CCJ Cosca 2012 Court Security Handbook Revised September 2012

CCJ/COSCA
Court Security Handbook

Ten Essential Elements for Court Security and
Emergency Preparedness
PUBLISHED JUNE 2010

REVISED SEPTEMBER 2012
Prepared Under the Auspices of the

CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on Court Security and
Emergency Preparedness
Table of Contents
Page
Dedication ............................................................................................................................ i
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. ii
Essential Ten Elements for Effective Courtroom Safety and Security Planning............... iv
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................v
Strategies for Success ............................................................................................ ix
Best Practices Institute: Emergency Management for Courts ................................x
Chapter One: Standard Operating Procedures ................................................................ 1-1
Chapter Two: The Self-Audit ......................................................................................... 2-1
Chapter Three: Emergency Preparedness and Response:

Continuity of Operations (COOP) ....................................................................... 3-1
Chapter Four: Disaster Recovery—Essential Elements of a Plan .................................. 4-1
Chapter Five: Threat Assessment ................................................................................... 5-1
Chapter Six: Incident Reporting ..................................................................................... 6-1
Chapter Seven: Funding for Court Security.................................................................... 7-1
Chapter Eight: Security Equipment and Costs................................................................ 8-1
Chapter Nine: Resources/Partnerships ............................................................................ 9-1
Chapter Ten: New Courthouse Design ......................................................................... 10-1
Appendices
Appendix A: Representative Sample of Guidelines from State Court

Security Manuals ................................................................................................ A-1
Appendix B: Steps to Best Practices for Court Building Security .................................B-1
Appendix C: Home Security Audit and Recommendations ...........................................C-1
Appendix D: Model Disaster Recovery Plan Forms...................................................... D-1
Appendix E: Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania—
Security Incident Fact Sheet ................................................................................ E-1
Appendix F: Sample Memorandum of Understanding .................................................. F-1
CCJ/COSCA Court Security Handbook
Ten Essential Elements for Court Security and Emergency Preparedness
Dedication
Thomas J. Moyer
Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Ohio
April 18, 1939 – April 2, 2010
In 2003 the Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court Administrators
established a Committee on Security and Emergency Preparedness. In recognition of the
gravity and importance of court security, the Chief Justices designated Tom Moyer to be
the committee's first co-chair. From 2003 to his untimely passing in 2010, Chief Justice
Moyer served as the committee's co-chair and advanced the interests of judicial security
with wisdom, patience and gentility. This practical guide is both a tribute to Chief Justice
Moyer and a testament to his remarkable work in the complex field of court security. We
are truly the beneficiaries of his pioneering efforts. We dedicate this court security
handbook to Chief Justice Thomas Moyer. His many good works will always be
remembered.
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Court Security and Emergency Preparedness
Acknowledgements
Members of the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ) and the Conference of State
Court Administrators (COSCA) Committee on Court Security and Emergency
Preparedness gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the many individuals who
contributed to the publication of this handbook: CCJ/COSCA Court Security Handbook -
Ten Essential Elements for Court Security and Emergency Preparedness. It is the result
of efforts, cooperation, and hard work of many that information contained in these
chapters was produced.
Over the years, numerous chief justices and state court administrators who have
served on the Committee have contributed their time and energy not only to developing
the ten elements, but to putting them into a useable format that judges and court managers
can use as guidelines to improve the safety and security of those individuals they serve in
our national system of justice.
Members of the Committee from fiscal year from 2009-10 through 2011-12 are:
CCJ Members COSCA Members
Thomas J. Moyer (dec.) OH, Co-Chair Zygmont A. Pines, PA, Co-Chair

Paul L. Reiber, VT, Co-Chair Karl R. Hade, VA, Co-Vice Chair
Michael L. Douglas, NV, Co-Vice Chair Arthur W. Pepin, NM, Co-Vice Chair
Sharon Keller, TX, Co-Vice Chair Joseph Baxter, RI
Sue Bell Cobb, AL Steven D. Canterbury, WV
James E. Edmondson, OK Nancy Dixon, KS
Thomas R. Fitzgerald, IL James T. Glessner, ME
Thomas L. Kilbride, IL Elisabeth H. Goodner, FL
Marilyn S. Kite, WY Donald D. Goodnow, NH
Maureen O'Connor, OH Glenda L. Lake, VI
Paul A. Suttell, RI Rodney A. Maile, HI
Steven Taylor, OK Ron Overholt, CA
Barton R. Voigt, WY Perry C. Taitano, GU
A. John Voelker, WI
Anne B. Wicks, DC
We would also like to offer special thanks to our many colleagues, consultants,
and court experts for their comments and contributions to the ten chapters contained in
this handbook. Those who contributed greatly to the development and publication of this
report are reviewers of the handbook — Steve Canterbury, Lisa Goodner, and Pat Griffin
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as well as NCSC liaison to the Committee, Timm Fautsko, and former liaisons Carolyn
Ortwein and José Dimas. Other contributors are Judy Amidon, Steve Berson, Ephanie
Blair, Pam Casey, Tom Clarke, Paul Embley, Kay Farley, Dan Hall, Laura Klaversma,
Frank Lalley, Arnold Lum, Jim O’Neil, Kevin Sheehan, Jewel Williams. Special
appreciation is extended to Darren Breslin, Alicia Davis, Kären Hallstrom, and Mary
Beth Kirven for their development of the section in Chapter Three entitled Emergency
Preparedness and Response: Continuity of Operations (COOP).
With respect to the chapters, we have again received contributions from many
internal and external contributors for whose efforts we are sincerely grateful. Our
gratitude also extends to the many members of the court community who shared
information and made suggestions about the application of the ten elements. These
contributions are reflected in the content of the chapters and demonstrate the value of
networking and collaboration between states’ administrative offices of courts and the
practitioners in the field. We would also like to recognize the many sponsors of the Web
sites and companies that are listed in the Resources and References section at the end of
each chapter.
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Introduction
The terror attacks on September 11, 2001, produced increased concerns for safety
and security for virtually all institutions in this country. State courts were no exception.
In 2003, a Court Security and Emergency Preparedness Committee (Committee) was
convened by the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ) and the Conference of State Court
Administrators (COSCA) and included representatives from both. The mission statement
of the Committee reads as follows:
Most court managers believe that their facilities will not be targeted for a
terrorist attack, or that disaster, natural or man-made, only happens to
other people. Yet, as we are all too aware, catastrophic events can happen
to anyone, at any time. Hurricanes, floods, fire, and earthquakes, as well
as terrorism and civil disorder all threaten the ability of the courts to
remain open. The events of September 11, 2001, further illustrated the
vulnerability of public institutions and the urgent need for effective
emergency response and security. Under Standard 1.2 of the Court
Performance Standards – Access to Justice – a court is required to make
its facilities safe, accessible, and convenient to use. The joint committee
will identify and address key emergency planning, response, and security
issues that affect state court systems and which have an impact on the
courts’ ability to maintain continuity of operations and the rule of law.
In October 2003, the Committee conducted a survey of the states to determine

security needs of state courts and to identify effective practices in the area of court
security. An analysis of the survey results produced a framework for addressing court
safety and security called Ten Essential Elements for Court Safety and Security. Those
elements were identified and generally defined as
Element 1 - Operational Security: Standard Operating Procedures

This is one of the most critical deficiencies in the state court system today.
Standard Operating Procedures are not being following and, for full safety,
there needs to be one hundred percent compliance.
Element 2 - Facility Security Planning: The Self-Audit Survey of Court Facilities

This point emphasizes the need to know the strengths and weaknesses of the
physical structure of the courtroom so that the people within are best
protected.
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Element 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response: Continuity of Operations

At any moment, courts can be affected by natural or manmade disasters;
however, they must continue to operate and serve the public in such events.
There needs to be a greater awareness and identification of command
structure, protocols, and communication routes for such emergencies and
responses.
Element 4 - Disaster Recovery: Essential Elements of a Plan

Adequate procedures must be in place to recover lost or vulnerable electronic
and other hard copy information in the event of an emergency.
Element 5 - Threat Assessment

The federal government currently has an effective threat assessment protocol
in practice. However, for security and safety purposes, state courts need to
begin identifying serious threats so they may prepare for the proper protective
actions.
Element 6 - Incident Reporting

States must develop an appropriate incident report form that allows for
capturing data on items such as intelligence and funding needs.
Element 7 - Funding
This is another critical deficiency facing the court system today and for years
past. Equipment can be bought at moderate costs but, without the trained
personnel, the equipment is of little to no use. In addition, many state court
administrators are troubled by the lack of federal funds. While much money
is appropriated to homeland security, very little is dedicated to state courts.
Element 8 - Security Equipment and Costs

State courts must have updated and readily available information on what
technology is available to them and how much it costs.
Element 9 - Resources and Partnerships

Strong and effective partnerships among state courts, law enforcement, and
county commissioners must be developed to ensure successful security
operations.
Element 10 - New Courthouse Design

As new courthouses are being constructed, this point emphasizes the
opportunity to ensure that up-to-date physical safety measures are included in
the design stage.
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The subject matters reflected in these ten elements cover the many issues and
concerns that court leadership – judges and court administrators – must consider in
discharging their responsibility to provide a safe and secure environment. These topics
include the following: making sure policies and procedures are in place to assure safety
and security (Element 1); assessing the current level of protection that exists within the
courthouse (Element 2); planning to stay open in the face of disaster and recovering data
and other resources lost in a disaster (Elements 3 and 4); identifying potential threats and
documenting existing threats in order to increase levels of protection (Elements 5 and 6);
developing effective funding and partnership strategies to assure the resources necessary
to provide a reasonable level of protection (Elements 7, 8, and 9); and building a
sufficient level of security into planning for new facilities (Element 10).
Pursuant to the Committee’s mission statement, the subject matters covered by the
elements are consistent with those Trial Court Performance Standards (TCPS) relating to
security developed by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) – Access to Justice.
Performance Standard 1.2 deals with Safety, Accessibility, and Convenience. The
following four measures relate to safety. Measure 1.2.1 examines the physical security of
the courthouse with a formal security audit. Measure 1.2.2 requires that trained law
enforcement officers conduct a test of courthouse security by observing and trying to
breach the court’s security. Measure 1.2.3 uses a survey to assess the general sense of
safety perceived by regular users of the court. Measure 1.2.4 examines the training
courthouse employees receive with respect to responding to emergency situations.
Since the formulation of the Ten Essential Elements, much has happened to fuel
interest in and concern for courthouse safety and security. On March 11, 2005, an in-
custody defendant in the Fulton County Courthouse in Atlanta, Georgia, overpowered a
security officer and fatally shot a judge, a court reporter, a court security officer and, the
next day, a customs officer. Many other security incidents since 2005 have served to
elevate concerns. Disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, along with fears over such
potential disasters as pandemic flu outbreaks (such as H1N1 - Swine Flu), have served to
heighten appreciation for the need for continuity of operations planning (COOP) and
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disaster recovery. Even lesser and more frequent emergencies such as the facilities-
closing blizzards of 2010 are illustrative of the need for a clearly developed COOP.
As a result, a vast amount of information is available on the general subject area
of emergency preparedness as well as in much greater detail regarding each of these ten
elements. Much of this information can be found online and in hard copy documents
published by state judicial departments, federal and state agencies, and various
organizations.
Although this handbook is not intended to provide detailed answers to every court
security and emergency preparedness question, it does provide the user a convenient yet
significant gateway to this information. Contained herein is a chapter on each of the ten
elements. Each chapter will offer the reader the following:
• A general discussion of the element: what it encompasses and why it is so
important.
• A practical guide on what needs to be done to put the element in place: what are
the specific steps to take to assure a reasonable level of protection?
• A list of additional references/resources: where to look for more expansive and

detailed information on each element in both hard copy and electronic format on
the Internet.
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EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT for COURTS

Strategies for Success
The following illustrates the steps needed for the development of comprehensive
security and emergency preparedness programs for state and local courts.
Strategy for a Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness Program
Vision
To institutionalize an approach to emergency preparedness that ensures that Court entities

continue to perform their statutory mandates if or when confronted with a broad array of
potential operational interruptions.
Emergency Preparedness Program Elements
Program
Management Prevention Preparedness Response Recovery
• Federal and State • Risk Management • Mission Essential • Activities designed to • Activities and programs
Guidance Functions address the immediate designed to return
• Vulnerability Assessment
• Internal Coordination and short-term effects of conditions to an
• Alternate Facilities
• Security Awareness the disaster/emergency, acceptable level, for
• Administrative Order Training • Communications for example: example:
• Advisory Council • Crisis • IT Systems
• Key Assets • COOP/OEP Plans
Communication Links • Voice and Data
• Coordinators • Random Security Checks • Multi-year Strategy • Evacuation Communications
• External Coordination Procedures • Essential Business
• Go Bags Operations
• Judicial Emergency • Event-Specific
Management Group Checklists
• Resource Planning • Emergency
Response Team
Test, Training, and Exercises
Note: On the next page the NCSC Best Practices Institute’s report Emergency
Management for Courts, provides an overview of the subject and briefly introduces best
practices.
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Chapter 1: Standard Operating Procedures
The cornerstone for any effective program of court security and personal safety is
a comprehensive and cohesive set of standard operating procedures. The establishment
of such standard operating procedures was ranked by court administrators in a 2004
survey conducted by the National Association for Court Management (NACM) as the
first important step in a court security program.
There are two crucial factors to consider with respect to standard operating
procedures. The first factor is simply that such procedures usually do exist. This means
that those in authority have given these matters proper thought, that concepts of best
procedures have been taken into account, and that an effort has been made for
consistency in security matters throughout the system. The second factor to consider is
how such practices become a living reality and are practiced inside court buildings.
Thus, policies and procedures must not only be promulgated, but must also be the subject
of a rigorous training regimen and ongoing communication efforts. Everyone who works
in a court building has the potential to enhance the safety and security of his or her work
environment materially, to be the eyes and ears of a workforce constantly alert to risks
and threats. Judges and court staffs that have been well trained on well-publicized
policies and procedures provide the best means for this function to be effectively
discharged.
Without standard operating procedures, those in court leadership positions have
no basis to resolve their courts’ safety and security concerns. With a solid set of
operating procedures, court leaders can systematically address such issues and effectively
minimize risks inherent in court operations.
The Committee has identified ten topic areas requiring standard operating
procedures. These topics were from standards and recommendations contained in
material (e.g., court security manuals, directives, policies, rules) from the following states
and organizations: Alabama, American University, Arizona, California, Delaware,
Florida, Michigan, National Association for Court Management (NACM), National
Sheriffs’ Association, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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In this chapter, specific standard operating procedures are set forth or referenced
for each of the ten topics. In some cases, information for the topic is summarized here,
with more information on the topic contained in another, cross-referenced chapter. (See
topics 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 10.) Topic 5 (Physical Security) encompasses a wealth of
suggested standard procedures in a great variety of physical and operational areas, which
are summarized below. The procedures themselves are set forth in Appendix A of this
handbook.
Topic 1: Leadership/Commitment/The Security Plan

Critical to the security endeavor is visible commitment from state and local
judicial leadership (chief justice, presiding/chief judge, court administrator) to stress the
importance and necessity of protecting the public, court personnel, judicial records, and
court facilities. Court security requires careful planning and continual concerted action.
It is important to ensure active commitment to court security by requiring (e.g., by order
or directive) written security plans that systematically address the following security
needs:
• Standard operating procedures
• Emergency procedures/protocols
• Continuity of operations plans (COOP)
• Governance of shared facilities
• Disaster recovery
• Communications protocols
• Employee training
• Equipment testing
Security plan implementation in states varies. Some state courts identify security
measures as mandatory standards; others refer to them as guidelines.
Topic 2: Collaboration and Coordination

Collaboration and coordination are key ingredients in any safety and security
program. This applies from both an internal and external perspective. Internally, it is
important to (a) establish within each judicial district a standing committee on court
security, chaired by the supervising judge and including major stakeholders such as court
administrators, local law enforcement officers, executive branch officials, facility

managers, and officials responsible for funding court security; (b) establish an
identifiable and distinct position-holder (a security administrator or coordinator) within
each facility who will serve as a point of contact and assume responsibility for the
facility's security needs, implementation of security procedures, coordination of activities
in an emergency, and collaboration with the local court security committee; and (c) create
a state level security administrator position to provide direction, guidance, and oversight
for security of the state's courts.
Externally, it is important for the court to establish formal, routine alliances or
partnerships with local and state security entities (e.g., state homeland security office),
officials, and law enforcement to ensure effective communication and collaboration to
address the judiciary's distinct security needs. External partnerships are discussed in
more detail in Chapter 9 of this handbook, “Resources and Partnerships,” Essential
Element 9.
A clear command structure – the designation of who is in charge – is critical to
quick action. A designated person in each facility should be authorized to declare an
emergency and to make decisions in the event of an emergency, especially if a facility is
shared with multiple courts or non-judicial departments. There should be a clear unity of
command structure to identify who specifically is responsible for securing a building. If
the court cannot reach agreement with a facility's non-judicial occupants, the court should
define and make adequate provisions to control its space.
Topic 3: Self-Assessment (Audits)

There are many significant ways to minimize the risks inherent in court
operations. A court can make significant progress in minimizing risks by conducting its
own security audit. A security self-audit entails a comprehensive and systematic effort
on the part of court leadership to identify security risks within and around the courthouse.
These security audits can be conducted at little or no cost by court staff and/or sheriff’s
deputies. Armed with information obtained through such audits, courts can prioritize the
risks and then develop plans and budgets to correct security deficiencies and make
courthouses safer places in which to work and visit.

Security self-assessments are discussed in detail in Chapter 2, “The Self-Audit,”

Essential Element 2.
Topic 4: Security Personnel (Staffing)

The facility should be adequately staffed with trained and properly assigned
security personnel to monitor the facility, operate security equipment effectively, and
respond to emergency/security needs at all times. For example, California recently
adopted guidelines for the funding and staffing of court security personnel based on the
number of filings and judgeships in each trial court. The recommended ratios are one
sergeant position for every 12 nonsupervisory positions and 1.7 deputy sheriffs for each
judicial position.
A court facility should identify the important areas where security officers are
needed and allocate sufficient staff with clearly designated responsibilities to those areas.
Only security personnel who are properly trained and qualified in court security
(including the use of force and weapons) should be assigned. Some states use civilian or
contract personnel. California is authorized by statute to use civilian court attendants in
non-criminal cases to allow better use of security resources where they are needed most.
Such use, thus far, has reportedly been very limited. The preferred approach seems to be
the use of uniformed officers trained in courthouse security and use of weapons (e.g.,
Washington), but such an approach may be two to three times more costly than the
privatization route. Use of private security or contract vendors may lower security costs
but may also pose some disadvantages (e.g., restrictions on ability to make arrest,
difficulty in coordinating with local law enforcement). If a court contracts for security
services, all security personnel should be subject to security clearance and be properly
trained/certified in court security. Law officers in court for other reasons should not be
considered a component of a court's security system.
Topic 5: Physical Security (Perimeter, entry, and interior areas)

Standard operating procedures are needed in all of the following physical and
operational areas:

A. Perimeter Security
1. Parking areas
2. Grounds (lighting, visibility, protective distance)
3. Exterior of buildings (potential access routes)
4. Surveillance (patrols, daily inspections)
5. Equipment (alarms, surveillance)
6. Loading docks
B. Entrance Security – Access to the Facility
1. Limited access (single point of entry concept)
2. Controlled access (screening post)
3. Screening of mail and deliveries
4. Personnel
5. ID and access control procedures
6. After-hours operations
7. Weapons policy
8. Other policy considerations: contraband, use of force
9. Custodial services
10. Vendors/independent contractors
C. Interior Security — Generally
1. Circulation zones
2. Locking devices: utility and environmental controls
3. Identification and monitoring procedures
4. Security equipment
5. Security personnel (training and safety)
6. Internal communications (within the facility)
7. Prisoner transport/holding areas
8. Building/personnel profiles
9. Daily inspections/sweeps
10. Personal security planning
D. The Courtroom
E. High-risk Proceedings and Populations
F. Administrative Offices
G. Judicial Chambers
H. Roof Exits, Hallways, and Stairwells
Recommended standard operating procedures for all of the above physical and
operational areas are found in Appendix A.

Topic 6: Incident Reporting and Recording

Security incidents should be properly and carefully defined, and security breaches
should be immediately reported to law enforcement or a designated court security officer.
Security incidents and breaches should be promptly documented on an easy-to-use
standardized form and given to the facility's security manager for prompt assessment.
Information obtained from security incident/breach reporting should be tabulated and
regularly assessed by the local court security committee to determine how security can be
improved. Security incident reports should be treated as confidential, and distribution
should be carefully controlled.
Incident reporting is discussed in detail in Chapter 6, “Incident Reporting,” which
covers Essential Element 6.
Topic 7: Records and Information

Courts should create and enforce record retention and destruction policies. All
court records and files should be safely secured and stored to protect them from theft,
misuse, damage, or destruction. Information stored in computer systems should be
backed up and then stored off-site to enable prompt retrieval of information. Courts
should take measures to insulate their computer networks from infiltration or sabotage.
There should be separate and secure storage for exhibits, including firearms, ammunition,
currency, etc. Courts should identify resources that will be able to provide immediate
assistance in salvaging and restoring court records in the event of an emergency. Access
to court records and confidential information such as medical and personnel records
should be restricted and monitored.
Storage and retrieval of essential information is discussed in detail in Chapter 4,
“Disaster Recovery – Essential Elements of a Plan,” which covers Essential Element 4.
Topic 8: Education and Enforcement

Routine mandatory security training should be required for all facility occupants.
A core curriculum is recommended. There should be instruction on evacuation,
emergency, and lock-down procedures. There should be periodic, unannounced mock
security drills for all who work in the court facility. Information should be provided to

judges and staff about how they can enhance safety in their personal lives, including the
development of family emergency plans, which is strongly recommended. New York
and Pennsylvania, for example, provide a Judicial Threats Handbook to every judge.
New York's security task force report recommended that a list of telephone numbers and
crucial first steps should be given to every judge in a convenient, portable form (e.g.,
wallet-sized card). The report recommended other considerations to provide judges with
prompt communication capabilities, such as portable home duress alarms and cell phones
with global positioning capacity.
Law enforcement and/or court security officers who work in the court facility
must be adequately trained and certified in the skills and performance standards required
to execute their court security roles and responsibilities. Such training should include
instruction in the transportation and restraint of prisoners, court facility security
procedures, use of force, dealing with the public, etc.
Security procedures and protocols should apply to all who work in or visit the
court facility and be strictly enforced. Effective court security requires 100percent
compliance. Security is a collective and individual responsibility that affects everyone.
Enforcement of court security procedures is the responsibility of management
(presiding/chief judges, judges, court administrators, and facility managers). Court staff
should be clearly advised that failure to comply with a facility's security procedures and
protocols may be grounds for disciplinary action. Security personnel should be consulted
and security procedures should be followed when employees are terminated.
Topic 9: Communication
Court staffs and judges should know what is expected of them at all times. Clear
and simple security information should be provided. For example, information can be
provided through the posting and dissemination of security directives and rules; security
manuals and handbooks; periodic security bulletins, announcements, newsletters, emails,
etc.; and wallet-sized laminated cards containing important basic information (such as
telephone numbers, courthouse Web site, emergency contacts, and emergency
procedures).

Topic 10: Funding

The cost of security should be included as an essential business expense in a
court's annual budget. Courts must seek adequate funding to support their security needs,
including physical infrastructure, operational enhancements, human resources, and other
components of an effective and comprehensive court security program. Many security
measures (such as leadership, security committees, security protocols, and
communication) are achievable at little or no cost. For costly measures such as security
equipment and security staff, courts can seek to augment their budgets on an incremental
basis. California recently adopted guidelines for funding and staffing of court security
personnel based on the number of filings and judgeships in each trial court. The
recommended ratios are one sergeant position for every 12 non-supervisory positions and
1.7 deputy sheriffs for each judicial position. A recent report indicated that California
allocated 16 percent of its court budget for court security. In addition to the number of
filings, other factors, such as building design and specific functions performed within the
building, will affect the calculation of security staffing levels.
Funding is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, “Security Equipment and
Costs,” which covers Element 8. Also see Chapter 9 of this handbook, “Resources and
Partnerships,” which covers Element 9.
References/Resources
Fautsko, Timothy F. Courthouse Safety Training: for the Courts of Appeal of Maryland,
Dept. of Emergency Preparedness and Court Security. Denver, CO: National Center for
State Courts. 2009.
< http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-
bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/facilities&CISOPTR=151>.
New York State Unified Court System. “The Task Force on Court Security – Report to
the Chief Judge and Chief Administrative Judge. October, 2005.
<http://www.nycourts.gov/reports/security/SecurityTaskForce_Report.pdf>.
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. “1999 Final Report: Courthouse
Security.” Security and the Courts Resource Guide. 1999.
<http://www.sanmateocourt.org/director.php?filename=./grandjury/1999/99courthouse.ht
ml>.

“Table of Contents.” Justice System Journal. Vol. 28, No. 1. 2007.

<http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Comm/Projects/JSJindex/JSJ_TOC/Vol28_1/vol28_1.ht
ml>.
Wisconsin Supreme Court. “SCR Chapter 70: Rules of Judicial Administration Rule
70.39.” Dec 9, 2004. <
http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/scrule/DisplayDocument.html?content=html&seqNo=1072>.

Chapter 2: The Self-Audit
The Nature and Purpose of a Court Security Self-Audit

Operating a courthouse is by its very nature a risky business. Day in and day out,
courthouses are visited by a large number of disgruntled, even lawbreaking citizens. In addition,
courthouses are seen as important symbolic targets for individuals who may want to cause
mischief or inflict terror. Given these risks, court leaders and security officials need tools to help
them provide a reasonably safe environment for those who work in and visit their courthouses
each day.
There are many significant ways to minimize the risks inherent in court operations.
Some are costly; others are not. However, before risks can be minimized, they need to be
identified with specificity. Optimally, court security experts or organizations can be consulted to
perform a comprehensive assessment of courthouse security risks. Yet in times of tight budgets,
funds might not be available for courts to retain outside experts. This should not, in itself, be a
deterrent to security assessment, since the court can make significant progress in minimizing
risks by conducting a security self-audit.
A security self-audit is a comprehensive and systematic effort on the part of court
leadership and security officials to identify security risks around and within the courthouse.
These self-audits can be conducted at little or no cost by court administration and/or law
enforcement officers. Armed with information obtained through such audits, court officials and
security providers can prioritize risks to their court and then develop plans and request budgets to
correct security deficiencies and make their courthouse a safer place.
Topics to Cover in a Security Self-Audit

There are two categories of topics to consider in a security self-audit: tangible and
intangible. Tangible topics are items that cost money and are essential for courthouse security:
the physical plant, equipment, technology, and personnel. –. Intangible topics include items that
generally cost little or no money but are equally essential for effective courthouse security:
operating policies and procedures, training, and communication. .
Tangible topics encompass both the exterior and interior of courthouses. Items relating to
courthouse exteriors may include secure parking for judges and staff; adequate lighting around

the courthouse perimeter; no shrubbery where dangerous items can be secreted; ground-floor
windows that are secure from breaking and entering; doors that are invulnerable to vehicular
assault; and a comprehensive intrusion alarm system.
Items in courthouse interiors may include a screening station with magnetometers, x-ray
machines, and hand wands that will prevent people from bringing weapons or other dangerous
items into the building; armed sheriff’s deputies not only staffing the screening station but
patrolling lobbies and hallways; a command and control center that monitors a system of closed
circuit televisions (CCTVs) with cameras located in such areas as courtrooms, lobbies, and
hallways; duress alarms in place at the bench and staff work areas in each courtroom, all judges’
chambers, and all work stations behind every public counter; and circulation zones that properly
separate public from private areas. These items provide just a sampling of the tangible issues a
comprehensive security self-audit will cover.
In terms of intangible items, the self-audit should assess the existence and the content of
policies prohibiting or regulating guns and other contraband being brought into the courthouse;
critical incident plans in the event of a shooting, bomb threat, hostage situation, or when an irate
or disruptive person is on the premises; protocols for documenting and evaluating security
incidents; policies governing transport and control of in-custody defendants; policies for
conducting background clearance checks and supervising vendors and cleaning crews inside the
courthouse; specific procedures for weapons screening; and policies to control after-hours access
to the courthouse as well as to limit access to secure areas within the courthouse during business
hours. In addition to the policies and procedures mentioned above, other questions to ask about
intangibles in the course of a self-audit include the following:
• Are judges, court staff, and law enforcement officials adequately trained to handle court
security problems?
• Has the court established an appropriate governance structure (e.g., a court security
committee) by which responsibility is clearly assigned for identifying, analyzing, and
remediating security issues on a comprehensive and ongoing basis?
• Is there a strategic plan in place for paying continuing and systematic attention to security
matters?

How to Conduct a Security Self-Audit

A security self-audit should be conducted based on accepted court security policies and
procedures and in cooperation with the court’s security committee, which will oversee the
successful conduct of the audit and ensure proper remedial steps are taken to correct problems
the self-audit uncovers. If court security policies and procedures and/or a security committee
have not been established, contemplation of a self-audit provides a good opportunity to establish
both. Typically, courthouse security committees are chaired by the presiding or other designated
judge and are staffed by the court administrator or building facilities manager. Committee
membership should include judges, court staff, sheriff’s representative or other law enforcement
personnel responsible for court security, first responders to courthouse emergencies, county
administrative personnel (including those responsible for building maintenance), and other major
tenants and courthouse users, such as district attorneys, bar representatives, etc.
Once established, the courthouse security committee (“Security Committee”) should
assign responsibility for conducting the self-audit to a small team consisting of the court
administrator or facilities manager (or a designee) and a representative of the sheriff or other law
enforcement agency providing security services to the courthouse. The Security Committee
should review the tools and methodology to be used for the self-audit, assign a timeframe for
conducting and completing the audit, review the results of the audit, and develop a budget and
plan for implementing corrective actions.
Tools and Methodology for the Self-Audit

Conducting a self-audit will require the use of an assessment form or check list (see
“References/Resources” at end of chapter) that reflects the court’s security policies and
procedures. Besides the National Center for State Courts, organizations such as the National
Sheriffs Association and the United States Marshals Service have developed good prototypes of
these checklists. California, Kansas, Minnesota, Montana, and Wisconsin have adopted and
utilized their own versions of these prototypes. Any national organization that has a
demonstrated interest in court security can assist a court in selecting a checklist that is
appropriate.
An effective courthouse security assessment form or checklist contains a comprehensive
set of elements, usually in question format, relating to security in and around a courthouse.

Questions on the checklists are typically organized around broad topic areas. For example,
California’s checklist is grouped around administrative issues (policies and procedures);
perimeter (parking); building exterior (access); building interior (equipment); building interior
(public areas); building interior (restricted areas); and security staff. There should be a strong
correlation among the items on a checklist. The standard operating procedures for this topic are
set forth in Appendix A. A comprehensive checklist should encompass all of these areas and
would be a method for determining the extent to which a court has these standard operating
procedures in place.
The checklist will ask questions about tangible as well as intangible matters. The
following are examples in the tangible category: Are parking areas safe? Are street-level
windows locked or secured? Is there shrubbery around the courthouse that can be used for
secreting weapons or other dangerous items? Is there a security entry screening station at each
public entrance and is it staffed properly? If so, does the entry screening station include a walk-
through magnetometer, x-ray machine, and a wand? How many armed law enforcement officers
operate the screening station? Is there a duress alarm at every station behind every public
counter?
The following are examples in the intangible category: Does the court have current
policies and procedures on courthouse security? Does the court have protocols that address
courtroom violence, hostage situations, fires, or evacuation of individuals in case of emergency?
Are there procedures in place to identify and dispose of suspicious vehicles parked near the
courthouse?
The checklist will typically include space for specific answers (Yes or No), as well as
space for brief comments or more expansive descriptions. The form also includes the date,
name, position/title, and signature of the individual(s) conducting the audit.
There are two primary techniques to use in the course of conducting the self-audit. The
most obvious technique is simply to walk around the exterior and interior of the courthouse to
make direct observations. Much of what is in place or is missing that comprises effective
courthouse security may be visible to the naked eye. These observations can also provide good
opportunities to conduct tests where applicable. Such items as intrusion and duress alarms can
be tested to see if they are in proper working order. Doors that should be locked can be tested to
make sure they are in fact locked.

