(Real)  Corporate  Diplomacies  

 
Noé  Cornago  

Despite  its   increasing   complexity   and   ambition,   literature   on   ‘economic   diplomacy’  

often   appears   to   be   trapped   in   a   sort   of   neo-­‐mercantilist   mentality.1   In   its   intention   of  
keeping   alive   the   semantics   of   ‘economic   statecraft’   and   the   fictions   of   ‘territorial  
sovereignty’,   that   body   of   literature   is   generally   written   under   the   assumption   of   the  
empirical  existence  of  ‘national  economies’  as  discrete  units,  regardless  of  the  challenges  
which   transnational   capitalism   poses   for   such   an   understanding   of   the   articulation  
between   State   sovereignty,   territory,   and   global   economy.   Consequently,   literature   on  
‘economic   diplomacy’   adopts   frequently   a   distinctive   narrative,   in   which   the   ship   of  
‘national  economy’,  in  the  hands  of  experienced  policy-­‐makers,  consultants  and  diplomats,  
in   spite   of   much   turbulence,   navigates   without   ever   losing   its   sense   of   direction,   in   the  
oceanic  seas  of  the  new  global  political  economy.2    

In   view   of   this,   Nicholas   Bayne   and   Stephan   Woolcock   have   recently   sustain,   more  
realistically,   that   through   economic   diplomacy,   governments   try   to   reconcile   at   least   three  
main   tensions:   the   tension   between   politics   and   economics;   the   tension   between  
international  and  domestic  pressures;  and  the  tension  between  public  and  private  actors.  
But   in   spite   of   their   very   reflective   approach   they   ignore   how   those   tensions   are  
transforming  the  architecture  of  States  themselves,  and  even  more  important,  the  role  of  

1   See   for   example   Laurence   Badel,   Diplomatie   et   grands   contrats.   L’Etat   français   et   les   marchés   extérieurs   au   20e  

siècle,  (Paris  :  Publications  de  la  Sorbonne,  2010).  

2   See   for   example   David   A.   Baldwin,   Economic   Statecraft   (Princeton   NY:   Princeton   University   Press,   1985),  

Gerard  Carrière,  La  diplomatie  économique,  le  diplomate  et  le  marché,  (Paris  :  Economica,  1998).  
States  in  global  capitalism.3  Something  similar  happens  in  the  otherwise  compelling  effort  
to  clarify  the  meaning  of  ‘economic  diplomacy’  authored  by  Maaike  Okano-­‐Heijmans.  She  
carefully  differentiates  it  from  ‘economic  statecraft’,  ‘economic  security’,  ‘trade  diplomacy’,  
‘commercial   diplomacy’   and   ‘financial   diplomacy’,   analyzing   how   the   ‘context,   theatres,  
tools  and  processes’  of  economic  diplomacy  evolves  across  time.  But  again,  in  spite  of  her  
fleeting   recognition   of   the   ‘artificial   distinction   between   the   public   and   private   sectors’,  
she   fails   to   consider   the   transformative   effects   of   the   restructuring   of   the   global   political  
economy  over  States  themselves.4    

In  short,  such  approaches  present  diplomacy,  and  what  has  come  to  be  referred  to  as  
new   global   governance,   as   isolated,   differentiated   realities   or,   even   worse,   as   two  
irreconcilable   ways   of   approaching   global   politics   that   mutually   ignore   each   other:   one,  
that   is   –through   diplomacy-­‐   adhered   to   the   grammars   of   State   sovereignty   and   that   is  
unwilling   to   consider   in   depth   the   crucial   institutional   and   territorial   impacts   of   global  
political  economy  restructuring;  the  other,  which  perceives  itself  better  equipped  to  deal  
with   the   challenges   of   the   so-­‐called   ‘global   governance’   -­‐   although   its   precise   legal   and  
institutional   dimensions   are,   to   a   great   extent,   yet   to   be   defined   –   that   tends   to   ignore  
nonetheless   the   critical   implications   that   the   displacement   of   relevance   from   public   to  
private  authorities  entails.5    

