Hontiveros vs RTC
FACT:
FACT:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a
complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio
Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that
they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they
were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of
the land registration case.
In their answer, private respondents denied that they were
married and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while
Teodora was single. They also denied depriving petitioners of
possession of and income from the land. On the contrary,
according to the private respondents, the possession of the
property in question had already been transferred to petitioners
by virtue of the writ of possession.
Trial court denied petitioner's motion that while in the
amended complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a
compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in
Article 151, therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had
been made to arrive at a compromise.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court can validly dismiss the
complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards a compromise
as stated in Article 151.
HELD: No. The petition for certiorari is granted, the case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this decision.
RULING:
The absence of the verification required in Art. 151 does not
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
complaint. The verification is merely a formal requirement
intended to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged
are true and correct. If the court doubted the veracity of the
allegations regarding efforts made to settle the case among
members of the same family, it could simply have ordered
petitioners to verify them. As this Court has already ruled, the
court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings
or act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order
that the ends of justice may be served.
2 Guerrero vs. RTC Ilocos
FACT:
The petitioner filed a complaint of accion publiciana against the
private respondent of which assumed another dimension when
it was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground that the
parties being brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged
1
that earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise.
Admittedly, the complaint does not allege that the parties
exerted earnest towards a compromise and that the same failed.
It was only on December 7, 1992, at the pre-trial conference,
that the relationship of petitioner Gaudencio Guerrero and
respondent Hernando was noted and so the private respondent
was given 5 days to file his motion and amended complaint.
On December11, 1992, Guerrero moved to reconsider the
December 7, 1992 Order claiming that since brothers by affinity
are not members of the same family, he was not required to
exert efforts towards a compromise. After Guerrero failed to
amend his complaint within the allotted five days on January
29, 1993, the respondent judge dismissed the case, stating that
it was done so without prejudice. Therefore, Guerrero appeals
the court's dismissal through this petition for review the
dismissal by the court a quo.
ISSUE: WON brothers or sisters by affinity are considered
members of the same family
WON the absence of an allegation in the complaint that earnest
efforts towards a compromise were exerted, which efforts
failed, is a ground for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
HELD:
No. In Gayon v. Gayon it was ruled that the enumeration of
""brothers and sisters"" as members of the same family does
not comprehend ""sisters-in-law"".
No. The attempt to compromise as well as the inability to
succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a suit between
members of the same family.
RULING: In Gayon v. Gayon case, then Chief Justice
Concepcion emphasized that ""sisters-in-law"" (hence, also
""brothers-in-law"") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New
Civil Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the
Family Code repeats essentially the same enumeration of
""members of the family"", we find no reason to alter existing
jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently, the court a quo
erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law
of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest
efforts towards a compromise before filing the present suit.
2. No. As regards the second issue, we need only
reiterate our ruling in O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit, citing Mendoza v.
Court of Appeals, that the attempt to compromise as well as the
inability to succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a
suit between members of the same family, the absence of such
allegation in the complaint being assailable at any stage of the
proceeding, even on appeal, for lack of cause of action. It is not
therefore correct, as petitioner contends, that private
respondent may be deemed to have waived the aforesaid defect
in failing to move or dismiss or raise the same in the Answer.
"
3 HIYAS SAVINGS BANK VS MORENO (GR 154132)
"On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent)
filed with the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas
Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios,
the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage contending that he
did not secure any loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or
execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife,
acting in conspiracy with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were
the ones that benefited from the loan, made it appear that he
signed the contract of mortgage; that he could not have
executed the said contract because he was then working abroad.
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that private respondent failed to comply with Article 151
of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it should
appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed. Petitioner contends that since the complaint
does not contain any fact or averment that earnest efforts
toward a compromise had been made prior to its institution,
then the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of
action.
Alberto asserts that since three of the party-defendants are not
members of his family the ground relied upon by Hiyas in its
Motion to Dismiss is inapplicable and unavailable.
RTC denied motion to dismiss. Court agreed with
plaintiff(Moreno). Petitioner filed a motion for partial
reconsideration. RTC again denied motion of partial
reconsideration ruling that failure to allege in complaint that
earnest effort towards a compromise were made by plaintiff is
not a ground for motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: W/N HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. can
invoke Article 151 of the Family Code.
HELD: No
RULING: The Court has ruled that the requirement under
Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in cases which
are exclusively between or among members of the same family,
it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by a
party who is a member of that same family, as provided for by
Article 150 of the Family Code.
Petition dismissed for lack of merit, costs against the petitioner.
4 FAVIS V. FAVIS G.R. NO. 18592
FACT:
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., after the death of his first wife
Capitolina Aguilar, entered into a common-law relationship
with Juana Gonzales. In 1974, Dr. Favis and Juana got married,
and Dr. Favis executed an affidavit acknowledging their child
Mariano as legitimate. After Dr. Favis' death, an alleged Deed of
Donation was executed, prompting Dr. Favis' children from his
first marriage to file a case seeking annulment of the donation.
The trial court nullified the deed, finding Dr. Favis mentally
incapacitated at the time. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the case, citing the absence of an averment on
earnest efforts toward a compromise.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals may dismiss the
complaint for failure to allege earnest efforts towards a
compromise.
HELD No.
RULING: The Court of Appeals committed an error in
dismissing the complaint. Article 151 of the Family Code
requires earnest efforts toward a compromise to be alleged in
the complaint. However, this condition is a ground for a motion
to dismiss, and the court's authority to dismiss it motu proprio
is limited to specific grounds such as lack of jurisdiction, litis
pendentia, res judicata, or prescription of action. The appellate
court wrongly ordered the dismissal based on an alleged failure
to comply with a condition precedent, which was not properly
invoked by the respondents during the trial court proceedings
or in their appeal.
5 MODEQUILLO VS BREVA, G.R NO. 86355, MAY 31,
1990
FACT: On January 29, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered a
judgment stating that the petitioner, Jose Modequillo is liable
for the damages he caused from a vehicular accident. On July 7,
1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at
Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur and an agricultural land
located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur, all
registered under the petitioner’s name. A motion to quash
and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by Modequillo
alleging therein that the residential land located at Poblacion
Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to
the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152 and 153
of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article
155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be enforced
against the family home of defendant is not one of those
enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to the
agricultural land although it is declared in the name of
defendant it is alleged to be still part of the public land and the
transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who
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was a member of a cultural minority was not approved by the
proper government agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not the residential house and lot of
Modequillo be considered as family home and be exempted as a
payment for the damages caused.
HELD: NO, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not
constituted as a family home whether judicially or
extrajudicially under the Civil Code
RULING: "The contention of petitioner that it should be
considered a family home from the time it was occupied by
petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under
Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that ""the
provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family
residences insofar as said provisions are applicable."" It does
not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences are
deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of
their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and
are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162
simply means that all existing family residences at the time of
the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state
that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive
effect.
The debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose
or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March
16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom was
rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both
preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution
provided in the Family Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial
court correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the sheriff shall
be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
" lot, as well as the cancellation of the title obtained by
6 PATRICIO V. DARIO III
FACT: On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He
was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their
two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent
Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a
parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school
building.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised
private respondent of their intention to partition the subject
property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent
refused to partition the property hence petitioner and
Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the
family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla
Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still
living therein namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson
of the decedent."
ISSUE: W/N the family home cannot be partitioned on the
grounds that a minor-beneficiary is still residing therein
HELD: No
RULING: Three requisites must concur before a minor
beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the
relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2)
they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for
legal support upon the head of the family.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV satisfied the first two requisites.
However, on the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV
cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother. Thus,
the obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the
order of liability for support is imposed first upon the shoulders
of the closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation
moved to the next nearer relatives and so on. It is his father
whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now
establish his own family home separate and distinct from that
of his parents, being of legal age."
7 EULOGIO V BELL
FACT: (the Bell siblings) are the unmarried children of
respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan-
Bell... sought the annulment of the contract of sale executed by
Spouses Bell over their 329-square-meter residential house and
petitioners by virtue of the Deed.
The RTC granted respondents' prayers, but declared Spouses
Bell liable to petitioners in the amount of PI million plus 12%
interest per annum.
CA affirmed
Spouses Bell later brought the case to this Court to question
their liability to petitioners in the amount of P1 million plus
interest. The Court, however, dismissed... their Petition for
failure to show any reversible error committed by the CA.
The RTC issued a Writ of Execution, as a result of which
respondents' property... was levied on execution.
Upon motion by respondents, the trial court, on 31 August
2004, ordered the lifting of the writ of execution on the ground
that the property was a family home.
Petitioners filed a Motion of the lifting of the writ of execution.
Invoking Article 160 of the Family Code, they posited that the
current market value of the property exceeded the statutory
limit of P300,000 considering that it was located in a
commercial... area, and that Spouses Bell had even sold it to
them for P1 million.
The RTC set the case for hearing to determine the present value
of the family home and directed the commissioners to canvass
prospective buyers of their house and lot respondents filed a
Petition before the CA. The CA rendered its Decision granting
respondents' Petition for Certiorari... the CA found that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
execution sale of the subject family home after finding that its
present value exceeded the statutory limit. The basis for the
valuation of a family home under Article 160, according to the
appellate court, is its actual value at the time of its constitution
and not the market/present value; therefore, the trial court's
order was contrary to law.
ISSUE: Whether respondents' family home may be sold on
execution under Article 160 of the Family Code. (NO)
HELD: No
RULING: Respondents' family home cannot be sold on
execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.
Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as
expressly provided for in Article 153 of the Family Code.
It has been said that the family home is a real right that is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment.
ARTICLE 155. The family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For nonpayment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or
after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,
materialmen and others who have rendered service or
furnished material for the construction of the building.
ARTICLE 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among
those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor,
and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home
is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in
Article 157, he may apply to the court... which rendered the
judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under
execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual
value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount
allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased
actual value... exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and
results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by
3
the person or persons constituting the family home, by the
owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries,
the same rule and procedure shall apply.
ARTICLE 157. The actual value of the family home shall not
exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of three
hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred
thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may
hereafter be fixed by... law.
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family
home by the persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its
beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the
actual value of the property at... the time of its constitution has
been determined to fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the
improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in
its value exceeding the statutory limit.[45] Otherwise, the
family home can be the subject of a... forced sale, and any
amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations
under Articles 155 and 160.
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home
under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these facts:
(1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase
resulted from voluntary improvements on the property
introduced by the persons constituting... the family home, its
owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual
value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.
During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was
alleged - much less proven - by petitioners. The sole evidence
presented was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already
determined with finality that the contract was null, and that the
actual transaction was an... equitable mortgage.
8 Florante F. Manacop v. Court of Appeals
FACT: Owing to the failure to pay the sub-contract cost
pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioner's
corporation and private respondent herein, the latter filed on
July 3, 1989, a complaint for a sum of money, with a prayer for
preliminary attachment, against the former. As a consequence
of the order on July 28, 1989, the corresponding writ for the
provisional remedy was issued on August 11, 1989 which
triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City
owned by Manacop Construction President Florante F.
Manacop, herein petitioner. The petitioner insists that the
attached property is a family home, having been occupied by
him and his family since 1972, and is therefore exempt from
attachment.
ISSUE: Whether a residential house and lot can be considered a
family home exempt from execution, even if the owner is living
abroad.
HELD: Yes.
RULING: A family home is deemed constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, regardless
of whether the owner is living abroad. The Supreme Court
ruled in favor of Florante F. Manacop and held that his
residential house and lot was exempt from execution because it
was his family home.
9 DE MESA V. ACERO
FACT: Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa. They
purchased a parcel of land located in Meycauayan, Bulacan. A
house was contracted in the said property, which became their
family home. A year after, Arceli contracted a loan in the
amount of P100,000 from Claudio Acero, which was secured by
a mortgage on the said parcel of land and house. Araceli issued
a check for the payment of the loan. When Acero presented the
check to the bank it was dishonored because the checking
account was already closed. Acero demanded payment.
However, Spouses De Mesa still failed to pay. Acero filed a
complaint for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The RTC
acquitted the Spouses but ordered them to pay Acero P100,000
plus legal interest. A writ of execution was issued to levy on the
said property.
The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero was
the highest bidder. Acero leased the property to Juanito Oliva,
who defaulted payment for several years. Oliva contends that
the Acero spouses are not the owners of the property.
The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses
Acero’s complaint and ordering the Spouses De Mesa and Oliva
to vacate the subject property. Spouses De Mesa contend that
they are the rightful owners of the property. The MTC also
stated that from the time a Torrens title over the subject
property was issued in Claudio’s name up to the time the
complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed
the validity of the levy made by the Sheriff, the regularity of the
public sale that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of
Acero’s Torrens title that was resultantly issued.
Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to
Acero. Spouses De Mesa contend that the subject property is a
family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family
Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon for
purposes of satisfying the writ of execution. RTC dismissed the
complaint. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property, as a family
home, may be subject to execution in this case.
HELD: YES, the subject property is family home but is
subject to execution. In general, the family home is exempt
from execution. However, the person claiming this privilege
must assert it at the time it was levied or within a reasonable
time thereafter.

RULING: "For the family home to be exempt from execution,
distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when
it was constituted and what requirements must be complied
with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such
privilege. The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes,
for purposes of exemption from execution, could be
summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the
Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a
family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from
execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be
family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it
was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are
considered as family homes by operation of law and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime
in January 1987 when Spouses De Mesa got married. There was
no showing, however, that the same was judicially or
extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with
the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject property became a
family home by operation of law and was thus prospectively
exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in
asserting that the subject property was a family home.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and,
thus, should have been exempt from execution, Spouses De
Mesa should have asserted the subject property being a family
home and its being exempted from execution at the time it was
levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. They are stopped
from claiming the exemption of the property from execution."
10 MARY JOSEPHINE GOMEZ and EUGENIA
SOCORRO C. GOMEZ-SALCEDO
vs. ROEL, NOEL and JANNETTE BEVERLY STA. INES and
HINAHON STA. INES
FACT: Purificacion dela Cruz Gomez (deceased), mother of
Mary Josephine C. Gomez and Eugenia Socorro C. Gomez-
4
Salcedo, entrusted rice land in Nueva Vizcaya to Marietta dela
Cruz Sta. Ines. Josephine and Socorro demanded for an
accounting of the produce of said rice lands while under the
management of Marietta and for the return of the Transfer
Certificate Title (TCT) of the property.
Trial court rendered judgment against Marietta and
ordered her to deliver the owner’s copy of the TCT and pay
damages. In order to satisfy damages, a writ of execution was
issued, by virtue of which, a parcel of land in Nueva Vizcaya
registered in Marietta’s name was sold at a public auction
wherein Josephine was the highest bidder. Marietta’s husband,
Hinahon together with their children, filed a complaint for the
annulment of the sale before the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya on the
ground that said house and lot sold during the public auction is
their family residence and is thus exempt from execution under
Article 155 of the Family Code. Respondents assert that the
house and lot was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta
as their family home from the time they occupied it in 1972
ISSUE: Whether or not the property can be sold.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that under article 155 of
the Family Code, the family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale, or attachment, except for, among other
things, debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
home. While the respondent contends that the house and lot
was constituted jointly by Hinahon and Marietta as their family
home in 1972, it is not deemed constituted as such at the time
Marietta incurred her debts.
RULING: Under prevailing jurisprudence, it is deemed
constituted as the family home only upon the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988. The complaint against Marietta
was instituted in 1986 to for acts committed as early as 1977,
thus, her liability arose years before the levied property was
constituted as the family home in 1988. The liability incurred
by Marietta falls within the exception provided for in Article 155
of the Family Code: debts incurred prior to the constitution of
the family home.
11 VITUG V. ABUDA, G.R. NO. 201264, 11 JAN. 2016
FACT:
Abuda extended a loan of P250k to Vitug and his wife, securing
it with a property mortgaged to Abuda. This property was under
a conditional Contract to Sell between NHA and Vitug, with the
title-award to go to Abuda upon completion. Despite
restructuring the mortgage, Vitug defaulted on payments.
Abuda filed for foreclosure, and the RTC ruled in Abuda's favor,
ordering the property's public auction to settle the mortgage
debt. Vitug sought reconsideration, claiming the property was
exempt as a family home established before the mortgage.
ISSUE: W/N the subject property is a family home and is
exempt from execution, forced sale, or attachment. (NO.)
HELD: No
RULING: The contention of the Pet. that the subject property is
their family home is irrelevant bc the debt secured by the
mortgage on the property before or after the constitution of the
family home does not exempt the same from execution under
Art. 155 of the FC.
12 MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueñas as
guardian ad litem, and MARIA DUEÑAS, Plaintiffs, -versus-
EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, Defendant. G.R. No. L-2474, EN
BANC, May 30, 1951,
Bautista, Angelo, J. According to Manresa, impossibility of
access by husband to wife would include (1) absence during the
initial period of conception, (2) impotence which is patent,
continuing and incurable, and (3) imprisonment, unless it can
be shown that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation
of prison regulations. Emiliano was clearly present during the
initial period of conception, especially during the period
comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942,
which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the
birth of the child Mariano Andal. Moreover, while Emiliano was
already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was
so serious that he could hardly move and get up from bed, this
does not prevent carnal intercourse. There is neither evidence
to show that Emiliano was suffering from impotency, patent,
continuous and incurable, nor was there evidence that he was
imprisoned.
FACTS:
Mariano Andal (Mariano), a minor, assisted by his mother
Maria Dueñas (Maria), as guardian ad litem, brought an action
in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the recovery
of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated in
the barrio of Talacop, Calabanga, Camarines Sur. It was alleged
that Mariano was the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal
(Emiliano) and Maria, and that Emiliano received the subject
parcel of land as a donation propter nuptias from his mother,
Eduvigis Macaraig. In January 1941, Emiliano became sick of
tuberculosis. Felix, his brother, came to live in his house to help
him work on his farm. Emiliano’s sickness worsened and he
became so weak that he became essentially bedridden. On
September 10, 1942, Maria eloped with Felix, and both went to
live in the house of Maria’s father until the middle of 1943.
