Progress in Development Studies 14, 3 (2014) pp.

299–308


Historicizing the state in
development theory: Michael
Mann’s model of social power
Jessica R. Hawkins
Institute for Development Policy and Management,
School of Environment, Education and Development,
University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

Abstract: Michael Mann seeks to explain the nature of power and its effects on the development of
the state. His work has had a considerable impact within the field of macro-historical sociology, but
has primarily been applied to Western case studies. This article builds upon an emerging literature
that considers the expediency of using this lens to examine developing countries. It analyzes how
the framework of social power can be used to provide a historical analysis of the reach, origins and
effects of state power within developing countries. Through a consideration of Mann’s historiog-
raphy, the article demonstrates the value of his social power framework for development theory.

Key words: Michael Mann, social power, development theory, history, state power

This article discusses the value of using
a framework of social power in order to
examine the mechanisms of state power
in developing countries. In particular, the
paper demonstrates that Michael Mann’s
historiographic model can be used to
understand the ways developing states have
organized social power. His framework
focuses on relations between four networks
of power—political, ideological, economic
and military—and is a means for explaining
social change and the development of a state.
Mann’s work has predominantly focused on
Western cases, but he has asserted that the
framework can explain social change within
any social situation (Mann, 1986). Thus far, it
has only been used to analyze a small number
of developing countries (see, for example,
Chen 2008; Lange 2009; Mann 2005; see
also a special issue of Studies in Comparative
International Development, 2008), with most
examples focusing on political power. This
article contends that Mann’s combination
of the nomothetic theorizing of sociology
with historically grounded evidence not only
adds to theoretical understandings of state
development, but also contributes a much
needed historical dimension to development
theory. This article is organized into two
parts. The first section examines the historical
contribution which Mann’s framework can
make, addressing the ahistorical position

© 2014 Sage Publications 10.1177/1464993414521333

300 Historicizing the state in development theory
which much of the development literature
takes. The second section considers how the
model can historicize one particular aspect of
development theory, state power, by focusing
on its political and military dimensions.
I History and development theory
Mann’s model is a ‘history and theory of
power relations in human societies’ (Mann,
1986: 1) combining historical idiosyncrasy
with sociological theory. Using four distinct,
but interrelated, networks of power, it is
a means of exploring dynamics amongst
groups within or between states. The basic
premise rests on the idea that ‘societies
are constituted of multiple overlapping and
intersecting sociospatial networks of power’
(Mann 1986: 1, emphasis author’s own).
However, across societies and over time,
there may be more extremes of each power
type, described by Mann as the ‘messiness’
of societies (Mann, 1986: 4). By analyzing a
society’s history through such dimensions, we
can see how people, materials and territories
have been organized and controlled. This
gives greater insight into understanding how
countries came to be what they are today.
As such, Mann uses the framework to look at
how the networks of power are employed by
a variety of actors within societies in order for
them to achieve their own or collective goals.
Building on previous work applying his model
to non-Western cases, this section of the
article concentrates on the benefits a historical
sociology framework of this type can have for
development theory (Chen, 2008; Jacoby,
2004a; Lange, 2009; Lucas, 1998).
A use of Mann’s macro-historical socio-
logical framework responds to calls not only
for greater macro-theorization (Mohan and
Wilson, 2005), but also for history to be taken
into account in development discourse. It is,
for instance, necessary to resist ‘monocausal
explanations’ of development that offer scant
regard for the heterogeneity of developing
states’ formation. Here, there are obvious
benefits in combining general nomothetic
Progress in Development Studies 14, 3 (2014) pp. 299–308
theorizing with historical empiricism (Booth,
1992: 4; Vandergeest and Buttel, 1988:
684–86). This point has been elaborated thus:
The heterogeneity and diversity of the out-
comes of social change have to be explained,
and this inevitably leads to the relevance of
historical studies documenting them. Specific
cases of actual development trajectories...