Fortunately   however,   some   valuable   attempts   have   been   done   that   seem   to   take  
more   seriously   the   complex   relationships   between   ‘diplomacy’   and   ‘global   governance’  
that   come   to   confirm   that   a   new   understanding   of   that   connection   is   taking   form.6     But  
form   the   point   of   view   that   this   chapter   adopts,   even   if   these   new   approaches   are  
contributing  to  a  new  awareness  of  what  can  be  called  the  pluralization  of  the  diplomatic  
landscape,   their   concentration   in   issue-­‐specific   global   policy   making   impedes   them   to  
capture   the   deeper   implications   that   those   transformations   entail,   when   considered   in   the  
long-­‐historical   term,   upon   traditional   notions   of   State   sovereignty,   as   well   as   the  
consequences   of   the   rise   of   global   corporate   power   for   our   conventional   understanding   of  
global  political  system  as  funded  in  notions  of  public  authority.  

3   See   Nicholas   Bayne   and   Stephen   Woolcock   (ed),   The   new   economic   diplomacy,   decision-­making   and  

negotiation  in  international  economic  relations  (London:  Ashgate,  2007).  

4  
See   Maaike   Okano-­‐Heijmans,   ‘Conceptualizing   Economic   Diplomacy:   The   Crossroads   of   International  
Relations,  Economics,  IPE  and  Diplomatic  Studies’,  The  Hague  Journal  of  Diplomacy,  vol.  6,  2011,  pp.  7-­‐36.  
5   For   an   early   critique   of   such   approaches   see   Yves   Dezalay   and   B.   Garth   (eds),   Global   Prescriptions:   The  

Production,   Exportation   and   Importation   of   a   New   Legal   Ortodoxy,   (Ann   Arbor:   The   University   of   Michigan  
Press,  2002).      
6   See   Andrew   F.   Cooper,   Brian   Hocking,   and   William   Maley   (Ed)   Global   Governance   and   Diplomacy:   Worlds  

Apart?,  (Houndmills:  Palgrave-­‐Macmillan,  2008).  

 The  lack  of  consideration  of  the  importance  of  diplomacy  by  political  scientists  and  
legal   scholars   sharply   contrast   with   the   growing   interest   that   diplomatic   methods   and  
skills   are   receiving   in   the   corporate   world.7   Under   the   rubric   of   ‘corporate   diplomacy’   a  
new   literature   is   flourishing   that   reveal   that   global   business   elites   increasingly   find   in  
diplomacy   an   important   field   for   corporate   strategy   in   front   of   States,   international  
organizations,   competitors,   environmental   and   human   rights   activists   and   consumers.  
Interestingly   enough   this   new   literature   adopts   a   distinctive   ‘soft-­‐power’   approach   that  
sharply  contrast  with  the  ‘hard-­‐power’  grammars  that  shaped  in  the  first  half  of  the  past  
century   –in   the   era   of   rampant   industrial   capitalism-­‐   the   original   field   of   business   or  
corporate  diplomacy  as  an  important  area  of  research.8  

In   a   now   classic   work   dedicated   to   the   study   of   international   cartels   published   in  

1946,   after   differentiating   ‘loosely   defined   inter-­‐firm   agreements’   and   ‘formal   compacts’,  
‘State-­‐sponsored’   and   ‘privately   contrived   cartels’,   ‘aggressive’   and   ‘defensive’,   ‘legal’   and  
‘illegal   cartels’…the   authors   aptly   introduced   the   notion   of   ‘business   diplomacy’   while  
suggesting  that  cartelization    

is  the  outcome  of  a  process  of  business  diplomacy.  New  problems  are  constantly  arising;  new  
products   and   processes   and   companies   threaten   the   balance   of   power   and   the   stability   of  
markets   in   this   dynamic   field.   The   function   of   business   diplomacy   is   to   adjudicate   these  
issues,   to   adjust   existing   relationships   to   them.   This   process   of   constant   adjustment   by  
negotiation,  rather  than  by  free  competition  in  the  market,  or  by  authoritative  decisions  of  a  
unified   administrative   mechanism   (as   in   the   thin,   robber,   and   several   others   industries)   is  
the  distinctive  characteristic  of  the  cartel  system  in  the  world’s  chemical  industries.9  

