INTERNAL MOOT COURT – 1

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AISHWARYA COLLEGE OF EDUCATION

(DEPARTMENT OF LAW)

LLB Ist Year

(Session 2022-2023)

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IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

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Writ Petition (Civil) No. 373/2006
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PETITIONERS :- Young Lawyers Association & Ors.
Versus
RESPONDENTS :- State of Kerala & Ors.
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WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE UNDER
ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
AND
IN THE MATTER OF PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
JUSTICE, FAIR PLAY, EQUITY AND GOOD
CONSCIENCE

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

S.No. Table of Contents Page No.

1. List of Abbreviations 3-4

2. List of Authorities 5-6

3. Statement of Jurisdiction 7

4. Summary of Facts 8-9

5. Statement of Issues 10

6. Summary of Arguments 11-12

7. Arguments Advanced 13-25

8. Prayer 26

9. Affidavit in support of petition 27

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 LIST OF ABBREVIATION

& And

¶ Paragraph

AC Appeal Case

AIR All India reporter

Anr. Another

BOMLR Bombay Law Reporter

Crl. LJ Criminal Law Journal

Cr.P.C. Code of Criminal procedure

Govt. Government

HC High Court

Hon’ble Honourable

i.e., That is

IPC Indian Penal Code

KLT Kerala Law Times

Ors. Others

p. Page

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Sec. Section

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCALE Supreme Court Almanac

SCW Supreme Court Weekly

UP Uttar Pradesh

u/s Under Section

V. Versus

Vol. Volume

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 LIST OF AUTHORITIES
A. TABLE OF CASES :
S.No. Case Title Citation
1. Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta And Ors V. A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 51
Commissioner Of Police, Calcutta And Anr.
2. Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam V. (2016) 2 S.C.C. 725
Government Of Tamil Nadu And Anr.
3. Ambalavana Pandara Sannidhi V. Meenakshi A.I.R. 1936 All 186
Sundareswaral Devastanam
4. Bijoe Emmanuel & Ors. V. State Of Kerala & (1986) 3 S.C.C. 615
Ors.
5. Dr Subramanian Swamy V. State Of Tamil Nadu (2014) 5 S.C.C. 75
6. Durgah Committee V. Syed Hussain Alid 1962 (1) S.C.R. 283
7. Jankijee Deities V. State Of Bihar A.I.R. 1999 S.C.W.
1878
8. Nallor Marthandam Vellalar And Ors V. The A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 4225
Commissioner, Hindu Religious And Charitable
Endowments And Ors
9. Pramatha Nath Mullick V. Pradyumna Kumar (1925) 27 BOMLR
Mullick 1064
10. Radha Kanta Deb V. Commissioner. Of Hindu (1981) 2 S.C.C. 226
Religious Endowments
11. Raja Bira Kishore Deb V. State Of Orissa A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1501
12. Rambrahma V. Kedar (1922) 30 C.L.J. 478
13. Ratiala Panachand Gandhi V. The State Of A.I.R. 1954
Bombay S.C. 388
14. Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb V. The A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 853
State Of Bombay
15. Seshammal & Ors. Etc. V. State Of Tamil Nadu (1972) 2 S.C.C. 11
16. S.P. Mittal V. Union Of India (1983) 1 S.C.C. 51
17. Sri Venkataramana Devaru And Ors V. The State A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 255
Of Mysore And Ors

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 18. State Of Rajasthan And Ors V. Shri Sajjanlal A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 706
Pajawat And Ors.
19. The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madhya 1957 A.I.R. 832
Pradesh & Bhopal V. Sodra Devi
20. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious 1954 S.C.R. 1005
Endowments, Madras V. Sri Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar Of Sri Shirur Mutt
21. Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj V. State Of A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1638
Rajasthan
22. Vidya Varuthi Thirthia Swamigal V. Baluswami (1922) 24 BOMLR
Ayyar 629
23. Yogendra Nath Naskar V. Commissioner Of 1969 (3) S.C.R. 742
Income-Tax, Calcutta