may not seem amenable to formulating the
broad general views of possible world orders
which are so alluring to development theory,
but they can lead to the formulation of
grounded theory which builds upon observa-
tion. (Van Donge, 1995: 283)
Jean-Philippe Platteau, for instance, uses
a variety of disciplines to increase interdisci-
plinarity, forging research agendas which have
‘remained insufficiently investigated’ (Platteau,
1994: 537). A more recent study focuses
specifically on the importance of history and
an engagement with the work of historians
for our understanding of development. The
introduction states,
That judicious efforts to ‘think in time’ – i.e.,
to take seriously the scholarly research that
specializes in disentangling complex inter-
dependent processes as they have played
themselves out in particular contexts across
decades and even centuries – are a desirable
and potentially fruitful basis on which to try to
enhance the quality of the responses to some
of the contemporary world’s most urgent
policy problems. (Woolcock et al., 2011: 7)
Indeed, there has been an emerging critique
that scholars need to not only acknowledge
the historical processes underlying and
framing their research, but that they should
also actively engage with history to inform
theoretical approaches to development
(Bernstein, 2006; Hickey, 2009). Within
thinking on poverty reduction, for example,
there is a clear need to consider the ‘underlying
processes’ of development and gain a deeper
understanding of social change from a historical
perspective (Hickey, 2009: 480–81).
Despite this, a search of journal databases
reveals that there are only a small number

of articles in each development-orientated
publication which have contained the words
‘history’, ‘historical’ or ‘historiography’ within
their titles since 1995. Table 1 shows this by
comparing the numbers with the total article
output for the same period of time. For
example, over 17 years, it is only Third World
Quarterly which has more than 20 instances
of both history and historical within article
titles; however, this only culminates in 2 per
cent of the total output. World Development,
which has the highest output over the period,
reveals only a 0.4 per cent of articles which fall
into these title categories. In another example,
the UK’s Development Studies Association
conference, held jointly with the European
Association of Development Research and
Training Institutes at the University of York
in 2011 consisted of 56 panels and working
groups. One session, organized by the History
and Economic Development Study Group,
consisting of a general discussion on the
development economist Arthur Lewis, along
with two other separate individual papers,
demonstrated the total extent of history
focused presentations at this event. The two
previous DSA conferences in 2009 and 2010,
although shorter in duration, did not yield
any papers or discussion groups on this topic.
Although these examples do not account for
Table 1 Number of instances of selected words in article titles between January
1995 and June 2012
Journal title Total number of articles
Development 1,408
Development and Change 1,125
Journal of Development 822
Studies
Journal of International 2,027
Development
Progress in Development 625
Studies (Established in 2001)
Third World Quarterly 1,124
World Development 2,740
Source: Author’s own elaboration.
Progress in Development Studies 14, 3 (2014) pp. 299–308
Jessica R. Hawkins 301
those papers which contain historical content,
this evidence does present a rough portrait of
the level of historical output in development
orientated forums.
The evidence and data presented indicate
on a more general level that the study of devel-
opment as ‘geographically uneven, profoundly
contradictory set of historical processes’ has
been sidelined in the literature (Hart, 2001:
650). As Mann’s framework of social power
uses the past to understand contemporary
dynamics, his method can be employed as
a tool to redress such marginalization. As he
puts it, his ‘historical–causal analysis of origins
considers the conditions which gave rise to
modern institutions relevant to understand-
ing their present nature and likely persis-
tence’ (Mann, 1994: 39, emphasis author’s
own). In other words, his approach brings a
level of analysis to research which can help
explain how societies have worked in the past
and how they have come to be structured.
These can ensure that our understanding of
development is extended beyond merely the
analysis of interventions in poor countries
and associated policy questions (Bernstein,
2006; Cowen and Shenton, 1996; Kothari,
2005).
Employing the social power framework uses
secondary sources to form an understanding
History Historical Historiography
5 1 0
9 3 0
4 1 0
7 2 0
1 0 0
13 12 1
8 3 0
302 Historicizing the state in development theory
of how societies change. This forges a direct
link with the work of historians, enriching the
‘quality of scholarship and policy responses’
through expanding the amount of material
available to the researcher (Woolcock et al.,
2011: 4). Further, the use of history brings
to the fore the importance of context.