Adding  later:  

The  general  practice  of  delineating  fields  both  within  and  around  the  chemical  industries  is  
obviously  not  the  casual  result  of  unilateral  decisions  made  in  competitive  markets.  Nor  it  is  
wholly  a  historical  accident…  it  reflects  a  wide  consensus  that  maintaining  ‘friendly  relations’  
and   avoiding   conflict   is   ‘good   business’.   It   is   part   of   a   modern   code   of   business   behaviour  
which  has  evolved  from  business  experience  and  been  formed  by  business  diplomacy.10  

7  See,  for  instance,  Abbas  J.  Ali,  ‘Managers  and  Diplomacy’,  International  Journal  of  Commerce  &  Management,  

vol.  19,  no.  4,  2009,  pp.  256-­‐259.  

8   This   ‘soft’   approach,   and   its   corresponding   discursive   innovations   is   currently   extended,   with   the   help   of  

anthropologists   and   ethnographers   now   serving   to   corporate   purposes,   to   some   of   the   most   contentious   fields  
of  corporate  activity,  such  as  those  protagonized  by  the  extractive  sector  in  front  of  local  communities.  See,  for  
instance,   Lisa   J.   Laplante   and   Suzanne   A.   Spears,   ‘Out   of   the   Conflict   Zone:   The   Case   for   Community   Consent  
Processes  in  the  Extractive  Sector’,  Yale  Human  Rights  &  Development  Law  Journal,  vol.  11,  2008.  
9     See   George   Stocking   and   Myron   Watkins   et   al,   Cartels   in   Action.   Case   Studies   in   International   Business  

Diplomacy,  (New  York:  Twentieth  Century  Found,  1946),  p.  57.  

10  Ibidem,  p.  397.  
Even   if   the   historical   moment   of   cartels   as   the   most   emblematic   form   of   inter-­‐firm  
diplomacy   apparently   has   passed,   mutating   in   a   new   era   of   seemingly   inoffensive   ‘joint-­‐
ventures’   and   ‘strategic   alliances’,11   that   original   understanding   of   corporate   diplomacy  
retains   its   deeper   significance.12   First,   because   of   the   enduring   relevance   of   oligopolistic  
practices   despite   the   growing   importance   of   global   anti-­‐trust,   corporate   leniency  
programs,   and   competition   law   in   Europe,   United   States   and   elsewhere.13   Second,   and  
even   more   important,   because   the   precedent   of   those   old   and   powerful   cartels   reminds   us  
that   the   combination   of   diplomacy   and   corporate   power   has   been   always   a   matter   of  
‘haute   politique’   as   Theodor   Kreps   formulated   almost   seventy   years   ago,   and   probably  
remains  to  be  so.14    

This   is   something   aptly   identified   by   Claire   Cutler,   in   a   work   in   which   she   briefly  
discuss   six   types   of   private   cooperative   arrangements   which   can   be   understood,   in   the  
context  of  this  chapter,  as  expressive  of  a  new  form  of  corporate  diplomacy:  informal  and  
tacit   industry   norms   and   practices   of   cooperation   amongst   firms;   coordination   services  
firms   devoted   specifically   to   facilitate   such   cooperative   relationships;   production   alliances  
and   subcontractor   relationships;   cartels   to   coordinate   production   outputs   and   prices   in  
spite   of   the   existence   of   anti-­‐trust   law;   business   associations   operating   both   as   self-­‐
regulatory   bodies   and   representative   lobbies;   and   private   international   regimes  
understood   as   a   more   complex   set   of   formal   and   informal   arrangements   which   serve   as  
source  of  governance  of  a  given  economic  area.15    

Bearing  in  mind  these  precedents  we  will  briefly  compare  now  that  understanding  
of   business   or   corporate   diplomacy   that   we   have   just   discussed,   with   those   others   that  
now   circulate   in   global   business   schools,   rapidly   displacing   indeed   older   notions   more  
familiar   to   management   studies   such   as   that   of   ‘public   relations’.16   Although   some  
important   differences   exist,   the   most   salient   aspect   of   all   them   is   that   they   invariably  

11  See  Ulrich  Wassmer,  ‘Alliance  Portfolios:  A  Review  and  Research  Agenda’,  Journal  of  Management,  vol.  36  no.  