Since May, 1942, Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and
treated each other as husband and wife. On January 1, 1943,
Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not
even attend his funeral. On June 17, 1943, Maria Dueñas gave
birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mariano can be considered a legitimate son of
Emiliano (YES)
RULING:
Since Mariano was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano died
on January 1, 1943, Mariano is presumed to be the legitimate
son of Emiliano and Maria as Mariano was born within three
hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage.
This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was
physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his
wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the
birth of the child. There is no evidence in this case to prove that
it was physically impossible for Emiliano to have access to
Maria. According to Manresa, impossibility of access by
husband to wife would include (1) absence during the initial
period of conception, (2) impotence which is patent, continuing
and incurable, and (3) imprisonment, unless it can be shown
that cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of prison
regulations. Emiliano was clearly present during the initial
period of conception, especialy during the period comprised
between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which is
included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of
the child Mariano Andal. During that initial period, Emiliano
and Maria were still living in one roof. Even if Felix was having
illicit intercourse with Maria then, this does not preclude
cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife. Moreover, while
Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and his
condition then was so serious that he could hardly move and
get up from bed, this does not prevent carnal intercourse. There
is neither evidence to show that Emiliano was suffering from
impotency, patent, continuous and incurable, nor was there
evidence that he was imprisoned. The presumption of
legitimacy under the Civil Code in favor of the child has not,
therefore, been overcome.
13 TEOFISTA BARBIERA, Petitioner, -versus-
PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, Defendant. G.R. No. 138493,
THIRD DIVISION, June 15, 2000, Panganiban, J.
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate
proof that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which shows
that the mother was already fifty-four years old at the time of
the child's birth and which was signed neither by the civil
registrar nor by the supposed mother. Because her inheritance
rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of such
mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation
of the said certificate.
FACTS:
5
Presentacion B. Catotal (Presentacion) filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Lanao del Node, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition
for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera
(Teofista) in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. Presentacion
alleged that she was the only child of Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariñosa; that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl
was delivered by "hilot" in the house of spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge of said
spouses; that Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and a
housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused
the registration of birth of her child, by simulating that she was
the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and
Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made Hermogena Babiera
appear as the mother by forging her signature; that the birth
certificate of Teofista was void ab initio as it contained the
following false entries: a) The child is made to appear as the
legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariñosa, when she is not; b) The signature of
Hermogena Cariñosa, the mother, is falsified/forged. She was
not the informant; c) The family name BABIERA is false and
unlawful and her correct family name is GUINTO, her mother
being single; d) Her real mother was Flora Guinto and her
status, an illegitimate child; and that the void and simulated
birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary
rights of petitioner. By way of special and affirmative defenses,
defendant/respondent contended that the petition states no
cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the
respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena; that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the
instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and
finally that the instant petition is barred by prescription in
accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the
instant petition under Art. 171 of the Family Code; (NO)
2. Whether or not the petition is barred by prescription under
Art. 170 of the Family Code; (NO) and
3. Whether or not Teofista was the real child of Hermogena
based on the evidence presented. (NO)
RULING:
1. Art. 171 of the Family Code is not applicable. it applies to
instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his
wife's child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child
was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case
alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
petitioner. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare
that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to
establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily,
the present action does not impugn petitioner's filiation to
Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no
blood relation to impugn in the first place.
2. The present action involves the cancellation of petitioner's
Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the
prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code
does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate
does not prescribe, because it was allegedly void ab initio.
3. There is no evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy, such as
medical records and doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth
Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to
the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the
time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years
old. Even if it were possible for her to have given birth at such a
late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own
home, when her advanced age necessitated proper medical care
normally available only in a hospital.
14. MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, Petitioner, -versus- COURT
OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO and FEODOR
BENITEZ AGUILAR, Respondents. G.R. No. 105625, SECOND
DIVISION, January 24, 1994, Puno, J.
A careful reading of Arts. 164, 166, 170, and 171 of the Family
Code will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in
the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of
nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these
articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies
as his own a child of his wife. The case at bench is not one
where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that
petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear
submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and
Isabel.
FACTS:
Private respondents Victoria Benitez Lirio (Victoria) and
Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Feodor) were Vicente Benitez’ sister
and nephew, respectively. Both of them filed a petition praying
for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente's estate
in favor of Feodor. Petitioner Marissa Benitez-Badua (Marissa)
opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the
deceased Vicente Benitez and capable of administering his
estate. Petitioner tried to prove that she is the legitimate son of
Vicente and his wife, Isabel Chipongian by presenting the
following: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth; (2) Baptismal
Certificate; (3) Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for
Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his
daughter; and (4) School Records. She also testified that the
said spouses reared an continuously treated her as their
legitimate daughter. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner
and relied on Arts. 166 and 170 of the Family Code. The CA held
that the trial court erred in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the
Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in not applying Arts. 164, 166, 170,
and 171 of the Family
RULING:
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do
not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a
child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child
of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation
where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his
wife. The case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late
Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel.
Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to
Vicente and Isabel.
15. RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, Petitioner, -versus- EDNA G.
SIASAT, Respondents. G.R. No. 200169, SECOND DIVISION,
January 28, 2015, Del Castillo, J.
Filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in
any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. It was erroneous for the CA to treat Exhibit G as mere
proof of open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172 of
the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first
paragraph thereof, the same being an express recognition in a
public instrument.
FACTS:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the
Aguilar spouses) died, intestate and without debts, on August
26, 1983 and February 8, 1994, respectively. Included in their
estate are two parcels of land (herein subject properties)
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-
(15462) 1070 of the Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod
6
(the subject titles). Petitioner filed a civil case for mandatory
injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat.
The complaint alleged that petitioner is the only son and sole
surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner)
discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he
suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen
the same; that he executed affidavits of loss of the subject titles
and filed the same with the Registries of Deeds of Bacolod and
Bago; that on June 22, 1996, he filed before the Bacolod RTC a
Petition for the issuance of second owner’s copy of Certificate of
Title No. T-25896, which respondent opposed; and that during
the hearing of the said Petition, respondent presented the two
missing owner’s duplicate copies of the subject titles. To prove
filiation, petitioner presented, among other documents, Alfredo
Aguilar’s Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1 (Exhibit G)
dated October 10, 1957, a public instrument subscribed and
made under oath by Alfredo Aguilar during his employment
with BMMC, which bears his signature and thumb marks and
indicates that petitioner, who was born on March 5, 1945, is his
son and dependent. The RTC and CA essentially ruled against
petitioner, and ruled that he failed to present sufficient
evidence that establish his filiation with the deceased spouses
Aguilar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in not taking into consideration
petitioner’s Exhibit G (SSS Form E-1, was acknowledged and
notarized before a notary public, executed by Alfredo Aguilar,
recognizing the petitioner as his son) as public document that
satisfies the requirement of Article 172 of the Family Code in
the establishment of the legitimate filiation of the petitioner
with his father, Alfredo Aguilar (YES)
RULING:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. Filiation may
be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required. It was erroneous for the CA to treat Exhibit G as mere
proof of open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172 of
the Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first
paragraph thereof, the same being an express recognition in a
public instrument.
16. ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS: JESUSA ARADO,
VICTORIANO ALCORIZA, PEDRO ARADO, HEIRS: JUDITHO
ARADO, JENNIFER ARADO, BOBBIE ZITO ARADO, SHIRLY
ABAD, ANTONIETA ARADO, NELSON SOMOZA, JUVENIL
ARADO, NICETAS VENTULA, AND NILA ARADO, PEDRO
ARADO, TOMASA V. ARADO, Petitioners, -versus-
ANACLETO ALCORAN and ELENETTE SUNJACO,
Respondents. G.R. No. 163362, FIRST DIVISION, July 8, 2015,
Bersamin, J.
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
One of the ways filiation of legitimate children is established is
by any of the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment. Considering that Nicolas, the putative father,
had a direct hand in the preparation of the birth certificate,
reliance on the birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his
paternity was fully warranted.
FACTS:
Raymundo Alcoran (Raymundo) was married to Joaquina
Arado (Joaquina), and their marriage produced a son named
Nicolas Alcoran (Nicolas). In turn, Nicolas married Florencia
Limpahan (Florencia) but their union had no offspring. During
their marriage, however, Nicolas had an extramarital affair with
Francisca Sarita (Francisca), who gave birth to respondent
Anacleto Alcoran (Anacleto) on July 13, 1951 during the
subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia. In 1972, Anacleto
married Elenette Sonjaco. Joaquina had four siblings, i.e.,
Alejandra, Nemesio, Celedonia and Melania, all surnamed
Arado. Nemesio had six children, namely: (1) Jesusa, who was
married to Victoriano Alcoriza; (2) Pedro, who was married to
Tomasa Arado; (3) Teodorico; (4) Josefina; (5) Gliceria; and (6)
Felicisima. During the pendency of the case, Pedro died, and
was substituted by his following heirs, to wit: (1) Juditho and
his spouse, Jennifer Ebrole; (2) Bobbie Zito and his spouse,
Shirly Abad; (3) Juvenil and his spouse, Nicetas Ventula; (4)
Antonieta and her spouse, Nelson Somoza; and (5) Nila.
Alejandra, Jesusa, Victoriano Alcoriza, Pedro and Tomasa filed
in the RTC a complaint for recovery of property and damages
(with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction) against Anacleto and Elenette. The aforementioned
plaintiffs argue, among others, that Nicolas did not recognize
Anacleto as his spurious child during his lifetime. The RTC
opined that Anacleto established that he was really the
acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. It cited the certificate
of birth of Anacleto (Exhibit 4) and Page 53, Book 4, Register
No. 214 of the Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong
(Exhibit 3), which proved that Nicolas had himself caused the
registration of Anacleto's birth by providing the details thereof
and indicating that he was the father of Anacleto. It observed
that the name of Nicolas appeared under the column
"Remarks" in the register of births, which was the space
provided for the name of the informant; that because the
plaintiffs did not present evidence to refute the entry in the
register of births, the entry became conclusive with respect to
the facts contained therein. The CA agreed with the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Anacleto is the illegitimate son of Nicolas (YES)
RULING :
Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
One of the ways filiation of legitimate children is established is
by any of the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment. Rightly enough, the RTC and the CA
unanimously concluded that Nicolas had duly acknowledged
Anacleto as his illegitimate son. The birth certificate of Anacleto
appearing in the Register of Births of the Municipality of
Bacong, Negros Oriental showed that Nicolas had himself
caused the registration of the birth of Anacleto. The showing
was by means of the name of Nicolas appearing in the column
"Remarks" in Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register
of Births. Based on the certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental, the
column in the Register of Births entitled "Remarks"
(Observaciones) was the space provided for the name of the
informant of the live birth to be registered. Considering that
Nicolas, the putative father, had a direct hand in the
preparation of the birth certificate, reliance on the birth
certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his paternity was fully
warranted.
17 ROMEO F. ARA AND WILLIAM A. GARCIA, Petitioners, -
versus- DRA. FELY S. PIZARRO AND HENRY ROSSI,
Respondents. G.R. No. 187273, SECOND DIVISION, February
15, 2017, Leonen, J.
For a claim of filiation to succeed, it must be made within the
period allowed, and supported by the evidence required under
the Family Code. If filiation is sought to be proved under the
second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, the action
must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Josefa passed away in 2002. After her death, petitioners could
no longer be allowed to introduce evidence of open and
continuous illegitimate filiation to Josefa. The only evidence
allowed under the would be a record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private signed, handwritten
instruction by Josefa.
FACTS:
Romeo F. Ara and William A. Garcia (petitioners), and Dra.
Fely S. Pizarro and Henry A. Rossi (respondents) all claimed to
be children of the late Josefa A. Ara (Josefa), who died on
November 18, 2002. Petitioners assert that Fely S. Pizarro
7
(Pizarro) was born to Josefa and her then husband, Vicente
Salgado (Salgado), who died during World War II. At some
point toward the end of the war, Josefa met and lived with an
American soldier by the name of Darwin Gray (Gray). Romeo F.
Ara (Ara) was born from this relationship. Josefa later met a
certain Alfredo Garcia (Alfredo), and, from this relationship,
gave birth to sons Ramon Garcia (Ramon) and William A.
Garcia (Garcia). Josefa and Alfredo married on January 24,
1952. After Alfredo passed away, Josefa met an Italian
missionary named Frank Rossi, who allegedly fathered Henry
Rossi (Rossi). The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision
finding petitioners Ara and Garcia to be children of Josefa, and
including them in the partition of properties. The Court of
Appeals omitted petitioners from the enumeration of Josefa's
descendants. The Court of Appeals found that the Trial Court
erred in allowing petitioners to prove their status as illegitimate
sons of Josefa after her death. Petitioners argue that the Court
of Appeals erroneously applied Article 285 of the Civil Code,
which requires that an action for the recognition of natural
children be brought during the lifetime of the presumed
parents, subject to certain exceptions. Petitioners assert that
during Josefa's lifetime, Josefa acknowledged all of them as her
children directly, continuously, spontaneously, and without
concealment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners may prove their filiation to Josefa
through their open and continuous possession of the status of
illegitimate children, found in the second paragraph of Article
172 of the Family Code (NO)
RULING :
If filiation is sought to be proved under the second paragraph of
Article 172 of the Family Code, the action must be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent. An alleged parent is
the best person to affirm or deny a putative descendant's
filiation. Absent a record of birth appearing in a civil register or
a final judgment, an express admission of filiation in a public
document, or a handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned, a deceased person will have no opportunity to
contest a claim of filiation. Josefa passed away in 2002. After
her death, petitioners could no longer be allowed to introduce
evidence of open and continuous illegitimate filiation to Josefa.
The only evidence allowed under the law would be a record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private signed, handwritten instruction by Josefa. DEAN’S
18. NARCISO SALAS, Petitioners, -versus- ANNABELLE
MATUSALEM, Respondent. G.R. No. 180284, FIRST
DIVISION, September 11, 2013, Villarama, Jr., J.
A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative
father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation
of the certificate. Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth
certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor,
registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of paternity.
Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a
public instrument and it has no probative value to establish
filiation to the alleged father.
FACTS:
Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for
Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City. Respondent
testified that petitioner told her he is already a widower and he
has no more companion in life because his children are all
grown-up. Petitioner at the time already knows that she is a
single mother as she had a child by her former boyfriend in
Italy. Thereafter, they saw each other weekly and petitioner
gave her money for her child. When she became pregnant with
petitioner’s child, it was only then she learned that he is in fact
not a widower. She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner
opposed it because he wanted to have another child. On the
fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an apartment
where she stayed with a housemaid; he also provided for all
their expenses. She gave birth to their child, Christian Paulo, on
December 28, 1994 at the Good Samaritan Hospital in
Cabanatuan City. Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at
the hospital room and massaged her stomach, saying he had
not done this to his wife. She filled out the form for the child’s
birth certificate and wrote all the information supplied by
petitioner himself. It was also petitioner who paid the hospital
bills and drove her baby home. He was excited and happy to
have a son at his advanced age who is his “lookalike,” and this
was witnessed by other boarders, visitors and Grace Murillo,
the owner of the apartment unit petitioner rented. Petitioner,
for his part, denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo. He
claimed that he was motivated by no other reason except
genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for
the delivery of said child, unaware of respondent’s chicanery
and deceit designed to “scandalize” him in exchange for
financial favor. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. The
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the same, citing Ilano vs. CA
where the Supreme Court ruled that the last paragraph of the
then Art. 283 of the Civil Code (now Art. 172 of the Family
Code) permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in
the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent’s evidence sufficiently proved that
her son, Christian Paulo, is the illegitimate child of petitioner
(NO)

RULING:
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Christian
Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as his
father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only
respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said
document though she claims it was petitioner who supplied the
information she wrote therein. A certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate.
Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the
placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other
person is incompetent evidence of paternity. Neither can such
birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument
and it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged
father.
19. JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and
guardian ad litem, ARLENE S. SALGADO, Petitioner, -versus-
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO,
Respondents. G.R. No. L-49162, SECOND DIVISION, July 28,
1987, Padilla, J.
There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood
grouping tests are conclusive as to nonpaternity, although
inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood
type of the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged
father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such
parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible
blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged
father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that
of the alleged father.
FACTS:
Petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her
mother and guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado, filed a case for
recognition and support with the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court against private respondent Perico V. Jao. The
latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping
test which was in due course conducted by the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) upon order of the trial court. The result
of the blood grouping test, held 21 January 1969, indicated that
Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Perico V.
Jao and Arlene S. Salgado. The trial court initially found the
result of the tests legally conclusive but upon plaintiff’s (herein
petitioner’s) second motion for reconsideration, it ordered a
trial on the merits, after which, Janice was declared the child of
Jao, thus entitling her to his monthly support. Jao appealed to
the Court of Appeals (CA), questioning the trial court’s failure
to appreciate the result of the blood grouping tests. As there
was no showing whatsoever that there was any irregularity or
8
mistake in the conduct of the tests, Jao argued that the result of
the tests should have been conclusive and indisputable evidence
of his non-paternity. The CA upheld Jao’s contentions and
reversed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the blood grouping test is admissible and
conclusive as to the issue of non-paternity (YES)
RULING:
There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood
grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although
inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood
type of the child is a possible product of the mother and alleged
father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such
parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible
blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged
father are crossmatched, then the child cannot possibly be that
of the alleged father. Citing Tolentino, the Court held that
Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in
man which can be transmitted through heredity. Although the
presence of the same type of blood in two persons does not
indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact that
they are of different types will indicate the impossibility of one
being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed father
and the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they
cannot be father and child by consanguinity.
