arsenia

Mala in se v Mala Prohibita:

1. Estrada v Sandigang bayan - The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that
plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the
acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in
se37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law,
especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala
in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though
they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P.
Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.
Facts: Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
On April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution in Criminal Case No. 26558, finding
probable cause that petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then the President of the Philippines has
committed the offense of plunder, and that he be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder). The petitioner contended that RA 7080 was
unconstitutional, on the grounds that 1.) it was vague; 2.) it dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and 3.) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, thus violating the fundamental rights of the
accused. The said law allegedly suffers from vagueness on the terms it uses, particularly:
'combination', 'series', and 'unwarranted'. Based on this, the petitioner used the facial challenge
to question the validity of RA 7080.
Issues:
1. WON the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.
2. WON the fact that the Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes
of plunder leads to its violation of the right of the accused to due process.
3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within
the power of Congress to classify it as such.

Rulings: 3. NO. Plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. The
legislative declaration in RA No. 7659 (which has been declared as constitutionally valid in a
previous ruling) that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se.

2.People of the Phil v Circulado (Distinction): It was from hornbook lore that we absorbed the
distinctions given by text writers, claiming that: (1) mala in se require criminal intent on the part of
the offender; in mala prohibita, the mere commission of the prohibited act, regardless of intent, is
sufficient; and (2) mala in se refer to felonies in the Revised Penal Code, while mala prohibita are
offenses punished under special laws. The first distinction is still substantially correct, but the second
is not accurate. In fact, even in the Revised Penal Code there are felonies which are actually and
essentially mala prohibita. To illustrate, in time of war, and regardless of his intent, a person who
shall have correspondence with a hostile country or territory occupied by enemy troops shall be
punished therefor. 19 An accountable public officer who voluntarily fails to issue the required
receipt for any sum of money officially collected by him, regardless of his intent, is liable for
illegal exaction. 20 Unauthorized possession of picklocks or similar tools, regardless of the possessor's
intent, is punishable as such illegal possession. 21 These are felonies under the Revised Penal Code but
criminal intent is not required therein.
Facts: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
DANIEL QUIJADA Y CIRCULADO, accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada appeals from the decision of 30 September 1993 of Branch 1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol convicting him of the two offenses separately charged in two
informations, viz., murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and illegal possession of firearm
in its aggravated from under P.D. No. 1866, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for
the first crime and an indeterminate penalty ranging from seventeen years, four months, and one day, as
minimum, to twenty years and one day, as maximum, for the second crime

Issue: Where or not the accused is guilty of murder and illegal position of firearms and affirm to the
penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol. Murder and homicide are defined and
penalized by the Revised Penal Code 46 as crimes against persons.

They are mala in se because malice or dolo is a necessary ingredient therefor. On the other hand, the
offense of illegal possession of firearm is defined and punished by a special penal law, P.D. No. 1866. It
is a malum prohibitum which the lawmaker, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, in the exercise of his
martial law powers, so condemned not only because of its nature but also because of the larger policy
consideration of containing or reducing, if not eliminating, the upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public
order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, ammunition,
and explosives. If intent to commit the crime were required, enforcement of the decree and its policy or
purpose would be difficult to achieve. Hence, there is conceded wisdom in punishing illegal possession
of firearm without taking into account the criminal intent of the possessor. All that is needed is intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by law, coupled, of course, by animus possidendi. However, it must be
clearly understood that this animus possidendi is without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent
which an accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm.

the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol convicting him of the two offenses separately charged in two
informations, viz., murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and illegal possession of
firearm in its aggravated from under P.D. No. 1866, and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for the first crime and an indeterminate penalty ranging from seventeen years, four months, and
Court
(Second Division) decided on 27 June 1995
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the challenged decision of 30
September 1993 of Branch 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol finding accused-appellant
DANIEL QUIJADA y CIRCULADO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 and of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated
form in Criminal Case No. 8179 is AFFIRMED.

The penalty which the trial court imposed in Criminal Case No. 8179 for illegal possession of firearm in
its aggravated form must, however, be modified. The penalty prescribed by P.D. No. 1866
is death. Since Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
the penalty next lower in degree, reclusion perpetua, must be imposed.