Mann’s model uses historical data in place of
‘a priori assumptions’ to draw out the links
between the actions of individuals and the
cultural circumstances, demonstrating that it
is only possible to understand social change
fully through the thorough employment of
empirical, historical data (Jacoby 2004a:
407–08). Consequently, this methodology
is of use for development theory through
its ability to enhance our understanding of
the structures which underpin development
processes (Kanbur, 2011). In addition, Mann’s
framework of social power, through its reliance
upon history, is not prescriptive. It accounts
for the uniqueness of individual states yet,
due to its focus on four networks of power, it
can be applied to different countries without
dictating a prescribed route of development,
thereby escaping the ‘dirty worlds of practical
policy-making’ (Corbridge, 2007: 202).
II Social power and the state
Mann’s approach to social power looks
specifically at the workings of the state.
By territorially bounding and administering
regulations and coercion, the state holds
political power, which, in turn, leads to a
greater control over the other power relations
in society. When state elites accomplish this
without routine negotiation or legitimacy
from their society, then this form of political
power is despotic (Mann, 1984). Conversely,
if a state can implement its actions throughout
its territory, whilst concurrently penetrating
civil society groups who in turn legitimate
or halt these actions, then it is organising
infrastructural power (Mann, 1984). Through
the use of these dimensions, measured over
a period of time, it is possible to see how the
state tries to organize its society and the other
Progress in Development Studies 14, 3 (2014) pp. 299–308
power relations within it. Moreover, it enables
an evaluation of how non-state actors can
challenge the power of the state. This section
of the article looks at these aspects and shows
how Mann’s model can provide a historical
analysis of state capacity.
Development research has outlined a
number of characteristics of high capacity states,
including economic growth, democratization,
citizenship and social welfare (Besley and
Persson, 2007; Soifer and vom Hau, 2008;
vom Hau, 2012). In order to achieve these, the
state needs to effectively employ the resources
which it has available to it. As Linda Weiss
points out, such an infrastructural capacity
can be thought of as the ability to ‘devise and
implement policies that augment a society’s
investible surplus, as opposed to merely
redistributing existing resources’ (Weiss,
1998: 5). This ‘captures both the organisational
and relational qualities of states’ and traces
the methods through which states implement
control and execute policies (vom Hau, 2012: 4).
State capacities, within the development
discourse can therefore inform us about the
extent of the state’s social and spatial reach
and provides a tool for assessing the strength
of a state (Soifer and vom Hau, 2008). Apart
from a few notable exceptions (Bräutigam
et al., 2008; Lange, 2009), the development
studies literature on state capacity remains
comparatively ahistorical. General accounts
focus on the measures which should be taken
in order to produce developmental outcomes
when faced with contemporary challenges
such as liberalization and globalization
(Jayasuriya, 2004; Robinson, 2008). Mann’s
notion of infrastructural power is a conceptual
framework which breaks down an analysis
of state capacity through a historical lens;
providing a technique to understand how the
state penetrates social life and ‘implement[s]
logistically political decisions throughout the
realm’ whilst concurrently acting out the
demands of its citizens (Mann, 1984: 113).
From this perspective, his framework
focuses on measureable variables which

concentrate on an assessment of the ‘resources
at the disposal of the state for exercising
control over society and territory’ (Mann,
1993; Soifer, 2008: 236). By considering the
ways in which central elites attempt to extend
state power over a period of time, processes
of state formation are made prevalent. The
analysis of the measurable variables changes
depending upon the era, the demands of
the state and the demands of its citizens. In
his work on Western state development,
Mann points to a number of processes which
contribute to increased state capacity. First,
a ‘division of labour between the state’s main
activities which it co-ordinated centrally’;
second, an increase in literacy, enabling
messages to be communicated throughout
the state; third, the development of coinage,
weights and measures; and fourth, an increase
in speed of the transmission of messages and
transport of people and resources (Mann,
1984: 192). These measures contribute
specifically to general state capacities, namely,
the formation and growth of the bureaucracy
and judicial apparatus (for example, property
rights and rule of law), the means to collect
revenue and an increase in legitimacy. In
the form of measureable variables, such as
the numbers of administrative personnel,
police officers, judges; the size of the army
or labour available to the state; money spent
on welfare policies; or the amount of tax
collected, these dimensions can be transposed
to a historical analysis of the developing
state to gauge the trajectory of its capacity
(Mann, 1993: 389, 444).