20. ARTEMIO G. ILANO, Petitioner, -versus- THE COURT OF
APPEALS and MERCEDITAS (sic) S. ILANO, represented by
her mother, LEONCIA DE LOS SANTOS, Respondent. G.R. No.
104376, SECOND DIVISION, February 23, 1994, Nocon, J.
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision
that practically covers all the other cases in the preceding
paragraphs. "Any other evidence or proof" that the defendant is
the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other
paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the
action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet
requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be
enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph permits
hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of
Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation.
FACTS:
Petitioner Artemio G. Ilano courted Leoncia de los Santos
(Leoncia) for four (4) years, after which, petitioner and Leoncia
became intimate and with petitioner’s promise of marriage,
they both eloped to Guagua, Pampanga. They stayed at La Mesa
Apartment, located behind the Filipinas Telephone Company
branch office, of which he is the president and general manager.
He came home to her three or four times a week. Thereafter,
while they were living in Highway 54, Makati, private
respondent Merceditas S. Ilano (private respondent) was born.
Petitioner arrived after five o'clock in the afternoon. When the
nurse came to inquire about the child, Leoncia was still
unconscious so it was from petitioner that the nurse sought the
information. Inasmuch as it was already past seven o'clock in
the evening, the nurse promised to return the following
morning for his signature. However, he left an instruction to
give birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was
leaving early the following morning. During the time that
petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he
showed concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas
was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her
Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods as her
parent. Since Merceditas started to have discernment, he was
already the one whom she recognized as her Daddy. He treated
her as a father would to his child. He would bring home
candies, toys, and anything a child enjoys. He would take her
for a drive, eat at restaurants, and even cuddle her to sleep. The
trial court was not satisfied that petitioner was the father of
private respondent because it did not believe that her mother
and defendant were in cohabitation during the period of her
conception, and took into account the testimony of Melencio S.
Reyes who frequented the apartment where Leoncia de los
Santos was living and who positively testified that he took care
of all the bills and that he shared the same bed with plaintiffs
mother. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent sufficiently proved her
filiation with and the paternity of petitioner (YES)
RULING:
Private respondent's evidence to establish her filiation with and
the paternity of petitioner is too overwhelming to be ignored or
brushed aside by the highly improbable and fatally flawed
testimony of Melencio and the inherently weak denials of
petitioner. The Supreme Court found that the role played by
Melencio S. Reyes in the relationship between Leoncia and
appellant (sic) was that of a man Friday although appellant (sic)
would not trust him to the hilt and unwittingly required him to
submit to Leoncia an accounting of his expenditures for cash
advances given to him by Leoncia, Artemio or Guagua
Telephone System which would not have been the case, if it
were true that there was an intimate relationship between him
and plaintiff's mother. To establish "the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary
to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements.
"Continuous" does not, however, mean that the concession of
status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an
intermittent character while it continues. The possession of
such status means that the father has treated the child as his
own, directly and not through other, spontaneously and without
concealment though without publicity. Merceditas bore the
surname of "Ilano" since birth without any objection on the
part of Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas had her
discernment she had always known and called Artemio as her
"Daddy"; the fact that each time Artemio was at home, he
would play with Merceditas, take her for a ride or restaurants to
eat, and sometimes sleeping with Merceditas and does all what
a father should do for his child — bringing home goodies,
candies, toys and whatever he can bring her which a child
enjoys which Artemio gives Merceditas are positive evidence
that Merceditas is the child of Artemio and recognized by
Artemio as such. Granting ex gratia argument that private
respondent's evidence is not sufficient proof of continuos
possession of status of a spurious child, respondent court
applied next paragraph (4) of Article 283. While defendant's
signature does not appear in the Certificate of Live Birth, the
evidence indubitably discloses that Leoncia gave birth on
December 30, 1963 to Merceditas at 4:27 p.m. at the Manila
Sanitarium. Artemio arrived at about 5:00 p.m. At about 7:00
p.m., a nurse came who made inquiries about the biodata of the
born child. The inquiries were directed to Artemio which were
about the name of the father, mother and child. After the
interview the nurse told them that the information has to be
recorded in the formal form and has to be signed by Artemio
but because there is no office, as it was past 7:00 p.m., the
nurse would just return in the morning for Artemio's signature.
Artemio gave the instruction to the nurse to give the biodata to
Leoncia for her signature as he was leaving very early the
following morning. Citing Roces v. Civil Registrar of Manila
where the Court held that the principle that if the father did not
sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the
mother, doctor, register, or other person is incompetent
evidence of paternity does not apply to this case because it was
the alleged father himself who went to the municipal building
and gave all the data about his daughter's birth, the Court held
that the totality of evidence in this case effectively proved
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was the father of
private respondent.
21 CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, Petitioner, -versus- HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT CUYUGAN,
Respondent. G.R. No. 95229, FIRST DIVISION, June 9, 1992,
Regalado, J.
9
A natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but
who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain
partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against
his coheirs ; and the same person may intervene in proceedings
for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father,
or mother. In neither of these situations has it been thought
necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits
and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take
by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration of
heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
FACTS:
Private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal
guardian of minor Chad D. Cuyugan, filed on April 9, 1987 a
complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein
petitioner as the administratrix of the estate of the late Atty.
Ricardo Ocampo. Private respondent, in her complaint, alleged
that she and Atty. Ocampo had an illicit amorous relationship
with each other that, as a consequence thereof, they begot a
child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the
ardent desire and behest of said Atty. Ocampo. Petitioner
contends that the action to claim for inheritance filed by herein
private respondent in behalf of the minor child, Chad Cuyugan,
is premature and the complaint states no cause of action, she
submits that the recognition of the minor child, either
voluntarily or by judicial action, by the alleged putative father
must first be established before the former can invoke his right
to succeed and participate in the estate of the latter. Petitioner
asseverates that since there is no allegation of such recognition
in the complaint denominated as "Claim for Inheritance," then
there exists no basis for private respondent's aforesaid claim
and, consequently, the complaint should be dismissed.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in
one complaint (YES); and
2. Whether or not the action to compel recognition had
prescribed. (NO)
RULING:
1. In Briz v. Briz, et al., the Supreme Court had the occasion to
rule that the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a
natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but
who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain
partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against
his co-heirs ; and the same person may intervene in
proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased
natural father, or mother. In neither of these situations has it
been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree
compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in
partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons
who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the
declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings of the
Family Code states that the Code shall have retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
It becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether the right
of the minor child to file an action for recognition is a vested
right or not. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at
bar, the right of action of the minor child has been vested by the
filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil
Code and prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Citing its
ruling in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
the Court held that the fact of filing of the petition already
vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same
proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force
at the time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or
impaired by the enactment of a new law.
22 JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, et al., Petitioners, -versus-
THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO S. FERNANDEZ,
Respondents. G.R. No. 108366, SECOND DIVISION, February
16, 1994, Puno, J.
While baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified.
They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of
entries therein with respect to the child's paternity
FACTS
Violeta P. Esguerra, as mother and guardian ad litem of
petitioners Claro Antonio Fernandez and John Paul Fernandez,
filed an action for recognition and support against the private
respondent before another branch of the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 87. To bolster their case, petitioners presented the
following documentary evidence: their certificates of live birth,
identifying respondent Carlito as their father; the baptismal
certificate of petitioner Claro which also states that his father is
respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito taken during the
baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of respondent Carlito
and Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra. Petitioners
likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario Cantoria, Dr. Milagros
Villanueva, Ruby Chua Cu, and Fr. Liberato Fernandez. The
first three witnesses told the trial court that Violeta Esguerra
had, at different times, introduced the private respondent to
them as her "husband". Fr. Fernandez, on the other hand,
testified that Carlito was the one who presented himself as the
father of petitioner Claro during the latter's baptism. In
defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he
sired the two petitioners. He averred he only served as one of
the sponsors in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was
corroborated by the testimony of Rodante Pagtakhan, an
officemate of respondent Carlito who also stood as a sponsor of
petitioner Claro during his baptism. The Private respondent
also presented as witness, Fidel Arcagua, a waiter of the
Lighthouse Restaurant. He disputed Violeta's allegation that
she and respondent Carlito frequented the said restaurant
during their affair. Arcagua stated he never saw Violeta
Esguerra and respondent Carlito together at the said
restaurant. Private respondent also declared he only learned he
was named in the birth certificates of both petitioners as their
father after he was sued for support. The trial court ruled in
favor of petitioners, but the Court of Appeals reversed the same
ruling that the proof relied upon by the trial court is inadequate
to prove the private respondent’s paternity and filiation of
petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence presented by petitioners prove the
paternity and filiation of private respondent (NO)
RULING:
Petitioners cannot rely on the photographs showing the
presence of the private respondent in the baptism of petitioner
Claro. These photographs are far from proofs that private
respondent is the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the
private respondent, he was in the baptism as one of the
sponsors of petitioner Claro. His testimony was corroborated by
Rodante Pagtakhan. Secondly, the pictures taken in the house
of Violeta showing private respondent showering affection to
Claro fall short of the evidence required to prove paternity.
Thirdly, the baptismal certificates of petitioner Claro naming
private respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value.
There is no showing that private respondent participated in its
preparation. While baptismal certificates may be considered
public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified.
They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of
entries therein with respect to the child's paternity. Fourth, the
certificates of live birth of the petitioners identifying private
respondent as their father are not also competent evidence on
the issue of their paternity. Again, the records do no show that
private respondent had a hand in the preparation of said
certificates. A birth certificate no signed by the alleged father
therein indicated is not competent evidence of paternity.
23 CAMELO CABATANIA, Petitioner, -versus- COURT OF
APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS, Respondents. G.R. No.
124814, THIRD DIVISION, October 21, 2004, Corona, J.
10
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance
or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove
paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
FACTS:
A petition for recognition and support was filed by Florencia
Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo
Regodos. Florencia claimed that while working as a household
maid for petitioner, she and the latter engaged in sexual
intercourse as a result of which, she got pregnant 27 days later.
Later, on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant, petitioner's
wife sent her home. But petitioner instead brought her to
Singcang, Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On
September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunt's house in
Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private
respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner alleged that he met
Florencia on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and
invited her to dinner. While they were eating, she confided that
she was hard up and petitioner offered to lend her save money.
Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual
intercourse. While doing it, he felt something jerking and when
he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with the
child of her husband. They went home the following day. In
March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another
household, went to petitioner's house hoping to be re-employed
as a servant there. Since petitioner's wife was in need of one,
she was re-hired. However petitioner's wife noticed that her
stomach was bulging and inquired about the father of the
unborn child. She told petitioner's wife that the baby was by her
husband. Because of her condition, she was again told to go
home and they did not see each other anymore. The trial court
ruled in favor of private respondent and held that based on the
personal appearance of the child then there can never be a
doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with
plaintiff-minor's mother, Florencia Regodos. The CA affirmed
the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence adduced by private respondent
prove petitioner’s paternity and filiation (NO)
RULING:
A high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and
filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an
unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or
the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity
or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal
certificates, the preparation of which was without the
knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.
The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity
of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person. In
this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
analysis, the extremely subjective test of physical resemblance
or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove
paternity and filiation before the courts of law.
24. MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA,
BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and
JUANA C. BAUTISTA, Petitioners -versus- THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her
husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND
DORIBEL SAYSON, Respondents G.R. NOS. 89224-25, FIRST
DIVISION, January 23, 1992, CRUZ, J.
Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is
one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of
the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. The birth
certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of
Appeals, where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public
documents must be sustained in the absence of strong,
complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
FACTS:
When spouses Teodoro and Isabel Bautista died, their
properties were left in the possession of Private respondents
Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who
claimed to be their children. They asserted that Delia and
Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. Petitioners,
however, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the
intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. The petitioners,
in addition, argued that Doribel is not the legitimate daughter
of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila,
who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that
she was her natural mother. The action was resisted by private
respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Doribel is the legitimate daughter of Teodoro
and Isabel. (YES)
RULING:
Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is
one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article 265 of
the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as
the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima
facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary
evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was
born to Edita Abila was understandably suspect, coming as it
did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila denying her
earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel
is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered
in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the
birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of
Appeals, where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public
documents must be sustained in the absence of strong,
complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity." Another
reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the
impropriety of the present proceedings for that purpose.
Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for
partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed
by the proper party.
25 JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE
JESUS, represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS,
Petitioners, -versus- THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN
GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON,
FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and
FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP.,
FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY
CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC.,
Respondents. G.R. No. 142877, THIRD DIVISION, October 2,
2001, VITUG, J.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. In an attempt to establish their
legitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in
effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being the
children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This
cannot be done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy
of children conceived or born during the marriage of the
parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for
the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional
instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action
the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when
the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that
the paternity of the husband can be rejected.
FACTS:
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married and it
was during this marriage that Jacqueline de Jesus and Jinkie
Christie de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born. In a notarized
document, a certain Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline
and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by
Carolina Aves de Jesus. When Juan G. Dizon died intestate,
leaving behind considerable assets, petitioners filed a complaint
for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate
11
with the RTC. Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate
children of late Juan Dizon sought the dismissal of the case,
arguing that the complaint would call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the
illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan
Dizon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus is Juan G.
Dizon’s own illegitimate children. (NO)
RULING:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing
is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child,
and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition;
it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim
for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending
to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic writing,
judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is
essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgment. A
scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born
during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live
birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of
the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the
husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband,
which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Quite
remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in
Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code
(which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the
status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable. In an attempt to establish their legitimate filiation
to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn
their legitimate status as being the children of Danilo de Jesus
and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This cannot be done because the
law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and
only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can
contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born
to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has
been successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband
can be rejected.
26. In the matter of the intestate estate of the late JUAN
"JHONNY" LOCSIN, SR., LUCY A. SOLINAP (Daughter of the
late Maria Locsin Araneta), the successors of the late
LOURDES C. LOCSIN, MANUEL C. LOCSIN, ESTER LOCSIN
JARANTILLA and the intestate estate of the late JOSE C.
LOCSIN, JR., Petitioners, -versus- JUAN C. LOCSIN, JR.,
Respondent. G.R. No. 146737, THIRD DIVISION, December
10, 2001, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
In Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "a birth
certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in
its preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity." A birth
certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both
the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes
of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers
only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by
contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained
where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its
falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry
(from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the
badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in
that office was removed and substituted with a falsified
Certificate of Live Birth. The glaring discrepancies between the
two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have
overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local
Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the
Civil Registry General. Respondent's photograph with his
mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and
will not constitute proof of filiation. Anybody can have a picture
taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter
utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
FACTS:
11 months after Juan “Jhonny” Locsin, Sr. died, respondent
Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the RTC a petition praying that he
be appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the
deceased. He alleged that he is an acknowledged natural child
of the late Juan Locsin and that he is the only surviving legal
heir of the decedent. The opposition avereed that respondent is
not a child or an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan
Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed “Sr.” in his name.
To support respondent’s claim that he is an acknowledged
narural child of the deceased, the intestate estate, respondent
submitted a machine copy (marked as Exhibit "D") of his
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound volume of
birth records in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. Exhibit
"D" contains the information that respondent's father is Juan C.
Locsin, Sr. Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph
(Exhibit "C") showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla,
in front of a coffin bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body.
Petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
(Exhibit "D") is spurious. They submitted a certified true copy
of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar
General, Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit "8", indicating that
the birth of respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo
Escamilla, and that the same does not contain the signature of
the late Juan C. Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact
that while respondent was born on October 22, 1956 and his
birth was recorded on January 30, 1957, however, his
Certificate of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D") was recorded on
a December 1, 1958 revised form. Exhibit "8" appears on a July,
1956 form, already used before respondent's birth. This
scenario clearly suggests that Exhibit "D" was falsified. The
RTC ruled for respondent and found Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and the photograph (Exhibit "C") are
sufficient proofs of respondent's illegitimate filiation with the
deceased. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Juan Locsin, Jr. was able to prove
his filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr. (NO)
RULING:
The Supreme Court, through Justice Jose C. Vitug, held: "The
filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing
is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child,
and no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition;
it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim
for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending
to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic writing,
12
judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is
essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgment." In
Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that "a birth
certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had no hand in
its preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity." A birth
certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both
the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes
of recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers
only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by
contrary evidence. Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained
where there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its
falsity or nullity. In this case, respondent's Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the Local Civil Registry
(from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the
badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in
that office was removed and substituted with a falsified
Certificate of Live Birth. The glaring discrepancies between the
two Certificates of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have
overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D" entered in the Local
Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the
Civil Registry General. Respondent's photograph with his
mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and
will not constitute proof of filiation. Anybody can have a picture
taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter
utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
27. GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioner, -versus- COURT
OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, Respondents.
G.R. No. 123450, THIRD DIVISION, August 31, 2005,
CORONA, J.
The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. The law requires that every
reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. The
presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a
declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is
grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from
the odium of illegitimacy. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is
a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases,
his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was
void from the very beginning; he never became her husband
and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of
her child. The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the
sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of
conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of
Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have
enabled the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to
be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless
such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The
presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the
evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband
and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child.
FACTS:
Gerardo Concepcion filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma.
Theresa Almonte annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged
that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa, she had married
one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. The
RTC annulled Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Gerardo for being
bigamous and as a result declared Jose Gerardo as an
illegitimate child. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma.
Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Ma.
Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting
visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate
child. She further maintained that Jose Gerardo’s surname
should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden
name, following the rule that an illegitimate child shall use the
mother’s surname. When brought to the appellate court, it held
that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo
but by Mario during her first marriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose Gerardo was the legitimate son of Mario
during Ma. Theresa’s first marriage. (YES)
RULING:
Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived
or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. As a
guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of
legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides: Article 167.
