far worse. In comparison with
both the post-war recession and the 1930s recession wh ich hit other
European countries, this recession was long-Iasting and extremely harsh.
The official numbers of unemployed in the years 1930-37 reached the fol-
lowing numbers (in thousands): lOS, 291, 554, 738, 677, 686, 622, 409,
and represented 6.5%-31.3% of the industrial workers (prücha, 1974: 505).
Also the partial unemployment was extensive. Unemployment not only hit
industrial workers, but also people working in agriculture, a significant
agrarian over-population being a Czechoslovak characteristic. For many
years, hundreds of thousands of working people (including many non-
manual) could not work or worked only for limited periods. For the most
 Camman Sacial Emancipatian 137
part, they and their family members succumbed to poverty. The normal
course taken by the economy and daily Iife deteriorated substantially.
State social policy was only able to help in extreme cases. The Iimited
social support according to the general system received only one third of
the unemployed (Olsovsky, 1961, pp. 437, 443). The industrial recession
was accompanied by an agrarian crisis with harsh consequences for peas-
antry and agricuItural workers and trying times for small-scale Iradesmen,
craftsmen and businessmen. Only state employees, seeure in the guarantee
of not being dismissed, enjoyed some protection.
The consequenees of the recession intensified the interrelationships of
social c\asses and c\ass-Iike categories. Even the normal differenees in the
social situation of employed were relatively large when compared with
the egalitarian requirements of the radicalIeft (and with their later aetual
realisation after the Second World War). We know, for example, that a
statistical survey of a selected sampIe of families in the years 1931-2
established the following relation of earnings of family heads: manual
workers - 100, officials - 232, lower, prevailingly non-manual personal,
Iike supervisors - 147 points. The contrast between these figures and later
egalitarianism in the state socialist era is striking (cf. the data presented in
Table 10.9). The standard of Iiving of the lower c\asses sank substantially
when compared even with the difficult situation following the First World
War. The index of the real annual wage, equal to 100 in 1921, rose to
116.5 points for employed workers in industry and even as high as 119.4
for all workers (inc\uding unemployed) in 1929. Afterwards the same
indices fell to 94.8 and 75.1 in 1935 (cf. Prucha, 1974: 505).
Nor were the economic situation and standard of Iiving of the numer-
ous medium-scale and small-scale peasantry, agricultural workers and
small businessmen - threatened by competition from large companies -
enviable.
Thc eeonomic and social diffieulties in the industrially developed
Czech lands were attended by an analogous but even harder situation in
Slovakia, depicted by a Slovak author 35 years later in the following
words:
In winter 1932-3, the number of unemployed in Slovakia was more
than 300 000; together with the family members, nearly one third of the
people in the country had no stable earnings, and were thrown upon
beggarly reliefs of some erowns. (Liptak, 1968, p. 117).
Slovak agriculture was additionally affected by the faIIing demand result-
ing from the decline in the standard of Iiving both in Slovakia and the
Czeeh Lands.
138 Social Metamorphoses
Taken as a whole, the aforementioned facts meant an extensive econ-
omic, social and eultural (including moral) destruetion for Czechoslovak
society, stimulating a substantial increase in radieal egalitarianism and/or
nationalism among those who - in many cases justifiably - saw them-
selves as victims of discrimination. Atthat moment the future national and
social confticts began to ripen. The democratic capitalist order in
Czechoslovakia discredited itself through its inabiJity to address this pro-
tracted critical situation effectively. This, of course, was not only the case
in this Central European country.
The sccond blow for Czechoslovakia came from abroad. The same
world recession was one of the factors which brought Hitler and his Nazi
Party to power in Germany. The threat for Czechoslovakia was immediate.
Everybody in the country knew that the liquidation of the Czechoslovak
state was one of the principal goals of the German government. This fact
strongly affected the internal political situation. It stimulated anti-
Czechoslovak forces and, step by step, caused a permanent polilical crisis
in the country. On the other hand, the forces loyal to the Czechoslovak
state also mobiHsed their forces. On this issue, they even raised an unex-
pected contingent and Iimited support from thc radieal len. Thc
Czechoslovak government sincerely tried to mobilise all the available
resources for the nation's defence. The intensified arms production
(including the plant enlarging and construction in Slovakia), thc construc-
ti on of boundary fortifications, the reinforcement of the army, all placed a
considerable strain on the people's financial and material resources and
energy. At the same time, it helped at least to increase production and,
towards the end of the decade, to moderate unemployment.
The 1935 elections showed the new situation clearly (Table 11.3). The
dominant position of the pro-Nazi Sudetendeutsche Partei amongst the
German population and the leading position of the autonomist Hlinka's
People's Party and Hungarian Christian Social Party in Slovakia was clear
three years before the Munieh dictate.
The combined effects of sodal and nationaltensions within the country
during the economic recession and the parallel pressures from abroad dis-
turhed the social and political equilibrium. In spite of the endeavour on the
part of both the government and the pro-Czechoslovak people's forces,
peaking in the army's mobilisation and large demonstrations by the citi-
zens in autumn 1938, Czechoslovakia's social and political system could
not withstand the unexpected external blow of the Munich dictate and
the ensuing German aggression. This brought the destruction of the
Czechoslovak state in two phases (in autumn 1938 and in spring 1939),
the invasion of the Czech Lands and Siovakia's transformation into a
 Common Social Emancipation 139

Table 11.3 Results of the 1935 parliamcntary elcctions for the House of
Reprcsentatives in the Czech Lands and Siovakia as percentages of valid votcs

Political pa,.ty euch Lands Stovt/kiel

Communist Party 8.9 13.0

Sodal Dcmocracy 13.0 11.3
Gcrman Sodal Democracy 4.7 0.3
CzS National Sodalist Party 11.0 3.2
CzS People's Party (Christian) 9.1 2.3
Small Business Party 6.3 2.6
Republican Agrarian Party 13.2 17.6
National Unity 6.3 1.6
Autonomist Block 0.5 30.1
Hungarian Christian Sodal Party 0.4 14.2
Sudeten German Party 19.4 1.7
Other parties 7.2 2.1

SOIl,.ces: Volby (1990); Broklov4 (1992), p. 86.

German puppet state. The first aUempt at a common social and political
emancipation by Czechs and Siovaks collapsed. The people, resolute in
their majority to defend their state, were frustrated both by the Western
democratic powers' participation in the Munich Agreement which they
deemed a bctrayal, and by the government's easy capitulation. Many of
them were inclined to connect these feelings with a general criticism of the
Western type of dcmocratic social order based on capitalist principles.
Thus the tragic experiences of the 1930s - the harsh and protracted econ-
omic recession and the Munich defeat - shook a significant part of the
Czechoslovak and, especially the Czech, population's confidence in the
principles on wh ich the common state had been buHt.
12 Social Developments
during the Second World
War
SOCIAL DEVASTATION IN THE CZECH LANDS

Social developments in the Czech Lands over the period September

1938-May 1945 represent an extraordinary phenomenon, above all
because of the intentional and violent interruption of historieal continuity
by external forces. The continuity of the state existence. of its territorial
basis, of the development of the national economy and social rel~tionships
was either totally interrupted or limited to such an extent that a substantial
change in the daily life of every family was immediately visible. The dis-
continuity also explains the lack of statistieal data comparable with the
series presented in Chapter 10. We are thus forced to use data and other
information drawn mainly from literary sources in this chapter, mostly
Professor Pnicha's working paper of the late 1960s (Priicha, 1970b,
pp. 3-49) or from its re-edition in (Kali nova, 1993a, pp. 50-76). Where no
other mention is made, the published data come from these sources.
Shortly before finishing the typescript of this book, two new important
literary sources appeared (Kural, 1994; and Kucera, 1994).
As a consequence of both the Munich Agreement and the German inva-
sion of March 1939, the Czech lands were torn out of the original
Czechoslovak state and their intensive contacts with Slovakia were strictly
Iimited. According to the Munich Agreement and its enforced acceptance
by the Czechoslovak government, 29 per cent of Czech territory (this con-
taining 40 per cent of the national industrial capacity) was occupied by
foreign armies and annexed by Germany and - in apart of Silesia - by
Poland in 1938. Approximately 700 000 people of Czech nationality lived
on the annexed territory. About 160 000 of them (or even more according
to other sources), together with 30000 German Anti-Fascists and 20-
30000 lews, escaped the invasion (Kural, 1994, pp. 44), most of them
without the fortunes that they had to leave behind on the invaded territory.
That part of the Czech population which stayed in the annexed
'Sudetenland' (more than 40 000 according to (Kucera, 1994, p. 20» were
persecuted, had an inferior socia) position and lived under the

140
 Social Developme1lts 141
Germanisation pressure (Kural, 1994, pp. 44-45). Later on, numerous
groups of foreed Czeeh workers eame to the border area, forming thc
lowest strata of the population there. In any ease, most of those who did
not yield to the Germanisation, experieneed a downwardly mobile movc-
ment, while those who aeeepted it were - Iike the German population -
exposed to the hardships of direet participation in the war, including the
eonsequences of the war-economy in daily life.
In 1939 (after the short ouverture of life in the 'Second Republic' wilh
its limited democracy), families and individuals Iiving on the territory of
the so-ealled 'Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia' found themselves in a
unpreeedented social and political system. They Iived in an authoritarian,
violent, military and police dictatorship of eolonial character in the heart
of Europe, ruled by foreign invaders. However, this regime was not to be a
temporary, militarily enforeed oceupation; it was intended as a means of
splintering and absorbing the Czech population, Germanising apart of it,
eradicating another and resettling the remainder.
Nowadays, fifty years after the end of the Seeond World War, thc last
sentence of the preccding paragraph may sound Iike emotionally coloured
propaganda to some cars. Unfortunately, in the years of German oecupa-
tion, Ihis was the verbatim programme of the 'final resolution' (Endlösung)
of Ihe Czech question, formulated and systematically realiscd by the highest
German authorities. Reecntly, a compctent Czeeh historian analysed the
emergenee of this programme in the years 1940-2 in thc memorandums,
official doeumcnts, speeches and interviews of von Neurath, K. H. Frank
and A. Hitler (Kural, 1994, pp. 68-71, 153-155, 164-6, 190). All the
elements of this programme had alrcady been carefulIy elaborated. Apart of
the Czech population was condemned to direet pel'secution and physical
liquidation (people of lewish origin, the disobedient part of intelligentsia,
the representatives of national or political opposition to the Germanisation,
ete.). The directions of resettlement were determined - for a smalI part of
the nation the German milieu, for other large parts some Eastern areas. The
'positive racial characteristics' of Germanisable part were also specified. At
the same time, the 'final solution' in the Czech case was somewhat post-
poned as eompared with lews, Poles and some other oceupied nations. The
first phases of the gradual solution, provided for the exploitation - for the
war effort - of the eeonomie capacity and skiJJ of the Czeeh people, particu-
larly of workers and peasants and of the obedicnt bureauerats. For this
reason, the main German 'expert' for Czech affairs, R. Heydrich, deve10ped
the idea of an estate-Iike, professional-corporativist instead of a political
type of socia1 organisation (Le. handling peasantry, tradesmen and eraftsmen
and, eventualIy, workmen separateJy).
142 Social Metamorphoses
The sociologieal specificity of the Czech situation in the years 1939-45
can only be understood adequately with reference 10 Ihis stralegie frame-
work, in whieh the intended rebuilding and subsequent final destruction of
the Czech nation was to be carried out. The type of social arrangement
which was planned and then realised step-by-step in the Czech lands was
perhaps one of the most radieal kinds of totaliarianism one could imagine
in European conditions. Totalitarianism was attended by the introduction
of a military, strictly regulated economy with many limitations on the free
development of market relations. Ruled by foreigners, the economie
system was, from the very beginning, oriented to the extensive expropri-
ation of fortunes and exploitation of more or less forced labour. Some evi-
dence of this was al ready presented and analysed in Chapter 7. The main
social result of the World War intermezzo in Czech history was a substan-
tial impoverishment of the Czech nation as a whole resulting from the
unlawful systematie German appropriation.
On the base of this pauperisation, a caste-like system (instead of the
formally declared 'estate-like') was established in Ihe place of an ordinary
European class system. 4 per cent of the inhabitants of German nationality
(including the recently Germanised Czechs) ruled Czech society in a total-
itarian way; the society was thus indoctrinated and managed by represen-
tatives of the German 'Reich' on colonial territory. In its turn, this top
elite managed the notables of the 'state' administrative, mostly collabora-
tors of the Germans or at least highly obedient people of Czech national-
ity. The top elite had been carefully purged by extreme means (including
the execution of the first Prime Minister, General Elias) of anyone who
could have played a double game. They had a substantial bureaucracy at
their disposal, established by Czechs who had found in administration
some degree of certainty against the danger of 'total displacement' . Some
bureaucratisation of Czech society was undoubtedly observable.
The social position of the large- and medium-scale Czech entrepreneurs
and top managers was extremely complicated. A large number of them
were simply expropriated in favour of Germans and, in the end, physically
liquidated on the basis of their Jewish origin. For the 'Aryanisation' of a
company a 25 per cent participation of Jewish capital was sufficient -
Aryanisation in these cases meant Germanisation. Firms run by Czech
patriots affected by the systematie political persecutions shared the same
fate. The large German economic monopolies such as Hermann Goerings
Werke, Dresdner Bank and many others achieved control over decisive
branches of the Czech economy through administrative pressure
(Olsovsky, 1961, pp. 528-32). In most other cases, German participation
or control of the business was simply enforced under the pretext of the
 Social Developments 143
necessities generated by the war-effort. These and many other ma-
noeuverings by the regulated economy were employed in order to foster
the advancement of German capital expansion. A 1941 statistical survey
on the population employed in Czech industry showed that the share of
Germans among its total labour-force was 4.4 per cent, 12.8 per cent
among the employees of the General Administratives and Directories and
36.3 per cent among the active owners and top managers. At the same
time, some of the Czech entrepreneurs received the opportunity of partici-
pating in war business and increasing their capital. Their activities bor-
dered on the division between lawful enrichment and collaboration with
the enemy, in some cases overstepping this. At any rate, during the war,
the Czech entrepreneurs Iived with a powerful pressure diminishing their
economic strength and social status. Many of them were forced onto
downwardly mobile paths.
For the peasantry, particularly in the fertile regions, the situation was
relatively quiet. Farmers produced food necessary for war effort, while
many people who in the past had been only partially engaged in this
branch now chose to work there full-time. Besides the obligatory deli ver-
ies to the state for the war-effort, a natural exchange of goods and ser-
vices characterised agriculture at that time. Many town and city
inhabitants had strong contacts with the rural areas, helped with the agri-
cultural work and provided nourishment for their urban families. On the
same territory, the percentage of economically active persons in agricul-
ture and forestry was 35.2 per cent in 1939, 39.1 per cent in 1942 and
37.9 per cent in 1943. Primarily for these reasons, the relative number of
self-employed in agriculture increased together with the number of self-
employed in other branches and with the assisting family members from
33.9 per cent in 1930 to 40.0 per cent in 1943 of the economically active
on the same territory (KnU, 1959, p. 293).
According to the same source, the share of non-manual employees
decreased from 18.6 per cent in 1930 to 15.6 per cent in 1943, this in spite
of the already-mentioned bureaucratisation, probably as a result of the
ongoing devastation of the intelligentsia. The 1939 c10sing of universities
and other establishments of higher education for six years, the gradual
reduction of other schools, and the political persecution of intelligentsia in
particular, the decrease in posts for professionals and the displacement of
the non-manual to manual workers' jobs - all this ensured the dwindling
number of this social group. The measures leading to these ehanges were,
of course, intentional and directed against the nation's spiritual potential.
In the remaining years of the war, the intensity of this tendency grew with
the development of the 'total displacement' and led to a mass-seale
144 Social Metamorpltoses
proletarisation of the intelligentsia with corresponding egalitarian
consequences.
The share of economically active occupied in industry, craft and trans-
port (not including commerce) was 44.3 per cent in 1939.39.5 per cent in
1942 and 41.5 per cent in 1943 on the 'Protectorate' territory. On the other
hand, the concentration of people working in large plants grew, as did the
percentage of the economically active population. Most of the mobility
was directed to ,the metal-working industry which, together with metal-
lurgy, concentrated 54 per cent of all industrial workers in March 1945.
Obviously this was designed to increase arms production. Here, then, was
the second wave of militarisation of the economy in the Czech Lands
(after the first in the late 1930s). In spite of the fact that in the statistical
comparison of 1930 and 1943 the relative number of workers and appren-
tices on the same territory somewhat decreased (47.5-44.4 per cent), their
total number increased to 105.7 points. If we take the percentage at the
employment peak in November 1944, the number of industrial workers
reached 153 per cent of their 1939 level. As already mentioned in Chapter
7, the concentration of manual workers in heavy industry and the preferen-
tial treatment they received produced a levelling effect in real incomes.
However, in spite of the clear endeavour of the German authorities to
acquire some workers' support, the amount of production and the produc-
tivity decreased, as was shown in Chapter 7, Table 7.2.
All hitherto presented statistical data excludes the numerous contingents
of those who, from 1939 to 1944, were gradually forced to work abroad in
extremely harsh conditions, mostlyon German territory, within the 'total
displacement' framework. Their cumulative number according to our
sources was more than 400 000, their average number could be estimated
between 120000 and 200 000. These people formed one of the lowest
social groups within the working class, possessing a social status near to
that of slaves.
And finally, there were some hundreds of thousands of prisoners: Jews,
gypsies, political prisoners, living, working, suffering and dying in the
prisons and concentration camps. These people were on the lowest rung of
the socialladder. The enormous intensification of racial and national politi-
cal persecutions after the arrival in 1941 to Prague of R. Heydrich as the
new 'Reichsprotektor' provoked the resistance's attempt on his Iife. The
subsequent wave of mass persecutions, killings and deportations to con-
centration camps was connected with the first open declarations of the Nazi
leaders and their Czech collaborators on the 'final resolution' of the Czech
question. This historical moment was decisive for the creation of the final,
unnegotiable attitude of the Czech population to the Germans during the
 Social Developments 145
war. It is not by chance that the required transfer of Sudeten Germans was
only adopted both by the Czech exile delegation and by the Allied govern-
ments after this cruel experience (Kural, 1994: 198-223). On the territory
of the Protectorate, approximately 740000 people were executed or died in
prisons and concentration camps (Kucera, 1994, pp. 35,48).
The formal shape of class positions' distribution in the occupied Czech
Lands does not differ substantially from that which characterised the pre-
war social structure. However, the substantial characteristics of these two
social structures were different. The 'Protectorate' structure was violently
enforced by foreign invaders and organised on totalitarian and caste-like
principles, not on the basis of a free labour market. It was created neither
on the class principle of the capitalist society, requiring the free competi-
tion of economic and human capitals, nor on the meritocratic principles of
advanced societies, laying stress on the competition between different
levels of performance and various qualifications. The first principle
employed fOT job allocation was the 'total displacement' of persons in
response to the immediate imperatives of the war-effort, the second princi-
pie, the resolution of the 'Czech question' by the outlined methods. Thus
the seemingly absurd plans of the Nazi leaders had an impact on the actual
sociallife of the Czech population.
The collective social mobility of the Czech nation was, in general,
directed downwards: the average social status and standard of Iiving of all
social c\asses and strata fell substantially during the six years of the
German occupation, as did the large majority of individual statuses. Under
the pressure of the totalitarian system, socio-professional mobility became
frequented to an extraordinary extent. People often changed their jobs,
entering new, unknown milieus of classes other than their original one.
The firm social structures, already eroded in the 1930s by the economic
recession, shattered under the press ure of the war and the wilfulness of
the foreign totalitarian regime. In spite of the fact that the self-employed
remained relatively numerous, most individuals, including the self-
employed, became poorer and socially more inferior in relation to the not-
too-numerous higher 'castes' . In this sense, a widespread proletarianisation
and egalitarianisation of the Czech society was effected. Thus Czechs had
to survive lheir first experience of a totalitarian, anti-meritocratic and ega-
litarian social system in the extreme, harsh conditions of war. One of the
most characteristic traits of this system was the decrease of work motiv-
ation caused partly by the equalisation of incomes and fortunes within the
relatively poor Czech majority, partly by political dissatisfaction with
the totalitarian political system, its war activities and oppression of the
national interests.
146 Social Metamorphoses
It is not surprising that in such conditions not only sympathies for
democracy but also radieal ideas of social equality thrived, and encouraged
thoughts of rebellion using violent means. Such ideologies therefore had
an immediate influence on the population's attitudes, determining the
behaviour of the active participants of the national resistance, the parti-
sans' movement, the people who joined the Prague insurrection in May
1945 and analogous activities in many other towns, those who resettled the
borderland and organised the transfer of Germans from Sudetenland 10
Germany on the basis of vietorious powers' decision. Democratic, mode-
rate and radieal socialist ideas, along with the 'revolutionary' inclination
to violence and stress on authoritarian power also were to influence
people's behaviour following the liberation.

SOCIAL SHiFfS IN THE 'SOVEREIGN' SLOVAK STATE

It is no coincidence that for the first time in this part of the book, we are
dealing with the situation in Siovakia in aseparate subchapter. It is true
that Siovakia shared many of the characteristics of the social changes in
the Czech Lands - primarily, the dominance of German interests, the nega-
tive influence of the war conditions and the discontinuity in regard of
developments in pre-war Czechoslovakia. The final instance is in factthe
reason for the considerably greater lack of empirical data than in the previ-
ous subchapter and the necessary reHance upon Iiterary sources.
However, this time the developments in Slovakia differed significantly
from the Czech situation, and cannot be seen as a mere modification of the
same model. It was a fact that Germany initiated the birth of the Siovak
state; that it bound this state by special 'agreement' to total obedience; that
the southern fertile regions of this country remained annexed by the
Hungarians; that the German government compelled Slovakia to enter the
war against the Soviet Union and other Allies and to join the crime of eradi
cating lews and decimating the numerous ethnical group of gypsies and
the 'Aryanisation' of lewish forlunes; that German capital entered the
Siovak economy massively, more than replacing Czech capilal's majority
position; that global economie control belonged to the exponenls of the
German economic administration (Pavlenda, 1968, p. 114; Liptak, 1968,
pp. 197-8). It is true that the group of voluntary collaborators of Germany
was relatively broad and that, concurrently with the external German pres-
sure, the initiative of the radieal wing of the Hlinka's Siovak People's Party
also played an important role in the foundation of the separate Siovak state
and in its joining the war on the side of Germany. However, the social and
 Social Developments 147
political forces that followed the German challenge and founded the Slovak
state in a sense continued their pre-war political activities, initially receiv-
ing some relatively broad social and political support from other right-wing
political parties and apart of the population. Regardless of the juridical and
political aspect of Czechoslovakia's continuity during the war, for thc first
time in its history Slovakia became astate with formal sovereignty, and
was accepted as such by its population and by the neighbouring countries.
The military invasion of Slovak territory was only carried out towards the
end of the war. The major political economic, cultural and social changes
on Slovak territory were ushered in by the Slovaks themselves, with an ini-
tially relatively broad social support, later on with the increasing disagree-
ment and resistance of the Slovak population. And not all of them had
solely negative consequences for the Slovak people. Instead of a Iimited
domestic resistance and partial participation in the military fight against
Germany and its allies abroad as was the Czech case, the Slovaks reacted to
the increasing alienation of the c1ergy-controlled fascist government from
the civil society by an active and wide participation in a militarily
significant Slovak insurrection in 1944 and in the Czechoslovak Army
Corps which, togcther with the Soviet Army. liberated the Czechoslovak
territory. This helped the Slovaks to secure a far more favourable constitu-
tional position in the post-war Czechoslovakia than they had had beforc
thc war. It is true that at the end of the war, the level of production and
standard of living in Slovakia was substantially lower than at the beginning
of the Slovak state - but not so low as in the Czech lands (Prucha, 1974,
p. 227) ~ and that the dcstruction of the Slovak territory was more far-
reaching than that of the Czech Lands (Pavlenda, 1968, p. 116). However,
the six-year existence of the Slovak state meant that, for the first time in
Slovak history. some important progress occurred in industrialisation
(above all in the arms-producing factories. as weil as in light industry this
time). and in education and cuhure, inc1uding corresponding upward social
mobility. (Agriculture continued to be the leading branch of the economy
in terms of thc share in the economically active population.)
For these reasons, we cannot speak about social devastation in
the Slovak case. but rather about social and political shifts in various
directions, strongly inßuenced. of course, by external pressures and
unfavourable war conditions.
The Slovak state organised its new political elite of an autocratic,
clergy-controlled fascist character on the basis of the pre-war autonomist
poJitical forces. However, other poJitical groups, except the forbidden left-
wing parties. also gave the new regime some initial support and partici-
pated in the creation of a political elite. The new state offered upwardly
148 Social Metamorphoses
mobile carriers to many politicising clergy, officials and clerks, army and
police officers and sergeants. They partly replaced the banished Czech
personneI, partly saturated the process of progressing bureaucratisation.
New careers were available for teachers in expanding universities and sec-
ondary schools (many of them also replacing expelled Czechs) and in
olher intellectual and professional posts. A relatively extensive national
bureaucracy and intelligentsia emerged. At the same time, or with some
delay, a new contingent of people preparing themselves for their future
roles of elite and middle-scale bureaucrats and professionals in the post-
war system appeared. These were oppositional politicians and intellect-
uals, partisans, officers and sergeants who took part in the resistance, in
Ihe insurrection and the liberation of the country.
The space for some growth in the national Slovak capilal also opened up.
In the years 1939-45, the Slovak shareholding capital doubled (particularly
in agriculture, food industry and commerce) while its share in Ihe total capital
rose merely from 15.1 per cent to 17.2 per cent, Ihis because ofthe Germans'
refusal 10 render at least apart of the stolen Czech capital 10 Slovaks
(Pavlenda, 168, p. 114). Similarly as in the Czech Lands, Ihe large economic
monopolies gained control of important branches of Slovak national
economy (Faltus and Prucha, 1967, pp. 340-343). Many smalliradesmen
and businessmen expanded their firms. Old financial institutes improved their
positions while new were built. Part of the increase in the number of
medium- and large-scale entrepreneurs and their fortunes was due to the par-
ticipation of some of the Slovak population in the Aryanisation process.
The considerable weight of agriculture and the numerous agricultural
producers (both self-employed and workers) remained untouched to the
end of war as did their structure. It is curious that neither was the Slovak
regime able to expand significantly upon the pre-war agrarian reform in
favour of the peasants, nor was the Hungarian regime able to revise it sub-
stanlially in favour of the large Hungarian estate owners in the annexed
Soulhern Slovakia.
On the other hand, the Slovak industry underwent a temporary war-
boom. If we take the industrial production, employment and productivity
in 1937 as equal to 100 points, then in 1943 they reached 163, 151 and
108 points, with a subsequent decrease to 59, 81 and 73 in 1945 (Faltus
and Prucha, 1967, p. 365). The increase in industry meant a rapid growth
of Ihe number of manual workers. Partly by means of administrative meas-
ures, partly by a spontaneous occupational mobility, the percentage of
workers increased. According to insurance statistics, the number of
workers (excluding miners) rose from 100 points in 1939 to 147 points in
1943, and eventually to 136 points in 1944. Besides workers on Slovak
 Social Developments 149
territory in the six years of the war, 40000-83000 people per year
worked in Germany. The increase in the number of non-manual employ-
ees in private ttrms was even steeper than the increase in workers: the rise
being from 100 points in 1939 to 174 points in 1944 (Prücha, I 970b,
p. 58). These last data fully correspond to the estimates concerning the
increase in the group of professionals and intellectuals.
The rank-and-file soldiers of the Slovak Army possessed a special kind
of inferior social status. It is true that the participation of the 'suspecl'
Slovak soldiers in the real war activities was Iimited when compared with
their participation in the First World War on the side of the Austro-
Hungarian monarchy (only 20 per cent approximately) (Lipllik, 1968,
p. 191). However, the precarious social position of these young people,
stripped as they were of any human rights, was an important experience
for the Slovak population of the extreme social inequalities typical of Cl
totalitarian society based on the nationalist principle. Many of them conse-
quently took part in armed liberation actions.
The imprisonment and eradieation of the Jewish and decimation of the
gypsy population has already been mentioned. It was as intensive and
cruel as the same processes organised directly by the Germans in the
Czech Lands. Only the political persecution of the Slovak opposition was
somewhat more moderate than in the •Protectorate , . The participation in
armed actions caused los ses in human Iife.
As the sovereignty of the Slovak state was strongly but not fully limitcd,
the social structure of Slovuk society was large!y, but not totally defonned.
The sociill pressure against the Slovak nation was not strong enough, and
the totalitarian system nol systematic enough to produce an overall social
degradation or even devastation. There was considerably more space for
the normal operation of dass relationships and for both downwardly and
upwardly oriented mobility. The hidden oppositional activities, the prepara-
tion and realisation of the Slovak National Insurrection and the participa-
tion of Slovaks in the liberation war admittedly led to the harsh course the
war took on Slovak territory but, at the same time, partly corrected the
social shifts from the first years of the Slovak state's existence and pre-
pared the population for the post-war situation. The desire for democraey,
the either moderate or radieal socialist moods, the tendencies to violent
means in the solution 01' post-war problems - all these existed in Slovakia
as in the Czech Lands. On the other hand, these attitudes were not so exten-
sive as in the Czech part of pre-war Czechoslovakia and met stronger oppo-
sition in the Slovak milieu. These circumstances, combined with the rural
und petit-bourgeois character of Slovak society, moderated the revolution-
ary potential for the post-war situation in advallce.
13 The Second Attempt at a
Democratic Common
Life
THE POST-WAR SOCIAL SITUATION

In both world politics and the social and political situation in

Czechoslovakia, the 1945-8 post-war period was of a purely transitional
character. It began with the renascence of democratic Czechoslovakia as
an expression of the political will of the victorious powers, which at that
time still acknowledged the most important agreements made within the
war alliance. As in the Polish case, the victors decided that the transfer of
the German population from the Czech borderland to their motherland
would best serve the preservation of peace in Europe. They thus facili-
tated the starting position for post-war development in Czechoslovakia.
The Czechoslovak President, the coalition government, with the participa-
tion of both socialist and ci vii democratic parties and the Czech and
Siovak people, welcomed and carried out this decision immediately after
the war. As an exception within Central and Eastern Europe, the Soviet
Army withdrew relatively soon after the country's liberation.
On the other hand, the Yalta agreement cIearly determined Czecho-
slovakia's future profile and treatment as apart of the Soviet sphere of
interests - a fact that was respected both by the Czechoslovak governments
as weil as the Western democracies until1989. The real significance of this
quickly became clear - indeed, as early as 1947 and 1948. In any case, the
1945 liberation mission of the Soviet Army was welcomed by a great
majority of the population; the political and ideological authority of the
Soviet Union was, furthermore, relatively high (when compared with its
pre-war status and with the subsequent historical situation). This was based,
of course, on a low level of information on the real history and actual situ-
ation in Soviet society, wh ich was successfully replaced by Communist
propaganda as weil as by positive evaluations from well-known democratic
personaIities who even before the war and particuJarly during wartime
actively supported the Western democracies' and Soviets' anti-fascist coali-
tion. A further important inftuence - at least in Europe, incIuding such
countries as France, Italy and Great Britain - was the general turn to the

150
 Democralic Common Life 151
left. Paradoxically, the anti-Soviet Nazi propaganda during the war had a
wholly contrary effect, improving the Soviet Union's image on the princi-
pIe that the enemy of our enemies must be beuer than his picture in the
German propaganda generally known for its mendacity.
These factors found fertile soil in the widespread anti-capitalist, moder-
ately socialist or radically egalitarian moods that represented a relatively
widespread reaction of various social groups' disappointment in the world
economic recession, in the Munich dictate and their fresh frustration in
the social difficulties of the war and post-war period. Political radicalism -
connected with the inclination to violence (as a response to massive
violent means used by the occupants) against the German population or
against anyone seen to be an enemy of the social progress necessary for
the poor and oppressed - also found a certain pI ace in the politicallife of
both parts of the Republic. In the atmosphere created by all these factors, a
massive turn to the left occurred, particularly in the Czech Lands and, to
some extent, in Slovakia. On the basis of both the war's extreme disturb-
ance of the social structures and the radicalised public opinion, a new
political structure and programme, imported from the East by the political
representation returning from abroad via Moscow, was accepted by a clear
majority. The pre-war right-wing political parties, considered responsible
for the collapse of Czechoslovakia at the end of the 1930s, were excluded
from political Iife, with only parties of the radicalor moderate left and of
moderate right centre allowed to develop political activities. While it is
true that this structure provided sufficient space for the articulation of
various social and poIitical interests and orientations, it was not
sufficiently balanced for the heavy conflicts which were to come.
And such conflicts inevitably came. Shortly after the war, the differ-
ences between the Western Powers (particularly the USA) and the Soviet
Union led in 1947 to the open declaration of the Cold War and to the
intensification of poHtical conflicts in those countries where significant
social and political forces stood face to face in the power struggle. The
difficuIties arising from the post-war economic revival in Czechoslovakia,
complicated by a poor crop in 1947, aggravated social tensions. The
Soviet leadership prevented the Czechoslovak government from accept-
ing the aid offered by the Marshall plan. The Communists purposefully
paced their claims. Thus, the short post-war period quickly evolved into a
sodal and political conflict wh ich was to put an end to democracy in the
Czechoslovak state for the next forty years. While at the beginning of this
phase of history, Czechoslovakia stood among the democratic victors of
the Second World War, at its end it was clear that it was merely one ofthe
Moscow sateIlites.
152 Social Metamorphoses
Such was the framework in wh ich post-war social history developed. Its
first step was, on the one hand, the return to the Czech population of for-
tunes confiscated by the Germans (nearly nothing being returned to the
Jewish population, whieh had mostly been exterminated) and, on the other,
the confiscation of enemies' and traitors' fortunes and their redistribution
among Czech and Slovak contenders (this process occurring in the Czech
lands over the years 1945-6 and 1945-8 in Slovakia). The realisation of
this edict in the inland, the voluntary escape (immediately after the war)
and the subsequent organised transfer of nearly 3 million Germans in total
provided the Czech and Slovak population and many repatriates from
eastern and south-eastern European countries with the opportunity to
acquire confiscated fortunes: lands, dwelling houses, farms, workshops and
small plants. For large groups of people mostly in lower social positions
(agricultural and other workers, sm all peasants and businessmen, returning
soldiers, repatriates), this meant a substantial improvement in their social
positions. In the Czech Lands alone, the number of people who acquired
some land in this stage of the agrarian reform amounted to 223 000
(Prucha, 1974, pp. 237-45). This was the main reason for the strengthening
of the group of self-employed, above all in agriculture. (In comparison with
the other nationalities - the exception being the sm all Polish minority - the
transferred Germans constituted the lowest percentage of people working in
agriculture: (Kali nova, 1993a, p. 13.)
This important shift in sodal position was of minor dimensions in
Slovakia, where the original intention of the analogous transfer of the
Hungarian population was not realised, mainly due to Soviet disapproval.
As the result of some resistance from inner forces, the processes of
confiscation and distribution of the fortunes of enemies and traitors were
far more drawn out than in the Czech Lands. 80 000 people obtained land
in the first stage of the post-war agrarian reform. Thus, the high share of
self-employed and others working in agriculture in Slovakia was more a
result of the still lacking transformation of the agrarian character of the
region and of the events in the last phase of the war.
The second major step in reshaping the Czechoslovak social structure .
was the nationalisation of large industrial plants, financial institutions and
other companies (such as cinema production). As early as autumn 1945 a
very radieal nationalisation took place and was accepted by all ruling
parties and by the President of the Republic Edvard Benes, though not
without some hesitation. This measure effected the sudden exclusion of the
remaining large-scale capitalist owners (meaning those not expropriated by
the Germans during the war) from the social structure. This act was
strongly supported by, among others, the industrial working class, due to
 Democratic Common Life 153
the accompanying introduction of a kind of workers' self-employment in
industry as a whole. Nationalised industry employed 61.2 per cent of indus-
trial workers in the Czech lands. This act concerned Slovakia as weil as the
Czech lands (the percentage of people occupied in nationalised industry
there reaching as much as 65 per cent), aIthough given the lower weight of
industry in the Slovak economy it was not of such importance there.
The third crucial social process of the post-war period was the radical
equalisation of earnings and incomes. The first step in this direction was
made by the transfer of Germans and by the confiscation and nationalisa-
lion acts. All this led to the excIusion of persons with higher incomes,
salaries and wages. In autumn 1945, a currency reform was carried out.
On this occasion, large financial sums acquired during the war were bur-
dened by cxtrcmely high taxes, while most other high deposits were
blocked and never rcturned (with the exception of operating small- and
medium-scale enterprises). This was followed by a general revision of
prices, wages and salaries. The main sense of these measures was to facili-
tate the social situation of the lower cIasses, of employed women and of
families with children. Hence in the Czech lands, 60 per cent of employed
with lower earnings received wage rises, while the wages and salaries of
the beUer paid remained unchanged. Allowing for the differential between
men's and women's pay, if we take the 1930 level as equal to 100 for men
and women respectively, then in 1946 the real value of workers' wages
was 121 for males and 129 for females, while the real value of the salaries
for the non-manual fell to 67 and 82 respectively. In eliminating the so-
called hunger wages, the nominal wages of agricultural workers, auxiliary
labour, industrial workers in Slovakia grew considerably more than the
wages of skilled Czech workers (Kali nova, 1993a, p. 154). In addition,
the prices of purchased agricultural products were substantially increased,
a development favouring small- and medium-scale farmers. (Most of the
data in this paragraph are drawn from Kaplan's chapter in Kalinova, 1993a,
pp. 80-99.
Similar tendencies were also visible in Slovakia, where the politics of
the Czechoslovak government werc also carried out, although not without
some delay and unwillingness. The average salary of non-manual employ-
ees in 1938 was equal to 220 per cent of the worker's wage; towards the
end of the war it rose to 247 per cent, while in 1946 it fell to 157 per cent.
However, there was an important difference between Slovakia and the
Czech Lands. In Slovakia, the harsh economic and civiIisation conse-
quences of the last phase of the war caused a sharp fall in the standard of
living as compared with the preceding temporary war-boom. Thus the
social situation of both the self-employed (mainly of agricultural workers
154 Social Metamorphoses
and fanners) and of manual and non-manual employees in the non-agricul-
tural branches was noticeably lower than that of their Czech counterparts.
Moreover, the Siovak officials feit threatened by the purge of collaborators
of the fascist regime. The Slovak enterpreneurs still numbered only a few
among their rank and - as a consequence of the former domination of the
Czech and German capital - had Iittle opportunity to play an important
role in the coming social changes.
The described post-war social situation was cJearly reflected in
the results of the last free Czechoslovak elections be fore 1990 (see
Table 13.\).
As far as the Czech lands are concerned, the dominant influence of the
left, particularly of Communists, is indisputable. In general, one can say
that at thattime the Communists were supported by two different groups:
• by adherents of the actual ideology and social psyehology of the
Communist Party, with its tradition as a member of the Communist
International - that is its egalitarian attitudes and then earefully hidden
authoritarian or even totalitarian inelinations;
• by people expressing in this way their support of the Soviet Army's
liberating role, of the Communists' disapproval of the Munieh dietatc,
and of the moderate official programme for the national and democra-
tie revolution and a gradual approach to soeialism (pledging, among
other things, proteetion of small- and medium-seale self-employed

Table 13.\ Results of the 1946 parliamentary elections for the National
Assembly in the Czeeh Lands and Slovakia as percentages of valid votes

Political party Czech Lands Siovakia

Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 40.2

Social Democracy 15.6
CzS National Socialist Party 23.6
CzS People's Party (Christian) 20.2
Communist Party of Slovakia 30.5
Democratic Party 62.0
Party of Liberty 3.7
Labour Party 3.1
Empty ballots 0.4 0.7

Source: Porovnanr (1992).