Of these, ‘the most analytically relevant
resource’ should be used for ‘measurement
purposes’ (Soifer, 2008: 237). In the past five
years, there has, for instance, been increasing
reference to the role of taxation in developing
countries (Bräutigam, 2008; DFID, 2009;
Di John, 2006; Therkildsen, 2008). Although
it has been acknowledged by international
development bodies that taxation can no
longer be seen as just a technical exercise,
there remains considerable uncertainty
Progress in Development Studies 14, 3 (2014) pp. 299–308
Jessica R. Hawkins 303
regarding why developing countries have
‘“tax handles” that allow them to tax, but
they do not seem able to utilize these handles
fully’ (Alm et al., 2006: 8; DFID, 2009; GTZ,
2006). While acknowledging that there is ‘no
simple road to better (or bigger) taxation in
developing countries’ (Bird, 2010: 3), policy
recommendations remain rooted in current
European practice (Damme et al., 2008).
There is thus a need to address the historical
roots of taxation and to take into account the
contexts which may affect its implementation.
Using Mann’s detailed comparative account of
the types of revenue collection which different
states were able to implement during the
nineteenth century and the reasons thereof
may help to fill the gaps in this regard (Mann,
1993: 381–89). By carefully analyzing the
regime types and the methods deployed,
he has been able to assess the strength of state
infrastructural power in each country in the
years leading up to World War I. However,
his analysis goes further by situating revenue
collection alongside other measurable variables
which increased state capacity during this
period. He tracks the amount of non-military
expenditure, such as education, post offices
and the telegraph, which not only had a huge
impact on literacy throughout these countries,
but also ‘extend[ed] material and symbolic
communications’ throughout the territory
(Mann, 1993: 380).
There has been limited, recent scholarship
which has applied a historical analysis of state
capacity. Works from New Institutional
Economics have taken a historical approach
to the creation of institutions, with a particular
focus on property rights (Acemoglu and
Johnson, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2001). Mann’s
concept of infrastructural power provides
greater scope for investigating how these
are built or hindered. It is a multidimensional
concept which incorporates combinations of
resources that can draw a picture of a state’s
political power over time. It can, for instance,
help to ensure that analyses of colonial legacies
‘expand beyond property right enforcement
304 Historicizing the state in development theory
and recognize the multifaceted ways in
which states affect developmental processes’
(Lange, 2009: 198). It also offers a more holistic
way of understanding the role of security in
the development of state power. For some,
any study which endeavours to provide an
explanation for the way in which developing
countries behave, must have security at its
heart (Ayoob, 1995). Indeed, the notion of
securitisation has certainly become a central
feature of the macro-policy discourse from
Western donors and agencies over the last
20 years (Duffield, 2007). Debates have
focused on the causality question of insecurity
and civil wars in the developing world, by
concentrating on ideas of either communal
differences (such as ethnic, national or
religious), the consequences of globalization,
or the ‘failed state’ (Dannreuter, 2007).
These tend to emphasize the importance of
stability in providing a basis for the extension
of a state’s infrastructural power and its claim
to hold the monopoly over military power
(Gros, 1996; Herbst, 1996/7; Jackson, 2002;
Migdal, 1988).
In theorizing this claim, Mann deviates
from traditional sociological theory which,
following Weber, tends to assume that political
power and the use of coercion and force are
the combined basis of state action. Defining
military power as ‘the social organization of
concentrated lethal violence’, he argues that
‘[t]o equate physical force with the state
often seems to make sense in the case of
modern states which monopolize military
force. However, conceptually they should
be regarded as distinct’, as ‘[p]olitical powers
are those of centralized, institutionalized,
territorial regulation; military powers are
of organized physical force wherever they
are organized’ (Mann, 1986: 11; 2006: 351,
emphasis author’s own). It is certainly clear
that military groups can be wholly separate
from the state, in some cases working against
it, or organizing resistance from within.