The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. The law requires that every
reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. The
presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a
declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is
grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from
the odium of illegitimacy. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is
a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases,
his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was
void from the very beginning; he never became her husband
and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of
her child. The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the
sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of
conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of
Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have
enabled the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to
be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless
such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. The
presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the
evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband
and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child. Sexual union
between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the
assumption should be presented by him who asserts the
contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the
presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue
of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands. As a
legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the
surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in
conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A
persons surname or family name identifies the family to which
he belongs and is passed on from parent to child. Hence,
Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in
the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.
28 EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R. TIJING,
Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and
ANGELITA DIAMANTE, Respondents. G.R. No. 125901,
SECOND DIVISION, March 8, 2001, QUISIMBING, J.
The trial court observed that the child and Bienvenida had
strong similarities in their faces. The resemblance between a
minor and his alleged parent is competent and material
evidence to establish parentage.
FACTS:
Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of
respondent Angelita. According to Bienvenida, Angelita went to
her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Bienvenida left
her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr. under the care of Angelita
as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while she was
doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned, Angelita and her
son were gone. Bienvenida went to Angelita’s house where she
was informed that Angelita had moved to another place. She
looked for her missing son together with her husband in various
places however they saw no traces of his whereabouts. Four
years later, Bienvenida read in a tabloid an article about the
death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of
Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy,
Bulacan. She later on went to Bulacan, where she allegedly saw
her son for the first time after four years. She averred that her
son was already named as John Thomas Lopez and that
Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to
do so. Petitioner Bienvenida and her husband then filed their
13
petition for habeas corpus to recover their son. Petitioners’
witnesses claimed that Tomas Lopez could not have possibly
fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile because of
an accident. Furthermore, Tomas Lopez himself admitted that
John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. The trial court
held that Tomas Lopez could not have fathered the child since
Angelita and her common-law husband could not have
children. It also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed
strong facial similarity. The CA reversed the decision rendered
by the trial court. The evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not
sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence presented by Bienvenida is
sufficient to establish that John Thomaz Lopez is actually her
missing son. (YES)
RULING:
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear
children. She herself admitted that she underwent ligation
before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of
marriage. Second, there is strong evidence which proves that
Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin
Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile
because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that
John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Third, it was
unusual that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was
filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4,
1989, four months after the alleged birth of the child. Under the
law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth
should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of
the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his
child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar
within thirty days after the birth. Significantly, the birth
certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private
respondent were legally married on October 31, 1974, in
Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even private
respondent had admitted she is a "common-law wife". This
false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.
Fourth, the trial court observed that the child and Bienvenida
had strong similarities in their faces. The resemblance between
a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material
evidence to establish parentage. Fifth, Bienvenida, unlike
respondent, presented clinical records consisting of a log book,
discharge order and the signature of petitioners.
29. ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, Petitioner, -versus- HON. COURT
OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE,
REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA
PROLLAMANTE, Respondents. G.R. No. 162571, THIRD
DIVISION, June 15, 2005, CORONA, J.
DNA testing is a valid means to prove paternity. For too long,
illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who
choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of
DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed
equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. The
Court has long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have
repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a
perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. The
Court therefore reiterated that DNA testing is a valid means of
determining paternity.
FACTS:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued
Martin’s alleged biological father, Arnel Agustin, for support.
Respondents alleged that Arnel impregnated Fe. Arnel insisted
on aborting the child, but Fe decided otherwise and gave birth
to Martin out of wedlock. The birth certificate was purportedly
signed by Arnel as the father. They further alleged that Arnel
shouldered the hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s requests
for Martin’s support and even suggested to place the child for
adoption. Arnel denied having fathered the child. While Fe was
carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and
Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the
open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This incident was reported to the
police. Months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has,
since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then
sued Arnel for support. In his answer, Arnel denied having
fathered the child because his affair with Fe had allegedly ended
long before Martin’s conception. He alleged that Fe had at least
one other secret lover and that she became so obsessed with
him that she even resorted to various devious ways and means
to alienate him from his wife and family. Arnel also claimed
that the signature attributed to him in the acknowledgment of
Marin’s birth certificate were falsified. Respondents therefore
filed a motion in court for issuance of an order to direct all
parties to submit themselves to DNA Paternity testing.
Petitioner Arnel filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack
of cause of action since under the law an illegitimate child is not
entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father. The
trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and
ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity
testing. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Martin has no right to ask for support and
must first establish his filiation in a separate suit under Article
283 in relation to Article 265 of the Civil Code. (NO)
2. Whether or not DNA testing is a valid means to prove
paternity. (YES)

RULING:
1. The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action
for support into one for recognition but merely allowed the
respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner.
But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively
integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for
support, such was valid and in accordance with jurisprudence.
In Tayag v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed the integration
of an action to compel recognition with an action to claim one's
inheritance. The two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in
one complaint. In Briz vs. Briz, et al. the Court held that, there
is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel
acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to
a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same
plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir.
Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel
acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here
applied different from that generally applicable in other cases.
Although the instant case deals with support rather than
inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or rationale for integrating
them remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is
entitled to support depends completely on the determination of
filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of
suits, given how intimately related the main issues in both cases
are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely
appropriate to these proceedings.
2. For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by
fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing
sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a
much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned
progeny. The Court has long believed in the merits of DNA
testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This
case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally
evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence
gathering. The Court therefore reiterated that DNA testing is a
valid means of determining paternity. The case of Wilson v.
Lumb shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in
some instances, ordering the procedure has become a
ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St. Lawrence County,
New York pointed out that a determination of paternity made
by any other state, whether established through the parents
acknowledgment of paternity or through an administrative or
judicial process, must be accorded full faith and credit, if and
only if such acknowledgment meets the requirements set forth
in section 452(a)(7) of the social security act. In Rafferty v.
Perkins, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test
results showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the
presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the course of a
marriage: The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted
by the results of the blood test eliminating Perkins as Justin's
14
father, even considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to Perkins, we find that no reasonable jury could find
that Easter is not Justin's father based upon the 99.94%
probability of paternity concluded by the DNA testing.
30. IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL
REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known
as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN
LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG, duly represented by his
mother ANNA LISA WANG v. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR,
duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO G.R. No.
159966, SECOND DIVISION, March 30, 2005, TINGA, J.
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation
of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who
may have the same given name and surname as he has. In the
case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the
dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such
change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the
continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and
difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to
drop it from his registered complete name. In addition,
petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation
on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that
the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and
discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of
tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value
of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point
may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
FACTS:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City to parents
Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet
married to each other. When his parents subsequently got
married, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so
that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner, however sought to drop
his middle name and have his registered name changed from
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang because he may
be discriminated against in Singapore. The RTC ruled that
under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have
the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and
there is no reason why this right should now be taken from
petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a minor. The trial
court added that when petitioner Julian reaches the age of
majority, he could then decide whether he will change his name
by dropping his middle name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law allows one to drop the middle name
from his registered name. (NO)
RULING:
Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation
of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who
may have the same given name and surname as he has. Our
laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and
legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to
bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while
illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother,
unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they
may bear the fathers surname. Accordingly, the registration in
the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that
the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The registered
name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate
child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and
a surname. In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by
petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience.
However, how such change of name would make his integration
into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly
established. That the continued use of his middle name would
cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and
reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the
nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name
is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left
to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of
majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of
the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights
under our laws.
31. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, -versus-
TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, Respondent. G.R. No. 157043,
FIRST DIVISION, February 2, 2007, CORONA, J.
An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the
father bears only a given name and his mother’ surname, and
does not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized
illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only
when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a
public document or private handwritten instrument that he
bears both his mother’s surname as his middle name and his
father’s surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a
legitimated child or an acknowledged child. The law and facts
obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of
the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule
103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural
requirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the
appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during
the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that,
under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change
his name as he was never recognized by his father while his
mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of
name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by
his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his
mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United
States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification
of mother and son.
FACTS:
Respondent Trinidad Capote filed a petition for change of name
of her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.
Respondent Capote claimed that Giovanni Gallamaso is the
illegitimate natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado
Gallamaso and was born prior to the effectivity of the New
Family Code and as such, his mother used the surname of the
natural father despite the absence of marriage between them.
The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time Giovanni was
born and up to the present, failed to take up his responsibilities
to him on matters of financial, physical, emotional and spiritual
concerns. Giovanni is now fully aware of how he stands with his
father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his
mother’s surname. The trial court rendered a decision ordering
the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni
Nadores. The CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the
change of name.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the minor Giovanni is entitled to have his
surname changed to that of his mother’s surname. (YES)
RULING:
When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and
effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines), the pertinent
provision of the Civil Code then as regards his use of a surname,
read: Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents
shall principally use the surname of the father. If recognized by
only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the
surname of the recognizing parent. Applying this provision in
the case, Giovanni should have carried his mother's surname
from birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention on
the part of Giovanni's putative father to actually recognize him.
Meanwhile, according to the Family Code which repealed,
among others, Article 366 of the Civil Code: Art. 176.
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
15
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. . . .
In the case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or
Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang, the Court held that an illegitimate child whose
filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name
and his mother’ surname, and does not have a middle name.
The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore
identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or
acknowledged by the father in a public document or private
handwritten instrument that he bears both his mother’s
surname as his middle name and his father’s surname as his
surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged child. The law and facts obtaining here favor
Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a
petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After
hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed)
that the evidence presented during the hearing of Giovanni’s
petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil
Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never
recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized
him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression
that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best
interest as it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to
have him join her in the United States. This Court will not stand
in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
32. MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, Petitioner, -versus- HON.
ADORACION G. ANGELES, JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 and CONCHITA
TALAG DE SANTOS, Respondents. G.R. No. 105619, EN BANC,
December 12, 1995, ROMERO, J.
Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to
natural children as defined thereunder. There was, therefore,
from the outset, an intent to exclude children conceived or born
out of illicit relations from the purview of the law. In the case at
bar, there is no question that all the children born to private
respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived
and born when the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother
was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent
were married abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada, U.S.A.
a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife does not change this
fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this
jurisdiction at the time. Although natural children can be
legitimized, and natural children by legal fiction enjoy the
rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that natural children by legal
fiction can likewise be legitimized.
FACTS:
Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was
blessed with a daughter, herein petitioner Maria Rosario de
Santos. After some time, Antonio fell in love and married
Conchita Talag de Santos, herein private respondent in another
country. This union produced eleven children. Less than a
month later, after the death of Sophia, Antonio and private
respondent contracted another marriage celebrated under
Philippine laws. After the death of Antonio, private respondent
went to court asking for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor in connection with the settlement of
her late husband's estate. After six years, petitioner Santos
decided to intervene. She argued that private respondent's
children were illegitimate. The RTC declared private
respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted
and declared them, along with petitioner and private
respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but this was denied. Hence, she filed the
instant petition contending that since only natural children can
be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as
legitimated her half brothers and sisters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not natural children by legal fiction can be
legitimized. (NO)
RULING:
Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states: "Art. 269. Only
natural children can be legitimized. Children born outside
wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other, are natural." The Civil Code provides three rights which,
in varying degrees, are enjoyed by children, depending on their
filiation: use of surname, succession and support. Legitimate
children and legitimated children are entitled to all three. Thus
they "shall principally use the surname of the father," and shall
be entitled to support from their legitimate ascendants and
descendants, as well as to a legitime consisting of one-half of
the hereditary estate of both parents, and to other successional
rights, such as the right of representation. "These rights as
effects of legitimacy cannot be renounced." Natural children
recognized by both parents and natural children by legal fiction
shall principally use the surname of the father. If a natural child
is recognized by only one parent, the child shall follow the
surname of recognizing parent. Both types of children are
entitled to receive support from the parent recognizing them.
They also cannot be deprived of their legitime equivalent to
one-half of that pertaining to each of the legitimate children or
descendants of the recognizing parent, to be taken from the free
disposable portion of the latter's estate. Recognized illegitimate
children other than natural, or spurious issues, are, in their
minority, under the parental authority of their mothers and,
naturally, take the latter's surname. The only support which
they are entitled to is from the recognizing parent, and their
legitime, also to be taken from the free portion, consists of four-
fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child or two-
fifths that of each legitimate child. Unrecognized illegitimate
children are not entitled to any of the rights above mentioned.
Article 269 itself clearly limits the privilege of legitimation to
natural children as defined thereunder. There was, therefore,
from the outset, an intent to exclude children conceived or born
out of illicit relations from the purview of the law. In the case at
bar, there is no question that all the children born to private
respondent and deceased Antonio de Santos were conceived
and born when the latter's valid marriage to petitioner's mother
was still subsisting. That private respondent and the decedent
were married abroad after the latter obtained in Nevada, U.S.A.
a decree of divorce from his legitimate wife does not change this
fact, for a divorce granted abroad was not recognized in this
jurisdiction at the time. Another point to be considered is that
although natural children can be legitimized, and natural
children by legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged
natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be
legitimized. As has been pointed out, much more is involved
here than the mere privilege to be legitimized. The rights of
other children, like the petitioner in the case at bench, may be
adversely affected as her testamentary share may well be
reduced in the event that her ten surviving half siblings should
be placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfully
entitled to only half of her share. Finally, attention must be
drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the
provisions of the Civil Code, not the Family Code which now
recognizes only two classes of children: legitimate and
illegitimate. "Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if
not pure fiction.
33. RICHELLE P. ABELLA, for and in behalf of her minor
daughter, MARL JHORYLLE ABELLA, Petitioner, -versus –
POLICARPIO CABAÑERO, Respondent. G.R. No. 206647,
SECOND DIVISION, August 9, 2017, LEONEN, J.
Indeed, an integrated determination of filiation is "entirely
appropriate" to the action for support filed by petitioner
Richelle for her child. An action for support may very well
resolve that ineluctable issue of paternity if it involves the same
parties, is brought before a court with the proper jurisdiction,
prays to impel recognition of paternal relations, and invokes
judicial intervention to do so. Thus, it was improper to rule
here, as the Court of Appeals did, that it was impossible to
entertain petitioner's child's plea for support without her and
petitioner first surmounting the encumbrance of an entirely
different judicial proceeding.
16
FACTS:
Petitioner Richelle alleged that while she was still a minor in
the years 2000 to 2002, she was repeatedly sexually abused by
respondent Cabañero inside his rest house at Barangay Masayo,
Tobias Fornier, Antique. 9 As a result, she allegedly gave birth
to a child on August 21, 2002. Richelle added that on February
27, 2002, she initiated a criminal case for rape against
Cabañero, This, however, was dismissed. Later, she initiated
another criminal case, this time for child abuse under Republic
Act No. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. This, too, was
dismissed. Richelle prayed for the child's monthly allowance in
the amount of P3,000.00. RTC dismissed Richelle’s Complaint
without prejudice, on account of her failure to implead her
minor child, Jhorylle, as plaintiff. CA sustained. It ruled that
filiation proceedings should have first been separately
instituted to ascertain the minor child’s paternity and that
without these proceedings having first resolved in favour of the
child’s paternity claim, petitioner’s action for support could not
prosper.
ISSUE:
Whether CA erred in ruling that filiation proceedings should
have first been separately instituted to ascertain the minor
child’s paternity and that without these proceedings having first
resolved in favour of the child’s paternity claim, petitioner’s
action for support could not prosper. (YES)
RULING:
While it is true that the grant of support was contingent on
ascertaining paternal relations between respondent and
petitioner's daughter, Jhorylle, it was unnecessary for
petitioner's action for support to have been dismissed and
terminated by the Court of Appeals in the manner that it did.
Instead of dismissing the case, the Court of Appeals should
have remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court. There,
petitioner and her daughter should have been enabled to
present evidence to establish their cause of action — inclusive of
their underlying claim of paternal relations — against
respondent. Indeed, an integrated determination of filiation is
"entirely appropriate" to the action for support filed by
petitioner Richelle for her child. An action for support may very
well resolve that ineluctable issue of paternity if it involves the
same parties, is brought before a court with the proper
jurisdiction, prays to impel recognition of paternal relations,
and invokes judicial intervention to do so. This does not run
afoul of any rule. To the contrary, and consistent with Briz v.
Briz, this is in keeping with the rules on proper joinder of
causes of action. This also serves the interest of judicial
economy — avoiding multiplicity of suits and cushioning
litigants from the vexation and costs of a protracted pleading of
their cause. Thus, it was improper to rule here, as the Court of
Appeals did, that it was impossible to entertain petitioner's
child's plea for support without her and petitioner first
surmounting the encumbrance of an entirely different judicial
proceeding. Without meaning to lend credence to the minutiae
of petitioner's claims, it is quite apparent that the rigors of
judicial proceedings have been taxing enough for a mother and
her daughter whose claim for support amounts to a modest
P3,000.00 every month. When petitioner initiated her action,
her daughter was a toddler; she is, by now, well into her
adolescence. The primordial interest of justice and the basic
dictum that procedural rules are to be "liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding"impel
us to grant the present Petition.
34. IN THE MATTER OF PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF
CERTIFICATES OF LIVE BIRTHS OF YUHARES JAN
BARCELOTE TINITIGAN AND AVEE KYNNA NOELLE
BARCELOTE TINITIGAN JONNA KARLA BAGUIO
BARCELOTE, Petitioner, -versus – REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RICKY O. TINITIGAN, and LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR, DAVAO CITY, Respondents. G.R. No. 222095,
SECOND DIVISION, August 7, 2017, CARPIO, J.
Upon the effectivity of RA 9255, the provision that illegitimate
children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother was retained, with an added provision
that they may use the surname of their father if their filiation
has been expressly recognized by their father. In Calimag v.
