Evidence Digests 1

People v.
Bowley (1963) 2
Jose v. CA (2000) 4
Tangan v. CA (2002) 6
People v. Amestuzo (2001) 7
Maturillas v. People (2006) 9
Reyes v. CA (2012) 12
People v. Freddie Ladip (2014) 15
People v. Hermanos Constantino (2014) 17
People v. Abetong (2014) 19
NAPOCOR v. Codilla (2007) 21
Aznar v. Citibank 23
Ang v. CA 25
Atienza v. Board of Medicine (2011) 26
EDSA Shangri-La Hotel and Resort vs BF Construction (2008) 28
Chua Gaw v. Chua (2008) 31
Citibank vs Sebaniano (2006) 33
Ebreo v. Ebreo 35
DECS v. Del Rosario (2005) 37
Asuncion v. NLRC (2001) 39
Governemnt v. Martinez (1918) 41
Paylago v. Jarabe (1968) 44
Baroda v. State Bank 46
Municipality of Victorias v. CA (1987) 48
Rodelas v. Aranza (1982) 51
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
ATENEO LAW 3-B BATCH 2017 1 ATTY. EUGENIO VILLAREAL
PEOPLE V. BOWLEY (1963)
59 Cal.2d 855, June 18, 1963
Digest Author: Katherine Ababa
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff-Respondents: The People
‣ Defendant-Appellants: Walter Bowley
FACTS
‣ A woman named Joan was the only witness for the prosecution in the case against Walter Bowley.
‣ Joan testified that on Apr 1960, Bowley’s brother employed her to participate in a film which was to be shot at the
Beaumont Studio in San Francisco.
‣ She stated that she went to the studio, had her picture taken, and voluntarily engaged in an act of oral copulation
with Bowley’s sexual organ, in addition to other sexual activities.
‣ A film claiming to show these activities was produced. Joan testified that she had seen portions of the film and
that those portions accurately represented what took place during its making.
‣ Over objection, the film was introduced into evidence and shown to the jury.
‣ Joan admitted that the film was the one which captured her participation in the events which occurred on Apr
1960 at the Beaumont Studio.
‣ She also testified that Bowley was the male in the film whose face was covered with a coat of dark grease, whose
hair was covered with a cloth turban, and with whom frequent acts in violation of Section 288a of the Penal Code
were shown.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N Joan’s testimony may be admitted into evidence. → YES
‣ W/N the film may be admitted into evidence. → YES
RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

‣ Joan was an accomplice. As such, her testimony must be corroborated. This requirement is based on the fear that
an accomplice may be motivated to falsify his testimony in the hope of securing leniency for himself.
‣ While the jurors may have moral certainty over the guilt of the accused, the statute expressly requires that there
be corroborative evidence to the testimony of an accomplice in order that he may be convicted. This requirement
is based on the theory that accomplice testimony, usually given in the hope or expectation of lenience or
immunity, is untrustworthy and should be viewed with caution.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

‣ However, the fact that a witness is an accomplice does not affect the admissibility or competency of his testimony.
It goes only to its weight and credibility in sustaining conviction. The fact that the foundation for the introduction
of the film into evidence was laid by an accomplice is not, therefore, a ground for objecting to the introduction of
the film into evidence.
‣ Although Joan may have testified to two separate scenes in the film, an analysis of the said film reveals that an act
of oral copulation (the illegal act charged) with an identifiable male is portrayed in each portion.
‣ It is well settled that the testimony of a person who was present at the time a film was made that it accurately
depicts what it purports to show is a legally sufficient foundation for its admission into evidence. The film was
therefore properly admitted into evidence.
‣ In admitting photographs into evidence, it is recognized that photographs are useful for different purposes. When
admitted merely to aid a witness in explaining his testimony they are nothing more than the illustrated testimony
of that witness. But they may also be used as probative evidence of what they depict. Used in this manner they
take on the status of independent "silent" witnesses.
‣ But because the film was properly admitted into evidence, and because that film, if properly authenticated is of
itself evidence of what it depicts, it does not follow that the film can corroborate the testimony of the sole
authenticating witness when she is an accomplice. To satisfy the requirement of the Penal Code, "The
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
corroborative evidence ... must be considered without the aid of the testimony which is to be corroborated and ...
it is not sufficient if it requires the interpretation and direction of such testimony in order to give it value."
‣ What is required is evidence apart from that of the accomplice which tends to instill trust in the inherently suspect
testimony of the accomplice. The film in the instant case can fulfill this function only if it is assumed to be
authentic. Since the film cannot "speak for itself" as to its own authenticity, reliance must first be placed in the
veracity of Joan that it is accurate before it can supply any corroboration.
‣ No photograph or film has any value in the absence of a proper foundation. It is necessary to know when it was
taken and that it is accurate and truly represents what it purports to show. It becomes probative only upon the
assumption that it is relevant and accurate. This foundation is usually provided by the testimony of a person who
was present at the time the picture was taken, or who is otherwise qualified to state that the representation is
accurate. In addition, it may be provided by the aid of expert testimony although there is no one qualified to
authenticate it from personal observation.
‣ When authenticated by a witness from personal observation its admission into evidence presumes confidence in
that witness' veracity. For a photograph to qualify for admission into evidence the source of the authentication is
immaterial. But the law requires that to sustain a conviction the source of the authentication of the corroborating
evidence must be independent of the accomplice.
‣ It follows that although the film is sufficient corroboration if authenticated by a source independent of the
accomplice, it cannot be used to corroborate Joan's testimony. Since its value rests upon the testimony of the
accomplice, it is not "other evidence" within the meaning of the Penal Code. The judgment must therefore be
reversed.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
JOSE V. CA (2000)
G.R. Nos. 118441-42. January 18, 2000
Digest Author: Marisse Aldeza
DOCTRINE
‣ Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in the Court’s hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence.
PARTIES
‣ Defendants Armando Jose; Manila Central Bus Lines (MCL) - operator-lessee of a public utility bus
‣ Plaintiffs Rommel Abraham, represented by his father Felixberto Abraham, Jose Macarubo and Mercedes
Macarubo
FACTS
‣ MCL is the operator-lessee of Bus 203 owned by Metro Manila Transit Corp and is insured with the GSIS.
‣ Bus 203, driven by Jose, collided with a red Ford Escort driven by John Macarubo on MacArthur Highway, in
Marulas, Valenzuela.
‣ As a result of the collision, the left side of the Ford Escorts hood was severely damaged while its driver, John
Macarubo, and its lone passenger, private respondent Rommel Abraham, were seriously injured.
‣ Despite surgery, Macarubo failed to recover and died five days later. Abraham survived, but he became blind on
the left eye which had to be removed. In addition, he sustained a fracture on the forehead and multiple lacerations
on the face, which caused him to be hospitalized for a week.
‣ The trial court found that:
1. During the night previous to the accident at 6:15 a.m., Rommel Abraham and John Macarubo were at a party
2. After the party at 11 p.m., while both Rommel and John were enroute home to Valenzuela from La Loma, the
car encountered mechanical trouble and had to be repaired as its cross-joint was detached. The defect of a
cross-joint is not minor and repair thereof would as testified to by Rommel lasted up to early dawn and the car
started to run only after five oclock in the morning.
3. The pictures that were taken of the two vehicles will clearly show that the MCL bus was at its proper lane and
not in an overtaking position while the car driven by John Macarubo was positioned in a diagonal manner and
crossed the line of the MCL, which is an indication of an overtaking act.
‣ The victims filed a complaint for damages against the driver and Manila Central Bus Lines (MCL)
‣ RTC then dismissed both cases.
‣ CA reversed the decision ruling that the trial court erred in:
1. Relying on photographs which had been taken an hour after the collision as within that span of time, the
positions of the vehicles could have been changed and
2. That the photographs do not show that the Ford Escort was overtaking another vehicle when the accident
happened and that John Macarubo, its driver, was negligent.
‣ Essentially, plaintiffs relied mainly on photographs showing the position of the two vehicles after the collision.
On the other hand, the defendants offered the testimony of Rommel Abraham to the effect that the collision took
place because Bus 203 invaded their lane
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the trial court is justified on relying mainly on photographs rather than the testimony of Abraham - YES
RATIO
‣ Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in the Court’s hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence.
‣ In this case, the positions of the two vehicles, as shown in the photographs taken by MCL line inspector about an
hour and fifteen minutes after the collision, disputes Abrahams self-serving testimony that the two vehicles
collided because Bus 203 invaded the lane of the Ford Escort and clearly shows that the case is exactly the
opposite of what he claimed happened.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
‣ Photographs show quite clearly that Bus 203 was in its proper lane and that it was the Ford Escort which usurped
a portion of the opposite lane. The three photographs show the Ford Escort positioned diagonally on the highway,
with its two front wheels occupying Bus 203’s lane.
‣ Exh. 1 shows that the Ford Escorts smashed hood was only about one or two meters from Bus 203s damaged
left front.
‣ Exh.3 shows that the left side of Bus 203 is about a few feet from the center line and that the bus is positioned
parallel thereto.
‣ Significantly, Abrahams explanation as to why they did not reach Valenzuela until six oclock in the morning of
the next day when the accident happened indicates that the Ford Escort careened and slammed against Bus 203
because of a cross-joint mechanical defect which affects the maneuverability of the car.
‣ Rommel Abraham mentioned in his appellant’s brief in the appellate court a sketch of the scene of the accident
allegedly prepared by one Patrolman Kalale, which shows Bus 203 to be occupying the Ford Escorts lane.
‣ However, the records of this case do not show that such a sketch was ever presented in evidence in the trial court
or that Patrolman Kalale was ever presented as a witness to testify on the sketch allegedly prepared by him. Under
Rule 132, 3 of the Rules on Evidence, courts cannot consider any evidence unless formally offered by a party.
‣ In sum, the Court reversed the decision of the CA and the complaints against MCL and Armando Jose were
dismissed.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
TANGAN V. CA (2002)
G.R. No. 105830. January 15, 2002
Digest Author: Ellen Buenaventura
DOCTRINE:
‣ Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in the hierarchy of our
trustworthy evidence. For this reason, it is regarded as evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently
than a hundred witnesses.
PARTIES
‣ Accused: Eladio Tangan
FACTS
‣ Tangan was charged and convicted of the crime of Homicide (no details at all in the full text of the case L) and
was sentenced to imprisonment for 6 yrs and 1 day (minimum) to 14 yrs, 8mos and 1 day (maximum).
‣ The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals but with modification, disregarding the finding of
mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense.
‣ NOTE: Tangan never raised the defense of self-defense during the trial but the lower courts found the attendance
of incomplete self-defense, sufficient provocation, and passion and obfuscation as mitigating circumstances
‣ Tangan filed an MR, saying that the RTC and CA’s finding of mitigating circumstances is binding on him. He also
said that the Court erroneously raised his indeterminate penalty from a maximum of 2 yrs and 4 months prision
correccional to a maximum of 14 yrs 8 mos and 1 day reclusion temporal. He says this exposed him to the
“horrifying reality” of being reincarcerated after having been preventively confined for more than 4 years.
ISSUE/HELD:
‣ W/N the Supreme Court erred in raising the penalty imposed upon Tangan for homicide? NO.
RATIO
‣ The evidence fails to support or substantiate the lower court’s findings and conclusions. Clearly, therefore, this
case falls within the recognized exceptions to the rule that an appellate court will generally not disturb the
assessment of the trial court on factual matters.
‣ The physical evidence belies Tangan’s version of the incident. Regarding his claim of accidental shooting, the
medical examiner testified that the distance b/n the muzzle of the gun and the target was about 2 inches, not more
than 3 inches, hence indicating, based on the point of exit and trajectory transit of the wound, that Tangan and
victim were face to face when the shot was fired, hence, disproving accidental shooting. Also, a revolver due to its
mechanism is not prone to accidental shooting.
‣ Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in the hierarchy of our
trustworthy evidence. For this reason, it is regarded as evidence of the highest order. It speaks more
eloquently than a hundred witnesses. The physical evidence is amply corroborated by the eyewitness accounts
of Rosalia dela Cruz and Mary Ann Borromeo to the effect that petitioner took a gun from his car and suddenly
fired it at the deceased
‣ On the alleged mitigating circumstances, the testimonies of Tangan’s witnesses suffered material inconsistencies:
i.e., from where Nelson Pante was standing, he could not have heard or have had an unobstructed view of the
events .
‣ On the whole, therefore, this Court correctly imposed on petitioner the proper penalty for Homicide, without the
attendance of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
PEOPLE V. AMESTUZO (2001)
G.R. No. 104383, July 12, 2001
Digest Author: Kevin Bulotano
DOCTRINE
‣ An open-court identification by the complainants brought about by the suggestion of the police should be
inadmissible.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff-Appellee: People of the Philippines
‣ Accused-Appellant: Albino Bagas
FACTS
‣ The crime of robbery with rape occurred in Kalookan, As found by the trial court and as presented in the Solicitor
General’s brief:
‣ An incident within the premises of Perlita Lacsamana occurred at around 9:30pm. Lacsamana heard her maid
crying “aray, aray” and went to investigate the noise. She went out of her room to check the ruckus and upon
returning found herself in the presence of two persons poking their guns on her. Lacsamana and the members of
her household were forcibly brought to the second floor of their house. She saw four other persons robbing her
premises.
‣ Said persons tied her and her employees. After that, they were told to lie down. However, she was asked by one of
the persons where the master’s bedroom was and was forcibly brought there. Upon going down she saw other
persons (one of the persons was later identified as Ampatin).
‣ The men ransacked the room (two of which were Amestuzo and Bagas). Later, one of the household members was
raped by Amestuzo. Likewise, Bagas sexually assaulted another member of the household named Catanyag.
‣ Trial court rendered a decision convicting Amestuzo, Ampatin, Bagas and Vinas of the complex crime of robbery
in band with double rape.
‣ Bagas appealed before the Supreme Court. His appeal is based on:
1. The alleged deprivation of his constitutional right to be represented by counsel during his identification,
2. The trial court’s error in giving due weight to the open court identification of him which was irregular and 3)
3. The trial court’s improper rejection of his defense of alibi.
‣ Bagas maintained that from the time he was arrested until he was presented to the complainants for identification,
he was deprived of the benefit of the counsel. He narrates the following:
‣ Four days after the alleged incident, a group of policemen together with Ampatin, who was then a suspect,
went to the handicrafts factory in Marikina where Bagas was working as a shell-cutter. They were looking for
a certain Mario and searched its floors. Failing to look for Mario, the police hit Ampatin and uttered “Magturo
ka ng kahit sino.” Ampatin pointed to Bagas as he was the first person Ampatin chanced to look upon.
‣ Bagas was arrested. While on board the jeep, Ampatin told him that he committed an error in pointing him.
Upon arrival at the police station, he was placed under detention together with Amestuzo and Vinas.
