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PDF SEPT 9 FINAL Mario Bergner DOC On Narcissim, With Revisions in BOLD TEXT
PDF SEPT 9 FINAL Mario Bergner DOC On Narcissim, With Revisions in BOLD TEXT
PDF SEPT 9 FINAL Mario Bergner DOC On Narcissim, With Revisions in BOLD TEXT
Abstract
Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Christian anthropology, and Otto Kernberg and Heinz Kohut’s object re-
lations modalities offer theological and psychological insights for arriving at an integrated provi-
sional definition of narcissism from these two disciplines. Psychology provides intellectual in-
sights and natural means for approaching such a definition. Likewise, theology employs these,
but also contributes supernatural identifiers for our understanding. Pannenberg’s Christian an-
thropology of personhood asserts human beings experience the Fall as an unnatural narcissistic
disturbance. According to Christian theology, we see only reflected features of our humanity, and
are never fully known this side of eternity (see 1 Cor. 13:12). Psychology, through its continuing
research and redefinition of various disorders, attests current diagnoses are not comprehensive
but await further research. Hence, even the provisional definition here proposed is an approxima-
tion. This is a phenomenological definition to be used as a starting point for understanding nar-
tion, not a label to be feared, which I hope opens new doors for pastoral and psychological tre-
atments.
Keywords: das Ich, ego, egocentric, entfremdung, hominization, introjection, libido, nar-
The goal of this paper is to answer that question in the affirmative vis-à-vis an interdisciplinary
dialogue between the theological anthropology of Wolfhart Pannenberg1 and the psychoanalyti-
cal object relations schools of Otto F. Kernberg2 and Heinz Kohut.3 The purpose of such a provi-
sional definition is to provide pastoral care givers and Christian therapists a shared entry point
and psychology.
1 Pannenberg (b.1928-d.2014) earned his first doctorate in 1953 at the University of Hei-
delberg with a dissertation on John Duns Scotus’ view of election. He then studied under Karl
Barth at the University of Basel, where in 1955 he was awarded his habilitationschrift (a second
doctoral thesis required to teach in German universities). There, he researched the role of analo-
tiago de Chile, Facultad de Medicina. He was influenced by Melanie Klein’s British school of
object-relations theory and his modality of object relations drew praise from Klein before her
Vienna and in 1950 earned a second doctorate from the Chicago Institute of Psychoanalysis.
A THEOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROVISIONAL DEFINITION OF NARCISSISM Page !4
My opening question, which inquires about a provisional definition of narcissism, frames part of
the answer. Namely, providing a definitive definition is not my task. Rather, what is here offered
experienced by all human beings. It my hope that such a definition will elicit compassion from
my reader about the various experiences of narcissistic disturbances all humans experience, to
some degree. I begin with a look at theological anthropology followed by an introduction to Pan-
nenberg. Then what follows is a review of three psychological typologies of narcissism and a
Theological anthropology offers a variety of answers to the question of the state of person-
regard to the material understanding of what it means to be a person, but also with
attempted to ignite an interdisciplinary discussion between religion and human nature in the aca-
demy. Twenty years after ATP was published he lamented, “But in the secularist climate of our
culture such a discussion did not develop” (Pannenberg, 2006, p. 190). Part of my purpose here
is to bring his theological anthropology into conversation with the 21st-century psychological
continued relevance in the post-modern context of the 21st-century by at least two Christian theo-
logians, F. Leon Shults (1999) and Stanley J. Grenz (1999, 2005). Moreover, Pannenberg’s canon
logy such as Colin E. Gunton (1990), Christoph Schwöbel (1991) and Alister E. McGrath (2001).
Therefore, I think another attempt to bring Pannenberg’s Christian anthropology into conversati-
ons for personhood within Christian anthropology, likewise, there are a multitude of definitions
of narcissism in psychology.
sism arranged into numerous typologies. Freud (1914) divided narcissism into two forms: normal
and pathological (p. 66). His division is widely adopted as two poles that delineate narcissism in
gradations from syntonic to dystonic along a continuum. I offer the reader a review of three typo-
• Ben Bursten (1973) claims there are four gradations of narcissism: craving, paranoid,
• Theodore Millon (1995) offers six: normal, unprincipled, amorous, compensatory, eli-
bances, offers five: healthy, extraordinary, arrogant, shy and psychopathic (p. 72).