3.ABSCBN v Duavit In its current form, the Intellectual Property Code is malum prohibitum and
prescribes a strict liability for copyright infringement. Good faith, lack of knowledge of the copyright,
or lack of intent to infringe is not a defense against copyright infringement.
Facts: News or the event itself is not copyrightable. However, an event can be captured and presented in a
specific medium. News as expressed in a video footage is entitled to copyright protection.
The controversy arose from GMA-7's news coverage on the homecoming of OFW and Iraqi militant hostage
victim Angelo dela Cruz. ABS-CBN conducted live audio-video coverage of and broadcasted the arrival
Angelo dela Cruz at the NAIA and the subsequent press conference. ABS-CBN allowed Reuters to air the
footages it had taken earlier under a special embargo agreement. GMA-7 subscribes to Reuters and it received
a live video feed coverage of Angelo dela Cruz' arrival from them. Thereafter, it carried the live newsfeed in its
program "“Flash Report" together with its live broadcast. Allegedly, GMA-7 did not receive any notice or was
not aware that Reuters was airing footages of ABS-CBN. GMA-7's news control room staff saw neither the
"No Access Philippines" notice nor a notice that the video feed was under embargo in favor of ABS-CBN.
ABS-CBN then filed a complaint for copyright infringement.
Issues: 1) Whether there is probable cause to charge respondents with infringement under Republic Act No.
8293, otherwise known as the Intellectual Property Code.

2) Whether criminal prosecution for infringement of copyrightable material, such as live rebroadcast, can be
negated by good faith.
CA: Dismissed
Ruling: 1) Yes. Under the Intellectual Property Code, "works are protected by the sole fact of their creation,
irrespective of their mode or form of expression, as well as of their content, quality and purpose."
An idea or event must be distinguished from the expression of that idea or event. Ideas can be either abstract or
concrete. It is the concrete ideas that are generally referred to as expression. News or the event itself is not
copyrightable. However, an event can be captured and presented in a specific medium. As recognized by this
court in Joaquin, Jr. v. Drilon (G.R. No. 108946, January 28, 1999), television "involves a whole spectrum of
visuals and effects, video and audio." News coverage in television involves framing shots, using images,
graphics, and sound effects. It involves creative process and originality. Television news footage is an
expression of the news. News as expressed in a video footage is entitled to copyright protection.
2) No. Infringement under the Intellectual Property Code is malum prohibitum. The general rule is that acts
punished under a special law are malum prohibitum. "In an act which is malum prohibitum, malice or criminal
intent is completely immaterial." Unless clearly provided in the law, offenses involving infringement of
copyright protections should be considered malum prohibitum. It is the act of infringement, not the intent,
which causes the damage. To require or assume the need to prove intent defeats the purpose of intellectual
property protection
In sum, the trial court erred in failing to resume the proceedings after the designated period. The Court of
Appeals erred when it held that Secretary Agra committed errors of jurisdiction despite its own pronouncement
that ABS-CBN is the owner of the copyright on the news footage. News should be differentiated from
expression of the news, particularly when the issue involves rebroadcast of news footage. The Court of
Appeals also erroneously held that good faith, as. well as lack of knowledge of infringement, is a defense
against criminal prosecution for copyright and neighboring rights infringement. In its current form, the
Intellectual Property Code is malum prohibitum and prescribes a strict liability for copyright infringement.
Good faith, lack of knowledge of the copyright, or lack of intent to infringe is not a defense against copyright
infringement. Copyright, however, is subject to the rules of fair use and will be judged on a case-to-case basis.
Finding probable cause includes a determination of the defendant's active participation, particularly when the
corporate veil is pierced in cases involving a corporation’s criminal liability. More: Thus, unless clearly
provided in the law, offenses involving infringement of copyright protections should be considered malum
prohibitum. It is the act of infringement, not the intent, which causes the damage. To require or assume the
need to prove intent defeats the purpose of intellectual property protection. Nevertheless, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is still the standard for criminal prosecutions under the Intellectual Property Code.

4. Matalam v People of Phil- This case is about the petition for review on Certiorari
assailing the Joint Decision dated April 28, 2015 and Resolution dated November 2,
 2015 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 26707 to 26708. The
Sandiganbayan found petitioner Datu Guimid P. Matalam (Matalam) guilty of non-
remittance of the employer's share in Government Insurance System and Home
Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG Fund) premiums.