Mann demonstrates this distinction in his
analysis of the military revolution between the
Progress in Development Studies 14, 3 (2014) pp. 299–308
fifteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe
(Mann, 1986: 453–58). The advancement
made in military technology changed the
political structure of Europe and gave rise to
a putative state system. Prior to this, military
power was held by a variety of actors: lords,
vassals, mercenary groups, often acting
independently of what may have been deemed
as the central, political authority. In another
case, he reveals how a disintegration of the
hold on political power by the Hutu MRND
(National Revolutionary Movement for
Democracy), led to a rise in patron-linked,
but independently acting, paramilitaries in
Rwanda prior to the coup which preceded
the genocide in 1994. The import of over half
a million machetes from China, which were
distributed amongst Hutu adults, further
added to the loss of the organization of military
power by the MRND. Concurrently, the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), constituting of
Rwandan Tutsis, was building up an army and
advancing from the Northeast of the country,
challenging the power of the Hutu state
(Mann, 2005: 428–48).
There is, therefore, an ‘unassailable
argument’ in Mann’s theoretical thinking for
the partition of political and military networks
of power (Schroeder, 2006: 12). It can be
used to provide a historical assessment of the
use of violence by state and non-state actors,
combining an analysis of political, ideological
and economic organization of power at the
same time. Therefore, in some societies, it is
possible to see how military power has been
monopolized by the state and its actions curbed
according to law, however, in other instances,
this network of power may have surpassed
or been used to challenge the political power
of the state, enabling independent military
elites to possess substantial social power over
others. As Mann elaborates, in many African
cases ‘institutionalized, law-governed political
power yields to the arbitrary violence of
military power’ (Mann, 2008: 364). A model
which conceptualizes military power as a
separate dimension to that of the state can

thus enable scholars to go beyond a perception
that ‘security matters arise primarily out of
internal and external processes by which
human communities establish and maintain
(or fail to maintain) machineries of government’
(Buzan et al., 1998: 49).
This allows us to theorize more richly both
the reasons why militarized action may attempt
to gain control over political, ideological or
economic power relations and the possible
consequences of such endeavours. First, the
obvious ability of state elites, to construct
or deconstruct conceptions of security
within a state through their ability to deploy
communication techniques far superior to
those of their citizens can be better understood
through a more fully theorised account of the
distribution of social power within society
(Buzan et al., 1998). These debates can be
added to by accounting for the trajectories of
history, looking at how some manage to gain
certain powers in society and others do not
(McDonald, 2008), thereby explaining regional
variations and why security issues arise in some
contexts on a national and sub-national level.
In his consideration of ethnic cleansing cases,
Mann not only uses his model to understand
the deep-rooted power-relations which have
led to these events, but also examines the
ways in which political elites use ideological
power in the preceding moments of violence
to change, perpetuate or invent these histories
(Mann, 2005).
This has implications for the literature
on civil wars and its focus on the short-
term causes of civil conflict (Collier, 2009:
231; also see Collier, 2006). Works from a
rational choice and neo-classical economics
perspective emphasise the pay-offs which
accrue to individuals through the waging of
violence and the opportunities presented
to rebels causing them to instigate violent
conflict (Nathan, 2005). Little is committed
to a consideration of the long-term, historical
and political economy causes of intrastate
war (Hoeffler, 2012: 188). As Chris Cramer
asks, ‘why must it be accepted that social
Progress in Development Studies 14, 3 (2014) pp. 299–308
Jessica R. Hawkins 305
phenomena are best apprehended through
individual rational choice (and a very narrow
notion of rationality) rather than relational
rationality and social and historical constraints
on choice?’ (Cramer, 2002: 1850). Mann’s
model focuses on these structural constraints,
confirming the role of agency, but also
acknowledging that the decision to organize
military power in opposition to the state ‘are
influenced by and operate very much within
specific conditions and social and historical
features of change’ (Cramer, 2002: 1857).