When one takes into consideration Freud’s dual typology alongside the three typologies
mentioned above (which is not an exhaustive list) we are confronted with a plethora of formula-
tions about narcissism, each with nuanced claims about its definitions. Kernberg and Kohut both
adopt Freud’s two-fold classification of narcissism as normal or pathological and remain au cou-
attested by the authoritative place they occupy in nearly all contemporary scholarship and clini-
cal modalities for treating narcissistic disturbances.5 Ronningstam (2005) notes that Kernberg’s
4 In 1988 Ronningstam earned her Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Stock-
holm with a thesis on narcissistic disturbances. She is associate clinical professor of psychology
in the Harvard Medical School Department of Psychiatry. The bulk of Ronningstam’s research is
published in journals. She argued for the retaining of Narcissistic Personality Disorder in the
fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual published by the American Psychiatric As-
thoritative by many contemporary therapists known for treating narcissistic disturbances as at-
tested to by Lowen (1985, 2f), Moberly (1985, 60f), Johnson (1987, 12f), Masterson (1988, 239),
object relations ego-psychology “has been the most useful perspective applicable to a broad vari-
ety of [narcissistic phenomena] (p. 19).” She credits Kohut’s object relations self-psychology as
treatment of narcissistic patients” (ibid). Kernberg’s and Kohut’s psychoanalytical schemata are
significant modalities incorporated into Ronningstam’s (1998, 2005) multimodal approach for
From what I have stated above, my choice of Pannenberg, Kernberg and Kohut for arri-
narcissism are flooded with a plethora of voices , delimiting my sources to three representative
authoritative.
• Third, nearly all psychologists researching narcissism cite Kernberg and Kohut as au-
thoritative.
• Fourth, the scholarship of Pannenberg, Kernberg and Kohut have continued relevancy
To aid my reader in understanding the definition of narcissism that unfolds below, I now
articulate my methodology. I derive it from two strata of reality: nature and super-nature. My ar-
gument is fourfold:
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• First, I commence with the natural view beginning with Ovid’s classic myth Metamor-
phoses and followed by Freud’s 1914 foundational work On Narcissism from dynamic psy-
chology.
• Second, I take into consideration the supernatural Christian view, beginning with Pan-
nenberg’s insights about how the Fall caused a narcissistic bent in the human person, which he
• Third, I return to the natural view taking into consideration Kernberg’s and Kohut’s in-
• Fourth, I take into account both the natural and supernatural viewpoints by integrating
The provisionality of all theological and psychological truth rests on the fact that there is
always more to be learned, and that no statement about the human condition is ever comprehen-
sive. As I construct this provisional definition of narcissism, it is highlighted in grey, and each
The early and well-known literary character that gives narcissism its name is found in
Ovid’s (AD 8) Metamorphoses. Gazing at a reflection of himself, Narcissus, the beautiful youth
declares, “I burn with love for myself, I am the one who fans the flame and bears the torture” (as
translated in Morford & Lenardon 1977, p. 215). In this Greek myth love is turned inward on the
self and proves tortuous: it leads Narcissus to self-destruction. Hence, from Ovid we find the first
mal narcissism is an infantile state of the ego, one in which the child’s demands for legitimate
needs, such as feeding and love, are externally met. In this seminal work for all future psycholo-
gy, he employed the term das Ich (literally ‘the I” meaning the whole person), which is the Ger-
man translation for the Latin ego. As a caveat, it should be noted that Freud’s 1914 anthropology
divided the human psyche into two spheres: conscious and unconscious. It was only after 1923,
when he reworked his theory of the human psyche into the tripartite id-ego-superego that confu-
sion about his use of the term ego began. His use of ego may mean both a feature of the human
psyche and the entire human person. For Freud, normal narcissism is natural and should gradual-
ly diminish as a person passes through psycho-sexual stages of human development, while re-
solving attendant conflicts. Successful encounters with external objects, primarily people, but
needs are met. However, if these stages are not successfully accomplished, the external reach of
natural or normal narcissism becomes abnormal by turning inward on das Ich. Kernberg sheds
withdrawal of libido from the external world); and 4) with reference to a type of
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object choice wherein the object is selected because it represents what the subject
Kernberg’s reading of Freud indicates one form of normal narcissism (#2), and three forms of
pathological narcissism (#1, #3 and #4). This is congruent with Freud’s comments that normal
The libido [the survival and sexual instinct manifesting in various ways during
psycho-sexual development] withdrawn from the outer world has been directed on
to the ego [das Ich meaning the whole person] and giving rise to a state we may
The term libido is used here in a broad sense to mean more than sexual desire and includes plea-
suring love that is not erotic. Narcissism is what manifests when ones entire personhood replaces
other people as the object of love. He declares, “They are plainly seeking themselves as a love-
object and their type of object choice is narcissistic” (p. 405). A rhetorical question emerges from
Kernberg’s reading of Freud. Namely, “Is not schizophrenia (#3), a disorder indicating a patho-
logical break with reality, radically different from mere confusion in object choice (#4), or what
was considered sexual perversion over one hundred years ago in 1914 (#1)?” Perhaps, this ex-
plains why various typologies of narcissism have developed (e.g. Bursten’s, Millon’s and Ron-
narcissism is indeed an abnormality. But, all abnormal occurrences of narcissism do not indicate
a departure from reality as in schizophrenia. The clinical term pathological could easily cause my
reader to think the definition of narcissism here proposed is applicable to a small sample of peo-
ple, such as those who occupy the far right slope of a bell curve. So where appropriate, I use ab-
A THEOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROVISIONAL DEFINITION OF NARCISSISM Page !11
normal instead of pathological to refer to the narcissism that continues beyond the normal nar-
Narcissism is a natural state of requesting love from others, which becomes ab-
normal by turning inward, seeking pleasure and withdrawn from other people.