Accused: (1) Datu Guimid Matallam – High ranking public officer; Regional
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform-Autnomous Region for Muslim
Mindanao (DAR-ARMM) (2) Ansarry Lawi; and (3) Naimah B. Unte – Both low-
ranking officials cashier and accountant.  Governmental Roles of the
accused/appellants: Collection and remittance ofaccounts to GSIS and PAG-IBIG
fund.

ANSARRY LAWI and NAIMAH UNTE are hereby ACQUITTED ofthis offense.
REASON FOR ACQUITTAL: According to the Sandiganbayan, it is the
employer who is penalized for the non-remittance to Pag-IBIG Fund. (Acquitted
due to lack of basis) o DATU GUIMID MATALAM , being the employer, is found
guilty ofViolation of Section 1, Rule XIII of the Implementing Rules
andRegulations of R.A. No. 7742.

DATU GUIMID MATALAM , being the employer, is found guilty of Violation of

Section 1, Rule XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
7742

Facts: This case is about the petition for review on Certiorari assailing the Joint Decision dated April
28, 2015 and Resolution dated November 2, 2015 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 26707
to 26708. The Sandiganbayan found petitioner Datu Guimid P. Matalam guilty of non-remittance of
the employer's share in Government Insurance System and Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-
IBIG Fund) premiums.
Accused: (1) Datu Guimid Matallam – High ranking public officer; Regional Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform-Autnomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (DAR-ARMM) (2)
Ansarry Lawi; and (3) Naimah B. Unte - Both low- ranking officials cashier and accountant.
➤ Governmental Roles of the accused/appellants: Collection and remittance of accounts to GSIS and
PAG-IBIG fund.
➤ Appellants were subjected to (2) two criminal cases: (1) Criminal Case No. 26707 (Violation of
Sec. 52 (g), Republic Act No. 8291); and (2) Criminal Case No. 26708 (Violation of Sec. 1, Rule XIII
of the Implementing Rules & Regulations of Republic Act No. 7742)
CASE 1: Criminal Case No. 26707 Some time in 1997 – Cotabato City, Maguindanao Maguindanao
– the accused (Datu, Ansarry, and Naimah) involved in the remittance of accounts GSIS failed/refused
to pay or remit PHP 2,418,577.33 representing DAR-Provincial Office-Maguindanao for the period of
January 1997 to June 1998 to GSIS.
DATU GUIMID MATALAM, ANSARRY LAWI and NAIMAH UNTE found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 52(g) of R.A. No. 8291.
CASE 2: ➤ Criminal Case No. 26708:
-
O Sometime in 1997 – Cotabato City, Maguindanao – the accused (Datu, Ansarry, and Naimah)
involved in the remittance of accounts to Home Development Mutual Fund (PAG-IBIG) failed/refused
to pay or remit PHP 149,100.00 representing DAR-Provincial Office-Maguindanao for the period of
January 1997 to June 1998 to GSIS.
o They refused to pay or remit despite the notice from GSIS.
ANSARRY LAWI and NAIMAH UNTE are hereby ACQUITTED of this offense. REASON FOR
AQCUITTAL: According to the Sandiganbayan, it is the employer who is penalized for the non-
remittance to Pag-IBIG Fund. (Acquitted due to lack of basis)
O DATU GUIMID MATALAM, being the employer, is found guilty of Violation of Section 1,
Rule XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7742.
Issue: Issue:
(1) WON there is a conspiracy involved in the crime?
(2) WON petitioner Datu Guimid P. Matalam is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of non-remittance of
the employer's share of the GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums.
Ruling: 1) YES. Conspiracy exists.
(2) YES. Petitioner, Datu Matalam is liable for the non-remittance of the contributions to GSIS and
Pag-IBIG Fund.

5. Dungo v Sibal & People: The fraternal contract should not be signed in blood,
celebrated with pain, marred by injuries, and perpetrated through suffering.
That is the essence of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049 or the Anti-Hazing Law of
1995. During a planned initiation rite and being then officers and members of
Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or
less twenty other members and officers, whose identity is not yet known, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal
violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof
and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to
physical harm, resulting to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs
of the victim. (Alpha Phi Omega)

Relevance: Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves
called acts mala in se; and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that
positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita. This distinction is important
with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the
subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita,
the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of
the offender is immaterial.64 When the doing of an act is prohibited by law, it is
considered injurious to public welfare, and the doing of the prohibited act is the
crime itself.65

The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is
the determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the
punishable act or .omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se,- on the
contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission
b)". reasons of public policy, then it is mala prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or
not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. The crime
of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum.