1,  2010,  pp.  141-­‐171..  

12   See   Akira   Kudo   and   Terushi   Hara   (eds.),   International   Cartels   in   Business   History,   (Tokyo:   University   of  

Tokyo   Press,1992),   and   Domique   Barjot   (ed.),   International   cartels   revisited.   Vues   nouvelles   sur   les   cartels  
internationaux  (1880-­1980),  (Caen:  Editions  Du  Lys,  1994).  
13  
See   Niklas   Jensen-­‐Eriksen,‘Industrial   Diplomacy   and   Economic   Integration:   The   Origins   of   All-­‐European  
Paper  Cartels,  1959–72’  Journal  of  Contemporary  History,  vol.  46,  no  1,  2011,  pp.  179–202.  
14   See   Theodore   J.   Kreps,   ‘Cartels,   a   Phase   of   Business   Haute   Politique”   The   American   Economic   Review,   vol.   35,  

no.  2,  1945,  pp.  297–311.  

15  See  A.  Claire  Cutler,  ‘Private  international  regimes  and  interfirm  cooperation’,  Bruce  R.  Hall,  and  Thomas  J.  

Biersteker  (eds):  The  Emergence  of  Private  Authority  in  Global  Governance  (Cambridge,  Cambridge  University  
Press,  2002),  pp.  28-­‐29.  
16  See  W.  Pedersen,  `Why  `corporate  PR'  when  `corporate  diplomacy'    flows  more  trippingly    on  the  tongue  and  

is  much  more  accurate?',  Public  Relations  Quarterly,  vol.  51,  no.  3,  2006,  pp.  10-­‐11.    
ignore   any   simple   mention   to   international   cartels   and   any   other   form   of   inter-­‐firm  
cooperation,   as   surely   the   most   important   precedent   of   ‘corporate   diplomacy’   in   the  
contemporary  era.17    

Raymond   Saner   and   his   collaborators   have   produced   one   of   the   most   consistent  
attempts   to   re-­‐conceptualize   diplomacy   taking   in   account   the   increasing   importance   and  
variety   of   both   ‘convergent’   and   ‘divergent’   diplomatic   relationships   between   what   they  
call  ‘state’  and  ‘non-­‐state’  actors  in  the  new  global  realm.  More  interestingly,  they  carefully  
differentiate   ‘corporate’   and   ‘business’   diplomacy,   suggesting   that   while   the   former   shall  
be   reserved   to   corporate   diplomatic   interactions   with   governments   through   its  
subsidiaries  abroad,  the  latest  can  be  better  understood  in  a  wider  societal  sense,  for  the  
purposes   of   corporate   interactions   with   ‘unions,   NGOs,   tribal   leaders,   political   parties’   and  
so   on.   Saner   approach   results   in   an   interesting   picture   of   diplomatic   realm   as   an  
increasingly   complex   network   of   relationship,   but   one   in   which   notions   of   hierarchy,  
either  in  terms  of  power  or  systems  of  law  are  basically  ignored.18    

These  dimensions  are  also  omitted  in  other  influential  works  that  paved  the  grave  in  
management  schools  for  the  emergence  of  a  growing  interest  in  ‘corporate  diplomacy’  that  
prefer  to  adopt  a  distinctive  tone  based  in  ‘value-­‐based’  corporate  strategy  when  dealing  
with  a  growing  variety  of  stakeholders.19  Ulrich  Steger  for  instance  defines  the  field  as  the:  

attempt   to   manage   systematically   and   professionally   the   business   environment   in   such   a  

way  as  to  ensure  that  ‘business  is  done  smoothly’  …  basically  with  an  unquestioned  ‘licence  
to   operate’   and   an   interaction   that   leads   to   mutual   adaptation   between   corporations   and  
society  (in  a  sense  of  co-­‐evolution).  This  does  not  exclude  –on  the  contrary-­‐  free  expression  
and  conflicts  of  interest  and  values,  different  priorities  and  disagreements  about  facts.  After  
all,  this  is  the  core  of  a  democratic  society.20    

Steger  normative  concerns  lead  him  and  his  collaborators  to  conclude  after  considerable  
empirical  research  that  for  corporations’  business  expectations  

17  See  for  instance  Bill  Kte’pi,  ‘Corporate  Diplomacy’  Encyclopedia  of  Business  In  Today's  World,  (London:  Sage,  

2009),  available  at  <http://sage-­‐ereference.com/businesstoday/  Article_n229.html>.  