The second technique for conducting the audit is to interview those who work in the
courthouse every day. These individuals are truly the eyes and ears of courthouse security, and
they may reveal information in an interview or focus group that cannot be readily observed,
including specific security concerns. For example, some employees may say they cannot hear
the public address system in the event of an emergency. Some may report that doors that are
supposed to be locked are often kept pegged opened.
Interviews can also reveal how familiar courthouse employees are with security policies
and procedures. It is particularly important to interview frontline employees, those who deal
directly with the public, on the phone, at the front counter, in an office, or inside the courtroom.
If threats have been made, these are the employees who are most likely to have experienced
them. It may also be useful to conduct these interviews through focus groups composed of
frontline staff. These focus groups often serve to get the conversation flowing freely, uncovering
useful information.
Evaluating the Results of a Self-Audit

Once the self-audit is completed and the assessment form is filled out, it will be necessary
to evaluate the results and to determine remedial action. To some extent, a good assessment
checklist will produce results that are relatively easy to interpret, thereby identifying what
remedial action can be promptly taken. If the answer to the question about shrubbery is “yes,”
an obvious remedial action would be to trim back the shrubbery.
With respect to many of the self-audit items, evaluating the results and recommending
remedial action may be more complicated and require more thought. The self-audit may reveal a
security deficiency but may not necessarily provide guidance on how to cure the deficiency.
Besides accepted policies and procedures, security standards or guidelines may be necessary to
help a court determine what steps are needed in order to provide a reasonable level of safety to
those who work in or visit the courthouse. For example, the survey may indicate the courthouse
does not have CCTV coverage, but will not identify how to prioritize the location of CCTV
cameras, nor will it reveal what the operational features of a CCTV system should be.
The Standard Operating Procedures set forth in Chapter 1, particularly Topic 5, “Physical
Security,” prescribe much of what needs to be in place in terms of courthouse security. A few
national organizations have developed sets of best practices that describe what is needed to

provide a reasonable security level with respect to virtually all the topics that will be covered in
the self-audit. To address the concern that full implementation of recommended best practices in
court security may be prohibitive for reasons of cost or organizational resistance, several
nationally known security assessment teams have developed a series of steps in phases that
courts may take to achieve best practices. (See Appendix B.)
An example is weapons screening. A recommended best practice is universal entry
screening. Everyone coming into a courthouse should be screened: judges, court staff, attorneys
— everyone. Another best practice is to have at least one screening station consisting of a
magnetometer, x-ray machine, hand wand, CCTV camera, and duress alarm at every courthouse
entrance, with three armed law enforcement officers using triple-retention holsters operating
each station.
These recommended best practice guidelines may not be readily achievable because of
cost and acceptability. In that case, the recommended first phase consists of a series of steps that
may involve relatively little cost or controversy, including the designation of only one door
through which the public can enter the courthouse and, if necessary, another door permitting
judges and staff to enter at a separate, private entrance; the assignment of one law enforcement
or security officer to guard the public entrance; a table or other physical structure at the public
entrance to serve as a screening station; a screening process for the public coming into the
courthouse, which includes the use of a hand wand and the physical search of personal items
(e.g., purses and briefcases). From these first steps, there are other phases that a court may go
through before reaching the final phase of best practice, with its vision of screening everyone at a
station that contains a magnetometer, x-ray machine, duress alarm, and CCTV camera.
Planning and Budgeting

Once the results of the self-audit have been evaluated, members of the Security
Committee, in concert with law enforcement officials, will need to decide what corrective steps
must be taken to cure deficiencies in security and in what order of priority. The Security
Committee should first rank-order the vulnerabilities and risks. Then, working through
designated task forces or subcommittees, if it so chooses, the Security Committee should
consider the most cost-effective means for mitigating the risks and implementing changes.
Mitigation of risks and implementation of change can be strategically spread over a multi-year

scenario to provide time for seeking and allocating sufficient funds to get the job done. As noted
previously, some items can be addressed at little or no cost. These include primarily intangible
items such as promulgating policies and procedures, improving communications, and sponsoring
security training. Other items may be more costly, like establishing and operating one or more
weapons-screening stations or purchasing and installing electronic access and alarmed
emergency exit systems on doors.
Ongoing Management of Courthouse Security

Finally, once plans have been established and budgets acquired, the court, through its
Security Committee, must remain constantly vigilant in overseeing the implementation of
security plans and improvements. Quarterly progress reports should be thoroughly analyzed by
Security Committee members to make sure the most significant risks are being appropriately
addressed, mitigated, and eliminated. Follow-up court security audits should be undertaken
periodically in order to assess progress. Security self-audits should be repeated no less than
every other year. Spot audits with respect to the areas of greatest risk should be taken more
frequently. Information gathered and analyzed as part of a solid incident reporting system can
also provide an additional basis for audits. (See Chapter 6 on Essential Element 6 – “Incident
Reporting.”)
It is important to note that self-audits are not limited to the courthouse. Judges and court
staff can benefit greatly from conducting safety and security audits of their homes. They can
also perform assessments of their own personal safety to and from work and in other non-work
contexts. Resources to enable judges and court staff to engage in these efforts are set forth below
in “References/Resources.” (See Appendix C.)
Postscript
Operating a program of effective courthouse security is not a one-time achievement. It is
a serious and continuous goal for a court and requires constant monitoring. Improving court
security must be a priority every day for all those interested and involved in the process. The
risks involved in courthouse operations are great and varied and may never be totally eliminated.
With proper attention, care, and support from court leadership and law enforcement officials,
risks to personal safety and security can be minimized. Successfully conducting security self-

audits and implementing remedial plans resulting from such audits can significantly assist courts
in minimizing risks and, thereby, securing access to justice.
References/ Resources
National Sheriffs’ Association

1450 Duke St.
Alexandria, VA 22314
(800) 424-7827 / (703) 836-7827
Fax (703) 683-6541
http://www.sheriffs.org/
U.S. Marshals Service

Addresses and phone numbers for district offices listed on Web site.
http://www.usmarshals.gov/
International Association of Chiefs of Police

515 N. Washington St.
Alexandria, VA 22314
(800) THE-IACP
Fax (703) 836-4543
www.theiacp.org
The National Judicial College

Judicial College Building/MS 358
Reno, Nevada 89557
(800) 25-JUDGE
www.judges.org
National Center for State Courts

300 Newport Ave.
Williamsburg, VA 23185-4147
(800) 616 -6164
Fax (757) 220 -0449
www.ncsc.org
The Justice Management Institute

1888 Sherman St., Ste. 410
Denver, CO 80203
(303) 831-7564
Fax (303) 831-4564
www.jmijustice.org

Policy Studies Inc.

1899 Wynkoop St., Ste. 300
Denver, CO 80202
(303) 863-0900 / (800)-217-5004
Fax (303)295-0244
https://www.policy-studies.com
ASIS International
1625 Prince Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
(703) 519-6200
Fax (703) 519-6299
www.asisonline.org
Note: There are many court security experts (directors and their security staffs) who presently
work for state court administrators in administrative offices of state courts who are able to
provide technical assistance for a self-audit of a court building.
Publications
Bell, Chief Judge R. M. “Improving the Security of Our State Courts.” Arlington, VA:
Government Relations Office, National Center for State Courts. May 3, 2007.
http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-
bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/facilities&CISOPTR=110.
Casey, P. “A National Strategic Plan for Judicial Branch Security.” Williamsburg, VA: National
Center for State Courts. 2006.
Fautsko, Timothy F. “Post 9/11: Are Courts Really Secure?” Annual Report on Trends in the
State Courts. National Center for State Courts. 2001.
http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/facilities&CISOPTR=129.
Fautsko, Timothy F. “Entry Screening – The Court’s First Line of Defense.” Annual Report on
Trends in the State Courts. Williamsburg, VA: National Center for State Courts. 2008.
Fautsko, Timothy F. “Taking Precautions: 101 Personal Safety Tips for Judges and Court Staff.”
Denver, CO: National Center for State Courts. 2009.
http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/facilities&CISOPTR=143
&REC=1.

Franklin, Malcolm. “Ensuring the Personal Security of Judges.” Future Trends in State Courts
2009. Williamsburg, VA: National Center for State Courts. 2009.
http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/facilities&CISOPTR=147.
Raftery, W. E., ed. “Mini-Symposium on Court Security.” Justice System Journal. Vol. 28,
No.16. 2007. http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-
National Sheriffs’ Association (n.d.). “Physical Security Checklist, Form 1.2.1.” Trial
Court Performance Standards and Measurement System. Williamsburg, VA: National
Center for State Courts. www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/tcps/Forms/Form_1 21.pdf.
National Sheriffs’ Association and Court Officers’ and Deputies’ Association, “Court Security
Resource Guide: A Practical Guide to the Practices, Procedures and Resources Available for
Those Providing Court Security.” 2008.
National Association for Court Management Court Security Subcommittee. “Court

Security Guide.” Williamsburg, VA: National Association for Court Management.
2005.

Chapter 3: Emergency Preparedness and Response:

Continuity of Operations (COOP)
Court operations are by their very nature both essential and vulnerable. They are
essential as a necessary and vital ingredient to preserving the rule of law that is a
cornerstone for our way of life in this country. They are vulnerable because they take
place in buildings susceptible to disruption caused by a variety of manmade as well as
natural emergencies or disasters. The list is long and can be frightening. In terms of
natural hazards, there is the possibility of storms, lightening, floods, hurricanes,
earthquakes, fires, and pandemic illnesses such as H1N1 Swine Flu. Human-caused
emergencies include vandalism, arson, hostage-taking, prisoner escape, and attacks by
aggrieved litigants. Under the banner of terrorism, there is a host of potential hazards
that include nuclear, biological, and chemical agents.
Manmade emergencies or disasters such as bombings are, to a degree, preventable
through the implementation of best practices in courthouse security. Natural
emergencies, or disasters such as floods or earthquakes, may strike and disrupt court
operations without any effective means to prevent them.
In this century, one of the most striking natural disasters affecting court
operations was Hurricane Katrina in 2005. According to newspaper accounts, some
examples of the sorts of havoc wreaked in a court system that ceased to function in the
wake of this enormous natural disaster included the following:
• The courts struggled to account for and properly process more than 8,000 New
Orleans area inmates evacuated to 34 jails around the state. The result was an
influx of habeas corpus petitions from prisoners held for unlawfully long periods
of time due to the absence of judicial forums to screen cases and set conditions of
release, the unavailability of essential justice system personnel and court records,
and the collapse of funding for the public defender system. In some cases, there
was little choice but simply to release dozens of inmates without bail after weeks
or months of imprisonment, potentially creating a hazard to public order and
safety.
• The justice system also faced significant public safety challenges in accounting
for defendants out on bail, convicted offenders on parole or probation, and
registered sex offenders.
• As soon as the New Orleans courts relocated to temporary sites around the state,
there was an increase in child custody and support cases. When they reopened in
New Orleans, there was a surge of domestic violence petitions, divorce filings,

and custody/visitation proceedings occasioned by the relocation of custodial

parents.
• The courts were quickly deluged with eviction proceedings as landlords sought to
take possession of properties in an effort to begin repairing and releasing them to
new tenants.
• The courts were inundated with storm-related lawsuits involving insurance
coverage, victim compensation, property damage, and commercial losses.
• Until the court system was remobilized, obligors had no clear route for making
child-support payments.
The public in our communities expect courts to continue to function during an

emergency and to resume full operation in a timely fashion after the emergency has
passed. Court management has a responsibility to have comprehensive emergency
preparedness plans in place, to test those plans, and to effectively communicate the
protocols and procedures contained in the plans to all those who have a need to know.
Local court management may look to the state or elsewhere for consultation, but in the
final analysis, the citizens of each community expect their local court officials to have
appropriate emergency plans in place.
Clearly the time for thinking about what to do in the case of an emergency or
disaster is long before the emergency or disaster strikes. Planning is the key to success,
and there are commonly three kinds of plans.
1. Emergency preparedness plan – covers what to do in the case of a variety of
specific emergencies (e.g., fire, bomb threat).
2. Continuity of operations (COOP) plan– encompasses how to withstand a
serious disruption of court operations, to restore and continue essential business
functions of the court.
3. Disaster recovery plan – focuses on how to retrieve and restore vital assets of the
court, particularly records and information systems, in the aftermath of a disaster.
This chapter covers the first two kinds of plans. Chapter 4 will discuss disaster
recovery.
Plans are essential tools in emergency management. NCSC has developed a
strategic framework for emergency management that will allow court management to
take a logical, structured, and comprehensive approach to dealing with these serious
matters. The framework encompasses six factors:

1. Management
2. Prevention
3. Preparedness
4. Response
5. Recovery
6. Training
Management
The first factor to consider is management. Leadership is the foundation for
effective emergency planning in state courts. Each chief justice (CJ) and state court
administrator (SCA) needs to set the tone for the entire judicial branch by demonstrating
a leadership commitment and by sending the message that emergency planning and
preparedness is a top priority that must be integrated into the state’s judicial culture. In
addition to policy statements and directives that emphasize this priority, a management
mechanism needs to be put in place. Chief Justices should appoint a statewide committee
to coordinate emergency preparedness efforts and recommend polices and guidelines for
the entire judicial branch. The Chief Justice should designate a chief emergency
preparedness officer to chair the committee and be the judicial branch’s point person.
Judicial districts and/or individual courts should likewise have their own standing
committees dedicated to emergency preparedness issues.
It is also extremely important for courts to coordinate their emergency and
disaster management efforts with those of other government agencies at the federal, state,
and local levels. Good emergency planning requires an enormous amount of advance
coordination among different court levels and between the courts and a host of federal,
state, and local agencies on a wide range of facility, security, law enforcement, and
emergency management issues. Unfortunately, many courts do not have a seat at the
table when state and local emergency management agencies are at the planning stage.
Nor have the state courts been very proactive in reaching out to these agencies to help
them understand how important it is to keep the courts open to address the immediate
justice needs of those experiencing disaster-related upheaval. Regular outreach and
communication with emergency management officials in the jurisdiction will help ensure
that every court is perceived and treated as a priority and integrated into state and local
emergency management networks and planning processes.

At the federal level, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is

critically important to disaster management because it coordinates all assistance provided
directly by the federal government to declared emergencies and provides federal grants to
cover many emergency costs, including repair, restoration, and reconstruction of public
facilities. Courts need to develop a strong understanding of FEMA’s workings and of the
basic legal framework governing federal disaster preparedness and recovery.
Courts should consider how best to organize a team to develop a COOP plan. To
begin drafting (or adapting) a COOP plan on the state level, consider recruiting district
court administrators from large, medium, and small counties. These valuable employees
have the experience to think through any plan or proposal, and their contributions will be
invaluable. An attorney from a court rules committee could be helpful, since he or she
will be able to identify legal issues and concerns. On a local level, the organizational
team structure for drafting and implementing the COOP plan will vary depending on the
size and complexity of each court system. A one-size-fits-all approach might not work
because of the unique character of each jurisdiction. A key factor in determining the
structure is the number of personnel available to conduct the numerous functions
associated with COOP implementation.
The COOP team must be large enough to represent the core areas the plan will
cover but small enough to work efficiently. The size of the committee will necessarily
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. It is probably best to err on the side of making the
committee too small when the process begins because it can always be enlarged if
necessary to add representatives from additional areas.
Some stakeholders should be involved on a limited basis. These contributors
need not be full members of the committee but should only be consulted for input in
particular areas of their expertise. They would not be involved with forming the overall
plan. Some stakeholders — both internal and external — may have a more specialized
role in assuring continuity of operations, and they can be asked to participate as needed.

Prevention
The second factor to consider in emergency management is prevention.
Prevention efforts are designed to protect occupants and visitors in court facilities as well
as the facility itself and the property inside the facility. Steps for prevention in the area of
court safety and security are discussed in other chapters of this handbook (Element 1,
“Operating Procedures;” Element 2, “The Self-Audit of Court Facilities;” Element 5,
“Threat Assessment;” Element 6, “Incident Funding;” and Element 10, “New Courthouse
Design”). The key to prevention is performing regular and systematic assessments to
identify areas of risk within and around the court facility and then instituting a rational,
comprehensive process for mitigating those risks.
Preparedness
The third factor to consider in emergency management is preparedness. It is here
that planning becomes crucial. As indicated above, three kinds of plans may be
appropriate: emergency preparedness, continuity of operations (COOP), and disaster
recovery. Plans can be developed separately or can be made part of one overall plan.
Plans to prepare for and respond to emergencies should include at least the
following components:
• Evacuation protocols to get people to safety, notify emergency responders, and
salvage vital records and physical assets.
• A clear provision for “who is in charge.” In a crisis, command and control are
essential.
• Communication protocols to keep key staff apprised of the status of the
emergency and whether, when, and how to report. A key element is a “phone
tree” that lists who needs to be contacted first and who is responsible for
contacting whom. The phone tree should include home and cellular phone
numbers, pagers, and other contact information. Court leaders and key staff,
including security personnel, should all be provided with the current phone tree
lists ahead of time. Along with phone trees, emergency preparedness Web sites
and telephone hotlines can serve as additional means for providing staff with
necessary information.
• A system for identifying employee location and status in the aftermath of an
incident.
• A designated assembly site so that building occupants know where to go during
an evacuation.

Continuity of operations (COOP) plans ensures courts know what to do if faced

with an emergency that threatens continuation of normal operations. Traditionally, a
COOP plan is developed and implemented for situations in which the courthouse or
court-related facilities are threatened or inaccessible (e.g., as a result of a natural or
manmade disaster). A traditional COOP plan establishes effective processes and
procedures to deploy quickly pre-designated personnel, equipment, vital records, and
supporting hardware and software to an alternative site in order to sustain organizational
operations for up to 30 days. It also covers resumption of normal operations after the
emergency has ended.
A COOP plan for courts should include the following:
• Specific objectives for the COOP plan relating to the court’s mission and
functions
• An overall approach for maintaining essential functions during an emergency
• Emergency roles and responsibilities of organizations and positions
• Orders of succession to key positions and arrangements for pre-delegation of
authority for making policy determinations and decisions
• Essential court functions and staffing, plus the resource requirements for each
• Measures to protect all vital records, databases, and information systems needed
to support the court’s essential functions
• Alternate operating facilities capable of immediately supporting the performance
of essential functions under various threat conditions
• Preparations for emergency relocation of COOP contingency staffs to alternate
facilities
• Interoperable communications requirements for the alternate facility to ensure the
availability and redundancy of critical communications systems
• A basis for training COOP participants, testing equipment, and conducting
exercises to evaluate specific aspects of COOP plans, policies, procedures,
systems, and facilities
• A multi-year strategy and program management plan for developing and
maintaining COOP capabilities
A court COOP plan should also include provisions for the resources of other
agencies that may be required in the performance of the court’s essential functions and
consideration of how the continued performance of the court’s essential functions will
affect or, in turn, be affected by other state, county, and local offices.

More recent COOP planning also takes into consideration the impact a pandemic
could have on normal court operations. Although the court facility might remain intact,
normal operations could be suspended, likely for 90days or more, because — due to
quarantines, sickness, or death — there would be too few individuals to perform the
court’s work or work on which the court relies (e.g., jury duty, prisoner transporting, mail
delivery, sanitation activities, equipment repairs). Under these conditions, pandemic-
specific aspects of the COOP plan may be activated even though the court facility is not
damaged.
The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) has developed an extensive COOP
planning guide and template, which are available online at the NCSC Web site. The
guide and template were prepared by NCSC with the assistance of a national coalition of
leaders from all sectors involved in business continuity planning for courts and was
supported by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). The template provides a step-
by-step approach to help courts develop and maintain a viable COOP capability.
Disaster recovery plans, which focus on the retrieval of vital records and
information systems, are the topic of the next chapter of this handbook.
Response
The fourth factor to consider in emergency management is response. At this
point, an emergency or disaster has occurred. Now is the time to activate and implement
the plans, including relocation of essential functions to alternate sites.
Recovery
The fifth factor is recovery. This includes steps to return court staff, operations,
and infrastructure to the condition in which they were prior to the time that the
emergency or disaster occurred. This also includes the recovery of information
technology (IT) systems and data. These topics will be covered in Chapter 4 of this
handbook.

Training
The sixth and final factor to consider is training. Although this factor is presented
last, it in fact encompasses all of the prior factors, which will prove of little value unless
judges, court staff, and emergency response teams are fully trained in how they should
respond in a crisis. Training and testing of emergency plans are imperative. By testing
and practicing plans (e.g., tabletop exercises), court emergency managers can identify
gaps and strengthen plans. Further, simulated exercises help the emergency responders
rehearse so that if and when a real emergency or disaster occurs, they will be better
prepared to discharge their duties.
Emergency Preparedness in Dependency Courts

In addition to the six factors discussed above, special consideration must be given
to emergency preparedness in dependency courts. When a court assumes jurisdiction
over a child, the court also assumes the responsibility that a parent would have to protect
the child’s best interests and welfare. This responsibility becomes particularly keen in
the event of an emergency.1
Professionals serving children and families are familiar with the perspective of
trying to view problems “through the eyes of a child.” This perspective is even more
important in times of crisis. The “needs of the children” should be kept foremost in all
emergency preparedness planning. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (PL 105-
89) clearly and unequivocally establishes three national goals for children in foster care:
safety, permanency, and well-being. These goals assume even more significance in times
of emergency. Safety of children is in more jeopardy during times of crisis where they
may not be in the homes of parents, relatives, or foster parents, but in transit, in
temporary shelters or even on the streets or in other locations where they may be in
danger.
Of the 5000 children who were in foster care in Louisiana at the time of
Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, nearly 2000 were displaced. Federally mandated judicial
1
This section incorporates information from prior collaborative efforts of the ABA, NCSC, NCJFCJ
funded by the Children’s Bureau of DHHS. The entire document is on line at
http://www.icmeducation.org/katrina/Introduction.html.

oversight of those 2000 displaced children was disrupted and delayed, thus threatening
their safety, permanency and well-being. Immediately after the hurricanes and even a
year later, many children under court jurisdiction were no longer living within the
geographical jurisdiction of their court of origin.
No one anticipated the extent of the devastation caused by Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, and many were unsure of what was expected of them in a crisis of this magnitude.
The safeguards that Louisiana and Mississippi built into their laws, policies, and
procedures did not anticipate the extent of the devastation and could not adequately
protect their children from the effects of the hurricanes.
In promoting the safety of children, courts should carefully address the following
concerns.
Emergency Preparedness and Planning

• Creating a specialized emergency preparedness plan for dependency courts.
• Integrating the dependency court emergency plan within the court’s over-all plan.
• Coordinating and sharing the court’s emergency plans with stakeholders.
Without dependency-specific disaster planning, courts, child welfare and juvenile

justice professionals, and advocates cannot share information or coordinate essential
activities. Courts and agencies cannot locate children and foster and biological families,
provide critical services and supports, and ensure appropriate oversight of cases. Courts
cannot make best interest determinations, enforce or modify custody orders, or transfer
jurisdiction as needed. In short, without emergency preparation and planning, courts
cannot discharge their responsibility for serving the best interests of the child.
An emergency preparedness program applies to any threat or emergency that may
disrupt normal court operations. It should be multidisciplinary and incorporate all facets
of court operations, including case management, administration, technology, security,
human resources, and facilities management. Stakeholders should embrace the concept of
shared responsibility for the program and related training activities.

For dependency courts,2 a viable emergency preparedness program requires

coordinated efforts within the dependency court itself, with other sections of court and
courts in the same jurisdiction (including appellate courts), with dependency courts in
other areas of the state or region, and with critical stakeholders including social services
departments, local law enforcement, and emergency responders to prevent, prepare for,
respond to, and recover from a broad array of disruptions.
Dependency courts should be involved in plans related to prevention,
preparedness, response, and recovery, including continuity of operations plans, occupant
emergency plans, evacuation and critical incident plans, shelter-in-place plans, disaster
recovery plans, emergency procedures, and security.3 Scarce resources should not prevent
planning for emergencies.
An important planning resource for dependency courts is the National Association
for Court Management’s Business Continuity Management Mini Guide (2006), the
appendix of which contains examples of a business impact analysis questionnaire, a
mission essential-function template, FEMA’s COOP planning guidance, and orders of
succession, as well as a delegation-of-authority worksheet and a continuity-of-operations
planning checklist. Although not dependency court specific, a template for assessing the
status of COOP planning has been developed by the Bureau of Justice Assistance at the
request of the Louisiana Supreme Court.4
For dependency courts, it is especially important to carefully plan evacuation so
that the judge, court clerk, and others necessary to hold hearings would all be evacuated
to the same location and so that parties, attorneys and other stakeholders would know
where hearings will be held. In addition, court personnel should have agreed-upon places
to report to if the emergency extends beyond the immediate area. Once relocated, judges
2
This document uses the term "dependency court" to refer to courts hearing cases involving abuse, neglect
or abandonment of children and youth. However, the provisions of this document and the responsibility of
the court would also extend to youth removed from the custody of a parent and otherwise placed in state
custody pursuant to state and federal law (specifically Title IV-E, Foster Care).
3
For example, see Jefferson Parish, (Louisiana) COOP, available at:
www.jpjc.org/WebContent/Downloads/COOP.doc.
4
Template for Assessing Status of COOP Planning: Louisiana District Courts. BJA Criminal Courts
Technical Assistance Project, American University. TA Assignment Number 4-134 (May 2010).

can adjust their individual calendars to accommodate the transfer of emergency matters
from other calendars.
The dependency court needs to identify which of the courthouse’s plans
specifically include them and which parts of the above detailed plans should be created
specifically for the dependency court. The Mission Essential Functions Template
(http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/emergency/bin/Mission%20Essential%20Functions
%20Template.doc) from the Florida State Courts Emergency Preparedness web site
might be helpful in prioritizing court functions in the event of an emergency.
Communication
Specifically, identify and incorporate dependency court needs in the court’s
COOP:
• Ensure the ability to communicate with others in an emergency.
• Establish alternate modes of communication.
• Identify emergency spokesperson(s).
• Inform the public.
Communication is vital to response and recovery of court operations both during

and after an emergency. In the event of an emergency that suspends court operations for
even part of a day, the dependency court must be prepared to establish or restore
communication among court leaders, between its judicial officers and personnel, and with
external stakeholders, such as child welfare agencies, families, dependents, and
attorneys.5
It is important to know how the dependency court fits into the entire courthouse’s
critical incident, evacuation, disaster recovery (IT), and continuity of operations plan
(COOP). The dependency court is likely to be tied into the courthouse’s plan for
recovering or repairing the general communications infrastructure. However, the
dependency court should take its own measures to ensure that key personnel have the
necessary contact information for court personnel, attorneys, guardians ad litem, court-
5
The New Jersey Judiciary's COOP planning includes an alternate location for hearings, communication
with the public and single sources of communication.

appointed special advocates (CASAs), foster parents, and social services agencies, and
that they in turn know how to contact the court.
While it is probably not possible for the dependency court to prepare for each and
every communication contingency, at a minimum the dependency court must be ready to
initiate some alternative modes of communication (e.g., alternate land lines, satellite
phones, Nextel-type radios, text messaging, media announcement template). Key
personnel need to know how to contact all court personnel and dependency court
stakeholders such as attorneys, foster families, and social services agencies. Having one
of these elements without the other will delay the court’s ability to perform essential
functions and resume normal operations.
Federal judicial branch COOP plan developers recommend the following actions
to support communications in times of emergency: have alternate e-mail addresses for
judges and court staff; maximize the use of available media, including e-mail, radio, TV,
and external Web sites, for both internal communications and communications to the
public; and have satellite phones charged and staff who know how to use them.
Emergency notification may be communicated through a variety of media,
including: a court emergency telephone notification system; public announcement
system; court web sites; electronic mail (e-mail); recorded telephone messages;
announcements on local radio and television stations; and in-person communication.
Multiple technologies should be employed when possible because communications
failures are inevitable in an emergency.
Emergency planning should include development of a centralized “go to” contact
for dependency court stakeholders. Such a website or phone number known in advance
can provide ready access to needed information, including the status of the emergency
plan implementation.
The court should designate one person and one alternate with authority to speak
for the court to ensure accurate and consistent information is imparted. This person could
be the same as the spokesperson for the entire court. If the media are not including
information about court operations in their briefings, other government agencies may be
willing to include the courts in their briefings. The dependency court can also print
announcements in local newspapers, use the court’s Web site, maintain an information

hotline at the court, or provide a toll-free number for the public to call for court
information.
Identifying and Locating Children, Families and other Parties

The court should implement several policies and procedures to assist in
identifying and locating children and families. Courts should consider:
• Using CASA volunteers to locate children.
• Having shelters automate lists of residents to facilitate locating children,
contacting their legal custodian, and reuniting children with families or foster
families.
• Advocating for child care and protective order/offender screenings at all
emergency assistance centers.
• Encouraging visitation of children displaced to other locations.
• Making agreements on health coverage part of interstate compacts. Facilitating
continuation of federal and state benefits and services to children during
displacement.
As Hurricanes Katrina and Rita demonstrated, if a disaster disrupts court

operations, ready plans are critical to protect children under the court's jurisdiction. The
emergency steps described above will be possible only if there has been strong advance
preparation and quick organizational adjustments following the disaster. Establishing
plans that take into account the expeditious location of children, and ensuring that key
court personnel and participants in the court process are aware of the specifics of the plan
will go far in reducing confusion and emotional impacts.6
6
In New Jersey the Division of Child Protection and Permanency and the judiciary have access to each
other’s database thereby allowing them to access case information on each child. However, the judiciary
does not have responsibility for any shelter or the location of children.