Heirs of Macapaz, we held that "under Section 5 of Act No.
3753, the declaration of either parent of the [newborn]
legitimate child shall be sufficient for the registration of his
birth in the civil register, and only in the registration of birth of
an illegitimate child does the law require that the birth
certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the
infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses to
acknowledge the child." Since the undisputed facts show that
the children were born outside a valid marriage after 3 August
1988, specifically in June 2008 and August 2011, respectively,
then they are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and
Barcelote. The children shall use the surname of their mother,
Barcelote. Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not
executed consistent with the provisions of the law respecting
the registration of birth of illegitimate children. Aside from the
fact that the entry in the subject birth certificates as to the
surname of the children is incorrect since it should have been
that of the mother, the subject birth certificates are also
incomplete as they lacked the signature of the mother.
FACTS:
Petitioner alleged that she bore a child out of wedlock with a
married man named Ricky O. Tinitigan (Tinitigan) in her
relative's residence in Sibulan, Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur. She
was not able to register the birth of their child, whom she
named Yohan Grace Barcelote, because she did not give birth in
a hospital. To hide her relationship with Tinitigan, she
remained in Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur while Tinitigan lived
with his legitimate family in Davao City and would only visit
her. On 24 August 2011, she bore another child with Tinitigan,
whom she named as Joshua Miguel Barcelote. Again, she did
not register his birth to avoid humiliation, ridicule, and possible
criminal charges. Thereafter, she lost contact with Tinitigan and
she returned to Davao City. When her first child needed a
certificate of live birth for school admission, Barcelote finally
decided to register the births of both children. However, upon
submission of the copies of the late registration of the births to
the NSO, Barcelote was informed that there were two
certificates of live birth (subject birth certificates) with the same
name of the mother and the years of birth of the children in
their office. Thus, Barcelote filed a petition with the RTC for the
cancellation of the subject birth certificates registered by
Tinitigan without her knowledge and participation, and for
containing erroneous entries. RTC ruled in favour of Barcelote.
CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. It ruled that
the registrations of the children's births, caused by Tinitigan
and certified by a registered midwife, Erlinda Padilla, were
valid under Act No. 3753, and such registrations did not require
the consent of Barcelote. The CA further ruled that the children
can legally and validly use the surname of Tinitigan, since
Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, amending Article 176 of the Family
Code, allows illegitimate children to use the surname of their
father if the latter had expressly recognized them through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in not cancelling the certificates of live
birth. (YES)
RULING:
Upon the effectivity of RA 9255, the provision that illegitimate
children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother was retained, with an added provision
that they may use the surname of their father if their filiation
has been expressly recognized by their father. The law is clear
that illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother. The use of the
word "shall" underscores its mandatory character. The
discretion on the part of the illegitimate child to use the
surname of the father is conditional upon proof of compliance
with RA 9255 and its IRR. Since the undisputed facts show that
the children were born outside a valid marriage after 3 August
1988, specifically in June 2008 and August 2011, respectively,
then they are the illegitimate children of Tinitigan and
Barcelote. The children shall use the surname of their mother,
Barcelote. The entry in the subject birth certificates as to the
surname of the children is therefore incorrect; their surname
17
should have been "Barcelote" and not "Tinitigan." We do not
agree with the CA that the subject birth certificates are the
express recognition of the children's filiation by Tinitigan,
because they were not duly registered in accordance with the
law. In Calimag v. Heirs of Macapaz, we held that "under
Section 5 of Act No. 3753, the declaration of either parent of the
[newborn] legitimate child shall be sufficient for the
registration of his birth in the civil register, and only in the
registration of birth of an illegitimate child does the law require
that the birth certificate be signed and sworn to jointly by the
parents of the infant, or only by the mother if the father refuses
to acknowledge the child." Thus, it is mandatory that the
mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificate of her
child in all cases, irrespective of whether the father recognizes
the child as his or not. The only legally known parent of an
illegitimate child, by the fact of illegitimacy, is the mother of the
child who conclusively carries the blood of the mother. Thus,
this provision ensures that individuals are not falsely named as
parents. Clearly, the subject birth certificates were not executed
consistent with the provisions of the law respecting the
registration of birth of illegitimate children. Aside from the fact
that the entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname
of the children is incorrect since it should have been that of the
mother, the subject birth certificates are also incomplete as they
lacked the signature of the mother.
35. JESSE U. LUCAS, Petitioner, vs. JESUS S. LUCAS,
Respondent. G.R. No. 190710 | June 6, 2011 | 650 SCRA
667 | Second Division | Justice Nachura
FACTS:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish
Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to
DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who
got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in
Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a)
petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s
baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma,
showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University
in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his
Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e)
Certificate of Recognition from the University of the
Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several
articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a
musical prodigy. Jesus learned of this and he filed a
Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the
petition was adversarial in nature and therefore
summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse
filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case
which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence
set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had
on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as
Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC
dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish
compliance with the four procedural aspects for a
paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v.
Alba namely, a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child. This
prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration
which the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled
where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied
upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature
considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken
place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled
in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that
the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity
action had been met and held that DNA testing should
not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish
a prima facie case.
ISSUES:
Was the service of summons jurisdictional?
Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a
court can issue a DNA testing order
RULING:
On the First Issue: The answer to this question depends
on the nature of petitioner’s action, that is, whether it is
an action in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. An
action in personam is lodged against a person based on
personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the
thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi
in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to
subject that person’s interest in a property to a
corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directed
against the “thing” itself or the res, which concerns the
status of a person, like a petition for adoption,
annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the
birth certificate, is an action in rem. In an action in
personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the
case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to
confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter
has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is
acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under
legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody
of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is
recognized and made effective. The herein petition to
establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the
simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate
filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the
latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that
the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all
who might be minded to make an objection of any sort
to the right sought to be established. Through
publication, all interested parties are deemed notified of
the petition.
If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the
defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court
with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due
process requirements. This is but proper in order to
afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect
his interest if he so chooses. Hence, failure to serve
summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to
try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of
summons may be excused where it is determined that
the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his
opposition, as in this case. We find that the due process
requirement with respect to respondent has been
satisfied, considering that he has participated in the
proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to
file his opposition to the petition to establish filiation.
18
On the Second Issue: Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss
the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for
DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been
presented by petitioner. Misapplication of Herrera v.
Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals. The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are
four significant procedural aspects in a traditional
paternity case which parties have to face has been widely
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is
confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during
trial, when the parties have presented their respective
evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be
determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when
only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The
CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a
prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima facie
case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading. Section 4 of the
Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions
that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of
the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court
may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application
of any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue
after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a
showing of the following: (a) A biological sample exists
that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i)
was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing
now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA
testing, but the results may require confirmation for
good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically
valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific
potential to produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence
of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as
potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA
testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing,
without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any
party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit
or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean,
however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a
matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions
are established. In some states, to warrant the issuance
of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause
hearing wherein the applicant must first present
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a
reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for
the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for
blood testing is considered a “search,” which, under
their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a
finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart
of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various
jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of
procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions
have almost universally found that a preliminary
showing must be made before a court can
constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in
paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary
matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show
that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As
explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is
contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily
undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held
in which the court can determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which
warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing The
same condition precedent should be applied in our
jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the
motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present
prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility
of paternity.”
36. TYSON'S SUPER CONCRETE INC. VS. CA G.R. No.
140081 June 23. 2005
FACTS:
1. Romana Dela Cruz is the registered owner of several
parcels of land located at P. Dela Cruz St., Sta. Quiteria,
Caloocan City. Dela Cruz entered a contract of lease with
Tyson's Super Concrete, Inc. where it was agreed that
the latter shall occupy the property as lessee for a period
of twenty (20) years beginning January 1, 1993, until
December 31, 2012.
2. the two major blocs of stockholders of Tyson's
composing of Elsa and Francis Chua, on one hand, and
Nancy, William, Genaro and Lydia, all surnamed Hao,
on the other hand, due to internal squabbling, filed a
joint motion with the Securities and Exchange
Commission SEC) praying for the appointment of a
receiver to oversee the functions of the Corporation.
3. the SEC issued an order creating a Management
Committee to undertake the management of Ivson's. to
take custody of and control over all the existing assets.
funds and records of the corporation, and to determine
the best way to protect the interest of the stockholders
and creditors
4. On February 27. 1996. a complaint for electment was
filed by Dela Cruz against Tyson's with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City for the alleged
failure of Tyson's to pay its rentals despite repeated
written demands for such payment. Tyson's failed to file
the required answer to the complaint.
5. MeTC rendered its decision in favor of Dela Cruz,
demanding Tyson to vacate the leased premises and pay
rentals, attorney's fees, and cost of suit.
On May 24, 1996, Dela Cruz filed a Motion for
Immediate Execution of the MeTC judgment.
Tyson's, on the other hand, filed a motion praying for
the stay of execution of the MeTC decision contending
that the MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
defendant corporation on the ground that said
corporation was not validly and effectively served with
summons.
7. On July 22, 1996, Tyson's filed a motion to vacate the
judgment of the MeTC. On even date, the MeTC issued
an order denying Tyson's motion to vacate judgment.
The MeTC court reasoned that Sheriff Antonio del
Rosario of such Court reported that had exerted efforts
on several occasions to serve the summons to any
responsible officer of the defendant in their office at the
leased premises but to no avail.
8. The sheriff, upon an information from the defendant's
security guard, was able to locate the spouses Elsa Hao
Chua and Francis Chua at their residence at 1231 G.
Araneta St., Tondo, Manila and served the summons on
them last March 21, 1996. Receipt of the summons and
its annexes was acknowledged by Francis Chua as
evidenced by his signature on the file copy of the
summons attached to the record ot the case
19
9. Tyson's then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Caloocan City a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order seeking to
stop the judgment of the MeTC. RTC denied the petition.
10. Tyson's elevated the case to the CA via a special civil
action for certiorari. The CA first decided in favor of
petitioner, declaring the decision of MeTC and RTC null
and void.
11. Respondent filed for a motion for reconsideration.
The CA reversed its decision. CA rationalizes that as
corporate secretary of the petitioner corporation,
Francis Chua, is a proper person under the Rules of
Court to whom service of summons may be validly
made.
12. Petitioners filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration
of the Amended Decision but was denied by the CA
ISSUE: WON Tyson's was validly and effectively served
with the summons issued by the MeTC.
RULING: The court ruled in the affirmative.
The procedural rule in effect at the time the ejectment
case was filed by Dela Rosa with the MeTC is
Kule 4. Section 3 of the Revised Kules of ourt. to wit
Sec. 13. Service upon domestic corporation or
partnershiv. - Ifthe defendant is a corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly
registered, service may be
made on the president, manager; secretarv, cashier,
agent, or anv of its directors
In the instant case, it is established that at the time
Francis Chua received the summons from the MeTC, he
was the incumbent corporate secretary of Tyson's. in
addition, he was a member of the management
committee created by the SEC to oversee the operations
of Ison's. Being a member of the Committee
there. 1S No guestion that he was an agent of petitioner
cornoration as contemplated under then section
13, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence,
whether he was acting in his capacity as corporate
secretary or as an agent of Iyson's, or both, when he
received the summons from the MeTC, the service of
said summons upon him is valid.
Furthermore. the Court agree with the pronouncement
of the CA in its assailed decision that nothing in the
order of the SEC creating the management committee
nor in the language of P.D. No. 902-A. provides that
only the chairman of the Committee is authorized to
receive summons. Even if the SEC or the Committee has
adopted a rule to the effect that only the chairman of the
latter may receive summons. such rule cannot amend or
alter the Rules of Court.
37. WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon
Garcia, Petitioner –versus JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL
MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA
CHRISTINA LIYAO, Respondents. G.R. No. 138961, SECOND
DIVISION, March 7, 2002, DE LEON, JR., J.
It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned
only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper
parties and within the period limited by law. It is clear that the
present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad
litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel
recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as
the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It
is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed
legitimate even though the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We
cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and
subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or
in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the
legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage.
The child himself cannot choose his own filiation
FACTS:
William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon, filed an
action for compulsory recognition as the illegitimate (spurious)
child of the late William Liyao against herein respondents
before the RTC. Petitioner Liyao, jr. insisted that his mother,
Corazon, had been living separately for ten (10) years from her
husband, Ramon Yulo. Corazon cohabited with the late William
Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William's untimely demise in
1975. On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr.
at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During her stay at
the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the
new born baby, William, Jr. (Billy). Petitioner alleged that since
birth, he had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of
the status of a recognized and acknowledged child of William
Liyao by the latter’s direct and overt acts. Respondents, on the
other hand, stated that their parents, William Liyao and Juanita
Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married and that Corazon Garcia is
still married to Ramon Yulo and was not legally separated from
her husband. The trial court ruled for the petitioner, saying that
it was convinced by preponderance of evidence that deceased
William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. The Court of Appeals,
however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the
law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the
child and "the presumption of legitimacy is thwarted only on
ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy between
husband and wife was physically impossible at the period cited
in Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code."
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be
able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William
Liyao. (NO)
RULING:
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a
valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption
of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a
declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. The
presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not
conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to
the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate. Against this
presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of
the physical impossibility of the husband's having access to his
wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child. This physical
impossibility may be caused: 1) By the impotence of the
husband; 2) By the fact that husband and wife were living
separately in such a way that access was not possible; 3) By the
serious illness of the husband. Impugning the legitimacy of the
child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the
one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of
the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in
exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can
impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his
memory. It is therefore clear that the present petition initiated
20
by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor,
herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of
petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late
William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born
within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to
maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of
the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances,
his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid
and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his
own filiation.
38. Teofisto Babiera v.Presentacion Catotal
G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000
FACTS:
Presentacion B. Catotal filed a petition for the cancellation of
the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera. From the petition filed,
Presentacion asserted the following:
a. that she was the only surviving child of the late
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa,
who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6,
1990 respectively;
b. that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered
by “hilot” in the house of spouses Eugenio and
Hermogena Babiera and without the knowledge
of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the mother of the child
and a housemaid of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena
Babiera, caused the registration/recording of the
facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was
the child of the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old
and Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made
Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging
her signature that petitioner, then 15 years old, saw
with her own eyes and personally
c. witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto,
in their house, assisted by “hilot”;
d. that the birth certificate of Teofista Guinto is void ab
initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of
informant forged, and it contained false
Teofista filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that “the
petition states no cause of action, it being an attack on the
legitimacy of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio
Babiera and HermogenaCariñosaBabiera; that plaintiff has no
legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171
of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is
barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of
the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a certificate of live birth is sufficient to establish
the legitimacy of a child regardless of the fact that the same is
obtained by fraud or that it contained some irregularities
RULING:
No. The present case alleged and showed that Hermogena did
not give birth to petitioner. The prayer was not to declare that
petitioner was an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to
establish that the former was not the latter’s child at all. The
action did not impugn petitioner’s filiation to Spouses Eugenio
and Hermogena Babiera, because there was no blood relation to
impugn in the first place.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioner’s
Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the
specific facts attendant in the case, as well as the totality of the
evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such
presumption. First, there were already irregularities regarding
the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil
registrar. More important, the Court of Appeals observed
that the mother’s signature therein was different from her
signatures in other documents presented during the trial.
The circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show
that Hermogena was not the former’s real mother. There was
no evidence of Hermogena’s pregnancy, such as medical
records and doctor’s prescriptions, other than the Birth
Certificate itself. Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth,
Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible
for her to have given birth at such a late age, it was
highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her
advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally
available only in a hospital. The most significant piece
of evidence, however, was the deposition of Hermogena Babiera
which stated that she did not give birth to petitioner, and that
the latter was neither hers nor her husband Eugenio’s.
39. Benitez vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 105625
Facts:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian had various
properties. They both died intestate. The special proceedings
for administration of the properties were filed with the trial
court. Vicente's sister Victoria B. Lirio filed for issuance of
letters of administration in favor of the nephew. Marissa
opposed the petition, saying that she is the sole heir of deceased
Vicente and that she is capable of administering his estate. She
submitted the pieces of documentary evidence and testified that
the spouses treated her as their own daughter. The relatives of
Vicente tried to prove through testimonial evidence, that the
spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage. Victoria
categorically declared that Marissa was not the biological child
of the spouses who were unable to physically procreate.
Trial court relied on Arts. 166 and 170 of the Family Code and
ruled in favor of Marissa. On appeal, the CA reversed the lower
court decision and declared Marissa Benitez-Badua is not the
biological child of the late spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not Marissa Benitez-Badua is the legitimate child
and the sole heir of the late spouses
Ruling:
No. The SC find no merit to the petition.
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be
applied in the case at bar. The above provisions do not
contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the
biological child of a certain couple.
In Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy
of the child by:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual
intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300
days which immediately preceded the birth of the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been his child;
(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence.
Articles 170 and 171 speak of the prescription period within
which the husband or any of his heirs should file an action
impugning the legitimacy of the child. In this case, it is not
where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that Marissa
is not his child or a child by Isabel, but they are contending that
Marissa was not born to Vicente and Isabel.
Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses.
Marissa's Certificate of Live Birth was repudiated by the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Isabel by
Vicente, saying that he and his brother-in-law are the sole heirs
of the estate.
40. Dasie David Vs. CA, Ramon Villar \
Facts:
Petitioner Daisie David worked as secretary of private
respondent Ramon Villar, who is married man and a
father of four children. Their relationship became
intimate and they had a child named Christopher J. and
followed by two more children namely Christine and
Cathy Mae. Their relationship became known to private
respondent’s wife and their children were eventually
accepted by the legal family of private respondent.