Lacsamana asked Bagas whether he knew the other accused wherein he replied in the negative. The policemen
told the complainants that Bagas was one of the suspects. The complainants, in a frenzied state, kicked and hit
him.
‣ Further, Bagas alleges that the trial court committed a serious error when it deprived him of his constitutional
right to be represented by a lawyer during his investigation. His presentation to the complainants without the
assistance of counsel was a violation of his constitutional right.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N Bagas’ constitutional right to be repsented by a counsel was violated – NO Bagas cannot invoke his right to
counsel during his presentation for identification to the complainants because the same was not yet part of the
investigation process.
‣ W/N the trial court erred in giving due weight to the open court identification of Bagas – YES such identification
was irregular hence making it inadmissible.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
‣ W/N the trial court erred in rejecting his defense of alibi – YES Bagas’ alibi was corroborated by his employer
and other credible witnesses and by his evidence of physical impossibility on the matter of his presence at the
time of the occurrence of the crime.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

‣ The right to counsel can only be invoked while a person is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation
starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry as to the crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts interrogation in order to elicit incriminating
statements.
‣ Police line-up is not yet part of the custodial investigation, hence such right cannot be invoked during this period.
There was no showing that during his identification by the complainants, the police investigators sought to elicit
any admission or confession from accused-appelant.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

‣ Complainant’s out of court identification of Bagas was seriously flawed to be considered admissible. The
identification was improperly suggestive – even before complainants had the opportunity to view accused-
appellant face-to-face, the police already made an announcement that he was one of the suspects of the crime and
that he was the one pointed by Ampatin. It is clear that identification was clearly suggested by the police. Such act
detracted the complainants from the subsequent spontaneity and objectivity of their identification.
‣ In Tuason vs. Court of Appeals, an NBI agent first pointed the accused to the witnesses after which the latter
identified the accused. The Court held that such identification was doubtful as the same was not spontaneous and
independent as there was improper suggestion coming from the NBI agent. We ruled that a "showup" or the
presentation of a single suspect to a witness for purposes of identification is seriously flawed as it "constitutes the
most grossly suggestive identification procedure now or ever used by the police.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 3

‣ Bagas’ alibi of being in the premises of his workplace during the time of the incident was corroborated by his
employer and co-employees. Alibi is strengthened when it is corroborated by a credible witness and it is
shown that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at
the time of its commission. Further, the witnesses were not related to Bagas nor do they have any personal
interest or motive in the case. Such witnesses’ testimonies cannot be doubted absent a clear showing of undue bias
or prejudice.
‣ It was shown that Bagas was working during the time of crime. Bagas was working in Pasay while the crime
happened in Kalookan at 9:30pm. Assuming that Bagas was able to leave work at around 10pm, the crime would
have already been completed upon his arrival in Kalookan. Ampatin also testified that he made a mistake of
pointing at Bagas when he was brought to the latter’s workplace.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
MATURILLAS V. PEOPLE (2006)
G.R. No. 163217, April 18, 2006
Digest Author: Coleen Bunao
DOCTRINE
PARTIES
‣ Accused: Celestino Marturillas
FACTS
‣ This is a case of homicide. Celestino Marturillas was the former barangay captain of Gatungan, Davao City who
was found guilty of killing Artemio Pantinople.
‣ Version of the People:
‣ Artemio Pantinople was invited for dinner by his neighbor, Lito Santos. Since Lito was not yet hungry, he
served his wife and the deceased Artemio some food. After eating, Artemio went outside and sat on a bench
with his three kids while Lito the neighbor went in to have dinner. While eating, Lito heard a gunshot and ran
outside to see Artemio on the ground, bleeding. Artemio asked Lito to help him as he was shot by the former
baranggay captain, Celestino.
‣ Version of the Accused
‣ According to the former baranggay captain, Celestino Marturillas, he was awoken by his wife because two
kagawads had wanted to see him. The two kagawads informed him that a resident was just shot (Artemio).
Upon hearing what had transpired, he ordered his Kagawads to assemble the members of the SCAA (Special
Civilian Armed Auxiliary) so that they could be escorted to the crime scene some 250 meters away. He then
asked what assistance they could offer.
‣ He then saw the deceased’s wife who was mad and belligerant. She accused him of shooting his husband. He
tried to talk to the wife of Artemio but to no avail. He then instructed his kagawads to retreat to his home since
he could not talk sense with the deceased’s wife. He ordered one of them to contact the police.
‣ The police came to Marturillas home and informed him that he was a suspect in the slaying of Artemio. His
surrendered his rifle with live ammunition to the police.
‣ When the incident was first recorded in the Daily Record of Events, it was indicated that unidentified armed men
shot the deceased. However, the extract from the police blotter already had a little modification stating that the
deceased was shot by an unidentified armed man.
‣ The police indorsed with the Bunawan PNP an empty shell fired from a carbine rifle which was recovered by the
said police officer from the crime scene in the night of the incident. Because he was pre-occupied in organizing
and preparing the affidavits of the Complainant and her witnesses the previous evening, he was only able to
indorse the same the following morning. At the same time, the Station Commander of the Bunawan PNP made a
written request addressed to the District Commander of the PNP Crime Laboratory requesting that a paraffin test
be conducted on Accused Marturillas and that a ballistics examination be made on the M-14 rifle which he
surrendered to Bunawan PNP.
‣ The PNP Crime Laboratory released Physical Sciences Report regarding the paraffin test results which found
Accused NEGATIVE for gunpowder nitrates based on the following findings of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
‣ The theory of the defense rested on the affidavits of the kagawads who affirmed that after they heard the gunshot,
they went to the accsued’s house and shouted to awaken him.
‣ The RTC found petitioner guilty.
‣ The CA affirmed the findings of the RTC that the guilt of Marturillas had been established beyond reasonable
doubt. According to the appellate court, he was positively identified as the one running away from the crime scene
immediately after the gunshot. This fact, together with the declaration of the victim himself that he had been shot
by the captain, clearly established the latter’s complicity in the crime.
‣ No ill motive could be ascribed by the CA to the prosecution witnesses. Thus, their positive, credible and
unequivocal testimonies were accepted as sufficient to establish the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
‣ The CA also rejected his defenses of denial and alibi. It held that they were necessarily suspect, especially
when established by friends or relatives, and should thus be subjected to the strictest scrutiny. At any rate, his
alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses found to be more
credible.
‣ Marturillas raises a lot of defenses:
1. The charge of homicide should be dismissed, because the inherent weakness of the prosecution’s case against
him was revealed by the evidence presented.
2. He submits that any doubt as to who really perpetrated the crime should be resolved in his favor. He doubts
whether Ernita (the wife) could have accurately identified him at the scene of the crime, considering that it
was dark at that time; that there were trees obstructing her view; and that her house was fifty (50) meters away
from where the crime was committed. Ernita testified on the crime scene conditions that had enabled her to
make a positive identification of petitioner. Her testimony was even corroborated by other prosecution
witnesses, who bolstered the truth and veracity of those declarations. The trees and plants did not obstruct her
view. She even presented photos of where the incident had happened. These trees and plants were slender that
they could not have obstructed her view of the crime scene.
3. He also asserts that the prosecution should never rely on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of its
evidence, implying that there was no sufficient evidence to convict him.
4. He takes issue with the negative results of the paraffin test done on him. While they were negative, that fact
alone did not ipso facto prove that he was innocent. Time and time again, this Court has held that a negative
paraffin test result is not a conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun.
5. He then argues that the prosecution miserably failed to establish the type of gun used in the shooting. Suffice it
to say that this contention hardly dents the latter’s case. As correctly found by the appellate court, the
prosecution was able to give sufficient proof of the corpus delicti -- the fact that a crime had actually been
committed.
6. He likewise harps on the prosecution’s failure to present the records from the Firearms and Explosives
Department of the Philippine National Police at Camp Crame of the .45 caliber Remington pistol owned by
petitioner for comparison with the specimen found at the crime scene with the hope that it would exculpate
him from the trouble he is in.
ISSUE/HELD
1. W/N the prosecution’s evidence is credible. -- Yes.
2. W/N it is sufficient to convict him of homicide. -- Yes.
3. W/N the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the failure to present the gun used in the shooting and the
negative paraffin test result- NO
RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

‣ We do not agree. This Court has judiciously reviewed the findings and records of this case and finds no reversible
error in the CA’s ruling affirming petitioner’s conviction for homicide.
‣ This Court has consistently held that -- given the proper conditions -- the illumination produced by a kerosene
lamp, a flashlight, a wick lamp, moonlight, or starlight is considered sufficient to allow the identification of
persons. In this case, the full moon and the light coming from two fluorescent lamps of a nearby store were
sufficient to illumine the place where petitioner was; and to enable the eyewitness to identify him as the person
who was present at the crime scene. Settled is the rule that when conditions of visibility are favorable and the
witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be
accepted.
‣ Even where the circumstances were less favorable, the familiarity of Ernita with the face of petitioner
considerably reduced any error in her identification of him. Since the circumstances in this case were reasonably
sufficient for the identification of persons, this fact of her familiarity with him erases any doubt that she could
have erred in identifying him.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

‣ We disagree. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to sustain the conviction of
petitioner. The dying declaration made by the victim immediately prior to his death constitutes evidence of the
highest order as to the cause of his death and of the identity of the assailant.
‣ The following circumstances proven by the prosecution produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt:
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
1. First. Santos testified that he had heard a gunshot; and seen smoke coming from the muzzle of a gun, as well
as the victim staggering backwards while shouting, "Help me p’re, I was shot by the captain." This statement
was duly established, and the testimony of Santos confirmed the events that had occurred. It should be
understandable that "p’re" referred to Santos, considering that he and the victim were conversing just before
the shooting took place. It was also established that the two called each other "p’re," because Santos was the
godfather of the victim’s child.
2. Second. Ernita testified that she had heard a gunshot and her husband’s utterance, "Help me p’re, I was shot by
the captain," then saw petitioner in a black jacket and camouflage pants running away from the crime scene
while carrying a firearm.
3. Third. Ernita’s statement, "Captain, why did you shoot my husband?" was established as part of the res gestae.
4. Fourth. The version of the events given by petitioner is simply implausible. As the incumbent barangay
captain, it should have been his responsibility to go immediately to the crime scene and investigate the
shooting. Instead, he avers that when he went to the situs of the crime, the wife of the victim was already
shouting and accusing him of being the assailant, so he just left. This reaction was very unlikely of an innocent
barangay captain, who would simply want to investigate a crime. Often have we ruled that the first impulse of
innocent persons when accused of wrongdoing is to express their innocence at the first opportune time.
5. Fifth. The prosecution was able to establish motive on the part of petitioner. The victim’s wife positively
testified that prior to the shooting, her husband was trying to close a real estate transaction which petitioner
tried to block. This showed petitioner’s antagonism towards the victim.
‣ These pieces of evidence indubitably lead to the conclusion that it was petitioner who shot and killed the victim.
This Court has consistently held that, where an eyewitness saw the accused with a gun seconds after the gunshot
and the victim’s fall, the reasonable conclusion is that the accused had killed the victim. Further establishing
petitioner’s guilt was the definitive statement of the victim that he had been shot by the barangay captain.
‣ That some pieces of the above-mentioned evidence are circumstantial does not diminish the fact that they
are of a nature that would lead the mind intuitively, or by a conscious process of reasoning, toward the
conviction of petitioner. Circumstantial, vis-à-vis direct, evidence is not necessarily weaker. Moreover, the
circumstantial evidence described above satisfies the requirements of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
‣ "SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. -- Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt."
RATIO FOR ISSUE 3

‣ To undermine the case of the prosecution against him, petitioner depends heavily on its failure to present the gun
used in the shooting and on the negative paraffin test result. These pieces of evidence alone, according to him,
should exculpate him from the crime. His reliance on them is definitely misplaced, however. In a similar case, this
Court has ruled as follows: “The choice of what evidence to present, or who should testify as a witness is within
the discretionary power of the prosecutor and definitely not of the courts to dictate.”
‣ Anent the failure of the investigators to conduct a paraffin test on petitioner, this Court has time and again held
that such failure is not fatal to the case of the prosecution as scientific experts agree that the paraffin test is
extremely unreliable and it is not conclusive as to an accused’s complicity in the crime committed."
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
REYES V. CA (2012)
“Chain of Custody in Buy Bust Operations of DDA (Dangerous Drugs Act)” GR. No.180177. April 18, 2012
Digest Author: Ian Canoy
PARTIES
‣ Accused: Rogelio Reyes
DOCTRINES
‣ Please refer to bold parts in the Ratio, too many to mention
FACTS
‣ Rogelio “Boy” Reyes (alleged seller and possessor of DD) and two others (Conchita and Jeonilo) were arrested at
his house pursuant to a Buy-Bust operation conducted by the police. (Crimes: illegal possession of DD; illegal
sale of DD
‣ At the police station, PO2 Payumo (the poseur-buyer) marked the 2 confiscated bags of shabu as “RRS1” and
“RRS2”. It was then turned over to the Crime Lab and it tested positive for Methampethamine Hydrochloride
(Shabu).
‣ At the trial, Reyes claimed:
1. That there was no Buy-Bust and it was all a frame up
2. That he was entertaining his guests, Conchita who was selling him a sofa, and Jeonilo, the driver of the vehicle
carrying the sofa.
3. That he was surprised that armed men in civilian clothes barged in his house and conducted a search
4. That he was surprised to find the plastic sachet of white substance when the men emptied his pockets
5. That such sachet wasn't his
6. That a certain PO1 Mijares tried to extort from him PHP 30k for his release but since he couldn't pay, he was
then brought to the police station
‣ Jeonilo corroborated the testimony of the accused
‣ RTC RULING: Held Reyes GUILTY. It held that unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the buy-bust
operatives were driven by improper motive, or not doing their duties properly, their testimonies with respect to the
operation deserves full faith and credit. Accused failed to show any ill motive on the part of the policeman to
testify falsely against him. The portrayal put forward by accused and his lone witness remained uncorroborated.
‣ CA Ruling: Affirmed RTC in Toto.
‣ Reyes wants the SC to give credence to his defense of frame-up, and to believe the testimony of Jeonilo Flores
who had no reason to testify falsely against the arresting officers.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N Reyes is guilty. NOT GUILTY (not because of the frame-up defense but the SC said that as an appellate
court, they have to check the records meticulously to find all errors that the lower courts might have done in
determine guilt beyond reasonable doubt even if it was not raised up on appeal. In this case, they acquitted Reyes
because the Buy Bust Operatives didn't follow Chain of Custody Rule under the DDA)
RATIO
‣ The buy-bust operation mounted against petitioner resulted from the tip of an unnamed lady confidential
informant. Such an operation is susceptible to abuse by officers. To safeguard against this abuse, the DDA
provides for the Chain of Custody Rule:
‣ Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. –:
1. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
‣ For Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of DD, it is crucial that the Prosecution establishes the identity of the
seized dangerous drugs in a way that the integrity thereof has been well preserved from the time of seizure or
confiscation from the accused until the time of presentation as evidence in court. Compliance with Section 21
fulfills this. This duty of seeing to the integrity of the dangerous drugs and substances is discharged only when the
arresting law enforcer ensures that the chain of custody is unbroken.