Recognizing the malum prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law provides that any
person charged with the said crime shall not be entitled to the mitigating
circumstance that there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong. 87 Also, the
framers of the law intended that the consent of the victim shall not be a defense in
hazing. WHY? That the defense of consent will not apply because the very act of
inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable act. The
result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely aggravates the act
with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the criminal
nature of the act.

The study of the provisions of R.A. No. 8049 shows that, on paper, it is complete and
robust in penalizing the crime of hazing. It was made malum prohibitum to discount
criminal intent and disallow the defense of good faith. It took into consideration the
different participants and contributors in the hazing activities. While not all acts cited
in the law are penalized, the penalties imposed therein involve various and serious
terms of imprisonment to discourage would-be offenders. Indeed, the law against
hazing is ideal and profound. As to whether the law can be effectively implemented,
the Court begs to continue on the merits of the case.

Facts:

 Marlon Villanueva was a neophyte of the Alpha Phi Omega fraternity.

 On January 14, 2006 at Villa Novaliches, Calamba City, Laguna, Dandy Dungo and
Gregorio Sibal Jr. together with other Alpha Phi Omega fraternity members and officers
held an initiation rite.
 During said rite, Villanueva was subjected to physical harm leading to his death.
 Dungo and Sibal were charged with violation of RA 8049 or the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995. The
RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC explained that despite
the fact that there was no evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated in inflicting physical harm
to Villanueva, their aid in inducing Villanueva to attend the initiation rite and bringing him to
the location was indispensable.
 Dungo and Sibal appealed but the CA upheld the ruling of the RTC.
 Hence, they appealed to the Supreme Court.
 Dungo and Sibal argued that the information charged them as “they did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon [Villanueva].” Yet, both the
RTC and CA found them guilty of violating RA 8049 because "they induced the victim to be
present during the initiation rites.” Since inducement is not included in the crime of hazing by
actual participation, they cannot be convicted of a crime noit stated or necessarily included in
the information They contend that this is a violation of their right to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against them.
 Dungo and Sibal argued that the information charged them as "they did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon
[Villanueva].” Yet, both the RTC and CA found them guilty of violating RA 8049
because "they induced the victim to be present during the initiation rites." Since
inducement is not included in the crime of hazing by actual participation, they
cannot be convicted of a crime noit stated or necessarily included in the
information. They contend that this is a violation of their constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them.
ISSUE: W/N Dungo and Sibal can be convicted of the crime of hazing under RA 8049.

Ruling: The SC ruled that Dungo and Sibal can be convicted of violation of RA 8049 despite the
lack of evidence in their direct participation.
The crime of hazing RA 8049 is a mala prohibita. The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral,
but the law deems the same to be against public policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the
existence of criminal intent is immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith
cannot be raised in its prosecution.
The argument of Dungo and Sibal that they were not properly informed of the accusation against
 them was also not accepted by the court. According to the Rules of Court', the information need not
use the exact language of the statute in alleging the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge
against him, and the court to render judgment properly.
Sec. 9, Rule 110: Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying
and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
The court said that the act of inducing the victim to attend the initiation rite is necessarily part of a
"planned initiation rite." Not only did they induce the victim, they also brought him to the location.
They fulfilled their role in the planned hazing rite which led to the death of the victim.
Furthermore, RA8049 provides that the presence of any person during the hazing is a prima facie
evidence of participation as principal unless he prevented the commission of the punishable act .

Notes:

RA 8049
Hazing - an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a
fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant in some
embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and
other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological
suffering or injury.
Elements of hazing:
1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership
in a fraternity, sorority or organization;
2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or
organization; and
3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating
situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities
or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.
Mala in se v. Mala Prohibita// Mala in se- Intent governs. As long as there is intent, the
person can be charged of the corresponding crime. If the punishable act or omission is
immoral in itself. it is mala in se.
Mala Prohibita// Sole question is has the law been violated? When the person did the
prohibited act considered by law to be injurious to public welfare, he can be charged of the
corresponding crime. If the act or omission is not immoral in itself but there is a law
prohibiting it.