The document Ensuring the Unique Needs of Dependency Courts are Met in
Disaster Planning Efforts: Dependency Court Planning Templates for Continuity of
Operations Plans provides helpful templates for establishing a Continuity of Operations
Plan to meet the needs of children placed in state care.7
Jurisdiction
• Examine relevant law (constitutions, statutes, court rules) regarding jurisdictional
authority.
• Establish jurisdictional flexibility and continuity through statutes or court rules for
judicial emergencies.
• Pre-determine how the court will operate in an emergency, including the status of
scheduled hearings and current court orders.
It is important to consult the relevant state constitutional and statutory provisions

that confer jurisdiction on the trial courts that adjudicate dependency cases. Also, state
court procedural rules should be reviewed to ensure local courts have the authority and
flexibility to function during and after an emergency.
Those in vulnerable situations look to consistency to provide stability. Appearing
before the same judicial officer in the same courthouse is a child-welfare best practice
that provides that sort of consistency, even if the events and life of the dependent are
changing from foster care to family, from family to temporary protective placement, or
any one of the myriad of changes that can occur in the course of abuse and neglect cases.
However, events as simple as a water-main break and as complex as a major natural
disaster can change this, forcing the foster child to (at best) go to a different courthouse
7
Ensuring the Unique Needs of Dependency Courts are Met in Disaster Planning Efforts: Dependency
Court Planning Templates for Continuity of Operations Plans, National Council of Juvenile and Family
Court Judges and American Bar Association, Center on Children and the Law (2008), available at:
http://www.ncjfcj.org/resource-library/publications/ensuring-unique-needs-dependency-courts-are-met-
disaster-planning (accessed June 2012). Designed to improve data-sharing practices and thereby improve
outcomes for youth involved in the juvenile justice system, the Models for Change Information-Sharing
Toolkit includes supporting documents such as consent forms, templates, memoranda of understanding, and
recorded webinars (Models for Change, 2008). Available at:
http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/282 (accessed June 2012).
See also: National Commission on Children and Disasters. 2010 Report to the President and Congress.
AHRQ Publication No. 10-M037, October 2010. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville,
MD. http://www.ahrq.gov/prep/nccdreport/ (accessed June 2012) for a full report which includes templates
and other materials.

or a different judge or (at worst) flee the area and take residence elsewhere in the state or
even the country. Reestablishing normalcy in process, services and relationships by
returning to pre-emergency conduct becomes essential for the safety, permanency, and
well-being of foster children.
Courts must balance the need for consistency in terms of places where hearings
are heard and the need to address ongoing emergencies as they occur. Courts must have
this authority and flexibility established long before the emergencies occur. In the case of
Hurricane Katrina, the federal district courts simply moved first and then sought
legislative approval of the relocation outside their assigned districts. The state courts in
many cases were not so fortunate because the state legislatures were unable to convene.
The trial courts were forced to rely on their inherent powers and issue orders themselves
or await orders as directed by their state courts of last resort.
For legal authority to address emergencies and changing conditions, the court may
be able to rely on the power granted by the constitution or statutes in terms of planning
for an emergency, functioning during the emergency and executing a recovery effort after
the event. It is important to consult the relevant state constitutional and statutory
provisions that confer jurisdiction on the trial courts that adjudicate dependency cases to
ensure court leaders know the scope of their authority to act. The lack of explicit
constitutional or statutory provisions arguably means that the court must rely exclusively
on its inherent powers or on the powers of the judicial branch in general to perform its
governmental obligation.
Some states, such as California and Georgia8 have enacted statutes that authorize
courts to take extraordinary measures in the aftermath of a disaster. Other states, such as
Pennsylvania9 have authorized similar measures through Supreme Court rule. New Jersey
8
California Code, Section 68115-68118; Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Sections 38-3-60 to 38-3-64.
The California statute authorizes the holding of sessions anywhere within the county or transferring civil
cases to an adjacent county in an emergency, “notwithstanding any other provision of law.” The Georgia
statute enables an authorized judicial officer to “declare a judicial emergency and designate an alternate
facility in lieu of court.”
9
42 Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes Annotated, Section 931; Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial
Administration, Rule 1950-1954. The Pennsylvania statute extends the county trial courts process “beyond
the territorial limits of the judicial district.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rules provide for the
declaration of a judicial emergency to permit the suspension or modification of court rules by “emergency
judicial order” and designate counties to act as “emergency regional administrative units.”

also has provisions for the judiciary to maintain jurisdiction of cases in any county in the
state and to conduct hearings by alternative methods. In all of these, emergency planners
have vested considerable authority in local court leaders to take a myriad of actions that
may be necessary to keep courts functioning. Relevant to the question of jurisdiction is
how such jurisdiction will be exercised. For example, can the court operate outside its
territorial jurisdiction? Can the court hear cases on an emergency basis as a courtesy to
other courts? Do the parties need to be physically present in court for the matter to be
heard or can the court operate via video or telephone? How will orders and other
information be recorded? Where will documents be filed? How will service be made?
How will notice be provided?
Confidentiality
• Assess informational needs and confidentiality barriers.
• Collaborate with IT and stakeholders.
• Facilitate access to confidential case record information through
- statutes and court rules
- emergency credentialing
- integrated juvenile justice system, especially to facilitate recovery and
back-up
- cooperative agreements
- orders of succession / delegation of authority
Dependency courts must continue to operate in spite of disaster conditions,

including damage to their physical facilities. Dependency courts may need to proceed
without all stakeholders present. Stakeholders may be absent after a disaster due to a
change in geographical location for hearings, loss of communications, incapacitation,
evacuation, or other reason. However, the absent stakeholders may still be keepers of
records that are needed for hearings to proceed or to ensure quality decisions.
One of the important components of any disaster preparedness plan is to facilitate
access to records by stakeholders who legitimately need access. Without prompt and
appropriate access to paper and electronic records, stakeholders cannot perform their
duties in a timely and quality fashion.

A disaster creates three categories of child protective system stakeholders:

stakeholders that are on-site and attempting to carry out their responsibilities under trying
conditions; absent stakeholders who are not available to carry out their everyday duties;
and new stakeholders whose presence in the child protective system is dictated by the
disaster conditions. A disaster can raise cross-jurisdictional issues with record
confidentiality that would not arise under normal conditions.
The child protection system today is a large and interconnected web bringing
together stakeholders from the judicial branch, the executive branch, and the public and
private sectors. Each stakeholder maintains its own set of records, often in both paper and
electronic form. Dependency records, whether from the judicial or executive branch, are
predominantly confidential in nature, and confidential clearance is required to view the
records. Access can be established through various legal authorities, such as statute, court
rule, or a court order. Often, the deciding factor in granting access by court order is
whether the requestor has a “legitimate interest” or “direct interest” in the case. The large
number of stakeholders from disparate fields with different institutional world views,
coupled with the confidentiality of the records, contributes to the complexity of
dependency matters, and sometimes contributes to delays in process and decision
making.
Confidential records in the child protection system raise unique problems in
emergency planning. Recovery staff not only must facilitate access to paper and
electronic records in a timely manner, but also must do so lawfully—in accordance with
confidentiality requirements. Recovery staff cannot ignore confidentiality requirements
or take “short cuts” to provide quick access to stakeholders. They must follow existing
law, policy, and procedure—unless special disaster-recovery provisions or contingencies
are in place that either deliver immediate access or relax requirements in disasters to
deliver access to those who legitimately seek it.
Information shared between the stakeholders includes information that would be
considered confidential, including treatment plans, programs and services the juvenile
participated in, worker history, current medications, and substance abuse. However, each
agency can decide to restrict its information to a smaller subset to safeguard
confidentiality.

Confidentiality rules serve an important function, i.e., to protect the privacy

interests of children and various stakeholders, but other interests may outweigh these
privacy interests in the wake of disaster. For example, in times of disaster, protection of a
child from abuse and neglect is in the best interests of the child and might outweigh
protections of confidentiality. This is not to suggest that we should abandon our regard
for confidentiality rules across the board, but we need to recognize that certain exceptions
may exist in times of exigency, when both victim protection and confidentiality cannot be
simultaneously accomplished. In response to Hurricane Katrina, HIPPA confidentiality
requirements were relaxed so that health care providers were authorized to speak with
family members, even if a patient was unable to grant permission to do so.10 Dependency
courts must act on critical pending matters, even if all regular stakeholders are not
available, and confidential records should not be a reason for delay. Stakeholder
substitutions and delegation of authority must be allowed in certain circumstances.
Dependency courts should: examine existing record recovery plans and consider
the needs of stakeholders to have access to confidential records in the child support
system after a disaster; instruct information technology professionals, records
management professionals, and other disaster recovery planners of special issues in
dependency matters and the need for a separate, comprehensive plan to ensure the
continuation of timely and quality decisions; and work with other institutional
stakeholders in the state to ensure that they take the same course and participate in
cooperative record-access planning across the state child support system in preparation
for disaster.
Access to confidential information can be addressed in the following ways:

Statutes and Court Rules
Statutes and court rules can be promulgated to facilitate the sharing of information
between agencies and between governmental branches. Child protective stakeholders
should work with legislative committees and the courts to define the emergency
circumstances that warrant a conditional exception to confidentiality restrictions.
10
See APHSA policy memo available at www.aphsa.org/katrina/docs/Policy-Memo-9-30-05.pdf.

Juvenile confidentiality statutes and court rules could contain a “Disaster” or

“Emergency” provision, such as: “Confidentiality requirements may be temporarily
waived when they hinder other more important goals of the dependency court, such as
identification or protection of a child.” For example, Minnesota has facilitated access to
confidential court records through court rule.11 Colorado has minimized the obstacles to
sharing information in delinquency, dependency and neglect cases through statute.12
Credentialing
Courts and other institutional stakeholders need to plan ahead and prepare a
policy for emergency credentialing to provide outside stakeholders with emergency
access to confidential information needed during an emergency. Disaster provisions
could spell this out to the most detailed level of guidance possible, leaving fewer
decisions to be made at the time of disaster.
Technology
Integrated juvenile justice systems which share juvenile information require a
great deal of planning and work by the stakeholders to come into existence, but the
reward is great under normal circumstances and even better in emergencies. Access to
confidential information in the integrated systems can be controlled at many levels. An
integrated juvenile justice system may allow retrieval of shared information when an
entity’s files are destroyed, lost, or temporarily inaccessible.
Technology solutions can help mitigate the effects of a disaster. A complete
electronic record, together with a comprehensive plan for backup and recovery, can make
dependency records available under disaster conditions. First, stakeholders should keep
complete electronic records which fully mirror paper records to allow for full electronic
recovery of dependency case records. It is not enough for the electronic dependency
record to consist merely of data in a case management system. Reports and other
documents should also be captured and stored in electronic form—including the
educational, psychological, diagnostic, and medical records. When disaster strikes and
11
Minnesota Rule 8 of the Rules of Public Access to Records of the Judicial Branch.
12
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §19-1-303 (1998) (Appx).

access to records is compromised, the judge cannot afford to wait until the clerk can
reconstruct this vital information from the original record custodians. Next, after building
a complete electronic case record for all dependency matters, stakeholders should plan
for 100% uptime for dependency applications and document access—also known as
“24/7/365.” The plan should include replicated data, critical applications, and security
policies at a remote “hot site.” This will ensure that the application is up and running,
with current data and proper security, as soon as communications can be established from
the disaster area or neighboring region. The stakeholder community should pool
resources and work together with state government to develop hot sites to service them,
when needed. If hot sites are not achievable, at a minimum all dependency records
should be backed up to one or more remote geographical locations. Although remote data
backups may not offer expedited access in a disaster, because applications have to be
reloaded and data recovered from the backup media, they will at least preserve the record.
Cooperative Agreements
Cooperative and mutual aid agreements can be a vital resource during and after an
emergency. Mutual aid agreements and assistance agreements are agreements between
agencies, organizations, and jurisdictions that provide a mechanism to quickly obtain
emergency assistance in the form of personnel, equipment, materials, and other
associated services. The primary objective is to facilitate rapid, short-term deployment of
emergency support prior to, during, and after an incident. Agreements between agencies
may facilitate, among other things, information and resource sharing, technical support
and personnel assistance. When considered in advance of an emergency, cooperative and
mutual aid agreements may resolve confidentiality and legal concerns, cost allocation and
even liability considerations.
Dependency court administrators should consider what information and resources
could be at risk during an emergency. For example, facilities could be compromised,
court records could be inaccessible, and electronic data could be lost. Agencies within
and outside the jurisdiction may have resources that would help the court rebuild or
recreate records, and they may have facilities or equipment that would aid the court in
resuming operations after a disaster. In addition to continuation of court operations,

agreements should be considered to provide continuity of services to children under the

court’s jurisdiction to the extent feasible.
Cooperative and mutual aid agreements executed by those with the authority to
commit resources and assistance in an emergency can be an integral part of continuity of
operations planning.13
Orders of Succession / Delegation of Authority

Orders of succession and delegation of authority are key elements in any court’s
COOP. For dependency court administrators however the court’s general plans may not
be sufficient, particularly with regard to confidentiality. For example, by law, court rule
or mutual aid agreement, certain individuals may be designated as points of contact or
decisions makers. If those individuals are unavailable in an emergency, the dependency
court’s ability to obtain or share otherwise confidential information may be
compromised. Ensuring that legal authorities (i.e. statutes and court rules) allow for the
delegation of authority, and that cooperative or mutual aid agreements specify who is
“next in command” when key decision makers are unavailable is critical. As with the
court’s general COOP, specifying several successors for key decision makers charged
with protecting, receiving or sharing confidential information is crucial.
Protection of Court Records: Storage and Recovery

The protection and availability of vital records, databases, and information
systems needed to support essential functions is a vital component of preparedness and
planning. By taking the proper steps, courts can minimize the impact of disasters and
thereby avoid the loss of records and the need to undergo recovery and salvage efforts.
The less damage caused to records by disasters, the less disruption will occur and the
easier it will be to resume operations. Plans for storage of dependency records should
prioritize ready accessibility due to the time sensitive nature of these cases. In addition,
13
See www.mmrs.fema.gov/emergency/nims/ResourceMngmnt.shtm for more information about mutual
aid agreements as well as this document, outlining best practices and lesson learned:
http://www.homelandplanning.nebraska.edu/Documents/radioconference/moreusefulmaterials/Best%20Pra
ctice-Mutual%20Aid%20Agreements-Developing%20Agreements.pdf.

dependency records should be stored in a manner that is designed to maintain their

confidentiality in the case of a disaster and recovery. Courts should consider the
following steps:
• Conduct a building inspection to familiarize personnel with potential risks to
records. Make any practical repairs or changes to mitigate the risks.
• Do not store records under plumbing or in areas that leak.
• Store records off the floor on sturdy shelves.
• Store records on an upper floor if the court’s facility is located in a flood-prone
area.
• Maintain constant temperatures below 65ºF in dedicated storage areas, or 70ºF in
work areas occupied by personnel. Maintain relative humidity levels of 40 to
50%.
• Install fans and commercial dehumidifiers if high humidity is a constant problem
and cannot be controlled with an adequate HVAC system.
• Store records out of direct sunlight and preferably in archival-quality containers.
• Consult a preservation professional about implementing a pest-control program.
• Create digital backups of all paper-based records. Store backups off-site and out
of the geographical area.
• Establish and maintain a schedule to back up electronic data, usually daily or
weekly. Store backups off-site and out of the geographical area.
Preparedness means having a response plan in place before a disaster. Besides
identifying response, recovery, and salvage procedures and techniques to be used by a
specific court in the event of disaster, a response plan should include other preparations
that make recovery more efficient. These include the following:
• Take inventory of records—Note record format and media. Create a shelf-list.
• Prioritize records—Identify vital records and label records according to priority.
• Alternate site planning—Have an alternate site where the work of the court can
continue and where recovered records can be housed.
• Develop and keep updated a recovery and salvage plan—Address options for the
recovery and salvage of damaged records and make recommendations based on
existing resources, personnel, and facilities.
• Establish a recovery team—Members should be authorized to view confidential
records, trained in salvage and recovery, and well versed in the court’s disaster
response plan.
• Maintain an updated list of local emergency contacts.
• Maintain disaster response supplies.
• Maintain a list of response-and-recovery vendors and suppliers—Identify and
establish contact with those vendors your court would be most likely to use in the
event of disaster.

• Conduct an annual review—any disaster response plan should be reviewed every

year.
• Cover storage areas with plastic sheeting to protect from water damage. (One of
the biggest dangers to records in the event of a fire is damage caused by water
used to extinguish the fire.)
• Move records to higher shelving to protect from rising floodwater.
• Move vital records off-site.
Hearings
Federal child welfare laws have been enacted to improve the quality and
timeliness of dependency case decisions. A disaster, whether it is a simple loss of power
or the total devastation of a courthouse or community, cannot be allowed to cause
extensive delays in the proceedings of dependency courts that affect the safety,
permanency, and well-being of children.
• Both state and federal law demand that courts proceed under specific and strict
timelines and the occurrence of a disaster that disrupts court operations will not
necessarily excuse states and courts from meeting such timelines.
• Aside from legal requirements, meeting the deadlines and avoiding long
interruptions in child abuse and neglect cases is critical due to the child’s sense of
time and need for permanency (Resource Guidelines, 1995; Flango, 2001).
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-629,
470-477, as amended by the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) necessitates more
timely, decisive, and substantive hearings, and more frequent court and administrative
case reviews. These include:
• Reviews at least once every six months
• Permanency hearings at least once every 12 months
• Petitions for the termination of parental rights by the time a child has been in
foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months
Other legal deadlines commonly found in state statutes or court rules include:
• Deadlines for hearings to determine whether to continue children’s emergency
removal from home—state laws set deadlines mostly ranging from 24 hours to
five days after removal.
• Deadlines for filing child abuse or neglect petitions—state laws set deadlines
mostly ranging from the date of the emergency removal hearing to two weeks
afterward.
• Deadlines for the completion of the hearing to decide whether the allegations of
the petition are true (most typically called the “adjudication,” “fact finding,” or

“trial”) to enable the court to assert its authority over the child. (Deadlines often
range from ten days after removal to 90 days after removal.)
• Deadlines for the completion of the hearing to decide whether the state will be
given custody of the child for placement into foster care—for children already
removed from home, state laws impose deadlines ranging from 10 to 30 days after
adjudication.
• Deadlines for the completion of termination of parental rights proceedings
(TPR)—state laws setting deadlines for TPR are frequently complex but often
require the completion of TPR as early as within five weeks after the filing of the
TPR motion or petition.
Whether or not a disaster has disrupted court operations, judicial timeliness is

critical to achieving permanency. The harm to children from remaining too long in
temporary care is compounded by the trauma of experiencing a disaster.
It may not be necessary for all participants to be physically present for all
hearings. State law or procedure may permit connecting parties to the hearing by
telephone or other audiovisual links. If parties and attorneys are scattered across state
lines, this can be arranged pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).How? Reports from other key stakeholders (e.g., service
providers, foster parents) can be relayed by the caseworker or CASA, for example, to all
parties at the hearing. It is also helpful to keep in mind that under ASFA a review hearing
may be held sooner than six months and more frequently than every six months.
Following an emergency, it may be helpful to set up a series of rapid review hearings, in
person or by phone, with the parties to update everyone on the status of children and to
make arrangements for displaced children or other family members.
The following are some key types of information that should be gathered before each
hearing:
• The current location of the child and with whom the child is living.
• The current safety and protective arrangements for the child.
• Which parties and agencies have visited the child and currently have access to the
child.
• The extent to which the child’s needs are being met, including services previous
ordered, services currently provided for the child, services arranged, and when
arranged services will be provided.
• Services previously ordered for the parents, services currently provided for the
parents, services arranged, and when arranged services will be provided.

• How, when, and where will any visitation with the parent and sibling(s)
commence.
• If applicable, how and when the child will return to school.
• If applicable, how and when the child will return to the child’s prior placement.
• If applicable, how and when the child will return to the court’s jurisdiction.
Training and Collaboration

Training activities are designed to inform court staff and local organizations about
emergency preparedness in the court. To sensitize external agencies and response
partners to the importance of the judicial branch as a component of the government
community, the court should consider forming a Judiciary Emergency Management
Group composed of court leaders, state and local law enforcement officials, state
emergency management officials, the bar association, and the public defender’s office.
This group should meet to plan collaboratively and thereafter meet periodically to review,
update and practice the plan. This type of formalized outreach and awareness effort
encourages communications under normal conditions and fosters relationships that
become vital during response and recovery from a disaster.
Templates
In addition to the “Mission Essential Functions Template” referenced above, the
reader may find the following templates useful:
• The Employee Directory Template at the Florida State Courts Emergency
Preparedness Web site may be helpful for creating directories of contact
information
(http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/emergency/bin/Employee%20Directory%20
Template.pdf).
• University of Virginia Library Disaster Preparedness and Recovery Plan. Online
March at http://www2.lib.virginia.edu/preservation/disaster/disaster-plan-
2005.pdf,
• COOP Plan Template Instructions. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency
Management Agency.
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/org/ncp/coop_multi_year_plan_guide.pdf
• Emergency Preparedness Templates. Florida State Courts:
http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/emergency/templates.shtml
• http://www.9-11summit.org
• Memo of Understanding, whereby a county/parish will provide emergency space
to a court. See template attached as Appendix F, modeled after a MOU utilized
by the Juvenile Court in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana.

American University School of Public Affairs. “Guidelines for Pandemic Emergency
Preparedness Planning: A Road Map for Courts.” 2007.
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pandemic/Pandemic_Road_Map.pdf.
Bomb threat reporting forms are available on the Web site of the Department of
Homeland Security.
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ocso-bomb_threat_samepage-brochure.pdf
Note: Bomb threat reporting forms are also available from court security and emergency
preparedness directors at state court administrative offices (AOC), e.g., Florida,
California.
Bureau of Justice Assistance and Center for Disease Control. “A Framework for
Improving Cross-Sector Coordination for Emergency Preparedness and Response –
Action Steps for Public Health, Law Enforcement, the Judiciary, and Corrections.” 2008.
http://www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/EmergencyPrep.asp.
Conference of Chief Judges. “Court Security Manual, State of Minnesota.”

http://www.9-11summit.org/materials9-
11/911/acrobat/27/P3&C10EmergencyPreparednessPlans/MinnesotaCtSecurityManual.pdf.
Conference of State Court Administrators. “Position Paper on Emergency Preparedness

in the State Courts.” Williamsburg, VA: National Center for State Courts. December
2006.
http://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/WhitePapers/EmergencyPreparednessStateCourts_Dec06.pdf.
COOP Planning. “Maintaining the Rule of Law – Planning for a Pandemic within an All-
Hazards Context.” Williamsburg, VA: National Center for State Courts and State Justice
Institute.
http://riz0ep.rmxpres.com/riz0ep/viewer/?peid=38a092eb-9c0b-41b1-88eb-
8e3e97dc0f55.
National Association for Court Management. “Business Continuity Management Mini

Guide.” 2006.
National Center for State Courts. “A Comprehensive Emergency Management Program:

A Model for State and Territorial Courts.” 2007.
http://www.ncsconline.org/emp/EMP%20PartI%20050307.pdf.
National Center for State Courts. “Continuity of Court Operations: Steps for COOP
Planning.” September, 2007.

Ortwein, Carolyn E. “A Road Map for the Design and Implementation of a State Court
Emergency Management Program.” Williamsburg, VA: National Center for State Courts.
Siegal, Lawrence, Caroline S. Cooper and Allison L. Hastings. “Planning for

Emergencies: Immediate Events and Their Aftermath: A Guideline for Local Courts.”
Washington, DC: Justice Programs Office, School of Public Affairs American
University. 2005.
http://www1.spa.american.edu/justice/documents/2151.pdf.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Administrative Office of the Courts. “Courthouse

Preparedness for Public Health Emergencies: Critical Issues for Bioterrorism/Biohazard
Preparedness Planning.” Jan. 2006.
http://www.prepare.pitt.edu/pdf/CourthousePrepBooklet.pdf.
The Supreme Court of Ohio Advisory Committee on Court Security and Emergency
Preparedness. “Court Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program Guide.” 2009.
http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Boards/courtSecurity/COOPGuide.pdf.
University of Pittsburgh and Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. “Courthouse Preparedness

for Public Health Emergencies – Critical Issues for Bioterrorism/Biohazard Preparedness
Planning.” Jan 2006.
www.pacourts.us
http://www.prepare.pitt.edu/pdf/CourthousePrepBooklet.pdf.

Chapter 4: Disaster Recovery — Essential Elements of a Plan

It is well known that disasters and emergencies can occur without warning. A
properly created and implemented disaster plan is the key to mitigating damage and
facilitating a return to normal operations. A disaster has a broad impact, results in
significant damage or loss, and requires the prolonged or extraordinary use of resources
before normal operations can be resumed. An emergency is an adverse event that does
not have widespread impact and does not require the use of extraordinary or prolonged
resources to return things to normal. Proper and timely responses can prevent an
emergency from turning into a disaster.
As is the case with most organizations today, data, in electronic as well as hard
copy form, have become the “life blood” of courts. Managing data and files has become
an essential court function. As discussed in the previous chapter, court operations face the
risk of disruption that can be caused by many kinds of disasters or emergencies, both
manmade and natural. When a disaster disrupts a court’s data system, the court will be
hard pressed to discharge even its most basic and essential responsibilities. Therefore,
courts must develop plans not only to prevent disruptions to data systems to the
maximum extent feasible, but also to recover such systems as soon and as effectively as
feasible after a significant disruption occurs. This chapter sets forth the basic steps for
effective disaster recovery planning with respect to information management systems and
for the preservation of hard copies of court records. (See Appendix D — “Model
Disaster Recovery Plan Forms.”)
Step One – Leadership Commitment

Court leadership, both judges and administrators, need at the outset to understand
the significance of disaster-recovery planning in the context of information management.
This includes knowing at a fundamental level why it is so important and how it fits within
the overall context of emergency preparedness as discussed in the previous chapter.
Based on this fundamental understanding, court leadership must make a strong
commitment to a vigorous planning methodology and to assigning the right number and
mix of staff to implement the methodology successfully. Care must be taken to make

clear who has the responsibility and authority for disaster-recovery planning for both
electronic and hard copies of the court’s records. It is important that this responsibility
not be assigned exclusively to the IT department. Users of technology within the courts
have the most at stake in the continued availability of information, and, therefore, users
of technology and those involved with the preservation of hard copies of records must
play a significant role in planning and conducting information recovery.
Step Two – Risk Assessment

Risk assessment begins with an understanding of the court’s data environment.
What are the sources of data, and how are they made available to users. This is a
relatively easy matter in the case of hard-copy data. Locations and subject contents of
hard-copy files can be readily identified and located. Sources of electronic data and
components for storage and delivery are more complex. Elements of electronic data
systems to cover in a risk assessment include, by way of example, the following: desktop
and laptop computers, servers, Web sites, email, local area networks, wide area networks,
distributed systems, and mainframe systems.
Once the critical resources have been comprehensively identified, the next step is
to determine the impact on court operations that would result from a material disruption
in one or more of the IT system components. A determination needs to be made as to
how significant each impact is and for how long it can be tolerated as well as how hard
copies of records will be used. This analysis will inform recovery strategies and the
priorities to be embedded in such strategies.
Assessing risks to establish a disaster recovery plan also involves looking at
potential disasters that might affect some but not all components of a network or data
center. A fire or earthquake might physically destroy records. Small-scale disasters are
more frequent, such as power feeds or server crashes. Such small-scale disasters also
have the potential to bring down courts’ mission-critical functions.

Step Three – Disaster Recovery Plan

Developing a disaster recovery plan for IT and hard-copy systems will need to
take into account the following factors:
1. The development of preventive strategies: While it may not be feasible to avoid
altogether the disruptions caused by a disaster, the risks and/or consequences of
such disruptions can be mitigated. Preventive strategies may include: emergency
power supplies that can be sustained over a long period; sophisticated fire
suppression systems; heat-resistant and waterproof containers for back-up
electronic data and for vital hard-copy files; offsite storage of data, both electronic
and hard-copy; and frequently scheduled data backup.
2. The development of recovery priorities: Regardless of steps taken to mitigate
risks, disruptions can occur. When they do occur, a recovery plan must contain
priorities to determine what the most important pieces to recover are and in what
order they should be recovered. These priorities will be informed by the risk
assessment the court has undertaken as a foundation for the recovery plan.
3. The development of recovery strategies: Once the priorities have been
established, there needs to be a recovery strategy that addresses each priority.
One essential recovery strategy that needs to be considered is the possible use of
an alternative, offsite location at which to operate data systems during the course
of the disruption. Size, location, compatibility, and availability are all factors that
will need to be taken into account when considering an alternate site. Other
strategies will, of course, need to consider restoration of the original site as soon
as feasible, which will include issues such as equipment repair and/or
replacement.
4. Clear assignment of responsibilities: It will need to be absolutely clear as to who
has authority and responsibility for every material aspect of the disaster recovery
plan. Disasters by their very nature breed confusion. Pre-planned clarity about
who does what is essential for any realistic hope of recovery and restoration of
operations.

5. Budget and resources: A disaster recovery plan needs to be realistic and have the
staff and funds available to enable recovery to take place within reasonable
timeframes.
Step Four – Testing

Waiting for a disaster to occur to see if a plan is effective is in and of itself a
recipe for failure. Disaster recovery plans need to be thoroughly tested. The following
areas should be included in a thorough test of the plan: system recovery on an alternative
platform and alternate equipment; coordination among all those who have responsibility
for recovery; internal and external connectivity; restoration of normal operations; and
notification procedures. “Table top” exercises should be conducted where scenarios are
tested in a classroom setting. More extensive function tests should also be conducted.
Thorough and rigorous training on disaster recovery plans is an extremely critical part of
plan testing.
Step Five – Plan Maintenance

The world of information technology is constantly changing. Accordingly, the
disaster recovery plan needs to be continuously reviewed and updated as necessary. The
plan should be thoroughly reviewed at least annually. More frequent reviews may be
required to make sure that material changes in systems, equipment, and/or critical staff
are appropriately reflected in the plan.
References/Resources:
“Disaster Recovery Planning for Courts: A Guide to Business Continuity Planning.”
Williamsburg, VA: National Association for Court Management.2000.
bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/facilities&CISOPTR=0
“Records and Document Recovery Techniques.” Florida State Library and Archives.
http://dlis.dos.state.fl.us/DisasterRecovery/records_and_document_recovery_techniques.
pdf
Patterson, Pat. “Disaster Recovery Planning for Technology.” Court Information

Technology Officers Consortium: Technology Experience Bulletin, TEB: 2007-

02 (2007). http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-
Swanson, Marianne et al. “Contingency Planning Guide for Information Technology

Systems.” Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Technology Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce. June 2002.
Diamond, Cindy. "Disaster Planning for Data Security." Practice Innovations 3, No.
1. March 2002.
http://west.thomson.com/pdf/iii/PractInnovMar02.pdf
U.S. Department of Commerce and National Institute of Standards and Technology.

“Contingency Planning Guide for Information Technology Systems.”
Note: This site contains detailed plan information and templates. Information in this
chapter relies on a framework developed by this government agency.
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-34/sp800-34.pdf.