Kernberg’s and Kohut’s schools of object relations define narcissism within the parame-
ters of Freud’s two categories of normal and pathological. Given that Pannenberg also utilizes
Freud’s basic two-fold definition of narcissism, especially when discussing the fallen condition
within our natural environment, I turn to his theological assertions about narcissism before ad-
Pannenberg on Narcissism: The Whole Person Shut-Up on Themselves with a Wearing Anxiety
level he agrees with Freud’s assessment that it is related to “the primary narcissistic pleasure ego
of infancy” (Pannenberg 1984, p.107). This form of narcissism is referred to as primary or nor-
mal narcissism, since it concerns the child’s legitimate need for well-being. However, Pannen-
berg never gives credence to Freud’s claim that the pleasure being sought is indeed infantile li-
bido. Rather he asserts the pleasure here is the child’s instinctual need for preservation, such as
nal bellowing demand for self-security beyond genuine need. In his theological framework, this
is an egocentricity that has its primary etiological source in the breech between humanity and
God at the Fall. In other words, for Pannenberg, normal narcissism always leads to abnormal
narcissism because humans are shaped into persons by both the natural world and the supernat-
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ural effects of the Fall. He asserts that the effect of the Fall on all human beings is alienation
from our destiny as persons made according to the Image of God (see Pannenberg 1991, p. 217).
Moreover, he adds that consequently all humans are impaired in trusting God (see Pannenberg
1985, p.106). This loss of relational trust in God caused an injurious effect upon the first-person
created in God’s Image: the distortion of original selfhood. Pannenberg postulates a phenomeno-
the entire person within itself (ibid, p. 109), orbits around itself (Pannenberg 1971, p. 64), and –
because it is no longer defined in relation to God – clings to its finiteness (Pannenberg 1971, p.
64).
In addition to clinging to finiteness, Pannenberg (1985) asserts humans suffer from alien-
ated dread-laden anxiety (entfremdung in German) and a painful awareness of the whole person
“wearing on itself” (p. 83). Entfremdung is an anxious alienation from God, self, others and even
society. Dread includes anxiety about the self in the future and is distinct from anxiety that is
simply about fearing future. For example, the fear of war breaking out in the future is cause for
anxiety, but the fear of dying in that war is a cause for dread-laden anxiety. The dread-laden anx-
iety of entfremdung, for Pannenberg, constitutes the imprisonment of the entire person within the
self and “has no external object” (ibid. p. 96). He asserts entfremdung is a central organizing fea-
ture of the fallen human condition and also results in egocentric self-care. This is self-preserva-
tion that seeks security in human finite existence, over and against basic trust in God. Josef
Pieper (1966) offers a clarifying insight to Pannenberg’s discussion of narcissism by adding that
at the Fall humans acquired a “selfish self-preservation” (italics mine, p. 148) that demands com-
plete personal self-serving control over the regulation of ones life. This is to be contrasted with
A THEOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROVISIONAL DEFINITION OF NARCISSISM Page !13
“selfless self-preservation”, which Pieper asserts is only possible as a virtue after human beings
are born from above in Jesus Christ. Such selfless self-preservation may include personal atten-
tion to ones health out of magnanimous self-respect because we are bearers of God’s Image. It
may also include self-preservation for the purpose of longevity for the virtue of responsibly in
caring for those entrusted to our love, such as a spouse, children and aging parents. Pannenberg’s
abnormal by turning inward, seeking pleasure and withdrawn from other peo-
ple. Supernaturally, it is a state of alienation from God, self and others due to
As you will read below, at least four of Pannenberg’s insights into the supernatural etiology and
phenomenon of narcissism correspond with some of Kernberg’s and Kohut’s natural insights.