6.ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents

This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 245471that affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court 2of
Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, for violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act
No. 6646.3
During the May 8, 1995 elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos, Province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B. Garcia, Municipal Treasurer
Herminio R. Romero, Public School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman,
Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de
Vera, conspiring with, confederating together and mutually helping each other, did,
then and there, willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes received by senatorial
candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel,.

Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the
violation of an election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita. The main
issue is, is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in
se or mala prohibita? Could good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

 Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal
Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are
deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. 8Accordingly,
criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the
crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that
are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become
punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes,
the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. 9Criminal intent is not
necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.

 Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 664611provides: SEC. 27. Election

Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated
in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the
following shall be guilty of an election offense: (b) Any member of the board of
election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or
decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any
member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and hearing, to
credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.12For otherwise, even
errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable.
Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of
time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent
of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally
increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently
immoral since it is done with malice and intent to injure.
Facts: GARCIA V CA & People of the Philippines
Petition seeks for the review of judgement of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
Affirming conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan - violation of Section 27(b)
of Republic Act No. 6646.
Note: Republic Act No. 6646 section 27 (b) from the Official Gazette read as follows:
AN ACT INTRODUCING ADDITIONAL REFORMS IN THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
SEC. 27. Election Offenses.—In addition to the prohibited acts and election offenses enumerated in Sections 261
and 262 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the
votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after proper verification and
hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial elections, an
information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio R.
Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and petitioner, with violation of Section 27(b).
Within Canvassing period in election in Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Accused Election Officer Arsenia
B. Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman,
Vice-Chairman, and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Alaminos,
Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, conspiring with each other, unlawfully decreased the
votes received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six thousand nine hundred ninety-eight
(6,998) votes to one thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the Statement of Votes by
Precincts, a difference of five thousand seventy-seven (5,077) votes.
The RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner Garcia who was convicted
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however, accused
Arsenia B. Garcia is not entitled to probation; further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office
and she is also deprived of her right of suffrage. Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed
with modification the RTC Decision.
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed with
modification, increasing the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year.
Grounds: Secretary Viray merely relied on what the petitioner (as chairman) dictated, and that it could not also be
the tabulator since petitioner was the one who read the adding tape.
Petitioner did not produce the said tapes during the trial. Petitioner was the one who entered the reduced figure of
1,921 in the Certificate of Canvass (COC) when it is the duty of the Secretary of the board. The reduction of votes
of the candidate was clearly not willful or intentional.

Issue: Whether the is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646, classified under mala in se or mala
prohibita
Whether good faith and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses
Note: mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of are
inherently immoral. Whereas on the other hand in mala prohibita the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but
become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden are forbidden.
Ruling: Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. Even errors and mistakes committed due to
overwork and fatigue would be punishable. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election
canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is
inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.
The Court has consistently held that factual findings of the trial court, as well as of the Court of Appeals are final
and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the
appellate court on the matter coincide.
The instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioner's conviction but
increasing the minimum penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six months is AFFIRMED
 G. G. Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Enact Penal Laws

1. Equal Protection- City Manila v Hon. Laguio Jr.

Facts:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business
of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was
licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. MTDC filed a Petition
with the lower court, praying the Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid
exercise of police power and it constitute a denial of equal protection under the law.
Enacted by the City Council, on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March 1993, the
said Ordinance is
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN
THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
In the decision rendered by Judge Laguio declared the Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of 1993, of the City of
Manila null and void. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issues:
Whether or not there was a violation of due process.
Whether or not there was a violation of equal protection clause.
Whether or not the City of Manila validly exercised police power.

HELD:
The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law. .. ."(Section 1, Article III)
1. Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has an adequate reason
for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other words, substantive due process looks to
whether there is a sufficient justification for the government's action. Case law in the United States
(U.S.) tells us that whether there is such a justification depends very much on the level of scrutiny used.
For example, if a law is in an area where only rational basis review is applied, substantive due process is
met so long as the law is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. But if it is an area where
strict scrutiny is used, such as for protecting fundamental rights, then the government will meet
substantive due process only if it can prove that the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government
purpose. The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot
be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation
or restriction demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law,
particularly those forming part of the Bill of Rights. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law
in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
2. The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since the requisites for a valid exercise of police power
are not met. The prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the
social and welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution,
adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual diseases in Manila. It is baseless and
insupportable to bring within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night
clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. These are lawful
pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. It is readily apparent that
the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental
interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to liberty
and property.
3. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated
differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others. The guarantee
means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by
other persons or other classes in like circumstances. The "equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the
protection of equal laws." It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to
artificial persons but only insofar as their property is concerned.