Chapter 5: Threat Assessment

It is incumbent upon all who work for the courts to ensure that justice is
administered in an open, accessible, and safe manner. We live in a time when threats and
acts of violence are directed toward judges as a result of their official duties. It is crucial
that every threat directed against a judge be taken seriously and assessed. Courts should
have in place a rigorous process to be followed when threats are received.
There is evidence to indicate that the number of threats against judicial officers
has been growing in recent years. At the federal level, the U.S. Marshals Service reports
that the number of threats against judges has almost doubled in five years, going from
674 in fiscal year (FY) 2003 to 1278 in FY 2008. At the state level, Frederick Calhoun
and Stephen Weston, noted authors on the topic of threat assessment, have documented
that nine local judges have been assassinated over the past 35 or so years, and identified
another thirteen who have been physically assaulted. For example, in March 2005, an in-
custody defendant in Georgia escaped by overpowering a deputy sheriff. In the process
of escape, he managed to kill the judge and a court reporter. He then killed a deputy
sheriff as well as a U.S. customs agent outside the courthouse.
Justice cannot be effectively dispensed when judges are faced with threats, so
courts must have a comprehensive process in place to deal with them. The essential
elements of such a process are discussed below. (For purposes of this discussion, the
individual making the threat is referred to as the “suspect.” The judicial official against
whom the threat is made is referred to as the “subject.”)
The Process of Threat Assessment

In order to be able to respond effectively to threats, it is imperative that courts
have a solid, structured process in place. There are four essential steps to such a process:
1. Identifying the threat
2. Assessing the threat
3. Investigating the threat
4. Managing the threat

Identifying the Threat

A threat is an expression of intent to injure someone or damage something. A
threat can be spoken, written, or symbolic (such as running one's finger across the throat,
leading another to believe he or she is going to be killed). Determining that the
communication is indeed a threat and not simply a statement of unhappiness is a critical
first step in the process. Also, the process needs to identify the suspect and the subject
and understand the relationship, if any, between the two.
Assessing the Threat

Once a threat has been identified, the next step is to assess how significant or
serious the threat is. Upon receipt of a direct or implied threat against a member of the
judiciary, a threat assessment should be conducted to determine the likelihood that the
person making the threat will actually carry it out. To determine the risk associated with a
specific threat, an assessment must be made of four characteristics relating to the suspect:
intent, motive, opportunity, and ability. Intent is a purposeful course of action. Motive is
the emotion, desire, psychological need, or similar impulse acting as an incitement to
action. Opportunity is required for the threat to be enacted. Ability is having the
resources and freedom to take the action.
Each of these four characteristics must be examined independently, then in
combination with one another. For example, some suspects may be highly motivated but
incapable of instigating an attack themselves because they are incarcerated. Other
suspects can lack coherent motivation but truly intend harm. Of most concern are those
suspects who possess strong intent, powerful motive, ample existing or created
opportunities, and considerable ability.
The threat can be evaluated as to the degree of probability by the use of a number
of tools, usually a matrix. More than one evaluation tool should be utilized. The use of
several tools may be the main reason for further investigation, the involvement of
professional psychologists, or the use of other law enforcement agencies. The following
are four evaluation tools that are typically utilized:

• HRC, Version 20 – Historical Clinical Risk Management

• RAGE - V – Risk Assessment Guideline Elements for Violence, developed by the
Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP)
• SARA, 2nd edition – Spousal Assault Risk Assessment Guide
• Violence Assessment Grid by James S. Cawood — addresses intelligence analysis
and various levels of threat
There are two important factors to consider in assessing a threat against a judicial
officer. First, judicial officers and court staff are good sources of significant intelligence
about the suspect. Since virtually every threat emanates from a court case, the subject
can provide important details about the case. Also, court records can be reviewed and
may reveal clues about the issues and motive underlying the threat.
The second factor to bear in mind is that the suspect understands that the court has
the potential to cause him harm. In the suspect’s mind, the threat may be a defensive
reaction prompted by some action by the court. The court may adversely affect the
suspect’s freedom or property. A restraining order can preclude contact with a spouse or
children. Knowing the nature of the suspect’s involvement with the court can shed
important light on the suspect’s motivation.
Investigating the Threat

Once the suspect has been identified and an assessment has been conducted, a
determination needs to be made that the threat is serious enough to warrant further action.
If so, then the next step in the investigation should be an interview with the suspect. This
interview should take place at the suspect's home and be conducted by two trained
investigators. Observing the contents of the house, the demeanor of the suspect, and the
answers given will form the basis of a successful interview. Other occupants of the home
should be observed carefully, not only to glean any possible corroborative factors
regarding the investigation, but also to guard for possible threats to the investigators.
Those conducting the interview must possess enough information about the
suspect, the threat, and the subject to ask pertinent questions and not risk antagonizing the
suspect. During the interview, one of the two investigators should be looking for
troublesome signs within the home. These include the presence of weapons or items

indicating an interest in weapons like gun magazines, hunting or gun competition

trophies, news articles about the subject, and controversial books and writings.
Questions to pursue with the subject and the suspect in the course of the
investigation include the following: What is the suspect’s current employment status?
How are the suspect’s family relationships? Were prior threats made to the subject by the
suspect? Did the suspect pursue or follow the subject? Does the suspect have a history
of violence or a tendency toward emotional outbursts or rage? Is there evidence of prior
mental illness or substance abuse? Does the suspect have possession of weapons? (A
recent purchase of firearms escalates the threat.) Has the subject received any unsolicited
correspondence or phone calls from the suspect? Does the subject believe the threat?
Was the threat made in the presence of others? Is the threat detailed? Does the suspect
have the means to carry it out?
If interviews of the suspect and subject, including answers to the above questions,
raise sufficient red flags, then the following steps should be taken:
• If letters or notes from the suspect to the subject are discovered, these must be
treated as crime scene evidence for possible DNA preservation.
• If a tape-answering device captured the threat, this too must be copied and
preserved.
• A call-trace feature with the phone company should be installed for future
documentation.
• A search warrant of the suspect's home, place of business, and motor vehicles
should be obtained.
o During the search, photos, journals, diaries, and other writings that describe
the suspect's activities should be seized.
o All computers must be taken.
o Fingerprints and handwriting samples must be taken.
o The National Crime Information Center (NCIC) or Targeted Violence
Information Sharing System (TAVISS) must be searched to determine if the
suspect is listed.
o The suspect's photos must be shared with courthouse security and personnel
for use during the investigation.
Managing the Threat

Once the assessment and investigation are complete and a determination is made
that the subject has indeed been placed at material risk by the suspect, then preventive
and/or management measures must be put in place. Responses can range from simply

holding a security briefing with the subject to more aggressive measures such as
providing the subject with a security detail or even incarcerating the suspect.
Additional management strategies may include mental health commitments
through the use of certified professionals. Long-term monitoring of the suspect, while
costly, may be the only method to evaluate the danger he poses. Short-term monitoring is
also part of the "watch and wait" strategy. Use of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
in certain circumstances may be appropriate. When using a TRO, the suspect must be
personally advised of the conditions and consequences of violating the order.
All possible management strategies should be considered in light of the details of
each case. The appropriate strategy is one that best fits the risks identified in the
assessment and investigation. Some cases may only require that a briefing be given to
subjects in order to increase their awareness and allow them to take some basic
precautions. Other cases will require more aggressive strategies, up to and including
incarcerating suspects.
Threat Assessment Training

In every court setting, there should be specifically assigned responsibility for
handling threats, and the threat manager assigned this responsibility should be properly
trained. The National Sheriffs’ Association offers threat management training. The
national chapter of the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP) holds
annual conventions, and many local ATAP chapters host one-day seminars. In addition,
there is a growing library of research, articles, and books on contemporary threat
management.
It is also important to train judicial officers and court staff on how to report
threats. This will help give threat managers accurate information as quickly as possible.
Although judges and senior staff need to be well trained in this regard, in fact the most
likely sources for reporting threats are those on the “front line” such as receptionists,
those working at court transaction counters or answering phones, mail handlers, and
court security officers. These are the people who have the most contact with the public
and are most likely to be aware of threats. Training these types of individuals on

reporting threat information will serve to make such information available in an accurate
and timely fashion.
Communicating with Subjects

The subject of a threat should always be kept informed every time a threat is
received. Communication with the subject should be ongoing throughout the stages of
dealing with a threat. Not only are the judge and the judge’s staff important sources of
information, as indicated above, but ongoing communication will help calm the subject’s
concerns and provide assurance that the threat is taken seriously and that the response is
being well managed.
Incident Tracking
Chapter 6 of this handbook will cover the topic of incident reporting. That topic
interrelates with this topic of threat assessment. On the one hand, incident reports need to
be regularly and systematically analyzed to see if they contain any indication of current
possible threats against judicial officers. On the other hand, once a threat is received, the
name of the suspect should be checked against information in incident reports on file to
see what, if any, problematic behavior the suspect may have displayed in the past. These
interrelationships can be best managed when one or both of the two systems (i.e., threat
assessment and incident reporting) are automated. But even a good index card system
can be helpful in providing the necessary information.
Build Liaisons with Other Agencies

It is important to establish and maintain ongoing contacts with law enforcement
agencies at the local, state, and national level. There is valuable intelligence that these
agencies can provide about those who may pose a risk to judicial officers. Connecting
the dots that may link individuals or incidents together can serve to identify threats in a
more timely fashion and, thereby, minimize the risk that such threats pose. Toward this
end, regular communication and coordination with other agencies can provide vital
assistance to those with responsibility for the safety and security of judicial officers.

Conclusion
Threats made against judicial officers can seriously interfere with the business of
the courts. While such threats cannot be eliminated, they can be effectively identified,
assessed, investigated, and managed. A thorough, all-encompassing process for doing so
can minimize the negative impact that threats have on the judicial system. A solid
process can also potentially save the life of a judge.
References
Calhoun, Frederick S. and Stephen W. Weston. “Defusing the Risk to Judicial Officials:
The Contemporary Threat Management Process.” Alexandria, VA: National Sheriffs`
Association. 2001.
http://www.sheriffs.org/coda/CourtSecurityResources.asp
Cawood, James S. “Enhanced Evidence Assessment and Management,” ASIS Seminar.

November 2007.
Clark, John F. “Protective Investigations Training Program.” U.S. Marshals Service.

August 2008.
Corcoran, Michael H., Ph.D. and James S. Cawood. “Violence Assessment and
Intervention: The Practitioners Handbook.” CRC Press LLC. 2003.
Judicial Council's Committee on Judicial Safety and Preparedness. “Unified Judicial

System of Pennsylvania Court Safety & Security Manual.” Administrative Office of
Pennsylvania Courts. July 2005.
"Protecting Judicial Officials: Implementing Effective Threat Management Process."

Bureau of Justice Assistance Bulletin. U.S. Department of Justice. June 2006.
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/213930.pdf.
Yeschke, Charles L. “The Art of Investigative Interviewing: A Human Approach to

Testimonial Evidence.” Butterworth-Heinemann, an imprint of Elsevier Science. 2003.
For on-line information on the evaluation tools discussed in this chapter, see
HRC http://www.violence-risk.com/hcr20annotated.pdf
Rage V: http://downloads.workplaceviolencenews.com/rage-v.pdf
SARA: http://www.violence-risk.com/risk/instruments.htm
Violence Assessment Grid: http://downloads.workplaceviolencenews.com/rage-v.pdf

Chapter 6: Incident Reporting
Importance of Incident Reporting

A standardized mechanism for reporting security incidents is an extremely
important aspect of a court's security program. As noted in responses to a CCJ/COSCA
Committee on Court Security and Emergency Preparedness 2006 survey on incident
reporting, a well-designed and managed incident reporting system can yield significant
benefits in terms of court security. A good system will not only allow courts to respond
more effectively to each security incident, it will also allow courts to analyze incidents in
the aggregate, providing guidance for making improvements to overall security within the
courthouse.
With respect to specific incidents, a good reporting system will let the appropriate
officials know in a timely manner that a problem has occurred and will also provide
essential information to allow the problem to be properly assessed, investigated, and
handled. Court staff may observe something that appears problematic (for example, a
door to a secure area that is propped open). Without an incident reporting system in
place, this problem may go unreported and uncorrected. More serious and obvious
incidents, such as someone pulling a gun outside a courtroom, will be dealt with even if
there is no incident reporting system in place. But an incident reporting system will
provide the information to respond to all incidents properly, whether obvious or subtle. It
will provide information to enable authorities to investigate, apprehend, and convict
perpetrators.
In the aggregate, data gathered from all security incidents over a span of time can
provide invaluable information to those who have responsibility for courthouse security.
This information can be periodically analyzed to identify patterns of conduct that reveal
problematic security issues and vulnerabilities. Analyzing such information can provide
decision-makers with a good basis for making informed decisions about overall
improvements needed in courthouse security, for example, improving compliance and
attitudes about the importance of court security. This analysis can also inform decisions
about the allocation of existing resources for security and can be used to obtain additional
funding to support the court’s security needs.

Because of its intrinsic value and importance, an incident reporting mechanism is

either mandated or strongly recommended in various state court security manuals or court
directives. (For examples, see the manuals of Arizona, Arkansas, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin.) The value of an incident reporting system at the
state and local levels would be immeasurably enhanced by the amalgamation of incident
information at the national level. A national security summit, sponsored by the National
Center for State Courts in 2005, acknowledged the importance of incident reporting in the
context of a national database.
Two caveats are in order. First, an incident reporting program is no substitute for
the need to report an incident to law enforcement promptly and directly. As
circumstances dictate, law enforcement should be notified immediately about an incident,
even before a report is prepared. Second, a security incident reporting program should
not be confused with risk assessment. A security incident report is intended as prompt
documentation of specifics of a security incident; its purpose is simply to create a record.
Threat assessment, on the other hand, is a mechanism for protective intelligence. Threat
assessment is a process of gathering and assessing information about individuals who
may have the interest, motive, intention, and capability of harming persons or property at
the courthouse. Threat assessments focus on vulnerability and interventions in order to
manage the risks of targeted violence. Threat assessments require the organizational
capacity to conduct sophisticated and systematic investigations.
Establishing an Incident Reporting System

A good incident reporting system begins with a good standardized form. Many
states employ a paper process: the paper form is completed, perhaps reviewed, and then
transmitted for filing and/or electronic input. Other states, such as Pennsylvania, have
initiated an electronic process for the completion and transmittal of the incident report.
The automated approach provides for greater speed in reporting and responding to
incidents; and it facilitates creation of an easily searchable database of bulk information.
In addition, such database information can also be easily and quickly shared among
authorized users. But a court should not wait until an electronic system is established

before installing some level of incident reporting. It is more important to begin with a
manual, hardcopy system rather than wait.
The standardized incident reporting form should be user-friendly to assist the
preparer in promptly providing essential information with relatively little effort. A check
box or checklist format can substantially simplify the process. As noted in NCSC's 2005
Security Summits I and II reports, it is advisable to identify only those pieces of
information that are necessary. The tendency to collect too much information about an
incident will often reduce "user friendliness" of a form and will create reluctance to use
the form, which can result in the collection of only minimal information regarding
incidents.
In the case of a bomb threat, for example, it is useful to have a specific format
available at the desk of every staff person who receives phone calls from the public. (See
Reference/Resources at the end of Chapter 3.) The form will serve to carefully guide the
staff person into recording as much relevant and helpful information about the threat as
possible.
There seem to be two schools of thought about verification and review of incident
information. One approach is to have an eyewitness to an event promptly and
independently fill out an incident report form and transmit it to a designated court
administrator or law enforcement agent for inclusion in the paper-based repository or
electronic database. In such circumstances, the form will be referred to the proper
security official for follow-up, but there will be no official approval or editing of the
form. This approach is based on the belief that it is better to capture more information
quickly and directly from the person who witnessed the security event.
On the other hand, there are those who believe a security incident reporting form
should be subject to oversight or approval before the information is officially transmitted
for inclusion in the database and/or forwarded to a responsible official for follow-up.
Upon receipt, the supervisor would review the document as soon as possible and, where
necessary, follow up with the sender to offer assistance and ascertain that the information
provided is understood and that no significant details have been omitted. This approach
is based on the belief that it is better to restrict incident reporting to those persons who
have received appropriate training regarding what incidents and related information

should be entered into the database. Proponents also contend that this approach promotes
greater accuracy and consistency.
Regardless of the specific approach that is chosen, it is recommended that a
trained court security officer or law enforcement supervisor should always be involved in
any incident worth reporting to make sure information is documented and saved
correctly.
There should also be a clear policy about who has access to the security incident
reports and whether they will contain any personal identifiers. Given the sensitive nature
of the information and its relevance to law enforcement, restricted access is advised.
Timely transmission of the reports is important. There should be a specified time
from the occurrence and reporting of the incident to the completion and submission of an
incident report. Also, recipients of the reports should be clearly identified. Appropriate
recipients may include court administration (state and local), the local or state security
committee, facility management, and law enforcement.
During the NCSC Security Summits I and II, there was discussion about the
importance of providing feedback to the person who gave information about a security
incident. Such feedback could include an acknowledgment that the information was
received and how the security matter was addressed. New Jersey, for example,
institutionalized an "acknowledgment and determination" process in its security incident
reporting system. Also, in Pennsylvania, once a report is received, security staff will
contact the individual who processes the report and determine if any assistance is needed.
All users of the incident form need instruction on the importance and mechanics
of reporting. Although a user-friendly form can be substantially self-explanatory,
assistance can promote the form's effectiveness. Pennsylvania, for example, provides
court staff with an explanatory preface to the state’s security manual's section on incident
reporting, which contains a list of illustrative scenarios highlighting the nature of a
reportable security incident. Educational security programs could include a segment on
how to report a security incident. Training is especially important if reporting is done
electronically.
In designing and implementing a security incident reporting process, it is
important to invite and receive feedback from those with special interests and insight.

Collaboration with law enforcement, security management and prospective users is

advisable. Several respondents to a 2005 survey suggested that an incident-reporting
mechanism should be pilot-tested to assess potential problems or weaknesses.
Pennsylvania, for example, conducted a trial run of its automated form with several
counties before it was implemented statewide.
A security incident reporting form is intended to capture essential information for
prompt transmission to management. Because of the important but limited use of the
form, some states have created supplemental forms to serve distinct purposes. For
example, special forms have been designed to guide a recipient in obtaining essential
information in the event of a threat. (For example, see forms from New Mexico,
"telephone threat form," and Wisconsin, "threat/security incident report.") Courts can
also design daily summary logs regarding the confiscation of weapons and contraband at
security control posts. This information can be especially helpful to document security
needs and support funding requests. See Appendix E for Pennsylvania’s Security
Incident Fact Sheet.
The success of a security incident reporting system ultimately depends on
compliance. Leadership again plays an important role. Court management (e.g.,
presiding judge, court administrators, security management, and departmental
supervisors) should stress the importance of this security initiative, exercise oversight,
and consider appropriate incentives and enforcement mechanisms to maximize
compliance. All levels of the judiciary should comply with security reporting
requirements. If management does not view incident reporting as a serious endeavor,
others will do the same.
Defining a Reportable Incident

The scope and clarity of definition will often determine a security incident
reporting system's effectiveness. A "reportable incident" must be clear in both concept
and application. A review of two very good report forms (from New Jersey and
Pennsylvania) suggests that a relatively simple concept of a reportable incident can serve
as a reliable springboard for a more detailed yet effective and user-friendly form. A
reportable incident could be constructed on the following definitional foundation:

• Acts of violence (attempted or actual) to persons or property of the court system,

to include, for example, assault, vandalism/damage to property, theft, disorderly
conduct, and arson
• Threats of violence (oral or written), to include, for example, oral threat, written
threat, bomb threat, mail threat, phone threat, or intimidation (e.g., stalking)
• Security implications (acts that have an actual or potential impact on the safety
of court personnel, the public, and the court's operations and facilities), for
example, escape from custody, emergencies, contamination exposure, explosion,
fire, weather, medical, suspicious activity, security breach, or security equipment
malfunction
Pennsylvania's electronic-based form, for example, guides the user through a

series of easy-to-identify categories with drop-down boxes in an attempt to identify with
specificity the details of a court security incident.
Many states have incident reporting forms that are not structured to pre-identify
the factual essentials of an incident; such forms defer to a generalized narrative summary
of the event. This approach presents particular downsides: accuracy and completeness of
information may be compromised, and ad hoc, non-structured reporting seriously
complicates the ability to compile and analyze critically important information. A
standardized reporting form avoids such deficiencies.
In comparing two structured and detailed forms from New Jersey and
Pennsylvania, one can identify the following as recommended components of an incident
report form:
1. Date of incident
2. Time of incident
3. General location of incident
4. Area of facility where incident occurred
5. Specific court division or unit in which incident occurred (e.g., civil, family, etc.)
6. Connection with particular proceeding (caption, court term, and number)
7. Type of incident (e.g., act of violence, threat of violence, security implication)
8. Weapon involved (used or displayed)
9. Contraband
10. Extent of injuries and/or property damage
11. Identification of who was involved in incident
12. Action taken/resolution
13. Brief description of incident/summary of facts
14. Identification of preparer's name and position, including signature
15. Date of report
16. Identification of supervisor (if review or approval is required)

Finally, there is an ongoing effort by the NCSC and others to create a model
standardized incident reporting form that will be used by all state courts. Such a model
form would facilitate and improve statistical reporting on security nationwide.
Note: Incident reporting forms for Pennsylvania and New Jersey Administrative Office
of Courts are available on their Web sites or by contacting the states’ judicial department
directors of court security.

Chapter 7: Funding for Court Security

Court security is a distinct and essential part of court operations. Security helps
guaranty access to the courts. For budget purposes, courts need to include the cost of
security as a necessary operational expense. When facing difficult economic times,
budgetary support for court security at the state and local level will necessarily be
incremental. Some essential components of court security, such as the creation of a
security committee and the development of policies and procedures, require little or no
cost. However, as indicated in other chapters of this handbook, equipment and law
enforcement personnel required for court security can be expensive.
Sustained communication and alliances with other interested stakeholders can be
of great use in funding court security. This notion is discussed in Chapter 8 of this
handbook. Adequate funding remains a challenge. While some assistance may
eventually come from the federal level, court security ultimately remains a state and local
responsibility as well as a potential liability.
Federal Funding for Court Security

At this time, there appears to be little in the way of direct federal funding for state
courts. State and local courts have been unable to apply directly for resources. In most
cases, those federal funds that are available flow from the Department of Justice or
Department of Homeland Security and are dispersed to the states. On the state level, an
administrative agency or official then can disperse the funds. Unfortunately, this often
creates competition between the executive and judicial branches for funding.14 There
have been attempts to lobby Congress to allow state courts to apply for the federal funds
directly. To date, these efforts have not been successful.
Nevertheless, organizations such as the Conference of State Court Administrators
(COSCA) have continued to lobby Congress for funding for court security issues. Chief
Judge Robert Bell, in his position as president of the Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ),
spoke to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security and urged the members to create a new federal grant program specifically
14
Casey, Pamela. A National Strategic Plan for Judicial Branch Security. p. 8 (2006).

targeted to assess and enhance state court security, ensure that state and local courts are
eligible to apply directly for discretionary federal funding, and ensure that state courts are
included in the planning for disbursement of federal funding administered by state
executive agencies.15
Mary McQueen, president of the National Center for State Courts, testified to a
House committee on the importance of a Threat Assessment Database and a mechanism
to ensure uniform collection of data and data-sharing among states. She also asked the
committee to consider funding for the NICS Improvement Act, which would provide
grants to state and local courts in reporting mandatory data to the National Instant
Criminal Background Check System (NICS).16 Although the House did not include the
requested funding, its report accompanying the bill urged the Department of Justices’
Bureau of Justice Assistance to devote resources to the problem of courthouse violence.
State Funding for Court Security

Funding for security measures in the state and local courts is generally provided
by several methods: court fees and assessments, direct appropriation by the legislature,
and — in some cases — donations by interested parties. Court security funding can
either be under direct control of a court or the control of others.17 These “others” who
provide grants to courts may be the state supreme court or the state court administrator’s
office.
One issue regarding court security funding is that it is often looked upon as a
budget line from which money can be taken should a state’s fiscal situation worsen. In
two instances below, there are efforts to take monies from the court security fund (for
unspecified reasons). California has recommended creating a court security budget line
item and requiring that allocations be used only for security efforts and the unused funds
be allowed to roll over to the next year.18
15
Bell, Robert W. Written Testimony on Improving Security of Our State Courts. 7 (2007).
16
Testimony by Mary McQueen to the House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce,
Justice, Science, and Related Agencies. April 2, 2009.
17
Raftery, William. Gavel to Gavel. February 15, 2007.
18
Judicial Council of California. Recommendations on Trial Court Security Funding Standards and
Methodology. p. 3.

A LEXIS search of all state codes, state constitutions, court rules, Advanced
Legislative Service (ALS), and legal periodicals reveals how the following states fund
their court security efforts:
Arkansas
Arkansas has created a central fund for court security, which is distributed by the
Administrative Office of the Courts.19
California
California assesses a $20 fee for any criminal conviction, which is disbursed into
the security fund for state courts.
Colorado
Colorado created a court security cash fund commission and assesses a $5 fee on
most civil actions, criminal convictions, probate filings, and traffic infractions.20
Note: There have been attempts to divert monies from this fund to the general
fund for unspecified reasons.21
Delaware
Delaware imposes court assessment fees of up to $10 on civil filings and each
criminal, traffic, or delinquency charge where there is a conviction or finding of
delinquency or responsibility.22 These monies are then deposited in a court
security fund and maintained separately from the general fund.
Illinois
Illinois allows jurisdictions to impose a court services fee for civil actions and in
convictions of criminal, local or county ordinance, traffic, and conservation
cases.23
Maine
Maine created a courthouse security fund under Supreme Judicial Court control. It
consists of all money appropriated or allocated for inclusion in the fund from
whatever the source.24
Mississippi
Mississippi has created a state court security systems fund, and monies deposited
into the fund are used by the Administrative Office of the Courts for court
security.25
19
For the coming year, $361,043.00 has been appropriated; 2009 Ark. ALS 1499.
20
C.R.S. 13-1-201 (2008); C.R.S. 13-1-204 (2008).
21
2009 Colo. SB 208; 2009 Colo. SB 279.
22
10 Del. C. § 8505 (2009).
23
55 ILCS 5/5-1103 (2009).
24
4 M.R.S. § 58 (2008).
25
Miss. Code Ann. § 37-26-9 (2008).

Montana
Montana courts apparently receive funding from the legislature. Chief Justice
Mike McGrath reported that recently $300,000 was appropriated for courtrooms
in Montana.26
Nevada
There is proposed legislation in Nevada allowing a filing fee of not more than $20
to be assessed for court security efforts.27
New Mexico
County commissioners are responsible for court security.28
Oklahoma
Oklahoma assesses a courthouse security fee of $10 for criminal actions.29
Oregon
Oregon’s counties maintain a court security account for providing security
services.30 Courts’ fees are assessed in a range of $3 - $7.31
Note: There has been an attempt to divert funds from the State Courts Facilities
Security Account to the general fund for some unspecified reason.32
Pennsylvania
Since 2004, Pennsylvania has dedicated a separate line item in the state’s judicial
budget to support court security (programs, equipment, services, and training).
Tennessee
Tennessee assesses a $2 fee on criminal cases to be deposited into the county
general fund for courtroom security.33
26
34 Montana Lawyer 18 (November 2008).
27
2009 Nev. ALS 443.
28
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 4-41-16 (2008).
29
28 O.S. § 153(E).
30
ORS § 1.182 (2007).
31
ORS § 137.309 (2007).
32
2009 Ore. SB 581.
33
Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-21-401 (2009).

Texas
Texas assesses a court fee of from $3 to $5, depending on the criminal offense,
for court security purposes.34 The county commissioners can authorize civil filing
fees of from $1 to $5 ($20 in Webb County) for court security purposes.35
Utah
Utah has created a restricted account within the general fund known as the Court
Security Account.36 A security surcharge of $25 is assessed in all courts of record
on all criminal convictions and juvenile delinquency judgments.37 In addition to
any fine, penalty, forfeiture, or other surcharge, a security surcharge of $32 shall
be assessed on all convictions for offenses listed in the uniform bail schedule
adopted by the Judicial Council, and moving traffic violations, of which 25
percent of that amount is to be deposited into the Court Security Account.38 The
Court Security Account also gets $15 of civil filing fees.39
Note: A Recent Utah House bill is trying to increase the fee amount.40
Virginia
Any county or city, through its governing body, may assess a sum not in excess of
$10 as part of the costs in each criminal or traffic case in its district or circuit
court in which the defendant is convicted of a violation of any statute or
ordinance.41
West Virginia
West Virginia has created a special revenue fund known as the Court Security
Fund, within the Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety, which is
chaired, by statute, by the supreme court administrator. The Court Security Fund
may receive any gifts, grants, contributions, or other money from any source that
is specifically designated for deposit in the fund.42 West Virginia assesses $5 on
each civil filing fee to be deposited in the Court Security Fund43 and $5 on each
criminal case.44
34
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 102.017 (2009).
35
Tex. Gov't Code § 101.0615 (2007).
36
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-602 (2008).
37
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-601 (2008).
38
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-601 (2008).
39
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-301 (2008).
40
2009 Ut. HB 455.
41
Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-120 (2009).
42
W. Va. Code § 51-3-14 (2008).
43
W. Va. Code § 50-3-1 (2008).
44
W. Va. Code § 50-3-2 (2008).

For states not listed above, general court security funding is part of the general judicial
appropriation by the legislature. In New York, for example, funds for court security are
allocated in the proposed annual judiciary budget request.45
Donations by Interested Parties

In a few cases, courts have received funding from interested parties. A 1997
survey by the American Judges Association (AJA) listed bar associations as an unusual
source of funding.46 Kansas courts have received monies from the Kansas Highway
Patrol to enhance physical security.47
Recent Attempts at Funding

Montana
SB 191 – Would provide funding for court security, sponsored by Sen. Larry Jent
(D), an attorney from Bozeman: This bill would require all courts of original
jurisdiction to impose a user surcharge in criminal, civil, and probate cases. The
surcharge must then be used by local governments for the payment of costs for
court security needs. The bill was indefinitely postponed on the Senate floor and
is probably dead.
http://data.opi.mt.gov/bills/2009/billpdf/SB0191.pdf
References
Pines, Zygmont. “Prudent Risk Management: A Court Administrator’s View.” Justice

System Journal. p. 58-61. 2007.
45
New York State Unified Court System. “The Task Force on Court Security: Report to the Chief Judge
and Chief Administrative Judge. ” p. 4 (2005).
46
American Judges Association, Court Security Survey Report. 1997. Available at
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/Old%20Website/Ctsecurity.html
47
From chart in National Summit on Court Safety and Security Follow-Up Meeting Participant Book
(2005).

Chapter 8: Security Equipment and Costs

Availability and cost of security technology and equipment – essential court
security tools – are major considerations for those responsible for ensuring a safe, secure
court environment. Having the necessary security equipment with appropriate state-of-
the-art technology, along with the training necessary to operate that equipment, will serve
the court family and the public well by minimizing opportunities for violence. This
chapter describes the essential technology and equipment needed in the provision of basic
court security. It also provides general information on costs. It is important to note that
the price of equipment will change over time and is subject to state bids and the selection
of vendors. For example, costs will ultimately depend in most cases on the bid awards
that court systems are able to make in response to requests for proposals (RFPs). It is
important to note that the Committee does not endorse or recommend the purchase of any
specific court security or emergency preparedness technology or equipment by specific
vendors. State judicial departments are encouraged to contact their authorized purchasing
department or agent.
Access Control: Hand Wand, Magnetometer, and X-ray Machine

Access control is the essential first step in providing a safe environment for the
courthouse. The major objective of access control is to prevent people from bringing
weapons into the building. A weapon is considered any device that could be used to
harm another; this includes anything from a gun to a knife to a knitting needle. The
security equipment used at the screening station at the entrance to the courthouse
provides the first line of defense in the effort to prevent the introduction of weapons into
the courthouse.
The most basic screening device required is a handheld metal detector (also
referred to as a hand wand), which is used to scan a person, a handbag, and/or briefcase
to detect concealed metal. Often this hand wand is used in conjunction with a walk-
through metal detector. Most handheld devices sold today are self-calibrating, meaning
that they automatically adjust the sensitivity level when in use. These hand wands are
durable and rugged enough to be dropped and still perform efficiently. No special tools

are required to operate this device, and the convenient simplicity provides for easy
operation. The hand wand has become a vital tool in successful screening processes at
courthouse entrances around the country. The cost of a handheld metal detector is about
$150 to $300 for the most popular brands. These battery-operated units typically have a
long life and in most cases come with a full two-year warranty.
The next basic piece of equipment in access screening is a walk-through metal
detector known as a magnetometer. Magnetometers fall into two categories: single-zone
detection and multi-zone detection. When a person walks through a magnetometer with a
concealed weapon located at his ankle, both the single- and multi-zone magnetometers
will detect the weapon. The difference between the two is that the multi-zone detector
will pinpoint the location of the weapon on either the individual’s left or right side. More
advanced multi-zone detectors will also pinpoint the specific location from head to toe.
Pinpointing the location of the weapon quickly is important so that court security officers
can respond swiftly. When scanning a large volume of individuals, a multi-zone
magnetometer will facilitate processing the public through the screening station more
quickly.
Modern walk-through magnetometers are easy to set up and operate. Most units
come with a detailed manual and instructions. Digital electronics are easily adjusted
through a touch pad and LCD display. The magnetometers come with factory preset
programs, but they can also be adjusted for specific locations or for the type of object
screening officers are trying to detect. Based on the level of sensitivity selected, the
detector can be adjusted to locate various targets.
Controlling the flow of traffic is an important consideration when setting up
magnetometers in screening stations. It is a good idea to have a basket or tray next to the
magnetometer where individuals can place metal objects, because it is important that
watches, coins, keys, and other large metal objects are removed before walking through
the detector. The better organized the screening station is, the better the through-put will
be.
The cost of walk-through magnetometers for court operations varies from a low of
$2,000 up to $12,000 or more for the most advanced models. It is important to note that
buying in bulk can save a significant amount of money when acquiring magnetometers.