2. Alienation.
3. Dread-laden anxiety.
Hence, I now turn to a rudimentary look at Kernberg’s and Kohut’s definitions of narcissism and
Kernberg utilizes two working definitions of abnormal narcissism from Freud’s later psy-
choanalytical theory. The first is narcissism as “the libidinal investment of the self” (Kernberg in
Ronningstam, (ed) 1998, p. 30). The second is an expanded version of that definition with the
addition of aggression. His definition of narcissism implies something about personhood as well
as objects and instincts. He asserts that abnormal narcissism, which he calls secondary, organizes
human personhood in a context where love turns inward with aggressivity that like libido is in-
Kohut (1971) identifies the primary feature of abnormal narcissism as the grandiose self
and explains, “Narcissism, within my general outlook, is defined not by the target of the instinc-
tual investment [e.g. whether it is introjected toward the subject himself or directed to other peo-
ple] but by the nature or quality of the instinctual charge” (p. 26). By nature or quality, Kohut
articulates it is the kind of satisfaction a person experiences that classifies narcissism as normal
or abnormal. For Kohut, then, abnormal narcissism is not only about over investment in an in-
stinct – namely libido. It is also about the positive personal satisfaction the person experiences
when investing in the instinct. If investing in the instinct was negative, and held no satisfaction,
it seems Kohut would not consider it to be narcissistically charged. He does not consider aggres-
sion to be involved in narcissism, perhaps because aggression is not generally positively experi-
enced. Kohut’s definition of narcissism is similar to that of Augustine’s (413). Namely, that of a
human being “becom[ing] an end unto itself” (p. 273) with the focus on its “own satisfaction” (p.
273). While Kohut does not include aggressivity, he does add self satisfaction to the equation.
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Kernberg and Kohut locate the etiological and phenomenological center of narcissism in
at least six constitutive features, with four (#2, #4, #5 & #6) sharing correspondence with Pan-
nenberg’s:
1. The Freudian concept of the ego (entire person) instinctively seeking pleasure (li-
bido) in infancy is also called innate primary narcissism (Kernberg in Ronningstam (ed)
1998, p. 31).
2. A profound relational injury (Kohut 1971, p. 13) that causes a deleterious disruption
berg 1975, p. 263f: Kohut 1971, p. 7) (c.f. Pannenberg’s #1 above — injurious loss of rela-
tional connection).
3. A continued introjection of both libido and aggressivity (Kernberg 1975, p. 342; Ko-
4. A rupturing between an object-choice such as a primary care giver like mother or fa-
ther and the self, resulting in lonely detachment (c.f. Pannenberg’s #2 above — alienation).
5. The object choice is now invested with powerful negative emotional energy – mani-
festing as hatred, anxiety, depression, and rage (c.f. Pannenberg’s #3 above — dread-laden
anxiety).
6. With the object choice compromised, it becomes displaced and is relocated internally
in the self, who then becomes a “replacement object” (Freud 1914/1957, p. 405) for other
Kernberg’s and Kohut’s insights about the organization of personhood, self-satisfying love and
of alienation from God, self and others, due to the Fall. Consequently, the
selfish self-preservation.
Pannenberg, Kernberg and Kohut all attest that narcissism includes a turning inward at
the expense of relating to other people. Kernberg and Kohut join their views with those of Ovid
and Freud, who all identify narcissism as various disruptions in receiving love that has become
introjected. In their conceptualizations they assert external objects (other people) are replaced by
the person whose love has turned inward on the self. Freud and Kernberg add aggressivity to this
inward love, which Kohut rejects and replaces with a personal self-satisfaction. Pannenberg,
identifies correspondence with Freud’s insights about infantile normal or primary narcissism and
therefore has connectivity with Kernberg and Kohut. Pannenberg also asserts that the ego as das
Ich implies it is the whole person who is turned inward orbiting around itself in a dreadful anx-
ious state of entfremdung, as well as an inordinate self-love (see Pannenberg 1971, p. 64f). This
is the miserable condition of each human being after the Fall: we do not trust God and fend for
our own security in sinful selfish self-preservation. Pannenberg articulates in theological lan-
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guage the supernatural features of narcissism that apply to some of the features of narcissism
So that my argument may further facilitate dialogue between Christian theological an-
self-love that Pannenberg, Kernberg and Kohut share. This will serve to further delimit my in-
For Pannenberg (1985, p. 87f; 1991, p. 17f; 1994, p. 2f; 1997, p. 2f.) Augustine is an au-
thoritative source in his doctrinal works on Christian anthropology. With Augustine, he asserts
3. Homo incurvatus in se (Latin for the human being bent back upon itself)
4. Restlessness
Pannenberg (1984) posits a direct correspondence between narcissism and Augustine’s two con-
The earliest form of the ego, that is the narcissistic pleasure ego as understood by
Freud, corresponds to the homo incurvatus in se and the amor sui of the theologi-
What Pannenberg here identifies as the ‘narcissistic pleasure ego understood by Freud’ is not the
infants’s natural request for love. Rather, it is the clambering demand of the ego infected with
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abnormal narcissism (ego is used here in Freud’s 1923 anthropology of id-ego-superego). But, as
will be shown below, the correspondence Pannenberg here observes, does not mean he is in
In the City of God, Augustine (413) offers a negative understanding of amor sui as “love
of self, even to the contempt of God” in contrast to amor Dei as “love of God, even to the con-
tempt of self” (p. 283). Pannenberg (1994) claims that personhood became deformed when hu-
man beings turned away from God at the Fall, resulting in an excessive focus on the self (p. 249).