2. Due process – substantive due process – procedural due process (Hildawa v

Minister of Defense)
 Due process of law requires that the accused must be heard in court of
competent jurisdiction, proceeded against under the orderly process of law,
and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him. with an
opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a
constitutional law. (Ong Chang Wing vs. U.S., 40 Phil. 1049)

(Substantive due process is based on the premise that the constitution

protects the public from unwarranted government intrusion infringing upon
their fundamental rights. If the government passes a law that infringes on life,
liberty, or property rights, a substantive due process analysis must be performed.
Procedural due process limits state and government power by requiring certain
procedures to be followed in both criminal and civil matters.)

Sections 1, 17,19, 20 and 21 of Article III (Bill of Rights)

Was there an international human rights law cited in the case? None [Reason:
because this case transpired during the Marcos administration (1965-1986)]
Facts: Isidro Hildawa v. Ministry of Defense
Petitioners Isidro T. Hildawa and Ricardo C. Valmonte in these Special Civil Actions pray that a "preliminary
injunction issue directing respondents to recall the crimebusters and restraining them from fielding police teams
or any of this sort with authority/license to kill and after hearing, declaring the order of respondents fielding
crimebusters null and void and making the injunction permanent." They alleged that the formation and fielding
of secret marshals and/or crimebusters with absolute authority to kill thieves, holduppers, robbers, pickpockets
and slashers are violative of the provisions of the New Constitution under Sections 1, 17,19, 20 and 21 of Article
III (Bill of Rights).
Issues: Whether or not the creation and deployment of special operations team to counter the resurgence of
criminality is violative of the provisions of the Constitution.
Cases: There is nothing wrong in the creation and deployment of special operation teams to counter the
resurgence of criminality, as there is nothing wrong in the formation by the police of special teams/squads to
prevent the proliferation of vices, prostitution, drug addiction, pornography and the like. That is the basic job of
the police.
It is the alleged use of violence in the implementation of the objectives
of the special squads that the court is concerned about. What is bad is if kill these "criminals" because then they
are not only law enforcers but also the prosecutors, the judges and the executioners. For, if in maintaining peace
and order, the peace of becomes the person to be feared the citizen will find himself between the criminal and the
lawless public official. Violence does not find support in a democratic society where the rule of law prevails.
It is our way of life that a man is entitled to due process which simply means that before he can be deprived of
his life, liberty or property, he must be given an opportunity to defend himself. Due process of law requires that
the accused must be heard in court of competent jurisdiction, proceeded against under the orderly process of law,
and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him with an opportunity to be heard, and a
judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law.

3. Bill of Attainder (People v Ferrer)

Facts:
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill
of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an
officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to
public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being
members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by
Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that
1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge
2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial.
3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness. The Anti
Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing
membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an
organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and
other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4
provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable.
* Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to
filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for
2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of
membership to the CCP through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its
valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.

Issues: WON RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

Ruling: NO. The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative
act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination
of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute
specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is
also an ex post facto law.)
In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for
purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having
the same purpose and their successors. The Act's focus is on the conduct not person.
Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to
further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is
punishable. This is the required proof of a member's direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership
renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.
Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The
members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by
renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the
necessary changes having been made.

Notes: 3. Bill of Attainder (People v Ferrer)

Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion

Act RA 1700- Anti-Subversive Act- 1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other
"subversive associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts
affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar "subversive"
organization. Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial
trial does it become a bill of attainder.

Expost facto law// Cases on estafa: People v Sandiganbayan / People v

Villaranza

4.Non-imposition of cruel and unusual punishment and excessive fines (Republic v

Dela Merced and Sons, G.R., )

Case: For a penalty to be considered obnoxious to the Constitution, it needs to be

more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe.58 To come
under the prohibition, the penalty must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive 59 or so
disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all
reasonable persons as to what is right and proper under the circumstances. 60 Dela
Merced & Sons failed to satisfy these jurisprudential standards. (Fines in the case-
₱3,980,000 (three million nine hundred eighty thousand pesos).