B. JOURNALS :
1. Mahendra Pal Singh, V N Shukla’s Constitution of India (13th edition
2019)
2. M Lakshmikant, Indian Polity (5th Edition 2017)
2. M.P Jain, Indian Constitution Law (6th Ed. Reprint 2012, Lexis Nexis
Butterworth Wadhwa, Nagpur)

C. DATABASE REFERRED :
1. https://www.scconline.com/
2. https://www.indiankanoon/
2. https://www.legalservicesindia/
3. https://www.lawoctopus.com

D. STATUTE :
1. The Constitution of India
2. The Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry)
Act, 1965
3. The Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980

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 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The petitioner have approached the Supreme Court of India under Article 32 of
The Constitution of India, 1950. The respondent humbly submits to the
jurisdiction of this Hon’ble court.

ARTICLES 32 READS AS UNDER :-

32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part.—(1) The

right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.

(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs,
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo
warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement
of any of the rights conferred by this Part.

(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses
(1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise
within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable
by the Supreme Court under clause (2).

(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as
otherwise provided for by this Constitution

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 SUMMARY OF FACTS

For the convenience of this Hon’ble Court the facts of the present case are
summarized as follows :

I. Located in the Periyar Tiger Reserve in the Western Ghat Mountain Ranges
of Pathanamthitta district of Kerala, the Sabarimala Temple is visited by
lakhs of pilgrims all year round. Pilgrims trek the Neelimala to reach the
shrine, which has eighteen sacred steps, to worship Lord Ayyapa after
undergoing strict religious vows for forty- eight days.

II. The temple is dedicated to Lord Ayyapa also known as Dharma Sastha.
According to belief he is the son of Shiva and Mohini, the feminine
incarnation of Vishnu. The temple is maintained by the Travancore
Devasom Board.

III. It has a selective ban on women of menstruating age i.e between ten and
fifty entering the temple so as to uphold the respect towards the celibate
nature of the deity. In 1991, the Kerala High Court had passed a judgment
legalizing the ban and forbidding women from entering the temple. It
further held that the restriction was in accordance with the usages which
have been followed from time immemorial and are not discriminatory. The
reasons put forward by the Temple Authorities are that Lord Ayyapa is a
Naishthika Brahmmachari (one who has vowed to remain celibate) and that
it is not possible for women to put up with the physical hardship, austerity
and days of celibacy like men. They also claim to be a religious
denomination and subsequently, the right to decide the rules and
regulations of the temple.

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IV. The Sabarimala Tantri performs the purification ceremony whenever the
rules are violated. In 2006, astrologer, P. Unnikrishna Panicker conducted
a devaprasnam at the temple and found signs of a woman having entered
the sanctum sanctorum. Soon after this, Kannada actor Jayamala claimed
to have entered the temple in 1987 and having touched the shrine. In 2011
the last purification ceremony was performed after a 35 year old woman
had managed to climb the Pathinettam Padi.

V. In the written statement/reply that follows it is explained that this cannot

be considered as discrimination on the basis of sex. These are customs and
rituals that have been followed since time immemorial and is not anti-
Hindu or unconstitutional. Further, being a religious denomination the
Temple Authority has the right to lay down the guidelines. Under such
circumstances the Respondents seek a direction from Supreme Court to
uphold the religious sanctity of the temple and honor the distinctive
celibate nature of Lord Ayyappa.

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 STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. DOES THE PRESIDING DEITY OF THE SABARIMALA TEMPLE,

LORD AYYAPPA, HAVE RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION? IF
YES, CAN THE PETITIONER’S RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 25(1)
TRUMP THE RIGHTS OF THE DEITY UNDER ARTICLE 25(1), 26
AND 21? ALSO, WHAT IS THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARTICLES
14, 15(3), 17, 25(1), 25(2)(B) AND 26(B) OF THE CONSTITUTION?
SPECIFICALLY, CAN AN INDIVIDUAL CITE RIGHTS UNDER
ARTICLE 25(1) TO ASSERT THE RIGHT TO IGNORE THE
TRADITIONS OF THE TEMPLE WHICH ARE PROTECTED UNDER
ARTICLE 26(B)?