21
Thereafter, private respondent asked petitioner to allow
Christopher, then six years old, to go with his family to
Boracay wherein petitioner agreed, but after the trip
private respondent refused to give back the child and
said that he had enrolled Christopher at the Holy Family
Academy for the next school year. Petitioner filed a
petition for habeas corpus which was granted by the trial
court but was reversed by the CA, hence this
petition.
Issue: WON the petition for habeas corpus for the custody of
the child was proper
Held: Yes. Rule 102 of the rules of court provides that the writ
of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto. In the case at bar,
Christopher is an illegitimate child since at the time of his
conception his father, private respondent, was married to
another woman other than the child’s mother. As such,
pursuant to art 176 of the Family Code, Christopher is under
the parental authority of his mother, who as a consequence of
such authority is entitled to have custody of him. Since
admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful
custody of the child by private respondent, she is entitled for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. The fact that private
respondent has recognized the minor child may be a
ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not
for giving him custody of the child
41. Dinah B. Tonog vs. Court of Appeals (Parental Authority)
Facts: In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith
Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with Edgar V.
Daguimol. A year after the birth of Gardin, Dinah left for
the USA where she found a work as a registered nurse.
Gardin was left in the care of her father and paternal
grandparents. Edgar filed a petition for guardianship over
Gardin in the RTC of Quezon City. In March 1992, the
court granted the petition and appointed Edgar as legal
guardian of Gardin. In May 1992, Dinah filed a petition for
relief from judgment. She averred that she learned of the
judgment only on April 1, 1992. The trial court set aside its
original judgment and allowed Dinah to file her opposition to
Edgar's petition. Edgar, in turn, filed a motion for
reconsideration. In 1993, Dinah filed a motion to remand
custody of Gardin to her. In 1994, the trial court issued a
resolution denying Edgar's motion for reconsideration and
granting Dinah's motion for custody of Gardin. Dinah moved
for the immediate execution of the resolution. Edgar, thus,
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The
CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon motion for
reconsideration, CA modified its decision and let Gardin
remain in the custody of Edgar until otherwise adjudged.
Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that she is
entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin, as a matter of
law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers
parental authority upon her as the mother of the
illegitimateminor. Second, Gardin cannot be separated from
her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven.
Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears that Gardin
Faith is now twelve years old.
Issue: Whether or not the mother is entitled to the temporary
custody of the child pending the guardianship proceeding.
Held: In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount
criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child. Statute sets
certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision.
Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the
Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under
the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of
the Family Code provides that “no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.” It will be observed that
in both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the
mother. This is especially evident in Article 213 where it may
be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best
custodian. As explained by the Code Commission: The general
rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a
mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can
sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of
her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has
to be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child. For
these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of
her child who is below seven years of age for “compelling
reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older
than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his
preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court
may exercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s
preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in
which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or
even to a third person.
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the
temporary custody of theminor, Gardin Faith, since it
appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the
trial court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement
has been made as to who should have final custody of the
 minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as
the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did
not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime
parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not
be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into
a strange environment away from the people and places to
which she had apparently formed an attachment.
42. G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999
MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch
130, RTC, Kalookan City and GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS
represented by her mother/guardian VIRCEL D. ANDRES,
respondents.
FACTS:
Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the decision of the
Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's Orders
denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint entitled
"Glen Camil Andres de Asis, etc. vs. Manuel de Asis", and the
motion for reconsideration.
In 1988, Vircel Andres filed a maintenance and support action
against Manuel De Asis, the alleged father of Glen Camil Andres
de Asis, who had failed to provide support despite repeated
demands. In 1989, Vircel withdrew the complaint after Manuel
denied paternity, rendering the legal action seemingly
pointless. Both parties agreed to dismiss the complaint, with
the condition that Manuel would not pursue a counterclaim.
However, in 1995, Vircel, now acting as the minor's legal
guardian/mother, filed a similar complaint. Manuel argued for
dismissal based on res judicata, asserting that the lack of
paternity negates the right to claim support.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the minor is barred from action for support.
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal with prejudice
of the first case cannot bar the subsequent case for support. The
second action for support may still prosper.
The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor
transmitted to a third person. Furthermore, future support
cannot be the subject of a compromise. The manifestation sent
by private respondent amounted to renunciation as it severed
the vinculum that gives the subject minor, the right to claim
support from his putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore,
the agreement entered into between the petitioner and private
respondent for the dismissal of the counterclaim was in the
nature of a compromise, which cannot be countenanced. It
violated the prohibition against any compromise of the right to
support. Moreover, it is true that in order to claim support,
22
filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the
claimant and the parent. However, paternity and filiation or the
lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially
established and it is for the court to declare its existence or
absence. It cannot be left to the willor agreement of the parties.
43 G.R. No. 196499, November 28, 2018
INGRID V. HILARIO, Petitioner, vs.
THELMA V. MIRANDA AND IRENEA BELLOC,
Respondents.
FACTS:
In 2000, the Regional Trial Court declared Antonio Belloc died
intestate, survived by illegitimate children Magdalena Varian
and Dolores Retiza, along with grandson Teresito Flamor. Upon
Dolores' death in 1995, her half-sister Magdalena and nephew
Teresito were identified as heirs. In 2001, Ingrid Hilario filed
for letters of administration, claiming to be Magdalena's
daughter. Magdalena passed away in 2003. In 2004, Irenea
filed a motion, asserting herself as the nearest surviving relative
and seeking sole administration. The RTC favored Ingrid, but
the Court of Appeals reversed, stating Magdalena, though
acknowledged as Antonio's daughter, couldn't inherit without
his recognition or court acknowledgment of her status.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Magdalena’s filiation as Antonio's illegitimate
child has been established by the final judgment rendered by
the RTC.
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed and
set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that: The
Court is compelled to rule in favor of the petitioner on the basis
of the final judgment rendered by the RTC in Civil Case No. AV-
929 which established Magdalena's filiation. Under paragraph
1, Article 172 of the Family Code, "final judgment" is a means of
establishing filiation. It refers to a decision of a competent court
finding the child legitimate or illegitimate. We find no need to
disturb the RTC's findings which are based on the evidence
presented for its consideration in the course of the proceeding.
While the subject of Civil Case No. AV-929 is the declaration of
nullity of certain documents, the ruling on Magdalena's filiation
cannot be considered obiter dictum since the RTC determinedly
discussed and settled that issue as a means to decide the main
issue brought for its disposition. Being a final judgment, the
Decision in Civil Case No. AV-929 constitutes res judicata.
44. G.R. NO. 183965 : September 18, 2009
OANIE SURPOSA UY, Petitioner,vs.
JOSE NGO CHUA, Respondent.
FACTS:
The petitioner sought a decree of illegitimate filiation against
the respondent, claiming an illicit relationship between the
respondent and Irene Surposa, resulting in two children: the
petitioner (Joanie) and her brother, Allan. Despite naming
Irene's father and maiden surname on the birth certificate, the
respondent financially supported and provided employment for
the petitioner and Allan, acknowledging them in the Chinese
community. However, during the petitioner's wedding, the
respondent denied their relationship. Legal proceedings
followed, including a previous petition by the petitioner and a
Compromise Agreement, where the petitioner acknowledged no
blood relationship in exchange for a monetary settlement.
Despite this, the court ruled in favor of the respondent, leading
to the current appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the
parties herein before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 09 of
Cebu City effectively bars the filing of the present case.
RULING:
No. The case should be remanded to another court (RTC-
Branch 24) for further proceedings, clarifying that while the
compromise agreement is void, admissions made in it may still
be considered as evidence in the ongoing proceedings.
The legal implications of a compromise agreement in the
context of a case involving the status and filiation of a child,
certain matters, such as civil status, validity of marriage, and
future legitime, cannot be validly compromised according to
Article 2035 of the Civil Code. The compromise agreement in
question, which aimed to settle the petitioner's status and
filiation, is deemed void ab initio as it violates law and public
policy.
The document argues that the approval of the compromise
agreement by the court (RTC-Branch 9) does not make it valid
if it is contrary to law and public policy. The court's lack of
jurisdiction over the matter is emphasized, and the decision is
considered null and void. Additionally, the application of a
demurrer to evidence and calls for a determination on whether
the petitioner is entitled to her claim, urging the court to
prioritize substantial justice over strict adherence to procedural
rules.
45. LIYAO VS LIYAO
GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002
FACTS:
William Liyao Jr. (Billy), the illegitimate son of the deceased, as
represented by her mother (Corazon), filed a petition ordering
Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda
Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory
heir of the deceased and to be entitled to all successional rights.
William Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment
of the status as the child of the deceased having been
recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent
during his lifetime. There were two sides of the story. Corazon
maintained that she is legally married but living separately
from Ramon Yulo for more than 10 years and that Corazon
cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 until the death
of William. On the other hand, the daughters of the deceased
stated that her mom and the deceased were legally married and
that her parents were not separated legally or in fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to
be able to claim from the estate of the deceased
RULING:
No. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal
right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the
reason that he was the one directly confronted with the scandal
and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced and he
should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or
expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved.
Hence, it was then settled that the legitimacy of the child can
only be impugned in a direct action brought for that purpose,
by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent
and positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his
alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a
valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption
of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a
declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect
innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not
conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to
the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days
following the celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other
than that of the physical impossibility of the husband having
access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days
of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused: 1) By the impotence
of the husband; 2) By the fact that husband and wife were living
separately in such a way that access was not possible; 3) By the
serious illness of the husband.
23
While physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning
the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds
for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article
255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in
proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under
Article 262 of the Civil Code.
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right
of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple
reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal
and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he
should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or
expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It
is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest
such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none even his heirs can
impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his
memory.
We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and
subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or
in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the
legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage.
The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the
husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the
legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and
the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged
paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy
is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the
husband who successfully defeated the presumption.
It is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are
allowed to contest the legitimacy of the child.
It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned
only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper
parties and within the period limited by law.
46. CHARLES GOTARDO vs. DIVINA
BULING,G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012
FACTS: In 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint
with the RTC for compulsory recognition and support pendente
lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze,
whose imputed paternity the petitioner denied. Trial ensued.
She met the petitioner in 1992 in a bank where they both
worked. They became sweethearts in the last week of January
1993. Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started
intimate sexual relations with the respondent in the former’s
rented room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the
respondent’s uncle. The sexual encounters occurred twice a
month and became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on
August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she was
pregnant. When told, the petitioner was happy and made plans
to marry the respondent but eventually backed out.
The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995.
When the petitioner did not show up and failed to provide
support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on
demanding recognition of and support for their child. When the
petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her
complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente
lite. The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for
himself. He denied the imputed paternity, claiming that he first
had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of
August 1994 and she could not have been pregnant for 3
months when he was informed of the pregnancy on September
1994.
During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondent’s
motion, granted a P2,000.00 monthly child support,
retroactive from March 1995. RTC dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence. The CA consequently set aside the
RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor
son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order for monthly child
support. The petitioner argues that the CA committed a
reversible error in rejecting the RTC’s ruling, and that the
evidence on record is insufficient to prove paternity.
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed a reversible error when it
set aside the RTC’s findings and ordered the petitioner to
recognize and provide legal support to his minor son, Gliffze.
RULING: NO. Petition is Denied for lack of merit.
In Herrera v. Alba, we stressed that there are four significant
procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties
have to face a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between
the putative father and the child. We explained that a prima
facie case exists if a woman declares —supported by
corroborative proof— that she had sexual relations with the
putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to
the putative father. We explained further that the two
affirmative defenses available to the putative father are:
(1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to
either physical absence or impotency, or
(2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the
time of conception.
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that
the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony
that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the
petitioner, at the time of her conception. Rodulfo corroborated
her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had
intimate relationship. However, the petitioner failed to
substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of
promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given
credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioner’s denial
cannot overcome the respondent’s clear and categorical
assertions. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as
a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family.
47. SSS v. AGUAS
G.R. No. 165546 February 27, 2006.
CALLEJO, SR., J.
FACTS:
Pablo Aguas, a member and pensioner of the SSS died. Pablo’s
surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS
for death benefits on indicating in her claim that Pablo was
survived by his minor child, Jeylnn. Her claim for monthly
pension was settled. SSS received a sworn from Leticia Aguas-
Macapinlac, Pablo’s sister, contesting Rosanna’s claim for death
benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode
approximately more than 6 years before, and lived with another
man on whom she has been dependent for support. She further
averred that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna. The
SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary
beneficiary. CA reversed the SSC deicision and favored the
respondents.
ISSUE:
W/N Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death
benefits accruing from the death of Pablo
HELD: Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code,
children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents
are legitimate. Jeylnn’s claim is justified by the photocopy of
her birth certificate which bears the signature of Pablo.
Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the
Civil Registry showing that she was born on October 29, 1991.
The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on
December 4, 1977 and the marriage subsisted until the latter’s
death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn
was born during Rosanna and Pablo’s marriage.Impugning the
legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband
or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. In this case, there is no
showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during
his lifetime.The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is
buttressed by her birth certificate bearing Pablo’s signature,
which was verified from his specimen signature on file with
petitioner. A birth certificate signed by the father is a
competent evidence of paternity. For Rosanna, to qualify as a
primary beneficiary, she must establish 2 qualifying factors: (1)
that she is the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent
upon the member for support.
A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband
cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the
husband, absent any showing to the contrary. If it is proved that
24
the were till living together at the time of his death, it is
presumed that she was dependent on the husband for support,
unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself.
Only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits as it was
established that she is his legitimate child. Records show that
Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there are no
legal papers to prove it. Rosanna was the legitimate wife of
Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary
since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of
his death, she was still dependent on him for support even if
they were already living separately. NOTE: Legitimacy cannot
be extended to other siblings.
48. Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals
Citation: G.R. No. 115409, June 5, 1996, 257 SCRA 695
Court: Supreme Court of the Philippines
Facts:
The case involves a dispute over paternity and filiation.
Petitioner Clarissa Macadangdang filed a complaint against
respondent Salvador Comas and his parents, seeking support
for her son, claiming that Salvador is the child's father.
According to Clarissa, she and Salvador had a romantic
relationship, resulting in the birth of their child. However,
Salvador denied paternity, arguing that he was not the father of
the child.
Issue or Issues:
Whether or not Salvador Comas is the biological father of
Clarissa Macadangdang's child.
Whether Clarissa is entitled to support for her child from
Salvador and his parents.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Clarissa Macadangdang,
affirming the decision of the lower court. The court found that
there was sufficient evidence to establish the paternity of
Salvador Comas. Therefore, Salvador was ordered to provide
support for the child. The court also held Salvador's parents
liable for support, as the child's entitlement to support extends
to the paternal grandparents under certain circumstances.
Doctrine:
The case reinforces the principle that paternity disputes should
be resolved based on clear and convincing evidence. In cases of
filiation, the court may consider various factors, such as
testimonies, medical findings, and other relevant evidence, to
determine the biological relationship between the alleged father
and the child.
Legal Basis:
The ruling is anchored on provisions of the Family Code of the
Philippines, particularly Article 175, which establishes the right
of illegitimate children to receive support from their parents,
and Article 195, which extends the obligation of support to the
grandparents in certain situations. The court also considered
established jurisprudence emphasizing the need for clear and
convincing evidence in pate
49. REPUBLIC V MAGPAYO
G.R. No. 189476, February 2, 2011
Facts:
Respondent Julian Edward Emerson was born in Makati City to
Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim
Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows,
contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming, however,
that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed
before RTC of Quezon City a petition to change his name to
Julian Edward Emerson Marquez-Lim Coseteng. In support of
his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the NSO
stating that his mother Anna Dominique does not appear in its
National Indices of Marriage. Respondent also submitted his
academic records from elementary up to college showing that
he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of
his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. Respondent
ran and was elected as Quezon City’s Councilor using the name
"JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."
The RTC granted the petition and ordered the Civil Registrar to:
1. Change entry of “Last name” from Magpayo to Coseteng
3. Delete entry of Coseteng from “Middle name”
4. Delete entry of Fulvio Miranda Magpayo Jr in the entry for
"Father".
Republic appealed contending that deletion of the entry on the
date and place of marriage of respondents parents from his
birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a
person must be effected through an appropriate adversary
proceeding.
Issues:
Was there a valid ground for changing respondent's name?
Held: YES
Ruling:
The petition is impressed with merit. A person can effect a
change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using
valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence
such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion;
(d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change
of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest. Respondent’s reason for
changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or
analogous to, recognized grounds, however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v.
Republic of the Philippines. In Alfon, the Court allowed the
therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had
been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon
did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use
the surname of her mother which she had been using since
childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was
lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the
avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to
do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his
legitimacy.
Furthermore, respondent seeks to change his legitimacy to that
of illegitimacy. It affects his legal status. When a petition for
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
involves substantial and controversial alterations including
those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or
legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the
requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
Rule 103 would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication.
50. CONCEPCION V. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R.
123450, AUGUST 31, 2005)
FACTS: Petitioner Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married.
After a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa's relationship turned out to be short-
lived. Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma.
Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that nine
years before he married Ma. Theresa had married one Mario
Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled and that Mario was
still alive.
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa's marriage to Mario was
valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo ana annulled
ner marriage to the latter or being bigamous. It declared Jose
Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody was
awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation
rights. Ma. Theresa moved for reconsideration of the decision
insofar only as that portion of granting petitioner visitation
rights and maintained that the child's surname be changed to
Almonte, her maiden name.
The trial court denied the motion. The case was elevated to the
Court of Appeals. CA denied the petition and affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Ma. Theresa moved for
25
reconsideration. The appellate court resolved the motion by
reversing its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not
the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first
marriage. Gerardo moved for a reconsideration but was denied.
Hence. this appeal.