 Democratic COmmOfl Life 155

including the peasantry, respeet for the intelligentsia and, of course

Ihe retrieval of demoeratie principles). These people supported also
many of the Communists' post-war aetivities (inc1uding holh the
endeavour to help the poor and voluntary work for the Republie).
Ultimately, the latter group of voters (not by any means restricted to
workers) played a pivotal role in Ihe Communist Party's decisive vietory.
However, their support was eonditioned by the party's adherence to ils
promises. History shows that this support, although it could be rationally
explained by the given conditions, was a huge mistake, which could never
be eorrected since the people were not to reeeive another opportunity to
revise their political will in new elections on the basis of their later experi-
enee. Even the effort on the part of these same people to eorreet this mistake
in the reform movement that peaked in the Prague Spring 1968 was in vain,
as the Yalta division of Europe allowed for the Soviet's unhindered, brutal
suppression of the reform movement for a further twenty years.
The 24 per cent support for the moderate centrist and right-wing parties
and, 10 a certain degree, the 16 per cent support for the Social Democrats
issued a warning 10 the Communists: they should not overestimate their
inftuence, and should recognise that a majority of the population supported
neither their official programme nor Ihe leadership's hidden agenda.
It was quite a different situation in Slovakia, the reasons being quite
understandable, given everylhing we have stated as far as the social situ-
alion in Ihis region was concerned. Those Slovak voters sympathetic to
egalitarian tendencies or adherent to the radieal aspect of the Slovak
National Insurrcction tradition mostly supported the Communist Party.
This group, however, constitutcd a minority of the population. The victory
of the Democratic Party was the result of the support of two groups:

• most self-employed and non-manual workers supported a moderate

and sufficiently nationally oriented political force on a respectable
level of political culture, whieh represented an apparent progress in
respect to the character of the previous leading political force in
Slovakia - the 'Hlinka's Slovak People's Party' (cf. LiPllik, 1968).
• those who had no opportunity to express their support for the ideology
and policy of the old c1ergy-controlled fascist regime in any other way.

In any ease, it is highly interesting to observe the results of the last free
decision of the Czcchs and Slovaks before Communist rule commenced.
The Czechs were the nation who. by their voting, affirmed the appurten-
anee of the Czechoslovak state to the Soviet bloe. the Slovaks those who.
in their hesitation, warned against this eventuality.
156 Social Metamorphoses
THE DECISIVE CONFLICT

In 1947 - after the commencement of the Cold War became a fact, after
thc Soviet leadership opcnly instructed Czechoslovakia as to the necessity
of its withdrawal from the Marshall Plan - the actual social situation in thc
country became worse. An extraordinarily bad crop in 1947, the deteriora-
tion in the supply of goods, price increases, the developing speculation,
the fall in the lower stratas' standard of Iiving and (he new social differen-
tiation - all this stimulated the conflictual character of the political situ-
ation. The two major political affairs of that time had an opcnly social
background. The non-Communist parties rightly proposed raising the
salaries of the state and public (non-manual) employees disregarded in the
post-war earnings reform. Because of the continuation of the egalitarian
approach the Communists did not agree to this. They, on the other hand,
proposed the progressive taxation of millionaires or nouveaux riches of
the post-war development. The right-wing parties were not willing to
rctreat on this partieular point.
Most likely instructed from Moscow, the Communist Party was pre-
pa red to opt for the offensive solution in deciding - as quickly as possible
- the crucial question of power. (On the other hand, the spirit of the Cold
War also influenced the behaviour of the right wing of the political spec-
trum, contributing to its radicalisation.)
The first problem the Communists had to solve before the main conflict
devcloped, was the asymmetry of the social and political situation in the
Czech Lands and Slovakia. Remember: this asymmetry had al ready been
one of the reasons for the collapse of the First Republic. And we shall be
dealing with similar phenomena in the analysis of 1968 and 1992! In
autumn 1944, however, the Bratislava Communists provoked a crisis in
the regional government (certain social difficulties and some support of
radieal elements within Slovak society providing the pretext), while the
Communist-Ied Prague government generated such political pressure that
the Democratic Party was forced to retreat and pass the majority in the
government to the Communists. Two circumstances are important in this
connection. It was Prague that compelled Siovaks to accept communism,
while Siovaks accepted it without enthusiasm, under pressure. And
second, Slovak autonomy once again became so unacceptable for Czechs,
that they did their best to suppress it.
In such a way, the battleground for the final social and politieal dash
was prepared: the real state power was firmly in the hands of the
Communists, while the future President of 1968, general Svoboda, ensured
the army's neutrality. And the Communists, supported by the unified trade
 Democratic Common Life 157
unions, particularly by their worker segments, declared new economic and
social requirements. The principal requirement was a new nationalisation.
If the limit for the first wave of nationalisation in 1945 was more than 500
employed, this time it should be 50 or even less in cases of enterprises of
important public interest. Already before that, a requirement for the con-
tinuation of the agrarian reform, Iimiting land posession to 50 hectares,
had been formulated. At the same time, the refusal to improve the salaries
of state and public non-manual employees was endorsed by the trade
unions. Taken as a whole, it is e1ear that all these requirements represented
an unprecedented programme of equalisation in an industrially developed
European eountry. It is typical that this very package of egalitarian social
requirements was the last to contribute to the social and political tension
provoking the subsequent political crisis. And it is no wonder that besides
the police and workers' Militia, the Communists were able to mobilise thc
workers' trade unions, the workers' demonstrations and the representa-
tives of small-scale peasantry (with prevailingly neutral attitude of the
medium-seale peasantry), while, for their part, the representatives of the
right-wing parties were only able to mobilise apart of students. Thc
Comrnunists' victory in February 1948 was not rnerely a coup d'etat,
although many undemocratie instruments were used in the course of the
political crisis. It was a coup d'erat attended by a continuing egalitarian
revolution. February 1948 saw the political peak of egalitarian tendencies
present in the Czeehoslovak, and particularly in the Czech society sincc
1920, since the 1930s, sinee the Seeond World War and since 1945 and
1947. The vietor in 1948 was a coalition of the new ruling elite, consisting
of the party and state apparatus and their lower-Ievel assistants, and of
those who gained from egalitarianism - generally speaking, those who feit
poorer than others, mostly beeause they had fewer qualifications and were
poorer aehievers.
This eharacteristic is not generally accepted. Many social scientists have
preferred to lay stress solelyon the totalitarian, that is, the more political
eharaeteristics of the Communist revolutions and systems. Reeently,
however, many sociologists and historians have admitted (in eonnection
with the ongoing post-eommunist social differentiation) that egalitarian-
ism must have played an important role in the past. Clear historieal facts
testify to the lower strata's real support for Communist victories in some
countries and, in nearly all of them, for the advantages they enjoyed from
the state socialist systems. The political crisis in Czeehoslovakia at the
beginning of 1948 e1early showed the participation of social groups inter-
ested in the maintenanee and continued expansion of the egalitarian
system. One must not forget that without the support of people interested
158 Social Metamorphoses
in egalitarianism and the relative advantages offered them, it would have
been impossible for the state socialist systems not only to operate for so
many years but also to continue to mobilise new sources for survival, even
in the many difficult situations.
It seems to us that the main reason for avoiding this aspeet of state
socialism eould be the unwillingness to admit that this system did have
somcthing good to offer any part of soeiety. In some periods of
Czeehoslovakia's history, at least, it did do so. Besides the privileged
'nomenklatura', it was above all the less-educated, less-qualified, poorer
performers who gained some benefits. The relative privileges given
by egalitarianism were exaggerated, unjustified, dysfunetional. They
cxceeded the inevitable extent of human and social protection for the poor
and unadaptable which any weIl-operating dcmocratic society can offer.
Thcir satisfaction could be ensured only to the detriment of the functional
nceds of society; it was an absolute contradiction to the principles of social
equity (equality of chances). It was an anti-meritoeratic element which
unfairly affeeted the neeessary compensations for higher, educated,
sufficicntly qualified, beUer performers. To acknowledge the egalitarian
charaeter of eommunism is not an apology for the system but rather an
incvitable eomponent of its historically based true critique. We must not
fm'get that the final reason for the eollapse of European eommunism was
above all its inability to perform and eompete with the advaneed societies.
And thc reason for this was more a lack of motivation than a lack of
demoeraey, whieh, of course, was an additional demotivating faetor.
Moreover, egalitarianism is a deeply rooted phenomenon emerging sys-
tematically in all societies threatened by poverty. It is therefore with
respeet not only to the past but also to the possible future of many eoun-
tries and of human society as a whole, that an open analysis of this
'populist' aspect of communism is very useful.
In any case, the events of February 1948 and their immediate eontinua-
tion signalled the crucial fact that the seeond attempt of Czechs and
Slovaks to live together in friendly cooperation on a democratic basis (this
time with some elements of autonomy for Slovakia) had eollapsed. Instead
of a transitory post-war 'people's democraey' with some opportunities to
save pluralist parliamentary institutions, a Soviet-type social and political
system of totalitarian eharacter was installed in the country. It was highly
typieal that the suppression of Slovak autonomy and the introduction of a
renewed Prague centralism accompanied the other anti-democratic
ehanges.
14 The Installation of a
Totalitarian and
Egalitarian Social
System
THE COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE AND THE FIRST SIGNS OF A
CRISIS (1948-52)

Throughout the period, 1945-7 the Czechoslovak Communists -like those

in some other so-called people's democracies in Europe - laid stress on
the national specificity of their strategy for the revolution and for the con-
struction of what was assumed would be the future socialist society. In the
Czechoslovak case, this was a long tradition dating back to the times of
the anti-fascist resistance and fully corresponded to the relatively broad
social support given the Communist Party (including direct membership)
by democratically disposed people, among them many intellectuals.
There is some evidence that even after the full takeover of political
control of the state, some elements of this approach survived, albeit for a
few weeks. The Soviet leadership soon gave the Communists in Prague
clearly to understand that the coquetry with national specificity, democ-
racy and the mutual understanding of different social categories and politi-
cal forces was at an end. In May 1948, the first in aseries of electoral
farces, with the 'unified' National Front candidates' lists typical of the
state socialist era, was arranged. From that time until 1990, the people bad
no real opportunity to elect their representatives. In the atmosphere of the
Cold War and warnings of tbe international Communist 'Informbureau'
against class enemies, the building of the state 'proletariat dictatorsbip'
according to the Soviet model started. Although the 'leading role of the
Communist Party' was only mucb later to become a constitutional para-
graph, tbe 'partocracy' was introduced immediately. It was symbolised by
the election of the Party' s leading functionary to the post of the President
of the Republic. Kalinova rightly affirms that the core of centralised politi-
cal power created about 15000 'nomenklatura cadres' who directly
governed lower party and state bureaucrats in an authoritarian way
(Kali nova, 1993a, pp. 104-114). The name we give to this group is not so

159
160 Social Metamorphoses
important : the present author prefers to speak of a monopolistic power
stratum or political elite with an extensive bureaucratic background which,
acquiring undeserved economic privileges, only gradually developed into
a class-like social group, later on called the 'new class' (Djilas, 1957).
The label of the proletariat dictatorship was, however, not a mere for-
mality: it symbolised the 'nomenklatura' and state socialist hierarchy's
linkage with the working class by virtue of their social origin. Kalinova's
figures provide a faithful picture of the situation: 60-70 per cent of former
workers in the central Party apparatus, about 87 per cent newcomers
within the professional army officers in 1952; 30-50 per cent of enterprise
directors of former workers' status in 1951. According to the same source,
200 000-250 000 workers changed their occupational status in the years
1948-1953. About one half of them became technical and economic
employees, 30 000 political workers and the remainder officials and army
and police officers. Only some were able to attend various short educa-
tional courses, while many simply exchanged their manual work for a pro-
fessional or administrative occupation.
However, behind this phenomenal connection another, more substantial
one was hidden. At least in the first years, most of the members of the
'nomenklatura', especially those who came to the Party and state hierar-
chy from the working cIass, sincerely believed that their primary mission
was to protect working-class interests. And they did so in the sense of
overseeing the realisation of egalitarian principles in economics and in
many other spheres of societallife. The state socialist regime never was
and never could be a 'proletariat dictatorship' in the literal sense of the
concept. In spite of the original recruitment of a substantial part of its
officials from the working class, its leading elite (under conditions of both
the political monopoly of one party growing together with the centralised
state power and the state ownership monopoly in the directively managed
economy) soon began to behave as a bureaucratic power stratum alienated
from the Iife of the society. Later, the criterion of a former occupation as a
worker was replaced by origin in a working class or Communist family or
by membership in the Communist Party, with a proved wiIIingness to
execute Party orders. However, except for apart of the functionaries in
some years of the subsequent reform attempts, a large majority of the
socialist state officials in Czechoslovakia never abandoned their defence
of egalitarianism, continuing it as long as possible under the given condi-
tions. It was a strange alliance, in which the interests of the less qualifled
and poorer performing lower strata merged with the interests of the
(equally less qualified and poorly performing) 'nomenklatura' and bureau-
cracy. The power elite and its apparatus guaranteed, by means of the state
 Totalitarian and Egalitarian Social System 161
power, unmerited relative privileges for the lower strata. The Iower strata
in their turn contributed to the status quo (the lack of democracy and
undeserved privileges for the nomenklatura) with their relative satisfac-
tion, their patience during hard times or, sometimes, with indications of
possible active support. Anti-meritocratism was the principle linking such
seemingly contradictory phenomena as egalitarianism (undeserved privi-
leges for the less-competent) and totalitarianism (undeserved privileges
for the ruling group and its assistants). Nobody who fails to understand
these relations can capture the substantial quality of the 'real socialism'.
The new establishment, under the additional pretext of the dass struggle
against the enemies and hidden agents of the bourgeoisie, developed system-
atic persecutional activities against representatives of the non-Communist
political forces and incessantly against Communists who, for various
reasons, were suspected of assisting the cIass enemy. It is important that the
persecution and following 'cadre measures' in the broader environment of
the persecuted were oriented against the former political rivaJs both outside
and inside the Communist Party, against potential rivals within the Party,
particularly those connected with domestic anti-fascist resistance, against a
part of those of 'bourgeois origin' (only those who were not sufficiently
obedient), against Jews, particularly those who assisted in the Czechoslovak
state's official post-war aid to Israel and, in a last but not least important
wave against the group of the so-called 'SIovak nationalists'. Under the
pretext of the cIass struggle against socially defined 'enemies', aseries of
deliberately engineered persecution waves was organised that excluded the
actual and potential opposition from positions able to influence societal
development in a different direction than that plotted by the leadership.
From the very outset, mass purges (attending, as a ruIe, the direct political
persecution of a narrower group of political opponents) became instrumental
in the application of the acquired power monopoly. According to some esti-
mates (Kalinova and Pröcha, 1969, pp. 69, 77), it is likely that about one-
half of the state apparatus remained at their posts (many of them accepting
the offer to enter the Communist Party), the other half were dismissed
(a part of these nevertheless finding posts in the lower levels of the state or
communal administration). The dismissed were replaced by the already-
described recruitment processes, primarily from amongst the workers.
Similar processes as mentioned in connection with the changes in the
ruling elite and bureaucratic administration occurred in the wider field of
all non-manual professionals, including the intellectuals. In spite of some
endeavour to gain the sympathy of the intelligentsia in the post-war period
(given certain pre-war traditions of the apparent inclination of apart of
this social group to left-wing political forces), shortly before the events of
162 Social Metamorphoses
February 1948, the Communist Party risked refusing the requirements for
raising the salaries of state employees. Thus it gained some support from
manual workers, but lost sympathy among most of the intelligentsia. Later
- in 1950 - they introduced a miserable salary reform which effectively
raised only the salaries of non-manual workers in the repressive institu-
tions (Kali nova 1993a, p. 136). Shortly after February 1948, this sectarian
'c1ass' approach to the non-manual was to become the guiding principle of
the Communist policy. Mistrust of the intelligentsia as a petit-bourgeois
social group closely connected with the bourgeoisie, and the systematic
endeavour to replace it with working-class people of minimal education or
young school-Ieavers - as much as possible coming from worker or
peasant families - or by 'reliable' Communist Party members, was, for
many years, the strategy applied to the task of creating 'a new, socialist
intelligentsia'. Even then, this creature was merely viewed in the Stalinist
spirit as a somewhat suspect service stratum assisting the leading social
force - the working class - and its 'certifiable' ally - the cooperative peas-
antry - to fulfil their decisive social roles.
These processes were, of course, realised by means of an extensive ver-
tical mobility, both downwardly and upwardly oriented. It was a massive
transfer of people to or from higher posts saturated by the rise of workers
or of other people without corresponding educational levels. Some
superficial mobility analyses even came to the conclusion that because of
the high chan ces of upward mobility, the state socialist countries were
among the most open European societies of the day. It is true that apart of
the upwardly mobile were talentedpeople who had formerly had no study
opportunities, and were able to enjoy well-deserved and successful careers
- many of them later participating in valuable reform attempts including
the Prague Spring or the 1970s or 1980s dissent. On the other hand, the
downward mobility of numerous educated people, their persecution and
frequent emigration brought no good to society. The main dysfunctional
result of this artificially provoked vertical mobility was a new phenom-
enon of social status inconsistency. (For a theoretical explanation, see
Lenski, 1954; Wesolowski, 1968; Machonin, 1969; K616si 1984). As a
result of the described processes, many people of higher qualifications and
cuIturallevels descended from professions with corresponding work com-
plexity and/or managerial positions to lower occupations with lower
incomes. On the other hand, a substantial group of people with low or
superficial education and a low level of cuItural participation emerged and
continued to work on higher professional and/or managerial positions,
receiving high earnings. It has been established that in 1954,47 per cent of
employees in the ministries and central offices did not have the level of
 Totalitarian and Egalitarian Social System 163
education requircd for their occupation (Kalinova, 1993a, p. 113). In the
apparatus of the National Committees (an analogy of the Russian Soviets)
this number reached 56 per cent of working persons. A similar situation
was said to exist in the economic management of the socialist enterprises.
Personal changes in the power elite, in the state apparatus and in profes-
sional and administrative staffs in all industries and branches were not ends
in themselves (although the desire to participate in unexpected and mostly
undeserved careers certainly played an important role as an additional motiv-
ation for the curious 'exchange of cadres'). The main reason for all this was
the endeavour to create leading professional and administrative cadre struc-
tures that would fulfil the monopolistic rulers' political will to change the
economic, cultural and social structures of Czechoslovak society radically.
The first step in the intended changes was to fulfil the requirements for
the second, radical wave of nationalisation and the so-called second and
third wave of agrarian reform. The nationalisation was carried out, its
hastily 'Iegalised' limits (after the February events) substantially
exceeded. In 1948, the share of people employed in the socialist sector
amounted to 95 per cent of industrial workers, in the wholesale and
foreign trade to 100 per cent (Pnicha, 1974, pp. 276-9). The agrarian
reform was also realised at high speed. Initially, the requirements of apart
of the individual applicants were fulfilled, but finally most of the distrib-
uted land was obtained by state-owned estates and agricultural coopera-
tives. Even at that early stage, the realisation of these two measures led not
only to the total and evidently unnecessary exclusion of the remaining
capitalist enterpreneurs on the middle-scale level but, at the same time,
showed that the new rulers did not intend to keep promises made to the
petit-bourgeois owners after 1945. All these acts have become subject to
numerous restitutions since 1989.
Parallel to the almost full-scale nationalisation, a system of centralised
planning and direct management of the national economy was introduced,
replacing the free operation of the market in all important dimensions. The
partocracy and bureaucracy thus accepted full responsibility for the
country's economic development.
According to the tasks outlined by Moscow, the second task was the
restructuralisation of Czech industry (that is, a second industrialisation of
the Czech Lands with stress on heavy industry, arms production and
machinery for the purposes of the industrialisation of other state socialist
countries) and an accelerated industrialisation of Slovakia. 80th processes
began towards the end of the 1940s and in the first third of the 1950s. Tbe
tasks were completed, as is shown in Tab1es 10.3 and 10.4. The deve10p-
ment of the branch structure in Slovakia, that is its industrialisation, was
164 Social Metamorphoses
initially very rapid. Later on, it was necessarily hampered due to the lack
of capital and capacities; the Slovak people, intimidated by the events
of 1947 and 1948 and by the recent campaign against the 'Slovak
Nationalists' inside the Communist Party, dared not protest against this
new delay in the promised and obviously functional industrialisation. On
the other hand, the hasty second industrialisation of the Czech Lands on
the basis of the 'iron concept' in a country without sufficient raw material
resources, a country already capable of following the normal modernisa-
tion path of an industrial country, caused major economic difficulties, the
consequences of which were to hamper economic developments in
Bohemia and Moravia for decades. Some acute economic difficulties
caused by this enforced extensive industrialisation appeared immediately.
The industrialisation caused some growth in the working class in both
parts of Czechoslovakia. The relative numerousness of the non-manual
workers also gradually increased as a result of the progressing bureaucrati-
sation. Both processes were saturated primarily by the fall in numbers of
self-employed both in agriculture and in small business and by the upward
mobility of workers. There are estimates that about 250 000 workers
ascended to the power elite, while one quarter of the working class had
recently come from other social groups (Kaplan, 1993, p. 11). Although
Tables 10.1 and 10.2 cannot show the exact changes in the mid-1950s
(because of the lack of census data), it is quite clear that as early as the end
of the 1940s and in the first third of the 1950s, the liquidation of the small-
and medium-scale (mostly non-capitalist) proprietors was well-advanced.
In c1ear contradiction to the promises made in the years 1945-7, the
Communists used all means from persuasion to administrative and police
pressure (including the punishment of innocent people) to liquidate self-
employment as a social phenomenon and to replace it with state, coopera-
tive and communal enterprise. By the end of 1953, they had succeeded
with the greater majority of the sm all businessmen and tradesmen, but
with only roughly one third of the farmers (Kali nova, 1993a, pp. 165,
185). One of the reasons for the speed and determination of the small-
proprietor liquidation (as weil as of the repeated but minimally successful
projects for transferring apart of non-manual employees to manual
workers' jobs) was the 'necessity' to mobilise the new labour force for
work in the growing industry.
As a consequence of the already-mentioned economic difficulties of the
early 1950s - then labelIed 'disproportional development' - the standard of
Iiving of the Czechoslovak population began to fall. According to Lewis
(\994) p. 101, the average real wages in Czechoslovakia sank from 100
points in 1950 to 96, 95 and 95 in the following three years. A similar but
 Totalitarian and Egalitarian Social System 165
even greater decline over the same period was also observed in Poland and
Hungary. In brief, it was an economic recession and an approaching social
crisis with harsh consequences for the population (cf. Kaplan, 1993, p. 7).
We already know from Table 10.9 that in 1954 egalitarianism in earn-
ings distribution had reached its peak in terms of the relations between
workers' and non-manual employees' wages and salaries. Some additional
data corroborate the fact that wage equalisation in Czechoslovakia was far
more cIear-cut than at the same time in Poland and the Soviet Union
(Kali nova, 1993a, p. 136). The workers had some additional advantages in
catering and social consumption. The standard of living of the workers'
families exceeded the pre-war level, while the standard of the families of
the non-manual was lower (Kaplan, 1993, p. 12).
We suppose that the already-mentioned egalitarian tendencies coneern-
ing the relations of various worker category earnings, identified as early as
1945 (Kali nova, 1993a, pp. 154-5), continued to ex ist in this most egali-
tarian period of the post-war development (see Kaplan, 1993, pp. 7, 10).
On the other hand, it has been proved that the earnings in industry and
construction grew in relation to the national economy average, while the
earnings in agriculture, commerce, education and health care relatively
decreased. The appurtenance to industry and branch and, intertwining with
it gender differences, beeame the main faetors influencing earnings distrib-
ution, while assisting in this way to the expansion of egalitarianism.
At this point, we should add that state socialist egalitarianism was not
based solelyon the insufficient differentiation of non-manual and manual
work. It is true that manual work was relatively preferred to non-manual.
At the same time, lower professionals and partieularly administrative
workers were relatively preferred to high professionals. Semi-skilled and
unskilled workers were exeessively rewarded in eomparison to skilled
workers, skilled workers in comparison to their supervisors and to all eate-
gories of non-manual, ete. All this means that apart from a eertain part of
skilled workers, none of the qualified oeeupational groups ean have been
satisfied with the standard of living in the early 1950s.

THE CRISIS, RETREAT AND FIRST ATTEMPTS TO RENEW THE

SOCIAL BALANCE (1953-6)

The Communist Party leadership chose the most diffieult eeonomie and
social situation of the year 1953 to exeeute a highly eomplieated economie
operation. For the seeond time sinee the Seeond World War, a eurreney
reform was earried out. Perhaps it was necessary and in the end also useful
166 Social Metamorphoses
as an anti-inflationary instrument, and somehow it did help to solve the
economie difficulties in the long run. However, it was used mainly as an
instrument of a further radieal equalisation of both individual and family
fortunes and incomes. All savings outside banks were lost, as were all
higher savings in banks. The currency reform and the concurrent abolition
of the war system of rationing combined with priee rises meant a radieal
impoverishment, annihilating the results of the population post-war
efforts. Applied to all inhabitants, it brought another radieal equalisation
on the lowest imaginable level. The population was highly dissatisfied and
expressed this through spontaneous strikes and demonstrations, this time
with apart of the working class's participation. Although the demonstra-
tions were suppressed, the social support of the regime diminished
significantly.
In the same year, the peasants voiced their dissatisfaction with the
administrative methods employed in the collectivisation process. The par-
tially renewed leadership of the Communist Party addressed this situation
with a temporary retreat vis-a-vis collectivisation and many.measures
aimed at creating an economic balance and a gradual improvement in the
standard of living. The most important aspect of the new economic policy
was the abandonment of the 'iron concept' and the partial return to normal
dimensions of economic development (including some revival in agrieul-
ture) which more fully satisfied the population's needs. In the years
1953-5, some cut in priees and wage and salary increases took place, that
is an improvement in real incomes. Something similar occurred in all
Central and Eastern European countries, obviously possible thanks to the
declining East-West tension. This was one of the first testimonies to a
peaceful international climate's positive influence on the economic and
social development in the state socialist societies.
After the radieal equalisation of fortunes caused by the confiscation of
savings (and the ongoing liquidation of sm all business and agricuItural
farms), earnings distribution became the last remaining possibility of
eventually enhancing the stimulative role of rational social inequalities.
Some improvements to the economic stimulation of performance (the
tariff system of wages and extension of the piecework) were introduced as
earlyas 1951. The preferences of some industrial branches and the hard
work of many worker categories did, however, limit its results. After the
experience of economic recession, a new step in this direction was taken.
A system of planning of personnel (a systemisation) was seen as one of
the measures necessary for the stimulation of the national economy effect-
ivity. This system encompassed some control of the fulfilment of
qualification requirements, as weil as a tendency to increase the earnings
 Totalitarian and Egalitarian Social System 167
differentiation in favour of people of higher education and achievement.
This decision, taken in '1954, can be seen as the first step in the direction
of a revised, or a slightly more rationalised, mOllocratic system of a
Soviet-type society (Strmiska, 1989). Our 'social historians' clearly
described how this decision was concretised by a de-equalisation pro-
gramme acceptcd in 1955, how it was carried out, how substantial the
obstacles were that it met (particularly the immediate resistance of the
non-qualified holding higher posts and, later, of the Party functionaries
who criticised these tendencies from 'c1ass-political' positions following
the events of 1956 in Hungary), and how reluctantly it was fulfilled
(Kali nova, 1993a, pp. 111-12, 138). In spite of their scepticism in the
evaluation of the real results of this endeavour, we should not omit the
fact that even this incomplete and purely administrative measure brought
some unique objective de-equalisation changes in the years that followed
(see Table 10.9), obviously since a large and influential part of society and
of the political and managerial structures seriously tried to push it through.
From our point of view, it was one of the most important aspects of the
attempts at economic reform which anticipated the reform tendencies of
the 1968 Prague Spring. In any case, it contributed to the self-confidence
of the educated and qualitied people, particularly among the intelligentsia,
and stimulated their courage to come up with new, more substantial sug-
gestions and requirements not only from outside but also from inside the
official political and managerial system. However, in a country bound by
an all-embracing totalitarianism (it was as late as 1954 that the last victims
of the 'revolutionary' political terror were executed), the inner stimuli for
more profound social changes were not strong enough. After the experi-
ences of recent years, everybody knew that the possibility of more sub-
stantial social change res ted in the hands of the Obig brother' - the Soviet
Union.
15 Reform Attempts
THE MAIN EVENTS OF THE PERIOD 1956-69

For Czechoslovakia - and not only for this country - the historical period
of 1956 to 1969 was a time of great hopes and great frustrations. The
hidden social tension characterising the situation in 1954 and 1955, when
the potentially politically active part of society awaited new signals from
the Soviet Union (the first critique of Stalinism having already begun),
was interrupted by information on the progress and results of the XX
Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. It was at that very time that the
courageous groups of the rather democratic and more intellectual part of
the Czechoslovak Communists first presented their ideas for the future
reform programme of the state socialist society. Some initial positive
political changes and, hot on their heels, the radical, fear-inspired preven-
tion of any pro-democratic initiative - provoked by parallel developments
in Poland and especially in Hungary, and even the (relatively moderate
compared with the 1950s) persecution of the most openly criticising
members by the leadership - these were the immediate consequences of
the reluctant and contradictory impulses issued from the Bast. The hard-
line reaction suppressing the reform attempts continued throughout the last
third of the 1950s with the liquidation of the last individual agricultural
farmers (the completion of collectivisation in a second wave) and the
remaining small businessmen - both through the renewed application
of administrative instruments, although not in the same drastic forms as
in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1956, even the challenge of de-
equalisation was withdrawn. This 'hard line', crowned in 1958 by a
new 'c1ass-poIitical check-up' (a new purge) of managers, professionals
and officials, was another attempt to impede the inevitable progress in the
education and quaIification of 'cadres' and to stimulate more intensively
qualified and high performance work.
At the beginning of the 1960s, the Party and state leadership tri-
umphantly announced the 'building up' of sociatism and declared the new,
socialist Constitution based on the liquidation of the 'antagonist c1asses'.
With the same act, they eradicated all remnants of Slovak autonomy,
returning to fully centralised administration. Immediately following 1his,
however, a radical disenchantment arose. Once again an economic reces-
sion, this time in 1961-3, and caused by imbalanced cen1ral planning and
management, led 10 the deterioration of the country's social and political

168
 Reform Attempts 169
situation. The inevitable economic and social reforms could be delayed no
longer.
Two important circumstances assisted the reform drive. The first was
the change in the international atmosphere, where the tendency towards
dhente had asserted itself and where even the theory and ideology of the
possible and useful convergence of capitalism and socialism as two types
of industrial society peaked in influence. Of no consequence whether it
had been a realistic image of one possible alternative of societal develop-
ment, grounded in a thorough knowledge of the real situation in the
Western world and in the Soviet Union; in Czechoslovakia, where better
times had not been forgotten, it was certainly embraced as a way out of the
totalitarian and egalitarian sodal system lagging so far behind progressive
modern societies. The positive experience with the first steps of an econ-
omic policy aiming to fulfil the population's needs, with improvements in
the qualification of managers and professionals, with the earnings de-
equalisation, with the increasing numbers of vocational, secondary and
tertiary school-Ieavers, with the positive developments in science and arts
in a somewhat liberated atmosphere - all this stimulated many people,
both non-Communists and Communists - to activity, and encouraged them
to contribute to positive sodetal changes. This very activity on the part of
relatively broad social groups represented the second favourable condition
assisting the pro-reform atmosphere. Concurrently in Slovakia, people
encouraged by the progress in the industrialisation and relative modernisa-
tion in their region and by the rehabilitation of the condemned 'Slovak
bourgeois nationalists ' returned to the idea of Slovak national emancipa-
tion and proposed the federalisation of Czechoslovakia. To this day many
I

people who remember the situation in the 1960s, consider it the best
period between the second half of the 1920s and the Velvet Revolution of
1989.
Although in the Soviet Union, the neo-Stalinists had already put an end
to the post-Stalinist 'thaw ' period, and the nomenklatura had sought to
regain control of the situation in the mid-1960s, the internal conditions
within Czechoslovakia were ripe for a radieal reform attempt. The first
steps in a well-elaborated economic reform had already been taken in
1966 and 1967, and so, at the first fortuitous occasion between the e10se of
1967 and the beginning of 1968 (in response to the Prague centralists'
endeavour to gain even stricter control over Slovakia), a powerful political
conflict within the Communist Party broke out. The subsequent exchange
of the political leadership provoked a chain of political and social events
known as the Prague Spring: the most systematic, consequential and
hopeful attempt to reform a Soviet-type sodety.
170 Social Metamorphoses
Given the neo-Stalinists' strict control of power in most state socialist
countries, particularly in the Soviet Union, and the Western powers' faith-
fu) observance of the Yalta division of spheres of influence, the Prague
Spring was suppressed by another military invasion and the protracted
foreign occupation of Czechoslovakia. In August 1968, a second Munich
Dictate and Berlin capitulation was signed in the form of the Moscow
Protocols. In April 1969, after a short period of retreat and defence whose
sole result was the significant constitutional act of federalisation, the col-
laborators to the invaders assumed control of the Party and state. The time
for an aUempted reform of state socialism in Czechoslovakia was over.
And there would never be another.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY ON SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN

1967: THE MAIN SOCIAL CHANGES, 1955-67

It is in this chapter that we can draw upon data coming from sociological
surveys for the first time. In autumn 1967, on the very eve of the Prague
Spring of 1968, a representative macrostructural sociological survey on
vertical social differentiation and mobiJity of the Czechoslovak society,
headed by the present author, was conducted. It was the first global repre-
sentative stratification survey in astate socialist country, as weil as the
first of its kind in the history of Czechoslovakia. The data collection
period was not chosen randomly. A hypothesis that at that time,
Czechoslovakia found itself on the crossroads of extremely different pos-
sible paths of social development was one of the key motivations for the
research project. The data was collected by the State Statistical Office, and
inc1uded 18 400 male family heads or flats users. The principal results of
the survey were pubJished and interpreted in 1969 (Machonin, 1969).
However, the 'normalisation regime' installed by the invaders soon with-
drew the publication from the Jibraries and bookshops and had alJ copie,;
destroyed. Later, a careful evaluation of the mobility data was published in
the form of working papers produced by a research institute (Rollova,
1972, 1,2). Here, the main changes in social relationships over the period
1955-67 will be presented on the basis of information from individual
chapters of the 1969 publication, with supplementary statistical and histor-
iographical data from other sourees. A book published in Czech after the
Velvet Revolution was similarly structured (Machonin, 1992a).
The population's age structure was characterised by the coming of a new
generation (compare Kaplan's observations in Kalinova, 1993a, pp. 203-5).
It was a generation growing and finding its place within society over the
 Reform Attempts 171
entire course of the post-war period; in 1967 it could be defined by the age-
group 15-37 years. At that time, it comprised nearly 60 per cent of inhabi-
tants in the productive age. It had no recourse to compare the actual social
situation with its own pre-war Iife experience, it was less politically active
and, at the same time, more critical than the older generations. In the chapter
written by F. Povolny in the publication from the 1967 survey (Machonin.
1969, pp. 469-84) the author proved that the economically active young
generation (with an upper limit in this analysis of 31 years) differed from the
middle generation in having both higher educationallevels and a higher cul-
tural quality to their leisure activities. At the same time, they had lower
incomes. lower occupational positions. a significantly lower material stand-
ard of living and much lower power positions. These findings verified the
hypothesis concerning the existence of a 'generation stopper' in the power
and professional hierarchy. Moreover, this corresponded to findings on the
1960s deceleration of the hasty intragenerational mobility symptomatic of
the second half of the 1940s and 1950s (Rollova, 1972, I, pp. 146, 210).
Young people's inconsistent social status, their higher qualifications, their
historieally limited experience as weil as the accepted psychological
specificities of youth, destined them to play an extraordinarily active roJe in
the Prague Spring events.
The position of women in Czechoslovak society was characterised by
their high share among the working population (44.8 per cent in 1967 as
compared with 37.4 per cent in 1948 and 42.4 per cent in 1960) and by
substantially lower social status indicators (education, work complexity,
earningsj. Through their economic activities, they contributed to the main-
tenance of families' standard 01" Iiving, while at the same time performing
most of the additional household 'duties' traditionally theirs.
The settlement and c1ass structure of the population in 1961 and 1970
and the branch structure of the employed in 1961, 1965 and 1970 have
been mentioned in the corresponding Tables 10.1-10.4 inclusive, and 10.8
in Chapter 10. The branch structure remained on the level of an extens-
ively industrialised society in the Czech Lands, while achieving the level
of an agrarian-industrial society in Siovakia. The privileged position of
the machinery, metallurgy and chemistry industries remained untouched.
However, both detailed analysis of the historieal changes between the
years 1960 and 1967 and intra-generational mobility data clearly show that
the first turn in the development towards a modern industrial society had
already begun in the course of 1960s.
As the analysis of vertical social differentiation revea1ed, this signalled
the reinforcement of those industries and branches and, correspondingly,
occupational aggregates characterised by a higher average education, work
172 Social Metamorphoses
complexity and, to some extent, also by a higher culturallevel of life-style
(see Machonin, 1969, pp. 423-50, chapter by L. Dziedzinska and
P. Kohn). The partial shifts in the number of employed were merely one of
many quantitative symptoms of recent global changes in the social activi-
lies structure, the most important of them being the increasing quality,
activity and social influence of the widely understood cultural sphere, the
partial retreat of the bureaucratic administration's influence (including its
repressive components) and the first signs of the declining significance of
the heavy industry complex. In addition to the metal-working industry's
consistently strong position, the decreasing number of finance and insur-
ance employees signalIed that these progressive tendencies were limited
both by traditional privileges and the lack of developed market relation-
ships. On the other hand, people working in some other formerly sup-
pressed industries and branches (particularly in services, including
research, education, cuIture, health-care, business and technical services,
accommodation and travel, but also in some branches of light industry)
had serious reason to be socially involved in the change of theirpositions,
in the assertion of the mostly progressive function of their economic and
cuItural contribution. Such was the role they soon were to play in the
Prague Spring events.
We are now at an appropriate point to present a systematic description
of the vertical social differentiation in the most important status-forming
dimensions, the first of them being education. From Tables 10.5 and 10.6,
we know that in both parts of Czechoslovakia, the educationallevel of the
population as a whole underwent a substantial increase between 1961 and
1970. This was a result of the accelerated supply of vocational, secondary
and tcrtiary school-Ieavers in the 1950s and 1960s. (The number of tertiary
school students increased particularly in the years 1959-65, when the
alrcady described pro-reform tendencies came into operation - see
Machonin, 1992a, p. 79). At this point it should be noted that after the
egalitarian school reform of the 1950s, the quality of formal education was
not optimal. It did, however, improve somewhat in the course of 1960s,
when a new school reform introducing a more selective educational
system was attempted (cf. Krejcf, 1972, p. 52). At that time the universi-
lies, in parlicular, became centres of a progressive intellectual effort.
The problem of 'external study' should also be mentioned in this con-
nection, it being the form of study designed to enable already working
pcople to achieve the required educational level and implemented through-
out the entire post-war period, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. In 1967,
27.8 per cent of tertiary school undergraduates and 25.2 per cent of sec-
ondary school students continued to pursue this kind of study (HSY. 1985,
 Reform Attempts 173
pp. 393, 390). Naturally, it could not fully compete with fuH-time study.
J. Alan estimates that at least one third of the leavers of this form of study
only additionally confirmed a professional position already achieved this
way (Rollova, 1972, 2, pp. 69-111). On the other hand, it was a far more
effective alternative to the simple appointment of managers, officials and
'professionals' who did not possess the necessary education and who often
went for years without improving their qualifications - a fairly typical
scenario in the years 1948-53. It was quite curious to observe the change
in the behaviour of the 'external' (and in some cases even shortened)
study-Ieavers once they had acquired a formal education. As the al ready-
mentioned leavers of the workers' courses, many of them were talented
people, some of them even energetically supporting the reform attempts of
that time.
In any case, the educational structure of economicaHy active persons in
1967 was better than in the 1950s, particularly in the Czech Lands, not
lagging too far behind the European standards. In the chapter presenting
the results ofthe 1967 survey (Machonin, 1969, pp. 265-93), J. Alan pro-
vides the following distrihution of the highest, attained educational levels
of the economically activc Czechoslovak male population:

As per cent of
population
Tertiary educated 5.4
Secondary educated 13.3
Vocational schools for non-manual 9.9
Vocational schools or apprenticeship
for manual 32.2
Primary educated 25.3
Incomplete primary education 13.9
100.0

In the years 1955-66, the number of tertiary-educated professionals in

the Czechoslovak economy increased 2.2 times, the number of secondary-
educated 2.6 times (HSY, 1985, p. 157). On the basis of statistical analysis,
the first edition of the recent social history of Czechoslovakia (Kali nova
and Pnicha, 1969, pp. 88-9) comes to the conclusion that as early as the
first half of the I 960s, the relative number of specialists in the
Czechoslovak national economy was elose to the international standards
of the times. This was even more the case in the improved situation of the
late 1960s, when the relative number of tertiary and secondary-educated
174 Social Metamorphoses
among non-manual employces and manual workers with apprcnticeship
certificates or other specialisations was quite satisfactory (Machonin,
1992a, pp. 32-3).
Another question was the extent to whieh the achieved education was
rca11y considered a qualification for performance of professions in general
and of managerial posts in partieular. Not a11 educated people were actua11y
profcssionally active in the positions for which they had trained. The histor-
ieal study(Kalinova and Prucha, 1969, pp. 84-8) proved that in 1966, the
qualification structure of the so-called technical and economic personnel
improved as a consequence of both the natural generational exchange and
external studies. The share of those with primary education practising in
professional roles decreased from 49 per cent in 1960 to 27.9 per cf\nt in
1966. However, the share of individuals who did not meet the educational
requirements remained high. From the (SY 1967: 116) we know that only
50.5 per cent of the 'white-collar' workers in the economie sec tor met the
professional educational requirements in 1966; 44.8 per cent of enterprise
and plant directors, 48.6 per cent of foremen, 48.3 per cent of heads of
departments, 58.6 per cent of other workers in the departments, 42.5 per
cent of the clerieal staff, and so on. A low qualification level was also
identified in central and regional administration.
Some insight into the dynamics of the relations between the managerial
positions and education can be found in statistical data fo11owing the per-
centage of tertiary-educated in the corresponding major of study among
the leading managers in the economy. Among the managers and deputy
managers of Czechoslovak enterprises and plants this percentage increased
from an incredibly low 17.2 per cent in 1958 to 29.1 per cent in 1966. In
the Czech Lands it was 25.9 per cent, in Slovakia 38.4 per cent. Among
the department leaders of enterprises and plants, the percentage increased
from 15.2 per cent in 1958 to 23.3 per cent in 1966 (21.8 per cent in the
Czcch Lands, 27.4 per cent in Slovakia). The data for individual years
prove that it was this very historical period in whieh the change from the
cconomic rule of non-educated people to qualified beg an (SY, 1958-1963;
1965; 1967). Later, data of this kind were observed more systematica11y.
Tablcs 15.1 and 15.2 show that in 1970, the situation (particularly in
Slovakia!) had much improved from that of 1966, described in the last
paragraph. This was inßuenced not only by the continuing generational
exchange but also by the coincidence of pro-qualificational shifts in 1968
and anti-qualificational shifts commencing in 1970. In any case, the status
incongruence level between education and work complexity remained
rat her high. It was to improve at only a gradual rate in the fo11owing years,
with an increasing distance in Slovakia's favour.
 Reform Attempts 175
Table 15.1 Fulfilment of cducational requirements in the socialist sector of the
national economy in the Czech Lands, 1970-83, as percentages of attained
required minimum level or above

Reqllired level 0/ edllcatioll 1970 1973 1978 1983

Tertiary 55.4 58.3 58.7 61.2

Secondary professional 60.4 62.8 63.9 69.2
Secondary general 54.1 54.4 57.8 59.1
Vocational 52.6 60.7 52.8 57.0

SOllrce: As Table 15.2.

Table 15.2 Fulfilment of educational requirements in the socialist sector of the

national economy in Siovakia, 1970-83, as percentages of attained required
minimum level or above

Reqllired level 0/ educatioll 1970 1973 1978 1983

Tertiary 60.7 65.2 68.5 73.9

Secondary professional 65.8 69.6 72.3 78.0
Secondary general 63.2 66.7 71.0 74.5
Vocalional 48.2 52.0 52.3 57.8

Source: HSY (/985) pp. 471, 672. 1970 and 1973 without agricultural coopera-
tives. 1978 and 1983 agricultural cooperatives inclusive.

For manual workers, the problem acquired a special character, the

statistics revealing that, in 1967, only about one half of ski\led workers
were actually employed in the areas of specialisation for which they had
trained (HSY, 1985, p. 158).
Thus, in spite of education's considerably increasing role in allocating
people to specialised posts and a growth in education and occupation con-
gruence prior to 1968, there was still a substantial degree of incongruence
in this area, which was particularly significant with regard to higher posts.
At the same time, this meant that an extraordinarily large number of
qualitied people held positions outside their specialisation and/or below
their qualificational level. Therefore, in the second half of the 1960s, the
social tensions between the dynamically growing group of specialists on
176 Social Metamorphoses
alt levels (including those with a disparity between their positions and
their education) and the still numerous groups of dilettantes holding posts
exceeding their abilities continued, becoming even more acute.
The second important partial social status dimension examined in 1967
was the vertical differentiation of the economically active population
according to occupation. In his chapter of the 1967 pubJication (Machonin,
1969, pp. 171-209) B. Jungmann used the concept of work-complexity
for the operationalisation of this dimension. The employed population was
divided by experts into six groups, ranging from highly complex, inde-
pendent and creative occupations to those of a very simple and auxiliary
character. It was established by historical comparison that a 'pear-Iike'
distribution (the highest complexity 1-0.7 per cent, the degrees
2-4.3 per cent, 3-20.6 per cent, 4-25.7 per cent, 5-34.0 per cent, and the
lowest 6-14.7 per cent) roughly corresponded to the development stage
between the 'early maturity' and 'advanced state' of the industrial evolu-
tion. The 1960s were marked by a gradual extension of the three upper
work-complexity levels and a narrowing of the three lowest levels: hence,
a slow approach to the advanced industrialisation stage. Foltowing the
completion of both ownership and power changes, the vertical occupa-
tional mobility in the 1960s decreased (see the chapter by Z. Safar in
(Roltova. 1972. I. pp. 205-76). Upwardly-oriented moves became more
numerous than the downwardly-oriented, thus reflecting young and more
educated people's appointment to positions requiring qualification, later
to be reported by statisticians and historians.
The most important finding: in 1967 the differentiation in work-
complexity's correspondence to educationallevel was far greater than had
been assumed in the research hypotheses. The trends of attaining increas-
ing qualifications in order to acquire or retrospectively legitimate spe-
ciaJised jobs resulted in the Spearman's Rank-Correlation Coefficient of
Work-Complexity and Education reaching the relatively high value of
0.65 (0.0 meaning a fult independence and 1.0 a full identity of the inter-
relating variables). The level achieved in the late 1960s has thus far
remained relatively stable.
The 'class political check-up' of 1958, contrary to its name, did not lead
to a new upward social mobility of the working class. Newcomers' access
to the party, state and enterprise apparatuses was already limited. Former
workmen and officials who, in most cases, became members of the
Communist Party merged to form a new bureaucracy obedient to the
monopolistic nomenklatura's directives. Civic society was repressed by
the totalitarian system. These basic facts are also true of the 1960s. With
their growing demand for competence. new economic and social processes
 Reform Attempts 177
did, however, lead to the already-mentioned increasing presence of
younger professionals in various control apparatuses (especially at the
lower and medium levels) as weil as to the changing behaviour of many
older bureauerats and managers, including some of those of worker origin.
Some mitigation of the repressive activities, the partially increasing poss-
ibility for freedom of speech, limited democracy in the internallife of the
Communist Party, of social associations and National Committees as weil
as some Iiberalisation in the sphere of personal policy - all these phenom-
ena appeared to some extent in the period following the XX Congress of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, bringing some changes to the
power system. Responding to the immediate situations, short periods of
liberalisation alternated with a tightening of the reins. These changes did
nevertheless enable the rise and even more pronounced formation of a
relatively influential pro-reform cutTent within the political system.
It was under these historically determined circumstances that, for the
first time in astate socialist country, the power-political dimension of
social differentiation was investigated on the basis of sociological methods
on a representative sampie, this within the framework of the 1967
stratification survey. The results, interpreted by L. Brokl, were published
in Machonin (1969, pp. 235-64).
The professional hierarchy ofparticipation in power is, obviously, steep
in every society. However, in societies with market economies and differ-
entiated ownership forms, it is moderated by the real authority of numer-
ous large-scale, medium-scale and even small-scale private owners. Hence
the extremely steep managerial hierarchy within Czechoslovak society.
One estimate for the period 1966-7 determined the global number of
persons participating significantly in the control of the Czechoslovak
economy and its organisational units at about 205 000, hence only
2.5 per cent of the total population (Krejc{, 1972, pp. 110-11). In pluralis-
tic societies, participation in political influence through voluntary mem-
bership in associations and elected functions is increased by a higher
number of associations (including free political parties) and through the
open, democratic character of the social and political system, not to speak
of the periodic free, democratic elections. Compared with democratic soci-
eties, this kind of participation in power in Czechoslovakia was limited
almost wholly to functionaries and to active members of the 'selective'
Communist Party - a clear minority in spite of its relatively mass charac-
ter. It is no surprise that in comparison with the distribution of all other
status-forming variables (e.g. education, work-complexity, life-style and
especially the equalised income distribution), the power pyramid based on
the combination of the two above-mentioned hierarchies was extraordinarily
178 Social Metamorphoses
steep. Thus, a full 37.5 per cent of the economically active population and
about 60 per cent of the examined population as a whole (including the
economically non-active) had no power inftuence at all.
The power distribution of the economically active was also correlated
with other status dimensions: with education by 0.44, with work-
complexity by 0.54, with the life-style index by 0.44 and with incomc by
0.43. The results: the enforcement of a certain level of professional
qualification and the beginnings of a kind of technocraticism (in spite of
the specific character of the processes by which the power structure had
been created and in spite of its specific shape, cven to this direct and non-
democratic power hierarchy). The lower dependence level of power distrib-
ution and education simultaneously demonstrates the limitations of this
relative progress. With reference to the medium value of correlation
between the power hierarchy and incomes, it should be added that a
macrostructural survey can hardly discover the unofficial incomes and pri-
vileges and show clearly the relationships within a narrow top elite. On the
other hand, given the surviving egalitarian atmosphere in Czechoslovakia,
it is quite possible that the creation of the 'new class' with an its developed
material privileges had not been completed by the late 1960s.
The cross-tabulations of the former occupation of the people 'in power'
and their fathers' occupations showed that the share of former workmen on
the highest positions was still quite significant (about 40 per cent), although
no longer the majority. The percentage of former workmen was higher at
the lower levels of the power pyramid. Distribution by 'class origin' worked
even more to the advantage of non-manual workers' children. The inftuence
of Communist Party membership was, on the contrary, decisive for the
upper degrees of the power hierarchy, its share sinking to the middle posi-
tions where the role of non-Communists was in no way negligible. At that
time, Communists' superiority in the power hierarchy was alrcady bound to
their superiority in work-complexity and education - the Communist Party
operating as a formal channel for the upward mobility of educated and com·
petent people. The mobility study showed that Communist Party member-
ship stimulated upward mobility, particularly in the years 1946/1952 and
195211960. In the period 196011967, Communists' superiority was only
slight in this respect (Rollova, 1972, I, p. 260).
Data from the 1967 survey showed the many emerging inner contradic-
tions in the totalitarian power system. They· created an opportunity for
social and political changes by promoting differentiation by performance
in the social system and, under certain conditions, some Iiberalisation of
social life. Naturally, these tendencies c1ashed with the still-prevailing
totalitarianism. The social and political history of the 1960s were full of
 Reform Attempts 179
manifestations of this inner tension: the partial pro-modernisation and pro-
meritocratic Oleasures and relatively liberal concessions on the one hand
and the entirely opposite anti-democratic reactions and repeated efl'orts to
save the inefficient economy. After a11, the very prehistory of the changes
in the political system which saw the commencement of the Prague Spring
showed to what extent it was open to a substantialtransformation.
Towards the end of the 1950s the population's basic food and clothing
needs were met. Many other living standard, life-style and, above all,
housing problems remained unsolved. In the 1960s, however, the remain-
ing basic social problems had already intertwined with new social interests
that could be identified as a product of the emerging new 'quality of life',
similar to life-style phenomena of the advanced societies (Kaplan, 1990,
pp. 15-22). Household equipment improved. The current consumption of
goods increased rapidly, in many cases as early as in the second half of the
1950s (Machonin, 1992a, pp. 44-7). Leisure time increased stepwise and
leisure activities multiplied, diversified and gained in attraction, among
them travel and tourism. The slowly developing production ol' consumer
goods and the service sector's inability to keep pace, in particular, pre-
sen ted an obstaclc to this, creating an additional source of dissatisfaction
tor that increasing part ol' society wh ich was better-informed about the
way of life in advanced societies.
The population's life-style and consumption level in 1967 were rather
markedly differentiated. In spite of the continuing necessity ol' solving
subsistence problems (e.g. performing household duties) for an ovewhe\m-
ing majotity ol' the population, the 1967 survey showed that some groups
ol' the population developed various and distinct life-style patterns (see
J. Linhart's chapter in Machonin, 1969, pp. 211-34). It was possible to
range them in a sophisticated way on a scale from li fe-style patterns
corresponding to the situalion in advanced countries through patterns cha-
racleristic of extensive induslrialisation to those still connected with the
survival (mainly in Slovakia) of the rural past.
Approximately 15 per cent of the population surveyed lived in good-
quality !lats or family houses, often equipped with telephones. They
owned labour-saving devices and good quality furniture, as weil as enjoy-
ing good-quality food and meals. It was often possible to find 'cultural
equipment' in these households. About 5 per cent of the respondents
formed a kind of elite, which owned what were luxury items for the time:
tape-recorders or 'music boxes' . Holidays were mostly spent away from
their homes, the elite often abroad. As a rule, they owned cars and facili-
lies for sports and recreation. Their cultural participation was signiflcantIy
higher than that of the other life-style categories.
180 Social Metamorphoses
About 40 per eent of population belonged to the opposite pole of the
life-style seale, this determined mostly by the urgently neeessary repro-
duetion of the labour-foree, and, eventually, of simple survival (in the ease
of the eeonomieally non-aetive). Their reereational aetivities were usually
of an elementary nature, mainly going to pubs, passive relaxation, a
passive interest in sports, eolleeting forest-fruit, ete. A substantial part of
their leisure time was neeessarily devoted to manual housework, house or
flat maintenanee and repairs, and often to the eare of domestie animals
and gardens. The meehanisation of housework was minimal as were their
leisure-time faeilities. The standard of housing was low, as many as 10 per
eent having no water supply or WC inside the flat or family house. They
participated in mass-eulture, preferring less demanding programmes in the
television and radio.
The remaining 45 per eent of the population balaneed somewhere
between these two described life-style patterns in all mentioned indica-
tors. One speeifie trait was eommon to this medium position: a high par-
licipation in a variety of different hobbies.
These basie eharaeteristies of the main life-style patterns beeame a base
for the creation of a six-degree seale whieh eould be adopted as a satisfae-
torily eonstrueted operationalisation of Iife-style as one of the sodal status
dimensions.
The differentiation in life-style may have been largely bound to work-
complexity (eorrelation eoeffieient 0.54), but it was primarily determined
by the attained level of edueation (0.61). It depended to a mueh lesser
extent on ineome levels (0.45). Thus those who tended to the higher life-
style levels were the people with both a higher edueational level and
higher work-eomplexity (mostly non-manual) but not always with high
ofticial earnings. Professionals, people working in administration, health
eilre, finanee, edueation and eulture and residents of large eities featured
more signifieantly in the higher life-style levels than the average popula-
tion. Clerks, skilled workers, people working in industry and residents of
average-sized towns dominated the medium life-style level; at the lower
level, semi-skilled and unskilled workers, manual-workers in agriculture,
construction workers, and residents of villages and smal1 towns. Of par-
ticular significance was the finding that the middle-aged tended to
higher levels of material consumption, while the young generation pre-
ferrcd a higher eultural level in their leisure, a differenee obviously to
some extent eaused by the latter's lower ineome level.
The demand for a higher-quality life-style ineluding both material con-
sumption and eultural participation became the clear tendeney of the
second half of the 1960s. Yet the more edueated and eompetent groups,
 Reform Attempts 181
especially those of the young and younger middle generation, tended to be
critical of the system. Foremost in their critique were the national
economy's obsolete and inflexible structures, its bureacratic organisation
and the political and administrative regulation of Iife-style phenomena.
And they could not be satisfied by egalitarian income distribution which
did not a1l0w them, particularly those who were young and not engaged in
official politics, to realise all their aspirations in this field. This was also
one of the sources of a strong support for the prepared economic reform.
At the same time, the expanding modern life-style led to a fuHer knowl-
edge both of their own society and of Iife abroad (as a result or the
increase in international travel). It inspired free thinking and c1eared the
way for significant parts of the population' s social and political activity.
With the increase in the nominal and, to so me extent, the real income
level following the recession of 1961-3, the differentiation of the popula-
tion according to income in Czechoslovakia remained more equalised than
in most European state socialist countries (with the exception of the GDR)
and more equalised than in the capitalist states. (If the currency's real pur-
chasing power was taken into account, then the differentiation range of
wages and salaries reached approximately only one quarter of the range
valid for the GFR, the most egalitarian Western European country at that
time.) (This was the starting-point of the income analysis in 1. Vecern(k's
chapter in Machonin, 1969, pp. 195-321, affirmed by analyses in Krejcf,
1972, pp. 63-72, and in Kaplan, 1990, pp. 7-8; and 1993.) Within the
equalised income differentiation, some factors of influence were more
important'than others. It was above a1l age (the middle-age generation
being advantaged over the young and pensioners), gender (women's
average incomes were two-thirds of those of men), industries and branches
(in continued favour of industries conserving obsolete production struc-
tures and to the detriment of industries and branches demanding intellec-
tual performance, in services, light industry and in agrieulture; although
some positive changes in this direction had occurred already between 1953
and 1969) (Machonin, 1992a, pp. 36-43).
In the 1967 survey, no great significant dependence of incomes on the
membership in the ruling party and on voluntary functions was identified
for the sampIe as a whole. Political activity was 'rewarding' only at a
certain level of participation in professional control, management or
bureaucratic hierarchy. There, it was one of the inevitable preconditions of
the well-paid posts. In the not-too-numerous higher income categories, the
proportion of Communists was significantly higher than in other strata.
The dominating equalisation and the inßuence of the al ready enumer-
ated factors resulted in the coefficients of rank correlations between
182 Social Metamorphoses
incomes distribution on the one hand and education, work-complexity and
participation in power reaching only the medium values of 0.44, 0.43,
0.42. This meant that for a large part of the population the distribution of
(in any respect equalised) earnings was in contrast with the officially
declared principle of distribution 'according to merit and qualification'.
TabJe 15.3 (constructed by Krejcf on the base of data from various
sources) provides a c1ear insight into this issue.
Many analyses from the 1960s proved, as Vecernfk argues (Machonin,
1969, p. 306):
that in the course of the individual's economic activity not only the
financiallosses and costs of higher education are not countervailed, but

Table 15.3 Monthly earnings in selected occupations in Czechoslovakia in 1965

Occupation Monthly eaming Index

in CScrowns (Average eal1ling in
national economy = JOO)

Lending manager in machinery

industry 4692 314
Skilled miner 3521 236
I-lead hospital physician 3381 226
Graduate researcher 3022 202
Skilled turner 2422 162
Engine-driver 2363 158
Experienced general practitioner 2243 150
Supervisor in heavy machinery 2149 144
ß1acksmith 2010 135
Graduate lawyer 1937 130
Secondary school teacher 1907 128
Rricklaycr 1865 125
Agricultural worker 1757 118
Milk-maid 1632 109
Teacher at primary school 1288 86
Hospital nurse 1178 79
Shop-assistant 1011 68
Charwoman 940 63
Nurse (in nursery) 802 54
Average labour-force 1493 100

Source: Krejcf (1972), p. 72.

 Reform Attempts 183
that even the total life balance of professionals with secondary and uni-
versity education is, as a rule, unprofitable in comparison with the life-
long incomes of qualified people.
In spite of this evident incongruence between income level and educa-
tion plus work-complexity, the statistics already presented in Table 10.9
proved that following the first wave of de-equalisation (1955-60) a new
wave of this character came in the years 1964-7 together with a renewed
real income increase. In 1968 and 1969, the attained level of congruence
was maintained in both parts of Czechoslovakia. The same phenomenon
was affirmed by Vecernfk's analysis of mobility data in Rollova, 1972,2,
pp. 42-68 and by an economic analysis in Krejcf, 1972, p. 70. In the fol-
lowing chapters we will see that the rank-correlations of 1967 individual
official (declared) incomes, and eventually earnings, which we rightly
considcred to be insufficient from the 'meritocratic' point of view were
higher than analogous correlations for 1984 and the 1990s (of course for
sampies incIuding both males and females). In any case, in the course of
the 1960s meritocracy made some progress in the relations between earn-
ings distribution and occupational status differentiation.
On the other hand, it should be added that the social (state-organised)
and family earnings redistribution into percapita family incomes had an
additional equalising effect, weakening, for example, connections between
qualification and occupational characteristics. On this level, family or
household size and composition played the most decisive role in deter-
mining the per capita income. The worst position in terms of per capita
income, besides the retired, was that of the age-group 30-40 (living
mainly in families with several children) i.e. the radical-minded part of
the middle generation. Special analyses of poverty and impending poverty
(Hirsl, 1977) concluded that the share of population below subsistence
level was lower in both parts of Czechoslovakia than in the developed
European countries, a conclusion wh ich is in accordance with the egalitar-
ian character of income distribution and redistribution. The position of
Siovakia in this respect was somewhat worse, but improved slightly
during the 1960s.
Irrespective of some progress typical 01' the analysed period of social
development, the sum of the presented facts must have provoked serious
social tensions especially between those on the one hand who attained
adecent standard of Iiving in spite of their lower education, work-
complexity, and, in many cases, even in spite of 10wer positions in manage-
ment and those who, on the contrary, were actually throughout their lives
insufficiently rewarded for the achievement of higher educational and
occupational statuses. The rise of the qualified socal groups, characteristic
184 Social Metamorphoses
of the 1960s, met with a slowly changing official reward system that still
allowed significant preferences according to class, industry and demo-
graphical indicators (gender, age, and number of family members).
It is remarkable that in relation to the occupational prestige (analysed by
J. Kapr in Machonin, 1969, pp. 377-99), the unofficial social conscious-
ness reftected far more exactly the objective complexity and qualificatioll
of various occupations and even the managerial hierarchy than did the
centralistic system of official material compensations. The ranking of
occupations in the public opinion differed significantly from the official
earnings rankings presented in Table 15.3. This was also a sign of the
emerging spiritual challenge for a move towards a social equity based on
meritocratical principles.

CZECH-SLOVAK COMPARISON

A special chapter in the publication reporting and interpreting, the results

ofthe 1967 survey (Machonin, 1969, pp. 486-541) was writlen by a group
of ,Slovak sociologists headed by R. Rosko. This chapter was devoted to
the comparison of social structures in the Czech Lands and Slovakia. We
already know from Tables 10. ]-10.8 inc\usive, and 10.10 that in the
1960s, some changes occurred in various aspects of the social structures
that led to a substantial decrease in the previously existing differences and
discrepancies between the economic, cultural and social characteristics of
the Czech lands and Siovakia (for a detailed analysis of the economic
aspects of this process see Pavlenda, ] 968, pp. 166-80). On the basis of a
thorough sociological and statistica] analysis of representative sampIes,
the authors of the Czech-Slovak comparison did however prove that in
the ]ate ]960s, the socia]-status distribution in Siovakia was on average
significantly lower than the analogous distribution in the C7.ech lands. It
was caused by only smaH differences in individuals' participation in man-
agement, in the level of work-complexity, and in individual earnings dis-
tribution; by more considerable differences in level of education and
material equipment of households; and, finaHy, by large differences in
family per capita income, consumption standards and culturallevel of life-
style.
In general, these findings demonstrated a continued existence of a deep
cultural and social inequality between the Czech and Slovak parts of the
country. Slovakia remained industrial/agrarian, with many characteristics
distinguishing it from the industrially overdeveloped Czech lands. This
social imbalance was aggravated by the consequences of the above-men-
 Reform Attempts 185
tioned anti-Slovak political repressions of the late 1940s and 1950s and of
the 'constitutional reform' of 1960, which was to suppress what remained
of the Slovak autonomy in favour of the centralised and bureaucratic
Prague administration. These circumstances caused a high degree of dis-
satisfaction particularly among the younger, more educated and most
dynamic part of the Slovak population, stimulated by the ongoing demo-
graphic boom as weil as industrialisation, urbanisation and educational
progress including job allocation. (Remember Table 15.1.) Shortly after
the collection of data, Le. during the events of 1968, this specific situation
caused the stepwise domination of national democratic aspects in the
Slovak reform movement.