‣ Chain of Custody is defined by Section 1b, Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1,2002: “The duly recorded
authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall
include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time
when such transfer or custody were made in the course of safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the final
disposition”
‣ Mallilin v. People (Importance of Chain of Custody Rule):
‣ Chain of Custody Rule is needed to authenticate evidence
‣ Involves testimony as to every link in the chain; from item seizure until presentation in court.
‣ Testimony in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
‣ While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to
obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is
not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or
when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the
exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering—without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not—dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule.
‣ In this case, the prosecution failed to demonstrate a faithful compliance by the arresting lawmen of the rule on
chain of custody. The fact that the dangerous drugs were inventoried and photographed at the site of arrest upon
seizure in the presence of petitioner, a representative of the media, a representative of the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official, was not shown. Consequently, the requirement for those people mentioned
above to sign and receive a copy of the inventory that was made was also not fulfilled. It was only at the Police
Station where PO2 Payumo marked the exhibits as RRS1&2. Prosecution did not also present any witness to
establish that an inventory of the seized articles at least signed by petitioner at that point was prepared.
‣ People vs Sanchez (Rule on Inventory and Photographing at Place Of Seizure):
‣ General Rule: immediate inventory and photographing of the seized items always at the place of seizure if
practicable.
‣ Exception: indications like accused tried to escape or resisted arrest, which might provide the reason why the
arresting team was not able to do the inventory or photographing at petitioner’s house;
‣ People vs. Pringas (When Noncompliance with Chain Not Fatal to Prosecution):“For as long as there was
justifiable ground for it, and for as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated or seized
articles were properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team, considering that they were to be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused, such non-compliance would not render an accused’s
arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible.”
‣ The Buy-Bust was also infested with lapses in the Chain: (stuff basically showing that the officers didn't properly
record the chain). PO2 Payumo declared that he was the one who had received the sachet of shabu ("RRS-1")
from petitioner and who had confiscated the two sachets Nothing more to support the fact that the evidence thus
seized had remained intact was adduced. The State did not anymore establish to whom the seized articles had
been endorsed after PO2 Payumo had placed the markings at the station, and with whose custody or safekeeping
the seized articles had remained until their endorsement to P/Insp. Macapagal (the lab examiner) for the
laboratory examination. It cannot justifiably presume that the seized articles had remained in the possession of
PO2 Payumo in view of the testimony of P/Insp. Macapagal to the effect that the party requesting the laboratory
examination had been a certain Police Officer Alano.
‣ The Lab Report also stated that the party requesting the conduct of the laboratory examination was the "OIC-
SAID-SOTU of PS-8” Prosecution also did not show to whom the seized articles had been turned over after the
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
laboratory examination and how the seized articles had been kept in a manner that preserved their integrity until
their final presentation in court. Such lapses of the Prosecution were fatal to its proof of guilt because they
demonstrated that the chain of custody did not stay unbroken, thereby raising doubt on the integrity and identity
of the dangerous drugs as evidence of the corpus delicti of the crimes charged.
‣ Other grounds for skepticism about the evidence of guilt:
‣ Payumo said they got the tip from a lady informant on January 20, 2005 when in fact, the documents (Pre-
Operation/Coordination Sheet by the police and the Certificate of Coordination issued by PDEA) required to
conduct a Buy Bust have already been prepared on January 19. This indicates the buy-bust operation was
already set in motion even before the lady informant actually made her report against petitioner. Thereby, his
defense of frame-up was bolstered.
‣ The documents mentioned indicated that there are ten members “plus three others” that comprise the buy-bust
team. Yet, the Joint Affidavit submitted by the members of the buy-bust team was executed and signed by only
six officers. Prosecution’s failure to explain why only six members of the buy-bust team actually executed and
signed the Joint Affidavit might indicate that the incrimination of petitioner through the buy-bust operation
was probably not reliable.
‣ The documents above revealed that the confidential information received involved two suspects of illegal drug
trade in Bacood, Sta. Mesa known as alias Boy and alias Totoy Tinga. Payumo recalled, however, that the lady
confidential informant had tipped the police off only about alias Boy. It seems from such selectiveness that
PO2 Payumo deliberately omitted the other target and zeroed in only on alias Boy (petitioner), which might
suggest that PO2 Payumo was not as reliable as a poseur buyer-witness as he presented himself to be.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
PEOPLE V. FREDDIE LADIP (2014)
G.R. No. 196146, March 12, 2014
Digest Author: Rofil Carpeso
DOCTRINE
‣ What is essential in a buy-bust operation is “the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.”
‣ Non–compliance with the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized,
will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule
which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the
evidentiary weight that will be accorded it by the courts.
PARTIES
‣ Accused: Freddie Ladip
FACTS
‣ The Freddie Ladip was charged for illegal sale of dangerous drugs (drug pushing)
‣ Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to said charge.
‣ Prosecution version of facts: On December 7, 2006, a male confidential informant came to the station and
provided the police information that a certain Freddie Ladip was selling illegal drugs in Area 1, Barangay
Batasan, QC.
‣ Consequently, a buy–bust operation was conducted on the same day whereupon the accused was arrested for
selling methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. P300 marked money (three 100-peso bill) and 2 plastic sachet
containing white crystalline granules were recovered (one from Ladip and the other on the ground near Perlyn,
wife of Ladip)
‣ It was further stated under oath that, prior to the turnover of the evidence to the investigator–on–duty in said
station, the police revealed that they placed their respective markings on the two (2) small heat sealed transparent
plastic sachets.
‣ Subsequently, an inventory of the seized items was made in the presence of the police operatives and the arrested
persons. Photographs of the arrested persons, the marked money, and the seized items were likewise taken,
followed by various requests for laboratory examination of said specimens, and for drug dependency examination
of the arrested persons. Later on, the subject sachets were brought to the AC Police District (QCPD) Crime
Laboratory.
‣ Defense’s version of facts: Accused testified that on that day he was engaged in a drinking session inside the
house of his live–in partner’s (Perlyn) friend (a certain Wilma) at Barangay Botocan, QC, when three men in
civilian clothes arrived and searched the house but found nothing illegal. Nevertheless, the three men grabbed and
handcuffed him and Perlyn, boarded them in a vehicle and brought them to a police station to show them the
shabu without explaining where it came from.
‣ RTC found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for drug pushing.
‣ On appeal, accused contended that the confiscated drugs were not marked immediately at the time and place of its
seizure, and that the subsequent physical inventory thereof was not made in the presence of representatives from
the DOJ, the media, and any elected public official, thus, destroying the identity and integrity of the evidence
against him; that there were inconsistencies in the testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution; and that
ultimately, the prosecution miserably failed to prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
‣ CA affirmed in toto RTC’s decision hence the case was elevated to SC by PAO and OSG
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the accused is guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs – YES
RATIO
‣ Elements which must be proven for the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs:
1. Identity of the buyer and seller, object and consideration; and
2. Delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
‣ What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, plus the presentation in court of corpus delicti as evidence.
‣ From the testimonies presented by the prosecution it was established that there was a buy–bust operation
conducted, showing that accused sold and delivered the shabu for P300.00 to PO1 Sibal, the poseur–buyer. PO1
Sibal himself testified that there was an actual exchange of the marked money and the prohibited drug. Certainly,
accused was fully aware that what he was selling was illegal and prohibited. Thereafter, the corpus delicti or the
subject drug was seized, marked, and subsequently identified as a prohibited drug.
‣ In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by
the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their
duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.
‣ The defense failed to show any ill motive or odious intent on the part of the police operatives to impute such a
serious crime that would put in jeopardy the life and liberty of an innocent person, such as in the case of accused.
‣ As for the observance of proper chain of custody of evidence: This Court has time and again spoken on the chain
of custody rule, a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This
would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is
offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom
it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it
was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
‣ People v. Salonga:
‣ It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is
the very same substance offered in court as exhibit. Drug enforcement agents and police officers involved in a
buy–bust operation are required under R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules to mark all seized evidence at
the buy–bust scene. The requirements are not inflexible.
‣ What is essential is “the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.”
‣ Non–compliance with the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or
seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a
law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject
only to the evidentiary weight that will be accorded it by the courts.
‣ No provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the non–admissibility of the
confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non–compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
‣ The issue therefore, if there is non–compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight —
evidentiary merit or probative value — to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said
evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case. In this case, the prosecution was able to establish
that there is no question as to the integrity of the evidence against the accused. Although the police officers did
not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of the IRR implementing R.A. No. 9165, the
noncompliance did not affect the evidentiary weight of the drugs seized from the accused, because the chain of
custody of the evidence was shown to be unbroken under the circumstances of the case. The court still ruled that
nothing invited the suspicion that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized articles were jeopardized.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
PEOPLE V. HERMANOS CONSTANTINO (2014)
G.R. No. 199689; March 12, 2014
Digest Author: Amber Gagajena
DOCTRINE
‣ Crucial in proving the Chain of Custody is the MARKING of the seized dangerous drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of
marking of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating
switching, "planting" or contamination of evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody
imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires.
PARTIES
‣ Accused: Constantino, Jr.
FACTS
‣ On January 20, 2005, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, Police Superintendent Mariano Rodriguez (Rodriquez), the
Chief of Police of Tuguegarao City, received a report from a confidential informant (CI) that a certain Jojit was
selling illegal drugs in the said city. P/Supt.
‣ Rodriguez immediately formed a buy-bust group composed of Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Noel Taguiam
(Taguiam), SPO2 Alexander Tamang (Tamang), SPO1 Arthur Blaquera (Blaquera), Police Officer (PO) 3 Edwin
Hernandez (Hernandez), and PO3 Rolando Domingo (Domingo). PO3 Domingo was designated as the poseur-
buyer. The buy-bust money, consisting of one P500 bill and five P100 bills, were dusted with fluorescent powder
and their respective serial numbers were recorded in the police blotter.
‣ Around 8:00 in the evening of the same day, the team proceeded to Reynovilla St., Caritan Centro, Tuguegarao
City, the place where, according to the CI, Jojit was selling shabu.
‣ PO3 Domingo positioned himself beside a street light while the rest of the team hid behind a nearby concrete
fence. After waiting for about 45 minutes, Constantino arrived on board a tricycle. PO3 Domingo recognized
Constantino as the Jojit described by the CI. PO3 Domingo approached Constantino and asked him if he was Jojit.
When Constantino replied in the affirmative, PO3 Domingo next asked, "Mayroon ka bang stuff?" In response,
Constantino inquired of PO3 Domingo how much he wanted to buy. PO3 Domingo said he wanted to buy P1,000
worth of shabu, simultaneously handing over the buy-bust money to Constantino, who, in turn, handed two plastic
sachets to PO3 Domingo.
‣ Thereupon, PO3 Domingo turned his cap backwards, the pre-arranged signal for the consummated sale. Upon
seeing the signal, the other members of the buy-bust team approached the scene at once and arrested Constantino,
from whom SPO2 Taguiam recovered the buy-bust money.
‣ Thereafter, Constantino was brought to the police station where the recovered drugs and money were turned over
to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang.
‣ The recovered drugs were then marked with the initials "A-1" and "A-2." The incident was recorded in the police
blotter with an inventory of the recovered drugs and money.
‣ Later that evening, at around ten o’clock, P/Supt. Rodriguez and SPO2 Tamang submitted to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Services, Camp Marcelo Adduru, Tuguegarao City, a request for
laboratory examination of two plastic sachets with white crystalline substance marked as "A-1" and "A-2" to
determine the presence of dangerous drugs; as well as both hands of Constantino, one piece P500 bill, and five
pieces P100bills, to determine the presence of the ultra violet powder.
‣ Per Chemistry Report and Physical Identification Report prepared by Police Senior Inspector (P/SInsp.) Mayra
Matote Madria, Forensic Chemist, the contents of the two plastic sachets tested positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride; while the other specimens tested positive for the presence of bright-yellow ultraviolet fluorescent
powder.
‣ Constantino denied the accusation against him and asserted that he was merely framed-up. He said that he was
just having a “joyride” and when he was walking home, he was stopped and frisked by the police.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N Constantino, Jr. should be acquitted – YES. The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidence’s chain
of custody is fatal to its case as the Court can no longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated dangerous drug were properly preserved.
RATIO
‣ Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking upon seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of
marking of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating
switching, "planting" or contamination of evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of initial custody
imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires. (DOCTRINE)
‣ The prosecution is completely silent as to why PO3 Domingo, the poseur-buyer, despite having immediate
custody of the two plastic sachets of shabu purchased from Constantino, failed to immediately mark the seized
drugs before turning over the custody of the same to another police officer.
‣ This lapse in procedure opened the door for confusion and doubt as to the identity of the drugs actually seized
from Constantino during the buy-bust and the ones presented before the trial court, especially considering that
three different people, during the interval, supposedly received and marked the same.
‣ To clarify the matter, the prosecution could have presented as witness either SPO2 Tamang or SPO2 Taguiam to
directly validate the marking in court, but unfortunately, the prosecution chose to dispense with the testimonies of
both officers.
‣ This omission diminished the importance of the markings as the reference point for the subsequent handling of the
evidence. As a consequence, an objective person could now justifiably suspect the shabu ultimately presented as
evidence in court to be planted or contaminated.
‣ The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation:
1. The seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer;
2. The turn over of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
3. The turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and
4. The turn over and submission of the marked illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
‣ After a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court finds glaring inconsistencies
affecting the integrity of the shabu purportedly confiscated from Constantino. The inconsistent testimonies of PO3
Domingo, PO3 Hernandez, and P/SInsp. Tulauan as to who, when, and where the two plastic sachets of shabu
were marked lead the Court to question whether the two plastic sachets of shabu identified in court were the very
same ones confiscated from Constantino. The doubtful markings already broke the chain of custody of the seized
shabu at a very early stage.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
PEOPLE V. ABETONG (2014)
G.R. No. 209785, June 4, 2014
Digest Author: Klark Garcia
DOCTRINE
‣ The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way
that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in
which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain
to have possession of it.
PARTIES
Accused: Marlon Abetong alias “Cano”
FACTS
‣ The Police Station 1 of Bacolod City Police Office received information that a certain "Cano" was selling drugs in
his house at Purok Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City.
‣ Police Inspector Jonathan Lorilla ordered for a buy-bust operation wherein PO3 Wilfredo Perez is the poseur-
buyer.