Courthouse screening stations should also be equipped with x-ray machines in

order to detect weapons and explosives in a non-intrusive way. The machine consists of
a generator that sends x-ray beams or radiation into the object being screened. These x-
ray beams are passed through a processor, creating an image on a computer screen. The
court security officer assigned to the computer reviews the images and, with proper
training, will be able to identify dangerous objects entering the courthouse. The x-ray
machine should be inspected annually and tested for leakage. Note that the radiation
from one of these machines is low in dosage and safe to be near. The median cost of a
standard x-ray screening machine for a courthouse is approximately $32,000. Again,
bulk purchasing will have a dramatic effect on pricing.
There is new technology in x-ray machines, but it comes with some controversy.
This new technology is called a backscatter x-ray scanner. In contrast to the traditional x-
ray machine which detects hard and soft materials by the variation in transmission
through the target, backscatter x-ray detects the radiation that comes back from the target.
It has potential applications in almost every situation in which non-destructive
examination is required, but only one side is available for examination. One application
currently under testing is a security scan of airline passengers. The technology has been
proposed as an alternative to personal searches at airports and other security checkpoints,
since it can easily penetrate clothing and reveal concealed weapons. However, it raises
privacy concerns in that it appears to screeners essentially as a nude picture of the
subject, and it may allow screeners access to otherwise confidential medical information.
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Electronic Privacy
Information Center are opposed to this use of the backscatter technology. The ACLU
refers to backscatter x-rays as a "virtual strip search." The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) announced in a November 2007 press release that to date, 79
percent of the public has opted to try backscatter over the traditional pat-down in
secondary screening. The TSA began using backscatter x-rays in February 2007.
Duress Alarms
Duress or panic alarms are essential components of any effective court security
program. A duress alarm button may be portable or may be mounted in a strategically

pre-determined location such as a judge’s bench, chambers, or a public transaction

counter. In a duress situation, the judge or staff member depresses a hidden button,
sending a silent, remote signal for help to emergency responders. A duress alarm system
should alert court security officers or local police to the location of the area needing
assistance. It is the primary technology used in courthouses across the country today to
alert first responders.
There are two basic types of duress alarm systems on the market today. The first
is the hard-wired alarm that has a permanent mount under a desk or counter. The other,
newer type is the wireless system that runs through a radio frequency. This system alerts
pagers and two-way radios used by security officers that an alarm has been activated. A
new system uses a GPS satellite to locate the activated duress alarm. New technology is
constantly improving this type of system.
The hard-wired duress alarm system has some weaknesses that need to be
considered. If the duress alarm is tied to a busy server on the computer mainframe, a
delay could result. The security department must test the system frequently by activating
each alarm to be sure it is working properly. Another problem is that the duress alarm
can be activated inadvertently, causing a false alarm situation. The more this happens,
the less likely an alarm will be treated as a genuine emergency in the future.
Costs of duress alarm systems vary depending on several factors, including size of
the courthouse (or multiple courthouses) tied into the system and how many buttons need
to be wired to the control panel. A large courthouse could be wired for approximately
$10,000, including the control panel and enough duress alarms for courtrooms, chambers,
and public counters. A panel can cost $1,000, and each emergency button costs
approximately $200. A competitive bidding process (RFP) is advised to receive the best
system at the best price.

Closed-Circuit Television System

No court security program would be complete without an integrated closed-circuit
television (CCTV) system with digital recording capabilities and a security control room
monitoring the cameras throughout the courthouse. A CCTV system is the strategic
placement of video cameras that send images to monitors and recording devices for
viewing and later recall. A CCTV system should be installed in a courthouse setting to
monitor areas within the court as well as surrounding areas that may be trouble spots.
These cameras act as a deterrent to crime, and the images produced can be used as
evidence when reconstructing an incident or crime on the premises. CCTV systems have
come a long way in a few short years, going from black-and-white, fixed-position
images, to full-color, tilt/pan/zoom capabilities. These new systems can recall video
from archived digital files, providing the opportunity to “go back in time.” A digital
video recorder (DVR), as part of an integrated CCTV system, will provide 14days of
high-resolution recording. This gives authorities time to compile evidence for a criminal
charge, if necessary.
Determining the cost of a CCTV system for a courthouse or court complex can be
quite detailed. Electrical wiring and necessary components to a compatible control room
can be very expensive indeed. The equipment is only part of the overall expense.
Including top of the line tilt/pan/zoom color cameras with mounting equipment,
multiplexers, and monitors, a set of 16units will cost between $20,000 and $30,000,
excluding labor costs. In all cases, a detailed RFP should be issued with no less than three
reputable quotes from established vendors with impeccable security credentials for their
companies and their individual employees.
Intrusion Alarm System

An intrusion alarm system consists of panels, signaling components, and sensors
that can detect the following: unauthorized movements, forced opening of doors and
windows, breaking glass, smoke, fire, and leakage of water or chemicals. A breach in
courthouse security can happen anytime — day or night. Installation of an intrusion
alarm system creates a much safer environment. The system’s brain is the control panel,

ideally located at a security command and control center. Various kinds of sensors are
connected to the control panel from locations around the court perimeter.
There are alarm sensors for two basic types of protection: perimeter and interior.
Perimeter protection sensors are located at the vulnerable entry points of the court such as
doors and accessible windows. These perimeter protection sensors include magnetic
contacts and glass break sensors. Interior sensors detect motion inside the courthouse.
One example is the passive infrared detector (PIR), which detects motion through body
heat. Smoke and fire detectors are other types of interior protection, usually located high
on inside walls or ceilings.
When a sensor reports a signal to the control panel, it analyzes the report to
determine which sensor is reporting and whether the problem is an intruder, fire, or an
emergency of some other kind. After this quick analysis, the control panel can sound an
alarm or siren alerting security officers that a problem has occurred. The unit can
activate lights and can alert a 24-hour monitoring service, which can then verify the
alarm and dispatch police, fire, or medical help, as necessary. Typically, the monitoring
service is notified by a digital message sent over regular telephone lines.
Determining the project cost for a complete integrated intrusion alarm system for
a courthouse or court complex can be a challenge, but it is well worth the effort for a
good security program. Costs will encompass all the components, from the control panel
to each sensor or detector at entry points as well as the electrical wiring necessary to
bring everything together in a comprehensive security command and control center for
monitoring. As with every major purchase, the quality of the equipment and the volume
of work required to complete the system should be put into an RFP for qualified vendors.
Access Cards
The next process in enhancing courthouse security is the purchase of a
computerized, identification-card access control system. A card access system is vital to
providing a secure courthouse for judges, staff, and the public. Restricting access to the
courthouse at specific entry points to authorized people only is the purpose of this
technology. A well-managed card access system will virtually eliminate the need for
keys, which can be lost, stolen, or copied. Keypad systems are less effective because

employees forget the combination or pass it on to someone else, causing a security

breach. One of the major benefits of the computerized card system is that the software
tracks time and entry points of users, leaving a record for later review.
The card access control system has three main components: the access card itself,
a proximity reader and locking mechanism for entry points, and the computer system
software. Using the access card provides several benefits, most notably access levels.
This means that the administrator controls who can go through what door at what time.
Some courts use the services of outside contractors where this feature would enhance
court security. Another benefit is that an access card can be instantly turned off or on,
immediately providing or denying access.
To determine the cost of a complete system, it is necessary to identify how many
doors, garage openings, and parking gates need to be included. The cost of a complete
system includes a full accounting of all doors, garage openings, and parking gates that
must be included in the system. Costs are affected by the number of employees and
visitors who require access cards on a daily basis, the manner in which the system is
managed, the process by which cards are issued, decisions about who will monitor
access, and other local needs. A comprehensive integrated access control system median
price is estimated at $2,500 per access point, not including cards or installation. Again,
many quality providers for this service exist, and an RFP with a minimum of three
vendors is recommended.
Command and Control Center

The command and control concept is about understanding what is happening, at
any given time, anywhere in the courthouse. When designed to work with the specific
needs of command and control operations, an integrated electronic security system
becomes a valuable component that integrates diverse and disparate security equipment
and relieves operational burdens from personnel. A single cohesive security network
enables information to be retrieved, decisions to be made, and the investment to be
leveraged to the fullest. A well-constructed and well-staffed control center will serve to
meet daily operational challenges necessary for a safe working environment in the
courthouse.

The security command and control center for court operations provides a central
hub, usually a room on site dedicated to this security function, where the electronic
systems described above are monitored. Information gathered there can be used to
handle many challenges that a court faces, including fires, vandalism, burglary, robbery,
loitering, high-profile trials, inclement weather events, and power outages. Rather than
providing bits and pieces of information, electronic security can be designed to provide a
total picture within the court facility.
In order to get the most from a security system, it needs to be used properly. A
comprehensive and ongoing training program is fundamental to meeting this challenge.
Other Security Equipment

There are other equipment components to a comprehensive court security
program that are worthy of consideration. Examples of these items include
• Security lighting and fencing. The use of high-intensity sodium lights can be a
very cost-effective security measure. There should be sufficient lighting around
the perimeter of court buildings and in parking lots in order to avoid shadows and
allow for CCTV cameras to capture images. Fencing should be of sufficiently
strong material, appropriate in height, and angled outward at the top to minimize
the risk of someone climbing over the fence.
• Protective barriers for public counters. These should be made of Plexiglass™-
type material or shatter-resistant glass. The bottom of the glass should be no
higher than 24 inches above the countertop.
• Bollards to prevent vehicle entry crashes. Bollards must be able to stop a
4,000-pound vehicle at 30 mph. They should consist of eight-inch diameter,
stainless-steel pipe core, with 4,000 ksi concrete fill. They should have a
minimum height above and below grade of three feet and provide 20-inch cross
dowels that protrude a minimum of six inches on either side of the bollard.
Maximum spacing between bollards is four feet, center to center.
• Ballistic material for judges’ benches. Opaque, ballistic-resistant material that
meets UL Standard 752 Level III should be installed behind the vertical surfaces
on the three sides of the bench visible to the public.
All of the equipment discussed in this chapter is intended to protect people and
property, while at the same time provide public access to an open judiciary. This balance
is not easy to maintain. A security industry resource for equipment and related costs is
the Security Industry Buyers Guide, which is published annually and available online at
www.sibgonline.com. It is the most current, comprehensive database of security

products and services in the industry. Comprising more than 3,000 manufacturers and
suppliers of security products and services, the SIBG fully categorizes the available
resources of the security industry from the most elemental tools to its most advanced
technology.
References
American Society for Industrial Security
<http://www.asisoline.org/>.
Guidelines for Implementing Best Practices in Court Building Security -

Costs, Priorities, Funding Strategies, and Accountability: A Paper by the National Center
for State Courts. Funded by the State Justice Institute, Grant Number SJI-09-P-125

Chapter 9: Resources/Partnerships
While in the final analysis courts may have ultimate responsibility for courthouse
security, it is a responsibility that cannot be successfully discharged by courts alone.
Courts on their own do not have the capacity or resources to address their own security
needs fully. Cooperation and coordination with a host of other organizations are
imperative. Other organizations have a shared interest in courthouse security, or they
have the capacity to provide resources to help make courts more secure, or they have
both.
According to Zygmont Pines, state court administrator for Pennsylvania and co-
chair of the CCJ/COSCA Committee on Court Security, “We need to build a culture of
collaboration that will create a mutually supportive network of information and
assistance. From my vantage point, collaboration needs to take place on many levels.”
• Local – within the facility itself, with broadly representative standing committees
on security and with law enforcement, executive, and legislative leaders
• Regional – with colleagues and partners who can provide guidance on common
issues or support in the event of a debilitating incident
• State – with court leadership, executive-level committees on security and disaster
planning, the legislature, and state police
• National – with the Department of Homeland Security, Congress, and various
associations and organizations such as the National Sheriffs' Association and
Partners for Collaboration

The following are key entities courts should look to for assistance and cooperation
in the daunting and vital challenge of making court buildings as secure as they can
possibly be.
U.S. Marshals Service

In fiscal year 2008, the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) established a National
Center for Judicial Security (NCJS) that is operated, staffed, and managed by employees
and contractor staff of the USMS Judicial Security Division. The NCJS provides
educational, operational, and technical functions that are designed to serve various needs
of a national, and in some cases, an international constituency. The NCJS also provides a

wide range of support and services to municipal, city, county, state, federal, and
international jurisdictions related to the security operations of their respective court
systems and protection of members of the judiciary and extended court family.
The National Center for Judicial Security Fellowship Program (NCJSFP) is
designed to afford a professional opportunity to state, local, and international court
security managers to train and serve with USMS counterparts in all facets of the USMS
program and experience high-level executive protection and security operations in the
Fortune 1000 private sector. The Judicial Security Fellow will participate in joint
training with court administrators at the National Center for State Courts in
Williamsburg, Virginia, in areas such as coordination of public and media relations in
high-visibility trials, coordinated approaches to policy and procedures implementation,
consolidated training for clerical staff in security awareness and response procedures, and
working with the judiciary.
National Sheriffs’ Association – Court Officers Association

The National Sheriffs’ Association is dedicated to court security training and has
long provided education for maintaining courthouse security and guarding the courthouse
workgroup, citizens, and users of the judicial system. Some of the training provides an
introduction to contemporary concepts and law enforcement strategies related to
courthouse and courtroom security. Topics include understanding the need for
vulnerability assessment, knowing current courtroom security standards of practice,
understanding the need for professional awareness, understanding the basic dynamics and
operations needed in planning a high-risk/high-profile trial, and understanding the basic
need for advanced planning for emergency events.
Local Police/Sheriffs/Security Personnel

Local police and sheriffs should be part of any court security efforts. It is
essential that those involved in court security reach out beyond the courthouse and
maintain contact with other security and law enforcement personnel to gather information
and assess threats to court security. Information from various resources can be pieced
together and often reveal relationships and behaviors of subjects who may be of concern

to courts. For example, after September 11, 2001, the New York judiciary worked with
various partners to assist families and provide court-related information to the public. It
also designated one or more officials to work full-time at the New York City Office of
Emergency Management and with the New York City Court — Terrorism Task Force. In
some states, the need for additional personnel is recognized by state law. For example,
Kentucky provides for compensation of local police when used for court security.
Local Government Officials

Quite often, courts are left out of plans for security and emergency preparedness
although they will typically play a major role when events take place. The chief justice
and state court administrator can stress the importance of the courts to local government
officials and leaders to ensure courts are included in any emergency or security plan.
Since in many jurisdictions local government officials may be responsible for funding the
courts and related security measures, it is essential that a close working relationship be
established.
Local Bar Associations

The local bar association is often a good resource for court security. As with
judges and the public, it is important that the local bar be aware of and on board with
court security. In many cases, members of the bar can provide lobbying efforts for court
security measures. One example of local bar association cooperation is the Allegheny
Bar Association, which has raised funds and created a political action group to lobby
lawmakers for issues of importance to the bar. Among the priorities is supporting the
continued funding of the Allegheny County (Pennsylvania) Court of Common Pleas,
which will enable Allegheny County to improve court facilities and provide adequate
security for judges, court support staff, attorneys, and the general public.

Example of Collaboration – Department of Homeland Security

The Web site “Lessons Learned Information Sharing” (www.LLIS.gov) is the
national network of lessons learned, best practices, innovative ideas, and preparedness
information for homeland security and emergency response professionals. By facilitating
the sharing of knowledge, LLIS.gov enhances the nation's ability to prepare for and
respond to terrorism, natural disasters, and other incidents. The Web site is not only a
repository for information but also a network that enables homeland security and
emergency response professionals from across the country to share knowledge and
expertise in a secure, online environment.
Positioning Courts to Facilitate Collaboration

In order to be well-positioned to reach out to potential security partners
effectively, court leadership should take care to make sure that the court itself has its
security responsibilities properly organized. Key to this is to have one or more court
security committees.
Ideally, a court security committee should be chaired by the presiding judge and
consist of stakeholders with an interest in or responsibility for court building security.
Such stakeholders could include representatives of the following: other judges in the
court system, court administration, court security department, local law enforcement
(e.g., sheriff, police department), the county administration, the district attorney’s office,
the bar, and the public.
The committee should meet regularly and encourage candid discussion of security
concerns among its members. Subcommittees can be established to study and assess
various areas of court security and report back to the committee. Examples of such issues
assigned to subcommittees might include policies and procedures, access control,
prisoner transport, facilities, funding, incident and contraband analysis and reporting,
screening, and training.
Cooperation of local judges and the community is important for a comprehensive
court security plan. Often, those responsible for court security may have to advocate for
new or stricter security measures. Since, in many areas, courts have been traditionally
open and used for numerous non-judicial events and occasions (such as weddings, school

events, community meetings, etc.), it may take some effort to change attitudes concerning
security. A rural sheriff once explained the effect of public attitude in his community
where everyone knew everyone by name. He believed that he could probably impose
some stricter security, but there would probably be an acceptable limit to what he could
do. Collaboration and communication with stakeholders and the court’s community are
important in fostering awareness and promoting change.
Allegheny County Bar Association. “9 Lawyers.” The Bar Journal. 2007.
Bureau of Justice Assistance and Center for Disease Control. “A Framework for
Improving Cross-Sector Coordination for Emergency Preparedness and Response –
Action Steps for Public Health, Law Enforcement, the Judiciary, and Corrections.” July
2008.
http://www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/EmergencyPrep.asp.
Campbell, Colin F. and Marcus W. Reinkensmeyer. “The Court Security Challenge: A

Judicial Leadership Perspective.” Justice System Journal, Vol. 28, No. 1 p. 51. 2007.
Casey, Pamela. “A National Strategic Plan for Judicial Branch Security: Prepared for the
National Center for State Courts and the National Sheriffs’ Association.” Williamsburg,
VA: National Center for State Courts. 2006.
http://solutions.ncsconline.org/Recommended_strategies_Appendices_Final_Report_2-7-
061.pdf.
Colorado State Court Administrator's Office. “Colorado Courthouse Security Resource

Guide.” 2008.
http://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/File/Administration/Financial_Services/Court_Sec
urity_Resource_Guide.pdf.
Conference of State Court Administrators. “Position Paper on Emergency Preparedness in the

State Courts.” p. 9. 2006.
http://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/WhitePapers/EmergencyPreparednessStateCourts_Dec06.pdf.
Kentucky Supreme Court. “KRS § 24A.140.” 2009.

Murer, Amanda C. “Communication is the Key in Court Security in Report on Trends in

the State Courts.” p. 19. 2005.
National Center for Judicial Security. U.S. Marshals Service.

http://www.usmarshals.gov/oca/ncjs.htm.
National Sheriffs’ Association. Court Officers and Deputies Association.

http://www.sheriffs.org/coda/index.asp.
National Sheriff’s Association. “Court Security Resource Guide.” p. 18. 2008.
New York State Unified Court System. “The Task Force on Court Security Report to the
Chief Judge and Chief Administrative Judge.” 2005.
http://www.nycourts.gov/reports/security/SecurityTaskForce_Report.pdf.
New York State Unified Court System. “The Task Force on Court Security: Report to
the Chief Judge and Chief Administrative Judge.” p. 15. 2005.
http://www.nycourts.gov/reports/security/SecurityTaskForce_Report.pdf.
New York State Unified Court System. “The Task Force on Court Security: Report to
the Chief Judge and Chief Administrative Judge.” p. 41. 2005.
Pines, Zygmont A. “Prudent Risk Management: A Court Administrator's View.” Justice

System Journal, Vol. 28, No. 1. 2007.
“Protecting Judicial Officials: Implementing an Effective Threat Management Process.”

Bureau of Justice Assistance Bulletin. p. 4. 2006.
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/213930.pdf.

Chapter 10: New Courthouse Design
Importance of Security Considerations in Designing a New Courthouse

Most courthouses in this country were designed and built at a time when concerns
about security were not at the high levels that exist today. As a result, courthouse design
poses significant constraints in terms of the security measures that can be effectively put
in place. A prime example of this is, in most courthouses, in-custody defendants who are
escorted to and from the courtroom through hallways in judges’ chambers areas or
through public space. This practice puts judges, court staff, and the public at potential
risk. It is far better from a security standpoint to escort in-custody defendants only
through “zones” or hallways dedicated exclusively for such use. However, the design of
courthouses frequently makes this solution impossible.
The prospect of building a new courthouse presents a significant opportunity to
build optimal security features into the very design of the building. Of course, security is
only one of several major factors that need to be taken into account when designing a
new courthouse. Aesthetics, accessibility, functionality, and technology are examples of
other important considerations. However, events since 2000, including the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, high-profile incidents of courthouse violence, and natural disasters, have resulted
in an ever-greater emphasis on security in courthouse design and techniques for providing
a safe and secure environment for staff and the public as well as the protection of records
and physical assets.
Courthouse design guidelines routinely stress the multiple decisions that will be
made in the course of planning, designing, and constructing a court building and the fine
balance that must be maintained among various considerations. At a fundamental level,
the design of each courthouse will reflect the basic decisions made on variables such as
size, type of calendar, space for special programs, expansion needs, location, geography,
and site context. Aesthetic, functional, and security requirements will have to be
balanced with the short- and long-term costs of construction and operations. Security
will have to be balanced with openness. Ensuring that courthouses are, and appear to be,
open to the public and that they fit with their environment is a recurrent theme in the
various court design guides and court facility standards that have been promulgated at the

federal and state levels. While security is only one of many elements to consider, it is
clearly a critical one.
Incorporating Security into Design

Security, as a critical element of basic courthouse design, should be addressed at
the beginning of the planning process and throughout the design process. The
architectural/engineering team planning and designing the courthouse should consider the
security implications of every aspect of design. Security equipment and personnel alone
cannot do an effective job when constrained by courthouse design. It is clear that few
agencies have sufficient resources or justification to implement every possible security
countermeasure for every conceivable scenario; however, integrating security throughout
the design process can provide an appropriate balance between security and other
considerations.
The California Trial Court Facilities Standards (CTCFS) emphasize the
importance of a comprehensive court facility security plan that integrates design,
technology, and operations, including policies, procedures, and personnel, noting that
“the most effective security plan is achieved when these three elements are coordinated
during early project phases” (CTCFS, 2006: 4-3). The CTCFS define these elements as
follows:
• Design. Design includes architectural elements and engineering systems,
including space planning, adjacencies, user group zoning, passive physical
protection, doors, locks, site perimeter barriers, exterior lighting, egress and
circulation system, and all building systems relating to building evacuation.
• Technology. Technology includes electronic security systems and equipment,
such as automated access controls, alarm monitoring, duress alarms, remote door
and gate controls, closed-circuit television (CCTV), and cameras.
• Operations. Operations refer to policies and procedures for the court facility and
those applied for security program management, security staffing, and employee
training.
The importance of a comprehensive and balanced approach to courthouse security

is also reflected in other materials developed in this handbook for the Ten Essential
Elements for Effective Courtroom Safety and Security Planning, including Element 1:
Standard Operating Procedures, and “Appendix A.” The approach should also be

collaborative and incorporate the perspectives of court personnel, space planners,

architects, security experts, and, in the instance of site security, members of the
community. All participants in the planning and design process should be educated about
the fundamental objectives and concepts surrounding security in the court environment.
Design guidelines and standards for court buildings categorize and integrate
recommended and mandated security measures in different ways. One of the more recent
and comprehensive set of security guidelines is presented in the U.S. Courts Design
Guide (published by the Judicial Conference of the United States Courts), which divides
the discussion of courthouse security systems and equipment design into exterior and
interior security. The specific guidelines on each topic are not reproduced here because
(1) they are extensive; (2) they reflect requirements for federal courthouses that may or
may not be applicable, cost-effective, or fit the context of the wide variety of state and
local court building projects; and (3) they are readily available at the General Services
Administration Web site. However, a review of the topics is useful to illustrate the broad
range of considerations related to security that should be addressed in the planning and
design phase even if the ultimate solution might not conform to federal specifications.
Exterior Security
According to the U.S. Courts Design Guide (USCDG) exterior security includes
considerations of site, parking, lighting, access control at building entrances, and
intrusion-detection/alarm systems. Specifically, the USCDG provides requirements for
• Site – building setback, landscaping, site lighting, separation of vehicle
circulation, and closed-circuit television (CCTV)
• Parking – restricted and separate parking for judges, employees, and visitors
monitored by CCTV cameras
• Building Perimeter – intrusion-detection system, windows, emergency exits, and
CCTV cameras
• Building Entrances – public entrance, employees’ entry, judges’ entry, and the
loading dock
In addition to the specific guidelines on site security contained in the USCDG, the
General Services Administration’s Site Security Design Guide provides an in-depth look
at this issue, including the principles underlying the effort, the tools that are available to

designers, and a hypothetical test case where the principles and tools are applied. The
authors acknowledge the complexity of site security issues and cite the following
challenges for building designers: “determination of threats and vulnerabilities, which
remain difficult to predict; decisions about what to protect, which may be fraught with
emotion; and selection of countermeasures, which are often extremely expensive.”
The Site Security Guide advises that in order to balance aesthetic goals with
security requirements, both the emotional and technical arguments about security must be
considered, and the most acute needs must be addressed while being mindful of available
resources. Successful site security design projects should adhere to four principles:
1. A strategic approach to reducing risk defines priorities; identifies correctable

conditions; leverages resources to implement appropriate facility design, site
design, and property management; and remains flexible to changing levels of
threat.
2. A comprehensive design satisfies multifaceted site requirements to maximize

functionality, aesthetics, and a total project value for its users and the community-
at-large.
3. A collaborative, multidisciplinary team — including the court and tenant agencies,

security professionals, designers, and community representatives — can integrate
diverse expertise to create innovative and effective solutions.
4. A phased, incremental development strategy is invaluable for the successful

implementation of security improvements over time, whether for a major project
with multiyear execution or for multiple, small projects at one property.
The California Trial Court Facilities Standards also stress the importance of risk
assessment and strategic approaches to site security design and recommend applying
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) principles in site and building
master plans in the early phases of architectural and landscape design. The standards cite
three basic CPTED strategies:
• Natural surveillance — The placement of physical features, activities,
and people in such a way as to maximize visibility, thus preventing the
opportunity of crime (e.g., proper placement of windows overlooking
sidewalks and parking lots, using transparent vestibules at building
entrances to divert persons to reception areas, etc.). This strategy can be

supplemented with the use of security and police patrols and the
application of CCTV cameras.
• Natural and constructed access control — Natural access control

focuses on limiting and providing guided access through use of properly
located entrances, exits, fencing, landscaping, sidewalks and roadways,
signage, and lighting. This guidance helps deter access to a crime target
and creates a perception of risk to a perpetrator.
• Territoriality — The use of physical attributes that express ownership,

such as fencing, pavement treatments, signage, and landscaping, promotes
a perception that these areas are controlled. In an area that is physically
designed to protect designated space, people are more likely to challenge
intruders or report suspicious activity, and the design itself causes
intruders to stand out.
In addition to the specific guidelines on building entrances discussed in the

USCDG, the General Services Administration and the U.S. Marshals Service have jointly
published a Design Notebook for Federal Building Lobby Security. These guidelines and
recommendations generally address the placement of security screening stations within
federal building lobbies, including courthouses, and security station prototypes. Noting
the “visual chaos” created by some security screening stations that were quickly
assembled in existing facilities in response to increased security demands, the authors
stress the importance of creating “a good first impression to those entering the building –
one that depicts an aura of professionalism, conscientiousness, and capability.” The
design notebook discusses the overall context of the lobby and the role of the free zone –
the interior space that lies between the exterior plaza and the secure portions of the
interior – in providing a user-friendly, unrestricted environment for the public that can
also serve functional needs such as access to information or forms. The coordinated
design of the exterior plaza, free zone, and secure lobby is described as an opportunity to
support the security requirements of the building, including allowing sufficient space for
visitors to queue prior to screening and accommodating the people who will wait for
elevators or seek information after screening. The design notebook also describes three
versions of the security station prototype – box scheme, planes scheme, and line scheme
– and provides an outline of the typical procedures at a security screening station.
Sixteen case studies on the layout and positioning of security screening stations in

various federal buildings are presented to allow designers to see the application of the
concepts in various contexts. The authors caution that many factors will effect design
decisions made in this area, including assessment of risks and vulnerabilities.
Interior Security
Under the USCDG, interior security includes personnel security, security of
property and documents, access control to interior spaces, personnel movement and
circulation controls, security aspects of spatial arrangements, and the coordination and
integration of security and fire and life safety requirements.
Physical separation of public, restricted, and secure circulation systems is an
essential element of courthouse security design, and the integrity of each circulation
system must be maintained for all functions within the court facility. The USCDG
specifically cites the importance of (1) providing judges with a means to move from
restricted parking to chambers, courtrooms, and other spaces through restricted corridors;
(2) providing jurors with a means to move between floors on restricted-access elevators
without crossing public spaces or secure prisoner corridors; and (3) providing a means for
security personnel to move prisoners from the vehicle sally port into central holding
facilities and to holding cells adjacent to trial courtrooms without passing or entering
public or restricted spaces.
Life-safety protection systems and emergency egress requirements are prescribed
by standards found in federal, local, and international building, fire, and electrical codes.
The USCDG advises that a fire and life safety system should be equipped with an
emergency evacuation system (EVAC) regardless of the number of occupants or floors.
And recently it has been recommended that an automated external defibrillator (AED) be
centrally located on each floor of court buildings.
When activated, intrusion detection systems, duress alarms, and other internal
alarm systems in a courthouse should electronically report to a central command and
control center.
The USCDG also contains guidelines on specific security measures for
courtrooms, spaces associated with courtrooms, judges’ chambers, jury facilities,
libraries, clerks’ offices, and court-related offices such as administration. These

guidelines outline what each of these spaces requires in terms of entry, type of windows,
CCTV, security alarms, and other measures as appropriate to its function.
As a final thought in planning state courthouses, consideration should be given to
designing additional security measures when warranted by specific kinds of cases. For
example, domestic relations cases involving potentially volatile issues of divorce and
custody have been statistically demonstrated to pose special security challenges.
Courtrooms can be designed for such cases that include additional physical barriers and
other means of providing extra security.
Bibliography and Resources

Hardenberg, D. and Phillips, T.S. (eds.). “Retrospective of Courthouse Design: 1991 –
2001.” Williamsburg, VA: National Center for State Courts. 2001.
Hardenbergh, D. et al. “The Courthouse: A Planning and Design Guide for Court
Facilities.” Williamsburg, VA: National Center for States Courts. 1998.
Judicial Conference of the United States Courts. “U.S. Courts Design Guide.”
Washington, DC. 5th ed. 2007.
Judicial Council of California, Administrative Office of the Courts. “California Trial

Court Facilities Standards.” San Francisco, CA. 2006.
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/occm/documents/06_April_Facilities_Standards-
Final-Online.pdf.
U.S. General Services Administration (GSA). “The Site Security Design Guide.”
Washington, D.C.: Public Buildings Service, Office of the Chief Architect. 2007.
http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?contentType=GSA_BASIC&contentId=23429
.
U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) and U.S. Marshals Service. “Design
Notebook for Federal Building Lobby Security.” Washington, DC. 2007
Utah Judicial System. “Master Plan for Capital Facilities.” Salt Lake City, Utah:
Administrative Office of the Courts. Vol. II. January 2008.
http://www.utcourts.gov/admin/facilities/Section-II.htm.

Appendix A:
Representative Sample of Guidelines

From
State Court Security Manuals
A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on A-1

Standard Operating Procedures: Physical Security

(perimeters, entryways, and interior areas)
A. Perimeter Security
1. Parking areas
Parking should be secure, reserved, separated, and unidentified for judges, staff,
jurors, and those subject to special security risks.
Judges and staff should have direct access to secure corridors and elevators from
the parking area. (See Michigan.)
Vehicles should not have any features identifying the owner.
Escorts or shuttles from the parking area to the facility should be available and
provided on an as-needed basis for those with special security needs.
Parking areas should be sufficiently illuminated and patrolled.
Security in these areas can be augmented by posting of emergency telephone
numbers, placement of emergency phones, CCTV cameras, panic/call stations,
assigned security personnel, entrance booths with guards, intrusion/detection
devices, space assignments and design, passive/active physical barriers, card keys,
and landscaping. (Wisconsin)
2. Grounds (lighting, visibility, protective distance)

Perimeter areas should be adequately illuminated and properly landscaped to
prevent concealment and in order to maximize visibility of persons and objects.
Physical barriers (e.g., bollards, planters, fences) can be installed to provide at
least a 50-foot set-back from the facility. For new structures, 100 feet is the
recommended set-back. (See Wisconsin.)
3. Exterior of buildings (potential access routes)

All potential openings or access points into the building (such as doors, windows,
skylights, ducts, grates, etc.) should be secured to prevent entry or tampering,
especially at the ground floor level.
All access points should be properly illuminated.
4. Surveillance (patrols, daily inspections)

Perimeter (including all grounds, parking areas, garages, common areas, doors,
windows, potential openings) should be subject to routine inspection patrols on a
24/7 basis.
All security problems encountered in such patrols should be promptly reported,
documented in a report, and promptly addressed.
5. Equipment (alarms, surveillance)

All entrances and portals should be equipped with intrusion alarms.
Video surveillance (CCTV) for these areas is also recommended and, if
employed, should be effectively monitored at all times.
All security equipment should be regularly maintained and professionally tested
pursuant to a schedule. (See New Jersey, Michigan, Washington, and Arizona.)