Issue: WON Jose Gerardo is an illegitimate child of Gerardo
Ruling: No. The petition was denied. Article 164 of the Family
Code is clear. The status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. A child who is conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate. Article 167 provides that
the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in
favor of legitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy proceeds
from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the
period of conception. The presumption is quasi-conclusive and
may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of
coitus between the husband and wife within the first 120 days
of the 300 days which immediately precede the birth of the
child. In this case there is no such evidence, thus presumption
of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo stands. An assertion by
the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the
legitimacy of a child born or conceived within the valid
marriage. For reasons of public decency and morality, a
married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her
husband and that her offspring is illegitimate. Public policy
demands that there be no compromise on the status and
filiation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of
those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.
Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child thus shall have the right to
bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Theresa, in
conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames.
Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo
who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in a way.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights
to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. In this
case, there being no such parent-child relationship between
them, thus, Gerardo has no legal demandable right to visit Jose
Gerardo.
51. TISON VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
The case involves Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller, who claim
to be heirs of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, the deceased sister of
their father, Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora died in 1983,
leaving behind her husband, Martin Guerrero, and the
petitioners as surviving relatives. Hermogenes, their father, had
died in 1973. Teodora's surviving spouse, Martin, executed an
Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement, claiming sole heirship and
selling the disputed land to Teodora Domingo.
After Martin's death, the petitioners filed for reconveyance,
asserting their right to inherit half of the property through right
of representation. Teodora Domingo challenged the legitimacy
of Hermogenes. During the hearing, Corazon Dezoller Tison
presented documentary evidence, including baptismal
certificates and family pictures, to prove filiation. The trial
court dismissed the complaint, and the Court of Appeals upheld
the decision, deeming the evidence insufficient. The appeal
challenges this ruling, arguing for the admissibility and validity
of the presented documents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a third person (private respondent), not the
father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of the petitioners.
RULING:
The private respondent is not the proper party to
impugn the legitimacy of petitioners herein.
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than
the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.
And well-settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot
be attacked collaterally.
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of
the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in
exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such
legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none — even his heirs — can
impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his
memory.
52. ENDE vs Catholic GR 191867

Facts: Butas Ende (Butas) and Damagi Arog (Damagi;
together, spouses Ende) are both from the Manobo tribe. They
were registered owners of a lot in Sudapin, Kidapawan,
Cotabato with an area of 223,877 square meters (sqm) that was
covered by OCT No. P-46114. But parts of the property are
currently occupied by respondents Roman Catholic (11,356
sqm), Welhilmina (11,023 sqm), Eliza and Juanito Diaz (26,457
sqm), and Jessie and Corazon Flores (12,500 sqm.).
Amado, Daniel, Felipe, and Pilar, claiming to be the spouses of
Ende's heirs, filed Civil Case No. 1069 on August 17, 1995, for
quieting OCT No. P-46114 and recovery of possession with
damages and attorney's fees. They claimed that respondents
deceitfully obtained ownership of parts of the subject property
by taking advantage of the spouses Ende's ignorance and
illiteracy. They also argued that respondents' ownership over
the portions of the subject property was only shown by tax
filings and that OCT No. P-46114 never annotated the
purported conveyances.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss contending that (a) the
barangay's certification in conformity with barangay
conciliation prerequisite was fatally faulty and (b) petitioners'
counsel executed the certificate of non-forum shopping.
Amado, Daniel, Felipe, and Pilar filed an amended complaint
on September 5, 1995, reiterating their August 17, 1995
allegations and rectifying the fatally defective verification and
certification against non-forum shopping. They argued that the
barangay certification was unnecessary because the complaint
requested a TRO and/or preliminary injunction.
Respondents filed their answer with compulsory counterclaim
on September 21, 1995, stating that Damage or third parties
had sold them their portions of the subject property.
Respondents denied Amado, Daniel, Felipe, and Pilar's claim to
be Ende's heirs. Respondents also invoked acquisitive
prescription, arguing that they had owned their portions of the
subject land for at least 30 years and no more than 50
years. Laches prevented petitioners from recovering the
property because they neglected to assert their rights.
Petitioners Amalayon and Quezon intervened on January 9,
1996, saying that they were the surviving children and legal
heirs of the spouses Ende. In their answer-in-intervention, they
said that they are the children and rightful heirs of the spouses
Ende and that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1069, Amado,
Daniel, Felipe, and Pilar, are mere impostors. They also said
that they couldn't use their rights to the property after the
spouses Ende died because Inacara Ende and Joseph Butas
Canta, who they said were the spouses Ende's nephews, drove
them away. They said that the people who filed the lawsuit in
26
Civil Case No. 1069 are not the real parties in interest in OCT
No. P-46114. So, the petitioners asked that the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of the spouses be declared null and that
the complaint for quieting of title be dismissed as well.
The RTC, Branch 23 of Kidapawan City, dismissed Amado,
Daniel, Felipe, and Pilar's case for quieting of title and recovery
of possession of OCT No. P-46114 on September 3, 2003.
However, the RTC granted petitioners Amlayon and Quezon's
claim after they proved by preponderance of evidence that they
are the children of spouses Ende and thus the lawful heirs of
the latter.
The RTC further ruled that Damagi's conveyances to
respondents over their respective shares of the subject property
were fictitious, except for Wilhelmina's April 5, 1945
conveyance from Damagi. Damagi could only sell Wilhelmina
7.4625 hectares since she could only inherit 7.4625 hectares.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the CA.
The CA Ruling: Partially Reversed the RTC Decision
On appeal, the CA rendered its assailed July 23, 2009 Decision
reversing and setting aside the RT's ruling in favor of
petitioners Amlayon and Quezon. However, the CA affirmed the
RT's dismissal of the complaint for quieting of title filed by
Amado, Daniel, Felipe, and Pilar. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by petitioners Amlayon and Quezon. However, it was
denied by the CA in its March 10, 2010 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the prior determination of heirship in a
separate special proceeding is a prerequisite for filing an
ordinary civil action.
RULING: No. The petition is meritorious.There is no doubt
therefore as to the rights of Amado, Daniel, Felipe, and Pilar;
and petitioners Amlayon and Quezon who claim to be the heirs
of spouses Ende to institute the present action to quiet OCT No.
P-46114 and to recover its possession even without a prior
determination of heirship in a special proceeding.
Consequently, the question as to who between Amado, Daniel,
Felipe, and Pilar; and petitioners Amlayon and Quezon, are the
real parties-in-interest or the rightful heirs of Butas is
inevitable in the case at bar.
It bears stressing that what is abandoned in Treyes is the prior
determination of heirship in a separate special proceeding as a
prerequisite for filing an ordinary civil action. Accordingly,
when two or more heirs rightfully assert ownership over
another in an ordinary civil action to recover the property of the
estate against third persons, the trial court may determine their
status or right as legal heirs to protect their legitimate interests
in the estate, since successional rights is transmitted by
operation of law from the moment of death of the decedent.
Thus, it is only proper to allow the legitimate heirs of Butas to
institute the present civil action or to intervene in the recovery
of the property of the estate without a prior determination of
heirship in a special proceeding.
53. Joaquin P. Roces v. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila, et
al.
Citation: G.R. No. L-10598. February 14, 1958. 257 SCRA 695
Court: Supreme Court of the Philippines
Facts:
Joaquin P. Roces, the petitioner, filed a petition with the Court
of First Instance of Manila to rectify the Certificate of Birth of
Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces. The birth certificate, registered with
the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, identified Joaquin P. Roces
as the father of Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces, who was born out of
wedlock. Joaquin P. Roces claimed that he had no knowledge or
consent regarding the birth certificate's execution and that the
information about his alleged paternity was false, violating Act
No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code. The Local Civil
Registrar expressed willingness to correct the records if ordered
by the court.
Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces, represented by his mother Carmen
O. Valdellon, intervened and opposed the petition, arguing that
the case involves controversial matters and that there is another
pending action on the name issue. The lower court dismissed
the petition, citing Ty Kong Tin v. Republic of the Philippines.
Issues:
Whether the statements in the birth certificate identifying
Joaquin P. Roces as the father of Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces are
valid.
Whether the Local Civil Registrar had the authority to include
the paternity information in the birth certificate.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, holding
that the statements in the birth certificate identifying Joaquin
P. Roces as the father were invalid. The court emphasized that
Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code explicitly
prohibit naming the father of an illegitimate child in the birth
certificate or recognition if not filed or made by him. The court
ruled that the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to include
the paternity information based on the information of a third
person. The entry regarding the identity of the father was
declared null and void, and the court granted the rectification of
the birth certificate.
Doctrine:
Statements in a birth certificate identifying the alleged father of
an illegitimate child are not valid if the birth certificate is not
signed by the father, and the Local Civil Registrar has no
authority to record paternity based on the information of a
third person.
Legal Basis:
1. Section 5 of Act No. 3753:
This provision is critical in the case as it outlines the proper
procedure for registering the birth of an illegitimate child. Here
are its key points and their relation to the case:
Joint Registration: The section stipulates that in the case of an
illegitimate child, the birth certificate should be signed and
sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the
mother if the father refuses.
Confidentiality of Father's Identity: Importantly, the provision
explicitly prohibits the disclosure of the name of the father who
refuses to acknowledge the child. It also bars the inclusion of
any information that could identify the father.
In the case of Joaquin P. Roces, the birth certificate of Ricardo
Joaquin V. Roces, an illegitimate child, contained statements
regarding Joaquin P. Roces as the father. However, it was
signed only by the mother, Carmen O. Valdellon, without
Joaquin P. Roces' acknowledgment. This directly violates the
confidentiality mandated by Section 5 of Act No. 3753.
2. Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
This article deals with the recognition of illegitimate children
and has the following implications in the case:
Recognition by Father or Mother: When a parent (either father
or mother) makes the recognition separately, Article 280
prevents the revelation of the name of the person with whom he
or she had the child. It also prohibits stating any circumstance
whereby the other parent may be identified.
In Joaquin P. Roces' case, the birth certificate, which was
supposed to be a form of recognition, incorrectly identified
Joaquin P. Roces as the father. This is a violation of the
confidentiality provisions outlined in Article 280. The
certificate should not have included any information that could
27
identify the father, especially when the acknowledgment is not Presidential Decree 1146, Section 25, provides an expedited
mutual. appeal procedure, allowing the party aggrieved by a GSIS
decision to appeal directly to the Court of Appeals on questions
of law and facts. This abbreviated procedure is designed to
54. Iluminada Ponce Berciles, et al. v. Government Service facilitate, rather than prolong, the payment of benefits.
Insurance System (GSIS), et al.
Citation: G.R. No. 57257. March 5, 1984. Legal Basis:
Court: Supreme Court of the Philippines Republic Act 910, as amended – Governs retirement benefits
for members of the judiciary.
Presidential Decree 1146, Section 25 – Outlines the appeal
Facts: procedure for GSIS decisions, providing an expedited route to
The case involves a dispute over the determination of legal heirs the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court for questions of
under Republic Act 910, as amended, a special statute law and facts.
governing retirement benefits for members of the judiciary.
Specifically, the controversy revolves around the paternity and
filiation of Pascual Voltaire Berciles, Maria Luisa Berciles,
Mercy Berciles, and Rhoda Berciles, in relation to the deceased 55. Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro vs. Hon. Court of Appeals,
Judge Pascual G. Berciles. Cipriano Naval, and Benita C. Naval
Citation: G.R. No. L-50974-75, May 31, 1989
The Committee on Claims Settlement, acting on behalf of the Court: Supreme Court of the Philippines
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), made findings
regarding the marriage of Judge Berciles to Iluminada Ponce
and the alleged marriage to Flor Fuentebella. The Committee
concluded that Pascual Voltaire Berciles is an acknowledged
Facts:
natural child, while Maria Luisa Berciles, Mercy Berciles, and
Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro, petitioners, contested the
Rhoda Berciles are illegitimate children.
acknowledgment and recognition of Benita Castro Naval as the
illegitimate child of their late brother, Eustaquio Castro. The
However, petitioners challenged these findings, arguing that
trial court declared Benita as a duly acknowledged and
the evidence presented, particularly the birth certificate of
recognized illegitimate child, entitling her to a share in the
Pascual Voltaire Berciles, was insufficient to establish
inheritance. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, noting
acknowledgment. The case also involves the interpretation of
various evidence, including Eustaquio's active role in Benita's
Section 25 of Presidential Decree 1146, which outlines the
life, such as giving her away at her wedding and continued
appeal procedure for GSIS decisions.
cohabitation.
Issues:
Issue:
Whether the evidence presented is sufficient to establish the
The main issue is whether Benita Castro Naval is the
acknowledgment of paternity for Pascual Voltaire Berciles and
acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio
the legitimacy status of Maria Luisa Berciles, Mercy Berciles,
Castro.
and Rhoda Berciles.
Ruling:
The applicability and interpretation of Section 25 of
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the Court
Presidential Decree 1146 in resolving disputes related to GSIS
of Appeals' decision. Benita Castro Naval was recognized as the
decisions.
acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of Eustaquio
Castro, granting her the right to inherit from his estate.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the GSIS's findings regarding the
Doctrine:
surviving spouse and legitimate children of Judge Pascual G.
The court applied the provisions of the Family Code,
Berciles. Still, it reversed the conclusions related to the
emphasizing the retroactive effect of the Code, simplifying
acknowledgment and legitimacy of certain children. The Court
classifications of children into legitimate and illegitimate. The
ordered the GSIS to pay specified sums to each legal heir.
case highlights that under the Family Code, illegitimate
children can establish their filiation in the same way as
Doctrine:
legitimate children.
Legal Basis:
The court referenced Article 175 of the Family Code, stating that
illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Articles 172 and 173 were cited to provide various means for
establishing filiation, allowing actions to claim legitimacy. The
court concluded that Benita enjoyed open and continuous
possession of her status as an illegitimate child, akin to an
"action to claim legitimacy."
56. Rosalina P. Eceta vs. Ma. Theresa Vell Lagura Eceta
Citation: G.R. No. 157037, May 20, 2004
Court: Supreme Court of the Philippines
Facts:
Rosalina P. Vda. De Eceta entered into marriage with Isaac
Eceta in 1926. Throughout their marriage, they were blessed
with a son named Vicente. Among the properties acquired by
the couple was a disputed property in Quezon City.
Unfortunately, Isaac, the husband, passed away in 1967, leaving
Rosalina and Vicente as his compulsory heirs.
In 1977, Vicente also passed away, leaving behind Rosalina and
an illegitimate daughter, Maria Theresa. In 1991, Maria Theresa
initiated legal action by filing a case for "Partition and
Accounting with Damages" against Rosalina, asserting her right
to a portion of the disputed property. Rosalina, in her defense,
argued that the property was paraphernal and exclusively hers.
The trial court, after due proceedings, ruled that both Rosalina
and Maria Theresa are co-heirs, with Maria Theresa entitled to
a one-fourth share of the property. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision with modification, reducing Maria
Theresa's share to one-eighth.
Issues:
Whether the certified xerox copy of the certificate of live birth is
competent evidence for proving filiation.
Whether Rosalina's admission that Maria Theresa is her
granddaughter is sufficient to prove filiation.
Whether the action for recognition has already prescribed.
Ruling:
The petition for review on certiorari is denied. The decision of
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the trial
court’s decision, is affirmed in toto.
Doctrine:
Filiation of illegitimate children can be established by:
28
 The record of birth in the civil register or a final
judgment.
 Admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or private handwritten instrument signed
by the parent.
 Open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child.
 Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is a consummated act of acknowledgment. No further
court action is required.
Legal Basis:
The legal basis for establishing filiation includes the Rules of
Court and special laws governing the recognition of illegitimate
children. In this case, the acknowledgment of filiation is based
on a duly authenticated birth certificate and the
acknowledgment made by Vicente Eceta by signing the birth
certificate.
57 ANGELES VS ANGELES-MAGLAYA
FACTS:
Francisco Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City
of Manila, leaving behind 4 parcels of land and a building,
among other valuable properties. Respondent Corazon claims
that as the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva
Mercado has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications required of an administrator. Petitioner Belen
claims, as Francisco’s second wife and surviving spouse, that
she should be made administratix of Francisco’s estate. She
claims that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco
for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate
daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by
him. Further she said that respondent, despite her claim of
being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado,
has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed
parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such
union. She also said that she and Francisco adopted a child.
Respondent in turn alleged that per certification of the
appropriate offices, the January to December 1938 records of
marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor, Pampanga where
the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were
destroyed. She also dismissed the adoption as of little
consequence, owing to her having interposed with the Court of
Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by
the RTC at Caloocan. Respondent testified having been in open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Four other witnesses testified on her behalf, and she also
offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an
entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital,
Tondo, Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado
and whereon the handwritten word “Yes” appears on the space
below the question “Legitimate?” Pictures taken during
respondent’s wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya; a
copy of her marriage contract, and her scholastic and
government service records, were also offered as evidence. RTC
ruled in favor of Petitioner, CA ruled in favor of respondent.
ISSUE:
WoN respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco
M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado?
HELD:
NO CA erred in giving respondent presumptive legitimacy.
RULING:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid
and lawful marriage (FC Art 146). However, the presumption of
legitimacy under Art 164 may be availed only upon convincing
proof of the factual basis therefore , i.e., that the child’s parents
were legally married and that his/her conception or birth
occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Respondent
failed to present evidence of Francisco’s marriage to Genoveva,
thus she cannot be presumed legitimate. Further, the Birth
Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom
legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was
only signed by the attending physician making it only proof of
the fact of the birth of a child. The legitimate filiation of a child
is a matter fixed by law itself, it cannot be made dependent on
the declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or that of
the mother of the newborn child. None of the evidence the
respondent presented is enough to prove filiation or
recognition. Further, RTC Caloocan in the case respondent filed
to nullify the adoption of Francisco and Belen of their child,
said that respondent is NOT a legitimate child of Francisco and
Genoveva; following the rule on conclusiveness of judgment,
herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the
legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In
fine, the issue of herein respondent’s legitimate filiation to
Francisco and the latter’s marriage to Genoveva, having been
judicially determined in a final judgment by a court of
competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res judicata and
may not again be resurrected or litigated between herein
petitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent
action, regardless of the form of the latter. Finally, it should be
noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the
estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over
the next of kin of the deceased.