18  See  Raymond  Saner  and  Lichia  Yiu,  ‘Business-­‐Government-­‐NGO  Relations:  Their  Impact  in  Global  Economic  

Governance’,   Andrew   F.   Cooper,   Brian   Hocking,   and   William   Maley   (eds)   Global   Governance   and   Diplomacy…  
op.  cit.  pp.  85-­‐103;  and  Raymond  Saner,  Mark  Sondergaard  and  Liu  Yiu,  ‘Business  Diplomacy  Management:  A  
Core  Competence  for  Global  Companies’,  Academy  of  Management  Executive,  vol.  14,  no.1,  2000,  pp.  80-­‐92.  
19   See   Manuel   London,   Principled   leadership   and   Business   Diplomacy:   values-­based   strategies   for   management  

development  (London:  Quorum-­‐Greenwood,  1999);  Robert  Trice,  Miyako  Hasegawa,  and  Michael  Kearns  (Ed),  
Corporate  Diplomacy:  Principled  Leadership  for  the  Global  Community  (Washington  DC:  Center  for  Strategic  and  
International  Studies,  1995).  
20   See   Ulrich   Steger,   Corporate   Diplomacy:   The   Strategy   for   a   Volatile,   Fragmented   Business   Environment  

(Sussex:  John  Wiley  &  Sons,  2003),  p.  6.  

 a   soft,   diplomatic   attitude   is   infinitely   better   than   a   hard,   combative   one   in   addressing  
contentious  issues,  regardless  of  the  degree  of  external  pressure.21  

Less   normative   in   content,   and   more   strategically   oriented   is   the   definition   of   ‘corporate  
diplomacy’  offered  by  Enric  Ordeix-­‐Rigo  and  Joao  Duarte,  as    

the   capability   that   some   major   transnational   corporations   develop   to   draft   and   implement  
their   own   programs,   independent   from   the   government’s   initiative,   to   pursue   similar  
diplomatic   aims…a   valid   way   for   organizations   to   extend   their   social   power   and   influence  
and  thus  achieve  their  status  of  institutions  within  society.22    

In   a   quite   similar   vein,   but   more   detailed   and   transparent,   goes   the   definition   provided   by  
Witold  Jerzy  Henisz,  a  Professor  of  the  prestigious  Wharton  School  of  Management,  in  the  
introductory   paragraph   of   a   really   interesting   syllabus   of   his   course   on   ‘corporate  
diplomacy’.  

Successful   practitioners   of   corporate   diplomacy   meld   art   and   skill   in   engaging   external  
stakeholders   to   advance   their   corporate   interests.   They   craft   international   coalitions   of  
stakeholders   spanning   politicians,   regulators,   bureaucrats,   analysts,   investors,   lawyers,  
reporters,  consumers  and  activists.  They  influence  these  stakeholders’  opinions,  perceptions,  
behaviors   and   decisions   so   as   to   secure   a   favorable   policy   outcome,   collective   decision   or  
shift   in   group   opinion   that   enhances   their   corporation’s   ability   to   generate   a   profit   by  
satisfying  a  market  demand.23  

Particularly   interesting   is   also   Gilberto   Sarfati’s   approach   to   the   issue.   This   Brazilian  
scholar  and  practitioner  suggest  that  in  view  of  its  new  global  challenges…  