But what was lost was not simply the self, but the humanness of the person, because only in rela-
tion to God is a human being authentically human. He also contends that self-love is primarily
immoderate and self-seeking (see Pannenberg 1991, p. 57), a claim supported by Bradley’s
(1978) clinical study indicating that all persons have a self-serving bias (p. 56).
Yet, Augustine claims there is an appropriate self-love which is not self-serving that cor-
responds to the biblical command to “Love your neighbor as yourself” (Lev. 19:18, Mt. 22:39,
Mk. 12:31 and Lk. 10:27). To love the other as the self is not the same as loving the other instead
of the self. Implied here is that loving another person is an empathic response based on internal
containment of genuine love. Augustine (413) addresses the lack of empathic responsiveness in
his observation that self-love may occur in varying degrees, and in its extreme may lead to the
And if some, with a vanity monstrous in proportion to its rarity, have become en-
moved or bent by no affection, such persons rather lose all humanity than obtain
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true tranquility. For a thing is not necessarily right because it is inflexible, nor
What Augustine describes as monstrous vanity, with an attendant lack of emotion and affection,
Kernberg (1975, p. 331) and Kohut (1971, p. 2) observe a lack of empathy in their clini-
cal assessments of patients with severe abnormal narcissistic disturbances. This lack of empathy
appears in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual V criteria
for identifying pathological narcissism. Kernberg and Kohut trace this lack of empathy in narcis-
sist disturbances and conclude it results from not having received loved. A person who has not
been properly loved cannot offer empathic genuine love to another. Therefore, part of the defini-
tion of narcissism includes the dichotomous features of having too much love for the self and re-
Kernberg (1975) claims there is a void left by “a simple lack of the normal course of de-
velopment toward object love” (p. 331) and Ronningstam (2005) adds that it is filled by the “si-
multaneous development of pathological forms of self-love” (p. 49). Kernberg (1975) notes this
void drives narcissistic disturbances to search for love (p. 331). However, the search for love is
hallmarked by internal anguishing emotions insofar that it is attended by depression and rage, the
two most common presenting issues that motivate a person with narcissistic disturbances to seek
professional help, as attested by Kernberg (2004, pp. 193-96, 29-33f ), Kohut (1971, pp. 16f, 22f
) and Ronningstam (2005, pp.85-88, pp.124-26). This anguishing search is not a natural seeking
of love in the otherness of another person, but in the painful awareness of ones personal need to
be loved. In lieu of a cohesive-self that grows in the warmth of another’s love (see Masterson
A THEOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROVISIONAL DEFINITION OF NARCISSISM Page !20
1988, p. 20; Johnson 1987, p. 45) a too little loved but prideful grandiose-self emerges from not
having been properly loved (see Ronningstam 2005, p. 78; Kohut 1977, pp. 24, 53-55).
Pannenberg (1985, p.107), Kernberg (1975, pp. 240-41) and Kohut (1977, p. 193) all
agree that psychological injuries, especially the failure to be loved, causes a disruption to the or-
ganization of human personhood, deciding the type and severity of narcissism that emerges.
However, Pannenberg alone asserts that there is nothing normal or natural about narcissism, be-
cause all our all our requests for love come from a fallen excessive focus on the self (Pannenberg
1994, p. 249). Therefore, I drop abnormal as a descriptor and add two features to my provisional
definition of narcissism: an unnatural state of receiving too little love and pride.
pleasure and withdraws from other people. This results in an organization of per-
sonhood shaped by internalized pride, hatred, anxiety, depression, and rage. Su-
pernaturally, it is a state of alienation from God, self and others due to the Fall.
But Kernberg and Kohut, along with others identified below, claim there is indeed such a thing
Kernberg (1975) asserts normal self-love is healthy, and enables a proper assessment of
ones good and bad qualities so these may be integrated into a realistic acceptance of the self (p.
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316). This self-love respects the genuine expression of seeking pleasure as both an internal need
that deserves satisfaction and a motivator for healthy relationships. Kohut’s healthy narcissism is
a self-love that seeks the satisfaction of the infant’s basic need for the warm affection of its
mother so that the child properly anticipates that legitimate needs shall be met when they arise.