THE PRAGUE SPRING, 1968, AS AN ATTEMPT AT SOCIAL

TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATE SOCIALIST SOCIETY

The global situation of 1967, that is, on the eve of the Prague Spring
events, was quite different from the situation of the mid-1950s. CI ass rela-
tionships largely lost their decisive role within the social structure. As
V. Rollova and P. Machonin proved (Machonin, 1969, pp. 323-50,
81-170), Stalin 's non-antagonist scheme for the leading working class,
allied and conducted cooperative peasantry and subordinated service
stratum of the intelligentsia (curiously enough attended by a 'sharpening
of the class-struggle' and, simultaneously, by the social classes' and
stratas' tendency to mergel revealed its full absurdity. On the other hand,
the awareness of the former existence of the liquidated classes of self-
employed Iived on in the accumulated social experience of their members
as weil as in the minds of their descendants. For both internal and particu-
larly external reasons, this phenomenon could exert no immediate
influence on the social situation. (One could, however, count on the inter-
vention by the adherents of both democratic capitalism and the 'dictator-
ship of the proletariat', further in the future, as explicitly stated in the
published book. A similar conclusion was drawn with reference to the
potential of the technocratic forces.)
Instead of repressed class differentiation, a new social differentiation
principle emerged as very important: (meritocratic) stratification based on
the proven, relatively high congruence of education, work-complexity and
life-style. In spite of the rather egalitarian income distribution (which most
probably had al ready been corrected by households' unofficial economic
and working activities outside official workhours), in spite of the steep
and politically coloured power distribution, an overwhelming majority of
186 Social Metamorphoses
people managed to apply their edueational level to jobs of eorresponding
eomplexity, realising both their offieial and unofficial eompensations in a
roughly corresponding life-style. Some aspects of the income and power
distribution of the late 1960s had already undergone adaptation to the
changing eonditions ereated by the far-reaehing economic reform of a
market eharaeter and, perhaps, by the hidden plans of some of the poten-
tial pro-reform leaders.
The strength and signifieance of the totalitarian and egalitarian eomplex
of social relationships ereated in the 1950s, should not have been underes-
timated, last but not least beeause of the international support from the
neo-Stalinist forces in many state socialist countries. Such relationships
were still decisive in determining the praetical operation of the social and
political system, the mode of thinking and the behaviour of a large part of
society.
In other words, as was empirically proved, on the eve of the Prague
Spring events Czeehoslovakia stood on a erossroads, with two main roads
to the future. One was a re-strengthening of the totalitarian bureacratic and
egalitarian system installed in the course of 1950s, with all the risks of
economie and eultural stagnation (then already praetieally demol\strated
by the behaviour of the neo-Stalinist regimes in the Soviet Union, the
German Democratic Republie, Poland and Bulgaria). The other was a pro-
found social transformation of Czechoslovak state socialist society in a
direction which would strengthen both the principle of achievement and
demoeraey (with the al ready planned, inevitable economie and political
reforms). This seeond route could be taken with the guaranteed coopera-
tion of some reformist forces in the state socialist societies (at least in
Hungary, Yugoslavia, China and perhaps even in Rumania with its nation-
alist orientation) and the cooperation of the advanced countries, the laUer
in the spirit of the convergence of the capitalist and socialist type of indus-
trial societies (cf. Machonin, 1969, pp. 165-7).
The two main developmental possibilities could be realised with the
more or less active support of partieular social forces (actors). Support for
the totalitarian and egalitarian (anti-meritoeratie) system eould be pro-
vided by influential power groups and the administrative apparatus that
were insufficiently or only formally qualified for their posts, with numer-
ous links to the previous 'hard' phase of social development and to the
relies of the 'proletariat dictatorship' . Their wider social base was repre-
sented by comparatively less-edueated and less-qualified seetions of all
socio-oeeupational groups. Their motivation was the hitherto prevailing
system's toleranee of their low qualifications and performance, its dispro-
portionate rewards, both of whieh enabled them to participate in power to
 Reform Attempts 187
a degree at variance with their ability. These groups obviously could not
manifest their interests explicitly but in the camouflaged form of an
official ideology of 'defence' - defence of socialism, of the 'moral-
political unity' of society - and 'preservation' - of preservation social
security, of the 'revolutionary achievements', of the working c1ass's
leading role, of the 'brotherhood' of the socialist countries.
Relatively more educated and more qualified strata of population span-
ning all socio-occupational groups (intellectuals, professionals, managers
- unless extensively engaged in the hard politics of the previous period -
and even so me qualified workers) formed the social core of potential
support fol' a development aimed at the deeper application of meritocratic
principles, at an economic reform and a simultaneous Iiberalisation and
democratisation of the regime. The tendency to both a greater involvement
in social activities and a certain radicalism was manifested by those who
had been insufficiently rewarded for their work and who had participated
in the power hierarchies to a lesser extent than their competence would
have allowed.
Both the potential supporters and opponents of the reform movement
could be typologically identified (by the cluster-analysis) from the 1967
survey data. (For details. see Machonin. 1993a. pp. 83-92.) Many other
concrete identifications of the pro- and contra-reform forces had been
elaborated prior to the Prague Spring, during its course and following its
suppression - see, for example, Skilling (1976, pp. 563, 613) and
Machonin (I 992a. pp. 93-100).)
The potential pro-reform forces' chances for success were increased by
the latent dissatisfaction of large parts of the population with the loss of
most of their civil rights and liberties at the hands of the totalitarian
system. The population's latent resistance to the existing limits of state
sovereignty had perhaps an even wider unifying function. In Slovakia, dis-
satisfaction with Prague centralism and the desire for Slovak emancipation
were important stimuli to joining the reform movement from the outset.
Later on, however, these stimuli were to become a factor separating the
Slovak reform endeavour from the global democratisation and meritocratis-
at ion tendencies.
In a tense social situation in Czechoslovakia before January 1968, inter-
nal social forces interested in a democratic and meritocratic reform were
prepared objectively, and partly also by their attitudes and determination,
for the approaching conflict with the conservative defenders of the total-
itarian bureaucratic and anti-meritocratic system. These were not simply
forces prepared to act in favour of areform 'from above', but rather a
potentially maturing wide coalition of social streams and movements both
188 Social Metamorphoses
'from below' and 'from above', forming networks across the whole socia}
structure.
In the concrete situation in Czechoslovakia of the late 1960s, those
forces with some connection to the existing system who could therefore
use their positions towards its reform - the reform-Communists - occu-
pied objectively better positions for effective social and political action.
The scope of those who might have been prepared for a more radical criti-
cism of socialism were limited by internat but more especially external
conditions. However, the course of events in the coming year - 1968 -
introduced some changes to this initial situation.
Our analysis of the social situation in 1967 and of those social forces
more or less prepared for the conflicts of the coming year leads us to dis-
agree with some aspects of K. Kaplan's statement:
Social problems were neither the immediate impulse, nor the central
point of the Czechoslovak reform 1968/1969. (Kaplan, 1993, p. 46)
This unequivocal assumption is based upon an extremely narrow sense of
the concept 'social'. Our analysis shows, on the contrary, that the inner
tensions of the developing social structure were one of the main causes for
the Prague Spring events, and that the course of events was the field on
which the social forces, through their conflict, sought to decide the social
future of the country. The defeat of the Prague Spring by foreign interven-
tion (also, in asense, socially motivated) and the subsequent political
changes caused areversal of social relationships in Czechoslovakia, the
consequences of which were to make themselves feit for another twenty
years. In their narrowest sense, social problems did not perhaps provide
the immediate impulse for the events in question; in the sociological sense
of thc term, however, they certainly constituted one of the central points of
the Czechoslovak reform.
It is not the intention of this study to reproduce the historical events of
the Prague Spring. However, it is important that the initial shifts inside
the ruling Party and state bodies by means of the mass-media rapidly
influenced the opinions and real behaviour of increasingly broader social
groups. This occurred in the first half of 1968, not only through their rep-
resentation within the political system (above an within the Communist
Party), but also through their representation in various social associations
and by their direct actions. The reinstigated public opinion research clearly
demonstrated the basic tendency of very broad social groups' gradually
increasing identification with the aims of the reform endeavour and their
support for the reform policy. These surveys showed that better-educated
people' s support for the reforms was significantly higher than that of other
 Reform Attempts 189
social groups. Moreover, ideas moving beyond the reform eharaeter of thc
eurrent ehanges (abovc a11 those supporting potitieal pluratism) were also
more frequent among people with higher edueation (Becvar, 1990;
Hudecek, 1990). In aeeordance with these changes in social conscious-
ness, real mass aetivities aimed at supporting and defending the reform
and its first results. The whole world rightly admired the mighty wave of
spontaneous aetivity defending the reform against the already-prescnt
foreign invaders and their threats of violent repressions. These moments
were important proof of the degree to whieh the population and the praeti-
eally operating social aetors had already internalised the awareness of thc
neeessity for a far-reaehing eeonomie, social and politieal reform.
Slovak social support for the reform movement was vcry intensive both
at the beginning and during the phase of inereasing eonfliet, due partially
to the lcading position of Slovak potiticians headed by A. Dubcek in the
Czechoslovak reform politicalleadership. On the other hand, in thc eritieal
situation following the Soviet invasion, the Slovak political representation
led by G. Husak saerifieed the general social and potitical ends of thc
reform for the satisfaetion both of national politieal claims and, subse-
quently, of the Slovak nation's specifie social claims. This manoeuvrc was
aeeepted by the Slovak people without strong resistanee, a signal that thc
Slovak politieal representation as weil as population did not fully identify
themselves with market principles, and eventually, with the assumed anti-
egalitarian consequenees of the prepared eeonomie and social reform: thc
Iikely outeome of these measures - the abolition of the stable redistribu-
tion of national ineome in Slovakia's favour - eould not have been seen as
fully eorresponding to the national intcrests. On the other hand, the Slovak
representation's behaviour ensurcd that at least one of the crueial require-
ments of the reform movement - the democratie federalisation of
Czeehoslovakia - was realised.
There are many diseussions concerning the behaviour of both the Czeeh
and Slovak nations following the Moseow eapitulation and during the
period marked by the gradual retreat of the pro-reform forees. It should be
pointed out that the oecupation of Czechoslovakia was never accepted by
the Czechoslovak people as a whole. It was, particularly in the Czeeh
Lands, merely seen as a temporary interruption of a necessary societal
transformation. However, the Czeeh and Slovak people had already had
experience of long-Iasting oecupations and other forms of suppresion of
their national interests, particularly in sueh eases when the world, includ-
ing aetual or potential allies, calmly watched the aggression. Life con-
tinued, the people doing their best to ensure favourable social eonditions for
it. Even be fore the oceupation and, with extraordinary effort, following it,
190 Sodal Metamorphoses
people sought through organised press ure to improve conditions, which
for years had restricted their income and standard of Iiving. They suc-
ceeded in many areas: the salaries and wages of the so-calJed budget
sphere, with its high concentration of non-manual professions, service
workers and some light industry branches, increased more than those in
other branches. The increased income contributed first and foremost to
greater social support of the reform. It also had favourable long-term
effects. According to Kaplan, these shifts as a whole operated in favour of
the structural changes to the economy and assisted in solving accumulated
social problems. The extraordinary increase in the income level caused a
rise in the Iiving standard for all households and contributed to a strength-
ening of the medium and upper income range. To Kaplan's evaluation, we
shalJ add the parallel important growth in leisure time through the transi-
tion to a five-day working week. These changes founded a new and stable
base for further social development which, mainly for political reasons,
could not be reversed. From a transitory factor with some unfavourable
inßational consequences for the economy (as the prices must also have
risen), it changed into a long-term trend to be respected by the subsequent
'normalisation' regime (Kaplan, 1993, p. 60).
It is impossible, at the end of this chapter, to avoid pertinacious ques-
tions: Was the reform attempt worth the well-known, severe conse-
quences? Was it at alJ possible to reform the state socialist system and
would it not have been better to wait for a more favourable moment for a
more radical social change? Our response is: This reform, although very
likely condemned in advance to defeat by the constellation of international
forces, was not an artificially constructed, accidental action. It was the
result of a lengthy social development and sought to solve the acute ten-
sions and problems surrounding the country's future development. The
question as to whether the Czechoslovak 'socialism' of the 1960s could
have been reformed at all, can no longer be answered: history allowed no
l'Oom for the development of the reform and the proof of its achievements.
One cannot exclude the possibility that even without the military invasion.
the reform attempt might have been blocked by external and internal con-
ditions. At the same time, however, one cannot exclude the possibility that
the inner social and political forces in Czechoslovkia might have suc-
ceeded in continuing the reform, even beyond its original limits, towards a
pluralist democracy and market economy - in some cooperation with the
advanced countries - twenty years before the collapse of the Soviet empire
made the same possible for all state socialist countries. History is made by
people who solve acute problems and - with rare exceptions - do not ask
their descendants in advance if they are entitled to do wh at they think is
 Reform Altempts 191

good. Their actions influence subsequent history either directly - in the

case of victory - or indirectly - in the case of defeat. Even the defeat of a
positive reform attempt is valuable for the future reactions of the sur-
rounding world and of the same society to similar situations. It is the new
generations' right to evaluate the past carefully and critically, and to seek
inspiration for the solution of present problems. In our opinion, the lesson
provided by both the positive and negative aspects of the Prague Spring
was highly instructive for development in the 1980s and 1990s in
Czechoslovakia and other parts of the Soviet bloc. The mere possibility of
a more favourable outcome of the Czechoslovak reform attempt enables us
to understand to what extent the Soviet invasion, the final defeat of the
Prague Spring movement and the indifferent attitude of the advanced
countries to these events were crucial in the furlher developments in
Europe and, in some respect, in the entire world.
16 The 'Normalisation': A
Return to Abnormality
SOCIALLY SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE PERIOD 1969-89
AND A GENERAL CHARACTERISTIC OF THE RULING SYSTEM

Although in the previous chapters we sought to identify the reasons for

the installation of a totalitarian, anti-meritocratic social system in
Czechoslovakia, as weil as the reasons for its actual development, it was
doubtless clear that this system was alien to the standard course of Central
European historieal developmenl. It was, in other words, an abnormal phe-
nomenon, the historieal emergence of whieh could have been explained by
the extraordinary concurrence of very specific conditions. It is therefore
peculiar that the reintroduction of the abnormal social conditions follow-
ing the defeat of the Czechoslovak reform attempts by the violent inter-
vention of foreign forces was termed the 'normalisation' by the 'victors'
of August 1968 and April 1969. This slogan had only one possible
meaning: to show that Czechoslovakia was to return to the specific system
of relationships dominating the country during the Stalinist period which
preceded the commencement of the first reform attempts. In the document,
Instruction Derived from the Crisis Development, the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, led by G. Husak, quite openly
criticised the Party leadership of the late t 950s and 1960s for its 'retreat'
under the pressure of right-wing opportunism. The only explanation is the
early 1970s' ruling group's desire to return to the times preceding the first
reform attempt of the year 1956. Since the world had changed somewhat
since that time, it could no longer occur with the extreme barbarism whieh
characterised the modus operandi of the late 1940s and early 1950s. This
time, it was to proceed in a 'modernised', more hypocritical, neo-Stalinist
manner.
By the first half of the 1970s, this had already been achieved, the social
arrangement established at that time being retained until the end of the
1980s without substantial change. For the Czech Lands, in particular, this
meant a twenty-year 'period of darkness', a label commonly applied by
Czechs to the most unpleasant phases of their history. (Incidentally, the
stubborness with which the Czechoslovak Communist leaders for so long
and so uncompromisingly defended their obscure system had a rational
explanation: after a twenty-year period, the charge of treason-felony for

192
 The 'Normalisation '; AReturn to Abnormality 193
their conduct in 1968 would no longer be valid.) Although foreign inter-
vention was neither as cruel nor as destructive as the German occupation
of the Second World War and the social destruction not so extensive,
the loss of sovereignty, the full reabsorption of the relatively open
Czechoslovak society of the 1960s by the Soviet-led 'world socialist
system' and the abnormal character of the social changes enforced by the
foreign invaders and realised by their collaborators against the nation's
cIearly expressed will was obvious. The social history of this recent period
has already been depicted or at least mentioned in some works (Kalinova,
1993b; Kaplan, 1993, pp. 60-83; MencI, 1993) and a preliminary socio-
logical outline of various aspects of the situation presented (Machonin,
1991, pp. 301-305).
At the outset of the normalisation, in April 1969, when a change in the
country's politicalleadership was pushed through by external pressure and
traitors' support, one could say that Czechoslovak, and in particular Czech
society, were in astate of anomy. All public opinion polis showed an
uninterrupted general support for the 1968 reforms and for the preserva-
tion of their results (Becvar, 1990). However, the new leadership formed
itself on quite an opposite political and ideological base. commencing its
unpopular job without any substantial social support (except that of a
small remaining group still fighting to save the 'proletariat dictatorship'
and the recently expelled or still operating old members of the Party appar-
atus), fully at odds with the populations' dominant value orientations. A
confusing element in the top leadership change was that it consisted
mainly ofpeople who had formally supported the reform movement at the
beginning of the Prague Spring events. On the other hand, most of them
were already known for their oppositional attitudes to the leading reform
representatives. An exception to this were some members of the group of
Slovak leaders who, together with Gustav Husak, accepted the role of col-
laborators to the invaders in the belief that they were acting in accordance
with the interests of the Slovak nation.
The first task for the leading group was to create a new, very narrow
political elite (a new 'nomenklatura'), propping itself on analogous small
groups on all levels of the social and political hierarchy. Their success was
due to the organisation from above of the so-called 'sane eore' of the
Communist Party - a sm all minority of Communists willing to join actively
in the unpopular purge against the reformists (in official terms, the 'right-
wing opportunists') within the Party, in public Iife and within enterprises
and institutions. Those who assumed the reponsibility of participation in
such an action were very often those who, in the last period of reforms.
feIt some frustration caused by their political andlor professional inability
194 Social Metamorphoses
to retain their posts or improve their positions. So me returned to their
posts after a short break in their careers during the Prague Spring events,
the desire for revenge demanding satisfaction. Many of them were charac-
terised by the social status inconsistency (particularly the incongruence of
low qualifications and high occupational and power positions). There
were, of course, some specificities to the psychological and moral charac-
teristics of those people who were willing to forsake their own colleagues
in favour of the foreign invaders. The reward for such behaviour was the
promise of a rapid rise to formerly inaccessible hierarchical positions.
Thus participation in the purge and, later, persecution of the active partici-
pants of the Prague Spring movement simultaneously provided a specific
candidate selection method for the core of the new political elite.
However, there were not enough people with such clear-cut characteristics
for the creation a new elite. Hence, the new ruling group offered such
career possibilities to others willing to participate in the dirty game, even
though in the past some of them had been rather neutral and had not
shared the neo-Stalinist views or even made the 'mistake' of supporling to
so me extent the Prague Spring activities. If they 'confessed their fault',
they were allowed 10 pursue their professional careers and were able to
join the political elite in the future. In a short time, the leading group
became aware of the need to enlarge the still-too-narrow hierarchy; they
c1eared the way for bureaucratic and professional careers and, through
Communist Party membership, even for political ascent for all 'promising
young people'.
A portion of young people with corresponding psychological and moral
qualities capitalised on this offer and gradually supplemented the bureall-
cracy, the professional personnel and, very soon, also the nomenklatura.
While the students active in 1968 were excluded from the universities, the
education system renewed the system of 'class preferences' for course
admission. Besides some small increase in the percentage of stlldents of
actual worker origin, the practical application of these measures meant
that children of the Prague Spring reformers were denied access to further
education while the children of the 'sane core' and the emerging restruc-
tured elite were granted automatie acceSS to the same. Thus a system
seeing the rapid supplementation of the elites and professional structures
by new, sufficiently submissive but formally educated people began. The
generational 'stopper' was at least weakened and some support for the
regime from apart of the young generation was ensured, untiI, in
the course of the 1980s, the barriers for the young were renewed in favour
of the new ruling groups. Thus no extraordinary measureS similar to those
used in the 'proletariat dictatorship' era were necessary and the formal
 The 'Normalisatioll': AReturn 10 Abnormality 195
status inconsistency did not grow. Table 15.1 has c1early shown that the
percentage of people fulfilling the requirements for formal education gradu-
ally rose. We can add that among the skilled manual workers the share of
those who worked in their own or kindred specialisation increased to
60.2 per cent in the Czech and to 63.6 per cent in the Slovak Republics in
September 1989 (SY, 1990. pp. 213-14). From a professional point of
view, however. it is questionable whether the new specialists were ad-
equate substitutes for the dismissed. In principle, they could not have
been, because the purges led to the exclusion of highly qualified peoplc,
most of whom had participated in the pro-democratic and pro-meritocratic
reform endeavour. Besides. the psychological and ethical context of the
available careers created a negative selection effect: generally. a large part
of the young generation considered membership in the Communist Party,
offered to many of them, shameful. This attitude was to prevail for some
years after the invasion. For others, however. it merely signified access 10
advantageous professional careers which many pursued. lt is therefore
true that in such conditions the formal congruence of education and work-
complexity or managerial position is not a sufficient indicator of meritoc-
racy (see Kalinova, 1993b. p. 12; Kaplan. 1993, p. 74).
It should be c1ear from the above that for at least two years after April
1969. when A. Dubcek was replaced in his leading post within the
Communist Party by G. Husak. the main activity of the new oligarchy was
mass purging. As stated, it concerned membership of the Communist Party.
participation in public Iife (including membership and functions in various
social associations and public institutions and the right to publish) and,
above all, the possibility of retaining professional posts. According to the
official announccments of the leading Party functionaries, G.Husak and V.
Bilak. nearly half a million Communist Party mcmbers were excluded or
'deleted' from the ranks of this political party. Nearly all of them were
either dismissed from their posts or severely hindered in pursuing their pro-
fessional careers. The non-Communist participants of the Prague Spring
were treated in a similar manner. Family members (incIuding children) and
relatives were also penalised, generally experiencing difficulties at their
place of work. and being denied access to study. One of our sources
(Kalinova, 1993b, p. 11) estimates the victims of persecution to number
around 500 000, the other (Kaplan. 1993. p. 74) setting that number as high
as 750000. Since mostly non-manual employees were the victims of these
persecutional acts. at least 30 per cent (and possibly more) of this socio-
ocupational category suffered extensively as a consequence of the reform
defeat. lt was the end of the Communist Party's flirtation with the left-
democratic intelligentsia. which had given its support in the years 1945-8
196 Social Melamorphoses
and/or in the reform allempts of the 1960s in particular. More than 100 000
people emigrated illegally from Czechoslovakia in 1968 and 1969, mainly
after the Soviet invasion, a further 140 000 in the 1970s and I980s. The
total of both legal and illegal emigres between 1948 and 1989 has been
estimated at approximately 565000 people (Kucera, 1995, p. 145). Given
the intellectual and professional capacity of the group concerned as weil as
the duration of the persecution and emigration, it was one of the three most
serious blows to the Czech intelligentsia over a thirty year period. (Neither
dllring the war nor in this period was the Siovak intelligentsia affected as
seriollsly as the Czech: in Siovakia, the persecution of the 1970s was much
more moderate. However, in the late 1940s and in the 1950s, the oppres-
sion of the Slovak intelligentsia was very intensive.) If we add to this the
consequences of the interruption of international contacts, so frequent in
the 1960s, we come to the conclusion that the restoration of the conserva-
tive Communist system at the beginning of the 1970s was fatal for the
development of civilisation and culture in the Czech lands.
Restructured and controlled by Moscow, the political elite systemati-
cally reintroduced the strongest possible totalitarian and bureaucratic
control of the political, economic and cultural institutions and associ-
ations, this time with little attention to the so-called class aspects. It was
based on the complete elimination of any democratic elements in public
Iife and a strict control of all institutions exercised by the Communist
cadres appointed to the key positions. Only in the 1970s and 1980s was
the nomenklatura principle applied consequently, this time being system-
atically combined with corresponding economic privileges and with the
emphasis on the command character of both the economic and cultural
management, not to mention the disciplined hierarchical organisation of
the bureaucratic party and state structures. Naturally this order encom-
passed the administrative control of public spiritual life, which was
influenced by an ideology which was not only oversimplified and biased,
but also completely mendacious, based as it was on the denial of national
interests in favour of the foreign invaders. The main element of this ideol-
ogy was the assumption that the uninvited foreign occupation which sup-
pressed the national sovereignty had been, on the contrary, a helping hand
directed at averting the fatal 'danger' of Czechoslovakia's becoming apart
of Europe. The population never accepted the systematic propaganda built
upon this lie, and, from beginning to end, the regime was viewed as an
alienated power. Only in Slovakia was there some response on the part of
the population to the ideology of the advantages of the formally feder-
alised political system, reflecting as it did to some extent real processes of
a stable redistribution of the national income in Slovakia's favour.
 The 'Normalisatiou'; AReturn to Ab,lOrmality 197
The more isolated the nonnalisation regime in the political and ideologi-
eal sphere, the more it beeame neeessary to aequire at least partial social
support. Besides the above-mentioned misuse of the Siovak issue, which
made the regime's situation somewhat easier in this part of the country, a
system of extensive social corruption was applied in both republics. A new
wave of egalitarianism was set in motion. However, while large sections of
the working class might have eonsidered the egalitarianism of the 1940s
and 1950s (and similarly large seetions of the cooperative peasantry thc
egalitarianism of the 1960s) as a fulfilment of Communist promises to thc
formerly exploited c1asses, everybody knew that the motivation behind the
new egalitarian system was the compensation ofthe masses' forbearance of
a regime that betrayed national interests, was subordinated to the foreign
occupation, admitted the loss of national sovereignty and the full suppres-
sion of democracy. Egalitarianism became an instrument of social corrup-
tion. Both our historiographical sources describe in detail the reintroduction
of egalitarian principles in wage and salaries distribution, in socially-
motivated redistribution, in standards of Iiving and Iife-style (Kaplan, 1993,
pp. 62-72; Kalinova, 1993b. pp. 16-19). In spite of some minor changes. in
all kinds of official income categories (more or less exactly declared in stat-
istical and sociological surveys), i.e. in earnings, individual and family
income, income per capita, Czechoslovakia was to remain one of the most
egalitarian countries in Europe. This is proved in the many studies con-
ducted by lire Vecernfk (see especially Vecernfk, 1991, pp. 39-56) On the
basis of extensive data analyses, the author concludes that in the years
1970-84 - the period which, in many respects, represented areturn to the
first, 'revolutionary' years of socialism - the distribution system in
Czechoslovakia did not apply, but directly denied Marx's postulate 'from
each according to his abilities. to each according to his work'. The data in
Table 10.9 also demonstrated a stable egalitarian tendency in the 1970s and
1980s. Statistical data from 1988 show that among economically active
people in the state socialist sector, the wages of those with elementary edu-
cation reached 83.2 per cent of the average wage, of those with apprentice-
ship and vocational schools 102.5 per cent, of the leavers of the secondary
schools \02.4 per cent and of tertiary school leavers 131.8 per cent
(SY, 1989, p. 215).
Egalitarian distribution was to ensure, after some restraint in the year
t 970, a substantial increase in incomes and standard of Iiving for broad
social strata: a goal the regime did, in fact, seek to attain in the course of
the 1970s. Ignoring the oil crisis and the restructuring of world's global
economics, state socialist Czechoslovakia made an out-and-out attempt to
meet the increasing needs of the lower strata, to reward handsomely the
198 Sodal Metamorphoses
obedient and, simultaneously, to commence extensive investment activities.
Priority was given to those projects making immediate improvements in
the population's material situation - the construction of new Hats, infra-
structural improvements (e.g. the Prague subway), improvements to
culture and sport centres, and so on. However, this tendency to fulftl the
population's needs through consumption and investment made nearly no
contribution to the modernisation of the economy, not to mention to the
environmental protection or the population's state of health, both areas of
slow or liule progress. Tables 10.1-10.4 inclusive have shown that until
the mid-1980s at least, the high percentage of manual labour force and
industrial employment remained constant. (In contrast, e.g., to Austria,
whcre at the beginning of the 1980s, more than half of the economically
active were already occupied in the service sector.) At the same time,
they draw our attention to the fact that the continuation of an extensive
industrialisation in the 1980s in Slovakia obviously had already exceedcd
reasonable limits.
Without speculating on the causes and the consequences, we can state
simply that, as in the 1950s, egalitarianism was cIosely connected to the
abolition of the formerly intended economic reform, to the full reintro-
duction of the non-market, centralised command economy based on
administratively regulated distribution and redistribution. Such conditions
did not accommodate the rationalisation of economic structures; instead
inHuence was mainly exerted on the economic policy by external power
pressures and the short-sighted political calculations of the governing
forces which were extremely isolated from society and sought any
available support.
It is \ittle wonder that under these conditions, the reserves of the
national economy were al ready exhausted by the beginning of the 1980s.
The inevitable consequence was a prolonged stagnation in the popula-
tion's standard of living, along with a subsequent partial and relative
decline in the second half of the 1980s. (For details on the economic
contcxt of social relationships in Czechoslovakia see Kalinova, I 993b,
pp. 4-19; Kaplan, 1993, pp. 61-83.)
One could say that by the mid-1980s, at the latest, the economic and
social situation in the Czech Lands was ready for relatively profound
changes. On the other hand, the already well-established political system,
propped up on a still acceptable standard of living and on a satisfactory
social and political situation in Siovakia, enabled the regime to continue
without substantial changes until the end of the I 980s. Of course, a certain
deterioration in the economic situation and the Iiving standard was visible
some years before the collapse. Around this time, the population deve-
 The 'Normalisation ',' AReturn 10 Abnormality 199
loped an unofficial economy, culture. life-sty1e and socia1 network of
a Czechos10vak variant on the 'second society', in which elementary
changes which would prove important for the future asserted themselves
spontaneously. New incentives for the change came from abroad. The
examples of the Polish people's courageous fight and its political success
as weil as the Hungarian economic reform and the development of an econ-
omically based 'second society' in Hungary were the source of extreme
inspiration. Initially, Czechoslovakia's population we1comed the Soviet
perestroika as an official acknowledgement of the crisis in the state social-
ist system and as an auempt to solve it through reform. However,
the population was disappointed by Gorbachev's hesistant approach to the
inevitable revision of the Soviet invasion in August 1968 as weil as the
support which the Soviet leadership extended to Czechoslovak collabora-
tors. In addition, some awareness of the profound crisis in the state social-
ist system as a whole - inspired by the still vivid frustration at the failure
of the Prague Spring reform attempt - had already emerged at that time. In
the second half of the 1980s, domestic dissent played a gradually increas-
ing role, supported by politically active emigres. The dissent had already
developed in two waves by the 1970s. The first consisted mainly of reform
Communists, the second (the Charter movement) of a coalition of people
with liberal dcmocratic attitudes irrespective of their former political
appurtenance. In the second half of the 1980s, concurrently with the con-
tinuing crisis in the official social and political system, the influence
exerled by the relatively small groups engaged in the dissent on the demo-
cratie intetligentsia and the youth grew, eontributing to the final collapse
of the state socialist system in Czechoslovakia in November 1989.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY OF CLASS AND SOCIAL

STRUCTURE IN 1984

In 1984, a group of sociologists led by J. Linhart from the Prague Institute

of Philosophy and Sociology, together with the Federal Statistical Office,
eondueted a representative soeiological survey on class and social struc-
ture. Although there were some ideologieal limits to the survey's theoreti-
eal framework, the authors managed to include oceupational identifications
in thc questionnaire, which enabled the data to be used in a new, compara-
tive context after 1989. Milan Tucek provided all the necessary operations
for this purpose as weil as the reeomputing of the results. The size of the
sampIe of economically active adult individuals dealt with here is 7625 for
the Czech and 3948 for the Slovak Republies. For details coneerning
200 Social Metamorphoses
methods and the first results of the 1984 and 1993 social structures com-
parison in the Czech Republic, see Machonin and Tucek, 1994.
To present the empirical data economically, we have arranged all the
necessary information in Table 16.1 comparing the distribution of the import-
ant variables in the Czech and SJovak Republies in 1984 and in 1993. The
origin of the Data (1993) will be discussed in the following chapter as an
introduction to the interpretation of the changes that occurred in the 1990s in
comparison with the 'normalised' society of the mid-1980s. Here we will
focus on the characteristics of the 1984 structure by means of Data (1984).
In Table 16. I as weil as in all tables in wh ich we present the sociological
survey data, unless otherwise statcd, all differences in the compared distribu-
tions are statistieally signifieant below the level of 0.0 I. All seal es of vertieal
differentiation are ranked from the highest to the lowest. They were con-
structed in the same way for both Republies and both years. CN in the tables
means the contingeney eoefficient (with vaJues from 0.0 - total dissimilarity
and independence - to 1.0 - total identity of the compared variables), RC
Spearman's Rank Correlation (showing on the seale +0.1 - 0;0 - 1.0 the
intensity of dependence/independence with respect to the orientation of the
hierarchy of the compared variables: '+' means in the following tables a
higher average status in the Czeeh, '-' in the Slovak Republies.
Table 16.1 shows that in 1984 only minor differences remained between
the Czech Lands and Siovakia, particularly in education and in the cultural
level of leisure aetivities. The differentiation in the general status index
was already minimal. We will return to the Czech-Slovak comparison in a
special subchapter. Here we wish to underline the still unsatisfactorily
high percentage of people with primary education alone and the still
insufficiently developed percentage of tertiary educated. Both the educa-
tional and occupational structures testify to the existence of astilI extens-
ively industrialised country. The distribution of managerial positions is
very steep, since the self-employed with an autonomy in deeision-making
did not exist - see the 'empty' eategories 3 and 5. (For a detailed explana-
tion of the synthesising social status indices, see Chapter 17.)
Tables 16.2 and 16.3 show minimal differences between the Czech and
Slovak class-structures. They also reveal a high percentage of manual
labour, supporting our identification of an exaggerated industrialisation
and still relatively high oecupation in agriculture. The percentage of both
higher and, in p'articular, lower professionals seems to be insufficient
given the needs for modernisation.
We have the opportunity to present data revealing the mutual relations
of the status-forming variables and thus to allow some insight into the
issue of status consistency/inconsistency.
 The 'Normalisatioll '; AReturn to Abnormality 201
Table 16.1 Basic social status characteristics of the economically active in the
Czech and Slovak Republics, 1984 and 1993, as percentages
(I = the highest, 6 = the lowest category)

1984 1993
Czech Slovak Czech Slovak
Republic Republic Republic Republic

Edllcation
1 (tertiary) . 8.2 9.1 11.4 12.0
2 (secondary, higher level) 8.9 8.8 10.1 13.6
3 (secondary, lower level) 15.2 17.3 18.0 20.6
4 (vocational, higher level) 27.0 21.7 22.7 19.3
5 (vocational and apprentices,
lower level) 13.3 9.7 19.5 12.1
6 (primary) 27.4 33.4 18.3 22.4
CN =0.09 CN = 0.12
RC = 0.02 RC=-O.03
Work-complexity
1 6.1 6.8 9.0 11.1
2 16.5 16.8 18.0 16.3
3 24.8 22.7 16.1 17.6
4 16.0 14.8 25.6 24.3
5 28.7 30.8 21.7 22.9
6 7.9 8.1 9.6 7.8
Statistically insignificant CN =0.05
RC=-O.02
Managerial position
1 1.9 1.5 3.1 2.5
2 6.5 6.1 3.8 6.4
3 0.0 0.0 1.8 1.4
4 11.0 8.7 8.0 8.4
5 0.0 0.0 7.2 5.6
6 80.6 83.7 76.1 75.7
CN =0.04 CN = 0.07
RC = 0.04 RC = 0.01

Both matrices for 1984 in Table 16.4 c1early ilIustrate that formal educa-
tion and work-complexity are (as a rcsult of the already-mentioned histori-
cal changes in allocation to professional and managerial posts) quite c10sely
interconnected. Although the managerial position correlation coefficients
202 Sodal Metamorphoses
Table 16.1 Colltinued

1984 1993
Czech Slovak Czech Siovak
Repllblic Repllblic Repllblic Republic

Culturallevel 0/ the leisure activities

1 1.7 1.6 1.2 1.9
2 6.8 4.4 17.6 11.2
3 17.6 13.6 22.8 23.8
4 27.5 22.6 33.3 31.3
5 29.2 30.0 26.9 23.4
6 17.2 27.8 7.2 8.4
CN =0.13 CN =0.06
RC=0.12 RC=-O.04
Earnings
I 3.3 2.3 10.1 5.8
2 3.6 3.3 6.2 6.1
3 14.0 11.1 12.2 12.7
4 26.6 26.2 21.8 23.9
5 38.0 39.6 30.4 33.6
6 14.5 17.5 19.3 17.9
CN=0.06 CN =0.08
RC=0.06 RC=0.03
Symhesising sodal status index
I 2.4 2.2 3.5 3.2
2 8.5 7.9 9.2 12.3
3 13.9 13.3 17.0 18.3
4 23.9 20.5 26.1 26.8
5 33.6 32.0 29.9 26.9
6 17.7 24.1 14.3 12.5
CN =0.08 CN =0.06
RC=O.06 RC=-O.05

Sources: Data, 1984 and Data, 1993, as elaborated at the end of 1994.

with other variables are not excessively high, they do create a link between
education, occupational position and, particularly, earnings; this link
reflects power differentiation's dominance in the social hierarchy. On the
other hand, the official earnings are, in accordance with the statement of
 The 'Normalisatioll': AReturn to Abnormality 203
Tabte 16.2 Class differentiation of the economically active in the Czech and
Slovak Republics, 1984, as percentages

Class category Cuch Republic Slovak Republic

Higher professionals 10.2 11.1

Lower professionals including
supervisors of manual 15.3 15.2
Routine non-manual 16.1 13.8
Skilled workers 28.4 29.6
Semi-skilled and unskilled workers 22.2 20.5
Manual in agriculture 7.8 9.8
CN =0.04

Sources: Datn (1984) and Data (1993).

Table 16.3 Class differentiation ofthe economically active in the Czech and
Slovak Republics, 1993, as pcrcentages

Class category Cuch Repllblic Slol'ak Republic

Higher professionals 9.7 10.2

Lower professionals 14.5 15.3
Routine rion-manual 14.0 14.8
Self-employed with employees 2.4 1.9
Self-employed without employees 7.2 5.7
Supervisors of manual 2.1 2.8
Skilled workers 16.8 19.7
Semi-skilled and unskilled workers 28.5 23.7
Manual in agricuhure 4.8 5.9
CN =0.07

Sources: As Table 16.2.

egalitarian income distribution, only loosely correlated with the other

status-forming variables, above all with cultural activities. And this last-
mentioned variable symbolising life-style levels shows some autonomy as
compared 10 parlicipalion in management and earnings as symbols of
official power and income distribution. It corresponds far more to education
204 Social Metamorphoses
Table 16.4 Spearman's rank correlations' matrices for status-forming variables
in the Czech and Slovak Republics in 1984

Czech Republic Slovak Republic

CA EA MP WC CA EA MP WC

ED 0.49 0.19 0.34 0.62 ED 0.56 0.21 0.31 0.64

WC 0.37 0.20 0.31 WC 0.46 0.24 0.31
MP 0.16 0.30 MP 0.18 0.30
EA 0.08 EA 0.11

Abbreviations: ED = attained level of education, WC:: work complexity,

MP = managerial position, EA = eamings, CA = culturallevel of
leisure activities.
Sources: Data (1984) and Data (1993) as elaboratcd at the end of 1994.

Table 16.5 Spearman's rank correlations' matrices for status-forming

variables in the Czech and Slovak Republics in 1993

Cuch Republic Slovak Republic

CA EA MP WC CA EA MP WC

ED 0.49 0.28 0.31 0.65 ED 0.47 0.25 0.32 0.65

WC 0.42 0.32 0.35 WC 0.40 0.28 0.35
MP 0.16 0.43 MP 0.18 0.30
EA 0.14 EA 0.19

Abbreviations: ED = attained level of education, WC = work complexity,

MP = managerial position, EA = earnings, CA = culturallevel of
leisure activities.
Sources: Data (1984) and Data (1993) as elaborated at the end of 1994.

and work-eomplexity, partieularly in Slovakia. This phenomenon stimu-

lates a erucial question: what meehanisms enabled people in an egalitarian
society to realise, in their leisure aetivities, higher Iife-styles than corres-
ponded to their eomparatively insuffieient edueational and oeeupational
statuses? There are two possible explanations, both of which are eonnected
to the existence of the already-mentioned unofficial 'second society'. In
 The 'Normalisatioll': AReturn to Abllormality 205

this sphere of life, it was possible to attain some unofficial andlor unde-
c1ared financial and material means and, at the same time, to use private
individual or family time for not too expensive cultural activities.
If we add to this our knowledge of the historieal processes by whieh
these structures were created, one could simply say that the relatively
strong position of power differentiation and the evident autonomy of earn-
ings and of Iife-style can be explained rather in terms of a c1ass-like differ-
entiation than in terms of meritocratic stratification. (These interpretations
were also partially arrived at from the results of application of additional
methods such as factor analyses and typological cluster analyses. The
results themselves do not appear here because of their somewhat compli-
cated character.)
Table 16.6 iIIustrates the role of the complex of various earnings
determinants typical of an egalitarian, respecti vely anti-meritocratic
society. It demonstrates that under egalitarian conditions, the main deter-
minant of official earnings differentiation were demographie factors:
gen der (that is the preferential treatment of males in rcwards) and agc (that
is, a constantly applied preference for older employees). Another impor-
tant factor was branch differentiation, not included here because of techni-
cal difficulties. As the link betwecn occupational and managerial status,
formal education seems to be rather important in determining official earn-
ings. Managerial position's relatively low inßuence can be explained by
its very steep distribution: in this case the high incomes of the higher
levels of the power hierarchy cannot explain the differentiation between
(he medium- and low-scale incomes.