21   See   Wolfgang   Amann,   Shiban   Khan,   Oliver   Salzmann,   Ulrich   Steger   and   Aileen   Ionescu-­‐Somers,   “Managing  

external  pressures  through  corporate  diplomacy”,   Journal  of  General  Management,  vol.  33,  no.  1,  2011,  pp.  33-­‐
49.  
22   See   Enric   Ordeix-­‐Rigo,   E.,   and   Joao   Duarte,   ‘From   Public   Diplomacy   to   Corporate   Diplomacy:   Increasing  

Corporation's  Legitimacy  and  Influence”,  American  Behavioral  Scientist,  vol.  53,  2009,  pp.  549-­‐564.    
23   It   is   worth   to   reproduce   here   the   practical   cases   to   be   studied   during   that   course:   ‘Newmont   Gold   in  

Fujimori’s   Peru,   Dell’s   negotiations   over   a   new   plant   in   Brazil,   United   Fruit   Company’s   investment   in  
Guatemala,  the  WTO  dispute  between  Bombardier  and  Embraer,  the  development  of  a  gold  mine  in  Indonesia  
by   Canadian   mining   company   Bre-­‐X,   Echelon’s   corporation   strategy   for   influencing   standard   setting   in   the  
European   Union,   creditors   seeking  to  minimize  the  losses  from  their   exposure   to   Thai   Petrochemical   after   the  
East   Asian   crisis,   a   Canadian   gold   mining   company   struggling   with   NGO   opposition   in   Romania,   Ikea’s  
treatment   of   accusations   that   it   was   complicit   in   the   use   of   child   labor   in   the   fabrication   of   rugs   and   the  
development   of   a   water   distribution   company   in   Tanzania’.   See   Witold   Jerzy   Henisz,   ‘Corporate   Diplomacy  
MGMT   720X-­‐Syllabus   2009’,   The   Wharton   School   of   Managament,   University   of   Pennsylvania,   http://www-­‐
management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/.   Interestingly,   the   sole   two   readings   for   students   ‘to   be   complete  
before   first   class’   are:   Edward   Bernays,   ‘The   Engineering   of   Consent’   Annals   of   the   American   Academy   of  
Political   and   Social   Science   no.   250,   1947,   pp.   113-­‐120;   and   Michael   T.   Watkins,   ‘Principles   of   Persuasion’,  
Negotiation  Journal,  vol.  17,  no.  2,  2001,  pp.  115-­‐137.  
 Multinational  companies  need  a  new  kind  of  employee,  the  corporate  diplomat,  able  to  deal  
with  market,  government  and  societal  objectives  of  this  new  corporation.24  

In  sum,  we  can  say  that  current  theoretical  developments  in  ‘corporate  diplomacy’  go  far  
beyond   of   Susan   Strange’s   1992   article   on   ‘Triangular   diplomacy’   that   is   commonly  
depicted   as   the   pioneer   attempt   to   rethink   diplomatic   realm   in   view   of   new   corporate  
power.25  But  same  as  it  happens  with  that  influential  Strange’s  work,  in  spite  of  its  value  
the   discussed   approaches   are   surely   unable   to   grasp   the   complexity   that   the   interplay  
between   public   and   private   power   entails   in   contemporary   global   capitalism.26  
Surprisingly   more   attentive   than   Susan   Strange   –at   this   point-­‐   to   the   realities   of   global  
capitalism,  Paul  Sharp  has  considered  recently  the  implications  for  diplomacy  of  the  rise  of  
corporate   power,   under   the   very   suggestive   rubric   of   ‘greedy   companies   diplomacy’.   After  
considering  the  limits  of  Strange’s  approach,  he  convincingly  contends  that:  

If   economic   actors   are   acquiring   (or   recovering)   some   of   the   characteristics   and   functions  
historically  associated  with  states,  while  states  appear  to  be  disaggregating  intro-­‐enterprise  
like  entities  acquiring  operating  practices  associated  with  private  economic  actors,  then  the  
picture  becomes  even  more  complicated27  