‣ After recording the details in the police blotter, the buy-bust operation proceeded. PO3 Perez knocked on the door
of the house and was greeted by Marlon Abetong alias “Cano” who asked for the purpose of his visit. PO3 Perez
answered that he intend to buy P100 worth of shabu. He paid with the marked money (i.e. two P50 bills marked
"WCP") and in turn, Abetong gave him a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.
‣ While he was inside the house, PO3 Perez also saw Ricky Bayotas, Reynalod Relos, and Archie Beturan passing
to one another a tooter and allegedly engaging in a pot session.
‣ After receiving the plastic sachet, PO3 Perez introduced himself as police officer and effected the arrest of the
Abetong, Bayotas, Relos, and Berturan with his back-up policemen.
‣ The tooter and the plastic sachet containing the crystalline substance was kept inside the evidence locker in the
Drug Enforcement Unit Office by PO3 Perez before it was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing on 25
August 2013 – three days after their seizure. Inspector Lorilla was the only one who has a key to the locker.
‣ Inspector Agustina Ompoy conducted quantitative and qualitative tests wherein the plastic sachet tested positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride weighing 0.04 gram while the tooter tested negative for any prohibited drug.
‣ Abetong argued that he was illegally arrested while he was sweeping the floor in his home and that he didn't know
of the charge against him until arraignment.
‣ RTC convicted Abetong of the crime charged and sentenced him to suffer Life Imprisonment and a to pay a fine
of P500,000.00.
‣ Abetong appealed to the CA on the following grounds:
1. That the markings on the items seized do not bear the date and time of the confiscation, as required;
2. That about three days have passed since the items were confiscated before they were brought to the crime
laboratory; and
3. That there was neither an inventory nor a photograph of the recovered plastic sachet.
‣ CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W.N Abetong's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt- NO
RATIO
‣ By failing to comply with section 21 of R.A. 9165 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
integrity of the evidence seized was not preserved.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
‣ Section 21 states: Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs,
Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/
Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.—The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
1. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
2. Within twenty four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination.
‣ Failure to observe strictly this provision can be excused as long as (1) the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers and (2) noncompliance was
attended by justifiable grounds.
‣ In the case at bar, it was not shown that there was no opportunity for tampering, contamination, substitution, nor
alteration of the evidence submitted. Narcotic substances are not readily identifiable, hence, more susceptible to
tampering or alteration especially when in small substance.
‣ The chain of custody rule should be observed to make sure that no change or substitution of the evidence has been
made by tracing every link in the chain i.e. every person who touched or had possession of the subject evidence.
‣ The Prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody when it did not present the testimony Inspector Lorilla.
During the three days that the plastic sachet and tooter were kept in the locker, Lorilla constructively acquired
custody over them since he was the only one who had the key to the locker. Hence, he is a vital link of the chain
and his testimony is indispensable in proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of Abetong. Only Lorilla can
testify that during the three-day interval from 22 August to 25 August, no one obtained possession or custody over
the evidence seized.
‣ The presumption of regularity is not applicable in this case since such presumption is obtained only when nothing
in the records suggests that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as
provided by law. In this case, apart from failing to present the testimony of Lorilla, the arresting officers also
failed to mark the seized items with the date and time of confiscation or take photographs of such items for
documentation purposes.
‣ There is also no justifiable ground presented by petitioner for the non-compliance or deviation from the rule.
Abetong could still have been convicted despite deviating from the procedural rules if petitioner offered a
justifiable ground as an excuse.
‣ There was also a disparity between the testimony of Ompoy and the Information filed against Abetong with regard
the weight of the crystalline substance confiscated. According to Ompoy's testimony, the weight is 0.04 grams
while in the Information its 0.02 grams. This is crucial since the shabu is the corpus delicti of the offense.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
NAPOCOR V. CODILLA (2007)
“Photocopies not electronic evidence; violate best evidence rule” G.R. No. 170491
Digest Author: Angeline Ibuna
DOCTRINE
‣ What differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information
is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff/Petitioner: NAPOCOR
‣ Defendant:Bangpai Shipping and Wallem Shipping
FACTS
‣ M/V Dibena Win, foreign vessel owned and operated by respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co. (Bangpai) allegedly
bumped and damaged petitioner NAPOCOR’s Power Barge (Barge). The barge was then moored at the Cebu
International Port.
‣ NAPOCOR filed before RTC Cebu a complaint for damages against Bangpai for the damages. Petitioner amended
its complaint impleading Wallem Shipping, Inc. (Wallem) as additional defendant contending that Wallem is the
ship agent of Bangpai.
‣ Wallem and Bangpai, individually, filed a Motion to Dismiss, which were both denied by the public respondent
Judge in their respective Orders.
‣ NAPOCOR, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower
court, consisting of exhibits “A” to “V” together with submarked portions thereof.
‣ Bangpai and Wallem filed their respective objections to the formal offer of evidence.
‣ The trial court issued the assailed order denying the admission and excluding from the records petitioner’s
exhibits A-E, H, and submarkings I-S. The court held that such evidence were being excluded as petitioner was
given the opportunity to present the originals of the photocopies of the documents it offered but never produced
the originals.
‣ NAPOCOR attempted to justify the admission of the photocopies by contending that the “photocopies offered are
equivalent to the original of the document” on the basis of the Electronic Evidence.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding the evidence offered - NO
‣ W/N the documents offered in evidence is covered under the Rules of Electronic Evidence thereby equal to an
original copy - NO
RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

‣ As what our jurisprudence tells us, grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as would be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
‣ It appears that the pieces of petitioner NAPOCOR’s documentary evidence which were denied admission by the
respondent judge were not properly identified by any competent witness. As pointed out by the respondent
Bangpai Shipping Company in its comment on the petition filed in this case which reproduces some excerpts of
the testimonies in the court a quo of Atty. Marianito De Los Santos, Engr. Nestor Enriquez, Jr. and Mr. Rodulfo I.
Pagaling, the said witnesses did not have personal knowledge of and participation in the preparation and making
of the pieces of documentary evidence denied admission by respondent judge.
‣ Then another ground for denying admission of petitioner’s Exhibits A, C, D, E, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R,
and S by the respondent judge is that said pieces of documentary evidence were merely photocopies of purported
documents or papers.
‣ Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines is very explicit in providing that, when the subject
of inquiry are the contents of documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original documents
themselves, except in certain cases specifically so enumerated therein, and the petitioner has not shown that the
non-presentation or non-production of its original documentary pieces of evidence falls under such exceptions.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
‣ So, the petitioner has only itself to blame for the respondent judge’s denial of admission of its aforementioned
documentary evidence.
‣ The pieces of documentary evidence offered by the petitioner in Civil Case CEB-18662 which were denied
admission by the respondent judge do not actually constitute as electronic evidence as defined in the Rules on
Electronic Evidence. The informations therein were not received, retrieved or produced electronically. The
petitioner has not adequately established that its documentary evidence were electronic evidence. it has not
properly authenticated such evidence as electronic documents, assuming arguendo that they are. Lastly, the
petitioner has not properly established by affidavit pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence the
admissibility and evidentiary weight of said documentary evidence.
‣ Thus, by any legal yardstick, it is manifest that the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying admission of the aforementioned documentary evidence of petitioner.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

‣ An "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or
other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an
obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.It includes digitally signed documents and any printout,
readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document.
‣ The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in
terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof
of its contents.
‣ A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the
contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or
produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered
as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced.
‣ Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential
that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
‣ The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are therefore
of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence.
‣ The best evidence rule was designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of
altered copies and the withholding of the originals.But the modern justification for the rule has expanded from the
prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law. The importance of the
precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence
of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best
evidence rule.
‣ Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
‣ When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents
by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order
stated.
‣ The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the
original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of
routine practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence
as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a
diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or places.
However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it
failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the above
quoted rule.
‣ Finally, it perplexes this Court why petitioner continued to obdurately disregard the opportunities given by the
trial court for it to present the originals of the photocopies it presented yet comes before us now praying that it be
allowed to present the originals of the exhibits that were denied admission or in case the same are lost, to lay the
predicate for the admission of secondary evidence.
‣ Had petitioner presented the originals of the documents to the court instead of the photocopies it obstinately
offered as evidence, or at the very least laid the predicate for the admission of said photocopies, this controversy
would not have unnecessarily been brought before the appellate court and finally to this Court for adjudication.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
AZNAR V. CITIBANK
“Dishonored Mastercard” G.R. No. 164273; March 28, 2007
Digest Author: Elwell Mariano
DOCTRINE
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff: Emmanuel B. Aznar
‣ Defendant: Citibank, N.A.
FACTS
‣ Aznar, a known businessman in Cebu, is a holder of a disPrefereed Master Credit Card issued by Citibank. It has a
credit limit of 150k
‣ Because Aznar and his wife was planning to take her 2 grandchildren on an Asian tour, he made a total advance
deposit of 485k with Citi to increase his credit limit to 635k.
‣ Aznar was able to purchase plane tickets to KL for the group worth 237k and they left Cebu.
‣ Aznar claims that his Mastercard was not honored in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.
‣ when he tried to use it again in Indonesia (Ingtan Tour and Travel Agency) to book plane ticket to Bali, it was
again dishonored for the reason that it was blacklisted by Citi.
‣ He was forced to buy the tickets in cash and was humiliated when Ingtan Agency spoke of swindlers trying to use
blacklisted cards.
‣ When he got back to the Philippines, Aznar filed and a complaint for damages against Citibank claiming that
Citibank fraudulently or with gross negligence blacklisted his Mastercard. He further claimed that he suffered
anguish, anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation and social humiliation due to wrongful blacklisting of
his Mastercard.
‣ To prove that Citibank blacklisted his Mastercard, Aznar presented a computer printout, denominated as ONLINE
AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency (Exh. G) with
the signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi (Nubi)which shows that his card in question was DECL OVERLIMIT
or declared over the limit.
‣ Citibank denied the allegations. It also contended that under the terms and conditions governing the issuance and
use of its card, Citibank is exempt from any liability for the dishonor of its card. To prove that they did not
blacklist Aznar;s card, Citibank Credit Card Department Head, presented Warning Cancellation Bulletins which
contained the list of its canceled cards covering the period of Aznar’s trip.
‣ RTC: dismissed the complaint of Aznar. It gave more weight on the evidence presented by Citi. There was also no
showing that Citi acted with malice and bad faith
‣ After MR, RTC reversed. It said that the only thing that Citi proved was that said credit card was not included in
the blacklisted list. It did not prove that it did not blacklisted the said card.
‣ CA: rendered in favor of Citi. Itsaid that Aznar only presumed that his card was blacklisted when it was
dishonored. It is not sufficient to prove that the said card was blacklisted.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N Aznar established his claim against CITI- NO. Aznar failed to prove by preponderance of evidence.
RATIO
‣ The dishonor of Aznars Mastercard is not sufficient to support a conclusion that said credit card was blacklisted
by Citibank, especially in view of Aznars own admission that in other merchant establishments in Kuala Lumpur
and Singapore, his Mastercard was accepted and honored.
‣ As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, the print out presented by Aznar, is not to be considered
admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently established by petitioner. It must be proved
either by anyone who saw the document executed or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
‣ Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001, and which is
being invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of Exh. G would still be found wanting. Pertinent sections
of Rule 5 read:
‣ Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal
proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
‣ Section 2. Manner of authentication. Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme
Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
‣ Aznars testimony that the person from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer printout and that he
thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient to show said printouts integrity
and reliability.The print out document presented by Aznar does not show on its face that it was issued by Ingtan
Agency as Aznar merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the print-out from the agency. Aznar
also failed to show the specific business address of the source of the computer printout because while the name of
Ingtan Agency was mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not reflected in the printout. Indeed, Aznar
failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the printout was generated and how the said information
could be relied upon as true
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
ANG V. CA
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
ATIENZA V. BOARD OF MEDICINE (2011)
G.R. No. 177407. February 9, 2011
Digest Author: Rose Anne Sy
DOCTRINE
‣ The best evidence rule is not applicable when the subject of inquiry is NOT the contents of a document. The
subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors are liable for gross negligence in removing the right
functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, and not the proper anatomical locations of
Editha’s kidneys.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiffs: Board of Medicine (BOM) and Editha Sioson
‣ Defendant: Rico Rommel Atienza
FACTS
‣ Due to her lumbar [lower part of back] pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center
(RMC) for check-up in 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin
III of RMC who ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It
was ascertained, however, that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent kidney
operation in September 1999.
‣ Editha’s husband, Romeo Sioson filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the BOM
against the doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr.
Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza. It was alleged in the
complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the said doctors, including petitioner,
consists of the removal of private respondents fully functional right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and
non-visualizing kidney.
‣ The complaint was heard by the BOM. After Romeo presented his evidence, Editha filed her formal offer of
documentary evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary evidence are Exhibits, which she offered for
the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was
operated. The Exhibits are certified photocopies of four X-ray Request Forms executed on different dates. The
forms contained handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination.
‣ Atienza filed his objections to Editha’s formal offer of exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible
because the same are mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and intended to establish
matters which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are
offered.
‣ The formal offer of documentary exhibits of Editha was admitted by the BOM per its Order. Atienza moved for
reconsideration but the BOM denied the motion, concluding that it should first admit the evidence being offered
so that it can determine its probative value when it decides the case. It can determine whether the evidence is
relevant or not if it will take a look at it through the process of admission.
‣ Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the exhibits are inadmissible as evidence for being incompetent to prove their purpose, completely hearsay
and violating the best evidence rule- NO, the Exhibits are ADMISSIBLE.
RATIO
‣ It is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies
such as the BOM. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, in
connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, the SC
have held that: “It is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but
admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places
them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand,
their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely
discarding them or ignoring them.”
‣ Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be
considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it
proves an issue.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
‣ As to Atienza’s contention that the admission of Editha’s exhibits violated his substantive rights leading to the
loss of his medical license, the Court held: The admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights
of petitioner because, fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper
anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court:
‣ “Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence: (y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course
of nature and the ordinary habits of life.”
‣ The exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin III’s counter affidavit filed with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed by Editha
against the doctors of RMC who handled her surgical procedure.
‣ The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s exhibits, that her kidneys were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the time of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.
Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology, include the structural make-up and
composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Editha’s kidneys
before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.
‣ The best evidence rule is inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
‣ “Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;”
‣ The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors are liable for gross negligence in removing the
right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations
of Editha’s kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at the time of
her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.
‣ Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. The
anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Editha’s kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be
established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
‣ In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed. Witness Dr. Nancy
Aquino testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits because it transferred
from the previous building to the new building. Ultimately, since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM
properly admitted Editha’s formal offer of evidence and, thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value
thereof when it decides the case.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT VS BF CONSTRUCTION (2008)
G.R. No. 145842, June 27, 2008
Digest author: Clarence Tiu
DOCTRINE
‣ The conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the photocopies of the original document as
secondary evidence are:
1. There is proof of the original document's execution or existence;
2. There is proof of the cause of the original document's unavailability; and
3. The offeror is in good faith
‣ One exception to the best evidence rule is when the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice (Rule 130, SEC.