Table 16.6 Multiple regressions of individual earnings in the Czech and Siovak
Republics in 1984 (values of beta coefficients)

Czech Republic Slol'ak Republic

Gender 0.53 0.51

Education 0.17 0.19
Age 0.17 0.15
Managerial position 0.12 0.13
Work-complexity 0.08 0.12

SOI/rces: As Table 16.7.

206 Social Metamorphoses
Table 16.7 Multiple regressions of individual earnings in the Czech and Slovak
Republics in 1993 (values of beta coefficients)

Czech Republic Siovak Republic

Gender 0.33 0.35

Managerial position 0.26 0.17
Education 0.15 0.19
Work complexity 0.15 0.15
Age -0.04' -0.03"'

XStatistical significance 0.022

"Statistical significance 0.025
SOllrces: Dala'(l984) and Dala (1993) as elaborated at the end of 1994.

On the basis of a multiple cIassification analysis of earnings from the

years 1970, 1978 and 1984, the already quoted-author, Vecernfk (1991)
pp. 45-6, specifies the historieal dynamics of the earnings determinations
as folIows:
in the years 1970-1984 the main systemic characteristics of the earnings
differentiation faetors either beeome stable or even strengthen.
Coneretely: 1. The stability of the earnings differences between males
and females; 2. the permanent transfer among the age categories in
favour of the older and to the detriment of the younger ones; 3. the
diminishing of the differences among various levels of education; 4. the
eontinuing earnings preferences for the produetive seetor.
These statements supplement quite naturally the already formulated
characteristics of soeial structure in an over-industrialised egalitarian
society.

CZECH-SLOV AK COMPARISON

In the practieal politics of the 'normalisation' regime installed by the

Soviet intervention in August 1968, the originally intended and legalised
federative arrangement was via facti replaced by a new version of total-
itarian and bureaueratie centralism. This time, however, the politieal
regime was in a sense more advantageous for Slovakia. The Slovak
Communist leaders gained far better and in some respect more influential
 The 'Normalisation ': AReturn to Abnormality 207
positions in the Prague central administration of the country than ever
before. Gustav Husak became General Secretary of the Communist Party
and, later, President of the Republic. The inftuence of other Siovak func-
tionaries, particularly that of the secretary for international affairs and ide-
ology, V. BiI'ak, was also considerable. The Federal Government led by a
Czech, L. Strougal, could not seriously face pressures coming from the
positions of the Siovak lobby in the Party apparatus. This was to change
somewhat only in the late 1980s. As a resuIt of the above, the secondary
redistribution of the GDP in favour of S!ovakia not on!y continued but
even intensified in the 1970s and 1980s. Simultaneously, the political
oppression of hundreds of thousands of Prague Spring participants during
this period was significantly weaker in Siovakia than in the Czech Lands.
Thus, paradoxically, the 'normalisation regime' brought Siovakia certain
advantages it had not enjoyed previously.
Some evidence of this can be found in the data collected for the 1984
sociological survey. The data presented in Tables 16.1-16.8 inclusive
show the cultural and socia! situation of the nonnalisation system at the
zenith of its development. It is hardly surprising that thanks to the penna-
nent redistributive mechanisms during the fifteen years after the final sup-
pression of the Prague Spring, the cultural and both partial and
synthesising social characteristics of the Czech and Siovak adult popula-
tions were much closer in 1984 than in the 1967 survey, with almost no
remaining differences in work-complexity and only small differences in
average earnings. The quality of housing was approximately the same.
Almost identical percentages of households were equipped with tele-
phones. People were equally active in professional studies and political
. activities (in official politics, of course). In some respects, small advan-
tages favouring the Czech population still existed. This is true as far as
some aspects of the educational level, the percentage of managers and the
equipment of households with automatie washing machines, freezers and
colour TVs are concerned. The most significant difference still existed in
the Iife-style indicators. In their leisure activities, the Czech population
was more frequently engaged in typically urban cuItural activities such as
theatre, concert, art exhibition and gallery attendance, hut also in reading
literature, sports, entertainment and physical domestic work with the
exception of agriculture. A substantially higher percentage of the Slovak
population Iived in private houses, in more rooms per family and in a
better environment than did the Czechs. They more frequeiltly had gardens
or other land at their disposal and devoted themselves more frequently to
domestic agricultural work. They were also more active in social contacts,
in visiting relatives, neighbours and friends.
208 Social Metamorphoses
The slightly beuer economic position of Czech households - caused
partly by lower average number of members in more aged Czech families
- expressed itself in the Czech population's somewhat higher evaluation
of the standard of living.
In other words, in the mid-1980s, although there still remained some
lag, the cultural and social characteristics of the Slovak population were
already c10se to the Czech standards. At any rate, the Czech Lands consti-
tuted the stagnating part of the federation, whilst Slovakia the progressing
one.
For the Czech population, the beginning of the Soviet perestroika her-
alded a new historical crisis of the Soviet-type societies. Dissatisfaction
with the stagnation of the Czech Lands, combined with the political
frustration of the citizens of an occupied country gradually arose, partic-
ularly \Vhen some difficulties concerning the standard of Iiving emerged
in the second half of the 1980s (see Table 16.8). The already-mentioned
disappointment with the official Soviet attitude to the events 01' 1968
also played an important role. The Siovak population still IiVing under
the protection of current redistributive processes and under slightly
heUer poJitical conditions did not feel these changes as intensely as did
the Czechs. It is no wonder that these specificities caused so me shift in
the subjective evaluations of the economic, social, political and cultural
situation in the country. In the public opinion polis from the second half
of the 1980s, the Siovak population's degree of satisfaction in response
to almost all questions was significantly higher than that of Czech
citizens.

Table 16.8 Evaluation of the development in the last five years by the Czeeh and
Slovak population 1986, as pereentages

Czech Republic Siovak Republic

Better Thesame Worse Better The same Worse

Standard of living 40.2 32.6 25.9 51.8 27.2 18.2

Social seeurity 23.5 59.9 7.0 29.4 40.5 9.4
Health eare 19.6 67.1 11.6 25.5 57.8 13.3
Housing 30.3 62.0 7.1 39.3 53.3 5.7
Clolhing 29.0 51.4 18.6 39.5 44.9 14.3
Food 27.2 55.6 15.8 39.2 46.1 13.0

Source: Archive IPOR (1986). Remaining percenlages were not able to answer.
 The 'Normalisation ': AReturn to Abllormality 209
As the crisis of 1989 approached, evaluations in both republics were
less and less favourable. However, Czech criticism grew more rapidly
than Slovak criticism. In 1985, for example, 57 per cent of Czech
respondents still believcd that the 'Ieading role of the Party was being
realised rightly', while the same opinion was expressed by 61 per cent of
Slovak respondents. In 1988 the relative data were 40 per cent and 50
per cent, in July 198929 per cent and 35 per cent (Archive IPOR 1985,
1988, 1989).

REASONS FOR THE COLLAPSE OF THE STATE-SOCIALIST

SYSTEM

Roughly concurrent with other central European Soviel-type societies

(towards the end of the year 1989), the state-socialist political system in
Czechoslovakia collapsed in the process of the so-called 'Velvet
Revolution'. This political event instigated a phase of gradual displace-
ment of the economic and social system which had dominated the country
for more than forty years with ncw, qualitatively different social relation-
ships. This process is usually called the 'post-communist social transform-
ation'. A deeper sociological insight into the nature and historieal
dynamies of the social structures of the past which we have undertaken to
communieate will lead to a fuller understanding of the collapse of the
Communist system in this particular country in the particular historieal
period.
The defeat of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries in the
Cold War and the consequent changes in international power relations cer-
tainly played a significant role in this respect. The examples of successful
revolts or reform movements in Poland, Hungary and the former East
Germany also helped considerably, as did the apparent unwillingness of
the Soviet leadership to aid the ruling group in Czechoslovakia. However,
none of these external circumstances can fully explain the historieal
process in question. In the end, the loss of support from abroad simply
revealed with great clarity the communist system's cruciallack of domes-
tic social and political stability.
Keeping in mind the given social and political characteristics of state-
socialist Czechoslovakia, it is not difficult to specify those traits in the
communist system that provoked the dissatisfaction and even resistance of
various social groups and, in some cases, of an overwhelming majority of
the population. By the end of the 1980s, nearly everyone was disturbed by
the long-term loss of national sovereignty. A life with very limited political
210 Social Metamorphoses
Iiberty and few opportunities for economic initiative could not satisfy the
majority. The authoritarian handling of the citizenry by a largely incompe-
tent bureacracy was another source of dissatisfaction. It is equally obvious
that qualified people could not accept the egalitarian and anti-meritocratic
system. Yet other reasons led to dissatisfaction with the centralist practices
of the federal administration, both on the part of Czechs and Siovaks.
However, national and democratic resistance and democratic or liberal
reform attempts had already been successfully 'managed' by the commu-
nist regime several times in the past, so we must ask (as did the Czech
sociologist, Ivo Mozny) the question: 'Why so easy?' (Mozny, 1991).
Why so easy in Czechoslovakia (as compared with the difficult political
struggle in Poland or the long-term Hungarian endeavour to reform the
economy), and why so easy just at the end of the I 980s ?
To ans wer this question, we must temporarily abandon the striclly
delineated field of social relationships. By this, we assurne that the
most profound internal reasons for the collapse of Communism in
Czechoslovakia He in the country's economic, tcchnological and cultural
developments. Many groups in the Czech population knew from their own
experience that the competition with the advanced capitalist countries had
not only been lost in the arms race and in the field of politicalliberties, but
also in the fields of technology, production, services, standard of Iiving, as
weil as in the civilisation and culturallevel as a whole, including Iife-style.
The communist social and political system had been able to stimulate
extensive industrialisation (with an accent on arms production); it had not,
however, been able to modernise an industrial society. Consequently, it
was not able to take effective steps towards post-industrialism in the later
decades. In other words, the state-socialist social and political structure in
Czechoslovakia c1early lagged behind the possibilities that the modern age
had opened for the development of civilisation and culture. The lack of
democratic liberties and particularly the lack of motivation for qualified
and competent work (as a consequence of the anti-meritocratic societal
arrangement) hindered talented Czechs from taking part in the progress of
world civilisation and culture typical of the last few decades.
People rightly feit a relative deprivation in comparison with their inter-
national surroundings. At the same time, they already feit absolutely
deprived in comparison with the country's past, even in comparison with
the 1960s period in the state socialist era. In the second half of the 1980s,
the general standard of living started to decline even in relatively
advanced Czechoslovakia, ecological conditions deteriorated rapidly and
life expectancy rather stagnated for decades. (It was 67.0 years for males
and 73.3 for females in 1965 and 67.8 and 75.3 in 1988. Only Hungary,
 The 'Normalisation': ARetu", to Abllormality 211
Poland and the Soviel Union showed c1early lower figures among
the European countries (Crisis, 1994, p. 24; Slatislicke udaje, 1990,
pp. 13-14.) Most importantly, such changes for the worse could no longer
be counterbalanced by the relative advantages enjoyed by the social strata
or c1asses given relatively preferential treatment over competent and
qualitied people. Subsequently, public support for the regime by this group
declined substantially.
At the crucial moment in November 1989, politically active groups -
dissidents, people persecuted by the communist regime either in the 1950s
or the 1970s, democratic intellectuals and students - received support
from relatively broad social strata prepared for this role by their experi-
cnce with life in the second society. At this moment, these people (mostly
with inconsistent status-patterns) were ready to transfer their aUitudes and
activities from the microsocial and unofficial level to the macrostructural
and give support to the formation of new democratic political institutions.
Support came from relatively broad groups of people who feit Iimited by
the totalitarian and anti-meritocratic system in their possible future
careers, in further raising their standard of living and in modernising their
Iife-stylcs. Evcn a number of qualified workers joined this movement.
However. the dccisive factor for the final success was that not only the
Soviets, but also the internal social forces that had for decades been
socially corrupted by the communist system (including many members of
the Communist Party and even the Workers' Militia), failed to support the
old regime this time. This circumstance seems to be the main reason why
thc leadership of the Communist Party surrended their power at that
particular time.
17 The Post-Communist
Social Transformation
THE LEGACY OF COMMUNISM

Thc Communist system operated in the country for more than forty years,
enjoyed a certain amount of constant social support (even a limited one
somc time after the Warsaw Pact occupation), and provided relativcly
broad social groups with certain undeserved advantages. Given this, its
inftuence on the social psychology and the behaviour of both people and
institutions cannot be expccted to" vanish overnight. We thus face a phe-
nomenon that undoubtedly exerts an inftuence on the course of the posl-
Communist social transformation. This is generally referred "to as the
"egacy of Communism' (Mokrzycki, 1992; Machonin, 1993). Abrief
enumeration of the factors in the Czech Lands and Slovakia subsumed
under this notion shows that the social characteristics of the Soviet-type
system (as discussed in Chapters 14-16 inclusive), have outlived the his-
torical existence of the structures that brought them into being and con-
tinue to affect the present and future of the countries in question.
The first factor born of long-term Communist rule and which now
hampers the course of the transformation has been analysed above: the
civilisation and cultural lag of the Czech Lands and Siovakia in compari-
son with advanced countries. This lag is not as considerable as the lag in
some other post-Communist countries; nevertheless it still exists. We can
expect many years of substantial and complex modernisation of the
economy, culture and way of Iife, processes which will be both difficult
and expensive. This civilisation and cultural lag has direct social conse-
quences. The Czech and Siovak societies, like the others of East-Central
Europe, differ from the societies of advanced countries mainly in the
branch and sector structures of the working population (see Tables 10.3
and 10.4) as weil as in the major and specialisatiOil educational structures
(Tucek, 1993a) A higher percentage of people are employed in industry, a
somewhat higher percentage in the primary sec tor, a lower percentage in
the tertiary sector (traditional services), while a substantially lower per-
centage of people are active in the quaternary sector (above all in science
and specialised education) than in advanced Western countries. Thus we
have had a high percentage of students majoring in agriculture, mining,

212
 The Post-Communist Social Transformation 213
industrial and construction occupations and in those professions dealing
with economics (except in courses training practical business skills) and a
lack of people educated for services in the broad sense of the word, a.o. in
the information technology sector.
This horizontal occupational differentiation has led to an extreme preva-
lence of manual over non-manual workers, and particularly professionals
(see Tables 10.1, 10.2, 16.2 and 16.3). At the same time, it means a small
share of people with higher work complexity and a large share of those
with lower work complexity. Such vertical differentiation is connected
with the corresponding shape of the educational hierarchy. There is a lack
of people with tertiary education qualifications in appropriate majors and
of sufficient quality to meet the needs of further modernisation. There is
also a lack of people with secondary education in some necessary special-
isations. On the other hand, the advantages of a large number of qualified
lower-Ievel specialists and of skilled and experienced semi-skilled workers
on the labour market should not be overlooked. It should be noted that
education's major and specialisation structure is still somewhat rigid. Such
lags in occupational and educational structures are a consequence of the
conservative economic and cultural policy which, as outlined in previous
chapters, characterised the Communist regime.
The most apparent trait of the social structure of 'real socialism' in
Czechoslovakia was the absolute lack of differentiation in the ownership
of economic resources. Possibly the highest degree in Europe of national-
isation and collectivisation of production means and other fortunes was
visible in this country. Hence, the state monopoly of the economy, the
planning and the redistributive system meant that for forty years, Czechs
and Slovaks had almost no official opportunity to participate in enterprise,
to compete, to try their best to satisfy the needs of the consumer. This lack
of experience has profoundly influenced the social psychology and the
population's behavioural patterns. There is empirical evidence of some
changes in this field subsequent to November 1989 (Tucek, 1993b; Hampl,
1993). In juridicalterms, the Czech Lands boasts the highest privatisation
pace among the post-Communist count ries, while Slovakia is progressing
somewhat more slowly. In both countries, however, the amount of real
change in economic behaviour effected by the privatisation process
remains modest. This demonstrates the difficulty facing any proposed econ-
omic policies seeking to create a new, private system of real decision-
making concerning economic capital. It is also significant evidence of how
deeply the etatiste approach to management is rooted in the economic
system inherited from Communism. Contrarily, the population's attitudes
toward private enterprise and competition have changed quite rapidly.
214 Social Metamorphoses
This is probably a consequence of the phenomenon we have called the
'second society', and of the Czech and - let us hope - also of the Siovak
population's historically proven high level of adaptability. Unfortunately,
a lack of skill in satisfying consumer needs seems to be one of the harshest
legacies of the old system, with its preferences for the 'working people',
that is, productive workers, tradesmen, and people working in services in
monopolistic positions.
As we have already considered the problems of egalitarianism, it
suffices to state here that both egaJitarian redistributive practices
(Vecernfk, 1993) and egaJitarian attitudes (Tucek, 1993b) persist.
Although things are changing, particularly in the sphere of attitudes, it is
in these areas that the 'Iegacy of Communism' will certainly prove to be
one of the most difficult obstac1es to the post-Communist social transfor-
mation, particularly in Slovakia. It should also be noted that the tendency
to strive for undeserved privileges by people in power and managerial
positions did not vanish with the Communist rule; it continues to operate
under the changed social conditions, in many cases in the attitudes and
behaviour of the same people.
At first glance, the pro-democratic changes in political institutions,
behaviour, and attitudes have been the most successful (Hampl, 1993;
Tucek, 1993b). The totalitarian aspect of the 'Iegacy of Communism' is
very unpopular, with only handfuls of people openly identifying them-
selves with anti-democratic tendencies. There is almost no protest against
free elections or against a pluralistic parliamentary system. On the other
hand, however, the not inconsiderable existence of radical political cur-
rents on both the left and right and, simultaneously, the existence of some
intolerance toward political, ethnic, racial and other minorities (Hampl,
1993) show that the 'legacy of Communism' still operates within the polit-
ical culture, although in some cases this intolerance now originales more
from the right than the left of the political spectrum. Strong elements of
bureaucracy (in the Marxian, not the Weberian sense) also continue to
operate within the newly created political institutions, in the state adminis-
tration and in the economic management of state-owned or only formally
privatised enterprises. Even some elements of 'partocracy' seem to have
survived their original Communist patterns.
Thus we see that the 'Iegacy of Communism' is relatively alive and
infiuential in an important spheres of societal Iife: in the level of technol-
ogy and culture, in economics and politics, in the social structure, and in
the attitudes and value orientations of the Czech and Siovak population.
On the other hand, traditions, habits and values typical of the 'second
society' also continue to exist and are rapidly developing under the new
 The Post-Communist Social Transformation 215
conditions. Not all of them have unifonnly favourable effects. It is elear,
for example, that the experience of those engaged in the 'greyeconomy'
has engendered many counter-productive fonns of economic behaviour that
have become one of the obstaeles to the development of the legal market
economy in astate of law. In any case, the legacies of both Communism
and the potential or actual opposition to it are undoubtedly of substantial
influence in the present social and political situation in the Czech and
Siovak Republics. These legacies compete with other foreign and domestic
influences and will continue to play an important role in the post-
Communist transfonnation, not only in the Czech and Siovak Republics.

DEMOCRATIC CHANGES AND THE EXCHANGE OF

POLITICAL ELITES

All political changes in the Czech and Siovak Republics occurring in the
years 1989-92 led to the installation of a parliamentary democratic system
in the place of the old totalitarian one. There is no doubt that these
changes have been based on a step-by-step exchange of the political elite,
with some elements of circulation (Szel6nyi and Treiman, 1991 ;
Machonin, 1994). (This, however, is not the case for the economic and
cultural elites, where the tendency to continue careers begun in the
Communist system is more pronounced, combined, of course, with the
natural exchange caused by generational shifts.) In the first period of
the transfonnation (until the first democratic elections in 1990 - see Table
17.1), where only those people obviously compromised within the old
regime were expelled from the political elite by both federal and republic
'governments of national understanding', thus allowing many former
communists and functionaries of the 1980s non-Communist 'National
Front' parties to participate in political Iife, particularly within state
administration.
The position of the political 'cadres' of the 1980s was weakened (to a
greater extent in the Czech than in the Slovak RepubJic) with the return of
reform communists from the 1960s who had been exeluded from the
Communist Party in the year 1970 and, as a rule, had been persecuted by
the old regime. Most of them were elderly and generally had not returned
to the Communist Party, at least in the Czech Lands. Especially those
active in dissident cireles have taken advantage of the opportunities avail-
able in the renewal of political Iife, and have participated in parties or
movements across the political spectrum. From the very beginning of the
political changes, a very important and, in many respects, decisive role
216 Social Metamorphoses
Table 17.1 Results of the 1990 parliamentary elections for the House ofPeople
in the Czech and Siovak Republics, as percentages of valid votes

Czech Republic Slovak Republic

CivicForum 53.2 Public against Violence 32.5

Communist Party 13.5 Christi an Democratic Movement 19.0
Christian Democratic Union 8.7 Communist Party 13.8
Self-Govemment Movement - 7.9 Siovak National Party 11.0
Association for Moravia
and Silesia
Social Democracy 3.8 Co-existence - Hungarian 8.6
Christi an Democratic Movement
Alliance of Agriculture 3.8 Democratic Party 4.4
and Country
Party of the Greens 3.1 Party of the Greens 3.2
CzS Socialist Party 2.8 Alliance of Agriculture and Country 2.6
Social Democracy 1.9
Other parties 3.2 Other parties 3.0

Source: Porovnlinf, 1992.

was played by the non-Communist wing of the dissent. A section of this

group, also mostly elderly, have prolonged their political activities in
various political parties and movements (except the Communist Party) or
as independent politicians. Most representatives of both wings of the
dissent reached the zenith of their political careers during the second
period of the transformation (ending with the second free elections in
1992), in connection with the Civic Forum Federal and Czech govern-
ments and the government of a democratic coalition headed by the 'Public
against Violence' movement in Slovakia. The former Czechoslovak and
present Czech president, Vaclav Havel, continues his political activity pri-
marily as a symbol of the moral values typical of the dissent, promoting
the revival of a civil society based on humanist principles. In Slovakia, the
less-intensive persecutions engendered weaker dissident groups, while the
influence of people with careers rooted in the 1980s remained more
explicit. On the other hand, unlike the Czech Lands, where the present
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia did not sufficiently separate
itself from the heritage of the past, the reform wing of the Communist
Party of Siovakia was strong enough to transform it into one of the post-
Communist parties of the democratic left. These circumstances were
 The Post-Communist Social Transformation 217
reftected in the results of the first free elections after aperiod of 44 years,
during which time the population was allowed neither to express its real
attitude to the regime officially nor to elect its representatives.
Even during the 1990 pre-electoral campaign, a new wave of zealous
political activists emerged. At that time, they belonged mostly to the
younger middle generation from all over the country. As a rule, they had
not been active in the dissent, nor had they been persecuted by the old
regime (some of them were even members or lower functionaries of the
Communist Party, admitted to the Party during the normalisation), but feit
bound to their careers and to the further improvement of their standard of
Iiving under Communism (in the 'second society'). They sought a decisive
break in the continuity with the Prague Spring reform attempt - the results
of which had been a source of frustration during their youth - and a new
era of development that would give them and their contemporaries
sufficient space. Fascinated with life-styles in advanced Western countries,
they willingly accepted the advice and slogans of a group of somewhat
otder Czech neo-Iiberats who had onty partty been engaged in the anti-
Communist dissent. (Not so in Slovakia, where neo-liberals were mostly
younger people with liule experience, knowledge and inftuence who did
not succeed in tocating an actually interested broader social background.)
The new wave of political activists first joined the Civic Forum or the
'Pubtic against Violence' , becoming their candidates in both the parlia-
mentary and locat elections. A number of them were oriented toward
upwardly mobile careers not only in politics, but also, simultaneously, in
the economy. This new sec tor of the political 6lite gradually strengthened,
and determined the character of the economic reform on the Federallevel
as weil as in the Czech Republic and refused the possibility of a regionally
specific economic reform in Slovakia. They formed the basis of the new
right-wing parties that emerged after the dissociation of the Civic Forum
(particularly the Civic Democratic Party). They managed to win the 1992
elections in the Czech Lands. Slovakia saw quite the reverse, with the
liberal wing of the 'Public against Violence' losing the elections, surren-
dering its seats to the rather nationally oriented and populist Movement for
Democratic Slovakia. As the parliaments of the Czech and Slovak
Republics became the most important centres of political power with the
coming dissociation of the Czech-Slovak Federation, we have presented
in Table 17.2 the electoral results concerning these bodies.
These electoral results became the immediate incentive for the dissoci-
ation of the Czech and Slovak federation at the beginning of 1993 - an
event which will be analysed from the sociological point of view in a
special subchapter devoted to Czech-Slovak relationships. A generational
218 Social Metamorphoses
Table 17.2 Results of the 1992 elections for the Parliaments of the Czech and
Slovak Republics, as percentages of valid votes

euch Republic Slovak Republic

Civic Democratic Party - 29.7 Movement for Democratic Siovakia 37.3

Christian Democratic Party
Left Block 14.1 Party of Democratic Left 14.7
Social Democracy 6.5 Christi an Democratic Movement 8.9
Liberal Social Union 6.5 Slovak National Party 7.9
Christian Democratic 6.3 Coalition Hungarian Christi an 7.4
Union - People's Party Democratic Movement
Republican Party (right-wing 5.9 Civic Democratic Union 4.0
orientation)
Civic Democratic Alliance 5.9 Social Democracy 4.0
Movement for Democratic 5.9 Democratic Party - Civic 3.3
Self-Government (Moravia Democratic Party
and Silesia)
Civic Movement 4.6 Slovak Christi an Democratic
Movement 3.1
Other parties 14.6 Other parties 9.4

Source: CSY, 1993, p. 441.

shift occurred in the ranks of the election victors as weil as in other demo-
cratic parties, in the extreme right-wing parties as weil as to some extent
within the Communist Party.
The most significant part of the political elite of dissident origins wh ich
participated in the 'Velvet Revolution' in November 1989 remained faith-
ful to its original centrist humanist and liberal democratic conceptions.
However, against the background of rapid social and political differentia-
tion. their somewhat abstract and vague slogans were not embraccd by
voters. In the 1992 elections, the Czech electorate did not support
the Civic Movement which sought to continue the original 'pure'
Iiberal-democratic strategy of the Civic Forum and thus excluded most
representatives of this group, including many former reform Communists,
from the power elite, leaving the Movement without parliamentary repre-
sentation. The same occurred to the liberal wing of the 'Public against
Violence' in Slovakia, the difference being that there were no conservative
neo-Iiberals with a right-wing orientation capable ofreplacing them on the
Slovak political scene.
 The Post-Communist Social Transformation 219
The generational shift within the political elite was accomplished later
with the decision of both national parliaments not to give the already-
elected members of the federal parliament from the two Republics seats in
a second Chamber. Only a relatively small group of older experienced
people now operate as prominent figures on the political scene in both the
Czech and Siovak Republics.
As result of these processes and against a background of ongoing social
and political polarisation, a real exchange of political elites occurred. They
now consist mainly of people who belong neither to the upper ruling nor
to the oppositional political elites from the Communist system. The former
Communists now participating in politics did not for the most part belong
to the real political elites of the old regime (with some exceptions in
Slovakia, being those that in time joined the post-November national
democratic movements). They are simply using the social and cultural
capital accumulated in lower positions within the Communist system for
careers in the present system.
Further development of the political elites will depend mainly on the
recruitment of young people and on their political attitudes. For the time
being, attitudes favourable to the Iiberalising changes seem to prevail
amongst the relatively small group of young political activists. The future
will depend not only on the success or failure of the transformation
process as a whole but also on the dominant response among the young
generation to this.
The main consequence of the hitherto mentioned political processes has
been a significant shift in power. The Communist Party's political monop-
oly was replaced by democratically-elected governments - one of a moder-
ately right-wing orientation in the Czech lands and several with changing,
prevailingly still-democratic political orientations in Slovakia. The Czech
government includes representatives of four right-wing parties. In addition
to the extreme Communist left and the extreme right, the democratic left
(above all, the Social Democrats) and the small centrist liberal democratic
parties have not been included in the ruling coalition, and remain in opposi-
tion. In the Slovak Republic, the present government was created by a
coalition of rather populisl parlies with national and social orientations and
some authorilarian inclinations led by the Movement for Democratic
Slovakia. Table 17.3 shows the results of the 1994 parliamentary elections.
For comparison, Table 17.4 gives data from the last available public
opinion poil in the Czech Republic, which illustrates the major political
attitudes in this part of the former Czechoslovak Federation and their
quite contrary developmental direction following the dissociation of the
Federation.
220 Social Metamorphoses
Table 17.3 Results of the 1994 parliamentary elections in the Slovak Republic,
as percentages of valid votes

Movement for Democratic Siovakia - Peasants' Party of Slovakia 35.0

Common Option (coalition of Democratic Left and Social Democracy) 10.4
Hungarian Coalition 10.2
Christian Democratic Union 10.1
Democratic Union of Siovakia 8.6
Slovak Workers' Party 7.3
Slovak National Party 5.4
Other parties 13.0

Source: Lidov~ (1994).

Table 17.4 Preferences for political parties in the Czech Republic in December
1994, as percentages of adult population (excluding the undecided)

Civic Democratic Party 29.2

Social Democracy 20.4
Civic Democratic Alliance 13.7
Communist Party 11.2
Christian Democratic Union - People's Party 8.2
Other parties (with preferences lower 3 per cent) 17.3

Source: Trendy (1994); N = 1328.

The shift in political power in both republics is crueial and indieates

that, in fact, the transition from a totalitarian to a pluralist democratic
system has been eompleted, albeit with some question-marks for the future
in the Slovak ease.
The existenee of a democratie eoalition on the one hand, and of a demo-
eratie opposition on the other indieates that the parliamentary demoeraey
system in the Czech Republie is doing quite weil. Even in moments of extra-
ordinary cIashes, it has shown sufficient ability to aehieve pragmatie and
compromise solutions where necessary. In spite of its radieal economie pro-
gramme and political rhetorie, the right-wing eoalition govemment has on
many oeeasions shown that in praetiee it adopts more gradual approaehes
hased on delaying the resolution of eonflietual problems, thus allowing for
inevitable social and political eompromises. Although both in reality and in
the attitudes of the population some differentiation and even polarisation is
 The Post-Communist Social Transformation 221
occurring and the first significant clashes are apparent, for the time being a
democratically-reached social consensus on major problems still does ex ist
in the Czech Republic. The situation in Slovakia is far more complicated:
the latent social conflicts seem grave and the political, social and economie
strategies adopted by various subjects on the relatively splintered political
scene are highly conflicting with regard to certain crucial questions.