When this type of healthy narcissism is repeatedly satisfied in childhood development, a proper
self-love anticipates receiving a loving response from others. But when loving responses are not
always given or received, internal tension is an appropriate reaction. This disruption of ones in-
ternal state, according to Kohut, is an appropriate disequilibrium to the self-love of healthy nar-
cissism. The self-loving response is to tolerate the unmet need and then, through relational mod-
eling with primary care givers, develop personal structures for resolving internal emotional dis-
ruptions. Such structures include giving validity to the need for love and reaching out to another
ing to Augustine (see below), it must be ascertained if the self-love is genuine (true) or disingen-
uous (false). For Augustine (413), a genuine and true self-love is part of the reality of God’s or-
dering of human relationships in creation. Such genuine self-love is a prerequisite for the “honest
love of husband and wife” (p. 268). Pannenberg’s anthropology upholds Augustine’s (413) claim
that there is “an order in which everything comes forth from God and strives to return to him” (p.
268). Anglican ethicist Oliver O’Donovan (1983) adds the insight that Augustine’s preferred way
of describing appropriate self-love is when it has been “set in order” by virtue of redemption in
Jesus Christ and God’s design in creation (p. 13). Augustine (413) continues to support the con-
cept of ordered love in statements such as: “There is no one who does not love himself; but one
A THEOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROVISIONAL DEFINITION OF NARCISSISM Page !22
must search for the right love and avoid the warped” (p. 268). Theologically, Pannenberg, Augus-
tine and O’Donovan all agree that love finds its proper order only when the human being is right-
Pannenberg (1985) argues that in the realm of nature there is an instinctual self-preserva-
tion and that supernaturally a God given self-love preserves human life because it is created ac-
cording to the Image of God (p. 147). He (1994) extends the category of self-preservation to the
realm of natural human relationships insofar as it serves the human need to relate the self to oth-
ers just as Kernberg and Kohut assert (p. 31, 52). But, this is not Ovid’s view of self-love in Nar-
cissus.
In Ovid’s Metamorphoses (AD 8) self-love leads to the destruction of both the self and
others. Of Narcissus, Ovid writes, he was “consumed in [self-love’s] hidden flame” (as translated
in Morford and Lenardon 1977, p. 217). Of the emotional destruction of the other, Echo’s long-
ing for Narcissus brought anger, resentment and grief for “the boy [she] cherished in vain” (ibid).
Conversely, Augustine asserts that because God has formed human beings, a yearning for God
remains even in a state of negative self-love. Augustine (413), therefore, does not hold the view
that negative self-love necessarily leads to complete self-destruction; moreover, he asserts “man
did not so fall away as to become absolute nothing” (p. 273). This statement by Augustine reads
like a counter argument to Ovid’s conclusion in Metamorphoses: where Narcissus becomes abso-
lutely nothing and is slowly “consumed in the hidden flame of self-love … Not even his body,
which Echo had once loved, was left,” (as translated in Morford & Lenardon 1977, pp. 216-217).
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Augustine’s Christian anthropology asserts that even the most narcissistic person is not
destined for nothingness. Quite the contrary, as Augustine’s famous dictum from The Confes-
sions (397) declares, “Thou has formed us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they find
rest in Thee” (p. 45). The very restlessness that could lead to nothingness might also lead to seek-
Many psychologists observe the features of emptiness and suicidality in pathological nar-
cissistic disturbances. Kernberg (1975, pp. 213-23; 2004, p. 67), Kohut (1971, p. 16;) and Ron-
ningstam (1999, p. 141) all identify restless empty boredom. Likewise, they all observe suicidali-
ty (Kernberg 2004, pp. 192-204; Kohut 1985, p. 180; Ronningstam 1998, pp. 159-80). Like Au-
gustine, they do not concur with Ovid’s mythic version of Narcissus that emptiness and suicide
are necessarily absolute end points. Hence, our provisional definition of narcissism expands to
pleasure and withdraws from other people. This results in an organization of per-
sonhood shaped by internalized pride, hatred, anxiety, depression, rage and empti-
from God, self and others due to the Fall. Consequently, the whole person is im-
Thus far the place of self-love in narcissism has been addressed as a natural phenomenon within
Freud’s classification of primary or normal narcissism. Kernberg and Kohut concur with Freud
and add that internal relational structures allow for the needs of self-love to be properly met
when normal narcissism loses its equilibrium. But Pannenberg criticizes Freud and questions if
his claims to libidinous and aggressive features of narcissism should be understood as normal
and natural in the first place. Pannenberg (1985) thus implicitly poses the question: Should
Freud’s observations of primary narcissism in early infancy be “considered normative” (p. 148)?