In   view   of   this,   nonetheless   Sharp   suggests   the   convenience   to   avoid   the   temptation   of  
attempting   to   resolve   the   problem   in   terms   of   States   as   being   displaced   by   private  
transnational   networks   conductive   to   a   sort   of   post-­‐diplomatic   world.   In   coherence   with  
his   convictions   on   the   durability   and   unavoidability   of   diplomacy   he   even   foresights   a  
world  in  which  once  the  States  were  fully  displaced  by  private  authorities  a  new  merchant  
diplomacy  a  la  Watson’s  raison  de  système-­‐  would  reborn.28  Sharp’s  stimulating  thoughts  
on   this   can   help   us   to   understand   from   a   diplomatic-­‐theory   point   of   view   the   ultimate  
design  behind  some  audacious  attempts  to  revise  conventional  notions  of  citizenship  not  
through  the  angle  of  global  cosmopolitism,  but  through  the  grammars  of  a  new  corporate  
power   which   feels   himself   able   and   willing   to   displace   State   power   with   its   corresponding  
allegiances.   After   reminding   us   that   ‘transnational   corporations   are   major   global  

24  See  Gilberto  Sarfati,  Manual  de  Diplomacia  Corporativa:  A  Construção  das  Relações  Internacionais  da  Empresa  

(São  Paulo:  Editora  Atlas,  2007).  

25  See  Susan  Strange,  ’States,  Firms  and  Diplomacy’,  International  Affairs,  vol.  68,  1,  1992,  pp.  1-­‐15.  

26   Consider   for   instance,   the   sharp   contrast   between   the   radical   analyses   the   late   Susan   Strange   offered   on   the  

‘retreat   of   the   State’,   and   the   flat   managerial   approach   to   the   interactions   between   public   and   private  
authorities,   that   under   the   rubric   of   ‘triangular   diplomacy’   she   previously   contributed   to   elaborate.   See  
respectively,  J.  Stopford,  S.  Strange  and  J.  Henley,  Rival  States,  Rival  Firms:  Competition  for  World  Market  Shares,  
(New   York:   Cambridge   University   Press,   1991);   and   Susan   Strange,   The   retreat   of   the   State:   the   diffusion   of  
power  in  the  world  economy,  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1996).  
27   See   Paul   Sharp,   Diplomatic   Theory   of   International   Relations,   (Cambridge:   Cambridge   University   Press,  

2009),  p.  238.  

28  Ibidem,  p.  242.  
structures,   many   larger   than   most   nation   states’,   and   considering   the   changing   ‘national  
and   international   organizational’   structures   in   which   they   are   embedded,   Hazel  
Henderson  analyzed  a  decade  ago,  and  in  all  seriousness  ‘how  corporations  are  evolving  to  
address   the   broader   demands   of   their   customers,   shareholders,   employees,   and  
community  stakeholders’  beyond  ‘the  traditional  bottom  line  to  address  issues  of  human  
and   employment   rights,   child   labor,   workplace   safety,   impact   of   technology   and  
environmental   protection’,   adding   that   ‘corporate   responses   to   such   demands   for   good  
global   citizenship’   shall   be   assessed   ‘together   with   the   growth   of   social   and   ethical  
investment   criteria   among   shareholders,   mutual   funs,   and   pension   asset   managers.29   In  
view  of  such  an  ambitious  design,  it  results  less  surprising  perhaps  the  impressive  range  
of  achievements  that  global  corporate  sector  has  gathered  in  the  past  decades,  through  a  
wide  range  of  new  business  diplomatic  practices,30  fostering  a  process  of  displacement  of  
relevance  from  public  to  private  forms  authority  as  the  ultimate  drivers  of  the  new  global  
regulatory  landscape.  

29   See   Hazel   Henderson,   ‘Transnational   Corporations   and   Global   Citizenship’,   American   Behavioral   Scientist,  

vol.   43,   2000,   p.   1231.   For   a   different   view   see   Lisa   Whitehouse,   ‘Corporate   Social   Responsibility,   Corporate  
Citizenship   and   the   Global   Compact:   A   New   Approach   to   Regulating   Corporate   Social   Power?’  Global   Social  
Policy  vol.  3,  2003,  pp.  299  
30  See  James  P.  Muldoon,  ‘The  Diplomacy  of  Business’,  Diplomacy  and  Statecraft,  vol.  16,  2005,  pp.  341-­‐  359.