3B). Under this exception, to warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in
the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given
reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof
of its existence. The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against
whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done
all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document. The notice
may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the
adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time
to produce the same. When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it
or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff: BF Corporation (BF)
‣ Defendant: Edsa Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc. (ESHRI)
FACTS
‣ Edsa Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc. (ESHRI) and BF Corporation (BF) entered into a construction contract for
the construction of the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel. Among other things, the contract stipulated for the payment of the
contract price on the basis of the work accomplished as described in the monthly progress billings. Under this
arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress billing to ESHRI which would then re-measure the work
accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for that month's progress billing
‣ BF submitted a total of 19 progress billings. ESHRI paid BF P86,501,834.05
‣ BF says the ESHRI did not pay for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and was misled into working continuously on
the project by ESHRI which gave the assurance about the payment already being processed.
‣ After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF filed before the RTC a suit for a sum of money and
damages.
‣ In its defense, ESHRI claimed having overpaid BF for Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13 and, by way of counterclaim
with damages, asked that BF be ordered to refund the excess payments. ESHRI also charged BF with incurring
delay and turning up with inferior work accomplishment.
‣ RTC ruled in favor of BF, said that it was entitled to the payment of its claim covered by Progress Billing Nos. 14
to 19. Also, According it ruled that ESHRI's refusal to pay BF's valid claims constituted evident bad faith entitling
BF to moral damages and attorney's fees.
‣ BF filed motion for execution pending appeal which was granted. The sheriff garnished from ESHRI's bank
account in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) the amount of PhP 35 million.
‣ ESHRI filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the trial court from
carrying out the writ of execution. The CA also issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to lift all the
garnishments and levy made under the enjoined order of execution pending appeal and to to immediately return
the garnished deposits to PNB.
‣ CA would later affirm the decision of the RTC, ruling in favour of BF
‣ ESHRI fault the CA, and necessarily the trial court, on the matter of the admission in evidence of the
photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and the complementing Project Manager's Instructions and
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
the Work Variation Orders. According to it, BF, before being allowed to adduce in evidence the photocopies
adverted to, ought to have laid the basis for the presentation of the photocopies as secondary evidence,
conformably to the best evidence rule.
‣ BF, on the other hand, avers having complied with the laying-the-basis requirement. Defending the action of the
courts below in admitting into evidence the photocopies of the documents aforementioned, BF explained that it
could not present the original of the documents since they were in the possession of ESHRI which refused to
hand them over to BF despite requests.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ WON the admission in evidence of the photocopies of Progress Billings, as well as the Project Manager's
Instructions and the Work Variation Orders were proper despite the Best Evidence Rule- YES
RATIO
‣ The only actual rule that the term "best evidence" denotes is the rule requiring that the original of a writing must,
as a general proposition, be produced and secondary evidence of its contents is not admissible except where the
original cannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court enunciates the best evidence rule:
‣ Rule 130, SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice
‣ Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads: “SEC. 6. When original document is
in adverse party's custody or control. - If the document is in the custody or under control of the adverse party,
he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence,
he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.”
‣ Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to evidence other than the original
instrument or document itself. A party may present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not only
when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse
party. In either instance, however, certain explanations must be given before a party can resort to
secondary evidence.
‣ In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied documents in question as
secondary evidence. Any suggestion that BF failed to lay the required basis for presenting the photocopies of
Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 instead of their originals has to be dismissed
‣ The stenographic notes of the following exchanges between Atty. Andres and Atty. Autea, counsel for BF and
ESHRI, respectively, reveal that BF had complied with the requirements:
‣ ATTY. ANDRES: “During the previous hearing of this case, your Honor, likewise, the witness testified that
certain exhibits namely, the Progress Payment Certificates and the Progress Billings the originals of these
documents were transmitted to ESHRI, all the originals are in the possession of ESHRI since these are internal
documents and I am referring specifically to the Progress Payment Certificates. We requested your Honor,
that in order that plaintiff [BF] be allowed to present secondary original, that opposing counsel first be
given opportunity to present the originals which are in their possession. May we know if they have brought
the originals and whether they will present the originals in court, Your Honor.”
‣ ATTY. AUTEA: “We have already informed our client about the situation, your Honor, that it has been
claimed by plaintiff that some of the originals are in their possession and our client assured that, they will try
to check. Unfortunately, we have not heard from our client, Your Honor.”
‣ Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above exchanges, to wit: (1) the existence of the original
documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2) a request was made on ESHRI to produce the documents; (3)
ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them; and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to produce them.
‣ Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130. In other
words, the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the photocopies of the original document
as secondary evidence have been met. These are:
1. There is proof of the original document's execution or existence;
2. There is proof of the cause of the original document's unavailability; and
3. The offeror is in good faith
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
‣ To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or control of
the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that he
fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence. The
mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against whom it is offered does
not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to
secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document. The notice may be in the
form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the adverse party or
via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the
same. When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses
to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
CHUA GAW V. CHUA (2008)
G.R. No. 160855; April 16, 2008
Digest Author: Helen Toledo
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiffs/Respondents: Suy Ben Chua and Felisa Chua
‣ Defendants/Petitioner: Concepcion Chua Gaw
FACTS
‣ Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of three business enterprises namely: Hagonoy Lumber,
Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and Columbia Wood Industries. The couple had seven children, among them were
Concepcion Chua, Suy Ben Chua, and Chua Sioc Huan. Chua Chin died, leaving his wife Chan Chi and his seven
children as his only surviving heirs. The surviving heirs executed a Deed of Partition, wherein the heirs agreed to
voluntarily renounce and waive their shares over Hagonoy Lumber in favor of their co-heir, Chua Sioc Huan.
‣ Concepcion and her husband, Antonio Gaw, asked respondent, Suy Ben Chua, to lend them P200,000.00 which
they will use for the construction of their house. Respondent issued in their favor China Banking Corporation
Check for P200,000.00 payable within six months without interest. Their sister, Chua Sioc Huan, executed a Deed
of Sale over all her rights and interests in Hagonoy Lumber in favor of respondent.
‣ Meantime, the spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed from respondent within the designated
period. Failing to heed his demand, respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the spouses.
‣ In their Answer, the spouses contend that Concepcion asked respondent for an accounting and payment of her
share in the profits of the three business enterprises but respondent persuaded Concepcion to temporarily forego
her demand as it would offend their mother who still wanted to remain in control of the family businesses. To
insure that she will defer her demand, Suy Ben Chua allegedly gave her P200,000.00 as her share in the profits of
Hagonoy Lumber.
‣ During trial, the spouses Gaw called the respondent to testify as adverse witness under Section 10, Rule 132. On
cross-examination, respondent explained that he ceased to be a stockholder of Capitol Sawmill when he sold his
shares of stock to the other stockholders. He further testified that Chua Sioc Huan acquired Hagonoy Lumber by
virtue of a Deed of Partition, executed by the heirs of Chua Chin. He, in turn, became the owner of Hagonoy
Lumber when he bought the same from Chua Sioc Huan through a Deed of Sale.
‣ The RTC ruled in favor of respondent holding that the validity and due execution of the Deeds of Partition and
Sale was never impugned, thus there was no need to produce the originals of the documents in accordance with
the best evidence rule.
‣ The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC holding that petitioner failed to show that the inclusion of respondent’s
testimony in the statement of facts in the assailed decision unduly prejudiced her defense and counterclaims. In
fact, the CA noted that the facts testified to by respondent were deducible from the totality of the evidence
presented.
ISSUE/HELD:
‣ W/N the trial court erred in admitting mere copies of the deeds – NO, best evidence rule does not apply.
RATIO
‣ The best evidence rule as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies
only when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such
document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the
best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is
likewise admissible without need to account for the original. Moreover, production of the original may be
dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the
document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.
‣ The best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant case. Here, there was no dispute as to the terms of either
deed; hence, the RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two deeds. The petitioner never even
denied their due execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition.
‣ As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in effect, admitted its genuineness and due execution when she failed to
specifically deny it in the manner required by the rules. The petitioner merely claimed that said documents do not
express the true agreement and intention of the parties since they were only provisional paper arrangements made
upon the advice of counsel. Apparently, the petitioner does not contest the contents of these deeds but alleges that
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
there was a contemporaneous agreement that the transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc Huan was only
temporary.
‣ An agreement or the contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties’ rights, duties and
obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the parties. The parties’ intention is to be deciphered from
the language used in the contract, not from the unilateral post facto assertions of one of the parties, or of third
parties who are strangers to the contract. Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest,
no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
CITIBANK VS SEBANIANO (2006)
G.R. No. 156132, October 12, 2006
Digest Author: Irvin Velasquez
DOCTRINE
‣ In general, the best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced.
Accordingly, for documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the production of the
document itself, to the exclusion of any secondary or substitutionary evidence. The best evidence rule applies
only when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document.
‣ But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when the content of such
document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually
executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does
not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible
without need for accounting for the original. Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or
condition it is offered not as documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of execution of the
documents is allowed.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff/Respondents: Modesta R. Sabeniano, client of Citibank
‣ Defendant/Petitioners: Citibank and FNCB Finance
FACTS
‣ Modesta R. Sabeniano was a client of both Citibank and FNCB Finance. She filed a Complaint against the latter
claiming to have substantial deposits and money market placements with the them, as well as money market
placements with the Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC), the proceeds of which were
supposedly deposited automatically and directly to respondent's accounts with Citibank.
‣ Sabeniano alleged that the defendants refused to return her deposits and the proceeds of her money market
placements despite her repeated demands, thus, compelling her to file a Civil Case.
‣ Ten years after the filing of the Complaint a Decision was finally rendered by the trial court, holding that the set-
off made by Citibank was illegal, null and void and declaring Sabeniano indebted to Citibank in the amount of
P1,069,847.40.
‣ The Court of Appeals also declared the setoff as illegal, null and void but it held that Citibank failed to establish
by competent evidence the alleged indebtedness, thus the setoff of P1,069,847.40 in the account of Sabeniano is
without legal and factual basis.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ Was there proper appreciation of evidence by the Court of Appeals in the case at bar? NO, the debts were
sufficiently established
RATIO
‣ After going through the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by both sides to this case, it is this
Court's assessment that respondent did indeed have outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank at the time it
effected the off-set. The totality of petitioners' evidence as to the existence of the said loans preponderates
over respondent's.
‣ Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse
party.
‣ The Court disagrees in the pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals summarily dismissing the
documentary evidence submitted by petitioners based on its broad and indiscriminate application of the
best evidence rule.
‣ In general, the best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof must be produced.
Accordingly, for documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the production of the
document itself, to the exclusion of any secondary or substitutionary evidence. The best evidence rule applies
only when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document.
‣ But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies only when the content of such
document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually
executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise
admissible without need for accounting for the original. Thus, when a document is presented to prove its
existence or condition it is offered not as documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of
execution of the documents is allowed.
‣ The Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and weighed in evidence the photocopies and
microfilm copies of the Promissory Notes(PNs), Manager’s Checks (MCs), and letters submitted by the
petitioners to establish the existence of respondent's loans.
‣ The terms or contents of these documents were never the point of contention in the Petition at bar. It was
respondent's position that the PNs in the first set never existed, while the PNs in the second set were merely
executed to cover simulated loan transactions. As for the MCs representing the proceeds of the loans, the
respondent either denied receipt of certain MCs or admitted receipt of the other MCs but for another purpose.
Respondent further admitted the letters she wrote personally or through her representatives to Mr. Tan of
petitioner Citibank acknowledging the loans, except that she claimed that these letters were just meant to keep up
the ruse of the simulated loans. Thus, respondent questioned the documents as to their existence or execution, or
when the former is admitted, as to the purpose for which the documents were executed, matters which are,
undoubtedly, external to the documents, and which had nothing to do with the contents thereof.
‣ Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply to the evidence presented by petitioners
regarding the existence of respondent's loans, it should be borne in mind that the rule admits of the following
exceptions under Rule 130, Section 5 of the revised Rules of Court. The execution or existence of the original
copies of the documents was established through the testimonies of witnesses, such as Mr. Tan, before whom most
of the documents were personally executed by respondent. The original PNs also went through the whole loan
booking system of petitioner Citibank – from the account officer in its Marketing Department, to the pre-
processor, to the signature verifier, back to the pre-processor, then to the processor for booking. It was only
petitioner FNCB Finance who claimed that they lost the original copies of the PNs when it moved to a new office.
The original documents in this case, such as the MCs and letters, were destroyed and, thus, unavailable for
presentation when a fire broke out. This would have been sufficient to allow the presentation of photocopies or
microfilm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters by the petitioners as secondary evidence to establish the existence
of respondent's loans, as an exception to the best evidence rule.
‣ To recapitualate, the PNs are declared subsisting and outstanding and Citibank is ordered to return to respondent
the principal amounts of the said PNs. Sabeniano, on the other hand, is ordered to pay Citibank the balance of her
outstanding loans in the sum of P1,069,847.40
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
EBREO V. EBREO
G.R. No. 160065 ; February 28, 2006
Digest Author: Kat Ababa
PARTIES
‣ Petitioners: Felino Ebreo, Spouses Antonio And Evelyn Beraña, Ignacio Ebreo and Eleuteria Cueto
‣ Respondents: Gil Ebreo, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Felixberto Ebreo, Flaviano Ebreo and Homobono
Cueto
FACTS
‣ Felipe Ebreo (the father) died intestate leaving as heirs his five children, Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio, and
Felipa.
‣ Felipa died, leaving behind her heirs, Genoveva, Homobono and Eleuteria Cueto
‣ Felino had five children, one of which was Antonio Ebreo
‣ The father left an untitled piece of land, known as Lot 9046, to his children. The same, which was subdivided into
6 lots (A,B,C,D,E and F), was extra-judicially partitioned by the 5 heirs in a “Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng
Lupa.”Only Lot 9046-F remained under the co-ownership of all the heirs.
‣ Later, the other heirs were surprised to discover that Lot 9046-F was already declared for taxation purposes in the
name of Antonio (Felino’s son). They allege that they never sold, ceded, conveyed or transferred their rights,
share and co-ownership over the said piece of land.
‣ A complaint for Partition, Reconveyance, Accounting and Damages was thus filed against Felino, the spouses
Antonio And Evelyn, Ignacio and Eleuteria.
‣ In answer, the defendants claim that Lot 9046-F was sold by the other heirs to Santiago Puyo after the extra-
judicial partition. Thereafter, the Puyo caused the transfer of the tax declaration in his name and caused the sale to
be annotated in it. However, only the annotation in the tax declaration was offered as proof of the sale. The deed
of sale evidencing the transaction was never presented.