6. Loading docks
Protocols should be developed for on-site deliveries (e.g., requiring identification
of drivers, advance notice of deliveries, assigned personnel and equipment to
screen deliveries and packages). (See Delaware.)
B. Entrance Security—Access to the Facility
1. Limited access (the “single point of entry" concept)

Access points to the facility should be limited in number, preferably limited to
one main entrance (the so-called "single point of entry").
The "single point of entry" is an important component of court security because,
when used in conjunction with the screening post, it greatly minimizes risk at the
front end.
All points of entry should be secured with adequate personnel and equipment at
all times.
Limited access to a facility greatly minimizes security risks, allows better observation
and detection, and helps to reduce the costs of weapons screening throughout a
facility.
There should be continuous monitoring of all points of entry.
2. Controlled access ("the screening post")

All persons entering the facility should be screened at all times.
Entrance screening is viewed as the single-most important element in a
comprehensive courthouse security program. (For examples, see, Arizona, Ohio,
Washington.) New Jersey exempts judges, and in New York, limited classes of
persons – court employees, tenants of courthouse facilities, attorneys, government or
non-profit agency employees who regularly conduct business within the courts –
generally are not required to pass through magnetometers provided they comply with
certain conditions (e.g., presentation of identification cards through the court's
SecurPass program, which requires a criminal background check).
There should be weapons screening at every access point.
Michigan's manual specifies that if staff and judges use non-public entrances,
provisions should be made for weapons screening at such entrances. Entrances
without screening should be locked and equipped with alarms and signage stating
"Emergency Exit Only. Alarm Will Sound." Michigan specifies that a court's
screening policy should include a list of restricted items, a secondary screening
policy for people who have not successfully passed through after two tries, storage
and disposal of confiscated items, protocols for appropriate responses to attempts to
bring weapons in the facility, and protocols for law enforcement personnel.
Michigan's manual also specifies the components of a proper weapons screening
station to include adequate room for people to congregate inside, out of the weather,
without being so crowded as to present additional security problems; a
magnetometer, x-ray equipment, and handheld magnetometers for back-up
screening; a duress alarm to summon additional help if needed; CCTV for
monitoring access points; adequate staffing of at least two trained staff to monitor
traffic flow and at least one officer with a weapon to observe and respond to
emergencies; and access to a private area to conduct a more thorough search using
same-gender personnel.

If there is a separate entrance for judicial officers, the court's protocol should
strictly prohibit admittance by any unauthorized persons.
Items (such as purses, backpacks, briefcases, bags, boxes, laptops, CD players,
cell phones, pagers, radios, etc.) should be subject to the screening process.
Screening stations should consist of a metal detector, x-ray machine, and
sufficient personnel to operate the equipment and conduct screening.
Ohio, for example, recommends at least one portable walk-through magnetometer
and one handheld magnetometer with a trained security person. The preferred
security practice is to have three personnel at each security screening post: one to
operate the machine, one to check persons who set off a detecting device, and a third
person who can provide back-up in the event of an emergency or need for additional
screening procedure. (For example, see "Gaining Access to Courthouse Security,"
Courts Today, pp. 34-37, Jan-Feb 2005.)
There should be clearly written, visible signage at the entrance indicating the
court's screening policies and list of prohibited items.
Signage operates as a deterrent.
3. Screening of mail and deliveries

All incoming mail and packages should be received in a central location and
subjected to screening prior to delivery.
See Wisconsin's manual (Chapter 5) for an identification of characteristics of
suspicious packages and appropriate response procedures. (Also, see Washington.)
4. Personnel (at entrance points)

The complement and competency of trained security staff should be sufficient to
operate court security equipment to control access to the facility. There should be
pre-employment criminal background checks for all new personnel and a policy
requiring employees to report promptly if they have been arrested or charged with
a crime.
5. ID and access control procedures

Identification procedures and protocols are helpful to reinforce entrance screening
(such as card keys, identification badges, sign in/sign out, etc.). Such procedures
should apply to all employees and visitors.
Identification should be displayed at all times in the building.
There should be strict control of all access keys and cards.
The use of badges and card keys must be strictly controlled and monitored, especially
with regard to terminated or departing employees. A log of all such ID badges and
cards should be maintained. Lost or stolen cards should be reported promptly. (See
Arizona SJI Project regarding monitoring and auditing access cards, and Michigan
and New Jersey. New Jersey provides for electric latch or card access entry for
judges' private entrances.)
Access codes should be periodically changed (especially after a security breach)
and courts should have the ability to act promptly in the event of a security breach
of its identification system.
New York, for example, utilizes a "smart card" system that physically incorporates
digital chips that can be promptly deactivated. The New York security taskforce

recommended there should be sufficient information infrastructure capability to

transmit data promptly to court administrators and the smart card system in order to
deal quickly with misuse, forgery, or recall of such cards.
6. After-hours operations
After-hours access to the facility should be limited and supervised.
Security protocols (e.g., single access point, screening, and identification) should
be employed on a 24/7 basis. (See New Jersey and Michigan.)
There should be continuous monitoring of all access points.
7. Weapons policy
Every facility should have a clear and strictly enforceable weapons policy, one
that also addresses possession of weapons by law enforcement officers in the
facility and courtrooms.
The New York security taskforce recommended that all firearms carried by uniformed
on-duty personnel be secured in safe and serviceable holsters with a safety rating of
Level III and that all court clerks authorized to carry firearms should be required to
use holsters with covered trigger guards and snap enclosures that securely attach to
their belts and to wear their uniform blazers at all times. Many states prohibit law
enforcement officers (when acting outside the scope of their employment) from
bringing weapons into a court facility. The carrying of weapons in a court facility is
a difficult practical, political, and policy issue for many jurisdictions. Some states
address the issue statutorily. In a 2005 survey conducted by the Delaware
Administrative Office of the Courts, the overwhelming majority of responders
indicated there was no formal court policy governing whether judges are permitted
to carry guns in the court facility. Some states (e.g., South Carolina and Kentucky)
apparently permit. Rhode Island and Allegheny and Berks counties in Pennsylvania
reportedly have a zero tolerance weapons policy for court facilities. (Also see
Michigan, Ohio, New Jersey [which exempts judges from weapons screening], and
Alabama.)
All personnel authorized to carry firearms in court facilities should be required to
pass a qualified certification program successfully and be required to pass an
annual firearms requalification program. (See Alabama.)
There should be clear signage at the court's entrance regarding the facility's
weapon policy.
There should be secure depositories for the temporary storage of firearms.
Unauthorized firearms and weapons should be confiscated and destroyed.
Annual statistical reporting regarding seized weapons and contraband is
advisable.

8. Other policy considerations: use of force and contraband

Courts should have clear policies on use of force by court security personnel
(when appropriate, acceptable physical responses).
Courts should have clear policies regarding contraband items.
Courts should have clearly stated and visible signage at court facility entrances
and interiors about prohibited items subject to confiscation.
9. Custodial services
Custodial staff should never have unsupervised access to the facility after hours.
Custodial staff should be subject to routine security screening procedures.
Custodial staff should be subject to initial and periodic security background
checks.
Other security protocols should be considered, such as the wearing of name/company
badges, fingerprinting, specific procedures for day and night shifts, sign-in/sign-out
procedures, security checks of supplies, restrictions on packages/bags, and
possession of alcoholic beverages/ non-prescription drugs in the building. (See
Delaware.)
10. Vendors/independent contractors

Protocols similar to those for custodial staff should also be identified and
implemented for non-employee occupants/visitors, including vendors and
independent contractors working in the facility. (See Delaware.)
C. Interior Security — Generally
1. Circulation zones
It is recommended that a court facility's space be segregated or separated into
three distinct "circulation zones" – separate zones for judges and staff, the public,
and prisoners.
Access to zones should be controlled. Access keys and cards by non-security
personnel should be limited and supervised by security personnel.
Circulation zones are mandatory in New Jersey for new or renovated court facilities.
If such circulation patterns or zoning areas are not feasible, other options (e.g.,
designating off-limits areas except for authorized personnel with I.D. cards,
installation of locking devices and monitoring system) may be available. Designated
off-limits areas could include HVAC/utility/computer equipment rooms or closets,
chambers, elevators, work stations, unused court rooms, hallways, stairs etc.
Delaware has designated security levels for areas and user groups. (Also see
Arizona.)
Where such circulation zoning is not possible, adequate procedures should be in
place to protect staff and public from prisoners (e.g., by escorting prisoners with
adequate security guards and using appropriate physical restraints).
Non-authorized personnel and visitors should be restricted to public areas at all
times.

2. Locking devices (utility and environmental controls)

There should be strict control of access to all controls for the environment and
utilities, which should be protected by tamper-resistant locking devices.
There should be central administration to oversee the security of such controls.
Outside air-intake mechanisms should be secured to prevent unauthorized access
or interference. (See Michigan, Wisconsin, Arizona, and Delaware.)
3. Identification and monitoring procedures

All personnel and authorized visitors should display appropriate identification at
all times when in the facility.
Michigan specifies that an employee's identification card should display only the first
name. New sophisticated technology is available to control and monitor access (e.g.,
electronic access cards or biometric systems that record a person's movement in the
building). For examples see New York and Michigan.
4. Security equipment and enhancements

Court facilities should be equipped with intrusion and duress alarms.
Intrusion alarms are designed to alert others to unauthorized entry after hours or in
restricted areas. Duress or panic alarms are designed to signal to others (usually
law enforcement or security officers) the need for immediate assistance at a specific
location.
Halls, corridors, and passageways should be brightly lit and equipped with
viewing mirrors.
There should be emergency back-up for lighting.
Ceiling panels should be secured to prevent intrusion.
First-aid kits should be readily available throughout the facility.
There should be properly trained personnel to operate security equipment
effectively.
In addition to x-ray machines and magnetometers to provide entrance security,
devices to provide interior security include ballistic-shielded benches; caller ID
phones; card-key readers; closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV); door viewers;
electronic mechanisms to control opening and locking of doors; intercoms; locks to
store and secure property (e.g., guns, cell phones, etc.); magnetic locks; numeric pin
pads; restraining equipment (handguns, knee/ankle braces, Tasers); security lighting;
and smoke detectors. Ohio recommends that, when practical, CCTV surveillance
should include the court facility, parking areas, entrance(s) to court facility,
courtrooms, and all other public areas of the facility.
5. Security personnel (training and safety)

Security personnel in the facility should be adequately trained and certified in the
skills and performance standards required to fulfill their responsibilities.
Such training should include instruction in the transportation and restraint of
prisoners, facility-specific security procedures, the use of force, dealing with the
public, etc. The New York court security taskforce recommends that each officer
providing security to the facility should be given a copy of the facility's security
protocols and acknowledge receipt thereof. (Also see New Jersey, Wisconsin
[Chapter 9], Arizona [pp. 24-25], and Michigan. Arizona provides that "training of

court security personnel shall be career oriented with a core curriculum that is court
security specific." New Jersey requires training in dealing with the public.
The physical safety of security personnel to perform their responsibilities should
be addressed.
The New York security taskforce recommended a court policy that requires court
officers serving in sensitive posts and patrols to wear ballistic-resistant vests
approved (and perhaps funded) by the judiciary and, further, that all such vests should
be standard issue for all uniformed court officers. The New York report also
recommended that some (but not all) security officers should be equipped with batons
and O.C. (oleoresin capsicum) pepper spray in accordance with applicable laws.
6. Internal communications (within the facility)

Each facility should have a public address system for use in the event of an
emergency (such as lockdowns, bomb threats, etc.). Evacuation routes and
emergency exits should be conspicuously identified.
7. Prisoner transport/holding areas

There should be separate and secure holding areas where prisoners can be locked
up and supervised (e.g., by security personnel, CCTV) while waiting to appear in
court or to be returned to jail.
Local corrections departments should notify the facility of any special category of
prisoner (e.g., assaulting prisoner, escape risk, suicide watch, and gang affiliation)
prior to transport to the court facility or, at the least, upon arrival at the court
facility.
A prisoner classification system, worked out by local law enforcement and the courts,
can be used to transmit critical data. For example, color-coded, high-security
restraints have been successfully used to identify high-risk prisoners in their facilities
quickly and easily. Also see New York security taskforce report regarding
notification.
Prisoners should have a separate circulation route away from court personnel and
the public, and out of sight of jurors.
Ohio provides that if a separate circulation route for prisoners is not feasible, then
appropriate restraints (handcuffs, leg braces) should be employed. See this section
for information regarding restraining devices.
Prisoners should be monitored by cameras or tracking devices.
Restraint equipment should be used in appropriate situations and should be
readily available in the facility in the event that a prisoner becomes unruly or
creates a security risk. Prisoners escorted in the courthouse should be restrained
with handcuffs.
For example, see Alabama and New York. Restraining devices include handcuffs,
transport leg braces, ankle restraints, waist chains, transport/custody belts, and
elastic belts equipped with stun devices. It is important to be cognizant of the
dangers of prejudicing a juror who views a defendant in such restraints. The New
York security taskforce recommended that a prisoner should be rear-handcuffed at
all times except when appearing before a jury and during extended hearings. Holding
cells could also be equipped with a small rectangular insert to provide secured
access to a prisoner when handcuffs need to be removed.

Appropriately trained and physically capable law enforcement personnel, in

sufficient ratio to the perceived risk, should escort prisoners to and from the
facility and courtrooms.
There should be clear written protocols to cover the following prisoner transport
issues: (1) the staffing levels required to escort prisoners, (2) the arming of
security personnel, (3) physical requirements of escort personnel, (4)
restraint/force procedures, (5) procedures to handle potentially volatile prisoners,
and (6) emergency procedures in the event of an escape or evacuation.
For examples, see New Jersey, Delaware, Michigan, Washington, Ohio, and Arizona.
Also see the publication by the National Sheriffs' Association ("Court Security Audits,
Forms, Policies, and Self-Assessment Tools") especially with regard to holding
facility guidelines. A recent publication from the National Association for Court
Management recommends that security personnel not carry weapons when handling
detainees and that a single officer never move more than one person at a time. See
National Association for Court Management, Court Security Guide, p. 21 (2005). The
New York taskforce on court security, supra, made the following recommendations
regarding prisoner handling: (1) the prisoner escort court officer in control and in
proximity to the prisoner should be unarmed (which is reportedly the current
practice in New York City courts); (2) the number of uniformed officers transporting
prisoners must be commensurate with the security risk presented vis-à-vis the
number of prisoners being transported and the location's physical characteristics;
(3) prisoners transported through public areas of a courthouse should be escorted by
no fewer than two uniformed officers; and (4) courts should strictly prohibit the
changing of clothes by prisoners at court facilities. Michigan's manual recommends
the following standards for holding areas for temporary prisoners: holding areas
should be constructed to lessen the possibility of self-inflicted injury; be inspected
daily for contraband; include doors that allow for easy observation; include toilet
facilities; be checked by staff every thirty minutes; have CCTV monitoring, if
possible; and have a self-contained breathing apparatus.
Videoconferencing should be considered as an alternative to prisoner transport.
Videoconferencing (e.g., of arraignments) entails less risk and expense. For
examples, see Missouri Statutes sec. 561.031 and Pennsylvania Statutes 42 Pa.C.S.,
Section 8703. Videoconferencing speeds the process, minimizes risk and cost, and
can be useful in a public health emergency. Such an option, however, must comport
with constitutional and statutory requirements.
8. Building/personnel profiles
Courts should maintain confidential files regarding up-to-date personnel lists,
essential personnel information (e.g., contact persons, medical needs), and the
facility's floor plans and allocation of space.
This confidential information should be readily accessible in the event of an
emergency or operational breakdown. Tennessee, for example, specifies that
"medical and family data on each judge should be kept in the clerk's office including
blood type, allergies or reactions to medication, and any other type of medical
problems that should be known in case of an emergency, and the names, addresses,
and telephone numbers of the next of kin."

9. Daily inspections/sweeps
A security plan should include daily and weekly inspections of the interior as well
as the exterior and adjacent areas.
Any suspicious conditions or activities should be reported immediately and
properly documented.
See Wisconsin (pp. 27-31), Delaware, and New Hampshire (providing a helpful
identification of the scope of daily security checks, which is described as "the first line
approach to achieving a secure court facility"). See Arizona regarding weapons
screening and daily security checklists. See section on security incident reporting.
10. Personal security: threats and risks

There should be procedures to notify law enforcement promptly about threats
against judges and personnel. All threats should be promptly documented in a
security incident form.
In preparing a comprehensive security plan, each court, in collaboration with law
enforcement, should have procedures providing for the security of judges and
court personnel when needed at times other than normal working hours.
All courts should have secure parking areas for judges, staff, jurors, and witnesses
who have been threatened.
For examples, see Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, and New Jersey. New Jersey outlines
procedures to protect members of the judiciary who receive threats. Wisconsin (pp.
79-90) identifies how to assess/rank a threat and provides information about threat
assessment techniques/responses, and the U.S. Secret Service's identification of
conditions that indicate a greater risk of violence. Also, see Fein and Vossekuil,
"Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State and
Local Law Enforcement Officials," (U.S. Dept. of Justice, July 1998). See
information on Element 5 (threat assessment).
Courts should have the ability to obtain a prompt professional assessment of any
reportable threat against their judges and personnel.
D. The Courtroom
Allocation of security personnel in the courtroom should be flexible to address the
risks posed in a particular proceeding, the type of case (e.g., family, pro se,
criminal), the stage of proceeding (e.g., sentencing), and the extent of anticipated
media coverage.
New Jersey's recommended standard is to establish a system of allocating security
personnel based upon the type of trial and the nature and number of participants
involved in the given proceeding – indicators that can be classified into increasing
degrees of risk (low, moderate, high). Others recommend that there should be a
uniformed officer in the courtroom during all proceedings. See Arkansas, SJI Court
Emergency/Disaster Preparedness Planning Project, "Planning for Emergencies,"
supra at p. 11 (2005). Arizona notes that it is a recommended standard not to include
in the security officer complement any officers assigned to escort in-custody
participants or protected individuals.

If the facility does not have adequate screening at its entrances, then each
courtroom should be equipped with security devices (e.g., magnetometer,
surveillance cameras, and duress alarms).
The number of public entrances to a courtroom should be restricted.
There should be a pre-determined, effective means of non-verbal communication
between the court security officer and designated court personnel (e.g., clerk,
presiding judge) that could be confidentially used in threatening or emergency
circumstances.
There should be restricted access to light and environmental controls located in
the courtroom.
There should be a safe, quick, and accessible evacuation/egress route (via
automatic locking door with peephole) in close proximity to the judge's bench.
Coverings (e.g., drapery, opaque glazing, and blinds) should be installed on
courtroom doors and windows to prevent a line of sight into the courtroom.
If feasible, windows should enhance security in terms of composition. Shatterproof
windows consist of two standard sheets of glass with transparent plastic that break
into a rounded grain instead of jagged shards. Bullet-resistant glass involves thicker
lamination; the thicker the glass, the more resistant to the type of bullet. Bullet-
resistant glass is substantially more expensive.
Courtrooms should be locked when not in use.
All objects (e.g., furniture, flagpole, utensils) that could be used as items of
assault in the courtroom should be secured or removed.
For example, see Wisconsin (p. 51), containing an identification of "common
weapons of opportunity" and recommendations for their safe use, noting that even
the simplest of everyday objects can be turned into lethal weapons.
There should be sufficient distance between the judge's bench and others
(litigants, attorneys, public). The judge's bench should contain bulletproof
(fiberglass resistant glazing) material and be separated by a rail from the
audience.
There should be a clear policy regarding the possession of guns in the courtroom
by law enforcement and judges.
There should be a clear policy regarding the possession of cell phones in the
courtroom.
There should be clear protocols and designated responsibility for opening,
locking, and daily inspecting of courtrooms.
Clear protocols should be in place to secure and store exhibits, especially firearms
and drugs.
Courtrooms should have essential security equipment and enhancements.
Important security equipment for a courtroom include silent duress/panic alarms
(e.g., at the judge's bench, clerk's desk, sheriff's station) activated by a hidden
switch/button and wired for immediate communication to a central location; ballistic
shielding for judge's bench to withstand penetration of "off the shelf" bullets from
handguns, including a .357 magnum; portable radios and phones (including walkie-
talkie); telephone; heat/smoke detectors; CCTV, if feasible, to alert and record a
security incident; intrusion alarms; emergency backup lighting and electricity; and
high-quality cylinder locks on doors with a locking/release button controllable by

judge or sheriff. (For example, see Wisconsin, Arizona, New Hampshire, Utah,
Delaware, and Tennessee.)
Court audiences should be seated at all times. Security and court personnel
should be mindful of spectators attempting to change seats or move toward the
bench, the parties, witnesses, or the jury. (See Alabama.)
The number of prisoners in a courtroom at any one time should be minimized.
The number of prisoners in a courtroom should be proportionate to the security
provided. (See Alabama.)
There should be clear protocols for dealing with disruptive people in the
courtroom.
In the event of a power failure where emergency power backup and ambient light
are not available, there should be a continuously charging flashlight or other light
source available at the judge's bench. (See Alabama.)
E. High-risk Proceedings and Populations

As noted, it is recommended that courts establish a system of allocating security
personnel based upon various factors, including the type of trial, number of
participants, media coverage, and degree of risk presented.
Arizona notes that in assessing courtroom risk and consequent security response, a
federal task force has identified the following factors as most useful in determining
the need for security: whether the matter is civil, family, or criminal; the stage of
the proceeding (e.g., pre-trial, trial, post-trial); the type of case; the subject matter
of the case; the number of persons and/or identity of other participants during
proceedings (e.g., witnesses, spectators); the identity of the parties to the
proceedings; the extent of anticipated media coverage. Also, see Wisconsin (Chapter
4), which identifies risk levels based on the type of trial. Wisconsin notes the need
for an "operational plan" that includes detailed information on protocols and
procedures, specifies in advance individual and team assignments, and includes
directives and essential documents, emergency response procedures, communications
procedures, and command post.
Pro se and domestic litigation may require special risk assessment, security
safeguards, and segregated spacing as well as clear advance communication and
cooperation with law enforcement.
Jurors should be afforded safe, secure, and separate space and should have ready
access to court security officers.
Jurors should be provided with clear, simple, written information about the court's
basic security procedures as part of the juror orientation program. (See
Wisconsin.)
Special security procedures should be available for sequestered juries.
Likewise, special security considerations should be given to victims, witnesses,
and those who have received threats.
New Jersey identified some essential considerations in drawing up a security plan for
a high-risk trial as well as special considerations for civil commitment hearings at
state institutions. See pp. 32-39.

F. Administrative Offices
Administrative offices are critical to a court's operations and, therefore, should be
properly protected like any other space in the court facility.
There should be special security protocols for the handling, storage, and transport
of money and negotiable instruments.
Cash on-hand and its equivalent should be limited.
Access to administrative offices should be controlled and monitored. Useful
security measures include physical separation of staff from public (e.g., by use of
counters, half-walls, window shields); secure storage/locking of important files;
daily inspections/sweeps of office space; controlled/supervised access by
custodial or off-hours workers; locking of all doors and windows after hours;
restricted access to areas housing computers, their servers, and related equipment;
policy requiring the prompt reporting of suspicious packages, suspicious activity,
and security breaches.
Wisconsin (Chapter 5) provides helpful detailed advice concerning how to enhance
office security generally and respond to specific situations. Arizona recommends
that, when practical, there should be CCTV surveillance for the clerk's office.
Security personnel should be readily accessible to the court's administrative
offices.
G. Judicial Chambers (Controlled Access)

Access to the chambers and staff of a judge should be strictly controlled and
monitored.
For example, see prior section on security of administrative offices. Controlled
access to judicial offices can be achieved through various devices: monitors,
electronic access cards, duress alarms (at desks or work stations of the secretary,
receptionist, and judge), caller I.D. phones, and self-locking doors, and off-limit
hallways and stairs. Ohio recommends an effective secondary screening process at
the entrance to a judge's office; there should be a separate and safe work area not
accessible to the public.
All exits should be properly controlled with security devices (e.g., locking
devices, alarms) and monitored.
All exits should be conspicuously identified.

Appendix B
Steps to Best Practices for Court Building Security
A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on B-1

STEPS TO BEST PRACTICES

FOR COURT BUILDING SECURITY
FEBRUARY 2010
Timothy F. Fautsko
Steven V. Berson
James F. O’Neil
Kevin W. Sheehan
Daniel J. Hall, Vice President

Court Consulting Services
707 Seventeenth Street, Suite 2900
Denver, Colorado 80202-3429

Entry Screening – A Court’s First Line of Defense

Acknowledgements
The development and publication of this report has been made possible by the
support and hard work of many people. The National Center for State Courts (NCSC)
wishes to acknowledge the four authors of this document, Timothy Fautsko, Principal
Staff at the NCSC, and especially security consultants Steven Berson, James O’Neil, and
Kevin Sheehan for their work in identifying the categories, topics, and steps to best
practices in court security contained in this document. The NCSC also extends its
appreciation to three practitioners in the field who carefully reviewed this document and
made important recommendations that have improved the final product. They are
Malcolm Franklin, Senior Manager, Emergency Response and Security from the
Administrative Office of Courts in California; Frank Lalley, Judicial Security
Administrator from the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts; and Carol Price,
Court Security Director from the Administrative Office of Courts in Utah. Their many
years of experience in the field of court security and emergency preparedness proved
invaluable in validating the many steps to best practice. Without their assistance, the
quality and usefulness of information contained in this report would not have been
possible. Finally, the NCSC extends thanks to its editorial staff – Ephanie Blair, Judy
Amidon, and Lorie Gomez – for the many hours they spent providing quality assurance
in the conformation and final editing of the report.

Introduction
The National Center for State Courts (NCSC), through its Court Consulting
Division, has conducted security assessments of court buildings as well as personal
security and safety training throughout the country. In conducting court building
assessments, the NCSC assessment team has evaluated court security in terms of “best
practices” – guidelines describing those security measures that should be in place with
respect to a comprehensive set of topics covering court buildings and court operations.
These best practices are not only based on the considerable experience of NCSC
assessment team members, but are also a compilation of various guidelines from the U.S.
Marshals Service, National Sheriffs’ Association, International Association of Chiefs of
Police, the Transportation Safety Administration, the Department of Homeland Security,
and the National Association for Court Management. The NCSC assessment team
recommends that leadership in every court building strive to achieve best practices in all
topic areas to provide a suitable level of security for all those who work in or visit the
court building.
Acknowledging that implementing best practices in court building security will
require increasingly scarce budgetary resources, the NCSC assessment team has also
developed steps in phases that can be taken toward achieving best practices in various
areas of court building security. These steps may be a useful approach to courts as they
strive to implement improvements in court building security. The NCSC assessment
team wishes to emphasize that a fully effective integrated level of security will be
reached only when all the measures at the best practices level are incorporated. The
NCSC assessment team has provided these steps in phases, so that a court at its discretion
can adopt incremental improvements before reaching the level of best practices. These
steps in phases are plateaus along an ascending path to improvement – improvement the
NCSC assessment team recommends that courts achieve over time.
It is important to note that Steps to Best Practices focuses almost exclusively on
security matters. With rare exception, issues of emergency preparedness, continuity of
operations, and disaster recovery are not within the scope of this document.

Security is not a one-time achievement. It is a serious and continuous goal and

requires constant vigilance. Further, it must be a number one priority every single day
for all those interested and involved in the process. The risks involved in court building
operations are great and varied, and they can never be eliminated. But with proper
attention and care, they can be minimized. Paying close attention to the
recommendations contained in Steps to Best Practices will help courts minimize the
risks.
Steps to Best Practices is organized by steps, phases, topics, and categories. It
will be helpful for the reader at the outset to have a working understanding of each of
these terms:
• Steps: These are specific buildings blocks, specific actions that courts can
take to improve security.
• Phases: These are logical groupings of steps forming a temporary plateau in
terms of security measures in place.
• Topics: These are the subject areas into which steps in phases are organized.
• Categories: These are sets of topics. There are four categories listed in
priority order. (Note: Topics within each category are listed in alphabetical
rather than priority order.)
o Category A. These are fundamental topics that must be addressed first in
order to provide a base on which to place all of the others.
o Category B: These are topics that are extremely important to address.
o Category C: These are topics that are very important to address.
o Category D: These are topics that are important to address.

CATEGORIES AND TOPICS

Topic #
Category A: Fundamental
One Command and control center
Two Policies and procedures
Three Security committee
Category B: Extremely Important

One Access of people into court building
Two After-hours access to court building
Three Chambers
Four Courtrooms
Five Court security officer (CSO) staffing levels
Six Duress alarms
Seven Threat and incident reporting
Eight In-custody defendants
Nine Training
Category C: Very Important

One Closed-circuit television (CCTV)
Two Emergency equipment and procedures
Three Interior access during business hours (circulation zones)
Four Intrusion alarms
Five Jurors
Six Parking (particularly for judges)
Seven Public counters and offices
Category D: Important
One Cash handling
Two Exterior/interior patrols
Three Perimeter issues
Four Public lobbies, hallways, stairwells, and elevators
Five Screening mail and packages

Category A: Fundamental
The three topics in this category provide an essential foundation for all the other topics in
Steps to Best Practices.
• Command and control center. Without such a center, the necessary and vital
technological tools for court building security – closed circuit televisions (CCTV*),
duress alarms, and intrusion alarms – cannot be utilized or monitored in an effective
manner.
• Policies and procedures. Without these, there is no way to assure a thorough and
consistent application of security measures aimed at making a court building
reasonably safe. The development of policies and procedures is an iterative process.
Reference will need to be made to the information included in Steps to Best Practices
to inform the process of developing a comprehensive and cohesive set of policies and
procedures.
• Security committee. Without such a committee, meeting regularly and empowered

to exercise rigorous oversight on all matters relating to security within the court
building, it is difficult, if not impossible, to properly assess and address the myriad
security challenges facing court leadership.
*CCTV, as used in this document, refers to a variety of old and new technologies. For detail, see
topic C-1.
TOPIC A-1: COMMAND AND CONTROL CENTER
Phase One
1. Establish a command and control center in the lobby area of the court building
with an assigned court security officer (CSO*). For smaller court buildings, the
monitoring function of a command and control center can take place at the front
entrance screening station.
2. Provide for telephone/radio communication as a point of contact between a CSO
and potentially vulnerable areas of the court building, such as courtrooms.
*Note: CSO is defined as an individual trained in court security and certified to use a
firearm. The CSO should also be armed with a triple-retention holster and a radio that
can communicate with the command and control center. The CSO at the command and
control center does not necessarily need to be armed.
Phase Two
Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:
3. Design and construct a command and control center that is isolated from the main
lobby of the court building.