MAJOR SOCIAL CHANGES IN FEDERAL CZECHOSLOV AKIA

DURING THE FIRST PERIOD OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION:
THE SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY ON SOCIAL STRATIFICATION
IN 1993

The processes occurring in the former state socialist countries of

Central-Eastern Europe are not viewed in this analysis as a mere transition
from an exactly defined social order (a totalitarian system based on a
redistributive, non-market economy) to another, equally familiar order
(namely liberal democratic capitalism), which is being realised by aseries
of instruments, supplied a prior;, logically deduced from the characteris-
tics of the outcome and the end or the transition. Indeed, we understand
the ongoing social processes in our countries as one aspect of a complex
societal transformation involving changes in civilisation and culture,
economy, the political system and spirituallife. We define them as a quali-
tative historieal change (social transformation), the prehistory, recent
history and the current course of which should be examined through the
empirical 'verification and falsification' of various theoretical concepts
(including the most plausible models of the possible future for the given
conditions), applying to this end all useful and attainable methodological
instruments (cf. Offe, 1991; Stark, 1992; Machonin, I 992c). In the case of
Czech society, the briefly described 'transition model' seems, for the time
being, greatly to resemble the Iikely course of the recent and next changes.
However, the development in Slovakia wh ich started in very similar con-
ditions al ready substantially differs from the Czech one. The experience of
Po land and Hungary also shows that all attempts to predict the future
should be formulated more in terms of likely alternatives and variants than
in a 'one-way' prognosis. Even the perfect realisation of the most opti-
mistic image of the assumed transition can be achieved in various social
forms which are strongly determined by the concrete social history of the
group of countries and of the individual countries in question as well as by
the complex initial conditions (including cultural specificities) resulting
from the social and political actors' activities. It is for this reason that the
222 Social Metamorphoses
social transformation processes are to be systematically monitored by
means of empirical research.
As has already been shown in the previous chapter, the empirieal basis
of our analysis of the post-Communist social transformation will be the
comparison of 1984 and early 1993 social structures. The most important
data for this have been presented in Tables 16.1-16.7 inclusive.
The 1993 survey used here is the international comparative survey,
Social Stratification and Mobility, conducted under the leadership of the
Department of Sociology of UCLA, USA (Professors Treiman and
Szelenyi). Data for the Czech and Siovak Republic were collected in
spring 1993 by the national teams of the Sociological Institutes of the
Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic (headed by P. Matejü and
carried out with the participation of the present author) and of the Slovak
Academy of Sciences (headed by J. Buncak). The income data relate to the
year 1992. The time of the data collection corresponds to the dissociation
of the Czechoslovak Federa! Republic and to the birth of the Czech and
Slovak Republics as sovereign states. N for the sam pIe analysed here of
economically active in both republics was equal to 6454 respondents, the
percentage for the Czech Republic being 67.4 per cent, for the Slovak
32.6 per cent More detailed infonnation concerning the methodological
and technical problems is presented in Machonin and Tucek (1994) where
some basic data interpretations concerning the Czech Republic were pub-
lished. In this subchapter, we will focus on a historieal comparison of the
state socialist past with the present situation, both periods in which the
Czech Lands and Siovakia share many similarities. A comparison of the
pro ces ses in the two countries taken separately will be the subject of
analysis in the following subchapter.
Tables 10.1-10.4 inclusive, and 16.2 and 16.3 show the first social
results of the economic refonn in the Czech Lands and Siovakia. The cre-
ation of an economic equilibrium on the macro-economic level following
price Iiberalisation was connected with a heavy decline in agricultural and
industrial production and with a fall in the GDP in the first years of the
1990s. On the other hand, it was soon attended by a rapid increase in ser-
vices. The growth of the tertiary sector and a powerful growth of small
enterprise recently saw the first signs of economic recovery emerge. The
same phenomena also contributed to progress in the modernisation of
sector structures. Unfortunately, as already noted in the commentary to
Tables 10.3 and 10.4, employment growth in the 'non-productive'
branches occurred mainly to the benefit of the traditional material services,
commerce, financial services, administrative apparatus and partly of ser-
vices in the information sector, while education, science, research and
 The Post-Commullist Social Tra1ls/ormatio1l 223
development, culture and health-care suffered in terms of favourable con-
ditions for development. Nevertheless, the revival of services, together
with the existence of a large grey and black economic sector, contributed
10 the maintenance of the extremely low unemployment rate in the Czech
lands (4.1 per cent in 1991, 2.6 per cent in 1992, 3.5 per cent in 1993, 3.1
per cent in the second quarter of 1994) but could not steer away from a
relatively high unemployment rate in Slovakia (11.8 per cent,
10.4 per cent, 14.4 per cent and 14.1 per cent in the same years), the laUer
paralleling the experience of the other post-Communist countries. (Ceska
republika, 1994, p. 95; Statistical Bulletin, 1994, p. 9) In any case, the first
steps in the modernisation processes do not signal that in this respect the
grave legacy of Communism has been overcome. Modernisation in the
broad sense of the word, including post-industrial processes, remains the
major problem for both republics. As only some progress in this field will
constitute a decisive criterion for the character of social changes occurring
in these countries, one can expect that in the future a policy stimulating the
development of the quaternary sector will become one of the most import-
ant fields of various social and political strategy conflicts.
For a thorough analysis of vertical social differentiation, we will com-
mence with a simple historical comparison of the basic partial status
dimensions presented in Table 16.1. In Tables 10.5 and 10.6, we saw some
increase in the educationallevel ofthe population aged 15 and over. Now,
analysing the economicalIy active population alone, we can state that, in
spite of a justified critique concerning the slow progress of tertiary educa-
tion under Communism (with university studies lasting at least four years,
in some faculties even more), some modernisation of educationallevels
has been achieved in both republics over the last decade. There is nOW a
relatively large proportion of people with the highest secondary-school
qualification (including people with two or three subsequent years of spe-
cialised schooling replacing the formerly non-existent undergraduate
studies). Moreover, a very broad group of people completing vocational
school education both for manual and non-manual occupations is typical,
particularly of the Czech Republic.
One cannot expect substantial shifts in work-complexity in one decade,
although some progress in the percentage of the highest and the fourth
degrees of the scales is noticeable, to the detriment of the less-complex and
less-qualified occupations represented by the second and fifth degrees. This is
in accordance with the changes in the educational structures. Such informa-
tion is nevertheless important because work-complexity is the variable which
we - continuing the Czechoslovak tradition from the 1960s - use as an
appropriate operationalisation of the vertical differentiation of occupations.
224 Social Metamorphoses
The comparison of managerial position distributions for both republics
shows the results of the reconstruction of this variable for the year 1993, at
which point some progress in the privatisation had al ready led to the emer-
gence of self-employed, whose managerial position - in terms of an enlarged
space for decision-making - is rightly conceived to be relatively higher than
the position of employees. Thus, the managerial position pyramids are no
Ion ger as steep as they were under state socialism. Hence, the introduction of
private property, in accordance with reality, has also intervened in the con-
struction of the synthesising social status index. Thus to some extent, man-
agerial position becomes a characteristie of c\ass appurtenance. Life-style
indices also displaya tendency to some shifts in the upward direction and to
a decrease in the percentages of pre-urban patterns of leisure activities.
As far as the income distribution is concerned, the distributions in Table
16.1 cannot be directly compared because of the varying income distances
used for their construction. However, aseries of empirieally-based data
comparison from 1984, 1988, and from the 1990s elaborated by
J. Vecernfk, prove that:
• the extraordinary equalisation of official (declared) incomes continued
untit the very end of the state socialist era and partially until 1991,
with a radieal dec\ine in real incomes;
• an increasing vertical differentiation of income, particularly that of
earnings, began around the end of 1991 when a stepwise rise in real
incomes commenced;
• 'since 1992, earnings inequality seems to be widening". the income
bottom, being protected in absolute terms by the minimum wage, does
not fall too much, while the income top's situation is improving quite
considerably' (Vecemfk, 1994, p. 6).
Our comparison of data on 1992 earnings in the Czech Lands and
Slovakia reveals that these statements are more applicable to the earnings
distribution in the Czech Republic, while the progress of earnings differ-
entiation in Slovakia has not been so rapid. It is connected with the differ-
ences in the real income developments in the two countries after the
dissociation. In the Czech Repuhlic, a moderate increase in real incomes
continued in 1993 and 1994, whereas in Siovakia 1993 a moderate
decline, and only a moderate increase in 1994 could be observed.
(Statistical Bulletin, 1994, p. 11)
Parallel to the rising eamings and incomc differentiation, some increase
in the differentiation of wealth (fortunes) can also be declared. However,
only the factors inftuencing earnings distrihution are comparable on the
basis of our sampIes.
 The Post-Communist Social Transformation 225
Tables 16.6 and 16.7 shows c1early the declining inftuence of traditional
demographie factors mostly explaining the existing earnings differentia-
tion in the egalitarian past. If we take education and work-complexity as
two variables operationalising the differentiation of people according to
their qualification and performance, then their influence as a whole has
increased somewhat. However, the most remarkable change in the Czech
lands is the increase in the explanatory power of managerial position dis-
tribution following from this variable's embodiment of self-employment.
(In Slovakia, where the privatisation processes are somewhat lagging
behind their pace in the Czech soeiety, the increase in inftuence of this
variable is not so remarkable.) Thus, from the first steps of our analysis,
two typical processes in the ongoing soeial differentiation are observable:
the parallel assertion of meritocratic and class prineiples.
The statistical class classifications in Tables 10.1 and 10.2 are not
sufficiently detailed and present no data after the 1991 Census. We can now
apply a more concrete model of class differentiation. The modernised class
classifications, particularly the EGP scheme (Erikson and, Goldthorpe,
1992), represent one possible conception of an apriori c1assification of
occupations through the configuration of some partial soeial differentia-
tions such as ownership, education, nature of work, management position,
and work in different branches of the economy. We have used this scheme
with some modification for the presentation of 1993 data in Table 16.3.
1984 data are presented in Table 16.2 under a similar, roughly comparable
classification, created recently on the base of the old Czechoslovak
classification of occupations. Only the limits dividing skilled and unskilled
workers are different for 1984 and 1993.
The figures for both republics clearly show a continuing fall in the per-
centage of manual in agriculture, connected with:
• the tendency to an abrupt and strict introduction of market principles
to Czech and, before dissoeiation, also to Slovak agriculture in a much
more severe form than within the European Union;
• a deterioration in the agricultural situation as a result of the privatisa-
tion processes (restitutions concerning mostly land ownership) and the
rather chaotic privatisation of state-owned farms.
Some fall in the total of workers, connected with the decline in extensive
levels of industrial production (particularly in the big plants), can be
observed. On the other hand, there has been a small rise in the relative
number of lower professionals, caused mainly by the growth of the service
sector (administration) and partly by the demand for this category
of workers in the private sector. If we consider that some of the
226 Social Metamorphoses
self-employed participate in non-manual jobs, it should be cIear that a
gradual reduction in the abnormal (for Western countries) size of the
manuallabour-force, typical of Central-Eastern Europe, has begun in the
Czech Republic, although it remains relatively high among employees. All
this reveals - in addition to those observations about the branch and sector
structure of employment - certain nuclei of the nascent modernisation of
the national economy, with its manifold, significant social eonsequenees.
The main change, however, is the emergenee of a eonsiderable group of
self-employed, roughly divided between 'medium-seale entrepreneurs'
with employees, and small businessmen, eraftsmen, and people without
employees offering various services. (In praetice. the pereentage of real
medium-seale entrepreneurs in spring 1993 was probably less than dis-
played in the table, sinee many entrepreneurs with employees have only
one or two assistants and belong rather to the group of sm all businessmen.)
In' addition, the formal employee registration shows that at least the same
percentage of self-employed from the total labour-foree as stated in the
tables (Le. about another 10 per cent) are developing private business aetiv-
ities on a part-time basis. The number of formally registcred self-employed
grew from a negligible level in the late 1980s to about I million in the
Czech and more than 300000 in the Slovak Republies in 1992 (CSY, 1994,
p. 294; SSY, 1994, p. 182) A substantial further portion of people are appar-
ently engaged in private aetivities without official registration, that is, in the
grey and blaek economies. These phenomena, combined with eareful and
pragmatic governmental poliey on bankruptey and wage regulation, have
contributed significantly to the low unemployment rate.
In any ease, in spite of the lengthy, highly systematic suppression of
private economic activities (even when eompared with Poland and
Hungary), at least 20 per cent of the eeonomically active pcople in the
Czeeh Lands and more than 15 per cent in Slovakia participate in private
economic activities, either in full-time or part-time jobs, with or without
official permission. This is an enormous social change directly inHuencing
a substantial part of the population and, indireetly, the population as a
whole. On the other hand, the developmental possibilities of the smalI-
scale proprietors' group are not yet fully exhausted. The development of
the medium-seale entrepreneur is only in its initial phases, as is the prob-
able joining of so me employee groups to a gradually emerging middle
cIass.
The expansion of the private seetor began quite reeently in Federal
Czechoslovakia - to be exact, in 1990. It oeeurred in five principal forms:

I. 'small-scale privatisation', involving mainly rctail trade and scrviccs;

 The Post-Commllnist Social Transformation 227
2. restitutions partly concerning small enterprises in different branches,
hut mainly houses and land;
3. that part of the so-ca lied 'Iarge-scale privatisation', in which standard
privatisation methods implemented in some Western countries were
adopted, this time on an unprecedented scale of privatisation acts con-
cerning the majority of national capitals;
4. the founding of new, predominantly smalI, firms;
5. that part of the 'Iarge-scale privatisation', in which the voucher
method has been implemented.

After 1992, the pace of privatisation in the dissociated, sovereign Siovakia

declined somewhat.
With regard to the voucher method applied in many large enterprises, its
significance during the first phase seemed more psychological and politi-
cal than economic. It is Iikely that only a sm all minority of the millions of
people who have or - in Slovakia - perhaps will receive the very cheap
vouchers will become shareholders in the colloquial sense of the word.
Of course, the voucher privatisation caused immediate changes in the
legal forms of capital ownership. However, for the time being, the voucher
privatisation (as weil as some standard privatisation acts) has mostly led
only to the first steps in the direction of the crucial changes concerning the
real disposal of economic sources. Although economic statistics dec1are
Ihe majorily of the GOP to have been produced in the private sec tor, the
process aiming 10 change the formal large-scale privatisation acts into
practicaily-operaling, private decision-making has only begun.
It is our opinion that a hidden baUle is at present under way, the
outcome of which will decide wh ich of the following groups will win the
decisive positions in individual former state enterprises (now formally pri-
vatised joint-stock companies): the privatisation investment funds (an
unexpectedly strong by-producl of the voucher privatisation, disposing of
72 per cent of the investment points in the first wave and with approx-
imately 60 per cent in the second), in most cases with their background in
financial capital; domestic financial capital directly; the present managers;
present or former state bureaucrats, eventually professional politicians;
foreign capitalists and/or managers; or some outside lobbies of multi-
faceled character, often combining people from the above groups. Financial
capital, in its manifold institutional forms and with its widely recognised
monopolistic tendencies, seems thus far to be one of the victors in this
baule. With their professional 'know how', experienced managers (many
of them with a relatively long work experience under state socialism) con-
tinue 10 enjoy favourable opportunities for the time being. It is probable
228 Sodal Metamorphoses
that only Iimited space will remain both for the medium-scale entrepre-
neurs who emerged in the first wave of privatisation as weil as for the
groups of shareholders recruited from amongst employees. Members of
transformed cooperatives, particularly in agriculture and in housing,
i.e. their representatives in the directing boards will probably maintain
so me positions. In any case, the baule is not yet over and the sociological
characteristics of the future large-scale and middle-scale capitalists in the
Czech and Slovak Republics are still unclear.
In eombination, the enumerated proeesses represent an analogy of the
primary accumulation of capital and a renewed creation of c1asses and
subclasses of large- and middle-scale capitalists, sm all entrepreneurs,
employees involved in enterprise on a part-time basis and, eventually, also
rentiers. Wbile in general the process is relatively rapid, the crucial
changes - the emergence of a developed middle class and particularly that
of a capitalist eeonomic elite - are only in their initial phases. It is not yet
clear how long this will take; what obstacles it will meet; what part of the
economy will remain in the hands of the state; what forms the coexistence
betwcen the diminishing state and the growing private sector will take;
how intensively and in what fonns the state will intervene in the formerly
state-owned privatised seetor; and, above all, what the exael social profile
of thc new classes will be.
At this point, it should be noted that in the countries in question the
process of primary capital accumulation and the emergence of new c1asses
based on private property has not only asserted itself in pure and 'noble'
fonns: in tbe first half of the 1990s, many fortunes have been made by
illegal and/or immoral means. Money-Iaundering - money acquired partly
in the Communist past, partly in recent years from both domestic and
foreign sources - has played a certain role. In addition, there are illegal
forcign-currency manipulations; tax swindles; smuggling and other crimi-
nal activities; abuse of power positions for personal enrichment; corrup-
lion and many olher similar methods of accumulating capital in an
under-capitalised country. For a sociologist, the point in this respect is not
a juridical or moral condemnation of indisputable social facts. Indeed, the
important question is : how will people who acquired their capital by such
mcans uphold the meritocratic criteria of qualification, perfonnance and
lasting market success in subsequent periods characterised by a normally
functioning and legally controlled economy? What will be the share of
people with these kinds of 'qualificalions' in the new c1asses of private
proprietors? Wh at sort of behaviour can the other social classes and the
democratic slate of law expect from them?
 The Post-Communist Sodal Transformation 229

It is cJear that the future development will lead to the ereation of an

economic elite, amiddIe class (both 'old' and 'new') and small propri-
etors. On the other hand, all realistic estimates of the future thus far elahor-
ated reekon with relatively high but limited pereentages of entrepreneurs.
It is this point which turns our attention to the obvious fact that only a
minority of thc economically active will ultimately be able to form the
core of the new c\asses whose existence will be based on private property.
A large majority of the population will remain in the ranks of both non-
manual and manual working people. The overwhelming majority of them
will ultimately be employed in the private sector, while only a minority
will work in the cooperative seetor, eventually in the remainder of the
state sector. Onee the younger population abandon their illusions as to the
possibilities of rapid enrichment for all who wish it, the main problem of
the future will arise: what will be the nature of the relationships between
the proprietary c\asses and the rank-and-file working people? Will they
on ce again become the permanently conflictual relations solved by the
'c\ass struggle', or can they be handled in the civilised form of negotia-
tions and social partnership in a democratic society? A great deal depends
on the solution to this problem, since employed people will, in any case,
form the majority decision-makers in democratic e1ectoral voting.
Having discussed the class approach to the post-Communist social
developmenl in the Czech and Slovak Republics, we must also analyse the
present reality through other concepts and approaches. Another method
(rather empirieal and eonceived aposteriori) of Iinking several social-
status ditnensions in a synthesising conslruct is based on the multidimen-
sional social-status concept already applied for the analysis of the 1984
data. The matrices presented in Tables 16.4 and 16.5 demonstrate for both
republics so me increase in the correlations between earnings and other
status-forming variables as compared with the situation in 1984, which
testifies to some increase in meritocratic restratification tendencies, or in
other words, a higher eongruence of the dec\ared earnings with education,
work-complexity and Iife-style. In the Czech case, the managerial posi-
tion, inc\uding the ownership aspect, is significantly more closely corre-
lated with earnings than in 1984, proving the increasing role of the
emerging class differentiation. The absence of this phenomenon in the
Siovak data is probably due to the comparatively lesser progress of
the privatisation processes in terms of earnings differentiation. In both the
historieal situations analysed, the class aspect of social differentiation as
symbolised by managerial position plays an important role, particularly in
the Czech data. Only in 1984 was it connected with the typieal 'new class'
230 Sodal Metamorphoses
system (Djilas, 1957), whereas in 1993 it was connected with the emerg-
ing differentiation according to private property - that is, with some return
10 the classical class differentiation. In both republics in 1993, its con-
nection with work-complexity was a linie stronger. In any case, the
significance of the meritocratic and c1ass-principle duality seems once
again to have been verified for the present situation, as the meritocratic
and the class types of vertical social differentiation evidently both comp1e-
ment and compele with one another in the actual social differentiation
system.
For both historical cases, a complicated procedure (described in detail
in Machonin and Tucek, 1994), created a synthesising social-status index
encompassing a weighted impact of all live status dimensions and ilIustrat-
ing the actual social hierarchy in both countries at the outset of their sep-
arate existences. The final distribution of the synthesising status indices
based on this model does not reveal many changes in the formal shape of
lhe vertical social differentiation between 1984 and 1993. In both cases, it
fomls a 'pear-like' distribution in both republies, which may take a some-
whal more gradual form in 1993. In Ihis way it is impossible to demon-
strate with sufficient clarity the differences between a society based more
on totalitarian and egalitarian principles and the society developing along
the lines of the Western model of class-differentiated society with merito-
cratic tendencies. What is important is the similarity of the differentiation
of status indices in both historical situations between the Czech Lands and
Slovakia. The significance of this phenomenon for the evaluation of the
normalisation system was al ready mentioned in Chapter 16; thc evaluation
of the changes in the 1990s will be discussed in the following subchapter.
Cross-tabulations of the status indices, class classifications and mobility
paths 1988-93 with other important variables in both republics (Data,
1993) have shown that the following groups enjoy beuer chances to
achieve or to maintain the higher sodal positions: well-educated (above all
those with tertiary education) people, higher (and part1y also lower) pro-
fessionals, self-employed with employees, inhabitants of towns and espe-
cially big cities, males, and former members of the Communist Party,
particularly those from the 1980s. Primary-educated people, unskilled and
semi-skilled workers and manual working in agricuIture, people employed
in the state enterprises, older people, females, inhabitants of villages and
non-members of the Communist Party have more frequent chances to
achieve the lower social positions or to maintain Ihem. Lower profession-
als with secondary education, supervisors of manual work, self-employed
without employees, and inhabitants of middle towns tend to some con-
centration mainly in the upper-middle status categories, with routine-non-
 The Post-Communist Sodal Transformation 231

manual and skilled workers in the lower middle ones. The age structure is
rather country specific (and - on the whole - more strongly influencing
social positions in Siovakia): thus, for example, in the Czeeh Lands older
middle-aged people are relatively more sueeessful, while in Siovakia, the
two higher levels of status hierarchy are more or less equally accessible
for various age-groups. In both eountries, however, young and younger
middle-aged people are strongly represented in the middle status eate-
gories. In both countries the majority of people in the lowest category are
over40 years old (Data, 1993).
Perhaps the most interesting finding is the partieipation of - mostly -
former communists in the social hierarchy. Let us examine the corre-
sponding data (Table 17.5).
Although the membership in the Communist Party is not the most
important among various factors eodetermining social position, it remains
cJear that on average it is mostly former Communists who still enjoy
significantly better positions than people who never were Communist
Party members. Prohably the best explanation of this is the theory of the
conversion of their social, euItural and eeonomie eapital aequired in the
state socialist era into economic or politieal capital under the new system
(Matejü and Rehakovli, 1993). Let us add that this use of eapital in quaJita-
tively new conditions testifies to a very high level of adaptability, particu-
larly in the prevailing cases of people who were Party members untiJ 1989
and left only after the politieal upheaval. Remember in this eonneetion

Table 17.5 Participation of fonner and present Communist Party members in the
social status categories of economically active in the Czech and Slovak Republies
1993 (l = the highest; 6 = the lowest)

Status category euch Republic Slovak Republic

I 36.6 35.7
2 32.4 30.6
3 17.1 16.1
4 14.0 15.4
5 11.7 12.4
6 6.7 5.0
CN=0.21 CN=0.20
RC=O.l8 RC=0.17

Source: Data (1993).

232 Social Metamorphoses
that the 'normalisation regime' of the 1970s-1980s looked for support
among young people in all social groups and that many of them, Iiving
concurrently in the 'first' and 'second' society, were interested in substan-
tial changes to the old system which hindered even the rank-and-file
Communists or lower functionaries from attaining positions corresponding
to their aspirations. Remember too the fact that in the economic and cul-
tural spheres the continuation of careers started in state socialism (com-
bined with natural exchange) prevails. Many officials in middle and lower
positions were also able to continue their careers in administration.
The afore mentioned empirical identifications correspond with what has
been said about the character of the recently begun, but growing, social
differentiation in the Czech and Slovak Republics. One must add that the
perceptions of the social situation, of the course of social transformations
and of its prospects are gradually becoming more and more socially
anchored in both countries in question. They are increasingly reflecting
the new social positions of people and derived from them needs and inter-
ests (Data, 1993 and 1993BB). It is too soon to speak of definite 'winners'
and 'losers', but we can al ready identify people 'gaining' and 'Iosing' in
comparison with the average, not only by their objective social character-
istics but also by their attitudes, expectations and aspirations. However,
the subjective aspect of the transformation processes is structured in dis-
tinctly different ways in the Czech Lands and in Slovakia. and we will
analyse this phenomenon in the next subchapter.

THE CZECH-SLOV AK DISSOCIATION

The 'Velvet Revolution' of 1989 was initiated mainly by thc Czech dissi-
dents and the politically active part of the Czech people. lt found an active
response in analogous groups in Siovakia. However, in the course of 1990,
when the outline of the radieal economic reform was drafted by the
Federal Government and the first practical steps were undertaken, a new
shift in the value-orientations structure occurred. Of crucial significance
was President Havel's declaration demanding the limitation of the arms
industry, particularly strongly developed in Slovakia. and the first practical
steps in this direction. In the name of the Czechoslovak government, the
Minister of Finance of the Federal Government and the later premier of
the Czech Government, V. Klaus, strictly refused the possibility of el ab-
orating a regionally specific version of the prepared economic reform for
Slovakia. These two steps radically worsened Siovakia's formerly
favourable economic position. Siovak industry had been deliberately built
 The Post-Communist Social Transformation 233
up in order to satisfy thc needs of the Soviet bloc in general and in anns
production in particular. Now it was to lose its relative advantage as a
result of the failure of the Eastern state socialist market and the federal
authorities' decisions. Besides, the steady redistribution of national
income in favour of Siovakia - a given in the past - although not yet fully
suspended, did nevertheless come under question from the Czech side.
For the analysis of the results of this development within the renewed
Czechoslovak democratic state in relation to Siovakia, we can use an addi-
tional and important information source. We have drawn upon representa-
tive data from the social transformation survey led by the present author
(The Institute of Social and Political Sciences, Charles University, and the
Sociological Institute of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, autumn
=
1991, N 2849.) The survey compared the objective status positions of
the adult population with their attiludes. In terms of objective characteris-
tics, the social transformation stirvey results were summed up by the
author in 1992 as folIows:
We discussed systematically all the relevant partial dimensions of the
social position (status) ... In all of these dimensions we could record
only two significant signals of larger social differences. The first of
them is a better standard of housing and a larger amount of family for-
tunes in Siovakia (relativised, of course, by the greater number of fam-
ilies ... ). The second is a more frequent declaration of the feelings of a
deteriorating market and especially the financial attainability of con-
sumer. goods and services in Siovakia as weil. Hiding behind this state-
ment is a more significant factor of a tower income per capita,
connected with the al ready mentioned higher number of family
members, and a different perception of the reality, influenced by the dif-
ference of social dynamics in both republics. In no case, however, is it
possible to speak about two fundamentally different status hierarchies
with an essentially distinct context corresponding to two different
phases of the civilisation and cultural development (Machonin, 1992b).
In other words, the cultural and social processes typical of the 1970s
and 1980s - the stagnation and the beginning of an absolute decline in the
Czcch Rcpublic and the continuing relative progress in Siovakia (limited,
as it was, by the character of the totalitarian and anti-meritocratic social
system common to both parts. of thc Federation) led to a nearly full equal-
isation of the social inequality of the two societies observed in 1967.
On the other hand, as early as 1991 the data revealed an already fully
dcvc10ped discrepancy betwen the balanced objective data and large dif-
ferences in the perception of the social situation. In principle, the evaluation
234 Social Metamorphoses
both of the past and of the future transformation processes was much more
favourable in the Czech than in the Slovak Republic. The most apparent
evaluative differences between the two republics could be found in the
standard of living and social security.
It was quite clear that such deep differences in attitudes could not be
explained by those objective facts confirming the attained social equalisa-
ti on of the Czech Lands and Slovakia, but rather in the specificitics of the
recent development of the two societies subsequent to the 'Velvet
Revolution'. In any case, the contradictory shape of the popular attitudes
became one of the stimuli contributing to the more liberal and pro-
federalist right-wing political parties' victory in the Czech Republic and
the rather anti-federalist political parties and movements in Slovakia in
the 1992 elections (whiJe in the federal elections both these groups, taken
separately, merely constituted two minorities). The republic election
victors decided after relatively short negotiations, without a referendum, to
dissociate the common state of Czechs and Slovaks. Thus they changed
from minorities within the federal state to decisive forces in the two new
sovereign republies. The dissociation took place peacefully on the first day
of 1993 and is currently acknowledged as a matter of fact by the majority
of the populations in both new states, although not without regret.
At this point it is most interesting to identify what the further destinies
of people in both countries have been as far as objective positions and atti-
tudes are concerned. The two extensive representative sociological
surveys on social stratification and mobility in the Czech and Slovak
Republies referred to at the beginning of the previous subchapter can
make a substantial contribution to such knowledge. (The most important
data from these sources has al ready been presented in Tables 16.1-16.7 in
Chapter 16) Some relevant information, mainly concerning attitudes, can
be drawn from parallel surveys of somewhat smaller representative
sampies, focusing on the beliefs and behaviour of Czech and Slovak
people, carried out in autumn 1993 by the Sociological Institutes of the
Czech and Slovak Academies of Sciences (Machonin and Rosko; da ta
elaboration Gatnar) on sampies with N of economically active equal to
1376 for the Czech, and 789 for the Slovak Republics. N for adult popula-
tion as a whole was 1902 respondents in the Czech, and 1223 in the
Slovak sampie.
Regarding the objective aspect of the problem, one can state that after
considering the data presented in the above tables, the economically active
populations of the Czech and Slovak Republics do not differ substantially
in any one of the basic social-status dimensions characterising individuals
(see Table 16.1). Even the status consistency/inconsistency indicators,
 The Post-Commutlist Social Transformation 235
namely the rank correlations of education. work-complexity. managerial
positions. earnings and life-style are not extremely different in either
republic. As Tables 16.4-16.17 inclusive have shown. the only marked
difference concerns the already-discussed more distinct influence in the
Czech Lands of management position on earnings. It is therefore not sur-
prising that the synthesising social-status hierarchies presented in Table
16.1 also only differ minimally. Tables 16.2 and 16.3 display only minor
differences in the social class distribution.
Small differences between the Czech and Slovak Republics have been
discovered only in two newly studied status characteristics. The so-called
social capital (the degree of development of purposeful informal social con-
tacts) seems to be somewhat more developed in Slovakia than in the Czech
Republic. On the other hand. the Czech Lands are somewhat more progres-
sive in the development of private enterpreneurship. (See Table 17.6.)
Nevertheless. these indisputably significant differences demonstrating
the greater social hindrances to the privatisation processes in Siovakia
than in the Czech Lands. are so far not so deep as to make the social
stratification shape of the two societies fundamentally dissimilar. Thus thc
data on the sodal positions of economicatly active individuals prove
clearly that in general Siovakia has reached approximately the same level
of social and cultural development as the Czech Republic.
There are. of course. some significant differences concerning the social
and cultural characteristics of families. including their economically non-
active members.
In Siovakia. substantially more respondents declared their dwellings to
be family houses. The household technical equipment is somewhat beUer
in the Czech Lands. while the size of the family flats or houses and the

Table 17.6 Indicators of the development of self-employment in the Czech and

Slovak Republics in autumn 1993. as percentages of economically active

Czech Republic Siovak Republic

Self-employed in the main working activity 11.6 8.3

Self-employed in main work andlor
supplementary work 17.4 11.8
People in different preparatory phases for
future self-employment 19.2 17.5

Source: Data (199388).

236 Social Metamorphoses
number of rooms is larger in Siovakia. Household material equipment
diners in some items, to Czech families' advantage, in others to the advan-
tage of Siovak families. Expressed in financial values, the average sum of
their family fortunes seems to be a Iittle higher in Siovakia. Czech families
are not as large as the relatively younger Siovak families, with the result
that their average income per capita is therefore higher. Among the popu-
lation interviewed in the stratification survey, there were substantially
fewer retired people in the Siovak Republic. Indeed, the percentage of
unemployed among the respondents has been several times higher in
Siovakia.
These characteristics are connected with widely recognised differences
bctwcen the two countries in the settlement structure and in the structure
of industries and branches in the national economy. In the Siovak
Republic, significantly more people are employed in agriculture, metal-
lurgy, heavy industry and energetics, as weil as in education, cuIture and
science; in the Czech Republic the same goes for other 'industry', 'olher
services', finance and banking. The already-mentioned differences in the
demographie structures also play their role, as do the differences in the
ethnic structures (the large Hungarian and gypsy minority in Siovakia) and
in contessional structures (substantially more believers, particularly
Roman Catholics but also Protestants, in Siovakia).
If we take into account all the mentioned social and cultural differences,
some of them favourable for the Czech, some for the Siovak Republic, we
cannot fail to notice that they stern in part from Slovakia's more rural and
traditional past as analysed in Chapter 15 on the basis of 1967 data and, of
course, in Chapters 10 and 11 as weil. On the whole, however, the weight
of such differences is not so great as to change our basic statement con-
cerning the fundemental cultural and social equality of the societies in
question, which are both now of the industrial type and together, in 1989,
set out on similar trajcctories of post-Communist transformation.
There is, however, one important field where the recently emerged dif-
ferences seem grave: the household standard of Iiving. Table 17.7 gives
some interesting data from 1988 and 1993 comparing the evaluation of
family standards of Iiving in the Czech Lands and Siovakia.
In spite of the fact that the data are somewhat subjectively coloured,
especially as far as retrospective evaluation is concerned, they c1early show
that the obvious decline in the standard of living in both republics must
have been much steeper in Siovakia. At the same time, we have the first
evidence proving the significant shift of satisfaction/dissatisfaction atti-
tudes in favour of the ezech Lands. This brings us to the important ques-
tion of perceptions of the post-Communist transformation (Table 17.8).
 The Post-Communist Social Transformation 237
Tllble 17.7 Positive answers to the quest ion: 'Did (do) you have enough money
in the family budget for ... 1' in the Czech and Slovak Republics 1988
(retrospeclively) and 1993, as percentages of population

Item 0/ the /amily budget 1988 1993

Cueh Siovak Czeeh S/OI'ak
Rel,ublic Rel'ublic Re"ublic Repllblic

Food 89.3 93.5 55.2 39.\

Clothing 80.3 87.0 38.7 25.5
Housing 88.6 90.8 40.5 26.9
Household equipment 62.2 75.0 28.4 15.8
Other industrial goods 85.7 86.0 53.4 30.()
Material services 79.5 83.1 45.2 25.8
CuIture, leisure activities 71.9 72.5 32.4 15.4
Travelling, tourism 49.1 59.9 20.5 10.0
Health eare 92.6 90.0 54.3 28.5
Education 90.3 89.6 45.1 28.9

Souree: Data (199388).

Table 17.8 Positive evaluations of the transformation and of its future prospeets
in the Czeeh and Slovak Republics in 1991 and \993, as percentages of
economically active

Czeeh Republic Siovak RelJ/lblie

/99/ /993 /99/ /993

The past from 1989 42.3 31.9 21.5 10.7

The foreseeable future 52.3 37.0 34.7 24.5

SOl/ree: Dala (1991) and [)alll (1993 88).

In both republics. the evaluation. based on new experience. is some-

what more sceptical than in \99\, while the sceptics include both those
who do not agree with the transformation and those who wish it to be
more rapid and radiea!. (A phenomenon common for nearly all post-
Communist transformations.) At the same time. a remarkable change in
the relation of positive evaluations occurred in favour of the Czech
238 Social Melamorphoses
Republic. (Remember the quite adverse evaluation of the social situation
in the 1980s!) In this case the experience of ni ne months of Slovak sover-
eignty evidently also plays a certain role. In most questions of a similar
nature, a constant can be identified: 15-25 per cent less positive and more
negative evaluations in Siovakia than in the Czech Lands. Thus, for
example, 35.7 per cent of economically active respondents in the Czech
Republic thought (or rather thought) that the soeial order in this eountry
needed radieal changes, while in Siovakia full 64.3 per cent expressed a
similar opinion Data (1993 BB).
Tbe discrepaney between the relative equality of general cultural and
social structures in the analysed countries, on the one hand, and substantial
differences in the evaluations, on the other, revealed for the first time in
the 1991 data, emerged from the 1993 data with even greater intensity.
Tbere are, in principle, three ways of interpreting this phenomenon.
The first would be to query the first of the premises of our considera-
tions by arguing that the residues of the traditional rural cultural and social
relations in Siovakia are still alive, particularly in limes of new erucial
changes, and hamper the operation of relatively young and therefore
unstable cultural and social relationships. However, the facts testifying to
the basic equality of the present cultural and social structures are substan-
tiat, impticating nearly all aspects of daily life in both societies, sueh that
it is difficult to question them.
There is a case for a second explanation, namely for the assumption that
in the stormy atmosphere of radieal social changes some deep culturat and
socio-psychological specificities of the nations concerned emerge which
are responsibte for the different reactions to relatively similar situations.
Neither of these phenomena or mechanisms can individually explain the
abruptness and intensity of the change in attitudes in the Czech Lands and
in Siovakia. In addition, the cultural and psychological phenomena are in
principle very vague and their empirical description is unusually problem-
atic. For this very reason, such argumentation has frequently been abused
by nationalist politicians hotb in Siovakia and in the Czech Lands on the
basis of arbitrary assumptions and statements.
Thus we propose a third hypothesis, interpreling the stated discrepancy
from the angle of the specificities of social and historical dynamics, as dis-
cussed extensively in this part of our book. This hypothesis seeks to
explain the differences in attitudes as the rationally understandable reac-
tions of two neighbouring nations to historically different combinations of
the long-term and short-term dynamics.
It is indisputable that from the end of the 1930s, Siovakia, a former
agrarian and economically underdeveloped region, moved steadily - with
 The Post-Communist Social Transformation 239
some short breaks - in the direction of an industrial and relatively modern
society with growing political authority. AIthough the Slovaks did not
favour Communism (as the resuIts of the 1946 elections c1early showed)
and had to be forced to adapt to the state-socialist system (as the events in
1947 and 1948 prove), paradoxically the peak of the modernisation of
their society, bringing hitherto the best Iiving conditions for the popula-
tion, was attained during the 'normalisation' period, i.e. at the peak of the
development of the totaIitarian and anti-meritocratic (egalitarian) social
system in Czechoslovakia. Clearly, then, the standard ideologies of the
state socialist era - egalitarianism, state paternalism and authoritarianism -
have far deeper roots in Slovakia than in the Czech RepubIic. Thus,
54.4 per cent of the economically active respondents in the Czech Lands
supported individual responsibility for one's material situation rather than
state responsibility, while in Slovakia only 40.7 per cent expressed the
same opinion.
The social expericnce of a long-term trajectory which saw the gradual
rise and emancipation of the Slovak nation c1ashed at once after 1989
with the contrasting experience of the rapid decline and deterioration of
economic and social conditions, much more intensive than in the Czech
Lands. It is no wonder that the Siovak population reacted to the new situ-
ation with far more frustration, resignation or even resistance than the
Czechs.
The social experience of the Czech nation from the end of the 1930s has
been substantially different. In the rudimentary developmental trajectory
until the· end of the 1980s, the degradation and stagnation 01' a formerly
well-developed Central European country prevailed. In the 1960s, a short
and contradictory wave of renewed progress endcd with grave frustration
at the defeal of the Prague Spring. The Soviel occupation meant a realloss
of national sovereignty for the Czech nation which it was never to accept.
After the loss of illusions as to the possibilities of the Soviet perestroika
and after a certain deterioration in the standard of Iiving in the second half
of the 1980s, the Czech nation was mentally prepared for a 'return to
Europe' . The subsequent decline in the first phase of the post-Communist
transformation was the least pronounced of all Central and East European
countries and the signs of improvement showed very early. It is once again
no wonder that people are relatively more satisfied with the developments
thus far and are more optimistic about the future than the Slovak popula-
tion. Of course, this does not mean that there is no danger Of a later disillu-
sionment of apart of society and of some rise in feelings of frustration and
resignation in the future if the current relatively favourable conditions
should deteriorate.
240 Sodal Metamorphoses
It is easy to see that such interpretation of our data is rational and corre-
sponds to the historical facts identified or corroborated in our surveys. It
can explain most of the seeming paradoxes of the Czech and Slovak
reality and mutual relationships without chaIIenging the evident historical
reality. In a way it also provides some keys to the explanation of the split
of Czechoslovakia, its unexpected abruptness and, concurrently, of the
peaccful form in which it occurred.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS

Instead of an economicaIIy and sociaIIy heterogeneous but politicaIIy

unified Czechoslovakia of 1918, after thrce quarters of a century of dra-
matic social and political changes, we now live in relatively economicaIIy
and socia1ly similar societies, separated into two sovereign, more or less
democratic republics. For both of them history has prepared many possible
roads of future development.
If we eliminate those types of future development that are simply not
applicable to Czech or Slovak conditions (aIthough they could be seen as
realisable in other post-Communist countries), some 'realistic' ones
remain that correspond to Czech or Slovak specificities and, therefore, are
grounded in the existing objective and subjective trends dcscribed by our
previous analyses. Thus we can speak of existing trends or tendencies,
models for the future, the social and political actors who aim to push
through changes in the corresponding directions and, fina1ly, of the actors'
different programmes and strategies. We term a1l such phenomena 'social
and political', as each of these tendencies and strategies has its own social
background and represents the interests of certain existing or newly
emerging social groups. Furthermore, they a1l propose and attempt to
assert a definite model of social arrangements. At the same time, each
stimulates the existence and activities of differing social movements and
associations - among others, political parties - applying ideologies, pro-
grammes and strategies, pal'tly already elaborated in the past, either in
foreign or in domestic conditions. Political parties are seeking to obtain or
maintain political power in order to implement their programmes and
strategies. In view of these complex interrelations, we can label the future
developmental possibilities simply, applying terms drawn from the inter-
national vocabulary of political science and/or political practice, having in
mind not concrete political parties or movements, but rather principal ide-
ological and political orientations. Each of these has, at the same time, a
certain social background and social and economic programme.
 The Post-Communist Social Transformation 241
According to previous analyses (see Machonin, 1994), the following
possibilities for the future social and political deve\opment of the next
decade currently exist in both the Czech Lands and in Slovakia:
I. liberal democratic changes with conservative modifications;
2. liberal democratic changes with welfare state modifications;
3. liberal democratic changes 'without attributes';
4. populist changes combined with leftist authoritarianism;
5. populist changes combined with rightist authoritarianism.
In the Czech case, nationalist or religious modifications of the populist
and authoritarian type are not too Iikely; in the Slovak case the interven-
tion of both nationalism and religion cannot be excluded. In this ease,
however, such an intervention would signify a mere modification to one of
the five basic possibilities.
These are, in our opinion, the principal possibilities for the foreseeable
future in the Czech and Slovak societies. In order to evaluate the probabil-
ity of their realisation, election results, data from public opinion polis as
weIl as our knowledge of the social and political differentiation of the
Czech and Slovak population and of their corresponding attitudes should
be taken into account.
On the basis of this evidence, the conservative liberal democrats, who
stress the role of a firm state order, have the greatest chance of asserting
themselves in the Czech Republie in the near future.
The possible heightening of social eonflict in future stages of the econ-
omic reförm - the continuing real privatisation, the emergence of classes
based on significant differentiation in fortunes and in comes, moderately
increasing number of bankruptcies, increasing unemployment and some
new economic difficulties - may, in the slightly more distant future,
strengthen tendencies toward the welfare state and social democratic
modifications to liberal democratic development. This kind of develop-
ment would correspond to the ongoing polarisation of the society. In
comparison with the likelihood of success for the conservative right and
their allies, on one hand, and that of the social democrats and their poten-
tial allies on the other, the eentrist 'pure' liberal democrats' chances (not
to speak of the chances of the extreme left or right) are substantially
lower.
If the leading political forces of thc government face this situation
calmly and do not react by abandoning their tried gradUal and compro-
mise solutions, and if the socially-oriented forces use democratic means
and social negotiations as the main instrument for resolving social
conflicts, then social peace could be preserved, even under such conditions.
242 Social Metamorphoses
A possible by-product of this scenario would be a certain strengthening of
the political centre.
If the ruling political structure cannot withstand the temptation of
employing undemocratic measures (e.g. under pressure of radieal rightists
from within their own ranks), and the social democrats and their allies use
populist approaches (abandoning liberal democratic principles), then both
left and right-wing radieals will strengthen their positions, social confticts
will intensify and the social and politieal centre will weaken further.
The situation in the Slovak Republic is far more complex. The newly
ruling coalition's reign over the political scene is somewhat uncertain
because of its strong heterogeneity. It encompasses some remainders of
liberal democrats, populists with national and social shades, people
tcnding to authoritarian solutions, post-Communists, etc. On the other
hand, the opposition is also quite heterogeneous. It consists of left-
democratic post-Communists and Social Democrats, 'pure' liberal demo-
crats, Christian Democrats with both conscrvative and social characteristics
and nationally coloured Hungarian parties. It is difficult to find realistic
solutions to such a complicated situation. We could venture to say that
both the Siovak nation and those ethnic minorities cohabiting in the same
state are facing a crucial decision. It is the decision between acceptance
and refusal of authoritarianism as the leading principle of state organisa-
tion. If this question is solved in favour of democracy (including the pro-
tection of political and ethnical minorities), the Siovak population will
have to search patiently for more distinctly crystallised social and political
strategies in aseries of c1ashes and negotiations and, according to the
newly acquired experience, to decide democratically which of the possible
tendencies will receive the majority's support. In every case, the crystalli-
sation period and search for acceptable solutions will be lengthy.
Wh ich of the objectively given and subjectively more or less distinctly
expressed social and political tendencies (alternatives and variants for
future development) are desirable for the Czech Republic as weil as,
finally, for Slovakia? The crucial point in answering this question is the
selection of criteria justifying the options.
The collapse of the Communist system was largely connected with its
inability both to continue the modernisation of Czech and Slovak society
and to satisfy the needs of the population with regard to freedom, Iiving
standards, life-style, level of civiIisation and culture and rational adminis-
tration. Therefore, we have to look for a social and political system that
will facilitate a gradual rise to the level of the modern, advanced European
societies in all these parameters. The main qualities of such a system must
be contrary to the outdated principles on which state socialism was built.
 The Post-Communist Social Transformation 243
The new society requires a pluralist democratic system with a rational
administration instead of a totalitarian and bureaucratic system. It requires
an effective, meritocratic system of work compensation and job allocation
in order to stimulate the performance of both individuals and enterprises in
the markets for goods, services, capital and labour.
Hence, the post-Communist transformation requires democratisation
and meritocratisation as its two functionally connected major deveJopmen-
tal directions. Only the balanced implementation of both can improve the
population's quality of Iife and help to secure a beUer position for the
Czech and Siovak Republics in relation to advanced Europe.
Unlike the advanced, economically and socially stabilised and balanced
Western societies, such conditions of deep and rapid social change, in
which there has been a serious delay in meritocratisation as compared with
democratisation, there is the danger that these two processes will conflict.
Such a conflict could lead to the misuse of democracy to block merito-
cratisation through populist measures, or to an iII-conceived undemocratic
(Le. authoritarian) implementation of radieal economic changes in favour
of the new establishment as an end in itself, against the will of the major-
ity of the population.
It is an extremely narrow road leading to balanced progress for both
democracy and meritocracy: the road of a well-conceived and cautious
poliey based on the continual renewal of democratie social consensus for
the progressing economic changes. This policy is incompatible with either
left or right populism and authoritarianism, both of which could only lead
to a restoration of totalitarianism and egalitarianism, regardless of the dif-
ferences in slogans and rhetoric. Such a development orientation would
lead to the prolonged societal collapse of civilisation and culture.
From Ihis point of view, the five 'realistie' possibilities for social and
political development can be reduced to two major alternatives:
• extremist populist and authoritarian solutions (including their national
or religious modifications) that do not lead to substantial societal
change (the radieal leftist and rightist approaches merely being two
variants of this alternative);
• the three other tendencies, all of which are relatively democratic and
lead to the progress of meritocracy which, in reality, means drawing
c10ser to advanced Europe.
From this point of view, it is not so important wh ich of the three variants
of the second alternative (the conservative, centrist or welfare-state
version of liberal democracy) will win in the next or subsequent elections
and assert itself in the social reality. In the end, the voters will decide
244 Social Meramorphoses
according to their experience of the achieved social changes and the per-
formance of both the political parties and their leaders in question. In addi-
tion, neither the objective nor subjective, neither the international nor
domestic conditions of the post-Communist transformation in the Czech
Lands or Slovakia give enough space for widely different solutions that
would really lead to the preferred ends of modernisation and prosperity.
This is probably the reason why, in practice, many political ac tors choose
step-by-step and compromise strategies that are not fully compatible with
their own ideologically defined goals. One could even say, after consider-
ing all the difficulties awaiting both countries analysed here, that a com-
promise combination of the strategies based on the three mentioned social
and political orientations or even their coalition would be useful at least
for the Czech Republic and, perhaps after some time, for Slovakia as weil.
If, from this viewpoint, we evaluate the two possible and more or less
probable paths of development in the global social and political situation
of the Czech and Slovak Republics as outlined above, we can only fonnu-
late one recommendation, based on our analysis. The more goodwiII in
maintaining social peace and achieving a consensus among the democratic
social and political forces, the more Iikely it is the Czech and Slovak
Republics' progress will be in a direction favourable for the population,
and the more Iikely will be the decisive defeat of the regressive forces and
the more successful the real post-Communist transfonnation of Czech and
Slovak societies.
Notes
Chapter 1

I. Strietly speaking, 'Magyars' is the correct ethnie label, whereas

'Hungarians' refers to the inhabitants of the country - Hungary, Le. a geo-
graphieal term. This differentiation made sense before 1918, when the
majority of Hungary's population consisted of non-Magyars. However,
Magyar nationalism wanted to make the whole of the Hungarian Kingdom
Magyar-speaking, and so eventually obliterate the difference between
Magyars and Hungarians in ethnic terms.
2. Osterreichisches Statistisches Jahrbuch, 1914, p. 21.
3. Jozef Lettrich (1985) pp. 37-9. (First ed. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1955.)

Chapter2

I. Quoted from Lettrich, 1985, pp. 289-90.

2. J. W. Bruegel, 'Tbe Germans in Pre-War Czechoslovakia', in V. S. Mamatey
and R. Luza (eds) (1973) pp. 184-5.
3. Eva BroJslovli (1992) p. 18.
4. Dejiny Ceskoslovenska v datech (History of Czechoslovakia in Dates)
(1968) p. 306.
5. The draft of a Bill submitted to the parliament on 27 April 1937, quoted in
E. Wiskemann (1967) p. 257.
6. Passages of the Henlein's eight-point Programme declared in Karlovy Vary
in March 1938. For more detail see V. Olivova (1972) pp. 215-16.

Chapter3

1. G. Rhode, 'The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia 1939-1945' in V.S.

Mamatey and R. Luza (eds) (1973) pp. 288-9.
2. A. Ritter, 'Hitler's Tischgesprllche', 20 May 1942, p. 91; 2nd. ed. p. 363.
Quoted in Mamatey and Luza (1973) p. 298.
3. Neuraths Protokoll Ober die Besprechung beim FOhrer am 23. Sept. 1940.
Quoted from Peter Nemec (1991) p. 444. •
4. Calculated from the Historical Statistical Yearbook CSSR, Prague, 1975,
p.826.
5. T. Prochazka, 'The Second RepubJic, 1938-39' in Mamatey and Luza (eds)
(1973) p. 268.

Chapter4

I. A comprehensive view of various estimates is given in T. Stanek (1993)

pp. 21-26. For more detail see T. Stanek (1991).

245
246 Notes
2. J. Zv6ra (1969).
3. V. Srb and O. Vom6ckov6 (1969) pp. 221-9.
4. If the USSR connived with that Polish move, it was, as some observers
believe, to put more pressure on the Czechoslovak government in order to
make it more willing to cede Ruthenia to the Soviet Union (see further below).
5. Recently, the position of Ruthenia was reassessed in two articles in the
journal Bohemia, published by the Collegium Carolinum in Munich:
L. Lipscher (1990) p. 55-72, and J. SI6ma (1988) pp. 35-49.

Chapter 5

I. This was the action of those social democrats who had refused to merge
with the Communist Party (the so-called shotgun marriage) at the time of
Siovak uprising in 1944.
2. Reference is made to the following titles in the bibliography, Korbel 1959,
Zinner 1963, Tigrid in Hammond (ed.) 1975, Taborsky 1961 and 1981,
Krystilfek 1981, Kaplan 1985.
3. For a comprehensive account of the various statistical estimates of the
'Czechoslovak Gulag' see V. Hejl and K. Kaplan (1986) pp. 229-36).
4. This is the title of the minutes on the crucial negotiation between the' oppo-
sition and the government that took place between November 26 and
December 9, 1989 in Prague. The editor is V. Hanzel, published by OK
Centrum, Prague 1991.

Chapter6

I. A. Kausei et al. (1965) p. 31.

2. L. Beck, Geschichte des Eisens, p. 1156, quoted in H. Matis, K. Bachinger,
Österreichs industrielle Entwicklung in A. Brusatti (ed.) (1973) p. 60.
3. P. Rapos (1957).
4. For the justification of these measures see Alois RaSfn (1923) (RaMn was
finance minister at that time).
5. Malluel Statistique de la Republiqlle Tchecoslovaque (1932) p. 85.
6. F. L. Pryor, Z. P. Pryor. M. St6dnfk andvG. J. Staller (1971).
7. Yearbook of Historical Statistics, CSSR, Prague (Bratislava, 1965),
pp. 852-3.
8. K. Maiwald (1940).
9. Yl?arbook of Historical Statistics CSSR, 1985, p. 853.
10. M. Hauner, 'Military Budgets and the Armaments Industry' in Kaser and
Radice (1986), pp. 57 and 86--9.
11. Klimecky (1946).
12. Jaroslav KrejcC (1968) in Review of Jllcome and Wealth, 3.

Chapter 7

I. 1. Krejcf (1968) in Review of Jllcome and Wealth, p. 455.

2. V. Pavlenda (1968), p. 112.
 Notes 247
3. For more detail see E. L. Hanze (1967).
4. E. A. Radice (1986) 'Changes in Property Relationships and Finance
Arrangements' pp. 437-8.
5. Ibid.

Chapter8

I. J. Krcjcf (1977) p. 300.

2. J. KrejCf,(I972) pp. 14-16.
3. Figures from Alice Teichovä (1974) pp. 38,42 and 48-9. In post-1945 cur-
rency these amounts would be three times as much.
4. R. 01sovsky et al. (1969).
5. A planning period of two years was chosen for two reasons: First, it co-
incided with thc election period (the National Assembly which was to pass
the first Plan, was elected for two years), second, it was expected that in
1946 just two more years were needed to complete the reconstruction and
reconversion of Ihe Czcchoslovak economy.
6. Statistical Digest, 1948, p. 84.
7. UN Trade Statistics, 1950, p. 61.
8. Por a more detailed account of the economic issues and their political impli-
cations during the Third Republic (1945-8) and one year later see Jaroslav
Krejcf (1977) pp. 297-344.
9. J. Dolansky (1949) pp. 173-8.
10. Publication of Statistical Yearbooks and periodicals was discontinued in
1949 and 1950 respectively, il was only in 1957 when Statistical Yearbooks
began to be published again, though in a very rudimentary form.
I\. For a more detailed aceount of monetary reform of 1953 and its economic
and social implications see J. Krejc( (1972) pp. 19,25 and 160-61.
12. According to the accounts of represenlalive sampIes, in 1953 the per capita
money income in the households of the cooperative farmers was 67 per cent
of the per capita income of the workers' household; in 1968 it was up to 97
per cent. Taking into account income in kind, it may be inferred that the gap
not only disappeared but that the cooperative farmers were on average
better-off then the workers. In 1985 the ratio of the money income in the
two types of households was the same as in 1968.
13. Por a theorelical, Marxist justil!cation of market relationship within a social-
ist economy see espccially O. Sik (1967) pp. 159 and ff.
14. Some of them even were put inlo a short-Iived effect. This was especially
the case with the concept of value added as the main planned indicator on
the enterprise level instead of gross production, payment of interest (or
ralhcr tax es) on fixed capital assets, on stocks and wages: also the elected
workers' councils, which emerged in many enterprises should be mentioned
in this context.
15. For details see O. Kyn, B. Sekerka, L. Hejl (1967).
16. In the first year (1967) the reduction was more substantial (by 64 per cent in
comparison with 1966), but then price subsidies were again more amply
used. Price subsidies. however, formed only a part (in 1968 a third) of
all 'non-investment' subsidies which together auained, in 1967 and 1968,
248 Notes
15 per cent of national income (complete data for former years are not avail-
able). This is another indication of the magnitude of the price-cost discrep-
ancies even when economic reform was.already in progress and had
abolished a good deal of them. (Data from es Statistical Yearbooks.)
17. P. Havlik and F. Levcik (1982).
Bibliography
ADAM, J. (1979) Wage Control and Inflation in the Soviet Bloc Coulltries
(Macmillan, London and Praeger, New York).
ALTMAN, F. L. and SLÄMA J. (1973) 'Wirtschaftliches Wachstum und privater
Verbrauch in der Tschechoslowakei' in Gumpel, W. and Keese, F. (eds).
Probleme des Industrialismus in Ost u nd West (Munich).
ALTON, T. P. (1987) National Product 0/ the Planned Economies 0/ Eastern
Europe (New York).
ALTON, T. P. et al. (1991) Economic Growtll in Eastern Europe, Research
Project on National Income in East Central Europe (OP 80, New York, 1984
and OP 115, New York).
ANDORKA, R. and K6L6sI, T. (eds) (1984) Stratification and Inequality (ISS,
Budapest).
ARCHIVE IPOR Archiv Institutu pro vyzkum verejneho mineni (Prague, years
given in the references).
BARTO. J. (1968) Rieienie vzt'ahu Cechov a Slovakov, 1944-1948 (Bratislava).
BAUCH, V. (1958) Pol'nohospodarstvo za slovenskiho statu (Bratislava).
BECV AR. J. (1990) Komentovany tematick» prehled vysledkd zavamych ietreni
veielneho m(nen(v Ceskoslovensku 1968... (Komi se vhidy, Prague)
BENES, V. (\973) 'Czechoslovak Democracy and its Problem' in Mamatey and
Luza (eds.)
BÖHM, E. T. (1976) The Slovak Minority in Hungary: A Memorandum 0/1942
(Slovak Institute, Cleveland-Rome).
BRANDES, D. (1969 and 1975) Die Tschechen unter deutschem Protektorat,
2 vols' (R. Oldenbourg, Munich and Vienna).
BROCK, P. (1976) The Slovak National Awakening (University of Toronto
Press).
BROKLOV A, E. (1992) Prvni ceskoslovensktl ustava (Institute for Contemporary
History, AV CR, Prague).
BROKLOV A, E. (1992) Ceskoslovensktl demokracie: Politick» system 1918-1945
(SLON, Prague).
BRUEGEL, J. W. (1973) Czechoslovakia Before Munieh: The German Minority
Problem and British Appeasement Policy (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge UK).
BRUEGEL, J. W. (1967) Tschechen und Deutsche 1918-1938 (Munieh).
BRUEGEL, J. W. (1974) Tschechen und Deutsche 1939-1946 (Munich).
BRUSATTI, A., (ed.) (1973) Die Habsburger Monarchie 1848-1918, vol. I
(Vienna).
CAPEK, A. (1992) 'Specific Features of the Slovak Economy' in Prague
Economic Papers, vol. I, No. 2.
CENSUS (1992) SeMnf Iidu, domö a bytö 1991. Z4kladnf udaje za republiky,
kraje a okresy (FSÜ Prague).
CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE (1947) Annual Report 0/ Statistics, No. 84,
1933-/946 (London).

249
250 Bibliography

CERNA., A. (1993) 'Environment and Economy in the CsFR' in Prague Economic

Papers, vol. 11, no. I.
CESKA. REPUBLIKA Slovenska republika (1994). Ekonomicke prehledy (OECD,
Paris, 1994).
'CRISIS IN MORTALITY, HEALTH AND NUTRITION (1994)' in Unicef
Economies in Transition Studies, Regional Monitoring Report, no. 2.
CsY (1993/4) Statistickd rocenka Ceske republiky (Czeck Statistical Yearbook)
(CsU, Cs, Prague, 1993, 1994).
DATA (1984) Survey on Class and Social Structure (UFS A V CsSR, Prague).
DATA (1991) Survey on Social Transformation (USPV UK, SoU CsAV, Prague).
DATA (1993) ,survey on Sf!cial Stratification ?nd Mobility in Eastern Europe
(UCLA, SoU A V CR, SoU SA V, Prague, BratJslava).
DATA (1993BB) Survey on Beliefs and Behaviour (SoU AVeR, SoU SA V,
j>rague, Bratislava).
DEJINY CESKOSLOVENSKA V DATECH (1986) (History of Czechoslovakia in
Dates) (Svoboda, Prague).
DESET LET CESKOSLOVENSKE REPUBLIKY (Statn( tiskärna, Prague).
DJILAS, M. (1959) The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System
(Praeger, New York).
DOLANSKY, J. (1949) Vyklad k rozpoctu lIa rok 1949 (Budgel Report) (Ministry
of Finance, Prague). . .
DUFF, S. G. (1970) German Protectorate. Tlle Czeclls Under Nazi Rule (Frank
Cass, London).
ERIKSON R. and GOLDTHORPE, J. H. (1992) The Constant Flux. A Study of
Class Mobility in Industrial Societies (Clarendon Press, Oxford).
EUROSTAT REVIEW (1987) 1976-1985 (Brussel-Luxembourg).
FALT' AN, S. (1968) Slpvenskd otazka v Ceskoslovensku (Bratislava).
FALTUS, J. and PRUCHA, V. (1967) Prehl'ad hospodarskeho vyvoja na
Slovensku v rokoch 1918-1945 (VPL, Bratislava).
FELAK, J. R. 'Die Tschechisch-Slowakischen Beziehungen aus der Sicht der
Historiker', in Bohemia, 32, I, 1991, pp. 60-76
GOLAN, G. (1971) The Czechoslovak Reform Movement (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge UK).
GOLAN, G. (1973) The Czechoslovak Reform Policy (Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge UK).
GOLDMANN, 1. and KOUBA, K. (eds) (1969) Hospodarsky rust v CSSR
(Academia, Prague, 1969).
GRAHAM A. and SELDON, A. (eds.) (1990) Goverlllnellt and Economies in the
Post-war World (Routledge, London and New York).
HABR, J. (ed.) Nove hospodarstvi, 1948 (Prague).
HNEK, M. et al. (1993) 'Ceskoslovenska ekonomika v zaveru roku 1992', in
Politickd ekonomie, vol. 3.
HAMMOND, T. T. (ed.) (1975) The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers (Yale
Universily Press, New Havcn and London). ,
HAMPL, S. (1993) Attitudes of Popula/ion in the Czech Rcpublic (SoU AV CR,
Prague).
HANZE, E. L. (1967) Foreign Labour ill Nazi Germany (Princeton U.P., New
Jersey, 1967).
HANZEL,1. (1991) Zrychleny tep dijin (OK Centrum, Prague).
 Bibliography 251
HARNA, J. (1991) 'Nationalkulturen und Koexistenz der Tschechen und
Slowaken in den Jahren der ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik', in
Bohemia, 32, 2.
HAUNER, M. (1978) 'Der Bürger gegenüber Staat und Gesellschaft' in J. Krejci
(ed.) Sozialdemokratie und Systemwandel: Hundert Jahre tschechoslowakische
Erfahrung (Dietz, Berlin-Bonn).
HAUNER, M. (1985) 'Human Resources' in Kaser and Radice (1985) vol. I.
BAUNER, M. (1986) 'Military Budgets and the Armaments Industry' in Kaser
and Radice (1986) vol. 11.
HA VEL, V. et al. (1985) The Power of Powerless, ed. by J. Keane (Hutchinson,
London).
BA VLI K, P. (1985) 'A Comparison of Purchasing Power Parity and Consumption
Levels in Austria and Czechoslovakia' in Joumal of Comparative Economics,
vol. 9,1985.
HAVLIK, P. and LEVCIK, F. (1982) GDP of Czechoslovakia. 1970-1980
(Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, Vienna).
HEIMRICH, V. (1948) 'Ukoly sociälni stastistiky' in Statistickj obzor (Prague)
March.
HEIL, V. and KAPLAN, K. (1968) Zprava 0 organizovanem nasill (Sixty-Eight
Publishers, Toronto).
HENZEL, K. P. et al. (1968) Die sozialistische Marktwirtschaft in der
Tschechoslowakei (Fischer, Stuttgart).
HEUMOS, P. (1988) 'Die Arbeiterschaft in der ersten Tschechoslowakischen
Republik', in Bohemia, 29, I.
HILBERG, R. (1985) The Destructioll ofthe European Jews, 3 vols., (Holmes &
Meier, New York and London).
BIRSL, M. (ed.) (1977) Skupiny obyvatelstva S omezenou moznosti spotreby v
a;SR v letech 1958-1973 (CsVUPSV, Bratislava).
HOLESoVSKY, V. (1977) Economic Systems, Analysis and Comparison
(McGraw-Hill, New York, London).
HSY (1985) Historicka statistickd roeenka (Historical Statistical Yearbook)
(SNTL, Alfa, Prague).
HUDECEK, J. (1990) Kapitoly z pruzkwmll1azoru skupin obyvatelstva CSR k
dlle{m otdzkam politickiho systemu v roce 1968 (Komise vlädy, Prague).
JAKSCH, W. (1945) Sudeten Labour and the Sudeten Problem (Golanz).
JANACEK, K. et al. (1993) 'The Czechoslovak Economy at the End of 1992 and
Short-Term Outlook' in Prague Economic Pap.:rs, vol. 11, no. 2.
KADLEC, V. (1945) Piebytek kupni sfly a jeho odstranini (Prague).
KALECKI, M. (1965) Outline of the theory of Growth in Socialist Economy
(Czech translation from Polish original, Prague) p. 150.
KALINOV A, L. (ed.) (1993a) K prominam socialni struktury v Ceskoslovensku
1918-/968 (USPV FSV UK, Prague).
KALINOV A, L. (1993b) ZOkladlli podmlnky a charakteristiky vyvoje socialn{
struktwyes. spolecnosti v 70. a 80. letech (USPV FSV UK, Prague).
KALINOV A, L. and Prucha, V. (eds) (1969) Vyvoj socialnl struktury Ceskosloven-
ska v uplynutem plUstoleti (USPV UK, Prague).
KAL VODA, J. (1986) The Genesis of Czechoslovakia (Boulder and Columbia
University Press, New York).
KAPLAN, K. (1984) Das verhängnisvolle Bündnis (Pol- Verlag, Wuppertal).
252 Bibliography
KAPLAN, K. (1985) The Short March. The Communisl Take-over of Power in
Czechoslovakia 1945-1948 (Holdan Books, Oxford).
KAPLAN, K. (1990) Ceskoslovenskfl reforma 1968 (Komise vlMy, Prague).
KAPLAN, K. (1993) 'Socialnf souvislosti krizf komunistick~ho rezimu 1953-1957
a 1968-1975. Studie' in Sesity USD AV CR, sv. 9.
KASER, M. C. and RADICE, E. A. (eds) (1985) The Economic History of Eastern
Europe 1919-1975, vol. I (Clarendon Press, Oxford).
KASER, M. C. and RADICE, E. A. (eds) (1986) The Economic History of Eastern
Europe 1919-1975, vol. II (Clarendon Press, Oxford).
KAUSEL, A. et al. (1965) 'ÖSterreichs Volkseinkommen 1913-1963' in
Monatsberichte des österreiclrischen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung,
Sonderheft 14 (Vienna).
KIRCHBAUM, J. M. (1960) Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Celltral
Europe (Robert Speiler, New York).
KLACEK, J., KLAUS, V., TOMS, M. (1968) Inf1ace. mzdya trh (prague).
KLIMECKY. V. (1946) 0 spotrebi(Prague).
KLVACOV A, E. (1993) 'The Current Situation of Privatisation in
Czechoslovakia' in Prague Economic Papers, vol. 11, no. 1.
KOCrUCH, H. (1968) Economic and Social Development ofSlovakia (Bratislava).
KOLOSI. T. (1984) 'Status and Stratification' in Andorka and K616si (1984).
KORBEL, J. (1959) The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakla 1938-48
(Princeton V.P., New Jersey).
KORNAI, J. (1992) The Socialist System (Clarendon Press, Oxford).
KOSTA, J. (1973) Versuch eines Strukturvegleichs der österreichischell und tsche-
choslowakischen Wirtschaft (Vienna).
KOSTA, J. (1978) Abriss der sozialökonomischen ElItwicklung eier
Tschechoslowakei 1945-1977 (Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a.M.).
KOUDELKOV A., J. (1987) Nase dijiny v datech (Albatros, Prague).
KRAJCoVIC, V. (1941) Die Struktur der slowakischen Wirtschaft (Bratislava).
KRAL, V. (1959) Otazky hospodarskeho a socialniho vyvoje v zemteh v letech
1938-1945 1I1 (NCsA V, Prague).
KREJd, J. (1968) 'Vyvoj Ceskoslovenskeho hospodarstvf v globälnf analyze' in
Politicka ekonomie, no. 11.
KREJCf, J. (1968) 'Intertemporal Comparability of National Income in
Czechoslovakia' in Review for Income and Wealth, no 3.
KREJCf, J. (1969) Volkseinkommens vergleich Osterreich-CSSR (Schriftenreihe
der Wiener Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte, Vienna).
KREJCf J. (1971) 'Gross National Product in the United Kingdom and
Czechoslovakia, A Comparative Analysis' in Soviet Studies, vol. 22, no. 3.
KREJä, J. (1972) Social Change and Stratijication in Post-war Czechoslovakia
(Macmillan, London, and Columbia University Press. New York).
KREJCf. J. (1977) 'The Czechoslovak Economy During the Years of Systemic
Transformation: 1945-1949' (Yearbook of East-European Economics, vol. 7,
Munieh).
KREJCf, J., ed., (1978) Sozialdemokratie ulld System wandel. Hundert Jahre tsche-
choslowakische Erfahrung (Dietz Verlag, Berlin-Bonn).
KREJCf, J. (1982) National Income and Outlay in Czechoslovakia, Poland alld
Yugoslavia (Macmillan, London).
 Bibliography 253
KREJCf, J. (1986) 'The Bohemian-Moravian War Economy' in Kaser and Radiee
(1986) vol. H.
KREJCf, J. (1990) Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History (I. B.
Tauris, London and New York).
KREJCI, J. (1993) 'Through the Maze of our Maeroeeonomie Statisties' in Prague
Economic Papers (Prague,}une, vol. 2).
KREJCI, 1. and VELtMSKY V. (1981) Ethnic and Political Nations in Europe
(Croom Helm, London and St. Martin's Press, New York).
Kl'lliN, J., KURAL, V., BRANDES, D. (1986) Integration oder Ausgrenzung der
Deutschen und Tschechen 1890-1945 (Donat & Temmen Verlag, Bremen).
K~OVAK J. and ZAMRAZILOVA, E. (1992) 'The Czeeh Lands-Slovakia
Eeonomie Relation. Some Evidenee' in Prague Economic Papers, I, no. 2.
KRYSrUFEK, Z. (1981) The Soviet Regime in Czechoslovakia (East European
Monographies, Boulder).
KUCERA, M. (1995) Populace Ceske republiky /9/8-1991 (CoS, SoU AV CR,
Prague).
KUNOSI, A. (1944) The Basis oJCzechoslovak Unity (A. Dakers, London).
KURAL, V. (1994) Mfsto spolecenstvt konflikt! Cesi a Nemci ve Velkonemecke
im a cesta k odsunu (1938-1945) (UMV, Prague).
KUSt N, V. (1971) The intellectual Origin of the Prague Spring (Cambridge V.P.,
Cambridge UK).
KusfN, V. (1971) Polilical Groupings in Ihe Czechoslovak Reform Movemenl
(Maemillan, London).
KUstN, V. (1978) From Dubcek 10 Charler 77 (Q Press, Edinburgh, and
SI. Martin's Press, New York).
KVETKO, M. and LICKO, J. (eds.) (1976) Zbomik 0 slovenskom ntirodnom povs-
tanf (Toronto).
KYN, SEKERKA, HEJL (1967) 'A Model for Planning of Priees in Soeialism' in
Socialism. Capitalism and Economic Growlh, ed. C.H. Feinstein (Cambridge
UK).
LAZARCIK, G. (1969) Czechoslovak GNP 1937 and 1948-1965 (Columbia V.P.,
New York).
LENSKI, G. E. (1954) 'Status Crysta\lization: A Non-Vertieal Dimension of
Social Status', American Sociological Review, 19, no 4.
LETHBRIDGE, E. (1985) 'National Ineome and Product' in Kaser and Radice
(1985) vol. I.
LETTRICH, J. (1985) History of Modem Sillvakia (Slovak Research and Studies
Centre, Toronto) 2nd edn.
LEWIS, P. G. (1994) Cenlral Europe since /945 (Longman, Harlow).
L1DOVE NOVINY 3. 10. 1994
L1PSCHER, L. (1990) 'KarpatenrussJand und die Südkarpatischen Ruthenen
1919-1933' , in Bohemia, vol. 31, no 1.
LI PTAK, L. (1968) Siovensko v 20. storocf (Vydavatel' stvo Politiekej literatury,
Bratislava).
LUiA, R. (1964) The Transfer of the Sudeten Germans (New York University
Press).
LUZA. R. (1973) 'The Czech Resistanee Movement' in Mamatey and R. Luza
(1973).
254 Bibliography
LUZA, R. (1973) 'Czechoslovakia Between Democracy and Commllnism' in
Mamatey and LlIza (1973).
MACHONIN, P. (ed.) (1969) c!eskoslovenska spolecnost. Sociologickti analyza
socialni stratifikace (Epocha, Bratislava).
MACHONIN, P. (1991) 'Poznatkove, teoreticke a metodologicke predpoklady
vyzkumu Iransformace soci,Un( struktury ceskoslovenske spoleenosli' in
Sociologicky Casopis, 27 pp. 299-318.
MACHONIN, P. (1992a) Socialn! struktllra Ceskoslovenska v predvecer
Prazskeho jara 1968 (Karolinl1m, Prague).
MACHONIN, P. (I992b) 'Cesko - slovenske vztahy ve svetle dat sociologickeho
vyzkumu' in F. Gal (ed.) Dnesn( krize cesko - slovellSkjch vztahU (SLON, Prague).
MACHONIN, P. (I 992c) 'Political and Economic Transition or Social
Transformation' in Sisyphus, 8, pp. 129-133.
MACHONIN, P. (1993) 'The Social Structure of Soviet-type societies, Its
Collapse and Legacy' in Czech Sociological Review, I, pp. 231-250.
MACHONIN, P. (1994) 'Social and Political Transformation in the Czech
Republic' in Czech Sociological Review, 11, pp. 71-87.
MACHONIN, P. and TUCEK, M. (1994) 'A Historical Comparison of Social
Structures in the Czech Republic in 1984 and 1993', Czech Sociological Review,
11: pp. 149-172.
MAGOSCI, P. R. (1978) The Shaping of aNational Identity: Subcarpalhiall Rus
1848-1948 (Cambridge, Mass. and London).
MAIWALD, K. (1931) Pokus 0 provizorn( seslavell( indexu prtimyslove vyroby v
CSR (Melantrich, Prague).
MAIWALD, K. (1940) VnitfnJ ohchod hehem posledn( hospodarske krize (praguc).
MAMATEY, V. S. and LUZA, R. (eds) (1973) AHistory of Ihe Czechoslovak
Republic 1918-1948 (Princeton U.P., New Jersey).
MASARYK, T. G. (1974) The Meaning ofCzech History, cd. by R. Wellek (The
University of North Carolina Press, 1974).
MASTNY, V. (1971) The Czeclls under Nazi Rule (Columbia U.P., New York and
London).
MATlbO, P. and REHAKOvA, B. (1993) 'Revolution for Whom? Analysis of
Selected Patterns of Intragenerational Mobility in the Czech Republic
1989-1992' in Czecll Sociology Review, I: pp. 73-90.
MENCL, V. (ed.) (1993) Ceskoslovensko roku 19682 (Parta, UMV Prague).
MICHAL, J. M. (1960) Centml Planning in Czechoslovakia (Stanford).
MICHAL, I. M. (1973) 'Postwar Economic Development' in Mamatey and Luza
(1973).
MIKUS, J. (1963) Slovakia - A Political History: /9/8-/950 (The Marquette
Uni~ersity Press, Milwaukee, Wisconsin).
MIKUS, J. (1955) La Slovaquie dalls le drame de I'Europe (Paris, 1955).
MLYNAR, Z. (1975) Ceskoslovensky pokus (} reformu (Index-Listy, Köln-Rome,
1975).
MLYNAR, Z. (1980) Nightfrosl in Prague: Ihe elld of humane socialism (Karz,
New York, 1980).
MOKRZYCKI, E. (1992) 'The Legacy of Real Socialism, Group Interests, and the
Search for a New Utopia' in W. D. Connor and P. Ploszajski, Escape from
Socialism (IFiS Publishers, Warsaw).
 Bibliography 255
MOZNV, I. (1991) Proc tak snadno?.Nekterl rodinne dltvody sametove revoluce
(SLON, Prague).
MY ANT, M. (1989) The Czechoslovak Economy 1948-1988 (Cambridge U.P.).
NACHTIGAL, V. (1989) Contribution to the Quantijication o/GDP (Economic
Institute CsA V, Prague). .
NACHTIGAL, V. (1991) Problems 0/ Dynamics and the Character 0/ the
Czecboslovak Development during 1961-1988 (CsAV, Prague). .
NEDVID, J. (1968) Cesta sloucenf socialnf demokracie s komunistickou stranou
SCsAV, Academia, Prague).
NEMEC, P. (1991) 'Die Lage der deutschen Nationalität im Protektorat Böhmen
und Mähren unter dem Aspekt der "Eindeutschung" dieses Gebiets', in
Jlohemia, vol.. 1,1991, pp. 39-59.
NEMEC, P. (1991) 'Das Tschechische Volk und die National sozialistische
Germanisierung des Raumes', in Bohemia, vol. 32, no. 2.
NÖTEL, R. (1986) 'International Credit and Finance' in Kaser and Radice (1986)
vol. H.
OFFE, C. (1991) 'Capitalism by Democratic Design?' in Social Research, 58:
pp. 865-92.
OLlVOV A., V. (1972) The Doomed Democracy (Sidgwick & Jackson, London).
OLSOVSKV, R. (ed.), (1961) Prehled hospoddrsklko vjvoje C!eskoslovenslUl v
letech 1918-/945 (SNPL, Prague).
OL&>VSKV, R. et al. (1961) Srruenj hospotMisklho vjvoj C!eskoslovenslUl (Prague,
1961).
OSTRV, A. (1972) C!eskoslovenskj problem (Index, Köln).
PAVLENDA, V. (1968) Ekonomickl zaklady socialistickeho rieienia ndrodnost-
nej oldzky v CsSR (Vydavatel'stvo Politickej literatliry, Bratislava).
PECKA, J. and PRECAN, V. (eds) (1993) Promeny praisklho jara 1968-1969
(Doplnek, Brno).
PEROUTKA, F. (1934-6) Budovanf statu, ~eskoslovenskd politilUl v IItech
poprevralovjch, 4 vols (F. Borovy, Prague).
POROVNA.N( vysledkö voleb do Nlirodnfho shrom6Zdenf CsR v roce 1946 a do
Federlilnfho shrom6zden{ CsFR v roce 1990 (FSU, Prague).
PRECAN, V. (1965) Siovenske ndrodne povstanie (Dokumenty, Bratislava).
PROCHAZKA, T. (1973) 'The Second Republic, 1938-39', in Mamatey and LuZa
(\973).
PRUBEH PLNFN( DVOULEWHO HOSPODA.itsK~HO PLANU 1947-48
(Two-Year Plan Report) (1949) (Prague).
PROCHA, V. (1970a) Socidln( struktura ceskoslovenske spolecnosti v predmni-
c~ovske republice (VSE, Prague).
PROCHA, V. (1970b) 'tmeny v Socialnl strukture ceskoslovenske spolecnosti v
lt;,tech 1938-1945 (VSE, Prague).
PROCHA, V. (ed.) (1974) HospodarskI dijiny C!eskoslovenslUl v 19. a 20. stoletl
(Svoboda, Prague).
PRYOR, F. L., PRYOR, Z. P., STADNfK, M., STALLER, G. J. (1971)
'Czechoslovak Aggregate Production in the Interwar Period' in Review 0/
Income a"d Weallh, Series, 17, no. I, March.
PRYOR, Z. P. (1973) 'Czechoslovak Economic Development in the Interwar
Period' in Mamatey and Luza (1973).
 256 Bibliography
RADICE, E.A. (1986) 'The Development of Industry' in Kaser and Radice (1986)
vol. 11.
RADICE, E. A. (1986) 'Changes in Property Relationships and Finance
Arrangements' in Kaser and Radice (1986) vol. 11.
RAfOS, P. (1957) Priemysel Slovenska za kapilalizmu (Bratislava).
RASfN, A. (1923) Finandal Policy olCzechoslovakia du ring the First Year olits
. History (Clarendon Press, Oxford).
RECHCIGL, M. Jr. (1968) Czechoslovakia, Past and Presellt, 2 vols. (Mouton,
The Hague and Paris).
RENNER, H. (1989) A History 01 Czechoslovakia sillce 1945 (Routledge, London
and New York).
RHODE, G. (1973) 'The Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia' , in Mamatey and
Luza.
RIPKA, H. (1950) Czechoslovakia Enslaved: The Story 01 the Communist coup
d'etat (London).
ROLLOV A, V. (ed.) (1972) Socialn{ a projesionalnf mobilita pracujfciho obyva-
teistva CsSR, 1,2 (CsVUP, Bratislava).
RUPNIK, J. (1981) Histoire du Parti communiste tchicoslovaque (Presses de la
fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris).
RYDLO.1. M. (ed.) (1976) Slovensko v retrospektive dejin (Liber, La.usanne).
SELUCKY, R. (1960) Ekonomicke vyrovnani Slovenska s ceskymi kraji (Prague).
SELUCKY, R. (1969) Rejormmodell CsSR (Reinbek).
SETON-W ATSON, R. V. (1931) Slovakia TI/eil and Now: A Political Survey
(Faber, London).
SETON-WATSON. R. V. (1943) A History o[ the Czechs and Slovaks
(Hutchinson, London).
SIK, O. (1967) Plan and Market under Socialism (Prague).
SIK, O. (1969) Fakten der tschechoslowakischen Wirtschaft (Vienna).
SKILLING, G. H., Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution (Princeton University
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1976).
SLAMA, 1. (1977) Die Sozio-ökonomische Umgestaltung der Nachkriegs-
Tschechoslowakei (Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden).
SLAMA, J. (1988) 'Die Parlamentswahlen im Jahre 1935 in Karpatorussland' in
Bohemia, vol. 29, no. 1.
SM (1925) Statisticka pr[rucka Republiky Ceskoslovellske 11 (Statistical Manual)
(SOS, Prague).
SOLNAIDVA, B. (1948) Nase zivotni "roven (Pr4ce, Prague).
SPIGLER, I. (1986) 'Public Finance' in Kaser and Radice (1986) vol. 11.
SRB, V. (1994) Vyvoj sodalni ekonomicke struktury v Ceskoslovensku v obdobl
1945-1966 (manussript, Prague, 1967, supplement for 1921-1937,1994).
SRB, V. and VOMACKOV A, O. (1969) 'Cik4ni v Ceskoslovensku v roce 1968'
y ('Gipsies in Czechoslovakia in 1968') in Demografie, XI.
SROBÄR, B. (1946) Stotnl hospodarenf za valky a po revoluci (Ministry of
Finance, Praltue).
SSY (1993) Statisticka rocenka Slovenskej Republiky (Slovak Statistical
Yearbook) (SOSR, Bratislava).
STÄDNfK, M. (1972) 'Macroeconomic Relations in Czechoslovakia 1929-1966:
Challenge and Response' in Review o[ Income and Wealth, XVII, no. 4.
 Bibliography 257
STANEK, T. (1993) Nimeckd mensina v ceskjch zem(ch (Gennan Minority in the
Czech Lands) 1948-68 (Institute for Central European Cuiture and Politics,
Pra1We).
STANEK, T. (1991) Odsun Nemc/J z Ceskoslovenska 1945-1947 (Academia. Nase
vojsko, Prague).
STARK, D. (1992) 'The Great Transformation? Social Change in Eastern Europe'
in Contemporary Sociology, 21, no. 3.
STATISTICAL BULLETIN 1994/2 (Statistical offices of the Visegrad countries,
Budapest).
§TATISTICKE (JDAJE, kter~ jsme nesmeli znlit (1990) (SNTL, Prague).
STEFANEK, A. (1945) Zdklady sociograjie Slovenska (Bratislava).
STEINER, E. (1973) The Slovak Dilemma (Cambridge U.P.).
STODOLA, E. (1936) 0 jazykovom ztikone a mensinovych ottiz/ctich (Prague-
PreSov).
STRMISKA, Z. (1989) 'Change and Stagnation in Soviet-Patterned Societies: A
Theoretical Framework for Analysis' in Research Project Crises in Soviel-Type
System, nos 15-16.
SUDA, Z. (1980) Zealots and Rebels, A History ofthe Ruling Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford).
SUMMERS, R., Heston, A. (1984) 'Improved International Comparison of Real
Product and its Composition: 1950-1980' in Review of Income and Wealth, 30,
no.2.
SUMMERS, R., HESTON, A. (1988) 'A New Set ofInternational Comparison of
Real Products and Prices. Estimates for 130 Countries 1950-1985', Review of
Income and Wealth, 34, no. I, March.
SVETON, J. (1958) Obyvatel'stvo Slovenska za kapilalizmu (Vyd. politickej
Iiterarury, Bratislava).
SVITAK, I. (1971) The Czechoslovak Experiment 1968-1969 (Columbia U.P.,
New York and London).
SY - Statistickti rocenka Ceskoslovenska (Czechoslovak Statistical Yearbook)
(Statistick~ l1rad, Prague, years given in the reference).
SZELENYI, I. and TREIMAN, D. J. (1991) 'Vyvoj sociälnf stratifikace a rekru-
tace elit ve v~chodnf Evrope' in Sociologickj casopis, 27, pp. 276-98.
TABORSKY. E. (1961) Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948-1960 (Princeton
U.P., New Jersey).
TABORSKY, E. (1981) President Edvard BeneS Between East and West
1938-1948.
TEICHOV A, A. (1974) An Economic Background to Munich (Cambridge U.P.).
TEICHOV A, A. (1985) 'Industry' in Kaser and Radice (1985) vol. I.
TIGRID, P. (1971) Why Dubcekfell (Macdonald, London).
TRENDY 12 Prosincove volebni preference (STEM, Prague, 1994).
TUCl!K, M. (1993a) Social and Class structure oj Society in the Czech Republic
and its Predicted Development up to 2005 (SoU AV CR, Prague 1993 a).
TUCEK, M. (1993b) Poplliar Attitudes towards the Transformation of Czech
Society (SoU A V CR, Prague). .
TUREK, O. (1967) 0 pldnu, trhu a hospoddrske politice (Prague).
VECERNfK, J. (1991) 'Distribucnf system v socialistickem Ceskoslovensku:
empirickli fakta, v~kladov~ hypot~zy' in Sociologickj casopis, 27, pp. 39-56.
258 Bibliography