‣ It is alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed and ratified by a notary public and that Puyo
possessed the lot peacefully, continuously, publicly, and in the concept of owner until the same was sold to
Antonio by way of Absolute Sale.
‣ It is further alleged that the Deed of Sale from the heirs of Felipe to Puyo could not be presented because the
copy on file with the City Assessor was lost in the fire that gutted the building housing their office.
‣ Felino Ebreo also testified as to the execution of the sale. However, when asked about the location of the
document of sale, he claimed that it was borrowed by his niece Eleuteria Cueto, Felipa’s daughter, and that the
latter refused to return the document upon demand.
‣ Asuncion Aguado, Santiago Puyo’s step-daughter, was also presented. She testified that her stepfather bought
the subject lot from the heirs and had paid taxes for his real estate properties.
‣ RTC: Judgment in favor of the complaining heirs and ordered the partition of Lot 9046-F among the heirs of
Felipe.
‣ The court held that the document of sale allegedly executed by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo in favor of Puyo and
chiefly relied upon by Antonio as the basis of his ownership is sadly missing. The testimonies of Felino,
Asuncion and Antonio to prove by way of recollection of witnesses that Lot 9046-F was sold to Puyo merits
scant consideration. Quite evidently, their testimony should be taken cum grano salis – with a grain of salt.
‣ CA: Affirmed the RTC’s decision. It held that the best evidence rule, applied to documentary evidence, operates
as a rule of exclusion, that is, secondary (or substitutionary) evidence cannot be introduced since the original
writing itself must be produced in court, except in the four instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
‣ The testimony of Felino Ebreo regarding the execution of the Deed of Sale cannot be believed. In fact, it was
contradicted by his supposed co-sellers and co-owners. His claim that the deed of sale was borrowed by
Eleuteria and never returned was refuted by Eleuteria herself. Not only are the testimonies of Felino and his
son Antonio self-serving, they are uncorroborated by independent witnesses. They did not even look for a copy
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
of the deed of sale on the notarial registry of the notary public who allegedly notarized the deed of sale.
Neither did they look for a copy in the archives of the Court where it should have been submitted as required
by the notarial law. The controversial deed of sale not having been produced as required by the rules of
evidence, the trial court was correct in ruling that Puyo acquired no rights whatsoever to Lot 9046-F.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the entries in the tax declarations are admissible in evidence to establish the fact of valid transfer of Lot
9046-F to Santiago Puyo? NO
RATIO
‣ Considering that the annotation of the disputed Deed of Sale in a tax declaration is not sufficient proof of the
transfer of property and since the subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was incumbent on Antonio, et al. to
adduce in evidence the original or a copy of the deed consistent with Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In
the absence of the said document, their claim as to the existence of said deed of sale must fail.
‣ To contradict the claim of sale to Puyo, the other heirs presented the testimony of Antonio Pajilan, an employee of
the City Assessor’s office who testified (for Antonio) regarding the tax declaration on which was annotated the
alleged sale between the heirs of Felipe and Puyo.
‣ It was shown that Pajilan did not make nor witness the causing of the annotation as he was not yet employed
at the said office at that time. Likewise, he was neither present when the deed of sale was executed nor did he
personally see the said deed of sale. Thus, his testimony is inconclusive.
‣ The testimonies of Felino, Aguado, and Pajilan are at most secondary evidence. Hence, they are inadmissible
considering that there was a failure to prove any of the exceptions provided in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court and to establish the conditions of their admissibility. Even if they are admitted, they have no probative
value.
‣ Under this rule, it is axiomatic that before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the original of a deed or document, the party has to prove with the requisite quantum of evidence,
the loss or destruction or unavailability of all the copies of the original of the said deed or document.
‣ Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of the deed, the
offeror is mandated to prove: (a) the execution and existence of the original, (b) the loss and destruction of the
original or its non-production in court, and (c) unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part
of the offeror.
‣ Both the testimonies of Asuncion and Antonio lacked the weight needed to prove the deed of sale. Their
testimonies were not recollection of witnesses who saw the execution and delivery of the document. According to
Section 4, Rule 130, the contents of the lost writing may be proved by the recollection of witnesses. However,
Aguado’s testimony relates not to the execution of the document but to what her father (Puyo) did with the
property after it was already acquired. Similarly, Antonio’s testimony does not refer to the execution and delivery
of the deed of sale but of having allegedly seen the said document when he purchased the lot from Puyo. Thus,
they were not witnesses to the execution and delivery of the document of sale to qualify their testimonies under
the phrase "recollection of witnesses.”
‣ Neither does the testimony of Felino evoke faith and confidence. His salutary recollection of the missing
document failed to instill belief. It was uncorroborated by any of the parties to the alleged deed of sale. Moreover,
he does not have the cold neutrality of a disinterested party as he is inclined to favor his and his son’s interest.
Finally, his claim that he could not produce the deed of sale because it was borrowed by his niece Eleuteria was
squarely refuted by the latter in her testimony.
‣ The alleged document of sale between Puyo and Antonio was ineffectual for the purpose of transferring ownership
of disputed Lot No. 9046-F since Puyo has not acquired it from the heirs of Felipe, there being no document of
sale to support the transaction. It is self-evident that the seller cannot transfer more than what he has.
‣ While the tax declaration may enjoy the presumption of regularity in its issuance, the presumption is not absolute
nor inflexible and will apply only in the absence of proof to the contrary. The fact that tax declarations for Lot
9046-F were issued in the name of Antonio and that he paid the taxes for the land provides no evidentiary value
that he was the owner thereof. Neither does the payment of taxes conclusively prove ownership of the land paid
for. It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
DECS V. DEL ROSARIO (2005)
G.R. No. 146596. January 26, 2005
Digest Author: Marisse Aldeza
DOCTRINE
‣ Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence other than the original document itself. A
party may introduce secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument not only when the original is lost
or destroyed, but also when it cannot be produced in court, provided there is no bad faith on the part of the
offeror. However, a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence before he can
resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation
for non-production of the original instrument.
‣ The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the court in its discretion
may change this order if necessary. Prior to the introduction of secondary evidence, a party must establish the
existence and due execution of the instrument. After a party establishes the existence and due execution of the
document, he must prove that the document was lost or destroyed.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff/Respondents: Julia Del Rosario, Maria Del Rosario, Pacencia Del Rosario and the Heirs of Santos Del
Rosario
‣ Defendant/Petitioners: Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
FACTS
‣ Julia, Maria, Placencia and Santos Del Rosario filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession against the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). They alleged that:
1. They own a parcel of land situated in Kaypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan registered in Bulacan Register of Deeds.
2. The Kaypombo Primary School Annex (KPPS) under DECS was occupying a portion of the Property through
their tolerance and that of their predecessors-in-interest and that KPPS refused to vacate the premises despite
their valid demands to do so.
‣ DECS countered that KPPSs occupation was with the express consent of the respondents’ father evidenced by a
deed of donation prepared by Atty. Natividad. Because of the donation, DECS now claims ownership of the 650
square meter Donated Site. In fact, DECS renamed the school the Isaias Del Rosario Primary School.
‣ DECS presented three witnesses (all residents of Kaypombo, Sta. Maria Bulacan).
1. Ricardo Nicolas: resident since 1953; that the act of donating the said land was made during a political
meeting and he actually saw respondents’ father, Isaias, and Mayor Ramos signed the deed of donation
2. Vidal de Jesus: a barangay council man; testified that the brgy. council and the children of Isaias had a meeting
in the presence of Judge Natividad and the children requested that the school be renamed after their father and
when they tried to secure a copy of the deed, they were told that, when they transferred to the new building,
the deed got lost. A certification to that effect was issued by the municipal mayor.
3. Atty. Natividad (now Judge Natividad): testified that he prepared the deed of donation which was signed by
Isaias del Rosario in his residence which was accepted by the municipality of Sta. Maria, Bulacan through a
resolution signed in the office of the secretary and the municipal mayor; that a copy of said resolution could
not be found due to the transfer of the municipal hall from the old to the new building
‣ Plaintiffs presented two witnesses
1. Eugenia Ignacio: that their father Isaias del Rosario died on April 18, 1966 long after the construction of the
school and that she does not know everything about the donation because her father never informed them of
his dealings and she did not inquire from him about the occupancy of the lot by the school.
2. Maria del Rosario-Esteban: testified that she knows the property in question and that they own it by virtue of
succession and that she cannot recall how the school was constructed on the land; that her parents never
donated any property because that is their only property.
‣ RTC dismissed the complaint and is of the opinion that the defense was able to prove the due execution of the
deed of donation and its acceptance, as well as the loss of the same, in accordance with Rule 130 Sec. 4.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
‣ CA reversed the decision of the RTC. DECS failed to prove the existence and due execution of the deed of
donation as well as the Resolution of the municipal council accepting the donation. The Court of Appeals was not
fully satisfied that DECS or the Municipality had made a diligent search of the alleged lost deed of donation.
‣ The Rule requires that the defendant must prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the testimony of the witnesses in the order stated. However, the defendant
proceeded with the last resort-testimony of the witnesses, without even showing any diligent effort to secure a
copy of the deed of donation and the resolution.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ Whether or not the CA erred in holding that DECS failed to prove the due execution or existence of the deed of
donation and resolution of the municipal council accepting the donation - NO.
RATIO
‣ The best or primary evidence of a donation of real property is an authentic copy of the deed of donation
with all the formalities required by Article 749 of the Civil Code. The duty to produce the original
document arises when the subject of the inquiry are the contents of the writing in which case there can be
no evidence of the contents of the writing other than the writing itself. Simply put, when a party wants to
prove the contents of the document, the best evidence is the original writing itself.
‣ Art. 749. “In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The
acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take
effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor. If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the
donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.”
‣ A party may prove the donation by other competent or secondary evidence under the exceptions in Section 3, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Section 3 reads:
‣ SEC. 3. “Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror”
‣ SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
‣ Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence other than the original document itself.
A party may introduce secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument not only when the
original is lost or destroyed, but also when it cannot be produced in court, provided there is no bad faith on
the part of the offeror. However, a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary
evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or
other satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument.
‣ The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the court in its discretion
may change this order if necessary. Prior to the introduction of secondary evidence, a party must establish the
existence and due execution of the instrument. After a party establishes the existence and due execution of the
document, he must prove that the document was lost or destroyed.
‣ Here, DECS allegedly made a search in the municipal building and in the DECS Division Office in Bulacan. The
copies of the deed of donation furnished these offices were purportedly lost when these offices transferred to new
locations. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, Judge Natividad who claimed to have notarized
the deed of donation failed to account for other copies of the deed, which the law strictly enjoins him to record,
and furnish to other designated government offices.
‣ DECS should have produced at the trial the notarial register where Judge Natividad as the notary public should
have recorded the deed of donation. Alternatively, DECS should have explained the unavailability of the notarial
register. Judge Natividad could have also explained why he did not retain a copy of the deed of donation as
required by law.
‣ As the Court of Appeals correctly observed, there was no evidence showing that DECS looked for a copy from the
Clerk of Court concerned or from the National Archives. All told, these circumstances preclude a finding that
DECS or the Municipality made a diligent search to obtain a copy of the deed of donation.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
ASUNCION V. NLRC (2001)
G.R. No. 129329, July 31 2001
Digest Author: Ellen Buenaventura
DOCTRINE
‣ The purpose of the rule requiring the production of the best evidence is the prevention of fraud, because if a party
is in possession of such evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the
presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes which its production
would expose and defeat.
‣ The liberality of procedure in administrative actions is not absolute and does not justify the total disregard of
certain fundamental rules of evidence. Evidence without any rational probative value may not be made the basis
of order or decision of administrative bodies.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff/Petitioner: Ester Asuncion
‣ Defendants/Respondent: Mabini Medical Clinic and Dr. Wilfrido Juco
FACTS
‣ Asuncion was employed as an accountant-bookkepper by Mabini Medical Clinic.
‣ Certain officials of the NCR-Industrial Relations Division made a routine inspection of the premises of
respondent company and discovered upon disclosure of documents violations of the labor standard law (i.e. non-
coverage of employees of SSS). Company was made to correct these violations
‣ Med Director Juco then issued a memorandum to Asuncion charging her with offenses such as chronic absences
(totaling to 35 absences and 23 half days), habitual tardiness (108 times), loitering, getting others’ salary without
signing, disobedience and insubordination.
‣ She submitted her response but on the same day Juco dismissed her.
‣ She filed an illegal dismissal case
‣ Labor Arbiter ruled for Asuncion but NLRC reversed the ruling
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the NLRC erred in ruling that Asuncion was dismissed for a just or authorized cause? YES, NLRC erred, the
termination was illegal.
RATIO
‣ A worker’s employment is property in the constitutional sense. In order for the dismissal to be valid, not only
must it be based on just cause supported by clear and convincing evidence, the employee must also be given an
opportunity to be heard and defend himself. It is the employer who has the burden of proving that the dismissal
was with just or authorized cause.
‣ There is a paucity of evidence to establish the charges of absenteeism and tardiness. We note that the
employer company submitted mere handwritten listing and computer printouts. The handwritten listing was not
signed by the one who made the same. As regards the printouts, while the listing was computer generated, the
entries of time and other annotations were again handwritten and unsigned.
‣ The handwritten listing and unsigned computer printouts were unauthenticated and, hence, unreliable. Mere self-
serving evidence of which the listing and printouts are of that nature should be rejected as evidence without any
rational probative value even in administrative proceedings.
‣ The liberality of procedure in administrative actions is not absolute and does not justify the total disregard
of certain fundamental rules of evidence. Evidence without any rational probative value may not be made
the basis of order or decision of administrative bodies.
‣ Both the handwritten listing and computer printouts being unsigned, the authenticity thereof is highly suspect and
devoid of any rational probative value especially in the light of the existence of the official record book of the
petitioner’s alleged absences and tardiness in the possession of the employer company.
‣ Ironically, in the memorandum charging petitioner and notice of termination, private respondents referred to the
record book as its basis for petitioner’s alleged absenteeism and tardiness. Interestingly, however, the record book
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
was never presented in evidence. Private respondents had possession thereof and the opportunity to present the
same.
‣ Being the basis of the charges against the petitioner, it is without doubt the best evidence available to substantiate
the allegations. The purpose of the rule requiring the production of the best evidence is the prevention of
fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior
evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent
purposes which its production would expose and defeat.
‣ Thus, private respondents’ unexplained and unjustified non-presentation of the record book, which is the best
evidence in its possession and control of the charges against the petitioner, casts serious doubts on the factual
basis of the charges of absenteeism and tardiness. Private respondents failed to present a single piece of credible
evidence to serve as the basis for their charges against petitioner and consequently, failed to fulfill their burden of
proving the facts which constitute the just cause for the dismissal of the petitioner.