4. Design a control panel that will provide space for administrative activity and
equipment to monitor CCTV cameras, duress alarms, fire alarms or alerts,
intrusion detection systems, and radio dispatches.
Best Practice
Continue all steps in Phase One and Two, plus add the following:
5. Install control panels and monitoring equipment for CCTV surveillance cameras,
duress alarms, fire alarms or alerts, intrusion detection systems, and telephone and
radio communication and dispatch.
6. Provide additional security personnel as required to supervise and monitor
command and control center activities.
TOPIC A-2: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Phase One
1. Judicial branch leadership understands the need for and commits to the
implementation of effective, comprehensive security based on best practice models
and establishes orders directing court security policies and procedures.
Phase Two
Continue with the step in Phase One, plus add the following:
2. Establish a task force under the direction of the court security committee (see
Topic A-3) and with the cooperation of the appropriate law enforcement
agency(s), to draft essential documents for the establishment of the policies and
procedures on court building security. The task force on policies and procedures
should include:
• Court administration
• Security personnel
• Facilities management
• Fire and rescue personnel
• Others responsible for and impacted by court security
3. Create the package of essential documents to include:
• Policies and procedures
o Overall court security operations
o Screening protocols
Define contraband that cannot be brought into the court
building and confiscate it at the door.
o Procedures to govern courtrooms and other areas in the event of a
security incident
• Risk and resource assessment instruments and protocols for use
• Incident reporting instruments and protocols for use

• Operations manuals and materials

• Training manuals and materials
• Administrative orders with authority to revise
Phase Three
Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:
4. Establish communication to stakeholders that allows for feedback and adjustments

as follows:
• Assign a liaison between task force and stakeholders.
• Provide periodic briefings in various formats to stakeholders.
• Solicit formal feedback from stakeholders.
• Adjust package (e.g., policies, procedures, manuals, materials) as
necessary.
Phase Four
Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, and Three, plus add the following:
5. Provide training and evaluate the package as follows:

• Train everyone with a direct role in court security.
• Conduct drills to test procedures.
• Evaluate results of the drills.
• Evaluate results of response to actual incidents.
• Modify the package to improve practice.
Best Practice
Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, Three, and Four, plus add the following:
6. Review and update policies and procedures at least every other year.
7. Analyze Phases Two through Four for operational effectiveness.
TOPIC A-3: SECURITY COMMITTEE

Phase One
1. Establish a court security committee at the court building, which is chaired by a

judge (preferably presiding) and has a membership of at least the primary security
provider, such as the sheriff or CSO, the clerk of court, and the court
administrator.
2. The judge or court administrator should meet regularly with law enforcement
officials to discuss security concerns and improve security at the court building.

Phase Two
3. Add the district attorney and public defender or representative from the state bar to
the court security committee.
4. Add tenants to the security committee as appropriate.
Phase Three
5. Add elected officials to the court security committee.

6. Add an ad hoc member to the court security committee to serve on a task force for
the committee.
7. Undertake a self-assessment of the security in place within the court building.
Checklists with which to conduct these assessments are available from various
sources, such as the National Sheriff’s Association. Assistance in conducting
assessments is also available from the NCSC.
Best Practice
8. Establish an integrated court security committee and use task forces to provide the
committee with additional research and information gathering capacity.
Additional members added to the committee or task forces should include:
• Court staff members working in the court building
• Local and state government officials
• Local and state subject matter experts
9. Reconstitute the court security committee to be additionally responsible for
emergency preparedness, disaster recovery/continuity of operations (COOP) plan,
and response to pandemic flu, and add members with this expertise as appropriate.
Rename the committee the court security and emergency preparedness committee.
10. Add planning responsibility for building new or improving current court facilities
to the newly named committee.

Category B: Extremely Important

TOPIC B-1: ACCESS OF PEOPLE INTO COURT BUILDING
Phase One
1. Establish only one main door through which the public can enter the court building
and display a sign at the entrance clearly listing those items that cannot be brought
into the court building.
• Designate one or more of the doors to the building to be used only for one
or more of the following: judges, court staff, and other building tenants, to
enter with an access card or key. Lawyers and jurors should not be
permitted to use this door but should enter through public entrances.
• Keep all other exterior doors locked during business hours.
• Emergency exit bars should be installed on all external exit doors. All exit
doors should be alarmed, with ten second delay consistent with local codes.
Establish signage that explains the “Exit Only” requirement.
2. Establish protocols for entry through locked doors.
• Tailgating* or bringing in family members/friends through these doors
should not be allowed.
• Delivery people and contractors should enter through the main door and be
verified by an authorized representative requesting the delivery or service.
The same procedure should be followed after verification at the main door
to the court building for delivery people and contractors needing to use
other external doors for service or delivery. These individuals should be
escorted and supervised while in the building.
*Note: In this context, tailgating is when an individual(s) enters a court building
with a person who is authorized to properly gain entry with an access card or key.
3. Assign one CSO to guard the public entrance to the court building on a full-time
basis.
4. Set up a table or other physical structure at the public entrance to serve as a
screening station.
5. Screen people coming in the public entrance for weapons by use of a hand wand
and physical search of personal items.
• Provide screener with a weapons ID chart.
• Provide screener with a list of contraband items.
6. Train the CSO for all Phase One tasks described above.
7. Provide basic court security orientation training for judges and staff.
Phase Two
8. Add a magnetometer at the main door (public entrance) to the court building.

9. Conduct a daily calibration and inspection of magnetometer, preferably by an

authorized and trained supervisor.
10. Train CSO(s) in all tasks added in Phase Two, plus provide additional security
training for judges, staff, jurors, and others.
11. Replace keys to the court building with access cards for judges, authorized court
staff, and other building tenants’ staff.
12. Install a CCTV camera at the main door (public entrance) to the court building.
13. Assign a second CSO* to assist with screening at the main entrance during high-
traffic times of the day. During the day, a second CSO occasionally should
conduct internal and external walk-around patrols and assist with courtroom
security and security monitoring at the judge and authorized staff entrances.
14. Establish a code notification procedure between law enforcement and the court so
screeners are aware if a dangerous person is likely to enter the building.
15. Add a duress alarm at the screening station.
16. Establish a policy that law enforcement officers entering the building on personal
business may not bring in a weapon.
*Note: Staffing level in Phase Two is one full-time CSO at the screening station, plus
one additional CSO for high-volume times.
Phase Three
17. Install an x-ray machine at the public entrance screening station.

18. The second CSO referenced in step 13 should be assigned as a full-time,
permanent CSO* to operate the public screening station. During slow periods, this
second CSO can still be available for additional duties as described in step 13.
19. Establish additional policies and procedures for Phase Three operations as follows:
• Conduct an annual inspection and certification of x-ray machines.
• Provide a detailed, step-by-step manual and training on screening
procedures.
20. Train CSOs in all tasks and provide security orientation training for judges and
staff.
21. Add a CCTV camera at the judge/staff entrance door.
*Note: Staffing level in Phase Three is two full-time CSOs at the screening station.
Best Practice
22. Assign a third CSO* to operate the public screening station: one CSO to operate
the magnetometer, one to operate the x-ray machine, and one to handle problems.
During low traffic times, the third CSO can assume another assignment. Ideally,

all three CSOs should be armed, but at least one should be armed. (Armed CSOs
should use a triple-retention holster.)
23. If two or more public screening stations are in operation, assign a fourth CSO as a
supervisor to oversee operations.
24. Install a magnetometer, x-ray machine, duress alarm, and CCTV camera to the
judge/staff entrance. Consider allowing jurors to use this entrance.
25. Assign at least two CSOs to the judge/staff entrance if staff or jurors use this
entrance and at peak hours during the day. Otherwise, assign at least one CSO.
26. Establish a universal screening policy. Universal screening means everyone
entering the building is screened.
27. When everything is in place, establish a policy that only law enforcement officers
with responsibility for court security inside the building may bring a weapon into
the building. Other law enforcement officers should be required to check their
weapons in a lock box at the screening station(s).
*Note: Staffing level in Best Practice is three full-time CSOs for each public screening
station, plus one additional CSO to supervise multiple stations, and two CSOs assigned
to judge/staff/juror entrance.
TOPIC B-2: AFTER-HOURS ACCESS TO COURT BUILDING
Phase One
1. Permit access into all areas of the court building via key or electronic card access.
Keys and cards should be issued and controlled pursuant to a comprehensive
accountability system that has been approved by the court’s security committee.
2. Conduct background checks prior to issuing a key or access card to any person.
3. Conduct background checks for cleaning crews and any vendors granted after-
hours access to the building. Cleaning crews and vendors should be supervised at
all times by a person who is accountable to the court.
4. Monitor the activities of the public while in the building after hours.
Phase Two
5. Eliminate the use of keys and implement the use of an access card system. As
necessary, issue keys to a limited number of people only for emergencies, building
maintenance purposes, and building security responsibilities.
6. Create a single access point into the court building that is guarded by a CSO who
checks IDs and signs in all people entering the building after regular hours. As
time permits, the CSO should periodically patrol the interior and exterior of the
court building.
7. Update background checks periodically (at least annually).

Best Practice
8. Conduct a full screening requiring everyone to go through the magnetometer and

x-ray station.
TOPIC B-3: CHAMBERS
Phase One
1. Install a duress alarm at the judge’s desk and in the chamber’s reception area.
2. Test duress alarms regularly – at least monthly.
3. Provide training to judges regarding personal security and safety in chambers.
4. Escort judges when leaving a chambers area for a courtroom if chambers hall is
unsecured.
5. Keep existing chambers window coverings adjusted so activities cannot be
observed from outside the court building.
6. Conduct daily sweeps of chambers in the morning and at the end of the day.
7. Keep entrance doors to chambers area locked. Keep doors to individual chambers
locked when judge is not present, especially at night.
8. Assign at least one CSO or transport deputy to be present whenever an in-custody
defendant is escorted through chambers hallway.
Phase Two
9. Install vertical blinds as interior window coverings in all chambers.

10. Install duress alarms in conference room(s).
11. Plan for and conduct drills regarding emergency situations in chambers area.
12. Escort judges when leaving secure chambers and courtroom area.
Phase Three
13. Assign at least two CSOs or transport deputies to escort in-custody defendants
through chambers hallway, with one to clear the path ahead. The transport officer
closest to the prisoner should be unarmed; the other officer should be armed.
14. Install ballistic-resistant material in all accessible windows (e.g., ground level, first
floor). The recommended ballistic-resistant material should meet UL Standard
752, Level IV, unless a lower level can be justified by an assessment of the risks
based on such factors as adjacent structures and geographic features associated

with the location of chambers. This level may be reduced based on specific
security assessments.
15. Request cleaning crews to clean chambers at the end of the day when court staff is
present, rather than at night.
Best Practice
16. Install CCTV cameras in chambers hallways that lead to the entrance to chambers
areas.
17. If feasible given the existing structure of the court building, establish a secure path
for judges to go from chambers to courtroom (no escorting of in-custody
defendants). If feasible, establish a secure path to escort in-custody defendants
from holding cells to the courtroom without going through chambers hallways.
18. Install ballistic-resistant material in all chambers windows that are located on
floors above ground level.
19. Prohibit cleaning crews from entering chambers unsupervised at any time.
Require cleaning during the day or leave waste baskets outside locked chambers
area doors at night. The judge or court staff should be present when cleaning
crews are physically cleaning/dusting chambers during the day.
TOPIC B-4: COURTROOMS
Phase One
1. Assign at least one CSO on every floor that has one or more courtrooms, dedicated
as a “rover” from one courtroom to the next (unless local or state rules require
additional coverage). There must be at least one CSO or transport officer present
throughout the entire court proceeding whenever an in-custody defendant is
involved.
2. Install duress alarms in the courtroom at accessible locations:
• On top of or under the working surface of the bench, plainly marked
• At the CSO station
• At the clerk’s station
Train judges and staff on the functionality of duress alarms and on the protocols
for use.
3. Test duress alarms regularly (at least monthly).
4. Conduct a sweep in the morning before a proceeding is held and at the end of the
day for all trials to court and trials to jury. (For high-visibility trials, use a dog
trained with the ability to detect guns, bomb materials, and other explosive
contraband.)

5. Secure or remove all metal and glass items inside the courtroom that can be used
as weapons (e.g., scissors, staplers, metal water pitchers, glasses). As substitutes
for these items use Styrofoam or paper products. Use snub nose scissors, bendable
pens for defendants, and smaller staplers.
6. Install and then regularly test emergency lighting/fire equipment in courtrooms.
7. Always keep front and back doors to courtrooms locked when courtroom is not in
use.
8. Use proper and acceptable restraints per state law on in-custody defendants.
9. Prohibit use of camera/cell phones in the courtroom and prohibit other items that
could be used as weapons.
Phase Two

10. Assign at least one CSO to be present in the courtroom whenever there is any court
proceeding being held in the courtroom. A second CSO or transport officer should
be assigned when there is an in-custody defendant present.
11. Install one CCTV camera in criminal and family courtrooms.
• The camera should be installed in the back of the courtroom in order to
monitor activities in the courtroom up to and including the well and bench
area.
12. Holding cells in the courtroom should be properly constructed and escape-proof.
13. Every three or four months, debrief incidents that have occurred in the courtrooms
and review procedures related to courtroom security. This debriefing should take
place in the courtroom. There should be an immediate debriefing on any serious
security incident.
Phase Three
14. A second CSO should be assigned to a courtroom whenever any court proceeding
is being held. Whether or not there is an in-custody defendant, one CSO should be
assigned for the judge and one for the courtroom. A second CSO is not ordinarily
needed for civil cases, unless specifically requested by a judge based on a
determination of a higher risk involved in a particular case.
15. Install one CCTV camera in all remaining courtrooms.
• The camera should be installed in the back of the courtroom to monitor
activities in the courtroom up to and including the well and bench area.
16. Install two CCTV cameras in criminal and family courtrooms.
• One camera should be installed in the back of the courtroom to monitor
• One camera should be installed on the wall in back of the bench to monitor
activities in the courtroom.
17. Begin the process necessary to establish a courtroom in the jail for
advisements/arraignments and other hearings. Use video arraignment* originating

from the jail for in-custody hearings as much as permitted by state law.
*Note: Video arraignment is the preferred solution to bringing in-custody defendants

back and forth for settings and brief hearings.
Best Practice
18. For high-visibility trials, an additional CSO should be assigned to be present in the
courtroom.
19. Use video or a courtroom in the detention center for all arraignments or hearings to
set dates of next appearance.*
*Note: Use of video is the preferred solution to personal appearance by in-custody

defendants whenever legally feasible by state law.
20. Conduct sweeps of all courtrooms, including the random use of trained dogs.
21. Provide separate working offices (not in the courtroom) for clerks and others to
use after courtroom proceedings have been completed.
22. Use bullet-resistant materials when constructing or retrofitting the bench and
workstations inside the courtroom. The most recent recommended standard for
these materials is UL Standard 752 Level III.
23. Install two CCTV cameras in all courtrooms.
• One camera should be installed in the back of the courtroom to monitor
• One camera should be installed on the wall in back of the bench to monitor
activities in the courtroom.
TOPIC B-5: COURT SECURITY OFFICER (CSO) STAFFING LEVELS
Phase One
1. One CSO* should be permanently assigned to the main entrance of the court
building during business hours.
2. One CSO or transport deputy should be assigned to the courtroom while there is an
in-custody defendant in the courtroom.
3. Assign at least one CSO on every floor that has one or more courtrooms, dedicated
as a rover from one courtroom to the next. There must be at least one CSO or
transport officer present throughout the entire court proceeding whenever an in-
custody defendant is involved.
*Note: It is estimated that each CSO post requires approximately 1.33 full-time
employees to cover for sick leave and annual vacation, training, etc.

Phase Two
4. As additional CSOs become available, assign in the following priority per

recommended phases leading up to Best Practices in each relevant topic:
• To meet recommended staffing guidelines at screening station (see

Topic B-1)
• To meet recommended staffing guidelines for the courtroom (see
Topic B-4)
• To meet recommended ratios for transporting in-custody defendants (see
Topic B-8)
• To assign patrols for the interior and exterior of the building (see
Topic D-2)
Best Practice
5. Achieve full recommended staffing guidelines for the following topics:

• Screening stations (see Topic B-1)
• Courtrooms (see Topic B-4)
• Transporting in-custody defendants (see Topic B-8)
• Regular patrols of building interior and exterior (see Topic D-2)
TOPIC B-6: DURESS ALARMS
Phase One
1. Install duress alarms in the courtroom and at the bench, clerk’s station, and CSO
station. Training should be provided on the functionality of duress alarms and on
the protocols for use.
Phase Two
Continue step in Phase One, plus add the following:
2. Install alarms in each chamber and reception area.

3. Install alarms at public counters, cash areas, and other offices where the public has
access, including those without counters.
4. Install alarms in the interview and mediation rooms.
5. Install alarms and 911 contact ability at the childcare center, if the court building
includes such a center.

Phase Three
6. Install alarms at screening stations.

7. Install an alarm in the jury assembly room.
Best Practice
8. Install duress alarms in the holding cell area.

9. Install a duress alarm in the loading dock area.
10. Install a duress alarm in the mailroom.
TOPIC B-7: THREAT AND INCIDENT REPORTING
Phase One
1. Establish a policy requiring incidents to be reported to the appropriate law

enforcement agency and to court administration as soon as feasible. The more
serious the incident, the more quickly it should be reported.
2. Train CSOs and staff in the court building on how to define what an incident is
and how to report incidents verbally and in writing.
3. Develop and use an incident reporting form and submit forms in writing to the
proper authorities, at least on a monthly basis.
Best Practice
4. Implement a practice for periodically evaluating incident reports and making

improvements based on lessons learned from reports with law enforcement
officials and the chairperson of the court security committee (and the committee’s
incident reporting task force).
5. Provide general feedback to staff on incidents, particularly to those who reported
them (e.g., complete the feedback loop).
TOPIC B-8: IN-CUSTODY DEFENDANTS
Phase One
1. Assign at least one CSO or transport deputy to escort in-custody defendant(s)

through all non-secure areas and to clear the path ahead of civilians.
2. Assign one CSO or transport deputy to remain with defendant(s) in the courtroom
at all times.

3. Efforts should be made to modify schedules so in-custody defendants are escorted

through public areas when the presence of people is at a minimum.
4. When transporting in-custody defendant(s) in public hallways, bystanders should
be moved to one side of the hall. When transporting in-custody defendant(s) in a
public elevator, the elevator should be cleared of all other people.
Phase Two
5. Assign a second CSO or transport deputy to escort an in-custody defendant and

clear a pathway. The transport officer closest to the prisoner should be unarmed;
the other officer should be armed.
6. Make sure all holding cells and areas within the court building are appropriately
structured, secured, staffed, and searched daily.
Phase Three
7. Install CCTV cameras along entire in-custody defendants’ escort route.

8. Establish a secure sally port for in-custody defendants entering the building.
Best Practice
9. Establish a secure pathway for a defendant from the transport bus, through the
sally port, to the holding cell and the courtroom to avoid crossing the path of
judges, staff, or public.
TOPIC B-9: TRAINING
Phase One
1. CSOs should be trained in court security responsibilities. CSOs should receive

initial classroom instruction on courtroom security techniques, judicial and staff
protection, security screening activities, firearm operation, and safety and weapons
certification.
2. New judges and court staff should receive an initial court security orientation
briefing that includes emergency procedures, building evacuation routes, building
emergency color code system, and personal safety procedures for work and home.
3. Judges and court staff should be provided with detailed instructions on reporting
threats and incidents received at home or in the court building.

Phase Two
4. All CSOs should receive at least 16 hours of mandatory in-service training on

court security each year.
5. Establish a judge and staff security education program that deals with workplace
violence and personal safety techniques, courtroom security and protection, and
personal safety while at work and at home.
Phase Three
6. In addition to annual qualification with firearms, establish mandatory refresher

court security training programs for CSOs, to include such topics as emergency
response, first-aid, defensive tactics, handcuffing, courtroom security, hostage,
shooter-in-place, and judicial protection.
7. Establish mandatory, ongoing security and safety education programs for judges
and court staff that include such topics as handling difficult people, home safety
techniques, safety practices for inside and outside the court building, hostage
incidents, and emergency evacuation from the court building.
Best Practice
8. In addition to annual qualification with firearms, establish annual mandatory

refresher court security training programs for CSOs to include first-aid, defensive
tactics, handcuffing, courtroom security, and judicial protection.
9. Establish mandatory ongoing security and safety education programs for judges
and court staff that include handling difficult people, high-profile trials, home
safety techniques, safety practices inside and outside the court building, hostage
incidents, travel safety tips, threats, and emergency evacuation from the court
building.
10. Train judges and court staff in self-defense and techniques for hostage-taking
situations.

Category C: Very Important

TOPIC C-1: Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)
Phase One
1. Install a digital and color CCTV camera system* at the entry screening station and
in the courtroom(s) facing the gallery.
*Note: CCTV systems can utilize various kinds of technology to transmit video images
and to provide for system access and control. Cables have been the traditional means of
system connectivity. Newer technologies have emerged over time. Some systems now
utilize an internet protocol (IP) to transmit data and control signals over a fast Ethernet
link. Another technology, virtual local area network (VLAN), allows authorized
personnel to access cameras or a recorder from a remote setting. Courts are encouraged
to explore and adopt the technologies that best suit their needs and budgets.
CCTV cameras should have the following functional capacity:
• Fixed or pan, tilt, zoom. These types of CCTV cameras are typically used
by most courts. Fixed cameras with a wide-angle lens allow for a
stationary focus on areas of interest. The capacity to tilt and pan allows
each camera to maximize its area of coverage, thereby minimizing blind
spots and the number of cameras needed. The ability to zoom allows each
camera to capture a more accurate and close-up picture of what is actually
transpiring in a particular scene.
• Color. This is standard in current systems. Black-and-white images cannot
tell the full story. Important features are indistinguishable. Only with a
color monitor can faces and other specific objects be clearly identified.
• Recording capacity. The CCTV system should have digital video
recording capacity enabling a CSO to view incidences at a later time. This
recording function is essential for identifying perpetrators for the purpose
of apprehension as well as conviction. Recordings should be retained for at
least ten working days.
• Activation issues. The operation and recording function of a camera can be
set to activate by either motion or sound, or by the setting off of duress or
intrusion alarms.
• Signs. Notices should be conspicuously placed to inform the public that
CCTV cameras are operating and recording activity in the area.
Phase Two
Continue the step in Phase One, plus add the following:
2. Install CCTV cameras in detention areas to monitor activities in holding cells.

3. Install CCTV cameras on building perimeters and in secure parking lots.

4. Install CCTV cameras to monitor activity at public counters and in offices where
the public may visit.
Phase Three
5. Install CCTV cameras at the loading dock.

6. Install CCTV cameras in hallways.
7. Install CCTV cameras in each courtroom.
Phase Four
8. Install CCTV cameras in elevators and stairwells.

9. Install CCTV cameras at screening stations.
Best Practice
Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, Three, and Four, plus add the following:
10. Install CCTV cameras in hallways that access chambers.

11. Install CCTV cameras in the mailroom.
12. Install CCTV cameras in the childcare area, if such an area exists.
13. Install CCTV cameras to cover all pathways through which an in-custody
defendant may be escorted.
14. Install CCTV cameras to cover the interior areas of all doors to the court building
and all accessible windows.
TOPIC: C-2 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES
Phase One
1. Use emergency color codes to designate emergency procedures for evacuation.

An example of such a code system is attached as part of the Appendix.
2. Have an emergency, battery-generated lighting system in courtrooms, offices, and
public areas.
3. Have a fire extinguisher on each floor, with egress floor plans posted.
4. Have fire alarms placed on each floor.
5. Have an elevator(s) that meets state and local fire codes, i.e., the national fire code
that was developed after the MGM Grand Hotel, Las Vegas, Nevada fire,
November 21, 1980.

Phase Two
6. Have an emergency generator system that is properly fenced-in and protected.

7. Test generator system monthly; keep a log of tests.
Phase Three
8. Have CCTV cameras installed in the elevator(s).

9. Have automated external defibrillators (AEDs) located accessibly on each floor
and designate a person(s) in the court building who is trained to respond to
medical emergencies (e.g., CPR and use of the AED) as 911 is called.
10. Designate a floor warden on each floor to ensure proper response to emergency
codes.
11. Have an enunciator fire alarm and extinguisher system.
Best Practice
12. Have a floor warden identified and trained on each floor to respond to medical
emergencies (e.g., CPR and use of the AED) as 911 is called.
13. Designate a safe area for a command and control center during an emergency.
14. Consider advising judges and staff by public address system, bull horn, email, or
phone. One method of warning is the use of Court Building Warning Codes; a
sample can be found in the Appendix.
15. Have an evacuation plan that everyone in the court building has been familiarized
with.
16. Have a bomb-threat protocol and a lockdown plan in place.
TOPIC C-3: INTERIOR ACCESS DURING BUSINESS HOURS

(CIRCULATION ZONES)
Phase One
1. Establish the concept of circulation zones (separate areas and routes) for the
following:
• Judges and court staff (e.g., chambers, administration, jury deliberation
rooms, conference rooms, back of public counters, private elevators, secure
stairways)
• In-custody defendant transport (e.g., routes for entering and exiting the

building, to and from holding areas/courtrooms)

• Public (e.g., restrict the public to public zones)
2. All doors that are required to be locked, in accordance with the court buildings
circulation zone concept, should be kept locked at all times. Such doors should
never be left propped open.
3. Have a key or access card system to control access based on a system approved by
the administrative authority of who needs to have access to which areas. Cards or
keys should be issued on the basis of need, not convenience. This system should
• Be under the control of a central authority
• Require background checks for all card or key holders
• Include effective procedures for retrieving keys or canceling cards when
situations change (e.g., employment termination)
Phase Two
4. Eliminate keys and require access cards. Maintenance staff and emergency
responders should retain keys.
5. Establish viewing ports (peepholes) to help prevent non-authorized access through
secured courtroom doors.
6. Improve definition and enforcement of circulation zones.
Phase Three
7. Establish some form of video recognition (phone) system to allow access into
secure areas.
8. Continue to improve definition and enforcement of circulation zones.
9. Install a CCTV camera system in all secure areas in the court building to monitor
activity.
Best Practice
10. Establish and maintain maximum separation among zones (e.g., in-custody
defendants are not escorted through secure hallways; judges do not pass through
public areas when going to and from their cars, through screening, and to and from
chamber areas.)

TOPIC C-4: INTRUSION ALARMS
Phase One
1. All exterior doors should have basic intrusion alarm devices, covering
• All locked doors after hours
• Emergency exit doors during business hours
Phase Two
Continue the step in Phase One, plus add the following:
2. Install intrusion devices on all accessible windows, either glass-break or motion

detector.
Phase Three
Continue the steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:
3. Establish a fully integrated intrusion system with the following functionalities:

• When a court building is closed, every external door should be equipped
with a device that will trigger an alarm at the control center of the
appropriate responding agency and identify the intruded area.
• During business hours, every door that is kept locked should be equipped
with a device that will trigger an alarm that will identify the area intruded
at the command and control center within the building. Every locked door
with an emergency exit bar should trigger an alarm whenever anyone uses
it, with a ten-second delay consistent with local codes
• When the building is closed, this alarm should go to the control center of
the appropriate responding law enforcement agency; when the building is
open, the alarm should go to the building’s command and control center.
• All windows that are reasonably accessible from the exterior perimeter of
the building (e.g., first floor, basement, possibly second floor) should be
protected against intrusion. This can be accomplished with a passive
infrared motion detector (PIR) in each room (or combination of rooms) that
has an accessible window or by attaching a motion sensor to each window.
Best Practice
Continue the steps in Phases One, Two, and Three, plus add the following:
4. Integrate CCTV cameras into the system described above so that cameras will be
activated in the area(s) of intrusion.
TOPIC C-5: JURORS

Phase One
1. Provide jurors with court security information before they report for duty by
placing information on the jury summons they receive. For example:
• Where to enter the court building
• What items (e.g., knives, nail files, scissors) should not be brought into the
court building
• Not to discuss cases with anyone before and during jury service
• Not to wear juror ID badges outside the court building
2. Screen jurors as they enter the court building or before they report to the jury
assembly area.
3. Give a basic security and building evacuation orientation and ID badge to jurors at
the assembly area before going to the courtroom. Cover such matters as what to
do in case of an emergency and how to respond to a coded emergency
announcement.
Phase Two
4. Assign a CSO to the jury room whenever juror payment is being made and when
juror funds are obtained and transported back and forth to the court building.
Best Practice
5. Assign a CSO to provide security inside and outside the jury assembly room when
jurors are present.
6. Assign a CSO to escort jurors to and from the courtroom. If jurors who are
serving on a jury trial are dining as a group outside the court building, a CSO
should accompany them. If an elevator is used to transport jurors, one CSO should
supervise the loading of jurors and another CSO should meet the jurors on the
floor on which they disembark.
7. Assign a CSO to remain with the jury during the entire trial/deliberation.

TOPIC C-6: PARKING

(PARTICULARLY FOR JUDGES)
Phase One
1. Remove all signs in judges’ parking area that identify spots either by name or title
of judge. Any signs should simply say reserved along with a number as
appropriate.
2. Each judge should notify law enforcement officials or a CSO of their arrival in the
morning and be escorted into the court building if they park in an unprotected
public parking lot.
3. Judges should be escorted to the unprotected parking lot by a CSO when they
leave at night.
Phase Two
Continue the steps in Phase One, plus add the following:
4. Fence in the judges’ parking lot and require that an electronic card access system
is used for entrance into the court building. Install privacy slats if a chain-link
fence is used.
5. Judges and court staff should be escorted to their cars or other mode of
transportation after business hours.
Phase Three
Continue the steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:
6. Provide secure parking for judges, court staff, and jurors.

7. Install CCTV cameras in secure parking lots.
8. Provide judges and court staff a regular patrol presence in the parking areas in the
morning, during the lunch hour, and at close of business.
Best Practice
Continue the steps in Phases One, Two, and Three, plus add the following:
9. Provide a secure parking area, preferably covered, for judges where they can
proceed directly from their car, through screening, to their chambers without
traversing any public areas or main court building entrance areas.

TOPIC C-7: PUBLIC COUNTERS AND OFFICES
Phase One
1. Install one or more duress alarms at the main public counter. Train staff on the
functionality of duress alarms and on the protocols for use.
2. Keep window coverings in offices (e.g., drapes, blinds) lowered to restrict
observation from outside.
3. Install Plexiglas-type enclosures at cash counters.
4. Keep cash and checks in a secure, locked area overnight.
Phase Two
5. Install Plexiglas-type enclosures at all public counters.

6. Install duress alarms strategically in the back areas of offices.
7. Keep cash and checks and daily change locked in a safe overnight.
Phase Three
8. Install CCTV cameras at all public counters.

9. Install an alarm on the safe.
Best Practice
10. Install CCTV cameras overlooking the safe.

11. Provide regular security patrols by CSOs at the public counters.

Category D: Important
TOPIC D-1: CASH HANDLING
Phase One
1. Develop and train court staff on procedures for handling cash. The procedures
should:
• Determine who should collect the money
• Determine how to safeguard money during the daytime work hours and
overnight
• Train staff on how to verify checks and reconcile fees
• Determine industry standards for deposits
2. Install protective barriers and duress alarms at cash counters.
3. Use an office safe for money storage.
Phase Two
4. Install CCTV cameras at counters and in the office.
Phase Three
5. Use an armored car service or the bank’s personnel to pick up funds daily.
Best Practice
6. Require two people – one court staff and an armed CSO – when carrying cash.
TOPIC D-2: EXTERIOR/INTERIOR PATROLS
Phase One
1. Request that the local law enforcement agency conduct exterior patrols,
particularly during times when the building is closed.
2. Develop a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with local law enforcement
regarding which agency is responsible to protect the exterior of the court building
during and after business hours.

Phase Two
3. Conduct regular CSO interior patrols by CSOs assigned to work in the court
building, focusing on crowded hallways.
4. Assign CSO exterior patrols both regularly and randomly throughout the day.
Phase Three
5. Continue to increase both interior and exterior CSO patrols of the court building.
Best Practice
6. Require scheduled patrols of all interior and exterior areas 24/7, either by CSOs
or local law enforcement officers.
TOPIC D-3: PERIMETER ISSUES
Phase One
1. Provide for sufficient lighting around the building perimeter, including parking
areas. Lighting should be sufficient to provide a reasonable level of safety for
judges and staff going to and from the court building during hours of darkness. It
should also be sufficient for perimeter CCTV cameras to capture images.
2. Keep doors locked after hours and allow access only via appropriately authorized
key or access cards.
3. Keep all shrubbery and trees properly trimmed to prevent hiding places or access
to the court building roof for persons or packages.
4. Conduct daily security checks around the perimeter.
Phase Two
Continue steps in Phase One, plus add the following:
5. Provide a secure parking area for judges with signs that do not indicate that the
space is being used by a judge (e.g., signs should not say for official use only).
6. Install intrusion alarms to cover all exterior doors and accessible windows.