As he has shown in the case of Rwanda, the
model of social power focuses on networks
of power, how they interlink and how people
in society attempt to use them to reach their
goals. Through an analysis which distinctly
separates military power from political power,
a historically focused account can be portrayed
which looks at the broader structures affecting
actors in society over a period of time. Not only
does this analysis overcome the short-termism
of rational choice perspectives but it also opens
up a debate on the extent to which the state
and non-state actors can affect the stability
and security of a society.
III Conclusion
This article has advocated the use of a
historical approach to development, specifically
when examining state power, utilising a
framework of social power in order to do
this. First, the paper presented the ways in
which the framework can answer some of
the criticisms which development theory
has received regarding previous ahistorical
approaches. Second, the benefits of using the
framework have been documented through an
analysis of discussions about state capacity in
the development discourse, highlighting how
a historical sociology approach can enhance
thinking in this area. There is little doubt
that such an approach can add a greater
depth to development theory in explaining
how societies have functioned, changed
and developed through the actions of the
state or non-state actors. Further, historical
306 Historicizing the state in development theory
investigation provides explanations for states’
current forms. Through the application of
primary or secondary data, the trajectory
of a country’s development can be teased
out, providing a much needed historical
dimension to the study of developing states.
Mann’s model of infrastructural power opens
up a space for a multifaceted and longitudinal
examination of state capacity. For example,
measurable variables such as the number
of law enforcers, courts or administrative
personal can provide clues about the state’s
ability to project its power across society,
which consequently could have an effect on
its capability to introduce or maintain taxation,
property rights and education. Furthermore,
Mann’s separation of political and military
power provides a method to assess how a
state’s capacity and ability to ensure stability
can be challenged by looking at the role of
state and non-state actors and how they have
been able to organize military power in the
past and present. This includes the numbers of
armed men which they have at their disposal,
the types of weapons and quantities, and the
ways in which they attempt to organize power
relations around them.
Using the social power model in part (Lange,
2009; Lange and Balian, 2008; Schensul, 2008;
Slater, 2008; vom Hau, 2008), or in full (Chen,
2008; Jacoby, 2004b), scholars are seeing
the benefits of employing this framework
for research on states in development. The
combination of historical and sociological
theorizing with multidimensional variables of
analysis provide a useful tool for understanding
how actors organize social power in society,
accounting for instances of social change when
power relations intersect and change. In all,
Mann’s framework of social power offers much
for the study of development as a historical
process.
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to Tim Jacoby and two
anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier
drafts of this paper. I also thank Annie Rowling
Progress in Development Studies 14, 3 (2014) pp. 299–308
and Jackie Reilly-Romo for proofreading
this paper.
References
Acemoglu, D. and Johnson, S. 2005: Unbundling
institutions. Journal of Political Economy 113, 949–95.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A. 2001:
The colonial origins of comparative development:
An empirical investigation. The American Economic
Review 91, 1369–401.
Alm, J., Martinez-Vazquez, J. and Rider, M. 2006:
Thinking about tax reform in the emerging global
economy. In Alm, J., Martinez-Vazquez, J. and
Rider, M., editors, The challenges of tax reform in a
global economy. Springer Science+Business Media,
Inc., 3–10.
Ayoob, M. 1995: The Third World secuity predicament:
State making, regional conflict, and the international
system. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Bernstein, H. 2006: Studying development/development
studies. African Studies 65, 45–62.
Besley, T. and Persson, T. 2007: The origins of state
capacity: Property rights, taxation, and politics. NBER
Working Papers 13028. National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Bird, R. 2010: Taxation and development. Poverty
Reduction and Economic Management Network.
The World Bank.
Booth, D. 1992: Social development research: An agenda
for the 1990s. The European Journal of Development
Research 4, 1–39.
Bräutigam, D. 2008: Introduction: Taxation and state-
building in developing countries. In Bräutigam, D.,
Fjeldstad, O.-H. and Moore, M., editors, Taxation
and state-building in developing countries: Capacity and
consent. Cambridge University Press, 1–33.