‣ Neither have the private respondents shown by competent evidence that the petitioner was given any warning or
reprimanded for her alleged absences and tardiness. Private respondents claimed that they sent several notices to
the petitioner warning her of her absences, however, petitioner refused to receive the same. The record is bereft of
any showing that complainant was ever warned of her absences prior to her dismissal. The alleged notices of her
absences fail to show that the notices were received by the complainant. The allegation of the respondents that the
complainant refused to receive the same is selfserving and merits scant consideration.
‣ From the foregoing, there are serious doubts in the evidence on record as to the factual basis of the charges
against petitioner. These doubts shall be resolved in her favor in line with the policy under the Labor Code to
afford protection to labor and construe doubts in favor of labor. The consistent rule is that if doubts exist between
the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.
The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.
Not having satisfied its burden of proof, we conclude that the employer dismissed the petitioner without any just
cause. Hence, the termination is illegal.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
GOVERNEMNT V. MARTINEZ (1918)
G.R. No. L-11889, January 10, 1918
Digest Author: Kevin Bulotano
DOCTRINE
‣ A certified copy of a document cannot be taken as an evidence without the one presenting it as an evidence having
proved the loss of its original copy.
‣ Undoubtedly the best evidence of the contents of a written instrument consists in the actual production of the
instrument itself, and the general rule is that secondary evidence of its contents cannot be admitted until the
nonproduction of the original has been satisfactory accounted for.
‣ Secondary evidence of the contents of writings if admitted on the theory that the original cannot be produced by
the party by whom the evidence is offered, within a reasonable time by the exercise of reasonable diligence. And
ordinarily secondary evidence is not admissible until the nonproduction of the primary evidence has been
sufficiently accounted for
PARTIES
‣ Applicant-Appellee: Government of the Philippine Islands
‣ Claimant-Appellant: Carmen & Dolores Martinez
FACTS
‣ Dolores and Carmen Martinez instituted cadastral proceedings before the Court of Land Registration for the
settlement of titles to lands in the municipality of Ilo-Ilo, province of Ilo-Ilo. They claimed that they were the
owners of two parcels of land and that they were in possession of the same for about 25 years having acquired
them by donation from Sarlabus and that their predecessors in interest had possession of the same for about three
years prior to the donation.
‣ When the case came into trial, Julio Salvador entered his appearance and claimed title to said lots, alleging that he
was in actual possession of the lots and that his predecessors in interest had been in possession of the same before
him for about fourteen years.
‣ The trial court ruled in favor of Salvador on the grounds that it was proved that the Martinez sisters sold the lots
to a certain Domenech and the latter sold the same lots to Salvador.
‣ The sisters filed a bill of exceptions after their motion for new trial had been overruled. They allege that the court
erred in:
1. Admitting the copy of the record of the supposed document of sale presented by the oppositor Salvador, in
support of his claim of title without the disappearance or loss of the original document having been previously
proved.
2. Not considering the evidence of the appellants as to his acts of possessioin and ownership on the lot in
question.
3. Adjudicating and decreeing the registration of said lot in favor of said oppositor.
‣ Saez, Salvador’s witness, claimed that Salvador acquired the said lots from Domenech. He signed a document in
behalf of Domenech who was not able to do so because of age. The document was then acknowledged before the
notary public Mr. Yulo.
‣ Soler, Salvador’s attorney-in-fact, testified that Salvador gave him papers referring to the said lots in question. He
looked for the document of the sale executed by the Martinez’ sisters in favor of Domenech but did not find any.
Soler investigated and asked Yulo about the said document. Yulo answered that he does not have them and said
that the Martinez sisters were looking for the same as well. Yulo stated that copies of those papers was in some
archive in Manila.
‣ Salvador’s attorney presented as evidence the document of sale between Domenech (Exhibit 1) and Salvador and
a certified copy issued by the acting registrar of deeds of IloIlo (Exhibit 2). The said certified copy contained the“
that said Martinez sold the same lots, that is, the property in the city, to Antonio Domenech de Toldra for the sum
of one hundred fifty pesos, and that the vendors acknowledged having received the price from the purchaser
before the execution of the contract. Said copy also contained all that was stated in the document of sale executed
on January 9, 1900, before the notary public, Don Gregorio Yulo y Regalado, and presented in that registry at 9:30
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
a. m. on April 23, 1900, according to entry No. 2, vol. 1 of the daybook. It further stated that in the same entry
there was a marginal note which read:
‣ "This property was sold too Mr. Julio Salvador y Miralles, as appears from record No. 2 of this property No. . .
. page . . . of vol. 6 of this book." And said acting registrar, Roman Lacson, having appeared at the trial,
indicated said registration in the book mentioned in said certificate, and also stated that Exhibit 2 was a true
and exact copy thereof. “
‣ Martinez’ attorney objected upon said evidence and alleged that it has not been proved that the sale involved in
the said copy involved the same lots in question, that there was no mention that Julio Salvador has in his
possession said document and that the existence of such document has not been proved nor anybody has seen it
before its loss. The lower court still admitted the said evidence.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N court erred in admitting the certified copy as evidence in the trial. YES, Salvador should have first proved
the loss of the original document and that the same was duly signed before he could have proved the content of
said document by means of a certified copy of the record.
RATIO
‣ Saez only mentioned that he learned the sale of the lots in question by the Martinez sisters to Domenech through
certain information but did not see its execution. Salvador and his attorney-in-fact failed to show the original of
said certified copy after mentioning that it can be found in the archives.
‣ The loss of said document of sale which, it is said, had been executed by the Martinez sisters in favor of
Domenech not having been proved and no proof having been offered that said document was duly executed and
signed, all of this being due to an obvious lack of diligence on the part of the oppositor himself, his lawyer and
attorney in fact, the presentation of the certified copy of the registration, Exhibit 2, and its admission by the court
as secondary and supplementary evidence of said document, was improper and cannot serve as a basis for us to
hold it proven, as the lower court did hold, that the Martinez sisters had sold the land in question to Antonio
Domenech and that having acquired it from the latter, Julio Salvador, the oppositor, could be adjudged to be the
owner of said disputed lots.
‣ Court argued that:
‣ The first observation that may be made against said argument, is that the certified copy issued by the acting
registrar of deeds of Iloilo, Exhibit 2, is not a true copy of the document of sale which is said to have been
executed by the Martinez sisters in favor of Antonio Domenech, but of the recital appearing in the books of
said registry with respect to the urban property, consisting of those two lots, which recital is to the effect that
there was presented in the office of the registrar at 9:30 a. m. on April 23, 1900, a document of sale, executed
on January 9 of said year by Carmen and Dolores Martinez before the notary, D. Gregorio Yulo y Regalado, in
favor of Antonio Domenech, of said property or lot composed of two parts, one acquired by said Martinez
from Doña Maria Victoria Sarlabus by donation inter vivos, according to the document of September 19, 1889,
ratified before a notary of that province, D. Andres Pastor Santana, and the other by a grant from D. Anastasio
Montes, as evidenced by a private document executed on April 24, 1893. On the margin of said entry it is
stated that said lot was sold to Julio Salvador. In short, the effect of the certified copy as evidence is that said
document, in which the facts already stated appear, was presented to the registrar of deeds on April 23, 1900.
So that all that was certified to by the registrar of deeds in the document, Exhibit 2, is that said recital,
referring to the document appears in the books of the registry.
‣ For this reason it is evident that as said certified copy was not a copy of the original document it could not,
unlike the original writing, be properly admitted as evidence in the present case on the ground that it was a
public document according to section 299. Neither could said copy produce the same legal effect as the
original. Such certification has the character of a public document and is such indeed, according to said section
299 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but is only effect is to show that said document was presented at the office
of the registrar of deeds of Iloilo, where the aforesaid statements appear. It does not, however, prove that said
lots had in fact been sold by the Martinez sisters to Antonio Domenech, or that the document presented was
true, duly executed or ratified before the notary, D. Gregorio Yulo, for the simple reason that said document
presented to the registrar might have been false and simulated, and the signatures appearing thereon might not
have been the authentic and legitimate signatures of the vendors, or of the notary before whom it was ratified,
or of the witnesses who appear in said document as eyewitnesses to the signing thereof by the vendors.
‣ It is true that section 299 already cited includes among public documents the public records of private writings
existing in the Philippine Islands; and this may very well give rise to the interpretation , which the appellee
seems to give it, that the entry in the books of the registry of Iloilo as to the presentation of said document of
conveyance executed by the Martinez sisters in favor of Domenech is a public record of the same writing, and
therefore the recital of said entry is a public writing. But in the first place it must be taken into account that the
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
entry made in the registry and mentioned in Exhibit 2 refers only to the presentation of the writing at the office
of the registrar; and as the Martinez sisters denied at the trial having executed said document in favor of
Domenech and sold the property therein described, and the document itself not being literally transcribed in
said entry or registry, and as it is neither proved that in the filing of said document with the registrar the
Martinez sisters took any part, said certified copy cannot have the effect of proving the said sale took place,
even considering said document as a public writing. It was therefore necessary for the claimant Julio Salvador,
in order to fully and sufficiently prove his alleged title to that real property, to present the original document of
said to have been executed by the Martinez sisters in favor of Domenech, or a literal copy of the same, or a
recital thereof appearing in some authentic document. If he could not do so he should have proved its contents
by means of the recollection that a witness might have had thereof.
‣ The recital in the entry in the registry, a certified copy of which has been presented as Exhibit 2, by counsel of
Julio Salvador, cannot be held to have the effect of proving the contents of the documents referred to, for the
reason that the Martinez claimants have questioned and denied the authenticity of said document which,
according to the entry in the registry, was presented to the registrar on April 23, 1900. And, as already stated
with respect to the recollection that a witness may have of said document, none of the witnesses who testified
for the oppositor, Salvador, affirmed having seen such document, said witnesses having learned of it only by
reference, as he himself stated, from the Martinez claimants themselves, who denied even this fact.
‣ Salvador did not comply with the best evidence rule which stated that:
‣ The best obtainable evidence should be adduced to prove every disputed fact, and a failure to produce it, but
an attempt instead to sustain the issue by inferior evidence, will authorize the inference that the party does not
furnish the best evidence because it would tend to defeat, instead of sustaining, the issue of his part. In
requiring the production of the best evidence applicable to each particular fact, it is meant that no evidence
shall be received which is merely substitutionary in its nature, so long as the original evidence can be had.
‣ Undoubtedly the best evidence of the contents of a written instrument consists in the actual production of the
instrument itself, and the general rule is that secondary evidence of its contents cannot be admitted until the
nonproduction of the original has been satisfactory accounted for.
‣ Secondary evidence of the contents of writings if admitted on the theory that the original cannot be produced by
the party by whom the evidence is offered, within a reasonable time by the exercise of reasonable diligence. And
ordinarily secondary evidence is not admissible until the nonproduction of the primary evidence has been
sufficiently accounted for.
‣ Under the earlier English decisions no degrees of secondary evidence are recognized. The American courts,
however, have asserted that secondary evidence, to be admissible, must be the best evidence obtainable under the
circumstances. . . . It is a rule of evidence, too ancient and too well understood to require proof of its existence,
that the original instrument is better evidence than a copy. Again, whenever a copy of a record or document is
itself made original or primary evidence, the rule is clear and well settled that it must be a copy made directly
from or compared with the original. If the first copy be lost, or in the hands of the opposite party, so long as
another may be obtained from the same source, no ground can be laid for resorting to evidence of an inferior or
secondary character. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 10, p. 912, par. 68, and cases therein cited.)
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
PAYLAGO V. JARABE (1968)
G.R. No. L-20046, March 27, 1968
Digest Author: Coleen Bunao
DOCTRINE
‣ The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any
person who knew the fact of its loss, or by any one who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination of the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are kept by the person in
whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or has made any other investigation which is
sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost." It is not even necessary to prove its loss beyond
all possibility of mistake. A reasonable probability of its loss is sufficient, and this may be shown by a bona fide
and diligent search, fruitlessly made, for it in places where it is likely to be found." And after proving the due
execution and delivery of the document, together with the fact that the same has been lost or destroyed, its
contents may be proved, among others, by the recollection of witnesses
PARTIES
‣ Petitioners: Romeo Paylago and Rosario Dimaandal
‣ Respondents: Ines Pastrana Jarabe
FACTS
‣ This case invloves a lot originally covered by Homestead Patent in the name of Anselmo Lacatan. After the death
of Anselmo Lacatan, a TCT was issued in the name his two sons and heirs, Vidal and Florentino Lacatan. Vidal
Lacatan died later. His heirs executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Romeo Paylago and Rosario
Dimaandal, plaintiffs-petitioners herein, over a portion of the entire lot (containing an area of 3.9500 hectares)
under a TCT, which portion is described as follows:
‣ North — Provincial Road;
‣ East — Property of Romeo Paylago;
‣ South — Property of Florentino Lacatan;
‣ West — Provincial Road (Nabuslot-Batingan);
‣ Florentino (the other heir) died and his heirs (wife and two kids) likewise executed a deed of sale in favor of the
same vendees over another portion of the same lot described as follows:
‣ North — Provincial Road (Calapan-Pinamalayan);
‣ East — Heirs of Sotero Mongo;
‣ South — Aniceta Lolong;
‣ West — Heirs of Vidal Lacatan;
‣ A new TCT was issued in favor of Paylago and Dimaandal. However, a subsequent subdivision survey for the
purpose of segregating the two aforementioned portions of land described in the deeds disclosed that a portion
(one half hectare) of the total area purchased by plaintiffs-petitioners was being occupied by defendant-
respondent. Hence, the action to recover possession and ownership of the said portion.
‣ Vis-a-vis the foregoing undisputed facts, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that a portion of land in
question which is described as follows, was purchased by Hilario Jarabe, late husband of defendant-respondent,
from one Apolonio Lacatan, which sale is evidenced by an unregistered deed of sale, who purchased it from
Anselmo Lacatan, the original registered owner in whose favor OCT No. 251 and later TCT No. T-4208 were
issued. The first deed of sale, also unregistered, executed by Anselmo Lacatan in favor of Apolonio Lacatan was
lost during the Japanese occupation; that the herein defendant-respondent has been in possession of the said
portion continuously, publicly, peacefully and adversely as owner thereof from 1938 up to the present; and, that
the herein plaintiffs-petitioners admitted in a deed of lease, that defendant-respondent has been in possession of
the premises since 1945.
‣ North — Provincial Road;
‣ East — Apolonio Lacatan;
‣ South — Anselmo Lacatan;
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
‣ West — Valentin Lastica;
‣ The lower court held that plaintiffs-petitioners were not purchasers in good faith and, accordingly, rendered
judgment in favor of defendant-respondent, declaring the latter as owner of the land in question with the right to
retain possession of the same. The decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the admission by the courts a quo of secondary evidence to establish the contents of the first unregistered
deed of sale executed by Anselmo Lacatan in favor of Apolonio Lacatan when the loss or destruction of the
original document, according to them, has been established. -- Yes.