Facts: The Guadalupe Commercial Complex is a commercial building owned and operated by Dela
Merced & Sons. Situated alongside the Pasig River, the complex operates a wet market and houses
eateries or kitchenettes in the same building.
On 13 July 2006, the Environmental Management Bureau-National Capital Region (EMB-NCR) of the
DENR inspected the Guadalupe Commercial Complex, owned and operated by Dela Merced & Sons.
The inspection team found that Dela Merced & Sons had violated the following: 1) Section 1 of DENR
Administrative Order No. 2004-26 for operating air pollution source installations (generator set) without
a permit to operate; and 2) Section 27(i) of R.A. 9275 for operating a facility that discharged regulated
water pollutants without a discharge permit.
On 11 October 2006, the EMB-NCR conducted another inspection of the Guadalupe Commercial
Complex to monitor Dela Merced & Sons' compliance with R.A. 8749 (The Clean Air Act of 1999) and
R.A. 9275, as well as their respective Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRRs).
On 6 February 2007, the DENR Secretary, upon the recommendation of the EMB-NCR, issued a cease
and desist order (CDO) to Dela Merced & Sons for violation of R.A. 9275 and the IRR thereof.
On 3 April 2007. Dela Merced & Sons filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the imposition of the
CDO and submitted the required documents for the issuance of a TLO. 14 The DENR-PAB issued the
TLO on 3 July 2007.
By 14 November 2007, another effluent sampling was conducted. The findings showed that the effluent
conformed to the DENR Effluent Standards. Thus, the DENR-PAB issued a Notice of Technical
Conference to Dela Merced & Sons for a discussion of the imposition of fines during the period of
violation of R.A. 9275. Attached to the notice was an initial computation of the fine in the total amount
of P3.98 million. The notice also directed Dela Merced & Sons to submit its position paper regarding the
fine.
The fine covered the alleged 398 days that Dela Merced & Sons had violated R.A. 9275. The rate was
P10,000 per day of violation in accordance with Sec. 28 of the law. The period covered was from 12
October 2006-when the collected effluent from the facility failed the DENR Effluent Standards-to 13
November 2007, which marked the end of the period when, by the next day, the sampling gathered by
the EMB-NCR had already passed the DENR Standards.

Issues: Whether or not the imposition of excessive fines can be collaterally attacked.

Ruling: No.
The contention of Dela Merced & Sons is that Section 2850 of R.A. 9275 violates Section 19 (1), Article
III of the Constitution, because the former section provides for the imposition of excessive fines.
We note at the outset that Dela Merced & Sons' attempt to assail the constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A.
9275 constitutes a collateral attack. This is contrary to the rule that issues of constitutionality must be
pleaded directly. Unless a law is annulled in a direct proceeding, the legal presumption of the law's
validity remains.
Nevertheless, even if the issue of constitutionality was properly presented, Dela Merced & Sons still
failed to satisfy the fourth requisite for this Court to undertake a judicial review. Specifically, the issue of
constitutionality of Sec. 28 of R.A. 9275 is not the lis mota of this case.
The lis mota requirement means that the petitioner who questions the constitutionality of a law must
show that the case cannot be resolved unless the disposition of the constitutional question is unavoidable.
onsequently, if there is some other ground (i.e. a statute or law) upon which the court may rest its
judgment, that course should be adopted and the question of constitutionality avoided.
In this case, Dela Merced & Sons failed to show that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the
constitutional issue it has raised is resolved. Hence, the presumption of constitutionality of Sec. 28 of
R.A.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition in G.R. No. 201501 is GRANTED. The Ruling of the
 Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 107626 dated 30 June 2011 and its Resolution on 18 April 2012,
are hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as to the amount of fine imposed.

Note: On the modification of the amount of fine imposed:

At the rate of P10,000 per day of violation, the fine was computed by the PAB in the
amount of P3.98 million, which covered the period of 12 October 2006 (when the
collected effluent from the facility failed the DENR standards) to 13 November 2007
(the day before the effluent sampling was gathered, which eventually passed the
DENR standards)—a total of 398 days.
On the other hand, the CA reduced the fine to P2.63 million, because the period of
violation it considered covered only 263 days-from 12 October 2006 to 3 July 2007
(the date of issuance of the TLO). The CA reduced the fine in view of EMB-NCR's
"unreasonable delay" in complying with the order in the TLO to conduct the effluent
sampling of the company's Wastewater Treatment Facility.