Pannenberg (1984) argues for two differentiated uses of the word nature in conjunction
with being human. First, he asserts human nature may mean our present sinful state as “under-
stood by the Christian theological tradition.” Second, human nature may mean who we are essen-
tially as persons created with an origin and “destiny of our being made according to the Image of
God” (p. 107). In questioning Freud’s claim that some narcissism is normal and natural, he asks,
“But even if human beings are in this [narcissistic] sense sinners by nature, this does not mean
that their nature as human beings is sinful” (ibid). Repeatedly in his works, Pannenberg asserts
that while narcissism is indeed a natural phenomenon (present state) in the human being, more
importantly it is an unnatural state, as God did not supernaturally create human beings with es-
sential narcissistic features. In other words, narcissistic features are an occupying presence in the
This is congruent with the Pauline claim in Romans 7:17b “that sin dwells within me.”
Sin is a foreign entity that occupies the human person, something that is operatively distinct from
the person in such a way that “it is no longer I who do it” (Rom 7:17a). In English, the Greek
εγω (transliterated ego) means I. Translators agree, the Greek εγω, like the German das Ich,
refers to the totality of the whole person. Pannenberg (1985) argues that the “I” mentioned in
Romans 7:17a is distinct from the Greek ἒσω άνθρωπον (transliterated eso anthropon) found in
Romans 7:22a, which he translates “inmost self” as does the Revised Standard Version of the
Bible.6 It is this “inmost self” that “delight[s] in God’s law” (Rom 7:22b). Therefore, he asserts,
[T]hat ‘inmost self’ is not to be equated with the ego [the entire person] of the
‘natural man.’ Rather it is the human person as seen in the light of that person’s
destiny to salvation in Christ. Seen in that perspective, the ego [the entire person-
hood] of the person I have been is profoundly different from what I now consider
myself to be, and yet it is identical. In identifying with an alienated personal past,
106).
The import is that ego (the whole self not the ego from Freud’s tripartite id-ego-superego), has
undergone a transformation by the saving work of Christ, causing the mobilization of the inmost
self (or true-self). Pannenberg is asserting that the true-self, hidden in the whole person, has its
6 Variously translated as ‘inward man’ King James Version (1611); ‘inner man’ New In-
ternational Version (1984, 2011); ‘inner self’ New Revised Standard Version (1989); and ‘inner
etiology in the alienated past (when its a priori existence at Creation was disrupted during the
Fall), not in this natural world alone. Thus, Pannenberg (1985) concludes, “[I]n the event of re-
generation according to Paul not only some quality of the subject but the subject itself is changed
(italics mine, p. 99).” This is a proclamation that salvation in Jesus Christ affects the whole per-
son, in such a way that to be a Christian constitutes an ontological change at the very core of our
humanity.
So, while agreeing with Kernberg and Kohut that we are born with some natural narcis-
sistic features, Pannenberg claims that because humans are made according to the Image of God,
these are not essential qualities of human nature according to God’s design. He is actually saying
something radical. Namely, that all narcissistic features are sinful and hence are an unnatural oc-
cupying presences in the human being, even in our natural earthly state. Therefore, from Pannen-
berg’s Christian anthropology and Kernberg and Kohut’s schools of object relations modalities, I
offer this final provisional definition of narcissism. It changes the definition of narcissism to a
natural earthly state, and adds it is not an essential feature of human beings created in the Image
of God. Rather, narcissism is an unnatural state of alienation from God, self and others due to
the Fall.
A THEOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROVISIONAL DEFINITION OF NARCISSISM Page !27
pleasure and withdraws from other people. This results in an organization of per-
restless alienation from God, self and others due to the Fall. Consequently, the
self-preservation.
God did not create us to have narcissistic features, and it is only because of the Fall that narcis-
sism is indeed a natural earthly state. God created us to be human beings. Pannenberg, Kernberg
and Kohut share a common goal: freeing a person to becoming fully human (also called ho-
Becoming Human: Pannenberg’s, Kernberg’s and Kohut’s Reason for Treating Narcissism
Pannenberg baptizes the term hominization and employs it theologically as the process of
becoming truly human. Joining his voice with philosophical anthropology, he asserts ‘we are not
yet [humans] but are daily becoming so’ (Pannenberg 1985, p. 44). In addition, he incorporates
into hominization the Christian theological claim that by virtue of a saving relationship with Je-
7 Narrowly defined within scientific empiricism, hominization means “the evolutionary develop-
ment of human characteristics” from Darwinian evolutionary theory (Merriam Webster, 2015).
A THEOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROVISIONAL DEFINITION OF NARCISSISM Page !28
sus Christ we become fully human by being propelled into our destiny of restoration to the Image
of God (ibid, p. 55). Pannenberg’s process of Christian hominization includes the supernatural
anticipatory promise of freedom and new life for which Jesus is the archetype on a natural and
Kernberg’s and Kohut’s object relations psychoanalytical schemata identify human de-
velopment as a gradual process, which includes successfully passing through the Freudian psy-
chosexual stages along with stages of cognitive development (Kernberg 1975, p. 267f; 1984, p.