2. DOES THE TEMPLE FALL UNDER THE DEFINITION OF A

RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION BELONGING TO A RELIGIOUS
DENOMINATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 26? IF YES,
DOES THE PUBLIC CHARACTER OF THE TEMPLE BELONGING
TO A RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION DEPRIVE IT OF ITS
DENOMINATIONAL CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENT
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 26?

3. CAN THE LANGUAGE OF THE NOTIFICATION BY THE

TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD WHICH BARS ENTRY OF
WOMEN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 AND 50 BE USED AS A
STRAW MAN TO STRIKE DOWN RULE 3(B) OF THE KERALA
HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP (AUTHORIZATION OF
ENTRY) RULES, 1965 OR TO CONCLUDE THAT THE
BASIS/PRINCIPLE OF THE IMPUGNED RELIGIOUS PRACTICE IS
DISCRIMINATION AND HENCE UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

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 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. DOES THE PRESIDING DEITY OF THE SABARIMALA

TEMPLE, LORD AYYAPPA, HAVE RIGHTS UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION? IF YES, CAN THE PETITIONER’S RIGHTS
UNDER ARTICLE 25(1) TRUMP THE RIGHTS OF THE DEITY
UNDER ARTICLE 25(1), 26 AND 21? ALSO, WHAT IS THE
INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARTICLES 14, 15(3), 17, 25(1), 25(2)(B)
AND 26(B) OF THE CONSTITUTION? SPECIFICALLY, CAN AN
INDIVIDUAL CITE RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 25(1) TO ASSERT
THE RIGHT TO IGNORE THE TRADITIONS OF THE TEMPLE
WHICH ARE PROTECTED UNDER ARTICLE 26(B)?

Deity of the temple has a legal personage under Indian law, which has been
recognized in several judgements by several High courts prior to 1947 and
by this Hon’ble Court post 1947. Lord Ayyappa too has the character of a
juristic person under Hindu Law.

2. DOES THE TEMPLE FALL UNDER THE DEFINITION OF A

RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION BELONGING TO A RELIGIOUS
DENOMINATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 26? IF
YES, DOES THE PUBLIC CHARACTER OF THE TEMPLE
BELONGING TO A RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION DEPRIVE IT
OF ITS DENOMINATIONAL CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENT
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 26?

The Fundamental requirements of religious denomination are:

(a) A spiritual organisation

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 (b) A common bond; and
(c) The existence of unique practices which flow from its beliefs.

Each of these requirements is fulfilled by the Sabarimala Temple and its

devotees.

3. CAN THE LANGUAGE OF THE NOTIFICATION BY THE

TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD WHICH BARS ENTRY OF
WOMEN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 AND 50 BE USED AS A
STRAW MAN TO STRIKE DOWN RULE 3(B) OF THE KERALA
HINDU PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP (AUTHORIZATION OF
ENTRY) RULES, 1965 OR TO CONCLUDE THAT THE
BASIS/PRINCIPLE OF THE IMPUGNED RELIGIOUS PRACTICE
IS DISCRIMINATION AND HENCE UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

It does not in any manner affect the legality and constitutionality of Rule 3
of the Kerala Hindu places of public worship (Authorization of Entry)
Rules 1965 or section 3 of the Kerala Hindu places of public worship
(Authorization of Entry) Act 1965 since the objective underlying these
provisions is to protect the religious diversity and traditions of the Temples
in Kerala, which is effectively a restatement of Article 26

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 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE-I

DOES THE PRESIDING DEITY OF THE SABARIMALA TEMPLE,

LORD AYYAPPA, HAVE RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION? IF
YES, CAN THE PETITIONER’S RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 25(1)
TRUMP THE RIGHTS OF THE DEITY UNDER ARTICLE 25(1), 26 AND
21? ALSO, WHAT IS THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN ARTICLES 14, 15(3),
17, 25(1), 25(2)(B) AND 26(B) OF THE CONSTITUTION?
SPECIFICALLY, CAN AN INDIVIDUAL CITE RIGHTS UNDER
ARTICLE 25(1) TO ASSERT THE RIGHT TO IGNORE THE
TRADITIONS OF THE TEMPLE WHICH ARE PROTECTED UNDER
ARTICLE 26(B)?