Bräutigam, D., Fjeldstad, O.-H. and Moore, M.,
editors 2008: Taxation and state-building in developing
countries: Capacity and consent. Cambridge University
Press.
Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and De Wilde, J. 1998: Security:
A new framework for analysis. Lynne Rienner.
Chen, Y.-Y. 2008: Asian developmental states,
autonomous power and the IEMP model. Paper
presented at Political Studies Association Annual
Conference – Democracy, Governance and Conflict:
Dilemmas of Theory and Practice. Swansea.
Collier, P. 2006: War and military expenditure in
developing countries and their consequences for
development. The Economics of Peace and Security
Journal 1, 10–13.
——— 2009: The political economy of state failure.
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 25, 219–40.
Corbridge, S. 2007: The (im)possibility of development
studies. Economy and Society 36, 179–211.

Cowen, M. and Shenton, R. 1996: Doctrines of
development. Routledge.
Cramer, C. 2002: Homo economicus goes to war:
Methodological individualism, rational choice and
the political economy of war. World Development
30, 1845–64.
Damme, L., Misrahi, T. and Orel, S. 2008: Taxation
policy in developing countries: What is the IMF’s
involvement? DV406 Consultancy Project. The
Bretton Woods Project.
Dannreuter, R. 2007: War and insecurity: Legacies of
Northern and Southern state formation. Review of
International Studies 33, 207–326.
DFID 2009: Why tax matters for international
development and what DFID is doing about it.
Briefing note.
Di John, J. 2006: The political economy of taxation and
tax reform in developing countries. WIDER Research
Paper, 74.
Duffield, M. 2007: Development, security and the unending
war: Governing the world of peoples. Polity Press.
Gros, J.G. 1996: Towards a taxonomy of failed states
in the new world order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia,
Rwanda and Haiti. Third World Quarterly 17, 455–72.
GTZ 2006: Nachhaltige Staatsfinanzierung durch
Good financial governance. Deutsche Gesellschaft
für Technische Zusammenarbeit [Sustainable public
sector financing through good financial governance].
Hart, G. 2001: Development critiques in the 1990s:
Culs de sac and promising paths. Progress in Human
Geography, 25, 649–58.
Herbst, J. 1996/97: Responding to state failure in Africa.
International Security 21, 120–44.
Hickey, S. 2009: The politics of protecting the poorest:
Moving beyond the ‘anti-politics machine’? Political
Geography 28, 473–83.
Hoeffler, A. 2012: On the causes of civil war. In
Garfinkel, M.R. and Skaperdas, S., editors, Oxford
handbook of the economics of peace and conflict. Oxford
University Press, 179–204.
Jackson, R. 2002: Violent internal conflict and
the African state: Towards a framework of
analysis. Journal of Contemporary African Studies
20, 29–52.
Jacoby, T. 2004a: Method, narrative and historiography
in Michael Mann’s sociology of state development.
Sociological Review 52, 404–21.
——— 2004b: Social power and the Turkish state. Frank
Cass Publishers.
Jayasuriya, K. 2004: The new regulatory state and
relational capacity. Policy and Politics 32, 487–501.
Kanbur, R. 2011: Commentary: Why might historians
matter for development policy? In Bayly, C.A., Rao,
V., Szreter, S. and Woolcock, M., editors, History,
historians and development policy: A necessary dialogue.
Manchester University Press, 117–21.
Progress in Development Studies 14, 3 (2014) pp. 299–308
Jessica R. Hawkins 307
Kothari, U. 2005: From colonial administration to
development studies: A post-colonial critique of the
history of development studies. In Kothari, U., editor,
A radical history of development studies: Individuals,
institutions and ideologies. Zed Books, 47–61.
Lange, M. 2009: Lineages of despotism and development.
The University of Chicago Press.
Lange, M. and Balian, H. 2008: Containing conflict
or instigating unrest? A test of the effects of state
infrastructural power on civil violence. Studies in
Comparative International Development 43, 314–33.