Phase Three
Continue steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:
7. Install CCTV cameras around the perimeter (at each corner of the court building).
8. Install bollards as necessary outside selected (main) entrance doors, ground floor
(accessible) windows, and other vulnerable areas.
9. Enclose and secure all exposed utilities.
Best Practice
Continue steps in Phases One, Two, and Three, plus add the following:
10. Replace keys with an electronic card access system (except for back-up
emergency) on exterior door entrances to the court building.
11. Provide secure parking for staff and jurors. Secure parking for judges and staff
should have the following attributes:
• Protected from public access
• Protected from public view
• Required electronic access, by way of card or other appropriate device
• CCTV cameras in place and operating
TOPIC D-4: PUBLIC LOBBIES, HALLWAYS, STAIRWELLS,

AND ELEVATORS
Phase One
1. Provide emergency lighting in the court building.

2. Establish egress/ingress standards regarding stairwells, hallways, and elevators.
3. Establish emergency procedure and evacuation diagrams.
Phase Two
4. Designate secure and public elevators.

• Provide secure elevator(s) for judges.
• Provide secure elevator for prisoner transport.
5. Install appropriate signage to alert the public to what items cannot be brought into
the court building (i.e., guns, knives, scissors).

Best Practice
6. Install CCTV cameras in lobbies, hallways, stairwells, and elevators in the court
building and provide secure elevator(s) with electronic card access.
7. Assign a CSO to regularly patrol these areas in accordance with an assigned
schedule.
8. Install a public address system in the building to facilitate announcements and
emergency codes.
TOPIC D-5: SCREENING MAIL AND PACKAGES
Phase One
1. Provide routine visual inspection of all mail/packages coming into the court
building, to include addressee verification and examination of suspicious items.
2. Require staff to attend training on postal security and package identification
techniques provided by the United States Postal Service (USPS).
3. Develop and practice a response protocol with law enforcement when a package is
identified as suspicious or dangerous.
Phase Two
4. Require all mail and packages to be processed through an x-ray machine.

5. Require everyone delivering mail or packages to pass through the magnetometer.
Best Practice
6. Best practice is to establish a single and separate offsite screening station or

location for all mail and packages delivered to the court building. It may not be
feasible for smaller courts to have an offsite location dedicated exclusively to its
use. Smaller courts may work with the USPS, county, or other local officials to
find shared offsite space for this purpose. Best practices for operating the
mailroom for larger courts include the following:
• All mail, packages, and parcels from USPS, FedEx, UPS, DHL, and other
carriers should be thoroughly screened (x-ray and explosive trace detector,
if suspicious) upon being received at the mailroom. This includes USPS
mail delivered/picked up by court staff from the local post office.

• Deliveries of flowers, candy, food, gifts, etc., to any person located in a

court building should be cleared through the mailroom first, be verified and
vouched for by the recipient, screened as appropriate, and then delivered.
• Mailroom staff should sort incoming mail and packages off site by
building, division, and/or department and prepare them for acceptance by
designated representatives of each court office or division.
• Designated representatives of each court office or division should go to the
mailroom, pick up mail for distribution to their offices, and identify
questionable items. All authorized court and other staff mail handlers
should attend training on handling suspicious mail. Local USPS or postal
inspectors may conduct advanced training for state and local government
agencies.

Sample Court Building Color Codes
Professional emergency responders advise that, as much as possible,

communication during an emergency should be clear, understandable, and simple.
Presently, state and local courts use different warning systems and language to advise
court building occupants what to do during an emergency. The decision whether to stay
or leave a court building during an emergency often can be the difference between life
and death.
Realizing that clear communication and understandable instructions are vital,

courts have been advised by the NCSC to use universal color codes and practice drills to
augment their existing evacuation procedures. Using the same color-coded language in
every court building will ensure that employees will understand and react properly to
emergencies.
• Code Yellow – Situational Awareness

o Cautionary: Be aware and prepared to react to danger.
o A dangerous situation may be developing in the court building.
• Code Red – Imminent Danger

o Stay put! An active shooter is in the court building or there is a hostage
situation.
o Get into an emergency protective posture or in a safe haven.
• Code Green – Emergency – Evacuate Building

o Listen to instructions from your floor warden.
o Report to your assigned location away from court building.
• Code Blue – Emergency Team Responding

o An emergency team is responding to or is in the court building.
o Wait for further instructions from officials.
• Code White – Administrative/Informational

o Return to normal operations.
o All is well.

Appendix C
Home Security Audit and Recommendations
A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on C-1

HOME SECURITY AUDIT AND

RECOMMENDATIONS
Even though reports indicate that judges and other judicial branch personnel are more
likely to be injured in a fall at home or in an automobile accident than in a work-related
assault, increased violence in recent years has resulted in three judges being murdered at
home. These deaths were directly connected to cases over which they presided. The home
security audit that follows is designed to identify security risks and provide judges and
other judicial branch personnel with basic personal security recommendations that can be
used to protect them and their homes.
PERIMETERS/EXTERIOR OF THE HOME

1. Does the home have perimeter lighting? Yes No
Recommendation: It is important that the entire yard is

illuminated at night, without shadows.
Recommendation: Install motion detector lights for interior and

exterior protection. Outside motion detector lights can be
installed to automatically turn on interior lights, giving the
impression someone has entered a room, at the same time the
outside lights turn on.
2. Does the home have trees and shrubs that are overgrown to the Yes No
point where they block easy view from within?
Recommendation: Trim or remove thick shrubbery from

window areas and replace them with shrubs that have thorns, like
roses, near windows.
Recommendation: Trim or remove trees that may provide

access to upper floor windows or balconies, and make sure trees
or shrubs do not block a clear view of entries and windows from
the street.
3. Does the home have outbuildings (detached garage, pool house, Yes No
storage buildings) located on the property?
Recommendation: Include all outbuildings into the main

security system. Install quality residential locks on the buildings.

4. Do all perimeter doors provide protection from intruders? Yes No
Recommendation: All perimeter doors should be solid core

wood or steel with a deadbolt lock, in addition to any other
locking device.
The door should have a peep hole installed to view any visitors
prior to granting access to the home. No glass should be on the
door that can be broken to gain entry. It is important that a three-
inch strike plate for screws be installed in all entry doors.
Recommendation: Secure sliding glass doors with pins to

prevent both horizontal and vertical movement, especially when
the home is left vacant for an extended period of time. Sliding
glass doors should be hung so that the sliding door is mounted on
the inside. The door should be reinforced with a “jimmy-proof”
bar to prevent forced entry.
Recommendation: Re-key or replace locks if keys are lost or

stolen or if you move into a previously occupied residence. Make
sure that you follow strict key control with keys used to access
the home.
Recommendation: Be sure to restrict the number of keys to your

residence. Keep keys in your possession. Do not hide keys
outside under the mat, over doors, in mail slots, or in potted
plants.
5. Are basement windows to the home secured? Yes No
Recommendation: All basement windows should be secured

from inside the home. Glass basement windows should be
replaced by polycarbonate material or reinforced with decorative
security bars. All ground shrubs in proximity to the basement
windows should be trimmed or removed so that they do not
provide potential intruders with cover from observation.
6. Does the home have an attached garage? Yes No
Recommendation: Whenever possible, park vehicles in the

garage. Always enter the vehicle from inside the garage. Always
keep the garage doors closed and locked when not in use. In
order to limit your exposure outside the vehicle during the hours
of darkness, install an automatic garage door opener and make
sure all family members know how to operate the garage door

manually in the event of an emergency. Ensure that the door

from the garage into the main house itself is a solid core door
with a deadbolt locking device.
Recommendation: If there is a vehicle parked outside, make

sure the area is well-lighted. If at all possible, have a remote
starter installed in all vehicles, especially if they are parked
outside. This device will allow you to start your vehicle from a
safe distance.
7. Does the mail box or the entry of the home personally identify Yes No
the occupants?
Recommendation: Remove any identifying information from the mail box or

entry of the home.
INTERIOR OF THE HOME

1. Does the home have an anti-intrusion alarm system? Yes No
Recommendation: Consider installing an anti-intrusion alarm

system in the home that is tied into the local police department
or a certified central alarm monitoring organization. Instruct
family members on the operation of the system. Consider
installing a local enunciation system or siren. The advantage of a
siren is to alert neighbors to notify authorities, should the direct-
connect alarm lines be compromised.
Recommendation: As an added security measure, alarm

systems can be customized to provide monitoring for fire,
medical alert, and closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance
of home exterior. The presence of cameras on the outside of the
home is a definite deterrent to would-be intruders.
Recommendation: If you have a monitored intrusion detection

system, display the monitoring company’s decal or sign
prominently on doors, windows, and in the yard to announce the
presence of a security alarm system in the home.
2. Do you have smoke/heat detectors installed throughout the Yes No

home?
Recommendation: Smoke alarms and heat detectors should be

installed throughout the home. They should be hard-wired into
the home’s electrical system with a battery backup in the event

of a power failure. In addition, install and maintain all-purpose

fire extinguishers throughout the home, especially in the kitchen.
Recommendation: Establish and periodically test fire

evacuation procedures for all family members.
3. Is the exterior door leading from the basement to the upper floor Yes No
made of solid core and equipped with a deadbolt lock?
Recommendation: As with other exterior doors in the home, it

is important that the basement door be of solid core wood or
steel construction and equipped with a quality deadbolt lock to
prevent entry by intruders.
4. Can the interior of the home be accessed through windows or Yes No

other openings from the second floor or roof?
Recommendation: All second floor windows and roof skylights

must be secured to prevent access by intruders who could use
drainpipes and other means to access the roof or upper floors.
5. Does the home have louver-type windows? Yes No
Recommendation: Louver windows should be replaced with

solid windows made with tempered or shatterproof material.
6. Do all windows have adequate window coverings? Yes No
Recommendation: Windows should be equipped with internal

blinds, curtains, drapes, or shutters to prevent someone from
seeing inside.
CONDOMINIUM AND APARTMENT SECURITY

Security in condominium and apartment complexes must be a cooperative effort between
residents, management, maintenance workers, and police. All must work together to
provide the best possible security for the building. Most of the recommendations for
single-family dwellings apply to condominiums and apartment complexes. The following
is an audit that is particular to those type buildings.
1. Do all doors and windows have locks that will secure the Yes No
condominium/apartment while it is vacant?
Recommendation: Examine all locks on doors and windows to

ensure they are working properly. Before leaving the

condominium/apartment, make sure all doors and windows are
locked. Always double-check locked access windows that are at
ground level.
2. Does your complex have a separate “Laundromat” area? Yes No
Recommendation: If at all possible, avoid using the

Laundromat in your complex by yourself. Always team up with
a neighbor who you know and trust.
3. Does your complex have a building association or a way to alert Yes No

residents of an emergency?
Recommendation: Develop an apartment alert system with

neighbors in the complex to help protect each other’s property. A
well-organized and active tenant association will assist in
deterring intruders.
Recommendation: Get to know the tenants in the complex.

After you meet them, make a personal contact list for future use.
4. Does the complex have an electronic access system to control Yes No

entry into the building?
Recommendation: Do not allow access to strangers by

“buzzing” them into the building. If someone enters the building
by following you in, and that person is unknown to you, do not
ride the elevator with them. If needed, exit the building and then
re-enter later.
Recommendation: Report suspicious strangers, sounds, or

actions to police, then notify the complex manager.
MAIL SECURITY
If you receive mail at your home, be wary of suspicious letters or packages. Do not open
a letter that appears to be unusual in any way, particularly if it has a perceptible bump,
which might be an explosive device. Notify law enforcement immediately of any
unexplained package in or near your home. You should notify law enforcement when
mail items have any suspicious features, such as:
• Excessive weight, size, or postage
• Springiness in the top, bottom, or sides of the envelope
• Wires or strings protruding from or attached to the envelope
• Envelope has uneven balance or a peculiar odor

• Stiffening of an envelope with cards or other material (such stiffening could be a

spring-loaded explosive striker)
• No return address or the place of origin is unusual or unknown
• Name is misspelled
All such items should be isolated. Only trained law enforcement professionals should be
allowed to open suspicious mail.
FAMILY SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation: If at all possible, your home telephone number should be unlisted.
Recommendation: Family members, including care givers, should never tell anyone you
are out of the house. They should be instructed to only take messages from callers.
Recommendation: Emergency police and fire numbers should be programmed into the
telephone using the “In Case of Emergency” (ICE) concept. If you do not have a
programmable phone, you should post emergency numbers near the main telephone in
the home.
Recommendation: Do not discuss family plans with outsiders. Even your friends should
not be informed. In general, do not discuss your family’s comings and goings.
Recommendation: Family members should not stop at the same supermarket at the same
time on the same day each week. Vary your daily activities.
Recommendation: Children should be instructed not to open doors to strangers. All

visitors should be viewed through a peephole with the door locked. Intercom systems
should be used to aid in the identification of strangers.
Recommendation: If it is necessary to leave children at home, keep the house well-

lighted and notify the neighbors.
Recommendation: Advise your children to:

• Never leave home without advising parents where they will be and who will
accompany them.
• Travel in pairs or groups.
• Walk along busy streets and avoid isolated areas.
• Use play areas where recreational activities are supervised by responsible adults
and where police protection is readily available.
• Refuse automobile rides from strangers and refuse to accompany strangers
anywhere on foot — even if the strangers say mom or dad sent them or said it was
okay.

• Report immediately to the nearest person of authority (teacher or police) anyone

who attempts to molest or annoy a child.
Recommendation: Be wary of strangers. Be watchful of strange cars that seem to cruise

the neighborhood or strange persons who suddenly start to frequent the neighborhood
streets. Record information that may be helpful to police.
Recommendation: Observe cars parked in the neighborhood with one or more persons
inside or persons who seem to be doing nothing in particular.
Recommendation: Never reveal to any stranger that you are home alone.
Recommendation: Know where your children are at all times. Maintain a daily itinerary
and stress the importance of notifying other family members of changes in the schedule.
Recommendation: As mentioned above, have unlisted telephone numbers for ALL

family members.
Recommendation: Always request salesmen, repairmen, meter readers, delivery

personnel, and even policemen (in civilian clothes) to show their identification prior to
admitting them into your home. If in doubt about their identity, place a call to their
business to confirm employment. Never accept a phone number that they offer; always
use the telephone directory or call the information operator.
Recommendation: Do not put your home telephone number on stationary or on any

name and address stickers in order to preclude undesirable telephone calls.
Recommendation: When harassing or obscene telephone calls are received, take action
to change your phone number immediately. Family members should never engage in a
telephone conversation with unknown or unidentified persons.
Recommendation: Children must follow a school schedule, but if they are driven to
school, varied routes should be followed. Children should be escorted to and from bus
stops. Neither hiking nor walking to school is recommended.
Recommendation: Inform school authorities that children should not be released from
school, athletic events, and club meetings on the strength of a telephone call. Advise the
school authorities to confirm the call with your home or office.
Recommendation: Instruct the school administration that if an authorized person does

not explain a child’s absence from school shortly after school starts, they are to call the
child’s home or your office to determine the child’s status.
Recommendation: Do not open doors to strangers or accept delivery of packages unless

the sender is known. Instruct children and in-home help on this procedure. Install a chain

lock on the main entry door so that you may accept small packages or letters by partially
opening the door. Do not rely heavily on this type of lock, as an intruder can break them
away by forcing the door.
Recommendation: Check references of service personnel, domestics and childcare

providers, and any other employees who have routine access to your residence or
property.
Recommendation: When receiving a wrong number telephone call, never give your
name or number. Just state that the caller has the wrong number.
Recommendation: When a stranger requests to use your telephone for an emergency,

never allow entry into the home. Offer to summon assistance, and use the phone yourself.
Recommendation: Never answer your telephone with your name; a simple hello is
acceptable.
Recommendation: Report all suspicious activity to the local police.
TRAVEL RECOMMENDATIONS
Whether you are going to the store or Europe, the fact that you have left your home or
office changes your security status SIGNIFICANTLY. Travel decreases your security
because you are not adhering to your routine, but instead, you are exposed to unfamiliar
surroundings. If you plan to travel outside your home area or overseas, you should check
with your director of security for additional security measures that can be taken to protect
you and your family.
VEHICULAR TRAVEL RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation: Do not pick up strangers or give a ride to a stranger or volunteer your
car to a group of strangers even though you may have a friend with you in the car.
Recommendation: If you should have car trouble on the road, drive to the side of the
road and place a handkerchief or white cloth on the radio antenna or door facing traffic.
Either place a cell phone call or wait for help to come.
Recommendation: If you are driving and an attempt is made to force you off the road,
move toward the center of the roadway and quickly proceed to a busy street and seek
assistance. As you proceed, blow your horn to attract attention to your plight.
Recommendation: Do not stop to aid other motorists or pedestrians, regardless of the

circumstances. If you believe the emergency is genuine, use a cell phone or proceed to a
public phone and report the matter to authorities, then let them handle the emergency.

Recommendation: If you suspect you are being followed:

• Circle the block to confirm the surveillance.
• Do not stop or take other actions that could lead to a confrontation.
• Do not drive home.
• Do not try to evade or elude the follower.
• Obtain a description of the vehicle and its occupants.
• Go to the nearest police or fire station and report the incident.
• Have an alternative safe place to go in the event you cannot get to the police
station.
• Report the incident to police once you are safe.
Recommendation: Avoid using magnetic key boxes hidden in the wheel well of your
car.
Recommendation: Park your car in a secured garage; do not park your car on a public
street.
GENERAL SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation: Place the police emergency telephone number (911) and the police
non-emergency number next to the phone in your home for immediate use; program it
into your telephone system if possible. Do not answer the telephone with your name or
official title.
Recommendation: Ladders and scaffolding should be kept in locked outbuildings or

garages.
Recommendation: Advise the local police department of your occupation and address.
Complete and submit a judicial profile for you and your family (attached), to the chief
security officer for use in emergencies. Judicial profiles should be protected as
“confidential-restricted access” documents.
Recommendation: Consider moving all fuse and switch boxes into the home if possible.
Place locks on those that remain outside or in outbuildings/garages.
Recommendation: Consider a trained watchdog for the family residence. In addition to

being a natural deterrent, it is another means of alarming the home.
Recommendation: Be constantly aware of surveillance. Usually a potential victim is

watched for several days before an act of violence is carried out.
Recommendation: Prepare an inventory of household and personal possessions,

describing the articles and listing the serial numbers for reference.

Recommendation: In order that personal items (jewelry, appliances, TV sets, radios,

etc.) can be identified if lost or stolen, a code number should be engraved on each item
with an etching machine.
Recommendation: A small safe or security box, which can be bolted down to a closet
floor, should be used to secure personal jewelry, cash, and personal documents that are
frequently used. Consider a safety deposit box for items used less frequently.
Recommendation: When the home is left vacant, install timers on televisions, radios,
and lights in order to give the impression that the home is occupied.
Recommendation: Have “Caller ID” for incoming telephone calls to your home. Use
“Caller ID” blocking to prevent your telephone number from being displayed on outgoing
calls.
Recommendation: Become familiar with the streets and roads surrounding your home.
Have a planned escape route from your home to a designated safe place in case of fire or
intrusion.
Recommendation: Plan and practice driving to area emergency services, such as

hospitals, police stations, and safe places.
Recommendation: Make sure your trash is kept in a secure place, such as a locked
outbuilding.
Recommendation: Keep the names, addresses, and telephone numbers for all staff
members handy in the event of an emergency.
Recommendation: If you have household employees, make sure they have been
screened with background checks.
For further information contact:

Court Consulting Services
707 17th Street – Suite 2900
Denver, CO 80202
(303) 305-4315
This document was prepared by Jim O’Neil, NCSC Consultant
Revised: February 2009

Appendix D
Model Disaster Recovery Plan Forms
The following section presents sample forms that can be used for the development
of a disaster plan regarding the preservations of electronic and hard copies of records in a
state court system. The samples contained herein could be made part of pre-service for
new employees and in-service training for court staff.
A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on D-1

Disaster Planning and Recovery Worksheets
Worksheet Name Content of worksheet and Instructions Page

PRE-DISASTER DOCUMENTATION
A set of worksheets should be completed for each court
location. This set should be updated annually.
Emergency Telephone contact for persons and agencies that must be

Telephone List notified of the event
Disaster Team List of names and 24-hour contact information for court
Assignments disaster team members
Equipment Supply Emergency supplies and equipment
List
External 24-hour contact information for vendors or others who are
Equipment able to supply resources or equipment
Contacts
Floor Plan Diagram of the court and/or vault annotated to show the
location of computer equipment as well as records
Records A survey of the building, inside and out, especially noting
Environment Risk leaks, broken windows and doors, dirt, extraneous materials,
Assessment damaged furnishings, and other potential hazards
Evacuation Plan Security plan to evacuate building, a fundamental part of the
court’s COOP
Records Inventory Inventory of court and administrative records in the area –
both electronic and hard copy – including record series
titles and dates
DISASTER RESPONSE DOCUMENTATION
These worksheets are completed during the recovery and
salvage process.
General A list of steps to be taken when a disaster occurs for the
Procedures During recovery of both electronic records and hard copy
a Disaster
Damage A report used to determine salvage priorities that is
Assessment Report composed of a description of the problem created
immediately after the event, including an estimate of the
scope of the damage, the records involved, and the
magnitude of the damage
Priority Listing Listing of records to be treated, arranged by priority
Interim Inventory A list of the new location of records removed from the usual
location for treatment, a list that must be updated as records
are treated and returned or marked as unsalvageable
Disaster Log Chronological record of actions taken, records involved, and
responsible individuals

Emergency Telephone Numbers
Date completed___________________
Form completed by
Agency Contact and Telephone Numbers

alternative if needed
Court Administration
Police
Fire Department
Medical Assistance
Ambulance
Other Government
Officer
Maintenance Training
and Security Company
Internet Service Provider
Judiciary IT Services
Judicial Security Services
Disaster Team Leaders

Disaster Team Assignments and Responsibilities
Date completed__________
Location____________
Team Title Responsibilities Contact

Member Information
Name
Team Leader(s) Individuals with authority to make decisions
and to direct others during the disaster and
salvage operations. Assign tasks to
individuals; perform priority assessment,
direct contacts with outside authorities and
vendors. Supervise recovery. These
individuals are responsible for pre-disaster
planning and disaster manual completion
for a courthouse. Responsible for the safe
evacuation of the building and identification
of the location of vital records, both
electronic and hard copy.
Backup Team Serves as a back up to the team leader(s)
Leader(s) responsible for carrying out leader functions
in the absence of the leader. Must have a
thorough knowledge of the plan and the
resources available.
Team Recorder Team member responsible for completion
of logs and documents describing the
actions undertaken during the disaster
assessment and recovery process. This
team member is responsible for annotating
the movement of records from disaster site
to temporary repair location and return.
Team Responsible for communicating information
Communications to judges, court personnel, and outside
Officer media regarding the status of recovery and
the extent of damage of electronic and hard
copy records.
Team Member Responsibilities as assigned.
Team Member Responsibilities as assigned.

External Vendor Contact Information
Date _________
Function or Name and Address Telephone or

Procedure Contact Person Emergency
Access Number
Transport - trucks
and equipment to
transport boxes of
records and/or
computer equipment
Freezer or cold
storage location for
hard copies
Freeze-drying
contractor for hard
copies
Portable generators
to borrow or lease
for backup
electricity
Food services
(for workers)
Refrigerated trucks
Conservationist
Pest control
Fumigation services
Salvage services
Trash removal
Alternative location
for air drying
Electrical
contractors
Computer
restoration experts

General Procedures for Hard Copy Records Recovery and Salvage

1. Make sure persons are safe and out of the area.
2. Notify the appropriate persons and agencies of the event. DO NOT try to re-enter
a building or handle records until the police and/or fire department indicate that it
is safe to enter. Notify the disaster team and administrative officers.
3. Create an assessment report that describes the damage to the structure and
materials.
4. Do not remove any records from the area until the priority plan is complete.
5. Create a priority assessment listing the sequence of steps to be taken.
6. Identify a location where records recovery work can take place.
7. DO NOT TRY TO REPAIR RECORDS IN THE DISASTER AREA. All records
must be removed to avoid the possibility of additional damage.
8. Try not to exacerbate the damage during the removal process.
9. Document the records being removed. Label the floor plan and note on the
disaster log the record type and date, original location, and location in the
recovery area.
10. Salvage damaged materials appropriately according to the type of damage.
11. Repair the damaged location.
12. Return materials to the damaged area after inspection.
13. Maintain a disaster log describing actions for future reference.
14. Prepare a disaster report summarizing the event; include advice and analysis of
procedures.
15. Replace any emergency equipment or supplies.
Floor Plan
The floor plan of the court should be available in electronic format and in hard
copy to help rescue personnel and other professionals physically respond to a disaster or
emergency. It should help identify potential problems in addition to providing an
overview of the physical layout as well as the location of outlets, master switches, vaults,
staircases, windows, and computer equipment. The locations of records, especially
confidential and sealed records, should be noted on the plan. The floor plan should be
updated annually and copies kept with first responders.

Appendix E
Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania

Security Incident Fact Sheet
A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on E-1




Appendix F
Sample Memorandum of Understanding
A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on F-1

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
BETWEEN
THE (Name of County/Parish)
AND
(Name of Court)
FOR A TEMPORARY COURT SITE IN THE EVENT OF DISASTER
This Memorandum of Understanding is made and entered into on the ___day of

(month), 20__, by and between the County/Parish and the Court.
(1) The County/Parish hereby recognizes the need for the preservation of access to
justice for all citizens, judicial efficiency and judicial responsiveness, public
health, safety and welfare afforded the citizens of this County/Parish as is
necessary to respond to the needs of the public in the event of a disaster to the
Court building , located at (address) .
(2) Certain space and equipment within the (title of building[s]), located at
(address), shall be made temporarily available for use by the Court in the event
the Court Building is seriously damaged and/or destroyed in an event primarily
isolated to the Court building and not a County/Parish-wide disaster or emergency
event.
(3) The Court shall have the use of courtroom(s) (building[s]) to be designated if
the need arises.
(4) Any equipment owned by the County/Parish may be used by the Court and its
employees subject to the security and operating rules and regulations of the
County/Parish.
(5) All employees working for or with the judges of Court shall remain Court
employees.
(6) The day-to-day Court management activities shall be under the direction and
control of one Court employee or judge designated by the Court to serve as its
"Judicial Administrator". This person shall be responsible for the day-to-day
administrative oversight, control, and guidance of all aspects of the use of the
County/Parish property and equipment under this Agreement.
(7) The Court is permitted to deliver for its own exclusive use such chairs, desks, and
computer equipment as is necessary to properly function.

(8) The Court shall be responsible for all maintenance, upkeep, repairs and technical
and engineering assistance on its own equipment during the term of this
Agreement. The Court shall also be responsible for the maintenance, upkeep and
repair of County/Parish equipment they may use, beyond normal wear and tear,
provided that the County/Parish equipment is used exclusively and/or primarily
by the Court.
(9) The Court is entitled to remove and shall remove all of its movable equipment
from the building at the termination of this Agreement. The County/Parish shall
have no claim or interest in any movable that is owned by the Court.
(10) The Court's movables shall be insured at its own expense.
(11) The Court will arrange for courtroom security as is customary for its day-to-day
operations at the Court's expense.
(12) Any additional costs incurred by the County/Parish to house the Court such as,
but not limited to, water, gas, and electricity, will be reimbursed to the
County/Parish from the Court's adopted budget.
(13) The Court will be responsible for any damages of any nature deemed as more than
normal wear and tear.
TERMINATION
This agreement may be terminated by either party at any time within thirty (30) days
written notice or as otherwise stated herein. All notices shall be sent to the undersigned
parties by certified mail, return receipt requested.
REMEDIES FOR DEFAULT
Any claim or controversy arising out of this agreement shall be resolved as per law.
Venue and jurisdiction shall be the (designate jurisdiction) .
ASSIGNMENT
No party herein shall assign any interest in the same (whether by assignment or notation).
TERM OF AGREEMENT
This Agreement shall remain in full force and effect unless terminated by one or both of
the parties to this Agreement.

DISCRIMINATION CLAUSE
The County/Parish and Court agree not to discriminate in their respective employment
practices, and will render services under this Agreement without regard to race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, veteran status, political affiliation, disabilities.
INDEMNIFICATION
The Court and County/Parish both agree to indemnify, hold harmless and defend each
other, and their respective officers, agents, servants, attorneys and employees from and
against any and all claims, demands, losses, suits, damages, judgments, costs and
expenses whether, indirect or consequential and including but not limited to all fees,
expenses and charges of attorneys and other professionals, as well as court costs and
expenses, for actions or inactions arising out of, in connection with or resulting from the
use of the (building identified above) hereinafter arising from claims or violations
resulting from such usage in the course and scope of this Agreement for any employee
and/or loaned employee that may be due to and caused in whole or in part by any act,
error, or commission or commission of any act by negligence or otherwise while
performing services.
SEVERABILITY
If any term or clause herein is deemed unenforceable or invalid for any reason
whatsoever, then that portion shall be severable and the remainder shall remain in full
force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement as of this ___ day
of (month),___, 20__.
County/Parish Court
By By
WITNESS:


CCJ Cosca 2012 Court Security Handbook Revised September 2012

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CCJ Cosca 2012 Court Security Handbook Revised September 2012

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CCJ/COSCA

Court Security Handbook

PUBLISHED JUNE 2010

Prepared Under the Auspices of the

Chapter One: Standard Operating Procedures ................................................................ 1-1

Chapter Two: The Self-Audit ......................................................................................... 2-1

Chapter Three: Emergency Preparedness and Response:

Chapter Four: Disaster Recovery—Essential Elements of a Plan .................................. 4-1

Chapter Five: Threat Assessment ................................................................................... 5-1

Chapter Six: Incident Reporting ..................................................................................... 6-1

Chapter Seven: Funding for Court Security.................................................................... 7-1

Chapter Eight: Security Equipment and Costs................................................................ 8-1

Chapter Nine: Resources/Partnerships ............................................................................ 9-1

Chapter Ten: New Courthouse Design ......................................................................... 10-1

Appendix A: Representative Sample of Guidelines from State Court

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on i

Thomas J. Moyer (dec.) OH, Co-Chair Zygmont A. Pines, PA, Co-Chair

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on ii

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on iii

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on iv

In October 2003, the Committee conducted a survey of the states to determine

Element 1 - Operational Security: Standard Operating Procedures

Element 2 - Facility Security Planning: The Self-Audit Survey of Court Facilities

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on v

Element 3 - Emergency Preparedness and Response: Continuity of Operations

Element 4 - Disaster Recovery: Essential Elements of a Plan

Element 5 - Threat Assessment

Element 6 - Incident Reporting

Element 8 - Security Equipment and Costs

Element 9 - Resources and Partnerships

Element 10 - New Courthouse Design

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on vi

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on vii

• A list of additional references/resources: where to look for more expansive and

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on viii

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT for COURTS

Strategy for a Comprehensive Emergency Preparedness Program

To institutionalize an approach to emergency preparedness that ensures that Court entities

Test, Training, and Exercises

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on ix

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on x

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on xi

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on xii

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on xiii

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on xiv

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on xv

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on xvi

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on xvii

Chapter 1: Standard Operating Procedures

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on 1-1

Topic 1: Leadership/Commitment/The Security Plan

Topic 2: Collaboration and Coordination

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on 1-2

Topic 3: Self-Assessment (Audits)

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on 1-3

Security self-assessments are discussed in detail in Chapter 2, “The Self-Audit,”

Topic 4: Security Personnel (Staffing)

Topic 5: Physical Security (Perimeter, entry, and interior areas)

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on 1-4

A Publication of the CCJ/COSCA Joint Committee on 1-5

Topic 6: Incident Reporting and Recording

Topic 7: Records and Information