The question of whether a Hindu Deity can be a juristic person or not was decided
by Privy Council in the case Vidya Varuthi Thirthia Swamigal v. Baluswami
Ayyar.

On the question of the legal personality of the Hindu Deities, Ameer Ali remarked
on page 126: “Under the Hindu law, the image of a deity of the Hindu pantheon
is, as has been aptly called a ‘juristic entity,’ vested with the capacity of receiving
gifts and holding property.”

A similar conclusion was reached by Lord Moulton in the Privy Council decision
in Ambalavana Pandara Sannidhi v. Meenakshi Sundareswaral Devastanam,
where His Lordship pointed out that the general trustee is only a representative
of the idol who is a juridical personage, and who is true owner.

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1. The Deity of the Temple has a legal personage under Indian law.

1.1. It is humbly submitted that the Deity of the temple has a legal
personage under Indian law, which has been recognized in several
judgements by several High courts prior to 1947 and by this Hon’ble
Court post 1947. Among the earliest judgements to recognize this
position in the Judgement of the Bombay High court in Pramatha
Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick.

1.2. A useful narrative of the concrete realities of the position is to be

found in the judgement of Mukherji J. in Rambrahma v. Kedar (p-
483):

“We need not describe here in detail the normal type of continued
worship of a consecrated image, the sweeping of the temple, the
process of smearing, the removal of the previous day’s offerings of
flowers, the presentation of fresh flowers, the respectful oblation of
rice with flowers and water, and other like practices. It is sufficient
to state that the deity is, in short, conceived as a living being and is
treated in the same way as the master of the house would be treated
by his humble servant. The daily routine of life is gone through with
minute accuracy; the vivified image is regaled with the necessaries
and luxuries of life in due succession, even to the changing of
clothes, the offering of cooked and uncooked food, and the
retirement to rest”

1.3. The said position was endorsed and reiterated by this Hon’ble Court
in Yogendra Nath Naskar v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Calcutta.
Also in the case of The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Madhya
Pradesh & Bhopal v. Sodra Devi, Bhagwati J. pointed out as
follows:

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 “the word “individual” has not been identified in the Act and there
is authority, for the proposition that the word ‘individual’ does not
mean only a human being but is wide enough to include a group of
persons forming a unit. It has been held that the word ‘individual’
includes a corporation created by a statue, e.g., a University or a
Bar Council, or the trustees of a baronetcy trust incorporated by a
Baronetcy Act”

1.4. The said position was again endorsed in 1999 by this Hon’ble Court
in Ram Jankijee Deities v. State of Bihar. Then again in another
judgment by Indian Supreme Court in the case of Radha Kanta Deb
v. Commissioner. Of Hindu Religious Endowments, a Hindu idol
was recognized as a Juristic Person.

1.5. Therefore, it is evident from the above that judgements that Lord
Ayyappa too has the character of a juristic person under Hindu Law
as recognized this Hon’ble Court. Consequently, the Deity enjoys
rights as a person under Article 25(1), 26 and 21. The Deity as the
owner of his Abode enjoys the right to privacy under Article 21,
which includes the right to preserve his celibate form and the
attendant restricts that apply to him under his vow of Naisthika
Brahmacharya. It is the will of the Deity which is being preserved
by the Temple through the traditions it observes, which the object of
Article 26 is effectively.

1.6. Finally, the Deity has the right to follow his Dharma, like any other
person under Article 25(1) and the State is duty bound to protect his
faith

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2. Interplay between Articles 14, 15(3), 17 25(1), 25(2)(b) and 26(b) of the
Constitution

2.1. It is humbly submitted that The Shirur Mutt decision10 makes it

abundantly clear that while Article 26 is subject to the reformative
lever provided to the Executive under Article 25(2)(b), nowhere
does it hold that the right of religious denominations under Article
26(b) are subservient to rights under Article 25(1). In fact, while
rights under Article 26(b) are subject to Article 25(2)(b), rights
under Article 25(1) are subservient to Article 26.