‣ Who has a better right in case of double sale of real property, the registered buyer or the prior but unregistered
purchaser? -- Jarabe.
RATIO
‣ Undeniably the alleged unregistered document could no longer be examined by the parties in court, because it was
lost — but its original, however, upon, the trial court's findings which we have no reason to question — has been
sufficiently proved as having existed. As observed by this Supreme Court, "the destruction of the instrument may
be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or
by any one who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination of the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has
been unable to find it; or has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the
instrument is indeed lost."
‣ This Court has formulated in no uncertain terms the general principle governing the matter: as between two
purchasers, the one who has registered the sale in his favor, in good faith, has a preferred right over the other who
has not registered his title, even if the latter is in the actual possession of the immovable property. The New Civil
Code, Article 1544, provides that if the same immovable property should have been sold to different vendees, "the
ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the registry of property.”
‣ While plaintiffs-petitioners have a registered title, it cannot be denied that their acquisition and subsequent
registration were tainted with the vitiating element of bad faith. It was so found by both the Court of First
Instance and the Court of Appeals, and their finding is conclusive upon us.
‣ Both Courts below found that petitioners knew beforehand that the parcel of land in question was owned by
defendant-respondent
‣ Considering that the boundaries of the lands that the petitioners Paylago purchased in 1953 and 1954 were well
defined, they must have known that the portion occupied by the defendant-respondent under claim of ownership
and leased to them by the latter was included in the description.
‣ The fundamental premise of the preferential rights established by Article 1544 of the New Civil Code is good
faith. To be entitled to the priority, the second vendee must not only show prior recording of his deed of
conveyance or possession of the property sold, but must, above all, have acted in good faith, that is to say, without
knowledge of the existence of another alienation by his vendor to a stranger.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
BARODA V. STATE BANK
“How to prove a lost original document; secondary evidence; drafts for fruits!” 235 Mich. 542. 209 N.W. 827.
Supreme Court of Michigan. July 22, 1926.
Digest Author: Ian Canoy
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff-appellee: Baroda State Bank
‣ Defendant-appellant: Will Peck
DOCTRINES
‣ English Rule: there are no degrees of secondary evidence. The original having been lost, the copy and the oral
testimony are both secondary evidence. Both are competent evidence in establishing the contents of the lost paper.
‣ American Rule: a copy of a lost paper is the next best evidence, and, if it is available, oral evidence is
inadmissible.
FACTS
‣ This is a case to recover the amount of unpaid drafts brought by Baroda State Bank (Baroda) against Will Peck
(Peck)
‣ Baroda Bank allegedly received a letter on January 12, 1922 from Peck stating:
‣ Dear Sir: In confirmation of a conversation with Mr. Dorr yesterday I hereby agree to honor all drafts to cover
payment for merchandise by check made and signed by Mrs. Gladys T. Parkinson for me, on presentation.
‣ After receipt of the letter, Gladys Parkinson (daughter of Peck) went to the bank to open an account in the name
of Peck. Parkinson and her husband were engaged in fruit merchandising or something like that
‣ Basically, Baroda claims that the agreement between it and Peck was that whenever Parkinson would buy fruit,
drafts will be made and the total cost of the fruits will be charged to the account of Peck with Baroda (in short,
Peck is a guaranty to the payment of the fruit purchases and he has not paid them at all) The total amount of the
drafts already amount to $6,691.20
‣ During Trial, Baroda claimed that they lost the original letter above so Baroda was permitted to introduce a copy
of such.
‣ Peck admits sending a letter on June 12 but denies that the copy shown by the bank was the correct one. He also
claimed to have sent the bank another telegram on June 18 saying: ‘Do not honor any draft made on me by
Parkinson unless specifically instructed by me by wire or letter.’ Peck claims he is not liable for any more drafts
that came after June 18 since the second letter cancelled the agreement. Baroda denies receipt of the second letter.
‣ Trial Court Ruling: Jury ruled in favor of the bank.
ISSUES/HELD
1. W/N allowing the copy of the first letter as secondary evidence was proper. Yes. Proof of loss was sufficient,
therefore, secondary evidence admissible.
2. W/N the refusal of the trial court to allow Peck to testify on the contents of the original letter was proper. No. He
should've been allowed to testify.
3. W/N the copy was found to be an exact copy, therefore, can be used in evidence to determine liability of Peck.
No, it wasn't an exact copy, therefore, no use in evidence.(The trial court erred in instructing the jury that a
substantial finding of accuracy of the copy is enough to determine liability of Peck. You need exact copy boiiiii)
RATIO
‣ Peck argues that the proof offered as to the loss of the original was not sufficient to warrant the admission of any
secondary evidence. Peck is wrong in this aspect.
‣ Mr. Moore, cashier of the bank, testified: to having delivered the original letter to the baroda’s attorneys; that
when this trial came on it could not be found; that in his presence, the attorneys made unsuccessful search of
their safe and of all the files in their office; that he searched over every piece of stationery in the bank, but was
unable to find it.
‣ This was sufficient proof of loss to permit of the use of secondary evidence.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
RATIO FOR ISSUE 2
‣ Peck didn't get to bring a copy of the letter with him and the trial court refused to let him testify as to its contents
when he offered to testify on such matters holding that in the absence of any showing that his copy was lost and
could not be produced he should not be allowed to give oral testimony of the original letter. Supreme Court of
Michigan held otherwise.
‣ (Michigan follows this and ruled in favor of Peckwith regard to this issue) English Rule: it has been held in this
state that there are no degrees of secondary evidence. The original having been lost, the copy and the oral
testimony are both secondary evidence. Both are competent evidence in establishing the contents of the lost paper.
‣ (I guess our ROC follows this because our rules provide for a hierarchy to follow in case of secondary evidence?)
American Rule: that a copy of a lost paper is the next best evidence, and, if it is available, oral evidence is
inadmissible.
‣ Following the English Rule, a party may give oral testimony of the contents of a lost letter which is a private
writing, even though he may have a copy in his possession or control.
‣ The court erred in excluding the oral testimony of the defendant, and, as the ruling prevented him from submitting
evidence on the only issue of fact in the case, it was reversible error.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 3

‣ The plaintiff’s action was based on a letter of guaranty of which the copy in evidence was claimed to be an exact
copy. If it were not an exact copy it had no value as evidence and was erroneously in the Case. In fact, there was
no evidence that it was an exact copy. The only witness, Mr. Moore testified:‘I didn’t make that copy. I don’t know
who made it. I didn’t testify this morning that it was a copy that I had made. I don’t know where it was made. I
don’t know what kind of a typewriter it was made on. I am sure it is an exact copy. There is no doubt about it.’
‣ There was no evidence that he compared the alleged copy with the original and only based his belief on what he
recollects as to what the original contained. The identity of the paper as an exact copy was not sufficiently shown
to permit of its use as evidence.
‣ While no objection was made to it on this ground, yet the nature of the testimony, together with the instruction of
the court, and the fact that the defendant was not permitted to testify that it was not an exact copy, created a
situation most prejudicial to his rights. Judgment reversed. NEW TRIAL granted.
DISSENT BY CLARK, J.
‣ If the business man of to-day were asked, What is the best evidence of a lost original letter? his ready response
would be, The copy. The common sense rule of the business world should be followed. (Short, he likes the
American Rule)
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS V. CA (1987)
G.R. No. L-31189 (1987)
Digest Author: Rofil Carpeso
DOCTRINE
‣ Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. — When the original writing has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction or unavailability,
its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
recollection of witnesses.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiffs/Respondent: Norma Leuenberger & Francisco Soliva
‣ Defendant/Petitioner: Municipality of Victorias
FACTS
‣ Gonzalo Ditching owned Lot No. 76 (208,157 sq. meters) which forms a part of Cadastral Lot No. 140 (27.2460
ha.) sugar land located in Negros Occidental, which (Tax declaration was paid by him for year 1941). He was
survived by his widow Simeona Jingeo Vda. de Ditching and a daughter, Isabel (who died in 1928) leaving one
off-spring, respondent Norma Leuenberger, who was then only 6 months old. Norma Leuenberger, married to
Francisco Soliva, inherited the whole of Lot No. 140 from her grandmother, Simeona J. Vda. de Ditching (not
from her predeceased mother Isabel Ditching).
‣ In 1952, Norma Leuenberger donated a portion of Lot No. 140, about 3 ha., to the municipality for the ground of a
certain high school and had 4 ha. converted into a subdivision. In 1963, she had the remaining 21 ha. relocated by
a surveyor upon request of lessee Ramon Jover who complained of being prohibited by municipal officials from
cultivating the land. It was then that she discovered that the parcel of land was used by the Municipality of
Victorias, as a cemetery from 1934, is within her property which is now Identified as Lot 76
‣ Later, Norma wrote the Mayor of Victorias regarding her discovery, demanding payment of past rentals and
requesting delivery of the area allegedly illegally occupied by Petitioner
‣ When the Mayor replied that Petitioner bought the land she asked to be shown the papers concerning the sale but
was referred by the Mayor to the municipal treasurer who refused to show the same
‣ Thus, Norma filed a complaint in the CFI of Negros Occidental, for recovery of possession of the parcel of land
occupied by the municipal cemetery
‣ The Municipality, by way of special defense, alleged ownership of the lot, subject of the complaint, having bought
it from Simeona Jingco Vda. de Ditching sometime in 193
‣ The lower court decided in favor of the Municipality.
‣ On appeal the CA set aside the decision of the lower court. It ruled that a mere entry in the notarial register of a
notary public of an alleged sale cannot prove that a particular piece of land was sold by one person to another, one
of the important requirements being the indication of the area and the technical description of the land being sold.
Since no deed of sale could be produced, there is no way of telling what particular portion of the property was
sold to defendant municipality and how big was the sale of the land conveyed to the defendant municipality. In
lieu of a Deed of Sale, the Municipality presented a certificate issued by the Archives Division of the Bureau of
Records Management in Manila, of a page of the 1934 Notarial Register of Vicente D. Aragon
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the secondary evidence presented by the Municipality is sufficient to substantiate its claim that it acquired
the disputed land by means of a Deed of Sale – YES
RATIO
‣ Under the Best Evidence Rule when the original writing is lost or otherwise unavailable, the law in point
provides:
‣ Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. — When the original writing has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction or
unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document,
or by the recollection of witnesses.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
‣ It will be observed that the entries in the notarial register clearly show:
1. The nature of the instrument. — a deed of sale;
2. The subject of the sale — two parcels of land, Lot Nos. 140-A and 140-B;
3. The parties of the contract — the vendor Simeona J. Vda. de Ditching in her capacity as Administrator in Civil
Case No. 5116 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and the vendee, Vicente B. Ananosa,
Municipal Mayor of Victorias;
4. The consideration P750.00;
5. The names of the witnesses Esteban Jalandoni and Gregoria Elizado; and
6. The date of the sale on July 9, 1934.
‣ It is beyond question that the foregoing certificate is an authentic document clearly corroborated and
supported by:
1. The testimony of the municipal councilor of Victorias, Ricardo Suarez, who negotiated the sale;
2. The testimony of Emilio Cuesta, the municipal treasurer of said municipality, since 1932 up to the date of trial
on September 14, 1964, who personally paid the amount of P750.00 to Felipe Leuenberger as consideration of
the Contract of Sale;
3. Certificate of Settlement "as evidence of said payment;”
4. Tax Declaration No. 429 which was cancelled and was substituted by Tax Declaration No. 3600 covering the
portion of the property unsold and
5. Tax Declaration No. 3601 in the name of the Municipal Government of Victorias covering the portion
occupied as cemetery.
‣ The above-mentioned testimonies and documentary evidence sufficiently identify the land sold by the
predecessors-in-interest of private respondent. To insist on the technical description of the land in dispute
would be to sacrifice substance to form which would undoubtedly result in manifest injustice to the petitioner.
Moreover, it is expressly provided by law that the thing sold shall be understood as delivered, when it is placed in
the control and possession of the vendee.
‣ In the case at bar it is undisputed that petitioner had been in open, public, adverse and continuous possession of
the land for a period of more than 30 years. In fact, according to the municipal treasurer there are over 1000
graves in the cemetery.
Additional Facts (Not really related to evidence, more on Land Titles, but just in case)
‣ Property was originally registered in 1916. Plaintiff was born only in 1928 and cannot possibly be the registered
owner of the original lot 140 at the time.
‣ Isabel (Norma’s mother) died in 1928
‣ Simeona (Norma’s grandmother) was the administratrix of the properties left by her husband Gonzalo and their
conjugal partnership.
‣ Conveyance of the property was made on 1934 when a document of sale was executed by Simeona in favor of the
municipality of Victories as indubitably shown in the notarial register in question.
‣ As this conveyance was executed by the judicial administratrix, unquestionably the party authorized to dispose of
the same, the presumption must be that she did so upon proper authority of the CFI
‣ Unfortunately, the Municipality of Victorias failed to register said Deed of Sale
‣ When Simeona died in 1942 her grand-daughter, Norma claimed to have inherited the land in dispute and
succeeded in registering said land under her name. As registered owner, she is unquestionably entitled to the
protection afforded to a holder of a Torrens Title.
‣ Since the Norma inherited the land from her grandmother, she merely stepped into her shoes and she cannot claim
a better right than her predecessor-in-interest.
‣ When she applied for registration of the disputed land, she had no legal right to do so as she had no ownership of
the land since land registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but only of confirming ownership of the
land.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
‣ However it has been held that where the land is decreed in the name of a person through fraud or mistake, such
person is by operation of law considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the persons from whom the
property comes. The beneficiary shall have the right to enforce the trust, notwithstanding the irrevocability of the
Torrens title and the trustee and his successors-in-interest are bound to execute the deed of reconveyance.
‣ Hence Municipality of Victorias can neither be deprived of its possession nor be made to pay rentals thereof.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS
RODELAS V. ARANZA (1982)
G.R. No. L-58509; December 7, 1982
Digest Author: Amber Gagajena
DOCTRINE
‣ The photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff: Marcela Rodelas
‣ Defendant: Amparo Aranza, et al.
FACTS
‣ Marcela Rodelas filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor.
‣ The petition was opposed by the Amparo Aranza Bonill, et al. on the following grounds:
1. Rodelas was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce the will within twenty
days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;
2. The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of property after death and was
not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was not a will
3. The alleged holographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would
produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
4. The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as required by law.
ISSUE
‣ W/N a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy – YES.
Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate court.
RATIO
‣ Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court
after its due execution has been proved.
‣ The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no
witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required.
‣ However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be
probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that
there be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.
‣ But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made
with the standard writings of the testator.
‣ In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such
will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the document itself
as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a
photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any,
whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate
court,"
‣ Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then
the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.
EVIDENCE DIGESTS

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