58. PERLA VS MIRASOL

FACTS:
Mirasol alleges that she and Antonio cohabited for about 2
years. As a result, Randy was born to her. However, when
Antonio landed a job as seaman, he left them and refused to
give support to their son. Antonio for his part, denied that they
ever cohabited although admitted that he had a one night stand
with Mirasol. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randy’s birth
and baptismal certificates. She avers that she and Antonio
supplied the information indicated in the certificates, as the
‘hilot’ who assisted her went to Antonio’s house to solicit the
said information. Randy also testified, saying that he even had a
vacation at her aunt, Antonio’s sister for a week with which he
1st met Antonio, calling him Papa and while the latter hugged
him, he promised to support Randy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Randy’s filiation to Antonio was sufficiently
proven.
HELD:
No. Respondents failed to establish Randy’s illegitimate
filiation to Antonio.
59. Ben-Hur Nepomuceno vs. Arhbencel Ann Lopez
Facts:
Arhbencel Ann Lopez, represented by her mother Araceli
Lopez, filed a complaint for recognition and support against
Ben-Hur Nepomuceno. Arhbencel, born on June 8, 1999,
claimed to be the child of petitioner from an extramarital affair.
Although petitioner refused to sign her Certificate of Birth, he
provided a handwritten note dated August 7, 1999, obligating
himself to give financial support. Arhbencel sought recognition
as petitioner's child and requested support.
Issues:
Whether Arhbencel has established her filiation to petitioner.
Whether the handwritten note obligating financial support
constitutes acknowledgment of paternity.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the Court
of Appeals' decision. The trial court's order dismissing the case
for insufficiency of evidence was reinstated.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court, in granting the petition, set aside the Court
of Appeals' decision and reinstated the trial court's order
dismissing the case for insufficiency of evidence. The key
determination was that Arhbencel failed to establish her
filiation to petitioner, as the handwritten note provided by him
29
did not contain any explicit statement acknowledging her as his
child, rendering it insufficient under Article 172(2) in
conjunction with Article 175 of the Family Code. The Court
emphasized the necessity of contemporaneous actions and
admissions of filiation for documentary evidence to be accorded
probative value. Arhbencel's Certificate of Birth, unsigned by
petitioner, was also deemed to lack probative value. While
recognizing the importance of considering the best interests of
the child in paternity and filiation cases, the Court underscored
the potential disturbance to the privacy and peace of the
putative father's legitimate family in unfounded paternity suits.
Consequently, the Court held that Arhbencel's claim for support
was not upheld due to insufficient and inconclusive evidence
establishing her filiation.
60. 49.G.R. No. 196510, September 12, 2018
SOFIA TABUADA, NOVEE YAP, MA. LORETA NADAL, AND
GLADYS EVIDENTE, Petitioners, v. ELEANOR TABUADA,
JULIETA TRABUCO, LAURETA REDONDO, AND SPS.
BERNAN CERTEZA & ELEANOR D. CERTEZA, Respondents
Facts:
Petitioners filed a petition to nullify a mortgage allegedly
executed by their relative and predecessor-in-interest Loreta
Tabuada four years after her death.
On January 27, 2005, the petitioners initiated Civil Case in the
RTC against Spouses Bernan and Eleanor Certeza, Eleanor
Tabuada, Julieta Trabuco, and Laureta Redondo, who were
later declared in default. During the ex parte hearing on
September 9, 2005, Sofia Tabuada, one of the petitioners,
testified about her late husband Simeon Tabuada, his relation
to Loreta Tabuada, and the contentious mortgage of Lot 4272-
B-2. She recounted receiving a notice from Spouses Certeza,
leading to inquiries where Eleanor Tabuada and Trabuco
admitted to mortgaging the property. The RTC nullified the
mortgage, citing Eleanor Tabuada's misrepresentation.
However, on appeal, the CA reversed, highlighting the
petitioners' failure to prove their legal heirship through proper
documentation, raising doubts about ownership. The CA
emphasized Sofia Tabuada's insufficient evidence of her
relationship with the late Loreta Tabuada due to the absence of
documentary proof.
Issue:
1. Whether the legal relationship between Sofia
Tabuada and the deceased Loreta Tabuada was
proven by a preponderance of evidence?
2. Whether the real estate mortgage was null and void
Held:
Yes, the relationship is established. .
Yes, it is declared null and void.
Ruling:
The CA's perception of a mere discrepancy between the names
on the death certificate and the title did not disprove the legal
relationship between Sofia Tabuada and Loreta Tabuada.
Evidence, including Sofia Tabuada's unchallenged declaration
and the family's actual possession of the property, affirmed the
legal relationship.
The RTC's declaration of nullity was justified as Loreta Tabuada
had already passed away, and Eleanor Tabuada, not legally
authorized, misrepresented herself in mortgaging the property.
The admissions by Spouses Certeza regarding the relationship
between the petitioners and Eleanor Tabuada contradicted
their claim of being mortgagees in good faith. Prudence was
expected, considering the presence of other individuals on the
property. The petitioners cannot recover moral damages based
on "disrespect to the dead" under Article 309 of the Civil Code.
The fraudulent representation by Eleanor Tabuada did not
occur during the mourning period or funeral, and therefore,
moral damages are not warranted. Petition for review on
certiorari GRANTED.
61.. Jison vs. CA
GR No. 124853, February 24, 1998
FACTS:
Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint
against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for recognition as
illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed 20 years after
her mother’s death and when she was already 39 years of age.
Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and
sometime in 1945, he impregnated Esperanza Amolar,
Monina’s mother. Monina alleged that since childhood, she had
enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as the illegitimate
child of petitioner by his acts and that of his family. It was
likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and spent for her
education such that she became a CPA and eventually a Central
Bank Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11
witnesses.
ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child
of Francisco Jison.
HELD: Yes
RULING:
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may
be established in the same way and on the same evidence as
that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the
various forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is
established.
“To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation
of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider
the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of
parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure
charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not
only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to
have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in
life, not accidentally, but continuously”.
The following facts was established based on the testimonial
evidences offered by Monina:
1. That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the
time when her mother was employed by the former;
2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his
overt acts and conduct.
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying
the putative father is not competence evidence as to the issue of
paternity. Francisco’s lack of participation in the preparation of
baptismal certificates and school records render the documents
showed as incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to the
affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age
attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the
position that if Monina were truly not Francisco’s illegitimate
child, it would be unnecessary for him to have gone to such
great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation.
Monina’s evidence hurdles the “high standard of proof required
for the success of an action to establish one’s illegitimate
filiation in relying upon the provision on “open and continuous
possession”. Hence, Monina proved her filiation by more than
mere preponderance of evidence.
Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if
illegitimate, Monina filed her action well within the period
granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her
action on ground of laches would clearly be inequitable and
unjust. Petition was denied.
62. PERLA VS BARING (2012)
FACTS:
Respondent Mirasol Baring (Mirasol) and petitioner Antonio
Perla (Antonio) were allegedly neighbors. Eventually, they
became sweethearts. When Mirasol became pregnant, Antonio
allegedly assured her that he would support her. However,
Antonio started to evade her. Mirasol and her then minor son,
Randy Perla (Randy), filed before the RTC a Complaint for
support against Antonio.
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Mirasol and Randy thus prayed that Antonio be ordered to
support Randy. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randys
Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate indicating her
and Antonio as parents of the child. Mirasol testified that she
and Antonio supplied the information in the said certificates.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering Antonio to support
Randy, which was affirmed by CA.
ISSUE:
Is Randy entitled for support from Antonio?
Held:
Mirasol and Randy's Complaint for support is based on Randy's
alleged illegitimate filiation to Antonio. Hence, for Randy to be
entitled for support, his filiation must be established with
sufficient certainty. The Court has ruled that a high standard of
proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order
for xxx support may create an unwholesome situation or may
be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it
must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by
clear and convincing evidence.
In the case at bar, Mirasol and Randy failed to establish
Randy's illegitimate filiation to Antonio. The Certificate of Live
Birth and baptismal certificate of Randy have no probative
value to establish Randy's filiation to Antonio since the latter
had not signed the same. A certificate of live birth purportedly
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had
a hand in the preparation of said certificate. Also, while a
baptismal certificate may be considered a public document, it
can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the
entries with respect to the child's paternity. Thus, × xx
baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as
proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as
circumstantial evidence to prove the same.
***
Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the
CA, are binding on the Court. However, this rule admits of
certain exceptions such as when the finding is grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures or when the
judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts. As
this case falls under these exceptions, the Court is constrained
to re-examine the factual findings of the lower courts.
GRANTED.
63. Uyguangco vs CA
FACTS:
Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975, leaving his wife,
four legitimate children and properties which they divided
among themselves. Graciano Uyguangco filed a complaint for
partition against the petitioners, claiming that as the
illegitimate son of the deceased and a Anastacia Bacao, he must
not be left out of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. He
also claims that he received support from his father while in
high school and was also assigned by his father as storekeeper
at the Uyguangco store.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
Graciano could not prove his alleged filiation having none of the
documents required in Art. 278 of the NCC (i.e. record of birth,
a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing. Neither may he resort to Art. 285 of the NCC because
he was already an adult when his alleged dad died. Graciano
insists however, that he is -in continuous possession of the
status of a child of his alleged father by the direct acts of the
latter or of his family as is under Art. 283 of the NCC.
ISSUE:
WON Graciano may adequately prove filiation.
HELD:
NO
RULING:
The Civil Code provisions they invoke have been superseded or
at least modified by the corresponding articles in the FC. Since
illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children
(Art 175), Graciano may establish his filiation by the means
given in Art. 172. Thus while he has no record of birth
appearing in the civil registrar or a final judgment or an
admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned, he insists that he has nevertheless been -in an open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,
which is admissible as evidence of filiation under Art. 172. As
proof to this open and continuous possession -he claims that he
lived with his father from 1967 until 1973, received support
from him, used the name Uyguangco without objection, a
special power of attorney executed in his favor by Apolinario's
wife, and another one by Suplcio Uyguangco, shared in the
profits of the copra family business of the Uguangco's and was
even given a share in his deceased father's estate as found in the
addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by
the petitioners. However, since his father has already died, his
action is now barred as Art. 172 specifically requires that when
the action is based on other proofs of filiation such as open and
continuous possession, the action must be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
64. Miguel Gocolay vs Michael Benjo Gocolay
GR No 220606 January 11, 2021
A petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision
and resolution of the CA which annulled and set aside
the RTC decision which granted Miguel Gocolay’s
motion to dismiss or recall the trial court and orders
requiring him to undergo DNA testing to determine
Michael Gocolay’s paternity.
FACTS:
Michael Benjo Gocolay filed with the RTC a petition for
paternity seeking to be recognized as a biological and
nonmarital son of Miguel Gocolay. His mother Priscilla
Castor got pregnant with Miguel. Miguel promised to
support him but never did. As a support to his petition
Michael presented Birth Certificate.
Miguel denied having a child with Priscilla and furthered
alleged that the documents with the information
presented are falsified.
Michael then filed a motion for DNA test which Miguel
opposed on the ground that DNA would violate his right
against involuntary servitude and self-incrimination.
RTC granted his motion which Miguel appealed and
filed motion to dismiss or to recall the orders allowing
the conduct of DNA on the grounds that Priscilla has
been charged with and pled guilty of PD651 for making
false entries in Michael’s Birth certificate RTC then
granted Miguel’s motion and found that the document
presented by Michael can no longer be relied. CA
reversed and set aside RTC’s order and directed to set
the date for the conduct of DNA examination.
Miguel claimed that since the admission and conviction
of Priscilla, the birth certificate contained false entries
which respondent cannot claim prima facie case for his
paternity and filiation but the court further found that
specific criminal act was making it appear in Michael’s
birth certificate that she and Miguel were married at the
time of Michael’s birth, which they were not. This false
entry did not render the other entries in the Birth
certificate false or change the other entries in it,
especially the entry where Miguel was named Michael’s
father. It only changed Michael’s status from a marital to
nonmarital child.
Miguel raised the conviction belatedly as supervening
event. She was convicted on June 2012 while the entry of
judgement that rendered final and executory the order
31
to conduct DNA testing was issued by the SC on August
3, 2012 yet the conviction issue was raised on November
2013. He further claimed that doctrine of immutability
of judgement cannot be applied to this case
ISSUES:
WON Priscilla Castor’s conviction for making false
entries in Michael Gocolay’s birth certificate is a
supervening event that warrants the setting aside of the
final and executory RTC orders for the DNA testing of
Michael Gocolay and Miguel Gocolay.
RULING:
No. The petition for review on Certiorari is denied.
Resolution of the CA is affirmed.
The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final
judgment has a two-fold purpose: (1) to avoid delay in
the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to
make orderly the discharge of judicial business and (2)
to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of
occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist.
Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights
and obligations of every litigant must not hang in
suspense for an indefinite period of time.
One exception to the immutability of judgments is when
there exists a supervening event, or "facts which
transpire after judgment has become final and executory
or to new circumstances which developed after the
judgment has acquired finality, including matters which
the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial
as they were not yet in existence at that time." A
supervening event renders the execution of the
judgment impossible or unjust, requiring new relief to
be granted as the new facts or circumstances warrant.
For a supervening event to be an exception to the
execution of a final judgment, the following must
concur: first, the fact or circumstance must occur after
the judgment became fmal and executory; and second,
the fact or circumstance must be shown to affect or
change the judgment's substance, making its execution
inequitable.
This Court has upheld the stay of execution of final and
executory judgments in cases where orders for
reinstatement to a previous position were no longer
feasible, or where court decisions changing the
execution of prior ones are promulgated.
Conversely, this Court does not consider to be
supervening event facts and circumstances that arose
before the judgment became final and executory, but
were only raised after. Further, if the fact or
circumstance did not materially change the parties'
situation and did not materially affect the execution of
the judgment, it cannot be considered a supervening
event. An instance would be the death of a party, as they
may be substituted by heirs.
In this case, the final and executory nature of the
Regional Trial Court's April 21, 2008 and April 1, 2009
Orders requiring the parties to undergo DNA testing is
undisputed
65. GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner, -versus- PATRICIO T.
ANTONIO, Respondent. G.R. No. 206248, EN BANC, February
18, 2014, VELASCO, JR., J.
It is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall
use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided
by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized
by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a
situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the
father. Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art.
176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal
mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then
custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless
she is shown to be unfit. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the
right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or
not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother
(herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children.
FACTS:
Petitioner Grace Grande and respondent Patricio Antonio for a
period of time lived together as husband and wife, although
Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. Out
of this illicit relationship, two sons were born. The children
were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the
Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry.
Respondent soon filed a petition for judicial approval of
recognition of the filiation of the two children with Prayer to
take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, and
Correction/Change of Surname of Minors before the RTC.
Petitioner on the other hand, speculated that Article 176 of the
Family Code as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, may
not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate
children of his surname without the consent of their mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the father has a right to compel the use of his
surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of
their filiation. (NO)
RULING:
Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the
Family Code. It is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother.
The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her
filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record
of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in
a public document or private handwritten instrument is made
by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use
the surname of the father. Parental authority over minor
children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence,
respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental
authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor
children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be
unfit. Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if
they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the
father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner)
who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their
illegitimate children. On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free
from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must
abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the provision
readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under
no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The
word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion
upon the illegitimate children.
embarrassment. The trial court granted the petition,
emphasizing Cynthia's best interest, a decision upheld by the
Court of Appeals. The Solicitor General appealed, expressing
concerns about potential legal complications, such as
inheritance claims, and suggested that adoption could achieve
the desired surname change.
ISSUE
Whether or not Cynthia Vicencio is allowed to adopt the
surname of her step-father
RULING
The court emphasizes that a change of name must have a
proper and reasonable cause. The general rule is that legitimate
children should use the surname of their father. Cynthia is the
legitimate child of Fe Leabres and Pablo Vicencio, and a change
of name is a privilege granted at the court's discretion. While
confusion may arise from Cynthia's current surname, allowing
her to use her step-father's surname without legal adoption
could lead to more significant legal complications. Despite
Ernesto Yu treating Cynthia as his own daughter, legal
constraints prevent the court from granting the name change,
as it may result in deeper inquiries into her parentage.
67. DELA CRUZ V. GRACIA
FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth
because the document attached to the Affidavit to use
the Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled
"Autobiography," did not include the signature of the
deceased father, and “because he was born out of
wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his
birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his
paternity to the child.”
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of
the deceased father of minor Christian can be
considered as a recognition of paternity.
RULING:
Yes.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255,
permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of
his/her father if the latter had previously recognized
him/her as his offspring through an admission made in
a pubic of private handwritten instrument.
Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that
there must be a signature by the putative father in the
private handwritten instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of
affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in
any private handwritten instrument wherein an
admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child
is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the
lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there
should be strict compliance with the requirement that
the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent;
and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is
accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence,
it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to
have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging
parent as it is merely corroborative of such other
evidence.

66. REPUBLIC V. VICENCIO, G.R. NO. 88202 Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for
injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial
court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the
author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the
FACTS
Cynthia Vicencio filed a petition to change her surname from same does not contain any express recognition of
"Vicencio" to "Yu," citing her estrangement from her biological paternity.
father, Pablo Vicencio, and her use of the surname Yu due to
her step-father, Ernesto Yu. Her parents' marriage was ISSUE:
dissolved, and her mother remarried Ernesto Yu. Despite not
having a relationship with her biological father and using the
surname Vicencio, Cynthia faced confusion and
32