Safrin Bakth

BLW 2510 Business Law and Ethics

Professor William H. Volz

Case Name: ​Weston v. Cornell University​ ​(Chapter 11)

Court Delivering Opinion:​ New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department
Citation:​ 136 A.D.3d 1094, 24 N.Y.S.3d 448 (2016)

Facts:​ In the case, the defendant, Cornell University (Ithaca, New York) designated plaintiff,
Leslie Weston to an associate professorship title with an initial five year term. The offer was
made in 1998 which stated it was with tenure. The university’s offer stated that the tenure be
submitted within a time frame after entering the employment; however Weston delayed her
submission for numerous reasons, which led the tenure to not be awarded. Later in 2003, the
defendant gave Weston a two year extension to submit her appointment, this time as an
“associate without tenure.” After she submitted it in 2005, it was once again denied. She was
then terminated from the employment. In the hopes of recovering from the breach of contract,
Weston attempted to file against the university. The New York Supreme Court denied that
portion of the motion seeking dismissal of the breach of contract claim. The defendant then
appeals. According to court documents, Weston’s previous contract of 1998 did state that the
position included a tenure, so the court did not comment on that portion. However, the new
contract given in 2003 clearly stated that her title was listed as “associate professor without
tenure.”
The defendant stated that she explicitly understood the 2003 letter, which Weston
admitted that the defendant was not guaranteeing her tenure in any case after the letter. In
response, Weston continued to claim that the university owed her the tenure. Contrary to her
opinions, the court ruled that the previous letter did not go beyond 2003. The new contract still
stood and in the end, the court sided with Cornell University. Leslie Weston lost her case and her
unsupported arguments regarding the 2003 contract were insufficient to change matters.

Issue: ​Should the defendant, Cornell University, be entitled to be granted its motion for
summary judgement after plaintiff Leslie Weston demanded tenure from the original 1998
contract?

Decision: ​Yes. The university was granted its motion for summary judgement. Plaintiff Leslie
Weston was unable to provide sufficient evidence against the breach and was aware of the new
contract she signed in 2003. This meant that the original contract was no longer effective and
could not be used to get her tenure. There were no material facts in dispute and it was evident
that the contract was modified to extend Weston’s appointment as a professor.

Reason:
● The 1998 contract stated that Leslie Weston was to be able to apply for promotion to full
professorship in less than three years after she was hired, if she were to submit the tenure
recommendation within a certain time frame.The offer letter indicated that the tenure to
be submitted through the defendant’s review process for confirmation. She continued to
delay her submission, leading her to get rejected from the tenure award. As it did state the
offer was with tenure, the court decided not to comment on this matter.
 ● One of the plaintiff’s concerns involved gender discrimination which she included in the
CPLR article 78 proceeding. The main concern was that the defendant failed to comply
with procedures in making determination to deny her tenure and failing to allow her to
respond to faculty concerns. Unfortunately, there was no sufficient evidence within this
claim and the court decided that her gender was not actually litigated in that proceeding.
● Defendant moved for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint in this action and the
Supreme Court granted that nmotion on collateral estoppel grounds, to which the plaintiff
denied that the estoppel does not apply due to the merits of the breech and gender
discrimination not being decided as a part of the article 78 proceeding. While the
Supreme Court initially declined the summary judgment to the defendant with respect to
the 1998 tenure, the order was reversed in the end which helped the university get its
motion for summary judgement.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion(s):

The court ordered that the order be reversed, on the law, with costs, and matter remitted
to the Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the court’s decision. The
justices did not have official concurring or dissenting opinions.

Comments:
Personally, I do agree that the defendant, Cornell University, should be granted the
motion for summary judgement. Leslie Weston was not clear on why she was unable to submit
her initial tenure on time and only further provided overall baseless claims of the breach of
contract. The contract was modified which meant that the previous offers were ineffective. The
original 1998 offer included a five year term with tenure and opportunity for professorship
within three years of the hiring. Regardless, the plaintiff decided to delay her submission for five
years and then claimed that she was given improper procedural confirmation from the defendant
on the basis of the breach and gender discrimination. There was no material evidence as to where
she was treated unfairly and was offered a two year extension without tenure. The second offer
clearly stated that it was without tenure and offered her an associate professor position. She still
tried to submit her tenure which was ultimately rejected again.
At first, the Supreme Court acknowledged some of Weston’s claims and denied the
defendant’s motion of summary judgment. After appealing, the university was able to regain the
summary judgement. It was better to appeal than to let it be because the court was able to do a
deeper dive into the facts and Weston’s contact was finally terminated in 2007. I believe that
Weston should have had a better understanding of the modifications made towards her offer and
understand that it was not a guaranteed tenure. Exceptions always apply, and in her case, she
could not get it in on time. The court reversed its previous decision and ruled that there was no
genuine issue on the material of fact. It is confusing as to why the plaintiff chose to wait until the
end of her initial term to state her issues, but it was not ruled in her favor.