VECERNf K, J. (1993) Changing Ineome Distribution and Prospeets for the

Future (SoU AV tR, Prague).
VECERNIK, J. (1994) Clzanging Eamings Distribution in the Cueh Republie:
Survey Evideneefrom 1988-1994 (SoU AV tR, Prague).
VINTROV A, R. (1979) Narodohospodarske bilanee (Academia, Prague, 1979).
VNUK, F. (1964) Slovakia's Six Eventful Months: October 1938-March 1939
(Slovak Institute, Cleveland-Rome).
VOLBY do Narodniho shromaideni. (1990) Historicky prehled vysledku voleb z
obdobi 1920-1935. (FSU, Prague).
WALLACE, W. V. (1977) Czechoslovakia (E. Benn, London and Tonbridge).
WESOLOWSKI, W. (1968) Tridy. vrstvya moe (Svoboda, Prague).
WISKEMANN, E. (1967) Czeehs arid Germans, A Study of the Struggle in the
Historie Provinees 0/ Bohemia and Moravia (London; Macmillan, and New
York: St Martin's Press) 2nd edition.
ZAMRAZILOV A, E. (1990) Ekonomieka urove,; CSSR a jeji vyvoj v mezimjrod-
n{m srovnan{ (CsAV, Prague).
ZEMAN, Z.A.B. (1973) The Masaryks. The Making of C1.eehoslovakia
(Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London).
ZESSNER, K. (1976) J. Seliger und die nationale Frage in Böhmen (Seliger
Archiv, Stuttgart.
ZINNER, P. E. 'Marxism in Action: Seizure of Power in Czechoslovakia' in
Foreign Affairs (Columbia U.P., New York). (1950).
ZINNER, P. E. (1963) Communist Strategy und Taeties in C1.echoslovakia
/918-1948 (New York and London).
ZV ARA, J. (1969) Mad'arska mensina na Slovensku Mag)'an Minority in Slovakia
(Bratislava). .
Index
agreements (treaties), international
Moscow, 1968 170, 189
Munieh, 1938 18, 19, 26, 36, 113,
138-40,151,154
Pittsburgh, 1919 9,10, II
Potsdam,I945 25,31,33,150
Prague, 1942 43
Versailles, 1919, Trianon, 1920 4,
5,113
Yalta, 1945 150, 155, 170
agriculture; rural 36,45,57,58,60,
65-70,74,76,77,81,82,85,88,
106, 107, 115-22, 125, 126, 130,
133-7, 143, 147-9, 152-4, 163-8,
175,179-82,200,203,207,212,
216,222,225,228,230,236,238
see also collectivisation;
cooperatives
anti-fascism, anti-nazism 15, 17, 140,
150,159,161
'Aryanisation' 142, 146, 148,
see also nations and ethnic groups
living in Czechoslovakia (Jews)
authors (references particularly
relevant for this book)
Alton, T. 92
Qruegel, J. W. 14
Capek, A. 102
Hauner, M. 64
Havlik, P. 92
Heimrich, V. 62
Kalecki, M. 88
Kalinov4, L. 114,132, 133, 135,
140, 152, 153, 159, 160, 161-5,
167,167,173,174,193,195-8
Kaplan, K. 153, 164, 165, 170,
179,181, 188, 190, 193, 195,
197, 198
Kaser, M. C. 68,70,71,73
Klimecky, V. 66
Krejcf, J. 45,59,62,64,65,67,
69,70,72,93,95,96,98,172.
177, 181, 182, 183
Krov4k, J. 103
Kural, V. 140-1,145
259
Leltrich, J. 245
Levcik, P. 92
Lipt4k, L. 135, 137, 146, 149,
155
Machonin, P. 114, 115, 162,
170-4,176,177,179,181,182,
184-7,193,200,212,215,221,
222,230,233,234,241
Mamatey, V. S. 21
Nachtigal, V. 92, 108
Luza, R. 21
Pavlenda, V. 72, 146-8, 184
Prochazka, T. 21
PrtJcha, V. 114, 135-7, 140, 147,
149, 152, 161, 163, 173, 174
Pryor, F. I. and Z. P. 62
Radice, E. A. 68, 70, 71, 73
Rhode, G. 20, 21, 245
Skilling, G. 187
Stanek, T. 245
Srh, V. 12,117
Teichov4, A. 68, 79
Vecernfk,1. 181-3,197,206,214,
224
Zamrazilov4, E. 103
Zv4ra, J. 246
autonomy (mainly Siovak) 9, 15,26,
28,30,37-9,42-6,101,156,158,
168,185
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 4,6,
22,37,57,58,64,68,76, 113,
121,123
banking 58,69, 70, 72, 79, 80, 84-6,
107, 131, 166,236
borderland 13,17,33,36,38,39,52,
113, 115, 141, 146, 150
borders 4,8,9,13,15,21,24-6,28,
33,50,51,52,64,100,104
branch, or sector, economic 57,58,
60,64,66,68,69,74,82,85-6,
91,94,95,102,115,118-22, 126,
127,134,143, 163, 165, 166, 171,
172,179,181,190,198,205,212,
213.222,223.225.226,236
260 Index
budget, national, or slale (govemment)
83, 104, 109, 129, 190
capital, economic, or other forms:
political, social, eullural 44, 70,
75,78,80,89,98,101, 102, 103,
135, 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 154,
164,219,227,228,231,235,243
eapilalism, eapitalisl society 99, 100,
107,115,132, 134, 135, 138,139,
145, 169, 181, 185, 186,210,213,
221
centralism, Prague 4,9,11,16,41,
42,52,87,88,158-60,163,168,
169,185,187,198,206,210
c1ass(es), social, class strueture 45,
84, 114, 115-8, 121,122,130,
134,199,200,203,205,224-6,
228-30,235,241
bourgeoisie (eapitalists, large owners)
25,29,58,86,133-5,148,152,
161,162,163,227,228
bureaueraey (bureaeralisation) 82,
115, 116, 118, 130, 135, 142,
143, 148, 159-61, 163, 164,
172,176,177,181,185,187,
194,196,206,214,227,243
employees (employed, manual and
non-manual workers, ete.) 143,
155,165,174,213,223,229
46,
intelligentsia (inlellectuals)
100, 1I5, 122, 134,.143, 144,
148,149,155, 159, 161, 162,
167,168,172,181,185,187,
195, 196, 199,211
lower class 132,137, 153
managers 68,80,81,82,89, 115,
116, 134, 142, 143, 154, 162,
163,167-9,173,174,177,181,
182-4,187,195,200,201,
203-7,214,224,225,227,229,
235
middle class 226, 228
'new class' 160,178,229
'nomenklatura' (eadres,
funelionaries) 127, 158-61,
163,168,169,176,193,194,
196,215
non-manual (while-eollar)
employees (workers) 62,
65-6,69,79,80,115-17,
122,125,127, 128, 136, 137,
143, 149, 153-7, 160-5, 168,
173.174,176,178,180,187.
190,195,203,213,223,226,
229
owners (propertied class) 60,67,
69,79-80,84,85,86,87,106,
143
peasanls (peasanlry, farmers.
eooperative farmers, workers in
agrieulture, eie.) 45,61,66,
85,87,88,115-22,126,133,
134, 136, 137, 140, 143, 147,
148, 152-7, 162-8, 175, 180,
182,185,197,200,203,225,
228,230,236
politieal ~Iite (polilieal class) 10,
15,27,38,49,127,147,160,
193,194,196,215,217,218,
219
professionals (specialisls, teehnieal
and eeonomie workers, ete.)
125, 134, 143, 148, 149,
160-165,168,169,171,173,
174,177,178,180, 187, 194,
195,200,201,203,213,225,
230
proletariat (proletarisation) 130,
132, 144,145,159, 160, 185,
186, 193, 194
routine non-manual employees
(clerks, offieials, administrative
staff, eie.) 17, 82, 116, 117,
127, 137, 143, 148, 154, 160,
163, 165, 168, 173, 176, 180,
203,222,232
self-employed 65,66,69,74,79,
115-17,130, 143, 145, 148,
152-5,164,185,200,203,
224-6,230,235
small businessmen (owners,
entrepreneurs, tradesmen, petit-
bourgeoisie, eie.) 106, 118,
137,149,162-8,177,222,
226-8
 Index
working class (workers, blue-collar
workers, skilled, semi-skilled
and unskilled workers) 59,
62,65,69,72-5,79-81,86,
115-18,121,125,127,128,
133, 134, 136, 137, 140, 141,
143, 144, 148, 159, 152-7,
160-6, 173-7, 180, 182, 185,
187, 190, 194, 195, 197, 198,
200,203,211,213,223,225,
226,229-31
collectivisation (of agricu1ture) 45,
85,118,120,166,168
see also cooperatives
communism, Communists passim
composite nation 5,8-12,50
confiscation 6,33,76,79,81,84,
86-7, 152, 153, 166
constitutional acts 4,9, 11, 13, 14,
27,46,47,49,50,52,87, lOS,
147, 159, 168, 170, 185
construction (building) 45, 58,
67-71,74,77,79, \07, 126, 165,
180,198,213
consumption 58,59,64,75,71,82,
83,86,88,89,90,91,93,96-9,
\08, 109, 165, 179, 180, 184, 198,
2J3., 214, 233
control (regulation, command),
economic 17,46,58,59,61,66,
67,72,73,76,78,84,86,89,100,
105-6,141,142,146,160,163,
166,177,196,198,226,228
cooperatives, workers in cooperatives
45,63,88,116-18,129,162-4,
175,185,197,228
see also collectivisation
cordon sanitaire 13, 38
crisis, social, or politica1 39,62,66,
137,138, 156,157, 159, 165, 192,
199,208,209
cycle, economic 62, 63, 64, 65, 97
crisis, economic 12,39,62,63,93,
137, 165
growth, economic 58, 72, 74, 82,
83,88,89,91-5,97,101,103,
\09,119,136,148,164,222,
225
261
recovery, economic 50,58,61-4,
93, 115,222
recession, economic 113, 115,
130,134,136-9,145, 151,
165-8, 181
reconstruction, economic 58, 60,
61,78,81,82,83,119
culture, civilisation 3, 5-6, 12, 13,
15, 17,23,34-5,44,81,98, 100.
105, 113, 118, 121, 122, 130, 132,
134-6, 138, 147, 153, ISS, 162,
163, 171, 172, 179, 180, 184, 186,
196,198-200,202-5,207,208,
210,212-15,219,221,223,229,
231-233,235-238,242,243
Czech Lands, or Bohemian Lands
passim
Bohemia 6,7-9,10,12,13,19-21,
23,34,36,45,50,52,57,58,
66,71-7,133,141,164,216
Moravia 7,8,12-14, 19-21,23,34,
51-3,57,58,71-7,121, 133,
141, 164,216,218
Silesia 7,8,12,13,19,21,23,32,
36,51-3,57,58,140,216,218
Czechoslovakia, Czechos1ovak
passim
deflation, statistical 77, 86, 91
democraey (parliamentary, pluralist),
democratisation, democrats 8,9,
15-17,28,41-5,49,100,105,
113,115,130,132-6,138,139,
146,149-51,154,155,158,159,
161,168,177-9,185-90,195-9,
210,211,214-21,214-21,228,
229,233,240,241-4
demographie faetors 25, 26, 49, 50,
51,54, 114, 130, 184, 185,205,
225,236
devaluation 63, 107
devastation, social 19, 140-7, 149
dissent, anti-communist 162, 199,
216,217
dissociation, of the Czeeh and Slovak
Federation,1992 49-50,109,
113,119,130,217,219,222,224,
225,227,232-40
262 Index
dwelling 59,65-7,69,70,82,98,
152,235
edllcation, qualification 6, 14,23,34,
44,52,98, 100, 1I5, 122-5, 130,
136, 145, 147, 157, 158, 160,
162-9, 171-8, 180, 182-7, 189,
194,195,197,200-7,210-13,
222,223,225,228-30,235-7
efficiency 48,88,89,90,94,98,179
egalilarianism,levelling 75,79, 127,
128,130, 137, 138, 144, 145,
154-61,164,165,169,172,178,
181,183,185,186,189,197,198,
203-6,210,214,225,230,239,
243
elections, parliamentary, presidential,
municipal 11, 13, 16, 17,29,
30-32,38,41,43,48,49,59,132,
133, 135, 138, 139, 154, 155,
214-20,234,239,241-3
elites see under class(es)
emancipation, national 37,41,105,
132,134,136,139,169,187,239
employment, or unemployment 49,
62,63,65,68,71-5,81,84,102,
107, 129, 134, 136, 138, 144, 153,
198,222,223,225,226,235,241
enterprise, company 59, 70, 79-88,
90,96,106,107,137,142,152,
153,157,160,163,164,174,176,
193,213,214,227,228,230,243
ethnic
c1eansing 24, 25, 50
eviction, linguocide, ethnocide,
extermination, genocide, etc.
21-5,27,29,31,32,33,35,42,
52, 145, 149, 152; see also
'solution'; transfer
homogeneity 8,21,22,24,25,50
minorily(ies) 4, 13, 15, 16, 19,20,
22,24,25,31-7,81,146,214,
242
nalion 3,4
slrllcture (system, relationships) and
change, multiethnic stote 5, 6,
7,8,12,13,22,25,31-7,50-2,
134,236
exchange rate 59, 79, 87, 99, 107
exile (political emigration) 28,39,
41,42,45,196,199
February 1948 coup d'etat-
installation of the Communist
regime 28, 44, 45, 78, 83-5,
122, 127, 157, 158, 162, 163, 196
federation (Czech-Slovak) 42,47,
49,50,104,108,126,130,206,
208,217,219,233
foscism, nazi sm 15-17,21,23,24,
27,35,43,45,138,141, 147, 151,
154, 155
'grey (block) economy' 109,127,
215,223,226
ilIiteracy 6, 7, 122
income, national, of governmenl, of
enterprises 57,65,66,67,69,
70,74,75,88,90,91,96,102,
103,104,129,189,196,233
incomes, personal, family
(distribution) 65,75,77,79,80,
86,88,96,125,127-30,132,135,
153, 162, 166, 171, 177, 178, 180,
181,182-6,190,197,203,205,
222,224,233,236,241
eomings (distribution) 66,74,77,
104,115,126-9,137,153, 156,
162, 165, 166, 169, 171, 180-7,
197,202-7,224,225,229,235
salories (distribution) 58,65,66,
74,79,80,81,86,153,156,
157, 162, 165, 166, 181, 190,
197
wages (distribution) 58, 59;65, 66,
74,77-81,83,86,88,101,102,
106,107, 129, 137, 153, 164-6,
181,190,197,224,226
inconsistency, of social status, or
incongruence of partial staluses
162,171,174,175,183, 194, 195,
200,211,234
industry (industries), industrialisalion,
induslrial society, etc. 6,27,44,
45,49,57,58,60-2,64,66-69,
71-4,77,79-88,94,95,100-3,
105,106, 115-30, 134, 136, 137,
 Index
140, 143, 144, 147, 148, 152, 153,
157,163-6,169,171, 172, 176,
179-81,184-6,190,198,200,
206,210,212,213,222,223,225,
232,236,237,239
inflation 58,59,77,78,86,88, 166,
190
input/output 57,62,74,83,87,88,
98, 103, 109
insurance 60,62,65,69,70,79,80,
85, 122, 133, 148, 172
insurrection
Slovak National, 1944 147-9,155
Prague (Czech), 1945 146
interest(s), from savings, from capita1
60,65,70
invasion (occupation)
Hungarian Red Army 1919-20 13,
132
German, Hungarian 1938, 1939-45
21,39,71-8,113,115,138,
140-7,151
Warsaw Pact (Soviet), 1968-90
47,48,89,113,127,170,
189-91,192-212,239
investment 64, 75, 80, 82, 83, 85, 88,
93-4,96-8,106,108,109,198,
227
Iife-sty1e 125, 172, 177-81, 184-6,
197,199,203-5,207,210,211,
217,224,229,235,242
management 67,68,80-2,88-90,
105,163,168,181,196,213,214
manufacturing 58,61,68-70,71,74
market (economy) 12,46,61,66,67,
76,77,82,83,86,89,91,98,100,
103,105-7,145,163,172,177,
186,189,190,213,215,225,233,
243
Marshall Plnn 151, 156
meritocracy (achievement,
performance), anti-meritocratic
principle 71, 72,90, 145, 157,
158,160,161,166-8,171,174,
178,179,181,183-7,192,195,
205,210,211,225,228-30,233,
239,243,244
263
migration 22,31,32,35,37,73,135,
162, 196
militarisation of economy and society
(military expenditure) 20, 26,
28,31,32,47,49,58,59,64,72,
73,89,94,97, 101-3, 109, 121,
138, 140-9, 160, 163, 170, 190,
210,232,233
mining 57-59,68-71,74,86,148,
182,212
mobility, social 35,114,141,143-5,
147, 148, 162, 164, 170, 171, 176,
178,183,217,230,234
modemisation (modemity) 105, 119,
121,122, 125, 130, 164, 169
National Council
Czech 42
Czechoslovak 37
Siovak 10,28,41,42,43,46,47,
49
nationalisation, or socialisation 45,
59,60,78,79-80,81,82,84-5,
152, 153, 157, 163
nationalism, nationalists 3, 15, 16,
20,22,39,41-3,45,46,48,49,
101,132,134,138,161,164,169,
186,238,241
nationbuilding 3,5,6, 100
nations and ethnic groups Iiving in
Czechoslovakia, their
interrelations
Czechs (inclusive Moravian Czechs)
4,5-14,18-21,23-6,29,32,
34-6,44,46-9,50-2,61,72,
74,100, lOl, 105, 131, 136,
139, 142, 145, 148, 155-158,
192,207,208,210,213,234,
239; see also borderland;
ethnic; transfer
Gerrnans (Sudeten Germans,
Carpathian Germans) 8,9,
12-15,17,20,23-5,30-5,42,
44,45,51,52,61,73,121,
142-149, 152, 153; see also
borderland, ethnic; transfer
gipsies (Romi) 24, 33, 34, 130,
144, 146, 149,236; see also
ethnic
264
nations cont.
Hungarians (Magyars) 9, 12, 13, 19,
22,25-6,30-4,52,132,146;
see also borderland; transfer
Jews 12,15,23,24,27-8,31,32,
34-6,38,134,135,140-52,161;
see also Aryanisation; ethnic
Poles 12, 24, 25, 31, 32, 36, 51, 52,
152
Ruthenians 9,11-13,16,19,21,24,
25,26,28,31,34,35,37-40
Siovaks 4,5-8,9-12,19,21,
25-6,28-30,32-4,38,40,42,
44,46-9,50-2,72,100,101,
104,105,131,132,139,147-9,
155-8,210,213,234,239; see
also borderland, ethnic
neighbouring states
Austria 6, 13, 15,34,80. 198
Germany 4,13,14,15,17,18-19,
21,23,25,26,27,36,45,48,
71,72-6,80, 115, 119, 138,
140,146-9,209
Hungary 4,7,9,10,12,13,19,21,
26,32,33,37,51,57,71,80,
100,115,165,167,168,186,
199,209,210,221,226
Poland 19,21,24,27,36,50,71,
96,140,165,168,186,209-11,
221,226
Soviel Union 4, 13, 16, 17, 24, 25,
28,32,36,39,42,44,47-8,83,
86,87,89,90-1,94,101,113,
121,127,132,146, 147, 150-9,
163-70, 177, 186, 189-96
neo-stalinism, neo-stalinists 169,
170,186,192,194
'normalisation' 89,96, 113, 122,
128,170.190.192-209.217.230.
232,239
Oetober 16, 1918, birth of
Czechoslovakia 10. 132
'perestroika' 48, 199,208.239
personal aetors, important for
developments of Czeehoslovakia:
domestic
Bend, E. 16,17,24,39,41,44,152
Dubcek, A. 47. 189, 195
Index
Eli/is, A. 142
Frank, K. H. 141
Havel, V. 48,216,232
Hlinka, A. 10,27,29.42. 135,
138,155
Husak, G 47,189,192.193.195.
207
Klaus, V. 50.232
Masaryk, T. G. 10. 16,24,35.37,
133,136
NovotnY. A. 47
Svoboda, L. 47, 156
Tiso,1. 5,26,27,44
personal aetors, important for
developments in
Czechehoslovakia : foreign
Hitler, A. 15-19,23-4,26,31,35,
113,138
Heydrich, R. 23
Mussolini, B. 18
Neurath von, K. 141
Stalin, J. V. 17,24.39,40,46,
83,87,88,162.168,169,185,
192
planning, planned economy 44, 78,
81-3,85,87-9,93-4.97.98.163.
166,168,213
politiea1 parties, system ()f 10, 13. 14,
28,29,38,43,48,49,81,83,133,
135,136,139,147,151,154,159,
215-20,234,240-2,244
Christian Democratic Movement
216,218,220
Civic Democratic Alliance 218,
220
Civic Demoeratie Party 218, 220
Civic Forum 216
Communist of Bohemia and
Moravia and Left Block 216.
218,220
Communist of Czechoslovakia 11,
133, 135, 139, 154
Communist of Slovakia 154. 216
Czech Peop1e's, Christian,
Democratic Union 81,133,
135,139,154,216,218,220
Czech Social Democracy 220
Czechoslovak National Democracy
(National Unity) 60, 133.
135.139
 Index
Czechoslovak National Socialist
133,135,139,154
Czechoslovak Social Democracy
10, 133, 135, 139, 154,216,218
Democratic Left 49,218,220
Democratic Union of Slovakia 220
German Social Democracy 133,
135,139
Hlinka Slovak People's 10,27,
135,139
Hungarian Christian Socia1 and its
coalitions 133,135,139,216,
218,220
Movement for Dcmocratic Siovakia
218,220
Public against Violence 216
Republican (Agrarian) 135, 139
Siovak Democratic 81, 154
Siovak National 216, 218, 220
Sudeten German I 39
poverty, or pauperisation 37, 119,
132,135,137,142,145,151,155,
157, 158, 166, 183
power position, or participation in
management (inequality) 149,
159-64,171,174,176-8,182-7,
194,195,200-6,214,219,224,
225,229,235
see also under c1ass(es)
Prague Spring, 1968 47,48, 113, 125,
127,155,162, 167, 169-72, 179,
185-91,193-5,199,207,217,239
prices 58-60,63-67,77-9,82,83,
86,88,89,91,94-9,102,106-9,
153,156,166,190,222
construction costs 67,77, 107
cost of living 77,86, 107
privatisation 106,224-9,235,241
profit(s) 59,65, 81, 87, 88
property,owncrship 33,43,48,
59-61,70,73,76,79,83-5,106,
160,176,177,213,224-230
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia,
1939-45 19,20-1,23,35,71-6,
78,141,144,145,149
reform, socia1 and societal 46,47,78,
86,90,96, 113, 125, 127, 130,
133,168-70,172,173,186-92,
199,209,210,217
265
agrarian (land) 60-1,85, 116, 132,
133, 148, 152, 157, 160, 163
economic 46-50, 60, 78, 86-90,
93,96, 122, 127,128, 156, 160,
162,167,169,181,186,187,
190, 199,217,222,232,241
monetary (eurreney) 78, 79, 86,
87, 127, 153, 165, 166
politieal 46,47, 113, 155, 167,
169,177,185-93,199,215-17
price 78,86,89,91,96
religion 3,1 1,12,22,27,34-6,39,
43,45,46,133,241,243
Catholics 5,8,9, 10,27,32,39,
40,43,45,61,133,236
Protestants 8,9,43,236
rent(s) 59,61,65,66,67,69,77. 79,
87,106
revaluation 59, 87
Ruthcnia see nations and ethnie
groups living in Czeehoslovakia
(Ruthenians)
savings (deposits) 76,77,78,79,81,
85,86-7, 153, 166
'second society' 199,204,211,214,
217
social security (po1iey, welfare state)
62,65,85,127,133,136,137,
187,208,234,241
socialism (state socialism, 'real
socialism' , ete.), socialists 27,
29,45,46,48,59-60,78,85-87,
89,90,98,99,114,121-29,137,
146,149-151,154,157-70,175,
177,181, 185-8, 190, 193, 197,
199,209,210,213,221,222,224,
227,231-3,239,242
'solution' , final, of the Czeeh question
21-7, 141-5
see also ethnie
Slovak State, 1939-45 100, 119,
146-9
Slovakia passim
standard of living 34, 37, 44, 88,
137, 145, 147, 153, 156, 164-6,
171,179,183,184,190,197,198,
208,210,211,217,234,236,239,
242
stocks 67,75,76,96,97,98,108,109
266
strategies (prospects, programmes), for
future 15, 28, 100, 136, 151,
154,157,159,162,167,168,218,
220,221,223,237,240-4
stratification (strata), sodal 3, 6, 22,
23,35, 114, 134,141,145, 156,
157,160-2,170-84,185,187,
197,199-206,211,221-5,229,
234-6
subsidies 49,70,87,89, 103, 107,
127, 129, 133
system, or structure, soda1, economic,
political 3,32,39,45-7,57,68,
69,73,74,83,85,88,93,95,
113-18,130,132-6,138,141,
142,145,148,149,151,152,
157-9, 163, 167, 169-79, 181,
184-8,192, 196-207,209-15,
219-25,230-2,236,238,239,
242,243
totalitarianism 113, 141, 142, 145,
149,157-9,161,167,169,176,
178, 186, 187, 192, 196,206,
211,214,220,221,230,233,
239,243
Irade 58, 63, 66, 68, 70, 120, 163
domestic 63, 69, 226
foreign 2,58,61,63-4,76,80,82,
84,90,98-100,107,109,122
tradeunions 61,81,156,157
transfer, of population 24, 31, 32, 33,
115,148,150, 152, 153,
see also ethnic
transformation
communist 45
reform-communisl 179, 185-91
Index
post-communist 19, 103, 105-7,
109, 113, 122, 125, 209,
212-44
United Nations Rehabilitation and
Reconstruction Administration
(UNRRA) 78
urbanisation 6, 115, 125, 126, 130,
185
value added 62,69,95
'Velvet Revolution', 1989 105,113,
169, 170,209,218,232,234
war
Cold 50,102.121,122,127,130,
151,156,159,209
First World 4, 5, 8, 9, 11, 15, 20,
23,24,26,37,50,58,59,78,
113,132
Second World 11,18-21,23-4,
27,34,36,39,47,50,71-7,
78-9,80,113,116,119,132,
140-9, 150-3
Warsaw Pact 89, 113,209,212
wealth, fortunes 9,70, 86,93,94,
127,129,132,140,141,146,148,
152, 166,213,224,228.233,236,
240,241
Western Powers, victors in First and
Second World Wars
France 16,18,19,132,150
Great Britain 18,19,150
USA 9,64,132,151
work complexity (occupational status)
162,171-86,195,201,204-7,
213,223,225,229,230,235