Lucas, J. 1998: The tension between despotic and
infrastructural power: The military and the political
class in Nigeria, 1985–1993. Studies in Comparative
International Development 33, 90–113.
Mann, M. 1984: The autonomous power of the state: Its
origins, mechanisms and results. Archives Européennes
de Sociologie 25, 185–213.
——— 1986: The sources of social power volume I: A history
of power from the beginning to A.D. 1760. Cambridge
University Press.
——— 1993: The sources of social power, Volume II: The
rise of classes and nation–states, 1760–1914. Cambridge
University Press.
——— 1994: In praise of macro-sociology: A reply to
Goldthorpe. The British Journal of Sociology 45,
37–54.
——— 2005: The dark side of democracy: Explaining ethnic
cleansing. Cambridge University Press.
——— 2006: The sources of social power revisited:
A response to criticism. In Hall, J.A. and Schroeder,
R., editors, An anatomy of power: The social theory
of Michael Mann. Cambridge University Press,
343–96.
——— 2008: Infrastructural power revisited. Studies in
Comparative International Development 43, 355–65.
McDonald, M. 2008: Securitization and the construction
of security. European Journal of International Relations
14, 563–87.
Migdal, J.S. 1988: Strong societies and weak states:
State–society relations and state capabilities in the Third
World. Princeton University Press.
Mohan, G. and Wilson, G. 2005: The antagonistic
relevance of development studies. Progress in
Development Studies 5, 261–78.
Nathan, L. 2005: ‘The frightful inadequacy of most of the
statistics’: Causes of civil war. Crisis States Discussion
Papers. Crisis States Research Centre.
Platteau, J.-P. 1994: Behind the market stage where
real societies exist—Part 1: The role of public and
private order institutions. Journal of Development
Studies 30, 533–77.
Robinson, M. 2008: Hybrid states: Globalisation and the
politics of state capacity. Political Studies 56, 566–83.
Schensul, D. 2008: From resources to power: The
state and spatial change in post-apartheid Durban,
308 Historicizing the state in development theory
South Africa. Studies in Comparative International
Development 43, 290–313.
Schroeder, R. 2006: Introduction: The IEMP model and
its critics. In Hall, J.A. and Schroeder, R., editors, An
anatomy of power: The social theory of Michael Mann.
Cambridge University Press, 1–16.
Slater, D. 2008: Can leviathan be democratic?
Competitive elections, robust mass politics, and
state infrastructural power. Studies in Comparative
International Development 43, 252–72.
Soifer, H. 2008: State infrastructural power: Approaches
to conceptualization and measurement. Studies in
Comparative International Development 43, 231–51.
Soifer, H. and vom Hau, M. 2008: Unpacking
the strength of the state: The utility of state
infrastructural power. Studies in Comparative
International Development 43, 219–30.
Soifer, H. and vom Hau, M., editors, 2008: Revisiting
state infrastructural power – Special edition. Studies
in Comparative International Development 43.
Therkildsen, O. 2008: Taxation and state-building
with a (more) human face. DIIS Policy Brief:
Progress in Development Studies 14, 3 (2014) pp. 299–308
Fragile Situations. Danish Institute for International
Studies.
Van Donge, J.K. 1995: Development theory, the
problem of order and history of the ‘longue durée’.
Journal of Development Studies 32, 282–88.
Vandergeest, P. and Buttel, F.H. 1988: Marx, Weber
and development sociology: Beyond the impasse.
World Development 16, 683–95.
vom Hau, M. 2008: State infrastructural power and
nationalism: Comparative lessons from Mexico
and Argentina. Studies in Comparative International
Development 43, 334–54.
——— 2012: State capcity and inclusive development: New
challenges and directions. ESID Working Paper No. 02.
Effective States and Inclusive Development.
Weiss, L. 1998: The myth of the powerless state: Governing
the economy in a global era. Polity Press.
Woolcock, M., Szreter, S. and Rao, V. 2011: How
and why history matters for development policy. In
Bayly, C.A., Rao, V., Szreter, S. and Woolcock, M.,
editors, History, historians and development policy.
Manchester University Press, 3–38.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission.