Not only does Hassan Abbas, a professor at the National Defense University in

Washington DC, provide an incisive peek behind the scenes of the Afghan
Taliban leadership, but he also offers in his book optimistic hope for the future
of the movement internationally maligned for its hard-line and suppression of
females.
“The Taliban today have huge numbers of young men born after 9/11 and the
US invasion — they have grown up in a different world than their seniors,”
Abbas writes. “….when the senior hardliners start to die out, the question is
whether the younger men of today, who adore their mobile phones and desire a
relationship with the outside world — when they grow fatigued of the famine
and global isolation — will slowly end the Taliban as we know it.”
But Abbas, of course, is unsure. “Perhaps the issue at heart is our naive
optimism,” he writes after noting: “Only time will tell what the new fate-creators
will do with their pens — one can only hope they will write in the language of
peace and poetry, not the dogma, strife, and sorrow of yesterday’s hands.”
The value of Abbas’s narrative is his description of the fractious Taliban factions,
the leadership, and the backstage machinations for power.
“The Taliban are a fractious bunch,” Abbas writes. “….Not to the point of
provoking fractures (at least yet) but more so rivalries that in turn create
conflicts….There is…a growing sense of jealousy and competition within the
Taliban inner circle….reminiscent of the Italian Mafia”
Abbas breaks down the factions into five categories: first, moderates like those
who negotiated with the United States at Doha; second, the Quetta Shura –
“hardliners and old guard”; third, field commanders “those fighting on the
ground”; fourth, “notorious organized criminal groups made up of drug
dealers”; fifth, ordinary villagers who “found themselves without much choice in
‘joining ‘ the Taliban.”
Abbas claims that faction rivalry kept the leadership in doubt after the Taliban
took Kabul and were ready to rule until the arrival in Kabul of Lt. Gen. Faiz
Hamid, head of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence. “Only under the iron fist
of the ISI chief could widening internal divisions be put aside and quarrels
resolved, one would assume,” Abbas writes.
Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada rose to the top as supreme leader, similar to the
position in Iran. “A giant among the Taliban”, Abbas labels him, “rigid” about his
religion, with an interpretation of Islam that “differs greatly from that of the
majority of Muslims worldwide.” His son died as a suicide bomber, a somber
strategy Hibatullah encourages, writes Abbas, who also notes the supreme
leader does not know how to use a mobile phone.
Abbas claims that Hibatullah is under the influence of a “hardline faction,” three
clerics from the city of Kandahar, “who continue to promote bigotry.” He
identifies them as chief justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani, minister for religious
affairs Noor Mohammed Saqib and minister for the promotion of virtue and the
prevention of vice Mohammed Khalid Hanafi. They apparently persuaded
Hibatullah to ditch an agreement at Doha with the Americans that females
would be allowed to attend school and work.
“There is no sermon of the Prophet nor any verse in the Quran that claims
women are to be prohibited from attending schools,” Abbas writes. “….The
contrast between the truth of actual Islamic teaching and the Taliban’s actions
could not be more extreme.”
The mention of the Pakistan ISI chief is only one of a number of references
throughout the book illuminating Pakistan’s dealings with the Taliban, especially
its efforts to get cooperation to end the hostility of the Pakistan Taliban, known
as the TTP. “The Afghan Taliban so far have only helped Pakistan halfheartedly
in pursuing the TTP as the two groups have enjoyed a mutually beneficial
relationship for a long time,”Abbas writes.
Abbas refrains from discussing the United States role during the 20-year war in
Afghanistan but notes “the US-Taliban peace deal of February 2020 enabled and
empowered the Taliban in a major way….The Taliban were soon to emerge as
the sole arbiter of Afghanistan’s destiny.” He writes gently about Zalmay
Khalilzad, an Afghan-born ethnic Pathan who led the American negotiating team
with the Taliban.
“Zal, to be fair to him,” writes Abbas, “had truly managed to make the idea of
negotiating with Taliban work — he was likely the best choice to be in that role.
While some place blame on him for giving in to Taliban demands, it is not likely
the Taliban would have gone that far in negotiations with any other
American….he looked like them”
“Despite their dysfunction and intense internal rivalries,” Abbas concludes, “the
Taliban’s grip on the steering wheel is not about to loosen any times soon….
“….We are not going anywhere with current US policy toward Afghanistan…The
best way to promote and protect international interests, for the sake of stability
in Afghanistan, and for it not to turn into a hub of terrorism again, is to start by
scrapping the moral lecture. Then to proceed with structured engagement that
involves direct communication with Taliban leaders….”
Whether one agrees or not with Abbas’s conclusion, his book is an informative,
invaluable asset for understanding the Taliban.