2.2. The consequence of rendering rights of denominations under Article

26 subservient to Article 25(1) would lead to the following
consequences:

(a) If a Temple has a practice of Strictly not allowing non-

vegetarian food to be offered or distributed as Prasad within
its premises, a lone individual could trump that practice by
citing his rights to offer non-vegetarian food as Prasad to the
Deity or distribute non-vegetarian food to devotees within the
Temple.

(b) It would be possible for a Muslim to distribute food and

alcohol, which is not considered halal, to devout Muslims
within a Mosque.

(c) It would be possible for a Sikh to offer Prasad laced with

tobacco and non-jhatka meat at a Gurudwara.

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 (d) In context of the Sabarimala Temple, it would be possible for
Hindu men who do not observe the 48-day vow, to also claim
a right of entry and worship at the Temple.

Clearly, not only would the religious beliefs and practices of

religious institutions be infringed by an untrammelled
exercise of Article 25(1), it would also affect the rights of
observant devotees and faithful under Article 25(1), which is
precisely what seshammal judgement11 addresses.

2.3. In the absence of being able to demonstrate discrimination on the

basis of gender, it is not possible to cite Article 15(3) to trump rights
under Article 26 and the rights of observant devotees under Article
25(1).

2.4. Since the impugned religious practice of the Sabarimala Temple is

based on the eternally celibate character of the presiding Deity, and
not on notions of menstrual impurity unlike the position of the
trustees of the Haji Ali Dargah, there is no evidence of
discrimination which has been placed before the Court for the Court
to be able to invoke the remedial mechanism under Article 15(3) or
25(2)(b).

3. The reliance by the petitioner on the prohibition against

untouchability under Article 17 is a desperate and baseless attempt to
overcome the hurdles posed by the settled law on Articles 25(1),
25(2)(b) and 26.

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 3.1. It is humbly submitted that Article 17 has no application legally
since it specifically applies only to the practice of untouchability
based on caste or religion, not gender, which is evident from the
promulgation of the protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955.

3.2. To expand the scope of the above mentioned provision to include

the impugned religious practice in Sabarimala is to ignore the
legislative history of the Article.

3.3. Further, to read Article 17 to cover the restrictions imposed by the

Section and rule under challenge, it is first necessary for the
petitioner to demonstrate that the framework of Articles 25 and 26
is, at the first instance, insufficient to resolve the question of the
constitutionality of the impugned religious practice.

3.4. There is no evidence to suggest that the impugned religious practice

is based on gender-based untouchability or notions of impurity
associated with the physiological process of menstruation.

3.5. On the contrary, the impugned religious practice is based solely on

the eternally celibate nature of the Deity at the Temple.

Therefore, the reliance on Article 17 holds no water

ISSUE-II

DOES THE TEMPLE FALL UNDER THE DEFINITION OF A

RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION BELONGING TO A RELIGIOUS
DENOMINATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 26? IF YES,

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DOES THE PUBLIC CHARACTER OF THE TEMPLE BELONGING TO
A RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION DEPRIVE IT OF ITS
DENOMINATIONAL CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENT
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 26?:

In a pluralistic society comprising of people with diverse faiths, beliefs and

traditions, to entertain PILs challenging religious practises followed by any
group, sect or denomination, could cause serious damage to the Constitutional
and secular fabric of this country12.

1. The definition of religious denomination under Article 26.

1.1. It is humbly submitted that The Constitution does not itself define a
religious denomination and therein lies the wisdom of the makers of
the Constitution. The absence of the definition itself is an indication
that the Constitution makers discouraged a rigid, fixed and
mechanical approach to the concept and definition of a religious
denomination.

1.2. This is because, in their wisdom, they were aware of the limitations
in prescribing the boundary conditions or contours of what
constitutes a religious denomination for all times to come, given this
country’s immense appetite for innovation and ingenuity in religion
and spirituality.

1.3. Therefore, to deny the status of a religious denomination to the

Sabarimala Temple and the devotees of Lord Ayyappa merely
because they defy the conventional notions of religious

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 denominations, is to defeat the very object of the absence of
definition.