211f; 2004, p. 79f; Kohut 1977, p. 228f; 1985, p. 130f). Kernberg claims his psychoanalytical
their personhood (1975, p. 314). According to Lowen (1985, p. xii) the goal of all therapy is the
Pannenberg, Kernberg and Kohut all understand personhood as organized within the stra-
tural assertions about Christian hominization easily converse with the natural process of homini-
treatment for narcissism extends beyond an interdisciplinary dialogue between psychology and
theology, as he asserts treatment for narcissism may be found through faith in Jesus Christ. The
orbit of the ego (the whole person) may be supernaturally changed from circulating itself by
being born anew in Jesus Christ. This causes the whole person to orbit around the Truine God.
Only then is a person positioned to genuinely become human person with a true-self. But this
Pannenberg asserts that after the supernatural power of regeneration in Christ emancipa-
tes the true-self, that the Christian community is the context for the continued emergence of that
self. From that community, the supernatural durable relationship with Jesus Christ is nurtured
vis-a-vis baptism, discipleship and receiving the Lord’s Supper. Moreover, Christian common
life in the church is the meeting point for establishing natural durable relationships with other
Christians (Pannenberg 1984, p. 47). For Pannenberg, the Lord’s Supper does not exist for the
subjective (e.g. egocentric) private needs of the individual person, but as the celebration of be-
longing to God and other believers in the Kingdom of God (ibid. p. 35). He asserts that conversi-
on, baptism, the Lord’s Supper and common life in the Kingdom of God, spiritually effects the
continued ontological mobilization of the hidden true-self previously imprisoned in sin since the
Fall (ibid, p. 100). This is attested to in Romans 6:4, “We were buried therefore with him by bap-
tism into death, in order that, just as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father,
we too might walk in newness of life.” The true-self in Christ is free to enter into his or her des-
tiny of restoration into the Image of God, so as to become fully human, like the resurrected
Christ.
What Pannenberg, Kernberg and Kohut all agree upon is that restoration of our genuine
humanity can only occur when both normal and abnormal narcissistic features are properly ad-
dressed. Such an undertaking is nothing less than the reordering of our personhood — the ardu-
ous journey of becoming human. For Pannenberg, such a journey can only be accomplished
through a saving union with Jesus Christ. For Kernberg and Kohut, such a journey is facilitated
As stated at the onset of this paper, the goal of constructing this provisional definition of
the phenomenological state of narcissism is to provide Christian therapists and pastoral care-
givers compassionate understanding into our fallen human nature. It is my hope that in reading
this paper, the subject of narcissism has been dislodged from a clinical context and brought into a
humanizing conversation with the Christian Gospel. Narcissism, as you have read here, has since
the time of Augustine been equated with sin. While not all sin is narcissism, all narcissism may
be considered as sinful, as a feature of the fallen human condition. From a natural viewpoint,
narcissism may result from sin committed against a person, such as neglecting to love a helpless
infant asking for care. It may be a reaction to sin done against a person, when powerful emotions
such as hatred and anger lash out toward others. Supernaturally, narcissism is the sin of pride,
when in choosing self over God, we became infected with inordinate self-love, alienation and
became incurved on ourselves. Therefore, a first step in treating a person with narcissistic distur-
bances may occur when, perhaps forced out of alienation, pride must be swallowed and seek help
Very often it is the effects of a disturbing occurrence (e.g. divorce, job loss, legal trou-
bles, complicated grief, etc.) that thrusts a person with narcissistic disturbances into a pastor’s or
therapist’s office. Ronningstam repeatedly refers to such an occurrence as a corrective life event
(Ronningstam 1995; 1998; 2005; 2011). Two corresponding Christian concepts are a severe mer-
cy and remedial suffering: these are God-ordained trials which facilitate healing. It is hard to ac-
cept, but the Bible clearly states there are times when we suffer “according to God’s will” (1 Peter
4:19). A golden opportunity for compassionate care is now present, as this suffering person, who
otherwise might not have sought-out help is doing so now — a bridge out of alienation is built. A
A THEOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROVISIONAL DEFINITION OF NARCISSISM Page !31
word spoken into the lonely grinding anxious center that is surely tormenting this human being
just might disrupt their ego (their whole self) from orbiting around itself. At the right moment, an
invitation into the reconciling presence of Jesus Christ offers supernatural help. If taken, this
person shall find a new orbit for their whole personhood, around the Triune God, resulting in his
or her restless heart finding rest in Him. And from there, the promise of becoming human, like
Beloved, we are God's children now, and what we will be has not yet appeared;
but we know that when he appears we shall be like him, because we shall see him
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