1.4. In fact, the sheer uniqueness of the Sabarimala Temple, its history
and the practices associated with the Temple, make it a fit case for
treatment as a religious denomination.

1.5. The Fundamental requirements of religious denomination are:

(d) A spiritual organisation

(e) A common bond; and

(f) The existence of unique practices which flow from its beliefs.

Each of these requirements is fulfilled by the Sabarimala Temple

and its devotees.

1.6. Therefore, the Sabarimala Temple is a denominational Temple

under Article 26 and enjoys rights under Article 26. Had this not
been the case, it is possible to kill the very idea of a religious
denomination by taking a philosophical approach that all paths lead
to the same divinity. However, such an approach would defeat the
constitutional mandate of Article 26, which is to protect the distinct
nature of each path.

2. The Sabarimala Temple fulfil the characteristic of Denominational

Character.

2.1. It is humbly submitted that Several Supreme Court Judgements have

laid down the tests to qualify as a religious denominations under
Article 26. For example, the Constitution Bench in S.P. Mittal v.

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 Union of India13, this Court upheld the constitutional validity of the
Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1980. (para 80) puts it thus:

“The word ‘religious denominations’ in Article 26 of the

Constitution must take care colour from the word ‘religion’ and if
this be so, the expression ‘religious denomination’ must also satisfy
three conditions:
(a) It must be a collection of Individuals who have a system of
beliefs or doctrines which they regard as conductive to their
spiritual well-being, that is, a common faith;
(b) Common organisation; and
(c) Designation by distinctive name”

2.2. For the reasons elaborated in part-I above, it is submitted that

Sabarimala clearly satisfies these Constitutional tests.

2.3. Religious Maths, religious sects, religious bodies, sub sects etc. or
“any section thereof” have been repeatedly held to be a religious
denominations:

(a) Commissioner Hindu Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra

Thirtha Swaminar of Sri Shirur Mutt (followers of Ramanuja,
known as Vaishanabas; also Madhwacharyas; etc. held to be
religious denominations; see para 15)

(b) Durgah committee v. Syed Hussain Ali (para 13) (holding the
Chishtia Sect of Muslim to be religious denomination).

(c) Dr Subramanian Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu (paras 1, 3 4,

5 to 7, 10, 12, 24, 31, 32, 34, 37, 49, 70) (holding that podhu
Dikshitars (smarthi Brahmins) administering a Temple
dedicated to Lord Natraja in the State of Tamil Nadu qua
Sabanayagar Temple at Chidambaram are a denominational
Temple entitled to the protection of Article 26(2)(b) of the
Constitution. This judgement also usefully summarizes the
entire relevant law in this regard at one place.

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 (d) As a religious Denomination, the Sabarimala management
would also fall under the proviso to section 3 of the Kerala
Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act,
1965, read with the rules of 1965 made thereunder especially
Rule 3 and Rule 5(3)(iii) thereof.

2.4. On the basis of this Hon’ble Court’s judgement in Raja Bira Kishore
Deb v. State of Orissa17, The Kerala High Court concluded that
devotees of Lord Ayyappa constitute a religious denomination,
wherein it was held that the identity of a religious denomination
consist in the identity of its doctrines, creeds and tenets and these are
intended to ensure the unity of the faith which its adherents profess
and the unity of the religious views are the bonds of the union which
binds them together as one community.

2.5. The finding of the Hugh Court is consistent with the law laid down
in this regard by this Hon’ble Court in the Following judgements:

(a) The commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v.

Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (para
15).
(b) Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Ors v. The State of Mysore
and Ors (para 14).
(c) The Durgah committee, Ajmer and Ors v. Syed Hussain Ali
and Ors (para 24)
(d) Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay
(para 61)
(e) Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan
(para 5)
(f) State of Rajasthan and Ors v. Shri Sajjanlal Pajawat and
Ors23 (para 35)
(g) SP Mittal v. Union of India (para 12-23, 21)

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 (h) Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta and Ors v.
Commissioner of Police, Calcutta and Anr (para 11)
(i) Nallor Marthandam Vellalar and Ors v. The Commissioner,
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments and Ors.
(para 8)
(j) Dr Subramanian Swamy v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors
(k) Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam v. Government of
Tamil Nadu and Another

2.6. Given the distinct identity of the Temple, the traditions it subscribes
to and the clear makers of identity which devotees have to observe
as Lord Ayyappa devotees during the period of observance of the
vow and the visit to the Temple, there can be no denying the fact that
Ayyappa devotees do in fact constitute a religious denomination foe
the purpose of Article 26.

2.7. The right to manage religious affairs cannot be abridged by any law.
These principles were established in the Ratiala Panachand Gandhi
v. the State of Bombay.

2.8. A Temple even if it a public place of worship does not lose its status
as the abode of Deity, which is the very significance behind the act
of consecration or prana pratishtha.

2.9. Therefore, it is the will of the Deity expressed in the form of tradition
that shall apply to the conduct of Devotees who have no regard for
the traditions of the Temple and the beliefs underlying such
traditions.

2.10. The rights of the Deity as the master of his abode have been
recognized by this Hon’ble Court in several Judgements.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

23
 2.11. Therefore, the limited consequence of the public character of the
Temple is to allow to all Hindus who abide by the rules of the owner
of the Abode, namely the Deity.

ISSUE-III

CAN THE LANGUAGE OF THE NOTIFICATION BY THE

TRAVANCORE DEVASWOM BOARD WHICH BARS ENTRY OF
WOMEN BETWEEN THE AGES OF 10 AND 50 BE USED AS A STRAW
MAN TO STRIKE DOWN RULE 3(B) OF THE KERALA HINDU
PLACES OF PUBLIC WORSHIP (AUTHORIZATION OF ENTRY)
RULES, 1965 OR TO CONCLUDE THAT THE BASIS/PRINCIPLE OF
THE IMPUGNED RELIGIOUS PRACTICE IS DISCRIMINATION AND
HENCE UNCONSTITUTIONAL?

It is evident that the object of the age limit specified by the Travancore Devaswom
Board notification is to give fuller effect to the impugned religious practice.

1. It does not affect the legality and constitutionality of Rule 3 of the

Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry)
Rules 1965 or Section 3 of Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship
(Authorization of Entry) Act 1965.

1.1. It is humbly submitted that even it is accepted that the age limit
specified by the Travancore Devaswom Board is arbitrary for being
inexact in its coverage of women entering menarche i.e. it falls to
take into account women who enter menarche under age of 10 and

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

24
 could continue to have reproductive capabilities beyond the age of
50, it can, at best, open then notification to challenge for this reason.

1.2. This still does not lead to rendering the principle behind the
notification illegal or unconstitutional.

1.3. Further, it does not in any manner affect the legality and
constitutionality of Rule 3 of the Kerala Hindu places of public
worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules 1965 or section 3 of the
Kerala Hindu places of public worship (Authorization of Entry) Act
1965 since the objective underlying these provisions is to protect the
religious diversity and traditions of the Temples in Kerala, which is
effectively a restatement of Article 26.

1.4. Simply stated, nothing stops the Devaswom Board from issuing a
letter-worded fresh notification under Rule 3(b) if the existing
notification is to be struck down.

1.5. The impugned religious practice is not based on any notions on

menstrual impurity or misogyny. The practice has clear, direct,
essential and integral nexus to the celibate nature of the very Deity
of the temple and to the worship of the Deity.

1.6. Therefore, the legality and constitutionality of Rule 3 and section 3

must not be viewed through the straw man prism of notification, and
must be judged independent of the notification since the notification,
at best, fails to capture the spirit of the impugned religious practice.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

25
 PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, it is therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may
graciously be pleased to declare that:

1. The presiding deity of the Sabarimala temple, lord Ayyappa has a legal
personage.
2. The presiding deity of the Sabarimala temple, lord Ayyappa, have rights
under the constitution.
3. Temple fall under the definition of a religious institution belonging to a
religious denomination within the meaning of article 26 and have full right
to maintain its own affairs under Article 26(b).
4. Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu places of public worship (authorization of
entry) rules, 1965 which derives its power from the Kerala Hindu places of
public worship (authorization of entry) Act, 1965 is constitutionally valid.
5. Pass any other order, other order that it deems fit in the interest of Justice,
Equity and Good Conscience.
And for this act of kindness the Petitioner as is duty bound shall humbly pray.

(TARA RAM)
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

26
 IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
***
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 373/2006
***
PETITIONERS :- Young Lawyers Association & Ors.
Versus
RESPONDENTS :- State of Kerala & Ors.
***
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)
***
I, Pratik Jain, aged about 55 years, presently working as Head (Legal),
Government of Kerala, Kerala, India, do hereby take oath in the name of God and
state as under:-

1. That I am the officer in charge in this case and am well conversant with
the facts and circumstances of the case.

2. That the annexed petition has been drafted by the counsel as per my
instructions. I have carefully gone through the contents thereof and have
also understood the same fully well.

3. That the averments regarding facts contained in the annexed petition are
true and correct to my knowledge based on official record of the
respondent. The legal submissions made therein are based on legal
advice, which I believe to be true.

DEPONENT
VERIFICATION:
I, Pratik Jain, the above-named deponent solemnly affirm and verify that
the contents of my above affidavit are true and correct to my knowledge. Nothing
has been concealed therein and no part of it is false. SO HELP ME GOD.

DEPONENT

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

27
 VAKALATNAMA
IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. _______/2023

Young Lawyers Association & Ors.

VERSUS
State of Kerala & Ors.

Defendant/Respondent/Accused KNOW ALL to whom these presents shall come that I/we, Pratik Jain,
aged about 55 years, presently working as Head (Legal), Government of Kerala, Kerala, India.

hereby appoint TARA RAM Advocate

(herein after called the advocate/s) to be my/our Advocate in the above noted case authorized him :- To act,
appear and plead in the above-noted case in this Court or in any other Court in which the same may be tried
or heard and also in the appellate Court including High Court subject to payment of fees separately for each
Court by me/ us.
To sign, file verify and present pleadings, appeals cross objections or petitions for execution review, revision,
withdrawal, compromise or other petitions or affidavits or other documents as may be deemed necessary or
proper for the prosecution of the said case in all its stages.
To file and take back documents to admit and/or deny the documents of opposite party.
To withdraw or compromise the said case or submit to arbitration any differences or disputes that may arise
touching or in any manner relating to the said case.
To take execution proceedings. The deposit, draw and receive money, cheques, cash and grant receipts
thereof and to do all other acts and things which may be necessary to be done for the progress and in the
course of the prosecution of the said case.
To appoint and instruct any other Legal Practioner, authorizing him to exercise the power and authority
hereby conferred upon the Advocate whenever he may think it to do so and to sign the Power of Attorney
on our behalf.
And I/We the undersigned do hereby agree to ratify and confirm all acts done by the Advocate or his
substitute in the matter as my/our own acts, as if done by me/us to all intents and purposes.
And I/We undertake that I / we or my /our duly authorized agent would appear in the Court on all hearings
and will inform the Advocates for appearance when the case is called.
And I /we undersigned do hereby agree not to hold the advocate or his substitute responsible for the result
of the said case. The adjournment costs whenever ordered by the Court shall be of the Advocate which he
shall receive and retain himself.
And I /we the undersigned do hereby agree that in the event of the whole or part of the fee agreed by me/us
to be paid to the Advocate remaining unpaid he shall been titled to withdraw from the prosecution of the said
case until the same is paid up. The fee settled is only for the above case and above Court.
I/We hereby agree that once the fee is paid. I /we will not be entitled for the refund of the same in any case
whatsoever. If the case lasts for more than three years, the advocate shall be entitled for additional fee
equivalent to half of the agreed fee for every addition three years or part thereof.IN WITNESS WHEREOF
I/We do hereunto set my /our hand to these presents the contents of which have been understood by me/us
on this … day of ……., 2023.
Accepted subject to the terms of fees.

Advocate Client

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

28